O ra l ar g u m e n t wa s h e a rd in this c a se in C o o k e v ill e , P u tn a m C o u n ty, T e n n e sse e , as p a rt o f t h is C o u rt’s 1 S .C .A .L .E .S . ( S upr eme C o u rt A d vanci ng L e g a l E d ucat i o n f o r S tud e n ts) p ro je c t. 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE May 28, 2008 S ession He ard at Cookevill e 1 

### STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RA ND Y L EE M EEKS ET AL 

### . App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Circuit Courtfor Coff

ee C ounty No. 34,241 Jer ry Scott , Senior Jud ge and L. Craig John son, Ju dge

No. M2006- 01385-SC-R11- CO - F iled Septem ber 2, 2008
This appea l involves the warr antl es s sear ch of a motel room containingan ac tively operating methamphetamine la

boratory . After

the occ upants of the r oo m we re i n d icted for manufa cturing methamphetamineand for possessing me thamphetamine a nd drugpara

pherna lia, they

filed a motion in t he Cir c uit Court fo r C of fe e County

se e kin gto s up pr e ss t

he e vid e nc e fo un d in

themot e l r oo m. The trial c ourt grante d the motion to suppress and dismiss ed the indictment. The State appea led, and the Co urt o f Crim in a l Ap p e a ls r e v e r s e d th e tria l c o urt’ s d e c is io n to s u p p r e s s th e e v id ence and vacated the order dismiss ing the indictment. State v. Me eks , No. M2006-01385-CCA-R3-CO, 2007 WL1987797 (Tenn. Crim. App. J uly 10, 2007). We gr anted the de fenda nts’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 a pp lic atio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l to a dd

re ss m or e fu lly

theprinc ipl e s a

pp lic a bleto w arr antl e ss sear ches of

actively operating methamphetamine laboratorie s when the State asser ts that the office rs wer e acting to a

vert a serious and immediate risk of injury to the mselves or other s. L ike the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls, we have de te rm ine d th at th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y gra nti ng the mot ion

to s up pr e ss and by dis mis sin gtheind ic tme nt. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e ntof t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Aff irm ed W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , and G AR Y R. W ADE , J J ., joined. Robert T. Carte r and Eric J . Bur ch, T u l l ah o m a, Te nnessee , for the a ppellants, Randy

Meeks a nd Ernest L . Snyder, Jr. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; Mar k A. Fulks, Senior Counsel; C. Michael L ay ne, District Attorney

Gene ral; and F elec ia Walkup, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee .-2- OP IN ION I. At approximately

11:45 p.m. on March 6, 2005, one of the oc cupants o f R o o m 1 0 9 of the Park Mo te l in Manc he ste r, Te nn e sse e te le ph on e d th e Ma nc he ste r P oli ce Depa

rtme nt t o r e po rt

a str ang e od or

in h e r m ote l r oo m. Wh e n O ff ic e r S c ott Pe te rs on re tur ne d th e c a ll, thec a lle r t old him that the odor appea

red to be coming from an adjoining room and that the odor was causingher a nd he r m oth e r t o h ave burn inge ye s and he a da c he s. The c aller al s o as k edOffic er Pete rson “[w]hat does a meth lab smell like? What does makingmethamphetamine sme ll like? ” Of fice r Peterson infor

med her that an ac tivel y

operating methamphetamine la

boratory has a distinct odor that i s difficult t o describe. Afte r talkingwith the caller for a pproxi mately

five minutes, Off

icer Peterson dec ided to follow up o n the ca ll. Even though the Manche ster Police Department ha d rec eived other simil ar c al l s t hat ultimately did not involve a methamphe tamine laboratory , Offic er Pete rson was a war e that other

methamphetamine laboratories had be en found at the Park Motel. Offic er Pete rson met with the ca ller in Room 109 of the Park Motel

. Up on entering the room, he discove red that the odor, par ticularly in the bathroom are a, wa s instantly rec ognizable and unm i s t ak able. The odor indicate d that the occ upants of Room 110 weremanufa cturing me tha mph e tamin e . O ff

ic e r P e te rs on

a lso no te d th at th e c a lle r a nd her e ld erl y

mot he r w e resti ll c omp la ini ngof

burn inge ye s and

he a da c he s –

sy mpt oms c on sis te nt w iththee ff e cts of thetoxic fumes produc ed whe n methamphetamine is be ing ma nufac tured. Offic er Stuart C al dwe l l arrived at the Park Motel shortly afte r Off icer Peterson. Of

fice r Caldwell is cer

tified as an e x pert re g ardingthe produc tion of methamphetamine. H e has e x amined more than two hundr ed labor atories makingmethamphetamine, a nd he has been involved in more than one hundr ed and f

ifty methamphetamine pr osecutions. Simply by standing in f ront of the door to Room 110, Officer

Caldwell “c ould smell what [he] knew to be a meth lab.” Offic ers Peter son and Caldwell dec ided to knock on the door of Room 110 to speak with the occupa nt or occ upants of the room. The office rs rec eived no response to the ir knocks, but with ever y knock, the odor

intensified bec ause the door wa s quite flimsy . In fac t, the odor wa s so strong that Of fi c e r P e te rs on

wa s f or c e d to sta

nd be sid e , r athe r t

ha n dir e c tly in fr ont of, the do or in o rd e r t o avo id the fumes. Whil e Offic ers Peterson and Caldwell wer e knocking on the door, they wer e joined by Corporal Ronny

Gra y who also immediately

noticed the e x t re m el y strongodors of the ong oing manu fa c tur e of

me thamph eta mine . T he oc c up ants of Roo m 11 0 d id n ot r e sp on d to theof fi c e rs ’ knocking , but the office rs hea rd someone’ s voice inside the r oom and also he ar d the sound of br e akin gg la ss. The off icer s then discussed their nex t course of action in light of the intensity of the odors eman at i n g from Room 110. Offic er Pete rson under stood that methamphetamine manuf acturing-3-

cre ated da ng erous f umes and a risk of explosion. Officer Stuart was aw are that the “pr esenc e of the c he mic a ls the reareda

ng e ro us in t

he mse lve s, but whe n you st art mi xingtho se c he mic a ls, it s tart s pr od uc ingph os ph ineg a s, hydr oc hlo ri c g a s, se ver a l g a se s th at in jus t on e pa

rt pe r m ill ion

c an k ill you .” He a lso fe a

re d the po ssibil ity of fata lit ie s bec a us e the oc c up ants of Roo m 110 an d pe rs on s in the vicinity

of the room risked inhaling the tox ic fumes, explos ion, a nd fire. Corporal Gra

y agree d that the situation posed a “thr eat.” Collectively , the offic ers a gree d that they should e nter Room 110 beca use of the dang ers pose d by manufa cturingmethamphetamine. T he off icer s made this decision a pp ro ximate ly

fi ve to t e n mi nute s a ft e r O ff ic e r P e te rs on

fi rs t arrive d at th e Park

Mo te l. Corporal Gr ay

obtained a ke y

to R o o m 1 10 from the motel mana g er. When the of fice rs unlocked the door , it sti ll would not open completely beca use of a chain lock on the interior of the door. Howeve r, a larg e cloud of fumes esca ped from the room through the par tially opened door

. The off icer s identified the fume s as a chemica l c loud a nd conclude d that the conditions in the room wer e extremely

hazardous. Of

fice r Peterson indicated that the air inside the room was not something th at h e “r ea l ly

want[ed] to be breathing ” and that it posed a dang er to other s near by . Offic er Caldwell noted that the c hemicals we re c apable of cr eating a fire. The off icer s continued to identify the mse lve s in lou d voic e s and to de mand that the oc c up ants of the ro om co me to t he do or . D e sp ite th e s e c o mm an d s , th e o c c u p ant s o f th e r o o ms t i l l d i d

n o tc o mp l y. Af te r re c e ivi ng no re sp on se , the of fi c e rs kic ke d in t

he do or to R oo m 11 0. A h ot p late wi th a g lowing r ed hea

ting e lement and bottles of pe roxi de and other unidentified liquids wer e nea r the door. Two men w ere in the room. Erne st S n y d er s t o od in the bathroom with one of his ha nds be hin d h is b a c k. Rand

y Me e ks wa s ly

ingun c on sc iou s o n th e be d. Whe n Mr . Snyde r r e fu se d to comply with their commands to put his hands up, the of fi ce rs re m o v ed him from the r oom. The i nt en s i ty o f th e f um es i nth e r o o mp re v en t edth e o ff i ce rs fr o mre -e nt er i n g. B e fo re re mov ing Mr . Mee ks fr om the ro om, Of fi c e r C a ldw e ll a

nd Cor po ra l Gra y do nn e d a ir suits they had obtained from the fire department. When they re- enter ed the r oom, Mr. Meeks wa s still lying unc onscious on the bed. The offic ers dr ag g ed him from the r oom, and par amedics w ere able to resusc itate hi m. Mr. M eeks remained inc ohere nt at the sce ne and w as in intensive ca re f or an extended period of time. Mr. Snyder also require d hospitaliz ation. Approxim ately ten minutes e la ps e d b e tw e e n th e of

fi c e rs ’ f ir st e ntr y int o Ro om 1 10 and

the ir re mov a l of

Mr . M e e ks

. After Messrs. Mee ks and Snyder w ereremove d from the r oom, the officers called a hazardo u s materia ls team to the motel and plac ed an e x haust fan in Room 110. The pe rsons who had been in the r ooms adjace nt to Room110, including the person who pla ced the orig inal telephone call to the police and her elderly mother, we re r elocated to other motels in Manche ster. L ater , when he wa s cross-e x amined re g ardingthe decision not to evac uate the motel be fore entering Room 110, Of fi c e r Ca ldw e ll c on c e de d that fa ili ng to re mov e theoth e r m ote l oc c up ants wa s “ po or jud gme nt” and that “[w]e should have done that first.” Usingthe info rm at ion obtained from their war rantless e ntry

of Room 110, the office rs secur ed a se arc h war

rant. When the authorities sear ched Room 110, they found methamphe tamineS ta te v . C a stile , No

. M 2 0 0 4

- 0 2 5 7 2

- C C A

- R 3

- C D, 2 0 0 6 W L 1 8 1 6 3 7 1 ( Te n n . C r i m . A p p . J u n e 2 8 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( No 2 T enn. R

. A p p . P

. 11 ap p l i cat i o n f i l ed ). -4- on the dre sser, a s well as evide nce of a methamphe t am i n e labor atory , including a n HCLg as g ener ator, plastic tubing , aluminum foil, a bottle of iodine cry stals, a bot tle containingmuriatic ac id, a Mason jar

containingsepar ati n g l i quids, a plastic containe r of ephedrine , a g allon jug of iodine, and dis po sa blepla sti c g lov e s. In April 2005, a Coffe e County grand jury

ind i ct ed M es s rs. M eeks a nd Snyder f

or manufa cturing

methamphe t am i n e, p o s s es s i n g m eth amp hetamine, a nd possessing dr

ug para phernalia. In Jul y 20 05, M e ssr s. Me e ks and Snyde r f ile d a mot ion in t he Cir c uit

Court fo r C of fe e County seekingto suppress the evide nce se ized in R oom 110 on the ground that the warra ntless entry

was not justi fied by

exigent cir cumstance s. Followingan Oc tober 10, 2005 he aring, t h e t ri al court enter ed an order on N ovember 9, 2005, grantingthe motion to suppress. Placing great significa nce o n t h e fa ct that the offic ers ha d not evac uated the oc cupants of the adjoining r ooms before they enter ed Room 110, the trial cour t concluded that the State had fa iled to demonstrate the e x istence of the sort of e x ige nt circumstanc es that would justify a wa rra ntless searc h. The State sought reviewof the trial c ourt’s November 9, 2005 orde r by the Court of Criminal Appea ls. On J uly 10, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appe als filed an opinion re versingthe trial cour t’s suppression orde r and va catingthe orde r dismissing the indictment. Sta t e v. Meeks , No. M2006- 01 38 5- CCA -R 3- CO , 2 00 7 WL 19 87 79 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. July 10 , 2 00 7)

. Re lying on on e of its unrepor ted opinions, the Court of Criminal A p p ea l s held that the wa rra ntless entry

and sea rch of 2 Room 110 was proper

beca use the a ctions of Messrs. Mee k s and S nyder “ did indeed pre sent an immediate threat to public safety .” State v. Me eks , 2 00 7 WL 19 87 79 7, at *8 . T he c ourt a lso he ld that the “pr obable c ause to sea rch w as pre sent and a ccompa nied by exigent cir cu m s t an ces – the dang ers a ssociated with the active pr oduction of methamphe tamine in a hotel room.” State v. Me eks , 2007 WL1987797, at *8. Me ssr s. Me e ks and

Snyde r f ile d a Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a

pp lic atio n f

or pe rm iss ion to a

pp e a l. They asser t (1) that the Court of Criminal Appe als violated their du e p ro ce s s rights by invoking T e nn . R

. Ap p . P

. 4 ( a ) t o p e r m i t th e S t at e t o f

i l e a n o t i c e o f a

p p e a l a f t e r th e e x p i r at i o n o f

th e th i rtyday deadline a

nd (2) that t h e Court of Criminal Appea ls erre d by reve rsingthe trial cour t’s N o v e mb e r

9 , 2 0 0 5 o r d e r

gr anti n gth e ir

mo ti o nto s u

ppress the ev id e n c e f

o un d in Ro o m 1 1 0

. We gran t ed M es s rs. Mee ks and Snyder pe rmission to appeal to addre ss more fully the principles applicable to warr antless sea rche s of ac tively

operating methamphetamine labor atories when the State a sse rt s th at the of

fi c e rs we rea c tin gto a

ve rt a se ri ou s a

nd imm e diate ri sk

of inj ur y to themselves or othe rs. II. Messrs. Mee ks and Snyder a ssert that the Court of C riminal Appea ls erre d by permitting the State to pursue its appea l from the trial c ourt’s Nove mber 9, 2005 suppre ssio n o rd er. The y argueT h i s r epr es en t at i on by t h e as s i s t an t di st ri ct a t t or n ey g en er al w h o pr epa r ed t h e T en n . R. App. P. 9 mot i on 3 cont r adi ct s t he as s er t i on i n t he St at e’ s b r i ef f i l ed i n t hi s C our t t hat i t was not unt i l m uch l at er t hat t he di s t r i ct at t orn ey d et erm i ned t hat t he supp res si o n of t he evi d ence wo ul d be f at al t o t he case agai nst M ess rs . M eeks and S ny d er. A t t hi s s t age of t he procee di ng , t he r es po ns i bi l i t y f or pur s ui ng t he appeal s hi f t ed f r om t he O f

f i ce of t he D i s t r i ct 4 A t t o rney G eneral t o t he O f f i ce o f t he A t t o rney G eneral and R ep o rt er. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 8

- 6

- 1 0 9 (b)(2) (Sup p . 20 0 7 ).

-5- that th e a pp e a l is no t ti me ly

a nd that the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls’ de c isi on to pe rm it the State to purs ue the a

pp e a l “ in the int e re st of jus tic e ” vio late s the ir du e pr oc e ss ri ghts

. Th e State , arguin gin thea lte rn ativ e , in sis ts that it s a pp e a l w a s ti me ly

but, i f i t w a s n ot, tha

t th e Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls properly invoked Tenn. R. App. P. 4 (a ) t o al l o w the appe al to proce ed. We have deter mined that invoking the r elief pr o v i s i ons in Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) w as unnec essar y beca use the State filed a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l. A. On July 11, 2005, Messrs. Mee ks and Snyder f iled a joint motion t o suppress the e vidence seized in Room 110. Following a he aringon October 10, 2005, the trial court e ntere d an orde r on November

9, 2005, grantingthe motion to suppress. The orde r did not purport to dismiss the pendingindictments ag ainst Messrs. Mee ks and Snyder. On No ve mbe r 1 7, 20 05 , th e State fi le d a mot ion in t he tr ia l c ourt

se e kin gpermi ss ion to pursue an interlocutory appea l unde r Tenn. R. A pp. P. 9. The State asser ted in this moti o nt hat pursuingan interloc uto r

y a p p e a l w a s “nec essar

y to preve nt the State from suff eringirrepa

rable injury in that th e State wo uld

be un a bleto s uc c e ssf

ull y ma int a in p ro se c uti on

of thede fe nd ants un le ss t

his motion is grante d.” On Marc h 2, 2006, the trial court enter ed an order grantingthe State per mission 3 to pur sue an interlocutory appea l. The court found expli citly in this order that “the suppression of thee vid e nc e g athe re d in

thi s c a se fr om ro om 11 0 of thePark Pla c e Mo te l c ou ld p re se nt i rr e pa ra ble harm to the State’s c ase in c hief a nd is disposi tive to the case .” For some rea son not appare nt in this rec ord, the Stat e d i d n ot file an a pplication for permission to appea l with the Court of Criminal Appea ls by the deadline in Tenn. R. App. P. 9(c). 4 Howeve r, on Ma rc h 1 4 , 2 006, the day followingthe dea dline for f iling the a

pplication for a

n int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l, t he State , thr ou gh an a ssi sta nt dis tr ic t atto rn e y

g e ne ra l, a sk e d th e tr ia l c ourt to place the ca se on its M ar ch 17, 2006 docket, a ppare ntly for the pur

poses of withdra

wingthe application for

an interloc utory

appea l and dismissi ngthe indictments ag ainst Messrs. Mee ks and Snyde r. On

May 19 , 2 00 6, thetr ia l c ourt fi le d an a gre e d o rd e r d ism iss ingthec a se s a g a ins t Me ssr s. Meeks a nd Snyder “without prejudice .” In this orde r, the trial court reiter ated its e arlier findingthat “the suppre ssion of the evidenc e g ather ed in this case from Room 110 of the Park Place Motel does prese nt irrepa

rable harm to the State’s c ase in c hief a nd is disposi tive of the c ase.” The a s s i s t ant district attorney g ener al there afte r filed a notice of a

ppeal on June 16, 2006. Despite the f

act that the pa

rties had a gree d to the dismiss al of the State’ s interlocutory appea l pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9, this notice states that the State is s eekingan appe al pursuant to Te nn.Code of T en n es s ee §§ 5244 t o 5250 ( Ret u r n J

. M ei g s & W i l l i am F. Cooper e ds

. , E. G

. Eas t man & Co. 1858) 5 (l at er cod i f

i ed at T enn. C o d e A nn. §§ 40

- 3 4 0 1 t o - 3 4 0 4 , 40

- 3 4 0 9 t o - 3 4 1 0 (19 7 5 ) ( repe al ed 19 8 1 ))

. T enn es s ee’ s cour t s l at er he l d t hat t he St at e c oul d ob t ai n l i mi t ed r evi ew of an i nt er l ocut ory s uppres s i on order 6 usi ng a pe t i t i o n f

o r wr i t of co m m o n- l aw cert i o rari i n cases where t he supp res si o n o rder had t he ef f ect of co m p l et el y and e ff e c tive ly en d ing the p ro se c u tio n . St at e v. J ohns on , 5 6 9 S .W .2 d 8 0 8 , 8 1 4 -1 5 (T e n n . 1 9 7 8 ); St at e v. G ant , 537 S. W

. 2d 7 1 1 , 7 1 2 -1 4 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 1 9 7 5 ). -6- R

. Ap p . P

. 9 , r ath e r

th anT e nn . R

. Ap p . P

. 3

. T h e d e f e n d ant s d e t e c t e d

th i s p r o c e d

ur a l an o m a l y. Th e y argue d to the Court of Cr imi na l Ap pe a ls that the State ’s a pp e a l w a s unti me ly

and imp ro pe rl y filed under

Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The Of fice of the Attorney Gene ral and Reporter treated the ca se as a routine Te nn. R. App. P. 3 appea l and did not bother to addre ss the argument that the appe al was improperly

filed under

Tenn R. App. P. 9. In its opini on filed on J uly 10, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals conc luded that the trial court’s N ovember 9, 2005 suppression order “had the substantive eff ect of dismiss ing the indictment a g a ins t the De fe nd ants ” and , the re fo re , that it wa s imme diate ly a pp e a la ble un de r Te nn . R. App . P. 3(c) (1). State v. Me eks , 2 007 WL 19 87 79 7, at *4 . T he c ourt a lso he ld t

hat e ve n th ou gh th e State should have filed its notice of appea l within thi rt y d ay s af t er the entry

of the Nove mber 9, 2005 order , it would waive this proce dural de ficienc y “in the intere sts of justice” in ac corda nce w ith Tenn. R. App. P

. 4(a) and consider the subst ance of the S tate’s a ppeal. State v. Me eks , 2007 WL1987797, at *4. B. Under the common law, as unde rstood and applied in the United States, neither a state nor theUn ite d St ate s h a d a

ri ght t o a

pp e a l in a c ri min a l pr os ecut io n, un less theri ght i s e xpre ssl y confe rre d by

a constitu t i o n al p rovision or by statute. Arizona v. Manype nny , 451 U.S. 232, 246 (1 98 1) ; United States v. Sange s , 14 4 U. S. 31 0, 31 2 ( 18 92 ); State v. Re ynolds , 5 Tenn. (4 Hay

w.) 110, 110 (1817). A g ener al grant of a ppellate jurisdiction does not satisfy this requireme nt. United States v. Sanges , 1 44 U. S. at 32 2- 23 ; S ta tev. Re ynolds , 5 T e nn . ( 4 H ay

w. ) at 11 0- 11 . Wh e n a

statut e a ff or ds a state or theUn ite d St ates th e ri ght t o a n a pp e a l in a c ri min a l pr oc e e din g , th e statut e wi ll b e s tric tl y c o n s tr

u e d to a p p ly o n ly to th e c ir c ums ta n c e s d e f in e d in the statute. Carroll

v. United States , 3 54 U. S. 3 94 , 4 00 (1 95 7) ; State v. Adler , 92 S.W .3d 397, 400 (Tenn. 2002)

. Th e fi rs t T e nn e sse e statut e s g ivi ngthe State a ri ght to ap pe a l in c ri min a l c a se s a

pp e are d in 1858. These statutes provided the state with a broad right to appea l from final orde rs, subject to the 5 do ub le je op ard

y pr ote c tio ns in Art ic le I , Se c tio n 10 of the Con sti tut ion of Te nn e sse e and theF if th Amendment to the United States Constituti on. However , this Court, construing these statutes narr owl y , concluded that they did not confer

on the state the right to appe al from pr eliminary or interlocutory

order s in criminal case s. Sta tev . B on ha rt , 223 Tenn. 582, 590-91, 448 S.W.2d 669, 672-73 (1969)

. 6In 1 9 8 1 , t h e T e n n e sse e G e n e ra l A sse m b ly ex p re ssly re p e a le d the sta tute s p e rta inin g to the S ta te ’s r ig h t t o 7
a p p e a l i n c rim ina l ca se s. A c t o f Ju n e 3 , 1 9 8 1 , ch . 4 4 9 , § 1 (1 3 ), 1 9 8 1 T e n n . P u b . A c ts 6 6 7 , 6 6 9

.

T h e g r ou n ds f

or s ee k i n g a n e x t r aor di n ar y a ppea l u n der T en n . R. App. P. 10 a r e s i m i l ar t o th e g r ou n ds f or 8
se e k ing a c o m m o n -law w rit o f ce rtio ra ri. St at e v. Wi l l oughby , 5 9 4 S .W .2 d 3 8 8 , 3 9 2 (T e n n . 1 9 8 0 ).

7 W a yn e R

. L a F a v e , e t al., C r i m i na lP r ocedu r e § 2 7

. 3 (c), at 39

- 4 2 (3d ed

. 20 0 7 ) ( “ C ri m i n a lP ro ce d u re ” ). 9 -7- Tenne ssee’ s statutes g overningthe State’s right to appeal in c riminal case s wer e repla ced by the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Procedur e, which beca me eff ective on J uly 1, 1979. With reg ard 7 to the State’s appe al as of right, Te nn. R. App. P. 3(c) provide d:

In c ri min a l a c tio ns an a

pp e a l a s of ri ght by the state lie s o nly from an order or

judgme nt entere d by

a trial c ourt fro m which an appea l lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appea ls: (1) thesu bs tanti ve e ff

e c t of wh ic h r e su lts in d ism iss ingan in dic tme nt, information, or c omplaint; (2) setting a side a ve rdi ct o f guilty and entering a judgme nt of acquittal; (3) arr estingjudgme nt; (4) granting or re fusingto revoke probation; or (5) rema nding a child to the juv e nil e c ourt
. In 1980, Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) was amended to state e x plicitly that the S tate was also entitled to an appea l as of right from final judgments in habea s corpus, e x traditi o n , and post-convic tion pr oc e e din g s. With re g ard to the State ’s ri ght to an a pp e a l fr om an int e rl oc uto ry or de r in c ri mi nal cas e s, Tenn. R. App. P. 9(g ) explicitl y states that both the S tate and the accused have a right to pursue an appea l from an interlo cu t o ry o rd er under Te nn. R. App. P. 9. S imilarly , Tenn. R. App. P. 10(e) e xplic itl y pe rm its bo th t

he State and

thea c c us e d to purs ue an e xtra or din ary a pp e a l un de r T e nn . R. App. P. 10. 8 Un like oth e r s tate s, Te nn e sse e do e s n ot h ave a statut e or

ru le that sp e c if

ic a lly a pp lie s to order s suppressingor excluding e vidence

. Thus, the cour ts and the litiga

nts have been left to work 9 through the application of the Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) , 9, and 10 to o rd er s gra n t ing a n acc used’s mot ion to s up pr e ss o r e xclu de e vid e nc e . T he re su lts have pr od uc e d p ro c e dura l c on fu sio n b e c a us e of the diff eringimpacts that a suppre ssion order c an have

. An orde r suppressing or excluding evidence is not a final order or judgment beca

use it does not formally

terminate the prosec ution. Whil e such an order may have the same pra ctical e ffe ct as an orde r of dism issal, an order suppressing or excluding evidence le aves the State with the option of proc eedingwith the prosec ution with it s remainingevidenc e or of dis missingthe indictment under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 48. Under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) (1), the State ha s an appe al as of right only when the “substantive eff

ect” of the order suppressing or excluding the evidenc e “r esults in dism issing an indictment, information, or complaint.”See , e. g. , St at e v. Sai ne , N o . M 2 0 0 7

- 0 1 2 7 7

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 20 0 8 W L 9 1 8 5 1 1 , at * 5

- 6 (T enn. C ri m . A p p . A p r. 10 4 , 2 0 0 8 ); St at e v. Copel and , N o. 03C 01- 9402- CR

- 00079, 1996 W L 368209, at * 3 (T en n . C r i m. A pp. Ju n e 28, 1996) (N o T enn. R

. A p p . P

. 11 ap p l i cat i o n f i l ed ).
S ee a lso The A m er i can H er i t ag e Co l l ege D i ct i on ary 11 64 (3d ed. 200 0) ( r es ul t means “ [ t ] o com e a bo ut as 11
a co nsequenc e” o r “ t o end i n a pa rt i cul ar way ”). -8- Interpre ting Te nn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) , the Court of Criminal Appeals re quires only that the suppression orde r have the “substantive effect of dismissing the indictment.” Thus, the Court of 10 Criminal Appeals holds that Tenn. R. App. P

. 3(c) (1) doe s not require an orde r dismissing the indictment, information, or complaint as a prer equisite to an appe al by the State. See , e.g. , State v. Holladay , No. E2004-02858- CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 304685, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2006) (N o T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a

pp lic atio n f

ile d) ; State v. Copeland, N o . 0 3 C0 1

- 9 4 0 2

- CR

- 0 0 0 7 9 , 1 9 9 6 WL 36 82 09 , at *3 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. June 28 , 1 99 6) (N o T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 11 ap pli c atio n f ile d) ; Sta te v. Udzinski , No. 01C01-9212-CC-00380, 1993 WL473308, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 1993) (No Te nn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). The Court of Criminal Appea ls’ interpret at i o n o f Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) misapprehe nds the plain languag e of the rule beca use it overlooks the wor d “re sults.” The State may appea l as of right from an order suppressing or ex cluding evidenc e only when the substantive effe ct of that orde r “re sults” in the dismi ssal of the indictment, information, or complaint. When used as a v erb , the wo rd “ re su lt” me ans “ [t]o ar ise a s a c on se qu e nc e , e ff e c t, o r c on c lus ion

fr om s omea c tio n, pr oc e ss, etc.” or “to e nd or conc lude in a spec ified manne r.” 13 Oxford English Dictionary 7 6 1 ( 2 d ed. 1989). Thus, to trigg er Te nn. R. App. P. 3(c) (1), the order suppressing or ex cludingthe evidenc e

11 must produce the e ntry

of an or der dismissing a

n indictment, information, or complaint. Even though the entry of a final order dismiss ing the indictment, information, or complaint is require d for a

n appea l as of right unde r Tenn. R. A pp. P. 3( c)( 1), it doe s not ne cessa rily follow that the State cannot appea l from an order suppressingor excluding e vidence when a n order of dismissal has not been e ntere d. In the abse nce of an orde r of dismissal, the State may still seek interlocutory appellate revie w of a trial court’s order suppressing or excluding evidenc e using either Tenn. R. App. P. 9 or Tenn. R. App. P. 10. These sorts of appea ls f rom pre- trial ruling s in criminal ca ses ar e not favor ed. State v. Scarborough , 2 01 S.W. 3d 60 7, 61 2 n .2 (T e nn . 2 00 6) ; State v. Gilley , 173 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2005). They addre ss the mselves to the courts’ discr etion, and thus, it is incumbent on the par ty seekingthe appe al – in thi s ca s e t h e S t ate – to satisfy the cour t or courts that ther e ar e appropriate grounds for a n interlocutory

appea l. No tw ith sta

nd ingthea

pp e llate c ourt s’ dis inc lin atio n to gr ant ap pe a ls und e r Te nn . R. App . P. 9 a nd Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 10, the State sh ou ld be a ble to ca rr y its burd e n of pe rs ua sio n in c a se s o f t his sort with little difficulty

. When a n order suppresses or

excludes evidenc e and the reby eliminates the he art of theState ’s c a se , re qu ir ing the State to pr oc e e d to tr ia l w ith out th e su pp re sse d e vid e nc e c ou ld result in irrepa

rable injury

to the public’s intere st if the acc used is a cquitted. In that circ umstance, theState c ou ld n ot o bta in m e anin g fu l a pp e llate re vie w of the su

pp re ssi on or de r b e c a

us e theDo ub leU

. S. Cons t
. a men d. V ; T en n . Cons t
. a r t
. I , § 10. 12

In te rlo c u to ry a p p e a ls m a y b e gr a n te d un d e r T e n n . R . A p p . P . 9 (a )( 1 ) o r (3 ) to “ p r e v e n t i rr e p a ra b le inj u ry, 13 gi vi ng consi dera t i on t o t he s eve r i t y of t he po t ent i al i nj ur y , t he probabi l i t y of i t s occu r r enc e, an d t he probabi l i t y t hat re v ie w up o n e n try o f fina l ju d g m e n t will b e ine ff e c tive ” a n d to a d d re ss q u e stio n s tha t “w ill no t o the rw ise b e re v ie w a b le u p o n e n try o f f

ina l ju d g m e n t.”
E x tra o rd ina ry ap p e a ls u n d e r T e n n . R

. A p p . P

. 1 0 (a ) ar e p e rm itt e d w h e n e v e r t h e y a re “n e c e ssa ry fo r c o m p le te 14 de t e r mi n a t i on of

t h e a c t i on on a pp e a l a s ot h e r w i s e pr ov i de d i n t h e s e r u l e s . ” I f a t r i a l c ou r t de c l i n e s t o g r a n t a T e n n . R. App. P. 9 i n t er l ocu t or y a ppea l f ol l owi n g t h e en t r y of

a s u ppr es s i on orde r t h at e l i mi n at es a n y r ea s on abl e pr obabi l i t y of a su c c e ssfu l p ro se c u tio n , t h e C o u rt o f C rim ina l A p p e a ls m a y gr a n t an e x tra o rd ina ry a p p e a l i f i t d e te rm ine s tha t t h e S ta te wo ul d not o t herwi se have a mea ni ngf ul op p o rt uni t y t o ob t ai n ap p el l at e revi ew o f t he supp res si o n ord er. -9- J eopardy Clauses of the f

eder al and s t at e constitutions would preve nt the State from try ing the 12 acc used a se cond time. Thus, a suppre ssion order that e l i m i n at es an y rea sonable proba

bility of a succe ssful prosec ution provides a basis for a n interlocutory

appea l under Te nn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1) , (3) or an e x traordina

ry appea l under Te nn. R. App. P. 10(a). 13 14 A sec ond justification for grantingTenn. R. App. P

. 9 or Tenn. R. App. P . 10 appea ls from suppression orde rs arises from the f act that the leg al principles r elatingto searc hes and se izures and interrog ations fluctuate a nd are h eavily

fac t-depe ndent. Givingthe par ties an opportunity

for imm e diate a

pp e lla te re vie w of su

pp re ssi on or de rs no t on ly a ff or ds the m wi th a chan ce t o obta in revie w of que stionable ruling s, b ut it also decre ases the r epetition of similar err ors by law enfor ceme nt officials be fore the cha lleng ed conduc t can be revie wed by the c o u rt s p u rs uant to an appea l as of right. Criminal Procedure § 27.3(c) , at 39-40. C. The e ntry of the trial c ourt’s suppre ssion order on November 9, 2005 was not ac companied by an o rd e r d ism iss ingtheind ic tme nt a g a ins t Messrs

. Meeks and Snyde r. Ac c or din g ly , th e State was not entitled to an appea l a s of right under Te nn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) at that time. It was, howe ver, e nti tle d to purs ue a

dis c re tio na

ry a pp e a l un de r T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 9 . T his is p re c ise ly wh at th e State did. Howeve r, afte r the State obtained the trial court’s permission to r equest the Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls t o h e ar the int e rl oc uto ry a pp e a l, it did not fi le there qu ir e d a pp lic atio n w iththeint e rm e diate a pp e llate c ourt

in t he mann e r r e qu ir e d b y

Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 9 (c ). Ins tea d, th e State a pp are ntl y a ba nd on e d th e int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l and decide d to re qu e st d ism iss a l of theind ic tme nts a g a ins t Messrs. Mee ks and S nyder and then t o pursue an appea l as of right under Te nn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)

. Whil e the wisdom or ne ce s s i t y o f the State’s tac tics might re asonably be questioned, the State’s dec ision to abandon the interlocutor y appea l in favor of

an appe al as of right do es not undermine the Sta te’s right to pursue an a ppeal f ollowing the e ntry

of the May

19, 2006 order dismiss ing the indictments. The Tenne ssee Ru les of Appe llate Proce dure do not c ontain an “e lection of re medies” provision that cause s an appellant to foreg o all other a ppellate r emedies onc e it decide s to p ur su e on e pa

rt ic ula r ap pe llate re me dy . N or

do theTe nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e durestate that persons who r equest a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory ap p ea l o n a particula r issue ar e not-10-

entitled to r aise that same issue on an appea l a s of right if they fail to follow through on the Tenn. R. A pp . P. 9 inte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l. After the State dec ided ag ainst pursuingthe interlocutory appea l from the November 9, 2005 suppression orde r, it reque sted the trial court to dismiss the indictments a g ainst Messrs. Mee ks and Snyder, a ppare ntly beca use the District Att orney Gene ral had conclude d that the s uppression of the e v i d e n c e f

o un d i nR o o m1 1 0 e l i m i n at e d any r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i ty o f a s u c c e s s f u l p r o s e c ut i o n . In its May 19, 2006 order

dismiss i n g t h e indictments, the trial court spec ifically found that “the su pp re ssi on of thee vid e nc e . . . d oe s p res ent irrepa rab le ha rm to t he State ’s c a se in c hie f. ” Th is order is a final orde r, and, by

its own terms, it resulted from the e ntry of the Nove mber 9, 2005 suppression orde r. Ac cording ly , followingthe entry of that orde r, the State was entitled to an appe al as of right unde r Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c )(1)

. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) require s that a noti ce of appea l must be filed within thirty day s after thedate of

thee ntr y of the jud gme nt a

pp e a le d fr om. Th e State fi le d it s n oti c e of a pp e a l in thi s c a se on J une 16, 2006. This notice of appea l w as timely beca use it was filed within thirty day s after

the entry of the May

19, 2006 order dismiss ing the case ag ainst Messrs. Meeks and S nyder. I n light of the fa ct that the State’s notice o f appe al was timely filed, this case did not require the Court of Criminal Appeals to e x erc ise its discr etion under Tenn. R. A pp. P. 4(a) to excuse the State f rom the timely filing of a notice of appea l. There fore , the arguments by Messrs. Mee ks and Snyder r eg arding the proprie ty

of the Court of Criminal Appea ls’ invocation of it s power under Tenn. R

. App. P . 4(a) to e xcu se theState fr om f ili nga tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l arewi tho ut m e ri t. III . Messrs. Mee ks and Snyder also asser t that the Court of Criminal Appeals er red by reve rsing the trial cour

t’s November

9, 2005 suppression orde r. While they conce de that the law enf

orce ment of fi c e rs ha d p ro ba

blec a us e on thee ve nin gof

Marc h 6 , 2 00 5 to e nte r R oo m 11 0 at th e Park Mo te l, they insist that the office rs wer e not c onfronted with e x ige nt c ircumstance s sufficie nt to ju stify e nte ri ngthero om b e fo reob ta ini nga se arc h w arr ant. We d isa gre e . The c ir c ums tanc e s o f t his c a se provide a textbook example of the so rt of exige nt circumstanc es that re quire immediate a ction by law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs . A. In revie wing suppression ruling s, the assessment of witness cre dibility , the weight and value of evide nce, a

nd the re solution of evidentiary conflicts ar e entr

usted to the trial cour

t as a fa ct-finde r. State v. Scarborough , 2 01 S.W. 3d at 61 5. Whe n a tr ia l c ourt

make s f ind ing s o f f

a c t in thec ours e of ruling upon a mot ion to suppress, thos e findings are bi nding on appea l unless the evidence in the rec ord p re p o n d er ates a g ainst them. State v. Be rrios , 235 S.W .3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007) . A trial court’s conclusions of law a re r eviewe d de novo without any presumption of cor

rec tness. State v. Haye s , 18 8 S.W. 3d 50 5, 51 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) . T he qu e sti on of wh e the r c ir c ums tanc e s w e resu ff ic ie ntl y exigent to justify a warra

ntless searc h is a mix ed question of law and fa ct. See , e.g. , United StatesT e rry v . O h io , 39 2 U

. S. 1 (19 6 8 ). 15

P ro fes so r L a F a v e ha s c o u n se le d tha t “[t]h o u g h this ‘em e rg e n c y a id e x c e p tio n ’ i s o n e o f m a n y ‘co m m u n ity 16
ca r et a k i n g f

u n c t i o n s ’ o f t h e p o l i c e , i t m u s t b e a s s e s s e d s e p a r a t e l y a n d b y a d i s t i n c t t e s t , a s a l l s u c h f u n c t i o n s a r e n ot

‘ j udg e d by t h e s a me s t a n da r d; ’ mo r e ov e r , t h e y mu s t be di s t i n g u i s h e d f r om ‘ t h e e x i g e n t c i r c u ms t a n c e s e x c e pt i on . ’ ” 3 (c o n tinu e d ...) -11- v . A nd re ws , 442 F .3 d 9 96 , 1 00 0 ( 7th Cir . 2 00 6) ; Un ite d S

tates v . R usse ll , 436 F.3d 1086, 1089 n.2 (9 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Un ite d S tates v . D av is , 2 9 0 F

. 3 d 1 2 3 9 , 1 2 4 1 ( 1 0 th Ci r . 2 0 0 2 )

. Re view of mixed questions of law and fac t is de novo without any presumption of cor

rec tness. Va ug

hn v . S tate , 202 S.W. 3d 10 6, 11 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) ; Sta tev . R oge rs , 188 S.W .3d 593, 629 (Tenn. 2006)

. B. B oth theCon sti tut ion

of theUn ite d St ate s and

theCon sti tut ion

of Te nn e sse e pr ohib it unre a so nab le sear ches an d s e izur e s. U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . IV; Te nn . Co ns t. a rt . I , § 7. Thus , a s a g ener al matter, la

w enf orce men t officials c annot conduc t a sea rch w ithout having f

irst obtained a valid war rant. Calif

ornia v. Carney , 4 71 U. S. 3 86 , 390 (1 98 5) ; R. D. S. v . S tate , 245 S.W .3d 356, 365 (Tenn. 2008)

. Howeve r, bec ause the contours of the se constitutional protections ar e shaped by the conc ept of “ re asonable ness,” the c ourts have recognized ex ceptions to the g ener al re quirement of the issuance of

a wa rra nt prior to conductinga sea rch. Br igh am City

, U tah v . S tua rt , 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2 00 6) ; State v. Scarborough , 201 S.W .3d at 616-17. Among the commonly rec ognized ex ceptions to the require ment of a war rant are : (1) a sear ch incident to a n arr est, (2) the plain view doc trine, (3) a conse nt to the se arc h, (4) a Te rry sto p a nd frisk , a nd (5 ) t he e xiste nc e of

e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s. 15 Sta t e v. Berrios , 2 35 S.W. 3d at 10 4; State v. Cox , 171 S.W .3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005) . Where a war rantless sea

rch is c onducted, the g overnme nt be ars the burden of demonstratingthat the sea rch was conducte d pursuant to one of the e x ceptions to the wa rra nt require ment. Vale v. Louisiana , 399 U. S. 3 0, 34 (1 97 0) ; State v. Hay es , 188 S.W .3d 505, 511 (Tenn. 2006)

. This a ppeal focuse s on the exigent circ umstances justification f or a war rantless s ear ch. Ex ige nt circum s t an ce s arise where “the ne eds of law enfor ceme nt [ are ] so compelling that the war rantless searc h is objectively rea sonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stu ar t , 5 4 7 U

. S. at 4 0 3 ( qu o ti ng Mi n cey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)). G iven the imp or tanc e of the wa

rr ant re qu ir e me nt in sa fe gua rd ing a g a ins t unre a so na

ble se arc he s and

se izur e s, a c ir c ums tanc e wi ll b e su ff ic ie ntl y e xig e nt o nly

wh e retheState has sh own that th e se arc h is imperative. Coo lid

ge v . New H

am ps hire , 4 03 U. S. 4 43 , 4 54 -5 5 ( 19 71 ); State v. Hay es , 188 S.W .3d at 51 4; State v. Y

eargan , 958 S.W .2d 626, 641 (Tenn. 1997) (Reid, J ., concur ring ). Although not an exclusive list, the following a re f reque ntly -ar i s i n g s i tu ations that have be en found to be su ff ic ie ntl y e xig e nt t o r e nd e r a

wa rr antl e ss s e arc h o f a

do mic ile re a so na

ble : ( 1) ho t- purs uit , ( 2) to thw art e sc a pe , ( 3) to p re ve nt t

he imm ine nt d e str

uc tio n o f e vid e nc e , ( 4) in re sp on se to a n imme diate risk of serious harm to t h e p o l i ce office rs or other s, and (5) to rende r eme rg ency aid to an injured p e r s o no r t o p r o t e c ta

p e r s o nf r o mi mm i n e nti n

j ur y. Br igh am City

, Ut ah v . S tua rt , 547 U.S. at 403; 16(

. . . con t i n u ed) 16 W a yn e R . L a F a v e , Search and Seiz ure § 6

. 6 (a) n. 6 , a t 4 5 1 (4 t h e d

. 2 0 0 4 ). T he U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt , how ever, i n B rig h a m C i t

y, U t a h v. S t u a rt54 7 U

. S. at 40 2

- 0 3 , em b ed d ed t he em ergency ai d excep t i o n d e e p w ithi n t he exi gent c irc u m sta n c e e x c e p tio n to the w a rr a n t re q u ire m e n t. See , e. g. , U n i t ed St at es v . Sni pe , 51 5 F.3d 94 7 , 95 1

- 5 2 (9t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ); Uni t ed St at es v . Naj ar , 45 1 F.3d 71 0 , 71 8 (10 t h C i r. 20 0 6 ).

