*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-30152

Summary Calendar

_____________________

SHEANNE M. TIERNEY, Individually and on

behalf of her minor child,

Christopher Michael Tierney,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

PRINCIPAL HEALTH CARE OF LOUISIANA, INC.,

Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(93-CV-1810-S)

_________________________________________________________________

February 26, 1999

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sheanne Tierney appeals a jury decision denying her product

liability claims against General Motors Corporation (“GM”).

Because we find that the evidence supports the jury’s finding in

this case, we affirm.
2

Tierney was injured when a Nissan pickup truck, driven by

LaToya Waller Cruz, lost control and crossed into oncoming traffic

on Lapalco Boulevard in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The pickup

first hit a Ford Taurus and then collided with the left front

corner of a Chevrolet Cavalier driven by Tierney. The accident was

devastating, causing Tierney to suffer terrible damage to her lower

right leg and severe facial injuries. 

Tierney filed lawsuits against both Cruz and GM. She settled

with Cruz for $25,000, the policy limit of Cruz’s insurance policy.

Her claim against GM alleged that her Cavalier was unreasonably

dangerous because there existed a superior floor design for the

vehicle. In order to prevail at trial, Tierney had to show (1)

that an unreasonably dangerous condition existed and (2) that the

condition legally caused the injury to Tierney. The jury concluded

that Tierney succeeded in demonstrating an unreasonable condition,

but failed to show that it was the legal cause of Tierney’s

injuries. The trial court therefore rendered judgment in favor of

GM.

On appeal, Tierney argues, first, that the jury’s two findings

are legally inconsistent and, second, that the evidence does not

support the jury’s finding that the defect was not a proximate

cause of the accident. Tierney’s first argument is unavailing.

Although the jury’s first finding, that the car was unreasonably

dangerous, requires the jury to conclude that the defect could have

caused the injury in question, Tierney still had to meet the burden
3

of showing that the defect caused the injury in this particular

situation. In this case, the jury concluded that the accident was

so severe that Tierney would have suffered the injury regardless.

Tierney’s second argument requires a review of the evidence

supporting the jury’s conclusion. Our review of jury

determinations is particularly deferential. We will not substitute

our judgment for that of the jury unless there is no evidence “of

such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the

exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.”

Granberry v. O’Barr, 866 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1988). At trial,

GM presented evidence that Tierney’s collision led to a significant

change in the velocity of the two vehicles. GM also presented

expert testimony that, for accidents involving similar changes in

velocity, passengers were exceedingly likely to suffer lower leg

and foot injuries regardless of the design of the car. In the

light of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the jury erred in

reaching its conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we therefore AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

A F F I R M E D.