COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman 

SA'AD EL-AMIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1063-01-2 PER CURIAM 

 JANUARY 29, 2002 

CAROLYN ADAMS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Barnard F. Jennings, Judge Designate 

 (Sa'ad El-Amin, pro se, on brief). 

 No brief for appellee. 

 Sa'ad El-Amin (husband) appeals the decision of the circuit 

court finding him in arrears in spousal support, ordering him to 

make a good faith effort to pay the amount due to Carolyn Adams 

(wife), and finding him in contempt of court. On appeal, husband 

contends the trial court erred by (1) including in its order 

findings it did not make when the parties were before the court, 

(2) deferring a ruling on husband's entitlement to subpoenaed 

materials until the hearing date, and (3) denying husband's 

request to present arguments on the termination of spousal support 

with a reservation to conduct additional matters. Upon reviewing 

the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision 

of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party 

prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 

391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). 

Procedural Background

 The parties were divorced in March 1990, and husband was 

ordered to pay wife spousal support. Appellant currently is 

obligated to pay wife support in the amount of $1,500 per month. 

In September 2000, wife filed a motion to reinstate and a petition 

for rule to show cause. Wife contended husband was in arrears in 

his support payments. Husband argued he was unable to make the 

payments and filed a motion to terminate spousal support. Husband 

served wife's employer with a subpoena duces tecum requesting 

information regarding wife's employment. Wife filed a motion to 

quash the subpoena. After hearing arguments on the motion to 

quash on December 11, 2000, the trial court deferred ruling and 

advised the parties that it would decide the matter when it heard 

their case. 

 The court heard the case on January 11, 2001. At the hearing 

the court denied wife's motion to quash and granted husband a 

continuance on the motion to terminate support. The court found 

husband in contempt, fined him $1,000, found he was in arrears in 

the amount of $137,035.21, and transferred the case to the 

- 2 -
juvenile and domestic relations district court. The court entered 

the order on March 23, 2001. 

Analysis

I. 

 Husband argues the trial court included in the order factual 

findings and rulings that had not been made when the parties were 

before the court. He also contends the trial court erred by 

entering the order without his endorsement in violation of Rule 

1:13. 

 Rule 1:13 provides, in pertinent part, that "[d]rafts of 

orders and decrees shall be endorsed by counsel of record, or 

reasonable notice of the time and place of presenting such 

drafts together with copies thereof shall be served [on] all 

counsel of record who have not endorsed them." However, 

"[c]ompliance with this rule . . . may be modified or dispensed 

with by the court in its discretion." Rule 1:13. When 

dispensing with endorsement or notice pursuant to Rule 1:13, 

a better practice would be for a trial court 

to include a statement reflecting its 

decision to exercise its discretion, [but,] 

in the absence of such a statement, we 

presume that a trial court exercised its 

discretion . . . . Courts are presumed to 

act in accordance with the law and orders of 

the court are entitled to a presumption of 

regularity. 

Napert v. Napert, 261 Va. 45, 47, 540 S.E.2d 882, 884 (2001). 

Accordingly, on the instant record, we must presume the court 

- 3 -
exercised discretion in dispensing with both the endorsement and 

notice requirements that attended the order in issue. 

 Furthermore, a review of the trial court's transcript 

reveals the court's written order included only factual findings 

and rulings made at the hearing. The trial court did not err in 

entering the order. 

II. 

 At the December 11, 2000 hearing, the trial court declined 

to rule on wife's motion to quash. On January 11, 2001, the 

court heard argument on the motion, denied it, and granted 

husband a continuance in order to review the requested documents 

and prepare arguments concerning his motion to terminate spousal 

support. Husband has failed to demonstrate any prejudice 

resulting from the court's decision to postpone ruling on the 

motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

III. 

 After the court denied wife's motion to quash, husband 

asked to proceed with his motion to terminate support with a 

reservation of right to conduct additional matters after 

reviewing the materials provided by wife's employer. The court 

denied husband's request, preferring to hear the entire matter 

at once and granted husband a continuance, at his request. 

 "[T]he order of proof is a matter 

within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and [an appellate] court will not 

reverse the judgment except in very 

exceptional cases, and, unless it 

- 4 -
affirmatively appears from the record that 

this discretion has been abused, [an 

appellate] court will not disturb the trial 

court's ruling." 

Lebedun v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 697, 715, 501 S.E.2d 427, 

436 (1998) (citation omitted). The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by denying husband's request to hear arguments 

with reservation to conduct additional matters. 

 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial 

court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.

- 5 -