2020 IL App (1st) 190610-U

No. 1-19-0610 

SECOND DIVISION

March 24, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

____________________________________________________________________________ 

DIRECT AUTO INSURANCE CO., 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MARIA REYNOSA and RANDY GUTIERREZ, 

Individually and as Father and Next Friend to 

KHRISTOPHER GUTIERREZ and KHAMILA 

GUTIERREZ, minors, 

Defendants-Appellants.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court 

of Cook County. 

No. 16 CH 15555 

The Honorable 

Celia Gamrath, 

Judge Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurer and 

against the defendants is affirmed as to the defendants of majority age, where (1) defendants’ 

counsel forfeited the issue that the insurance policy’s notice requirements for uninsured motorist 

claims violate public policy, and (2) defendants could not assert that section 143.1 of the Insurance 

Code tolled their claim because defendants’ counsel submitted no clear argument or evidence as 

to when they submitted proof of loss to the insurer. The circuit court’s order granting summary 

judgment is reversed as to the minor defendants where the record requires more factual 

development as to the minor’s age and interest in the case. 
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¶ 2 Defendant Maria Reynosa was the insured under an insurance policy issued by plaintiff 

Direct Auto Insurance Company (Direct Auto). Defendants were in a motor vehicle accident with 

an individual insured by Interstate Bankers Casualty Company (Interstate), and filed suit against 

the individual. Subsequently, Interstate was ordered into liquidation, and defendants submitted an 

uninsured motorist claim to Direct Auto. Direct Auto filed suit against defendants for a declaratory 

judgment that defendants were not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because they did not 

file a timely notice of their uninsured motorist claim under the terms of Reynosa’s policy. The 

circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Direct Auto and against defendants. 

¶ 3 On appeal, defendants allege that the circuit court erred in granting Direct Auto summary 

judgment where (1) the 30-day notice provision in the insurance policy issued by Direct Auto 

violates public policy; (2) it was plain error to apply a time limitation on the uninsured motorist 

claims of minors Kristopher and Khamila Gutierrez; and (3) section 143.1 of the Illinois Insurance 

Code (Code) (215 ILCS 5/143.1 (West 2010)) tolled the policy’s time limitation. We affirm in 

part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions. 

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On November 30, 2016, Direct Auto filed a complaint for declaratory judgment. Direct 

Auto alleged that on June 18, 2011, Reynosa was the named insured under an automobile liability 

policy issued by Direct Auto. Reynosa operated a vehicle containing passengers Randy, 

Khristopher, and Khamila Gutierrez (collectively, the Gutierrezes), when they were involved in a 

motor vehicle accident with Angela Nowaczyk on June 18, 2011. The record reflects that the same 

law firm that represented defendants following the accident also represented defendants in this 

case both before the circuit court and on appeal. Reynosa and the Gutierrezes filed suit against 

Nowaczyk in the circuit court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in Will County, Illinois, under case 
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number 2013 L 0005. However, on August 19, 2015, the circuit court of Cook County ordered 

Nowaczyk’s insurer, Interstate, into liquidation. Direct Auto alleged that on August 23, 2016,

“more than one year from the date [Interstate] went into liquidation and more than five years from 

the date of the accident,” defendants notified Direct Auto of their uninsured motorist claim under 

Reynosa’s policy. 

¶ 6 Direct Auto attached to its complaint the policy, which stated in relevant part that under 

Condition 3, “[a]s a condition precedent to coverage, within 30 days of any accident, occurrence 

or loss, regardless of fault, [Direct Auto] must receive written notice” containing the following 

information: (1) the time and location of the loss; (2) the full name and address of any known 

person who occupied a vehicle involved in the loss or who was present when the loss occurred; 

(3) the purpose of the vehicle’s use at the time of the loss; (4) “facts surrounding the loss”; and (5) 

“[a]ny other information the Company requests in order to conclude its investigation of the loss.” 

¶ 7 The policy further states the following: 

“PART II – UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

*** 

COVERAGE C: UNINSURED MOTORIST BODIL [sic] INJURY and 

COVERAGE D: UNINSURED MOTORIST PROPERTY DAMAGE.

If you have paid for this coverage(s), have provided prompt and proper notice of 

the loss pursuant to Condition 3, and have submitted your written claim by certified mail, 

return receipt requested, for Uninsured Motorist coverage within two (2) years from the 

date of the accident, unless otherwise set forth herein, we will pay all sums (up to your 

applicable policy limits) which the named insured or his legal representative shall be 

legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
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vehicle because of property damage to a vehicle described in the policy and bodily injury, 

including death resulting there from [sic] sustained by the insured provided that the 

damages were:

(1) caused by accident; and 

(2) while ‘you’ are an occupant in an ‘insured automobile’ as defined herein, and 

(3) were as a result of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor 

vehicle.

*** 

‘uninsured motor vehicle’ means:

***

(d) a motor vehicle where on, before, or after the accident date the liability insurer 

thereof is unable to make payment with respect to the legal liability of its insured within 

the limits specified in the policy because of the entry by a court of competent jurisdiction 

of an order of rehabilitation or liquidation by reason of insolvency on or after the accident 

date, provided, however, that: 

1. the insured reported the accident within thirty (30) days of the accident ***; and

2. the insured notifies the Company of his/her claim under this provision within the 

later of either: (a) thirty (30) days from the date of such court order of rehabilitation or 

insolvency or (b) two (2) years from the date of the accident. To the extent that this 

provision conflicts with this policy’s exclusion for claims submitted to the company more 

than two years after the accident, this provision shall control.” 

¶ 8 The policy also contains a provision requiring the insured to submit proof of loss for 

uninsured motorist claims, which states:
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“As soon as practicable any injured person or someone on his/her behalf making 

claim shall give to the Company written proof, under oath if required, including full 

particulars of the accident or loss and the nature and extent of the injuries, treatment, and 

other details entering into the determination of the amount payable.” 

¶ 9 We note that while the parties dispute on appeal whether defendants provided proof of loss 

and complied with subsection (d)(2) of the notice requirements for uninsured motorist claims, 

Direct Auto did not clearly dispute, either in its summary judgment motion before the circuit court 

or before this court, whether defendants reported the accident within 30 days of the accident under 

subsection (d)(1). Nonetheless, the record contains no evidence that defendants even minimally 

reported the accident to Direct Auto within 30 days of the accident. 

¶ 10 Based on the insurance policy’s notice requirements for uninsured motorist claims, Direct 

Auto requested the circuit court to find the following: 

“a) that the Defendants first notified [Direct Auto] of [sic] they were making claims 

under Part II – Uninsured Motorist Coverage more than one year from the date of 

Interstate’s liquidation and more than five years from the date of the accident;

b) that, as such, the loss was not the result of an accident with an ‘uninsured motor 

vehicle’ under the provisions of the [Direct Auto] policy; [and] 

c) that, as such, [Direct Auto] owes no duty to provide coverage to the Defendant 

under Part II – Uninsured Motorist Coverage and that the Defendants are not entitled to 

collect any monies from the [Direct Auto] policy for damages arising from the accident of 

June 18, 2011 ***. (Emphasis in original.) 

¶ 11 On January 25, 2017, Direct Auto moved for default judgment against defendants. An order 

on February 7, 2017, however, continued the motion for Direct Auto to present a sheriff’s affidavit 
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of service. On February 21, 2017, the circuit court denied Direct Auto’s motion for default without 

prejudice and allowed Direct Auto to re-notice their motion. Direct Auto filed a renewed motion 

for default on March 3, 2017. Then, on March 30, 2017, the court entered an order signed by 

defendants’ counsel, which denied the renewed motion without prejudice and gave defendants 

leave to file an appearance and answer within 27 days. 

¶ 12 The record suggests, however, that defendants’ counsel did not timely file an appearance 

or answer on behalf of defendants, as yet another renewed motion for default was filed on May 10, 

2017. That same day, a court order was entered stating that “no one from [defendants’ counsel] or 

pro se defendants having appeared today, the defendants, through counsel or [pro se], are ordered 

to file their appearance and answer by 5/24/17.” On May 12, 2017, defendants’ trial counsel filed 

an appearance and answer on behalf of all defendants. In their answer, defendants denied that they 

first notified Direct Auto of their uninsured motorist claim on August 23, 2016. 

¶ 13 On July 17, 2017, Direct Auto moved to compel defendants to answer their discovery 

requests, alleging that defendants had neither responded to discovery nor attempted to contact 

Direct Auto’s counsel. The circuit court granted Direct Auto’s motion and ordered defendants to 

respond to written discovery on or before August 24, 2017. On August 29, 2017, the court 

continued the matter to September 19, 2017, and on September 19th, the circuit court set a status 

on discovery for November 8, 2017. 

¶ 14 On October 4, 2017, however, Direct Auto brought a second motion to compel, alleging 

that defendants’ counsel (1) had only identified witnesses relevant to the underlying tort case and 

not Direct Auto’s claim; (2) failed to provide complete answers regarding communications with 

Direct Auto; (3) failed to identify any document supporting defendants’ denial that they first 

notified Direct Auto of their claim on August 23, 2016; and (4) did not produce any documents in 
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an amended response or incorporate documents provided in prior responses. A court order entered 

October 24, 2017, reflects that Direct Auto withdrew this second motion to compel without 

prejudice.

¶ 15 On September 6, 2018, Direct Auto filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that 

defendants were not entitled to coverage where they failed to file notice of their uninsured motorist 

claim within the policy’s 30-day period. In support of its motion, Direct Auto presented the 

affidavit of its claims manager and co-manager for underwriting, who alleged that defendants 

untimely submitted their first notice of an uninsured motorist claim on August 23, 2016, more than 

one year from Interstate’s liquidation on August 19, 2015, and more than five years from the 

accident on June 18, 2011. 

¶ 16 In response, defendants’ counsel cited section 143.1 of the Code (215 ILCS 5/143.1 (West 

2010)), which provides: 

“Whenever any policy or contract for insurance *** contains a provision limiting 

the period within which the insured may bring suit, the running of such period is tolled 

from the date proof of loss is filed, in whatever form is required by the policy, until the 

date the claim is denied in whole or in part.” 

¶ 17 Defendants’ counsel asserted that defendants sent a policy demand letter to Interstate on 

August 2, 2011, and that “[i]t is custom and standard practice to notify one’s own insurance 

provider about a car collision even when the other driver was the cause of the incident.” 

Defendants’ counsel claimed that based on this “custom and standard practice,” “[i]t would not be 

out of the ordinary to assume that Plaintiff notified Defendant of this accident within the same 

time period after the incident.” Thus, according to counsel, a question of fact existed as to when 

they submitted proof of loss to Direct Auto for purposes of section 143.1. 
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¶ 18 Defendants’ counsel also asserted that defendants did not know they would need to file an 

uninsured motorist claim until August 29, 2015, when Interstate was ordered into liquidation. 

Counsel thus asserted that defendants’ claim was denied in whole under section 143.1 on August 

29, 2015. Based on this time frame, defendants’ counsel concluded that section 143.1 tolled their 

claim until August 29, 2015, and defendants timely submitted their claim within the policy’s twoyear notice limitation. 

¶ 19 In the alternative, defendants’ counsel argued the following: 

“Finally, for public policy reasons, this motion should be denied. The Defendants 

in this case filed a claim against the at-fault driver’s insurance provider after this incident. 

They were involved in litigation with Interstate *** for almost four years until [Interstate] 

was liquidated. Plaintiff was unaware that an uninsured motorist claim was necessary that 

entire time, until the at-fault driver’s insurance provider was no more. After discovery of 

IBCC’s insolvency, an uninsured motorist demand letter was sent in November, 2015. 

Defendants subsequently made attempts to arbitrate this matter with Plaintiff. The 

arbitration letter sent to Plaintiff on August 23, 2016 was actually the final such letter sent 

to Plaintiff, not the first. In light of Defendants’ good faith participation in a lawsuit against 

Interstate *** and repeated efforts to notify Direct Auto Insurance Company of this 

uninsured motorist claim after their own discovery of IBCC’s insolvency, policy reasons 

support denying this motion for summary judgment.” 

¶ 20 Defendants’ counsel attached to the response an unsigned letter dated August 2, 2011, from 

defendants’ counsel to Interstate, which states that defendants’ counsel was retained by defendants 

to represent them in their personal injuries claim. Defendants’ counsel also attached an unsigned
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notice of attorney’s lien sent to Direct Auto by defendants’ counsel and dated November 4, 2015, 

which states: 

 “PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Maria T. Reynosa, Randy Gutierrez, Khristopher 

Gutierrez (minor) and Khamilia Gutierrez (minor), By: Randy Gutierrez (father) have 

placed in my hands as their attorney to represent them in suit or collection of claim, demand 

or cause of action against you growing out of personal injuries sustained as a result of an 

accident *** on the 18th day of June, 2011.” 

This notice did not mention any uninsured motorist claim. Also attached to the response was an 

unsigned August 19, 2016, letter to Direct Auto from defendants’ counsel stating, “I am putting 

you on notice that my clients demand arbitration under the uninsured motorist provision on the 

policy of Maria Reynosa.” (Emphasis in original.) Finally, defendants’ counsel attached another 

unsigned letter dated August 23, 2016, in which defendants’ counsel informed State Farm

Insurance that he represented defendants with respect to Randy Gutierrez’s claim under the 

uninsured motorist provision of his policy with State Farm Insurance. 

¶ 21 In reply, Direct Auto asserted that the exhibits attached to defendants’ response were never

produced during discovery. Even had they been produced, however, Direct Auto asserted that none 

of the exhibits created a genuine issue of material fact, as none of them showed that defendants 

had timely notified Direct Auto of their uninsured motorist claim either within two years of the 

accident or 30 days of the liquidation order. Two of the alleged notices did not even reflect that 

they were sent to Direct Auto. Direct Auto also noted that defendants failed to cite legal authority 

supporting their assertions that the notice requirements for uninsured motorist claims violated

public policy, or that section 143.1 could toll the notification deadline. As to defendants’ section 

143.1 argument, Direct Auto additionally asserted that defendant presented no evidence that they 
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tendered proof of loss to Direct Auto for purposes of section 143.1. Additionally, as to defendants’ 

public policy argument, Direct Auto cited legal authority stating that declaring an insurance policy 

provision void as against public policy is an extraordinary remedy. 

¶ 22 The circuit court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Direct Auto and 

against defendants.1 The court’s order further found that “there is no Uninsured Motorist Coverage 

for the accident of June 18, 2011.” This appeal followed. 

¶ 23 ANALYSIS

¶ 24 I. Standard of Review 

¶ 25 “[S]ummary judgment is proper only where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Mashal v. City of Chicago, 

2012 IL 112341, ¶ 49. When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, “a court 

must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly against the movant 

and liberally in favor of the opponent.” Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 

(2004). “If the undisputed material facts could lead reasonable observers to divergent inferences, 

or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be denied and the issue 

decided by the trier of fact.” Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 53. “The burden of proof and the 

initial burden of production in a motion for summary judgment lie with the movant.” Pecora v. 

County of Cook, 323 Ill. App. 3d 917, 933 (2001). Once the movant has satisfied its initial burden, 

the burden shifts to the respondent, who must “present some factual basis that would arguably 

entitle [it] to a favorable judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “Summary judgment 

is a drastic means of disposing litigation and, therefore, should be granted only when the right of 

1 While the record on appeal suggests that a hearing was conducted on Direct Auto’s motion for 

summary judgment, the record does not contain a transcript of the proceeding. 
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the moving party is clear and free from doubt.” Mashal, 2012 IL 112341, ¶ 49. We review the 

circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and we may affirm the circuit court’s grant on 

any ground apparent from the record. Filliung v. Adams, 387 Ill. App. 3d 40, 53 (2008). 

¶ 26 II. Public Policy 

¶ 27 On appeal, defendants first argue that the circuit court erred in rejecting their argument that

Direct Auto’s notice requirements for uninsured motorist claims violate public policy. Direct Auto 

responds that defendants have waived this argument, as their response to Direct Auto’s motion for 

summary judgment did not set forth a specific argument as to why granting Direct Auto summary 

judgment violated public policy. Direct Auto also asserts that the notice requirements for uninsured 

motorist claims in its policy are not so restrictive as to violate public policy.

¶ 28 Before reaching the merits of this issue, we must determine whether defendants forfeited 

the issue on appeal by failing to raise it before the circuit court. We initially note that while courts 

often use the terms “forfeit” and “waive” interchangeably, we will use the term “forfeiture” when 

describing the rule that issues that could have been raised, but were not, are barred. See People v. 

Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443-44 (2005). We will use the term “waiver” when referring to “an express 

or implied voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Illinois Insurance Guaranty 

Fund v. Nwidor, 2018 IL App (1st) 171378, ¶ 21. 

¶ 29 Generally, an appellant who fails to raise an issue before the circuit court forfeits that issue. 

