J-A30030-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

DA’RAN MALIK SEARS

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 292 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0001293-2013

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

DA’RAN MALIK SEARS

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 293 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0000293-2014

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 13, 2021

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Appellee Da’Ran 

Malik Sears’ petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545. Based on our review of the record, the 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A30030-19

- 2 -

Commonwealth’s response to our order, and in light of Commonwealth v. 

Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), we quash.

Briefly, Appellee was charged at Docket No. 1293-2013 with involuntary 

manslaughter and receiving stolen property for a shooting that occurred in 

2013. See Docket No. 1293-2013. Approximately nine months later, the 

Commonwealth filed an additional charge at Docket No. 293-2014 for thirddegree murder based on the same underlying incident. See Docket No. 293-

2014.

Following a consolidated jury trial, Appellee was convicted of all charges 

and sentenced to twenty-to-fifty years’ incarceration. Appellee filed a direct 

appeal, and this Court affirmed Appellee’s judgment of sentence on February 

14, 2017. See Commonwealth v. Sears, 1738 MDA 2015, at 2 (Pa. Super. 

filed Feb. 14, 2017) (unpublished mem.).

Appellee filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on November 27, 2017. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on Appellee’s 

behalf. Therein, Appellee argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

advising him not to enter an open guilty plea to the charges at Docket No. 

1293-2013 and for failing to anticipate that the Commonwealth would file the 

third-degree murder charge at Docket No. 293-2014, which resulted in 

Appellee receiving a much greater sentence. Am. PCRA Pet., 1/24/18, ¶ 26, 

50. The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel 

and Appellee testified. 
J-A30030-19

- 3 -

On January 17, 2019, the PCRA court issued an order granting

Appellee’s petition. Specifically, the PCRA court vacated Appellee’s judgments

of sentence at Docket Nos. 1293-2013 and 293-2014 and scheduled a new 

guilty plea and sentencing hearing. PCRA Ct. Order, 1/17/19. The PCRA court 

specified that Appellee would “be permitted to plead open to all counts under 

[Docket No.] 1293-2013. The plea of guilty and the sentence on said counts 

shall preclude the Commonwealth from proceeding with prosecution under 

[Docket No.] 293-2014.” Id. In addition to listing both trial court docket 

numbers, the PCRA court’s order was placed in the record for both cases.

On February 12, 2019, the Commonwealth filed one notice of appeal

that listed both docket numbers. The clerk of courts docketed the 

Commonwealth’s notice of appeal at both trial court docket numbers and 

placed a copy of the notice in the record for each case.

On February 22, 2019, this Court issued a rule to show cause for the 

Commonwealth to explain why we should not quash the appeal based on our 

Supreme Court’s decision in Walker. Order, 2/22/19. On March 8, 2019, the 

Commonwealth filed a response indicating that “[i]t was the Commonwealth’s 

intention that only one appeal be filed, that being to Docket No. 293-2014 and 

assigned Superior Court Docket No. 293 MDA 2019. We would request that 

the appeal at 292 MDA 2019 be withdrawn.” Commonwealth’s Resp. to Rule 

to Show Cause, 3/8/19. On April 1, 2019, this Court discharged the rule to 

show cause and referred the issue to this panel.
J-A30030-19

- 4 -

The Commonwealth subsequently filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement and the PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion 

addressing the Commonwealth’s claims.

After reviewing the record, the Commonwealth’s brief, and the 

Commonwealth’s response to this Court’s rule to show cause, it was unclear 

whether the Commonwealth (1) filed a single notice of appeal at one trial court 

docket number; or (2) filed two identical notices of appeal, one at each trial 

court docket number. Therefore, on October 30, 2020, we issued an order 

directing the Commonwealth to clarify whether it filed separate notices of 

appeal at each docket number in compliance with Walker and 

Commonwealth v. Jerome Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en

banc). Order, 10/30/20.

The Commonwealth filed a response indicating that “[a] separate 

[n]otice of [a]ppeal was not filed for each case; both docket numbers were 

incorrectly listed on the [n]otice of [a]ppeal.” Commonwealth’s Resp. to 

Order, 11/9/20, at 1. The Commonwealth reiterated that it “only intended to 

file one appeal under [Docket No.] 293-2014.” Id. at 2. The Commonwealth 

also acknowledged that the original notice of appeal was “defective,” but 

referred this Court to the first argument in its appellate brief. Id. at 3. 

Appellee filed a response requesting that we quash the Commonwealth’s 

appeal based on Walker and Jerome Johnson. Appellee’s Resp. to Order, 

11/13/20.

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issues:
J-A30030-19

- 5 -

1. Commonwealth v. Walker does not require quashal under 

the circumstances of [this] case.

2. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise [Appellee] 

of third degree murder[,] an offense with which [Appellee] was 

not charged.

3. Counsel was not ineffective for not having a guilty plea for third 

degree murder scheduled prior to August 1, 2014.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 1 (some formatting altered).

Initially, we must address the Commonwealth’s claim that even though 

it “filed a single notice of appeal from an order granting [PCRA] relief on two 

dockets, under the circumstances of the case, [Walker] is inapplicable.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. 

The Commonwealth first argues that, unlike the defendants in Walker, 

Appellee “effectively stipulated to consolidation” by filing a single PCRA 

petition that listed both docket numbers. Id. at 10. Additionally, the 

Commonwealth asserts that Appellee did not raise separate ineffectiveness 

claims at each docket, but instead “stated only a single claim of ineffectiveness 

by virtue of counsel’s action at [Docket No.] 1293-2013.” Id. at 11. The 

Commonwealth explains that the PCRA court’s order vacated Appellee’s thirddegree murder conviction at Docket No. 293-2014 and “barred further 

prosecution on that charge if [Appellee] pled to [Docket No. 1293-2013].” Id.

at 11 n.2. Therefore, the Commonwealth reiterates that its notice of appeal 

was “really only from [Docket] 293-2014 although the relief was based upon 

a finding of ineffectiveness under [Docket] 1293-2013.” Id.
J-A30030-19

- 6 -

The Commonwealth also claims that Appellee is “the party responsible 

for the procedure that caused the Commonwealth to file but one appeal.” Id.

at 10. Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that Appellee’s filing of one 

PCRA petition listing two docket numbers “placed the Commonwealth in the 

untenable position of filing one appeal for two separate dockets.” Id. at 11.

The Commonwealth concludes that “under the circumstances of this case, 

Walker is not applicable and the appeal should not be quashed.” Id.

Appellee responds that he did not stipulate to consolidation “as is 

envisioned by the Walker decision and Pennsylvania’s Rules of Appellate 

[P]rocedure.” Appellee’s Brief at 9. Further, he asserts that “filing a single 

PCRA petition at the trial court level is not a stipulation to consolidation at the 

appellate level.” Id. Appellee argues that not only did he “raise issues related 

to each docketed case, but the Commonwealth has appealed both issues and 

argued both issues in its brief.” Id. at 10. Therefore, Appellee concludes that 

“[t]he Commonwealth violated the bright line rule of Pa.R.A.P. 341 and 

Walker” and that therefore, “quashal of the appeal is required.” Id. at 11.

In Walker, our Supreme Court concluded that Pa.R.A.P. 341 provides a 

“bright-line mandatory instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of 

appeal.” Walker, 185 A.3d at 976-77. The Walker Court held that “where 

a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate 

notices of appeal must be filed for each case.” Id. at 971. “The failure to do 

so requires the appellate court to quash the appeal.” Id. at 977.
J-A30030-19

- 7 -

In Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Super. 2016), the 

appellant filed a notice of appeal listing four trial court docket numbers. On 

appeal, a panel of this Court noted that although it was impossible to 

determine whether counsel filed separate notices of appeal, it “appear[ed] 

that one notice of appeal listing all four docket numbers was simply 

photocopied and placed in each record, conceivably by the clerk of courts.” 

Creese, 216 A.3d at 1144 n.1. Nonetheless, the Creese panel interpreted 

Walker to mean that “we may not accept a notice of appeal listing multiple 

docket numbers, even if those notices are included in the records of each 

case.” Id. at 1144. Therefore, the Creese panel quashed the appellant’s 

appeal, holding that “a notice of appeal may contain only one docket number.” 

Id.

Recently, an en banc panel of this Court revisited our prior decision in 

Creese. Jerome Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1148. Specifically, the Court 

expressly overruled Creese to the extent that it required notices of appeal to 

contain no more than one docket number. Id. However, the Court reaffirmed 

Creese for the proposition that “a clerk of courts has only ministerial powers”

and “cannot perfect an appeal at multiple dockets when a lawyer fails to file 

separate notices.” Id. at 1147 n.5 (citing Creese, 216 A.3d at 1144 n.2).

Here, the Commonwealth concedes that, like the appellant in Walker, 

it filed a single notice of appeal from an order that resolved issues arising at

more than one docket number. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. Although 

the Commonwealth listed two docket numbers on its notice of appeal, that 
J-A30030-19

- 8 -

fact alone does not require quashal. See Jerome Johnson, 236 A.3d at 

1148. 

However, while the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal appears in the 

record for both cases, the Commonwealth specifically stated that a “separate 

notice of appeal was not filed for each case,” and that it only intended to 

appeal from the PCRA court’s order as it related to Docket No. 293-2014. See

Commonwealth’s Resp. to Order, 11/9/20, at 1 (emphasis in original). 

Therefore, although a notice of appeal appears in the record for each case, it 

is evident from the Commonwealth’s assertions that it failed to comply with 

Walker and Rule 341(a). Under these circumstances, we are constrained to 

quash.1 See Jerome Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1147 n.5 (reiterating that “the 

clerk of courts cannot perfect an appeal at multiple dockets when a lawyer 

fails to file separate notices”); cf. Commonwealth v. Rebecca Johnson, 

236 A.3d 63 (Pa. Super. 2020) (concluding that, irrespective of whether the 

defendant included multiple docket numbers on each notice of appeal, Walker 

did not require quashal where the defendant filed three separate notices of 

____________________________________________

1 We recognize that there may be instances where remand is appropriate for 

a party to correct a purely technical defect in an otherwise timely notice of 

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583 (Pa. 2014). Here,

however, the Commonwealth has repeatedly stated that it intentionally filed

a single notice of appeal in an effort to raise issues solely relating to Docket 

No. 293-2014. Nonetheless, as discussed herein, the Commonwealth’s issues 

relate to both docket numbers. Under these circumstances, we conclude that 

remand is inappropriate. See id. at 588 (stating that the note to Pa.R.A.P. 

902 “indicates that dismissal of a defective appeal remains an alternative 

where the appellate court determines that an appellant has failed to take the 

necessary steps to correct an identified defect”).
J-A30030-19

- 9 -

appeal, one at each lower-court docket number) (relying on Jerome

Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1148).

Finally, we reject the Commonwealth’s claim that it only intended to 

appeal from the order as it related to Docket No. 293-2014. In its brief, the 

Commonwealth specifically challenges the PCRA court’s finding of 

ineffectiveness in relation to Docket No. 1293-2013, which ultimately led to 

the PCRA court’s disposition in both cases. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-

16. In any event, the PCRA court’s order clearly resolved issues pertaining to 

both docket numbers, as the order vacated the sentences at both docket 

numbers so that Appellant could plead guilty at Docket No. 1293-2013 and 

barred the Commonwealth from proceeding with the third-degree murder 

charge at Docket No. 293-2014. Therefore, because the PCRA court’s order 

resolved issues pertaining to both trial court docket numbers, quashal is 

necessary under Walker.

In sum, because the PCRA court’s order resolved matters relating to two 

docket numbers, the Commonwealth was required to file two separate notices 

of appeal. See Walker, 185 A.3d at 976-77. Because the Commonwealth 

confirmed that it failed to do so, we are constrained to quash. See id.; see 

also Jerome Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1148.

Appeal quashed.
J-A30030-19

- 10 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/13/2021