SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1352 

KA 15-00249 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TAYLOR D. CARBONARO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

THE ABBATOY LAW FIRM, PLLC, ROCHESTER (DAVID M. ABBATOY, JR., OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LEAH R. MERVINE OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Victoria M.

Argento, J.), rendered January 27, 2015. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of manslaughter in the second degree,

vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, driving while

intoxicated, a misdemeanor (two counts) and reckless driving. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court

for proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

following a jury trial of manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law

§ 125.15 [1]), vehicular manslaughter in the second degree (§ 125.12

[1]), reckless driving (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212), and two

counts of driving while intoxicated (§ 1192 [2], [3]). The charges

arose from an automobile accident that resulted in the death of

defendant’s girlfriend (decedent). The accident occurred when a

vehicle occupied by defendant and decedent veered off the road at a

high speed and struck a utility pole and then a tree. The primary

issue at trial was whether defendant was operating the vehicle at the

time of the accident. The jury rendered a guilty verdict on all

counts of the indictment, evidently resolving that factual issue

against defendant. 

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that

the trial evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he was

operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. Although defendant

moved at the close of the People’s case for a trial order of dismissal

on the ground that the People failed to prove that element of the

crimes charged, he did not renew the motion after the defense rested

(see People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 61, rearg denied 97 NY2d 678; People

v Nichols, 89 AD3d 1503, 1504). In any event, we conclude that the
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contention is without merit. The evidence established that defendant

admitted three separate times to the police that he was driving the

vehicle and that, during the ambulance ride to the hospital, he told a

paramedic that he “screwed up,” he was sorry, and he had never done

“this before.” Defendant also admitted that he was driving to an exgirlfriend who visited him in the hospital while he was recovering

from the injuries he sustained in the accident. The ex-girlfriend

testified, “He told me that he went to the bar with [decedent] and

before leaving the bar they got in an argument and he told me he

remembers driving like speeding because he was angry.” She further

testified that, several months later, defendant called her and said

that he had good news, i.e., that his statements to the police were

“getting tossed out,” and that, if the charges were dismissed, he

would use “this as a second chance to start school.” 

Further, the evidence established that the vehicle was registered

to defendant, and that decedent did not even have a driver’s license. 

According to decedent’s father, with whom she and defendant lived,

decedent to his knowledge never had driven the vehicle. In addition,

an acquaintance of the couple who was at the bar drinking with them

before the accident testified that he saw defendant leave the bar with

keys in his hand and say, “I’m going home.” That witness also

testified that decedent followed defendant down the street, presumably

to the vehicle. Yet another witness testified that, when he saw the

vehicle in question speeding down the road moments before the

accident, the driver was “slouching” down in the driver’s seat and

leaning on the center console. Decedent was only four feet, nine

inches tall, seven inches shorter than defendant, making it unlikely

that she could have been so positioned while operating the vehicle. 

We also note that defendant’s expert witness agreed with the

People’s expert that the driver was ejected almost immediately after

the vehicle struck the tree, and that the passenger was in the vehicle

for a longer period of time after the collision, thus subjecting the

passenger to more injuries. Defendant sustained only a fractured leg

and a cut to his head, while decedent suffered many more injuries of

greater severity. It is undisputed that decedent’s blood was found on

the front passenger’s seat, and none of defendant’s blood was found

anywhere in the vehicle. Decedent’s body was found lying next to the

stopped vehicle, directly outside the driver’s door, as if she had

fallen out, while defendant was found some 20 to 30 feet away from the

vehicle, trapped under a trailer. Finally, defendant had a

compression injury to his left leg that appeared to have been caused

by his leg striking the window crank on the driver’s door, and the

Medical Examiner testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty

that such injury was caused by the window crank. 

To be sure, defendant attempted at trial to explain or controvert

the above evidence, and there is other evidence suggesting that

decedent may have been operating the vehicle. In determining whether

the evidence is legally sufficient, however, we must view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Cabey, 85 NY2d

417, 420; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), and afford them the

benefit of every favorable inference (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d
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490, 495). Applying that standard of review, we conclude that the

evidence is more than sufficient to establish that defendant was

operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. 

Moreover, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the

crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342,

349), we reject defendant’s further contention that the verdict is

against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at

495). Defendant’s contention is based largely on his assertion that

the medical evidence conclusively establishes that decedent was

operating the vehicle. According to defendant, the injuries sustained

by decedent could have come only from her head striking the steering

wheel, which was bent toward the front windshield. We reject that

assertion. Although that medical evidence is probative, it is not

conclusive. As the People’s expert testified, decedent’s injuries

could have occurred by her head striking the center console or some

other part of the vehicle’s interior other than the steering wheel. 

Moreover, defendant’s expert agreed that decedent emerged from

the vehicle through the driver’s door, which opened upon impact, and

it is therefore possible that her head or face came into contact with

the steering wheel after the vehicle’s initial impact with the utility

pole. As noted above, both experts agreed that the driver was ejected

from the vehicle almost immediately upon impact with the tree. 

Because the air bag in the steering wheel deployed immediately, then

quickly deflated, and the driver’s body was pushed sharply to the

left, and not forward, it is entirely possible, as the People’s expert

opined, that the driver’s head never struck the steering wheel. In

sum, we conclude that, although a different verdict would not have

been unreasonable, it cannot be said that the jury failed to give the

evidence the weight it should be accorded (see People v Kalinowski,

118 AD3d 1434, 1436, lv denied 23 NY3d 1064; People v Hennings, 55

AD3d 1393, 1393, lv denied 12 NY3d 758). 

Defendant next contends that his Miranda rights were violated and

that County Court therefore erred in refusing to suppress statements

he made to a sheriff’s deputy at the accident scene and at the

hospital, subsequent statements he made to an investigator, as well as

the results of a blood test conducted at the hospital showing that he

was intoxicated. We conclude that the court properly refused to

suppress that evidence. The first statement defendant sought to

suppress was his admission to the deputy at the accident scene that he

had “too much to drink” and that he had been driving the vehicle. The

deputy’s questioning of defendant at that time, however, was “merely

investigatory and did not constitute custodial interrogation to which

Miranda is applicable” (People v Saunders, 174 AD2d 700, 701; see

People v Williams, 81 AD3d 993, 993, lv denied 16 NY3d 901; People v

Palmiere, 124 AD2d 1016, 1016). 

We further conclude that defendant was not in custody when he was

questioned by the same deputy in the hospital trauma bay, where

defendant again admitted that he was driving, and that such admission

therefore was not obtained in violation of defendant’s Miranda rights

(see People v Rounds, 124 AD3d 1351, 1352, lv denied 25 NY3d 1077;
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KA 15-00249 

People v Gore, 117 AD3d 845, 846, lv denied 24 NY3d 1084). “In

determining whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes,

‘[t]he test is not what the defendant thought, but rather what a

reasonable [person], innocent of any crime, would have thought had he

been in the defendant’s position’ ” (People v Kelley, 91 AD3d 1318,

1318, lv denied 19 NY3d 963, quoting People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589,

cert denied 400 US 851). Here, defendant was not restrained in any

way by the police while at the hospital, and the questioning by the

deputy was investigatory and not accusatory in nature (see People v

Drouin, 115 AD3d 1153, 1155-1156, lv denied 23 NY3d 1019; People v

O’Hanlon, 5 AD3d 1012, 1012, lv denied 3 NY3d 645; People v Ripic, 182

AD2d 226, 231-232, appeal dismissed 81 NY2d 776). 

Inasmuch as it is common knowledge that the police prepare

reports with respect to motor vehicle accidents even where no criminal

conduct is suspected, we conclude that a reasonable, innocent person

in defendant’s position at the hospital would not have felt that he or

she was in custody when asked questions about the accident by the

deputy (see generally People v Borukhova, 89 AD3d 194, 212-213, lv

denied 18 NY3d 881, reconsideration denied 18 NY3d 955). Instead, a

reasonable, innocent person would have thought that the deputy was

“still in the process of gathering information about the [accident]

prior to taking any action” (People v Dillhunt, 41 AD3d 216, 217, lv

denied 10 NY3d 764; see People v Taylor, 57 AD3d 327, 328, lv denied

12 NY3d 860). Although defendant was in custody when he was

subsequently interviewed by the investigator, he knowingly and

voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before speaking to the

investigator (see People v Allen, 104 AD3d 1170, 1171, lv denied 21

NY3d 1001; People v Hernandez, 67 AD3d 820, 820-821, lv denied 13 NY3d

939). 

Defendant nevertheless contends that all of his statements to the

police should have been suppressed because, owing to his injuries and

the pain medication he was given at the hospital, he was incapable of

making voluntary statements. Similarly, defendant contends that he

was unable to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and consent to the

blood test at the hospital. We reject those contentions. Even

assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s thought process was affected by

his head injury and the pain he experienced from his fractured leg, we

conclude that the record does not support a finding that he was

“unable to understand the meaning of his statements” (People v

Schompert, 19 NY2d 300, 305). Defendant responded appropriately to

questions asked of him by the deputy and the medical personnel who

treated him. For instance, when questioned by a nurse at the

hospital, defendant was able to state his name, his date of birth, and

the reason he was at the hospital. According to the nurse, who

testified at the Huntley hearing, defendant was aware of his

surroundings and did not appear to have difficulty understanding

anything that she said. Furthermore, when speaking to the deputy at

the hospital, defendant recalled the name of the bar he was at earlier

that evening, and accurately stated the name of the road on which the

accident occurred. As the court noted in its suppression decision, at

no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate
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answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” 

Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive

ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary

and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d

724, 725-726, lv denied 100 NY2d 644; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380,

381, lv denied 82 NY2d 927; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589),

or to waive his Miranda rights knowingly and voluntarily (see People v

Torres, 220 AD2d 785, 786, lv denied 87 NY2d 908; People v Butler, 175

AD2d 252, 253, lv denied 79 NY2d 854). 

We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude

that they lack merit. 

Entered: December 31, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court