In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-1859

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

THOMAS ALLMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 CR 453-2—Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2003—DECIDED JULY 15, 2003

____________

Before BAUER, POSNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The defendant pleaded guilty to

possessing a prohibited weapon (an M-16 rifle), and related crimes, and was sentenced to 144 months in prison,

but in his plea reserved the right to appeal from the denial

of his motion to suppress.

An employee in the postal service’s Phoenix, Arizona

airmail center noticed a package from which protruded an

object that he recognized as the “pivot pin” of an M-16. An

army veteran, he had become intimately acquainted with

the M-16 during his military service. The pivot pin connects

the lower to the upper part of the gun and is prominent
2 No. 02-1859

when the gun is disassembled. The employee squeezed the

package and felt the outline of the lower part of the gun,

to which the pin is attached. He noticed at about the same

time a box with the same Chicago address and in the

same handwriting. He notified a postal inspector in the

airmail center who in turn called a postal inspector in

Chicago and was directed to send the two parcels to

Chicago. The inspector in Chicago who examined them

when they arrived was also an army veteran and he thought

that the box was too short to contain the upper part of

the gun, the lower part being in the package. (It’s as if

one parcel had contained a headless body, and the other

was too small to contain the head.) By this time he had

learned that both Thomas Allman, who had mailed the

two parcels and is the defendant in this case, and his brother Michael, the addressee, had histories of violent crimes

and might have ties to right-wing organizations. Putting

two and two together (although it is unclear that the sum

he derived was four), he decided that the box might contain an explosive device of some sort, or ammunition,

and so he x-rayed it and discovered that it contained the

upper part of an M-16 after all. A warrant to search the

two parcels was obtained and executed, confirming their

contents. The warrant also authorized the insertion of a

transmitter in them, which was done and led federal officers to Michael Allman’s apartment. He too pleaded guilty

to federal firearm violations, but his case is not before us.

The pivot pin was in plain view and created probable

cause to believe that Thomas Allman was violating federal

firearm laws. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Arkansas

v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n. 13 (1979); United States v.

Eschweiler, 745 F.2d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 1984); State v.

Youngblood, 786 P.2d 551, 556 (Idaho 1990). The identical

handwriting and address on the second parcel and the

fact that the two parcels were traveling together created
No. 02-1859 3

probable cause to search the second parcel as well. We

could stop right there. The defendant contends that the

squeezing of the package from which the pin was protruding, and the x-raying of the box, violated the Fourth

Amendment. Even if he is right, there was an ample

basis for the search warrant that was issued and so, the

evidence having been obtained lawfully by virtue of the

warrant, the motion to suppress was properly denied.

We do not think a warrant was even necessary. Although

the Supreme Court has held that feeling luggage to determine its contents is a search within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment, Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334

(2000), and although the general rule is that a search is

unlawful without a search warrant, there are a number of

exceptions. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938,

940 (1996) (per curiam) (automobile searches supported

by probable cause); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,

616-18 (1977) (search at international border); South

Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1976) (inventory

search of impounded car); United States v. Robinson, 414

U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (search incident to a lawful arrest);

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (search

after consent); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (pat-down

search for weapons based on reasonable suspicion). There

ought also to be an exception for packages about to be

placed on an airplane. See United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d

1290, 1303 (4th Cir. 1995) (concurring opinion). When

we consider that all persons, with all their belongings,

who travel by air are subject to search without a warrant,

see, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489

U.S. 656, 675 n. 3 (1989) (collecting and approving cases);

United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 n. 5, 500 (2d Cir.

1974) (Friendly, J.), we have trouble making sense of a

rule that would forbid such a search if a parcel is traveling by itself, also by air, as part of a mail shipment.
4 No. 02-1859

Apropos is United States v. Ramsey, supra, 431 U.S. at 620,

where the Supreme Court held that the warrantless

search of envelopes mailed from Thailand and containing

heroin was justified by the border-search exception to

the warrant requirement. Had the defendants carried

the envelopes on their persons there would have been no

doubt that custom officials could search the envelopes

when the defendants entered the country. The defendants

were entitled to claim no greater right of privacy in the

contents of the envelopes simply because they mailed

rather than carried them. If anything, there is a stronger

justification for searching parcels that are traveling alone

on a plane than for searching those that are part of a

passenger’s baggage, since in the first case, if there is a

bomb in the parcel set to explode during the flight, there

is no personal risk to the bomber.

Regarding the second parcel, the box containing the

rest of the gun, we do not accept the government’s argument that opening the package in Chicago was justified

by the rule that permits a search without a warrant if

there is an emergency or other urgent need (“exigent

circumstances”). Had the postal authorities feared that

the box might contain an explosive device, they would

hardly have flown it to Chicago without inspection, as

they did; or when it arrived have x-rayed it rather than

calling the bomb squad. Certainly, though, they had

probable cause to believe that it contained contraband or

evidence of crime, and the question is whether x-raying,

though a form of search, United States v. Montoya De

Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n. 4 (1985); Brent v. Ashley, 247

F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001); Thompson v. City of Los

Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989); United States

v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1980), requires a

warrant when it is conducted on a parcel in transit. Airline

passengers and their luggage are searched on embarking,
No. 02-1859 5

not arriving; and numerous cases hold that a parcel may

not be opened by the authorities without a warrant even

if there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of crime. United States v. Place, 462

U.S. 696, 701 (1983); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654-

55 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 523 (7th

Cir. 1989); United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir.

1998). But a prima facie case of violation of the Fourth

Amendment requires that there be a “reasonable expectation” of privacy in the property searched, Kyllo v. United

States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001), and we have trouble seeing

how, in this age of routine, soon to be universal, x-raying of

containers shipped by air, the defendant could have had

a reasonable expectation that his package would not be

x-rayed at any point during transit. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Oriakhi,

supra, 57 F.3d at 1303 (concurring opinion). If anything, it

was irresponsible of the postal authorities to ship the box

to Chicago without first x-raying it, and we do not see why

their lapse should give the defendant a constitutional claim.

Whether a more intrusive search of the box than merely

to x-ray it would have been permissible without a warrant

we need not decide.

AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-15-03