J-S53038-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JUSTIN CORLISS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1232 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered May 27, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-45-CR-0000743-1997

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: Filed: April 30, 2021

Justin Corliss appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe 

County (PCRA court)1 denying his petition for a writ of coram nobis. In 1998,

following a jury trial, Corliss was found guilty of several sexual offenses

against the victim, D.G., and he was sentenced to a prison term of four to ten 

years. He now asserts that his convictions must be vacated because judges

and prosecutors have conspired to obscure evidence of his innocence. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that Corliss disputes that this appeal arises from a petition filed 

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

His position is that the PCRA does not apply and that the common law writ of 

coram nobis is a viable means of correcting his asserted errors. As explained 

below, the “PCRA” designation is apt.
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However, because all of the factual and legal claims now advanced by Corliss 

are procedurally barred, the order on review is affirmed.

I.

Corliss currently has appeals pending in three separate matters, each 

involving similar allegations of sexual abuse against minors.2 The present 

case concerns D.G., who was a 14-year-old co-worker of Corliss at a pet store 

in 1997. After D.G. came forward about an ongoing sexual relationship with 

Corliss, he was charged with statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent 

assault, indecent assault and corruption of minors. At the time, Corliss was 

about 32 years old.

Samples were obtained from D.G.’s underwear for DNA testing a few 

days after she divulged to the police that she and Corliss had been having 

sexual interactions.3 Those samples were compared to the DNA profile 

obtained from Corliss’ blood. The lab report detailing the DNA comparison, 

however, was excluded from the evidence at trial because some of the tested 

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2 The pending case at appellate docket number 1239 EDA 2020 began in 2013 

when Corliss’ minor daughter, C.C., informed her mother that Corliss had 

touched her inappropriately under her pants between 2009 and 2012. The 

case at appellate docket number 1272 EDA 2020 also began in 2013 when the 

minor daughter of Corliss’ former girlfriend, R.V., reported similar abuse 

between 1995 and 1997. Both of those cases were tried together in 2016.

3 D.G. and her parents contacted the police on July 9, 1997, which was the 

day of the final time she and Corliss had sexual intercourse. She was 

interviewed by police two days later, and on July 13, 1997, a pair of her 

underwear was taken to a crime lab for DNA testing.
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specimens taken from D.G.’s underwear contained no DNA or were simply

“uninterpretable.” The prosecution described the report as “inconclusive” but 

maintained that Corliss could not be excluded as a contributor of DNA on the 

clothing. See Pre-trial Hearing Transcript, 6/16/98, at pp. 36-37.

Corliss then moved to compel the production of the lab test materials so 

that he could hire his own expert to ascertain whether his DNA could be 

excluded as a match. The trial court denied the motion, ruling in part that 

even if Corliss could prove his DNA was absent from the underwear, it would 

not be exculpatory because the alleged offenses took place on multiple dates

other than when D.G. wore that clothing. Id. In sum, this lack of relevance 

precluded the defense from conducting its own DNA testing. See Trial 

Transcript, 7/9/1998, at pp. 61-62.

Corliss was found guilty of the above charges in 1998. He filed 

numerous appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief, none of which were 

successful. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Corliss, 750 A.2d 366 (Pa. Super. 

1999) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming judgment of sentence on direct 

appeal); Commonwealth v. Corliss, 778 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(unpublished memorandum) (affirming denial of first PCRA petition); 

Commonwealth v. Corliss, 841 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. 2003) (unpublished 

memorandum) (affirming denial of second PCRA petition).

Corliss was not granted parole and he completed his full prison term in 

2008. Upon his release, Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law required Corliss to
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register as a sexual offender. After Corliss was charged with new sexual 

offenses in 2013, it was discovered that he had violated those registration 

requirements. He challenged the violation by contesting the underlying 

convictions via a petition for a writ of coram nobis.

The filing was construed as an untimely PCRA petition and that finding 

was upheld on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 709 EDA 2014 (Pa. 

Super. December 2014) (unpublished memorandum) (reiterating that the 

PCRA subsumes all common law remedies, including coram nobis, making the 

PCRA the sole means of obtaining post-conviction relief in Pennsylvania).

It was not until 2017 that Corliss hired an expert (Dr. Monte Miller) to 

evaluate the DNA report that was disclosed to the defense but excluded from 

trial in 1998. According to a report compiled by Dr. Miller dated March 1, 

2017, the DNA samples taken from D.G.’s underwear did not match the DNA 

of Corliss, excluding him as a possible contributor of the tested samples. Dr. 

Miller stated in his report that while there was a possible semen stain on the 

underwear, the DNA that was foreign to D.G. on the garment did not originate 

from that stain. Dr. Miller speculated that no DNA was taken from the semen 

stain at all.

Corliss filed a “Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis” on March 3, 2020, 

which was over three years after he obtained Dr. Miller’s report. In the coram 

nobis petition (his second), Corliss argued that the absence of his DNA on 

D.G.’s underwear could have resulted in a different trial verdict. He also 
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claimed that Dr. Miller’s testimony proves that since the trial in 1998, the 

prosecutors and judges assigned to his case have misrepresented the DNA 

report as incriminating evidence. According to Corliss, Dr. Miller’s testimony 

shows that the suspected semen stain on D.G.’s clothing was a result of her 

sexual relations with someone other than himself.

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on the coram nobis petition

on January 23, 2020, and Dr. Miller testified. See Hearing Transcript, 

1/23/2020, at pp. 125-148. He discussed his review of the DNA report from 

1998 and concluded that it was unlikely that the specimens taken from D.G.’s 

underwear were actually semen: “I’m extremely doubtful that what they 

found was a fresh semen stain, No. 1, because the way that they have written 

it; but No. 2, because they didn’t get any DNA from it. That doesn’t rule it 

out but I’m not really sure they found semen.” Id. at p. 135.

The PCRA court issued an opinion outlining the reasons for its denial of 

Corliss’ petition for a writ of coram nobis. See PCRA Court Opinion, 

5/27/2020. First, the PCRA court construed Corliss’ filing as an untimely PCRA 

petition that does not satisfy the after-discovered evidence exception to the 

PCRA’s time-bar. Id. at 2-8.

Next, the PCRA court ruled that even if the claim was timely, it would 

afford Corliss no relief because the evidence he sought to rely upon would be 
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inadmissible at a new trial. The PCRA court found that the Rape Shield law4

would preclude evidence that D.G.’s underwear contained a seminal stain

caused by someone other than Corliss. Id. at 9-10.

Finally, the PCRA court found that Corliss’ claim fails because the lack 

of his DNA on D.G.’s underwear in no way proved his actual innocence or 

otherwise entitled him to any post-conviction remedies. Id. at 10-11. The 

purported absence of his DNA did not undermine any of the evidence that was 

presented to the jury at trial. For example, D.G. had testified that during the 

last time they had intercourse, Corliss had only ejaculated on his own clothing, 

which would be consistent with Dr. Miller’s opinion that none of Corliss’ semen 

was on D.G.’s underwear.

Corliss moved the PCRA court to correct perceived errors in the opinion, 

arguing that it had inaccurately described the relevant facts without adequate 

citation to the record. The PCRA court issued a statement pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), wherein it clarified and enlarged upon the citations in the 

opinion, albeit not to Corliss’ satisfaction. See PCRA Court 1925(a) 

Statement, 6/24/2020.

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4 Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104, prohibits the 

admission of evidence at trial regarding the victim’s past sexual conduct with 

individuals other than the defendant.
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Corliss timely appealed from the order denying his petition. In his brief, 

he concedes that he cannot plead and prove a meritorious claim under the 

PCRA. He insists, rather, that he is eligible for the common law writ of coram 

nobis,

5 which he believes is available where government obstruction has 

thwarted an otherwise valid PCRA claim.

The four issues Corliss presents in his brief, which he filed pro se, are 

as follows:

1. Did [the PCRA court] intend to obstruct the fair administration 

of justice when his opinion is rife with ex parte claims, deliberate 

misrepresentations, and fake citations, designed to mislead this 

reviewing court, rendering it not entitled to the presumption of 

correctness?

2. Did the [PCRA] court err in construing a coram nobis petition 

as a “PCRA [petition]” for the purpose of delaying the relief due, 

of vacating the conviction obtained, and to cover up twenty-two 

(22) years of the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office 

deliberately obstructing access to the remedies of a direct appeal 

and the PCRA?

3. Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that incontrovertible physical 

evidence of someone other than the accused had sexual 

intercourse with the minor complainant, at the relevant time, as 

not being relevant to her credibility and [Corliss’] constitutional 

right to present a defense, when [D.G.] never admitted to who 

she actually had sexual intercourse with, fraudulently claiming she 

was otherwise a “virgin?”

4. Would the fact of the Monroe County District Attorney’s office 

deliberately misrepresenting exculpatory DNA results as being 

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5 At common law, a writ of coram nobis could be used to “challenge the validity 

of a judgment based on facts not before the court when the judgment was 

entered.” Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465, 467 (Pa. 1971).
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“inconclusive,” to obstruct the fair administration of justice, act to 

bar retrial under the double jeopardy clause?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5.

In response, the Commonwealth argues both in its brief and its motion

to quash the appeal that Corliss’ claims are time-barred by the PCRA, 

previously litigated or waived, and unavailable because Corliss has already 

completed the full term of his sentence.

II.

The preliminary issue is whether the grounds asserted in Corliss’ coram 

nobis petition were subject to the PCRA’s filing deadlines.

6

 Importantly, 

Corliss concedes that he cannot prevail unless it is determined that the alleged 

judicial and prosecutorial fraud renders the PCRA inapplicable. He correctly

recognizes that he does not qualify for PCRA remedies because many years 

have passed since his judgment of sentence became final, he has completed 

the full term of his sentence, and he has exhausted his PCRA and appellate 

remedies. The gist of his argument is that he should not be bound by the 

PCRA because judges and prosecutors intentionally misrepresented a DNA 

report as “inconclusive,” preventing him from demonstrating that the report 

is, in fact, exculpatory.

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6 “[T]he standard of review is whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported 

by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 

875, 878 (Pa. 2009).
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Contrary to Corliss’ interpretation of the law, the PCRA clearly does

encompass exactly the types of claims that he now asserts. As we stated in 

a decision in 2013 affirming the denial of an earlier coram nobis petition filed 

by Corliss, “[t]he PCRA subsumes common law remedies where the relief 

sought is available under the PCRA[.]” Corliss, 709 EDA 2014, at 2-4 

(footnote omitted).

7

 The PCRA encompasses all common law post-conviction 

remedies, including coram nobis. See Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 

A.3d 493, 503 (Pa. 2016).

Section 9545(b)(1)(i) makes “government interference” an exception to

the one-year filing deadline running from the date that a judgment of sentence

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7 The PCRA provides in relevant part:

This [PCRA] provides for an action by which persons convicted of 

crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences 

may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this 

subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral 

relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory 

remedies for the same purpose that exist when this 

subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and 

coram nobis. This subchapter is not intended to limit the 

availability of remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal from 

the judgment of sentence, to provide a means for raising issues 

waived in prior proceedings or to provide relief from collateral 

consequences of a criminal conviction. Except as specifically 

provided otherwise, all provisions of this subchapter shall apply to 

capital and noncapital cases.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (emphasis added).
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becomes final.8 To satisfy this particular exception, a petitioner must show

that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by 

government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the 

United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i). Under the applicable version of

Section 9545(b)(2), such a claim had to be raised within 60 days from the 

date that it could have been presented.

9

Since 1998, when the DNA report was excluded from trial, Corliss has 

disputed that it is “inconclusive” and inadmissible. He has also maintained 

that the report exonerates him. All the while, Corliss could have hired his own 

expert to review the report and assess its conclusions, methodology and 

terminology. Yet he did not do so until 2017, by which time he had already 

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8

It is well established that the PCRA encompass asserted violations of Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the seminal case compelling the 

government’s disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Where a PCRA petitioner 

alleges that a delay in making a claim for post-conviction relief arose from a 

Brady violation, Section 9545(b)(2) of the PCRA applies. See generally 

Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11 (Pa. 2019). In Corliss’ direct 

appeal as to cases 1749-CR-2013 and 2173-CR-2013, we explained that when 

a Brady claim is alleged, there is still a duty on the part of the defense to 

perform due diligence and conduct reasonable investigation. See 

Commonwealth v. Corliss, 108 EDA 2017, at 20-25 (Pa. Super. Dec. 8, 

2017).

9 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended on October 24, 2018, extending the time 

for filing from 60 days from the date the claim could have been presented to

one year. This amendment applies to claims arising on or after December 24, 

2017. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3. Corliss’ claim arose 

long before that effective date.
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exhausted his direct appeal and post-conviction remedies under the PCRA and 

served the full term of his sentence.

Another three years passed before he filed the present coram nobis 

petition. Corliss has offered no logical explanation for why he could not have 

acted sooner to establish that the report exonerates him. As the claims of 

government obstruction/fraud are within the ambit of the PCRA, and Corliss 

concedes he cannot satisfy any recognized exception to the PCRA’s filing 

deadline, the PCRA court properly found that his petition is barred.

Having disposed of the case in that manner, it is unnecessary for us to 

reach the merits of his remaining legal claims or address the litany of factual 

disputes littered throughout his brief. To the extent we have not specifically 

addressed these other points, we adopt the reasoning of the PCRA court, as 

outlined in its opinions and clarifying statement.10

Because we are affirming the PCRA court’s denial of relief for the 

timeliness reasons set forth in its opinion, the Commonwealth’s motion to 

quash the appeal is denied as moot. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 2468 

EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. May 9, 2017) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming 

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10 Regardless of whether Corliss agrees with how prosecutors and judges have 

construed the facts and evidence in this case, “this Court may affirm a PCRA 

court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it.” Commonwealth 

v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010). The indisputable 

procedural history of this case, the relevant transcripts, and Corliss’ 

longstanding possession of the DNA report, all support the PCRA court’s 

decision to dismiss Corliss’ petition as untimely filed.
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denial of PCRA petition on timeliness grounds and denying motion to quash 

appeal as moot).

Motion to quash denied. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/30/21