## SUPERIOR COURT of the STATE OF DELAWARE

Jeffrey J Clark Kent County Courthouse Resident Judge 38 The Green Dover, DE 19901 Telephone (302)735

- 2111

Mrs. Ta mmy Yost Mr. Edward J. Fornias, III, Esquire 382 Stevenson Drive Law Office of EJ Fornias, P.A. Magnolia, DE 19965 615 W. 18 th Street, Lower Level Wilmington, DE 19802

Submitted: March 23, 2023 Decision: May 1, 2023

RE: Weber v. Brown, et al., C.A. No. K22 J

- 00403 JJC

Dear M s . Yost and Mr. Fornias:

Ms. Yost serves as the administratrix of her mother’s estate and is a lso a
beneficiary of the E state

. In the latter capacity, she seeks reconsideration of a

commissioner’s order declining to stay a s heriff’s sale of the Estate’s real property. 1

Th is letter explains why t he Court cannot revisit the validity of a Superior

Court judgment from New Castle County that is filed in Kent County for the purpose

1 Ms. Yost file d her pro se response and motion for re consideration in her capacity as administratrix of her mother’s e state. The Estate, however, remains unrepresented because no attorney has entered an appearance for it. Nevertheless, the Court interprets Ms. Yost’s filings to be made in her alternative capacity as a beneficiary and considers the substance of her arguments.2

of execution

. For the reasons discussed below

, the Commissioner committed no

error when she declined to st ay a sheriff’s sale because Ms. Yost cannot collaterally

attack the New Castle County judgment in this Court. She, the other beneficiaries,

and the Estate had a full and fair opportunity to challenge the judgment against the

Estate in New Castle County and were unsuccessful

. Accordingly, th is Court cannot
vacate that judgment and will not stay the sale.

Background
The Superior Court, in New Castle County, entered a default judgment in a

tort matter in favor of Christine and Michael Weber in F ebruary 2020

. 2 Thereafter,

the presiding judge in New Castle County referred the proceedings to a
commissioner for an inquisition on damages

. A Superior Court commissioner in
New Castle County then held an inquisition hearing and awarded the Webers
approximately $440,000 against Defendants Mary Brown and Gregory Scott

. 3

After obtaining the New Castle judgment , the Webers filed a writ of tes tatum
fi fa in Kent County to index the judgment in order to schedule a sheriff’s sale of

Ms. Brown’s Harrington real estate

. 4 Th e Kent County Sheriff s cheduled the sale

in the fall of 2022

. In the meantime, Ms. Brown passed away and Mr . Scott (also a
potential beneficiary of the Estate) filed an emergency motion in Kent County to
stay the sale. 5 At an emergency hearing, the Court explained to Mr. Scott that he
could not challenge the judgment ’s validity i n Kent County; rather, the Court told

2 Weber v. Brown

, C.A. No. N19C

- 10

- 034 ( Del. Super. Feb. 19, 2020) (ORDER) [here in after “ NC
D

. I

. ” at 9 ]

. Because the procedural background arises from two separate cases

– (1) the underlying tort case in New Castle County

, and (2) the New Castle judgment indexed in Kent Count y

– the Court will refer to the corresponding docket en t ries with th e designation of either “NC D.I.” or “KC D.I.”

3 NC D

. I

. 18

. 4 KC D.I. 1.

5 KC D

. I

. 1 4

.3

him that he could only raise such a challenge with the original judge in the Superior

Court in New Castle County. 6

At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Scott represented that he would file an
appropriate motion in New Castle County

. As an accommodation, the Webers
voluntarily stay ed the sale to permit the Estate and the beneficiaries the time to do

so. 7

Mr. Scott and Ms. Yost then moved to vacate the default judgment s in New
Castle County alleging insufficient service of process. 8 At a hearing that followed,

the commissioner vacated the default judgment against Mr. Scott but declined to
vacate the judgment against Ms. Brown. 9 As to the latter

, her order provided that

t he “judgment against Mary Brown and her estate will remain firmly in place.” 10

She further held that the Webers “may continue to execute on the default judgment
against Mary Brown and her estate.” 11

Neither Mr. Scott nor Ms. Yost requested that a judge reconsider the

commissioner’s decision within ten days as required by Court rule. 12 In fact, Ms.

Yost took no ac tion over the next thirty days. Thereafter

, the Webers re initiated

their efforts to execute in Kent County by filing a motion to do so

. 13 Ms. Yost
opposed the motion by again collaterally attacking the New Castle County
judgmen t

. 14

6 KC D.I. 17 , at 8

– 10

. 7 K.C. D.I. 18

. 8 NC D.I. 24

. 9 NC D.I. 29

. 10 Id

. 11 Id

. 12 See Super

. Ct. Civ. R. 132(a)(4)(ii) (requiring a party to move to reconsider a commissioner’s decision within ten days or to accept the commissioner’s order as final).

13 K C D

. I . 21

. 14 KC D.I. 224

Next, o n March 2, 2023, a Kent County C ommissioner held a hearing on the
Weber’s motion to p ermit a sale. 15 When doing so, she refused to collaterally vacate
the judgment because the New Castle County docket demonstrated that the Webers

had personally served Defendant Mary Brown at her place of residence. 16 Namely

, the Kent County s heriff’s return , uploaded on t he New Castle County docket,

satisfied her that the Webers validly served Ms. Brown. 17

After the C ommissioner issued her order

, Ms. Yost filed the present motion

for reconsideration. 18 In it, she contends that the sheriff did not serve her late mother

as t he deputy represented in the return. 19 She also submits an affidavit executed by

Antaneek Jackson . In that affidavit, Ms. Jackson explains that she accepted service

of the summons and complaint while living at the same residence occupied by Ms.

Brown , her aunt

. 20 Ms. Jackson further contends that she “completely forgot about
the summon[s] and compla int” and neglected to give it to Ms. Brown. 21 When
accepting everything in her affidavit as true
, it establishes that : (1) Ms. Jackson was an adult, (2) she resided in Ms. Brown’s home at the time of service , and (3) she
accepted service of process

.

Standard

Ms. Yost labels her filing an appeal

. The Court, however, considers it to be

a motion for reconsideration of a commissioner’s order. Here, the Commissioner

issued an order in a non case

- dispositive matter as contemplated by Superior Court

15 KC D.I. 32

. 16 NC D.I. 3.

17 Id

. 18 K C D.I. 34.

19 Id

. ¶ 29.

20 K C D.I. 34, Ex. B ¶¶ 2

– 3.

21 Id

. ¶ 8.5

Civil Rule 132(a)(3). Accordingly, when considering Ms. Yost’s challenge to the

C ommissioner’s decision, the Court must apply the standard set by that rule

. Namely

, a judge may reconsider her decisio n only if the record demonstrates that

the decision was based upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, was contrary to law,

or was an abuse of discretion. 22 Otherwise, the decision must stand. As a final

note, there is no automatic stay of a commissioner’s order under Rule 132(a)(3 )
while the judge reviews the motion

. 23

Discussion

The Commissioner did not base her decision on erroneous factual findings,
decide the matter contrary to law, or abuse her discretion. In fact, even w ere the

Court to employ a de novo review of her decision

, it fell where the l aw requires

. Ms. Yost, who identifies herself as administratrix for the Estate

, asks this

Court to (1) vacate a judgment issued in New Castle County against the Estate , and
thereby (2) prevent execution of that judgment in Kent County. 24 At the outset, the

Webers had the statutory right to file the ir judgment in Kent County , and acquired
the right to execute upon real estate located in Kent County when doing so

. 25 The

Cour t informed Mr. Scott last fall

, during the first motion to stay

, that he would have
to return to New Castle County to pursue any efforts to vacate the judgment against

him and his mother. 26 Mr. Scott and Ms. Yost a ttempted to vacate the judgment but

a New Castle County commissioner ruled against them

. That order became final

22 Super

. Ct. Civ. R. 132(a)(3)(iv).

23 Id

. 24 NC D.I. 34 ¶ 29.

25 10 D el

. C

. § 2304(b)

. 26 KC D.I. 17 at 8. Although the Delaware Superior Court is a unified, state

- wide Court, there is no reason to treat a judgment transferred from another county under 10 Del. C. § 2304(b) differently than the Court would treat a transferred judgment from another jurisdicti on or another State c ourt.6

when Ms. Yost and Mr. Scott declined to appeal th e decision within ten days as required by rule

. On balance , two legal principles support the C ommissioner’s decision to not
stay the Kent County sale scheduled for later this month

. First, the doctrine of issue
preclusion prevents th e Court from re considering a final order that already resolved
Ms. Yost’s challenge s to the Weber’s judgment. 27 Although Mr. Scott succeeded in
vacating the default against him, he , Ms. Yost, and others did not convince the
commissioner in New Castle County to vacate the judgment against Ms. Brown ’s

Estate. For that reason, the Commissioner in Kent County did not err when she

refused to revisit the issue.

A s econd legal tenet also s upports the Commissioner’s decision

. Namely, a
valid judgment from another jurisdiction or venue , once transferred (or in this case

indexed) , cannot be collaterally attacked. 28 In other words, a court has no power to

invalidate the judgment of another jurisdiction or venue upon transfer of that
judgment. At most, the Court may exercise its limited equitable authority to stay

execution to permit an aggrieved party to return to t he issuing jurisdiction or venue
to challenge it

. Here, the Court entertained the same motion last fall and the Webers
voluntarily provided Ms. Yost and Mr. Scott the ability to do so. T his Court cannot

revisit that final judgment or entertain a colla teral attack against it.

27 Garvin v. Booth , 2019 WL 3017419, at *5 (Del. Super. Jul. 10, 2019) (citations omitted).

28 See Worthington Homeowners Ass’n v. Couch

, 2022 WL 333283, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 4, 2022) (explaining in the different, though analogous context of a judgment transferred from the Justice of the Peace Court to Superior Court

, that only the origin ating court ha s jurisdiction to consider post

-

judgment proceedings); see also 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 693 (2023) ( explaining that

a party may not collaterally attack a final judgment by challenging it in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction that entered the judgment).7 Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, t he Cour t DENIES Ms. Yost’s motion to

reconsider the C ommissioner’s order

. The Commissioner did not err by declining
to stay the sheriff’s sale

. Th e sale may proceed as scheduled.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Jeffrey J Clark Resident Judge JJC:klc Via File & ServeXpress U.S. Mail to Defendant Tammy Yost