No. 81-144 INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981

LARRY LAWRENCE GONZALES, JR., Petitioner,



### -vsJAMES BLODGETT, 

### actingWarden, Respondent.

ORIGINALPROCEEDING:

Counsel

### of Record: For Petitioner; LarryLawrence Gonzales, 

### Jr., Pro Se, DeerLodge, Montana For Respondent: Hon, MikeGreely, AttorneyGeneral! Helena, Montana HaroldHanserr CountyAttorney! Billings, Montana

Submittedt 

### June 1, 1981 Decided:

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Filed;

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ClerkMr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Petitioner Larry Lawrence Gonzales, Jr., has filed a pro 

### se petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging (1) that the District Court was without jurisdiction to revoke his deferred sentence after 

### it had expired or was completed and (2)that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by reason of the failure of his court-appointed counsel to raise this asa defense. On October 24, 1977, the District Court of Yellowstone County deferred imposition of sentence and placed petitioner on probation for a period of one year following his plea of guilty to the crime of aggravated assault. On August 14, 1978, the District Court extended the deferred imposition of sentence an additional two years to October 24, 1980, following a revocation hearing wherein petitioner admitted a parole violation. On April 4, 1979, theDistrictCourt again extended the deferred impositionof sentence until October 24, 1982, following a second revocation hearing wherein the District Court found that petitioner had againviolatedhisparole. On February 2, 1981, petitioner was found guilty of the crime of criminal mischief, 

### a misdemeanor, in the Justice Court of Yellowstone County. Two days later the county attorney filed a third petition for revocation of petitioner's deferred imposition of sentence based on this misdemeanor conviction which constituted a parole violation

as well. Following a hearing, the District Court revoked 

### its order staying deferment of sentence and sentenced petitioner to a term of fiveyears in the State Prison for the original crime of aggravated assault.Petitioner contends in this habeas corpus proceeding that: (1)the District Court lacked jurisdiction to revoke the deferment of sentence and to sentence him for the original crime because petitioner had completed the period of deferment and probation; and (2) petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel by failure of his court-appointed counsel to raise thisdefense in the revocationproceeding. The State raises four additional issues that 

### it considersnecessary tothe resolution of thisproceeding: 

### (1) Is a deferred imposition of sentence a valid sentence that can only be vacated or modified pursuant to statutoryauthority? (2)Is section 46-18-203, MCA, a limitation upon the DistrictCourt's sentencing authority? (3) What 

### is meant by the statutory language of section 46-18-203, MCA, wherein the district judge 

### is granted optional and discretionary authorityto "retainsuch jurisdiction with his court"? 

### (4)Were the orders extending theperiod of deferment of imposition of sentence in excess of the DistrictCourt's jurisdiction? We find that only the first issue raised by the petitioner need be addressed by the Court in reaching a decision inthismatter. The District Court 

### is granted broad and flexible sentencing authorityby statute, sections46-18-201 etseq., MCA. Specifically, the districtjudge 

### is granted authority to defer imposition of sentence following conviction of afelony for a period not exceeding three years. Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA. In this action the petitioner's sentence was deferred on three separate occasions by the District Court for a total deferral period of five years. The District Court's order of October 24, 1977, deferred imposition of sentence and placed petitioner on probation for a period of one year. Following an admitted violation of probationary rules, the period of deferment was extended

an additional two years. Following a second violation of probationary rules, the period of deferment was extended another two years. During that period of deferment, petitioner was found guilty of a misdemeanor, his deferment

was revoked and he was sentenced tofiveyears imprisonment. Petitioner contends that the District Court exceeded 

### its jurisdiction in extending the total time of deferment beyond the three-year limitationprovided by statute, and we agree. Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA, gives the district judge authority to defer imposition of sentence following conviction of a felony for a period not exceeding three years. The language of the statute

### is clear and unambiguous and 

### it is the function of this Court, as set forth in section 1-2-101, MCA, to simply ascertain and declare what 

### is in terms or in substance contained inthe statute. "When the language of the statute 

### is plain, unambiguous, direct and cqrtain, the statute speaks for itself and there 

### is nothing for the Court toconstrue." State, Etc. v. District Court, Etc. (1979), Mont. 

## , 591 P.2d 656, 662, 36 St.Rep. 489, 496, and cases therein cited. "The intention of the legislature must firstbe determined from the plain meaning of thewords used and if themeaning of the statute

### can be so determined, the courts may not go further and apply any other means of interpretation." State, Etc. v. DistrictCourt, Etc., 

### supra. Applying these rules we hold that section 46-18- 201(l)(a), MCA, 

### allows the District Court to revoke a deferred sentence for any felony only during the three-year period immediately following the initial sentence deferral. Thisthree-year period cannot be extendedby anorder of the DistrictCourt. The DistrictCourtcan impose conditionsof probation during the time of deferment which are not in contradictiontothedeferred sentence, but thecourtcannot extend theperiod of defermentbeyond themaximum three-year periodmandated by section46-18-201(1)(a), MCA. 

### In this action the maximum period for revoking a deferred sentence had elapsed and the District Court no longer had jurisdiction at the time it 

### sentenced the petitioner to serve five years in the State Prison for the original crime of aggravated assault. Since the District Court had lost 

### itsjurisdiction, the sentence imposed by it 

### is

### void. Accordingly thewritof habeas corpus is

### granted, and the respondent 

### is directed to release petitioner from confinement inthe StatePrison forthwith absent independent grounds for holding petitioner incustody. 

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# & Chief Jusfice

### We Concur: