J-A17025-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARCUS LLOYD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1720 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 19, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0501982-1998

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARCUS LLOYD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1750 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 20, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0501992-1998

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 17, 2022

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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In these consolidated appeals, Appellant Marcus Lloyd appeals from 

orders dismissing his second Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition.2 

After review, we vacate the orders and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this Memorandum.

A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case as follows:

[Appellant] and three confederates, Herbert Blakeney, Gregory 

Miller, and Kenneth Miller, were arrested and charged with two 

counts of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy, and related 

offenses, pertaining to the robbery and shooting deaths of Charles 

Love, Esquire, who had been co-defendant, Gregory Miller’s 

attorney, and Mr. Brian Barry, who was an assistant/paralegal to 

attorney Charles Love. The criminal incident occurred on February 

25, 1998.

Blakeney, entered into a negotiated guilty plea agreement with 

the Commonwealth, whereby he pled guilty to two counts of firstdegree murder, and related charges, and received two concurrent 

sentences of life imprisonment. Blakeney testified for the 

Commonwealth at trial, and [he] admitted to being the actual 

shooter of the two victims.

The evidence at trial established that one of the murder victims, 

Charles Love, Esquire, had represented co-defendant, Gregory 

Miller, in various matters, and had obtained monies for Gregory 

Miller as a result of civil claims. The entire sums recovered could 

not be distributed to Gregory Miller because of outstanding Family 

Court support orders and liens. In claims against the City of 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Appellant filed a separate notice of appeal at each trial court docket. The 

appeal at 51-CR-0501982-1998 (501982-1998) was docketed at Superior 

Court docket 1720 EDA 2021, and the appeal at trial court docket 51-CR0501992-1998 (501992-1998) was docketed at Superior Court docket 1750 

EDA 2021. On September 8, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to consolidate the 

appeals, and on September 21, 2021, this Court granted Appellant’s motion. 
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Philadelphia, Mr. Love had recovered a sum of $15,000 for his 

client, Gregory Miller. A “Statement of Distribution” indicated that 

after various deductions, Gregory Miller was to receive the amount 

of $5,915.10. However, Gregory Miller had also owed child 

support arrearages, and had agreed that the sums recovered were 

to be applied to the reduction of the amount of the arrearages.

On February 25, 1998, [Appellant] and Kenneth Miller visited 

Blakeney and told him that Gregory Miller wanted to speak to all 

of them about a “stick-up.” The three of them then proceeded to 

Gregory Miller’s home, where the group discussed Gregory Miller’s 

plan to have them rob and murder Mr. Love and Mr. Brian Barry.

Gregory Miller explained that he wanted the victims robbed and 

killed because he had not received the expected amount of funds 

from attorney Love.

Gregory Miller gave [Appellant] a .38 caliber handgun and some 

telephone wire and instructed him to conceal the weapon until the 

group was inside Mr. Love’s law office. Gregory Miller directed 

that Brian Barry was to be tied up. He also told Blakeney to use 

the gun to force Mr. Love to write a check for $10,000.00. He told 

[Appellant] to take the check to a bank to have it cashed, and he 

instructed Kenneth Miller to shoot both victims [after Appellant] 

cashed the check. Gregory Miller told his cohorts to “leave no 

witnesses”.

[Appellant], Kenneth Miller, and Blakeney then went to Mr. Love’s 

office. Gregory Miller did not go with them to the office. Once at 

the office, Blakeney confronted Mr. Love with the handgun and 

demanded that he write a check for $10,000.00. [Appellant] took 

Mr. Brian Barry into a storage closet, laid him face-down on the 

floor, and “hog-tied” him. [Appellant] then took the check to a 

nearby bank, in an attempt to cash it. Blakeney took $1,500.00 

from Mr. Love’s pocket, and he and Kenneth Miller took turns 

keeping watch at a window, and holding Mr. Love at gunpoint, to 

ensure that he could answer the phone. [Appellant] was unable 

to have the check cashed at the bank because of inadequate 

identification. [Appellant] returned to the law office and said to 

Mr. Love: “You know you are a dead motherf****r now.”

Blakeney then gave the gun to Kenneth Miller while he (Blakeney) 

took Mr. Love into the storage closet and laid him on the floor next 

to Mr. Barry. Kenneth Miller gave the gun back to Blakeney and 

urged him to kill the victims, saying, “You are a bitch ass n r, 

if you don’t kill the motherf** **rs.” Blakeney . . . then shot both 

victims in the head. [Appellant], Blakeney and Kenneth Miller 
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then split the $1,500.00 taken from the robbery and went 

shopping. Blakeney subsequently returned the gun to Gregory 

Miller, but [he] did not give him any money, telling him that they 

had been unable to cash the check, and omitting telling him of the 

$1,500.00 taken from Mr. Love. . . .

Blakeney pled guilty to two counts of murder and agreed to testify 

at [Appellant’s] trial in exchange for concurrent life sentences. 

The Honorable James F. Fitzgerald, III, presided over [Appellant’s] 

jury trial and the subsequent penalty phase, after which the jury 

returned verdicts of death for each of [Appellant’s] murder 

convictions.[3] On December 20, 1999, the sentencing court 

formally imposed concurrent death penalty sentences for the 

murder convictions and imposed concurrent sentences of five (5) 

to twenty (20) years’ imprisonment for the robbery conviction and 

twenty (20) to forty (40) years’ imprisonment for the criminal 

conspiracy conviction.

[Appellant’s] counsel filed post-sentence motions on December 

28, 1999[.] Upon request, trial counsel was permitted to 

withdraw, and Richard E. Johnson, Esquire was appointed as 

replacement counsel. On August 23, 2000, Attorney Johnson filed 

amended post-sentence motions, the trial court heard oral 

argument thereon, and the court denied [Appellant’s] motions for 

a new trial and an arrest of judgment.

[Appellant] appealed his judgment of sentence to the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and on May 29, 2002, the Court 

granted his petition to remand for resentencing and remanded for 

a new sentencing hearing. Thereafter, Attorney Johnson was 

permitted to withdraw and . . . counsel was appointed. On August 

20, 2003, the Honorable Jane Cutler Greenspan conducted a 

sentencing hearing, following which she imposed consecutive 

terms of life imprisonment for the two murder convictions. The 

sentences for the robbery and criminal conspiracy convictions 

remained the same and were ordered to run concurrently with the 

life sentences. . . .

On June 27, 2005, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

On November 10, 2005, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 

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3 The jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (18 

Pa.C.S § 2502(a)), and one count each of robbery (18 Pa.C.S § 3701) and 

conspiracy (18 Pa.C.S. § 903).
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[allowance of] appeal. [Appellant] did not file a petition for a writ 

of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.

On November 30, 2005, [Appellant] filed a timely first PCRA 

petition, which the PCRA court ultimately denied on February 6, 

2008. This Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief on March 20, 

2009. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [allowance of]

appeal on September 22, 2009. 

Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 3010 EDA 2017, 2019 WL 5212767, at *1-3 (Pa.

Super. filed Oct. 16, 2019) (Lloyd I) (unpublished mem.) (citations omitted 

and formatting altered). 

On April 20, 2012, Appellant filed his second PCRA petition. Appellant 

acknowledged that his second PCRA petition was facially untimely, but he 

asserted that he had established an exception to the PCRA time bar. Second 

PCRA Pet., 4/20/12, at 3. Specifically, Appellant claimed that he satisfied the 

newly discovered facts exception, and he maintained that he had uncovered 

information concerning prosecution witness and co-conspirator Blakeney’s 

mental health status that could have been used to impeach Blakeney at 

Appellant’s trial. Appellant alleged that the Commonwealth failed to turn over 

sealed records and sealed notes of testimony from Blakeney’s guilty plea 

revealing that at the time of Appellant’s trial, Blakeney was mentally ill and 

taking psychotropic medication. Appellant claimed that this information was 

improperly withheld by the Commonwealth in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963). Id. at 3-4.

The PCRA court found that Appellant failed to satisfy an exception to the 

PCRA time bar, and it dismissed Appellant’s second PCRA petition as untimely. 
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Order, 8/11/17. Appellant filed a timely appeal, and on October 16, 2019, 

this Court concluded that the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s 

second PCRA petition, reversed the PCRA court’s order, remanded for the 

appointment of counsel, and directed the PCRA court to hold an evidentiary 

hearing. See Lloyd I at *6-7. 

On February 21, 2020, the PCRA court appointed Attorney Stephen 

O’Hanlon to represent Appellant, and Attorney O’Hanlon filed an amended 

second PCRA petition on April 4, 2020. On October 21, 2020, the 

Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, and in this motion, the 

Commonwealth agreed that Appellant satisfied the newly discovered fact 

exception to the PCRA time bar. Mot. to Dismiss, 10/21/20, at 9. However, 

the Commonwealth also contended that even if the petition is deemed timely, 

there was no merit to Appellant’s underlying claims. See id. at 9-11. 

The record reflects that despite this Court’s directive to hold an 

evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court filed notice of intent to dismiss without a 

hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Rule 907 Notice, 3/3/21. In orders 

filed on August 19, 2021, and August 20, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without holding a hearing.

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal at each trial court docket. The 

PCRA court did not order Appellant to file concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On February 18, 

2022, the PCRA court informed this Court that the judge who oversaw this 
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matter was no longer on the bench, and that the record would be forwarded 

to this Court without an opinion. 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue:

Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition 

without a hearing because the Superior Court previously 

remanded for a hearing [concerning Superior Court] docket 3010 

EDA 2017, and Appellant also raised newly discovered evidence 

issues below relating to former Philadelphia detective, David 

Baker?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).

Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his PCRA 

petition without a hearing and asserts that this Court ordered the PCRA court 

to hold a hearing to determine whether Appellant’s second PCRA petition 

satisfied an exception to the PCRA time bar and further, to consider 

substantive claims in his second PCRA petition. Id. at 9-18. Additionally, 

Appellant argues that there is merit to both his Brady claim and his claim 

concerning Detective David Baker. Id. at 19-22. Specifically, Appellant states 

that the Commonwealth failed to provide evidence of Blakeney’s mental health 

records, and he also asserts that there is after-discovered evidence that 

Detective Baker attempted to coerce statements from Appellant while 

preventing Appellant from having access to counsel. See id.4 

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4 We note that at times, Appellant appears to conflate the concepts of newly 

discovered evidence and after-discovered evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 

10-14. However, in light of our disposition, on remand, it is for the PCRA court 

to first determine whether Appellant’s claim involving newly discovered 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In response, the Commonwealth contends that this Court’s 

determination in Lloyd I only required a hearing to determine whether 

Appellant’s second PCRA petition was timely. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-

11. The Commonwealth asserts that because it conceded that Appellant’s 

second PCRA petition satisfied the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA 

time bar, the PCRA court was not required to hold a hearing to determine if 

Appellant’s second PCRA petition satisfied an exception to the PCRA time bar. 

Id. at 11. The Commonwealth then explains that the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s second PCRA petition due to lack of merit. Id. at 12-

16. 

Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to 

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “The PCRA 

court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding 

on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA 

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evidence satisfies an exception to the PCRA time bar, and only then shall the 

PCRA court reach the merits of the substantive claim concerning afterdiscovered evidence. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 244 A.3d 1281, 

1289 n.20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (explaining that a claim of newly discovered 

evidence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) is a jurisdictional threshold that 

does not require any merits analysis of an underlying after-discovered 

evidence claim, and it is only after a petitioner establishes jurisdiction by 

pleading and proving the newly discovered facts exception that he or she can 

then present a substantive after-discovered evidence claim pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi)).
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court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 

1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed 

within one year of the date the judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time 

for seeking the review.” Id. at § 9545(b)(3). When a PCRA petition is filed 

after the one-year time bar, the petitioner must plead and prove one of the 

following exceptions:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). The timing requirements of the PCRA are 

jurisdictional, and the PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to address an untimely 

petition unless the petitioner pleads and proves one of the exceptions set forth 

in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). See Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 

A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000); see also Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 
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1027, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that the PCRA court’s determination 

as to whether it has jurisdiction is a threshold requirement, and “[i]n the PCRA 

context, statutory jurisdiction cannot be conferred by silence, agreement[,] or 

neglect” (citation omitted)).

In Lloyd I, a prior panel of this Court concluded and directed as follows:

[T]he record in this matter is undeveloped. It is simply not clear, 

absent prior knowledge of Blakeney’s mental illness, PCRA counsel 

would have had any reason to seek out the newly unsealed guilty 

plea hearing transcript. Thus, we cannot say, based on the 

current record, the PCRA court was correct in holding the 

information contained in the transcript was not unknown and, 

therefore, did not constitute an unknown fact. Moreover, the 

record is simply undeveloped with respect to whether or not 

[Appellant] acted with due diligence in uncovering the 

information. Thus, we find the PCRA court erred in dismissing 

[Appellant’s] PCRA petition.

Instantly, we are not holding [Appellant] met the threshold inquiry 

of establishing the facts upon which the claim was predicated were 

unknown and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of 

due diligence. Instead, we hold there is a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether the facts were unknown and whether 

[Appellant] acted with due diligence and, therefore, [Appellant] is 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing with respect to these issues. If, 

after a hearing, the PCRA court determines the facts were 

unknown and [Appellant] did act with due diligence, then 

[Appellant] has pled and proven the applicability of the newly 

discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement.

In that case, the PCRA court possesses the jurisdiction to consider 

the merits of [Appellant’s] Brady and [after] discovered fact 

claims.

During the pendency of the instant appeal, [Appellant] filed an 

additional PCRA petition with the court below on August 31, 2019, 

as well as an application with this Court, on September 5, 2019, 

to supplement the record with the August 31st petition. Given the 

inordinate delays in this matter, as well as the substance of the 

petition, upon remand, the scope of the remand may include 

consideration of the PCRA petition filed August 31, 2019. We deny 
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the application to supplement the record, without prejudice to 

seek relief from the PCRA court upon remand.

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find the PCRA 

court erred in dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition. We remand 

for an evidentiary hearing and direct the PCRA court to appoint 

counsel to represent [Appellant’s] interests in this hearing, as 

expeditiously as possible. 

Lloyd I at *6-7 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

It is undisputed that despite this Court’s directive in Lloyd I, the PCRA 

court did not hold a hearing in this matter. After this Court ordered remand 

in Lloyd I, the PCRA court appointed counsel and counsel filed an amended 

second PCRA petition on April 4, 2020. In response, the Commonwealth filed 

a motion to dismiss on October 21, 2020. Mot. to Dismiss, 10/21/20. 

However, in its motion, the Commonwealth agreed that Appellant’s second 

PCRA petition satisfied the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time 

bar. Id. at 1-2.

On March 3, 2021, the PCRA court filed notice of intent to dismiss 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.907. Rule 

907 Notice, 3/3/21. In its Rule 907 notice, the PCRA court checked a box 

denoting that Appellant’s PCRA petition lacked merit. See id. In orders filed 

on August 19, 2021, and August 20, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Order, 8/19/21; Order, 8/20/21.

As noted previously, Appellant argues that the PCRA court failed to 

follow this Court’s directive from Lloyd I and erred in dismissing his second 

PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 9. However, the 
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Commonwealth responded that that no hearing was required because it 

conceded that Appellant satisfied an exception to the PCRA time bar, and 

therefore the PCRA court was free to reach the merits of Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-11. Additionally, the Commonwealth 

asserts that Appellant’s Brady claim concerning the Commonwealth’s alleged 

failure to disclose Blakeney’s mental health records was resolved in codefendant Kenneth Miller’s case. Id. at 11-13. The Commonwealth notes 

that in Kenneth Miller’s case, the PCRA court held a hearing on this matter, 

concluded that there was no Brady violation, and it dismissed Kenneth Miller’s 

PCRA petition. Id. at 11. The Commonwealth adds that this Court affirmed 

the PCRA court’s denial of Kenneth Miller’s PCRA petition in a published 

opinion. Id. at 12-13 (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 212 A.3d 1114 (Pa. 

Super. 2019)). 

After review, we vacate the PCRA court’s orders filed on August 19, 2021 

and August 20, 2021, and we again remand this matter to the PCRA court. As 

stated above, the timing requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional. See 

Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 783. We are cognizant that the Commonwealth 

agreed with Appellant that his second PCRA petition satisfied the newly 

discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar and appreciate the 

Commonwealth’s candor in this regard. However, we are constrained to 

conclude that the PCRA court did not make this determination on the record 

which was necessary to perfect the PCRA court’s jurisdiction. See id.; see

also Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1033 (explaining that the PCRA court’s jurisdiction 
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is a threshold requirement, and jurisdiction cannot be conferred by 

agreement).

Moreover, although the PCRA court may have held a hearing in Kenneth

Miller’s case and addressed an identical Brady claim, and while this Court 

affirmed the dismissal of Kenneth Miller’s PCRA claims, there is nothing from 

Kenneth Miller’s case in the certified record in the instant case. It is wellsettled that for purposes of appellate review that what is not of record does 

not exist. Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 246 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

The certified record in this matter does not include the notes of testimony 

from Kenneth Miller’s PCRA hearing, nor does it contain the order or the PCRA 

court’s opinion from the dismissal of Kenneth Miller’s PCRA petition. 

Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that the PCRA court 

considered or addressed Appellant’s claims relative to Detective Baker aside 

from the Rule 907 notice where the PCRA court checked a box noting that 

Appellant’s claims were meritless. Furthermore, because the PCRA court did 

not order a Rule 1925(b) statement, nor prepare a Rule 1925(a) opinion, and 

has retired from the bench, we are without any rationale supporting the PCRA 

court’s orders. In Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401 (Pa. 2015), 

our Supreme Court explained that “in order to enable appellate review, PCRA 

courts are required to provide a legally robust discussion, complete with clear 

findings of fact where required.” Id. at 410 (citations omitted and formatting 

altered). “Where a PCRA court fails to support its holding with sufficient 

explanations of the facts and law, or [it] fails to provide an adequate opinion 
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addressing all of the claims raised in a PCRA petition, including factual and 

credibility disputes, a remand is appropriate.” Id. Additionally, remand may 

necessitate further proceedings including holding a hearing and the admission 

of supplemental evidence from which the PCRA court can make findings of fact 

and conclusions of law regarding the credibility of the proposed testimony, as 

well as its impact on the truth-determining process. Id.

In sum, there is no judicial determination on whether Appellant satisfied 

an exception to the PCRA time bar that would confer jurisdiction upon the 

PCRA court, there is nothing in this record concerning the PCRA court’s ruling 

in Kenneth Miller’s case that may be applied to the instant case, and there is 

nothing in the record indicating that the PCRA court considered Appellant’s 

claims regarding Detective Baker. Moreover, because there is no PCRA court

opinion, we do not have the PCRA court’s rationale to support its conclusion 

that Appellant’s claims lack merit beyond the checked-box on the Rule 907 

notice and the conclusory statement in the orders dismissing Appellant’s PCRA 

petition.

For these reasons, we vacate the PCRA court’s orders filed on August 

19, 2021 and August 20, 2021, and remand for the PCRA court to comply with 

this Court’s prior mandate to hold an evidentiary hearing addressing 

Appellant’s PCRA petition as expeditiously as possible. See Commonwealth 

v. Rohades, 300 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 6285217, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Oct.

27, 2020) (unpublished mem.) (vacating and remanding for further 

proceedings where the PCRA court did not comply with this Court’s prior 
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mandate) (citing Carmen Enters., Inc. v. Murpenter, LLC, 185 A.3d 380, 

389 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating, a “trial court has an obligation to comply 

scrupulously, meticulously, and completely with an order of the appellate court 

remanding a case to the trial court[, and t]he trial court is required to strictly 

comply with the mandate of the appellate court.” (citations omitted and 

formatting altered)).5 At the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court shall first 

determine whether Appellant’s second PCRA petition satisfied the newly 

discovered facts evidence exception to the PCRA time bar, and if the court 

deems Appellant’s petition timely, it shall then address the merits of 

Appellant’s substantive issues. Additionally, the PCRA court has discretion to 

permit the parties to supplement the record. After the hearing is concluded, 

the PCRA court shall file a final and appealable order that addresses 

Appellant’s second PCRA petition, and the court shall provide the reasons for 

its disposition. 

Orders vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

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5 We may cite to unpublished memorandum decisions of this Court filed after 

May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/17/2022