COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Frank 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

RONALD JAMES UZENOFF 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2047-99-4 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 APRIL 11, 2000 

LINDA ANNE TERRELL 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 

 Donald E. Coulter for appellant. 

 John D. Steffan (Steffan & Associates, P.C., 

on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

The trial court found Ronald James Uzenoff $11,247 in 

arrears in child support payments. He alleges the trial court 

erred in finding that a 1991 consent order extended his 

obligation to pay child support past the age of eighteen. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

The parties married in 1977, separated in 1986, and 

divorced September 28, 1990. They had two children: Kimberly 

Nicole born March 22, 1979 and Jennifer Marie born January 28, 

1983. The trial court entered a child support order on July 31, 

1991 that ordered the husband to pay child support to each 

child. Child support continued "until [she] finished school 
and/or college, dies, marries, or is otherwise emancipated." 

The husband's counsel endorsed this order as "seen agreed." 

Neither party appealed that order. 

In 1999, the wife filed to enforce the support order, and 

the husband defended that he had overpaid child support for his 

oldest daughter because she was eighteen years old and past the 

age of majority. The husband concedes that she attends college. 

The trial court ordered the husband to continue paying child 

support while his daughter was in college and entered judgment 

for the payments in arrears. The husband argues that the trial 

court (1) lacked jurisdiction to order child support past the 

age of majority, and (2) erred in finding that his obligation to 

pay child support did not end upon the child turning eighteen 

years old and completing high school. 

A divorce court has jurisdiction to provide for support and 

maintenance of minor children. See Code §§ 20-103 through 

-109.1. Children attain their majority at the age of eighteen 

years. See Code § 1.13-42(a)(1). Accord Code § 20-103(v). 

Jurisdiction to provide support for minors terminates when a 

child turns eighteen years old.1 See Hosier v. Hosier, 221 Va. 

 1

 Code § 20-124.2(C) provides: 

 The court may order that support be 

paid for any child of the parties. The 

court shall also order that support will 

continue to be paid for any child over the 

age of eighteen who is (i) a full-time high 

school student, (ii) not self-supporting, 

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827, 831, 273 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1981); Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 

Va. 638, 641, 261 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1979); Eaton v. Eaton, 215 Va. 

824, 826, 213 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1975). 

However, parties may agree to support their children beyond 

reaching the age of majority. If they do, the courts may 

enforce the agreement. See Hosier, 221 Va. at 831, 273 S.E.2d 

at 566 (court's jurisdiction terminates when child reaches 

eighteen "unless otherwise provided by agreement incorporated 

into the divorce decree"); Cutshaw, 220 Va. at 641, 261 S.E.2d 

at 54; Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 654, 203 S.E.2d 123, 126 

(1974) (it is clear that the parties intended to support 

children past majority). It is undisputed that the parties' 

daughter turned eighteen years old and is no longer a minor. 

 

and (iii) living in the home of the party 

seeking or receiving child support until 

such child reaches the age of nineteen or 

graduates from high school, whichever first 

occurs. The court may also order the 

continuation of support for any child over 

the age of eighteen who is (i) severely and 

permanently mentally or physically disabled, 

(ii) unable to live independently and 

support himself, and (iii) resides in the 

home of the parent seeking or receiving 

child support. In addition, the court may 

confirm a stipulation or agreement of the 

parties which extends a support obligation 

beyond when it would otherwise terminate as 

provided by law. The court shall have no 

authority to decree support of children 

payable by the estate of a deceased party. 

The court may make such further decree as it 

shall deem expedient concerning support of 

the minor children, including an order that 

any party provide health care coverage. 

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Unless otherwise provided by agreement between the parties, the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the husband to support 

her beyond her eighteenth birthday. 

The 1991 order provided that the father would support each 

child "until said child has finished high school and/or college, 

dies, marries, or is otherwise emancipated." The phrase "or is 

otherwise emancipated" would only apply if the child was under 

eighteen and still a minor. The child must have the status of 

"minor" in order to be emancipated. The phrase "or is otherwise 

emancipated" could only encompass an event that would free the 

minor from that status before the status terminated by the 

inexorable passage of time. By reaching the age of majority, 

the child could no longer be emancipated because she was no 

longer a minor.2 The phrase "or is otherwise emancipated" as 

used in the child support order cannot limit the determination 

of whether the order obligated the parties to pay support after 

a child reached eighteen. 

Both parties appeared before the trial court and testified 

at the hearing on child and spousal support held July 26, 1991. 

The trial court found that the parties agreed that the husband 

would continue to pay child support after the children turned 

eighteen years old. The order memorialized their agreement that 

 2

 Code § 16.1-333 provides that a court may declare a minor 

emancipated if she is validly married, in the armed forces, or 

willingly living separate and apart from her parents. 

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support continue until their daughters "finished high school 

and/or college." Both parties endorsed the order as seen and 

agreed, and neither party appealed its entry. The language was 

clear that the parties intended support to continue past the age 

of majority if the child was enrolled in high school or college 

and had not been emancipated while a minor. 

The husband's interpretation of the 1991 order renders the 

words "finished high school and/or college" meaningless and of 

no effect. The order should be interpreted in the same manner 

as statutes and contracts. "No word or clause in the contract 

will be treated as meaningless if a reasonable meaning can be 

given to it, and there is a presumption that the parties have 

not used words needlessly." D.C. McClain, Inc. v. Arlington 

County, 249 Va. 131, 135-36, 452 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1995) 

(citations omitted). 

We conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted its 

1991 order. The consent order memorialized the parties' 

agreement that the husband would support his children past the 

age of majority if they attended high school or college. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 

 Affirmed. 

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