[Cite as State v. Alexander, 2012-Ohio-3349.] 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 27, 2012 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Fox & Scott, PLLC, and Bradley Fox, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Please note: These cases have been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

YVONNE ALEXANDER, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

:

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NOS. C-110828 

 C-110829 

TRIAL NOS. B-1104473 

 B-1103448 

 

 O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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CUNNINGHAM, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Yvonne Alexander challenges the sentences imposed 

following her pleas of guilty to ten counts of theft from elderly or disabled adults in the 

case numbered B-1103448 and to a single count of Medicaid fraud in the case numbered 

B-1104473. Alexander had used her position as a manager of a group home for 

developmentally disabled adults to steal the retirement and disability payments of those in 

her care. The theft offenses were variously punishable as second-, third-, and fourthdegree felonies. The Medicaid-fraud offense was punishable as a fourth-degree felony. 

The trial court’s sentence included an order that each prison term be served consecutively, 

for an aggregate prison term of 191⁄2 years. 

{¶2} Alexander was sentenced after the effective date of the revisions to the 

felony sentencing statutes found in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86. Because the trial court’s findings 

to support consecutive sentences are amply demonstrated in the record, because the court 

considered the seriousness and the likelihood of recidivism in reaching its sentencing 

decision, and because it did not otherwise abuse its discretion in imposing sentence, we 

affirm. 

I. The Sentencing Hearing 

{¶3} In exchange for Alexander’s pleas of guilty, the state dismissed 26 other 

serious felony charges. The trial court accepted her pleas, found her guilty of each 

remaining offense, and continued the matter for the preparation of a presentence 

investigation. 

{¶4} At a sentencing hearing conducted on November 30, 2011, the trial court 

indicated that it had reviewed the presentence investigation, which included evidence that 

Alexander had been convicted of welfare theft in Seattle in 1992 and had been convicted of 

falsification in Hamilton County in 1979. The court heard the statements of Deb Lyle, a 
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representative of the group home. Lyle noted that the victims, disabled women from 39 to 

67 years of age, had trusted and relied on Alexander for over 14 years. Alexander’s duties 

had included overseeing the financial arrangements made for residents of the group 

home. The victims had “perceived her as a parent figure.” Yet, Lyle explained how, over a 

period of years, Alexander had “stole[n] their money, lied to them, broke[n] promises and 

betrayed their trust.” She recounted how Alexander had stolen the women’s retirement 

and disability payments and had collected funds for “bogus cemetery plots.” Lyle stated 

that, even after being terminated by the group home, Alexander had forged documents 

and had lied to her former employer and to state agencies to obtain the state-retirement 

payments of a disabled victim, leaving the home to charge the state and county for the 

victim’s care. 

{¶5} The court also heard the statement of Holly Mott, an investigator for 

Hamilton County’s developmental-disabilities agency. Mott described Alexander’s 

actions as “one of the most tragic and sad cases” and noted that “Alexander is one of the 

most manipulative and calculating perpetrators” to be investigated. Mott provided more 

detail regarding Alexander’s schemes and the tremendous impact they had on the 

defenseless victims. According to Mott, Alexander had capitalized on the victims’ beliefs 

that Alexander was “a special person that they could trust.” She also noted that 

Alexander had lied to investigators when first confronted by allegations of her 

malfeasance at the group home. The court then received the comments of an Ohio 

assistant attorney general and police detectives who recounted more details of 

Alexander’s theft and fraud activities. 

{¶6} After entertaining the arguments of counsel, the trial court then 

explained to Alexander: 

[The victim-impact statements], boy, they really nailed it 

on the head just how I felt. And I was going to quote some of 

them but they did it enough, and so I’ll just move on. 
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What I do have to say to you, I’m the Mental Health 

Court judge, so I have - - well, what you’ve done is just so 

disturbing and reprehensible to me, to take advantage and prey 

upon the most vulnerable, the most trusting, the most 

defenseless, the most assailable members of society is just 

wrong. It’s more than wrong. 

* * * 

You, ma’am, are never to work with any elderly or 

disabled individuals ever again. 

* * * 

The sentence I have imposed - - I’m not maxing you out 

because you did step forward and take responsibility and pled 

to this offense. 

