UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ GREGORY IFESINACHI EZEANI, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. DR. LUIS RODOLFO GARCIA CARILLO; DR. DAVID V. JAUREGUI; DR. PHAME CAMARENA, Defendants - Appellees. No. 23-2104 (D.C. No. 2:23-CV -00325-MIS-DLM) (D. N.M.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Gregory Ifesinachi Ezeani, pro se, appeal s the district court’s order dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Exercising jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 25, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-2104 Document: 010110989810 Date Filed: 01/25/2024 Page: 12 I Ezeani, a former student at New Mexico State University (NMSU), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the alleged viola tion of his civil right s. A magistrate judge granted his motion to proceed wit hout prepayment of fees (IFP). After screening the complaint, the magistrate j udge determined that it failed to state plausible claims for relief and directed Ez eani to file an amended complaint. In his amended complaint, Ezeani allege d that NMSU Assistant Professor Luis Rodolfo Garcia Carrillo “failed to provide academic supplies, re fuse[d] to provide distribution of mark of his project grades for proper transparency and . . . penalized [him] for not using suppl[ies] that he did not provide.” R., vol. 1 at 146. According to Ezeani, Professor Carrillo “violated NM SU Rule[s] 4.41, 5.40 & 3.00.” Id. For his claims against David V. Ja uregui, NMSU’s Associate Dean of Academics, and Phame Camarena, its Inte rim Dean of Graduate Studies, Ezeani alleged that “Dr. Jauregui on appeal di d not follow the University rule in his decision,” and “Dr. [Camarena] on final a ppeal refuse[d] to fo llow NMSU rule in making final decision.” Id. Ezeani alleged violations of his (1) “[ F]ifth [A]mendment . . . right to due process to NMSU law determination,” (2) “[E]ight[h] [A]mendment . . . right to NMSU Rule,” and (3) “14th [A]mendment . . . right to NMSU Rule.” Id. at 145. As relief, he sought (1) $20,000 in compensa tory damages, id. at 146; (2) damages for “emotional pain and suffering” from being “subjected to unlawful academic Appellate Case: 23-2104 Document: 010110989810 Date Filed: 01/25/2024 Page: 23 probation,” id. at 147; and (3) an order de leting “the F grade gi ven” by Dr. Carrillo, id. at 146. In its memorandum opinion and order dismissing the amended complaint, the district court determined that Ezeani “fails to state a due process claim because [he] does not identify a protected property inte rest to which due process protections apply.” Id. at 151. Specifically, “[t]here are no factual allegati ons that [his] class grade is a protected property interest, [or] that [he] has a protected property interest in remaining off academic probation.” Id. Also, the amended complaint fails to “describe the criteria for placing students on academic probation or the consequences of being placed on academic probation.” Id. Further, the court explained that th e amended complaint “does not contain [any] factual allegations desc ribing the process due to [E zeani] and showing [that he] was not afforded the process due.” Id. To the contrary, “[t]he Amended Complaint [contains only] conclusory allegations th at Defendants violated or did not follow NMSU rules but does not contain factual allegations regarding what those rules require and how Defendants violated those rules.” Id. “[B]ecause the Amended Complaint does not describe the rule(s) th at Defendants allegedl y did not follow or the appeal process that Defe ndants provided, the Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts showing that Defendants di d not provide an appropriate level of process during [Ezeani’s] app eal.” Id. at 152. The court also determined that E zeani’s Eighth Amendment claim failed because “[t]he Eighth Amendment, which prohi bits the infliction of cruel and unusual Appellate Case: 23-2104 Document: 010110989810 Date Filed: 01/25/2024 Page: 34 punishments, applies to thos e who have been convicted of crime [and] [t]here are no factual allegations in the Amended Compla int that [Ezeani] was convicted of a crime.” Id. (internal quot ation marks omitted).
II Any complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915( a) is subject to sua sponte dismissal if the court determines that complaint “fai ls to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U. S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii ). “[W]e review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to . . . § 1915(e)(2) in an [IFP] proceeding.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 10 91, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009). In doing so, “[w]e apply the same standard of review for dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that we employ for Fe deral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failur e to state a claim.” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to di smiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausibl e on its face.’” Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2023) (q uoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 67 8 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp . v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[W]hen Iqbal speaks of a claim’s facial plausibility, the complaint must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellate Case: 23-2104 Document: 010110989810 Date Filed: 01/25/2024 Page: 45 “In reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, our role is like the district court’s: we accept the well-p leaded facts alleged as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but need not accept threadbare rec itals of the elements of a cause of action that ar e supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. (citation, brackets and internal quotation marks omitte d). “An allegation is conclusory where it states an inference wit hout stating underlying facts or is devoid of any factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Because [Ezeani] [appears] pro se, we liberally cons true his filings, but we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wa das, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). “Although we construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint broadl y, the plaintiff still has the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized le gal claim could be based.” Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III In his opening brief, Ezeani lists seve ral reasons why the district court’s decision was wrong. For example, he argue s that his class grade is a protected property interest that warrant s due process protections becau se it “results from effort owned and resource invested by the student .” Aplt. Opening Br . at 8. Next, he maintains that because the c ourt did not issue summonses to defendants, “it is the duty of the court to show beyond reasona ble doubt that evidence provided by the plaintiff lacks merit or [that] it is . . . false ev idence before dismissa l.” Id. at 9. Similarly, he argues that his failure to describe the NMSU rules that defendants Appellate Case: 23-2104 Document: 010110989810 Date Filed: 01/25/2024 Page: 56 allegedly failed to follow, th e appeal process, or the process that was provided must be overlooked “because the court [did] not refute[] that the evidence provided by the plaintiff was faulty or false.” Id. at 10. As to the alleged Eighth Amendment violation, he contends that “stopping the plaintiff from gra duation and placing him on] academic probation . . . is as good as [a ] crim[inal] conviction because [un]usual punishment exist[s] in both ci rcumstances.” Id. at 11. But Ezeani fails to address the releva nt question: whether the amended complaint stated plausible cl aims for relief. Instead, as an overarching argument, he maintains that any considerat ion of whether the amended complaint stated plausible claims for relief was premat ure because “[t]he [district] court lacks jurisdiction to determine final insufficie ncy without issuing a summons to the defendant to determine sufficiency or non- sufficiency in a federal civil procedure method of investigation.” Id. at 12. He also faults th e district court for “fa il[ing] to investigate” his case before dismissing it. Id. at 11. Ezeani does not support any of his argumen ts with legal authority. Therefore, we decline to consider them. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A ) (among other things, “[t]he appellant’s brief must contain . . . the argument, wh ich [in turn] must contain[] appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citati ons to the authorities . . . on which the appellant relies”); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a pro se litigant must comply with Rule 28, including providing legal authority for his arguments); Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Ci r. 1992) (declining to cons ider an issue, in part, Appellate Case: 23-2104 Document: 010110989810 Date Filed: 01/25/2024 Page: 67 because appellant’s position not even mi nimally supported by legal argument or authority). 1
IV The judgment of the dist rict court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge

1 The only legal authority cited by Ezeani is Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), which held that “a complain t should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can pr ove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” See Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. However, the Conley standard is no longer good law; rather, the “beyond doubt” standard was abrogated and replaced with the plausibility standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560-63 (2007). Appellate Case: 23-2104 Document: 010110989810 Date Filed: 01/25/2024 Page: 7