PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 21-4086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

TERESA MILLER,

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at 

Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:19-cr-00041-IMK-MJA-1) 

Argued: October 28, 2022 Decided: November 29, 2022 

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, conviction and sentence vacated, and remanded by published 

opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Diaz joined. 

ARGUED: Jenny R. Thoma, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth Wesley, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: 

Hilary L. Godwin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Katy J. Cimino, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Randolph J. Bernard, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

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GREGORY, Chief Judge:

Teresa Miller was indicted on one count of unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The firearms at issue were uncovered during a traffic 

stop. Miller was traveling in the backseat of a vehicle operated by Jessica Phillips when the 

vehicle was stopped by Officer Helms for having an inoperable taillight. After printing a 

warning citation for Phillips, Officer Helms used his canine to sniff around the vehicle, and 

then conducted a full search when the dog alerted, uncovering two firearms in Miller’s 

backpack. The district court denied Miller’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearms, 

concluding that Officer Helms had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and conduct the 

search. Following a bench trial, Miller was convicted of one count of unlawfully 

possessing a firearm.

On appeal, Miller argues that the district court erred by (1) denying her motion to 

transfer the proceedings to another district pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

21(a) and (2) finding that Officer Helms had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop.

We hold that (1) Miller’s motion to transfer was appropriately denied and (2) Officer 

Helms lacked a reasonable, articulable factual basis for extending the traffic stop to conduct 

the dog sniff.

1 We therefore reverse the district court’s order denying Miller’s motion to 

suppress, vacate Miller’s conviction and sentence, and remand to the district court for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 There is no dispute that once the dog alerted on the vehicle, Officer Helms had 

probable cause to conduct a full search.

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I.

On July 3, 2018, Officer Helms, who conducts surveillance with a canine, stopped a 

vehicle driven by Phillips for having an inoperable taillight. See Supplemental J.A. Volume 

I (“S.J.A. I”); see also J.A. 109.2 Officer Helms’s dashboard camera captured footage of the 

traffic stop. The footage begins roughly thirty-one seconds before Officer Helms turned on 

his lights to pull Phillips over. Supplemental J.A. Volume II (“S.J.A. II”) at 00:00-00:31.3

When Officer Helms turned on his lights, Phillips’s vehicle was essentially parallel with a 

turn lane that led to a well-lit parking lot. Id. at 00:31. Phillips hit her brakes just four 

seconds after Officer Helms’s lights came on and activated her blinker three seconds after 

hitting her brakes. Id. at 00:35-00:38. Phillips came to a complete stop seventeen seconds 

after Officer Helms turned his lights on. Id. at 00:48.

After Phillips came to a stop, Officer Helms approached the driver’s side of the 

vehicle. His body camera captured his exchange with Phillips. Shortly after Officer Helms

approached Phillips’s vehicle, she began searching for her license. S.J.A. I 00:00-00:30. 

While Officer Helms testified that Phillips’s hands were shaking during the encounter, her 

hands did not appear to be shaking while she was handing Officer Helms her license or her 

2 While Officer Helms stated that the stop occurred on July 4, the stop was instituted 

approximately ten minutes before midnight on July 3, as shown by the body camera 

footage. The search, however, began on July 4. See S.J.A. I at 08:00.

3 Two days before oral argument, Miller submitted a motion to file a supplemental 

appendix containing the dashboard camera footage. The footage is considered a part of the 

record on appeal because it was a part of the record at the district court. See Fed. R. App. P. 

30(a)(1). Although the footage need not be included as an appendix, the motion is granted.

See Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)(2).

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insurance information. See id. at 00:28-00:32, 00:35-00:40; J.A. 117.

4 The next time that 

Phillips’s hands were in view, it still was not evident that she was shaking. Id. at 01:11-

01:18, 01:25-01:32.

While Phillips was looking for the vehicle’s registration card, she noted that the 

vehicle was not very organized and, as a result, she was struggling to locate the card. Id. 

at 00:45-01:35. Phillips stated that she had seen the registration card earlier that day 

because she used it at the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). Id. at 00:58-01:01. 

Officer Helms then asked Phillips if “everything [was] good with her license,” to which 

she replied “yeah,” and then noted that she had renewed her license at the DMV earlier that 

day and had to wait three hours to do so. Id. at 01:01-01:09. Officer Helms responded, 

“ah, that’s always awesome.” Id. at 01:08-01:11. While continuing to search for the 

registration card, Phillips continued the conversation, saying that “it took [her] three hours 

and twenty minutes to renew [her] license.” Id. at 01:14-01:20. Officer Helms responded 

by laughing and saying, “that’s always pleasant.” Id. Expanding on her unpleasant DMV 

experience, Phillips stated that she had to supervise her three grandchildren while at the 

DMV. Id. at 01:21-01:25. Officer Helms then said, “if everything is good, I’m just going 

to cut you a warning.” Id. at 01:34-01:37. Phillips thanked him. Id. at 01:38-01:40. 

Officer Helms returned to his car just one minute and fifty seconds after he initially 

approached Phillips’s vehicle. Id. at 01:50.

4 Officer Helms held the insurance paper in front of his body camera for a prolonged 

period of time, obstructing the body camera’s view of Phillips. S.J.A. I at 00:45-01:23.

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When a backup officer arrived,5 Officer Helms told him that he was suspicious of 

the vehicle’s occupants because Phillips was shaking and tapping on the car door. Id. at 

07:15-07:50. At approximately the same time, Officer Helms printed Phillips’s warning 

ticket. Id. at 07:15. Soon thereafter, Officer Helms approached Phillips’s vehicle, asked 

Phillips to exit the vehicle, and told her he would be leading his canine around the vehicle 

to sniff for illegal drugs. Id. at 08:25. After the canine indicated that there were drugs in 

the vehicle, officers performed a full search. Id. at 12:00-12:15. During the search, they

located two handguns in Miller’s backpack. J.A. 127.

In July 2019, Miller was indicted in the Northern District of West Virginia for 

unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). J.A.

15–16. Acting pro se, Miller filed a motion to transfer her case to another district because 

multiple civil suits she had previously filed in the Northern District of West Virginia—which 

named judges sitting in that district as defendants—had been transferred to the Southern 

District of West Virginia due to a conflict of interest. J.A. 17–19; see Miller v. Gaujot, No. 

2:16-CV-50 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 6, 2017); Miller v. Gaujot, No. 1:17-CV-128 (N.D.W. Va. 

Sep. 5, 2017). The district court denied the motion because defense counsel, who was 

appointed just two days after Miller filed the motion, refused to adopt it. J.A. 24–27.6

5 Officer Helms testified that it is standard procedure for officers to provide backup 

during night shift traffic stops. J.A. 170.

6 The district court addressed the issue again at sentencing and stated that the civil 

cases had to be transferred because they created a conflict of interest between the judges 

sitting in that district. J.A. 302.

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Miller later filed a motion to suppress evidence of the firearms, arguing that the 

extension of the stop to conduct the dog sniff violated the Fourth Amendment. J.A. 33–

34. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion. The district court adopted the 

majority of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,

7 including its ultimate 

recommendation to deny Miller’s motion to suppress. J.A. 72–73. The district court held

that the magistrate judge properly (1) considered Officer Helms’s experience and training; 

(2) determined that Phillips was excessively nervous; and (3) concluded that Phillips was 

slow to pull over. J.A. 83–91.8

Regarding Phillips’s alleged nervousness, the district court stated that while the 

body camera footage was not clear enough to see whether Phillips was shaking, she

exhibited nervous behavior by sharing unnecessary details of her day, her nervousness did 

not subside after she was told she would receive a warning if her license was clean, and 

tapping her fingers on the car door constituted excessively nervous behavior. J.A. 86–88.

Further, the district court noted that Phillips “was slow to pull over and passed at least one 

or two well-lit streets and parking lots in favor of a dimly-lit section of Route 7.” J.A. 88–

90. In considering whether Phillips was slow to stop, the district court found it significant

that Phillips would have travelled roughly 100 yards if traveling at 35 miles per hour for 

7 The district court rejected only one portion of the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, which considered the passengers’ lack of eye contact when analyzing 

whether Officer Helms had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. J.A. 91.

8 The district court only considered evidence arising before Officer Helms printed 

the warning ticket, which occurred approximately seven-and-a-half minutes after the 

initial stop. J.A. 82; S.J.A. I at 07:10.

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six seconds. J.A. 90.9 Finally, the district court noted that Route 7 was a known drug 

corridor. J.A. 91. These factors, it concluded, were enough to establish reasonable

suspicion for Officer Helms to extend the traffic stop. J.A. 92.

II.

We first address Miller’s argument that the district court erred by refusing to transfer 

her case to another district. We conclude that the district court did not so err.

A.

We consider Miller’s appeal from the district court’s order denying her motion to 

transfer pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a). Notably, the Government 

interprets Miller’s motion to be for recusal rather than transfer. But regardless of whether Miller 

moved for transfer or recusal, we review for abuse of discretion. See Scott v. United States, 255 

F.2d 18, 20 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 339 (4th Cir. 2008).

B.

Miller filed a pro se motion to transfer under Rule 21(a), which states that “the court

must transfer the proceeding against [the] defendant to another district if the court is 

satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that 

the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a). Miller

filed the motion just two days before being appointed counsel, and counsel subsequently 

refused to adopt the motion. J.A. 17–19, 46–26. The district court declined to consider the 

9 The district court did not further explain why the distance that Phillips travelled 

was more important than the time it took for her to come to a complete stop.

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motion, reasoning that every circuit court to address the issue has held that a district court 

has no obligation to consider a pro se motion filed by a represented party. J.A. 24–25.

Miller argues that this case should have been transferred to the Southern District of 

West Virginia because the civil cases she had filed in the Northern District had been 

transferred due to a conflict of interest. Tellingly, Miller’s appellate counsel does not appear 

to support this argument. Brief of Appellant at 12 (stating that “Counsel’s research into this 

issue does not appear to offer relief; however, as the issue was preserved below, Miller 

respectfully requests this Court consider Miller’s argument and whether it has merit.”).

The Government characterizes Miller’s motion as a motion for recusal rather than 

transfer and argues that, because the civil cases are unrelated to this criminal action, they

do not bring the district court’s impartiality into question.

Under either standard, the district court did not have to transfer this case because 

Rule 21(a) addresses juror, rather than judicial, prejudice, and the district judge was not 

otherwise required to recuse herself.

It is quite clear that district courts are “not require[d] . . . to permit ‘hybrid’ 

representation,” which occurs when a person is represented by counsel but still seeks to act 

as her own attorney, during a court hearing or jury trial. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 

168, 183 (1984). This Court has echoed this view, albeit in an unpublished opinion, with 

regard to written motions. See United States v. Barnes, 358 F. App’x 412, 413 (4th Cir. 

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2009).10 As the district court correctly noted, other circuits agree that a defendant has no 

right to hybrid representation for written motions. See, e.g., Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 

395 (2d Cir. 2008); Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir. 1996); United States

v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1024 (10th Cir. 1975).

The question here is whether the district court must consider a pro se motion filed 

before the defendant is appointed counsel and counsel refuses to adopt the motion once 

appointed. No circuit seems to have passed judgment on this precise issue. We need not 

resolve that question here, because Miller’s motion fails on the merits.

Rule 21(a) is commonly invoked when pre-trial publicity could taint the jury pool, 

which indicates that the rule is designed to prevent juror, rather than judicial, prejudice. 

See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 307–08 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. 

Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Skelos, 988 F.3d 645, 

659 (2d Cir. 2021). Note 4 of the 1944 Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 21(a) states

that the Rule applies “in addition to and does not supersede existing statutes enabling a 

party to secure a change of judge on the ground of personal bias or prejudice.” 

Additionally, Note 1 of the 1944 Advisory Committee Notes states that Rules 21(a) and 

(b) provide a new right for defendants to move for a change of venue based on the “public 

feeling in the vicinity of the crime [that] may render impossible a fair and impartial trial.” 

Therefore, Rule 21(a) appears to be concerned with juror, rather than judicial, prejudice. 

10 Similarly, a litigant may not “raise substantive motions while [she] is represented 

by counsel” in this Court. United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 941 n.1 (4th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotations omitted).

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Thus, Miller’s motion for transfer should have been brought as a motion for recusal and 

was properly denied.

Even if Miller’s motion is treated as a motion for recusal, as the Government seems 

to believe, it would still fail. Miller overstates the possibility that her prior civil suits would 

threaten the impartiality of judicial proceedings. As the district court explained, the civil 

cases had to be transferred out of the Northern District of West Virginia because they 

named judges sitting in that district as defendants, thereby creating a conflict. J.A. 302.

There is no such conflict in Miller’s criminal case. The judge in her criminal case 

was not named as a defendant in the civil cases, so any relation between the civil and 

criminal cases is too attenuated to warrant recusal. Miller has made no showing that the 

district judge has personal bias against her, and she cannot point to any evidence of

partiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (stating that a judge should recuse herself if her

“impartiality might reasonably be questioned”); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (stating that a judge 

should recuse herself where she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party”). 

Accordingly, the district court properly denied Miller’s motion for transfer.

III.

A.

“In considering the district court’s suppression decision, we review legal 

determinations de novo and the [district] court’s underlying factual findings for clear 

error.” United States v. Thomas, 908 F.3d 68, 72 (4th Cir. 2018). We construe the facts in 

the Government’s favor. United States v. Brinkley, 980 F3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2020).

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The standard governing traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment is wellestablished in this Circuit. Traffic stops are “subject to the reasonableness requirement of 

the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 209 (4th Cir. 2018). 

The standard the Supreme Court articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), applies to 

traffic stops because they are investigatory stops rather than custodial arrests. Bowman, 

884 F.3d at 209. Accordingly, we ask “(1) if the stop was legitimate at its inception, and 

(2) if the officer’s actions during the seizure were reasonably related in scope to the basis 

for the traffic stop.” Id. (cleaned up). For the initial stop to be reasonable, the officer must 

have probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred. Id. However, a traffic stop that 

was reasonable at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment when an officer extends 

the stop beyond the “‘time reasonably required to complete [the] mission’ of issuing a 

warning ticket.” Id. at 209–10 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) 

(brackets in original)). Even a de minimis extension violates the Fourth Amendment. Id.

at 210. In order to extend a traffic stop beyond what is necessary to effectuate its original 

purpose, the officer must possess reasonable suspicion. Id.

“A dog sniff around [a] vehicle’s perimeter for the purpose of detecting narcotics 

‘is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop.’” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 

U.S. 348, 356 (2015)). However, the officer may “conduct an investigation unrelated to 

the reasons for the traffic stop as long as it ‘[does] not lengthen the roadside detention.’” 

Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354) (brackets and emphasis in original). Thus, a 

canine sniff that is unrelated to the purpose of the original stop is lawful only if it does not 

extend the traffic stop or is based on reasonable suspicion. See id. at 209.

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Reasonable suspicion “require[s] something more than an ‘inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’” United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 

1997) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Indeed, “an officer and the Government must do more 

than simply label a behavior as ‘suspicious’ to make it so.” United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 

243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011). That said, the reasonable suspicion standard is not mechanical; 

rather, it “entails common sense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with factual and 

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [people], not legal 

technicians, act.” United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004).

To support reasonable suspicion, an officer must put forth “specific and articulable 

facts that demonstrate at least a minimal level of objective justification for the belief that 

criminal activity is afoot.” Bowman, 884 F.3d at 213 (internal quotations omitted). The 

Government may not rely on post hoc rationalizations to explain a search—rather, the 

officer must have had a reasonable suspicion at the time the search was conducted. See 

United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511–12 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated in part on 

other grounds by Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348. Accordingly, we consider only those facts 

known to the officer at the time of the search. See id.

When assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed, we view the evidence in its 

totality, while remaining “mindful of the practical experience of officers who observe on a 

daily basis what transpires on the street.” Bowman, 884 F.3d at 214 (internal quotations 

omitted). However, we address each factor individually before evaluating them together. 

Id. Critically, the facts “must in their totality serve to eliminate a substantial portion of 

innocent travelers.” Id. at 213 (internal quotations omitted).

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One relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion inquiry is whether a driver was 

excessively nervous during the stop. Id. at 214. In analyzing this factor, we have

considered, inter alia, whether the driver was fidgeting, shaking, or talking nervously. See 

id.; United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 711 (4th Cir. 2012). But “[a]s this court has 

recognized on multiple occasions, a driver’s nervousness is not a particularly good 

indicator of criminal activity, because most everyone is nervous when interacting with the 

police.” Bowman, 884 F.3d at 214 (internal quotations omitted). The suspect’s 

nervousness must therefore be unusual, beyond the norm, or evasive. Id.; United States v. 

Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 490 (4th Cir. 2011). Therefore, “absent signs of nervousness 

beyond the norm, we will discount the detaining officer’s reliance on the detainee’s 

nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion.” Bowman, 884 F.3d at 214 (quoting 

Massenburg, 654 F.3d at 490). In determining whether a person was excessively nervous, 

it is relevant whether their nervousness subsided or increased after the initial stop because 

an innocent person’s nerves tend to decrease as the traffic stop progresses. See Bowman, 

884 F.3d at 214–15; Vaughan, 700 F.3d at 711.

Other relevant factors include the road the driver was traveling on and the length of 

time it took the driver to pull over. See United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 128–29 (4th 

Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). But the mere fact 

that a person is traveling on a route commonly used to transport drugs, “standing alone, is 

entitled to very little weight.” Williams, 808 F.3d at 247. We have observed that “the 

number of persons using interstate highways as drug corridors pales in comparison to the 

number of innocent travelers on those roads,” which makes it doubtful that the mere fact a 

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person was traveling on such a road late at night “helps narrow the identification of 

travelers to those involved in drug activity.” Williams, 808 F.3d at 247; see also United

States v. Villavicencio, 825 F. App’x 88, 98 (4th Cir. 2020).

Finally, when an officer’s testimony is clearly contradicted by video evidence, the court 

should normally discount the testimonial statements. See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 512–13.

B.

To reiterate, the district court held that Officer Helms had reasonable suspicion to 

extend the traffic stop because Phillips was (1) slow to pull over, (2) excessively nervous, and 

(3) traveling on a known drug corridor. The district court gave great weight to Officer Helms’s

experience in its analysis.11 It determined that Phillips was slow to pull over because she 

“passed at least one or two well-lit streets and parking lots in favor of a dimly-lit section 

of Route 7.” J.A. 89–90. It further found that Phillips was excessively nervous because 

she was allegedly shaking during the traffic stop, talking excessively, and tapping her 

fingers on the outside of her car door. The district court also found that Phillips’s

nervousness did not decrease after being told she would only receive a warning. Finally, 

11 Officer Helms testified to having over fourteen years of law enforcement 

experience with the Morgantown Police Department—including assignments to the 

Department’s Street Crimes Unit and the Department’s Drug Task Force. J.A. 103–04. 

Officer Helms noted that he had received training for drug interdiction that included 

courses on how to spot deceptive behavior. J.A. 105. He also testified to having executed 

more than 2,000 traffic stops throughout his career, with approximately 300 of those 

occurring in 2018. J.A. 85, 106–07. Of those 300 stops in 2018, he said, more than 60 

resulted in drug prosecutions. J.A. 106–07.

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the district court credited Officer Helms’s testimony that Route 7 was “a corridor 

commonly used to traffic drugs between counties.” J.A. 91, 108.

Here, however, the video evidence does not support some of Officer Helms’s 

statements and impressions. As we explain, the district court clearly erred by crediting 

portions of Officer Helms’s testimony regarding whether Phillips was slow to stop and 

excessively nervous. These erroneous findings of fact ultimately led the district court to 

incorrectly find that Officer Helms possessed reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop.

1.

First, Phillips was not unduly slow to pull over. Phillips was even with the turn lane 

when Officer Helms’s lights first came on. She hit her brakes four seconds after his lights 

came on, activated her blinker three seconds after that, and stopped the vehicle a total of 

seventeen seconds after Officer Helms first activated his lights. S.J.A. II at 00:31-00:48. 

The district court nonetheless found that Phillips was slow to pull over and passed “at least 

one or two well-lit streets and parking lots in favor of a dimly-lit section of Route 7.” J.A. 

89–90. It also noted that the seventeen seconds it took Phillips to stop gave her an 

opportunity to converse with her passengers about how to cover up criminal conduct. J.A. 

89. Additionally, the district court found the distance the vehicle traveled in those seventeen 

seconds (100 yards) was more important than the time it took for her to stop. J.A. 90.

We cannot agree. Just as officers are not required to complete a traffic stop as 

quickly as humanly possible, drivers should not be required to pull over as quickly as 

humanly possible—especially when a driver may need to continue driving for a slightly 

longer amount of time to reach a safer stopping point—as long as the time it took to stop 

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was reasonable. See United States v. Perez, 30 F.4th 369, 375–76 (4th Cir. 2022) (finding 

that an officer’s search of a vehicle was proper despite it not being completed as quickly 

as possible due to the officer’s reasonable safety precautions). Such a rule deters the 

Government from transforming innocuous behavior—or, as found here, behavior that 

enhances the safety of the driver, the officer, and others on the road—into evidence of 

criminality. See Foster, 634 F.3d at 248 (expressing “concern about the inclination of the 

Government toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent, as indicia 

of suspicious activity”).

Our analysis is necessarily fact-specific, and the ultimate touchstone is whether the 

driver pulled over in a reasonable amount of time given the circumstances. Still, some 

commonsense principles should guide the way. First, a driver should be given time to react 

and be entitled to make certain that a hailing officer intends to pull them over rather than 

simply pass them on the way to another emergency. Second, a driver should be given a 

meaningful opportunity to reach a safe place to stop.

Here, the video evidence from Officer Helms’s dashboard camera shows that 

Phillips stopped within a reasonable amount of time. Phillips could not have pulled into 

the well-lit parking lot that Officer Helms intended her to because she was parallel with 

the entrance when Officer Helms activated his lights. And contrary to the district court’s 

findings, the video shows Phillips did not pass any other area, well-lit or otherwise, where 

she could have safely stopped. There were no earlier exits, and the road did not have a 

shoulder. Next, Phillips began braking just four seconds after Officer Helms turned his 

lights on, indicating that she was in the process of stopping. Four seconds is a reasonable 

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time for a person to react and determine that an officer intends to pull her over. While it 

ultimately took Phillips thirteen seconds to come to a complete stop after first engaging her 

brakes, she stopped at the first available place on the road where she could safely do so. 

Under these facts, she came to a stop in a reasonable amount of time.

The fact that Officer Helms intended for Phillips to turn into the well-lit parking lot is 

of little probative value because Phillips had no way of knowing Helms’s intention. Although 

Officer Helms had extensive experience conducting traffic stops, Phillips did not. Thus, she 

should not be expected to intuit the precise place Officer Helms wanted her to pull over.

Accordingly, the district court clearly erred by finding that Phillips was slow to pull over.

2.

Second, the body camera footage showed that Phillips was not excessively nervous 

during the traffic stop. On that point, the footage of the stop depicts multiple instances 

where Phillips’s hands can be seen. See S.J.A. I at 00:28-00:32, 00:35-00:40, 01:11-01:18, 

01:25-01:32. While the district court is correct that the video does not show Phillips’s

hands the entire time, the video clarity is quite good, and shows that her hands were not 

shaking. See id. Moreover, her hands can be seen both at the beginning of the encounter 

and at the end, and the video footage shows that her demeanor did not change throughout 

the conversation. Thus, the district court clearly erred by finding that Phillips was shaking 

during the traffic stop.

The body camera footage also refutes Officer Helms’s testimony that Phillips was 

nervously talking and sharing unnecessary details about her day. The footage shows that 

Phillips was simply making related small talk and responding to the questions Officer Helms

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asked. For instance, while looking for the vehicle’s registration card, Phillips noted that 

the car was not very organized, which was why she was struggling to find the card. Id. at 

00:45-01:00. Phillips also stated that she had seen the registration card earlier in the day 

because she had used it at the DMV. That point was directly relevant to the stop, given 

that Officer Helms asked to see the card. Id. at 00:50-01:00. In context, it is clear that she 

was simply explaining that she knew the card was somewhere in the car.

Phillips’s allegedly unrelated statement about her visit to the DMV was made in 

response to Officer Helms asking her if “everything [was] good with [her] license.” Id. at 

01:00-01:05; see J.A. 86. She responded by saying that she knew her license was “good” 

because she had visited the DMV to renew it earlier that day. S.J.A. I at 01:05-01:30. The 

allegedly “unnecessary details of her day” that Phillips shared were simply remarks about 

how unpleasant her DMV experience was. Id.; see J.A. 87. In response to her comments 

about the long wait time at the DMV and having to simultaneously watch her three 

grandchildren, Officer Helms even chuckled and remarked, “that’s always pleasant.” 

S.J.A. I at 01:15-01:20. It is hard to imagine why this exchange would arouse suspicions 

of criminal behavior. The district court clearly erred by finding that Phillips was talking 

excessively and that these statements were unrelated to the traffic stop.

Additionally, the district court found it “significant” that Phillips remained nervous 

“despite having been told by Officer Helms that she would be free to go if her license came 

back clean.” J.A. 87–88. The only (arguably) nervous behavior the Government can point 

to after Officer Helms’s statement is Phillips tapping her fingers on the car door. But 

tapping is not an indicator of excessive or sustained nervousness because it is completely 

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consistent with law abiding behavior. Although fidgeting may certainly be a sign of 

nervousness, Bowman, 884 F.3d at 214, tapping one’s fingers may just as likely be a sign 

of annoyance, impatience, or even boredom—any of which may be expected when a person

is stopped by a police officer and is awaiting the results of a license check. By itself, 

tapping one’s fingers is a very weak indicator of nervousness.

3.

Finally, the district court thought it relevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis that 

Phillips was traveling on a known drug corridor.

But this Court has stated that traveling on a known drug corridor is not itself 

probative of criminal behavior and does not serve to eliminate a substantial portion of 

innocent travelers. See Williams, 808 F.3d at 247 (explaining that “the number of persons 

using the interstate highways as drug corridors pales in comparison to the number of 

innocent travelers on those roads” and stating that “we are not persuaded by the proposition 

that traveling south on [a known drug corridor] late at night helps narrow the identification 

of travelers to those involved in drug activity.”).

Considering the record as a whole, and even after accounting for Officer Helms’s 

substantial experience, we conclude that Officer Helms did not have reasonable suspicion 

to extend the stop. Simply put, the factors articulated to support reasonable suspicion in 

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this case do not “serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers.” Foreman, 

369 F.3d at 781. The district court erred in denying the motion to suppress.12

IV.

In sum, we affirm the district court’s denial of Miller’s motion to transfer. But 

because the extension of the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, the 

district court erred in denying Miller’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the 

subsequent search. Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Miller’s motion to 

suppress is reversed, Miller’s conviction and sentence are vacated, and the case is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED, AND REMANDED

12 Miller also challenges the district court’s sentencing decision, arguing that it 

focused too heavily on a single issue at the expense of a properly reasoned analysis of the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Because we vacate Miller’s conviction and sentence based on 

the Fourth Amendment violation, this issue is now moot.

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