Filed 8/14/14 T.S. v. Super. Ct. CA1/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

T.S., 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

HUMBOLDT COUNTY, 

 Respondent; 

HUMBOLDT COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 

 Real Party in Interest. 

 A141965 

 (Humboldt County 

 Super. Ct. Nos. JV120220-1, 

JV120220-2, JV120220-3) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

 The three children of petitioner T.S. (Father), L.S., then six years old, W.S., four 

years old, and D.S., two years old, were the subject of dependency petitions, filed 

December 26, 2012, alleging Father and the children’s mother negligently failed to 

provide them with necessary medical care. (Welf. & Inst. Code,2

 § 300, subd. (b).) All 

three children were found to be dependents of the court, and Father was granted visitation 

and reunification services.3

 Following a contested 12-month review hearing, the juvenile 

 1

 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards 

of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(1), (3). 

2

 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

3

 The juvenile court’s rulings with respect to the children’s mother, who left the 

family, are not at issue in this petition and will not be discussed. 
2

court entered an order finding that reasonable services had been provided, terminating 

reunification services to Father, and finding by clear and convincing evidence that return 

of the children to Father would be detrimental. The court scheduled a permanency 

planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26. 

 On June 29, 2014, Father filed a petition for an extraordinary writ in this court, 

seeking an order directing the juvenile court to vacate its order terminating reunification 

services and scheduling a section 366.26 hearing and to provide him further reunification 

services. Father contends the juvenile court’s finding of detriment was not supported by 

substantial evidence, the reunification services and visitation provided to him were not 

adequate, and the court should have found extenuating circumstances allowing additional 

time for services. 

 The factual circumstances underlying Father’s claims of error are known to the 

parties and are summarized in the “Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ,” filed 

in this matter on July 16, 2014, by the Humboldt County Department of Health and 

Human Services (Agency). 

A. Detriment

 At the 12-month hearing, “[a]fter considering the relevant and admissible 

evidence, the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her 

parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk 

of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” 

(§ 366.21, subd. (f), 1st par.) “A substantial risk of detriment means that ‘returning a 

child to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional 

well-being.’ [Citation.] [¶] In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court must consider the 

extent to which the parent participated in reunification services. [Citations.] The court 

must also consider the efforts or progress the parent has made toward eliminating the 

conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.’ ” (In re E.D. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 960, 965–966.) We review a juvenile court’s finding of detriment for 

substantial evidence. (In re B.S. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 246, 252.) 
3

 

 In denying further reunification services to Father, the juvenile court noted that for 

these children, with their serious medical conditions, “being in [Father’s] custody . . . 

threatens their very existence.” Although Father was devoted to his children, the court 

concluded, he was unable or unwilling to provide the care and attention required to 

prevent deterioration of their health. As the court found, “[F]ather has not consistently 

and regularly contacted and visited the children and not made significant progress in 

resolving the problems that led to [the] children’s removal, and has not demonstrated the 

capacity and ability to complete the treatment plan objectives or provide for the 

children’s protection, physical or emotional well-being and special needs.” 

 These findings are supported by substantial evidence. Each of the children has a 

serious health condition; L.S. and D.S. both suffer from cystic fibrosis, while W.S. is at 

heightened risk of kidney disease. They were originally detained because Father had not 

monitored their medical condition and not provided necessary care, leading to the 

hospitalization of L.S. and D.S. Over the course of the proceedings, Father was 

inconsistent and inattentive in assuming responsibility for their medical care, although he 

appeared to understand its importance. Visitation in his home was curtailed both because 

he could not be trusted to provide consistent care and exposed the children to tobacco and 

apparently marijuana smoke, despite their compromised respiratory conditions. His 

attention to the children’s needs did not improve significantly over the 12-month course 

of services, despite the Agency’s efforts, and by the end of the period his visitation was 

half-hearted and sporadic. Because Father refused to recognize the deficiencies in his 

care, let alone change his behavior, return of the children to his custody would have 

exposed them to a risk of the same serious harm that caused their detention. 

 Father does not really contest the evidentiary support for the finding of detriment, 

instead arguing there was no exploration of alternative approaches that would have 

provided him a better opportunity to demonstrate his ability to care for the children. We 

are satisfied that the Agency, over the course of 12 months, provided Father with 
4

adequate opportunities and assistance to demonstrate his abilities. He proved unwilling 

or unable to assume the necessary responsibility. 

B. Reunification Services

 The purpose of reunification services is to place the parent in a position to gain 

custody of the child. (In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1244.) The law 

governing the provision of reunification services was summarized in Tracy J. v. Superior 

Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415: “Family reunification services play a critical role in 

dependency proceedings. [Citations.] Reunification services should be tailored to the 

particular needs of the family. [Citation.] . . . [¶] The ‘adequacy of reunification plans 

and the reasonableness of the [Agency’s] efforts are judged according to the 

circumstances of each case.’ [Citation.] To support a finding reasonable services were 

offered or provided, ‘the record should show that the supervising agency identified the 

problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those 

problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service 

plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved 

difficult . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the 

best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable 

under the circumstances.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1425–1426.) We review the juvenile court’s 

finding of reasonableness under the substantial evidence test. (Amanda H. v. Superior 

Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1346.) 

 At the time of the children’s detention, the Agency found Father “overwhelmed 

with the tasks of providing specialized care for the children.” It attempted to help him 

organize his life and instructed him in their care. In the dispositional report, the Agency 

prepared a 21-point list of activities designed to improve the health of the children and 

put Father in a position to care for them. To allow Father to become familiar with caring 

for the children, the Agency arranged for visitation in his home, with transport of children 

and the equipment needed for their care. When it became clear Father suffered from 

mental health conditions that might impair his parenting, the Agency arranged for 

counseling and assistance in obtaining health insurance. Substantial evidence supports a 
5

conclusion that the Agency identified the problems leading to the children’s detention 

and provided services targeted to address those problems.4

 Father contends the Agency did not do enough to address his mental health 

disabilities, but given Father’s refusal of the offered counseling and his insistence he was 

capable of providing care, any further efforts in this regard would likely have been futile. 

C. Visitation 

 Father criticizes the Agency’s attempts to organize visitation, but the Agency’s 

efforts were appropriate. Father was allowed unsupervised overnight visits for a time in 

an attempt to familiarize him with the children’s healthcare needs, but these were 

terminated after he failed to provide consistent care for the children and L.S. fell ill. 

Thereafter, in-home unsupervised visits of shorter duration were permitted until the 

Agency became concerned about the children’s exposure to tobacco and marijuana 

smoke in the home. The Agency offered to rent an “ozone machine” that apparently 

would make Father’s home suitable, but he did not follow up with the social worker on 

the offer. Arrangements were then made for supervised visits to occur elsewhere. In the 

two months prior to the 12-month review hearing, Father had cancelled “a majority” of 

his scheduled visits. A similar pattern prevailed after the hearing, prior to the court’s 

decision. Father’s failure to reunify was not the result of the Agency’s failure to arrange 

for adequate visitation. 

D. Relative Placements 

 Father contends the Agency did not sufficiently explore placement with his 

relatives. In fact, the Agency located family members in California, Kansas, 

Washington, and Nebraska, but none were able or willing to take the children 

permanently. 

 In particular, Father suggests the Agency should have explored permanent 

placement with the children’s maternal grandmother, his mother-in-law, whom Father 

 4

 In this connection, we grant the Agency’s motion to augment the record with a 

letter prepared by an examining physician concerning Father’s health. 
6

had accused at the 12-month review hearing of initiating the dependency proceeding to 

obtain custody. The children were initially placed with the maternal grandmother and 

stayed with her for several months. The Agency vaguely asserted in a subsequent status 

report that “exigent circumstances” required their removal from her care and deemed her 

unable to take custody, although she continued to be involved in the children’s lives. We 

assume the vagueness in the Agency’s references was intended to protect the privacy of 

the maternal grandmother. In light of Father’s failure to provide evidence to refute the 

Agency’s conclusion, other than that his mother-in-law was healthy, the juvenile court 

could rely without requiring further explanation on the Agency’s conclusion that custody 

with her was not appropriate. 

E. Extenuating Circumstances 

 Father argues the juvenile court erred in not finding “extenuating circumstances” 

to justify a further extension of reunification services beyond the 12-month review 

hearing. Extending services beyond the 12-month review hearing is “disfavored.” 

(Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 845.) Such services “are available 

only if the juvenile court finds specifically that the parent has ‘consistently and regularly 

contacted and visited with the child,’ made ‘significant progress’ on the problems that led 

to removal, and ‘demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of 

his or her treatment plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and 

emotional well-being, and special needs.’ ” (Ibid.) 

 Father’s brief does not even attempt to address these various factors, and we find 

substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that Father failed to satisfy 

them. His visitation with the children was inconsistent; he made little or no progress in 

mastering the skills necessary to maintain their health; and his resistance to cooperating 

with the Agency and healthcare professionals gave little reason for hope things would 

improve during the following six months. The juvenile court did not err in declining to 

provide further reunification services. 
7

 Father’s petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Kowis v. 

Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) The decision is final in this court immediately. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).) 

 _________________________ 

 Margulies, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Humes, P.J. 

_________________________ 

Dondero, J.