2021 IL App (2d) 200497-U 

No. 2-20-0497 

Order filed February 19, 2021

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re A.T., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of Winnebago County. 

) 

) No. 16-JA-428 

) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) Honorable 

Appellee, v. Taylor T., Respondent- ) Francis M. Martinez,

Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Hutchinson and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s rulings, finding that respondent was an unfit parent and that it was 

in his son’s best interest to terminate his parental rights, were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Further, respondent was not denied due process 

from having the same trial judge preside over earlier hearings and the termination 

of parental rights hearing. Therefore, we affirm. 

¶ 2 Respondent, Taylor T., appeals from the trial court’s orders finding him unfit as to his son, 

A.T., and finding that it was in A.T.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. In 

addition to challenging these two rulings on appeal, respondent argues that his right to due process 

was violated because the same judge who presided over three years of preliminary proceedings 

also presided over the trial. We affirm.
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¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A.T. was born on January 30, 2015, to respondent and Jasmine D. Only respondent’s rights 

are at issue in this appeal.

¶ 5 On December 9, 2016, the State filed a petition alleging that A.T. was neglected because

his environment was injurious to his welfare (see 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) in that 

Jasmine had a substance abuse problem that prevented her from properly parenting A.T. (count 1), 

respondent had a substance abuse problem that prevented him from properly parenting A.T. (count 

2), and Jasmine had threatened suicide in A.T.’s presence (count 3). On December 22, 2016, the 

parties waived their rights to a shelter care hearing and agreed that temporary guardianship and 

custody of A.T. would be awarded to his maternal great aunt, Betsy B. The parents were ordered 

to submit to random drug tests, with missed tests deemed to be positive. 

¶ 6 A report of the Youth Service Bureau (YSB) filed on February 13, 2017, stated that the 

parents had been given several random urine screens, which were all positive for THC. It stated 

that respondent was complying with drug tests but not cooperating with any other recommended 

services.

¶ 7 The State filed an amended neglect petition on March 3, 2017, that added two counts. Count 

4 alleged that A.T.’s environment was injurious to his welfare in that Jasmine had an untreated 

mental problem that prevented her from properly parenting. Count 5 alleged that A.T.’s 

environment was injurious to his welfare in that respondent left A.T. in Jasmine’s care even though 

he knew that she was intoxicated and had an untreated mental health problem.

¶ 8 At the adjudicatory hearing on September 5, 2017, the parties stipulated to count 1 of the 

amended neglect petition, with the factual basis being the original statement of facts. They further 

agreed “to do all services as to all counts if they are recommended.” The State dismissed the 
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remaining counts. The trial court gave guardianship of A.T. to the Department of Children and 

Family Services (DCFS) with the expectation that he would continue his placement with Betsy B.

¶ 9 A dispositional hearing took place on October 27, 2017. The parents agreed to a finding 

that they were “unfit or unable” and that guardianship and custody would remain with DCFS.

¶ 10 On March 27, 2018, Children’s Home and Aid filed a permanency hearing report to the 

court dated March 15, 2018. Regarding why the case was initiated, the report stated:

“The case opened due to untreated mental illness and substance abuse. On 7/19/16

police were dispatched to the home of Jasmine and Taylor for a suicide attempt. Jasmine 

was found to be barricaded in a bedroom with a large butcher-like knife threatening suicide. 

Jasmine was found to be under the influence of alcohol at the time and had superficial cuts 

on her arm. The minor was present in the home and witnessed the incident. Prior to the

incident occurring, the father and mother were in a verbal altercation and the father left the 

minor in the care of the mother while he left the home. The father tested positive for 

marijuana. The case failed as an intact case and the court granted DCFS temporary 

guardianship and custody on 9/05/17.” 

The report stated that respondent had not been fully cooperative with the agency, in that he 

maintained sporadic contact with the caseworker, did not always return her phone calls, and did 

not allow her to assess his home for safety. There were a few times that respondent tried to arrange 

visitation through Betsy without contacting the agency in advance. He frequently reported family 

emergencies and struggled with keeping appointments and attending all recommended services.

¶ 11 The report continued that respondent had been diagnosed with moderate cannabis use 

disorder. He completed the intensive outpatient group at Rosecrance and transitioned to a lowerlevel continuing care group on October 25, 2017. He initially struggled with attendance and 
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ambivalence that his marijuana use was a problem, but he was successfully discharged from the 

group on March 9, 2018. The caseworker requested in November 2017 that respondent attend a 

weekly 12-step program to establish and maintain communication with a sober support network 

of recovering individuals. Respondent reported attending such meetings but did not provide any 

verification. However, at his administrative case review on March 9, 2018, he admitted not having 

attended any such meetings. Based on reports from Rosecrance, respondent had remained free of 

drugs and alcohol since October 2017, but he failed to appear for two random drug screens in 

November and December 2017. He tested negative for drugs during screens in January and 

February 2018. 

¶ 12 The report further stated that respondent would be referred for a mental health assessment 

and individual counseling at Rosecrance. Respondent was participating in one-hour weekly visits 

with A.T., and there had been multiple conversations about increasing his visitation time. 

However, his attendance at visits and engagement in services had been inconsistent since the case 

was opened, and he demonstrated a limited understanding of how this impacted A.T. Respondent 

struggled with exerting parental authority and providing structure during the visits. The caseworker 

referred respondent to parenting classes at YSB on January 2, 2018, but he was unsuccessfully 

discharged on February 15, 2018, due to lack of attendance. The class facilitator stated that 

respondent had been given the opportunity to attend make-up sessions but failed to do so.

¶ 13 Last, the report stated that respondent had reportedly obtained housing in October 2017, 

but he had not provided any verification of this or proof that he was paying rent and utilities. The 

caseworker had several conversations with respondent about the importance of allowing the 

agency to assess his home for safety, but he continued to be uncooperative. The most recent home 

assessment was scheduled for January 20, 2018, but respondent canceled the visit one hour prior.
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¶ 14 A permanency review hearing took place on April 9, 2018. The State and guardian ad litem

argued that respondent had not made reasonable efforts because he had not been fully cooperative 

with the agency, had not made himself available for a home safety check, was not attending 

Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings, had missed half of his drug 

screenings, was unsuccessfully discharged from parenting classes, and was inconsistent with 

attending visitation. Respondent’s counsel argued that respondent’s negative drug tests in January 

and February showed that he was making efforts towards reunification through ceasing use of 

marijuana, and that his drug tests through Rosecrance were also negative. The caseworker updated 

the court that she had been able to assess respondent’s home in the interim, and that it was safe. 

The trial court found that respondent had not made reasonable efforts. It set a goal of return home 

within one year.

¶ 15 On September 25, 2018, Children’s Home and Aid filed a permanency hearing report to 

the court dated September 14, 2018. We summarize the report’s statements regarding respondent. 

