NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0129n.06 No. 08-5879 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. DONNE L LMARTI

N, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

B e fo re : ME RRI TT , CO L E, and CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. COOK, Circuit J udg e. Donne ll Martin appea ls the district c ourt’s orde r deny ing his motion to reduc e his sen t en ce u nder 18 U .S.C. § 3582(c)(2) afte r a r etroa ctive cr ack c ocaine amendment lowere d his guide lines rang e. We af firm.
I n 19 97 , fo llo wi ng Mart in’ s g uil ty ple a fo r po sse ssi on wi th i nte nt t o d istri bu te c oc a ine ba se in v iol a tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § 84 1( a )( 1) , a dis tr ic t c ourt

se nte nc e d him t o a

statut or ily -m and a te d tw e nty y ear s in prison. Ten y ear s later, in 2007, the Sentencing Commi ssion promulg ated Ame ndment 706, which re duced the base of fense level for

most offenses involving coca ine base by two. Soon the re a ft e r, Am e ndme nt 7 13 ma de Am e ndme nt 706 re tr oa c tiv e by a dd ingit t o th e lis t of a me ndme nts in USSG § 1B1.10(c) . Ostensibly relying upon the reduc tion in his base offe nse leve l and g uidelines rang e, Mar

tin filed a motio n for sentence modification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)( 2). TheNo. 08-5879

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 2 - district court denie d the motion on the gr ounds that the s t at u t o ry mandatory minimum sentenc e, wh ic h e xce e de d th e a me nd e d guid e lin e s r ang e , p re ve nte d a se nte nc e re du c tion. Mar tin tim e ly appea led, ar g uing e x clusively —and for t h e fi rst time—that, though he rema ins subject to the statutory minimum , his sentence violates Fifth Ame ndment substantive due proc ess bec ause of the
coca ine base /powder se ntencingdisparity
. As a pr e lim ina

ry ma tte r, we no te tha

t, o n a pp e a l, M a

rt in ab and on s th e c la im h e ra ise d in district court—t h at Am en dment 706’s ef fec t on his guidelines r ang e re quired a sentenc e reduc tion—appare ntly

rec og nizi ng that the statutory mandatory

minimum continues to control on
rese ntencing
. See USSG § 5G1.1(b) (N ov. 1, 2008).
Mart in n owargue s o nly

that the c oc a ine /po wd e r d isp ari ty vio la te s su

bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss, a cla im he failed to raise below. “[I ]n gene ral, ‘issues not pre sented to the district cour t but raised for the f irst time on appea l are not properly befor e the c ourt.’” McFarland v . Hende rson , 307 F.3d 4 0 2 , 4 0 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g J.C. W yck off & Assoc., Inc . v. S t a n d ard Fire Ins. Co. , 936 F.2d 1474, 1488 (6th Cir. 1991)). And thoug h we r etain discre tion to appropr iately consider some new issues, McFarland , 3 07 F .3 d at 40 7, the fr ivolo us nat ure of M art in’ s argume nt w e ig hs a g a ins t exercisi ng it here: “ We have c onsistently held that the cr ack/powde r disparity withstands
c on sti tut ion a l sc rutiny , inc lud ing c ha lle ng e s ba se d on du e pr oc e ss, e qu a l pr ote c tio n, and the Ei g hth Amendment.” Un ite d S

tat es v . B e rry , 290 F. App’ x 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2008) (listing c ases)
. But e ven if we treated hi s claim as proper ly raised, w e still lack jurisdiction to review it underNo. 08-5879

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 3 - § 3582(c) (2). As a

court of limit ed jurisdi ction, we are both bound to consider our own jurisdiction and per mitt ed t o opine only

when c ong ressionally

authorized. Bende r v. W illiamsport

Area Sch. Di st. , 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Our authority “to resentence a def endant is limited by

statute” a nd is “expressly

prohibit[ ed] . . . bey ond those exceptions ex p re s s ly enac ted by

Congr ess.” United Sta te s v . R os s , 245 F.3d 577, 586 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Section 3582(c) (2) a l l o ws “modification of a sentenc e only

wher e the se ntence was ‘ba sed on a se ntencingrang e that has sub s equently been lowere d by

the SentencingCommi ssion.’” United States v. Park er , N o . 08-6253 , 2 0 0 9 WL 4927949, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec . 21, 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). T h u s, beca use § 3 5 8 2 (c )( 2 )’ s n arro w a mb i tex cl u d es co n s t i tu t i o n al ch al l en ges , an d M ar t i n ’s sole complaint on appe al inv olv e s a lleged c on sti tut ion a l e rr or , w e la c k ju ri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r h is c la im, e ve n if pr op e rl y raised.
We affir

m.No. 08-5879

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 4 - ME RRI TT , Ci rc uit

Judg e , co nc ur

ri ng . I c on c ur

in t he re su lt i n th is c a se . T he a pp e lla nt d id
no t r a ise his c on sti tut ion a l c la im in the c ourt be low , and the re fo re he ha s wa ive d th e c la im. We s it
as a c ourt of appe llate re view and not a s a cour t of first instance , and we may not r eac h out to decide
e nti re ly ne w c la ims no t pre se nte d to a tria l court . I do no t bel ie ve that 18 U.S. C. § 35 82 (c )( 2) is a “subjec t matter jurisdiction” st atute. W e have subject matter jur isdiction to consider and a pply the statute as we ll as the consti t u t i o n al i t y of a se ntence . Iwould not dismi ss the appea l for “la ck of j u ri s d i ct i o n ” u n d er

§ 3 5 8 2
. Iwo u l d

n o tem p l o y

t h at re as o n i n g.