NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 21-3269

________________

ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY;

AMINAH SINGLETARY; LATIESHA SINGLETARY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; POLICE OFFICER ROBERT SCHUTTE;

CHARLES RAMSEY; POLICE OFFICER MICHAEL NAVEDO;

RICHARD ROSS; POLICE OFFICER JENNIFER GRESHAM;

POLICE OFFICER OWEN SCHAEFFER

Police Officer Robert Schutte; Police Officer Michael Navedo;

Police Officer Jennifer Gresham; Police Officer Owen Schaeffer,

 Appellants

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D. C. No. 2-19-cv-00190)

District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge

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Argued on January 12, 2023

Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 10, 2023)

Craig R. Gottlieb (ARGUED)

City of Philadelphia

Law Department

1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellants
2

Christopher Markos (ARGUED)

Williams Cedar

One South Broad Street

Suite 1510

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellees

________________

OPINION*

________________

ROTH, Circuit Judge

Ronald Singletary was fatally shot by law enforcement in a bedroom of his 

Philadelphia boarding house. His personal representatives filed state and federal civil 

rights claims against numerous parties, including four police officers (Officers). The 

Officers ask us to review the District Court’s denial, at summary judgment, of their 

entitlement to qualified immunity. For the following reasons, we lack jurisdiction of this 

appeal. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Philadelphia Police Policy Directive 10.7 is intended to “help identify a ‘barricaded 

person,’ hostage taker, or Severely Mentally Disabled Person (SMDP) and instruct police 

personnel in the proper tactics and procedures in order to remove such an individual and 

safeguard the personal well-being of all concerned.”1 The policy establishes that a person 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1

JA009 (citing Compl. ¶ 19; Ex. A to Pl.’s Compl.). 
3

who “has indicated by action or implication that he/she may have a weapon and refuses to 

cooperate with police commands” is generally considered a barricaded person, and sets 

forth procedures for police to follow in this situation.

2

On May 12, 2017, police were called to Ronald Singletary’s boarding house to arrest 

him for violating a protective order obtained against him by a companion.3 Upon arrival, 

Officer Schutte found the companion outside, and observed Singletary inside at an upstairs 

window, from which Singletary called down “that Officer Schutte would ‘have to call 

SWAT and all the cops . . . because he’s not going without a fight.’”4 The companion 

informed Schutte that Singletary had knives in the room, and Schutte called additional 

officers to the scene. Officers Schutte and Navedo entered the residence and went upstairs,

where they observed Singletary enter a bedroom with a knife. Meanwhile, Officers 

Gresham and Schaeffer arrived and followed Schutte and Navedo up the stairs. Schutte 

then kicked in Singletary’s bedroom door, Navedo tased Singletary, and Schutte fatally 

shot him. None of the Officers designated the situation as a barricade per Policy Directive 

10.7. A Philadelphia Police Department Lieutenant assigned to the Internal Affairs 

Division later testified that, under the policy, at least one Officer should have done so.

The parties dispute the particulars of these events, and the Officers—the only 

eyewitnesses to the interactions with Singletary—provided contradictory testimony. As 

the District Court observed, “[t]he Defendant Officers here offer markedly different 

2

JA009 (citing Compl. ¶ 19; Ex. A to Pl.’s Compl.).

3 Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the facts and proceedings only to 

the extent necessary to resolve this matter. 

4

JA007 (quoting ECF No. 50-4 at 17). 
4

accounts of what happened during the pivotal seconds before Singletary’s death.”5 

Crucially, the Officers presented conflicting accounts of how and why they stormed the 

bedroom and whether Singletary “lunged” at them with a knife after Officer Schutte kicked 

in the door.6

Singletary’s personal representatives (the Singletarys) filed claims against 

numerous parties. Relevant to this appeal, these included federal excessive force claims 

against the Officers.7 On the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the District Court 

found “the record reveals a genuine dispute of material facts as to whether the Defendant 

Officers used excessive force.”8 These material facts included “whether the Defendant 

Officers’ failure to conform to established police policy and storm the door, when 

Singletary was neither a flight risk nor a risk to others, was a proximate cause of 

Singletary’s shooting,”

9

and whether Ronald Singletary lunged at the Officers with a knife. 

The court found that these issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on qualified 

immunity, where the officers “knowingly violated police policy [and] there are significant 

factual inconsistencies that call into question the application of force and whether the 

5

JA034. 

6

JA007–08, 10–11. 

7 The Singletarys commenced this action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas by 

Writ of Summons, and the defendants removed it to federal court. With respect to the 

Officers, the Singletarys sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations 

based on use of excessive force and state-created danger. They additionally brought claims 

for assault and battery under Pennsylvania state law. The Singletarys alleged an additional 

federal excessive force claim against Officer Schutte alone. The District Court granted 

partial summary judgment to the Officers on the Singletarys’ state-created danger and 

failure to train claims. 

8

JA024. 

9

JA024.
5

Defendant Officers were acting in self-defense.”10 Accordingly, the court found the 

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claims as a matter 

of law. The Officers appealed. 

II. Discussion

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under the collateral

order doctrine,11 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we may exercise limited jurisdiction over 

an interlocutory order “to the extent that [the order] turns on an issue of law.”

12 Therefore, 

we may review “whether the set of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to 

establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right,” but not “whether the 

district court correctly identified the set of facts that the summary judgment record is 

sufficient to prove.”13 We recognize only a narrow exception to this limited jurisdiction in 

such cases: “[W]here the trial court’s determination that a fact is subject to reasonable 

10 JA038. 

11 The collateral order doctrine maintains that “an interlocutory order is immediately 

appealable as a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of § 1291 if it ‘[1] conclusively 

determine[s] the disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue completely separate 

from the merits of the action, and [3] [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 

judgment.’” Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 985–86 (3d Cir. 2014) 

(alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995)). 

12 Id. at 986 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–530 (1985)).

13 Id. (quoting Ziccardi v. City of Phila., 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002)); see also Williams

v. City of York, 967 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2020) (asserting this Court “lack[s] jurisdiction 

to review the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity when ‘the pretrial record sets 

forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial’”) (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320); Monteiro v.

City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen qualified immunity depends 

on disputed issues of fact, those issues must be determined by the jury.”).
6

dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may say so, even on 

interlocutory review.”14

The Officers argue that this exception to our limited jurisdiction applies here. 

Specifically, the Officers contend that the District Court reached the “factual conclusion” 

that Singletary did not lunge at the Officers with the knife, and that this conclusion was 

“blatantly” wrong because the Singletarys admitted the lunge in their Complaint and Local 

Rule 56.1 statement.15 In light of this purported concession, the Officers argue that the trial 

court’s contrary determination—that the fact of the lunge remains at issue—is blatantly 

and demonstrably false.

This argument is unavailing.16 The text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, 

which governs summary judgments, implies that a district court is not bound by the parties’ 

factual stipulations when those stipulations are contradicted by the record. As an initial 

matter, nothing in the rule states that a district court is so bound; rather, the rule requires 

that the moving party “show[],” i.e., convince, the district court that “there is no genuine 

14 Williams, 967 F.3d at 258 (quoting Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir.

2007)).

15 Officers’ Br. at 20, 23–25; see JA 52–53 (Officers’ Statement of Undisputed Material 

Facts ¶ 44–53); JA 57–58 (Singletarys’ Statement in Opposition ¶ 44–53). The Officers 

also cite a line from the Singletarys’ Complaint, which the Officers construe as an 

admission of the same. See JA 372 (Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 49). This line is ambiguously 

drafted, however, and could be read to plead only that the Officers claimed Singletary 

lunged.

16 We observe that the Officers appear to misstate the District Court’s conclusions. The 

court did not make a “determination that Singletary did not lunge.” Officers Br. 2. Rather, 

consistent with its obligations at summary judgment, the court found a sufficient 

evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party (i.e., the 

Singletarys) on this issue, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 

non-moving party’s favor. See JA017, 24, 25, 28.
7

dispute as to any material fact[.]”17 Additionally, the rule provides that “[t]he court need 

consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”18 

Because Rule 56 permits the District Court to review the entire record, and because nothing 

in the rule prevents the District Court from discounting a party’s stipulation when it is 

contradicted by the record, we should not impose an extra-textual limitation on Rule 56 

that would circumscribe the District Court’s discretion. Indeed, this case underscores the 

advantage of allowing the district court such leeway, as the decedent is unavailable to 

contest the Officers’ factual account.19

17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 

812, 820 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (“‘[A] district court may not rely solely on the statement of 

undisputed facts’ . . . . This admonition applies with equal force to this Court on appeal.”) 

(quoting Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1–800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir.

2004)).

