IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

May 26, 2016 Session

IN RE: ESTATE OF JOAN UHL PIERCE

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County

No. 74292-2 Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr., Chancellor

No. E2016-00013-COA-R3-CV – Filed July 22, 2016

This appeal arises from a dispute over purported wills. Joan Uhl Pierce (“Decedent”) 

died and was survived by five living children (“Petitioners”). Another of Decedent’s 

children, Brock Andrus, predeceased her, and he was survived by two adult children of 

his own (“Respondents”). The Administrator of Decedent’s estate filed a petition for 

declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking 

a determination as to whether Decedent died testate or intestate. Petitioners filed a 

verified petition seeking to admit a purported holographic will of Decedent’s to probate, 

under which Respondents did not inherit. Respondents asserted that the document, a 

completed questionnaire, was not a valid holographic will. After a hearing, the Trial 

Court entered an order in which it held that the questionnaire was not a holographic will, 

and instead entered into probate an earlier purported will and codicil of Decedent’s in 

which Respondents did inherit. Petitioners appeal. We hold that the questionnaire is not 

a valid holographic will. However, we hold also that the Trial Court erred in admitting 

the putative will and codicil into probate when there was no verified petition before the 

Trial Court seeking their admission. We vacate the admission of the putative will and 

codicil and remand for the Trial Court to address the lack of a verified petition. The 

judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, in part, and, vacated, in part, and this cause is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court 

Affirmed, in Part, and, Vacated, in Part; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

MCCLARTY and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

J. Scott Griswold, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Kim A. Soper, Shauna 

Andrus, Marlin V. Andrus, Graydon H. Andrus, and Shane H. Andrus.
-2-

Willis B. Jackson and Thomas G. Slaughter, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, 

Joshua Andrus and Lexi Staley.

OPINION

Background

Decedent died on October 14, 2013. In 2007, Decedent had signed a 

typewritten document called her last will and testament in which she bequeathed her 

assets to her living children and, if any of her children did not survive her, to that child’s 

children. In 2010, Decedent handwrote a purported holographic codicil to the 2007 

document in which, among other things, she clarified that her son Brock had given up his 

own livelihood to become her caregiver. Decedent’s other children lived outside of 

Tennessee. Decedent’s son, Brock, was to receive her home under the purported 

holographic codicil. Brock died eleven months before Decedent. On October 9, 2013, 

mere days before she died, Decedent completed a three-page document she had obtained 

from an attorney titled “Confidential Estate Planning Questionnaire.” This document ran 

contrary to the 2007 and 2010 will and codicil in that, this time, no mention was made of 

any distribution to her grandchildren. The issue in this case and on appeal between the 

surviving children, Petitioners, and the grandchildren, Respondents, is whether the 2007 

and 2010 documents should be admitted to probate and whether the 2013 purported 

holographic will serves to revoke and replace those earlier documents even if they were 

otherwise appropriate to be admitted to probate.

In November 2013, the Trial Court appointed Steve Sams as Administrator 

of Decedent’s estate.1 In the wake of confusion over which document, if any, disposed of 

Decedent’s assets, the Administrator filed a petition for declaratory judgment in February 

2014. In March 2015, Petitioners filed a verified petition seeking to admit the purported 

holographic will to probate. Respondents filed their response in opposition to the 

petition. In October 2015, this matter was tried. Kim Soper (“Soper”), a Petitioner and 

one of Decedent’s adult children, was the only witness. Soper testified to a falling out 

between Decedent and Respondents around the time of Brock’s death. According to 

Soper, it was Decedent’s desire that Respondents not inherit any of her assets. 

In December 2015, the Trial Court entered its final judgment in which it 

admitted the 2007 and 2010 documents to probate. The Trial Court held that the 

Questionnaire was not a valid holographic will. The Trial Court stated as follows:

 

1

Steve Sams filed no brief on appeal.
-3-

This cause having come on the [sic] be heard before this Honorable 

Court on the 13th day of October, 2015, upon Verified Petition to Admit 

Holographic Will to Probate in Solem[n] Form. After testimony of sworn 

witnesses, introduction of exhibits and argument of respective counsel and 

a review of the records as a whole, the Court finds as follows: Decedent 

Joan Uhl Pierce passed away on October 14, 2014, at which time she was

survived by five children and predeceased by one child, Brock Andrus, who 

died approximately eleven months before the Decedent. At the time of 

Brock Andrus’ death, he was living with the Decedent and left two

surviving children of his own. Collective Exh. No. 1, which was admitted 

into evidence, is a set of three separate documents:

a) Last Will and Testament of Joan Uhl Pierce dated January 

3, 2007;

b) Amendment/Addendum to Last Will and Testament of 

Joan Uhl Pierce, which had a handwritten date of February 1, 

2010; and

c) Confidential Estate Planning Questionnaire, which had a 

hand written date of October 9, 2013. 

The parties stipulated that the handwriting and signatures on the 

2007, 2010 and 2013 documents were those of the Decedent. The parties 

further stipulated that the originals of the 2007, 2010 and 2013 documents 

were authentic. The 2007 Last Will and Testament was found in the 

Decedent’s bedside table. The 2013 estate planning “Questionnaire” was 

found on the Decedent’s desk in her office. Decedent obtained the 

Confidential Estate Planning Questionnaire from Knoxville Attorney Keith 

Burroughs. Decedent completed the “Questionnaire” on October 13, 2015. 

The “Questionnaire” is a multi-page document and on page 2, in response 

to question No. 3, “Estate Planning Goals”, the Decedent wrote the 

following in her own handwriting: “Bequeath all money and home + 

contents to 5 children. Shauna, Marlin, Graydon, Kim and Shane.” The 

“Questionnaire” was never returned to Attorney Keith Burroughs and a new 

will was never prepared. The five surviving children of the Decedent are 

asking this Court to find the “Questionnaire” to be a holographic will. The 

authenticity of and the handwriting on the 2013 “Questionnaire” offered as 

the Decedent’s holographic will is not in question as both have been 

stipulated to by the parties.

The question for this Court is whether the Decedent intended the 

“Questionnaire” to be a holographic will, revoking Decedent’s previous 
-4-

will. The construction of wills is a question of law for the court. Presley v. 

Hanks, 782 S.W.2d 482, 287 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). While the validity of a 

will is a question of fact, as determined from all the evidence, intrinsic or 

extrinsic, as to whether the testatrix intended the writing to operate as a 

will. Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-4-107(a); In re: Estate of Cook, 2002 WL 

1034016 at 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), citing Scott v. Atkins, 44 Tenn. App. 

353, 314 S. W. 2d 52, 56 (1957). Evidence presented at trial showed that 

the Decedent was at one point upset with the children of Brock Andrus 

nearly one year prior to her death, but no evidence was presented at trial 

showing that Decedent’s testamentary intent was for the “Questionnaire” to 

be her new will. 

This Court considers the “Questionnaire” to be merely notes or 

memorandum in preparation of making a new will and not a new will. 

Therefore, this Court finds that the 2007 Will and the 2010 Codicil 

executed by the Decedent are authentic and signed by the decedent and that 

the original 2007 Will and the 2010 Codicil is controlling in this case, and 

is hereby admitted to Probate for administration.

(Format modified). Petitioners appealed to this Court.

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Petitioners raise the following two 

issues on appeal: 1) whether the Trial Court erred in holding that the proffered 2013

Questionnaire was not a holographic will; and 2) whether the Trial Court erred in 

admitting two earlier putative testamentary instruments to probate when there was no 

verified petition seeking their admission and no proof of due execution.

We first address whether the Trial Court erred in holding that the proffered 

2013 Questionnaire was not a holographic will. This Court previously has discussed the 

requirements for holographic wills as follows:

At the outset of our analysis, we note that it is immaterial whether a 

testatrix necessarily understands that by executing a particular document 

she is making a will, so long as the document demonstrates it was her clear 

intention to dispose of her property after her death, and the statutory 

formalities are satisfied. Smith v. Smith, 33 Tenn.App. 507, 232 S.W.2d 

338, 341 (1949); Carver v. Anthony, 35 Tenn. App. 306, 245 S.W.2d 422, 

424 (1951).
-5-

A holographic will need not be dated or name an executor to be 

valid. Nicley v. Nicley, 38 Tenn.App. 472, 276 S.W.2d 497, 500 (1954); 

Pulley, 137 S.W.2d at 340. The statutory requirements for a holographic 

will are that the document’s provisions be entirely in the testator’s 

handwriting, and authenticated by 2 witnesses. Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-

105. In this case, the parties have stipulated that the handwritten document 

is the decedent’s handwriting and that the requirements of the statute are 

met.

When the statutory requirements are met, a holographic will is of the 

same dignity as a will attested by subscribing witnesses. Campbell v. 

Henley, 172 Tenn. 135, 110 S.W.2d 329 (1937), and a properly proven 

holographic will supercede a formal will. See, First Christian Church of 

Guthrie, Kentucky v. Moneypenny, 59 Tenn. App. 229, 439 S.W.2d 620, 

623 (1968). Testamentary intent “must be determined from what he has 

written and not from what it is supposed he intended.” Presley, 782 

S.W.2d at 488, citing, Burdick v. Gilpin, 205 Tenn. 94, 325 S.W.2d 547, 

551 (1959); First American Nat’l Bank v. Dewitt, 511 S.W.2d 698, 706 

(Tenn. 1972).

In re Estate of Meade, 156 S.W.3d 841, 843-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Petitioners argue that the completed Questionnaire satisfied the 

requirements of a holographic will. Chiefly, Petitioners point to the testamentary intent 

evidenced by Decedent’s use of the word “bequeath,” which, Petitioners assert, has a 

strong and unmistakable meaning. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the 

document consists merely of notes and memoranda.

Petitioners are correct that the substance of a holographic will prevails over 

the form. The fact that the document in question has a somewhat informal nature does 

not mean that it cannot be a holographic will, nor does the existence alone of pre-printed 

language in the Questionnaire decide the issue. Testamentary intent controls.

Nevertheless, context is crucial. That the document is entitled 

“Confidential Estate Planning Questionnaire” and was furnished to Decedent by an 

attorney raises immediate concerns. A questionnaire suggests something less than final. 

Indeed, Section IV of the Questionnaire is titled “Items to bring with you when you come 

in for our conference.” While there is language that, in another context, might well 

reflect Decedent’s testamentary intent, the fact that it is included in a planning document 

for a future meeting with a lawyer serves to undermine any expression of testamentary 

intent. The Questionnaire completed by Decedent constitutes the beginning stages of 
-6-

addressing her estate plan and is not a final product demonstrating her clear intention to 

dispose of her property. We affirm the Trial Court in its determination that the 

Questionnaire is not a valid holographic will.

We next address whether the Trial Court erred in admitting two earlier 

putative testamentary instruments to probate when there was no verified petition seeking 

their admission and no proof of due execution. Petitioners raise various issues with the 

Trial Court’s admission of the 2007 and 2010 will and codicil to probate. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 30-1-117 requires that, when offering a will for probate, a verified petition 

containing certain essential information be filed. No such verified petition was filed by 

Respondents. Petitioners point out that the Trial Court did not state whether it admitted 

the 2007 and 2010 documents in common or solemn form. Petitioners also note that the 

notary public’s jurat date on the self-proving affidavit with the putative will predates the 

putative will by around six months. Petitioners assert that Respondents, as proponents of 

the documents, had to prove their due execution by an attesting witness. Respondents 

argue that whatever errors are contained in the 2007 will were cured by the 2010 codicil. 

In In re: Estate of Boote, this Court explained:

A will or codicil has no legal effect until it has been admitted to 

probate. State v. Lancaster, 119 Tenn. 638, 651, 105 S.W. 858, 861 (Tenn. 

1907); Weaver v. Hughes, 26 Tenn. App. 436, 443, 173 S.W.2d 159, 162 

(1943); 1 PRITCHARD §§ 35, at 55, 326, at 504.... Proceedings to probate a 

will are instituted by the filing of a verified petition in the court that 

exercises probate jurisdiction over the county where the testator or testatrix 

resided at the time of his or her death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-2-101 (2001); 

1 PRITCHARD § 326, at 504.

* * *

There are two types of probate in Tennessee: probate in common 

form and probate in solemn form. Delaney v. First Peoples Bank of 

Johnson City, 214 Tenn. 355, 364, 380 S.W.2d 65, 69 (1964); 1 PRITCHARD

§ 325, at 502; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-5-103 (2001) (providing for 

probate of foreign will “either in common or in solemn form”). Probate in 

common form is an extremely informal procedure. McClure v. Wade, 34 

Tenn. App. 154, 173, 235 S.W.2d 835, 843 (1950); 1 PRITCHARD § 331, at 

511-12. There is no requirement that interested parties be given notice of 

the proceedings, Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-1-117(b); Reaves v. Hager, 101 

Tenn. 712, 720, 50 S.W. 760, 762 (1899); In re Estate of Powers, 767 

S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); 1 PRITCHARD § 331, at 511, and a 
-7-

judicial hearing is not required to have the will admitted to probate, Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 16-16-201(b); 3 PAGE ON WILLS § 26.110, at 292.

The clerk and master of the chancery court is statutorily authorized 

to probate wills in common form. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201(b). Thus, 

in many cases, the will can be admitted to probate in common form on the 

same day that the petition is filed. The clerk and master of the chancery 

court simply reviews the petition for completeness, collects the required 

fees, and enters an order admitting the will to probate in common form. 

After taking a bond and administering the appropriate oath or affirmation, 

the clerk and master issues letters testamentary to the person nominated by 

the testator or testatrix to serve as the executrix or executor for the estate. 

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 30-1-111 (2001), 30-1-201(a)(2) (2001); 1 PRITCHARD

§ 36, at 58-59; 2 PRITCHARD §§ 595, at 108-09, 596, at 109-10, 601, at 113.

Probate in solemn form is a much more formal affair. All interested 

parties are entitled to receive notice of the proceedings and of their right to 

participate in them. Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-1-117(b); 1 PRITCHARD §§ 341, 

at 523-24, 342, at 524-25. There must be a judicial hearing at which the 

will is formally offered for probate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201(b); 1 

PRITCHARD § 343, at 525. At the hearing, the proponent of the will must 

produce all living witnesses who attested its execution for examination. In 

re Estate of King, 760 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1988); 1 PRITCHARD § 345, 

at 526-27. The court must enter an order accepting or rejecting the will for 

probate in solemn form, but there is no requirement that the court enter the 

order on the same day that the in solemn form hearing is held. 1 

PRITCHARD § 343, at 525-26; 3 PAGE ON WILLS § 26.110, at 289-90.

Prior to the entry of an order admitting a will to probate in common 

form or in solemn form, the will can be challenged directly by means of a

will contest. 1 PRITCHARD §§ 358, at 550, 396, at 591. However, because 

of the procedural and evidentiary distinctions between the two types of 

probate proceedings, the conclusiveness of an order admitting a will to 

probate differs depending on whether it was admitted to probate in common 

form or in solemn form. 1 PRITCHARD § 325, at 503-04. Historically, 

orders of both types have been immune from attack in all collateral 

proceedings absent allegations of fraud in the procurement of the order 

itself. Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 188 Tenn. 44, 49-50, 216 S.W.2d 718, 721 

(1949); Murrell v. Rich, 131 Tenn. 378, 403, 175 S.W. 420, 427 (1914); Ex 

parte Williams, 69 Tenn. 529, 530-31, 1878 WL 4406, at * 1 (1878); 1 

PRITCHARD §§ 45, at 73, 325, at 503-04, 327, at 505, 335, at 515-16, 337, at 
-8-

517-18. However, even after an order has been entered admitting a will to 

probate in common form, the will can still be challenged directly in a will 

contest at any time up to two years following the date of entry of the order. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-4-108 (2001); Murrell v. Rich, 131 Tenn. at 403-04, 

175 S.W. at 427; 1 PRITCHARD §§ 338, at 519, 366, at 559; 3 PAGE ON

WILLS §§ 26.113, at 296-97, § 26.114, at 298-99. By contrast, once an 

order admitting a will to probate in solemn form has been entered, the will 

cannot be challenged in a later will contest. Jennings v. Bridgeford, 218 

Tenn. at 292, 403 S.W.2d 287 at 291; State v. Lancaster, 119 Tenn. at 651, 

105 S.W. at 861; 1 PRITCHARD § 325, at 503. Thus, if there is to be a will 

contest at all in proceedings to probate a will in solemn form, it must be 

initiated prior to the entry of the final order.

In re: Estate of Boote, 198 S.W.3d 699, 711-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (footnotes 

omitted).

The record on appeal reveals that Respondents did not file a verified 

petition seeking admission of the 2007 will and 2010 codicil as required by statute. We,

therefore, vacate the judgment of the Trial Court admitting the purported 2007 will and 

2010 codicil to probate, and remand to give Respondents an opportunity to comply with 

all statutory requirements in admitting the documents to probate and to allow Petitioners 

the opportunity to contest the same. In so doing, we express no opinion as to whether 

these documents should be admitted to probate.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, in part, and, vacated, in part, 

and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this 

Opinion and collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed equally onehalf against the Appellants, Kim A. Soper, Shauna Andrus, Marlin V. Andrus, Graydon

H. Andrus, and Shane H. Andrus, and their surety, if any, and, one-half against the 

Appellees, Joshua Andrus and Lexi Staley.

____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE