UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

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RECEIVED 

FEB 0 7 2017 

HEARING DOCKET 

IN THE MATTER OF 

PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL 

SKYDIVING CENTER, 

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Judge: Douglas M. Rawald 

Respondent 

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Docket#: FAA-2014-1116 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

RESPONDENT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 

Phaedrus, a first century Roman fabulist, wrote that "things are not always what they seem; 

the first appearance deceives many." The facts and necessary conclusions in the case before this 

Court confirm the accuracy of Phaedrus' observation. The motivations of the ground video 

videographer to destroy the Respondent's business and to even kill its personnel, coupled with 

uncontradicted, articulated, expert opinions and reasons why neither the ground video nor the air 

video are accurate portrayals of reality prove that the actions purportedly shown in the videos are 

not what they seem, and that the first appearance must be disregarded and a decision rendered in 

favor of the Respondent, Pacific International Skydiving. 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 

On 27 January 2015, in response to Respondent's written appeal request, the Administrator 

filed its Complaint in this cause, alleging four (4) separate dates on which the Respondent allegedly 

conducted parachute operations into or through clouds (8 December20 13, 5 January 2014, 22 March 

and 25 March 2014) and alleged violations of 14 C.P.R. §105.17(a) and 14 C.P.R. §91.13 (a). 

(Complaint.), seeking a total civil penalty of$55,000.00. 

Inspector Kyle Bartler testified that he reviewed "Y ouTube" videos through links provided 

by Hinshaw and decided that there was sufficient evidence enough to pursue enforcement." I Tr. 

38. Similar decisions were made for the other videos Hinshaw submitted. Hinshaw provided 

affidavits stating "under penalty of perjury" that he had "not altered the video in any way." A-6., A8, A-16 However, because there were multiple files strung together in the videos provided to the 

Administrator, contrary to his declarations, they had, in fact, been edited (I Tr. 161), and the 

important metadata (time and time code, date, lens focal length, f-stop, etc.) which would have 

helped to analyze the accuracy of the video and audio was lost. 2 Tr. 297-302. 

During all of the videos, Hinshaw maintained a running commentary, including comments 

about how "dirty" (2 Tr. 253) the jumps were, and how the jumpers were going through clouds and 

violating Federal Aviation Regulations ("F ARs) (multiple instances in transcript). The Court stated 

that it was not going to consider him an expert and that it would not consider his conclusions made 

in the audio about F ARs being violated. 1 Tr. 172. 

I. The individuals did not parachute through clouds. 

A. Definition of a cloud. The only definition of a cloud provided in this case was provided by 
the Respondent. The FAA interpretation of what constitutes a cloud was stated in a deposition 

taken in a case styled, In the Matter of FAA v. Kamm, NTSB Docket No. SE-19099, a case 

involving alleged aircraft penetration of clouds, Danny Billman, an FAA inspector with 23,000 

hours of pilot time (R-14 at 4-5) and experience flying in Hawaii (I d. at 6) stated, as a representative 

of the Administrator, that if you can see through it, it's not a cloud; that a cloud is opaque; that "if 

it was misty and you can see through it, it wouldn't be a violation. R -14: Danny Billman Deposition 

Transcript, 18-19. We can"t determine from any camera angle or view what the parachutists saw 

with their eyes. If the parachutist could see through the reduced visibility (not what the camera 

recorded, but what the parachutist saw) then the parachutist was not jumping into or through a cloud. 

Because of the accuracy limitations of what a camera records, as discussed below, compared with 

the power and accuracy of the human eye for a parachutist who would be much closer to any 

existing reduced visibility situation than any observer on the ground, it is impossible for anyone 

except the parachutist conducting the jump to determine if the precipitation or condensation is not 

opaque. 

B. With respect to the ground to air video recorded by Frank T .K. Hinshaw and the 

credibility of his testimony, neither should be assigned any weight. 

The Administrator presented videos taken by Frank T.K. Hinshaw (hereinafter referred to 

as "Hinshaw,"), the son of the owner of a competitor, Skydive Hawaii. (1 Tr. 187, 239.) Hinshaw 

posted Facebook posts threatening the lives of Respondent's personnel and their pets. R-16, 2 Tr. 

257. When asked about the Facebook posts, he invoked the 5'h Amendment. 1 Tr. 280. 

During the hearing, the father, Frank Hinshaw, president of Skydive Hawaii (! Tr. 239), 

who had been present in the courtroom through most of the hearing (2 Tr. 269), after testimony by 

an employee and contractors of Respondent regarding threats, including verbal and other threats, 

such as throat slashing gestures made by Hinshaw towards them (2 Tr. 243, 245-246, 258, 261 ), left 

the courtroom and swore at and intimidated (2 Tr. 272) witnesses who had just testified and who 

were, at the time, subject to recall for further testimony. 2 Tr. 268. Darryl Green was recalled to the 

stand and stated that he was sitting outside and that Frank Hinshaw "just came out of the building 

and said something about talking to each other and then also said, 'You are a fucking bitch."' 2 Tr. 

268. Green was concerned for his safety. Id. 

When brought back to the wituess stand to describe what had occurred in the hall, Roxanne 

Stanley was shaking and almost in tears. She stated, in response to a question whether or not she 

was concerned for her safety, that her "heart is racing because this is the kind ofbehavior that I feel 

is extremely intimidating and scary .... " 2 Tr. 271-272. 

In response to the incident, the Court stated: "I will note for the record that Mr. Frank 

Hinshaw has been an avid spectator here throughout the hearing. Before the hearing started, Mr. 

Feldman advised me that he thought that it may influence the witness' testimony. However, I found 

that this is going to be a public forum and that Mr. Frank Hinshaw would, of course, accord himself 

in the appropriate fashion and so I did not ask him to depart the courtroom. So at this point, if he 

has made any sort of statements that may, of course, unfortunately at the credibility ofhis son, I will 

have to think about that further. !d. At 269. 

Hinshaw also invoked his 5'h Amendment rights when asked about the throat slashing 

gestures. 1 Tr. 281-282. It is clear that his motivation for shooting the video was to destroy the 

Respondent's business, and that his ultimate goals were maybe worse. His credibility against 

Respondent should be deemed to be non-existent. It is most probable, considering the nature of the 

videos, in listening to Hinshaw's self-serving running commentary, and in consideration of the 
inaccuracy of what he claims they show, that the entire video procedure was designed by Hinshaw 

to create an appearance that parachutists were descending through clouds and the worst possible 

record to submit to the FSDO so that inspectors there would investigate the Respondent and create 

such financial hardship for them that they would be driven out of business. Hinshaw did his best 

to show the worst possible clouds in the sky, even if they were nowhere near the skydivers. His 

comments identifYing Mr. Banal in the video as "the leadership over there" and his description of 

him in court as short and losing his hair also show his contempt for the Respondent. I Tr. 178. The 

outrageous events that took place outside the courtroom also show his malice and contempt for 

Respondent's contractors and employees. 

Even with his lack of credibility, brief moments of candid honesty were present in Hinshaw's 

testimony. He testified that he had no professional experience, however he had edited video as a 

hobby, and that his experience was "very amateur." (I Tr. 253.) He stated that he had no 

professional camera training. (I Tr. 275.) He was not an expert. Most importantly, he stated that 

he never actually saw any jumpers going into a cloud. I Tr. 252. Hinshaw, even as a lay witness, 

stated that it would be possible that he could look up and think that someone' s going through a cloud 

when, in fact, they could be going through an opening if there were clear areas around the overcast 

area. 1 Tr. 245-6. He stated that if viewed from an angle at a distance a jumper could appear to be 

going through a cloud when in fact they did not. 1 Tr. 246-247. 

Respondent's expert, Torn Sanders, a world renowned skydiver, cameraman and 

videographer R-24; 2 Tr. 281-282) who both flew aircraft (2 Tr. 284) at and around, and skydived 

at and around, Dillingham Airfield (2 Tr. 283-284) and who, at one time, lived near the airport (2 

Tr. 284-285), who has lived on the North Shore for 15 years, works at Dillingham Airfield, was 

familiar with the weather conditions there (2 Tr. 284) and who had observed cloud conditions as 

they changed over Dillingham Airfield (2 Tr. 285) was the only expert in both skydiving and 

photography to testifY in this case. He had 38 years experience in skydiving photography and 

understood the limitations of video shot from the ground and in the air. He was the only expert 

qualified to testifY about the false conclusions a viewer not skilled in understanding the factors 

affecting its reliability could draw from watching the video in the case; the only expert who could 

testifY aboutthe lack of reliability of the photographic evidence, including the Hinshaw video, shot 

from the ground, and the GoPro video, shot from the air. 

He testified that there were multiple cloud layers in all of the ground to air videos. 2 Tr. 311. 

He testified that because of camera limitations that affected the quality of the video, there was 

actually blue sky where it appeared to a lay observer to be grey. 3 Tr. 34-35. He stated that because 

of the angle and layered clouds, none of the Hinshaw video showed what was above any of the 

parachutists; that they could have come through a hole, but the video wouldn't show it; that it did 

not show what the parachutists fell through but only what was behind them. 2 Tr. 338-339, 3 Tr. 

35, 3 Tr. 38, 3 Tr. 42-43, 3 Tr. 59. With respect the ground to air video he stated: 

I'm going to have to stand behind my statement, which will apply for all ground shots 

looking upward, you can't tell where the clouds are. They are stacked together from 

an angle. If he is zooming in, it's not a sufficient angle to judge when somebody is 

falling downward if they are going through it or not. You can't tell if you are looking 

out. They are opening their parachute a mile high in the sky and they start at almost 

3 miles high in the sky and all we are seeing is a black dot out here. I don't know 

what is straight above him. I don't know if there is a cloud in front and they are 

falling behind the wall in the back. I have no idea from the ground what is going on. 

2 Tr. 319-320. 
Mr. Sanders stated that the parachute canopies were steerable and that they could fly away 

from clouds, "go wherever they want," (3 Tr. 24) and that he had "no belief ... (from the angle that 

the videos were shot) that any of ... (the video) proves going through clouds." Id 

As to whether there were holes in the clouds through which jumpers could descent without 

violating FAR 1 05.17(a), Kyle Bartler stated that he saw "scattered holes in the clouds in the videos 

from December 2013 and January 2014. Mr. Santa Elena's testimony was that he saw "patches of 

open sky" in the March 2014 videos. 1 Tr. 108. If open sky is visible, the sky is not overcast, it is 

broken sky conditions if the cloud cover is five-eighths to seven-eighths sky cover. 1 Tr. 108. 

However, even an eight-eighths overcast sky cover, however, would not mean that there are no holes 

in the clouds. 

Hinshaw stated in each of his declarations (A-6, A-8 and A-16) that the skies were 

broken/overcast or broken & overcast skies. This is a contradiction. Either the sky is broken or it 

is overcast. It cannot be both at the same time and presents another credibility problem with his 

testimony. None of the ground to air or air to air video introduced into evidence shows overcast 

skies for any of the jumps, meaning that there were significant holes through which jumpers could 

descend, blocked from view from the ground by an intervening cloud layer,. 

With respect to the appearance of a cloud layer from the ground, Mr. McCowan testified that 

if you look at clouds at an angle, they appear to be closer together than if you are looking straight 

up at the clouds. He stated that he had seen this phenomenon while flying (2 Tr. 94) and also that 

he had seen it from the ground. 2 Tr. 95. 

Regarding Hinshaw's opinion that jumpers descended through clouds, the Court confirmed 

that Mr. Hinshaw's lay opinions regarding jumpers passing through a cloud were based upon a 

"central assumption" that he was making that if he could not see the starting point, the plane, and 

then he could see the parachutists, they must have passed through a cloud. I Tr. 292. This was 

similar to Mr. McCowan't opinions based upon the false premise that if you don't see a jumper and 

then you do, he must have fallen through a cloud. Both were wrong and were disproved by the 

evidence. 

A dramatic example of disproving Mr. McCowan's opinion that someone jumped into or 

through a cloud if they suddenly appear below a cloud is shown in R-25, a video showing the 

Administrator's expert himself making a parachute jump. The video appears to show him going 

through a cloud and also a large C-4 7 aircraft going through a cloud. Based on the premise 

expressed by both Mr. McCowan and Hinshaw that if you didn't see a parachutist and then you saw 

him below a cloud, he must have come through the cloud, one would conclude that both the aircraft 

and Mr. McCowan went through a cloud, since in R-25, the aircraft disappeared and then 

reappeared, and Paul McCowan appeared from a cloud. However, according to Mr. McCowan, 

neither he nor any other team member jumped through a cloud (2 Tr. II 0), nor did the aircraft go 

into a cloud. Id. 

As the Court noted, "while the viewer from this footage may think that the jumpers or the 

plane itself went through the cloud, because of the (ground to subject) angle of the camera, (Mr. 

McCowan), in (his) personal knowledge from that experience, stated no one wentthrough a cloud." 

2 Tr. 117. When asked why the aircraft couldn't be seen, Mr. McCowan replied, "There is a cloud 

between you and the aircraft. !d. He further stated that whether or not he could determine whether 

or not the aircraft was in a cloud would depend "on the angle you were looking at." 2 Tr. 112. That 

the angle between the observer/camera and the subject is critical to a determination of cloud 

penetration is agreed upon by both experts. Because the angle varies with the cloud layers altitudes 

and camera/observer-to-subject distance and angle and these values are completely unknown, the 
reliability and probative value of any and all of the ground to air video is zero. 

The Court questioned Mr. Sanders about the reliability ofMr. McCowan's opinion that "he 

was basing, in large part his notion that someone went through a cloud based (on an observation) 

that they would appear where they weren't there before." 3 Tr. 115. The Court stated, "It seems to 

me what you're saying is, that is not an appropriate way of judging if someone has gone through a 

cloud." Mr. Sanders agreed with the Court and stated, "It's not an appropriate way." !d. 

The Court also questioned Mr. Sanders about the appropriateness ofHinshaw' s methodology 

on which based "his conclusion that a person had gone through a cloud because he couldn't see the 

plane; but he could see the parachutist. Mr. Sanders stated, "No, not at all. We actually saw that in 

the (Administrator's) expert witness testimony." 3 Tr. 116. 

Mr. Sanders testified that none of the ground to air video was reliable to prove that any 

jumper jumped into or through a cloud. There were many factors he cited which made the ground 

video unreliable, including moisture (2 Tr. 67), out of frame to into frame subject/camera movement 

(2 Tr. 317-318), focus (2 Tr. 349-350), edge sharpness (2 Tr. 301-302), a very small, one sensor 

camera chip to gather information (2 Tr. 303-304), narrow bandwidth of color pickup (2 Tr. 307), 

contrast pickup/washed out images (2 Tr. 307), salt spray (2 Tr. 323), the size of the subject skydiver 

or skydiver and parachute (2 Tr. 313), moisture/volcanic ash in the air (2 Tr. 323), light across the 

lens (3 Tr. 5), the poor quality of the monitors in the courtroom to view the video (2 Tr. 308-310) 

and again, very significantly, camera angle (2 Tr. 310, 319-320) and multiple cloud layers 2 Tr. 311, 

2 Tr. 319-320. Mr. Sanders stated that none of the videos accurately showed the conditions that 

existed in the sky. 2 Tr. 310. He testified that "none of them, even just on the angle alone, 

regardless of all the other technical issues, were useful." !d. 

None ofhis testimony as to their lack of reliability and the reasons therefor was rebutted by 

any witness testimony, and indeed much ofit was supported by Inspector McCowan. Close, frameby-frame, examination of the video fully supported Mr. Sanders' testimony and the reasons he gave 

in support thereof that the video was useless to determine whether or not any jumps were made into 

or through a cloud and also why Hinshaw's opinions as to cloud penetration by jumpers from 

Respondent's aircraft, even if Hinshaw actually believed his opinion, were useless as well. 2 Tr. 

337-339. 

Therefore, neither the Hinshaw videos nor his testimony are reliable or probative, and each 

should be given no weight. 

C. The proper weight the Court should give the credibility of tbe GoPro footage is no 

weight at all. 

For many reasons, the GoPro videos are no more probative than the ground to air videos. 

Mr. Sanders may have testified that "filming skydiving from the ground is like filming scuba diving 

from the boat. You really need to get in the sky. 2 Tr. 286. But the GoPro video taken in the sky 

is equally unreliable. 

Mr. Sanders testified about its lack of reliability. One ofthe most significant reasons he cited 

for the video giving a false impression of jumpers going through clouds was again camera angle. 

In videos where it appeared that a jumper was entering a cloud, he testified that moisture condensing 

on the lens could give the false appearance of a parachutist going into or through a cloud 2 Tr. 310, 

3 Tr. 102-106 (referring to A-32), 3 Tr. 108-112 (referring to A-33). Regarding A-32, it was his 

opinion, as restated by the Court that "neither the tandem nor the videographer are going through 

a cloud." 3 Tr. 63. Regarding A-35, he testified that his expert opinion was that the parachutists did 

not go through a cloud. 3 Tr. 66. His reasons were that the camera never looked straight down; that 

is was always looking "out in front" (!d.); that the tandems clearly opened up in the drier air above 
(the cloud level) (!d.) and that camera people opened at cloud level where there was lots of moisture 

on the lens, giving the illusion of entering a cloud. Id. 

In a dramatic example of air to air GoPro video inaccuracy, a video of Skydive Hawaii 

jumpers jumping from a Skydive Hawaii aircraft with a Go Pro mounted on the bottom of the aircraft 

which appeared to capture jumpers jumping into a cloud (R-12), Hinshaw stated that neither of the 

tandem jumper pairs or cameramen who appeared to be going through a cloud did, in fact, go 

through the cloud (I Tr. 275), "even though the video camera on the bottom ofthe aircraft appeared 

to show that the tandem pair may have went (sic) through the cloud." 1 Tr. 275. He stated that it 

looked like they did, but they didn't. 1 Tr. 270. He stated that it was "actually so determined by the 

HNL FSDO. 1 Tr. 269. "It was actually the Flight Standards District Office that made that 

determination," (1 Tr. 293) he said. "I had personal knowledge because I had to talk to the (helmet 

camera) videographers in order to get their videos to the Flight Standards District Office." 1 Tr. 294. 

Many of the other factors stated by Mr. Sanders as affecting ground to air video would also 

affect air to air video reliability. These factors include camera angle, as cited by Mr. Hinshaw in 

explaining why the parachutists shown in R-12 did not go into or through a cloud. They also include 

edge sharpness (2 Tr. 301-302), the quality of the sensor chip and camera to gather information (2 

Tr. 303-304), "light across the lens" (3 Tr. 5) and the poor quality ofthe monitors in the courtroom 

to view the video instead of a better monitor. 2 Tr. 308-310. Even Mr. McCowan testified that in 

determining the accuracy ofGoPro video, camera-subject "distance and angle matter" and that it is 

"hard to determine that." 2 Tr. 163. 

The lack of reliability was also expressed in testimony of Paul McCowan commenting on 

Exhibit A-38 (2 Tr. 163) and in testimony ofT om Sanders stating that he believed "they opened 

above and to the side (of the cloud)" 3 Tr. 67. Mr. McCowan testified the cameraman "did not go 

through a cloud, that their lens fogged up as they hit the moisture layer." !d. He also stated that the 

GoPro housings contribute to the propensity for a GoPro to fog up. 3 Tr. 68. 

It is significant and definitive in support of Mr. Sanders' opinions regarding lens fog that in 

response to a question by Administrator's counsel, the Administrator's expert agreed with Mr. 

Sanders' opinions. Administrator's counsel asked him, "And when you're diving and you're not 

going through the clouds, do you ever see this kind of condensation on the lens?" In response, Mr. 

McCowan stated, " .. .looking at other people's videos when they come through that level, you will 

see condensation. That is where the cloud layer he's corning out the bottom of it right now. So that 

would be where you would see the condensation. 3 Tr. 142-143. Mr. McCowan further testified 

that at whatever level the moisture level is, is where you will see condensation in the absence of a 

cloud ("at whatever the moisture level is." 3 Tr. 143. 

D. Spoliation of evidence and resulting inferences against the testimony of T.K. and the 

evidence he created. 

1. Spoliation of Evidence: An adverse inference against the Hinshaw's testimony and against 

the Administrator should be drawn with respect to the ground to air video. 

Hinshaw acknowledged that he erased from the camera cards on which it was recorded the 

original data files showing the subject parachute jumping activities. He was filming the activities 

in order to capture video to submit to the FAA, yet he erased the original files, even though he knew 

or should have known that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the anticipated Respondent's 

claim or defense, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or 

defense. 

In Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107 (2nd Cir., 2000), the court stated: 
We have defined spoliation as "the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, 

or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or 

reasonably foreseeable litigation." West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 

776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). The spoliation of evidence germane "to proof of an issue at 

trial can support an inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the 

party responsible for its destruction." Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 

(2d Cir. 1998). This sanction serves a threefold purpose of (1) deterring parties from 

destroying evidence; (2) placing the risk of an erroneous evaluation of the content 

of the destroyed evidence on the party responsible for its destruction; and (3) 

restoring the party harmed by the loss of evidence helpful to its case to where the 

party would have been in the absence of spoliation. Id. 107. 

Where one seeks an adverse inference regarding the content of destroyed evidence, 

one must first show that "the party having control over the evidence ... had an 

obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed. Such an obligation usually 

arises when a party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation ... but also on 

occasion in other circumstances, as for example when a party should have known 

that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation. [internal citation omitted.] !d. 

Finally, a court must determine whether there is any likelihood that the destroyed 

evidence would have been of the nature alleged by the party affected by its 

destruction. The burden falls on the "prejudiced party" to produce some evidence 

suggesting that a document or documents relevant to substantiating his claim would 

have been included among the destroyed files." Id. 108. 

There is no question that Hinshaw destroyed the contents of the camera cards and thereby 

destroyed their unedited condition and tbe metadata contained thereon. He testified that he shot the 

video on camera cards and then transferred it to a computer; that he had "limited resources and 

couldn't buy a whole bunch of cards." 1 Tr. 156. Tom Sanders, testified that the cards cost 

approximately $6.00 each. 2 Tr. 305. Therefore, the cost of the cards, assuming a new card were 

required for each video, would be only $24.00. A total cost of$24.00 makes Hinshaw's testimony 

difficult to believe, even absurd, and in consideration of the other factors suggesting his lack of 

credibility and alternative motivation for his shooting video suggests that it creates a presumption 

that the cards contained information he wanted to hide from the Administrator and ultimately from 

the Respondent. 

Mr. Sanders testified that the metadata on the cards would have been very useful in 

interpreting the accuracy of the video (2 Tr. 298, 300-301) and in determining if the files had been 

edited (2 Tr. 343) or if the shots had been "cropped" to make it appear more heavily clouded than 

it would be in a wide shot. 2 Tr. 301. The investigating inspectors never requested the original cards. 

1 Tr. 156-1 57. They could have easily done so and preserved the original evidence. Respondent was 

prejudiced in its defense by not having access to the original videos. 

An inference must be drawn that the missing original video would have been favorable to 

the Respondent in showing that they did not conduct parachute jumps in violation of 105.17(a), 

particularly in view of Hinshaw's history ofhate for the Respondent. The Administrator's inspectors 

are equally responsible for the spoliation in that they knew that they were viewing the video on a 

computer, in a YouTube posting or on a CD/DVD, and they failed to seek to preserve tbe original 
crucial evidence while they were in the midst of investigating four dates of jumps based on the 

recordings. Therefore, the Administrator must also bear the burden of such a negative inference. 

E. The expert testimony of Tom Sanders was more logical, deeper and persuasive than that 

ofPanl McCowan. 

With regard to the credibility of the experts, the Administrator's counsel questioned Mr. 

Sanders about where hejumped (Pacific Skydiving), whether he paid for his jumps ("No."), and if 

he was friends with Mr. Banal, the Respondent's manager ("Yes."). 3 Tr. 71. Mr. Sanders also 

stated that he worked infrequently as an expert witness (3 Tr. 72), and that he was being paid $500 

per hour for his services as an expert in the case. 3 Tr. 70. He testified that his daily rate as a 

professional skydiver, including daily rate and jump charges was "three or $4,000 a day." 3 Tr. 134. 

He agreed that this is consistent with a rate of$500 an hour. 3 Tr. 135. He also testified that he had 

to jump somewhere and that he had chosen to jump at Pacific Skydiving (3 Tr. 132-133) and that 

his friendship with Mr. Banal in no way affected his truthfulness in the testimony he gave in the 

hearing. 3 Tr. 133. He testified that his testimony was based on his expertise rather than his 

friendship. ld. 

By his own admission, Mr. McCowan acknowledged that he "was currently employed as an 

aviation safety inspector with the FAA" and that he had been so employed for 9 Y, years. 2 Tr. 5-6 

and that he has been a "Subject Matter Expert in Parachuting for the FAA'' for 7 years. A-52. It is 

noteworthy that he has only been, and could only could be, a subject matter expert for the FAA. He 

could only have been called to support the Administrator's position. Thus, a strong argument exists 

that he was not impartial, since he was part ofthe agency bringing the action against the Respondent 

and only served as an expert for the agency. He was a professional expert for the agency. In contrast, 

Respondent's expert, while he was friends with Respondent's personnel and utilized its facilities to 

skydive, had no affiliation with the Respondent. 

Affiliations notwithstanding, there is no evidence in the record that either expert's testimony 

was based upon, or motivated by, anything other than their beliefs, based upon their experience and 

expertise, though significantly the Administrator's expert was not an expert in the crucial area of 

skydiving photography, and the Respondent's expert was. 

With respect to Hinshaw's testimony, In the Matter ofThomas Fedele, FAA Order# 98-3, 

the court based its decision on a disinterested witness who had "no axe to grind." Obviously, 

Hinshaw, the only witness to testify he saw jumpers descending through clouds, has not one axe but 

a whole armory of axes to grind. The hatred is evident from his actions, as well as those of his 

father, Frank Hinshaw. Assessing credibility after hearing all of the evidence, Hinshaw's lay 

opinions regarding cloud penetration should be given no weight whatsoever, particularly since it's 

also been proven to be false as to fact and premise. Fedele may also be distinguished in that in 

Fedele, the disinterested witness testified that airport was overcast. !d. at 4. In the instant case, blue 

and multiple layers of clouds can be seen. Also, in Fedele, the violation alleged a cloud clearance 

violation and not a violation of penetrating clouds. Id. at 1. And Hinshaw's testimony and 

impressions notwithstanding, there is no video evidence that supports a contention that the jumpers 

were seen coming out of the clouds "straight up," from Hinshaw, or his camera. It is noteworthy 

that the Fedele civil penalty action was against a skydiver and that footnote 3 of the opinion states 

that other enforcement cases were pending against the pilot and other skydivers but does not 

reference any against the skydiving center operator. Fedele, at 4. 

In evaluating the expert testimony in this case, per the criteria in the Alphin Aircraft, Inc. 

civil penalty case (FAA Order 97-9), with Mr. Sanders being the only expert in photography and in 

the reasons for inaccuracy of video shot from the ground and from the air, his testimony must be 
deemed to be the most logical and the deepest in its analysis of the matters at issue with regard to 

cloud penetration by any of the parachutists and in an analysis of the limitations of the all of the 

video and why none of it was reliable or probative. Considering that his testimony concerning the 

effect of the camera to subject angle was agreed to not only by lay witness Hinshaw but by the 

Administrator's expert, and considering that the lens fog effect was confirmed by Mr. McCowan, 

Mr. Sanders' expert testimony must be deemed to also be the most persuasive. Based upon Mr. 

Sanders' expert analysis of the video, the lack of reliable testimony from Hinshaw, and the lack of 

photographic knowledge of the Administrator's expert, there is no preponderance of reliable, 

probative or substantial evidence proving that any parachutist conducted a parachute jump into or 

through a cloud on any of the subject jumps. Therefore Respondent's appeal should be granted 

based on the evidence alone, or rather the lack thereof. 

II. The Respondent is not a responsible party under the applicable regulations. The persons 

conducting the parachute operation were independent contractors. 

Assuming any violations occurred, which is categorically denied, Respondent is not a 

responsible party under the applicable regulations and case decisions. The pilot in command and 

the parachutists, as independent contractors, are the sole responsible parties. In the instant case, all 

jumpers involved in the parachute jumps were independent contractors. (2 Tr. 191-3, 195-6, 197, 

201,253, 278.) Each was paid for each service they performed as a contractor. (See, for example 

the independent contractor contracts, A-44 [tandem instructor], A-41 [1099s], A-48 [pilot], A-49 

[photographer]). 

Respondent's president, Guy Banal, did everything he could to inform its employees and 

contractors of the cloud penetration prohibition. He placed notices in its aircraft and around the 

premises reminding its employees and contractors ofthe cloud clearance requirements; that jumping 

into or through a cloud was prohibited. (R-20, R-21, 2 Tr. 205, 206.) They were placed where 

anyone getting in or out ofthe aircraft would see them. (2 Tr. 206). They can be seen on the aircraft 

side walls of the aircraft in the Administrator's exhibit A-38 as the jumpers prepare to exit the 

aircraft. He stated that he never told anyone to jump; that if it was not good, don'tjump. (2 Tr. 206) 

If the Court were to find that anyone, in fact, jumped into or through a cloud, it would have been 

totally outside of their instructions and cautions which Respondent, in many different forms, gave 

to its employees and contractors. Many times, Respondents's aircraft descended with a load of 

jumpers on board because the pilot, on his own or because discussions with personnel on the ground 

about the sky conditions decided to abort jumping operations and land. 2 Tr 207-208. It should be 

noted that Mr. Banal's native language is French, and that his accent was very thick, leading perhaps 

to a misunderstanding of certain words when recorded by the court reporter, and the ability to 

express himself in English is not the best, but the gist, if not the literal words, of his statements is 

clear in most instances. 

When a contractor violated the FAR prohibiting jumping into or through a cloud, they were 

suspended from performing their contractual duties. 2 Tr. 223-4 In response to the Court's 

question, no one was disciplined by Respondent as a result of the "occasions the FAA was worried 

about. 2 Tr. 225-5. Note that the witness' reply, after he said "No, because .... "was interrupted by 

the Court and the answer is incomplete. 2 Tr. 225. It is submitted that his answer would be 

"because they did not go through clouds." That notwithstanding, Respondent's remedy was to 

suspend their contracts for any violations or to terminate their contracts. 2 Tr. 195. 

14 C.F .R. l.l defines "operational control" with respect to a flight as the exercise of 

authority over initiating, conducting or terminating a flight. It is clear that, as independent 

contractors, this authority lies solely with the pilot. I d. The pilot had operational control of the 
aircraft. The pilot was contracted to fly parachutists to jump altitude and was obligated by law to 

comply with the applicable FARs in doing so. The pilot decided what flight path to take and when 

to open the aircraft door to give the jumpers the opportunity to assess when and if to jump. Mr. 

Banal described the process in his testimony. 2 Tr. 210-212. 

It is undisputed that the personnel involved in conducting the parachute operation were 

independent contractors. The status of the personnel was not challenged by the Administrator. The 

testimony of Guy Banal was that the pilots and tandem instructors were independent contractors. 

2 Tr. 191. The videographers were independent contractors. 2 Tr. 192. In further support of the 

contractor status, it should be noted that the pilots and skydivers chose how to perform their work, 

based on their specialized knowledge and training, and where in the sky their work of conducting 

a parachute jump would be conducted. The pilot chose when to take off and land and where and 

how to fly the aircraft. The jumpers chose when, where and how to make their parachute jumps, all 

based on their specialized knowledge and training and their licensed skills. None had set hours of 

work but chose to perform their contract work when they wanted. There was no obligation to 

perform full-time work for Respondent. Because they were contracted for individual services for 

individual aircraft or parachute flights, they worked, took vacation when they wanted, came and 

went when they wanted and worked at the same time for others. 2 Tr. 234. Respondent introduced 

the IRS Form 1 099s for its pilots, tandem instructors and videographers/photographers (A-41) and 

representative independent contractor contracts for each class of contractor (A-42, A-43, A-44, A45, A-46, A-47, A-48, A-49, A-50 and A-51). Each contractor operated under its own business 

entity name. Most were LLCs or DBAs. Greg Meyer, a tandem instructor, testified that he was an 

independent contractor (2 Tr. 253), as did tandem instructor Bryan Stanley. 2 Tr. 279. 

In further support of their independent contractor status, 14 C.F.R. I 05.45 contains specific 

requirements for a parachutist to conduct tandem parachuting operations. They needed to have 

specialized skills and training. !d. The tandem instructors spotted (lined up for the purpose of 

jumping) the aircraft. 2 Tr. 179. The tandem instructors controlled the parachutes on a tandem 

jump. The videographers and camera personnel also had special skills and licenses and had to be 

experienced jumpers. Id Each contractor was paid pursuantto their independent contractor contract 

with Respondent, for each time they performed their specialized service. It is uncontroverted that 

the pilot determined when to initiate, conduct or terminate all of the subject flights. Inspector Santa 

Elena testified that the pilot was operating the flights. 1 Tr. 121. He testified that under Part 105, 

either the pilot or the jumper is responsible for the safety of the flight; that the pilot was responsible 

for deciding how to fly the aircraft after it takes off (I Tr. 122); that the pilot and the jumper would 

be responsible for deciding when a jumper would get out of the aircraft. I Tr. 123. Inspector Santa 

Elena testified that Randy Pacheco, one of Respondent's contractor pilots, stated to Inspector Santa 

Elena that "the weather, it was cloudy over the field but he waited until .. .it was clear before he 

released the jumpers. 1 Tr. 127. This shows an awareness and an intent to comply with 105.1 7(a). 

Respondent did not have, and could not have, any control over how and where a pilot flew 

the jump aircraft or where or when a jumper exited the aircraft for a parachute jump. 

Hinshaw testified that any pilot can abort a jump run whenever they wish. I Tr. 290. He further 

testified that "Generally it's left up to the pilot and the skydivers on board because they have the best 

view of what's occurring." I Tr. 291. McCowan testified that he had conversations with his pilots 

and that they "knew what I expected." 2 Tr. 174. However, he then acknowledged that he "could 

not fly the aircraft for the pilot." 2 Tr. 175. He told them what he expected and it was their 

responsibility , as pilots who had airman's certificates, to perform properly under their certificates. 

2 Tr. 175. This was the industry standard. 
Respondent engaged each contractor for their services for specific purposes (pilot, tandem 

instructor and cameramanlvideographer). If they violated any FAR in the performance of those 

services, Respondent is not responsible for it. If any violated any F ARs, the acts and responsibility 

of conducting the parachute operations lay solely with the violator. 

In the Matter of Federal Express Corporation, FAA Order 2002-20, is definitive in 

determining whether Respondent was responsible for the acts of its contractors. As in the instant 

case, the Respondent in Federal Express was not an air carrier and its defense was that it was not 

responsible for the actions of its independent contractors. The lower court found in favor of the 

Administrator, and the Respondent appealed. The issue on appeal was whether or not the 

Respondent was responsible for the improper actions of its independent contractors. The appellate 

court held that it was not and reversed the ALJ decision. The Court cited Mini Mart v. Direct Sales 

Tire Co., 889 F.2d 182, 184 (8th Cir. 1989), which held 

The general rule encompasses the notion that employers should not 

be held responsible for activities they do not control and, in many 

instances, lack the knowledge and resources to direct. . .The 

exceptions, in the main, reflect special situations where the employer 

is in the best position to identify, minimize, and administer the risks 

involved in the contractor's activities. [citations omitted.] !d. at 6. 

The Fedex opinion, inter alia, cited the rule that "(i)f an employer does not supervise an 

entity's day-to-day operations- i.e., control the 'detailed physical performance' of the operationthen courts generally find that the entity is an independent contractor." See, e.g., United States v. 

Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976) (quoting Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973) and 

stating that "a critical element" in determining whether an entity is an independent contractor is the 

principal's power to control the entity's "detailed physical performance"). See also In re Coupon 

Clearing Service, Inc., 113 F .3d 1091, l 099 (9th Cir. 19970, holding that if a person has the rightto 

control only "the result of the work [by another person], and not the means by which it is 

accomplished, ... an independent contractor relationship exists." !d. 

Without any evidence in the record to the contrary, the evidence in the instant case is solely 

that the Respondent could not control the detailed physical performance of the pilots, the tandem 

instructors or the videographers and the means by which each accomplished their tasks, and that 

each acted independently under their individual licensing authority, their specialized training and 

their duty to follow the FARs in conducting each of the parachute jumps in question. 

In further support that the pilot and jumpers are solely responsible for violations ofFARs 

during parachute jumps, it is instructive to look at NTSB decisions involving parachuting. 

Though FAA AC-l05-2E (A-55) states that the "PIC (pilot-in-command) is solely 

responsible for the operational requirements of Parts 91 and 1 05," in Administrator v. James Kelly 

Foss, NTSB Order No. EA-4631, a case involving an issue of who was responsible for parachute 

jumps made into clouds, the Board referenced the Administrator's position. It stated: 

The Administrator's interpretation of section l 05.29 (now section 105.17) is that it 

creates a "dual responsibility for the pilot and the parachutists (emphasis added) to 

ascertain that the parachutists can adhere to cloud clearance requirements." 

