NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CROWN ATLANTIC COMPANY, LLC, 

a Delaware limited liability company, 

Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

AP WIRELESS INVESTMENTS I, LLC, 

a Delaware limited liability company, 

Defendant/Appellee. 

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0159 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CV2013-003332 

The Honorable Katherine M. Cooper, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Lake & Cobb, PLC, Tempe 

By R. Kris Bailey, Kiel S. Berry 

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 

Stinson Leonard Street, LLP, Phoenix 

By Craig A. Morgan, Sharon Ng 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
CROWN v. AP WIRELESS 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Michael J. Brown joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 This appeal reviews a judgment on the pleadings in favor AP 

Wireless Investments I, LLC (AP Wireless), resolving Crown Atlantic 

Company LLC’s (Crown) breach of contract and tortious interference 

claims against AP Wireless. Because judgment on the pleadings was 

proper, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 Crown is the lessee successor-in-interest to a lease for a 

mobile telephone communications facility. The lease, signed in May 1985, 

provided for a term of twenty years. The lease also provided that the lessee 

could exercise “an option for an additional five (5) year lease term to be 

acted upon prior to the completion of the original stated lease term.” This 

provision was later amended to grant the lessee “two additional 

consecutive five (5) year terms in addition to the existing five (5) year option 

to renew as stated in [the original lease], for a total of fifteen (15) years.” 

Another provision in the lease granted the lessee “the first right of refusal 

on any lease term at the completion of the original stated lease term[.]” In 

2005, Crown exercised the first five-year option to extend the lease and the 

second option in 2010. 

¶3 In 2012, AP Wireless purchased the lease from the lessor. AP 

Wireless and the lessor also agreed to a successor lease that would make 

AP Wireless the property’s tenant “commencing upon the expiration or 

termination of the Lease [to Crown].” 

¶4 In April 2013, Crown filed an action in the trial court claiming 

that AP Wireless breached the lease and alleging tortious interference with 

contract, claiming the right of first refusal provision in the original lease 

obligated the lessor to first offer the successor lease to Crown. 

¶5 AP Wireless answered and moved for judgment on the 

pleadings. The trial court awarded judgment on the pleadings in AP 

Wireless’s favor and held that the lease’s plain language shows the right of 
CROWN v. AP WIRELESS 

Decision of the Court 

3 

first refusal expired when the “original stated lease term” ended in 2005. 

This timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, 

Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) 

sections 12-120.21.A.1. and -2101.A.1. (West 2015).1

DISCUSSION 

¶6 Crown contends that judgment on the pleadings was 

improper because the lease is “reasonably susceptible to multiple 

interpretations.” “A motion for judgment on the pleadings . . . tests the 

sufficiency of the complaint, and judgment should be entered for the 

defendant if the complaint fails to state a claim for relief.” Giles v. Hill Lewis 

Marce, 195 Ariz. 358, 359, ¶ 2, 988 P.2d 143, 144 (App. 1999). We view the 

complaint’s well-pled factual allegations as true and review de novo the 

trial court’s legal rulings. Mobile Cmty. Council for Progress, Inc. v. Brock, 211 

Ariz. 196, 198, ¶ 5, 119 P.3d 463, 465 (App. 2005). Issues of contract 

interpretation are legal questions subject to de novo review. ELM 

Retirement Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 290, ¶ 15, 246 P.3d 938, 941 

(App. 2010). 

¶7 When interpreting contracts, we look “to the plain meaning 

of the words as viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.” United 

Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 259, 681 P.2d 390, 411 

(App. 1983). Here, the trial court correctly observed that the lease’s plain 

language is unambiguous. The lease established two distinct periods of 

time: (1) the “original stated lease term” of twenty years and (2) the 

“additional” five-year option terms. The lessee’s right of first refusal is 

made available “at the completion of the original stated lease term.” 

(Emphasis added.) Although the lease was amended to grant additional 

five-year option terms, the amendments do not state or suggest that the 

additional option terms were considered part of the original lease term. 

Likewise, the lease itself does not state or suggest that the period of the lease 

extended by any exercise of one or more five-year option terms should be 

considered part of the original lease term. As a result, the trial court 

correctly concluded that the lease established a one-time right of refusal to 

be exercised before or when the original stated lease term expired. 

¶8 Crown’s argument that the trial court erred in interpreting the 

contract hinges on establishing that the word “at” in the phrase “at the 

completion of the original lease term” could mean “after.” Crown further 

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
CROWN v. AP WIRELESS 

Decision of the Court 

4 

argues that this could mean the right of first refusal “commenced at the end 

of the initial lease term and could be exercised thereafter.” But the trial 

court correctly rejected this argument because, to the extent the meaning of 

“at” is established in Arizona law, no interpretation of the word has 

resulted in “at” meaning “after.” See Ring v. Taylor, 141 Ariz. 56, 69, 685 

P.2d 121, 134 (App. 1984) (superseded by statute) (interpreting “at the time 

alleged” and “at that time” to mean “the time of the alleged offense”); 

Blount v. Indus. Comm’n., 19 Ariz. App. 245, 247, 506 P.2d 285, 287 (App. 

1973) (interpreting “at the time of the subsequent injury” to mean “the time 

the subsequent injury was received”). 

¶9 Crown argues that Ring and Blount do not apply because they 

are contextually inapposite. But they, along with several of cases Crown 

cites from other jurisdictions, collectively show the importance of Arizona’s 

interpretive rule that courts must look “to the plain meaning of the words 

as viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.” United Cal. Bank, 140 

Ariz. at 259, 681 P.2d at 411; see also Tex. Co. v. Blackmon-Scarbrough, Inc., 38 

S.E.2d 890, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (“The word ‘at’ in this contract, is 

equivalent in meaning to ’after’”) (emphasis added); Cent. Guarantee Co. v. 

Fourth & Cent. Trust Co., 244 Ill.App. 61, 65-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1927) (observing 

the word “at” means doing a certain thing on the date named “and not 

afterwards” but holding that the particular contract in question allowed for 

cancellation after a certain date). In other words, even if “at” does not 

necessarily mean a fixed point in time, using the word does not 

automatically make a contract ambiguous; rather, it means we must 

examine how the word fits contextually into the entire contract. Ultimately, 

Crown’s position that “at” could mean “after” would render meaningless 

the unambiguous distinction between the “original stated lease term” and 

the additional option terms. “It is a cardinal rule of contract interpretation 

that we do not construe one term of a contract to essentially render 

meaningless another term.” Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 223 Ariz. 463, 

478, ¶ 56, 224 P.3d 960, 975 (App. 2010). 

¶10 Crown’s argument that the lease is susceptible to multiple 

interpretations presupposes that ambiguity is established merely by 

suggesting a possible alternative reading. But having failed to establish that 

“at” could reasonably mean “after” in this lease, Crown has offered no 

evidence that calls the lease’s plain meaning into question. As established 

in Arizona law, a contract’s susceptibility to multiple interpretations is both 

a question of law and contingent on offering extrinsic evidence that calls a 

contract’s plain meaning into question. See Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 158-59, 854 P.2d 1134, 1144-45 (1993); State v. Mabery 

Ranch, Co., L.L.C., 216 Ariz. 233, 241, ¶ 28, 165 P.3d 211, 219 (App. 2007). 
CROWN v. AP WIRELESS 

Decision of the Court 

5 

¶11 Here, no extrinsic evidence was offered for the trial court to 

consider. Crown has made no argument that discoverable extrinsic 

evidence exists or that, given the opportunity, discovery would produce 

extrinsic evidence supporting their proffered interpretation of the lease. 

Had Crown provided some indication that, given opportunity for 

discovery it could produce evidence supporting its interpretation of the 

lease, granting judgment on the pleadings might have been premature. But 

without even a suggestion that such evidence exists or how it might be 

discovered, merely providing the court with a possible alternative reading 

of the contract is not extrinsic evidence as contemplated by Taylor. 

¶12 The trial court correctly determined the contract’s plain 

meaning, and Crown has not established the lease is susceptible to multiple 

reasonable interpretations. Judgment on the pleadings in AP Wireless’s 

favor was therefore proper. 

CONCLUSION 

¶13 We affirm the judgment in favor of AP Wireless. As the 

prevailing party and upon compliance with ARCAP 21, AP Wireless is 

entitled to its costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-

341 and -341.01 (West 2015).