SERVED: June 24, 2016 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

In The Matter Of: ) 

) Docket No. FAA-2014-0320 

GLOBAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION ) 

) Case No. 20 12NM71 0034 

Respondent ) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

THE FAA'S MOTION FOR DECISION 

On August 15,2014, the FAA filed a Complaint. 1 

On September 22, 2014, the FAA filed a Motion for Decision or in the 

Alternative, Motion to Deem All Allegations Admitted ("First Motion"). 

On October 15, 2014, the previously assigned Judge issued an Amended 

Procedural Order. This Order did not address or reference the FAA's September 22, 

2014 First Motion. 

Five (5) days later, on October 20, 2014, the FAA filed a Renewed Motion to 

Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion to Deem All Allegations Admitted ("Renewed 

Motion"), in which the FAA reasserted the same arguments as those in the September 22, 

2014 First Motion. 

Shortly thereafter, on October 22, 2014, the prose Respondent Global Arms and 

Ammunition filed both the Respondent's Motion for Leave to File an Answer, and the 

Respondent's Answer. 

1 This Complaint was filed pursuant to a July 29, 2014 Order issued by Judge Goodwin, the previously 

assigned Judge. See, July 29,2014 Order on Respondent's Brief of Appellant and Complainant's Reply to 

Brief of Appellant. 
On November 24,2014, the previously assigned Judge issued an Order Granting 

Respondent's Motion for Leave to File an Answer. Although this Order granted the 

Respondent relief, it did not address or reference either the FAA's September 22,2014 

First Motion or the FAA's October 20, 2014 Renewed Motion. 

On December 16, 2014, the FAA filed a Motion for Decision, or in the 

Alternative, Motion for Decision Hereafter Limiting the Hearing to a Determination as to 

the Appropriate Sanction" ("Motion for Decision"). 

On January 6, 2015, the Respondent, by its newly appointed representative,2 filed 

its Answer to Complainant's Motion for Decision ("Response"). 

On September 4, 2015, the previously assigned Judge transferred to a different 

agency. The FAA's First Motion, Renewed Motion, and its Motion for Decision 

remained pending. This proceeding was then reassigned to the undersigned Judge. 

On March 4, 2016, an Order Setting Deadline for the Respondent to Supplement 

its Response and Granting/Denying Other Relief was filed, which gave the Respondent 

an opportunity to supplement its January 6, 2015 Response. Among other things, this 

March 4, 2016 Order ruled on the FAA's First Motion and Renewed Motion, and 

reserved ruling on .the FAA's December 16, 2014.Motion for Decision. 3 

On April 1, 2016, the Respondent filed its Response Brief to Complainant's 

Motion for Decision ('~Supplemental Response"). 

A. Complaint, Proposed Penalty Assessment, and Answer 

The FAA's August 15,2014 Complaint alleged that on or about June 15,2012, 

the Respondent, Global Arms and Ammunition, had offered a shipment of four ( 4) 

2 Prior to December 2, 2014, the Respondent had been represented by its president and lay representative, 

Mr. David Carl Williams. On December 2, 2014, a Mr. Vincent Williams filed a lay representative Notice 

of Appearance on behalf of the Respondent. However, subsequent materials filed by Mr. Vincent Williams 

identified him as a licensed attorney in Washington State. (See, e.g., April I, 2016 Response, Signature 

lines on page 7.) 

3 Based on the record ofthe case, the March 4, 2016 Order denied the FAA's September 22,2014 First 

Motion and October 20, 20 14 Renewed Motion, because of the rei ief granted by Judge Goodwin's earlier 

issued November 24,2014 Order. 

Page 2 of22 
fiberboard boxes for transport in air commerce, via Federal Express ("FedEx") from 

Spokane, Washington to Whitefish, Montana. The FAA alleged that the four boxes 

contained weapons ammunition, which is subject to the Hazardous Materials Regulations 

("HMR"), 49 C.P.R. Chapter I, Subchapter C. The FAA further alleged that the 

Respondent had not marked or labeled the shipment as a hazardous material ("hazmat"), 

and the Respondent had not ensured that each of its employees who handled hazmat was 

properly trained. As a result, the FAA asserted that the Respondent had committed ten 

(10) violations ofthe HMR. The FAA proposed a total penalty of$50,000 for the 

violations. 

In its October 22, 2014 Answer, the Respondent denied offering any hazmat for 

air commerce on June 15, 2012, and denied that its etnployees had not been properly 

trained in Hazmat procedures. The Respondent also raised multiple defenses. 

B. FAA's Motion for Decision and Respondent's Response 

In its December 16, 2014 Motion for Decision the FAA asserted that "there are no 

genuine issues of material fact left to dispute as Respondent has admitted that it offered 

an undeclared shiptnent of HAZMAT to Federal Express." (Mot. Dec. 3.) The FAA 

argued that it was the Respondent's responsibility, as the business offering a shipment, to 

perforn1 the shipper's duties (e.g., marking, labeling, preparing shipping papers), and 

those duties could not be passed on to Federal Express, the shipping carrier. (!d. at4 

(citing Walsh, Docket No. CP07S00011, 2008 WL 926620 (FAA Mar. 31, 2008))). In its 

Motion for Decision the FAA requested full dispositive relief, or in the alternative, a 

finding that the ten (1.0) alleged HMR violations had occurred and limiting the hearing to 

the proposed $50,000 civil penalty amount. (Mot. Dec., 1, 7.) 

In its January 6, 2015 Response, the Respondent argued that it needed "time to 

review the discovery materials and further investigate facts and evidence the FAA is 

relying upon." (Resp. 2.) The Respondent asked that the FAA's Motion for Decision be 

denied to allow the Respondent "a fair opportunity to further develop the facts and 

prepare its case." (!d.) 

Page 3 of22 
On March 4, 2016 an Order was issued (i.e., after this case was reassigned to the 

undersigned) which offered the Respondent an opportunity to supplement its January 6, 

2015 Response. Thereafter, on April 1, 2016, the Respondent filed a Supplemental 

Response, which included the proffer of three exhibits and a specific argument that the 

Respondent had not knowingly violated the HMR, and FedEx should be held solely 

responsible for the alleged violations. (Supp. Resp. 3-8.) 

C. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment 

Pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 13.218, a party may file motions, including a motion for a 

decision on the merits, in advance of a hearing when a party asserts that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact in dispute. A motion for decision on the merits prior to a 

testimonial hearing in a civil penalty adjudication is analogous to a motion for swnmary 

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Horizon Air industries, . 

Inc., FAA Order No. 96-24, n.3 (Aug. 13, 1996); Stebbins Aviation, Inc., Docket No. 

F AA-2000-7576-16, n.3 (Aug. 30, 2004) (Initial Decision). 

The purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate, and then terminate, claims and 

defenses that are factually unsupported." Steven Baicker-McKee, et al., Federal Civil 

Rules Handbook, 1164 (West 2016). 

Pursuant to Rule 56( a), a summary judgment motion shall be granted if "the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.~ 4 77 U.S. 

242, 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In addition, 

pursuant to Rule 56(f), summary judgment may also be granted to a non-tnoving party, 

after all parties have had notice and a reasonable time to respond. 

A fact is "material" if it is capable of affecting the substantial outcome of the 

litigation. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895; Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is 

"genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for 

the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris, 5550 US 372, 380 (2007); Liberty Lobby Inc., 

477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, supra, 433 F.3d at 895. 

Page 4 of22 
On a motion for summary judg1nent, all evidence and inferences are to be viewed 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. If the moving party establishes a 

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show, by affidavit or 

otherwise, that a genuine dispute of material fact remains for the fact-finder to resolve. 

Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1178. Pursuant to Rule 56( c), (d), and (e), a non-moving 

party who wishes to proceed to trial must respond, and set forth specific facts sufficient to 

show there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 

(1986); see also, Citizens State Bank of Big Lake v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 815 F.Supp. 

309 (D. Minn. 1993); Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1178-79 (arguments, denials, 

inferences, or hopes are not enough). 

Pursuant to Rule 56( c)( 1 )(A), specific facts alleged by either party n1ay be 

asserted by submitting or citing to a variety of documents and declarations. In reviewing 

the summary judgment motion and submitted evidence, the court does not evaluate 

credibility or rule on the weight of the evidence. Baicker-Mcl<.ee, et al., supra, at 1168-

69. Instead, the court's role is limited to "assessing the threshold issue of whether a 

genuine dispute exists as to material facts" that requires a trial. !d. at 1168. 

D. Evidentiary Rulings 

As summarized above, a party moving for, or resisting, summary judgment relief 

has the burden of factually supporting its positions. 

As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that 14 C.F.R. § 13.222(c) specifically 

allows for the proffer and potential admission of certain hearsay evidence at the civil 

penalty hearing. 4 However, if hearsay is admitted at the hearing, the court must ~~weigh" 

the hearsay evidence for probative value. (!d.) In contrast, in summary judgment 

proceedings, the court may not "weigh" any evidentiary facts that are deemed 

admissible. 5 Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1168-68. Thus, the admissibility of hearsay 

4 Hearsay evidence proffered at the hearing is still subject to exclusion on the basis of relevance, 

materiality, or undue repetitiveness. 14 C.F.R. § 13.222(b). 

1 In general, evidence admitted in summary judgement proceedings is deemed true upon admission. 

However, certain evidence need not be deemed true if it is conclusory, speculative, improbable, or 

. contradicted by the record. The court may "credit" certain types of evidence if it is "unimpeached." The 

Page 5 of22 
in su1nn1ary judgment proceedings must be addressed differently than at hearing, because 

once hearsay is deemed admissible in this dispositive 1notion proceeding, it cannot be 

"weighed". (I d.) Because the FAA Rules of Practice do not address this point, the Federal 

Rules and well-established summary judgment litigation practice have been utilized as 

helpful guidance in reviewing proffered hearsay evidence for admissibility as ""material 

fact" in this pre-hearing dispositive motion. 

In addition, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c)( 1 ), (2) and ( 4 ), 

materials offered to support or oppose a fact during summary judgment proceedings must 

be capable of being offered at trial in an admissible form. !d. at 1180 ("Generally, this 

does not mean that the materials 'themselves must be presented in an admissible forn1 

during the sun1mary judgment briefing, only that an admissible form exists by which 

those facts may be later introduced at trial."). The burden is on the proponent to show 

that the material is admissible as presented or alternatively, to explain the admissible 

fonn that is anticipated. 

1. FAA's Motion- Objections and Rulings 

As part of its Motion for Decision, the FAA submitted eight (8) Exhibits, 

identified as Exhibit Numbers 1 - 8. The Respondent did not object to the admissibility 

of any of the FAA's Exhibits. 

FAA Exhibit 2 (August 15, 2014 Complaint) and Exhibit 3 (October 22, 2014 

Answer) are admissible as public records, since they are copies of the Court's pub! ic file 

in this case. 6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44(a)(1)(B)(i). 

FAA Exhibit 4 (FAA October 29,2014 First Set of Discovery Requests) and 

Exhibit 5 (Respondent's Answer to Complainant's First Set of Discovery Requests) are 

court may also draw certain reasonable inferences from admissible evidence. In addition, proven 

evidentiary disputes, if involving unnecessary facts, will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. 

Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1166 -71. 

6 However, any averment of fact contained in such pleading documents is not correspondingly admitted as 

true .. Such averments of fact still need to be independently proved. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(8); BaickerMcKee, et al., supra, at I 025. 

Page 6 of22 
admissible as relevant background infonnation, subject to the introduction of factual 

proof. See Fed. R. Evict. 1 04(b). 

FAA Exhibit 7 (Respondent's August 7, 2012 Letter to Special Agent Shane J. 

Allen) is admissible as an opposing party's statement. See Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2). 

FAA's Exhibit 8 is admissible as a partial copy of "official publication" material 

available on FedEx's public website. See Fed. R. Evid. 902(5). 

FAA Exhibit 1 (October 26, 2010 Material Safety Data Sheet) and Exhibit 6 (July 

2012 FAA Letter of Investigat~on) 7 ~re partially admissible as evidence, absent any . 

objection, in that both exhibits identify small arms ammunition as hazmat~ subject to the 

HMR. (See~ e.g., Mot. Dec. Ex. 1 ~ 2-6 §§ 3~ 6~ 10, and 13-15; Ex. 6~ 1 ~ 2). The Exhibits 

are not otherwise admissible as proof of the allegations, since no testimonial evidence or 

other evidence was submitted by the FAA 8 to discuss what relevant proof the material 

purported to further offer. See,. e.g., Baicker-McKee, et al., supra~ at 1182-85. 

2. Respondent's Respons.e and Supplemental Response- Objections and Rulings 

In its January 6, 20f5''R.esponse, the Respondent did not submit any exhibits. 

However, as part of its April' 1 ,'20 16 Supplemental Response, the Respondent submitted 

three (3) Exhibits, identified as Exhibits A- C. The FAA did not object to the 

adn1issibility of the Respondent's Exhibits. 

Respondent Exhibit A (a photograph of four boxes to which are affixed various 

7 The FAA's July 2012 Letter of Investigation was not dated. (Ex. 6.) However, it referenced the June 15, 

2012 alleged shipping incident, and it requested the Respondent to provide a response (if any) within ten 

( 1 0) days of receipt. On August 7',20 12 the Respondent served a responsive letter. (Ex. 7.) As a result, it 

appears likely the FAA Letter of Investigation (Ex. 6) was authored and mailed during the month of July 

2012. 

8 It is well-established that arguments or statements made by counsel in a summary judgment motion or a 

brief do not substitute for testimonial evidence based on personal knowledge. Baicker-McKee, et al., 

supra, at I 184. 

Page 7 of22 
labels) is partially admissible, as a photograph of the four boxes at issue in this case.

9 

Respondent Exhibit B (two (2) June 27, 2012 Statements of FAA Special Agent 

David C. King, summarizing witness interviews) are deemed admissible, 10 since the 

Respondent has subtnitted it as part of its responsive evidence. 

Respondent Exhibit C (a printout from Google Maps showing the mileage and 

travel time from Spokane, Washington to Whitefish, Montana), is deemed admissible as a 

partial copy of "official publication" material available on Google' s public website. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 902(5). 

E. Undisputed Facts 

It was undisputed th~t 'th~ Respondent is a business entity that regularly offers, 

accepts, or transports hazmat. (Compl. 1; Ans. 1.) Typically, the Respondent's 

customers had "big order" hazn1at shipments weighing over 2,000 pounds, which were 

always shipped via "pallets b,Y ground." (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) 

Prior to June 15,2012, Mr. Williams had asked FedEx about shipping a "sample" 

of mnn1unition ''by two-day air or overnight" from Seattle, Washington to Whitefish, 

Montana. (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.)· A customer wanted to use this sample of the an1munition 

at a machine gun shoot. (ld) .PedEx advised Mr. Williams that the cost of shipping 

would be reduced almost 50 percent if the ammunition was shipped overnight from 

Spokane, Washington instead of Seattle, Washington. (I d.) As a result, Mr. Williams 

decided to ship the an1munition ~~overnight" from Spokane, Washington. (!d.) 

On June 15,2012, Mr. David Carl Williams (a Respondent representative), and a 

9 Although the Respondent argued that Ex. A demonstrated that certain information had been included in 

the labels affixed to the boxes (Supp. Resp. 4), Ex. A was illegible in that regard, and no testimonial 

statement in support of such arguments was submitted. 

10 It should be noted, however, that the statements in Respondent Ex. 8 offered multiple layers of hearsay, 

including purported statements made by unidentified Respondent representatives to two different Fed Ex 

personnel, who then repeated this information (to the best of their recollection) to Agent King during later 

interviews, which Agent King then summarized in writing and reported to the FAA, which the FAA then 

provided to the Respondent at some time prior (date unknown) to the pending motion. (See Resp. Ex. 8, 

!.) 

Page 8 of22 
male friend 11 appeared at a Spokane, Washington, FedEx office with four (4) small, 

heavy, fiberboard boxes, which were each "taped and secured." (Mot. Dec. Ex. 5, 2:1-2 

and 21-22; Supp. Resp. 1.) Inside each box was ammunition which was ""loosely" packed 

and which rattled. (I d. at 2:23-25.) The labels placed by Mr. Williams on each of the 

boxes for the overnight shipment had included the words "arms" and "ammunition." (/d.; 

Ex. B, 2.) Mr. Williams asked the Spokane FedEx Store to transport the boxes (i.e. "the 

Ship1nent") "as quickly as possible" to Whitefish, Montana. (/d. at 3:2; see also, Compl. 

~,-r II-2, 11-4; Ans. ~ II-4; Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) 

It was undisputed t~~~. ~?~Shipment lacked shipping papers and required hazmat 

markings and labels. The l~p~!s provided by the Respondent read: "Global Arms & 

An1munition" (Mot Dec.; Ex:, 7, 1 ), and FedEx personnel agreed that the trigger terms 

"arms" and "ammunition" appeared on the airway bill (Supp. Resp. 4; Ex. B, 2). 

FedEx accepted the Shipment, as packed and labeled, for transportation under 

Federal Express Air Waybill Nmnber 8768-2610-5551. (Compl. ~ 11-3; Ans. ~ 11-3.) 

·Shortly thereafter, during sorting operations, a Federal Express employee saw that one of 

the fiberboard boxes in the .Sflh)ment had broken open and ammunition was falling out. 

(Compl. ~ 11-4; Ans. ~ 11-4.) The Shipment was intercepted, and never arrived in ' ' 

Whitefish, Montana. (Mot. pee. Ex. 7, 1.) 

The parties agreed that the ammunition in the Shipment was classified as hazmat 

under the HMR. (Compl. ~ II-5; Ans. ~ II-5.) The proper shipping name and description 

for the ammunition was "Cartridges, Small Anns, Class 1.4, UN0012, PG II." (Com pl.~· 

II-6; Ans. ~ II-6.) The Shipfn:ent had not been marked or labeled as required by the : . ~ \ I , 

HMR. (Compl. ~ II-7; Ans. ~Il-7.) It had not been accomp.anied by emergency response 

information as required. (Compl. ~ Il-9; Ans. ~ 11-9.) In addition, at the time Respondent 

offered the Shipment, the Respondent had not ensured that each of its employees who 

had offered the Shipment had been trained in accordance with 49 C.F.R., Part 172, 

Subpart H. (Compl. ~ II-1 0; Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 2.) 

11 In their Motion and Responses, neither party identified the man who had accompanied Mr. Williams to 

the Fed Ex Store. (Ex. B, 1.) It is likely, however, that this individual with personal knowledge of the 

incident was the "Robert Smith" identified by. the Respondent in its December I, 2014 Answers to the FAA 

Interrogatories (Mot. Dec.; Ex. 5, l.) 

Page 9 of22 
F. Brief Discussion of Disputed Matters 

The FAA must prove that the Respondent knowingly violated the HMR. 49 

U.S.C. § 5123(a)(l). "A person acts knowingly when-(A) the person has actual 

knowledge of the facts giving rise to the violation; or (B) a reasonable person acting in 

the circumstances and exercising reasonable care would have that knowledge." !d. The 

Respondent asserted it had not "knowingly" violated any HMR. It argued that genuine 

issues of material fact remained for hearing on all issues. 

All evidence and argiifne.nts by both parties have been fully considered. However, 

only certain matters will be .h~g.~lighted and discussed. 

1. "Knowingly" Offet-ihg:the Ammunition· for Air Shipping 

The FAA asserted th~t ~he evidence showed. the Respondent had clearly known 

that the Shipment containing l~a;z:mat was offered for air transportation (rather than 

ground transportation). (Mot. Dec., 5.) As part of the FAA's Motion for Decision, it 

proffered Mr. Williams' August 7, 2012 statement to the FAA ("Statement"). (Mot. Dec. 

Ex. 7.) The FAA also poinfed but that the undisputed evidence showed that the 

Respondent had agreed that ·it :ha:d offered an undeclared hazmat shiptnent for any type of 

transportation. 12 (Mot. Dec: ?,)~. 

In its Supplemental Response, the Respondent disagreed. It presented multiple 

arguments, but submitted little· or no fact evidence in support of these arguments. 13 For 

exmnple (not inclusive), it proffered hearsay evidence gathered by the FAA which 

generally supported the FAA's rendition of certain facts (Supp. Resp. Ex. B), but then 

... '•i 

12 There is some limitation to this po,rtion of the FAA's argument. For example, it did not assert or 

demonstrate that the regulations charged against the Respondent in this case applied equally to ground 

transportation. See, Atlas Frontier_s, LLC, FAA Order No. 20 I 0-10, 20 I 0 WL 7940346, (FAA June 16, 

20 I 0)( §E. Change in Transportati'o.h ·Mode ... "the regulations at issue [in this case] apply to transportation 

by ground as well as by air.") Se9pnd, it specifically alleged in its pleadings that the mode of transportation 

utilized by the Respondent had been air transportation. 

13 As noted supra, (i.e., § C. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment), in a summary judgment motion a 

party who wishes to proceed to trial must present "adequately probative evidence." See Baicker-McKee, et 

al., supra, at I 179 ("[M]ere allegations or denials" or "assertions in legal memoranda or argument" or 

"characterizations of disputed facts". are not sufficient.) 

Page 10 of22 
. argued that such hearsay evidence was notcredible. This was not helpful, since neither 

credibility disputes nor arguments about credibility may be considered in summary 

judgment proceedings. 14 The Respondent also argued that it had never specifically 

requested the Spokane FedEx clerk to send the Shipment by air. It had only asked that the 

Shipment be sent expeditiously. It asserted that it had not "known" that the Spokane 

FedEx clerk would ship the ammunition by air when it was shipped "overnight.'' 15 

(Supp. Resp. 3-4.) Thus, the Respondent concluded, it did not have actual knowledge that 

the boxes would be shipped via air transportation, and therefore should not be held liable 

for any hazmat shipping viol~tibns. 16 (Supp. Resp. 3-4.) 

I ·,; 

It should be noted tpat, in the Respondent's Answers to the FAA's Interrogatories :r,' :.· .• 

(Mot. Dec.; Ex. 5), the Respqndent summarized this defense 17 and asserted that it would 

support this defense with I\1~·!David Carl Williams' testimonial evidence. 18 But in 

response to the FAA's sumn1ary judgment motion, the Respondent did not provide any 

testimonial or other fact evide,nce, either from Mr. Williams or the male friend who 

accompanied Mr. Williams to the FedEx Store. Further, the Respondent did not provide ·.' 

any evidence to explain, lin1it, correct, or disavow the multiple fact admissions expressly 

tnade by Mr. David Carl Williams in his August 7, 2012 Letter regarding the June 12, 

2012 Ship1nent. 

A. Party Agent's Statement Against Interest- Substantive Evidence 

It is well established that a statement (i.e., oral, written, or non-verbal conduct) of 

a party opponent may be offered against that party in a civil action. Fed. R. Evid. 

14 As noted supra (i.e., § C. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment), the court does not evaluate 

credibility or rule on the weight of.the evidence in a summary judgment motion. See Baicker-McKee, et al., 

supra, at I I68-69. 

15 See, e.g., the Respondent's Answers to the FAA's Interrogatories (according to the Respondent's 

"recollection, the Federal Express employee never stated whether the packages would be sent via air or 

ground transportation. (Mot. Dec: Ex. 5, 2-3, ~I 0 .)(emphasis added). 

16 These arguments were also contained in the Respondent's Answers to the FAA's Interrogatories (Mot. 

Dec. Ex. 5) .. 

17 See, e.g., Mot. Dec. Ex. 5, 2-3, ~I 0. 

18 Respondent Answer 2 states: "Mr. Williams will testify to his personal account of the facts as stated in 

Interrogatory answer number I 0" (Mot. Dec.; Ex. 5, 2). 

