J-S54009-15

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BERNARD SALMOND,

Appellant No. 3151 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 20, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009618-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, AND FITZGERALD, *JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2015

Bernard Salmond appeals from the judgment of sentence of eighteen 

to thirty-six years incarceration that the trial court imposed after a jury 

convicted him of third-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. We 

affirm. 

The certified record supports the trial court’s summary of facts. 

On April 10, 2008, Kenneth Wiggins and [Appellant’s] 

brother, Quentin Salmond [(“Quentin”)], were betting on a game 

of dice. N.T. 3/18/14 at 220-221. During the betting, there was 

an altercation over a bet which prompted Wiggins to take money 

from Quentin. N.T. 3/18/14 at 221-222, 251; 3/19/14 at 141.

Two days later, on April 12, 2008, at approximately 12:30 

p.m., Wiggins went into the Skyline Restaurant, which he was 

known to frequent. N.T. 3/18/14 at 161, 238. As Wiggins 

entered the restaurant, a car driven by [Appellant], with Quentin 

and Jamil Banks as passengers, pulled up and parked on 

Woodlawn Road, near the intersection with Chew Road. N.T. 
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3/18/14 at 95-96, 162. [Appellant] was driving a blue Lincoln 

Continental, with PA license plate GXW5380. N.T. 3/18/14 at 

106. Quentin, dressed in an Islamic khimar[1]and sunglasses to 

hide his identity, and Banks exited the vehicle and walked up the 

street towards the Skyline Restaurant. N.T. 3/18/14 at 97, 162, 

168, 259; 3/19/14 at 182. [Appellant] remained in the car, 

parked, with the engine running. N.T. 3/18/14 at 99-100. Joan 

Hill witnessed [Appellant] park the car and also noticed Quentin, 

who appeared to Hill to be a male wearing female headwear. 

Believing that a robbery was about to happen, Hill called 911. 

N.T. 3/18/14 at 100. 

Quentin remained outside the restaurant while Banks went 

inside and purchased a soda, presumably scouting for Wiggins. 

N.T. 3/18/14 at 1620163. Banks then exited the restaurant and 

returned to where Quentin was standing outside. N.T. 3/18/14 at 

163-164. Shortly thereafter, Wiggins left the restaurant and 

began walking up the street when he was confronted by Quentin 

and Banks. N.T. 3/18/14 at 130, 164; 3/19/14 at 182-183. 

After being shot, Wiggins attempted to flee the scene but 

collapsed on the far side of the street. N.T. 3/18/14 at 164, 

255. Quentin and Banks ran back to the car in which [Appellant] 

was waiting, and the three fled the scene. N.T. 3/19/14 at 183. 

Medical personnel arrived on scene and transported Wiggins to 

the hospital, where he was later pronounced dead. N.T. 3/18/14 

at 129, 257-258.

Police recovered two fired cartridge casings and a 

Mountain Dew soda bottle from the scene of the shooting. N.T. 

3/18/14 at 81, 166. Police also recovered the surveillance 

cameras from the Skyline Restaurant, which had recorded the 

entire encounter. N.T. 3/18/14 at 155-156. A .32 caliber bullet 

was recovered from Wiggins’ body. N.T. 3/19/14 at 12-13. As 

the casings found at the scene were not .32 caliber, police 

determined that two guns had been fired outside of the 

restaurant, one .22 caliber semi-automatic and one .32 caliber 

revolver. N.T. 3/19/14 at 12-14, 18-19.

____________________________________________

1 A khimar is a two-piece garment consisting of a long cape covering the 

entire body and a head covering that also can be pulled up to hide the 

mouth. 
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[Appellant] had obtained the car that he used in the 

murder from Charles Hayward, who sold the vehicle to 

[Appellant] but never transferred the title. N.T. 3/19/14 at 26-

28, 42, 183-84. Because [Appellant] feared that police would 

trace the car to [him through] Hayward, . . . [Appellant] 

instructed two associates, Shawn Pina and Tyree Fisher, to burn 

the vehicle. N.T. 3/19/14 at 184. The vehicle was found on April 

14, 2008, two days after the shooting, when fire department 

personnel responded to a report of a vehicle . . . fire near Chew 

Street and 10th Street in Philadelphia. N.T. 3/20/14 at 21-22. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/15, at 2-4 (footnotes omitted). 

On March 21, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder 

and criminal conspiracy to commit murder. The trial court imposed two 

concurrent terms of eighteen to thirty-six years imprisonment. Appellant 

filed a post-sentence motion that challenged the weight of the evidence and 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. This timely appeal followed the 

denial of post-trial motions. Appellant’s ensuing Rule 1925(b) statement 

included, inter alia, the foregoing challenges to the weight of the evidence 

and the discretionary aspects of sentencing. 

Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

I. Is the appellant entitled to an arrest of judgment with 

regard to his convictions for murder of the third degree and 

criminal conspiracy since the evidence is insufficient to sustain 

the verdict as the Commonwealth failed to prove the appellant’s 

guilt of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt? 

II. Is the appellant entitled to a new trial with regard to his 

convictions for murder of the third degree and criminal 

conspiracy since the verdicts of guilt are against the weight of 

the evidence?
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III. Is the appellant entitled to a new trial as a result of the 

trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial based upon juror 

misconduct?

IV. Is the appellant entitled to be resentenced since the trial 

court’s aggregate sentence of 18 to 36 years for murder [in] the 

third degree and criminal conspiracy is contrary to the 

appellant’s character, history and condition and is therefore, 

excessive and unreasonable?

Appellant’s brief at 5. 

Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that 

the Commonwealth adduced at trial. Generally, “[o]ur standard when 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the evidence at trial, 

and reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish 

all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth 

v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2006). The Commonwealth may 

sustain its burden of proof based entirely on circumstantial evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 624 (Pa. 2010). “[A]ny doubt 

about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability 

of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth 

v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). 

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the varying degrees of murder 

as follows:
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(a) Murder of the first degree.--A criminal homicide constitutes 

murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional 

killing.

(b) Murder of the second degree.--A criminal homicide 

constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed 

while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in 

the perpetration of a felony.

(c) Murder of the third degree.--All other kinds of murder shall 

be murder of the third degree. Murder of the third degree is a 

felony of the first degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2502. 

As developed by case law, the elements of third-degree murder are (1) 

a killing (2) with legal malice (3) but without the specific intent to kill 

required in first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 

742, 657 (Pa.Super. 2014). Additionally, 

Malice is defined as: wickedness of disposition, hardness of 

heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind 

regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not 

be intended to be injured[.] Malice may be found where the 

defendant consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely 

high risk that his actions might cause serious bodily injury. 

Malice may be inferred by considering the totality of the 

circumstances.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1219 (Pa.Super. 

2011)). 

As it relates to criminal conspiracy conviction, 

A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons 

to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating 

its commission he:
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(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or 

more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such 

crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or 

commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime.

. . . .

(e) Overt act.--No person may be convicted of conspiracy to 

commit a crime unless an overt act in pursuance of such 

conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by 

a person with whom he conspired.

18 Pa.C.S. § 903 (a) and (c). Thus, the elements of criminal conspiracy are 

(1) an agreement to commit or aid others in committing a crime; (2) shared 

criminal intent; and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. See 

Commonwealth v. Bricker, 882 A.2d 1008, 1017 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

As a practical matter, conspiracies are commonly established through 

circumstantial evidence. We previously stated, “Proof of a conspiracy is 

almost always extracted from circumstantial evidence. The Commonwealth 

may present a ‘web of evidence’ linking the defendant to the conspiracy 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must, however, rise above mere 

suspicion or possibility of guilty collusion.” Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 

A.3d 858, 873 (Pa.Super 2014) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa.Super. 2000)). Additionally, “The 

conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding such conduct may 
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create a web of evidence linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bricker, supra at 1017. 

Herein, Appellant asserts generally that the Commonwealth failed to 

adduce sufficient evidence to establish his identity as the driver of the 

vehicle that transported the shooters to Chew Avenue or his participation in 

the incident that resulted in the victim’s death. Appellant’s brief at 21. As it 

relates to the murder conviction, he contends that the evidence does not 

demonstrate that he “engaged in any conduct that exhibited his intent to kill 

the victim or cause the victim serious bodily injury that resulted in death.” 

Id. Finally, in reference to the conspiracy conviction, he maintains that the 

evidence does not sustain the finding that he entered into an agreement to 

kill the victim. Id. We address these components seriatim. 

During the jury trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

Joan Hill, a local business owner who observed Appellant and his 

codefendants stop in a blue Lincoln Continental with license tag No. 

GXW5380 in front of her office at the intersection of Woodlawn Road and 

Chew Avenue. N.T., 3/18/14, at 96, 106. Two males exited the vehicle. 

Id. 95-96. One of the males was dressed like a woman in an Islamic khimar 

and sunglasses. Id. at 96, 97. The driver remained in the vehicle with its 

engine idling. Id. at 99. As one of the men’s attire and his obvious attempt 

to conceal his identity alarmed her, she called 911 to report the suspicious 

activity that she observed. Id. at 100, 102. Several minutes later, Ms. Hill 
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heard gunshots discharged on Chew Avenue and called 911 a second time. 

Id. at 104, 105. Following the murder, she spoke with police at her office 

and described the vehicle and the men that she observed earlier that day. 

Id. at 107. 

The exterior surveillance video recovered from the Skyline Restaurant 

confirms much of Ms. Hill’s testimony. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-64. 

The video depicted the blue Lincoln traveling down Chew Avenue and turning 

left onto Woodlawn Road out of the camera’s perspective. Id. Ninety 

seconds after the car traveled out of frame, Appellant’s two codefendants, 

one of whom wore a khimar, re-emerged into frame. Id. The pair walked 

toward the Skyline Restaurant, and stepped into a vestibule near the 

entrance of the restaurant. Id. A different segment of video recorded 

several minutes later showed the victim exiting the restaurant at 

approximately 11:39 a.m. and walking down Chew Avenue toward 

Woodlawn Road. Id. After the victim passed the vestibule, the assailants 

emerged individually, followed the victim a short distance, and shot him. 

Id. Both assailants fled toward Woodlawn Road and disappeared around the 

corner where the Lincoln had passed several minutes earlier. Id. 

The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Charles Hayward, 

the registered owner of the blue Lincoln Continental. Mr. Hayward stated 

that he grew up with Appellant, whom he identified in the courtroom, in the 

Germantown section of Philadelphia and had remained friends with him. 
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N.T., 3/19/14, at 24-25. Mr. Hayward explained that he sold the blue 

Lincoln to Appellant during February 2008, but he neglected to transfer the 

title or registration into Appellant’s name. Id. 26-28, 29. Appellant 

stipulated that the vehicle’s tag number was GXW5380. Id. at 28. The 

Commonwealth presented Mr. Hayward with the verbatim signed statement 

that he provided to police during their investigation of the murder. Id at. 

33. Exhibit C-39. Although Mr. Hayward’s trial testimony challenged the 

accuracy of certain portions of the prior verbatim statement, the 

Commonwealth used the statement as evidence that Quentin had informed 

Mr. Hayward of an incident where he had been robbed at gun point while 

gambling with the victim, Kenny Wiggins, on Chew Avenue. N.T., 3/19/14, 

at 45-48. Mr. Hayward further explained that it was Appellant’s inquiry 

about the gambling incident that led to the revelation that the victim had 

been involved in the robbery. Id. at 48. Mr. Hayward stated, “[Appellant] 

asked him, Quentin[,] who was up there and he, Quentin, said[,] Kenny and 

them.” Id. at 48. Following the interview, Mr. Hayward identified Appellant 

and Quentin from photographs supplied by police and he identified Quentin 

as one of the assailants in a still frame taken from surveillance video. Id. at 

57-58. 

Next, the Commonwealth presented the testimony and the signed 

verbatim statement Robert Bluefort gave to police. Appellant confided to 

Bluefort his role in the murder, and Bluefort assisted Appellant in selecting a 
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location to set the Lincoln Continental ablaze to avoid its discovery by police. 

N.T., 3/18/14, at 286, 290. Mr. Bluefort’s verified statement, which Bluefort 

challenged at trial, outlined Appellant’s confession to his involvement in the 

murder committed by Quentin and Banks. Id. at 286. Appellant confided 

that, after the trio observed the victim near the Skyline Restaurant, he 

pulled the Lincoln over so the two assailants could exit. Quentin and Banks 

waited for the victim to remerge from the restaurant, and, following a brief 

exchange, Quentin shot the victim in the stomach. Id. at 286-287. The 

assailants ran back to the Lincoln, and Appellant sped away. Id. at 287. 

As it relates to Appellant’s attempt to destroy the automobile, Mr. 

Bluefort’s statement indicated that “[Appellant] was paranoid about the 

police finding the car[,] so he told . . . Tyree Fisher and [Shawn Pina] to 

burn it.” Id. at 290. Bluefort continued that he helped Appellant find a 

suitable location to set the car ablaze. Id. Thereafter, Appellant gave the 

key to Fischer and one or two days after the murder, they received 

confirmation that the car had been set on fire. Id. For the next two 

months, Appellant remained at Bluefort’s home to “[lay] low . . . from police 

and [because] he was worried about retaliation.” Id. at 291.

The preceding evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Appellant committed third-degree murder and criminal 

conspiracy. The surveillance video captured an image of Appellant’s blue 

Lincoln Continental driving past the Skyline Restaurant and turning abruptly 
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onto Woodlawn Road immediately before the two assailants emerged from 

that location and prepared to ambush the victim. Ms. Hill identified 

Appellant’s blue Lincoln Continental as the car that the two gunmen alighted 

from on Woodlawn Road immediately prior to the murder, and she recorded 

the vehicle’s license number. 

Two of Appellant’s acquaintances, Hayward and Bluefort, informed 

police that Appellant implicated himself in the murder. Hayward explained 

that the murder was in retaliation for a prior armed robbery committed 

against Quentin. Bluefort detailed the particulars of his role in the murder 

and the disposal of the vehicle, and discussed Appellant’s attempt to hide 

from police and potential retribution from the victim’s associates. Thus, we 

reject Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to establish his 

identity as the person driving the blue Lincoln Continental when the murder 

was committed.

Likewise, the evidence sustains the requisite agreement to support 

criminal conspiracy and the intent element of third-degree murder. Initially, 

we observe that the foregoing evidence adduced at the jury trial 

demonstrates that Appellant conspired with Quentin and Banks to shoot the 

victim as retribution for his role in an armed robbery against Quentin two 

days prior to the murder. The entire episode was accomplished with 

Appellant’s aid and assistance. Appellant drove the two assailants to the 

murder scene in his automobile, and waited with an idling engine while 
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Quentin and Banks ambushed the victim by shooting him in the chest at 

close range and returned to the waiting vehicle. Then he drove the trio 

away. Thereafter, he engaged in a futile attempt to destroy his car and 

remove it from any connection to the crime. Hence, the evidence was 

sufficient for the jury to infer that Appellant and his co-conspirators entered 

an agreement to kill the victim. Bricker, supra at 1017 (conduct of parties 

and circumstances surrounding conduct may create web of evidence linking 

accused to alleged conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt). 

Having established the conspiracy to shoot the victim in retaliation for 

his crimes against Quentin, we next conclude that the jury could infer the 

malice element of third-degree murder from the totality of the circumstances 

and the assailants’ use of a deadly weapon on the victim’s chest, a vital part 

of the victim’s body. See Vargas, supra (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc) (“Once there is 

evidence of the presence of a conspiracy, conspirators are liable for acts of 

co-conspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Even if the 

conspirator did not act as a principal in committing the underlying crime, he 

is still criminally liable for the actions of his co-conspirators taken in 

furtherance of the conspiracy.”)); Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 

1128 (Pa.Super. 2009) (malice may be inferred from use of deadly weapon 

on vital part of victim’s body). As the evidence contained in the certified 
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record is sufficient to sustain the jury verdicts for criminal conspiracy and 

third-degree murder, no relief is due. 

Appellant’s next issue challenges the weight of the evidence. The trial 

court’s belief that the verdict is not against to weight of the evidence and 

that a new trial is not warranted in the interest of justice is one of the least 

assailable reasons for a trial court to deny a new trial. Commonwealth v. 

Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000). It is well established that appellate 

review of a weight claim is limited to determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion rather than review the weight claim itself. 

Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329 (Pa.Super. 2015). A new trial 

should only be awarded if the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice. Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 493 

A.2d 669, 672 (Pa. 1985). 

Appellant argues that the testimony of Robert Bluefort, whom he 

styles as the sole incriminating witness, “was so unreliable, incredible, 

conjectural and contradictory that no probability of fact can reasonably be 

drawn from his testimony.” Appellant’s brief at 34. He highlights Mr. 

Bluefort’s criminal history involving dishonesty as well as the facts that the 

witness might have been involved in the case, was motivated to provide 

false information, and avoided prosecution as an accessory in this case or 

other crimes that he allegedly committed. He also challenges the witness’s 

purported inability to remember key facts that were essential to his cross-
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examination. In sum, Appellant opined, “[r]eliance on Bluefort’s testimony 

renders the jury’s verdict speculative and conjectural.” Id. at 35. 

In rejecting Appellant’s weight claim, the trial court outlined the 

relevant evidence that the Commonwealth adduced during the jury trial and 

determined that “[t]he evidence . . . plainly established that [Appellant] 

committed the crimes for which he was convicted.” Trial Court Opinion, 

1/22/15, at 9. Specifically, it found that Bluefort’s statements were 

substantially corroborated by testimony presented by Ms. Hill and Mr. 

Hayward, video surveillance, and the physical evidence surrounding the 

shooting and the location of the burned vehicle. Thus, upon review of the 

trial court’s reasoning, we find no basis to disturb the court’s finding that the 

verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. Stated plainly, the 

jury was the ultimate arbiter of fact and, notwithstanding the potential flaws 

in Bluefort’s credibility, the jury’s verdict was not so contrary to the evidence 

as to shock one’s sense of justice. Appellant’s claim fails. 

Next, we confront Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in 

failing to grant his motion for mistrial based upon alleged juror misconduct. 

We review the decision to grant or deny a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 624 (Pa. 2001). As our 

Supreme Court explained, “The remedy of a mistrial is an extreme one that 

is required only when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable 

effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial by preventing 
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the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” Id. at 624. 

Additionally, “a mistrial is not necessary if a court's cautionary instructions 

adequately cure any prejudice.” Id. at 624-625.

The following facts are relevant. During a break on the second day of 

trial, Juror Two informed the trial court that he believed that he had 

observed a spectator, later identified as Appellant’s father, make a throatcutting gesture during Hayward’s testimony. He stated, “one of the people 

present moved [his] right index finger across his neck.” N.T., 3/19/14, at 

81. The juror could not discern to whom the gesture had been directed. 

The trial court conducted an extensive colloquy of each juror individually, 

advised each that the incident had nothing to do with the trial, and asked 

whether he or she could disregard it. All of the jurors except one had heard 

about the incident from Juror Two, but none of the other jurors witnessed 

the gesture. When asked whether they could disregard the incident, only 

Juror Seven said that it would be difficult to disregard. Every other juror 

testified unequivocally that he or she would have no problem disregarding it. 

The trial court excused Juror Two and Juror Seven and replaced them with 

alternates. Satisfied that the remaining jurors would abide by his statement 

that the incident had nothing to do with the case and confident that they 

could render a fair decision, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a 

mistrial. Id. at 123. 
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Appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because Juror Two’s 

conduct in discussing with the other remaining jurors his observation of the 

throat-slashing incident was prejudicial. We disagree. The reality is that 

none of the empaneled jurors observed the gesture and all of the remaining 

jurors avowed that they would not let the incident affect their ability to be 

fair to both sides. The trial court removed the juror who observed the 

gesture and the single juror who indicated that the incident could affect his 

view of the case. The trial court conducted voir dire with the jurors 

individually to insure their continuing impartiality and impart to them that 

the information that he or she heard regarding the alleged gesture had 

nothing whatsoever to do with the trial. As the jury is presumed to have 

followed the trial court’s instruction to disregard the incident, which each of 

the empaneled jurors personally avowed to do, we cannot find that the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial. See

Commonwealth v. Miller, 819 A.2d 504, 513 (Pa. 2002) (“The law 

presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court”); and 

Begley, supra at 624-25 (“a mistrial is not necessary if a court's cautionary 

instructions adequately cure any prejudice.”). As the trial court’s curative 

actions removed any possibility of prejudice, a mistrial was not warranted. 

Next, we address Appellant’s argument challenging the discretionary 

aspects of the judgment of sentence and for the following reasons, we find 

that no relief is due. Before we reach the merits of a discretionary 
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sentencing issue, we must ascertain whether (1) a timely appeal was filed 

from the judgment of sentence; (2) the issue was preserved during the trial 

court proceedings; (3) the appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) the Rule 2119(f) statement reveals a substantial question that the 

sentence was not appropriate under the sentencing code. Commonwealth 

v. Lebarre, 961 A.2d 176, 178 (Pa.Super. 2008).

Herein, Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed timely. Likewise, 

Appellant raised his sentencing issue in a post-sentence motion and leveled 

the challenge in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Additionally, Appellant 

included in his brief a concise statement of reasons for allowance of appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Accordingly, we must determine whether 

Appellant’s sentencing issue raises a substantial question. “A substantial 

question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that 

the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 

91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2012)). 

Appellant asserts that the judgment of sentence was manifestly 

excessive and unreasonable. In Commonwealth v. Treadway, 104 A.3d 

597, 599 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted), we reiterated, “Generally, 

Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its 
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sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at 

the same time or to sentences already imposed.” We further explained, 

“[a]ny challenge to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a 

substantial question.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant’s position offers nothing more than the assertion 

that, “A review of the record in this case clearly shows that the trial court’s 

aggregate sentence of 18 to 36 years . . . [is] manifestly excessive [in that it 

does] not [reflect] a proper consideration of the history, character and 

condition of the [A]ppellant.” Appellant’s brief at 50. He bolsters this 

position with the added assertion, “There is no evidence in this record with 

regard to Appellant’s background that would warrant 18 to 36 years 

sentences.” Id. at 51. 

It is well settled that bald allegations of excessiveness do not raise a

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (OISA), aff’d 2015 WL 6498828 (Pa. 2015) 

(“generic claim that a sentence is excessive does not raise a substantial 

question”). Moreover, we have consistently held that a trial court’s failure to 

give greater weight to various purported mitigating factors does not present 

a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (“inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not 

raise a substantial question”). We stress that Appellant does not allege that 

the trial court failed to consider the noted factors. Indeed, when combined 
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with a claim of manifest excessiveness, that assertion, as opposed to a 

challenge to the weight the court assessed among the factors it considered, 

may raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 

1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014) (“an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction 

with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a 

substantial question.”). Thus, we find Appellant’s bare contention that the 

sentence was manifestly excessive because the trial court should have 

weighed certain factors more heavily, does not raise a substantial 

question that the sentence was not appropriate under the sentencing code. 

Accordingly, we do not address the merits of Appellant’s argument. 

Moreover, even to the extent that Appellant’s bare assertion could be 

deemed to have arguably raised a substantial question, we would reject it. 

The trial court fashioned the judgment of sentence in accordance with the 

sentencing guidelines. Applying Appellant’s prior record and offense gravity 

scores to the basic sentencing matrix, the court accurately determined that 

the standard range for minimum terms of confinement for each offense was 

between 120 months (ten years) and the statutory limit (forty years). N.T., 

6/20/14, at 9. Therefore, the trial court’s concurrently imposed sentences of 

eighteen to thirty-six years incarceration were within the standard range of 

the sentencing guidelines. 
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In addition to imposing standard range sentences, the trial court 

fashioned the sentences with the benefit of the Presentence Investigation 

report (“PSI”). Id. at 4. This Court has previously held that, absent more, 

the imposition of a standard range sentence in combination with the 

existence of a PSI report cannot be considered excessive or unreasonable. 

Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 546 (Pa.Super. 1995); 

see also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super. 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010) (same). 

Herein, Appellant’s argument that a reconsideration of his “history, character 

and condition” would reflect a more appropriate deliberation of the 

appropriate sentencing factors is insufficient to overcome the presumption of 

reasonableness created by the combination of the trial court’s consideration 

of the PSI in conjunction with its imposition of a standard-range sentence. 

See Appellant’s brief at 50. Thus, even if Appellant did raise a substantial 

question, no relief is due. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2015