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### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d O n B ri ef

A pr il 18, 200 8
IVA N D . B RA DLE Y v. GINGE R K AY E BRAD LEY

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Weakley County No. 19481 William Michael Maloan, Chancellor

No. W2007-01962-C OA-R3-C V - Filed June 24, 2008

This appea l arises fr om a divorce action. The trial court named Father primar y residential pa

rent of the pa rt ie s’ min or

c hil d, and

Mo the r a pp e a ls. We a ff

ir m.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t A ff ir me d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined. Milly Worley, Dyer sburg, Tenne ssee f or the a ppellant, Ginger

Kaye Bradley.

James H. Bra dberry, Dre sden, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, I van D. Bra dley.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1 The pa rties to this divorce ac tion, Ivan D. Bra dley (Mr. Bra dley) a nd Ginger K aye Bra dley (Ms. Bradley) wer e mar

ried in 1995 and se parat ed in 2005. At the time of the ma rriage , Mr. Br a dle y, a

c omm iss ion e d o ff

ic e r i n the Un ite d St a te s A rm y, wa s st a tio ne d at Fo rt Ca mpb e ll, Kentucky. A t the time of separ ation, the parties were living in Germany, wher e Mr. Bra dley was statio ne d. Th e pa

rt ie s’ have on e min or c hil d, Blake , born in 1996 . W hil e in G e rm a ny , th e famil y also included Mr. Bra dley’s daughte r fr om his previous marriage and M s. Bradley’ s two daughters-2-

fr om h e r p re vio us marria ge . A pp arently , M r. Br a dle y h a s b e e n d omi c ile d inTe nn e sse e wh ile serving in the Army.
Mr. B rad le y f

il e d a c o mp lain t f

o r d iv o r c e in th e Ch a n c e r y Co u r t o f W e ak le y Co u n ty, Te nn e ss ee in M arc h 2 00 6. W he n M r. Br a dle y f ile d h is c omp la int , th e pa rt ie s w e re re sid ing in Germany. In his complaint, Mr. Bradle y alleged ir rec oncilable diff

erence s and inappropriate martial conduct a s grounds for divorc e. He also praye d to be designated primary residential pare nt of the parties’ minor child. In July 2006, the trial court entere d a tempora ry par enting plan designating Mr. Bradley a s primary re sidential p ar en t

. Appar ently, Mr. Bradley w as stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and re siding in S hepar dsville, Kentucky, whe n the tempora ry par enting plan was e ntere d. Ms. Bradley answ ere d and counte r-c omplained in August 2006. Appar ently, Ms. Bradley had re located to Oklahoma and was unemployed as of the date of her answe r. Ms. Bradley a dmitted that ir re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s h a d a

ri se n be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s, bu t de nie d a lle gatio ns of ina pp ro pria te marital conduc t. Ms. Bradley coun t er -c o m p lained for absolute divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital c onduct and pr ayed f or custody of the minor child. In September 2 0 0 6 , the trial court entere d an orde r designating Ms. Bradley primary residential pa

rent. In its orde r, the trial court found both pa rents fit in c onsideration of the fac tors e nu me rate d at Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d § 36 -1 -1 06 , a nd de te rm ine d th a t it

wa s in B lake ’s be st interest to re side with Ms. Bra dley in light of he r family support network in Okla homa. The or der was not ente red a s a final judg ment pursuant to Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e 54.02, howeve r, and did not establish a visitation schedule. In November 2006, the trial co urt modified its order, enter ing a temporar y pare nting plan na

ming Ms. Bradle y as primary residential parent and somewhat establishin g a visitation schedule. Unde r this temporary plan, the par

ties ag ree d to meet half w ay to exchang e re sidency of Blake. On M ay 22, 2007, Ms. Br adley submitt ed a pr oposed per manent pare nting plan which named he r as pr imary residential pa

rent.
The e ntire divorce matter wa s hear d by the trial court on May 22 and 24, 2007, and the trial court e ntere d final judg ment on J uly 30, 2007. The trial c ourt dec lare d the par ties divorced pur suant to Tennesse e Code Annotated § 36-4-129 a nd named Mr. B radle y

primary residential parent “pursua nt to the rationale of

the Court [cont ai n ed ] i n its letter of May 29, 2007,” a c opy

of which
was attached a

nd made pa

rt of the or der of

the cour t. I n its May

29, 2007, letter the trial court state d that it had awa

rded te mporary

custody to Ms. Br adley based on her f amily situation in Oklahoma and the fact that Mr. Bradley was stationed at Fort Knox, but that “[t ]hat sit uation ha[d] chang ed.” T he trial court noted that Mr

. Br adley had retire d from the Ar my and wa s seekinga job, and that B lake had per formed p o o rl y

in school while in Ms. Bra dley ’s ca re. The trial court e ntere d a per manent pa re nti ngpla

n d e signatin g Mr . B ra dle y a s p ri mary

re sid e nti a l pa

re nt.
Mother filed a

timely notice of a p p ea l to this Court on Aug ust 28, 2007. On October 31, 2007, Ms. Bra dley

filed a motion for a

n extension of tim e within which to file a transcript of the evidenc e. This Court g rante d her moti on on November 1, 2007. On Fe bruar

y 8, 2008, Ms. Bra dley filed a motion for the extension of tim e for the fi l i n g o f h er brief. We g rante d that motion on Fe bruar y 11. Ms. Bra dley

filed her brief in this Court in March 2008. We a ffirm.-3- Anal y sis
Th e s o l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d f o r o ur r e v i e w o na

p p e a l i s w h e th e r

t h e t r i a l c o urte r

r e d in desig nating Mr. B radle y

as t he primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. We reviewthe trial court’s deter

mination of child custody under a n abuse of discretion standa

rd, af fordingthe trial court g reat defe renc e. E. g. , H e rre ra v . H

e rre ra , 9 44 S.W. 2d 37 9, 38 5 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 6) . T his Court w ill not interfe re w ith the trial court’s de termination absent a palpable a

buse of discr etion or unless the judg ment is ag ainst the g reat weig ht of the evide nce. Id. at 386. This defe rential re view is p re mis e d o n th e a ssumpt ion that th e tr ia l c ourt

fi rs t c on sid e re d th e be st i nte re sts of the c hil d in making the custody

deter mination and did n o t act arbitrar ily

. Id. When making a custody deter mination, the trial court must eng ag e in a comparative fitness analy sis of t he par ents. Ga sk ill
v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). I n so doing, i t m u s t co n s ider the f actor s o u tl in e d b y th e le g is latu

r e a s c o d if

ie d a t T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d § 3 6

- 6

- 106. Id. Custody deter minations are thus base d on a combination of subtle f actor s, and req u i re a factually based inquiry

. Id. The trial c ourt is in the best position to weig h the facts prese nted t o it, and to assess the
cre dibilit y

of the pa

rties. Id. Al tho ug h th e tr ia l c ourt ’s disc ret io n is no t w ith out li mit and its deter minations must be based on the evidenc e and appropr iate leg al principles, we will not dis turb the trial cour

t’s deter minations a

bsent an abuse of discretion. Hogue v . Hogue , 147 S.W .3d 245, 251 (Tenn. Ct. App

. 2 0 0 4 ). We reviewthe trial cour t’s deter mination of the fac ts reg ardingthe comp arativ e fi tne ss o f t

he pa re nts de novo , presumingthose finding s to be corr ect unless the
e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s o the rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; In reCla rk, No. W2005-01687-COA-R3-JV, 2007 WL 152537, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. J an. 22, 2007)( citing se e In re C.K.G. , 1 7 3 S

. W

. 3 d

7 1 4 , 7 3 2 (T en n

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g H a s s v

. Knighton , 6 7 6 S.W .2d 554, 555 (Tenn.1984) )). Upon re view of the re cord, w e obser ve that neither

pare nt is without persona l faults. The tr ia l c ourt c le arl y a

pp re c iate d the se fa

ult s, ho we ve r, and

ma de pa rt ic ula r f ind ing s u po n e ng a g ingin the compar ative fitness a

naly sis required unde r Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 36- 6-106. In its 2006 order , the trial cour

t found that, “[w]i th respec t to the love, aff ection, and e motional ties ex isting be tw e e n th e pa

re nts and the c hil d, the Court

fi nd s th a t bo th p are nts lov e the c hil d a nd have his be st interest in mind[ .]” The t rial court also found t hat M r. Bradle y had an alcohol problem for which he had voluntar ily

soug ht reha

bilitation, and that Ms. Br adley was underg oing psychiatric car e for anxiety and depr ession. The c ourt found that Ms. B radle y ’s condition did not ap p ea r to have had a detr imental eff

ect upon her pa

rentingskills, however. The trial court f ound that there was e vidence of “ina ppropriate discipline” by Mr. B radle y , but that the incident “obviousl y did not scar B lake
e mot ion a lly

. . . . ” As no te d a bo ve , in 20 06 the tr ia l c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t i t was in Blak e ’s be st int e re st t o r e sid e wi th M s. B ra dle y in l ig ht o f t

he fa c t th a t he wo uld

be liv ingwi th sib li ng s and in lig ht o f M s. B ra dle y ’s fa

mil y su pp or t ne tw or k. Ul tim a te ly , h ow e ve r, in its fi na l or de r e nte re d in Jul y 2007, the trial court f

ound that Mr. B radle y ’s living situation had c hang ed upon his retire ment from the Army , that Blake had failed to perf orm well in school while living w ith Ms. Bradle y . The trial court spec ifically

stated t hat i t had reviewe d the evidence in light of the statutory fac tors enumer ated in Tennesse e Code Annotated § 36-1-106, and found t hat bot h pare nts have “ strong aff ection” f or B lake . T he tr ia l c ourt

re ite ra te d th a t it s 2 00 6 o rder ha d b e e n p ri mari ly ba se d u po n a be st i nte re st-4-

deter mination in consideration of the “ stability of the fa mily unit,” and found that the “situation [had] chang ed.” Upon consideration of t he record, we cannot say the evidence preponder ates a g ainst the trial
c o urt’ s f in d in g s w it

hr e s p e c t t o it s c o mp ar a ti v e f it n e s s an a ly s is o r

it s b e s t inte r e s t d e te r

mi n a ti o n

. We
a c c or din g ly

fi nd no a bu se of dis c re tio n in

the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.
Hol din g
In light of the fore g oing, the trial court’ s judgme nt is aff irmed. Costs of this a

ppeal a re tax ed t o th e Ap p e l l an t , G i n g e r

K aye B r a d l e y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE