UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

SIMONE L. GREGGS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AUTISM SPEAKS, INC. et al, 

Defendants. 

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Civil Action No. 12-1107 (RJL) 

MEMORAN~PINION (March Z-6 , 2013) [#3] 

Plaintiff, Simone L. Greggs ("plaintiff' or "Greggs"), who is proceeding prose, 

brings this action against Mark Roithmayr, Ann Gibbons, Pat deSaules, Tracy Wilbanks, 

and Linda LePage (collectively, the "individual defendants"), in addition to Autism 

Speaks Inc. ("Autism Speaks") (collectively, "defendants"), seeking declaratory and 

injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, for numerous causes of 

action relating to Autism Speaks' rescindment of an offer of employment to plaintiff. 

Before the Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #3], contending that plaintiffs 

complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Upon consideration of the 

parties' pleadings, relevant law, and the entire record therein, the defendants' Motion to 

Dismiss is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

Simone L. Greggs is a 44 year-old resident of Prince George's County, Maryland 

with two children, one ofwhich is autistic. Compl. ~~ 7, 17, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff 

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previously worked for several non-profit organizations in a fundraising and event 

planning capacity, including the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights. !d.~ 17. 

After being laid off from her previous employment, plaintiff applied for the Walk 

Events Manager position at Autism Speaks in March 2012. !d.~~ 18-19. On March 26, 

2012, Autism Speaks' Director of Talent Acquisitions, Pat DeSaules, reached out to 

plaintiff for a preliminary interview and discussion about the Walk Events Manager 

position. !d. ~ 20. On March 27 and April3, 2012, plaintiff had a telephone interview 

and an in-person interview, respectively, with Autism Speaks' Executive Director Ann 

Gibbons. !d.~~ 21-22. After another telephone interview with Autism Speaks' Regional 

Director, Tracey Wilbanks, on April 5, 2012, plaintiff was invited to Autism Speaks' 

Washington, D.C. office to meet with staff. !d.~~ 23-24. 

On April13, 2012, Autism Speaks offered plaintiff the position, which she 

accepted via a signed offer letter. !d.~ 25. According to the plaintiff, Autism Speaks' 

employment offer was contingent on a successful background check and drug test, which 

she successfully passed on April23, 2012. !d.~~ 25, 28. As a result of her new position 

with Autism Speaks, plaintiff declined an employment opportunity with the Democratic 

National Committee at the end of April2012. !d.~ 33. On May 6, 2012, one day prior to 

her start date, plaintiff contacted defendant Ann Gibbons regarding a day care issue with 

her autistic son, who arrives home from school early on Wednesdays. /d.~ 29. Although 

she proposed several ways to solve the problem, including working from home on 

Wednesdays, plaintiff alleges that Gibbons was unreceptive and would only allow her to 

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delay her start date by one week to find the appropriate solution. /d. On that same day, 

plaintiff was able to successfully resolve the day care issue, and immediately let Gibbons 

know that working in the office on Wednesdays would no longer be a problem. /d.~ 30. 

The next day, however, plaintiff alleges that, via a conference call with defendants 

Gibbons, DeSaules, Wilbanks, and Linda LePage, she learned that Autism Speaks was 

rescinding its employment offer because it did not want to make any adjustments for the 

provision of plaintiffs autistic child. /d. ~ 31. On May 8, 2012, plaintiff claims that she 

filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

("EEOC"), alleging that defendants engaged in unlawful discriminatory employment 

practices against her because she had a disabled child. /d. ~~ 15, 32. Plaintiff filed the 

instant suit on July 6, 2012. See generally id. Alleging violations of numerous antidiscrimination laws, as well breach of contract, plaintiff asks this Court to grant judgment 

in her favor, in addition to compensatory and punitive damages and an award of costs and 

fees. /d. Defendants moved to dismiss this action on July 30, 2012. See generally Defs.' 

Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mot."), ECF No.3. For the following reasons, defendants' 

motion is GRANTED. 

ANALYSIS 

The defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs complaint because it "fails to state any 

viable cause of action against [ d]efendants upon which relief can be granted." See Defs.' 

