COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

TIMOTHY HERREL, S/K/A 

 TIMOTHY JOSEPH HERREL 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2138-97-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 DECEMBER 8, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 

Perry W. Sarver, Judge 

 Michael C. Allen (Hairfield, Morton & Allen, 

PLC, on brief), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Timothy J. Herrel (appellant) appeals from his jury trial 

conviction for attempted marital sexual assault in violation of 

Code § 18.2-67.2:1. On appeal, he contends (1) his behavior did 

not constitute marital sexual assault under Code § 18.2-67.2:1 

because a finger is not an "object" within the meaning of that 

code section, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support 

his conviction because it failed to prove the necessary intent. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm his conviction. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 Appellant was indicted for "attempt[ing] to penetrate the 

anus of his spouse with an object against her will by force or 

the present threat of force" in violation of Code § 18.2-67.2:1. 

 A bill of particulars revealed that the object with which 
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appellant attempted to penetrate his wife's anus was appellant's 

finger. 

 The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, showed that, on July 7, 1996, appellant's wife 

(victim) began sleeping in the spare bedroom of the marital 

residence because she suspected appellant was seeing another 

woman. Appellant left on a business trip on July 9, 1996. When 

he returned home at about 7:30 p.m. on July 14, 1996, victim had 

already dressed for bed and was in the spare bedroom folding 

clothes. Appellant walked into the spare bedroom in the nude and 

pushed victim face down onto the bed. He climbed on top of 

victim, and when she flipped over, he grabbed her wrists. She 

said, "No, stop, I'm not doing it, get off of me," and she tried 

repeatedly to get away. Victim again told him "no" and to "[g]et 

off of [her]." She "kept [her] legs crossed" as they continued 

to struggle. Appellant then "flipped [her] over" and said, "If 

you're not going to give me some that way[,] then give me some 

this way." She saw a container of "KY Jelly from our master 

bedroom . . . laying to [her] right . . . on the bed," and 

appellant said, "We'll use some of this, . . . [and] it will 

slide in real easy." Appellant then "[took] his finger and 

wiggled it and was pushing it at [her] rectum" as he tried to 

keep her pinned down with his knees. Victim "freaked out," used 

a burst of "extra energy" to turn herself back over, and told him 

again to "[g]et off of [her] and leave [her] alone." 
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 Victim told her mother, sister and friend about the incident 

and showed them her bruised arms and wrists. Victim told her 

mother that appellant "had tried to penetrate . . . her anus," 

and she told her sister he "tried to . . . put [his finger] up 

her rectum." Victim reported the incident to the authorities in 

September 1996, after she and appellant had separated and filed 

for divorce. 

 Appellant moved to strike at the close of the Commonwealth's 

evidence on the ground that it failed to prove "he attempted to 

penetrate her anus." The trial court denied the motion. 

 Appellant testified and denied the incident. 

 The jury found appellant guilty of attempted marital sexual 

assault and, after hearing evidence relevant to sentencing, 

recommended a sentence of three months. 

 Appellant filed two post-trial motions. On April 7, 1997, 

he moved to set aside the verdict on the ground that no evidence 

proved he attempted to penetrate victim's anus, the same ground 

asserted in his earlier motion to strike. The trial court denied 

the motion. On June 6, 1997, the date set for sentencing, 

appellant filed a second motion to set aside the verdict, 

claiming that his finger was not an "object" within the meaning 

of Code § 18.2-67.2:1. The trial court noted that the statute's 

use of the term "any object" includes both animate and inanimate 

objects in keeping with the ordinary dictionary meaning of the 

term "object." It denied the motion and imposed sentence in 
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accord with the jury's recommendation. 

 II. 

 ANALYSIS 

 A. 

 SCOPE OF "ANY OBJECT" AS USED IN CODE § 18.2-67.2:1 

 Appellant contends that the term, "any object," as used in 

Code § 18.2-67.2:1, includes only inanimate objects and that his 

alleged attempt to penetrate victim's anus with an animate

object, his finger, did not violate the statute. We disagree. 

 Code § 18.2-67.2:1(A) provides, in relevant part, that 

 [a]n accused shall be guilty of marital 

sexual assault if (i) he . . . penetrates the 

labia majora or anus of his . . . spouse with 

any object other than for a bona fide medical 

purpose . . . and (ii) such act is 

accomplished against the spouse's will by 

force or a present threat of force . . . . 

Id. (emphasis added). 

 "Well established 'principles of statutory construction 

require us to ascertain and give effect to the legislative 

intent.'" Brooks v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 563, 566, 454 

S.E.2d 3, 4-5 (1995) (quoting Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 

836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992)). Legislative intent is to 

be determined by the words in the statute. See Marsh v. City of 

Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 11, 360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987). Absent 

ambiguity, "the manifest intent of the legislature clearly 

expressed in its enactments should not be judicially thwarted 

under the guise of statutory construction." Cregger v. 
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Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 87, 90, 486 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1997). 

 A court must construe the challenged statute "from its four 

corners and not by singling out particular words or phrases." 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 109, 113, 379 S.E.2d 374, 376 

(1989). "If the several provisions of a statute suggest a 

potential for conflict or inconsistency, we construe those 

provisions so as to reconcile them and to give full effect to the 

expressed legislative intent." Mejia v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. 

App. 173, 176-77, 474 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1996) (en banc). "[A] 

statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd 

results." Branch, 14 Va. App. at 839, 419 S.E.2d at 424. 

 In light of these principles, we hold that the challenged 

language is not ambiguous. The statute in no way restricts the 

meaning of the word "object" to connote only inanimate objects. 

In fact, the legislature modified the word "object" with the word 

"any." "Object" is defined as "a discrete visible or tangible 

thing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1555 

(1981). "Any" is defined as "one no matter what one: 

every--used . . . to indicate one that is selected without 

restriction or limitation of choice." Id. at 97. As we held in 

Bell v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 93, 468 S.E.2d 114 (1996), a 

statute which proscribes sexual penetration with "'any object' 

. . . addresses the universe of objects with which an accused may 

not sexually penetrate a complaining witness." Id. at 99, 468 

S.E.2d at 117 (interpreting Code § 18.2-67.2(A)). Therefore, the 
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trial court did not err in holding that the ordinary meaning of 

the term "any object" as used in Code § 18.2-67.2:1 includes both 

animate and inanimate objects.1

 For these reasons, we reject appellant's contention that a 

finger is not an "object" within the meaning of Code 

§ 18.2-67.2:1. 

 B. 

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE INTENT 

 Appellant also contends the evidence is insufficient to 

prove that he intended to penetrate victim's anus with his 

finger. We disagree. 

 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 

in a criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v. 

 

 1The statute we interpreted in Bell, Code § 18.2-67.2, 

provides that "[a]n accused shall be guilty of inanimate or 

animate object sexual penetration if he or she penetrates the 

labia majora or anus of a complaining witness who is not his or 

her spouse with any object . . . or . . . animal." (Emphases 

added). That code section, as enacted in 1981, originally 

referred only to "inanimate object sexual penetration." See 1981 

Va. Acts ch. 397. In 1993, the legislature added animate objects 

to the category of objects with which penetration was proscribed. 

See 1993 Va. Acts ch. 549. It could have achieved this result 

in either of two ways: first, as it did, by adding the phrase 

"or animate" to expressly include both animate and inanimate 

objects within the scope of "any object," or second, by removing 

the word "inanimate," leaving the statute to proscribe 

penetration with "any object," without limitation. We hold that 

both statutory schemes define the same "universe of objects with 

which an accused may not sexually penetrate a complaining 

witness." See Bell, 22 Va. App. at 99, 468 S.E.2d at 117. 
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Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). On 

review, we do not substitute our own judgment for that of the 

trier of fact. See Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 239, 415 

S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992). The judgment will not be set aside 

unless it is plainly wrong or without supporting evidence. See

Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 

(1987). 

 Intent may, and usually must, be proven by circumstantial 

evidence, see Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 

S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988), such as a person's conduct and 

statements. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 198, 379 

S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). "Circumstantial evidence is as competent 

and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it 

is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 

except that of guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 

307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). However, "the Commonwealth need only 

exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the 

evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the 

defendant." Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 

S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). Whether a hypothesis of innocence is 

reasonable is a question of fact. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 

7 Va. App. 269, 290, 373 S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988). 

 Here, the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant tried to penetrate victim's anus with his 

finger. After trying unsuccessfully, due to victim's struggling, 
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to engage in vaginal intercourse with her, appellant turned 

victim over on her stomach and said, "If you're not going to give 

me some that way[,] then give me some this way." Victim saw a 

container of KY Jelly on the bed beside her, and appellant said, 

"We'll use some of this, . . . [and] it will slide in real easy." 

 Immediately thereafter, appellant "[took] his finger and wiggled 

it and was pushing it at [her] rectum" as he tried to keep her 

pinned down with his knees. Victim later told her sister that 

appellant tried to "put [his finger] up her rectum." Based on 

this evidence, the fact finder reasonably could infer that 

appellant intended to put his finger in her anus and that he 

attempted unsuccessfully to do so. On these facts, the evidence 

was sufficient to support appellant's conviction for attempted 

marital sexual assault. 

 The holding in Howard v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 904, 275 

S.E.2d 602 (1981), cited by appellant, is inapposite. In Howard, 

the trial court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to prove 

attempted sodomy. As the Virginia Supreme Court noted, "[t]he 

trial court's ruling that the evidence was insufficient to prove 

attempted sodomy constituted an acquittal of Howard on that 

charge." Id. at 907, 275 S.E.2d at 604. Therefore, the 

sufficiency of the evidence to prove attempted sodomy was not 

before the Supreme Court on appeal. The ruling of the trial 

court in Howard carries no precedential value in this Court. 

 In addition, that appellant also may have intended to engage 
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in forcible anal intercourse with victim in violation of 

subsection (A)(i) of the statute does not preclude a finding that 

he intended first to penetrate her anus with his finger in 

violation of subsection (A)(ii). 

 A person may commit a crime with more than 

one purpose, and the fact that the act is 

done with two or more specific objectives 

does not mean that the Commonwealth has 

failed to prove the specific intent to commit 

the charged crime. . . . By proving that an 

accused harbored two or more specific 

criminal intents, the Commonwealth has 

excluded every reasonable hypothesis of 

"innocence." 

Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 530-31, 446 S.E.2d 451, 

463 (1994) (en banc) (Coleman, J., concurring). Under the facts 

of this case, the evidence supports the finding by the trier of 

fact that appellant intended to penetrate victim's anus with his 

finger. 

 For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

 Affirmed.