J-S05001-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.P.,

MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1881 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered September 17, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000721-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2021

S.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the dispositional order wherein the juvenile 

court adjudicated her infant daughter, S.A., dependent and placed her in the 

legal and physical custody of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services

(“DHS”). We affirm. 

DHS’s involvement with the family precedes S.A.’s premature birth in 

June 2020, as the agency previously removed the child’s two older siblings 

from the care of Mother and J.A. (“Father”), who still reside together, due to 

allegations of child abuse based in 2017. The child abuse report, which was 

founded upon medical neglect and the failure to meet the children’s needs,

was substantiated. The results of a 2018 parenting capacity evaluation 

(“PCE”) conducted in conjunction with those dependency proceedings 

illustrated, inter alia, that Mother lacked the capacity to provide safety and/or 
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permanency to her children. Mother has a history of anger management 

problems and mental health issues, including suicidal ideations, and it was 

unclear whether she had resumed her medication after giving birth to S.A. 

Upon S.A.’s discharge from the hospital, the juvenile court granted a 

temporary commitment to DHS. Child was placed in the kinship care of her 

maternal aunt, who also cares for S.A.’s older brother. In addition, maternal

aunt desires to be the placement option for their sister, who is currently in

pediatric care.1 The aunt supervises Mother’s visitation with S.A. and her 

brother. The status of Mother’s supervised visitation with S.A.’s older sister 

is uncertain because of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Within one month of S.A.’s birth, DHS filed a dependency petition and,

after an evidentiary hearing on September 17, 2020, the juvenile court 

adjudicated S.A. dependent. Specifically, juvenile court reasoned that the 

credible, persuasive testimony presented by two parenting experts, the DHS 

investigator, and the caseworker from the community umbrella agency that 

coordinated the family’s services constituted clear and convincing evidence 

that Mother and Father’s continuing parental incapacity rendered their infant 

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1 During the dependency hearing, Tianna Pelzer, the family’s case manager, 

testified that she visited S.A. in the kinship home with her maternal aunt and 

confirmed that her needs were being satisfied. N.T., 9/17/20, at 50. The 

infant was current with her immunizations and had regularly-scheduled 

pediatric appointments. Id. However, Ms. Pelzer noted her concern regarding 

episodes where the infant choked on her vomit to the extent that she turned 

blue. Id. The maternal aunt was required to manually clear the child’s throat 

to restore unobstructed breathing. Id. at 50.
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daughter dependent pursuant to Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act. The 

juvenile court continued S.A.’s placement in kinship care with the maternal 

aunt, which the court found to be the least restrictive placement alternative 

available. The child’s placement goal remains reunification with her parents. 

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). She

presents one issue for our review: “Did the Trial Court committed [sic] an 

error of law and/or abuse its’ [sic] discretion when it adjudicated the minor 

child dependent without clear and convincing evidence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 

section 6301-6365 of the Juvenile Act?” Mother’s brief at 7.2

We review the juvenile court’s order of adjudication and disposition for 

an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., In Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 

(Pa. 2015). Furthermore, “The standard of review in dependency cases 

requires an appellate court to accept findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does 

not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or 

conclusions of law.” Id. (cleaned up). 

As we noted in In re G.T., 845 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa.Super. 2004), DHS 

has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the statutory 

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2 Father did not file a notice of appeal or participate in this appeal. Similarly, 

Patricia Cochran, Esquire, the guardian ad litem appointed to advocate S.A.’s 

best interests, neglected to file a brief on behalf of the child. 
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ground for a finding that S.A. is a “dependent child.” The Juvenile Act defines 

a dependent child as, inter alia, one who: 

is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education 

as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his 

physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A determination 

that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based 

upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian or other 

custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at 

risk, including evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other 

custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places 

the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). “The question of whether a child is lacking proper 

parental care or control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two 

discrete questions: whether the child presently is without proper parental care 

and control, and if so, whether such care and control are immediately 

available.” In re G.T., supra at 872 (cleaned up).

Furthermore, 

If the court finds that the child is dependent, then the court may 

make an appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child’s 

physical, mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child to 

remain with the parents subject to supervision, transferring 

temporary legal custody to a relative or public agency, or 

transferring custody to the juvenile court of another state. 

In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc) (cleaned up).

Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in adjudicating S.A. 

dependent upon less than clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, Mother 

contends that the court based its decision upon Mother’s prior interaction with 

DHS during 2017 when her two older children were adjudicated dependent. 

She continues that, since she was compliant with her reunification objectives 
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relating to the older children and DHS failed to present any evidence of a 

current parental incapacity or inability to care for S.A., the agency effectively 

discriminated against her due to her intellectual disability. 

Mother’s contentions are unconvincing. Mother’s argument confuses her 

prior compliance with DHS service directives with an actual capacity to parent 

her infant daughter. As demonstrated by the evidence presented during the 

evidentiary hearing, Mother is not currently able to provide the necessary 

parental care and control, despite her compliance with services. 

William F. Russell, Ph.D., testified as an expert in the area of parental 

capacity evaluations (“PCE”) and he discussed the specific PCE that he 

conducted on Mother during 2018. N.T., 9/17/20, at 4758. Dr. Russell 

explained that the PCE “is a review of an individual’s ability to function in all 

the spheres of their life, . . . and provide a safe environment for the child.” 

Id. at 59. Specifically, it examines a parent’s history, current functioning, 

mental health, medical health, “and any area or subject that might interfere 

with their, ability to provide a safe environment for a child[.]” Id. The 

evaluation involves the combined review of background information, referral 

information and a clinical, structured interview. Id. at 58-60. While the 

evaluation typically includes psychological testing, he was not able to perform 

that component due to Mother’s reading level. Id. at 60.

As it relates to Mother’s cognitive abilities, Dr. Russell observed that,

although it is possible for individuals with cognitive limitations to provide 
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appropriate and adequate care for children, his experience in this particular 

case revealed that the needs of the older children exceeded Mother’s abilities 

to provide a safe environment. Id. at 62-63. Indeed, on multiple occasions 

he attempted to discuss with Mother the various medical problems, autism, 

and speech delays that affected the older children and Mother declined to 

acknowledge the issues. Id. at 62. He further noted that supervised visitation 

with the children was instituted in 2017 because of Mother’s inappropriate 

interactions with the children and irregular attendance. Id. at 71-72. 

Furthermore, he stressed that the continuation of supervised visitation after 

three years of services reflects ongoing concerns regarding Mother’s “ability 

to understand the threat and depth of the problems,” provide a safe 

environment, and satisfy their needs. Id. at 66. He continued, “I would 

certainly think that if we are going to [argue] that she can care for the two 

older children . . . I think that the critical factor would have been that the 

visitation has been expanded and [she] is expanding [her] ability where [she] 

is not.” Id. at 68. 

Particularly damaging to Mother’s argument that the juvenile court erred 

in ignoring her compliance with DHS’s objectives is Dr. Russell’s explanation 

that “[p]articipation doesn’t equate to competence. . . . I think that following 

the recommendations is a positive, but I do not know that [it] provides them 

with the skill to take care of two children with very special needs.” Id. at 68. 

In sum, Dr. Russell opined that although S.A. does not have any special needs, 
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Mother would not be able to care for her without additional support from an 

intensive case manager to help her and monitor her ability to provide safety. 

Id. at 69-71. 

The juvenile court also considered the testimony of Erica G. Williams, 

Psy.D., who conducted Father’s PCE. While Dr. William’s testimony focused 

on Father, she corroborated Dr. Russell’s position that Mother could not 

provide parental care for S.A. without assistance. Id. at 83. She explained 

that she looks to the parental ability to provide safety and permanency 

independent of other people being present, and concluded:

There is substantial concern that even though all of these supports 

are in place, all of these services have been offered, professionals

have weighed in, [and] provide[d] recommendations that there’s

still some amount of barriers that are still present that these 

parents cannot execute care of a child[,] even for a short period[,] 

without the help of another adult. 

Id. at 83-84. 

Significantly, Mother’s witness, Elizabeth Lurenda, the Intellectual 

Disability Services (“IDS”) supports coordinator for Mother, testified that the 

relevant services to assist Mother in caring for an infant are not currently in 

place and it is unclear whether those services could be implemented because 

of the limited type of waiver IDS will provide Mother. Id. at 91-95.

The totality of the circumstances implicated by the evidence in this case 

supports the juvenile court’s decision. As an infant, S.A. is entirely dependent 

on her caregiver for her protection and survival, and Mother lacks the 

parenting capacity to provide her with proper parental care and control and 
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that capacity is not immediately available. See In re G.T., supra at 872. 

Stated plainly, notwithstanding Mother’s compliance with the reunification 

objectives relating to the older children, the certified record belies Mother’s 

contentions that she is capable of meeting S.A’s basic needs and that the 

juvenile court is discriminating against her due to her cognitive disability. The 

evidence presented during the hearing simply does not support those

assertions. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional order 

adjudicating S.A. dependent and maintaining her placement with maternal 

aunt.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2021