Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1511-CR-1918 | May 24, 2016 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jerry T. Drook

Marion, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ryan Sizemore,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 24, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

27A02-1511-CR-1918

Appeal from the Grant Superior 

Court

The Honorable Dana J. 

Kenworthy, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

27D02-1505-F6-193

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] In May of 2015, Appellant-Defendant Ryan Sizemore engaged in a series of 

verbal and physical disputes with his then-girlfriend. As a result of Sizemore’s 

actions during these disputes, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the 

“State”) subsequently charged Sizemore with Level 4 felony possession of a 

firearm by a serious violent felon, Level 6 felony residential entry, Level 6 

felony domestic battery in the presence of a child, Level 6 felony neglect of a 

dependent, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. 

[2] On August 18, 2015, the morning that his trial was scheduled to begin, 

Sizemore pled guilty as charged. In exchange for Sizemore’s guilty plea, the 

State agreed that it would not request consecutive sentences. The trial court 

subsequently accepted Sizemore’s guilty plea and sentenced him to an 

aggregate term of twelve years. Sizemore contends on appeal that the trial 

court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Concluding otherwise, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 22, 2015, Jeff Hartman, his girlfriend Kimberly Troy, and Carolyn

Duncil went to Duncil’s apartment so that Duncil could tend to her dog. 

Hartman and Troy waited outside while Duncil went into the apartment. 

While Duncil was inside the apartment, Sizemore—who was Duncil’s 

boyfriend—ran into the apartment. After Sizemore had entered the apartment, 

Hartman and Troy heard screaming coming from inside the apartment. 

Hartman went to the door to investigate. He was met at the door by Sizemore 
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who repeatedly stated that Duncil was not leaving. Hartman and Troy 

implored Sizemore to let Duncil leave. 

[4] After more arguing between Sizemore and Duncil and repeated requests from 

Hartman and Troy for Sizemore to let Duncil leave, Duncil and Sizemore came 

to the door. Sizemore again reiterated that Duncil was not leaving. When

Troy threatened to call the police if Sizemore did not allow Duncil to leave the 

apartment, Sizemore pulled up his shirt to show that he had a pistol in his 

waistband and said, “If I go I’m taking everyone with me.” Tr. p. 23. About 

ten minutes later, Sizemore relented and allowed Duncil to leave the apartment.

[5] Duncil, Hartman, and Troy left in Hartman’s truck and began to make their 

way to Troy’s residence. While in route to Troy’s residence, Duncil became 

sick and Hartman had to pull the truck to the side of the road to allow Duncil to 

vomit. The trio “took off” after they noticed Sizemore approaching Hartman’s 

truck on a bicycle. Tr. p. 24. As they continued towards Troy’s residence, the 

trio stopped and purchased a blanket for Duncil from a local store. Upon 

arriving at Troy’s residence, Hartman stayed at the residence and Duncil and 

Troy left in Hartman’s truck. 

[6] Soon thereafter, Hartman saw Sizemore approaching the residence on a bicycle. 

While standing on the sidewalk in front of Troy’s residence, Sizemore told 

Hartman that he was “waiting” on Duncil and Troy. Tr. p. 24. Sizemore was 

still waiting when Troy and Duncil returned. Troy parked Hartman’s truck in 

her driveway and she and Duncil ran in the back door of her residence. 
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However, before Hartman could close the door behind them, Sizemore “put his 

foot between the door and the doorjamb” so that Hartman could not close it 

completely. Tr. p. 25. 

[7] Sizemore yelled that he wanted to talk to Duncil. Duncil initially refused, but 

after about fifteen minutes of continued yelling and arguing, Duncil met 

Sizemore on Troy’s front porch. Before long, Duncil and Sizemore were 

yelling at each other. Hartman came to the front porch and instructed 

Sizemore to leave. Sizemore responded by getting “nose to nose” with 

Hartman, asking him “Do you know who you’re ... f-ing with?” Tr. p. 25. 

Duncil escorted Sizemore off the porch to the sidewalk. Sizemore then pulled 

out a “blue, anodized” pistol, pointed it at Hartman, and again asked Hartman 

“Do you know who you’re f-ing with?” Tr. p. 25. Hartman, who had seen 

Sizemore with that particular pistol on multiple occasions, then called 911. 

Sizemore then fled to a local restaurant. Later that evening, the responding 

officer made contact with Sizemore and told him “to stay away for the night.” 

Tr. p. 28.

[8] The next day, Hartman, Troy, Duncil, and others—including Duncil’s and 

Sizemore’s three-year-old daughter, Tazra, and Hartman’s one-and-a-half-yearold son, Kyden—were at Troy’s residence preparing to go to a picnic. Sizemore 

approached the residence, again on a bicycle; walked into the residence, and 

talked to Duncil. Sizemore demanded that Duncil leave with him. Duncil 

refused and ran out the back door of the residence. Once outside, Duncil 

picked up Tazra. Sizemore came out of the residence and attempted to 
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“forcefully grab” Duncil to make her come with him. Tr. p. 30. When Shawna 

Bryant, another person who happened to be at Troy’s residence, protested, 

Sizemore “forcefully pushed her against the trunk” of Hartman’s vehicle. Tr. p. 

30. Sizemore then grabbed Duncil, who was still holding Tazra, and pulled her 

down the street. 

[9] “[A]bout three-quarters of the way down the block,” Sizemore began hitting 

Duncil, who again was still holding Tazra, with a closed fist. Tr. p. 30. 

Hartman again called 911. Hartman and some of the other people at Troy’s 

residence then pursued Sizemore, who had stopped striking Duncil and had fled 

down an alley. Duncil later found Sizemore’s pistol in a burn barrel in the 

alley. Hartman and another man retrieved the pistol from the barrel and gave it 

to Duncil. Duncil subsequently gave the pistol to Sizemore’s mother. 

Sizemore was later arrested and a no-contact order relating to Duncil was put in 

place. 

[10] On May 27, 2015, the State charged Sizemore with Level 6 felony residential 

entry, Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child, and Level 6 

felony neglect of a dependent. On June 29, 2015, the State amended the 

charging information to include a charge of Level 4 felony unlawful possession 

of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The State subsequently amended the 

charging information a second time on August 5, 2015, to include two counts of 

Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Sizemore remained in custody while 

awaiting trial.
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[11] While in custody, Sizemore made 726 calls to Duncil in violation of the nocontact order. During the relatively few calls in which he successfully made 

contact with Duncil, Sizemore instructed her not to appear at his trial, told her 

that she would not get in trouble if she did not appear, indicated that she should 

contact the prosecutor and recant her statement, and indicated that she should 

convince Hartman and Troy to recant their statements regarding the events in 

question. Sizemore also told Duncil that she should tell the Department of 

Child Services that his conduct was not as serious as the witnesses said it was.

[12] On the morning of August 18, 2015, the date Sizemore’s trial was scheduled to 

begin, Sizemore pled guilty to each of the charged offenses. In exchange for 

Sizemore’s guilty plea, the State agreed that it would not request consecutive 

sentences. The trial court subsequently sentenced Sizemore to an aggregate 

term of twelve years. This appeal follows. 

Discussion and Decision

[13] On appeal, Sizemore contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing him. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the 

trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on 

reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted). 
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One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing 

to enter a sentencing statement at all. Other examples include 

entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for 

imposing a sentence-including a finding of aggravating and 

mitigating factors if any-but the record does not support the 

reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are 

clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, 

or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Under 

those circumstances, remand for resentencing may be the 

appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the 

trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly 

considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.

Id. at 490-91. 

[14] In challenging the trial court’s sentencing order, Sizemore claims that the trial 

court abused its discretion by failing to consider certain proffered mitigating 

factors. The finding of mitigating factors is discretionary with the trial court. 

Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993) (citing Graham v. State, 535 

N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (Ind. 1989)). The trial court is not required to find the 

presence of mitigating factors. Id. (citing Graham, 535 N.E.2d at 1155). 

Further, the trial court is not required to weigh or credit the mitigating evidence 

the way appellant suggests it should be credited or weighed. Id. (citing 

Hammons v. State, 493 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ind. 1986)). Likewise, if the trial 

court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued 

by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the 

factor does not exist. Id. (citing Hammons, 493 N.E.2d at 1254-55). 
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A. Sizemore’s Guilty Plea

[15] Sizemore claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find the 

fact that he pled guilty to be a mitigating factor at sentencing. “[A]lthough we 

have long held that a defendant who pleads guilty deserves ‘some’ mitigating 

weight to be given to the plea in return, a guilty plea may not be significantly 

mitigating when the defendant receives a substantial benefit in return or when 

the defendant does not show acceptance of responsibility.” McElroy v. State, 865 

N.E.2d 584, 591 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted). 

[16] In the instant matter, Sizemore’s decision to plead guilty seems to represent a 

tactical decision rather than a sincere display of remorse. The trial court noted 

its belief that Sizemore did not plead guilty prior to the morning of trial because 

Sizemore was “banking on the victim and the witnesses not coming to court, 

because [Sizemore] directed them multiple times not to come to court.” Tr. p. 

92. Further, the trial court specifically stated that it did not find Sizemore to be 

remorseful. The trial court noted that Sizemore was not truly taking 

responsibility for his actions as he continued to blame Duncil for his actions. 

The trial court further noted that Sizemore continued to make threatening 

comments to Duncil, including telling her that it would be “[w]ay worse when 

[he] [got] out” if she did not follow his instruction to fail to appear at his trial. 

Tr. p. 93. The record also demonstrates that Sizemore benefitted from this 

tactical decision as the State agreed that it would not seek consecutive sentences 

in exchange for Sizemore’s guilty plea. 
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[17] In addition, we recognize that the Indiana Supreme Court has held that a 

defendant generally deserves to benefit when his guilty plea spares the victim of 

the trauma of a trial and the State of the need to expend considerable time, 

resources, and effort to prepare for trial. See Sensback v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1160, 

1164 (Ind. 1999). Here, however, Sizemore did not enter into his guilty plea 

until the morning of trial. Thus, while spared of need to actually testify during 

trial, Duncil was not spared of the trauma associated with preparing for trial. 

Likewise, Sizemore’s decision to plead guilty did not spare the State of the need 

to expend the necessary time, resources, and effort to prepare for trial. 

[18] Review of the record indicates that, contrary to Sizemore’s claim on appeal, the 

trial court did consider Sizemore’s guilty plea in sentencing Sizemore. In light 

of the seemingly tactical nature of Sizemore’s decision to plead guilty coupled 

with the trial court’s determination that Sizemore lacked remorse and did not 

seem to truly accept responsibility for his actions, we conclude that Sizemore 

has failed to demonstrate that his guilty plea warranted significant mitigating 

weight. 

B. Potential Hardship on Sizemore’s Dependents

[19] Sizemore also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

consider his “expressed concern for being away from his young children for a 

lengthy incarceration” and the potential hardship a lengthy incarceration would 

have on his family. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. We have previously concluded that a 

trial court “is not obligated to find a circumstance to be mitigating merely 
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because the defendant advances it.” Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009) (citing Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). 

More specifically, as Sizemore acknowledges, a trial court is not required to 

find that a defendant’s incarceration would result in undue hardship on his

dependents. Id. In reaching this conclusion, we observed that “[m]any persons 

convicted of crimes have dependents and, absent special circumstances showing 

that the hardship to them is ‘undue,’ a trial court does not abuse its discretion 

by not finding this to be a mitigating factor.” Id. In order for the hardship to 

the dependent to be “undue,” there must be special circumstances that make the 

burden on the dependent unusual. See generally, id. at 247-48.

[20] Sizemore claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to even 

consider his claimed concern about the potential hardship that his incarceration 

would have on his children. The record reveals, however, that the trial court 

considered and rejected Sizemore’s expressed concern in sentencing Sizemore. 

The trial court noted that Sizemore committed some of the violent acts at issue 

in front of one of his children. The trial court also noted that Sizemore “felt 

free to use his mother and his children ... to communicate with the victim after 

being served with the no-contact order.” Tr. p. 91. In expressing concern for 

Sizemore’s apparent willingness to use his mother and children in this way, the 

trial court stated the following:

This tells me, sir, that you’re willing to put your mother in 

jeopardy of arrest, you’re willing to put your children in a very 

bad position, communicating things to their mother. And I note, 

in one of the jail calls, you talked to a little boy and you tell him, 
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“Make sure mom doesn’t have any dudes around,” uh, tell him 

he’s the man of the house, and we’re talking about a little boy. 

So you’re putting responsibility to watch for mom’s boyfriends 

on a little child.

Tr. p. 91. The trial court also noted the in threatening Duncil, Sizemore had 

indicated that his threat was “a promise on my kids.” Tr. p. 93. In mentioning 

this statement, the trial court explained: “And that tells me what you think of 

your children as well. You say that they mean the world to you here today, I 

see you using them as a threat to the victim.” Tr. p. 93. These statements 

indicate that the trial court considered Sizemore’s claimed concern for his 

family. 

[21] The record also reveals that both Sizemore’s mother and Duncil would be 

available to care for the children during Sizemore’s incarceration. The record 

further reveals that Sizemore was largely unemployed at the time of his arrest. 

Duncil, on the other hand, was employed and provided for the family. 

Sizemore fails to explain how his incarceration would impede Duncil’s ability 

to continue to care and provide for the children. 

[22] It is clear from the record that the trial court considered Sizemore’s claimed 

concern for the impact that his incarceration would have on his children, but 

that it simply did not afford Sizemore’s claim with the mitigating weight 

Sizemore believed it should have. Again, “[a] trial court is not obligated to 

weigh or credit the mitigating factors the way a defendant suggests they should 

be weighed or credited.” Jones v. State, 790 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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2003) (citing Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind. 2000)). Sizemore 

has again failed to demonstrate that his claim is both significant and clearly 

supported by the record or that it warranted significant mitigating weight.

Conclusion

[23] In sum, Sizemore has failed to demonstrate that either of the above-discussed 

proffered mitigating factors were both (1) significant and clearly supported by 

the record or (2) warranted significant mitigating weight. As such, we conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Sizemore.

[24] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.