IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

20 1 3 WY 56

APRIL TERM, A.D. 20 1 3

May 9, 2013

T H E S T A T E O F W

Y O M I N G

, D E P A R T M E N T O F F A M I L Y

S E R V I C E S

, C H I L D S U P P O R T

E N F O R C E M E N T

,

A p p e l l a n t

( I n t e r v e n o r )

,

v

.

C O N N I E M

. P O W E L L

,

A p p e l l e e ( D e f e n d a n t )

. S

- 12

- 0192

App eal from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The Honorable Robert E. Skar , Judge

Representing Appellant:

Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy

Attorney General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jared

Crecelius, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

R e presenting Appellee:

N o appearance filed.

B e f ore KITE, C.J., HILL, VOIGT , BURKE, and DAVIS JJ.

N O T I C E : T h i

s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f

o r m a l r e v i

s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n P a c i f i c R e p o r t e r T h i

r d

. R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e C l e r k o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t

, S u p r e m e C o u r t B u i l d i n g , C h e y e n n e , W

y o m i n g 8 2 0 0 2

, o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r f

o r m a l e r r o r s s o t h a t c o r r e c t i o n m a y b e

m a d e b e f o r e f i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e p e r m a n e n t v o l

u m e

.1

H I L L

, J u s t i c e

.

[¶ 1 ] In 2009, the Wyoming Department of Family Services ( Department ) filed an

action to enforce a 2003 order requiring Connie Powell to pay child support and certain

related expenses. Instead of enforcing the 2003 order, the district court set aside the 2003

o r d e r

, o r d e r e d t h a t t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n b e r e c a l c u l a

t e d

, a n d d i r e c t e d t

h a t t h e revised child support obligation be applied retroactive to 1999, the date the children ’ s father obtained custody of the children. The Department appeals, contend ing that the

district court abused its discretion in setting aside the 2003 order. We hold that the

district court was without jurisdiction to modify the 2003 child support order and remand

for entry of an order consistent with our direction herein.

I S S U E

[¶ 2 ] The Department presents the following issue on appeal:

I n 2 0 1 2

, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o r d e r e d a r e t r o a c t i v

e r e c a l c u l a t i o n

o f child support against Connie Powell, the non

- custodial

mother. The district court also set aside a 2003 judgment

entered aga inst Ms. Powell for child support arrears and

m edical and travel expenses even though neither the mother

nor the father filed a motion or petition requesting

m o d i f i c a t i o n o f c h i l d s u p p o r t o r r e l i e f f r om the judgment.

Did the district court abuse its discr etion by retroactively

modifying the child support order a nd setting aside the

judgment without a proper petition or motion from a party

requesting such relief?

F A C T S

[¶ 3 ] Charles Ferree (Father) and Connie Powell (Mother) divorced in 1990. Mother

and F ather had two children as issue of the marriage, CF and WF, and originally entered

into a Property Settlement and Custody Agreement that gave Mother primary custody of

the children and established Father ’ s child support obligation. In 1991, Mother and

Fat her stipulated to a modification of their agreement, which provided that each parent

would have custody of one child and neither would pay child support. The agreement

was approved by a May 16, 1991 Order Modifying Decree of Divorce.

[¶ 4 ] In 1998, Mother and Father stipulated to transfer the case from the First Judicial

District to the Fifth Judicial District, Hot Springs County, since Mother lived out of state

and Father lived in Hot Springs County. In 1999, Mother and Father again stipulated to a

modif ication of their divorce decree, this time agreeing that Father would have primary

custody of both children, Mother would be responsible for half the children ’ s m e d i c a l2

e x p e n s e s n o t c o v

e r e d b y i n s u r a n c e a n d h a l f o f t h e t r a v e l e x p e n s e s f o r t h e c h i l d r e

n ’ s vi sits

with Mother, and Mother would have no responsibility to pay child support. In August

1999, the district court entered an order approving the stipulated modification except the

terms governing child support. Regarding child support, the court ruled t hat the parties ’

stipulation was contrary to law, and it ordered:

P l a i n t i f f a n d D e f

e n d a n t s h a l l s u

b m i t f i n a n c i a l

a f f i d a v i t s t o t h e C o u r

t w i t h i n t w e n

t y ( 2 0 ) d a y s o f t h i s O r d e r

,

a l o n g w i t h a n y f

u r t h e r s t i p u l a t i o n s a s t o c h i l d s u p p o r t

. I f

c h i l d s u p p o r

t i s n o t r e s o l v

e d w i t h i n t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) d a y s

, t h e

p a r t i e s s h a l l r e q

u e s t a h e a r i n g b e f

o r e t h e C o u r

t

.

[¶ 5 ] Neither Mother nor Father filed financial affidavits or requested a hearing on the

child support as ordered, and the case remained inactive until May 2003, wh en Father

filed a Motion for Order to Appear and Show Cause. Through that motion, Father

alleged that Mother had made no payments toward her half of the children ’ s expenses or any child support payments since entry of the 1999 order. Father requested tha t the

district court order Mother to pay her half of the children ’ s expenses and that:

T h e C o u r t o r d e r t

h e D e f e n d a n t t o s u p p l y c o p i e s o f t a x

r e t u r n s f r o m 1 9 9 9 t o p r e s e n

t a n d a f

i n a n c i a l a f

f i d a v i t t o

d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e D e f

e n d a n t i s c a p a b l e o f w o r k i n g

t o s u p p o r t t h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n a

n d d e t e r m

i n e c h i l d s u p p o r t f

o r

b o t h c h i l d r e n e i t h e r a

t t h e s t a t u

t o r y m i n i m u m o r p u r s u a n

t t o

W y o m i n g S t a t u t e s

, a n d m a k e s a i d p a y m e n t s r e t r o a c t i v e f r o m

the Court ’ s Order of August 23, 1999.

[¶ 6 ] Following a hearing on Ju ne 30, 2003, the district court entered an Order on

Medical and Child Support, dated August 4, 2003. The court made findings concerning

medical and travel

- related expenses and granted Father the sum of $21,027.85 “ for

arrearages for child support, medical care, and transportation costs of the minor children

as of June 30, 2003. ” Concerning child support, the order stated, in part:

7

. A n O r d e r w a s i s s u e d b y t h i s C o u r t c h a n g i n g

p r i m a r y c u s t o d y o f t h e m i n o r c h i l d

, [ W F ]

, w h i c h o r d e r w a s

s i g n e d a n d f

i l e d o n A

u g u s t 2 3

, 1 9 9 9

, w

h i c h o r d e r e d t

h e

p a r t i e s t o s u b m

i t a p p r o p r i a t e w a g

e a f f i d a v i t s f o r

d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p r o p e r c h i l d s u p p o r t

.

8

. P r o p e r a f f i d a v i t s w e r e n o t s u

b m i t t e d

.

9

. P u r s u a n t t o t

h e O r d e r t o A

p p e a r a n d S h o w C a u s e

s i g n e d b y t h i s C o u r t o n M a y 2 3

, 2 0 0 3

, t h e D e f e n d a n t a n d3 P l a i n t i f f s u p p l i e d i n c o m e a f

f i d a v i t s a n d c o p i e s o f p a y s t u b s

. B a s e d u p o n t h e p a y s t u b s u b m i t t e d b y t h e D e f

e n d a n t

, s h e

c u r r e n t l y h a s a n a v

e r a g e n e t i n c o m e o f $ 1

, 6 9 3

. 2 9 p e r m o n t h

.

1 0

. B a s e d u

p o n p a y s t u

b s s u b m i t t e d b y t h e P l a i n t i f

f

, h e c u r r e n t l y h a s a n a v

e r a g e n e t m o n t h l y i n c o m e o f $ 3

, 6 0 0

. 9 3

.

1 1

. B a s e d u p o n t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s f

o r t w o

c h i l d r e n

, t

h e c u r r e n t t o t a l a m o u

n t o f s u p p o r

t d u e f o r t h e

s u p p o r t o f t h e c h i l d [ r e n ] w o u l d b e $ 1

, 2 1 8

. 7 8

.

1 2

. S i n c e P l a i n t i f

f

, a s f a t h e r

, h a s p r i m a r y c u s t o d y o f

t h e c h i l d [ r e n ]

, t

h e p e r c e n t a g e o f s u p p o r t o w e d b y t h e m o t h e r

i s $ 3 8 9

. 8 1 p e r m o n t

h

.

1 3

. S a i d s u p p o r t s h o u l d b e s e t r e t r o a c t i v e t o t h e d a

t e

o f c u s t o d y g

r a n t e d b y t h i s C o u r

t o n A u g u s t 2 3

, 1 9 9 9

,

r e s u l t i n g i n a t o t a l a r r e a r a g e o f $ 1 7

, 9 3 1

. 2 6 i n c h i l d s u p p o r t

a r r e a r a g e t h r o u g h a n d i n c l u d i n g J

u n e 3 0

, 2 0 0 3

. T h e n e x t

r e g u l a r l y s c h e d u l e d p a y

m e n t d u e b y t

h e D e f e n d a n t t o t

h e

P l a i n t i f f f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t i s J

u l y 2 3

, 2 0 0 3

, a n d c h i l d s u p p o r t

p a y m e n t s a r e d u e o n t

h e 2 3 r d o f e a c h m o n t

h t h e r e a f t e r

.

[¶ 7 ] Mother did not appeal this order, and the case again remained inactive until

December 2003. On December 1, 2003, Mother filed a Petition for Modification of

Order requesting that she be awarded primary custody of the parties ’ daughter, WF.

Father re sponded to Mother ’ s motion on February 10, 2004

, by filing a Motion to Modify

Visitation, requesting that Mother be permitted only supervised visitation with the

children, and a Motion for Order to Appear and Show Cause, alleging Mother had failed

to compl y with the August 2003 child support order.

[¶ 8 ] The district court held a hearing on the motions on March 4, 2004. This hearing

was not reported, and the court did not enter a written order following the hearing. On

March 9, 2004, Father ’ s attorney sub mitted a letter to the court, apparently seeking

clarification and guidance regarding what occurred during the March 4th hearing. The

letter from Father ’ s attorney stated that during the hearing the court denied Mother ’ s custody motion and Father withdrew his visitation motion, and stated as follows

concerning child support:

T h e C o u r t m a d e a r

u l i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e S h o w C a u s e

t h a t d e s p i t e t h e D e f

e n d a n t h a v i n g t e s t i f

i e d t h a t s h e h a s n e v

e r

p a i d a n y s u p p o r

t f o r t h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n

, t

h a t t h e P l a i n

t i f f h a d

u n c l e a n h a n d s d u e t o h i s f

a i l u r e t o f

i l e a f i n a n c i a l a f

f i d a v i t

.4 T h e C o u r t s t a t e d t h e r e w a s n o f i n a n c i a l a f

f i d a v i t i n t h e C o u r t

f i l e

. U p o n m a k i n g a n i n v

e s t i g a t i o n a f t e r C o u r t

, i t w a s f

o u n d

b o t h P l a i n t i f f a n d D e f

e n d a n t h a

d f i n a n c i a l a f

f i d a v i t s o n f i l e

w i t h t h e C o u r t

, b u

t t h e y h a d b e e n p l a c e d i n a s e p a r a t e

, s e a l e d

e n v e l o p e

, m a r k e d " C o n f

i d e n t i a l F i n a n c i a l I

n f o r m a t i o n "

.

. . . . P l e a s e n o t i f

y t h e p a r t i e s i f t h e O r d e r s i m p l y n e e d s t o

b e a m e n d e d o r w

h e t h e r o r n o t t h e o l d O r d e r n e e d s t o b e p u t

i n t o e f f e c t a n d w e n e e d t o request a rehearing on the matter.

... If no direction is given by the Court, the Defendant will

file for a rehearing in 10 days.

[¶ 9 ] The record contains no indication that either party requested a new hearing

f ollowing this correspondence, and the dist rict court did not enter an order subsequent to

the letter. The case again remained inactive until 2009. On October 14, 2009, the

Department filed an Affidavit and Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Judgment of

Contempt against Mother based on Mother ’ s alleged failure to pay child support and

related expenses. On March 31, 2010, the court issued an Order Denying Contempt and

Requiring Information to be Submitted to the Court. In so ordering, the court found that

Mother ’ s failure to pay child support was not willful but was instead a result of confusion

over the court ’ s order following the March 2004 hearing. The court thus ordered that the

parties or their attorneys submit “ a l l r e l e v a n t n o t e s o r o t h e r d o c u m e n t s f r o m t h e M a r c h 4

, 2 0 0 4 h e a r i n g t o p r o v

ide the court a basis for a written order from said hearing. ” 1

[¶ 10 ] On September 2, 2010, the Department filed a Motion for Order from March 4,

2004 Hearing. Through its motion, the Department informed the district court that no

information was submitte d in response to the court ’ s order requiring the submission of

information, and it requested that the court set a hearing to determine the content of the

March 4, 2004 order.

[¶ 11 ] On March 14, 2012, Mother filed a Request for Entry of Order on Hearing He ld

March 4, 2004. Mother attached to her request an affidavit from the attorney who

represented her in the March 4, 2004 hearing. That attorney attested as follows:

T o t h e b e s t o f m

y k n o w l e d g e a n d b e l i e f

, a t t h a t

hearing, because of plaintiff having “ u nclean hands ” for

failure to file financial records, the Court order dated August

4, 2003 was withdrawn and Plaintiff, by and through his

attorney

... , was instructed to file a new motion if so desired.

1 Between the March 4, 2004 hearing and the Department’s 2 0 0 9 c o n t e m p t m o t i o n

, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

judge who presided over t he March 2004 hearing retired and a new district court judge was appointed

.5

[ ¶ 1 2 ] O n M a y 2 1

, 2 0 1 2

, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d a h e a r i n g o n the Department ’ s motion.

During that hearing, the court indicated that from the record, it was unable to resolve

what occurred during the March 2004 hearing and it was thus willing to take testimony

on the question. The only testimony offered was f rom Mother, who testified that she

could not recall how the issue of child support was raised during the March 2004 hearing.

She further testified:

H e d i d r u l e a t t h e t i m e t h a t h e w a s m o d i f y i n g o r

d i s m i s s i n g t h e p r e v

i o u s 2 0 0 3 c o u r t o r

d e r b e c a u s e i t w a s

s t a t e d t h a t M r

. F e r r e e h a d u n c l e a n h a n d s b y n o t s u b m i t t i n g

h i s f i n a n c i a l a f

f i d a v i t

, a n d t h a t i f h e w i s h e d t o p u r s u e f u r t h e r

c h i l d s u p p o r

t

, t h a t t h e y w o u l d n e e d t o f

i l e a n e w m o t i o n w i t h

t h e C o u r t

, a n d a

t t h e t i m e I w a s t o l d t

h a t t h e o r

d e r w a s

d i s m i s s e d

.

[ ¶ 13 ] On June 29, 2012, the district court issued an Order Setting Aside August 4, 2003

Judgment and Child Support Obligation. The court found and ordered as follows:

1

. T h e o r d e r f

r o m A u g u s t 4

, 2 0 0 3 i s s e t a s i d e

, i n c l u d i n g t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t p r o v i s i o n s

, a r r e a r s p r o v

i s i o n s

, a n d

t h e j u d g m e n t s f

o r c h i l d s u p p o r t a r r e a r s

, m e d i c a l a r r e a r s a n d

t r a v e l e x p e n s e s

.

2

. C h i l d s u p p o r t s h a

l l b e r e

- c a l c

u l a t e d a n d s h a l l b e

r e t r o a c t i v e t o t h e d a t e t

h e f a t h e r o b t a i n e d c u s t o d y o f t h e

c h i l d r e n

. T h e c a

l c u l a t i o n s h a l l b e b a s e d o n t h e i n c o m e s o f

t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e s t a

t u t o r y g u i d e l i n e s i n e f

f e c t d u r i n g 2 0 0 4

.

