[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13529

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LAWRENCE TWEED, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cr-00064-PGB-DCI-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13529

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lawrence Tweed is a federal prisoner serving a total of 90 

months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to possession of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and 

receipt of child pornography, in violation of § 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1). 

He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for 

compassionate release. However, in his briefing on appeal, he does 

not address the district court’s reasons for denying his motion for 

compassionate release. Instead, he argues for the first time on 

appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion for 

compassionate release because it overlooked that his convictions 

allegedly violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and that there was an 

Alleyne1 violation at sentencing, which he contends constitute 

extraordinary and compelling circumstances. After review, we 

affirm. 

In the district court, Tweed filed a pro se motion for 

compassionate release because his mother had passed away and he 

needed to care for his adult brother who is mentally incapacitated. 

He maintained that he was not a danger to the community and that 

1 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013) (holding that any facts that 

increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt).

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22-13529 Opinion of the Court 3

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors supported his request. 

The government opposed the motion. 

The district court denied Tweed’s motion, concluding that 

Tweed failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling 

circumstances for a sentence reduction because care for one’s 

sibling did not fall under any of the extraordinary and compelling 

circumstances set forth in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.13(A)–(D). Moreover, the district court found that the 

§ 3553(a) factors did not support Tweed’s request. Tweed, 

proceeding pro se, appealed. 

We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for an 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 

F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). 

Although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and held to 

a less stringent standard that counseled pleadings, Tannenbaum v. 

United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “issues not 

briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned,” 

Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).2 

Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court may reduce a 

movant’s imprisonment term if: (1) there are extraordinary and 

compelling reasons for doing so, (2) the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 

2 Tweed abandons any challenge to the district court’s determination that 

sibling care did not qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason and that 

the § 3553(a) factors did not support his request by failing to brief those issues 

on appeal. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13529

§ 3553(a) favor doing so, and (3) doing so is consistent with the 

policy statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. United States v. Tinker, 14 

F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021).

The Sentencing Commission defines “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons” in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 

Pursuant to this definition, there are four circumstances under 

which “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist”: (A) the 

defendant suffers from (i) “a terminal illness” or (ii) a permanent 

health condition “that substantially diminishes the ability of the

defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a 

correctional facility from which he or she is not expected to 

recover”; (B) the defendant is “at least 65 years old,” “is 

experiencing a serious [age-related] deterioration in physical or 

mental health,” and “has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of 

his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less”; (C) the 

defendant’s assistance is needed in caring for the defendant’s minor 

child, spouse, or registered partner due to (i) “[t]he death or 

incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or 

minor children” or (ii) “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s 

spouse or registered partner”; and (D) there exist “other” 

extraordinary and compelling reasons “[a]s determined by the 

Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1 

(A)–(D)). “[D]istrict courts are bound by the Commission’s 

definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in 

[§] 1B1.13.” Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262. 

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On appeal, Tweed argues for the first time that 

compassionate release was warranted because his convictions 

allegedly violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and because there 

was an Alleyne violation at sentencing, which he contends 

constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances under 

§ 1B1.13’s catch-all provision.3 Tweed’s argument fails because the 

alleged illegality of his conviction and his sentence is not a 

qualifying basis for compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 

cmt. (n.1 (A)–(D)). And contrary to Tweed’s argument, the 

catchall provision in “Application Note 1(D) does not grant 

discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a 

reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Tweed’s

motion. 

AFFIRMED. 

3 Issues not raised in the district court are reviewed only for plain error. 

United States v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2019). “For there to be 

plain error, there must (1) be error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the 

substantial rights of the party, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.” Id. (quotation 

omitted).

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