United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 3, 2021 Decided August 26, 2022

No. 21-1123

VIASAT, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

SPACE EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, LLC,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 21-1125, 21-1127, 21-1128

On Notices of Appeal and Petition for Review of an

Order of the Federal Communications Commission

William M. Jay argued the cause for appellants Viasat, 

Inc. and The Balance Group. With him on the briefs were 

Colin L. Ward, David J. Zimmer, Gerard J. Cedrone, Jordan 

Bock, Michael F. Smith, and Stephen L. Goodman.
2

Pantelis Michalopoulos argued the cause for appellant 

DISH Network Corporation. With him on the briefs were 

Mark C. Savignac and William Travis West.

Ivan L. London, Jean-Claude Andre, and Philip E. 

Karmel were on the brief for amicus curiae Professor Andy 

Lawrence in support of appellants.

James M. Carr and Rachel Proctor May, Counsel, 

Federal Communications Commission, argued the causes for 

appellee. With them on the brief were Todd Kim, Assistant 

Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Robert B. 

Nicholson, Robert J. Wiggers, Justin Heminger, and Allen 

Brabender, Attorneys, and Jacob M. Lewis, Associate 

General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission.

Pratik A. Shah argued the cause for intervenor Space 

Exploration Holdings, LLC in support of appellee. With him 

on the brief was Z. W. Julius Chen.

Corbin K. Barthold and James E. Dunstan were on the 

brief for amicus curiae TechFreedom in support of appellee.

Before: WILKINS, KATSAS, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.

KATSAS, Circuit Judge: The Federal Communications 

Commission approved a request by Space Exploration 

Holdings, LLC to fly its satellites at a lower altitude. One 

competitor contends that the FCC did not adequately consider 

the risk of signal interference, a claim we reject on the merits. 

Another competitor, joined by an environmental group, raises

a claim under the National Environmental Policy Act. We 

decline to consider it because the environmental group lacks 
3

Article III standing, and the competitor’s asserted injury does 

not fall within the zone of interests protected by NEPA.

I

A

The Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the FCC to 

grant radio station licenses, including for the operation of 

communications satellites. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a). The 

Commission may modify licenses if it finds that the 

modification would serve the public interest, convenience, 

and necessity. Id. § 316(a)(1). The Telecommunications Act 

of 1996 requires the agency to facilitate the provision of 

broadband internet service to unserved areas. Id. § 1302.

To further that goal, the FCC granted Space Exploration 

Holdings, LLC (which goes by SpaceX) a license to provide

internet service by satellite. In re Space Exploration 

Holdings, LLC, 33 FCC Rcd. 3391 (2018). Once operational, 

this service will reach currently unserved areas.

SpaceX uses new technology to expand its coverage area. 

Traditional communications satellites move in geostationary 

orbit, or GSO. GSO satellites orbit at the same speed as the

Earth’s rotation, so they appear fixed in the sky. A single 

GSO satellite has a continuous sight line to users within its 

coverage area—and thus can provide continuous service to 

them. SpaceX’s satellites, by contrast, move at lower 

altitudes in a non-geostationary orbit, or NGSO. The lower 

altitude reduces transmission latency, making NGSO satellites

better suited to provide high-speed internet service. But these 

satellites do not synchronize with the Earth’s spin, so a single 

satellite cannot maintain a sight line with any given user. 

SpaceX solved this problem by deploying multiple satellites 

that move and communicate as a constellation: When one 
4

satellite moves out of view of a user’s ground antenna, it 

transfers the signal to the next satellite in line.

B

After receiving authorization for its satellites and 

launching about half of them, SpaceX requested permission to 

operate the constellation at a lower altitude. Given the 

complexity of satellite system design, the FCC seeks where 

possible to allow licensees “to modify the technical design of 

their satellites as they are being built.” Teledesic LLC, Order 

and Authorization, 14 FCC Rcd. 2261, 2264 (Int’l Bureau 

1999). But technical changes can interfere with signals from

other satellites, so the Commission must find that “the 

proposed modification does not present any significant 

interference problems.” Id. Various FCC rules govern this 

interference determination.