Page 11 of22 
801 ( d)(2); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 286 (Am. Law Inst. 20 15). In addition, 

when a party opponent admits some "damaging" fact, then such statement may be used to 

prove the truth of fact asserted, "irrespective" of the party's or party agent's "motive in 

making them." 2 McCormick on Evidence§ 259 (7th ed.). Such opposing party 

statements are deemed to have "special evidentiary value" and are admissible as 

"substantive" evidence, "because that party is discredited, like a witness impeached by 

contradictory statements, by the party's own statements inconsistent with his or her 

present claim." 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence,§ 773. See also, Airborne Maintenance, FAAOrder No. 2016-1, 15 (April1A, 2016) ("admissions by their very nature have a "special 

reliability".) 

. ' 

They will only be off~red against the principal when they admit son1e fact 

damaging to the pri~2'ip~l, and this kind of statement by an agent is likely 

to be trustworthy. No special danger of surprise, confusion, or prejudice 

from the use of the evidence is apparent. 

2 McCormick on Evidence § 259 (ih ed.). 

B. The Respondent Offered the Shipment for Air Transportation 

As noted earli'er herein, as part of the FAA's Motion for Decision, it proffered 

Exhibit 7, which was Mr. Willimns' August 7, 2012 Statement to the FAA ("Statement''). 

Mr. Williams wrote this Statement to provide an "explanation of the circumstances 

surrounding our shipment of ammunition by overnight air through the FedEx facility in 

Spokane, Washington." (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) In this Statement, Mr. Williams 

acknowledged that prior to June 12, 2012, he had specifically obtained cotnparison price 

quotes from FedEx for shipping the ammunition either by "two-day air," or"ovemight" 

from both Seattle, Washington and Spokane, Washington to Whitefish, Montana. 19 (Mot. 

Ex. 7, 1.) He decided to ship overnight from Spokane, Washington via FedEx because of 

the reduced cost. (Jd.) FedEx assured him the ammunition could be shipped overnight 

(i.e., "next day service") without a problem. (!d.; Supp. Resp; Ex. 8, 1.) Mr. Willian1s 

relied upon the FedEx employee's advice. (Mot. Ex. 7, at 1-2.) In retrospect, after 

19 It is noteworthy that the Respondent never offered any evidence in support of its inferential argument 

that the Fed Ex quote for "overnight" delivery was not for "one-day air", but instead was for a ground 

transportation option that would have provided faster delivery than a "two-day air" transportation option. 

Page 12 of22 
discussing the n1atter with Agent King and FAA Special Agent Allen, Mr. Willimns 

realized that the manner in which the ammunition had been shipped by air had been 

''wrong." (ld. at 2.) 

The Respondent vigorously argued that there was a lack of evidence to prove the 

FAA's allegation that the Respondent had "knowingly" offered the Shipment for air . ' 

transport. The Respondent argued (among other things) that it had not known that 

"overnight" shipping meant "air" transportation. However, in making these arguments, 

the Respondent ignored Mr. Williams' August 7, 2012 Statement, in which he states (in 

part): "1. We did not know th~t ammunition could not be sent by overnight air." (Mot. 

Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) Mr. Williams further stated: "Had we ... known that there was going to be 

a problen1 with the shipment, we would have rented a car and drove to Whitefish, 

Montana to deliver the ammunition- as we had originally planned:" (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) 

This evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the Respondent 

(who did not proffer the material), proves that the Respondent knowingly offered the 

Shipment for overnight air transportation. It also refutes the Respondent's unsupported 

arguments that it reasonably believed the Shipment would be sent "overnight" via ground 

transportation, since Mr. Williams affirmatively states that he would have provided 

ground transportation himself had he known about the problems with overnight air 

shipping. 

In proffering Mr. Williams' Statement (and other materials), the FAA has met its 

burden of proof on the prima facie case involving the alleged issue. Thus, the burden 

shifts to the Respondent to show, by affidavit or otherwise, that a genuine dispute of 

material fact remains for the fact-finder to resolve. Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1178. 

As part of its defense, the Respondent asserted that the statements of Ms. Orsburn, 

a FedEx employee, as summarized and recorded by Agent King, were not accurate. 20 

(Supp. Resp. 3, ~liLA and Ex. B). However, even if the Court could accept as evidence 

20 Ms. Orsburn (the FedEx employee) stated that she accepted the Shipment for "next-day service", but did 

not expressly say that the Respondent had asked for air transportation. However, Ms. Orsburn also stated 

that had she known of the Shipment contents, she would have taken steps to ensure that the Shipment had 

been "properly offered and accepted for air transport." (Supp. Resp., Ex. B, I.) 

Page 13 of.22 
the Respondent's arguments that Ms. Orsburn had failed to accurately and credibly recall 

statetnents she might have made to Mr. Willian1s on June 12, 2012, such potential 

inaccuracies in Ms. Orsburn's reported hearsay statement would not offset or counter Mr. 

Williatns' own August 7, 2012 unrefuted admissions on the issue. 

Mr. Williams' Statement is a party's admission of material fact. In its two 

Responses to the FAA's Motion for Decision, the Respondent failed to present any fact 

evidence to limit, explain, refute or correct either Mr. Williams' Statement, or to rebut the 

FAA's other proffered evidence. 21 As a result, there is no genuine dispute on any tnaterial 

::!;:· 

fact that on June 12, 2012, the Respondent knowingly offered the Shipment to FedEx in 

Spokane, Washington for overnight air transportation to Whitefish, Montana. 22 

2. Proof of Actual Knowledge of HMR Marking and Labelling Laws 

The Respondent argued that the FAA was required to show that the Respondent 

"had [actual] knowledge of the labeling and certification requirements" in order to prove 

that the Respondent had committed the violations. (Supp. Resp. 4.) 

In essence, the Respondent argued that a business should be shielded from civil 

penalty enforcement actions unless the FAA could prove that the business had actual 

knowledge about the published regulations prohibiting certain conduct, and had 

knowingly failed to abide by such regulations. In other words, a business' ignorance of 

the law23 should be a defense. The Respondent did not provide, however, any regulation 

or caselaw that supported this legal argument. 

21 While the Respondent did submit a Google Map to show the distance between Spokane, Washington and 

Whitefish, Montana, this was evidence submitted by the Respondent to support its alternate argument that, 

absent proof of the Respondent's actual knowledge that the Shipment was sent by air, a reasonable person 

would have believed that the Shipment was being transported by ground transportation. (Supp. Resp. 5, Ex. 

C.) This alternate argument was rendered moot by the Respondent's own admissions, as noted in this 

Order. 

22 Given these admissions and evidence, the Respondent's alternate argument-absent any evidence 

proving actual knowledge, under a reasonable person standard the Respondent could not have known the 

Shipment would be sent by FedEx by air (Supp. Resp. 5.C)- need not be addressed. 

23 "Ignorance of law is want of knowledge or acquaintance with the laws of the land in so far as they apply 

to the ... matter under consideration." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). 

Page 14 of22 
It should be noted that this type of'"ignorance" defense has a well-established 

history, dating back to the Roman era. However, even in R01nan times, ignorance of the 

law was not a persuasive defense. 24 

Furthermore, in the instant case, 49 U.S.C. § 5123(a)does not require that the 

FAA prove that the Respondent have actual or constructive knowledge of the regulations 

(requiring hazmat marking and labelling) prior to being found culpable for violating these 

regulations. Stated more specifically, the FAA need not prove that the Respondent 

actually knew of the HMR requirements for marking and labelling hazmat. Nor does the 

FAA need to prove that the ~~spondent knew that its act in offering the shipment without 

· such marking and labelling ~<?:l!stituted a violation. Instead, the FAA must simply prove 

that the Respondent knowingly committed an act (or acts) which resulted in the 

violation(s). Thus, it is enotigh that the FAA proves that the Respondent knew or should 

have known the hazn1at contents of its shipment when it offered it for transportation. 25 

[W]here ... dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious 

waste materials are involved, the probability of a regulation is so great that 

anyone who is aware that he is in possession of. .. [dangerous materials] or 

. dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. 

United States v. Int 'l Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971 ). 

In the instant case, the parties agreed that the Respondent's Shipment contained 

stnall arms an11nunition which is classified as hazmat under the HMR. (Con1pl. ~ 11-5; 

Ans. ~ II-5.) The parties also agreed that the proper shipping name and description for the 

hazmat ammunition was "Cartridges, Small Arms, Class 1.4, UN0012, PG II." (Compl. ~ 

II-6; Ans. ~ II-6.) The Respondent admitted that it was fully aware that it was shipping 

24 The Latin phrase "ignorantia legis neminem excusat" translates as: Ignorance of the law excuses no one. 

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1979). 

25 See TCI Corp., FAA Order No. 92-77, at 8-9, fn. 13, 1992 WL 753226 (Dec. 22, 1992) (quoting the 

legislative history: a civil penalty may be imposed only upon proof that the defendant knowingly 

committed the act which constitutes the violation (it is not necessary to show that he knew the act 

constituted a violation)[.]. S. Conf. Rep. No. 1347, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code 

Cong. & Ad. News 7669, 7686)). See also, Midtown Neon Sign Corp., FAA Order No. 96-26, at *5, and fn. 

4, 1996 WL 509936 (Aug. 12, 1996)(Midtown "knowingly" violated the hazardous material statute and 

regulations because Midtown had knowledge of the hazmat content of its shipment, which gave rise to the 

violations). 

Page 15 of22 
ammunition when it brought its Shipn1ent into the FedEx Store on June 12, 2012. (Mot. 

Dec., Ex. 5, 2-3 ~ 1 0.) Thus, the stipulated evidence proves that the Respondent knew the 

contents of its shipment when it proffered it for FedEx transportation.26 

3. FedEx Should be Held Solely Liable for the Improper Shipment 

The FAA asserted that the law clearly required the Respondent, as the shipper 

offering hazmat, to be held responsible to perform the shipper's duties (e.g., marking, 

labeling, preparing shipping papers), and that those duties could not be transferred by the 

Respondent to FedEx. (Moi. bee., 3-4). 

In response, the Respondent asserted that FedEx was the actual ~~offeror" of the 

hazmat Shipment, and was, therefore, solely liable for the violations and civil penalty. 

(Ans. 2; Mot. Dec., Ex. 5 at 3; Supp. Resp. 6.) In support of this assertion, the 

Respondent argued that it had not hidden the fact that the Shipment contained 

atnmunition frotn FedEx. 27 ,(Supp. Resp. 4.) Therefore, the Spokane FedEx clerk who 

accepted the Shipment on June 12, 2012 should have known, or "reasona~ly inferred" 

that the boxes contained ammunition. (Supp. Resp. 4.) The Respondent argued that 

because FedEx did not refuse the Shipment, and accepted it for transportati-on, the burden 

for properly marking and labelling the Shipment had been transferred to, and accepted 

by, Fed Ex. (I d. at 6:5-21 ). 

In essence, the Respondent seeks to place the primary burden of HMR 

compliance on con1tnercial transportation and delivery service companies (e.g., FedEx, 

United Parcel Service, etc.), instead of on the customers who bring their hazmat packages 

to these businesses in order to utilize their transportation and delivery services. The 

Respondent provided no regulatory language or case law in support of this legal 

26 Given the undisputed and admitted evidence and the well-established legal standards regarding the 

requisite proof of knowledge in hazmat shipping, the Respondent's alternate argument-that under a 

reasonable person standard it could not have known about the need to utilize HMR markings and labelling 

and therefore cannot be held culpable (Supp. Resp. 5.0)-need not be addressed. 

27 The Respondent emphasized that it orally communicated to FedEx employees that the packages 

contained small arms ammunition. (Mot. Dec., Ex. 5, ~ I 0.) However, this is not a material fact in dispute, 

because the Complaint does not allege that the hazmat Shipment was an "undeclared shipment." 

Page 16 of22 
argument. 28 The Respondent also did not respond to the James Walsh case cited by the 

FAA (Motion for Decision, 3:39-4:6), in which Judge Benkin held that it is the '"shipper's 

responsibility, not the carrier" to comply with hazmat regulations. James Walsh, Docket 

No. FAA-2007-29197, 2008 WL 926620, at 4 (FAA Mar. 31, 2008). 

The Respondent's unique arguments that it is not culpable as a matter of iaw, 

because its' shipping duties under the HMR should be deemed to have been transferred to 

FedEX, is not supported by any legal authority and appears contrary to established 

regulation and caselaw; As ~result, such arguments have no merit and will not be further 

addressed. 

4. Insufficiency of Evidence on the HMR Training Allegation 

The FAA alleged that the Respondent had not ensured each of its employees who 

handled Hazmat had been trained per Title 49 C.F.R., Subchapter C, Subpart H. (Compl. 

3, ~ 10.) In support ofthis allegation, the FAA proffered Mr. Williams' August 7, 2012 

Statement, and asserted that the Respondent had ad1nitted to the allegation. (Mot. Dec. 5~ 

Ex. 7, 2.) 

In response, the Respondent asserted that the FAA had failed to name any 

"employee" involved, and had failed to submit any evidence in support of the 

"e1nployee" allegation. (Supp. Resp., 6-7.) The Respondent further argued that Mr. 

David Carl Williams, one of the two individuals who offered the Shipment for FedEx on 

behalf of the Respondent, was exempt from the regulation because he was the company 

owner, and, therefore, could not be deemed an ""employee." (!d.) 

The Respondent is correct that the Shipment was offered to FedEx by two 

Respondent representatives-Mr. Williams and another gentleman (unnamed). (Supp. 

Resp. Ex. B 1; Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1.) The Respondent is correct that the FAA has not 

affirn1atively identified the name of Mr. Williams' companion, nor has the FAA 

28 Even if Fed Ex is I iable for violations of regulations governing the acceptance of hazmat for air 

transportation, see 49 C.F.R. § I 75.30, it would not relieve the Respondent of liability for violating the 

regulations governing the offer ofhazmat for transportation. See 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(a) ("Each person who 

performs a function covered by [the HMR] must perform that function in accordance with the HMR."). 

Page 17 of22 
established that this companion was legally employed by the Respondent at the time the 

Shipment was offered. 

Nevertheless, this absence of evidence is not dispositive of the issue, since Mr. 

Williams-as the owner of the Respondent-clearly offered the Shipment on June 12, 

2012, in his capacity as the self-employed representative of his business. According to 

the HMR, a hazmat employee is defined in part as: 

( 1) A person who is: (i) Employed on a full-time, part time, or temporary 

basis by a hazmat employer and who in the course of such ... 

employment directly affects hazardous materials transportation safety; (ii) 

Se(f-employed . .. who in the course of such self-employment directly 

affects hazardous materials transportation safety[.] 

49 C.F.R. § 171.8 (emphasis added). 

In addition, Mr. Willian1s acknowledged in his August 7, 2012 Statement that he 

had not had any haz1nat training, and that he realized that he needed it. 

Therefore, I think a course in dangerous and hazardous goods is actually 

fitting for us. I have signed up for this course online (enclosed). I wi II 

con1plete the course and provide FAA with a certificate in the near future. 

Mot. Dec., Ex. 7, 2. 

The Respondent's legal argument that 49 C.F.R. § 172.702 cannot impose 

liability on employers who themselves are not properly trained (Supp. Resp., 6-7) is 

fundamentally flawed, because it ignores the legal definition of "hazmat employee.'' 49 

C.F.R. § 171.8. In short, even self-employed individuals like Mr. Williams are required 

to comply with the HMRs when they offer hazmat for transportation. 

G. Alleged Regulatory Violations Proven 

As noted earlier herein, the purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate, and then 

terminate, claims and defenses that are factually unsupported." Baicker-McKee, et al., 

supra, at 1122. In the instant case, the facts admitted into evidence for summary 

judgment review show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding 

Page 18 of22 
the ten (1 0) alleged violations of the HMR, and the FAA is entitled to judgment as a 

tnatter of law on the ten (1 0) alleged violations: 

1. Violation 1 -offering a haztnat for transportation in commerce when the hazn1at 

was not properly classed, described, packaged, marked, labeled, and in condition 

for shipment as required or authorized by the HMR. 29 49 C.F .R. § 171.2( e). 

2. Violation 2 -offering hazmat for transportation without describing the hazmat on 

the shipping paper in the manner required by subpart C of Part 172. 30 49 C.F.R. ~ 

172.200(a)/172.202. 

3. ViolatioQ 3- offering!hazmat for transportation when the shipping paper did not 

include the certification contained in§ 172.204(a)(l) of the HMR, the declaration 

contained in § 172.204(a)(2) of the HMR, or the certification contained in § 

172.204(c)(1) of the HMR. 31 49 C.F.R § 172.204. 

4. Violation 4- offering for transportation a hazmat in a non-bulk packaging and 

failing to mark the package with the proper shipping name. 

32 49 C.F .R. § 

172.300/172.301 (a). 

5. Violation 5- offering hazmat for transportation when the required tnarkings 

were not durable, in English, and printed on or affixed to the surface of the 

' 33 package or on a 'label, tag, or sign. 49 C.F .R. § 172.304( a)( 1 ). 

6. Violation 6 -offering a package containing hazmat for transportation when the 

package was not properly labeled as specified in 49 C.F.R. § 172.101.34 49 C.F.R. 

§ 172.400(a). 

29 NB: Violation 1 is a general regulation which necessarily results, if the FAA proves any of the more 

specific regulations allegedly violated, involving classing, describing, packaging, marking, or labeling. 

]O The Respondent never disputed that it failed to describe the hazmat on the shipping paper in the manner 

required by subpart C of Part 172. (Compl. 3, ~~ 6- 7; Ans. I,~~ 6- 7.) 

31 The Respondent never disputed that the shipping paper did not include the required certification or 

declaration. (Compl. 3, ~ 7; Ans. I,~ 7.) · 

]Z The Respondent never disputed that it failed to mark the package with the proper shipping name. 

(Compl. 3, ~ 7; Ans. I,~ 7.) 

33 The Respondent never disputed that the required markings were not durable, in English, and printed on 

or affixed to the surface of the package, because it did not dispute that it failed to mark the package at all. 

(Compl. 3, ~ 7; Ans. 1, ~ 7.) 

]

4 The Respondent never disputed that the package was not properly labeled. (Compl. 3, ~ 7; Ans. I,~ 7.) 

Page 19 of22 
7. Violation 7- offering hazmat for transportation without providing emergency 

response information required by 49 C.P.R., Part 172, Subpart G. 35 49 C.P.R. § 

172.600( c )/172.604. 

8. Violation 8 - ensuring that each of its hazmat employees is trained in accordance 

with the requirements prescribed in 49 C.P.R. Part 172, Subpart H. 49 C.F.R. § 

172.702(a). 

9. Violation 9- offering for transportation by air, highway, rail, or water a 

shipment of hazmat that is not prepared in accordance with the HMR. It is the 

responsibility of each hazmat employer to ensure that each haz1nat employee is 

trained in accordanc,~ .with the requirements prescribed in the HMR. 36 49 C.F.R. § 

173.1 (b). 

10. Violation 10 -offering.? hazmat for transportation and failing to properly class 

and describe the hazrpa~ in accordance with 49 C.F.R., Parts 172 and 173.37 49 

. C.F.R. § 173.22(a). 

H. Dispute Remains on the $50,000 Proposed Civil Penalty 

In its Motion for Decision, the FAA asserted that the $50,000 proposed civil 

penalty was appropriate, in part because "[t]his case involves an undeclared shipment that 

was within quantity limitations and therefore is considered an Offense Category II for 

sanction purposes." (Mot. Dec., 6- 7.) 

The evidence demonstrates a genuine dispute, in that that the Mr. David Carl 

asserted that the· Shipment was identified. (Mot. Dec. Ex. 7, 1 ("We clearly labeled our 

boxes with 'Global Arms & Ammunition' stickers, as we were not trying to hide 

anything.")). Exhibit B appears to support the Respondent's position that "PedEx was 

infonned" that the boxes contained ammunition," because labels which read, ''"GLOBAL 

35 The Respondent never disputed that it failed to provide emergency response information. (Compl. 3, ~ 9; 

Ans. 2, ~ 9.) 

16 Like Violation I, this is a general regulation which necessarily results if the FAA proves any of the more 

specific regulations allegedly violated that involve hazmat training. 

:n The Respondent never disputed that the proper shipping name and description of small arms ammunition 

is "Cartridges, Small Anns, Class 1.4, UNOO 12, PG II" (Com pl. 3, ~ 5; Ans. I,~ 5), nor did it ever dispute 

that that it failed to properly class and describe the hazmat (Com pl. 3, ~ 7; Ans. I,~ 7). 

Page 20 of22 
ARMS & AMMUNITION" were affixed to the Shipment (Supp. Resp. 4; Ex. 5, ~ 1 0.) 

FedEx personnel acknowledged that the trigger terms "arms" and "ammunition" appeared 

on its airway bill. (Ex. B, 2.) 

The FAA's assertion that Offense Category II should be utilized because the 

Shipment was "undeclared hazardous material" is disputed, and also may not be 

supported by law, since the Shipment did have some "visible indication" on the outside 

of the package that hazardous material was present. See Undeclared hazard material, 49 

C.P.R. § 171.8. 

The FAA asserted that' because "Respondent is a company that regularly offers, 

accepts or transports HAZMA T, it is considered a Category D Offender for sanction 

purposes." (Mot. Dec., 6.) In:. its' general responses, the Respondent admitted that it was 

a company that regularly offered, accepted or transported Hazmat (Com pl. 2, ~ 1; Ans. 1, 

~ 1 ), but it argued that the FAA had not considered all relevant fact information regarding 

the Shiptnent incident, and had taken "son1e of the facts .... out of context.'' (Supp. Resp. 

4; Resp. 2: 15-16.) Mr. Williams explained he had not known that the ammunition in the 

four-box Shipment "could not be sent by overnight air." (Mot. Dec., Ex. 7 at 1-2.) He 

also had not known about the HMR limitations for shipping ammunition by air. (!d. at 

2.) Once he learned of the HMR limitations, he agreed that taking hazmat training would 

be helpful, and had immediately enrolled online in a course. (/d.) It appeared undisputed 

that the Respondent had taken corrective action after the violation, a fact which n1ay not 

have been factored into the FAA's calculations. (Mot. Dec., Ex. 7, 2.) 

Thus, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the FAA's proposed civil 

penalty of $50,000.See, e.g., Atlas Frontiers, LLC,· FAA Order No. 201 0-1 0, 201 0 WL 

. 7940346, (FAA June 16, 201 0). 

I. Conclusion 

Pursuant to 14 C.P.R. § 13.218 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and after 

considering all the subn1itted evidence and undisputed materials in a light most favorable 

to the non-n1oving party (i.e., the Respondent herein); 

Page 21 of22 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1) The FAA's Motion for Decision is granted in part. There is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact regarding Violations 1 - 1 0~ and the FAA is granted judgment 

as a matter of law on each of these violations. 

2) The FAA's Motion for Decision is denied in part. There are genuine disputes of 

material fact remaining regarding the FAA's proposed civil penalty of $50,000. 

The FAA is denied judgment as a matter of law on the proposed $50,000 civil 

penalty. 

3) The parties shall proceed to hearing on the disputed issue of the proposed $50,000 

civil penalty. 

4) A separate Order will be issued shortly, which will notify the parties of the date 

for appearing at a Litigation Scheduling Conference on the remaining matter. 

Attachment: Service List 

Page 22 of22 
Docket No. FAA-2014-0320 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

SERVICE LIST - BY U.S. MAIL 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1 000 1 

ONE COPY 

Mr. Kyle Lomazow 

Complainant's Counsel 

Northwest Mountain Region, ANM-7 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1601 Lind Ave., S.W. 

Renton, W A 98057 

TEL: 425-227-1847 

FAX: 425-227-1007 

Mr. Vincent Williams 

Respondent's Lay Representative 

Global Arms and Ammunition 

501 South Jackson St., Suite 305 

Seattle, WA 98104 

TEL: 206-366~5279 

Judge J.E. Sullivan 

U.S. Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200NewJersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-6941 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

Mr. David Carl Williams, President 

Global Arms and Ammunition, Re.spondent 

28 -3i11 Street N.E., Suite A 

Auburn, W A 98002 

TEL: 206-325-9400 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: 

Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 

2W I 000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.