COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

ALEXANDER C. GRAHAM, JR. 

v. Record No. 0718-95-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

TERRELL C. GRAHAM NOVEMBER 7, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GOOCHLAND COUNTY 

F. Ward Harkrader, Jr., Judge 

 (Donald K. Butler; Morano, Colan & Butler, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 No brief for appellee. 

 Alexander C. Graham, Jr., (husband) appeals the decision of 

the circuit court awarding Terrell C. Graham (wife) $200,000 of 

the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. Husband 

argues: (1) the trial court based its award on an erroneous 

appraisal; (2) the facts do not justify the award; (3) the award 

is irreconcilable with the decision to give husband the larger 

portion of the equity in the marital residence; and (4) the award 

was an abuse of discretion because it failed to effect an 

equitable distribution of the principal marital asset. Upon 

reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that 

this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm 

the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 Our review of an equitable distribution order pursuant to 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

Code § 20-107.3 requires deference to the chancellor's resolution 

of the equities. The decision will be disturbed only if it fails 

to comport with the statutory scheme, is without support in the 

evidence, or reflects an abuse of discretion. Banagan v. 

Banagan, 17 Va. App. 321, 326, 437 S.E.2d 229, 231-32 (1993). 

 The commissioner's initial report estimated the value of the 

marital residence at $864,500, which was the listing price at the 

time of the hearing. The commissioner found that husband had 

provided virtually all the funds used to acquire and construct 

the marital home, and determined husband was entitled "to a share 

of the value of the real estate which is at least twice the 

amount to which [wife] is entitled." However, the commissioner 

also determined that wife was entitled to a lump sum payable from 

the proceeds of the marital home, in part due to her substantial 

nonmonetary contributions to the family's well-being and also 

because of "the circumstances and factors which led to the 

dissolution of the marriage." The lump sum payment to wife, 

subtracted from husband's share, would "result in an equal 

division of the proceeds." Therefore, the commissioner 

determined that, on balance, the parties should roughly share the 

equity, but that wife should be guaranteed $200,000 from the net 

sale proceeds. The subsequent commissioner's report confirmed 

that wife was to receive the first $200,000 of the sales 

proceeds, regardless of the sales price. 

 While husband alleges that the commissioner's report was 
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based upon the erroneous conclusion that the home would sell for 

over $800,000, the record demonstrates that the commissioner's 

recommendation, as accepted by the chancellor, remained the same 

even when the listing price was substantially lower. Therefore, 

there is no evidence to support husband's argument that the 

commissioner relied on an erroneous fact. 

 The marital residence was the largest single marital asset. 

 Wife made few monetary contributions to the marriage, but made 

substantial nonmonetary contributions. Husband deserted the 

marriage, which necessitated the sale of the home. Husband 

acquired a separate residence prior to the divorce, while wife 

and the parties' children had not yet moved. While husband 

alleges that no facts justify the award of $200,000 to wife, we 

cannot say on review that the chancellor's decision to give wife 

a lump sum award was unsupported by evidence or an abuse of 

discretion. 

 There was no irreconcilable conflict between the 

commissioner's recognition of husband's greater financial 

contributions to the acquisition of the marital home and the 

commissioner's recommendation to award a minimum lump sum payment 

to wife. The commissioner listed husband's greater financial 

contributions as a factor which would justify husband receiving a 

greater share of the sale proceeds. However, husband's financial 

contributions were balanced by wife's nonfinancial contributions 

and husband's desertion of the marriage. The commissioner 
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therefore recommended that the parties share the proceeds of the 

sale of the marital home, subject to the condition that wife 

first receive at least $200,000. In the event the proceeds were 

less than $400,000, wife was to receive $200,000 nonetheless. 

Therefore, husband has not demonstrated that an irreconcilable 

conflict existed within the commissioner's recommendations. 

 Finally, the fact that husband might receive less than wife 

from the sale of the marital home did not amount to an abuse of 

discretion. The commissioner listed the factors warranting a 

minimum lump sum payment to wife. "The term 'equitable 

distribution' does not mean 'equal distribution.'" Marion v. 

Marion, 11 Va. App. 659, 663, 401 S.E.2d 432, 435 (1991). We 

cannot say the chancellor abused his discretion by accepting the 

commissioner's recommendation. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.