1

The proper formulation of the petitioner’s last name is unclear; his last name is

alternatively listed as “Olalde-Mejia,” “Olalde Mejia” or merely “Olalde.” Because the

petitioner signs his last name as “Olalde,” and used that last name on his marriage license, we

refer to him as “Olalde.”

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued June 13, 2007

Decided October 17, 2007

Before

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 06-3255

ALEJANDRO OLALDE MEJIA,

Petitioner,

v.

PETER D. KEISLER, Acting

Attorney General of the United

States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A76-974-606

O R D E R

Alejandro Olalde Mejia,1

 a Mexican citizen, moved to continue his removal

proceedings so that he could pursue his request to adjust his status to lawful

permanent resident. The IJ denied the continuance after finding that Olalde would

be ineligible to adjust his status, and ordered him removed. The BIA affirmed,

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance 

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-3255 Page 2

leading to this petition for review. We dismiss Olalde’s petition because Olalde

challenges only a discretionary ruling entered during a removal proceeding, and

under the circumstances of this case we lack jurisdiction to review that ruling.

This case represents the fourth time that Olalde has confronted immigration

authorities. He first illegally entered the United States in 1991 but voluntarily

departed in 1992. In 1995 Olalde reentered the United States, again without

permission, and filed a false claim for asylum. In that application, he

misrepresented that he was Guatemalan and provided a fake Guatemalan birth

certificate. But he did not pursue the application any further. Instead, he was

apprehended for unlawful presence in Florida three years later, and after he failed

to appear at his removal hearing in February 1999, an immigration court ordered

him deported in absentia. Olalde left the country in December 1999; at least, that

is what he told immigration authorities when they again found him back in the

United States in July 2004 and began the present removal proceedings. 

At his hearing, Olalde conceded removability, but his counsel asked the IJ to

continue Olalde’s removal proceedings to await the result of his pending

adjustment-of-status application. Olalde claimed that his wife (whom he married

two days before the hearing) was in the process of adjusting her status to legal

permanent resident (based on her mother’s lawful permanent residence). 

Faced with Olalde’s request to continue the hearings, the IJ asked Olalde

questions relating to his eligibility to adjust status. Olalde admitted to falsely

claiming to be Guatemalan in his asylum application. But he refused (on the advice

of his attorney) to say whether he had left the United States after the deportation

order of February 1999. Recognizing that an alien who departs the country after

the entry of a deportation order is ineligible to seek a visa, and finding nothing

incriminatory about whether Olalde had departed in late 1999, the IJ noted that he

could “draw a negative inference from [Olalde]’s refusal” to answer. The IJ also

doubted Olalde’s eligibility for an adjustment of status because he had given false

asylum documents to immigration authorities. Nevertheless, the IJ scheduled

another hearing in four weeks, advising Olalde that he was going to “try and make

the decision” in the case then. 

Before the hearing resumed, Olalde filed a Memorandum of Law (and

exhibits) in Support of Adjustment of Status, arguing that he was eligible for an

adjustment of status “as a derivative, on his wife’s approved I-130 petition

[establishing the wife’s relationship to her mother].” He argued further that the

deportation order issued in February 1999 should not bar him from adjusting his

status because it was entered without notice to him, and because the government

abandoned it by instituting new removal proceedings in 2004. 
No. 06-3255 Page 3

At the second hearing, Olalde again sought a continuance to pursue his plans

to seek an adjustment of status. The government opposed the continuance, noting

that Olalde had not even placed an actual application to adjust his status, an I-485,

in the record. The IJ observed that he also had not produced an I-130 petition filed

on his behalf by his wife, documenting his wife’s relationship to him. The IJ denied

the motion to continue, reasoning that: (1) Olalde was ineligible to adjust his status

because he had presented false documents (his asylum application) to immigration

authorities; (2) Olalde was ineligible to adjust his status because had left the

country in December 1999 while an order of removal was outstanding; and (3) apart

from his request to pursue adjustment of status, Olalde did not merit a favorable

exercise of discretion for a continuance, again because he had shown “complete

disregard for the Immigration laws of the United States.” 

The Board of Immigration Appeals “adopted and affirmed” the IJ’s opinion. 

The BIA ruled that the IJ “gave cogent reasons” for refusing to use his discretion to

continue the proceedings to allow Olalde to pursue an application to adjust his

status. Specifically, the BIA noted that Olalde would not be able to adjust his

status without waivers from the Attorney General of the two grounds of ineligibility

that the IJ identified (false documents and self removal), and Olalde had not even

requested those waivers. 

On appeal, Olalde argues that the IJ erred in denying his motion to continue

because, Olalde claims, he was eligible for an adjustment of status notwithstanding

the removal order of February 1999, and should therefore have been able to pursue

an adjustment of status to prevent his removal. As an initial matter, the

government contends that Olalde is appealing not from the denial of a motion to

continue but from the BIA’s discretionary denial of an adjustment-of-status request,

a ruling that this court would be powerless to review absent constitutional

violations. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i); see Sokolov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 566, 569-70 (7th

Cir. 2006). But, as in Ali v. Gonzales, Nos. 06-3240, 06-3879, 2007 WL 2684825, at

*5 (Sept. 14, 2007), Olalde ’s case never got far enough for a ruling on his

adjustment-of-status application. We are thus here asked only to review the denial

of Olalde’s motion to continue. 

Our review of the denial of Olalde’s motion to continue faces a dual

jurisdictional hurdle, however. The denial “was a procedural step along the way to

an unreviewable final decision”—a request to adjust status—and we generally lack

jurisdiction to review such interim rulings. Ali, 2007 WL 2684825, at *1-2, 6;

Leguizamo-Medina v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2007); 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Not only that, but our review is precluded by the jurisdictional

bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). That statute generally strips us of jurisdiction to

review discretionary rulings like continuances entered during removal proceedings. 

Ali, 2007 WL 2684825, at *1. 
No. 06-3255 Page 4

Together these jurisdictional bars prevent us from reviewing the denial of

Olalde’s motion to continue unless this case falls within the exception set forth in

Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2004). Ali, 2007 WL 2684825 at

*3, *6. Under Subhan, only if the IJ denies the alien’s motion to continue for an

arbitrary reason or for a reason inconsistent with the adjustment-of-status statute,

8 U.S.C. § 1255, such as the government’s failure to timely process an alien’s

request within a government agency, do we have jurisdiction to review that denial. 

Id. at *3. A denial of a motion to continue does not fall within Subhan’s exception

where the IJ denies the motion because alien’s past conduct disqualifies the alien

for adjustment and thereby renders the alien’s application to adust status

“hopeless.” Ali, 2007 WL 2684825, at *6; Pede v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 570, 571 (7th

Cir. 2006). An IJ’s denial of a continuance because of its ultimate hopelessness is

consistent with § 1255, Ali, 2007 WL 2684825, at *6; Pede, 442 F.3d at 571, and we

lack jurisdiction to review such a denial. Ali, 2007 WL 2684825, at *6. 

In particular an application to adjust status may be hopeless when the alien

is inadmissible and thus ineligible to pursue a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); see Pede,

442 F.3d at 571 (noting that immigration judge properly denied continuance where,

for adjustment of status to be granted, government would have to “overlook” her

fraud conviction). Two aspects of the inadmissibility provision of § 1182(a) are

pertinent to this case. First, an alien is inadmissible for ten years if he leaves the

country while a removal order is pending, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II), unless

the attorney General consents to his earlier admission, see id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii). 

Similarly, he is inadmissible generally if he willfully misrepresents a material fact

to seek an immigration benefit, see id. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), unless the Attorney

General has waived the misconduct, see id. § 1182(i). See also Singh v. Gonzales,

413 F.3d 156, 160 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding IJ’s denial of alien’s application for

adjustment of status because IJ properly found that alien was inadmissible due to

prior false testimony).

Here the IJ denied Olalde’s motion to continue only after finding that he was

ineligible for an adjustment of status (i.e., the application would have been

hopeless) under both § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) and § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i): Olalde had left

the country while a removal order was pending and returned within ten years

without the Attorney General’s consent; and he had presented false documents to

immigration authorities during an earlier application for asylum. Olalde, who has

not even challenged the second of those reasons, does not argue that either reason

for deeming his application hopeless—and therefore denying him a

continuance—was inconsistent with § 1255. And, indeed, both reasons are

consistent with § 1255, as they are statutorily-based reasons that Olalde was

inadmissible and thus ineligible to adjust his status. See Subhan, 383 F.3d at 593-

94; Singh, 413 F.3d at 160. Thus, because the IJ denied Olalde’s motion to continue

for reasons consistent with § 1255, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial. Ali,
No. 06-3255 Page 5

2007 WL 2684825, at *6 (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review denial

of motion to continue to pursue adjustment of status if application to adjust status

is futile); Pede, 442 F.3d at 571 (upholding denial of motion to continue removal

because pending application to adjust status was futile). 

Accordingly, Olalde’s petition is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.