3

. T h e r e c a l c

u l a t i o n w i l l n o t i n c l u d e t r a v e l o r m e d i c a l

e x p e n s e s s i n c e t h e A

u g u s t 4

, 2 0 0 3 o r d e r d o e s n o t c l e a r l y

e x p l a i n h o w t

h o s e e x p e n s e s w e r e c a l c u l a t e d f o r j u d g m e n t

p u r p o s e s

. C h a r l e s F e r r e e m a y p e t i t i o n t h e c o u r t f o r s a i d

t r a v e l a n d m e d i c a l e x

p e n s e s t h a t w e r e i n c l u d e d i n t h e A u g u s t

4

, 2 0 0 3 j u d g

m e n t i f h e c h o o s e s

.

[¶ 14 ] The Department timely filed a notice of appeal. Father did not participate in the

2012 proceedi ngs or in this appeal. Mother did not participate in the appeal to this Court.

S T A N D A R D O F R E V I E W

[¶ 15 ] A district court ’ s d e c i s i o n t o m o d i f y a d i v o r c e d e c r e e i s r e v i e w e d f o r a n a b u s e o f

discretion. Rocha v. Rocha , 925 P.2d 231, 233 (Wyo. 1996). “Judi cial discretion is a

c o m p o s i t e o f m a n y t h i n g s

, a m o n g w h i c h a r e c o n c l u s i o n s d r a w n f r o m o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a ; i t6

m e a n s e x e r c i s i n g s o u n d j u d g m e n t w i t h r e g

a r d t o w h a t i s r i g h t u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously.” Hanson v. Belveal , 2012 WY 98, ¶ 4,

280 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Selvey v. Selvey , 2004 WY 166, ¶ 15, 102

P.3d 210, 214 (Wyo. 2004) ). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court ’ s decision

exceeds the bounds of reason or constitutes an error of law. Rocha , 925 P.2d at 233

(citing Crans ton v. Cranston , 879 P.2d 345, 348 (Wyo. 1994)).

[¶ 16 ] Because a court has jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree only as provided by

statute, this appeal also presents jurisdictional issues, which are questions of law that this

Court reviews de novo

. H all v. Park County , 2010 WY 124, ¶ 3, 238 P.3d 580, 581

(Wyo. 2010); Thomas v. Thomas , 983 P.2d 717, 719 (Wyo. 1999).

D I S C U S S I O N

[¶ 17 ] In our view, the first question that must be addressed in this appeal is whether the

district court had statutory autho rity to enter its order vacating the 2003 child support

order and to enter a new order retroactive to 1999. We must conclude that the court did

not have such authority.

[¶ 18 ] This Court has, on a number of occasions, addressed a district court ’ s authorit y to

modify a divorce decree and the statutory limitations on that authority. We have held:

Generally, courts have “only that authority to act which is

conferred by the subject statute.” Bush v. State , 2003 WY

156, ¶ 9, 79 P.3d 1178, 1183 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Merkison

v. State , 996 P.2d 1138, 1141 (W yo. 2000) ) . It is well settled

that divorce is purely a statutory process, with courts having

no authority in such proceedings other than that provided by

statute. Urbach v. Urbach , 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 956

(1937) ; 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 7 (2008)

. This limitation extends to the court’s power to mod ify a

divorce decree. Aragon v. Aragon , 2005 WY 5, ¶ 10, 104

P.3d 756, 759

- 60 (Wyo. 2005) ; Smith v. Smith , 895 P.2d 37,

41 (Wyo. 1995) ; CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 531 (Wyo.

1992) ; 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 369 (2008)

.

Weiss v. Weiss , 2009 WY 124, ¶ 13, 217 P.3d 408, 411

- 12 (Wyo. 2009); see also

Hanson , ¶ 17, 280 P.3d at 1192

- 93.

[¶ 19 ] The statute gov

erning modification of a child support order provides, in relevant

part:

( a ) Any party, or the department of family services in7 t h e c a s e o f c h i l d s u p p o r t o r d e r s b e i n g e n f

o r c e d b y t h e

d e p a r t m e n t

, m a y p e t i t i o n f o r a r e v i e w a n d a d

j u s t m e n t o f a n y

c h i l d s u p p o r t o r d e r t

h a t w a s e n t e r e d m o r e t h a n s i x ( 6 ) m o n t h s

p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n o r w

h i c h h a s n o t b e e

n a d j u s t e d w i t h i n s i x

( 6 ) m o n t h s f

r o m t h e d a

t e o f f i l i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n f

o r r e v i e w

a n d a d j u s t m e n t

. T h e p e t i t i o n s h a l l a l l e g e t h a t

, i n a p p l y i n g t h e

p r e s u m p t i v e c h i l d s u p p o r

t e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h i s a r t i c l e

, t h e

s u p p o r t a m o u n t w i l l c h a n g

e b y t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) o r m o r e

p e r m o n t h f

r o m t h e a m o u n t o f t h e e x i s t i n g o r d e r

. T h e c o u r t

s h a l l r e q u i r e t

h e p a r e n t s t o c o m

p l e t e a v

e r i f i e d f i n a n c i a l

s t a t e m e n t o n f

o r m s a p p r o v

e d b y t h e W

y o m i n g s u p r e m e c o u r t

,

a n d s h a l l a p p l y t h e p r e s u m

p t i v e c h i l d s u p p o r

t s e t o u t i n t

h i s

a r t i c l e i n c o n d u c t i n g t h e r e v i e w a n d a d j u s t m e n t

. I f

, u p o n

a p p l y i n g t h e p r e s u m

p t i v e c h i l d s u p p o r

t t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s

o f t h e p a r e n

t s o r c h i l d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e r e v i e w

, t h e c o u r

t

f i n d s t h a t t h e s u p p o r

t a m o u n t w o u l d c h a n g e b y t w e n t y

p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) o r m o r e p e r m o n t h f r o m t h e a m o u n t o f t h e

e x i s t i n g o r d e r

, t h e c o u r t s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h e r e t o b e a c h a n g e o f

c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u f

f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f

y t h e m o d i f

i c a t i o n o f t h e

s u p p o r t o r d e r

. T h e p r

o v i s i o n s o f t h i s s e c t i o n d o n o t p r e c l u d e a

p a r t y o r a s s i g

n e e f r o m b r i n g

i n g a n a c t i o n f

o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f

a s u p p o r t o r d e r

, b a s e d u

p o n a s u b s t a n

t i a l c h a n g e o f

c i r c u m s t a n c e s

, a t a n y t i m e

. E v e r y t h r e e ( 3 ) y e a r s

, u p o n t h e

r e q u e s t o f e i t h e r p a r e

n t o r

, i f t h e r e i s a c u r r e

n t a s s i g n m e n t o f

s u p p o r t r i g h t s i n e f f e c t

, u p o n t

h e r e q u e s t o f t h e d e p a r

t m e n t

,

t h e c o u r t

, w i t h r e s p e c t t o a s u p p o r t o r d e r b e i n g e n f

o r c e d

u n d e r t h i s a r t i c l e a n d t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f

t h e c h i l d i n v

o l v e d

, s h a l l r e v i e w a n d

, i f a p p r o p r i a t e

, a d j u s t t h e

o r d e r i n a c c o r

d a n c e w i t h t h e g

u i d e l i n e s e s t a b l i s h e d p u r s u a n t

t o t h i s a r t i c l e

. A

n y a d j u s t m e n t u n d e r t

h e t h r e e ( 3 ) y e a r c y c l e

s h a l l b e m a d e w i t h o u

t a r e q u i r e m e n t f

o r a s h o w i n g o f a

c h a n g e i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s

. ...

. . . .

( c ) I n a d d i t i o n t o t

h e p e t i t i o n a u

t h o r i z e d u n d e r

s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n

, t h e c o u r t o n i t s o w

n m o t i o n

, o r

t h e d e p a r t m e n t w i t h o u

t p e t i t i o n i n g t h e c o u r t

, m a y i n c r e a s e

m o n t h l y c h i l d s u p p o r

t p a y m e n t s t o i n c l u d e a m o u n t s f o r

a r r e a r a g e s o r m a y d e c r e a s e t h e m o n t h l y c h i l d s u p p o r t

p a y m e n t i n c a s e s o f e m e r g

e n c i e s o r i f t h e a r r e a r a g

e s a r e p a i d

. A n y a c t i o n b y t

h e d e p a r t m e n t t o i n c r e a s e m o n t h l y c h i l d

s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s u n d e r t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l a l l o w t h e

obligor a reasonable opportunity to contest the action in8 a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t

h e W y o m i n g A d m i n i s t r a t i v

e P r o c e d u r e A c t

a n d r u l e s a n d r e g

u l a t i o n s a d o p t e d b y t h e d e p a r t m e n t

.

( d ) A n o r d e r f

o r c h i l d s u p p o r

t i s n o t s u b

j e c t t o

r e t r o a c t i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n e x c e p t :

( i ) U p o n a g r e e m e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s ; o r

( i i ) T h e o r d e r m a y b e m o d i f i e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o a n y

p e r i o d d u r i n g w

h i c h a p e t i t i o n f

o r m o d i f i c a t i o n i s p e n d i n g

, b u t o n l y f r o m t h e d a t e n o t i c e o f t h a t p e t i t i o n w a s s e r v e d u p o n

t h e o b l i g e e a s p r o v

i d e d b y t h e W

y o m i n g R u l e s o f C i v i l

P r o c e d u r e

, i f t h e o b l i g

o r o r t h e d e p a r

t m e n t i s t h e p e t i t i o n e r

, o r

t o t h e o b l i g

o r

, i f t h e o b l i g

e e o r t h e d e p a r

t m e n t i s t h e

p e t i t i o n e r

.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20

- 2

- 311 (LexisNexis 2011).

[¶ 20 ] The district court was not presented with any of the above

- quoted circumstances

that would statutorily authorize it to modify the 2 003 child support order. None of the

parties, Mother, Father, or the Department, moved for a modification of the child support

order, and the circumstances were not as described in § 20

- 2

- 311(c), such that the court

could act on its own motion to modify. See also Connors v. Connors , 769 P.2d 336, 348

- 49 (Wyo. 1989) (recognizing petition to modify child support as a statutory prerequisite

to court ’ s jurisdiction to act). Similarly, the court was not statutorily authorized to make

its modifications retroac tive. No petition to modify was pending, and the record contains

no agreement of the parties to a retroactive modification. See also Thomas , 983 P.2d at

720 (holding that by statute child support order may not be modified retroactively beyond

the date of petition to modify unless parties agree to modification ).

[¶21] Because the district court did not have before it a petition to modify the August

2003 child support order, or a statutory circumstance authorizing the court to act on its

own motion, the co urt was without jurisdiction to modify the child support order.

Moreover, our holding is not affected by the fact that the court was attempting to give

effect to the 2004 proceedings.

[¶ 22 ] The record is of course entirely unclear as to what occurred dur ing the March 2004

hearing. What is clear, however, is that Mother did not appeal the August 2003 child

support order, she did not file a W .R.C.P . 60 motion seeking relief from the child support

order, and she did not file a petition to modify the child s upport order. Whatever may

have occurred during the unreported March 2004 hearing, the court had before it only

Father ’ s contempt and visitation motions and Mother ’ s custody motion. We thus

conclude that to the extent the court in 2004 intended to order that the 2003 child support

o r d e r b e m o d i f

i e d o r v a c a t e d a n d f

o r s u c h m o d i f

i c a t i o n t o b e a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y

, t h e9

c o u r t w a s w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r s u c h a n o r d e r a n d t h e o r

d e r w a s v o i d

. S e e W

e i s s

, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d at 412 (holding district court with out jurisdiction to modify order where

no petition to modify had been filed

, dismiss ing appeal

, and remand ing for entry of an

order vacating modification order).

[¶ 23 ] This Court has recognized that the limitations on a court ’ s jurisdiction to modify a

di vorce decree serve important policy goals in the finality and predictability of

j udgments. See Hanson , ¶ 18, 280 P.3d at 1193; Smith v. Smith , 895 P.2d 37 at 41 (Wyo.

1995) . We have also observed the policy served by not allowing retroactive

m odification s of child support orders:

F u r t h e r m o r e

, a l l o w i n g r e t r o s p e c t i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f d i v

o r c e

d e c r e e s m a y e n c o u r a g

e d e f a u l t

. A p a r t y m

i g h t d e c i d e t o s t o p

p a y m e n t a n d a l l o w a r r e a r a g e s t o a c c r

u e t o a s u b s t a n t i a l

a m o u n t

, w i t h t h e h o p e a n d a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a

t t h e c o u r

t w i l l

c a n c e l t h e a c c r u e d p a y m e n t s o w e d t o t h e r e c e i v i n g p a r t y

. W e

p r e f e r a r u l e w h i c h e n c o u r a g

e s a p a r t y t o s e e k m o d i f

i c a t i o n o f

a d i v o r c e d e c r e e a t t h e m o m e n t h i s f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n

c h a n g e s

. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e

, a p p e l l a n t c h o s e t o s i m

p l y s t o p

m a k i n g t h e r e q u i r e d p a y

m e n t s

. W e w i l l n o t s a n c t i o n t h i s t y p e

o f s e l f

- h e l p b y a l l o w i n g r e t r o s p e c t i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e

d e c r e e

.

P a r r y v

. P a r r y

, 7 6 6 P

. 2 d 1 1 6 8

, 1 1 7 0 ( W y o

. 1 9 8 9 )

.

[¶ 24 ] While we recognize that the district court was attempting to craft an order to

c orrect an incomplete record, we conclude that the court exceeded its statutory authority.

Mother has taken no steps to legally modify the 2003 child support order, and the order

therefore stands and is subject to enforcement.

C O N C L U S I O N

[¶ 25 ] The distri ct court was without jurisdiction to modify the August 2003 child

support order where no petition to modify had been filed

. We therefore dismiss the

appeal and remand to the district court for entry of an order vacating the Order Setting

Aside August 4, 2 003 Judgment and Child Support Obligation filed on June 29, 2012.

[¶26] The procedural history of this case does not reflect well on the judicial system and

there are multiple reasons why. However, one fundamental problem is the lack of a

record. The dis trict court and the parties expended time, effort and resources in the 2004

hearing and, apparently, a decision was made. No court reporter recorded the

proceedings or the decision. Whether that was because of the historically outdated

$45 .00 appearance fee required by statute for the reporter

, who is a S t a t e e m p l o y e e

, t o10

a p p e a r o r t

h e w i d e s p r e a d p r a c t i c e o f a t t o r n e y s a n d j u d g e s t o p r o c e e d w i t h o u

t a r e p o r t e r

,

w e d o n o t k

n o w

. T h e r e p o r

t e r a l s o w a s n o t e v

e n u t i l i z e d b y t

h e c o u r t t o m e m o r i a l i z e i t s

o r d e r

. The attorneys failed to follow the court’s directive to prepare an order consistent

with the oral ruling and the parties failed to file the financial information the court

requested, although a letter to the court by the attorney for F ather suggested the f inancial

affidavits had been filed, but placed in another confidential file. M other failed to pay any

child support and now has a substantial financial obligation. And

, a pparently, no one

followed up to assure the court’s orders were followed. Worse yet , this process drug out

for over twelve years. Whether that failure was the result of no system of keeping track

of deadlines or simple inattention, we do not know. Ultimately, public resources had to

be expended by the child support enforcement authori t i es to attempt to recoup child

support that should have been paid, but the required amount is uncertain. The first judge

retired and the incoming district judge attempted to make the best of a bad situation, but

did not have the requisite authority to do so. Finally, the cost and delay of an appeal to

this C ourt resulted, and we are left with no choice but to remand the matter for the parties

to start over. Surely our judicial system, and all of the actors within that system, could do

better. While a si tuation as bleak as this one is the exception, similar failures appear in

far too many cases. The Court believes that i t is time for the bench and bar to take a hard

look at our system and collaborate on procedures that will assure that judges, lawyers,

a nd parties consistently perform our respective responsibilities so that situations such as

those existing in the cases cannot occur.