IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2020 WY 132

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2020

October 15, 2020

RYAN SCOTT SIMMONS,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-20-0083

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County

The Honorable Dawnessa A. Snyder, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming Public Defender; Kirk 

A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant 

Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee:

Bridget L. Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 

General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Timothy P. Zintak, 

Assistant Attorney General.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
1

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Ryan Scott Simmons was convicted of three felonies after law enforcement officers 

found methamphetamine in his truck: possession, possession with intent to deliver, and 

conspiracy to deliver. On appeal, Mr. Simmons contends the district court erroneously 

denied his motion to suppress because the initial traffic stop was not justified. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Simmons’ motion to suppress?

FACTS

[¶3] In February 2019, Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation agents gathered 

information indicating Mr. Simmons was selling methamphetamine in Carbon County, 

Wyoming and that his source was in Denver, Colorado. On February 24, agents installed

a GPS tracking device on his truck.1

 On February 27, the tracking device indicated the 

truck traveled from Rawlins to Laramie and then to Denver. On February 28, the tracking 

device indicated the truck was returning to Wyoming. 

[¶4] Suspecting the occupants may be transporting controlled substances, Agent Ford 

contacted Wyoming Highway Patrol Lieutenant Kelly Finn and Trooper Aaron Kirlin and 

briefed them on the investigation. He requested that the troopers conduct “a wall stop” if 

the driver committed a traffic violation in Carbon County. While one trooper conducted 

the traffic stop, another should immediately deploy a canine around the truck’s exterior. 

Trooper Kirlin, a canine handler, passed this information along to Trooper Caleb Hobbs

and they parked their separate patrol cars on the Interstate 80 median in Carbon County to 

watch for the truck. 

[¶5] That afternoon, Troopers Hobbs and Kirlin spotted the truck and observed a crack

in the front windshield. Trooper Hobbs pulled onto the interstate and initiated a traffic 

stop. He identified the driver as Jessica Nadeau and requested she accompany him to his 

patrol car so that he could write her a warning. Mr. Simmons waited in the truck. 

[¶6] Trooper Kirlin arrived shortly after and parked behind the truck. After briefly 

interacting with Trooper Hobbs, Ms. Nadeau, and Mr. Simmons, he retrieved his certified 

drug-detection dog from his patrol car and conducted a free air sniff of the exterior of the 

truck. The dog alerted on the seam between the cab and the bed. On searching the truck, 

officers found approximately one-quarter pound of methamphetamine, a glass pipe with 

methamphetamine residue, two scales, another pipe, a straw with methamphetamine 

residue, and a small amount of marijuana. 

1 The truck was registered to Mr. Simmons’ father. Special Agent Eric Ford had previously observed Mr. 

Simmons driving it. 
2

[¶7] The State charged Mr. Simmons with possession of methamphetamine, possession 

with intent to deliver methamphetamine, conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, and 

possession of marijuana (third or subsequent offense). He pleaded not guilty to those 

offenses. Before trial, Mr. Simmons moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his

truck. He argued, in relevant part, that he “was stopped for a crack on his windshield which 

did not obstruct the view of the road.” He noted the prosecutor had not released “dash cam 

video or body cam video from the stop to dispel the reasonableness of this search.” 

[¶8] The court denied Mr. Simmons’ motion after an evidentiary hearing at which Agent 

Ford, Trooper Hobbs, and Trooper Kirlin testified. The prosecutor introduced a 

photograph of the cracked windshield as well as Trooper Hobbs’ dash cam video. In sum, 

the court decided:

Since Trooper Hobbs witnessed a traffic violation, there was 

proper justification for initiating a traffic stop. Further,

Trooper Kirlin deployed his drug [detection] canine while 

Trooper Hobbs completed the traffic stop and his actions in no 

way extended the duration of the traffic stop, nor did his 

questions of Mr. Simmons exceed the scope of the traffic stop. 

As such, [Mr. Simmons’] Fourth Amendment and Wyoming 

Constitutional rights were not violated.

We address the evidence and the court’s findings in more detail below.

[¶9] At trial, the State dismissed the marijuana charge and the jury found Mr. Simmons 

guilty of the three methamphetamine charges. The court imposed concurrent sentences of

12 to 16 years for (1) possession and possession with intent to deliver, which merged for 

sentencing purposes, and (2) conspiracy to deliver. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶10] In reviewing the district court’s denial of Mr. Simmons’ motion to suppress, we 

view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination and 

defer[] to the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Robinson 

v. State, 2019 WY 125, ¶ 20, 454 P.3d 149, 156 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Jennings v. State, 

2016 WY 69, ¶ 8, 375 P.3d 788, 790 (Wyo. 2016)). We defer to the district court’s factual 

findings because it had “the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness credibility, 

and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions[.]” Id. (quoting Flood v. 

State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 10, 169 P.3d 538, 542 (Wyo. 2007)). “Whether an unreasonable 

search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a question of law 

which we review de novo.” Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 8, 146 P.3d 492, 495 (Wyo. 

2006) (citation omitted); see also Lovato v. State, 2010 WY 38, ¶ 22, 228 P.3d 55, 60 (Wyo. 

2010) (reviewing de novo whether reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop).
3

DISCUSSION

[¶11] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects Mr. Simmons

from unreasonable searches and seizures. There are “three tiers of interaction between law 

enforcement and citizens: consensual encounter[s], investigatory detention[s] and 

arrest[s].” Robinson, ¶ 21, 454 P.3d at 156 (citations omitted). Mr. Simmons’ interaction

with troopers began as a traffic stop, which is an investigatory detention. Id. (citation 

omitted). 

[¶12] The only issue on appeal is whether the initial stop was justified. 

To justify a traffic stop, the trooper must have “reasonable 

suspicion—that is, a particularized and objective basis” to 

suspect the motorist is violating the law. The trooper’s conduct 

is judged by “‘an objective standard which takes into account 

the totality of the circumstances.’” “[W]hile the test is 

objective, the [trooper]’s training, experience, and expertise 

are to be considered as part of the totality of the 

circumstances.”

Id. ¶ 22, 454 P.3d at 156 (citations omitted). “Provided the [trooper] has reasonable 

suspicion to initiate a stop, ‘[the trooper’s] subjective intent to search for drugs does not 

invalidate an otherwise lawful traffic stop.’” Pier v. State, 2019 WY 3, ¶ 18, 432 P.3d 890, 

896 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Fertig, ¶ 14, 146 P.3d at 496); see also Lovato, ¶ 14, 228 P.3d 

at 28.

[¶13] The district court concluded the stop was justified because Trooper Hobbs observed 

a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a). Section 31-5-955(a) (LexisNexis 2019) states 

in relevant part: “No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any . . . crack within the 

front windshield . . . which materially obstructs, obscures or impairs the driver’s clear view 

of the highway[.]” The court reasoned:

Both Trooper Hobbs and Trooper Kirlin testified that they 

observed a cracked windshield on the Tacoma. They saw light 

from the sun glint off the windshield. Also, Trooper Hobbs 

testified that the window had multiple cracks running through 

it including one right down the middle of the windshield and 

such a crack could create impairment due to sun reflection, 

distortion, and damage to windshield wipers. The photograph 

of the windshield clearly shows the cracked windshield 

consistent with the Troopers’ testimony. Further, Ms. Nadeau 

told Trooper Hobbs that the reason for the trip she and Mr. 

Simmons took to Laramie was to try to replace the cracked 

windshield. 
4

Despite the stop of the Tacoma being pretextual due to 

information provided by Agent Ford, Trooper Hobbs based the 

initial traffic stop upon a personally witnessed violation of the 

law. Thus, [Mr. Simmons’] rights under both the Wyoming 

Constitution and the United States Constitution were not 

violated by Trooper Hobb[s’] initial stop.

[¶14] Lovato v. State supports the district court’s ruling. There we affirmed denial of a 

motion to suppress challenging a traffic stop for two violations—a cracked windshield and 

a dark-tinted license plate cover. Lovato, ¶¶ 13–22, 228 P.3d at 58–60. At the motion to 

suppress hearing, Trooper Cheser testified he “could see the sunlight glinting off of a crack 

on the windshield on the upper left side of the windshield,” suggesting a possible violation 

of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a). Id. ¶ 15, 228 P.3d at 59. Mr. Lovato argued to the 

district court and again on appeal that testimony about the crack’s location and size was 

inconsistent. Id. ¶ 16, 228 P.3d at 59. Neither the prosecution nor the defense offered a 

photograph or other evidence to resolve the inconsistencies. Id. We deferred to the district 

court’s finding that “Trooper Cheser observed a crack in the [] sedan’s windshield[,]”

noting it was uncontroverted the crack was there and visible, and we were not convinced 

the district court made a mistake. Id. ¶ 17, 228 P.3d at 59. We concluded Trooper Cheser’s 

observations of the windshield crack and license plate “were sufficient to provide [him]

with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Mr. Lovato.” Id. ¶ 22, 228 P.3d at 60.

[¶15] Mr. Simmons attempts to distinguish Lovato on two grounds: (1) “there was also an 

unreadable license plate” and (2) the trooper’s observations “did not stretch credulity.” We 

address these grounds in turn.

[¶16] That the trooper in Lovato observed Mr. Lovato driving his sedan in violation of 

two statutes, not one, is not a meaningful distinction. Either violation standing alone would 

have supplied the necessary justification to stop Mr. Lovato under the circumstances. See

Allgier v. State, 2015 WY 137, ¶ 20, 358 P.3d 1271, 1277–78 (Wyo. 2015) (“Because we 

have determined that the initial stop was permissible based upon the reasonable suspicion 

that there was a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-210(a), we need not reach the question 

of whether Trooper Tegdesth had a reasonable suspicion that the jeep was in violation of 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a).”). Similarly, one traffic violation was enough here.

[¶17] Mr. Simmons’ assertion that the troopers’ observations “stretch credulity” impugns

the district court’s factual findings. As noted above, we defer to the district court’s factual 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Robinson, ¶ 20, 454 P.3d at 156. “A finding of 

fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court

on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” Dixon v. State, 2019 WY 37, ¶ 24, 438 P.3d 216, 228 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting 

King v. State, 2017 WY 129, ¶ 9, 403 P.3d 1070, 1073 (Wyo. 2017)). We are left with no 

such conviction.
5

[¶18] At the motion to suppress hearing, Trooper Hobbs testified he was not aware of the 

cracked windshield before the stop. When the truck came over the hill, he “noticed a 

reflection on the windshield indicating a cracked windshield[.]” Asked to describe the 

reflection, he responded that a cracked windshield not only causes “bright sunlight glare . 

. . but it will refract and . . . go in an odd direction and be very sharp and crisp.” The crack 

appeared to be in the center of the windshield. The weather at the time was cloudy to the 

west and sunny to the east; vehicles were traveling about 75 miles per hour.

[¶19] Trooper Hobbs also explained why the windshield concerned him. Based on his 

experience driving with a cracked windshield, a crack could “create blind spots with the 

reflection of the sun” and shift a driver’s perception of where objects are located. A crack 

could also damage the windshield wipers, affecting a driver’s “ability to look out and have 

a safe field of view” in inclement weather. Trooper Hobbs believed the windshield crack 

was obstructing the driver’s view, noting his belief that there were two cracks—one vertical 

and one horizontal—creating “more area for blind spots or possible obstruction of the 

driver’s view.” 

[¶20] Trooper Kirlin’s testimony about the windshield corroborated Trooper Hobbs’ 

testimony. He “witnessed a cracked windshield as the vehicle passed [their] stationary 

location” and, based on his observation, he too believed it was obstructing the driver’s 

view. Trooper Hobbs confirmed the cracks visible in a photograph of the windshield, 

which Agent Ford took after the traffic stop, were those he saw as the truck approached 

him. 

[¶21] The evidence before the district court was thus similar to, if not stronger than, the 

evidence before the district court in Lovato. Cf. ¶ 16, 228 P.3d at 59. As in Lovato, we 

conclude the district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous. Deferring to those 

findings, we hold Trooper Hobbs had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck’s driver for 

driving with a “crack within the front windshield . . . which materially obstructs, obscures 

or impairs the driver’s clear view of the highway[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a). 

Contrary to Mr. Simmons suggestion, Trooper Hobbs did not need to “determine . . . that 

the driver’s view was impaired.” He needed “‘reasonable suspicion—that is, a 

particularized and objective basis’ to suspect” the driver’s view was obstructed, obscured, 

or impaired, Robinson, ¶ 22, 454 P.3d at 156, and he had as much under the circumstances 

of this case.

[¶22] Affirmed.