NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IMELDA G. PRAKELT, Plaintiff/Appellee, 

v.

REFORM PHYSICIANS, LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellants. 

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0124 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CV2020-093333 

No. CV2020-094234 

The Honorable Rodrick J. Coffey, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Dessaules Law Group, Phoenix 

By Jonathan A. Dessaules, F. Robert Connelly 

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee 

Jaburg & Wilk PC, Phoenix 

By Roger L. Cohen, Kathi M. Sandweiss 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

FILED 12-26-2023
PRAKELT v. REFORM, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined. 

C A T L E T T, Judge: 

¶1 This appeal turns on the authenticity of the signatures on two 

quit claim deeds. Anelime Holding LLC (“Anelime”), Reform Physicians 

LLC (“Reform Physicians”), Harinder Takyar (“Takyar”) and his wife 

Raman Takyar (collectively the “Takyars”) claim the signatures are 

authentic. Imelda G. Prakelt (“Prakelt”) claims they are not. After hearing 

testimony and taking evidence during a three-day bench trial, the superior 

court agreed with Prakelt that the signatures are not authentic. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 Prakelt and Takyar began a romantic relationship in 2012. 

The two also worked together—Prakelt provided various services for three 

health care companies Takyar controlled. All three of those companies 

closed between 2016 and 2017. In November 2019, Prakelt and Takyar 

ended their relationship. 

¶3 According to the Takyars, Prakelt signed two quit claim deeds 

in January 2020, transferring two properties she owned to Reform 

Physicians, a company the Takyars own. One of the properties was

Prakelt’s primary residence in Maricopa County (“Maricopa Property”) 

and the other was a rental property in Pima County (“Pima Property”). 

Reform Physicians later paid off Prakelt’s $311,000 mortgage on the 

Maricopa Property. Reform Physicians transferred both properties to 

Anelime, another company the Takyars own. 

¶4 In May 2020, Prakelt recorded a notice of lis pendens against 

both properties and filed two separate quiet title actions against Reform 

Physicians, Anelime, and the Takyars, one in Maricopa County and one in 

Pima County. Prakelt alleged she had no knowledge of the property 

transfers. Anelime filed quiet title counterclaims against Prakelt. The two 

cases were eventually consolidated into one action in the Maricopa County 

Superior Court. 
PRAKELT v. REFORM, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

¶5 After discovery and motion practice, the superior court held 

a three-day bench trial. Prakelt disputed signing either deed or otherwise 

intending to transfer either property. Takyar alleged that, in 2012, Reform 

Physicians agreed to loan Prakelt $200,000 as her contribution for a 

partnership interest in two companies. According to Takyar, Prakelt agreed 

to transfer the Pima Property to Reform Physicians for a release of this debt. 

¶6 In support, Takyar introduced a Promissory Note (the 

“Note”) that Prakelt allegedly signed on October 1, 2012, which a notary 

allegedly signed and stamped on October 22, 2012. The Note contained 

various inconsistencies. Takyar also produced two K-1 tax forms for the 

two businesses, stating Prakelt invested $140,000 in one and $60,000 in the 

other. Neither form was signed and there was no evidence either form was 

sent to the IRS. Prakelt denied she borrowed the money, had any 

knowledge of the Note prior to receiving a copy from Takyar in 2020, or 

ever had an ownership interest in either business. 

¶7 Takyar also testified that Prakelt agreed to transfer the 

Maricopa Property to Reform Physicians in return for paying off Prakelt’s 

$311,000 mortgage. Both parties agreed Reform Physicians paid off the 

mortgage, but Prakelt testified that Takyar did so to rekindle their 

relationship and to thank her for the work she had done for him and his 

companies over the years. 

¶8 Both deeds contain drafting errors. Takyar testified that 

Prakelt personally typed both deeds in his presence. But both deeds 

misspell Prakelt’s middle name as “Gutieerrez”—her middle name is 

correctly spelled “Gutierrez”—and separately identify her as “Imelda 

Prakelt G.,” which is not her legal name. Each deed includes three notary 

stamps and notary signatures from Lety Santos (“Santos”), a notary public. 

The date above Prakelt’s purported signature on the Pima Property deed is 

January 28, 2019, but Santos hand wrote “Date corrected January 30, 2020” 

next to it. Santos also stamped and signed the deed in two other locations, 

using January 31, 2020 as the date. The Maricopa Property deed also 

includes three separate notary signatures, one correcting the date above 

Prakelt’s purported signature, but each dated January 31, 2020. 

¶9 Santos admitted she did not have Prakelt sign her notary 

journal when Prakelt allegedly signed the deeds, and Santos testified she 

was unaware she was required to do so. After the validity of Prakelt’s 

signature became an issue, Santos drafted, signed, and stamped a 

document titled, “Verification Regarding Notarized documents” (the 

“Verification”). The Verification states that Prakelt signed the deeds, and it 
PRAKELT v. REFORM, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

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contains detailed information about each property. Santos testified that she 

drafted the Verification without any prior communication with Takyar and 

without possessing the deeds at issue. She also testified she did not know 

if the Verification was accurate, and Santos’ employer later prohibited 

Santos from notarizing documents for Takyar.

¶10 The superior court found Prakelt’s testimony to be 

“significantly more credible than Takyar,” and quieted title on both 

properties in Prakelt’s favor. The court recognized there were questions 

regarding why Takyar would pay off Prakelt’s mortgage, but it found 

“those questions are significantly outweighed by the weaknesses and 

inconsistencies in Takyar’s testimony[.]” Specifically, the court found no 

reliable financial documentation showing Reform Physicians actually 

transferred money to Prakelt or any third-party on her behalf, which was 

“highly suspicious since Defendants could have obtained and disclosed 

their own bank records.” The court also found the fact that Prakelt’s name 

was misspelled in the deeds “significantly undermines Takyar’s claim that 

[Prakelt] drafted the Deed.” 

¶11 The court further found Santos’ testimony that she was able 

to draft the Verification without consulting Takyar or having the deeds in 

front of her lacked credibility. Consequently, the court found that Prakelt 

is the rightful owner of both properties and awarded her attorneys’ fees 

under A.R.S. § 12-1103(B). 

¶12 The Takyars, Anelime, and Reform Physicians timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

¶13 In an appeal after a bench trial, “we review the evidence in a 

light most favorable to sustaining the verdict,” and will accept the superior 

court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, “giving due regard to the 

opportunity of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Castro v. 

Ballesteros-Suarez, 222 Ariz. 48, 51 ¶ 11 (App. 2009); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). 

“A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence supports 

it, even if substantial conflicting evidence exists.” Castro, 222 Ariz. at 51–52 

¶ 11. Substantial evidence exists if a reasonable person could reach the 

same result as the superior court. Id. at 52 ¶ 11. We review any questions 

of law de novo. Id. ¶ 12; Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 167 Ariz. 

254, 257 (1991). 
PRAKELT v. REFORM, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

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I. Quiet Title

¶14 Takyar first argues the superior court erred in granting quiet 

title to Prakelt because there is a presumption that Prakelt’s signatures on 

the deeds are valid, which, he contends, can only be overcome with clear 

and convincing evidence. Thus, according to Takyar, the court should have 

ended its inquiry after examining the face of the deeds, and it erred by 

making factual findings regarding witness credibility. Prakelt asserts 

Takyar waived this argument by failing to raise it below. We conclude the 

issue was sufficiently preserved because, in the superior court, both parties 

discussed various aspects of presumptions regarding signature 

authenticity. 

¶15 In arguing that Prakelt’s signature is presumptively 

authentic, Takyar relies primarily on A.R.S. § 47-3308(A), located in 

Arizona’s Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). The UCC provides that, 

“[i]n an action with respect to an instrument,” the authenticity of a 

signature is admissible unless denied in the pleadings. A.R.S. § 47-3308(A). 

If the validity of the signature is contested, the person claiming validity has 

the burden of proof, “but the signature is presumed authentic[.]” Id. 

¶16 Takyar’s reliance on the UCC’s presumption is misplaced—

the presumption does not apply here because neither deed at issue is an 

“instrument.” The UCC defines an “instrument” as a “negotiable 

instrument.” A.R.S. § 47-3104(B). And it defines a “negotiable instrument” 

as “an unconditional promise to order or pay a fixed amount of money[.]” 

A.R.S. § 47-3104(A). The deeds at issue are not negotiable instruments—

they do not contain a promise that Prakelt would pay an amount of money 

to any of the defendants or anyone else. Thus, the UCC’s presumption is 

inapplicable. 

¶17 Takyar also maintains that we should apply a presumption of 

validity that can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence 

because the deeds were notarized. We disagree that such a presumption 

applies in this case and that clear and convincing evidence is required to 

overcome that presumption. 

¶18 First, even assuming notarization could result in the 

presumption Takyar advocates, such a presumption would only trigger if 

the notary complied with the law. See 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgements § 86 

(“A proper acknowledgment does not conclusively establish execution of a 

deed but is strong proof thereof[.]” (emphasis added)). Here, there was 

substantial evidence that Santos did not so comply. Santos admitted she 
PRAKELT v. REFORM, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

did not have Prakelt sign her notary journal when Santos notarized the 

deeds. That failure is a violation of A.R.S. § 41-319(A), which required 

Santos to include a variety of information in her journal to prove she 

witnessed Prakelt’s signatures. Alternatively, § 41-319(B) allows a notary 

who personally knows a signer to retain a copy of the notarized documents 

in lieu of making a journal entry, but Santos did not claim to have followed 

that path. The failure to establish Santos lawfully witnessed Prakelt sign 

the deeds removes any presumption that would otherwise follow a notarial 

act. 

¶19 Second, the evidentiary standard required to defeat a 

presumption based on notarization is unclear. Takyar cites no Arizona case 

law, nor have we located any, establishing a “clear and convincing 

evidence” presumption based on notarization of a deed. Instead, a 

notarized signature is presumed valid unless someone comes forward with 

contrary evidence. As our supreme court has said, a notary certificate on 

an affidavit is presumptive evidence a party swore to the statements 

contained therein “so long as [the certificate] stood unimpeached[.]” Lewis 

v. State, 32 Ariz. 182, 189 (1927); see also 1A C.J.S. § 76 (“A certificate of

acknowledgement attached to an instrument such as a deed or a mortgage

raises the presumption of due execution, which can be rebutted only after

being weighed against any evidence adduced to show that the subject

instrument was not duly executed.” (emphasis added)). Here, the

signatures on the deeds did not stand unimpeached because Prakelt

disputed their authenticity and produced evidence supporting her claim.

¶20 In any event, the record contained enough evidence to 

overcome any presumption. Under Takyar’s version of events, Prakelt 

drafted and signed the deeds. But there was sufficient evidence supporting 

the superior court’s conclusion otherwise. 

¶21 Starting with the issue of how the deeds were created, Takyar 

claimed Prakelt typed the deeds. The evidence sufficiently supported the 

court’s finding that Prakelt did not create the deeds. Prakelt, for example, 

testified she was not involved in drafting either deed. The deeds misspelled 

Prakelt’s middle name and referred to “Imelda Prakelt G.,” which is not, 

and has never been, Prakelt’s legal name. 

¶22 The evidence also sufficiently supported the superior court’s 

conclusion that Prakelt did not sign the deeds. Prakelt’s own testimony 

supports that finding—Prakelt testified she did not sign the deeds. 

Moreover, the notary who allegedly witnessed the signatures could not 

produce a notary journal or any other evidence proving Prakelt signed the 
PRAKELT v. REFORM, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

7 

deeds. And the deeds themselves reflected multiple different notary 

stamps and multiple execution dates. For example, the deed for the Pima 

Property reflected three notary stamps and three execution dates. 

¶23 Lacking the kind of evidence a notary would ordinarily 

provide, Takyar introduced the Verification to prove Prakelt signed the 

deeds. Santos signed the Verification under oath to prove she notarized 

Prakelt’s signatures on the two deeds. The Verification states Santos 

“personally examined . . . Quit Claim deed signed by Imelda G. Prakelt 

regarding property in Maricopa County with Parcel Number 304-74-152 on 

January 31st 2020,” and “Quit Claim deed signed by Imelda G. Prakelt 

regarding property in Pima County with Parcel Number 304-63-1460 on 

January 31st 2020.” Santos claimed she drafted the Verification under 

penalty of perjury, but admitted she did not know what “perjury” means. 

Santos claimed she did not have any communications with Takyar or 

remember reviewing the deeds before she drafted the Verification. But she 

did not know how so much detailed information—including accurate 

parcel numbers and the identity of a statutory agent—made its way into the 

Verification. Santos ultimately admitted she did not know whether the 

substance of the Verification was true when she drafted it. 

¶24 Then there is the issue of witness credibility. The superior 

court heard live testimony from the primary players involved and we have 

only a cold record. Thus, “the trial court, not this court, assesses 

credibility.” In re U.S. Currency in Amount of $26,980.00, 199 Ariz. 291, 295 

¶ 10 (App. 2000). The superior court here concluded that Prakelt was 

“significantly more credible than Takyar” because “[m]uch of Takyar’s 

testimony simply did not make sense.” The court also found that Takyar 

“contradicted his own testimony numerous times during the trial.” 

Similarly, the court determined that the testimony Santos provided was not 

“the least bit credible.” We defer to these credibility determinations, which 

further support the court’s ultimate factual conclusions regarding the 

authenticity of the signatures at issue. 

¶25 In sum, the record contained sufficient evidence to support 

the superior court’s finding that Prakelt did not sign the deeds regardless 

of whether a presumption exists, or the quality of evidence needed to 

overcome it. See Castro, 222 Ariz. at 51–52 ¶ 11. Because we reach this 

conclusion, we need not address whether the deeds’ language was 

sufficient to convey the properties from Prakelt to Takyar. 
PRAKELT v. REFORM, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

8 

II. Wrongful Lis Pendens

¶26 Takyar also argues the superior court erred by refusing to find 

that Prakelt wrongfully recorded a notice of lis pendens. “A lis pendens 

provides constructive notice to prospective purchasers and lenders of a 

pending lawsuit that may affect title to real property.” Santa Fe Ridge 

Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bartschi, 219 Ariz. 391, 395 ¶ 11 (App. 2008); A.R.S. § 

12-1191(B). A lis pendens is wrongfully recorded only if the action does not

affect title to real property. Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Ass’n, 219 Ariz. at

395 ¶ 11. Here, both parties filed quiet title actions disputing who held title

to the properties. This litigation, therefore, clearly could have affected (and

ultimately did affect) the properties’ titles and, consequently, regardless of

who ultimately prevailed, Prakelt did not wrongfully record the lis pendens.

III. Attorneys’ Fees

¶27 Finally, Takyar maintains the superior court erred by 

awarding Prakelt attorneys’ fees because she should not have prevailed on 

her quiet title claim. A party may recover attorneys’ fees in a quiet title 

action by providing the other party with five dollars and requesting 

execution of a quit claim deed twenty days prior to bringing a quiet title 

action. A.R.S. § 12-1103(B). Prakelt complied with both statutory 

requirements and prevailed in her quiet title action. Thus, the superior 

court did not abuse its discretion in granting Prakelt’s request for attorneys’ 

fees. Charles I. Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 213 Ariz. 344, 350 ¶ 17 (App. 

2006) (reviewing an attorneys’ fee award for an abuse of discretion). 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

¶28 Prakelt has also, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1103, requested her 

attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal. We grant those requests upon Prakelt’s 

compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. We deny 

Anelime’s and Reform Physicians’ requests for attorneys’ fees because 

neither prevailed on their quiet title claims. 
PRAKELT v. REFORM, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

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CONCLUSION 

¶29 We affirm the superior court’s judgment.