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# OAR Box 1142 Prepped by Ollie Stewart



### Document

Number: 

# 13 ) IV-F-1 1 Docket Number: 

# A-87-1 1

Printed 4/23/2008 10:21:21 AM Sheet 13 of 30Statemen to f KeD y M . Blown , Executiv

e Enginee r ..-•• " Ford Fue l Econom y an d Emission

s Contro l Plannin g Staf f EP A PubU c Hearin g - Onboar

d Vehicl e Refuehn g Control s '% > \ Septembe r 26 , 199 1
-'Goo d afternoon , I a

mKell y M
. Brown , Executiv

e Enginee r o f Fue l Econom

y an d /Emission s Contro l Plannin g at For d Motor Company
. Wit

h m e toda y ar e Rober

t Brow n o f th e Automotive Emission s and Fue l Econom y Office , Ti

mO'Brien o

f Ford' s Offic e o f th e Genera

l Counsel , and Te d Rusinowsk i o f Ford' s Automotive Safet

y Office
. For

d i s please d to have a

n opportunit

y t o appea

r here today
. W

e wil l present Ford' s positio n regarding th e safet y issue s associate d wit

h onboar d refuelin g vapor recover y (OBVR ) system s and th e repor

t b y th e Nationa

l Highway
. Traffi

c Safet y Administration : "A

n Assessmen

t o f th e Safet y o f Onboar d Refuelin g Vapor Recover y Svstems. " For

d participate d i

n th e preparatio n o

f and full y endorse s th e lega

l analysis , presente d b

y MVMA
. For d believe s tha

t vehicle base d refuehn

g control s ("onboar

d controls") , i

f required , wil

l resul t i n increased vehicle safet

y risk
. W e d o no t believe tha

t onboar d refuelin g vapor recover y system s ar e simpl

e extension s o

f evaporativ e systems , especiall y whe n viewe d fro m a safety context . In vie w o f th e fac ttha tther e i s a saf e alternativ e mean s o

f controllin g refuelin g vapor s (Stag e II) , w

e believe tha

t th e safet y risk associate d wit

h onboar d control s i s unreasonable
. Accordingly , w e believ e tha

t EP A should publis h it s determinatio n no t t o requir e onboar d controls
. Sinc e EPA' s August , 198

7 Notic e o f Propose d Rulemakin

g proposing t o requir

e onboar d controls , For

d ha s continue d wor

k t o develo p an acceptabl e onboar

d refuelin g system . W

e hav e evaluate d severa

l systems a s wel

l a s componen

t design concepts . A s ye tw e hav e no tdevelope d an d demonstrate d a productio n feasibl e onboar d refuelin g vapor recover y system, whic

h include s meeting th e refuelin g contro l requirement s as wel l a s mor e stringen t exhaus t emissio n standards , custome

r performanc e need s and safet y requirements
.P. 3

I n evaluating experimenta

l component s an d systems , w e hav e experienced , i

n varyin g degrees , som

e o f th e specifi

c failur e mode s discusse

d i n th e NHTS A report . Wit h regar d t o severa

l o f th e concern s discusse

d i n th e NHTS A report , th e followin g comments are provided
.

• Failur e mode s during th e refuelin g process : For

d ha s experience d fue

l spitbac k and frequen

t fue l nozzl e shut-off s during evaluation o

f experimenta

l onboar d refuelin g vapo r contro l systems .

• Failur e mode s whil

e th e vehicle i s being driven : For d ha s experience d stumble s an

d stalls
. Additionally , a s vehicle s ag e withou t prope r maintenanc e - includin

g maintenanc e o

f th e onboar

d refuelin g vapo r recove r system, w e ar e concerne d tha

t an y potentia l driveabilit

y issue s associated wit

h refuelin g vapor recover y system s coul d becom e mor e pronounced
.

• Failur e mode s du e t o cras h involvement : W e hav e no tsuccessfull y demonstrate d acceptabl e cras h characteristic s on vehicle s equippe d wit h experimenta

l onboar d refuelin g vapor recover y systems . Moreover , th e potentia

l fo r fir e caused b

y componen

t failure , imprope

r repair , tamperin g o r

cras h damag e t o th e onboar d syste mi s aprimar

y concer n t o Ford du e t o th e potentia

l fo r sever e injur y t o vehicle occupants . Ford agree s wit

h th e methodolog

y (logistic regression ; th e dependent variabl e wa

s define d a s adichotomou s outcom e [0,1 ] indicatin

g whethe r afir e was reporte d i

n th e specifi c vehicle involve

d i n th e crash ) use

d b y th e NHTS A i

n it s analysi s o

f fir e acciden t data , an d agree s that

th e finding s ar e correc t

Whil e recognizin

g th e limitation s (impossible t o defin e th e sourc e o

f afir e i n amotor vehicle crash ) o

f th e analysi s du e t o th e man

y changin g factors (196 8 implementatio n o f afue l syste m integrit y safet y standard , changin

g vehicle emissio

n contro l svstems , i.e. , 197 1 evaporativ e canister s implementation , etc. ) a s note d i n th e NHTS A report , FordP. 4

believe s tha

tth e fire acciden

tdat a support s th e finding

s state d i n NHTSA' s report. Also , from a logica

l standpoint

, w e believ e tha

ti ti s reasonabl e t o conclud e tha tth e adde d components , connections , an d lac k o f availabl e spac e t o properl y package onboar d refueling vapo r control s , along wit h th e added syste

m complexity , support

s th e conclusio n tha

ta n additiona

l ris k of fir e ca n b e expected . Som e believ e tha

tonboar d refueling control s wil

l b e simpl e extension s of enhance d evaporative emissio n contro l systems . For

d disagrees . While th e technolog y ma y b e similar, certain operationa l parameters , whic

h coul d have importan

tsafet y implications , wil

l b e ver y differen tFo r instance w e have foun d tha tvapo r flo

w rates durin g th e refueling even tca

n rang e fro m 1 8 t o 5 6 gram

s pe r minute , fro

m 3. 2 t o 10. 8 gram s pe r minut

e durin g ho tweathe r driving, an d fro m 0. 3 to 0. 6 gram

s pe r minut

e durin g typica l diurna l event s (vapo r flo

w rate s var

y dependin g o n fue

l RVP , temperature , tan

k size , an d additionall

y fo r refueling , fue

l fill rate) . Th e higher refueling vapo r flow rat

e greatl y increase s th e consequence s o f a syste m lea k in term s o f th e resulting concentratio n o f combustibl e vapor

s a tth e sit e o f

th e leak . Vehicle-base d refuelin

g control s wil

l significantl

y increas e syste

m complexit

y b y increasing th e require

d vapo r storage volum e (a s muc h a s doubling th e volum e compared t o enhance d evaporative systems) , increasing th e numbe r o f vapo r hos e connections , requirin

g large r hoses , an

d increasing th e potentia l fo r collisio n damag

e t o syste m components . I

n addition , For

d believe s tha

tdevelopin g onboar

d systems wil

l requir e th e inventio n o f

new vapo r valve s an

d associate d strategie s t o por tvapor s to storag e canister

s durin g refueling events . Thes e requirement s representa significan

t technologica

l challeng e abov e tha

trequire d fo r enhance d evaporative systems . Since there wil l b e a substantia

l increas e i n th e amoun

to f vapo r presento n th e vehicle , combined wit

h th e added complexit

y o f onboar d systems , i ti s difficul

tno tt o conclud e tha ta n increase d potentia

l fo r fire exists . Furthermore , heav

y dut y vehicle s (HDVs ) would presentunique refueling contro l challenges . A significan

tvolum e o f

HDV s ove r 10,000 pound GVW Ran d th e majorit

y o f 8,500-10,00 0 pound GVW Rapplications ar

e complete d b

y secon d stag e vehicl eP. 5

manufacturers
. Secon

d stag e manufacturer s woul d face a n almos t overwhelmin

g challeng e t o properly assemble onboar d vapo r controls , wer

e the y t o b e mandated
. I

n addition , th e averag e gasolin e fue l tan k fo r thes e heav

y dut y application s i s approximatel

y 3 8 gallon s an

d coul d rang e as hig

h a s 10 0 gallon s fo

r vehicle s equippe d wit h dua l tanks
. Thi s woul

d result , o n average , i

n eigh t liter s o f carbo n and coul

d potentiall y requir e a s muc h as twelv e liter s o f carbon , fo

r onboar d controls
. Moreover , heav

y dut y application s ove

r 10,00 0 pound GVW

R encounte

r awid e rang e o f operatin g condition s and usage patterns . Significan t portion s o

f tim e ar e spen t unde r hig h load , wid

e open throttl e cycles , suc

h a s occurs o n hill

y terrai n and i

n hig h altitud e locations
. Thi s operatio n make s purgin g mor e difficul t an d i n conjunctio

n wit h th e relativel

y larg e refuelin

g canisters , whic

h ar e u p t o fou

r time s th e capacit

y o f current evaporativ e contro l systems , coul d result i n canister s being full

y saturate d essentiall y all th e time
. For d support s NHTSA' s conclusio n tha t Stag e II systems ar e th e preferabl e metho d o f controlling refuelin

g vapors :

• Th e technolog

y exist s an d state-of-the-ar

t Stag e II nozzle systems ar e bot h ver y effectiv e an d use r friendly
.

• Stag e II systems have bee n prove n safe
. I n fact , studie s sho

w that servic e station s equippe d wit h Stag e I I systems hav e improved safet y record s compare d t o station s withou t Stag e I I controls
.

• Emission reduction s fro

mStag e I I systems ar e mor e timely , becaus e upo n installation , the

y wil l collec t vapor s fromall vehicles , no t jus t th e ne w vehicle s tha

t woul d b e equippe d wit

h onboar d controls
.

• Stag e I I systems ar e gainin g widesprea

d acceptanc e i

n man y area s o f th e countr y (outside o

f California ) including , Th e Distric t

o f Columbia ,P. 6 S t Louis , Missouri , Ne w Jersey , th e Ne w Yor k metropolita n area , Massachusetts , Philadelphia , an d Dad e County , Florida
.

• Studie s sugges t

tha t curren t technolog y Stag e I I svstem s use d i n conjunctio n wit

h onboar d control s will resul t i n lower vapo r captur e rates ; refuelin g vapor s woul d b e capture d b y th e onboar d syste mthu s sacrificin g undergroun d storag e tan k losse s "Breathin g Losses " normall y capture d by Stag e I I systems . I f th e earlies t

practica l ai r

qualit y improvemen t

consisten t

wit h safet y i s importan t t o th e public , For d believe s tha t i t doe s no t mak e sens e t o forc e ayet-to-be-prove n technolog y upo n societ

y that , eve n i

f successful , wil

l tak e 2 0 year s t o implemen t an d tha t involve s seriou s safet

y uncertainties , whe n amuc h safer alternativ e wit

h mor e immediat e ai r

qualit y benefi t i s available
. I n summary , For d ha s no t develope d an d demonstrate d aproductio n feasibl e onboar d system , whic h include s meetin g th e refuelin g contro l requirement s a s wel l a s mor e stringen t

exhaus t emissio n standards , custome r performanc e need s an d safet y requirements
. We , therefore , concu r in NHTSA' s primar

y conclusio n tha t

"becaus e OBV R system s increas e safet y ris k an d Stag e I I doe s not , i t seem s reasonabl e for

EP A t o conclud e tha t

OBV R system s constitut e a n unreasonabl e safet y risk"
. Than k you . W e will b e gla d t o answe r any question s yo u ma

y have
.