Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 

Case No. C-02-JV-16-000262 & 263 

REPORTED 

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

No. 2234 

September Term, 2016 

 

IN RE: ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP OF 

C.A. AND D.A. 

 

Kehoe,

 Leahy, 

 Kenney, James A., III

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 

JJ.

 

Opinion by Kenney, J. 

 

 Filed: August 30, 2017 
 On September 15, 2014, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as the 

juvenile court, declared D.A. and C.A., children of A.C.-R., appellant (“Father”), each to 

be a Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”). D.A. and C.A. (the “Children”) were placed 

in the custody of the Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services (the 

“Department”). In 2016, the Department filed a petition seeking to terminate appellant’s 

parental rights. Following a hearing, the court granted the Department’s petition and 

terminated appellant’s parental rights. In this appeal, appellant presents the following 

question for our review: 

Did the circuit court err in terminating [a]ppellant’s parental rights? 

 For reasons to follow, we answer appellant’s question in the negative and affirm the 

judgment of the circuit court. 

BACKGROUND 

C.R.-A. (“Mother”) gave birth to D.A. and C.A. on February 7, 2007 and February 

20, 2009, respectively.1 Father, who was in the country illegally, was arrested in 2010 “due 

to domestic violence between himself and the children’s mother” and was eventually 

deported to his home country of Mexico. At that time, Mother and her five minor children, 

all of whom were the children of Father, “resided in a boarding house with multiple families 

known for illegal activities including drug use, gambling and excessive alcohol.” In 2011, 

Mother was indicated for neglect by the Prince George’s County Department of Social 

Services (hereinafter “PGDSS”). 

 

1

 Mother consented to the adoption of D.A. and C.A. and voluntarily relinquished 

her parental rights. She is not a party to this appeal. 
2

In August of 2013, Mother befriended Levi R. and Mary D., a married couple whom 

she met while the couple was doing missionary work for their church. At the time, Mother 

was living in a tent in Washington D.C. with her five children, including D.A. and C.A., 

and her boyfriend, Phillipe W. Not long after meeting Levi R. and Mary D., Mother asked 

Mr. R. if he and his wife would care for the five children. The couple agreed and eventually 

filed for emergency custody of all five. The juvenile court granted custody of the five 

children to Mr. R. and Ms. D. in December of 2013. In that order, the court found that 

Father had “no present involvement in the case.” 

Around the same time, Father was arrested and incarcerated in a federal prison in 

Louisiana because he again came into the United States illegally and was “trying to bring 

others into the country.” The record does not disclose Father’s whereabouts between the 

time he was deported in 2010 and the time he was incarcerated in 2013. 

In February 2014, PGDSS investigated a report of child sexual abuse against 

Phillipe W. involving D.A. and C.A. The alleged sexual abuse happened “sometime in 

later 2012 or early 2013” when the Children were living in a tent with Mother and Phillipe 

W. PGDSS ultimately determined that the allegations involving D.A. were “indicated;” a 

finding of “unsubstantiated” was issued regarding the allegations involving C.A. 

In July of 2014, Mr. R. informed the Department that he and his wife could no longer 

care for the Children. The Department subsequently filed and was granted a Petition with 

Request for Shelter Care, and D.A. and C.A. were placed in foster care.2 At the time, 

 

2

 The Department also filed custody/guardianship petitions regarding the other three 

children. 
3

Mother’s whereabouts were unknown, while Father remained incarcerated in federal 

prison. In August of 2014, the court held a review hearing regarding the shelter care order,

and, on September 15, 2014, the court found D.A. and C.A. to be CINA and ordered outof-home placement under the care of the Department. 

The court held another review hearing in January of 2015. By this time Mother had 

been located and was present at the hearing. Also present was counsel for Father, who 

remained in federal detention.

3

 Following the hearing, the court found that the Department 

had made reasonable efforts at reunification. The court also ordered that D.A. and C.A. 

were to remain in the custody of the Department and that Mother be allowed supervised 

visitation. The court made no findings regarding Father. 

In May of 2015, the court held a hearing regarding D.A. and C.A.’s permanency 

plans. Again, Mother and counsel for Father were present for the hearing. Following the 

hearing, the court found that Mother had made “no progress toward correcting the problems 

that caused the children to be placed in foster care,” that she continued “to live with a man 

who may have abused one of her children,” that she had no employment or place to live, 

and that she continued “to test positive for illegal drugs.” The court also noted that Father 

remained “incarcerated in Louisiana.” As a result of these and other findings, the court 

ordered that D.A. and C.A.’s permanency plans be changed from reunification to custody 

and guardianship with a relative. 

 

3

 The record is unclear as to whether Father’s counsel made any arguments on his 

behalf. 
4

In November of 2015, the court held another hearing regarding D.A. and C.A.’s 

permanency plans. Mother and counsel for Father were present at the hearing, and Father, 

who was still incarcerated, participated by telephone. The court ultimately ordered that 

D.A. and C.A.’s permanency plans be changed to custody and guardianship by a nonrelative. The Department, in April of 2016, filed petitions for guardianship of D.A. and 

C.A., and the court held a hearing on the Department’s petitions in October of 2016. 

At that hearing, Maggie Swink, one of the Department’s assigned in-home services 

workers for D.A. and C.A., testified that, during her time as the Children’s caseworker, the 

Department provided Mr. R. and Ms. D. with various in-home services, including weekly 

visits, assisting with clothing and food for the Children, offering referrals for therapy, and 

working with the couple on parenting techniques. Ms. Swink also testified that she 

contacted Father regarding placement for the Children and that Father provided two 

potential resources: his mother and a “fictive relative that he called a cousin who was 

living in California.” Ms. Swink could not locate Father’s “cousin” but did manage to 

locate his mother, who indicated that she was not willing to be a resource at that time. Ms. 

Swink also reported that she tried to communicate with Father on other occasions and that 

she “sent him court reports.” 

Hadassah Freed, who replaced Ms. Swink as the Children’s caseworker in August 

of 2014, testified that Father was in prison the whole time she was his caseworker, that she 

only spoke with him “two or three times,” and that he tried to contact her only one time. 

Ms. Freed also testified that she mailed “every service agreement” to Father but never 
5

received a signed service agreement in return. When asked about Father’s phone contact 

with the Children, Ms. Freed responded that “it wasn’t frequently.” 

She also reported that Father informed her that he had family in the United States 

and that his mother was “available in Mexico.” She had “phone conversations” with his 

family in the United States, and she contacted the International Social Services regarding 

his mother. The International Social Services completed a home study with Father’s 

mother, which, according to Ms. Freed, had been “favorable.” Ms. Freed left the 

Department in April of 2015, before she could follow up on any of these resources. 

Following Ms. Freed’s departure, Kimberly McKay was assigned as D.A. and 

C.A.’s caseworker. Ms. McKay reported that she made several attempts to reach Father 

by phone but was unable to do so. She also sent several service agreements to Father for 

him to sign, but Father never sent any back. Ms. McKay also spoke with Father’s mother 

about “possibly coming here to the United States . . . to care for the children,” but she was 

“denied her visa to the United States.” Ms. McKay stated that she later investigated 

Father’s niece in Arizona as a potential resource, but the niece did not take the appropriate 

steps to initiate the process of becoming a resource. She also investigated Father’s “cousin” 

in California and discovered that he was in the country illegally and without a known 

address. 

In the meantime, D.A. and C.A.’s foster parents informed the Department that they 

could no longer care for the Children. In September of 2015, the Children were moved 

into the care of a new foster parent, Melanie R., with whom they now live. Ms. R. testified 

that the Children’s adjustment into her home had gone “extremely well,” that they loved 
6

school and reading, and that they were involved in numerous activities, including soccer 

and Girl Scouts. Ms. R. also testified that the Children regularly attended therapy and that 

she had not seen any behavioral problems with the Children since they moved into her 

home. She added that the Children had requested that they not be addressed by their birth 

names (D.A. goes by “S.” and C.A. goes by “M.”). When asked about long-term plans for 

the Children, Ms. R. responded that “they’re going to be adopted by me.” 

Regarding the Children’s relationship with Father, Ms. R. testified that the Children 

had been speaking with him by phone “less than once a month” but that the conversations 

had become more frequent in recent months. When Father and the Children spoke, there 

was “a language barrier” because Father spoke to the Children in Spanish, which neither 

child can speak fluently. Ms. R. reported that, during one conversation, Father suggested 

that he be allowed to live with her and the Children after his release. 

After their permanency plans had been changed to adoption, D.A. and C.A.’s case 

was transferred to Susan Lonergan, a case manager with the Department’s adoptions unit, 

in June of 2016. Ms. Lonergan testified that she conducted in-home visits with Ms. R. and 

the Children at least once a month and that she had no concerns about the Children’s care 

under Ms. R. She reported that the Children were “always clean” and “always 

appropriately dressed” and that they were “happy” and “appear comfortable.” According 

to Ms. Lonergan, the Children never expressed an interest in speaking with Father. Ms. 

Lonergan also testified that she made frequent attempts to reach Father’s case manager in 

prison but that “they never call back.” She also stated that she sent several documents to 

Father but that she did not receive any response. 
7

Lisa Cammauf, a family support worker with the Department, testified that she had 

been assigned D.A. and C.A.’s case in November of 2014 and that she had worked with 

them ever since. Ms. Cammauf reported that she had been involved in several “team 

decision meetings” in which Father participated by telephone and that she had assisted in 

answering questions that he had regarding the Children. During one meeting, she told

Father that his ability to be a resource for the Children was limited because he was in 

prison, to which Father responded that “when he gets out, no matter what, [D.A. and C.A.] 

are his children” and “he will do everything he can to come back and...get his kids.” Father 

reiterated this sentiment at a subsequent meeting in which he again participated by 

telephone. 

Ida Johnson, a family therapist, testified that she had been treating D.A. and C.A. 

since July of 2014. Ms. Johnson reported that the Children had behavior problems when 

they first came into her care, including stealing, lying, wetting the bed, and fighting with 

their siblings. She attributed the Children’s behavioral issues in part to the instability of 

their home life and having to continually adjust to new surroundings. 

Regarding D.A. and C.A’s current situation, Ms. Johnson reported that the Children 

had adjusted “very well” to life with Ms. R.; that Ms. R. was “very committed” to the 

Children’s therapy; and, that Ms. R. and the Children were “very bonded” and “very 

affectionate.” She further stated that the Children were “making significant progress 

adjusting to their new home” and that they “appear happy and comfortable with their 

surroundings.” 
8

Father testified by telephone from prison, admitting that he is “an illegal alien” and 

that, on at least two occasions, he had entered the United States illegally.4 According to 

Father, it was his last entry into the United States, which occurred in December of 2013, 

that resulted in his being incarcerated. He also stated that he would not be released until 

July of 2017, at which time he would be deported to Mexico. Father asserted that he was 

not to blame for “everything that’s happened” and that he loved his Children and wanted 

to do “absolutely everything possible to be with them.” He also claimed that after his 

deportation he would “find a way to come back” but that if he could not “God will bless 

them anyway.” Father stated that he had not seen D.A. or C.A. since 2012. 

As to resources available to him, Father testified that his mother had been willing to 

care for the Children but that she had passed away prior to the hearing. He also reported 

that he had a cousin in California but that he did not know the cousin’s name. As to the 

Department’s efforts in providing services, Father testified that he and the Department had 

“had meetings;” that the Department told him that there were papers he needed to sign; that 

the Department had sent him letters “all about court hearings, meetings;” and, that the 

Department sent him updates on the Children. 

At the close of the hearing, the court issued a written order terminating Father’s 

parental rights and granting the Department the authority to consent to D.A. and C.A.’s 

adoption. In so doing, the court made the following findings:

The Juvenile Court finds after giving primary consideration to the health and 

safety of [D.A. and C.A.] and consideration to each of the relevant statutory 

factors, it is in the best interests of each minor child...to terminate the 

 

4 Father testified through an interpreter. 
9

parental rights of [Father.]... He is not able to provide a safe and healthy 

environment for the children. [Father], has been incarcerated in a federal 

prison since December 2013, and is due to be deported to Mexico upon his 

release in July 2017, nine months from this hearing. He entered the U.S. 

illegally resulting in his incarceration. This is his second incarceration for 

illegal entry, and this second time he was incarcerated for transporting other 

illegal immigrants into the United States. He has not seen his children since 

sometime in 2012.... There has been some contact by telephone, once a 

week approximately these past few months.... The father has not provided 

care for his children in approximately four years. 

[D.A. and C.A.] want to remain in the care of their current foster 

mother who is an adoptive resource. They have adjusted well to their home 

and are in a stable and nurturing environment. 

The father is not in any better circumstance than when the children were 

placed in foster care in July 2014, 26 months ago, or even 11 months prior to 

that date when the mother asked [Mr. R.] to take her five children. 

* * * 

The Court finds that pre-placement services were not offered to the father 

because he was incarcerated in a federal prison in Louisiana beginning in 

December 2013. 

* * * 

The Department was able to locate [Father] at the federal prison and 

discussed with him by telephone the children’s placement into foster care. 

In response to the request of the Department. [Father] provided the names of 

paternal relative residing in Mexico and [a] fictive relative, first name only, 

in the United States. The Department attempted to contact the relative by 

written correspondence, but at least initially, the paternal grandmother was 

not able to be a resource. 

The Court finds that the extent, timeliness, and nature of the services offered 

to [Father] was reasonable given his out of state incarceration during the 

entire time the children were in foster care. The father was included by 

telephone in two Team Decision Making meetings: May 2015 and in 

February 2016.... The Department secured the assistance of interpreters and 

translators to ensure meaningful communication with [Father]. The 

Department sent written documents, service agreements, letters and court 

orders, to [Father] in both English and Spanish. 
10 

* * * 

Because the father was incarcerated...in federal prisons, not to be released 

until July 2017, but to be deported back to Mexico upon his release, any 

further attempts at reunification services to him were prohibitive and futile. 

This Court finds that the Department has fulfilled its obligations under the 

agency service agreements with the parents, but that neither parent met its 

obligations in full under the service agreements. The Department attempted 

to enter into service agreements with the father, who did not return any 

document signed.... Although the father did not return a signed agreement 

to the Department, he did contact the Department by phone to confirm receipt 

of the first service agreement. The Department discussed with him by 

telephone service plans and obligations and court orders. At no time did he 

state to the Department that he did not understand what had been sent or 

explained to him about his children. 

* * * 

The Court finds that the father...is not a resource for his children. He 

indicated in a letter to the Department that his plan was to take the children 

to Mexico once established there. He also stated in both May 2015 and 

February 2016 that he was “going to get” his children, even if it meant his 

entering into the United States again illegally. 

The Court finds that the Department made reasonable efforts to attempt to 

maintain regular contact with the father by phone and mail service.... The 

Department made regular attempts to speak with him and his case manager. 

The Department attempted to arrange a translation service (“Language 

Link”) for the father (who speaks some English but [D.A. and C.A.] have 

some difficulty understanding him, and the foster mother does not speak 

Spanish) to facilitate communication with the children but the prison would 

not permit the service. 

Contact between the father and foster mother, while feasible, has been 

minimal.... The father has been inappropriate. He asked the foster mother 

during one phone call to allow him to live with her when he is released from 

prison. She told him no. 

The Court finds that the father has not contributed financially to a reasonable 

part of the child’s care and support. 
11 

The Court finds that there has not been any evidence presented that the father 

has a disability that renders [him] consistently incapable of caring for the 

children’s immediate and ongoing physical and psychological needs for long 

periods of time. 

This Court finds that additional services would not be likely to bring about a 

lasting adjustment so that the children could be returned to the father within 

an ascertainable time not to exceed 18 months from the date of placement. 

The children have been in care over 26 months. The children have been out 

of the care of the father, for over an estimated four years. 

* * * 

This Court finds that [D.A. and C.A.] have adjusted to their community, 

foster home, and school. The Court further finds that there are no known or 

reasonably foreseeable negative feelings demonstrated by the children 

regarding the severance of the parent-child relationship and that the likely 

impact of the termination of parental rights on each child’s well-being is 

positive. 

* * * 

Recently, the girls started to call themselves by different names.... 

[They] made this decision independently. It is apparent that the girls are 

comfortable in their environment, that they are well cared for, and that they 

have a loving relationship with [Ms. R.] 

* * * 

This Juvenile Court further finds in consideration of In re: 

Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477 (2007) that 

continuation of the parental relationship of the father is not in the best 

interests of the children...due to exceptional circumstances that exist that 

make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best 

interests of the children, [D.A. and C.A.] As discussed infra, the father has 

not seen his children in approximately four years due to being incarcerated 

for a second illegal entry into the United States and will be deported back to 

Mexico in July 2017. 
12 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Our review of the juvenile court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights 

involves three interrelated standards: (1) a clearly erroneous standard, applicable to the 

juvenile court’s factual findings; (2) a de novo standard, applicable to the juvenile court’s 

legal conclusions; and (3) an abuse of discretion standard, applicable to the juvenile court’s 

ultimate decision. In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003). In other words, “when the 

appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [juvenile court] founded upon sound 

legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court’s] 

decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Davis v. 

Davis, 280 Md. 119, 234 (1977). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision 

is “‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the 

fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 

3598, 347 Md. 295, 313 (1997) (quoting North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994)). 

