### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 13 , 200 7 S es sio n ROBE RT H. CRAWFORD, SR. ET AL 

### . v. J . AVERY BRYAN F UNERAL HOME , INC. ET AL 

### . Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 03C349 W. Ne il Th om as, III, Jud ge

No. E2006-00987-COA- R3-CVF iled Novem ber 21, 2007

Cha rl e s D . Su sano , Jr. , J., c on c ur ri ngin p art

and dis se nti ngin p art

. Th e de fe nd ants ’ f

ili ng s in thi s c a se c le arl y

e sta bli shthat Te ri Cr awf

or d do e s no t ha

ve a c a us e of ac tion for intentional interfe renc e with the dea d body of her brother, Robe rt H. Craw ford. That c a us e of a c tio n be lon g e d to Mr

. Cr awf or d’ s wi do w, to the e xclu sio n o f a ll o the rs . F ur the rm or e , in my op ini on , th e re c or d b e fo re us ne g a te s Ms . Cr awf or d’ s a lle g e d c a

us es of a c tio n a g a ins t a ll de fe nd ants e

x c e pt those as s erted ag ainst the individuals and entities directly associate d with the op e ratio n o f t

he Tr i- State Cr e mator

y (h e re ina ft e r s ome tim e s r e fe rr e d to a s “the Tr i- State De fe nd ants ” ). As to t

he se latte r i nd ividu a ls a

nd e nti tie s, Ibe lie ve the de fe nd ants ’ f ili ng s f a il t o neg ate Ms. Craw ford’ s three c auses o f ac t ion for (1) intentional, (2) re ckless, and ( 3) neg lige nt infliction of mental distress. Ther efor e, I disag ree with the majority ’s conclusion that the trial cour t was c orre ct in dismiss ing Ms. Cr aw ford’s complaint with respec t to these “infliction of menta l dis tr e ss” the or ie s. As particularly

pertinent to my

separ ate opinion, the complaint conta ins the following a lle g a tio ns : * * *

1. This action ar ises from the mishandling , abuse and desec ration of the b o d ie s o f th e d e c e a s e d lo v e d o n e s o f hun dr e d s o f c it izens of Tenne ssee, Ge org ia, Alabama and other states. . . . * * *-2- 5. .

. . [Teri] Crawf

ord is the surviving sister of Robert H. Cra wford, Jr. [, on e of

the de c e de nts wh os e re ma ins we re to be c re mate d b y Tr iState Crematory]. . . . * * * 11. . . . [R ay Marsh, Clara Marsh, T. Ray

Br ent Marsh a

nd Rhames L e She a Marc h – ] the Ma rs h D e fe nd ants [–] c on du c te d b us ine ss without corporate protec tion, but as partne rs, joint ventur ers and joint pr op ri e tor s d oin g b usine ss a s T ri -S tate Cr e mator y , T ri -S tate Crem at ory , Inc. and/or

Marsh Va

ult & Gr ave, I

nc., and/or

Br ent’s Tents, all of which wer e not valid cor porate entities subsequent to the re sp e c tiv e re vo c a tio ns of

c or po rate c ha

rt e rs by th e State of

Ge or g ia as her einabove set forth, but we re me rely trade n ames, fic titious names, or tr ade styles under which the Marsh Def endants jointly

and c oll e c tiv e ly

ow ne d a nd op e rate d th e Tr i- State Cre mator y fa c ili ty in Nob le, G e or g ia . T he Ma rs h D e fe nd ants and

De fe nd ant T ri -S tate Cr e mator y wi ll he re ina ft e r be c oll e c tiv e ly re fe rr e d to a s [th e Tr i- State D e f e n d an ts ]. * * * 2 6