Asian Human Services Family Health Center, Inc. v. Asian Human Services, Inc., 2020 IL App 

(1st) 191049, ¶ 15. “[T]he responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and for the 

maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations 

of [forfeiture] that stem from the adversary character of our system.” Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 

225 (1967). However, we cannot ignore the doctrine of forfeiture “if it is clear that the party 
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claiming forfeiture would have been able to refute or overcome the arguments if it had been given 

the opportunity to do so in the trial court.” Forest Preserve District of Du Page County v. First 

National Bank of Franklin Park, 2011 IL 110759, ¶ 28. 

¶ 30 In response to Direct Auto’s summary judgment motion before the circuit court, 

defendants’ counsel asserted that it would be against public policy to grant Direct Auto summary 

judgment, based on their “good faith participation” in a lawsuit against Interstate, and their 

“repeated efforts to notify Direct Auto” of their uninsured motorist claim. However, counsel 

presented no argument that the insurance policy itself contained any provisions that violated public 

policy, or that the court should strike the notice requirements for uninsured motorist claims in 

Direct Auto’s policy. They also cited no legal authority whatsoever explaining the basis of their 

public policy argument. 

¶ 31 Whether an agreement is against public policy depends on the facts and circumstances of 

the case. Country Preferred Insurance Co. v. Whitehead, 2012 IL 113365, ¶ 28. 

¶ 32 Given the circumstantial nature of this issue, Direct Auto could have refuted or overcome

defendants’ public policy claim before the circuit court, had defendants’ counsel actually placed 

at issue whether Direct Auto’s uninsured motorist claim notice requirements violated public 

policy. Forest Preserve District of Du Page County, 2011 IL 110759, ¶ 28. This is particularly the 

case where defendants’ response to Direct Auto’s summary judgment motion contained no clear 

explanation as to why defendants’ counsel did not bring a claim within 30 days of Interstate’s 

liquidation, having been aware of the nature of defendants’ injuries for more than five years. See 

Whitehead, 2012 IL 113365, ¶¶ 34-39 (finding that an insurance policy requiring notice of an 

uninsured motorist claim within two years of the accident did not violate public policy, where the 

defendant insured presented “[n]othing of record” indicating that she “lacked information 
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necessary to pursue her claim against [the insurer] in a timely manner or that she was legally 

incompetent to do so”). This is an explanation that defendants’ counsel in this case should have 

been able to provide, as the exhibits submitted by defendants at the summary judgment stage—

which according to Direct Auto were never produced in discovery—suggest that the same counsel 

representing defendants before the circuit court and on appeal began representing defendants

following the accident, as early as August 2, 2011. If those exhibits are any indication, the same 

counsel also handled the submission of defendants’ notices to the various insurers involved in this 

case. Nonetheless, we note that defendants’ counsel submitted no affidavit, explanation, or 

evidence regarding the apparent failure to timely file notice under the terms of Direct Auto’s 

policy. 

¶ 33 Defendants’ counsel failed to raise the issue of whether the notice requirements for 

uninsured motorist claims under Direct Auto’s policy violated public policy. Rather, defendants’ 

counsel largely focused their theory at the summary judgment stage on whether section 143.1 

tolled the policy’s limitation period. We find defendants have therefore forfeited their public policy

claim on appeal, as Direct Auto was not given the opportunity to refute the claim before the circuit 

court, and the circuit court was not afforded the opportunity to rule on the issue. Accordingly, 

defendants have failed to preserve this issue for appeal, and we do not reach its merits. 

¶ 34 III. Enforcement of Limitation Period against Minors

¶ 35 Defendants also argue on appeal that the circuit court erred in applying a limitation on the 

minor defendants’ uninsured motorist claims, where the supreme court has held that a similar 

provision violated public policy when applied to a minor. See Severs v. Country Mutual Insurance 

Co., 89 Ill. 2d 515 (1982) (finding that an insurance policy that required notice of an uninsured 

motorist claim within two years of the accident violated public policy as set forth in section 143a 
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of the Code (215 ILCS 5/143a(1) (West 2010)) when applied to a minor). Defendants acknowledge 

that they failed to raise this issue before the circuit court but assert that we may reach the issue 

under the plain error doctrine. Direct Auto responds that the circumstances here do not warrant 

relaxing the doctrine of forfeiture to allow the claim to be asserted on review. 

¶ 36 We find that we are currently unable to rule on this issue, as the record prepared by 

defendants’ counsel contains no information regarding the age of the minors or the extent of the 

minors’ injuries, if there were any.2 The minors’ ages are particularly important—without this 

information, we cannot determine that Randy Gutierrez is still able to represent them as a “next 

friend” on appeal. See In the Interest of R.W., 176 Ill. App. 3d 868, 874 (1988) (“[A] minor may 

not even appear or defend in a legal action, but may do so only through a representative or a 

guardian ad litem appointed by the court.”); see also 735 ILCS 5/13-211 (2018) (“If the person 

entitled to bring an action, *** at the time the cause of action accrued, is under the age of 18 years 

or is under a legal disability, then he or she may bring the action within 2 years after the person 

attains the age of 18 years, or the disability is removed.”). Minor who reach the age of 16 may also 

have a means of demonstrating that they are a mature minor and therefore capable of enjoying the 

rights and responsibilities of an adult. See 750 ILCS 30/1 et seq. (West 2018) (the Emancipation 

of Minors Act). 

¶ 37 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court as to the minors, and remand the 

case to the circuit court for further proceedings on the status of the minor defendants and their 

2 One of Direct Auto’s motions to compel contains a list of potential witnesses that defendants’ counsel 

provided to Direct Auto. Most of the witnesses on this list strangely would have only testified as to defendants’ injuries 

in the underlying tort claim regarding the accident, though not necessarily relevant to this declaratory judgment case. 

If this list is any indication, minors Khristopher and Khamila Gutierrez may have suffered some sort of injury. 

However, the “injuries” listed appear to be mere boilerplate language and there is no elaboration as to any particular 

damages the minor defendants suffered. 
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interest in this case. As to the remaining defendants of majority age, we now consider defendants’ 

claim that section 143.1 of the Code tolled the insurance policy’s limitation period. 

¶ 38 IV. Section 143.1 

¶ 39 Defendants also assert on appeal that the circuit court erred in granting Direct Auto 

summary judgment, where section 143.1 of the Code tolled the limitation period by which 

defendants could file notice of an uninsured motorist claim. Direct Auto responds that defendants 

failed to present any evidence that they submitted proof of loss to Direct Auto and therefore cannot 

benefit from the section 143.1 tolling provision. 

¶ 40 Section 143.1 of the Code states:

“Periods of limitation tolled. Whenever any policy or contract for insurance, except 

life, accident and health, fidelity and surety, and ocean marine policies, contains a provision 

limiting the period within which the insured may bring suit, the running of such period is 

tolled from the date proof of loss is filed, in whatever form is required by the policy, until 

the date the claim is denied in whole or in part.” 215 ILCS 5/143.1 (West 2010). 

This provision was enacted “to prevent insurance companies from sitting on claims, allowing the 

limitations period to run and depriving insureds of their opportunity to litigate their claims in 

court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Leon, 

2019 IL App (1st) 180655, ¶ 27. 

¶ 41 The purpose of a proof of loss is to provide “the insurer the opportunity to investigate the 

claim,” so that it may “reasonably estimate its rights and liabilities in order to prevent fraud and 

unjust claims from being asserted” and secure “information as to any possible defense.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Maier v. CC Services, Inc., 2019 IL App (3d) 170640, ¶¶ 34-35 (finding 

that a letter that merely served as notice of an attorney’s lien did not provide sufficient information 
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of the claim to constitute proof of loss). For purposes of section 143.1, this court has previously 

found that an insured submitted sufficient proof of loss, where insurer required the insured to 

submit “ ‘particulars’ of the loss,” and the insurer received “a police report from the accident, an 

itemized ambulance bill, a paramedics report, an ‘Incident Detail’ from the Chicago fire 

department and Tutson’s medical bills and records.” American Access Casualty Co. v. Tutson, 409 

Ill. App. 3d 233, 239 (2011). 

¶ 42 In moving for summary judgment, Direct Auto met its initial burden in showing that it was 

entitled to summary judgment, by establishing through affidavit that defendants submitted their 

uninsured motorist claim more than one year after Interstate’s liquidation and more than five years 

after the accident. Pecora, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 933. Thus, the burden shifted to defendants, who 

were to “present some factual basis that would arguably entitle [them] to a favorable judgment.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 

¶ 43 In response to Direct Auto’s summary judgment motion, defendants asserted that section 

143.1 tolled their claim. Defendants, however, presented no facts or evidence raising a question of 

fact as to whether defendants or their counsel provided Direct Auto with proof of loss, or any 

information regarding the accident, prior to Interstate’s liquidation. Rather, defendants’ counsel

asserted in their response that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether they submitted 

proof of loss, because “[i]t would not be out of the ordinary to assume that Plaintiff notified 

Defendant of this accident within the same time period after the incident.” However, a nonmovant’s “mere assertion” that a genuine issue of material fact exists is not sufficient to survive 

summary judgment. Kosten v. St. Anne’s Hospital, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1081 (1985). 

¶ 44 Moreover, as defendants’ response to Direct Auto’s motion for summary judgment 

suggests, defendants’ counsel appears to conflate the insurance policy’s requirement that the 
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insured submit notice of the accident within 30 days of the accident with the requirement that the 

insured submit proof of loss. This conflation continues on appeal, as defendants now claim that 

the insurance policy did not require a specific form of proof of loss in its notice provision. 

According to defendants, because Direct Auto failed to raise before the circuit court whether 

defendants submitted notice of the accident within 30 days of the accident, Direct Auto cannot 

now claim that defendants or their counsel failed to submit proof of loss. 

¶ 45 This argument overlooks the fact that the policy has two separate provisions with different 

requirements for submitting notice of an accident and submitting proof of loss. In requiring notice 

of an accident, the policy provides that “[a]s a condition precedent to coverage, within 30 days of 

any accident, occurrence or loss, regardless of fault, [Direct Auto] must receive written notice” 

stating: (1) the time and location of the loss; (2) the full name and address of any known person 

who occupied a vehicle involved in the loss or who was present when the loss occurred; (3) the 

purpose of the vehicle’s use at the time of the loss; (4) “facts surrounding the loss”; and (5) “[a]ny 

other information the Company requests in order to conclude its investigation of the loss.” The 

policy also separately requires proof of loss, stating that, “[a]s soon as practicable,” an individual 

asserting a claim must submit “written proof, *** including full particulars of the accident or loss 

and the nature and extent of the injuries, treatment, and other details entering into the determination 

of the amount payable.” In order to benefit from section 143.1, defendants would need to establish 

two dates: (1) the date on which defendants presented proof of loss to Direct Auto in the form 

required by the insurance policy, and (2) the date on which their claim was denied in whole.

Defendants failed to present any facts or evidence that could raise a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether or when they submitted proof of loss as required by the policy. Thus, they failed to 
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show that they would be arguably entitled to a favorable judgment based on the section 143.1 

tolling provision. Pecora, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 933. 

¶ 46 In their reply brief, defendants claim that Direct Auto affirmatively waived its requirement 

that defendants submit proof of loss. See Pick v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 191 Ill. App. 3d 121, 

126 (1989) (stating that an insurer will have waived an insurance policy requirement where its 

words or conduct are inconsistent with the insurer’s right to rely on that requirement). According 

to defendants, by arguing that defendants did not comply with the two-year or 30-day notice 

requirements for uninsured motorist claims, Direct Auto “denied liability on grounds other than 

the defendants’ failure to file a proof of loss, thus waiving compliance with the proof-of-loss 

requirement.” However, the record contains no indication that defendants ever asserted before the

circuit court that they did not need to provide proof of loss, based on a theory that Direct Auto 

waived the requirement. They also do not clearly explain how Direct Auto’s denial of defendants’ 

claim based on their failure to submit notice is inconsistent with Direct Auto’s right to additionally 

rely on the proof of loss requirement. Before the circuit court, defendants did not claim that they 

did not need to submit proof of loss, but rather asserted that they had submitted proof of loss, 

though they presented no evidence or facts showing that they did. Accordingly, we find that 

defendants have forfeited this argument. Asian Human Services Family Health Center, Inc., 2020 

IL App (1st) 191049, ¶ 15. 

¶ 47 Defendants failed to show they would arguably be entitled to a favorable judgment based 

on the section 143.1 tolling statute, as they presented no facts that could establish they provided 

proof of loss to Direct Auto. Therefore, as to the defendants of majority age, Reynosa and Randy 

Gutierrez, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
1-19-0610 

-19- 

¶ 48 CONCLUSION

¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court as to defendants 

Reynosa and Randy Gutierrez, and reverse the circuit court’s judgment as to minor defendants 

Kristopher Gutierrez and Khamila Gutierrez. This case is remanded for further proceedings as to 

the status of Khristopher Gutierrez and Khamila Gutierrez as minors and interested parties in the 

case.

¶ 50 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.