PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MOZAFAR H. DAVANI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 05-1432 VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION; STEVEN E. WELCH;

WILLIAM V. JOHNSON, JR.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Claude M. Hilton, District Judge.

(CA-04-1397-1)

Argued: December 1, 2005

Decided: January 17, 2006

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge

Williams wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge

Shedd joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Michael Wayne Beasley, Falls Church, Virginia, for

Appellant. Ronald Nicholas Regnery, Assistant Attorney General,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Judith Williams Jagd-
mann, Attorney General of Virginia, Maureen Riley Matsen, Deputy

Attorney General, Edward M. Macon, Senior Assistant Attorney General/Chief, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

Mozafar Davani was employed by the Virginia Department of

Transportation (Department) where he was supervised by Steven

Welch and William Johnson. Over the course of several years, Davani

received three disciplinary warnings for failure to follow Welch and

Johnson’s instructions. After receiving the third warning, Davani was

terminated. He grieved the third warning and his termination with the

Department, but a hearing officer upheld the termination. Davani

appealed to the Virginia circuit court, which dismissed the appeal. 

Davani subsequently filed suit in federal district court alleging that

the Department, Welch, and Johnson (collectively Appellees): discriminated against him on the basis of his race (Middle Eastern),

national origin (Iran), and religion (Muslim); retaliated against him

for filing prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints;

and violated state law by conspiring to injure his reputation. Appellees moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over Davani’s suit under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, in the alternative, that the suit was precluded by res judicata

and collateral estoppel. The district court granted the motion, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. The district court therefore did not address Appellees’ preclusion arguments. 

Before appellate briefing was due, the Supreme Court decided

Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517

(2005), which significantly altered this circuit’s interpretation of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under our prior cases, the RookerFeldman doctrine had been interpreted broadly to provide that the

loser in a state-court adjudication was barred from bringing suit in

federal court alleging the same claim or a claim that could have been

2 DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT
brought in the state proceedings. Exxon teaches, however, that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the loser in state court

files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court’s decision itself. Because Davani’s suit

does not challenge the state court’s decision, and it instead seeks

redress for an injury allegedly caused by Appellees, the RookerFeldman doctrine does not apply, and the district court’s dismissal of

Davani’s complaint was in error.1

For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse the district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and remand for the district

court to allow the parties to supplement the record so that it may give

full consideration to Appellees’ preclusion arguments.

I.

The Department employed Davani as a Right-of-Way and Utilities

Project Administrator. He was directly supervised by Johnson, and

Welch was in the line of supervision over Davani. Davani alleges that

starting in the year 2000, Johnson began to treat him differently from

other employees because of his race and national origin, culminating

in Johnson denying him a promotion. On December 18, 2000, Davani

filed an internal grievance with the Department, and on March 16,

2001, he filed a formal EEO complaint with the Virginia Department

of Human Resources Management (DHRM) alleging that Johnson’s

failure to promote him was discriminatory. Davani and the Department, acting through Welch, arrived at a settlement whereby Davani

received, inter alia, a promotion to the position of Insurance and Property Management Practitioner. 

Welch later claimed that Davani discussed the settlement with

Department employees in violation of Welch’s instructions, and on

May 15, 2001, he gave Davani a Group II Written Notice for discussing the terms of the settlement.2

 Davani alleges that he did not imper1Of course, we offer no criticism of the district court, which ruled on

the motion to dismiss without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517

(2005). 

2A Group II Written Notice, like a Group I and Group III Written

Notice, is a notice of disciplinary action. Group I offenses "include types

DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT 3
missibly discuss the settlement, and that this Written Notice was

discriminatory and given in retaliation for his success on his prior

EEO complaint. Davani grieved the Written Notice with the Department, but for reasons that are unclear from Davani’s complaint, the

Department took no action on the grievance. Davani contends that

after May 15, 2001, Johnson continued to treat him differently from

others based on his national origin and race, and that after September

11, 2001, Johnson’s mistreatment escalated to the point of giving him

bad work evaluations, making degrading comments to him, and even

threatening violence against him. On November 14, 2001 and February 11, 2002, Davani filed, respectively, a second and third EEO complaint with the DHRM, complaining of discrimination and retaliation.

For reasons that are not clear from Davani’s complaint, the DHRM

did not take action on these EEO complaints.

On February 22, 2002, Welch gave Davani a second Group II Written Notice for failing to follow Johnson’s instructions by, inter alia,

failing to submit a required accident report. Davani alleges that he followed the correct post-accident procedures and that the second Written Notice was also discriminatory and retaliatory. Although the

Department could have terminated Davani at that time based on the

second Group II Written Notice, it only suspended him for thirty

days. On April 3, 2002, after his suspension, Davani filed a charge

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),

"provid[ing] detailed allegations of the full range of unlawful discriminatory (based on race and national origin) and retaliation (based on

protected EEO activities)." (J.A. at 37.) The EEOC subsequently

made a "no violation" finding on Davani’s charge and issued a rightto-sue letter to him. (J.A. at 137.) 

On or about April 7, 2003, Welch gave Davani a third Group II

Written Notice for failing to follow Johnson’s instructions, this time

of behavior least severe in nature but which require correction in the

interest of maintaining a productive and well-managed work force." (J.A.

at 94.) Group II offenses "include acts and behavior which are more

severe in nature and are such that an additional Group II offense should

normally warrant removal." (J.A. at 94.) Group III offenses "include acts

and behavior of such a serious nature that a first occurrence should normally warrant removal." (J.A. at 94.) 

4 DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT
for Davani’s purported failure to investigate certain issues relevant to

the utilities present at a project site. On April 22, 2003, the Department terminated Davani because of the three Group II Written

Notices. 

Davani challenged his termination by filing a grievance with the

Department, arguing that the third Group II Written Notice was unjustified on the facts and that it was retaliatory. The Department refused

to reinstate him, and he requested a hearing before a hearing officer

in the Department of Employment Dispute Resolution. On August 4,

2003, the hearing officer held an evidentiary hearing on the grievance.

Although the record is unclear on this point, it appears that Davani

attempted to challenge his first two Written Notices, but the hearing

officer limited the issue before him to the propriety of the third Written Notice. On August 13, 2003, the hearing officer issued a written

decision reducing Davani’s third Group II Written Notice to a Group

I notice because Davani did not fail to follow his supervisor’s instructions but simply did a poor job. Despite this fact, the ALJ nevertheless

rejected Davani’s challenge to his termination because he still had

two Group II Notices, which were sufficient to sustain Davani’s termination. The hearing officer also stated: "[Davani] contends the

[Department’s] disciplinary action raises from [sic] improper retaliation against him. No credible evidence was presented suggesting the

[Department] disciplined [him] for any impermissible reason." (J.A.

at 95.) 

Davani filed an appeal in the circuit court of Fairfax County. On

October 10, 2003, that court dismissed the appeal, holding that the

hearing officer’s ruling was not "contradictory to law" pursuant to Va.

Code Ann. § 2.2-3006 (Bender 2005). (J.A. at 98.) Davani did not further appeal the circuit court’s decision. 

On November 18, 2004, Davani filed a civil action in the district

court alleging six causes of action: (1) against the Department for discrimination on the basis of race, national origin and religion in violation of federal law; (2) against the Department for retaliation in

violation of federal law; (3) against Welch for retaliation in violation

of federal law; (4) against Johnson for retaliation in violation of federal law; (5) against Appellees for conspiracy to retaliate in violation

of federal law, and (6) against Welch and Johnson for conspiracy to

DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT 5
injure his reputation and professional standing in violation of Virginia

law. 

On January 14, 2005, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that the district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction by virtue of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Davani’s complaint failed

to state a claim on which relief could be granted by virtue of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclusion doctrines. The district court

granted the Rule 12(b)(1) motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and it therefore did not

address Appellees’ Rule 12(b)(6) res judicata and collateral estoppel

arguments. 

Davani appeals, arguing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

extend to his claims. We review de novo the district court’s grant of

Appellees’ motion to dismiss. See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730

(4th Cir. 2002).

II.

Davani argues that Exxon makes clear that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine is inapplicable here because he does not challenge the state

circuit court’s decision itself, but rather seeks redress for Appellees

alleged discrimination and retaliation. Appellees argue that the district

court correctly dismissed Davani’s case under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine because, even after Exxon, Davani’s federal claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the circuit court’s decision. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is the namesake of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In Rooker, the plaintiffs

brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that a statecourt judgment against them was "null and void" because, they

alleged, it was in violation of the Constitution. Id. at 414-15. The

Supreme Court concluded that the district court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over the claim because "[u]nder the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify [a state-court] judgment for

errors of [Constitutional] character." Id. at 416.

6 DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT
In Feldman, the plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court

against the District of Columbia Court of Appeals3 alleging (1) the

District of Columbia court’s rule prohibiting those who had not graduated from law school from becoming members of the bar violated

federal constitutional and statutory law and (2) the District of Columbia court’s denial of their petitions for a waiver from the baradmission rule also violated federal constitutional and statutory law.

Id. at 468. The Supreme Court held that the district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ first claim because the

facial challenge to the rule was like any other challenge of any legislative enactment. Id. at 486. The second claim, however, was different. There, in ruling on the plaintiffs’ application for a waiver, the

District of Columbia court had acted in a judicial, rather than a legislative, capacity. Id. at 480-82. The plaintiffs’ second claim challenged

that judicial determination and therefore effectively sought appellate

review of the District of Columbia court’s ruling in the district court.

Id. Because only the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction to

review a state court’s order, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(a) (West 1993),4

the Supreme Court held that the district court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ second claim. Id. at 482. In a cryptic

footnote, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the district

court would have had subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’

second claim if the plaintiffs had failed to make their federal-law

3The District of Columbia Court of Appeals is the highest local court

in the District of Columbia. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 464 (1983). 

4The full text of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(a) provides: 

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a

State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty

or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the

validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the

ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or

laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or

immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or

the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority

exercised under, the United States. 

The District of Columbia’s court system is treated the same as the court

systems of every state. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(b). 

DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT 7
arguments to the state court, instead holding that "[i]f the constitutional claims presented to [the district court] are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [ruling] in a judicial proceeding . . ., then

the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state

court decision." Id. at 482 n.16 (emphasis added). 

Our cases have given the Rooker-Feldman doctrine an expansive

reading. In Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, 306 F.3d 113 (4th Cir.

2002), for example, the city enacted an ordinance that allowed it to

annex the plaintiffs’ land. Id. at 118. The plaintiffs opposed the

annexation, and filed suit in state court alleging that the ordinance

violated state law. Id. at 119. The state court disagreed and upheld the

ordinance. Id. The plaintiffs then filed suit in the federal district court

alleging that the ordinance violated several federal constitutional provisions. Id. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order and an injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed.

Id.

On appeal, we held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the

suit, stating:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally bars district courts

from sitting in direct review of state court decisions. The

prohibition extends not only to issues actually decided by a

state court but also to those that are inextricably intertwined

with questions ruled upon by a state court. A federal claim

is inextricably intertwined with a state court decision if success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that

the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.

Id. at 120 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because

the plaintiffs had the opportunity to raise their constitutional claims

before the state courts, we held that their federal suit was inextricably

intertwined with the state proceedings. Id. at 121. 

Barefoot and numerous similar cases both from within and outside

of our circuit represent a broad interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.5 The plaintiffs in Rooker and Feldman sought redress for an

5Among the other cases cited by the parties in this case that gave the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine a broad interpretation are Shooting Point v.

8 DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT
injury allegedly caused by the state-court decision itself — in Rooker,

the plaintiff sought to overturn a state-court judgment in federal district court, and in Feldman, the plaintiffs sought to overturn a judgment rendered by the District of Columbia court in federal district

court. In Barefoot, by contrast, we extended the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply in situations where the plaintiff, after losing in state

court, seeks redress for an injury allegedly caused by the defendant’s

actions. What is more, this expansive view of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine carried with it implications for Feldman’s "inextricably intertwined" language. To wit, by shifting the focus from an examination

of whether the plaintiff challenges the state-court decision itself to

whether the plaintiff challenges the defendant’s actions, our interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine became, in essence, a jurisdictional doctrine of res judicata: state-court losers became precluded

from raising claims in federal district court that they had either

already raised before the state court or that were so "inextricably

intertwined" with the claims they presented to the state court that the

federal claims could have been raised in the state proceedings.

Last term, the Supreme Court reined in the expansive interpretation

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine exemplified in cases such as Barefoot. In Exxon, Exxon and Saudi had formed a joint venture to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 1525. Exxon contended that

Saudi had overcharged the venture for certain licenses. Id. Saudi sued

Exxon in state court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the charges

were proper. Id. Exxon then sued in federal court for damages and

asserted as counterclaims in the state action the same claims it had

made in the federal action. Id. Saudi moved to dismiss the federal

court action. Id. The district court denied the motion and Saudi took

an interlocutory appeal. Id. While the federal appeal was pending, the

state case went to trial, and the jury awarded Exxon significant damages. Id. On appeal of the federal court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the Third Circuit held that the state court’s entry of judgment

Cumming, 368 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2004), Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290

F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2002), and Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211

F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2000). See also Leonard v. Suthard, 927 F.2d 168 (4th

Cir. 1991). 

DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT 9
divested the federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 1526. 

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that application of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine was inappropriate because Exxon had

merely filed parallel litigation against Saudi but did not seek redress

from an injury that the state-court order itself caused:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the

kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases

brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review

and rejection of those judgments. . . . [In cases of parallel

litigation, d]isposition of the federal action, once the statecourt adjudication is complete, would be governed by preclusion law. . . . 

[Moreover, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not] stop a

district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction

simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court

a matter previously litigated in state court. If a federal

plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that

denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in

a case to which he was a party . . . , then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.

Id. at 1521-22, 1527 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis

added).

This language undercuts the broad interpretation of the RookerFeldman doctrine we applied in cases like Barefoot. Whereas in Barefoot we examined whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal court is attempting to litigate claims he either litigated or could

have litigated before the state court, Exxon requires us to examine

whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal district court

seeks redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself.6

6

In Exxon, of course, Exxon could not have been complaining that the

state-court decision itself caused it injury because at the time Exxon filed

10 DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT
If he is not challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not apply. See, e.g., Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d

274, 280 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding, post-Exxon, that the RookerFeldman doctrine did not apply because "[the plaintiff’s] claim of

injury rests not on the state court judgment itself, but rather on the

alleged violation of his constitutional rights [by the defendant]"). If,

on the other hand, he is challenging the state-court decision, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. It is important to note that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in this second situation even if the

state-court loser did not argue to the state court the basis of recovery

that he asserts in the federal district court. A claim seeking redress for

an injury caused by the state-court decision itself — even if the basis

of the claim was not asserted to the state court — asks the federal district court to conduct an appellate review of the state-court decision.

Exxon clarifies, however, that § 1257(a) provides that only the

Supreme Court may review state-court decisions. Under Exxon, then,

Feldman’s "inextricably intertwined" language does not create an

additional legal test for determining when claims challenging a statecourt decision are barred, but merely states a conclusion: if the statecourt loser seeks redress in the federal district court for the injury

caused by the state-court decision, his federal claim is, by definition,

"inextricably intertwined" with the state-court decision, and is therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the federal district court. See

Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 86-87 (2d

Cir. 2005) ("[D]escribing a federal claim as ‘inextricably intertwined’

with a state-court judgment only states a conclusion. Rooker-Feldman

bars a federal claim, whether or not raised in state court, that asserts

injury based on a state judgment and seeks review and reversal of that

judgment; such a claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state

judgment."); cf. Washington, 407 F.3d at 280 (concluding that plaintiff’s federal suit was not "inextricably intertwined" with the statecourt decision because it sought redress for the defendant’s violation

of his rights, not the state-court decision.) 

its federal suit, the state court had not even reached a final judgment in

the parallel state case. The rule announced in Exxon — that the RookerFeldman doctrine applies only if the state-court loser files a federal suit

seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state-court decision

itself — extends beyond the context of parallel litigation. 

DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT 11
Applying Exxon here, we reject Appellees’ argument that Davani’s

federal suit is "inextricably intertwined" with the state proceedings.

Davani lost before the Virginia circuit court and then filed a suit in

the federal district court raising similar claims to those he presented

in the state proceedings.7 In his federal complaint, Davani did not

allege that the state decision caused him injury; rather, he alleged that

Appellees discriminated against him in violation of federal and state

law. Davani’s federal claims do not challenge the state decision and

are therefore "independent" from that decision. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at

1527. As the Second Circuit put it well in Hoblock v. Albany County

Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005):

Suppose a plaintiff sues his employer in state court for violating . . . anti-discrimination law and . . . loses. If the plaintiff then brings the same suit in federal court, he will be

seeking a decision from the federal court that denies the

state court’s conclusion that the employer is not liable, but

he will not be alleging injury from the state judgment.

Instead, he will be alleging injury based on the employer’s

discrimination. The fact that the state court chose not to

remedy the injury does not transform the subsequent federal

suit on the same matter into an appeal, forbidden by RookerFeldman, of the state-court judgment.

Id. at 87-88. We therefore conclude that Davani’s claims were properly before the district court under Exxon’s interpretation of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

III.

Appellees contend that even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does

not bar this suit under Rule 12(b)(1), the suit nevertheless must be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the doctrines of res judicata

and collateral estoppel preclude it. While the district court’s failure to

address these legal arguments below does not alone prevent us from

addressing them on appeal, see Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524

(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that dismissal on res judicata grounds is

7We assume, without deciding, that the state circuit court’s dismissal

of the hearing officer’s decision was a "judicial" proceeding for purposes

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

12 DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT
proper under Rule 12(b)(6) unless a disputed issue of material fact

exists); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4

F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "is

intended to test the legal adequacy of the complaint"), prudence counsels that, because of the undeveloped state of the record, we refrain

from doing so at this time. 

Among the factors that must be considered in determining the preclusive sweep of Davani’s state proceedings are the claims Davani

actually made and the issues that he actually presented in those proceedings. See, e.g., Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., 576 S.E.2d 504,

506-507 (Va. 2003) (holding that one of the elements of Virginia res

judicata law, "identity of the cause of action," requires that the "same

evidence [be] necessary to prove [the claims in the first and second

suit]" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Harnett v. Billman, 800

F.2d 1308, 1312 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that the "identity of the

cause of action" test under federal law requires that the claims "aris[e]

out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions");

Whitley v. Virginia, 538 S.E.2d 296, 299 (Va. 2000) (noting that one

of the elements of Virginia collateral estoppel law is that the factual

issue sought to be precluded must have been "actually litigated" in the

prior proceeding); Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d

219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998) (announcing a similar element under federal

law).8 Neither the hearing officer’s written decision nor the circuit

court’s dismissal of Davani’s appeal, however, indicate precisely

what claims Davani made in his grievance or, similarly, what issues

were actually decided. For example, it is unclear from the record

whether the hearing officer even allowed Davani to challenge his first

two Group II Written Notices, which were the grounds on which the

hearing officer affirmed Davani’s termination. If Davani was unable

to challenge those prior Written Notices, this fact would be relevant

to the resolution of whether Davani’s state proceedings and federal

suit share an "identity of the cause of action," Davis, 576 S.E.2d at

506, and whether the factual issue was "actually litigated," Whitley,

538 S.E.2d at 299. To consider Appellees’ arguments on the record

before us, especially considering that Davani represented at oral argument that a tape recording of the grievance hearing exists, would be

8We need not decide at this juncture whether Virginia or federal law

determines the preclusive effect of the state proceedings in this case. 

DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT 13
premature. We therefore conclude that the proper course of action is

to remand to the district court to allow the parties to supplement the

record with material relevant to Appellees’ res judicata and collateral

estoppel arguments.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s Rule

12(b)(1) dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and remand

for the district court to allow the parties to supplement the record so

that it may give full consideration to Appellees’ Rule 12(b)(6) claim

and issue preclusion arguments.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

14 DAVANI v. VIRGINIA DOT