UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BONNIE THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

 v. Civil Action No. 15-249 (JEB)

VETERANS CANTEEN SERVICE,

 Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Two weeks after starting her job as a food-service associate at the Veterans Canteen 

Service, pro se Plaintiff Bonnie Thompson was fired. She has sued, claiming that the VCS’s 

employment action constitutes unlawful age and sex discrimination. As the undisputed evidence 

instead demonstrates that a rude interaction with a patron precipitated her termination, the Court 

will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

Although the facts here are quite simple, the procedural history is somewhat involved. 

Thompson initially filed suit in this court on December 4, 2013. See ECF No. 1 (Complaint). 

Her very abbreviated Complaint alleged that she had been terminated “as a food service 

associate” at the Veterans Canteen Service on July 25, 2012. See id. at 1. She claimed that she 

“was discriminated against based upon my gender in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended. [¶] Moreover, I believe that I was discriminated against based upon my age 57, in 

violation of the age discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as amended.” Id.
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After setting out these legal bases, the remainder of the Complaint alleges, in its entirety:

I was having breakfast prior to my shift and there was another person 

having breakfast in the room, shortly afterwards another person 

came in and sat next to me. He got up from his seat picked up the 

TV remote and asked the other person whom was a male, “Hay 

Man” are you watching this”. The person didn’t respond verbally 

so the person who came in last rudely changed the channel At that 

time, I said to him Sir there is such a thing as mannerism, you could 

have asked both of us, he stated it doesn’t matter you’re out 

numbered anyway

At that time I left the room, I was approached by Rodney Guiles 

(Cafeterial Supervisor) who indicated he wanted to speak with me I 

waited for Mr. Guiles approximately 15 minutes before he called me 

into his office, at that time Mr. Guiles asked another Supervisor 

name Pat to come into the office to listen to my statement, along 

with Chief Manager Gavin Moore After giving my statement Mr. 

Guiles ask me to sit in the cafeteria while he call the other person, 

when I was recalled back into his office Mr. Guiles stated he had to 

terminate my employment even though my shift had not begun At 

that time I asked Mr. Guiles for a reason and a letter of termination 

which he refused I can only conclude that Mr. Guiles treated me 

differently than the other people involved in the incident which were 

males. I feel Mr. Guiles is bias against older workers which are 

females [sic]

Id.

Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF) accompanying its Motion 

largely confirms this account and add a few additional facts – all from Thompson’s own 

deposition testimony. See Mot., Exhs. A & B (extracts from Plaintiff’s deposition). She had 

been working at the cafeteria for only two weeks at the time of the incident. See Def.’s SUMF, ¶ 

4. On that day, while wearing her uniform, she was seated in the cafeteria eating breakfast 

before her shift began. See id., ¶¶ 5-7. A dispute occurred over television channels, leading 

Thompson to make the comment she alleges in her Complaint. See id., ¶¶ 10-15. Her supervisor 

then terminated her for this interaction. See id., ¶¶ 24-25.
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The case was initially transferred at the end of 2013 to the Eastern District of Missouri, 

where the VCS is headquartered. See ECF No. 3 (Transfer Order). On February 6, 2014, 

Thompson filed an Amended Complaint, using a form apparently provided by the court there. 

She checked a space indicating her suit was brought under Title VII, but she did not check the 

space next to “Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.” Am. Compl. at 1. This 

document elsewhere indicates that she believed she was discriminated against based on gender 

and possibly age. See id. at 5. In the narrative, she stated that she did not “feel that the incident 

was properly and adequately investigated between the customer and myself. Also I received bias 

treatment due to the fact I’m a woman and at that time, I was the only woman in the room.” Id. 

To give Thompson the benefit of the doubt, the Court will treat this Amended Complaint as 

supplementing, not superseding, her original Complaint.

After Defendant answered, see ECF No. 12, Plaintiff successfully moved for venue to be 

returned to Washington. See ECF Nos. 20 (Motion); 21 (Order transferring case based on 

convenience of parties, convenience of witnesses, and interests of justice). This Court thereupon 

held an initial scheduling conference on April 1, 2015, and the parties engaged in discovery 

through October 1, 2015. See ECF No. 24 (Scheduling Order). The VCS has now moved for 

summary judgment. 

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v. 

Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A fact is “material” if it is capable of affecting the 

substantive outcome of the litigation. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 
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895. A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or 

“showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, 

or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(1).

When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor.” Liberty 

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Aka v. 

Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). On a motion for summary 

judgment, the Court must “eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” 

Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

The nonmoving party’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere 

unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other 

competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The nonmovant is 

required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in its favor. See

Laningham v. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

In light of this requirement, and pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(h) and Federal Rule 56(c), 

the Court, in resolving summary-judgment motions, “assume[s] that facts identified by the 

moving party in the statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in 

the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1). Plaintiff here 
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submits neither a separate statement nor any record evidence whatsoever. The Court, 

consequently, will credit the VCS’s evidence, which, in any event, consists only of Thompson’s 

own testimony.

III. Analysis

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice . . . to discharge any individual, or 

otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The ADEA, similarly, prevents an

employer from “discharg[ing] any individual or otherwise discriminat[ing] against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 

such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Individuals 40 years of age and older are 

included in the protected class. Id., § 631(a). Because Thompson was concededly 

“discharge[d],” the sole inquiry here is whether she was terminated “because of” her sex or age. 

Id., §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a).

Claims of sex and age discrimination ordinarily proceed in three steps. See McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); Kersey v. Washington Metr. Transit 

Auth., 586 F.3d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 2009). First, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 

450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Kersey, 586 F.3d at 17. To pass that hurdle, a plaintiff need only 

show that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment 

action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Czekalski v. 

Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C.

Cir. 2005)). Next, the defendant typically rebuts that prima facie showing with evidence of “a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods, Inc., 
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530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). Finally, if the defendant has produced such evidence, then the 

plaintiff must show that “the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 

reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

other words, the plaintiff must prove “that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason 

was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the 

employee.” Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

At the summary-judgment stage, however, the inquiry typically collapses into one simple 

question: Given all the evidence, could a reasonable jury conclude that “the defendant 

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff”? Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Once 

an employer has offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing the plaintiff, “the prima 

facie case” becomes “a largely unnecessary sideshow.” Id. (italics added). After all, a jury 

would be permitted to consider all the evidence on both sides of the scale – not only the 

defendant’s explanation of the firing and whatever evidence formed the plaintiff’s prima facie

case, but also any other facts tending to demonstrate animus. The relevant inquiry at the 

summary-judgment stage, as always, is simply whether the facts, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor. 

According to Plaintiff herself, she was terminated for her comment to the cafeteria 

customer. While her actions hardly seem to amount to a firing offense, that is not the question 

here. Her assertion in her Opposition that the VCS “acted irrationally and hastily firing me 

without any investigation,” Opp. at 2, is similarly beside the point. The only issue is whether the 

VCS acted because of Plaintiff’s age or sex. See Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 86 

F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (court “may not second-guess an employer’s personnel 

decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive”). All Thompson can muster on that point 
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is her allegation in the Complaint that “I can only conclude that Mr. Guiles treated me differently 

than the other people involved in the incident which were males.” Compl. at 2; see also Am. 

Compl. at 5 (“I received bias treatment due to the fact I’m a woman and at that time, I was the 

only woman in the room.”). Assuming Plaintiff is trying to claim that she was treated differently 

from her purported male comparators, she has neither alleged nor established that either of the 

men involved was even a VCS employee. See Exh. A at 33-34 (seated man “wasn’t an 

employee of the Veterans Canteen Service”); id. at 37 (“don’t know” if other man “was a Vet”). 

As a result, they cannot serve as comparators who were conceivably treated more favorably than 

Plaintiff. 

In her Opposition, Plaintiff now asserts that she was also “wrongfully dismiss[ed] for 

exercising my First Amendment Constitutional Rights to freedom of speech while off duty as 

well.” Opp. at 1. As a preliminary matter, she never mentioned this rationale in any of her prior 

pleadings. Even if the Court could now consider such a claim as an amendment to her 

Complaint, a public employee’s speech is protected only where she “spoke as a citizen on a 

matter of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). Sniping about 

television etiquette does not qualify.

IV. Conclusion

The Court, accordingly, concludes that the VCS is entitled to summary judgment and will 

this day issue a contemporaneous Order to that effect.

 /s/ James E. Boasberg 

 JAMES E. BOASBERG

 United States District Judge

Date: January 12, 2016