FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT NOVEMB ER 29, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble Robert L . Vining, Jr., United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District * of Ge org ia, sitting by

desig nation. [PUBLIS H]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1435 4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 03-60237 -CR- JIC UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A,
Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee,
ve rs us GLENN F. STRAUB, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (N ove m be r 29, 200 7) Befo re ANDERSON an d P RYOR, Ci rcu itJu dg es , and VINING, District Judge. * PRY OR, Circuit Judge:2

Glenn Stra

ub appeals his conviction of crim inal contem pt for violating a court order that prohibited h is presence on the pr emis es of Br owar d Yac hts while an unf ini she d hu ll tha t be lon ge d to S ea gr ove T ra din g, I nc . , w as r em ove d f ro m the prem ises. See 18 U .S .C. § 401(3). Str aub argues that the evidence adduced at trial
w as ins uf fi ci en t t o su

ppor t hi s c onvi ct ionbe ca

use the or de r w as not

law fu l and
re as ona bly spe ci fi c and

a ny vio la tio n of

the or de r w as not

w ill fu l. B ef

or e re ac hin g the m er its , w e co nc lud e tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt had jur isd ic tio n ov er the c ha rg e of
c r i m i n al co n t emp tev en t h o u g h t h e c o u rt t h at i s s u ed t h e o rd erl ac k ed m a r i t i me j urisdictio n over the underly ing cont roversy about the un fi nished h ull. W e re j ect Stra ub’ s arg um en ts on the m er its , be ca use the e vid en ce that he r ef use d to le av e the prem ises after a deputy m arshal re ad to Straub the relevant portion of the order w as
s u f f i c i e n tt o s up p o rth i s c o n v i c t i o n . We a f f i rm. I. BACKG ROUND Glenn Stra

ub was the president of Brow ard Y acht s, I nc., which provided dockage, storage, and haul-out services for a partially com pleted y acht known as D es tin y H ull tha t wa s ow ne d by S ea gr ove T ra din g, I nc . B ro w ar d Y ac hts f ile d an in
rem action against the hu ll to recover unpaid fees. On June 23, 2003 , the district
co urt di sm iss ed

the a ct ionf

or la ck of subject m at ter

j ur isd ic tio n be ca

use the
u n f i n i s h e d h u l l d i dn o tqu a l i f y a s av e s s e l f

o r t h e p u r p o s e o f i n v o k i n g ma r i t i me3

j ur isd ic tio n, a nd w e af

fi rm ed
. B ro w ar d Ya ch ts v. V es se l Kn ow n a s D es tin y H ull , 107 Fed. App’ x 183 (11th Cir. 2004) (unpubli shed table decision ). On Mar ch 6, 20 03, b efore the district court dism issed the suit, the court issued
a w ar rant f or the a rr es t of

the hul l. O n Marc h 19, 2003 , the dis tr ic t co urt or de re d th e
re le as e of the hul l i n r et

ur n fo r a bond

pos te d by

S ea gr ove . B ec au se the part ie s c oul d not agree on the term s and logi stics of the transfer, the district court issued a serie s of orders clar ify ing th e obligatio ns of the parties. O n April 15 , 2 003, the district court issued an order that outli ned the procedure for the transfer an d prohibit ed Stra ub’ s pr es en ce on the pr em ise s duri ng the r em ova l: A cc or din gly , it

is he re by O RD E RE D that B ro w ar d sh al l m ak e the T rave lif t a va il ab le to Se ag ro ve ’ s C ontra ct or s, a t su chti m e as the y c an a ga in b e m obi liz ed , f

or use in m ovi ng H ull N o. 4 fr om Br ow ar d’ s shed int o th e w at er . S ea gr ove m ay a lso use c rane s, tr

uc ks o r oth er

e qui pm en t ne ce ssary

to as sis t i n th e rem oval o f t h e h ull, engines, and any of its other property

still located o n Br o wa rd ’s p re m i s e s , a n dBr o wa rd s h al l p ro v i d e S ea g ro v e’s Co nt r a c t or s f ull a cc es s to it s pr em ise s, inc lud ing the launc hin g f ac ili tie s, fo r suc h pu rp ose s. Upon pla ce m en t of H ull N o. 4 i n th e w at er , S ea gr ove w ill be r es pons ibl e fo r tow ing H ull N o. 4 t o anothe r loc at ionof it s ch oosi n g . S e ag ro ve w ill pr ovi de Me gaMari ne a nd B ro w ar d tw en ty f our ho ur s’ writ te n n ot ic e o f it s i nt en t t o u se th e Trav el ift
. IT I S FU RT H E R O RD E RE D that the Unit ed S ta te s M ar sha l i s hereby direc t ed to use such force as m ay be necessary

to ensure that Se ag ro ve ’ s C ontra ct or s have the uno bstru ct ed use of the T rav el if

t and ha ve un obstr

uc te d a cc es s to Br ow ar d’ s pr em ise s and the launc hin g fa ci l i t i es as o rd er ed h er ei n u n t i l Hu l l No
. 4 , t h e e n g i n es , a n dSe ag ro v e’s4

oth er pr ope rty a re r em ove d fro m

Br ow ar d’ s pr em ise s, a nd t o pr ev en t an y party , thi rd pa rty , or oth er pe rs on o r en tity f ro m int er fe ri ng w ith , or otherwise o b structing o r preventing the m ove from taking pl ace when Se ag ro ve ’ s C ontra ct or s are m obi liz ed
.

. . . . IT I S FU RT H E R O RD E RE D that M r. G le nn S tr au b shal l no t i n t er fe re i n an y m an n er wi t h t h e r emo v al o f H u l l No . 4 an dSe ag ro v e’s oth er pr ope rty , a nd s ha ll not

be pr es en t onBr ow ar d’ s pr em ise s duri ng the r em ova l. T he hul l w as re m ove d fr om Br ow ar d’ s pr ope rty on Apr il 18, 200 3. Whil e the hull was in the wa ter secured to a sl ip, Straub arrived at the facility
. De putyUnited States Mar shal Jerom e Retto re ad to Straub the relevant po rt i o n s o f the order that pr ohi bit ed

S tr au b’ s pr es en ce on the pr em ise s. R et to t old S tr au b tha t he w oul d be he ld in c ont em pt if he re m ai ne d onthe pr ope rty a nd tha t, if

he w as a rr es te d, he c oul d no t br ing pe rs ona l pr ope rty

w ith him
. Stra

ub the n en te re d the Br ow ar d Y ac hts bui ldi ng to l eave his pe rs ona l e ff

ec ts. Whe n S tr au

b r et ur ne d, Re tto tol d S tr au

b th at he c oul d
av oid a rr es t i f he w ai te d inthe pa rk ing lot
. S tr au b r ef use d to le av e an d w as a rr es te d. Af ter a bench trial before a

m agistrate j udge, Stra

ub wa s convicted of crim inal contem pt. Str aub appealed the j udgm ent to the dist rict court, an d the district court af fi rm ed
. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc luded that ( 1) S tr au

b ha d f ai le d to pr es er

ve f or ap pe al his a rg um en ts a

bout ( a) the law fu lness of

the und er ly ing or de r an d th e applicabilityof the collateral bar rule and (b) the specificity of the term “ prem ises”;5

( 2 ) t h e o r d e r

wa s r e a s o n ab l y s p e c i f

i c ; a n d( 3 ) S t r aub v i o l a t e dt h e o r d e r wi l l f u l l y. II. ST AN DA RD S OF RE VIEW To r eview the suff

iciency of the evi d en ce that supp orts an order of cr im inal
co nte m pt, w e de te rm ine w he the r the e vid en ce , co nstru ed in the lig ht m ost f av or ab le to the g o v ernm ent, per

m its a finding of guilt bey ond a reasonable doub t. U nited St at es v. Be rn ar din e, 237 F. 3d 1279 , 1281 –82 (1 1th Ci r. 200 1)
. Whe n th e de fe ndant doe s no t pr es er