. Be gi n n i n g ata d at e p re s en t l y un kn o wn , an d

co n t i nu i n g th ro u gh Fe b ru ary 15, 2002, [t he Tri- State Def endants] sy stematically

and commonly

mishandled, desec rate d, abused a nd commingle d the rema ins of the dec edents in a manner of fensive to human se nsibili ties and/or e x pressly

prohibited by

law. 27. [The f unera l home ] re turned what it r epre sented to be the re mains of the ir lov e d o ne s to Pla int if

fs

. 28 . T he re ma in s ret

ur ne d w e re no t th e tr

ue re ma ins of

Pla int if fs ’ lov e d o ne s o r whe re [sic ] not pr op e rl y c re mated r e ma ins in confor mit y t o t he lawf

ul and profe ssional standard of car e for final dispositi on of human rema ins, or there rema ins uncerta inty whether the dec ease d loved on[es were ] ever ac tually cre mated. 29. I n light of this knowle dg e, Plaintiffs nowknow that their loved ones’ r emains we re not c remated in acc ordanc e with the wishes of Plaintiffs’ or under

the terms of the agree ment with [ the funeral home] but i nstead we re subjec ted to [t he Tri- State Def endants’] un lawf ul a nd imp ro pe r p ra c tic e s.-3- 30 . Pl a int if

fs have a ll s uf

fe re d a nd c on tin ue to s uf fe r t he pr e dic ta

ble and reasonably fore seea

ble emoti onal distress including anguish and g ri e f, up on

le arn ingof

the tr e a tme nt t o w hic h th e re mains o f t he ir loved-ones were subjected by [t he Tri- State Def

endants a nd other d e f e n d an ts ]. * * * 33 . T hr ou g ho ut [the re le va nt t ime pe ri od ], [th e Tr i- State De fe nd ants ] sy stematically and commonly mishandled, desec rate d, abused, and c omm in gle d th e re ma ins of the de c e de nts in a

mann e r o ff

e ns ive to human sensibilities and/or expressly prohibited by

law. * * * EI GHTH CAUSE OF ACTI ON I NT EN TI ON AL

I NF L I CTI ONOF EM OT I ON AL DI STR ESS 77 . Pl a int if

fs re -a lle g e and

inc or po ra te he re in, a s if se t fo rt

h in fu ll, eac h and every alleg ation contained in the pre cedingpara g raphs a nd further alleg e: 78. The . . . c onduct [of the Tri-State De fe n d an t s and other defe ndants] directed towa rd Plaintiffs, as desc ribed he rein, wa s intentional, knowing, a

nd/or rec kless. I t is so outrag eous that it is not t o l e r a t e d b y c i v i l i z e d

s o c i e ty. 79

. As a dir e c t and pr oximate re su lt of the

. . . c on du ct [ of t he T riState Def endants a nd oth er d efendants], P laintiffs suffe red se rious me nta l in jur ie s and e mot ion a l di str e ss t

hat n o r e a s o n a

b l e p e r so n c ou ld be expected to e ndure or

adequately

cope w ith. 80 . In th e ir

c on du c t, t

he [Tr i- State De fe nd ants and oth e r d e fe nd ants ] acte d intentionally , knowing ly , wi th suppression, fra ud and malice and in re ckless and c onscious d is reg ard of Plaintiffs’ rig hts. Pl aintiffs are , there fore , entitled to punitive a nd exemplary

damag es fr om . . . the [Tri-State Def

enda n t s and other

defe ndants] in s uch amount as sh a ll b e n e c e s s a

r y a nd a pp ro pr iate to p un ish

the [Tr i- State De fe nd ants and oth e r d e f e n d an ts ] an d

to d e te r th e m a n d an y o n e e ls e f

r o m e ver c omm itt ingsim ila

r i nd e c e nc ie s u

po n huma n r e ma ins

. NI NTH CAUSE OF ACTI ONCommen t g . t o § 868 r ec og n i ze s t h at § 46 m ay have some appl i cabi l i t y t o cas es i nv ol vi ng t he abus e of a dea d 1 b o d y: U nder t he r ul e s t at ed i n § 46 one wh o by ext r eme an d out r age o us conduct

i nt ent i onal l y or r eck l es s l y i nf l i ct s s eve r e emo t i onal di s t r es s upon anot her i s s ubj ect t o l i ab i l i t y f

o r t he em o t i o na l d i st ress. -4- NE GL I GENT I

NF L I CTI ONOF EM OT I ON AL DI STR ESS 81 . Pl a int if

fs re -a lle g e and

inc or po ra te he re in, a s if

se t f or th i n f ull , eac h and eve ry alleg ation contained in the precedingpara g raphs a nd further alleg e: 82. At all materia l times, the [ Tri-State De fendan ts and other defe ndants] owed a duty

to Plainti ffs to ac t with the ordinary car e of a reasonable person with re spect to all aspe cts of the se rvice s promised i n cluding , but not lim ited to, all phases of the cre mation proce ss, including but not limit ed to the hiring , rete ntion, training a nd su pe rv isi on of a ll a g e nts , e mpl oy e e s and re pr e se ntativ e s o f t he [Tr iState Def endants a nd other de fenda

n ts] , in connec tion with such service s and transa ctions, the manag ement and administration of the service s and transa ction, t h e as sociation with other per sons and entit i es t o acc omplish t he per formanc e of suc h service s, the individual, p ro per a

nd respe ctful per formanc e of a ll steps of the cre mation proce ss, and the ascer tainment that all such ser

vices we re beingfully

and prope rly

undertaken and pe rfor

med. 83. The [Tri-State D efe ndants and other defe ndants] neglig ently and c are le ssl y fa ile d to dis c ha

rg e the se dutie s. 84

. A s a p r o xi m a t e c a

u s e o f th e . . . n e g l i g e n c e [o f the Tr i- Sta te Def endants a nd other de fenda

nts] , Plai nti f

f s h a v e s u f f e r e d s e rious and se ve re me nta l in

jur ie s and

e mot ion a l di str e ss that no re a so na ble person c ould be expected to endur e or a dequate ly cope w ith. * * * (Capitalization and underlining in orig inal). As I understand the se alleg ations, the ca uses of a ction be inga sse rt e d a

re no t prem is ed up on “ the int e rf e re nc e wi th a

de a d b od

y ” c on c e pt c on ta ine d in Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 868 (1965) and the old ca se of Hil l v . T ra v e lers ’ Ins. Co ., 294 1 S.W . 1097 (Tenn. 1927) , but rather upon the conc ept of outrag eous conduct found in RestatementSee Re s t a t e me n t ( Se c on d) of T or t s §§ 31 2, 31 3, 43 6, a n d 4 36 A. 2 -5- ( S e c o n d ) o f

T o rt s § 4 6 an d o th e r s e c t i o n s o f th e R e s t a t e m e n t ( S e c o n d ) o f T o rt s . S t a t e d

an o th e r w ay, 2 the “r ight” in “outrag eous conduc t” ca ses is the rig ht to be fre e fr o m t h e i n fl i cti on of ser ious em otional distress, seeRe s tate me n t ( Se c o n d ) o f T o rts § 4 6 , c mt

. b

. , a s o p p o s e d to th e s ur

viving spouse’s right t o be free from i nterfe renc e with her ex clusive control of the de cea sed’s body

. See Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 868, cmt. a. Th e co n ce p t of outrag eous conduc t was addr essed in the r elatively rec ent ca se of Doe v

. Roman Ca tho lic

Dioc ese of Na shv ill e , 154 S.W .3d 22 (T en n . 2 0 0 5 ). In Doe , v ic tim s o f c hil d mol e statio n b y

a fo rm e r p ri e st br ou g ht s uit a g a ins t th e Catho lic dio c e se of wh ic h th e pr ie st previously

had bee n a member

. Id . at 24 , 2 8. Th e pla int if fs a lle g e d th a t the dio c e se ha d b e e n guil ty of re ckless conduc t in the nature of outrag eous ac ts and omissions that ultimately inflicted emotional harm on the pla intiffs. Id . at 30. The tria l court g rante d the diocese summary judgme nt and the Court of Appea ls affirme d. Id . In our op ini on , we he ld “ that re c kle ss inf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss must be based on c onduct that was dire cted at the plaintiff.” Id

. at 24. The Supreme Court disag ree d with our conc lusion. I t gr anted permission to a ppeal and reve rsed the lower c ourts. The Hig h Court state d th a t Doe

pr e se nte d a qu e sti on

of fi rs t im pr e ssi on . T he Court

he ld t hat “ a c la im f or re c kle ss infliction of emotional distress need not be based upon conduct that was directed at a spec ific per son or that occ urre d in the prese nce of the plaintiff.” Id

. at 43. As in Doe , the Tri-State D efe ndants had no direc t contact or

relationship wit h Terr

y Crawf ord and th e al l ege d outrag eous conduc t did not occur in her pre sence . In the course of its opinion, the S upreme Court in Doe state d th e re qu ir e me nts fo r r e c kle ss inf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss:

Thre e e le me nts are re qu ir e d: f ir st, t he c on du c t c omp la ine d o f m us t hav e been r e c kle ss; se c on d, the c on du c t mu st h ave be e n s o outrag e o u s th a t i t i s n o t t o le r a te d b y c iv il iz e d s o c ie ty ; t

h ir d , the c o n d u c tc o m p l a i n e d

o f mu s th av e c a

u s e d s e r i o u s m e n t a l i n

j ur y . In order to mount a prima fac ie ca se, the plaintiff ne ed not alleg e that the de fe nd ant’ s r e c kle ss m isco nd uc t ha s b e e n d ir e c te d at a sp e c if ic person or that it had occur

red in the pla intiff’s pre sence . Id . at 41 (c itation omit ted). The Court in Doe d e f i n e d th e c o n c e p to f

r e c k l e s s n e s s thu s l y: Recklessne ss is a hy

brid conc ept which r esembles both neg li gence and int e nt, y e t w hic h is dis tin c t f ro m bo th and can

be re du c e d to neith er . “A person a cts intentionally when it is the person’ s conscious objec tive or desire to eng ag e in the conduc t or ca use the result.” Althoug h the re ckless ac tor intends to act or not t o act, the re c kle ss a c tor

la c ks the “ c on sc iou s o bje c tiv e or de sir e ” to e ng a g e in harmful c onduct or to ca

use a ha rmful re sult. (“[ R ]ecklessness and-6- ne g lig e nc e are inc omp a tib le wi th de sir e or int e nti on .” ); (T he re c kle ss actor “does not intentionally

harm a nother, but he intentionally or consciously

runs a ve ry

serious risk wit h no g ood rea son to do so.”). Neve rtheless, re cklessness c ontains an aware ness component similar to intentional conduct which i s not demanded of neg lige nce. (R e c kle ssn e ss “ e nta ils a me nt a l e le me nt t

hat is no t ne c e ssa

ri ly re qu ir e d to est a

bli shg ro ss n e g lig e nc e .” ); (“ Th e e le me nt o f a wa re ne ss of risk

. . . does distinguish betwee n rec klessness and ne g lige nce.” ). Fur ther, a lthough reckle ssness is ty pically a criterion for de termining wh e the r pun iti ve dama g e s ar e wa rr ante d in ne g lig e nc e c a se s, c la ims for r eckle ss infliction of emotional distress lack an unde rlying neg lige nce c laim. There fo re, a rec klessness ana ly sis is som ething unique which differ s from analy ses based strictly on either intent or neg lige nce. Courts requiring the direc ted-at element g ener ally have fa ile d to re c og nize and to ad dr e ss the un iqu e qu a lit ie s o f r e c kle ssn e ss. Id . at 38 . ( c itatio ns omi tte d) . In my op ini on , th e c on c e pts e mbo die d in the se tw o q uo te s f ro m Doe fit the instant case like a g love. B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g , I

wo uld ho ld t hat T e ri Cr awf

or d ha s st a te d in

he r c omp la int

a cause o f a c ti o na g a in s t t

h e T r i- St a te in d iv id

u a ls an d e n ti ti e s f o r r e c k le s s in f

li c ti o no f emotional dis tr e ss. Iwo uld

a lso ho ld t

hat th e c omp la int

be fo re us is s uf

fi c ie nt t o s tate a

c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t the same defenda

nts for intentional infliction of the same c ondition. Finally , Ibelieve the plaintiff has sufficiently alleg ed a cause of action for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. Iexpress no opinion as t o w h e th e r

M s . Cr aw f

o r d c anp r o v e th e e s s e n ti a l e le me n ts o f an y o r a ll o f h e r a ll e g ed cause s of ac tion. Ac c or din g ly , I

c on c ur in p art and re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt i n p art

.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE