UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4161

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RONALD MATTHEW GAINEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:15-cr-00245-NCT-3)

Submitted: September 29, 2016 Decided: October 3, 2016

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stephen F. Wallace, WALLACE LAW FIRM, High Point, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ronald Matthew Gainey pled guilty, pursuant to a written 

plea agreement, to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, in 

violation 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). The district court sentenced 

Gainey to 175 months’ imprisonment, a term below his 240-month 

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, counsel has 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal. The Government declined to file a brief.

Because Gainey did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, we review the guilty plea hearing for 

plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th 

Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Gainey] must show that 

an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error 

affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad, 

478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Gainey satisfies 

these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our 

discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error 

seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that 

the district court substantially complied with Rule 11 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting Gainey’s guilty 

plea, which Gainey entered knowingly and voluntarily. 
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Turning to Gainey’s sentence, we review a sentence for 

procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential 

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). We must first ensure that the district court did 

not commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing 

to properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing 

to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, 

or failing to adequately explain the sentence. Id. If we find 

the sentence procedurally reasonable, we then consider its 

substantive reasonableness. Id. at 328. We presume on appeal 

that a sentence within or below the properly calculated 

Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v. 

Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). Such a presumption 

is rebutted only when the defendant shows “that the sentence is 

unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” 

United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 

2006). 

Upon review, we discern no procedural or substantive 

sentencing error by the district court. The district court 

correctly calculated Gainey’s advisory Guidelines range, heard 

argument from counsel, provided Gainey an opportunity to 

allocute, and considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. We 

have reviewed the record and conclude that Gainey’s below-
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Guidelines sentence is both procedurally and substantively 

reasonable.

Gainey filed a pro se supplemental brief asserting that the 

district court erred in adjudging him permanently ineligible to 

receive federal benefits. However, the district court made no 

such ruling. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this 

case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. This 

court requires that counsel inform Gainey, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Gainey requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Gainey.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED