AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed February 19, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-13-01512-CV

ESMERALDA ESTEVEZ, Appellant

V.

LEADER FINANCIAL SERVICES, A DIVISION OF AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK, 

CLEVELAND, OHIO; LOANCARE, A DIVISION OF FNF SERVICING, INC.; AND 

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 12-01960

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Myers, Evans, and O’Neill1

Opinion by Justice O’Neill

 Appellant Esmerelda Estevez filed her Original Petition in this case alleging violations 

of the Debt Collection Act, breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure, and wrongful eviction. Her 

claims centered on alleged defects in the special warranty deed supporting the foreclosure and

her eviction from her residence. Estevez did not effect service of citation on any of the three 

defendants, but LoanCare, a Division of FNF Servicing, Inc. (LoanCare) waived service and 

answered the suit. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment; both motions were 

denied by the trial court. The trial court then heard the case on the merits. The final judgment 

ordered that Estevez take nothing by her claims against LoanCare and dismissed those claims 

 1 The Honorable Michael J. O’Neill, Justice, Court of Appeals. Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
–2–

with prejudice. The judgment also dismissed without prejudice Estevez’s claims against the 

defendants that were not served. Estevez appeals the portion of the judgment dismissing her 

claims against LoanCare. We affirm.

Estevez filed her notice of appeal and arranged for the timely filing of the clerk’s record 

in this Court. She failed, however, to request transcription of the reporter’s record. When she 

did not respond to this Court’s directive to file written verification of her arrangements to have 

the record transcribed, we ordered the appeal submitted without a reporter’s record. 

Accordingly, we may consider and decide only those issues that do not require a reporter’s 

record. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 37.3(c).

In her first and second issues, Estevez challenges the trial court’s resolution of issues 

tried in the bench trial. Estevez contends the trial court erred when it entered the take-nothing 

judgment and dismissed her claims because (1) she had proved to the trial court that the special 

warranty deed on which LoanCare relied to claim possession was unsupported by a recorded 

power of attorney, and (2) she had proved to the trial court that one or more instruments in the 

chain of title preceding that same special warranty deed were executed by a person acting 

without proper capacity. These issues turn on the proof Estevez contends she offered concerning 

the invalidity of the special warranty deed. However, in the absence of a reporter’s record, we

cannot evaluate any proof she offered. Instead, we must presume the evidence presented at trial 

was sufficient to support the trial court’s final judgment. See Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. 

Assurance Servs. N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. 1998) (“We indulge every presumption in favor 

of the trial court’s findings in the absence of a statement of facts.”); Willms v. Americas Tire 

Co., 190 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (“[W]hen an appellant fails to 

bring a reporter’s record, an appellate court must presume the evidence presented was sufficient 
–3–

to support the trial court’s order.”). Without a reporter’s record, Estevez cannot establish that 

she proved any defect in the special warranty deed. We overrule her first and second issues.

In her third issue, Estevez contends the trial court erroneously denied her motion for 

partial summary judgment. The general rule is that an order overruling a motion for summary 

judgment is interlocutory in nature and is not appealable. Ackermann v. Vordenbaum, 403 

S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1966). When the denial of a motion for summary judgment is followed by a 

trial on the merits—as was the case here—the denial does not finally decide any issue pending 

before the trial court, and so it presents nothing for our review. See Anderton v. Schindler, 154 

S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). Because the denial of Estevez’s partial 

motion for summary judgment is not appealable, we overrule her third issue.

We have resolved each of Estevez’s issues against her. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

131512F.P05

/Michael J. O'Neill/

MICHAEL J. O’NEILL

JUSTICE, ASSIGNED
–4–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

ESMERALDA ESTEVEZ, Appellant

No. 05-13-01512-CV V.

LEADER FINANCIAL SERVICES, A 

DIVISION OF AMERICAN NATIONAL 

BANK, CLEVELAND, OHIO; 

LOANCARE, A DIVISION OF FNF 

SERVICING, INC.; AND MORTGAGE 

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 

SYSTEMS, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 12-01960.

Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neill. 

Justices Myers and Evans participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellees LEADER FINANCIAL SERVICES, A DIVISION OF 

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK, CLEVELAND, OHIO; LOANCARE, A DIVISION OF FNF 

SERVICING, INC.; AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. 

recover their costs of this appeal from appellant ESMERALDA ESTEVEZ.

Judgment entered this 19th day of February, 2015.