[Cite as State v. Jordan, 124 Ohio St.3d 397, 2010-Ohio-281.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. JORDAN, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Jordan, 124 Ohio St.3d 397, 2010-Ohio-281.] 

To obtain a conviction for escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), the state may prove 

that the defendant was subject to postrelease control without proving that 

during a sentencing hearing the trial court orally notified the defendant 

that he would be subject to postrelease control. 

(Nos. 2008-2119 and 2008-2172 — Submitted October 21, 2009 — Decided 

February 4, 2010.) 

APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Marion County, 

No. 9-08-11, 2008-Ohio-4647. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

To obtain a conviction for escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), the state may prove 

that the defendant was subject to postrelease control without proving that 

during a sentencing hearing the trial court orally notified the defendant 

that he would be subject to postrelease control. 

__________________ 

 MOYER, C.J. 

I 

{¶ 1} The Third District Court of Appeals certified the following issue 

pursuant to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and App.R. 25: 

“If a defendant is under actual detention, can the defendant be convicted of 

escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) when the record demonstrates that the defendant 

knew he was under detention or was reckless in that regard, irrespective of 

whether the defendant was properly under said detention?” (Emphasis sic.) We 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

recognized the certified conflict and also accepted the case on discretionary 

appeal. 

{¶ 2} The determinative issue in this case is more narrow than the 

question certified by the court of appeals. We have previously held that the 

version of R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)1

 that is relevant in this case required a trial court to 

advise a defendant at the sentencing hearing of the possibility of postrelease 

control and that the failure to do so would result in a void sentence. State v. 

Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 12. Here, the 

narrow issue before us is whether in order to prove the element of detention in a 

prosecution for escape, the state must show that the offender was notified of 

postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.19 during the underlying sentencing 

hearing. We hold that the state may prove that an accused was under detention 

for purposes of a prosecution for escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) without 

offering affirmative evidence that the sentencing court orally advised the offender 

of the possibility of the imposition of postrelease control.2

 Thus, we answer the 

narrowed issue in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, 

albeit for reasons different from those stated by the court of appeals. 

 

1. {¶ a} Former R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) provided: 

 {¶ b}“Subject to division (B)(4) of this section, if the sentencing court determines at the 

sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall do all of the 

following: 

 {¶ c} “* * * 

 {¶ d} “(c) Notify the offender that the offender will be supervised under section 2967.28 of the 

Revised Code after the offender leaves prison if the offender is being sentenced for a felony of the 

first degree or second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree in the 

commission of which the offender caused or threatened to cause physical harm to a person; 

 {¶ e} “(d) Notify the offender that the offender may be supervised under section 2967.28 of the 

Revised Code after the offender leaves prison if the offender is being sentenced for a felony of the 

third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(3)(c) of this section.” Am.Sub.H.B. 

No. 473, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5707, 5743-5744. 

2. In view of this holding, the conflict between the courts of appeals on the certified issue has 

been eliminated. Therefore, we do not address the question whether a person can be proved to be 

under detention for purposes of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) if the evidence shows affirmatively that the 

trial court failed to meet its duties with regard to the imposition of postrelease control. 
January Term, 2010 

3 

II 

{¶ 3} Rusty Jordan, appellant, pleaded guilty to several felonies in 2006. 

In its entry, the sentencing court imposed a three-year term of postrelease control. 

Jordan complied with the terms of his postrelease control for several months, 

reporting regularly to his parole officer. Jordan eventually failed to report for 

scheduled meetings with his parole officer, and it was determined that he had 

abandoned his approved residence. Eventually, Jordan was located, arrested, and 

charged with escape under R.C. 2921.34. A jury found him guilty of that offense. 

{¶ 4} On appeal, Jordan argued that the state had not proven that he was 

“under detention” for purposes of R.C. 2921.34, because there was no proof that 

the sentencing court had orally advised him that he would be subject to 

postrelease control. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that (1) the state was 

not required to prove that the imposition of Jordan’s postrelease control had been 

proper, but merely that Jordan knew he was under detention or was reckless in 

that regard, and (2) the state had met that burden. 

{¶ 5} The court of appeals certified that its judgment conflicted with the 

judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals in State v. North (Oct. 9, 2007), 

Lorain App. No. 06CA009063, 2007-Ohio-5383. We recognized the conflict, 

accepted Jordan’s appeal, and consolidated the cases. State v. Jordan, 120 Ohio 

St.3d 1484 and 1486, 2009-Ohio-278, 900 N.E.2d 196, 197. 

III 

{¶ 6} Jordan’s argument can be divided into the following components. 