Respondent had not been cooperative with the agency in that he had failed to keep appointments 

with the caseworker. Specifically, although he attended an appointment in August 2018, he did not 

attend or call to say that he would miss two appointments in May 2018 and two appointments in 

June 2018. Per his YSB discharge summary dated September 4, 2018, it was important that he 

mature, organize his life, follow through on his word, and not make excuses. Respondent’s 

discharge summary for substance abuse indicated that self-help for substance abuse was part of 

the relapse prevention plan, and the agency requested in February 2018 that he attend and provide 

verification of weekly recovery meetings. On September 10, 2018, he turned in one log showing 

that he attended six meetings between July and August 2018. Respondent was referred for 

individual counseling in April 2018 and completed an intake assessment in August 2018. He was 
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working on a treatment plan, and it was recommended that he address issues of domestic violence 

during the individual sessions. Respondent was consistently attending visitation with A.T., which 

had increased from two hours to four hours weekly on September 10, 2018. Respondent had 

completed parent education classes through YSB on August 16, 2018, though he had issues along 

the way with showing up very late to classes and not turning in homework. Respondent had 

allowed the caseworker to assess his home for safety on March 28, 2018, and there were no 

significant issues. He was employed full-time with Federal Express and had provided one pay stub. 

He had not provided verification showing that he was paying rent, utilities, and other expenses.

¶ 16 A permanency review hearing also took place on September 25, 2018. The State stood on 

the report that was submitted. Respondent testified that he had completed the drug program at 

Rosecrance and had been attending AA meetings for four to five months. He was engaged in 

individual counseling, had not missed any visits with A.T., and the visits had recently increased. 

He successfully completed parenting education on August 16, 2018, and was working at FedEx 30 

hours per week. Respondent admitted that he had not provided documentation for all of the AA 

meetings. He had not turned it in because he had “a stack full of paperwork that [he] need[ed] to 

go through.” Respondent admitted that he failed to meet with the caseworker, but he testified that 

he always rescheduled the meetings. He missed two drug drops because he was out of town for 

one of them and received the voicemail a day late for the other. There were two instances where 

he did not turn in his parenting homework on time because he left his folder at home, but he turned 

the assignments in the next morning. 

¶ 17 The State argued that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or progress. He had 

missed four appointments with the caseworker for which he also did not call, and he testified that 

he could not remember why he missed them. He was asked to provide logs for substance abuse 
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services, but he did so for only two months of the review period and testified that he did not know 

where his other verification papers were. He failed to appear for two drugs drops without a 

legitimate reason, and he claimed that he had a sponsor but had never informed the agency of this. 

Respondent completed parenting classes but had struggled greatly to get through them, and he was 

only now beginning individual counseling. 

¶ 18 Respondent’s counsel argued that respondent had made reasonable efforts and progress. 

He argued that it was difficult for respondent to keep appointments because he worked 30 hours 

per week, and that he rescheduled any missed appointments. Counsel argued that respondent 

passed the drug drops that he took and completed parenting classes. He argued that, most 

importantly, respondent had not missed any visits with A.T., and that the visitation was doubled. 

¶ 19 The guardian ad litem argued that respondent had made reasonable efforts but not 

reasonable progress. He had just started individual counseling in August even though there had 

been a referral since April. Respondent had scheduled the four appointments with the caseworker 

that he missed, so work should not have been an excuse, and he also did not call to say that he 

would miss the appointments. He was not communicating information, such as that he had a 

sponsor, and he missed two drug drops. 

¶ 20 Upon questioning from the trial court, respondent stated that he worked from 5 to 11 p.m. 

The trial court stated as follows. Respondent’s schedule allowed him to attend appointments and 

services during the day. His “no call, no show” for appointments showed a level of irresponsibility

and that respondent needed to improve his organizational skills. Respondent’s two missed drug 

tests were considered positive. Visitation was going very well, which was important, but he was 
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not in a position to start unsupervised visitation. The trial court found that respondent had made

reasonable efforts but not reasonable progress. It set a goal of return home within five months.1

¶ 21 A permanency hearing report to the court dated March 1, 2019, was filed on March 4, 2019.

It stated that the agency had little contact with respondent since November 2018. He had not 

verified that he had an AA sponsor, nor had he verified that he had been attending group meetings 

regularly. Respondent tested negative in drug screenings conducted in October and November 

2018. He began individual counseling in August 2018 but was unsuccessfully discharged due to 

lack of attendance. He was appropriate during visitation but had attended only about 75% of the

visits since the last court hearing. 

¶ 22 The next permanency review hearing occurred on March 11, 2019. The State stated that it 

would stand on the reports and attachments submitted by DCFS. Respondent called caseworker 

Molly Giese as a witness. She testified that she was assigned to the case in late January 2019. 

Giese had exchanged voicemails with respondent but had not yet met with him. She testified 

consistently with information in the report. She further testified that respondent had attended only 

7 out of 16 individual counseling sessions over a four-month period. He called and canceled some 

of the missed appointments, but he did not cancel or show up to other appointments. Respondent 

missed some visitation due to inclement weather. 

¶ 23 The hearing was continued to April 2, 2019. Respondent called Carmen Harwood, his 

former individual counselor, as a witness. Respondent attended seven counseling sessions between 

September 5, 2018, and December 28, 2018. Respondent obtained a “most likely” score for 

progress on the goal of coping skills, and he obtained the best score possible for progress on the 

1 The goals set by the trial court also took into account Jasmine’s efforts and progress.
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goal of abstaining from marijuana. He was usually willing to discuss healthy coping methods 

during the session. He had not successfully achieved his third goal, which was increasing his 

understanding of his anxious feelings and appropriately addressing those feelings. Respondent was 

unsuccessfully discharged from counseling because of inconsistent attendance, which made it 

difficult to meet all of his goals, and he would not always do the homework. There were several 

appointments where respondent did not show up or call to cancel. Prior to his discharge, they were 

still actively working on all three goals. 

¶ 24 The State argued that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or progress because the 

main service that he was supposed to be engaged in during the reporting period was individual 

counseling. He began the counseling in August 2018 and made some progress towards some of 

the goals, but he was unsuccessfully discharged due to lack of attendance. Respondent was 

additionally supposed to find a sponsor and attend AA/NA group meetings, but he failed to provide 

verification of these requirements. The State asked that the goal be changed to substitute care 

pending court determination of termination of parental rights. The guardian ad litem provided a 

similar argument.

¶ 25 Respondent’s counsel argued that the standard was reasonable progress, not perfect 

progress, and that respondent had met two out of his three individual counseling goals. He did not 

call or show up to only three counseling appointments over a four-month period, and he attended 

seven sessions during that time.

¶ 26 The trial court stated as follows. Respondent had made some progress, and it congratulated 

him for having a good job and appearing to have ceased using marijuana. However, respondent’s

progress had to be measured against the goal of return home and the prognosis for future goals. 

There was no concept of partial credit, and respondent had not made reasonable efforts or progress. 
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Respondent was asked to do individual counseling and was doing well in some respects, but he 

was not doing well enough overall to complete the service, and if a parent did not complete a 

specific service, they would not get any closer to having their child return home. There was also 

the issue of procuring an AA/NA sponsor and attending meetings, which were readily available in 

town. The prognosis for reunification in a reasonable timeframe was slim, so it was changing the 

goal to substitute care pending court determination of termination of parenting rights. 

¶ 27 The State filed a petition to terminate parental rights on April 30, 2019. The petition alleged 

that respondent was unfit because he failed to protect the child from conditions within his 

environment that were injurious to his welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2018)) (count 1); failed 

to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare (750 

ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)) (count 2); and failed to make reasonable progress toward the return 

of the child within nine months after the adjudication of neglect or abuse, specifically from 

September 5, 2017, to June 5, 2018, and from June 11, 2018, to March 11, 2019. (750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)) (count 3). 

¶ 28 A hearing on the State’s petition to terminate parental rights began on June 7, 2019. We 

summarize Giese’s testimony. She had been the caseworker since January 2019. She had not 

observed any visits between respondent and A.T. Respondent had missed visits, including visits 

where he did not show up and did not call to cancel, resulting in a decrease from two visits per 

week to one visit. A.T. was upset and had questions when he was transported to visits that 

respondent missed. Respondent was asked to engage in community support services for sobriety, 

but he had not provided documentation of attendance at AA/NA meetings and did not report having 

a sponsor. He was asked to engage in individual counseling but was discharged due to lack of 

attendance and lack of progress. He did not ask to be re-referred for counseling, and shortly 
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afterwards the permanency goal was changed. Respondent had scheduled an appointment with 

Giese, did not show up, rescheduled the appointment when Giese saw him prior to a court hearing, 

and then did not show up for the rescheduled date. Giese did not have a concern that respondent 

was abusing substances. Giese identified People’s Exhibits 1 through 4 as DCFS service plans, 

and they were admitted into evidence without objection. The State also asked the trial court to take 

judicial notice of the neglect petition, the adjudication and dispositional orders, and the orders 

following the permanency review hearings.

¶ 29 The State rested, and respondent called a series of witnesses. Harwood testified that she 

provided counseling for respondent for three or four months and had prepared a report. She did 

not test him for drugs. Respondent failed to attend weekly sessions and was therefore 

unsuccessfully discharged from counseling. He was close to completion for two goals but did not 

complete them because he did not successfully complete counseling. 

¶ 30 Krista Vaccarello testified that she had been a supervisor on A.T.’s case through Children’s 

Home and Aid until January 2019. She filed the permanency report dated September 25, 2018, that 

stated that respondent had successfully completed the continuing care drug treatment program 

through Rosecrance in February 2018. He completed the parenting education program through 

YSB in August 2018. Part of respondent’s drug relapse prevention plan was to attend community 

support groups and obtain a sponsor, but Vaccarello was not aware of respondent having done so. 

Also, part of the recommendations of the parenting instructor was for respondent to engage in 

individual counseling after completing the parenting program to address a few issues that she 

observed. 

¶ 31 Elaine Gaither testified that she was a parenting instructor and supervisor with YSB. 

Respondent enrolled in YSB’s parenting education program in January 2018. He was discharged 
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in March 2018 due to lack of attendance, but he re-enrolled in May 2018. Respondent was initially 

quiet but then began to actively participate in group discussions and became a role model for 

others. Respondent’s attendance was excellent, but he would arrive 10 to 60 minutes late, so they 

had to address that issue with him. Respondent’s tardiness and failure to turn in assignments caused 

him to be placed on a warning list, but he was later removed from the list. Twelve people began 

the parenting program, and eight people, including respondent, completed it in August 2018. 

Afterwards, Gaither recommended that respondent get a sponsor to help him maintain his sobriety. 

She also recommended he engage in individual counseling to mature and recognize the importance 

of organizing his life, and to not make excuses but rather follow through on his commitments.

¶ 32 Betsy testified that she was responsible for observing visits between respondent and A.T.

between September and November 2016. Respondent interacted with and played with A.T. well. 

Discipline was usually an issue because respondent and Jasmine did not want to tell A.T. “no,” put 

him in time-out, or correct his behaviors. Mostly they just engaged in fun activities together. 

¶ 33 Respondent provided the following testimony. On July 19, 2016, he, Jasmine, and A.T.

lived with respondent’s mother and stepdad. A.T. was about 11⁄2 years old. When respondent woke 

up that morning, Jasmine was not in the house. Jasmine later came home and was under the 

influence of alcohol. She started yelling at respondent, and A.T. woke up. Respondent got A.T.

dressed, and he had his mother put A.T. in the stroller and left the house. They walked outside and 

hung out in the park to give Jasmine time to sober up and calm down. They kept coming back to 

the house to check on her, but she seemed like she was getting worse, and they ended up staying 

out until nighttime. Respondent’s mom later tried to calm Jasmine down, and when respondent 

returned with A.T., police officers were outside. Respondent and his stepdad then took A.T. to the 

neighbor’s house. The police told respondent that Jasmine was being taken into custody for 
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attempting suicide. A.T. was not in the house when Jasmine had a knife, and respondent kept A.T. 

away from Jasmine that day to protect him. 

¶ 34 Prior to the incident, respondent had tried to help Jasmine in her struggles with drug and 

alcohol abuse by taking her to the hospital a few times for a mental health diagnosis, and taking 

her to Rosecrance for counseling. Respondent was never an alcoholic but used to smoke marijuana 

on a regular basis. He was successfully discharged from substance abuse and parenting classes. He 

started individual counseling sessions in December 2017 and attended several sessions. He missed 

some sessions but called to reschedule them. The counselor gave respondent three goals, 

specifically for anxiety, depression, and abstaining from marijuana. Respondent made progress on 

all three goals and was still abstaining from marijuana; his last positive drug tests was over one 

year prior. Respondent had missed some visits with A.T., including one where there was an ice 

storm, but he attended about 90% of the visits with A.T. because seeing his son was his top priority. 

A.T. engaged with him during the visits. Respondent was still employed with Federal Express. 

¶ 35 Zachary Oldham testified that he was respondent’s step-brother. He testified that he had 

observed a couple of visits between respondent and A.T., with the last one being about two years 

prior. Respondent was “very joyful” and interactive with A.T., who seemed to love respondent as 

well. 

¶ 36 Terry Oldham testified as follows. He had been dating respondent’s mother for about 18 

years and considered respondent to be his son. Respondent was living in his home on July 19, 

2016. That day, Oldham returned home from work at about 5 p.m. Only Jasmine was home, and 

she appeared to be intoxicated and irritable. Later that evening, she began talking about suicide, 

and respondent’s mother called the police. A.T. was not around Jasmine when she was getting out 
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of control because respondent and his mother had taken A.T. out of the house. After the police 

were called, Oldham went outside, talked to respondent, and took A.T. to the neighbor’s house. 

¶ 37 Respondent had been living with Oldham for about one year at the time of the incident, 

and Oldham had observed respondent taking care of A.T. and playing with him. Jasmine had an 

alcohol problem, and respondent always tried to keep A.T. away from her when she was 

intoxicated. Respondent had matured over the past few years and had a job and his own place.

¶ 38 Sara Marks, respondent’s mother, testified that on July 19, 2016, respondent, Jasmine, and 

A.T. had been living with her and Oldham for about six months. She testified consistently with 

respondent regarding taking A.T. outside all day due to Jasmine’s intoxication. She further testified 

consistently with Oldham regarding returning to the home in the evening and calling the police. 

Marks described respondent as an “amazing father” who played very well with A.T., was very 

patient, and taught him right from wrong. Respondent had also matured in the past few years. 

Respondent did not drink alcohol, and Marks had never seen him drunk. She was aware that he 

used marijuana in 2016. 

¶ 39 The trial court issued its ruling on August 12, 2019, finding as follows. The State had 

proven the counts against Jasmine by clear and convincing evidence. The State had not proven 

count 1 against respondent, that he failed to protect the minor, by clear and convincing evidence. 

The evidence showed that Jasmine had a substantial mental health issue, but it appeared from the 

testimony that respondent and his family kept a reasonably watchful eye on A.T. 

¶ 40 The State had proven count 2 against respondent by clear and convincing evidence. He had 

shown a reasonable degree of interest and concern for A.T., but he had failed to show a reasonable 

degree of responsibility. There were good things to say about respondent in that he had completed 

substance abuse classes and went into continuing care. He seemed to understand the issue with 
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marijuana, but he missed drug tests, which was problematic for someone battling dependence. 

“Those missed drug tests [were] critical.” He was unsuccessfully discharged from parenting 

classes on February 15, 2018, and had sporadic contact with the agency during this time, which 

were all issues that went to his responsibility. The State had further proven count 3 against 

respondent by clear and convincing evidence, in that the lack of responsibility resulted in a failure 

to progress. It appeared that respondent just could not dedicate himself to accomplish the services 

that were necessary to cure the conditions that would allow A.T. to return home. 

¶ 41 On August 30, 2019, on the advice of his counsel, respondent signed an irrevocable consent 

for A.T.’s adoption by Betsy. The trial court accepted the consent. After a hearing, it found that it 

was in A.T.’s best interest to terminate Jasmine’s parental rights. Respondent filed a notice of 

appeal that day challenging the fitness determination.

¶ 42 This court subsequently granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal without 

prejudice on the basis that there was no final and appealable order entered terminating his parental 

rights to vest the appellate court with jurisdiction. See In re A.T., No. 2-19-0745. The trial court 

then granted respondent’s motion to withdraw the consent to adopt. 

¶ 43 On April 24, 2020, respondent filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the finding of 

unfitness. The trial court denied the motion on August 4, 2020. In the interim, a Children’s Home 

and Aid report was filed with the court on May 19, 2020, stating as follows in relevant part. 

Respondent had had minimal contact with the agency since the last court hearing on February 18, 

2020. Because the trial court had changed the goal to substitute care pending termination of 

parental rights, the agency was unable to pay for services for respondent, and he had been 

encouraged to resume the services listed in his service plan on his own. He had not informed the 

agency that he was engaged in any services. The agency resumed supervised visits in February 
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2020, and respondent attended in-person visits on February 27, 2020, and March 5, 2020. A March 

19, 2020, visit was canceled due to Covid-19, and respondent had phone visits on April 1 and 29, 

2020. 

¶ 44 A best interest hearing took place on August 4, 2020. We summarize Giese’s testimony. 

She had been the caseworker for A.T. for two years. He was currently five years old and had been 

living with Betsy since he was 11⁄2 years old. They were the only members of the household, and 

A.T. had his own bedroom with toys and a bunk bed. He was comfortable and attached to the 

home. He referred to his foster parent as “Betsy,” felt love and attachment to her, and looked to 

her for all of his needs. Betsy was likewise very attached to A.T., and they gave each other hugs. 

She was very attentive to all of his needs and took him to his medical and dental appointments, 

bought him clothes and food, and enrolled him in daycare. He was going to start kindergarten in 

the fall. Giese felt that the placement with Betsy was in A.T.’s best interest because he had lived 

there for most of his life, he felt comfortable there, Betsy provided excellent care for him, and he 

looked to her for all of his needs. Betsy’s mother and adult daughters were frequent visitors to the 

home, and A.T. got along very well with them. Betsy’s mother liked to take A.T. camping, and he 

really loved that activity. Respondent’s biological father had also visited A.T. at Betsy’s house

every couple of months. Betsy had pictures of respondent in her home and was willing to allow 

him to participate in A.T.’s life.

¶ 45 Giese had not observed any visits between A.T. and respondent and had not asked A.T.

how he felt about his father or whether he wanted to live with him. She knew that respondent cared 

for A.T. Giese had read visitation notes. At times there had been issues that concerned her, such 

as a visit within the last year where respondent purchased gifts for A.T. but would not allow A.T.
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to take them back to Betsy’s home with him. Also, at a recent visit, respondent stated that if A.T.

did not want to listen to someone, then he did not have to.

¶ 46 Respondent testified that he was nervous about visiting in person after a gap due to the 

Covid-19 pandemic, but A.T. ran up to him and said that he loved and missed him. He called 

respondent “Dad.” Respondent’s mother would also attend visits when she could, and A.T. called 

her “Gigi,” which was short for grandma. Respondent thought that it was in A.T.’s best interest to 

be with him. Respondent currently lived alone in a rent-to-own home in Rockford. He thought that 

his relationship with Betsy “was pretty well [sic] until this adoption thing.” Afterwards, he had 

“been blocked, and [it was] hard to keep in contact with her.”

¶ 47 Respondent’s mother testified that A.T.’s interactions with respondent were wonderful. It 

was not awkward when they visited, and they always had a lot of fun together. Respondent would 

do anything for A.T., and A.T. loved respondent tremendously. She thought that it was in A.T.’s 

best interest to have respondent and her in his life. Her entire family loved and missed A.T. 

¶ 48 The guardian ad litem offered a letter with photos written by Betsy in June 2019 into 

evidence, and it was admitted without objection. She also asked that the trial court take judicial 

notice of the court report prepared May 19, 2020, which it did without objection. 

¶ 49 At the end of the hearing, respondent’s counsel asked to be allowed to orally argue that 

respondent was denied due process because the same trial judge who heard the first three years of 

proceedings was the same judge determining the minor’s best interest. The trial court allowed the 

argument and denied the motion.

¶ 50 On September 3, 2020, the trial court found as follows. The trial court recognized that 

respondent cared very deeply for A.T., and that A.T. had a relationship with respondent. However, 

it was clear from the evidence that A.T.’s relationship with respondent was not of the same caliber 
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as his relationship with Betsy. A.T. enjoyed seeing respondent but did not appear to inquire about 

him between visits. Betsy was the person whom A.T. looked to as a parent, whom he looked to for 

shelter and protection, and who met his every need. Betsy was willing to allow a relationship with 

A.T.’s parents and family. Recognizing A.T.’s relationship with respondent, Betsy kept a 

photograph of respondent in her home for A.T. to see, and A.T. also visited with respondent’s 

biological father. A.T. had a relationship with Betsy’s extended family as well, and it was clear 

that he was accepted and loved by them. A.T. had thrived and developed a sense of identity as a 

member of Betsy’s family, and it was his best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

¶ 51 Respondent timely appealed.

¶ 52 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 53 The termination of parental rights is a two-step process governed by the Juvenile Court Act 

of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)) and the Adoption Act (750 

ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2018)). In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010). The court must first find 

by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under one of the statutory grounds of 

parental unfitness listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). In 

re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28. We will not reverse a trial court’s finding of unfitness unless it is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 29. A decision is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id. If the trial court determines 

that the parent is unfit, the trial court’s focus shifts from the parent’s rights to whether it is in the 

child’s best interest to terminate parental rights in the second stage of the process, the best interest 

hearing. In re S.H., 2014 IL App 3d 140500, ¶ 34. 

¶ 54 A. Fitness

¶ 55 1. Hearsay
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¶ 56 Respondent argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he was unfit by 

clear and convincing evidence on counts 2 and 3. We first address respondent’s argument that the 

State relied solely on inadmissible multi-level hearsay to prove his failure to complete services, 

resulting in the trial court’s findings of unfitness being against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Respondent argues that Giese offered no testimony based on personal knowledge regarding his 

participation, or lack thereof, in services. Respondent maintains that the State’s four exhibits were 

offered into evidence without objection because there was no dispute that they were business 

records under section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act, which states:

 “Any writing, record, photograph or x-ray of any hospital or public or private 

agency, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or 

record of any condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event relating to a minor in an 

abuse, neglect or dependency proceeding, shall be admissible in evidence as proof of that 

condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the court finds that the document was 

made in the regular course of the business of the hospital or agency and that it was in the 

regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or 

event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. A certification by the head or responsible 

employee of the hospital or agency that the writing, record, photograph or x-ray is the full 

and complete record of the condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event and that it 

satisfies the conditions of this paragraph shall be prima facie evidence of the facts 

contained in such certification. *** All other circumstances of the making of the 

memorandum, record, photograph or x-ray, including lack of personal knowledge of the 

maker, may be proved to affect the weight to be accorded such evidence, but shall not affect 

its admissibility.” 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018).
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Respondent argues that under the statute, an agency’s records, acts, or events that an agency’s 

employee observed are admissible, even if the employee observing the acts did not prepare the 

agency’s report. Respondent argues that, however, the statute cannot be read to allow as admissible 

evidence the observations of other agencies or persons, which would also render superfluous the 

requirement that the recording be made at the time of the event, or within a reasonable time 

thereafter. He further argues that a document can be considered as evidence of particular events, 

as opposed to evidence of everything in the document. Finally, he argues that admission of a 

document as a business record does not allow third and fourth level hearsay within the document 

to be admissible. Respondent argues that his interpretation of the statute is consistent with Illinois 

Rule of Evidence 805 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), which states: “Hearsay included within hearsay is not 

excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an 

exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.” Respondent also cites People v. 

McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, ¶ 113, where this court stated that multiple level hearsay 

is not admissible unless each layer of hearsay is excused by its own exception.

¶ 57 The State argues that respondent forfeited his argument by failing to object to the admission 

of the State’s exhibits. We agree. “Any objection a party failed to make in the proceedings below 

is regarded, on appeal, as procedurally forfeited.” In re K.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190496, ¶ 59. 

Because respondent offered no objection in the trial court to the admission of the service plans, he

may not argue on appeal that the trial court could not consider certain aspects of their contents. 

See In re Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 50. Defendant also does not argue that plain error 

review applies.

¶ 58 Even otherwise, defendant’s argument fails on its merit. Respondent’s attorney presented 

an identical argument for the respondent in In re Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 66. That is, the 
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respondent argued that although the exhibits were admissible pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a), multilevel hearsay was not transformed into admissible evidence just because it was within an otherwise 

admissible report. The respondent also cited Illinois Rule of Evidence 805 and McCullough. 

Accordingly, we apply the same analysis to resolve his argument. 

¶ 59 In In re Z.J., we noted that we review the admission of evidence under section 2-18(4)(a) 

for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or 

unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would agree with the trial court’s position. Id. ¶ 55. 

We highlighted that section 2-18(4)(a) provides: “ ‘All other circumstances of the making of the 

memorandum, record, photograph or x-ray, including lack of personal knowledge of the maker, 

may be proved to affect the weight to be accorded such evidence, but shall not affect its 

admissibility.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶ 67 (quoting 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018)). We 

then stated:

 “In light of this language, respondent’s multilevel hearsay objection is not well 

founded. Quite simply, the lack of knowledge of the maker of the documents at issue is, in 

accordance with the statute, a matter of weight rather than admissibility. 705 ILCS 405/2-

18(4)(a) (West 2018). Indeed, as noted above, the legislature deemed it proper to admit 

DCFS records and the information contained therein, as long as the information was made 

of record in the regular course of the agency’s business and at the time of the event or 

within a reasonable time thereafter. It is only logical that such records are admissible and 

may be considered, because assessing a parent’s compliance with service plans is included 

in a determination of whether the parent has made reasonable progress or has maintained 

a reasonable degree of interests, concern, or responsibility as to a minor’s welfare. 
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[Citations.] Thus, the trial court here properly could consider the service plans and attribute 

to them whatever weight they were due, taking into account their hearsay nature.” Id. ¶ 67.

We stated that the multilevel hearsay argument “ignore[d] the plain language of the statute, which 

clearly specifies that, once a foundation is properly laid, all other circumstances surrounding the 

making of the document affect the weight to be accorded the evidence, but do not affect its 

admissibility.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 69. We observed that nothing in defendant’s argument 

“alter[ed] the language stating that the maker’s lack of personal knowledge constitutes a matter of 

weight.” Id. ¶ 70. Accordingly, even absent forfeiture, this court has already considered and 

rejected respondent’s argument regarding multilevel hearsay. 

¶ 60 Respondent acknowledges the existence of In re Z.J. in his reply brief but argues that we 

failed to consider that the language in section 2-18(4)(a) about all other circumstances affecting 

the weight of the evidence but not its admissibility also appears in Supreme Court Rule 236 (eff. 

August 1, 1992), the general business records exception. Respondent cites Holland v. Schwan’s 

Home Service, Inc., 2013 IL App (5th) 110560, ¶ 184, where the court stated, “Therefore, pursuant 

to Rule 805 of the Illinois Rules of Evidence, when a business record contains hearsay statements 

within the record, the hearsay statements within the record must also be admissible under an 

exception to the hearsay rule.” 

¶ 61 Respondent’s argument is not persuasive, as in In re Z.J. we considered the potential 

application of Illinois Rule of Evidence 805 but rejected it on the basis on section 2-18(4)(a) states 

that “[a]ll other circumstances of the making of the *** record, ***, including lack of personal 

knowledge of the maker, may be proved to affect the weight to be accorded such evidence, but 

shall not affect its admissibility.” 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018). We recognize that Rule 

236 contains very similar language to section 2-18(4)(a), but Holland did not consider the sentence
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about weight versus admissibility before stating that Rule 805 applied, and therefore does not cause 

us to believe that In re Z.J. was incorrectly decided.

¶ 62 Defendant also argues in his reply brief that the State did not lay a proper foundation for 

the admission of the service plans. Defendant forfeited this argument by not objecting to the 

admission of the evidence in the trial court (In re K.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190496, ¶ 59), and by 

first raising this argument in his reply brief (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“[p]oints 

not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief”)). 

¶ 63 2. Counts 2 and 3

¶ 64 Respondent additionally argues that the trial court’s findings of unfitness on counts 2 and 

3 both relied on the same evidence that he had allegedly failed to complete services related to his 

alleged substance abuse issue, with the trial court finding that the failures showed both a lack of 

reasonable responsibility and a failure to make reasonable progress. Respondent argues that failure 

to complete services can be grounds for termination only if the services were necessary to cure the 

cause for removal, or discovered during the case and posing a potential danger to the child. He 

cites In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 99, where the appellate court stated: 

“We agree with [the respondent] that a parent’s refusal to participate in referred 

intact family services, no matter how unnecessary or unrelated to the facts that brought the 

case into court those services may be, is not automatically relevant to a finding of abuse or 

neglect. However, we also agree with the State and the GAL that, where evidence is 

presented supporting a finding of environmental neglect based on a specific problem—like 

an untreated mental health disorder or substance abuse—evidence regarding whether or 

not the parent engaged in services intended to remedy that problem is indeed relevant at 

the adjudicatory hearing.” 
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Respondent also cites In re S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d 88 (1992), where this court stated that DCFS 

service plans should be primarily directed at the parental deficiencies that led to the initial removal 

of the child, and that DCFS services plans are a means to an end as opposed to an end in 

themselves. 

¶ 65 Respondent argues that in order to terminate parental rights due to a failure to complete 

services, the State must prove both that the parent failed to complete the services and that the 

services were necessary. Respondent maintains that the State offered no evidence that his use of 

marijuana created an injurious environment for A.T., that he used marijuana when A.T. was in his 

care, or that his use ever caused an impairment making him unable to care for the child. He argues 

that, in particular, there was no testimony or documents from medical witnesses or providers about 

his marijuana use. Respondent further contends that the record demonstrates that he abstained from 

marijuana from early in the case to the date of trial.

¶ 66 Respondent further argues as follows. The trial court did not rely on any evidence 

regarding respondent’s interactions with A.T. to find him unfit. To the contrary, he testified that 

he attended 90% of the available visits from 2016 through 2019 and was still employed by FedEx. 

The State’s own exhibits described his interactions with A.T. as appropriate and affectionate. The 

State and trial court simply assumed that because respondent used marijuana, he had a substance 

abuse problem that put A.T. at risk, but marijuana is a legal substance in Illinois, and there was no 

evidence about the amount of marijuana respondent consumed or the frequency of his use. 

Respondent again cites In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 102, where the court stated

that “the State failed to present any evidence regarding the frequency of that use or establishing 

that the children witnessed or were otherwise affected by [their parents’] marijuana use.”

Respondent argues that the State failed to offer any evidence that the services demanded were 
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necessary, such that the trial court’s findings that he was unfit under counts 2 and 3 were against 

the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 67 We begin with the trial court’s determination on count 3, that respondent failed to make 

reasonable progress during the nine-month periods of September 5, 2017, to June 5, 2018, and 

from June 11, 2018, to March 11, 2019. We summarize the service plans, which, as discussed, 

were properly admitted into evidence and considered, as an aid in assessing respondent’s progress 

during the relevant time frames. 

¶ 68 The service plan dated October 5, 2017, stated that the police had been dispatched to the 

parents’ home multiple times for domestic disputes between respondent and Jasmine. Goals for 

respondent included living a drug-free lifestyle, finding safe and appropriate housing, reducing 

arguments and no longer having domestic violence in the home, achieving the permanency goal 

through cooperation with the agency, and maintaining and strengthening his relationship with A.T.

¶ 69 The March 9, 2018, service plan stated that respondent had been diagnosed with moderate 

cannabis use disorder. He was rated unsatisfactory on the goal of cooperation with the agency to 

achieve the permanency goal, in that he did not allow the caseworker to enter his mother’s home 

to assess safety, did not report when he moved into his own house, canceled an appointment to 

assess his new housing one hour prior, tried to schedule visits through Betsy without asking or 

notifying the agency, was difficult to contact and did not return the caseworker’s calls, and 

frequently reporting family emergencies and struggled with keeping appointments and attending 

all recommended services. For some of these same reasons, he was rated unsatisfactory in the goal 

of having safe permanent housing. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory on the goal of maintaining 

and improving his relationship with A.T. because he was inconsistent in attending the one-hour 

weekly visits and showed limited understanding on how this impacted his son. He also attempted 
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to arrange visits through Betsy without notifying the agency and was not prepared for visits with 

supplies. He was offered the opportunity to attend A.T.’s first dental exam, which he did not, and 

A.T.’s school Christmas concert, to which he arrived late and missed his entire 15-minute 

performance. Respondent was rated satisfactory for progress on a drug-free lifestyle. He 

successfully completed the intensive outpatient group at Rosecrance on May 26, 2017, and had

transitioned to the lower level, continuing care group. He struggled with attendance in both groups 

but was making good progress. The caseworker requested in November 2017 that he attend at least 

one 12-step meeting weekly in order to develop and maintain communication with a sober support 

network of recovering people. Respondent reported attending weekly AA/NA meetings but had 

not provided proof of attendance. He had abstained from marijuana and other drugs since 

September 2017 but failed to report for two random drug tests, in November and December 2017. 

The service plan further listed a new goal, created on January 2, 2018, of learning and 

demonstrating effective parenting approaches. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory on this goal. 

He was referred for parenting classes on January 2, 2018, but unsuccessfully discharged on 

February 15, 2018, due to lack of attendance. The class facilitator stated that respondent was given 

the opportunity to make up the sessions that he missed but failed to do so. Respondent had 

struggled during visits at providing complete supervision, being firm, and establishing appropriate 

limits. He had made an effort to demonstrate positive behavioral management techniques such as 

using time-outs. 

¶ 70 Looking next at the September 2, 2018, service plan, respondent was rated satisfactory for 

visitation. He was consistently attending visitation and interacting appropriately with A.T., and 

visits were going to increase on September 10, 2018, from two-hour weekly visits to four-hour 

weekly visits. He was rated satisfactory for safe housing in that he had allowed the agency to assess 
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his home for safety on March 28, 2018, though he had not yet provided verification showing that 

he was paying rent, utilities, and other expenses. Respondent was rated satisfactory on the goal of

a drug-free lifestyle. However, part of his relapse prevention plan in his discharge summary 

through Rosecrance was to attend self-help for substance abuse meetings, and YSB recommended 

on September 4, 2018, that he obtain a sponsor and attend NA meetings. Respondent had not 

provided verification of attendance at AA/NA meetings or engagement in other recovery activities. 

He had failed to complete two out of six random drugs tests since the last review period, on June 

14, 2018, and July 3, 2018. The service plan further listed a goal of maintaining a healthy emotional 

state, and he was rated satisfactory on his progress. He had competed an intake assessment in 

August 2018 and had recently started individual therapy sessions. Respondent was rated 

satisfactory for the goal of learning and demonstrating effective parenting approaches. Per his final 

parenting progress report, dated September 4, 2018, he was recommended to engage in individual 

counseling to address what appeared to be frustration from past experiences, lack of trust, and 

inability to consistently follow through with obligations and commitments. Respondent was rated 

unsatisfactory for cooperation with the agency because although he attended two appointments on 

April 9, 2018, and August 15, 2018, he did not call or show up to two appointments in May 2018 

and appointments on June 13 and 20, 2018. 

¶ 71 In the service plan dated April 2, 2019, respondent was rated unsatisfactory for the goal of 

a drug-free lifestyle because he did not provide verification of his attendance at group meetings or 

other recovery activities, or of obtaining a sponsor. He had missed one out of three random drug 

tests since the last review, on March 12, 2019. Respondent was rated satisfactory for the goal of 

safe and permanent housing. He was rated unsatisfactory for cooperation with the agency because 

he was supposed to meet with the caseworker at 8 a.m. on March 11, 2019, but did not call or show 
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up. They talked after the court hearing that day. He then did not show up to the rescheduled 

appointment the following day. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory for his relationship with A.T.

He had not been consistent with his attendance on visits since the last review, so they were reduced 

to two-hour weekly visits. He was rated satisfactory for learning and demonstrating effective 

parenting approaches. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory for maintaining a healthy emotional 

state, because he was discharged from individual counseling in January 2019 for lack of attendance 

and progress. 

¶ 72 One statutory ground of unfitness is a parent’s failure to make reasonable progress towards 

the child’s return during any nine-month period after the initial nine-month period following the 

adjudication of neglect. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018). Our supreme court has defined 

reasonable progress as “ ‘demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.’ ” In re C.N., 

196 Ill. 2d 181, 211 (2001) (quoting In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 565 (2000)). Progress towards 

the child’s return is measured by the parent’s compliance with the service plans and the court’s 

directives, in light of both the conditions which caused the child’s removal and conditions that 

became known later and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the 

parent. Id. at 216-17. We review reasonable progress using an objective standard, and reasonable 

progress can be found if the trial court can conclude that it can return the child to the parent in the 

near future. In re K.P, 2020 IL App (3d) 190709, ¶ 36. In contrast, reasonable efforts are judged 

according to a subjective standard of the amount of effort reasonable for a particular person. In re 

L.J.S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180218, ¶ 24. 

¶ 73 Looking at the period of September 5, 2017, to June 5, 2018, respondent was not 

cooperating with the agency in that he was not returning the caseworker’s calls and did not call or 

show up to two appointments in May 2018. He did not allow the caseworker to assess his residence 
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for safety until March 28, 2018. As of the March 9, 2018, service plan, he was not consistently 

attending scheduled visitation with A.T., missed A.T.’s dentist appointment and school concert, 

and tried to arrange separate visitation through Betsy without notifying the agency. He had a 

difficult time supervising A.T. and establishing appropriate limits. He was also unsuccessfully 

discharged from parenting classes on February 15, 2018, due to lack of attendance, despite having 

been given the opportunity to attend make-up classes. 

¶ 74 Respondent focuses almost entirely on the question of his marijuana use, but we may affirm 

a trial court’s finding of unfitness on any basis supported by the record, regardless of whether the 

trial court relied on that basis. In re Nevah R., 2017 IL App (2d) 170229, ¶ 24. It is not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence to conclude that the above-mentioned facts, including lack of 

cooperation with the agency, not consistently attending visitation with A.T., and being 

unsuccessfully discharged from parenting classes, failed to show demonstrable movement toward 

the goal of reunification, and therefore constituted clear and convincing evidence of a lack of 

reasonable progress.

¶ 75 Moreover, In re Zariyah A. is distinguishable from the instant case because it dealt with a

challenge to orders following an adjudicatory hearing (In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, 

¶ 2) as opposed to a fitness determination as is the case here. In fact, at respondent’s September 5, 

2017, adjudicatory hearing, he agreed “to do all services as to all counts if they are recommended,” 

and one of the dismissed counts alleged that respondent had a substance abuse problem that 

prevented him from properly parenting A.T. Though marijuana is a legal substance in Illinois, it, 

like alcohol, can still be abused. The March 9, 2018, service plan stated that respondent had been 

diagnosed with moderate cannabis use disorder, which indicates that respondent did in fact have a 

drug issue. During the time period in question, respondent certainly made some progress in his 
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goal of abstaining from cannabis, as he was successfully discharged from drug treatment. 

However, part of his relapse prevention plan in his discharge summary through Rosecrance was to 

attend self-help for substance abuse meetings, but he did not provide verification of attendance. 

He also missed two drug tests in November and December 2017, with missed tests deemed to be 

positive for drugs. Accordingly, respondent’s progress on services related to his drug use was 

relevant to assessing his overall progress. 

¶ 76 Turning to the period of June 11, 2018, to March 11, 2019, respondent still had not 

provided proof of attending AA/NA meetings or obtaining a sponsor, and he missed drug tests on 

June 14, 2018, and July 3, 2018. He missed two caseworker appointments in June 2018 and one 

on March 11, 2019. Respondent was no longer consistently visiting A.T., so the length of his visits 

was reduced. Giese testified that A.T. was upset about the missed visits. Respondent was 

unsuccessfully discharged from individual counseling in January 2019 for lack of attendance and 

progress. His counselor testified that he was close to completion for two goals but did not complete 

them because he did not successfully complete counseling. Based on these factors, it was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial court to conclude that the State had proven 

by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had not made reasonable progress during the 

relevant time period. 

¶ 77 We may affirm a trial court’s finding of unfitness based on a parent’s failure to make 

reasonable progress in any single nine-month period (In re Phoenix F., 2016 IL App (2d) 150431, 

¶ 7) and here we have found that the trial court’s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence as to two distinct nine-months period alleged. We therefore do not address respondent's 

challenge to the trial court’s ruling on count 2, namely that he was also unfit because he failed to 
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maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility as to A.T. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018); In 

re Tr. A., 2020 IL App (2d) 200225, ¶ 43.

¶ 78 B. Best Interest

¶ 79 Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that it was in A.T.’s best interest 

to terminate respondent’s parental rights. He argues that the evidence at the best interest hearing 

demonstrated that A.T. had an extremely close relationship with him and loved him. He highlights 

his testimony that A.T. was his “sense of purpose” and belonged with him. Respondent maintains 

that although A.T. understandably developed a close relationship with his foster parent, he called 

her “Betsy” instead of “Mother,” whereas he called respondent, “Father” and his grandmother, 

“Gigi.” Respondent contends that, most importantly, the caseworker admitted that she never asked 

A.T. if he would like to live with respondent, presumably because he would have answered in the 

affirmative. Respondent points to his testimony that at the last visit, A.T. ran up to him and said 

that he loved and missed respondent. He argues that his successful completion of almost all 

services and his long-term abstention from marijuana show that he can provide a loving 

environment for A.T., and that it was in A.T.’s best interest to not have respondent’s parental rights 

terminated. He asserts that the apparent limitation on his contact with A.T. once adoption became 

an issue created a risk that A.T.’s relationship with him would become even more restricted in the 

future, to A.T.’s detriment. 

¶ 80 A trial court’s ruling that a parent is unfit does not automatically mean that it is in the 

child’s best interest to terminate parental rights. In re K.I., 2016 IL App (3d) 160010, ¶ 65. Still, 

during the best interest hearing, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship 

must yield to the child’s interest to live in a stable, permanent, loving home.” In re S.D., 2011 IL 

App (3d) 110184, ¶ 34. In determining a child’s best interest, the trial court is required to consider 
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the following statutory factors of the Juvenile Court Act in light of the child’s age and 

developmental needs: (1) the child’s physical safety and welfare, including food, shelter, health, 

and clothing; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural, and 

religious background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachment, including love, sense of security, 

sense of familiarity, continuity of affection of the child, and least disruptive placement for the 

child; (5) the child’s wishes and goals; (6) the child’s community ties, including church, school, 

and friends; (7) the child’s need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) 

the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the 

child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). The court may also consider the nature and length of 

the relationship that the child has with his or her present caregiver and the effect a change in 

placement would have on the child’s emotional and psychological well-being. In re Nevaeh R., 

2017 IL App (2d) 170229, ¶ 27. The State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In re Tr. A., 2020 IL App (2d) 200225

¶ 32. We will not disturb a trial court’s determination that it is in the child’s best interest to 

terminate parental rights unless the ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

¶ 81 We conclude that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial court 

to find that it was in A.T.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Respondent cites 

no authority that a child who was only five years old should be asked where he wants to live, 

particularly when it would not be an option for him to move in with respondent for a long time, as 

respondent had not yet advanced beyond four hours of visitation per week, which was subsequently 

reduced to two hours. The trial court recognized that respondent loved A.T. and that A.T. had a 

relationship with respondent as well. However, it stated that A.T. looked to Betsy for shelter and 

protection and to meet all of his needs. The record shows that A.T. had been living with Betsy 
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since he was 11⁄2 years old. The trial court stated that he had a loving relationship with Betsy’s 

extended family as well. Further, Betsy recognized A.T.’s relationship with respondent by keeping 

a photograph of respondent on display, and she also allowed A.T. to visit respondent’s biological 

father.

¶ 82 C. Due Process

¶ 83 Last, respondent argues that he was denied his right to due process because the judge who 

presided over the trial was the same judge who had presided over years of hearings where a lesser 

burden of proof was applied, had reviewed hundreds of pages of multi-level hearsay, and had 

changed the goal to substitute care pending court determination of the termination of parental 

rights. Respondent argues that, as a result, the trial judge simply assumed that the services that it 

ordered at disposition were necessary, whereas a new judge would have required much more 

evidence on all aspects of the case, far beyond the few pages of testimony in the report of 

proceedings. He states that his counsel has “found no case on point” but urges us to adopt a rule 

wherein a judge who presides over a case and orders a goal change of termination of parental rights 

is not allowed to preside over the trial. 

¶ 84 Respondent’s counsel’s argument that he had “found no case on point” on this issue is not 

well-taken when he already advanced this argument, and we rejected it, in In re Z.J., 2020 IL App 

(2d) 190824, ¶ 66, which was filed long before appellant’s brief. We stated, in relevant part: 

“[T]he authority that does exist does not favor respondent’s position. For instance, 

a trial judge is presumed to consider only admissible evidence and disregard inadmissible 

evidence. People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 603 (2008). This presumption is rebutted only 

‘if it affirmatively appears from the record that improver evidence was considered by the 

court.’ People v. Dobbs, 353 Ill. App. 3d 817, 824 (2004). Further, Illinois Supreme Court 
2021 IL App (2d) 200497-U 

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Rule 903 (eff. March 8, 2016) provides that ‘[w]henever possible and appropriate, all child 

custody and allocation of parental responsibilities proceedings relating to an individual 

child shall be conducted by a single judge.’ Thus, our supreme court has expressed a 

preference for the same judge to hear all proceedings involving child custody and the 

division of parental responsibilities. Indeed, this is similar to the supreme court’s 

proclamation in the criminal context that ‘the same judge who presided over the defendant's 

trial should hear his post-conviction petition, unless it is shown that the defendant would 

be substantially prejudiced.’ People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324, 331 (1993). The per se rule 

advocated by respondent would be contrary to the supreme court's admonition that ‘[t]o 

conclude that a judge is disqualified because of prejudice is not, of course, a judgment to 

be lightly made.’ People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 179 (1979).” 

Respondent acknowledges In re Z.J. in his reply brief but argues that the decision was in error.

However, we believe that the reasoning is sound and applies equally to this case.

¶ 85 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 86 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Winnebago County circuit court. 

Given multiple extensions in the briefing schedule, we have good cause for issuing our decision 

beyond the 150-day deadline under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

¶ 87 Affirmed.