Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 23573 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–4279; Special 

Conditions No. 25–612–SC] 

Special Conditions: Gulfstream 

Aerospace Corporation, Gulfstream 

GVI Airplane; Non-Rechargeable 

Lithium Battery Installations 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Gulfstream Aerospace 

Corporation (Gulfstream) GVI airplane. 

This airplane will have a novel or 

unusual design feature when compared 

to the state of technology envisioned in 

the airworthiness standards for 

transport-category airplanes. This 

design feature is non-rechargeable 

lithium batteries. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for this design feature. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective April 22, 2017. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Nazih Khaouly, Airplane and Flight 

Crew Interface Branch, ANM–111, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington, 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–2432; facsimile 

425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Future Requests for Installation of NonRechargeable Lithium Batteries 

The FAA anticipates that nonrechargeable lithium batteries will be 

installed in other makes and models of 

airplanes. We have determined to 

require special conditions for all 

applications requesting nonrechargeable lithium battery 

installations, except the installations 

excluded in the Applicability section, 

until the airworthiness requirements 

can be revised to address this issue. 

Applying special conditions to these 

installations across the range of all 

transport-airplane makes and models 

will ensure regulatory consistency 

among applicants. 

These are the first special conditions 

the FAA has issued for non-rechargeable 

lithium battery installations on any 

airplane. The FAA has determined that 

these special conditions become 

effective 1 year after their publication in 

the Federal Register for reasons 

explained below in response to a public 

comment. The FAA intends for future 

special conditions for other makes and 

models to be effective on this same date 

or 30 days after their publication, 

whichever is later. 

Background 

Gulfstream applied for several 

changes to type certificate no. 

T00015AT to install non-rechargeable 

lithium batteries in the Model GVI 

airplane. The Gulfstream Model GVI 

airplane is a twin-engine, transportcategory airplane with a maximum 

passenger capacity of 19 and maximum 

takeoff weight of 99,600 pounds. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.101, 

Gulfstream must show that the design 

change and areas affected by the change 

continue to meet the applicable 

provisions of the regulations listed in 

type certificate no. T00015AT, or the 

applicable regulations in effect on the 

date of application for the change, 

except for earlier amendments as agreed 

upon by the FAA. The regulations listed 

in the type certificate are commonly 

referred to as the ‘‘original type 

certification basis.’’ The regulations 

listed in type certificate no. T00015AT 

are 14 CFR part 25 effective February 1, 

1965, including Amendments 25–1 

through 25–120, 25–122, 25–124, and 

25–132. The certification basis also 

includes certain special conditions, 

exemptions, and equivalent-safety 

findings that are not relevant to these 

special conditions. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Gulfstream Model GVI 

airplane must comply with the fuel-vent 

and exhaust-emission requirements of 

14 CFR part 34, and the noisecertification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Gulfstream Model GVI airplane 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the Gulfstream Model GVI 

airplane model for which they are 

issued. Should the type certificate for 

that model be amended later to include 

any other model that incorporates the 

same novel or unusual design feature, or 

should any other model already 

included on the same type certificate be 

modified to incorporate the same novel 

or unusual design feature, these special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Gulfstream Model GVI airplane 

will incorporate non-rechargeable 

lithium batteries. 

A battery system consists of the 

battery and any protective, monitoring, 

and alerting circuitry or hardware inside 

or outside of the battery, and venting 

capability where necessary. For the 

purpose of these special conditions, we 

refer to a battery and battery system as 

a battery. 

Discussion 

The FAA derived the current 

regulations governing installation of 

batteries in transport-category airplanes 

from Civil Air Regulations (CAR) 

4b.625(d) as part of the re-codification 

of CAR 4b that established 14 CFR part 

25 in February 1965. This recodification basically reworded the CAR 

4b battery requirements, which are 

currently in § 25.1353(b)(1) through 

(b)(4). Non-rechargeable lithium 

batteries are novel and unusual with 

respect to the state of technology 

considered when these requirements 

were codified. These batteries introduce 

higher energy levels into airplane 

systems through new chemical 

compositions in various battery-cell 

sizes and construction. Interconnection 

of these cells in battery packs introduces 

failure modes that require unique design 

considerations, such as provisions for 

thermal management. 

Recent events involving rechargeable 

and non-rechargeable lithium batteries 

prompted the FAA to initiate a broad 

evaluation of these energy-storage 

technologies. In January 2013, two 

independent events involving 

rechargeable lithium-ion batteries 

revealed unanticipated failure modes. A 

National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) letter to the FAA, dated May 22, 

2014, which is available at http://

www.ntsb.gov, filename A–14–032– 

036.pdf, describes these events. 

On July 12, 2013, an event involving 

a non-rechargeable lithium battery, in 

an emergency-locator-transmitter 

installation, demonstrated 

unanticipated failure modes. The 

United Kingdom’s Air Accidents 


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Investigation Branch Bulletin S5/2013 

describes this event. 

Some known uses of rechargeable and 

non-rechargeable lithium batteries on 

airplanes include: 

• Flight deck and avionics systems 

such as displays, global-positioning 

systems, cockpit voice recorders, flightdata recorders, underwater locator 

beacons, navigation computers, 

integrated avionics computers, satellite 

network and communication systems, 

communication-management units, and 

remote-monitor electronic linereplaceable units; 

• Cabin safety, entertainment, and 

communications equipment, including 

emergency-locator transmitters, life 

rafts, escape slides, seatbelt air bags, 

cabin-management systems, Ethernet 

switches, routers and media servers, 

wireless systems, internet and in-flight 

entertainment systems, satellite 

televisions, remotes, and handsets; 

• Systems in cargo areas including 

door controls, sensors, videosurveillance equipment, and security 

systems. 

Some known potential hazards and 

failure modes associated with nonrechargeable lithium batteries are: 

• Internal failures: In general, these 

batteries are significantly more 

susceptible to internal failures that can 

result in self-sustaining increases in 

temperature and pressure (i.e., thermal 

runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or 

lead-acid counterparts. The metallic 

lithium can ignite, resulting in a selfsustaining fire or explosion. 

• Fast or imbalanced discharging: 

Fast discharging or an imbalanced 

discharge of one cell of a multi-cell 

battery may create an overheating 

condition that results in an 

uncontrollable venting condition, which 

in turn leads to a thermal event or an 

explosion. 

• Flammability: Unlike nickelcadmium and lead-acid batteries, 

lithium batteries use higher energy and 

current in an electrochemical system 

that can be configured to maximize 

energy storage of lithium. They also use 

liquid electrolytes that can be extremely 

flammable. The electrolyte, as well as 

the electrodes, can serve as a source of 

fuel for an external fire if the battery 

casing is breached. 

Special condition no. 1 requires that 

each individual cell within a nonrechargeable lithium battery be designed 

to maintain safe temperatures and 

pressures. Special condition no. 2 

addresses these same issues but for the 

entire battery. Special condition no. 2 

requires the battery be designed to 

prevent propagation of a thermal event, 

such as self-sustained, uncontrolled 

increases in temperature or pressure 

from one cell to adjacent cells. 

Special condition nos. 1 and 2 are 

intended to ensure that the nonrechargeable lithium battery and its 

cells are designed to eliminate the 

potential for uncontrollable failures. 

However, a certain number of failures 

will occur due to various factors beyond 

the control of the battery designer. 

Therefore, other special conditions are 

intended to protect the airplane and its 

occupants if failure occurs. 

Special condition nos. 3, 7, and 8 are 

self-explanatory; the FAA does not 

provide further explanation for them at 

this time. 

The FAA requires special condition 

no. 4 to make it clear that the 

flammable-fluid fire-protection 

requirements of § 25.863 apply to nonrechargeable lithium battery 

installations. Section 25.863 is 

applicable to areas of the airplane that 

could be exposed to flammable-fluid 

leakage from airplane systems. Nonrechargeable lithium batteries contain 

an electrolyte that is a flammable fluid. 

Special condition no. 5 requires each 

non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installation to not damage surrounding 

structure or adjacent systems, 

equipment, or electrical wiring from 

corrosive fluids or gases that may 

escape. 

Special condition no. 5 addresses 

corrosive fluids and gases, whereas 

special condition no. 6 addresses heat. 

Special condition no. 6 requires each 

non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installation to have provisions to 

prevent any hazardous effect on 

airplane structure or systems caused by 

the maximum amount of heat the 

battery installation can generate due to 

any failure of it or its individual cells. 

The means of meeting these special 

conditions may be the same, but they 

are independent requirements 

addressing different hazards. 

These special conditions apply to all 

non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installations in lieu of § 25.1353(b)(1) 

through (b)(4) at Amendment 25–113. 

Sections 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at 

Amendment 25–113 remain in effect for 

other battery installations. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

no. 25–15–09–SC, for the Gulfstream 

GVI airplane, was published in the 

Federal Register on November 20, 2015 

(80 FR 72618). Five commenters 

provided comments. 

The Aerospace Industries Association 

(AIA) recommended revising proposed 

special condition no. 1 to read (see 

italics), ‘‘. . . each non-rechargeable 

lithium battery installation must 

maintain safe cell temperatures and 

pressure under all foreseeable operating 

conditions to prevent fire and explosion 

by validating that the performance of 

non-rechargeable lithium cells selected 

for use are acceptable with regards to 

the operating environment.’’ AIA stated 

that this revision helps clarify the term 

‘‘foreseeable operating conditions’’ as 

‘‘airplane operating and environmental 

conditions over which proper 

functioning of the equipment, systems, 

and installations is required to be 

considered includes the full normal 

operating envelope of the airplane as 

defined by the Airplane Flight Manual 

together with any modification to that 

envelope associated with abnormal or 

emergency procedures.’’ AIA referenced 

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309– 

1A and AC 25–11A to support this 

definition. The FAA does not agree with 

the proposal. The FAA intends for the 

term ‘‘foreseeable operating conditions’’ 

in these special conditions to not only 

apply at the airplane level but also at 

the battery-cell level. Therefore, we 

have not incorporated this proposed 

revision into the special condition. 

AIA recommended revising proposed 

special condition no. 2 to read, ‘‘. . . 

each non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installation must prevent the occurrence 

of self-sustaining, uncontrolled 

increases in temperature or pressure 

which would preclude continued safe 

flight and landing.’’ AIA states that this 

change allows the use of airplane-level 

mitigation or design change to 

appropriately address the hazard. The 

FAA does not agree with the proposal. 

The FAA has determined that these 

special conditions are intended to 

require the battery, which includes its 

installation provisions, to be designed to 

prevent uncontrollable failure, and to 

not rely only on mitigation of a battery 

failure at the airplane level. Therefore, 

we have not revised proposed special 

condition no. 2. 

AIA recommended revising proposed 

special condition no. 3 to read, ‘‘. . . 

each non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installation must not emit explosive or 

toxic gases in normal operation, or as a 

result of any failure which is not shown 

to be extremely remote . . .’’ The FAA 

does not agree with the proposal to 

exclude extremely remote failures. To 

ensure that all failures that are not 

extremely improbable are properly 

anticipated and accounted for, we have 


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not revised proposed special condition 

no. 3 to include the proposed words. 

Note that service history currently 

shows that battery failure is more 

frequent than extremely remote. 

AIA recommended deleting proposed 

special condition no. 4. AIA stated that 

it does not introduce a new 

airworthiness requirement and that it 

seems more appropriate to clarify 

applicability of an existing 

airworthiness requirement via policy. 

The FAA does not agree with the 

proposal. Section 25.863 historically has 

been applied to flammable fluids related 

to propulsion and hydraulic systems. 

The FAA has not issued guidance 

material at this time that would ensure 

a proper understanding that this section 

also applies to non-rechargeable lithium 

battery installations, which contain 

flammable fluid. We have determined to 

not delete proposed special condition 

no. 4. 

AIA recommended revising proposed 

special condition no. 5 to read, ‘‘. . . 

each non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installation must not allow escape of 

corrosive fluids or gases that may 

damage surrounding structure or any 

adjacent systems, equipment, or 

electrical wiring of the aircraft in such 

a way as to cause a hazardous or 

catastrophic failure condition.’’ The 

FAA agrees with the comment in that 

the special condition requires 

clarification. The FAA intends for 

special condition no. 5 to be consistent 

with § 25.1309. So, we added the words 

‘‘. . . in such a way as to cause a major 

or more-severe failure condition.’’ The 

revised special condition now reads, 

‘‘. . . each non-rechargeable lithium 

battery installation must not damage 

surrounding structure or adjacent 

systems, equipment, or electrical wiring 

from corrosive fluids or gases that may 

escape in such a way as to cause a major 

or more-severe failure condition.’’ The 

FAA does not concur with excluding 

major failure conditions, nor limiting 

the types of failure conditions as 

proposed. 

AIA recommended revising proposed 

special condition no. 6 to read, ‘‘. . . 

each non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installation must have provisions to 

prevent any hazardous effect on 

airplane structure or systems caused by 

the maximum amount of heat it can 

generate due to any failure of a single 

cell within a battery pack, which 

precludes continued safe flight and 

landing.’’ AIA stated that they believe 

the intent of this special condition is to 

show that the battery design can tolerate 

a failure of a single cell. The FAA does 

not concur with AIA’s recommendation. 

We intend for special condition no. 6 to 

require consideration of the maximum 

heat the battery can generate if it fails 

(that is, not just the heat from one cell 

for multi-cell batteries), including the 

heat generated from thermal runaway 

propagating from one cell to the other 

cells. AIA’s proposed wording could be 

interpreted as only requiring 

consideration of the heat generated from 

a single cell. AIA also stated that design 

mitigation or analysis at the airplane 

level may be applied to show the design 

to be compliant. This comment 

addresses how to show compliance with 

the special condition and would not 

change the special condition. This 

comment can be addressed during the 

type certification projects. 

AIA recommended deleting proposed 

special condition no. 7, which reads, 

‘‘. . . each non-rechargeable lithium 

battery installation must be capable of 

automatically controlling the discharge 

rate of each cell to prevent cell 

imbalance, back-charging, overheating, 

and uncontrollable temperature and 

pressure.’’ AIA stated that the hazard 

intended to be addressed by this special 

condition would be prevented by 

meeting special condition nos. 1, 2, 4 

and 5. The intent of proposed special 

condition no. 7 was to also address 

charge imbalance because an in-service 

event demonstrated that a charge 

imbalance is one of many failure modes 

that can lead to a thermal runaway 

condition. However, the FAA agrees 

with deleting proposed special 

condition no. 7 because compliance 

with special condition nos. 1 and 2 

accomplish the safety objectives of 

proposed special condition no. 7. 

AIA recommended deleting proposed 

special condition no. 8, which reads, 

‘‘. . . each non-rechargeable lithium 

battery installation must have a means 

to automatically disconnect from its 

discharging circuit in the event of an 

over-temperature condition, cell failure, 

or battery failure.’’ The FAA agrees with 

deleting this proposed special condition 

because doing so does not relieve 

applicants from the need to comply 

with § 25.1309. In addition to § 25.1309, 

all applicable system-level requirements 

may require the connected system to 

automatically disconnect from the 

battery discharging circuit in the event 

of an over-temperature condition, cell 

failure, or battery failure. 

AIA recommended revising proposed 

special condition no. 9 (which is now 

special condition no. 7 in these special 

conditions) to read, ‘‘. . . each nonrechargeable lithium battery installation 

must have a failure sensing and warning 

system to alert the flightcrew if its 

failure affects precludes continued safe 

flight and landing of the airplane.’’ AIA 

stated that this proposed special 

condition repeats the criteria defined in 

§ 25.1309, and therefore is a duplication 

of current Federal aviation 

requirements. Proposed special 

condition no. 9 has the same purpose as 

that of § 25.1309(c), which is to require 

flightcrew alerting if failure of a battery 

installation, in itself or in relation to a 

system that performs an airplane-level 

function, could result in ‘‘unsafe system 

operating conditions’’ as stated in 

§ 25.1309(c). The FAA’s intent for this 

special condition is to emphasize this 

requirement specifically for nonrechargeable lithium battery 

installations. We do not concur with 

AIA’s recommendation because the 

revised wording does not fully address 

the ‘‘unsafe system operating 

conditions’’ as required in § 25.1309(c). 

AIA recommended revising proposed 

special condition no. 10 (which is now 

special condition no. 8 in these special 

conditions) to read, ‘‘. . . each nonrechargeable lithium battery installation 

must have a means for the flightcrew or 

maintenance personnel to determine the 

battery charge state if the battery’s 

function is required for continued safe 

flight and landing of the airplane.’’ AIA 

stated that this proposed special 

condition repeats the criteria defined in 

§ 25.1309, and therefore is a duplication 

of current Federal aviation 

requirements. For similar reasons given 

in our response to the AIA comment on 

proposed special condition no. 9, we do 

not concur with AIA’s recommendation. 

The FAA’s intent for this special 

condition is to emphasize this 

requirement specifically for nonrechargeable lithium battery 

installations. We do not concur with 

AIA’s recommendation because the 

revised wording does not fully address 

the ‘‘unsafe system operating 

conditions’’ as required in § 25.1309(c). 

The Boeing Company commented that 

they concur with AIA’s comments. 

The Boeing Company also requested 

that the FAA provide adequate time 

before non-rechargeable lithium battery 

special conditions become effective, to 

support validation activities by foreign 

civil airworthiness authorities (FCAA) 

and to not adversely impact future 

airplane deliveries by all applicants. 

The Boeing Company stated that they 

have been ‘‘informed by FCAAs that 

validation activities for FAA type 

certificate data sheet certification basis 

changes can take up to 12 months after 

receipt of application.’’ The FAA agrees 

that adequate time is necessary to allow 

Gulfstream, and other applicants for 

which similar special conditions will be 

issued, to coordinate with FCAAs, and 

to conduct other activities associated 


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with implementing these special 

conditions, which have not been 

required for previous approvals. These 

are the first special conditions the FAA 

has issued for a non-rechargeable 

lithium battery installation on any 

airplane. Likewise, we have determined 

that an effective date of one year after 

special conditions publication is 

appropriate. The FAA also has been 

coordinating with other applicants to 

develop proposed special conditions for 

their projects involving nonrechargeable lithium batteries. The FAA 

intends for future special conditions, for 

other airplane makes and models, to be 

effective on this same date or 30 days 

after their publication, whichever is 

later. 

The Boeing Company commented that 

‘‘. . . these special conditions should 

clearly indicate the scope of changes for 

which the certification basis is deemed 

inadequate and requires application of 

the special conditions.’’ The Boeing 

Company made this comment in regards 

to the applicability of these special 

conditions to batteries that have less 

than 2 watt-hours of energy and meet 

Underwriters Laboratories (UL) 1642 or 

UL 2054. The FAA has determined that 

the use of UL 1642 and UL 2054 should 

be addressed as a method-of-compliance 

issue rather than exclusion criteria for 

certain battery sizes. These special 

conditions are to apply to all nonrechargeable lithium batteries regardless 

of their size. These special conditions 

require this where it states ‘‘. . . each 

non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installation must . . .’’ 

Airbus commented that they assume 

that the FAA considers the standards in 

Radio Technical Commission for 

Aeronautics (RTCA) DO–227, Minimum 

Operational Performance Standard for 

Lithium Batteries, to be an acceptable 

means of compliance with the special 

conditions that address batteryqualification aspects. Airbus also 

commented that they assume that 

compliance with the other special 

conditions is demonstrated through 

analysis of battery integration in the 

airplane physical and functional 

environment. These comments address 

how to show compliance with the 

special conditions and would not 

change the special conditions. These 

comments can be addressed during the 

type certification projects. 

Airbus commented that batteries that 

are Category I, as defined in RTCA DO– 

227, should be excluded from proposed 

special condition nos. 1 through 8 

(which are special condition nos. 1 

through 6 in these special conditions). 

RTCA DO–227 defines these batteries as 

‘‘solid-cathode cells that contain less 

than 0.15 grams of lithium or lithium 

alloy, and batteries that use not more 

than four such cells.’’ The FAA does not 

concur. These special conditions are 

intended to provide an appropriate level 

of safety for all non-rechargeable 

lithium battery installations. 

Bombardier provided the following 

comment on proposed special condition 

no. 3: ‘‘The quantity of [lithium battery] 

gas that will constitute a hazard is 

difficult to define and test. An 

outgassing limit in corresponding to cell 

size/number would be easier to comply 

with and test. This should only apply in 

the failure case, as in normal cell 

operation non-rechargeable [lithium 

batteries] are expected to remain sealed. 

We recommend wording that would 

instead limit cell size/number and 

require cell isolation to minimize 

hazard to airplane and occupant in case 

of failure and be sealed in normal 

operation. Exposure to occupants may 

be achieved by locating battery 

installations away from occupant areas 

on the airplane.’’ The FAA does not 

agree with the proposal. The FAA 

considers that a special condition that 

limits the number of cells and their size 

would be unnecessarily restrictive. Note 

that this special condition does not 

require applicants to determine the 

quantity of gas that would constitute a 

hazard. For example, an acceptable 

means of complying with this special 

condition is to demonstrate, through 

tests, that all emitted gasses are 

contained or vented overboard through 

designed ports. However, this special 

condition does allow explosive and 

toxic gases to be uncontained and not 

vented overboard if they do not 

accumulate in hazardous quantities 

within the airplane. 

Bombardier commented that a design 

that prevents fluids and gases from 

escaping the installation should be an 

acceptable means of complying with 

proposed special condition no. 5. 

Bombardier recommended addressing 

the need for fluid containment. These 

comments address how to show 

compliance with the special conditions 

and would not change the special 

conditions. These comments can be 

addressed during the type certification 

projects. 

Transport Canada recommended 

revising proposed special condition no. 

1 to address ‘‘all hazards.’’ We have not 

revised this special condition because it 

is intended to address only the cell-level 

hazards, which are fire and explosion. 

All hazards are addressed through 

compliance with the complete set of 

applicable special conditions. 

Transport Canada recommended 

adding a sentence to proposed special 

condition no. 2 that reads, ‘‘Batteries 

that are capable of venting toxic gases 

shall not be installed or used in the 

aircraft cockpit.’’ Transport Canada 

stated that adding this sentence would 

harmonize the special condition with 

Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO– 

C142a, Non-Rechargeable Lithium Cells 

and Batteries, and RTCA DO–227, 

Minimum Operational Performance 

Standard for Lithium Batteries. The 

FAA does not agree with the proposal 

and did not add this sentence to special 

condition no. 2. We consider the special 

condition without this sentence more 

appropriate because it allows an 

applicant to demonstrate that the 

amount of gases a battery vents is not a 

hazard to the flight deck, and allows 

installation of those batteries. 

Transport Canada recommended 

revising proposed special condition no. 

5 to read, ‘‘. . . each non-rechargeable 

lithium battery installation must not 

damage surrounding structure or 

adjacent systems, equipment, or 

electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or 

gases that may escape in such a way as 

to cause a major or more severe failure 

condition.’’ The FAA concurs, and has 

incorporated the recommended wording 

into special condition no. 5. We explain 

our agreement with adding these words 

in our above response to AIA’s comment 

on this special condition. 

Transport Canada recommended 

revising proposed special condition no. 

6 to refer to ‘‘essential systems’’ instead 

of ‘‘systems,’’ because the FAA 

previously found that wording 

acceptable for rechargeable lithium 

battery special conditions. 

Alternatively, Transport Canada 

recommended that the FAA be 

consistent and use ‘‘systems’’ for both 

rechargeable and non-rechargeable 

lithium battery special conditions in the 

future. The intent of this special 

condition is to address the hazards to 

the airplane regardless of the system 

critically. The FAA agrees with using 

‘‘systems’’ in this special condition and 

in the next special conditions we 

propose for a rechargeable lithium 

battery installation. 

Transport Canada recommended 

revising proposed special condition no. 

6 to read, ‘‘. . .each non-rechargeable 

lithium battery installation must have 

provisions to prevent any hazardous 

effect on airplane structure or systems 

caused by the maximum amount of heat 

it can generate due to any discharge 

condition and/or failure of it or its 

individual cells.’’ The FAA does not 

agree with the proposal. The maximum 

heat generated due to any battery or cell 

failure (for example, the heat generated 

during thermal runaway) represents the 


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worst-case condition. The maximum 

heat generated during ‘‘any discharge 

condition’’ will not exceed this worstcase condition. Therefore, the FAA did 

not revise this special condition. Transport Canada recommended 

including ‘‘unbalanced discharge’’ in 

the list of conditions intended to be 

prevented in proposed special condition 

no. 7. As a result of a comment from 

AIA addressed above, the FAA deleted 

proposed special condition no. 7 

because compliance with special 

condition nos. 1 and 2 accomplish its 

safety objectives. Special conditions 1 

and 2 also address unbalanced 

discharge. Transport Canada recommended 

revising proposed special condition no. 

8 to read, ‘‘. . . each non-rechargeable 

lithium battery installation must have a 

means to automatically and 

permanently disconnect from its 

discharging circuit in the event of an 

over-temperature condition, overcurrent condition, cell failure, or battery 

failure.’’ Transport Canada 

recommended this change to raise 

awareness of issues associated with 

positive temperature coefficient 

protective devices in lithium battery 

design. As discussed above in response 

to an AIA comment, the FAA deleted 

proposed special condition no. 8, and 

therefore, has not incorporated the 

recommended revision. 

Transport Canada recommended 

adding a special condition to require 

instructions for continued airworthiness 

(ICAs) to address handling and storage 

of non-rechargeable lithium batteries at 

a minimum. The FAA has not added the 

recommended special condition because 

§ 25.1529 requires ICAs for nonrechargeable lithium battery 

installations. To ensure compliance 

with § 25.1529, the FAA is documenting 

acceptable methods of compliance with 

§ 25.1529 for non-rechargeable lithium 

battery installations as part of the 

certification process. These methods of 

compliance address the issues Transport 

Canada raised. The FAA previously 

included a special condition that 

requires compliance with § 25.1529 in 

rechargeable lithium battery special 

conditions. For consistency and the 

above-stated reasons, the FAA plans to 

no longer include that special condition 

in special conditions applicable to 

rechargeable lithium batteries. Transport Canada recommended ‘‘the 

special condition be written in such a 

way as to drive the requirement for 

original equipment manufacturers to 

complete an adequate failure modes and 

effects analysis (FMEA) in order to 

discover and mitigate for all failure 

modes, including those that are less 

well known.’’ The FAA does not agree 

with the proposal. The current FAA AC 

25.1309–1A and Aviation Rulemaking 

Advisory Committee (ARAC) 

recommended AC 25.1309–Arsenal 

contain guidance to utilize FMEA in the 

safety-assessment process. The FAA 

believes that these special conditions, 

and the hazards identified, drive the 

FMEA or any other system-safety 

assessment tool to comprehensively 

assess the risk of battery failures. We 

believe that we have accomplished 

Transport Canada’s recommendation. Transport Canada recommended 

changes to FAA TSO–142a, NonRechargeable Lithium Cells and 

Batteries. Their comment did not 

recommend changes to these special 

conditions; as such, this comment does 

not affect these special conditions. Transport Canada recommended 

adding a special condition that reads, 

‘‘Equipment manufacturers intending to 

use lithium-metal batteries in aircraft 

equipment must demonstrate that the 

battery design incorporates an 

acceptable level of circuit protection to 

mitigate against known failure modes 

including, but not limited to, external 

short-circuits and unbalanced 

discharge.’’ Transport Canada 

referenced Air Accidents Investigation 

Branch (AAIB) Safety Recommendation 

2015–016 to support this 

recommendation, which states, ‘‘It is 

recommended that the Federal Aviation 

Administration, in conjunction with the 

European Aviation Safety Agency and 

Transport Canada, require equipment 

manufacturers intending to use lithiummetal batteries in aircraft equipment to 

demonstrate that the battery design 

incorporates an acceptable level of 

circuit protection to mitigate against 

known failure modes including, but not 

limited to, external short-circuits and 

unbalanced discharge.’’ The FAA does 

not concur with adding this special 

condition. The AAIB wrote their 

recommendation based on a nonrechargeable lithium battery installation 

that was approved before the FAA 

determined the need to apply special 

conditions. Their recommendation is 

specific to incorporating circuit 

protection, which is a means to achieve 

the safety level defined in these special 

conditions. The FAA intends for these 

special conditions to be performancebased. Additionally, type certificate and 

supplemental type certificate 

applicants, and not the equipment 

manufacturers who have not applied for 

the installation approval, are required to 

demonstrate compliance to applicable 

special conditions. The FAA has determined that 

‘‘uncontrolled’’ in special condition no. 

2 should be ‘‘uncontrollable’’ to more 

accurately describe the concern. This 

revision does not change the intended 

meaning of this special condition. 

Except as discussed above, the special 

conditions are adopted as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the 

Gulfstream Model GVI airplane. Should 

Gulfstream apply at a later date for a 

change to the type certificate to include 

another model incorporating the same 

novel or unusual design feature, these 

special conditions would apply to that 

model as well. 

These special conditions are only 

applicable to design changes applied for 

after its effective date. The existing 

airplane fleet and follow-on deliveries 

of airplanes with previously certified 

non-rechargeable lithium battery 

installations are not affected. 

These special conditions are not 

applicable to changes to previously 

certified non-rechargeable lithium 

battery installations where the only 

change is either cosmetic or relocating 

the installation to improve the safety of 

the airplane and occupants. The FAA 

determined that this exclusion is in the 

public interest because the need to meet 

all of the special conditions might 

otherwise deter design changes that 

solely involve relocating batteries to 

improve safety. A cosmetic change is a 

change in appearance only, and does 

not change any function or safety 

characteristic of the battery installation. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of airplane. It is not a rule of general 

applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and record keeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, the following special 

conditions are part of the type 

certification basis for Gulfstream Model 

GVI airplanes. 

Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery 

Installations 

In lieu of § 25.1353(b)(1) through 

(b)(4) at Amendment 25–113, each nonrechargeable lithium battery installation 

must: 

1. Maintain safe cell temperatures and 

pressures under all foreseeable 

operating conditions to prevent fire and 

explosion. 


asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
23578 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

2. Prevent the occurrence of selfsustaining, uncontrollable increases in 

temperature or pressure. 

3. Not emit explosive or toxic gases, 

either in normal operation or as a result 

of its failure, that may accumulate in 

hazardous quantities within the 

airplane. 

4. Meet the requirements of § 25.863. 

5. Not damage surrounding structure 

or adjacent systems, equipment, or 

electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or 

gases that may escape in such a way as 

to cause a major or more-severe failure 

condition. 

6. Have provisions to prevent any 

hazardous effect on airplane structure or 

systems caused by the maximum 

amount of heat it can generate due to 

any failure of it or its individual cells. 

7. Have a failure sensing and warning 

system to alert the flightcrew if its 

failure affects safe operation of the 

airplane. 

8. Have a means for the flightcrew or 

maintenance personnel to determine the 

battery charge state if the battery’s 

function is required for safe operation of 

the airplane. 

Note 1: A battery system consists of the 

battery and any protective, monitoring, and 

alerting circuitry or hardware inside or 

outside of the battery. It also includes vents 

(where necessary) and packaging. For the 

purpose of these special conditions, a 

‘‘battery’’ and ‘‘battery system’’ are referred to 

as a battery. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 14, 

2016. 

Victor Wicklund, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–09311 Filed 4–21–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–4819; Special 

Conditions No. 25–615–SC] 

Special Conditions: Bombardier Inc. 

Model BD–700–2A12 and BD–700– 

2A13 Airplanes; Airplane Electronic 

System Security Protection From 

Unauthorized External Access 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Bombardier Inc. Model 

BD–700–2A12 and BD–700–2A13 

airplanes. These airplanes will have a 

digital-systems network architecture 

composed of several connected 

networks that may allow access to or by 

external computer systems and 

networks, and may result in airplane 

systems-security vulnerabilities. The 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

DATES: This action is effective on 

Bombardier Inc. on April 22, 2016. We 

must receive your comments by June 6, 

2016. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number FAA–2016–4819 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://www.regulations.gov/, 

including any personal information the 

commenter provides. Using the search 

function of the docket Web site, anyone 

can find and read the electronic form of 

all comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot. 

gov/. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and 

Flight Crew Interface, ANM–111, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–1298; facsimile 

425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

substance of these special conditions 

has been subject to the public comment 

process in several prior instances with 

no substantive comments received. The 

FAA therefore finds that good cause 

exists for making these special 

conditions effective upon publication in 

the Federal Register. 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We may change these special 

conditions based on the comments we 

receive. 

Background 

On June 13, 2012, Bombardier Inc. 

applied for an amended type certificate 

for their new Model BD–700–2A12 and 

BD–700–2A13 airplanes. These 

airplanes are derivatives of the Model 

BD–700 series of airplanes, and are 

marketed as the Bombardier Global 7000 

and Global 8000, respectively. These 

airplanes are ultra-long-range, 

executive-interior business jets. 

The Model BD–700–2A12 and BD– 

700–2A13 airplanes have a maximum 

certified passenger capacity of 19, and 

include new high-speed transonic wings 

with improved aerodynamic efficiency 

and a pressurized cabin for luxury 

interiors. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.101, 

Bombardier Inc. must show that the 

Model BD–700–2A12 and BD–700– 

2A13 airplanes meet the applicable 

provisions of part 25 as amended by 

Amendments 25–1 through 25–137. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Model BD–700–2A12 and BD– 

700–2A13 airplanes because of a novel 

or unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 


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