(Citations omitted). Under the Administrator's interpretation of this regulation, "the 

pilot of a parachute operation is responsible for determining, prior to releasing the 
parachutists, that the area between the aircraft and the intended landing site meets the 

cloud clearance requirements of section 105.29." (Citations omitted.) Id. 

In a footnote, the Board noted: 

The point at which a parachutist becomes solely (emphasis added) responsible for 

non-adherence to cloud clearance requirements is a decision we need not reach in 

this case, for respondent's culpability stems from his lack of active decision-making 

prior to the time the parachutists jumped from his aircraft. We are compelled, 

however, to enunciate our belief-- in accordance with the "dual responsibility" 

imposed by the regulation (emphasis added)-- that pilots would be responsible under 

this regulation for all foreseeable violations by parachutists of the requirements of 

section 105.29. In this regard, pilots should discuss with parachutists the 

requirements of section I 05.29, particularly because parachutists are not licensed by 

the FAA and they will not necessarily be familiar with FAR requirements. It also 

seems axiomatic that a pilot could not make the required independent evaluation 

unless he has taken steps to insure that the parachutists know the cloud clearance 

requirements and plan to abide by them. Id. 

Thus, under both the Administrator's and the Board's interpretation, the responsibility is a 

dual responsibility shared between the pilot and the parachutists. It is noteworthy that though the 

pilot in Foss failed to discuss with the parachutists the requirements of section 105.29 (now 105.170, 

the Respondent did, in fact, discuss it with each pilot and jumper, placed placards in the aircraft (R20, R-21), and also met with all of his contractors because he wanted to "make sure it's covered." 

2 Tr. 203. 

With respect to the issue of Respondent conducting the parachute operation, the Board's 

statement in Administrator v. Bischoff, Order EA-608 (1974), 2 NTSB at 1013 is definitive in 

determining, based on the evidence, that the Respondent is not responsible for the acts of its 

contractors. In Bischoff, the Board stated: "Not every "operator" of a flight who technically comes 

within the definition (of operator) could be held responsible in an enforcement action ... Rather, 

the operator must be shown to have been involved in the flight in such a manner that it can 

reasonably be inferred that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, he participated in, 

authorized or permitted the violations." ld. at 1015. 

Clearly, in the instant case, the Respondent did not participate in, authorize of permit any 

violations which may be deemed to have been committed by the pilot or the parachutists. To the 

contrary, it did everything it could to prevent them, but, as the evidence shows, once the pilot elected 

to take off for a flight, there was no way for the Respondent to control the pilot, the aircraft or any 

of the parachutists once the aircraft took off. 

Ill. The penalty demanded by the Administrator is excessive and is not supported by the 

relevant gnidance; The Respondent was not careless or reckless. 

The penalty demanded by the Administrator is clearly excessive. The Administrator seeks 

a total penalty of$55,000.00, combining two notices of proposed civil penalty into one final Notice 

of Proposed Civil Penalty and one Complaint. The amount of the penalty is governed by the 

guidance contained in FAA Order 2150.3 b (the "Order"). For the purposes of this section of this 

closing argument only, in order to discuss the appropriateness of the amount of the sanctions, we 
shall assume that the Court has ruled that one or more ofthe violations occurred, though Respondent 

categorically denies that any did. 

The claim is $22,000.00 for alleged violations on one flight in December 2013 and one flight 

in January, and $33,000.00 for alleged violations on three flights on March 22,2014 and on three 

flights on March 25,2014. Apparently, the Administrator is seeking $11,000.00 per violation for 

the alleged violations on December 8, 2013 and January 5, 2015, and is seeking $33,000.00 for 

alleged violations on a total of six flights in March 2014. This is $11,000.00 per flight for the first 

two dates and only $5,500.00 for each ofthe flights on the latter two dates. The Administrator offers 

no reasons to justify why the first two flights were different from the latter three. Absent such 

justification, the penalties demanded are arbitrary and capricious. 

In determining the amount of civil penalty, the Administrator fails to show any aggravating 

factors. Insofar as mitigating factors, Respondent had no record of violations for conducting 

parachute operations into or through clouds. 1 Tr. 131. 

The Administrator acknowledged that the Respondent is a "small business concern." 1 Tr. 

14. Despite the requirement that "Each FAA employee who conducts an inspection of a small 

business concern that is regulated by the FAA provides the small business concern with an 

information sheet" to inform "that entity that it may submit complaints or comments regarding unfair 

FAA regulatory enforcement to the National Ombudsman," (A-1, 186), this was not done. I Tr. 52. 

The Administrator failed to follow its guidance, as specified in FAA Order 2150.3b. A-1 at 7-21. 

Respondent was prejudiced by it not knowing that it could complain about what it considered an 

unfair investigation based upon false information. Perhaps the penalty amount could have been 

mitigated by the Small Business Ombudsman, but Respondent never had the chance to try. 

Respondent was fully compliant with the Administrator's investigation into the matters 

alleged in the Complaint. 1 Tr. 67, I Tr. 130-1. It replied to the letters of investigation. It provided 

all documents requested by the inspectors. I Tr. 80, I Tr. 130. Respondent has no history of 

violations of91.17. I Tr. 68, 2 Tr. 229. 

The Order provides that: "Of particular importance in determining an appropriate sanction 

for numerous multiple violations is the degree of the alleged violator's culpability for the multiple 

violations. A lower degree of culpability is present when the alleged violator neither knew nor was 

likely to discover the continuing violations." The testimony and evidence demonstrate the difficulty 

in ascertaining whether or not a parachutist went into or through a cloud from the ground. The fact 

is, only the accused jumper can know for sure. Mr. Banal testified that when he confronted jumpers 

with accusations that they went through a cloud, they responded, "prove (it to) me." 2 Tr. 223. With 

the difficulties of proof one way or the other encountered in the instant case, Respondent 

understandably does not want to risk a breach of contract action for wrongfully terminating a 

contractor's contract, nor does it want to risk FAA enforcement action. Absent definite proof, 

however, sanctions against their contractors are impossible to justify, and sufficient proof, based on 

Mr. Sanders' testimony in this case is impossible to obtain from the ground. Thus a lower degree 

of culpability is present in this case. 

Other factors affecting the amount ofthe civil penalty include whether or not the Respondent 

was careless or reckless in its conduct. As discussed above, Respondent took every measure it could 

to prevent violations ofl05.17(a), but there was no way it could control the actions of its contractors 

once they left the ground, and because of the rapidly changing cloud conditions, it was necessary 

to determine whether a jump could be made in compliance with 105.17(a) from the air, not from the 

ground. As previously mentioned, many times Respondent's aircraft descended with a load of 

jumpers because it was too cloudy to jump. 2 Tr. 207-208. Any violation ofF AR 1 05.17(a) by 

Respondent was purely inadvertent and unintended. There is no evidence that any ofRespondent' s 
actions were deliberate. Respondent was not careless or reckless. It was powerless to control 

contractors engaged to achieve certain results and who were expected, in choosing methods to 

accomplish their services to follow the F ARs, as required. 

The creative evidence presented by the Administrator regarding potential harm to the person 

or property of others was purely speculative, with a remote likelihood of its occurrence. Rebuttal 

testimony to the hypothetical of a parachutist striking helicopter blades was that clouds were not a 

factor in increasing the risk of striking the blades of one of the helicopters that "come in and out to 

get fuel occasionally" 3 Tr. 101; that a jumper couldn't avoid striking a helicopter as described in 

the hypothetical, even in clear skies. Id And with respect to glider operations and the risk of a 

parachutist hitting one, Hinshaw's testimony was that "skydivers have fallen very close to gliders 

and that's been in clear conditions." I Tr. 183 There was no testimony that clouds increased the risk. 

In fact, Mr. Sanders testified that the glider in the video was "definitely downwind of the drop zone, 

which is not where the parachutes will go ... so it is not a concern. It is to the west of the landing 

zone." 2 Tr. 255-256. He testified that he flew at the airfield "ahnost every single day and it's a 

9,000 foot runway ... It is two independent runways and it's not an issue at all. This is not a safety 

thing at all." Further, Mr. Sanders testified that the Sectional aeronautical chart A-54 states 

"extensive jumping activity" (actually "intensive parachute activity") (A-54) and that all pilots 

would be aware of the markings on the chart. 2 Tr. 357; that typically the gliders are flown with 

someone that flies there every day because they are taking people up for rides. Further, the glider 

was nowhere near overhead of the parachutist landing area. 2 Tr. 357-359. Hitting a glider was not 

a risk. A concern about jumper collisions with gliders or helicopters at an airfield for which the 

charts and other aeronautical publications (A-53) and even the runways (2 Tr. 3570 are marked with 

warnings about parachute jumpers and with a required notification pursuant to 14 C.F .R. I 05. 15 and 

I 05.25 warning all aircraft about parachute jumping at and around the airfield, is a red herring in 

determining whether or not a violation of91.13 occurred. We have already addressed the credibility 

of Mr. Hinshaw. Mr. Sanders' opinion is the one which is credible. Respondent has not violated 

FAR§ 91.13, regardless of whether or not it was included in determining the amount of the civil 

penalty. 

The Order states that "One of the agency's goals is to achieve relative consistency in 

imposing similar sanctions for similar violations." Order 2150.3b at 7-8. There appears to be no 

other case in which a civil penalty was assessed against a skydiving operator for a violation of 

91.17(a). All cases found were against a pilot or a parachutist. This suggests that it is not proper to 

bring a civil penalty action against the Respondent. Further, the question arises as to how 

consistency can exist in the instant with the large variation in proposed sanction between that for 

the first two dates and that for the second two. This appears to go against the guidance. 

The Order also states that "When determining a specific sanction amount within a range, 

FAA enforcement personnel begin with an amount in the middle of the range and increase that 

amount toward the higher end of the range for aggravating factors or decrease that amount toward 

the lower end of the range for mitigating factors." A-1, at 7-9. The Administrator has failed to do 

this. indication in the record that the Administrator has considered any of the factors in what 

appears to be an arbitrary proposed sanction. 

Considering the Sanction Guidance Table, A-1, Appendix B-6, for some reason, unspecified 

in the evidence and unsupported by any stretch of argumentthe Administrator could rationally make, 

the Administrator has chosen to place all proposed penalties in the "Maximum" category and even 

not at the lowest amount in that category. Penalties of this amount are completely unjustified, 

particularly under the circumstances of this case. The only possible reason for the high penalty 

amounts might be that the Administrator was unaware, at the time he proposed the civil penalties, 
and put them out of business, rather than seeking truth and safety, he might have determined early 

on that Hinshaw's videos had zero credibility, and this case might never have been brought. 

Therefore, considering the Sanction Guidance Table, the penalties, should be in the 

minimum, rather than in the maximum category. That penalty range is from $550-$2199. In view 

of Respondent's lack of actual involvement in any violations committed by its contractors, 

Respondent suggests that any penalty assessed, if any is assessed, should be $550 per violation. 

CONCLUSION 

Thus, there being absolutely no reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record to 

support any of the Administrator's allegations of violations of 14 C.F.R. §105.17(a) and §91.13, as 

required by 14 C.F.R. §13.223, Respondent respectfully moves that its appeal be GRANTED and 

that the Administrator's Complaint be dismissed, and for such other and further relief as this Court 

may deem just and proper. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Robert L. Feldman, Esq., B.C.S. 

Attorney for the Respondent 

8900 SW 107 Ave., Ste 203 

Miami, FL 33176 

Telephone; 305-598-4841 

Fax: 305-598-4842 

Email: feldmans48@hotmail.com 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certifY that on this date I have sent a true copy of the foregoing by Fedex, addressed 

to: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building- Room 2Wl 000 

and by email and Fedex to: 

The Honorable Douglas M. Rawald, Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

Tel: 202-366-5121 

Fax: 202-366-7536 

Email: c/o Ms. Jacklyn Booker (jacklyn.booker@dot.gov) 

Don Bobertz, Esquire 

Office of Regional Counsel, A WP-7 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Western-Pacific Region 

15000 Aviation Blvd 

Lawndale, CA 90261 

Tel: 310-725-3454 

Fax: 310-725-6816 

Email: don.bobertz@faa.gov 

--:? _r--£7) 

~dk~----,, Robert L. Feldman 

Dated: 6 February 2017