Mem. in Supp. ofMot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem.") at 2, ECF No. 3-1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). Although the complaint is ambiguous as to the causes of action asserted, this 

Court will assume that plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

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1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Americans with 

Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and a breach of contract claim. 1 

Out of an abundance of caution, this Court will also presume that plaintiff intends to 

bring the aforementioned claims against each of the individual defendants, as well as 

defendant Autism Speaks, despite her use of the word "defendant" throughout the 

complaint, without any specificity or plurality. See generally Com pl. 

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need 

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his 

entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotations marks 

omitted). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he [C]ourt need not accept 

inferences drawn by plaintiffl] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in 

the complaint." Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

The Court may, however, consider "any documents either attached to or incorporated in 

1 See Compl. ~ 1 ("[Plaintiff] has claims of discriminatory treatment and breach of 

contract as a result of conduct by the [d]efendant that interferes with her right to be 

employed based on a disability."); id. ~ 2 ("This is an action ... to redress [d]efendant's 

unlawful employment practices and retaliation against [p ]laintiff ... in violation of ... 42 

U.S.C. § 1981 ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... and the Americans with 

Disabilities Act[.]"); id. ~ 5 ("[T]his action involves federal questions regarding the 

deprivation of [p]laintiffs civil rights under Title VII, Section 1981 and the ADA."); id. ~ 

46 ("On May 7, 2012, [d]efendant had breach [sic] the contract by rescinding the 

employment offer."). 

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the complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice." EEOC v. St. 

Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

Under the aforementioned standards, plaintiffs complaint is deficient for several 

reasons. First, the complaint fails to plead any claim under either Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 

1981. A cause of action under Section 1981 may be brought when a plaintiff suffers an 

injury flowing from the racially-motivated breach of his or her contractual relationship 

with another party. See Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 480 (2006). 

And Title VII proscribes employment discrimination on the basis of an "individual's 

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Far from the 

typical Title VII or Section 1981 case, however, plaintiff is alleging that the defendants 

"discriminated against [her] on the basis of her child's disability by denying her 

reasonable accommodations in order to perform the job and to take care of her [a]utistic 

child." Compl. ~ 35 (emphasis added); see also id. ~~ 2, 7, 39. Because plaintiffs 

allegations of employment discrimination against the defendants do not "contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face" under either Title VII or Section 1981, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted), her causes of actions based thereon must be dismissed. 

Second, the plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect 

to the ADA and Title VII claims. The ADA incorporates the "powers, remedies, and 

procedures" of Title VII, which includes the limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); see also Stewart v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 04-1444, 2006 

WL 626921, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2006). Before initiating an action in federal court, 

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"ADA plaintiffs, like those under Title VII, must exhaust their administrative remedies 

by filing an EEOC charge and giving that agency a chance to act on it." Marshall v. Fed. 

Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1). More specifically, if a plaintiffwishes to bring a suit in federal court, his or her 

complaint must be pending before the agency or the EEOC for at least 180 days, or 

plaintiff must be notified by the EEOC of his or her right to sue through the issuance of a 

right-to-sue letter, and bring suit within ninety days. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e16(c); see Hunter v. Dist. ofColumbia, No. 09-1491, 2012 WL 5974036, at *4 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 29, 2012). "The purpose ofthe [administrative exhaustion] doctrine is to afford the 

agency an opportunity to resolve the matter internally and to avoid unnecessarily 

burdening the courts." Wilson v. Pefia, 79 F.3d 154, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

Accepting all of her allegations as true for purposes of this motion, plaintiff filed a 

formal EEOC complaint on May 8, 2012, yet initiated the present action on July 6, 2012, 

well before the 180-day window had run its course or plaintiff received a right-to-sue 

letter from the EEOC. See Compl. ,-r 32; Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s 

Opp'n") at 1, ECF No. 7. Indeed, plaintiff herself concedes that, four months after she 

filed this lawsuit, she still had yet to receive a right-to-sue letter from the agency, and the 

EEOC was still engaged in its investigation ofher claims.2 See Pl.'s Opp'n at 1. Because 

2 Defendants have supported their Rule 12(b)(6) motion with a notice of plaintiff's EEOC 

charge of discrimination, attached as an exhibit to defendants' briefing. See Defs.' 

Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Reply"), Ex. A, ECF No.8; Wiley v. 

NEBF lnvs., No. 09-223,2010 WL 114953, at *1 n.l (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (court can 

consider Notice of Charge without converting motion to dismiss into motion for summary 

judgment). This administrative notice reflects that defendant Autism Speaks did not even 

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plaintiff deprived the EEOC of the opportunity to resolve the present matter 

administratively, her claims under Title VII and the ADA3 in this court must be dismissed 

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Dahlman v. Am. Ass 'n of Retired 

Persons (AARP), 791 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2011) ("ordinarily, receipt of a notice of 

right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent to the initiation of an ADA [or] Title VII ... 

action in court."); Parkv. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904,907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Only after 

the EEOC has notified the aggrieved person of its decision to dismiss or its inability to 

bring a civil action within the requisite time period can that person bring a civil action 

herself."). 

Last, the complaint fails to assert a viable cause of action for breach of contract 

against either the individual defendants or Autism Speaks. In her complaint, plaintiff 

contends that she was given an offer of employment by defendant Autism Speaks on 

April13, 2012, which she "sign[ed] and faxed back to the organization." Compl. ~ 25. 

Although the employment offer was contingent on her passing a background check and 

drug test, plaintiff successfully completed such tests, and was given a start date of May 7, 

2012. See id. ~~ 25, 28. Plaintiff argues that, when Autism Speaks rescinded her 

receive notice of plaintiffs discrimination charge from the EEOC until, at the earliest, 

October 12, 2012, over three months after plaintiff filed the instant suit. See generally 

Compl.; Defs.' Reply, Ex. A. 

3 Additionally, the notice of plaintiffs EEOC charge of discrimination, see Defs.' Reply, 

Ex. A, also demonstrates that plaintiff failed to assert a Title VII discrimination claim 

against defendants. This is yet another ground upon which plaintiffs Title VII claim is 

deficient. See Howard v. Fenty, 580 F. Supp. 2d 86, 90 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Plaintiffs must 

exhaust their Title VII claims prior to raising them for the first time in a lawsuit, and the 

law in this Circuit is clear that an allegation as to one type of discrimination does not 

exhaust all administrative remedies as to another type of alleged discrimination."). 

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employment offer on May 7, 2012, defendants committed a breach of contract. See id. ,-r,-r 

31,42-47. 

As an initial matter, even if the offer letter could properly be construed as an 

employment contract, plaintiff cannot assert a claim for breach of contract against the 

individual defendants because they were not parties to the alleged contract. More 

specifically, the offer letter is unambiguously between plaintiff and defendant Autism 

Speaks, and makes no mention of any of the individual defendants. See Defs.' Mot., Ex. 

A at 1 ("On behalf of Autism Speaks, we are pleased to confirm our offer of 

employment."). As such, plaintiffs contract-based claim against Mark Roithmayr, Ann 

Gibbons, Pat deSaules, Tracy Wilbanks, and Linda LePage fail. 

With regard to plaintiffs breach of contract claim against Autism Speaks, plaintiff 

does not contend that the employment offer at issue is anything but an offer of at-will 

employment with Autism Speaks, which can be terminated "by either party for any 

reason, or no reason, at any time." Hopkins v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass 'n, No. 10-

900, 2010 WL 5300536, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2010). Indeed, it is long-standing 

precedent in the District of Columbia that "unless a contrary contractual intent is clearly 

expressed, all employment is at-will." Turner v. Fed. Express Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 

404, 410 (D.D.C. 2008) (citation omitted). Thus, even ifthe offer letter is deemed an 

employment contract, plaintiff does not allege that it alters her at-will employment status 

with Autism Speaks in any way, and the offer letter's language is consistent with an atwill employment relationship. See generally Compl.; Defs.' Mot., Ex. A at 1 ("You are 

being employed as an 'employee-at will,' which means your employment and 

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compensation may be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at 

any time, by either Autism Speaks or yourself."). And under the at-will employment 

doctrine, Autism Speaks had the capacity to withdraw the offer or cease the employment 

relationship with plaintiff at any time, a right which Autism Speaks properly exercised on 

May 7, 2012. See Daisley v. Riggs Bank, NA., 372 F. Supp. 2d 61,67 (D.D.C. 2005) 

("Termination of employment, then, does not breach an at-will employment contract, 

because by its very terms the agreement contemplates that either party may end the 

employment relationship, with or without cause."); Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 

597 A.2d 28,30 (D.C. 1991). Accordingly, plaintiffs breach of contract claim must be 

dismissed because it fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 

CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendants' Motion to 

Dismiss [Dkt. #3]. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

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