### SERVED: June 

### 24, 2016 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS WASHINGTON, DC
In The Matter Of: ) ) 

### DocketNo. FAA-2014-0320 GLOBAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION ) ) 

### Case No. 2012NM710034 Respondent ) 

### ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THEFAA'S MOTION FOR DECISION
OnAugust 15,2014,the FAA filed a Complaint. 1 

### On September 22, 2014, the FAA filed a Motion for Decision or in the Alternative, Motion to Deem All Allegations Admitted ("First Motion"). On October 15, 2014, the previously assigned Judge issued an Amended Procedural Order. This Orderdid not address or reference the FAA's September 22, 2014 First Motion. Five (5) days later, on October20, 2014, the FAA filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss orin the Alternative, Motion to Deem All Allegations Admitted ("Renewed Motion"), in which the FAA reasserted the same arguments as those in the September 22, 2014 First Motion. Shortly thereafter, onOctober22, 2014, the

### prose Respondent Global Arms and Ammunition filed both the Respondent's Motion for Leave to File an Answer, and the Respondent's Answer.

1This Complaint was filed pursuant to a July 29, 2014 Order issued by Judge Goodwin, the previously assigned Judge. See, July 29,2014 Order on Respondent's BriefofAppellant and Complainant's Reply to BriefofAppellant.OnNovember 24,2014, the previously assigned Judge issued an Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Leave to File an Answer. Althoughthis Order granted the Respondentrelief,it did not address orreference eitherthe FAA's September22,2014 First Motion orthe FAA's October20, 2014 Renewed Motion. On December 16, 2014, the FAA filed a Motion for Decision, or in the Alternative, Motion for DecisionHereafter Limitingthe Hearingto a Determination as to the Appropriate Sanction" ("Motionfor Decision"). On January 6, 2015, the Respondent, by its newly appointed representative,2 filed its Answerto Complainant's Motion for Decision ("Response"). On September4, 2015, the previously assignedJudge transferred to a different agency. The FAA's First Motion, Renewed Motion, and its Motion for Decision remained pending. This proceeding was then reassigned to the undersigned Judge. On March4, 2016, an Order Setting Deadline for the Respondent to Supplement its Response and Granting/Denying OtherReliefwas filed, which gave the Respondent an opportunity to supplement its January 6, 2015 Response. Among other things, this March 4, 2016 Order ruled on the FAA's First Motion and Renewed Motion, and reserved ruling on.the FAA'sDecember 16, 2014.Motion for Decision. 3 On April 1, 2016, the Respondent filed its Response Briefto Complainant's Motion for Decision**('~Supplemental** Response"). 

### A. Complaint, Proposed Penalty Assessment, and Answer The FAA's August 15,2014 Complaint alleged that on orabout June 15,2012, the Respondent, Global Arms and Ammunition, had offered a shipmentoffour (4)

2 Prior to December 2, 2014, the Respondent had been represented by its president and lay representative, Mr. David Carl Williams. On December 2, 2014, a Mr. Vincent Williams filed a lay representative Notice ofAppearance on behalfofthe Respondent. However, subsequent materials filed by Mr. Vincent Williams identified him as a licensed attorney in Washington State. (See, e.g., April I, 2016 Response, Signature lines on page 7.) 3 Based on the record ofthe case, the March 4, 2016 Order denied the FAA's September 22,2014 First Motion and October 20, 20 14 Renewed Motion, because ofthe reiiefgranted by Judge Goodwin's earlier issued November 24,2014 Order. Page 2 of22

### fiberboard boxes for transport in air commerce, via Federal Express ("FedEx") from Spokane, Washington to Whitefish, Montana. The FAA alleged that the four boxes contained weapons ammunition, which is subject to the Hazardous Materials Regulations ("HMR"), 49 C.P.R. ChapterI, Subchapter C. The FAA further alleged that the Respondent had not marked or labeled the shipment as a hazardous material ("hazmat"), and the Respondent had not ensured that each ofits employees who handled hazmat was properly trained. As a result, the FAA asserted that the Respondent had committed ten (10) violations oftheHMR. The FAA proposed atotal penalty of$50,000 for the violations. In its October 22, 2014 Answer, the Respondent denied offering any hazmat for air commerce on June 15, 2012, and denied that its etnployees had not been properly trained in Hazmatprocedures. The Respondent also raised multiple defenses. B. FAA's Motion for Decision and Respondent's Response 

### In its December 16, 2014 Motion for Decisionthe FAA asserted that "there are no genuine issues ofmaterial fact leftto dispute as Respondent has admitted that it offered an undeclared shiptnent ofHAZMATto Federal Express." (Mot. Dec. 3.) The FAA argued that it was the Respondent's responsibility, as the business offering a shipment, to perforn1 the shipper's duties (e.g., marking, labeling, preparing shipping papers), and those duties could not be passed on to Federal Express, the shipping carrier. (!d. 

### at4 (citing 

### Walsh, Docket No. CP07S00011, 2008 WL 926620 (FAA Mar. 31, 2008))). In its Motion for Decision the FAA requested full dispositive relief, or in the alternative, a finding that the ten (1.0) alleged HMR violations had occurred and limiting the hearing to the proposed $50,000 civil penalty amount. (Mot. Dec., 1, 7.) In its January 6, 2015 Response, the Respondent argued that it needed "time to review the discovery materials and further investigate facts and evidence the FAA is relying upon." (Resp. 2.) The Respondent asked that the FAA'sMotion for Decision be denied to allow the Respondent "afair opportunity to further develop the facts and prepare its case." (!d.) 

