****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************RICHARD TRUSZ v. UBS REALTY

INVESTORS, LLC, ET AL. (SC 19323)
Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa, Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js. Argued March 24—officially released October 13, 2015

Procedural History Actionto recover damages forthe allegedlywrongful termination ofthe plaintiff’s employment, and for other relief, brought to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, where the defendants filed
a motion for summaryjudgment; thereafter, the court, Squatrito, J., certified to this court a question of law regarding the interpretation of General Statutes § 31- 51q. Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Todd Steigman, KarenL. Dowd and, on the brief, JacquesJ. Parenteau, for the appellant (plaintiff).
JamesA. Wade, withwhomwereBrettJ. Boskiewicz and, on the brief, Thomas J. Donlon, for the appellees (defendants).Sandra J. Staub, David J. McGuire and Martin B. Margulies filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut as amicus curiae.
CharlesKrich, principal attorney, andJaneKelleher, law student intern, filed a brief for the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities as amicus curiae.
DanielA. Schwartz, Christopher T. Parkin and Clarisse N. Thomas filed a brief for Connecticut Business and Industry Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.Opinion PALMER. J. This case comes before us on certification from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes § 51- 199b. The certified question that we must answer is: ‘‘Does the rule announced by the [United States] Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, [421, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689] (2006), i.e., ‘that when

. . . employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking
as citizens for [f]irst [a]mendment purposes, and the [c]onstitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline,’ apply to a claim that an employer violated [General Statutes] § 31-51q1 by subjecting an employee ‘to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by

. . . [§§] 3, 4 or 14 of article first ofthe [c]onstitution of the state

. . . .?’’ (Footnote added.) We concludethattheanswertothisquestionis ‘‘no.’’ We further conclude that amodified form ofthePickering/ Connick balancing test applies to speech by a public employee pursuant to the employee’s official duties under the state constitution; see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983) (in determining scope of public employee’s constitutional rightto free speech inworkplace, court’stask is to seek ‘‘a balance between the interests of the [employee], as
acitizen, incommentinguponmattersofpublicconcern andtheinterestofthe [s]tate, asanemployer, inpromoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Pickering v. Board ofEducation, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968) (same); and that § 31-51q extends the same protection to similar speechbyaprivate employee. Specifically, we conclude that, underthe state constitution, employee speechpursuant to officialjob duties on certain matters ofsignificant public interest is protected from employer discipline in a public workplace, and § 31-51q extends the same protection to employee speech pursuant to official job duties in the private workplace.
The District Court’s certification order sets forth the following facts that we accept as true for purposes of responding to the certified question. ‘‘[The defendant UBS Realty Investors, LLC (UBS Realty)] provides real estate investment management services to clients, such
as pension funds, public employee retirement systems, foundations, and private investors. UBS Realty is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as
an investment advisor. UBS Realty is a subsidiary of [the defendant] UBS AG2 and is part of UBS AG’s [g]lobal [a]sset [m]anagement division. UBS AG is a corporation whose stock is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. ‘‘At all times pertinent to this action, the plaintiff,Richard Trusz, was the head of UBS Realty’s valuation unit and a [m]anaging [d]irector ofUBS Realty. As head ofthevaluationunit, [theplaintiff] managedtheprocess which ultimately resulted in the valuation ofproperties held in UBS Realty’s private real estate investment funds. In early 2008 [the plaintiff] reported to UBS Realty management what he contended were errors in the valuation of certain properties held by UBS Realty in various investment funds. At that time [the plaintiff] also expressedto UBS Realtymanagementhis opinions that UBS Realty was obligated to correct and disclose to investors the valuation errors, that UBS Realty was obligatedto returntoinvestors anyexcessmanagement fees received as a result of the valuation errors, that the valuation unit had insufficient staff and resources to adequately perform its function, that UBS Realty’s internal controls regarding valuation were inadequate, that UBS Realty improperlyprovidedpreferential treatment to certain investors, and that UBS Realty was breaching fiduciary duties it owed to its investors. ‘‘UBS Realty’s compliance officersubsequentlyinvestigated [the plaintiff’s] contentions. Althoughthe report issued at the conclusion ofthis investigation confirmed the valuation errors reported by [the plaintiff], it concluded that none of the errors rose to a level that requiredUBSRealtytorestatethevaluestoitsinvestors
or return any management fees that had been paid by investors. A third-party auditor for some of the funds managed by UBS Realty also investigated [the plaintiff’s] claims ofvaluation errors. The auditor confirmed valuation errors, but concluded that these errors were not material to the funds’ financial statements and did not require a restatement of any of the financial statements for the funds. ‘‘[The plaintiff] disagreed with the conclusions ofthe compliance officer and the third-party auditor and continued to express to both UBS Realty and UBS AG his opinionthat bynot disclosingpropertyvaluation errors to investors and not adjusting management fees in light of these valuation errors, UBS Realty was violating its fiduciary, legal, and ethical obligations to its investors. ‘‘[The plaintiff] subsequently filed discrimination and retaliation complaints with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration. [The plaintiff] claimed that UBS Realty discriminatedagainsthimbasedonadisability—aheart condition—and later retaliated against him by taking adverse employment actions, culminating in his termination in August, 2008, because he opposed what he believed was unlawful activity by the defendants and because he had reported alleged securities laws violations. The defendants dispute [the plaintiff’s] allegations of unlawful activity. [The plaintiff] sued [thedefendants] infederal courtin2009.’’ (Footnote added.) Theplaintiffalleged, among otherthings, thatthe defendants had violated § 31-51q by subjecting him to discipline ‘‘on account of the exercise

. . . of rights guaranteed by

. . . [§§] 3, 4 or 14 of article first ofthe [c]onstitution of Connecticut.’’ Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment contending that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s claim under § 31-51q.3 Before the court, Squatrito, J.,4 could rule on that motion, this court issued its decision in Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., 304 Conn. 585, 598, 43 A.3d 111 (2012), in which we concluded that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti, holding that speech pursuant to a public employee’s officialjob duties was notprotected bythe first amendment; Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 421 (public employees who make statements pursuant to their official duties are not speaking as citizens for purposes of first amendment); applies to claims brought pursuant to § 31-51q against a private employer that are based
on the first amendment. See Schumannv. DianonSystems, Inc., supra, 598. In light of our decision in Schumann, the plaintiff filed in the District Court a motion for conference to discuss new authority in which he stated that he intended to argue that Garcetti did not apply to his retaliation claim because he was raising that claim under the state constitution.5 The District Court askedthe parties to submitbriefs onthe question of whether it should certify the issue raised by the plaintiffto this court. The defendants filed a brief contending that § 31-51q did not apply because the plaintiff’s workplace speech did not relate to matters of public concern and, therefore, was not constitutionally protected under either Garcetti or the Pickering/Connick balancing test.6 The defendants also argued, however, that if the District Court were to determine that the plaintiff’s speech did involve matters ofpublic concern, it should certify the issue to this court. The plaintiff contended in his brief that the requirements for certification set forth in § 51-199b had been met and the question of whether the Garcetti standard applies to the free speech provisions of the state constitution should be certified to this court, provided that doing
so would not delay proceedings in the District Court. Thereafter, the District Court issued its order ofcertification to this court, and we accepted the question of law previously set forth in this opinion.7
To provide context for our resolution ofthe certified question, we briefly review the governing legal principles. ‘‘In Pickering v. Board ofEducation, [supra, 391 U.S. 568]

. . . the court

. . . recognized that a government has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation ofthe speech of the citizenry in general. The court then setforth ageneralprinciple governing the constitutionality ofgovernment restrictions on the speech ofits employees: in evaluating the constitutionality of government restrictions on an employee’s speech, a court must arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [s]tate, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 601. ‘‘In Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. 150, the court added a modification to the general balancing test promulgated in Pickering

. Under Connick, if a government employee’s speech cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary

. . . to scrutinize the
reasons for [his or] her discharge.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 601. Thus, under the Pickering /Connick balancing test, employee speech in a public workplace is protected from employer discipline if it involves a matter ofpublic concern and ifthe employee’s interest in commenting on the matter outweighs the employer’s interest in promoting the efficient performance of public services.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 418–19, a majority ofthe United States Supreme Courtnoted ‘‘the practical difficulties of applying the principles articulated in Pickering and Connick

. . . [and] then observed that ‘[g]overment employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.

. . . Public employees, moreover, often occupy trusted positions in society. When they speak out, they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of governmental functions.’ ’’ (Citation omitted.) Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 602. ‘‘The court emphasized that [u]nderlying [its] cases has been the premise that while the [f]irst [a]mendment invests public employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to constitutionalize the employee grievance. [Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra] 420, quoting Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. 154. Thus, the court concluded that, when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees
are not speaking as citizens for [f]irst [a]mendment purposes, and the [c]onstitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 421

. . . .’’8 (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internalquotationmarks omitted.)Schuman v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 603. The court in Garcetti reasoned that ‘‘[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties theemployee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over whatthe employeritselfhas commissioned orcreated.’’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 421–22. Accordingly, under Garcetti, a court will subject the employee’s speech to the Pickering

/Connick balancing test only if it first determines that the employee was not speaking pursuant to his or her official duties; if the employee was speaking as an employee rather than as a citizen, the speech is not protected by the first amendment.
In Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1, 8, 738A.2d623 (1999), amajorityofthiscourtconcluded that § 31-51q prohibits a private employer from disciplining an employee for engaging in constitutionally protected speech not only when the speech occurs outsidethe workplace, butalso whenit occurs inthe workplace.9 Thereafter, in Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 610–11, we addressed a claim by
an employee against his private employer pursuant to § 31-51qallegingthatthe employerhadunlawfullydisciplined him for exercising his first amendment rights in the workplace. The plaintiffin Schumann claimed that

‘‘Garcetti, which involved a public employer-employee relationship, should not be applied to the private workplace’’ so as to limit the scope of employee speech that is protected by § 31-51q. Id., 598. The defendant contended that, to the contrary, § 31-51q applied only tospeechbyaprivateemployeethatwouldbeprotected from employer discipline in a public workplace under Garcetti

. Id., 597–98. This court agreed with the defendant.10 Id., 598. We did not reach the plaintiff’s claim in Schumannthatthe state constitutionprovidedbroader protectionthan Garcettibecausetheplaintiffhadfailed to raise the issue in the trial court and, even if the issue hadbeenproperlybefore us, the plaintiff’s speech would not have beenprotected underthe broaderPickering/Connick balancing test that the plaintiff advocated. Id., 619. The state constitutional issue that we
were not required to decide in Schumann is now squarely before us. Before considering the merits of the certified question, however, we must first address a threshold issue. The defendants claim that this court in Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 251 Conn. 1, ‘‘left open’’ the question of whether any speech in the private workplace is constitutionally protected, and they contend that it is not. The defendants further contend that, because § 31-51q applies only to constitutionally protected speech, no § 31-51q claim arising from speech intheworkplaceispossible. Contrarytothe defendants’ claim, however, Cotto clearly held that at least some employee speech in the workplace is constitutionally protected. Seeid., 8 (‘‘§ 31-51qconfirmsthelegislature’s intent to provide coverage for the exercise ofconstitutional rights at a private as well as at a public workplace’’ [emphasis added]). Otherwise, § 31-51q wouldnot protect it. See General Statutes § 31-51q (employer may not subject employee to discipline ‘‘on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment

. . . or [§§] 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the [c]onstitution of the state’’). Indeed, there
was no suggestion to the contrary, either by the defendant in Cotto or by Justice Borden in his concurring and dissenting opinioninthat case. Specifically, Justice Borden did not argue that employee speech in aprivate workplace was not constitutionally protected, that is, that it could be prohibited or punished by the governmentatwill, butonlythatinterferencewithsuchspeech by a private employer did not violate the employee’s constitutional rights. Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 26; but see footnote 9 of this opinion. Moreover, nothing inPickering, Connick or Garcetti supports the proposition that speech in the workplace, whether public or private, generally enjoys less first amendment protection than speech elsewhere. Rather, the United States Supreme Court emphasized in Connick that even speech by an employee on personal and private matters enjoys first amendment protection in the workplace, in the sense that such speech cannot be lawfully prohibited or punished by the government. See Connick v

. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. 147 (‘‘We in no
sense suggest that speech on private matters falls into
one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expressionwhich carries so little socialvalue, such as obscenity, that the [s]tate can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.

. . . For example, an employee’s false criticism ofhis employer
on grounds not ofpublic concern may be cause for his discharge but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel action accorded an identical statement made by aman onthe street.’’ [Citations omitted.]). The court also emphasized that it was holding ‘‘only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, afederal courtis notthe appropriateforuminwhichto reviewthewisdom ofapersonnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reactiontothe employee’sbehavior.’’Id. Inotherwords, although workplace speech on private matters is protected by the first amendment to the same extent that it is protected elsewhere insofar that it cannot be punished orprohibited by the government acting in its role
as a lawmaker, a public employer nevertheless may discipline the employee for such speech in its role as
an employer, subject to certain limitations.
We do not suggest that, because all speech in the workplace is constitutionally protected to the same extent as speech elsewhere, the protection provided to the speech of public employees by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Pickering, Connick and Garcetti was based on something other than firstamendment principles. To the contrary, the court has drawn the line between constitutionally protected speechthatis also protectedfrom discipline byapublic employer and constitutionally protected speech that may subject the employee to employer discipline by analyzing ‘‘the hierarchy of [f]irst [a]mendment values

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 145. The court concluded in Connick that, because certain speech is low in the hierarchy of constitutionally protected speech, the first amendment does not protect it from discipline by apublic employer. Id., 145–47. Only in that special and narrow sense, however, may it be saidthatsuchspeechisnot constitutionallyprotected.11 Although we recognize that this distinction may seem somewhat technical, making the distinction is important in order to avoid the type of confusion into which the defendants in the present case appear to have fallen, and also to avoid any suggestion that the government, acting as a lawmaker, has greater leeway to regulate speech in the workplace than it has to regulate speech in other locales. Because it is undisputed that § 31-51q was intended to prevent interference by
a private employer with the constitutionally protected speech ofits employees, and because employee speech in a private workplace is constitutionally protected to the same extent that it is protected in other locales, in the sensethatthegovernmentcannotprohibitorpunish it, we reject the defendants’ claim that ‘‘no § 31-51q claim is possible’’ based on employee speech in a private workplace.12
We note, however, that this court held in Schumann

v. DianonSystems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 607–608, that § 31-51qwas notintendedto conferonemployees inthe private sector a broader right to be free from employer discipline on the basis ofspeech in the workplace than the constitutionally based right enjoyed by employees inthe public sector, and the plaintiffinthe present case has not asked us to reconsider that decision. See id., 607 (‘‘[w]e disagree with those cases holding Garcetti inapplicableintheprivate sectorbecause oftheirincongruous effect ofgivingprivate sectoremployees greater workplace free speech rights than those afforded to their public sector counterparts’’). In other words, we concludedinSchumannthatanylimitations onthefirst amendment right of employees in a public workplace to be free from discipline on the basis of their speech also applyto the speechrights ofemployees inaprivate workplace under § 31-51q. We can perceive no reason, and the plaintiffdoes not contend, thatthe same principle should not apply to speech rights under the state constitution. The defendants contend, however, that the scope ofthe right ofan employee in aprivate workplace to be free from employer discipline based on speechpursuantto § 31-51qisnarrowerthanthe analogous constitutionally based right of a public employee in some respects. Accordingly, the questions that wemustanswerare: (1) Whatisthe scope oftheprotection afforded by the free speech provisions ofthe state constitution to a public employee’s speech in the workplace?; and (2) Is the protection afforded by § 31-51q toanemployee’sspeechinaprivateworkplacecoextensive with or narrower than the protection afforded by thespeechprovisionsofthestate constitutiontospeech by an employee in a public workplace?13
I
We first address the scope of a public employee’s right to be protected from employer discipline on the basis ofworkplace speech underthe speech provisions ofthe state constitution. The plaintiffcontends thatthe free speech provisions ofthe state constitution provide broader protection to the speech of public employees thandoesthefirstamendment. Specifically, theplaintiff contends that the flexible Pickering/Connick formula, and notthe bright line rule ofGarcetti, applies to workplace speech by apublic employee underthe state constitution. We conclude that the state constitution incorporates a slightly modified form ofthe Pickering/ Connick test. ‘‘It is [well established] that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher level ofprotection for such rights.

. . . State v

. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). In determining the contours of the protections provided by our state constitution, we employamultifactorapproachthatwe first adopted in Geisler. The factors that we consider
are: (1) the text of the relevant constitutional provisions; (2) related Connecticut precedents; (3) persuasive federal precedents; (4) persuasive precedents of other state courts; (5) historical insights into the intent of [the] constitutional [framers]; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Kelly, 313 Conn. 1, 14, 95 A.3d 1081 (2014). We now turn to these factors.
A
We first address the text of the operative constitutional provision. Article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.’’ Article first, § 5, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or ofthe press.’’ Finally, article first, § 14, ofthe Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘The citizens have
a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their
common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remon-strance.’’
This court previously has held that because, unlike the first amendmentto the federal constitution: (1) article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution includes language protecting free speech ‘‘on all subjects’’; (2) articlefirst, § 5, ofthe Connecticutconstitutionusesthe word ‘‘ever,’’ therebyproviding ‘‘additional emphasis to the force of the provision’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 381, 655 A.2d 737 (1995); and (3) article first, § 14, ofthe Connecticut constitution provides a right to seek redress for grievances by way of ‘‘remonstrance,’’ and therefore ‘‘sets forth free speech rights more emphatically than its federal counterpart’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Linares, supra, 381; these textual differences ‘‘warrant an interpretation separate and distinct from that ofthe first amendment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thetextofarticlefirst, § 4, ofthe Connecticut constitution providing that citizens ofthis state are free to speak ‘‘on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse ofthat liberty’’; (emphasis added); is particularly relevant in the present case. This broad and encompassing language supports the conclusion that the state constitution protects employee speech in the public workplace on the widest possible range of topics, as long as the speech does not undermine the employer’s legitimate interest in maintaining discipline, harmony and efficiency in the workplace. See Ozols v. Madison, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:11cv1324 (SRU) (D. Conn. August 20, 2012) (‘‘[t]he breadth of the Connecticut [c]onstitution’s language suggests that
a citizen’s speech is protected, even when the speech is about her employment’’). This standard is more consistent with the Pickering/Connick standard than with Garcetti

. Compare Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, 391 U.S. 568 (employee has right to comment on matters ofpublic interest that must be weighed against employer’s interest inpromoting efficient services); id., 570 (noting employer’s interest in maintaining discipline, harmony, personal loyalty and confidence in workplace), with Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 423–24 (employee’s speech pursuant to his or her officialjob duties is not constitutionally protected, even if it involves matter of public concern and employee’s interestincommentingonmatteroutweighs employer’s interest in performing its services efficiently). It is apparent, therefore, that the text of article first, § 4, supportsthe plaintiff’spositionthatthePickering/Connick balancing test provides the proper standard under the state constitution.
In support of their claim to the contrary, the defendants contend that, because article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution provides that ‘‘[e]very citizen,’’ andnoteveryperson, ‘‘mayfreelyspeak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,’’ the provision is narrower than the first amendment. They furthercontend that, when a person is speaking pursuant to his or her officialjob duties, the person is not speaking
as a citizen and, therefore, the speech is not protected underthisprovision. Cf. Garcettiv. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 421 (‘‘when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizensfor [f]irst [a]mendmentpurposes’’); Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. 146 (‘‘[w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the [f]irst [a]mendment’’). The defendants’ argument, however, proves too much. Taken to its logical conclusion, the defendants’ interpretation would permit the state to regulate all speech on personal or private matters that is not made in the speaker’s capacity as a citizen, regardless of where the speech occurred. There is no evidence that the constitutional framers intended to impose such severe limits on the speech rights of the state’s citizenry. Moreover, the defendants’ interpretation would render article first, § 4, internally inconsistent, as it would prevent citizens from speaking freely ‘‘on all subjects’’; (emphasis added) Conn. Const., art. 1, § 4; including those subjects that do not involve the speaker’s role as a citizen. For these reasons, we reject the defendants’ contention.
B
We next considerthe second Geislerfactor, the holdings and dicta of this court and the Appellate Court. Aswehaveindicated, this courtheldinStatev.Linares, supra, 232 Conn. 381, that the free speech provisions of the state constitution have ‘‘an interpretation separate and distinct from that of the first amendment’’; (internal quotation marks omitted); and that ‘‘the framers of our constitution contemplated vibrant public speech, and a minimum of governmental interference

. . . .’’ Id., 386. In Linares, this court rejected the rigid ‘‘federal forum analysis, which affords the most rigorous protection of speech only at ‘traditional’ forums and narrowly defines ‘traditional’ to exclude modern public gathering places often otherwise compatible with public expression’’ in favor of a more ‘‘flexible approach,’’ requiring a ‘‘case-by-case balancing of the right to free speech against the competing interest of preventing unreasonable interference with the ‘normal activity’ of a particular place.’’ Id., 382. This court reasoned that ‘‘this flexible approachprohibits the government from unilaterally and unnecessarily limiting speech

. . . .’’ Id., 386. Similarly, in the present case, the sensitive, case-by-case balancing test set forth in Pickering and Connick would minimize unilateral governmental interference with employee speech that is compatible with the legitimate interests of employers
more effectivelythantherigidGarcettirule, whichcate-gorically denies constitutionalprotectionto anyspeech byanemployee inhis orherofficialcapacity, regardless of whether the speech unduly burdens the employer. Moreover, astheAppellate Courthas observed, ‘‘Connecticut’s appellate courts have not been hesitant to continue to grant its citizens the same protection as did the ‘old’ federal decisions, when the United States Supreme Court has retreated from apreviously enunciated broad protection reading of [a federal constitutional provision].’’14 State v

. DeFusco, 27 Conn. App. 248, 256, 606 A.2d 1 (1992), aff’d, 224 Conn. 627, 620 A.2d 746 (1993). This willingness to adhere to an old rule that provides broaderprotection than the new rule is consistent with the principle that ‘‘our state constitution is an instrument ofprogress, it is intended to stand for a great length oftime and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally so that it fails to have contemporary effectiveness for all of our citizens.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Linares, supra, 232 Conn. 382. When a constitutional rule has beeninplaceforalongperiodoftime, asuddencontractionoftherulemaywellviolatetheentrenchedconstitutional expectations ofthe state’s citizenry.15 Cf. State v. DeFusco, supra, 256 (observingthat, inStatev.Marsala, 216Conn. 150, 579A.2d58 [1990],this ‘‘courtinterpreted
our state constitution to allow the maintenance of a constitutional status quo that had existed for our citizens for at leasttwenty-nine years’’). We note thatPickeringwas decidedin 1968, Connickwas decidedin 1983 and Garcetti was decided in 2006. Thus, the citizens of this state enjoyedthebenefitofthePickeringbalancing test for thirty-eight years. Accordingly, we conclude thattheprecedentsofthiscourtandtheAppellate Court support the plaintiff’s position in the present case.16
C
We next address the third Geisler factor, persuasive federal precedent. As we have explained, the primary federalprecedentsconsistoftheUnitedStates Supreme Court’s decisions in Pickering, Connick and Garcetti

. For the following interrelated reasons, we find Pickering and Connick to be more persuasive than Garcetti

. First, we believe that the distinction that the court made in Garcetti between an employee’s speech on a matter ofpublic concern in the speaker’s role as citizen andanemployee’s speechonamatterofpublic concern pursuant to official duties is somewhat artificial and potentially difficult to apply. See Ozols v. Madison, supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:11cv1324 (SRU) (concluding that Garcetti does not apply to § 31-51q claims under state constitution because ‘‘there is something strangely arbitrary about
a judicial inquiry into when a citizen is acting as a citizen’’). AsJustice Souterpointed outinhis dissenting opinion in Garcetti, under the rule adopted by the majority in that case, a ‘‘schoolteacher is protectedwhen complaining to the principal about hiring policy,’’ because hiring is not within the duties ofateacher, but ‘‘a school personnel officer would not be [protected] if he protested that the principal disapproved of hiring minority job applicants.’’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 430; see also id., 429 (Souter, J., dissenting), citing Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. WisconsinEmploymentRelations Commission, 429 U.S. 167, 177 n.11, 97 S. Ct. 421, 50 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1976) (schoolteacherwho spoke atschoolboardmeetingaboutpending labor negotiations between board and teachers’ union spoke ‘‘bothas an employee andacitizenexercising [f]irst [a]mendment rights’’); Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 427 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (‘‘[P]ublicemployees
are still citizens while they are in the office. The notion that there is a categorical difference between speaking
as a citizen and speaking in the course ofone’s employment is quite wrong.’’). Justice Souter also stated in his dissenting opinion that this distinction ‘‘seems stranger still in light ofthe majority’s concession of some [f]irst [a]mendment protection when a public employee repeats statements made pursuant to his duties but in
a separate, public forum or in a letter to a newspaper.’’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 430 n.1. He argued that ‘‘separating the citizen’s interest from the employee’s interest ignores the fact that the ranks ofpublic service include those who share the poet’s ‘object

. . . to unite [m]y avocation and myvocation’; these citizen servants
are the ones whose civic interest rises highest when they speak pursuant to their duties, and these are exactly the ones government employers most want to attract.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 432 (Souter, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Souter observed in his dissent that ‘‘public employees are often the members of the communitywho are likelyto have informed opinions as to the operations oftheir public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues.

. . . This is not a whit less true when
an employee’s job duties require him to speak about suchthings: when, for example, apublic auditor speaks
onhis discoveryofembezzlementofpublicfunds, when
a building inspector makes an obligatory report of an attempttobribehim, orwhenalawenforcementofficer expresslybalks at asuperior’s orderto violate constitutional rights he is sworn to protect.’’ (Citation omitted; internalquotationmarksomitted.) Id., 433. Wegenerally find Justice Souter’s argument persuasive. Second, and relatedly, although Garcetti sought to justify the adoption of a categorical rule on the ground that a more flexible test ‘‘would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and among government employees and their superiors in the course of official business’’; id., 423;Garcetti has merely created new uncertainties that will require judicial resolution. Specifically, the court in Garcetti did not provide any clear guidance on what speechwillbefoundtobe ‘‘pursuanttoofficialresponsibilities,’’ but merely noted that ‘‘[t]he proper inquiry is
a practical one.’’ Id., 424; see also C. Rhodes, ‘‘Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Preyto an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism,’’ 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1173, 1193 (2007) (‘‘the [c]ourt [in Garcetti] has merely shifted the uncertainty to the scope of the underlying categorization’’); C. Rhodes, supra, 1194–98 (discussing conundrums that arise when attempting to apply ‘‘ ‘practical inquiry’ ’’ standard under Garcetti). Not surprisingly, courts have struggled with this issue. See Weintraub

v. Board ofEducation, 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir.) (concluding that teacher who filed grievance to complain about supervisor’s failure to discipline student who repeatedlythrew books at teacherwas speaking pursuant to official duties ‘‘even though [such speech] is not required by, or included in, the employee’sjob description or in response to a request by the employer’’ because speech ‘‘was part-and-parcel of his concerns abouthisabilitytoproperlyexecutehisduties’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 995, 131 S. Ct. 444, 178 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2010); id., 205 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (arguing that Garcetti ‘‘lends itself to multiple interpretations, and the majority’s decision to construe it broadly

. . . while a possible reading, is not compelled by anything in the Supreme Court’s opinion’’); Davis v. McKinney, supra, 518 F.3d 314 (underGarcetti, courtisrequiredto analyze ‘‘separately each aspect of a communication with multiple topics and recipients’’ to determine whether each aspect of speech was pursuant to official job duties); Davis v. McKinney, supra, 315 (employee speech ‘‘directed within the employee’s chain of command is not protected,’’ but speech to fellow employee outside chain ofcommand is protected). Accordingly, we are notpersuaded that Garcetti’s purported bright line rule reduces the need for judicial oversight of workplace disputes. Third, we are persuaded that ‘‘Garcetti’s reasoning

. . . turned the Pickering/Connick test on its head by privileging employment status over the subject matter of public employee speech.’’ S. Nahmod, ‘‘Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos,’’ 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 561, 573 (2008). As we have explained, in Pickering and Connick, the court focused on the place of the employee’s speech in the ‘‘the hierarchy of [f]irst [a]mendment values

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. 145. If the speech occupied a high rung in that hierarchy, it was protected. Incontrast, Garcettifocuses on ‘‘the employee’s [f]irst [a]mendment status. Ifthe speech is required by the job, the public employee loses his status as acitizen with [f]irst [a]mendment protection against employer discipline

. . . .’’ S. Nahmod, supra, 574. This is so evenifthe speech has the highest first amendment value because it involves a matter of great public concern, and even if the speech imposed little burden on the employer’s legitimate interests. See, e.g., Davis v. McKinney, supra, 518 F.3d 315–16 (employee’s speech to supervisor expressing concerns about inadequate response to employee’s investigation into fellow employees’ use ofworkplace computers to access pornography, possibly including child pornography, not protected from employer discipline under Garcetti); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 593–94, 597 (7th Cir. 2007) (police officer’s statementto fellowpolice officer that deputy police chief had harbored felon not protected because first police officer had official duty to apprise second police officer of information pertinent to investigation; second police officer’s statement to district attorney about deputy chief’s harboring felon not protected because second police officer had duty to assist district attorneybyproviding details ofinvestigation), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, 128 S. Ct. 905, 169 L. Ed. 2d 729 (2008); see also Morales v. Jones, supra, 598 (concluding that first police officer’s deposition testimony regarding deputy chief was protected and recognizing ‘‘the oddity of a constitutional ruling in which speech said to one individual may be protected underthe [f]irst [a]mendment, while preciselythe same speech said to another individual is not protected’’); compare Lane v. Franks, U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 n.4, 2380, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2014) (holding that truthful sworn testimony in court given outside job duties is protected, but declining to address question whether truthful sworn testimony pursuant to employee’s ordinary job duties would be protected). We concludethattheflexiblePickering/Connickbalancingtest is preferable to Garcetti’s categorical rule in this context. See C. Rhodes, supra, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1192 (‘‘[p]ublic employee speechcases defysimple rulebased categorization because of the almost limitless circumstances in which they arise’’). Fourth, because employee speech to persons outside the workplace is potentially protected under Garcetti
even if it involves the employee’s official duties, Garcetti creates a perverse incentive for public employees to bring their work-related concerns to such persons before trying to resolve them internally.17 See Garcetti

v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 423–24 (‘‘Employees who make public statements outside the course of performing their official duties retain some possibility of [f]irst [a]mendment protection because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government. The same goes for writing a letter to
a local newspaper

. . . .’’ [Citations omitted.]); see also Davisv.McKinney, supra, 518 F.3d315–16 (employee’s speech to supervisor complaining of inadequateresponse to employee’s investigation revealing use of workplace computers to view pornography not protected, while employee’s complaints to Federal Bureau of Investigation about possible use of computers to view child pornography were protected);18 P. Secunda,

‘‘Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees,’’ 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 117, 127 (2008–2009) (‘‘[t]he moral ofthe Garcetti story appears to be to go directly to an external agency, do not pass [g]o, and certainly do not attempt to resolve internally’’). Finally, although we recognize that public employers have an important interest in ensuring that ‘‘their employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment and promote the employer’s mission’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Garcetti

v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 434 (Souter, J., dissenting);
we are persuaded by Justice Souter’s argument that this interest can be adequately protected by applying
a slightly modified Pickering test, under which the employee could prevail only if ‘‘he speaks on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way he does it.’’19 Id., 435. Specifically, Justice Souter proposed that ‘‘only comment on officialdishonesty, deliberatelyunconstitutionalaction, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can weigh out in an employee’s favor’’ when an employee is speaking pursuantto officialjob duties. Id. Thus, underJustice Souter’sproposedstandard, speech pursuant to an employee’s official duties regarding, for example, amerepolicydisagreementwiththe employer would not be protected, even ifit pertained to a matter of public concern and had little effect on a legitimate employer interest.20
Because we find Pickering and Connick to be more persuasive than Garcetti, we conclude that the weight ofpersuasive federal precedent favors a broader reading of the free speech provisions of the state constitution than of the first amendment.
D
We next addressthe fourth Geislerfactor, persuasive sister state decisions. The defendants point outthatthe three state courts that have considered the issue that is before us have concluded that Garcetti applies to claimsundertherespectivestate constitution. SeeKaye

v. Board ofTrustees, 179 Cal. App. 4th 48, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456 (2009); Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 967 A.2d 729 (2009); Gilbert v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 725 N.W.2d 249 (S.D. 2006).
We do not find these cases persuasive. In Kaye v. Board of Trustees, supra, 179 Cal. App. 4th 57–58, the court concluded the relevant state constitutional provision21 was not broader than the first amendment in this context because Garcetti did not narrow the scope ofprotected speech in the workplace and the case was not ‘‘illogical, unpersuasive or incompatible with its prior precedents.’’ For the reasons set forth in part I C of this opinion, we disagree with this conclusion. In Newellv. Runnels, supra, 407 Md. 608, the court merely stated conclusorily that the speech protections provided by the Maryland constitution22 are ‘‘generally ‘coextensive’ with the protections accorded by the [f]irst [a]mendment.’’Thereisno suchgeneralpresumption in this state. Similarly, the court in Gilbert v. FlandreauSanteeSioux Tribe, supra, 725N.W.2d258, stated that the majority of states with constitutional free speech provisions like South Dakota’s23 ‘‘have interpreted their state constitutional free speech provisions as coextensive with their federal counterparts.’’ The court did not analyze Garcetti or compare the holding and reasoning of that case to the holdings and reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Pickering and Connick. These cases, therefore, provide little, if any, support to the defendants’ position in the present case. E
We next consider the fifth Geisler factor, historical insights into the intent of the constitutional framers. This courtpreviouslyhas recognizedthat ‘‘ourconstitution’sspeechprovisionsreflectauniquehistoricalexperience and a move toward enhanced civil liberties, particularlythoselibertiesdesignedtofosterindividuality.

. . . This historical background indicates that the framers ofourconstitutioncontemplatedvibrantpublic speech, and a minimum of governmental interference

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Linares, supra, 232 Conn. 385–86. Thus, this factor supports the conclusion that, when employee speechwillnot undulyinterfere with apublic employer’s interests in promoting efficient services, in maintaining discipline, harmony, personal loyalty and confidence in the workplace and in setting official policy within the limits of the law, the mere fact that the employee was speaking pursuant to his or her official duties should not subject the employee to discipline.
F Finally, we consider the sixth Geisler factors, contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms. This factor has significant overlap with the first Geisler factor, the persuasiveness of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering, Connick and Garcetti

. Specifically, we noted in part I A of this opinion that, by eliminating first amendment protection for employee speech pursuant to officialjob duties, even ifthe speech is on a matter ofpublic concern and places little burden on the employer, Garcetti reduced the likelihood that public employees would speak to their employers regarding corrupt practices, threats to the public safety or otherillegal or dangerous workplace practices. Thus, the persons who are in thebestpositionto know about corrupt or dangerous practices by public entities face the prospect of discipline
ordischarge iftheybringsuchpracticestothe attention of their employers. Moreover, Garcetti created an incentive for public employees to raise their concerns outside the workplace in the first instance. Although public employees certainly have the right to raise their
concerns externally, we can discern no public policy that would be advanced by requiring them to do so. Finally, the public policy expressed by § 31-51q is that employees in this state should have the right to speak freely on all subjects, even in the workplace, as long
as their speech does not ‘‘substantially or materially interferewiththeemployee’sbonafidejobperformance
or the working relationship between the employee and the employer

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-51q. Accordingly, we conclude that these public policy factors weigh in favor of the plaintiff’s position.
The defendants contend, however, that other public policy considerations weigh strongly in favor of applyingthe Garcetti standardto claims underthe state constitution. First, they contend that public employers have the right to control their employees’ official job related speech so that their communications are accurate and promote the employer’s mission. Under the standardthatJustice Souterarticulatedinhisdissenting opinion in Garcetti, however; see part I C of this opinion; inaccurate employee speech or employee speech that undermines a legitimate employer policy or missionwouldnotbeprotected. Althoughemployeespeech that undermines a corrupt or dangerous employer mission would be protected, we have concluded that this fact weighs against adopting the Garcetti standard as the state constitutional standard. Second, relying on our decision in Schumann, the defendants contend that applying Garcetti would avoid
a clash of employee and employer speech rights. See Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 610 (‘‘[a]pplying Garcetti to federal constitutional claims brought under § 31-51q keeps courts from the constitutionally untenable task of, in essence, having to choose sides in a work-related viewpoint dispute between two private actors’’); see also Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 251 Conn. 30 ( Borden, J., concurring and dissenting) (‘‘interpreting [§ 31-51q] to apply to private workplace conduct could

. . . bring two competing sets of expressive rights into conflict, andtherefore placesthe state, inthe form ofthe courts,
on one side ofthat contest’’). The questionthatwe were addressing inSchumann, however, is whether Garcetti limited the scope of employee speech in the private workplace that was protected by § 31-51q or, instead,
as the plaintiffin that case claimed, § 31-51q applied to allsuchspeechthatisprotectedbythefirstamendment in the sense that the government cannot punish or prohibit it. Schumannv. DianonSystems, Inc., supra, 598.The question that we are addressing here is whether Garcetti or the Pickering/Connick test provides the properrule forpublic employees underthe state constitution. Nothing in Garcetti, Pickering or Connick suggests that a public employer has any speech rights beyond the right to control its official policies within thelimits ofthelawandto efficientlyandproperlycarry outits legitimate mission. Accordingly, ifthePickering/ Connick test is adequate to protect that right, the fact that it may limit other speech of the public employer has no bearing on ouranalysis. The question ofwhether Garcetti is preferable to the Pickering/Connick test in the private workplace is more properly considered in part II of this opinion, in which we address the defendants’ claim that § 31-51q protects less speech in a private workplace than the state constitution protects in
a public workplace. Third, the defendants contend that extending constitutional protection to job related speech would transform § 31-51q into ‘‘a sweeping whistleblower protection law that will apply to all public and private employers in any circumstance,’’ and that doing so is
more properly the function of the legislature than of this court. Again, we disagree. Ifthe Garcetti standard isinconsistentwiththeintentofthe constitutionalframers to protect speech by public employees on all subjects to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the legitimate interests ofpublic employers, we cannot adopt that standard merely because the constitutional speech provisions confer greater protection in certain circumstances than that provided by statute. The legislature has no power to define constitutional speech rights. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 430 (Souter, J., dissenting) (‘‘[t]he applicability of a provision of the [c]onstitution has never depended on the vagaries of state or federal law’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); id., 440 (‘‘the combined variants of statutory whistle-blower definitions and protections add up to a patchwork, not a showing that [constitutional] worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief’’). Accordingly, the question of whether § 31-51q protects less speech in the private workplace than is constitutionally protected in the public workplace is also more properly considered inpart II ofthis opinion. Finally, the defendants contend that the bright line rule ofGarcettiprovides clearerguidance to employers than the flexible Pickering/Connick test. As we explained in part I C ofthis opinion, however, Garcetti merely substituted one difficult question—whether a public employee is speaking pursuant to his officialjob duties or as a citizen—for another difficult question— whether the employee’s speech is on a matter ofpublic
concern and outweighs the employer’s legitimate interests in workplace discipline, order and efficiency. But
even if it is true that the rule in Garcetti is marginally easier to apply than the Pickering/Connick test, thatfactwouldhardlyoutweighthe obvious benefits associated with the significantly greater free speech rights afforded under the latter standard.
G
In summary, the Geisler factors as a whole provide considerable support for the plaintiff’s claim that the Garcetti standard does not comport with the free speechprovisions ofthe state constitution, and no such factor provides any meaningful support for a contrary determination. We conclude, therefore, that Justice Souter’s modified Pickering/Connick balancing test, whichrecognizes boththe state constitutionalprinciple that speech on all subjects should be protected to the maximum extent possible and the important interests ofan employer in controlling its own message and preserving workplace discipline, harmony and efficiency, provides the proper test for determining the scope of
a public employee’s rights under the free speech provisions of the state constitution when the employee is speaking pursuant to his or her official duties. Id., 435 (Souter, J., dissenting) (‘‘only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can weigh out in an employee’s favor’’ when employee is speakingpursuantto official duties); see also partI C of this opinion. In our view, Justice Souter’s test properly balances the employer’s heightened interest in controlling employee speech pursuant to official job duties—
aninterestthatPickering didnotspecificallyaddress— and the important interests ofthe employee and ofthe public in allowing employees to speak without fear of retaliation about matters of particularly acute public concern—interests that the Garcetti standard fails to protect. AsJustice Stevens aptlystatedinhis dissenting opinion in Garcetti, ‘‘[t]he proper answer to the question ‘whether the [constitution] protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties’

. . . is ‘[s]ometimes,’ not ‘[n]ever.’ ’’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
II
Wenextconsiderthe defendants’ claimthatthescope ofspeech that is protected by § 31-51qis narrowerthan the scope of speech by public employees that is protected by the free speech provisions ofthe state constitution. Specifically, the defendants contend that: (1) private employers have the right to control their employees’job relatedspeech; (2) applyingthe Garcetti standard under § 31-51qavoids a clash ofemployee and employer speech rights; (3) broadening the scope of whistleblower speech that is protected by § 31-51q is a matter for the legislature, not this court; (4) applying the Pickering/Connick test under § 31-51q undermines the ability of private employers to make timely and certain decisions; and (5) the public policy in favor ofbringing corrupt and dangerous employer practices to light carries less weight when the employer is private. We address, and reject, each of these claims in turn.
With respect to the defendants’ first claim, that private employers have the right to control their employees’ job related speech, we are satisfied that the modified Pickering/Connick standard adequately protects this right. Under this standard, if an employee’s job related speech reflects a mere policy difference with the employer, it is not protected. It is only when the employee’s speech is on a matter ofpublic concern and implicates an employer’s ‘‘official dishonesty

. . . other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety’’; id., 435 (Souter, J., dissenting); that the speech trumps the employer’s right to control its own employees and policies.24 With respect to the defendants’ argument that ‘‘[t]he general public does not have the same interest in, or entitlement to, information about the operations of private businesses’’ as it has in public entities, the defendants fail to recognize that, even underGarcetti, anemployee’s speechoutsidetheworkplace about the employee’s job related duties—for example, a letter to the editor—is protected, as long
as the speech involves a matter of public concern. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 423. Accordingly,
we fail to see how protecting such speech within the workplace would threaten aprivate employer’s privacy interests. To the contrary, protecting such speech will
remove the incentive for an employee to raise concerns publicly without first raising them internally. Finally,
we are mindful that ‘‘[a]s a remedial statute, § 31-51q deserves a generous construction

. . . .’’ Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 251 Conn. 8–9.
The defendants also claim that the Garcetti standard avoids a clash ofemployee and employer speech rights. We are persuadedthatthe modifiedPickering/Connick standard is sufficient to avoid such a clash. We first note that when Justice Borden, in his concurring and dissenting opinionin Cotto; see id., 30; andJustice Zarella, in his concurring opinion in Schumann; see Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 636; expressed concerns about a clash of employee and employerspeechrights, theywere objectingtotheholding of the court in Cotto that § 31-51q applies to employee speechintheprivate workplace. The correctness of that holding is not before us in this appeal. Rather, the issue that we are deciding is whether Garcetti or the Pickering/Connick balancing test, or some other standard, determines the scope ofthe protection afforded by § 31-51q to employee speech in the private workplace. For all of the reasons that we have previously discussed in this opinion, we conclude that the modifiedPickering/Connicktestdoesnotplaceasignificantly greater burden on the speech rights of private employers than does the Garcetti test.25 The only employee speechthatisprotectedbythemodifiedPick-ering/ConnicktestandthatisnotprotectedbyGarcetti is speech pursuant to an employee’s officialjob duties that is on a matter of public concern and involves the employer’s ‘‘official dishonesty

. . . other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety

. . . .’’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 435 (Souter, J., dissenting). Moreover, the defendants in the present case have made no claim that their own first amendment rights would be violated if § 31-51qprotected the plaintiff’s speech.26 Accordingly, we reject this claim.
The defendantsnextarguethatthe decisionto extend whistleblowerprotection to employee speechpursuant to official job duties in a private workplace should be left to the legislature. The legislature, however, has expresseditsintentin § 31-51qthatconstitutionallyprotected speech in the private workplace should be protected from employer discipline. See Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 251 Conn. 16 (‘‘[W]e are persuaded that the legislature meant what it said. Section 31-51qextendsprotection ofrights offree speechunder the federal and the state constitutions to employees in the private workplace.’’). We have concluded in the present case that, under the free speech provisions of the state constitution, speech by a public employee on all subjects, including internal whistleblowing speech, should be protected from employer discipline to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the legitimate interests ofthe employer. We see no evidence that the legislature intended to carve out an exception for internal whistleblowing speech under § 31-51q merely because such speechisnotprotectedunderotherstatutory provisions.27 To the contrary, as we observed in Cotto, the legislative history of § 31-51q supports the conclusion that one purpose ofthe statute was to protectemployeesfromretributionforspeakingaboutdangerous or illegal workplace conditions. See id., 9–10 (underscoring remarks of Senator Howard T. Owens during Senate debate on proposed legislation that purpose of legislation was to prevent retribution against employees who complain about violations of federal occupational safety laws and labor laws). We therefore reject this claim as well.
The defendants further contend that § 31-51q should not protect employee speech pursuant to official job duties because employers need to be able to make timely decisions with certainty. They argue that the bright line rule of Garcetti provides clearer guidance than the flexible Pickering/Connick test as to when employee speech is protected from discipline. We note, however, that, although there is no presumption that the official job duties of a private employee, unlike those of a public employee, implicate the public interest, underthe state constitutionalstandardthatwehave adopted in the present case employee speech pursuant to officialjob dutieswouldbeprotectedby § 31-51qonly to the extent that it involves dishonest or dangerouspractices by the employer that would be a matter of public concern. When speaking on such matters, a private employee is speaking both as an employee and as
a citizen, just as a public employee would be. Accordingly, for the same reason that we rejected this claim in part I B ofthis opinion, namely, that the question of whether an employee is speaking as a citizen or as an employee is often no less difficult than the questions presentedbythePickering/Connicktest, we also reject it here. Similarly, with respect to the defendants’ claim that greater efficiency and proper performance by a private employer are not matters of public concern, although
we would agree that that is true as a general rule, it is clearthatthatisnotalwaysthecase. Underthestandard that we have adopted, only employee speech that involves employer policies and practices that are matters of significant public concern is protected. For that reason, this claim also fails.
III
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the answer to the certified question is ‘‘no.’’ We further conclude that thePickering/Connick balancing test, as modified by Justice Souter in his dissenting opinion in Garcetti; see Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 435 (Souter, J., dissenting) (‘‘only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can weigh out in an employee’s favor’’ when employee is speaking pursuant to official duties); applies to speech in a public workplace under the state constitution and that § 31-51q extends the same protection to employee speech in a private workplace for claims involving the state constitution.
No costs will be taxed in this court to the plaintiff
or the defendants.
In this opinion EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

1 General Statutes § 31-51q provides: ‘‘Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee’s bona fidejob performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney’s fees as part ofthe costs ofany such action for damages. If the court determines that such action for damages

was brought without substantial justification, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the employer.’’

2 Hereinafter, joint references to UBS Realty and UBS AG are to the defendants, and references to the defendants individually are by name.
3 Because the record before us does not contain the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the basis of the defendants’ claim is unclear.

4 Hereinafter, all references to the District Court are to Judge Squatrito unless otherwise indicated.

5 Before filing their motion for summary judgment, the defendants hadfiled a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims. In her ruling on the motion to dismiss the claim pursuant to § 31-51q, the District Courtjudge to whom the matter was then assigned, Arterton, J., concluded that Garcetti did not apply to the claim because Garcetti did not apply to claims arising in a private workplace. See Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:09cv268 (JBA) (D. Conn. March 30, 2010). This court’s decision in Schumann abrogated Judge Arterton’s ruling.

6 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 419 (‘‘[s]o long as employees

are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively’’); Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. 146 (‘‘[w]hen employee expression cannotbe fairly considered as relatingto any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the [f]irst [a]mendment’’).

7 After we accepted the certified question from the District Court, we granted permission to the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities to file briefs as amici curiae in support of the plaintiff’s position, and to the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, Inc., to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the defendants’ position.

8 In Garcetti, Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion; see Garcetti

v. Ceballos, supra, 547U.S. 426; Justice Souterauthoredadissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg joined; id., 427; and Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion. Id., 444. We discuss the substance of these dissenting opinions later in this opinion.

9 Justice Borden authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in Cotto, in which he argued that, although § 31-51q applied to private employers, it did not provide protection against infringement ofspeech rights in aprivate workplace, because interference with speech rights by a private employer does notviolate the constitution. Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 251 Conn. 32–33. Justice Katz authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in which she agreed with the majority’s interpretation of § 31-51q, but disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant had not violated the statute. Id., 41. Justice Francis McDonald issued a concurring opinion in which he maintained that § 31-51q did not apply to employee speech in the workplace because private employers have a constitutional right to express their own views on their property, free from government interference. Id., 53–54.

10 We note that Justice Zarella authored a concurring opinion in which he argued that § 31-51q was inapplicable to any speech made by an employee in a private workplace and that Cotto should be overruled. Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 628–29.

11 To be sure, some language in Schumann may be read as suggesting that private employee speech pursuant to officialjob duties is not protected under the first amendment. See Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 610 n.21 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that § 31-51q applies to employee speech pursuant to official duties because ‘‘§ 31-51q, by its plain language, applies only ‘to constitutionallyprotected speech,’ ’’ which, under Garcetti, does not include speech pursuant to official job duties). To the extent that this language possibly could be interpreted to suggest that the government may freely punish or prohibit such speech, we now disavow any such suggestion. Rather, as we have explained, speech by a public employee pursuant to official job duties is not constitutionally protected under the federal constitution only in the special sense that the constitution does not insulate such speech from employer discipline.

12 We recognize that § 31-51q confers only statutory protection against a private employer’s interference with constitutionally protected employee speech, whereas an employer’s right to address employees as it sees fit is, at least to some degree, constitutionally protected from government interference. To the extent that the defendants intended to claim that § 31- 51q is facially unconstitutional because it confers a statutory speech right

on employees that constrains the employer’s constitutional speech rights,

we conclude that any such claim is unreviewable because it was inadequately briefed.

13 The District Court has asked us only to articulate the proper legal standard under the state constitution; it has not asked us to apply that standard to the facts of this case. 14 ‘‘See, e.g., State v

. Marsala, [216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58 (1990)]; State

v

. Geisler, supra, [222 Conn. 672]. Thus, in [Marsala], our Supreme Court refused to follow United States v

. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed. 2d 677 (1984), and gave our citizens the protection of the exclusionary rule, under our constitution, undiluted by agood faith exception, as allowed inLeon. UntilLeon, abroad exclusionaryrule underthe federal constitution had been a constant in fourth amendment analysis, having been first announced in Weeks v

. United States, 232 U.S. 383, [398] 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), and made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution inMapp v

. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, [655] 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). The Marsala court interpreted

our state constitution to allow the maintenance of a constitutional status quo that had existed for our citizens for at least twenty-nine years. ‘‘In [Geisler], this court refused to follow New York v

. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1990). The Harris court also created

an exception to the exclusionary rule under the federal constitution, and held that evidence obtained outside a residence, immediately following an illegal warrantless arrest made in the residence, was admissible at trial. [Id., 21.] Such evidence had been previously banned as violative of the fourth amendment. See Payton v

. New York, 445 U.S. 573, [590] 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). Our conclusion in Geisleraligned our state constitutionalprotections withthose protections long affordedbythe federal constitution prior to Harris and followed by the courts of this state.’’ State v. DeFusco, 27 Conn. App. 248, 256–57, 606 A.2d 1 (1992), aff’d, 224 Conn. 627, 620 A.2d 746 (1993).
15 Authorities have disagreed as to whether Garcetti narrowed thePickering/Connick test or, instead, merely addressed an issue that it had not previouslyhadthe opportunityto address. CompareKayev. Board ofTrustees, 179 Cal. App. 4th 48, 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456 (2009) (‘‘Garcetti does not

. . . limit rights established by earlier precedents in a manner inconsistent with those precedents. Rather, Garcetti relied upon and applied earlier precedents to address an issue that had never been directly addressed by them

. . . .’’), with R. Garcia, ‘‘Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos, and the Paradox of Statutory Protection for Public Employees,’’ 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 22, 24 (2008–2009) (Garcetti ‘‘narrowed the scope of the [f]irst [a]mendment protections that public employees had enjoyed for decades’’). In our view, Garcetti narrowed the scope ofprotected speech. Before Garcetti was decided, public employees reasonably could have expected that speech pursuant to their official duties would be protected from employer discipline if it related to a matter of public concern and if it satisfied the Pickeringbalancingtest. AfterGarcetti, the ‘‘answertothequestionwhether the [f]irst [a]mendment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties’

. . . is

. . . ‘[n]ever.’ ’’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

16 Although the second prong of Geisler focuses on the decisions of this court andthe Appellate Court, itbears notingthat, on atleast five occasions,

our trial courts have either declined to apply Garcetti to § 31-51q claims involving the state constitution or held that it is an open question whether Garcetti appliesto suchclaims. SeeSanchezv.High WatchRecovery Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CV-12- 6032834-S (January 14, 2013) (denying motion to strike claim pursuant to § 31-51qpursuantto Garcetti because ‘‘the Connecticut constitution is more liberal than the federal constitution on freedom of speech’’); Maysonet v. Primecare, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-10-5016091-S (February 1, 2013) (denying defendant’s motion for summaryjudgment ‘‘because Connecticut may afford individuals greaterprotection under its own constitution’’ than is afforded by Garcetti); Matthews v. Dept. ofPublic Safety, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CV-11-6019959-S (May 31, 2013) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 262, 270–82) (conducting Geisleranalysis andconcludingthatPickering/Connickbalancingtestappliesto employee speechunderConnecticutconstitution); Cubilla

v. Montville, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. KNL-CV-11-6010874-S (March 18, 2014) (57 Conn. L. Rptr. 860, 864 n.65) (adopting analysis of court in Matthews); Carson v. Dept. of Children & Families, Superior Court, judicial district ofHartford, Docket No. HHD-CV07-5036578-S (March 27, 2014) (denying motion to strike claim pursuant to § 31-51q pursuant to Garcetti because free speech rights may be broader under state constitution); see also Ozols v. Madison, supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:11cv1324 (SRU) (concluding that Garcetti does not apply ‘‘to those portions of [§] 31-51q that relate to rights protected by the Connecticut [c]onstitution’’); but see Cabrera v. American Schoolfor the Deaf , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CV12-6035273-S (February26, 2013) (55 Conn. L. Rptr. 637, 639–41) (performing Geisler analysis and concluding that Garcetti applies to claims understate constitution).

17 The court in Garcetti stated that ‘‘[i]f

. . . a government employer is troubled by the perceived anomaly, it has the means at hand to avoid it. A public employer that wishes to encourage its employees to voice concerns privately retains the option of instituting internal policies and procedures thatare receptive to employee criticism. Giving employees aninternalforum fortheirspeechwill discourage themfrom concludingthatthe safestavenue of expression is to state their views in public.’’ Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 424. The court failed to recognize, however, that apublic employee who speaks pursuant to such internal policies and procedures still might face the prospect of employer discipline for the speech, unless the policies andprocedures rose to the level ofa contractual guarantee thatthere would be no retaliation for critical speech. Moreover, we do not see why this important issue of public policy should be subject to a public employer’s unilateral choice.

18 Compare Matthews v. Lynch, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:07cv739 (WWE) (D. Conn. April 11, 2011) (speech of state police officer relating to alleged corruption within Connecticut State Police and directed at office of Connecticut attorney general and New York State Police not protected because speaker was ‘‘charged with reporting crime and

. . . he did in fact report misconduct to the agencies to which he was supposed to report such misconduct’’).

19 Indeed, it is arguable that what Justice Souter characterized as an ‘‘adjustment’’ ofthePickering test; Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 434; is not an adjustment at all, but is a straightforward application ofPickering to aspecifictype ofspeech, thatis, speechpursuantto an employee’s official duties, thatthe employerhas aparticularly important interest in controlling. Justice Breyer argued in his dissenting opinion in Garcetti that the standard adopted by the majority was too narrow, but that Justice Souter’s proposed standard was too broad. Id., 446–48. In his view the Pickering balancing test should apply to employee speech pursuant to official duties ‘‘only in the presence of augmented need for constitutional protection and diminished risk of undue judicial interference with governmental management of the public’s affairs.’’ Id., 450. He concluded that that test was met in Garcetti because the case involved the speech of an attorney, which is subject to regulation by canons of professional ethics, and because it involved the speech of a prosecutor, which is subject to the constitutional mandate to communicate with the defense about exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the government’s possession. Id., 446–47. We believe that Justice Souter’s proposed standard provides adequate protection of the interests of public employers.

20 For example, if a public employee responsible for establishing state traffic rules and policies insisted that, contrary to the state’s established policy, the speed limit on interstate highways should be eighty miles per hour, that speech would not be protected under Justice Souter’s approach,

even though it was on a matter of public concern and placed little burden

on the employer.

21 The Californiaconstitutionprovides in relevantpart: ‘‘Everyperson may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.’’ Cal. Const., art. I, § 2 (a).

22 The Maryland constitution provides in relevant part: ‘‘That the liberty ofthe press oughtto be inviolablypreserved; that every citizen ofthe [s]tate oughttobeallowedtospeak, writeandpublishhissentimentsonallsubjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.’’ Md. Const., art. 40.

23 The South Dakota constitution provides in relevant part: ‘‘Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.

. . .’’ S.D. Const., art. VI, § 5.

24 Inthepublicworkplace, themodifiedPickering/Connicktestalsowould protect speech regarding deliberately unconstitutional action by the employer because that conduct would satisfy the state action requirement. Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. 435 (Souter, J., dissenting).
25 The defendants raise the hypothetical examples of an employee who ‘‘has a racist bumper sticker on a car that he or she uses when visiting customers,’’ an employee who ‘‘hands out political leaflets to customers or solicits donations to social causes,’’ an employee who ‘‘hands out religious materials when meeting customers,’’ and an employee who ‘‘uses racist

or sexist slurs when conducting business or communicating with other employees.’’ Presumably, however, none ofthese examples involves speech pursuant to official job duties. Thus, if they would be protected under the Pickering/Connick balancing test, they would be protected under Garcetti,which is the standard that the defendants would have us adopt under the state constitution. Moreover, although there is no need in the present case to consider whether such speech would be protected under the Pickering/ Connick test, we doubt that the employee’s interest in engaging in such speech would outweigh the employer’s legitimate interest in maintaining discipline, harmony and efficiency in the workplace or that the speech would satisfy the statutory requirement that the employee’s activity ‘‘not substantiallyormateriallyinterferewiththe employee’sbonafidejobperformance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-51q. Indeed, a number ofthese activities would subjectthe employerto legalaction, whichwouldhardlypromote aharmonious working relationship between the employee and the employer. The amicus ConnecticutBusiness andIndustryAssociation, Inc., contends that, in the present case, ‘‘not only was [the plaintiff’s] speech part of his professional duties, but his speech occurred even after his employerfully considered his concerns, and, after two separate investigations, disagreed with [the plaintiff] that additional disclosures were necessary.’’ (Emphasis in original.) As we have indicated, however, we have not been asked to apply the standard that we have adopted to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whetherthe plaintiff’s speech was protected under § 31-51q.

26 As the majority in Cotto stated, ‘‘[w]e do not dispute the possibility that circumstances may arise when the rights of an employee under § 31-51q may conflict with the employer’s own free expression rights. If and when that case does arise, we will be required to resolve any such conflict in light of the particular facts and circumstances then presented.’’ Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 251 Conn. 8 n.5.

27 The defendants’ reliance on Schumann in support oftheir claim to the contrary is misplaced. In Schumann, we rejected the plaintiff’s claim that applying Garcetti to the speech of internal whistleblowers in the private workplace pursuant to § 31-51q would chill such speech, stating that ‘‘by its plain language, [§ 31-51q] applies only to constitutionally protected speech

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., supra, 304 Conn. 610 n.21. Thus, we held only that, if the first amendment did not protect internal whistleblower speech in a public workplace from employer discipline under Garcetti, § 31-51qdidnotprotect such speech from discipline by a private employer in claims involving the firstamendment. We didnotsuggestthat, ifthe speechprovisionsofthestate constitution do protectinternalwhistleblowerspeechin apublic workplace, § 31-51q could not be construed to provide protection to such speech in the private workplace if the protection went beyond that provided by other statutes.