IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0387

Filed October 24, 2018

JAMIE LEE COLE,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, Bradley J. Harris, 

Judge.

Appeal from the denial of an application for postconviction relief filed 

pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 822 (2015). AFFIRMED.

Thomas M. McIntee, Waterloo, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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McDONALD, Judge.

This case arises out of Jamie Cole’s challenge to his conviction and 

sentence for operating while intoxicated, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code 

section 321J.2 (2015). In his application for postconviction relief, Cole requested 

the district court order the Iowa Department of Corrections to place him in a 

rehabilitation facility rather than prison. In the alternative, Cole requested his guilty 

plea and conviction be vacated and he be allowed to plead anew. Following a trial

on the merits of the postconviction application, in which Cole represented himself, 

the district court denied Cole’s application for postconviction relief. Cole timely 

filed this appeal. 

By way of background, in March 2015, Cole was charged with operating 

while intoxicated, third offense, in Delaware County. As part of a plea agreement, 

Cole pleaded guilty to the charge, and the State agreed to dismiss other counts. 

In addition, the parties agreed Cole would be placed in a chapter 321J 

rehabilitation program rather than prison. The district court agreed to be bound by 

the parties’ plea agreement. The sentencing order was in accord with the parties’

agreement. It provided Cole was committed to the “custody of the Director of the 

Iowa Department of Corrections for placement in the 321J Program at West Union, 

administered by the First Judicial District Department of Correctional Services.”

At the time Cole pleaded guilty to the Delaware County charge, he also had

pending a charge in Buchanan County for operating while intoxicated. At the time 

of his plea and sentencing in the Delaware County case, the district court asked 

Cole whether he understood the court could not control the sentence in the 

Buchanan County case:
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THE COURT: And do you understand that I can’t make any 

guarantees that you’ll receive the same sentence or consecutive or 

concurrent sentence in Buchanan County? I have no control over 

that.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

In April 2015, Cole pleaded guilty to operating while intoxicated, third offense, in 

Buchanan County. The sentence in that case did not require or prohibit his entry 

into the 321J rehabilitation program. 

Following his plea and sentencing in the Buchanan County case, Cole 

remained in jail while the department of corrections reviewed his application for 

admission into the rehabilitation program. During that time, Cole indecently 

exposed himself to one correctional officer and acted aggressively toward another. 

Cole was charged with and convicted of indecent exposure because of this 

conduct. Shortly after, the department of corrections denied Cole’s application for 

the rehabilitation program, citing his recent violent actions and conviction for

indecent exposure. Cole was then committed to the custody of the department of 

corrections and placed in prison.

Cole filed this application for postconviction relief challenging only his 

Delaware County conviction. He contends the district court should have ordered 

the department of corrections to place him in the rehabilitation facility. In the 

alternative, he contends the district court should have vacated his guilty plea and 

conviction. Our review is for the correction of errors at law. See Perez v. State, 

816 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 2012). The court will affirm the lower court if “the law 

was correctly applied” and there was substantial evidence supporting findings of 

fact. Id. (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003)).
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We cannot conclude the district court committed legal error in denying the 

application for postconviction relief. Cole pleaded guilty to operating while 

intoxicated, third offense, in Delaware County. In that case, he received the 

sentence for which he bargained. At the time of the plea and sentencing in 

Delaware County, Cole stated he understood the district court could not control 

what occurred in the Buchanan County case. After pleading guilty to operating 

while intoxicated in Buchanan County, Cole was convicted of indecent exposure. 

It was this additional offense conduct that precluded Cole from being placed in the 

rehabilitation program. It was Cole’s conduct that precluded the execution of his 

bargained-for sentence. As the district court noted, “The fact that applicant has 

been confined pursuant to the terms of his sentences in other cases does not affect 

the validity, constitutionality or the legality of the sentence which is the subject of 

this action.” We agree. There is no legal reason to vacate his plea, conviction, or 

sentence in the Delaware County case. 

For the first time on appeal, Cole contends his plea counsel provided 

constitutionally deficient representation in allowing Cole to plead guilty without first 

explaining it might be possible Cole would not be placed in the rehabilitation 

program. This claim was not raised in Cole’s application for postconviction relief. 

The error was not preserved for appellate review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 

N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that 

issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we 

will decide them on appeal.”).

Cole appears to claim his postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing 

to assert a claim that his plea counsel was ineffective for not explaining it might be 
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possible Cole would not be placed in the rehabilitation program. Cole also asserts 

his postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to subpoena Cole’s plea 

counsel to testify at the postconviction trial. These claims are without merit. Cole 

moved to represent himself in this civil proceeding. The district court granted 

Cole’s request after Cole filed a disciplinary complaint against his postconviction 

counsel. An applicant cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance when 

representing oneself. See State v. Hutchison, 341 N.W.2d 33, 42 (Iowa 1983) 

(“[T]he defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently make an election to proceed 

pro se and then, having lost his trial on the merits, seek a reversal on appeal by 

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

Finally, Cole contends the postconviction court failed to make necessary 

findings and conclusions in ruling on his application. When ruling on an application 

for postconviction relief “[t]he court shall make specific findings of fact, and state 

expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented.” Iowa Code 

§ 822.7. “[S]ubstantial compliance is sufficient.” Gamble v. State, 723 N.W.2d 

443, 446 (Iowa 2006). 

We conclude the district court substantially complied with the rule. In the 

order denying Cole’s application for PCR, the court listed the issues that Cole 

raised:

A. A conviction or sentence was in violation of the 

constitution of the United States or the constitution and laws of this 

state.

B. The court was without jurisdiction to impose 

sentence.[

1

]

 

1 The Court’s order skips from B to D.
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D. There exists evidence of material facts, not previously 

presented or heard, that require vacation of the conviction or 

sentence in the interests of justice.

E. Applicant’s probation, parole or conditional release has 

been unlawfully revoked.

F. Applicant is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or 

other restraint.

The court concluded that Cole “failed to provide any evidence of any of the grounds 

alleged to allow the court to grant him the requested relief.” Nothing more was 

required of the court. 

AFFIRMED.