18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

19 As the Dissent notes, we have long recognized that judicial admissions “are concessions 

in pleadings or briefs” and “bind the party who makes them.” Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. 

Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 211 & n.20 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). But we also gave some 

meaningful context and nuance to that rule when we said that, where there is “no evidence 

contradicting [an] admission,” and “no compelling reason” to contradict the plain meaning 

of an admission, a district court cannot contradict the admitted fact, and the admission 

necessarily “narrows the trial issues in the case[.]” Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. Div. of the 

BOC Grp., Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund of Phila. & Vicinity, 850 

F.2d 1028, 1036–37 (3d Cir. 1988). Our dissenting colleague would read our precedent as 

saying that an ill-chosen word in court filings overcomes any and all other evidence in the 

factual record, no matter how compelling. We do not believe our precedent so rigid that it 

requires that result. On the contrary, as suggested in Airco, if a district court finds a 

compelling reason to discount a party’s admission, the court should be free to do so. Here, 

the District Court found evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion that the Officers 

attempted to contrive a false account of what transpired in Singletary’s bedroom before 

Officer Schutte shot Singletary. We do not mean to imply that such a suspicion will turn 

out to be well-founded; only that it is not unreasonable on this record and so is a sufficient 

basis for the District Court to look past the admission.
8

Such is the case here. As the District Court explained, the record reflects the 

Officers’ conflicting testimonies concerning Ronald Singletary’s actions prior to the 

shooting. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Singletarys, as proper at summary 

judgment, the Officers’ testimony does not clearly support the conclusion that Singletary

lunged at them with a knife. Moreover, we advise district courts to “be cautious on 

summary judgment to ‘ensure that the officer is not taking advantage of the fact that the 

witness most likely to contradict his story—the person shot dead—is unable to testify.

[T]he court may not simply accept what may be a selfserving account by the officer.’”20 

Thus, the District Court exercised appropriate caution by reviewing the record 

independently rather than facially accepting the noted assertions. Because the record does 

not show that the District Court’s finding with respect to the lunge was blatantly and 

demonstrably false, we lack jurisdiction to review it. 

The Officers’ remaining arguments assume that we find Singletary lunged at the 

Officers with a knife. Because such a finding is beyond our jurisdiction, we neither 

consider nor address their remaining arguments. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the Officers’ appeal.

20 Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (emphasis 

added) (citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).
1

Estate of Ronald Singletary v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-3269

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

In declining jurisdiction over this appeal, the Majority Opinion validates the 

District Court’s disregard of two judicial admissions made by the Estate of Ronald 

Singletary. But the District Court erred in overriding those admissions, and such an error 

does not shield the denial of qualified immunity from appellate review.

Both admissions unequivocally confirm the same underlying fact: that Singletary 

lunged, with a knife, at officers attempting to arrest him for violating a protection from 

abuse order, which was issued based on allegations that he had choked a woman. First, 

the Estate’s own complaint alleges that “[Singletary] then walked toward Officer Navedo 

and lunged with the knife. Officer S[c]hutte then shot Singletary twice.” Compl. ¶ 48 

(App. 372) (emphasis added). Second, the Estate admitted the paragraph in the officers’ 

statement of material facts to the same effect:

Defendants’ Statement, Paragraph 49:

[Singletary] then charged at the officers with the knife in an 

overhead motion.

Plaintiffs’ Response, Paragraph 49: 

Admitted.

See Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 49 (App. 52) (emphasis added); Pls.’ Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 49 

(App. 58). 

This Circuit has long recognized that judicial admissions are “binding.” Berckeley

Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 211 & n.20 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). 

Statements in pleadings are judicial admissions by the party making the statement. See

Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining 

that no factfinding was necessary because the plaintiff “conceded” the dispositive facts 

“in her complaint”); see also 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 257 
2

(8th ed. July 2022 update) (explaining that statements in pleadings “are conclusive” as 

judicial admissions). So are factual admissions used as evidence at summary judgment. 

See Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. Div. of the BOC Grp., Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare

Pension Fund of Phila. & Vicinity, 850 F.2d 1028, 1037 (3d Cir. 1988) (“This admission 

is not merely another layer of evidence, upon which the district court can superimpose its 

own assessment of weight and validity.”); see also Federal Trial Objections § J30 (7th 

ed. Oct. 2020 update) (“[A] judicial admission is binding on the party making it and 

cannot be subsequently contradicted at trial or on appeal.”). 

