IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SANDRA R., SERGIO C., Appellants, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.R., F.M., J.M., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0147 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD20586 

 JS19097 

The Honorable Alison Bachus, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant Sandra R.

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa

By H. Clark Jones

Counsel for Appellant Sergio C.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn L. Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 1-29-2019
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

2 

OPINION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Sandra R. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights to her three children: M.R., born in 2008; F.M., born in 2015; and J.M., 

born in 2017. Sergio C. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his rights to 

their two children in common, F.M. and J.M.1 We affirm the termination 

orders and hold: (1) the court committed harmless error by allowing the

Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) to introduce statements from scientific 

articles without meeting the foundation requirements of Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 803(18); (2) sufficient evidence supports the abuse finding related 

to the shaken-baby injury (nonaccidental trauma) even though the evidence 

did not prove which parent abused the child; and (3) under Alma S. v. DCS, 

245 Ariz. 146 (2018), the “constitutional nexus” requirement established by 

Linda V. v. ADES, 211 Ariz. 76 (App. 2005), is considered under the totality 

of the circumstances in determining whether termination is in the best 

interests of the child.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2013, Mother and her five-year-old daughter M.R. began 

living with Father. Mother subsequently gave birth to F.M. and J.M. In April

2017, six-week-old J.M. slept most of the day and vomited “a lot” that 

evening. Mother noticed that J.M.’s arms began shaking at various times.

Assuming it was a stomach issue, Father went to the store to buy tea for 

J.M. Meanwhile, J.M.’s condition worsened. J.M. turned pale, started 

moaning, could not fully open her eyes, and her arms became stiff. After 

Father returned from the store, Mother and Father took J.M. to an 

urgent-care center where they waited more than 40 minutes for the doctor 

to evaluate her. Upon examination, the doctor told Mother and Father to 

immediately take J.M. to Phoenix Children’s Hospital (“PCH”).

 

1 M.R.’s father’s parental rights were terminated in the same 

proceeding. He is not a party to this appeal.
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

3 

¶3 At PCH, a scan revealed that J.M had a large subdural 

hemorrhage on the left side of her brain and a smaller subdural hemorrhage 

on the right. She also had damage to her optic nerve and severe retinal 

hemorrhaging in both eyes. The hemorrhaging caused her brain to shift out 

of position and compress her brainstem. Because J.M.’s life was in danger, 

doctors had to perform emergency neurosurgery. After surgery, 

Dr. Melissa Jones, a pediatrician with a specialty in child abuse pediatrics, 

evaluated J.M. After ruling out possible medical causes, Dr. Jones

determined the injuries resulted from abusive head trauma and Mother and 

Father provided no alternative explanation for the cause of J.M.’s injuries. 

PCH reported the injuries, and DCS took custody of all three children and 

filed dependency petitions. The juvenile court later established the case 

plan as severance and adoption.

¶4 In July 2017, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s rights to 

J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father’s rights to J.M. and F.M., under the abuse 

ground. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B). Over seven months, DCS 

offered Mother and Father services, including hair-follicle testing to rule 

out drug abuse, psychological evaluations, individual counseling, and a 

parent aide during visits with the children. Although Mother and Father

participated in services, in discussions with counselors, they continued to 

minimize J.M.’s severe injuries and provided no further explanation for 

how the injury occurred. 

¶5 The juvenile court held a three-day termination hearing.

Dr. Jones testified for DCS, opining that J.M.’s injuries resulted from 

nonaccidental trauma. Dr. Ruth Bristol, J.M.’s pediatric neurosurgeon, 

testified on the manner and extent of J.M.’s injuries. Mother and Father’s 

expert, Dr. Joseph Scheller, a pediatric neurologist with specialties in 

pediatric neurology and neuroimaging, opined that J.M.’s injuries most 

likely resulted from an unusual complication of a birth injury. The court 

took the matter under advisement and later issued an order terminating

Mother’s rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father’s rights to J.M. and F.M. 

Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the court must find 

at least one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by 

clear and convincing evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 

(2005). The court must also find termination is in the child’s best interests 
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

4 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. We review the court’s termination 

determination for an abuse of discretion and will affirm unless no 

reasonable evidence supports the court’s findings. Mary Lou C. v. ADES, 207 

Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). The juvenile court “is in the best position to 

weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, 

and resolve disputed facts.” ADES v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 

2004). 

A. The Court Committed Harmless Error by Allowing DCS to 

Cross-Examine Mother and Father’s Expert Witness with

Publications in His Field Without Laying Proper Foundation. 

¶7 Mother and Father assert that DCS failed to lay proper 

foundation for the scientific articles it used to impeach Mother’s and 

Father’s expert witness, Dr. Scheller. Although we agree the court erred by 

not requiring DCS to lay the proper foundation for the publications, we 

conclude the error was harmless. See Monica C. v. ADES, 211 Ariz. 89, 94, 

¶ 22 (App. 2005) (harmless error applies in juvenile proceedings).

¶8 This court will affirm the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings 

“absent a clear abuse of its discretion and resulting prejudice.” Lashonda M. 

v. ADES, 210 Ariz. 77, 82–83, ¶ 19 (App. 2005). Abuse of discretion occurs 

when a court’s decision is “manifestly unreasonable” or based on 

“untenable” grounds. Id. (quoting Quigley v. City Court of Tucson, 132 Ariz. 

35, 37 (1982)). 

¶9 Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(18) governs the admission of 

hearsay statements from learned treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets. Rule 

803(18) provides that statements from such publications may be read into 

evidence, but not received as an exhibit, if:

(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness 

on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct 

examination; and 

(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the 

expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s 

testimony, or by judicial notice.

“The learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule stems from

[the] . . . independent guarantees of trustworthiness of such works.” Rossell 

v. Volkswagen of Am., 147 Ariz. 160, 173 (1985). By requiring the proponent 

to elicit an expert’s recognition of the publication’s reliability, Rule 

803(18)(B) provides the proper method to verify the statement’s
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

5 

trustworthiness. See State v. West, 238 Ariz. 482, 500–501, ¶¶ 68, 70 (App. 

2015). 

¶10 Mother and Father argue DCS failed to lay the proper 

foundation before recounting statements from the scientific articles in the 

following two instances: 

[DCS Counsel:] Okay. In Jones’ study, he concluded, 

again, that these are rare, but cannot be 

diagnosed unless nonaccidental head 

injury had been questioned thoroughly, 

do you agree with that statement?

[Dr. Scheller:] Yes and no. It’s sort of -- it’s a very 

complicated statement that he said. And 

I’m happy to explain why or I’ll just 

say -- 

* * * 

[DCS Counsel:] And you’re familiar with the Feldman 

study that was published in September 

of 2001? 

[Dr. Scheller:] Yes, 2001. Because he’s published a real 

lot of studies.

* * * 

[DCS Counsel:] And [Feldman’s] study found chronic or 

mixed chronic and acute subdural 

hematoma were found only in abused 

children in his study, that’s what he 

found, correct?

[Dr. Scheller:] Yes.

Mother timely objected to each line of questioning, citing DCS’s failure to 

establish that the publications containing the articles were reliable as 

required by Rule 803(18)(B). The court overruled each objection and found 

Dr. Scheller’s knowledge of the studies provided adequate foundation to 

question him about the contents.

¶11 DCS asserts it was not obligated to follow Rule 803(18)’s 

foundation requirements during the cross-examination because it “did not 
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

6 

seek to admit the articles into evidence.” We reject this argument. By asking 

Dr. Scheller to confirm its paraphrased descriptions of the articles’ findings, 

DCS put the truth of the findings themselves at issue. See Ariz. R. Evid. 

801(c) (hearsay means an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth 

of the matter asserted in the statement); Ariz. R. Evid. 802 (hearsay 

generally inadmissible); West, 238 Ariz. at 501, ¶ 71 (superior court properly 

sustained objection to prosecutor’s reference to the findings of a “great deal 

of literature” in scientific journals); Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 

168–69 (App. 1979) (discussion of a report’s findings on cross-examination 

introduced hearsay statements from report). Thus, before recounting the 

articles’ findings, DCS was required to first lay proper foundation 

concerning the reliability of the publications in which those articles 

appeared, or the reliability of the studies within the articles. DCS did not 

lay the required foundation, and the court erred by overruling Mother’s

and Father’s objections to DCS’s improper cross-examination.

¶12 Although the court should have required DCS to establish the 

publications’ reliability before receiving evidence of the articles’ findings, 

we nonetheless conclude that the error was harmless. Dr. Scheller conceded 

his familiarity with each authority, was able to answer DCS’s follow-up 

questions, and at times challenged DCS’s attempts to restrict his 

explanations of the articles’ findings. While Mother and Father take issue 

with whether the referenced publications were current and credible, their 

respective counsel did not develop these arguments on redirect

examination despite the opportunity to do so. And although the juvenile

court ultimately rejected Dr. Scheller’s opinion, it based that decision on the 

testimony of J.M.’s treating physicians and Dr. Scheller’s concessions 

surrounding the cause of J.M.’s injuries, not whether Dr. Scheller’s opinion 

was contrary to the weight of published authority.

B. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Court’s Order Terminating 

Mother’s and Father’s Rights Based on Abuse or Failure to Protect 

from Abuse.

¶13 Mother and Father argue insufficient evidence supports the

court’s termination order under the abuse ground. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) 

provides:

B. Evidence sufficient to justify the termination of the 

parent-child relationship shall include . . . 

* * * 
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

7 

2. [t]hat the parent has neglected or wilfully abused a 

child. This abuse includes serious physical or emotional 

injury or situations in which the parent knew or reasonably 

should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting 

a child. 

If a parent abuses or neglects their child, the court may terminate that 

parent’s rights to their other children on this basis, even if there is no 

evidence that the other children were abused. Linda V., 211 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 14. 

¶14 Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that J.M.’s 

injuries were caused by abuse. While in Mother and Father’s exclusive care, 

J.M. suffered a large subdural hemorrhage on the left side of her brain and

a smaller subdural hemorrhage on the right. She also had significant 

midline shift and herniation of her brain, meaning there was so much 

pressure in the brain that it started to shift out of its normal position. J.M. 

required emergency neurosurgery to relieve the pressure because it had 

become so great that her skull could no longer contain the brain and its 

contents without threatening her life. She also had diffused retinal 

hemorrhages (or bleeding) in all quadrants of the retina and all layers of the 

retina. Her head injuries negatively affected a multitude of systems in her 

body. Post-trauma, doctors diagnosed her with cerebral palsy because she 

had significant motor impairment. She also suffers from regular epileptic 

seizures and is blind. She now requires occupational therapy, feeding 

therapy, and 24-hour monitoring. Dr. Bristol testified that J.M. will likely 

require long-term, full-time care for the foreseeable future.

¶15 At the termination hearing, Dr. Jones opined that J.M.’s 

injuries occurred within a few days before her hospital admission and 

resulted from nonaccidental trauma. After reviewing the family’s medical 

history and J.M.’s birth records, Dr. Jones found no alternative medical 

explanation for her injuries. Similarly, Dr. Bristol testified that J.M.’s 

injuries were most likely caused by recent trauma. Dr. Jones added that 

J.M.’s lack of external injuries did not rule out abuse.

¶16 Dr. Scheller disagreed and testified that J.M.’s injuries 

resulted from a subdural hematoma at birth that began spontaneously 

re-bleeding some weeks later, which in turn caused her retinal 

hemorrhages. Dr. Scheller conceded that this occurrence would be “an 

unusual complication” and that no other non-traumatic medical condition 

could have caused J.M.’s injuries.
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

8 

¶17 Dr. Jones and Dr. Bristol opined on Dr. Scheller’s conclusion, 

testifying that such an occurrence under the circumstances present with 

J.M. would be “very, very rare.” Dr. Jones testified that “children [who] 

have spontaneous re-bleeding [also] have some other complicating factor 

with their brain.” Dr. Bristol testified that in her experience as a pediatric 

neurosurgeon she had “not seen a spontaneous re-bleed to that degree.” 

Dr. Jones opined that J.M.’s presentation and injuries did not correspond to 

Dr. Scheller’s theory, particularly the diffuse nature of J.M.’s retinal 

hemorrhages, which was consistent with “massive trauma with

acceleration and deceleration.” Regarding J.M.’s eye injuries, Dr. Jones 

stated that: 

[T]here had to be [a] significant force that led to that pattern 

of retinal hemorrhages. You can get retinal hemorrhages from 

many different causes, but the only times we see [J.M.’s] 

pattern of retinal hemorrhages in the pediatric population is 

from abusive head trauma, severe motor vehicle collisions or 

there’s some case reports of children who have fallen out of 

two or three story windows onto concrete.

Dr. Jones specifically distinguished Dr. Scheller’s theory, testifying that 

“when the pressure is high in the brain, you can get retinal hemorrhages,” 

but they are typically “in the . . . most recessed part of the 

retina . . . surrounding the optic nerve,” which was “not the same pattern 

that [J.M.] had.” 

¶18 Throughout the investigation, dependency, and termination

hearings, Mother and Father maintained that J.M. had suffered no accidents 

or injuries that would explain her injuries. At J.M.’s first health checkup (a 

few weeks before her traumatic brain injury), the doctor examining J.M.

noted no concerns. Likewise, Mother and Father maintained that J.M. only

began showing symptoms the evening they took her to the hospital. In sum, 

reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that J.M.’s 

injuries were the result of nonaccidental trauma.

¶19 Based on its conclusion that J.M.’s injuries were the result of 

nonaccidental trauma, the court also found that Mother or Father, or both, 

intentionally abused J.M. or knew or reasonably should have known that 

the other parent abused her, “as she was in their sole care when she suffered 

life-threatening injuries.” The court also found that, despite the “timing, 

extent, mechanics and presentation of [J.M.’s] injuries,” Mother and Father 

continued to deny that abusive conduct occurred, presented a “united 

front,” and remained committed to each other and their relationship. And 
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

9 

because neither parent had “shown a willingness to leave the other to 

protect the children from the other parent,” the court concluded that “both 

parents have demonstrated their lack of protective capacities for all of the 

children, not only [J.M.].”

¶20 Mother and Father have consistently maintained that they 

were J.M.’s only caregivers since her birth. Mother and Father continuously 

denied J.M. was abused, even after they were confronted with PCH’s 

medical assessments of J.M.’s injuries. Despite strong evidence that at least 

one of them caused J.M.’s injuries, Mother and Father made no attempt to 

distance themselves from one another. To the contrary, in the months

following the incident with J.M., Mother and Father deepened their 

commitment to one another by marrying. Given this record, reasonable 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that: (1) one or both 

parents willfully abused J.M. by causing J.M.’s physical injuries; and (2) one 

or both parents failed to protect J.M. after they knew or reasonably should 

have known J.M. had been abused. See Maricopa County Juv. Action Nos. 

JS-4118/JD-529, 134 Ariz. 407, 408–09 (App. 1982) (where mother refused to 

obtain a divorce or otherwise separate herself from husband who had 

committed abuse, her “knowing failure” to protect her children from abuse 

by her husband justified termination of her parental rights); see also Mario 

G. v. ADES, 227 Ariz. 282, 287–88, ¶¶ 19–25 (App. 2011) (finding a father’s 

failure to protect one child from abuse justified termination of his rights to 

another child); Linda V., 211 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 14 (parents “who permit another 

person to abuse or neglect their children” may have their parental rights 

terminated). Once DCS established Mother and Father abused or failed to 

take steps to protect J.M. after the abuse occurred, the statutory grounds to 

terminate Mother’s and Father’s rights to the other children were also met. 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2); Linda V., 211 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 14. Accordingly, reasonable 

evidence supports the court’s finding that termination of Mother’s rights to 

J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father’s rights to J.M. and F.M., was justified 

under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2).

C. Alma S. v. DCS Requires Courts to Consider the Connection 

Between the Prior Abuse of One Child and the Risk of Future 

Abuse to the Other Children During the Best-Interests Inquiry.

¶21 Mother and Father argue insufficient evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that there was a “nexus” between the abuse of J.M. 

and the risk of abuse to F.M. and M.R. In the past, this court has expressly 

held that termination of parental rights to a child who has not been the 

direct target of abuse requires the party seeking termination of rights to

show, at the statutory-grounds stage, “a constitutional nexus between the 
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

10 

prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue.” Seth M. v. 

Arienne M., 245 Ariz. 245, 248, ¶ 11 (App. 2018) (quoting Tina T. v. DCS, 236 

Ariz. 295, 299, ¶ 17 (App. 2014)); Mario G., 227 Ariz. at 285, ¶ 16. This court 

recently revisited the constitutional nexus requirement, noting that it “first 

appeared in a footnote in the Linda V. opinion, although that opinion does 

not identify any legal source for such a requirement and it is not present in 

the statute itself.” Seth M., 245 Ariz. at 248, ¶ 11 (citing Linda V., 211 Ariz. at 

80, ¶ 17, n.3).

¶22 The uncertainty expressed in Seth M. towards requiring this 

showing at the statutory-grounds stage was realized when our supreme 

court issued its decision in Alma S. v. DCS. In Alma S., the supreme court 

held “the substantive grounds for termination listed in § 8-533(B) [are 

synonymous] with parental unfitness,” and once the juvenile court finds a 

parent to be unfit, the best-interests analysis is triggered. 245 Ariz. at 150–

51, ¶¶ 9, 12. Alma S. thus makes clear that, at the statutory-grounds stage, 

the juvenile court should only determine whether the party seeking 

termination has met its burden of proving a parent unfit under one of the 

grounds for termination. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 154, ¶ 32–33 (Bolick, J., 

concurring in the result) (“However, the Court today holds that all that 

must be proven by clear and convincing evidence is that the parent engaged 

in one of the statutory grounds for termination, which by itself ‘constitute[s] 

a finding of parental fitness.’” (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 150, 

¶ 11)). Considerations outside the scope of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2)—such as 

whether a connection exists between a parent’s abuse of one of their

children and the risk of abuse to their other children—are left to the 

best-interests inquiry. This conclusion not only comports with Alma S.’s 

discussion of the two-step termination inquiry, but also Linda V.’s original 

application of a “nexus” requirement. See Linda V., 211 Ariz. at 80, ¶ 17, n.3 

(addressing the need to demonstrate a nexus between prior abuse and the 

risk of future abuse in the court’s best-interests analysis). 

D. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding that 

Termination of Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights Served the 

Children’s Best Interests.

¶23 Once the court finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory 

ground for termination, “the interests of the parent and child diverge,” and 

the court proceeds to balance the unfit parent’s “interest in the care and 

custody of his or her child . . . . against the independent and often adverse 

interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, 

¶ 35. “[A] determination of the child’s best interest must include a finding 

as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the 
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

11 

continuation of the relationship.” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 

167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990) (emphasis omitted). Courts “must consider the totality 

of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, 

including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation.” Alma S., 

245 Ariz. at 148, ¶ 1. In cases where termination of a parent’s rights to one 

child is predicated on the parent’s abuse of another child, courts must also 

consider the connection between that abuse and the risk of future abuse to 

the child at issue. See Seth M., 245 Ariz. at 248, ¶ 11; Mario G., 227 Ariz. at 

285, ¶ 16; Linda V., 211 Ariz. at 79–80 ¶¶ 14–15, 17. “When a current 

placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is 

otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that 

termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best 

interests.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016). Finally, 

“[t]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological 

parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in 

addressing best interests.” Dominique M. v. DCS, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 12 (App. 

2016). 

¶24 Here, based on its finding that Mother or Father abused J.M. 

or that they failed to protect J.M. from abuse, the juvenile court found that 

it had “grave concerns about the parents’ protective capacities in the 

future.” Mother and Father argue that the risk of abuse to F.M. and M.R. is 

remote because J.M. was a vulnerable infant, unlike the older children. But 

the juvenile court rejected this argument and concluded that by failing to

take steps to protect J.M. from the unidentified abusing parent, “Mother 

and Father have demonstrated they cannot or will not protect their 

children.” The court specifically found that: 

Although [M.R. and F.M.] are no longer infants, [they] are 

young children who are vulnerable. [M.R.] has already been 

the victim of child abuse by Mother in the past.[2] Mother and 

Father . . . have not been forthcoming about the cause of 

[J.M.’s] injuries.

 

2 In 2011, while Mother went shopping, she left M.R., who was two 

years old at the time, unsupervised inside her car for 40 minutes. The 

temperature outside was 106 degrees. A police officer removed M.R. from 

the car before she suffered any serious injury, but Mother was arrested and 

subsequently pled guilty to child abuse.
SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al. 

Opinion of the Court

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The court also found that “given the parents’ persistent denials that any 

abuse occurred,” both J.M. and her older siblings remained at risk of future 

abuse.

¶25 Reasonable evidence in the record supports these findings. 

M.R. was nine years old at the time of the termination hearing and F.M. was 

almost three—both still dependent on Mother and Father to meet their 

needs. Both parents’ actions after learning the nature of J.M.’s injuries

demonstrated they could not recognize danger and keep the children safe. 

As J.M.’s primary caregivers, Mother and Father are the only ones in a 

position to explain how her injuries occurred. Mother and Father have 

refused to acknowledge abuse occurred or that at least one of them was 

responsible. Instead, they have remained together, and neither parent has 

taken steps to prevent the children from being returned to the same 

situation that led to J.M.’s near-fatal injuries. On this record, we conclude 

reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that the abuse to J.M. bore 

a substantial connection to the risk of future abuse to the other children in 

Mother’s and Father’s care.

¶26 Moreover, reasonable evidence concerning the children’s 

adoptability supports the juvenile court’s best-interests finding. The case 

manager testified that F.M. and M.R. were in a kinship placement that was 

meeting their needs and the foster parents wished to adopt them. Due to

J.M.’s special needs, she was in a separate placement for a medically-fragile 

child that was providing her the specialized care she required. Although 

J.M.’s placement was not willing to adopt, DCS identified other potential 

adoptive placements for her. Considering the children’s stability in their 

current placements, and the availability of adoptive placements, the case 

manager testified that termination would provide the children with “a safe, 

secure environment, where all of their needs will be met.” Reasonable 

evidence supports the court’s finding that termination was also in the 

children’s best interests because of their adoptability. 

CONCLUSION

¶27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Mother’s rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R. and Father’s rights to 

J.M. and F.M.