COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RONALD H. MOOREFIELD, SR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2686-96-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 FEBRUARY 3, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 

James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge 

 Carl C. Muzi for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Ronald H. Moorefield, Sr. appeals his conviction by a jury 

on two counts of possession of marijuana with the intent to 

distribute. Petersburg police on two separate occasions executed 

warrants to search appellant's house. On the two occasions they 

recovered marijuana, large amounts of cash, and paraphernalia 

related to the distribution of drugs, including scales, a pager, 

baggies, and a grinder containing traces of marijuana. Appellant 

lived in the house with his two sons. The police recovered 

various items of evidence from appellant's bedroom, the bedrooms 

of appellant's sons, and the common areas of the house. The 

officers testified as to which room in appellant's house they 

found each item. Appellant contends that the items of evidence 

seized from his sons' bedrooms and from the common areas of the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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house were inadmissible because those areas were not subject to 

his dominion and control. He also contends the evidence was 

insufficient to support his convictions. We hold that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence and 

that Rule 5A:12(c) bars our consideration of appellant's 

sufficiency claim. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE

 "Evidence is admissible if it is both relevant and material. 

 '[E]vidence is relevant if it tends to establish the proposition 

for which it is offered.' . . . Evidence is material if it 

relates to a matter properly at issue." Evans-Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 196, 361 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1987) 

(citation omitted). The admissibility of evidence is a matter 

within the sound discretion of the trial court and its 

evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 

"clear abuse of discretion." Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 

88, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986). 

 The Commonwealth charged that appellant constructively 

possessed the marijuana seized from the home and intended to 

distribute it. "To support a conviction for constructive 

possession, the Commonwealth must . . . show that the defendant 

was aware of both the presence and character of the substance and 

that it was subject to his dominion and control." White v. 

Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 446, 452, 482 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1997) 

(citation omitted). "[P]ossession [of a controlled substance] 
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need not always be exclusive. The defendant may share it with 

one or more." Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1, 9, 421 

S.E.2d 877, 883 (1992). Possession of cash and instrumentalities 

of the drug trade, such as scales, pagers, and baggies, may 

evince an intent to distribute drugs. See Davis v. Commonwealth, 

12 Va. App. 728, 733, 406 S.E.2d 922, 931 (1991). 

 The items seized from the appellant's sons' bedrooms and the 

common areas of the house were admissible if they tended to prove 

that appellant constructively possessed the drugs found 

throughout the house and intended to distribute the drugs. 

 Evidence that drugs are located at various locations 

throughout the appellant's house, whether it be in rooms occupied 

exclusively by the appellant, in common areas, or in rooms or 

areas occupied primarily by other family members, is relevant 

because it tends to show that appellant was aware of the drugs, 

he exercised dominion and control of the drugs, either by himself 

or jointly with his sons, and he intended to distribute them 

using the various paraphernalia found in his house. See Wymer v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 294, 300-01, 403 S.E.2d 702, 706-07 

(1991) (evidence of cocaine and drug paraphernalia found in 

common areas of house and bedroom shared by accused and another 

relevant in accused's prosecution for cocaine possession). The 

test for relevancy "is not whether the proposed evidence 

conclusively proves the fact, but whether it has any tendency to 

establish the fact in issue." Radar v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 
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325, 331, 423 S.E.2d 207, 211 (1992). Furthermore, the evidence 

that drugs and paraphernalia were throughout the house was 

material in that it related to and tended to prove the 

Commonwealth's charges of possessing drugs with the intent to 

distribute. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it admitted the evidence seized from the sons' 

bedrooms and the common areas of the house. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE - RULE 5A:12(c)

 Appellant also contends the evidence was insufficient to 

prove that he possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute. 

 Appellant failed to raise this issue in his petition for appeal. 

 "Only questions presented in the petition for appeal will be 

noticed by the Court of Appeals." Rule 5A:12(c); see Cruz v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 661, 664 n.1, 406 S.E.2d 406, 407 n.1 

(1991) ("[This Court] will not consider issues on appeal that 

were not raised in the petition and were not granted by this 

Court."). Accordingly, Rule 5A:12(c) precludes our review of 

appellant's sufficiency claim. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.