COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Humphreys and Kelsey 

Argued by teleconference 

DIABY MOHAMED 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3439-01-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MAY 6, 2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

William C. Andrews, III, Judge 

 Stephen K. Smith for appellant. 

 Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Diaby Mohamed (appellant)1 was convicted of uttering a forged 

public document in violation of Code § 18.2-168. He contends the 

evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to utter a forged 

public document and that he obstructed justice.2 Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

1

 At various times in the record, appellant refers to 

himself as Diaby Mohamed, Sylla Famara and Famara Sylla. 

 

2

 We note that the sentencing order indicates that appellant 

was found guilty of obstruction of justice pursuant to Virginia 

Code § 24-6. However, the warrant reflects this to be a 

violation of the City of Hampton Code § 24-6. This matter is 

remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting 

that clerical error. 
I. BACKGROUND 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the prevailing party below, granting to that evidence all 

reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997).

 So viewed, the evidence proved that on April 26, 2001, 

appellant, using the name Diaby Mohamed, approached Department of 

Motor Vehicles (DMV) employee Brenda Johnson and obtained title to 

a vehicle. He stated he did not have the necessary identification 

and used a "second title because he had another record already set 

up so [Johnson] used that title record to bring up his information 

to title that vehicle." Johnson found appellant's "T number"3

 on 

the second title and "rolled it over to title the other vehicle." 

 On April 27, 2001 appellant again approached Johnson. He had 

an application for a driver's license and stated his name was 

Famara Sylla. He presented Johnson with a New York identification 

card, a New York international driver's license and the Virginia 

DMV application for a driver's license. The DMV application was 

complete except for a signature. Johnson asked appellant to sign 

it, and he wrote "Famara Sylla" in Johnson's presence. Johnson 

asked him "for proof of his residence and proof of his social 

security." Appellant had neither. When Johnson questioned the 

difference in the names, appellant said Famara Sylla was his 

Muslim name. Johnson became suspicious and asked Officer Roberto 

Cruz of the Hampton Police Department to handle the situation. He 

 3

 "T" numbers are used in lieu of social security numbers as 

- 2 -
approached appellant and requested identification. Appellant then 

produced a Virginia identification card in the name of Diaby 

Mohamed. When Cruz asked appellant to have a seat, appellant 

attempted to run out of the DMV office. Appellant and Cruz 

fought, and Cruz sustained two broken ribs and a bruised spleen. 

 Appellant moved to strike the evidence of uttering a forged 

public record as insufficient at the end of the Commonwealth's 

case. In overruling the motion, the trial court stated: 

 [T]he argument is that he has two 

names. One of them is a Muslim name and 

what [appellant's counsel] said is an 

American name. . . . 

 Even if I got by that, I wonder if 

Americans or Muslims, as the case may be, 

have two different birth days. On the 

Famara Sylla he shows a birth date of April 

5, 1959. On the Diaby Mohamed it shows a 

birth date of January 7, 1950. 

 I don't think a person is entitled to 

have two different birth days so I would 

respectfully deny the motion. 

(Emphasis added). 

Appellant then testified in his case as follows: 

My real name is Diaby Mohamed . . . . I 

come here as Sylla Famara. . . . [S]omebody 

used my name Sylla Famara. . . . The police 

arrest me, I've been in prison for one year. 

I pay $8,000 and I go to the law library to 

take an application to change my new name 

Diaby Mohamed because somebody stole my 

driver's license Sylla Famara. . . . I got 

a social security on Sylla Famara. I change 

my name. This is my new name Diaby Mohamed 

because I got a robbery in New York City 

because I want to come stay here. I stayed 

in New York City one year in the prison for 

 

identification numbers. 

- 3 -
this case. I never drove, I never got a 

ticket and the police arrested me for one 

year in the prison that's why I changed my 

name. 

 The trial court then attempted to sort out appellant's date 

of birth. 

[APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL:] [C]an you tell 

the Judge why there are different birth 

dates on these identifications . . . ? 

[APPELLANT:] No, no. 

[COUNSEL:] [T]here was one I believe 

January of 1950 and then another one of 

April the 5th of '55, can you explain to the 

Judge how those different birth dates? 

[APPELLANT:] No, I never put this birth 

date here because on the other ID I take 

this - 

COURT: You didn't put that birth date - 

what's the birth date on that Commonwealth's 

Number 4? 

[COUNSEL:] It looks like April the 5th of 

'55. 

COURT: Okay. And whose name is that? 

[COUNSEL:] This is Famara Sylla. 

COURT: Well, I've got a card here that's 

Commonwealth's Number 7 it says January 7th, 

1950, date, birth date of Diaby Mohamed. 

[APPELLANT]: Yes. 

COURT: Which one is your birth day? 

[APPELLANT]: My birth day? 

COURT: Do you know which one is your birth 

day? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes. 

COURT: Would you like to tell us. 

- 4 -
[APPELLANT]: My birth day? 

COURT: Yes, sir. 

[APPELLANT]: The day I was born? 

COURT: Yes, the day you were born. 

[APPELLANT]: 4-15-55. 

 The trial court found him guilty of both offenses: 

I don't have any evidence that this man has 

ever legally changed his name. You have one 

legal name. I find him guilty as charged. 

It's incredible that he will sit here and 

tell me that he never touched the officer. 

The officer has testified about what 

happened in some detail. . . . The officer 

suffered two fractured ribs and a bruised 

spleen, it's incredible. And then we have 

the fact that he tried to flee, 

consciousness of guilt. 

 Appellant appeals from those convictions. 

II. Forged Public Document 

 Appellant first contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

prove he had the requisite intent to forge a public document 

pursuant to Code § 18.2-168.4 We disagree. 

"Forgery is a common law crime in Virginia. It is defined 

as 'the false making or materially altering with intent to 

defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be 

of legal efficacy, or the foundation of legal liability.'" 

Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 171, 173-74, 313 S.E.2d 394, 

 4

 Code § 18.2-168 provides: "If any person forge a public 

record, . . . or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such 

forged record, . . . he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 

- 5 -
395 (1984) (quoting Bullock v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 558, 561, 

138 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1964)). 

In 1874, in its only opinion on the subject, 

the Virginia Supreme Court defined a public 

record as a written memorial, intended to 

serve as evidence of something written, said 

or done, made by a public officer authorized 

to make it. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. 

(25 Gratt.) 865, 881-82 (1874). Since that 

time, the General Assembly has broadened the 

definition. The Virginia Public Records Act 

provides as follows: 

"Public Records" means, but is not limited 

to, all written books, papers, letters, 

documents, photographs, tapes, microfiche, 

microfilm, photostats, sound recordings, 

maps, other documentary materials or 

information in any recording medium 

regardless of physical form or 

characteristics, including electronically 

recorded data, made or received in pursuance 

of law or in connection with the transaction 

of public business by any agency or employee 

of state government or its political 

subdivisions. Id.

Reid v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 468, 470, 431 S.E.2d 63, 64 

(1993). "Intent is a state of mind that may be proved by an 

accused's acts or by his statements and that may be shown by 

circumstantial evidence." Wilson v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 

101, 452 S.E.2d 669, 673-74 (1995) (citations omitted). 

The specific intent to commit [a crime] may 

be inferred from the conduct of the accused 

if such intent flows naturally from the 

conduct proven. Where the conduct of the 

accused under the circumstances involved 

points with reasonable certainty to a 

specific intent to commit [the crime], the 

intent element is established. 

Id. at 101, 452 S.E.2d at 674. 

- 6 -
 "[W]hile a person may adopt any name he may choose so long 

as it was done for an honest purpose, under the broad definition 

of forgery the crime is committed by signing an assumed name, or 

a fictitious name, for a dishonest purpose and with intent to 

defraud." Moore v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 838, 841, 153 S.E.2d 

231, 234 (1967). 

 "[T]he trial court evaluates the credibility of witnesses, 

resolves the conflicts in their testimony, and weighs the 

evidence as a whole. Its finding is entitled to the same weight 

on appeal as that accorded a factual finding by a jury and will 

not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong." Stockton v. 

Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140, 314 S.E.2d 371, 381 (1984). 

 The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish 

that appellant uttered a forged public document. An application 

for an operator's license and an application for a vehicle title 

are squarely within the accepted definition of "public records." 

Appellant's attempt to obtain each in a different name was 

evidence of a forgery of one or both of the names. Appellant made 

contradictory and inconsistent statements concerning his name and 

provided documentation that was plainly false. As the trial court 

noted, appellant presented no evidence of a legal name change and 

listed at least two different dates of birth. Further, he said he 

had a social security number in the name of Sylla Famara but not 

Diaby Mohamed and then said he had a social security number in the 

name of Diaby Mohamed. Lastly, the trial court could properly 

- 7 -
consider appellant's flight from Cruz as "tending to show a 

consciousness of guilt." See Ricks v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 

330, 335, 573 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2002). Ample evidence supports 

the finding that his testimony was incredible. 

III. Obstruction of Justice 

 Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

prove he obstructed justice. 

 Hampton City Code § 24-6 states: 

If any person, by threats, or force, 

knowingly attempts to intimidate or impede a 

judge, magistrate, justice, juror, attorney 

for the Commonwealth, witness or any 

law-enforcement officer, lawfully engaged in 

his duties as such, or to obstruct or impede 

the administration of justice in any court, 

he shall be deemed to be guilty of a Class 1 

misdemeanor. 

 Both Johnson and Cruz testified that when appellant attempted 

to flee, he attacked and injured Cruz who suffered severe 

injuries. Appellant stated that he "never touched the officer." 

The court believed Cruz and Johnson and found appellant's 

testimony "incredible." "The credibility of the witnesses and 

the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact 

finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as 

it is presented." Hughes v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 448, 462, 

573 S.E.2d 324, 330 (2002) (quoting Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 

Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995)). 

 Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant 

intended to utter a forged public document and obstructed justice. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

- 8 -
Affirmed. 

- 9 -