UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

) F RIENDS OF A NIMALS, ) ) P laintif f, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 09-707 (RMC) ) KEN SALAZ AR, Secr etar y of the In ter ior, ) e t al . , ) ) Defendan ts. ) )
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION On April 16, 2009, the non-prof it a nimal advoca cy

g roup F riends of A nimals filed

a Co mp la in t a g a in s t K e n Sa la zar , Se c r e ta r y o f th e I n te r io r ; Ro w a n G o u ld , A c ti n g D ir e c to r o f the U.S. F is h an d Wi ld li f

e Se r v ic e ; a n d th e U
. S. F is h a n d Wi ld li f e Se r v ic e ( “ F WS ” ) p u r s u ant to the Endang ere d Species Ac t (“ESA”) , 16 U.S.C. § 1533 et seq. , seeki n g d e clar atory

and injunctive re lief. On Novembe r 2 0 , 2 0 0 9 , this Court i ssued a Me morandum Opinion [Dkt. # 13] finding that Plaintiff’s claim that Def endants ha d failed to make a 90-da y finding on its endang ere d-spec ies petition, as require d by

the ESA, was moot and its claim that Defenda nts had failed to mee t the 12- month deadline provide d by the ESA had to be dismissed due to P l ai n t i ff ’s failure to provide Def endants with prope r notice, a s re quired by statute. The Court also found, how ever , that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit was the c ataly st prompting De fenda nt s to ultim ately

issue a 90-da

y finding as require d and, ther efor e, Plaintiff may be entitled to reco ver attorney s’ fe es and c osts. Pl aintiff’s motion for attorney s’ fe es and c osts [ Dkt. # 15] i s now befor e the Court.

Def endants “ do[] not dispute that Pl aintiff is entitled to rea sonable fees for the filing-2-

of its 9 0 -d ay finding claim.” De fs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y Fe es and Costs (“D efs.’ Resp.”) [Dkt. # 16] at 6. They argue, howeve r, that the costs Plaintiff ha s submitt ed ar e unre asonable

. Id. Specifica lly , Def

endants a sk the Court to deduct 50% of the t ime spent on the not ice letter, 65% of the time s p en t o n t h e C omplaint, and all of the time spent on the motion to dismi ss. Id. at 2. D e f e n d an t s a r g u e t h a tt h e t i m e s p e n t o n t h e C o mp l a i n tan d n o t i c e l e t t e r

w a s e x c e s s i v e f

o r a t t o r n e ys of the skill level of Plaintiff’s c ounsel and that the time spent on the Com p l ai n t s h o u l d be fur ther reduc ed bec ause it includes time spent working on Plaintiff’ s 12-month deadline c laim, which was

unsucce ssful. Defe ndants also ar g ue that Plaintiff should not recove r at a l l for wor k spent on the motion to di smiss because it did not preva il on that moti on.

Th e D
. C

. C i r c u i th a s n o t e d t h a t “ [w ]h e r e a

p l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s i n o n e l a w s u it ‘distinctively

differ ent claims for relief that are based on differ ent fa cts and leg al theorie s,’ the cour t cannot allow a plaintiff to r ecove r fee s on the unsucce ssful claims.” Sierra Club v. EPA , 769 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (interna l c itations omitted). Rather, the Court must addre ss e ach of the issues prese nted and de termine whe ther the c laims on w hich Plaintiffs prevailed w ere closely related to the ones on which they did not. See id. ; Am. Lands Alliance v. Norton , 525 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146 (D.D.C. 2007). “[T] he mere fact t hat all the issues in a ca se stem ‘fr om the same set of regulations

and the same a dmi nis tr a tiv e re c or d’ do e s n ot m e a n th a t th e iss ue s ar e re la te d en ou g h for a pa rt ia lly

succe ssful plaintiff to be aw arde d attorney ’s fe es for work pe rf

ormed on both succ essful and

unsucce ssful claims.” Am. Lands Alliance , 525 F. Supp. 2d at146 (inter nal citations omitted). Plaintiff’s claim reg arding Def endants’ f ailure to issue a

12-month finding is distinct from its claim reg ardinga 90-da y finding and, in fa ct, the 12-month cla im was not even pr operly part of this lawsuit. Pl aintiff ther efor e may re co v er fe es for wor

k expended on the notice le tter and-3-

Complaint t o the extent that work was re lated to its 90-day finding claim, but not for wor k related to its 12-month finding claim. Additionally , “hours rea sonably expended on [a moti on for f ees] are compensa ble,” Sierra Club , 769 F.2d at811, so Plaintiff may rec over those fee s as well. The Court

a g re e s th a t Pla int if

f c a nn ot re c ov e r fo r wo rk sp e nt o n th e mot ion to d ism iss ; Pla int if

f d id n ot p re va il on that motion and the Court did not have jurisdiction over any of P laintiff’s subst antive cla ims at that po int

. Having deter mined that Plaintiff may

rec over some of

its fees for

the notice letter , Complaint, and petition for fee s, the Court must determine how much P l ai n t i ff may rec over. De fe nd ants a rgue tha

t this wa s a simpl e c a se a nd that the Com pla int a nd no tic e le tte r w e re vir tua lly boilerplate doc uments. They cite MacClarenc e v. J

ohnson , 539 F. Supp. 2d 155, 161 (D.D.C. 2008) fo r t he pr op os iti on

that 10 .4 hour s is a

re a so na ble a mou nt o f t ime to s pe nd

on a c omp la int

that is “substantially

simil ar” to a complaint filed in an earlier action. Def s.’ R esp. at 5. Plaintiff counters that draf ting the Complaint and notice letter involved e x tensive re sear ch to lear n the fa cts underly

ing Plaintiff’s petition calling f or the prote ction of seve ral spec ies of parr ot a nd addre ss “complex issues of standing .” Pl.’s Reply [Dkt. # 17] at 4-5. Plaintiff also ar g ues that De fenda nts a re making “conc lusory

asser tions reg ardingthe amou

n t o f ti me th a t D e f e ndant[s] thinks P laintiffs’ [sic] counsel ‘should have spe nt’ on ce rtain docume nts and litigation tasks,” id. at 3 (q u o t i n g Holbrook v. D istrict of C olu mb ia , 305 F. supp. 2d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2004)), when in fac t the t ime spent was r easona ble for a third-y ear

law student workingunder the supervision of a licensed attorney , as was the c ase he re. MacClarenc e pr ov ide s g uid a nc e , thou g h not ne c e ssa ri ly in t he mann e r D e fe nd a nts
may have ho pe d. Th e re , the c ourt fo un d that the de fe nd a nt “ [did ] n ot po int [the c ourt ] to the sp e c if

ic i n ef fi ci en ci es i tfi n d s o b

j ec t i o n ab l e. W i t h o u tt h at i n fo rm at i o n , an ac ro s s t h e b o ar d p er ce n t age-4-

reduc tion for unspecified ‘ineffic iencies’ is arbitrar y .” MacClarenc e , 5 39 F . Su pp . 2 d at 16 1; see also Ferland v. Conrad Credit Cor p. , 2 44 F .3 d 1 14 5, 11 49 (9 th C ir . 2 00 1) (remandi ngc a se to district court for rec alculation of f ees w here district court re duced the amount of compe nsable hours without e x planation). Additionally , “the g reater a lawy er’ s experience , the less time he should spend on familiar tasks. I t is li kely that an inexperienc ed lawy er w ould have spe nt more time than plaintiffs’ counse l did draf ting the complaint and getting it in final for m to be filed.” MacClarenc e , 539 F. Supp. 3d at 161. I t is also rea sonable to expect law students to require more super vision for their work than would a lice nsed attorne y . See Gavin-M ouklas v. Infor. Builders, Inc. , Civ. No. 97- 2085, 1999 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 14448, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1999).

The Court finds i t i s re asonable for a n inexperience d attorney

— or, as he re, a

law student — to ta

ke more than the 10.4 hours the MacClarenc e court de emed a ppropriate for dr afting a complaint. The Court ag ree s, howeve r, that the fa ct that the Complaint purported to sue Steven Wil liams in his capacity

as Dire ctor of F WS , when Mr. Wil liams had not been Direc tor for se vera l y ear s at t h e time of filing , sug g ests that Plaintiff’s counsel wor ked fr om a template that ha s been

us e d ma ny tim e s b e fo re . T his is f

ur the r e vid e nc e d by the fa c t th a t th e ma jor ity of the Com pla int is citations to statutory

provisions , wi t h only

the Fa ctual B ackg round and Pra y er f or Relief se ctions containing information uni que to this case. See Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. The Court ther efor e will reduc e the amount of time spent on the Complaint by 50% to ac count for the fac t that it ap p ear s to be larg ely boilerplate and for the time spent addre ssing the 12-month deadline claim, on which Plaintiff did no t pr e va il. Th e no tic e le tte r a pp e a rs to b e muc h mo re sp e c if ic to thi s c a se tha

n th e Com

pla int , detailing Plaintiff’s petition and the rese arc h in support there of. The two attorney s who worke d onL aff

ey Matrix 2003-2010, available at United States Attorney ’s Offic e for the District of Columbia, 1 h tt p :/ /w ww . ju s ti c e . g o v/u s a o /d c /D iv is io n s /C iv il

_ D ivision/L aff

ey _Matrix_8.ht ml (last visit ed Mar ch 15, 2010). -5- the notice letter , Michae l Harr is and Kay Bond, are ex perie nced attorney s in the field of environmenta l la

w, boasting near ly

twenty y ear s of leg al pra ctice be tween the m. See De c l. o f K e vin L y nch [Dkt. # 15-1], Ex s. B & C ( Resumes of Mr. Har ris and Ms. B ond). Mr. Har ris and Ms. B ond sp e nt 1 7. 3 h ours fi na lizin g the fi ve -p a g e no tic e le tte r. De fe nd ant s do not po int to a ny sp e c if ic

re dund anc ie s in

the tim e sh e e ts the se a tto rn e y s su bmi tte d, bu t si mpl y

state th at th e amo un t is

e xce ssi ve fo r e xpe ri e nc e d atto rn e y s. De fs .’ Re sp . at 5. Ho we ve r, in r e vie wi ngtho se tim e sh e e ts, the Court sees that much of this ti me was spe nt meet i n g wi th the law student team and re viewing their re sear ch memora

nda and dr afts of the notice letter over the course of two months. As the Court noted above, it is not unrea sonable for law st udents to take longer and to require more super vision to complete tasks that may seem basic to a more experience d attorney
. Plaintiff doe s not se ek fe es in conne ct i o n with any

student’s work on the notice letter, only for the w ork of the supe rvising attorney s. The Court finds this reasona ble and will not reduc e the amount of t ime for whic h Plaintiff

can r ecove r fe es re lated to pre paringthe notice letter

.

The pa rties do not dispute that the appropria te rate s for the c alculation of attorney fee s
are found in the L aff

ey Matrix. There fore , Ms. Pig g ot’s work on the Complaint, reduced by 50%, 1 wi ll b e bil le d at a r a te of

$1 30 pe r h our f

or a tot a l of $1 94 3. 50 . M r. Ha

rr is’ s w or k o n th e Com

pla int , reduc ed by

50%, will be billed at a r ate of $410 per hour for a

total of $738. Mr. Ha

rris’s wor k on the notice letter

will be billed at a rate of $410 pe r hour f or a total of $943. Ms. B ond’s work on the

no tic e le tte r w ill be bil le d a t a rate of $2 70 pe r ho ur fo r a tot a l of $4 ,0 50 .0 0. Pla int if f’ s c ouns e l a lso may rec over all fee s that the C ourt can establish are connec ted t o their m otion for attorney fee s and-6-

all costs, that is, $1189 for Mr. Har ris’s work on the fee petition, $2857.50 for Mr. Ly nch’s wor k, and $1053 for Ms. F err ell’s work, plus $350 in c osts. Pl aintiff’s c ounsel may not rec over a

ny fee s associate d with responding to Defe ndant’s motion to dism iss.

I n sum, Plaintiff will be awa rded $13,124 in fee s and costs. A memoria liz ing or der

acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date : Ma rc h 1 6, 20 10 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COL L YER Un i t edS t at es Di s t ri ct J u d ge