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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

STATE TREASURER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

October 20, 2016 

v No. 327657 

Lenawee Circuit Court 

BRADLEY BENCES, RANDIE BENCES, 

Successor Power of Attorney, and BRIAN 

BENCES, Power of Attorney and Joint Receiver, 

LC No. 14-005070-CZ 

 Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

MONROE BANK & TRUST, 

 Defendant, 

and 

JOHN BURTLE, 

 Intervenor-Appellant. 

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and BORRELLO and STEPHENS, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Intervening-appellant, John Burtle, appeals as of right the trial court’s stipulation of 

settlement and final order in an action between plaintiff, the State Treasurer, defendantsappellees, Bradley Bences (Bences), successor power of attorney Randie Bences, power of 

attorney and joint receiver Bryan Bences, and defendant, Monroe Bank & Trust, pursuant to the 

State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act (SCFRA), MCL 800.401 et seq. At issue in this 

appeal is an earlier order in which the trial court denied Burtle’s motion to intervene in the 

SCFRA action. We affirm. 

 In 2013, Bences was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious assault), 

MCL 750.226, among other crimes, for stabbing Burtle. The judgment of sentence ordered 
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Bences to pay $108,589 in restitution, and the court entered an order to remit funds for fines, 

costs, and assessments on December 11, 2013. 

 On May 27, 2014, the State Treasurer filed a complaint against defendants pursuant to the 

SCFRA, asserting that Bences was a state prisoner subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan 

Department of Corrections (MDOC), and seeking reimbursement for his incarceration costs. 

Burtle filed a motion to intervene in the SCFRA action pursuant to MCR 2.209(A). Following a 

hearing, the trial court denied his motion. 

 On appeal, Burtle argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to 

intervene because he had an interest in the SCFRA action as a result of the restitution order. 

Specifically, Burtle asserts that his payment under the restitution order should take priority over 

the State Treasurer’s reimbursement claim under the SCFRA. We disagree. 

 “A trial court’s decision on a motion to intervene is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” 

Hill v L F Transp, Inc, 277 Mich App 500, 507; 746 NW2d 118 (2008), citing Vestevich v West 

Bloomfield Twp, 245 Mich App 759, 761; 630 NW2d 646 (2001). “This Court reviews de novo 

a trial court’s resolution of issues of law, including the interpretation of statutes and court rules.” 

Hill, 277 Mich App at 507, citing Cardinal Mooney High Sch v Mich High Sch Athletic Ass’n, 

437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991). 

 A person may intervene in an action by right 

when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which 

is the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may, 

as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that 

interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing 

parties. [MCR 2.209(A)(3).] 

“ ‘The rule for intervention should be liberally construed to allow intervention where the 

applicant’s interests may be inadequately represented.’ ” Hill, 277 Mich App at 508, quoting 

Neal v Neal, 219 Mich App 490, 492; 557 NW2d 133 (1996). Nevertheless, “ ‘intervention may 

not be proper where it will have the effect of delaying the action or producing a multifariousness 

of parties and causes of action.’ ” Hill, 277 Mich App at 508, quoting Precision Pipe & Supply, 

Inc v Meram Constr, Inc, 195 Mich App 153, 157; 489 NW2d 166 (1992). 

 In this case, the trial court correctly concluded that Burtle did not have a sufficient 

interest in the property at issue in the State Treasurer’s SCFRA action against Bences to mandate 

his intervention because he did not have a perfected interest arising from the restitution order. At 

the time Burtle filed his motion to intervene, he had not yet filed a personal injury action against 

Bences. Although Burtle was awarded restitution as part of Bences’s sentence, he provided no 

evidence confirming that Bences failed to satisfy the restitution order, and he failed to seek 

enforcement of the order beyond moving to intervene in the State Treasurer’s SCFRA action. 
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 Trial courts are required to award restitution to crime victims. Const 1963, art 1, § 24; 

MCL 769.1a(2);1

 MCL 780.766(2);2 In re Lampart, 306 Mich App 226, 232-233; 856 NW2d 

192 (2014). Restitution must be made immediately, unless the court orders otherwise. MCL 

769.1a(10); MCL 780.766(10). Further, both the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et 

seq., and the Crime Victim’s Rights Act (CVRA), MCL 780.751 et seq., provide that 

[a]n order of restitution . . . remains effective until it is satisfied in full. An order 

of restitution is a judgment and lien against all property of the defendant for the 

amount specified in the order of restitution. The lien may be recorded as provided 

by law. An order of restitution may be enforced by the prosecuting attorney, a 

victim, a victim’s estate, or any other person or entity named in the order to 

receive the restitution in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action or a lien. 

[MCL 769.1a(13); MCL 780.766(13).] 

Burtle does not allege, and the record contains no evidence, that Burtle sought to enforce the 

restitution order in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action or a lien. Therefore, Burtle 

did not have a perfected interest in the assets sought by the State Treasurer at the time the State 

Treasurer initiated the SCFRA action. 

 Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Burtle’s motion to 

intervene because an SCFRA action is not the type of proceeding in which Burtle had the right to 

intervene. Pursuant to MCL 800.403(2) of the SCFRA, 

[i]f the attorney general . . . has good cause to believe that a prisoner has 

sufficient assets to recover not less than 10% of the estimated cost of care of the 

prisoner or 10% of the estimated cost of care of the prisoner for 2 years, 

whichever is less, the attorney general shall seek to secure reimbursement for the 

expense of the state of Michigan for the cost of care of that prisoner. 

 

1

 MCL 769.1a(2) provides the following: 

 Except as provided in [MCL 769.1a(8)], when sentencing a defendant 

convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation, the court shall order, 

in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law or in addition to 

any other penalty required by law, that the defendant make full restitution to any 

victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction or to 

the victim’s estate. 

2

 MCL 780.766(2) provides, in relevant part, the following: 

 Except as provided in [MCL 780.766(8)], when sentencing a defendant 

convicted of a crime, the court shall order, in addition to or in lieu of any other 

penalty authorized by law or in addition to any other penalty required by law, that 

the defendant make full restitution to any victim of the defendant’s course of 

conduct that gives rise to the conviction or to the victim’s estate. 
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In so doing, the attorney general may file a complaint seeking reimbursement. MCL 800.404(1). 

The court must then “issue an order to show cause why the prayer of the complainant should not 

be granted.” MCL 800.404(2). If the court concludes that a prisoner has assets subject to the 

SCFRA, it must order any person possessing those assets “to appropriate and apply the assets or 

a portion thereof toward reimbursing the state . . . .” MCL 800.404(3). 

 Under the SCFRA, “the state . . . is not a ‘creditor,’ nor is the relationship between a 

prisoner and the state a typical debtor-creditor relationship.” State Treasurer v Schuster, 456 

Mich 408, 419; 572 NW2d 628 (1998). Further, “the statutory obligation created by the SCFRA 

is not a ‘personal judgment or liability against the prisoner,’ but ‘a lien upon his estate[.]’ ” State 

Treasurer v Sheko, 218 Mich App 185, 189; 553 NW2d 654 (1996), quoting Auditor General v 

Hall, 300 Mich 215, 221; 1 NW2d 516 (1942). The SCFRA affords the state a number of tools 

to secure a prisoner’s assets for reimbursement that would not be available to the average 

creditor in a civil action. For example, without formal discovery, all prisoners must complete a 

form listing their assets. MCL 800.401b. The statute then provides: 

[T]o secure reimbursement under [the SCFRA], the attorney general may use any 

remedy, interim order, or enforcement procedure allowed by law or court rule 

including an ex parte restraining order to restrain the prisoner or any other person 

or legal entity in possession or having custody of the estate of the prisoner from 

disposing of certain property pending a hearing on an order to show cause why 

the particular property should not be applied to reimburse the state as provided for 

under this act. [MCL 800.404a(1).] 

An ordinary creditor does not have, and is not entitled to, the unique statutory tools that are 

available to the state when it pursues a reimbursement claim under the SCFRA. This suggests 

that the Legislature intended to give such state reimbursement claims priority over the claims of 

other creditors. The mere fact that Burtle is a beneficiary of a restitution order likewise does not 

confer him with the same statutory advantages available to the state. Accordingly, it would be 

improper to allow Burtle, or any other potential creditor, to intervene in an SCFRA action 

between the state and a prisoner and thus benefit from these statutory tools. 

 Moreover, even if the court abused its discretion by denying Burtle’s motion to intervene, 

the court’s error was harmless. Despite Burtle’s argument to the contrary, his restitution order 

would not have taken priority over the state’s reimbursement claim pursuant to the SCFRA. The 

SCFRA grants the state access to most of a prisoner’s assets for reimbursement. The statute 

defines “assets” to mean “property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due a 

prisoner or former prisoner including income or payments to such prisoner from social security, 

worker’s compensation, veteran’s compensation, pension benefits, . . . or from any other source 

whatsoever . . . .” MCL 800.401a(a). The only property excluded from the definition is the 

prisoner’s homestead up to $50,000 and money saved from wages paid to the prisoner while he 

or she was confined to a state correctional facility. MCL 800.401a(a)(i) and (ii). Further, when 

entering a reimbursement order, a court need only consider the prisoner’s legal and moral 

obligations to dependents. MCL 800.404(5). 

 In other words, “ ‘the plain and broad language of the reimbursement provisions at issue 

indicates a legislative intent to shift the burden of incarceration expenses to prisoners and from 
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the taxpayers whenever possible.’ ” State Treasurer v Snyder, 294 Mich App 641, 647; 823 

NW2d 284 (2011), quoting Schuster, 456 Mich at 418. The SCFRA does not require a court 

entering a reimbursement order to consider any restitution the prisoner may owe a victim. See 

MCL 800.404(5). This Court’s opinion in Sheko further illustrates the broad grant of authority 

the Legislature gave to the state under the SCFRA. In Sheko, 218 Mich App at 186-187, the 

state filed a complaint pursuant to the SCFRA to intercept money a prisoner was going to receive 

as part of an arbitration award. This Court rejected the prisoner’s argument that he preferred to 

pay the debts he owed to his brother first, concluding that 

any common-law right defendant may have had to prefer creditors does not apply 

to actions under the SCFRA. Accepting defendant’s position would lead to the 

absurd result of the state receiving reimbursement only when a prisoner has no 

other financial obligations or, having other financial obligations, does not object 

to the state securing reimbursement from the prisoner’s assets. [Id. at 188.] 

 The CVRA does not explicitly provide that restitution orders to victims take priority over 

the state’s reimbursement claims under the SCFRA. Under MCL 780.766a(1) and (2), restitution 

payments take priority over “fines, costs, . . . assessments, probation or parole supervision fees, 

or other payments arising out of the same criminal proceeding . . . .” However, these statutory 

provisions make no reference to reimbursement pursuant to the SCFRA. Further, MCL 780.768 

states that restitution must be paid by a prisoner before reimbursement under the SCFRA, but 

only in cases in which the prisoner has derived a profit from recollections of thoughts or feelings 

or the sale of memorabilia related to the offense committed by the prisoner. This suggests that 

restitution orders do not take priority over SCFRA claims under general circumstances. In sum, 

Burtle has not shown that he was entitled to intervene in the SCFRA action, or that he was 

entitled to priority distribution over the state. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens