Present: All the Justices 

LINDA FLANARY 

v. Record No. 010220 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 January 11, 2002 

DOSS JACKSON MILTON, JR. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 

Donald A. McGlothlin, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we determine whether an oral property 

settlement agreement between spouses made during a deposition 

taken in furtherance of an action for divorce is valid. 

 Linda and Ross E. Flanary married on February 5, 1982 and 

separated on July 7, 1995. Mrs. Flanary filed for divorce on 

the grounds of desertion and/or cruelty and Mr. Flanary filed a 

cross-bill seeking a divorce based upon desertion. On April 17, 

1997, during Mrs. Flanary's deposition taken in conjunction with

the divorce proceedings, an oral agreement between the parties 

was recited into the record by the parties' attorneys. The 

agreement provided that Mrs. Flanary, in exchange for a lump sum 

payment of $45,000, would release "any interest in any assets [] 

in [Mr. Flanary's] possession and/or name and in further release 

of any interest or any rights she has to any additional or 

future spousal support." Mrs. Flanary agreed to this 

arrangement and agreed that it would serve as "a full and final 

settlement of all rights accrued by virtue of this marriage." 
Mr. Flanary died the day after the deposition. The divorce 

proceeding was subsequently dismissed. 

Mrs. Flanary filed a petition of surviving spouse, pursuant 

to Code § 64.1-151.1, for determination of the appropriate 

family allowance, exempt property, and an elective share of the 

augmented estate. Mr. Doss Jackson Milton, Jr., as executor of 

Mr. Flanary's estate (the Executor), filed a responsive pleading 

asserting that Mrs. Flanary was estopped from pursuing these 

claims because she contracted away all her marital interests in 

Mr. Flanary's estate in the oral agreement made during her 

deposition. Following briefing and oral argument of counsel, 

the trial court concluded that the oral agreement was valid and 

effectively released "not only any marital rights [Mrs. Flanary] 

may have had as to equitable distribution, spousal support or 

property, but also any inchoate right to inherit from or 

otherwise participate in the distribution of the estate of Mr. 

Flanary." The trial court entered a final decree dismissing 

Mrs. Flanary's petition. We awarded Mrs. Flanary an appeal. 

 The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the oral 

agreement made in conjunction with the divorce proceeding is 

valid. The General Assembly has identified agreements between 

spouses involving rights and obligations arising from the 

marital relationship as a unique category of agreements subject 

to specific requirements. Code § 20-155 provides that: 

2
Married persons may enter into agreements with each 

other for the purpose of settling the rights and 

obligations of either or both of them, to the same 

extent, with the same effect, and subject to the same 

conditions, as provided in §§ 20-147 through 20-154 

for agreements between prospective spouses, except 

that such marital agreements shall become effective 

immediately upon their execution. However, a 

reconciliation of the parties after the signing of a 

separation or property settlement agreement shall 

abrogate such agreement unless otherwise expressly set 

forth in the agreement. 

Code § 20-150 identifies the various subjects that such 

agreements may properly address, including the parties' rights 

regarding spousal support and disposition of property upon 

separation or divorce. The agreement at issue purported to 

settle, among other things, spousal support and property rights. 

However, the agreement was not in writing, nor was it signed by 

the parties as required by Code § 20-149. 

The Executor, relying on Richardson v. Richardson, 10 Va. 

App. 391, 392 S.E.2d 688 (1990), asserts that Code § 20-155 does 

not apply to the agreement at issue. The Court of Appeals in 

Richardson held that "compromises and settlement agreements to 

pending litigation which incidentally include issues of property 

and spousal support" are not within the purview of Code § 20-155 

and, thus, do not need to comply with the requirement that such 

agreements be in writing. Id. at 398, 392 S.E.2d at 691. We 

disagree. 

3
Statutes must be read according to their plain meaning, 

giving effect to the language that the legislature chose to use. 

Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985); 

Bott v. Hampton Roads San. Dist. Com., 190 Va. 775, 783, 58 

S.E.2d 306, 309 (1950). Code § 20-155 by its terms applies to 

agreements between spouses affecting the "rights and 

obligations" arising from the marital relationship. While 

agreements made in contemplation of settling litigation can be 

enforced even though not reduced to writing, see, e.g., SnyderFalkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 376, 457 S.E.2d 36 (1995), 

nothing in the language of Code § 20-155 exempts from its 

application a property or spousal support agreement made in 

contemplation of resolving a pending divorce action. Nor can 

such an exemption be read into the statute. Courts are not 

allowed to write new words into a statute plain on its face. 

Porter v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 183 Va. 108, 113, 31 

S.E.2d 337, 339 (1944). 

 Additionally, collateral statutes within the Premarital 

Agreement Act clearly contemplate marital agreements entered 

into for the purpose of resolving a pending divorce action. The 

language of Code § 20-150(3) specifically includes agreements 

made regarding the disposition of property upon "marital 

dissolution" within its provisions. Furthermore, the 1998 

amendment to Code § 20-155 anticipates agreements made during 

4
proceedings for dissolution of a marriage, by providing that a 

signed separation or property settlement agreement is abrogated 

if the parties reconcile unless otherwise specifically provided 

in the agreement. For these reasons, we reject the Executor's 

arguments and the rationale and holding of Richardson upon which 

he relies. 

 We hold that Mrs. Flanary's oral agreement made in 

conjunction with the divorce proceedings was subject to the 

provisions of Code § 20-155. The agreement was not in writing 

and not signed by the parties, as required by statute. 

Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the agreement to be 

valid and in dismissing Mrs. Flanary's petition as surviving 

spouse for determination of family allowance, exempt property, 

and an elective share of Mr. Flanary's augmented estate. 

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and 

remand the case for further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded.

5