NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JEFFREY MATHEW ACKERMAN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0825 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-002717-001

The Honorable Warren J. Granville, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

The Hopkins Law Office, PC, Tucson

By Cedric Martin Hopkins

Counsel for Appellant

Jeffrey Mathew Ackerman, Florence

Appellant

FILED 8-23-2018
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Jeffrey Mathew Ackerman timely filed this appeal in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 

104 Ariz. 297 (1969), following his convictions of aggravated assault, a Class 

6 felony; attempted sexual conduct with a minor, a Class 3 felony; sexual 

abuse, a Class 3 felony; and four counts of sexual conduct with a minor, 

each a Class 2 felony. All of the crimes involved a victim under the age of 

15. Ackerman's counsel has searched the record on appeal and found no 

arguable question of law that is not frivolous. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 

259 (2000); Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530 (App. 1999). 

Counsel now asks this court to search the record for fundamental error.

¶2 Ackerman filed a pro per supplemental brief identifying 

several issues and later filed a pro per "Enlargement of Supplemental Brief" 

expanding further on issues Ackerman contends require reversal of his 

conviction.1 After reviewing the entire record and considering the issues 

Ackerman raises, we affirm Ackerman's convictions and sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 On October 19, 2011, a 14-year-old girl became unhappy that 

her grandmother was restricting her use of the home phone and snuck out 

to try to make some phone calls after her grandmother went to bed.

2 The

girl met an older girl at a nearby park, and the two girls walked together to 

an apartment, where they met three men: Ackerman, Ackerman's 

roommate, and a third unidentified man. One of the men allowed the 14-

year-old girl to use a cell phone, and she was able to call a friend but was 

 

1 We hereby grant leave for Ackerman to file his "enlarged" 

supplemental brief.

2 Upon review, we view the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury's verdicts and resolve all inferences against Ackerman. 

See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

3

unable to arrange for someone to pick her up. Ackerman gave her a drink 

in a cup. When she finished that drink, she was given another even though 

she told the men she did not want it. The unidentified man and older girl

then left the apartment.

¶4 After drinking the second drink, the girl became intoxicated. 

She told Ackerman and his roommate that she wanted to call her friend 

again, but the men refused. They began to shove the girl around, 

announced to her that they were "sharing tonight," then pushed her onto a 

mattress and together pulled off all her clothes and performed various 

sexual acts on her, despite her protests and resistance. Ackerman's 

roommate muffled the girl's cries by putting his hand over her mouth and 

told her not to scream.

¶5 After being assaulted on the mattress, the girl put her clothes 

back on but could not find her shirt, so she donned a shirt one of the men 

handed her. Later, Ackerman performed six additional acts on the stillintoxicated girl while she was sitting on a couch.

¶6 Early the next morning, the girl left the apartment for home, 

and her grandmother picked her up in a car along the way. The 

grandmother noticed that the girl was barefoot, was wearing an unfamiliar 

shirt and had a bruise on her neck. At first, the girl did not tell her 

grandmother what had happened, but she later confided in her aunt, who 

told the girl to tell the grandmother about it. On October 24, the girl told 

her grandmother, who contacted police that same day.

¶7 The girl told police and medical staff about the assaults and 

described tattoos on the men's bodies, including a swastika tattoo just above 

the base of Ackerman's penis. The girl had not bathed or showered since 

the events in Ackerman's apartment. A forensic nurse performed a medical 

exam and collected samples from various places on the girl's body. A 

known DNA sample from Ackerman matched samples taken from the 

victim's neck, breast, external genitals and around her mouth.

¶8 Ackerman's first trial resulted in a mistrial. A grand jury then 

re-indicted him on charges of kidnapping, aggravated assault, attempted 

sexual conduct with a minor, sexual abuse and four counts of sexual 

conduct with a minor, all involving a victim under the age of 15. After a 

13-day trial, the jury did not reach a verdict on the kidnapping charge but 

found Ackerman guilty of all the other charges. The court imposed

consecutive sentences totaling 84.75 years, with credit for 1,170 days' 

presentence incarceration.
STATE v. ACKERMAN

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¶9 Ackerman timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised 

Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018), 13-4031 (2018) and -4033 

(2018).3

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

¶10 Ackerman argues he was convicted solely based on false 

testimony by the victim. He argues her testimony was so inconsistent with 

her prior statements that the jury could not reasonably believe her. At the 

same time, Ackerman argues that other evidence before the jury was

insufficient to convict him. He points to the forensic examination, which 

did not find spermatozoa on the victim and which Ackerman asserts 

concluded the victim suffered few injuries. Ackerman was charged as an 

accomplice to his roommate's criminal acts in several of the charges, and on 

appeal, Ackerman argues that no evidence of his roommate's DNA was 

found on the victim. As for his own DNA found on the victim, Ackerman 

argues the DNA could have been deposited on the victim when, as she 

testified, she used a towel in Ackerman's apartment to wipe herself because 

there was no toilet paper. Ackerman also argues his DNA could have been 

on the t-shirt that she put on when she could not find her own shirt.

¶11 The jury, however, was entitled to believe the victim's account 

of what happened in Ackerman's apartment that night. See State v. 

Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 230, ¶ 18 (2015) (jury's role is to assess weight and 

credibility of evidence). None of the physical evidence that Ackerman 

contends supports his innocence disproves the victim's testimony 

supporting his convictions. Furthermore, Ackerman's theories of the 

physical evidence fail to explain away other evidence supporting the 

victim's account, including bruising on her neck and breast and the fact that 

the victim could describe the swastika tattoo above Ackerman's penis. As 

for inconsistencies in the accounts the victim gave over time, the State 

offered expert testimony that victims of sex crimes suppress memories of 

events and often fail to disclose uncomfortable details or disclose them in 

"piecemeal" fashion.

¶12 Moreover, the jury was entitled to consider inconsistencies 

and contradictions in Ackerman's testimony and disbelieve his assertion

 

3 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

a statute's current version.
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

5

that he did nothing wrong. For example, the jury saw Ackerman's initial 

interview with police, in which he claimed he had no memory of ever 

meeting the victim, and so was entitled to disbelieve the detailed 

recollection of that night's events to which he testified at trial.

B. Impeachment Evidence.

¶13 Ackerman contends that the superior court improperly 

excluded a screenshot from a dating website allegedly showing that the 

victim made a false statement about her age. Contrary to his argument, 

however, the screenshot was inadmissible to attack the credibility of the 

victim. Rule 608(b) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence states that "extrinsic 

evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct 

in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness." To be 

sure, "the court may, on cross-examination, allow [specific instances of 

conduct] to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . a witness." Ariz. R. Evid. 608(b). Here, 

however, the court did not abuse its discretion by precluding evidence of 

the screenshot because the court could reasonably conclude that its 

impeachment value was cumulative: The victim admitted that she told 

Ackerman she was 17 when in fact she was 14, and thus the jury already 

knew she had lied about her age on another occasion. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403; 

Hernandez v. State, 203 Ariz. 196, 200, ¶ 15 (2002) (impeachment evidence 

subject to exclusion under Rule 403).

C. Impasse Instruction.

¶14 After the jury had deliberated for some time, it announced it 

had reached a verdict and was called into court. As the court reviewed the 

verdict forms, it saw that the jury had returned verdicts on only two of the 

eight charges. The court excused the jury and discussed with counsel how 

to proceed. Over Ackerman's objection and motion for mistrial on the 

undecided counts, the court then read the jury the following impasse 

instruction:

Ladies and gentlemen, in reviewing the verdict forms, 

it appears to the Court that you are unable to reach 

unanimous verdicts on every count. Because of that, we ask -

- we ask that you consider each count separately. The fact that 

you have not reached a unanimous verdict on each count is 

proper. The law allows -- I'm sorry -- the law does allow us 

to inquire if there is further instructions or further brief 

argument by counsel that may assist you to reach a 
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

6

unanimous verdict on other counts. The law allows, at your 

request, further legal instructions by the Court, and/or brief 

arguments by the attorneys on a particular issue you specify.

In light of this instruction, please openly and fairly consult 

with each other and then through your foreman, advise 

whether further instructions may be useful, whether brief

argument on a particular issue would be useful, whether

further deliberations would be useful, or whether no further 

instructions, arguments or deliberations would be useful.

So we ask you to go back and tell us what you need, if 

you need, anything else. I'll hand the verdict forms back to 

the Bailiff and we'll excuse the jurors.

¶15 The jury later submitted some questions and, after hearing

further argument from counsel on those questions, the jury reached guilty 

verdicts on all but the kidnapping charge, which the court dismissed on the 

State's motion.

¶16 After trial, Ackerman moved for a new trial, arguing that the 

court erred by giving the jury the instruction quoted above and instructing 

the jury to deliberate further. The court denied the motion. Ackerman 

argues on appeal that the court erred in giving the instruction.

¶17 Rule 22.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure "permits 

judges to assist juries that are at an impasse." State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, 

99, ¶ 17 (2003). Specifically, Rule 22.4 states:

If the jury advises the court that it has reached an impasse in 

its deliberations, the court may, in the parties' presence, ask 

the jury to determine whether and how the court and counsel 

can assist the jury's deliberations. After receiving the jurors' 

response, if any, the court may direct further proceedings as 

appropriate.

We have held Rule 22.4 "requires an affirmative indication from the jury it 

is in need of help before assistance may be offered." Huerstel, 206 Ariz. at

99, ¶ 17.

¶18 Here, although the jury did not expressly say it was having 

difficulty reaching verdicts, the fact that it returned blank verdict forms on 

some charges while reaching verdicts on others indicated it was at an 

impasse on several counts. On the facts presented here, the superior court 

did not abuse its discretion in issuing the impasse instruction.
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

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D. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct.

¶19 Ackerman claims the prosecutor intentionally elicited false 

testimony from the victim through "tampering, coercing and coaching." 

Ackerman does not offer direct evidence of tampering, coercing or 

coaching, however, and the mere fact that the prosecutor called the victim 

to the stand, where she gave testimony that was inconsistent with her prior 

statements, does not show that the prosecutor knowingly elicited false 

testimony.

¶20 Ackerman also asserts the prosecutor withheld impeachment 

evidence that the victim had falsely accused others of sexual misconduct on 

other occasions. Ackerman does not cite anything in the record supporting 

this allegation, and our examination of the record reveals no support for it. 

Ackerman further contends the State failed to disclose evidence that the 

victim had created a profile on an online dating service stating her age as 

23 when she was only 17. Nothing in the record before us supports this 

allegation, and at any rate, Ackerman had this evidence at trial, as discussed 

above.

¶21 Ackerman contends that the State breached an obligation 

under Rule 15.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure to record all of 

its interviews of the victim and disclose those recordings. Ackerman is 

mistaken. Although Rule 15.1(b)(1) requires the State to disclose any 

relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses it intends to call at 

trial, the rule does not require "the state . . . to make a recording any time 

its representatives speak with a witness." State v. O'Neil, 172 Ariz. 180, 181 

(App. 1991). "[N]othing in the criminal discovery rules . . . require[s] the 

state to create or produce evidence, specifically statements, which it must 

then disclose." Id.

¶22 Ackerman argues that the prosecutor, in "a deliberate attempt 

to sabotage [his] testimony," engaged in various antics during Ackerman's

direct examination, thereby distracting the jury from his testimony. He also 

contends that portions of the prosecutor's cross examination of him were 

"egregiously improper." Ackerman fails to point to anything in the record 

evidencing these assertions, however, and the record does not show that 

Ackerman's counsel raised any objections to the prosecutor's conduct 

during Ackerman's testimony.

¶23 Ackerman accurately states that the prosecutor "repeatedly 

brought up [his] swastika tattoo" at trial. Among other occasions, the 

prosecutor referred to the tattoo during opening statements, and in 
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

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questioning the victim, the State elicited testimony that the victim had seen 

the tattoo above Ackerman's penis. But at no point did Ackerman's 

attorney object to any of these references to the swastika tattoo. Before 

opening statements, the State filed a motion in limine announcing it 

intended to introduce evidence of the tattoo to prove identity. The record 

does not reveal any effort by Ackerman's counsel to oppose the motion or 

otherwise object to the State's use of that evidence. Given the defense's lack 

of objection and the probative value of the tattoo evidence -- its location and 

the victim's identification of it tended to show that the victim saw 

Ackerman in a state of undress –- the mentions of the tattoo do not raise an 

appealable issue. See State v. Montano, 204 Ariz. 413, 425, ¶ 58, supplemented, 

206 Ariz. 296 (2003) (Rule 403 cannot be basis for appeal where objection 

not raised in the superior court).

E. Purported Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

¶24 Ackerman contends his trial counsel failed in various 

respects, including failing to explore the victim's mental health history, 

which he says would have yielded impeachment material; failing to object 

to inflammatory and prejudicial testimony; and failing to call expert 

witnesses to rebut the State's witnesses. We do not address such claims on 

direct appeal; if he wishes, Ackerman may raise them in future proceedings 

under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. 

Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2002).

F. Expert Witnesses.

¶25 Ackerman argues the superior court erred by failing to 

appoint a forensic child psychologist and other expert witnesses to rebut 

the State's expert witnesses. At the relevant time, former Rule 15.9(a) of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provided that "[a]n indigent 

defendant may apply for the appointment of an investigator and expert 

witness . . . if the defendant can show that such assistance is reasonably 

necessary to present a defense adequately at trial or sentencing." See also 

Jacobson v. Anderson, 203 Ariz. 543, 545, ¶ 5 (App. 2002) ("Indeed, due 

process requires the appointment of expert witnesses for an indigent 

defendant when such testimony is reasonably necessary to present an 

adequate defense.").4 But while the superior court has the discretion to sua 

sponte appoint a reasonably necessary expert witness, see A.R.S. § 13-4013(B) 

(2018) ("the court may on its own initiative . . . appoint investigators and 

 

4 The rule has since been rewritten and relocated. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 6.7(a).
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

9

expert witnesses as are reasonably necessary to adequately present a 

defense at trial" (emphasis added)), the court is not required to do so. 

Ackerman provides no support for the contention that a defendant can go 

to trial without asking the court to appoint an expert, and then, when the 

desired result is not achieved at trial, obtain a new trial for lack of an expert. 

To the extent Ackerman argues that his counsel failed to take steps to obtain 

reasonably necessary expert testimony, we do not address issues of 

counsel's alleged ineffectiveness on direct appeal. See Spreitz, 202 Ariz. at

3, ¶ 9.

¶26 Ackerman also contends the superior court improperly 

denied his forensic expert access to certain photographs taken during the 

victim's forensic examination and denied discovery of the victim's medical 

records. The record does not support these contentions. After Ackerman 

changed counsel, the court denied without prejudice a motion for 

disclosure of the photographs filed by Ackerman's previous attorney

because the court was uncertain whether the motion reflected current 

counsel's views. The motion was never refiled. As for the victim's medical 

records, Ackerman does not point to, and we have not found, any 

indication in the record showing the court denied him discovery.

¶27 Ackerman also argues the court erred by failing to grant a 

request for appointment of a private investigator he made on January 22, 

2016. The transcript of the pretrial conference held that day, however, does 

not reflect any such request.

G. Accomplice Liability.

¶28 Ackerman contends that the court improperly instructed the 

jury that it could find him liable as an accomplice because there was "no 

direct evidence [that Ackerman's roommate] was guilty of anything." But 

the victim testified Ackerman's roommate committed the offenses, and 

Ackerman aided his roommate in committing those offenses by, among 

other things, helping to take off the victim's clothes. The record shows the 

court gave the jury the appropriate instruction on accomplice liability. See 

A.R.S. §§ 13-301 (2018), -303 (2018); State v. Adrian, 111 Ariz. 14, 17 (1974)

("When a person aids, assists, procures or counsels another in the 

commission of a crime, all are principals and equally guilty.").

H. Other Matters.

¶29 The record reflects Ackerman received a fair trial. He was 

represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings against him and was 

present at all critical stages. The court held appropriate pretrial hearings. 
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

10

Pursuant to Rule 609 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, the court held a 

hearing on Ackerman's prior conviction and sanitized it for the jury. The 

court did not conduct a voluntariness hearing, but by failing to move to 

suppress his statements, ask for a voluntariness hearing or otherwise object 

to admission of the statements, Ackerman forfeited any argument about the 

voluntariness of the statements. See State v. Bush, __ Ariz. __, No. CR-11-

0107-AP, 2018 WL 3910681, at *10, ¶ 54 (Ariz. Aug. 16, 2018).

¶30 The State presented both direct and circumstantial evidence 

sufficient to allow the jury to convict. The jury was properly comprised of 

12 members, who returned unanimous verdicts, which were confirmed by 

juror polling.

5 The court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the 

charges, the State's burden of proof and the necessity of a unanimous 

verdict. The court received and considered a presentence report, addressed 

its contents during the sentencing hearing and imposed legal sentences for 

the crimes of which Ackerman was convicted.

CONCLUSION

¶31 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none, and therefore affirm the convictions and resulting sentences. See 

Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300.

¶32 Defense counsel's obligations pertaining to Ackerman's

representation in this appeal have ended. Counsel need do no more than 

inform Ackerman of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, 

unless, upon review, counsel finds "an issue appropriate for submission" to

 

5 The transcript shows that Juror 11, an alternate juror who was 

dismissed before jury deliberations commenced, was polled and concurred 

in the verdict. This court has obtained courtroom video of the jury polling

and confirmed that the reference to Juror 11 during polling was a 

transcription error: Juror 11 was not polled, and there is no evidence from 

the video that any more than the requisite 12 jurors participated in 

deliberations.
STATE v. ACKERMAN

Decision of the Court

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the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 

Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). On the court's own motion, Ackerman has 30 days 

from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro per motion 

for reconsideration. Ackerman has 30 days from the date of this decision to 

proceed, if he wishes, with a pro per petition for review.