No. 81-144 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

LARRY LAWRENCE GONZALES, JR., 

Petitioner, 

-vsJAMES BLODGETT, acting Warden, 

Respondent. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : 

Counsel of Record: 

For Petitioner; 

Larry Lawrence Gonzales, Jr., Pro Se, 

Deer Lodge, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon, Mike Greely, Attorney General! Helena, 

Montana 

Harold Hanserr County Attorney! Billings, 

Montana 

Submittedt June 1, 1981 

Decided : JuL 2 2 198% 

Filed; 3Uh 2 2 198d 

Clerk 
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Petitioner Larry Lawrence Gonzales, Jr., has filed a 

pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging (1) 

that the District Court was without jurisdiction to revoke 

his deferred sentence after it had expired or was completed 

and (2) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 

by reason of the failure of his court-appointed counsel to 

raise this as a defense. 

On October 24, 1977, the District Court of 

Yellowstone County defer red imposition of sentence and 

placed petitioner on probation for a period of one year 

following his plea of guilty to the crime of aggravated 

assault. On August 14, 1978, the District Court extended 

the deferred imposition of sentence an additional two years 

to October 24, 1980, following a revocation hearing wherein 

petitioner admitted a parole violation. On April 4, 1979, 

the District Court again extended the deferred imposition of 

sentence until October 24, 1982, following a second 

revocation hearing wherein the District Court found that 

petitioner had again violated his parole. 

On February 2, 1981, petitioner was found guilty of 

the crime of criminal mischief, a misdemeanor, in the 

Justice Court of Yellowstone County. Two days later the 

county attorney filed a third petition for revocation of 

petitioner's deferred imposition of sentence based on this 

misdemeanor conviction which constituted a parole violation 

as well. Following a hearing, the District Court revoked 

its order staying deferment of sentence and sentenced 

petitioner to a term of five years in the State Prison for 

the original crime of aggravated assault. 
Petitioner contends in this habeas corpus proceeding 

that: 

(1) the District Court lacked jurisdiction to revoke 

the deferment of sentence and to sentence him for the 

original crime because petitioner had completed the period 

of deferment and probation; and 

(2) petitioner was denied effective assistance of 

counsel by failure of his court-appointed counsel to raise 

this defense in the revocation proceeding. 

The State raises four additional issues that it 

considers necessary to the resolution of this proceeding: 

(1) Is a deferred imposition of sentence a valid 

sentence that can only be vacated or modified pursuant to 

statutory authority? 

(2) Is section 46-18-203, MCA, a limitation upon the 

District Court's sentencing authority? 

(3) What is meant by the statutory language of 

section 46-18-203, MCA, wherein the district judge is 

granted optional and discretionary authority to "retain such 

jurisdiction with his court"? 

(4) Were the orders extending the period of deferment 

of imposition of sentence in excess of the District Court's 

jurisdiction? 

We find that only the first issue raised by the 

petitioner need be addressed by the Court in reaching a 

decision in this matter. 

The District Court is granted broad and flexible 

sentencing authority by statute, sections 46-18-201 et seq., 

MCA. Specifically, the district judge is granted authority 

to defer imposition of sentence following conviction of a 
felony for a period not exceeding three years. Section 

46-18-201(1)(a), MCA. In this action the petitioner's 

sentence was deferred on three separate occasions by the 

District Court for a total deferral period of five years. 

The District Court's order of October 24, 1977, deferred 

imposition of sentence and placed petitioner on probation 

for a period of one year. Following an admitted violation 

of probationary rules, the period of deferment was extended 

an additional two years. Following a second violation of 

probationary rules, the period of deferment was extended 

another two years. During that period of deferment, 

petitioner was found guilty of a misdemeanor, his deferment 

was revoked and he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. 

Petitioner contends that the District Court exceeded its 

jurisdiction in extending the total time of deferment beyond 

the three-year limitation provided by statute, and we agree. 

Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA, gives the district 

judge authority to defer imposition of sentence following 

conviction of a felony for a period not exceeding three 

years. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous 

and it is the function of this Court, as set forth in 

section 1-2-101, MCA, to simply ascertain and declare what 

is in terms or in substance contained in the statute. "When 

the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, direct 

and cqrtain, the statute speaks for itself and there is 

nothing for the Court to construe." State, Etc. v. District 

Court, Etc. (1979), Mont. , 591 P.2d 656, 662, 36 

St.Rep. 489, 496, and cases therein cited. "The intention 

of the legislature must first be determined from the plain 

meaning of the words used and if the meaning of the statute 
can be so determined, the courts may not go further and 

apply any other means of interpretation." State, Etc. v. 

District Court, Etc., supra. 

Applying these rules we hold that section 46-18- 

201(l)(a), MCA, allows the District Court to revoke a 

deferred sentence for any felony only during the three-year 

period immediately following the initial sentence deferral. 

This three-year period cannot be extended by an order of the 

District Court. The District Court can impose conditions of 

probation during the time of deferment which are not in 

contradiction to the deferred sentence, but the court cannot 

extend the period of deferment beyond the maximum three-year 

period mandated by section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA. 

In this action the maximum period for revoking a 

deferred sentence had elapsed and the District Court no 

longer had jurisdiction at the time it sentenced the 

petitioner to serve five years in the State Prison for the 

original crime of aggravated assault. Since the District 

Court had lost its jurisdiction, the sentence imposed by it 

is void. 

Accordingly the writ of habeas corpus is granted, and 

the respondent is directed to release petitioner from 

confinement in the State Prison forthwith absent independent 

grounds for holding petitioner in custody. 

=?L+,gu & 

Chief Jusf ice 
We Concur: