Opinion issued June 20, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-12-00994-CR

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ABRAHAM PIZANO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1314178

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Abraham Pizano of injury to a child, enhanced by two 

earlier felony convictions, and assessed his punishment at forty-eight years’ 

confinement. On appeal, Pizano contends that the trial court abused its discretion

in admitting letters that Pizano wrote to his girlfriend while incarcerated and 
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awaiting trial, because the letters are not relevant. Finding no error, we affirm.

Background

Pizano and Loraine Perez, Pizano’s girlfriend, lived together with Perez’s 

two young children, a son and a daughter. During an argument between Pizano and 

Perez, Pizano pushed Perez onto a sofa, and began to beat Perez. Perez’s five-yearold daughter intervened by standing between Pizano and Perez and urging Pizano 

to stop. Pizano slapped the child’s face with his open hand. While Perez held her 

daughter, Pizano stood over both of them with a knife and threatened to kill Perez. 

Pizano then left, and nearby neighbors who stood outside and had witnessed part of 

the struggle called the police. The police arrested Pizano a few days later.

While awaiting trial in this case, Pizano sent forty-eight letters to Perez. In 

the letters, Pizano states that he was sorry, both to Perez and the children. He urges 

Perez to recant and to tell the children to testify in his favor. At trial Pizano 

objected to the relevance of the letters.

Discussion

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A trial 

court abuses its discretion only if the court’s decision is “so clearly wrong as to lie 

outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor v. State, 
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268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Roberts v. State, 29 S.W.3d 596, 

600, (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). A trial court’s ruling falls 

within this zone if the record and the law applicable to the case reasonably support 

it. See De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). If the 

trial court’s decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will 

uphold the decision, even if the trial court gives the wrong reason for its decision. 

Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Analysis

Pizano contends that the letters are not relevant under Texas Rule of 

Evidence 401. Any evidence that is both material and probative is relevant. TEX. R.

EVID. 401. Evidence is material if it influences consequential facts. Mayes v. State, 

816 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Evidence is probative if it tends to 

make the existence of a material fact more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence. Miller v. State, 36 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 

Evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. TEX. R. EVID. 402.

The conduct of a defendant subsequent to the alleged commission of a crime 

that indicates a consciousness of guilt is a circumstance tending to prove that the 

defendant committed the act with which he is charged. Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 

117, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 1990, no writ) (“A ‘consciousness of guilt’ is perhaps one of the 
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strongest kinds of evidence of guilt.”). A defendant’s apology to the victim, even if 

vague, is also a circumstance indicating guilt. See Yost v. State, 222 S.W.3d 865, 

877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that defendant’s 

statements in letter sent from jail that “I am sorry for everything” and “please 

forgive me” were circumstance indicating guilt). Evidence of a defendant’s efforts 

to induce a witness to alter potential testimony or suppress a witness’s testimony 

also shows a consciousness of guilt. See Brown, 657 S.W.2d at 119; Johnson v. 

State, 583 S.W.2d 399, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Garza v. State, 358 S.W.2d 

622, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962).

Almost all of the letters contain an apology, either to Perez or her children. 

Some of the apologies are vague, such as “I never meant to hurt you,” and “I know 

I was wrong.” Others, however, are specific and border on admissions: “I’m sorry 

that I lost control after you scratched my face.” These apologies are relevant as a 

circumstance indicating Pizano’s consciousness of guilt. See Yost, 222 S.W.3d at 

877.

In most of the letters, after apologizing and expressing his love and 

devotion, Pizano asks Perez to recant her statements to police that Pizano hit her 

and her daughter. Pizano asked Perez to coach her children to give conforming 

statements, as well. He asked Perez to tell her children to say that a jar fell on 

Perez’s daughter’s face to explain the bruising on her cheek. Pizano also asked 
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Perez to sign an affidavit that he had prepared, recanting her previous statement 

and averring that she had made a false report. He repeatedly pleaded with Perez not 

to testify and to recant. These attempts to suppress Perez’s testimony and to 

persuade her to recant are relevant to show Pizano’s consciousness of guilt. See 

Brown, 657 S.W.2d at 119; Johnson, 583 S.W.2d at 409.

Virtually all the letters contain apologetic statements by Pizano or are 

attempts to induce Perez to alter her statement or not testify. See Brown, 657 

S.W.2d at 119; Johnson, 583 S.W.2d at 409. Only two of the forty-eight letters

contain no such statements. A general objection to evidence that consists of both 

admissible and inadmissible material does not preserve error. Alvarez v. State, 536 

S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Rather, a party must specifically object

to the material deemed objectionable, so that the trial court may strike the

objectionable material. Brown v. State, 692 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex. Crim. App.

1985). Because the vast majority of the letters are relevant, and Pizano did not 

specifically object to the two irrelevant letters, the relevance objection was not 

sufficient to preserve error as to those particular letters. See id.
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Conclusion

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

Pizano’s letters over his relevance objection. We therefore affirm the judgment of 

the trial court.

Jane Bland

Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Bland.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).