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MARK BOVA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 36915)

Lavine, Mullins and Schaller, Js.

Argued October 8, 2015—officially released January 12, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Kwak, J.)

Peter Tsimbidaros, for the appellant (petitioner).

Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, state’s

attorney, Michael Proto, assistant state’s attorney, and

Steven M. Lesko, deputy assistant state’s attorney, for

the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

SCHALLER, J. The petitioner, Mark Bova, appeals

after the second habeas court granted his petition for

certification to appeal from the court’s judgment denying his second amended petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. On appeal, he claims that the second habeas

court improperly concluded that he had not been denied

effective assistance of counsel when his first habeas

counsel failed to adequately pursue claims pertaining

to the failure of this trial and appellate counsel, John

R. Williams, (1) to request a new trial based on or to

raise on appeal the trial court’s inconsistent application

of the dual intent requirement in the law of conspiracy;

(2) to investigate and then produce an adequate basis

to impeach a witness regarding her bias and motive; and

(3) to object adequately to instances of prosecutorial

impropriety during closing argument. We affirm the

judgment of the second habeas court.

The petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and

conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General

Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-48 (a). The trial court,

Gormley, J., sentenced him to concurrent prison terms

of sixty years on the murder count and twenty years

on the conspiracy count. On direct appeal in State v.

Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 213–15, 690 A.2d 1370 (1997),

our Supreme Court concluded that the jury reasonably

could have found the following facts.

On January 29, 1992, the petitioner reported his wife,

Susan Bova, missing. Id., 213–14. The West Haven Police

Department discovered her body shortly thereafter and

commenced an investigation of her death. Id., 214. In

the course of the investigation, the petitioner revealed

that he had been engaged in an extramarital affair with

Diane Donofrio since 1985. Id., 215. In May, 1993, the

petitioner terminated his relationship with Donofrio.

Id., 216. Two months later, Donofrio reported that the

petitioner had killed the victim on January 28, 1992.

Id., 216. The petitioner was arrested and charged with

murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

Donofrio testified at the petitioner’s criminal trial

that the petitionertold her he intended to kill the victim,

then called her on Tuesday, January 28, 1992, while he

was in the process of doing so, asking for her assistance.

Id., 216. Donofrio went to the petitioner’s house. Id.

She found him strangling the victim with a cord. Id.

Because the victim still had a pulse, Donofrio and the

petitioner took turns smothering her with a pillow until

they could no longer detect any heartbeat. Id.

As previously stated, the petitioner was convicted of

murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Donofrio

pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and

making a false statement to the police; she was sentenced, by the same trial judge, Gormley, J., as the
petitioner, to ten years imprisonment, execution suspended afterfour years, and three years of probation for

the conspiracy charge, and received an unconditional

discharge on the false statement charge. On direct

appeal our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of

the trial court.1

Id., 213. On March 9, 1999, the petitioner

filed his first habeas petition, citing grounds different

from those in the present appeal,2 and was represented

by a different attorney (first habeas counsel) from Williams or from his present attorney.3 The habeas court

dismissed the petition, and this court affirmed the judgment of dismissal.Bova v.Commissioner ofCorrection,

95 Conn. App. 129, 130–31, 894 A.2d 1067, cert. denied,

278 Conn. 920, 901 A.2d 43 (2006).

The petitioner filed a second habeas petition, which

he amended on April 9, 2013. Following a trial (second

habeas trial) at which the petitioner testified and submitted documentary evidence, the habeas court, Kwak,

J. (second habeas court), first granted the motion for

summary judgment filed by the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, on three of the four counts,

then denied the petition regarding the remaining count

by written memorandum of decision on March 14, 2014.

The second habeas court subsequently granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal.4 The present

appeal followed.

The standard ofreview pertaining to claims ofineffective assistance of counsel is well settled. ‘‘The habeas

court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual

findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless

they are clearly erroneous. . . . Historical facts constitute a recital of external events and the credibility of

their narrators. . . . Accordingly, [t]he habeas judge,

as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility

of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. . . . The application of the habeas court’s factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however,

presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is

subject to plenary review.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner

of Correction, 313 Conn. 360, 375, 98 A.3d 23 (2014),

cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Semple, U.S. ,

135 S. Ct. 1453, 191 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2015).

‘‘[I]t is well established that [a] criminal defendant

is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective

assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal

proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists

of two components: a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong . . . the

petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the

range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, [the petitioner] must
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different. . . . A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 225, 264–65, 112

A.3d 1 (2015). ‘‘Because both prongs of [Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984)] must be demonstrated for the petitioner

to prevail, failure to prove either prong is fatal to an

ineffective assistance claim.’’ Jefferson v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn. App. 767, 773, 73 A.3d

840, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 929, 78 A.3d 856 (2013).

When raising a subsequent habeas petition, ‘‘the petitioner must establish that both prior habeas counsel

and trial counsel were ineffective.’’ Alterisi v. Commissioner of Correction, 145 Conn. App. 218, 227, 77 A.3d

748, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 933, 78 A.3d 859 (2013).

I

The petitioner claims that his first habeas counsel

failed to pursue claims pertaining to the failure of Williams either to request a new trial or to appeal on the

basis of the trial court’s inconsistent application of the

dual intent requirement in the law of conspiracy, which

requires an agreement between coconspirators. The

petitioner claims that this inconsistency is evident in

argument on two successive days of the petitioner’s

criminal trial, and in Donofrio’s sentencing transcript.

The petitioner asserts that media coverage of the trial

motivated the trial court to change course. He asserts

that the trial court concluded there was no evidence

of a conspiracy on November 28, 1994, then, despite

this finding and after reading and hearing the media

speculation, denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on November 29, 1994, and then again found, when

sentencing Donofrio, that there was no evidence of a

conspiracy. The respondent replies, first, that collateral

estoppel bars this argument because the sufficiency of

the evidence for conspiracy was raised on direct appeal,

and second, that the petitioner failed to provide evidence at the second habeas trial that his first habeas

counsel was ineffective.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of the petitioner’s first claim. During the

criminal trial on November 28, 1994, Williams moved

for a judgment of acquittal on the second count, conspiracy to commit murder, on the ground that there was

no evidence of a meeting ofthe minds between Donofrio

and the petitioner. In considering the motion, the trial

court reviewed the evidence, principally Donofrio’s testimony on direct examination, and indicated it did not

see evidence of an agreement, a necessary element of

the crime. The state then focused the court’s attention

on Donofrio’s testimony that she suffocated the victim
after the petitioner handed her the pillow; the court

queried whether Donofrio’s testimony or the testimony

of Wayne Carver, the medical examiner, indicated that

the victim was alive when Donofrio placed the pillow

over her face. Judge Gormley concluded by telling the

state: ‘‘I’ll give you until tomorrow morning to deal with

this, but I can tell you I’ve gone over this transcript

with a fine tooth comb looking for exactly what you’ve

said I should be looking for before I remove the issue

from the jury and I don’t find any evidence, and I recognize I’m not looking for proof beyond a reasonable—I

don’t see any evidence, express or implied, explicit or

implicit, as of my reading of this, to evidence that this

kind of agreement was entertained by Ms. Donofrio and

without her there cannot be a conspiracy . . . .’’

At trial the following day, November 29, 1994, the

state again argued that there was sufficient evidence

that Donofrio had entered into an agreement with the

petitioner to murder the victim for the court to submit

the conspiracy count to the jury. In support of its argument, the state filed a brief and presented the court

with various sections of the transcript of Donofrio’s

cross-examination by Williams, which the court indicated it had not seen. One exchange in the transcript,

between Williams and Donofrio, provided as follows:

‘‘Q. [I]t’s your claim that Mark Bova was on the other

end of the line and he told you that he was right in the

middle of committing the murder. Is that right?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And it’s your claim that he told you he wanted

you to come right over and help him do it. Is that right?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And you said sure, I’ll be right there. Is that right?

‘‘A. I don’t know exactly what I said.

‘‘Q. Or something to that effect.’’

‘‘A. Yes.’’

Another exchange, again between Williams and

Donofrio, provided:

‘‘Q. Oh. Okay. All right. You’re just claiming that your

role was to use the pillow, is that right?

‘‘A. Yes.’’

Following a discussion of the law of conspiracy to

commit murder, the court commented: ‘‘I’m going to

read this because you’ve pointed out some new areas

or some areas where there may be sufficient evidence

to allow this to go to the jury . . . .’’ Still later, the

court noted that ‘‘I have both listened to myself being

quoted by others on the radio and what I’m supposed

to have said in newspaper accounts of this thing. They,

they, as often is the case, they come off somewhat

differently than what the court is actually dealing with.’’
The trial court reiterated that it would read the transcript it had just been given and continue to consider

the issue, after it let Williams present his argument.

Thereafter, the trial court denied the petitioner’s

motion for a judgment of acquittal. In doing so, it

reviewed Carver’s testimony, concluding that his testimony allowed for the possibility that the victim was

alive when Donofrio arrived at the house, and it

reviewed Donofrio’s testimony, finding several

instances that indicated a conspiracy, drawing special

attention to her testimony that the petitioner asked

for help when he was ‘‘in the process’’ of murdering

the victim.

In a separate proceeding, Donofrio pleaded guilty

to conspiracy to commit murder and making a false

statement to the police. State v. Bova, supra, 240 Conn.

217 n.3. At her sentencing, Judge Gormley considered

a statement from the victim’s family, a statement by

Donofrio’s brother, and several letters. The trial court

noted Donofrio’s cooperation in the prosecution of the

petitioner, and made its own observations regarding

her demeanor and her veracity while testifying. In the

course of its extensive remarks, it commented: ‘‘Again,

in the court’s mind, there is no way I could conclude

one way or the other whether or not there was still life

in Mrs. Bova at [the time when Donofrio arrived at the

house]. More than likely there was not.’’ It also noted

that in pleading guilty, ‘‘she has also chosen not to force

the state to prove a conspiracy case which would at

least have been, in the court’s mind, difficult, not impossible but difficult.’’ She was sentenced to ten years

imprisonment, execution suspended after four years,

and three years of probation for the conspiracy charge,

and received an unconditional discharge on the false

statement charge.

At the second habeas trial, the petitioner testified

regarding the media attention generated by the case,

specifically media speculation that the court was about

to grant the motion for acquittal based on the judge’s

statements on November 28, 1994. The petitioner also

submitted a newspaper article published on the morning of November 29, 1994. The article asserts that the

trial court was leaning toward granting the motion for

a judgment of acquittal. The article quotes several attorneys who opine on the effect of an acquittal on the

conspiracy charge.5 The second habeas court found that

the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proving

ineffective assistance of counsel according to both

Strickland prongs.

The petitioner has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by Williams’ failure to raise the issue of any discrepancy among the trial court’s statements regarding

the existence of a conspiracy; therefore we decline to

reach the first Strickland prong or the collateral estoppel argument.6 See Jefferson v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, supra, 144 Conn. App. 773. Our review of the

record demonstrates that the trial court commented on

the evidence in a thorough and thoughtful manner prior

to ruling; it did not make inconsistent rulings. The evidence and argument presented on November 29, 1994,

rather than the media speculation, provided the basis

for the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for

a judgment of acquittal. The trial court’s leniency in

sentencing Donofrio was supported by a host of factors,

and the trial court specifically stated that a conspiracy

case against Donofrio would not have been impossible

for the state to win. Nothing presented at the second

habeas trial rebuts this. The second habeas court properly found that the petitioner was not prejudiced by first

habeas counsel’s failure to raise the issue of Williams’

failure to argue that the trial court applied inconsistent

standards either in a motion for a new trial or in the

direct appeal.

II

The petitioner claims that the second habeas court

erred in finding that the petitioner’s first habeas counsel

did not fail to pursue adequately claims pertaining to

Williams’ failures to investigate and then produce an

adequate basis to impeach Donofrio. He asserts that

Williams should have pursued the theory that Donofrio

had been stalking the petitioner and his fiance ́e, Lisa

Sheldon, prior to and during the trial, and that this

would show Donofrio’s bias and motive. The respondent argues that this issue, again, is barred by collateral

estoppel,7 or, alternatively, that the petitioner failed to

demonstrate that his first habeas counsel and Williams

were ineffective.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. On direct examination during

the criminal trial, Donofrio testified that within one and

one-half years of the murder, the petitioner was with

another woman, Lisa Sheldon, and that after learning

this, Donofrio contacted the police. Donofrio testified

that she had not told the full truth in statements to

the police and in her testimony at the probable cause

hearing on September 30, 1993. She initially left out her

own involvement in the crime completely, but steadily

divulged further information regarding her role as the

investigation progressed. She eventually divulged, a

month before trial, that she felt for the victim’s pulse

and smothered her with a pillow. She testified that she

was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and

aiding and abetting murder.

On cross-examination during the criminal trial, Williams elicited further testimony from Donofrio regarding specific instances when she had lied to the police

and had lied in court at a pretrial hearing regarding her

own role in the murder and other details about her

relationship with the petitioner. She testified that she

had written the victim a letter describing her affair with
the petitioner in order to upset the victim and destroy

the victim’s marriage to the petitioner. Most importantly, she testified that she hated the petitioner and

wanted to destroy him.

While cross-examining Donofrio at the criminal trial

on November 15, 1994, Williams also asked why she

had been near the petitioner’s residence the previous

morning. The state objected on relevancy grounds, the

court excused the jury, and Williams continued to question Donofrio outside the presence of the jury. Donofrio

denied being near the petitioner’s residence on the

morning of November 14, 1994, and denied being near

Sheldon’s residence over the Memorial Day holiday of

1994. The trial court did not allow Williams to continue

the line of questioning.

At the second habeas trial, the petitioner testified

that he had seen Donofrio behind Sheldon’s house over

the Memorial Day weekend in 1994, that Sheldon had

seen Donofrio driving next to her during the trial, and

that Donofrio had moved from Derby to Naugatuck to

be closer to the petitioner. He also testified that Williams could have interviewed Sheldon or hired a private

investigator to uncover more information regarding

Donofrio’s alleged stalking behavior. The second

habeas court found that the petitioner had failed to

meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of

counsel according to both Strickland prongs.

We agree with the habeas court that the petitioner

failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Williams’ failure to pursue the stalking theory further and

do not reach the respondent’s other arguments. See

Jefferson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 144

Conn. App. 773. We are unable to conclude what evidence of stalking behavior the petitioner could have

elicited due to the petitioner’s failure to call Sheldon,

Donofrio, trial counsel, or first habeas counsel at the

second habeas trial. Moreover, our review of the record

reveals that Williams had elicited numerous examples

of Donofrio’s inconsistent statements and of her animosity toward the victim and the petitioner. There was

significant support for the second habeas court’s determination that the petitioner failed to prove there was

a reasonable possibility that had his first habeas counsel

raised Williams’ failure to pursue the stalking theory,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.

III

The petitioner next claims that his first habeas counsel failed to pursue adequately claims pertaining to Williams’ failures to object adequately to instances of

prosecutorial impropriety during closing argument. He

claimed that because Williams did not object to statements made by the prosecutor until after the luncheon

recess, the trial court denied Williams’ objection ‘‘as

untimely thereby allowing the comments to fester.’’ The
respondent replies that this claim is also controlled by

the Supreme Court’s determination that the comments

were not improper.8In the alternative, the respondent

asserts that neither the first habeas counsel nor Williams was ineffective.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

consideration of this issue. At the petitioner’s criminal

trial, the prosecutor argued at the conclusion of her

closing argument: ‘‘This is the husband of the week,

father of the year, best man, best friend of the decade.

This is the person with the motive, the opportunity and

the method. This is the man who has greed and has

lust. And, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is a

crime about greed and about lust on both their parts.

But for you, twelve men and women firm and true, with

a great responsibility, this is a case about justice. Thank

you.’’ The court excused the jury for lunch. Following

the luncheon recess, Williams argued that the language

used by the prosecutor and the manner in which she

delivered the closing (gesturing at the petitioner) were

unacceptable and that the court should instruct the jury

to disregard those portions of the closing argument. In

response, the prosecutor claimed that Williams’ failure

to object immediately demonstrated that those remarks

were not improper. The court ruled: ‘‘It would not be

the court’s intention to either comment on or strike the

language within the argument.’’

At the second habeas trial, the petitionertestified that

during the luncheon recess, following the prosecutor’s

comments, he asked Williams whether the prosecutor

was permitted to point her finger at him and make

statements such as ‘‘father of the year’’ and ‘‘husband

of the decade’’ about him. The petitioner further testified that, following this conversation, Williams objected

to the prosecutor’s comments, but the trial court

refused to comment to the jury.

Again, we agree that the petitioner has failed to prove

prejudice pursuant to Strickland. See Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 264–65. We

need not reach the respondent’s other arguments. See

Jefferson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 144

Conn. App. 773. Pursuant to State v. Stevenson, 269

Conn. 563, 576, 849 A.2d 626 (2004), when analyzing a

claim of prosecutorial impropriety, ‘‘the fact that

defense counsel did not object to one or more incidents

of [impropriety] must be considered in determining

whether and to what extent the [impropriety] contributed to depriving the defendant of a fair trial . . . .’’

See also State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540, 529

A.2d 653 (1987) (factors for determining prosecutorial

impropriety). The petitioner cites to State v. Ceballos,

266 Conn. 364, 832 A.2d 14 (2003): ‘‘We emphasize the

responsibility of defense counsel, at the very least, to

object to perceived prosecutorial improprieties as they

occur at trial . . . . Accordingly, we emphasize that
counsel’s failure to object at trial, while not by itself

fatal to a defendant’s claim, frequently will indicate on

appellate review the magnitude of the constitutional

error . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered.) Id.,

414. This statement by our Supreme Court is clearly

distinguishable; here, Williams did object at trial; he

merely did so following the luncheon recess. The trial

court did notrule that the objection was too late or that,

because Williams had not objected earlier, it discounted

the merits of the objection. It ruled that it would not

comment on or strike the language and did not further

elucidate its reasoning. Our Supreme Court upheld this

decision on direct appeal, with reference to State v.

Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 523, among other cases,

and without any mention of Williams’ failure to object

before the luncheon recess. State v. Bova, supra, 240

Conn. 244–45. Our only task, then, is to determine

whetherthe petitioner was prejudiced because Williams

objected after lunch rather than before lunch. We see

no evidence in the trial transcript or the second habeas

trial transcript suggesting that the court would have

ruled differently prior to lunch. We find that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing he was

prejudiced by the first habeas counsel’s failure to raise

the issue of Williams’ failure to object the moment the

prosecutor finished her closing argument.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The petitioner claimed on direct appeal that the trial court ‘‘improperly:

(1) restricted his cross-examination of several witnesses in violation of his

right to confront his accusers as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the

United States constitution; (2) denied his motion to suppress incriminating

evidence seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant issued in

violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution; (3)

precluded him from introducing certain evidence in violation of his right

to present a defense as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments

to the United States constitution; (4) overruled his objections to certain

allegedly inflammatory comments by the state during its closing argument,

thereby depriving him of a fair trial; and (5) concluded that the evidence

was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of the crime of conspiracy to

commit murder.’’ State v. Bova, supra, 240 Conn. 213.

2

In the first habeas case, the petitioner claimed that Williams failed to

object when the jury asked a question regarding the meaning of a ‘‘nonsurety

bond’’ during Donofrio’s testimony. Bova v. Commissioner, 95 Conn. App.

129, 131–133, 894 A.2d 1067, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 920, 901 A.2d 43 (2006).

The petitioner claimed that this demonstrated the jury was impermissibly

deliberating prematurely, and that Williams was ineffective in failing to

request an evidentiary hearing into the premature deliberations. Id., 135–36.

3 The petitioner alleged in the amended petition in the present action that

his attorneys for his first habeas action were Cynthia Barlow and George

Cameron, but the petitioner stated at the habeas trial that they were Adele

Patterson, Cynthia Barlow, and others.

4 While the petition for certification to appeal lists the habeas court’s

granting of the motion for summary judgment as a ground, the petitioner’s

arguments on appeal all concern the count alleging ineffective assistance

of first habeas counsel, which was the remaining count following the habeas

court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment.

5 The petitioner claims that the attorneys quoted in the article expressed

the opinion that acquitting as to one count would imply that the entire case,

including the remaining charge of murder, was weak. While this accurately

represents the opinions of some of the attorneys quoted, the article also

contained opinions to the contrary: one attorney stated that acquitting as

to one count ‘‘could cut both ways—either casting doubt on the prosecution’s
entire case or implying that even though [the trial judge] felt there wasn’t

enough evidence of conspiracy, there was enough evidence that Bova committed the murder’’; another stated that ‘‘the effect would be minimal.’’

6 While we do notreach the issue of collateral estoppel, in Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57, 66, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied,

299 Conn. 926, 11 A.3d 150 (2011), this court held that in order for a claim

on direct appeal to have preclusive effect on a habeas action, the claims

must be identical. ‘‘Although the habeas court was correct that the deficiency

of counsel claim bears a striking similarity to the claim of impropriety by

the court raised on direct appeal, this is a separate claim, thus requiring

separate legal analysis.’’ Id. Unlike in Diaz, in the present case, collateral

estoppel was not the basis for the habeas court’s decision on the issues

appealed by the petitioner, although it was the basis for the court’s grant

of summary judgment on other counts of the petition.

7 See footnote 6 of this opinion. On direct appeal, our Supreme Court held

that ‘‘the [petitioner] had already elicited numerous admissions by Donofrio

that clearly established her intense and abiding hostility toward him.’’ State

v. Bova, supra, 240 Conn. 226.

8 See footnote 6 of this opinion. On direct appeal, our Supreme Court

held: ‘‘In this case, the state’s remarks regarding the defendant’s lust and

greed were fully supported by the evidence; indeed, the jury reasonably

could have concluded that such lust and greed provided the defendant with

sufficient motive to kill the victim. Although it may be argued that the state’s

ironic characterization of the defendant as a good husband and father was

unnecessarily caustic, it cannot be said that the comments were without

support in the record. The challenged remarks were relatively isolated and

brief, they did not reflect a pattern of misconduct, and they did not implicate

the fairness of the defendant’s trial.’’ State v. Bova, supra, 240 Conn. 244–45.