This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0750

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Terry Gordon Wurtz,

Appellant.

Filed November 16, 2015

Affirmed

Rodenberg, Judge

Cottonwood County District Court

File No. 17-CR-13-471

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Nicholas A. Anderson, Cottonwood County Attorney, Lori A. Buchheim, Assistant 

County Attorney, Windom, Minnesota (for respondent)

Ryan M. Pacyga, Murad M. Mohammad, Derek W. Hansen, Anthony M. Bussa, Ryan 

Pacyga Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and 

Stoneburner, Judge.



 

 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

RODENBERG, Judge

On appeal from his hunting-while-under-the-influence-of-alcohol conviction, 

appellant Terry Gordon Wurtz argues that the conservation officer (1) lacked reasonable, 

articulable suspicion to expand the stop, and (2) conducted an impermissible custodial 

interrogation of appellant. We affirm.

FACTS

On October 12, 2013 at approximately 6:15 p.m., Conservation Officer Jason 

Beckmann of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources was working near the 

Hurricane Lake Wildlife Management Area (WMA) in Cottonwood County. While he 

was at the entryway to the WMA, Officer Beckmann noticed a car parked in a legal 

parking area. Officer Beckmann testified that, in accordance with his usual practice, he 

parked his truck near the empty car and waited for the hunters to return so he could check 

their licenses and equipment. 

Officer Beckmann noted that the closing time for hunting waterfowl and pheasants 

was at 6:42 p.m. that day. At 6:45 p.m., Officer Beckmann heard two gunshots. After 

hearing the gunshots, Officer Beckmann continued to wait near the hunters’ vehicle for 

them to return. When the hunters returned, Officer Beckmann asked them about the hunt

and the weather and checked the three men’s guns and licenses. 

Once the men were close to Officer Beckmann, he noticed the odor of an alcoholic 

beverage. He also noticed that S.F. had empty, partially crushed beer cans in the front 

pouch of his jacket. While speaking with the group, Officer Beckmann noted that E.B. 
3

smelled strongly of an alcoholic beverage, his eyes were glassy, and his speech was 

slurred. Officer Beckmann smelled a moderate odor coming from S.F. and that S.F. 

appeared to be tired, with droopy eyelids. In his report, Officer Beckmann noted that he

was not initially able to smell an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from appellant. 

But Officer Beckmann “thought there was a strong likelihood that one or all of them

could have been hunting under the influence” when he was talking to the group because,

despite the windy conditions, he could easily smell the odor of alcoholic beverages 

coming from the group. 

Once Officer Beckmann completed checking the licenses and guns of the three 

men, he explained to them that hunting after hours was prohibited. He then explained to 

them that he could smell an odor of alcohol coming from them and asked whether the 

threesome had been drinking, and all three responded that they had been drinking.

Appellant admitted drinking approximately two beers before going hunting. 

After receiving confirmation from all three men that they had been drinking, 

Officer Beckmann advised the group that he wanted to speak with them individually and 

perform field-sobriety testing to better determine their level of intoxication. As he began

his questioning of E.B., Officer Beckmann radioed the sheriff’s office to send a deputy to 

assist him. Officer Beckmann then subjected E.B. to field sobriety tests. He observed 

indicia of intoxication, including a preliminary breath test (PBT) with a result of .147. 

Officer Beckmann then did the same with S.F., whose PBT showed an alcohol 

concentration of .182. A second law enforcement officer arrived during the examination 

of S.F.
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After testing S.F., Officer Beckmann spoke with appellant away from the other 

two men. At that point, Officer Beckmann was able to smell a moderate odor of an 

alcoholic beverage coming from appellant. Officer Beckmann asked appellant to submit 

to field-sobriety testing. Appellant claimed previous injuries that he thought would 

prevent him from doing the field-sobriety testing. Officer Beckmann then asked 

appellant to submit to a PBT. Appellant agreed, and his PBT result was .114. 

Officer Beckmann then advised the group that they were all under arrest and 

would need to go to Windom for further testing. None of the three wanted to go to 

Windom. Based on the time of night and length of the investigation, Officer Beckmann 

determined that the hunters could submit to a urine test at the scene. Officer Beckmann 

then individually read the hunting-while-intoxicated advisory to each man, and each

agreed to provide a urine sample without contacting an attorney. After reading the men 

the advisories, Officer Beckmann read the Miranda warning to them and asked them to 

give statements. All three, including appellant, agreed to speak with Officer Beckmann. 

Appellant then admitted to drinking six or seven beers throughout the day.

The state charged appellant with hunting while under the influence in violation of 

Minn. Stat. § 97B.065, subd. 1(a) (2012). Appellant moved to suppress evidence and to 

dismiss the charge, based on the arguments he advances on appeal. Following an 

omnibus hearing, the district court denied appellant’s motions. Appellant then waived his 

right to a jury trial, and the parties proceeded under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4

(2012). The district court found appellant guilty. This appeal followed.
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D E C I S I O N

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his pretrial suppression motion, 

arguing that the officer (1) lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the stop, 

and (2) conducted an impermissible custodial interrogation of appellant. He asks us to 

reverse the district court’s pretrial ruling, suppress the urine tests results, and reverse the 

conviction. When parties stipulate to the facts, we review de novo the district court’s 

determination of whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists to expand the 

stop, State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011), and of whether a person was in 

custody for Miranda purposes. State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2012).

I. Reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the stop

Appellant first argues that the district court erred in concluding that Officer 

Beckmann had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the initial stop 

and to investigate specifically whether appellant was intoxicated. 

Although a stop may be valid initially, the actions of the police during the stop 

must be “reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the 

stop in the first place.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d, 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (citing 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)) (other citations omitted). 

“To be reasonable, the basis must satisfy an objective test: would the facts available to 

the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 

belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Id. at 364-65 (citations omitted).

Investigation of any offense beyond that which rendered the initiation of the stop 

permissible “must be justified by reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal 
6

activity.” State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 2003). Although “[t]he reasonable 

suspicion standard is not high[,] . . . [a] hunch, without additional objectively articulable 

facts, cannot provide the basis for an investigatory stop.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 

(quotations omitted). In determining whether there is reasonable, articulable suspicion to 

expand a stop, we consider the totality of the circumstances, “includ[ing] the officer’s 

general knowledge and experience, the officer’s personal observations, information the 

officer has received from other sources, the nature of the offense suspected, the time, the 

location, and anything else that is relevant.” Appelgate v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 

N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987). Appellant concedes that the initial stop was valid, but

argues that Officer Beckmann’s inquiries concerning alcohol consumption to the group, 

and later to him individually, impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop.

In support of his arguments, appellant cites multiple Minnesota cases holding that 

a person’s nervous behavior alone does not create reasonable, articulable suspicion to 

expand a stop. In State v. Burbach, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the officer’s 

expansion of a traffic stop into a request to search for drugs was unconstitutional because,

apart from nervous behavior and an unsubstantiated tip, the defendant showed no signs of 

impairment. 706 N.W.2d 484, 490 (Minn. 2005). In Fort, the supreme court held that 

the defendant’s nervousness and avoidance of eye contact did not support expansion of a 

traffic stop into a pat-down search. 660 N.W.2d at 417. In State v. Wiegand, the 

supreme court held that a request for consent to search and use of a K-9 unit was an 

unlawful expansion of a stop when the defendant appeared somewhat nervous, had glossy 
7

eyes, and the officer did not suspect that the defendant was intoxicated. 645 N.W.2d 125, 

128-29, 136-37 (Minn. 2002).

Here, Officer Beckmann observed more than mere nervousness from the three 

hunters with whom he was speaking. He asked the group about alcohol consumption 

only after he made observations leading to his reasonable, articulable suspicion of their 

consumption of alcohol. As the group approached Officer Beckmann, he was able to see 

empty, crushed beer cans in S.F.’s shirt pouch. While he was checking each man’s 

equipment and licenses, Officer Beckmann could smell an odor of an alcoholic beverage

coming from the group, even in windy conditions. Officer Beckmann initially observed 

that E.B. had glassy, watery eyes and slightly slurred speech, and that S.F.’s eyes 

appeared droopy and tired. Based on these observations, Officer Beckmann began to 

suspect during this initial conversation that “there was a strong likelihood that one, or all 

of them, could have been hunting under the influence.” Those observations support the 

district court’s factual finding that, at that point, Officer Beckmann could not specifically 

identify an odor of alcohol coming from appellant but also could not confirm that the 

odor of alcohol was not coming from him. After these observations, Officer Beckmann 

asked the group whether and how much they had been drinking, and all three men

admitted that they had been consuming alcohol. 

The facts, including Officer Beckmann’s inability to precisely identify the source 

of the odor of alcohol, gave the officer reasonable, articulable suspicion that one or more 

of the hunters was intoxicated. Therefore, asking the group whether and how much they 

had been drinking to determine whether any or all of them were under the influence of 
8

alcohol was lawful. Once appellant acknowledged he had consumed two beers before 

hunting, it was also reasonable and appropriate to expand the investigation to include 

asking appellant to perform field-sobriety tests. The expansion of the stop was limited to 

this purpose. The district court did not err in concluding that Officer Beckmann had 

reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to expand the scope of the stop.

II. Miranda custodial interrogation

Appellant also argues that the district court erred by concluding that he was not in 

custody for Miranda purposes at the time he admitted in response to questions that he had 

consumed six or seven beers while hunting. 

A statement produced by a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the 

suspect is first advised of certain constitutional rights, including the Fifth Amendment 

right against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 

1612 (1966); State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Minn. 1999). A person is in 

custody for Miranda purposes when there has been a “formal arrest or restraint on 

freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Minnesota v. 

Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1144 (1984) (quotation omitted). We apply

an objective standard to determine whether, “based on all the surrounding circumstances, 

a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police 

custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 

485, 491 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). But general on-scene questions such as 

“Have you been drinking?” and “How much?” do not convert a detention into an arrest, 

and therefore, do not trigger the need for a Miranda warning. State v. Kline, 351 N.W.2d 
9

388, 390 (Minn. App. 1984). And law-enforcement officers are not required to give 

Miranda warnings to individuals temporarily detained pursuant to brief investigations of 

criminal activity justified by reasonable suspicion. Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 

440 (1984); State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. 1986). 

In State v. Staats, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted several factors that may 

combine to create a custodial situation: the police interviewing the suspect at the police 

station; the police telling the suspect that he or she is the prime suspect; the police 

restraining the suspect’s freedom; the suspect making a significantly incriminating 

statement; the presence of multiple police officers; and a gun pointing at the suspect. 658 

N.W.2d 207, 211 (Minn. 2003). The supreme court also noted factors tending to weigh 

against a finding of a custodial situation: questioning taking place in the suspect’s home; 

the police expressly informing the suspect that he or she is not under arrest; the brevity of 

questioning; the suspect’s freedom to leave at any time; a nonthreatening environment; 

and the suspect’s ability to make phone calls. Id. at 212.

Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, appellant was not in custody

during his conversation with Officer Beckmann. Most significantly, Officer Beckmann’s 

inquiry to the group about alcohol consumption was a general on-scene question. Officer 

Beckmann, acting on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, was conducting a brief 

investigation as part of his ordinary duties as a conservation officer to determine whether

any or all of the hunters were intoxicated. 

The Staats factors also support the conclusion that “a reasonable person under the 

circumstances would [not] believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree 
10

associated with formal arrest.” Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 491 (citing State v. Champion, 

533 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. 1995)). Appellant was standing in the public WMA parking 

lot. Officer Beckmann was alone, talking with three armed men. Officer Beckmann 

never drew his weapon or handcuffed the men. And Officer Beckmann was professional 

and courteous, exchanging pleasantries with the men about their hunting experience and 

the weather. 

Appellant argues that Officer Beckmann’s not having instructed appellant that he 

could leave shows that he was in custody. But the custody determination does not turn 

on “merely whether a reasonable person would believe he or she was not free to leave.” 

Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637. Instead, “an interrogation is custodial if, based on all the 

surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he or she was in police 

custody to the degree associated with formal arrest.” Id. (emphasis added). Only one 

relevant factor suggests that appellant was in custody: that he made significantly 

incriminating statements. 

The district court did not err in concluding that appellant was not in custody for 

the purposes of Miranda. It therefore properly denied the motion to suppress and 

dismiss.

Affirmed.