alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 23.1

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

The
Board of Directors
Diedrich Coffee, Inc:

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 333-66744, 333-74626, 333-52190, 333-50412) of Diedrich
Coffee, Inc. of our report dated September 15, 2003, except as to note 7, which is as of September 26, 2003, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Diedrich
Coffee, Inc. and subsidiaries as of July 2, 2003 and July 3, 2002, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders' equity and cash flows for each of the years
in the three-year period ended July 2, 2003, and the related financial statement schedule, which reports appear in the July 2, 2003 annual report on
Form 10-K of Diedrich Coffee, Inc. Our report refers to a change in the method of accounting for goodwill and other intangible assets effective June 28, 2001.

Costa
Mesa, California
September 30, 2003

---

QuickLinks
Motion Denied and Order filed August 23, 2012. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

____________

NO. 14-12-00078-CV

____________

LINDA BRUEGGEBORS, Appellant

V.

KINGWOOD SENIOR VILLAGE, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law #4

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 11-25,852

ORDER

Appellant’s brief was originally due May 14, 2012. We have granted three 

extensions of time to file appellant’s brief until August 13, 2012. No brief was filed. On 

August 14, 2012, appellant filed a further request for extension of time to file her brief. 

We deny the request and issue the following order.

We order appellant to file a brief with the clerk of this court within thirty (30) days 

of the date of this order. If appellant does not timely file the brief as ordered, the court 

will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). 

PER CURIAM
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of NewPage Holding Corporation and NewPage Corporation (the
Companies) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Richard D. Willett, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Companies,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial position and results of operations of the Companies.



|                           
|---------------------------
|/s/ Richard D. Willett, Jr.
|Richard D. Willett, Jr.    
|Chief Executive Officer    
|May 13, 2009
NO. 04-15-00499-CV

ROBERT GOMEZ § IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 § 

v. § FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

 § 

PHILIP BERNAL, INDEPENDENT § 

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF § 

LOUIS A. BERNAL § SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

 

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:

NOW COME Beth Watkins and Shannon K. Dunn and hereby file their appearance of 

counsel for Appellee Philip Bernal, Independent Executor of the Estate of Louis A. Bernal, in the 

above entitled and numbered cause. This appearance of counsel does not supersede Cecil 

William Bain III as attorney of record for Philip Bernal, Independent Executor of the Estate of 

Louis A. Bernal for any continuing proceedings in the probate court.

 Respectfully submitted,

 

 /s/ Shannon K. Dunn 

 Beth Watkins 

 State Bar No. 24037675 

 Shannon K. Dunn 

 State Bar No. 24074162 

 LAW OFFICE OF BETH WATKINS

 926 Chulie Drive 

 San Antonio, Texas 78216 

 (210) 225-6666—phone 

 (210) 225-2300—fax

 Beth.Watkins@WatkinsAppeals.com

 Shannon.Dunn@WatkinsAppeals.com

 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE 

 

ACCEPTED

04-15-00499-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

12/3/2015 9:37:05 AM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 12/3/2015 9:37:05 AM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the above and foregoing document was forwarded in accordance 

with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5 on December 3, 2015 to the following counsel of 

record for Appellant:

Mr. Reed Greene via e-filing

26254 IH-10 West, Suite 135

Boerne, Texas 78006

c.reed.greene@gmail.com

Mr. Jerry H. Kagan via facsimile at (210) 738-0088

1600 Culebra Avenue

San Antonio, Texas 78201

 /s/ Shannon K. Dunn 

Shannon K. Dunn

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1489 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1489

 To amend the Small Business Act to create parity among small business 
             contracting programs, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 21, 2009

   Ms. Snowe introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
    referred to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Small Business Act to create parity among small business 
             contracting programs, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Small Business Contracting Programs 
Parity Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act--
            (1) the terms ``Administration'' and ``Administrator'' mean 
        the Small Business Administration and the Administrator 
        thereof, respectively; and
            (2) the terms ``HUBZone small business concern'', ``small 
        business concern'', ``small business concern owned and 
        controlled by service-disabled veterans'', and ``small business 
        concern owned and controlled by women'' have the same meanings 
        as in section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632).

SEC. 3. CONTRACTING IMPROVEMENTS.

    (a) Contracting Opportunities.--Section 31(b)(2)(B) of the Small 
Business Act (15 U.S.C. 657a(b)(2)(B)) is amended by striking ``shall'' 
and inserting ``may''.
    (b) Contracting Goals.--Section 15(g)(1) of the Small Business Act 
(15 U.S.C. 644(g)(1)) is amended in the fourth sentence by inserting 
``and subcontract'' after ``not less than 3 percent of the total value 
of all prime contract''.
    (c) Mentor-protege Programs.--The Administrator may establish 
mentor-protege programs for small business concerns owned and 
controlled by service-disabled veterans, small business concerns owned 
and controlled by women, and HUBZone small business concerns modeled on 
the mentor-protege program of the Administration for small business 
concerns participating in programs under section 8(a) of the Small 
Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)).
                                 <all>
```
Opinion issued October 1, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-20-00223-CV

NO. 01-20-00224-CV

———————————

W.J. BILLY DEVILLIER AND PAULA WINSER, Appellants

V.

A.P. LEONARDS AND MILDRED G. LEONARDS, Appellees

On Appeal from the County Court

Chambers County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. P03986A, P03846A

MEMORANDUM OPINION
2

Appellants, W.J. “Billy” Devillier and Paula Winzer, seek permission to 

appeal two virtually identical interlocutory orders on will construction issues. 

Appellees, A.P. Leonards and Mildred G. Leonards, have not filed a resp onse to 

the petitionsfor permissive appeal. 

To be entitled to a permissive appealfrom an interlocutory order that would 

not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order 

to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a 

substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the 

order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4);TEX. R.

CIV. P. 168. 

Both the trial court’s orders and relators’ p etitions for p ermissive appeal 

identify the enforceability of the exculpatory clauses in the wills as the controlling 

issue of law and assert the issue is one of first impression in Texas. Assuming

enforceability of the exculpatory clauses is a controlling question of law, the orders

and the petitionsmust still reflect substantial grounds for disagr eement as to the 

issue. The trial court’s orders state:

The Court’s ruling contained in this Amended Order on Will 

Construction Issues pertains to a controlling question of law, which is 

undecided in Texas and to which there is a substantial ground for 

difference of opinion. The controlling question of law is whether the 

exculpatory clause contained [in each of the decedents’ wills] is 

enforceable under Texas law.
3

(Emphasis in original.) Although the orders refer to the enforceability of the 

exculpatory clauses as one of first impression, they do not explain how or why 

there is a “substantial ground for difference of opinion” on the issue. 

Further, the trial court’s orders do not explain how the determination of the 

appealswould materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Nor do

appellants explain in their petitions how resolution of the issue would materially 

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. In fact, the only reference to this 

requirement in the petitionsis a citation to the trial court’s orders, which say the 

permissive appeal “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 

litigation.”

Because we conclude that the petitionsfail to establish each requirement of 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3(3)(e)(4), we deny the petitions

for permissive appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Lloyd, and Landau.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Small Business Administration

Pursuant to the authority granted to the United States Small Business Administration under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, under Section 309 of the Act and Section 107.1900 of the Small Business Administration Rules and Regulations (13 CFR 107.1900) to function as a small business investment company under the Small business Investment Company License No. 05/75-0240 issued to Chicago Venture Partners, L.P., and said license is hereby declared null and void.

United States Small Business Administration.

Sean J. Greene,

Associate Administrator for Investment.

[FR Doc. 2012-4926 Filed 2-29-12; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM THE CONSOLIDATED
BALANCE SHEET FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND THE CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                             527
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   89,337
<ALLOWANCES>                                    19,251
<INVENTORY>                                    381,022
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               469,686
<PP&E>                                       1,211,031
<DEPRECIATION>                                 434,092
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,391,211
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          291,508
<BONDS>                                      1,275,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           709
<OTHER-SE>                                    (488,161)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,391,211
<SALES>                                      1,778,991
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,778,991
<CGS>                                        1,304,231
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,304,231
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   968
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             105,677
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                141,678
<INCOME-TAX>                                    51,125
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             90,553
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (50,621)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    39,932
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .69
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .67
        

</TABLE>
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 38 (Monday, February 27, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11485-11486]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-4483]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-489-805]

Certain Pasta From Turkey: Extension of Time Limit for the 
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephanie Moore, AD/CVD Operations, 
Office 3, Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Ave. NW., 
Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-3692.

Background

    On August 26, 2011, the Department of Commerce (``Department'') 
published a notice of initiation of the administrative review of the 
antidumping duty order on certain pasta from Turkey, covering the 
period July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011. See Initiation of 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Requests 
for Revocation in Part, 76 FR 53404 (August 26, 2011). The preliminary 
results of review are currently due April 1, 2012.

Extension of Time Limit of Preliminary Results

    Section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the 
Act), requires that the Department make a preliminary determination 
within 245 days after the last day of the anniversary month of an order 
for which a review is requested. Section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Act 
further states that, if it is not practicable to complete the review 
within the time period specified, the administering authority may 
extend the 245-day period to issue its preliminary results to up to 365 
days.
    We determine that completion of the preliminary results of this 
review within the 245-day period is not practicable as the Department 
needs additional time to analyze complex issues regarding affiliation 
and knowledge of U.S. destination. Given the complexity of these 
issues, and in accordance with section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Act, we are 
extending the time period for issuing the preliminary results of this 
review by

[[Page 11486]]

120 days. Therefore, the preliminary results are now due no later than 
July 30, 2012. The final results continue to be due 120 days after 
publication of the preliminary results.
    This notice is published pursuant to sections 751(a)(3)(A) and 
777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: February 17, 2012.
Christian Marsh,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Operations.
[FR Doc. 2012-4483 Filed 2-24-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
```
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1477 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1477

 To establish a user fee for follow-up reinspections under the Federal 
                     Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 21, 2009

 Mr. Feingold introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To establish a user fee for follow-up reinspections under the Federal 
                     Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF USER FEE FOR FOLLOW-UP REINSPECTIONS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary shall assess and collect a user fee 
from each facility registered under section 415 of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 350d), establishment registered under 
section 510 of such Act (21 U.S.C. 360), and facility described in 
section 351(a)(1)(C) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
262(1)(C)) for which a follow-up reinspection is required to ensure 
correction of a violation found by the Secretary during initial 
inspection of the facility or establishment of a good manufacturing 
practices requirement under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.).
    (b) Payment of Fee.--The user fee required under subsection (a) 
shall be due from a facility or establishment described in such 
subsection upon the reinspection of such facility or establishment, as 
described in subsection (a).
    (c) Amount of User Fee.--The amount of the user fee required under 
subsection (a) shall be established by the Secretary.
    (d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
            (1) the terms ``animal drug'', ``device'', ``drug'', and 
        ``food'' have the meanings given those terms in section 201 of 
        the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321);
            (2) the term ``biological product'' has the meaning given 
        the term in section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (42 
        U.S.C. 262); and
            (3) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Health 
        and Human Services.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-1396

BRIAN DAVID HILL,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

GLEN ANDREW HALL, ESQ., in his official capacity, Commonwealth Attorney 

of Martinsville, Virginia; GILES CARTER GREER, ESQ., Judge of Martinsville 

Circuit Court, in his official capacity; MATTHEW SCOTT THOMAS CLARK, 

ESQ., Attorney, in his official capacity; LAUREN MCGARRY, ESQ., Martinsville 

Public Defender Office, in her official capacity,

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at 

Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge. (4:20-cv-00017-JLK)

Submitted: June 18, 2020 Decided: June 23, 2020

Before FLOYD, THACKER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian David Hill, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Brian David Hill appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil action. We 

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the 

reasons stated by the district court. Hill v. Hall, No. 4:20-cv-00017-JLK (W.D. Va. 

Mar. 30, 2020). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 463

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II

No. CR-13-1099

TERRELL WAYNE HOOD

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered September 17, 2014

APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-2012-511]

HONORABLE MICHAEL A.

MAGGIO, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge

This is an appeal from a probation revocation. Appellant pled guilty on April 4, 2013,

to charges of possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and

driving with a suspended license. He was placed on probation for a period of five years,

conditioned, inter alia, on meeting with the probation office in a regular and timely manner. 

A petition to revoke was filed after appellant failed to appear at his initial probation intake. 

After a hearing, the trial court found that appellant violated the terms of his probation and

sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court

employed the wrong standard in determining his punishment and that the revocation hearing

was untimely. We affirm.

Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court employed the wrong

standard by failing to exercise its discretion in deciding whether or not to revoke. We cannot

address this issue because appellant failed to object to the sentence imposed at the revocation
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 463

hearing; the issue is therefore not preserved for appellate review. Mixon v. State, 330 Ark.

171, 954 S.W.2d 214 (1997).

Appellant next argues that the probation hearing was untimely because he was initially

incarcerated on revocation charges and remained incarcerated for over sixty days. Arkansas

Code Annotated section 16-93-307(b)(2) (Supp. 2013) provides that a revocation hearing

must be held within sixty days of an arrest for a probation violation. However, this is not in

the nature of a speedy-trial provision, Miller v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 554, 386 S.W.3d 65, and

is mandatory only when one is arrested for the violation of the conditions of his probation. 

Id. Where the accused is incarcerated on other charges, the limitation is inapplicable. Id. 

Here, appellant was arrested for a probation violation on May 29, 2013. Less than two weeks

later, on June 10, the petition to revoke was dismissed based on appellant’s agreement to a

negotiated plea (on which he later reneged). Appellant remained incarcerated on other

charges. Upon determining that appellant had rejected the plea offer, the revocation petition

was refiled on August 15. The revocation hearing was then held promptly on August 28, less

than two weeks after the petition was refiled. Therefore, although appellant may in fact have

been incarcerated from April until August 2013, less than thirty days of the incarceration was

attributable to the revocation charges, and the sixty-day limitation set out in section

16-93-307(b)(2) was not violated.

Affirmed.

WALMSLEY and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Nicana C. Sherman, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

2