St at e v. I

nghr am , N o. M 2006- 00818- CC A- R3- CD , 2007 W L 2011132, a t * 4 ( T en n . Cr i m. App. J u l y 11, 17 2 0 0 7 ) (N o T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n fi le d ); see a lso , e. g. , D eMayo v. Nugent , 51 7 F.3d 11 , 15 (1st C i r. 20 0 8 ); M cCl i s h v

. Nugent , 4 8 3 F .3 d 1 2 3 1 , 1 2 4 0 -4 1 (1 1 th C ir. 2 0 0 7 ); Un ited S ta te s v . Ma rsh a ll , 1 5 7 F.3d 4 7 7 , 48 2 (7t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ).
S ta te v . D a v is , N o. M 2 0 0 4

- 0 3 0 6 0

- CC A- R3- CD , 2005 W L 2255968, a t * 5- 6 ( T en n . Cr i m. App. Se pt
. 15,

18 2 0 0 5 ) (N o T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n fi le d ); S ta te v . M c C a ll , 6 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 3 , 6 5 0 (T enn. C ri m . A p p . 19 8 5 ); s ee a lso , e.g ., U

n ited S ta te s v . B e ll , 50 0 F.3d 60 9 , 61 3 (7t h C i r. 20 0 7 ).
S ta te v . D a v is , 2 0 0 5 W L 2 2 5 5 9 6 8 , at *4 -7 ; see a lso , e. g. , Un ited S ta te s v . A tc h le y , 4 7 4 F .3 d 8 4 0 , 8 5 0 (6 th 19 C ir. 2 0 0 7 ); Uni t ed St at es v . M al donado , 47 2 F.3d 38 8 , 39 5 (5t h C i r. 20 0 6 ).

S ta te v . D a v is , 2 0 0 5 W L 2 2 5 5 9 6 8 , at *6 ; s e e al s o, e . g. , Uni t e d S t at e s v . Br own , 44 9 F.3d 74 1 , 74 5 (6t h C i r. 20 2 0 0 6 ); Uni t ed St at es v . H er nandez Le on , 3 7 9 F .3 d 1 0 2 4 , 1 0 2 9 (8 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ).

Bai l ey v . Newl and , 2 6 3 F .3 d 1 0 2 2 , 1 0 3 3 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 1 ); Uni t ed St at es v . Anders on , 154 F. 3d 1225, 1234 21 (1 0 th C ir. 1 9 9 8 ).

S ta te v . L o v e ll , No. M 20 02

- 02 37 9- CCA- R3- CD, 20 03 W L 22 14 24 99 , a t * 6 ( Se pt
. 17 , 20 03 ) ( N o Te n n . R. 22 A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n fi le d ); s ee als o, e . g. , Un ited S ta te s v . R e id , 2 2 6 F .3 d 1 0 2 0 , 1 0 2 8 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 0 ); St at e v . W arr en , 9 4 9 So

. 2d 12 1 5 , 12 2 5 (La. 20 0 7 ).

St at e v. I nghr am , 2 0 0 7 W L 2 0 1 1 1 3 2 , at *5 ; see a lso , e. g. , Un ited S ta te s v . L ic a ta , 7 6 1 F .2 d 5 3 7 , 5 4 3 (9 th 23 C ir. 1 9 8 5 ); S ta te v . E b e rly , 7 1 6 N .W .2 d 6 7 1 , 6 7 9 (N e b . 2 0 0 6 ); H o w e v . S ta te , 9 1 6 P .2 d 1 5 3 , 1 5 9 (N e v . 1 9 9 6 ).

See , e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. U s cang a-Ra m i r ez , 4 7 5 F .3 d 1 0 2 4 , 1 0 2 8 (8 th C ir. 2 0 0 7 ); St at e v. S h ri n er , ___ 24 N

. W

. 2 d __
_ , __
_ , 20 0 8 W L 2 2 2 9 4 9 0 , at * 4 (M i nn. 20 0 8 ).

T he U n i t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt , i nt erpret i ng t he Fo urt h A m end m ent t o t he U ni t ed Stat es Co nst i t ut i o n, (c o n tinu e d ...) -12- Minnesota v. Olson , 4 95 U. S. 9 1, 10 0 ( 19 90 ); United States v. Huffman , 461 F.3d 777, 782 ( 6th Cir. 20 06 ); State v. Adams , 238 S.W .3d 313, 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)

. Ex ige nt circumstanc es ar e those in which the urg ent nee d for immediate a ction become s too co mp el l i n g t o i mp o s e up o ngo v ernm en t al ac t o rs th e att en d an td el ay th atac co mp an i es o b t ai n i n g a war rant. Thus, in assessingthe consti tutionality of a war rantless sea

rch, the inquiry

is whether the 17 circ umstances g ive rise to an obje ctively rea sonable be lief that therewas a compellingneed to a ct and insuffic ient time to obtain a war rant. The e x ige ncy

of th e ci rc u m s t an ces is eva luated base d 18 u p o nth e t o t a l i ty o f

th e c i r c um s t an c e s kn o wnt o th e g o v e r nm e nt a l a c t o r

atth e t i m e o f

th e e ntr y. 19 20 Mere speculation is inadequate; rathe r, the State must rely upon specific and ar

ticulable fa cts and 21 22 the rea sonable infere nces drawn from them. The circ umstances are viewed from an ob jective 23 perspe ctive; the g overnme ntal actor ’s subjective intent is irre levant. The manne r and the scope of 24(

. . . con t i n u ed) 24 d et erm i ned t hat subject i ve m o t i vat i o n i s i rr el evant even wi t h regard t o t he em ergency ai d excep t i o n. Br igham Ci t y, U t ah v. S t u a rt , 547 U

. S. at 404

. I ns of ar as t hi s ex cept i on ca n r eac h bey ond cr i mi nal i nv es t i gat ory pur po s es t o broader “com m uni t y caret aker” p o l i ce acti vi t i es, t he T enness ee C o urt o f C ri m i nal A p p eal s has s o und ed a caut i o nary note. I n r es po ns e t o t he St at e’ s as s er t i on t hat i t was ex er ci s i ng i t s comm un i t y care t ake r f un ct i on, Ju dge W i l l i ams s t at ed t hat “[s ]u c h a c tio n s a re ju stif ia b le a n d lau d a b le so lo n g a s the a id is ac tua lly n e e d e d o r so u g h t b y the c iti z e n . O the rw ise , i t i s mer el y a g ui s e f

or u nwa nt ed of

f i ci al i nt r us i on i nt o the p rivac y of t he af f ect ed ci t i zen . ” S t a t e v . W a t ers , N o. M 2006- 01468- CC A- R3- CD , 2007 W L 2744996, a t * 4 ( T en n . Cr i m. App. Se pt
. 21, 2007) ( N o T en n . R. App. P. 11 a pp l i c a t i on f

i l e d)

. W h e t h e r t h e c on s t i t u t i on a l pr ot e c t i on s a f f or de d by T e n n . Con s t
. a r t
. I , § 7 a r e a n y br oa de r i n t e r ms o f no t allo w ing p o lice o ff ic e rs w h e n a c ting in a c o m m u n ity c a re ta k e r, ra the r th a n a c rim ina l l a w e n fo r c e m e n t, ro le to k n o w ing ly an d p u rp o se fully us e the e m e rg e n c y a id e x c e p tio n a s a c rim ina l i n v e stiga tio n to o l is no t an issu e b e fo re this C o u rt b u t m a y in su b se q u e n t ca se s w a rr a n t co n sid e ra tio n .

M i nce y v. Ar iz ona , 43 7 U

. S. at 39 3 (quo t i ng T e rry v . O h io , 3 9 2 U .S. at 2 5

- 2 6 ) (i nd i ca t i ng t ha t “a wa rran t l ess 25
se a rc h m u st b e ‘stric tly c irc u m sc rib e d b y the e x ige n c ie s w h ic h ju stif y its i n iti a tio n ’”) ; Uni t ed St at es v . Naj ar , 451 F. 3d a t 7 1 8 , 7 2 0 ; Sham aei

z adeh v. Cunigan , 33 8 F.3d 53 5 , 55 0 (6t h C i r. 20 0 3 ).
See , e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v . Sni pe , 5 1 5 F .3 d a t 9 5 1 -5 2 ; Uni t ed St at es v . Lay m an , 2 4 4 F e d

. A p p x . 2 0 6 , 2 1 0 (1 0 th 26 C ir. 2 0 0 7 ); Uni t ed St at es v . Huf f m an , 4 6 1 F .3 d a t 7 8 3 ; Un i t e d S t a t e s v . Wi l l i a ms , 35 4 F.3d 49 7 , 50 5 (6t h C i r. 20 0 3 ).

-13- these arc h mu st b e re a so na bly attuned to the e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s th at ju sti fi e d th e wa rr antl e ss sear ch, or the sear ch will exceed the bounds a uthorized by

exigenc y al o n e. W h ere the asser ted 25 ground of e x ige ncy

is risk to the safety

of the off icer s or others, the g overnme ntal actor s must have an objec tively

reasonable ba sis for conc luding that ther e is an immediate ne ed to ac t to protect the mse lve s and

oth e rs fr om s e ri ou s h arm . 26 C. Methamphetamine laboratories ar e re g arde d as hi ghly dang erous. Un ite d S

tates v . Purc e ll , 5 2 6 F

. 3 d 9 5 3 , 9 6 0 ( 6 thC i r . 20 08 ); Uni ted State s v . W als h , 2 9 9 F

. 3 d

7 2 9 , 7 3 4 ( 8 thC i r . 2 0 0 2 )

. In 2000, the United States House of Represe ntatives explained: The methamphetami ne epide mic in America differ s in kind from the thre at of other

illega l drug s beca

use m ethamphetamine can be ma de fr om re a dil y ava ila ble and le g a l c he mic a ls a

nd su bs tanc e s, and bec ause i tposes serious da ng ers to both human life a nd the en v ironment. Additionally , these c hemicals a nd substances a

re utiliz ed in a ma nufac turingproce ss that is unstable, volatile, and highly combustible. Even small amounts of these c h emi cals, whe n mix ed improperly , can c ause e x plosions an d fi re s . For ever y one pound of methamphe tamine that is produce d, appr o x i m ately five pounds of tox ic and of

ten lethal waste products may be left behind at th e l ab o rat o ry

s i t e, o r di s p o s ed o f i nri v er s , k i t ch ens i nk s , o r s ew age s y s t em s i nanef

fo rtt o co n ce al ev i d en ce o f i l l ega l m an u f a cturi n g. Mo redis tur

bin gis that mo st o f t

he se la bo rat ori e s aresit

uate d inSee h ttp : // www . co ngres s. go v/ cgi

- b i n/ cp q uery / R ? cp 1 0 6 : FL D 0 1 0 :@ 1 (h r8 7 8 ) (la st visite d J u ly 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 ). T h is 27 H ous e Repo r t was i s s ued wi t h r ega r d t o t he M et hamphet ami ne and Cl ub D r ug Ant i

- P r ol i f er at i on Act of

200 0 whi ch was en ac t ed as Sec t i on 3612 of t h e M et h amph et ami n e Ant i

- Prol i f er at i on Act of

2000, Pub. L. N o. 106- 310, 114 St at
. 1101.
A pp r oxi mat el y f

i f t een per cen t of

al l met hamphet ami ne l aborat ori es t hat ar e di s cover ed i n t he U ni t ed St at es 28
a re fo u n d a s a re su lt o f an e x p lo sio n o r fire

. See D e p ’t o f Ju stice , D angers t o Chi l dr en Li vi ng atM et h Labs , a v a ila b le a t h t t p: / / ww w. oj p. u s doj

. g ov / ov c/pu bl i ca t i on s / bu l l et i n s / ch i l dr en / pg 5. h t ml ( l as t v i s i t ed Ju l y 30, 2008) ( “ D a n g e rs to Chi l dr en Li vi ng at M et h La bs ”)

. T h e T en n es s ee G en er al As s embl y h as e v en i mpos ed a r epor t i n g r equ i r eme n t on hos pi t al s , cl i ni cs , s ani t ar i ums , do ct ors , phy s i ci ans , s ur geons , nu r s es , phar maci s t s , un dert ake r s , embal mers , an d ot her p ers o ns cal l ed upo n t o render ai d t o p ers o ns suf f eri ng f rom any wo und or o t her i njury t o repo rtwhen t he i njury or wo und r es u l t s f r om e x pos u r e t o a me t h amph et ami n e l abor at or y or a me t h amph et ami n e l ab o rat o ry - rel at ed f i r e, e x pl os i on , or c h e m i c a l r e l e a s e . T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 8 - 1 - 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 6 ). S e e a l s o ht t p: / / www. met hf

r eet n. org / met h101 / r eci pe_f or_di s as t er . php (l as t v i si t ed Jul y 30, 200 8) ( “ M aki ng met h c an be as d a n g e ro u s a s ta k ing it . M e th la b e x p lo sio n s sh a tter b u ild ing s , b u r n in g a n d inc ine ra ting e v e ryth ing in sig h t. W h y? M et h’ s i ngredient s co nt ai n a hazardo us co m b i nat i o n of p o i sono us and f l am m ab l e chem i cal s, whi ch are heat ed on a st o ve or h ot pl at e. A s l i gh t mi s cal cul at i on wi t h i ng r edi ent s or cooki ng t emp er at ur e, an d m et h bec om es a dea dl y bom b. ”)

See gene r al l

y Uni t ed St at es v . Lay ne , 3 2 4 F .3 d 4 6 4 , 4 7 0 (6 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ); B a rth v . S ta te , 955 So. 2d 1115, 29 1 1 1 8 (F la . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 6 ); C e n te r s fo r D ise a se C o n tro l & P re v e n tio n , P u b l i c H ea l t h C o n seq u en ce s A m o n g F i rst Res ponders t o Em er

genc y Eve nts A s s oci at ed wi t h Il l i ci tM et hamphet am i ne Labor at or i es - Se l ec t ed St at es , 1996- 1999 , 4 9 M o rb id ity & M o rta lit y W k ly. R e p . 1 0 2 1 , 1 0 2 3 (2 0 0 0 ), a v a ila b le a t h t t p: / / ww w. cdc

. g ov / mmwr / pdf / wk / mm4945. pdf (la st visite d J u ly 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 ); D angers t o Chi l dr en Li vi ng atM et h Labs , su p ra n o te 3 2 ; W is. D e p ’t o f H e a lth a n d F a m ily S e r v s., C l e a n i n g U p H a z a r dous Chemi cal s at For m e r M e t h Labs , avai l abl e a t h ttp :// d h fs.w isc o n sin .go v /e h /C h e m F S /fs/ M e thC lnU p .htm (la st v isited J u ly 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 ); W yo . D e p ’t o f H e a lth, Cl eani ng U p H a z a r d o u s C h e m i c a l s a t M e t h a m p h e t a m i ne Lab orat ori e s , avai l abl e a t h ttp :// w d h .sta te .w y.us /p h sd /e p iid /m e th c le a n u p .htm l (las t visite d J u ly 1 6 , 2 0 0 8 ); J e a n C . O ’C o n n o r e t al., D ev el opi ng L a st i n g L eg a lS o l u t i o n s t o t h e D u a lE p i d em i cs o

f M eth a mp h eta m i n e P ro d u cti o n a n d U se , 82 N

. D

. L. Rev

. 1165, 1172 (2 0 0 6 ); A n n a S

. V o g t, N o te , The M es s L ef tB ehi nd : R egul at i ng t he C l eanu p of F orm er M et ha mph et am i ne Lab orat ori es , 3 8 Idaho L. R ev. 25 1 , 25 8

- 6 0 (20 0 1 ). -14-

re sid e nc e s, mot e ls, tr a ile rs , a nd va ns , and of te n tim e s areop e ra

te d in the pre sence of childre n. H.R. Rep. No. 106-878, Part I , at *22 (Sept. 21, 2000). In addition to being highly combustible, 27 28 theva po rs or fume s that are g e ne rate d in the pr od uc tio n of me tha mph e tamin e po se fu

rt he r d ang e rs . For example, ex p o s u re to the tox ic fumes or vapors pr oduced during the manufa cture of me tha mphetamin e , s omeof

wh ic h a rec arc ino g e nic , c an c a

us e se ri ou s inha la

tio n in jurie s to tho se at th e la bo rator y sit e and so me tim e s e ve n to ne ighb or s. 29 The hazards posed by an ac tively operating methamphetamine labor atory are so signific ant that a number

of st ate and fede ral courts have determined that the discovery of an a ctively

operating me tha mph e tamin e la

bo rator y , in and of its e lf , c re ate s a n e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e jus tif yingimm e diate ac t i on without the attendant dela y s that acc ompany

obtaining a

sear ch wa

rra nt. See , e.g. , United States v. L loyd, 3 96 F .3 d 9 48 , 9 54 (8 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; W ill iam s v . S

tate , N o . CR

- 0 6

- 1 7 5 2 , 2 0 0 8 WL 22 23 06 8, at *6 (A la . Crim. Ap p. May 30 , 2 00 8) ; Barth v. State, 95 5 So .2 d at 11 18 ; Sta tev . W hite , 886 N.E.2d 904, 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). Othe r cour ts that h av e re co gn i z ed the dang ers of actively operating met h am phetamine labor atories have stopped short of a dopting a per se rule. Rather, they

have ba sed their finding of exigenc y on the location of the particula r laboratory
. UnitedT hi s case do es not requi re us t o ad d res s t he l ega lit y o f a w a rrant l ess s earch o f an act i vel y op erat i ng 30
m et ham p het am i ne l ab o rat o ry where t he sol e o f ri sk o f da nger i s to the p ers o ns who are act ual l y m anuf act uri ng t he m etha m p he t am i ne o r w he re t he re i s a si gn i f i ca nt d elay b etwe en t he t i m e the law en f o rce m en t o f

f i ce rs had p ro b ab l e c au se t o bel i eve t hey ha d di s cover ed an act i vel y op er at i ng met hamphet ami ne l aborat ory and t he t i me t he of f i cer s conduc t ed t he war r ant l es s s ear ch. N ei t her of t hes e c i r cums t anc es ar e pr es ent i n t hi s ca s e. I n a ddi t i on t o t h e ex i s t en ce of a n e x i g en t c i r cu ms t an ce , t h e s ea r ch g en er al l y mu s t a l s o be s u ppor t ed by 31 p ro b a b le c a u se . Ki r k v. Loui s i ana , 5 3 6 U .S . 6 3 5 , 6 3 7 (2 0 0 2 ); Un ited S ta te s v . M c C la in , 44 4 F.3d 55 6 , 56 2 (6t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ); St at e v. H enni ng , 9 7 5 S .W .2 d 2 9 0 , 3 0 0 (T e n n . 1 9 9 8 ); see a lso R .D .S . v. S ta te , 2 45 S

. W

. 3d at 3 66 n. 4 ( not i ng t hat o ne o f t he p ri m ary excep t i o ns t o t he warrant re q u irement i s “prob ab l e cause t o s earch wi t h exi gent ci rcum st ances”). I nt er pret i ng t he Fourt h A mendm ent , t he U ni t ed St at es Supre me C our t r ul ed i n 2006 t hat “ l aw e nf orce ment of

f i cer s may en t er a h ome wi t h ou t a w ar r an t t o r en der e mer g en cy a s s i s t an ce t o a n i n j u r ed occ u pan t or t o pr ot ec t a n oc cu pan t f r om i mm i nen t i nj ur y . ” B rig h a m C i t y, U t a h v. S t u a rt , 5 4 7 U .S . at 4 0 3 . N o ta b ly, a b se n t f ro m the S u p re m e C o u rt’s a n a lysis w a s a n y r e fer e n c e to th e e x isten c e o f p ro b a b le c a u se . B ru c e A . A n tko w ia k , S a vin g P ro b a b l e C a u se , 40 Su f f ol k U

. L. R e v . 5 6 9 , 5 7 5 (2 0 0 7 ); R ic a rd o J . B a sc u a s, F o u rt h A m en d m en tLesson s F rom t h e H ig h w a y a n d t h e S u b w ay: A P r i nci pl ed A pp r oa ch t o Su s

pi ci on l es s Searc hes , 3 8 R u tge rs L .J . 7 1 9 , 7 7 8 -7 9 (2 0 0 7 ). T h e S u p re m e C o u rt “fa iled to co nd uct any t radit i o nal pro b ab l e cause i nq ui ry . I nst ead , t he C o urt ass um ed tha t p ro b a b l e cause t o ass o ci at e t he e m e rg e n c y w ith the p la c e to b e s e a rc h e d e x ists w h e n e v e r la w e n fo rc e m e n t o ff ic e rs h a v e a n o b je c tive ly re a so n a b le b a sis f or c oncl udi ng t hat an emer gen cy i s un f ol di ng i n t hat pl ace . ” Uni t ed St at es v. Sni pe , 5 1 5 F .3 d a t 9 5 2 ; Uni t ed St at es v. Naj ar , 45 1 F.3d at 71 8 (10 t h C i r. 20 0 6 ) ( no t i ng t hat t he C o urt did no t “ re q u ire pro b ab l e cause i n t hi s t y p e o f exi gent c irc u m sta n c e s” ). In c o n s id e rin g the e m e rg e n c y a id e x c e p tio n un d e r th e F o u rth A m e n d m e n t, p ro b a b le c a u se is no t a n e c e ssa ry e le m e n t. T h e inte r-re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n p ro b a b le c a u se a n d the va rio u s p e rm u ta tio n s o f t h e e m e rg e n c y a id exc ept i on un der A r t i cl e I , Sect i on 7 o f t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on i s not b ef ore t he C our t i n t he pres ent cas e b ut may w arra nt co nsid era t i o n in f uture ca ses. -15- States v. Atchle

y , 4 74 F .3 d 8 40 , 8 51 n. 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ; State v. Chapman , 813 P.2d 557, 560-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1991). T hese c ourts have f ocused on whether

there wer e people in the vicinity of the actively operating methamphetamine labor atory , notably neighbors, law e nforc ement off icials, and those manufa cturingthe methamphetamine. United States v. Atchle y , 4 74 F.3 d at 85 1; State v. Simmons , 71 4 N .W. 2d

26 4, 27 3- 74 (I ow a

20 06 ); Bi sh op v . Co mm on we alt

h , 237 S.W .3d 567, 570 (Ky . Ct. App. 2007). Reg ardle ss of the appr oach taken, whe th er a p er s e rule or a de termination based upon the prese nce of others in the vicinity , the scope of a permissible war ran t l es s sear ch rema ins limited to the scope of the exigenc y . United States v. Layman , 244 F e d. Ap px. at 21 1; Sta te v. Bilynsky , 9 32 A. 2d

11 69 , 1 17 6 ( Me . 2 00 7) ; Cof fe yv . S tate , 99 P.3d 249, 252 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). 30 D. Th e re is no iss ue in t

his c a se re g ard ingthelaw e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs havin gpr ob a

blec a us e to believe that the oc cupants of Room 110 at the Par k Motel wereactively

man u fa ct u ri ng metham phetamine in their r oom on the eveningof Mar ch 6, 2005. Messrs. Mee ks and Snyder 31 conce de that they

did. The undisputed fa cts clea rly establish the sort of ex ige nt circumstanc es that justified the of fi c e rs ’ de c isi on to e nte r Roo m 11 0 of the Park Mo te l wi tho ut fi rs t ob ta ini ng a sear ch w arr ant. Th e y kn e w that an a c tiv e ly

op e ratin gme tha

mph e tamin e la

bo rator y po se d a se ri ou s d ang e r n ot o nly to the persons in the room itself but also to all persons in the immediate vicinity

. The distinct odorM e ssr s. M e e k s’ an d S n yd e r’s a rg u m e n t t h a t St at e v . Ca r t er , 1 6 0 S.W

. 3 d 5 2 6 (T enn. 2 0 0 5 ) requir es a f i nd i ng 32 tha t t h is se a rc h w a s u n re a so n a b le is un p e rs u a siv e . St at e v . Ca r t er di d not r equire t his Court t o add r es s t he pi vot al q uest i o n rai sed i n t hi s case – w het her an act i vel y op erat i ng m et ham p het am i ne l ab o rat o ry pro vi d es a s uf f i ci ent l y exi gent ci rcum st ance t o jus t i f

y a warrant l ess ent ry i nt o t he p l ace whe re t he l ab o rat o ry w as l o cat ed

. In St at e v . Ca r t er , t h e S ta te argued t hat de st ruct i o n o f e v ide nce, an exi gent ci rcum st ance creat ed by t he p o l i ce o f f i cers t hem sel ves, jus t i f i ed t he warrant l ess ent ry . T he Stat e d i d not argue t hat t he o f f i cers act ed i n res p o nse t o t he ri sk p o sed t o t he o f f i cers o r ot hers f rom t he m et ham p het am i ne m anuf act uri ng pro cess . N o r di d t he Stat e p res ent evi d ence i nd i cat i ng t hat t he o f f i cers were a w a re a t t h e ti m e o f en try o f t h e d a n g e rs p o se d b y the a c tive m a n u fac tur ing o f m e tha m p h e ta m ine

. S e e g e n e ra lly S ta te v. Ca r t er , 1 6 0 S .W .3 d 5 2 6 ; St at e v . Ca r t er , N o. W 2002- 00947- CC A- R3- CD , 2003 W L 22213225 ( T en n . Cr i m. App. Se p t
. 24 , 20 0 3 ). -16- surroundingRoom 110, the intensity and strength of the odor, the fumes emanating from Room 110, and thee ff e c ts o f t he od or and fume s o n th e inh a

bit ants of Roo m 10 9 p ro vid e d th e offic e rs wi th enough fac t s t o believe that the persons in Room 110 were actively manufa cturing methamphetamine. T his conclusion provided the office rs with an objec tively rea sonable ba sis for concludingthat there was a n immediate need to act to protec t themselves and other s from serious harm. The fac t that the office rs overlooked clea ringthe adjoining rooms befor e they enter ed Room 110 does not undermine the rea sonablene ss of their dec ision to enter Room 110 without waiting for a sea rch w arr ant. Acc ording ly , the officers’ war rantless entry

into and sear ch of Room 110 was not an unreas o n ab l e sear ch under either the Four

th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion or Article I , Section 7 of the Constituti on of Tenne ssee. 32 IV. The judgme nt of the Court of Criminal Appe als reve rsing the trial cour t’s November

9, 2005 or de r s u p pr e ssi ngthee vid e nc e fo un d in Roo m 11 0 a

nd va c atin gtheor de r d ism iss ingtheind ic tme nts is a ff ir me d, and thec a se is r e mand e d f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s o pin ion . B e c a us e Messrs. Mee ks and Sny d er ar e i n d i gen t, the costs of this appea l shall be paid by the State of Tenne ssee.

______________________________ WI L L IAMC. K OC H, JR., JUST I CE