Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 11385 

At present, Oman has no nuclear 

research or power program; however, 

Oman does have the need for 

radioactive sources for legitimate 

industrial, medical, and research 

purposes in support of important 

economic and commercial development 

projects. Exports of radioactive sources 

from the United States for such 

purposes would be facilitated by 

removal of Oman from the restricted 

destinations list in Part 110. 

The NRC staff has determined that 

removing Oman from the restricted 

destinations list is consistent with 

current U.S. law and policy, and will 

pose no unreasonable risk to the public 

health and safety or to the common 

defense and security of the United 

States 

Because this rule involves a foreign 

affairs function of the United States, the 

notice and comment provisions of the 

Administrative Procedure Act do not 

apply (5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). This rule will 

become effective immediately upon 

publication. 

II. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

The National Technology Transfer 

and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–113) requires that Federal Agencies 

use technical standards that are 

developed or adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies unless, 

using such a standard is inconsistent 

with applicable law or otherwise 

impractical. This final rule does not 

constitute the establishment of a 

standard for which the use of a 

voluntary consensus standard would be 

applicable. 

III. Environmental Impact: Categorical 

Exclusion 

The NRC has determined that this 

final rule is the type of action described 

in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(1). Therefore, neither an 

environmental impact statement nor an 

environmental assessment has been 

prepared for the rule. 

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Statement 

This final rule does not contain new 

or amended information collection 

requirements subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 

et seq.). Existing requirements were 

approved by the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB), Approval Number 

3150–0036. 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a request for information or an 

information collection requirement 

unless the requesting document 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

V. Regulatory Analysis 

Removal of Oman from the restricted 

destinations list in § 110.29 means that 

exports of certain radioactive materials 

to Oman may qualify for the NRC 

general license specified in §§ 110.21 

through 110.24. There is no alternative 

to amending the regulations for the 

export and import of nuclear equipment 

and materials. This final rule is 

expected to have no changes in the 

information collection burden or cost to 

the public. 

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), 

the Commission certifies that this final 

rule will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. This rule 

affects only companies exporting 

nuclear equipment and materials to 

Oman which do not fall within the 

scope of the definition of ‘‘small 

entities’’ set forth in the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601(3)), or the 

Size Standards established by the NRC 

(10 CFR 2.810). 

VII. Backfit Analysis 

The NRC has determined that a 

backfit analysis is not required for this 

rule, because these amendments do not 

include any provisions that would 

impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 

Chapter I. 

VIII. Congressional Review Act 

Under the Congressional Review Act 

of 1996, the NRC has determined that 

this action is not a major rule and has 

verified this determination with the 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs of OMB. 

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 110 

Administrative practice and 

procedure, Classified information, 

Criminal penalties, Export, Import, 

Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear 

materials, Nuclear power plants and 

reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Scientific equipment. 

For the reasons set out in the 

preamble and under the authority of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 

as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, 

the NRC is adopting the following 

amendments to 10 CFR part 110. 

PART 110—EXPORT AND IMPORT OF 

NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND 

MATERIAL 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 110 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 54, 57, 63, 64, 65, 

81, 82, 103, 104, 109, 111, 126, 127, 128, 129, 

161, 181, 182, 183, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 

930, 931, 932, 933, 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 

955, 956, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 

2074, 2077, 2092–2095, 2111, 2112, 2133, 

2134, 2139, 2139a, 2141, 2154–2158, 2201, 

2231–2233, 2237, 2239); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 

1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841; sec. 5, 

Pub. L. 101–575, 104 Stat 2835 (42 U.S.C. 

2243); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 

3504 note); Energy Policy Act of 2005; Pub. 

L. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 

Sections 110.1(b)(2) and 110.1(b)(3) also 

issued under Pub. L. 96–92, 93 Stat. 710 (22 

U.S.C. 2403). Section 110.11 also issued 

under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152) 

and secs. 54c and 57d, 88 Stat. 473, 475 (42 

U.S.C. 2074). Section 110.27 also issued 

under sec. 309(a), Pub. L. 99–440. Section 

110.50(b)(3) also issued under sec. 123, 92 

Stat. 142 (42 U.S.C. 2153). Section 110.51 

also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Section 110.52 

also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 

U.S.C. 2236). Sections 110.80–110.113 also 

issued under 5 U.S.C. 552, 554. Sections 

110.130–110.135 also issued under 5 U.S.C. 

553. Sections 110.2 and 110.42(a)(9) also 

issued under sec. 903, Pub. L. 102–496 (42 

U.S.C. 2151 et seq.). 

§ 110.29 [Amended] 

■ 2. Section 110.29 is amended by 

removing ‘‘Oman’’ from the list of 

restricted destinations. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day 

of February 2012. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Michael F. Weber, 

Acting Executive Director for Operations. 

[FR Doc. 2012–4556 Filed 2–24–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 21, 25, 121, and 129 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0186; Amdt. Nos. 

21–94, 25–133, 121–354, 129–50; SFAR 111] 

RIN 2120–AJ92 

Security Considerations for Lavatory 

Oxygen Systems 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Interim final rule; disposition of 

comments. 

SUMMARY: On March 8, 2011, the FAA 

published an interim final rule, request 


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11386 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

for comments (Amendment Nos. 21–94, 

25–133, 121–354, 129–50; SFAR 111) on 

security considerations for lavatory 

oxygen systems (77 FR 12550). The 

interim final rule addresses a security 

vulnerability and is needed so the 

affected airplanes can continue 

operating until the non-compliance to 

airworthiness standards and operating 

rules is resolved. We sought public 

comment on the interim final rule even 

though it became effective upon 

publication. This action responds to the 

public comments the FAA received. 

ADDRESSES: You may review the public 

docket for this rulemaking (Docket No. 

FAA–2011–0186) at the Docket 

Management Facility in Room W12–140 

of the West Building Ground Floor at 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC, 20590–0001 between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. You 

may also review the public docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

action, contact Jeff Gardlin, Airframe 

and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM–115, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, Federal Aviation 

Administration, Northwest Mountain 

Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA 98057–3356; telephone: (425) 227– 

2136; email: jeff.gardlin@faa.gov. 

For legal questions concerning this 

action, contact Douglas Anderson, 

Federal Aviation Administration, Office 

of the Regional Counsel, ANM–7, 

Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

telephone: (425) 227–2166; email: 

douglas.anderson@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The FAA became aware of a security 

vulnerability with certain types of 

oxygen systems installed inside the 

lavatories of most transport category 

airplanes. As a result, the FAA issued 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011–04– 

09, which mandated that these oxygen 

systems be rendered inoperative until 

the vulnerability could be eliminated. 

However, by completing the mandated 

actions in AD 2011–04–09, operators 

were no longer in compliance with the 

requirements of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1447, 

121.329, and 121.333, and could not 

legally continue flight operations. AD 

2011–04–09 also affects newly 

manufactured airplanes and airplanes 

undergoing other modification. The 

Special Federal Aviation Regulation 

(SFAR) is needed to address the security 

vulnerability and allow the affected 

operators to continue flight operations 

until the non-compliance to 

airworthiness standards and operating 

rules created by the AD is resolved. 

The FAA chartered an Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee (ARC) primarily 

comprised of industry representatives in 

March 2011. The ARC’s purpose was to 

recommend regulatory changes and 

guidance that could be used to restore 

oxygen in affected lavatories while 

addressing the security vulnerability. 

The ARC submitted its 

recommendations to the FAA on August 

3, 2011. The FAA is reviewing the 

recommendations and will initiate 

additional rulemaking as necessary. The 

recommendations will facilitate 

developing future rulemaking to address 

existing and new certifications of 

aircraft. As stated in SFAR 111, we 

envision a two- to four-year regulatory 

process to restore the affected oxygen 

systems to their full operational 

capability. Complete restoration 

includes any new regulatory changes, as 

well as incorporating any new oxygen 

system designs into airplanes currently 

in service. 

Discussion of Comments 

The FAA received comments from ten 

commenters: Aerox Aviation Oxygen 

Systems, Inc., The Boeing Company, 

and eight private citizens. Boeing and 

three citizens supported the SFAR with 

the overall assertion that removing 

chemical oxygen generators from the 

lavatories poses a risk to a small number 

of passengers compared to putting all of 

the passengers on the airplane at risk by 

keeping the chemical oxygen generators 

installed. 

Five citizens opposed the SFAR, 

asserting that the safety benefit gained 

by removing the chemical oxygen 

system from lavatories to preclude the 

unlikely event of a terrorist attack does 

not outweigh the potential risk of 

individual passengers experiencing 

hypoxia in the event of a 

decompression. These commenters also 

suggested that the FAA consider other 

options, such as installing an alternative 

oxygen system in the lavatories, rather 

than simply removing the chemical 

oxygen system. 

We disagree with the commenters’ 

assertion that the potential risk of a 

security breach is outweighed by the 

potential individual risk of hypoxia for 

a passenger in the lavatory during cabin 

decompression. We continue to believe 

that the approach taken by the FAA— 

to temporarily allow a non-compliance 

with existing regulations until a 

solution is found to the problem 

identified in the underlying AD— 

appropriately addresses risk. While 

there is some risk of hypoxia, the 

emergency descent procedures initiated 

by the flightcrew are the primary 

protection against hypoxia provided to 

passengers. 

Pressure loss events have not resulted 

in a cabin pressure altitude that was 

instantaneously equal to the airplane 

altitude. Even when decompressions 

have occurred when the airplane is at a 

high altitude, such as 40,000 feet, cabin 

occupants have not been exposed to 

those altitudes because it takes time for 

the cabin pressure to leak from the 

fuselage. Flightcrews initiate an 

emergency descent shortly after they 

receive notification that the cabin 

pressure cannot be maintained. The 

airplane is already descending by the 

time the internal cabin pressure is equal 

to the airplane altitude. 

We carefully considered all of the 

variables and determined that the risk to 

all of the passengers due to the security 

vulnerability was significantly greater 

than the potential individual risk of 

hypoxia in the event of cabin 

decompression. AD 2011–04–09 and 

SFAR 111 are only interim measures, 

and we are actively pursuing regulatory 

changes intended to restore 

supplemental oxygen in the affected 

lavatories, while considering the 

security issues. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters’ suggestions to consider 

other rulemaking alternatives because 

other alternatives could be used to 

restore oxygen in the affected lavatories. 

We disagree with the commenters’ 

suggestions to accomplish longer-term 

rulemaking actions while leaving the 

chemical oxygen generators installed in 

the lavatories. The security vulnerability 

would remain until final corrective 

actions were identified and completed. 

Accomplishing the actions in AD 2011– 

04–09 eliminates the security 

vulnerability until additional actions 

can be identified and taken to restore 

the oxygen system with a design that 

would consider the security risk. 

Boeing stated that in and of itself, the 

SFAR does not require removing or 

expending the contents of the chemical 

oxygen generators. This will likely 

cause confusion and is not consistent 

with the actions in AD 2011–04–09. 

Boeing recommended that the SFAR be 

revised to require the oxygen generators 

to be either removed or expended and 

that the wording be the same as that in 

the AD; we disagree. The affected 

chemical oxygen generators have 

already been removed or expended in 

accordance with AD 2011–04–09, and 

the SFAR does not supersede AD 2011– 

04–09. The SFAR provides interim relief 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 11387 

to operators from type design 

requirements that the operators would 

have been out of compliance with once 

the actions mandated in AD 2011–04–09 

were completed. No changes to SFAR 

111 were made as a result of this 

comment. 

Boeing also suggested that the SFAR 

be clarified to allow the applicant for a 

type certificate to receive a production 

certificate and an airworthiness 

approval for domestic operators affected 

by AD 2011–04–09 (14 CFR part 121 

operators) or for foreign operators (14 

CFR part 129) in countries where the 

local civil aviation authority has issued 

a mandatory action equivalent to AD 

2011–04–09. We infer that Boeing is 

requesting we clarify SFAR 111 for 

airplanes registered outside the United 

States because only foreign registered 

airplanes could be subject to a 

mandatory action similar to AD 2011– 

04–09. We disagree because SFAR 111 

does not apply to airplanes registered 

outside the United States. We cannot 

provide relief from airworthiness 

standards issued by civil aviation 

authorities in other countries. The 

responsible civil aviation authority must 

grant relief from an airworthiness 

standard. Furthermore, SFAR 111, 

paragraph (b)(2) already provides this 

relief for airplanes registered in the 

United States but operated by foreign 

carriers. No changes were made to the 

SFAR as a result of this comment. 

Boeing suggested paragraph (c) of the 

SFAR be revised to indicate that it is the 

operators’ responsibility to provide 

flightcrew training procedures for 

airplanes with a disabled lavatory 

oxygen system. We disagree that this 

clarification is necessary because the 

SFAR does not include a requirement to 

revise existing flightcrew training 

procedures. Operators currently have 

the option to add or revise existing 

training for the cabin or flightcrew as 

they deem necessary. No changes were 

made to the SFAR as a result of this 

comment. 

Aerox Aviation provided information 

pertaining to the availability of a small 

portable, gaseous oxygen supply and 

stated that such equipment could 

provide an emergency oxygen supply. 

We are familiar with the Aerox portable 

oxygen equipment as well as other 

portable oxygen equipment from other 

suppliers. It is possible for operators to 

incorporate installation of portable 

gaseous oxygen equipment for use in the 

lavatory under existing regulations. If 

such equipment were to be installed, it 

would need to be approved by the FAA 

in accordance with existing procedures 

applicable to type design changes. 

Neither AD 2011–04–09 nor SFAR 111 

would prevent installation of portable 

gaseous oxygen equipment for use in the 

lavatory. No changes were made to the 

SFAR as a result of this comment. 

Conclusion 

After analyzing the comments 

submitted in response to SFAR 111, the 

FAA has determined that no further 

revisions to the SFAR are necessary at 

this time. The FAA determined this 

interim rule remains necessary because 

it addresses an emergency safety 

situation that made it imperative to 

immediately implement the 

rulemaking’s provisions. While the 

chemical oxygen supply is intended to 

provide passengers with supplemental 

oxygen when necessary, lavatories 

become privately enclosed areas when 

in use. Possible tampering with that 

chemical oxygen supply presented a 

security vulnerability that this 

rulemaking addresses. Therefore, 

Amendments 21–94, 25–133, 121–354, 

and 129–50 remain in effect. 

The FAA is currently assessing the 

recommendations of the ARC discussed 

above. We are using these 

recommendations to develop additional 

rulemaking actions that will restore the 

affected oxygen systems to their full 

operational capability in existing and 

new certifications of affected aircraft, 

while eliminating the potential security 

threat posed by the previous systems. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on February 15, 

2012. 

Frank P. Paskiewicz, 

Deputy Director, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–4571 Filed 2–24–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

33 CFR Part 165 

[Docket No. USCG–2012–0068] 

RIN 1625–AA00 

Safety Zone; Lauderdale Air Show, 

Atlantic Ocean, Fort Lauderdale, FL 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Temporary final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is 

establishing a temporary safety zone on 

the waters of the Atlantic Ocean in the 

vicinity of Fort Lauderdale, Florida 

during the Lauderdale Air Show. The 

event is scheduled to take place on 

Saturday, April 28, 2012 and Sunday, 

April 29, 2012. The safety zone is 

necessary for the safety of air show 

participants, participant aircraft, 

spectators, and the general public 

during the event. Persons and vessels 

are prohibited from entering, transiting 

through, anchoring in, or remaining 

within the safety zone unless authorized 

by the Captain of the Port Miami or a 

designated representative. 

DATES: This rule is effective from 

11 a.m. on April 28, 2012 through 4:15 

p.m. on April 29, 2012. This rule will 

be enforced daily from 11 a.m. until 

4:15 p.m. on April 28, 2012 and April 

29, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: Documents indicated in this 

preamble as being available in the 

docket are part of docket USCG–2012– 

0068 and are available online by going 

to http://www.regulations.gov, inserting 

USCG–2012–0068 in the ‘‘Keyword’’ 

box, and then clicking ‘‘Search.’’ They 

are also available for inspection or 

copying at the Docket Management 

Facility (M–30), U.S. Department of 

Transportation, West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 

you have questions on this temporary 

final rule, call or email Lieutenant 

Jennifer S. Makowski, Sector Miami 

Prevention Department, Coast Guard; 

telephone (305) 535–8724, email 

Jennifer.S.Makowski@uscg.mil. If you 

have questions on viewing the docket, 

call Renee V. Wright, Program Manager, 

Docket Operations, telephone (202) 

366–9826. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Regulatory Information 

The Coast Guard is issuing this 

temporary final rule without prior 

notice and opportunity to comment 

pursuant to authority under section 4(a) 

of the Administrative Procedure Act 

(APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This provision 

authorizes an agency to issue a rule 

without prior notice and opportunity to 

comment when the agency for good 

cause finds that those procedures are 

‘‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary 

to the public interest.’’ Under 5 U.S.C. 

553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that 

good cause exists for not publishing a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 

with respect to this rule because the 

Coast Guard did not receive necessary 

information regarding the event until 

January 17, 2012. As a result, the Coast 

Guard did not have sufficient time to 

publish an NPRM and to receive public 

comments prior to the event. Any delay 

in the effective date of this rule would 

be contrary to the public interest 


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