2005 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-6-2005

Corron v. Kent Gen Hosp

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 05-2161

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"Corron v. Kent Gen Hosp" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 156.

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DPS-343 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 05-2161

______________________________________

PAMELA ERIKA CORRON,

 Appellant

 v.

KENT GENERAL HOSPITAL

______________________________________

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-00180)

Chief Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

_______________________________________

Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action

Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

August 18, 2005

Before: ROTH, BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed December 6, 2005)

____________________

 OPINION

_______________________

PER CURIAM

Pamela Corron, proceeding pro se, appeals the March 22, 2005 order of the United

States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissing her civil rights complaint

with prejudice for failure to prosecute or to comply with its orders pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). We review such an order for abuse of discretion. 
2

Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). “While we defer to the

District Court’s discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in limited

circumstances and doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the

merits.” Id. We have emphasized that “dismissal is a drastic sanction and should be

reserved for those cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by

the plaintiff.” Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982).

Before dismissing an action, the District Court is required to make explicit

findings regarding the factors enumerated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

747 F.2d 863, 869 (3d Cir. 1984). See Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 74

(3d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141,

161 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We have opined that [the Poulis factors] must be weighed by a

District Court in determining whether the harsh sanction of dismissal is justified”). The

Poulis factors that the District Court must consider are: 

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the

adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders . . .; (3) a history

of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party . . . was willful or in

bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which

entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of

the claim.

Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. 

This Court’s function is to determine whether the District Court properly balanced

the Poulis factors and whether the record supports its findings. Livera v. First Nat. State

Bank of New Jersey, 879 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hicks v. Feeney, 850
F.2d 152 (3d Cir.1988)); see also Emcasco, 834 F.2d at 73-74 (noting that “[i]n order that

we may properly exercise our function of reviewing for abuse of discretion, we have []

required the district court to make explicit findings concerning the factors it must

consider in rendering judgment by . . . dismissal”). Here, however, the District Court did

not conduct any Poulis analysis. We thus conclude that the District Court erred in

dismissing Corron’s complaint without making the requisite findings. Livera, 879 F.2d at

1193. Moreover, given the record presented, we will forego the opportunity to conduct

our own Poulis test as it would require factual findings not within the parameters of our

review. See id. at 1194. 

By failing to conduct a Poulis balancing test, the District Court abused its

discretion; therefore, a remand to the District Court for consideration of the Poulis factors

is necessary. See id. at 1188. Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s

order entered March 22, 2005 and remand the case to the District Court for further

proceedings.