* We granted the appellant’s unopposed motion to waive oral argument.  Thus, the

appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P. 34(f).  

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 22, 2010 *

Decided December 23, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

   

No. 10‐1898

MARLA R. PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant‐Appellee.                 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:09‐cv‐00367‐PMF

Philip M. Frazier,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Marla Phillips applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income, claiming that she was disabled by major depression, borderline personality

disorder, and other physical impairments.  The Social Security Administration denied her

claim, and a magistrate judge, presiding by consent, upheld the agency’s decision.  Phillips

appeals, arguing primarily that the Administrative Law Judge erred by discounting the

opinions of her treating doctors, improperly weighing the evidence of her mental illnesses,

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 10‐1898 Page 2

and discrediting her testimony.  Because we conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not

supported by substantial evidence, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Background

Phillips is 30 years old.  At the age of four, her father allegedly molested her and

tried to drown her in the bathtub, and since then she has been treated for depression and

other mental impairments.  She spent five years in counseling as a child, and at the age of

ten, she made her first of at least six attempts to commit suicide with drugs or by cutting her

wrists.  At one point she was hospitalized for six weeks for psychiatric treatment.

   

Phillips worked beginning at age 15 as a housekeeper, clerk, and certified nurse’s

assistant.  But by December 2004 her physical and psychiatric impairments had left her

unable to work, and she applied for disability benefits.  Three times in the 25 months

immediately preceding that application, Phillips had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation

or attempted suicide.

  

The first of these incidents was in November 2002 when, at age 22, Phillips was

admitted to Harrisburg Medical Center in southern Illinois, complaining of severe

depression and suicidal ideation.  At the time her Global Assessment of Functioning

(“GAF”) score was 20 to 25, indicating serious impairments in her ability to function and a

danger that she might hurt herself or others.  The severity of her symptoms led the

examining psychiatrist to conclude that Phillips, who until this episode had been enrolled in

a college nursing program and working as a nursing assistant, would “require an extensive

treatment plan” and was “a good candidate for a partial hospitalization program.”  The

psychiatrist noted that Phillips had been dropped from the nursing program because her

depression had led to poor attendance.  She also had been fired from her job after a

misdemeanor arrest for receiving $1900 in unauthorized food stamps, which she maintained

were for her son, who was then two years old and living with her mother.  Phillips

remained at the hospital for twelve days until doctors found a workable combination and

dosage of antipsychotic drugs.

  

Just ten days after her discharge, however, Phillips was readmitted to Harrisburg

following two successive suicide attempts—first overdosing on her antidepressants and

then, when that did not work, slashing her wrists.  Phillips cried throughout the interview

as she told the same psychiatrist who had treated her in November that she had “no desire

to do anything,” that she didn’t have any will to live, and that she “just can’t get rid of it.”

The psychiatrist observed that Phillips had embraced the view that her situation was

hopeless and that eventually she would succeed in killing herself.  He recommended that

planning be done “to facilitate the patient’s entering a group home or similar kind of
No. 10‐1898 Page 3

arrangement” because her “high degree of suicidality and lethal potential makes her a very

difficult case to manage.”  Her depression gradually subsided after more adjustments to her

medications, and by the time she was discharged after eight days, her GAF score had

increased from 20 to 50, still showing that she suffered from serious symptoms.

  

Then in July 2004, after relocating to Kansas, Phillips was admitted to Mount Carmel

Regional Medical Center for severe depression and suicidal ideation.  Doctors there noted

that Phillips presented with hypersomnolence, refusing to get out of bed for her intake

evaluation and declining to participate in any psychological testing or therapy sessions.

This led one psychologist to conclude that Phillips “appear[ed] to be treating her hospital

stay as more of a vacation than a treatment program.”  Her medications were adjusted,

though, and her condition improved by her discharge eight days later.

  

In January 2005, following her return to southern Illinois and about a month after she

applied for disability benefits, Phillips again was hospitalized at Harrisburg when she

attempted to take her life by cutting her wrist.  Dr. Aline Gilbert‐Johnson, a psychiatrist,

noted that Phillips experiences bouts of serious depression a few times a year, each time

lasting three weeks to two months.  He adjusted her medications, adding Wellbutrin

(because “that’s the only antidepressant she hasn’t tried yet”), Abilify (used to treat

schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression) and Tegretol (for bipolar disorder).  Her

GAF score on admission had been 30, indicating serious impairments in her ability to

function, but this had increased to 70, reflecting mild symptoms, by the time she left.

  

After her discharge, Phillips continued outpatient treatment with Mohamed

Elsamahi, a physician’s assistant at Harrisburg with a Ph.D. in Philosophy, and Dr. Rakesh

Chandru, a psychiatrist at the Egyptian Health Department.  On February 14, 2005, Phillips

reported to Elsamahi that she had insomnia, had been crying when depressed, and was

hearing voices.  Elsamahi noted in his file that Phillips had “improved 50%” but her affect

was still restricted.  On that same day Phillips also participated in a “comprehensive mental

health assessment” at the Egyptian Health Department.  The assessment was completed by

Amy Bates, a social worker on staff, but reviewed and signed by Dr. Chandru.  Bates

concluded that, although Phillips’s ability to care for herself was not impaired by her

mental‐health issues, she had moderate impairments in social and educational/vocational

functioning and a serious impairment related to her “symptom distress.”

  

On March 5, 2005, Phillips was admitted to Harrisburg because of “homicidal

ideation and auditory hallucinations telling her to kill people.”  Phillips reported feeling

angry and agitated and terrified of the voices she was hearing.  She was still taking

Wellbutrin, Abilify, Trazodone, and Tegretol for her depression, as well as Klonopin for

panic attacks, and Atarax for anxiety.  Dr. Gilbert‐Johnson increased her dose of Abilify,
No. 10‐1898 Page 4

and after the adjustment he noted that she “made good improvement.”  Her GAF on

admission had been 40, indicating a major impairment in several areas of functioning, and

before her discharge three days later it had increased to 75, reflecting only transient

symptoms or normal reactions to stress.

On March 18, 2005, Dr. David Warshauer, a state‐agency clinical psychologist,

examined Phillips.  Her affect, he reported, was one of “agitated depression,” and she cried

while explaining how she “feels that she has failed as a mother” and “has nothing to live

for.”  He commented that her GAF was 45, indicating a serious impairment in functioning,

and opined that her “borderline personality disorder is quite severe.”

In May 2005, Dr. Lionel Hudspeth, a state‐agency psychologist, assessed Phillips’s

mental residual functional capacity based upon the medical record.  Dr. Hudspeth

acknowledged her diagnoses of a depressive disorder and a borderline personality disorder

characterized by persistent disturbances in mood or affect, intense and unstable

interpersonal relationships, and impulsive and damaging behavior.  On the agency’s form

assessment, however, he checked boxes indicating that these impairments were causing

only mild restrictions in Phillips’s daily activities and her ability to maintain concentration,

persistence and pace, and a moderate limitation in her social functioning.  Dr. Hudspeth

also checked a box corresponding to his count of “one or two” extended episodes of

decompensation caused by her mental impairments.  At the end of the form he offered his

two‐sentence assessment: “This claimant has cognition, memory and thought processes are

intact.  She does have difficulty in interpersonal relationships, and would be best suited in

job tasks requiring no contact with the public, and minimal contact with coworkers, and

supervisors.”  Dr. Hudspeth did not explain any of his findings, or discuss the extensive

medical record, or even identify the portions of the medical record he deemed significant.

Indeed, he left blank the page for “Consultant’s Notes” except to remark, “25yo female who

has DX: of Depressive Disorder and Borderline Personality.”

  

In mid‐June, Phillips went to the emergency room at Harrisburg, complaining of

severe depression, suicidal ideation, and auditory hallucinations.  She was not admitted,

and there are only two pages of records from her visit, but the examining doctor noted that

she was depressed, angry, and agitated.  Progress notes from Elsamahi and Dr. Chandru

show that Phillips’s condition continued to fluctuate throughout 2005.

On March 20, 2006, Phillips was again admitted to Harrisburg for severe depression

and another attempted suicide; she had overdosed on 20 tablets of Ativan, an antianxiety

medication.  Dr. Naeem Qureshi, a psychiatrist, noted that Phillips had experienced

episodes of major depression since she was a child and that “in between the depressive

episodes [she] sometimes experiences also mild to moderate depression of between 3‐4 days
No. 10‐1898 Page 5

weekly with excessive mood swings.”  Phillips told Qureshi that she had been hallucinating

and hearing voices which told her to kill herself and others.  When she was admitted

Phillips was taking Geodon (which is used to treat schizophrenia and mania), Zoloft,

Effexor XR (for depression), Ativan, and Trazodone.  Qureshi adjusted her medications and

observed that Phillips “improved rather fast and the depression disappeared quickly” after

Abilify was added to the drug regimen.

On April 4, 2006, Elsamahi, the physician’s assistant, authored a letter describing his

treatment of Phillips and summarizing his findings.  He noted that Phillips had been seeing

him regularly since January 2005.  According to Elsamahi, Phillips’s mental illnesses caused

severe symptoms, which in turn meant that she could not “function normally in public” or

“tolerate normal occupational stressors, or have the energy to attend work regularly.”  He

corroborated her diagnoses of depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic

disorder with agoraphobia, and borderline personality disorder, and opined that Phillips

“cannot hold an average job for a reasonable period of time.”  The name of the psychiatrist

who treated Phillips at Harrisburg in 2002 also appears on the letterhead, but it is unclear

whether that physician had reviewed and approved Elsamahi’s correspondence.

Around the same time, Linda Redick, a physician’s assistant for the primary‐care

physician Phillips had been seeing regularly for the past three years, completed a “Multiple

Impairment Questionnaire.”  Redick noted under “prognosis” that “mentally [Phillips] is

very unstable, ” and she opined that Phillips was likely to be absent more than three times a

month and was incapable of tolerating even low‐stress work because she “has very low self‐

esteem” and “gets very emotional during stressful times.” According to Redick, Phillips was

not a malingerer.

   

Phillips continued to attend monthly sessions with Elsamahi, who in April 2007

completed a mental‐health assessment.  He concluded that her prognosis was “guarded”

because she responded only partly to medications, her anxiety was severe, and her panic

attacks and depressive episodes were frequent.  According to Elsamahi, Phillips experienced

marked limitations in five functional areas, including in her ability to maintain regular

attendance, to complete a normal workweek without interruptions from psychologically

based symptoms, to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number of breaks,

and to interact appropriately with others.  Like Redick, Elsamahi concluded that Phillips was

not a malingerer, that she would likely miss work more than three times a month, and that

she was incapable of tolerating even low‐stress work because even mild stress had triggered

serious deteriorations in her mental stability.

  

At the hearing before the ALJ in April 2008, Phillips testified about the debilitating

effect of her mental impairments.  Phillips explained that her medications would help for a
No. 10‐1898 Page 6

while, but doctors had to change her prescriptions frequently in order to manage her

symptoms.  When asked how her conditions affected her ability to work, Phillips responded

that “being criticized or being told to do something or told that I’ve done something wrong

makes me very anxious and nervous and depressed even.”  Phillips explained that

everything caused her anxiety, that she regularly experiences nightmares and flashbacks,

and that she still thinks about committing suicide every day.  She informed the ALJ that,

about a month before the hearing, her son, then seven years old, and a daughter born in 2005

had been removed from her home by social workers after she had been “declared unstable

and unfit in a court of law.”  She testified that she had done her best to care for her children

but struggled with daily activities.  She spent a lot of time sleeping or watching television,

she said, but even these activities were affected because she experiences “a lot of racing

thoughts” that hinder her concentration.  When asked about her use of illegal drugs, Phillips

denied current use but acknowledged past use of marijuana.  Her medical records document

disclosures of periodic marijuana use to her physicians, and Phillips offered that she

sometimes resorted to marijuana when her combination of prescription drugs no longer

controlled her symptoms.

   

The ALJ and Phillips’s counsel posed hypothetical questions to a vocational expert,

who testified that an employee with the same age and work history as Phillips, and with the

limitations described by the ALJ, could perform the sedentary, unskilled work of a packer,

an inspector, or an assembler.  The vocational expert conceded, however, that none of these

jobs—or any others—would be available unless the employee could maintain her

concentration, persistence, or pace for at least seven hours a day.  The vocational expert also

conceded that no work would be available for someone who could not be punctual and

follow a schedule, would miss work more than three times a month, and could not interact

with the general public and get along with coworkers.

  

After the hearing Phillips submitted an additional mental‐health assessment from

Dr. Julie Handwerk.  Handwerk is a psychiatrist who treated Phillips at Harrisburg from

August through December 2007.  She diagnosed Phillips with bipolar disorder, post‐

traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and borderline

personality disorder.  Dr. Handwerk opined that Phillips exhibited marked limitations in

nine work‐related functions, including her abilities to maintain attention and concentration,

to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism, and to maintain regular

attendance.  According to Dr. Handwerk, Phillips’s GAF score was 45, and her prognosis

was “poor.”  Like Redick and Elsamahi, Dr. Handwerk also opined that Phillips was not a

malingerer, that she would likely be absent from work more than three times a month, and

that she was incapable of tolerating even low‐stress work because of her “frequent

decompensation requiring hospitalization.”

  
No. 10‐1898 Page 7

Even after considering the additional medical evidence, the ALJ denied Phillips’s

claim.  The ALJ performed the requisite five‐step analysis, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,

concluding that Phillips had not engaged in gainful work since filing her application in

December 2004, and that her depression with anxiety and her borderline personality

disorder constituted severe impairments.  At Step 3, relying principally on the checkbox

form submitted by Dr. Hudspeth in May 2005, the ALJ concluded that these impairments did

not meet a listing requirement and that Phillips had only a mild limitation in her activities of

daily functioning and moderate limitations in social functioning  and concentration.  Despite

Phillips’s numerous hospitalizations and suicide attempts, the ALJ also concluded that she

“experienced no episodes of decompensation.”  At Step 4, the ALJ explained that he

incorporated these findings into Phillips’s RFC and determined that she could perform a

reduced range of sedentary jobs at which she would be “limited to simple repetitive tasks,

occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors, and no contact with the public.” Finally,

the ALJ concluded at Step 5 that Phillips was not disabled because she could perform the

work of a packer, inspector, or assembler.

In reaching these conclusions, the ALJ discredited Phillips’s statements regarding the

severity of her mental impairments.  The only specific ground he offered was that she had

given inconsistent answers about her use of marijuana.  The ALJ gave little or no weight to

the opinions of Dr. Handwerk and Dr. Warshauer, commenting that Dr. Handwerk’s

findings were “not consistent with the weight of the evidence presented and are only based

upon a 4 month period of treatment” and that Dr. Warshauer, the state‐agency psychologist,

examined Phillips only once.  The ALJ similarly discounted the conclusions of Elsamahi, the

physician’s assistant at Harrisburg, because, according to the ALJ, they were “not consistent

with the evidence contained within the file” and lacked any documentation, treatment notes,

or “explanatory remarks.”  The ALJ failed to mention any records from Dr. Chandru, social

worker Bates, Phillips’s two hospitalizations in 2002, her emergency room visit in June 2005,

her history of sexual abuse, or the fact that she has been experiencing severe depression since

she was a child.  The Appeals Council denied review.

Discussion

We review the ALJ’s decision deferentially and will uphold the denial of benefits

unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on an error of law.  42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g); Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009); Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 368‐69

(7th Cir. 2004).  An ALJ need not address every piece of evidence but must build a “logical

bridge” between the evidence and his findings and adequately discuss the issues so that we

can evaluate the validity of the agency’s findings.  Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th

Cir. 2010); Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009).  We confine our review to the

reasons offered by the ALJ and will not consider post‐hoc rationalizations that the
No. 10‐1898 Page 8

Commissioner provides to supplement the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence.  See SEC v.

Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93‐95 (1943); Spiva v. Astrue, No. 10‐2083, slip op. at 13‐14 (7th Cir.

Dec. 6, 2010); Campbell v. Astrue, No. 10‐1314, slip op. at 16 (7th Cir. Dec. 6, 2010).

Phillips principally contends that, under the treating source rule, the ALJ should have

given controlling weight to Elsamahi’s opinion that she is unable to work because of her

mental impairments.  According to that rule, the opinion of a “treating source”—typically a

physician—is entitled to “controlling weight” if it is adequately supported by objective

medical evidence and is consistent with other substantial evidence in the record.  20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(d)(2); Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2010); Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390

F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2004).  If the ALJ discounts the opinion of a claimant’s treating

physician, the ALJ must offer “good reasons” for doing so.  Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 751

(7th Cir. 2010); Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2008).  The ALJ must then go on to

determine what weight to give to the opinion using the factors listed in § 404.1527(d)(2),

including the length of treatment, the physician’s specialty, and the types of diagnostic tests

performed.  Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415

(7th Cir. 2008).

But, as the Commissioner points out, not every provider will qualify as a treating

source.  See SSR 06‐03p; Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1274‐75 (10th Cir. 2008); Frantz v.

Astrue, 509 F.3d 1299, 1301‐02 (10th Cir. 2007).  Only “acceptable medical sources,” such as

licensed physicians, can be characterized as treating sources whose opinions are generally

entitled to controlling weight.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a); SSR 06‐03p.  Physician’s assistants like

Elsamahi are considered “other medical sources.”  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1); SSR 06‐03p.

Although the opinions of other medical sources are important and should be considered

when evaluating “key issues such as impairment severity and functional effects,” their

findings cannot “establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment.”  SSR 06‐

03p.  In deciding how much weight to give to opinions from these “other medical sources,”

an ALJ should apply the same criteria listed in § 404.1527(d)(2).  Id.; Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 541 (6th Cir. 2007).  Thus, Elsamahi’s assessment that Phillips was unable

to work and his findings that she had marked limitations in numerous work‐related abilities

do not support an automatic finding of disability.  Moreover, even measured against the

criteria listed in § 404.1527(d)(2), we can understand how an ALJ might be skeptical of

Elsamahi’s qualifications to render a psychiatric opinion.  Elsamahi was involved to a

significant degree in Phillips’s psychiatric care, but he is not a licensed psychiatrist or

psychologist.  He is a certified physician’s assistant.  He has a Ph.D., but that degree is in

philosophy.  Thus, even though Elsamahi saw Phillips regularly, we cannot tell from this

record whether the ALJ might have had good reason to give diminished weight to his views.
No. 10‐1898 Page 9

What is certain, however, is that the ALJ did not cite Elsamahi’s credentials or any

other legitimate reason for rejecting his conclusions.  Instead, the ALJ offered two cursory

reasons—both flawed—for giving “little weight” to this evidence:  Elsamahi’s findings, said

the ALJ, are inconsistent with the rest of the medical evidence and are unexplained and

unsupported by documentation or treatment notes.  But the ALJ never identified what

evidence contradicts Elsamahi’s findings, and, as we explain below, his conclusions—at least

enough of them to support a determination of disability at Step 3 under listings 12.04 and

12.08—are corroborated by a wealth of medical evidence accumulated over six years by a

range of professionals at different facilities.  And, in fact, the record does include some

treatment notes from Elsamahi, whose written assessments about Phillips are much more

extensive than the few sentences that Dr. Hudspeth offered to explain his conclusions to the

effect that Phillips remained capable of some types of work.

   

And that is the crux of the problem with the ALJ’s decision.  The ALJ did not simply

discard the conclusions of Elsamahi; rather, the ALJ’s decision belittled the views of every

medical professional who treated or examined Phillips and adopted the terse conclusions of

the one doctor who had never met her.  Even if we put Elsamahi’s opinions aside entirely,

which we should not, that would still leave many others—both treating physicians and other

treating medical sources—who uniformly concluded that Phillips suffered from severe

mental impairments that effectively rendered her disabled, even under the stringent

standards of the Social Security Act.  Most important, Dr. Handwerk, who does qualify as a

treating physician, opined that Phillips was markedly limited in nine functional areas related

to her work abilities.  According to Dr. Handwerk, Phillips’s prognosis was poor and she

was incapable of even low‐stress work.  The ALJ gave Dr. Handwerk’s opinion “little

weight” because she treated Phillips for only four months, yet he did not explain the logic of

then crediting only the opinion of Dr. Hudspeth, who never even examined Phillips.  The

ALJ also found that, as with Elsamahi’s opinions, the “weight of the evidence” contradicted

Dr. Handwerk’s conclusions, but with the exception of Dr. Hudspeth’s evaluation offered

without examination, we are unable to identify any other inconsistent findings in the record.

    

In fact, Dr. Handwerk’s conclusions are supported by the opinions and observations

of other doctors, including the psychiatrists who treated Phillips during her hospitalizations,

Dr. Warshauer, Dr. Chandru, and physician’s assistant Redick.  Dr. Gilbert‐Johnson and Dr.

Qureshi, who treated Phillips during her psychiatric hospitalizations at Harrisburg, both

commented on the episodic nature of her depression, which they described as consisting of

several extended periods of severe depression each year and mild to moderate bouts of

depression every week.  Other hospital doctors relayed concerns that the volatility and

severity of her impairments made it extremely difficult to manage Phillips’s case and opined

that intensive forms of treatment would be necessary to help her.  Even Dr. Warshauer, the

state‐agency clinical psychologist who examined Phillips just seven weeks before Dr.
No. 10‐1898 Page 10

Hudspeth gave his assessment, concluded that Phillips’s borderline personality disorder was

“quite severe.”  Dr. Chandru concurred with the assessment of the social worker Bates that

Phillips lacked impulse control and was seriously impaired by her symptom distress.  And

Redick echoed Dr. Handwerk’s conclusions that Phillips was very unstable, likely to miss

work more than three times a month, and could not tolerate any work‐related stress.

Treatment notes from these medical professionals show that all of them made observations

about Phillips’s condition that track Dr. Handwerk’s opinions about her limitations.

   

In addition to these notes from her doctors, the record is replete with objective

medical evidence that Phillips suffered from a debilitating mental illness.  By the time of her

hearing, Phillips had attempted suicide at least six times and had been repeatedly

hospitalized for severe bouts of depression and suicidal or homicidal ideation.  To manage

her anxiety, irritability, and depression, Phillips had tried every kind of antidepressant,

according to Dr. Qureshi, and she was often prescribed a combination of four or five

antipsychotic medications.  And even though there are no details about the state’s decision to

remove her children from the home, we do know that they were taken away from her at least

once because she was not stable enough to care for them.

  

The ALJ’s assessment of the medical record also demonstrates a misunderstanding

about the nature of mental illness.  Each time the ALJ described Phillips’s hospitalizations in

his decision, he stressed only the few hopeful observations, increased GAF scores, and any

comments about her speedy improvement.  What the ALJ failed to recognize is that, in every

instance, Phillips improved only after the doctors had adjusted her medications and

discovered a new combination of prescriptions that would adequately manage her

symptoms.  Many mental illnesses are characterized by “good days and bad days,” rapid

fluctuations in mood, or recurrent cycles of waxing and waning symptoms.  See Spiva,

No. 10‐2083, slip op. at 9‐10; Larson, 615 F.3d at 751; Bauer, 532 F.3d at 609; Kangail v. Barnhart,

454 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2006).  We are also troubled by the ALJ inexplicable conclusion

that Phillips had never experienced an episode of decompensation, a conclusion suggesting

that the ALJ does not understand the meaning or significance of that term.  See Larson, 615

F.3d at 750.  Under listings 12.04 and 12.08, a claimant is deemed to have a disabling mental

impairment if she has marked limitations in either two categories of functional limitation or

one category coupled with evidence of three or more episodes of decompensation.  20 C.F.R.

Pt. 404. Subpart P., App. 1, § 12.00.  Such episodes may include incidents like

hospitalizations, which signal the need for a different treatment, or they “may be inferred

from medical records showing a significant alteration in medication.”  Id.; Larson, 615 F.3d at

750.  Because the ALJ did not explain why none of Phillips’s suicide attempts,

hospitalizations, or frequent medication adjustments evidenced episodes of decompensation,

he failed to build a logical bridge between the evidence and his finding that she could

perform full‐time work.
No. 10‐1898 Page 11

  

Most puzzling to us is that, despite this overwhelming medical evidence, the ALJ

seized on the one outlier opinion in the record and this from a nonexamining source.

Dr. Hudspeth’s evaluation suggests that he was unfamiliar with a significant portion of the

medical record.  By May 2005, when he reviewed Phillips’s file, she had been hospitalized

five times for suicide attempts or suicidal thoughts, not including her attempt to take her life

when she was still a child, yet he concluded she experienced only “one or two” extended

episodes of decompensation.  And Dr. Hudspeth’s opinion was rendered before Phillips’s

two subsequent hospitalizations in June 2005 and March 2006, which is significant because

Phillips’s insured status did not end until September 2009, and thus she is entitled to benefits

if her impairments were disabling before the ALJ made his decision.  Given these

deficiencies, we cannot conclude that Dr. Hudspeth’s evaluation provides substantial

evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC determination and the ultimate decision to deny benefits.

  

Phillips also argues that the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony regarding the

severity of her symptoms.  Although we generally defer to an ALJ’s credibility

determination, we will overturn that finding if we conclude that it is “patently wrong.”  See

Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006); Sims v. Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th

Cir. 2006).  Here, in addressing Phillips’s credibility, the ALJ employed the same boilerplate

language that we have often criticized, stating that although “the claimant’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged

symptoms . . . [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of

these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with” the RFC.  See Spiva,

No. 10‐2083, slip op. at 1‐2; McClesky v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 2010); Parker v.

Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921‐22 (7th Cir. 2010).  The only specific reason the ALJ gave for

doubting her credibility was his perception that Phillips had not always been candid about

her use of marijuana.  On this record it is far from certain that Phillips had tried to conceal

her marijuana use—on one occasion after testing negative she still confessed to a physician

that she had used the drug—but the important point is that Phillips may have been afraid to

fully disclose her marijuana use to medical providers.  See McClesky, 606 F.3d at 353.  And

what is more unsettling is the ALJ’s failure to mention record evidence that was plainly

relevant to the question of Phillips’s credibility, i.e., that three of her healthcare providers—

Dr. Handwerk, Elsamahi, and Redick—all unequivocally stated that she was not a

malingerer, and there is no suggestion of symptom exaggeration in the record.

Finally, we note that much of the Commissioner’s appellate brief is devoted to trying

to rewrite the ALJ’s decision by providing additional rationalizations not articulated by the

ALJ and by attempting to bolster the significance of Dr. Hudspeth’s opinion.  These post‐hoc

rationalizations not only undermine our confidence in the accuracy of the Commissioner’s

representations of the record, but we have repeatedly warned that attempts to supplement
No. 10‐1898 Page 12

the ALJ’s decision are inappropriate.  Twice recently, we again emphasized that the

government may not provide the missing justification for an ALJ’s decision.  See Spiva, No.

10‐2083, slip op. at 13‐14; Campbell, No. 10‐1314, slip op. at 16.

Accordingly, the judgment is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the agency

for further proceedings.