J-S58006-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. CALEB KENYON RAMEY, Appellant No. 814 WDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 5, 20 12 in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at No.: CP-63-CR-0002491-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J

. * MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2014 Appellant, Caleb Kenyon Ramey, appeals from the jud gment of sentence following his jury conviction of rape of a child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c); involuntary deviate sexual intercourse w ith a child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b); aggravated indecent assault of a child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b); indecent assault (complainant less than thirteen ye ars of age), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7); indecent exposure, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 312 7(a); endangering welfare of children, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1); rec klessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705; unlawful restr aint, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902; false imprisonment, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903; an d terroristic threats, 18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cour t.J-S58006-14

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Pa.C.S.A. § 2706. 1 Appellant challenges various evidentiary rulings, the trial court’s decision not to remove certain jurors, and the weight and sufficiency of the evidence for all convictions. He also claim s the sentence was excessive. We affirm on the basis of the trial cou rt opinion. In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/14, at 1-9). Therefore, we have no reason to restate t hem in detail here. We note briefly for context that Appellant’s jury conv iction arose out of his forcible restraint and sexual assaults of D.R., the victim, then seven years of age, from July to September 2011. Following the de ath of both of her parents, D.R. and her brother resided with various friends and family, including Appellant and his family, and eventually in foster care. D.R. disclosed the sexual assaults by Appellant to her f ormer and current foster parents, as well as to her therapist. After his jury conviction, on November 5, 2012, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of not less than thi rty four years’ nor more

____________________________________________ 1 Appellant erroneously appeals from the “order” ent ered on May 17, 2012. ( See Notice of Appeal, 5/09/13). May 17, 2012, was the date of the jury verdict. An appeal in a criminal matter is taken f rom the judgment of sentence as finalized by the denial of a post-sente nce motion. See Commonwealth v. Borovichka , 18 A.3d 1242, 1246 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Chamberlain , 658 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. 1995) (order denying post-sentence motion acts to finaliz e judgment of sentence; thus, appeal is taken from judgment of sentence)). We have amended the caption accordingly.J-S58006-14

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than sixty-eight years’ incarceration. This timely appeal followed the denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motion by operation of law. Appellant raises ten questions for our review: I. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s ] motion to review the accuser’s Fayette County CYS records in toto ? II. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’ s] motion to evaluate the accuser? III. Did the trial court err by not removing sever al jurors for cause when prejudice was revealed? IV. Did the trial court err by denying [Appellant] due process by scheduling trial for a time when the acc user’s psychologist was on vacation which rendered her una vailable for trial? V. Did the trial court err when it denied [Appella nt] the opportunity to present evidence of multiple prior a nd concurrent false accusations of the same or similar acts? VI. Did the trial court err by allowing witnesses s ubsequent to accuser to give hearsay testimony as to statemen ts made by accuser? VII. Did the trial court err when it denied, by op eration of law, [Appellant’s] request for a new trial based up on after discovered evidence of accuser’s sworn testimony th at contradicts her testimony at trial? VIII. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evide nce to sustain the verdict of guilty for each count, inclu ding: 1. rape of a child; 2. involuntary deviate sexual intercourse; 3. aggravated indecent assault of a child; 4. indecent assault on a person less than thirteen years of age; 5. indecent exposure; 6 . endangering welfare of children; 7. recklessly endangering anot her person; 8. unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude; 9. false imprisonment; and 10. terroristic threats? IX. Was the verdict of guilty entered against the weight of the evidence on each count, including: 1. rape of a child; 2.J-S58006-14

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involuntary deviate sexual intercourse; 3. aggravat ed indecent assault of a child; 4. indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age; 5. indecent exposure; 6. end angering welfare of children; 7. recklessly endangering anot her person; 8. unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude; 9. false imprisonment; and 10. terroristic threats? X. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when i t sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate period of inc arceration of thirty-four (34) years to sixty-eight (68) years? (Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6). 2

Preliminarily, we are reminded of the observation b y the Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that this Court has previously cited in Kenis v. Perini Corp. , 452 Pa. Super. 634, 682 A.2d 845 (1996), as well as other cases: When I read an appellant’s brief that contains ten or twelve points, a presumption arises that there is n o merit to any of them. I do not say that it is an irrebuttab le presumption, but it is a presumption that reduces t he effectiveness of appellate advocacy. Appellate adv ocacy is measured by effectiveness, not loquaciousness. Id. at 847 n.3 (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Snyder , 870 A.2d 336, 340 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“[T]he effectiveness of appellate advocacy may suffer when counsel raises numerous issues, to the point where a presum ption arises that there is no merit to any of them.”) (citations omitted). J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Associates , 56 A.3d 402, 409-10 (Pa. Super. 2012).

____________________________________________ 2 The Commonwealth received a requested extension, b ut did not file a brief in this appeal.J-S58006-14

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After a thorough review of the record, Appellant’s brief, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned, thorough opinion of the Honorable John F. DiSalle, we conclude that there is no merit to any of the issues Appellant has raised on appeal. The trial court opinion properly disposes of all of the questions presented. 3 ( See Trial Ct. Op., at 10-45) (finding that the trial court: (1) properly protected confidentiality of ch ild-abuse investigations, after in camera review; (2) properly denied the defense request fo r psychological evaluation of victim by a defense exp ert; (3) properly denied a challenge to certain jurors for cause where the jur ors on questioning by the court agreed they could render a fair, impartial an d unbiased verdict; (4) did not deny due process in scheduling trial while the victim’s psychologist was on vacation, where there was no contemporaneous obj ection, or request for continuance, and after review of the entire record, the court found no basis for reasonable doubt of Appellant’s guilt, such tha t psychologist’s testimony would not have affected the outcome of the trial; ( 5) properly applied Rape Shield Law where Appellant failed to comply with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(b), requiring written motion and offer of proof of vict im’s past sexual conduct; (6) properly admitted alleged hearsay statements wh ere Appellant failed to offer contemporaneous objection; (7) properly denie d a new trial on a claim

____________________________________________ 3 We note that Judge DiSalle, the author of the tria l court opinion, did not preside at the trial. The Honorable Paul Pozonsky, who presided at the jury trial, retired on June 30, 2012. ( See Trial Ct. Op., at 1 n.1).J-S58006-14

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of after discovered evidence where Appellant failed to offer necessary and appropriate details of the alleged independent proc eeding, and the purported evidence would have been introduced solely for impe achment; (8) properly decided that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth was sufficient to prove all elements o f all offenses charged; (9) properly rejected the challenge to weight of ev idence where the victim and other Commonwealth witnesses were credible and the jury verdict did not shock the conscience of the trial court; and (1 0) properly determined sentence was not excessive where sentence was withi n Sentencing Guidelines, sentence was not the product of partial ity, prejudice, bias or ill will, and the sentencing court found several aggrav ating factors, including tender age of victim, Appellant’s position of trust as a caregiver, his lack of remorse, and his blame of the government). Accordi ngly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Gantman, P.J., joins the Memorandum. Bender, P.J.E., concurs in the result.J-S58006-14

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2014