COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judg es Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman

SA'AD EL-AMIN MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 10 63-01-2 PER CURIAM JANUARY 29, 2002 CAROLYN ADAMS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Barnard F. Jennings , Judge Designate (Sa'ad El-Amin, pro se , on brief). No brief for appellee.

Sa'ad El-Amin (husband) appeal s the decision of the circuit court finding him in arrears in spousal su pport, ordering him to make a good faith effo rt to pay the amount due to Carolyn Adams (wife), and findin g him in contempt of cour t. On appe al, husband contends the trial co urt erred by (1) incl uding in its order findings it did not make when th e parties were be fore the court, (2) deferring a ru ling on husban d's entitlement to subpoenaed materials until the hearing date , and (3) deny ing husband's request to present argu ments on the terminatio n of spousal support with a reservation to conduct addition al matters. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affi rm the decision of the tria l court. See Rule 5A:27. On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire , 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). Procedural Background The parties we re divorced in March 1990, and hu sband was ordered to pay wife spousal support. Appellant currently is obligated to pay wife support in the amount of $1,500 per month. In September 2000 , wife filed a motion to reinstate and a petition for rule to show cause. Wife contended husb and was in arrears in his support paymen ts. Husband argued he was unable to make the payments and filed a mo tion to termin ate spousal supp ort. Husband served wife's employ er with a subpoena duces tecum requesting information re garding wife's employment. Wife filed a motion to quash the subpoena . After hearin g arguments on the motion to quash on December 11, 2000, the trial court deferred ruling and advised the partie s that it would decide the matter when it heard their case. The court heard the case on Janu ary 11, 2001. At the hearing the court denied wife's motion to quas h and granted husband a continuance on the moti on to terminat e support. Th e court found husband in contempt, fi ned him $1,000, found he was in arrears in the amount of $137,035.21, and transf erred the ca se to the

- 2 -juvenile and domestic relations distri ct court. Th e court entered the order on March 23, 2001. Analysis

I. Husband argues the trial court included in th e order factual findings and rulings th at had not been made when the parties were before the court. He also contends the trial court erred by entering the order with out his endorsem ent in violation of Rule 1:13. Rule 1:13 provides, in pertinent part, that "[d]rafts of orders and decrees shall be endorsed by counsel of record, or reasonable notice of the time and place of presenting such drafts together with copies thereof shall be served [on] all counsel of record who have not endorsed them." However, "[c]ompliance with this rule . . . may be modified or dispensed with by the court in its discretion." Rule 1:13. When dispensing with endorsement or notice pursuant to Rule 1:13, a better practice would be for a trial court to include a statement reflecting its decision to exercise its discretion, [but,] in the absence of such a statement, we presume that a trial court exercised its discretion . . . . Courts are presumed to act in accordance with the law and orders of the court are entitled to a presumption of regularity. Napert v. Napert , 261 Va. 45, 47, 540 S.E.2d 882, 884 (2001). Accordingly, on the instant record, we must presume the court

- 3 -exercised discretion in dispensing with both the endorsement and notice requirements that attended the order in issue. Furthermore, a review of the trial court's transcript reveals the court's written order included only factual findings and rulings made at the hearing. The trial court did not err in entering the order.

II. At the December 11, 2000 hearing, the trial court declined to rule on wife's motion to quash. On January 11, 2001, the court heard argument on the motion, denied it, and granted husband a continuance in order to review the requested documents and prepare arguments concerning his motion to terminate spousal support. Husband has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the court's decision to postpone ruling on the motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

III. After the court denied wife's motion to quash, husband asked to proceed with his motion to terminate support with a reservation of right to conduct additional matters after reviewing the materials provided by wife's employer. The court denied husband's request, preferring to hear the entire matter at once and granted husband a continuance, at his request. "[T]he order of proof is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and [an appellate] court will not reverse the judgment except in very exceptional cases, and, unless it

- 4 -affirmatively appears from the record that this discretion has been abused, [an appellate] court will not disturb the trial court's ruling." Lebedun v. Commonwealth , 27 Va. App. 697, 715, 501 S.E.2d 427, 436 (1998) (citation omitted). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband's request to hear arguments with reservation to conduct additional matters. Accordingly, we su mmarily affirm the de cision of the trial

court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.

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