FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AE JA ELLIOT-PARK, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 08-16089 JARROD MANGLONA; MICHAEL

LANGDON D.C. No. ; ANTHONY MACARANAS; 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 1:07-cv-00021

Defendants-Appellants, OPINION

and

NORBERT DUENAS BABAUTA,

Defendant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands

Alex R. Munson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 12, 2009—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed January 12, 2010

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Jay S. Bybee and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Chief Judge Kozinski;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Callahan

887
COUNSEL

Braddock Jon Huesman, Assistant Attorney General, CNMI

Office of the Attorney General, Saipan, MP, for the

defendants-appellants.

George L. Hasselback and Joseph E. Horey, O’Connor Berman Dotts & Banes, Saipan, MP, for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

We consider whether law enforcement officers who are

accused of failing to investigate a crime or make an arrest due

to the race of the victim and that of the perpetrator are entitled

to qualified immunity.

Facts

We recite the facts as Ae Ja Park Elliott* alleges them in

her complaint. Elliott, who is racially and ethnically Korean,

was driving south along 16 Highway in Papago, Saipan. Norbert Duenas Babauta, who is racially and ethnically Micronesian, was driving north along the same highway when he sped

through a turn, crossed onto oncoming traffic and crashed into

Elliott’s car. Officer Manglona noticed the accident and

approached. When Elliott asked him to call her husband, he

shoved her inside her car and told her to shut up and calm

down. Manglona then began conducting interviews of the witnesses, drivers and passengers. Officers Macaranas and Lang-

*The district court caption refers to Elliott as “Elliot-Park,” and our caption follows the district court. Elliott explains on appeal that her correct

name is “Ae Ja Park Elliott,” which is the name we use in our opinion.

Elliott may request that the district court docket be corrected by motion

on remand. 

890 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
don arrived shortly thereafter and spoke to both drivers. The

officers are all racially and ethnically Micronesian.

The three officers had cause to believe Babauta had been

driving under the influence of alcohol: He was teetering and

slurring his words, he reeked of alcohol and had bloodshot

eyes, his truck bed was littered with empty beer cans and he

told Manglona that he had “blacked out” while driving.

Despite these obvious signs of intoxication, the officers didn’t

administer field sobriety or blood alcohol tests, or otherwise

investigate whether Babauta had been driving drunk. Nor did

the officers charge him with a DUI or any other crime or

infraction. Manglona also falsely stated in his accident report

that Babauta “had not been drinking.”

Dr. Thomas Austin, who examined Elliott and Babauta at

the hospital, called DPS to complain after he learned that

Babauta hadn’t been charged with a DUI. After this complaint, and perhaps some others, the Department of Public

Safety (DPS) initiated an investigation, but the three officers

conspired with others to obstruct the investigation and prevent

prosecution of Babauta. Elliott claims the officers failed to

investigate the crime or arrest Babauta because of racial animus against her as a Korean and in favor of Babauta as a

Micronesian.

On a motion to dismiss, the district court found that Elliott

sufficiently alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection claim

and a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy and obstruction of justice

claim against the officers. The district court concluded the

officers weren’t entitled to qualified immunity at the motion

to dismiss stage. The officers bring this interlocutory appeal.

Analysis

[1] Unlike prosecutors, who enjoy absolute immunity,

police officers are entitled only to qualified immunity in section 1983 cases. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-43

ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 891
(1986). In a qualified immunity appeal, we normally look first

to whether a constitutional violation was alleged and then to

whether the defendants have qualified immunity as a matter

of law. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 813 (2009).

We review the district court’s decision de novo. Newell v.

Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1996).

1. According to Elliott, the three police officers refused to

investigate the incident because Babauta is Micronesian and

Elliott is Korean. Elliott also claims that Officer Macaranas

fully investigated another drunk driving accident that

occurred the same evening where the victim was Micronesian

but the driver wasn’t. The officers don’t dispute that Elliott

has pled facts from which a trier of fact could infer racial discrimination.

[2] Instead, the officers argue that individuals don’t have a

constitutional right to have police arrest others who have victimized them. But Elliott’s equal protection claim isn’t based

on some general constitutional right to have an assailant

arrested. Rather, she argues Babauta was given a pass by the

police because of the officers’ alleged racial bias not only in

favor of Babauta as a Micronesian, but also against her as a

Korean. And while the officers’ discretion in deciding whom

to arrest is certainly broad, it cannot be exercised in a racially

discriminatory fashion. For example, a police officer can’t

investigate and arrest blacks but not whites, or Asians but not

Hispanics. Police can’t discriminate on the basis of the victim’s race, either. We recognized as much in Estate of Macias

v. Ihde, where we held that there is no right to state protection

against madmen or criminals, but “[t]here is a constitutional

right . . . to have police services administered in a nondiscriminatory manner—a right that is violated when a state actor

denies such protection to disfavored persons.” 219 F.3d 1018,

1028 (9th Cir. 2000); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago

County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989)

(“The State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective

892 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the

Equal Protection Clause.”).

[3] The officers concede that the Constitution protects

against discriminatory withdrawal of police protection, but

they claim that Elliott was not denied this right because they

provided her with some police services: They called an ambulance and questioned bystanders. According to the officers,

only a complete withdrawal of police protective services violates equal protection. But diminished police services, like the

seat at the back of the bus, don’t satisfy the government’s

obligation to provide services on a non-discriminatory basis.

See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 715-17 (9th Cir. 1995)

(alleged policy to treat domestic violence 911 calls less

urgently could form the basis for an equal protection claim).

Certainly the government couldn’t constitutionally adopt a

policy to spend $20,000 investigating each murder of a white

person but only $1,000 investigating each murder of a person

of color. Likewise, it doesn’t matter that Elliott received some

protection; what matters is that she would allegedly have

received more if she weren’t Korean and Babauta weren’t

Micronesian.

The officers also suggest that the equal protection clause

only protects against selective denial of protective services,

and that investigation and arrest aren’t protective services

unless there is a continuing danger to the victim. But the officers’ understanding of protective services is too limited. If

police refuse to investigate or arrest people who commit

crimes against a particular ethnic group, it’s safe to assume

that crimes against that group will rise. Would-be criminals

will act with a greater impunity if they believe they have a get

out of jail free card if they commit crimes against the disfavored group. Babauta may well have been emboldened to

drive drunk with empty beer cans rolling around in the back

of his truck because he believed that he would suffer no ill

consequences should he cause an accident.

ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 893
In any event, whether investigation and arrest are protective

services is immaterial. While the Supreme Court may have

written in DeShaney that the government couldn’t “selectively

deny its protective services” to disfavored minorities, 489

U.S. at 197 n.3, that certainly doesn’t imply that the government can selectively deny its non-protective services to disfavored minorities. The government may not racially

discriminate in the administration of any of its services. See

Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219-223 (1971)

(government-funded pools cannot be operated on a racially

discriminatory basis); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d

1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971) (municipal services cannot be provided on a racially discriminatory basis).

[4] The dissent agrees that the discriminatory denial of

investigative services may violate equal protection. Dissent at

909. Nevertheless, our colleague questions whether Elliott has

an equal protection claim based on the officers’ failure to

arrest Babauta because arrest decisions are entitled to deference and because Elliott probably suffered little harm. See id.

at 901. But even the dissent recognizes that police officers

aren’t entitled to deference for their decision if it is based on

racial animus. See id. at 899-900. And the fact that Elliott may

not have been harmed much speaks more to whether she can

recover anything beyond nominal damages than to whether

she has an equal protection claim. See also Flores v. Morgan

Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (9th Cir.

2003) (discriminatory failure to investigate and discipline student harassment complaints violates equal protection). Certainly, a plaintiff complaining of heart attack symptoms has

a claim against a government hospital that turns him away

because of his race, even if the symptoms turn out to be

caused by heartburn. The officers’ alleged discriminatory failure to arrest, as well as investigate, therefore violated equal

protection.

[5] 2. Law enforcement officials are entitled to qualified

immunity even where their conduct violated a constitutional

894 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
right unless that right was clearly established at the time of

the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). The

dispositive inquiry is whether “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Id. Thus, our “task is to determine whether the

preexisting law provided the defendants with ‘fair warning’

that their conduct was unlawful.” Flores, 324 F.3d at 1136-37

(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)).

[6] The right to non-discriminatory administration of protective services is clearly established. See p. 892 supra. Nevertheless, the officers argue that it wasn’t clearly established

that investigation and arrest are protective services. But the

very purpose of section 1983 was to provide a federal right of

action against states that refused to enforce their laws when

the victim was black. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,

338 (1983) (“It is clear from the legislative debates that, in the

view of the Act’s sponsors, the victims of Klan outrages were

deprived of ‘equal protection of the laws’ if the perpetrators

systematically went unpunished.”); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.

167, 174-180 (1961) (“It is abundantly clear that one reason

the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,

intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced

. . . .”); Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 37 (6th Cir. 1973)

(“Particularly in view of the circumstances surrounding the

passage of § 1983, including the concern for protecting

Negroes from the widespread non-enforcement of state laws,

the remedies provided in § 1983 are most appropriately

extended to persons who, because of the unpopularity of their

life-styles or the pervasiveness of racist animus in the community, are not protected . . . .” (citation omitted)). It hardly

passes the straight-face test to argue at this point in our history that police could reasonably believe they could treat individuals disparately based on their race.

[7] The officers argue that Elliott’s equal protection rights

weren’t clearly established because she can’t find a case simiELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 895
lar to hers—like a sobriety check and arrest case or a traffic

case—where the court found an equal protection violation.

But there doesn’t need to be a prior case with materially similar facts in order for a right to be clearly established. Flores,

324 F.3d at 1136-37 (“In order to find that the law was clearly

established, however, we need not find a prior case with identical, or even ‘materially similar,’ facts.” (quoting Hope, 536

U.S. at 741)). This is especially true in equal protection cases

because the non-discrimination principle is so clear. “The

constitutional right to be free from such invidious discrimination is so well established and so essential to the preservation

of our constitutional order that all public officials must be

charged with knowledge of it.” Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d

1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1980). 

We have recognized the absurdity of requiring equal protection plaintiffs to find a case with materially similar facts.

In Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, we held that

public school administrators who failed to respond to gay students’ harassment complaints were not entitled to qualified

immunity. 324 F.3d at 1136-38. The administrators argued

that “no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit case had yet established a student’s right under the Equal Protection Clause . . .

to be protected by school administrators from peer sexual orientation harassment.” Id. at 1136. But we reasoned that it was

“not necessary to find a case applying the [equal protection]

principle to a particular category of state officials, such as

school administrators,” because “[a]s early as 1990, we established the underlying proposition that such conduct violates

constitutional rights: state employees who treat individuals

differently on the basis of their sexual orientation violate the

constitutional guarantee of equal protection.” Id. at 1137.

Thus, “[t]he defendants were officers of the state who had fair

warning that they could not accord homosexual and bisexual

students less protection.” Id.

[8] Contrary to the dissent’s claim, see dissent at 904, Flores isn’t limited to the unique characteristics of the school

896 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
environment. Indeed, Flores found that school administrators

were on notice that they had to treat gay students the same as

straight students based on a case holding that state employees

in general can’t irrationally discriminate on the basis of sexual

orientation. 324 F.3d at 1137. The same holds true here. It’s

been long established that state employees can’t treat individuals differently on the basis of their race. The three officers

thus had a more than fair warning that failure to investigate

and arrest Babauta because of race violated equal protection.

* * *

[9] The officers admit their appeal of the district court’s

refusal to dismiss Elliott’s section 1985 claim, which alleges

that the defendants conspired to deny her equal protection, is

tied to the success of their appeal of the section 1983 claim.

The district court did not err in failing to dismiss the section

1983 and section 1985 claims.

AFFIRMED.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:

I agree with the first part of the majority opinion: the government may not racially discriminate in the administration of

its services. See opinion at 894. I further agree that the right

to the non-discriminatory administration of protective services

is clearly established. See opinion at 894-895. Nonetheless, I

write separately and dissent because I am concerned that the

broad language in the majority’s opinion fails to recognize the

deference courts have given, and should give, police departments in determining when and how to investigate crimes.

This underlying theme informs the two specific issues I

address. First, I am leery of any suggestion that a person’s

right to equal protection extends to requiring an arrest of a

third person; and second, I do not think that a reasonable offiELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 897
cer in defendants’ position was on notice that refusing to give

Babauta a sobriety test might constitute a violation of Elliot’s

right to equal protection of the law. Of course, with the publication of this opinion Ninth Circuit law on this issue will be

established.

However, I conclude that existing law did not provide the

defendants with clear notice that their actions concerning

Babauta violated Elliot’s constitutional right to equal protection of the law. This distinction is exactly the purpose of the

second prong of the test set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194 (2002): “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Id. at 202. Accordingly, I would hold that although defendants

may have violated Elliot’s right to equal protection of the law,

they are entitled to qualified immunity because it would not

have been clear to a reasonable officer that he or she was

doing so.

I

The majority’s opinion fails to distinguish between investigations and arrests and thus fails to appreciate that the discretionary determination to arrest someone is particularly

unsuited to judicial review. The unique nature of the prosecutorial function, which includes the decision to arrest an individual, was recognized by the Supreme Court over thirty

years ago in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). In

Imbler, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of

his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is

entitled to qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 “for alleged deprivations of the defendant’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 410. In Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.

598, 607 (1985), the Court reiterated that “the Government

retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute” and that

this “broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the

898 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial

review.”

The prosecutor’s discretion, however, is “subject to constitutional restraints.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,

464 (1996) (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.

114, 125 (1979)). In Armstrong, the Court explained:

One of these constraints, imposed by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,

500 . . . (1954), is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on “an unjustifiable standard

such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, . . . (1962). A

defendant may demonstrate that the administration

of a criminal law is “directed so exclusively against

a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so

unequal and oppressive” that the system of prosecution amounts to “a practical denial” of equal protection of the law. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,

373 . . . (1886).

In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor

has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present “clear evidence to the contrary.”

[United States v.] Chemical Foundation, . . . [272

U.S. 1] . . . 14-15 [(1926)] . . . . We explained in

Wayte why courts are “properly hesitant to examine

the decision whether to prosecute.” 470 U.S., at 608,

. . . . Judicial deference to the decisions of these

executive officers rests in part on an assessment of

the relative competence of prosecutors and courts.

“Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s

enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to

the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not

readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts

ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 899
are competent to undertake.” Id. at 607, . . . . It also

stems from a concern not to unnecessarily impair the

performance of a core executive constitutional function. “Examining the basis of a prosecution delays

the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law

enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives

and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may

undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing

the Government’s enforcement policy.” Ibid.

517 U.S. at 464-65.1 The Court went on to reaffirm that “[t]o

establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant

must show that similarly situated individuals of a different

race were not prosecuted.” Id. at 465.

These cases, indeed almost all cases concerning selective

prosecution, are brought by individuals who are challenging

their prosecutions by the government. Here, Elliot’s assertion

is not that she was selectively prosecuted, but that her consti1Chief Judge Kozinski has acknowledged the deference owed to the

decision whether or not to prosecute. In his dissent from the denial of

rehearing en banc in Untied States v. Mussari, 168 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th

Cir. 1999), he wrote: 

The majority’s complaint is that they did not give Mussari a pass

for violating federal law. But whom to prosecute and whom to

leave alone is the heart and soul of prosecutorial discretion, a

decision committed to the Executive Branch and “particularly illsuited to judicial review.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,

607, . . . (1985). 

He further commented: 

Reexamining prosecutorial decisions “entails systemic costs,”

such as delaying justice, chilling law enforcement, and “undermin[ing] prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy.” Id. By injecting themselves into a

process in which judges have no legitimate role to play, the

majority has compromised the neutrality of the court and taken

us into the treacherous waters of politics. 

Id. at 1143. 

900 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
tutional right to equal protection was violated by the officers’

failure to investigate and arrest a third party, Babauta. As the

decision to arrest and prosecute an individual is entitled to

substantial deference from the courts, it follows that the decision not to arrest and prosecute a person is entitled to at least

the same degree of deference. This does not suggest that it

would be impossible for a plaintiff to allege and show that her

right to equal protection was violated by an officer’s failure

to arrest a third party, but only to clarify that the decision to

arrest — as opposed to the officer’s duty to investigate — is

part of the prosecutorial function and is therefore entitled to

greater deference.

In addition, as a practical matter, it is not clear how Elliot

was harmed by the defendants’ failure to arrest Babauta. Certainly the failure to give him a sobriety test or to otherwise

investigate his competency to drive may well have collateral

consequences for Elliot. But had the defendants investigated

Babauta’s competency to drive, it is doubtful whether

Babauta’s arrest would have had any impact on Elliot.

Accordingly, because the failure to arrest Babauta had little

impact on Elliot and because the determination of whether to

arrest an individual is entitled to enhanced deference, I question whether the failure to arrest Babauta constitutes a violation of Elliot’s right to equal protection of the law. 

In sum, I agree with the essence of the majority’s opinion

— that Elliot has a constitutional right not to have police services denied because of race — but would not hold that police

services necessarily include the decision to arrest a third party.2

2Furthermore, I do not read the opinion as suggesting that courts should

not continue to give considerable deference to the decisions of police

departments on how they conduct investigations and perform their functions. While we hold that the “government may not racially discriminate

in the administration of any of its services” (opinion at 894), the burden

remains on a plaintiff to show that an alleged denial of services was due

to racial animus and not some other reason. 

ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 901
II

The majority’s failure to distinguish between the police

officers’ duty to investigate and the decision to arrest a third

party is symptomatic of its failure to consider the meaning of

“protective services” when applying the second prong of the

Saucier test. The second prong of the Saucier test requires an

inquiry into “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. A careful review of the cases cited

by the majority reveals that despite the language cited by the

majority, they fail to place a reasonable officer in defendants’

position on notice that his actions related to Babauta constituted a violation of Elliot’s constitutional right to equal protection of the law. 

The majority address the second prong of the Saucier test

in broad strokes. It starts with the premise that the “right to

non-discriminatory administration of protective services is

clearly established” (opinion at 895), comments that “there

doesn’t need to be a prior case with materially similar facts

in order for a right to be clearly established,” (opinion at 896),

asserts that “[w]e have recognized the absurdity of requiring

equal protection plaintiffs to find a case with materially similar facts,” (opinion at 896), and concludes that the “officers

thus had a more than fair warning that failure to investigate

and arrest Babauta because of race violated equal protection.”

Opinion at 897.

The simplicity of this approach is of little comfort or guidance to the police officers whose qualified immunity is dependant on their understanding of case law. As indicated, I agree

with the majority that the Supreme Court has held that the

government may not “selectively deny its protective services

to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal

Protection Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989) (emphasis added).

I also agree that this quote from DeShaney does not imply that

902 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
the “government can selectively deny its non-protective services to disfavored minorities.” See opinion at 894. But this

leaves unanswered the question of whether the defendants

were on notice that their treatment of a third party, Babauta,

constituted a violation of Elliot’s right to equal protection of

the law.

First, the defendants’ actions concerning Babauta are not

clearly within a commonsense meaning of “police protection.” Here, the officers responded to the accident, inquired as

to Elliot’s injuries, called for an ambulance, and saw that she

was safely transported to the hospital. Also, there was no possible additional harm to Elliot from Babauta following the

accident as the police ensured that he was transported to the

hospital and he was subsequently released to a friend or relative who drove him home. What the defendants failed to do,

and what I agree may constitute a violation of Elliot’s right

to equal protection, was to investigate Babauta’s alleged intoxication.3

 The failure to investigate an accident may fit within

the definition of “protective services,” but such a conclusion

is by no means compelled.

Second, an examination of the cases cited by the majority

fails to reveal any clear notice, or “fair warning,” that an officer’s treatment of one person will constitute the denial of

“protective services” to another person. The opinion relies

heavily on Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d

1130 (9th Cir. 2003). Flores, however, is both factually and

legally distinguishable and thus did not give the officers reasonable notice. It is factually distinct because it concerned the

alleged failure of high school administrators to protect stu3Because this appeal arises from a motion to dismiss on the basis of

qualified immunity, we accept Elliot’s allegation of racial discrimination

as true. On remand, she will have the burden of showing that the officers’

failure to investigate was racially motivated, and the officers will have an

opportunity to present evidence that their actions were not racially motivated. 

ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 903
dents from “student-to-student anti-homosexual harassment.”

Id. at 1132. School administrators have a unique relationship

with the students. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406-

08 (2007) (noting the “special characteristics of the school

environment”). Indeed, the court in Flores recognized that

“the defendants believed that, under District policies, harassment of any kind would not be tolerated.” 324 F.3d at 1135.

Police officers, however, do not have a relationship to the

public or even to accident victims that is similar to a high

school administrators relationship to a student. Moreover,

Elliot does not allege a failure to “protect.”

Flores is legally distinct because in that case we held that

prior court cases had placed the defendants on notice that failure to enforce the school district’s policies concerning sexual

orientation violated the constitution. Id. at 1137 (citing High

Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d

563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (establishing that “state employees who treat individuals differently on the basis of their sexual orientation violate the constitutional guarantee of equal

protection”). Flores indicated that a “right” need not be

spelled out in a statute or federal regulation, and that there

need not be a prior case that “defined the scope of a school

administrator’s duty.” Id. Nonetheless, our task remained “to

determine whether the preexisting law provided the defendants with ‘fair warning’ that their conduct was unlawful.” Id.

We concluded that case law alone could render the law

“clearly established,” and in that existing case law had done

so. Id. 

Thus, Flores offers a standard for determining the existence

of a clearly established right, but it does not answer the question of what case law, regulation, or statute placed the defendants in this case on notice that failing to give Babauta a

sobriety test would violate Elliot’s constitutional right to

equal protection of the law.

The other cases cited by the majority do not fill this gap.

The opinion cites Estate of Macias, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th

904 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
Cir. 2000), which concerned a tragic situation where the

police allegedly provided a woman inferior police protection

from her estranged husband who then murdered her. On

appeal, the issue before us was whether “the policy or custom

caused the constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 1027. We noted

that “the district court assumed, without actually deciding that

Mrs. Macias was deprived of her constitutional right to the

equal protection of the laws.” Id. Thus, our decision in

Macias offers very little guidance on what type of police

action or inaction violates a person’s constitutional right to

equal protection of the law.

Moreover, in Macias we went on to determine that the district court had erred in concluding that the denial of police

protection caused Mrs. Macias’ death. In doing so the court

did state, as noted by the majority, that “[t]here is a constitutional right, however, to have police services administered in

a nondiscriminatory manner — a right that is violated when

a state actor denies such protection to disfavored persons.” Id.

at 1028. As the failure to protect Mrs. Macias from her husband was determined not to have been the cause of Mrs.

Macias’s death, the quoted language appears to be dicta. Furthermore, Macias clearly concerned protection, whereas the

officers’ actions at issue in this case had no impact on Elliot’s

“protection.” The case cannot reasonably be read as giving the

defendants a “fair warning” that the failure to test Babauta for

alcohol would violate Elliot’s right to equal protection of the

law.

In addition, the reference to DeShaney, 489 F.3d 189, in the

majority opinion in this case provides little guidance. In

DeShaney, the Supreme Court basically held that a state had

no constitutional duty to protect a child from his father after

receiving reports of possible abuse. Id. at 191. This is clearly

not analogous to the situation presented in this case. Moreover, the majority only cites to the language in a footnote:

“[t]he State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective

services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the

ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 905
Equal Protection Clause.” Opinion at 892-893 (quoting

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3) (emphasis added). This raises,

but does not answer, the question of what constitutes a “protective service.” DeShaney does not address this question

because, as the Supreme Court noted, “no such argument has

been made here.” Id.

The majority also cites Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167

(1961), but does not suggest how Monroe would have put the

officers in this case on notice that their actions violated

Elliot’s constitutional right to equal protection.4

In addition, the majority cites the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in

Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1973). In Ross, a deputy

sheriff was alleged to have tried to “persuade” an inter-racial

band to leave the building it had rented. The district court dismissed the complaint, the band members appealed, and the

Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 36-37. The majority’s opinion in

our case includes the following quote from Ross: “Particularly

in view of the circumstances surrounding the passage of

§ 1983, including the concern for protecting Negroes from the

widespread non-enforcement of state laws, . . . the remedies

provided in § 1983 are most appropriately extended to persons who, because of the unpopularity of their life style or the

pervasiveness of racist animus in the community, are not protected . . .” Opinion at 895 (quoting Ross, 482 F.3d at 37).

The usefulness of the quoted language is weakened when

it is considered in the context of the Ross opinion. The Sixth

Circuit goes on to state:

We agree with appellants that a law enforcement

4Monroe held that allegedly illegal actions of city police officers

respecting unreasonable search and seizure constituted actions taken

“under color of” a state statute for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but

that the municipal corporation was not a person within the meaning of the

statute. 

906 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
officer can be liable under § 1983 when by his inaction he fails to perform a statutorily imposed duty to

enforce the laws equally and fairly, and thereby

denies equal protection to persons legitimately

exercising rights guaranteed them under state or

federal law. Acts of omission are actionable in this

context to the same extent as are acts of commission.

Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added). Thus, even assuming that the

police in the Northern Mariana Islands may be held to be on

notice of a 1973 Sixth Circuit opinion, it is doubtful that they

would have gleaned much guidance from the opinion. It is

difficult to conclude that the defendants’ failure to test

Babauta for alcohol denied “equal protection to [Elliot for]

legitimately exercising rights guaranteed [her] under state or

federal law.” Id. at 36-37.

Finally, the majority cites Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386

(9th Cir. 1980), which concerned allegations that city officials

had discriminated against the Mexican-American plaintiffs on

the basis of race or national origin in delaying the issuance of

a liquor license. The majority opinion quotes the following

sentence from Pierce: “[t]he constitutional right to be free

from such invidious discrimination is so well established and

so essential to the preservation of our constitutional order that

all public officials must be charged with knowledge of it.”

Opinion at 896 (quoting Flores, 617 F.2d at 1392). “Such

invidious discrimination,” however, is defined in Flores in the

preceding sentence, which reads: “No official can in good

faith impose discriminatory burdens on a person or group

by reason of a racial or ethnic animus against them.” Id.

(emphasis added). In the present case, it is difficult to conceive of the defendants’ failure to test Babauta for alcohol as

imposing a discriminatory burden on Elliot.

The allegations in Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473

(9th Cir. 1989), are arguably closer to the facts in this case,

but our opinion there does not provide the type of fair warnELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 907
ing necessary under Saucier’s second prong. In Benigni, the

plaintiff, an owner of a bar, filed an action under § 1983

against city police officers alleging that they harassed his customers with the intent of forcing him to sell his business. Id.

at 475. The case went to trial, where the jury’s verdict was

mostly in favor of plaintiff, and the city and certain police

officers appealed. Id.

We recognized that Benigni could maintain an equal protection claim.5

Id. at 477. However, we held that “we need not

rule directly on the equal protection claims since the general

verdict in this case is sustainable under the standards enunciated in Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938-39 (9th Cir.

1980).” Id. at 478. We concluded that “Benigni’s due process

theory was clearly supported by evidence and is legally correct,” and noted that “the due process and equal protection

theories in this case are practically identical, both being

grounded on the allegation of arbitrary law enforcement activity for the purpose of harassment and interference.” Id.

(emphasis added). Benigni informs us that police action

against third parties (Benigni’s customers) may amount to a

denial of equal protection to the plaintiff (Benigni) when

motivated by race discrimination. But the opinion also

requires a “purpose of harassment and interference” which

Elliot has not alleged and probably cannot allege. 

In sum, although I agree that case law holding that it is

unconstitutional for officers to discriminate based on race

now extends to an alleged failure to provide police services,

including the investigation of an automobile accident, this

position was not so clearly established as to defeat defendants’ claim of qualified immunity. Indeed, all the language

5We noted that “[e]lements of an intentional discrimination claim are

present in this case because the evidence tends to show the discriminatory

effect of greater law enforcement activity at the Silver Fox than at other

bars, and the discriminatory intent of singling out Benigni based on his

Italian ancestry.” 879 F.2d at 477. 

908 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
in the relevant cases concerning “protective services,” “persons legitimately exercising rights,” “discriminatory burdens”

and even “purpose of harassment and interference” would be

unnecessary if any action by a police officer allegedly taken

based on racial animus inherently violated someone’s right to

equal protection of the law. More is necessary to ensure that

the officer knows or should know that his inaction with

respect to one person violates another person’s constitutional

right to equal protection of the law.

III

A unique feature of the second prong of the Saucier test is

precisely that it applies only when a plaintiff’s constitutional

right has been violated.6 Accordingly, our focus must shift

from the plaintiff’s rights and injury, to what the officer knew,

or should have known, concerning the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

In Saucier, the Supreme Court explained: “if a violation

could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was

clearly established,” and commented that “it is vital to note”

that this inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific

context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” 533

U.S. at 201. Indeed, the Court proceeded to explain that in the

case before it, it was not enough that the law “clearly establishes the general proposition that use of force is contrary to

6The Supreme Court has held that in some instances a court may find

qualified immunity without making a constitutional ruling under the first

prong of the Saucier test. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009)

(“There are cases in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not

clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a

right.”). The Court, however, reiterated that a determination of notice

under the second prong of the Saucier test is premised on the assumption

of a constitutional violation. Id. at 816 (noting that “if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was

‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct”). 

ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 909
the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness.” Id. at 201-02. Instead, it reiterated

that:

the right the official is alleged to have violated must

have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours

of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right . . . . The relevant, dispositive

inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 

Id. at 202 (internal citation omitted).

This is the inquiry that the majority opinion fails to undertake “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.” Id. at 201. The majority leaps from the

general proposition that police services cannot be denied on

the basis of race to the fact-specific conclusion that the officers should have known that a failure to give Babauta a sobriety test and arrest him violated Elliot’s constitutional rights.

As noted in the prior section, there is no case law that even

arguably assists the majority in this flight of reason. There is

no suggestion that the officers had any heightened responsibility to Elliot or that there was a state created danger. See

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir.

2006) (holding that an officer was not entitled to qualified

immunity because a jury could find that he created a false

sense of security). Rather, the majority concludes that because

everyone knows that police services may not be denied

because of race, the officers were on notice.

But in Saucier, the Court held that despite clearly established law that the use of excessive force was unconstitutional, this was not sufficient to place the defendant officer on

910 ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA
notice that his shoving a person into the van constituted

excessive force. Indeed, the Supreme Court concluded that

despite the clearly established law on the use of excessive

force, under the specific circumstances in that case, the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.7

Furthermore, we have held that the plaintiff has the burden

of establishing the second prong of Saucier. Kennedy, 439

F.3d at 1065. Thus, the failure of any of the cases cited by

Elliot, or by the majority, to address a similar factual situation

— i.e., that an officer may deny one person equal protection

of law by failing to investigate a third person — supports the

district court’s grant of qualified immunity. Of course, as

indicated by our determination that defendants did violate

Elliot’s right to equal protection of law, a particularly prescient officer might have foreseen that his inaction would violate Elliot’s right. But this is not the standard established by

the Supreme Court in Saucier and reaffirmed in Pearson. Neither Elliot nor the majority cites any authority that fairly

placed the officers on notice that cases denying qualified

immunity for the denial of “protective services” allegedly on

racial grounds would apply to all police services, including a

determination of whether to investigate a third person.

Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s finding of

qualified immunity.

7The Court commented that “[a] reasonable officer in petitioner’s position could have believed that hurrying respondent away from the scene,

where the Vice President was speaking and respondent had just

approached the fence designed to separate the public from the speakers,

was within the bounds of appropriate police responses.” Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 208. 

ELLIOT-PARK v. MANGLONA 911