After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is

not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

August 23, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ANSELMO A. CHAVEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-2078

(D.C. No. CIV-06-1225 BB/RHS)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

Anselmo A. Chavez, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal

of his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction to consider his

appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

Mr. Chavez’s claim relates to the Democratic primary election for the

office of governor in New Mexico, which was held in June 2006. Defendant
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Ct. of App. 1

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

-2-

Richardson won the Democratic nomination in that election and also won the

general election in November 2006. Mr. Chavez was a write-in candidate in the

Democratic primary. He claims that, under New Mexico law, Mr. Richardson was

not an eligible candidate in the primary because he signed his name on certain

election-related forms as “Bill Richardson” rather than his full name of “William

Blaine Richardson.”

Mr. Chavez filed a pro se complaint in district court on December 15, 2006,

seeking to set aside the Democratic primary nomination and the general election

of Mr. Richardson, and asking that Mr. Chavez be named the winner of both

elections. Alternatively, he sought an award of $440,000, which he claimed was

equal to the New Mexico governor’s compensation for four years. The district

court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Mr. Chavez responded, asserting that jurisdiction

was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because his complaint raised federal

questions.

The district court dismissed the action, finding no jurisdiction under § 1331

and also concluding that it lacked jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman1

doctrine, under which lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review

“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
-3-

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In holding Rooker-Feldman

applicable in this case, the district court found that Mr. Chavez had filed the same

claim in New Mexico state court. His state-court complaint was dismissed, and

the dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the New Mexico Supreme Court, before

he filed his federal-court complaint. The district court concluded that Mr. Chavez

sought, in his federal-court action, to overturn the New Mexico state-court

rulings, and therefore the district court did not have jurisdiction. Mr. Chavez

filed a timely appeal.

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1145

(10th Cir. 2007). In his appeal brief, Mr. Chavez first argues the merits of his

claim and then he repeats one of the bases for federal-question jurisdiction under

§ 1331 that he asserted in the district court. But he does not address the district

court’s alternative ground for dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Mr. Chavez has therefore waived his right to appeal that issue. See State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding issue

waived by appellant’s failure to raise it in opening brief). Moreover, we need not

address the remaining arguments Mr. Chavez makes on appeal because that issue,

standing alone, was sufficient to divest the district court of jurisdiction. See
Even if Mr. Chavez had not waived his appeal of the district court’s 2

dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we would affirm, finding no

error in the district court’s ruling on that issue.

-4-

Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 877 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying

waiver and upholding summary judgment on one of district court’s alternative

grounds which appellant failed to appeal); GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale

Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1387-88 (10th Cir. 1997) (same).2

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock

Circuit Judge