Appellant was also convicted of a lesser-included offense 1

of striking, beating, or wounding, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 113(a)(4), but he does not contest that conviction in this

appeal. 

 The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District 2

Judge for the District of South Dakota.

___________

No. 96-2003

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

Richard Quentin LeCompte, * of South Dakota.

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: October 24, 1996

 Filed: March 17, 1997

___________

Before MAGILL, ROSS and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

Richard LeCompte (appellant) appeals his conviction of two counts of

aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon which occurred within Indian

country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 113(a)(3), for which he was

sentenced to 51 months imprisonment. After considering the record,

1

briefs and arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.2
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I.

The record reflects that on the evening of July 10, 1995, a night of

drinking culminated into an argument over money between appellant and the

victim, Danielle Welch. Appellant and Welch had been at appellant's

brother's residence and other locations until sometime into the early

morning hours of July 11, 1995, when they returned to Welch's trailer house

where the two were currently living. Welch testified that as she and

appellant were proceeding on the driveway to the trailer house, Welch

realized that some of her money was missing from her wallet and she accused

appellant of taking it without her approval. She stated that appellant

became angry and reached from the passenger seat and grabbed the keys from

the ignition while the car was still proceeding. Both appellant and Welch

got out of the car, at which time appellant hit her on the face with his

fist several times, causing her to fall into a ditch alongside the

driveway. When she was knocked down into the ditch, Welch struck her arm

on a rock on the ground and received a deep laceration that later required

stitches to repair. While Welch was still in the ditch, appellant

continued hitting and kicking her. At one point, appellant threatened

Welch by holding a rock as he stood over her, calling her names. Welch

testified that she believed appellant intended to strike her with the rock.

These actions provided the basis for Count I of the indictment, charging

appellant with assault with a dangerous weapon.

Also according to Welch's testimony, after assaulting her in the

ditch, appellant ordered her to get into the house. On the way to the

trailer, appellant again struck Welch in the face, breaking her glasses and

causing them to fly off her face. Once inside the trailer the beating

continued. At one point, appellant jerked the phone base for the cordless

phone off the counter. Welch gave conflicting testimony regarding when the

appellant hit her with the phone base, but the phone base provided the

basis for the charge in 
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Count III of the indictment. The jury ultimately reduced this count to a

striking, beating, and wounding offense.

Because her arm was bleeding profusely, appellant ordered Welch to

take a shower and Welch complied. During the shower, appellant entered the

bathroom carrying the receiver of a second phone and struck her on the

head, while challenging her to call her "cop friends." The use of the

phone receiver provided the basis for the second count alleged in the

indictment, charging appellant with assault with a dangerous weapon. 

After her shower, but before she had a chance to dress, appellant

ordered Welch back into the kitchen, where Welch saw that appellant had

taken out his hunting knife and laid it on the table. Welch testified that

appellant told her to go ahead and pick it up and use it on him, and that

he could take Welch "out in the trees out back and hog-tie [her] up and gut

[her] like a deer and kill [her] and nobody would know about it." When

appellant turned his back, Welch took the knife and hid it on a chair under

the table. The incident relating to the hunting knife was not charged in

the indictment. 

The verbal and physical abuse continued until Welch was finally able

to escape from the trailer. She ran approximately 1/2 mile to her closest

neighbor where she received help. Welch's neighbor, Shawn Boehr testified

that in the early morning hours of July 11, 1995, he was awakened by Welch,

who was naked, crying and obviously injured. Welch told Boehr that

appellant "tried to kill me and he's got a knife." Boehr took Welch to the

hospital where her laceration was sutured and her other injuries were

treated. 

Police investigation of the scene revealed Welch's shoes in the ditch

where she alleged the first assault occurred, her broken glasses on her

front porch, phones torn off the walls, bloody paper towels in the kitchen,

a knife sheath on the kitchen table, and a
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phone receiver in the bathroom tub. At trial, appellant admitted through

his counsel that he assaulted Welch, but claimed that his attack was

limited to his fists and shod feet.

On appeal, appellant claims the district court erred by enhancing his

offense level by two points for aggravated assault resulting in bodily

injury; improperly limiting his cross-examination of Welch regarding

allegations that she was dishonest at her place of employment; allowing

Welch to explain to the jury that appellant intimidated her with a hunting

knife; and denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal based on

insufficient evidence. 

II.

Appellant first argues that the court erred in adding two points to

his base offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(A), which allows

a two-level enhancement when a victim sustains bodily injury. Application

Note 1(b) of U.S.S.G. 1B1.1 defines "bodily injury" as "any significant

injury; e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a type for

which medical attention ordinarily would be sought." Appellant claims on

appeal that the enhancement was improper because the "bodily injury" Welch

sustained was not caused by the dangerous weapons charged in the

indictment, but by appellant's fists and feet. 

The presentence investigation report noted that during the course of

the assault, Welch sustained "a large cut on her right forearm, bruises on

her face and chin, a swollen nose, and scraped knees and shins . . .

[b]ruising on [her] shoulder, face, and shin areas . . . , [l]acerations

on [her] forearm were sutured, . . . and a hairline [rib] fracture was not

ruled out."

Under the relevant conduct provision of the Sentencing Guidelines,

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, "[u]nless otherwise specified, the
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base offense level . . . [and] specific offense characteristics . . . shall

be determined on the basis of . . . all acts and omissions committed . . .

that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, [or] in

preparation for that offense." 

In United States v. Bassil, 932 F.2d 342, 345-46 (4th Cir. 1991), the

Fourth Circuit concluded that a two-level enhancement was warranted under

§ 2A2.2(b)(3)(A) even though it was uncertain whether the dangerous weapon

used by the defendant caused a specific injury. The court reasoned that

it was undisputed that the defendant participated in the assault which

caused the bodily injuries, and that he was therefore accountable for this

harm under the Guidelines. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3).

We agree that the Sentencing Guidelines allow the consideration of

§ 1B1.3 relevant conduct in determining specific offense characteristics

under the § 2A2.2(b)(3) enhancement, and includes the whole, nearly

continuous assaultive behavior of the appellant upon the victim. Welch

received injuries that were "painful, obvious and required medical

attention." The district court was not required to assign the use of a

specific dangerous weapon to a particular resulting injury. The district

court did not err in considering the injuries sustained during the

commission of the assault.

III.

Next, appellant contends the district court improperly barred certain

cross-examination of Welch relating to her former employees' allegations

that she was dishonest and untrustworthy. The appellant possessed a letter

sent by Welch's employees to corporate management a few months before the

assault, alleging that Welch stole money from the company. The appellant

contends this evidence was relevant to the issue of Welch's credibility as

a 
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witness. It is undisputed that Welch was never charged nor convicted of

any crime associated with these allegations. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) gives the court wide discretion to

allow questioning during cross-examination on specific bad acts not

resulting in the conviction of a felony if those acts concern the witness's

credibility. However, in order to avoid holding "mini-trials on

peripherally related or irrelevant matters," Rule 608(b) "forbids the use

of extrinsic evidence to prove that the specific bad acts occurred."

United States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 1038 (1992).

Here, the district court determined that the proposed crossexamination was not probative of untruthfulness as there was an

insufficient foundation other than unsubstantiated accusations by

employees. The court allowed appellant's attorney to ask Welch whether she

had ever stolen money from her employer, but refused to allow appellant to

introduce the employees' letter as extrinsic evidence. The district court

did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of Welch.

 

IV.

Appellant next takes issue with the district court's decision to

allow Welch to provide testimony concerning the appellant's hunting knife,

claiming the government had filed no charges relating to the knife and that

this testimony was inadmissible "prior bad acts" evidence under Fed. R.

Evid. 404(b). According to Welch's testimony, after appellant forced her

to take a shower and return to the kitchen, she observed the appellant's

hunting knife on the kitchen table. At this point, appellant renewed his

verbal and physical assault. Welch testified that the appellant berated

her with comments, "go ahead and pick it up, use it against me," and that

"he could take [her] out back and hog-tie [her] up and gut
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[her] like a deer and kill [her] and nobody would know about it." Welch

further testified that when appellant was not looking she took the knife

off the table and hid it on the seat of the kitchen chair. This is where

the knife was later discovered by the police. 

We have previously approved admission of prior bad acts evidence

where such evidence "relates to an integral part of the immediate context

of the crime charged." United States v. Waloke, 962 F.2d 824, 828 (8th

Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Evidence of the earlier bad act is

admissible where it is "so blended or connected, with the one on trial as

that proof of one incidentally involves the other; or explains the

circumstances; or tends logically to prove any element of the crime

charged. . . . In such a case the evidence of the other act is not

considered extrinsic evidence and Rule 404(b) is not implicated." United

States v. Bettelyoun, 892 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).

Here, the evidence was admissible to explain Welch's intense fear,

as well as her initial statements to her neighbors regarding the knife, and

to provide insight into what motivated Welch to flee from the house naked

in search of help. Alternatively, we conclude the testimony was admissible

under Rule 404(b) as evidence relevant to the issue of appellant's intent

to cause bodily harm as required under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3). The court

did not abuse its discretion in allowing Welch to testify regarding the

knife.

V.

Finally, appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain

his conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon involving either the

rock or the phone under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3). To sustain a conviction

under § 113(a)(3), the government is required to prove: 1) that the victim

was assaulted, 2) with the
-8-

use of a dangerous weapon, and 3) with the intent to inflict bodily harm.

An assault is any intentional and voluntary attempt or threat to do injury

to the person of another, when coupled with the apparent present ability

to do so sufficient to put the person against whom the attempt is made in

fear of immediate bodily harm. 

Appellant claims that even if Welch's story regarding the rock was

believed, just standing above her holding onto a rock does not constitute

assault with a dangerous weapon. Appellant, however, apparently disregards

the allegations that just prior to the incident with the rock, appellant

had physically attacked Welch with his fists and feet and knocked her down

into a ditch where he continued to kick her and threaten her. Welch

testified that she was afraid and thought the appellant intended to hit her

with the rock. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction

regarding the rock.

 Appellant also contends the physical and medical evidence proves no

assault with the phone ever took place. According to appellant, Welch's

own description of her injuries, the observation of her injuries by

treating medical personnel and various police officials, and photographs

of all her injuries identified to police, revealed a complete absence of

any injury or complaint of injury consistent with the striking with the

phone on the back of her head as she claimed. 

Welch alleged that she was struck in the head with the phone as she

showered and that the phone was then thrown in the bathtub. Upon

investigation, the police discovered the phone in the bathtub in conformity

with Welch's story. Further, 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) requires only that the

government present sufficient evidence that appellant assaulted the victim

with an object capable of inflicting bodily injury, not that the victim

actually suffered bodily injury as a result of the assault. The

government's evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction with respect

to the phone.
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VI.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.