* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not

precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Hietman asserts th at his name has been misspelled throughout the litigation. His name is

William Randolph Heitman. Hietman brief. 2 n.1.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-10711

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RANDY HIETMAN, also known as Sealed dft. 4;

JOSEPH LESTER MIXON, also known as Sealed dft. 12,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:95-CR-160-G)

August 4, 1997

Before WISDOM, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Randy Hietman 1 and Joseph Lester Mixon appeal their convictions for conspiracy to

manufacture, to possess with the intent to distribute, and to distribute methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 846 . Mixon argues that the district court abused its discretion by

allowing evidence that should have been excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and

by failing to give a limit

ing instruction on extr insic evidence. Both Mixon and Hietman also1 The indictment also charged Lloyd David Shipley, Tracy Joseph Wagner, Caro l Smothermon, Barbara

Wilson, Jerry S. Holbrook, Leslie Gen e Payne, Troy Dean Compton, Melissa Avery, Curtis Ballard, Dan

Ballard, Richard Cleveland, and Cecil Lanford. A second count in the indictment charged Shipley, Wagner,

Holbrook, and Payne with carrying and using a firearm during a drug trafficking.

2 argue that the district court abused its discretion by overruling their objection to a testifying

witness’ statement that he passed a polygraph test and whether the curative instruction given

by the district court was sufficient.

I.

On June 1, 1996, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Hietman, Mixon

and twelve other individuals with conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to distribute,

and distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 1 The indictment covered the

period of Spring 1990 through approximately February 6, 1995. Hietman and Mixon pleaded

not guilty to the charges. The case proceeded to trial before a jury, where the defendants were

found guilty on the conspirac y co unt . During the trial, several government witnesses were

codefendants who pleaded guilty t o co nspiracy or another charge, or were unindicted

coconspirators. Most of these witnesses t est ified to engaging in drug transactions with

Hietman or Mixon, or of being aware of their drug activities. The essence of the codefendants’

testimony was that on several occasions Hietman and/or Mixon would either purchase or sell

metha mphet amine. The government witness who supplied most of the damaging evidence

against Hietman and who also implicated Mixon was Lloyd “Popaw” Shipley, a reputed drug

“kingpin” who supplied Hietman with most of the illegal drugs.

II.

Mixon argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain testimony

that should have been excluded under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of3

evidence o f prior bad acts or crimes in order to show action in conformity therewit h.

Nevertheless, such evidence may be admissible under the Rule if “the evidence is relevant to

an issue other than the defendant’s character and if . . . its probative value is not substantially

outweighed by its prejudicial impact.” United States v. Ridlehuber

, 11 F.3d 516, 522 (5th Cir.

1993). Rule 404(b) does not, however, apply to intrinsic evidence. I d. at 521. “[E]vidence is

‘intrinsic’ when the evidence of th e other act and the evidence of the crime charged are

‘inextricably intertwined’ or both acts are part of a ‘single criminal episode’ or the other acts

were ‘necessary preliminaries’ to the crime charged.” United States v. Williams

, 900 F.3d 823,

828 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States

v. White , 972 F.2d 590, 598 (5th Cir. 1992). The evidence at issue is: (1) codefendant Troy

Compton’s testimony concerning his drug transactions wi t h Mixon when Compton was

associated with codefendant Dwight Harrell, a two-or-three-m onth peri o d occurring before

Co mpt on obtained methamphetamine from Hietman; (2) codefendant Curtis Ballard’s

testimony concerning his drug transaction with Mixon’s unidentified girlfriend; and (3) Police

Detective Jeff Hull’s testimony concerning two undercover drug buys he transacted with Mixon

during the time of the conspiracy as alleged in the indictment. The district court admitted this

evidence, without a limit

ing instruction, because it concluded that the evidence was intrinsic

to, or inextricably intertwined with, the charged offense of conspiracy. Moreover, because the

court concluded the evidence was intrinsic rather than extrinsic evidence, a limit ing instruction

on extrinsic evidence was not nece ssary. After careful consideration, we conclude that the

testimony concerned intrinsic evidence. The acts testified to were all within the time period of

the conspiracy, w e re specifically alleged in the indictment, and included members of the1 Some of the drugs Shipley supplied to Hietman were eventually sold to Mixon.

4 conspiracy. This was sufficient to show that the acts were “inextricably intertwined” with the

crimes charged. Thus we hold that the district court did not abuse its discret io n when it

admitted the disputed testimony into evidence as intrinsic, rather than extrinsic evidence.

Ridlehuber , 11 F.3d at 521-22

III.

Next, Hietman’s and Mixon’s argument that the district court erred by overruling their

objections to Shipley’s statement that he “passed a polygraph test” is also without merit. First,

assuming without deciding that the admission of Shipley’s statement was in error, the statement

w as no t evidence that went to guilt or innocence of the defendants, but rather went to the

testifying witnesses’ credibility. Shipley was a person who had supplied drugs to Hietman 1

, but

w ho, at the time he made the challenged statement, was not testifying as a wi tness to the

defendants’ role in the crimes for which they were convicted. Rather, he was testifying about

a murder that the gover nment was attempting to tie into the drug conspiracy, but for which

neither of the defendants had been c harged wit h committing. Second, the district court

instructed the jury the following day to limit any consideration of Shipley’s polygraph statement

to the issue of his credibility only, and if the statement did not help them in d etermining

Shipley’s credibility, the statement should be disregarded. Considering the tangential relevance

of the murder to the defendants’ charges and the plethora of evidence adduced against them,

we find that this instruction was sufficient to prevent any prejudice.

Hence, we find Shipley’s statement harmless when viewed against the backdro p of

Shipley’s u ndisputed role as the “kingpin” of a drug distribution ring and the tangential5

relevance of his statement to the issues in the case. See F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 52(a). Moreover, in

light of all the evidence adduced at trial, Hietman and Mixon have failed to show ho w t he

statement affected their substantial rights. Id. We therefore hold that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony.

IV.

Having determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM.

AFFIRMED.