J-A20038-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM GAGE JACOBS

Appellant No. 3 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 2, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0002917-2013

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., SHOGAN, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015

William Jacobs appeals his December 2, 2014 judgment of sentence, 

which was imposed after Jacobs was convicted in a non-jury trial of driving 

under the influence (“DUI”), careless driving, and reckless driving.1 For the 

reasons contained herein, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

On October 19, 2012, following a severe traffic accident, Jacobs was 

arrested and charged with the above offenses, as well as damage to 

unattended vehicle or property and driving at a safe speed.2 The trial court 

summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

On October 19, 2012, [Jacobs], Kristopher Lilick and Julie Radliff 

left “The Rib House” restaurant in [Jacobs’] 2004 Jeep Wrangler, 

____________________________________________

1 See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(c), 3714, and 3736, respectively. 

2 See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3745 and 3361, respectively. 
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after imbibing several alcoholic beverages. [Jacobs] drove to 

Radliff’s house, where she exited the vehicle. After dropping 

Radliff off, [Jacobs’] driving became increasingly hazardous as 

he exceeded the speed limit on wet roads. While driving 

southwest on Church Road, [Jacobs] accelerated to 

approximately sixty-five miles per hour, lost control of the 

vehicle, and struck the guardrail. Upon hitting the guardrail, Mr. 

Lilick was ejected from his passenger seat in the vehicle. 

Because [Jacobs] was wearing a seat belt, he remained in the 

vehicle until it eventually came to a stop.

Immediately prior to the accident, driver Jeffrey Rawles made a 

left turn onto Church Road. Rawles heard [Jacobs’] vehicle 

strike the guardrail and he turned his car around to see what 

happened. Approaching the accident, Rawles briefly talked with 

Mr. Lilick. Mr. Lilick then left the accident scene and walked to a 

friend’s house for transportation to a hospital. Later, Mr. Lilick 

arrived at Mercy Suburban Hospital where he was treated for 

lacerations to the back of his head, road rash and other 

abrasions. Subsequently, Mr. Lilick was transferred to the 

Temple University Hospital Emergency Room for further care.

After speaking with Mr. Lilick, Rawles contacted the Upper 

Merion Police Department. At approximately 2:28 a.m., Upper 

Merion Township Patrol Officer Joseph Davies received a report 

regarding a vehicle accident on Church Road. Upon arrival, 

Officer Davies found a heavily-damaged gray Jeep Wrangler, half 

of which sat off the road. An initial search of the immediate area 

surrounding the accident for anyone involved was unsuccessful. 

As police were leaving the scene, another Upper Merion Police 

Officer, Officer Reiner, discovered [Jacobs] between two tractor 

trailers in a nearby parking lot. 

Officers Davies and Reiner approached [Jacobs]. Officer Davies 

immediately noticed [that Jacobs] had an odor of alcohol, redbloodshot glassy eyes, slurred speech and was unsteady on his 

feet. [Jacobs] admitted drinking that evening and that he 

operated the vehicle in the accident. At that point, Officer 

Davies requested Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) to treat 

[Jacobs’] injuries. While waiting for EMS, [Jacobs] was unable to 

identify other passengers in the vehicle or describe what 

happened. Officer Davies concluded that [Jacobs] was driving 

while impaired and informed [Jacobs] that he was under arrest 

for [DUI]. 
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Officers Davies and Reiner waited with [Jacobs] until EMS 

arrived. EMS took [Jacobs] to Paoli Hospital where he was 

treated for various cuts and abrasions. At the hospital, Officer 

Davies read the DL-26 form to [Jacobs] and a blood sample was 

taken. The blood sample revealed that [Jacobs’] blood alcohol 

concentration (BAC) was 0.195%.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 3/4/15, at 1-2. 

Prior to trial, Jacobs filed a motion seeking to suppress his admission 

to the police that he was the driver of the Jeep. Therein, Jacobs maintained 

that he was in custody, and, therefore, should have been provided with his 

Miranda3 warnings before being interrogated. Following a hearing, the trial 

court denied Jacobs’ motion.

On October 16, 2014, following a two-day bench trial, Jacobs was 

convicted of DUI, careless driving, and reckless driving. On December 2, 

2014, the trial court sentenced Jacobs to eight days to six months’ 

incarceration on the DUI conviction. The trial court imposed no further 

penalty on the reckless driving conviction. The Commonwealth agreed to 

nolle prosse the careless driving charge, even though the trial court had 

found Jacobs guilty of that offense. On December 12, 2014, Jacobs filed 

post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied on December 18, 2014. 

On December 26, 2014, Jacobs filed a notice of appeal. On the same 

date, Jacobs filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), even though the trial court did not yet order 

____________________________________________

3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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him to do so. On March 6, 2015, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Jacobs raises the following four questions for our review:

1. Did the lower court err in failing to suppress [Jacobs’] 

statement to police when it was taken without first giving 

[Jacobs] his Miranda warnings?

2. Did the lower court err in disregarding all of the testimony of 

[Jacobs’] expert witness, a qualified medical doctor and 

pathologist, even though his testimony raised a reasonable 

doubt as to whether it was [Jacobs] or actually the 

prosecution’s own witness who was driving under the 

influence at the time of the accident?

3. Was there sufficient evidence to convict [Jacobs] for Reckless 

Driving?

4. Did the trial court properly exclude from evidence [Jacobs’] 

medical records (even though the Commonwealth had 

stipulated to their authenticity and which showed that 

[Jacobs] had suffered a concussion and a thoracic fracture) 

when [Jacobs] argued that the records were relevant to show 

his physical condition at the time he spoke to the arresting 

officer?

Brief for Jacobs at 5. 

In his first issue, Jacobs challenges the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress his admissions that he was the driver of the vehicle and 

that he had been drinking alcohol prior to driving. Specifically, Jacobs 

contends that the statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional 

rights pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s seminal 

pronouncement in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Our standard 

of review over such a claim is well-settled. 
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Our standard of review of an order denying a motion to suppress 

evidence is limited to determining whether the findings of fact 

are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. 

Crompton, 682 A.2d 286 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. 

Chambers, 598 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991). In making this 

determination, this [C]ourt may only consider the evidence of 

the Commonwealth’s witnesses, and so much of the witnesses 

for the defendant, as fairly read in the context of the record as a 

whole, which remains uncontradicted. Id. If the evidence 

supports the findings of the trial court, we are bound by such 

findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are erroneous. Id.

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948, 954 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations 

modified); see Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 783-84 (Pa. 

Super. 2012), allowance of appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2012). “The 

Commonwealth need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right was 

made.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 A.2d 1205, 1209 

(Pa. Super. 1987); see Commonwealth v. Smith, 784 A.2d 182, 185-86 

(Pa. Super. 2001) (same in context of challenge to probable cause in 

support of warrant).

It is a fundamental precept of constitutional law that a suspect subject 

to a custodial interrogation by police must be warned that he has the right to 

remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him in court, and 

that he is entitled to the presence of an attorney. Miranda, 348 U.S. at 

469. If an individual is not advised of his Miranda rights prior to a custodial 

interrogation by law enforcement officials, evidence obtained through the 
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interrogation cannot be used against him. In re K.Q.M., 873 A.2d 752, 755 

(Pa. Super. 2005). “[I]n order to trigger the safeguards of Miranda, there 

must be both custody and interrogation. Statements not made in response 

to custodial interrogation are classified as gratuitous and are not subject to 

suppression for lack of Miranda warnings.” Commonwealth v. Heggins, 

809 A.2d 908, 914 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

Jacobs focuses his argument upon his contention that he was in 

custody for Miranda purposes. Jacobs highlights the facts that he was 

injured, that two police officers questioned him, that the officers arrived in 

separate vehicles, and that the officers did not seek medical assistance until 

after speaking with him about the accident. See Brief for Jacobs at 18-25. 

None of these assertions compels us to conclude that Jacobs was in custody 

for Miranda purposes.

In deeming an interaction to be a custodial interrogation, “the police 

officer’s subjective intent does not govern the determination but rather the 

reasonable belief of the individual being interrogated.” Commonwealth v. 

Zogby, 689 A.2d 280, 282 (Pa. Super. 1997). An individual is deemed to be 

in custody for Miranda purposes when he “is physically denied . . . his 

freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which 

he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted 

by the interrogation.” K.Q.M., 873 A.2d at 755 (citing Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 650 A.2d 420, 427 (Pa. Super. 1994)). The court must consider 

the totality of circumstances, including factors such as “the basis for the 
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detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transferred 

against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show, 

threat or use of force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or 

dispel suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Busch, 713 A.2d 97, 101 

(Pa. Super. 1998). 

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Jacobs was 

not in custody. When the police arrived at the scene, they were unable to 

locate anyone involved in the crash. However, during a search of the 

surrounding area, they found Jacobs hiding between two tractor trailers. In 

an attempt to investigate the accident, and not for the purposes of detaining 

or confining Jacobs, the police approached the hiding Jacobs and asked him 

if he was involved in the crash. The officers did not relocate him, nor did 

they show force or detain him for an unreasonable period of time. The 

purpose of the brief detention was to investigate the accident, not to 

coercively interrogate Jacobs. Jacobs readily admitted to driving the Jeep 

and to drinking seven or eight beers. Considering the totality of the 

circumstances, as well as the factors delineated in Busch, Jacobs was not in 

custody. The officers merely asked him some questions for the purpose of 

investigating the accident. 

Jacobs’ assertions to the contrary are unpersuasive. The facts that 

two officers approached him, and that they arrived in two separate vehicles, 

do not create a coercive environment such that Miranda would be triggered. 

Nor do they create a situation where a reasonable person would feel 
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involuntarily detained, as would be the case if, for example, Jacobs was 

surrounded by a team of officers with their weapons drawn. We also are not 

persuaded by the fact that Jacobs was injured. That he was injured and was 

unable to leave the scene does not, ipso facto, mean that the police created 

an environment where he could not leave. The officers simply approached 

Jacobs and asked him some questions for the purposes of investigating a 

traffic accident. They did not place him in custody for Miranda purposes. 

Jacobs is not entitled to relief.

In his second issue, Jacobs argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by disregarding the testimony of Jacobs’ expert, Dr. Jonathan 

Briskin. Dr. Briskin testified as an expert at trial that, to a reasonable 

degree of medical certainty, Jacobs was a restrained passenger in the Jeep, 

and not the driver. The trial court elected not to credit Dr. Briskin’s 

testimony. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court provided the following 

explanation of Dr. Briskin’s testimony and the court’s reasoning for 

disregarding that testimony:

Dr. Briskin opined that [Jacobs’] injuries to his lower left 

abdomen and right shoulder could be consistent with [Jacobs] 

being restrained in the passenger seat. In reaching this 

conclusion, Dr. Briskin reviewed medical records of both [Jacobs] 

and Mr. Lillick, as well as photographs of [Jacobs’] injuries and 

the damaged vehicle. Dr. Briskin did not personally view 

[Jacobs’] injuries nor did he inspect [Jacobs’] vehicle. Dr. 

Briskin’s analysis was based on his review of a limited amount of 

evidence and Dr. Briskin was unable to conclude what actually 

happened. Dr. Briskin did, however, note that the injuries 

sustained by [Jacobs] could occur if [Jacobs] was a restrained 

passenger in a head[-]on collision.
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Accordingly, [the trial court] chose to disregard much of Dr. 

Briskin’s testimony because it was inconclusive and based on 

conjecture. Furthermore, whatever significance [the court] 

allotted to Dr. Briskin’s testimony was weighed against [Jacobs’] 

stipulation to his BAC and his admission to driving, in addition to 

the other evidence [in the case.]

T.C.O. at 13 (emphasis in original).

Jacobs maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

accepting wholesale Dr. Briskin’s testimony. This amounts to a challenge to 

the weight of the evidence. When reviewing a weight of the evidence claim, 

we consider the following:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 

751-52 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 

1189 (Pa. 1994) A new trial should not be granted because of a 

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Widmer, 

744 A.2d at 752. Rather, “the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that ‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them 

equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.’” Id. (citation 

omitted). It has often been stated that “a new trial should be 

awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is 

imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to 

prevail.” Brown, 648 A.2d at 1189.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Brown, 648 A.2d at 1189. Because the trial judge has 

had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence 

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest 
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consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the 

trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 354 A.2d 545 (Pa. 

1976). One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the 

verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence 

and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of 

justice.

Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

modified).

Our task in evaluating a weight challenge is as follows:

To determine whether a trial court’s decision constituted a 

palpable abuse of discretion, an appellate court must examine 

the record and assess the weight of the evidence; not however, 

as the trial judge, to determine whether the preponderance of 

the evidence opposes the verdict, but rather to determine 

whether the court below in so finding plainly exceeded the limits 

of judicial discretion and invaded the exclusive domain of the 

jury. Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the 

trial court has acted within the limits of its judicial discretion.

Brown, 648 A.2d at 1190 (citation omitted).

We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The court 

carefully considered the testimony of Dr. Briskin, and weighed the contents, 

both favorable and unfavorable to Jacobs, against the other evidence 

presented in the case and reached a verdict. That Dr. Briskin was an expert 

in no way binds the trial court to credit any, all, or even some of his 

testimony. The trial court astutely considered the evidence, and weighed 
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the value of that evidence against the remaining evidence. The court did not 

abuse its discretion, and this claim fails.

In his third issue, Jacobs argues that the evidence presented at trial 

was insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless driving. Our standard 

of review governing sufficiency challenges is well-settled. We must 

determine:

whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying

[the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the 

facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need 

not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts 

regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations 

omitted).

Pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a), “[a]ny person who drives any 

vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is 

guilty of reckless driving.” As a preliminary matter, we note that the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

demonstrates that Jacobs was the driver of the vehicle and that he was 

substantially intoxicated when driving. However, “evidence of intoxication 

alone is insufficient to support a reckless driving conviction.” 
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Commonwealth v. Jeter, 937 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007). The 

Commonwealth must present additional “indicia of unsafe driving” in order to 

prove that the defendant exhibited a “willful or wanton disregard for the 

safety of persons or property.” Id.; 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a). The 

Commonwealth clearly has met that burden here.

In addition to driving while intoxicated, the testimony at trial 

demonstrated Jacobs’ recklessness. The witnesses testified that Jacobs was 

speeding on wet roads at 2:30 in the morning. Additionally, in his 

intoxicated state and with these dangerous conditions, Jacobs decided to “do 

donuts” in the center of a public intersection. He then drove into a quarry, 

where he drove the Jeep into piles of gravel and stone, and then did more 

donuts in the gravel. One of the passengers in the car pleaded with Jacobs 

to take her home. Jacobs then sped away, and drove into a guardrail. This 

evidence undoubtedly was sufficient to demonstrate that Jacobs was guilty 

of reckless driving.

In his final issue, Jacobs contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by ruling that his medical records were inadmissible at trial. The 

records at issue were produced following a visit to the doctor approximately 

one week after the accident. According to Jacobs, the records would show 

that he suffered from a concussion and a fracture of one of his vertebra. 

Jacobs maintains that the records, and the injuries described therein, were 

relevant to the question of whether his admissions to the police after the 

accident were credible. 
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Our standard of review of challenges to the admissibility of evidence is

well settled:

Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial 

court clearly abused its discretion. Admissibility depends on 

relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically 

tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a 

fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable 

inference or presumption regarding a material fact. 

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon 

facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing 

and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill 

will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is 

abused.

Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citation omitted). “In determining the admissibility of evidence, the trial 

court must decide whether the evidence is relevant and, if so, whether its 

probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Commonwealth v. 

Hawk, 709 A.2d 373, 376 (Pa. 1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Crews, 

640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Dollman, 541 A.2d 319 (Pa. 

1988)). “Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact 

in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports 

a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material 

fact.” Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696, 699 (Pa. 1992).

The Commonwealth stipulated to the authenticity of the records, but 

not the admissibility of them. Despite their authenticity not being in 
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question, the trial court ruled them inadmissible primarily because Jacobs 

did not intend to call his diagnosing physician to explain the injuries and how 

injuries that were diagnosed one week after the accident would have 

impacted Jacobs at the time of the accident. Hence, the court ruled that the 

evidence was irrelevant. We agree with the trial court.

The primary issue at trial was whether Jacobs, or someone else, was 

driving the Jeep at the time of the accident. Eyewitness testimony 

overwhelmingly placed Jacobs in the driver’s seat. Jacobs also admitted to 

the police that he was the driver. However, with the medical records, Jacobs 

wanted to show that his admission should not have been believed. The 

records simply were not relevant for that purpose. As noted, evidence is 

relevant if it tends to make one fact more or less likely. By this definition, 

the records would have had to show that he suffered substantially from an 

illness or injury at the time of the accident. The records only would have 

proven Jacobs’ mental and physical condition one week after the accident. 

Without supporting testimony to explain to the trial court that his injuries 

derived from the accident, that he suffered them in the accident, and that 

the effects of those injuries would have impaired his ability to accurately 

recall and relay to the officers the events that led to the crash, the records 

simply were not legally relevant. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in ruling that the records were inadmissible. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/15/2015