### IN THE CO URT OF APPEALS OF TE NNE SS EE
AT JACKSON

Ja nu ary 17 , 20 12 Ses si on

IN RE: RO BERT S ADLER BAI LEY

D i r e c t A p p e a l f

r o m t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t f o r S h e l b y C o u n t y
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m o t i o n u p o n d e t e r m i n i n g D e f e n d a n t ’ s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l w a s v i o l a t e d

. T h e S t a t e a p p e a l s

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S a d l e r B a i l e y

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O P I N I O N

T h i s i s t h e s e c o n d t i m e t h a t t h i s m a t t e r i s b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t

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t h i s m a t t e r o c c u r r e d o n M a r c h 2 6 a n d 2 7

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, d u r i n g a t r i a l i n w h i c h t h e D e f e n d a n t

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, a n a t t o r n e y , a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t f

o r S h e l b y C o u n t y

a s l e g a l c o u n s e l f

o r a l i t i g a n t

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a t k i n s
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c o n s i d e r e d M r

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, a n d o n M a r c h 2 8 t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r

s e t t i n g a c o n t e m p t h e a r i n g f o r A p r i l 2

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d e n i e d M r

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f a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f

l a w , d e t e r m i n e d M r

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e n t e r e d M a y 1 3

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, t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e f o r t h e T h i r t i e t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ( S h e l b y C o u n t y ) s i g n e d a n o r d e r t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e m a t t e r t o t h e T w e n t y

- s i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ( M a d i s o n C o u n t y )

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c o u n s e l f o r M r

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t h a t n o c h a r g i n g d o c u m e n t h a d b e e n i s s u e d s i n c e e n t r y o f t h i s C o u r t ’ s o r d e r i n M a y 2 0 0 9

. I n F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 0

, t h e S t a t e a d v i s e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t i t h a d b e e n d e l a y e d i n p r e p a r i n g a

c h a r g i n g d o c u m e n t b e c a u s e i t h a d e x p e r i e n c e d d i f f i c u l t y i n o b t a i n i n g d o c u m e n t s f r o m t h e S h e l b y C o u n t y C i r c u i t C o u r t C l e r k ’ s O f f i c e

. I n M a r c h

, t h e S t a t e a d v i s e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t
i t a g a i n h a d b e e n d e l a y e d i n p r e p a r i n g t h e c h a r g i n g d o c u m e n t b e c a u s e t h e S h e l b y C o u n t y j u d g e w h o h a d h e l d M r

. B a i l e y i n c o n t e m p t a y e a r e a r l i e r h a d b e e n u n a v a i l a b l e f o r i n t e r v i e w

. O n A p r i l 2 7

, 2 0 1 0

, t h e S t a t e a d v i s e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t i t s t i l l h a d n o t b e e n a b l e t o i n t e r v i e w

t h e S h e l b y C o u n t y j u d g e b e c a u s e s h e h a d b e e n i l l a n d w a s s t i l l r e c o v e r i n g

.

O n A u g u s t 2

, 2 0 1 0

, t h e S t a t e c h a r g e d M r

. B a i l e y w i t h b e h a v i o r s o a s t o o b s t r u c t t h e

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e a n d / o r i n a b u s e o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e c o u r t

. F o l l o w i n g a

s c h e d u l i n g c o n f

e r e n c e b y t e l e p h o n e i n A u g u s t

, t r i a l w a s s e t f o r D e c e m b e r 9

, 2 0 1 0

. O n O c t o b e r 1 5

, 2 0 1 0

, M r

. B a i l e y m o v e d t o d i s m i s s t h e m a t t e r , a s s e r t i n g t h a t h i s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y

t r i a l h a d b e e n v i o l a t e d

. I n h i s m o t i o n , M r

. B a i l e y a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e r e h a d b e e n a d e l a y o f

m o r e t h a n 3 0 m o n t h s i n p r o s e c u t i n g t h e c r i m i n a l c o n t e m p t c h a r g e s , a n d t h a t t h i s d e l a y

v i o l a t e d h i s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l

. T h e S t a t e r e s p o n d e d t o M r

. B a i l e y ’ s m o t i o n o n N o v e m b e r
1 0

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, a n d t h e m a t t e r w a s h e a r d o n N o v e m b e r 1 9

, 2 0 1 0

. T h e t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d a l e t t e r

r u l i n g o n N o v e m b e r 2 2

, 2 0 1 0

, a n d d i s m i s s e d t h e m a t t e r b y o r d e r e n t e r e d D e c e m b e r 3

, 2 0 1 0

. T h e S t a t e f

i l e d a t i m e l y n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t

.

I s s u e P r e s e n t e d

T h e S t a t e p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e f

o r o u r r e v i e w :

W h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n c o r r e c t l y d i s m i s s e d t h i s m a t t e r a p p l y i n g “ s p e e d y

t r i a l ” f a c t o r s

.

S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w

W e r e v i e w t h i s m a t t e r u n d e r a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w

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, ( T e n n

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. “ [ A ] n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h o u l d f i n d t h a t

a t r i a l c o u r t h a s a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n o n l y w h e n t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s a p p l i e d a n i n c o r r e c t l e g a l

-2-s t a n d a r d

, o r h a s r e a c h e d a d e c i s i o n w h i c h i s i l l o g i c a l o r u n r e a s o n a b l e a n d c a u s e s a n i n j u s t i c e

t o t h e p a r t y c o m p l a i n i n g

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, 7 7 8 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 6 )

.

A n a l y s i s

A d e f e n d a n t ’ s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l i s g u a r a n t e e d b y b o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t h e T e n n e s s e e C o n s t i t u t i o n

. U

. S

. C o n s t

. a m e n d

. V I ; T e n n

. C o n s t

. A r t

. 1

, 

### § 9. The Tenne ssee C o d e additionally provides, “[i] n all criminal prosec utions, the acc used is

entitled to a speedy trial and to be hear d in person and by counsel.” Tenn. Code. Ann. 

### § 40-14-101 (2006). The ri gh t t o a s peedy trial “is desig ned to protec t the acc used from oppressive pre- trial
incar cer ation, the anxiety and conce rn due to unresolved criminal char g es, and the ri s k t h at t he

acc used’s de fense will be impaired by dimming memories or

lost evidence .” State v. Simmons

, 54 S.W .3d 755, 758 (Tenn. 2001) (citations o m itted). I t is implicated when there is an arrest or a “for mal acc usation.” Id. at 759 (citations omitted). Under the test develope d by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. W ingo

, and adopte d in Tennesse e by State v. Bishop

, 493 S.W .2d 81,
83-85 (Tenn. 1973), courts must apply a four- part balanc ing test when deter m i n i n g whether a defe ndant’s rig ht to a speedy trial has been violated. Id. (citing Barker v. W ingo

, 407 U.S. 514, 530,
92 S.Ct

. 2182, 2192 (1972))

. The four elements which comprise this test are : “(1) the leng th of the delay ; (2) the rea son for the delay ; (3) the defe ndant’s as s er t ion of t he right; and (4) the prejudice
suffe red by the defe ndant from the delay .” Id. at 759. I f a court deter mines that a defe ndant’s rig ht

to a speedy trial has been violated under this test, the criminal char g es m u s t b e d i smissed. Id. (citation omitted).

The leng th of the delay is the first element which the court mus t consider. Id. Unless a “pre sumptively prejudicia l” delay has occur red, inquiry into the rema ining fac tors is not nece ssary

. Id. (citation omitted). A delay of one y ear g ener ally will be considere d sufficie nt to trig g er analy sis
of the rema ining three fac tors, but the nature and complexit y of the case impact the rea sonablene ss of the leng th. Id. “[T] he presumption that delay has prejudice d the acc used intensifies over time[ ,]”
howeve r. Id. (citations omitted).

I n this case , althoug h Mr. B ailey asser ted a de lay

of m ore than 30 months in his motion to dismiss

, as the trial court noted in its letter ruling

, the applicable delay period beg an to run on May 13, 2009, when this Court vacated the April 2008 order of the S h el b y C o u nty Circuit Court and

rema nded the matter for

further proce eding s. Prior to entry of our May 2009 order

, the t rial court
had no jurisdiction over the matter. Thus the applicable delay period was approximately 15 months
from the date of our Orde r to the date the State issued its char g ing order

. Be cause the delay was in

excess of one y ear , and in light of the totality of the circ umstances, we ag ree with the trial court that the delay was suff icient to trig g er an inquiry into the rema ining three fac tors. We acc ording ly turn to the rea son for the de lay

.

This second fac tor in the analy sis “g ener ally falls into one of four cate g ories: (1) intentional delay to g ain a tactica l advanta g e or to hara ss the defe ndant; (2 ) burea ucra tic indiffer ence or

neg lige nce, including overc rowde d dockets or lack of diligenc e; (3) delay nece ssary to the fair and

-3-eff

ective prosec ution of the case , such as locating a missin g wi t n ess; and (4) delay cause d, or acquie sced [ in,] by the defense, includin g go o d faith attempts to plea- barg ain or repe ated defense

reque sts for continuance s.” Id. at 759. I n this case , as the trial court noted, there wer e no questions

reg arding the events g iving rise to the charg e agai nst Mr. Bailey or wit h respe ct t o the wit nesses. The trial court further noted that over four months elapse d betwee n entry of our May 2009 judgme nt and transfe r of the matter as order ed by t h i s C o u rt

, and near ly six months until a prosec utor was assig ned. The trial court state d:

The State points out in defe nse of the [m ]ot ion that it had no explanation for
the delay betwee n May 13, 2009 and late Dec ember

, 2009, since it’s [si c] office was
not involved up to that date. The State also pointed to difficulty in secur ing court

rec ords of the underly ing case , causing an additional sever al wee k delay in revie wing
documents. Upon completing the revie w, the State decide d to pr osecute Ba iley for
contempt. T h e S t ate points out that its attempt to interview [t he Shelby County judge ] was delay ed beca

use of medical issues. No statement is befor e the [c] ourt as
to why [t he judge ] could not be interviewe d by telephone, or at her home in person,

or why the char g e could not be prepa red sooner from finding s filed by [t he judge ] on April 2, 2008, along with the statements in the transcr ipt of the morning session on Marc h 27, 2008.

Thus, the fac ts have been secur ed and available by transcr ipts and a compac t disk rec ording of the Marc h 27, 2008, hear ing since that date. The same fac ts exis ted on May 13, 2009 when the Court of Appeals vacated t he conviction and remanded
the case for trial with another judge

. Supposedly

, the State’s brief on appea l and the
Def endant’ s brief wer e avail ab le and presumably discussed the issues rela tive to contempt.

. . . .Once involved, the District Attorney ’s office s was delay ed by misplaced

court rec ords and an unexplained lack o f ability to speak with [t he Shelby County judge ] who was identified as the State’ s main witness.

No Affida vit has been produce d explaining the misplaced court rec ords or the

rea son [t he judg e] could not be rea ched or interviewe d.

The trial court deter

mined that the delay did not appea r to be i n t en t i o n al

, to g ain tactica l
advanta g e, or for hara ssment. Rather, the trial court deter mined that the delay in this case arose from
the second cate g ory , burea ucra tic indiffer ence

. The supreme court has noted, moreove r, that

overc rowde d court dockets or “simple lack of diligenc e” are included in the cate g ory of burea ucra tic
indiffer ence or neg lige nce. State v. W ood , 924 S.W .2d 342, 347 n. 10 (Tenn. 1996)

.

The supreme co u rt h as noted that when the delay is cause d by this second cate g ory , “the weig ht to be assig ned this fac tor differ s depending upon the leng th of the delay .” State v. Simmons

, 54 S.W .3d 755, 760. “‘[O]ur toleration of such neg lige nce varie s inversely with its protrac tedness

-4-and its co n s eq u en t t h reat to the fairne ss of the acc used’s trial.’” Id. (quoting Doggett v. United

States

, 505 U.S. 647, 656, 112 S.Ct

. 2686, 2693 (1992))

. The trial court in this case “‘r ejec t[ ed]’ the
State’s position that it was nece ssary to a fai r an d effective prosec ution of the case to delay the
document pending interviews with [t he Shelby County judge ].” I t also found, howeve r, that “[u] pon being offe red a speedy trial in Dec ember 2010, Def endant advised that he cou l d not g o to trial without knowing the c harg e.”

Upon revie w of the rec ord we note that there is nothing to explain the delay in this case other
than the State’s asser

tion that co u

r t r e cords wer e difficult to obtain, primarily beca use of burea

ucra tic
ineffic iency

, and that the Shelby County trial judge wa s u n available

. As the trial court notes, howeve r, the information nece ssary to pr epar e the char g ing doc ument was in the transcr ipts of the

proce eding s in both the trial court and this Court. This was not a complex matter requiring further investiga tion. W e ca

nnot say the trial cour

t erre d in weig hing this fa ctor a g ainst the State.

We next turn to whether

Mr. Ba iley asser

ted his r ight to a speedy

trial. The supre me cour

t has stated that “an acc used person’ s asser tion of his r ight to a speedy trial, may or may not pla y an important role in the ul timate deter mination of wh ether that person has been deprived of his rig ht

to a speedy trial.” State v. W ood , 924 S.W .2d 342, 347 (Tenn. 1996) . I t has noted that the United
States Supreme Court had “re jected an outrig ht ‘dema

nd’ rule, wher eby failure to seek a speedy trial
would result in a waiver of that rig ht.” Id. (citing Barker v. W ingo

, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30, 92 S.Ct

. 2182, 2191-92 (1972). Tenne ssee also has “re jected such a rig id rule[,] ” noting that “[t] he primary burden, afte r all, is on the courts and prosec utors to assure that case s ar e b ro ug ht to trial.” Id

. (citations omitted). Howeve r, whether a defe ndant has asser ted the ri gh t t o a speedy trial

never theless rema in s o n e o f t h e fac tors to consider when deter mining whether the rig ht has been deprive d. Id. (citations omitted). “A defe ndan t ’s as s ertion of the speedy trial rig ht is entitled to strong evidentiar

y weig ht in deter

mining whether the rig ht has been denied, and failure to asser t the rig ht will make it difficult to prove it was denied.” Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct

. at 2192-93; Stat e v. B ishop

, 493 S.W .2d 81, 85 (Tenn. 1973)). I n this case , Mr. Ba iley did not demand a speedy trial when the char g ing doc ument was finally issued in Aug ust 2010, but moved
for dism issal of t he matter in October 2010 on the basis that over 30 months had elapsed since he
was fir st taken into custody on the contempt cha

rg e. Thus, Mr. B ailey

did not assert the rig ht to a speedy t ri al

, but mere ly asser ted that the rig ht had been denied. To the extent that demanding a speedy trial rema ins an eleme nt in this a naly sis, a nd to the extent to which a defe ndant must make
the demand befor e asser

ting the rig ht as been denied, we must weig h this fac tor ag ainst Mr. Ba iley

.

We finally turn to the fac tor that is considere d to be t h e most important in this analy sis,
whether the defe ndant suffe red prejudice as a result of the delay

. Id. at 348 (citations omitted). The

W ood court noted,

Usual l y , i t is rela tively easy to deter mine whether a defenda

nt has been prejudice d by inordinately

long pretrial inca

rce ration, or whe ther he or she ha s been subjec ted

to the stress and anxiety that acc ompany a public acc usation over an extremely long period of time. I t is often extremely difficult, howeve r, for a defe ndant to demonstrate

-5-specific ally how the delay has impair ed his ability to defe nd himself. Courts have

rec og nized this difficulty and conseque ntly do not nece ssarily require a defe ndant to aff irmatively

prove pa rticularized pre

judice.

Id.

I n this case , Mr. Ba iley has suffe red no long pretria l incar cer ation, and there is nothing in the

rec ord to demonstrate that his ability to defe nd ag ainst the char g es have been impaired. As the trial

court noted, howeve r, Mr. Ba iley is a prac ticing attorn ey who, for near ly three y ear s, fac ed an

acc usation of criminal contempt. Although, as noted above, the delay rele vant to our analy sis here

was 15 months, the trial court noted that “[t] here are serious ethics proce eding s pending for both
sides which are rela ted to this case which have hung over his licensure while this case is pending .”
The trial court also noted Mr. Ba iley ’s asser tion that he had suffe red “public h u m i liation and
embar rassment in his profe ssional and personal l ife.” Additionally

, as st ated above, the rig ht to a speedy trial is desig ned, in part, to alleviate the anxiety and conce rn cause d by an impending criminal
trial

. I n t h i s ca s e, we cannot say that the trial court err ed in weig hing this fac tor in favor of Mr.

Ba iley

.

Holdin g

I n l ight of the foreg oing, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of t he tria l co u rt

. T h e judgme nt of the trial court is aff irmed. Costs of this appea l are taxed ag ainst the Appellant, the State
of Tenne ssee.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ D A V I D R

. F A R M E R

, J U D G E

-6-