Filed 3/2/23 Marriage of Guldseth CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of ALISON and 

DAVID GULDSETH.

ALISON GULDSETH,

Respondent,

v.

DAVID GULDSETH,

Appellant.

 D077308

 (Super. Ct. No. 18FL000052N)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Cynthia A. Freeland, Enrique E. Camarena, and Victor M. Torres, Judges. 

Affirmed.

David Guldseth, in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.
2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant David Guldseth, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from 

multiple final and/or postjudgment orders of the trial court arising out of the 

dissolution of his marriage to Alison Guldseth.1 The orders from which 

David appeals involve issues of child custody and visitation, the 

characterization and division of property, child and spousal support, attorney 

fee contributions, and the sale of the parties’ marital residence.2 Alison has 

not filed a respondents brief and has not otherwise appeared in this appeal.

We conclude that David has forfeited his challenges to the trial court’s 

rulings by failing to present a brief that meets basic appellate standards, 

which require parties to present coherent and legally supported reasons for 

reversal. Further, to the extent that we can discern what David’s challenges 

appear to be, we conclude that he has failed to demonstrate reversible error 

with respect to those issues. We therefore affirm the trial court’s orders

being challenged in this appeal.

1 Because the parties share the same last name, we will refer to them by 

their first names for clarity.

2 David filed 10 notices of appeal, all of which have been filed under case 

No. D077308, and two of which have been dismissed. In these notices of 

appeal, David typically identifies multiple orders or hearing dates as the 

orders from which he is appealing. The orders and rulings David is 

challenging were entered by at least three different judges over a period of 

approximately 15 months.
3

II.

BACKGROUND3

Alison filed a petition to initiate a marriage dissolution proceeding on 

January 3, 2018. At that point in time, Alison and David had been married 

for almost 20 years and had four minor children and one adult child. 

In February 2018, the parties reached a stipulation for temporary 

orders regarding custody, visitation, and support. The court issued interim 

orders consistent with the parties’ stipulation, which included granting 

Alison legal and physical custody of the minor children, and granting David 

visitation every other weekend morning and every Wednesday afternoon.

The court issued its “Finding and Order After Hearing” (some 

capitalization omitted) regarding custody in October 2018. In considering 

what custody arrangement would be best for the minor children, the court

found that although “the evidence did support the conclusion that, at times, 

David has demonstrated a lack of good judgment” with respect to his 

interactions with the children, the court could not conclude at that point in 

time that he “put the children at risk from a health or safety standpoint.” 

The court also found that although “David did discipline the children 

3 David has designated a record that spans more than 2250 pages of 

Clerk’s Transcript and just under 2000 pages of Reporter’s Transcripts. It is 

apparent from this record that the parties have engaged in protracted 

litigation regarding all aspects of the dissolution of their long-term marriage, 

including issues involving the characterization and division of property, 

custody and visitation, child and spousal support, as well as multiple 

requests for sanctions and attorney fees. Despite this lengthy record, or 

perhaps because of it, David’s briefing does not present this court with a 

thorough and coherent timeline of the relevant events and proceedings in the

action. We therefore do our best to distill from the record a sufficiently 

comprehensive summary of the relevant background for purposes of this 

appeal.
4

physically and did exert control over Alison,” it was not ready to conclude 

that his conduct “constituted domestic violence.” The court rejected the 

conclusion that David’s spanking “constituted child abuse or sufficiently 

disturbed Alison’s peace of mind to constitute domestic violence.” The trial 

court did conclude “that David engaged in controlling behavior” throughout 

the marriage, but then analyzed “whether this exercise of control, per se, is 

sufficient to support a finding of a history of abuse,” and “answer[ed] this 

question in the negative.” 

The court also rejected David’s contention that Alison had engaged in 

conduct that would support a finding of a history of abuse on her part. The 

trial court specifically noted that David had failed to convince it that his 

version of events was more true than Alison’s differing version. 

After taking into consideration the four factors set forth in Family Code 

section 3011 (i.e., the health, safety and welfare of the children, any history of 

abuse, the nature and amount of contact with both parents, and the use or 

abuse of controlled substances or alcohol), the trial court concluded that the 

parents should share legal custody of the minor children. The court 

thereafter adopted the recommendations of a Family Court Services (FCS) 

mediator, with certain modifications, with respect to physical custody. In 

essence, the trial court granted Alison primary physical custody, and 

provided that David would have custody of the children during two two-hour 

“midweek dinner visits,” as well as on alternate weekends.

The court set David’s monthly child support obligation at $5,860, based 

on David having an 11 percent time share, as set out in the court’s custody 

order. The court also ordered that David pay Alison spousal support of just 

over $4,700 per month.
5

A few months later, both parties moved ex parte, seeking to modify the 

custody order. The parties then stipulated to a change in custody of one of 

the minor children (the eldest of the now three remaining minor children) to 

permit him to reside primarily with David. 

The court eventually set a time for a bifurcated trial to take place 

regarding the custody issues before Judge Enrique E. Camarena in October 

2019. Before this time, Judge Cynthia A. Freeland had made most of the 

orders in the parties’ case.

In June 2019, before the scheduled custody trial, Alison moved ex parte 

for an order for the sale of the marital residence. Alison contended that she 

had been granted exclusive use of the residence and had been made 

responsible for the mortgage and all utilities. Alison asserted that she lacked 

the resources to pay the expenses on the home, including the property taxes,

and indicated that the property was at risk of foreclosure. According to 

Alison, she had reached out to David through his attorney to try to resolve 

the financial issues regarding the residence, but her attempts had been 

ignored. Judge Freeland denied Alison’s request to list the marital residence 

for sale, but set all issues other than custody, which remained on calendar for 

trial before Judge Camarena, to be considered at a one-day trial to take place 

on December 10, 2019.

In the meantime, in late June 2019, David filed a request for order 

seeking to modify the court’s interim spousal and child support orders. 

By early October 2019, David was representing himself in the 

dissolution action. David filed a peremptory challenge to Judge Freeland on 

October 2, 2019, which she denied as untimely. 

The trial on the custody issues proceeded to take place over six days in 

October and November 2019. 
6

While the custody trial was pending, David moved ex parte for an order 

regarding the mortgage payments on the marital residence. David 

complained that Alison was “[m]issing [h]ouse [p]ayments” and indicated that 

he was concerned about the effect on his credit, but his papers did not seek 

any particular relief from the court. The trial court denied David’s request 

for an order regarding the marital residence but indicated that the issue of

the disposition of the marital residence would be addressed at the trial 

regarding the characterization and division of the parties’ property that was 

set for December 10, 2019.

Also while the custody trial was pending, Judge Freeland made

temporary support orders just for November 2019 and December 2019, and 

continued any final determination of the support issues pending the outcome 

of the custody trial. Judge Freeland also issued a “Judgment of Dissolution” 

as to the status of the parties’ marriage, thereby determining that the parties 

were no longer married.

At the conclusion of the custody trial, Judge Camarena made 

temporary orders that granted both parties time with the children during 

their Christmas break and indicated that a formal written statement of 

decision regarding custody would be forthcoming. 

Judge Camarena then issued a proposed statement of decision 

regarding custody in early December 2019. In the proposed statement of 

decision, the court made a finding that neither party had demonstrated that 

domestic violence “has occurred,” and the court therefore determined that 

“the presumption [against granting custody to an individual who perpetrates 

domestic violence] pursuant [to Family Code] section 3044 does not apply.” 

The court also indicated that it had considered the policy of the State of 

California that parents share in decision-making rights and responsibility of 
7

child rearing, and had also considered the preferences of the minor children 

as expressed in the evaluator’s report. The trial court thereafter made 

several detailed and specific findings regarding the “issue of the bests 

interests of the Minor Children.” After setting out these findings, the court’s 

proposed order provided for the parties to share legal custody of the children

and specified that one of the three still-minor children would reside primarily 

with David, while the other two would reside primarily with Alison. David 

and Alison were each granted visitation with the other child/children on 

alternating weekends, and at certain other times, depending on the child. 

The proposed order provided for a change in physical custody of the two 

youngest children at the conclusion of the school year, when the parents 

would begin to share equally the physical custody of those children.

David filed a 23-page document outlining his objections to Judge 

Camarena’s proposed statement of decision regarding child custody. Among 

his many other objections, David asserted that rather than the proposed 

order’s transition to shared custody at the end of the school year, the trial 

court should have adopted a custody evaluator’s recommendation, without 

alteration, that the two youngest children maintain the current schedule for 

a period of eight weeks, only, starting when “counseling [for these children] 

begins,” and, after the completion of eight weeks of counseling, a “transition 

period of four weeks of counseling wherein the children are gradually 

transitioned to a fully shared parenting schedule with each parent having 

two overnights during the week plus alternating full weekends.”

David also filed a request for order seeking to modify the court’s 

custody and visitation orders, even though the court had not issued its final 

orders regarding custody. In addition, David filed another 26-page document
8

of objections and requested changes to the proposed statement of decision on 

the issues of child custody and visitation. 

Judge Camarena issued the court’s final statement of decision on child 

custody and visitation on December 19, 2019. The final statement of decision 

indicated that the court had received and considered David’s objections, as 

expressed in multiple documents filed with the court. The court indicated 

that to the extent that David’s objections presented “new and different 

evidence,” the court did not consider such evidence because the court’s 

decision “can only be based on evidence introduced at the hearing.” The trial 

court also addressed David’s concern that the proposed statement of decision 

permitted Alison to relocate with the children, explaining that the trial “did 

not involve a relocation request.” The court rejected David’s request that the 

court issue an order “forever disallow[ing] Ali[son] from relocating from San 

Diego County.” The court also generally disposed of David’s other objections.

The final statement of decision adopted the proposed statement of 

decision with only minor modifications. The trial court indicated that its 

final statement of decision was intended to “constitute a final custody 

determination,” and that “[a] showing of a significant change of 

circumstances will be required [in the future] in order for the court to modify 

any of these provisions unless the change is agreed to by both parties.”

In early January 2020, Judge Freeland conducted a trial on the 

financial and property issues, as well as competing attorney fees requests

that the parties had filed. Approximately a month later, the court issued a 

proposed statement of decision on child and spousal support, real property, 

assets and debts, reimbursements and reallocations of costs, as well as 

attorney fees and costs. With respect to Alison’s request to sell the marital 

residence and David’s request to be permitted to buy out Alison’s interest, the 
9

court indicated that because David had failed to meet his burden to 

demonstrate that he would be able to refinance the mortgage, the court was 

left without sufficient information “to be able to order a buy-out.” The court 

concluded that directing the sale of the marital residence would be the most 

“efficient and expedient” way to ensure the parties did not continue to 

accumulate further debt. David filed a 30-page brief outlining his objections 

to virtually every aspect of the proposed statement of decision. 

The day after the trial court issued its proposed statement of decision 

on the property and financial matters, Alison moved ex parte for an 

emergency custody order granting her sole legal and physical custody of the 

parties’ eldest remaining minor child, who had been residing primarily with 

David, citing her concern for the mental health of that child. In response to 

Alison’s request for sole physical custody of the parties’ eldest minor child, 

David requested that the court grant him primary physical custody of the 

other two children.

On February 4, 2020, David filed a notice of appeal related to Judge 

Camarena’s December 19, 2019 final statement of decision as to the issue of 

custody. 

Judge Freeland issued a final statement of decision regarding the 

property and financial issues in March 2020. The court ordered the sale of 

the marital residence and further ordered that the proceeds from the sale of 

the residence were to be used to pay various offsets and reimbursements, and 

that any remaining amount was to be split between the parties. The court 

also ordered David to pay monthly child support to Alison in the amount of 

$5,107 until June 1, 2020, after which David’s monthly child support 

obligation would be reduced to $2,919. With respect to spousal support, the 

court ordered David to pay monthly spousal support in the amount of $3,800. 
10

The court determined that because of the great disparity in the parties’ 

incomes, it was appropriate to order that David contribute $35,000 toward 

Alison’s attorney fees. The court denied David’s request for attorney fees. 

A week later, David filed a request to modify the child support and 

spousal support orders that had just taken effect. David asserted, as he had 

before and during trial on the financial matters, that his “income ha[d]

significantly decreased due to disability.” 

On March, 9, 2020, David filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s 

final statement of decision regarding the property and financial issues.

Also in early March 2020, Judge Freeland held a hearing regarding the 

parties’ competing requests to modify the final child custody orders. The 

court noted that the custody order was final, and that therefore a significant 

change in circumstances was required to revisit those orders. The court 

found that the involuntary disenrollment of the parties’ eldest minor child 

from school and lack of consistent therapy for that child constituted changed 

circumstances. The court declined to change primary physical custody from 

David to Alison, however, out of concern that doing so would be even more 

detrimental to the child’s mental health. With respect to the two youngest 

children, however, the court concluded that a mental health counselor’s 

determination that the two youngest children were unhappy with having 

increased time with David constituted a changed circumstance that 

warranted at least one change to the December 2019 final custody order. The 

court ordered that the step-up in the youngest children’s custody time with 

David that was supposed to occur at the end of the school year as set forth in 

the December 2020 final custody order would no longer take place. 

In April 2020, Alison moved ex parte for court assistance with respect 

to the sale of the marital residence. Alison indicated that David was refusing 
11

to participate in the sale process and had refused to sign the listing 

agreement. Alison stated that she was unable to pay the mortgage on the 

property as a result of David’s failure to pay his child or spousal support 

obligations during the litigation, and she requested an order granting her 

authority to sign documents on David’s behalf in order to effectuate the sale, 

or, in the alternative, an order directing David to sign all documents

necessary to effectuate the sale.

On June 3, 2020, David filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s 

March 2020 order regarding custody of the minor children.

Also in June, David moved ex parte seeking an order permitting him to 

move into the marital residence, and he also filed a document requesting 

removal of Judge Freeland from the case “for cause.” Less than a week later, 

David filed another set of ex parte requests. David sought orders to “set 

aside” the March 2020 custody order, to “set aside and vacate” the final 

statement of decision regarding the property and financial matters, and to

“remove Judge Freeland for cause.” (Some capitalization and underscoring 

omitted.) Judge Freeland denied David’s ex parte request for control of the 

marital residence and rejected his requests to disqualify her.

The same month, Alison filed a request for an order for (1) attorney 

fees and costs, (2) a determination of the arrears for support and add-ons 

David still owed, and (3) the enforcement of prior orders regarding the sale of 

the marital residence. In her supporting declaration, Alison stated that 

David was still refusing to participate in the sale of the marital residence. 

Alison also noted that despite the court’s order that David pay her attorney 

$2,000 per month as of April 1, 2020, he had already missed two consecutive 

payments. In addition, Alison asserted that David owed arrears of $34,145 
12

for child and spousal support. Alison requested an additional contribution of 

$30,000 toward her attorney fees.

It appears from the record that as of late July 2020, David had engaged 

the services of a new attorney. At that point in time, David filed a 

declaration in response to Alison’s June request for order regarding support 

arrears and enforcement of prior court orders, asserting that he had a request 

for order regarding multiple financial issues that the court had still not 

addressed, and he further asserted that he was entitled to a modification of 

the trial court’s final statement of decision regarding property and financial 

issues because that final statement of decision failed to take into account that 

David was “disabled from November 1, 2019 through April 16, 2020.” David 

again asked to be able to purchase Alison’s share of the marital residence, 

rather than be required to sell the property on the open market. David also 

contended that the trial court should not entertain Alison’s requests 

regarding arrears, enforcing the prior orders, or modifying the prior orders 

because many of those orders were being appealed, and, he asserted, the 

court should maintain the status quo while those appeals were pending.

In August 2020, David filed a request for order seeking a stay of the 

trial court’s orders regarding “property division, reimbursements, credits, 

support arrears, and attorney’s fees and costs,” pending David’s appeal of the 

trial court’s March 2020 final statement of decision as to those issues. David 

asserted that he was not required to post an undertaking in connection with 

the requested stay to prevent the ordered sale of the marital home. 

Also in August, Judge Freeland proceeded with a hearing regarding the 

parties’ competing requests on various financial matters. The court 

determined that David owed spousal support arrears in the amount of $7,600 

and child support arrears in the amount of $9,261 for January 2020 through 
13

March 2020. The court granted Alison’s motion for attorney fees as

sanctions, awarding her $5,000 pursuant to Family Code section 271. The 

court confirmed its earlier attorney fee award and ordered David to

immediately pay the full amount due to Alison’s attorney. The court delayed 

making rulings with respect to support arrears for April 2020 through 

August 2020 and issues related to the sale of the marital residence, including 

determinations regarding the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the 

residence.

On August 24, 2020, David filed a notice of appeal identifying as the 

order from which he was appealing as the court’s “hearing dates 8/13/20 [and] 

8/18/20 which are ruling on matters that I have under appeal in case 

currently pending D077308.”

The trial court heard David’s request for a partial stay of litigation in 

August 2020. On that date, the court rejected David’s argument that he was 

not obligated to post an undertaking in order to obtain a stay the order 

directing the sale of the marital residence. The court concluded that 

although David was required to post an undertaking, Alison had not provided 

the court with evidence as to the amount of an undertaking that would be 

sufficient to protect her interests, and therefore the court could not make an 

order in that respect. The court invited the parties to “seek appropriate relief 

on an expedited basis,” however.

Less than two weeks later, Alison filed a request for emergency relief, 

seeking an order directing David to comply with the order requiring the sale 

of the marital residence, or, alternatively, the appointment of an elisor to sign 

all of the documents necessary to effectuate the sale. Alison noted that the 

parties were delinquent on the mortgage and the lender was pursuing the 

foreclosure process. David objected to Alison’s request for court assistance 
14

regarding the sale of the marital residence. He contended that since he was 

“appealing the order to sell the home,” any order granting Alison the relief 

she sought “would sabotage [his] appeal and effectively render [his] appeal 

moot.” The court issued an order granting Alison’s request to appoint an 

elisor for purposes of completing the listing agreement. The same day, David 

filed a notice of appeal in which he indicated that he was appealing “rulings 

on matters that are already under appeal in case D077308” from “9/14/20, 

9/28/20, 8/28/20.” (Some underscoring omitted.)

In the meantime, in mid-September 2020, Judge Freeland issued an 

order addressing outstanding issues regarding David’s March 2020 request to 

modify child and spousal support. The court considered David’s repeated 

claims that the court was failing to adequately consider that his income had 

been reduced as a result of him being on disability leave. The court rejected 

David’s contention that modification of support was warranted, noting that 

the claimed disability had occurred between November 2019 and April 2020, 

and further explaining that David had raised the issue of the purported

reduction in his income at trial, but had failed to submit evidence to support 

his claims. The court also noted that even when David filed his request to 

modify support in March 2020, he failed to provide the court with sufficient 

evidence from which the court could conclude that the income that should be 

attributed to him was lower than the amount the court had used to calculate 

support. As a result, the court did not modify its previous spousal support 

determination. However, the court did modify the child support 

determination as a result of its finding that the parties’ relative share of 

custodial time with the children had changed since the prior order. The court 

calculated David’s child support arrears for the period between and including 
15

April 2020 and August 2020 to be $17,050.34. The court also set monthly 

child support at $3,836 going forward. 

In October 2020, Alison again sought the court’s assistance regarding 

the sale of the house and other matters. Alison requested that the court

(1) sign an income-withholding order, (2) order David to move out of the 

residence, (3) freeze a particular retirement account, and (4) appoint an elisor 

to sign various documents to effectuate the sale of the residence. Alison 

indicated that David had moved into the residence and changed the locks,

despite the fact that the court had repeatedly denied his requests to take 

possession of the residence. 

The court granted Alison an income-withholding order, as well as an 

order freezing certain retirement accounts pending a further hearing. Before 

the court ruled on the other matters in Alison’s ex parte request, David filed 

his own ex parte request for relief in which he sought an order permitting 

him to “satisf[y]” any “undertaking required to stay sale of the community 

residence” by “making a $64,941.24 payment that reinstated the mortgage to 

good[ ]standing” and taking over the mortgage payments. David also 

requested an order granting him temporary exclusive use and possession of 

the residence. 

In October 2020, David’s second attorney filed a motion to be relieved 

as counsel, and a third attorney appeared in the matter on David’s behalf.

In late October, the court made multiple findings and rulings regarding 

the sale of the residence. The court determined that the marital residence 

should be listed for sale at $1.379 million. The court denied Alison’s request 

for appointment of an elisor to sign various documents, and instead

reiterated that pursuant to the March 2020 final statement of decision, the 

“parties are ordered to cooperate in executing all documents necessary to list 
16

the property for sale and to facilitate an expeditious sale of the property.” 

The court also denied Alison’s request to order David to vacate the marital 

residence, but did order that David would be responsible for the mortgage 

payments, payments on a solar loan, outstanding property taxes, 

homeowner’s insurance, and all repairs, maintenance and other expenses 

associated with the residence. The court denied David’s request to consider 

these items as constituting the undertaking required to stay the order 

directing the sale of the house. Instead, the court determined that the 

appropriate amount of an undertaking that fairly represented Alison’s 

interest in the proceeds from the house was $262,958.62. The court informed 

David that he could not use funds from a community account for purposes of 

posting the undertaking. 

Just over a week later, Alison moved ex parte requesting that the court 

enter an order specifying that no stay would issue if David posted an 

undertaking after the parties entered into a sale contract with a buyer. 

Alison also sought specific orders regarding the listing and showing of the 

marital residence, including orders requiring David to allow a lockbox to be 

installed for realtor access, requiring David to make the home available for 

showings at certain times on weekends and one weekday each week, 

requiring David to participate in a walk-through with the agent so that he 

could be informed on how to prepare the home for showings and for David to 

comply with those instructions, and requiring David to make the home 

accessible to the listing agent, buyer, and buyer’s agent for purposes of 

inspections and walk-throughs in the event that escrow was opened. 

On October 29, 2020, David filed another notice of appeal in which he 

identified the orders from which he was appealing as those entered on 
17

“10/5/20, 10/7/20, 10/15/20, 10/20/20” and “all judgments of Judge Freeland 

since March 2020” (some capitalization omitted).

In November 2020, the court issued specific orders in response to 

Alison’s request for the court’s assistance regarding the listing of the marital 

residence. The court directed David to sign all documents required to 

effectuate the sale within certain time frames, ordered that a realtor was 

permitted to install a lockbox at the residence, directed when and how David 

would have to make the property available for showings, required David to 

participate in a walk-through with the realtor and to complete reasonable 

repair requests made by the realtor, and directed David to vacate the 

residence as of the close of escrow. 

On December 1, 2020, David filed a notice of appeal that appears to 

consist of a copy of his October 29, 2020 notice of appeal, with the addition of 

handwritten notes indicating that David was seeking to add to his appeal the 

trial court’s orders from “10/30/20 [and] 11/30/20.”

Judge Freeland held a custody review hearing in early December 2020. 

Based on evidence and information provided at that review hearing, the court 

found that David had failed to present “sufficient evidence to demonstrate 

that the therapy that [the eldest minor child] is receiving is sufficient to meet 

his needs.” The court concluded that it was in that child’s best interest to 

give Alison sole legal custody with respect to his medical and mental health 

care. However the court retained the physical custody arrangement, such 

that the child would continue to reside primarily with David. 

On December 17, 2020, this court dismissed David’s notices of appeal, 

filed on September 28 and October 29, 2020, for procedural deficiencies. 

Other of David’s notices of appeal were also dismissed at various times by 

this court, but he cured the deficiencies and those appeals were reinstated. 
18

He was unable to reinstate the appeals filed on September 28 and October 29, 

2020.

In early February 2021, Alison filed an ex parte request for orders

regarding the sale of the marital residence and past due child and spousal 

support. Alison indicated that the realtor with whom she had been working 

for almost a year had withdrawn as a result of David’s refusal to cooperate 

with the sale, but she explained that she had found a new realtor and a 

potential buyer who had offered more than the listing price. According to 

Alison, David was “either refus[ing] to respond” to messages and emails

about the sale, or “send[ing] ‘cease and desist’ messages back.” Alison 

requested that the court order that the amount that David continued to owe 

to Alison for child and spousal support arrears and attorney fees be paid to 

her out of David’s portion of the proceeds from the sale of the residence. 

Before the court could hear Alison’s request for those orders, Alison 

filed for additional ex parte relief from the court, seeking David’s “immediate 

removal” from the residence. In her declaration, Alison indicated that the 

scheduled escrow closing date was February 25, 2021, and there was no 

indication that David intended to vacate the marital residence. Instead,

David repeatedly indicated to those involved in the sale process that he 

believed that he would be the one purchasing the residence, and he suggested 

that his appeal from the order that the residence be sold operated to prevent 

the sale from being completed. 

The following day, Judge Victor M. Torres entered an order requiring 

all “occupants” of the marital residence to vacate by 5:00 p.m. on the date 

escrow was set to close. On February 19, 2020, David filed a notice of appeal 

from this order. 
19

In March 2020, Alison filed another ex parte request, this time seeking 

an order authorizing a sheriff’s removal of David from the marital residence. 

Alison indicated that escrow associated with sale of the marital residence had 

closed on February 25, 2021, but when the buyers arrived at the property 

after escrow closed, David had not vacated the residence and instead “greeted 

[the buyers] by calling them ‘sick sick people.’ ” Alison requested that the 

court issue an order for a sheriff’s removal. The following day, the court 

granted Alison’s requested relief and signed an order directing the county 

sheriff or any law enforcement agency with jurisdiction to remove David from 

the residence.

On the same day the court issued its sheriff’s removal order, David filed 

a notice of appeal from that order.

In March 2021, the court proceeded with the hearing on Alison’s 

request for the court to determine support arrears and amounts due to other 

parties, as well as her request for a final determination as to the

disbursement of proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. The court

ordered that $285,832.91 of the total proceeds from the sale of the marital 

residence were to be disbursed to Alison, and $30,984 to David.

On April 15, 2021, David filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s 

March 2021 order regarding the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of 

the marital residence.

III.

DISCUSSION

As David himself concedes, this appeal involves virtually the entirety of 

the litigation between David and Alison that occurred in the wake of Alison’s 

decision to file for dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, as our 

recitation of the background of this matter reveals, David filed a notice of 
20

appeal from almost every ruling entered by the trial court below. We 

generally understand David to be challenging three broad aspects of the trial 

court’s many rulings in this matter: (1) the court’s determinations regarding 

custody of the minor children, (2) the court’s determinations as to child and 

spousal support, and (3) the court’s decision to order that the marital 

residence be sold, and all of the subsequent orders flowing from that decision, 

including an order directing David’s removal from the residence. In addition, 

running throughout David’s briefing is his contention that Judge Freeland 

was biased against him. However, David’s briefing is difficult to understand

and often appears to be based on David’s misapprehension of both the legal 

and factual underpinnings of the court’s rulings. In addition, because Alison 

has not appeared in this appeal, we are left on our own to discern the nature 

of David’s complaints with respect to the issues David ostensibly raises 

through this appeal. In doing so, we conclude that David’s briefing fails to 

meet basic appellate standards, resulting in the forfeiture of his claims. To 

the extent that we are able to ascertain certain of David’s complaints, we 

conclude that they are without merit.

A. David has forfeited his contentions on appeal by failing to present cogent 

legal arguments demonstrating reversible error

Given the character and tone of the assertions set forth in David’s 

briefing, we feel it necessary to begin by stating certain basic rules of practice 

and procedure that apply in every appeal. On appeal, a reviewing court

begins with a fundamental presumption that the trial court's judgment or 

orders are correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is 

the burden of the party challenging a judgment or order to affirmatively 

demonstrate error. (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 

Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125.) “ ‘In so doing, [an appellant] must raise claims of 
21

reversible error or other defect [citation], and must “present argument and 

authority on each point made.” ’ ” (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) A reviewing 

court is “not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments 

for the litigants.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; 

Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 104.) “Nor is an 

appellate court required to consider alleged error where the appellant merely 

complains of it without pertinent argument.” (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 

Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119 (Berger).)

An appeal may therefore be deemed forfeited or abandoned where it 

fails to comply with the essential requirements of an appeal, including the 

requirement of providing a “reason to reverse or even modify the orders in 

question.” (Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 544, fn. 8, 

italics added; see Berger, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 1120 [deeming appeal 

abandoned where appellant's brief “simply failed to make any arguments to 

support any theory of error”].)

We are mindful that David is appearing in propria persona, and that a 

party who proceeds without the assistance of legal counsel may encounter 

unique challenges not encountered by those who utilize the services of 

competent legal counsel. However, the above-cited rules apply equally to selfrepresented litigants: “A self-represented party is to be treated like any 

other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than 

other litigants having attorneys.” (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 

Cal.App.4th 570, 574; see Burkes v. Robertson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 334, 

344–345 [“The same burdens are imposed uniformly and equally on all 

appellants, and self-represented parties are ‘ “held to the same restrictive 

procedural rules as an attorney.” ’ ”].) Thus, David is not exempt from the 
22

rules governing preparation of an adequate appellate record and presenting 

legal arguments supported by citations to relevant legal authority and 

portions of the record. 

David's briefing is clear only insofar as it generally communicates

David’s belief that the trial court erred with respect to virtually all of its 

rulings. But David’s brief fails to set forth cogent legal arguments to 

demonstrate the legal basis, if any, supporting such assertions of error. 

Because David has failed to set forth cogent legal arguments and cite the 

record in support of the points made, we conclude that David has forfeited his

contentions on appeal. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 

Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [absence of cogent legal argument or citation to 

authority forfeits the contention; “[w]e are not bound to develop appellants' 

arguments for them”].)4

B. David has not demonstrated error with respect to the court’s 

determination as to custody of the minor children

 Even if we were to decide the merits of David’s objections to the trial 

court’s orders, we have not been persuaded that the trial court erred or 

abused its discretion. We begin with David’s complaints regarding the orders 

touching on custody and visitation with respect to the minor children. Again, 

David’s contentions are ambiguous. What we discern from David’s briefing is

4 On February 6, 2023, David filed handwritten documents in this court 

titled “Motion/Request to Reinstate Montenegro Orders of May 2020 [and] 

12/19/19” (some capitalization omitted) and “Request/Motion to Stop 

Garnishment of Wages and Follow Our Stipulated Agreement Between 

Parties” (some capitalization omitted). In these documents, David merely 

repeats many of the same assertions and requests made in his briefing on 

appeal. Given that these documents do not request anything new or different 

from what David seeks through his appeals from the various orders issued in 

this case, we deny the motions.
23

that he believes the court erred in at least two respects with regard to 

custody—(1) its failure to make a finding that Alison committed domestic 

violence against him, which would have triggered application of the Family 

Code section 3044 presumption against awarding custody to an individual 

who has committed domestic violence, and (2) its decision to modify at a later 

point in time the final custody order that had been issued, after a six-day 

trial, on December 19, 2019 (i.e., the custody order that David refers to as 

“the Montenegro orders,” an apparent reference to Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 

26 Cal.4th 249, 255).

With respect to the first issue, David appears to suggest that because 

he testified that Alison had abused him, the court necessarily should have 

concluded that Alison did so. Although David continues to repeat in his 

appellate briefing his claims that Alison committed domestic violence against 

him, the record demonstrates that the court considered David’s contentions

about domestic violence and rejected them. “ ‘ “[I]t is the exclusive province 

of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the 

truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends.” ’ ” (People 

v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738–739.) The trial court here did not fully 

believe David’s version of various events, and it is not this court's function to 

second-guess the trial court's determinations of witness credibility. (In re 

A.S. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 131, 149; see, e.g., In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 

Cal.App.4th 187, 199 [“We review a cold record and, unlike a trial court, have 

no opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses.”].) 

We therefore reject David’s assertion that the trial court should have granted 

him full custody of all three minor children based on his claims that Alison 

committed domestic violence against him.
24

We also conclude that David’s repeated complaints regarding the trial 

court’s decision to modify the final custody order are without merit. David 

does not explain the basis for his contention that the trial court’s March 10, 

2020 order modifying the final custody order was “unjust[ ],” and we see no 

error in the trial court’s handling of the matter. The trial court recognized 

that the December 19, 2019 custody order was a final order, and further 

correctly recognized that because of the finality of the December 19, 2019 

custody order, any party seeking to modify that order would have to 

demonstrate the existence of changed circumstances before the court could 

even consider ordering a modified custody arrangement. (See, e.g., In re 

Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 956.) The trial court made 

findings about the existence of at least two changed circumstances that 

warranted a revisiting of the final custody order. The first significant

changed circumstance involved the parties’ eldest minor child, who had been

living primarily with David pursuant to the December 19, 2019 order, and 

who had been involuntarily disenrolled from his school because of his lack of 

attendance and who was not getting the level or consistency of therapy that 

his counselor had indicated was necessary. The second significant changed 

circumstance involved the two youngest children, who were living primarily 

with Alison and had been participating in therapy since the final order. The 

youngest children’s therapist had indicated that the children had “expressed 

their discomfort” at being in David’s custody and were “dissatisfied” with the 

increased time that David had been granted in the final custody order; the 

therapist also indicated that the level of emotional “upset” caused to the 

children as a result of being in David’s care was “preventing them from 

focusing on school and [preventing them] from healing.”
25

David has not attempted to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the trial court’s conclusion that these changed circumstances existed. 

Nor has David attempted to demonstrate why the court’s ultimate custody 

orders, made in the face of these changed circumstances, were an abuse of the 

court’s discretion. The trial court, focusing on the eldest minor child’s state of 

mind, and recognizing that this child would be facing “changing academic 

environments and beginning a new therapeutic regime,” determined that a 

change in primary custody from David to Alison would be too detrimental, 

overall, and the court therefore retained the custody order as to that child.

However, with respect to the two youngest children, the court concluded that 

retaining the original custody order, but not giving effect to the step-up in 

custody envisioned by the December 19, 2019 final custody order, was the 

appropriate course of action. We see no abuse of the court’s discretion in its 

decision that this modification was appropriate, given the information it had 

obtained about the children’s mental health. We therefore reject David’s 

contention that the trial court’s decision not to move forward with the plan to 

give him increased custody time with the two youngest children, as 

envisioned in the December 19, 2019 final custody order, was somehow 

“unjust.” Rather, the court focused on the needs of the children, as it was 

required to do.

C. David has demonstrated no basis for reversing the court’s orders 

regarding child or spousal support

Again, David’s contentions with respect to the court’s orders regarding 

child and spousal support are ambiguous, at best. However, it appears that 

David believes the trial court erred in setting both child and spousal support 

in two ways. First, David appears to believe that he and Alison “had a 

stipulation for child support and spousal support,” and that the court “should 
26

not have usurped the stipulated agreement without the consent of the parties 

in writing.” Second, David appears to contend that the court failed to 

consider the fact that he had a lower income while he was “on disability,” and 

that therefore the court should have ordered lower amount for child and 

spousal support than the court ultimately ordered.

First, with respect to David’s reference to a stipulated agreement 

between the parties, what David apparently fails to appreciate is that the 

February 2018 stipulation between the parties was an agreement as to the 

temporary child and spousal support numbers that were to be in place until

the trial court was able to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the 

parties’ financial matters. Indeed, the parties’ agreement envisioned further 

action by the court—it stated that David would pay Alison $5,714 for child 

support and $4,526 for spousal support, “until further agreement of [the] 

parties or court order.” Further, the stipulated agreement specified that 

there would be a “[r]eview hearing scheduled for June 7 at 1:45 pm,” for 

which “[u]pdated Inc. & Expense declarations [are to be] exchanged 2 weeks 

prior (May 24, 2018).” Obviously, there would be no need to exchange 

updated financial information if there was no expectation that the court 

would be considering these issues. Nothing in the stipulation indicated that 

the parties intended it to be their final agreement with respect to any of the 

issues, let alone the final agreement as to child and spousal support. Indeed, 

the parties proceeded to a two-day trial on all of the property and financial 

matters, including child and spousal support. David participated fully in this 

trial, suggesting that he was aware that these issues had not been fully 

determined by agreement of the parties. David’s argument in this regard is 

therefore without merit.
27

We also reject David’s suggestion that the trial court erred with respect 

to assessing David’s income for child and spousal support purposes by failing 

to account for his reduced income while he was “on disability.” With respect 

to this issue, David again misapprehends the record. David proceeds as if the 

trial court simply ignored evidence that David’s income had been reduced as 

a result of a decrease in his working hours attributable to “disability.” 

However, the record demonstrates that the court concluded that David had 

failed to provide sufficient evidence from which the court could adequately 

assess David’s contention that his income was necessarily reduced as a result 

of David being on disability leave. Specifically, the trial court noted that 

David presented no evidence of: (1) a physician's certification of the need for a 

disability leave of absence, (2) the scope/limitations resulting from the alleged 

disability, (3) the anticipated duration of any such leave, (4) income received 

following the commencement of either the FMLA leave or the disability leave 

(to the extent that there was not complete overlap), or (5) documentation 

reflecting how long said income was expected to continue. The court 

concluded: “Consequently, the Court was not presented with sufficient 

evidence to warrant a finding that David's income is different than it was as 

represented in the Income and Expense Declaration that he filed on 

November 4, 2019.” 

David has not pointed to any portion of the trial court’s recitation of its 

factual understanding that is incorrect or unsupported by the evidence, nor 

has he cited to pages in the record where he submitted sufficient evidence 

regarding any of the items the trial court identified as being necessary for it 

to make an assessment that his diminished income was, truly, involuntary 

and the time frame during which any diminution in his income might have 

been in effect. Without such evidence, the court appropriately determined 
28

that it could not make a finding that David’s income should be calculated to 

be something different than the amount reflected in David’s November 4, 

2019 Income and Expense Declaration, plus the addition of the rental income 

that had not been disclosed in that document. 

In sum, David has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s setting of the child support and spousal support amounts ordered in 

this case. (See In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 529 [award 

of child support reviewed for abuse of discretion; In re Marriage of Ciprari

(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 104, 108 [temporary and permanent spousal 

support orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion].) 

D. David’s contentions regarding the marital residence have been rendered 

moot by the sale of the property to third party purchasers

One of David’s main contentions throughout the trial court proceedings 

and in his briefing on appeal is that the trial court should not have ordered 

the marital residence be sold and it should not have ordered him removed 

from the residence. We conclude that these issues have been rendered moot

by the fact that the property has already been sold.

 “It is well settled that an appellate court will decide only actual 

controversies and that a live appeal may be rendered moot by events 

occurring after the notice of appeal was filed.” (Daily Journal Corp. v. County 

of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557.) “A case is moot when any 

ruling by this court can have no practical impact or provide the parties 

effectual relief.” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 

77 Cal.App.4th 880, 888.)
29

The record includes evidence of the fact that the sale of the marital 

home to third party purchasers was completed as of February 25, 2021.5 

When a litigant appeals from an order directing the sale of real property, the 

intervening sale of the property renders the appeal moot because the court is 

unable to provide effective relief. (First Federal Bank of California v. Fegen

(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 798, 800–801.) Because this court has no ability to 

provide David with effective relief from the trial court’s order directing the 

sale of the residence, or any of its subsequent orders issued to effectuate the 

sale order, this aspect of David’s appeal is moot and we decline to address 

David’s challenges regarding the sale of the marital home and his removal 

from the home on their merits.

E. David’s claims of bias on the part of Judge Freeland are without merit

Finally, we address David’s repeated accusations that Judge Freeland 

acted out of a bias against him and treated him inequitably. We disagree 

with David’s reading of the record and the accusations of bias against a 

judicial officer he draws from this record. We note that the mere fact that a 

trial judge makes numerous rulings against a party, even if some of those 

rulings are ultimately determined to have been erroneous, is insufficient to 

establish even the appearance of bias. (See, e.g., Brown v. American Bicycle 

Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [“[t]he mere fact that the trial 

5 David was informed multiple times throughout the underlying 

litigation that his appeal from the court’s order directing the sale of the 

marital residence did not operate to stay the order. (See Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 917.4 [no automatic stay of order directing sale of property without 

undertaking].) The trial court set an amount for an undertaking to stay the 

sale, but David never posted it. As a result, the trial court never issued a 

stay of the order directing the sale, and sale of the property moved forward. 

David requested that this court issue a stay of all proceedings in the trial 

court pending resolution of his appeal, but his request was denied.
30

court issued rulings adverse to [one party] on several matters in this case, 

even assuming one or more of those rulings were erroneous, does not indicate 

an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate actual bias”].) 

We recognize that David disagreed with and was upset by many of 

Judge Freeland’s rulings. However, that does not mean that Judge Freeland 

treated him inequitably or operated out of bias. Rather, Judge Freeland did 

what she was tasked with doing by virtue of her role as the judicial officer 

overseeing much of the parties’ litigation—i.e., she formed opinions and made 

credibility determinations based on the evidence before her. “When making a 

ruling, a judge interprets the evidence, weighs credibility, and makes 

findings. In doing so, the judge necessarily makes and expresses 

determinations in favor of and against parties. How could it be otherwise?” 

(Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219.)

Our review of this record discloses no support for David’s contentions of bias 

on the part of Judge Freeland. Rather, all of the judicial officers who made 

rulings in this case appeared to have properly focused on the evidence 

presented and made determinations based on the relevant legal standards 

applicable to the questions raised by the parties’ requests. We therefore 

reject David’s assertion that Judge Freeland was biased against him.
31

IV.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the trial court encompassed by the pending notices of 

appeal filed under case No. D077308 are affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.