### Page 3 

### of22

### On March4, 2016 an Order was issued (i.e., afterthis case was reassigned to the undersigned) which offeredthe Respondent an opportunity to supplement its January 6, 2015 Response. Thereafter, on April 1, 2016, the Respondent filed a Supplemental Response, which included the proffer ofthree exhibits and a specific argument that the Respondent had not knowingly violatedthe HMR, and FedEx should be held solely responsible for the alleged violations. (Supp. Resp. 3-8.) C. Standard ofReview for Summary Judgment 

### Pursuantto 14 C.P.R.§ 13.218, a party may file motions, including a motion for a decision onthe merits, in advance ofa hearing when a party asserts that there is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact in dispute. A motion for decision on the merits prior to a testimonial hearing in a civil penalty adjudication is analogous to a motion for swnmary judgmentunder Rule 56 ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure: 

### HorizonAir industries, . Inc., FAA OrderNo. 96-24, n.3 (Aug. 13, 1996); 

### StebbinsAviation, Inc., DocketNo. FAA-2000-7576-16, n.3 (Aug. 30, 2004) (Initial Decision). Thepurpose ofsummaryjudgmentis "to isolate, and then terminate, claims and defenses that are factually unsupported." Steven Baicker-McKee, et al., 

### Federal Civil Rules Handbook, 1164 (West 2016). Pursuant to Rule 56(a), a summaryjudgment motion shall be granted if"the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitledtojudgmentas a matteroflaw." 

### See Anderson v. LibertyLobby

**Inc.~** 

### 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); 

### Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In addition, pursuant to Rule 56(f), summaryjudgmentmay also be granted to a non-tnoving party, after all parties have had notice and areasonable time to respond. A fact is "material" ifit is capable ofaffecting the substantial outcome ofthe litigation. 

### Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895; 

### LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is "genuine" ifthe evidence is such that a reasonable trier offact could return a verdict for the non-movingparty. 

### See Scott v. Harris, 5550 US 372, 380 (2007); 

### LibertyLobbyInc., 477 U.S. at 248; 

### Holcomb, supra, 433 F.3d at 895. Page 4 

### of22On a motion for summaryjudg1nent, all evidence and inferences are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movingparty. Ifthe moving party establishes a primafacie case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show, by affidavit or otherwise, that a genuine dispute ofmaterial fact remains for the fact-finder to resolve. Baicker-McKee, et al., 

### supra, at 1178. Pursuant to Rule 56(c), (d), and (e), a non-moving party who wishes to proceed to trial mustrespond, and set forth specific facts sufficient to showthere is a genuine issue for trial. 

### Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); 

### see also, Citizens State Bankof BigLake v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 815 F.Supp. 309 (D. Minn. 1993); Baicker-McKee, etal., 

### supra, at 1178-79 (arguments, denials, inferences, orhopes are not enough). Pursuant to Rule 56(c)(1 )(A), specific facts alleged by either party n1ay be asserted by submittingor citing to

### a variety ofdocuments and declarations. In reviewing the summaryjudgment motion and submitted evidence, the court does not evaluate credibility or rule onthe weight ofthe evidence. Baicker-Mcl<.ee, et al., 

### supra, at 1168- 69. Instead, the court's role is limited to "assessing the threshold issue ofwhether a genuine dispute exists as to material facts" that requires a trial. 

### !d. at 1168. 

### D. Evidentiary Rulings As summarized above, a party moving for, orresisting, summaryjudgment relief has the burden offactually supporting its positions. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that 14 C.F.R. 

### §13.222(c) specifically allows for the proffer and potential admission ofcertain hearsay evidence at the civil penalty hearing.4 However, ifhearsay is admitted at the hearing, the court must

**~~weigh"** the hearsay evidence for probative value. 

### (!d.) In contrast, in summaryjudgment proceedings, the court maynot "weigh" any evidentiary facts that are deemed admissible.5 Baicker-McKee, et al., 

### supra, at 1168-68. Thus, the admissibility ofhearsay

4 Hearsay evidence proffered at the hearing is still subject to exclusion on the basis ofrelevance, materiality, or undue repetitiveness. 14 C.F.R. §13.222(b).
1In general, evidence admitted in summaryjudgement proceedings is deemed true upon admission. However, certain evidence need not be deemed true ifit is conclusory, speculative, improbable, or

.contradicted by the record. The court may "credit" certain types ofevidence ifit is "unimpeached." The Page 5 of22

### in su1nn1aryjudgmentproceedings must be addressed differently than at hearing, because once hearsay is deemed admissible in this dispositive 1notion proceeding, it cannot be "weighed". 

### (I d.) 

### Because the FAA Rules ofPractice do not address this point, the Federal Rules and well-established summaryjudgment litigation practice have been utilized as helpful guidance in reviewing proffered hearsay evidence for admissibility as ""material fact" in this pre-hearing dispositive motion. In addition, pursuantto Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 56(c)(1 ), (2) and ( 4), materials offered to support oroppose a fact during summaryjudgmentproceedings must be capable ofbeing offered at trial in an admissible form. 

### !d. at 1180 ("Generally, this does not mean thatthe materials'themselves must be presented in an admissible forn1 during the sun1maryjudgmentbriefing, only that an admissible form exists by which those facts may be later introduced at trial."). The burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or alternatively, to explain the admissible fonn that is anticipated. 1. FAA's Motion- Objections and Rulings As part ofits Motion for Decision, the FAA submitted eight (8) Exhibits, identified as ExhibitNumbers 1
- 8. The Respondent did not objectto the admissibility ofany ofthe FAA's Exhibits. FAA Exhibit 2 (August 15, 2014 Complaint) and Exhibit 3 (October 22, 2014 Answer) are admissible as public records, since they are copies ofthe Court's pub!ic file in this case.6 See 

### Fed. R. Civ. P. 44(a)(1)(B)(i). FAA Exhibit4 (FAA October 29,2014 First Set ofDiscovery Requests) and Exhibit 5 (Respondent's Answerto Complainant's First Set ofDiscovery Requests) are

court may also draw certain reasonable inferences from admissible evidence. In addition, proven evidentiary disputes, ifinvolving unnecessary facts, will not defeat a motion for summaryjudgment. Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1166 -71. 6 However, any averment offact contained in such pleading documents is not correspondingly admitted as true..Such averments offact still need to be independently proved. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(8); BaickerMcKee, et al., supra, at I025. 

### Page 6 of22admissible as relevant background infonnation, subject to the introduction offactual proof. 

### See Fed. R. Evict. 1 04(b). FAA Exhibit 7 (Respondent'sAugust 7, 2012 Letterto Special Agent Shane J. Allen) is admissible as an opposingparty's statement. 

### See Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2). FAA's Exhibit 8 is admissible as a partial copy of"official publication" material available on FedEx'spublic website. 

### See Fed. R. Evid. 902(5). FAA Exhibit 1 (October 26, 2010 Material Safety Data Sheet) and Exhibit 6 (July 2012 FAA Letter of**Investigat~on)**7**~re** partially admissible as evidence, absent any . objection, in that both exhibits identify small arms ammunition as**hazmat~** subject to the HMR.**(See~** e.g., Mot. Dec. Ex. 1**~** 2-6 §§**3~ 6~**  10, and 13-15; Ex.**6~** 1**~** 2). The Exhibits are not otherwise admissible as proofofthe allegations, since no testimonial evidence or other evidence was submitted by the FAA8to discuss what relevant proofthe material purported to further offer. 

### See,. e.g., Baicker-McKee, et al.,**supra~** at 1182-85. 2. Respondent's Respons.e and Supplemental Response- Objections and Rulings In its January 6, 20f5''R.esponse, the Respondent did not submit any exhibits. However, as part ofits April'1,'2016 Supplemental Response, the Respondent submitted three (3) Exhibits, identified as Exhibits A- C. The FAA did not object to the adn1issibility ofthe Respondent's Exhibits. Respondent ExhibitA (aphotograph offour boxes to which are affixed various

7The FAA's July 2012 Letter ofInvestigation was not dated. (Ex. 6.) However, it referenced the June 15, 2012 alleged shipping incident, and it requested the Respondent to provide a response (ifany) within ten ( 1

0) days ofreceipt. On August 7',2012 the Respondent served a responsive letter. (Ex. 7.) As a result, it appears likely the FAA Letter ofInvestigation (Ex. 6) was authored and mailed during the month ofJuly 2012. 8 It is well-established that arguments or statements made by counsel in a summaryjudgment motion or a briefdo not substitute for testimonial evidence based on personal knowledge. Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at I184. Page 7 of22labels) is partially admissible, as a photograph ofthe four boxes at issue in this case.9 Respondent Exhibit B (two (2) June 27, 2012 Statements ofFAA Special Agent David C. King, summarizingwitness interviews) are deemed admissible,10 since the Respondent has subtnitted it as part ofits responsive evidence. Respondent Exhibit C (aprintout from Google Maps showing the mileage and travel time from Spokane, Washingtonto Whitefish, Montana), is deemed admissible as a partial copy of"official publication"material available onGoogle's public website. 

### See Fed. R. Evid. 902(5). 

### E. Undisputed Facts It was undisputed



### th~t**'th~** Respondent is a business entitythat regularly offers, accepts, ortransports hazmat. (Compl. 

### 1; Ans. 

### 1.) Typically, the Respondent's customers had "bigorder" hazn1at shipments weighing over 2,000 pounds, which were always shipped via "palletsb,Y ground." (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) Priorto June 15,2012, Mr. Williams had asked FedEx about shipping a "sample" ofmnn1unition ''by two-day air orovernight" from Seattle, Washington to Whitefish, Montana. (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.)· A customerwanted to use this sample ofthe an1munition at a machine gun shoot. 

### (ld) .PedEx advised Mr. Williamsthatthe cost ofshipping would be reduced almost 50percent ifthe ammunition was shipped overnightfrom Spokane, Washington instead ofSeattle, Washington. (Id.) As a result, Mr. Williams decided to shipthe an1munition

**~~overnight"** from Spokane, Washington. (!d.) On June 15,2012, Mr. David Carl Williams (a Respondent representative), and a

9 Although the Respondent arguedthat Ex. Ademonstrated that certain information had been included in the labels affixed to the boxes (Supp. Resp. 4), Ex. Awas illegible in that regard, and no testimonial statement in support ofsuch arguments was submitted. 10 It should be noted, however, that the statements in Respondent Ex. 8 offered multiple layers of hearsay, including purported statements madeby unidentified Respondent representatives to two different FedEx personnel, who then repeated this information (to the best oftheir recollection) to Agent King during later interviews, which Agent King then summarized in writing and reported to the FAA, which the FAA then provided to the Respondent at some time prior (date unknown) to the pending motion. (See Resp. Ex. 8, !.) Page 8 of22male friend 11 appeared at a Spokane, Washington, FedEx office with four (4) small, heavy, fiberboard boxes, which were each "taped and secured." (Mot. Dec. Ex. 5, 2:1-2 and 21-22; Supp. Resp. 

### 1.) Inside each box was ammunition which was ""loosely" packed and which rattled. (I 

### d. at 2:23-25.) The labels placed by Mr. Williams on each ofthe boxes for the overnight shipmenthad included the words "arms" and "ammunition." (/d.; Ex. B, 2.) Mr. Williams asked the Spokane FedEx Store to transport the boxes (i.e. "the Ship1nent") "asquickly as possible" to Whitefish, Montana. 

### (/d. at 3:2; 

### see also, Compl.

**~,-r** II-2, 11-4; Ans.

**~** II-4; Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 

### 1.) 

### It was undisputed

**t~~~. ~?~Shipment**  lacked shipping papers and required hazmat markings and labels. The

**l~p~!s** provided by the Respondent read: "Global Arms 

### & An1munition" (Mot Dec.; Ex:, 7, 1 ), and FedEx personnel agreed that the triggerterms "arms" and "ammunition"appeared onthe airway bill (Supp. Resp. 4; Ex. B, 2). FedEx accepted the Shipment, as packed and labeled, for transportation under Federal Express Air Waybill Nmnber 8768-2610-5551. (Compl.

**~** 11-3; Ans.

**~** 11-3.) ·Shortly thereafter, during sorting operations, a Federal Express employee sawthat one of the fiberboard boxes in the.Sflh)ment had broken open and ammunition was falling out. (Compl.

**~** 11-4; Ans.

**~** 11-4.) The Shipment was intercepted, and never arrived in ' ' Whitefish, Montana. (Mot. pee. Ex. 7, 1.) Theparties agreed thatthe ammunition in the Shipmentwas classified as hazmat under the HMR. (Compl.

**~** II-5; Ans.

**~** II-5.) The proper shipping name and description for the ammunition was "Cartridges, Small Anns, Class 1.4, UN0012, PG II." (Com

**pl.~·** II-6; Ans.

**~** II-6.) The Shipfn:ent had not been marked or labeled as required by the : .

**~** \ I, HMR. (Compl.

**~** II-7; Ans.

**~Il-7.)** It had not been accomp.anied by emergency response information as required. (Compl.

**~** Il-9; Ans.

**~** 11-9.) In addition, atthe time Respondent offered the Shipment, the Respondent had not ensured that each ofits employees who had offered the Shipmenthad been trained in accordance with 49 C.F.R., Part 172, Subpart H. (Compl.

**~** II-10; Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 2.)

11 In their Motion and Responses, neither party identified the man who had accompanied Mr. Williams to the FedEx Store. (Ex. B, 1.) It is likely, however, that this individual with personal knowledge ofthe incident was the "Robert Smith" identified by. the Respondent in its December I, 2014 Answers to the FAA Interrogatories (Mot. Dec.; Ex. 5, l.) Page 9 of22

### F. BriefDiscussion ofDisputed Matters The FAA mustprovethatthe Respondent knowingly violated the HMR. 49 U.S.C. 

### § 5123(a)(l). "A person acts knowingly when-(A) the person has actual knowledge ofthe facts giving rise to the violation; or (B) a reasonable person acting in the circumstances and exercisingreasonable care would have that knowledge." 

### !d. The Respondent asserted it had not "knowingly" violated any HMR. It

### argued that genuine issues ofmaterial fact remained for hearing on all issues. All evidence and argiifne.nts by bothparties have been fully considered. However, only certainmatters will be

**.h~g.~lighted** 

### and discussed. 1. "Knowingly" Offet-ihg:the Ammunition·for Air Shipping TheFAA asserted

**th~t ~he**  

### evidence showed.the Respondent had clearly known that the Shipmentcontaining

**l~a;z:mat** 

### was offered for airtransportation (rather than ground transportation). (Mot. Dec., 5.) As part ofthe FAA's Motion for Decision, it proffered Mr. Williams' August 7, 2012 statement to the FAA ("Statement"). (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7.) The FAA also poinfed butthat the undisputed evidence showed that the Respondent had agreed that ·it :ha:d offered an 

### undeclaredhazmat shiptnent for 

### any type of transportation. 12 

### (Mot. Dec:



### ?,)~. In its SupplementalResponse, the Respondent disagreed. It

### presented multiple arguments, but submitted little·orno fact evidence in support ofthese arguments. 13 

### For exmnple (not inclusive), itproffered hearsay evidence gathered by the FAA which generally supported the FAA's rendition ofcertain facts (Supp. Resp. Ex. B), but then

... '•i 12 There is some limitation to this po,rtion ofthe FAA's argument. For example, it did not assert or demonstrate that the regulations charged against the Respondent in this case applied equally to ground transportation. See, Atlas Frontier_s, LLC, FAA Order No. 20I0-10, 20 I0 WL 7940346, (FAA June 16, 20I0)( §E. Change in Transportati'o.h ·Mode..."the regulations at issue [in this case] apply to transportation by ground as well as by air.") Se9pnd, it specifically alleged in its pleadings that the mode oftransportation utilized by the Respondent had been airtransportation. 13 As noted supra, (i.e., §C. Standard ofReview for Summary Judgment), in a summaryjudgment motion a party who wishes to proceed to trial must present "adequately probative evidence." See Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at I179 ("[M]ere allegations or denials" or "assertions in legal memoranda or argument" or "characterizations ofdisputed facts". are not sufficient.) 

### Page 10 

### of22. argued that such hearsay evidence was notcredible. This was not helpful, since neither credibility disputes nor arguments about credibility maybe considered in summary judgmentproceedings. 14 The Respondent also argued that it hadnever specifically requested the SpokaneFedEx clerk to send the Shipmentby air. Ithad only asked that the Shipment be sent expeditiously. Itasserted that it had not "known" that the Spokane FedEx clerk would ship the ammunition by air when it was shipped "overnight.'' 15 (Supp. Resp. 3-4.)Thus, the Respondent concluded, it did nothave actual knowledge that the boxes would be shipped via airtransportation, and therefore should not be held liable for any hazmat shipping



### viol~tibns. **16** (Supp. Resp. 3-4.)

I ·,; 

### Itshould be noted tpat,inthe Respondent's Answers to the FAA's Interrogatories :r,' :.· .• (Mot. Dec.; Ex. 5), the Respqndent summarizedthis defense17 and asserted that it would supportthis defense with



### I\1~·!David Carl Williams' testimonial evidence. 18 But in response to the FAA's sumn1aryjudgment motion, the Respondent did not provide any testimonial orotherfact evide,nce, eitherfrom Mr. Williams orthe male friend who accompanied Mr. Williams to the FedEx Store. Further, the Respondent did not provide ·.' any evidence to explain, lin1it, correct, ordisavow the multiple fact admissions expressly tnade by Mr. David Carl Williams in his August 7, 2012 Letter regarding the June 12, 2012 Ship1nent. 

### A. PartyAgent'sStatementAgainstInterest- Substantive Evidence It is well established that a statement (i.e., oral, written, or non-verbal conduct) of a party opponent may be offered againstthatparty in a civil action. Fed. R. Evid.

14 As noted supra (i.e., §C. Standard ofReview for Summary Judgment), the court does not evaluate credibility or rule on the weight of.the evidence in a summaryjudgment motion. See Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at II68-69. 15 See, e.g., the Respondent's Answers to the FAA's Interrogatories (according to the Respondent's "recollection, the Federal Express employee never stated whether the packages would be sent via air or ground transportation. (Mot. Dec: Ex. 5, 2-3,

**~I**0 .)(emphasis added). 16 These arguments were also contained in the Respondent's Answers to the FAA's Interrogatories (Mot. Dec. Ex. 5).. 17 See, e.g., Mot. Dec. Ex. 5, 2-3,

**~I**0. 18 Respondent Answer 2 states: "Mr. Williams will testify to his personal account ofthe facts as stated in Interrogatory answer number I0" (Mot. Dec.; Ex. 5, 2). Page 

### 11 of22801(d)(2); Restatement (Second) ofAgency §286 (Am. Law Inst. 2015). In addition, when a party opponent admits some "damaging" fact, then such statement may be used to prove the truth offact asserted, "irrespective" ofthe party's orparty agent's "motive in making them." 

### 2McCormick onEvidence§ 259 (7th ed.). Such opposing party statements are deemedto have "specialevidentiary value" and are admissible as "substantive" evidence, "becausethat party is discredited, like a witness impeached by contradictory statements, by the party's own statements inconsistent with his or her present claim." 29A Am. Jur. 2dEvidence,§ 773. See also,Airborne Maintenance, FAAOrderNo. 2016-1, 15 (April1A, 2016) ("admissions by their very nature have a "special reliability".)

. ' They will only be

**off~red** againstthe principal when they admit son1e fact damagingto the



### pri~2'ip~l, and this kind ofstatement by an agent is likely to be trustworthy. No special danger ofsurprise, confusion, or prejudice from the use ofthe evidence is apparent. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 259 (ih ed.). B. The Respondent Offeredthe Shipment forAir Transportation As noted earli'er herein, as part ofthe FAA's Motion for Decision, it proffered Exhibit 7, which was Mr. Willimns' August 7, 2012 Statementto the FAA ("Statement''). Mr. Williams wrote this Statementto provide an "explanation ofthe circumstances surrounding our shipmentofammunitionby overnight airthrough the FedEx facility in Spokane, Washington." (Mot. Dec. Ex. 

### 7, 1.) In this Statement, Mr. Williams acknowledged that priorto June 12, 2012, he had specifically obtained cotnparison price quotes from FedEx for shippingthe ammunition either by "two-day air," or"ovemight" from both Seattle, Washington and Spokane, Washingtonto Whitefish, Montana. 19 (Mot. Ex. 7, 1.) He decided to ship overnight from Spokane, Washington via FedEx because of the reduced cost. (Jd.) FedEx assured him the ammunition could be shipped overnight (i.e., "next day service") without a problem. (!d.; Supp. Resp; Ex. 8, 1.) Mr. Willian1s relied uponthe FedEx employee's advice. (Mot. Ex. 7, at 1-2.) In retrospect, after

19 It is noteworthy that the Respondent never offered any evidence in support ofits inferential argument that the FedEx quote for "overnight" delivery was not for "one-day air", but instead was for a ground transportation option that would have provided faster delivery than a "two-day air" transportation option. Page 

### 12 of22discussing the n1atter with Agent King and FAA Special Agent Allen, Mr. Willimns realized thatthe mannerin whichthe ammunition hadbeen shipped by airhad been ''wrong." 

### (ld. at 2.) The Respondent vigorously argued that there was a lack ofevidence to prove the FAA's allegationthatthe Respondenthad "knowingly" offered the Shipmentfor air

. ' transport. The Respondent argued (among otherthings) thatithad not knownthat "overnight" shipping meant "air"transportation. However, in making these arguments, the Respondent ignored Mr. Williams' August 7, 2012 Statement, in which he states (in part): 

### "1. We did not know

**th~t** ammunition could not be sent by overnight air." (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) Mr. Williams further stated: "Had we...knownthat there was goingto be a problen1 with the shipment, we would have rented a car and drove to Whitefish, Montana to deliver the ammunition- as we had originally planned:" (Mot. Dec. Ex. 

### 7, 1.) This evidence, evenwhen viewed in a light most favorable to the Respondent (who didnotprofferthe material), proves that the Respondentknowingly offered the Shipment for overnight airtransportation. It also refutes the Respondent's unsupported arguments that it reasonably believedthe Shipment would be sent "overnight" via ground transportation, sinceMr. Williams affirmatively states that he would have provided ground transportationhimselfhad he known about the problems with overnight air shipping. In proffering Mr. Williams' Statement (and other materials), the FAA has met its burden ofproofonthe primafacie case involving the alleged issue. Thus, the burden shifts to the Respondentto show, by affidavit or otherwise, that a genuine dispute of material fact remains for the fact-finder to resolve. Baicker-McKee, et al., 

### supra, at 1178. As partofits defense, the Respondent assertedthatthe statements ofMs. Orsburn, a FedEx employee, as summarized and recorded by Agent King, were not accurate. 20 (Supp. Resp. 3,

**~liLA** and Ex. B). However, even ifthe Court could accept as evidence

20 Ms. Orsburn (the FedEx employee) stated that she accepted the Shipment for "next-day service", but did not expressly say that the Respondent had asked for air transportation. However, Ms. Orsburn also stated that had she known ofthe Shipment contents, she would have taken steps to ensure that the Shipment had been "properly offered and accepted for air transport." (Supp. Resp., Ex. B, I.) Page 

### 13 of.22the Respondent's arguments that Ms. Orsburn had failed to accurately and credibly recall statetnents she mighthave made to Mr. Willian1s on June 12, 2012, such potential inaccuracies in Ms. Orsburn'sreportedhearsay statementwould not offset or counter Mr. Williatns' own August 7, 2012 unrefuted admissions on the issue. Mr. Williams' Statementis a party's admission ofmaterial fact. In its two Responses to the FAA'sMotion for Decision, the Respondent failed to present any fact evidence to limit, explain, refute orcorrect either Mr. Williams' Statement, or to rebut the FAA's other proffered evidence.21 As a result, there is no genuine dispute on any tnaterial ::!;:· fact that on June 12, 2012, the Respondent knowingly offered the Shipmentto FedEx in Spokane, Washington for overnight air transportation to Whitefish, Montana. 22 2. ProofofActual Knowledge ofHMR Marking and Labelling Laws The Respondent arguedthatthe FAA was required to showthat the Respondent "had [actual] knowledge ofthe labeling and certificationrequirements" in orderto prove that the Respondenthad committed the violations. (Supp. Resp. 4.) In essence, the Respondent arguedthat a business should be shielded from civil penalty enforcement actions unless the FAA could provethat the business had actual knowledge about the published regulations prohibiting certain conduct, and had knowingly failed to abide by such regulations. In other words, a business' ignorance of the law23 should be a defense. The Respondent did not provide, however, any regulation or caselawthat supported this legal argument.

21 While the Respondent did submit a Google Map to show the distance between Spokane, Washington and Whitefish, Montana, this was evidence submitted by the Respondent to support its alternate argument that, absent proofofthe Respondent's actual knowledge that the Shipment was sent by air, a reasonable person would have believed that the Shipment was being transported by ground transportation. (Supp. Resp. 5, Ex. C.) This alternate argument was rendered mootby the Respondent's own admissions, as noted in this Order. 22 Given these admissions and evidence, the Respondent's alternate argument-absent any evidence proving actual knowledge, under a reasonable person standard the Respondent could not have known the Shipment would be sent by FedEx by air (Supp. Resp. 5.C)- need not be addressed. 23 "Ignorance oflaw is want ofknowledge or acquaintance with the laws ofthe land in so far as they apply to the...matter under consideration." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Page 14 of22It should be noted that this type of'"ignorance" defense has a well-established history, dating backto the Roman era. However, even in R01nan times, ignorance ofthe lawwas not a persuasive defense.24 Furthermore, in the instant case, 49 U.S.C. 

### § 5123(a)does not require that the FAA prove thatthe Respondent have actual or constructive knowledge ofthe regulations (requiring hazmatmarking and labelling) priorto being found culpable for violating these regulations. Stated more specifically, the FAA need not prove thatthe Respondent actually knew ofthe HMRrequirements for marking and labelling hazmat. Nor does the FAA need to prove that the

**~~spondent** knew that its act in offering the shipment without

· such marking and labelling

**~<?:l!stituted** a violation. Instead, the FAA must simply prove that the Respondent knowingly committed an act (or acts) which resulted in the violation(s). Thus, it is enotighthatthe FAA provesthatthe Respondent knew 

### orshould have known the hazn1at contents ofits shipment when it offered it for transportation. 25 [W]here ... dangerous ordeleterious devices orproducts or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability ofa regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of. ..[dangerous materials] or

.dealing with them must be presumed to be aware ofthe regulation. 

### UnitedStates v. Int 'lMinerals & 

### Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971). In the instant case, the parties agreed that the Respondent's Shipment contained stnall arms an11nunition which is classified as hazmat under the HMR. (Con1pl.

**~** 11-5; Ans.

**~** II-5.) The parties also agreed that the proper shipping name and description for the hazmat ammunitionwas "Cartridges, Small Arms, Class 1.4, UN0012, PG II." (Compl.

**~** II-6; Ans.

**~** II-6.) The Respondent admitted that it was fully aware that it was shipping

24 The Latin phrase "ignorantia legis neminem excusat" translates as: Ignorance ofthe law excuses no one. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1979). 25 See TCI Corp., FAA OrderNo. 92-77, at 8-9,fn. 13, 1992 WL 753226 (Dec. 22, 1992) (quoting the legislative history: a civil penalty may be imposed only upon proofthat the defendant knowingly committed the act which constitutes the violation (it is not necessary to show that he knew the act constituted a violation)[.]. S. Conf. Rep. No. 1347, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7669, 7686)). See also, Midtown Neon Sign Corp., FAA Order No. 96-26, at *5, and fn. 4, 1996 WL 509936 (Aug. 12, 1996)(Midtown "knowingly" violated the hazardous material statute and regulations because Midtown had knowledge ofthe hazmat content ofits shipment, which gave rise to the violations). Page 15 of22ammunition when it brought its Shipn1ent into the FedEx Store on June 12, 2012. (Mot. Dec., Ex. 5, 

### 2-3

**~** 

### 1 0.) Thus, the stipulated evidence proves that the Respondent knew the contents ofits shipment when it proffered it for FedEx transportation.26 3. FedEx Shouldbe Held Solely Liable for the Improper Shipment The FAA asserted that the law clearly required the Respondent, as the shipper offering hazmat, to be heldresponsible to perform the shipper's duties (e.g., marking, labeling, preparing shippingpapers), and thatthose duties couldnotbetransferred by the Respondent to FedEx. (Moi. bee., 3-4). In response, the Respondent asserted that FedEx was the actual

**~~offeror"** ofthe hazmat Shipment, andwas, therefore, solely liable for the violations and civil penalty. (Ans. 2; Mot. Dec., Ex. 

### 5 at 3; Supp. Resp. 6.) In support ofthis assertion, the Respondent argued that it had not hidden the fact that the Shipment contained atnmunition frotn FedEx.27 ,(Supp. Resp. 4.) Therefore, the Spokane FedEx clerk who accepted the Shipmenton June 12, 2012 should have known, or

**"reasona~ly** inferred" that the boxes contained ammunition. (Supp. Resp. 4.) The Respondent arguedthat because FedEx did not refuse the Shipment, and accepted it for transportati-on, the burden for properly marking and labellingthe Shipmenthad been transferred to, and accepted by, FedEx. (I d. at 6:5-21). In essence, the Respondent seeks to place the primary burden ofHMR compliance on con1tnercial transportation and delivery service companies (e.g., FedEx, United Parcel Service, etc.), instead ofonthe customers who bring their hazmat packages to these businesses in orderto utilize theirtransportation and delivery services. The Respondent provided no regulatory language or caselaw in support ofthis legal

26 Given the undisputed and admitted evidence and the well-established legal standards regarding the requisite proofofknowledge in hazmat shipping, the Respondent's alternate argument-thatunder a reasonable person standard it could not have known about the need to utilize HMR markings and labelling and therefore cannot be held culpable (Supp. Resp. 5.0)-need not be addressed.
27 The Respondent emphasized that it orally communicated to FedEx employees that the packages contained small arms ammunition. (Mot. Dec., Ex. 5,

**~** I0.) However, this is not a material fact in dispute, because the Complaint does not allege that the hazmat Shipment was an "undeclared shipment." Page 16 of22argument.28 The Respondent also did not respond to the

### James Walsh case cited by the FAA (Motion for Decision, 3:39-4:6), in which Judge Benkinheld that it is the '"shipper's responsibility, not the carrier" to comply with hazmat regulations.

### James Walsh, Docket No. FAA-2007-29197, 2008 WL 926620, at 4 (FAA Mar. 31, 2008). The Respondent's unique arguments that it is not culpable as a matter ofiaw, because its' shipping duties under the HMR should be deemed to have been transferred to FedEX, is not supported by any legal authority and appearscontrary to established regulation and caselaw; As

**~result,** such argumentshave no merit and will not be further addressed. 4. Insufficiency ofEvidence on the HMRTraining Allegation The FAA allegedthatthe Respondent had not ensured each ofits employees who handled Hazmathadbeentrained perTitle 49 C.F.R., SubchapterC, Subpart H. (Compl. 3,

**~** 10.) In support ofthis allegation, the FAA proffered Mr. Williams' August 7, 2012 Statement, and asserted that the Respondent had ad1nitted to the allegation. (Mot. Dec.

**5~** Ex. 7, 2.) In response, the Respondent asserted that the FAA had failed to name any "employee" involved, and had failed to submit any evidence in supportofthe "e1nployee" allegation. (Supp. Resp., 6-7.) The Respondent further argued that Mr. David Carl Williams, one ofthetwo individuals who offered the Shipmentfor FedEx on behalfofthe Respondent, was exempt from the regulation because he was the company owner, and, therefore, could not be deemed an ""employee." (!d.) The Respondentis correctthat the Shipmentwas offered to FedEx by two Respondentrepresentatives-Mr. Williams and another gentleman (unnamed). (Supp. Resp. Ex. B 1; Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) The Respondent is correct that the FAA has not affirn1atively identified the name ofMr. Williams' companion, nor has the FAA

28 Even ifFedEx is I iable for violations ofregulations governingthe acceptance ofhazmat for air transportation, see49 C.F.R. § I75.30, it would not relieve the Respondent ofliability for violating the regulations governing the offer ofhazmat for transportation. See 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(a) ("Each person who performs a function covered by [the HMR] must perform that function in accordance with the HMR."). Page 17 of22established that this companionwas legally employedbythe Respondent at the time the Shipment was offered. Nevertheless, this absence ofevidence is not dispositive ofthe issue, since Mr. Williams-asthe ownerofthe Respondent-clearly offered the Shipment on June 12, 2012, in his capacity as the self-employed representative ofhis business. According to the HMR, a hazmat employee is defined in part as: 

### (1) A person who is: (i) Employed on a full-time, parttime, ortemporary basis by a hazmat employer and who inthe course ofsuch ... employment directlyaffectshazardous materials transportation safety; (ii) 

### Se(f-employed. .. who in the course of suchself-employmentdirectly affects hazardous materials transportation safety[.] 49 C.F.R. § 171.8 (emphasis added). In addition, Mr. Willian1s acknowledged in his August 7, 2012 Statementthat he had not had any haz1nat training, and that he realized that he needed it. Therefore, Ithink a course in dangerous and hazardous goods is actually fitting for us. I have signedup for this course online (enclosed). I wi

### II con1plete the course andprovide FAA with a certificate in the near future. Mot. Dec., Ex. 7, 2. The Respondent's legal argumentthat49 C.F.R. § 172.702 cannot impose liability on employers who themselves are notproperly trained (Supp. Resp., 6-7) is fundamentally flawed, because it ignores the legal definition of"hazmat employee.'' 49 C.F.R. § 171.8. In short, even self-employed individuals like Mr. Williams are required to comply with the HMRs when they offer hazmat for transportation. G. Alleged Regulatory Violations Proven As noted earlierherein, the purpose ofsummaryjudgment is "to isolate, and then terminate, claims and defenses that are factually unsupported." Baicker-McKee, et al., 

### supra, at 1122. In the instant case, the facts admitted into evidence for summary judgmentreview show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding Page 18 of22the ten (10) alleged violations ofthe HMR, and the FAA is entitled tojudgment as a tnatter oflawonthe ten 

### (10) alleged violations: 1. Violation 1-offering a haztnat for transportation in commerce when the hazn1at was not properly classed, described, packaged, marked, labeled, and in condition for shipment as required or authorized by the HMR.29 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(e). 2. Violation 2 -offeringhazmatfor transportation without describing the hazmat on the shippingpaperin the mannerrequired by subpart C ofPart 172. 30 49 C.F.R.**~** 172.200(a)/172.202. 3. ViolatioQ 

### 3- offering!hazmatfor transportation whenthe shippingpaper did not include the certification containedin§ 172.204(a)(l) ofthe HMR, the declaration contained in § 172.204(a)(2) ofthe HMR, orthe certification contained in 

### § 172.204(c)(1) ofthe HMR. 31 49 C.F.R § 172.204. 4. Violation 4- offering for transportation a hazmat in a non-bulk packaging and failing to markthepackage withtheproper shipping name.32 49 C.F.R. 

### § 172.300/172.301(a). 5. Violation 

### 5- offering hazmat for transportation when the required tnarkings were not durable, in English, and printed on or affixed to the surface ofthe ' 33 package or on a'label, tag, or sign. 49 C.F.R. § 172.304(a)(1). 6. Violation 6 -offering a package containing hazmat for transportation when the package was not properly labeled as specified in 49 C.F.R. 

### § 172.101.34 49 C.F.R. § 172.400(a).

29 NB: Violation 1 is a general regulation which necessarily results, ifthe FAA proves any ofthe more specific regulations allegedly violated, involving classing, describing, packaging, marking, or labeling.
]O The Respondent never disputed that it failed to describe the hazmat on the shipping paper in the manner required by subpart C ofPart 172. (Compl. 3,**~~** 6- 7; Ans.**I,~~** 6- 7.) 31 The Respondent never disputed that the shipping paper did not include the required certification or declaration. (Compl. 3,**~** 7; Ans.**I,~** 7.) · ]Z The Respondent never disputed that it failed to mark the package with the proper shipping name. (Compl. 3,**~** 7; Ans.**I,~** 7.) 33 The Respondent never disputed that the required markings were not durable, in English, and printed on or affixed to the surface ofthe package, because it did not dispute that it failed to mark the package at all. (Compl. 3,**~** 7; Ans. 1,**~** 7.) ] 4 The Respondent never disputed that the package was not properly labeled. (Compl. 3,**~** 7; Ans.**I,~** 7.) Page 19 of22

### 7. 

### Violation 7- offering hazmatfor transportation withoutproviding emergency response information required by 49 C.P.R., Part 172, Subpart G. 35 

### 49 C.P.R. 

### § 172.600(c)/172.604. 8. 

### Violation 8
- ensuring that each ofits hazmat employees is trained in accordance with the requirementsprescribed in 49 C.P.R. Part 172, Subpart H. 49 C.F.R. 

### § 172.702(a). 9. 

### Violation 9- offering for transportation by air, highway, rail, or water a shipment ofhazmatthat is not prepared in accordance with the HMR. 

### It is the responsibility ofeach hazmatemployerto ensure that each haz1nat employee is trained in

**accordanc,~** 

### .with the requirements prescribed in the HMR.36 

### 49 C.F.R. § 173.1(b). 10. 

### Violation 10 -offering.?hazmatfor transportation and failing to properly class and describe the

**hazrpa~** 

### in accordance with 49 C.F.R., Parts 172 and 173.37 

### 49

.C.F.R. 

### § 173.22(a). 

### H. Dispute Remains on the $50,000 Proposed Civil Penalty In its Motion for Decision, the FAA asserted that the $50,000 proposed civil penalty was appropriate, in part because "[t]his case involves an undeclared shipment that was within quantity limitationsand therefore is considered an Offense Category II for sanctionpurposes." (Mot. Dec., 6- 7.) The evidence demonstrates a genuine dispute, in thatthat the Mr. David Carl asserted that the·Shipment was identified. (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1("We clearly labeled our boxes with 'Global Arms & 

### Ammunition' stickers, as we were not trying to hide anything.")). Exhibit B appears to supportthe Respondent'sposition that "PedEx was infonned" that the boxes contained ammunition," because labels which read, ''"GLOBAL

35 The Respondent never disputed that it failed to provide emergency response information. (Compl. 3,

**~** 9; Ans. 2,

**~** 9.) 16 Like Violation I, this is a general regulation which necessarily results ifthe FAA proves any ofthe more specific regulations allegedly violated that involve hazmat training.
:n The Respondent neverdisputed that the proper shipping name and description ofsmall arms ammunition is "Cartridges, Small Anns, Class 1.4, UNOO 12, PG II" (Compl. 3,

**~** 5; Ans.

**I,~** 5), nor did it ever dispute that that it failed to properly class and describe the hazmat (Compl. 3,

**~** 7; Ans.

**I,~** 7). 

### Page 

### 20 of22ARMS 

### & AMMUNITION" were affixedto the Shipment (Supp. Resp. 4; Ex. 5,

**~** 1 0.) FedEx personnel acknowledgedthat the triggerterms "arms" and "ammunition" appeared on its airway bill. (Ex. B, 2.) The FAA's assertionthat Offense Category II should be utilized because the Shipment was "undeclaredhazardous material" is disputed, and also may not be supported by law, since the Shipmentdid have some "visible indication" on the outside ofthe package that hazardous material was present. 

### See Undeclaredhazardmaterial, 49 C.P.R. 

### § 171.8. The FAA asserted that'because "Respondent is a companythat regularly offers, accepts ortransports HAZMAT, it is considered a Category D Offenderfor sanction purposes." (Mot. Dec., 6.) 

### In:.its' general responses, the Respondent admitted that it was a company thatregularly offered, accepted ortransported Hazmat (Com pl. 2,

**~** 1; Ans. 1,

**~** 1 ), but it argued thatthe FAA had not considered all relevant fact information regarding the Shiptnent incident, and had taken "son1e ofthe facts....out ofcontext.'' (Supp. Resp. 4; Resp. 2: 15-16.) Mr. Williams explained he had not known that the ammunition in the four-box Shipment "could not be sent by overnight air." (Mot. Dec., Ex. 7 at 1-2.) He also had not known aboutthe HMR limitations for shipping ammunition by air. 

### (!d. at 2.) Once he learned ofthe HMR limitations, he agreed that taking hazmat training would be helpful, and had immediately enrolled online in a course. (/d.) It appeared undisputed that the Respondenthad taken corrective action afterthe violation, a fact which n1ay not have been factored into the FAA'scalculations. (Mot. Dec., Ex. 7, 2.) Thus, genuine issues ofmaterial fact remain regarding the FAA's proposed civil penalty of$50,000.See, e.g.,

### AtlasFrontiers, LLC,·FAA OrderNo. 2010-1 0, 2010 WL

.7940346, (FAA June 16, 2010).



### I. Conclusion Pursuant to 14 C.P.R. § 13.218 and Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 56, and after considering all the subn1itted evidence and undisputed materials in a light most favorable to the non-n1oving party (i.e., the Respondent herein); Page 21 of22

### ITIS HEREBY ORDERED: 1) The FAA's Motionfor Decision is granted in part. There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding Violations 1 - 1

**0~** and the FAA is grantedjudgment as a matter oflaw on each ofthese violations. 2) The FAA's Motion for Decision is denied in part. There are genuine disputes of material fact remainingregarding the FAA'sproposed civil penalty of

### $50,000. The FAA is deniedjudgment as a matter oflaw on the proposed 

### $50,000 civil penalty. 

### 3) Theparties shall proceed to hearing onthe disputed issue ofthe proposed 

### $50,000 civil penalty. 4) A separate Orderwill 

### be issued shortly, which will notify the parties ofthe date for appearing at a Litigation Scheduling Conference onthe remaining matter.

Attachment: Service List

Page 22 of22

### DocketNo. FAA-2014-0320 (Civil Penalty Action)


### SERVICE LIST - BY U.S. MAIL ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

### Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1 000 1 ONE COPY 

### Mr. Kyle Lomazow 

### Complainant's Counsel Northwest Mountain Region, ANM-7 Federal Aviation Administration 1601 Lind Ave., S.W. Renton, WA 98057 TEL: 425-227-1847 FAX: 425-227-1007 Mr. Vincent Williams 

### Respondent'sLayRepresentative Global Arms and Ammunition 501 South Jackson St., Suite 305 Seattle, WA 98104 TEL:

**206-366~5279** 

### Judge J.E. Sullivan 

### U.S. AdministrativeLawJudge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200NewJerseyAvenue, S.E. (E11-310) Washington, DC 20590 TEL: 202-366-6941 FAX: 202-366-7536 Mr. David Carl Williams, President Global Arms and Ammunition, 

### Re.spondent 28 -3i11 

### StreetN.E., Suite A Auburn, WA 98002 TEL: 206-325-9400

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W I000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.