Present: All the Justices 

BRENDA HUBBARD 

v. Record No. 971060 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 February 27, 1998 

HENRICO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 

T/A HENRICO ARMS APARTMENTS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

Lee A. Harris, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we decide whether a tenant in an unlawful 

detainer action who pays the overdue rent and related charges 

before the first court return date automatically invokes the 

rights afforded by Code § 55-243 to retain possession of the 

leased premises. 

 Brenda Hubbard leased an apartment from Henrico Limited 

Partnership t/a Henrico Arms Apartments (Henrico Arms) under the 

terms of a written lease that required her to make monthly rent 

payments to Henrico Arms. In February, April, and June 1996, 

Hubbard failed to make the required rent payments. On each of 

these occasions, Henrico Arms sent Hubbard a written notice, 

pursuant to Code § 55-225, stating that she must pay the overdue 

rent and related charges within five days or surrender 

possession of the leased premises. When Hubbard failed to pay 

the amounts specified within five days of each written notice, 

Henrico Arms filed a summons for unlawful detainer on each 

occasion, seeking payment of past due rent, costs, and 

possession of the leased premises. 
Prior to the return date on each of the unlawful detainer 

summonses, Hubbard paid to Henrico Arms all overdue amounts. 

Henrico Arms accepted each payment with reservation, pursuant to 

Code § 55-248.34, to preserve its right to seek possession of 

the premises. After accepting the rent with reservation, but 

prior to trial, Henrico Arms dismissed each unlawful detainer 

summons as “paid.” 

In September 1996, when Hubbard again failed to make the 

required rent payment, Henrico Arms sent Hubbard a written 

notice stating that she must pay the overdue rent and related 

charges within five days or surrender possession of the 

apartment. After Hubbard failed to pay the amount specified 

within five days, Henrico Arms filed a summons for unlawful 

detainer in the general district court, seeking payment of rent, 

costs, fees, and possession of the premises. Although Hubbard 

paid the entire amount due to Henrico Arms prior to the return 

date, and Henrico Arms accepted the payment with reservation, 

Henrico Arms did not dismiss the action. 

At trial, Hubbard notified the general district court that 

she had paid all amounts due and sought to invoke her rights 

under Code § 55-243, which provides, in relevant part: 

A. If any party having right or claim to such lands 

shall . . . before the first court return date in an 

action of unlawful detainer seeking possession of a 

residential dwelling based upon a default in rent, pay 

or tender to the party entitled to such rent . . . all 

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the rent and arrears, along with any reasonable 

attorney’s fees and late charges contracted for in a 

written rental agreement, interest and costs, all 

further proceedings in the . . . unlawful detainer 

shall cease. . . . 

B. In cases of unlawful detainer, the tenant may 

invoke the rights granted by this section no more than 

one time during any twelve-month period of continuous 

residency in the rental dwelling unit. 

Hubbard informed the court that she had not exercised these 

rights within the preceding twelve-month period. Henrico Arms 

argued that Hubbard had invoked the rights on the earlier 

occasions when she paid the amounts due prior to the first court 

return dates. The general district court agreed with Henrico 

Arms and entered judgment in its favor for possession of the 

leased premises. 

Hubbard appealed the judgment to the circuit court. After 

a trial de novo, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of 

Henrico Arms for possession of the premises, ruling that Hubbard 

had invoked her rights under Code § 55-243 within the preceding 

twelve-month period and, therefore, was prevented from asserting 

those rights in the current action. 

 On appeal to this Court, Hubbard contends that the trial 

court erred in awarding possession of the premises to Henrico 

Arms because she had not invoked her statutory rights in any of 

the earlier unlawful detainer actions. Hubbard asserts that a 

tenant can only invoke these statutory rights by manifesting an 

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intent to do so through “some words or conduct,” after paying 

all overdue rent and related charges. Hubbard also argues that 

Henrico Arms should not be permitted to rely on the annual 

limitation in Code § 55-243(B) because Henrico Arms failed to 

inform Hubbard on any of those earlier occasions that she was 

exercising her rights under the statute. 

 In response, Henrico Arms contends that under the express 

terms of Code § 55-243, once a tenant pays accrued rent, 

attorney’s fees, late charges, interest, and costs, the unlawful 

detainer proceeding “shall cease.” Thus, Henrico Arms asserts 

that when a tenant pays all overdue rent and related charges 

before the first court return date on the unlawful detainer 

summons, the tenant has invoked the rights provided by the 

statute and the unlawful detainer action terminates by operation 

of law. Henrico Arms also argues that the statute does not 

require a landlord expressly to acknowledge that a tenant has 

invoked these statutory rights at the time the rights are 

exercised. We agree with Henrico Arms. 

We repeatedly have stated the principles of statutory 

construction that apply when a statute, such as Code § 55-243, 

is clear and unambiguous. In such circumstances, a court may 

look only to the words of the statute to determine its meaning. 

Harrison & Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assocs., 253 Va. 364, 

368, 484 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1997); Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 

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321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). The intention of the legislature 

must be determined from those words, unless a literal 

construction would result in a manifest absurdity. Abbott v. 

Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997); Barr v. Town 

& Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 

674 (1990). Thus, when the legislature has used words of a 

clear and definite meaning, the courts cannot place on them a 

construction that amounts to holding that the legislature did 

not intend what it actually has expressed. Id.; Weinberg v. 

Given, 252 Va. 221, 225-26, 476 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1996). 

The plain language of Code § 55-243 gives a residential 

tenant a limited right to avoid a judgment for possession of 

leased premises by tendering to the landlord or paying into 

court at any time before the first court return date on the 

unlawful detainer summons all overdue rent and related charges. 

This right is limited by paragraph B of the statute, which 

affords the tenant this protection only once during any twelvemonth period of continuous residency in the dwelling unit. 

The tenant’s act in tendering the amount due before the 

first court return date triggers the protection provided by the 

statute. Thus, no further act is required from the tenant 

before “all further proceedings in the . . . unlawful detainer 

shall cease.” Code § 55-243(A). 

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We disagree with Hubbard’s contention that the 

legislature’s use of the word “invoke” in paragraph B of the 

statute requires us to reach a different conclusion. When, as 

here, a statute contains no express definition of a term, the 

general rule of statutory construction is to infer the 

legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the language 

used. City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362, 467 

S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1996); Marsh v. City of Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 

11, 360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987). In the present context, the 

plain meaning of the term “invoke” is “to put into legal 

effect.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1191 

(1993). Thus, Hubbard “put into legal effect” the protection of 

the statute when she timely tendered payment for the overdue 

rent and related charges for February 1996, the period covered 

by the first unlawful detainer summons. 

This interpretation of paragraph B also is compelled by the 

language in paragraph A of the statute that the unlawful 

detainer proceedings “shall cease” upon a timely tender by 

the tenant of the delinquent amounts due. This language is 

unconditional and leaves nothing more to be done by the 

tenant before the statutory protection takes effect. Once 

in effect, this protection requires the landlord to 

terminate the unlawful detainer action. 

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Hubbard’s interpretation of Code § 55-243 would require us 

to render meaningless the statutory language which provides that 

an unlawful detainer action “shall cease” on the tenant’s tender 

to the landlord of the overdue rent and related charges. Such 

an interpretation would violate the settled principle of 

statutory construction that every part of a statute is presumed 

to have some effect and no part will be considered meaningless 

unless absolutely necessary. Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman 

Corp., 251 Va. 398, 405, 468 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1996); Raven Red 

Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 335, 149 S.E. 541, 542 

(1929). 

We also find no merit in Hubbard’s contention that, since 

Henrico Arms intended to rely on the annual limitation in Code § 

55-243(B), Henrico Arms was “required to recognize when the 

right was used and to acknowledge this fact to the tenant.” 

Such a construction would constitute a rewriting of the statute, 

an act in which the courts are not permitted to engage. See

Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. at 295, 396 

S.E.2d at 674; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 

S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944). Thus, we hold that the trial court 

correctly ruled that Hubbard was not entitled to invoke the 

rights afforded by Code § 55-243 in the present unlawful 

detainer action. 

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For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

Affirmed.

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