### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-06-00197 -CV

Ci tyof G ar de n Ri dge , Te xa s, App e lla nt

v. Curtis Ray , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. C-200 4-1 131A , HO NORAB LE GARY L. STEEL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n this int erloc utory

appea l, the City

of Ga rden Ridg e cha l l en ges t he trial c ourt’s de nia l of its ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n. Ga

rd e n Ri dg e ma int a ins a

dr a ina g e c ulv e rt

on Ray ’s pr op e rt

y pursuant to an e aseme nt gr anted in fa vor of the c ity

by subdivision pl at in 1984. I n Oc t o b erand November

2004, sever e ra infall exceede d the ca pacity of the dra inag e culve rt an d fl ooded Ray ’s proper ty . Ray sued Ga rden Ridg e for d am ages a lleg edly cause d by

the city ’s construc tion and maintenanc e of the culver t. H e soug ht damag es for

brea ch of c ontrac t, non-neg lige nt nuisance, a nd inverse c ondemnation as we ll as decla ratory and i n j u n ct i v e relief re lating to the c ity ’s use of the dr a ina g e e a se me nt. Ga

rd e n Rid g e fi le d a ple a to the jur isd ic tio n, wh ic h w a s d e nie d b y the tr ia l c ourt
. On a pp e a l, G ard e n Ri dg e con ten ds that the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyingits ple a

to the jurisdiction b ecause Ray ’s claims ar e bar red by sovere ign immunity . We ag ree with Garde n Ridge . We reve rse the tr ial court’s de nial of the plea to the j u ri s d i ct i o n and re nder judg ment dis mis sin g Ray ’s c la ims
.2 A plea to the jur isdiction is a dilatory plea used “to defeat a cause of ac tion without reg ard to whether the claims asse rted have mer it.” Bland Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea challeng es the trial cour

t’s authority

to determine the subject matter of a plea ded ca

use of a ction. City

of C e lin a v . B lai r , 171 S.W .3d 608, 610 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). The exis tence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, there fore , we r eview the trial court’ s denial of Ga

rden Ridg e’s plea

to the jurisdiction de novo. Frasier v. Y anes , 9 S.W .3d 422, 425 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.).

So v er ei gni m m u n i t y

p ro t ec t s go vernme ntal units from lawsuits for monetar y damag es absent leg islative consent to sue the State. Ry lan de r v. Cal dw ell , 2 3 S. W. 3 d 1 3 2 , 1 3 5 ( T e x. Ap p . — Au s t i n2 0 0 0 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Fede ral Sign v. Texas S. Univ. , 9 5 1 S. W. 2 d 4 0 1 , 4 0 5 ( T e x. 1 9 9 7 ) )
. U n d e r th e d o c tr in e o f s o v e r e ign immu n it y , in th e a b s e n c e o f le g is lati v e c o n s e n t to suit, a court ha s no subject matter jur isdiction to entertain a suit ag ainst a g overnme ntal unit. Texas De p’t of Transp. v. Jones , 8 S.W .3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999)
. Additionally , private parties c annot circ umvent
sovere ign immunity

by char acte rizing a suit for mone tary damag es as a claim for de clar atory relief
or a r equest for

injunctive relief

. Texas N atural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. I T-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 84 9, 85 6 ( Te x. 20 02 ); Cou nty of G alv esto n v . To lle , 1 76 S.W. 3d 85 9, 86 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)
.

I n his second amended petition, R ay alleg ed that Ga

rden Ridg e’s dr ainag e ea sement
on his pr operty “exists as a contra ct betwee n [Garden Ridg e] and [R ay ]” and that the city “has f ailed and re fused to comply with its contra ctual obligations” with respec t to the drainag e ea sement. HeTh e L e g isl a tur e ha s, by statut e , w a ive d s ov e re ig n immun ity fo r c e rt a in t y pe s o f a c tio ns . 1 See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.001-110.012 (West 2005 & Supp. 2006); Tex. L oc. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 271.152 (West 2006). No statutory waiver applies to Ray ’s claims for brea ch of contra ct. 3 soug ht damag es for

Gar den Ridg e’s alleg ed bre ach of contra ct. Howe ver, a s expl ained by this Court in Texas Parks & W

ildlif e De partment v. Callaway , 971 S.W .2d 145, 152 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.), “ [t ]he st at e i s i m m u n e from a suit for money damag es base d on an alleg ed bre ach of
co n t ra ct u n l es s t h e s t at e h as ex p re s s l y gi v en i t s co n s en tt o b e s u ed
. ” S t at edd i ff e re n t l y , s o v er ei gn immunit y bars suit ag ainst a g overnme ntal entity for money

damag es base d on contra ct unless the state wa ives its imm unity
. Id. ; se e als o Te x as Natural Re

so urc e Con se rv ati on Com mi ssi on v . ITDavy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 858 (Tex. 2002)(state ag ency cannot waive sove reig n immunit y by contra ct). In T e x a s , o n l y t h e L e g i s l a tu r e c anw a i v e s o v e r e i g ni m mun i ty. IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 858. Her e, 1 there is no e vidence in Ra y ’s pleading s or elsewhe re in the r ecor d demonstratingthat Ray rec eived leg islative permission to sue Garde n Ridge for br eac h of con t ra ct or that sovereig n immunit y has been w aived in any

way . Acc ording ly , no waiver of immunity

from suit has bee n shown, and Ray
may no t ma int a in a

n a c tio n a g a ins t G ard e n Ri dg e fo r b re a c h o f c on tr a c t. Ray also reque sted a declaration from the trial court that “[Garde n Ridge ’s] conduct in using th e e a s e me n t f

o r dr a in a g e an d w a te r p o o li n g is o u ts id e o f th e b o un d s o f th e ease ment ag ree ment” as w ell as injunctive re lief to preve nt the city from “utiliz ing the ease ment outside the bounds of any

ease ment conveyance .” A similar re qu es t fo r dec laratory and injunctive re lief
conce rning the scope of an e aseme nt ag ree ment was c onsidered by this Court i n Callaw ay. See 971 S.W. 2d a t 14 8. I n th a t c a se , th e Te xas P ark s a nd Wild lif e De pa rtme nt e nte re d into a

n e a se me nt4

a g re e me nt wit

h Cal lawa y ’s pr e de c e sso r in inte re st—Da lc o Oil Comp any —r e str ic tin g pu

bli c a c c e ss to a ca nal the De partment built acr oss Dalco’ s land. Id. at 147. When the Depa rtment opene d the
cana l to the publ ic s ever al y ear s later, Callaway sued for brea ch of contrac t and re quested de clar atory
an d i n j u n ct i v e re l i ef “t o p re v en t fu tu re v i o l at i o n s o f t h e e as em en t ’s re s tri ct i o n s o np u b l i c b o at i n g” in the cana l. Id. at 148. This Court held t hat C allawa y ’s claims for breac h of contra ct wer e bar red by sovere ign immunity and provided the following analy sis c oncer ning his request for

decla ratory and injunctive re lief: Although Ca llaway ’s re quest for de clar atory judgme nt is not pr emised expressly on br e a c h o f c on tr a c t, i t is ana log ou s to su c h a c la im. In e sse nc e , Ca lla wa y se e ks a de c laratio n o f h is r ig hts un de r t he ease men t and

an o rd e r e nf

or c ingtho se ri g hts
. There is no basis for the injunctive relief or the c ontrac tual damag es that Callawa y seeks unless he can establish that the ease ment constituted a contra ct, binding on the Depa rtment, which he can e nforc e. Whether the Depa rtment’s dec ision that it was leg ally require d to open the [cana l] was c orre ct or incor rec t, a suit to test it by

seeking enfor ceme nt of contra ct rights is nece ssarily a suit ag ainst the state that ca nnot be maintained without leg islative permission.
Id. a t 1 5 2 ( c it a ti o n s o mi tt e d )
. A c c o r d in g ly , th is Co urt c o n c lu d e d th a t s o v e r e ignimmu

n it y b ar red Callaway ’s re quest for de clar atory and injunctive re lief. Id. I n this case, Ray

soug ht a dec laration of his contrac tual rig hts under the subdivision plat that g rante d the ea sement in favor of Garden Ri dg e across hi s proper ty and an order e nforc ing those rig hts. Specifica lly , he requested a decla ration from the t rial court that “such rig hts convey ed by way o f th e [s u

b d iv is io n p lat] d o n o t in c lu d e [G ar d e n Ri d g e ’ s ] u s a g e o f th e e a s e me n t f o r the
re t en t i o nan d

re -d i re ct i o n o f wa t er

fl o w. ” H e a l s o re qu es t edt h at t h e t ri al co urt en j o i nGa rd en R i d ge fr om “ uti lizin g the e a se me nt o uts ide the bo un ds of any e a se me nt c on ve y a

nc e .” Ho we ve r, a s th is“ D e c l ar a t o r y- j u d g m e n ts u i t s a g a i n s ts t a t e o f f i c i a l s s e e k i n g t o e s t a

b l i s ha c o n tr a c t ’ s v a l i d i ty, 2 to enforc e per formanc e u n d er a contract, or to impose c ontrac tual liabiliti es ar e suits ag ainst the State.” Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. I T-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002) 5 Court held in Callaw ay , a suit to enfor ce c ontrac tual rig hts, although c hara cter ized as a re quest for decla ratory and injunctive re li ef

, is nece ssarily

a suit ag ainst the state that ca nnot be maintained without legislative pe rmission. Id. (c i t i n g Fede ral Sign , 951 S.W. 2d a t 40 8; W

.D. Haden Co. v

. Dodgen , 308 S.W .2d 838, 8 42 (Tex. 1958)). There fore , Ray ’s re quest for de clar atory and injunctive 2

r e l i e f i s b ar r e d b y s o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y. Ray argues that this Court’s opinion in Ro be rso n v. City of A us tin , 157 S.W .3d 130, 137 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) , supports his posit ion that sovereig n immunit y does not bar his re quest for de clar atory and inj unctive re lief. In Roberson , a homeowne r soug ht a dec laration that an unre corde d sanitary ease ment running acr oss his proper ty was invalid. Id. at 134. The tria l
c ourt de nie d th e ho me ow ne r’ s re qu e st fo r de c lara tor y re lie f be c a

us e it de c ide d that the a c tio n s ho uld have be en broug ht as a tre spass to try title action rathe r than a s a re quest for a dec laratory relief
. Id. On appe al, this Court held that the Uniform De clar atory J udg ments Act is a prop er v eh icle for deter mining the va lidity

of an e aseme nt and, ac cording ly , reve rsed the tr ial court’s denial of decla ratory relief
. Id. at 137. Whil e we ag ree that the UDJA may be used to determine the va lidity of an e aseme nt
as wa s done in Roberson , Ray ’s re quest for de clar atory relief in this case does not co n ce rn the
va lid ity of an ea se me nt. Th e re is no dis pute that the e a se me nt i n th is c a se is v a lid . Ra y ’s c la im i s that the ea sement re prese nts an ag ree ment betwee n him and Garden Ridge that the city is breac hing by using the are a cove red by the ea sement in a manne r inconsistent with the alleg ed agree ment. He6

a sse rt s th a t a

de c la ratio n o f r ig hts is n e c e ssary because the c ity ’s “ wr on g fu l in tr us ion ” on his proper ty (by letting water run onto it) and “una uthorized activities” (building a dra inag e culve rt that all o ws fl ooding of

his property

afte r hea vy rainfa ll) are not allowed by the ea sement. Unlike the plaintiff in Roberson , who re quested that the tria l court dete rmine the va lidity of an e aseme nt, Ray
re qu es t e d t h at t h e t ri al co u rt cl ar i fy th e l i m i t s o f G ar d en R i d ge’ s ri gh tt o u t i l i z e t h e d ra i n age
ease ment under the subdivision pl at that g rante d the ea sement i n favor of Garden Ri dg e across Ray ’s pr op e rt y in 1 98 4. Al tho ug h c a st i n th e langua g e of de c larator

y and inj un c tiv e re lie f, Ray ’s c la ims
ar e , in s u b s ta n c e , c la im s f

o r b r e a c hof contra ct. Callaw ay , 971 S.W .2d at 152. Consequently , as previously

discussed, they are barr ed by sovere ign immunity
. Id. The rationale of Roberson does not apply to this case. Ray also asser

ted clai m s ag ainst Garde n Ridge for inver se conde mnation and nonneg lige nt nuisance pur suant to the taking s clause of the Texas Constitution. Tex
. Const. art. I , § 17 (“N o person’ s p r o p e rty

s h a ll b e ta

k e n , d ama g e d

o r d e s tr o y e d

f o r o r a p p li e d to p u b li c u s e w it

h o ut
a de qu a te c omp e ns a tio n. ” ). Al tho ug h s overei gn immun ity g e ne ra lly pr ote c ts g ov e rnme nta l un its from lawsuits for mone t ar y d am ages, the doctrine doe s not shield them from an ac tion for compensation under the taking s clause. General Servs. Comm’n v . Litt le-Tex Insulation Co. , 39 S.W. 3d 59 1, 59 8 ( Te x. 20 01 ); Steele v . City of Houston , 603 S.W .2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980)
. When a plaintiff doe s not alleg e a va lid claim under the takings c lause, howeve r, sover eig n immunit y does apply
. Bell v. City of Dallas , 146 S.W .3d 819, 825 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t.).

Ga rd e n Ri dg e c on te nd s th a t Ray ’s pl eadin g s d o n ot a lle g e va lid c la ims fo r i nv e rs e7

c on d e m n a t i o nan d

n o n - n e g l i g e n tnu i s an c e un d e r t h e t ak i n g s c l a

u s e s u c ht h a ts o v e r e i g nimm un ity is w a ive d. We a g re e . T o r e c ov e r o n a takin g s claim, a

pla int if f m us t e sta bli shthat ( 1) the State intentionally

perf ormed c erta in ac ts, (2) that re sulted in a “taking ” of pr operty , (3) f or public use. Li tt le

- Tex , 3 9 S.W .3d at 598. The Te x as Supreme Court ha s held that the re quisite intent for a takin g is pr e se nt wh e n a g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty kn ow s that a sp e c if ic a c t is c a

us in g iden tif

ia ble h ar m o r knows that har m is subst antially

cer tain to result. Ci ty

o f D a ll a s v . J e n nings , 142 S.W .3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2004).

In t h i s c a s e , t h e r a i n f

a l l t h a t c a u s e d th e f l o o d i n g o f

R ay’ s p r o p e rty w a s e x tr a o r d i n ar y. The re cord r efle cts that in O ctober 2004 it rained e ight inche s in forty minutes. The Novembe r 2004 storm was also sever e and resulted in further flooding due to t he saturated condition of the g round. Although Ra

y ’s sec ond amende d petition alleg ed that he ha s “re peate dly put the City

on notice that the pa rt i c u l ar

m an n e r i nw h i c h[G ar d e nR i d g e ] ut i l i z e s th e e a s e m e n tc a u s e s w a t e r

t o f l o w a c ro ss [R ay ’s] property

and into his resi d en ce , ” he did not alleg e that Ga rden Ridg e knew

or wa s substantially

cer tain that its maintenance of the dra inag e easement would c ause the kind of flooding and dama g e th a t r e s u lt e d f r o m t h e an o ma lo u s amo un t o f

r a in f a ll in O c to b e r an d N o v e mb e r

2 0 0 4. Fur thermore , there are no alleg ations in Ray ’s petit ion that Gar den R idge perf ormed a n intentional act c ausing damag e to Ray ’s prope rty that would not have oc curr ed other wise i n the event of sever e rainfa ll. I nstead, his alleg ations appea r to complain that Ga

rden Ridg e has not taken action since the rainstorms of 2004 to pre vent furthe r flooding
. Be cause Ray ’s pleading s do not alleg e an intentional act r esulting in a

taking of private proper

ty , his claims for inver se conde mnation and non-ne g lige nt8

nuisance under the taking s clause of the Texas Constit ution are ba rre d by sovere ign immunity
. Be ll , 14 6 S. W.3 d at 82 5; see Little-Tex , 39 S.W .3d at 599 (af firming g rant of plea to the jurisdiction where plaintiff did not alleg e prope r taking s claim).

We r ever se the trial court’s or der de nying G arde n Ridge ’s plea to the jur isdiction and rende r judg ment dismiss ing Ra y ’s claims in this cause.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Puryear and Waldrop Reverse d and Rende red Filed: F ebrua

ry 15, 2007