### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE S e pt e m be r 16, 2005 S e s s i on

W I L L I A M M . H E N S L E Y , ET AL


### . v . R O BER T C A R R I ER

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Washin gton County No. 34979 G . Richard Johns on, Chan cellor

No. E2005-00335-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JANUARY 9, 2006

Wil lia m M

. H e n s le y

a n d M ar y

H e n s le y ( “ Pl a in ti f

f s ” ) s u e d Ro b e r t C arr ie r ( “ D e f e n d a n t” ) reg arding the use of a

driveway . The c ase w as tried without a jury and the Tri al C o u rt fo u n d and he ld tha t it

wa s th e int ent of th e orig ina l g ranto rs that th e drive way be a joi nt dri ve way ; th a t if t h i s holding wa s incorre ct, that the Plaintiffs had e stablished a rig ht to the drivewa y through adver se possession; t h at i f the prior two holdings we re inc orre ct, that Plaintiffs had prove n a presc riptive ea sement or a n i m p l i ed ea s ement to use the driveway . Def endant a ppeals c laiming that the Trial Court er

red in finding a pre scriptive ea sement or a n implied easeme nt, and also that the Tria l Co urt e rr e d in no t di smi ssi ng Pla int if fs ’ c la ims ba se d u po n th e statut e of lim itat io ns. We a ff ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d; Case Re m anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J .J ., joined.

Rowland E. Ver

ran a nd Shane Usa

ry , J ohnson City , Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Robert Carrie r.

J ames D. Culp, J ohnson City , Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llees, Will iam M. He n s l ey and wife , Mary H e n s l e y.Rober t Car r i er doe s n ot ow n Lot 205, a l t h ou g h h e s t at ed i n h i s a n s we r t o Pl ai n t i f f s ’ c ompl ai n t t h at h e di d. I n s t ea d, 1 h is siste r, M a ry E v e lyn B ro w n , i s the re c o rd o w n e r o f L o t 2 0 5 . B y A g re e d O rd e r o f S u b stitutio n , M a ry E v e lyn B r own wa s s ubs t i t ut ed as t he proper part y D ef endan t

. M ar y E vel y n B r own t hen gr ant ed R ob er t Carr i er a Li mi t ed P ower of

At t orn ey t o re pres ent he r i nt er es t s i n r ega r d t o Lo t 205

. As M r

. Carr i er r epre s ent ed hi s s i s t er ’ s i nt er es t at t r i al , a n d w as t h e par t y r es i di n g on Lot 205 a t t h at t i me, w e r ef er t o M r

. Car r i er a s “ D ef en dan t

. ” M r

. Car r i er di d n ot at t em p t t o act as M s. B row n’ s at t o rney , how ever. OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Pla int iffs, hu sb a nda ndwi fe , o wn la ndloc a te d a t 20 7 We st Wataug a Av e nu e in John so n Ci ty

(“ L ot 2 07 " ) a ndha ve us e d th is p ro pe rt y a s r e nta l pr op e rt y

sin c e the y

pu rc ha se d it

. Def endant r esides at the pr operty located at 205 West W at aug a Ave nue in J ohnson City(“L ot 205") . The drive way

at issue re sts on L ots 205 an d 2 0 7

. T he majority of the drive way

sits on 1 L ot 205, with t h e ex ception of a small part that is on L ot 207. The drivew ay leads to one building, part of which is a g ara g e sitting mostly on L ot 207 w i t h t h e remainder of the building b e i n g o n L o t2 0 5

. T h e g ar a g e l o c a t e d o n L o t2 0 7 w a s b u i l tp r i o r t o c o n s tru c t i o n o f

t h e d r i v e w a y.

D e f e n d a n tr e n t e d t h e h o u s e o n L o t2 0 7 f r o mt h e P l a i n t i f

f s f o r ap p r o x i m a t e l y a y ear and a ha lf or two y ear s beg inning in 1995. Since 1997 or 1998, Def

endant ha s lived in the ho us e on L ot 2 05 . D e fe nd a nt a lso re nte d ju st the g ara g e on L ot 2 07 fr om P la int if fs be g inn ing in 1997, a n d h e c o n ti n u e d r e n ti n g th e g ar a g e th r o u g h Ju n e o f 2 0 0 2 , w e ll a f te r h e b e g a n li ving on L ot 205.

When Defe ndant first moved into the house on L ot 205 , h e wa s renting from the then owner . I n Aug ust of 2002, Def endant’ s sister, Mary

Evel y n Br own, purc hased L ot 205. Def endant c urre ntly

resides on L ot 205 and holds a L i m i t ed Power of A ttorney from his sister
a llo wi ng him

to r e pr e se nt h is s ist e r’ s in te re sts in this la ws uit

. After his sist er pur chase d L ot 205, Defe ndant wrote a letter to Mrs. Hensley

dated Se pte mbe r 2 4, 20 02 . T his le tte r s ta te d, in p e rt ine nt p art :

I would like to talk with y ou. Ab o u t t h e gar ag e we share . As y ou no by now the re is n o rig ht a way

to i t. andI

ow e n 3 .5 fe e t of

it. I wo uld lik e to t a lk w ith y ou. About the mon ey I h av e p aid y ou over the past y ear s. As y ou now no I
s h o u ld not have bee n pay ing it. I was thinking may

be we could work something out on y o u r p ar t of the g ara g e. May be y ou could g ive me that little pice of la nd and we would call it even.

Plaintiffs sued Def

endant i n J anuary

of 2003, cla iming, in part, that they wer e try ing to se ll L ot 207 and that Def endant was i n t er fe ri ng with their lawful right to use the joint driveway . The c ase w as tried without a jury in November

of 2004.-3- Copies of dee ds introduced at trial show that A.L . And er s o n an d his wife, Chlories L eig h Ander son at one time ow ned L ot 207 and that by deed dated M ay 9 , 1 9 4 1 , Mr. and M rs

. An d er s o n deede d a strip on the northe asterly side of L ot 207 approxim ately three and a ha lf fe e t w ide to C ha

rl e s Pa rs on s, wh o a t th e tim e ow ne d L ot 20 5. Mr . a ndMr s. An de rs on so ld the re mainder of

L ot 207 to Charles B. K elto n an d h i s wi fe , Maude C. Ke lton, by deed dated April 2, 1 943. Plaintiffs purchase d L ot 207 from the Estate of Maude C. Ke lton by

deed dated May 11, 1984.

B y d e e d d a te d Ja n u ar y

1 5, 19 9 0 , St e v e n P. H arr is a n d h is w if e , B e v e r ly

W. Har ri s , p u rc h as ed L ot 205 from the then owne rs, Richard T . Pearc e and w ife, June Pearc e. The Pearc es had obta ined L ot 205 from Mrs. Parsons in 1989. The January 15, 1990 deed f

rom Mr.
a ndMr s. Pe arc e to M r. a ndMr s. Ha rris s ta te s, in p e rt ine nt p art : “ Th is p ro pe rt y is s pe c if ic a lly subj ec t t o a joint ga

rag e built upon L ots 5 and 6, Bloc k 1, of the Wataug a L and Company ’s A d d i t i o n t o J o h n s o n C i t y
.... ” De fenda nt’s sister, Mary Evely n Br own purc hased L ot 205 from Mr. and Mrs. H arris by

deed dated Aug ust 23, 2002.
At trial, Mr. He nsley

test i fi ed t h at there are two sets of steps betwe en the driveway and L ot 207. Photogra phs of t h es e steps wer e introduce d at trial. The photog raphs
s h o w t h a to n e s e t o f s t e p s h a s a m e t a l h a n d r a i l a n dt h a tt h e s t e p s l i n k L o t2 0 7 t o t h e d r i v e w a y. The steps lea d no wher e else

.

Mr. Hensle y

further testifi ed that the prope rty line betwee n L ots 205 and 207 runs a fe w inches inside their g ara g e, b u t t h at t h e rest of the ir g ara g e is on L ot 207. Mr. Hensley testified that the drive way was built after

the g arage “w as b u i l t beca use it - - our g ara g e wa s ins ide the orig ina l bo un da ry lin e of 55 fe e t.” He a dmi tte d that th e gre a te r p art of the drive way

is on L o t 2 0 5

. M r

. H e n s le y te s ti f ie d th a t “ M r s

. Pa

r s o n s o w n e d [L o t 2 0 5 u n ti l s h e s o ld it to the Pearc es in 1989] . . . and Mrs. Parsons told us that we had a joint driveway .”

Mr. Hensley testified that over the y ear s, he has seen some of his r ent er s u s i n g the dr ive way . H e state d:

We had s o m e o f o ur people rent it. They use their c ars, ha d to repa ir their ca rs out there on the driveway , and they also

... mov e d s ome of

the ir bel on gings int o that g ara g e which w e re nted.

... And also t h es e p eople that r ented our house, a lot
o f t h em s t o re d t h ei r, s o m e e x tra s t u f f i n o u r ga ra ge t h er e. An d we h ad t h e ga ra ge re pa ir e d in 19 93 to put new do or s o n it to m ake su re that no bo dy c ou ld g e t in there and g et the stored e quipment.

Mr. Hensle y

testified that no demand e ver w as made that they stop using the g arage or the driveway . I n fac t, Mr. Hensley testified t h at Defendant wa s one of Plaintiffs’ r enter s and that “af ter [Defe ndant] moved away , he re nted th e g ara g e fr om us beca use he ne eded to c ontinue using it to store some of

his equipment or some of his furniture or something in that ga rag e.”-4- M rs

. H e n s l eyal s o t es t i fi ed at tri al

. S h e t es t i fi ed t h at t h e m aj o ri t y o f t h ei r ga ra ge is on the i r s i d e o f t h e p ro perty line and that over

the y ear s, she and he r husband ha ve paid f or the require d mai ntenanc e on their g ara g e. Mrs. He nsley handled most of the de tails reg arding renting L ot 207, and she testified:“ I t was my custom to t el l t h e re n t ers that the g ara g e wa s a part of the pr op e rt y .” Mr s. Hen sle y te sti fi e d th a t sh e do e s n ot r e c a ll s pe c if ic a lly ha vin g thi s c on ve rs a tio n w ith De fe nd a nt, bu t it wa s h e r c us tom

to t e ll a ll r e nte rs

. Eig hty -six y ear

old E t hel Corre ll, Maude Ke lton’s sister-in-law, a lso testified. Ms. Correl test if

ie d th a t Maud e Ke lto n o nc e ow ne d L ot 2 07 a ndha d o wn e d it fo r “ [f]o rt y -s ome y ear s.” Ms. Correl testified that Ms. Kelton had an automobile that she kep t i n t he g ara g e on L ot 2 0 7 a n d th a t M s

. K e lt o n u s e d th e d r iv e w a y to a c c e s s th e g ar a g e

. I n f a c t, M s

. Co rr e l te s ti f

ied: “I had used the g ara g e - - we l l , ev er y b ody that went up ther e used the drive be cause there wasn’t any other way

to ge t in,

... .”

After trial, the Trial Court e ntere d its F inal J udg ment on J anuary 12, 2005. T he Final Judgment inc o rp o rate s by ref ere nce the Trial Court’s memora ndum opinion. I n the memorandum opinion, the Tria l Court specifica lly found and he ld:

T h er e i s ab s o l u t el y , p o s i t i v el y , u n eq u i v o ca l l y n o q u es t i o n t h at t h i s gar age b el o n gs to the P l ai n t iff He nsley s. Ag ain, there is absolutely , positively , unequivoca lly no question that t h e Hensley s and their Pre dece ssors in Title have used this g ara g e, indeed a t a p o in t in ti me f o r ab o u t a y e a

r o r tw o , may

b e a y e ar a n d a half , the Plaintiffs rented this g ara g e to [Defendant] . Prior to the time of the Plaintiff’s renting the g ara g e itself to [Defend an t ] , t h ey rente d the pre mises, including the house and the g ara g e to [Defendant] . So [ Def endant] kn ew from first-hand knowledg e that the [Plainti ffs] were n o t o n l y claiming the house a s rental p ro p er t y but were claiming the g ara g e which sits on the rig ht side of the drive way next t o their house a s rental a s [Defenda nt] has re nted both of these structures from the Plaintiffs.

* * *

So t h e C ourt finds first that these pr operties, these structure s have be en ther e on t h i s property

since the 1940' s, that the g ara g e unquestionably g oes with the Plaintiff’s property

and that the pr oof is conclusive an d unequivoca l that the Pla int if f s a n d t h e i r

P r e d e c e s s o r s i n T i t l e h a v e u s e d t h i s d r i v e w a y s i n c e t h e 1 9 4 0 ' s, since the house was built and the g ara g e wa s place d there for 60 some y ea rs, over 60 y ea rs

. W hen [Defe ndant’s] sist er Mr s. Br own, boug ht the property at 205, that’s when [Def

endant] found what he deemed to be a discr epanc y in the deeds to these two prope rties bec ause the driveway is never me ntioned and bec ause the g ara g e wa s n ot m e nti on e d u nti l th e 19 80 so me thi ng de e d f ro m H arris’ s to Pur c ha se rs wh e re the g ara g e wa s r e fe rr e d to qu ote “ joi nt g ara g e ” , c los e qu otes.-5-

Wel l ob vio us ly it’ s no t a joi nt g ara g e

. Th is g ara g e do e s no t be lon g to 205 W e st Wataug a. Une qu i v o ca l l y i t belong s to 207 so what are they talking a bout when they say joint gar ag e? What did thos e g ran t o rs and gr antee s intend in that [ 1980
so me thi ng de e d] w he n th e y re fe rr e d to qu ote “j oi nt gar a g e ” c los e d q uo te s? Well obviouslyit’s one of two thi n gs an d i t can only be one of

two things if one uses a ny re a so n o r a ny

log ic . F ir st, the g ara g e is n ot j oin t bu t r a the r i t app e ars in the se photogr aphs that t h er e could be a joint wall between the Plaintiff’s g ara g e and a structure on the Def

endant’ s property that, I can’ t a scertain whether it’s a ga ra ge or wha t it is , it ’ s a s tr

u c tu r e , b u t it ap p e ar s th e y h a v e a c o mm o n w a ll

. T h is Court also fi n d s th a t th e p r o p e r ty o f th e Pl a in ti f f s is n o t a c c e s s ib le b y v e h ic le e xcept by thi s d ri vew ay

. Yo u c a n lo ok a t th e se pic tur e s a ndind e e d th e de e d it se lf on ly c a lls 51 a nd 1/2 fe e t f

ro nta g e on Wat a ug a

for the Pla int if

f’ s p ro pe rt y , a

ve ry na rr ow lot , v er yd i ff i cult in 1940 for them to lay these things out and there ’s just no way for a fire tr uck, a moving truck, a

car , a per son who l i v es at 207 c ould ge t on that propert y ex ce pt by

this driveway

that runs betwe en the pr operties. This Court finds th at t h e unequivoca l intention of the parties fr om the inception of the building of the se structure s on t h e p ro p ertywas to have a joint drivewa y indeed. Three and a ha lf fee t of the drivew ay was c onvey ed, or thre e and on e h al f fe et of the pr op e rt y

wa s c on ve y e d a t on e tim e a ndthat w a s, I thi nk we sa id i n 1 94 1 a ndit

ap p e ar s t h a tt h e p u rp o s e o f t h a td e e d w a s t o c o n s tru c tt h e d r i v e w a y.
...

* * *

Th is C ou rt

fu rthe r f ind s th a t th e re ha s n e ve r b e e n a n o bje c tio n o ve r 6 0 y e ars to thi s d ri ve way

or it’ s u se or

to w ho m it

be lon g e d u nt il th e De fe nd a nt ... in h is words, g ot a hold of the de eds and c oncluded as a l ay p erson that this driveway belong ed t o h i s s i s ter, Mrs. B rown a nd there fore the g ara g e belong ed to his sister,

....
I n its Final J udg ment, the Trial Court found a nd held, int e r a lia :

IT I S, TH ER EF OR E, O RD ER ED , A DJ UD G ED , A ND DE CR EED that the Court finds that the unequivocal intention of the parties f rom the inception of the building of these stru ct ures on the pr operty was to have a joint driveway indeed.
IT IS, F UR THER , OR DE RE D, AD JU DG ED , A ND DE CR EED that ... the re ha s n e ve r b e en a ny ob je c tio n o ve r 6 0 y e ars to this drive way or its us e or

to whom it belonge d until [ Def endant] ... in his words got a hold of a de ed and conclude d as a la y

person that this driveway belong [ed] to his sis ter.-6- IT IS, F UR THER , OR DE RE D, AD JU DG ED , A ND DE CR EED t h a tit
was the intention of the g rantors/g rante es orig inally that the drivewa yb e a j oint d r i v e w a y.

IT I S, F UR THER , OR DERED , A DJ UD G ED , A ND DE CR EED that the Plain t i ffs in Title have claimed this driveway , have ma de uninterr upted open and visible use o f t h i s p roperty for more than 60 y ear s....I f there is any question about the title, the Plaintiffs have me t the criteria for a dverse possession.

The F inal J udg ment also stated that if the Trial Court’s first two holdings we re incorre ct, then the Trial Court found and he ld that Plainti ffs ha d pro v en either an e aseme nt by imp lic a tio n o r a

pr e sc ri pti ve e a se me nt t o th e drive way . D e fe nd a nt a pp e a ls t o th is C ou rt

. Discussion

Def endant r aises four

issues on appea l, which we quote : (1) Whether

appellee s established by a pre ponderan ce of the e vidence a presc riptive ea sement in a drive way by adver s e possession for twenty y ear s or more. (2) Wh et h er appellee s could “tac k” their posse ssion to that of their prede cessor s in interest to establish the pre scriptive period of twenty y ear s or more. (3) Whether

the Chance llor err ed in holding t h at appellee s had established a n ease ment by

implication. (4 ) Wh e the r a

pp e lle e s’ c la im w a s b arr e d b y the Sta tut e of

L imi ta tio ns

. Def endant ha s failed to addr ess the fa ct that the Tria l Court first cons t ru ed the deed a nd found and he ld that it wa s the intention of the orig inal g rantors tha t the driveway be a joi nt d ri ve way , a ndthat if thi s h old ing we re inc or

re c t, that P lai nt if

fs ha d p ro ve n th e ir

ri g hts to t h e d ri v ew ayb y

ad v er s e p o s s es s i o n

. T h e T ri al C o u rt s t at ed t h at o n l y i f i t s fi rs tt wo h o l d i n gs wer e incor

rec t did it find and hold that P l ai n tiffs had prove n by clea r and une quivocal evide nce that theyhad an e aseme nt by implication or an ea sement by presc ription. Thus, if we dec ide that the Trial Court wa s corr ect e ither in construing the dee d or in holding tha t the Plaintiffs had established their c laim throu gh adver se possession, we pr etermit the necessity of addr essing whether Plaintiffs established an e aseme nt by presc ription or an ea sement by implication.
We, the re fore, first addre ss whether the Trial Court cor

rec tly construed the deed and found that “it was the intention of the g rantors/g rante es orig inally that the drivew ay

be a joint driveway

. ” Ou r r e vie w i s de novo upon the re cord, a ccompa nied by a pre sumption of
c or re c tne ss o f the fi nd ing s o f f a c t of the trial cou rt , un le ss the pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e is oth e rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; B o g a n v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001) . A trial-7-

court' s conclusions of law a re subjec t to a de novo revie w with no presumption of co rre ctness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

As our S u p re m e C ourt rec ently explained in Griffis v. Davidson County Metro. Gov’ t :

I n construing a dee d, our primary task is to ascertain the g rant o r’s int ent from the words of the deed a s a whole a nd from the s u rr o u n d ing c ircumstance s. Colli ns v. Smithson , 5 85 S.W. 2d59 8, 60 3 ( Te nn . 1 97 9) ; Benne tt v. Langham , 214 Tenn. 674, 383 S.W .2d 16, 18 (1964). Interpre tation of a de ed is a que stion of law. Ro dg e rs v . B ur

ne tt , 108 Te nn . 1 73 , 6 5 S. W. 4 08 , 4 11 (1 90 1) ; Mitchell v. Chance , 149 S.W .3d 40, 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
Griffis v. Davidson County Metro. Gov’ t , 164 S.W .3d 267, 274 (Tenn. 2005)

.

Two of the de eds introduce d at t ri al ar e pertinent to resolving the issue at hand. First, we look at the dee d from A.L . Ander son and Chlories L ei gh An d erson dated May 9, 1941, de e din g a strip o n th e no rthe a ste rl y sid e of L ot 20 7 app ro xima te ly thr e e a nda

ha lf fe e t w ide to Charles Parsons, who at the time owne d L ot 205. The surrounding circ umstances show tha t the gar age o n L ot 207 exi sted prior to the making of this deed. F urther, the evidenc e shows that other than the driveway , there is no reasona ble vehicula

r ac cess to the g ara g e on L ot 207. The Trial Court also found that the purpose of the 1941 deed “ was to construc t the driveway ” lea ding to the a lr e a dy

e xistin g g ara g e loc a te d o n L ot 2 07 . It de fi e s lo g ic to a ssu me that Mr. a ndMr s. An de rs on wo uldde e d th a t st ri p o f l a ndto M r. Pars on s w ith ou t i nt end ing to r e ta in an e a se me nt t o uti lize the dr ive way . O the rw ise , M r. a ndMr s. An de rs on wo uld h ave effective ly c ut- of f the ir
acc ess to their alre ady

exis ting g ara g e.
The sec ond deed pe rtinent to the issue at hand is the one from Richar d T. Pearc e and wife , J un e P ea rc e t o Steven P. Harris and wife, B everly W. Harris date d J anuary 15, 1990, whic h s tate s , in p e r ti n e n t p ar t: “ T h is p r o p e r ty is s p e c if ic a ll y s u b je c t to a jo in t g ar a g e b uilt upon L o t s 5 a n d 6 , B l o c k

1 , o f t h e W a t a u g a

L a n d C o m p a n y’ s A d d i t i o n t o J o h n s o n C i t y
.... ”

I n r e g ardto this de e d, the Tria l Co urt f ou nda ndhe ld:

the g ar a g e w a s n o tm e n t i o n e d u n t i l t h e 1 9 8 0 s o m e t h i n g d e e d f r o mH arr i s ’ s to Pur c ha se rs wh e re the g ara g e wa s r e fe rr e d to qu ote “ joi nt g arag e ” , c los e qu ote s. Wel l ob vio us ly

it’ s n ot a joint

g ara g e . T his g ara g e do e s n ot b e lon g to 2 05 Wes t Wataug a. Une quivocally it belongs to 207 so wh at ar e t hey talking a bout when they say joint gar ag e? W hat did those g rantors a nd g rante es intend in that [1980
so me thi ng de e d] w he n th e y re fe rr e d to qu ote “jo in t garag e ” c los e d q uo te s? Well obviousl y i t ’s o n e of two thing s and it can only be one of

two things if one uses a ny re a so n o r a ny

log ic . F ir st, the g ara g e is n ot j oin t bu t r a the r i t app e ars in the se-8-

photogr aphs that t h er e co uld be a joint wall betwe en the Plaintiff’s g ara g e and a
s t ru ct u re o n t h e D e fe n d an t ’s p ro p er t y th at , I ca n ’t as ce rt ai n wh et h eri t ’s a ga ra ge or wha t it is , it’s a s t ru ct u re , but it appear s they have a common wall. This Court also finds that the prope rty of t h e P l ai n t i ffs is not acc essible by vehicle e x cept by thi s d ri ve way . Y ou c a n look at th ese pi c tur e s a ndind e e d th e de e d it se lf on ly c a lls 51 a n d 1 /2 f

e e t f r o n ta g e o n Wa ta

u g a f o r th e Pl a in ti f

f ’ s p r o p e r ty , a

v e r y n arr ow lot, very difficult in 1940 for them to lay these thing s out an d there ’s just no way for a fire t ru ck , a m o ving tr

uck, a c ar, a

person who lives at 207 could g et on that property except by

this driveway

that runs betwe en the pr op er t i es

. This Court finds that the unequivoca l intention of the parties fr o m t he ince ption of the building of the se structure s on th e p ro p er t y was to have a joint drivewa y indeed. Three and a ha lf fee t of the drivew ay was c onvey ed, or thre e and one h al f fee t of the prope rty

was c onvey ed at one time and that was, I thi n kthat we sa id in 1941

a n d i tap p e ar s t h a tt h e p u rp o s e o f t h a td e e d w a s t o c o n s tru c tt h e d r i v e w a y.
... We find that the evidenc e d o es n o t preponde rate ag ainst any of the finding s of fac t made by

the Trial Court. The evidenc e s hows that the drivew ay was tre ated a s a joint driveway for a pproxi mately

60 y ears and used both by prior owne rs of L ot 207 and by some of the re nte rs of

L ot 2 07 . T he e vid e nc e sh ow s, a s f ou ndby the Tria l Co urt, that a strip approximately

three and a ha lf fee t wide of L ot 207 was conve y ed t o the then owne rs of L ot 205 in 1941, appar ently

to fac ilitate con s t ru ct i o n of the joint driveway . Photogra phs of the drive way introduced at trial show that t h e d ri v ew ay g ives ac cess to both the g ara g e on L ot 207 and to the rest of the structure s i t t i n g o n L ot 205. The photog raphs a lso show sets of steps that wer e constructe d to lead dire ctly from the driveway

to L ot 207. These step s l ea d n o wh er e else . The evidenc e shows that other than the drive way , th er e i s n o o ther re asonable vehicular acc ess to the g arage on L ot 2 07 . I n a dd iti on , M r. He ns le y te sti fi e d th a t “ Mr s. Pars on s o wn e d [L ot 2 05 un til she sold it to the Pearce s in 1989] . . . and Mrs. Parsons told us that we ha d a joint drivewa y .”

The re cord is devoi d of evide nce show ing that any one other than the owne rs or persons re nting f

rom the owne rs of L ot 2 0 7 ev er at t empt ed to use the g ara g e that sits mostl y on L ot 207. The Tria l Court found and held that the g ara g e located mostlyo n L ot 207 had bee n used exclusively

by the owner s of L ot 207, or their re nters, and be longe d so l el y t o the owner s of L ot 2 0 7

. T h e ev idence does not preponde rate ag ainst the Trial Court’s finding s, and we find no
err or in the Tria l Court’s conclusion as to the g ara g e located on L ot 207.

Th e Janu ary

15 , 1 99 0 d e e d f

ro m Mr. and Mrs . Pe arc e to M r. a ndMr s. Ha rris states: “This prope rty

is specifica lly

subject to a j o i n t ga

rag e built upon L ots 5 and 6, Bloc k 1, of t h e W a t a u g a

L a n d C o m p a n y’ s A d d i t i o n t o J o h n s o n C i t y
.... ” We find and hold, a s did the Trial Cou rt , th a t th is d e e d f

ou ndin D e fe nd a nt’ s c ha in o f t itle s ho ws c le arl y that L ot 2 05 is s ub

je c t to the ri g hts of

the ow ne rs of

L ot 2 07 to u til ize the g ara g e sit tin g mos tly on L ot 2 07 a ndto a c c e ss this ga rag e by means of the driveway . This is consistent with t he Tria l Court’s finding t h at the-9-

g rantors/g rante es, including those of the 1941 de ed, intended that “the dri v ew ay b e a joint driveway .”

We h oldthat th e Tria l Co urt di d n ot e rr in c on stru ing the re le va nt d e e ds , including the 1941 deed, when it held “that it was the intention of the g rantors/g rante es orig inally that the drivew ay

be a j o i n t d ri vewa y .” Our determination that the Trial Court
corr ectly interpre ted the re levant dee ds preterm its the nece ssityof addr essing the first three iss ue s D e fe nd a nt r a ise d o n a pp e a l.

We w ill , h ow e ve r, br ie fl y a dd re ss D e fe nd a nt’ s is su e regardin g wh e the r a pp e lle e s’ claim was ba

rre d by the statute of limitations. Defendan t cl aims that Plainti ffs’ suit wa s barr ed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 2-103, an d that the Trial Court did not rule upon this statute of limit ations defe nse.

I n p e rt ine nt p art , T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 8- 2- 10 3 p ro vid e s:
2 8

- 2

- 1 0 3

. Se v e n- y e a r pe r io d r un s fr o m t im e r ig ht a c c r ue d

– Extent of possession . –(a) No per son or any on e cl ai m i n g under suc h person sha ll have any
ac ti o n , e ith e r a t la w o r in e q u it y , f o r th e r e c o v e r y o f a n y lan d s , te n e ments or here ditaments, but within seven (7) y ear s after the rig ht of ac tion accr

ued.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 2-103(a ) (2000)

.

T h e Trial Court implicitlyruled on the statute of limit ations defe nse as the T rial Court hear d proof a n d made the f indings a nd holdings in Plaintiffs’ fa vor as discusse d above. Plaintiffs had no notice that De fenda nt or any o n e el s e was interfe ring or intended to interf ere with their rig ht to use the drivew ay u n t i l af t er D efe ndant’s sister purc hased L ot 205 in August of 2002. Plaintiffs filed suit in J anuary of 2003, we ll within t he statute of lim i t at i ons. Clearly , the Trial Court f

o u n d t h at T en n . Code Ann. § 28-2- 103 did not bar Plaintiffs’ cla ims. W e ag ree and find this issue to be without merit.

Conclusion

The judg ment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause i s rema nded to the Trial Court for co l l ec t i o n of the c osts below. The c osts on appeal a re a ssessed ag ainst the Appellant, Robert Car

rier, and his surety

.

__________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE