1

See§ 22.01(a) (3), T EX . P EN AL C ODE (per son commits an assault if per son “ca uses phy sical contac t w ith a

nother when the person knows or should r easona bly believe that the other will reg ard the contac t as offe nsive or provoc ative”)

. 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS
NOS. P D-0969-09 & P D-0811-09

JU LIA N M AR S M CK

ITH AN & R

AL P H F RA NK

LIN WEL SH, App e lla nt s

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS ON AP P ELLA NT S’ P ETIT ION S F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE F IR ST & SEC ON D CO UR TS OF AP P EA LS

HA RRIS & TA RR

AN T C OU NT IES H ERV EY , J. , de liv e r e d t he opi nio n of t he Co ur t i n whic h K ELLER , P .J., M E YE RS , W OM ACK , K

EASLER , H O L C O MB and C OCH RAN , JJ., jo ine d. C OCH RAN , J., file d a c onc ur r ing opin ion in wh ich H O L C O MB , J., jo ine d. P R I C E and J OHN S ON , JJ., concurre d . O P I N I O N I n these c onsolidated ca ses, we a ddress whe ther, unde r the c og nate- pleading s app ro ac h of the s tep-one lesser- included-of fense analy sis set out in our decision in Ha ll v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 525 (T e x.Cr .App . 2 00 7) , o ff

e ns ive -c on ta c t a ssa

ult is a le sse r-incl ude d o ff

e ns e of the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e 1McKithan/Welsh--2

2 See§ 22.01(a) (1), T EX . P EN AL C ODE (p e rs on c omm its an a ssault i f p e rs on c a us e s b od ily injury to another pe rson); § 1.07(a )(8) , T EX . P E N AL C ODE (“bodily injury ” mea

ns “phy sical pain, illness, or any

impairment of phy sical condition”).
3 Welsh’s indictment also alleg ed that the c omplainant was a family or household member

and that W els h had pr e vio us ly be e n c on vic te d o f b od ily -i nju ry a ssa ult a g a ins t a fa mil y or ho us e ho ld member, w hich enha

nced Welsh’s punishment rang e from a Class Amisdemeanor to a third-deg ree felony

. See§ 22.01(b)( 2)(A) , T EX . P EN AL C ODE .

4 See§ 22.01(c) , T EX . P EN AL C ODE . 5 See§ 12.42(a) (3), T EX . P EN AL C ODE . of b od il y -i nj ury

ass aul t in an i nd ict men t al legi ng bo di ly in ju ry by “ki cki ng” th e comp la ina

nt ( W e lsh , 2 PD-0811-09) a

nd of the c harg ed off

ense of ag g ravated s exual assault i n an indi ctment alleg ing that the complainant was compelled to subm it and participate by the use of “ phy sical for ce a nd violence” ( McKithan , PD-0969-09). We a lso address Mc Kithan’s claim that bodily -injury assault is a lesser

included off

ense of the cha rg ed ag g ravated-sexual-assa ult o f f e n s e . We decide that offensive -conta ct assault is a not lesser- included offense of the charg ed offenses in W e lsh and in McKithan and that bodily -injury

assault also is not a lesser -included of fense of the c harg ed off

ense in McKithan

. An indictment char g ed Welsh with committ ing bodily -injury assault by

“kicking ” the complainant (Welsh’s wife ) with his foot. The trial court denied Welsh’s reque st for a jury 3 ins tr uc tio n o n th e no ne nh anceab le Clas s C m isd e me ano r o ff e ns e of of fe ns ive -c on ta c t a ssa

ult

. A 4 jur y c on vic te d We lsh

of the c ha rg e d th ir d- de g re e fe lony

of bo dil y -i nju

ry a ssa ult and se nte nc e d h im, as an ha bitual offende r, to eig hteen y ear s in prison. 5 Welsh claimed on direc t appea l that he was e ntitled to a jury instruction on offensive -conta ct assault as a

lesser- included o ff

en s e o f the c harg ed off

ense of bodily -injury

assault. The c ourt ofMcKithan/Welsh--3

6 See §§§§ 22.021(a) (1)( A), 22.021(a) (2)( A)(ii), 22.021(c) , 22.011(b)( 1) T EX . P EN AL C ODE (per son commits agg ravated sexual assault if person causes the pe netration of the sexual org an of another person b y any

means without that other pe rson’s conse nt by compelling that other pe rson to s u b mi t o r p arti c ip a te b y

th e u s e o f

p h y s ic a l f

o r c e o r v io le n c e an d

th e p e r s o nb y

a c ts o r w ords place s the other pe rson in fea r of imminent serious bodily injury). a p p e a l s d e c i d e d

t h a t o f f e n s i v e - c o n t a c t a s s a

u l ti s n o ta l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d

o f f e n s e o f t h e c h ar g e d

b o d i l yinjury -assa

ult offense beca

use, to establish that Welsh c aused bodily injury to the complainant “by kic kin g he r w ith his fo ot, the State wa s not re qu ir e d to pro ve that We lsh kn e w o r r e a so na

bly sh ou ld have be lieved t h at [t he complaina nt] would reg ard the contac t as offe nsive or provoc ative.” See W e lsh v . S tate , No. 02-08-169- CR, sl ip op. at 4-5 (Tex .App.–For t Worth, delivered Ma

y 21, 2009) (not desig nated f

or publication). McKithan wa s char g ed with ag g ravated sexual a ssault in an indictment that in six para g raphs all ege d al t er n ative manne rs and mea ns of committing this offe nse. The f irst para g raph of

the indictment alleg ed that McK ithan sexually assaulted the complainant by placinghis finge r inside the

c omp la ina

nt’ s se xua l or g an and that Mc Ki tha n c omp e lle d the c omp la ina nt to su bmi t and pa rt ic ipate by t h e use of “ phy sical for ce a nd violence, a

nd by acts a nd words the De fenda

nt placed the Complainant in fear

that SERI OUS BO DI L Y I NJ URY would be imminently inflicted on [the complainant].” (Capi t alization in original). The first para g raph of McKithan’s indictment 6 specific ally

alleg ed: The duly o r g an iz e d

G r an d Ju r y o f H ar r is Co u n ty , T e xa s , p r e s e n ts in th e D is tr ict Court of Har

ris County , Texas, that in Har ris County , T ex as, JULIAN MAR S MCK ITHAN , h e re a ft e r sty

le d th e De fe nd ant, he re tof or e on or a bo ut DE CE M BER 17, 2006, did the n an d t h ere unlawfully , intentionally and knowing ly

cause the penetr ation of the F EMAL E SEXUAL ORGAN of [the complaina nt] , here inafter called the Complainant, by placingA FI

NGER in the FE MAL E SEXUAL ORGAN of the Complainant, without the consent of the Complainant, namely , the Def endant compelled the Complainant to submit and participate by the use of phy sical forc e andMcKithan/Welsh--4

7 The five additional para g raphs in the indictment alleg ed ag g ravated sexual assault by other manner and means. For

example, para g raph two of the indictment was identica l to parag raph one except that i t al l ege d t h at “by acts a nd words the De fenda

nt placed the Complainant in fear that KI DNAPPI

NG would be imminently inflicted on [the complainant.].” (Capitalization in orig inal). See§§§§ 22.021(a) (1)( A), 22.021(a) (2 )( A)(ii), 22.021( c), 22.011( b)(1) T EX . P EN AL C ODE . We further note that McKithan a

rgued in his disc retionary -re view petition that the “other [four] pa ra g ra ph s w e re va

ri a tio ns of

the [] the me s” in t

he fi rs t tw o p ara g ra

ph s. 8 The re cord r efle cts tha

t Mc Kithan re quested jury instructions on the lesser- included off enses “of a ssault, bodily

injury , and assa

ult defe nsive touching .” The S tate ar g ues on discre tionary revie w that McKithan fa iled to preser ve the c laim that he was e ntitled to a jury instruction on offensive

contac t assault beca

use McKithan reque sted an instruction on “de fensive touc hing” and “the re is no such o f f e n s e in th e Pe n a l C o d e . ” We n o te th a t t h e St a te d id

n o t m a k e th is p r e s e r

v a ti o n - o f

- e rror c la im i n th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls a nd tha t th e c ourt of a pp e a ls a dd

re sse d th e me ri ts o f M c Ki tha n’ s c la im that he wa s entitled to a jury i n s t ruction on off ensive-c ontact assa

ult. See M

cKithan , s lip op . at 3 n.3 (stating that it understood “appe llant’s objection to be ‘a ssault, offensive tou c hin g ’” ) ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . We re

je c t th e State ’s pr e se rv a tio n- of -e rr or c la im.
9 See§§ 12.42(d), 22.01( e), T EX . P EN AL C ODE . violence, a

nd by acts and words the De fenda nt placed the Complainant in fear that SE RI O U S B O D I L Y I

N JU RYw o u ld

b e immi n e n tl y in f

li c te d o n[th e c o mp la in an t]

. (Emphasis in bold and ca pitaliz ation in orig inal). 7 McKithan testified at trial and denie d having sexual contact with the complaina nt, but admitted assaulting her by , among other thing s, “slapping and punching” her. The trial court denied his request for

jury instructions on bodily -injury assault and on offensive- contac t assault. A jury 8 convicted Mc Kithan of the c harg ed ag g ravated-sexual -a s s au l t offense and sente nced him, as a n habitual offe nder, to life in pr ison. 9 We under s t an d M cKithan to have claimed on dir ect a ppeal that he was e ntitled to jury instructions on bodily -injury assault and on offe nsive-conta ct assault as l esser -included of fense s of the c ha rg e d a g g ra

vate d- se xua l- a ssa

ult of fe ns e un de r the “ ph y sic a l f or c e and vio le nc e ” a lle g a tio n inMcKithan/Welsh--5

10 We ex press no opinion on whethe r these a re le sser-inc luded offe nses under the other para g raphs of

the indictment. Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W .3d at 531 (“ This co urt has said on a number of occa sions that when the g reater off ense ma y be commit ted in more than one manner , the manner a lle g e d w ill de te rm ine the ava ila bil it y of le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s. ” ); c f. F e ldm an v . S

tate , 71 S.W .3d 738, 750-54 (Te x .Cr.App. 2002) (in c apital-murde r prosecution alleg ing two alternative means of committing th e o ff

en s e, def endant not entitled to lesser -included- offe nse instruction on murder , under the second step of

lesser- included-of

fense analy sis, without evidence ne g a ti n g b o th a lternative means of c ommitt ing the offe nse).

11 McKithan a

rgues in his brief on discr etionary revie w that the cour

t of appe als err ed by focusingexclusively

on the “a g gra v at i n g fac tors” alleg ed in the indictment and ig noring the alleg ation of “phy sical forc e and violence,” which, acc ording to Mc Kithan, “without re g ard to a ny ag g ravating f

actor s–provide[s] th e b a s is f o r d e d ucingthe eleme nts of the lesser offe nses.” Mc Kithan argue s: The fir st error , as is appar ent from the lang uag e of the [court of a ppeals’s] holding a bo ve , is that th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls f oc us e d e xclu siv e ly

on the “ a g g ra

vatin g fa c tor s” alleg ed in the indictment. This is h ar d t o understand, be cause Appellant’s br ief specific ally

called the court’s attention to the first para g raph of the indictment: “The first para g raph the n alleg e d th a t A p pellant ‘c ompelled the Complainant to submit and the first par ag raph of

the indictment. T h e co urt of appe als reje cted this claim bec ause ne ither 10 “bod i l y injury ” nor “ offe nsive touching ” ar e “w ithin the elements of ag g ravated sexual assault as char g ed in the indictment, which relied on assault by threat or kidnappingas ag g ravating f actor s.” Se e Mc Kith an v . S

tate , No. 01-08-00222- CR, sl ip op. at 9 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 Dist.] , delivere d st J une 4, 2009) ( not desig nated f or publication) ( “Howe ver, w e must a ddress appellant’ s contention that assault bodily injury and assa ult offensive touc hing w ere lesser- included off enses of ag g ravated sexual assault as char g ed in the indictment. Assault bodily injury require s proof that the de fenda nt

cause d bodily

injury to the complainant; assault offensive touc hing r equire s proof that the de fenda nt knew or should have re asonably believed that the complainant would reg ard the contac t as offe nsive or provoc ati v e. Neither

of these e lements are within the elements of a g g ravated sexual assault as char g ed in the indictment, which r elied on assa ult by threat or kidnapping as ag g ravating f actor s.”). 11McKithan/Welsh--6

participate b y t h e use of phy sical for ce a

nd violence, a

nd by acts a nd words the Def endant plac ed the Complainant in fe ar that serious bodily injury would be imminently

inflicted on [the complainant].’” The f irst portion of that para g raph state s an esse ntial element of se x ual assault; is not “an a g g ravating f actor .” The off ense of sexual assault under Penal Code Sec. 22.011( a)( 1)(A) require s proof that the assaultive c onduct on the other person is “ without that person’ s consent,” and subsection (b) pr escr ibes 11 way s in which that eleme nt must be establishe d

