Filed 1/ 13/15 In re J.S. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re J.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile C ourt Law. B255857 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK02634)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A RMANDO S.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Julie F ox Blackshaw, Judge

. Affirmed

. Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Richard D. Weiss, Acting County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison , Assistant County Counsel, a

nd Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————2

A father appeals jurisdictional and dispositional findings made with respect to his son. He contends evidence of his sexual abuse of the boy’s two younger nieces is insufficient to show his son was at risk of harm in his care. The father also argues there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order removing his son from his custody or that there were no reasonable means to protect the boy short of removal from father’s care. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Before r espondent Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) initiated this matter, 11

- year

- old J.S., the sole subject of this appeal
, lived with his mother
, O

. C. ( m other ), 1 his biological father and m other ’s long

- term companion, appellant
Armando S. ( f

ather ), his half

- sister Gabriela C., and various members of his extended family. On November 12, 2013, s heriff’s deputies executed a search warrant at the family’s home in the course of an investigation of J.S.’s adult half

- brother, Mario C., for
the alleged rape of a teenager. DCFS was contacted, and a social worker came to the home to investigate, after deputies determined the minor children in the home were at
risk based on Mario’s endangering conduct

. In the course of that investigation, then 15

- year

- old Gabriela became upset and told the social worker that it was “awkward” having f ather back in the home, 2 and that
the children all went to their rooms whenever he came i n. Gabriela said that N.C., her
10

- year

- old niece and other ’s granddaughter, had disclosed that f ather touched her in an inappropriate way during a family trip to visit a relative in Sacramento. While at the relative’s home, f

ather asked N.C. to sleep on the floor with him, and touched her over her clothing, while m other and other children slept in a bed in the same room

. Gabriela

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

2 Father, who had been in a romantic relationship with mother for over 12 years,

m oved out of the family home in January 2013 to live with another woman, but had returned two weeks earlier. Mother had forgiven father, but her adult children remained angry and disagreed with the decision to allow him to return . As a res ult, mother and father s tayed together in a converted room apart from the rest of the family , whom father mostly avoided

.3

said she and N.C. had shared this information with their respective m other s. N.C. confirmed Gabriela’s story. She told the social worker that during that trip, f ather told her to sleep on the floor with him

. After s he laid next to f ather he pulled the blankets over her and touched her on her breasts, the sides of her body, squeezed her buttocks and leaned over her running his lips from side to side over hers and kissing her. N.C. ran to the bathroom to hide, but returned after f ather came looking for her. N.C. told her

m other , Alicia C., and Gabriela what f ather had done. Alicia spoke to the other adults in the home and they agreed n one of the children should have any unsupervised contact with
f ather . N.C. and Alicia had not lived in th e family home at the time of the incident in Sacramento, but had moved in after f ather moved out . N.C. told the social worker that
since f ather ’s return, she had not been alone with or had any sort of relationship with him. The social worker spoke with a nother of m other ’s grandchildren, six

- year

- old F.C., who appeared somewhat apprehensive. When the children’s social worker asked F.C. if any child in the home had been hurt, F.C. at first refused to answer the question and looked down, but then said that she had been hurt. However, she refused to disclose
how she had been hurt and refused further interaction s with the social worker. J.S. told the social worker he had never heard anyone talk about any of the children being touched on their private areas. He knew to call the police and tell m other if anyone tried to touch him. When asked if he had ever been accused of perpetrating sexual abuse, f ather acknowledged that eight months after the family’s trip to Sacramento, N.C. claimed he
had touched her ina ppropriately on that trip. He admitted having asked N.C. to sleep on the floor with him, but denied touching or kissing the child. Father agreed to move out of the family residence, said he would do what he needed in order to reunite his family and

agree d to a safety plan.
N.C. and F.C. underwent forensic medical exams. During her exam, N.C. told a nurse that when she was eight or nine years old, she had been sleeping with her cousins
on a bed while f

ather was o n the floor. He woke her up and told her to sleep with him.
He got on top of her, put his lips on hers and made a sliding motion. She felt safe now4

that he was out of the home. D uring her examination, F.C. said she was afraid of f ather because he had touched her vaginal area t h ree times under her clothes when she was four years old. There had been no penetration. Both girls’ physical exams were normal and
neither confirmed nor negated sexual abuse.
When mother met with DCFS on December 5, 2013, she expressed disbelief that
f ather had sexuall y abused her grandchildren . She wanted to maintain her relationship
with him. On December 10, 2013, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code 3 section 300 petition on behalf of Gabriela and J.S. alleging that the children were at risk due to
f ather ’s sexual abuse of N.C. and F.C., and m other ’s failure to protect them. At the detention hearing on December 10, 2013, f ather was deemed J.S.’s presumed father . J.S. was detained from his custody, and f ather was given monitored visitation. J.S. and
Gabr iel a remained in m other ’s care

. Gabriela was interviewed by a DCFS Dependency Investigator (DI) on February 4, 2014. She said that during a family trip to see her brother in Sacramento three years earlier, N.C. told her that f ather asked her to sleep wit h him on the floor before getting on top of her, kissing her and trying to touch her buttocks. T he rest of the family was told about the incident and agreed f ather could not be left alone with any child. Afterwards, Gabriela, J.S., m other and f ather had lived in the converted room

. The other children in the family were sent to their rooms whenever f ather went in to the main house. Gabriela did not think anyone was aware of f ather ’s sexual abuse of F.C.
before her forensic exam.
J.S. told the DI he knew nothing about what happened and did not believe his
father would do what he had been accused of doing. He described f ather as “one of the good guys.”

3 All further s tatutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated

.5

N.C. told the DI that when the family went to Sacramento, she had gone to sleep
in the bed with m other , but f ather woke her up and told her to sleep on the floor with him. She moved to the floor and went back to sleep, but awoke to find f ather on top of her
, kissing her on the mouth. As she pulled away, f ather began touching her buttocks and breasts over her clothes. N.C. got scared and ran to the bathroom. She tried to leave the
room to tell her m other what happened, but f ather grabbed her and put her back on the bed. Later, N.C. told Gabriela and they both told N.C.’s m other , who informed the rest of the family and the children were kept away from f ather . N.C. first learned about
f ather ’s molestation of F.C. when she heard what F.C. told the forensic examiner. When F.C. met with the DI in early February 2 014, she said f ather touched her vagina by placing his hand under her underwear. She had asked him for some gum when he grabbed her and began kissing her on the mouth. After his hand was in her underwear,
f ather began fondling her with his finger. He ru bbed her buttocks while touching her vagina. F.C. also said f

ather had tried to touch her another time, but could not provide a time frame. F.C. said that the second time
, f ather had grabbed her and tried convincing her to go in the converted room saying he had g um, but she g o t away. She could not say why she had never said anything about the abuse.
Mother acknowledged that one day about a year after the trip when she picked N.C. up from school, her granddaughter told her f ather had sexually abused her during the trip to Sacramento. She did not believe N.C. who made the disclosure in a nonchalant

manner . Because of the child’s disclosure, and in order to avoid “serious problems”

m other decided she would no longer take care of N.C. She told Alicia she c ould no longer care for the child, but did not mention N.C.’s disclosure. Mother knew no thing
about f ather fondling F.C. She said f ather was a good person who helped her care for her children when they were young. The jurisdictional hearing was conducted on April 14, 2014. DCFS’s reports were received into evidence. Alicia testified that on one occasion the whole family took a trip
to visit her brother at his two

- story apartment in Sacramento. Alicia slept downst airs.
Mother
, f ather , N.C., J.S. , a nephew
, and a niece slept upstairs. Alicia testified that6

N.C.’s demeanor was unchanged the day after the incident of abuse, which N.C. did not
disclose until four or five months later. In November or December of 2011 , after N.C. told her about the abuse, Alicia told her brothers and they agreed to keep the children away from f

ather . Since then, to Alicia’s knowledge, N.C. had never been alone with
f ather . The only time N.C. and f ather had lived in the same home was the two or three week period before the deputies came to the home with the search warrant. Alicia
testified that m other knew what had happened to N.C., but did not believe it. Father had never been kept away from Gabriela or J.S.
F.C. is Alicia’s niece. F.C.’s m other , D .P. had been a stay

- at

- home mom for eight years. Alicia was not aware that f ather e ver babysat F.C. , but there had been a period
, when F.C. was about four years old
, when the child and f ather lived in the same house

. They also lived tog ether after father returned and he and m other moved into t he
converted room. Seven

- year

- old F.C. testified in chambers that D .P. never told her not to be around
f ather . She said f

ather had touched her in her “middle part” (pointing to her crotch) and
kiss ed her when she was four or five years old. The incident happened at m other ’s house.
F.C. did not like it when f ather touched her like that, which he did twice

. In closing argument counsel for DCFS requested that the court sustain the petition as to the allegations pleaded under section 300, subdivisions ( b ) and ( d ) based on the statements by N.C. and F.C. Children’s counsel agreed and urged the court also to find
J .S. was at risk even though he is male, based on f ather ’s predilection for prepubescent girls with “boyish” rather than “womanly” features, and observing that m other could not be counted on to pro tect the children.
Father ’s attorney argued that the allege d conduct was not egregious enough to justify including J.S. in the petition, particularly given his denial that he had been
touched , and the fact that N.C. and F.C. were not related by blood, only “kind of related”

to f ather by virtue of his relationship with m other

. The juvenile court sustained the allegations under section 300, subdivisions ( b ) and ( d ). The court referred to statements made by N.C. and F.C., observing that the7

sexual misconduct they described was covered by section 300, subdivision (d) . The court
also sustained the allegations as to J.S., observing that there was not “much distinction in the body types” between f ather ’s prepubescent victims and the young boy. 4 The court
also noted that f

ather had engaged in sexual misconduct in the fa mily ’s home and there was no “reason to believe that [ he] would be deterred from possibly doing so to his own son in the family home, as well. ” Proceeding to disposition, the court declared the children dependents under section 300, subdivisions (b) and ( d), and removed J.S. from f ather ’s custody

. Father was ordered to participate in sexual abuse and individual counseling, parenting classes, and joint counseling with J.S. Father w a s given two hour unmonitored visits with J.S. in a public place during day time hours

. He appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial evidence supports the j urisdictional findings
Father contends that the evidence that he sexually abused two unrelated female children does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as to his son under section 300 subdivisions (b) or (d).

4 The court sustained the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d) as follows: “The children, Gabriela C[.] and [J.S.]’s mother[’s]

. . . male companion,

. . . father of the child [J.S.], sexually abused the children’s ten

- year

- old niece, [N. C.], in which

. . . father fondled the niece’s breasts, squeezed the niece’s buttocks and kissed the niece’s lips. The

. . . father placed his body on top of the niece’s body, simulating sexual intercourse. The mother failed to protect the children when she knew of

. . . father’s sexual abuse of the niece. The mother allowed

. . . father to reside in the children’s home and have unlimited access to the children. Such sexual abuse of the niece by

. . . father, and the mother’s failure to protect the chil dren, endangers the children’s physical health and safety, and places the children at risk of physical harm, damage, danger, sexual abuse and failure to protect. ” “The children, Gabriela C[.] and [J.S. ] ’s mother [’s]

. . . male companion,

. . . father of th e child [J.S.], sexually abused the children’s six

- year

- old niece, [F.C.]
, in which

. . . father repeatedly fondled the niece’s vagina. Such sexual abuse of the niece by

. . . father endangers the children’s physical health and safety and places the child ren at risk of physical harm, damage, danger, [and] sexual abuse.”8

“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the e vidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exer cise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘“[We] must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence

. . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is appropriate].”’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’” ( In re I.J

. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 ( I.J

. ) .) DCFS bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence , that a child is a dependent of the court under section 300. ( I.J. , at p. 773.)
It is undisputed that f

ather did not sexually abuse or neglect J.S. before this matter
was initiated. “But section 300 does not require that a child actually be abused or

n eglected before the juvenile court can assume jurisdiction. The se subdivisions

. . . require only a ‘substantial risk’ that the child will be abused or neglected. The legislatively declared purpose of the provisions ‘is to provide maximum safety and prot ection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well

- being of children who are at risk of that
harm .’ (§ 300.2, italics added.) ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.]” ( I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) “‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerate d in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In9

such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.]” ( I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4t h at p. 773.) Here, we focus on section 300, s ubdivision ( d ) , the
subdivision most closely describ ing the situation involving J.S. (See id . at pp. 773

– 774.)
Father contends there was insufficient evidence to support the assertion of dependency jurisdict ion over J.S. because his sexual abuse of N.C and F.C. did not give
rise to a reasonable inference that he would similarly abuse his son or that he had a sexual interest in boys.
S ection 300, s ubdivision (d) is limited to cases in which a child either has been sexually abused himself, is at risk because of a parent’s failure to protect him from sexual abuse about which the parent knew or should have known, or where the child faces a
substantial future risk of sexual abuse as defined in Penal Code section 1 1165.1

. Subdivision (d) protect s the siblings of a victim of sexual abuse, and boys in a home in which a parent or guardian has sexually abused girls. ( I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 776 .) Relying upon In re Rubisela E . (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177 ( Rubisela E .) , In re
P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339 ( P.A. ) , and In re Karen R. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 84
, ( Karen R. ) and distinguishing th e facts here from those of I.J

. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 766
, f ather contends that J.S. was not at risk of sexual abuse base d upon f ather ’s abuse of N.C.
and F.C. This is so because J.S. was never inappropriately touched and never s aw or knew about any inappropriate touching of his young nieces

. Further, f ather argues there
was no evidence to indicate he e ver abused or had a proclivity to sexually abuse his own children, or any male minor
, or that J.S. was at risk of any offense identified in Penal
Code section 11165.1

. The California Su preme Court recently addressed this precise issue, albeit in a case with significantly mor e egregious sexual misconduct by the father

. ( I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 771

. ) Prior to the decision in I.J. , appellate courts were divided over the issue of whether evidence of sexual abuse of a child of one gender justified assertion of jurisdiction over a child of another gender. In Rubisela E.
, supra , 85 Cal.App.4th 177 , disapproved in part in I.J. , the court reversed a jurisdictional finding that three younger10

brothers of a 13

- year

- old female victim of sexual abuse were at risk of similar abuse
b ecause there was no evidence the father engaged in any suspicious behavior toward the boys, and no evidence he had engaged in any homosexual actions or had homosexual tendencies. ( Rubisela E.
, at pp. 198

– 199.) Similarly, in In re Maria R

. (2010) 1 85
Cal. App.4th 48 ( Maria R

. ) , disapproved in part in I.J. , the court reversed a jurisdictional finding over a young boy premised on his father ’s sexual abuse of the boy’s older sisters, noting the lack of “any scientific authority or empirical evidence to support the conclusion that a person who sexually abuses a female child is likely to sexually abuse a male child.” ( Maria R. , at p. 68; see In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 137

– 138 ( Jordan R. ) [upholding finding that a three

- year

- old boy whose father had sexually
abused his 13

- year

- old niece was not in danger of sexual abuse].)
Other courts had held essentially that any type of “aberrant sexual behavior by a parent places the victim’s siblings who remain in the home at risk of aberrant sexual
behavior .” (See
, e.g., P.A. , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347; In re Andy G . (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1414; Karen R. , supra , 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90

– 91.)
In I.J

. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 766 , t he c ourt addressed the question of “whether a
father ’ s sexual abuse of his daughter supports a determination that his sons are juvenile court dependents when there is no evidence the father sexually abused or otherwise mistreated the boys, and they were unaware of their sister ’ s abuse.” ( Id

. at p. 770 , ital ics
omitted .) In that case, the father ’s biological daughter was 14, and h ad three younger brothers, 12

- year

- old twins and an eight year old. ( Id . at p. 771 .) The court found the
assertion of jurisdiction over the boys appropriate based on the father ’ s prolonged sexual
abuse ( rape, oral copulat ion and digital penetrat ion for more than three years ) of his daughter , which was “ ‘ aberrant in the extreme. ’ ” ( Id . at p p . 770 , 778 .)
The father argued the evidence of abuse of his daughter, by itself
, was not sufficient to support the jurisdictional finding s with re gard to his sons. ( I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 77 2.) The court disagreed

. It held that although it was safe to assume that
father ’ s other daughter was at greater risk of sexual abuse tha n were his sons , “ this d oes

n ot mean the risk to the sons is nonexistent or so insubstantial that the juvenile court may11

not take steps to protect the sons from that risk. ‘Although the danger of sexual abuse of a female sibling in such a situation may be greater than the danger of sexual abuse of a male sibling, the danger of sexual abuse to the male sibling is nonetheless still substantial.’ [Citation.]” ( Id . at p p. 779

– 780.)
The c ourt f

ocused in particular on section 355.1, subdivision (d), which prov ides that a finding of sexual abuse by a parent in a prior proceeding constitutes prima facie evidence that the child who is the subject of the current proceeding is subject to the

court ’ s jurisdiction. The c ourt noted that when it enact ed section 355.1, subdivision (d), the Legislature stated that the “‘children of the State of California are placed at risk when permitted contact with a parent or caretaker who has committed a sex crime

. . . . ’ (Stats. 1999, ch. 417, § 1, p. 2780.)” ( I.J., supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 779.) Acknowledging that section 355.1, subdivision (d) d oes not apply where the finding i s made in the same proceeding, the court nevertheless found the statute “ relevant because it evinces a legislative intent that sexual abuse of someone else, without more, at least supports a dependency finding.” ( Ibid. , italic s omitted. ) The c ourt observed that “[n]othing in [ section 355.1, subdivision (d)] sug gests it is limited to sexual abuse of a person of the same gender as the child before the co urt.” ( I .J. , at p. 779. ) The court cautioned, however, against interpreting its decision too broad ly : “ In upholding the assertion of jurisdiction in this case, we are not holding that the juvenile court is compelled, as a matter of law, to assume jurisd iction over all the children whenever one child is sexually
abused. We merely hold the evidence in this case supports the juvenile court ’ s assertion of jurisdiction. ” ( I

d. at p. 780.) 5
I.J

. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at page 780 , cited Jordan R. , supra , 205 Cal.App.4th 111 with approval. In Jordan R ., t he court a ffirm ed the assertion of jurisdiction over the daughter of a man who sexually abused his 13

- year

- old niece but also affirmed the

5 In so doing, the court disapproved, to the extent inconsistent with its holding, the decision in Rubisela E.
, supra , 85 Cal.App.4th 177, among others. ( I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 775. )12

juvenile court’s refusal to assert jurisdiction over the man ’ s son. ( Id . at pp. 136

– 139 .)
The father had sexually abused his niece by making sexual comments to her, asking her for a lap dance and oral sex, which she performed, licking her breasts and genitals and masturbating in her presence

. ( Id. at p. 136.) Notwithstan ding the particularly sordid nature of the abuse, the appellate court found it did not compel a finding that the father ’ s toddler son was at substantial risk of abuse . N othing in the record suggested the father had inappropriately touched another male in a sexual manner and “abuse of a female child, as aberrant as it is, does not establish, in and of itself, that a male child is at substantial risk of sexual abuse.” ( Id . at p. 138.)
Neither Jordan R

. , supra , 20 5 Cal.App.4th 111 or I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 773 is directly on point , in that this case does not involve the severe or prolonged sexual abuse of a sibling. This case more closely resembles P.A

. , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, w ith respect to the severity o f the alleged abuse. There, the juvenile court found substantial
evidence that on two occasions a father sexually abused his nine

- year

- old daughter by touching her vagina under her clothes and over her underwear , conduct the court found put the father ’s two younger sons , ages eight and five, at risk of sexual abuse. Although
the abuse was less shocking than in either Jordan R . or I.J ., the court concluded that “where

. . . a child has been sexually abused, any younger sibling who is approaching the

age a t which the child was abused, may be found to be at risk of sexual abuse

. . . . [A]berrant sexual behavior by a parent places the victim ’ s siblings who remain in the home at risk of aberrant sexual behavior.” ( P.A. , at p. 1347.) It is noteworthy that I. J

. d iscussed P.A . and left its holding intact. ( I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at pp. 775

– 776.) In the instant case, the juvenile court found that the fact that J.S. was a boy was not determinative, because both N.C. and F.C. were prepubescent at the time they were abused, and there was not “much distinction in the body types” between J.S. and his young nieces. The court found the similarity in body type more compelling than the girls’ gender

. Moreover, there was also evidence that the sexual abuse of N.C. occ urred in the presence of other children, including J.S., w ho could easily have aw a ken ed and
observed it. Further, t he abuse of F.C. took place at the family’s home, where J.S. was13

similarly vulnerable to abuse. Thus it found dependency jurisdiction was properly
exercised over J.S. under section 300, subdivision (d), based on the risk he would be
sexual ly abuse d

. Father insists subdivision (d) is inapplicable here because J.S., his “biological child, . . . was male, . . . was not aware of any abuse to his nieces who were several years younger,” and there was “no evidence that [J.S.] witnessed or was aware of [ f ather ] ’s
sexual conduct with them.” Father maintains this case is unlike Karen R

. , supra , 95 Cal.App.4th 84
, because J .S. did not witness any sexual abuse which was, in any case,
not incestuous. The record reflects otherwise. Father has been involved in a romantic relationship with the girls’ grand m other for many years, has lived with her in the family
home in which eac h victim resided at various times , and visited regularly . I t is

r easonable to infer that he was treated as part of the extended family during that time, at
least before he went to live with another woman. Indeed, b y virtue of his client’s longstanding, live

- in relationship with their grand m other
, f ather ’s counsel conceded that his client and the girls were “kind of related. ” (See In re Ricky T. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 515, 523 [declining to distinguish line of cases addressing risk posed to sex
abuse vic tim ’ s siblings who were unrelated to their abuser, because victims knew him for years and considered him their grand father ]. ) We also reject f ather ’s attempt to distinguish P.A. , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th 1339 , on the ground that J.S. had passed the age

at w hich abuse of either girl began here

. Father i gnores the larger point made in P.A ., i.e., that “aberrant sexual behavior by a parent places the [children] who remain in the home at risk of aberrant sexual behavior.” ( Id . at p. 1347, fn. omitted.)
Father ’s argument also overlooks the limited nature of our review. We determine only whether the record contains substantial evidence, contradicted or not, to support the juvenile court ’ s order . We cannot resolve evidentiary disputes or reweigh the evidence in
a manner more favorable to f ather . Those tasks are exclusively within the province of the juvenile court. We also defer to the lower court on issues of credibility. ( In re E.B. (2010) 1 84 Cal.App.4th 568, 574

– 575.) If substantial evidence supports the juvenile

court ’ s finding, it must be uph eld even if other evidence would s upport a different14

conclusion. ( In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 25 1 .) Testimony by even “a single witness can be sufficient to uphold a judgment.” ( Rubisela E.
, supra , 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 195.)
T he extent of sexual abuse of female siblings need not rise to the level perpetrated
in I.J

. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 773 to affirm the exercise of jurisdiction over male siblings , or to affirm a dispositional order disallowing the p erpetrator of the abuse to retain physical custody of a son. (See, e.g., In re Andy G

. , supra , 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1407

– 140 8 [abuse consisted of father fondling one sister ’ s breast and fondling another’s vagina, exposing his penis, and showing one sister a pornographic movie and masturbating in her presence]; P.A. , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 134 1

– 1343 [ father twice touched daughter ’ s vagina].) I.J. cited b oth cases with no indication of disapproval. ( I.J. , at
pp. 775

– 776.) In sum, I.J

. , su

pra , 56 Cal.4th 773 does not establish a minimum threshold . On the contrary, the case acknowledged that “‘[ s ] ome risks may be substantial even though they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great

. . . . ’” ( Id . at p. 778.) We believe t he guidance I.J

. provides is that appellate courts should not draw bright lines around categories of conduct in these cases. The juvenile

court was not compelled to assume jurisdiction over J.S. because his younger n ieces were sexually abused

. There were factors to suggest J.S. was not likely to be at risk, including
his gender
, the absence of evidence that f ather had a sexual interest in boys, the fact that the girls were not related by blood and the lack of evidence J.S. him self was abused or neglected. There was, however, substantial evidence to suggest he was at risk . That evidence, including f

ather ’s inexcusable sexual behavior with N.C. and F.C.
, J.S.’s young age and similarly prepubescent body
, m other ’s feeble response to N.C.’s revelation of abuse, and her insistence on maintaining a relationship with f ather in the family home
where he had unrestrained access to J.S. The court would have acted within its discretion
had it decline d jurisdiction over J.S. Nevertheless , on this record it was also reasonable to find that the circumstances surrounding the sexual abuse of N.C. and F.C. amount s to15

substantial evidence supporting the judgment. Accordingly, dependency jurisdiction was properly asserted over J.S . based on the risk of sexual abuse

. 6
2. The j uvenile c ourt ’ s r emoval f inding r egarding J.S.
Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court ’ s order removing J.S. f

rom h is custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1) , a nd that the court failed to address whether DCFS made reasonable efforts to prevent J.S.’s removal

. Section 361, subdivision (c) provides: “A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence of any of the fol lowing circumstances

. . . . [¶] (1) There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well

- being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the mi nor ’ s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor ’ s parent ’ s or guardian ’ s physical custody.

. . . The

c ourt shall consider, as a reasonable means to protect the minor,

. . . [¶]

. . . [ t ] he option of removing an offending p arent or guardian from the home. ” The court shall also consider, as a reasonable means to protect the minor, “[ a ] llowing a nonoffending parent or guardian to retain physical custody as long as that parent or guardian presents a plan acceptable to the cour t demonstrating that he or she will be able to protect the child from
future harm. ” (§ 361, subd. (c)(2).) A “ parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate. The focus of the statute is

on ave rting harm to the child.” ( In re Cole C. (2 009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) “The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order. ” ( In re Jose M. (1988)
206 Cal.A pp.3d 1098, 1103

– 1104.) We review a dispositional order removing a child

6 Because there was sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction u nder section 300 subdivision ( d ), we need not consider father’s claim that there was insubstantial evidence to support jurisdiction under subdivision (b) as to him

. ( I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4t h at p. 773.)16

from a parent for s ubstantial evidence , bearing in mind that the juvenile court was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. ( In re Ashly F . (2014) 225 Cal.App. 4th 803, 809.) Here, the juvenile court found , “by clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361(c) that there is a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physic al or emotional well

- being of [J.S.] if [he]

were returned to the custody of the father . And there are no reasonable means by which [his] physical health can be protected without removing [him] from the father ’s custody.”
The court further found that “ [ r ] easonable efforts were made to prevent and eliminate the
need fo r [J.S.]’s removal.”
Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support the order removing J.S.
from his custody. T he juvenile court was presented with evidence that f ather consisten tly denied any sexual abuse and that m other disbelieved the allegations and failed to protect
the children from f

ather because she wanted to maintain her relationship with him . The court reasonably concluded that m other ’s disbelief of the girls’ accusatio ns of abuse and
her failure to keep f

ather out of the home e xposed J.S. to substantial risk of harm. Where a parent fails to acknowledge that abuse has occurred and been perpetrated upon a child,
and where that failure may lead to further contact between the abuser and the children, a

court may reasonably determine removal is proper. (See In re Levi H . (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1292 [ m other did not believe her husband could have inflicted injuries

upon her child and continued living with husband]; see also In re Mariah T . (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 440

– 441 [ m other refused to believe boyfriend sexually abused daughter, chose to continue to live with boyfriend rather than to avoid having children placed outside the home ].) On this record , a ccording the juvenile court the deference to which its findings are entitled, we find there is sufficient evidence to support its finding
J.S. faced substantial danger if he remained in f ather ’s custody.
Father also argues that DCFS f ailed to prove there were no reasonable means t o protect J.S. short of removal. Father does not challenge the jurisdictional findings with regard to his sexual abuse of two young family members. He was a sexual predator and17

the court was not required to ignore his history of aberrant behavior towards young children. Further, the record contains no evidence that f ather made any effort at remediation, or admitted any wrong

- doing at all . Although f ather claims that J.S. “could have safely lived with [him],” he does not explain how that could have been accomplished in light of his refusal to acknowledge the abuse
, and there is clear evidence to the contrary. Further, a s discussed above, m other ’s presence in the home could not be
considered a dete rrent given her disbelief of her grandchildren’s accusations and her
failure to take protective action

. This lends credence to the court’s finding that it
believed m other continued to pose a danger to the c hildren because she was unwilling to protect them. Given m other ’s commitment to placing a priority on maintaining her relationship with f

ather
, and her fail ure to protect the children
, there is sufficient evidence in this record to support the juvenile court ’ s removal order. T he court had a well

- founded
fear that m other would continue to dis believe the allegations of abuse and permit f ather to remain in the home, allowing him the possibility of contact with the children. DCFS
noted f ather ’s lack of progress regarding reunification services. T he record reflects that
the juvenile court made its dispositional findings by clear and convincing evidence and, as discussed above, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court ’ s decision to remove
J.S. Further, the juvenile court consider ed an alternative to removing J.S., and permitted him to remain in m other ’s care as long as f ather moved out

. For this reason,
this case is unlike In re Ashly F. , supra , 225 Cal.App.4th 803, in which the juvenile court failed to consider “‘as a reasonable means to protect the minor, the option of removing an offending parent

. . . from the home.’ ( § 361, subd. (c)(1).) ” ( Id . at p. 810.) T he juvenile

court ’ s dispositional order finds substantial eviden tiary support.18 DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.