November 7, 2011

By Electronic Mail and Express Mail

Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration (FAA/AST-200)

Room 331 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20591

SUBJECT: Petition to Amend Commerc ial Space Transportation Regulations

To the Office of Commercial Space Transportation:

Further to the September 29, 2011 meeting between representatives of Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (“SpaceX”) and FAA/AST, SpaceX respectfully proposes six changes to the Commercial Space Transportation Regulations, 14 CFR §§ 400-460, as described in detail below. As required by 14 CFR § 404.3(b), this letter sets fo rth the text or substance of each regulation or amendment proposed and contains facts, views, and data that we believe supports the action requested.

1. Acceptable Risk for a Launch License

A. Current Requirements

14 CFR Part 415 prescribes requirements for obtaining a license to launch a launch vehicle. With respect to the acceptable level of risk, 14 CFR § 415.35(a) states in pertinent part:

(a) Flight risk through orbital insertion or impact. Acceptable flight risk through orbital insertion for an orbital launch vehicle, and through impact for a suborbital launch vehicle, is measured in terms of the expected average number of casualties (E

c ) to the collective members of the public exposed to debris hazards from any one launch. To obtain safety approval, an applicant must demonstrate that the risk level associated with debris from an applicant's proposed launch meets the public risk criteria of §417.107(b)(1) of this chapter for impacting inert and impacting explosive debris.

14 CFR § 417.107(b)(1) provides as fo llows with respect to the E

c criterion for launch vehicles:

(b) Public risk criteria. A launch operator may initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if flight safety analysis performed under paragraph (f) of this section demonstrates that any risk to the public satisfies the following public risk criteria:(1) A launch operator may initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if the risk associated with the total flight to all members of the public, excluding persons in wa terborne vessels and aircraft, does not exceed an expected average number of 0.00003 casualties (E

c ≤ 30 × 10 − 6 ) from impacting inert and impacting explosive debris, (E

c ≤ 30 × 10 − 6 ) for toxic release, and (E

c ≤ 30 ×
10 − 6 ) for far field blast overpressure. The FAA will determine whether to approve public risk due to any other hazardassociated with the proposed flight of a launch vehicle on a caseby-case basis. The E

c criterion for each hazard applies to each launch from lift-off through orb ital insertion, including each planned impact, for an orbital launch, and through final impact
for a suborbital launch.

B. Proposed Requirements

SpaceX respectfully suggests that 14 CFR § 417 .107(b)(1) be amended to read as follows:

(b) Public risk criteria. A launch operator may initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if flight safety analysis performed under paragraph (f) of this section demonstrates that any risk to the public satisfies the following public risk criteria:

(1) A launch operator may initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if the risk associated with the total flight to all members of the public, excluding persons in wa terborne vessels and aircraft, does not exceed an expected average number of 0.0001 casualties (E

c ≤ 100 × 10 − 6 ). The E

c criterion applies to each launch from lift-off through orb ital insertion, including each planned impact, for an orbital launch, and through final impact
for a suborbital launch.

C. Rationale for Proposed Change

The proposed change would replace the separate E

c criterion for each hazard in the current version of 14 CFR § 417.107(b)(1) with a single E

c criterion for the mission. Since the overarching concern is with public safety, the regulation should focus on the overall E

c . For example, the allocation of E

c between the various hazards identified in the current 14 CFR § 417.107(b)(1) could result in a scenario wh ere a launch vehicle with an overall E

c of 87 × 10 − 6 (assuming E

c of 29 × 10 − 6 from impacting debris plus 29 × 10 − 6 for toxic release plus 29 × 10 − 6 for far field blast overpressure) met the safety approval standard, but a launch vehicle with an
overall E

c of 31 × 10 − 6 (assuming 31 × 10 − 6 from impacting debris plus no risk of toxic release or far field blast overpressure) did not despite posing on ly one third of the risk to the public. The proposed change would eliminate this potential in consistency while maintaining an appropriate focus on overall public safety.

The proposed change also would make FAA require ments consistent with other U.S. Government standards. The suggested E

c value of E

c ≤ 100 × 10 − 6 is currently used in U.S. GovernmentOrbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, Range Commanders Council Document 321 10 (Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges), Air Force Instruction 91-217 (2010 Space Safety and Mishap Prevention Program), a nd NASA Technical Standard NASA-STD 8719.14 (Process for Limiting Orbital Debris). To Sp aceX’s knowledge, the FAA is the only government agency, including international ag encies, that applies the 30 × 10 − 6 value. Thus, a change to require E

c ≤ 100 × 10 − 6 would provide consistency.

In addition, both the 30 × 10 − 6 and 100 × 10 − 6 values are indicative of extremely low risk to the public. As noted in FAA Advisory Circular No . 431-35-1, these values are orders of magnitude less than the background risk to the public of fatalities due to non-occupational accidents, which
has been estimated at 2 × 10 − 4 . Moreover, the background risk only accounts for fatalities, not serious injuries, whereas E

c measures both fatalities and serious injuries.

2. Acceptable Risk for a Reentry License

A. Current Requirements

14 CFR Part 435 prescribes requirements for obtaini ng a license to reenter a reentry vehicle. With respect to the acceptable level of risk, 14 CFR § 435.35 states as follows:

To obtain safety approval for reentry, an applicant must demonstrate that risk for the proposed reentry, when assessed in combination with launch of the reentry vehicle, does not exceed acceptable risk for the conduct of an RLV mission as defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of §431.35 of this subchapter.

14 CFR § 431.35(b)(1)(i) similarly provides as follows with respect to the E

c criterion for reentry
vehicles:

(b) Acceptable risk for a proposed mi ssion is measured in terms of the expected average number of casualties (E

c ).

(1) To obtain safety approval, an applicant shall
demonstrate:

(i) For public risk, the risk level to the collective members of the public exposed to vehicle or vehicle debris impact hazards associated with a proposed mission does not exceed an expected average number of 0.00003 casualties per mission (or E

c criterion of 30 ×

10 − 6 ) to members of the public from the applicant's proposed activity; and ...

B. Proposed Requirements

SpaceX respectfully suggests that 14 CFR § 435.35 be amended to read as follows:To obtain safety approval for reentry, an applicant must demonstrate that risk for the proposed reentry does not exceed acceptable risk for the
conduct of an RLV mission as define d in paragraphs (a) and (b) of §431.35 of this subchapter.

In addition, SpaceX respectfully sugg ests that 14 CFR § 431.35(b)(1)(i) be
amended to read as follows:

(b) Acceptable risk for a proposed mi ssion is measured in terms of the expected average number of casualties (E

c ).

(1) To obtain safety approval, an applicant shall
demonstrate:

(i) For public risk, the risk level to the collective members of the public exposed to vehicle or vehicle debris impact hazards associated with a proposed mission does not exceed an expected average number of 0.0001 casualties per mission (or E

c criterion of 100 ×

10 − 6 ) to members of the public from the applicant's proposed activity; and

C. Rationale for Proposed Changes

The proposed change in 14 CFR § 435.35 would eliminate the “combined” E

c requirement for launch and reentry and separate the E

c calculations into two discret e events: launch and reentry. Although the FAA initially decided to use a single aggregate risk threshold for a mission involving the launch and reentry of a reentry vehicle, the FAA also acknowledged that there could be circumstances where it would be appropriate to separate launch from reentry risk, such as where different operators were involved and coul d be apportioned allowable risk thresholds, or where intervening events or time made reentry risks sufficiently independent of launch risks as to warrant separate consideration. Commercial Sp ace Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations , NPRM, 64 FR 19626, 19635 (Apr. 21, 1999).

SpaceX believes it would be more logical to rout inely separate launch from reentry risk since the two events are distinct. This would replicate th e approach taken by the U.S. Air Force, which imposes a requirement of E

c ≤ 100 × 10 − 6 on launch and a separate requirement of E

c ≤ 100 × 10 − 6 on reentry per Air Force Instruction 91-217 (2010 Space Safety and Mishap Prevention Program). This logically consistent methodology also would eliminate some of the potential infelicities that may result from combining launch and reentry risk under the FAA’s current approach. Under the current system, for example, a reentry vehicle could have an E

c = 0 for the reentry portion of its mission but still fail to meet the safety standard for obtaining a reentry license if the launch E

c >
30 × 10 − 6 . Accordingly, SpaceX recommends that the FAA treat launch and reentry risk separately, which would both be a more logical a pproach to the subject and consistent with the approach taken by the U.S. Air Force.

Similarly, the proposed change in 14 CFR § 431.35(b)(1)(i) would make FAA requirements
consistent with other U.S. Govern ment standards. The suggested E

c value of E

c ≤ 100 × 10 − 6 iscurrently used in U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, Range Commanders Council Document 321 10 (Common Ri sk Criteria for National Test Ranges), Air Force Instruction 91-217 (2010 Space Safety a nd Mishap Prevention Program), and NASA Technical Standard NASA-STD 8719.14 (Process for Limiting Orbital Debris). To SpaceX’s knowledge, the FAA is the only government agency, including international agencies, that applies
the 30 × 10 − 6 value. Thus, a change to require E

c ≤ 100 × 10 − 6 would provide consistency.

In addition, both the 30 × 10 − 6 and 100 × 10 − 6 values are indicative of extremely low risk to the public. As noted in FAA Advisory Circular No . 431-35-1, these values are orders of magnitude less than the background risk to the public of fatalities due to non-occupational accidents, which
has been estimated at 2 × 10 − 4 . Moreover, the background risk only accounts for fatalities, not serious injuries, whereas E

c measures both fatalities and serious injuries.

3. Definition of “Launch”

A. Current Requirements

14 CFR § 401.5 defines “Launch” in pertinent part as follows:

Launch means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and any payload from Earth in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in outer space, or otherwise in outer space, and includes preparing a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United States. Launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and includes pre- and post-flight ground operations as follows:

(1) Beginning of launch . (i) Under a license, launch begins with the
arrival of a launch vehicle or payload at a U.S. launch site.

B. Proposed Requirements

SpaceX respectfully suggests that 14 CFR § 401.5 be amended to read as
follows:

Launch means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and any payload from Earth in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in outer space, or otherwise in outer space, and includes preparing a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United States. Launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and includes pre- and post-flight ground operations as follows:

(1) Beginning of launch . (i) Under a license, launch begins at the moment when the vehicle is fully integrated and fueled in preparation for lift-off
from a U.S. launch site.

Alternatively, 14 CFR § 401.5 coul d be amended to read as follows:Launch means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and any payload from Earth in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in outer space, or otherwise in outer space, and includes preparing a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United States. Launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and includes pre- and post-flight ground operations as follows:

(1) Beginning of launch . (i) Under a license, launch begins at the moment when the vehicle is first fully fueled in its ready-for-flight configuration
at a U.S. launch site.

C. Rationale for Proposed Changes

The current definition of launch requires a launch operator to obtain license (or a waiver) prior to the delivery of the major components of the launc h vehicle to the launch site. Consequently, a launch operator may be required to obtain a license (or waiver) for an action as benign as transporting empty tanks or other major component s of the launch vehicle to the launch site six
months or more before launch. This creates an unnecessary administrative burden on the launch operator and the FAA, without providing any corresp onding benefit to public safety. In the same way that a launch provider is not required to have an FAA license to perform ground tests (such as static fires), a launch provider should not be required to have a launch license (or waiver) to perform standard ground operations well in advance of the planned mission.

4. Definition of “Mission” for a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV)

A. Current Requirements

14 CFR § 431.35(a) defines “Mission” in pertinent part as follows:

To obtain safety approval for an RLV mission, an applicant must demonstrate that the proposed mi ssion does not exceed acceptable risk as defined in this subpart. For purposes of this section, the mission commences upon initiation of the launch phase of flight and consists of launch flight through orbital insertion of an RLV or vehicle stage or flight to outer space, whichever is applicable, and reentry or descent flight, and concludes upon landing on Earth of the RLV.

B. Proposed Requirements

SpaceX respectfully suggests that 14 CFR § 431.35(a) be amended to read as
follows:

To obtain safety approval for an RLV mission, an applicant must demonstrate that the proposed mi ssion does not exceed acceptable risk as defined in this subpart. For purposes of this section, the mission commences upon initiation of the launch phase of flight and consists of launch flight through orbital insertion of an RLV or vehicle stage orflight to outer space, whichever is applicable, and suborbital descent flight, and concludes upon landing on Earth of the suborbital stages of the RLV. Reentry from orbit by any portion of the RLV shall be treated as a reentry by a reentry vehicle and governed by Part 435 of this subchapter.

C. Rationale for Proposed Changes

The proposed change in 14 CFR § 431.35 would retain the “combined” E

c requirement for launch and suborbital descent flight, but it would treat th e reentry of any orbital stage as a separate event subject to its own E

c calculation. The FAA previously has acknowledged that there could be circumstances where it would be appropriate to separate launch from reentry risk, such as where different operators were involve d and could be apportioned allowa ble risk thresholds, or where intervening events or time made reentry risks sufficiently independent of launch risks as to warrant separate consideration. Commercial Sp ace Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations , NPRM, 64 FR 19626, 19635 (Apr. 21, 1999).

As with the acceptable risk for a reentry license discussed in Section 2 above, SpaceX believes it would be more logical to routinely separate la unch and suborbital descent risk from reentry risk since the two events are distinct. Similarly, th e reentry of any of the RLV’s orbital stages should be treated as separate reentries si nce intervening events and/or th e passage of time will make the reentries sufficiently independent to warrant separate consideration.

5. Autonomous Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle or Reusable Launch Vehicle

A. Current Requirements

14 CFR § 431.43(e)(2) provides as follows with r espect to whether reentry can be initiated autonomously:

(e) Any RLV that enters Earth orbit may only be operated such that the vehicle operator is able to—

(1) Monitor and verify the status of safety-critical systems before enabling reentry flight to assure the vehicle can reenter safely to Earth; and

(2) Issue a command enabling reen try flight of the vehicle. Reentry flight cannot be initiated autonomously under nominal circumstances without prior enable.

Although 14 CFR Part 431 prescribes requirements for obtaining an RLV mission license, the above language also governs reentry vehicles as it is incorporated by reference per 14 CFR § 435.33 into the part that prescribes requirements for obtaining a license to reenter a reentry vehicle.B. Proposed Requirements

SpaceX respectfully suggests that 14 CFR § 431.43(e)(2) be amended to read as
follows:

(e) Any RLV that enters Earth orbit may only be operated such that the vehicle operator is able to—

(1) Monitor and verify the status of safety-critical systems before enabling reentry flight to assure the vehicle can reenter safely to Earth; and

(2) Issue a command enabling reen try flight of the vehicle. Reentry flight cannot be initiated autonomously under nominal circumstances without prior enab le. Reentry flight can be initiated autonomously under othe r than nominal circumstances if the criteria that govern the autonomous reentry decision have been approved by the FAA.

C. Rationale for Proposed Changes

As the FAA acknowledged when it granted a waiver permitting a potential autonomous reentry of the Dragon spacecraft on its maiden flight, allowi ng autonomous reentry rather than permitting the vehicle to continue circling the Earth until it reentered randomly due to natural orbital decay would reduce risk to the public in many cases. Notice of Waiver , 75 FR 75621 (Dec. 6, 2010). The proposed change would cont inue to require the capability fo r human intervention in nominal
circumstances but would elimin ate the requirement of a waiver for any autonomous reentry capability. Instead, the proposed au tonomous reentry capability would be evaluated as part of the application package for a reentry license. SpaceX believes that such a change would reduce risk to the public by allowing autonomous r eentry in appropriate circumstances.

6. Tailored Requirements

A. Current Requirements

All FAA requirements related to commercial space launch opera tions can be found at 14 CFR

Parts 400-460.

B. Proposed Requirements

SpaceX respectfully suggests that the FAA adopt a tailorable requirements document that can be adapted for each launch or reentr y operator rather than publishing detailed technical requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations.C. Rationale for Proposed Changes

Due to the extremely diverse nature of space vehicl es, regulations that are suitable for one type of vehicle may be entirely inappropriate for another type of vehicle. In order to change any of the regulations governing commercial space activitie s, the FAA must go through the standard rulemaking process, which is time consuming a nd administratively burdensome for both the FAA and industry. Moreover, the standard rulemaking process is inadequate when faced with rapidly changing technology and a dynamic commercial environment. Thus, it is highly desirable that the FAA develop a more flexible way to update its requirements and tailor them to individual
vehicles.

SpaceX recommends that the FAA minimize the t echnical requirements in the regulations and instead incorporate by reference a separate ta ilorable document that would contain the more detailed requirements. This would be similar to the approach the U.S. Air Force takes with the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, which has resulted in fast response times and efficient operations at Federal launch ranges. It has also allowed the range to customize its rules for a diverse group of launch vehicles, reentry ve hicles, and RLVs. SpaceX further notes that this approach would be similar to the way that the Federal Highway Administration handles design standards for highways under 23 CFR Part 625, which incorporates relevant design and safety standards by reference.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, SpaceX resp ectfully requests that the FAA implement the proposed changes. SpaceX believes the proposed ch anges would be in the public interest and would not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety or property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the United States.

Please contact either me at 202-649-2704 ( tim.hughes@spacex.com ) or David Harris (202-649- 2708; david.harris@spacex.com ) with any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

Timothy R. Hughes
SVP & General Counsel