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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT H.*

(AC 36742)

(AC 37544)

Lavine, Devlin and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child arising out

of two separate acts of masturbation in the presence of the minor victim,

and judgment revoking his probation, the defendant appealed. The defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction

as to one of the counts of risk of injury because the only evidence of

the second incident was two statements that he made to the police,

which were admitted without objection at trial. The victim had testified

at trial concerning only one such incident. The defendant claimed that

the common-law corpus delicti rule, or corroboration rule, precluded

his confession from being used as the only evidence of the second

incident because there was no substantial independent evidence tending

to establish the trustworthiness of that confession. This court affirmed

the conviction. The defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed

to our Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of this court and

remanded the case to this court with direction to consider fully the

merits of the defendant’s corpus delicti claim in light of its decision in

State v. Leniart (333 Conn. 88). Held that the defendant could not prevail

on his corpus delicti claim that his confession constituted insufficient

evidence for the jury to conclude that he had masturbated in the presence

of the victim on more than one occasion, as there was substantial

evidence to corroborate the defendant’s written statement, which was

against his penal interest, that he had masturbated at least twice in the

presence of the victim, including that the defendant voluntarily went to

the police and agreed in writing to a videotaped interview with officers

and to waive his constitutional rights when he gave a signed, written

statement to the police, the defendant’s statement closely paralleled

the victim’s testimony regarding the defendant’s masturbation in her

bedroom, there were seven stains containing the defendant’s DNA on

the bottom of the victim’s bedspread and testimony was presented at

trial that semen is water soluble and the defendant tried to wipe the

semen with a wet cloth and the bedspread had been laundered two or

three weeks before the police seized it.

Argued February 20—officially released June 23, 2020

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the

defendant with three counts of the crime of risk of

injury to a child and two counts of the crime of sexual

assault in the first degree, and information, in the second case, charging the defendant with violation of probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Hartford, where the first case was tried to

the jury before Suarez, J.; verdict of guilty of two counts

of risk of injury to a child; thereafter, the defendant

was presented to the court in the second case on a plea

of guilty; judgment of guilty in accordance with the

verdict and judgment revoking probation, from which

the defendant filed separate appeals to this court, Lavine and Sheldon, Js., with Flynn, J., dissenting, which

affirmed the trial court’s judgments, and the defendant,

on the granting of certification, appealed to our

Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of this

court and remanded the case to this court for further
proceedings. Affirmed.

Naomi T. Fetterman, for the appellant (defendant).

Bruce R. Lockwood, supervisory assistant state’s

attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Lisa Herskowitz, former senior assistant state’s attorney, Gail P.

Hardy, state’s attorney, and John F. Fahey, supervisory

assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. This risk of injury case returns to this

court on remand from our Supreme Court; see State v.

Robert H., 333 Conn. 172, 175, 214 A.3d 343 (2019)

(Robert II); directing this court to consider fully the

merits of the ‘‘corpus delicti claim’’ raised by the defendant, Robert H., in his direct appeal. See State v. Robert

H., 168 Conn. App. 419, 422–23, 146 A.3d 995 (2016)

(Robert I), rev’d, 333 Conn. 172, 214 A.3d 343 (2019).

Our Supreme Court further directed this court to review

the defendant’s corpus delicti claim pursuant to its decision in State v. Leniart, 333 Conn. 88, 97, 215 A.3d

1104 (2019). We have considered the defendant’s corpus

delicti claim as directed and conclude that the judgments of conviction should be affirmed.

The following procedural history provides the context for this opinion. In 2013, the defendant was charged

in a long form information with two counts of sexual

assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury

to, or impairing the morals of, a child for a sexual

encounter that allegedly took place between the defendant and the minor victim in the kitchen of the victim’s

home (kitchen incident). Robert I, supra, 168 Conn.

App. 422–23. He also was charged in counts four and

five of the long form information with risk of injury to,

or impairing the morals of, a child (risk of injury) in

violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1).1 Counts

four and five alleged two instances in which the defendant masturbated in the presence of the victim.2 The

charges were tried to the jury, which found the defendant not guilty of the three charges related to the

kitchen incident. The jury, however, found the defendant guilty of the two risk of injury charges in violation

of § 53-21 (a) (1), arising from the defendant’s having

masturbated twice in the presence of the victim.3

Id.,

426. After the jury found the defendant guilty, he

pleaded guilty to a charge of violation of probation that

had been alleged in a separate file. The court sentenced

the defendant on all three charges to a total effective

sentence of twenty years of incarceration. Id., 421.

The defendant appealed to this court, claiming that

there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on a second charge of risk of injury for masturbating in the presence of the victim. Id., 421. He argued

that ‘‘the only evidence presented at trial to support the

jury’s finding that he had masturbated in [the victim’s]

presence on more than one occasion were two statements he made to [the] police, which were admitted

into evidence against him without objection at trial.

The defendant [continued] that such evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction on a second

charge of risk of injury because, under the corpus delicti

rule, also referred to as the corroboration rule, there

was not substantial independent evidence tending to

establish the trustworthiness of his confession to a sec-
ond act of masturbation in the [victim’s presence].’’ Id.,

421–22. In response, the state argued that ‘‘the defendant’s [corpus delicti] claim [was] unreviewable

because the corroboration rule is a rule of evidence

governing the admissibility of oral and written statements, and the defendant never challenged the admissibility of his statements [to the police] at trial.’’ Id., 422.

In deciding whether to review the defendant’s claim

in Robert I, the majority stated that this court recently

had held, ‘‘in State v. Leniart, 166 Conn. App. 142,

152–53, 140 A.3d 1026 (2016) [rev’d in part, 333 Conn.

88, 215 A.3d 1104 (2019)],4

that the corroboration rule

is solely a rule of admissibility [and] agree[d] with the

state that the defendant [could not] raise his unpreserved [corpus delicti] claim as part of his claim of

insufficient evidence.’’ (Footnote added.) Robert I,

supra, 168 Conn. App. 422. The majority, therefore, concluded that it was not necessary ‘‘to decide whether

there was substantial independent evidence tending to

establish the trustworthiness of the defendant’s confession.’’ Id. The majority considered the defendant’s

‘‘unobjected-to statements in the light most favorable

to the state in evaluating his . . . claim of evidentiary

insufficiency.’’ Id. The majority ultimately concluded

that the ‘‘defendant’s statements that he masturbated

in the [victim’s presence] ‘at least twice’ provided a

sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury reasonably to

conclude that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of both counts of risk of injury of which he was convicted’’; id.; and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.5

Id., 432.

Our Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition

for certification to appeal limited to the question of

whether ‘‘the Appellate Court properly conclude[d] that

the corpus delicti rule is merely a rule of admissibility,

in determining that there was sufficient evidence to

sustain the defendant’s second conviction of risk of

injury to a child . . . .’’ State v. Robert H., 323 Conn.

940, 151 A.3d 845 (2016). After the appeal was argued,

our Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision,

answering the question by stating that ‘‘our corpus

delicti rule is a hybrid evidentiary-substantive rule that

implicates a defendant’s fundamental right not to be

convicted in the absence of evidence sufficient to establish every essential element of the charged crime

beyond a reasonable doubt, and, therefore, even unpreserved corpus delicti claims are reviewable on appeal.

See State v. Leniart, supra, 333 Conn. 110.’’ Robert II,

supra, 333 Conn. 175. The Supreme Court, therefore,

reversed this court’s judgment in Robert I and

‘‘remand[ed] the case to [this] court for full consideration of the merits of the defendant’s corpus delicti

claim.’’ Id.

On November 19, 2019, this court issued an order

stating that the parties may file simultaneous supple-
mental briefs, addressing the impact of State v. Leniart,

supra, 323 Conn. 88, on the defendant’s appeal. In his

supplemental brief, the defendant claims that ‘‘the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction on a

second charge of risk of injury since, under the corpus

delicti rule, there was not any evidence, much less substantial, independent evidence, tending to establish the

trustworthiness of his confession to a second act of

masturbation in the presence of [the victim].’’

Before considering the evidence before the jury, we

set forth the applicable principles of law. A criminal

defendant has a constitutional right not to be convicted

of a crime ‘‘except upon sufficient proof . . . to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the

existence of every element of the offense.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Adams, 225 Conn.

270, 275 n.3, 623 A.2d 42 (1993). ‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two part test.

First we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second we determine

whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences

reasonably drawn therefrom the [fact finder] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force

of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt . . . . This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the [fact finder] if there is sufficient

evidence to support the [fact finder’s] verdict . . . .

We ask . . . whether there is a reasonable view of the

evidence that supports the [fact finder’s] verdict of

guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Watson, 195 Conn. App. 441, 445, 225 A.3d 686, cert.

denied, 335 Conn. 912, A.3d (2020).

‘‘[W]e do not sit as the seventh juror when we review

the sufficiency of the evidence . . . rather, we must

determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the

verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including

reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury’s

verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miles, 97 Conn. App.

236, 240, 903 A.2d 675 (2006).

We now turn to State v. Leniart, supra, 333 Conn. 88.

The corpus delicti rule ‘‘generally prohibits a prosecutor

from proving the [fact of a transgression] based solely

on a defendant’s extrajudicial statements.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 97. Our Supreme Court

now has concluded that ‘‘the corpus delicti rule is a

hybrid rule that not only governs the admissibility of

confession evidence but also imposes a substantive

requirement that a criminal defendant may not be convicted solely on the basis of a naked, uncorroborated

confession.’’ Id., 110. The rule ‘‘not only governs the

admission of confession evidence but also sets the conditions for obtaining a conviction.’’ Id., 101.

‘‘[T]he general rule is that the corpus delicti cannot

be established by the [extrajudicial] confession of the
defendant unsupported by corroborative evidence.

. . . There are cases which hold in effect that it must be

established by evidence independent of the defendant’s

confession and that without such proof evidence of the

confession is inadmissible.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 111; see State v. Doucette, 147 Conn. 95,

98–100, 157 A.2d 487 (1959), overruled in part by State

v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 20, 202 A.2d 494 (1964); State

v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691, 693, 166 A. 252 (1933),

overruled in part by State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 20,

202 A.2d 494 (1964).

In keeping with the modern trend, our Supreme Court

previously reduced the burden the corpus delicti rule

imposes on the state in prosecuting crimes. See State

v. Leniart, supra, 333 Conn. 112. In State v. Tillman,

152 Conn. 15, 20, 202 A.2d 494 (1964), the court

‘‘departed from the traditional rule that the state must

establish, by independent evidence, both that an injury

or loss occurred and that the loss was feloniously

caused. . . . [T]he corpus delicti that must be established by independent evidence encompasses only the

former element, namely, the specific kind of loss or

injury embraced in the crime charged.’’ (Footnotes

omitted.) State v. Leniart, supra, 112. The court again,

in State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189, 193–94, 575 A.2d 223

(1990), modified the rule as it applies to ‘‘crimes, such

as driving under the influence, that proscribe certain

undesirable conduct but do not necessarily entail any

particular injury or loss.’’ State v. Leniart, supra, 113.

‘‘[F]or crimes of that sort, the state need not establish

the corpus delicti of the crime through extrinsic evidence . . . [it] need only introduce substantial independent evidence [that] would tend to establish the

trustworthiness of the [defendant’s] statement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In State v. Hafford,

252 Conn. 274, 317, 746 A.2d 150, cert. denied, 531 U.S.

855, 121 S. Ct. 136, 148 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2000), our Supreme

Court ‘‘held that this trustworthiness rule set forth in

Harris, also known as the corroboration rule, now

applies to all types of crimes, not only those offenses

that prohibit conduct and do not result in a specific loss

or injury. In other words, post-Hafford, a confession is

now sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of any

crime, without independent extrinsic evidence that a

crime was committed, as long as there is sufficient

reason to conclude that the confession is reliable.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leniart,

supra, 113.

To determine whether there was substantial, independent evidence to corroborate the defendant’s confession that he twice masturbated in the presence of

the victim requires us to examine all of the evidence

presented at trial.6 At the time of the alleged sexual

abuse, the victim was a ten or eleven year old, intermediate school student. She was thirteen years old when

she testified at trial. She lived with her older brother
and her mother, who was romantically involved with

the defendant, who spent time in the victim’s home.

The victim’s bedroom was adjacent to her mother’s

bedroom and was connected to it by a doorway.

During her testimony, the victim was able to recall

two specific incidents of a sexual nature that transpired

between her and the defendant. During one incident,

the victim was lying on her bed watching television

when the defendant entered her bedroom, took out his

penis, masturbated, and ejaculated onto her bed. After

the defendant ejaculated, he wet a cloth and ‘‘tried to

rub [the semen] off.’’ The second incident took place

after the first and occurred in the kitchen. During the

kitchen incident, the victim, dressed in her pajamas,

was bending over when the defendant approached her

from behind and pulled down her pajama bottom. He

placed his penis in her ‘‘butt’’ and penetrated her vaginally or anally. The victim did not tell her mother about

the incidents that occurred between her and the defendant because she was scared. Although the victim testified that something unusual had occurred between her

and the defendant on more than one occasion, at trial

she could recall only the two events just described.

The kitchen incident took place approximately three

weeks before the victim disclosed the defendant’s abuse

to a school friend, K, in March, 2011. K wrote a note

about the victim’s disclosure to one of their teachers,

Gail Jordan, who reported the alleged abuse to a school

counselor. The next day, the victim’s counselor, Karen

Goldman, spoke with the victim, who shared with her

the defendant’s sexual abuse. Because she is a mandated reporter,7 Goldman reported the alleged abuse to

the Department of Children and Families (department).

On the day the department received the complaint, Nina

Bentham, a department investigator, reported the complaint to Detective Beth Leger of the Bloomfield Police

Department, with whom the department had a working

relationship. That evening, Bentham and Leger together

went to the victim’s home, where the defendant was

present. Leger spoke to the victim’s mother privately

and secured her permission to seize a fitted bedsheet

and bedspread from the victim’s bed.

Subsequently, the victim was examined at Connecticut Children’s Medical Center on March 10, 2011. On

March 14, 2011, the victim also was examined by Audrey

Courtney, a pediatric nurse practitioner at the Children’s Advocacy Center at St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center (children’s center). Courtney made a written

report of her examination, which was placed into evidence. Richard Cousins, an inspector in the state division of criminal justice, obtained a buccal swab from

inside the victim’s cheek for DNA testing. Erin Byrne,

a forensic interviewer at the children’s center, also

authored a report that was put into evidence. Byrne’s

interview of the victim was videotaped and shown to
the jury.

Leger telephoned the defendant to arrange a meeting

at the Bloomfield police station. At that meeting on

April 7, 2011, the defendant signed a consent to search

form giving the police permission to take a buccal swab

from the inside of his cheek for DNA testing. Leger also

asked the defendant to submit to another interview.

The bedclothes Leger collected from the victim’s bed

were transferred to the state forensic laboratory by

Madison W. Bolden, Jr., a Bloomfield police officer.

Jane Codraro, a forensic biologist at the state forensic

laboratory, testified about her examination of the blue

fitted bedsheet and the bedspread Leger removed from

the victim’s bed. Codraro found stains on both the sheet

and bedspread. She used a screening test known as

acid phosphatase to detect the presence of semen on

both the sheet and bedspread. She found no evidence

of semen on the bedsheet, but there were approximately

seven stains containing semen in a one and one-half

feet square area on the bedspread at the foot of the

bed. Codraro was able to extract cellular material from

one of the bedspread stains that indicated the presence

of spermatozoa. Codraro sent the cellular material to

the DNA section of the laboratory for further testing.

The defendant’s DNA was found in the cellular material.

Codraro also testified that semen is water soluble and

could be removed by washing.

On May 17, 2011, the defendant voluntarily went to

the West Hartford police station where he was interviewed by Leger and Frank Fallon, then a sergeant in

the West Hartford Police Department.8 Fallon presented

the defendant with a waiver of rights form that the

defendant read and signed. Fallon and Leger spent

approximately four hours interviewing the defendant

in a room approximately eight feet by eight feet,9 but

they did not spend the entire time discussing the victim’s allegations.10 Both Fallon and Leger testified that

a discussion of the victim’s allegations did not begin

until the defendant spoke the word ‘‘enticement.’’ Leger

testified that the defendant stated that he had been

enticed by the victim when he was lying on her mother’s

bed from where he could see the victim lying on her

bed masturbating. The defendant began masturbating

and at some point ended up near the victim’s bed masturbating until he ejaculated. He also stated that it was

possible that the victim had touched his penis. The

defendant steadfastly denied that he ever penetrated

the victim. He, however, admitted that he masturbated

twice near the victim’s bed while she was in it. The

defendant became emotional, stating that he knew what

he had done was wrong, and that, as an adult, he knew

that it should not have happened.

During the interview, Leger represented to the defendant that the police had certain evidence, namely the

victim’s underwear containing his semen, which actu-
ally they did not have. Leger explained that that interview technique is used by police officers to elicit a

truthful response. The police may get a very clear objection to the evidence because the suspect knows that it

does not exist, or the technique may help the suspect

to be truthful.

At no time during the interview did the defendant

invoke his right to remain silent, state that he wanted

an attorney or otherwise invoke his constitutional

rights. He appeared to Leger to be coherent, and not

under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or medicines. At

the conclusion of the interview, the defendant agreed

to give Leger a written statement summarizing what he

had stated during the interview. He dictated his statement to Leger, read it, swore to its truthfulness, and

signed it. After he signed the statement, the defendant

left the West Hartford police station. He was not

under arrest.

The final forty or so minutes of the defendant’s

recorded interview was played for the jury. His written

statement was read to the jury and placed into evidence.

The defendant’s confession, which is the basis of his

corpus delicti claim, states as follows: ‘‘I . . . do

hereby make the following statement of my own free

will, without fear, threats or promises of any kind, and

knowing that the same may be used in court against

me, and that false statements are punishable by law.

‘‘Either late January or February, 2011, I was visiting

my girlfriend . . . at her apartment . . . . I was in

[her] bedroom. [She] was in the living room and had

smoked weed. I was lying in [her] bed and could see

[the victim] in her bedroom, lying in her bed, with her

hands inside her pants. She was masturbating. She knew

that I could see her, but it was like she wanted me to

see her.

‘‘After watching her masturbate for about [fifteen]

minutes, I went to [the victim’s] room. I stood about

two or three feet away from her bed, and with my

clothes on, pulled my penis out and started to masturbate myself.

‘‘She seemed like she was happy with me doing that.

I ejaculated in her general direction, but not on top of

her. I don’t know if she came or not.

‘‘This same thing happened at least twice, where I

masturbated in front of her in her room, and it’s probably how my semen got on her bed or clothes. I never

penetrated her with my penis or anything else. I think

she might have touched my penis on one of those times,

right after I ejaculated, which might explain any of my

semen in her pants.

‘‘I’ve had a problem with resisting temptation like this

for quite a while. I have been attending group therapy

sessions, but don’t think that program is working for

me. I believe I need more help than that, because I don’t
want to continue doing these things.

‘‘I’ve read the above statement consisting of one page

and it is true and correct. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

At the conclusion of evidence, the state argued to

the jury that the sexual assaults alleged in counts one

and two and risk of injury alleged in count three related

to the kitchen incident. The risk of injury counts alleged

in counts four and five were predicated on the two

incidents during which the defendant masturbated in

the victim’s presence. Robert I, supra, 168 Conn. App.

426. The state specifically argued that the defendant

had confessed to having masturbated in the victim’s

presence on two occasions. Id. In his closing argument,

defense counsel argued that the victim’s story changed

each time she told it. Id.

On appeal, the defendant claims that there was no

substantial independent evidence to establish the trustworthiness of his confession that he twice masturbated

in the presence of the victim. Under the corroboration

rule, the state need only ‘‘introduce substantial independent evidence [that] tend[s] to establish the trustworthiness of the [defendant’s] statement[s].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leniart, supra, 333 Conn.

119. The substantial evidence standard is met if the

record provides a ‘‘substantial basis of fact from which

the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Adriani v. Commission on

Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 307, 315,

596 A.2d 426 (1991).

On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude

that it contains substantial independent evidence to

corroborate the trustworthiness of the defendant’s confession. The defendant’s sworn written statement that

he masturbated ‘‘at least twice’’ in the presence of the

victim is a statement against his penal interest, which

has been recognized as indicative of trustworthiness

by the United States Supreme Court. See United States

v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d

723 (1971) (admission of crime, like admission against

proprietary interests, carries indicia of credibility). Our

appellate courts and code of evidence reflect this rule

of trustworthiness.

In addressing the admissibility of a coconspirator’s

confession to his postconviction cellmate, this court

has looked to § 8-6 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence,

which concerns hearsay. See State v. Collins, 147 Conn.

App. 584, 590, 82 A.3d 1208 (confession not against

penal interest), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 929, 86 A.3d 1057

(2014). See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6 (4) (‘‘A trustworthy

statement against penal interest that, at the time of its

making, so far tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in the declarant’s

position would not have made the statement unless

the person believed it to be true. In determining the
trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest,

the court shall consider (A) the time the statement was

made and the person to whom the statement was made,

(B) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case,

and (C) the extent to which the statement was against

the declarant’s penal interest.’’).

‘‘The against [penal] interest exception is not limited

to a defendant’s direct confession of guilt. . . . It

applies as well as to statements that tend to subject

the speaker to criminal liability. . . . The rule encompasses disserving statements by a declarant that would

have probative value in a trial against the declarant.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 695, 523 A.2d 451 (1987).

In the present case, the evidence demonstrates that

the defendant voluntarily went to the West Hartford

Police Department, agreed in writing to a videotaped

interview with two police officers, and again agreed in

writing to waive his constitutional rights when he gave

a signed, written statement to Leger, the detective

investigating the report of the defendant’s abuse. The

defendant attested to the truthfulness of his statement

that he masturbated at least twice in the victim’s presence. His statement closely parallels the victim’s testimony during which she described the defendant’s masturbating in her bedroom. The victim’s testimony lends

credibility to the defendant’s statement that he masturbated at least twice in her presence. Seven stains were

found on the bedspread that covered the bottom portion

of the bed. Laboratory analysis detected the presence

of the defendant’s DNA on the bedspread, confirming

that the defendant had ejaculated on to the victim’s

bed. Codraro testified that semen is water soluble. The

victim testified that the defendant tried to wipe the

semen from her bedspread with a wet cloth and that

the bedspread had been laundered two or three weeks

before Leger seized it. This evidence strongly corroborates the defendant’s statement that he had masturbated

in the victim’s presence at least twice.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there

was substantial evidence to corroborate the defendant’s

written statement that he had masturbated at least twice

in the presence of the victim. The defendant’s corpus

delicti claim, therefore, fails.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the

victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained.

See General Statutes § 54-86e.

1 General Statutes § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who

(1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of

sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such

child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the

morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to

impair the health or morals of any such child . . . shall be guilty of . . .

a class C felony . . . .’’
2 Counts four and five of the long form information are identical and allege

in relevant part: ‘‘The said Senior Assistant State’s Attorney further accuses

Robert [H.] of the crime of INJURY OR RISK OF INJURY TO, OR

IMPAIRING MORALS OF A CHILD, in violation of . . . General Statutes

§ 53-21 (a) (1) and alleges that on unspecified dates between September,

2009 and March 5, 2011, at or near [the victim’s address] . . . the defendant

did an act likely to impair the health or morals of a child under the age of

sixteen, identified as the person listed in State’s Exhibit 1.’’ (Emphasis in

original.) Exhibit 1 states the name of the victim, her date of birth, and

town of residence.

3 The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the

state’s case-in-chief, at the close of evidence, and again at sentencing. The

defendant argued that there was no evidence to support a finding that he

masturbated in the victim’s presence a second time, as the victim had

testified to only one such incident. He further argued that the state, therefore,

could not establish that she was harmed or affected by the alleged second

incident if she was not aware of it. Robert I, supra, 168 Conn. App. 425. The

state responded by arguing that risk of injury does not require that the child

be aware of the defendant’s acts, only that the defendant’s conduct was of

a nature that it was likely to impair the health or morals of a child. Id.,

425–26. The court denied each of the defendant’s motions for judgment of

acquittal, stating that there was sufficient evidence by which the jury could

find that the defendant had masturbated in the victim’s presence on more

than one occasion. Id., 426.

4

Judge Flynn dissented in part in State v. Leniart, supra, 166 Conn. App.

228. He agreed ‘‘with the majority that there was sufficient independent

evidence that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim,

corroborating the extrajudicial confession of the defendant, and thus by

sufficient evidence establishing the necessary elements of the crime of

murder . . . . [He] dissented in part because [he] did not agree that the

corpus delicti rule was merely evidentiary in that murder case.’’ (Citation

omitted.) Robert I, supra, 168 Conn. App. 433.

5

Judge Flynn wrote a dissenting opinion in Robert I as he did in Leniart.

See footnote 4 of this opinion. In Robert I, he opined that corpus delicti

claims implicate a defendant’s substantive due process rights and, therefore,

are reviewable on appeal even if not preserved at trial, and that the evidence

at trial was not sufficient to corroborate the reliability of the defendant’s

confession as to a second incident of sexual misconduct. See Robert I,

supra, 168 Conn. App. 435–38.

6 We undertake a more extensive review of the evidence than was done

in Robert I.

7 Teachers and school counselors, among others, are mandated reporters

of suspected child abuse. See General Statutes § 17a-101 (b).

8 Fallon testified that it is common practice for police departments in the

Greater Hartford area to assist one another in investigations.

9 The defendant’s entire interview was video recorded.

10 Fallon testified about the training police officers undergo to investigate

and speak with suspects in crimes of sexual abuse of young children. The

police seek to create a comfortable environment for an individual to speak

about sensitive allegations.