IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Clifton Johnson :

:

v. : No. 703 C.D. 2022

: Submitted: June 6, 2023

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: September 26, 2023

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 

Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT), appeals from the June 9, 2022 order entered 

by the Chester County Court of Common Pleas (trial court), which sustained the

appeal filed pro se by Clifton Johnson. PennDOT contends that the record does not 

support the trial court’s finding that Johnson’s Delaware County conviction never 

occurred. We are constrained to reverse the trial court’s order.

I. BACKGROUND1

In December 2021, PennDOT notified Johnson that his license was 

1 We glean the facts from the record, which are generally undisputed. This Court, however, 

“may take judicial notice of the dockets of other courts of the Commonwealth.” Elkington v. Dep’t 

of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 478 M.D. 2018, filed May 27, 2021), 2021 WL 2156909, at *4 n.4 (citing 

cases); accord Miller v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 131 A.3d 110, 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) 

(taking judicial notice of criminal docket); Smith v. A.O. Smith Corp., 270 A.3d 1185, 1194 n.8 (Pa. 

Super. 2022) (reviewing a civil docket); Moss v. SCI – Mahanoy Superintendent Pa. Bd. of Prob. 

& Parole, 194 A.3d 1130, 1337 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (stating “this Court may take judicial notice 

of pleadings and judgments in other proceedings where appropriate. This is particularly so where, 
2

suspended for three months because he had been convicted in Delaware County of 

driving with a suspended registration. Hr’g Ex. C-1.2 Johnson timely appealed to 

the trial court, which scheduled a hearing de novo. Prior to the hearing, Johnson 

purportedly went to Delaware County and “Delaware County had nothing.” Notes 

of Testimony (N.T.) Hr’g, 6/9/22, at 4.3

At the hearing, PennDOT moved into evidence a certified copy of 

Johnson’s driving record. Id. at 5; see also Hr’g Ex. C-1. The exhibit consists of 

two screenshots of tabulated data stating, inter alia, the citation and docket numbers, 

as well as the violation and conviction dates. Hr’g Ex. C-1.4 The exhibit also 

identifies the offense place and county number as “600 Block E. La” and “23,”

respectively. Id. The exhibit also reflects Johnson’s Nissan vehicle, his registration 

number, and his city of residence as West Grove. Id.

as here, the other proceedings involve the same parties” (cleaned up)). Finally, we may cite to 

unreported or Superior Court cases as persuasive authority. 210 Pa. Code §§ 65.37, 69.414; Pa. 

State Police v. Madden, 284 A.3d 272, 278 n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).

2 Exhibit C-1, which is PennDOT’s certified driving record showing Johnson’s conviction, 

identifies the county number as 23, i.e., Delaware County. 

3 A hearing de novo was held in March 2022. At that untranscribed hearing, Johnson was 

prompted to visit Delaware County to inquire about his conviction. N.T. Hr’g at 4 (“When I came 

to you before on the 24th of March, I came in with the same things. I don’t know what’s going on 

here. And when we spoke before, I went to Delaware County, and Delaware County had nothing, 

and they said something about Pittsburgh and a woman. And I’m thinking, is this got something 

to do with identity theft? Or, I don’t know what’s going on.”). Unfortunately, the record does not 

provide any additional clarity on Johnson’s alleged visit to Delaware County. The docket reflects 

that the trial court rescheduled the hearing de novo for June.

4 Specifically, Exhibit C-1 states that the docket number is TR000119720. Upon our review 

of the relevant docket, see, e.g., Miller, 131 A.3d at 115, it states (1) the citation and docket numbers 

in Hearing Exhibit C-1; (2) a summary trial occurred before Magisterial District Judge Hunter on 

December 13, 2021; (3) an “offense disposition” of “guilty” for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 1371(a), with 

a disposition and filed date of December 13, 2021; and (4) “disposition cancelled” with a filed date 

of December 13, 2021. See Dkt. No. MJ-32243-TR-0001197-2020. The docket states that the 

“arresting agency” was “Radnor Township Police Department” in Delaware County. The docket 

does not define or discuss the term “disposition cancelled.”
3

As noted above, at the June hearing de novo, Johnson stated that he 

went to Delaware County, which “had nothing.” N.T. Hr’g at 4. Johnson denied 

ever being stopped or cited for driving with a suspended registration. Id. at 7. On 

cross-examination, Johnson acknowledged that he owns a Nissan vehicle with the 

registration number on file, he is the only driver, and the vehicle has been 

continuously registered. Id. at 8-9. PennDOT’s counsel asked Johnson if he was

“familiar with the 600 Block of East Lane in West Grove, Pennsylvania, Chester 

County[.]” Id. at 8.5 Johnson denied familiarity with that address. Id. Upon 

questioning by the trial court, PennDOT indicated it had no other evidence of 

Johnson’s citation. Id. at 9. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sustained 

Johnson’s appeal, concisely stating that it “believe[d] your testimony, Mr. Johnson. 

And on that basis, [the trial court] sustained your appeal and the suspension will be 

rescinded.” Id. at 10. 

PennDOT timely appealed and timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. The trial court prepared a responsive opinion, in which it 

indicated that it found Johnson’s testimony credible and that he “did all that could 

be done to rebut the record.” Trial Ct. Op., 8/24/22, at 2-3. The court criticized 

PennDOT’s Exhibit C-1 as almost indecipherable and stated that PennDOT “should 

have been able to advise [Johnson] of the jurisdiction in which the offense was 

alleged to have occurred so that . . . [Johnson] could have investigated . . . or

[PennDOT] could have obtained the underlying record of conviction from the

jurisdiction in which it was alleged to have occurred.” Id. In the trial court’s view, 

because Johnson’s defense was that the offense never occurred, PennDOT should 

5 As noted herein, the citation occurred in Delaware County and not Chester County. See 

Dkt. No. MJ-32243-TR-0001197-2020. Further, Radnor Township Police Department arrested 

Johnson, and Radnor Township, Delaware County, is not West Grove, Chester County. See id.
4

have presented information sufficient to permit Johnson to investigate. Id. at 4. The 

trial court concluded that reversal would require an appellate court to usurp the trial 

court’s authority as finder of fact. Id. at 5.

II. ISSUE

PennDOT contends that the trial court’s finding that Johnson’s 

Delaware County conviction “never occurred” is unsupported by the record. 

PennDOT’s Br. at 4.

III. DISCUSSION6

In support of its contention, PennDOT argues that its certified copy of 

Johnson’s driving record establishes that the vehicle at issue was Johnson’s vehicle 

and that Johnson was the driver. Id. at 13-14. PennDOT emphasizes that the trial 

court accepted Johnson’s driving record into evidence and therefore PennDOT 

satisfied its burden of proof. Id. at 19, 21. PennDOT reasons that because it 

established a rebuttable presumption of Johnson’s conviction, “the burden shifted to 

Johnson to show by ‘clear and convincing evidence’that he was not convicted . . . .” 

Id. at 22. PennDOT maintains, however, that Johnson’s uncorroborated testimony 

that he was not convicted is not “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 22-23 

(discussing, inter alia, Mateskovich v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 

755 A.2d 100 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)). In PennDOT’s view, “uncorroborated testimony 

is insufficient to meet the strict evidentiary standard required to overcome the 

statutory presumption.” Id. at 23-24 (quoting Fell v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of 

Motor Vehicles, 925 A.2d 232, 239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (en banc)). PennDOT thus 

6

“Generally, an appellate court’s standard of review in a driver licensing matter is to 

determine whether the factual findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and 

whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion in reaching its decision.” 

Linkosky v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 247 A.3d 1019, 1026 (Pa. 2019).
5

concludes this Court must reverse. Id. at 25.7

In Mateskovich, the driver was twice convicted of truancy, which, at 

that time, mandated a six-month suspension of driving privileges under the nowrepealed Section 1338.1(a) of the Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. § 13-1338.1(a).

8

 

Mateskovich, 755 A.2d at 101. On appeal to the trial court, the driver challenged the 

record of his second conviction. Id.

At the de novo trial court hearing in Mateskovich, PennDOT introduced 

a certified copy of the driver’s convictions. Id. The driver contested the accuracy 

of that copy by testifying that the tribunal found him not guilty. Id. The trial court 

found the driver’s “testimony was credible and that it constituted clear and 

convincing evidence that the second conviction did not take place . . . .” Id. The 

trial court therefore sustained the driver’s appeal. Id.

PennDOT appealed to this Court, which held that the driver’s testimony 

alone was not “clear and convincing evidence that the certified record is erroneous.” 

Id. at 102. In the Mateskovich Court’s view, in order to successfully rebut the 

certified copy of the driver’s convictions, the driver “would have to challenge the 

regularity of the record or provide other direct evidence as to why the court record 

was incorrect, i.e., testimony of court personnel that the records were incorrect and 

that the conviction was never entered by the district justice.” Id. This Court thus 

concluded that the driver’s credible testimony that he was not convicted was 

insufficient as a matter of law. See id. The Mateskovich Court therefore reversed 

the trial court. Id.9

7

Johnson did not file a brief. See also Order, 1/18/23.

8 Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, added by Act of November 17, 1995, P.L. 

1110, formerly 24 P.S. § 13-1338.1(a), repealed by Act of November 3, 2016, P.L. 1061.

9 The dissent disagreed, reasoning that the majority improperly infringed “upon the trial 

court’s credibility determinations and improperly reweigh[ed] the testimony presented by” the 
6

Instantly, we acknowledge that Mateskovich involved a conviction 

under the Public School Code, unlike Johnson’s conviction under the Vehicle Code, 

75 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9701. Cf. id. at 102. Nevertheless, both cases involve the accuracy 

of PennDOT’s certified copy of the driver’s record, upon which PennDOT relies to 

suspend driving privileges. Compare id., with N.T. Hr’g at 5. The Mateskovich 

driver, identical to Johnson, testified that the conviction never occurred. Compare 

Mateskovich, 755 A.2d at 102, with N.T. Hr’g at 7. Like the trial court in 

Mateskovich, the instant trial court also found Johnson’s testimony credible and 

sustained the appeal. Compare Mateskovich, 755 A.2d at 102, with N.T. Hr’g at 10. 

Because the Mateskovich Court found that the driver’s credible testimony that the 

conviction did not occur was insufficient to rebut PennDOT’s record, we are 

similarly constrained to hold that Johnson’s credible testimony was also insufficient. 

See Mateskovich, 755 A.2d at 104; see also Fell, 925 A.2d at 239; Mattiuz v. Dep’t of 

Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1161 C.D. 2009, filed Jan. 28, 

2010), 2010 WL 9511404, at *2 (holding that the licensee’s “uncorroborated 

testimony” that a citation was withdrawn did not rebut PennDOT’s documentary 

evidence of a conviction). Because the trial court erred in reaching its decision, we 

reverse. See Linkosky, 247 A.3d at 1026.10

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order. We 

driver. Mateskovich, 755 A.2d at 104 (McCloskey, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that the 

driver was not required to produce additional direct evidence that the certified copy of the record 

was incorrect. Id. In the dissent’s view, “the testimony of a single witness, if found to be credible, 

can be sufficient to overcome the presumption.” Id.

10 Nevertheless, we acknowledge the apparent record discrepancies. The relevant docket 

reflects a “disposition cancelled” of Johnson’s conviction and that Radnor Township Police, in 

Delaware County, was the arresting authority. See Dkt. No. MJ-32243-TR-0001197-2020. 

PennDOT’s counsel nonetheless believed that the offense occurred in Chester County. N.T. Hr’g 

at 8.
7

add, however, that under the unique circumstances of this case, including taking 

judicial notice of the relevant docket and PennDOT’s counsel’s misreading of 

Exhibit C-1, that counsel may be obliged, as an officer of the court, to investigate 

further. 

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Clifton Johnson :

:

v. : No. 703 C.D. 2022

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of September, 2023, we REVERSE the June 9, 2022 

order entered by the Chester County Court of Common Pleas.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge