07-1180-c r

Un ite d St a te s v . Wh ite 1 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS 2 F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 3 4 August Term 2007 5 6 7 Argued: May

30, 2008 Dec ided: J anuar y 9, 2009 8 9 10 Docke t No. 07-1180-c r 11 12

_____________________________________ 13 14 UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, 15 16 Appellee , 17 18 -v.- 19 20 ANTHO NY WHI TE, 21 22 Defendant- Appellant

. 23

_____________________________________ 24 25 26 Be fore : KEARSE, SACK, L I VI NGSTON, Circuit Judges

. 27 28 Def

endant- appellant Anthony Whit e appe als from a

judgme nt of the United States District 29 Court

fo r t he Wes te rn

Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k ( L ari me r, J.), se nte nc inghim to e ig hty -f

our m on ths ’ 30 imp ri so nme nt a ft e r a jur y tr ia l f or be inga fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm in vio latio n of 1 8 U .S. C. 31 § 922(g )(1)

. Whit e contends principally that: (1) the district court erre d in declining to give a jury 32 instruction on the aff irmative defe nses of nece ssity or innocent/flee ting possession; ( 2) he is entitled 33 to a new tr ial beca use the g overnme nt used it s p er em ptory challeng es to exclude two Afr ican 34 Americ an women f rom the jury , contra

ry to Batson v . Kentucky , 4 76 U. S. 7 9 ( 19 86 ); and (3 ) h is2 1 sentenc e is unrea sonable, primar ily beca use the district c ourt err ed in depa rting upwar d to criminal 2 history

cate g ory VI based on a

conclusio n t h at cr i minal history cate g ory V under repr esente d the 3 seriousness of White’s past c riminal conduct a nd the likelihood that he would commit other crimes 4 in the future. 5 Affir

med. 6 ROBERT G. SMI TH, Assistant Fe deral Def ender , Western 7 D is tr ic t o f N e w Y o r

k ( Jay S. O v s io v itch, of counsel), for 8 Defendant- Appellant

. 9 10 R OB E RT A. MARANGOLA, Assistant United States 11 Attorney , for T e r r an c e P

. F l yn n , U n i t e d

S t a t e s A t t o r

n e y, 12 Western District of Ne w York, for Appellee

. 13 14 L I VI

NGSTON, Circuit Judge : 15 Def

endant- appellant Anthony Whit e appe als from a

judgme nt of the United States District 16 Court

fo r t he Wes te rn

Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k ( L ari me r, J.), se nte nc inghim to e ig hty -f

our m on ths ’ 17 imprisonment after a jury trial at which he was c onvicted of being a felon in possession of a f irea rm 18 in vio latio n of 18 U. S.C. § 922 (g )( 1) . White c on te nd s pri nc ipa lly that: ( 1) the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in 19 decliningto give a jury instructio n o n t h e af

firmative de fense s of nec essity or innoce nt/fleeting 20 possession; (2) he is entitled to a new trial beca use t he g overnme nt used its peremptory challeng es 21 to exclude tw o Afric an Amer ican wome n from the jury , contra ry to Batson v. Kentuck

y , 4 76 U. S. 22 79 (19 86 ); and

(3 ) h is s e nte nc e is unr e a so na ble , p ri mari ly

be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in 23 depar

ting upwa

rd to criminal history

cate g ory VI based on a

conclusion that cr imina l history 24 cate g ory

V unde rre prese nted the ser iousness of White’s past criminal conduc t and the likelihood that 25 he wo uld

c omm it o the r c ri me s in

the futur e . F or

the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e a ff

ir m.3 1 BACK GR OUND 2 Whit e wa s char g ed on June 28, 2005 with one count o f beinga fe lon in possession of a 3 firea

rm and ammunit ion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1)

. The g overnme nt’s evidenc e at tria l 4 e sta

bli sh e d th a t on

June 10 , 2 00 5, a t 4: 36 p. m., on e Cathe ri ne Mo ble y c a lle d 9 11 , g ave he r a dd re ss 5 as 494 Sewa

rd S tree t in Rochester , New York, and told t he oper ator that he r boy friend ha d hit her. 6 She also indicated that no weapons w ere involved in the i ncident. Of fice r F ranc is Arche tko of the 7 Rochester

Police Depa

rtment responde d to a

dispatch for

family trouble at 494 Sewa

rd Street, whic h 8 he re ceive d “at about 4:40 [p.m.] or so,” arr iving at the addre ss w ithin minutes. He obse rved Mobley 9 standing in the drivewa y and spoke w ith her briefly

. During this conver sation, Mobley repor ted that 10 her live- in boy friend, A nthony Whit e, had hit her during an ar g ument and she r equeste d that Offic er 11 Arc hetko ask White to leave the residenc e. Mobley al s o told Office r Arc hetko that White was 12 curr ently

in the first-floor bedroom and that there wer e no wea pons inside the re sidence . She did not 13 indicate to the of fice r whe ther other

people we re inside the home

. 14 When Office r Arc hetko enter ed the house , he knocke d on th e p ar t i al l y opened door

to the 15 be dr oo m, but did no t ann ounc e his pr e se nc e or oth e rw ise sp e ak. He he ard a ma le vo ic e say , “ [C]ome 16 in.” Off

icer Arc hetko then opene d the door a nd saw White sitti ng on the edg e of a bed next to two 17 .12 g aug e shot g un shells. Whit e was holding a sawe d-off shotgun by

the trig g er a

rea with his right 18 hand while he loaded a round into the mag azine tube with his left. He was aiming the shotg un at the 19 doorwa

y wher e Of

fice r Arc hetko stood. Offic er A rche tko immediately pulled his se rvice wea pon, 20 pointed it at Whi te, and or dere d Whit e to drop the shotgun. Whit e complied with thi s demand a nd 21 Offic er A rche tko then ar rested him. The round that Off icer Arc hetko observe d Whit e load into the4 1 shotgun w as still in t he we apon whe n Offic er A rche tko retrieve d both the wea pon and the she lls on 2 the be d. Ac c or din g to Of fi c e r Ar c he tko , no on e oth e r t ha n Wh ite wa s in

the ho us e a t th e tim e of

thi s 3 inc ide nt. 4 J o h nC l a r

k , a f i r e ar m s e x am i n e r

f o r th e M o n r o e C o un ty D e p art m e n to f P u b l i c S a f e ty, 5 de mon str a te d f

or the jur y ho w t o lo a d a

nd un loa d th e weap on rec ov e re d f ro m Whi te . H e a lso 6 te sti fi e d th a t he ha d te st- fi re d th e we a po n u sing tw o of the re c ov e re d s he lls and tha t bo th s he lls 7 d i s c h ar g e d

s u c c e s s f u l l y. 8 The de fense case consisted entire ly of White’s testimony . Whit e testified that on June 10, 9 2005, he and Mobley wer e in their house at 494 Sewa rd Street, a s was Mobley ’s y oung est son, who 10 wa s a

bo ut s e ve n y e ars old a t the tim e . A c c or din g to Wh ite , h e and Mo ble y g ot i nto a fi g ht o ve r h is 1 1 co n v er s at i o nwi than o t h er wo m an . W h i t e l o ck edh i m s el f i nth e b at h ro o mt o “k ee p fr o mh ea ri n g” 12 Mobley ’s voice. When he emer g ed about twenty -five minutes later, Mobley was pointing a shotg un 13 at him. Whi te testified that Mobley pulled the trig g er, but the g un did not fire. White then knocked 14 the g un out of her ha nd, at which point Mobley fled the house

. 15 Whit e testified that he next pi cked up the g un and took it into the be droom so that Mobley ’s 16 y oungso n—

wh o “ saw the wh ole thi ng ” fr om the kit c he n and ha d be e n ple a din g fo r h is m oth e r t o 17 put the g un down—would not “play [] cops and r obbers a nd stuff” a

nd “g et the gun, [and] pull the 18 trig g er a

nd kill his self or . . . blow his fe et off.” Ac co rd i n g t o W h ite, when he went into the 19 bedroom, he put the g un on the floor a nd beg an removing the shells. H e remove d two shells from 20 the sh otgun

wi th s ciss or s, but w a s una ble to g e t th e thi rd

sh e ll o ut b e c a

us e it w a s “ stu c k. ” Whit e 21 testified that he intended to g ive the shotgun to the police, that he did not call the police beca use the5 1 phone wa s on the porch, a nd that the “[o]nl y

thing [he] could think of was s af ety .” While he was 2 attempting to r emove the third shell, he hear d a knock on the bedroom door to which he r esponded 3 that he “w as comi ng .” The police ente red a nd arr ested him. Whit e denie d pointing the we apon at 4 Offic er A rche tko. 5 B efor e W hi te w as cr os s-e x ami ned , t he gov ernm ent pro fferedevi den ce t hat W hi te p rev iou sly 6 ha d e ng a g e d in se ve ra l inc ide nts of do me sti c vio le nc e in whic h h e us e d o r t hr e a te ne d to us e fi re arm s, 7 including one occa sion on which he bra ndished a gun and thre atene d to kill a girlfr iend and a second 8 in which he plac ed a gun to th e h ea d o f a girlfr iend’s daughter a nd threatened to kill her. The 9 g overnme nt argued that such e vidence was a dmissibl e pursua nt to Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 404(b) 10 to show criminal motive and intent and, more specific ally , to rebut the implication that Whit e had 1 1 p o s s e s s e d

t h e s h o t g uni n n o c e n t l y. The district cour t refuse d to allow admission of this evid en ce, 1 2 r u l i n g t h a tW h i t e ’ s r e a s o nf o r p o s s e s s i n g t h e w e a

p o nw a s n o tr e l e v an tan d o p i n i n g , p r e l i m i n ar i l y, 13 that the def

ense ha d not put o n ev i dence sufficie nt to require a n instruction as to a def

ense of 14 nece ssity

or flee ting possession. 15 On cr oss-examination, W hite acknow led g ed that he w as at a ll tim es aw are that the object that 16 he had pic ked up was a shotgun. He also admitted that he had been convicted in state court in 1995 17 of possessing stolen proper ty and in 2000 of thi rd-de g ree rape , both of which c rimes he kne w to be 18 felonies. He further indicated that when he initially picked up the shotgun in the living room he used 19 a child’s shirt to do so in order to a void ge tting his fing erpr ints on the weapon since he did not know 20 wh e re it c ame fr om. 21 Af

te r t he c los e of e vid e nc e , White re qu e ste d that the jur y be ins tr uc te d o n b oth

the ne c e ssi tyTh e de fe ns e arr ive d at th is e sti mate ba se d u po n O ff ic e r Arc he tko ’s te sti mony that it 1 took him about two minut es to respond to 494 Sewa rd Street a fter r ece iving the dispatch and that his conversation with Mobl ey lasted “[a]pprox imately

a minute.” This estimate, how ever , does not take ac count of the time that e lapsed be tween Moble y ’s 911 ca ll at 4:36 p.m. and the dispatch to Office r Arc hetko at “a

bout 4:40 or so.” The thre e ele ments descr ibed by the district court we re a s follows: (1) the de fenda nt 2 “wa s convicted in a

ny court of a

crime punishable by

a ter m [ of imprisonment] ex cee ding one y ear ”; (2) the defe ndant “knowing ly possessed the f

irea rm”; and ( 3) “the firea

rm . . . was in or aff ecting[i nterstate] commerc e.” T hese e lements corr espond direc tly to the statutory

definition of the c rime with which White was cha rg ed. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1) ( “It shall be unlawful f or any person . . . who ha s been c onvicted in any court of, a

crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term excee ding one y ear

. . . to . . . possess in or aff ectingcommerc e, any

firea rm or ammunition . . . .”). 6 1 and fl e e tin g -p os se ssi on de fe ns e s, ba se d on the e vid e nc e that Whit e ha d po sse sse d the g un fo r o nly 2 “thre e and a

half minutes afte r the incident [wit h Mobley ] wa s done.” The district court denie d the 1 3 reque st. I t observed that this C ourt has re cogn i z ed neither a nece ssity nor a f leeting -possession 4 e xce pti on

to f e lon -i n- po sse ssi on

lia bil ity . T he c ourt

c on c lud e d f

ur the r t hat ne ith e r d e fe ns e , e ve n if 5 it ex isted, was supported by the re co rd , s i n ce Whi te’s possession was not fle eting and he w as not 6 shown to be in imminent dang er a fter Moble y dropped the g un and lef

t the house. 7 The district c ourt char g ed the jury , specific ally advising that the Gover nment was re quired 8 to prove thre e ele ments to establish that Whit e had violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) and af firming that 9 eac h of these e lements must be shown by “proof beyond a rea sonable doubt.” The c ourt noted that 2 10 the def

endant’ s motive or rea son for possessinga fire arm wa s not an eleme nt of the crime and that 1 1 t h e G o v ern m en tn ee d n o tp ro v e o r d i s p ro v e “ an y p art i cu l ar re as o n o r m o t i v at i o n ” f o r p o s s es s i n g a 12 wea

pon. An hour int o deliberations, the j ury sent a note asking , among other thi ng s, whether there 13 are “ any

e xce pti on s to the law o f po sses sio n [su c h a s] f or se lf -d e fe ns e purp os e s. ” Withre sp e c t to7 1 this ques t i o n , W h i te aske d the cour t to charg e the jury

“as a law prof essor would,” descr ibing 2 hy p o t h et i cal scenar ios in which a flee ting- possession or nec essity defe nse mig ht apply . The c ourt 3 ag ain re fused to g ive an instruction on these defe nses, but responde d to the jury ’s qu est ion as 4 fo llo ws : 5 I n the universe there may be [ex ce p t i o n s to the law of 6 possession] , dependingon the fa cts of the case . But in this case, ther e 7 are none that apply here

. I f there wer e defe nses, y ou would have be en 8 ins tr uc te d o n th e m. 9 10 An d I do n’ t th ink

it a dv anc e s to dis c us s p os sib le 11 circ umstances. The evidenc e her e, the Court has de termined, doe s not 12 support any possible defe nse. The statute contains no de fe n ses and 1 3 the evidenc e o th e r w is e is n o t s u c hth a t t

h e r e is an y

th in g to in s tr

u ct 14 y ou a bo ut. 15 16 Whit e ob

je c te d to th is in st ru c tio n, arguin g that th e c ourt ha d e sse nti a lly

dir e c te d a

ve rd ic t a g a ins t 17 him

wh e n it state d th a t it

ha d “ de termin e d” that th e e vid e nc e “ do e s n ot s up po rt any po ssi ble 18 defe nse.” White did not request a mistrial, however , but instead asked that the district court instruct 19 the jury

to “foc us on the eleme nts of possession” and “n o t o n wh ether there a re or are not 20 e xce pti on s. ” I n r e sp on se to t his re qu e st, the dis tr ic t c ourt ins tr uc te d th e jur

y a s f oll ow s: 21 Ig ue ss j us t tr y to f oc us he re a

bit . T he Cou

rt ha s c on sis te ntl y 22 spoken about the elements of the offe nse that control he re, a nd Ithink 23 that’s what you should and mu s t focus on, the e lements, and not on 24 wh e the r t he re are e xce pti on s o r d e fe ns e s. 25 26 Ime an, the law that you he ard fr om m e that c on tr ols thi s c a se 2 7 i s w h a ty o u h e ar d o n t h e f a c t s o f th i s c a s e . T h e r e i s n o o th e r l aw . In 28 eac h case the instruction s are g iven depe nding on the fac ts of the 29 particula r ca se. 30 31 So Ithink that’s w h at I intend to say

at this point. Focus on 32 the eleme nts and the law that Ig ave to y ou is the universe of the law 33 on this particular c as e i n v o l ving a cts that occ urre d on J une 10th,W h i t e ar g u e s a tv ar i o u s p o i n t s th a th e w a s e n t i t l e d t o a j ur y i n s tr u c t i o no nn e c e s s i ty or 3 jus tif ic a tio n, us ingthe te rm s inte rc ha ng e a bly . We no te that “

jus tif ic a tio n” tr a dit ion a lly enca psulates a br oad cla ss of defe nses, of whic h “nec essity ” is but one. See United States v. Leahy , 473 F.3d 401, 406 ( 1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the defe nse of “ justification” enc ompasses se ve ra l mo re sp e c if

ic a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e s r e c ognize d at c omm on law) ; United States v. Newcomb , 6 F .3 d 1 12 9, 11 33 (6 th C ir . 1 99 3) (d ist inguis hin g be tw e e n ju sti fi c atio ns and e xcu se s, and noting that “nec essity ” is one kind of justification); Model Pena l Code § 3.02 (desc ribing justification as an a ffirmative defe nse ar ising whe n “the a ctor be lieves [otherwise cr iminal conduct] to be nec essar

y to avoid a har

m or evil to himself or to another ”); 2 Way ne R. L aF ave, Substantive Criminal L aw 115-87 (2d e d. 2003) (discussingdoctrines f alling unde r the he ading “justification”) . Some Circuits, however, ha ve re g ularly

used the ter

m justi fication in the felonin-possession context t o ref er to a n aff irmative def

ense c ompara

ble to the traditional def

ense of nece ssity , see, e .g., United States v. Hargrov e , 416 F.3d 486, 489- 90 (6th Cir. 2005) ; United States v. De leve aux , 205 F.3d 1292, 1296- 97 (11th Cir. 2000); Newcomb , 6 F.3d at 1133, and we will mirror our sister Circuits in using the words interc hang eably here

. 8 1 2005. 2 3 Whit e raised no objection to this suppl emental c harg e. L ess than an hour later, the jury

returne d a 4 g uil ty

ve rd ic t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt ult imate ly

imp os e d a

pr iso n s e nte nc e of

e ig hty -f our m on ths . T his 5 appea l followed. 6 7 DI SCU SSIO N 8 I. Jury Charge 9 Whit e’s pr incipal claim on appe al is that the district court erre d in failing to instruct the jury 10 on aff

irmative def

enses, whic h Whit e desc ribes var iously as the de fenses o f “necessity ” or 11 “justification,” a s well as “f leetingpossession” and “ innocent possession.” He claims also that he 3 12 was pre

judiced by the district c ourt’s response to the jury ’s question reg arding“exceptions to the law 13 of possession.” 14 “ To se c ur e re ve rs a l ba se d o n a fl awe d ju ry ins tr uc tio n, a de fe nd ant m

us t de mon str a te bo th9 1 err or and e nsuing pr ejudice.” United States v. Quinone s , 511 F.3d 289, 313-14 (2d Ci r. 2007), c e rt. 2 denied , 129 S. Ct. 252 (2008). Although we revie w de novo a claim of e rror in jury instructions, id. 3 at 314, including a claim that the district c ourt improperly declined to instruct the jur y reg ardingan 4 aff

irmative def

ense, see U

nited States v. Gonzalez , 4 07 F .3d 11 8, 12 2 (2d Cir . 2 00 5) , “ we wi ll 5 reve rse only

wher e the c harg e, viewe d as a whole, ‘either failed to inf orm the jury adequately of the 6 law or m i s led the jury about the cor

rec t leg al rule,’ ” Quinones , 5 1 1 F. 3 d at3 1 4 (q u o t i n g United 7 Sta te

s v . F or d , 435 F.3d 204, 209- 10 (2d C ir. 2006)). A fede ral court may decline to instruct on a

n 8 a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e , mor e ov e r, “ wh e n ‘ the e vid e nc e in s up po rt of su c h a de fe ns e wo uld

be le g a lly 9 insufficient.’” United States v. W illiams , 3 8 9 F. 3 d 4 0 2 , 4 0 4 (2 d C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g United States 10 v. Villegas , 8 99 F .2 d 1 32 4, 13 43 (2 d Ci r. 19 90 )) ; see also Gonzalez , 407 F.3d at 122 (“Adefe ndant 11 is entitled to an instruction on an aff irmative def

ense only if the def ens e h as ‘a foundation in the 1 2 ev i d en ce . ’” (q u o t i n g United States v. Podlog , 35 F.3d 699, 704 ( 2d Cir. 1994))). 13 14 A. Affirmative Defense s 15 Turningfirst to Whi te’s cla im that the jury sh o u l dhave be en instructed on the defe nse of 16 “nec essity ,” we conclude that even a ssuming such a defe nse is g ener ally available in the felon-in17 possession context – a question we need not de cide today – Whit e wa s not entitled to an instruction 18 in the circ umstances of this case. The district court there fore did not err in dec lining to g ive one. 19 We have not def initively rec og nized the exi stence of a ne cessity defe nse to a c harg e under 20 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1 ). See W illiams , 3 89 F .3 d at 40 4- 05 (“ Al tho ug h th e langua g e of 18 U. S.C. 21 [§] 922(g )(1) does not provide f or a ne cessity

defe nse, we will assume, without deciding , thatDelev eaux de sc ri be s th e fi rs t e le me nt o f t he jus tif ic a tio n d e fe ns e in t e rm s o f s e lf -d e fe ns e 4 – r e qu ir ingpr oo f t

hat “ the defendant

was unde r unlawf

ul and pre sent, imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury .” Delev eaux , 2 05 F .3 d at 12 97 (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Co ur ts have he ld, ho we ve r, that th e “ imm ine nt d ang e r” e le me nt m ay be me t by

sh ow ingthat so me person other

than the def

endant wa s in harm’s wa

y . See Newcomb , 6 F.3d at 1135-36 (allowing the de fe ns e wh e re the de fe nd ant a lle g e dly dis arm e d h is g ir lf

ri e nd ’s so n to pr ote c t a

thi rd pa rt y fr om h arm ); Un ite d S

tates v . P ao le llo , 9 51 F .2 d 5 37 , 5 41 -4 3 ( 3r d Ci r. 19 91 ) ( fi nd ingthe de fe ns e available wher e the de fenda nt alleg edly

knocked a

g un out of an attacker ’s hand to prote ct a third pa rt y and the n p ic ke d th e g un

up to p re ve nt t

he a tta c ke r f

ro m g e tti ngit) ; se e als o United States v. Toney , 27 F.3d 1245, 1249 ( 7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the defe ndant was e ntitled to rece ive a justification instruction where he alleg edly wre stled a gun awa

y from his g irlfriend to pre vent her suicide). 10 1 pe rs on s c ha

rg e d wi th vio latin g 18 U. S.C. [§] 92 2( g )( 1) may a sse rt su c h a de fe ns e .” ); see also United 2 States v. Oak

land Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. , 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (“ [I ]t i s an open question 3 whether

fede ral c ourts ever

h a v e a uth o r it y to rec og nize a nece ssity

defe nse not provided by

statute.”). 4 Courts that h av e recog nized such a def ense in the f

elon-in-possession conte x t, however , have 5 established the f

ollowing e lements: (1) that the de fenda nt or a third person wa s under unlaw ful and 6 pr e se nt, imm ine nt, and imp e nd ing thr e a t of de a th or se ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y ; ( 2) that th e de fe nd ant d id 7 no t ne g lig e ntl y

or re c kle ssl y

pla c e him se lf

in a si tuat ion

wh e re he wo uld

be fo rc e d to e ng a g e in 8 criminal conduc t; (3) that the def endant ha d no rea sonable leg al alter native to violating the law by 9 taking possession o f a weapon; and (4) that there w as a dire ct ca usal rela tionship between the 10 criminal ac tion – possessing the we apon in violation of § 922(g )(1 )

– an d t h e avoidance of the 11 threatened ha

rm. See, e .g. , United States v. De leve aux , 2 0 5 F

. 3 d 1 2 9 2 , 1 2 9 7 ( 1 1 thC i r . 2 0 0 0 )

. In 4 12 addition, the defe ndant must establish that he did not maintain possession of t he we apon at issue a ny 13 longe r than a

bsolutely nece ssary . See U

nited States v. Singleton , 902 F.2d 471, 473 ( 6th Cir. 1990), 14 cited by W

illiams , 389 F.3d at 4 0 5

. The c ourts that have r ecognized just ification as a defe nse to a11 1 f e lo n - in

- p o s s e s s io n

c h ar g e h av e h e ld

th a t t h e d e f e n s e mu s t b e c o n s tr

u e d “ v e r y n ar r o w ly

. ” Un i t ed 2 Sta te

s v . P e rri n , 4 5 F .3 d 8 69 , 8 75 (4 th C ir . 1 99 5) ; Singleton , 9 02 F .2 d at 47 2; accord United States 3 v . P ao le llo , 951 F.2d 537, 541-42 (3d Cir. 1991) (adoptinga “r estrictive view ” of the defe nse). As 4 the Eleventh Circuit ha s stated, the defe nse “is available in § 922( g )(1) case s in only extraordinary 5 circ umstances.” Delev eaux , 2 05 F .3 d at 12 97 ; se e als o Pe rri n , 45 F.3d at 874 (“It has bee n only on 6 the ra

rest of occa sions that our sister circ uits have found de fenda nts to be in the ty

pe of imminent 7 d an ger

t h at wo u l d wa rr an t t h e ap p l i ca t i o n o f a j u s t i fi ca t i o nd ef en s e. ” ( ci t i n g Singleton , 902 F.2d at 8 472)). 9 I n th is cas e , Wh ite ’s te sti mony wa s th e on ly

e vid e nc e of

fe re d in su pp or t of a ne c e ssi ty 10 defe nse. This testimony was c lear ly

sufficie nt o n i ts own to establish that W hite was in imminent 11 dang er at the moment Moble y pointed the g un at him. The problem with Whit e’s position, howeve r, 12 is t

hat on c e he kn oc ke d the g un out of Mo ble y ’s ha nd and sh e ra n o ut o f t he ho us e , a

ny imm e diate 13 dang er to White was di s p ell ed. See United States v. Lemon , 824 F.2d 763, 765 ( 9th Cir. 1987) 1 4 ( f i n d i n g n o i m m i n e n t d an g e r o n c e t h e d e f e n d an t ’ s a s s a i l an t h a d l e f t the sc e ne ); United States v. 15 Nolan , 700 F.2d 479, 484 ( 9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the defe nse wa s not m ad e o u t where the 16 alleg edly

threatening party

left the building and the defe ndant pursued him). Whit e testi fied that he 17 pic ke d u

p th e we a po n a nd c arr ie d it int o th e be dr oo m in

or de r t o e ns ur e tha

t Mo ble y ’s y oungso n d id 18 not obtain possession of it a nd come to ha

rm. The question thus becomes whe ther a loaded shotgun 19 ly ing on the living r oom floor cr eate d such an imminent dang er to Mobley ’s seve n-y ear -old son that 20 Whit e wa s ju sti fi e d in takin g po sse ssi on

of the g un and un loa din g it i n a

no the r r oo m. 21 We find it doubtful that the threat wa s sufficiently imminent. Those decis i o n s that have12 1 require d a jury

instruction as to justification have a lmost uni formly done so in circ umstances whe re 2 the def

endant pr esente d evidenc e sugg esting that he took possession of a w eapon when conf ronted 3 with an immediate, compe lling, and direc t thr eat to human life

. See, e .g., United States v. Moone y , 4 49 7 F .3 d 3 97 , 4 06 -0 8 ( 4th Cir . 2 00 7) (f

ind in g t he jus tif

ic a tio n d e fe ns e to b e po te nti a lly ava ila ble 5 wh e r e th e d e f

e n d an t to o k th e w e a

p o n f r o m a th ir d p arty w it

h kn o w n v io le n t te n d e n cies who 6 a lle g e dly

put a loa de d f ir e arm to t he de fe nd ant’ s h e a d) ; Pa ole llo , 951 F.2d at 539, 542-43 (re quiring 7 the ins tr

uc tio n w he re the de fe nd ant a lle g e dly se ize d the we a po n fr om a

man w ho ha d h ara sse d h im 8 in a b ar , p u n ch ed his stepson in the face , discharg ed the we apon, and the n strug g led with the 9 de fe nd ant o ve r i t) ; United States v. Panter , 688 F.2d 268, 269, 271- 72 (5th Cir. 1982) (holdingthat 10 a justification instruction was re quired whe re the defe ndant alleg edly took possession of a we apon 11 a s a

c on vic te d mu

rd e re r t hr e a te ne d to kil l hi m, s ta

bb e d h im w itha

po c ke t kn if

e , a nd the n p inn e d h im 12 to the floor). In contra st, the threat of harm to Mobl ey ’s s on was c onsiderably more attenuated a

nd 13 speculative in nature. Ac co rd i ng to Whi te’s testimony , Mobley ’s son was in anothe r room. The re 14 is nothing in the re cord indicating that the child had expressed an intention to handle the shotgun or 15 that, h avin g ple a de d w ithhis mot he r to put the g un do wn , he wo uld a ft e r he r de pa rt ur e a tte mpt

to 16 pick it up and play with it. W hite’s testimony thus sug g ests that he ac ted to preve nt a cog nizable, but 17 not immi nent, risk to human life. 18 We need not dec ide th e i m m i nence -of- threat question in the circumstanc es of this ca se, 19 howeve r, since even assuming Whit e was fully justified in initially picking up the wea pon to keep 20 it f

ro m Mo ble y ’s so n, his te sti mony fa ile d to sh owtha

t he ma int a ine d p os se ssi on of the sh otgun on ly 21 for a s long a s nece ssary to dispel any

threat. That is, e ven assuming an imminent threat exist ed af ter13 1 Moble y

f le d , Wh it e p e r

h a p s w a s ju s ti f

ie d in c ar r yin g th e g uninto th e b e dr o o m a n d , f o r example, 2 putting it on a high closet shelf, locking the door to the room, or other wise plac ing the g un outside 3 of the reac h of a seven- y ear -old child. But it cannot be said that Whit e’s possession of the shotgun 4 c on tin

ue d to be jus tif

ie d d ur ing the tim e it too k for Whit e to pic k up the we a po n care fu lly

so a s to 5 avo id g e tt inghis fi ng e rp ri nts on it; to l oc a te sc iss or s to us e in d isl od g ingthe g un ’s sh e lls ; and to 6 remove two shells while workingon a third. This amount of ti m e wa s sufficie ntly extended for 7 Mo ble y

to c a ll 9 11 and

fo r O ff ic e r Arc he tko to res po nd to th a t c a ll, have a c on ve rs a tio n w ith 8 Mobley , and find White sitti ng on the bed with the gun in hand. See W illiams , 389 F.3d at 404-05 9 (noting that, even if a thre at of de ath or ser ious bodily injury exis t ed wh en t h e d efendant took a 10 wea

pon from a te enag er to pre vent it from being used, no such t hreat exis ted when the def endant wa s 11 confr onted by

police). We c onclude that the “ very n ar ro w” doc trine of justification, if available, 12 would not apply

in this case. 13 Whit e a lso argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t court e rr e d in r e fu sin g to i ns tr uc t th e jur

y on the de fe ns e 14 of “fleeting ” or “innocent” possession. We have no diffic ulty concludingthat Whit e wa s not entitled 15 to a jury

instruct i o n o n this defense . In United States v. Paul , 110 F.3d 869 ( 2d Cir. 1997), we 16 sug g ested in dicta that circumstanc es “ma y be imag ined” whe re posse ssion of a firear m by a fe lon 17 is “too flee ting” to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1)

. We of fer ed the example of a felon who, noticing 18 “a police office r’s pistol slip t o the floor while the office r [i s] seated at a lunch counter ,” picks up 19 the wea

pon, and immediately

returns it to the off

icer

. Id. at 872. In this case, howe ver, White did not 20 possess the shotg un for mer e sec onds, but picked it up, car ried it to another r oom, beg an handling 21 ammunition, and all told, ha d the g un in hand for at least the time requir ed for Mobley to contact 91114 1 and for Offic er Arc hetko to r espond to Moble y ’s call. Whit e there fore “extended his possession of 2 a f ir e ar m f ar b e y o n d th e f

le e ti n g s o rt o f p o s s e s s io n w e il lu s tr a te d in Paul .” W illiams , 389 F.3d at 3 40 5. Ac c or din g ly , e ve n if we we re to r e c og nize the ava ila bil ity of a fl e e tin g -p os se ssi on

de fe ns e to 4 a § 922(g )(1) char g e, the e vidence in this ca s e wo u l d n o t have justified a jury instruction on that 5 defe nse. 6 Withre sp e c t to “ inn oc e nt p o s s e s sio n, ” so me c ourt s h ave tr e a te d th is d e fe ns e int e rc ha ng e a bly 7 with the various justification defe nses. See, e .g., United States v. He ndricks , 31 9 F .3 d 9 93 , 1 00 7 ( 7th 8 C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) (“ [ W ] e pr ev i o u s l y h av e li m i t ed an ‘i n n o ce n t p o s s es s i o n ’ d ef en s e t o a § 9 2 2 (g) (1 ) c h ar ge 9 t o situations in which the elements of a justification defe nse . . . ar e pre sent.”). T he District of 10 Columbi a Circuit, howeve r, has sug g ested that the innoc ent possess i o n defe nse is distinct. See 11 United States v. Mason , 233 F.3d 619, 622-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

