Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

JULIA BLACKWELL GELINAS LARRY PLEASANTS

JEFFREY J. MORTIER Indianapolis, Indiana

MAGGIE L. SMITH

Frost Brown Todd LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

FRONTLINE NATIONAL, LLC, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 93A02-1405-EX-308

)

KATHY STEINHAUER, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA WORKER’S COMPENSATION BOARD

Application No. C-201362

November 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Frontline National, LLC (“Frontline”) appeals the Worker’s Compensation 

Board’s (“the Board’s”) denial of Frontline’s Application for Review of the Single 

Hearing Member’s Order that Frontline pay worker’s compensation benefits to Kathy 

Steinhauer. Frontline raises three issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the Board abused its discretion when it denied Frontline’s 

request for the Board to consider evidence that Frontline could have 

but did not produce to the Single Hearing Member.

2. Whether the Board’s decision that Frontline was not prejudiced by a 

purported delay in Steinhauer’s notice to Frontline of her injury is 

clearly erroneous.

3. Whether the Board’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On January 24, 2013, a Single Hearing Member held a fact-finding hearing on 

Steinhauer’s Application for Adjustment of Claim, which she had filed with the Board in 

October of 2009. Following that hearing, the Single Hearing Member entered the 

following findings of fact:

1. [Steinhauer] worked for [Frontline] as a contract LPN at Camp 

Atterbury . . . . [Steinhauer’s] job duties involved the processing of 

military personnel before and after deployment. [Steinhauer] had no in[-

]person contact with anyone at [Frontline], and [she had] only 

communicated with Frontline by email or fax.

2. On August 26, 2009, [Steinhauer] was walking across a gravel lot 

with reams of paper when she stepped into a divot and felt pain in the back 

of her foot. [Steinhauer] went into her building and reported to Staff 

 

1

 We note that the Statement of Facts in Frontline’s brief on appeal is not “in accordance with the 

standard of review appropriate to the judgment or order being appealed.” Ind. Appellate Rule 

46(A)(6)(b). Accordingly, we do not consider it.
3

Sergeant Peter Boyd what had occurred and was told to elevate her foot. 

Boyd also recommended that she see a physician. Boyd was [Steinhauer’s] 

immediate supervisor at the base and he specifically recalled the incident 

and recalled examining her ankle and finding it swollen. Major Mike 

Keller, the officer in charge of medical operations[,] testified that Boyd was 

an honest person. Boyd completed an incident report, but this incident 

report was not produced at [the] hearing[;] Boyd noted that this was not 

surprising based on previous record keeping. Boyd noticed [Steinhauer] 

limping and hobbling after the incident and told her she was unable to 

continue working. Boyd had not previously seen her having trouble 

limping. Although [Steinhauer] has a history of changing her recollection 

of the incident, the support for this incident is based on the credible 

testimony of Staff Sergeant Boyd.

3. [Steinhauer] suffered from pre-existing plantar fasciitis and bilateral 

Achilles tendonitis[,] which was symptomatic for three (3) years. 

[Steinhauer] first saw Dr. Stevens on August 7, 2009, complaining of 

chronic pain in her Achilles tendons and a retrocalcaneal spur[;] at this time 

she was fitted for static ankle-foot orthotics. Dr. Stevens conducted an 

ultrasound at this visit and ruled out any tears to either Achilles tendon.

4. On the date of the incident, [Steinhauer] went to Dr. Stevens’s office 

for a previously scheduled appointment for follow-up on her orthotics. The 

record from Dr. Stevens on this date does not note a work accident; 

however, he testified by deposition that this was because of the form 

template of his medical records and that he was aware of her injury on this 

date and that she presented with severe pain. Additionally, nursing notes 

from August 31, 2009, state that [Steinhauer] injured her left foot at work 

on August 26, 2009, and that she did not have that type of pain before the 

injury[;] therefore, they were sending her for an MRI and physical therapy. 

An MRI taken on September 2, 2009, revealed a tear to the left Achilles 

tendon.

5. On September 9, 2009, [Steinhauer] emailed Jeanne Peddicord at 

Frontline and informed [her] that she had an MRI and that surgery was 

recommended. She specifically stated[,] “I have been tolerating the pain 

about three years and thought it was plantar fasciitis until I had the MRI 

done.” [Steinhauer] claims that she did not reference her fall because she 

believed it had been previously reported by Staff Sergeant Boyd.

6. On September 11, 2009, [Steinhauer] sent an email to [Peddicord] 

and stated that she was walking through gravel, up an incline, and noticed 

the burning sensation.
4

7. [Frontline] denied her claim due to pre-existing issues and late 

reporting.

Appellant’s App. at 7-9. 

The Single Hearing Member then concluded that Steinhauer’s injury occurred in 

the course of and arose out of her employment with Frontline. The Single Hearing 

Member specifically stated that, “[d]espite [Steinhauer’s] credibility issues, the hearing 

member was persuaded by the credible testimony of Staff Sergeant Boyd, an independent 

witness receiving no benefit for his testimony, and the medical opinions of Drs. Stevens 

and Patel,” who had performed Steinhauer’s surgery. Id. at 9-10. The Single Hearing 

Member further concluded that Steinhauer had “notified her immediate supervisor on the 

date of the accident” and Frontline “within 15 days,” and that “there is no prejudice to 

[Frontline]” to support its allegation that Steinhauer had not provided it timely notice. 

The Single Hearing Member then ordered Frontline to pay for Steinhauer’s medical 

treatment and to pay her disability.

Following the January 24 hearing, Frontline informed the Single Hearing Member 

that it had obtained documents that purported to show that Boyd was not working on the 

day of Steinhauer’s injury, and Frontline requested the Single Hearing Member “to 

consider [this] supplemental evidence” in her final decision. Id. at 41. The Single 

Hearing Member refused to consider the purported records, stating that this 

“evidence . . . has been readily available at all times,” and that Steinhauer “would be 

severely prejudiced if this evidence were allowed into the record without giving Sgt. 

Boyd or any of the other witnesses the ability to respond or cross-examine.” Id. at 12. 

Frontline appealed the Single Hearing Member’s decisions to the Board, which likewise
5

refused to consider the supplemental evidence and then adopted and affirmed the Single 

Hearing Member’s findings and conclusions. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Standard of Review

When reviewing the decisions of the Board, we are bound by the factual 

determinations of the Board and may not disturb them unless the evidence is undisputed 

and leads inescapably to a contrary conclusion. Eads v. Perry Twp. Fire Dep’t, 817 

N.E.2d 263, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Additionally, all unfavorable 

evidence must be disregarded in favor of an examination of only that evidence and the 

reasonable inferences therefrom that support the Board’s findings. Id. And we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the witness’s credibility. Id. We review questions of law 

de novo. Prentoski v. Five Star Painting, Inc., 827 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), 

aff’d in part, adopted in part, 837 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2005).

Issue One: Denial of Motion to Consider Supplemental Evidence

We first consider Frontline’s assertion that the Board abused its discretion when it 

refused Frontline’s request that the Board consider supplemental evidence, namely, 

documents that purported to show that Boyd was not at work on the day of Steinhauer’s 

injury. When the Board is reviewing a single hearing member’s determination, the 

decision to deny or allow the introduction of additional evidence is a matter within the 

Board’s sound discretion. Hancock v. Ind. Sch. for the Blind, 651 N.E.2d 342, 343 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. This court will not disturb the Board’s ruling in this regard 

unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
6

The Board did not abuse its discretion when it denied Frontline’s attempt to 

backfill the record. Frontline’s only clear argument to the contrary is that “[t]he 

additional evidence . . . was directly relevant to the issues raised . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 

23. But Frontline does not explain why, in light of that fact, it failed to produce this 

evidence at the fact-finding hearing, when Steinhauer would have had the opportunity to 

examine the evidence and Staff Sergeant Boyd. We reject Frontline’s argument that the 

Board abused its discretion when it denied Frontline’s request.

Issue Two: Notice

Frontline next asserts that the Board’s decision that Frontline was not prejudiced 

by Steinhauer’s alleged late notice of her injury to Frontline was clearly erroneous. 

According to Indiana Code Section 22-3-3-1, an injured employee “as soon as practicable 

after the injury . . . shall give written notice to the employer of such injury,” unless “the 

employer or his representative shall have actual knowledge of the occurrence of an 

injury . . . at the time thereof or shall acquire such knowledge afterward . . . .” Further:

Unless such notice is given or knowledge acquired within thirty (30) days 

from the date of the injury or death, no compensation shall be paid until and 

from the date such notice is given or knowledge obtained. No lack of 

knowledge by the employer or his representative, and no want, failure, 

defect or inaccuracy of the notice shall bar compensation, unless the 

employer shall show that he is prejudiced by such lack of knowledge or by 

such want, failure, defect or inaccuracy of the notice, and then only to the 

extent of such prejudices.

Ind. Code § 22-3-3-1 (2014) (emphasis added).

On appeal, Frontline asserts that it was prejudiced by the purported delay in 

Steinhauer’s notice because it did not have the opportunity to have one of its own doctors

examine Steinhauer’s injury to determine whether her torn Achilles tendon was a pre-
7

existing condition. We cannot agree. First, Frontline had actual notice of Steinhauer’s 

injury the day it occurred because Boyd, Steinhauer’s supervisor, observed her injury that 

day. As such, Frontline knew of Steinhauer’s injury seventeen days before her surgery. 

But Frontline did not use those seventeen days to pursue its own examination of 

Steinhauer’s condition, and neither did Frontline instruct Steinhauer to seek treatment 

from a Frontline-approved doctor. Rather, Frontline simply denied her claim outright 

based on “her pre-existing conditions and late reporting.” Appellant’s App. at 9. 

Its own lack of diligence aside, Frontline’s current argument that it was denied the 

opportunity to discover evidence to show that Steinhauer’s injury was a preexisting 

condition is undermined by Frontline’s original denial of her claim on the basis of her 

preexisting condition. Either Frontline knew of her condition or it needed more evidence 

to assess her condition. Moreover, the Single Hearing Member expressly found that the 

expert testimony and Steinhauer’s medical records supported her claim that the injury to 

her Achilles tendon was not a preexisting condition. Thus, Frontline cannot demonstrate 

that it was prejudiced by the timing of Steinhauer’s notice.

Issue Three: Sufficiency of the Evidence

We lastly consider Frontline’s argument that the Board’s decision is not supported 

by sufficient evidence. Frontline asserts broadly that “[t]he evidence also does not 

support a finding that there ever was a workplace injury.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. But 

Frontline’s entire argument on this issue simply seeks to credit its assessment of the 

evidence over the Board’s, the Single Hearing Member’s, and Steinhauer’s. The Single 

Hearing Member and the Board refused to weigh the evidence in the manner Frontline 
8

desired, and we are in no position to reconsider the weight of the evidence on appeal. 

This argument must fail.2

Conclusion

In sum, we affirm the Board’s decision in all respects.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and MAY, J., concur.

 

2

 Embedded in this argument, Frontline asserts that Steinhauer’s surgery “was to repair both the 

Achilles tendon tear and to repair the pre-existing bone spur issues. [Steinhauer] never presented any 

evidence that the bone spur was related to her workplace injury, yet she seeks worker’s compensation 

payments for the full surgery.” Appellant’s Br. at 19 (emphasis original). These statements are not 

supported by citations to authority or to the record, which, among other things, might have informed this 

court whether Frontline actually challenged the amount of the medical costs claimed by Steinhauer during 

the fact-finding hearing. This court will not comb the record or make an argument for a party. This 

contention concerning Steinhauer’s bone spur is undeveloped, and we do not consider it a freestanding 

argument.