ve a n arg um en t f

or appe al , w e re vie w f

or pla in e rr or , U nit ed

S ta te s v. L ew is, 492 F
. 3d 1 219, 122 1–22 ( 11th C ir
. 200 7) , w hic h r equir es the pe tit ion er to establish (1) th at t here w as err or; (2) that w as plain; (3) that aff ected his subs tantial ri ght s; and ( 4) that se ri ousl y a ff ec te d th e fa ir

ne ss, int eg ri ty , or

pub lic r ep uta tio n of

the j udicial proceeding. Brough v. Im perial Ster ling Ltd., 297 F. 3d 11 72, 1180 (11t h Cir. 2002 ) (c iting United State s v. H u m p h re y, 164 F.3d 585, 588 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999)). A n e rr or is pla in i f it is “ cl ear” or “ obvi ous. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. O lano, 507 U
. S. 725 , 73 4, 1 13 S. Ct. 1 77 0, 1 77 7 (1 99 3)
. III. D ISCU SSION Our discussion is divid ed in tw o parts. First, we consider sua spon te w hether the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d j ur isd ic tio n ov er the ch ar ge of cr im ina l c ont em pt e ve n th ough the c ourt tha t i ssu ed

the or de r la ck ed subj ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n ov er the und er ly ing
co ntr ove rs y . W e ho ld tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d j ur isd ic tio n ov er the c ha rg e of6

crim inal contem

pt. Se cond, w e consider Stra ub ’s ar g um ent that the evidence wa s insufficient to su pport his conviction because th e g overnm ent did not establish th at the order w as law ful and reasonably specific and that he willfully violated th e order. We c o n c l u d e t h a tS t r aub ’s a r g u me n t s f a i l , a n dw e a f

f i rm. A
. T he D istric t C

ourt H ad J uri sdi ct ion ov er

the Ch arge of Cr im ina l C ont em pt. Be fo re w e co nsi de r the m er its of the appe al , w e ad dr es s su a spon te w he the r the district court had subject m atter j urisdictio n over a char ge of crim inal contem pt based on the vio la tio n of

a n or de r iss ue d by a co urt tha t l ac ke d su bj ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n
ove r the und er ly ing c ontro ve rs y . S ee E ag er tonv. V al ua tions, I nc . , 698 F
. 2d 1 115, 1118 (11th Cir. 1983). At our r equest, the parties a ddressed this issue in th ei r oral arg um en ts. W e co nc lud e tha t, notw ith standi ng the ult im at e dis m iss al of the underly ing controversy for lack of s ubjec t m atter j urisdictio n, the district court had j ur isd ic tio n ov er

the c ha rg e of

c ri m ina l c ont em

pt. The S uprem e Court has held that a district court m ay im pose sanctions , under Fe de ra l Rul e of Ci vil Pr oc ed ur e 11, fo r co nduc t tha t occ ur re d duri ng a

pr oc ee din g in which the court lacked su bje ct m atter jurisdiction, Willy v. Coastal C orp., 503 U.S
. 131, 112 S
. Ct
. 107 6 ( 1992 ), a nd the tw o- fo ld r ea soni ng o f tha t de ci sio n is ins tr uc tiv e. Fi rs t, the W ill y Co urt ex pla ine d tha t, be ca use the im

posi tio n of

Ru le 11
sanc tions d id n ot r equir e ana sse ssm en t of the le ga l m er its of

the c om pla int , the7

district court did not adj udicate a controversy over which it lacked j urisdictio n when it im pose d th e sanc tio ns. I d. a t 13 8, 112 S
. Ct
. a t 10 80

– 81. Secon d , t h e C ourt distin guish ed Rule 11 sanctions from civil contem pt, w hich requires subject m atter j ur isd ic tio n ov er

the und er ly ing c ontro ve rs y . I d. a t 13 8

– 39, 112 S. Ct. at 1081; see al so U
. S. Catho lic Co nf

er en ce v. Abortio n R igh ts M obi liz at ion , I nc . , 487 U
. S. 72, 76

– 80, 108 S. Ct . 2 268, 227 0

– 73 ( 1988 ). C ivi l c ont em pt i s r em ed ia l and a im s to fo rce c om pl ia nc e wit h an ord er of the cou rt. Gom pe rs v. Bu ck ’s Sto ve & Ran ge Co ., 221 U
. S. 418, 441

– 42, 31 S. Ct
. 492, 498 (1 911)
. T he pun ish m en t f or c ivi l c ont em

pt
co nti nue s un til the co nte m nor ch oose s to c om

ply w iththe or de r. I d. a t 44 2, 31 S
. Ct
. at 498. Rule 11 sanctions, in c ontrast, are puni tive. W illy , 503 U. S. at 139, 112 S. Ct
. a t 1081. T he ir pur

pose is to punis h a party

w ho h as a lr ea dy

vio la te d th e ru le s of th e co ur t. Id
. T he dif fe re nc e in pur

pose be tw ee n asanc tio n f or c ivi l c ont em

pt and a pun iti ve
sanc tio n unde r Ru le 11 de te rm ine s w he the r the abse nc e of sub j ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n in the unde rl y ing pr oc ee din g a ff ec ts the va lid ity

of the sanc tio n. T he int er es t of the court in levy ing sanctio ns for civil contem pt dis ap p ea rs if the court lac ks sub j ect
m at te r j ur isd ic tio n, be ca

use the pur

pose of c ivi l c ont em

pt i s to f or ce c om pli an ce w ith
anor de r. I d. T he int er es t of the co urt in im posi ng puni tiv e sanc tio ns unde r Ru le 11 does not disappear if the court lac ks sub j ect m att er ju ris diction , bec ause the court8

re ta ins a n in te re st i n part ie s’ obe die nc e to i ts a uth or ity
. I d. Both aspects of the reasoning of W illy apply to Straub’ s convicti on

for cr im inal contem pt. Fir st, as with Rule 1 1 sanctions , the adj udication of a c harge of cr im inal
co nte m pt d oe s no t r equir e ana sse ssm en t of the le ga l m eri ts of

the und er ly ing
co ntr ove rs y , so the co urt tha t hears the c ri m ina l c ont em pt c ha rg e doe s no t a dj udi ca te
a co ntrov ers y ov er

w hic h it la ck s j ur isd ic tio n. Whe re as “ [p ] ro ce ed ing s f or c ivi l
co nte m pt are be tw ee n th e or igi na l part ie s, a nd are ins tit ute d and tri ed

a s a part of

the
m ai n c au se [, ]
. . . pr oc ee din gs a t l awf or c ri m ina l c ont em

pt are be tw ee n th e publ ic a nd the defendant, and ar e not a p ar t o f the original cause.” Gom pers, 221 U.S . a t 444– 4 5, 31 S. Ct. at 499. Se cond, like Rule 11 sanctions , a sanction for crim inal
co nte m pt i s punit ive an d aim s to vin dic at e the auth or ity of the c ourt. I d. a t 44 1, 31 S. Ct
. a t 49 8. R

ule 11 s an ct ion s an d crim ina l c ont em pt b othdif

fe r fr om c ivi l
co nte m pt, w hic h is r em ed ia l and a im s to fo rc e co m pli an ce w ith an or de r of

the c ourt. Id
. Although we have stated in dicta that “ if th e is suing court lacks subjec t-m atter j urisdictio n over the underly ing controversy or p ersonal j urisdictio n over the parties to i t, it s or de r m ay

be vi ol ate d w ithim

puni ty , ” Inr e N ova k, 932 F
. 2d 1 397, 140 1 (1 1th Ci r . 1 9 9 1 ) ( c i t i n g I n r e G r e e n , 3 6 9 U
. S
. 6 8 9 , 8 2 S
. C t . 1 1 1 4 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; E x pa rt e Fi sk, 113 U.S. 713 , 718 , 5 S
. Ct
. 724 , 726 ( 1885 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. D ic kin son, 4659

F. 2 d4 9 6 , 5 1 1 (5 t h Ci r. 1 9 7 2 )) , t h at l an g u ag e s h o u l db e c o n s t ru ed n ar ro wl y. W e
re lie d up on tw o de ci sio ns o f the S upr em e Co urt in whi ch the c ourt tha t i ssu ed the order either lacked or m ight h ave lacked j urisdictio n to issue the order itself, and each of these decisions is distin guish able. The f irst decision we cited in our dicta in Novak was Fisk, in which the court tha t i ssu ed

the or de r ha d su

bj ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n ove r the unde rl y ing c ontro ve rs y but lacked jurisdiction to is sue the order. Fisk, 113 U. S. at 726, 5 S. Ct. at 730. In Fi sk, af ed er al c ourt ha d or dered the de fe ndant i n ac ivi l su it to s ubm it to a de posi tio n, but

the S upr em e Co urt de te rm ine d th at af ed er al st at ute pr ohi bit ed

the
co urt f ro m or de ri ng the de posi tio n. 113 U
. S. 713, 5 S
. Ct
. 724
. T he dis tr ic t c ourt i n Stra ub’ s c as e, in co ntr as t, la ck ed j ur isd ic tio n ov er

the und er ly ing co ntr ove rs y but iss ue d an or de r tha t w as oth er w ise w ith in the auth or ity of the c ourt. The second dec ision we cited in N ovak w as Gr een, in which the co u rt t hat issued th e order m ight h ave lacked j urisdictio n to iss ue the order as a result of feder al pr ee m pti on. I n G re en , astate c ourt ha d is sued a res tra ini ng o rd er that pr ohi bit ed

a uni on f ro m pic ke tin g. 369 U
. S. a t 69 0, 82 S
. Ct
. a t 11 15. T he S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t the state c ourt vi ola te d th e de fe ndant’ s du e pr oc es s r igh ts w he n it he ld him in
co nte m pt w ith out

pr ovi din g hi m

w ithahe ar ing to es ta

bli sh w he the r the r es tr ai nin g order w as preem

pted by federa l law. Id. at 692– 93, 82 S
. Ct. at 1116 –17. The Court10

explained that th e contem pt convi ction could not stand if the re s t rain ing order was pr ee m pte d by f ed er al law . I d. a t 69 2, 82 S
. Ct
. a t 11 17. G re en , li ke Fis k, di d no t invo lve as i tua t i ona na l og ou s t o S t r aub ’ s c a se , i n w hi c h t he c ourtl a c ke d subj ect
m atter j urisdictio n over the underly ing cont roversy but iss ued an order that w as oth er w ise w ith in i ts a

uth or ity
. T he dic tain D ic kin son, w hic h w as ade ci sio n of our pr ed ec es sor

c ourt tha t we al so ci te d inN ova k, r el ie d larg el y on G re en . D ic kin son, 46 5 F .2d at 5 11 & n .16
. T he de ci sio n of

the Su pr em e Co urt in W ill y

r es olv es thi s is sue . W e co nc lud e that the district court had subje ct m atter j urisdictio n to r esolve the charge of cr im inal contem pt against Straub. O ur dicta in Novak is inappos ite. B
. Straub ’s A rgum en ts T hat the E vi de nc e W

as I nsuf fic ie nt F ail

. To convict Straub of crim inal contem pt, the governm ent had to establis h that the c ourt e nte re d alaw fu l or de r of r eas on ab le spe ci fi ci ty

that S tr au

b w ill fu lly vio la te d, Be rn ar din e, 237 F
. 3d a t 12 82 ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. Mayna rd , 933 F. 2d 918, 920 ( 11 th Ci r. 19 91) ( pe r curi am))
. S tr au b m ak es thr ee a rg um en ts tha t the
ev ide nc e ag ai nst

him w as in suf

fi ci en t. F ir st, S tr au

b arg ue s th at

the or de r w as not law fu l be ca

use it f el l w ith in tw o e xc ep tio ns t o th e co llate ra l bar ru le , w hic h pr ev en ts defendants in crim inal contem pt proceedings from raising the invalid ity of the order
as a de fen se . S ec ond, S tr au b arg ue s th at

the or de r w as not

r ea sona bly spe ci fi c11

because the term s “ rem oval” and “ prem ises” we re am bigu ous. Third, Straub ar gues tha t hi s vi ola tio n of

the or de r w as not

w ill fu l. E ac h of

the se a rg um en ts f

ai ls. 1. S traub’ s Ar gum ents About the Law fulness of the Order and the Collateral Bar Ru le F ai l. St rau b a rg ue s t ha t t he ord er t ha t h e was ch arg edwit h v io la ti ng fel l wi th in two
ex ce pti ons to the c oll at er al bar ru le a nd, a s a re sul t, w as not “ law fu l. ” O rd inari ly , the
co llate ra l bar ru le ope rate s to pr ev en t de fe ndants in cr im ina l c ont em pt p ro ce ed ing s fr om r ai sin g th e inval idi ty

of the or de r as ade fe nse . N ova k, 932 F
. 2d a t 14 00–0 1; D ic kin son, 465 F
. 2d at 50 9– 10 . A d ef en da nt m ay

appe al the or de r but

m ay not d i s o b e y t h e o r d e r

a n dc h a l l e n g e i tc o l l a t e r a l l y i n ac r i m i n a l c o n t e m

p tp r o ce ed ing unl es s c er ta in exc ep tio ns ar e m et . N ova k, 932 F. 2d at 1401 –03; D ic kin son, 465 F. 2d at 511 –12. S tr au

b arg ue s th at

“ ad equa te a nd e ff

ec tiv e re m ed ie s [ did

not ] e xis t f

or
or de rl y r ev ie w of the c ha lle nge d r

uli ng, ” N ova k, 932 F. 2d a t 14 01; a cc or d D ic kin son, 465 F. 2d a t 51 1, a nd tha t the or de r “ requir e[ d] a n ir re tr ie vable sur

re nde r of
co nst itu tio na l gu ar an te es , ” N ova k, 932 F
. 2d a t 14 01; D ic kin son, 465 F
. 2d a t 51 1. T he gov er

nm en t arg ue s th at

our r ev ie w of

thi s is sue is fo r pla in e rr or , but Straub argues t hat he preserved this issue in h is m otion for a j udgm ent of acquittal under Rule 29 when he argued that the governm ent m ust prov e that the court entere d a law ful order of reasonable s pecificity
. Ac cording to Straub, his m otion preserved12

his argum ent about th e collater al b ar rule because an order that falls w ithin an
ex ce ption to the c oll at er al bar ru le is not a“ law fu l or de r” a s r equir ed by se ct ion 401( 3)
. T o pr es er

ve a n is sue f

or appe al , “ one m

ust ra ise an obj ec tio n th at

is suf fi ci en t to apprise the trial court and the oppos ing party of the particular ground s upon which ap pe llate r el ie f w ill la te r be soug ht. ” U nit ed St at es v. D en nis , 786 F. 2d 1 029, 104 2 (1 1thCi r. 198 6)
. T he obj ec tio n m ust be r ai se d “ in s uc h cl ear an d si m ple langua ge tha t the tr ia l cour

t m ay not m isunde rs tand it. ” U nit ed St at es v. Ma sse y , 443 F. 3d 8 14, 819 (11t h Cir. 2006 ) (quoting Un i t ed States v. Riggs, 967 F.2d 561, 565 (11th Cir. 1992 )) ( internal quotatio n m ark om itted). Stra ub’ s ob j ec tio n w as insuff

ic ie nt t o a

ppr ise the c ourt of

the gr ound s f

or appeal. Straub d id not raise it in such clear and sim ple language that the trial court could no t m isund erstand. A fter obj ecting that the order had not been a lawf ul order of r ea sona ble spe ci fi ci ty , S tr au

b’s coun se l e xpl ai ne d on ly w hy he be lie ve d th at

the order w as not reasonably

specific. Stra

ub’s c ouns el failed to sugg est that he intended to raise an objec tion based on the collateral bar rule or on the ground that the order
wa s not law ful. Beca

use Straub did not preserve this ar gum ent for appeal, we review fo r pla in e rr or . S ee Br ough , 297 F
. 3d a t 11 80. Straub argues that because the hull w as rem oved on ly three day s after

the order of Apr il 15 w as en te re d, “ ad equa te an d ef fe ct ive re m ed ie s [ did

not ] e xis t f

or or de rl y13

re vie w of the c ha lle nge d r

uli ng. ” N ova k, 932 F
. 2d a t 1401; a cc or d D ic kin son, 465 F. 2d a t 51 1. I n W al ke r v. Ci ty of Bi rm ing ham , t he S upr em e Co urt r ej ec te d th e argum ent that adequate rem edies did not exist when two day s separated the issuance of an ex pa rt e inj unc tio n and the m ar ch tha t it e nj oin ed
. 388 U
. S. 307 , 318

– 19, 87 S. Ct
. 1824 , 1831 (1 967)
. In the lig ht of W al ke r, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t c om m it pla in
error . Stra

ub al so ar gue s tha t be ca

use the or de r re qui re d him to sur re nde r te m

por ar ily his pro pe rt y r i gh t s i n t he B r ow a r d Y a c ht s f a c i l i t y a nd t he T r a ve l i f

t , t he order

“ re qui re [d ] a n ir

re tr ie vable sur

re nde r of co nst itu tio na l guar an te es . ” N ova k, 932 F
. 2d at 140 1; D ic kin son, 465 F.2 d at 5 11. W e ha ve sug ge ste d th at to fa ll w ith in this
ex ce pti on the or de r m

ust c ause irr epar ab le harm by ir re voc ab ly de pr ivi ng the
co nte m nor of ac onst itu tio na l r igh t. S ee D ic kin son, 465 F. 2d a t 51 2

– 13. Stra ub cites
no a uth or it y fo r the pr opos iti on tha t r equir ing his te m por ar y a bse nc e fr om

the pr ope rty w as a n ir

re voc ab le de pr iva tio n. A ga in , t he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t c om m it plain error. 2. T he Or der W as Reasonably Specific
. Stra ub ne xt ar gue s th at

the or de r tha t he w as c ha rg ed w ithvio la tin g w as not reasonably

specific. D eterm ining whether an order is re asonablyspecific inv o l v es
a fa ct ua l i nqui ry

that m ust co ns id er the c ont ex t i n w hic h th e or de r w as e nte re d and14

the audi en ce to w hi ch th e or de r w as a ddr es se d. B er na rd ine , 237 F
. 3d a t 12 82 (q uo ti ng In re McDo na ld , 81 9 F.2d10 20 , 10 24 (11 th Cir . 19 87 ) (p er cu ria m )). “ An
or de r m ee ts the ‘ re as ona

ble spe ci fi ci ty ’ re qui re m en t only if it is a ‘ cl ear, de fi nit e, a nd
unam bigu ous’ order

requiring the action in qu estion.” In re E.I . DuPont De Ne m ours & Co. –Benlate L itigatio n, 99 F. 3d 363, 370 (11t h Cir. 1996 ) (quoting United States v. K oblit z, 803 F.2d 1523 , 1527 (11th Cir. 1986)). Straub argues that the order w as not r ea sona bly spe ci fi c be ca

use the te rm

“ re m ova l” c oul d have m eant “ m ove d f ro m the shed to th e w ater” instead of “ fully launched and towed aw ay .” St raub ’ s a r g u m e n tf

