UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DENIECE JONES, Plaintiff,


### v. STEPHANIE YANTA, 

### etal., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

## --------------------------)
MARY R. JOHNSON, Plaintiff,

v. STEPHANIE YANTA, et

### al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

## --------------------------)
ANTOINE B. JONES, JR., Plaintiff,
v. STEPHANIE YANTA, 

### etal., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

## ---------------------------) Civil ActionNo. 07-1994 (RJL)

Civil ActionNo. 07-1995 (RJL)

Civil ActionNo. 07-1996 (RJL)

MEMORANDUM OPINIONThese consolidated cases are before the Court on defendants' motions to dismiss. Forthe
reasons discussed below, the motions will be granted. 

### BACKGROUND Deniece Jones ("Mrs. Jones"), Mary R. Johnson ("Mrs. Johnson"), and Antoine B. Jones, Jr. ("Jones Jr."), are the wife, mother-in-law, and son, respectively, ofAntoine B. Jones, Sr. ("Jones Sr."). Jones Sr. was one ofseveral defendants in a criminal action brought in this court, and boththe investigation ofJones Sr.'sactivities and the prosecution ofhis criminal case are the contextfrom whichplaintiffs' claims arose: AsallegedintheIndictment,from atleast sometimein2003 throughOctober 24,2004, [JonesSr.] andhisco-conspiratorsacquired,repackaged, stored,processed, sold, andredistributedlargequantities ofcocaineandcocainebase, in the Districtof Columbia,the StatesofMarylandandTexas,the RepublicofMexico andelsewhere. 

### It is further allegedthat Jones [Sr.] was theprimary supplierofcocaine andcocaine base to members ofthe organization in the District ofColumbia and in the State of Maryland. As part oftheir investigation into the alleged conspiracy, law enforcement agents utilized a number of investigative techniques, including surveillance, informants, installation ofan electronic tracking device on Jones [Sr.'s] vehicle, search warrants issued to electronic communication service providers for text messages to or from cellular telephones used by Jones [Sr.] and an alleged coconspirator, and a Title III wire intercept. The covert portion ofthe investigation ended on October 24,2005, with searches pursuantto warrants and arrests. Atthat time, drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and significant quantities ofcash were seized from the homes ofa number ofthe defendants, as well as from an alleged "safe house" in Fort Washington, Maryland where 97 kilograms of cocaine, 3 kilograms ofcrack cocaine, and in excess of$800,000 was found. UnitedStates v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71,73-74 (D.D.C. 2006), recons. denied, 511 F. SUpp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2007). Jones Sr.'sfirst trial "ended in his acquittal on seventeen counts ofusing a communication facility to facilitate a drug trafficking offense and ahungjurywith respect to thirteen similar counts and one count ofconspiracyto distribute orpossess with intent to
2distribute a controlled substance." UnitedStates v. Jones, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 76. Onretrial of the remaining counts, Jones Sr. was found guilty on one court ofconspiracyto distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms ormore ofcocaine and 50 grams ormore of cocaine base and was sentenced to a term oflife imprisonment. His appeal is pendingbefore the United States Court ofAppeals for the District ofColumbiaCircuit. A. Deniece Jones, Civ. No. 07-1994 Mrs. Jones brings this civil rights action against the United States Department ofJustice ("DOJ"), the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation ("FBI"), FBI Special Agents Stephanie Yanta ("Yanta"), Kellie O'Brien ("O'Brien") and StephenNaugle ("Naugle"), MetropolitanPolice DepartmentDetectivesNormaHorne ("Horne") and Steve Kirschner ("Kirchner"), and Assistant United States Attorneys Rachel Lieber ("Lieber") andJohn Geise ("Geise") under 42 U.S.c. 

### § 1983. CompI. at 1. She demands damages in the amount of$22,000,000. 

### Id. Mrs. Jones alleges that agents enteredherhouse at 10870 Moore Street in Waldorf, Maryland, in the early morning hours ofOctober 24, 2005 without a warrant, that agents "snatched [her] and [her] family out of [their] beds, pointed guns at [their] heads and made [then] lay onthe floor" during the search. CompI. at 6. She states thatthe agents "tookover40boxes of
... personal, private, and business documents" from the residence, 

### id. at 7, and amongthese items were records "crucial to the continuance of[her] consultingbusiness [and her] real estate investmentbusiness" butwholly unrelatedto the criminal investigation, 

### id. at 4. She alleges that she was "severelyhandicapped in [her] abilityto continue [her] business affairs" withoutthese records, and further alleges that herbusinesses were harmedbecause Special Agent Yanta "used

3information obtainedthrough the wiretap to lie, harass, deceive, and interfere with [her] legitimate business partners." 

### Id. at 5. According to Mrs. Jones, Lieber denied her "the opportunityto visit with [her] husband
..

. while he was being detained at the [D.C.] Jail," and also deprived her ofopportunitiesto communicate with Jones Sr. by other means. CompI. at 4. This situation apparently arises from Lieber's December 22,2005 request to the Warden ofthe D.C. Jail that Jones Sr. "beplaced in protective custody, based on growing concerns that Jones [Sr.]" was misusing his telephone privileges in a waythat undermined "the safety ofvarious individuals, and the integrity ofthe investigation" ofhis criminal activities. Mem. ofP. & A. in Support ofFed. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Fed. Defs.' Mot."), Ex. C (December 22, 2005 Memorandum) at 1. Mrs. Jones further alleges that Detective Kirchner and FBI agents are responsible for the placement ofa "GPS tracking device on [her] personal auto," a Jeep Cherokee, "inviolation ofa Court Order" issued in Jones Sr.'scriminal case. CompI. at 3; 

### see id. at 5. She asserts thatthe agents installed the device afterthe orderhad expired. 

### Id. at 9. In addition, she contendedthat AUSA Geise presented "tainted GPS data" at trial. 

### Id. at 3. B. Mary R. Johnson, Civ. No. 07-1995 Mrs. Johnson brings this action against the DOJ, the FBI, Yanta, Lieber and Geise under 42 U.S.c. 

### § 1983. CompI. at 1. She demands damages of$I,OOO,OOO for alleged violations of her constitutional rights. 

### Id. Mrs. Johnson rented the house at 12221 Brandywine Road in Brandywine, Maryland from her daughter and son-in-law, Jones Sr., and lived there with another daughter and two grandchildren. CompI. at 3. On October 24,2005, Mrs. Johnson "was awakened by the sound of 4FBI agents and DC MPD detectives banging on [the] front door." 

### Id. Accordingto Mrs. Johnson, the agents "wereyelling threats," pointed shotguns at her, "stormedthe house and held [her], [her] daughter and two grandchildren (ages 10 and 11) at gunpoint." 

### Id. The agents "were looking for [her] son-in-law (Antoine Jones, Sr.)," 

### id., who, according to Mrs. Johnson, neither resided at nor visited the Brandywine Road house, 

### id. at 5. The agents "proceeded to search the house and continued to hold [the occupants] at gunpoint," an event Mrs. Johnson described as a stressful ordeal for the household. 

### Id. Since the events ofOctober 24, 2005 and the subsequent decline ofMrs. Jones' businesses, Mrs. Johnson has been supporting Mrs. Jones financially on her retirement income. 

### Id. at 4. C. Antoine B. Jones, Jr., Civ. No. 07-1996 Jones Jr. brings this civil rights action against the United States Department ofJustice, the FBI, FBI Special Agents Yanta, O'Brien and Naugle, and against Assistant United States Attorneys Lieber and Geise under42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983, and demands damages in the amount of $2,000,000. CompI. at 1. Jones, Jr., formerly a student at Coppin State University in Baltimore, Maryland, states that he resided at the Moore Streetresidence and was among the occupants awakened in the early morning hours ofOctober 24, 2005 and held at gunpoint while the search warrant was executed. CompI. at 4-5. He, too, alleges that the agents failed to present a warrant, that defendants seized items unrelated to the criminal investigation and failed to return them upon request, thus hampering the continued operation ofthe family'S real estate and consultingbusinesses. 

### Id. at 4. Further, Jones Jr. alleges that Yanta unlawfully monitored his telephone calls, including conversations with his father, 

### id. at 6-7, and that Lieber denied him an opportunity to visit or 

### 5otherwise contacthis father while he was detained at the D.C. Jail, 

### id. at 3. As a result of defendants' action, Jones Jr. allegedly has experienced mental anguish and has dropped out of school due to his inability to focus onhis education. 

### Id. at 3. Although Jones Jr. does not name Home as a defendant in his action, he faults her for misrepresenting his parents' ownership of real estate, including an "uninhabitable shell" in Baltimore that was to be rehabilitated and made available to him as "aplace close to school to live." 

### Id. at 6. He alleges that the "negative publicity surrounding this investigation" prompted the contractor working onthe Baltimore house to abandonthe project. 

### Id. Lastly, Jones Jr. challenges the validity ofthe search warrant for text messages and the wiretap, and accuses Yanta of"illegally eavesdropp[ing] on [his] personal, business and private conversations with [his] father." 

### Id. at 7. D. All Plaintiffs Mrs. Jones, Mrs. Johnson and Jones Jr. allege that the individual defendants have violated rules ofprofessional conduct, have perjured themselves before the court, Grand Jury, ortrialjury, and, with respectto AUSAs Lieber and Geise, have committedprosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that defendants failed to disclose evidence favorable to Jones Sr.'s defense in violation ofBradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and failed to tum overdiscovery materials from the items seized from the Moore Street residence. In addition, plaintiffs allege that Yanta obtained the wiretap authorization and search warrants for text messages and for the Moore Street and Brandywine Road residences by deceiving the court with perjuredtestimony and erroneous information. All the plaintiffs allege that Detective Home falsely represented that the Joneses owned six houses, apparently in an effort to create a negative perception ofthe plaintiffs. In addition, all the plaintiffs assert, vaguely, that Jones Sr. was wrongfully arrested,
6and, as a result, they have suffered loss ofconsortium, thatthey were slandered, and thatthey have experienced depression and stress. DISCUSSION' A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6) The Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure require that a complaintcontain '''a short andplain statement ofthe claim showingthat the pleader is entitledto relief,' in orderto 'givethe defendant fair notice ofwhatthe
... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, _, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A motionunder Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiffs likelihood of
success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiffproperlyhas stated a claim. See Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A court considering such a motionpresumesthe factual allegations ofthe complaintto be true and construes them liberally in the plaintiffs favor. See, e.g., UnitedStates v. PhillipMorris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2001). Although "detailedfactual allegations" are notrequired to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must offer "morethan labels and conclusions"to provide "grounds" of"entitle[ment] to relief." BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65. Thus, the complaint's "[fJactual allegations mustbe enoughto raise a right to reliefabove the speculative level, onthe assumptionthat all the allegations in the complaint are true (even ifdoubtful in fact)." Id. at 1965 (citations omitted).

Forpurposes ofthis Memorandum Opinion, the courtpresumes, butdoes not decide, that service ofprocess on Yanta, Naugle, O'Brien, Lieber, Geise, Horne and Kirchner has been effected in boththeir official and individual capacities. 7

### B. Claims Under 42 Us.c. 

### § 1983 The court notes atthe outsetthat plaintiffs fail to state a claim againstthe DOJ, the FBI, Yanta, O'Brien,Naugle, Lieber and Geise under42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 applies to state actors, notto federal agencies oremployees. See, e.g., Williams v. UnitedStates of Am., 396 F.3d 412, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2005). These plaintiffs are proceedingpro se, and their complaints are entitledto a liberal construction. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Accordingly, the courtpresumes that plaintiffs also bring this action against Yanta, O'Brien,Naugle, Lieber and Geise in their individual capacities underBivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). "ABivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under
...42 U.S.C. § 1983." Marshall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 518 F. Supp. 2d 190, 193 (D.D.C. 2007) (citingHartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006) (internal citation omitted)). UnderBivens, a plaintiffhas "animpliedprivate action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated [his] constitutional rights." Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). C. Standing Defendants argue thatplaintiffs lack standing to bring "anyclaims related to ... Jones [Sr.'s] trial." Fed. Defs.' Mot. at 16. The court concurs. Article III ofthe Constitution limits thejurisdiction offederal courts to cases or controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "Therequisite elements ofArticle III standing are well established: [a] plaintiffmust allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Hein v. Freedom
8from Religion Found., Inc., 551U.S. 587,_,127 S.Ct. 2553, 2562 (2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The injury plaintiffs allege "must affect [them] in apersonal and individual way." Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992). "The focus is on the qualifications and the status ofthe party seeking to bring his complaintbefore a federal court and not onthe issues he wishes to have resolved." McKinney v. UnitedStates Dep't of the Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citingSimon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28 (1976)). "Plaintiffs were nottargets, nor defendants, nor suspects, nor conspirators, nor participants; neither were they arrested for any involvement in any illegal or criminal activities." PIs.' Opp'nto Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Compl. [#31] at 1. Plaintiffs, then, have suffered no injury in fact arising from any ofthe alleged constitutional violations attributed to these defendants. Plaintiffs were not defendants to the criminal action, and, therefore, the prosecutors' alleged misconduct, failure to disclose information under Rule 16 ofthe Federal Rules ofCriminal Procedure or to disclose Bradymaterial, has caused them no harm. Norhave the plaintiffs sustained any injury arising from the FBI Special Agents' actions with respect to the search warrants or wiretaps. Only Jones Sr. has standing to raise such claims, and, thus far, he has met with no success. See Jones v. Lieber, 579 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing Bivens action against Lieber arising from his placement in administrative segregation because Lieber enjoys qualified immunity from suit); Jones v. Gikas, No. 07cvl068, 2008 WL 2202264, at *1 (D.D.C. May 27,2008) (dismissing civil rights action against "Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents [who] conducted unlawful searches ofhis apartment and warehouse and subsequently gave perjured testimony in the criminal proceedings against him"); Jones v. Yanta, 9No. 07cvll72, 2008 WL 2202219, at * 1(D.D.C. May 27, 2008) (dismissing civil rights action against federal and District ofColumbia law enforcement officers who allegedly "violatedthe lawby obtaining wiretaps withoutprobable cause, forging documents, making false sworn statements, deceiving the Judge, and suborning perjury, among otherthings"); UnitedStates v. Jones, No. 05cr0386, 2007 WL 3287536, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 6,2007) (denying Jones Sr.'s motion to dismiss the indictment against him based in part on alleged "outrageous government conduct"); UnitedStates v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 85-88 (denying Jones Sr.'smotionto suppress evidence seized from Moore Streetresidence and denying in part motion to suppress evidence obtained from mobile tracking device). D. Immunity 

### 1. Sovereign Immunity The federal defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against the DOJ, the FBI, and against Yanta, Naugle and O'Brien, Lieber and Geise in their official capacities on the ground that the claims are barred by the doctrine ofsovereign immunity. Fed. Defs.' Mot. at 12-13. "Official capacity suits
... generally represent only another way ofpleading an action against an entity ofwhich an officer is an agent," such that "an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,165-66 (1985). Accordingly, the court treats plaintiffs' claims as ifthey were brought against the United States directly. "Itis axiomatic thatthe United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence ofconsent is a prerequisite forjurisdiction." UnitedStates v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Such consent may not be implied, but mustbe "unequivocally expressed." United 10States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992). The United Stateshas notwaived its sovereign immunity for constitutional tort claims, see Fed. DepositIns. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,477 (1994) (stating that sovereign immunityprecludes damage claims against the United States government for constitutional violations broughtunderthe Federal Tort Claims Act), and sovereign immunity extends to governmental agencies such as the DOJ and to their employees where such employees are sued in their official capacities, see id. at 483-86. "Sovereign immunity isjurisdictional in nature," id. at 475, and absent a waiver ofsovereign immunity, the court lacks subject matterjurisdictionto entertainplaintiffs claims for money damages against the DOJ, the FBI or against these federal government officials sued in their official capacities. See id.; Clark v. Librarya/Congress, 750 F.2d 89,101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1984);Meyer v. Reno, 911 F. Supp. 11, 18 (D.D.C. 1996). 2. Prosecutorial Immunity Liber and Geise argue thatthey are absolutely immune from suit underthe doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Fed. Defs.' Mot. at 17-19. "[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presentingthe State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit under [42 U.S.C. § 1983]." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). The Supreme Court instructs that "whetherto present a case to a grandjury, whetherto file an information, whether and when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what other evidence to present" are advocatory decisions protected by immunity. Id. at 431 n.33; see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (concluding that a deputy prosecuting attorney's "activities in connectionwith the preparation and filing oftwo ofthe three charging documents

- the information and the motion for 

### an arrest 11warrant
- are protectedby absolute immunity," even ifthese documents contained inaccurate factual statements); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,492 (1991) (dismissing Sec. 1983 action against state prosecutorbecause his "appearance in court in support ofan application for a search warrant and the presentation ofevidence at thathearing are protected by absolute immunity"); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1305 n.8 (1Ith Cir. 2007) ("Injury flowing from aprocedural due process violation
...that results from a prosecutor's failure to comply with the Bradyrule cannot be redressed by a civil damages action against the prosecutorunder [Sec.] 1983 because the prosecutor is immune from such liability." ), reh 'gdenied, 254 Fed. Appx. 803 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
_ U.S. _, 128 S.Ct. 1259 (2008). "The law ofimmunity in a Bivens claim against
a federal official mirrors that in a [S]ection 1983 claim against a state official." Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 820 (1996). Lieber and Geise are "insulate[d]
... from liability for [their] unquestionably advocatory decision to prosecute" Jones Sr., and their prosecutorial immunity "alsoprotects [them] from liability for allegedly concealing exculpatory evidence from the grandjury and for allegedly manipulating evidence before the grandjury." Moore, 65 F.3d at 194. Similarly, their alleged failure to disclose Brady material is advocatory conductprotected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id.; see Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257,262 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that absolute immunity protects a prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995). Assuming without deciding that plaintiffs have standing to pursue claims against AUSAs Lieber and Geise for their alleged acts ofmisconduct inthe course ofthe criminal proceedings against Jones Sr., their complaints fail to state claims upon which reliefcan be granted.
123. Qualified Immunity "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearlyestablished statutory or constitutional rights ofwhich a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity shield public officials "from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats ofliability," id. at 806, and is designed to dispose of"insubstantial lawsuits" on a motion to dismiss, before the point at which the defendant is required to engage in substantial litigation, id. at 808. Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the otherburdens oflitigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth,472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The privilege is "an immunity from suit ratherthan a mere defense to liability; and
... is effectively lost ifa case is erroneously permittedto go to trial." Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court "repeatedly [has] stressed the importance ofresolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). By definition, qualified immunity is not absolute. However, "[a] plaintiffwho seeks damages for violation ofconstitutional or statutoryrights may overcomethe defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing thatthose rights were clearly established atthe time ofthe conduct at issue." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984). The court considers, "then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show [that] the [defendant's] conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,201. Ifthe facts alleged do not show a constitutional violation, the inquiry ends. Jd. at 207.
13a. Lieber "[W]hen a prosecutorperforms duties which are not intimately associated with the judicialprocess, only qualified immunity is granted." Carter, 34 F.3d at 262. Withrespect to Lieber's involvementin Jones Sr.'splacement in administrative segregation, this court already has determined that Lieber is protected by qualified immunity,Jones v. Leiber, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 181, and there is no need to revisit the matter in the context ofthis case. NeitherMrs. Jones, Jones Jr. nor Jones Sr. has a constitutionallyprotectedright to visitation, and Lieber's alleged involvement with Jones Sr.'splacement in segregation is not actionable. See KentuckyDep 't of Carr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 165 (1989) (concluding that prisonregulations allowing officials to exclude certain visitors without ahearing "do not establish a liberty interest entitled to the protections ofthe Due Process Clause"); Blockv. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984) (concluding that a "blanketprohibition [on contact visits with family members and friends] is an entirely reasonable, nonpunitive response to the legitimate security concerns" ofthe Los Angeles County Central Jail). b. Yanta, O'Brien and Naugle Defendants argue that qualified immunity protects FBI Special Agents Yanta, O'Brien and Naugle from suit on the ground thatplaintiffcannot showthat their constitutional rights were violated. Fed. Defs.' Mot. at 12-15. Generally, plaintiffs' claims against Yanta, O'Brien and Naugle arise from theirhaving obtained and executed search warrants for the Moore Street and Brandywine Road houses, obtained authorization to monitortelephone calls and text messages, and installed a GPS tracking device on the Joneses' Jeep Cherokee, presumably in violation oftheir Fourth Amendment
14rights. The Fourth Amendment states that "no Warrant shall issue, butupon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The court already has determined that "Yanta's supporting affidavits [were] sufficient to establishprobable cause for the text message warrants." 

### Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 77. Her "29- page August 10th Affidavit, which served as the foundation upon which subsequent affidavits submitted in support ofwiretap and search warrant applications were based, reference[d] informationprovidedbythree confidential sources who had first-hand knowledge of [Jones Sr.'s] illicit activity" and "describe[d] at length the results ofsurveillance, searches, debriefings, review ofelectronic data, and other investigative techniques." 

### Id. Accordingly, the court concludedthat "the affidavit clearly establishe[d] probable cause to believe that Jones [Sr.] operated a conspiracy to distribute narcotics." 

### Id. Further, the court found that Yanta's two subsequent affidavits in support ofthe government's application for a wiretap "satisfie[d] the applicable probable cause requirements," 

### id. at 81, and summarily rejected an argument that the government failed to "minimize" intercepted conversationsto protect matters "pertainingto [the targets'] jointbusiness ventures as well as social orothermatters unrelated to a drug conspiracy," 

### id. at 83. With respect to the search ofthe Joneses' Moore Streethouse, the courthas determined that "[t]he warrant applicationwas supported by a 47-page affidavit sworn to by [FBI] Special Agent Yanta," 

### id. at 85, and that it "clearly establishe[d] probable cause to search," 

### id. at 86. Further, because the courtrejected Jones Sr.'s argument that the warrant was rendered invalidby the investigating agents' alleged failure to present him, Mrs. Jones orJones Jr. with "acopy of
15the warrant with attachmentto inform them ofthe scope ofthe warrant," and their alleged failure to leave a copy ofthe warrant on the premises. Id. Mrs. Jones' signature was "affixedto each page ofa five-page receipt for goods taken during the search," and "[t]herefore, atthe very least, Jones was providedwith a copy ofthe warrant and a receipt at the conclusion ofthe search." 

### Id.;

see Fed. Defs.' Mot., Ex. B (Search Warrant and Receipt for Property Seized). The governmentplaced "anelectronic device - a Global Positioning System ("GPS")

-

.. on [Jones Sr.'s] Jeep Cherokee" pursuantto a court Order. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 87. In the course ofthe search ofthe Moore Streetresidence, agents found the Jeep Cherokee parked in the garage. 

### Id. The courtrecognized thatthe affidavit supportingthe original search warrant "specifically noted the Jeep Cherokee as having been observedparked at the Moore Street address" and that Jones Sr. had been observed driving the Jeep. 

### Id. The court found that the search ofthe Jeep was authorized by the original search warrant and that data obtained from the GPS device while the vehicle was in public spaces was admissible at Jones Sr.'strial. 

### Id. at 88. Only "the data obtained from the GPS device whenthe Jeep Cherokee was parked in the garage adjoining the Moore Streetproperty [was] suppressed." 

### Id. Based on the court'sprior evidentiaryrulings in the course ofJones Sr.'s criminal proceedings, Yanta, O'Brien and Naugle did not violate plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. Absent factual allegations to withstand these defendants' assertion ofqualified immunity, plaintiffs' claims must fail.
c. Kirchner and Horne The courtpresumes that Kirchner's argument for dismissal ofplaintiffs' complaints is a truncated argument asserting qualified immunity. Relying wholly onthe court'sruling onJones
16Sr.'smotion to suppress evidence obtained from the GPS device onthe Jeep Cherokee, see Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 87-88, Kirchner argues that his actions did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. See Mem. ofP. & 

### A. in Support ofDef. Steve Kirchner's Mot. to Dismiss PI.'s CompI. at 3-4. Specifically, he argues that "the government is not required to obtain a search warrantto install a GPS or similar device on a vehicle to monitor it in public, 

### id. at 4, and, therefore, "placementofthe device did not violate [Mrs. Jones'] FourthAmendment or any other constitutional rights." 

### Id. The court concurs. Kirchner cannotbe held liable unless he has violated a "clearly established
... constitutional right[] ofwhich a reasonable person would have known," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818, and the court'sprior conclusion that installation ofthe device isjustified, as was the use ofdata obtained from the GPS device while Jeep Cherokee was in public space, precludes plaintiffs' civil rights claims. Insofar as plaintiffs allege that Kirchner and Home testified falsely, the court concludes that they are absolutely immune from suit. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983) (holding that 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983 does not authorize a convicted person to assert a claim for damages against a police officer for giving perjured testimony at his criminal trial on the ground that absolute immunityprotects any witness from civil liability based onhis testimony in a judicial proceeding); Rogers v. Johnson-Norman, 466 F. Supp. 2d 162, 175 (2006) (dismissing claim against defendant who allegedly presented false petition for a civil protection order and gave perjured testimony at a criminal trial in the Superior Court on the ground that witness' testimony is absolutely privileged).

17CONCLUSION Notwithstandingplaintiffs' efforts to distance themselves and their claims from Jones Sr.'scriminal trial and his civil cases filed in this court, plaintiffs lack standing to bring any claims arising from the investigation ofJones Sr.'s criminal activities orfrom the criminal proceedings against him. The court further concludes that the doctrine ofsovereign immunity bars their claims against the DOJ andthe 

### FBI, and their claims against Yanta, O'Brien,Naugle, Leiber, and Geise in their individual capacities. Because the facts plaintiffs allege do not establish a constitutional violation with respect to the search warrants orwiretaps, they cannot
overcome the qualified immunity which protects Yanta, O'Brien,Naugle, Leiber, Kirshner and Moore from civil liability. Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motions to dismiss and dismisses this action in its entirety. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

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