J-S58006-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

CALEB KENYON RAMEY, 

 Appellant No. 814 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 5, 2012 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-63-CR-0002491-2011 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.

*

 

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2014 

Appellant, Caleb Kenyon Ramey, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence following his jury conviction of rape of a child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3121(c); involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3123(b); aggravated indecent assault of a child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b); 

indecent assault (complainant less than thirteen years of age), 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3126(a)(7); indecent exposure, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a); endangering 

welfare of children, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1); recklessly endangering 

another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705; unlawful restraint, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2902; false imprisonment, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903; and terroristic threats, 18 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
J-S58006-14 

- 2 - 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2706.1 Appellant challenges various evidentiary rulings, the trial 

court’s decision not to remove certain jurors, and the weight and sufficiency 

of the evidence for all convictions. He also claims the sentence was 

excessive. We affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion. 

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case. (See Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/14, 

at 1-9). Therefore, we have no reason to restate them in detail here. We 

note briefly for context that Appellant’s jury conviction arose out of his 

forcible restraint and sexual assaults of D.R., the victim, then seven years of 

age, from July to September 2011. Following the death of both of her 

parents, D.R. and her brother resided with various friends and family, 

including Appellant and his family, and eventually in foster care. D.R. 

disclosed the sexual assaults by Appellant to her former and current foster 

parents, as well as to her therapist. 

After his jury conviction, on November 5, 2012, the court sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of not less than thirty four years’ nor more 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Appellant erroneously appeals from the “order” entered on May 17, 2012. 

(See Notice of Appeal, 5/09/13). May 17, 2012, was the date of the jury 

verdict. An appeal in a criminal matter is taken from the judgment of 

sentence as finalized by the denial of a post-sentence motion. See

Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1246 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 658 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(order denying post-sentence motion acts to finalize judgment of sentence; 

thus, appeal is taken from judgment of sentence)). We have amended the 

caption accordingly. 
J-S58006-14 

- 3 - 

than sixty-eight years’ incarceration. This timely appeal followed the denial 

of Appellant’s post-sentence motion by operation of law. 

Appellant raises ten questions for our review: 

I. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to 

review the accuser’s Fayette County CYS records in toto? 

II. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion 

to evaluate the accuser? 

III. Did the trial court err by not removing several jurors 

for cause when prejudice was revealed? 

IV. Did the trial court err by denying [Appellant] due 

process by scheduling trial for a time when the accuser’s 

psychologist was on vacation which rendered her unavailable for 

trial? 

V. Did the trial court err when it denied [Appellant] the 

opportunity to present evidence of multiple prior and concurrent 

false accusations of the same or similar acts? 

VI. Did the trial court err by allowing witnesses subsequent 

to accuser to give hearsay testimony as to statements made by 

accuser? 

VII. Did the trial court err when it denied, by operation of 

law, [Appellant’s] request for a new trial based upon after 

discovered evidence of accuser’s sworn testimony that 

contradicts her testimony at trial? 

VIII. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to 

sustain the verdict of guilty for each count, including: 1. rape of 

a child; 2. involuntary deviate sexual intercourse; 3. aggravated 

indecent assault of a child; 4. indecent assault on a person less 

than thirteen years of age; 5. indecent exposure; 6. endangering 

welfare of children; 7. recklessly endangering another person; 8. 

unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude; 9. false imprisonment; 

and 10. terroristic threats? 

IX. Was the verdict of guilty entered against the weight of 

the evidence on each count, including: 1. rape of a child; 2. 
J-S58006-14 

- 4 - 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse; 3. aggravated indecent 

assault of a child; 4. indecent assault of a person less than 

thirteen years of age; 5. indecent exposure; 6. endangering 

welfare of children; 7. recklessly endangering another person; 8. 

unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude; 9. false imprisonment; 

and 10. terroristic threats? 

X. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 

sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate period of incarceration of 

thirty-four (34) years to sixty-eight (68) years? 

(Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6).2

Preliminarily, we are reminded of the observation by the 

Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that this Court has 

previously cited in Kenis v. Perini Corp., 452 Pa. Super. 634, 

682 A.2d 845 (1996), as well as other cases: 

When I read an appellant’s brief that contains ten or 

twelve points, a presumption arises that there is no merit to 

any of them. I do not say that it is an irrebuttable 

presumption, but it is a presumption that reduces the 

effectiveness of appellate advocacy. Appellate advocacy is 

measured by effectiveness, not loquaciousness. 

Id. at 847 n.3 (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. 

Snyder, 870 A.2d 336, 340 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“[T]he 

effectiveness of appellate advocacy may suffer when counsel 

raises numerous issues, to the point where a presumption arises 

that there is no merit to any of them.”) (citations omitted). 

J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 409-10 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). 

____________________________________________ 

2

 The Commonwealth received a requested extension, but did not file a brief 

in this appeal. 
J-S58006-14 

- 5 - 

After a thorough review of the record, Appellant’s brief, the applicable 

law, and the well-reasoned, thorough opinion of the Honorable John F. 

DiSalle, we conclude that there is no merit to any of the issues Appellant has 

raised on appeal. The trial court opinion properly disposes of all of the 

questions presented.3 (See Trial Ct. Op., at 10-45) (finding that the trial 

court: (1) properly protected confidentiality of child-abuse investigations, 

after in camera review; (2) properly denied the defense request for 

psychological evaluation of victim by a defense expert; (3) properly denied a 

challenge to certain jurors for cause where the jurors on questioning by the 

court agreed they could render a fair, impartial and unbiased verdict; (4) did 

not deny due process in scheduling trial while the victim’s psychologist was 

on vacation, where there was no contemporaneous objection, or request for 

continuance, and after review of the entire record, the court found no basis 

for reasonable doubt of Appellant’s guilt, such that psychologist’s testimony 

would not have affected the outcome of the trial; (5) properly applied Rape 

Shield Law where Appellant failed to comply with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(b), 

requiring written motion and offer of proof of victim’s past sexual conduct; 

(6) properly admitted alleged hearsay statements where Appellant failed to 

offer contemporaneous objection; (7) properly denied a new trial on a claim 

____________________________________________ 

3

 We note that Judge DiSalle, the author of the trial court opinion, did not 

preside at the trial. The Honorable Paul Pozonsky, who presided at the jury 

trial, retired on June 30, 2012. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 1 n.1). 
J-S58006-14 

- 6 - 

of after discovered evidence where Appellant failed to offer necessary and 

appropriate details of the alleged independent proceeding, and the purported 

evidence would have been introduced solely for impeachment; (8) properly 

decided that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth was sufficient to prove all elements of all offenses charged; 

(9) properly rejected the challenge to weight of evidence where the victim 

and other Commonwealth witnesses were credible and the jury verdict did 

not shock the conscience of the trial court; and (10) properly determined 

sentence was not excessive where sentence was within Sentencing 

Guidelines, sentence was not the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill 

will, and the sentencing court found several aggravating factors, including 

tender age of victim, Appellant’s position of trust as a caregiver, his lack of 

remorse, and his blame of the government). Accordingly, we affirm on the 

basis of the trial court’s opinion. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Gantman, P.J., joins the Memorandum. 

Bender, P.J.E., concurs in the result. 
J-S58006-14 

- 7 - 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/7/2014