. Acc ording to that court, “[t] here are 12 two g ener al re quirements that must be satisfied in order for a defe ndant t o succe ssfully invoke the 13 innocent possession def ense. The rec ord must revea l that (1) the f irea rm was attained innocently and 14 held with no illicit purpose and (2) posse ssion of the fire arm wa s transitory — i.e

. , i n l i gh t of the 15 c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nte d, the re is a g oo d ba sis to fi nd that the de fe nd ant too k a de qu a te me a sure s to 16 rid himself of possession of the f irea rm as promptly

as re asonably

possible.” Id. at 624. 17 We need not decide here whether to rec og nize an innocent possession defe nse in the sec tion 18 922(g )(1) context, or whether w e would cha rac terize i t as coe x tensive with a fle eting -possession 19 defe nse or a s sui ge neris. Since White fa i l ed to adduc e suff icient evidenc e that he posse ssed the 20 shotgun only

for a s long a s nece ssary to vitiate a potential threat to Mobley ’s c h i l d , h e wa s not 21 entitled to a jury

instruction on fleetingpossession as we have, in dicta , previously discussed it, or15 1 on innocent possession a s we might define it. Ac cording ly , since the a ffirmative defe nses cited by 2 Whit e lac ked suff

icient foundation in the evidence , it was appropr iate for the district court to dec line 3 to c ha

rg e the jur

y on tho se de fe ns e s. 4 5 B. Supplemental Charge 6 Whit e also a rgues that the district cour t’s instructions to the jury in response to its question 7 asking if there are “exceptions to the law of posse ssion” require reve rsal. This contention is subject 8 only

to plain error

revie w. As pre viously

noted, White request ed and rece ived a spe cific c urative 9 instruction immediately following the district court’s suppleme ntal ch ar ge an d , afte r the district 10 c ourt ’s re cit ati on of that c ur a tiv e ins tr

uc tio n, did

no t pr e ss a

ny fu rt he r o bje c tio n. Whe n a

pa rt y 11 objects to a jury char g e and the district c ourt subsequently g ives a c urative instruc tion to which the 12 pa

rt y do e s n ot f

ur the r o bje c t, w e re vie w the c ha rg e , in c lud ingthe c ur a tiv e ins tr uc tio n, on ly

fo r p la in 13 err or. S

e e U n ite d S ta te s v. Salameh , 152 F.3d 88, 144- 45 (2d Cir. 1998). “T his standard re quires 14 there to be ‘(1) error, (2) t hat i s plain, and (3) that aff ect[s] substantial rig hts.’” See U nited States v. 15 Rossomando , 1 4 4 F. 3 d 1 9 7 , 2 0 0 (2 d C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( al t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Johnson v. U nited 16 States , 52 0 U. S. 46 1, 46 7 (1 99 7)) ; see also F e d. R. C ri m. P . 5 2( b) (“ A p la in e rr or that a ff e c ts 17 substantial rig hts may be considered even though i t was not broug ht to the court' s attention.”). Eve n 18 if eac h of t hese conditions is met, we may only exercise our discretion to consider a “forfe ited err or 19

. . . i f (4 ) t h e error ‘se riously aff ect[s] the fa irness, integ rity , or public re putation of judicial 20 proce eding s.’” Johnson , 520 U.S. at 467 (sec ond alteration in original) ( quoting Un i t ed States v. 21 Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). H ere , we f ind no error , much less er ror that is plain.16 1 Whit e ar g ues that the district cour t erre d in stating that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) “conta ins no 2 defe nses” be cause many Circuits have re cog nized affirmative defe nses to felon-in- possession 3 liability

even thoug h these de fense s do not appea r in the statute. See generally M ooney , 497 F.3d at 4 403 (citing case s). This challeng e is without merit. Even if we assume that the def enses invoked by 5 Whit e should be re ad into § 922(g )(1) , the district court’s char g e was not e rrone ous. A district court 6 need not instruct on a n aff irmative def

ense where the def

endant ha s failed to provide a suff icient 7 evidentiar

y foundation. See G onzalez , 4 07 F .3 d a t 12 2; W illiams , 389 F.3d at 404. B e c a us e Whit e 8 did not adduce sufficie nt e vidence to ha ve the issue of

justification c onsidered by the jury , it wa s not 9 err oneous for

the district court to eliminate fr om its cha rg e defe nses that did not perta in to W hite’s 1 0 c a s e . M o r e o v e r , e v e n i f t h e d i s t r i c tc ou rt did err by stating that there a

re no a ffirmative defe nses 11 applicable to § 922( g )(1) , Whit e could not conc eivably have be en pre

judiced by

such an e rror

since 12 these potential de fense s did not apply to him. 13 Whit e also a sserts that it was improper for the district c ourt to state that “[t] he evide nce . . . 14 does not support any possible defe nse,” be cause this statement sugg ested that the c ourt had a ssessed 15 the cr edibility

of White’s testim ony

and found it wa

nting. To the extent the jury could have 16 misint erpr eted the supplemental char g e as g oing to a n assessment of Whit e’s c redibility , howeve r, 17 the cur ati v e i n s t ru ct ion refoc used the jury on the eleme nts of possession and made no me ntion of 18 Whit e’s c redibility . We ordinarily presume that the j ury adher es to curative instructions and see no 19 rea son to depart f rom that g ener al rule he re. See Salame h , 15 2 F .3 d at 14 4; United States v. 20 Colombo , 909 F.2d 711, 715 (2d Cir. 1990). Ac c or din g ly , we fi nd no e rr or , le t a lon e pla in e rr or , in 21 the district court’s suppleme ntal char g e.17 1 II. Jury Se lection 2 Whit e ne xt as se rt s tha t he is e nti tle d to a ne w tri a l on

the g ro un d th a t th e g ov e rnme nt, in 3 e xer c isi ngits pe re mpt or y chall e ng e s d

ur ingjur y se le c tio n, dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t hi m on the ba sis 4 of ra ce in violation of his rig ht to equal protec tion. See Batson v. Kentuck y , 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 5 Th e g ov e rnme nt a rgue s th a t Whi te fa ile d to pr e se rv e thi s cha lle ng e and that it is, in a ny e ve nt, 6 me ri tle ss. 7 I n assessing a defe ndant’s claim that the g overnme nt has exercised its per emptory challeng es 8 in a discriminatory manner , a dist ri ct co u rt eng ag es in a thre e-step a naly sis. I t first must consider 9 whether

the def endant ha s made a

prima fa cie showingthat t he g overnme nt has exercised a 10 pere mptory

challeng e on the ba sis of a prohibited g round. I f the c ourt deter mines that the defe ndant 11 has done so, it must then decide whether the gover nment has satis fied it s burden of offe ring a neutr al 12 explanation for the cha lleng e. I f t h e co u rt co ncludes that this burden ha s been me t, it mus t then 13 deter

mine, based on a ll the fac ts and circ umstances, whe ther the de fenda nt has car ried his burde n 14 of proving purposef ul d i s cr i m i n ati on. See U

nited States v. Thompson , 528 F.3d 110, 115 ( 2d Cir. 1 5 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Batson , 4 7 6 U. S. at 96-98), cert. de nied , 1 29 S. Ct . 2 18 (2 00 8) ; se e als o Purkett v. 16 Elem , 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (“ [T] he ult imate burden of per suasion reg ardingrac ial motivation 17 rests with . . . the opponent of the strike.”) . We have he ld that “the ultimate question of 18 discriminatory

intent repre sents a findingof fa ct that will be set asid e o n l y if clea rly err oneous.” 19 T h o mpson , 5 2 8 F. 3 d

at 1 1 5 (q u o t i n g United States v. Taylor , 9 2 F

. 3 d 1 3 1 3 , 1 3 2 6 ( 2 d Ci r . 1996) 20 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) ). “ Th is i s so in l arg e part beca us e a c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n w ill 21 often turn on the judg e’s obse rvations of prospec tive jurors and the attorney s during voir dire a nd18 1 an asse ssment of their cred ibilit y .” Un ite d S tates v . B ro wn , 352 F.3d 654, 661 ( 2d Cir. 2003) 2 (alter ation and interna l quotation marks omitted). 3 I nt h e f

i rs tro u n d o f j u ry s el ec t i o n i n th i s ca s e, th e go v ern m en tu s eda p er em p t o ry ch al l en ge 4 to exclude juror number thirty , an Af rica n Americ an woman. I

n a subseque nt round, the g overnme nt 5 attempted to cha lleng e juror numbe r twenty -six , also an A f r ic a n A merica n woman. Only

one Af rica n 6 Am er ican ve nirepe rson re mained. White , wh o i s Af ri ca nAm er i ca n , o b

j ec t edfo l l o wi n g th e c h al l en ge 7 of juror numbe r t we n t y -six , claiming that the g overnme nt’s attempt to exclude two out of three 8 Afric an Amer icans in the ve nire indicated a pattern of r acia l discrimination. 9 The district cour t d et er m ined that White’s initi al burde n of makinga prima f acie showing 10 of discrimination had be en met, and a sked the g overnme nt for an e x planation for its ch al l enge of 11 juror number twenty -six

. The g overnme nt a verr ed that it had not used its challeng es on the ba sis of 12 rac e. I t expl ained that it had challeng ed juror number twenty -six beca use she had “a

n ang ry look that 13 she wa sn’t happy to be here ,” and beca

use “she had her

ey es closed f

or extended per iods of time” 14 as if she had been sleeping . The g overnme nt expl ained f urther that it had challeng ed juror numbe r 15 thi rt

y be c a us e sh e ha d state d duri ng qu e sti on ing that sh e ha d b e e n a wi tne ss i n a

no the r c ri min a l tr ia l, 16 testifying in support of a def endant’ s self-de fense claim. Finally , the gover nment stated t hat it had 17 no intention of challeng ing jur or number twe nty , the re maining A frica n Americ an in the venir e. 18 The dis t ri ct j u d ge n oted that he, too, had observe d juror number twenty -six with her e y es 19 closed duringquestioning. D efe nse counse l did not dispute this obser vation, but stated that he ha d 20 been too f

ar f rom juror number twenty -six to observe her ey es. The defe nse ar g ued fur ther that the 21 district court should not find a juror’ s unhappiness t o constitute a valid re ason for the exercise of

a19 1 pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e . Th e jud g e the n state d that e ve n tho ug h th e c ha lle ng e of jur or numbe r t hir ty 2 was “ not before the Court,” and that “there was no objec t i o n as t o [j uror number thirty ],” the 3 g overnme nt had offe red a leg itimate, nondisc riminatory rea son for making that challeng e “in lig ht 4 of what could develop a s a def ense here

. ” T h e j udg e, stating that he wa s unconvince d by the 5 defe nse’s objec tion to the gove rn m ent’s attempt to s trike juror numbe r twenty -six , found that the 6 g overnme nt had not used its pere mptory challeng es in a discr iminatory manner . 7 We ne e d not de c ide on thi s r e c or d w he the r t

he g ov e rnme nt i s c or

re c t in arguin g that Whi te 8 fa ile d to pr e se rv e his Batson challeng e. Even assuming that he did prese rve his challeng e, the recor d 9 in the prese nt case persua des us that the dis trict court did not clea rly err in finding that the 10 g overnme nt’s use of pe remptory challeng es wa s not motivated by discriminatory intent. As to juror 11 number twe nty -six , the g overnme nt’s conce rn about a juror’s i n at t en t i veness or ang ry demea nor 12 constitutes an acce ptable reason for the ex erc ise of a pe remptory challeng e. See M

essiah v. Dunc an , 13 435 F.3d 186, 200 ( 2d Cir. 2006); Gr e e n v . Trav is , 414 F.3d 288, 300 ( 2d Cir. 2005); United States 14 v. Rudas , 9 05 F .2 d 3 8, 41 (2 d Ci r. 19 90 ). Juro r n umb e r t hir ty ’s e arl ier ex peri ence te sti fy ingin 15 support of a criminal defe ndant’s self-de fense claim likewise wa s a valid g round for striking he r. Cf. 16 United States v. Douglas , 525 F.3d 225, 239-41 (2d Cir. 2008) (ac cepti n g t h e prosecutor’s 17 explanation that a stricken ve nirepe rson had se rved on a prior jury that acquitted a

nother c riminal 18 defe ndant), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct . 619 (2008); Un ite d S tates v . R uiz , 894 F.2d 501, 506-07 (2d Ci r. 19 1990) (f

inding suff

icient the explanation that a s tric k e n v e n ir e p e r s o n

h a d serve d on multipl e pre vious 20 hung juries). “ [T] he district cour t permissibly

found that t he g overnme nt articulate d, and possessed, 21 a neutral rea son for ex cusing the juror[s] in question . . . .” Douglas , 5 2 5 F

. 3 d a t2 3 9

. A c c o r d i n g l y,20 1 we c on c lud e that th e c ourt pr op e rl y re je c te d Wh ite ’s Batson c la im. 2 3 IV. Sentenc e 4 Whit e’s f

inal challenge o n ap p eal is t o his eig hty -four -month prison sentence . We review 5 criminal sentenc es forboth proce dural fa irness and substantive r easona bleness under

an 6 abuse- of-discr etion standard. United States v. Legros , 52 9 F .3 d 4 70 , 4 73 -7 4 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 8) . Wh ite 7 claims both proce dural a nd substantive err or in his sentence . We find both clai m s to be without 8 me ri t. 9 Whit e first c ontends that the district c ourt improperly applied an upw ard de parture pursuant 10 to se ction 4A1.3(a )(1) of the United States Sentenc ing Guidelines. See United States v. Jone s , 531 11 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that an improper a pplication of the Guide lines is a proce dural 1 2 e r r o r t h at “c an re n d er a s en t en ce u n re as o n ab l e” (c i t i n g Gall v. United States , 1 2 8 S. Ct

. 586, 597 13 (2007)) ). That se ction of the Guide lines permits a court to depar t from the applica

ble cr iminal hist ory 14 cate g ory

“[i] f re liable information indicate s that the defe ndant' s crimin al history cate g ory 15 substantially

under- repr esents the se riousness of the de fenda nt's criminal history or the likelihood 16 that t

h e d e f e n d a nt will commit other c rimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a )(1) . “We re view the district cour t’s 17 finding reg ardingthe ade quacy of the c alculate d criminal history for c lear err or and r eview the scope 18 of the sente ncing court’s depar ture [under section 4A1.3(a )(1) ] for rea sonablene ss.” United States 19 v. Cox , 2 9 9 F. 3 d 1 4 3 , 1 4 6 ( 2 d C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Kassar , 47 F.3d 562, 566 ( 2d 20 Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds, Spence r v. Kemna , 523 U.S. 1 (1998)). 21 Whit e ’s Pr e se nte nc e I nv e sti g a tio n Re po rt (“P S R” ) d e te rm ine d th a t un de r t he Gu ide lin e s,21 1 W h i t e’ s o ff

en s e l ev el wa s t we n t y an d h i s cr i m i n al h i s t o ry ca t ego ry V, re s u l t i n g i na s en t en ci n g ra n ge 2 of six ty -three to seventy -eig ht months’ imprisonm ent. The district c ourt adopted the finding s in the 3 PSR , to which White did not obj ect, but conc luded that criminal hist ory cate g ory V under repr esente d 4 the seriousne ss of Whit e’s past criminal conduct and the likelihood t hat he would c ommit another 5 c r i m e . In r e a c h i n g t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , t h e d i s tr i c t c o urt n o t e d th a t W h i t e h a d b e e nc o n v i c t e d

o f t w e n ty6 one off

enses, six of which wer e felonies, and many of which involved violenc e. As the district c ourt 7 p ut it, “virtually

since the e ighties, a

bout ever y other y ear , ever

y y ear [,] Mr. White ge ts convicted 8 of so me thi ng . T his is h is s ixth f e lony . . . [and ] 21 st co nv ic tio n. ” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d th a t so me 9 of the co n v i ct i o n s , including a conviction for bur g lary

and one f

or attempted r obbery , as we ll as 10 sever al misdemeanor s, were not counted in the cr iminal hist ory calc ulation beca

use of their

ag e. 11 Be cause of this “continuing long- te r m p a tt e r n , ” th e s e nte n c in g

ju dg e conc luded, “the c riminal history 12 does under

repr esent how se rious [W hite’s] rec ord i s, and also

. . . underr epre sents the likelihood that 13 he will commit some other crime.” The court there fore depar ted upwar d to criminal history cate g ory 14 VI , w hic h r e su lte d in a Gu ide lin e s r ang e of

se ve nty to e ig hty -s e ve n mo nth s. 15 We are not pe rsuade d that the district c ourt clea rly err ed in f

inding that the PSR ’s Guidelines 16 calc ulation, which discounted seve ral of White’s prior c onvictions, did not adequately repr esent the 17 seriousness of White’s cr iminal history

. Guidelines § 4A1.3(a )(2) expressly provides that “[p]rior 18 sentenc e(s) not used in computing the criminal hi story cate g ory” may be considered in determining 19 whether

to depar t under § 4A1.3( a)( 1). U

. S. S. G. § 4A1.3(a )(2) . Given White’s many convictions and 20 the reg ularity with which he committed crimes, moreover, we see no clea r error in the district judg e’s 21 c on c lus ion

tha t Whi te is the ty

pe of pe rs on wh o is no t e a sil y de te rr e d, and

wh o th e re fo re is l ike ly

to22 1 c omm it f

utu re c ri me s. 2 I n a dd iti on , w e se e no thi ngunre a so na ble a bo ut t he sc op e of

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de pa

rt ur e in 3 this case. The court de par t ed o n l y o ne leve l to criminal history cate g ory VI , the hig hest criminal 4 history

level ava ilable in ordinary case s. See id. § 4A1.3(a )(4) (B ). The district c ourt’s depar ture wa s 5 there fore narr ow. Fur thermore , the cour

t imposed a sentence that was a mere six months above the 6 Guidelines rang e that would have been applicable without t he depa rture, a nd to which White had no 7 objection. We cannot sa y that this was an abuse of discre tion. 8 Finally , Whit e conte nds that his sentence is substantively unrea sonable be cause it is gre ater 9 than nec essar

y to meet the sente ncingg oals expressed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See J ones , 531 F.3d 10 at 170 (noting that “substantive re asonable ness re duces to a single quest i o n: ‘whethe r the District 11 J udg e abuse d his discretion in determiningthat the § 3553(a) factors supported’ the sentenc e 1 2 i mp o s ed ” ( qu o t i n g Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 600)). A s noted previously , t h e d i s trict court imposed a 13 sentenc e only

slightl y ab o ve the Guide lines rang e. F urthermor e, White possesses an e x tensive 14 criminal history

for whic h the Guidelines do not fully acc ount. I n light of these fa cts, we c annot say 15 that th e se nte nc e wa s e xce ssi ve or outsi de the ra

ng e of se nte nc e s tha t the d ist

ri c t c ourt c ou ld 16 rea sonably

impose. 17 18 CO NC LU SION 1 9 We ha

v e c o n s id e r e d

a ll o f Wh it e ’ s c o n te n ti o n s o nth is a p p e a l a n d h av e f o un d th e m t o be 20 wi tho ut m e ri t. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e jud g me nt of the dis tr ic t c ourt he re by is AF F IRM ED

.