IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-2149

Filed January 9, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DUANE HUFFER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel, 

District Associate Judge.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his deferred judgment and 

imposition of sentence. AFFIRMED.

C. Aron Vaughn of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., May, J., and Blane, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2020).
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PER CURIAM.

Duane Huffer was granted a deferred judgment and placed on probation. 

After stipulating to two probation violations, the district court revoked his deferred 

judgment, imposed sentence, granted probation, and as a condition of probation 

required Huffer to reside at a residential facility. Huffer appeals asserting the court 

abused its discretion both in revoking his deferred judgment and in imposing the 

condition of probation that he reside at a residential facility. We affirm.

In spring 2018, Huffer pled guilty to first-degree harassment pursuant to a 

plea agreement. The district court granted Huffer’s request for a deferred 

judgment, placed him on supervised probation for eighteen months, and imposed 

a no-contact order for five years. Approximately four months after sentencing, the 

State filed an application for probation revocation. At the hearing, Huffer admitted 

he had twice violated the no-contact order by entering the protected party’s car in 

her driveway when she was not at home and sending her a text message a week 

later. At the hearing, the protected party explained her efforts to keep her home 

address and car license plate numbers concealed from Huffer and how his 

invasion of her car caused her additional stress and fear. She also testified she 

learned Huffer came to her house within hours of discovering her new address

from a divorce filing. 

The district court revoked Huffer’s deferred judgment and imposed a 

sentence of an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed two years, 

suspended, and probation. The court imposed as a condition of probation that 

Huffer reside in a residential facility, rejecting his request for “street probation.” 

Huffer appeals.
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The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2019). An abuse of discretion occurs 

when the court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that are clearly 

untenable or unreasonable. Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 918 

(Iowa 2014)). Revocation decisions follow a two-step process. Patterson v. State, 

294 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 1980). First, the court must determine whether the 

person violated any condition of probation. Id. If the State established the 

violation, the court then decides whether to continue probation or impose any 

sentence that might originally have been imposed. See Iowa Code § 908.11(4)

(2018); State v. Ferguson, No. 18-1137, 2019 WL 2153100, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 

May 15, 2019). Huffer contests the second step. In challenging the sentence, 

Huffer concedes it is within statutory limits, so review is also for an abuse of 

discretion. See State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). Sentencing 

decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor.

State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995). 

The district court gave the following explanation for imposing the condition 

of a residential facility rather than street probation:

I think what the evidence here establishes clearly is that you’re just 

not capable at this point in time of being on street probation without 

committing more criminal offenses and without putting yourself and 

the community at risk, and I think residential facility is the best option 

available to both rehabilitate you and to protect our community. . . . 

[Y]ou’ll be closely supervised and monitored. I’ll know pretty quickly 

if you’re making decisions that places the community at risk.

I also think it best serves to rehabilitate you because at the 

residential facility we can make sure that you’re following through 

with your treatment, that you’re following through with taking 

medication if you need to do that, and we can make sure that you 

are making responsible decisions.
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Huffer makes an impassioned plea for why his deferred judgment should 

not have been revoked and why he should not be required to reside in a residential 

facility. He sets out a number of factors that he argues support his positions—for 

example, that there were mitigating circumstances, his lack of a prior criminal 

history, his other efforts on street probation, and his mental health status. But we

do not substitute our judgment for the district court based on his factual assertions. 

Huffer stipulated to two violations of the no-contact order within months of 

being placed on probation for first-degree harassment. While on street probation, 

he demonstrated an inability to abide by the no-contact order and leave the 

protected party alone. His attempt to explain away and minimize the violations

and intrusion into her life is of no assistance here. The State presented evidence 

of the impact that the violations had on the protected party. Huffer’s probation 

officer recommended revocation of the deferred judgment, and the State argued 

for prison time. The explanation the district court gave cogently balances the 

interests of the the broader community with Huffer’s need for assistance and 

supervision in abiding by the no-contact order as well as increasing the prospects 

of his rehabilitation. The court’s rationale—in both the revocation and sentencing 

decision—is free from any untenable or unreasonable ground. We find no abuse 

of discretion and affirm.

AFFIRMED.