No. 88-361 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

RANDALL M. RUDOLPH , 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsANN DUSSAULT, et al., 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable James B. Wheelis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Randall M. Rudolph, pro se, Warm Springs, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula, 

Montana; Michael Sehestedt, Deputy County Attorney 

Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 23, 1988 

Decided: November 1, 1988 

Filed: 

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Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Mr. Rudolph appeals from the dismissal with prejudice of 

his pro se complaint by the District Court for the Fourth 

Judicial District, Missoula County. We affirm as modified in 

this opinion. 

The issue is vrhether the District Court erred in dismissing Mr. Rudolph's complaint on its own motion. 

Mr. Rudolph was arrested, tried, and convicted on charges of robbery. While he 97as av~aiting sentencing following 

that trial, he commenced this civil action. We are unable to 

determine with certainty the specific allegations of the 

complaint because the original district court file has been 

lost. However, from the materials we have before us it 

appears that the complaint alleged that the defendants, 

listed as "city cornrnissioners'~, the "unknown" chief of police, and 2 "unknown" city police officers, allowed Mr. 

Rudolph's constitutional rights to be violated during and 

immediately following his arrest. Mr. Rudolph claimed insufficient grounds for arrest, an unconstitutional line-up, and 

inadequate investigation of the crime with which he was 

charged. Although Mr. Rudolph filed his complaint with the 

District Court, there is no indication that he ever served or 

gave any notice of the complaint to the persons named as 

defendants. The court dismissed the complaint on its own 

motion four months after it was filed. 

Did the District Court err in dismissing Mr. Rudolph's 

complaint on its own motion? 

In dismissing Mr. Rudolph's complaint, the District 

Court stated that on its face, the complaint was "frivolous 

and fails to state any cognizable cause of action." The 

District Court did not explain its reasoning further. The 
record concerning Mr. Rudolph's criminal conviction is now 

before this Court on appeal and we have taken notice of that 

record. 

The individuals listed by name as defendants in this 

suit were, at the time of this action, county commissioners 

of Missoula County. The complaint does not allege any connection between county commissioners and the action of city 

police which is claimed to have deprived Mr. Rudolph of his 

rights. We conclude that as to Ann Dussault, Barbara Evans, 

and Janet Stevens, dismissal with prejudice was proper. 

As to the remaining defendants, we recognize that Mr. 

Rudolph is appearing pro se and will not be held to the 

standards of pleading expected of attorneys. Though it does 

not expressly name the statute, Mr. Rudolph's complaint, 

broadly viewed, states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 

S 1983 for violation of civil rights. In such a case, collateral estoppel applies as to previous criminal proceedings. 

Allen v. McCurry (1980), 449 U.S. 90, 66 L.Ed.2d 308, 101 

S.Ct. 411. Collateral estoppel is the doctrine that issues 

previously argued and ruled upon cannot be relitigated. 

Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson (1984), 207 Mont. 

409, 414-16, 673 P.2d 1277, 1280-81. Mr. Rudolph's claims 

may be barred under a theory of collateral estoppel as a 

result of the decision in the criminal proceeding against 

him. 

The District Court in which this action was filed was 

the court which had heard the criminal case. It could properly take judicial notice, as have we, of that matter. 

However, since Mr. Rudolph's criminal conviction is on appeal 

before this Court, we conclude that dismissal of his complaint with prejudice was premature. 

We hold that although the matters raised in the complaint may be barred by collateral estoppel, the dismissal 
with prejudice was not proper. We amend the dismissal to 

provide as to all parties a dismissal without prejudice. We 

admonish Mr. Rudolph that he is required to have an adequate 

basis for the filing of another complaint. 

We Concur: A