[Cite as Tate v. Natural Nails, 2019-Ohio-4062.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

TOMIKA TATE, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 107983 

 v. : 

 

NATURAL NAILS, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 3, 2019 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-17-890148 

 

Appearances: 

Burkes Law, L.L.C., and John F. Burke, III, for appellant. 

Alan J. Rapoport, for appellee. 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.: 

Plaintiff-appellant, Tomika Tate (“appellant”), brings the instant appeal 

challenging the trial court’s judgment granting an oral motion to dismiss made by 

defendant-appellee, Natural Nails. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court 

erred in (1) determining that she was required to present medical expert testimony 

to demonstrate proximate cause in her negligence action, and (2) granting the 
motion to dismiss without hearing any evidence or empaneling a jury. After a 

thorough review of the record and law, this court affirms. 

I. Factual and Procedural History 

Natural Nails is a nail salon in Euclid, Ohio. In March 2015, appellant 

received a manicure at Natural Nails. According to appellant, sometime after she 

received the manicure, she developed an infection on her middle finger and middle 

fingernail. Appellant alleged that the infection resulted from Natural Nails’ 

negligence. 

Appellant originally filed her negligence complaint on May 16, 2016, in 

Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-16-863279. However, on December 7, 2016, appellant filed 

a notice of voluntary dismissal, and the trial court dismissed the case without 

prejudice on December 8, 2016. 

Appellant refiled her negligence complaint on December 7, 2017, in 

Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-17-890148. Therein, appellant alleged that she received a 

manicure at Natural Nails’ salon “[o]n or about March 1, 8, or 17, 2015[.]” Appellant 

further alleged that she sustained the following injuries and damages as a result of 

Natural Nails’ negligence: 

5. As a direct and proximate cause of [Natural Nails’] acts and 

negligence, [appellant] sustained serious injuries, including but not 

limited to, mental and physical pain and suffering, aggravation, 

inconvenience, grief, restrictions on activities, and/or loss of 

enjoyment of life. 

6. As a direct and proximate result of [Natural Nails’] negligence, 

[appellant] has been damaged and required hospital and medical care 

and treatment and incurred expenses for same. 
On December 14, 2017, Natural Nails filed an answer. Natural Nails 

filed a motion for summary judgment on January 3, 2018. On March 14, 2018, the 

trial court denied Natural Nails’ motion for summary judgment. 

During a case management conference on March 27, 2018, the trial 

court ordered appellant to submit her expert report on or before July 26, 2018; 

Natural Nails’ expert report was due on or before September 26, 2018. On June 26, 

2018, the trial court issued a judgment entry that provided, in relevant part, 

“compliance with pre-trial order to be completed and filed one week prior to 

[November 7, 2018] trial. * * * All expert reports[.]” 

On July 26, 2018, appellant filed a motion for an extension of time to 

submit an expert report. The trial court granted appellant’s motion, and ordered 

appellant to submit an expert report on or before August 24, 2018. 

On October 26, 2018, Natural Nails filed motions in limine seeking to 

prohibit appellant from (1) calling medical expert witnesses at trial, and (2) 

introducing additional medical bills at trial. The matter was called for trial on 

November 13, 2018. 

At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court addressed the motions 

in limine filed by Natural Nails. Regarding the first motion, appellant’s counsel 

conceded that it would not be calling a medical expert witness to testify. Regarding 

the second motion, the trial court ordered the parties to go through appellant’s 

medical bills and redact any information that was not related to the infection at 

issue. 
While the trial court was waiting for a jury to be empaneled, Natural 

Nails orally moved to dismiss the case based on appellant’s representation that she 

would not be presenting the testimony of a medical expert. Defense counsel argued 

that without evidence or testimony from a medical expert, appellant would not be 

able to establish proximate cause, and therefore, the causation issue should not be 

submitted to the jury. In support of its position, Natural Nails cited the Ohio 

Supreme Court’s holding in Darnell v. Eastman, 23 Ohio St.2d 13, 261 N.E.2d 114 

(1970). 

Appellant’s counsel opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that there 

was medical evidence, appellant’s medical records, that explain and document 

appellant’s infection. Appellant’s counsel asserted that appellant would testify at 

trial that the issues with her finger began after she received a manicure at Natural 

Nails. 

The trial court granted Natural Nails’ motion to dismiss, over 

appellant’s objection, concluding that Darnell mandated a dismissal of appellant’s 

case. The trial court explained, “[t]he case will be dismissed. [The victim] had an 

infection, I don’t think there is any dispute about that. However, there’s no medical 

testimony to indicate that it was contracted at the time of her nail salon visit and so 

I am going to grant the motion.” (Tr. 11.) The trial court further emphasized that 

“there’s nothing in the medical records that say this infection was caused by a visit 

to the nail salon.” (Tr. 12.) The trial court’s November 13, 2018 judgment entry 
provides, in relevant part, “pursuant to this court’s ruling dismissing case this case 

is dismissed with prejudice.” 

On December 13, 2018, appellant filed the instant appeal challenging 

the trial court’s judgment. Appellant assigns one error for review: 

I. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred when it granted [Natural Nails’] [o]ral 

[m]otion to [d]ismiss without hearing any evidence, testimony or ever 

empaneling a jury. 

II. Law and Analysis 

In her sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court 

erred in dismissing her negligence action. 

“Under Ohio law, a claim for negligence requires proof of ‘(1) the 

existence of a legal duty, (2) the defendant’s breach of that duty, and (3) injury that 

is the proximate cause of the defendant’s breach.’” Garofoli v. Whiskey Island 

Partners Ltd., 2014-Ohio-5433, 25 N.E.3d 400, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), quoting Wallace v. 

Ohio DOC, 96 Ohio St.3d 266, 2002-Ohio-4210, 773 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 22. Regarding 

the proximate cause element, “[w]hether the plaintiff is required to provide medical 

expert testimony regarding an injury depends on the causal connection between the 

injury and disability.” Ogolo v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 99675, 2013-Ohio-4921, ¶ 13. Expert testimony is generally required 

when an issue involves a question of scientific inquiry that is not within the 

knowledge of a layperson. Stacey v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 205, 

101 N.E.2d 897 (1951). 
In this case, Natural Nails does not appear to dispute that appellant 

contracted an infection. As explained in further detail below, appellant was 

diagnosed with the infection paronychia1 on March 8, 2015. The parties do dispute, 

however, whether appellant received a manicure at Natural Nails before she was 

diagnosed with the infection. 

Appellant alleged in her complaint that she received a manicure at 

Natural Nails’ salon “[o]n or about March 1, 8, or 17, 2015,” after which she 

contracted an infection. Appellant did not present any documentary evidence, such 

as a receipt or an appointment confirmation, demonstrating that she received a 

manicure at Natural Nails on or before March 8. 

Natural Nails, on the other hand, asserted that appellant received a 

manicure at Natural Nails on March 17, 2015 — after she had been diagnosed with 

an infection — and that she was not at the salon prior to that date. In support, 

Natural Nails submitted two receipts, dated March 17, 2015, that appellant signed.2 

Even if we assume that appellant did, in fact, receive a manicure at 

Natural Nails on or before March 8, appellant failed to present any evidence 

whatsoever regarding Natural Nails’ breach of its duty and proximate causation. 

 1 “Paronychia is an inflammation involving the folds of tissue surrounding the 

nail.” Yowpp v. Apfel, N.D.Ohio No. 99 CV 7714, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22914 (Nov. 19, 

1999), fn. 5, citing Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1232 (27th Ed.1994). 

2 The first receipt, time stamped 3:19 p.m., was for $37.80; the second receipt, time 

stamped 3:09 p.m., was for $57.84. 
As noted above, the trial court dismissed appellant’s negligence action 

pursuant to Darnell, 23 Ohio St.2d 13, 261 N.E.2d 114. In Darnell, the Ohio 

Supreme Court held, 

Except as to questions of cause and effect which are so apparent as to 

be matters of common knowledge, the issue of causal connection 

between an injury and a specific subsequent physical disability involves 

a scientific inquiry and must be established by the opinion of medical 

witnesses competent to express such opinion. In the absence of such 

medical opinion, it is error to refuse to withdraw that issue from the 

consideration of the jury. 

Id. at syllabus. 

“The Darnell syllabus divides causation questions into two categories: 

those that are within common knowledge and those that involve a scientific inquiry 

not within the common knowledge of persons.” Dixon v. Miami Univ., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 04AP-1132, 2005-Ohio-6499, ¶ 37. “[T]he relevant distinction 

regarding the character of the injury is whether it is readily observable or 

understandable or the injury is ‘internal and elusive in nature, unaccompanied by 

any observable external evidence.’” Chilson v. Conrad, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2005-

P-0044, 2006-Ohio-3423, ¶ 20, quoting Davis v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 11th Dist. 

Lake No. 90-L-15-083, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5270, 6 (Nov. 1, 1991). 

In Wright v. Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-432, 2006-

Ohio-759, the Tenth District explained, 

“It is when the internal complexities of the body are at issue that we 

generally initiate the [metamorphosis] in the evidential progression 

where medical testimony moves from the pale of common knowledge 

matters and within layman competency where expert testimony is not 

required, to those areas where such testimony is more appropriate and 
indeed most necessary for the trier of fact to understand the nature and 

cause of the injuries alleged.” 

Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Gibbs v. Gen. Motors Corp., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 3625, 1987 

Ohio App. LEXIS 6288, 4 (Mar. 27, 1987). 

In the instant matter, appellant appears to argue that the causal nexus 

between the manicure, Natural Nails’ negligence, and her infection is so clear and a 

matter of common knowledge, such that expert medical testimony was not 

necessary. Appellant contends that the causal connection between the finger 

infection and the manicure “is within the common knowledge of the average 

layman.” Appellant’s brief at 5. We disagree. 

As an initial matter, it appears from the record that appellant’s 

counsel originally intended to call an expert witness at trial. As noted above, 

appellant requested an extension of time to submit an expert report. Additionally, 

in her final pretrial statement, filed on October 17, 2018, appellant listed, generally, 

“[p]laintiff’s medical providers” in the “list of expert trial witnesses” section. 

However, in her pretrial witness list, subsequently filed on October 31, 2018, 

appellant indicated that her counsel would call appellant and a representative of 

Natural Nails at trial. Appellant’s counsel ultimately conceded that appellant would 

not be presenting any medical expert testimony at trial, based upon which Natural 

Nails moved for a dismissal of the case. 

This court has recognized that in certain instances, the causal nexus 

between an accident and a resulting injury is, in fact, so clear that expert medical 
testimony is not absolutely necessary. Ogolo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99675, 2013-

Ohio-4921, at ¶ 14. For instance, the causal relationship between physical impact 

and a bruise or a fracture is a matter within common knowledge. See White Motor 

Corp. v. Moore, 48 Ohio St.2d 156, 357 N.E.2d 1069 (1976) (medical testimony was 

not required to establish causal relationship between employee’s bruised knee 

caused by a truck frame falling and landing on the employee, as the injury involved 

“little if any medical complexity”); Canterbury v. Skulina, 11th Dist. Portage No. 

2000-P-0060, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5442 (Dec. 7, 2001) (a broken ankle sustained 

from a slip and fall is a sufficiently understandable, observable, and comprehensible 

injury that does not require expert testimony because it is within the scope of 

common knowledge); Kelley v. Connor, 5th Dist. Licking No. CA 2981, 1984 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 9193 (Apr. 9, 1984) (severe strain sustained as a result of moving heavy 

objects is a matter of common knowledge and therefore, expert testimony on the 

issue of causation was not required); see also Bowling v. Industrial Comm., 145 

Ohio St. 23, 29, 60 N.E.2d 479 (1945) (“[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that 

any liquid heated to 880 degrees Fahrenheit and coming into contact with any part 

of the human anatomy probably would cause injury. This is especially true when 

such liquid comes in contact with the delicate membrane of the eye.”). 

In this case, we cannot say that the causal relationship between 

Natural Nails’ breach of its duty and appellant’s infection is so clear or a matter 

within common knowledge. “The existence and cause of a bacterial infection are 

not matters of common knowledge and must be demonstrated with expert medical 
testimony.” (Emphasis added.) Prysock v. Bahner, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03-AP1245, 2004-Ohio-3381, ¶ 9; see also Marzocco v. Taco Bell Corp., 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 17818, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 62 (Jan. 14, 2000) (expert medical 

testimony is required to demonstrate the cause of foodborne illnesses). Unlike 

bruises or bone fractures, there are many different types of bacterial agents that can 

cause an infection, and it is possible to contract an infection in a number of different 

ways. Accordingly, the question of the causal connection between the manicure and 

appellant’s infection is within the scope of expert scientific inquiry. 

Regarding the element of Natural Nails’ breach of its duty, appellant 

generally alleges in her complaint that Natural Nails was negligent. She does not, 

however, allege or specify how Natural Nails was negligent (i.e. failing to properly 

clean or sanitize manicure tubs, failing to properly clean or sanitize manicure 

instruments, etc.). Like the question of proximate cause, proper salon sanitation 

techniques are not within the common knowledge of a layperson. 

In this case, the finder of fact would be charged with determining 

(1) whether Natural Nails failed to properly clean, sanitize, and disinfect its tools, 

instruments, and tubs, or properly perform appellant’s manicure, and (2) whether 

Natural Nails’ failure to do so caused appellant’s infection. To accomplish these 

tasks, the factfinder would need to understand the means and methods of cleaning 

and sanitizing manicure tubs and instruments and the potential risks, such as 

exposure to bacteria and development of infection, that customers faced if the 

cleaning procedures were not followed. These matters are outside of the common 
and ordinary experience and knowledge of a layperson. As a result, expert testimony 

was required.3 

Appellant appears to argue that expert medical testimony was not 

necessary because the infection “was external not internal and was documented in 

photographs and medical records.” Appellant’s brief at 8. 

Initially, unlike a bruise or a bone fracture, every infection is not 

necessarily visible. Nevertheless, in this case, we cannot say that the infection or the 

damage to appellant’s finger and fingernail is readily observable in the photographs. 

One of the photographs shows a small chip in the nail on appellant’s left middle 

finger. Plaintiff’s exhibit No. 14. While some photographs show a slight 

discoloration in the fingernail of appellant’s left middle finger, a discoloration can 

also be observed in other nails, both on appellant’s left and right hands. See

plaintiff’s exhibits Nos. 8, 13, and 14. 

This case is analogous to Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-466, 2013-Ohio-5714. In Harris, the plaintiff-appellant, an 

inmate, brought a negligence action against a correctional facility after receiving a 

haircut at the facility’s barbershop, after which his scalp became tender and he was 

ultimately diagnosed with the staph infection MRSA. Id. at ¶ 2. The inmate alleged 

 3 See, e.g., Detraz v. Lee, 900 So.2d 1099 (La.App.2005) (plaintiff in a negligence 

action involving an infection contracted during a pedicure at a nail salon presented 

medical testimony from (1) a licensed plastic surgeon who treated the plaintiff and opined 

that the unsanitized pedicure tub was the cause of her infection, (2) a dermatologist who 

treated her and opined that it was possible for a customer to contract an infection from 

an improperly sanitized pedicure tub, and (3) a licensed cosmetologist who testified that 

improperly cleaning pedicure tubs can generate potentially dangerous bacteria). 
that the facility was negligent in maintaining sanitary conditions in the barber 

facility and that this negligence proximately caused his injury. The court of claims 

granted the correctional facility’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the 

Tenth District acknowledged that in opposing the correctional facility’s motion for 

summary judgment, the inmate did not present any expert evidence that his injury 

was proximately caused by the haircut he received at the barbershop. Id. at ¶ 14. 

The court affirmed the judgment of the court of claims, concluding: 

The mechanisms for contracting MRSA are not within the knowledge 

of a layperson. Proper sanitation techniques in a barbershop are not 

within the knowledge of a layperson. As previously noted, appellant 

failed to submit any expert testimony on the issues of breach or 

proximate causation. Appellant’s theory of liability is premised solely 

on speculation and conjecture. Appellant submitted no evidence 

regarding how MRSA is transmitted; whether the chemicals used in the 

barbershop kill the MRSA bacteria; whether it is possible to contract 

MRSA in the manner appellant alleges; how long it takes for the MRSA 

infection to manifest itself after exposure; and whether the absence of 

hot water has any bearing on the transmission of MRSA. Even if we 

assume that appellant created an issue of fact regarding appellee’s 

breach of a duty due to the absence of hot water, appellant points to 

nothing beyond conjecture and speculation to establish proximate 

causation. The documents appellant has submitted do not address the 

issue of proximate cause. Given the [unrefuted] evidence presented by 

appellee in support of its motion for summary judgment, we conclude 

that a reasonable fact finder could only conclude that appellant has 

failed to create a material issue of fact on an essential element of his 

negligence claim. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that appellee 

is entitled to summary judgment. 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 17. 

Here, like Harris, neither the mechanisms for contracting paronychia 

nor proper salon sanitation techniques are within the knowledge of a layperson. 

Like Harris, appellant conceded that she would not be presenting expert testimony 
— either on the issue of breach of duty (i.e. improper sanitation or disinfecting 

techniques) or the issue of proximate cause (i.e. Natural Nails’ negligence caused 

her infection). Like Harris, appellant’s theory of liability was premised entirely on 

speculation and conjecture. Like Harris, the medical records appellant submitted 

do not address the issue of proximate causation. “It is well-established that when 

only speculation and conjecture is presented to establish proximate causation, the 

negligence claim has failed as a matter of law.” Harris at ¶ 15, citing Mills v. Best W. 

Springdale, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-1022, 2009-Ohio-2901, ¶ 20. 

To the extent that appellant argues that her medical records 

specifically and directly indicate that her finger infection resulted from her visit to 

the nail salon, we find no merit to this argument. 

The medical records from Euclid Hospital’s emergency department, 

where appellant was treated on March 8, 2015, provide, in relevant part, “[patient] 

presents to ED for pain left middle finger, [patient states] pain began shortly after 

she had her nails manicured.” These records also confirm that appellant was 

diagnosed with paronychia. Appellant’s discharge instructions explain what 

paronychia is and how to treat it. The medical records do not, however, state 

anything about how the infection is or was caused. 

The medical records from appellant’s primary care doctor at New 

Family Physicians Associates, where appellant was treated on March 12, 2015, 

provide, in relevant part, “[p]atient is here for a follow up an infection on her left 

middle fingernail. She went to the Euclid emergency room a week ago. They gave 
her antibiotic * * * She recalls going to get a manicure before the infection started.” 

The assessment and plan specified in these records is “Paronychia of third finger of 

left hand[.]” These records also do not contain any information regarding the cause 

of appellant’s infection. 

Accordingly, the references to the manicure in the medical records are 

based on the account appellant provided to the medical staff, not the independent 

observations or diagnoses of third-party, detached medical personnel. Based on the 

foregoing analysis, we find that appellant’s negligence claim and the requisite 

proximate cause element were based on speculation and conjecture. Accordingly, 

appellant’s negligence claim fails as a matter of law, and the trial court properly 

granted Natural Nails’ motion to dismiss the case. 

Finally, appellant argues that the trial court’s dismissal was “clear 

error in complete contravention of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.” Appellant’s 

reply brief at 2. During oral arguments, appellant’s counsel argued that the trial 

court committed a procedural error by dismissing the case, on the day of trial, before 

appellant had an opportunity to present any evidence to the jury. Appellant 

emphasized that despite the fact that a jury trial was scheduled to commence that 

day, the trial court dismissed the case before the jury had even been selected. 

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court dismissed the case without any 

citation to or support of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 

We note that the proceedings below and the manner in which the case 

was dismissed are procedurally irregular. As noted above, the record reflects that 
appellant’s counsel conceded that appellant would not be calling an expert medical 

witness to testify at trial. Appellant’s counsel’s concession rendered Natural Nails’ 

motion in limine moot. Furthermore, based on the concession, defense counsel 

orally moved to dismiss the case, pursuant to Darnell, based on “the lack of medical 

expert testimony concerning [appellant’s] injury.” (Tr. 7.) 

Thereafter, the trial court entertained arguments from both parties on 

Natural Nails’ oral motion to dismiss the case. Furthermore, defense counsel 

provided the trial court with a copy of the Darnell decision. Based on the arguments 

presented and the Darnell decision, the trial court granted Natural Nails’ oral 

motion to dismiss. 

Defense counsel’s oral motion to dismiss may have been more 

appropriate as a motion for a directed verdict, pursuant to Civ.R. 50, following 

appellant’s opening statement at trial. Furthermore, had appellant conceded during 

the exchange of discovery — rather than on the day of trial — that no expert medical 

testimony would be presented at trial, it may have been more appropriate to dismiss 

the case pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and Natural Nails’ motion for summary judgment. In 

the motion for summary judgment, filed on October 6, 2018, Natural Nails argued 

that appellant’s “failure to offer required medical evidence means it now is 

impossible for [her] to establish at trial that alleged negligence at a nail salon could 

have caused claimed injury to her finger.” Furthermore, although Natural Nails 

conceded that appellant’s evidence indicated that she did, in fact, sustain an 

infection on her finger for which she received medical treatment, Natural Nails 
argued that “the mere presence in [appellant’s] finger of an infection and any 

coincidental visit by [appellant] to [Natural Nails’] salon do not combine to prove 

causation in the absence of medical expert testimony.” Although these were 

essentially the same arguments based upon which Natural Nails orally moved to 

dismiss the case on the day of trial, the trial court denied Natural Nails’ motion for 

summary judgment. 

Notwithstanding the procedural irregularity of the trial court’s 

proceedings and the manner in which the case was ultimately dismissed, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court erred in granting Natural Nails’ oral motion to dismiss 

and dismissing the case. 

For all of these reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in 

granting Natural Nails’ motion to dismiss. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is 

overruled. 

We emphasize that our holding is limited to and based upon the 

allegations in appellant’s complaint, the facts of this case, and the evidence in the 

record before this court. This case does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff 

must always present expert medical testimony in order to maintain a negligence 

action of this type or of a similar nature. As noted above, this court has recognized 

that when the causal connection between an accident and a resulting injury is so 

clear and obvious, and a matter within common knowledge, expert medical 

testimony is not absolutely necessary in order to maintain the negligence action. See

Ogolo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99675, 2013-Ohio-4921, at ¶ 14. Furthermore, 
contrary to appellant’s assertion that the causal connection between a finger 

infection and a manicure “is within the common knowledge of the average layman,” 

we cannot conclude that the existence and cause of bacterial infections are always 

matters of common knowledge that need not be supported by expert medical 

testimony. See Prysock, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03-AP-1245, 2004-Ohio-3381, at ¶ 

9. 

After reviewing the record, we must conclude that appellant’s 

negligence claim fails as a matter of law based on (1) appellant’s failure to present 

any evidence indicating that she did, in fact, receive a manicure at Natural Nails on 

or before March 8, 2015, when she was diagnosed with the infection, and (2) 

appellant’s failure to specifically allege or present evidence indicating how Natural 

Nails was negligent. Appellant’s general, unspecified assertion that her infection 

resulted from Natural Nails’ negligence — without more — was insufficient to 

maintain and proceed with her negligence action. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________ 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and 

RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR