IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-0650

Filed October 12, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MATTHEW ALAN KUESTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joseph M. 

Moothart, District Associate Judge.

Matthew Kuester appeals his judgment and sentence on three counts of 

indecent exposure. AFFIRMED.

 

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

Matthew Kuester appeals his judgment and sentence on three counts of 

indecent exposure arising from acts of masturbation in a parked vehicle on the 

University of Northern Iowa campus. He challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the jury’s findings of guilt and contends his trial attorney was 

ineffective in failing to request certain jury instructions.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The jury received three jury instructions tailored to the three counts of 

indecent exposure. Each required the State to prove the following elements:

1. [T]he defendant exposed his genitals or pubes to [a 

person] who was not then the defendant’s spouse.

2. The defendant did so with the specific intent to arouse or 

satisfy the sexual desire of the defendant or [the person].

3. [The person] was offended by the defendant’s conduct.

4. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known

that the act was offensive to [the person].

On appeal, Kuester argues the evidence was insufficient to establish “exposure”

under the first element of the jury instruction. In his view, his acts “were private, 

not public” because he was inside his vehicle. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected 

a similar argument in State v. Jorgensen, 758 N.W.2d 830, 836 (Iowa 2008). 

Citing a predecessor statute, the court explained that indecent exposure could 

occur where the exposure was “in such a place or under such circumstances that 

the exhibition is liable to be seen by others.” Jorgensen, 758 N.W.2d at 835-36. 

A reasonable juror could have found the following facts. A student

observed a man masturbating in a truck parked next to her vehicle in a campus 

parking lot. The incident occurred in the afternoon and the man made no attempt 

to cover himself. A second student twice observed the man sitting inside his 
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truck in the same parking lot with his penis out and erect. Again, these incidents 

occurred during daylight hours and the man made no attempt to cover himself. 

Based on this testimony, the jury reasonably could have found Kuester exposed 

his genitals in a public setting. 

On a related note, Kuester argues the State presented “insufficient proof 

[he] exposed himself to either complaining witness,” a fact he asserts was 

required under both the first and second elements of the crime. Jorgensen

debunked the notion that the indecent exposure statute requires exposure to a 

targeted viewer. Id. at 836. The court stated, “The statute does not require the 

actor to be aware or have knowledge of the specific person or persons to whom 

he is exposing himself. . . . It is reasonable to assume that a person who 

exposes himself in a public place runs the risk that he will be observed by more 

than his targeted audience.” Id. Under the first element, the State did not have 

to prove Kuester exposed himself to the complaining witnesses. 

As for the second element, the State could prove Kuester’s specific intent 

to arouse sexual desire by establishing his intent to arouse himself rather than 

another person; accordingly, the State did not have to prove Kuester was aware 

of the two women who saw his exposed penis. A reasonable juror could have 

found the second element satisfied based on Kuester’s decision to masturbate in 

plain view of college students. See State v. Guthrie, No. 10-1285, 2011 WL 

2694713, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 13, 2011) (noting defendant “chose to 

masturbate near the Drake University campus, in an area where others were 

likely to see him. . . . The fact [he] was reclined in his vehicle, masturbating in 
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clear view of anyone who walked by is sufficient evidence of his sexual 

motivation”). 

Substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings of guilt on the three 

counts of indecent exposure. See State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 467 

(Iowa 2015). 

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Kuester contends his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to request an 

instruction defining “exposure” and an instruction limiting his culpability to 

behavior occurring at the time of, or after, the witness’s observations. To prevail,

Kuester must show (1) counsel breached an essential duty and (2) prejudice 

resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We find the 

record adequate to address these challenges. See State v. Thorndike, 860 

N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2015). 

The instruction quoted at the outset informed the jury of the context in 

which the term “exposed” was being used. A reasonable juror would have known 

what the term meant without a supplemental instruction defining it. See State v. 

Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996) (“Generally understood words of 

ordinary usage need not be defined.”). On our de novo review, we conclude 

counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to seek an instruction defining 

exposure.

We turn to Kuester’s contention that counsel should have requested an 

instruction requiring proof of his attempt to satisfy his desires at the time he was 

seen by each of the witnesses. See State v. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Iowa 

2008) (“Our statute requires such a purpose at the time of exposure to the 
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viewer.” (emphasis added)). Parties are entitled to have their legal theories 

submitted to the jury if they are supported by substantial evidence. 

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 823-24 (Iowa 2000). 

There was no need for a timing instruction because substantial evidence 

established a “concurrence of the exposure . . . and the defendant’s sexual 

purpose.” Isaac, 756 N.W.2d at 821. We conclude counsel did not breach an 

essential duty in failing to seek a timing instruction.

We affirm Kuester’s judgment and sentences for three counts of indecent 

exposure.

AFFIRMED.