Opinion issued August 22, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-23-00757-CV

———————————

RANBIR S. RANDHAWA, Appellant

V.

AMICK STORM MANAGEMENT, LLC D/B/A AMICK STORM 

MANAGEMENT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 393rd District Court

Denton1 County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 23-3799-393

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Ranbir S. Randhawa appeals the trial court’s order granting 

appellee Amick Storm Management, LLC’s Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a 

1 Pursuant to its docket-equalization authority, the Supreme Court of Texas transferred this 

appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas to this Court. See Misc. 

Docket No. 23-9079 (Tex. Sept. 26, 2023); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001 

(authorizing transfer of cases). We researched relevant case law and did not locate any 

conflict between the precedent of the Court of Appeals for the Second District and that of 

this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2

motion to dismiss Randhawa’s declaratory judgment action. In one issue, Randhawa 

contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion because his suit has a basis 

in law and fact and Amick’s res judicata defense is not supported by the pleadings. 

He alternatively argues that the award of attorney’s fees contains an error and asks 

us to correct the trial court’s judgment. We affirm as modified. 

Background

In June 2017, Randhawa contracted with Amick for the repair and 

replacement of the roof on his residence. When Randhawa failed to pay Amick the 

full amount due, Amick filed suit against Randhawa on February 21, 2019.

Thereafter, Amick filed a constitutional mechanic’s lien on November 1, 2019 in the 

amount of $11,347.12. Amick filed an amended petition on November 5, 2019, 

asserting claims against Randhawa for breach of contract and quantum meruit and 

seeking foreclosure of its lien. 

Though Randhawa was personally served with Amick’s lawsuit, he failed to 

answer or otherwise appear. On November 6, 2020, Amick filed two motions for 

entry of default judgment—the first seeking a judgment against Randhawa for the 

amount due under the contract, plus attorney’s fees, and the second seeking a 

judgment declaring Amick’s constitutional lien valid and enforceable. The trial court 

granted both motions on November 10, 2020 and entered two separate judgments.
3

Amick sent copies of the trial court’s judgments to Randhawa on December 1, 2020 

and demanded payment. Randhawa did not respond. 

On March 30, 2022, Randhawa filed a Homestead Affidavit as Release of 

Judgment Lien, claiming that the property at issue was his homestead. Amick 

responded by filing its own Affidavit of Judgment Creditor Contradicting Debtor’s 

Homestead Affidavit as Release of Judgment Lien, pointing to the trial court’s 

judgment declaring the lien valid and disputing the purported release of the lien. 

On May 4, 2023, Randhawa filed the underlying lawsuit seeking a declaratory 

judgment declaring Amick’s lien invalid and unenforceable. Randhawa claimed that 

the applicable statute of limitations for filing a suit to foreclose the lien expired on 

September 15, 2018, months before Amick filed its lawsuit. Randhawa included 

Amick’s lien and the trial court’s judgment declaring the lien valid as exhibits to his 

petition. 

Amick answered Randhawa’s lawsuit on June 2, 2023 asserting a general 

denial and various affirmative defenses, including res judicata. Amick then moved 

to dismiss Randhawa’s lawsuit pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. In its 

motion, Amick argued that Randhawa’s suit was barred by res judicata, pointing to 

the November 10, 2020 judgment declaring Amick’s lien valid and enforceable. 

Randhawa responded to the motion, arguing that his suit was based on facts 

that arose after the November 10, 2020 default judgment. In his response, Randhawa 
4

contended that Amick’s failure to foreclose on the lien within one year of the trial 

court’s judgment invalidated the lien and claimed that his suit sought “a declaration 

that Amick’s lien is unenforceable today, in 2023, which is an issue that could not 

have been litigated in 2020.” Randhawa claimed that his petition “does not challenge 

whether Amick’s lien was valid in 2020 or whether the remedies specified in the 

default judgment were unenforceable in 2020.” 

The trial court conducted a Zoom hearing on Amick’s motion to dismiss on 

August 18, 2023 and signed an order granting the motion later that day. This appeal 

followed.

Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss

In his sole issue on appeal, Randhawa argues that the trial court erred in 

granting Amick’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss because: (1) his suit has a basis in law 

and fact, (2) Amick’s constitutional mechanic’s lien is invalid and unenforceable 

due to Amick’s failure to obtain foreclosure within one year, (3) Amick’s filing of a 

foreclosure suit in 2019 does not satisfy the one-year statute of limitations because 

Amick failed to obtain a judgment of foreclosure, and (4) Amick’s res judicata 

defense is not supported by the pleadings. Randhawa also argues that the trial court 

made a typographical error in awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of “$27650” 

instead of $2,750. We first consider whether Randhawa’s suit is barred by res 

judicata because that issue would be dispositive of his appeal. 
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A. Standard of Review

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a allows a party to move for early dismissal 

of a cause of action against it. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a; Ball v. City of Pearland, No. 

01-20-00039-CV, 2021 WL 4202179, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 

16, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court may dismiss a cause of action under Rule 

91a if “it has no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Reynolds v. Quantlab 

Trading Partners US, LP, 608 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2020, no pet.). “A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, 

together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to 

the relief sought.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Reynolds, 608 S.W.3d at 555. We review a 

trial court’s decision on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss de novo. Bethel v. Quilling, 

Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2020); Malik 

v. GEICO Advantage Ins. Co., No. 01-19-00489-CV, 2021 WL 1414275, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Rule 91a “permits motions to dismiss based on affirmative defenses.” Bethel, 

595 S.W.3d at 656; see also Smale v. Williams, 590 S.W.3d 633, 637–38 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (affirming Rule 91a dismissal on res judicata 

grounds); Seger v. Branda, No. 01-21-00224-CV, 2022 WL 17981559, at *10 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming grant 

of Rule 91a motion based on affirmative defense of statute of limitations). 
6

In ruling on a Rule 91a motion, the trial court “may not consider evidence” 

and “must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, 

together with any pleading exhibits” permitted by the Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; see also Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654. But “[i]n 

deciding a Rule 91a motion, a court may consider the defendant’s pleadings if doing 

so is necessary to make the legal determination of whether an affirmative defense is 

properly before the court.” Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. A trial court may grant a Rule 

91a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense if it meets the rule’s standard. 

Id. If an affirmative defense cannot “be conclusively established by the facts in [the] 

plaintiff’s petition” and requires consideration of evidence, “such [a] defense[] [is] 

not a proper basis for a [Rule 91a] motion to dismiss.” Id. Evidence is typically 

required to prove a res judicata defense. Reynolds, 608 S.W.3d at 556 (citing Fed. 

Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Pham, 449 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2014, no pet.)).

B. Res Judicata

Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars lawsuits that arise out of 

the same subject matter as a prior suit when, with the use of diligence, that subject 

matter could have been litigated in the prior suit. Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, 

L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. 2021) (citing Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 

217 S.W.3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007)). “The doctrine is necessary to ‘bring an end to 
7

litigation, prevent vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court decisions, promote 

judicial economy, and prevent double recovery.’” Id. (quoting Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 

at 449). A final judgment on an action extinguishes the right to bring suit on the 

transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. Id.

(quoting Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992) (internal 

quotations omitted)). When determining whether a set of facts forms a transaction, 

“the determination is to be made pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations 

as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they 

form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a trial unit conforms to 

the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” Id. (quoting Barr, 837 

S.W.2d at 631).

The elements of res judicata are (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a 

court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them,

and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised or could have been 

raised in the first action. Id. (quoting Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 449 (internal 

quotations omitted)).

C. Analysis

Amick’s Rule 91a motion focused on res judicata. Thus, the trial court could 

properly consider Amick’s answer in making the legal determination whether res 

judicata was properly before it (and it was). See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656 (noting 
8

that court may consider defendant’s pleadings in deciding Rule 91a motion to 

determine whether affirmative defense is properly before court); Parker v. Ohio 

Dev., LLC, No. 04-23-00069-CV, 2024 WL 1864756, at *5 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio Apr. 30, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (same). 

On appeal, Randhawa contends that because the trial court cannot consider 

any evidence in deciding a Rule 91a motion, and evidence is required to establish 

res judicata, res judicata was not a proper basis for Amick’s Rule 91a motion. 

Randhawa is correct that a trial court “may not consider evidence in ruling on the 

[Rule 91a] motion.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. However, Rule 91a.6 also provides that 

the trial court “must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of 

action, together with any pleading exhibits permitted by Rule 59.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Randhawa argues that the trial court was prohibited from considering the 

evidence attached to Amick’s Rule 91a motion. Even so, Randhawa overlooks the 

fact that he attached the trial court’s November 10, 2020 judgment declaring 

Amick’s lien valid as an exhibit to his petition, and such exhibits could be considered 

in deciding Amick’s Rule 91a motion. See id. 

We next consider whether the trial court correctly determined that the

elements of res judicata were satisfied. 
9

1. Prior Final Judgment 

Amick first needed to demonstrate the existence of a prior final judgment on 

the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 619 S.W.3d at 

705–06. Again, Randhawa attached a copy of the November 10, 2020 default 

judgment declaring the lien valid and enforceable to its petition. “A default judgment 

can constitute a determination on the merits for res judicata purposes.” FFGGP, Inc. 

v. MTGLQ Invs., LP, 646 S.W.3d 30, 36 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.) 

(quoting In re Marriage of Mouret, 14-20-00050-CV, 2021 WL 1184190, at *3 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotations 

omitted)). 

Here, the trial court’s November 10, 2020 judgment stated: “[t]he Court has 

considered the pleadings and evidence on file and is of the opinion that [Amick’s] 

constitutional lien is both valid and enforceable”; “This Court therefore GRANTS 

[Amick’s] Motion for No-Answer Default Judgment Declaring [Amick’s] 

Constitutional Lien Valid against Defendant Ranbir S. Randhawa and considers 

[Amick’s] ability to bring a foreclosure action against the property that is subject to 

the constitutional lien a valid post-judgment remedy once the time period for appeals 

has expired.” By its language, the trial court’s judgment reached the merits of the 

validity and enforceability of Amick’s lien. See McMillan v. Tally Two Inv. Grp., 

LLC, No. 03-18-00550-CV, 2019 WL 3680130, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 7, 
10

2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering language of default judgment and holding 

that judgment reached merits of validity and binding effect of deed for purposes of 

res judicata); Reliance Cap., Inc. v. G.R. Hmaidan, Inc., No. 14-07-01059-CV, 2009 

WL 1325441, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 14, 2009, pet. denied) 

(mem. op.). Further, Randhawa does not dispute this first element. 

2. Both Suits Involve Same Parties

Likewise, Randhawa does not dispute the second element of res judicata—

identity of parties. See Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 619 S.W.3d at 706. The November 10, 

2020 default judgment identifies the parties as Amick Storm Management and 

Ranbir S. Randhawa, the same parties in Randhawa’s suit. 

3. Same Claims at Issue in Both Suits

As to the third element, Randhawa appears to argue to this court that his 

lawsuit raises different claims than those presented in Amick’s original suit. For 

example, Randhawa contends that his suit does not question the validity of Amick’s 

lien at the time of the trial court’s November 10, 2020 judgment (the focus of 

Amick’s suit); rather, he claims that his suit challenges the validity of the liens

thereafter. But Randhawa’s arguments on appeal do not comport with the 

allegations in his petition. To the contrary, Randhawa’s original petition for 

declaratory judgment alleged the following: 

• In or around June 2017, Randhawa and Amick contracted for the repair 

and replacement of the roof at Randhawa’s property. The work performed 
11

by Amick was completed in or around June 2017. Amick claims a lien 

against the subject property. 

• Pursuant to certain sections of the Texas Property Code, the last date for 

Amick to file a statutory lien was September 15, 2017; the deadline for 

Amick to file suit to foreclose the lien was September 15, 2018. 

• Instead, on February 21, 2019, more than five months past the deadline for 

filing suit to foreclose on the lien, Amick filed a lawsuit against Randhawa 

seeking monetary damages and to foreclose the lien. 

• On November 1, 2019, Amick filed an affidavit in Denton County, Texas 

claiming a lien on the property (Randhawa attached the lien as an exhibit). 

• On November 10, 2020, Amick obtained a judgment against Randhawa 

(attached as an exhibit). “However, the Judgment did not purport to 

foreclose the Lien, nor did it order the sale of the Property.” Instead, the 

judgment stated that the court “considers [Amick’s] ability to bring a 

foreclosure action against the property that is subject to the constitutional 

lien a valid post-judgment remedy once the time period for appeals has 

expired.” The judgment did not order foreclosure or somehow extend or 

revive the one-year statute of limitations that expired on September 15, 

2018.

• Amick filed a judgment lien in Denton County, Texas on November 19, 

2020. “Even if [Amick’s] untimely Lawsuit and Judgment somehow 

extended or revived the one-year statute of limitations, which [Randhawa] 

denies, [Amick] still failed to foreclose on the Property within one year of 

entry of the Judgment or the expiration of the time to appeal the Judgment.” 

