No. 2--00--1326	  

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

THE CITY OF NAPERVILLE,	)	Appeal from the Circuit

	)	Court of Du Page County.

	Plaintiff-Appellant,	)

		)	

v.		)	No. 00--DT--539

	)

GARY C. SCHIAVO,	)	Honorable

	)	Ronald B. Mehling,

	Defendant-Appellee.	)	Judge, Presiding.

	JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

	Defendant, Gary C. Schiavo, filed a motion to quash his arrest

for driving under the influence of alcohol and suppress the

evidence flowing therefrom.  The circuit court of Du Page County

granted this motion.  Following the denial of its motion to

reconsider, the City of Naperville (City) filed a certificate of

impairment (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), and this appeal ensued.  For

the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand this caUuse for

further proceedings.

	The pertinent facts in this case are undisputed.  At

approximately 12:30 a.m on February 5, 2000, defendant was stopped

by Steve Baker, a police officer employed by the City, and cited

for driving under the influence of alcohol.  Defendant also

received a citation for having an inoperative rear registration

light.  The trial court found Baker's testimony regarding the inoperative registration light innot credible, and the City does not contest this finding on appeal.

	Baker testified that, prior to stopping defendant, he was

sitting in a parking lot monitoring traffic near the corner of

Aurora Avenue and Ogden Avenue.  A small white vehicle pulled up to

his car rather quickly.  The driver, a man, told Baker that a red

Ford Taurus was heading westbound on Aurora Avenue and was "weaving

all over the road."  The man also provided Baker with a partial

license plate of "DEAL."  From where he was sitting, Baker could

see one vehicle traveling westbound, and he proceeded to go after

it.  When he caught up to the vehicle, it was stopped at a red

traffic signal.  Baker confirmed that it was, in fact, a red Ford

Taurus and it bore the license plate "DEAL 911."  When the light

turned green, the vehicle proceeded forward.  Baker immediately

effected a traffic stop.  Defendant was subsequently arrested and

cited.

	The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash arrest and

suppress evidence.  After having rejected Baker's testimony

regarding the equipment violation, the court determined that Baker

lacked a sufficiently reasonable suspicion that defendant was violating the law

such that to warrant an investigatory stop was warranted.  The trial court

found that the information provided by the driver of the white

vehicle was, without corroboration, an insufficient basis to stop

defendant.

	We generally will not interfere with a trial court's decision

on a motion to suppress evidence unless the decision is clearly

erroneous or contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 867-68 (1997).  However, de novo review is appropriate where, as here, neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is at issue.  People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 310 (1994).  Defendant asserts that, because the trial

court rejected Baker's testimony regarding the alleged equipment

violation, de novo review is inappropriate.  However, this testimony bears no relation to whether a stop was permissible based

upon what the driver of the white car told Baker, and defendant

points to no other disputed facts or credibility issues. 

Accordingly, we will review this issue de novo.

	Absent a warrant, a search or seizure is unreasonable unless

it falls within a specific and well-delineated exception to the

warrant requirement.  Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 868.  The United States Supreme Court set forth one such exception in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).  In

appropriate circumstances, a police officer may briefly detain an

individual for investigatory purposes and, if necessary, conduct a

limited protective search for weapons.  People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1997).  Such an investigatory stop is permissible

where a police officer reasonably believes that the individual has

committed or is about to commit a crime.  Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 262.  The officer's suspicion must be based on specific and

articulable facts; a hunch or an unparticularized suspicion is not

sufficient.  Village of Gurnee v. Gross, 174 Ill. App. 3d 66, 69 (1988).  A lesser showing is required to meet the reasonable-

suspicion standard than is necessary to establish probable cause. 

Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 867.  Whether this standard has been met is analyzed considering the totality of the circumstances

confronting the officer at the time of the stop.  People v. Yarber, 279 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524-26 (1996).  A brief stop of a vehicle,

like the brief detention of an individual, may be conducted if a

reasonable suspicion exists.  People v. Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d 561, 563-64 (1984).

	The facts relied on by an officer in determining if a

reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop exists need not have been

personally observed by the officer.  People v. Earley, 212 Ill. App. 3d 457, 465 (1991).  An officer may rely on facts related to

him or her by third parties.  People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 237 (1984). (Tisler and some of the other cases cited herein  involve probable cause determinations rather than reasonable

suspicion in the Terry context; such cases nevertheless provide guidance for the present inquiry, keeping in mind the lower

standard involved here (see Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 869).)  However, before the officer is entitled to rely on information

provided by a third person, the information must bear some indicia

of reliability.  Village of Gurnee, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 69-70.  In determining whether any indicia of reliability exist, a court

should consider the reliability of the source of the information as

well as whether the information is corroborated sufficiently to

show the overall reliability of the tip.  Earley, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 465.  As we are considering the totality of the circumstances,

a deficiency in one area may be overcome by the strength of

another.  Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 873.

	Regarding the reliability of the source, courts have

historically drawn a distinction between police informants and

private citizens.  People v. Jones, 196 Ill. App. 3d 937, 955 (1990).  Prior to 1989, the law of this state presumed that

information provided by private citizens was reliable and therefore 

not subject to the same scrutiny as information provided by an

informer who was being compensated for his or her assistance. 

People v. Hood, 262 Ill. App. 3d 171, 175 (1994).  In People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 398 (1989), our supreme court stated "the rigidity embodied in the presumptions concerning [these]

classifications is no longer applicable."  However, the supreme

court did hold that this distinction is still relevant in assessing

the reliability of the source of the information.  Adams, 131 Ill. 2d at 398.  Moreover, information that comes from a victim or from

an eyewitness is entitled to particularly great weight.  People v. Aguilar, 286 Ill. App. 3d 493, 496-97 (1997).

	Alternatively, information provided by a third party may be

deemed sufficiently reliable to permit an investigatory stop if it

is adequately corroborated.  Earley, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 465.  The Ccorroboration of predictions about future behavior or details that

are not commonly known demonstrates a special familiarity with the

suspect's affairs, which, in turn, indicates that the third party

likely also possesses special knowledge about the suspect's

criminal activities.  See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 310, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417 (1990).  Conversely, the

corroboration of generally known facts, like a description of the

suspect, does little to demonstrate that the third party possesses any special knowledge about the suspect.  See Yarber, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 528-29; City of Lake Forest v. Dugan, 206 Ill. App. 3d 552, 555-56 (1990).  

	Because we are concerned with the totality of the

circumstances under which the stop was made, additional factors may

inform our inquiry.  For example, information containing concrete

facts is entitled to more weight than information that consists of

conclusory allegations.  Compare City of Lake Forest, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 555, with Jones, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 956.  Further, individuals who come forward and give information that is

immediately verifiable, thus exposing themselves to the risk of

sanctions for making a false complaint, cloak themselves with an

air of reliability.  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-24 (1972).

	In the present case, Baker observed defendant sitting at a

traffic signal and immediately stopped him as he was pulling away. 

Thus, Baker did not observe defendant while he was driving.  During

this period, Baker was able to confirm only details of the

information he received from the driver of the white car insofar as

they related to a description of defendant, namely, the color,

make, model, and license plate number of defendant's car.  These

details were merely descriptive in nature and would have been known

by anyone who had seen defendant driving down the road.  As noted

above, the corroboration of such facts is entitled to little weight

in assessing whether the information Baker received was reliable. 

See City of Lake Forest, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 555-56 (holding that the mere fact that a police officer observed a car with the same license plate and of the same make and model as one identified by

an informant as being driven by an intoxicated person was

insufficient corroboration to justify a stop).  Accordingly, if the

stop of defendant was justified, it had to be because the

information Baker received came from a credible source.

	The man who provided Baker with the information upon which

Baker decided to stop defendant approached Baker directly.  The man

was in a vehicle.  At the time this information was conveyed, Baker

could see defendant's car.  Aside from providing Baker with

descriptive details, the man stated that defendant's car was

"weaving all over the road."  The man's identity was, and remains,

unknown.  These facts present us with a situation lying somewhere

between that of an anonymous informant, whose reliability is

necessarily unknown (see People v. Wiley, 174 Ill. App. 3d 444, 450 (1988)), and that of a known citizen who voluntarily comes forward

to aid the police, which courts have traditionally considered

reliable (see Hood, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 175).  We believe the case before us is more similar to the latter scenario.

	This court confronted an analogous situation in In re J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3d 381 (1989).  In that case, a security guard at a

McDonald's restaurant called the police and reported that there was

a man with a gun in the restaurant.  The guard had not seen the gun

himself; rather, he had been told about it by a customer.  The

respondent argued that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to

detain him, in that the detention was based solely upon information

provided by an anonymous person.  J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3d at 384.  We rejected this argument despite the fact that the informant's identity was unknown, noting that the information was provided by

a citizen who voluntarily came forward and conveyed it, in person,

to the security guard.  J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3d at 387.  Further, prior to the stop, the police were able to corroborate only

descriptive details about the respondent.  J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3d at 386-87.  Similarly, in the present case, the stop was based on

information provided by someone who, though unknown, openly came

forward to provide the information.  Also, like the officers in

J.J., Baker corroborated only descriptive details before initiating the stop.  The present case actually presents a more compelling

case for upholding the stop, in that the unidentified person

directly approached a police officer rather than a security guard. 

See also People v. Delk, 96 Ill. App. 3d 891, 896 (1981) (holding that an unidentified woman who provided a tip directly to the

police was entitled to greater credibility in the absence of any

indication that she was a professional informant rather than an

ordinary citizen).

	Numerous other jurisdictions confronting the issue of an

unidentified civilian coming forward to provide information to law

enforcement have held that an investigatory stop is permissible

under such circumstances.  In United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit upheld an

investigatory stop where an unidentified citizen approached a

border patrol agent and informed the agent that a vehicle was

transporting marijuana.  The court first noted that "[i]nformation

from a citizen who confronts an officer in person to advise that a

designated individual present on the scene is committing a specific crime should be given serious attention and great weight by the

officer."  Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d at 763.  The court went on to observe that, by "presenting himself to the agent and doing so

while driving a car from which his identity might easily be traced,

the informant was in a position to be held accountable for his

intervention," thus increasing the reliability of the information

provided.  Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d at 763.  Other courts have upheld investigatory stops in similar situations.  See State v. Ramey 129 Ohio App. 3d 409, 416-18, 717 N.E.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1998); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Rittman v. Department of Public Safety, 875 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Okla.  App. 1994); People v. Willard 183 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 6-7, 228 Cal. Rptr. 895, 895-96 (1986); State v. Davis, 393 N.W.2d 179, 180- 81 (Minn. 1986); see also State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694, 701, 986 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1999) ("Second on the scale of reliability are

those tips in which, although the informant does not identify

himself or herself, the informant gives enough information that his

or her identity may be ascertained.  This occurs where the

informant states that he or she is calling from his or her place of

business, or where the informant in person makes contact with the

police officer.  In such cases, courts generally find such a tip to

be reliable").  We find the reasoning of these courts to be

persuasive.

	When the man in the white car approached Baker, he did not

know if Baker would request his name.  Moreover, he was driving a

vehicle from which Baker easily could have obtained the

registration number.  Thus, it is apparent that the man was not concerned with preserving his anonymity.  The man provided a

concrete fact--that defendant was swerving--rather than a

subjective opinion as to defendant's state of intoxication. 

Finally, at the time the information was conveyed, defendant was in

sight of Baker, making the information immediately verifiable. 

Under such circumstances, the man in the white car openly exposed

himself to possible sanctions for making a false complaint, thus

imbuing himself with an air of credibility.  See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 617, 92 S. Ct. at 1923-24.

	Defendant relies on Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d 561; however, we find that case distinguishable.  Moraca involved an anonymous telephone call, the substance of which was relayed to the police by

a crime prevention organization, rather than a citizen conveying

information to the police in a face-to-face setting.  Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 562.  Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 258-59, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1377 (2000), also relied on by

defendant, is distinguishable for the same reason.  Defendant also

briefly relies on Village of Gurnee, 174 Ill. App. 3d 66.  However, in that case, no evidence was presented regarding the basis or

reliability of the information conveyed to the police or the

identity of the source of the information.  Village of Gurnee, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 68.  In fact, that opinion does not even reveal the

manner in which the information was conveyed to the police.  In the

case before us, we know the information was obtained from the

driver of the white car.

	In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court

erred in granting defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.  Baker was entitled to rely on the information provided

by the citizen who voluntarily came forward and reported

potentially illegal behavior occurring simultaneously with and in

the immediate vicinity of the report.  

	The order of the circuit court quashing defendant's arrest and

suppressing the evidence flowing therefrom is reversed, and the

cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views

expressed in this opinion.

	Reversed and remanded.

	GEIGER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.