I n th is o pin ion , a ll r e fe re nc e s to se c tio n 5 21 .4 57 wi ll b e to the 19 99 ve rs ion , wh ic h wa s in 1 e ff e c t a t th e tim e of a

pp e lla nt’ s of fe ns e . F or a ll oth e r se c tio ns of the tr ans po rt a tio n c od e , w e c ite to the cur rent ve rsions b eca

use no substantive ame ndments have be en made since the time of appellant’ s offe nse. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00188- CR

P at r ic ia E . N at ion s, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W OF M cC U L L OC H C OU N T Y, NO. 9481, H ONO RAB LE RANDY YO UNG, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt P atr ic ia

E. Natio ns a

pp e a ls her con vic tio n f

or “ dr ivi ngwh ile lic e ns e suspended.” See Act of May 30, 1999, 76th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1207, § 6, 1999 Tex. Gen. L aws 4201 (cur rent ve rsion at Tex. Transp. C o d e Ann. § 521.457(a)(2) ( West S upp. 2005)). Appellant 1 complains in four issues that the j udg ment of conviction should be reverse d based on a fatal varia nce2

betwee n the pleading s and the proof, insuff icient evidenc e, the tria l court’s e rror in refusingto gr ant he r an i n s t r

u c t e d v e r d i c t , an d

t h e f a c tt h a tt h e i n f

o r m a t i o nc h ar g e d

ano f f e n s e t h a td o e s n o te xis t
un de r T e xas l aw. He r c la ims a re ba se d o n tw o argume nts : ( 1) tha t th e re is a

mate ri a l di ff

e re nc e in the t erms u s e d

in th e in f o r mati o n( “ o p e r a to r ’ s li c e n s e ” ) v e r s u s th e tr an s p o rtati o nc o d e ( “ dr iv er’ s license” ), and ( 2) that she should ha ve been char g ed with violatingthe provisions of her restric ted
oc c up a tio na l li c e ns e , r a the r t ha n d ri vin g wi th a

su sp e nd e d li c e ns e . We wi ll a ff ir m.
BACK GR OUND Both the infor

mation and the complaint alleg ed that appel lant “intentionally or knowing ly

operate[d] a motor vehic le upon a hig hway during a period that a suspension of the Te x as op e rator ’s lic e ns e of

the de fe nd ant w a s in

e ff e c t un de r the Tr ans po rt a tio n Code .” I n r e le va nt p art , se c tio n 5 21 .4 57 (a ) p ro vid e s th a t “ a pe rs on c omm its an of

fe ns e if the pe rs on op e ra

te s a mot or ve hic le on a hig hway

. . . (2) during a period that the person’s driver’ s license or privileg e is suspended or revoke d.” Te x . Transp. Code A nn. § 521.457(a) (2) ( West 1999).

At the jury trial, the State’s only witness, Deputy

J ames Micha el Hall, testified that upon observingappellant speeding and failing to use her left turn signa l, he initiated a traff ic stop. Hall “r an a chec k” on appellant’ s driver’ s license and found that it wa s suspended. He then ar rested appellant. Ha ll testified that a ppellant provided him a c ourt order demonstrating that, althoug h her driver’ s license was suspende d, she had a restric ted occ upational license that allowed he r to drive for a maxi mum of five hours per day within W illiamson and Travis Counties, as long as sheThis document was e ntere d into evidence . I t refle cts that appellant had petitioned the cour t 2 for this restric ted license beca use her regular lice nse had be en s u s p en d ed due to an “excessive number of spe eding tickets,” but she ha d an “e ssential n ee d ” to oper ate a motor vehicle f

or transportation to and from wor k and for household purposes. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.242 (West Supp. 2005). Appellant’s driving rec ord wa s also admitted into e vidence , showing that at the time Hall stopped her, she had nine pr ior traf fic violations in a twenty -month period. Ap pe lla nt as se rt e d a th ir d g ro un d in su pp or t of the mot ion , b ut d oe s n ot r a ise it o n a pp e a l. 3 3 maintained a dr iving log
. Hall stopped appe llant in McCulloch Count y around midnig ht and was 2 unable to locate a dr iving login her ve hicle.

At the conc lusion of Hall’s testimony , appellant moved f or an instructed ve rdict of acquittal on the g rounds t hat (1) she was c harg ed with driving while her “oper ator’s lice nse” w as suspended, but the tra

nsportation code de fines the of fense in te rms of a suspended “ driver’ s license,” and (2) if any

offe nse wa s established by the State’ s evidenc e, it was a ppellant’s violation of the terms of he r occ upational license , not driving w hile her lice nse wa s suspended. The tr ial court 3 denied a ppellant’s motion for inst ructe d verdic t, specific ally ruling that “an operator’s l icense
. . . is a driver ’s license under the Transpor tation Code .” The c ourt furthe r instructed the parties that the
oc c up a tio na l li c e ns e iss ue c ou ld b e argue d a s a de fe ns e , b ut t

hat it did no t, as a matte r o f l aw, ne g a te the cha rg e of “ driving while license suspended
. ” Appellant then rested without prese nting a ny evidenc e. Th e jur

y e nte re d a ve rd ic t th a t app e lla

nt w a s “ g uil ty

of the of fe ns e of dr ivi ngwh ile operator’s license suspended” and re commended that appellant be punished by a fine of $500.00 a nd 180 day s’ conf

inement in jail, with one dollar and one day of t hat s entenc e probated for a per iod of twenty -four

months. The trial court e ntere d a judg ment i n acc ordanc e with the jury ’s
rec ommendation. Following an unsucc essful motion for newtrial, appe llant filed this appeal.4 AN AL YSI S I n her f irst argument, appellant ur g es that there is a materia l disti nction betwee n the terms “ope rator’ s license” and “dr iver’s lice nse.” Appellant claims that her c onviction for driving with a suspended ope rator’ s license should be r ever sed bec ause there is no evidenc e that she had a suspended “ op er at o r’s li cense ”—ther e is evidenc e only that she had a

suspended “ driver’ s license” —and the Te x as Tra nsportation Code define s the offe nse only in terms o f t he latter
. Appellant re lies on this arg ument to suppor t e ach of her

four issues: that (1) the pleading s and proof
wer e f a ta ll y v ar ie d , ( 2 ) th e e v id e n c e w a s in s u f f ic ie n t, ( 3 ) h e r mo ti o n f

o r in s tr u c te d v e r dict was improperly

denied, a nd (4) the information cha rg ed an of

fense that does not exist under Te x as law. Appellant cites only

one ca se to support h e r ar g ument, Cam pb e ll v . S tate , 274 S.W .2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955). The Cam pb e ll c ourt

he ld t hat, p ur su ant t o th e statut e a s it e xiste d in 19 5 5 , w h ic h d e f

in e d th e o f f e n s e in te r ms o f an“ o p e r a to r ’ s li c e n s e , ” p r o o f th a t C a mp b e ll dr o ve without a “drive r’s lice nse” w as “insuff icient to sustain the alleg ations of the off ense c harg ed in the information beca

use a driver’ s license is not an operator’s license” and “ther e is no suc h license a s a drive r’s lice nse known to our law .” Id . at 401-02.

Cam pb e ll do e s n ot s up po rt

a pp e lla nt’ s argume nt, ho we ve r, be c a us e sin c e that ti me it ha s been rec og nized that the terms “oper ator’s lice nse” a nd “drive r’s lice nse” a

re e quivalent in the context of having a valid license to ope rate a motor vehic le. Se e Ge e v . S tate , 626 S.W .2d 603, 604 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

1981, pet. re f’d) (fa ct that Depa rtment ref

err ed to license both as

“ op e rator ’s ” and “ dr ive r’ s” lic e ns e c re a te d no fata l va ri anc e in p le a din g and

pr oo f o f d

ri vin g wh ile lic e ns e su sp e nd e d) ; se e als o J on es v . S tate , 77 S.W .3d 819, 822 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (using5

te rm s “ op e rator ’s lic e ns e ” and “ dr ive r’ s lic e ns e ” int e rc ha ng e a bly in c on te xt of

dr ivi ngwh ile lic e ns e
su sp e nd e d) ; Sm ith v . S

tate , 895 S.W .2d 449, 452 -5 4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, pe t. ref’ d) (i nf or matio n c ha

rgin g appe lla

nt w ithdr ivi ngwh ile “ op e ra tor ’s lic e ns e ” su sp e nd e d “ su ff ic ie ntl y trac ked” statutory

lang uag e, which use d t erm “ driver’ s license” ; evidence of driving without “drive r’s li cense ” was sufficie nt to convict appellant a s char g ed); Kok Lie v v . S tate , 2001 Tex. App. L EXI S 5713, at *1-4 (Te x . App.—Dallas Aug . 22, 2001, no pet.) (not de signated for publication) (using terms interc hang eably and noting t h at o m i s sion of essential ele ment from informa tion or indictment will not render it fatally defic ient). F ur the rm or e , the tr ans po rt a tio n c od e de mon str a te s th e e qu iva le nc y of the tw o te rm s. “Dr iver’s lice nse” is define d as the “ authorization . . . for the ope ration o f a mo to r v e h ic le
. ” T e x. Transp
. Code Ann. § 521.001(a )(3) (West Supp. 2005). Also, “license” is broadly define d as “a

n authorization to operate a motor vehi cl e, ” wh i ch “includes: (A) a driver’ s license.” Id
. § 5 2 1
. 0 0 1 (a) (6). F inally , “ operator ” is define d as “a person who drives . . . a vehic le.” Id
. § 54 1. 00 1( 1) (We st 1 99 9) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o id
. § 521.001(b). Thus, while Cam pb e ll once supported appe llant’s argument, under the curr ent statutes and c ourt opinions it i s no longe r g ood law for the theory

asser ted. See 274 S.W .2d at 401. Her e, the offense char g ed—driving while oper ator’s lice nse suspende d—is “known to our law,” even if

the statute uses the te rm “drive r’s license.” See 2 7 4 S .W.2d at 401-02. The lang uag e used in the infor

mation—that appellant “operate[d] a mot or vehicle upon a hig hway during a per iod that a suspension of the Te x as operator’s license of the defe ndant was in e ffe ct under the Transpor tation Code”—suffic iently trac ked the statutory

lang uag e—that “a

person c ommits an6

offe nse if the pe rson oper ates a motor vehicle on a

highw ay . . . d u ri n g a per iod that the person’ s driver’ s license or privileg e is suspe nded or r evoked.” See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.457(a )(2)
. An d, the un dis pu te d ev ide nc e that app e lla nt wa s ope ra

tin g a mot or ve hic le wh ile he r d ri ve r’ s li c e ns e was suspende d was a dequate to establish the offe nse of “driving while license suspended,” whether ref err ed to as a

n “oper ator’s” or “dr iver’s” license. Henc e, with re g ard to ap p ell ant’s first a rg ument, there was no fatal varia nce in the pleading s and proof

, the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the conviction, t he trial court did not err in denying a

ppellant’s mot ion for instructed ve rdict on this gr ound, and the infor mation char g ed appellant with an of

fense rec og nized by

Texas law. I n app el lant’s sec ond argument, she cla ims that her conviction should be re verse d beca use she wa s improperly

char g ed and convicted for “ driving while license suspended” under section 521.457, rather than “driving in violation of an occupational license” under se ction 521.253. Se e id .; se e als o id
. § 521.253 (West 1999) (“pe rson who holds an oc cupational lice nse commits an
o ff en s e if the per son: (1) oper ates a motor vehicle in violation of a r estriction imposed on the license” ). Appe llant asserts that, if a ny violation was established by the S tate’s e vidence , it was the latter, for which she w as not cha

rg ed. Unde r this theory , appellant a g ain urg es t hat t here was a fata l varia nce betwee n the pleading s and proof , that the evidenc e wa s insufficient, and that the trial court
err ed by not gr anting her instruc ted ver dict on this ground. We disag ree . First, the State e stablished that appellant violated section 521.457, which states that “ap er s o nco m m i t s an o ff en s e i f t h e p er s o n o p e r a t es a m o t o r v eh i cl e o na h i gh wa y . . . d u ri n g a period that the pe rson’s driver’ s license or privileg e is suspended or revoke d.” Se e id
.7

§ 521.457(a) (2). De puty

Hall testified that he witnessed appe llant driving on the highw ay and, upon sto pp ing he r and ru

nn ing he r lic e ns e , d isc ov e re d th a t he r l ic e ns e wa s su sp e nd e d. Ap pe lla nt a dmi ts to this vi olation.

Appellant, howe ver, c laims that she cannot be convicted f or this violation because , a lth ou g h she wa s dri vin g wh ile he r lic e ns e wa s susp e nd e d, sh e ha d a re str ic te d o c c up a tio na l li c e ns e that allowed he r to drive in ce rtain circ umstances. Se e id
. §§ 521.249-.250 (W est 1999). As the tria l court re cog nized, this was in the nature of a n aff irmative def

ense, w hich must be pleade d and prove d to avoid conviction on the char g ed offe nse. Se e ge ne ra lly Sta te v . H

ar t , 7 5 3 S. W. 2 d

2 1 3 , 2 1 4 ( T e x. Ap p. —B e a

umo nt 1 98 8, no pe t.) . App e lla nt adm it s th at sh e wa s n ot o pe ratin g the ve hic le in compliance with the provisions of t h is restricted lice nse. Thus, appe llant has failed to satisfy her burden of proof to esta

blish thi s aff

irmative def

ense. Moreove r, it was not improper f or the State to cha

rg e appel l an t with a violation of
se c tio n 5 21 .4 57 (d

ri vin g wi th s us pe nd e d lic e ns e ) rathe r tha n sec tio n 5 21 .2 53 (o c c up a tio na l li c e ns e vio la tio n) be c a

us e a pp e lla nt’ s oc c up a tio na l lic e ns e wa s no t e ff e c tiv e in M c Cul loc h Co un ty —o n it s fa c e , th e oc c up a tio na l li c e ns e se rv e d a s a vali d li cens e on ly

in Wi lli a mso n a

nd Tr a vis c ounti e s. Thus, the only

authority appellant had to ope rate a motor vehicle in McCulloch County was g rante d by her dr iv e r ’ s li c e n s e , w h ic h w a s s u s p e n d e d , an d th a t is th e v io lati o n f o r w h ic h a

p p e ll an t was char g ed and c onvicted.

This conclusion is consistent with t h at of our sister court in He ra ld v . S

tate , 67 S.W .3d 292 (Tex. App.—Amar illo 2001, no pet.). In He ra ld , t h e ap p el l an t cl ai m edt h at , al t h o u gh “the State may

have pr oved he w as driving out side the restrictions of hi s occupational license, [there8

was] no evidence [t hat] supported t he finding which wa s char g ed: driving while his license wa s suspended.” Id
. at 292. The He ra ld court he ld that there w as no er ror, statingthat, “[b] eca

use the State c ou ld h a ve c ha

rg e d a pp e lla nt w ithop e ratin g a

ve hic le ou tsi de the tim e s all owe d b y his occupational license [ ] does not mean that appellant c ould not also have be en cha rg ed with oper ating a vehic le duringa per iod of time when his regular license w as suspende d and duringwhich he w as not within the restrictions on his occupational license.” Id . at 294.
CO NC LU SION Havingfound both of appe llant’s arguments unpersua sive, we ove rrule e ach of her four issues a

nd aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice B e fo re Chi e f Jus tic e L aw, Justi c e s B . A . Sm ith and Pember ton Affir med Filed: June 23, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh