COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges O’Brien, Malveaux and Senior Judge Frank

ANTHONY HARRIS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0534- 19-3 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 22, 2019 DANVILLE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE Clyde H. Perdue, Jr., Judge (James C. Martin; Martin & Martin Law Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellant. (Alan Spencer, Assistant City Attorney; R. Colby Warren, Guar dian ad litem for the minor child; Haymore & Holland, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Anthony Harris (father) appeals the order terminating his pare ntal rights. Father argues that the circuit court erre d in terminating his parental rights “whe re he had committed no abuse or neglect and where the evidence against him did not meet the sta ndard of clear and convincing evidence and was legally insuffi cient to prove the statutorily required criteria for such termination.” Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclud e that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summaril y affirm the decision of the ci rcuit court. See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - BACKGROUND 1 “On appeal from the termination of parental rights, this Court is required t o review the evidence in the light most favor able to the party prevailing inthe circuit court.” Yafi v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va . App. 539, 550-51 (2018) (quoting T hach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 168 (2014)). Father and Victoria Steele (m other) are the biological parents to A.H., who is the subject of this appeal. On August 6, 2015, the Danville Department of Social Services (the Department) removed then-one-year-old A.H. fro m her parents’ care after rec eiving a report that their home was infested with rats and had t oilet and tub problems. The Da nville Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court held a hearing on August 12, 2015. Atthat time, father was incarcerated for unauthorized use of an autom obile. The Department met with father while he was incarcerated. Father expresse d an interest in having custody o f A.H., but also suggested that the Department contact his father, w ho lived in Pennsylvania, as a possible relative placement. On December 17, 2015, the Department spoke with father by telep hone and discussed the need for father to participate in a psychological evaluation an d attend parenting and substance abuse classes. Father attende d the parenting classes, but did not participate in the other required services. Father complained about a particular parenting coach , so the Department arranged for a different parenting coach. Father visited with A.H. until August 2016, when he claimed tha t he had contracted Methicillin-resistant Staphyloc occus aureus, or MRSA. The Depa rtment informed him that he

1 The record in this case was seal ed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates unsealing relevant portions of the record to resolve the issues appellant has raised. Evidence and factual findings below that are necessar y to address the assignments of error are included in this opinion. Consequently, “[t]o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the seale d record, we unseal only those specific facts , finding them relevant to the decision in this case. The remainder of the previously sealed recor d remains sealed.” Levick v. Mac Dougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1 (2017).- 3 - could not visit with A.H. until he provided proof that he no lo nger had the infection. Father never produced the necessary proof to show that the infection h ad been cured. Father did not contact the De partment between August and Octobe r 2016. Then, on October 6, 2016, he left the social worker a voice mail message , and thereafter, they “played ‘phone tag.’” The social worker met with father at a JDR court hearing on November 18, 2016. Meanwhile, the Department explored a relative placement for A.H .; however, it determined that the placement was not viable. Father did not attend a JDR court hearing on February 24, 2017. On March 15, 2017, the Department attempted to contac t father by going to his last kno wn address and calling him, but the Department was unable to reach him. The Department had no contact with father until January 2018, when it learned that father was incarcerated for a probation violation. A social worker met with father in jail and asked him where he had been living. Father replied that he had moved to Raleigh, North Caro lina and had been living with h is girlfriend. Father informed the Department that his father was interested in custody of A.H ., but his father never filed a petition for custody. The last time that the Departm ent had face-to-face contact with father was on February 24, 2018. After that date, all cont act between them was by tel ephone. On April 16, 2018, father called the Department. He was out of jail, but since he had no t provided documentation confirming that he no longer had M RSA, the Department did not a rrange a visit with A.H. On June 15, 2018, father called the Dep artment and informed the social worker that he had moved to Delaware. The Department explained that it could not provide services to father while he lived in Delaware; howev er, it did arrange for weekly Facetime visits between father and A.H., beginning in July 2018. At th at time, father indicat ed that he was still interested in- 4 - having custody of A.H., but by Sep tember 2018, father told the Department that he was no longer seeking custody because “it would be easier to arrange v isitation through [mother].” On October 5, 2018, the JDR court te rminated father’s parental rights to A.H., and father appealed the matter to the circuit court. 2 On February 6, 2019, the parties a ppeared before the circuit co urt. The Department presented evidence that father had two Facetime visits with A.H . in late 2018, and two more Facetime visits in early 2019, befo re the circuit court hearing

. Father testified that he wante d custody of A.H ., but when asked if he preferred for mother to have custody, “he replied th at he only felt she might do bet ter in court if he lost.” He further explained that he could take car e of A.H. He lived in a two-be droom apartment in Delaware with a roommate and worked fort y hours per week. His father li ved approximately forty-five minutes away, and his grandmother lived approximately ten miles away. After hearing the parties’ argum ents, the circuit court termina ted father’s parental rights to A.H. under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (C)(2). 3 This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS Father argues that the evidence was insufficient to support th e circuit court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. 4 Father acknowledged that “contact with the [Department] [had] been very difficult for [him] at times,” but contends that “thi s contact problem [had] been substantially solved.” Father fu rther asserts that “his out-of -state locati on . . . provides good

2 The JDR court also terminated m other’s parental rights to A.H. , and she appealed the decision to the c ircuit court.

3 The circuit court did not termina te mother’s parental rights t o A.H.

4 Several times in the argument section of his brie f, father sta tes that he did not abuse or neglect A.H. The circuit court did not terminate his parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B), so we will not address father’s state ments regarding abuse or negl ect.- 5 - cause for some excusable de lay” under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). H e emphasizes that he has “a good job, an available home, and rel atives nearby.” Lastly, fa ther contends that the Department did not provide reasonable services to him. “On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly wei ghed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determinati on based on the child’s best interests.’” Castillo v. Loudoun C ty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cty. D ep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991)). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plai nly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011) (quotin g Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20 (1986)). The circuit court terminated f ather’s parental rights under Co de § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (C)(2). Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) states that a court may terminat e parental rights if: The parent or parents, wit hout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the condi tions which led to or required continuat ion of the child’s foster care p lacement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental h ealth or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. “[S]ubsection C termination d ecisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that created the origi nal danger to the child, but on t he demonstrated failure of the parent to make reasonable c hanges.” Yafi, 69 Va. App. at 552 ( quoting Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 271 (2005)). “Considerably mo re ‘retrospective in nature,’ subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the pe riod in which he has been offe red rehabilitation services.”- 6 - Toms, 46 Va. App. at 271 (quoting C ity of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63 (2003)). The Department removed A.H. in August 2015, and met with fathe r a couple of weeks later while he was in carcerated. Initiallythe Department did not discuss any services for father because he expected to be released from incarceration shortly t hereafter. When his release date was later than expected, the De partment contacted father, and h e challenged paternity. After a paternity test confirmed that he w as the father, the Department met with him in December 2015 and discussed the services, inclu ding a psychological evaluatio n, parenting classes, and substance abuse classes, that father had to complete. By the t ime of the circuit court hearing in February 2019, father still had no t completed the psychological evaluation and substance abuse classes, despite having more than t hree years to complete the s ervices. Father argues that his move t o Delaware “provides good cause f or some excusable delay under [Code § 16.1-283(C)(2)].” F ather, however, had had no co ntact with the Department from November 2016 until January 2018, despite the Department’s atte mpts to contact him. Father belatedly told the Department th at he had moved to North Caroli na in 2017. Then, in June 2018, he informed the Department tha t he had moved to Delaware. At t hat time, A.H. had been in foster care for almost three y ears, and fathe r still had not pa rticipated in the required services. “Code § 16.1-283(C)(2)’s twelve-mont h time limit ‘was designed to prevent an indeterminate state of foster care “drift” and to encourage timeliness by the courts and social services in addressing the circumstances tha t resulted in the foster care p lacement.’” Thach, 63 Va. App. at 171 (quoting L.G. v. Amherst Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 51, 56 (2003)). Father’s move to Delaware did not create “an excusable delay” for his fa ilure to complete services after the child had been in foster care for three years.- 7 - Father also asserts that the D epartment did not provide him re asonable services. “‘Reasonable and appropriate’ efforts can only be judged with r eference to the circumstances of a particular case. Thus, a cour t must determine what constitut es reasonable and appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Harrison v. Tazewel l Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 163 (2004) (quoting Fer guson v. Stafford Cty. Dep ’t of Soc. Servs., 14 Va. App. 333, 338 (1992)). The Department “is not required to force its services upon an unwilling or disinterested parent.” Tackett v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Huma n Servs., 62 Va. App. 296, 323 (2013) (quoting Harris v. Lync hburg Div. of Soc. Servs., 223 Va . 235, 243 (1982)); see also Logan, 13 Va. App. at 130. Father had sporadic and limited contact with the Department wh ile A.H. was in foster care. The Department reviewed t he required services with fathe r in December 2015, while he lived in Virginia. Father only pa rticipated in the parenting c lasses. The Department also arranged for father to vis it with A.H. Then, in August 2016, h is visitations stopped when he claimed to have MRSA. For more than two years, father failed t o provide any proof that his infection had cured so that he c ould visit with A.H. in person. The Department had no contact with father after a hearing on November 28, 2016, until January2018, when the Department learned that he was incarcerate d. Father subsequently moved to Delaware. The Department told father that it could not provide s ervices when he lived “at suc h a long distance.” Contrary to father’s arguments, the Departm ent had provided father with opp ortunities to engage in services before he moved to Delaware, but father did not cooperate. The evidence was sufficient to t erminate father’s parental rig hts. Father had had ample opportunities over the years to pa rticipate in the required services; however, he failed to do so. He did not maintain continuous cont act with the Department and never provided them with the necessary documentation to visi t with A.H. in person. Father d id not demonstrate that he had- 8 - substantially remedied the condi tions that led to the requireme nt for A.H.’s continued foster care placement. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even i f, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Tackett , 62 Va. App. at 322 (quoting Kaywoo d v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540 (1990)). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court did not err in terminating f ather’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). “When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternativ es is sufficient to sustain th e judgment of the t rial court, and if so, we need not address the ot her grounds.” Kilby v. Culpeper Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 55 Va. App. 106, 108 n.1 (2009); see also F ields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8 (2005) (the Court affi rmed termination of parenta l rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to a ddress termination of pare ntal rights pursuant to another subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the circu it court erred in terminating father’s parental rights pu rsuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is summar ily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.