### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Fe br ua ry 16, 200 5 S es sio n

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . DONALD BLEVI NS

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty No. —9201 Larry B. Stanley, Judge

No. M2004- 01906-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 6, 2005

The de fenda nt, Donald B levins, was convicted for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The trial court impos ed a sentenc e of 11 months and 29 day s. On appe al, the def endant a sserts that the trial court err ed by

failing to instruct the jury on the def

enses of nece ssityand dure ss. The convic tion

a ndse nte nc e are a ff

ir me d; the c a se is r e ma nd e d f or e ntry of a n amen ded ju dg me nt t o c or re c t a cler ical er ror.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed ; Rem anded f or Entry of Co r r e c te d Judg m e nt

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

Michelle M. B enjamin, Winchester, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Donald B levins.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ha m, A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; and L arry Bry ant, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

At approximately

11:55 p.m. on J uly

27, 2002, L isa Norr is of the McMinnvil l e Police Depa rtment was dispatc hed to the Scottish I nn Motel in McMinnvill e. The office r wa s responding
to a c a ll f ro m T e rry Mil bu rn , w ho ha d le g a l c us tod y of he r s e ve nte e n- y e ar- oldg ra nd daug hte r, Ho lly Clay ton. O ffice r Norris informed Ms. Milburn, who was at the motel looking for he r g randdaug hter, that sh e wo uldwa it o uts ide to w a tc h in c a se Ms. Cla y ton ste pp e d outs ide on e of the ro oms . Sh ortly ther ea ft er, O ffice r Norris observed the defe ndant and Ms. Clay ton walk out of a r oom toge ther. Be cause Ms. Clay ton was holding a bee r and a cig are tte, Offic er Norris a rre sted her f

or possession of alc ohol and for violation of t he curfew law. The defe ndant, who wa s thirty -one y ear s old at the time, was cited f

or contributing to the delinquency of a minor.-2-

At the trial, Ms. Milburn testified t h at wh en she had found her g randdaug hter in the defe ndant’s ca

r ea rlier the sa me day , she had r equire d Ms. Clayton to g et out of the car , order ed the defe ndant to sta y awa y , and then take n Ms. Clay ton home. She testified that later that evening , she left Ms. Clay ton alone at home w hile she took another g randc hild to the skating rink. She returne d thirty minutes later to find that Ms. Clay ton was g one. Ms. Milburn, who explained that there was

never any alcohol in her

house, testified that while looking for M s

. C l ay t o n, she found the defe ndant’s vehic le par

ked at the Scottish I nn and ultimately contac ted the police f

or assistance

.

Offic er N orris testified that upon her arrival at the Scottish I nn, she spoke with Ms. Milburn, loo ke d o uts ide the mot e l f or Ms. Cla y ton , a ndthe n s a w the de fe nd a nt a ndMs. Cla y ton e me rg e arm

in-arm f rom one of the units. According to the office r, Ms. Clay ton was ca rry ing a beer in one hand

a nda c ig are tte in the oth e r. She re c a lle d th a t th e re wa s a no the r c ou pl e in the sa me ho te l r oo m. Offic er N o rr is
, w h o te s ti f ie d th a t th e r e w a s a n 1 1 :0 0 p

. m. c u r f e w in th e c it y , p la c e d M s

. Cla y ton under a rre st for possession of alcohol and for violation of the cur few law and issued a citation to the defe ndant for c ontributing to the de linquency of a minor.

Th e de fe nd a nt test if

ied th a t a t app ro xima te ly 8:3 0 p .m. on the nig ht o f the of fe ns e , M s. Cla y ton te le ph on e d to inf or m him th a t sh e wa s u ps e t be c a us e sh e a ndhe r b oy frie ndha d e nd e d th e ir rela tionship. According to the def endant, she threa tened to harm herself if he did not take he r for a drive . He state d that a fe w minutes later h e p i ck ed her up as she w as wa lking a long the road a sh ort dista nc e fr om he r g ra nd mothe r’ s hou se

. I t wa s his tes tim on y that his only pu rp os e wa s to c a lm Ms. Cla y ton be c a us e of

his c on c e rn fo r h e r w e lf

are . Ac c or din g to the de fe nd a nt, he re c e ive d a c a ll

on his c e llu lar te le ph on e fr om a fr ie nd , Bry a n Tid e nb e rg , who inv ite d him to a roo m Mr . a ndMr s. Tidenber g had re nted at the Scotti sh I nn. Whil e the de fenda nt remembe red tha t Ms. Cl ay ton, prior to their arrival at the motel, had a sked for an alc oholic drink, he c l ai m ed t h at he had r efuse d the
reque st.

The de fenda nt stated that afte r they arrived at the motel, Ms. Tidenbe rg, wh o was of leg al

a g e , a sk e d h i m f

o r s o m e b e e r , s o h e b r o u g h t i n a s i x- p a c k f r o m h i s c ar

. H e t e s t i f

i e d tha t Ms

. Tidenber g put the alcohol in the re frig erator and that during the next s ever al minutes, Ms. Clay ton did not cons u me a n y

a lc o h o l. T h e d e f

e n d a n t c la im e d th a t h e h a d to le a v e th e mo te l r o o m o n an

err and and tha t when he returne d to the room, Ms . Clay ton had not consumed a ny alcohol. I t was his con te n ti o n th a t h e w a s c o n c e r n e d ab o u t M s

. Cl a y to n ' s b e in g o u t s o late b u t th a t s h e made a telephone c all and af

terwa rd assure d Ms. T idenber g that she had permission t o stay at the motel. He

c la ime d th a t Ms . Cla y ton a sk e d him fo r a be e r but he re fu se d, e xpla ini ng , “ [Y]ou ’r e no t drinking in
my prese nce.” The de fenda nt blamed Ms. Tidenber g for g iving Ms. Clay ton the beer

and testified that he lef

t the room with Bry an Tidenbe rg and at that point saw O fficer No rris, who asked about Ms. Clay ton. He cla imed that befor e he c ould a nswer, Ms. Clayton w alked out of the room with a beer in her ha nd. The de fenda nt insist ed that h e n ev er ga ve Ms. Clay ton any beer and neve r ob se rv e d h e r d ri nk ing a ny a lc oh ol.

On cr oss-examination, the defenda nt contended tha t Ms. Cl ay t o n wa s fea rful of he r g randmother

who, he understood, beat her. He denied that Ms. Milburn warne d him to st ay awa y-3-

from her g randdaug hter. He acknow ledg ed that he ha d neither attempted to calm Ms. Clay ton down at her house nor a ttempted to take her back home, explaining it was bec ause of “all the stuff

that happens in he r house” and be ca u s e s h e had thre atene d suicide if re turned ther e. The defe ndant

c la ime d th a t he didno t ha ve a c hance to no ti fy the po lic e or Ms. Mil bu rn to t e ll the m th a t Ms

. Cla y ton wa s a t th e mot e l r oo m.

B ry a n T ide nb e rg , w ho a c knowl edged that he a sk e d th e de fe nd a nt t o b ri ng the be e r t o h is room, testified that he did not obser ve the de fenda nt give Ms. Clay ton any of t he alc ohol. He stated that w he n th e de fe nd a nt l e ft the mot e l f

or app ro xima te ly

tw e nty min ute s, Ms. Cla y ton dida sk his wi fe fo r s ome be e r, bu t he re c a lle d th a t hi s w if e re fu se d h e r r e qu e st. I t w a s h is c on te nti on that w hil e the defend a nt w a s st ill ou t of the ro om, Ms. Cla y ton too k a be e r w ith ou t a sk ing . A c c or din g to Tidenber g , the def

endant r efu s ed t o gi v e Ms. Clay ton alcohol. For the most part, his testimony

corr oborate d that provided by the def endant.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury that the def

endant wa s char g ed with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. No obje ctions were made with re g ard to the c ontent of the instructions. Ther e we re no spe cial re quests for a dditional charg es to the jury

. On appe al, the def

endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed by failing to instruct the jury on the de fe ns e s of ne c e ssi ty a nd du re ss. He arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld h a ve ins truc te d o n th e de fe ns e of dure ss as prese nted in Tenn es s ee Pattern J ury I nstruction 40.03 and the de fense of nec essity as provided in Tenne ssee Patter n J ury I nstruction 40.05. Bo t h of the c harg es ar e take n from the provisions of our code . See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11- 504(a) , -609.

Under the United States and Te nnessee Constit utions, a defe ndant has a constitutional right to trial by jury

. U.S. Const. amend. VI ; T enn. Const. art. 1, § 6; se e State v. B obo, 814 S.W .2d 353, 356 (Tenn. 1991) ; Wi llard v. State, 174 Tenn. 642, 130 S.W.2d 99 (1939). This rig ht encompasse s the def endant' s rig ht to a corr ect a nd complete c harg e of the law. State v. Te el, 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990) . I n conseque nce, the trial court ha s a duty "to g ive a c omplete cha rg e of the law

app lic able to the fa c ts o f a c a se ." Sta te v. Ha rb iso n, 70 4 S.W. 2d 31 4, 31 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 6) ; se e Sta te v. For bes, 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30.

Ou r l a w r e qu ir e s th a t a ll o f the e le me nts of e a c h o ff e ns e be de sc ri be d a ndde fi ne d in

connec tion with that offense. See State v. Cravens, 764 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tenn. 1989). When the evidenc e in the rec ord fairly raises or supports the exis tence of a defe nse, the trial court is compelled to i ns truc t th e jury

on the iss ue . M a nn ing v. Sta te , 50 0 S.W. 2d 91 3, 91 5- 16 (T e nn . 1 97 3) ; se e a lso Almonrode v. State, 567 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tenn. 1978). A s part of its instruction, the trial court

mus t in fo rm

the jury that a ny re a so na ble do ub t on the e xiste nc e of the de fense requ ire s a c qu itt a l. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-203(c ); State v. Bult, 989 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tenn. C ri m

. Ap p . 1998); State v. Shropshire, 874 S.W .2d 634, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). This court has added that " due
pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s th a t a

c ri min a l defendan t be af fo rd e d a me a nin g fu l op po rtun ity to p re se nt a complete de fense , which includes the rig ht to have the jury i n s t ru cted reg arding fundame ntal-4-

de fe ns e s ra ise d by the e vid e nc e ." Sta te v. Mic ha e l S. Ne ve ns , No. M 20 00 -0 08 15 -C CA -R 3- CD (Tenn. Crim. App., a t Nashville, April 27, 2001); see also Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-11-203( c), ( d).

Whether the evidence has raised a defense and, t here fore
, require s a jury instruction depends upon an examination of the evide nce in the light mos t favor able to the defendant. Bult, 989 S.W.2d

a t 73 3. Th e ins truc tio ns sh ou ld inc lud e a c ha rg e on the de fe ns e of ne c e ssi ty or du ress i f t he fa c ts would fairly

support eit h er

. As nece ssityand dure ss are not classified by our code as af

firmative defe nses, t he defenda nt need not prove them by a prepondera nce of the evidence. State v. Culp, 900 S.W .2d 707, 710 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Where the proof, howe ver, " fairly raises" the def

ense, the trial court "must submit the d ef ense to the jury

and the pr osecution must 'pr ove bey ond a

rea so n ab l e d o u b t that the defe nse does not apply .' " I d. (quoting State v. Hood, 868 S.W.2d 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) ).

Nec essi t y i s a d efense whe rein c onduct, otherw ise unlawful, is justified if " [t ]he person

rea sonably

believes the conduct is immediately nece ssary

to avoid i m m inent harm; and [t] he desirability

and urg ency

of avoiding the harm clea rly outweig h, acc ording to ordinary standards of

rea sonablene ss, the harm soug ht to be preve nted by the law pr oscribing the conduc t." Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11-609. The Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments to this s ection state tha t the defe nse of

ne c e ssi ty is a pp lic able in ex c e e din g ly ra re situa tio ns wh e re c ri min a l a c tiv ity is " a n o bje c tiv e ly

rea sonable response to an e x treme situation." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-609, Sentenc ing Commi ssion Com ments. The Sentenc ing Commis s i o n provides an e x ample as f ollows: "The

nece ssitydefe nse would bar a tre spass conviction for a hiker, stra nded in a snowstorm, who spe nds the nig ht in a vaca nt cabin ra ther than risking de ath sleeping in the open." I d.

Nec essity has t raditionally been used appropriately when the extreme situation is broug ht on by something oth er t h an a huma n act. Ne il P. C ohen et a l., Prevalenc e and U se of Criminal Def enses: A Pre liminary

Study , 60 Tenn. L . Rev. 957, 966 (1993). Examples of nec essity include

a sh ip v iol a tin g an emb arg o la w t o a vo id a sto rm , a ph arm a c ist

pr ov idi ng me dic a tio n w ith ou t a presc ription to alleviate someone' s suffering during an emerg ency , or one of two shipwrec ked sailors pushing the other off

the float to sa ve his ow n life. 11 David L . Ray bin, Tennesse e Prac tice § 28.118 (1 98 5 & Sup p. 19 97 ). Mo re ov e r, ne c e ssi ty re qu ir e s a n im me diate ly

ne c e ssa ry a c tio n, ju st if

iabl e be c a us e of

a n immin e nt thr e a t, wh e re the a c tio n is the on ly me a ns to a vo id the ha rm . I d. ; se e a lso State v. Gre en, 915 S.W .2d 827, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (noting that defe nses of necessity and du re ss w ou ld h a ve be e n r a ise d by fathe r’ s te sti mon y that he ha d a g re e d to pa rt ic ipate in b ur g lary

on ly beca use his son was dire ctly

threa tened with harm if he re fused)

.

F a ilu re to c ha

rg e the jury a s to the de fe ns e of ne c e ssi ty c a n be re ve rs ibl e e rr or wh e re the fa c ts fa ir ly sa tis fy the e le me nts

. Sta te v. B ob by Ra y Jenkins , N o. 03 C01 -9 20 2- CR- 00 05 0 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , at K n o xv i l l e , S e p t

. 1 8
, 1 9 9 2 )

. I n Je n k i n s , a p o l i c e o f f i c e r f o u n d t h e d e f

e n d a n ti n a

v e h ic le

s t o p p ed i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e ro ad ; t h e d ef en d an t wa s i n t h e d ri v er 's s ea tan d t h e m o t o r w as ru n n i n g. The de fenda nt, who was intox icated, ha d no driver' s license, a nd had bee n previously convicted a s

a mot or ve hic le ha

bitua l of fe nd e r, was arres ted a nd a g a in c on vic te d u nd e r the Mo tor Ve hic le Habitual Of

fende rs Act. I d., slip op. at 2. He had prese nted proof at t rial t hat t he car' s transmission-5-

had malfunc tioned and his f riend, who had a ctually

been driving, ha d left the sce ne to g et help. The defe ndant had to kee p his foot on the brake pedal to pre vent the ca r fr om rolling do wn hill and neede d the engine running to operate t he power brakes. On appea l, a panel of t his court found the defe nse witnesses we re c onsistent and the defe ndant' s testimony corr oborate d them. I d., slip op. at 7. The court ruled that the defe ndant had fairly raised a nece ssity defe nse and it was re versible e rror for the tr ial judge not to charg e it to the jury . I d., slip op. at 8.

T h i s c o u r th a s a l s o h e l d t h a ti n o r d e r f o r a d e f e n d a n t t o b e e n t i t l e d t o t h e d e f e n s e o f n e c e s s i t y, he “must show an immediate ly nece ssary

action, justifi ab le bec ause of an imminent threat, whe re the action is the only means to a void the harm.” State v. Watson, 1 S.W .3d 676 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (c iting Gr een, 915 S.W .2d at 832). The sentencing commission comments indi cate that the statute codifies the common law and, there fore
, common law distinctions are instruc tive. State v. Gre en, 995 S.W.2d 591, 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). I n particula r, the c ommon law indicated a s fo llo ws :

"D uress wa s said to excuse criminal conduc t wherethe ac tor was unde r an unla wful thr e a t o f i m m i n e n t d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y , w h i c h t h r e a t c a u s e d t h e a c t o r t o

e ng a g e in c on du c t vi olatin g the lit e ra l te rm s o f the c ri min a l law . While the de fe ns e of dure ss cover ed the situation wher e the c oerc ion had its source in the actions of other human being s, the defense of nece ssity
, or choice of e vils, traditionallycover ed the situation where phy sical for ces be y o n d th e a c to r ' s control re ndere d illega l conduct the le sse r o f t wo e vil s. Th us , w he re A de str oy e d a dik e be c a us e B thr e a te ne d to kil l him if he did not, A would arg ue that he acted under duress, wherea s if A destroy ed the dik e in o rd e r t o p ro te c t mo re va lua ble property

fr om f loo din g , A c ou ld c la im a defe nse of ne cessity ."

I d. (q uo tin g Un ite d St a te s v . B a ile y , 4 44 U.S

. 39 4, 40 9- 10 (1 98 0) ). Th e de fe ns e of ne c e ssi ty is
g ener ally only available when nonhuman a cts prompt the illeg al ac tion. St ate v. Jason C. P olston, No. W2003-02556-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., a t J ackson, A ug . 19, 2004).

Th e de fe nd a nt i n th is i ns ta nc e didno t pr e se nt e vid e nc e that he wa s u nd e r a n im me diate phy sical t hreat to provide Ms. Clay ton with alcohol in order to avoid her harming herse lf. Further, the de fe nd a nt d id n ot p ro du c e a ny e vid e nc e that hi s ac tio ns we re the on ly me a ns a va ila ble to a vo id an imminent threat to the health of t he victim

. Nothing in the rec ord indicate s that the victim had
any means to harm herse lf or wa s in imm ediate da ng er of doing so. The defe ndant was c onvicted of contributing to the del inquency of a minor by

allowing a minor to consume a lcohol. The evidenc e, ther efor e, did not proper ly raise the issue of nece ssity ; thus, the trial court was not requir ed to char g e the jury

on nece ssity

.

Du re ss, pr e vio us ly

dis tin g uis he d f

ro m th e de fe ns e of ne c e ssi ty , ha s b e e n d e fi ne d a s f oll ow s:

Du re ss i s a

defens e to p ro se c uti on wh e re the pe rs on or a thi rdpe rs on is thr e a te ne d w ith ha

rm wh ic h is pr e se nt, imm ine nt, imp e nd ing a ndof su c h a n a tur e to-6-

induce a well-g rounded a

pprehe nsion of death or

serious bodi ly injury if the act is not done. The threa tened ha

rm must be continuous throug hout the time the act is being

c o m m i t t e d
, a n d m u s tb e o n e f r o m w h i c h t h e p e r s o n c a n n o tw i t h d r a w i n s a f e t y. Furth er , the desira

bilityand urg ency

of avoiding the har m must clearly outweig h,

acc ording to ordinary

standards of

rea sonablene ss, the harm soug ht to be pre vented by the law pr oscribing the conduc t.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-504(a ). The Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments to this s ection advise that the dure ss defe nse re quires that the of fense must be co m m i t t ed b ecause a nother pe rson threa tens death or serious bodily

injury if the off

ense is not committed. I d., Sentencing C o m m i s s i on Comments. There must be no re asonable means to e scape the compulsion to commit the of fense

. See State v. Robinson, 622 S.W .2d 62, 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)

.

The de fenda nt arg ues that the trial c ourt was required to instruct the jury on duress. Ag ain, he cla ims that his motivation to take the victim to the motel, r ather than home, wa s to prevent he r from harming herse lf. The defe ndant failed, howeve r, to pr esent any evidenc e that he was f o rc ed to p ro vid e the vic tim a lc oh ol in or de r to pr e ve nt de a th or se ri ou s bo dil y ha rm . M or e ov e r, he c ou ld have e asily

avoided g iving he r acc ess to his beer. The defe ndant could have taken the vic tim to a ho sp ita l if

he fe are d h arm

. He could h a ve le ft the a lc oh ol i n h is c ar w he n h e e nte re d th e mot e l. There wer e alternatives other tha n commission of this offense a vailable to the def endant. No one thr e a te ne d the de fe nd a nt or a thi rd pe rs on wi th ha rm if he didno t pr ov ide the vic tim a lc oh ol. Th us , duress is not fairly

raised by t h e p ro o f and the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.

Although not r aised a s an i ssue, the judg ment corr ectly classifies the of

fense as “c ontributing to the delinquency

of a minor,” but incorre ctly cites Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-15-404. Th e pr op e r s ta tut ory

c ita tio n f

or the off e ns e of c on tr ibu tin g to the de lin qu e nc y of a min or is Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-156. The jury was instructe d under the proper section.

There fore , the j udg ment of t he trial court is af firmed, but re manded f

or re -entry

to refle ct the
proper statutory citation. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36 (providing for corr ection of cler ical mistakes on judgme nt forms).

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DI NG JUDGE