UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________ ___ ) KAYLA DIONNE LEWIS, et al. , ) ) Plaintiffs, ) )
v. ) Civil Action No. 15

- 352 (RBW) ) GOVERNMENT OF THE ) DISTR ICT OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant

. ) ____________________________________)

ME MORANDUM OPINION Kayla Dio nne L ewis and Felton Hill, the named plaintiffs in this case , bring this putative class action against the defendant, the District of Columbia ( t h e “ D i s t r i c t ” ) , pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (201 8 ), alleging constitutional violations arising from their arre sts and subse quent
detenti ons. See generally Third Amended Complaint [ a ] nd Jury Demand ( “ Third Amended Complaint ” or “3d Am. Compl.”)

. Currently pending before the Court is Defendant District of
Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (“ Def.’s Mot.”)

. Upon careful
considera tion of the p arties’ submissions, 1 the Court concludes for the following reasons that it
must grant in part and deny in part the District ’ s motion to dismiss

. I. BACKGROUND The Court discussed the factual background of t his case in its Memorandum Opinion
iss ued on June 2 7, 2016, see Lewis v. District of Columbia ( “ Lewis I ” ) , 195 F. Supp. 3d 53, 56

–

1 In addition to the f il ings already identified, the Court considered t he follow in g submissions in rendering its decision: (1) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of D efendant th e District of Columbia ’s Motion to Dismi s s the Third Amended Complaint (“ Def.’s Mem .”) ; (2) the Pla intiffs’ Opposition to D efendant ’s Motion t o Dismiss the T h ird Amended Complaint (“Pls.’ Opp’n”); and (3) t he Reply in Support of D efendant the District of C ol umbia ’s Motion to Dismiss the Third Am e nded Complaint ( “ Def. ’ s Reply ” )

.2 57 (D.D.C. 2016) (Walton, J.), and it will not reiterate those facts again here

. T he Court will , however, discuss the procedu ral posture of this case, which is relevant to the resolution of the pending motion

. I n Lewis I , the Court granted in part and denied in part the Distric t ’ s motion to dismiss the p laintiff s ’ Amended Complaint. S ee i d. at 56. T he Court granted the Distr ict ’ s motion to
dismiss Hill ’ s claims pertaining to the length of his dete ntion becau se he ha d not “ asserted a constitutional deprivation

. ” I d. at 60. The Court c oncluded tha t “[t]he only reason proffered by
Hill for the Court to find an unreas onable del ay [

— ] that the judicial officer affirmatively concluded at his initial appearance that the government lac ked probable cause to effect the

arrest [

— ]

. . . [was] belied by the transcript of that proceeding , ” id. at 59 (emphasis omit ted ) , and
that “ Hill fail [e d] to offer any other reason for this Court to find an unreasonable delay in his
release , ” i d. at 60

. Regarding Lewis ’ s claims pertaining to the length of he r detention , the Court
denied the District ’ s motion to dismiss and concluded that, because “ th e D istrict concede [d] that it held her for more than forty

- eight hours without a j udicial finding of probable cause , and ultimately acknowledge [d] th at it was ord ered to release Lewis after fail ing to submit evidence substantiating probable cause,

. . . t he s e concessions alone are sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss [

. ] ” I d. (citation s omitted). 2 The Court also denied the District ’ s motion t o di smiss the plaintiff s ’ clai m “ that the [District] violated the ir Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by subje cti ng them to blanket strip[ ]searches at the [District of Columbia] Jail after presentment.”

I d. at 63 (second a nd third alterations in original) ( in t ernal quotation marks omitted )

.

2 The Court also granted the District ’ s m otion to dismiss regarding the plaint if f s ’ claim that the District “ violated the Fifth Amendment by denying a bail hearing to arrestee s like [the plainti ffs] who contest pro bable c a use after a judicial officer has made a finding of no pr obable cause[ ,] but granting a bail hearing to arrestees w ho concede probable cause after a judicial officer has made a finding of no probable [cause].” Lewis I , 195 F. Su pp. 3d at 62 (al terations i n original) ( in t ernal quotation marks omitted). T h e plain tif fs have not realleged th is claim in the Thi rd Amended Complaint. S ee generally 3d Am. Compl.3 The current operative complaint in this case

— the Third Amended C o mplain t, which was filed on March 12, 2018 , s ee 3d Am. C ompl. at 1

— assert s three claims that ch allenge the
District ’s p o licies regarding probable cause deter minations and detainee str ip searches. Specifically , t he plaintiffs claim that the District (1) “ violate d their Fourth Amendment rights . . .
under Gerstein v. Pugh [, 420 U.S. 103 (19 75 ) , ] by holding them after present ment after the administrative steps incident to their arrests had been com pleted without an affirmative finding of prob able c ause ” ( “ C o unt One ” ) , 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 103; (2) “ violated the Fourth Amend ment rights

. . . of Lewis . . . [under C ount y of Riverside v. McLaughlin , 500 U.S. 44 (1991) ] by holding [ her for ] more than [ forty

- eight ] hours after [her] arrest without a finding of probable

cau se by a judicial officer ” ( “ C o unt Two ” ), id. ¶ 107; and (3) “ violated the Fourth [and Fifth]
Amendment rights of th e [plaintiffs]

. . . by subjecting them to blanket strip [ ] sear ches at the [District of Columbia] Jail after pr esentment ( after the administr ati ve steps incident to their arrests had been completed ) without an affirmative finding of prob able c ause ” ( “ C o unt Three ” ),
id. ¶ 112

. On March 26, 2018, t he District filed its motion to dismiss the pla intiff s ’ Th ird
Amended C omplaint, see Def

. ’ s Mot. at 1, which is the subject of this Memorandum Opinion.
II. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint “state[s] a claim upon which r elief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion t o dismiss [ under Rule 12 (b)(6) ], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 5 44, 570 (20 07)). A cl ai m is f aci ally plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the [C] ourt to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for th e misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Two mbly , 550 U.S. at 556)

.4 In evalua ting a moti on to dismi ss under Ru le 12(b)(6), “the Court must construe the complaint ‘ in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged. ’ ” Hettinga v. United States , 677 F.3d 471, 476 ( D.C. Cir. 2 012) ( quoti ng Schul er v. United States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ). While the Court must
“assume the [ ] veracity” of any “well

- pleaded factual allegations” in a co mplaint, conclusory allegations “are no t entitled to the assumption of tr uth.” Iqba l , 556 U.S. a t 679. T hus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombl y , 550 U.S. at 555). Also, the Court n eed not accept “legal conclusions cast as fac tual allega ti ons,” or “inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Hettinga , 677 F.3d at
476. The Co urt “may consider only the facts allege d in the complaint, any documents either

atta ched to or in corpor ate d in the complaint[,] and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial
notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Claims Pertaining to the Length of the Plaintiff s ’ Detentio ns ( Count s On e and Tw o )
The District argues that (1) Counts One and Tw o “ should be dismissed because they are premised on official acts by [ judges for the ] Superior Court [ for the District of Columbia ( ‘ Superio r C ourt ’ ) ] [ ] w ho are not policymakers for the Distr ic t , ” and “ as su ch, [t he ] plaintiffs
cannot establish muni ci pal liability under Section 1983 , ” Def. ’ s Mem. at 12; (2) Count One

“ should be di smissed as to Hill because his detention of less than [forty

- eight ] hours does not give rise to a Fourth Ame ndment violation , ” i d. at 8 ; and ( 3 ) Count O ne “ should be dismisse d as

to Lewis because it is duplicative of her allegations in [ Count Two ]

— na mely , that she was unreasonably held for over [forty

- eight] hours without a finding of probable cause by a judicial5 officer to allow t he ‘ perfecti o n ’ of the Gerstein af fi davit , ” 3 id. The Court will address each of
the District ’ s arguments in turn. While “a policeman ’ s on - the

- scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justif ic ation for arrest ing a person suspected of crime,” Gerst ein , 420 U.S. at 11 3

– 14 , “the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prer equisite to detention,” id. at 126

. “[A] j urisdiction that provid es judicial determinatio ns of probable cause within [forty

- eight] hours of arr est will , as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” Riverside , 500 U.S. a t 56

. “Such jurisdictions will be immune fr om system ic challenges

. ” I d. However, a “ probable cause determination in a particu lar case [does not] pa ss [] constitutional muster simply because it is provided within [ forty

- eight ] hours. ” I d.

