IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-30868

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HAROUT ANSOURIAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC 3:09-CR-152-2

Before WIENER, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Harout Ansourian appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to

suppress. Because the district court did not err in finding that Ansourian’s

consent to the search was an independent act of free will, we AFFIRM.

I.

While patrolling the interstate after midnight, Officer Jarod Averette

noticed a pickup truck towing a car on a trailer that was drifting repeatedly into

the adjacent lane. Officer Averette initiated a traffic stop. A video camera inside

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 23, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published *

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-30868 Document: 00511966916 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/23/2012
the patrol car and a microphone attached to Officer Averette’s clothing recorded

the encounter.

Officer Averette asked the driver, Harout Ansourian, to step out and

accompany him to the front of the patrol car. The officer questioned Ansourian

about his travels, his passenger, Gayk Eskichyan, and the ownership of the

truck, car, and trailer. Ansourian responded that he was driving his truck from

California to Florida, that he borrowed the trailer from a friend, and that

Eskichyan owned the car. Officer Averette then approached Eskichyan who had

remained in the truck and asked similar questions. Eskichyan’s answers

corroborated those of Ansourian. Officer Averette told both men to “hang tight”

for a few minutes while he checked their drivers’ licenses.

Back in his patrol car, Officer Averette turned the camera’s audio off,

called for backup, and ran a computer check. During the suppression hearing,

Officer Averette testified that he told the officers to come to his location and that

he “had a vehicle [he] wanted to search.” The computer check showed that

Ansourian had a prior arrest for first degree murder, Eskichyan had a prior

arrest for carrying a loaded firearm, and both men had been arrested less than

a month earlier for fraud.

Approximately thirteen minutes after Officer Averette entered his patrol

car, he turned the audio back on, exited the vehicle, and asked Ansourian for the

paperwork on the car being towed. Ansourian provided the registration

certificate for the pickup and stated that he could get the car’s documentation. 

Officer Averette continued to question Ansourian while examining the pickup’s

registration. Officer Gerardo Almendares arrived and talked with Ansourian

while Officer Averette approached Eskichyan to ask about the car’s paperwork. 

Eskichyan explained that it would be difficult to retrieve the paperwork because

the car doors were blocked by the trailer’s fenders.

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Seven minutes after leaving his patrol car, Officer Averette walked back

to Ansourian, returned his license and paperwork, advised him that he was not

going to be ticketed for the traffic violation, and said, “You’re free to go.” Ten

seconds later, Officer Averette asked Ansourian for consent to search

Ansourian’s “stuff.” Ansourian immediately responded, “You’re more than

welcome to,” but told Officer Averette that he and Eskichyan had already spent

three days on the road and were “really in a hurry.” Officer Averette assured

Ansourian that the search “wouldn’t take very long.” Ansourian asked the

officer what he was looking for, and Officer Averette responded that he was

looking for “anything illegal.” Officer Averette then asked again, “Do you mind

if I search your vehicle?” Ansourian answered, “I don’t mind.” 

The officers began to search the vehicles. During the search, Ansourian

approached the officers and offered to remove the trailer’s fenders in order to

allow the officers to gain access to the car. He did not attempt to stop the search

or complain about the length of the search. The police recovered $1,300 in cash,

several gift cards, and plastic cards which appeared to be counterfeit hidden in

the truck’s headliner. Inside the car’s trunk, the police found several apparently

counterfeit credit cards, handwritten lists of four-digit personal identification

numbers, small pinhole cameras, credit card readers, and numerous electronic

storage devices. 

The officers immediately arrested Ansourian and Eskichyan. A federal

grand jury subsequently indicted both men, charging them with possessing

device-making equipment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(4), and possessing

15 or more counterfeit access devices in violation of § 1029(a)(3).

Ansourian filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic

stop, arguing that he was illegally detained after the computer check was

completed. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the

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motion with a thorough ruling spanning twenty-six pages. The district court

determined that the prolonged detention by Officer Averette was a violation of

the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of

additional criminal activity warranting further investigation. However, the

district court concluded that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search

and his consent was an independent act of his free will that was sufficient to

dissipate any taint of the unlawful detention. 

Ansourian pleaded guilty to the second count in the indictment,

specifically reserving his right to appeal the district court’s order denying his

motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Ansourian to forty-six months

imprisonment, and Ansourian timely filed a notice of appeal. 

II.

When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this court

reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United

States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 158 (5th Cir. 2005). “Where a district

court’s denial of a suppression motion is based on live oral testimony, the clearly

erroneous standard is particularly strong because the judge had the opportunity

to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d

193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005).

The only issue on appeal is whether Ansourian’s consent was an

independent act of free will. Neither party challenges the district court’s

conclusion that extending the traffic stop after the license check was completed

was unconstitutional. See United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 404–06 (5th

Cir. 2006). However, consent to a search may remedy the taint of a

constitutional violation if the consent was both voluntary and an independent

act of free will. United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127–28 (5th Cir.

1993). Ansourian admits that his consent to the search was voluntarily given,

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but he challenges the district court’s finding that it was an independent act of

free will. “Even though voluntarily given, consent does not remove the taint of

an illegal detention if it is the product of that detention and not an independent

act of free will.” Id. This prong focuses on the causal connection between the

consent and the unconstitutional detention. Id. at 127. 

We consider three factors to determine whether the consent was an

independent act of free will: “(1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct

and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the

purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct.” Jenson, 462 F.3d at 407

(citations omitted). 

The first factor weighs in favor of Ansourian. Officer Averette asked for

Ansourian’s consent just ten seconds after telling Ansourian that he was free to

leave and returning his paperwork. Thus, the district court properly concluded

that “the first factor supports a finding that defendant’s consent was not an

independent act of free will.” 

The second factor of intervening circumstances indicates the consent was

an independent act of free will. Prior to asking for consent, Officer Averette

communicated to Ansourian that “You’re free to go.” At this point, Officer

Averette also returned Ansourian’s license and registration. We have previously

identified both of these facts as intervening circumstances. See Jenson, 462 F.3d

at 407 (holding that the second factor cut against the government because “there

is no evidence that (a) [the defendant] knew he was free to leave or (b) that his

license had been returned to him, both of which might be viewed as intervening

circumstances”). The knowledge that one is free to leave, accompanied by the

return of the license and registration, cuts the causal chain between the

unconstitutional detention and the consent. Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Pena,

336 F.3d 431, 443 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that after the driver receives the

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license, registration, and any other material needed to leave then the encounter

after a traffic stop becomes a consensual one). Both of these intervening

circumstances distinguish the case at hand from our prior decision in United

States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2011). In Macias, this court held that

the second factor weighed against the government because there were “no

circumstances that intervened between the detention and the consent, and thus

. . . there [was] no reason to think that [the defendant] believed he was free to

go.” 658 F.3d at 524 (internal quotations omitted). 

Finally, although there is some support for both sides, the third factor of

flagrancy and purpose of police misconduct leans in favor of the government. On

the one hand, Officer Averette said that he wanted to search a vehicle when he

radioed for backup, and we have held that if the clear purpose of the detention

was to obtain consent to search the vehicles, then that factor weighs against the

government. United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 243 (5th Cir. 2000). 

However, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the

unlawful detention spanned only seven minutes, and the officers did not

purposefully use that period of illegal detention to procure the defendant’s

consent to search the vehicles. In addition, the video clearly shows that the

consent was not obtained by any misrepresentations made to the defendants as

Officer Averette told Ansourian that he was looking for “anything illegal.” 

Moreover, once the search began, Ansourian never tried to stop it, revoke his

consent, or complain about the length of the search. To the contrary, Ansourian

offered to remove the trailer fenders to allow the officers to access the car. 

We conclude that the district court’s determination that Ansourian’s

consent was voluntary and an independent act of free will was not error. 

Therefore, Ansourian’s consent was valid and remedies the taint from the prior

unconstitutional detention. AFFIRMED. See United States v. Bessolo, 269 F.

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App’x 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding that the district

court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because of the valid consent).

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