UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4852

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LATRONE ANTONIO HICKS, a/k/a Tee, a/k/a FNU LNU,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge. 

(7:07-cr-01467-HFF-42)

Submitted: November 30, 2010 Decided: January 6, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy Ward Murphy, KOLB & MURPHY, LLC, Sumter, South Carolina, 

for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Latrone Antonio Hicks of conspiracy 

to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine 

and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A), 846 (2006). He was sentenced to 360 months’ 

imprisonment. Hicks’ appellate counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating 

in his opinion there are no meritorious issues for appeal but 

raising the issues of whether sufficient evidence supports the 

jury’s verdict and whether Hicks’ sentence is reasonable. The 

Government has declined to file a responsive brief. Hicks has 

filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm. 

“A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his conviction bears a heavy burden.” 

United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A jury’s verdict “must be 

sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most 

favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United 

States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see United States v. Perkins, 

470 F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is 

“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alerre, 430 

F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 
3

omitted). We consider both circumstantial and direct evidence, 

drawing all reasonable inferences from such evidence in the 

Government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 

(4th Cir. 2008). In resolving issues of substantial evidence, 

we do not reassess the factfinder’s determination of witness 

credibility, see United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th 

Cir. 2008), and “can reverse a conviction on insufficiency 

grounds only when the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United 

States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed the 

evidence introduced at trial and conclude that there is 

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, 

we affirm Hicks’ conviction. 

With respect to Hicks’ sentence, we review a sentence 

for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review 

requires consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence. Id. This court must assess 

whether the district court properly calculated the advisory 

Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)

factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). If 
4

there is no procedural error, we review the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the 

circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied 

the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. 

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the 

sentence is within the Guidelines range, we apply a presumption 

of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56

(2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for withinGuidelines sentence).

We have thoroughly reviewed the sentencing transcript 

and the presentence report in this case, and conclude the 

district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, 

considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, made an 

individualized assessment based on the facts presented, and 

adequately explained the reasons for the chosen sentence in open 

court, demonstrating that it had a reasoned basis for its 

decision. In imposing a 360-month sentence, the district court 

specifically considered Hicks was involved in a very large 

conspiracy and a very serious offense. The court noted a need 

to provide adequate deterrence and also to protect the public 

from crimes of the defendant. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 357 

(“[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a 

particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy 
5

explanation.”). We conclude the sentence was not procedurally 

unreasonable. Additionally, we conclude Hicks’ withinGuidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable on appeal, see

Rita, 551 U.S. at 346-56; United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 

(4th Cir. 2008), and he has failed to rebut that presumption. 

See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 

2006) (stating presumption may be rebutted by showing sentence 

is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors). 

Therefore, the sentence is substantively reasonable. See Go, 

517 F.3d at 220.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and Hicks’ pro se supplemental brief, and have found no 

meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district 

court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform 

Hicks, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of 

the United States for further review. If Hicks requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Hicks. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED