### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs F

ebruary 14, 200 1 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL RAY SWAN Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sumner County

No. 254-1999 Jane Wheatcraft, Judge

No. M2000-00539-CCA-R3-CD - Filed April 27, 2001

The defendant, Mich

ael Ray Swa

n, was convicted f

or simple assault,

driving on a revoked, suspended, or cancelled license, and violating the implied consent law. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months, 29 days for the assault; ordered a term of six months on the revoked license conviction; and revoked the defendant's license for one y ear for violating the implied consent law. In this appeal of rig

ht, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court properly charged the jury; (3) whether the trial court erre

d by allowing

the state to submit a

statement o f evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying

defendant’s motion to stay the suspension of his license; and (5) whether the trial court erred by revoking the defendant’s lice nse. After a review

of the record, w

e reverse and dismiss the conviction for driving on a revoked, suspended, or cancelled license; the judgment for the implied consent vio

lation is modified to

a one-yea

r su spension r ather than revocation. The conviction for simple assault is affirmed. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Ju

dgment of the Trial

Court Affirmed in P

art, Reversed in

Part and Remanded.
G ARY R. W ADE , P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OSEPH M. T IPTON and A LAN E. G LENN , JJ., joined. Ramona P. DeSalvo, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Michael Ray Swan.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; David H. Findley, Assistant Attorney General; Joe James, Assistant Attorney General; La

wrence Ray

Whitley, Distr

ict Attorney

General; and Lytle A. Jam es, Ass ist ant Dis tri ct A tto rney. OPINION
On the morning of January 6, 1999, Hendersonville Police Officers Brian Weaks and Bruce Guldeman received information about an erratic driver. Shortly therea fter, the officers loca

ted a Ford Ranger truck, which was weaving on a public roadway. When the police sig naled for the defendant1 In the defendant’s Statement of Evidence, the of ficer’s last

name is spelled Guildeman. -2- to stop, he did not immediately respond. The truck trave led some distance further before stopping at a parking lot in front of an apartment complex. The defendant had two passengers in his vehicle, Shane Decker, who was seated in the middle, and Trey Matthews.
Some of the evidence is disputed. There was no transcript of the trial and the defendan t prepared a Statement of

Evidence, pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(c). The state objected to

the defendant’s

statement, primar

ily because

it was in "verbat

im" form. Beca

use the trial court lacked sufficient recollection of the facts to determine if the “verbatim” transcript was accurate, it allowed the state to submit its own Statement of Evidence. The defendant then objected, contending that his substantial ly verbatim recita

l of evidence wa

s preferable to

the state’s narrative account. While the trial cour t stated that its

recollection of

events more close

ly reflected the state’s account, it order

ed both versions to b

e included in the r

ecord on direct a

ppeal. According to the state’s narrative account, the defendan t smel led of alcohol and was “extremely

belligerent and aggressive” as he walkedfrom his truck. Defense witnesses testified that the defe nda nt h ad h ad o nly o ne d rink earlier in the night. They described the defenda nt as cooperative with the police. State witnesses testified that the defendant “got in [an officer’s] face” andhad to be pushed away. According to the investigation report, the defendant "assaulted" Officer Weaks and threatened to "kick [the officer’s] ass." The defendant then "charge

d" at Weaks. During the scuffle, another officer at the scene, S ergeant Jim Lawson, sprayed the defendant with mace. At that point, Officer Weaks maneuvered the defendant to the ground and hand

cuffed him. Def

ense witnesses testified that the defendant never made an aggressive move toward Of ficer Weaks. The defendant was arrested for DUI and place d in the back of a pa

trol car. No fiel

d sobriety tests were conducted due to the nature of the arrest. Later, Officer Weaks read the implied consent form to the defendant and asked him to take a blood test. The defendant refused and signed the form, although he did not check the box indicating his refusal to take the test. The defendant claimedthat the test was never offered. He explained that it was dar koutside, that his face was pushed against the trunk of a patrol car, and that an officer had directed his hand to the paper he signed. The defendant contended that he believed

he was signing

a release of lia

bility form f

or his truck and was una

ware that it was a

ctually an i

mplied consent for

m. The narrative offered by the s tate p rovided that on the way to the jail, Officer Guldeman 1 testified that the defendant’s attitude began to change. He testified that the defendant apologized for his conduct and even

complimented Off

icer Weaks on his “takedown” maneuver. He then made smalltalk about his experiences as a former police officer. The defendant, however, denied that any conversation took place. After the initial arrest, Officer Weaks testified that he ran a check on the defendant’s license and that records indicated a suspension for failure to satisfy a citation.
In the s tat ement of evidenc e offered by

the defense, the

testimony of t

he police office

rs is virtually the same as that inc

luded in the state’ s narrative exce pt that t he account of the de

fense-3-

witnesses suggests that the police officers behav

ed badly. Ac

cording to the sta

tement, both Decker andMatthews, who remained inside the truck when the defendant walked away from his vehicle, testified that

an officer called the defendant “stupid” while searching through his wallet f or a driver’s license. The defense witnesses maintained that after the defendant objected to being called “stupid,” an argument ensued. Decker recalled the demeanor of the offic ers as being “ar gumentative” and “very arrogant,” and characterized the officers as

having given th

e defendant a

“hard time.” During the argument, the defendant placed his arms behind his back and told the officers to arrest him if they thought he had done something wrong. According to Decker, there were a few more verba l exchanges before one of th e officers sudde

nly “maced” the defendant in the face. The defendant was then thrown to the ground face first and handcuffed. Matthews testified that he turned around and didnot see the defendant get sprayed with mace; he told Decker

not to move because an officer had a gun pointed at them. The defendant descri bed Officer W eaks as “cocky and aggre ssive” and claimedthat he never lunged at or charged either officer. He testified that he was talking with Weaks when Officer Guldeman suddenly spray ed mace into his eyes.
The defendant w

as indicted for DU

I, driving on

a suspended drive

r’s li cense, resist

ing arrest, simple assault, and violating the implied consent law. A jury convict ed the d efendant of driving on a suspended license and s imple assault. The trial court found the defendant guilty of violating the implied consent law. He was found not guilty of DUI and resisting arrest. The trial court imposed a sentence of six months on the suspended license conviction and 11 m ont hs, 29 d ays for the assault conviction, both to be served concurrently. The defendant’s license was revoked for one year for violation of the implied consent law.
I
Init ial ly, the defendant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions of driving on a revoked, suspended or cancelled license, violating the implied consen

t law and simple assault.
On appeal, of course, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate viewof the evidence and all reasonable

inferences which might

be drawn therefrom. State v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) . The credi bility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony , and the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are matte

rs entrusted to the

jury as trie

r of fact. Byrge v . State , 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact co

uld have found the

essential elemen

ts of the crime bey

ond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App.

P. 13(e); State v. Williams , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn.1983). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses,

the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factu

al issues raised b

y the eviden

ce are resolve

d by the trie

r of fact. Liakas v. State

, 199 Tenn. 298, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956). B ecause a verdi ct of guilt against a defendant

removes the presumption of inno

cence and rais

es a presumption of

guilt, the convic

ted crimin al defendan t2 The statute pertains to the use of seat belts. -4-

bears t he burden of s howing that the e vidence was leg

ally insuffi

cient to sustain a g

uilty verdic

t. State v. Evans , 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992).
A. Driving on a Revo ked, Suspended or

Cancelled Lic

ense The defendant argues that t he trial court erred by deny ing his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state had not carried its burden of proving that he had been given prior

notice of the suspension, revocation or cancellation of his driver’slicense. A person is guilty of driving on a suspended, revok

ed or cancelled

license if he driv

es a motor vehicle

on any public highway of the state at a time whenthe person’s privilege to do so is cancelled, suspended or revoked. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504. The defendant contends that in order to be found

guilty of th

e crime, the lice

nse must first be properly suspended under the law as prov ided in Tenn . Code Ann. § 55-50-502(9). That statute provides that the Department of Safety may suspend a

license upon a showing, among other things, "t

hat the licensee ":
Has failed to appear in any court to answer

or to satisfy any traffic citation issued for violating any statute regulating traffic. No license sha ll be suspended pursuant

to this subdivision for failure to appe ar in court on or failure to pay a parking ticket or citation or for a violation of § 55-9-603. 2 Any request from the court for suspension under this subdivision must be submitted to the department of safety within six (6) months of the violation date. No suspension action shall be taken by the department unless such request is made within six (6) months of t h e violation date. Prior to suspending the license of any person as authorized in this subsection, the department shallnotify the licensee in writing of the proposed suspension and, upon the licensee’s request, shall

afford the licensee an

opportunity for a hearing to show that there is an error in the records received by the depa rtment; pro v ided, that such request is made within thirty (30) days following the notifi cation of proposed suspension or cancellation. Failure to make such request within the time specified shall without exception constitute a waiver of such right. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-502(9) (emphasis added).
The department has th

e burden of provi

ng that it met th

e statutor y license suspension req uirements

"by its records or other sufficient evidence. . . ." T enn. Code Ann. § 55-50-5 02(a)

. According to t he evidenc e presented at trial, the suspension of the defendant’s license arose from a previous traffic citat

ion in Hope, A rkansas. The defendant testified that he paid the citation on October 6, 1997, over a year before his ar rest in t his case, but that the payment was received late. He stated that he was

fined for the late

payment, bu

t t he citation rem ained on his record. The defendant testified that

he never received

notice of the proposed suspension. The state did not offer proof that the department had notified the defendant of the proposed suspension.-5-

It is a prerequisite

to conviction for driving on a revoked license that the defendant’s driver’s license was legally

revoked at the time of the alleged crime. State v. Loden , 920 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see also Tenn. Code. Ann . § 55-50-504. Because the defendant’s license was suspendeddue to a failureto pay a traffic citation, he was entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-502(9). There was simply no evidence presented at trial that the defendant was sent notice concerning the suspension of his driver’s license or that he received such notice.
The state contends that because the defendant testified that he moved in July of 1998 and that he failed to notify the Depa rtment of Safe ty of hi s new a ddres s, the convi ction shoul d stan d. It reasons that the defendant would not have received the notice if it had been sent. In the alternative, the state argues that no notice was needed because the citation occurred in anothe r state. The statute provid

es that the Depar

tment of Safety

is authorized to suspe

nd a license if

the licensee committed an offense in anothe r state which if committed in this state would be grounds for suspension or revocation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-502(7). It doe s not, however, relie

ve the state from the notice requirement when the suspension is based upo n th e fai lur e to pay a fine for a traff ic citation. Tenn. Code. Ann § 55-50-502(9). Under the applicable statute, the re quir ement is man dat ory. Here, the defendant was entitled to notification that the department had suspended his license. Because there was insufficient evidence in either the narrative rec ord provided by the

state or the "verbatim" record supplied by the defense tha t notice had been pr ovided, the convic tion is reversed and dismissed.
B. Implied Consent Law Next, the de f

endant cont ends that t he evidence w as insuffi cient to su pport the t rial court's conclusion that he had violated the implied consent law. Because there was contradictory testimony about the circumstances surrounding the reading of the implied consent form, the defendant maintains that the trial court erred by finding that he violated the statute. We disagre e. The statute under

which the defend

ant was convicte

d provides in part a

s follows: Any person who drives any motor vehicle in the state i s deemed to have given consent to a test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content of that person’s blood; provided, that such tes t is administered at the direction of a law enforcement

officer having reasonable grounds to believe such person was driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or drug, as defined in § 55-10-405. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(1).
The statute further r

equires t hat any law enforcement officer who requests that a driver submit to an alcohol or drug test must inform thedriver that refusalto take such a test will result in a suspensi on of his driver’s license by the court. Tenn Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(2). If, after-6-

advisedof the consequences, a person refuses to submit to the test, the test will not be given and the person will be charged for violating the statute. Id.
In this instance, Officers Weaks and Guldeman were o

n patrol in

Hendersonville when they received the report of an e

rratic driver. After f

inding the vehic

le, the officer

s attempted to

make a stop. The defendant, ho wever, kept driving for a few blocks before turning into an apartment complex

. St ate witnesses testified that there was a strong scent of alcohol emanating from the defendant. Officer Weaks testified that he read the implied consent form to the defendant and asked him to take a blood test. He further testified that the def endant re fused to take a blood test and signed the implied consent form. Similarly, Officer Guldeman testified that Officer Weaks rea d the impl ied conse nt form to the defendant while they were still in the parking lot of the apartment complex.Even though the officer had failed to check the implied consent form indicating refusal, the trial judge, after he aring all of the proof, accredited the state's witnesses and found that the defendant had been given the opportunity to take a blood test. The trial judge conc luded that the defendant had been apprized of the consequ ences of refusal and had nevertheless refused the opportunity

to be examined. The record supports that determination. In our view, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant violated the implied consent law.
C. Assault
The defendant next contends that therewas insufficient evidence to support the conviction for simple assault. We disagree. A person commits assault who (1) intentional ly, knowingly or recklessly caus es b odi ly i njury to an other; (2) intenti onally or kno

wingly ca

uses another to reasonably

fear imminent bodi

l y inj ury; or (3) int entionally or knowingly causes phy sical contact that a reasonable

person would regard as extremely offensive or provoca tive. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 101. Here, state witnesses testified that the defendant "lunged" at Officer Weaks and that he had to be subdued with mac

e. Officer Weak

s testified that he

was in fear of ph

ysical inju

ry w hile defense witnesses testified that the defendant never "lunged " a t Officer Weaks. The jury, by

its guilty verdict, accredited

the testimony offered by the state. When viewed in the l

ight most favora

ble to the state, the evidence presented here was suffic

ient for a rationa

l jury to find b

eyond a re asonable doubtthat the defendant was guilty of assault. In our view, there wa s sufficient evidenceto support the verdict.
II Next, the defendant a

rgues t hat the t rial court's instruction for the assault charge was erroneous because the trial court improperly instructed the jury on "

recklessly " causing an a

ssault, instead of "knowingly

" or "intentiona

lly" causi ng an assault. He

contends that b y following the instruction, the jury cou

ld have found the de

fendant guilty

based upon a lesse

r mental state

than was required.-7-

The trial court

has a duty " to give a complet e charge of th

e law applicable

to the facts

of a case." State v. Harbison , 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 198 6); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30. "[The] defendant has a constitutional right to a correct and complete charge of the law." State v. Teel , 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990). Jury instructions must, however, be reviewed in the context of the overall charge rathe

r th an in isolation. See Sandstrom v. Montana , 442 U.S. 510 (1979) ; see also Statev. Phipps , 883 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Erroneous jury instructions require a reversal unless theerror is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Welch v. State , 836 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 992). At the close of the proof, the t

rial court instruc

ted the jury

on simple assault as follows : Any person who commits an assa ult upon another is

guilty of a crime. For y

ou to find the defendant guilty of th

is offense, the st

ate must have prov

en beyond a

reasonable

doubt the existence of the following

essential elemen

ts: (1) that

the defendant caused another to be in reasonable fea

r of imminent bodily injury; and (2) tha t th e def end ant act ed ei the r in ten tio nal ly, o r kn owi ngly.
After instructing the jury on the e lements of the off

ense, the trial c

ourt inadvertent

ly included a definition for r

ecklessness:
"Rec kle ssl y" means that a pe r son acts recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct when the person is aware of but consciously disrega rds a substantial a nd unjustifiable ri

sk that the circums

tances e xis t or the result will occur. T he risk must be of su ch a nature and d

egree that its disregard constitutes a gross devi ation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise und er all circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint.
The trial court specifically charged the jury that the defendant had

to have acted intentiona

lly orknowingly in order to be guilty of assault. That instruction was proper. In t he context of th

e entirety of the instructions , there isno reversible error by providing a definition for "recklessly ." The trial court included the requisite mental state in the statutory elements for assault. Recklessness was merely included in a series of other definitio ns in the instruction

s. In our view, th

e trial court cle

arly placed the duty on the

jury to conc

lude that the assa

ult was either intentionally or knowingly made.
The defendant a

lso challenges c

ertain of the instructions for driving on a revoked, cancelled or suspended licens

e. Because the

evidence was ins

ufficient to suppo

rt th at convic tion, any error during instruction s would qualifyas moot. See, e.g. , State v. Doe , 812 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).-8-

Fin all y, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by not properly

handling his req

uest fo r jury inst

ructions pursuant to Rule 30(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. He argues that the

trial court provid

ed no opportunity

to review, discus s or approve the in structions. Rule 30(a) provid

es: At the close of the evidence or at such earlier t ime during the trial as the court reasonably

directs, any

party may

file written requ

ests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set for

th in the requests. At the same time copies of such requests sha

ll be furnished to adve

rsary coun

sel. The court sha

ll inform counse

l of it s proposed action upon the requests, and any other portion of the instructions concerning which inquiries are made, prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shallinstruct the jury after the argumen

ts are completed. The c

ourt may, in i

ts discretion, ente

rtain requests for instr

uctions at any

time before the ju

ry retires to consider its ver

dict. Here, the record shows that at the completion of the evidence, the defen dan t renewed his motion for Judgment of Acquittal on the driving while license is revoked, suspended or cancelled ch arge. Further, the record shows that the defendant requested and was denied a jury instruction with respect to "notice" as an element of that offense. That issue has been addresse d. There is no showing, however, that oth er written speci

al requests

were submitted, denied, or made a part of the record. The appellant has the duty to supply an adequa te record. Absent that, this court cannot consider the question.
III
There was no court reporter at the trial. The defendant maintains that the trial court erred by allowing the state to submit its own Statement of Evidence. He contends that, pursuant to Rule 24(e) of the Tennessee Rules of

Appellate Procedure, extraordinary circumstances warrant review of the trial court’s order.
Tennessee Rules o

f Appellate Proc

edure 24(e) sta

tes in relevant pa

rt: Correction or Modification of the Record. – [A]ny differences regarding whether the record accurately discloses

what occurred

in the trial court shall be submitted to and settled by the trial court regardless of whether the record has been transmitted to the appellate court. Absent

extraordinary

circumstances, the determination of the trial court is conclusive. If nec essary, the appellate or tria

l court may d

irect that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted.
In thi s cas e, t he t ria l co urt det erm ine d th at a sta tem ent of t he ev ide nce w as n eces sar y. It had the duty to resol

ve any diff

erences in the rec ord. For the most part, it chose not to do so. The differences in the record, however, are not so significant as to affect any of the issues presented. The jury reviewed most of the factual issues. Either sta

tement would

support its conclusions. The trial-9-

court determined that

there was testimony that the defendant had the opportunity to take a blood test an d refused to do so. Whether there was a violation of the implied consent law was not a jury question. Such a violation is not a criminal offense and may result only in a suspe nsion o f the license. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55 -10-406(a)(3) ; see State v. Smith , 681 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). While the trial court should have resolved any differences in the statement in lieu of a transcribed record, the failure to do so in this instance was of no consequence.
IV Next, the defendant conte nds that the trial c

ourt erred by

refusing to

stay the suspension of his driver’s license pending this appeal. He maintains that he would suffer irr

eparable harm i

f the one-year suspension was imposed, because the ruling wo uld be "n on-appealable." In essence, he argues that even if he were successful on appeal, his license still would have been suspended.
The impli ed consent law is applicable regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of driving under the influence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406. In fact, the statute provides that an officer only has to have

"reasonable g

rounds" to believ

e that a person wa

s driving while

under the in fluence of an intoxicant or drug. Id. Although the defendant was acquitted of the DUI charg e, "reas onable

grounds" to bel

ieve that the def

endant was committ

ing the offense

did exist. Sta

t e witnesses testified that the defendant was driving in an erratic manner and that he was agg ressive and belligerent

after being stopped. T

hey also testified that the

defendant had a

strong scent of a

lcohol. Furthermore, there is no provisi on inTenn. Code Ann. § 55 -10-406 that a judgment be final prior to license suspension. The s tatut e mandates that when a court finds that a driver has violated the provisions of the subsection, it "shall suspend" the license of such driver for 12 months. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(3). The trial court did so at the conclusion of the trial.
The defendant also argues that there is no public policy reason to deny a sta

y pending a

ppeal, because he was acquitted of the DUI offense and there was no e videnc e that he endangered other motorists. The statu

te contains a publi

c policy sta

tement: (1) Prov ide m aximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of the state; (2) Deny

the privilege of

operating motor

vehicles on such h

ighways to

persons who by their

conduct and record have demonstrated their indifference to the safety and welfare of

others and their disrespect for the laws of the state; and (3) Discourage repetition of unla wful acts by individuals against the peaceand dignity

of this state and its

political su

bdivi sions, and to impose the added deprivation of the privilege of ope rating motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who have been co nvicted repeate

dly of violations of law

s involving the ope

ration of motor ve

hicles. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-602.-10-

In State v. Loden , 920 S.W.2d at 264, this court held that an appeal of a DUI conviction did notautomatically stay the r evocation of the l

icense. While the s

tate argues tha

t Loden applies to these circumstances, the cases are distinguishable on the facts. More impo rt antly, the defendant chose not to file an applicati

on for a stay

with this court during the pendency o

f the appeal. Be

cause it is our view that the suspension was proper, the issue is now moot. At this point, it is not necessary to decide whether the trial court erred by refusing a stay.
V
Fin all y, the defendant maintains that the trial court erred by revoking his licen se becaus e revocation, as opposed to suspension, is not permissible under Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406 (a)(3). That statute provides that if a trial cour t finds that a motorist viola ted the implied con

sent law, it shall suspend the li

cense for 12 month

s. On the judgment form for the defendant’s conviction for violation of the implied consent law, the trial court

noted that the defendant’s license was "revoked one year." Althoug h the words "suspended" and "revoked" are often used interc hangeably, they

have di fferent meanings. In the chapter addressing driver’s license s, the statute provides the following definitions:
"Revocationof driver license" means the termination by formal action of the department

of a person’s dri

ver license or pr

ivilege to operate a motor v

ehicle on the public highways, which termination shall not be subject to ren ewal or restoration except that an application for a new license may be presented and a cted upon by the department after the expiration of at least one (1) year af ter date of revocation. *** "Suspension of driver license" means the temporary

withdrawal by formal action of the department of

a person’s drive

r license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, which temporary withdrawal shall be for a period specific

ally designated by the department. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-102(42), (47). Here, it is likely tha

t the trial court in

tended only

to suspend the defendant’s driver’s license because it followed the ter

m "revoked" wi

th the phrase, "for one year." I n any event, that was the extent of i ts s tat uto ry aut hor ity. The judg ment is, therefore, modified to provide for a one-year suspension. See

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.
In summary, the con viction for driving on a revoked, susp

ended, or cance

led license is revers ed and di smissed. The assault conviction is affirmed. The judgment is amended as to the violation of implied consent conviction so as to provide for a one-year license suspension.-11- ___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE