Filed 1/5/23 P. v. Bridges CA2/3

Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THOMAS BRIDGES,

Defendant and Appellant.

B308894

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA240172)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Remanded for 

resentencing.

Kathy R. Moreno, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

In 2004, a jury convicted Thomas Bridges of first degree 

special circumstance murder and robbery, with gang and firearm 

enhancements. In 2020, Bridges petitioned for vacation of his 

murder conviction and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1

section 1172.6.

2

 After appointing counsel for Bridges and 

considering briefing from the parties, the trial court denied the 

petition. We affirmed that order denying the petition. (People v. 

Bridges (Oct. 18, 2021, B308894 [nonpub. opn.].) Bridges 

appealed. Our California Supreme Court granted review and has 

now transferred the matter back to us with the direction to 

vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of People 

v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). Doing so, we conclude 

that remand is required.

BACKGROUND3

I. The offenses, Bridges’s conviction, and original appeal

In 1998, Tiasha Croslin was Bridges’s girlfriend, and they 

were living together. Reginald Howard, Jesse Singleton, Amar 

Mobley, Rollin Denem, Claudell Hatter, and Wardell Joe were all 

members of the 69 East Coast Crips criminal street gang. 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to 

section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

3 We derive the background in part from this Division’s

unpublished opinion in this case, which is in the record, and of 

which we take judicial notice on our own motion. (Evid. Code, 

§§ 451, 459.)
3

Bridges was a member of a related gang, the West Covina 

Neighborhood Crips.

On the morning of November 3, 1998, Bridges, Denem, 

Hatter, Joe, Singleton, Howard, Mobley, and Croslin met at 

Hatter’s house in Los Angeles. Hatter said he needed money to 

get a car out of impound, and the group discussed committing a 

robbery. When the meeting ended, Bridges told Croslin to get 

into a Buick Regal automobile with Hatter, and she did so. 

Hatter drove the Buick to the Big Saver Foods Market near 

Slauson and Compton Avenues in Los Angeles. Croslin 

understood they were going to commit a robbery. Joe drove to the 

market in an Oldsmobile Cutlass and waited outside the market. 

Mobley drove to the market in a Trans-Am automobile and 

parked nearby.

When they arrived at the market, Croslin and Hatter went 

inside and Hatter said, “ ‘This is where we’re going to hit.’ ” 

Croslin and Hatter made a purchase and then left.

Thereafter Bridges, Howard, Denem and Singleton entered 

the market. Denem produced a gun, ordered everyone to get on 

the floor, and fired a shot into the ceiling. Howard and one of the 

other robbers struggled with the security guard, Juan 

Hernandez; Howard shot and killed him. One of the robbers took 

Hernandez’s gun.

Cashier Marissa A. saw Hernandez struggling with the

robbers, and then heard a shot. She ran to the manager’s office, 

but the manager had locked the door before she could enter. 

Bridges then forced her, at gunpoint, to empty the contents of two 

cash registers into a plastic bag.

After the robbery, the entire crime team returned to 

Hatter’s residence. Howard, who appeared jittery and nervous, 
4

paced and repeatedly said, in a scared manner, “ ‘I killed him, I 

killed him.’ ” The robbers argued among themselves, and Bridges 

and Hatter loudly urged Howard to calm down. Bridges 

complained that they would have gotten more if Howard had not 

been “ ‘so trigger happy.’ ” The robbers divided the loot obtained, 

which included money and food stamps. An associate of the 69 

East Coast Crips gang, Leonard Jackson, arrived at Hatter’s 

home just as the robbers returned from the crime scene, and they 

gave him some food stamps obtained in the robbery. When the 

robbers saw television news reports of the robbery, Bridges and 

Denem said the police sketches did not look like them, and 

Denem laughed. Hatter told Singleton to get rid of the Trans 

Am. After the loot was divided, the perpetrators left the house.

Croslin did not learn Hernandez had been killed until she 

saw the news on television that night. When Bridges returned 

home that evening, she confronted him about it. He said, 

“ ‘Howard was tussling with the security guard and shot him.’ ” 

Bridges explained that Howard’s job in the robbery had been to 

distract the security guard while Bridges and Denem or Singleton 

got money from the safe in the store’s office. Bridges said that 

Denem had worn a hat and a curly wig as a disguise. Hatter’s 

role had been to drive along 58th and indicate to the others that 

it was okay to rob the market.

Two days after the robbery Croslin was arrested on a 

federal bank robbery charge, and Jackson was arrested for 

violating parole.

The crime went unsolved for two years until Jackson, who 

was at that point serving a 17-year federal drug term, contacted

the United States Attorney and offered to assist in hopes of 

obtaining a reduction of his term. A detective interviewed 
5

Jackson in March 2001, and he identified the participants in the 

robbery. Several months later, Jackson and Bridges were 

incarcerated together, and Bridges discussed the Big Saver Foods 

crimes. Bridges said Hatter and Croslin entered the store first to 

“ ‘check the move out[.]’ ” Bridges and Denem intended to force 

the manager to open the safe at the back of the store, but the 

manager locked himself inside a room. Bridges heard a shot, 

then ran with Denem to the front of the market and saw that 

Howard and Singleton already had fled. Bridges then took food 

stamps from the cash register. Howard had been armed with 

a .45-caliber handgun.

Market employees identified Singleton, Bridges, and 

Howard as the perpetrators. A man who lived nearby when the 

crimes occurred had observed the three cars parked near the 

market and saw four men go inside. He identified Croslin, 

Hatter, and Joe as the persons he had seen in the Buick Regal 

and the Oldsmobile Cutlass, respectively.

In May 2001, a detective interviewed Croslin, who was in 

federal custody in Connecticut. She admitted her role in the Big 

Saver Foods case and identified the participants. She 

subsequently pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter and 

robbery in exchange for a 12-year prison term and her truthful 

testimony. Both Jackson and Croslin ultimately testified at trial. 

The jury convicted Bridges, along with Denem, Hatter, and 

Joe, of special circumstance first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 

190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and two counts of robbery (§ 211). As to 

the murder and one of the robbery counts, the jury found true a 

gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), as well as the allegation 

that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a 

firearm, proximately causing Hernandez’s death (§ 12022.53,
6

subds. (c), (d), (e)(1)). The court sentenced Bridges to life in 

prison without the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life.

In 2006, a different panel of this Division modified 

Bridges’s sentence but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People 

v. Bridges (Jan. 30, 2006, B176263) [nonpub. opn.].) 

II. Bridges’s 2017 habeas petition

In 2017, after the California Supreme Court’s decisions in 

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. 

Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) —cases that substantially 

narrowed and clarified the class of defendants who are major 

participants who act with reckless indifference to human life 

during a felony—Bridges filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the trial court, apparently asserting the evidence was 

insufficient to support the special circumstance finding because 

he was not a major participant in the robbery who acted with 

reckless indifference to human life, under Banks and Clark. The

trial court considered the factors articulated by Banks and Clark,

and the facts as set forth in this Division’s opinion in codefendant 

Howard’s direct appeal (People v. Howard (June 1, 2007, 

B186175) [nonpub. opn.]) and concluded that Bridges was a major 

participant in the robberies who acted with reckless indifference 

to human life. Accordingly, it denied the petition.

III. The section 1172.6 petition

In July 2020, after passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–

2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), Bridges filed a petition for 

vacation of his murder conviction and resentencing. Using a 

preprinted form, he checked boxes stating that he had been 

convicted of murder pursuant to the felony-murder rule or the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine; he was not the 
7

actual killer; he did not, with the intent to kill, aid and abet the 

actual killer, nor was he a major participant in the offense who 

acted with reckless indifference to human life; the victim was not 

a peace officer; and he could not now be convicted of murder in 

light of changes to section 189 effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. 

He also checked a box requesting that counsel be appointed for 

him. In a five-page document appended to the petition, Bridges 

averred that there was no evidence he had acted with malice 

aforethought. 

In support, he attached this court’s opinion in People v. 

Howard, which discussed evidence that Bridges told Jackson the 

killing was “ ‘messed up’ ” and was not supposed to have 

happened. He also attached the trial court’s 2017 order denying 

his Banks/Clark habeas petition, and the trial court’s order 

denying an earlier habeas petition that had asserted ineffective 

assistance of counsel and instructional error. As relevant here, 

that order observed that Bridges was tried on a felony murder 

theory, not a natural and probable consequences theory.

The trial court appointed counsel for Bridges.

The People filed an opposition to the petition, primarily 

arguing that the jury’s special circumstance finding rendered 

Bridges ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. The People attached 

this Division’s opinion in People v. Bridges, supra, B176263, and 

the trial court’s 2017 order denying the 2017 Banks/Clark 

habeas petition as exhibits. 

Bridges, through counsel, filed a responsive brief, arguing

that the evidence did not show he was a major participant who 

acted with reckless indifference. He claimed he was not actually 

present at the scene, the planned robbery was not supposed to 

involve violence but went awry, the eyewitness identifications of 
8

him were inconsistent, and a special circumstance finding 

rendered before Banks and Clark does not preclude section 

1172.6 relief.

On October 8, 2020, after considering the petition, the 

parties’ briefs, the “entire court file,” and the opinion in People v. 

Bridges, supra, B176263, the trial court denied the section 1172.6

petition. It reasoned: “Among other crimes, petitioner was 

convicted of first degree murder. The sole basis of the murder 

conviction was felony murder as an aider and abettor. A felonymurder special circumstance was found true. In instructing the 

jury, the court instructed re former CALJIC [No.] 8.80.1. The 

language in the instruction was pursuant to Penal Code section 

190.2(c) and (d). Thus, by their finding, the jury found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that petitioner was, at the least, a major 

participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. This has been found sufficient to 

summarily deny a petition under Penal Code section [1172.6]; i.e., 

the petitioner cannot challenge the sufficiency of evidence under 

Penal Code section [1172.6]. [Citations].” “The fact that the case 

was tried prior to [Banks and Clark] does not entitle petitioner to 

relief [citations].” The court cited then-recent authority so 

holding and acknowledged the existence of contrary appellate 

authority. It continued: “Although the court is of the opinion 

that the [former line of authority is] better reasoned, it is noted 

that on March 1, 2017, the court denied petitioner’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus under Banks/Clark grounds. . . . [¶] As a 

matter of law petitioner is not entitled to relief.”

Bridges appealed the order denying his petition, and this 

Division affirmed the order, concluding that the jury’s true 

finding on the special circumstance allegation precluded section 
9

1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (People v. Bridges, supra, 

B308894.)

Thereafter, our California Supreme Court issued Strong, 

supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, which further clarified the scope of section 

1172.6. Specifically, Strong held that a special circumstance 

finding predating Banks and Clark does not preclude eligibility 

for resentencing under section 1172.6. As we now explain and as 

the People concede, remand is now required.

DISCUSSION

Senate Bill 1437, which took effect on January 1, 2019,

limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and 

eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it 

relates to murder, to ensure that a person’s sentence is 

commensurate with his or her individual criminal culpability. 

(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) As relevant 

here, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule by adding 

section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a participant in 

the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for felony murder 

only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual 

killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and 

abettor; or (3) the person was a major participant in the 

underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human 

life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Gentile, at 

p. 842.)

Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6, which created a 

procedure whereby persons convicted of murder under a nowinvalid felony-murder theory may petition for vacation of their 

convictions and resentencing. A defendant is eligible for relief 

under section 1172.6 if the defendant meets three conditions:

(1) the defendant must have been charged with murder under a 
10

theory of felony murder, (2) must have been convicted of first or 

second degree murder, and (3) could no longer be convicted of 

first or second degree murder due to changes to sections 188 and 

189 effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a 

petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, 

the trial court shall issue an order to show cause (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the 

prosecution bears the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted 

murder” under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (d)(3)).

As noted, Bridges’s jury found true the special 

circumstance allegation that the murder was committed during a 

robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) In denying the section 1172.6

petition, the trial court observed that Bridges’s jury had been 

instructed with CALJIC No. 8.80.1, which provides in pertinent 

part: “If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a 

human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the 

defendant was the actual killer or an aider or abettor, you cannot 

find the special circumstance to be true as to that defendant 

unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such 

defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, 

commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor 

in the commission of the murder in the first degree, or with 

reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, 

aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, 

requested, or assisted in the commission of the crime” which 

resulted in the victim’s death.

Bridges has challenged the trial court’s order denying his 

petition on the ground it erred by finding him ineligible for 
11

resentencing based on the jury’s special circumstance findings

that predated Banks and Clark, which, as we have said,

substantially clarified what it means for an aider and abettor

defendant like Bridges to be a major participant in a crime who 

acted with a reckless indifference to human life for the purposes 

of the special circumstance statute, section 190.2, subdivision (d). 

Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pages 719 to 720, held that a preBanks and Clark finding that the defendant was a major 

participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life

during a felony does not preclude the defendant from making a 

prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6, even if the trial 

evidence was sufficient to support the findings under Banks and 

Clark. Strong, at page 720, footnote five, further noted that 

“section 1172.6 relief is not necessarily confined to those who 

might have been able to obtain relief through sufficiency-of-theevidence claims raised on direct appeal or through functionally 

similar claims raised on habeas corpus.” The People accordingly 

concede that the denial of Bridges’s habeas corpus petition does 

not preclude relief and that Strong requires remand.

We agree that, under Strong, Bridges is entitled to 

appointment of counsel and to an evidentiary hearing under 

section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). 
12

DISPOSITION

The order denying Thomas Bridges’s petition is reversed, 

and the matter is remanded with the direction to the trial court 

to appoint counsel for Bridges, to issue an order to show cause, 

and to conduct an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Penal 

Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.