IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SECURE VENTURES, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, 

Petitioner, 

v.

THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS GERLACH, Judge of the SUPERIOR 

COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of 

MARICOPA, 

Respondent Judge, 

CARL JOHNSON and JUNE JOHNSON, husband and wife,

Real Party in Interest. 

No. 1 CA-SA 19-0293 

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. LC2019-000179 

The Honorable Douglas Gerlach, Judge

McDowell Mountain Justice Court

No. CC2019-04779EA 

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED

APPEARANCES

Evans, Dove, Nelson, Fish & Grier P.L.C., Mesa

By Douglas N. Nelson and Trevor J. Fish

Counsel for Petitioner

FILED 5-5-2020
2 

Carl Johnson, Scottsdale

Real Party in Interest

June P. Johnson, Scottsdale

Real Party in Interest

OPINION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 In this special action we address whether, under A.R.S. § 12-

1173.01, the justice court lacks jurisdiction to hear a forcible detainer action 

filed to evict the occupants of property purchased at a trustee’s sale. For the 

following reasons, we accept jurisdiction and deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Secure Ventures, LLC (“Petitioner”) purchased a home at a 

trustee’s sale in February 2019. Petitioner served Carl and June Johnson 

(“the Johnsons”) with a notice to vacate ten days later. After the Johnsons 

failed to comply, Petitioner filed a forcible detainer action in the McDowell 

Mountain Justice Court. The justice court issued an eviction judgment in 

Petitioner’s favor, which was affirmed on appeal to the superior court. The 

Johnsons filed an appeal in this court, but it was dismissed for lack of 

appellate jurisdiction. The Arizona Supreme Court initially denied the 

Johnsons’ request for expedited consideration of their petition for review. 

Upon reconsideration, the supreme court granted a stay of enforcement of 

the eviction judgment and remanded to the superior court to consider the 

justice court’s jurisdiction under § 12-1173.01. 

¶3 On remand, the superior court held the justice court lacked 

jurisdiction to hear a forcible detainer action brought by an owner that 

acquired title to property in a trustee’s sale. The superior court therefore 

vacated the justice court’s judgment. Petitioner then filed this special action.

JURISDICTION

¶4 Special action jurisdiction is discretionary, and is proper 

when petitioner has no “equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by 
SECURE VENTURES v. HON. GERLACH/JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

3 

appeal.” Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). Special action jurisdiction is particularly 

appropriate in cases “rais[ing] questions of law that are of statewide 

importance, apparently of first impression, and likely to recur.” O’Brien v. 

Escher, 204 Ariz. 459, 460, ¶ 3 (App. 2003). We accept jurisdiction because 

appellate relief was exhausted when the matter, which originated in the 

justice court, was appealed to the superior court, see A.R.S. § 22-375; see also

Sanders v. Moore, 117 Ariz. 527, 528 (App. 1977), and because this case 

presents a legal issue of first impression that has statewide importance. 

DISCUSSION

¶5 Whether § 12-1173.01 limits the jurisdiction of Arizona’s 

justice courts is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de 

novo. State v. Kearney ex rel. Pima Cty., 206 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 5 (App. 2003). 

When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to find and give effect to 

legislative intent. Ariz. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City 

of Phoenix, 247 Ariz. 45, 47, ¶ 7 (2019). We look first to the statute’s plain 

language as the best indicator of legislative intent. Glazer v. State, 244 Ariz. 

612, 614, ¶ 9 (2018). We give the statute’s words their ordinary meaning, 

Mail Boxes, etc., U.S.A. v. Indus. Comm’n, 181 Ariz. 119, 121 (1995), 

interpreting different sections of a single statute consistently, Wyatt v. 

Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284 (1991). “A cardinal principle of statutory 

interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision 

so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” Nicaise v. Sundaram, 

245 Ariz. 566, 568, ¶ 11 (2019). We do not resort to secondary statutory 

interpretation principles when the plain language is unambiguous. Glazer, 

244 Ariz. at 614, ¶ 9. 

¶6 Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-1173 provides in relevant part:

12-1173. Definition of forcible detainer; substitution of parties

There is a forcible detainer if:

1. A tenant at will or by sufferance or a tenant from month to 

month or a lesser period whose tenancy has been terminated 

retains possession after his tenancy has been terminated or 

after he receives written demand of possession by the 

landlord.

 . . . . 

¶7 Section 12-1173.01, added by the legislature in 1984, provides:
SECURE VENTURES v. HON. GERLACH/JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

4 

12-1173.01. Additional definition of forcible detainer1

A. In addition to other persons enumerated in this article, a 

person in any of the following cases who retains possession 

of any land, tenements or other real property after he receives 

written demand of possession may be removed through an 

action for forcible detainer filed with the clerk of the superior 

court in accordance with this article:

1. If the property has been sold through the foreclosure of a 

mortgage, deed of trust or contract for conveyance of real 

property pursuant to title 33, chapter 6, article 2. 

2. If the property has been sold through a trustee’s sale under 

a deed of trust pursuant to title 33, chapter 6.1.

3. If the property has been forfeited through a contract for 

conveyance of real property pursuant to title 33, chapter 6, 

article 3.

4. If the property has been sold by virtue of an execution and 

the title has been duly transferred.

5. If the property has been sold by the owner and the title has 

been duly transferred.

B. The remedies provided by this section do not affect the 

rights of persons in possession under a lease or other 

possessory right which is superior to the interest sold, 

forfeited or executed upon.

C. The remedies provided by this section are in addition to 

and do not preclude any other remedy granted by law.

¶8 Arizona Revised Statutes § 22-201(C) gives justice courts 

concurrent jurisdiction in most forcible detainer actions. The legislature, 

however, has the power to limit the justice court’s jurisdiction in forcible 

detainer actions. See State ex rel. Neely v. Brown, 177 Ariz. 6, 8 (1993); see also

1 Petitioner argues the statute’s title, “Additional definition of forcible 

detainer,” shows the legislature intended to add to, rather than supplant, 

§ 12-1173. Section headings are not part of the law itself, A.R.S. § 1-212, but 

may be used to help interpret an ambiguous provision, State v. Barnett, 142 

Ariz. 592, 597 (1984). 
SECURE VENTURES v. HON. GERLACH/JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

5 

Ariz. Const. art. 6 §§ 14(5), 14(11). Before § 12-1173.01 was enacted, the 

superior and justice courts had concurrent jurisdiction of forcible detainer 

actions pursuant to § 12-1173. This included those brought after trustee’s 

sales. See Andreola v. Ariz. Bank, 26 Ariz. App. 556, 558 (1976). We therefore 

must decide whether the legislature intended to divest the justice court of 

jurisdiction in post–trustee’s sale forcible detainer actions by enacting § 12-

1173.01. 

¶9 The plain language of § 12-1173.01, read consistently with 

§ 12-1173 and giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s words, 

shows the legislature intended that § 12-1173.01 requires post–trustee’s sale 

forcible detainer actions be filed only in the superior court. By adding § 12-

1173.01, the legislature expressly addressed post-conveyance forcible 

detainers—including forcible detainers brought after trustee’s sales— 

separately from those forcible detainers set forth in the already-existing 

§ 12-1173. And although post–trustee’s sale evictions technically are forcible 

detainers under § 12-1173, see Andreola, 26 Ariz. App. at 558,2 the only 

interpretation of § 12-1173.01 that gives meaning to all its words and 

provisions is that the legislature intended in § 12-1173.01 to (1) make plain 

that post–trustee’s sale eviction actions qualify as forcible detainers without 

resorting to inferential analysis, and (2) prescribe the procedure for doing 

so. See Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 221 Ariz. 229, 239, ¶ 37 (App. 2009) 

(recognizing the presumption that “when the legislature uses different 

wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning 

and consequence to that language”).

¶10 Petitioner points to § 12-1173.01(C), which provides that the 

remedies afforded by the addition of this statute “are in addition to and do 

not preclude any other remedy granted by law.” There is, however, no such 

expansive statement as to procedure. Rather, § 12-1173.01(A) makes clear, 

as to procedure, that an occupant in those scenarios specifically listed may 

only “be removed through an action for forcible detainer filed with the clerk 

of the superior court.” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, any other interpretation 

would render the entirety of § 12-1173.01(A)(2) superfluous, which would 

be inconsistent with a primary principle of statutory interpretation. See 

Nicaise, 245 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 11. Because the language of § 12-1173.01 is 

unambiguous, we need not resort to secondary statutory interpretation 

principles to ascertain the legislature’s intent. 

2 The superior court correctly noted that A.R.S. § 12-1173.01 was enacted by 

the legislature after Andreola was decided.
SECURE VENTURES v. HON. GERLACH/JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

6 

¶11 Since the statute’s adoption in 1984, no appellate court has 

been tasked with interpreting whether § 12-1173.01 grants exclusive 

jurisdiction to the superior court in post–trustee’s sale forcible detainer 

actions. We acknowledge that our holding may well conflict with the 

common practice in Arizona. However, we cannot disregard the statute’s 

plain language in deference to common practice. The superior court did not 

err in determining that, under § 12-1173.01, the justice court lacked 

jurisdiction over Petitioner’s forcible detainer action. 3 

CONCLUSION

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction, but deny 

relief. 

3 Petitioner also contends the Johnsons waived any defenses and objections 

to the sale of the property pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-811(C) by failing to obtain 

an injunction preventing the sale and by failing to raise the issue of 

jurisdiction with the justice court. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

however, can be raised at any time. See, e.g., Medina v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Transp., 

185 Ariz. 414, 418 (1995). Because A.R.S. § 12-1173.01 does not grant the 

justice court subject matter jurisdiction over post–trustee’s sale forcible 

detainer actions, the Johnsons did not waive the right to contest jurisdiction.