First, regulations prioritize GSO systems over NGSO 

systems. An NGSO system “must not cause unacceptable 

interference to” a GSO system. 47 C.F.R. § 25.289. More 

specifically, NGSO systems must operate within power limits 

set by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a 

United Nations agency responsible for addressing signal 

interference internationally. See id. The licensee must use 

ITU-approved software to show compliance with the power 

limits. Initially, the licensee enters its satellite data into the 

software and certifies the results to the FCC. 47 C.F.R. 

§ 25.146(a); see Update to Parts 2 and 25 Concerning NonGeostationary, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems and Related 

Matters, 32 FCC Rcd. 7809 ¶ 41 (2017) (NGSO Order). The 

licensee then submits the data to the ITU, which must make a

“favorable” or “qualified favorable” finding before the 

licensee may provide service. 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(c).
5

The rules also address interference among NGSO 

systems. Priority is based on the order in which the

competing systems were licensed; systems licensed later must

not unduly interfere with those licensed earlier. NGSO Order, 

32 FCC Rcd. 7809 ¶ 61. An NGSO licensee can modify its 

license without losing its priority only if the changes will not 

cause “significant interference” to existing services. 

Teledesic, 14 FCC Rcd. 2261 ¶ 5.

C

In 2019, the FCC’s International Bureau approved

SpaceX’s request to lower roughly half the satellites in its

constellation, after finding that the changes would impose no 

undue interference and would serve the public interest. In re 

Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 34 FCC Rcd. 2526 (Int’l 

Bureau Apr. 26, 2019) (First Modification Order). Because of 

a backlog at the ITU, the Bureau waived the ITU-finding 

requirement in part: It allowed the satellites to fly at the 

lower altitude after SpaceX certified compliance with ITU 

power limits using ITU-approved software. Id. ¶ 28. But the 

Bureau still required SpaceX to submit its data to the ITU and

cautioned that SpaceX would have to adjust its operations if 

the ITU were to make an unfavorable finding. Id.

In the order under review, the full Commission

authorized SpaceX to lower the remainder of its constellation.

In re Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 36 FCC Rcd. 7995 

(2021) (Second Modification Order). Again, the FCC 

permitted SpaceX to act upon a successful software 

certification. See id. ¶ 41. But it reiterated that SpaceX

would have to bring its system into compliance if the ITU 

were to make an adverse finding. Id. ¶ 97(p).

DISH Network Corporation, one of SpaceX’s 

competitors, objected to the modification. DISH argued that 
6

the proposed changes would interfere with its GSO satellite 

television service. Another competitor, Viasat, Inc., jointly 

objected with an environmental organization calling itself The 

Balance Group. They argued that NEPA required the FCC to 

prepare an environmental assessment before granting the 

modification. The FCC rejected both contentions. Second 

Modification Order, 36 FCC Rcd. 7995 ¶¶ 47, 92.

DISH, Viasat, and The Balance Group appeal the FCC’s 

order. SpaceX has intervened to support the Commission. 

We have statutory jurisdiction under 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6).1

II

We first consider interference issues. DISH argues that 

the FCC’s interference determination violated the 

Administrative Procedure Act and the Communications Act. 

DISH also challenges the regulatory procedure for showing

compliance with ITU power limits.

A

The APA requires us to set aside agency action that is 

arbitrary or capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). An action is 

arbitrary if the agency relied on inappropriate factors, failed to 

consider important aspects of the problem, or ignored relevant 

evidence. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Conversely, agency 

action is not arbitrary if it is “reasonable and reasonably 

1

 Because we have jurisdiction over the appeals under section 

402(b), we dismiss Viasat’s petition for review under section 

402(a). See Sprint Nextel Corp. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 253, 256 n.4 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (sections 402(a) and 402(b) are “mutually 

exclusive”).
7

explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 

1150, 1158 (2021). DISH contends that the interference 

determination was arbitrary for three reasons.

1

DISH first argues that the FCC unreasonably refused to 

consider expert reports claiming that SpaceX’s proposed 

changes would interfere with DISH’s GSO satellites. But the 

reports use a different method for assessing interference than

what binding regulations require.

The FCC must “adhere to its own rules and regulations.” 

AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 448 F.3d 426, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

Here, the governing rules require interference between GSO 

and NGSO systems to be assessed through the method used in

the ITU-approved validation software. 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(a), 

(c)(2). DISH acknowledges that SpaceX’s desired changes 

pass muster under that approach. Nevertheless, DISH argues

that its experts have a better method for calculating 

interference. DISH thus faults the FCC for following its own 

interference rules. But an agency “abuses its discretion when 

it arbitrarily violates its own rules, not when it follows them.” 

BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

DISH cites American Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 

F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008), to support its argument. There, we

faulted the FCC for failing to consider data that undermined a 

regulation. Id. at 240–41. But we did so in reviewing the 

regulation itself, not its application in a later licensing

proceeding. See id. at 236; see also Env’t Health Trust v. 

FCC, 9 F.4th 893, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (same for agency 

decision not to initiate a rulemaking). As we have explained, 

“an agency need not—indeed should not—entertain a 

challenge to a regulation, adopted pursuant to notice and 

comment, in an adjudication or licensing proceeding.” Trib. 
8

Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The FCC did 

not err by following that “hornbook” rule of administrative 

law. Id.2

2

DISH argues that the FCC misapplied Teledesic in

refusing to lower the priority of SpaceX’s NGSO license. 

Under Teledesic, the FCC generally permits NGSO licensees 

to modify licenses without losing priority if the changes do 

not cause “significant interference” to other systems and are 

“otherwise consistent with Commission policies.” 14 FCC 

Rcd. 2261 ¶ 5. DISH argues that the FCC failed to consider 

interference to GSO systems. But the agency expressly found 

that lowering SpaceX’s constellation “will not increase 

interference to GSO satellite systems.” Second Modification 

Order, 36 FCC Rcd. 7995 ¶ 47. And as explained above, it 

applied the correct legal standard in making that finding based 

on a certified compliance with ITU power limits. Id. ¶ 40; see 

47 C.F.R. § 25.289.

3

Finally, DISH argues that the FCC unreasonably waived 

the requirement of a favorable ITU finding, thus allowing 

SpaceX to proceed based on software validation alone. The 

FCC may waive its rules “for good cause shown.” 47 C.F.R. 

§ 1.3. Good cause exists “when particular facts would make 

strict compliance inconsistent with the public interest.” 

AT&T Wireless Servs. v. FCC, 270 F.3d 959, 965 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). To satisfy the APA, the FCC must “clearly state in the 

2

 As explained below, the regulations themselves permit 

waivers “for good cause shown.” 47 C.F.R. § 1.3. DISH does not 

contend that its expert reports compelled the FCC to formally waive 

the validation method required by section 25.146(c)(2).
9

record its reasons for granting the waiver.” Keller Commc’ns

v. FCC, 130 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

The FCC met these requirements. When the International 

Bureau first granted the waiver, it determined that an ITU

backlog would significantly delay the start of operations even 

though SpaceX had already certified compliance with ITU 

power limits using ITU-approved software. First 

Modification Order, 34 FCC Rcd. 2526 ¶ 28. We have held 

that “harm resulting from delay” can be good cause for a 

waiver. Omnipoint v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 631 (D.C. Cir. 

1996). Here, the Bureau reasonably granted a waiver to avoid 

long delays in the provision of internet service to Americans 

who remain “totally unserved by other broadband solutions.” 

First Modification Order, 34 FCC Rcd. 2526 ¶ 1. And it 

reasonably concluded that the certification of compliance 

would provide some assurance of no harmful interference.

DISH faults the FCC for not justifying the waiver anew in 

the Second Modification Order. But, in that order, the 

Commission explained that allowing SpaceX to lower the 

remainder of its constellation “will facilitate deployment” of 

broadband internet and “improve service to remote and 

underserved areas.” 36 FCC Rcd. 7995 ¶ 13. Seeing “no 

reason to revoke” the previously granted waiver, id., the 

agency extended it to the rest of SpaceX’s constellation. That 

decision was reasonable and reasonably explained.

DISH also challenges the waiver as discriminatory and 

illogical. It cites WorldVu Satellites Ltd., 32 FCC Rcd. 5366 

(2017), to show that the FCC has not waived the ITU-finding 

requirement for other licensees. But the licensee there

received a waiver of a different rule. Id. ¶ 19. DISH cannot 

show improper discrimination by offering only an “applesand-oranges comparison.” Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 
10

1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As for logic, DISH questions 

the utility of requiring SpaceX to receive a favorable ITU 

finding in the future, despite the possibility of harmful 

interference in the present. Although DISH is right that future

ITU review will neither prevent nor undo any current 

interference, it still serves a purpose: If the ITU should make 

an unfavorable finding, SpaceX will have to eliminate 

interference going forward. Second Modification Order, 36 

FCC Rcd. 7995 ¶ 97(p). In the meantime, other licensees

may report any present interference through established 

regulatory channels. See id. ¶ 97(i).

B

As a fallback to its arguments about arbitrariness, DISH

argues that the FCC’s interference determination violated 

sections 303 and 316 of the Communications Act. Section 

303 requires the FCC to promulgate regulations “to prevent 

interference between stations.” 47 U.S.C. § 303. As detailed 

above, the Commission has done so. Section 316 permits 

license modifications to promote the “public interest,” which 

is undermined by harmful interference. See id. § 316(a)(1). 

DISH’s argument rests on the premise that the FCC failed to 

adequately address the question of harmful interference, so it 

fails for reasons explained above.

C

Finally, DISH raises a structural challenge to 47 C.F.R. 

§ 25.146(c), which requires licensees to obtain a favorable 

ITU finding. According to DISH, this requirement violates 

constitutional and statutory rights to judicial review, because 

courts cannot review the ITU finding. Moreover, DISH 

continues, the regulation impermissibly delegates FCC 

authority to the ITU.
11

We lack jurisdiction to consider these arguments, which 

DISH failed to press before the FCC. The Communications 

Act bars judicial review of “questions of fact or law upon 

which the Commission, or designated authority within the 

Commission, has been afforded no opportunity to pass.” 47 

U.S.C. § 405(a). Quoting a phrase from one of our cases, 

DISH contends that the Act’s exhaustion requirement applies 

only to “technical defects” in an FCC decision. See Time 

Warner Entm’t v. FCC, 144 F.3d 75, 79–81 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

DISH is mistaken. In Time Warner, we held that section 

405(a) applies with special rigor to “technical or procedural” 

errors; in that context, a party must “raise the precise claim 

before the Commission” so that the agency has an opportunity 

to correct any mistake. Id. at 81. But we did not suggest that 

section 405(a) applies only to technical or procedural errors. 

To the contrary, we explained at length that section 405(a)

requires all claims to be “flagged” or “teed up” before the 

Commission, whether by the appellant or by some other party, 

before they may be pursued in court. See id. at 79–81; see 

also Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, 983 F.3d 498, 509 (D.C. Cir. 

2020) (“we will not review arguments that have not first been 

presented to the Commission”). Here, no party teed up—with 

precision or otherwise—the judicial-review and delegation 

claims that DISH now seeks to raise.

III

We now turn to the environmental claim. Viasat and The 

Balance Group contend that the FCC violated NEPA by 

allowing SpaceX to proceed without first preparing an 

environmental assessment.

Before reaching the merits of this claim, we must ask 

whether any party has standing to raise it. For constitutional 

standing under Article III, a party must show it has suffered 
12

an injury that is actual, imminent, or certainly impending. 

See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 

(2013). On the other hand, a “speculative” possibility of 

future injury does not suffice. See, e.g., id.; Lujan v. Defs. of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583–84 (1992); City of Los Angeles v. 

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). In addition, to pursue NEPA 

claims under the APA, the party must show that its injury “is 

to interests of the sort protected by NEPA.” Fla. Audubon 

Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc); 

see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997)

(explaining the “zone of interests” rule for APA review). The 

“injury that supplies constitutional standing must be the same 

as the injury within the requisite ‘zone of interests.’” Mount. 

States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996).

Because neither Viasat nor The Balance Group has met 

both requirements, we do not reach the merits of their claim.

A

Viasat competes against SpaceX as a provider of 

satellite-communications services. It asserts three distinct 

injuries from the approval of SpaceX’s constellation.

1

Viasat worries that SpaceX’s satellites may cause debris 

to collide with its own satellites. Viasat operates only a single 

satellite that flies close to SpaceX’s constellation, and it does 

not seriously contend that the probability of a direct collision 

is high enough to support Article III standing. Instead, Viasat 

posits that SpaceX’s satellites may collide with other orbiting 

bodies, which may cause more space debris, which may in 

turn collide with a Viasat satellite.
13

This theory of injury is much too speculative. To ground 

standing on the risk of future harm, a party must show both 

that the risk is substantial and that the challenged action 

substantially increases it. Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. 

Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Viasat posits too 

many unlikely contingencies to clear those hurdles. First, one 

of SpaceX’s satellites would have to suffer a collision. The 

FCC estimated this risk to be a chance between 1-in-44 and 

1-in-200 over the next century, depending on the number of 

satellites launched and the disposal failure rate. Second 

Modification Order, 36 FCC Rcd. 7995 ¶ 63. Second, the

collision would have to generate a debris field of its own, with

particles large enough to damage another satellite. According 

to Viasat, only 0.5 percent of debris particles currently in orbit

are large enough to cause such damage. Finally, a debris 

particle large enough and traceable to an impact with a 

SpaceX satellite would have to happen upon a collision 

course with Viasat’s satellite, remain undetected, and thwart 

satellite protocols to avoid collisions. Viasat’s standing 

affidavit is long on the general problem of space debris, but 

short on the probability that any SpaceX impact might 

imminently harm a Viasat satellite. Viasat’s theory of spacedebris collision does not cross the line from speculative to

certainly impending.

2

Alternatively, Viasat asserts that SpaceX’s constellation 

increases its own operating costs—for example, by making it 

more technically complex and more expensive for Viasat to 

launch its own satellites. Those harms are economic—and 

thus fall outside the zone of interests protected by NEPA. 

See, e.g., Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, 807 F.3d 267, 

274 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The zone of interests protected by the 

NEPA is, as its name implies, environmental; economic 
14

interests simply do not fall within that zone.”); Mount. States,

92 F.3d at 1235–36 (“NEPA’s rather sweeping list of interests 

... do not include purely monetary interests, such as the 

competitive effect that a construction project may have on 

plaintiff’s commercial enterprise.”).

Viasat responds that predominating economic injuries,

although themselves unprotected by NEPA, do not disqualify 

a party from asserting other, “environmental” injuries, Nat’l 

Ass’n of Home Builders v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 F.3d 

1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2005), or injuries with “an 

environmental as well as an economic component,” Monsanto 

v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010). Viasat 

reasons that its economic injury flows from “orbital 

crowding”—in other words, congestion in outer space—

which Viasat says is a “classic environmental concern.” 

Viasat Reply Br. at 22–23.

We reject this argument. To be sure, we have suggested 

that congestion such as “vehicular and pedestrian traffic” is an

environmental harm against which NEPA is directed. Realty 

Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 452 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 

1977) (quoting Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 

1972)). Individuals subjected to these nuisances may 

therefore sue to prevent NEPA violations. An apartment 

owner “in Manhattan” may object to the building of a jail 

“across the street.” Hanly, 460 F.2d at 642. And the owner 

of buildings “in downtown Jackson, Mississippi” may object 

to “the construction of a new federal office building in 

downtown Jackson.” Realty Income Trust, 564 F.2d at 452. 

But Article III standing is not geographically unbounded. 

Individuals wishing to look at elephants in the Bronx Zoo 

cannot complain about the treatment of elephants in Sri 

Lanka. See Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 566. Likewise, 

commuters in New York City cannot complain about actions
15

that worsen traffic in Washington, D.C. To press a NEPA 

claim, an individual must be close to the wildlife that he

wants to experience or the congestion that he wants to avoid. 

This follows from the bedrock standing principle that “the 

‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury to a 

cognizable interest. It requires the party seeking review to be 

himself among the injured.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 

727, 734 (1972); see also Match-E. Band of Pottawatomi 

Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 227 (2012) (a “neighboring 

landowner” may challenge federal land acquisition over

aesthetic and environmental concerns). We do not question 

that space congestion attributable to SpaceX may impose 

economic costs on Viasat itself. But we do not think that 

Viasat (or its shareholders, officers, employees, customers, 

suppliers, or other stakeholders) can fairly be described as 

having personally suffered a nuisance, aesthetic, or other 

environmental injury from congestion in outer space.

3

Finally, Viasat claims injury because the FCC licensed 

one of its competitors. That is a pure economic harm well 

beyond the purview of NEPA. ANR Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 

205 F.3d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“suppressing competition 

... is not within the zone of interests protected by NEPA”).

B

The second party seeking to raise a NEPA claim is The 

Balance Group. According to its “operating officer” Joseph 

Sandri, the Group “exists to provide a balanced approach to 

solving large, systemic issues” about technology’s “impact on 

the human condition and the environment at large.” Sandri 

Decl. ¶ 3. The Group asserts standing as an organization and 

as an association acting on behalf of its members.
16

1

To determine organizational standing, we “conduct the 

same inquiry as in the case of an individual.” Havens Realty 

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982). Thus, the 

Group must show that it has suffered a concrete, imminent

injury from the FCC’s licensing decision. See Defs. of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. A mere “setback to the 

organization’s abstract social interests” is not enough. 

Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 378. The Group must prove that 

its “discrete programmatic concerns are being directly and 

adversely affected.” PETA v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087, 1093

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 

84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

A party seeking to challenge agency action in court bears 

the same burden to prove standing “as that of a plaintiff 

moving for summary judgment.” Ams. for Safe Access v. 

DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Thus, unless

standing is clear from the administrative record, the party 

must submit evidence to prove it. See D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(7); 

Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In 

this context as elsewhere, “barebones” statements do not 

suffice. Twin Rivers Paper Co. v. SEC, 934 F.3d 607, 613–14

(D.C. Cir. 2019).

The Group’s affidavit is too conclusory to establish 

organizational standing. The Group says that the FCC’s 

licensing decision has forced it to “redeploy personnel and 

divert other resources” from research projects about terrestrial 

networks. Sandri Decl. ¶¶ 5–6. But which personnel and 

resources, and to where were they redeployed? Sandri does 

not say, beyond a threadbare claim that “equipment and 

personnel” were needed to “measure the impacts of the 

SpaceX system.” Id. ¶ 5. Sandri estimates that the Group
17

spent “at least $10,000” on “activities related to” SpaceX’s 

constellation, but he gives no concrete sense of what the funds 

were spent on. Id. ¶ 7. These unadorned assertions do not 

enable us to fairly assess whether the Group has satisfied the 

requirements for organizational standing under Havens Realty 

and PETA. See Conservation Force v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 

1207 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“We do not insist on record evidence 

and affidavits to establish standing because we are misguided 

nitpickers, but rather because we must respect the limits of 

our jurisdiction.”).

2

Associations sometimes may assert standing on behalf of 

their individual members, Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. 

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), but the Group has not 

shown that it qualifies as a membership association.

To assert associational standing, an organization must 

have the “indicia of a traditional membership association.”

Sorenson Commc’ns v. FCC, 897 F.3d 214, 225 (D.C. Cir. 

2018) (quoting Am. Legal Found., 808 F.2d at 90). This turns 

on considerations such as whether members finance the 

organization, guide its activities, or select its leadership. See

id.; Gettman v. DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2002). On 

the other hand, it is not enough for putative members simply

to read a group’s publications, subscribe to its e-mail list, or 

follow its Facebook page. See Sorenson Commc’ns, 897 F.3d 

at 225; Gettman, 290 F.3d at 435. In Gettman and American 

Legal Foundation, we applied these criteria to deny 

associational standing to groups that fell on the wrong side of 

this line. See 290 F.3d at 435; 808 F.2d at 89–90. And in 

Sorenson Communications, we denied standing to a group 

whose affidavit left it “unclear” whether the group satisfied 

these criteria. 897 F.3d at 225.
18

Here, the Group has given us no insight into how it 

relates with its members. Two purported members submitted 

affidavits, but neither describes involvement in the Group 

beyond a bare assertion of membership. See Baddiley Decl. 

¶ 2; Malina Decl. ¶ 2. And the Group’s own affidavit, 

submitted by its operating officer, makes no reference to 

membership. Again, we are left with no basis to determine 

whether the requisite elements of standing have been met—an 

issue on which the Group bore the burden of proof.

IV

The FCC adequately explained its conclusion that the 

modification of SpaceX’s license would not interfere with 

DISH’s satellites, and there is no proper party to pursue the 

NEPA claim.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.