NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BRIAN M. BURMASTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2018-1868

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:17-cv-01903-CFL, Judge Charles F. 

Lettow. 

______________________ 

Decided: August 7, 2018

______________________ 

BRIAN M. BURMASTER, Milwaukee, WI, pro se. 

 SEAN SIEKKINEN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., CHAD 

A. READLER. 

 ______________________ 

Before O’MALLEY, CLEVENGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
2 BURMASTER v. UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM. 

Brian M. Burmaster appeals from the final decision of 

the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims 

Court”) dismissing his pro se complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the 

Court of Federal Claims. Burmaster v. United States, No. 

1:17-cv-01903, 2018 WL 1417683 (Cl. Ct. Mar. 22, 2018). 

Because the Claims Court correctly concluded that it 

lacked jurisdiction over the claims raised in Burmaster’s

complaint, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On September 26, 2007, a grand jury indicted Burmaster for three counts of knowingly transmitting in 

interstate and foreign commerce threats to injure people 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Indictment, United 

States v. Burmaster, No. 2:07-cr-00628 (D. Utah Sept. 26, 

2007), ECF No. 1. Burmaster was remanded to custody 

pending trial and, while in custody, underwent a psychiatric exam. Order, United States v. Burmaster, No. 2:07-

cr-00628 (D. Utah Aug. 8, 2008), ECF No. 43 at 1–2. 

After that initial exam, the district court found by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Burmaster “suffer[ed] 

from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 

incompetent to the extent that he is unable to assist 

properly in his defense.” Id. Accordingly, the district 

court ordered that Burmaster be committed to the custody 

of the Attorney General and be hospitalized for treatment 

in a suitable facility for a reasonable period of time to 

determine if he could be restored to competency, but, in no 

event, for longer than four months. Id. at 2. In July of 

2009, the United States moved to dismiss the indictment 

without prejudice after the district court ultimately 

concluded that Burmaster’s mental competency was not 

readily restorable. Mot. for Leave to File Rule 48(a) 

Dismissal, United States v. Burmaster, No. 2:07-cr-00628 

(D. Utah July 21, 2009), ECF No. 78. The district court 
BURMASTER v. UNITED STATES 3

granted the dismissal and Burmaster was released from 

custody. 

On November 22, 2013, a grand jury again indicted 

Burmaster for knowingly and intentionally transmitting 

in interstate and foreign commerce, from the country of 

Lebanon to the State of Louisiana, threats to injure a 

person in violation of § 875(c). Indictment, United States 

v. Burmaster, No. 2:13-cr-00265 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2013), 

ECF No. 3. Burmaster’s counsel moved for a psychiatric 

exam to determine whether he was competent to stand 

trial, and he was again committed to a federal facility for 

the purposes of such an exam. Order & Reasons, United 

States v. Burmaster, No. 2:13-cr-00265 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 

2016), ECF No. 49 at 1–2. Doctors at the Federal Medical 

Center in North Carolina diagnosed Burmaster with 

Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar type and Obsessive 

Compulsive Personality Disorder. Id. at 3. This trial 

court also found Burmaster incompetent to stand trial at 

that time and he was again hospitalized for treatment to 

determine if his competency could be restored. Id. Burmaster then filed a petition for writ of mandamus, in 

which he “complain[ed] of delay in a competency evaluation,” “challenge[d] the district court’s determination that 

he is not competent to stand trial and assert[ed] that his 

continued detention is unlawful and exceeds the maximum sentence he faces.” Judgment, United States v. 

Burmaster, No. 2:13-cr-00265 (E.D. La. Aug. 17, 2017), 

ECF No. 69 at 1. The petition was denied. Id. The 

Government filed, and the district court granted, a motion 

to dismiss without prejudice the indictment for good cause 

in view of Burmaster’s psychiatric evaluations. Order, 

United States v. Burmaster, No. 2:13-cr-00265 (E.D. La. 

Aug. 17, 2017), ECF No. 68. Again, Burmaster was 

released from custody. 

On December 5, 2017, Burmaster filed a complaint 

against the United States in the Claims Court, alleging 

unlawful imprisonment and a violation of his Sixth 
4 BURMASTER v. UNITED STATES

Amendment right to a public trial by an impartial jury. 

Suppl. J.A. 2, 4. Burmaster sought monetary relief for 

the 1,241 total days he spent incarcerated, first, in Utah 

between 2008 and 2009, and second, in Louisiana between 

2015 and 2017. He also sought “various forms of equitable relief[,] including declarations that ‘the United States 

of America is not a [r]ogue [n]ation,’ that ‘Americans 

honor both the word and letter of [their] international 

commitments,’ that the “‘Mental Health’ statutes (18 

[U.S.C. §] 4241 through 18 [U.S.C. §] 4246’ are unconstitutional, and that Mr. Burmaster is ‘competent to stand 

trial.’” Burmaster, 2018 WL 1417683, *1 (quoting Suppl. 

J.A. at 4). The Government moved to dismiss Burmaster’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Claims Court found that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over Burmaster’s case. First, it found that it 

lacked jurisdiction over Burmaster’s various claims for 

declaratory relief because the Claims Court’s jurisdiction 

is restricted to claims for liquated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort under the Tucker Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Next, the Claims Court found it 

lacked jurisdiction over Burmaster’s claim of unjust

imprisonment because he was never convicted and he 

never provided, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)–(b),

a certificate proving his innocence of the crimes for which 

he was indicted. Finally, the Claims Court found that it 

lacked jurisdiction over Burmaster’s claim that the Government violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by 

jury because the Claims Court’s jurisdiction over constitutional claims arises only when the provisions at issue are 

money mandating, and the Sixth Amendment is not such 

a provision. Thus, the Claims Court dismissed Burmaster’s complaint.

Burmaster appeals, arguing that the Claims Court 

has jurisdiction over his claims for unjust imprisonment, 

seeking equitable relief, and for violation of the Sixth 
BURMASTER v. UNITED STATES 5

Amendment. We have jurisdiction over a final decision 

for the Claims Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether the Claims Court possessed jurisdiction. Wheeler v. United States, 11 F.3d 156, 

158 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Tucker Act defines the jurisdiction of the Claims Court. Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers 

Assoc. v. United States, 160 F.3d 714, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)).

First, Burmaster contends that the Claims Court has 

jurisdiction over his claim of unjust imprisonment. The 

Tucker Act grants the Claims Court “jurisdiction to 

render judgment upon any claim for damages by any 

person unjustly convicted of an offense against the United 

States and imprisoned.” Humphrey v. United States, 60 

F. App’x 292, 294 (Fed. Cir. 2003). To satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for claims of unjust imprisonment, 

the person suing the United States must submit a certificate or pardon stating that “[h]is conviction has been 

reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of 

the offense of which he was convicted,” and that “[h]e did 

not commit any of the acts charged . . . .” Id. (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 2513). Here, presumably because he was never 

convicted of any offense, Burmaster did not submit such a 

certificate or pardon, nor did he otherwise assert that he 

did not commit the crimes charged in the indictments. 

For these reasons, the Claims Court correctly dismissed 

Burmaster’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.1 

 

1 Burmaster’s complaint also sought treble damages 

under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations 

(“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Suppl. J.A. at 2. The 

Claims Court held that it “lacks jurisdiction over any 

claims that may be cognizable under the RICO Act because jurisdiction over such claims ‘is conferred exclusive-
6 BURMASTER v. UNITED STATES

To the extent Burmaster claims that his pretrial determination was in excess of that necessary to determine 

if he could be restored to competency, any remedy for that 

claim must be sought in the courts with jurisdiction over 

his custody. The Claims Court lacks authority to entertain any such action. 

Next, Burmaster contends that the Claims Court has 

jurisdiction over his claims seeking various forms of 

equitable relief, including “a judgment on the constitutionality of the ‘Mental Health’ statutes (18 U.S.C. 

[§] 4241 through 18 U.S.C. [§] 4246).” Suppl. J.A. at 4. 

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Tucker Act “to 

require that a plaintiff seeking to invoke the court’s 

jurisdiction must present a claim for ‘actual, presently 

due money damages from the United States.’” Nat’l Air, 

160 F.3d at 716 (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 

1, 3 (1969)). “Although the Tucker Act has been amended 

to permit the [Claims Court] to grant equitable relief 

ancillary to claims for monetary relief over which it has 

jurisdiction, there is no provision giving the [Claims 

Court] jurisdiction to grant equitable relief when it is 

unrelated to a claim for monetary relief pending before 

the court.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 

added). Here, as noted above, the Claims Court lacks 

jurisdiction over Burmaster’s claim for monetary relief, 

i.e. his claim for unjust imprisonment. Even if it had 

jurisdiction, Burmaster’s claims for equitable relief are 

unrelated to his claims for monetary relief. Indeed, a 

 

ly on the United States District Courts.’” Burmaster, 

2018 WL 1417683, *2. Burmaster appears to challenge 

this on appeal. Reply Br. at 4–6. We agree with the 

Claims Court’s finding that it lacks jurisdiction over 

RICO claims. See § 1964(a) (“The district courts of the 

United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and 

restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter . . . .”).
BURMASTER v. UNITED STATES 7

judgment regarding Burmaster’s competency to stand 

trial or a judgment regarding the constitutionality of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 4241–46 would not help Burmaster obtain

monetary relief under his claim for unjust imprisonment. 

Therefore, the Claims Court correctly found that it lacked 

jurisdiction over Burmaster’s claims for equitable relief. 

Finally, Burmaster contends that the Claims Court 

has jurisdiction over his Sixth Amendment claim. The 

Claims Court has jurisdiction over claims against the 

United States that are founded upon a Constitutional 

provision, but only those provisions that mandate payment of money damages. Humphrey, 60 F. App’x at 295. 

The Sixth Amendment does not mandate money damages 

under the circumstances presented here, Smith v. United 

States, 36 F. App’x 444, 446 (Fed. Cir. 2002), therefore,

the Claims Court correctly dismissed Burmaster’s claim. 

CONCLUSION

Because the Claims Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each of Burmaster’s claims, we affirm the 

Claims Court’s dismissal of Burmaster’s complaint. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.