Texas follows a transactional approach to determine whether res judicata 

applies. Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 631. Under this approach, “a subsequent suit is barred 

if it arises out of the same subject matter as the prior suit, and that subject matter 

could have been litigated in the prior suit.” Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 449 (citing Barr, 
12

837 S.W.2d at 631). Determining what constitutes the subject matter of a suit for res 

judicata purposes

requires an analysis of the factual matters that make up the gist of the 

complaint, without regard to the form of the action. Any cause of action 

that arises out of those same facts should, if practicable, be litigated in 

the same lawsuit.

Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630. In making this determination, courts “giv[e] weight to such 

considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, 

whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a trial unit 

conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” Daccach, 

217 S.W.3d at 449 (internal quotations omitted). Ordinarily, “[w]here there is a legal 

relationship, such as under a lease, a contract, or a marriage, all claims arising from 

that relationship will arise from the same subject matter and be subject to res 

judicata.” Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, 77 

S.W.3d 487, 497 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied). 

Here, Randhawa’s claims arise from Amick’s lien on the property—the same 

lien made the basis of the November 10, 2020 default judgment. Further, 

Randhawa’s lawsuit sought a determination as to the validity of the lien—a 

determination made in the November 10, 2020 default judgment. Though Randhawa 

argues that his suit did not challenge the validity of the lien at the time of the 

November 10, 2020 default judgment, the averments in his petition demonstrate 

otherwise. 
13

Randhawa’s arguments concerning the application of various property code 

sections and the statute of limitations for enforcement and foreclosure of a lien are 

all issues that could have been litigated in the earlier proceeding. Instead, Randhawa 

waited four years after Amick’s original suit (and two years after the trial court’s 

default judgment) before filing his own suit. Res judicata bars such an attempt. See 

Mitchell v. Fort Davis State Bank, 243 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, 

no pet.) (“Because a challenge to the validity of the lien could have and should have 

been raised before the bankruptcy court, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the 

Mitchells from raising the defense in the state district court.”); Flippin v. Wilson 

State Bank, 780 S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989, writ denied) (holding 

that because appellants failed to raise issue of lien validity in bankruptcy proceedings 

to which they were parties, and in which issue could have been raised and 

determined, res judicata precluded them from raising it in later suit); see also Rios 

v. Town Nat’l Bank, No. 05-94-00980-CV, 1995 WL 375490, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—

Dallas June 19, 1995, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (holding res 

judicata barred subsequent suit seeking declarations concerning lien invalidity and 

wrongful foreclosure where prior bankruptcy order lifted automatic stay so creditor 

could foreclose; court determined validity of lien was factual predicate in both 

actions). 
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In conclusion, we determine that the allegations in Randhawa’s petition, taken 

as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, support the trial 

court’s determination that his claims against Amick are barred by res judicata. See 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 655; see also Smale, 590 S.W.3d at 

637–38 (affirming Rule 91a dismissal on res judicata grounds; court reviewed 

appellant’s petition and exhibits thereto and determined claims asserted were 

previously litigated); McMillan, 2019 WL 3680130, at *5 (affirming grant of Rule 

91a motion based on res judicata; court noted that “matter actually litigated” in first 

suit was validity of deed and judgment in that suit included declaration that deed was 

valid; thus, subsequent suit’s request that deed be declared void was barred by res 

judicata). The trial court did not err in granting Amick’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss 

and dismissing Randhawa’s claims with prejudice based on the affirmative defense 

of res judicata. 

We overrule Randhawa’s sole issue on appeal. 

Attorney’s Fees

Randhawa alternatively argues that even if we uphold the trial court’s grant 

of Amick’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss, we must nevertheless modify the judgment 

to correct an error in the award of attorney’s fees. In its motion, Amick sought 

attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,562.50. At the hearing, Amick’s counsel testified 

to fees in the amount of $2,750. Counsel testified that she arrived at this figure based 
15

on a rate of $250 per hour and a total of eleven hours spent on the case at the time 

of the hearing. At the conclusion of her testimony, the trial court stated that it was 

“awarding attorney’s fees of $2,750 for the work to date.” 

Despite the evidence presented and the court’s oral pronouncement, the 

court’s August 18, 2023 order on Amick’s Rule 91a motion included the following: 

Randhawa contends this is a typographical error and asks us to modify the trial 

court’s judgment. Amick’s appellate brief concedes the amount in the judgment is 

erroneous. We therefore modify the judgment to reflect an award of $2,750 in 

attorney’s fees. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). We affirm the trial court’s judgment in 

all other respects. 

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. 

Amparo Monique Guerra

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.