### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Fe br ua ry 15, 200 5 S es sio n
ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E, D EP A R TM EN T O F C HI LD R EN ’S S ER V IC ES v. RDV

Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Anderson County No. J-21244 Hon. P atric ia Hess, Jud ge

No. E2004-01216-COA- R3-P T - F ILED MARCH 17, 2005

I n this a c ti o n to te r mi n a te f a th e r ’ s p ar e n ta l r ig h ts , th e T r ia l Co u r t r e f u s e d to ap p o in t c o u n s el for fathe r, despite his cla im of indige nce. On appeal, we vacate t he J udg ment and re mand for f urther h e ar i n g o n t h e i s s u e o f

i n d i g e n c y.

Te nn. R

. App

. P .3 App e al as of Ri ght ; Judg m e nt of th e Juv e nile Co ur t v ac at e d and r e m ande d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.

Da vidA. Stu art , Cl int on , T e nn e sse e , f or app e lla nt.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter
, and Doug las Ear l Dimond, Senior Counsel, Nashville, Tennesse e, for appellee

.

OP IN ION

Th is i s a n a c tio n to te rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts be tw e e n th e min or c hil d, DM , a ndhis biologica l father , RDV, who wa s incarc erated at the time of the termination hea ring

.
The Peti t i o n to Terminate w as filed on Oc tober 13, 2003, see king to terminate the ri g hts of bo th p are nts , a nda lle g e d g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts

.-2- A h ea ri n g wa s s ch ed u l ed fo r J an u ar y 1 2 , 2 0 0 4 , an d at t h e b egi n n i n g o f t h e h ea ri n g, the J udg e stated tha t there ha d been some contac t f rom RDV or his family

about g etting a

form filled out so that he could be a

ppointed counsel, but the Court had not re ceive d hi s application. RDV’s mother attende d the hea

ring
, and she advised the Court that the form ha d been f illed out by

RDV and faxed to the Court, but the J udg e told her it wa s not there, a nd that she should try to ge t a copy . The mother re ported that RDV wa s incarc erated in Florida at the time, ha ving been move d from Knox Countythe pre vious week.

The Court then proc eede d to hear tes t i mony

from the DCS worke r re g arding the mother and her circ umstances. At the conclusion of hear ing tha t evidence , the Court terminated the mothe r’ s p are nta l r ig hts

.

RDV’s fa milythen re turned to t he courtroom, and the Court re viewed a copy of a Uniform Af

fidavit of I ndige ncy

signe d by RDV. The Court noted t hat t he af fidavit stated that RDV

was e mploy ed by

Russell Gibson, and enquired of the mother, who a dv i s ed t h e Court that Mr. Gibso n wa s RDV’s fa ther. The Court enquired the name of the business and the nature of the business, and the mother said that it wa s a fa milytree business, and whe n RDV worke d he ea rned $18.00 an hour. The mother on the c ourt’s inquiry said that RDV had an interest in the business, and that he had be en a pa

rtner in the busine ss before his incarc era tion.

RDV’s sister then explained that the fa ther wa s g oing to own ha lf the business once he pa id f or his int e re st, bu t th a t he ha d n ot d on e so

. Whe re up on , th e Cou rt re sp on de d, “ Wel l he is

a pa rt ne r a n d h e h a s a h a l f i n t e r e s t w h e t h e r y o u l i k e i t o r n o t

. S o y o u j u s t n e e d t o a n s w e r m y qu e sti on s a

bo ut h ow muc h th e e qu ipm e nt i s w orth. ” Hi s sis te r re pli e d that th e e qu ipm e nt w a s w orth $40,000, which was all in he r name. The Court the n stated that RDV would not qu al i fy fo r an
a tto rn e y be c a us e of

his pa rt ne rs hip int e re st.

Th e Cou rt c on tin ue d th e c a se un til Janu ary 29 , 2 00 4 in or de r fo r R DV to g e t c ou ns e l, and RDV c ould participate in the hearing by teleconf ere nce f rom the jail.

The a ffidavit filed by

RDV stated that he wa s incarc erated, and ha d no income and no assets. At the he aring on J anuary 29, 2004, RDV participa ting by teleconf ere nce, a sked the Court why he wa s not allowed to have an attorney appointed, and the C ourt replied tha t he did not qualify based on his af

fidavit of income. RDV then stated that he h ad n o i n co m e an d no assets, and the J udg e stated tha t there w as prior te stimonyof owne rship in a business. RDV stated, “B ut that’s g one completely

under. I don’t have a business. A-Rea sonable Tree Service does not exist any more. The J udg e re plied, “Tha t’s not the statements of those who w ere here , sir. And then whe n they found out that th a t impa c te d y ou r ab ili ty to g e t a law y e r, the y wa nte d to c ha ng e the ir

te sti mon y . B ut tha t’ s a conclude d matter.”

RD V atte mpted to expl a in tha t th e Cou rt wa s c on fu sin g his tr e e bu sin e ss a ndhis sister’s tree business, which wa s A-Af forde d Tree Service , but the Court replied ther e wa s no confusion, t h at h e wa s not to arg ue with the Court, and “ that is how that is.” The he aring then-3-

proce eded, a nd at the conc lusion of the hea ring the Court enter ed a de cre e ter minating the pa renta l rig hts of RDV.

Severa l issues are pr esente d on appea l, but the determinative issue is whe ther RDV

wa s impr op e rl y

de nie d h is rig ht t o c ou ns e l.

RDV asserts that the Court improperly denied him his rig ht t o counsel. This Court ha s p re vio us ly

a dd re sse d th e iss ue of

ri g ht t o c ou ns e l in pa

re nta l te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g s, in the c a se of In re Va lle , 31 S.W .3d 566, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), w here in it was expl ained:

Un de r the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on , p are nts do no t ha ve an abs olu te ri g ht t o counsel in termination of pa renta l rig h t s p ro ceeding s. Lassit er v. D ept. of Social Servic es , 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. C t. 2153, 68 L . Ed. 2d 640 (1981). The Lassit er Cou rt , howeve r, re cog nizi ng that t h e re quirements of due proce ss vary from ca se to ca se, deter mined that the nat u re o f t he proc eeding and the inter ests involved are deter minative fac tors in what due pr ocess r equire s. 101 S.Ct . at 2158. I n State ex

r e l

. T

. H

. by H

. H

. v

. M in , 802 S.W .2d 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), the pare nts of a minor child fi l ed a c omplaint and petition for writ of ha beas c orpus, ag ainst the Commi ssioner of theD e p a r tm e n t o f H u ma n Se rvice s, seeking a dec lara tory judgme nt that their due pr ocess r ights we re violate d by failure of the juvenile court to appoint counsel to re prese nt them at various custody hearings. This Court noted that the issue on ap p e a l i s w h e th e r th e d u e p r o c e s s p r o v is io n s o f th e s tate a n d/o r

f e d e r al constitutio n s re q u i re the juvenile court to appoint counse l for the pa rents in a proce eding in w hich the pare nts f ace the possibili ty of losing custody of t h e c h ild. I d. a t 62 5. Th e Cou rt no te d that it i s w e ll e sta bli sh e d " that th e pa

re nta l r ig ht t o r a ise one' s ch ildren is a funda mental liberty protec ted by

the due pr ocess c lause of the Fourteenth Amendme nt." I d. at 626. The Court further noted that the Lassit er Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals in Davis v. Page , 714 F.2d 512 ( 5th Cir. 1983) listed severa l fac tors to determine w hether an indig ent par ent in a hea ring aff ecting pa re nta l r ig hts ma y

be e nti tle d to the a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l a s a

ma tte r o f d ue pr oc e ss. The Court stated:
To help asse ss the risk of an unf air proc eeding resulting in an er roneous de cision, the courts in Lassit er

and Da v is have listed seve ral fa ctors that b ea r o n t he question. They include: (1) w hether

expert medical a nd/or psy chiatric testimonyis presente d

a t th e he ari ng ; ( 2) wh e the r the pa re nts ha ve ha d u nc omm on dif fi c ult y in d e a lin g wi th life and lif

e s i t uations; (3) whe ther the pa rents ar e thrust into a distressing and disorienting situation at the he aring ; (4) the difficulty and complexityof the issues and proc edure s; (5) the possibilityof criminal self-incrimination; (6) the e ducational backg round of the par en t s ; an d (7) the pe rmane ncy of potential deprivation of the child in question. Lassit er , 1 01 S.Ct . a t 21 61 -2 16 3; Da v is , 714 F.2d a t 516-517.

I d. at 627.-4- Rule 39 of the Te nnessee Rules of J uvenile Proce dure pr escribes the proce dures f or te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts c a se s. Rul e 39 (f ) p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art :
(f) Adjudicatory

Hea ring on Termination
(1) The court shall conduct an adjudicatory hearing to deter mine the i ssues raised by the petition and by

any answe r(s) f

iled. Notice of

the hea ring shall be provided in the

summons.
(2 ) A t th e be g inn ing of the he ari ng , a ny pa rt y wh o a pp e ars wi tho ut a n a tto rn e y sh a ll be informed of the rig ht to an attorney , and in the ca se of a n indige nt respondent, the court shall consider the fac ts a nd circ umstances alleg ed and make a dete rmination as to whether

an attorne y

should be appointed.

I n State, Dept. of Human Services v. Taylor
, 19 97 WL 12 22 42 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. ), thi s Court held t hat t he procedure s of Rule 39(f) (2) c oncerning the rig ht to have an attorney , appointed or otherw ise, are mandatory . I n so holding, the Court said:

Ou r p re se nt R ule s o f Juv e nil e Pr oc e du re be c a me e ff e c tiv e July 1, 19 84

. Sin c e the se rules postdate La s s ite r , it would appear that in order to insure that the conditions there in stated are proper ly considere d, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court and the Ge nera l Assembly , by

the adoption of the Rules of Juvenile Procedur e, p ro vide minimum require ments which the trial c ourt must f ollow w hen a pare nt a

ppear s at a ter mination hearing w ithout an attorney

.
I d. at *2.

T h e s t at ute re g arding termination of par ental rig hts, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1- 113, pr ov ide s:
(f) Be fore terminating the rig hts of any pare nt or g uardia n who is incarc erated or who was inca rce rate d at the time of an action or pr ocee ding is initiated, it must be aff irmatively

shown to the court that such incar cer ated parent or g uardia n rec eived

ac t u al n o t i ce o f t h e f

o l l o wi n g:
(1 ) T he tim e a ndpla c e of the he ari ng to t e rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts ;
(2) That the hearing will de termine whe ther the rights of the incar cer ated pa rent or g uardia n should be terminated;
(3) That the i ncar cer ated parent or g uardia n has t he rig ht to participate in the he aring

a ndc on te st the a lle g a tio n th a t th e ri g hts of the inc arc e rate d p are nt o r g ua rd ia n s ho uld be ter minated, and, at the di scre tion of t he court, such participation may be ac hieved-5- throug h persona l appea

ranc e, telec onfer ence , telecommunica tion or other mea ns de e me d b y

the c ou rt to b e app ro pr ia te un de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s;
(4) That if the incar cer ated pa rent or g uardia n wishes to participa te in the hea ring and contest the a lleg ation, such par ent or g uardia n:
(A) I f indig ent, will be provided with a court-appointed attorney to assist the pare nt or g uardia n in contesting the alleg ation; and
(B ) Shall have the rig ht to perpe tuate such person' s testimony or that of any witn e s s b y me a n s o f d e p o s it io n s o r in te rr o g a to r ie s a s p r o v id e d by the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure ; and
(5) I f, by means of a signe d waiver , the court determines that the inc arc erated par ent
or g ua rd ia n h a s v olu nta

ri ly wa ive d th e ri g ht to part ic ipate in the he ari ng a ndc on te st the alleg ation, or if such pa rent or g uardia n takes no action af ter re ceiving notice of

s u ch ri gh t s , t h e c o u rt m ay p ro ce ed wi t h s u ch ac t i o n wi t h o u t t h e p ar en t 's o r gu ar d i an 's participa tion.

I n addi ti o n , Su p r e me Co u r t Ru le 1 3 ( d ) p r o v id e s th a t in c a s e s d e a li n g w ith the termination of par ental rig hts, the court “sha ll advise any party who i s without counsel that he or she ha s the ri g ht to be re pr e se nte d by c ou ns e l thr ou g ho ut the c a se a nd that cou ns e l will be app oin te d to repr esent the pa

rty if he or she is indige nt and requests the appointm ent of counsel.” Subsection (e) of thi s rule pr ov ide s th a t a

pa rt y re qu e sti ng the app oin tme nt o f c ou ns e l mu st c omp le te a n A ff ida vit of I nd ig e nc y

F or m, a ndthe c ou rt “ sh a ll up on inq uiry make a fi nd ing a s to the ind ig e nc y of the pa rt y pursuant to the provisions of Te nn. Code Ann. §40-14- 202.”

Tenn. Code Ann. §40- 14-202 states “w h en ev er the ac cused informs the court that

su c h a c c us ed is fi na nc ia lly un able to o bta in the a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l, i t is the du ty

of the c ou rt to conduct a full and complete hearing a s to the financ ial ability of the a ccuse d to obtain the assistance of counse l, and, t here afte r, m ake a findi ng as t o the i ndige ncy of the a ccuse d.” The statute g oes on to list sever al fa ctors which the court is re quired to consider , such as the nature of the servic es to be rende red, the usual cha

rg e i n t h e community

for a n attorney

to rende r such se rvice , the income of the ac cused, a ny

property owned by

the ac cused, the poverty level income g uidelines compiled by the depa rtment of labor , whether

the party posted a bond, and other releva nt circumstanc es. Tenn. Code Ann. §40-14- 202. Further, Tenn. Code Ann. §40-14- 201, the def inition s ection re lating to the

abo ve statut e , d e fi ne s a n in dig e nt p e rs on a s “ a ny pe rs on wh o d oe s n ot p os se ss s uf fi c ie nt m e a ns to pay rea sonable c ompensation for the service s of a c ompetent attorne y .”

Whether a person is indige nt is a question of fa ct, and a s such, the standa rd of r eview is de novo with a pre sumption of cor rec tness of the trial c ourt’s finding s, unless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise. Te nn. R. App. P. 13(d). I n this case, the e vidence in the rec ord does not support the Trial Court’s f inding that RDV w as not indige nt.-6- RDV filed an a ffidavit which listed his income a nd ass et s at z er o. RDV’s mother testified that RDV had be en a pa rtner in a tree cutting busine ss with her, but stated that she ow ned all the equipment and he did not own it. RDV’s sister attempted to e x plain to the court that RDV ha d n e ve r p a id f

or his int e re st i n the bu sin e ss, bu t the Cou rt dis c ou nte d h e r t e sti mon y , d e sc ri bin g it as “a chang e in the story .”

At the be g inn ing of the se c on d he ari ng , RD V e xpla ine d to the Cou rt that hi s b us ine ss
wa s b a nk ru pt, ow ne d n o e qu ipm e nt, a ndhe th us had no thi ng to s e ll. Th e Cou rt re fu se d to

rec onsider, and in the Court’ s Order , she noted that the r uling that RDV w as not entitled to an attorney was ba sed o n h i s aff

idavit (which listed zero income/a ssets) and on RDV’ s mother’s te sti mon y that RDV ma de g oo d mone y in h is t re e -t ri mmi ng bu sin e ss a ndsu pp orte d tw o h ou se ho lds

. RDV, of cour se, was incar cer ated at the t ime of t he hearing , and ther e wa s no evidenc e that he w as
earning any income or supporting two households. The Court also remar ked about state ments RDV

m ad e d u ri n g a p ri o r h ea ri n g, b u tt h er e i s n o t ra n s cr i p t o f t h at h ea ri n g. The Court of Criminal Appeal s, when c onstruing the require ments of Tenn. Code An n

. § 4 0

- 1 4

- 2 0 2 , h as ru l ed t h at an i n d i gen cyh ea ri n g i s re q u i re d at an y p o i n ti n t h e p ro ce ed i n gs when the de fenda nt claims indige ncy

. State v. Dubroc k , 649 S.W .2d 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)

. Thus, the fac t that a def

endant ha d previously

been a ble to aff ord private counsel did not prec lude him from later c laiming a cha n ge i n ci rc u mstances ha d rende red him indig ent and in nee d of an appointed attorne y

. Id. The Court noted t h at the leg islature plac ed no limits on t he wor d “whe never ” as use d in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-202, and that a defe ndant who put the trial court

on notice that he could no longe r aff ord an attorney was entitled to a n indige ncy hearing. Id. Th us , th e f a c t th a t R D V may

h a v e p r e v io u s ly

b e e n in a d if f e r e n t f in a n c ia l c o n d it io n w o u ldn o t p r e c lu de him from claiming indige ncy at the time of the te rmination p ro ce ed i n g s, and he w ould stil l be entitled to a hea

ring on this iss ue.

Th e sta tut e re qu ir e s a

“ fu ll a ndc omp le te he ari ng ” re g ard ing the indig e nc y c la im, which did not occur in this case . At the initial hearing , the Court asked que stions of RDV’s mother and sister (w ho RDV claims wer e not sworn, a lthough it is impossi ble to deter mine thi s from the

re c or d) , b ut the n r e fu se d to a llo w the m to e xpla in the ir a ns we rs or

to p ro vid e the Cou rt

wi th additional information re g arding RDV’s situation. L ikewise, the Court ha d RDV’s aff idavit which showed he had no ass et s o r income, but did not question RDV at the late r hea ring reg arding the same, nor did the Court a llow RDV to ex plain his situation, but s i m p l y t o l d RDV that she had alre ady made a decision on that issue. The fore g oing demonstrates that RDV did not have a full and complete he aring on this iss ue, as r equire d statute. See State v. Miller , 2003 WL 1618070 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2003).

Since RDV was denied a proper hearing on the i ssue of his i ndige ncy and nee d for appointed counse l, the J udg ment is vaca ted, and the c ause r emande d, and the Trial Court is directed to conduct a f

ull hearing on RDV’s indige ncy , and a new trial on the proprie ty of the termination. The Court is require d to comply with the statute and Court Rules and must tak e i n t o ac co unt the-7-

fac tors a s e n u me r a te d

. M o r e o v e r , th e Co u r t c a n n o t c o n s id e r th e a s s e ts o r in c o me o f the RDV’s family

. State v. Gardne r , 6 26 S.W. 2d72 1 ( Te nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ); State v. Ramse y , 2 0 0 3 WL 21658589 (Tenn. Crim. App. J uly 15, 2003). As above reiter ated, the T rial Court ca nnot prec lude RDV’s cla im of indige ncy based simply

on the fa ct that at an ear lier time in the proc eeding s, he may not ha ve been indige nt. See Dubrock and Ramsey

. F urthe r, the Cou rt sh ou ld co ns ide r tha t “ [i]t is not nece ssary

that one be a

‘paupe r’ in orde r to be ‘indig ent’ for purposes of hav ing a

ppointed

c ou ns e l . . . I nd ig e nc y

in the sens e of

abil ity to e mpl oy

c omp e te nt c ou ns e l is no t ne c e ssa ri ly equata ble with ‘destitution’. The judg e ne ed o n l y be satisfied tha t repre sentation essential to an

a de qu a te de fe ns e is b e y on d th e me a ns of the de fe nd a nt. I nd ig e nc y is a re la tiv e c on c e pt, a ndmus t be def ined with ref

ere nce to the particular

rig ht asserte d.” State v. Gardne r , 626 S.W .2d 721, 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)

.

The Tr ial Court’s Orde r of Paternal Termination is vacated a nd the cause re manded fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith thi s O pin ion

. Th e c os t of the app e a l is a sse sse d to the Sta te of Te nn e sse e , D e pa

rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.