. The first way in which it may

be alleg ed that the a ssaultive conduct wa s “without c on se nt” is s e t out in

su bs e c tio n ( b) (1 ), and

the State inc lud e d that lan guage in Appellant’s indictment, alleg ing that in causing phy sical contact wi t h the complainant he “ compelled the c omplainant to submit and par ticipate by the use of phy sical for ce a

nd violence.” I t makes a

bsolutely no differ ence that the indictment “re lied on assault by threat or kidnapping as ag g ravating f actor s,” as the lowe r cour

t’s opinion stated. (See quoted por tion, su pra ) I f t he a lle g a tio ns of

the ind ic tme nt, le ss the a g g ra vatin g fa c tor s, le ss a

ny fa c tor s and

any nu mb er of

fa c tor s in

the a bs tr a c t, pe rm it a de du c tio n o f a

le sse r o ff

e nse on tho se re du c e d f

a c ts, the n th e c og nate pleading s test [ set out in Ha ll ] is satisfied. I n this c ase it ha ppens that the a lleg ations of the sexual assault–without r eg ard to any ag g ravating f

actor s–provide the ba sis for de du c ingthe e le me nts of

the le sse r o ff

e ns e s. (Emphasis in underline in orig inal).

12 The pa rties have cited publi shed and unpublished intermediate a ppellate c ourt dec isions that the par ties assert de monstrate conf l i ct i n g intermediate -appe llate-c ourt dec isions on thi s issue. Com pa re Aguil

ar v . S tate , 263 S.W .3d 430, 434-36 (Tex .App.–Houston [1 Dist.] 2008, pet. re f’d) st (ag g ravated-robbe ry

ind i ct m en t alleg ing that the defe ndant ca used bodily

injury “by striking [the c omp la ina

nt] i n the he a d with his fi st” did no t inc lud e of fe ns ive -c on ta c t ass a

ult be c a us e the “ fa c ts re qu ir e d to pr ov e [of

fe ns ive -c on ta c t] a ssa

ult inc lud e tw o that ar e no t the same a s, or le ss t ha n, tho se require d to establish the ag g ravated robbe ry : that the contact was offensive or provocative and that [the de fe nd ant] k

ne w o r sh ou ld have kn ow n that the c on ta c t w a s o ff e ns ive or pr ov oc a tiv e ” ); Ramos v . S tate , 981 S.W. 2d 70 0, 70 1 (T e x.Ap p. –H ou sto n [1 Di st. ] 199 8, pe t. r e f’ d) (s a me wi th r e sp e c t to st c ha rg e d o ff e ns e s o f a g g ra

vated sex ual a ssa

ult by pe ne tr a tio n a

nd ind e c e nc y

by c on ta c t be c a

us e ne ith e r o f t

he se tw o o ff

e ns e s, a s c ha

rg e d, re qu ir e d “ pr oo f t

hat th e de fe nd ant k

ne w o r r e a so na

bly believed that the complainant would re g ard the contac t as offensive or provocative at t he ti me of the con t ac t”) with In re A.E.B. , 255 S.W .3d 338, 345-47 (Te x .App.–Dallas 2008, pe t. dism’d) We g rante d discretionar

y revie w i n these c ases a

nd consolidated them. In W e lsh , PD-0811- 09, we g rante d revie w of the f ollowing g round: Th e F or t Wor th C ourt of Ap pe a ls e rr e d in

ho ldi ngthat a

pp e lla nt wa s n ot e nti tle d to an in str uc tio n o n th e le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e of a ssa ult by c on ta c t. 12McKithan/Welsh--7

(attempted- sexual-assault indictment alleg ing that juvenile “knocke d O.P. [t he complainant] to the g round and phy sically

overpow ere d her” included off ensive-c ontact assault bec ause “ the conduc t e le me nt o f atte mpt e d s e xua l assa ult a lle g e d– kn oc kin g O. P. t o th e g ro un d a nd ph y sic a lly overpow ering her–inc ludes the conduct element of assault–ca using phy sical contact with O.P. when he knew or should rea sonably have believed that O.P. would have reg arde d the contac t as offe nsive or provoc ative”)

.

13 McKithan a lso claims in his br ief on discretionar y revie w, as he did in the trial cour t, in the court of a ppeals a nd in his discretionar

y -re view petition, that bodily -injury assault is also a lesser

inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of the c ha rg e d a g g ra

vate d- se xua l- a ssa

ult of fe ns e . We wi ll a dd

re ss t his c la im.
14 Emphasis supplied. I n McKithan , PD-969-09, we g rante d revie w of the f ollowing g round: W as t h e C o u rt o f A p p ea l s co rr ec ti ns ay i n g as s au l t

– o ff en s i v e t o u ching

–is not allowed when the indictment sa y s th e d efendant used f orce and violence ag ainst the c omp la ina

nt? 13 Article 37.09( 1), T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC ., provides that an of fense i s a lesser -included offe nse “if it is established by proof of the s ame or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offe nse charg ed.” I n Ha ll , we a dopted the cognate- pleading s approa ch for the 14 first s t ep o f t h e l es s er -i n cl u d edo ff en s e a n al y s i s an d

re co gn i z edt h at t h i s ap p ro ac hi s co mp at i b l e w ith, and is “the be tter ana ly sis” of, Article 37.09. Se e Hall , 2 25 S.W. 3d a t 53 3 ( Ar

tic le 37 .0 9 is compatible with cog nate- pleadi ng s approa ch to lesser -included of fense s) and at 535 (holding that cog nate- pleading s approa ch is the sole test for determining in the first step whethe r a pa rty may be entitled to a lesser-included- offe nse i nstruction) and at 537 (also re cog nizi ng that this is t he “be tter

ana ly sis ” of

Ar tic le 37 .0 9) and

a t 5 39 (Her

ve y , J., dis se nti ng ) ( “ Th e Court ’s de c isi on that A rt ic le 37.09(1) r equire s an examination of the statutory elements o f t h e ch arg ed off ense a s they

are modified by the charg ing instrument in deter mining the ‘fa cts require d’ t o establish the commissionMcKithan/Welsh--8

of t he offense charg ed is consistent with the plain lang uag e of A rticle 37.09(1) .”). We fur ther stated in Ha ll that the step-one lesser- included-of fense analy sis must b e “ c a p a b leo f b e in g p e r formed be fore trial by compar ing the elements of the offe nse as they are alleg ed in the indictment or information with the elements of t he potential lesser-included of fense .” Se e Ha ll , 2 2 5 S. W. 3 d a t 5 3 5

- 3 6

. We also stated in Ha ll

that “the e lements o f the lesse r off ense do not have to be plea ded [in the indictment] if they can be deduce d from the fac ts a lleg ed in the indictment.” Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W . 3d at 535. I n an opinion on rehe aringin Ex parte W atson , we r eaf

firmed that Ar

ticle 37.09(1) a

nd Ha ll control the step-one lesser- included-of fense analy sis. See E

x parte W atson , 306 S.W .3d 259, 273 (Tex.Cr.App. 2009) (op. on r eh’g ). The opinion on re hear ing in W atson stated: We now rea ffirm the pr inciple that we , at l east implicitly , rec og nized in Ha ll : An offe nse is a lesser-included offense of another offense, under Article 37.09(1) of the Cod e o f C ri m i n al P ro ce d

u re , i f t h e i n d i ct m en tfo r t h e gr ea t er -i n cl u s i v e o ff en se either : 1) a lle g e s a ll o f t

he e le me nts of

the les ser -i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e , o r 2 ) a lle g e s e le me nts plu s f a c ts ( inc lud ingde sc ri pti ve ave rm e nt s , s u c h a s n on -s tatut or y mann e r a nd me ans , that are alleg ed for

purposes of providing notice) from which all of the eleme nts of the lesser -included of

fens e m ay

be deduc ed. B oth statutory elements a

nd any de sc ri pti ve ave rm e nts a lle g e d in the ind ic tme nt fo r the g re a te r- inc lus iv e of fe ns e should be compar ed to the statutory elements of the lesser offe nse. I f a de scriptive aver ment in the indictment for the g reater o ff en s e i s i dentical to an e lement of the lesser of fense , o r i f

a n el eme n t o f

th e l es s e r o f

f en s e ma y b e d ed u ce d f

ro m a de sc r ipt ive av e r m e ntin the indic tm e ntfor th e gr e at e r -i nc lusi ve offe nse , th is sh ou ld b e fa c tor e d into [the fi rs t st e p o f] the l ess e r- inc lud e d- of fe ns e ana ly sis in asking whether

all of the e lements of the lesse r off ens e are containe d within the alleg ations of the g reater off ense. Id . (footnotes omitted and e mphasis supplied). This emphasized lang uag e fr om the opinion on rehea ring in W atson is based on the state ment in Ha ll that “the e lements of the lesser offense do not have to be pleade d [i n the indictment] i f they can be deduced from the fa cts alleg ed in the indictment.” Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W . 3d at 535. Our c asesMcKithan/Welsh--9

15 This “func tional-equivale nce concept” appe ars to be sy nony mous with the conce pts of “nec essar y inclusion” or “subsumption of ele ments.” See E vans , 299 S.W .3d at 143.
16 I n Salazar , we state d: In t h i s c a s e , t h e C o u rto f Ap p e a l s d i d

c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f

y Ha ll as the c on t rol ling sta nd ard fo r a sse ssi ng le sse r- inc lud e d off e ns e s. Ho we ve r, in i ts a

na ly sis of the fi rs t step, the Court deter

mined that the leg al el em en t s o f cr iminal trespass wer e not compar able to th e e le me n ts o f b u r g la r y o f a h a b it a ti o n a s th e y w e r e a ll e g e d in the indictment. Accor ding to the Court, the nota ble element absent from the indictment have re c og nize d th a t th is s tate me nt f ro m Ha ll approving ly descr ibes what is e ssen t i al l y the

“ fu nc tio na l- e qu iva le nc e c on c e pt” a s a va lid c omp on e nt o f t

he ste p- on e le sse r- inc lud e d- of fe ns e analy sis set out in Ha ll

. Se e Ev an s v . S tate , 299 S.W .3d 138, 143 (Tex.Cr.App. 2009) (noting State’s

c on c e ssi on

“ that Ha ll

approve d the use in t he lesser -included- offe nse ana ly sis of a conc ept similar to functional eq uivalence when it stated that ‘the elements of the lesser of fense do not have to be p l ea ded if they

can be deduce d f

r o m t h e f a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t

. ’ ” ) ( e mp h a s i s a dd e d in orig inal). The “ functional-e quivalence conce pt” require s courts to “examine the eleme nts of the

15 lesser of fense and dec ide whethe r they are functionally the same or less than those re quired to prove the cha rg ed off ense.” Se e Fa rra k

ha n v . S tate , 247 S.W .3d 720, 722-23 (Te x .Cr.App. 2008) (inter nal qu o t es om itted and emphasis in orig inal) and at 724 (“When it used the ter m ‘functional equivalenc e,’ the court [of appe als] employ ed the same two-step method of conduc ting suc h lesserincluded-of

fense analy ses in its opini on that we de scribed in Ha ll shortly there afte r.”)

. T h i s is consistent with our decision in Sa laz ar v . S tate in which we he ld that a habitation “inher ently ” provide s notice that entry is forbidden for purposes of deter mining whe ther c riminal trespass is a lesser-included of fense of the c harg ed burg lary -of- a-ha bitation offense

. See Salazar v. Sta te , 284 S.W .3d 874, 875, 878 (Tex.Cr.App. 2009). I n other wor ds, the indictment’s alleg ation 16McKithan/Welsh--10

wa s notice of for

bidden entry , which i s a requirement of c riminal trespass a nd y et nowher e mentioned in the indictment. I n this c ase, howeve r, it would not have be en nece ssary to expressly

include the languag e of notice in the indictment beca use n o ti ce is inherent in a “ habitati o n . ” Fu rt her, pur suant to Ha ll , “the e lements of the lesse r offe nse do not have to be pleade d if they can be deduce d from the f acts a lleg ed in the indictment.” We believe it ca n be deduc ed fr om the i n d i ct m en t , that the appe llant had notice, quite simply , beca use notice is inher ent to a habitation and the indictment rea d “burg lary

of a ha bitation.” See Salazar , 284 S.W .3d at 878 (footnotes omitted and e mphasis in origina l). in Salazar

of a “ habitation” was functionally equivalent to a n alleg ation of notice that entr y into the habitation was for

bidden making this e lement of criminal trespa ss established by the fa cts requir ed (i.e., “habitation”) to e stablish the char g ed burg lary -of- a-ha bitation offense

. Se e id

. Thus, in case s like this, wh ere an alleg ation in the indictment is not i dentical to an e lement of the le sser off ense, the issue under Ha ll

is whether the indictment’s alleg ation is f unctionally equivalent to an e lement of the lesse r off

ense. See W

atson , 3 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 2 7 3 ( o p . on re h’ g ); E va ns , 299 S.W .3d at 143; Salazar , 2 84 S.W. 3d

a t 87 8; Farrakhan , 247 S.W .3d at 722-23. I. Is B odi ly- Inj ur y A ssa ultor Offen siv e -C ont ac t A ssa ulta Le sse r -I nc luded Offen se of t he Cha r ge d Offe nse in McKithan ? The e lements of bodily -injury assault are set out in Section 22.01(a)( 1) of the Pena l Code, whi ch pro vi des that a

pe rs on c omm its the of

fe ns e of a ssa ult if the pe rs on

c a us e s b od ily

inj ur y to another . The e lements of off ensive-c ontact assa

ult are se t ou t i n S ec t i o n 22.01(a) (3) of the Penal Code, which provide s that a per son commits the offense of assa ult if the p er s o n ca u s es phy sical
contac t with another whe n the per son knows or should rea sonably believe that the other will reg ard the contac t as offe nsive or provoc ative. I nitially , we note that McKithan has not cla imed that the ind i ct m ent’s alleg ation that he penetr ated the c omplainant’s sexual org an with his fing er is the f unctional equivale nt (or re quiresMcKithan/Welsh--11

17 This could b e b e c a

u s e M c K it

h and e te r mi n e d th a t h e w o u ld

n o t h a v e b e e ne n ti tl e d

to ju ry instructions on these offe nses under the step-two lesse r-include d-off ense a naly sis under Ha ll , since Mc Ki tha n te sti fi e d at tr ia l and

de nie d th a t he pe ne tr a te d th e c omp la ina nt’ s se xua l or g an w ithhis fi ng er. Se e Ha ll , 2 2 5 S. W. 3 d a t 5 3 6 ( e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d a t t r ia l i s im p o rta n t t o s te p - tw o le s serincluded-of

fense analy sis). We ex press no opinion on whethe r the a lleg ation in McKithan’s ind ic tme nt t

hat he pe ne tr a te d th e c ompla ina nt’ s se xua l or g an w ithhis fi ng e r r e qu ir e d th e State to pr ov e bo dil y -i nju

ry a ssa ult or of fe ns ive -c on ta c t a ssa

ult

. 18 F or e xamp le , M c Ki tha

n a rgue s: [T]he langua g e a lle g ing se xua l ass a ult in thi s in dic tme nt c le arl y imp lie s th e e le me nts of Pena l C o de Sec. 22.01( a)[3], assault by causingphy sical conta ct with another when the a ctor knows or re asonably should believe the othe r per son will reg ard the contac t as offe nsive, as a possible lesse r off ense. It takes no g reat leap of the imag ination to infer–that is, to deduce from the languag e of the indictment–that the co mp la in an t w o u ld r e g ar d a s o f f e n s iv e [M c K it

h an ’ s ] p h y s ic a l c o n ta c t, w h ich the indictment alleg ed that he c ompell ed her to submit to, by

the use of f

orce and vio le nc e , a

nd that [Mc Ki tha

n] did kn ow or re a so na

bly sh ou ld h a ve kn ow n s he wo uld reg ard it as of

fensive.
19 We note that “infe r” is a de finition and sy nony m of the term “ deduce .” Se e Roge t’ s Desk Thesaurus 1 3 3 ( 2 0 0 1 ) ; W e b s t e r ’ s II Ne w Co lle gia te Di c tio na ry

294 (1999). pr oo f) of bo dil y -i nju

ry a ssa ult or of of fe ns ive -c on ta c t a ssa

ult

. Rathe r, Mc Ki tha

n c la ims that th e se 17 offe nses may

be deduc ed or infe rre d from the indictment’s “ phy sical for ce a nd violence” alleg ation. McKithan a

rgues in his brief on discr etionary revie w th at “[ i] t can c erta inly be infe rre d from the indictment’s alleg ation that [McKithan] u sed phy sical for ce a nd violence a g ainst the complainant that he ca used her pain–one definition of bodily injury ” in Sec tion 1.07( a)( 8) of the Penal Code and that “he w ould know that the complainant would f ind such contac t offensive or provoc ative.” 18 McKithan’s arguments are based on the languag e fr om the opinion on rehea ring in W atson that it is rele vant to the step-one lesser- included-of fense analy si s u nder Ha ll “if a n element of

the lesser of fense may

be deduc ed from a de scriptive ave rment in the indictment for the g reater-

19McKithan/Welsh--12

20 We also n o t e t hat McKithan’ s rea ding of the opinion on rehe aringin W atson would be inc on sis te nt w iththe “ fa c ts r e qu ir e d” languag e in Art ic le 37 .0 9( 1) and wo uld c ha ng e thi s “ fa c ts require d” languag e into “fa cts deduce d or infer red.” Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W .3d at 534 (disappr oving of int e rp re tatio n o f A rt ic le 37 .0 9( 1) tha t neg a te s the langua g e of Ar tic le 37 .0 9( 1) “ by

c ha ng ing‘f a c ts re qu i re d ’ i n t o ‘f

ac t s p re s en t ed ’” ) ( qu oti n g J ac ob v . S tate , 892 S.W .2d 905, 908 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995)). inclusive offe nse.” Mc Kithan’s ar gu m en t s , howeve r, re ad too much into this statement from the opinion on rehea

ring in W atson , wh ic h, a s we have a lr e a dy dis c us se d, de sc ri be s w hat is e sse nti a lly the “ fu nc tio na l- e qu iva le nc e c on c e pt” a s a va lid c omp on e nt o f t he ste p- on e le sse r- inc lud e d- of fe ns e analy sis under Ha ll

. See also Ev ans , 299 S.W. 3d a t 14 3; Salazar , 2 84 S.W. 3d a t 87 8; Farrakhan , 247 S.W .3d at 722-24. The issue unde r Ha ll and W atson is not whether bodily -injury assault or 20 offe nsive-conta ct assault may be deduc ed or infe rre d from the indictment’s a lleg ation that McKithan

us e d “ ph y sic a l fo rc e and vio le nc e ” bu t wh e the r thi s a lle g a tio n in the ind ic tmen t i s func tio na lly

e qu iva le nt t o a

n a lle g a tio n o f b od ily -i nju ry a ssa ult or to a n a lle gati on of off

e ns ive -c on ta c t a ssa

ult (i .e ., wh e the r, in e sta

bli sh ing the “ ph y sic a l fo rc e and vio le nc e ” a lle g a tio n in the ind ic tme nt, the State

was re quired to prove bodily -injury assault or off

ensive-c ontact assa

ult). And we be lieve that settled c ase la w supports a de cision that the “phy sical for ce a nd violence” a l l egation in M cKithan’ s indictment is not functionally equivalent to an a lleg ation of bodily -injury

and that the State wa s not require d to prove bodily injury to es tablish this “phy sical forc e and violence” alleg ation in McKithan’s a g g ravated-sexual-assa ult indictment. See W

isdom v. Sta te , 708 S.W .2d 840, 843 n.3 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986) (t h e t er ms “forc e” a nd “violence ” ar e

“ sy no ny mou s w he n u se d in

re latio n to a ssa

ult , and inc lud e any a

pp lic a tio n of

fo rc e e ve n th ou g h it

e nta ils no pain or bo dily inj ur y and le a ve s n o ma

rk ” ); Br own v . S

tate , 576 S.W .2d 820, 822-23 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978) (def

endant compelling complainant to submit to se x ual intercour se by holdingMcKithan/Welsh--13

21 McKithan a lso argues that this Court’s decision in Sc hm idt v . S tate “c o m es cl o s e to h o l d i n g” that bodily -injury

assault is the leg al equivale nt to the “phy sical force and violence” alleg ation in the indictment. Se e Sc hm idt

v . S tate , 278 S.W .3d 353 (Tex.Cr.App. 2009). We understand Mc Kithan to cl a im that Schmidt

d e c i d e d t h a t“ s t r i k i n g ” s o m e o n e i s t h e “ l e g a l e qu i v a l e n to f c a u s i n g b o dil y injury ” which, a ccor ding to Mc Kithan, would support deciding that “phy sical force a nd violence” is also the “lega l equivalent of causing bodily injury .” In Schmidt , we assumed without de ciding that the def endant’ s act of “striking ” the complainant was “the leg al equivalent of causingbodily

injury ,” beca use the State did not cha lleng e that dec ision by the court of appe als. See Sc hmidt , 278 S.W .3d at 356 n.6. a g u nt o h e r

h e a d s u f f i c i e n tt o s h o w f

o r c e an d t h re a ts) ; Tre

jo v . S tate , 242 S.W .3d 48, 50-52 (Tex.App.–Houston [14 Dist.] 2007) (a g g ravated assault not lesser -i n cl u ded off ense of char g ed th

a g g ra vate d- se xua l- a ssa

ult of fe ns e be c a

us e se ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y wa s n ot a “ fa c t r e q u i r e d ” t o e s ta

bli sh the “phy sical for ce a

nd violence” and “thr eatening to use forc e and violenc e” a lleg ations in the indictment), ov e rru le d o n ot hergr ou nd s, Tre jo v . S tate , 280 S.W .3d 258 (Tex.Cr.App. 2009); Ed war ds v . S tate , 9 7 S. W.3 d 2 79 , 2 91 (T e x.Ap p. –H ou sto n [14 Di st .] 20 03 , p e t. r e f’ d) (e xplic it th verba l threats and phy sical injury are not require d to prove that a defe ndant compelled the victim’s pa rt ic ipatio n in a sexua l ass a ult by ph y sic a l f

or c e and vio le nc e ) ( and

c a se s c ite d) ; Go nz ale

s v . S tate , 2 S.W .3d 4 1 1 , 4 1 4

- 1 6 ( T e x. A

p p . – Sa n Antonio 1999, no pet.) (de fenda nt compelling the complainant to submit to se x ual intercour se by laying on top of the complainant and preve nting her f rom moving

su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w p hy sic a l f

or c e and vio lence). Th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls, the re fo re , d id n ot e rr to 21 decide that the trial court proper ly ref used McKithan’s reque sted jury instruction on bodily -injury

a ssa ult

. We also believe that this case law supports a decision that the “phy sical for ce a nd violence” alleg ation in

M c K it h an ’ s in d ic tm e n t i s n o t f u n c ti o n a ll y

e qu iv a le n t t o ana ll e g a ti o no f p h y s ic al
contac t and that the State was not require d to prove phy sical contact in establishing this “phy sicalMcKithan/Welsh--14

forc e and violence” alleg ation in McKithan’s a g g ravated-sexual-assa ult indictment. See W

isdom , 70 8 S. W.2 d at 84 3 n .3 (“ vio le nc e is a g e ne ra l te rm and incl ud e s a ll s or ts o f f or c e ” ); Br own , 576 S.W .2d at 822-23 ( conce pt of force includes “phy sical force, threats, or some other ty pe of c oerc ion”

and the de fe nd ant c omp e lli ngthe c omp la ina nt t o s ub mit

to s e xua l in te rc ours e by

ho ldi nga g un to he r he a d suf

fi c ie nt to s ho w f

or c e or thr e a ts) ; Ro bin so n v . S

tate , 149 S.W . 186, 187-88 (Te x .Cr.App. 19 12 ) ( “ vio le nc e ” is a

g e ne ra l te rm

and inc lud e s all so rt s of fo rc e and no tin g that th e te rm ha s a lso been de fined a s “moving or ac ting with phy sical streng th, urg ed or impelled with f orce , actingthat is c ha ra c te ri zed or pr od uc e d b y imp ro pe r f

or c e ” ). Th e c ourt of a

pp e a ls, the re fo re , d id n ot e rr to decide that the trial cour

t properly ref used McKithan’ s reque sted juryinstructions on offensivec on ta c t a ssa

ult

. II. Is O ffens ive -C ont ac t As sa ult a Le sse r -I nc lude d Offen se of t he Cha r ge d Offe nse in We lsh ? Welsh arg ues that off

ensive-c ontact a s s au l t is a lesser- included off ense of bodily -injury

ass au l t “because the eleme nt of ca using bodily

injury [by kicking ] i s leg ally

equivalent to the

co mp l ai n an t ’s re gar d i n g s u ch co n t ac tas o ff en s i v e o r p r o v o ca t i v e. ” W e d ec i d e t h at t h e c au s i n gbodily -injury -by -kickingalleg ation in Welsh’s in d i ct m ent is not functionally equivalent to an alleg ation that Welsh knew or should rea sonably have be lieved that the c omplainant would reg ard this contact as of

fensive or provocative. The State wa s not require d t o p ro v e the latter (i.e., that appellant kne w or should re asonably have be lieved that the c omplainant would reg ard this contac t as off ensive) to e stablish the former (i.e. that a

ppellant ca

used the c omplainant bodily injury by kicking ). Se e als o W

e lsh , s lip op . at 4- 5 ( of

fe ns ive -c on ta c t a ssa

ult is n ot a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of th e c h ar g e d b o d il y - in

ju r y - a s s a u lt o f f e n s e a s c h ar g e d b e c a

u s e , to e s ta

b li s h th a t Welsh c aused bodily injury to the complainant “by

kicking her w ith his foot, the State wa s not require d to proveMcKithan/Welsh--15

22 See§ 2 2. 01 (a )( 1) (b od ily -i nju ry a ssa ult ); § 22. 01 (a )( 2) (a ssa

ult by thr e a te nin g ano the r w ith imminent bodil y

injury); § 22.01(a) (3) ( offe nsive-conta ct assault). that Welsh knew or

rea sonably

should have be lieved that [the complainant] would reg ard the contac t

a s of fe ns ive or pr ov oc a tiv e ” ). I n e sta bli sh ingthe c ha

rg e d b od ily -i nju

ry -a ssa ult of fe ns e , th e State

wa s r e qu ir e d to pr ov e on ly that app e lla nt ca us e d the c omp la ina

nt bod ily inj ur

y by kic kin g he r. I t is irrele vant whet h er t h e d efe ndant knew or should have re asonably

believed that the complainant would consider this conta ct as off ensive or pr ovocative. We a lso no te that this Court ha s sta te d that the thr e e statut or y de fi nit ion s of simp le a ssa ult contained in Sec tion 22.01(a)( 1)-( 3) of the Pena l Code are “thre e distinct criminal offe n ses.” See L an dr ian v . S

tate , 2 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d 5 3 2 , 5 4 0 ( T e x. C r . Ap p . 2 0 0 8 )

. A c o n t r ar y d e c i s i o n i n t h i s c a se 22 would be inconsistent with this legislative intent and w ould amount to a holding that, in eve ry bodily -injury -assa

ult c ase involving phy sical contac t, the State is require d to prove, a s an ele ment of that bodily -injury -assa

ult case, that the defe ndant also knew or should have re asonably believed that the complainant would r eg ard that contact a s offe nsive. Our opinion in Ha ll

and the opinions by

the court of appea ls and by this Court i n Farrakhan support this decision. Se e Fa rra k ha n v . S tate , 263 S.W .3d

1 2 4 , 1 3 2

- 4 0 ( T e x. Ap p . – H o u s to n[1 st Dist.] 2006), aff’d by Farrakhan , 247 S.W .3d at 724. In Farrakhan , this Court approved of the court of appe als’s pre

- Ha ll

lesser- include d -off

ense a naly sis as beingconsistent with Ha ll

. See F arrakhan , 247 S.W .3d at 724 (“When it use d the term ‘func tional e quivalence ,’ the court [of appeals] employ ed the same two- step method of conduc ting suc h lesser- included-of fense analy ses i n its opini on that we descr ibed in Ha ll

sh or tly the re a ft e r. Thus , it

re a c he d th e same re su lt that Ha ll would have mandated.” ).McKithan/Welsh--16

23 See§ 545.421(a) , T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE . 24 See§ 38.04(a) , T EX . P EN AL C ODE . 25 95 S.W .3d 516, 519 (Tex.App.–For t Worth 2002, pet. ref’d) (dec iding that offense of flee ing or attempting to elude a police office r is a lesser -included of fense of eva ding de tention by use of a motor vehicle)

. T h e issue in Farrakhan was whe ther the Class B misdemeanor of fense of flee ing or attempting to e lude a police office r is a lesser- included offe nse of the char g ed s t at e-ja il-felony 23 offe nse of e vading detention by use o f a mot or vehic le. I n rele vant par t, the indictment for the 24 state-jail-f

elony offe nse of e vading detention by use of a motor vehicle al l ege d that the def endant fled in a ve hicle fr om a police of fice r who wa s attempting la wfully to arre st the defe ndant. See Farrakhan , 263 S.W .3d at 132. Over the def endant’ s objection, the trial court i n s t ru cted the jur y on the Cl as s B m i sdemea nor off ense of flee ing or

attempting to e lude a police office r, which pr ov ide s th a t a pe rs on c omm its thi s off e ns e wh e n “ the pe rs on

op e rate s a

mot or ve hic le and

wi lf ull y fa ils or re fu se s to br ingthe ve hic le to a sto p or fl e e s, or a tte mpt s to e lud e , a

purs uin g po lic e ve hic le when g iven a visual or audible sig nal to bring the vehicle to a stop.” See Farrakhan , 263 S.W .3d at 129, 132 (interna l quotes omitt ed). This off ense is fur

ther de fined by

stating that “the off

icer ’s signa l may

be by hand, voice , emer g ency

light, or siren, and the sig naling office r must be uniformed, prominently

display ing his ba dg e, and dr iving a vehicle that is appropriately marke d as an of

ficial police vehic le.” Se e id . (interna l quotes omitt ed). Dec lining to follow the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’s dec ision in W alk e r v . S tate , the cour

t 25 of appe als in Farrakhan decide d that the State was not r equire d to pr ove at least three elements of
t h e f l ee i n g-o r- at t em p t i n g-t o -e l u d e- a- p o l i ce -o ff i ce r o ff en s e i nes t ab l i s h i n g t h e c h ar gedev ad i n g-McKithan/Welsh--17

26 Ha ll , t h er ef

o re , decide d that shooting a nd killing a pe rson with a gun is not, in a step-one detention-by -a- motor-vehicle offe nse and that “the unchar g ed offe nse’s elements re quiring proof of these three fac ts w ere neither the functional equivalents of the eleme nts of the cha rg ed off ense nor

wer e they included within the char g ed offe nse’s e lements.” See F arrakhan , 263 S.W .3d at 138-39. The c ourt of appe als stated that it was irre levant that the State may have pr oved the f

leeing -orattempting- to-elude- a-police -off icer offe nse “in the proce ss of proving the statutori l y re quired elements of e vading detention is irrele vant.” The court of a ppeals stated: F or e xamp le , a s c ha

rg e d he re , the of

fe ns e of e va din g de te nti on

re qu ir e d th a t th e State prove only

that appellant, by using a motor vehicle, intentionally fled from Offic er Roi wh e n a

pp e lla nt kn e w that O ff

ic e r R oi w a s a

pe a c e of fi c e r a tte mpt ingto d e ta in him lawfully . That off

ense did n o t require the State to prove, f or example, that Offic er Roi wa s in a vehicle of any kind (as unusual a s that scena rio might be when the su sp e c t is in a

ve hic le); th at the of

fi c e r w a s unif

or me d a nd pr omi ne ntl y display ing his ba dg e; or that, if the of fice r wa s u s ing a

vehicle, that vehicle wa s appropr iately marke d as an officia l police vehicle. The fact that the St ate did prove these thing s in the proce ss of proving the statutorily require d elements of e vading detention is irrele vant. We respe ctfully disag ree with the W

alker court’s c onclusion to the c o n tr ar

y b e c a u s e it s c o n c lu s io n a

p p e ar s to h a v e r e s te d o n w h a t e v id e n ce the State a c tua lly

pr e se nte d, rathe r t

ha n o n w hat e vid e nc e the S tat e was re qu ir e d to prese nt, to prove the c harg ed off ense. See F arrakhan , 2 63 S.W. 3d

a t 13 9 ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l, fo otn ote s and c itatio n to a

uth or ity omitted). I n Ha ll , w e de c ide d th a t a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult by thr e a te nin g ano the r w ithimm ine nt bodil y inj ur y by dis pla yinga g un wa s n ot a le sse r- inc lud e d off e ns e of mur de r as c ha

rg e d in an in dic tme nt, wh ic h, in r e le va

nt p art , all e g e d that the de fe nd ant ca us e d the de a th o f a

n in div idu a l by

sh oo tin g him with a gu n . W e d ec ided in Ha ll that the “thre atening ” and “ display ” ele ments of the ag g ravatedas s au l t l es s er o ff

en s e we re n o t “f

ac t s re qu i re d ” to es t ab l i s h t h e ch ar ged m u rd er o ff en s e e v en t h o u gh “the e vidence may

show threatening and display .” Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W .3d at 536-37. I n Ha ll , we 26McKithan/Welsh--18

lesser- included-of

fense analy sis, functionally equivalent to threateningthat person with imminent bodily injury by displaying a

g un. stated: The facts required to pr ov e the le sse r of fe ns e inc lud e tw o that are no t the same a s, o r l e s s t h an , t h o s e r e qu i r e d t o e s t a b l i s ht h e o f

f e n s e c h ar g e d : t h r e a t e n i n g an d d i s p l ay. I t is true that the evidenc e may show t h re at en i n g and display . The e vidence may show a nu mb e r o f o th e r le s s e r o f f e n s e s a s w e ll , s u c h a s d is o r d e r ly conduct by d i s ch ar gi n g a f

i re arm i na p u

b l i c p l a c e o rac ro s s a p u b l i c r o ado r b y

d i s p l ay i n g a firea rm in a public plac e in a manne r ca lculated to ala rm, unlawfully

car rying of we ap on, or unlawf

ul possession of wea

pon. But those of

fense s likewise ar e not established by the s ame or less than the proof required to prove the a lleg ations in the indictment for murde r. Ag g ravated assault by threat, like the other off enses me nti on e d, re qu ir e s p ro of of a dd iti on a l f

a c ts. Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W .3d at 536-37 (e mphasis supplied and footnotes omitted). I n Farrakhan , we a

pproved of the cour

t of appe als’s dec ision that the “flee ing” offe nse wa s not a lesser -included of

fense of the c harg ed “e vading ” offen s e ev en though pr oof of the c harg ed “eva ding” offe nse may

also have shown the “f

leeing ” off

ense. See F

arrakhan , 247 S.W .3d at 722- 23 ; Farrakhan , 263 S.W .3d at 138-39. In Ha ll , we de cide d t h at t he ag g ravated-a ssault-by -threat offe nse wa s not a lesser- included off ense of the cha rg ed m u rd er offe nse eve n though pr oof of the char g ed murde r off

ense ma y also have shown the ag g rav ated-assault-by -threat offense

. Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W .3d at 536-37. The se we re not lesse r-include d offe nses of the c harg ed off enses in both of the se c a se s b e c a

us e the State wa s n ot required to prove these offe nses in establishing the char g ed offe nses, even though the State’s evidence may have shown them. Se e id .; Farrakhan , 263 S.W .3d at 138-39. Thus, as in Farrakhan and Ha ll wher e the fac ts r equire d to show the cha rg ed off enses mayMcKithan/Welsh--19

27 Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W .3d at 536.
28 These sa me consider ations apply in McKithan’s case since t he S tate’s proof of a “phy sical forc e and violenc e” indictment a lleg ation in McKithan’s c ase may also have shown bodily

injury and offe nsive contac t. also have shown “a number of other lesser offenses as well,” it is not dispositi ve that the evidenc e 27 in Wels h ’s bodily -injury -assa ult case ma

y also have shown offe nsive-conta ct assault. Com pa re Farrakhan , 263 S.W .3d at 139 (cha rg ed offense “did not require the S tate to prove, for e x ample, that Of fi c e r R oi w a s in

a ve hic le of any kin d (a s unu su a l as that sce na ri o mi g ht b e wh e n th e su sp e c t is in a ve hic le )” ). Th e re le va

nt i nq uir y is no t what th e e vid e nc e may sh owbut w hat th e State is

re q u i red to prove to establish the cha rg ed off ense. Se e Ha ll , 2 2 5 S. W. 3 d a t 5 3 6

- 3 7 ( State not require d to pr ove threatening and display even though these may be show n b y t h e e vidence ); Farrakhan , 263 S.W .3d at 139 (re levant inqui ry is based on “what evidenc e the State wa s require d
t o p resent, to prove the c harg ed off ense” and that “the State c ou ld and did prese nt evidence ” of a le sse r of fe ns e “ do e s no t me an th a t th e State wa s required to do so”) (emphasis in orig inal). And, 28 in We lsh ’s c a se , w e have de c ide d th a t th e State was no t re qu ir e d to pr ov e of fe ns ive c on ta c t in establishing the char g ed bodily -injury -assa ult offense (eve n though the State’s evidenc e may have shown offe nsive contac t). The judg ments of the cour ts of appea ls in McKithan and in W e lsh are aff

irmed.

H e r v e y , J.

Deliver ed: Novembe r 10, 2010 Pub lis h