{¶7} The record also reflects that the trial court filled out and journalized 

sentencing-findings worksheets for these offenses. The trial court noted on the 

worksheets that it had considered the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 

2929.12 and had made the findings for imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 

2929.14(C). The trial court also journalized two separate judgment entries imposing 

the sentences of incarceration, imposing costs, ordering restitution, and notifying 

Alexander of her postrelease-control obligations. These consolidated appeals 

followed. 

II. The Two-Step Review of Felony Sentences 

{¶8} In two interrelated assignments of error, Alexander argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively, and that 
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the trial court’s sentence was contrary to law because the court had failed to apply 

and consider the seriousness and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12. We disagree. 

{¶9} The Ohio Supreme Court has identified a two-step process for appellate 

review of felony sentences. State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 

N.E.2d 124, ¶ 14; see also State v. Love, 194 Ohio App.3d 16, 2011-Ohio-2224, 954 N.E.2d 

202, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). First we must determine whether Alexander’s sentences of 

imprisonment were contrary to law. Kalish at ¶ 14. Then, if the sentences were not 

contrary to law, we must review them to determine whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in selecting sentences within the range permitted by statute. Id. at ¶ 17. 

A. The First Step—Has the Trial Court Adhered to the 

Applicable Statutes? 

{¶10} Under the first step of the Kalish inquiry, the reviewing “court must 

ensure that the trial court has adhered to all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the 

sentence.” Id. at ¶ 14. We conduct this inquiry to determine only whether the sentences 

imposed were “clearly and convincingly contrary to law, [under] the standard found in 

R.C. 2953.08(G).” Id. at ¶ 14. 

{¶11} For example, R.C. 2929.14(A) imposes a statutory requirement that a trial 

court must adhere to when imposing sentence: the term of imprisonment must be within 

the range provided by statute. We have held that a trial court failed to adhere to the 

applicable sentencing statute when it imposed an 18-month prison term for an offense for 

which the maximum prison term was 12 months. State v. Andrew, 1st Dist. No. C-110141, 

2012-Ohio-1731, ¶ 8, citing Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, 

at ¶ 15. Since that sentence was outside the permissible statutory range, it was clearly and 

convincingly contrary to law. Id. And we vacated the sentence and remanded the matter 

to the trial court for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 10. 
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{¶12} Alexander concedes that each prison term imposed was within the range 

provided by statute. But she contests whether the trial court erred in ordering the 

sentences to be served consecutively. 

{¶13} Findings are required to impose consecutive sentences. The 

enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 has established an additional requirement that trial 

courts must adhere to when imposing consecutive sentences. The General Assembly has 

“revived the requirement that trial courts make findings before imposing consecutive 

sentences in R.C. 2929.14(C).” State v. Jones, 1st Dist. No. C-110603, 2012-Ohio-2075, ¶ 

17; see also State v. Hites, 3rd Dist. No. 6-11-07, 2012-Ohio-1892, ¶ 11; State v. Bonner, 

8th Dist. No. 97747, 2012-Ohio-2931, ¶ 5 (“The revisions * * * now require a trial court to 

make specific findings when imposing consecutive sentences.”); State v. Sullivan, 10th 

Dist. No. 11AP-414, 2012-Ohio-2737, ¶ 24. 

{¶14} Our determination of whether a trial court has adhered to the 

applicable requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) in imposing consecutive sentences is also 

subject to review under the first prong of Kalish and under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). See 

Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, at ¶ 14. We do not apply the 

abuse-of-discretion standard urged by Alexander. Rather, a reviewing court may vacate 

consecutive sentences only if “it clearly and convincingly finds” either that the record does 

not support the trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) sentencing findings or that the sentence is 

otherwise contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

{¶15} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) now requires that a trial court engage in a three-step 

analysis in order to impose consecutive sentences. First, the trial court must “find” 

that consecutive sentencing is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to 

punish the offender. Next, the trial court must “find” that consecutive sentences are 

not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger 

the offender poses to the public. Finally, the trial court must “find” that at least one 

of the following applies: (1) the offender committed one or more of the multiple 
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offenses while awaiting trial or sentencing, while under a sanction imposed pursuant 

to R.C. 2929.16, R.C. 2929.17, or R.C. 2929.18, or while under postrelease control for 

a prior offense; (2) at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of 

one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the offenses 

was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed 

as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the 

offender’s conduct; or (3) the offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates 

that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by 

the offender. 

{¶16} In each step of this analysis, the statutory language directs that the 

trial court must “find” the relevant sentencing factors before imposing consecutive 

sentences. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). A trial court is not required to use “talismanic words to 

comply with the guidelines and factors for sentencing.” State v. Brewer, 1st Dist. No. C000148, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5455 *10 (Nov. 24, 2000). But it must be clear from the 

record that the trial court actually made the findings required by statute. See State v. 

Pierson, 1st Dist. No. C-970935, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3812 (Aug. 21, 1998). A trial 

court satisfies this statutory requirement when the record reflects that the court has 

engaged in the required analysis and has selected the appropriate statutory criteria. See 

State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999); see also State v. 

Brewer, 1st Dist. No. C-000148, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5455 *11 (Nov. 24, 2000). 

{¶17} Because a trial court speaks only through its journal, we have long 

approved the use of a sentencing-findings worksheet to document that the trial court has 

made the required findings. E.g., State v. Phillips, 1st Dist. No. C-960898, 1997 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 2615 (June 18, 1997); see also State v. Meister, 76 Ohio App.3d 15, 19, 

600 N.E.2d 1103 (1st Dist.1991). Use of the sentencing-findings worksheet ensures 

that the trial court has adhered to the applicable statutory mandate. See R.C. 

2929.14(C); see also Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, at ¶ 15. 
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And by documenting the findings in the court’s journal, the use of a worksheet also 

ensures meaningful review of the trial court’s sentencing decisions. 

{¶18} The consecutive-sentence findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C) are 

not the same as those required by former R.C. 2929.19(B)(2), which provided that 

the trial court “shall impose a sentence and shall make a finding that gives its 

reasons for selecting the sentence * * * (c) If it imposes consecutive sentences.” 

(Emphasis added.) See State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165, 793 

N.E.2d 473, ¶ 14-16. In 2003, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the requirement 

that a trial court give its reasons for selecting consecutive sentences was “separate 

and distinct from the duty to make the findings,” and it imposed an obligation on 

trial courts to articulate the reasons supporting their findings at the sentencing 

hearing. Id. at ¶ 19-20. The trial court’s obligation to “give its reasons” is now gone 

from the sentencing statutes. Gone with it, we hold, is the requirement that the trial 

court articulate and justify its findings at the sentencing hearing. A trial court is free 

to do so, of course. But where, as here, there is no statutory requirement that the 

trial court articulate its reasons, it does not commit reversible error if it fails to do so, 

as long as it has made the required findings. See Phillips, 1st Dist. No. C-960898, 

1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2615. 

{¶19} Here, the trial court carefully and fully complied with the mandates of 

R.C. 2929.14(C) to make sentencing findings. The trial court employed sentencingfindings worksheets and journalized them on the date of the sentencing hearing. For 

each case number, it selected the appropriate statutory criteria for imposing consecutive 

sentences. In both cases, it noted on the face of the worksheets that consecutive 

sentences were necessary to protect the public and to punish the offender, and that 

they were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Alexander’s conduct and the 

danger she posed to the public. Finally, the trial court found in both cases that 

Alexander had committed one or more of the multiple offenses while awaiting trial, 
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and that the harm caused by them was so great or unusual that no single prison term 

would adequately reflect the seriousness of her conduct. 

{¶20} The record demonstrates that the trial court adhered to all applicable 

rules and statutes in imposing consecutive sentences. See Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 

2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, at ¶ 14. And the record of Alexander’s misdeeds amply 

supports the trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) sentencing findings. See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

Alexander had used her position as the manager of a group home for elderly and 

disabled adults to illegally obtain tens of thousands of dollars from multiple victims in 

her care. While she was awaiting trial on these charges, Alexander was charged with and 

ultimately pled guilty to Medicaid fraud. Alexander had forged documents and had lied 

to her employer and to state agencies. With the victim’s retirement payments illegally 

diverted to Alexander’s account, the group home, believing that the retirement payments 

had ceased, had billed state and county agencies for over $25,000 to maintain the 

victim’s care. 

{¶21} We, therefore, conclude that the trial court complied with the dictates of 

the newly amended R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and made all the findings required to support 

the imposition of consecutive sentences, and that those findings were supported in the 

record. 

{¶22} The trial court considered the seriousness and recidivism 

factors. R.C. 2929.12 provides another statutory requirement that the trial court 

must follow. Alexander next argues that the trial court failed to apply and consider 

the seriousness and recidivism factors of that statute. Again, we disagree. 

{¶23} R.C. 2929.12 states that in exercising its discretion to determine the 

most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of felony sentencing, 

the trial court shall “consider” the factors relating to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and the factors relating to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism. Along 

with R.C. 2929.11, which lists the purposes and principles of felony sentencing, R.C. 
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2929.12 “serve[s] as an overarching guide for trial judges to consider in fashioning an 

appropriate sentence.” Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, at 

¶ 17. 

{¶24} But as the Ohio Supreme Court has noted, R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 

are “not fact-finding statutes like R.C. 2929.14.” Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-

Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, at ¶ 17. R.C. 2929.12 requires only that a trial court 

“consider” the factors. Unlike R.C. 2929.14(C), it does not require the trial court to 

“use specific language or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the 

requisite consideration of the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” State v. 

Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000); see also State v. Luecke, 11th 

Dist. Nos. 2011-P-0085 and 2011-P-0104, 2012-Ohio-3032, ¶ 10. Thus, we would 

presume, even from a silent record, that the trial court had considered the R.C. 

2929.12 factors, unless an appellant could demonstrate affirmatively that the court had 

failed to do so. See State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, 

¶ 31; see also Love, 194 Ohio App.3d 16, 2011-Ohio-2224, 954 N.E.2d 202, at ¶ 14. 

{¶25} Here, moreover, it is abundantly clear from the sentencing-findings 

worksheets and from the trial court’s remarks at the sentencing hearing that the 

court considered a number of factors relating to the seriousness of Alexander’s 

conduct and to the likelihood of her offending in the future. The trial court noted at 

sentencing that Alexander had preyed upon elderly and disabled victims. See R.C. 

2929.12(B)(1) (injury suffered exacerbated by victim’s age or physical or mental 

condition). The worksheets also reflect that the trial court considered the harm inflicted 

on the victims. The trial court considered that Alexander’s position as a caretaker, 

obligating her to prevent exactly these kinds of offenses, was used to facilitate the 

offenses, as was Alexander’s relationship with the victims. See R.C. 2929.12(B)(1), 

2929.12(B)(2), 2929.12(B)(4), 2929.12(B)(5), and 2929.12(B)(6). The court also 
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considered that Alexander had showed no genuine remorse for her crimes. See R.C. 

2929.12(D)(5). 

{¶26} Each of these factors is amply supported in the record. Alexander had 

entered multiple pleas of guilty to charges of theft from elderly or disabled adults. See 

R.C. 2913.02(A)(2). She had used her position as the manager of a group home for 

elderly and disabled adults to illegally obtain funds from those in her care. And she had 

entered a plea of guilty to generating fraudulent billing statements to state agencies 

administering the Medicaid program. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court 

adhered to the statutory requirements of R.C. 2929.12 in imposing sentence. 

B. The Second Step—Did the Trial Court Abuse Its 

Discretion in Selecting Sentences Within the Ranges 

Permitted by Statute? 

{¶27} Since we have determined that the sentences imposed were not contrary 

to law, we now proceed to the second step of our sentencing analysis. We must 

determine whether the trial court actually abused its discretion in imposing 

sentences permitted by statute. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 

N.E.2d 124, at ¶ 17 and 19. Thus, we will not reverse the trial court’s sentencing 

decisions unless the court exhibited an attitude that was “unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable.” State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). In 

applying this standard, a reviewing court “is not free to substitute its judgment for 

that of the trial judge.” Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169, 559 N.E.2d 1301 

(1990); see also State v. Morris, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2012-Ohio-2407, __ N.E.2d __, 

¶ 14. Rather, if the trial court’s exercise of its discretion exhibited a “sound reasoning 

process” that would support its decision, a reviewing court will not disturb that 

determination. Morris at ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community 

Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶28} The trial court was well acquainted with the facts surrounding these 

crimes. It had reviewed the presentence investigation, the statements of 

investigators, and the arguments of counsel. In light of the seriousness of Alexander’s 

conduct, preying upon vulnerable and trusting victims for financial gain, we find that the 

trial court exhibited a sound reasoning process in imposing consecutive prison terms 

totaling 191⁄2 years. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The first and second 

assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶29} Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. 

Judgments affirmed. 

HILDEBRANDT, P.J., and DINKELACKER, J., concur.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.