### 12277 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations

aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure condition categories of ‘‘ no effect, ’’ and

‘‘ minor, ’’ and for non-complex systems whose failure condition category is classified as ‘‘ major. ’’ Hoh must comply with the requirements of these special conditions for all applicable design and operational aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure condition categories of

‘‘ catastrophic ’’ and ‘‘ hazardous severe/ major, ’’ and for complex systems whose failure condition category is classified

as ‘‘ major. ’’ A complex system is a system whose operations, failure conditions, or failure effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods (for example, FTA, Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, FHA).
System Design Integrity Requirements

Each of the failure condition categories defined in these special conditions relate to the corresponding aircraft system integrity requirements. The system design integrity requirements, for the Hoh AP/SAS, as they relate to the allowed probability of occurrence for each failure condition category, and the proposed software design assurance level, are as follows:

• ‘‘ Major’’—For systems with ‘‘ major’’ failure conditions, failures resulting in these major effects must be shown to be remote, a probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 × 10

¥ 5 to 1 × 10

¥ 7 failures/hour, and associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO–178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification) Level C software design assurance level.

• ‘‘ Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For systems with ‘‘ hazardous/severe-major’’ failure conditions, failures resulting in these hazardous/severe-major effects must be shown to be extremely remote, a probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 × 10

¥ 7 to 1 × 10

¥ 9 failures/ hour, and associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO–178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification) Level B software assurance level.

• ‘‘ Catastrophic ’’—For systems with

‘‘ catastrophic ’’ failure conditions, failures resulting in these catastrophic effects must be shown to be extremely improbable, a probability of occurrence on the order of 1 × 10

¥ 9 failures/hour or less, and associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO–178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification) Level A design assurance level. System Design Environmental Requirements

The AP/SAS system equipment must be qualified to the appropriate environmental level per RTCA document DO–160F (Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment), for all relevant aspects. This is to show that the AP/ SAS system performs its intended function under any foreseeable operating condition, which includes the expected environment in which the AP/ SAS is intended to operate. Some of the main considerations for environmental concerns are installation locations and the resulting exposure to environmental conditions for the AP/SAS system equipment, including considerations for other equipment that may be affected environmentally by the AP/SAS equipment installation. The level of environmental qualification must be related to the severity of the considered failure conditions and effects on the rotorcraft. Test Analysis Requirements

Compliance with the requirements of these special conditions may be shown by a variety of methods, which typically consist of analysis, flight tests, ground tests, and simulation, as a minimum. Compliance methodology is related to the associated failure condition category. If the AP/SAS is a complex system, compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘ major’’ may be shown by analysis, in combination with appropriate testing to validate the analysis. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ may be shown by flight-testing in combination with analysis and simulation, and the appropriate testing to validate the analysis. Flight tests may be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ failure conditions and effects due to safety considerations. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘ catastrophic ’’ may be shown by analysis, and appropriate testing in combination with simulation to validate the analysis. Very limited flight tests in combination with simulation are used as a part of a showing of compliance for

‘‘ catastrophic ’’ failure conditions. Flight tests are performed only in circumstances that use operational variations, or extrapolations from other flight performance aspects to address flight safety.

These special conditions require that the Hoh AP/SAS system installed on a Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L– 3, or 206L–4 helicopter, Type Certificate Number H2SW, meet these requirements to adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design system integrity requirements.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on February 25, 2011. Kimberly K. Smith, Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2011–5103 Filed 3–4–11; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Federal Aviation Administration**

**14 CFR Part 39**

**[Docket No. FAA–2010–0960; Directorate Identifier 98–ANE–09–AD; Amendment**  **39–16620; AD 98–09–27R1]**

**RIN 2120–AA64**

**Airworthiness Directives; Rolls-Royce plc RB211–Trent 768, 772, and 772B**  **Turbofan Engines**

**AGENCY :**  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION :**  Final rule.

**SUMMARY :**  We are rescinding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. The existing AD, AD 98–09–27, resulted from aircraft certification testing which revealed that stresses on the thrust reverser hinge were higher than had been anticipated during engine certification, and the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority, issuing AD 008–03–97. Since we issued AD 98–09–27, we discovered that its requirements were duplicated in airplane-level AD 2001–09–14, issued by the FAA Transport Airplane Directorate. We proposed to rescind the engine-level AD.

**DATES :**  This AD becomes effective April 11, 2011.

**ADDRESSES :**  The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC
20590–0001.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT :**  Alan Strom, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: alan.strom@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238–7143; fax (781) 238–7199.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION :** 


### 12278 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations

Discussion

On April 23, 1998, the FAA Engine & Propeller Directorate issued engine AD 98–09–27 (63 FR 24911, May 6, 1998). On April 30, 2001, the FAA Transport Airplane Directorate issued airplane AD 2001–09–14 (66 FR 23838, May 10, 2001). Those ADs both require the same initial and repetitive visual inspections of Rolls-Royce plc RB211–Trent 768 and 772 series turbofan engine thrust reverser hinge lugs and attachment ribs for cracks, and, if necessary, removal from service and replacement with serviceable parts.

Since we issued engine AD 98–09–27 and airplane AD 2001–09–14, we determined that duplicate ADs to address the same unsafe condition were unnecessary. We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on November 15, 2010 (75 FR 69611), and proposed to rescind AD 98–09–27, Amendment 39–10508 (63 FR 24911, May 6, 1998). Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is provided in the

**ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

Comments

We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We received no comments on the proposal.

Conclusion

We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed. Authority for this Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ‘‘ General requirements. ’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a ‘‘ significant regulatory action ’’ under Executive Order 12866;

(2) Is not a ‘‘ significant rule ’’ under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under **ADDRESSES**

. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES** 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

**§ 39.13 [Amended]**

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by rescinding airworthiness directive (AD) 98–09–27, Amendment 39–10508 (63 FR 24911, May 6, 1998):
98–09–27R1 Rolls-Royce plc: Amendment 39–16620. Docket No. FAA–2010–0960; Directorate Identifier 98–ANE–09–AD. Effective Date (a) This AD becomes effective April 11,
2011.

Affected ADs

(b) This AD rescinds AD 98–09–27.
Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Rolls-Royce plc RB211–Trent 768, 772, and 772B turbofan engines. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Airbus A330–341 and A330– 342 series airplanes.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on February 24, 2011. Peter A. White, Acting Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2011–4831 Filed 3–4–11; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Federal Aviation Administration**

**14 CFR Part 71**

**[Docket No. FAA–2011–0018; Airspace Docket No. 10–AWP–18]** 

**Amendment to and Revocation of Reporting Points; Hawaii** 

**AGENCY :**  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION :**  Final rule, technical amendment.

**SUMMARY :**  This action amends and removes, several Hawaiian Reporting Points. Specifically, the FAA is revising the description of EELIC, and TOADS to address recent technical adjustments to their actual locations. Additionally, the FAA is renaming the SILVA reporting point to SYVAD, and has determined that the LULUS, NIEMO, and PADDI reporting points are no longer needed. This action ensures the safe and efficient management of aircraft within the National Airspace System (NAS).

**DATES :**  Effective date 0901 UTC, May 5, 2011. The Director of the Federal Register approves this incorporation by reference action under 1 CFR part 51, subject to the annual revision of FAA Order 7400.9 and publication of conforming amendments.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT :**  Ken McElroy, Airspace Regulation and ATC Procedures Group, Office of Mission Support Services, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267–8783.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION :**  History

The Honolulu Control Center conducted a review of their airspace and