“ Such a hearing may nonetheless violate Gerstein if the ar rested individual ca n prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonab ly , ” suc h a s “ delays for the pu rpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay mot ivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or de lay for delay ’ s sake

. ” I d. If a n arrest ed individual is de tained for more
than forty

- eight ho urs with out a judicial determination of probable cause , “ the burden shifts to the government to demons trate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other ext ra ordinary
circumstanc e. ” I d. at 5 7

. As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with the Di strict ’ s firs t a rgument that Count One
and Tw o must be dismissed bec au se the plaintiffs “fail [ed] to allege a specifi c District custom, polic y[,] or a practice that runs a foul of the Constitution ” in order to state a mun icipal li ability

3 A Gerstein affidavit is “filed to provide a pro per b asis for t he judicial finding of probable caus e that Gerstein
re quires to jus tify restraint after an arrest.” In re Hol lo way , 995 F.2d 1080, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1993).6 claim under Section 1983. 4 I d. at 1 3. The Court n ot es that the District previously advanced this

s ame argument in its motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, see Defendant District of
Columbia ’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 21 ( “ The Amended Comp laint falls f ar
short of stati ng a municipal liability claim under Section 1983. . . . [The] [p ] laintiffs fail to allege a specific District custom, policy or a practice that runs afoul of the Constitution. ”) , and the
Court rejected i t in Lew is I , concludi ng that “ the Magistrate Judge pre siding over Lewis ’ s initial hearing indicated to t he contrary , ” see Lew is I , 195 F. Supp. 3d at 62 . Specifically, the Court
stated :
In d enying the request of defense counsel that Lewis be released while the gove rnment sought to “perfect” its Gerstein a ffi davit, the Magistrate Judge responded : “ If [the D is trict] ask [ s ] for the [twenty

- four] hours, they get it . . . . I’ve read the statute, been here five years, been trained and . . . [t]he bottom line is they get the [twenty

- four] hours.” “[E]ven a sin gle decision by [ mun icipal policymakers ] unquestiona bl y constitutes an act of official government policy

. ” While it is unclear what particular statute or training the Magistrate Judge was referenc ing during the hea ring, the Cou rt must afford the plaintiff “t he benefit of all inferences that can be derived fr om the facts alleged , ” and thus , finds [ ] Lewis’s allegations sufficient to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss [.]

4 “Although a municipality is

. . . subject to suit under [Section] 1983 for constitutional violations, it

. . . cannot be held liable un d er [Section] 1983 on a responde at superior theory. ” Singletary v. Dist rict of Columbia , 766 F.3d 66, 72 (D .C. Cir. 2014 ) (internal quotation m arks omitted) ( quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 65 8, 691 (1978)). Therefore, in order to state a claim for munic ipal liability , t he complaint must “ state [] a claim that a custom or policy of the municipa lity caused t he violation , ” Baker v. District of Columbia , 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. C ir. 2003) (citat ions omitted) , and must allege an “ ‘affirmativ e link,’ such that a municipal poli cy was the ‘moving force’ behi nd the constitutional violation , ” i d. ( first q uoting City o f Okla. City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 822 (1985) ; then quoting City of Canton v. Harri s , 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (plurality opinion ) ). There are “a numb er of ways a municipality can adopt a policy or custom that might create lia bility,” Brow n v. Dist rict of Columbia , 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), including the explicit setting of a policy by the government that violates the C onstitution; the ac ti on of a policy maker within the government; the adoption through a knowing failure to a ct by a policy maker of actions by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become “cus tom”; or the failure of the government to resp o nd to a need (for e xa mple, training of employees) in such a manner as to show “deliberate indif ference” to t he risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional violations,
Baker , 326 F.3d at 13 06 (citations omitted) ( first quoting City of S t. Louis v. Praprotnik , 485 U.S. 112, 1 23

– 30 (1988); then quoting Harris , 489 U.S. at 39 0 ).7 I d. ( second through t enth alter ations in ori ginal ) ( citations omitted)). T her efo re, b ecause the Third Amended Complai nt lar ge ly mirrors the Amended Complaint on this matter , compare Amended Complaint f or Judg ment and Money Damages and Injunctive Relief and Equitable Relief and Declaratory Relie f and Jury Demand , with 3d Am. Compl. , an d because the Di st rict
has not present ed any new argument s to warrant a different ruling , 5 see Def

. ’ s Mem. 12

– 1 6, the Court, for the same reasons indic ated in Lewis I , 195 F. Supp. 3d at 62, must deny the Distric t ’ s
motion to dismiss on the basis of its ar gument that the Third Amended Complaint does not
establish a basis for finding municipal li ability under Se c tion 1983

.

5 The District cite s several cas es decided by other Circuit s in support of its argument that the plaintiffs cannot establish municipal liability because their clai m s are premised on acti ons by Superior Court judges. S ee De f. ’ s Mem. at 14

– 15

. However, none of the se cases st a nd s for the pr oposition that , as a matter of law, municipal judges cannot expos e a munic ipality to li ability , but rather conclude that the muni c ipalit y cannot be liable for t he actions of
a municipal judge beca use the judge ’s act s were more appro priately attributed to the state rather than the municipality

. S ee, e.g. , Gr anda v. City of St. Louis , 472 F.3d 565, 568

– 69 (8th Cir. 2007) ( finding tha t a municipality was not liab le for the judicial decision of a municipal judge because it “ was not a final policy dec ision ”) ; Deleon v. City of Halt om City , 106 F. App’x 909, 911

– 12 (5th Cir. 2004) ( affirming dismissal of Section 1983 claims against a muni c ipality for the actions of a municipality judge “ under the facts of this ca se ” because the municipality did not have “ the power to set judicial policy for a municipal judge ” a n d “could [n ot ] have ratified a municipal judge's judicial conduct ”) ; Ledbetter v
. C ity of Topeka , Ka n. , 318 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) ( concluding th at because “ the authority of the municipal [judge] . . . is established by state law , . . . [a]ny procedural ‘trailblazing’ on his part

. . . was not done under the auspices of the [ municipality] and could not be interpreted as promulgating municipal policy ” ( fourth alteration in original) ) ; Eggar v. City of Livingston , 40 F.3d 312, 3 14

– 15 (9th Cir. 1994) ( “ The crucial factor i s whether under state law the acts in question were perfo r med under the municipality ’ s or the state ’ s authority. [The mun icipal ] [j] udge [ ’s] [ ] acts and decisions advising indigents of their rights are not admi nistrative or ministerial acts based on the judge ’ s authority as a local official. However, the judge ’ s treatment of indigent defendants was an exercise of judicial discretion drawn from the authority of the state, appealable to higher state courts, and closely analogous to actions found to be outside the scope of municipal liability. ” ) ; Johnson v. Moore , 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992) ( “ [A] municipal judge acting in hi s or her judicial capacity to enforce state law does not act as a municipal official or lawmaker. ” (emphasi s added) ); Woods v. City of Mich. , 940 F.2d 275, 280 (7th C ir. 1991) ( finding that municipality cannot be held liable for actions of a municipal judge because , under state la w , mun icipality judge s “ a re not county officials , ” but rather “are considered to be officials of the state , ” and because t he county courts “ are exclusively units of the judicial branch of the state ’ s constitutional system ” ) ; Familias Unidas v. Briscoe , 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980) ( finding that although “[t]here are . . . many actions of a county judge that may justifiably be considered to constitute or represen t county

‘ policy ’ under Monell , ” the municipal judge ’s action d id not “repre sent[ ] t he official policy of [the mun icipality ] ” and was “ more fairly [ ] characterized as the effectuation of the policy of the State . . . , for which the citizens of a p articu l ar county should not bear singular responsibility ”)

. Moreover, t he facts of the cases cited by D i strict are not analog ous to the facts in this case given the Superior Court j udges ’ unique status as “Article I

. . . judges, whom Congress intended to be analogous to state court judges

. ” United States v. Stewart , 104 F.3d 1377, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

. T herefore, even though the plaintiff s f

ace a significant challenge in est ablishing municipality liability on the basis of the actions of Superior C o urt judge s , the cases cited by the District do not r equire dismiss al of Lewi s ’s claim regarding the length of her detention , especially at this stage of the litigation w here the Co urt is tasked with
eva l uating the sufficiency of t he alle gations conta ined in a complaint

.8 T he Court agrees with the District ’ s second argument that “ [ t]he Third Amend ed Compl aint [ ] does not present a basis to res urrec t [ C oun t One of the Third Amended Complaint

as to Hill , which] th [e] Court previously dismissed

. ” D ef. ’ s M em. at 8

. As the Co urt concluded

pre viously in Lew is I , Hill ’s claims regarding the length of his dete ntion in the Amended Complaint “ d [id] not pass mus ter , ” 195 F. Supp. 3d at 59, be cause he “ fai l[ed] to o ffer a [] [sufficient] reason for this Court t o find an unr easonable delay in his release, ” id. at 60. Count
One of th e Third Amended C omplaint fares no b etter. Th e on ly reason that Hill n ow offers f or
th e Court to find that his probable cause d eter mination was delayed unreasonably is that the Magistra te Judge presiding over his initial appearance , “without making an affirm ative finding of probable cause,

. . . ordered [that] Hill [be] held until the next day . . . to give the Distr ic t an

oppor tunity to perfect the Gerstein [aff idavit]

. ” 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 95 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. 6 However, the Supreme Court has ackno wl edged that “ the Fourth Amendment does not compel an immediat e dete rmination of probable cause upon comp le ting the administrative steps incident to arr est , ” Riversi de , 500 U.S. at 53

– 54 , as “s ome d elays are inevitable [ , ] [f ] or example, ” in jurisd iction s “ where [] . . . the probable cause determination is combined wit h

6 In their opposition, the plaintiffs claim several times that “ the District violated [ Hill ’ s ] [ Fourth] Amendment rig hts by holding him after [hi s] [initial ] [a]ppearance . . . a fter a S u perior Court Ma gi strate Judge found the D istrict had failed to establish probable cause. ” Pl s. ’ Opp ’ n at 4 ; see id. at 7 ( “ [T]he Magistrate Judge found that the District ’ s Gerstein affid avit failed to establish pro bable cause

. ” ); id. at 9 (same); id. at 1 0 (same with respect t o Lewis ) ; id. a t 12 ( “ [The] [p]laintiffs ’ position is that Magistrate Judge Howe made a finding of no probable cause at the probabl e cause determination seg ment of Hill ’ s [initial ] [a]ppearance

. . . [and tha t such findin g ] may have b een im plicit as opposed to exp li cit, but she clearly found that the [District] had failed to establish probable cause. ” ). However, as the Court previously note d, [this] assertion is belied by t he tra nscript of that proceeding. Specifically, the Magistr a te Jud ge presiding over his in it ial appea rance received an oral request from the government to continue the hearing “ for [twenty

- four] hours to perfect the Gerstein [affidavit], ” and granted the r equest , simply stating “ Okay, back tomorrow for Gerstein pe r fectio n. ” It is apparent from t his trans cript that the Magistrate Judge deferred her ruling on the issue of probable cause until the subsequent heari ng. Where, as here, a complaint ’ s factual allegatio ns are contradicted by exhib its of which the Court ma y take judicial notice, the Cou rt need no longer accept as true plaintiff [s ’ ] version of events.
Lewis I , 195 F. Supp. 3d at 59

– 60 ( second and third alteration s in original) (citations omitted)

.9 arraignment, t here will be delays caused by paperwork and l ogistical pr oblems, ” id. at 5 5 , a nd in such situations, “t he Fourth Amendment permits a r easonable pos tponement of a probable cause
determinatio n while the police cope with the everyday problems of processing su spects through an overly burdened criminal justice system , ” id. And, a l though stat es are accorded “ fl e xibility ” by Gerstein in regards to integrating pro bable cause d eterminations into their pretrial procedures , this accommodation “ has its limit s [ ] [and] is not a blank check

. ” I d. at 55

. However, Hill ’s

pr of fered reason fo r th e Court to find an un reasonable delay is ins ufficient to resurrect his claim regarding the length of his detention

. Therefore, the Court conclude s that Hill has not sufficiently al leged that the Magistrate Judge ’ s deferral of his probabl e cause determination

res ult ed in an unr ea sona ble delay and thus must again grant the D istric t ’ s motion to dismiss
Hill ’ s claim c hallenging the len gth of his detention.

T he Court als o agrees with th e District ’ s third argument t hat Lewis cannot maintain both
Cou nt s One a n d T w o against the District

. S ee Def. ’ s M ot. at 11

– 12. In Coun t Two, Lewis alleges that the Distric t violat ed a right guara nteed by the Fourth Amendment “ by holding [ her
for ] more th an [ forty

- eight ] hours after [her] arrest without a finding of prob able cause by a judicial officer

. ” 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 1 07

. But, in Count One, Lewis already allege s that her
Fourth Amendment ri ght s were viola ted by the District when s he was de tained “ afte r present ment after the administrative steps incident to [ h er ] arrest [] had been completed without an affirmative finding of prob able c aus e
. ” I d. ¶ 103

. T hese allegations , altho ugh couched in
d ifferent terms and plead ed in separate counts of the Third A m e nded Complaint , are premised on the very same set of factual allegations, involve the same legal standard , and if successful, would
result in identical relief. In fact, both c ounts , at their c ore , pertain to the same alleged violation
of Lewi s ’s Fourth A mendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure

. And , d esp ite10 Lewis ’s characterization of Count Two as a claim that purports to be brought under Riverside
di s tinct from Count One, which is purportedly brought unde r Gerstein , c ompare 3d Am. Compl.

a t 22 ( “[Section] 1983 Liab ilit y of District of Colum bia under the F o urth Amendment for I llegal

H olds under Riverside

. ”), with id. at 2 1 ( “[Section] 1983 Liab ility of District of Colum bia under
the F o urth Amendment under G er stein [.] ” ) , the Supre me Court in Gerstein an d Riverside d id not

create d istinct cause s of action that allow s Lewis to maintain Count One and Count T wo as
distinct cause s of action

. 7 In fact, becau se C o unt One is in disti ng uishable from Cou nt Two , Lewis is doing nothing more than pursuing the same cla im in separate counts

. According to Lewis, she can maintain the two counts separately
becaus e all [of] the other proceedings (such as filing an information, appoin tment o f c ounsel, [a nd ] arraignment ) the District combines with the probable cau se det ermina tions for detained arrestees had been completed before Magistrate Judge Howe

. . . addressed wh ether [the Ger stein affidavits] est ablished probable cause to h old [t he plai ntiffs , ]

. . . no ne of the delay caused by the Gerstein [ ] holds was att ributable to the Dist rict ’ s com bining those additional Riverside proc eedings with the probable cause dete rm ination required by Gerstein . Therefore, the [forty

- eight] hour safe ha rbor , which was developed to accommodate those types
o f delay, d rops out of p art of the a na lysis.
Pls. ’ Opp ’n at 24

. 8 However, this argument is premised upon a flawed interpretatio n of the Supreme Court ’s decisions i n not only Gerstein , but also Riv erside

. Lewis claims that the Supreme Court in Gerstein “di d not address the r ela ted issue of the time within which the government must provide probable cause determinations to d etained arrestees arrested [without]

warrant [s] when the probable cause determination is combine with other p retrial proceedings, such as arraignment or bai l h ear ings

. ” I d. at 2 0

– 2 1 . And, she maintains that the Supreme Court

7 Rather, the Supreme Court , in Ger stein , recogn ized tha t, in accordanc e with the Fourth Am end ment ’ s guarantee to be free from unreasonable se izures , a n individual arrested without a warrant is entitled to “ a judicial determination of probable cause , ” which “ must be made

. . . promptly , ” 4 20 U.S. at 1 1 4, 1 25 , an d later , in Riverside , “ articul at e [ d ]
more clearly the boundaries of what is [considered ‘ prompt ’ and therefore ] per missible under the Fourth Ame ndment , ” 500 U.S. at 56

.

8 The Court notes that Lewis does n ot cite any legal authority in support of her po si t ion. S ee Pl s. ’ Opp ’ n at 24.11 in Riverside “addressed the specific fa ct pattern of how much time a jurisdiction has to provide probable cause determination s to detained arrestees wh e re a juri sdiction combines the proba ble

cau se de t erminat ion with other p retrial proceedings, s uch as arraignment or bail h earing s ” and
conclu de d that th e presumption of reasonableness a pplies to judicial determination s of proba ble cause provided within the forty

- eight

- hour time period only “ when th e pro b able ca use
determ ination is combined with othe r pretrial proceedings , ” i d. at 22

. This is i nc orrect. T he Supreme Court in Gerstein , after stating that “ [t] here is no single preferred pretrial procedure, ” recognized “ the desirability of flexi bi lity a nd e xpe rimentation by the [s] tates , ” and s pecifically
concluded that [i] t may be fo und desirable, f or example, to make the probable cause determination at the suspect ’ s first appearance before a judicial officer, or the determination may be incorp orated i nto th e proce dure for setting bail or fixing other conditions of pretrial release

. . . . Whatever pr ocedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any sig nificant pretrial restraint of libe rty, a nd this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arr es t.
420 U.S. at 123

– 25 (emphasis added) (citations and footno tes omitted)

. And , the Suprem e Court
in Riverside did not limit its conclu sion that “ a jurisdictio n that provides judicial deter minati ons
of probable cause within [forty

- eight] hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply w ith the promptness requirement of Gerstein , ” River side , 500 U.S

. at 56, to ins tances wher e a jurisdic tion
combines a prob able cause determination with other pretrial proceedings, as Lewis suggests , see
Pl s. ’ Opp ’ n at 22

. Therefore, contrary to Lewis ’s argume nts , Gerstein and Riverside do not give rise to separate violations of the Fourth Amendment

. And, because Lewi s “ has not [ s ufficientl y ]
articulated an y reason to maintain [ Count Two ]

. . . as a separate cause of action ” from C ou nt
One , Rodriguez v. Lab. Corp. of Am

. Holdings , 13 F. Supp. 3d 121, 128 (D.D.C. 2014) , the
Court finds Cou nts One and Two as du pl icative of one an othe r. H owever, instead of dismissing
Count One as the District suggests, s ee Def. ’s M ot. at 12 , the Court will dismiss Cou nt Two12 since Count Two “ do es not present any legal or factual theories that are not already sub sumed ”
in Count One , id. ( qu ot ing WMI L i quidating T r. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. C o rp. , 110 F. Supp. 3d 44 (D.D.C. 2015) (Walton, J.)).
B. The Plaintiffs ’ Strip

- Search Claim (C ount Three )
Th e District al so argues tha t the plaintiffs ’ Fifth Amendment claim regarding the
Distr ic t ’s alleged b lanket strip searches should be dismissed because “ [ t ] here is no legal basis to support a Fifth Amendment ch allenge to the strip searche s of [the] plaintiff s
. ” Def. ’s M em. at
16. The Court agrees with the Di strict

. “Where a particul ar Am endment provide s an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of g ov ernment behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be th e guide for a nalyzing the claims. ”
A lbright v. Oliver , 510 U. S. 266, 273 (1998) ( internal quotation marks omitted) ( quoting Graham
v. Connor , 490 U.S

. 386, 395 (1989) )

. Here , “ [t] he Fourth Amendment, in prohibiting unreasonable searches, is clearly the explicit textual source of co nstitutional prote ction against t he governmental conduct alleged in
this case. ” Barnes v. D is trict of Columbia , 793 F. Supp. 2d 260, 291 (D.D.C. 2011) ; see Cty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) ( stating that the Fourth “ Amendment covers only ‘ searches and seizures ’ ” )

. Th erefor e, because the plaintiffs ’ strip search claim i s “ covered by ” the Four th Amen dment ’s guara ntee to be free from an unreasonable search , Cty. of
Sac ramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. at 843 (quoting United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7 (1997) ), “ [t h e ] [p] la in tiffs ’ challenge to the reasonableness of the [ ] strip searches

. . . is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth , ” Barnes , 793 F. Supp. 2d at 291

. According ly, the Court gr ants the Dis t rict ’s motion to dismiss Count Three of the Third13 Amended Complaint to t he extent that the plaintiffs re ly o n the Fifth Amendment to maintain
th eir strip search claim

. IV. CONCLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Hill has failed to allege sufficient facts in support of hi s claim regarding the len gth of his dete ntion. The Court further co nc ludes that Count Two is duplicative of Count One and that Cou nt Two is therefore dismissed

. The Court also concludes that the plaintiffs cannot m aintain their claim regarding t he Distri c t ’ s alleged blanket strip searches under the Fift h Amendment. Accordingly, the Court will grant in
part an d deny in part the Distric t ’ s motion to dismiss

. 9

SO ORDERED this 8 th day of October , 2019. 10

REGGIE B. WALTON United S t ates District Judge

9 The Thi rd Amended Complaint also asserts a number of class allega tions based upon the claims of the named plaintiffs

. See 3d Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 115

– 30 . On June 10, 2015, upon the request of the p laintiff s and in light of the Dis t r ict ’s con sent , the Court stay ed the pl aintiffs ’ deadline for filing a motion for class certification, as required by t he Court ’ s Local Civil Rules

. S ee L Cv R 23.1(b) (“Within [ninety] day s after the filing of a complaint in a case sought to be maintained as a class action,

. . . the plaintiff shall move for a certification under Rule 23(c)(1) [.] ”)

. Accordingly, t he Court will defer a ruling on these class al legations until such time as the pa rties have an opportunity to brief a mo tion to certi fy or to st r ike these class allegations.

10 The Cou rt will contemporaneously issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.