J. S40005/15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

WILLIAM GEORGE THOMPSON A/K/A 

WILLIAM THOMPSON, 

:

:

No. 467 WDA 2014 

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, January 17, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0002610-2002 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2015 

 William George Thompson appeals, pro se, from the order of 

January 17, 2014, dismissing his PCRA1 petition without a hearing on the 

basis of untimeliness. After careful review, we affirm. 

 The PCRA court has summarized the procedural history2 of this matter 

as follows: 

 On September 16, 2005, [appellant] was 

convicted by a jury of three counts of criminal 

homicide, one count of aggravated assault, five 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

2

 The underlying facts of this matter, which are extensive, are not germane 

to the instant PCRA appeal; therefore, they have been omitted. The facts 

are set forth at length in the trial court’s opinion of January 15, 2010, pages 

8-28. 
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counts of recklessly endangering another person, 

one count of possession of a firearm without a 

license and one count of criminal conspiracy. On 

December 12, 2005, [appellant] was sentenced to 

three consecutive life sentences to be followed [by] a 

sentence of ten to twenty years for his conviction of 

aggravated assault; five sentences of one to two 

years for his convictions of recklessly endangering

another person which were to run consecutive to his

other sentences; another consecutive sentence of 

three and one-half to seven years for his conviction 

of possession of a firearm without a license; and a

final sentence of ten to twenty years for his 

conviction of criminal conspiracy. [Appellant] filed 

an appeal to the Superior Court and this Court filed 

an eighty-six page Opinion resolving the claims of 

error asserted by [appellant] and his co-defendant in 

their respective appeals. On February 22, 2012, the 

Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence 

imposed upon him based on this Court’s Opinion filed 

on January 1[5], 2010. [Appellant] filed the instant 

petition for post-conviction relief on May 13, 2013, 

which was more than one year after his judgment of 

sentence had become final. 

PCRA court opinion, 1/22/15 at 2-3. 

 As stated above, this court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence 

on February 22, 2012. Commonwealth v. Thompson, No. 378 WDA 2006 

unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super. filed February 22, 2012). Appellant 

did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court. On May 13, 2013, appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, requesting 

that his right to file a petition for allowance of appeal be reinstated 

nunc pro tunc. According to appellant, his trial attorney, 

Patrick Nightingale, Esq., failed to file a requested petition for allowance of 

appeal. Charles R. Pass, III, Esq., was appointed to represent appellant for 
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PCRA purposes. On August 29, 2013, Attorney Pass filed a petition for leave 

to withdraw and accompanying Turner/Finley “no merit” brief.3 On 

September 6, 2013, the PCRA court issued Rule 9074 notice of its intention 

to dismiss appellant’s petition without a hearing and granted Attorney Pass 

permission to withdraw. Appellant was given 30 days in which to file a 

response. 

 On September 12, 2013, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction 

DNA testing, alleging that DNA testing on a pair of black Nike sneakers 

introduced at trial would establish that they were not his, thereby 

exonerating him. On October 7, 2013, appellant filed a pro se response to 

Rule 907 notice. On January 17, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed appellant’s 

petition for post-conviction relief. On February 18, 2014, appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal.5 Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b), 

42 Pa.C.S.A., and the PCRA court has filed an opinion. 

 

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). 

4

 Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 907, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

5

 Monday, February 17, 2014, was Presidents’ Day, a legal holiday. 

Therefore, appellant’s notice of appeal had to be filed by Tuesday, 

February 18, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal shall be filed 

within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken); 

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (excluding weekends and holidays from the computation 

of time when the last day of the time period falls on a weekend or holiday). 

Appellant’s appeal notice was not docketed until February 25, 2014. (Docket 

#161.) However, in response to a rule to show cause issued by this court, 

appellant stated that he placed his notice of appeal in the prison’s outgoing 

mailbox on February 14, 2014. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 
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 Appellant has raised the following issue for this court’s review: 

Whether the court erred by denying PCRA Petition 

alleging counsel is ineffective for failing to file an 

ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL to the Supreme Court after 

Superior Court affirmed lower Court’s decision. Then 

5 to 6 months before the dead-line (3/26/13), 

counselor forwards defendant a letter stating that he 

no longer represents him, file a PCRA Petition, and

claim ineffective assistance of counsel. As pro se

appellant state[s], the facts will be discussed in this 

matter to prove a deliberate indifference by the 

PCRA Court which prejudiced appellant in not being 

heard. 

Appellant’s brief at 4. 

Appellant’s petition was filed after the effective date 

of the 1995 amendments to the PCRA; therefore, the 

jurisdictional time limits established by those 

amendments govern this case. Commonwealth v. 

Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 217-18 (1999). A 

PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, 

must be filed within one year of the date the 

petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, 

unless he pleads and proves one of the three 

exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1).[Footnote 2] Commonwealth v. 

Howard, 567 Pa. 481, 788 A.2d 351, 354 (2002). A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct 

review by this Court or the United States Supreme 

Court, or at the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Howard, at 

353. The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are 

jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not address the 

merits of the issues raised if the petition was not

timely filed. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 574 

 

423, 426 (Pa. 1997) (an appeal by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the 

date the prisoner deposits the appeal with prison authorities and/or places it 

in the prison mailbox). We also note that the envelope in which appellant’s 

notice of appeal was mailed bears a postmark of February 18, 2014. 

Therefore, we consider the appeal to be timely filed. 
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Pa. 724, 833 A.2d 719, 723-24 (2003); 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 

201, 203 (2000). The timeliness requirements apply

to all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature of the 

individual claims raised therein. Murray, at 203. 

The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the 

burden of proving an untimely petition fits within one 

of the three exceptions. See Commonwealth v. 

Bronshtein, 561 Pa. 611, 752 A.2d 868, 871 (2002) 

(“[I]t is the petitioner’s burden to plead and prove 

that one of the exceptions applies [.]”). The PCRA

further requires a petition invoking one of these 

exceptions to “be filed within 60 days of the date the 

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(2). On appeal from the denial of PCRA 

relief, this Court decides “whether the findings of the 

PCRA court are supported by the record and free of 

legal error.” Abu-Jamal, at 723. 

[Footnote 2] These exceptions are: 

“(i) the failure to raise the claim 

previously was the result of interference 

by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States; (ii) the facts 

upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not 

have been ascertained by the exercise of 

due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is 

a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United 

States or the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been 

held by that court to apply retroactively.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012). 

 Instantly, appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on Friday, 

March 23, 2012, when the time for filing a direct appeal expired. See 
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Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50, 54 (Pa.Super. 2000) 

(appellant’s judgment of sentence became final after the expiration of the 

30-day period in which appellant was allowed to seek further review in our 

supreme court); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, appellant had until 

March 23, 2013, to file a timely PCRA petition. Appellant’s petition, filed 

May 13, 2013, is untimely. 

 Appellant does not plead any exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional 

one-year time bar. Appellant alleges that he suffers from a learning 

disability and his jailhouse lawyer was sent to the restricted housing unit 

(“RHU”) for an infraction. (Appellant’s brief at 7.) However, it is well settled 

that there is no generalized equitable exception to the PCRA’s time 

requirements. Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 2008). 

Furthermore, appellant knew an allocatur petition had not been filed on his 

behalf at least as early as November 9, 2012, when he filed a “petition for 

relief” with this court alleging that: 

4. Court appointed counsel was requested by this 

petitioner to file a notice for allowance of 

appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on 

2-24-12. 

5. Court appointed counsel did NOT file the notice 

for appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

as requested as requested [sic] by this 

petitioner. 

See Turner/Finley letter, 8/29/13, appendix at A36 (emphasis in original). 

Appellant’s petition was denied as there was no appeal pending before this 
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court and we lacked jurisdiction. (Id. at A41.) Therefore, appellant knew 

several months prior to the PCRA filing deadline that trial counsel failed to 

file the requested petition for allowance of appeal. Yet, he waited until May 

2013 to file a post-conviction petition alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

Cf. Commonwealth v. Williamson, 21 A.3d 236, 242 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(counsel’s failure to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal could be 

considered a newly-discovered fact for purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), 

but a petitioner invoking Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) must still comply with 

Section 9545(b)(2) by presenting the claim within 60 days of discovering the 

new fact), discussing Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 

2007) (counsel’s failure to perfect appellant’s appeal constituted 

abandonment by counsel and could serve as a newly discovered fact for 

purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)). As appellant’s petition was untimely, 

the PCRA court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider it, 

as does this court. Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398 

(Pa.Super. 2002) (PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear an untimely 

petition); Bennett, supra (PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction 

and may not be altered or disregarded to address the merits of the petition); 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1294 (Pa.Super. 2002) 

(Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of an appeal from an 

untimely PCRA petition). 
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 Turning briefly to appellant’s petition for DNA testing, it appears that 

the petition is still pending in the court below. From our review of the 

record, the PCRA court has not disposed of appellant’s post-conviction 

petition for DNA testing filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1. Therefore, 

we will not address appellant’s arguments in this regard. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/21/2015