1

08

- 16 69

- cv K u h n e v . Cohe n & Sl amow i t z, LL P 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 3

_______________ 4 5 August Term, 2008 6 7 (Argued: May

19, 2009 Dec ided: August 27, 2009) 8 9 Docke t No. 08-1669-c v 10 11

_______________ 12 13 P A U L K UHNE , 14 15 Plain tif f- Ap pe lla nt, 16 17 —v.— 18 19 C OHE N & S L AMO W I TZ , L L P, M I DL AND F UNDI NG NCC-2 C O RP ., 20 21 Defendants-A ppellees

. 22 23 24

_______________ 25 26 B e f o r e : 27 28 S TR AUB , H A LL , and L I VI NGS TON , Circuit Judges

. 29 30

_______________ 31 32 On appe al from a judgme nt of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 33 New Y ork (Ha

rold Ba er, Jr., Judge ), g rantingsummary judgme nt in favor of

defe ndants and 34 dismiss ing pla intiff’s complaint in its entirety . Plaintiff Paul Kuhne alleg es that def endant 35 Mid land

F un din gNC C- 2 Co rp or atio n is a “ de bt c oll e c tio n a g e nc y” un de r N e w Y or k Ci ty 36 Administrative Code § 20-489(a ) and is thus requir ed under § 20-490 to be lice nsed by the New 37 York City

Depa rtment of Consumer Af

fairs in orde r to eng ag e in debt collec tion activities in the 38 City

of Ne w Y or k. He a lle g e s th at be c a

us e NC C- 2 d id n ot h ave su c h a lic e ns e , d e fe nd ants 39 violated the F air De bt Coll ection Prac tices Ac t, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. , and Ne w York G ener al2 1 Business L aw § 349 whe n defe ndant Cohen & Slamowitz , L L P filed a lawsuit ag ainst him on 2 behalf

of NCC-2 see king to c ollect from him def aulted consume r debt that NCC-2 had pur chase d 3 from his orig inal cre ditor. The par ties do not dispute that NCC-2 eng ag es in the business of 4 p urc h as i n g d ef

au l t edco n s um er

d eb tan d au th o ri z es th i rdp arty

d eb tco l l ec t i o nage n ci es t o en gage 5 in d e bt c oll e c tio n a c tiv iti e s to c oll e c t th at de bt, inc lud ingthe fi lin gof laws uit s in

NC C- 2’ s n ame 6 in t

he e ve nt t hat th e ir ini tia l e ff or ts a re un su c c e ssf

ul. Th e iss ue is whe the r, un de r t he se 7 circ umstances, NCC-2 is a de bt collection ag ency under N .Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489(a)

. 8 Be cause (1) the A

ppellate Divisions of Ne w York State Supre me Court and the Ne w York Court 9 of Appe als have not addre ssed this question, (2) the lower courts ar e not in ag ree ment on the 10 issue, (3) the te x t of the statute fa ils to provide an unmistakable a nswer, a nd (4) a rec ent 11 amendment of

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489(a ) complicates our dete rmination of the leg islative 12 int e nt, we re sp e c tf ull y be lie ve that th e Ne w Y or k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls s ho uld

have the fi rs t 13 op po rt

un ity to d e te rm ine the iss ue . I f t he Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls a

ns we rs thi s q

ue sti on in 14 the af

firmative, then w e re spectfully reque st that it also address whe ther de fenda nts violated New 15 York Gene ral B usiness L aw § 349 by virtue of NCC-2’s status a s the named pla intiff in the debt 16 collection suit ag ainst Kuhne. 17

_______________ 18 19 B R I AN L. B ROM BERG , B ro mbe rgL aw O ff ic e , P. C., Ne w Y or

k, NY , f or Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt. 20 21 T H O M A S A. L EG H O RN , Wil son, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & D icker L L P (J ay A. Wechsler, on 22 the brief

), Whit e Pla ins , N Y, fo r D e fe nd ants -A pp e lle e s. 23 24 C AR OL YN E. C OF F EY , MFY L eg al Service s, Inc. (AndrewGoldberg , Anamar ia Segura, on the 25 brief

; J eane tte Z elhof, of counsel), Ne w York, N Y for MF Y L eg al Service s, Inc. as amicus cur iae 26 in s up

po rt o f P lai nti ff

- Appellant

. 27

_______________ 28 29 STRAUB, Circuit Judge : 30 31 Plaintiff Paul Kuhne appe als from a judgme nt of the United States District Court for the 32 Southern District of Ne w York ( Har old Ba er, Jr., Judge ), ente red on Ma rch 6, 2008, granting 33 summary

judgme nt in favor of

defe ndants and dismissing Kuhne ’s complaint in its entirety

. 34 Kuhne a lleg es that def endant Midland F unding N CC-2 Corp. (“NCC-2”) is a “de bt collection 35 ag ency” under

New Y ork City

Administrative Code (“N .Y.C. Admin. Code” or “ Code”) § 20- 36 489(a) and is thus require d under § 20- 490 to be license d by the New York City

Depa rtment ofWhil e this appea l was pending , the City Council of the City

of Ne w York a

mended 1 cer tain provisions of the N.Y.C. Admin. Code re lating to de bt collection, includingsection 20- 489(a) . Unless otherw ise indicated, a ll citations to t he Code re fer to the version in ef

fec t at the time of the alleg ed wr ong doing. 3 1 Consumer Aff

airs (“ DCA”) in or der to e ng ag e in debt collec tion activities in the Cit y of Ne w 2 Yo rk . H e a lle g e s th at be c a us e NC C- 2 d id n ot h ave su c h a lic e ns e , d e fe nd ants vio late d th e F a ir 3 Debt Collection Practice s Act (“ FDCPA”) , 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. , and Ne w York G ener al 4 Business L aw ( “N.Y. G EN . B US . LAW ” ) § 3 4 9 w h e nd e f e n d an tC o h e n& S l am o w i t z , LLP 5 (“C& S”) filed a

lawsuit ag ainst him on behalf of N CC-2 seekingto collect fr om him defaulted 6 consumer de bt that NCC-2 had purcha sed fr om his original c reditor. 7 Until rece ntly , section 20-489( a) of the Code def

ined “de bt collection ag ency” as “ a 8 pe rs on

e ng a g e d in

bu sin e ss t

he pr inc ipa l pu

rp os e of wh ic h is to r e gula

rl y c oll e c t or atte mpt to 9 collect de bts owed or due or asse rted to be ow ed or due to another.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20- 10 489(a)

. Section 20-490, in turn, makes it “unla wful for any person to ac t as a de bt collection 1 11 ag ency

without first havingobtained a lice nse” f rom the DCA. Id. § 20-490. The pa rties do not 12 dispute that NCC-2 eng ag es in the business of purc hasingdefa ulted consumer de bt and 13 authorizes third party debt collec tion ag encie s to eng ag e in debt collec tion activities to collect 14 that de bt, inc lud ingthe fi lin gof laws uit s in

NC C- 2’ s n ame in t

he e ve nt t hat th e ir ini tia l e ff or ts 15 are unsucce ssful. The issue on appe al is whether , under the se circ umstances, NCC-2 is a de bt 16 collection ag ency under the pre- amendment ve rsion of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489( a). 17 The Appe llate Divisions of New Y ork State Supreme Court a nd the New

York Court of 18 Appea ls have not addr essed this question, and we do not believe the te x t of the statute provide sL ocal L aw No. 15 is available at 2 http:// www.nyc.g ov/html/ dca/downloa ds/pdf/law09015.pdf. 4 1 an unmistakable a

nswer. While the we ight of the authority

in New Yor

k appea rs to support 2 defe ndants’ position that NCC-2 is nota debt c ollection ag ency , Kuhne’ s position i s not without 3 su pp or t. M or e ov e r, a s n ote d, the City Counc il r e c e ntl y

e na c te d le g isl atio n th at ame nd s N .Y .C. 4 Admin. Code § 20-489(a ), which be came eff ective July

16, 2009, to unambiguously include 5 entities such as NCC-2 within the def inition of debt collection ag ency . See N.Y.C. L ocal L aw 6 No. 15 (2009) ( Council I nt. No. 660-A). The leg islative history of L ocal L aw No. 15 states that 2 7 it is a clarific ation of the law , there by imply ing that the pre- amendment ve rsion of § 20-489( a) 8 treats entities such as NCC-2 as debt c ollection ag encie s. Under the se circ umstances, we 9 re sp e c tf

ull y be lie ve that th e Ne w Y or k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls s ho uld

have the op po rt

un ity to 10 deter

mine whether

the pre -ame ndment version of § 20- 489(a) includes within its definition of 11 “ de bt c oll e c tio n a g e nc y” e nti tie s su c h a s N CC- 2. I f t he Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls a c c e pts thi s 12 c e rt if

ic atio n a nd ans we rs thi s q

ue sti on in t he a ff ir mativ e , th e n w e re sp e c tf

ull y re qu e st t hat it a lso 13 addre ss whether

defe ndants violated N.Y. G EN . B US . LAW § 349 by virtue of NCC-2’s status a s 14 the named pla intiff in the debt collec tion suitag ainst Kuhne. 15 BACK GR OUND 16 Th e fo llo wi ngfa c ts a re un dis pute d. NC C- 2 is a De lawa re c or po ra tio n a nd is i nd ir e c tly 17 owned by

Encore Capital Group, Inc. (“ Encore ”), a lso a Dela war e cor poration. NCC-2 is in the 18 business of purc hasingdefa ulted debt. It has no employ ees a nd is not li cense d as a de bt 19 collection ag ency by the DCA.5 1 NC C- 2 is ind ir e c tly owne d b y

and ha s a se rv ic inga g re e me nt w ithMid land Cr e dit 2 Mana g e me nt, Inc . ( “ MCM ” ) p ur su ant t o whic h M CM e ng a g e s in c oll e c tio n a c tiv iti e s o n b e ha lf 3 of NC C- 2. MCM is a lso owne d b y En c or e , b ut, un lik e NC C- 2, is d uly lic e ns e d b y

the DC A a s a 4 debt collec tion ag ency . MCM ini tially attempts to collect a de bt by contac ting the de btor by 5 telephone a

nd letter, a

nd, in the event that these eff orts fail, it forwa

rds the debt to a loc al, debt 6 collection law f

irm for suit in the name of the debt owne r. 7 Kuhn e is a n in div idu a l r e sid ingin N e w Y or k Co unty , N e w Y or

k. Som e tim e in t

he late 8 1990s, he def

aulted on a Citibank/Associate s cre dit card. Y ear s later, Kuhne rec eived a letter 9 dated June 8, 2005 from MCM indicating that NCC-2 “rec ently purcha sed” his ac count and that 10 MCM, “a debt c ollection company , is the service r of this obligation.” 11 NCC-2 never had conta ct with Kuhne; all conta ct with him was initially made by MCM. 12 MCM sent Kuhne seve ral letter s attempting to c ollect the debt, the f irst of which wa s its J une 8, 13 2005 letter mentioned a bove. It offer ed Kuhne a 50% discount of f of his cur

rent ba lance if he 14 se nt p ay

me nt t o M CM b y

July 23 , 2 00 5. On

Au gus t 4, 20 05 , M CM s e nt a se c on d le tte r, thi s 15 time offer ing K

uhne an inter est fre e pay

ment schedule . I t sent simil ar le tters on September 21, 16 2005, November

1, 2005 and January

6, 2006. MCM was unsucce ssful in collectingthe debt. 17 Kuhne doe s not alleg e that def endants or MCM violated the F DCPA or N.Y. G EN . B US . LAW § 18 349 by

sendingany

of these le tters. 19 MCM then retained C& S, a debt collec tion law firm in New Y ork, to pursue c ollection 20 activities ag ainst Kuhne on be half of N CC-2. C&S is and has bee n at all re levant times licensed 21 by

the DCA as a

debt collec tion ag ency . In J une 2006, C& S filed suit on behalf of NCC-2 in theThe re cord doe s not revea l whether Kuhne a nd NCC-2 entere d into a settlement 3 ag ree ment. Specifica lly , Kuhne a lleg es that def endants violated 15 U .S.C. § 1692e(5), (9) and (10) 4 “by falsely , dece ptively , and misleading ly repr esentingthat NCC-2 was author ized to collect debts by the DCA.” B rief f

or Plaintiff-Appe llant at 23. Those provisions prohibit a debt collector from using“any

false, de ceptive, or

misleadingrepr esentation or means in conne ction with the collection of a

ny debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, includinga “thr eat to take any action that cannot leg ally

be take n or that is not intended to be take n,” id. § 1692e(5) , “[t] he use or distribution of any

written communication which . . . cre ates a false impre ssion as to its . . . authorization . . . ,” id. § 1692e(9) , and “[t]he use of any false r epre sentation or dec eptive mea ns to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concer ning a consumer,” id. § 16 92 e (1 0) . K

uhne a lso a lle g e s th at de fe nd ants vio late d 1 5 U .S. C. § 16 92 f, wh ic h p ro hib its “[t] he collec tion of any

amount . . . unless such amount is . . . permitted by law.” Id. § 1692(f) (1). F inally , he alleg es that def endants violated N .Y. G EN . B US . LAW § 349, which pr oh ibi ts “ [d]e c e pti ve a c ts o r p ra c tic e s in the c on du c t of

any bu sin e ss, tr a de or

c omm e rc e or

in the furnishingof any

service in this st ate.” N.Y. G EN . B US . LAW § 349. 6 1 Civ il Co ur

t of the City of Ne w Y or k. NC C- 2 w a s th e on ly

name d p la int if

f i n th is a c tio n. Sho rt ly 2 there afte r, C&S ser ved Kuhne with the nece ssary summons. C &S also sent him seve ral letter s 3 indicating , inte r a lia , that it was willing to settle the matter “without appea

ringin court.” O n 4 Fe bruar

y 20, 2007, NCC-2 and Kuhne stipulated to a discontinuance with prejudice

. 3 5 A f

e w d ay s a ft e r t

he dis c ontin

ua nc e , o n F e br

ua ry 23 , 2 00 7, Kuhn e c omm e nc e d th is 6 action. He filed an a mended c omplaint on May 15, 2007, alleg ing that NCC-2, “ac ting tog ether 7 with Encore and MCM, directe d [C &S] to collect the alleg ed consume r debt by telephone a

nd 8 mail, and by

filing litig ation in the New Y ork City Civil Courts.” Am. Compl. ¶ 22. He fur ther 9 alleg es that “[b]ecause [NCC-2] i s not licensed as a debt collec tor by

the [DCA] , it is not 10 permitted to bringsuit” in the City of Ne w York a

nd that C&S “kne w or should have known” 11 this fact. Id. ¶¶ 39- 40. Kuhne c laims that defenda nts thereby

violated the F DCPA and N.Y. G EN 12 B US . LAW § 349. He a lleg es that, as a result of these violations, he “hired a n attorney to defe nd 47 1 NCC-2’s suit and incurre d $1,000 in leg al fe es.” B rief f or Plaintiff-Appe llant at 7. He f urther 2 alleg es that “[h]e also suffer ed fr om sy mptoms of emotional dist ress a nd had to take time of

f 3 from wor

k to go to c ourt to meet with his attorney .” Id. 4 In J anuar

y 2008, the par

ties filed with the District Court competingmotions for summary 5 jud g me nt. On

Marc h 5 , 2 00 8, the Di str ic t Co ur t a g re e d w ithde fe nd ants and he ld t hat N CC- 2 is 6 not a debt collec tion ag ency . Kuh nev . Co he n &Sla mo witz , LLP , No. 07 Civ. 1364(HB ), 2008 7 WL608607 (S.D.N.Y. Mar . 5, 2008). It noted that “Kuhne ’s claim that [d] efe ndants violated the 8 FDCPA and [N.Y. G EN . B US . LAW § 3 49 ] re sts e nti re ly on his a sse rt ion

tha t th e Ne w Y or

k Ci ty 9 debt licensingstatute requir ed NCC-2 to be lice nsed bef ore it could sue to c ollect a de bt.” Id. at 10 *2. The District Court examined the leg islative purpose of N ew Yor k City ’s licensing 11 require ment, New Y ork state c ase la w interpre ting § 20- 489(a) and a le tter fr om DCA’s Gene ral 12 Counsel opining that entities such a s NCC-2 are not debt collection ag encie s under the Code

. Id. 13 at *2-6. It concluded that “[i] n light of the leg islative intent, the case law, the a dminist rative 14 interpre tation embodied in the [DCA] letter a nd Encore ’s cor

porate structure , the mere 15 commence ment of a la wsuit in the name of a

holding c ompany

with no employ ees doe s not 16 mandate a

pplication of the Ne w York City licensingreg ime.” Id. at * 6

. I t e mp h a s iz e d th at “ [t ]o 17 require NCC-2 to be licensed, when it had no dire ct contac t with the consumer, would r un afoul 18 of the purpose of the Ne w York City licensingstatute and the F DCPA, which are aimed at 19 preve nting a

busive collec tion practice s.” Id. The District Court ente red judg ment in favor of 20 de fe nd ants sh or

tly the re a ft e r. Kuhn e tim e ly fi le d a no tic e of a pp e a l. 21 On

a pp e a l, K uhne c ha lle ng e s th e Di str ic t Co ur t’ s le g a l de te rm inatio n th at N CC- 2 is no t a8 1 debt collec tion ag ency as def ined under

the pre -ame ndment version of N .Y.C. Admin. Code § 2 20-489(a ). On Apr il 9, 2009, MFY L eg al Service s, Inc. (“ MFY” )—a not-f or-pr ofit org anization 3 that provides leg al counse ling a nd repr esentation to New York r esidents who ar e conta cted or 4 su e d b y

de bt c oll e c tor s— fi le d a

mot ion to a pp e ar a s amicus curiae in support of Kuhne. A long 5 with its m otion, MFY filed a letter dated Marc h 30, 2009, pursuant to Rule 28(j) of the Fe dera l 6 Rules of Appellate Procedur e. The letter infor med this Court of a local law passed by

the New 7 York City

Council and signe d into law on Marc h 18, 2009 by the Mayor, which a

mends, inter 8 ali a , N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489(a ). It provides, in rele vant par t, that a debt collec tion ag ency 9 “shall also include a buy er of delinquent debt who se eks to collec t such debt either direc tly or 10 throug h the servic es of a nother by , including but not limited to, init iating or using le g al proc esses 11 or other me ans to collec t or attempt to collect such de bt.” N.Y.C. L ocal L aw No. 15 ( 2009) 12 (Council Int. No. 660-A). T here is no dispute that entities such as NCC-2 fall within the scope of 13 L ocal L aw No. 15’ s definition of a “ debt collec tion ag ency .” The amendment be came eff ective 14 120 day s after

its enactment, see id. § 6, i.e. , on J uly 16, 2009. 1 5 A s d i s c u s s e d m o r e f u l l y inf ra , the passag e of L ocal L aw No. 15 a nd its legislative history 16 are rele vant to the prope r interpr etation of the pr e-a mendment ver sion of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17 20-489(a ). Ac cording ly , we or dere d the par ties to file letter brie fs addr essingthe amendme nt’s 18 imp or

t on the ir re sp e c tiv e po sit ion s. We a lso g ra nte d M F Y’ s mo tio n to a

pp e ar a s amicus curiae 19 and to par

ticipate in ora l argument. We now consider the ir arguments. 20 219 1 DI SCU SSIO N 2 I. N.Y.C. Adm in. Code § 20-489(a) 3 The thre shold question on appeal is whe ther NCC-2 is a “ debt collec tion ag ency” as 4 define d under the pre- amendment ve rsion of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489( a) a nd is thus 5 require d to have a license unde r § 20-490 to eng ag e in debt collec tion activities in New York 6 City . This is an issue of statutory interpre tation. “Our c ardina l function in interpre ting a New 7 York statute is to asce rtain and g ive ef fec t to the intent of the leg islature.” Tom Rice Buick

8 Pontiac v. Ge n. Motors Corp. , 5 5 1 F. 3 d 1 4 9 , 1 5 4 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Abrams v. Ford Motor 9 Co. , 74 N.Y.2d 495, 500, 548 N.E.2d 906, 908 ( 1989); N.Y. S TAT . LAW § 9 2) . “ ‘A s th e c le are st 10 indicator of le g islative intent is the statutory text , the startingpoint in any case of interpr etation 11 must alway s be the languag e itself, g iving e ffe ct to the plain meaningthere of.’” Id. at 154-55 1 2 (qu o t i n g Ma

je wsk i v . B ro ad alb in- Pe rth Ce nt. Sc h. Di

st. , 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 696 N.E.2d 978, 13 980 (1998)) . We theref ore be g in, as we must, with the text of the statute in effe ct at the time of 14 the a lle g e d c on du c t, whic h p ro vid e s in re le va nt p art a s f oll ow s: 15 “ De bt c oll e c tio n a g e nc y” sh a ll m e an a pe rs on e ng a g e d in

bu sin e ss 16 the pr inc ipa l pu rp os e of wh ic h is to r e gula

rl y c oll e c t or atte mpt to 17 collect de bts owed or due or asse rted to be ow ed or due to another. 18 The ter m does not include: . . . (7) a ny person c ollectingor 19 attempting to c ollect any debt owed or

due or a sserted to be owed 20 or due a nother to the e x tent such ac tivity . . . (ii) conc erns a

debt 21 which wa s orig inated by such per son; (iii) conce rns a de bt which 22 wa s n ot i n d e fa ult at th e tim e it w a s o bta ine d b y su c h p e rs on

a s a 23 secur ed par ty in a commer cial cr edit transac tion involvi ngthe 24 cre ditor . . . . 25 26 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489(a ). 27 Def

endants c ontend that under this provision, NCC -2 is not a debt collec tion ag ency10 1 beca

use it does not “collec t or attempt to collect de bts.” They emphasize that NCC-2 never once 2 ha d c onta c t w ithKuhn e , a nd MCM and

C& S, b oth

lic e ns e d d e bt c oll e c tio n a g e nc ie s, e ng a g e d in 3 a ll c oll e c tio n e ff

or ts o n it s b e ha lf

. O nly a ft e r M CM’ s a

nd C& S’ s c oll e c tio n e ff

or ts f a ile d d id 4 C& S f

il e th e d e b t c o ll e c ti o na c ti o na g a in s t K uh n e o nN CC

- 2 ’ s b e h a lf

. D e f e n d an ts e mp h a s iz e 5 that NCC-2 was the named plaintiff simply beca use it was the owne r of the de bt. 6 Def

endants’ position seems to comport with the statute’ s decla ration of its leg islative 7 purp os e . Se c tio n 2 0- 48 8 o f N .Y .C. Ad min . Co de pr ov ide s: 8 The c ouncil here by finds the pre sence of consumer related 9 problems with respe ct to the pra ctices of debt collec tion ag encie s 10 whose sole c oncer n is the collection of de bts owed to their clients. 11 Whil e the major ity of those eng ag ed in this business are hone st and 12 ethical in their de aling s, there is a minority of unscr upulous 13 collection ag encie s in operation that pra ctice a busive tactics suc h 14 as threa teningdelinquent debtors, or callingsuch people at 15 outrag eous times of the nig ht. These a ctions constitute tactics 16 which would shock the conscie nce of ordinary people. Due to the 17 sensitive nature of the infor mation used in the course of such 18 ag ency ’s [sic] ever yday business, and the vulner able position 19 c on sume rs fi nd the mse lve s in

wh e n d e a lin gwi th t

he se a g e nc ie s, it 20 is incumbent upon this council to protect the intere sts, reputations 21 and fi sc a l w e ll- be ingof

the c iti zen s o f t

his c ity a g a ins t th os e 22 a g e nc ie s who wo uld a bu se the ir pr ivi le g e of

op e ra tio n. I t is he re in 23 decla red that the city

should license debt c ollection ag encie s. 24 25 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-488. Thus, the purpose of the statute is to preve nt debt collector s 2 6 fr o mu s i n g un s cr u p u l o u s co l l ec t i o nt ac t i cs aga i n s tth e p u b l i c. Be cau s e N C C -2 h adn o d ea l i n gs 27 with Kuhne, other than as the na

med plaintiff in the debt c ollection action, and hir es license d 28 debt collec tion ag encie s to perfor m debt collection ac tiviti es, it does not seem to ser ve the 29 statute’s purpose to require NCC-2 to be licensed a s well. 30 Although the re is no Appe llate Division or New Y ork Court of Appe als dec ision on11 1 point, there is an opinion letter f rom DCA’s Ge nera l Counsel dated Marc h 7, 2007 and a de cision 2 by the Fir st Depar

tment Appellate Te rm from 2008 fa voringthis posit ion. The Ge nera l 3 Counsel’s letter states that “[a] debt buy er that merely purcha ses or a cquire s defa ulted debt but 4 does not eng ag e in collec tion activities itself does not require a license from the De partment.” 5 L etter f

rom Marla

Teppe r, Ge nera l Counsel of the DCA, to Dennis Malen, Ma len & Assocs., 6 P.C. (March 7, 2007) (“Te pper L etter” ), available at J .A. 663-64. B eca

use the DCA is the 7 ag ency

in char g e of issuingthe license s, see N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 20-102, -491 to -93, a letter 8 from its Gene ral Counsel interpr etingthe meaningof a “ debt collec tion ag ency” may be entitled 9 to respec t at least to the extent that its i nterpre tations have the pow er to pe rsuade

. Cf. 10 Chr iste ns e n v . H

arris Cou nty , 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (discussingfede ral a dminist rative la w 11 pr e c e de nt) . T he Te pp e r L e tte r p ro vid e s in re le va nt p art : 12 Th e De pa rtme nt o f C on sume r A ff

a ir s is su e s th is l e tte r i n 13 response to an inquiry from the Consumer Cre dit Association of 14 Metropolitan New York, a local tra de g roup, as to whe ther “ debt 15 buy e rs ” that do no t th e mse lve s e ng a g e in c oll e c tio n a c tiv iti e s mu st 16 be lic e ns e d b y the De pa rtme nt. “ De bt b uye r” is a te rm c omm on ly 17 used to descr ibe a pur chase r or a ssigne e of de faulted de bt. 18 19 In a dd re ssi ngthi s q

ue sti on , th e De pa

rtme nt f ir st c on fi rm s 20 its po sit ion that a purc ha se r o r a ssi g ne e of

de fa ult e d d e bt who se 21 principal purpose is the collection of that de bt, whether for itself or 22 oth e rs , is a “ de bt c oll e c tio n a g e nc y” un de r N e w Y or k Ci ty 23 Administrative Code § 20-489(a ). De bt buy ers that e ng ag e in debt 24 collection ac tiviti es must theref ore be licensed by

the Depa rtment 25 in order to c ollect debts in New York City

[citi ngN.Y.C. Admin. 26 Code § 20-490]. 27 28 A debt buyer that merely purcha ses or a cquire s defa ulted 29 debt but does not eng ag e in collec tion activities itself does not 3 0 r e qu ir e a li c e n s e f r o m t h e D e p artm e n t.

. . . Ine n a c ti n g[§ 2 0

- 4 8 9 ], 31 the City Council sought to cur

b abusive pra ctices of

debt collec tion12 1 a g e nc ie s b y re qu ir inglic e ns ingof

tho se e nti tie s d e a lin gdir e c tly 2 with the consumer public in the c ollection of debts. Thus, under 3 the Ad min istrativ e Cod e , a

“ de bt c oll e c tio n a g e nc y” is a n e nti ty 4 eng ag ed in ac tiv e ly c olle c ting o r a tte mp ting to c olle c t de bts

. 5 6 J .A. 663-64 (e mphasis added a nd citations omitt ed). 7 Th e re a ft e r, the Ap pe llate Te rm of the Sup re me Court

fo r t he F ir st D e pa

rtme nt c ame to 8 the same c onclusion. See M RC Rece ivables Corp. v. Morales , 21 Misc. 3d 133(A), 873 9 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Table ), 2008 WL4754065 (full text) (N.Y. App. Te rm 1st Dep’t 2008) ( “ MRC 10 II ”). The trial court ha d held in that case that “[t] here was no showingby the def endant that the 11 plaintiff . . . eng ag ed in collec tion activities sufficient to re quire plaintiff to obtain a license f rom 12 the New

York City

Depa rtment of Consumer Af

fairs.” MRC Rec eivables Corp. v. M orales , No. 13 64334/06 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. May 7, 2007), av ail

ab leat J .A. 668-69. In aff irming the trial court, the 14 Appellate T erm re lied on the Teppe r L etter. It wrote: 15 De fe nd ant’ s e vid e nti ary su bmi ssi on s w e re ins uf

fi c ie nt t o 16 de mon str ate that pl a int if f, a s th e purc ha se r o f t

he un de rl yingde bt, 17 is a debt collec tion ag ency within the meaningof Administrative 18 Code § 20-489(a ), and thus subjec t to the licensingrequire ments of 19 Ad min istrativ e Cod e § 2 0- 49 0. Th e re c or d d oe s n ot c on c lus ive ly 20 e sta bli shthat pl a int if

f’ s “ pr inc ipa l pu

rp os e . . . is to r e gula

rl y 21 collect or attempt to collect debts owe d or due or asser ted to be 22 owed or due to another ”. The re w as no showingthat plaintiff 23 regularly and ac tively

eng ag es in collec tion activities. 24 25 MRC II

, 21 Misc. 3d 133(A), 873 N .Y.S.2d 513, 2008 WL4754065, at *1 (c itation omit ted). 26 Kuhne c ounters, howe ver, that NCC-2 purchase s debt for the sole purpose of attempting 27 to collect it, and the mer e fa ct that it hires another entity to undertake the collec tion effor ts does 28 not absolve it of its obligations under the N.Y.C. Admin. Code. He c ites sever al lower court 29 decisions in support of this proposition. Mostof the a uthority offe red by

Kuhne is, in ourThree of the five New Y ork state c ases c ited by Kuhne a ddress the que stion of whether 5 an entity that actively

collects de bt due to itself qualifies as a debt collec tion ag ency

under § 20- 48 9( a ). Th is i ssu e ha s b e e n li tig ate d o n s e ve ra l oc c a sio ns be c a us e § 2 0- 48 9( a ) p ro vid e s th at a “‘[d]ebt collection ag ency ’ shall mean a person e ng ag ed in business the principa l purpose of which is to regularly

collect or attempt to collect debts owe d or due or asser ted to be owe d or due to another .” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489( a) ( emphasis adde d). See D ep’t of Consumer Af fai rs v . A sse t A c c e

pta nc e, LLC , Violation No. PL 1044927 (City of N.Y. D ep’t of Consumer Affa irs J uly

24, 2006), aff’d , Appea l Deter mination, Violation No. PL 1044927 (F eb. 23, 2007), available at

J.A. 64 8- 62 ; Centurion Capi tal Corp. v. Druce , 14 Misc. 3d 564, 567-68, 828 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853-54 (N.Y . Civ. Ct . 2006) (c oncludingthat “the Ne w York City statute, like the fede ral statute, should be inter prete d to define de bt collection ag encie s as entities which c ollect de fa ult e d d e bt, wh e the r o r n ot t he de bt t he y c oll e c t is du e to t

he mse lve s o r o the rs ” ); PRA II I, LLC v . M ac Do we ll , 1 5 M isc . 3 d 1 13 5( A) , 8 41 N. Y. S.2 d 8 22 (T a ble ), 20 07 WL14 29 02 6 ( fu ll text ), at *1 (N .Y. Civ. Ct. 2007) (“Entities such as plaintiff whic h purcha se def aulted debt a

nd collect the de bt for themselve s are debt collec tors. . . . The fa ct that it has purcha sed the de bt does not chang e the r equire ment that it be licensed[;] only the orig inator of the de bt is ex cluded f rom th e s t atu t e. ” ( ci t i n g Centurion Capi tal Corp. , 1 4 M isc . 3 d 5 64 , 8 28 N. Y. S.2 d 8 51 )) . K uhne a lso c ite s Gre at S

e ne c a F ina nc ial Cor p. v . D owd, Index No.: 012627/05 (N.Y. Civ. C t. J an. 24, 2008), available at

Plaintiff-Appellant Adde ndum to Appellant’s B rief, in whic h the cour t conclude d that Gre at Senec a, a pur chase r of de faulted de bt, was a de bt collector, but only afte r or de ri ngit t o p ro du c e e vid e nc e that it did no t e ng a g e in d e bt c oll e c tio n a c tiv iti e s a nd it f a ile d to do so. Kuhne’ s citation to Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC v. Morningstar , Index No. 55981/07 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Apr. 15, 2008), available at Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt L e tte r d ate d July

19 , 2 00 8, is a lso unhelpful. Althoug h this decision states that an entity that makes money

by purcha sing de faulted consumer de bt and then trying to g et the debt c ollected is a de bt collection ag ency , it is unclear whether the entity in that case actively

attempted to collec t the debt itself, or c ontrac ted with a third party

to do so; in any

event, the c ourt appe ars to have simply relied on Centurion , whic h is inapposite. 13 1 opinion, inapposite. Howeve r, he doe s cite Rushmore Re cove ries, XI, LLC v. Morningstar , 5 2 Index No.: 19884-06 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. J uly 17, 2007), available at

J .A. 665-67, in which the 3 su pp os e d d e bt c oll e c tio n a g e nc y purc ha se d c on sume r d e bt a nd the n imme diate ly

“ fo rw ard e d [it ] 4 to its attorney s for c ollection activity .” Id. at 2; J .A. 666. The c ourt held that the princ ipal 5 purpose of

the company ’s business, there fore , was de bt collection. The pla intiff moved for 6 rene wal and r ear gument in light of the Te pper L etter. The court a ffirme d its prior ruling, writing14 1 “Plaintiff has pre sented no e vidence that this court’s prior de cision was er roneous due to an 2 opinion letter of the DCA. Such le tter is not sufficient to over ride, e rode, or

clar ify a dec ision of 3 a cour

t of law.” Rushmore Re cove ries XI, LLC v. Morningstar , Index No.: 19884/06, at 2 (N.Y. 4 Civ. Ct . Nov. 9, 2007). Rushmore Re cove ries is n ot e a sil y dis tin guis ha

ble fr om t his c a se . T hu s, 5 wh ile the we ig ht o f t he a uth or ity in N e w Y or

k, a lbe it f ro m lo we r c ourt s, a

pp e ars to b e in 6 defe ndants’ fa

vor, Kuhne ’s position is notwithout support. 7 Duringthe pende ncy of this appea l, moreover , the City Council passed leg islation 8 amendingN.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489(a ) and the reby complicated the deter

mination of 9 whether

entities such as NCC-2 fa ll within t he pre -ame ndment definition of debt collec tion 10 ag ency . See N. Y. C. L ocal L aw No. 15 (2009) ( Council I nt. No. 660-A). T he ame ndment was 11 passed by

the City Council on March 11, 2009 a nd signe d into law by

the Mayor on Mar ch 18, 12 2009. Id. I t became ef fec tive 120 day s “af

ter it [was] enacted into law,” id. § 6, i.e., J uly 16, 13 20 09 . It pr ov ide s in re le va nt p art : 14 “ De bt c oll e c tio n a g e nc y” sh a ll m e an a pe rs on e ng a g e d in

bu sin e ss 15 the pr inc ipa l pu rp os e of wh ic h is to r e gula

rl y c oll e c t or atte mpt to 16 collect de bts owed or due or asse rted to be ow ed or due to another 17 an d s ha ll a lso inc lud e a b uy e r o

f de lin qu e nt d

e bt w ho se e k

s to 18 collect suc h debt either direc tly or through the service s of another 19 by, including but not limited to, ini tiating or using legal processes 20 or oth e r m e an s to c olle c t or atte mp t to c olle c t su c h d e bt. 21 22 Id. § 1. 23 The text and leg islative history of this amendment make clea r that its definition of debt 24 collection ag ency includes those entities, like NCC-2, that have made the a rgument that they

are 25 not subject to the licensingrequire ments beca use they themselves do not eng ag e dire ctly in the15 1 c oll e c tio n a c tiv iti e s. Th e Committe e Re po rt state s in pe rt ine nt p art : 2 Al tho ugh b oth c omp anie s c ontr a c te d b y c re dit or s to c oll e c t de bts 3 on their beha lf and third-pa rty buy ers of defa ulted debt ar e 4 considere d under the Code to be debt c ollection ag encie s and as 5 such must be license d, there has bee n some confusion re g arding 6 the lic e ns ingre qu ir e me nts fo r d e bt- buy e rs wh o h ir e law f ir ms t o 7 ini tiate lit ig atio n a g a ins t de bto rs . In th e se sit uatio ns , s ome de bt8 buy ers ha ve cla imed they

are not require d to be license d since they 9 are not “direc tly ” eng ag ing in c ollection activities but rather hiring 10 others to collec t the debt on their be half. . . . [Th is b ill ] wou ld 11 am e nd thede fin iti on of ‘

de bt c olle c tio n age nc

y ’ to in c lud

e de bt12 buyers who use third party agenc ies or attorneys to collect suc h 13 debt from a debtor. By c larifying the definiti on of debt collection 14 agency , the bill seeks to address de bt buyer argume nts, noted 15 above, that oncethey c ontract collection of the debt to another 16 party they areengaged in “passive” collec tion and as such are not 17 re qu ire d to belic e ns e d a s a de bt c olle c tio n age nc yby DC A

. 18 19 C OMM . ON C O N SUM ER A FF A I RS , C OMM . R EPORT OF THE G O V ER N M EN T A L A FFA I RS D IV ., A 20 L O CA L LA W T O AM EN D T H E AD M I N I STRA T I V E COD E OF T H E CI T Y OF NEW YO RK , I N R E L AT I ON TO 21 BUY ERS OF CON SUM ER DE BT , L ocal L aw No. 15, at 7-8 (2009) ( emphasis adde d). 22 Kuhne a

nd defe ndants ea ch ar gue that this chang e in law supports their r espec tive 23 po sit ion s. Kuhn e argue s th at “ [t]he Committe e Re po rt e vid e nc e s th e le g isl atur e ’s int e nt t o 24 clar ify , not alter, e x isting law,” L etter B rief f or Plaintiff-Appe llant at 4, there by imply ing that the 25 intent of the pre -ame ndment version wa s likewise to treat entities such as NCC-2 as de bt 26 collection ag encie s. Defe ndants argue that “[h]ad Appellant’s interpr etation bee n corr ect, ther e 27 would have be en no nee d for the N ew Yor k City Council to pass this l eg islation.” L etter B rief 28 for De fenda

nts-Appellee s at 2. 29 Un de r N e w Y or k la w, c ourt s ma

y loo k to a su bs e qu e nt a

me ndme nt o f a

law i n o rd e r t o 30 dis c e rn

the me anin gof

the pr e -a me ndme nt v e rs ion . T he g e ne ra l r ule ha s lo ngbe e n c od if

ie d in16 1 N.Y. S TAT . LAW § 193(a) , which provide s, “The L eg islature, by enac ting a

n amendment of

a 2 statute cha

ng ing the languag e ther eof, is dee med to have intende d a mater ial chang e in the law.” 3 Id. ; see also id. , c mt. (“ A m ate ri a l c ha ng e in t he phra se olo g y

of an a c t is g e ne ra lly

re g ard e d a s a 4 leg islative construction that the lawso amende d did not origina lly embra ce the amende d 5 provisions, especia lly if it follows soon after c ontroversie s have a risen conc erningthe 6 interpre tation of the orig inal statute.”). “ I t might occ asionally happen, of

course , that the 7 L eg islature in attemptingto amend a statute would, by the use of ina

pt terms, rea lly

eff ectuate no 8 c ha

ng e ; but a c on str uc tio n whic h im

pute s su c h a

n in of fe ns ive fo lly

to t he lawm akin gbo dy

is t o 9 be avoide d.” Id. “Althoug h g ener ally , a statutory amendment is pre sumed to have be en intended 10 to chang e the law , the leg islative history may indicate that the a

mendment was intende d instead 11 as a c larifica

tion.” 1A Norma

n J . Singer , S TATUTES AND S TATUTOR Y C ONS TR UC TI ON § 22:30, at 12 366 (6th ed. 2002). 13 The issue of whether an ame ndment’s purpose is to cla rify or to adopt a substantive 14 chang e ofte n arises when dete rmining whether the amende d law should be a pplied retroa ctively

. 15 In this contex t, New Yor k courts “ha

ve found it re levant whe n the leg islative history reve als that 16 the purpose of

new leg islation is t o clar ify what the law

was a lway s meant to say and do.” 17 Ma

je wsk i v . B ro ad alb in- Pe rth Ce nt. Sc h. Di

st. , 91 N.Y.2d 577, 585, 696 N.E.2d 978, 981 18 (1998). Kuhne argues that this is precisely what the Committee Report does. He contends that 19 by

char acte rizing the amendment as a clar ification, the Committee Report nec essar ily implies 20 that the unamende d version of § 20- 489(a) applies to entities such as NCC-2. B ut, the New Y ork 21 Court of Appea ls has war ned that “la

belingthe leg islation as ‘reme dial’ in this reg ard is notWe n ote that at or a l argume nt whe n th is p a ne l br oa c he d th e pr os pe c t of c e rt if ic atio n to 6 the New York Court of Appe als, the par ties provided no objec tion, citing only the inconvenie nce of the a dd e d c os t in

fu rt he r l iti g atin gthi s a

pp e a l. M or e ov e r, de fe nd ants a pp e ar t o s ug g e st i n th e ir brief that resolution by

the New York Court of Appe als would be a ppropriate

. See Br ief for De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s at 24 (n oti ngthe unre so lve d s tate law q ue sti on and c omm e nti ngtha

t th is case may be “be fore the wrongcourt” ). 17 1 dispositi ve in light of other indicators of leg islative intent.” Id. at 58 5, 69 6 N .E .2 d at 98 1; see 2 also id. at 586, 696 N.E.2d at 981-82 (“A lthough these aver ments ‘may

be ac corde d some weight 3 in the absenc e of more definitive manife stations of leg islative purpose’, suc h indicators of 4 le g isl ativ e int e nt m us t be c a uti ou sly us e d. ” (c itatio n o mitte d) ); Town of C or tla nd t v . N. Y . S tate 5 Bd . o f R e al Pro

p. Se rv s. , 8 3 0 N

. Y

. S. 2 d

1 8 9 , 1 9 2 , 3 6 A

. D

. 3 d

8 2 3 , 8 2 6 ( 2 d

D e p ’ t 2 0 0 7 )

. We 6 believe it most prudent to pass no fur ther on these issues of statutory interpre tation, as we 7 respe ctfully

conclude that cer

tification is the most appropriate path to decide this case. 8 II. Cer tification 9 Although the parties did not re quest ce rtification, we are empower ed to see k cer tification 10 no stra s

po nte . City of N.Y

. v. Smok es-Spirits.com, Inc

. , 541 F.3d 425, 457 ( 2d Cir. 2008) (citing 6 11 2d Cir. R. § 0.27)). At the outset, we note that there is no Appellate Division or Ne w York Court 12 of Appe als dec ision on point

. See, e .g. , City of N.Y . v. Be retta U.S.A. Corp. , 524 F.3d 384, 407 13 (2d Cir. 2008) (K atzmann, J ., dissenting) (notingthat the use of c ertification for an unse ttled are a 14 of state law

is “[i] n keepingwith our pref ere nce that states define the meaningof their own la ws 15 in the first instance” ). Given that the exis ting c ase la w on this issue has come e x clusively from 16 two lower state courts, “w e conc lude that we ha ve insuffic ient guidance from the c ourts of Ne w 17 York c onfidently to decide” this iss ue. N.Y . Univ. v. F

irst Fin. Ins. Co. , 322 F.3d 750, 757 ( 2d18 1 Cir. 2003). 2 This problem is compounded bec ause w e believe that the leg islative history surrounding 3 L ocal L aw No. 15 injec ts a ce rtain ambiguity in the pre- amendment ve rsion of § 20-489( a) that 4 may

well be r esolved with re fer ence to the public policy g oals underly

ing the City

of Ne w York’ s 5 debt collec tion laws. See Se aled v. Se aled , 332 F.3d 51, 59 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (“Wher e a que stion of 6 statutory

interpre tation impli cate s the weighing of policy conce rns, principles of

comity and 7 fe d er al i s ms tro n gl y s u p p o rtce rt i fi ca t i o n . ” ( ci t i n g Cweklinsky v . Mobil Chem. Co. , 297 F.3d 154, 8 16 0 ( 2d

Cir . 2 00 2) )) . T he re c an b e no do ub t th at th e City of Ne w Y or k h a s a c omp e lli ngint e re st 9 in protectingconsumers f rom unscrupulous debt c ollectors, and thus the statutory scheme at issue 10 here implicates signif icant issues of loca l public policy

. See Br ief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 22 11 (citing“[t] he re cent e x plosion of massive debt-buying ope rations [that] ha[ve] led to heightene d 12 int e re st o n th e pa rt of the DC A a

nd the State As se mbl y , le a din gto p ub lic he ari ng s” ); c f. Sealed, 1 3 3 3 2 F. 3 d

at5 9 (c i t i n g Israel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 239 F.3d 127, 135 ( 2d Cir. 14 2000)). Obviously , this iss ue has the attention of the City Council in li g ht of its rece nt leg islation 15 amendingN.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489(a ). 16 I t is a lso wo rt h n oti ngthat, u

nd e r N e w Y or

k la w, un lik e the law o f t

his Cir c uit , “ it i s 17 appropr iate to examine the leg islative history [of a statute] even thoug h the languag e of [the 18 statute] is clea

r.” Riley v . County of Broome , 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463, 742 N.E.2d 98, 102 ( 2000); 19 contra Daniel v. Am . Bd. of Emerge ncy M ed. , 428 F.3d 408, 423 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (“I f the mea ning 20 is plain, we inquire no f urther. O nly

if we disce rn ambiguity

do we r esort first to ca

nons of 21 statutory

construction, and, if

the meaningrema ins ambiguous, to leg islative history .” (c itationsThe fa ct that the statute did not bec ome ef fec tive until 120 day s after its enactment, i.e., 7 on J uly 16, 2009, is not dispos itive of whethe r it applies re troac tively

. See M ajewski , 91 N.Y.2d at 583, 696 N.E.2d at 980 (“[T]he date that leg islation is t o take e ffe ct is a sepa rate question from whether the statute should apply

to claims and rig hts then in ex istence.” ).

19 1 omi tte d) ). B e c a

us e we be lie ve that “ [a] s tate c ourt is b ound to h ave a be tte r i de a

of the e la sti c ity 2 of the state’ s statutes than a fe dera l court,” Ma jor s v . A be ll , 317 F.3d 719, 724 ( 7th Cir. 2003), 3 we lea

ve this task to the New Y ork Court of Appe als, cf. Sealed, 332 F.3d at 59. 4 Fur

thermore , as explained su pra , interpre tation of the pre -ame ndment version of § 20- 5 489(a) depends in pa rt on whethe r the re cent amendment is a mere clar ification of the la w or a 6 substantive chang e. The answe r to this question also affe cts the dete rmination of whethe r the 7 amendment should apply retroa ctively

. As noted, in deter mining whe ther a

statute should be 7 8 g iven re troac tive eff ect, the N ew Yor

k Court of Appea ls has “found it re levant whe n the 9 leg islative history

reve als that the purpose of newleg islation is t o clar ify what the law

was 10 alway s meant to say and do.” Id. at 58 5, 69 6 N .E .2 d at 98 1; accord I n re Gleason (

Michae l Vee, 11 Ltd.) , 96 N.Y.2d 117, 122, 749 N.E.2d 724, 726 ( 2001). The issue of the re cent amendment’s 12 retroa ctivity , though not r aised by any of the pa rties, poses yet another

unsettled question of law, 13 which is likely

to arise a g ain in the future . This consideration further militates in favor of 14 cer

tification of the r elated que stion that is now before us. Cf. Golden v. W injohn Taxi Corp. , 311 15 F.3d 513, 524 ( 2d Cir. 2002). 16 Un de r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s, c e rt if ic atio n to the Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls i s th e mos t 17 prudent path. 18The que stion whether NCC-2 is a de bt collection ag ency under N .Y.C. Admin. Code § 8 20-489(a ) direc tly

impacts two outstanding issues pr esente d in this appeal. Thus, we rese rve de c isi on on : ( 1) wh e the r d e fe nd ants vio late d th e F DC PA; and (2 ) whe the r t

he lic e ns ingsc he me imposed by

N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 20-488 to 90 violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti tution. 20 1 CO NC LU SION 2 For

the fore g oing r easons, we respe ctfully cer tify to the New Y ork Court of Appe als the 3 fo llo wi ngtw o q

ue sti on s: 4 (1) Whether NCC-2 is a “debt c ollection ag ency” under the pre -ame ndment version of 5 New Y ork City Administrative Code § 20-489(a ). 6 (2) I f the a nswer to que stion (1) is y es, whe ther NCC-2 violated Ne w York 7 Gene ral B usiness L aw § 349 unde r the c ircumstance s prese nted in this case. 8 In formulatingthese two que stions, as we have here , we do not mea n to limi t the Court of 9 Appea ls’s response. T he ce rtified questions may be dee med expanded to cove r any further 10 pe rt ine nt q

ue sti on of Ne w Y or k la w that th e Court

of Ap pe a ls f

ind s a pp ro pr iate to a

ns we r i n 11 connec tion with these issues, including whe ther the a mended ve rsion of § 20-489( a) a pplies 12 retroa ctively . This panel re tains jurisdiction so that we may dispose of the a

ppeal f ollowing the 13 New Y ork Court of Appe als’s dec ision. 8 14 I t is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court transmit to the Clerk of the N ew Yor k 15 Court of Appea ls a Certificate, as set f orth below, tog ether

with a copy

of this opinion and a 16 complete r ecor d of the c ase, inc luding a complete se t of brief

s and appe ndices filed in this Court 17 by

the par ties and amicus, a ll corre spondence submitt ed pursua nt to Rul e 28(j) of

the Fe dera l 18 Rules of Appellate Procedur e in conne ction with this appeal and the parties’ letter brie fs enter ed21 1 on the 17th and 24th of Apr il 2009. The parties sha ll bear e qually any costs or fe es imposed by 2 the New

York Court of Appe als. 3 CE RT IF IC AT E 4 The for eg oing is he reby cer tified to the NewYork Court of Appe als, pursuant to 2d Cir. 5 R. § 0.27 and N.Y. Comp. Codes. R. & Reg s. tit. 22, 500.27, as ordere d by the United States 6 Court of Appea ls for the Sec ond Circuit.