This Circuit has previously relied on judicial admissions to decide excessive force 

cases. See Williams v. City of York, 967 F.3d 252, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2020) (immunizing 

officers in excessive force case where, “most importantly, in [the arrestee’s] summary 

judgment briefing, she conceded she cannot establish that any of the Officers were 

personally involved in the violations”). Every other federal appellate court with 

jurisdiction over such claims1 has done the same – sometimes using a victim’s admission 

against the victim, sometimes using a law enforcement officer’s admission against the 

officer.

2

 Thus, it was error for the District Court to override the two judicial admissions

1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1294; cf. id. § 1295 (defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal 

Circuit). 

2 See Estate of Rahim v. Doe, 51 F.4th 402, 407, 412, 414 n.12 (1st Cir. 2022) (relying on 

counsel’s admission that the deceased “had a knife”); Jeffreys v. City of New York, 

426 F.3d 549, 555 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on arrestee’s “multiple admissions” that 

“were neither ambiguous, confusing, nor incomplete”); Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 

112, 120 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2017) (relying on response to request for admission that 

“Admitted” resistance to arrest); Linicomn v. Hill, 902 F.3d 529, 540 & n.9 (5th Cir. 

2018) (relying on “admission of the facts” submitted in response to the Answer); Jones v.

City of Elyria, 947 F.3d 905, 917 (6th Cir. 2020) (relying on officers’ “own admission” 

that they tackled, struck, and tased the victim); O’Malley v. Litscher, 465 F.3d 799, 805 

(7th Cir. 2006) (relying on inmate’s “conce[ssion] that he told staff he would [resist]”); 

McManemy v. Tierney, 970 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 2020) (relying on arrestee’s 

“admissions,” which would “take on central importance”); Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 
3

and conclude that without those admissions there was a genuine dispute of material fact 

about excessive force.

The Majority Opinion recasts my position as being that “an ill-chosen word in 

court filings” could “overcome[] any and all other evidence in the factual record, no 

matter how compelling.” Maj. Op. at n.19. But that is not the case here. The admitted 

fact had a solid grounding in the record as the four officers all agreed: Singletary lunged 

with a knife.3 Thus, this case is not about an inadvertent mistake that should not receive 

dispositive weight; it involves nearly identical judicial admissions made on two separate 

occasions in court filings upon which courts are expected to rely.

Because the two admissions eliminate any dispute of material fact and place this 

matter in the heartland of qualified immunity, the District Court should have entered 

summary judgment in the officers’ favor. See City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 

575 U.S. 600, 605–06, 613 (2015) (immunizing officers applying deadly force in 

bedroom where the deceased threatened them with a knife); Reese v. Cnty. of

351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003) (relying on supervisory officer’s admission that “he 

observed the deputies struggling with [the] victim”); Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 

774, 781 (10th Cir. 1993) (relying on arrestee’s “admi[ssion]. . . that he was actively and 

openly resisting . . . attempts to handcuff him, even to the extent of biting the officers”); 

Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2015) (relying 

on arrestee’s “conce[ssion] that he had refused to surrender his hands”); DeGraff v.

District of Columbia, 120 F.3d 298, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (relying on arrestee’s admission 

at a deposition that “she had not suffered any physical injury” to limit her claim to 

“mental and emotional injuries”). 

3 See Officer Schaeffer Interview (App. 469) (“[H]e had the knife in his hand, I forget 

which hand. He got up, screamed, and went towards Nevado and that’s when [Officer]

Schutte discharged his weapon twice.”); Officer Navedo Interview (App. 474) (“He 

lunged at me again with the knife making the same kind of jabbing motion. At that point 

Officer Schutte discharged two times into his lower torso with his firearm.”); Officer 

Gresham Interview (App. 532) (“[H]e immediately popped back up, still holding the 

knife and again charged towards our direction.”); Officer Schutte Interview (App. 563) 

(“He proceeded to rush toward us with the knife in an overhand position and I discharged 

my weapon twice.”). 
4

Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2018) (immunizing officer applying 

deadly force in apartment after the deceased held “a knife in his hand in an elevated 

position”); cf. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.) (“Detached 

reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.”); Johnson v. City of 

Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 346–47, 352 (3d Cir. 2016) (dismissing a claim against an 

officer who applied deadly force after the deceased survived a taser and then attacked, 

reaching for the officer’s service weapon). To correct that error, I would have exercised 

jurisdiction over this appeal and reversed the denial of summary judgment. For that 

reason, I respectfully dissent.