Filed 8/14/14 T.S. v. Super. Ct. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

T.S., Petitioner,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF HUMBOLDT COUNTY, Respondent; HUMBOLDT COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Real Party in Interest. A141965
(Humboldt County Super. Ct. Nos. JV120220-1, JV120220-2, JV120220-3)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 The three children of petitioner T.S. (Fathe r), L.S., then six years old, W.S., four years old, and D.S., two year s old, were the subject of dependency petitions, filed December 26, 2012, alleging Fa ther and the children’s moth er negligently failed to provide them with n ecessary medical care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 2 § 300, subd. (b).) All three children were found to be dependents of the court, and Father was granted visitation
and reunification services. 3 Following a contested 12-month review hearing, the juvenile

1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opi nion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(1), (3).

2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

3 The juvenile court’s rulings with respec t to the children’s mo ther, who left the family, are not at issue in this petition and will not be discussed.2 court entered an order finding that reasonabl e services had been provided, terminating
reunification services to Fath er, and finding by clear and convi ncing evidence that return
of the children to Father would be detrim ental. The court scheduled a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26. On June 29, 2014, Father filed a petition for an extraordinary writ in this court, seeking an order directing the juvenile court to vacate its order te rminating reunification services and scheduling a sec tion 366.26 hearing an d to provide him further reunification services. Father contends the juvenile cour t’s finding of detriment was not supported by substantial evidence, the reunification servic es and visitation provi ded to him were not adequate, and the court shoul d have found extenuating circ umstances allowing additional
time for services. The factual circumstances underlying Fa ther’s claims of e rror are known to the parties and are summarized in the “Oppositio n to Petition for Extraordinary Writ,” filed in this matter on July 16, 2014, by the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (Agency).
A. Detriment At the 12-month hearing, “[a]fter c onsidering the relevant and admissible evidence, the court shall order th e return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court find s, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or phys ical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (f), 1st par.) “A substantial risk of detriment means that ‘returning a child to parental custody represents some da nger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.’ [Citation.] [¶] In evaluating detriment, the juven ile court must consider the extent to which the parent par ticipated in reunification servi ces. [Citations.] The court must also consider the efforts or progress the parent has made toward eliminating the
conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.’ ” ( In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 965–966.) We review a juvenile court’s finding of detriment for substantial evidence. ( In re B.S. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 246, 252.)3 In denying further reun ification services to Father, th e juvenile court noted that for these children, with their serious medical conditions, “being in [Father’s] custody . . . threatens their very existence. ” Although Father was devoted to his children, the court concluded, he was unable or unwilling to provide the care and attention required to prevent deterioration of their health. As th e court found, “[F]athe r has not consistently and regularly contacted and visited the child ren and not made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to [the] child ren’s removal, and has not demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the treatment plan ob jectives or provide for the children’s protection, physical or emo tional well-being and special needs.” These findings are supported by substan tial evidence. Each of the children has a serious health condition; L.S. and D.S. both suffer from cystic fibrosis, while W.S. is at heightened risk of kidney diseas e. They were originally de tained because Father had not monitored their medical condition and not pr ovided necessary care, leading to the hospitalization of L.S. and D. S. Over the course of the proceedings, Father was inconsistent and inattentive in assuming resp onsibility for their medical care, although he appeared to understand its importance. Vi sitation in his home was curtailed both because he could not be trusted to pr ovide consistent care and expose d the children to tobacco and apparently marijuana smoke, despite their compromised respiratory conditions. His attention to the children’s needs did not impr ove significantly over the 12-month course of services, despite the Agency’s efforts, a nd by the end of the peri od his visitation was half-hearted and sporadic. Because Father re fused to recognize the deficiencies in his care, let alone change his behavior, return of the children to his custody would have exposed them to a risk of the same seri ous harm that caused their detention. Father does not really contest the eviden tiary support for the finding of detriment, instead arguing there was no exploration of alternative approaches that would have provided him a better opportunity to demonstrat e his ability to care for the children. We are satisfied that the Agency , over the course of 12 months, provided Father with4 adequate opportunities and assi stance to demonstrate his ab ilities. He proved unwilling
or unable to assume th e necessary responsibility.
B. Reunification Services The purpose of reunification services is to place the parent in a position to gain custody of the child. ( In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4t h 1236, 1244.) The law governing the provision of reunifi cation services was summarized in Tracy J. v. Superior
Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415: “Family reunif ication services play a critical role in dependency proceedings. [Citations.] Reunifi cation services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family. [Citation.] . . . [¶] The ‘adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Agency’ s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.’ [Citation.] To support a finding reasonable services were offered or provided, ‘the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘The standard is not whether the servic es provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal wo rld, but whether the se rvices were reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” ( Id. at pp. 1425–1426.) We revi ew the juvenile court’s finding of reasonableness under the substantial evidence test. ( Amanda H. v. Superior
Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1346.) At the time of the children’s detention, the Agency found Father “overwhelmed with the tasks of providing specialized care for the children.” It attempted to help him organize his life and instructed him in their ca re. In the dispositional report, the Agency prepared a 21-point list of ac tivities designed to improve th e health of the children and put Father in a position to care for them. To allow Father to become familiar with caring for the children, the Ag ency arranged for visitation in hi s home, with transport of children and the equipment needed fo r their care. When it becam e clear Father suffered from mental health conditions that might impair his parenting, the Agency arranged for counseling and assistance in obta ining health insurance. Subs tantial evidence supports a5 conclusion that the Agency id entified the problems leading to the children’s detention and provided services target ed to address those problems. 4 Father contends the Agency did not do enough to address his mental health disabilities, but given Father’s refusal of the offered counseling and his insistence he was capable of providing care, any fu rther efforts in this regard would likely have been futile.
C. Visitation Father criticizes the Agency ’s attempts to organize vi sitation, but the Agency’s efforts were appropriate. Father was allowe d unsupervised overnight visits for a time in an attempt to familiarize hi m with the children’s healthca re needs, but these were
terminated after he failed to provide consistent care for the children and L.S. fell ill. Thereafter, in-home unsupervised visits of shorter duration were permitted until the Agency became concerned abou t the children’s exposure to tobacco and marijuana smoke in the home. The Agency offered to rent an “ozone machine” that apparently
would make Father’s home suitabl e, but he did not follow up with the social worker on the offer. Arrangements were then made for supe rvised visits to occur elsewhere. In the two months prior to the 12-month review hear ing, Father had cancelled “a majority” of
his scheduled visits. A simila r pattern prevailed after the he aring, prior to the court’s decision. Father’s failure to reunify was not the result of the Agency ’s failure to arrange for adequate visitation.
D. Relative Placements Father contends the Agency did not sufficiently explore placement with his relatives. In fact, the Ag ency located family members in California, Kansas, Washington, and Nebraska, but none were able or willing to take the children permanently. In particular, Father suggests the Ag ency should have explored permanent placement with the children’s maternal gra ndmother, his mother-in-law, whom Father

4 In this connection, we gr ant the Agency’s mo tion to augment the record with a letter prepared by an examining phys ician concerning Father’s health.6 had accused at the 12-m onth review hearing of initiating the dependency proceeding to obtain custody. The children were initially placed with the maternal grandmother and stayed with her for several months. The Agen cy vaguely asserted in a subsequent status report that “exigent circumstances” required their removal from her care and deemed her unable to take custody, although she continued to be involved in th e children’s lives. We assume the vagueness in the Agency’s references was intended to protect the privacy of the maternal grandmother. In light of Father’s failure to provide ev idence to refute the Agency’s conclusion, other than that his mo ther-in-law was healthy, the juvenile court could rely without requiring further explana tion on the Agency’s conclusion that custody with her was not appropriate.
E. Extenuating Circumstances Father argues the juvenile court erred in not finding “extenuating circumstances” to justify a further extension of reunifica tion services beyond the 12-month review hearing. Extending services beyond the 12 -month review hearing is “disfavored.” ( Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 845.) Such services “are available only if the juvenile court finds specifically th at the parent has ‘consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child,’ made ‘s ignificant progress’ on the problems that led to removal, and ‘demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide fo r the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.’ ” ( Ibid. ) Father’s brief does not even attempt to ad dress these various factors, and we find substantial evidence to support the juvenile cour t’s conclusion that Father failed to satisfy
them. His visitation with the children was in consistent; he made little or no progress in mastering the skills necessary to maintain their health; and his resistance to cooperating with the Agency and healthcare professiona ls gave little reason for hope things would improve during the following six months. The j uvenile court did not err in declining to provide further reunification services.7 Father’s petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Kowis v

. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) The decision is final in this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule s 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

_ ____________ ____________ Margulies, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Humes, P.J.

_____________ ____________ Dondero, J.