[Cite as A.L.R. v. R.L.R. , 2020-Ohio-3241.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO

A.L.R., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH : O P I N I O N HER FATHER NEXT FRIEND SCOTT F. RUTHERFORD, : CASE NOS. 2019-G-0230 Petitione r -Appellant, : 2019-G-0236

- vs - : R.L.R., : Respondent-Appellee. :

Appeals from the Geau g a Count y Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018 DV 0615.

Jud g ment: Affirmed.

Michelle S. Stine Makkos, P.O. Box 816, Uniontown, OH 44685 (For PetitionerAppellant )

. R.L.R., pro se, 533 North Carolina Avenue, Statesville, NC 28677 (Respo ndentAppellee )

.

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J. {¶1} Appellant, A.L.R., by and through her father, S.F.R., appeals f rom the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, which sua sponte sealed the record of a dismissed petition for domestic violence civil prot ection order (“CPO”). Appellant contends the trial court exceeded its authority by se aling the record without notice to the parties and therefore without protecting the orig inal petitioner’s due process rights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.2 {¶2} On August 16, 2018, appellant filed an ex parte petition for do mestic violence CPO. The matter was continued because appellee, R.L.R ., an out-of-state resident, needed time to prepare for hearing. A hearing was se t and took place on October 22, 2018 before the magistrate. Several days later, th e ex parte order was vacated, and the magistrate denied appellant’s petition. Appel lant filed objections, which were ultimately overruled, and the trial court adopted th e magistrate’s decision. No appeal was taken from this judgment. {¶3} On October 3, 2019, the trial court entered judgment, sua spont e, sealing the record from the underlying proceedings. Appellant filed a notice of appeal of this judgment, assigning the following three errors: {¶4} “[1.] The trial court erred in entering a sua sponte order whic h sealed the record in a dissolved adult civil protection order, as sua spon te decisions are likely the product of intuitive selection rather than the more disciplined and balanced process of party presentation. {¶5} “[2.] The trial court erred in that its sua sponte sealing of the record is violated of due process clause of the Ohio and U.S. Constitutio n (Clause XIV, Section 1, US; Article 1, section 16 Ohio), as the order denied the opport unity for adversarial testing. {¶6} “[3.] The trial court erred in that there is no evidence in th e record or subsequent factual findings by the court indicating that appell ee qualifies for such an extraordinary remedy as the sealing of the record, such that ap pellee’s right of privacy does not outweigh the government’s interest in maintaining the records.”3 {¶7} Under the first assignment of error, appellant makes a policy a rgument that the trial court’s sua sponte order was improper because it was not the result of the adversarial process, which involves the parties’ presentation o f their relative arguments towards the end of fully informing the court to obtain a reason ed and impartial decision. Under the second assignment of error, appellant contends she wa s denied due process of law when the court proceeded to seal the record without noti fying her and receiving an opportunity to be heard. Finally, under the third assignmen t of error, appellant claims that, even if the trial court acted within its authority , its judgment is not supported by the record, i.e., there are no unusual or exceptional circum stances that supersede the government’s str ong intere st in retaining the underlying re cord. {¶8} R.C. 3113.31(G) provides: {¶9} (1) Any proceeding under this section shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, except that an or der under this section may be obtained with or without bond. An ord er issued under this section, other than an ex parte order, that g rants a protection order or approves a consent agreement, that refuse s to grant a protection order or approve a consent agreement that modifies or terminates a protection order or consent agreement, or that refuses to modify or terminate a protection order or conse nt agreement, is a final, appealable order. The remedies and procedures provided in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other available civil or criminal remedies. {¶10} (2) If as provided in division (G)(1) of this section an order issued under this section, other than an ex parte order, refuses to gr ant a protection order, the court, on its own motion, shall order tha t the ex parte order issued under this section and all of the records pertaining to that ex parte order be sealed after either of the following occurs: {¶11} (a) No party has exercised the right to appeal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. {¶12} (b) All appellate rights have been exhausted.4 {¶13} Pursuant to Subsection (G)(2), a court is required to seal records pertaining to an ex parte CPO where the court refuses to grant the protection order after one of two conditions occurs; in the instant matter, appellants did not timely appeal the denial of the CPO and, consequently, any appellate rights have long since extinguished. The trial court, therefore, was statutorily required to sua spo nte seal the records. The statute obviates the adversarial process in cases such as this and, by implication, appellants were not entitled to due process. Appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of the statute; rather, they challenge the co nstitutionality of the trial

court’s actions. Because the trial court’s actions were statut orily sanctioned, we discern

no error. {¶14} Furthermore, prior to the enactment of the foregoing legislatio n requiring a court to seal the records where a court refuses to grant a CPO, Schussheim v.

Schussheim , 137 Ohio St.3d 133, 2013-Ohio-4529 governed the sealing of re cords for a domestic violence CPO. In that case, the Ohio Supreme Court he ld that “a court has the inherent authority to order the expungement and sealing of records that relate to a dissolved CPO in ‘unusual and exceptional circumstances,’” such that the applicants “‘good name and right to be free from unwarranted punishment’ o utweighs the ‘legitimate need of government to maintain records.’” Id. at ¶14, quoting Pepper Pike v.

Doe , 66 Ohio St.2d 374, 377 (1981). By the procedure set forth in current R.C. 3113.31(G), the legislature elected not to adopt the balancing test set forth in

Schussheim . Now, a trial court must seal the records on its own motion i f one of the conditions set forth under subsection (2)(a) or (b) applies. A ppellant’s contention that5 no unusual or exceptional circumstances supersede the governmen t’s interest in maintaining the records public is therefore irrelevant and need not be analyzed. {¶15} Appellant’s three assignments of error are without merit. {¶16} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.