*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 99-10929

Summary Calendar

_____________________

REGINALD ROBERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DALLAS COUNTY; T. NATT,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:99-CV-863-T

_________________________________________________________________

January 10, 2000

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Reginald Roberson has appealed the decision of the district

court to dismiss his in forma pauperis (IFP), 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

complaint against Dallas County and Deputy T. Natt as frivolous

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). He alleged that Deputy

Natt violated his constitutional rights by using excessive physical

force against him while he was a prisoner at the Dallas County

jail. Roberson alleged the following facts in his complaint:

(1) he is HIV positive and requires special medication;
2

(2) he flooded his jail cell with toilet water to get

attention after he did not receive his medication;

(3) Deputy Natt responded to his actions and ordered him to

exit his jail cell, face the glass in front of his cell, and

place his hands above his head against his cell door;

(4) he complied;

(5) Deputy Natt grabbed the collar of his jumper and shook him

until he lost balance and fell on his stomach in a pool of

toilet water;

(6) Deputy Natt jumped on his back, knee first, and repeatedly

punched him in the mouth and slammed his face into the cement

floor. See id.

A district court is required to dismiss a prisoner’s IFP civil

rights complaint if the court determines that the action is

frivolous or malicious. See Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733

(5th Cir. 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). This court

reviews for an abuse of discretion the district court’s

determination that an IFP complaint is frivolous under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Black, 134 F.3d at 734. A complaint filed IFP

is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Id. A

complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is “based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint

alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not

exist.” Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).
3

Roberson has abandoned his claim against Dallas County by

failing to address it on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d

222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Brinkmann v. Dallas County

Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987)

(appellant’s failing to identify any error in the district court’s

analysis is the same as if the appellant had not appealed that

judgment). The district court’s decision to dismiss Roberson’s

claim against Dallas County is therefore AFFIRMED.

The district court abused its discretion in dismissing

Roberson’s excessive force claim against Deputy Natt as frivolous.

When a prisoner alleges that a prison official used force in

violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). “[T]o support an

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have

suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical

injury, but there is no categorical requirement that the physical

injury be significant, serious, or more than minor.” Gomez v.

Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1999). Relying on Siglar,

112 F.3d at 193-94 (holding that “sore, bruised ear lasting for

three days” for which the prisoner did not seek or receive medical

treatment was de minimis physical injury), the district court held

that Roberson’s physical injuries, a bruised lip and a swollen eye,

treated with ibuprofen and eye drops, were de minimis. Roberson’s
 

1Because this court has concluded that Roberson has alleged

more than de minimis physical injuries, it need not determine

whether the force allegedly used by Deputy Natt was of the kind

“repugnant to the conscience of mankind” such that allegations of

de minimis physical injuries may have been sufficient to state a

claim. See Gomez, 163 F.3d at 924 n.4.

4

alleged physical injuries, however, are more analogous to those

alleged by the prisoner in Gomez, 163 F.3d at 924-25 (holding that

“‘cuts, scrapes, [and] contusions to the face, head, and, body’”

for which prisoner received medical treatment were more than de

minimis physical injuries). Furthermore, the quantity of force

that Roberson alleges that Deputy Natt applied was “of a

character . . . [more] calculated to produce real physical harm.”

Compare Gomez, 163 F.3d at 924-25 (officers knocked prisoner down

so his head struck concrete floor, scraped his face against floor,

repeatedly punched him in face, and kicked him in face and head)

with Siglar, 112 F.3d at 193 (officer twisted prisoner’s arm behind

his back and twisted his ear). We therefore REVERSE the district

court’s judgment with respect to Roberson’s excessive-force claim

against Deputy Natt.1

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

MOTIONS DENIED.