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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 122,751

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

DONSHAI L. COPRIDGE,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER M. MAGANA, judge. Opinion filed June 4,

2021. Affirmed.

Jacob Nowak, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant county attorney, Marc Bennett, county attorney, and Derek 

Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., HILL, J., and MCANANY, S.J.

PER CURIAM: Donshai L. Copridge appeals the revocation of his probation and 

imposition of the underlying 72-month sentence for his convictions of possession of 

marijuana and drug paraphernalia with intent to distribute. On appeal, he argues the 

district court abused its discretion because no reasonable person would have revoked his 

probation and imposed the underlying sentence. We disagree and affirm the district 

court's ruling.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2017, Copridge pleaded guilty to one count each of felony possession of 

marijuana with intent to distribute, and one count of felony possession of drug 

paraphernalia with intent to distribute or manufacture. Under the plea, the State agreed to 

recommend a dispositional departure from presumptive prison to probation. The district 

court accepted the plea and in June 2017 sentenced Copridge to an underlying prison 

sentence of 72 months but released him on probation for a period of 36 months consistent 

with the plea agreement.

Almost two years later, the State filed a probation violation warrant alleging that 

Copridge failed to complete his GED program as a condition of probation and violated 

the law by committing battery and destruction of property. He stipulated to the violation 

at a hearing and the court imposed a two-day jail sanction with credit for time served.

A few months after that, the State filed a second probation violation warrant 

alleging that Copridge committed the crimes of unlawful distribution of a controlled 

substance and unlawful use of a communication facility in committing a felony in 

Sedgwick County case No. 19CR1918. A month later, the State filed a third probation 

violation warrant alleging that Copridge committed the crime of resisting or obstructing 

arrest and he was at a bar in violation of his probation.

In January 2020, Copridge entered a guilty plea in case No. 19CR1918 to one 

count of distribution of marijuana. The district court conducted a joint hearing in March 

2020 on the probation violations and sentencing in 19CR1918. After Copridge stipulated 

to the violations, the court sentenced Copridge to a controlling sentence of 37 months in 

19CR1918, and then revoked probation in the current case. As for the probation 

revocation, the court found that intermediate sanctions were not required because 
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Copridge had committed a new crime while on probation and because his original 

sentence resulted from a dispositional departure.

Copridge timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

Copridge argues the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 

probation and imposed his prison sentence, thus warranting reversal. Copridge contends 

no reasonable person would agree with the court's decision to revoke his probation 

because his crimes were all nonviolent drug offenses, and because he had succeeded in 

completing the terms of his probation for nearly two years before his recent struggles.

The standard of review is abuse of discretion.

Because Copridge stipulated to violating his probation, the only question before 

this court is whether the district court correctly determined that revocation was warranted 

rather than reinstatement of probation or the imposition of intermediate sanctions. An 

appellate court reviews a district court's decision to revoke an offender's probation for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Coleman, 311 Kan. 332, 334, 460 P.3d 828 (2020). A judicial 

action constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; based 

on an error of law; or based on an error of fact. State v. Ingham, 308 Kan. 1466, 1469, 

430 P.3d 931 (2018). Unless the district court has made a legal or factual error, an 

appellate court may find an abuse of discretion only when no reasonable person would 

agree with the district court's decision. State v. Brown, 51 Kan. App. 2d 876, Syl. ¶ 4, 357 

P.3d 296 (2015). The party asserting the district court abused its discretion bears the 

burden of showing such abuse of discretion. State v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 739, 415 

P.3d 430 (2018).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Copridge's probation and 

ordering him to serve the balance of his term in prison.

Because Copridge committed his original crimes in 2016, the district court was 

limited to the probation revocation scheme in effect at that time. And as he 

acknowledges, under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3716(c)(8) a court can revoke probation and 

impose the underlying sentence without having previously imposed an intermediate 

sanction "[i]f the offender commits a new felony or misdemeanor . . . while the offender 

is on probation." So the district court had the authority here to bypass any intermediate 

sanctions that would normally be required.

We pause to note that the district court also made a finding that it was not required 

to first impose intermediate sanctions because it had originally granted a dispositional 

departure in this case. That exception, currently found at K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-

3716(c)(7)(B), allows a court to revoke probation without intermediate sanctions if 

probation "was originally granted as the result of a dispositional departure." Although 

Copridge does not challenge this aspect of the court's decision, the court could not rely on 

the dispositional departure exception because it became effective after he committed his 

original crimes of conviction in 2016. See Coleman, 311 Kan. at 337 (holding 

dispositional departure exception enacted in 2017 "applies only to probationers whose 

offenses or crimes of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2017"). 

That said, Copridge argues that the district court abused its discretion in relying 

mainly on the new crime exception to revoke his probation. He asserts that he did well on 

probation for two years; he had an impressive work history; and his employer was even 

willing to rehire him even though he had been in jail for six months simply awaiting a 

hearing on the current probation violation. He noted he was only one credit short of 

obtaining his GED. He relies on State v. Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 233, 911 P.2d 792 

(1996)—a case interpreting factors to consider in ruling on a departure motion—in
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support of his argument that "'[p]rison space should be reserved for serious/violent 

offenders'" and that "'[t]he degree of sanctions imposed should be based on the harm 

inflicted.'" 259 Kan. at 233.

We agree with Copridge that just because a district court can impose Copridge's 

full prison sentence under these circumstances, does not conclusively establish that it 

must or should. The court must consider all the circumstances. But based on a review of 

the record, we find nothing unreasonable about the district court's decision. The court 

credited Copridge for only having one probation violation before his current violations, 

saying, "normally, that would bode pretty well for someone in [his] situation." Yet the 

court found it significant that he pleaded guilty to distribution of marijuana while he was 

on probation in the current case for essentially the same offense. Moreover, his most 

recent conviction was his third such offense. The court adjudicated him guilty of 

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute as a juvenile six years before the charges 

in the current case. It was not unreasonable for the court to conclude that revocation was 

appropriate because Copridge's actions showed he was not learning his lesson by 

continuing to commit the same crime over again. Put another way, Copridge has failed to 

establish that no reasonable person would have revoked his probation and imposed the 

underlying sentence.

For these reasons, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

revoking Copridge's probation and ordering him to serve the balance of this sentence in 

prison.

Affirmed.