a i l s . T h e o r d e r

o f Ap r i l 1 5 p r o v i d e di n s t r u c t i o n s f or

“ m ovi ng H ull N o. 4 f

ro m Br ow ar d’ s shed i nto the w at er ” an d f or “ re m ova l of

the h u l l , e n g i n es , a n dan y o f [ Se ag ro v e’s ] ot h erp ro p er t y s t i l l l o ca t ed o n Br o wa rd ’s prem ises.” The purpose of the order would have been underm ined if it had prohibi ted Stra ub’ s int er fe re nc e w ith the tr an sf er of the hul l t o th e w at er but not the tow ing of the hull. The evidence, view ed in t h e l i g h t m ost favorable to the gov ernm ent, w as suf fi ci en t t o su

ppor t the c onc lus ionthat the or de r w as r ea sona bly spe ci fi c ab out

the
m ean in g o f th e te rm

“ rem ov al .” Stra ub a lso a rg ue s that the te rm “ pr em ise s” w as not

r ea sona bly spe ci fi c be ca use it le ft unc le ar w he the r the w at er

a nd b oa t sl ip w er e inc lud ed w ith in the
m eanin g of “ pr em ise s. ” Be ca use S tr au b di d no t r ai se thi s is sue dur ing the c ont em pt15

pr oc ee din g, w e re vie w f

or pla in er ro r. Se e Br ough , 297 F. 3d a t 11 80. A lth oughthe
or de r of Apr il 15 r ef

er re d ini tia lly

to the “ pr em ise s” a s “ inc lud ing the launc hin g fa ci lit ie s” but la te r lis te d the “ pr em ise s” an d the “ launc hin g fa ci lit ie s” se pa rate ly , the p u rp o s e o f t h e o rd er

wo u l d h av e b ee n u n d er m i n ed i f i th ad n o tp ro h i b i t ed St ra ub ’s pr es en ce a t the launc hin g fa ci li ty . I t w as not pla in e rr or

f or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light m ost f avorable to the governm ent, w as sufficient to determ ine that the order w as rea sonablyspecific about the term

“ pr em is es .” 3. T he V iol at ionW as W ill fu l. Straub argues that he did not w illfully violate the order because the order w as
am bigu ous. W illfulness “ m eans a d eliberate or intended violatio n, as dis tingu ished fr om a n a cc ide nta l, ina dve rt en t, or ne gli ge nt viol at ion of

a n or de r. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ba ldw in, 770 F
. 2d 1 550, 155 8 ( 11th C ir. 1 985) ( quot ing F al sta ff Br ew ing Co rp . v. Mi lle r Br ew ing Co
. , 702 F
. 2d 7 70, 782 ( 9thCi r. 1983 )) (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks
om itt ed ). S tr au

b’ s arg um en t f

ai ls. Whe n we vi ew th e ev id en ce in th e li gh t m os t fav or ab le to th e g ov ern m en t, we
co nc lu de tha t S tr au

b’ s be ha vio r w as not

the pr oduc t of

r ea sona ble c onf usi on o r
m isunde rs tandi ng. Whil e Stra ub stood at

the launc hin g f

ac ili ty , Re tto w ar

ne d S tr au b
se ve ra l t im es that he woul d be a rr es te d if he did not le av e the pr em ise s, a nd R et to16

re ad to Stra

ub the re le va nt portio n of the or de r of Apr il 15. Stra ub e ve n w en t i nsi de the Br ow ar d Y ac hts bui ldi ng t o le av e his pe rs ona l ef fe ct s af te r Re tto inf

orm ed him tha t i f he w as a rr es te d he c oul d not br ing pe rs ona l pr ope rty w ith him
. A ft er S tr au b
re tur ne d, Re tto a dvi se d Stra

ub tha t he c oul d w ai t i n th e park ing lot , but S tr au b st ill refused to l e a ve . T hi s e vi de nc e w a s m or e t han su f f i c i e nt t o su pp or taf i nd i ng t ha t S t r aub v i o l a t e dt h e o r d e r

wi l l f u l l y. IV. C ONC LUS ION Stra ub’ s c ri m ina l c ont em

pt c onvi ct ionis AF FIRMED
.