IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JESSICA SIMPSON, an individual, Appellant,

v. LINDA GIPSON and JOHN DOE GIPSON, husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof, Respondents. No. 75029-1-

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: January 17, 2017 Mann, J. — Jessica Simpson appeals the summaryjudgmentdismissal ofher 

### lawsuit against LindaGipson, arguing thatthe trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to continue the summaryjudgment hearing. We affirm the dismissal. FACTS On September 26, 2014, Simpson, represented by attorney Gregory 

### Skidmore, sued the Whidbey Island Public Hospital District. Simpson contended that, while she was a patient at the hospital in May2013, Gipson, the hospital's chiefNo. 75029-1-1/2 

### nursing officer, aggressively restrained her inorderto administer medicine. Simpson's complaint asserted causes ofaction for assault, battery, intentional infliction ofemotional distress, and negligent infliction ofemotional distress. Simpson named the hospital as the defendant based on the theory thatthe hospital was vicariously liable for Gipson's conduct.1 On December 14, 2015, the superior court granted summaryjudgment dismissal ofSimpson's lawsuit. Simpson did not appeal. However, on January 7, 2016, Simpson, acting pro se, filed a second lawsuit involving the same incident. The second lawsuit contained the same facts and causes of action as the first with the 

### exception ofnaming Gibson as the defendant instead ofthe hospital. On January 25, 2016, Gipson moved for summaryjudgment dismissal arguing 

### that itwas barred by the doctrines ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel because Simpson's prior lawsuit againstthe hospital had already been heard and determined
on the merits. Gipson noted the motion for a hearing on February 22, 2016. Simpson did not file a response to Gipson's motion. On February 18, 2016, attorney Victor Ro filed a notice ofappearance on behalfofSimpson. The same day, Ro filed a motion to continue the summary 

### judgment hearing. The motion requested the court grant "more time
... inorderfor Plaintiff's attorney to prepare."2 The motion did not articulate any basis for a continuance, nor specify the length of the continuance requested.

1The complaint also asserted claims forcorporate negligence, medical negligence and violation ofthe vulnerable adult protection act, chapter RCW 74.34. 2Clerk's Papers (CP) at 164.No. 75029-1-1/3
Atthe hearing, Ro acknowledged he had been retained only a few days prior and did not "know anything about this case whatsoever."3 He requested a continuance of 90 days to "prepare for this case and perhaps either amend the 

### Complaint or whatever is necessary to respond to the summaryjudgment motion."4 

### Ro did not identify any discovery he wished to complete, nor any grounds upon which he could oppose summaryjudgment. The trial court denied the continuance, stating "You've given me no reason for continuing this case otherthan there may be something somewhere somehow." The trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor ofGipson.5 Simpson appeals. ANALYSIS CR 56(f) provides: Should itappearfrom the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that 

### for reasons stated, the party cannot present by affidavitfacts essential 

### to justifythe party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may ordera continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as isjust. 

### We review the denial of a CR 56(f) motion for abuse ofdiscretion. Pitzer v. Union Bank ofCalifornia. 141 Wn.2d 539, 556, 9 P.3d 805 (2000). A trial court does not 

### abuse its discretion if '"(1) the requesting party does not offer a good reason forthe 

### delay in obtaining the desired evidence; (2) the requesting party does not state what evidence would be established through the additional discovery; or (3) the desired

3Report ofProceedings (RP) (Feb. 22, 2016) at 3. 4RP(Feb. 22, 2016) at 8-9. 5The trial court also denied Simpson's motion for reconsideration. Because Simpson does notassign error to the trial court's order denying reconsideration, we do not address it. See RAP 10.3(a)(4), (6).No. 75029-1-1/4 

### evidence will not raise a genuine issue of material fact.'" Pitzer, 141 Wn.2d at 556. 

### (quoting Turner v. Kohler. 54 Wn. App. 688, 693, 775 P.2d 474 (1989)). "Only one of the qualifying grounds is needed for denial." Gross v. Sunding, 139 Wn. App. 54, 68, 161 P.3d 380 (2007) (citingPelton v. Tri-State Mem'l Hosp., 66 Wn. App. 350, 356, 831 P.2d 1147 (1992)). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion indenying a continuance. 

### Simpson did not explain what evidence would be gained by further delay. Nor did Simpson establish how any evidence would raise a genuine issue of material fact, 

### given the dismissal of her prior, identical lawsuitagainstthe hospital. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the continuance request. 

### Simpson relies on Coqqle v. Snow. 56 Wn. App. 499, 784 P.2d 554 (1990), and Butler v. Joy, 116 Wn. App. 291, 65 P.3d 671 (2003) to support her argument. Both cases are distinguishable. 

### In Coggle, a plaintiffretained new counsel after his firstattorney retired. In his 

### motion to continue the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiffspecified the affidavits of material witnesses thatwould require additional time to obtain and explained how 

### this evidence wouldestablish a genuine issue of material fact. Incontrast, Simpson 

### merelywished foradditional time to prepare a response, withoutidentifying any facts or legal theories she planned to pursue. 

### InButler, the plaintiff'snewly-retained counsel appeared at the summary 

### judgmenthearing and orally requested a continuance. However, becausethe hearing
was not recorded, the record contained "no indication whether [the new attorney] 

### argued that he needed more time to obtainfurther discovery or whatfurther evidence

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he expected to produce." Butler, 116 Wn. App. at 299. The court held, in dicta, that the trial court abused its discretion "[bjecause we cannotfind a tenable ground for the trial court's decision." Butler. 116 Wn. App. at 300. Here, however, the record clearly showed that Simpson failed to meet the requirements of CR 56(f), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm the decision ofthe trial court.



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WE CONCUR: 

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