IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-70,963-02

EX PARTE JUAN RAMON MEZA SEGUNDO, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

IN CAUSE NO. C-3-W011370-0974988-B

IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NUMBER THREE

FROM TARRANT COUNTY

NEWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion in which HERVEY and

KEEL, JJ., joined.

We have already recognized that the United States Supreme 

Court’s death-penalty test for determining intellectual disability does not 

answer whether an intellectually disabled capital murderer fits into that 

category of offenders whose moral blameworthiness is lessened by their 
Segundo Concurring — 2

intellectual disability.1 The test, or at least the floor for the diagnostic 

criteria, has become untethered from the rationale for that test set out 

in Atkins v. Virginia.2 This defendant, a serial killer who brutally raped 

and murdered eleven-year-old Vanessa Villa (as well as two other 

women while the Villa murder remained unsolved), could not provide a 

clearer example of the Supreme Court’s intellectual failure. Segundo 

does not fit the mold that the Supreme Court used to justify the 

intellectual disability exemption from the death penalty.3

Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that the 

execution of intellectually disabled defendants violates the Eighth 

1 Petetan v. State, 622 S.W.3d 321, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“At its core, [Atkins v. 

Virginia] seems to rest its justification for a death-penalty exemption on the assumption that 

intellectual disability is a character trait that lessens moral culpability and so the retributive 

value of punishment. But the clinical criteria for diagnosing someone with intellectual 

development disorder seems to look forward to how the diagnosis can better assist the 

individual function in society without regard to any consideration of moral blameworthiness.”).

2 See, e.g., Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Newell, J., 

concurring) (“But to the extent that Applicant can build a claim of intellectual disability upon 

the shifting sands of clinical psychological standards detailed in [Moore v. Texas], this case 

demonstrates that the determination of intellectual disability has become untethered from the 

original rationale for the exception to the imposition of the death penalty announced in [Atkins 

v. Virginia].”).

3 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (“[Intellectually disabled] persons frequently 

know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of 

their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and 

process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, 

to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. 

There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but 

there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a 

premeditated plan, and that in group setting they are followers rather than leaders. Their 

deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their 

personal culpability.”).
Segundo Concurring — 3

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.4 When 

we decide cases involving the United States Constitution, we are bound 

by United States Supreme Court case law interpreting it.5 If we disagree 

with the Court’s holding, too bad. It is up to the United States Supreme 

Court to fix it, not us. 

In this case, Applicant presented some evidence of his intellectual 

disability during his trial, but he was denied a specific jury instruction 

on the issue. In his first habeas application, Applicant raised a claim 

regarding intellectual disability. The trial court made findings and 

conclusions regarding Applicant’s claims based in part upon the criteria 

we set out in Ex parte Briseno.6 We deferred to those findings and 

denied relief.7 The United States Supreme Court subsequently made 

clear in Moore v. Texas that we cannot rely upon the test set out in 

Briseno because it violates the federal constitution.8 Applicant filed a 

4 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.

5 See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also United States 

Const. Art. VI, cl. 2; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 146 (1803) (“This is the 

supreme court, and by reason of its supremacy must have the superintendence of the inferior 

tribunals and offices whether judicial or ministerial.”). 

6 See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore v. Texas, 

137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).

7 Ex parte Segundo, No. WR-70,963-01, 2010 WL 4978402 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2010) 

(not designated for publication).

8 Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017) (holding that the Briseno factors may not be 

used to restrict the qualification of an individual as intellectually disabled).
Segundo Concurring — 4

subsequent writ application based upon Moore, and we remanded the

case for the habeas court to resolve Applicant’s claim of intellectual 

disability.9

Applying the standard set out in Moore, the habeas court resolved 

Applicant’s claim in his favor. The habeas court made factual findings 

to support its conclusion that Applicant is intellectually disabled under 

Moore. Those findings are supported by the record.10 The State does 

not contest those findings and agrees that it cannot execute Applicant 

due to his intellectual disability. Applicant is entitled to relief under 

Supreme Court precedent, and the Court correctly grants it. We’ve 

already seen what happens when we ignore the Supreme Court on this 

issue.11 

With these thoughts, I join the Court’s order.

Filed: May 25, 2022

9 Ex parte Segundo, No. WR-70,963-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2018) (not designated for 

publication).

10 Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting that we defer to and 

accept a trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in post-conviction habeas review 

when those findings and conclusions are supported by the record).

11 Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (Moore I); Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2019) (Moore 

II). 
Segundo Concurring 

—5

Publish