Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II 

No. CV-16-205

PATRICIA GARRETT

APPELLANT

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF 

HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR 

CHILD

APPELLEES 

Opinion Delivered SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE SALINE 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 63JV-2014-312] 

HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED 

DAVID M. GLOVER, Judge

 

By order entered April 7, 2016, our supreme court granted Patricia Garrett’s motion 

for belated appeal, and this appeal from the termination of her parental rights to her 

daughter, K.C. (d.o.b. 8-25-2010), followed. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the termination, and she also contends she was not provided with adequate 

accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when she was denied 

more time to complete services. We affirm.

K.C. was taken into the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services 

(DHS) in July 2014. The trial court found probable cause to continue temporary custody 

following a July 29, 2014 hearing, and then, following an August 25, 2014 adjudication 

hearing, the trial court found the child was dependent-neglected. The trial court expressed 

its concern about Garrett’s drug use and ordered her to cooperate with DHS and undergo 

a psychological evaluation. Garrett’s refusal to submit to DHS drug screens and undergo an 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

2 

intensive outpatient drug-treatment program was a continuing problem throughout the 

case. The goal of the case was changed to termination following a June 22, 2015 

permanency-planning hearing. DHS filed a motion to terminate Garrett’s parental rights on 

July 9, 2015, and the termination hearing was held over two days—September 21, 2015, 

and October 26, 2015. The order terminating Garrett’s parental rights was entered 

November 9, 2015.

At the termination hearing, Dr. Paul DeYoub, a forensic psychologist, testified he 

had evaluated Garrett; she was forthright and cooperative; she had a history of substance 

abuse and major depression; and her test results demonstrated “very significant depression, 

personality problems, substance abuse, difficulty coping, great deal of dependency, feelings 

of inadequacy, history of unstable abusive relationships, multiple hospitalizations for 

depression, major depression, methamphetamine abuse and alcohol abuse throughout her 

adult life.” He explained that for her to be an adequate parent, she would have to completely 

recover from her substance-abuse issues; she would require individual counseling, 

medication management, and ongoing outpatient treatment for substance abuse; and she 

would need to be observed for six months to a year to make sure she was no longer drug 

dependent, no longer needed in-patient mental health treatment, and could avoid abusive 

relationships. He further explained the child had observed Garrett being beaten by the 

child’s father. He stated if Garrett’s only problem were major depression, it could be 

properly managed and she could care for the child, but she also suffered from dependentpersonality issues, substance-abuse problems, and poor relationship choices, which made 

parenting difficult.
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

3 

The trial court asked Garrett’s counsel if she was still refusing DHS drug screens. 

Counsel explained she had submitted to drug screening at the Counseling Clinic and she 

had one test through DHS very early on that was positive and then had refused others

administered by DHS.

Kenneth Arnold, a substance-abuse coordinator and counselor, testified his 

therapeutic relationship with Garrett began on July 13, 2015. He explained she was very 

attentive and participatory in group; she understood the necessary changes she has to make; 

she tested positive for methamphetamine when she first came into the program; she was 

screened every Monday and had received seven tests; and with the exception of the first 

test, the results had been negative. As of the hearing date, she had completed thirty-two 

hours of intensive outpatient treatment. Arnold described Garrett’s drug use as “moderate,” 

explaining that it had been severe in the past to the point she could not function. He stated 

she needed to continue the recovery process, but she had maintained sobriety during the 

three months she had been in the program. He expressed his belief she could maintain 

sobriety. 

Kathleen Armstrong, an adoption specialist for DHS, testified she ran an adoption 

match for K.C. that came back with 162 possible adoptive family placements, and she felt 

she would be highly successful in identifying an appropriate family for the child, despite the 

child’s problems with aggression, self-abuse, temper tantrums, and lying. 

Boyce Barger, the child’s counselor, testified he had been seeing the child since the 

fall of 2014; the behaviors described by the adoption specialist had been treated with 

behavior-modification approaches; and there had been a dramatic reduction in the behavior. 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

4 

He attributed the results to the stability in the foster parents’ home. He said he would 

diagnose the child with adjustment disorder, anxiety, and neglect. He stated the child was 

very attached to her mother, spoke of her with affection, and wanted to live with her. He 

expressed his belief that if the child were moved into an adoptive home, her behaviors 

would restart and need to be addressed again. However, he also stated the child needed to 

be in a home that provided a very well-defined and appropriate structure with predictable 

outcomes and consequences for appropriate and inappropriate behavior; and she would need 

affection. He acknowledged he had not observed Garrett and the child interact, and he 

would not know if the child had an attachment disorder or like disorder with her mother 

unless he was able to observe them interact. Barger explained that there were no hard and 

fast lines where a patient is required to comply with a case plan before beginning family 

therapy; family therapy would be counterproductive when the case seems about to fall apart 

because a child needs permanency; and there was never any discussion with DHS about 

Garrett’s progress and the need for family therapy. 

Craig Jones, Garrett’s licensed certified social worker and outpatient therapist, 

testified that her compliance had been bumpy; that it went from semicompliant to a long 

drought of noncompliance to improved compliance. He stated he began to see improved 

compliance around July 2015, which coincided with her admission into the intensive 

outpatient drug-treatment program. He explained that Garrett completed parenting and 

anger management early on but around January 2015, she became inconsistent with services; 

that she missed her initial intake evaluation for IOP services and then missed several 

counseling appointments; that she missed her psychological evaluation and a psychiatric 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

5 

evaluation; that Garrett had not resumed her medication regimen as of August 30; and that 

he believed it was because she was without funds to pay for the medication (lithium). He 

said he did not recommend an increase in visitation because more progress needed to be 

made. He agreed with Dr. DeYoub’s opinion that she could potentially parent the child if 

she completed long-term drug-and-alcohol treatment and got her medication. He stated 

Garrett had expressed significant doubts about the validity of the drug tests performed by 

DHS; she agreed to take drug tests administered by other people, just not DHS; he believed 

her refusal to take the DHS drug test arose out of a feeling of powerlessness, things out of 

her control, and feeling threatened; and he attributed it to her mental illness, domestic 

violence, and her child being removed. He stated she was beginning to overcome that sense 

of powerlessness; she needed to continue counseling, maintain her sobriety and medication 

and appointments; and he believed she could demonstrate her stability and willingness to 

improve with additional time. He acknowledged there were two or three times over the 

course of the case that medication compliance became an issue; failure to maintain her 

medication regimen could have a profound impact upon her; lithium has a quick washout 

time in the sense that it does not take long to leave a person’s system and reduce its 

effectiveness; her severe depression returned without medication for a period of time; she 

has issues dealing with stress; she is redirectable and can calm down with support; her stressmanagement capacities are somewhat limited; she shuts down and is tearful when stressed; 

there was one point when she stopped coming to see him because she believed that 

reunification was hopeless; she became reinvigorated and was doing what she was supposed 

to do to reunify with her child; some of the missed appointments at the beginning of the 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

6 

year were because of weather issues; and her medication regimen currently did not include 

the use of lithium. He said he believed increased visitation could start somewhere around 

December, and he thought six more months were needed to get to a trial home visit.

Erin Descoteaux, caseworker, testified she was assigned to the case at the end of 

August 2015; she had reviewed the file and ascertained that Garrett’s progress with the case 

plan was as follows: she completed parenting and anger-management classes; she participated 

in a drug-and-alcohol assessment as well as a psychological evaluation; she participated in 

intensive outpatient drug treatment and was still in counseling at the Counseling Clinic; she 

had her own home; she had Social Security income; she attended AA/NA meetings; and 

since the last hearing in September she had taken two drug screens for DHS, both of which 

had been negative. She stated the petition to terminate was filed on July 9, 2015. She 

explained Garrett did not begin intensive outpatient drug treatment until July 13, 2015. She 

stated counseling and outpatient drug treatment were the only two services that were not 

completed prior to the filing of the petition to terminate but that those were the two most 

significant areas of concern. She said Garrett had appropriate housing and had been 

appropriate at visits with the child throughout the case, but she had not paid any child 

support. She stated she was aware Garrett was submitting to drug screens at Counseling 

Clinic and she trusted those test results. She stated Garrett has mental-health issues. She 

acknowledged that DHS is subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act; that Garrett had 

completed most of her services but they needed to see a long period of stability in her 

services, sobriety from all substances, stable mental health, and maintenance of her 

medications and counseling. She explained they had asked Garrett for names of relatives 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

7 

who might be able to take the minor child, and she provided her adult son’s name; there 

were no problems with his background checks, but he lived with her and they did not know 

if he had the means to support the child on his own. She acknowledged the child receives 

Social Security benefits from her mother, and those benefits would be considered when 

assessing whether her brother could financially support her.

 Garrett testified she visits with her child every Friday; she missed one visit because 

she was incarcerated for failing to appear on a shoplifting charge; she was not able to 

consistently participate in services because of transportation issues; she did not realize DHS 

would provide transportation; and she did not want to start services if she could not be 

consistent and did want to rely on other people two and three times a week. She explained 

she refused to take drug screens for DHS because she lost power in every part of her life 

and the one thing she could grasp onto was her resentment of DHS for doing this; it was 

not until she realized her child could be taken away forever that she realized what she was 

doing was wrong; she realizes it was her fault the child was taken into care, not DHS’s; she 

has accepted responsibility, and it has helped her in counseling; she was more than willing 

to move out of her house so that her twenty-one-year-old son could have her daughter 

with him; and if things go well, and she is able to move back in, her son could be her 

support system. She stated her father was helping her son get a truck; she has family support; 

she speaks with her dad every day; and her sister originally took the child but brought her 

back when she got mad at Garrett because Garrett told her she was “going to beat her ass if 

she didn’t quit acting the way she was.” She said she got rides from DHS employees during 

the day, but did not realize they would assist her after hours until she learned of that service 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

8 

at a staffing. She said she provides for herself financially from her disability and by selling 

items on eBay; she might have joked about getting money another way, but she was being 

sarcastic. She acknowledged she had violated the court’s order by refusing to submit to drug 

screens for DHS. She also acknowledged her son was taken from her care as a child; her 

mother had guardianship of him; and she got him back. She stated if the court gave her 

more time to get K.C. back, she would continue to cooperate; she feels she is making 

progress with Craig Jones; she also liked working with Ken Arnold; she has not used drugs 

for a while; and there was a time her services were delayed because Counseling Clinic 

burned and all the records had been lost. 

During closing arguments, Garrett’s counsel commented, “Your honor we did bring 

to your attention the Americans with Disabilities Act. While I agree that we did not make 

a request for reasonable accommodations to the Department, I do not think the Department 

can provide us with the one accommodation my client needs and that is a greater amount 

of time to complete services than the ordinary individual would require. Only you can order 

that accommodation and that is what we are requesting.” 

For her first point of appeal, Garrett contends the trial court erred in granting the 

petition to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.

The trial court terminated the rights of both parents. This appeal involves only the 

mother. In pertinent part, the trial court found the following statutory grounds had been 

proved: 1) that the child had been adjudicated dependent-neglected and continued out of 

the parent’s custody for twelve months, and despite meaningful efforts by DHS to 

rehabilitate and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions had not yet 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

9 

been remedied by the parent; 2) that the child had lived outside the parent’s home for a 

period of twelve months, and the parent willfully failed to provide significant material 

support in accordance with the parent’s means; and 3) that other factors and issues arose 

subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate 

that placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent was contrary to the juvenile’s 

health, safety, and welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent 

had manifested the incapacity and indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or 

rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances that prevented placement of the juvenile in the 

parent’s custody. In addition, the trial court found that termination was in the child’s best 

interest, considering the likelihood the juvenile would be adopted and the potential harm 

to the health and safety of the juvenile caused by returning her to the parent’s custody.

Our review of cases involving the termination of parental rights is de novo. Harbin 

v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 715, 451 S.W.3d 231. A trial court’s 

termination of parental rights must be based on factual findings proven by clear and 

convincing evidence. Basham v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 232, 490 

S.W.3d 330. We will not reverse a trial court’s ruling as to termination unless it is clearly 

erroneous. Id. In order to terminate parental rights under Arkansas law, a trial court must 

find that at least one statutory ground for termination has been established and that 

termination would be in the child’s best interest. Id. In determining the best interest of the 

child, the court must take into consideration the likelihood of adoption and the potential 

harm to the health and safety of the child that would be caused by return to custody of the 

parent. Id.; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) (Repl. 2015). Credibility determinations 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

10

are left to the fact-finder. Harbin, supra. Only one statutory ground is necessary to terminate 

parental rights. Vail v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 150, 486 S.W.3d 

229.

Here, the trial court found as one statutory ground that K.C. had been adjudicated 

dependent-neglected and continued out of Garrett’s custody for twelve months, and despite 

meaningful efforts by DHS to rehabilitate and correct the conditions that caused removal, 

those conditions had not yet been remedied by the parent. Another ground the trial court 

found was that other factors and issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition 

for dependency-neglect that demonstrated placement of the juvenile in the custody of the 

parent was contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, and welfare and that, despite the offer of 

appropriate family services, the parent had manifested the incapacity and indifference to 

remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances that 

prevented placement of the juvenile in the parent’s custody. 

We are not left with a definite and firm conviction the trial court made a mistake 

with respect to either ground. As previously mentioned, proof of only one ground is 

sufficient to terminate, making it unnecessary to discuss the remaining ground found by the 

trial court involving lack of material support. As noted by the trial court in its order, K.C. 

was removed from Garrett on July 25, 2014; Garrett tested positive in her first court-ordered 

drug screen, and then refused to participate in the remaining DHS drug screens ordered by 

the court; she did not participate in DHS drug screening until October 2015, which even 

though it was negative, was performed after the petition to terminate had been filed; drug 

screens that are refused are deemed to be positive; Garrett’s therapist, Craig Jones, testified 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

11

he could not recommend increased supervised visitation until he had seen months of 

progress; and Dr. DeYoub opined that Garrett’s treatment needed to continue for a 

minimum of six months and as long as a year to prove she was stable, compliant with mentalhealth treatment, and not relapsing into substance abuse. The court found it unreasonable 

to have the child wait another six months to a year to see if Garrett was able to maintain 

her sobriety and her mental health. The trial court further found that at the time the child 

was removed, a hair-follicle test was positive for methamphetamine; that Garrett also tested 

positive for methamphetamine; that Garrett had refused the random DHS drug testing; that 

she only began outpatient drug treatment after the termination petition had been filed; that 

during the period from January 2015 to mid-July 2015, she participated in no drug treatment 

or NA/AA meetings, and only recently began complying with the medication-management 

regimen outlined by her psychiatrist; that K.C.’s behavioral issues were related to the neglect 

she suffered from the mother; that K.C.’s behavior had improved dramatically with 

appropriate behavior modification and stability received in foster care; and that no familytherapy sessions were undertaken because it would be counterproductive to do so when 

Garrett was not participating in the case plan and the case was about to fall apart, as explained 

by Mr. Barger. The trial court determined that Garrett’s lack of participation in services and 

consistent treatment indicated her incapacity or indifference to remedying the factors that 

prevented K.C.’s placement with her. 

With respect to the trial court’s finding that it was in the child’s best interest to 

terminate Garrett’s rights, the trial court noted Cathleen Armstrong testified 162 families 

were interested in adopting a child with similar characteristics, and Armstrong anticipated 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

12

being highly successful in finding a match between the child and an adoptive family. The 

trial court further relied upon the testimony of Descoteaux and Dr. DeYoub in 

demonstrating that the child would be at risk of potential harm if she were returned to 

Garrett. Again, we are not left with the conviction that the trial court made a mistake.

The intent of our termination statute is to provide permanency in a minor child’s life 

in circumstances where returning the child to the family home is contrary to the child’s 

health, safety, or welfare, and where the evidence demonstrates that the return cannot be 

accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Harbin, 

supra; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). The child’s need for permanency and stability may 

override the parent’s request for additional time to improve the parent’s circumstances. Id. 

The issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for the child. 

Id. The court may consider the parent’s past behavior, and even full compliance with the 

case plan is not determinative. Id. 

Garrett appears to have finally realized the seriousness of the case when the goal was 

changed to termination—July 2015. While from that point forward she seems to have 

applied herself to remedying her substance abuse and mental-health issues, her eleventh hour 

efforts were simply too late. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. 

App. 401, 439 S.W.3d 65. There was testimony from Dr. DeYoub that another six months 

to a year would be necessary to make sure she was no longer drug-dependent, could stay 

out of mental hospitals, and could avoid abusive relationships. The trial court was justified 

in balancing all of those factors against the child’s need for stability and permanence. Garrett 

has not convinced us that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights. 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 401

13

For her remaining point of appeal, Garrett contends the trial court failed to provide 

an adequate accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act when it refused to 

allow her more time to complete services. We do not address the issue because it was not 

preserved for our review. As demonstrated earlier in this opinion, Garrett never properly 

developed this ADA argument before the trial court nor did she receive a ruling on the 

issue. She is therefore prevented from raising it on appeal. Woodall v. State, 2011 Ark. 22, 

376 S.W.3d 408.

 Affirmed. 

HARRISON and VAUGHT, JJ., agree. 

Wallace, Martin, Duke and Russell, PLLC, by: Valerie L. Goudie, for appellant. 

Jerald A. Sharum, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor child.