UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Cyrus YOUNG, Sergeant First Class 

U.S. Army, Appellant 

No. 06-0505 

Crim. App. No. 20010820 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 

Argued February 5, 2007 

Decided March 21, 2007 

ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which 

EFFRON, C.J., and BAKER, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined. 

Counsel 

For Appellant: Captain Scott T. Ayers (argued); Colonel John T. 

Phelps II, Lieutenant Colonel Kirsten V. C. Brunson, Lieutenant 

Colonel Steven C. Henricks, and Major Billy B. Ruhling II (on 

brief). 

For Appellee: Captain Michael Friess (argued); Colonel John W. 

Miller II, Lieutenant Colonel Michele B. Shields, and Captain

Tami L. Dillahunt (on brief). 

Military Judges: Robert F. Holland, Michael J. Hargis, and 

Michael B. Neveu 

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication. 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

2

Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court. 

Sergeant First Class Cyrus Young was charged with 

attempting to distribute marijuana, conspiracy to distribute 

marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to 

distribute, and distribution of marijuana in violation of 

Articles 80, 81, and 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice 

(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 881, 912a (2000). Young entered pleas 

of not guilty but was convicted of all charges by members at a 

general court-martial. He was sentenced to a dishonorable 

discharge, confinement for ten years, forfeiture of all pay and 

allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The 

convening authority approved the sentence and the United States 

Army Court of Criminal Appeals summarily affirmed the findings 

and sentence. United States v. Young, Army 20010820 (A. Ct. 

Crim. App. 2006). We granted review of three issues: whether 

the evidence was legally sufficient; whether two offenses stood 

as greater and lesser included offenses; and whether Young had 

been denied his due process right to speedy post-trial review 

and appeal. We affirm the decision of the Army Court of 

Criminal Appeals. 

Background

The offenses underlying this appeal occurred at the home of 

Young’s cousin, Frederick Young. In January 2001 Frederick 

invited an individual named Paul Chapman to come over to his 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

3

house, which is located in Laurel, Mississippi. When Chapman 

arrived, Frederick introduced him to Young. Young showed 

Chapman a bag with a “block” of marijuana in it and asked if 

Chapman was interested in some. 

At about the same time, because of a “911” call indicating 

a possible domestic disturbance and some confusion over the 

address from which the call originated, police officers showed 

up at Frederick’s home believing that a domestic disturbance was 

in progress. Officer Jerome Jackson knocked on the door and 

explained to Frederick that he was responding to a 911 call. 

Jackson explained that he needed to enter the residence to check 

on the occupants’ welfare and Frederick permitted Jackson to 

enter. As they entered, Frederick loudly announced that he was 

alone and no one had called the police. Chapman, who was in a 

bedroom with Young, testified that at this point Young appeared 

nervous and gathered something that he “had on the floor in a 

bag” as if “[h]e was trying to hide something.” Chapman then 

testified that he observed Young pick up a black bag and toss it 

across the room into the closet. 

When Jackson entered a hallway in the house he noticed that 

the door to a rear bedroom was slightly open. Jackson saw an 

individual behind the door and saw the door quickly close. 

Jackson knocked on the door, identified himself and asked the 

occupant to open the door. After he heard a lot of commotion, 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

4

Jackson opened the door and entered. Upon entering, Jackson 

observed a light-colored bag being thrown across the room from 

his left, where Young was located, to his right. The bag landed 

on a couch. Jackson testified that Young and Chapman appeared 

nervous. 

After Young and Chapman were removed from the bedroom, 

Jackson examined the bag that he had seen land on the couch. 

Jackson described the bag as one plastic bag inside of another 

plastic bag. The bags contained a “compressed . . . rectangular 

. . . green-leafy substance” that Jackson believed was 

marijuana. At that point, Jackson contacted the Narcotics 

Division and Sergeant Malcolm L. Bounds responded to the house. 

 Bounds testified that in the bedroom he found a white 

grocery bag on the couch which held a plastic ziplock bag 

containing marijuana. The white grocery bag was on top of a 

black duffle bag with red writing on the side. This black 

duffle bag contained a “Crown Royal” cloth bag which in turn 

contained five rolls of money, each roll containing $1,100.00, 

and a bank receipt from Young’s account at the Fort Hood 

National Bank. Young would later testify that the Crown Royal 

bag and bank receipt were his, although he denied owning the 

black bag in which they were found. Next to the black duffle 

bag on the couch, Bounds saw approximately twelve plastic bags. 

Although empty, some of the bags retained an impression as 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

5

though they had contained a square-shaped object similar to the 

shape of a brick of compressed marijuana. These empty plastic 

bags contained marijuana residue. Bounds also found a set of 

“Sunbeam panel scales” on the floor of the bedroom. 

Bounds testified that he found another small set of scales 

in the doorway of the bedroom closet. Inside the closet Bounds 

found another black duffle bag. Bounds described this duffel 

bag as having been “thrown” into the closet because “[t]here was 

also a lot of paint and trash in there and that was the only 

thing that was clean in there.” Bounds found six bricks of 

marijuana in the black duffle bag and a seventh brick underneath 

the duffel bag in the closet. 

The total weight of all marijuana seized was about eighteen 

pounds. A search of Young netted $1,179.00 in cash from a small 

pouch around his waist. Testimony revealed that a pound of 

marijuana was worth between $900.00 and $1,100.00 in that region 

of Mississippi. Bounds stated on cross-examination that the 

circumstances at Frederick’s house were indicative of a drug 

trafficker in the process of breaking down marijuana for 

distribution. Later, a drug detection dog alerted on Young’s 

vehicle, but no marijuana was found in the vehicle. Young 

testified that although he was at Frederick’s home, he did not 

own or possess any marijuana and the money found on him was to 

buy a car, tires, and gas. 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

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Discussion

I. Legal Sufficiency

 Young claims that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

show that he distributed any marijuana because there was no 

evidence connecting him to any marijuana, to the empty plastic 

bags containing marijuana residue, or to ownership of any 

marijuana. Because of the lack of evidence and uncertainty over 

who owned the marijuana, Young claims that the findings cannot 

be sustained. The Government responds that overwhelming 

circumstantial evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Young distributed marijuana. 

 In reviewing a case for legal sufficiency, this court must 

determine “whether, considering the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have 

found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Dobson, 63 M.J. 1, 21 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); United States v. 

Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324-25 (C.M.A. 1987). In order to convict 

an accused for distribution of marijuana, the prosecution must 

prove: “(a) That the accused distributed a certain amount of a 

controlled substance; and (b) That the distribution by the 

accused was wrongful.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States

pt. IV, para. 37.b.(3) (2005 ed.) (MCM). We are “‘bound to draw 

every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in favor 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

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of the prosecution.’” United States v. McGinty, 38 M.J. 131, 

132 (C.M.A. 1993) (quoting United States v. Blocker, 32 M.J. 

281, 284 (C.M.A. 1991)). We review a question of legal 

sufficiency de novo as a question of law. United States v. 

Hays, 62 M.J. 158, 162 (C.A.A.F. 2005). 

 There is evidence in the record indicating, or giving rise 

to an inference of, Young’s dominion or control over the 

marijuana and drug related materials found in the bedroom of 

Frederick’s home: 

1. Young had possession of a brick of marijuana which he 

displayed to Chapman; 

2. Young gathered items in the bedroom when he knew that 

police were in Frederick’s house and he threw a black 

duffel bag that yielded marijuana into the closet; and 

3. Young tossed a light-colored bag across the room when 

Officer Jackson opened the door and that bag contained 

marijuana. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this 

evidence establishes Young’s constructive possession of the 

marijuana and a reasonable factfinder could indeed find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Young had a direct criminal relationship 

with, if not ownership of, the marijuana. From this point, 

additional evidence supports the finding that Young distributed 

marijuana: 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

8

1. Near the black duffel bag found on the couch, which 

contained Young’s Crown Royal bag and his deposit 

slip, were several empty plastic bags that retained 

the shape of a brick of marijuana; 

2. These empty plastic bags contained marijuana residue; 

3. Young’s Crown Royal bag contained five rolls of money, 

each in the identical amount of $1,100.00; 

4. The price for marijuana in that region of Mississippi 

was between $900.00 and $1,100.00 a pound; and 

5. Two separate sets of scales, an item that can be 

reasonably associated with drug distribution, were 

found in the bedroom. 

Reviewing this evidence for legal sufficiency and making 

the inferences in favor of the prosecution, we conclude that the 

evidence of distribution is legally sufficient. The record 

supports a conclusion that Young exercised dominion or control 

over the drugs and drug-related materials found in the bedroom 

of Frederick’s home. Further, it is entirely reasonable to 

conclude, based on the empty plastic bags, the marijuana residue 

in those bags, and the rolls of money in Young’s cloth Crown 

Royal bag, that Young had completed a sale of marijuana before 

the police arrived. 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

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II. Greater and Lesser Included Offenses

 Young argues that his separate convictions for distributing 

marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to 

distribute cannot stand. He claims that the marijuana 

distributed was a portion of the marijuana charged within the 

specification alleging possession of marijuana with the intent 

to distribute. Asserting that there is no evidence to support a 

finding that these were separate and distinct quantities of 

marijuana, Young argues that the lesser included offense of 

possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute should be 

dismissed. The Government responds that Young was convicted of 

distributing and possessing two distinct quantities of marijuana 

and the two offenses do not stand as greater and lesser included 

offenses. 

 In United States v. Savage, 50 M.J. 244, 245 (C.A.A.F. 

1999), this court addressed charges alleging distribution and 

possession with intent to distribute the same marijuana on the 

same day. Under those circumstances, we determined that the 

offenses stood as greater and lesser included offenses and that 

“Congress did not intend to punish a servicemember twice for 

essentially the same act.” Id.; see also United States v. 

Brown, 19 M.J. 63, 64 (C.M.A. 1984). However, where the facts 

demonstrate that the acts or quantities of contraband are 

distinct, separate convictions for both distribution and 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

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possession may be upheld. Thus, in United States v. Heryford, 

52 M.J. 265, 267 (C.A.A.F. 2000), we upheld separate convictions 

for distribution of LSD and possession of that same LSD where 

the facts demonstrated that the accused had retained the LSD in 

his off-base apartment for two days prior to entering a military 

installation and distributing the substance. Similarly, an 

accused may be separately convicted and punished for 

distributing a portion of a quantity of drugs and for possessing 

that portion he retains. See United States v. Morrison, 18 M.J. 

108, 108 (C.M.A. 1984) (summary disposition). 

 The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that 

Young was convicted of distributing one quantity of marijuana 

and thereafter retaining (possessing) a distinct remaining 

quantity. We have found legally sufficient evidence to support 

the finding of distribution of some amount of marijuana, in 

part, based upon the empty plastic bags, marijuana residue in 

those bags, and the large quantity of cash found in Young’s 

Crown Royal bag. This same evidence supports an inference that 

Young had completed a marijuana transaction before law 

enforcement entered the premises and discovered the remaining 

eighteen pounds of marijuana. The identity of the person to 

whom marijuana was distributed is not an essential element of 

proof of the offense. See MCM pt. IV, para. 37.b.(3). 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

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The approximately eighteen pounds of marijuana found in the 

bedroom is the amount that Young was convicted of possessing 

with the intent to distribute. We conclude that the evidence 

supports a factfinder’s conclusion that the marijuana Young was 

charged with possessing was not the same marijuana that he was 

charged with distributing. Consequently, the offenses do not 

stand as greater and lesser included offenses, and both findings 

of guilty may stand. 

III. Post-Trial and Appellate Delay

 We granted review of a final issue in this case to examine 

whether Young was deprived of his right to due process by the 

1,637 days that elapsed between his trial and completion of 

appellate review. Our methodology for reviewing issues of posttrial and appellate delay is set out in United States v. Moreno, 

63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006). We ask first whether the 

particular delay is facially unreasonable. Id. at 136. If we 

conclude that the delay is facially unreasonable, we then 

examine the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 

514, 530 (1972): (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons 

for the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of the right to 

timely review and appeal; and (4) prejudice. See Moreno, 63 

M.J. at 135-36; United States v. Jones, 61 M.J. 80, 83 (C.A.A.F. 

2005); Toohey v. United States, 60 M.J. 100, 102 (C.A.A.F. 

2004). 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

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If this analysis leads to the conclusion that an appellant 

has been denied the due process right to speedy post-trial 

review and appeal, “we grant relief unless this court is 

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional 

error is harmless.” United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 363 

(C.A.A.F. 2006). Issues of due process and whether 

constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt are 

reviewed de novo. United States v. Allison, 63 M.J. 365, 370 

(C.A.A.F. 2006). 

 In this case, the delay of 1,637 days (four years, five 

months, and twenty-five days) between the trial and completion 

of review at the Court of Criminal Appeals is facially 

unreasonable. Nonetheless, we need not engage in a separate 

analysis of each factor where we can assume error and proceed 

directly to the conclusion that any error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See id. at 370. This approach is appropriate 

in Young’s case. 

 Having considered the totality of the circumstances and 

entire record, as well as the fact that we have found no merit 

in Young’s other issues on appeal, we conclude that any denial 

of his right to speedy post-trial review and appeal was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt and no relief is warranted. 
United States v. Young, No. 06-0505/AR 

13

Decision

 The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal 

Appeals is affirmed.