J-S27022-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MATTHEW E. MCFARLAND 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2200 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 2, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0004070-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J. and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2017

Matthew E. McFarland appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

on February 2, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County. A 

jury found McFarland guilty of sale or transfer of firearms – materially false 

written statement during a firearm purchase, and unsworn falsification to 

authorities.1 The trial court sentenced McFarland to an aggregate term of 5 

years’ probation. McFarland claims (1) the verdicts were against the weight 

of the evidence, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding his 

involuntary commitment, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6111(g)(4)(ii) and 4904(a)(1), respectively.
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regarding subsequent inpatient treatment.2 Based upon the following, we 

affirm.

The trial court’s opinion fully reviews the evidence presented at trial. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/2016, at 2–53. Therefore, by way of 

background, we simply recite the following synopsis:

The majority of the facts in this case were not in dispute. In 

2001, [McFarland] was in a serious car accident and suffered 

traumatic brain injury. In 2003, [McFarland] was involuntarily 

committed pursuant to sections 302 and 303 [of the 

Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. §§ 7302 and 

7303]. In 2014, [McFarland] went to a gun shop, picked out a 

handgun, provided his driver’s license and filled out the two 

required forms. [McFarland] answered “no” to the question 

about being involuntarily committed and [McFarland] verified 

that his answers were true on the form. [McFarland’s] 

application was rejected due to his involuntary commitment.

The only question in dispute is whether [McFarland] knew about 

his involuntary commitment and had the requisite intent to lie on 

the forms.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/2016, at 56.

McFarland first asserts the verdicts were against the weight of the 

evidence.3 

____________________________________________

2 McFarland preserved the issues raised on appeal by timely complying with 

the order of the trial court to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. See McFarland’s Concise Statement, 7/18/2016.

 

3 McFarland’s weight claim was raised in a post-sentence motion, which was 

denied by the trial court on June 1, 2016. See McFarland’s Motion for PostTrial Relief, 2/11/2016. See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A) (“A claim that the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial 

judge in a motion for a new trial[.]”).
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A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the 

ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in 

favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reiterated the proper standard of 

review of a weight claim as follows:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the 

discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted 

because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge 

on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion.

Rather, “the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of 

greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight 

with all the facts is to deny justice.’” It has often been stated 

that “a new trial should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and 

the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given 

another opportunity to prevail.” 

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear 

and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will 

give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's 

determination that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting 

or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that 

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the 

interest of justice.
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This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial 

court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In 

describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have 

explained:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate 

conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not 

exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the 

judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of 

reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, 

caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where 

the course pursued represents not merely an error of 

judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where 

the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis in original).

“In order for an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence, ‘the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the 

verdict shocks the conscience of the court.’” Commonwealth v. Mucci, 143 

A.3d 399, 411 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

McFarland was convicted pursuant to Section 6111(g)(4)(ii) of the 

Crimes Code, which provides:

(4) Any person, purchaser or transferee commits a felony of the 

third degree if, in connection with the purchase, delivery or 

transfer of a firearm under this chapter, he knowingly and 

intentionally: ...

(ii) makes any materially false written statement, 

including a statement on any form promulgated by 

federal or State agencies[.]
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18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(g)(4)(ii). In addition, McFarland was convicted pursuant 

to Section 4904(a)(1), which states:

(a) In general. — A person commits a misdemeanor of the 

second degree if, with intent to mislead a public servant in 

performing his official function, he: 

(1) makes any written false statement which he does not 

believe to be true[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(a)(1).

The trial judge, the Honorable Phyllis R. Streitel, rejected McFarland’s 

weight challenge, explaining:

After review of the evidence as set forth above, this court 

unequivocally determines that the guilty verdict of these charges 

is not against the weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the 

evidence strongly supports the verdict. The verdict is not 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

****

The only question in dispute is whether [McFarland] knew about 

his involuntary commitment and had the requisite intent to lie on 

the forms. This court examined all of the evidence as 

summarized above and does not find that certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or give them equal 

weight with all the facts is to deny justice. [McFarland] clearly 

would like the court to give greater weight to the extensive 

evidence of his brain injury and lack of memory, but doing so 

would deny justice. 

[McFarland’s] accident, brain injury and subsequent change to 

his path of life are certainly tragic. However, the evidence 

presented that he has no knowledge of the involuntary 

commitment and has never been told about it in the 

approximately eleven years after the hospitalization is just not 

credible. This court spent a great deal of time summarizing and 

digesting all the evidence presented and determines that the 

guilty verdict of these charges is not against the weight of the 
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evidence. For the above listed reasons, [McFarland] is not 

entitled to a new trial.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/2016, at 56–57 (emphasis added).

McFarland asserts that he presented evidence that he suffered a near 

fatal, traumatic brain injury following a motor vehicle accident in 2001, and 

in this regard, he relies on the testimony of his expert witness, Dr. Carol 

Armstrong. Dr. Armstrong, who was qualified as an expert in the field of 

neuropsychology, testified that in her expert opinion to a reasonable degree 

of neuropsychological certainty, based upon her extensive testing of 

McFarland, review of his hospital records, and lengthy interview with him, he 

could not have recalled the involuntary commitment. McFarland also points 

out that he himself testified that he did not know of the involuntary 

commitment when he filled out the application, and that he would not have 

intentionally lied to get a gun knowing there would be a background check in 

connection with the purchase. See McFarland’s Brief at 32.

McFarland claims the Commonwealth did not offer any evidence to 

rebut the nature of his injuries or his inability to form and recall memories. 

He argues the only evidence offered by the Commonwealth regarding his 

knowledge and intent came from Detective Sergeant Patricia Doyle, who 

testified that when she interviewed McFarland as to why he answered “no” to 

the involuntary commitment question, he told her he thought the question 

referred to the past year. McFarland asserts that because Detective Doyle 

did not memorialize this aspect of her conversation with him in her 
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contemporaneous police report, and because this trial testimony was 

presented a year after the interview, “Det. Sgt. Doyle’s recollection should 

not have been relied upon.” McFarland’s Brief at 33.

McFarland’s argument fails, however, because he is challenging the 

credibility of Detective Doyle, which is not for this Court to assess or 

reweigh. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 39 (Pa. 2011) 

(citations omitted) (“On appeal, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for 

that of the jury on issues of credibility, or that of the trial judge respecting 

weight. Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused 

its discretion; the Court’s role precludes any de novo consideration of the 

underlying weight question.”). In this case, the jury apparently chose to 

believe Detective Doyle, and not the testimony of Dr. Armstrong and 

McFarland that McFarland did not know of his involuntary commitment when 

he filled out the application. The trial court, in assessing the weight of the 

evidence, applied the correct standard for a weight claim (“when the ... 

verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice”), 

made detailed, comprehensive findings of fact regarding the testimony 

presented at trial,4and determined the jury’s verdict was consistent with the 

evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/2016, at 55. Based on our review, we 

____________________________________________

4 The trial court summarized the testimony presented at trial in “Findings of 

Fact” that spanned over 50 pages of its 68-page opinion. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/30/2016.
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find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting McFarland’s weight 

challenge. Accordingly, McFarland’s claim that the verdicts were against the 

weight of the evidence warrants no relief.

In his next issue, McFarland contends the trial court erred in admitting 

evidence regarding the underlying reason for his involuntary commitment 

because such evidence was prejudicial. 

McFarland maintains the relevant issue in this case is whether he 

remembered the involuntary commitment of 2003 when he was filling out 

the applications in 2014, and asserts the trial court erred in allowing 

evidence of his aggression toward his brother as the underlying issue for his 

involuntary commitment because such evidence was prejudicial. See 

McFarland’s Brief at 38. McFarland contends the trial court misapplied the 

legal standard set out in Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403, which provides:

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 

delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 

evidence. 

Pa.R.E. 403. 

McFarland recognizes “the Commonwealth’s argument seeking 

admission of [McFarland’s] aggression as the underlying reason of the 

involuntary commitment was that if the involuntary commitment was 

repeatedly raised through family discussions or provided in medical history 

to various facilities to treatment purposes, [McFarland] would be more likely 
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to have a memory of it.” McFarland’s Brief, at 36. However, McFarland 

claims the trial court, in “allowing evidence of [McFarland’s] aggression 

towards his brother as the underlying issue for his involuntary commitment 

certainly created a ‘danger’ of unfair prejudice and confusion of issues before 

the jury.” Id. at 38. 

McFarland asserts “[t]he mixture of violence and aggression with 

psychiatric issues and an attempt to obtain a firearm is highly 

inflammatory.” Id. He also contends the evidence created a danger of 

confusion in that the jury would be focused on whether the jury wanted an 

individual with a history of aggression and psychiatric issues to own a gun, 

rather than the issue before the jury of whether he intentionally supplied a 

false statement or was unable to recall the involuntary commitment. See 

id.

It is well settled that the admission of evidence

rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and therefore, 

we “will reverse [the] trial court’s decision . . . only if the 

appellant sustains the ‘heavy burden’ to show that the trial court 

has abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 620 Pa. 

218, 67 A.3d 716, 726 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). ...

It is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it 

might have reached a different conclusion[;] it is 

necessary to show an actual abuse of the discretionary 

power. An abuse of discretion will not be found based on 

a mere error of judgment, but rather exists where the 

court has reached a conclusion [that] overrides or 

misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.
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Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Pa.R.E. 402. 

Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a material fact more or 

less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id., 401. 

Even if relevant, however, evidence may be excluded “if its 

probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the 

issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Id., 403.

Commonwealth v. Christine, 125 A.3d 394, 398 (Pa. 2015).

Having reviewed the record, we are not persuaded by McFarland’s 

argument. Rather, we are satisfied that the trial court’s ruling was a proper 

exercise of discretion. Moreover, Judge Streitel has presented a sound 

analysis of the admissibility of the underlying reason for McFarland’s 

involuntary commitment and, therefore, we simply reiterate:

The above evidentiary ruling was taken into account when the 

witnesses were questioned and testified. Out of the six witnesses 

presented at trial, only two were questioned with regard to this 

issue. Mr. [Joshua] Wa[r]field testified that the basis for the 

request for [McFarland’s] commitment was listed as clear and 

present danger to himself and others. (N.T., 9/28/15, pgs. 103-

104). He did not divulge the underlying reasons Ms. [Tracy] 

Stairs [McFarland’s mother] requested the commitment.

At trial, Ms. Stairs was questioned briefly by the Commonwealth 

about this as follows:

Q And am I also correct that part of that commitment, 

one of the reasons that you sought to have him committed 

to the hospital it involved his ongoing anger issues, 

correct?

A Correct.

Q That he was angry a lot?

A Yes.
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Q An[d] specifically, he was committed because he was 

angry and acting aggressively towards his brother?

...

A Yes.

(N.T., 9/30/16, p. 31).

Thereafter, defense counsel brought the issue up again when 

questioning Ms. Stairs as follows: “And we talked a little bit on 

cross-examination you talked to Miss Cardamone [the 

Commonwealth’s attorney] about the reason Matthew was 

committed back in 2003 and the issues he was having at that 

time. As you know Matthew today are those types of anger 

issues a problem for him anymore?” (N.T., 9/30/16, p. 46). Ms. 

Stairs responded, “No.” 

That was the extent of the testimony with regard to the reasons 

[McFarland] was involuntarily committed. It is clear that this 

evidence is relevant to assist the jury in deciding the 

truthfulness of the defense witnesses’ claim that the 

hospitalization was never discussed in all the years after 

its occurrence, either among themselves or in 

[McFarland’s] subsequent treatment. It was very limited 

in scope and sanitized to not include anything 

inflammatory, such as [McFarland’s] homicidal ideation at 

the time.

The testimony about this subject was extremely brief. Its 

probative value far outweighed any prejudicial effect. Its 

admission was not the result of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. This brief evidence was 

properly admitted and [McFarland’s] issue on appeal is without 

merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/2016, at 64–65 (emphasis supplied).

Accordingly, because we find the trial court’s ruling does not constitute 

an abuse of discretion, we reject McFarland’s claim that the trial court erred 

in admitting the evidence of the underlying reason for his involuntary 

commitment. 
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Lastly, McFarland claims the trial court erred “in allowing evidence 

referencing [his] voluntary inpatient treatment at Malvern Institute, a known 

drug and alcohol treatment facility, by instructing the Commonwealth to 

refer to the treatment as that to address ‘other issues.’” McFarland’s Brief 

at 39. McFarland asserts this evidence of “other issues” was prejudicial and 

should not have been allowed pursuant to P.R.E. 404(b).

Rule 404(b) provides, in relevant part:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act 

is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to 

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for 

another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this 

evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the 

evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)–(2).

McFarland contends “[t]he probative value of whether [he] possibly 

remembered being involuntarily committed by possibly supplying this 

information by way of medical history to the voluntary inpatient treatment 

program he attended at Malvern Institute was certainly outweighed by a 

potential that this addiction information or information of the treatment of 

‘other issues’ (other than psychiatric and aggressive issues) would create an 

unfair prejudice.” McFarland’s Brief at 40. McFarland argues that if the jury 

knew Malvern Institute was a drug and alcohol treatment facility, this 
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information was unfairly prejudicial to him. He further argues that if the jury 

did not know what type of facility Malvern Institute was, the jury did know 

he voluntarily admitted himself inpatient to a treatment facility, which would 

indicate (1) that he had a severe problem since inpatient treatment was 

sought, (2) that he was admitting that he had a problem since it was a 

voluntary commitment, and (3) that he was struggling with issues other 

than psychiatric and aggression issues. See id. at 40–41.

The trial court rejected this claim, explaining that the reference to 

“other issues” did not cause undue prejudice to McFarland:

We now turn to [McFarland’s] final argument on appeal that 

“[t]he trial court erred in allowing evidence referencing 

[McFarland’s] voluntary inpatient treatment at Malvern Institute, 

a known drug and alcohol treatment facility, by instructing the 

Commonwealth to refer to the treatment as that to address 

‘other issues’. Such evidence was prejudicial and should not 

have been allowed pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b).”

A discussion between the court and counsel regarding the 

Malvern Institute was first addressed in argument outside the 

hearing of the jury in the context of the expert witness and 

[McFarland’s] medical history. See N.T., 9/29/15, pgs. 80 and 

83-84). In addition, [McFarland] was briefly questioned about it 

as follows:

Q Did you ever go to Malvern Institute?

A I think so.

Q And did you ever do outpatient therapy?

A Where?

Q Connected to Malvern Institute?

A I don't know.
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(N.T., 9/29/15, p. 256).

However, the testimony reference to the Malvern Institute to 

which [McFarland] objects on appeal occurred during the 

questioning of Ms. Stairs [McFarland’s mother]. The following 

question, objection and sidebar took place:

Q There were times that he went into an inpatient 

treatment program for issues that he was dealing with, 

correct?

MS. WALKER [MCFARLAND’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your 

Honor. Not sure where that foundation for that question 

is laid. She is referring to inpatient involuntary treatment.

MS. CARDAMONE [COMMONWEALTH’s COUNSEL]: I’m 

referring to the Malvern Institute.

MS. WALKER: That has nothing to do with the psychiatric 

issue.

THE COURT: Well, I’m not asking for your testimony. I’ll 

see you both at sidebar.

(SIDEBAR RECORDED)

THE COURT: Now what is going on?

MS. WALKER: Malvern Institute was drug treatment that 

he did or alcohol. That is an inpatient treatment 

voluntarily for alcoholics. It’s not relevant to anything.

MS. CARDAMONE: Your Honor, again, it is because that 

gentleman that has consistently since 2002 been dealing 

with psychological issues and emotional consequences of 

his accident. I’m sanitizing it by not specifically eliciting 

drugs and alcohol. But there is no way in that they don’t 

discuss things like involuntary hospitalization in the 

course of his help. 

You don’t think that is going to come up in a counseling 

session? You don’t think they are going to talk about 
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medical history? It’s not as if the kid got out of the 

hospital and never had treatment.

THE COURT: These are people from Chester County. 

Some people out there know that Malvern Institute is for 

drugs and alcohol.

MS. CARDAMONE: I’m trying to strike – I’m being careful 

in law and in fairness.

THE COURT: Did he go inpatient?

MS. CARDAMONE: Yes.

MS. WALKER: Why is it so important to the jury? He 

went to other inpatient treatments. They are going to 

think this is involuntary treatment.

MS. CARDAMONE: He voluntarily went to inpatient drug 

and alcohol treatment.

THE COURT: We don’t know. I don’t want to get into 

drug and alcohol.

MS. CARDAMONE: I think I’m trying to keep that out but 

this is relevant.

THE COURT: But here’s the thing, if he went in 

something other than that would be misleading. And if we 

say he went in for drugs and alcohol it’s not relevant and 

it has a negative connotation.

MS. CARDAMONE: My argument it is relevant because in 

2015 common sense is telling you you’re going to be 

talking about issues and talking about things that you feel 

wrong about, things that happen to you: You’re certainly 

going to be talking to a counselor about your psychiatric 

history. That conversation is going to include whether or 

not you went to the hospital.

THE COURT: I think we’re making a lot of assumptions to 

get to that point.
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MS. CARDAMONE: It’s common sense if they are 

reasonable inferences to make. I don’t believe I’m 

forbidden from making those inferences because it might 

make the defendant look bad. These are the facts of our 

case and they are relevant facts.

MS. WALKER: She [apparently referring to Ms. Stairs, 

McFarland’s mother] wasn’t in Malvern Institute.

THE COURT: Why don’t we do this. You can establish 

that he went to a facility for inpatient treatment for 

collateral issues.

MS. CARDAMONE: I think that is exactly what I did. He 

went to Malvern to deal with some of his issues.

THE COURT: I don’t want to get the name in again. 

Didn’t he go to another facility for treatment of the 

collateral issues?

MS. WALKER: Can we also make it clear that it was not 

beyond them to –

THE COURT: He voluntarily went to another facility. How 

long was he there?

MS. CARDAMONE: I don’t know.

MS. WALKER: Nobody knows. He doesn’t know.

THE COURT: When was it?

MS. WALKER: Nobody knows. That is why this is –

MS. CARDAMONE: She may know.

THE COURT: He voluntarily went to inpatient to a facility 

to address collateral issues. I’ll allow that. You can ask 

her a couple times if she remembers this, where was it, 

was it in Chester County. If she seems confused the 

facility in Chester County would be your follow-up.

MS. WALKER: I’m a little confused. She is not going to 

understand the whole collateral issue.
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MS. CARDAMONE: That is why –

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. It’s okay to address other 

issues. How is that?

MS. WALKER: I want to make sure they are not 

confusing it with inpatient treatment that means we don’t 

need to get into the facts that he is there for alcohol.

THE COURT: We have a cardiac thoracic surgeon in the 

group. I think someone like that will probably open his 

mouth.

MS. WALKER: There is an RN on there as well. She’ll 

understand too.

THE COURT: Okay. You can get into that. Try to avoid 

the name Malvern. Twelve people, someone has to have 

a relative who has been there. Everything I heard so far 

is heartbreaking and I’m just like - I'm just like the 

fifteenth juror just trying to spend the morning in a 

truthful way. All right.

(N.T., 9/30/15, pgs. 37-42).

Thereafter, Ms. Stairs answered the questions as follows:

Q Since he got out of the hospital in 2003 ever since 

that time he had ongoing psychiatric counseling, correct?

A Yes, he has had ongoing counselors.

Q That he worked with?

A Yes.

Q He has been to outpatient treatment to deal with 

some of his issues, correct?

A Correct.

Q And he voluntarily went to an inpatient treatment 

facility to deal with some of his issues, correct?
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A Yes.

(N.T., 9/30/15, pgs. 42-43).

It was proper to allow testimony regarding further counseling 

and treatment [McFarland] received to show that [McFarland] 

would have been discussing issues and providing medical history 

at various times throughout the years. It was certainly relevant 

and admissible. By not referencing drug and/or alcohol 

treatment, it diminished any negative or prejudicial connotations 

regarding the treatment. Referring to [McFarland’s] treatment of 

“other issues” was proper and protected [McFarland] from 

prejudice. The brief reference to the Malvern Institute was not 

highlighted, nor was the jury informed as to the type of 

treatment the facility administers.

Accordingly, the evidentiary ruling and limitation was proper and 

[McFarland’s] argument on appeal is without merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/2016, at 65–69.

Based on our review, we discern no basis upon which to disturb the 

conclusion of the trial court. In light of Judge Streitel’s well-reasoned 

discussion, no further comment by this Court is warranted here. 

Accordingly, McFarland’s final claim fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2017