J-A01023-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL TEIL CHAPMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1421 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 15, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-45-CR-0002046-2017

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 04, 2020

Michael Teil Chapman (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after the trial court found him guilty of possession with 

intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance (PWID).1 On appeal, 

Appellant challenges the denial of his suppression motion. After careful 

review, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, reverse the order 

denying the suppression motion, and remand this matter to the trial court.

The trial court summarized the facts as follows:

On August 18, 2017, Trooper Joseph Urban of the Pennsylvania 

State Police observed a vehicle traveling on Interstate 380 North 

in the left passing lane for approximately a mile, with the right 

lane readily available. The vehicle’s speed also fluctuated 

between 65 and 73 miles per hour in a 70 mile per hour zone. 

Trooper Urban made these observations while following 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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[Appellant] for about one mile. Trooper Urban pulled the vehicle 

over and initiated a traffic stop. Trooper Urban noticed that the 

registration of the vehicle began with “HPC,” which indicated to 

him that it was a newer registration, even though the vehicle was 

an older model.

During the stop, Trooper Urban noticed [Appellant] exhibiting 

visible signs of extreme nervousness. Trooper Urban saw 

[Appellant]’s hand shaking, and several facial tremors.

Following a discussion with [Appellant], Trooper Urban decided 

to issue a warning in lieu of a citation. Trooper Urban stated to 

[Appellant] that he appeared “overly nervous,” noting that his 

eyelid had quivered and his voice cracked. He immediately asked 

[Appellant] if there was anything illicit in the vehicle. Trooper 

Urban then asked for consent to search the vehicle, and when 

[Appellant] declined[,] Trooper Urban said “You have every right

to refuse consent,” and “I don’t want to talk you into it,” instead 

indicating he would call for a canine team to come to sniff the 

vehicle. Trooper Urban provided [Appellant] the consent form and 

made efforts to go over it with him, but when [Appellant]

continued to waiver about consenting to the search, Trooper 

Urban decided to call the canine unit. While waiting, Trooper 

Urban twice had to tell [Appellant] he could not return to his 

vehicle.

About 45 minutes after calling the canine unit, the dog, Micho, 

and his handler, Corporal Doblovasky, arrived and conducted an 

exterior search of the vehicle. Micho alerted, signaling the 

presence of narcotics. Based upon the alert, Trooper Urban and

Troopers Sohns and Doblovasky conducted a search of the interior 

of the vehicle. There were groceries in the rear of the vehicle and 

the Troopers noted that even the perishable food items were room 

temperature, indicating to the Troopers to examine them further. 

Upon close inspection of the groceries, the Troopers found 

approximately 220 grams of cocaine in sealed bags inside a plastic 

Folgers coffee container, located in the back of the vehicle.

On August 18, 2017, a criminal complaint was filed against 

[Appellant]. A preliminary hearing was held on August 30, 2017 

and the charges were bound over. Formal arraignment was held 

on October 11, 2017. On November 6, 2017, [Appellant] filed his 

[suppression motion]. We held a hearing on [Appellant]’s 
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[m]otion on January 18, 2018, briefs were ordered and 

submitted[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/18, at 1-3 (record citations omitted). On July 6, 2018, 

the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion.

On March 1, 2019, following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant 

guilty of PWID. On April 15, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 4 to 

24 months minus one day of incarceration. On May 7, 2019, Appellant timely 

appealed to this Court.

Appellant presents the following issues for review:

A. Did the trial court err in finding that the traffic stop was valid 

based on “reasonable suspicion” that [Appellant] had committed 

a non-investigable traffic offense?

B. Did the trial court err in finding that the police had “reasonable 

suspicion” to detain [Appellant] after the traffic stop?

C. Did the trial court err in finding that it was reasonable to detain 

[Appellant] for over 1 hour when he didn’t even receive a citation?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Each of Appellant’s three issues challenge the trial court’s denial of his 

suppression motion. Therefore, we address these issues together, mindful of 

the following:

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 
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supported by the record, [the appellate court] is bound by [those] 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted). Importantly, our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited 

to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing. In re 

L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013).

First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining his traffic 

stop was constitutional. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court 

wrongly concluded that Trooper Urban had reasonable suspicion to stop 

Appellant’s vehicle for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3313(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania 

Vehicle Code. Appellant contends that a police officer must have probable 

cause to stop an individual suspected of violating Section 3313(d)(1).

“The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d 

889, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012). “To secure the right of citizens to be free from 

such [unreasonable] intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law 

enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify 

their interactions with citizens as those interactions become more intrusive.” 

Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 563 (Pa. Super. 2007). Courts in 
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this Commonwealth have recognized three types of interactions between the 

police and a citizen: a mere encounter, an investigative detention, and a 

custodial detention.

A mere encounter between police and a citizen need not be 

supported by any level of suspicion, and carr[ies] no official 

compulsion on the part of the citizen to stop or to respond. An 

investigatory stop, which subjects a suspect to a stop and a period 

of detention . . . requires a reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity is afoot. A custodial search is an arrest and must be

supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Newsome, 170 A.3d 1151, 1154 (Pa. Super. 2017).

With respect to the quantum of cause necessary to conduct a traffic 

stop, the relevant statutory authority is Section 6308(b) of the Pennsylvania 

Vehicle Code, which provides:

Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of 

checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a 

violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a 

vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the 

vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle

identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or 

to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably 

believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).

Section 6308(b) requires only reasonable suspicion in support of a 

vehicle stop for gathering information necessary to enforce the Vehicle Code 

violation. However, a police officer must have probable cause to support a 

vehicle stop where the officer’s investigation following the stop serves no 

“investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected [Motor Vehicle Code] 
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violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (en banc), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 397 (Pa. 2011).

Our Supreme Court explained:

Indeed, the language of § 6308 reflects this very intent. Stops 

based on reasonable suspicion are allowed for a stated 

investigatory purpose: “to secure such other information as the 

officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the 

provisions of this title.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). This is conceptually 

equivalent to the purpose of a Terry[

2] stop. It does not allow all 

stops to be based on the lower quantum – it merely allows this for 

investigatory stops, consistent with the requirements of both 

federal and state constitutions. We interpret the legislature’s 

modification of § 6308 as merely eliminating the statutory 

requirement of a greater level of information for a stop under the 

Vehicle Code than is constitutionally required for all other stops.

Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008). “[I]f the officer 

has a legitimate expectation of investigatory results, the existence of 

reasonable suspicion will allow the stop – if the officer has no such 

expectations of learning additional relevant information concerning the 

suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot be constitutionally permitted on 

the basis of mere suspicion.” Id. at 115. Therefore, “when the existence of 

reasonable suspicion combines with the expectation that the stop will allow 

light to be shed on the relevant matters, the stop is not unconstitutional.” Id.

Trooper Urban stopped Appellant based on his determination that 

Appellant had violated Section 3313(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. 

Section 3313(d)(1) provides:

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2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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(d) Driving in right lane.--

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and unless otherwise 

posted, upon all limited access highways having two or more 

lanes for traffic moving in the same direction, all vehicles shall 

be driven in the right-hand lanes when available for traffic 

except when any of the following conditions exist:

(i) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding 

in the same direction.

(ii) When traveling at a speed greater than the traffic flow.

(iii) When moving left to allow traffic to merge.

(iv) When preparing for a left turn at an intersection, exit or 

into a private road or driveway when such left turn is legally 

permitted.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3313(d)(1).

With this authority in mind, we conclude that the trial court improperly 

determined that reasonable suspicion was the necessary quantum of cause 

for stopping Appellant under Section 3313(d)(1). Instead, Trooper Urban 

needed probable cause to stop Appellant for violating Section 3313(d)(1), as

Trooper Urban could not have possessed a legitimate expectation of learning 

additional relevant information concerning whether Appellant was driving in 

the appropriate lane during the stop. See Chase, 960 A.2d at 115-16. 

Although the trial court incorrectly determined reasonable suspicion was the 

appropriate standard in this case, Appellant’s traffic stop was nevertheless 

constitutional because it was supported by probable cause.

Probable cause exists “where the facts and circumstances within the 

officers’ knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in 
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the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth 

v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 883 (Pa. Super. 2015). Trooper Urban testified at 

Appellant’s suppression hearing to observing the following:

[Trooper Urban]: Upon catching up to [Appellant’s] vehicle, I 

observed the vehicle traveling in the left lane when the right lane 

was readily available for travel. The vehicle was not passing 

anybody, did not exit on the left, never allowed any cars to merge 

on from the right.

Q. Did it pass any entrance ramps? You said there were no 

entrance ramps?

A. There were no entrance ramps -- there are no exit ramps when 

you exit on the left. This occurred for approximately one mile I 

observed this violation. So as a result of the violation, 

Pennsylvania Vehicle Code 3313(d)(1), I initiated a traffic stop.

N.T., 1/18/18, at 9.

The record reflects that Trooper Urban observed Appellant violating 

Section 3313(d)(1) for approximately one mile. Thus, although the trial court 

improperly identified reasonable suspicion as the appropriate quantum of 

cause necessary to stop Appellant in this case, Trooper Urban nevertheless 

had probable cause to stop Appellant for violating Section 3313(d)(1). 

Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that his traffic stop was unconstitutional is 

meritless.

For his second and third issues, Appellant argues that Trooper Urban

impermissibly extended the traffic stop and improperly conducted a canine 

sniff of the vehicle. Appellant contends that Trooper Urban lacked reasonable 
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suspicion of criminal activity beyond the initial reason for the stop and 

therefore, could not detain Appellant and his vehicle for a canine sniff.

During a traffic stop, an officer “may ask the detainee a moderate 

number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information 

confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 

U.S. 420, 439 (1984). “[I]f there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation . . 

. additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop’s purpose has been 

fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate the new 

suspicions.” Chase, 960 A.2d at 115 n.5. This Court has held that such 

investigations, including a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle, must be 

supported by reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 

1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[C]onsidering the relatively minor privacy 

interest in the exterior of the vehicle and the minimal intrusion occasioned by 

a canine sniff, . . . mere reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, [is] 

required prior to [a dog] sniffing the exterior of [a] vehicle.”).

Our Supreme Court has explained:

A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an 

investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual 

is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. Cook, [] 735 

A.2d 673, 676 ([Pa.] 1999). “This standard, less stringent than 

probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion.” Id.

In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable 

suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. 

In re D.M., [] 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 ([Pa.] 2001). In making this 

determination, we must give “due weight . . . to the specific 

reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from 

the facts in light of his experience.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 [] (1968)). Also, the 
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totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an 

examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal 

conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when 

taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police 

officer.” [Id.]

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004).

We conclude that Trooper Urban lacked the reasonable suspicion 

necessary to detain Appellant for a canine sniff. Trooper Urban’s testimony 

points to three reasons for his determination that he had reasonable suspicion 

to detain Appellant for a canine sniff of his vehicle. First, Appellant was 

traveling from Brooklyn, New York, a known source area, west on Interstates

80 and 380, a known drug corridor. N.T., 1/18/18, at 8, 26, 29. Second, 

although Appellant’s license plate indicated that his automobile was a newly 

registered vehicle, he was actually driving “an older model SUV.” Id. at 7. 

Third, Appellant exhibited abnormal and excessive nervousness while 

speaking with Trooper Urban. Id. at 26-27.

On their face, these factors are each innocuous. Although this Court 

has frequently stated that even a combination of innocent facts, when 

considered together, can warrant further investigation by the police, this case 

does not present such a situation. In short, the trial court based its finding of 

reasonable suspicion on Appellant becoming nervous after Trooper Urban 

pulled him over for driving in the left lane while traveling west from Brooklyn,

New York along Interstates 80 and 380 in a used car. Even considering the 

totality of the circumstances, there is no indicia of criminal activity in this fact 
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scenario, as these set of facts could apply to any number of the many 

individuals who the police stop along Interstates 80 and 380 in Pennsylvania.

The only fact that arguably could point to criminal activity was 

Appellant’s extreme and excessive nervousness. This Court, however, has 

repeatedly stated that “while nervous behavior is a relevant factor, 

nervousness alone is not dispositive and must be viewed in the totality of the 

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 896 A.2d 601, 606 n.7 (Pa. Super. 

2006). Moreover,

It is the rare person who is not agitated to some extent when 

stopped by police, even if the driver is a law-abiding citizen who 

simply failed to notice or repair a broken taillight or was unaware 

that he or she was driving above the speed limit. Whether 

described as nervousness, apprehension, concern or otherwise, 

forced interaction with a police officer is not an everyday 

occurrence for the average citizen.

Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 305-06 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc).

Based on our review of the certified record on appeal, we conclude that 

Trooper Urban lacked reasonable suspicion to extend his traffic stop of 

Appellant for a canine sniff. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence, reverse the order denying Appellant’s suppression motion, and 

remand this matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this 

decision.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Suppression order reversed. Case 

remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judge Colins joins the memorandum.

Judge Nichols concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/4/20