The criminal escape statute, R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), requires the state to prove as an 

element of the offense that the defendant was “under detention”; “detention” is 

defined in R.C. 2921.01(E); in this case, the relevant portion of R.C. 2921.01(E) 

defines “detention” as “supervision by an employee of the department of 

rehabilitation and correction of a person on any type of release from a state 

correctional institution”; and the “supervision” required by R.C. 2921.01(E) could 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4 

arise in this case only as an element of the postrelease control imposed upon 

Jordan. Thus, Jordan argues that in order to prove such supervision, the state 

must offer evidence to show that when his sentence was imposed, the court 

properly advised him of postrelease control. 

{¶ 7} In Jordan’s view, the evidence of supervision was legally 

insufficient because the state did not prove that the sentencing court advised him 

of postrelease control as required by R.C. 2929.19, and, therefore, the state did 

not prove that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction was authorized to 

supervise him. We are not persuaded by Jordan’s argument. Supervision can be 

proven without evidence that the sentencing court advised an offender that he 

would be subject to postrelease control as required by R.C. 2929.19. When the 

parties do not submit evidence to show whether the sentencing court performed 

each of its duties for imposition of postrelease control, the question is simply 

whether the state provided sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant was 

under detention. 

{¶ 8} The state provided ample evidence that Jordan was under the 

supervision of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The relevant 

sentencing entry states that Jordan “may be subject to a period of three (3) years 

of postrelease control.” Jordan was also advised of his postrelease control two 

weeks before his release from prison. 

{¶ 9} Jordan signed a document detailing the conditions of his monitored 

time (one type of postrelease control) on the day after his release from prison. 

This document stated: “I understand if I am a releasee and abscond supervision, I 

may be prosecuted for the crime of escape, under section 2921.34 of the revised 

code.” A few weeks later, when Jordan was arrested for an unrelated charge, his 

postrelease control was increased from monitored time to basic supervision. 

{¶ 10} When he was placed on basic supervision, his parole officer met 

with him, explained the terms of basic supervision, and provided him with a 
January Term, 2010 

5 

document entitled “Conditions of Supervision.” This document also included the 

statement “I understand that if I am a releasee and abscond supervision, I may be 

prosecuted for the crime of escape, under section 2921.34 of the Revised Code.” 

Jordan signed a receipt indicating that he was to follow all the conditions of 

supervision listed on the document. Jordan initially complied with his reporting 

requirements. For many months, he contacted his parole officer and appeared for 

meetings when required. Jordan testified that before his release from prison, he 

was aware that he would be subject to postrelease control. 

{¶ 11} Based on this evidence, we hold that the state proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Jordan was subject to supervision by the Department of 

Rehabilitation and Correction. The evidence shows that Jordan was “under 

detention” as “detention” is defined in R.C. 2921.01(E), and therefore the state 

proved that element of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1). 

{¶ 12} Jordan directs us to the lack of proof in the record that the court 

orally advised him during sentencing that he would be subject to postrelease 

control. He directs us to cases in which we held that oral notification of 

postrelease control is a necessity for a validly imposed sentence. Bezak, 114 Ohio 

St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, at ¶ 12, citing State v. Jordan, 104 

Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864. However, this case differs from 

Bezak and Jordan because in those cases, the defendants directly challenged the 

validity of the imposition of their postrelease control as an aspect of their 

sentences. Bezak, 2007-Ohio-3250, ¶ 3-4; Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 2-3. If this 

case had arisen as a direct challenge to Jordan’s postrelease control via an appeal 

of his sentence, Bezak and Jordan would control. Instead, Jordan challenges the 

sufficiency of evidence on an element of the criminal offense of escape, and 

therefore ordinary standards regarding the sufficiency of evidence will apply. 

{¶ 13} A reviewing court need not dwell on the question whether the 

sentencing court advised the defendant of postrelease control at the sentencing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

hearing when the record is silent in that regard and there is uncontroverted 

evidence that the accused was indeed subject to supervision by the Department of 

Rehabilitation and Correction. Of course, it would be better practice for trial 

courts to note in the written sentencing entry that the defendant was orally advised 

of postrelease control on the record, and it may be advisable for the state to 

introduce transcripts or testimony, when available, to that effect. But when, as 

here, the evidence sufficiently proves that the defendant was under detention, 

such silence in the record is not fatal to the state’s case. To obtain a conviction 

for escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), the state may prove that the defendant was 

subject to postrelease control without proving that during a sentencing hearing the 

trial court orally notified the defendant that he would be subject to postrelease 

control. 

{¶ 14} Our holding today does not reach the question whether a defendant 

can be convicted of escape when the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that the 

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction lacked the authority to supervise the 

accused. In North—the case that was cited by the court of appeals as being in 

conflict with this case—the evidence established that the sentencing court failed 

or declined to impose postrelease control upon the defendant. North, 2007-Ohio5383, at ¶ 7-8. The provision of North’s sentencing entry that imposed 

postrelease control had been struck through by the sentencing court. Id. at ¶ 7. 

Citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, 

the court of appeals held that the Adult Parole Authority lacked authority to 

impose postrelease control on North. Id. Consequently, the court held, North 

could not be convicted of escape, because he was never legally under supervision. 

Id. 

{¶ 15} In this case, there was no evidence that postrelease control was 

improperly imposed or that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
January Term, 2010 

7 

lacked the authority to supervise Jordan. Instead, the evidence supports the 

conclusion that Jordan was subject to supervision. 

IV 

{¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, we answer the narrowed issue in the 

affirmative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 

__________________ 

LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 17} I respectfully dissent because the majority opinion relieves the 

state of its obligation to prove detention as an element of escape under R.C. 

2921.34(A)(1). 

{¶ 18} Jordan argues that to prove that he was under detention for 

purposes of escape, the state must show that the court properly advised him of 

postrelease control when he was sentenced. This argument is persuasive, 

considering a line of decisions of this court. We have ruled that unless the 

defendant is advised of postrelease control both at the sentencing hearing and in 

the judgment entry, the Adult Parole Authority is without authority to impose it. 

Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, at ¶ 20, 

quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at 

¶ 19. Although in this case there is a sentencing entry that includes three years of 

postrelease control, the state has not provided evidence that the defendant was 

orally notified of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing. 

{¶ 19} The majority holds that “the state may prove that an accused was 

under detention for purposes of a prosecution for escape under R.C. 

2921.34(A)(1) without offering affirmative evidence that the sentencing court 

orally advised the offender of the possibility of the imposition of postrelease 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

control.” (Emphasis added.) Majority opinion at ¶ 2. In other words, the state 

need not show that there was a valid sentence that placed the defendant under 

detention. 

{¶ 20} In failing to require the state to show proper oral notification to the 

defendant, the majority retreats from the idea that unless a defendant is notified of 

postrelease control at sentencing, the sentence is void. See State v. Bezak, 114 

Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961; Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 

2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864. "The effect of determining that a judgment is 

void is well established. It is as though such proceedings had never occurred; the 

judgment is a mere nullity and the parties are in the same position as if there had 

been no judgment." (Citations omitted.) Romito v. Maxwell (1967), 10 Ohio 

St.2d 266, 267-268, 39 O.O.2d 414, 227 N.E. 2d 223. In my view, this means that 

either a sentence is void and has no effect, or it is not void and does have effect. 

{¶ 21} The majority opinion distinguishes Bezak and Jordan because in 

those cases the defendants directly appealed the validity of postrelease control as 

part of their sentence. Bezak, 2007-Ohio-3250, ¶ 3-4; Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 

2-3. It states that Bezak and Jordan would control if this case had arisen “as a 

direct challenge to Jordan’s postrelease control via an appeal of his sentence.” 

Majority opinion at ¶ 12. However, cases such as State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio 

St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, show that a void sentence need not 

be challenged on direct appeal. 

{¶ 22} From now on, apparently, the following will be sufficient proof of 

“detention”: postrelease control in the sentencing entry, the defendant’s 

knowledge of postrelease control before release from prison, the defendant’s 

signature on a form detailing monitored-time conditions, or the defendant’s 

contact with his or her parole officer. However, permitting these forms of proof 

contradicts precedent by allowing a defendant serving a void sentence, one that 

has “no effect,” to be convicted of a new crime of escape, even though the 
January Term, 2010 

9 

underlying sentence that allegedly imposed the detention is void. The majority 

concludes, “Our holding today does not reach the question whether a defendant 

can be convicted of escape when the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that the 

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction lacked the authority to supervise the 

accused.” (Emphasis added.) Majority opinion at ¶ 14. Nevertheless, the state 

need not provide affirmative evidence of a valid detention as an element of escape 

by showing that there is a valid sentence allowing postrelease control of the 

accused. Thus, the state receives the benefit of the doubt on an element of the 

offense, even though a missing notification renders void a sentence for which 

postrelease control was imposed in the sentencing entry. 

{¶ 23} I would require the state to prove that a defendant was notified of 

postrelease control at sentencing to show that the defendant was under valid 

detention for purposes of escape. I respectfully dissent and would reverse the 

defendant’s conviction. 

 PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

Brent W. Yager, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, and Denise M. 

Martin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 

Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

______________________