In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

ESTATE OF RYAN L. CLARK,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

BRUCE WALKER and TINA KUEHN,

Defendants‐Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 14‐C‐1402 — Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 28, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2017

____________________

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Ryan Clark committed suicide

five days after entering the custody of the Green Lake County

Jail in Wisconsin. The officers on duty at the time of his death

did not know that Clark had a high risk of committing sui‐

cide. When he entered the jail, however, he was assessed as

having a maximum risk of suicide. The intake staff who were

aware of that risk—Officer Bruce Walker and Nurse Tina Ku‐

ehn—had not initiated the jail’s suicide prevention protocol.
2 Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

Clark’s estate brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

that Walker and Kuehn violated Clark’s Eighth Amendment

rights by acting with deliberate indifference toward his seri‐

ous risk of suicide.

Walker and Kuehn moved for summary judgment. They

argued there was insufficient evidence to allow a jury to find

deliberate indifference, and they invoked qualified immunity.

In a detailed order, the district court denied their motions. See

Estate of Clark v. County of Green Lake, No. 14‐C‐1402, 2016 WL

4769365 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 2016). The court found numerous

issues of material fact regarding Clark’s suicide risk, the de‐

fendants’knowledge of thatrisk, and who was responsible for

initiating the suicide protocol (Walker or Kuehn). The court

also rejected defendants’ qualified immunity arguments. As a

preliminary matter, the court determined that Kuehn was un‐

able to invoke qualified immunity because she was a private

contractor, not a government employee. On the merits, the

court ruled that both defendants were not shielded by quali‐

fied immunity because it was clearly established in the Sev‐

enth Circuit that inmates have the right to be free from delib‐

erate indifference to a known risk of suicide. Both defendants

appealed.

Because this is an appeal from a denial of summary judg‐

ment, our jurisdiction is quite limited. We have jurisdiction to

review only the denial of qualified immunity and only to the

extent the denial turned on questions of law. This narrows our

consideration to two issues: whether Nurse Kuehn was enti‐

tled to qualified immunity as a private medical contractor,

and whether it was clearly established that Clark had a right

to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious risk of

suicide. We agree with the district court on both points, so we
Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644 3

affirm its denial of summary judgment for these two defend‐

ants.1  

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Clark’s History of Suicidal Behavior

Our review on appeal from denial of summary judgment

based on qualified immunity is limited to questions of law, so

                                                  1 The parties and the district court addressed Clark’s rights under the

Eighth Amendment. While the Eighth Amendment applies to convicted

prisoners, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees. See

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015) (“The

language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the claims often dif‐

fers. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prison‐

ers) cannot be punished at all, much less maliciously and sadistically.”)

(quotations omitted). Courts have expressed some uncertainty regarding

which amendment controls for hybrid forms of detention, such as here

where Clark’s extended‐supervision officer placed him on short “holds”

in the county jail. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Gilden, No. 15‐cv‐437‐jdp, 2017 WL

90389, slip op. at *3 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“When plaintiff turned him‐

self in after violating the terms of his extended supervised release from his

prior conviction, and was thus held in jail custody, it is not clear whether

the law considered him a ‘prisoner’ or a ‘pretrial detainee.’”). We need not

address this issue here, both because of the parties’ apparent agreement

and because summary judgment was properly denied under the Eighth

Amendment standard, which is at least as difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy

as the Fourteenth Amendment standard. See, e.g., Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321

F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003) (“as a pretrial detainee, [plaintiff] was entitled

to at least the same protection against deliberate indifference to his basic

needs as is available to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amend‐

ment ”); see also Jackson v. Illinois Medi–Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir.

2002) (“[W]hen considering a pretrial detainee’s claim of inadequate med‐

ical care, we frequently turn to the analogous standards of Eighth Amend‐

ment jurisprudence.”) (citations omitted).
4 Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

we recount the facts as stated by the district court in its assess‐

ment of the summary judgment record. See Locke v. Haessig,

788 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2015).

Ryan Clark struggled for years with alcoholism and de‐

pression. In 2009 he was released from Wisconsin state prison

after serving time for his fifth offense of operating a vehicle

under the influence of alcohol. His release was subject to ex‐

tended supervision. Over the next two years he was admitted

to the Green Lake County Jail approximately eight times.

Each time his extended‐supervision officer placed him on a

“hold” due to alleged violations of his supervision rules, and

each time he was intoxicated.  

Jail records show that Clark received regular medical

treatment for depression while in custody. He was frequently

given medication for depression, such as sertraline and fluox‐

etine, and his jail record stated that he experienced “anxiety

attacks” when he did not receive his medication. The jail rec‐

ords also documented Clark’s serious risk of suicide. This in‐

cluded documentation of instances of self‐harm, including a

suicide attempt in 2011. At times in the past, the jail had put

Clark on “Special Watch Observation,” where he was ob‐

served every fifteen minutes to prevent suicide.

B. Intake, Confinement, and Suicide

On May 23, 2012, Clark was admitted once more to the

Green Lake County Jail because he violated supervision rules

by drinking alcohol. His breath test showed a blood alcohol

level of 0.27, more than three times the legal limit for driving.

Defendant Walker performed the intake process. Following

standard practice, Walker administered the Spillman Initial
Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644 5

Inmate Assessment, which is a software program that in‐

cludes a suicide risk assessment. The program provides ques‐

tions for the intake officer to ask the inmate, and it uses the

inmate’s responses to estimate his suicide risk.

Based on Clark’s responses, the Spillman Assessment cal‐

culated that he was at a “maximum” suicide risk. According

to the jail administrator, the Spillman Assessment is not dis‐

positive, and officers have discretion to initiate the suicide

protocol based on other factors, such as when an inmate ex‐

pressly says that he is contemplating suicide. Walker testified

that he thought the Spillman Assessment automatically pro‐

duced a maximum suicide rating for all inmates intoxicated

at the time of the test. Officer testimony indicated that officers

made discretionary determinations about suicide risk without

psychological training on suicide prevention or an under‐

standing of how the Spillman Assessment functioned.  

After completing the suicide assessment reflecting maxi‐

mum risk, Walker placed Clark in the holding cell to wait for

Nurse Kuehn’s routine medical intake. He left the Spillman

Assessment for her review. Walker did not, however, imple‐

ment the jail’s suicide prevention protocol, which requires

special precautions for inmates at risk of committing suicide.

For instance, officers are supposed to check jail records to de‐

termine if the inmate has a prior history of suicidal behavior.

Walker did not conduct this check, which would have shown

a prior suicide attempt while in jail. Nor did Walker place

Clark in a suicide prevention cell, initiate monitoring of Clark,

orrefer him to a mental health provider. The district court also

found a factual dispute between Walker and Nurse Kuehn

over who was responsible for initiating the suicide protocol.  
6 Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

Nurse Kuehn performed Clark’s medical intake. Kuehn

worked for Correctional Healthcare Companies, a company

contracted by the jail to provide medical services. During the

intake, Kuehn documented that Clark was taking antidepres‐

sant medication but could notrememberthe name of his med‐

icine while he was intoxicated. She never followed up to learn

Clark’s medication. She placed Clark’s Spillman Assessment

in his medical chart, but she also did not take steps pursuant

to the jail policy to mitigate Clark’s risk of suicide. She did not

refer Clark to a mental health counselor, which she had done

for Clark in the past. Nor did she inform jail staff of Clark’s

suicide risk. Instead of assigning Clark to the cell designed for

suicide prevention, she assigned him to a cell for alcohol de‐

toxification. Inmates in detoxification cells are alone 24 hours

a day. Kuehn later testified that she was aware that alcohol

detoxification increases the risk of suicide. She also testified

that she knew Clark would experience extreme isolation in

the detoxification cell. Kuehn followed up with Clark several

times after his initial intake.  

Four nights later, Clark committed suicide, on May 28

shortly after midnight. The officers on duty at the time were

unaware that Clark posed a suicide risk. He was not in the

suicide prevention cell, and neither Walker nor Kuehn had

notified them of any risk. The officer monitoring the security

cameras did not observe Clark’s suicide. The video recording

shows that Clark’s preparation and suicide took approxi‐

mately thirty minutes. Clark fashioned a noose with pieces of

fabric and tied it to his bedroll. He used his bedroll as a coun‐

terweight by placing it over a little dividing wall in his cell,

and then hanged himself by letting his body sag on the other

side of the wall. An officer discovered Clark’s body approxi‐

mately one hour later, but it was too late to revive him.  
Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644 7

C. Procedural History

In November 2014 Clark’s estate brought suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to Clark’s risk of

suicide. The estate named as defendants Green Lake County

and Officers Walker, Schoenscheck, and Pflum (the “County

Defendants”). The estate also named Kuehn and Correctional

Healthcare Companies, Inc. (the “Medical Defendants”). The

County Defendants moved to dismiss or alternatively for

summary judgment. The Medical Defendants also moved for

summary judgment. The district court denied the County De‐

fendant’s motion to dismiss and then granted summary judg‐

ment on the Eighth Amendment claim for all defendants

other than Walker and Kuehn.2

The court found that genuine issues of material fact pre‐

cluded summary judgment for Walker and Kuehn. As an ini‐

tial matter, Walker and Kuehn both disputed who was re‐

sponsible for initiating the suicide protocol. The court also

concluded that the estate offered sufficient evidence to allow

a jury to find that Walker and Kuehn acted with deliberate

indifference to Clark’s risk. Finally, the court rejected defend‐

ants’ qualified immunity arguments. After reviewing our

precedent, the court held that the immunity defense should

not extend to Kuehn as a private contractor. Nonetheless, the

court went on to consider the merits of the qualified immun‐

                                                  2 Defendants also named Health Professionals Ltd. as a defendant, but

that company was taken over by Correctional Healthcare Companies, and

for purposes of this case it is undisputed that both organizations had com‐

mon corporate ownership. In addition, the estate amended its complaint

to add a Monell claim against Green Lake County, but that issue is not

before us on appeal.
8 Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

ity defense for both defendants and determined that the de‐

fense failed because it was clearly established in 2012 in the

Seventh Circuit that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s se‐

rious risk of suicide violates the Eighth Amendment. Walker

and Kuehn then appealed the denial of summary judgment.  

II. Analysis

A. Jurisdiction over Denial of Summary Judgment

We have limited jurisdiction over these appeals. Ordinar‐

ily, a denial of summary judgment is not appealable because

it is not a final order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Ortiz v. Jordan, 562

U.S. 180, 188 (2011). The collateral order doctrine recognizes

certain exceptions, including when qualified immunity is de‐

nied for legal reasons. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530

(1985) (“[A] district court’s denial of a claim of qualified im‐

munity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an ap‐

pealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.”).  

If qualified immunity is denied at summary judgment be‐

cause of a factual dispute, however, we do not have jurisdic‐

tion overthat issue. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995)

(“[W]e hold that a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified

immunity defense, may not appeal a district court’s summary

judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or

not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for

trial.”); see also Locke, 788 F.3d at 665 (“Because this is an in‐

terlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity, we have appellate jurisdiction over only legal

questions.”). As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson, we

have appellate jurisdiction when a district court denies a pub‐
Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644 9

lic official’s qualified immunity defense and “the issue ap‐

pealed concerned, not which facts the parties might be able to

prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed

a violation of ‘clearly established’ law.” 515 U.S. at 311 (cita‐

tions omitted).  

Given these constraints, we cannot review all of the issues

briefed by Walker and Kuehn, including whether the district

court erred by denying their motions for summary judgment

on the merits of the deliberate indifference claim. That ruling

on the merits is not a final judgment, and it does not fall into

one of the exceptions provided by the collateral order doc‐

trine. See Ortiz, 562 U.S. at 188, citing Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,

v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976).

B. Denial of Qualified Immunity

We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary

judgment based on qualified immunity. Levin v. Madigan, 692

F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2012). Qualified immunity “protects

government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009),

quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When we

review a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on

qualified immunity, we consider “(1) whether the facts, taken

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the de‐

fendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the

constitutional right was clearly established at [that] time.”

Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009), cit‐

ing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.  

   
10 Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

1. Private Contractors

Before addressing the two steps of qualified immunity, we

must determine whether Kuehn was entitled to invoke quali‐

fied immunity as a private healthcare contractor. Kuehn’s cen‐

tral argument is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Filarsky

v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012), requires us to extend qualified

immunity to private healthcare contractors, even though our

cases since Filarsky have held otherwise.  

We have addressed this issue recently, holding that private

medical personnel in prisons are not entitled to the protection

of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722,

734 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“qualified immunity does not

apply to private medical personnel in prisons”), citing Shields

v. Illinois Depʹt of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 794 (7th Cir. 2014);

see also Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2017) (“This

Court has construed the Supreme Court’s holding that em‐

ployees of privately‐operated prisons may not assert a quali‐

fied‐immunity defense also to deny that defense to employees

of private corporations that contract with the state to provide

medical care for prisoners.”).  

In Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997), the Su‐

preme Court held that privately employed prison guards can‐

not assert qualified immunity. More recently in Filarsky, the

Court considered whether a private lawyer who worked part

time for a municipality was eligible for qualified immunity on

federal claims arising from his public service. The Court de‐

termined that the lawyer was eligible, holding that “immun‐

ity under § 1983 should not vary depending on whether an in‐

dividual working for the government does so as a full‐time

employee, or on some other basis.” Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 389.

Filarsky did not overrule Richardson. Instead, “the Filarsky
Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644 11

Court reaffirmed the holding of Richardson categorically re‐

jecting immunity for the private prison employees there.”

Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2013), citing

Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 392–94.  

The Court in Filarsky reached its conclusion on the part‐

time lawyer through an historical inquiry, asking whether the

person asserting qualified immunity would have been im‐

mune from liability under the common law in 1871 when

Congress passed the law later codified as § 1983. See Filarsky,

566 U.S. at 384. In a detailed opinion, the Sixth Circuit applied

Filarsky’s historical method and held that a privately em‐

ployed doctor working for a state prison could not invoke

qualified immunity. McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696, 697 (6th

Cir. 2012). After examining numerous nineteenth‐century

sources, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “the absence of any

indicia that a paid physician (whether remunerated from the

public or private fisc) would have been immune from suit at

common law, convince[s] us that there was no common‐law

tradition of immunity for a private doctor working for a pub‐

lic institution at the time that Congress passed § 1983.” Id. at

704. We found the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning persuasive in Cur‐

rie, 728 F.3d at 632, and have held in other post‐Filarsky cases

that private medical personnel in prisons are not afforded

qualified immunity. See, e.g., Rasho, 856 F.3d at 479; Petties, 836

F.3d at 734. Because Kuehn was a privately employed nurse

working at the Green Lake County Jail, she is ineligible for

qualified immunity.  

2. Step 1: Violation of a Constitutional Right

Because Kuehn is ineligible for qualified immunity, we

turn our focus to Walker’s appeal. The first qualified immun‐

ity step raises again the issue of deliberate indifference. We
12 Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

can review this question in the context of a denial of qualified

immunity at summary judgment to the extent that the denial

turns on a question of law. In this case, deliberate indifference

requires the estate to show that Clark had a serious medical

condition that posed a substantial risk and that Walker actu‐

ally knew about the risk and acted or failed to act in disregard

of thatrisk. See Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir.

2002), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994);

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Walker admits

that an elevated risk of suicide is a serious medical condition,

but he disputes whether Clark’s risk was sufficiently acute. He

also argues that there was insufficient evidence to raise a gen‐

uine issue about whether he “actually knew” of Clark’s risk

and disregarded it.

Both of these disputes are factual in nature. Johnson holds

that a defendant who is denied qualified immunity at sum‐

mary judgment cannot immediately appeal “whether or not

the evidence in the pretrial record was sufficient to show a

genuine issue of fact for trial.” 515 U.S. at 307. The district

court found here that “the facts, when taken in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, establish that Walker was aware that

Clark was a risk” but that he “told no one.” (The court also

found that the “record is replete with questions of fact that

preclude summary judgment with respect to Kuehn.”) Be‐

cause the district court’s ruling on the first qualified immunity

step turns on factual questions, we do not have jurisdiction to

review it.

3. Step 2: Clearly Established Law

We do have jurisdiction to review the second qualified im‐

munity step: whether Clark’s asserted rights were clearly es‐
Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644 13

tablished at the time of his suicide. A right is clearly estab‐

lished when it is defined clearly enough to put officers on no‐

tice of their duties under the circumstances they confront. See

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (“For a constitutional

right to be clearly established, its contours must be suffi‐

ciently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right.”) (quotation omitted).

This does not require a prior case “directly on point, but ex‐

isting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitu‐

tional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 741 (2011).  

Clark’s right to be free from deliberate indifference to his

risk of suicide while he was in custody was clearly established

at the time of his death in 2012. See Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 623

(“[T]he right Mrs. Cavalieri asserts on behalf of Steven is the

right to be free from deliberate indifference to suicide. There

is no doubt that this right was clearly established prior to Ste‐

ven’s 1998 suicide attempt.”); Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 404–

05 (7th Cir. 1992) (“It was clearly established in 1986 that po‐

lice officers could not be deliberately indifferent to a detainee

who is in need of medical attention because of a mental illness

or who is a substantial suicide risk.”); see also id. at 406 n.6

(collecting cases from other circuits).  

Walker responds to this substantial body of case law in

several ways. First, he argues that it is “doubtful” whether cir‐

cuit precedent can clearly establish law for purposes of quali‐

fied immunity. He cites two Supreme Court cases, but both

cases leave this question unanswered. See Taylor v. Barkes, 579

U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015); City & County of San

Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015).
14 Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

Other Supreme Court cases indicate circuit precedent is ade‐

quate for these purposes. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.

603, 617 (1999) (“Petitioners have not brought to our attention

any cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the

time of the incident which clearly established the rule on

which they seek to rely.”). In addition, we have exercised this

authority for decades, including in this specific context of

prison and jail suicides. See Hall, 957 F.2d at 404–05; see also

Werner v. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016). We see no rea‐

son to depart from these precedents.  

Second, Walker argues that the Supreme Court’s decision

in Taylor v. Barkes shows that Clark’s rights were not clearly

established. 579 U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). Barkes had

committed suicide in prison, and his estate brought a § 1983

suit for deliberate indifference. The estate sued the commis‐

sioner of the Delaware Department of Correction and the war‐

den of the prison where Barkes committed suicide. Although

it was undisputed that the commissioner and the warden had

never interacted with Barkes and did not know about his sui‐

cide risk, the complaint alleged that these officials violated

Barkes’ rights by failing to supervise and monitor the imple‐

mentation of adequate suicide prevention protocols. Id. at

2043. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, holding

that the right at issue was not clearly established at the rele‐

vant time in the precedent of the Supreme Court or the Third

Circuit. Id. at 2045.

Taylor is readily distinguishable from this case. First,

Clark’s estate is not suing supervisory officials who did not

know about Clark’s risk. The estate contends that Walker and

Kuehn actually knew Clark’s risk and disregarded it. Second,

in Taylor the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit in part
Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644 15

because the right at issue was not clearly established in the

Third Circuit. Here, the right at issue has long been clearly

established in this circuit, as explained above.  

Finally, Walker argues that the clearly established prohibi‐

tion on deliberate indifference to prisoners’ and jail inmates’

risk of suicide is too general to be enforceable for purposes of

qualified immunity. Walker urges us to consider Clark’s rights

at a very high level of specificity: whether a jail inmate had a

right “to be placed immediately on a special watch in a suicide

cell despite no outward signs of suicidal ideation during an

initial intake assessment, when the intake officer knew that

trained medical personnel would conduct a follow‐up assess‐

ment and ultimately determine the inmate’s proper observa‐

tion and housing status.” This very specific right, Walker ar‐

gues, “has never been clearly established by the Supreme

Court.”

Courts may not define clearly established law at too high

a level of generality, see Sheehan, 575 U.S. at —, 135 S. Ct. at

1775–76, but there is no such problem here. The Supreme

Court has long held that prisoners have an Eighth Amend‐

ment right to treatment for their “serious medical needs.” Es‐

telle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). For purposes of quali‐

fied immunity, that legal duty need not be litigated and then

established disease by disease or injury by injury. Risk of sui‐

cide is a serious medical need, of course. See Sanville v.

McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2001) (“It goes without

saying that suicide is a serious harm.”) (quotation omitted).

Accepting the facts described by the district court, Clark’s es‐

tate has offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that

Walker actually knew about Clark’s serious risk of suicide.
16 Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644

(Recall that Clark’s score on the suicide risk screening tool in‐

dicated a maximum risk of suicide.) Walker should have

taken action based on this knowledge, yet he chose to do noth‐

ing. Our precedent establishes that “particular conduct” such

as this violates clearly established law. See Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. —, —, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (empha‐

sis omitted), citing al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. To the extent

Walker argues that our prior cases are factually distinguisha‐

ble from this case, our limited jurisdiction precludes consid‐

ering that argument.  

The district court’s denial of summary judgment for de‐

fendants Kuehn and Walker on the basis of qualified immun‐

ity is

AFFIRMED.