J-A33027-16

2017 PA Super 60

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.B., A MINOR,

APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 527 WDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order Dated March 11, 2016, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County, 

Criminal Division, at No: CP-42-JV-0000063-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2017

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered on 

March 11, 2016, which granted the motion to suppress filed on behalf of 

N.B. (Appellee).1 We reverse the order and remand this case for further 

proceedings.

On April 28, 2016, Appellee’s mother (Mother) received information 

from her daughter that Appellee and his twin brother, D.B., then 14 years 

old, had engaged in sexual conduct with a nine-year-old female who lived in 

an adjacent apartment. Mother confronted Appellee and his brother, both of 

whom confirmed the allegations. Mother reported the conduct to the boys’ 

school district. In response, Lieutenant Steve Caskey of the Bradford Police 

 

1 The Commonwealth filed its notice of appeal on April 8, 2016; the 

Commonwealth included in the notice its certification that suppression would 

substantially hinder its prosecution of the case. See Notice of Appeal, 

4/8/2016. “In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the 

Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not 

end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of 

appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the 

prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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Department requested that Appellee and his brother be brought to the police 

station for an interview. Based on the inculpatory statements elicited during 

that interview, the Commonwealth filed a written allegation of delinquency. 

On December 1, 2015, Appellee’s attorney filed a motion to suppress.2 A 

hearing was held on that motion on February 17, 2016. On March 11, 2016, 

the juvenile court granted Appellee’s motion. This timely appeal followed. 

Both the Commonwealth and the juvenile court complied with the mandates 

of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The Commonwealth presents the following issue for our review.

Did the [juvenile] court err in granting [Appellee’s] motion 

to suppress where [Appellee] consulted with [Mother] prior to 

police questioning, and where [Mother] voluntarily brought 

[Appellee] to the police station, and where [Appellee] and 

[Mother] were both read their Miranda[3]rights, with each 

indicating that they understood those rights?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization and underlining 

omitted).

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, the 

relevant scope and standard of review is as follows.

[W]e are required to determine whether the record supports the 

factual findings of the suppression court, and we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

 

2 Appellee’s case proceeded separately from that of his brother. The motion 

and order at issue here concern only Appellee’s statements to police. 

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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therefrom are in error. Since [the j]uvenile prevailed below, we 

consider only the evidence of [the j]uvenile and so much of the 

Commonwealth’s evidence that is un-contradicted when read in 

the context of the entire record. Concomitantly, where the 

questions presented concern legal questions, we are not bound 

by the suppression court’s determinations and our standard of 

review is de novo.

In re T.P., 78 A.3d 1166, 1169 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Instantly, the Commonwealth argues that the juvenile court erred in 

granting Appellee’s motion to suppress because the totality of the 

circumstances presented here demonstrates that Appellee’s confession was 

made voluntarily. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12.

In [Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283, 1287 

(Pa. 1984)], which addressed a juvenile’s waiver of his Miranda

rights in the context of providing a confession during police 

interrogation, our Supreme Court held: 

The requirements of due process are satisfied, 

and the protection against the use of involuntary 

confessions which law and reason demand is met by 

application of the totality of circumstances analysis 

to all questions involving the waiver of rights and the 

voluntariness of confessions made by juveniles. All of 

the attending facts and circumstances must be 

considered and weighed in determining whether a 

juvenile’s confession was knowingly and freely given. 

Among those factors are the juvenile’s youth, 

experience, comprehension, and the presence or 

absence of an interested adult.

Id. at 1288. Other factors to consider in this context also include 

“(1) the duration and means of an interrogation; (2) the 

[juvenile’s] physical and psychological state; (3) the conditions

attendant to the detention; (4) the attitude of the interrogator; 

and (5) any and all other factors that could drain a person’s 

ability to withstand suggestion and coercion.” In re V.C., 66 
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A.3d 341, 351 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (providing further that waiver must be made 

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently).

In re N.M., 141 A.3d 539, 543–44 (Pa. Super. 2016) (footnotes omitted). 

The “interested adult” rule ... provided that no person 

under the age of eighteen years could waive his right to remain 

silent and his right to the assistance of counsel without being 

provided an opportunity to consult with an interested adult, who 

is informed of the juvenile’s rights and is interested in the 

welfare of the juvenile.” Williams, 475 A.2d at 1286–87. ...[T]he 

presence or absence of an interested adult is no longer a per se

requirement, but one factor in determining the voluntariness of a 

juvenile’s waiver of his or her Miranda rights. Id. at 1288; In 

re V.C., 66 A.3d [at] 351[].

Id. at 547 n. 2.

As to the aforementioned factors, the certified record establishes the 

following.

A recording of the interview was introduced into evidence. 

When Officer Caskey met with [Appellee], his brother, and 

Mother, Officer Caskey read Miranda warnings to all of them 

and explained that the room and interviews were being audio 

and visually recorded. No waivers were signed by Mother, 

[Appellee], or his twin brother. [Officer Caskey explained that, 

due to the nature of the case, that criminal charges may be filed. 

N.T., 2/17/2016]. Officer Caskey explained very clearly that 

Mother was permitted to be present for the interviews, but he 

preferred to speak with each of them individually. Mother 

acquiesced and let the boys be interviewed individually. Officer 

Caskey first interviewed [Appellee], then his twin. During the 

interview, [Appellee] understood why he was there and was 

forthright with Officer Caskey in answering the questions. 

[Appellee] disclosed his actions in detail. 

The interview took place in an office and was audio and 

visually recorded. There was a desk between Officer Caskey and 

[Appellee]. Officer Caskey remained seated in his desk for the 
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entirety of the interview. [Appellee] was seated across the desk 

and the door was immediately behind him. There were no 

barriers or obstacles between [Appellee] and the door. The door 

was closed, but it remained unlocked at all times. Officer Caskey 

maintained a calm and cool manner during questioning. He did 

not yell or threaten [Appellee]. [Appellee] was never restrained. 

[Appellee] did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs 

or alcohol and had a normal physical appearance. [Appellee] 

was responsive to questioning and disclosed many details to 

Officer Caskey and agreed to meet again for additional 

interviews. The interview in question lasted a total of twentyseven (27) minutes, with [Appellee] being interviewed 

individually for approximately ten (10) minutes.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/12/2016, at 1-3 (unnumbered).

At the suppression hearing, Mother testified that she understood the 

Miranda warnings. N.T., 2/17/2016, at 14. She also indicated that, at the 

time of the interview, she understood there could be criminal consequences 

as a result of her sons’ actions, although “not to the extent” to which she is 

now aware. Id. However, on redirect examination, she stated that Appellee 

could not have understood the legal ramifications of his statement because 

she did not understand. Id. at 27. Appellee testified that he had difficulty 

understanding in school, id. at 48-49; that he affirmed he understood his 

Miranda warnings at the time of the interview but had no appreciation for 

the meaning of those warnings, id. at 47-49; and that all he understood was 

“that [he] was in trouble and that [he] had to own up to it,” id. at 54.
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Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court determined that Appellee’s 

statements should be suppressed because Appellee “participated in the 

interview under compulsion of a parent[; therefore], the disclosures made 

were not voluntary.” Juvenile Court Opinion, at 5 (unnumbered). Notably, 

the juvenile court found Mother’s testimony “less than credible.” Id. 

7/1/2016, at 4 (unnumbered). Rather, the court “considered most strongly 

[Appellee’s] own testimony that he believed he was forced to be there by his 

mother and that he was directed to confess.” Id. at 4-5 (unnumbered).

We are mindful that, in evaluating whether a statement to police 

satisfies the requirements of due process we are “constrained to examine 

only whether an individual’s confession was the product of coercion, duress, 

or the use of other measures by interrogators deliberately calculated to 

overcome his or her free will.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 14 A.3d 798, 

815 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Accordingly, our 

concern with respect to the voluntariness of Appellee’s confession is coercion 

by law enforcement. Here, Appellee did not testify that Officer Caskey 

behaved inappropriately during the interview. Rather, the record reveals 

quite the opposite. 

Specifically with respect to Mother, Williams and its progeny support 

the presence of an interested adult who can advise a juvenile as to his rights 

and act in his best interest as one factor in determining the voluntariness of 
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a juvenile’s confession. Here, Mother brought Appellee to the police station 

and advised him to tell the truth. However, these actions cannot be 

reasonably interpreted to rise to the level of coercion such that suppression 

is warranted. The juvenile court erred in conflating the actions of Mother 

with prohibited conduct by law enforcement. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellee, as we 

must, the record demonstrates that the statements during Appellee’s 

interview were made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Accordingly, 

we hold that the juvenile court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to 

suppress. 

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judge Lazarus joins.

Judge Solano files a dissenting opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2017