In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-22-00018-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF L.M., A CHILD

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Panola County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018-006

Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Stevens
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

On October 14, 2019, the Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition 

to modify the trial court’s prior order1that denied the Department’s prior petition to terminate

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children, L.M. and K.M.2 After a final hearing, the 

trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to L.M.

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under statutory grounds (D), (E), (O), and 

(P) of the Texas Family Code4and terminated Father’s parental rights under statutory grounds 

(C) and (E) of the Texas Family Code.5 The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of L.M. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(2).

Mother and Father both appeal. Mother’s attorney has filed an Anders brief with this 

Court arguing that there are no non-frivolous issues that can be raised on appeal. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967). Father, however, argues that the trial court erred when 

the trial court failed to admonish him of his right to be represented by counsel and failed to 

appoint him counsel even though he was indigent.

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1The prior order appointed the Department the permanent managing conservator of the children and appointed

Mother possessory conservator. 

2To protect the identities of the children, we refer to them by their initials and to their parents as “Mother” and 

“Father.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).

3K.M. was eighteen years old at the time the final order on the motion to modify was entered. 

4See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P).

5See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(C), (E).

6On appeal, Father also challenges the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s 

statutory grounds and best-interest findings. Because his due process complaint is dispositive of this appeal, we do 

not need to address these issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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Because we agree that there are no meritorious grounds for reversal of the trial court’s 

order terminating Mother’s parental rights to her children, we affirm the trial court’s order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. However, because we find that the trial court erred when it 

failed to admonish Father of his right to counsel as required by Section 107.013(a-1) of the 

Texas Family Code, we reverse the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights and 

remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

I. No Meritorious Grounds for Reversal of the Termination of Mother’s Parental 

Rights

Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief 

discussing the applicable law and evaluating the entire record in this case. Counsel states that 

she has reviewed the record and has found no genuinely arguable issues that could be raised on 

appeal. The brief sets out the procedural history of the case and summarizes the evidence 

elicited during the trial court proceedings. Meeting the requirements of Anders, counsel has 

provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable 

grounds to be advanced. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743–44; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding); see In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) 

(per curiam) (recognizing that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). 

On April 22, 2022, counsel mailed to Mother copies of the brief and the motion to 

withdraw. Mother was informed of her rights to review the record and file a pro se response. On 

May 24, this Court granted Mother’s pro se motion for access to the appellate record and 

forwarded a copy of the appellate record to Mother. By that same letter, this Court informed 

Mother that any pro se response was due on or before June 23. On June 29, this Court further 
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informed Mother that the case would be set for submission on the briefs on July 20. We received 

neither a pro se response from Mother nor a motion requesting an extension of time in which to 

file such a response.

We have determined that Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous. We have independently 

reviewed the entire appellate record and, like counsel, have determined that no arguable issue 

supports an appeal by Mother.

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See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005). Even so, we deny Mother’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 

27 (noting that, in parental-rights termination cases, court-appointed counsel’s duty to her client 

generally extends “through the exhaustion of appeals,” “including the filing of a petition for 

review” in the Texas Supreme Court). If Mother desires to pursue this matter in the Texas 

Supreme Court, counsel may fulfill her duty “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the 

standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 28.

II. The Trial Court Failed to Admonish Father of His Right to Counsel

On appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred when it denied him his right to 

counsel in violation of his constitutional rights. He argues that the trial court erred both when it 

failed to admonish him of his right to be represented by counsel and when it failed to appoint 

him counsel even though he was indigent. The Department does not dispute that Father was 

indigent and agrees that Father’s constitutional rights were violated by being denied appointed 

counsel. Because we agree that the trial court erred when it failed to admonish him of his right 

7Our review determined, inter alia, that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s bestinterest finding and its termination of Mother’s parental rights under statutory ground (E).
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to counsel, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights and remand 

Father’s case for a new trial.

“The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional 

dimensions.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (quoting 

Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). “Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to 

make decisions concerning ‘the care, custody, and control of their children.’” Id. (quoting Troxel 

v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). For that reason, “the termination of parental rights 

implicates fundamental interests.” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)).

The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that, when the Department seeks termination of 

parental rights, “[p]arents face a complex and nuanced family-law system that is challenging to 

navigate without the guidance of counsel.” In re B.C., 592 S.W.3d 133, 137 (Tex. 2019)

(per curiam). “Considering the importance of the fundamental rights at issue, the Legislature has 

adopted important safeguards in [the Family Code] to help ensure parents will not be deprived of 

their parental rights without due process of law.” Id. These safeguards include a “statutory 

framework [that] mandates that courts repeatedly inform unrepresented parents about their 

statutory rights so they will have an adequate opportunity to understand and invoke those rights.” 

Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.013, 263.0061, § 262.201 (Supp.).

In any suit filed by a governmental entity that seeks the termination of parental rights, 

Section 107.013 grants indigent parents the right to appointed counsel by requiring the court to

appoint an attorney for “an indigent parent of the child who responds in opposition to the 

termination.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1); In re B.C., 592 S.W.3d at 135. In 
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addition, Section 107.013 requires trial courts to admonish any parent “not represented by an 

attorney at the parent’s first appearance in court . . . of: (1) the right to be represented by an 

attorney; and (2) if the parent is indigent and appears in opposition to the suit, the right to an 

attorney ad litem appointed by the court.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a-1); In re B.C., 592 

S.W.3d at 135. 

To have an attorney appointed, a parent claiming indigence must first file an affidavit of 

indigence, and the trial court must make a determination that the parent is in fact indigent. In re 

B.C., 592 S.W.3d at 136; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(d). However, the trial court must also 

inform the parent of the necessity of filing the affidavit of indigence. In re B.C., 592 S.W.3d at 

136. Thus, at the parent’s first appearance in court, the trial court must admonish the indigent 

parent of both his right to have appointed counsel and the procedural steps to obtain appointed 

counsel.8

Here, over two years before the final hearing, Father filed his pro se answer opposing 

termination of his parental rights. In his answer, Father requested the trial court to determine that 

he was indigent and to appoint an attorney to represent him pursuant to Section 107.013. 

Although Father was subsequently notified of several permanency hearings before the final 

hearing, he failed to appear at any of those hearings. Consequently, Father’s first appearance in 

court was at the final hearing. 

8Sections 262.201 and 263.0061 of the Texas Family Code also require that these admonishments be made to

indigent parents appearing in opposition to termination at the fourteen-day full adversary hearing, at each status 

hearing, and at each permanency hearing. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.201(c), (d), 263.0061(a), (b).
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When the final hearing began, the trial court asked for announcements, and all parties

represented by counsel announced ready. Although no announcement was made for Father, the 

trial court made no inquiry to find out if Father was present. Nevertheless, when the trial began,

Father was called as the Department’s first witness. 

Even though Father was making his first appearance in court, was unrepresented by 

counsel, had made a claim of indigence, and testified as the Department’s first witness, the trial 

court never admonished him of his right to counsel, of his right to appointed counsel if he was

indigent, or of the necessity to file an affidavit of indigence in order to obtain appointed counsel. 

As a result, Father was deprived of the opportunity to understand and invoke those rights. See id.

at 137. Because the trial court failed to admonish Father of his right to appointed counsel and of 

the procedure necessary to obtain such counsel, as required by Section 107.013, the trial court 

deprived Father of his parental rights without due process of law. See id.

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 Therefore, we find

that the trial court erred.

As a result of the trial court’s failure to properly admonish Father, he was unrepresented 

at trial, where his parental rights to L.M. were terminated. Since it is undisputed that Father was 

indigent,

10 the trial court’s failure to comply with Section 107.013 was not harmless, and reversal 

is required. See id.

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In In re B.C., the trial court clearly admonished Mother of her right to counsel at her first appearance in court. In re 

B.C., 592 S.W.3d at 137. Nevertheless, because the trial court failed to admonish her of her right to counsel and the 

right to appointed counsel at subsequent hearings at which she was present, as required by Section 263.0061, the 

Supreme Court found that the trial court had reversibly erred. Id.

10As noted earlier, the Department does not dispute that Father was indigent. We also note that five days after the 

final hearing, an affidavit of indigence, with a finding that Father was indigent, was filed. In addition, in its 
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III. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.M. However, 

we reverse the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to L.M. and remand this 

case to the trial court for a new trial.

Scott E. Stevens

Justice

Date Submitted: July 20, 2022

Date Decided: July 22, 2022

termination order, entered seven weeks after the hearing, the trial court found that Father had filed an affidavit of 

indigence and appointed an attorney ad litem to represent him.