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2023 IL App (5th) 220594-U 

NO. 5-22-0594 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

ASHLEY RICHARDS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 21-AR-67 

 ) 

LYNNA CLEMENS, ) Honorable 

 ) Kevin T. Hoerner, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Moore and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The order of the circuit court of St. Clair County denying the defendant’s motion 

to dismiss pursuant to section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-

301 (West 2020)) is reversed where the trial court erred in finding that the defendant 

was a resident of Illinois at the time of the incident that occurred in Missouri and 

therefore subject to general jurisdiction in Illinois. 

¶ 2 This is an appeal from the circuit court of St. Clair County denying the defendant, Lynna 

Clemens’s, motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) 

(735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2020)). The trial court, in denying the motion to dismiss, found that the

defendant was a resident of Illinois where the home she owned was in Belleville, Illinois; she paid 

tax on the residence; received mail there; kept her personal belongings there; and was staying there 

on the night of the incident. However, the defendant appeals, arguing that she was only 

temporarily staying at the home for an event she was attending and was in fact a resident of South 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 05/24/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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Dakota on the night of the incident and intended to continue to reside in South Dakota. For the 

reasons that follow, we reverse.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On February 8, 2021, the plaintiff, Ashley Richards, filed a four-count complaint against 

the defendant in St. Clair County circuit court for battery, assault, outrage/willful wanton 

misconduct, and negligence. In the complaint, the plaintiff acknowledged that the event giving 

arise to the litigation occurred in St. Louis, Missouri. 

¶ 5 On July 22, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-301 of the 

Code. Id. The motion alleged that the defendant was not a resident of the state of Illinois and 

therefore was not subject to the state’s jurisdiction. The plaintiff claimed she was a resident of 

South Dakota and confirmed that the alleged incident on October 4, 2020, occurred in St. Louis, 

Missouri. She further stated that she had not lived in Illinois since October of 2019, one year prior. 

Therefore, she argued that she was a nonresident of Illinois and that she was not subject to specific 

jurisdiction under the Illinois long-arm statute as the alleged conduct occurred in Missouri.

¶ 6 The plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss alleging that, based on the 

defendant’s deposition, it was clear that jurisdiction was proper in Illinois. The response admitted 

that the defendant was a member of the military and that she bought a home in Belleville, Illinois, 

while she was stationed at Scott Air Force Base. The plaintiff further admitted that the defendant 

was transferred from Scott Air Force Base in October 2019, but pointed to the fact that the 

defendant still owned the Belleville, Illinois, home, had never rented it in the year since her 

relocation, and kept her possessions there. The plaintiff also pointed to the fact that the defendant 

paid her taxes on the home through her mortgage carrier, paid for utilities on the home, and 

received mail there. The plaintiff additionally noted that, on the night of the alleged incident, the 
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defendant left St. Louis and returned to her home in Belleville, Illinois. The plaintiff admitted that 

the defendant still had five years of service remaining before she would retire from the military. 

¶ 7 Attached to the plaintiff’s response was the defendant’s deposition. In her deposition, the 

defendant stated that she was in the military; had been for 15 years; and intended on serving 20 

years, after which she would retire. She was living in South Dakota at the time of her deposition; 

however, she did not know where she intended to live when she retired in five years. She was 

stationed at Scott Air Force Base when she bought her Belleville, Illinois, home, and she remained 

stationed there for three years from 2016 to 2019. She was then transferred to South Dakota in 

October 2019. She had never rented or sold the property because she still had some of her 

belongings at the home, and it would not have been feasible for another family to live there. She 

did not keep any furniture at the home, just decorations and old clothes she did not wear anymore. 

She also was not comfortable selling the property as-is. She paid taxes on the home through her 

mortgage company. She was originally from Pennsylvania but had not lived there since May 

2007. Her father and one of her grandparents still lived in Pennsylvania. The Belleville home was 

the only home she owned. 

¶ 8 On October 4, 2020, the date of the incident, the defendant was living in South Dakota. 

She had come to Belleville, Illinois, for an event and to visit friends. She was temporarily staying 

at her house while she was in town. She was the only person with a physical key to the house, but 

a friend had the code so that the friend could check the mail as she still received some mail at the 

address, though it was mostly junk mail. She also paid the utility bills to keep the heat and water 

running in the home. She did not have a cable or a phone bill and, although the city included trash 

service with her sewer bill, she did not utilize the trash service as there was no trash to collect. She 

also stated, though, that she did not intend to continue living in South Dakota after her retirement, 
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which would occur in five years. She stated that the address she uses on her tax returns is in 

Pennsylvania. When questioned by her lawyer, the defendant recalled that around the time of the 

incident, she stayed in her house in Belleville, Illinois, for less than a week. It was not her intention 

to return to Illinois at that time. She was stationed in South Dakota, and it was her intention to 

return to and continue living in South Dakota after her visit. She did in fact return and continued 

to reside in South Dakota through the time of her deposition. 

¶ 9 The defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss. The reply 

made substantially the same arguments that general jurisdiction was not applicable where the 

defendant resided in South Dakota, intended to reside in South Dakota, and had no present 

intention of residing in Illinois. Additionally, the reply asserted that specific jurisdiction was not 

applicable where it was undisputed that the alleged incident occurred in Missouri. In sum, the 

defendant argued that South Dakota was her residence, even if she did not plan on staying there 

forever. 

¶ 10 On August 12, 2022, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered an order 

denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-301 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-

301 (West 2020)). The defendant was given 30 days to file an answer. This court granted the 

defendant leave to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306 (eff. 

Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss 

pursuant to section 2-301 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2020)), where she was a resident 

of South Dakota and where the alleged incident occurred in Missouri. 
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¶ 13 At the outset, we note that the parties disagree as to the standard of review. Therefore, we 

begin our analysis of this issue by addressing the applicable standard of review. The plaintiff 

claims the standard should be whether the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. The defendant claims that the standard of review is de novo. This court in Cori v. 

Schlafly, 2021 IL App (5th) 200246, ¶ 17, stated that “[w]hen a trial court decides jurisdictional 

issues after an evidentiary hearing, this [c]ourt’s standard of review is whether the decision was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) When the court 

makes a determination on personal jurisdiction based on the pleadings and materials produced 

during discovery without conducting an evidentiary hearing, our standard of review is de novo. 

Levy v. Gold Medal Products Co., 2020 IL App (1st) 192264, ¶ 26. If no evidentiary hearing has 

been held:

“A plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for jurisdiction when 

seeking jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. [Citation.] *** A reviewing court 

addressing a challenge to personal jurisdiction must resolve in favor of the plaintiff any 

conflicts in the pleadings and affidavits [citation]; however, a plaintiff’s prima facie case 

for jurisdiction can be overcome by a defendant’s uncontroverted evidence that defeats 

jurisdiction. [Citation.] If we decide that a plaintiff has made a prima facie case for 

jurisdiction over a defendant, we must then determine if a material evidentiary conflict 

exists. [Citation.] If a material conflict does exist, then we must remand the cause to the 

trial court for an evidentiary proceeding.” MacNeil v. Trambert, 401 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 

1080 (2010).

¶ 14 Here, there is no report of proceedings and no exhibits included in the trial record to 

indicate that there was an evidentiary hearing held. The order of the court merely states 

“Defendant’s motion to dismiss is heard, argued[,] and denied.” Therefore, we find that our review 

is de novo. 

¶ 15 Moving to the substance of the appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

denying her motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-301 of the Code where she was a South Dakota 

resident and where the incident leading to the complaint occurred entirely in Missouri. We agree.
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¶ 16 Section 2-209 of the Code provides that Illinois courts have general jurisdiction over a 

natural person for actions arising outside of Illinois if he or she was “present within this State when 

served”; was “domiciled or [a] resident within the State when the cause of action arose, the action 

was commenced, or process was served”; or is “doing business within this State” (735 ILCS 5/2-

209(b)(1), (2), (4) (West 2020)). Buron v. Lignar, 2020 IL App (1st) 192152, ¶ 17. 

¶ 17 In arguing that there was general jurisdiction in Illinois, the plaintiff relies on Hatcher v. 

Anders, 117 Ill. App. 3d 236, 239-40 (1983). Hatcher involved a case where defendant was a 

member of the military. There, the court found that his temporary absence for his service did not 

amount to his abandonment of his Illinois residence. However, this case is easily distinguishable. 

First, the defendant is a career service member, and at the time of her deposition, she had served 

for 15 years. Second, the only reason she ever lived in Illinois was that she was stationed at Scott 

Air Force Base, which was the same reason she relocated to South Dakota. Thus, we do not find 

Hatcher helpful in resolving the issue before us. 

¶ 18 The defendant was a member of the United States Air Force. For a time from 2016-2019, 

she was stationed at Scott Air Force Base. During her time there, she bought a home. In October 

of 2019, she was relocated to South Dakota. She has resided in South Dakota since moving from 

Illinois. At the time of the incident, she did not have an Illinois license, did not physically reside 

in Illinois, and was only staying at her home temporarily while she was in town for an event and 

to visit friends. She testified that it was always her intention to return to South Dakota after her 

short stay in Belleville, Illinois. The fact that she did not know where she wanted to live after 

retiring from the military in five years was not sufficient to assume that she was still an Illinois 

resident. She did not have any furniture in the Belleville, Illinois, residence and only stored old 

decorations and clothes she no longer wore there. Nothing in the record shows that she ever 
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intended to abandon her South Dakota residency and return to live permanently in Illinois at the 

time of the incident. A person can only have one domicile. In re Estate of Elson, 120 Ill. App. 3d 

649, 654 (1983). Here, the defendant lived out of state and she testified it was her intent to return 

to South Dakota and remain living out of state for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we cannot 

say that the defendant is subject to the general jurisdiction of Illinois.

¶ 19 Next, we look to specific jurisdiction. In Illinois, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

a nonresident defendant is authorized under the “long-arm” statute found in section 2-209(c) of 

the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2020)). Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate 

Warehousing, Inc., 2017 IL 121281, ¶ 13. A trial court can exercise jurisdiction on any “basis 

now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.” 

735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2020). Therefore, to determine whether jurisdiction is appropriate 

under the long-arm statute, we must consider the constitutional limits placed on a state’s authority 

to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Aspen, 2017 IL 121281, ¶ 13. 

¶ 20 “The United States Supreme Court has held that the federal due process clause permits a 

state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the defendant 

has ‘certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 14. Specific 

jurisdiction exists only when plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or relates to defendant’s 

contacts with the forum state. Russell v. SNFA, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 40. 

¶ 21 As to the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant is subject to specific jurisdiction in Illinois 

where, after the incident, the defendant returned to her house in Belleville, Illinois, we find this 

argument entirely unpersuasive. It is undisputed that all of the complained of conduct occurred in 

Missouri. The mere fact that the defendant stayed in her Belleville, Illinois, house is not enough 
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to justify exclusive, specific jurisdiction over her in Illinois. Therefore, we find that the defendant 

is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Illinois under the long-arm statute, and the trial 

court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. 

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County 

denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 24 Reversed.