In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 97-3821, 97-3826, 98-3885

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ADETORO ADENIJI,

ADEMOLA G. ALLISMITH, and

ABDUL R. ADEDIRAN,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 96 CR 259--James T. Moody, Judge.

Argued April 23, 1999/*--Decided July 26, 2000

 Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

 ROVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury found the three

defendants in this case guilty of mail fraud.

They attack their convictions on a variety of

grounds that we find to be without merit.

I.

 In April and May of 1991, the Motorola

Corporation issued a series of five checks

totaling $17,951.40 to Better Communications

Systems ("BCS") and Michael Owonla Marketer’s

Inc. ("MOM"), purportedly two of its vendors. The

first four checks were mailed and cashed. When

Motorola did some investigating before mailing

the fifth check, it could locate no invoice to

support any of the five checks. Upon further

investigation, Motorola determined that its

employee, defendant Adetoro Adeniji, had covertly

caused each of the five checks to issue. BCS and

MOM turned out to be fictitious businesses whose

mailing addresses and bank accounts were

established by her two co-defendants, Ademola

Allismith and Abdul Adediran.

 Motorola hired Adeniji in January 1990, under

the name Toro Williams (her married name). In

January 1991, the company assigned her to work in
the accounts payable department at the company’s

headquarters in Schaumburg, Illinois, as a data

entry clerk. When an outside vendor provided

goods and services to one of the Motorola

entities in the United States--a "Motorolan"--the

vendor would submit an invoice requesting

payment; the Motorolan would then forward the

invoice to the accounts payable department in

Schaumburg. There the invoices were assigned to

one of three processing groups organized

alphabetically (A-G, H-O, and P-Z) based on the

vendor name.

 A batch control person in each group would

quickly review the invoices to make sure they

contained the information required for payment,

including an account number and an authorizing

signature. Once the batch control operator had

reviewed the invoices, she would batch them into

groups of between twenty-five and forty invoices,

assign a control number to the batch and place

the invoices into a folder, record certain

information about each batch, including the total

dollar amount billed on the invoices in that

batch, on a batch control group log sheet ("batch

log"), and assign the batch to a data entry clerk

like Adeniji for processing. The identification

number of the assigned clerk would be entered

into the batch log. The data entry clerks had

access to the batch logs, and they were free to

visit the batch control person’s office and log

out batches of invoices for processing on their

own. 

 Data entry clerks would then enter information

from each invoice in the batch into the company’s

computer system, enabling checks to issue. This

information included the vendor number, Motorola

account number, date and number of the invoice,

and dollar amount of the invoice. The clerk would

also record the date she entered this data into

the computer and the batch control number. After

inputting the data from all of the invoices in

the batch, the clerk would complete a control

group ticket sheet, noting the total number of

invoices in the batch, the total dollar amount

billed on the invoices, the batch control number,

the date of entry into the computer system, and

her own operator identification number. It was

the data entry clerk’s responsibility to make

sure that the total invoice dollar amount she

entered on the control group ticket sheet jibed

with the amount reflected in the batch log. Once

all this was completed, the clerk would return

the batch to the batch control person. Each clerk

processed between two and three hundred invoices

daily. Checks were issued and mailed to vendors

three times weekly based on the information input

by the data entry clerks.
 In the course of processing the invoices, the

data entry clerk might discover that the vendor

identified on a particular invoice had not yet

been set up in the company’s database. In such

cases, the clerk would take the invoice to the

vendor file maintenance person in her group. This

individual was responsible for assigning a unique

identification number to each new vendor, after

verifying the vendor’s legitimacy. Once this was

done, she would enter appropriate information for

the vendor into the database (including such

things as the terms of payment for this vendor),

enabling data entry clerks to process invoices

for the vendor.

 In June 1991, Adeniji’s supervisor, Judith

Amerlan Johnson ("Amerlan"), began looking into

the five checks that Motorola had issued in April

and May to vendors MOM and BCS. Her investigation

commenced after it became apparent that the total

dollar amounts of the invoice batches from which

these checks emanated were out of balance, and

the invoices corresponding to these checks could

not be found. In the course of her investigation,

Amerlan reviewed the pertinent batches of

invoices, the batch log sheets, the control group

tickets, and two different computer records: the

terminal screen printouts, and daily accounting

activity reports for each data entry clerk. The

terminal screen printout reflected the data for

each invoice as entered into the computer system

by the clerk, including the clerk’s two-digit

operating code. The accounting activity report

tracked all of the invoices entered into the

system by a particular clerk on a particular day.

Because this report was keyed to the clerk’s

security password, which the clerk had to use in

order to log on to Motorola’s computer system, it

was the most accurate record of the data that

each clerk had actually entered into the system.

 The accounting activity reports pointed to

Adeniji as the clerk who entered the data for

each of the five checks that Amerlan was

investigating. The batch logs, the control group

tickets, and the terminal screen printouts all

indicated that clerks Linda Clark and Shirley

Williams had input the data. But the accounting

activity reports showed that Clark and Williams

were either logged off of their terminals at the

time the data was entered or busy entering data

from other invoices. These reports revealed that

Adeniji, in fact, was the person who had keyed in

the information. Her time cards confirmed that

she was working at these times. And, like any

other data entry clerk, she knew her fellow

clerks’ operator code numbers. At least two other

irregularities indicated that the five checks

were issued improperly.
 First, Amerlan was never able to find any of

the invoices corresponding to these checks. The

invoices underlying the first four checks were

the only ones missing from their batches. On the

other hand, the batch that included the invoice

for the fifth check was missing altogether.

Computer records indicated that Adeniji had

entered the data for that fifth check six days

after a different clerk (Shirley Williams) had

completed the rest of the batch.

 Second, on April 19, 1991, Adeniji had

approached Carol Rickman, the vendor maintenance

person for the H-O invoice group (recall that

Adeniji worked in the A-G group) to ask why an

invoice from MOM was on hold. That invoice had

been forwarded to Rickman because MOM had not yet

been validated and set up in Motorola’s computer

system. Adeniji told Rickman that someone from

MOM had called her to ask why the company was not

being paid. Rickman explained that she had

already tried to call MOM and obtain its

taxpayer’s identification number, but without

success. Adeniji urged Rickman to complete the

verification as quickly as possible so that MOM’s

invoice could be processed right away. Later that

same day, Adeniji returned to Rickman with a

taxpayer i.d. number she said she had obtained

from MOM. In violation of protocol, Rickman

entered the number into the system without

verifying it herself, assigned a vendor number to

MOM, and gave the invoice to Adeniji, who input

the data the same day. Adeniji would later deny

having asked Rickman to establish MOM as a

vendor, pointing out that as a member of the A-G

alpha group, she would have nothing to do with

MOM. Adeniji resigned from Motorola’s employ on

July 22, 1991.

 Whereas Adeniji arranged for the checks to be

issued, Adediran and Allismith arranged for their

receipt. In early April 1991, Adediran, using the

aliases "Michael Owonla" and "Michael Olowanla,"

rented commercial mailboxes in the Chicago

suburbs of Northbrook and Vernon Hills, Illinois.

All three of the checks that Adeniji caused

Motorola to issue to MOM were later mailed to the

Vernon Hills address. Adediran used both

addresses to open three different checking

accounts--all under the name Michael or Micheal

C. Owonla--in Vernon Hills, Riverwoods, and

Northbrook. One of the three Motorola checks

issued to MOM was deposited into each of these

accounts; Adediran’s fingerprint was later

identified on one of the checks. Each account was

closed by the end of May, 1991, with a negative

balance. Tellers from two of these banks

identified Adediran as the individual who engaged

in transactions at the banks as "Michael Owonla".
 At the end of March, 1991, Adediran opened a

fourth checking account at the Uptown National

Bank in Chicago. The account was for a company

named Beta Enterprises, and on the account

application, Adediran identified "Babatunde

Adediran" as the authorized signer on the

account. A handwriting expert identified the

signature on three different documents associated

with this account as Adediran’s. On May 11,

Adediran wrote a check on this account in the

amount of $3,000 to Toro Williams, the name that

Adeniji used while in Motorola’s employ. That

check was later deposited into a joint bank

account that Adeniji maintained with her husband

at another bank. 

 Allismith’s activities were quite similar. In

mid-May, 1991, Allismith rented a post office box

in the Rogers Park neighborhood of Chicago for

BCS using the name "Steve T. Howard." (A

handwriting expert was able to positively

identify some of the entries on the application

form as Allismith’s.) This was the address

reflected on both of the checks that Motorola

issued to BCS. Also in mid-May, Allismith opened

a checking account at the Uptown National Bank

under the name "Henry A. Smith." On the same day

that Allismith opened this account, Adediran

withdrew $3,000 in cash from one of his Owonla

checking accounts. Two days later, $3,000 in cash

was deposited into the Henry Smith account. In

early June, Allismith opened a second account at

the Uptown National Bank under the name "Henry A.

Smith D/B/A Better Communication Systems." He

opened the account with one of the two checks

that Motorola issued to BCS. A handwriting expert

would later identify handwriting on documents

associated with both of the accounts at the

Uptown National Bank, as well as the endorsement

of the Motorola check, as Allismith’s

handwriting.

 A postal inspector was unable to verify the

existence of either BCS or MOM. The inspector

went to each of the mailboxes linked to the two

companies, and in turn to the addresses listed on

the applications for those boxes, but could find

no evidence of an operating business.

 Telephone records revealed a series of phone

calls between telephones registered or assigned

to Adeniji and her co-defendants (in some cases,

under their aliases) beginning in February 1991

and continuing through early October 1991. Many

of these calls took place on dates when key

events in the scheme to defraud Motorola took

place--when Adeniji inputted data from one of the

MOM or BCS invoices into the Motorola payment

system, for example, or Adediran opened a bank

account. So far as the telephone records reveal,
however, Adediran and Allismith never spoke to

each other. The records reflect calls between

Adeniji and Adediran, and Adeniji and Allismith,

but no calls between Adediran and Allismith.

II.

A.

 Adediran and Allismith contend that the evidence

was insufficient to convict them of mail

fraud./1 Our review of the sufficiency of the

evidence is highly deferential. E.g., United

States v. Woolfolk, 197 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1705 (2000). Only

when the evidence, viewed favorably to the

government, would permit no reasonable jury to

find the defendant guilty of the crime charged

will we reverse the conviction. Id. Adediran and

Allismith argue that without proof that neither

MOM nor BCS ever provided any goods or services

to Motorola, the jury could not reasonably find

that they intended to defraud Motorola.

 Although no Motorola witness ever confirmed that

MOM and BCS were not legitimate vendors, the jury

could still find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Adediran and Allismith were defrauding Motorola.

First, none of the invoices supporting the five

checks issued to MOM and BCS could be found.

Second, Adeniji input the data from these

(putative) invoices in a manner which bespoke

fraud: she used other operators’ codes, and

logged the invoices into batches assigned to

those operators, in an effort to conceal her own

connection to the checks. Third, Adeniji

personally intervened with the vendor maintenance

person for the H-O alpha group to have MOM

approved as a vendor, although Adeniji did not

even work in that group. Fourth, Motorola was

given commercial or post-office mailbox addresses

for both MOM and BCS that Adediran and Allismith

had rented under aliases. Fifth, MOM and BCS

purportedly issued the invoices to Motorola

before either vendor had established a mailing

address or bank account. For example, the data

that Adeniji entered into Motorola’s accounts

payable system indicated that MOM’s first invoice

to Motorola was dated February 12, 1991. Yet,

Adediran did not rent the commercial mailbox used

as MOM’s vendor address until April 3, 1991, and

he did not open any of the three checking

accounts into which the MOM checks were deposited

until the second week of April. Likewise,

although the putative invoices underlying the two

checks issued to BCS were (according to the data

input by Adeniji) issued in December 1990 and

January 1991, Allismith did not rent the post

office box for BCS or obtain an assumed name

certificate for the company until May 1991, and

he did not open a bank account for the business
until June. Sixth, each of the bank accounts into

which Adediran and Allismith deposited the checks

from Motorola was opened under an alias. Seventh,

when he visited the residential addresses that

Adediran and Allismith had given in renting the

mail boxes for the two companies, the postal

inspector could not confirm that either MOM or

BCS was an actual, legitimate business. These

circumstances, among others, supply more than

ample proof that Adediran and Allismith intended

to defraud Motorola.

 Allismith secondarily argues that the evidence

did not establish his joint participation in the

scheme to defraud Motorola with Adeniji and

Adediran. As we mentioned earlier, there is

abundant proof of telephone calls between

Allismith and Adeniji on the one hand, and

Adeniji and Adediran on the other, but no direct

proof of contact between Allismith and Adeniji.

Indeed, as Allismith points out, there is no

proof that he and Adediran even knew one another.

 Whether or not the government established a

direct link between Adediran and Allismith is

irrelevant, however. The joint agreement that is

essential to a defendant’s liability for the

crime of conspiracy is not a prerequisite to a

conviction for mail fraud. United States v. Read,

658 F.2d 1225, 1240 (7th Cir. 1981); accord,

United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1124 (6th

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010, 106 S.

Ct. 1183 (1986); United States v. Camiel, 689

F.2d 31, 36 (3rd Cir. 1982). Allismith need not

even have been aware of Adediran’s identity or

his specific acts in furtherance of the

fraudulent scheme, so long as the evidence

adequately establishes Allismith’s own knowing

participation in the same scheme. United States

v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 1252, 1257 (7th Cir. 1974);

see also United States v. Silva, 781 F.2d 106,

108-09 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wormick,

709 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1983).

 The record lends ample support to the jury’s

conclusion that Allismith was liable as a

participant in a single scheme to defraud

Motorola. Adeniji, of course, worked at the core

of this scheme, arranging for all five checks to

issue to MOM and BCS; and one can infer from the

telephone records that Allismith was in

telephonic contact with her throughout the life

of the scheme. See infra at 17-18. For his part,

Allismith established a mailing address and bank

account for BCS in much the same manner that

Adediran did for MOM, and closely on the heels of

Adediran’s efforts. These facts establish one

unified scheme to defraud the same victim

(Motorola). Moreover, Allismith not only set up

the post office box and bank account for Motorola
using aliases, he also received and negotiated

the one check to BCS that Motorola placed in the

mail before its suspicions were aroused. These

actions betray Allismith’s knowing participation

in the scheme. Additional evidence linking him to

Adediran was therefore unnecessary. We note,

however, that Allismith made a cash deposit of

$3,000 into one of the "Henry A. Smith" accounts

at the Uptown National Bank two days after

Adediran withdrew the same amount in cash from

one of the "Michael Owonla" bank accounts and

five days after Adediran wrote a check in the

same amount to "Toro Williams," the name that

Adeniji used at Motorola. These transactions took

place shortly after Motorola issued the three

checks to MOM totaling $10,440.40, and considered

with all of the other evidence, reasonably

suggest that Adediran was sharing the proceeds of

the MOM checks with Allismith as well as Adeniji.

See infra at 14-15.

B.

 Allismith contends that the district court

improperly refused an instruction that would have

directed the jury not to consider any of the

evidence offered against his co-defendant

Adediran, or which related to the scheme as it

involved Adediran and Adeniji, unless the jury

was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that

Allismith "associated himself in a common scheme

with defendant Adediran." R. 86, Allismith

Instruction No. 4. The evidence regarding the MOM

component of the scheme arguably was the stronger

part of the government’s case: Adediran had

opened a series of three different checking

accounts in Michael or Micheal Owonla’s name, MOM

was established as a Motorola vendor after

Adeniji herself intervened with Carol Rickman,

and ultimately three different checks were issued

to MOM and deposited into an Owonla account. This

evidence was unduly prejudicial to Allismith, he

argues, in the absence of proof that BCS, like

MOM, was not a genuine venture and that Allismith

was, in fact, co-scheming with Adediran.

 The district court properly rejected the

instruction, however. As we have already pointed

out, the evidence established a single scheme to

defraud Motorola irrespective of whether or not

Adediran and Allismith knew exactly what the

other was doing. Although, as our discussion thus

far also makes clear, mail fraud and conspiracy

are distinct offenses with distinct elements,

certain evidentiary principles apply to both

crimes. Principal among these is that evidence of

one participant’s actions in furtherance of a

scheme to defraud is admissible against the other

participants in that scheme, just as it is in a

conspiracy case. United States v. Read, supra,
658 F.2d at 1239, citing United States v. Serlin,

538 F.2d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 1976); see also United

States v. Silva, supra, 781 F.2d at 108-09;

United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 552 (7th Cir.

1984); United States v. Wormick, supra, 709 F.2d

at 461; United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 16-17

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031, 95 S. Ct.

512 (1974). The district court in this case found

that there was but one scheme to defraud

Motorola, and that finding rendered the evidence

relating to Adediran and the MOM component of the

scheme admissible against Allismith. The notion

that Allismith was unfairly prejudiced by that

evidence is untenable. However compelling the

evidence against Adediran may have been,

additional proof--including the use of aliases to

open a post office box and bank account for BCS,

the fraudulent issuance of checks to BCS, and the

endorsement and deposit of one of those checks

into an account Allismith had opened for BCS--

unquestionably demonstrated Allismith’s own

deliberate actions in furtherance of the fraud.

Moreover, as the government reminds us, the jury

was instructed to give separate consideration to

each defendant, to assess each defendant’s

culpability based on his or her own actions, and

in particular to determine, based on the

defendant’s own acts and statements, whether each

defendant was aware of the scheme’s common

purpose and became a willing party to the scheme.

Tr. 1246-47, 1250, 1252-54. We presume that the

jury followed these instructions. E.g., United

States v. Hernandez, 84 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir.

1996); United States v. Anderson, 61 F.3d 1290,

1300 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1000, 116

S. Ct. 543 (1995).

C.

 When the district court determined the amount

of loss in sentencing Allismith, see U.S.S.G.

sec. 2F1.1(b)(1), it held him to account not only

for the two BCS checks but also for the three MOM

checks that Motorola mailed to Adediran.

Allismith Sentencing Tr. 15. Section 1B1.3(a)

(1)(B) of the Guidelines indicates that when the

defendant engaged in a criminal scheme with other

individuals, the court should calculate the loss

based not only on the defendant’s own actions,

but "all reasonably foreseeable acts and

omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly

undertaken criminal activity." The guideline

therefore poses two separate questions with

respect to the loss amount that can be attributed

to the defendant: (1) Were the acts resulting in

the loss in furtherance of jointly undertaken

criminal activity? and (2) Were those acts

reasonably foreseeable to the defendant? See id.

(comment.) (n.2); United States v. Thomas, 199

F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 1999). Judge Moody
answered both questions in the affirmative. He

found that there was a single scheme to defraud

Motorola in which Allismith participated, and

that the individual efforts of Adediran and

Allismith represented coordinated prongs of that

scheme. See R.119 at 5-6; Allismith Sent. Tr. 15.

He found further that the acts culminating in the

issuance of the three checks to MOM were

reasonably foreseeable to Allismith. Allismith

Sent. Tr. 15. Allismith contends that the court

erred in both assessments, given the lack of

direct proof that he was involved in the MOM

component of the scheme. Both determinations are

findings of fact subject to review for clear

error. Thomas, 199 F.3d at 953-54; United States

v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 531 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1112, 118 S. Ct. 1688 (1998).

 Allismith argues in the first instance that the

MOM prong of the scheme was beyond the scope of

the criminal activity to which he agreed. His

argument in this regard is founded in principal

part upon the multi-factor test that the Second

Circuit articulated in United States v. Studley,

47 F.3d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 1995). Studley

identified three factors that bear on the scope

of the activity that the defendant agreed to

jointly undertake with others: (1) whether the

participants in the activity pooled their profits

and resources, or worked independently; (2)

whether the defendant assisted in designing and

executing the scheme; and (3) what role the

defendant agreed to play in the operation. Here,

Allismith argues, there is no evidence that he

had any part in designing the scheme, no evidence

that he and his co-defendants pooled profits and

resources, and no evidence that he agreed to play

any role in the scheme apart from the activities

related to BCS. We have yet to embrace Studley as

authoritative, however. Instead, we have

consistently distinguished the facts presented to

us from the facts that the Second Circuit found

insufficient to establish a joint undertaking in

that case. See Thomas, 199 F.3d at 953

(collecting cases). So long as we are satisfied

that the facts permit the inference that the

defendant agreed to jointly undertake the acts

for which he is being held to account, we will

sustain the district court’s determination even

if those facts do not fit neatly within the

Studley framework. See Thomas, 199 F.3d at 953-

54; United States v. Giang, 143 F.3d 1078, 1080-

81 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Senn, 129

F.3d 886, 898 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Boatner, 99 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 1996).

 We believe that the record lends adequate

support to the district court’s finding that

Allismith agreed to a joint undertaking that

embraced the entire scheme, not just the BCS
component. There was, as we have already

emphasized, a single scheme to defraud at work

here. It was not a scheme to defraud multiple

victims, as was true in Studley, but rather one

victim, Motorola. See Boatner, 99 F.3d at 837.

Furthermore, Adediran and Allismith took

virtually identical steps in setting up mailing

addresses and bank accounts for the fictional BCS

and MOM vendors. See Giang, 143 F.3d at 1080.

They did so within the same period of

approximately 8 to 9 weeks in April, May, and

early June of 1991, and contemporaneously with

Adeniji’s own efforts to arrange for the issuance

of the checks. Multiple telephone calls between

phones associated with Adediran and Allismith on

the one hand, and with Adeniji on the other,

supply confirmation that all three defendants

were coordinating their activities. Finally,

there is the fact that Allismith made a $3,000

cash deposit into one of the "Henry A. Smith"

accounts at the Uptown National Bank just two

days after Adediran withdrew the same amount in

cash from one of the "Michael Owonla" bank

accounts and five days after Adediran wrote a

check in the same amount to Adeniji. In a vacuum,

we agree with Allismith that it would be sheer

speculation to infer a link between those three

transactions. But considered against the backdrop

of the fraudulent scheme, we believe it is

plausible to infer that Adediran, Adeniji, and

Allismith were, in fact, sharing the proceeds of

the checks that Motorola issued to MOM--a factor

that Studley itself identifies as relevant. 47

F.3d at 575. Cumulatively, all of these

circumstances permitted the district court to

find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the issuance of checks to MOM was a joint

undertaking among all three defendants, including

Allismith.

 Allismith separately contends that there is no

evidence that Adediran’s actions in furtherance

of the scheme were foreseeable to him. There is

no evidence that he ever had a discussion with

Adeniji about Adediran or his activities,

Allismith maintains, and no evidence that he ever

had contact with Adediran or knew that Adediran

caused Motorola to issue checks to MOM.

 We reject this argument for the same reasons we

have found the evidence sufficient to establish

a joint undertaking. Granted, there is no

evidence concerning the content of Allismith’s

conversations with Adeniji, and no evidence of

any contact or conversations between Allismith

and Adediran. Still, the fact that both men

coordinated their efforts with Adeniji, the fact

that both took nearly identical steps closely in

time to establish mailing addresses and bank

accounts to receive funds from MOM and BCS, and

the apparent sharing of the proceeds from the
three MOM checks, all permitted the district

court to find that the actions of Adediran were

foreseeable to Allismith.

 For these reasons, we find no clear error in

the district court’s decision to hold Allismith

to account for the full amount of money (i.e.,

the total of all five checks) put at risk by the

fraudulent scheme.

D.

 The district court ordered Allismith to make

restitution in the amount of $13,951.40, which

represents the total of the four checks that were

actually sent to Adediran and Allismith. (Recall

that the fifth check was never sent.) Allismith

argues in the first instance that it was improper

for the court to impose a restitution obligation

for any of the checks to MOM, but we reject that

argument for the same reasons we have overruled

his contention that the MOM losses were not part

of his joint undertaking with the two other

defendants and were not foreseeable to him.

Allismith also points out that both Adediran and

Adeniji were likewise ordered to make restitution

in the same amount; and he appears to suggest

that this raises the possibility of excessive

(i.e., duplicative) restitution. Yet, the

judgment makes clear that his obligation will be

discharged once payments by any or all of the

defendants have totaled $13,951.40. R. 124 at 5.

Congress has specifically authorized joint and

several liability for restitution in cases

involving joint criminal endeavors, see 18 U.S.C.

sec. 3664(h), and we have previously indicated

that such restitution orders are appropriate, so

long as the total restitution mandated does not

exceed the amount of the loss. E.g., United

States v. Trigg, 119 F.3d 493, 501 & n.6 (7th Cir.

1997).

E.

 Finally, Adeniji contends that in five different

instances during opening statements and closing

arguments, prosecutors made remarks that were

improper. No contemporaneous objection was made

to four of these remarks, and because none of

them approaches the gravity of plain error, see,

e.g., United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829, 843

(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hartmann, 958

F.2d 774, 785 (7th Cir. 1992), we shall confine

our discussion to the one line of argument that

Adeniji objected to at trial. 

 While laying out the evidence against Adeniji

and her co-defendants in closing, the government

referred repeatedly to telephone conversations

between Adeniji and her co-defendants. The
assertion that Adeniji was conferring by phone

with Adediran and Allismith was based, of course,

on the telephone records that reflected the many

calls between numbers associated with Adeniji and

with her co-defendants. But Adeniji argues, as

she did (unsuccessfully) to the district court,

that because the telephone records relied upon by

the government do not reveal either the content

of the conversations or the speakers, it was

improper for the government to assert that

Adeniji was a party to any of the telephone

calls.

 The government may properly put before the jury

the inferences that one can reasonably draw from

the evidence, however, United States v. Ward, 211

F.3d 356, 365 (7th Cir. 2000), and for that reason

we find nothing improper in the prosecutor’s

argument. See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 207

F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2000) (first step in

assessing whether prosecutor committed misconduct

in closing argument is to examine objected-to

comment in isolation to determine whether it was

improper). Records that reflect calls to and from

telephone numbers associated with the

participants in a criminal scheme permit the

inference that the participants were in

telephonic contact with one another; and where,

as here, the timing and frequency of the calls

coincide with key events in the scheme, one may

reasonably infer that the participants were

consulting one another in regard to those events.

See, e.g., United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d

1173, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1139, 118 S. Ct. 1104 (1998), quoting United

States v. Garcia, 35 F.3d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir.

1994); United States v. Knox, 68 F.3d 990, 999

(7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1119, 116

S. Ct. 926 (1996); and see United States v.

Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d 1438, 1451 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 871, 116 S. Ct. 191 (1995)

(collecting cases). Of course, it is

theoretically possible that persons other than

the defendants were parties to the telephone

calls at issue in this case, and even if the

defendants themselves were conversing, they were

not necessarily speaking about the scheme to

defraud Motorola. But it would have been

reasonable for the jury to infer that that these

calls reflected conversations between Adeniji and

her co-defendants about the nuts and bolts of the

effort to defraud Motorola. And because the jury

was entitled to draw that inference, it was

entirely appropriate for the prosecutor to argue

that inference in his closing remarks.

III.

 For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the

defendants’ convictions and sentences.
/* On the appellant’s motion, the appeal of Adetoro

Adeniji was submitted without argument and

decided on the briefs and record alone.

/1 On the same grounds that Adediran challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence, he maintains that

the district court erroneously denied his motions

for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R.

Crim. P. 29. As the thrust of both lines of attack

is the same, we need not address the denial of

the Rule 29 motion separately. See United States

v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1155 & n.12 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841, 110 S. Ct. 126

(1989).