SUPERIOR COURT

of the

STATE OF DELAWARE

Jeffrey J Clark Kent County Courthouse

Resident Judge 38 The Green

Dover, DE 19901

 Telephone (302)735-2111

Mrs. Tammy Yost Mr. Edward J. Fornias, III, Esquire

382 Stevenson Drive Law Office of EJ Fornias, P.A.

Magnolia, DE 19965 615 W. 18th Street, Lower Level

 Wilmington, DE 19802

 

 Submitted: March 23, 2023

 Decision: May 1, 2023

RE: Weber v. Brown, et al., 

C.A. No. K22J-00403 JJC

Dear Ms. Yost and Mr. Fornias:

Ms. Yost serves as the administratrix of her mother’s estate and is also a

beneficiary of the Estate. In the latter capacity, she seeks reconsideration of a 

commissioner’s order declining to stay a sheriff’s sale of the Estate’s real property.1 

This letter explains why the Court cannot revisit the validity of a Superior 

Court judgment from New Castle County that is filed in Kent County for the purpose 

1 Ms. Yost filed her pro se response and motion for reconsideration in her capacity as 

administratrix of her mother’s estate. The Estate, however, remains unrepresented because no 

attorney has entered an appearance for it. Nevertheless, the Court interprets Ms. Yost’s filings to 

be made in her alternative capacity as a beneficiary and considers the substance of her arguments.
2

of execution. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner committed no 

error when she declined to stay a sheriff’s sale because Ms. Yost cannot collaterally 

attack the New Castle County judgment in this Court. She, the other beneficiaries, 

and the Estate had a full and fair opportunity to challenge the judgment against the 

Estate in New Castle County and were unsuccessful. Accordingly, this Court cannot 

vacate that judgment and will not stay the sale. 

Background

The Superior Court, in New Castle County, entered a default judgment in a 

tort matter in favor of Christine and Michael Weber in February 2020.

2

 Thereafter, 

the presiding judge in New Castle County referred the proceedings to a 

commissioner for an inquisition on damages. A Superior Court commissioner in 

New Castle County then held an inquisition hearing and awarded the Webers 

approximately $440,000 against Defendants Mary Brown and Gregory Scott.

3

 

After obtaining the New Castle judgment, the Webers filed a writ of testatum 

fi fa in Kent County to index the judgment in order to schedule a sheriff’s sale of 

Ms. Brown’s Harrington real estate.

4

 The Kent County Sheriff scheduled the sale 

in the fall of 2022. In the meantime, Ms. Brown passed away and Mr. Scott (also a 

potential beneficiary of the Estate) filed an emergency motion in Kent County to 

stay the sale.5 At an emergency hearing, the Court explained to Mr. Scott that he 

could not challenge the judgment’s validity in Kent County; rather, the Court told 

2 Weber v. Brown, C.A. No. N19C-10-034 (Del. Super. Feb. 19, 2020) (ORDER) [hereinafter “NC 

D.I.” at 9]. Because the procedural background arises from two separate cases – (1) the underlying 

tort case in New Castle County, and (2) the New Castle judgment indexed in Kent County – the 

Court will refer to the corresponding docket entries with the designation of either “NC D.I.” or 

“KC D.I.” 

3 NC D.I. 18.

4 KC D.I. 1.

5 KC D.I. 14.
3

him that he could only raise such a challenge with the original judge in the Superior 

Court in New Castle County.6 

At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Scott represented that he would file an 

appropriate motion in New Castle County. As an accommodation, the Webers

voluntarily stayed the sale to permit the Estate and the beneficiaries the time to do 

so.7 

Mr. Scott and Ms. Yost then moved to vacate the default judgments in New

Castle County alleging insufficient service of process.8 At a hearing that followed, 

the commissioner vacated the default judgment against Mr. Scott but declined to 

vacate the judgment against Ms. Brown.9 As to the latter, her order provided that 

the “judgment against Mary Brown and her estate will remain firmly in place.”10 

She further held that the Webers “may continue to execute on the default judgment 

against Mary Brown and her estate.”11

Neither Mr. Scott nor Ms. Yost requested that a judge reconsider the 

commissioner’s decision within ten days as required by Court rule.12 In fact, Ms. 

Yost took no action over the next thirty days. Thereafter, the Webers reinitiated 

their efforts to execute in Kent County by filing a motion to do so.

13

 Ms. Yost 

opposed the motion by again collaterally attacking the New Castle County 

judgment.

14

6 KC D.I. 17, at 8–10. 

7 K.C. D.I. 18.

8 NC D.I. 24.

9 NC D.I. 29.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 132(a)(4)(ii) (requiring a party to move to reconsider a commissioner’s 

decision within ten days or to accept the commissioner’s order as final).

13 KC D.I. 21.

14 KC D.I. 22
4

Next, on March 2, 2023, a Kent County Commissioner held a hearing on the 

Weber’s motion to permit a sale.15 When doing so, she refused to collaterally vacate 

the judgment because the New Castle County docket demonstrated that the Webers 

had personally served Defendant Mary Brown at her place of residence.16 Namely, 

the Kent County sheriff’s return, uploaded on the New Castle County docket,

satisfied her that the Webers validly served Ms. Brown.17 

After the Commissioner issued her order, Ms. Yost filed the present motion 

for reconsideration.18 In it, she contends that the sheriff did not serve her late mother 

as the deputy represented in the return.19 She also submits an affidavit executed by 

Antaneek Jackson. In that affidavit, Ms. Jackson explains that she accepted service 

of the summons and complaint while living at the same residence occupied by Ms. 

Brown, her aunt.

20

 Ms. Jackson further contends that she “completely forgot about 

the summon[s] and complaint” and neglected to give it to Ms. Brown.21 When 

accepting everything in her affidavit as true, it establishes that: (1) Ms. Jackson was 

an adult, (2) she resided in Ms. Brown’s home at the time of service, and (3) she 

accepted service of process. 

Standard

Ms. Yost labels her filing an appeal. The Court, however, considers it to be 

a motion for reconsideration of a commissioner’s order. Here, the Commissioner 

issued an order in a non case-dispositive matter as contemplated by Superior Court 

15 KC D.I. 32.

16 NC D.I. 3.

17 Id.

18 KC D.I. 34.

19 Id. ¶ 29.

20 KC D.I. 34, Ex. B ¶¶ 2–3. 

21 Id. ¶ 8.
5

Civil Rule 132(a)(3). Accordingly, when considering Ms. Yost’s challenge to the 

Commissioner’s decision, the Court must apply the standard set by that rule. 

Namely, a judge may reconsider her decision only if the record demonstrates that 

the decision was based upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, was contrary to law, 

or was an abuse of discretion.22 Otherwise, the decision must stand. As a final 

note, there is no automatic stay of a commissioner’s order under Rule 132(a)(3) 

while the judge reviews the motion.

23

 

Discussion

The Commissioner did not base her decision on erroneous factual findings, 

decide the matter contrary to law, or abuse her discretion. In fact, even were the 

Court to employ a de novo review of her decision, it fell where the law requires. 

Ms. Yost, who identifies herself as administratrix for the Estate, asks this 

Court to (1) vacate a judgment issued in New Castle County against the Estate, and 

thereby (2) prevent execution of that judgment in Kent County.24 At the outset, the 

Webers had the statutory right to file their judgment in Kent County, and acquired 

the right to execute upon real estate located in Kent County when doing so.

25

 The 

Court informed Mr. Scott last fall, during the first motion to stay, that he would have 

to return to New Castle County to pursue any efforts to vacate the judgment against 

him and his mother.26 Mr. Scott and Ms. Yost attempted to vacate the judgment but 

a New Castle County commissioner ruled against them. That order became final 

22 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 132(a)(3)(iv).

23 Id.

24 NC D.I. 34 ¶ 29.

25 10 Del. C. § 2304(b).

26 KC D.I. 17 at 8. Although the Delaware Superior Court is a unified, state-wide Court, there is 

no reason to treat a judgment transferred from another county under 10 Del. C. § 2304(b)

differently than the Court would treat a transferred judgment from another jurisdiction or another 

State court. 
6

when Ms. Yost and Mr. Scott declined to appeal the decision within ten days as 

required by rule. 

On balance, two legal principles support the Commissioner’s decision to not 

stay the Kent County sale scheduled for later this month. First, the doctrine of issue 

preclusion prevents the Court from reconsidering a final order that already resolved 

Ms. Yost’s challenges to the Weber’s judgment.27 Although Mr. Scott succeeded in 

vacating the default against him, he, Ms. Yost, and others did not convince the 

commissioner in New Castle County to vacate the judgment against Ms. Brown’s

Estate. For that reason, the Commissioner in Kent County did not err when she 

refused to revisit the issue. 

A second legal tenet also supports the Commissioner’s decision. Namely, a 

valid judgment from another jurisdiction or venue, once transferred (or in this case 

indexed), cannot be collaterally attacked.28 In other words, a court has no power to 

invalidate the judgment of another jurisdiction or venue upon transfer of that 

judgment. At most, the Court may exercise its limited equitable authority to stay 

execution to permit an aggrieved party to return to the issuing jurisdiction or venue

to challenge it. Here, the Court entertained the same motion last fall and the Webers 

voluntarily provided Ms. Yost and Mr. Scott the ability to do so. This Court cannot 

revisit that final judgment or entertain a collateral attack against it. 

27 Garvin v. Booth, 2019 WL 3017419, at *5 (Del. Super. Jul. 10, 2019) (citations omitted).

28 See Worthington Homeowners Ass’n v. Couch, 2022 WL 333283, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 4, 

2022) (explaining in the different, though analogous context of a judgment transferred from the 

Justice of the Peace Court to Superior Court, that only the originating court has jurisdiction to 

consider post-judgment proceedings); see also 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 693 (2023) (explaining that 

a party may not collaterally attack a final judgment by challenging it in a jurisdiction other than 

the jurisdiction that entered the judgment).
7

Conclusion

 For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Ms. Yost’s motion to 

reconsider the Commissioner’s order. The Commissioner did not err by declining 

to stay the sheriff’s sale. The sale may proceed as scheduled. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours, 

/s/ Jeffrey J Clark 

 Resident Judge

JJC:klc

Via File & ServeXpress 

U.S. Mail to Defendant Tammy Yost