J-S24016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

FREDRICK A. POSTIE,

Appellant No. 2442 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered July 15, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-13-CR-0000340-2012

and CP-13-CR-0000343-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2015

Fredrick A. Postie (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the order denying 

and dismissing his “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Section 110 of the Crimes 

Code.” We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural background as 

follows:

The pertinent facts in these two companion cases and the 

relevant case in Schuylkill County are neither lengthy nor 

complex. In later February of 2012, Police Officer Lori Lienhard, 

of the Summit Hill Police Department, interviewed [Appellant] as 

it related to various burglaries that occurred in Carbon and 

Schuylkill Counties. After admitting his involvement in these 

burglaries, a plethora of charges were filed against [Appellant] in 

both counties.

More specifically, the Schuylkill County District Attorney’s 

Office charged [Appellant] with: two counts of criminal 

conspiracy, four counts of burglary, eight counts of criminal 

trespass, four counts of theft by unlawful taking or disposition, 
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four counts of receiving stolen property, four counts of criminal 

mischief, and three counts of loitering and prowling at night 

time, for the alleged burglaries that occurred at 268 East Main 

Street, Rush Township, 714 and 716 Claremont Avenue, Rush 

Township, and 474 Fairview Street, Rush Township, respectively. 

Moreover, the Schuylkill County District Attorney’s Office 

contended that these burglaries occurred sometime between 

December 12, 2011 and January 22, 2012.

Around the same time, the Carbon County District 

Attorney’s Office filed similar charges against [Appellant], 

namely, criminal conspiracy, burglary, theft by unlawful taking, 

receiving stolen property, criminal mischief, and criminal 

trespass. As alleged in the information to the case indexed 340 

CR 2012, [Appellant] committed these various offenses at two 

residences located at 211 Yard Street, Nesquehoning, Carbon 

County, sometime between November 17, 2011 and December 

3, 2011. Pursuant to the case identified as 343 CR 2012, the 

Commonwealth has alleged that during the time period of 

November 30, 2011 through December 21, 2011, [Appellant] 

committed the offenses listed above at the residences located 

at: 99, 100, 116, and 495 West White Bear Drive, with all four 

residences located in the borough of Summit Hill, Carbon 

County.

Thereafter, [Appellant] stood trial for the charges in 

Schuylkill County where, by a jury of his peers, he was convicted 

on twenty-five of twenty-nine counts. Subsequent to that trial, 

[Appellant] filed the instant compulsory joinder motion here in 

Carbon County. In the motion, [Appellant] argues that based 

upon his convictions in Schuylkill County on similar charges, the 

Carbon County District Attorney is barred from prosecuting him 

for alleged offenses that might have happened in Carbon County.

After holding a hearing on the motion, [the trial court] by 

Court Order dated July 15, 2014, denied [Appellant’s] 

compulsory joinder motion, [from] which [Appellant] appealed 

[]. [Although the trial court authored an opinion for submission 

to the Superior Court, it did not order Appellant to comply with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).]

Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/14, at 2-4 (footnotes referencing the applicable 

statutes omitted). 
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Appellant presents a single question for our review:

Did the Trial Court err in denying dismissal where the same 

witnesses and testimony, same evidence, and same investigation 

by the same officers that were used to produce a conviction in 

Schuylkill County and will be used in Carbon County at trial 

creates a Collateral Estoppel issue therefore barring the instant 

trial where the Commonwealth should have moved for joinder?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

We initially recognize that this interlocutory appeal is properly before 

us because “an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss on the grounds of 

double jeopardy/collateral estoppel is a final, appealable order.” See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Winter, 471 A.2d 827, 828 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1984) 

(citations omitted). Our standard of review of issues concerning [18 

Pa.C.S.A. §] 110 is plenary. Commonwealth v. Reid, 35 A.3d 773, 776 

(Pa. Super. 2012).

We thus consider Appellant’s assertion that “the instant case is nearly 

an exact copy of the prior case, [and] the issues have previously and fully 

been litigated, barring the current prosecution.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. 

Appellant maintains that “the factors in [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110] ... have been 

met and ultimately this case is violating [Appellant’s constitutional] rights 

against double jeopardy.” Id. 

The Commonwealth counters that the trial court “properly found that 

[Appellant] failed to meet all of the criteria necessary under the Compulsory 

Joinder Rule, and therefore, failed to show that the prosecution currently 
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pending in Carbon County is barred.” Commonwealth Brief at 2. Upon 

review, we agree with the Commonwealth.

With regard to compulsory joinder, the Crimes Code specifies:

§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for 

different offense

Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision 

of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different 

facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following 

circumstances:

(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a 

conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when 

prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) 

and the subsequent prosecution is for: 

(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted 

on the first prosecution; 

(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the 

same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the 

appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the 

commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same 

judicial district as the former prosecution unless the court 

ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or 

(iii) the same conduct, unless: 

(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or 

acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently 

prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the 

other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to 

prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or 

(B) the second offense was not consummated when the former 

trial began. 
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1).

In Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 72 (Pa. 2008), our 

Supreme Court explained:

As has been summarized by our Court, Section 110(1)(ii), which 

is the focus in this appeal, contains four requirements which, if 

met, preclude a subsequent prosecution due to a former 

prosecution for a different offense:

(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an acquittal or 

conviction;

(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal 

conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former 

prosecution;

(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before the 

commencement of the trial on the former charges; and

(4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial district 

as the former prosecution.

See Nolan, 579 Pa. at 308, 855 A.2d at 839; Commonwealth v. 

Hockenbury, 549 Pa. 527, 533, 701 A.2d 1334, 1337 (1997). 

Each prong of this test must be met for compulsory joinder to 

apply.

Fithian, 961 A.2d at 72 (underline added for emphasis).

In the instant case, the Commonwealth conceded that the first and 

third prongs articulated in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 and Fithian had been met. 

Upon review, we find that the Honorable Joseph J. Matika, sitting as the trial 
J-S24016-15

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court, has provided a thoughtful analysis, concluding that the second and 

fourth prongs (whether Appellant’s offenses arose from the same criminal 

episode and in the same judicial district as the former prosecution) were not 

met. In explaining his conclusion, Judge Matika has authored a 

comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion in which he artfully applies 

pertinent statutory and case law to the facts of record in this case, such that 

further commentary by this Court would be redundant. Accordingly, we 

adopt Judge Matika’s September 11, 2014 opinion as our own in disposing of 

this appeal. 

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Case remanded for further 

proceedings.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2015
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1 A defendant is entitled to an immediate interlocutory appeal as of right 

from an order denying a non-frivolous motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 

grounds. Commonwealth v. Orie, 22 A.3d 1021 (Pa. 2011); see also, 

Commonwealth v. Feaser, 723 A. 2d 197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (Pretrial orders 

denying double jeopardy claims are immediately appealable in absence of 

written finding of frivolousness by the hearing court.} Moreover, a claim 

rationale set forth in the July 15, 2014 order. 1 Respectively, 

Procedure 1925 (a), ·to expand upon the brief holding and 

Court, in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

decision. This memorandum opinion is offered to the Superior 

that order, and on the eve of trial, appealed this Court's 

to Section 110 of the Crimes Code." Defendant, subsequent to 

denying and dismi·ssing Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss Pursuant 

On July 15, 2014, this Court issued an Order of court 

Matika, J. - September H , 2014 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Frederick A. Postie Pro Se 

Counsel for Commonwealth 

.Assistant: t7!.L~-C'.L.::.Lct Attorney 

.Jean A. EngJ_er., Esquire 

Defendant 

FREDERICK ANDREW POSTIE, 

No. CR 340-2012 

No. CR 343-2012 

vs. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CARBON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

' 

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5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 392l(a). 

4 Four of the counts of criminal trespass alleged that the Defendant broke 

into a building or occupied structure, a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3503 (a) (J.) (ii). The other four counts of criminal trespass assert that the 

Defendant violated subsection (a) (l) (i}, that.being the Defendant entered and 

remained in the building or structure. 

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a). 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903 (a} {J.). 

that the compulsory joinder statute prohibits a subsequent prosecution of the 

defendant implicates doub l e jeopardy principles. See, Commonwealth v. 

Schmidt, 919 A.2d 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 

disposition, 

5 four counts of receiving stolen property, 6 four 

criminal trespass, 4 four counts of theft by unlawful taking or 

criminal conspiracy, 2 four counts of burglary, 3 eight counts of 

Attorney's Office charged the Defendant with: two counts of 

More specifically, the Schuylkill County District 

the Defendant in both counties. 

in these burglaries, a plethora of charges were filed against 

Carbon and Schuylkill Counties. After admitting his involvement 

Defendant as it related to various burglaries -·ci?at occurred in 

Lienhard, of the Summit Hill Police Department, interviewed the 

complex. In later February of 2012, Police Officer Lori 

relevant case in Schuylkill County are neither lengthy nor 

The pertinent facts in these two companion cases and the 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Defendant's appeal accordingly. 

this Court recommends to the Honorable Superior Court to dismiss 

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6 18 Pa.C.S.A. s 392S(a). 

7 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304 (a) (S). 

8 18 Pa.C.S.A. s 5506. 

9 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304 (~) (2) . 

West White Bear Drive, with all four residences located in 

listed above at the residences located at: 99, 100, 116, and 495 

through December 21, 2011, Defendant committed the offenses 

has alleged that during the time period of November 30, 2011 

Pursuant to the case identified as 343 CR 2012, the Commonwealth 

sometime between November 17, 2011 and December 3, 2011. 

County, and 134 Stock Street, Nesquehoning, Carbon County, 

residences located at 211 Yard Street, Nesquehoning, Carbon 

,· 

1, 

' ,. 

2012, Defendant committed these various offenses at two 

trespass. As alleged in the information to case indexed 340 CR 

receiving stolen property, criminal mischief,9 and criminal 

criminal conspiracy, burglary, theft by unlawful taking, 

Office filed similar charges against the Defendant, namely, 

Around the ~ame time, the Carbon County District Attorney's 

sometime between December 12, ·2011 and January 22, 2012. 

Attorney's Office contended that these burglaries occurred 

respectively. Moreover, the Schuylkill County District 

Avenue, Rush Township, and 474 Fairview Street, Rush Township, 

at 268 East Main Street, Rush Township, 714 and 716 Claremont 

prowling at night time,8 for the alleged burglaries that occurred 

counts of criminal mischief,7 and three counts of loitering and 

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as the former prosecution. See, 18 Pa.C.S.A. s llO{l) {ii); 

trial; and 4) all charges were within the same judicial district 

subsequent trial was aware of the charges before the first 

arose from the same criminal episode; 3) the prosecutor in the 

current prosecution was based upon the same criminal conduct or 

prosecution .re su l.t.ed in an acquittal or convi·ction; 2) the 

all of the following criteria are present: 1) the former 

the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, bars a subsequent prosecution if 

The compulsory joinder rule, as set forth in Section 110 of 

DISCUSSION 

motion, to which the Defendant has appealed that order. 

Order dated July lS, 2014, denied Defendant's compulsory joinder 

After holding a hearing on the motion, this Court, by Court 

Carbon County. 

prosecuting him for alleged offenses that might have happened in 

charges, Carbon . County District Attorney is barred from 

that based upon his convictions in Schuylkill County on similar 

motion here in Carbon County. In the motion, Defendant argues 

that trial, Defendant filed the instant compulsory joinder 

convicted on twenty-five of twenty-nine counts. Subsequent to 

Schuylkill County where, by a jury of his peers, he was 

Thereafter, Defendant stood trial for the charges in 

borough of Summit Hill, Carbon County. 

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755, 761 (Pa. 1995). In deciding the logical relationship prong 

defendant was charged." Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 658 A. 2d 

differences be tween the various off ens es with which the 

be made "by merely cataloguing simple factual similarities or 

of Rude have commented that such analysis of this prong cannot 

whether they constitute the same ''episode. " Subsequent readings 

temporal relationship between the criminal a.cts to determine 

177, 181-82 (Pa. 1983), the courts must examine the logical and 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 

Commonwealth v. Nolan, 855 A. 2d 834 (Pa. 2004) . As directed by 

arose from the same criminal conduct or episode. See, 

.

. 

prosecution to the former to determine if both prosecutions 

labeled as the logical relationship prong, compares the present 

The second prong of the compulsory joinder rule, also 

related offenses. 

Attorney's Office from prosecuting the Defendant on these 

Pennsy.l vania Crimes Code would forb.id the Carbon County District 

prosecution, were present. If so, then Section 110 of the 

episode and in the same judicial district as the former 

those being whether the offense arose from the same criminal 

for the Court was to determine if the second and fourth prongs, 

prongs of this test are met; thus, the only consideration left 

case at bar, the Commonwealth concedes that the first and third 

Commonwealth v . Hockenbury, 701 A.2d 1334 (Pa. 1997). In the 

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January 13, 20·12. 

Schuylkill County occurring between December 12, 2011 and 

21, 2011, while the crimes Defendant was found guilty of in 

Carbon County occurred between November 17, 2011 and December 

dates these alleged crimes occurred. The alleged crimes in 

related as the two matters overlap each other in terms of the 

county, the Court finds that th~ two prosecutions are temporally 

between the charges in this County and the charges in Schuylkill 

In examining the "temporal" and "logical" relationship 

840) . 

A.3d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (quoting Nolan, 855 A.2d at 

to sanction "vo Lume discounting."'" Commonwealth v. Reid, 35 

180. "However, 'these policy concerns must not be interpreted 

as well as for judicial economy purposes. Hude, 458 A. 2d at 

trials for offenses originating from the same criminal episode, 

harassment resulting from being forced to undergo successive 

protect a ·person accused of c r Lme s from "'.r.h,;;, ~l')'.':/'F.:l:·>::"Ue:nt 

considering the policy reasons of compulsory joinder, namely to l 

i 

I 

"single criminal episode" in a strict sense especially when 

Accordingly, the courts should not construe the phrases 

substantial duplication of issues of law and fact." Id. 

relationship between offenses. Rather what is required is a 

factual and legal issues is insufficient to establish a logical 

of the compulsory j oinder rule, "mere de minimis duplication of 

J 

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various properties, some being residences and others unoccupied 

through mid-January of 2012, the Defendant allegedly burglarized 

that of a single criminal episode. From mid-November of 2011 

multiple episodes of the same criminal enterprise rather than 

The Court views Defendant's alleged conduct to be that of 

rested upon the credibility of a single witness.) 

where different evidence was required as the Commonwealt:h's case 

facts between the two prosecution did not Lnvo Lve a situation 

[for] each trial."); see also Hude, 458 A. 2d at 183 (The law and 

different investigations, and different witnesses [] necessary 

three victims in three different counties requiring three 

homicides occurred within a three-day period as "there were 

Section 110 of the compulsory joinder statute where three 

Supreme Court ruled the subsequent action was not barred by 

Spatz, 756 A.2d 1139, 1159 (Pa. 2000) (Spatz II) {Pennsylvania 

different investigations by the police. See, Commonwealth v. 

the Locat.Lons of the alleged burglaries, and thu...s-~~ach required 

different from the victims in Schuylkill County, as are all of 

prosecution of the Defendant, the alleged victims are all 

in Schuylkill County does not exist. In this subsequent 

between the matters in Carbon County and the former prosecution 

matters; however, a substantial duplication of fact and law 

the two prosecutions, there is some duplication between the two 

Turning to the issue of the logical relationship between 

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criminal episode." Nowhere did this Court make such a finding. 

that the two suppression motions are based upon a single 

which Defendant is referring to reads: "Defendant recognized 

prosecutions as a single criminal episode as the sentence in 

is necessary to note that it was Defendant who defined these two 

conclude the same for this current motion. The Court finds it 

derived from the same criminal episode, the Court must likewise 

that the prosecutions in Carbon and Schuylkill Counties are 

Defendant argued, since the Court concluded in the prior hearing 

order, the phrase "single criminal episoden appears and thus, as 

motion. Defendant points out that in footnote two of that 

Court addressed and disposed of Defendant's omnibus pre-trial 

to this Court's order dated September 9, 2013, in which the 

Defendant, in his motion and argument to the Court, cited 

855 A.2d at 840. 

his own series with multiple episodes in each county." Nolan, 

enterpri.se ... Such is the scenario here; Ide r endaar l starred in 

week is a separate episode-the series of episodes is an 

characters, producers, and continuity of storyline, but each 

like a television sitcom, each week's story has similar 

scrap metal. As the Nolan Court so cleverly stated, '' [m] uch 

contained copper, copper piping, copper wiring, or other various 

between these properties was that they were vacant and they 

structures, within a certain locality. The main commonality 

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judicial district as the former prosecution. However, for 

all charges in these two prosecutions were within the same 

not inquire into the fourth prong of this test, that being that 

compulsory j oinder are present. Consequently, this Court need 

charges in Schuylkill County, not all four criteria of 

County have not arose from the same criminal episode as the 

As <;). re·s1,1l t, of the Court finding that the. char qes in Carbon 

f. • -·· • \ ' • • ~ 

originate from the same criminal episode. 

whether the prosecutions in Schuylkill County and Carbon County 

prior to this order has this Court addressed the issue of 

second prosecution. Lagana, 509 A. 2d at 866. At no point 11 

motion of the previous prevailing party, become part of the 

suppression judge during the first prosecution can, upon the 

arise out of a single search and/or seizure, a decision by a 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that \\where two prosecutions 

the Court answered that issue in the affirmative as the 

Cozmnonwealth v. Camperson, 650 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), 

to Commonweal th v. Lagana, 509 A. 2d 863 (Pa. 1986) and 

him at the first suppression hearing in Schuylkill. In citing 

have new evidence to present that was previously unavailable to 

Defendant's suppression motion, and if so, does the Defendant 

the ruling of Judge Domalakes in Schuylkill County to 

whether this Court, in Carbon County, must adopt and incorporate 

More importantly, the issue in the previous hearing. was 

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Section 5; this section reads in relevant part that: '' [t] here 

Pennsylvania Constitution, and more specifically Article V 

In reaching its conclusion, the McPhail Court analyzed the 

limits." Id. 

Pennsylvania and is not circumscribed by county territorial 

jurisdiction flows from the sovereign Corrmonwealth of 

142. The;refore, "[t]heir subject matter •,". power. " . Id. ·4tt 

power to try drug cases from independent sources of 

"counties are not separate sovereigns and do not derive their 

proceeding. Id. at 144-45. The McPhai 1 Court reasoned that 

a single criminal episode, had to be tried in a single 

transactions that occurred in two counties, which did constitute 

plurality decision, held that Section 110· mandated that drug 

A.2d 139 {Pa. 1997), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 

compulsory j cinder statute. In Commonwealth v. McPhail, 692 

context that prompted the legislature to amend the former 

phrase "judicial district,n it is necessary to review the 

To fully understand what the General Assembly meant by the 

1992) •· . 

See, Commonwealth v. Rightley, 617 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

to also address the compulsory joinder statute's fourth prong. 

ramifications if infringed upon, the Court feels it is necessary 

implicates double jeopardy principles which have severe 

purposes of being thorough, and since Defendant's appeal 

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10 The Fithian Court defined judicial district to mean "the geographical area 

established by the General Assembly in which a court of common pleas is 

located." Fithian, 961. A,2d at 75. 

episode." Id. 

prosecution was brought, even though part of a single criminal 

boundaries of the judicial district in which the former 

offenses that occurred wholly outside of the geographic 

from the reach of the compulsory joinder statute those current 

the Court held that 11the General Assembly intended to preclude 

occurring in a single judicial district. Id. at 77.10 Moreover, 

s t at ut e was to limit mandatory j cinder to only those offenses 

concluded that the legislative intent of the compulsory joinder 

76. (internal citation omitted) . Accordingly, the Fithian Court 

the aame judicial district as the former prosecution.'" Id. at 

within the jurisdiction of a single court' with 'occurred within 

legi,slo.t~r.e in pciX&:graph (l} (ii) s-..J.bs·tit.uted . .the: phl:as~ 'was 

Section 110 (1) (ii) to its current language. Specifically, the 

Court's decision in McPhail, the General Assembly amended 

v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66 (Pa. 2008), "[i]n direct response to our 

As stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth 

as may otherwise be provided by law." Id. at 141. 

having unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except 

shall be one court of common pleas for each judicial district . 

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12 Similarly, the Schuylkill County District Attorney's Office charged the 

Defendant with certain crimes that were only associated to a particular 

property located in Schuylkill County. 

1: Although conceivably the charges of rece1v1ng stolen property could be 

asserted against the Defendant for property that was stolen in Schuylkill 

County and Defendant received the property within the carbon County boarder, 

or vise-a-verse. However, the informations in both Carbon County cases and 

Schuylkill county case do not charge such a scenario. 

conspiracy brought forth by the Carbon County District 

Court too had to consider whether the charges of criminal 

Analogous to the charges before the Fithian Court, this 

meritless, for the reasons stated above. 

Off ice charged him with, save for the conspiracy charges, are 

that the crimes that the Carbon County District Attorney's 

then Schuylkill County .12 Consequently, Defendant's contention 

occurred in Carbon County, which is a separate judicial district 

criminal mischief, and criminal trespass could have only 

burglary, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property,11 

entirely in Carbon County. Thus, the elements for the crimes of 

specifiG to certain properties, properties that are located 

District Attorney's Office charged the Defendant with are all 

being Schuylkill County. The crimes that the ·carbon County 

d i s t r i c t in which the former prosecution was brought," that 

"wholly outside of the geographic boundaries of the judicial 

criminal conspiracy charges, occurred in Carbon County, and thus 

there can be no dispute that all the charges, except for the 

In evaluating all the charges in both Carbon County cases, 

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or conspiracy, to burglarize specific houses located in both 

Defendant himself, testified that there was a global agreement, 

witnesses, which included Defendant's co-conspirators and the 

Schuylkill County. In reading the transcript, none of the 

Defendant only offered the transcript from the trial in 

At the hearing before this Court on the instant motion, the 

prosecution.'" Id. 

not occur 'within the same judicial district as the former 

offenses took place solely within [the former] county, they did 

offense occurred within the same judicial district. As these 

interpretation of Section 110 (1) (ii), focuses upon whether the 

affirmed that "the proper analysis, pursuant to our 

former prosecution. Fithian, 961 A.2d at 79. The Court 

charges could have been brought against the defendant in the 

of the defendant for criminal conspiracy charges even though the 

In Fithian, the Court permitted the subsequent prosecution 

1·963) )• . 

at 78 (citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 189 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 

conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful combination." Id. 

or in any county where an overt act was committed by any of the 

brought in any county where the unlawful combination was formed, 

Court stated, "prosecution for criminal conspiracy may be 

same judicial district as Schuylkill County. As the Fithian 

Attorney's Office were to be classified as occurring within the 

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Office from prosecuting the Defendant. Accordingly, this Court 

statute does not bar the Carbon County District Attorney's 

Defendant's appeal be dismissed as the compulsory joinder 

Based upon the foregoing, this Court respectfully asks that 

CONCLUSION 

Schuylkill County. 

same judicial district as the former prosecution, that being 

in this subsequent prosecution are charges that were within the 

Defendant was also unsuccessful in establishing that the charges 

Schuylkill and Carbon Counties are of the same criminal episode, 

Accordingly, in addition to not proving that the charges in 

conspiracy charges brought forth by Schuylkill County. 

County or are not based upon the same conduct as the criminal 

Carbon County District Attorney's Off ice occurred within Carbon 

the elements of the criminal conspiracy charges filed by the 

from -t.he trial in Schuylkill County, this Court gleaned that all 

Court at the hearing on his motion other than the transcript 

the Defendant not proffering any additional evidence to this 

borders of Carbon County. Thus, in reading the transcript, and 

either the agreement· or any overt act occurred within the 

witnesses testified, whether explicitly or implicitly, that 

Schuylkill County charges of criminal conspiracy, none of the 

Carbon and Schuylkill Counties. Moreover, as it related to the 

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15 

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BY THE COURT: 

J-Oeph ~ J. Matika, J. 

affirmed. 

2014 dismissing Defendant's compulsory joinder motion, be 

respectfully recommends that this Court's order dated July 15, 

,. 

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