 That said, “our function, in reviewing [the juvenile court’s] findings, is not to 

determine whether, on the evidence, we might have reached a different conclusion.” In re 

Adoption No. 09598 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, 77 Md. App. 511, 

518 (1989). “Rather, it is to decide only whether there was sufficient evidence – by a clear 

and convincing standard – to support [the court’s] determination that it would be in the best 

interest of [the child] to terminate the parental rights of [the parent].” Id. In making that

decision, “we must assume the truth of all the evidence, and of all of the favorable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom, tending to support the factual conclusion of the trial 

court.” Id. (citation omitted). And, “in a case involving termination of parental rights, the 
13 

greatest respect must be accorded the opportunity [the trial court] had to see and hear the 

witnesses and to observe their appearance and demeanor.” In re Adoption/Guardianship 

Nos. 2152A, 2153A, 2154A in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, 100 Md. App. 262, 

270 (1994) (citations and quotations omitted). “Where the best interest of the child is of 

primary importance, ‘the trial court’s determination is accorded great deference, unless it 

is arbitrary or clearly wrong.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

 Father argues that the circuit court erred in granting the Department’s petition and 

terminating his parental rights. This is because “the record fails to establish that retaining 

the parental relationship would be detrimental to the children’s best interests.” He also 

maintains that “the Department did not do enough to provide him with services during his 

incarceration” and that “the services agreements did not meaningfully outline obligations 

for [Father] to complete.” Finally, he avers that, although D.A. and C.A. “may have 

adjusted well with their pre-adoptive family,” the existence of a bond between the Children 

and their foster family “cannot trump the father’s liberty interest in maintaining his parental 

relationship” and “cannot be a dispositive consideration when evaluating whether parental 

rights should be terminated[.]” 

The State counters that the court “properly found that exceptional circumstances 

justified a termination of parental rights based on its review of the factors set forth in § 5-

323(d) of the Family Law Article,” which, according to the State, permits a court to 

“terminate a parental relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests.” The State posits that the Children have a right 
14 

to a stable environment and that the court’s decision “properly promotes the [C]hildren’s 

best interests by providing them with a stable and permanent adoptive home which will 

meet their emotional and physical needs.” 

 The right of a parent to raise his child, “recognized by constitutional principles, 

common law and statute, is so fundamental that it may not be taken away unless clearly 

justified.” In re Adoption Guardianship No. 10941 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 

County, 335 Md. 99, 112 (1994). And, “[w]hen the State initiates a parental rights 

termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, 

but to end it.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). “The consequences of this 

drastic and permanent severing of the strongest and basic natural ties and relationships has 

led the Legislature and this Court to make sure, as far as possible, that adoption shall not 

be granted over parental objection unless that course clearly is justified.” Walker v. 

Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284 (1960). 

Nevertheless, the fundamental right of a parent to raise his child “is not absolute and 

does not exclude other important considerations.” In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705 (2001). 

For instance, “the State of Maryland has an interest in caring for those, such as minors, 

who cannot care for themselves.” Id. In addition, our appellate courts have long held that 

“the best interests of the child may take precedence over the parent’s liberty interest in the 

course of a custody, visitation, or adoption dispute.” Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 219 

(1998). 

In harmonizing these competing interests, the Court of Appeals has recognized “a 

substantive presumption – a presumption of law and fact – that it is in the best interest of 
15 

children to remain in the care and custody of their parents.” In re Adoption/Guardianship 

of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 495 (2007). “That presumption, however, has limits, and the 

right of a parent to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children 

may be taken away where (1) the parent is deemed unfit, or extraordinary circumstances 

exist that would make a continued relationship between parent and child detrimental to the 

child, and (2) the child’s best interests would be served by ending the parental 

relationship.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jasmine D., 217 Md. App. 718, 733 (2014) 

(citation omitted). 

In short, the presumption that it is in a child’s best interests to remain in the care 

and custody of his parent “may be rebutted upon a showing either that the parent is ‘unfit’ 

or that ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist which would make continued custody with the 

parent detrimental to the best interest of the child.” In re Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 495. 

Therefore, “in all cases where the interests of a child are in jeopardy the paramount 

consideration is what will best promote the child’s welfare, a consideration that is of 

‘transcendant importance.’” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561 

(1994) (citation omitted). In other words, “the controlling factor in adoption and custody 

cases is not the natural parent’s interest in raising the child, but rather what best serves the 

interest of the child.” In re No. 10941, 335 Md. at 113; see also In re 

Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 90, 111 (2010)(“[W]hile the parental rights 

are recognized...the child’s best interest standard trumps all other considerations.”) 

(footnote omitted). 
16 

“In determining the child’s best interests, the juvenile court is required to consider 

the statutory factors in [Maryland Code, Family Law] FL § 5-323(d).” In re Jasmine D., 

217 Md. App. at 734. Moreover, “[i]n cases where parental rights are terminated, it is 

important that each factor be addressed specifically not only to demonstrate that all factors 

were considered but also to provide a record for review of this drastic measure.” In re 

Adoption/Guardianship No. 87A262, 323 Md. 12, 19-20 (1991). If, based on these factors, 

the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s best interests are served 

by a termination of parental rights, the court may terminate said rights. In re Jasmine D.,

217 Md. App. at 734. As the Court of Appeals has explained: 

The court’s role in TPR cases is to give the most careful consideration 

to the relevant statutory factors, to make specific findings based on the 

evidence with respect to each of them, and, mindful of the presumption 

favoring a continuation of the parental relationship, determine expressly 

whether those findings suffice either to show an unfitness on the part of the 

parent to remain in a parental relationship with the child or to constitute an 

exceptional circumstance that would make a continuation of the parental 

relationship detrimental to the best interest of the child, and, if so, how. If 

the court does that – articulates its conclusion as to the best interest of the 

child in that manner – the parental rights we have recognized and the 

statutory basis for terminating those rights are in proper and harmonious 

balance. 

In re Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 501 (footnote and emphasis omitted). 

 The primary statutory factor the court must consider before terminating parental 

rights is “the health and safety of the child[.]” FL § 5-323(d). The other factors the court 

must consider are, in relevant part: (1) the nature and timeliness of the services offered by 

the Department to the parent; (2) the extent to which the parent has fulfilled his obligations 

under a social service agreement; (3) the parent’s efforts in adjusting his circumstances, 
17 

condition, or conduct to make it in the child’s best interest to be returned to the parent’s 

care; (4) the extent to which the parent has maintained regular contact with the child, the 

child’s caregiver, and the Department; (5) the parent’s financial contributions to the child’s 

well-being; (6) whether additional services would likely bring about a lasting parental 

adjustment so that the child could be returned to the parent within a reasonable time not to 

exceed 18 months from the date of placement unless the court finds that it would be in the 

child’s best interests to extend the time period; (7) whether the parent has abused or 

neglected the child or another minor and the seriousness of the abuse or neglect; (8) the 

child’s emotional ties with and feelings toward the parent and others who may affect the 

child’s best interests; (9) the child’s adjustment to community, home, placement, and 

school; and (10) the child’s feelings about severing the parent-child relationship and the 

likely impact this severance would have on the child’s well-being. Id. 

 In addition to being mandatory considerations prior to a termination of parental 

rights, the factors outlined in FL § 5-323 also serve “as criteria for determining the kinds 

of exceptional circumstances that would suffice to rebut the presumption favoring a 

continued parental relationship and justify termination of that relationship.” In re Rashawn 

H., 402 Md. at 499. Other criteria relevant to an exceptional circumstances determination 

include: the length of time that the child has been with his adoptive parents; the strength of 

the bond between the child and the adoptive parent; the relative stability of the child’s 

future with the parent; the age of the child at placement; the emotional effect of the adoption 

on the child; the effect on the child’s stability of maintaining the parental relationship; 

whether the parent abandoned or failed to support or visit with the child; and, the behavior 
18 

and character of the parent, including the parent’s stability with regard to employment, 

housing, and compliance with the law. In re No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 562-64. 

Viewing the court’s decision in light of the above legal principles, we hold that the 

juvenile court in the instant case did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s 

parental rights. We are persuaded that the presumption favoring a continued parental 

relationship between Father and the Children was rebutted by clear and convincing 

evidence in the record. 

Father resided in the United States illegally around the time D.A. and C.A. were 

born and was ultimately deported in 2010 following a domestic violence incident involving 

the Children’s Mother. Rather than adjust his circumstances and make legal efforts to 

obtain entry into the United States, Father, by his own admission, made another illegal 

entry into the United States in 2013, this time bringing other individuals with him. That 

resulted in his arrest and eventual incarceration in federal prison, where he remained 

through the date of the hearing on October 11, 2016. 

Thus, for the vast majority of the Children’s lives, Father made little to no effort in 

adjusting his circumstances to make the Children’s living situation better or become more 

involved in the Children’s lives. Although his incarceration made such adjustments 

difficult, that incarceration did not commence until December of 2013, which was at least 

a year after he last saw the Children. During that time, the Children were subjected to 

unacceptable living conditions, neglect, and possible sexual abuse while in the care of their 

Mother. Father, according to the evidence, did nothing to remedy that situation. In fact, 
19 

other than Father’s claim that he last saw the Children in 2012, there is little indication that 

he was even involved in the Children’s lives at any time prior to his incarceration. 

Father maintained minimal contact with the Children during his incarceration, and 

any sort of parental bond was virtually non-existent at the time of the hearing. Not 

surprisingly, the Children expressed no real desire to speak with him or maintain the 

relationship. Other than Father’s insistence that he “loved” the Children, there was no 

indication of any meaningful bond with the Children. On the other hand, the Children had 

developed a strong bond with their foster mother, Melanie R., with whom they had lived 

for over a year. The Children were adjusting extremely well in her care, were safe and 

healthy, and were excited about the prospect of being adopted. While in Ms. R.’s care, the 

Children did well in school, took part in activities, and participated in therapy, which their 

therapist indicated was progressing well. 

Father argues that the record fails to establish how retaining the parent-child 

relationship would be detrimental to the Children’s best interests. We disagree. Not only 

did he show a consistent disregard for the law and a general inability and/or unwillingness 

to provide a safe and stable environment for the Children prior to his incarceration, he also 

showed a general lack of regard for the Children’s best interest during their time in foster 

care. He stated several times that “no matter what” he was “going to get” the Children, 

despite the fact that he had no legal right to do so, and he even expressed a desire to live 

with Ms. R. and the Children following his release from prison, even though neither Ms. 
20 

R. nor the Children suggested that such an arrangement was feasible or desirable.5 Father 

also suggested that the Children could live with his “cousin” in California, even though he 

did not know the cousin’s name or present any indication that this “cousin” was capable of 

caring for the Children. 

 At the time of the hearing, Father was incarcerated and would not be released until 

July of 2017, nine months after the hearing and almost three years after the Children’s date 

of placement. Moreover, Father was to be deported following his release, and there was 

no indication as to when or whether he would be able to come back to the United States to 

care for the Children. Despite his insistence that he planned to reenter the United States 

legally, Father offered no explanation for how he would manage to do so. In fact, Father 

admitted that he might not be able to come back into the country at all. 

Father has taken no discernable steps toward ensuring that he would become more 

active in the Children’s lives or how he planned to care for the Children following his 

release from prison and eventual deportation. Father offered no feasible resources 

available to him in the United States, no explanation of what he would do upon his release 

or how he would manage to reenter the United States, and no evidence that he was capable 

 

5 Appellant argues that the court “clearly erred when it found that [appellant] acted 

inappropriately when he asked the foster mother if he could come live with her after he 

reenters the United States[.]” We disagree, as such a suggestion, under the circumstances, 

was clearly inappropriate. See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inappropriate 

(defining “inappropriate” as “not right or suited for some purpose or situation”). 
21 

of even sustaining a relationship with the Children, much less providing them with a safe 

and healthy environment.6

Meanwhile, both D.A. and C.A. expressed an eagerness to move on with their lives. 

And, after having been subjected to substandard living conditions for three years and then 

shuttled through the foster-care system for the next two, the Children were finally living in 

a stable, supportive, and healthy home with someone who is qualified and willing to adopt 

them. Clearly, any impediment to the Children’s relationship with Ms. R., including 

maintaining a parent-child relationship between the Children and Father, would be 

detrimental to the Children’s best interest. Conversely, severing what little relationship the 

Children and Father have will likely have no negative impact on the Children. 

Father argues that, although the Children may have adjusted well to life with Ms. 

R., that fact cannot trump his liberty interest in maintaining his parental relationship with 

the Children. He also argues that the length of time they were out of his care cannot be 

treated as dispositive. While we agree, generally, with those statements, Father has 

conflated the issues and misrepresented the court’s determination. The court did not 

terminate Father’s parental rights based solely on the Children’s relationship with Ms. R. 

or the amount of time they were in foster care. Rather, these were but two of many factors 

that the court considered in determining that it was in the Children’s best interests to 

terminate their relationship with Father. And, as previously stated, a child’s best interests 

 

6

 Father’s deportation status in this case is one factor in the best interests’ analysis 

because it impacts his ability to care for the Children and to provide them with a safe and 

healthy environment now or in the foreseeable future. But deportation of an undocumented 

parent in and of itself is not a basis for termination of parental rights of otherwise fit parents. 
22 

do trump the parent’s liberty interest in maintaining his relationship with a child. For these 

reasons, Father’s reliance on In re James G., 178 Md. App. 543, 603-04 (2008)(holding 

that the court’s changing of a child’s permanency plan was erroneous because the court 

failed to address the child’s best interest while giving “paramount consideration” to the 

length of time the child was out of the parent’s care); Washington County Dept. of Soc. 

Serv. v. Clark, 296 Md. 190, 197 (1983)(finding unconstitutional a Maryland statute that 

created a legal presumption that termination is in the best interest of the child when the 

child had been in foster care for two or more continuous years); and, In re 

Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D., Jr., 412 Md. 442, 468 (2010)(holding that the court’s 

termination of parental rights was erroneous because “the judge focused primarily on the 

length of time [the children] had been in foster care and the apparent bond that had 

developed between [the foster parent] and the children” while at the same time failing to 

show “how a continued parental relationship would have caused a detriment to the 

children[.]”) is misplaced. 

Father also contends that the Department “did not do enough to provide him with 

services during his incarceration” and that “the services agreements did not meaningfully 

outline obligations for [him] to complete.” Again, we disagree. As the court explained, 

pre-placement services were not offered to Father because he was incarcerated. When the 

Department spoke with Father about possible relative resources, he provided several 

names, all of which were investigated and ruled out by the Department.7 Moreover, any 

 

7 Although appellant’s mother was ultimately identified as a potential resource, she 

died before the hearing. 
23 

provision of services toward reunification would have been futile given that Father was 

incarcerated the entire time the children were in foster care. Nevertheless, the Department 

still provided the following services: including Father, via telephone, in certain meetings; 

securing the assistance of interpreters and translators; sending written documents, service 

agreements, letters, and court orders to Father in both English and Spanish; discussing 

service plans and court orders with Father; maintaining contact with Father by phone and 

mail service; and, making regular attempts to speak with Father and his case manager. The 

fact remains that no amount of services would have alleviated the primary obstacle to 

Father’s ability to care for the children, namely, his incarceration and impending 

deportation. Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the juvenile court’s 

determination that the Department’s provision of services was reasonable was clearly 

erroneous. 

Finally, Father avers that the evidence showed only that he could not take custody 

of the Children immediately, which he claims did not “have a direct bearing on whether 

the parental relationship should remain intact.” On this point, In re Adoption/Guardianship 

No. J970013, 128 Md. App. 242 (1999) is instructive. There, the appellant, James L., 

fathered a child in 1991 while in prison. Id. at 245. At the time of the child’s birth, James 

was serving a sentence of twenty years to life for first-degree murder. Id. at 246. In 1997, 

the Department of Social Services filed a petition to terminate James’ parental rights, and 

a hearing on the petition was held in 1998. Id. at 246-47. The juvenile court ultimately 

ordered James’ parental rights terminated because of his incarceration. Id. The court noted 
24 

that, while James was “coming up for” parole in “a couple of years,” it was possible “that 

he could be in jail for the rest of his natural life.” Id. at 249. 

On appeal, James argued that the court erred in terminating his parental rights based 

on his incarceration.8 Id. at 245. We disagreed, explaining that “[g]iven the appropriate 

set of factual circumstances...incarceration may indeed, under the facts of a particular case, 

be a critical factor in permitting the termination of parental rights, because the incarcerated 

parent cannot provide for the long-term care of the child.” Id. at 252. Applying this 

principle to the facts of that case, we held that the juvenile court “was acting in the best 

interests of [the child] in terminating the parental rights of [James].” Id. at 253. We 

reasoned that such a finding was not clearly erroneous because, had James’ parental rights 

remained intact, the child’s status would be “placed in suspended animation until 2001 or 

even beyond waiting for [James’] potential for parole to be realized, an occurrence that the 

trial court noted may never come to be.” Id. at 253. 

This case presents a similar situation. Despite Father’s claims that he planned to 

legally come back to the United States following his deportation, he recognized that his 

reentry may never happen. Therefore, not only was he unable to take care of the Children 

immediately, or even in the immediate future, there exists the very real possibility that he 

may never be able to enter the United States legally. This distinct possibility is made even 

 

8

 Specifically, James claimed that the juvenile court erred “in finding that [his] 

incarceration was tantamount to a disability thus rendering him incapable of providing 

adequate care for his son[.]” In re No. J970013, 128 Md. App. at 245. Although we agreed 

that the incarceration of a parent does not necessarily constitute a disability, we found no 

support for James’ claim in the record. Id. at 252. 
25 

more probable in light of the fact that Father made no known efforts at securing legal entry 

in the years between the Children’s birth and his incarceration in 2013. As was the case in 

In re No. J970013, maintaining Father’s parental rights under these circumstances would 

have placed the Children’s status in a state of suspended animation until a future date that 

may never occur. We cannot say, therefore, that the trial court was clearly erroneous or 

abused its discretion in finding that terminating Father’s parental rights was in the 

Children’s best interest. See In re No. 10941, 335 Md. at 106(discussing Title 5 of the 

Family Law Article as being based on the premise “that it is in a child’s best interest to be 

placed in a permanent home and to spend as little time as possible in foster care.”). 

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL 

COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO 

BE PAID BY APPELLANT.