alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EXHIBIT 32.1

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly
Report of Euro Currency Trust (the Trust) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
July 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Carl G. Verboncoeur, Chief Executive Officer of Rydex Specialized
Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Trust, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.              The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2.              The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material           respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.

Date: February 28, 2007

/s/ CARL G. VERBONCOEURCarl G.
Verboncoeur*Chief Executive Officer(principal executive officer)

*The Registrant is a
trust and Carl G. Verboncoeur is signing in his capacity as the principal executive
officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Registrant.
Exhibit 23




               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We consent to the  incorporation by reference in (i) the Registration  Statement
on Form S-8 (No. 333-59301) pertaining to the Effective Management Systems, Inc.
1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, (ii) the  Registration  Statement on Form S-8
(No. 33-78658 and No. 333-59303) pertaining to the Effective Management Systems,
Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan,  and (iii) the  Registration  Statement on Form S-3
(No.  33-95816)  pertaining to the  registration  of 550,000 shares of Effective
Management  System's,  Inc.'s common stock of our report dated January 18, 1999,
with respect to the consolidated  financial  statements of Effective  Management
Systems,  Inc.  included  in the  Annual  Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
November 30, 1998.

                                       /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
                                       Ernst & Young LLP


Milwaukee, Wisconsin
February 26, 1999
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                        INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' CONSENT


The Board of Directors and Stockholders
Computron Software, Inc.


We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos.
333-11681, 333-49733, and 333-61125) on Form S-8 and (No. 333-49731) on Form S-3
of Computron Software, Inc. of our reports dated January 28, 2000, relating to
the consolidated balance sheets of Computron Software, Inc. and subsidiaries as
of December 31, 1998 and 1999, and the related consolidated statements of
operations, comprehensive loss, stockholders' equity (deficit) and cash flows
for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1999, and
related schedule, which reports appear in the December 31, 1999 annual report on
Form 10-K of Computron Software, Inc.


KPMG LLP


Short Hills, New Jersey
March 29, 2000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JONATHAN TARELL FISHER,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D15-4306

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed May 12, 2017 

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Osceola County,

Leticia J. Marques, Judge.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and 

Robert Jackson Pearce III, Assistant 

Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the court for a second time. In the prior case of Fisher v. 

State, 168 So. 3d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), the matter was remanded back to the trial 
2

court for a Sheppard hearing.1 At the hearing below, the trial court did not make an inquiry 

as to whether or not there was a conflict between Fisher and his trial counsel. 

Notwithstanding, it is apparent from the record that there was a definite conflict between 

trial counsel and Fisher. Appellant should have been appointed conflict free counsel prior 

to the hearing on whether to permit him to withdraw his plea. As a result, this matter is 

remanded to the trial court for appointment of conflict free counsel after which a hearing 

should be held on Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. 

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions. 

EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., and JACOBUS, B.W., Senior Judge, concur.

 

1 Sheppard v. State, 17 So. 3d 275 (Fla. 2009).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER BAUTISTA-DELACRUZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 15-73564 

Agency No. A071-594-601 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 17, 2018

San Francisco, California

Before: HAWKINS and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and EATON,** Judge.

Javier Bautista-Delacruz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration 

Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion to reopen deportation proceedings as untimely. 

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** Richard K. Eaton, Judge of the United States Court of International 

Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 13 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002), we deny in part and dismiss 

in part the petition.

1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bautista-Delacruz’s motion 

as untimely because he failed to offer any evidence of country conditions in Mexico 

at the time of his initial deportation proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). As 

a result, the BIA could not conduct the necessary comparison between evidence 

presented on the current motion, and evidence of conditions in existence at the time 

of the original hearing. See Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016); 

Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007). 

2. The BIA determined that Bautista-Delacruz had not shown an “exceptional 

circumstance” warranting sua sponte reopening. The BIA’s decision of whether to 

exercise its sua sponte authority is not subject to judicial review. See Ekimian v. 

INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2002).

DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk March 29, 2010

y0322 

# Order

March 29, 2010

139715

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 139715 COA: 291918 Wayne CC: 03-013968 TENG KUE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the August 27, 2009 order of the Court of Appeal s is considered, and it is DE NIED, because the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

COSMETIC SOLUTIONS, LLC,

Appellant,

v.

DANIEL BRINK,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-2779

[April 13, 2023]

Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth

Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Bradley Harper, Judge; L.T. Case 

No. 502022CA002581.

Bernardo Burstein of Burstein & Associates, P.A., North Miami Beach, 

for appellant. 

Gregory S. Sconzo of Sconzo Law Office, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for

appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

DAMOORGIAN, CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Rodell JOHNSON, Complainant-Appellant, v. The COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS and Colorado State Personnel Board, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86CA0971.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. III.

Jan. 28, 1988.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1988.

Certiorari Denied June 13, 1988.

Barry D. Roseman, Denver, for complainant-appellant.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Carolyn Lievers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appel-lees.

STERNBERG, Judge.

Rodell Johnson appeals the decision of the Colorado State Personnel Board (Board) in which it reversed an order of its hearing officer that had rescinded a corrective action taken by the Colorado Department of Institutions against Rodell, its employee. We reverse the order of the Board.

In June 1984, Johnson was given a notice of corrective action and was transferred laterally to another position at the same pay. He filed a grievance which was denied. Johnson then sought review before the Board. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer determined that the corrective action “rested on only one finding of fact, and this finding was neither proved at hearing nor investigated by the appointing authority in his consideration of the grievance.” The hearing officer concluded that the appointing authority had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to rescind the corrective action, and therefore, he ordered the corrective action to be rescinded and removed from Johnson’s personnel file.

The Department of Institutions sought review of the hearing officer’s ruling and Johnson petitioned the Board for his attorney’s fees.

The Board adopted the hearing officer’s findings of fact. However, the Board ordered that the corrective action “be expunged from [Johnson’s] file on the second anniversary of the date of this board decision, provided his performance is such that no additional corrective or disciplinary action need be taken during the two years.” Johnson’s motion for attorney fees was denied.

Johnson contends on appeal that the Board erred in refusing to rescind the corrective action. We agree.

*148The Board’s failure to affirm the rescission of Johnson’s corrective action after adopting and affirming the hearing officer’s findings of facts was arbitrary and capricious. There being no factual basis for any corrective action, it was error for the Board to allow the corrective action to remain in Johnson’s file for *any*length of time. *See Mayberry v. University of Colorado Health Sciences Center,*737 P.2d 427 (Colo.App.1987).

Because the Board was without grounds for its action, Johnson is entitled, pursuant to § 24-50-125.5(1), C.R.S. (1987 Cum. Supp.), to attorney fees and costs on appeal.

The order is set aside, and the cause is remanded to the Board with directions to reinstate the hearing officer’s order, and with further directions that the Department of Institutions reimburse Johnson for reasonable attorney fees and other costs incurred in the prosecution of this appeal before this court and the Board.

TURSI and BABCOCK, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                  DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                        71,124
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 39,166
<ALLOWANCES>                  0
<INVENTORY>                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              110,290
<PP&E>                        918,120
<DEPRECIATION>                (819,400)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                365,693
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         2,214,389
<BONDS>                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   0
<COMMON>                      1,281
<OTHER-SE>                    (1,574,951)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  365,693
<SALES>                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              65,996
<CGS>                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              5,228,556
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            135,884
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (3,481,444)
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (3,481,444)
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  (3,481,444)
<EPS-BASIC>                 (0.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                 (0.18)



</TABLE>
June 29, 2011 

Mr. David Bushy 

Cape Air Chief Operating Officer/President 

Cape Air, Nantucket Airlines 

660 Barnstable Road 

Hyannis, MA 02601 

Dear Mr. Bushy: 

This letter is to inform you that we have received and begun processing your petition for 

exemption. It acknowledges receipt of the petition and describes how we will process it. 

We Have the Petition 

We’ve received your May 9, 2011, petition on behalf of Hyannis Air Service, Inc., d.b.a Cape 

Air (Cape Air) for an exemption from § 43.3(g) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations 

(14 CFR). This exemption, if granted, would allow its properly trained pilots (under an 

approved training program) to accomplish updates of navigational software databases of 

installed flight management systems. 

We’ve added your petition to the public docket (No. FAA-2011-0619) and we are processing 

it. We will contact you if we need additional information. 

How We’ll Process the Petition 

A petition for an exemption, according to 14 CFR 11.63(d), must be sent to the FAA at least 

120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. In addition, we publish a 

summary of the petition in the Federal Register for public comment unless, according to 

14 CFR 11.87, we determine that good cause exists for not publishing it. 

We will advise you of the agency's final decision on your petition as soon as possible. If you 

have any questions in the meantime, you may contact me at (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Frances Shaver 

Program Analyst 

Aircraft and Airport Rules Division
Exhibit 31.1



CERTIFICATION REQUIRED BY SECTION 302(a) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Dale Vincent, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of MangoSoft, Inc. for
the year ended December 31, 2003;



2. Based on my knowledge,
this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the
financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;



4. As the sole certifying officer of MangoSoft, Inc,
I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. As the sole certifying officer of MangoSoft, Inc, I have
disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|    |  |                                                                    
|--- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Dale Vincent                                                   
|    |  | Chief Executive Officer (principal executive and financial officer)
|    |  | March 26, 2004
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Quarterly Report of NewPage Holding Corporation and NewPage Corporation (the Companies) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Ronald J. Arling, Chief Accounting Officer of the Companies, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial position and results of operations of
the Companies.



|                        
|------------------------
|/s/ Ronald J. Arling    
|Ronald J. Arling        
|Chief Accounting Officer
|May 12, 2011
#### PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, Appellant (Employer-Defendant), v. Oren Thomas RUPE, Appellee (Employee-Claimant).

No. 87-109.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Aug. 24, 1987.

*610Ann M. Rochelle of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellant.

James A. Hardee, Douglas, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

The district court ordered payment of worker’s compensation medical benefits for Oren Thomas Rupe more than four years after the last award. We affirm.

Mr. Rupe injured his left knee at work on April 24, 1980, and underwent surgical procedures twice between 1980 and 1982 to correct the problem. On January 14, 1982, the district court awarded Mr. Rupe permanent partial disability benefits. All of Mr. Rupe’s medical expense claims were paid through March 4,1982. In 1986, it became apparent that the previous surgical procedure had failed and that further surgery was necessary to repair Mr. Rupe’s knee. On November 17, 1986, Mr. Rupe filed his request that the expenses for the third surgery be paid. The employer and the worker’s compensation division objected to payment of the claim on grounds that the claim was not timely and thus that the case should not be reopened under §§ 27-12-606 and 27-12-607, W.S.1977. The district court found that the medical problem necessitating the November 1986 surgery related to the April 1980 injury and ordered payment.

The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act provides that “[t]he expense of medical attention and hospital care of an injured employee shall be paid from date of the compensable injury * * Section 27-12-401(a), W.S.1977. When an employee has been awarded compensation, he may apply for additional benefits of any kind within four years of the last award. Section 27-12-606, W.S.1977. Although it is apparent that the medical expenses arose from the original accident and previous surgery, appellant argues that the claim “for additional benefits” was not timely because it was not filed within four years after March 4, 1982, the date of the last award.

The district court did not err in rejecting this contention. This court has recognized that a single industrial accident may give rise to more than one compensable injury. In the case of *In the Matter of Barnes,*Wyo., 587 P.2d 214, 218 (1978), we said:

> “It would equally do violence to the Act were we to say that merely because an employee is aware at the time of the accident that a compensable injury *may*manifest itself in another compensable injury some time in the future, that knowledge will bar a future claim based upon the earlier accident and injury.” (Emphasis in original.)

See also *Baldwin v. Scullion,*50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 539, 108 A.L.R. 304 (1936), wherein we said “conditions produced at the time of the accident * * * whose final consequences [medical science] could not forecast” can ultimately produce a compen-sable injury. The district court’s factual determination that the 1986 medical claim was a compensable injury arising from the 1980 accident has not been challenged in this appeal. Given that finding, the court did not err in ordering payment.

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel., OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. Raymond D. NORTH, Respondent.

S.C.B.C. No. 3419.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 13, 1987.

ORDER

The Court has considered the Motion filed herein by Complainant seeking to stay the briefing schedule and to remand this action to the Trial Panel for making additional findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of discipline. The Court has also considered Respondent’s Objection to the Motion.

Based on the facts and circumstances of this cause, the provisions of Rules 6.11-6.-13 Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 1-A (1981), and the arguments advanced by the parties, the Court finds and holds, that said Motion should be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, THE ORDER OF THIS COURT THAT:

This matter should be, and hereby is, remanded to the Trial Panel for further proceedings for making findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation of discipline pursuant to Rule 6.13, supra. If, on remand, the panel should be dissatisfied with the stipulation tendered to it by the parties, it may refuse to accept the tender and inquire into the facts.

The briefing schedule is stayed until further order of this Court.

HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS, OPALA, WILSON, KAUGER and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.

DOOLIN, C.J.,

dissenting:

At the time of hearing, attorney North was placed in jeopardy and failure to draw conclusions, make findings of fact and conclusions of law by the panel, amounts to exoneration.