Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Centro Medico Panamericano, Ltd. v. Laborers’ Welfare Fund of the Health & Welfare 

Department of the Construction & General Laborers’ District Council,

2015 IL App (1st) 141690

Appellate Court 

Caption

CENTRO MEDICO PANAMERICANO, LTD., an Illinois 

Corporation, s/b/a Fullerton Kimball Medical and Surgical Center, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LABORERS’ WELFARE FUND OF THE 

HEALTH AND WELFARE DEPARTMENT OF THE 

CONSTRUCTION AND GENERAL LABORERS’ DISTRICT 

COUNCIL OF CHICAGO AND VICINITY, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Third Division

Docket No. 1-14-1690

Filed May 13, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-L-006838; the 

Hon. Sanjay T. Tailor, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Douglas L. Prochnow, John A. Roberts, and William R. Andrichik, all 

of Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.

J. Peter Dowd, Justin J. Lannoye, and George A. Luscombe III, all of 

Dowd, Bloch, Bennett & Cervone, of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Hyman and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in 

an insurance coverage lawsuit to defendant Laborers’ Welfare Fund of the Health and Welfare 

Department of the Construction and General Laborers’ District Council of Chicago and 

Vicinity. On appeal, plaintiff Centro Medico Panamericano, Ltd., an out-patient surgical 

center, contends that the trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment because defendant’s service representatives made plaintiff an oral unambiguous 

promise about the extent of insurance coverage. Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred 

in concluding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 18 

(2000) (ERISA)), preempted plaintiff’s claim for promissory estoppel. In addition, plaintiff 

contends that the trial court erred by considering inadmissible hearsay and failing to grant 

plaintiff’s Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(a) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) motion to strike. We affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 We recite only those facts necessary to understand the issues raised on appeal. Between 

June 2007 and October 2011, plaintiff provided medical services for 21 procedures on 16 

patients. Before each procedure, plaintiff placed a verification call to defendant’s service 

representatives to verify whether the procedure was covered by each patient’s health insurance 

policy. During the verification calls, plaintiff provided defendant with the provider’s name, the 

patient’s name, insurance information, and the procedure and services to be performed. 

Defendant responded by confirming coverage and the amount of benefits available for each 

procedure, which was a percentage of plaintiff’s billed charges. Defendant paid plaintiff on 

each of the claims totaling $35,491.05, pursuant to the plan’s “usual and customary charges” 

for out-of-network providers, including any applicable deductibles or coinsurance, which was 

significantly less than the amount billed. Upon payment, defendant also provided an 

explanation of benefits for each claim and explained why payments were not paid in full. 

Defendant also included information about its detailed appeal procedure, but no participant 

appealed. 

¶ 4 In June 2012, five years after the first disputed claim, plaintiff filed this promissory 

estoppel suit against defendant contending that it was entitled to approximately $98,000 more 

on its claims, arguing that defendant’s service representatives orally promised that defendant 

would pay a fixed percentage of whatever amount plaintiff billed, no matter how high or 

excessive. In response, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, including the 

affidavits of its claims director Lori Williams and expert Rebecca Busch, contending that 

plaintiff could not establish its promissory estoppel claim under Illinois law. Defendant also 

contended that because this dispute over the level of benefits paid to plaintiff related to an 

ERISA plan, plaintiff’s claim was preempted.

¶ 5 According to Williams’ affidavit, defendant was a multiemployer ERISA welfare fund and 

provided for the payment to eligible participants of health benefits detailed in its written plan 

of benefits (the Plan). Defendant only paid benefits in accordance with the Plan as interpreted 

by the trustees or persons delegated by them to decide benefit issues in their sole discretion. 

The Plan prevented excessive charges by only allowing payment for “usual and customary 
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charges” defined in the Plan. The definition of “usual and customary charges” depended on 

whether the provider was in-network or out-of-network. For in-network providers (PPOs), 

defendant had a negotiated rate for services. Defendant, however, had no negotiated rate with 

out-of-network providers, such as plaintiff. Therefore, to limit exposure to excessive claims 

from these out-of-network providers, the Plan would pay only “usual and customary charges” 

defined as a “charge that [was] no higher than the 90th percentile of the Plan’s most currently 

available healthcare charge data, or where there [was] insufficient data, a value or amount 

established by the Fund.” Since July 2007, defendant based those amounts on data provided by 

Blue Cross Blue Shield. 

¶ 6 In addition, defendant’s participant service representatives received over 14,000 calls per 

month from providers and participants inquiring about coverage and benefit levels for covered 

services. In response to such calls, these representatives verified whether each participant had 

coverage for that month. If the records reflected the coverage, the representative confirmed 

that to the caller and advised that the coverage was subject to the terms of the Plan. Defendant 

trained and expected its representatives to give the parameters of coverage under the Plan, 

including deductibles and coinsurance, and explain that charges were subject to the usual and 

customary allowance as currently in effect under the Plan. 

¶ 7 Furthermore, the record reflected that representatives from both parties took notes 

summarizing the substance of the verification calls. There was no testimony, however, from 

anyone present on any of the calls. Plaintiff’s insurance verification forms demonstrated that, 

in addition to verifying coverage, the parties discussed levels of benefits and limitations on 

coverage under the Plan, including deductibles and coinsurance. The records from three of the 

calls also made express reference to “usual and customary” limitation, and one log made 

specific reference to the “Blue Cross Blue Shield” allowed amount. Further, six of defendant’s 

call records referenced the “Blue Cross Blue Shield” amount. Moreover, in her deposition, 

plaintiff’s office manager Mary Jane Flojo admitted that on each of the calls the parties would 

have discussed or understood that benefit levels were subject to usual and customary 

limitation, although this may not have meant the same thing to both parties. She believed 

coverage was always 80% of whatever plaintiff charged. Plaintiff also required all of its 

patients to sign contracts agreeing to be personally and fully responsible for payment. 

¶ 8 Before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff moved pursuant to 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(a) to strike numerous paragraphs in Williams’ affidavit as 

inadmissible hearsay, which contradicted her deposition testimony. Plaintiff also moved to 

strike paragraphs in Busch’s affidavit because she did not have any personal knowledge of her 

averments. After hearing oral arguments, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment. The court concluded that there was no evidence of an unambiguous 

promise by defendant to pay the amounts claimed by plaintiff, and regardless, the promissory 

estoppel claim was preempted by ERISA. Therefore, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to 

strike the affidavits as moot. Plaintiff timely filed this notice of appeal. 

¶ 9 ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment because defendant’s service representatives made plaintiff an oral unambiguous 

promise about the extent of insurance coverage. We first note that since we may affirm on any 
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basis in the record, we need not consider whether this claim was preempted under ERISA. See 

American Service Insurance Co. v. Iousoupov, 2014 IL App (1st) 133771, ¶ 32. 

¶ 11 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, admissions, depositions and affidavits 

demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact so that the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Ioerger v. Halverson Construction Co., 232 Ill. 2d 196, 201 

(2008); 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2010). In determining whether a genuine issue of material 

fact exists, the court must consider such items strictly against the movant and liberally in favor 

of its opponent. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008). We review the trial 

court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. Weather-Tite, Inc. v. University of 

St. Francis, 233 Ill. 2d 385, 389 (2009). 

¶ 12 To establish a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must prove that (1) defendant made 

an unambiguous promise to plaintiff, (2) plaintiff relied on such promise, (3) plaintiff’s 

reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendants, and (4) plaintiff relied on the promise to 

its detriment. Newton Tractor Sales, Inc. v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 233 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (2009). 

¶ 13 Based on the record on appeal, the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for promissory 

estoppel, namely, that defendant made plaintiff an unambiguous promise to the extent of 

insurance coverage. Here, plaintiff did not provide any evidence, such as testimony from any 

of its claim representatives or an actual transcript of the calls, suggesting that defendant’s 

representatives made plaintiff an unambiguous oral promise. In fact, plaintiff’s insurance 

verification forms reflect that the parties discussed levels of benefits and limitations on 

coverage under the Plan, including deductibles and coinsurance. Plaintiff’s written records 

from three of the calls made express reference to “usual and customary,” and one log made 

specific reference to the “Blue Cross Blue Shield” allowed amount. In addition, six of 

defendant’s records referenced this standard. Furthermore, Williams attested that defendant 

trained its representatives to give the parameters of coverage under the Plan and explain that 

charges were subject to the usual and customary allowance. Nothing in the record suggests that 

defendant’s representatives failed to do so. Thus, we cannot say that defendant definitively 

made plaintiff an unambiguous promise based on the record before us. See Robinson v. BDO 

Seidman, LLP, 367 Ill. App. 3d 366, 372 (2006) (where the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege 

that the defendant’s promises for permanent employment were unambiguous or allege 

additional facts in his promissory estoppel claim from which such promises could be inferred); 

cf. Chatham Surgicore, Ltd. v. Health Care Service Corp., 356 Ill. App. 3d 795, 803 (2005) 

(promissory estoppel was established when the parties had a common intention that the 

plaintiff’s patients were covered under the insurance policy and then the defendant declined 

payment). 

¶ 14 In the alternative, plaintiff contends since it subjectively believed that its own charges 

established what was usual and customary, and defendant’s representatives failed to dispel this 

belief, in fact an ambiguous promise was made to plaintiff’s detriment. It is well settled under 

contract law that if the words in the contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given 

their plain, ordinary and popular meaning. Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 

213 Ill. 2d 141, 153 (2004). However, if the language of the contract is susceptible to more 

than one meaning, it is ambiguous. Thompson v. Gordon, 241 Ill. 2d 428, 441 (2011). Thus, if 

the contract language is ambiguous, a court can consider extrinsic evidence to determine the 

parties’ intent. Id.
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¶ 15 We find plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive. Defendant’s uncontroverted expert testified 

that it is common knowledge in the health care industry that there are many differing standards 

of usual and customary charge limitations and it is common for a benefit plan to establish its 

own usual and customary limit on allowable payments. It is, however, not common or expected 

that an insurer or benefit plan would consent to paying a provider based on the provider’s 

unilaterally determined usual and customary charge. Plaintiff has provided no compelling 

reason why insurance companies, as a standard industry practice, would agree to terms that so 

unilaterally favor medical institutions to the detriment of the insurance companies. 

Furthermore, plaintiff’s office manager admitted that usual and customary limitation may not 

have meant the same thing to both parties, and plaintiff did nothing such as request written 

documentation from defendant to clarify this misconception. Again, plaintiff offers no 

evidence that an unambiguous promise was even made and provides no extrinsic evidence to 

support its claim that the parties shared a common intent under contract law. See also Demos v. 

National Bank of Greece, 209 Ill. App. 3d 655, 661 (1991) (where the court concluded that 

because the specification of the interest rate to be charged is a significant element of a contract 

to loan money and the “plaintiff expressly pleaded no allegations (and none could be implied) 

as to interest, duration, and terms of repayment, the court found no error” in the lawsuit’s 

dismissal (citing McErlean v. Union National Bank of Chicago, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1146-47 

(1980))). Accordingly, since plaintiff cannot meet its burden and establish its prima facie case 

for promissory estoppel, its claim fails. 

¶ 16 Plaintiff further contends that the trial court erred by considering inadmissible hearsay and 

failing to grant plaintiff’s Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(a) motion to strike paragraphs of 

Williams’ testimony. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(a): 

“Affidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment *** shall 

be made on the personal knowledge of the affiants; shall set forth with particularity the 

facts upon which the claim, counterclaim, or defense is based; shall have attached 

thereto sworn or certified copies of all documents upon which the affiant relies; shall 

not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence; and shall affirmatively 

show that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently thereto. If all of the 

facts to be shown are not within the personal knowledge of one person, two or more 

affidavits shall be used.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 191(a) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013).

Therefore, “if from the document as a whole, it appears that the affidavit is based upon the 

personal knowledge of the affiant and there is a reasonable inference that the affiant could 

competently testify to its contents at trial, Rule 191 is satisfied.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Piser v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 405 Ill. App. 3d 341, 349 

(2010). It is the function of a trial court to determine the admissibility of evidence, and its 

rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 350. 

¶ 17 In the case sub judice, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. As 

defendant’s claim director, Williams had personal knowledge of the training, instruction, and 

standard practice of defendant’s service representatives in responding to provider calls, 

including what the representatives told providers about the Plan coverage and the notes that 

representatives recorded during the calls. She can certainly testify to this standard practice 

even though she was not a party to the calls, as well as the common business practices within 

the company. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this matter. 
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¶ 18 CONCLUSION 

¶ 19 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 20 Affirmed.