Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter

Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 05-2031

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

LOUIS SEGALLA,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Torruella, Lynch and Howard,

Circuit Judges.

Robert M. Greenspan on brief for appellant.

Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Lee H.

Vilker, Assistant United States Attorney, and Robert Clark

Corrente, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

September 6, 2006
That range, which was ultimately undisputed in the district 1

court and is not challenged on appeal, was computed as follows:

total offense level of 25 (base offense level of 24, U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(a)(2); plus 4 levels for possessing the gun in connection

with another felony offense--i.e., assault with a dangerous weapon,

id. § 2K2.1(b)(5); minus 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility,

id. § 3E1.1(a) & (b)), combined with a criminal history category of

VI (27 criminal history points, id., ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing

Table)), resulting in a guidelines sentencing range of 110 to 137

months, id. 

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Per Curiam. After pleading guilty to being a felon in

possession of a gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and

after admitting that the offense involved shooting the gun in a

residential area to scare someone, defendant Louis Segalla was

sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment, the statutory maximum, which

fell in the middle of the advisory guidelines range. In the 1

district court, Segalla sought a below-guidelines sentence of 72

months, under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),

primarily on the ground that he had been physically abused as a

child. On appeal, he argues, in addition, that the 120-month

sentence imposed was unreasonable in light of the nature of the

offense, which he characterizes as relatively minor, that the

sentence is longer than necessary to deal with his admitted need

for rehabilitation, and that his criminal history category

overstates the seriousness of his criminal record. Finally, he

argues that United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514 (1st Cir.

2006) (en banc), which articulated the sentencing protocols to be

followed by the district courts in this circuit and the standards
As Segalla concedes, this panel is powerless to overrule the 2

court's en banc opinion in Jiménez-Beltre. We therefore do not

address his criticisms of that decision.

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of appellate review of sentences post-Booker, was wrongly decided.2

For the reasons detailed below, we find the sentence to be

adequately explained and substantively reasonable in light of the

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, we reject

Segalla's arguments to the contrary and affirm the sentence.

The district judge expressly took into account each of

the mitigating factors that defense counsel brought to her

attention but found them unpersuasive or outweighed by other

legitimate considerations. As to Segalla's history of child abuse,

the judge stated that, "although [she] was very familiar with the

kind of childhood [he] had[,] [t]hat information . . . only goes so

far. There comes a point in one's life where you have to take

responsibility for your own actions." As to the nature of the

offense, which involved riding a motorcycle while drunk and firing

a gun in a residential area, the judge repeatedly commented on the

danger that conduct posed to the public and to Segalla himself,

which made it significantly more serious than the ordinary felonin-possession case. As to Segalla's need for rehabilitation, the

sentence imposed was expressly designed to address Segalla's

recognized need for mental health and substance abuse treatment.

Finally, as to Segalla's criminal history--which included several

instances of violence, particularly against women, and resulted in
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more than twice as many criminal history points as needed to place

him in the highest criminal history category--the judge commented

that Segalla's history makes him a "menace to society," and that,

if her discretion were not limited by the statutory maximum, she

would have imposed a higher sentence based on that factor alone.

In addition, the judge expressly considered the statutory factors,

including the need for punishment, deterrence, and public

protection. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(d)(A), (B), (C).

In sum, because we find the court's reasoning to be

plausible, and the resulting sentence, at least, defensible,

Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 519, we summarily affirm the sentence.

See 1st Cir. R. 27(c).