Filed 11/24/20 Aaronson v. Heshmati CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

CYNTHIA AARONSON et al., 

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

NADIA HESHMATI,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B299230

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SS026275)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Kimberly Dotson, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant 

to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Nadia Heshmati, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Aaronson & Aaronson and Arthur Aaronson for Plaintiffs

and Respondents.

_____________________________
2

Defendant Nadia Heshmati appeals an order renewing a 

restraining order against her. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Heshmati and Cynthia Aaronson are neighbors and have 

had frequent disputes, often related to a fence and vegetation 

separating their properties.2 In 2016, Cynthia filed a request for 

a civil harassment restraining order seeking protection for her 

and her husband, Arthur Aaronson, against Heshmati.3

In support of her request, Cynthia submitted evidence 

showing Heshmati frequently sent the Aaronsons threatening 

letters falsely accusing them of vandalizing and destroying her 

property, shouted obscenities at them, left trash on their 

property, and placed a note on Cynthia’s car containing an 

obscenity. During one confrontation, Heshmati stated, “Why 

don’t you fucking Jews go back to Woodland Hills. If Hitler had 

done his job we would not be talking right now.” 

On August 17, 2016, the trial court granted Cynthia’s 

request and issued an order restraining Heshmati from harassing 

and contacting the Aaronsons for three years. Heshmati 

appealed the order, which we affirmed. (See Aaronson v. 

1 We deferred ruling on Heshmati’s third motion to augment 

the record, which she filed on September 28, 2020. We deny the 

motion as untimely. (See Ct. App., Second Dist., Local Rules, 

rule 2(b), Augmentation of record.)

2 We take some of the background facts from our prior 

nonpublished opinion in this case, Aaronson v. Heshmati

(B279469) [nonpub. opn.].

3 We refer to the Aaronsons by their first names for the sake 

of clarity.
3

Heshmati (B279469) [nonpub. opn.].) 

About two months before the restraining order was set to 

expire, Cynthia filed a request to renew the order for five years. 

Cynthia claimed Heshmati continued to harass her and her 

husband since the court issued the restraining order. In a 

declaration attached to the request, Cynthia contended that, 

among many other things, Heshmati shouted obscenities at her 

and her husband on multiple occasions, sent them a threatening 

email, blew leaves onto their property, flashed a light into their 

house, and made false police reports about them.

Heshmati filed a response to the renewal request. Five 

days later, she filed a motion to strike the request pursuant to 

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). 

The hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion was set for October 7, 

2019, nearly three months after the date set for the hearing on 

Cynthia’s renewal request. Heshmati did not move to advance 

the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. 

The court considered the renewal request at a hearing on 

July 10, 2019. Cynthia was represented by her husband, Arthur, 

who is an attorney. Heshmati’s counsel urged the court to 

disqualify Arthur as Cynthia’s counsel because he is a protected 

person under the restraining order and might be called as a 

witness. The court asked Heshmati’s counsel if he intended to 

call Arthur as a witness, but counsel did not directly answer the 

court’s question.

Counsel then requested the court continue the hearing to 

the date of Heshmati’s anti-SLAPP motion hearing. He argued a 

continuance was necessary because parties cannot be compelled 

to give testimony before an anti-SLAPP motion is decided. 

Counsel did not provide authority to support that assertion, and 
4

the court denied the continuance request. 

After hearing argument from the parties, the court 

renewed the restraining order for three years. On October 7, 

2019, the court heard and denied Heshmati’s anti-SLAPP motion.

Heshmati timely appealed the order renewing the 

restraining order.4 

DISCUSSION

Before turning to the merits of Heshmati’s arguments, we 

must address her blatant disregard of the court rules requiring 

her summary of facts be “limited to matters in the record” and 

supported by citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C).) Heshmati’s opening brief contains a 17-

page recitation of the facts of the case, which she supports with a 

total of five citations to the record. The vast majority of those 

“facts,” moreover, are wholly irrelevant accusations against the 

Aaronsons, which we will not repeat here for fear of lending any 

credence to them. Although Heshmati is representing herself, 

this is her third appeal before this court and she is no stranger to 

the Rules of Court. There is simply no excuse for her failure to 

follow them. (See Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 

Cal.App.4th 536, 543 [“[p]ro. per. litigants are held to the same 

standards as attorneys”]; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 

1229, 1246–1247 [“pro. per. litigants must follow correct rules of 

procedure”].) 

4 Heshmati separately appealed the court’s order denying 

her anti-SLAPP motion, which is not presently before us. 

Accordingly, we decline to consider her arguments concerning the 

merits of the anti-SLAPP motion. 
5

 Turning to the merits, Heshmati identifies seven issues on 

appeal, none of which has merit.5 

Heshmati first contends Arthur was required to withdraw 

as Cynthia’s attorney pursuant to rules of professional conduct 

that state a lawyer “shall not act as advocate at a trial in which 

the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness . . . .” (Cal. Rules 

Prof. Conduct, rule 3.7; ABA Model Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.7; 

see Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 913.) 

Contrary to Heshmati’s contentions, such rules were not 

implicated here. Although Arthur was a protected person under 

the restraining order, he was not likely to be a “necessary 

witness.” Arthur did not submit a declaration in support of the 

renewal request, and neither party indicated an intention to call 

him as a witness at the hearing. Arthur, therefore, was not 

required to withdraw as Cynthia’s attorney under the various 

rules of professional conduct. 

5 Heshmati’s briefs are littered with numerous other halfbaked arguments made in passing, in violation of the 

requirement that a brief “[s]tate each point under a separate 

heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each 

point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) We deem such 

arguments forfeited on account of Heshmati’s failure to support 

them with cogent analysis or citation to relevant legal authority. 

(See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–

785 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but 

fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to 

authority, we treat the point as waived.”]; Loranger v. Jones

(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 847, 858, fn. 9; People v. DeSantis (1992) 

2 Cal.4th 1198, 1240, fn. 18.)
6

Heshmati next contends the restraining order is overbroad 

and infringes upon her constitutional rights by prohibiting her 

from filing appeals, petitioning the California Supreme Court, 

and contacting the police. As best we can tell, Heshmati believes 

the restraining order will prohibit such activities because 

Cynthia identified them in her declaration attached to the 

renewal request as examples of Heshmati’s harassment. 

Heshmati, however, overlooks that the court did not issue a new 

restraining order based on Cynthia’s declaration. Rather, it 

simply renewed the original restraining order, which does not 

categorically prohibit any of the above activities. The order 

instead precludes Heshmati from having contact with the 

Aaronsons and “harass[ing], molest[ing], attack[ing], strik[ing], 

stalk[ing], threaten[ing], assault[ing] . . . , hit[ing], abus[ing], 

destroy[ing] . . . personal property . . . , or disturb[ing] the peace 

of” the Aaronsons. Such restrictions do not violate Heshmati’s 

constitutional rights. (See Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop 

Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 

1228, 1250 [“In California, speech that constitutes ‘harassment’ 

within the meaning of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.6 is 

not constitutionally protected, and the victim of the harassment 

may obtain injunctive relief.”].)

Next, Heshmati argues the court should have granted a 

continuance and delayed ruling on the renewal request until 

after it had decided her anti-SLAPP motion. “The granting or 

denying of a continuance is a matter within the court’s discretion, 

which cannot be disturbed ‘on appeal except upon a clear showing 

of an abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Foster v. Civil Service 

Com. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 444, 448.) The hearing on 

Heshmati’s anti-SLAPP motion was set for October 7, 2019, 
7

which was almost two months after the restraining order was set 

to expire. Granting a continuance, therefore, would have 

frustrated the purpose of the renewal request, which was to 

provide continuing protection for the Aaronsons. It also would 

have frustrated the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute, which is 

to “resolve quickly and relatively inexpensively meritless 

lawsuits that threaten free speech on matters of public interest.” 

(Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World 

Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 639.) Indeed, granting 

Heshmati’s last-minute request for a continuance would have 

only delayed resolution of the case, likely without any reduction 

in litigation costs. If Heshmati wanted the court to decide her 

anti-SLAPP motion before the renewal request, she should have 

requested the court advance the anti-SLAPP hearing. The court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance. 

(See Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 649 

[“we see no reason that the pendency of [an anti-SLAPP] motion 

should interfere with the disposition of a [Code of Civil 

Procedure] section 527.6 petition” for a restraining order].) 

Heshmati next asserts the trial court failed to conduct a 

full hearing, did not allow witnesses to testify or be crossexamined, and denied her constitutional rights to “cross-examine

plaintiffs and to testify in her own defense.” The record belies 

each of these claims. The transcript of the hearing shows the 

court did not preclude Heshmati from offering evidence, calling 

witnesses, testifying on her own behalf, or cross-examining 

witnesses. Heshmati simply chose to submit on her counsel’s 

argument and the evidence she had previously submitted in 

response to the renewal request. 
8

Heshmati further argues the trial court abused its 

discretion by stating in its minute order that the restraining 

order “will not expire on August 17, 2022.” It is clear this is a 

typographical error and the minute order should state the 

restraining order “will now expire on August 17, 2022.” The 

court’s actual order renewing the restraining order provides as 

much. The court did not abuse its discretion. 

Heshmati additionally claims “section 527.8 [sic] does not 

meet the burden of proof” and the injunction does not fit the 

intent of the statute. It is not clear, and Heshmati does not 

explain, what she means by this. To the extent she is arguing 

there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s order, we 

disagree. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 grants a trial court 

discretion to renew a restraining order, upon the request of a 

party, for up to five additional years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, 

subd. (j)(1).) The court should exercise that discretion only if it 

“finds a reasonable probability that the defendant’s wrongful acts 

would be repeated in the future.” (Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 

Cal.App.4th 77, 90.) The court may base such a finding solely on 

the evidence submitted in support of the original request; the 

protected party need not present new evidence or show further 

harassment since the issuance of the original order, although 

there is nothing preventing the party from doing so. (Id. at pp. 

90–91; see Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (j)(1).) We review the 

factual findings underpinning a court’s renewal of a restraining 

order for substantial evidence. (See Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 717, 725.) 
9

Here, there is substantial evidence supporting the trial 

court’s renewal of the restraining order. The trial court issued 

the original restraining order based on evidence showing 

Heshmati repeatedly yelled obscenities at the Aaronsons, sent 

them a threatening communication, and left trash on their 

property. In support of her renewal request, Cynthia submitted a 

declaration in which she claimed Heshmati continued to engage 

in similar behavior while the restraining order was in effect, 

including yelling obscenities at the Aaronsons, sending them a 

threatening email, and blowing leaves onto their property. 

This provided sufficient evidence from which the court could find 

a reasonable probability that Heshmati would repeat the 

wrongful acts that were the basis of the original restraining 

order. 

Finally, Heshmati argues the trial judge was biased as 

evidenced by the fact that the judge repeatedly ruled against her 

and expressed familiarity with another case involving Heshmati 

and the Aaronsons. Neither is sufficient to show bias. (See 

Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 

665, 674 [“The mere fact that the trial court issued rulings 

adverse to [appellant] on several matters in this case, even 

assuming one or more of those rulings were erroneous, does not 

indicate an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate actual

bias.”].) We have also reviewed the transcripts of the relevant 

hearings and find no evidence of bias or anything that would 

raise doubts about the trial judge’s impartiality.
10

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on 

appeal.6

BIGELOW, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

STRATTON, J.

6 In passing, the Aaronsons request we grant sanctions 

against Heshmati for filing a frivolous appeal. They did not file a 

separate motion for sanctions or provide a declaration supporting 

the amount of monetary sanctions sought, as required under rule 

8.276 of the California Rules of Court. Accordingly, we deny their

request. (Kajima Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Pacific 

Bell (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402.)