[Cite as Poindexter v. Grantham, 2011-Ohio-2915.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95413

ROBERT POINDEXTER 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

ESSIE GRANTHAM 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-703587 

BEFORE: Keough, J., Blackmon, P.J., and Jones, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 16, 2011 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

 

Lester S. Potash 

1717 Illuminating Building 

55 Public Square 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 

Ronald S. Marshek 

Ronald Marshek Co., L.P.A. 

27600 Chagrin Boulevard 

Suite 160 

Woodmere Village, Ohio 44122 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Essie Grantham (“Grantham”) appeals the trial court’s 

judgment granting the motion for appointment of a receiver filed by plaintiff-appellee, Robert 

Poindexter (“Poindexter”). For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for an 

evidentiary hearing. 

{¶ 2} Poindexter, Grantham, and Catherine Kelso (“Kelso”) are siblings, each having 

an interest in three parcels of real property located in Cleveland, Ohio. In September 2009, 
Poindexter filed a declaratory judgment action against Grantham and Kelso seeking an order 

declaring (1) the termination of Grantham and Kelso’s ownership interest in and to the three 

properties; (2) an accounting from Grantham and Kelso; and (3) the appointment of a receiver 

for the properties located at 13603 and 13605 Crennell Avenue.1

 

{¶ 3} In April 2010, Poindexter filed a motion with the trial court to appoint a receiver 

over the properties located at 13603 and 13605 Crennell Avenue. The motion was scheduled 

for an evidentiary hearing on June 17, 2010. 

{¶ 4} According to the trial court’s App.R. 9(C) Statement of the Evidence or 

Proceedings, the hearing was not conducted; rather, the trial judge and the parties met in the 

court’s jury room to discuss Poindexter’s motion and determine whether they could resolve the 

matter. After the court determined that the matter could not be resolved, the trial court 

granted Poindexter’s motion and requested that the parties mutually agree on the selection of a 

receiver. The trial court subsequently granted the parties’ joint motion appointing Robert 

Gutner as the agreed-upon receiver. 

{¶ 5} R.C. 2735.01 permits a court to appoint a receiver under certain circumstances. 

In this case, Poindexter alleged in his motion that a receiver was necessary pursuant to R.C. 

2735.01(A) and (F), which provide that a receiver may be appointed: 

 1

Poindexter did not request that a receiver be appointed for 13607 Crennell Avenue, where he 

resides. 
{¶ 6} “(A) In an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of property, or by 

a creditor to subject property or a fund to his claim, or between partners or others jointly 

owning or interested in any property or fund, on the application of the plaintiff, or of a party 

whose right to or interest in the property or fund, or the proceeds thereof, is probable, and when 

it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured; 

[and] 

{¶ 7} * * * 

{¶ 8} “(F) In all other cases in which receivers have been appointed by the usages of 

equity.”

{¶ 9} “Because the appointment of a receiver is such an extraordinary remedy, the 

party requesting the receivership must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 

appointment is necessary for the preservation of the complainant’s rights.” Equity Ctrs. Dev. 

Co. v. S. Coast Ctrs. Inc. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 643, 649-650, 615 N.E.2d 662. The 

decision to appoint a receiver is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 

reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs (1991), 60 Ohio 

St.3d 69, 73, 573 N.E.2d 62. “A court in exercising its discretion to appoint or refuse to 

appoint a receiver must take into account all the circumstances and facts of the case, the 

presence of conditions and grounds justifying the relief, the ends of justice, the rights of all the 

parties interested in the controversy and subject matter, and the adequacy and effectiveness of 

other remedies.” Id. 
{¶ 10} Provided there is evidence “tending to prove the facts essential to sustain the 

order,” a reviewing court must uphold a trial court’s appointment of a receiver. Equity Ctrs. at 

649-650, citing Malloy v. Malloy Color Lab., Inc. (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 434, 436, 579 N.E.2d 

248. “Such order may be reversed only where there is failure of proof which would be 

essential to support the order, * * *.” Id., citing Wilgus v. Arthur (1943), 72 Ohio App. 511, 

53 N.E.2d 197. 

{¶ 11} Grantham argues that the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver 

because the trial court (1) failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to the appointment of 

the receiver; (2) failed to provide an explanation for the appointment of the receiver; (3) 

appointed a receiver absent clear and convincing evidence as to irreparable loss; and (4) 

appointed a receiver absent grounds set forth in R.C. 2735.01. We find merit to the appeal. 

{¶ 12} The trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding Poindexter’s 

motion. The trial court’s App.R. 9(C) statement does not indicate the evidentiary proof it 

relied upon in granting the motion; it merely provides that the trial court granted Poindexter’s 

motion to appoint a receiver “after hearing both sides of the issue [off the record in the court’s 

jury room], and after having been familiar with the circumstances of this case for several 

months.” This statement is insufficient to provide meaningful appellate review of this matter. 

 Moreover, the trial court acknowledged that it did not receive any testimony or exhibits. 

Absent some basis for the appointment of the receiver, we cannot determine whether evidence 

“tending to prove the facts essential to sustain the order,” was presented and relied upon by the 
trial court. Equity Ctrs., supra. Poindexter had the burden of providing clear and convincing 

evidence to the trial court that a receiver was “necessary for the preservation of the 

complainant’s rights.” Id. From the record, it is uncertain whether Poindexter satisfied this 

burden. 

{¶ 13} Poindexter cites Victory White Metal v. N.P. Motel Sys., Inc., Mahoning App. 

No. 04 MA 245, 2005-Ohio-2706, for the proposition that an evidentiary hearing was not 

required. However, we find that case distinguishable from the case before us. In Victory 

White Metal, the court recognized that the trial court did not merely have arguments of counsel 

before ruling on the pending motion; rather, it had affidavits with attachments, evidence of 

property transfer, and admissions by the nonmovant that evidenced “that the property was in 

danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured.” Victory White Metal at 54. 

Therefore, appellate review of the Victory White Metal trial court’s rationale and decision in 

appointing a receiver was not limited to a court’s App.R. 9(C) statement and blanket journal 

entry granting such motion. 

{¶ 14} Although a trial court is not statutorily obligated to conduct a hearing, this court 

has held that a trial court abuses its discretion in failing to consider evidentiary material prior to 

appointing a receiver. Neece v. Natl. Premier Protective Servs., LLC, Cuyahoga App. No. 

89643, 2007-Ohio-5960. In Neece, this court held that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it appointed a receiver without conducting a hearing on the evidence when there was no 

evidence in the record that addressed the issues the trial court was required to consider before 
appointing a receiver. The trial court appointed a receiver “based upon the ‘arguments of 

counsel.’” Id. at 12. This court, in holding that an evidentiary hearing should have been 

held, noted that the trial court did not provide what evidence it relied on in appointing the 

receiver or what section of R.C. 2735.01 it found relevant to the case. Id. Furthermore, this 

court recognized that the trial court had no evidentiary material before it. Id. The facts 

before us are similar to those in Neece. 

{¶ 15} Here, the trial court granted Poindexter’s motion to appoint a receiver “after 

hearing both sides of the issue.” But the App.R. 9(C) statement demonstrates that the trial 

court did not hear any testimony or receive any exhibits. Furthermore, the trial court did not 

indicate what evidence it relied on in granting Poindexter’s motion, nor did it make any 

findings in its journal entry. Our review of Poindexter’s motion indicates that the only 

documentation attached to his motion was his affidavit that does not provide any evidentiary 

support for appointing a receiver. It merely contains unsubstantiated allegations. 

Nevertheless, neither the App.R. 9(C) statement nor the judgment entry indicate that the court 

relied on Poindexter’s affidavit. Furthermore, the trial court did not specify which section of 

R.C. 2735.01 it found relevant to the case. 

{¶ 16} Because appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary measure, we find it 

imperative that the trial court “take into account all the circumstances and facts of the case, the 

presence of conditions and grounds justifying the relief, the ends of justice, the rights of all the 
parties interested in the controversy and subject matter, and the adequacy and effectiveness of 

other remedies” and set forth its rationale in making its decision. Gibbs at 73. 

{¶ 17} Although we recognize that the trial court may have been familiar with the 

parties, facts, and circumstances of the case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering its 

decision without hearing any evidence and setting forth its rationale for granting Poindexter’s 

motion for appointment of a receiver. See Tarantino v. Portale, 174 Ohio App.3d 749, 

2008-Ohio-315, 884 N.E.2d 659 (trial court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver when 

the journal entry granting the motion for appointment of a receiver provides no explanation). 

{¶ 18} Accordingly, we sustain Grantham’s assignment of error. This case is reversed 

and remanded with instructions for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on 

Poindexter’s motion to appoint a receiver. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE 

PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, P.J., CONCURS 
LARRY A. JONES, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION 

LARRY A. JONES, J., DISSENTING:

{¶ 19} Respectfully I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court 

granting the motion for appointment of a receiver. 

{¶ 20} In Ohio, it is well established that a judge of the common pleas court has 

statutory authority to appoint a receiver when necessary to preserve the petitioning party’s 

rights. R.C. 2735.01. An evidentiary hearing is not required “where the court is sufficiently 

convinced that the property is in danger from a review of the affidavits * * * admissions and 

inferences that can be rationally drawn from these materials and from any arguments 

presented.” Victory White Metal, supra at ¶54. 

{¶ 21} The pleadings demonstrate that the parties each have an ownership interest in the 

subject properties. Poindexter’s complaint set forth a claim requesting the appointment of a 

receiver and he filed an affidavit that indicated the properties were in danger of being 

materially injured or lost due to nonpayment of the mortgage, that justified the trial court’s 

decision to appoint a receiver in this case. See Pal v. Strachan, Cuyahoga App. No. 91808, 

2009-Ohio-730, citing Reserve Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Burbach, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 85874 and 

85912, 2005-Ohio-6097. 

{¶ 22} In this case, as in Pal, the receiver was not appointed contemporaneously with 

the filing of the complaint, but, rather, after the trial court became thoroughly familiar with the 

parties, facts, and issues as a result of pretrial hearings and its review of the affidavits and 
pleadings. Moreover, the parties filed a joint motion suggesting Robert Gunther as the 

receiver. Under these circumstances, I would find no abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 23} The parties have been in litigation for more than a year and a half and I would 

find that Poindexter set forth sufficient evidence to justify the trial court’s appointment of a 

receiver. 

{¶ 24} Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.