* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30187

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MEALVINE MELODY WALKER

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 05-50117-01

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mealvine Melody Walker pleaded guilty to possession with intent to

distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine and possession of a firearm in

relation to drug trafficking. The plea was conditioned on the right to appeal the

denial of her motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm.

1. A confidential informant (“CI”) told law-enforcement officers that

Walker was selling crack cocaine on the 1800 block of Booker T.

Washington Streetin Shreveport, Louisiana. The CI told the officers

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 8, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-30187

2

that Walker was sitting in a black Ford Thunderbird with the crack

cocaine. After confirming that she was at the location, police officers

made contact with Walker and another person who was with her.

During a pat-down search, the officers discovered that the other

person had cocaine, and they arrested him.

Walker was advised of her Miranda rights but was told that

she was not under arrest. One of the police officers, Officer David

Derrick,told Walker that he had reason to believe she had narcotics

in her vehicle. She denied that she had any narcotics in the car.

Officer Derrick explained to her that one of her options was to

cooperate to avoid being arrested. Agent Russell Sarpy then pulled

her aside and talked with her about cooperating. Officer Derrick

also told her that if she did not consent to the search of her car, he

would call a K-9 unit to do a dog sniff of the car. According to

Officer Derrick, Walker then said that “we were going to find it

anyway and that she had some cocaine and a gun in the car and

that we can go ahead and get it.” After being asked again if they

could search the car, she told them to go ahead. 

Officer Derrick entered the car and found Walker’s purse,

which contained two plastic bags of crack cocaine and a loaded gun.

Walker then told the officers that she was selling drugs and carried

the gun for protection. The entire encounter with the officers took

about 20 to 30 minutes. While Walker was not arrested on that day,

charges were later brought. She sought to suppress the evidence

gathered pursuant to the search of her car and the statements she

made to the officers. The district court denied her motion. She

subsequently pleaded guilty. This appeal ensued.
No. 07-30187

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2. When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we

review factual determinations for clear error and questions of law

de novo. United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1999).

The evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 n.2

(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Due deference is given to the credibility

determinations of the district court. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d

420, 437 (5th Cir. 2002). 

3. Walker alleges that the search of her car was improper. The initial

encounter with Walker was a valid stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), because the officers had

information from a reliable CI;they knew Walker had been involved

in drug trafficking in the past; and they knew that she was located

in a high drug-trafficking area. See United States v. Gonzalez, 190

F.3d 668, 672–73 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a tip may provide the

reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop). 

We must also consider whether the officers’ subsequent

actions were related in scope to the circumstances that initially

justified the stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878–79.

The officers’ detainment and questioning of Walker regarding her

alleged narcotics trafficking were reasonably related to the reliable

information provided by the CI, which was independently confirmed

by an officer who witnessed Walker at the location described, and

the officers’ knowledge of Walker’s involvement in drug dealing. 

During the legal Terry stop, Walker consented to the search

of her car. The government has the burden of demonstrating that

this consent to search was voluntary. United States v. Ponce, 8 F.3d

989, 997 (5th Cir. 1993). “The voluntariness of consent is a question
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of fact to be determined from a totality of the circumstances, and we

review the district court’s finding of voluntariness for clear error.”

Solis, 299 F.3d at 436 (internal citation and quotations omitted).

“This court considers six factors in evaluating the voluntariness of

consent to search, all of which are relevant, but no one of which is

dispositive or controlling.” Id. The six factors we consider are the

following: (1) the voluntariness of the defendant’s custodial status;

(2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and

level of the defendant’s cooperation with the police; (4) the

defendant’s awareness of his or her rightto refuse to consent; (5)the

defendant’s education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant’s belief

that no incriminating evidence will be found. Id.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Walker’s

consent was voluntary. For example,there is no evidence of coercive

police actions. Despite Walker’s protestations to the contrary, the

offer of leniency if she cooperated did not vitiate her voluntariness.

See United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 202 (5th Cir. 2005)

(holding that offering leniency does not always preclude finding that

consent was voluntary). Walker also argues that she was coerced

into giving her consent because she had been used as an informant

by these officers many times in the past, and she was led to believe

that if she cooperated now, she would not be prosecuted. However,

in light of the totality of the circumstances, her past relationship

with the officers did not affect the voluntariness of her consent to

search. In fact, her past encounters with law enforcement are

indicative of her “awareness of the consequences of providing

assistance.” Id. Walker’s other arguments regarding her consent to

the search are equally unavailing.
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4. Walker also alleges that the statements she made to the officers

should have been suppressed. She was given a warning during her

interaction with the officers that is consistent with the warning

described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602

(1966), and its progeny. Walker claims that the incriminating

statements she made should be suppressed because she did not

voluntarily waive her Miranda rights. The government maintains

that Walker did not have to waive her rights under Miranda, even

though she was given a Miranda warning, because she was not in

custody at the time she made her statements. We do not reach this

issue because even if she was entitled to Miranda rights, she waived

them.

Waiver of Miranda rights must be made voluntarily,

knowingly, and intelligently. As the Supreme Court explained:

“First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in

the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice

rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second,the waiver

must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of

the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to

abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135,

1141 (1986). We examine the totality of the circumstances to see if

the waiver choice was uncoerced and the defendant had a “requisite

level of comprehension.” Id. As explained above, Walker was not a

novice to criminal matters and was well aware of her rights.

Furthermore, her relationship with the officers, as well as their

statements about possible leniency if she cooperated, do not affect

the voluntariness of her waiver. We have previously held that

deceptive tactics may notinvalidate an otherwise lawful waiver, and
No. 07-30187

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they do not invalidate Walker’s waiver. See Soffar v. Cockrell, 300

F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that deceit is only

prohibited to the extent that it deprives the suspect of the ability to

understand his or her rights and the consequences of abandoning

them). There is no other indication that Walker’s waiver was not

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Therefore, the

district court properly denied Walker’s motion to suppress her

statements.

AFFIRMED.