IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs June 6, 2017

JAVON WEBSTER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 99-03924, 99-03925 Chris Craft, Judge

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No. W2016-01473-CCA-R3-PC

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Petitioner, Javon Webster, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of 

the post-conviction petition filed approximately twelve years after expiration of the one

year statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions. Petitioner alleged facts in his 

petition which he claims justify tolling of the statute of limitations based upon due 

process grounds. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

THOMAS T. WOODALL, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE 

OGLE and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Javon Webster, Clifton, Tennessee, Pro Se. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Reggie Henderson,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In its order dismissing the late filed petition for post-conviction relief, the postconviction court made the following findings:

This cause came on to be heard May 31, 2016, on the Petition for 

Post-conviction Relief filed December 11, 2015, upon preliminary 

consideration mandated by T.C.A. § 40-30-106, and the record as a 

whole, 

03/29/2018
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FROM ALL OF WHICH THE COURT FINDS that after having 

examined the technical record, the Court has determined that the petition 

was clearly filed more than one year after the last appellate action on 

petitioner’s case, and therefore it plainly appears that the petition has not 

been filed within the statute of limitations of one year set forth in T.C.A. 

§ 40-30-102, and should be dismissed.

The defendant was indicted for Murder in the Perpetration of 

Robbery and Especially Aggravated Robbery in Shelby County 

indictments 98-006751 and 98-06752. The following year, the abovestyled superceding [sic] indictments, 99-03924 and 99-03925, were 

returned charging him with these same offenses, along with four other 

co-defendants. On April 22, 1999, he was convicted after a trial by jury 

of Murder First Degree and Criminal Attempt: Especially Aggravated 

Robbery on indictments 99-03924 and 99-03925. On March 15, 2000 

indictments 98-006751 and 98-06752 were nolle prosequied. The Court 

of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on February 7, 2002, 

remanding one of the indictments for sentencing on the Criminal 

Attempt: Especially Aggravated Robbery, finding that this court should 

not have merged that conviction with the Murder First Degree 

conviction, but should have sentenced the defendant separately on that 

conviction. See State v. Javon Webster, 81 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 2002). After this court sentenced him to a concurrent sentence on 

the second count, on August 12, 2002, the defendant filed a petition for 

post-conviction relief on the two original indictments, 98-006751 and 

98-06752, which had been nolle prosequied. That petition, styled P26682, was assigned to trial judge J. C. McLin for handling in Division 

IX of Criminal Court, and was dismissed by him as filed outside the 

statute of limitation[s] of one year by order dated October 3, 2002, as 

those two indictments had been disposed of on March 26, 2000, more 

than two years prior to the petition’s being filed. This court has 

previously sent the petitioner copies taken from that court jacket, P26682, of Judge McLin’s order denying that petition and of the

envelopes used to mail that decision to the defendant and the Office of 

the Attorney General in October of 2002, showing that he had notice in 

2002 of Judge McLin’s dismissal. No appeal was ever taken from Judge 

McLin’s order of dismissal, and no additional petition for postconviction relief was filed for the next 13 years. The petitioner did file a 

pro se petition for writ of certiorari in 2010, however, using the correct 

indictment numbers, which was denied by the Court of Criminal 

Appeals. In that opinion, which is attached to this order, Judge 
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[McMullen] clearly stated that the petitioner “includes a case history for 

case number 99-03924-25. That case history has no relation to case 

number 98-06751-52.” The petitioner still filed no petition for postconviction relief for the next 5 years.

The defendant was returned to Shelby County on indictments 99-

03924 and 99-03925, and he was re-sentenced by this court on October 

1, 2002. No appeal was ever taken from the Court of Criminal Appeals 

decision affirming his convictions or this court’s sentence given him on 

October 1, 2002, and no petition for post-conviction relief was filed on 

the Defendant’s convictions from the instant indictments, 99-03924 and 

99-03925, until the instant petition was filed 13 years later on December 

11, 2015.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 

that the above-styled Petition for Post-conviction Relief is hereby 

dismissed as having been filed outside the statute of limitations of one 

year.

Tennessee’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides that a claim for postconviction relief must be filed “within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the 

highest state appellate court to which appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one 

(1) year of the date on which the judgment became final, or consideration of such petition 

shall be barred.” T.C.A. § 40-30-102(a). Our legislature emphasized the fact that “[t]ime 

is of the essence of the right to file a petition for post-conviction relief,” and provided 

only three narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations: (1) a new constitutional right 

with retrospective application; (2) new scientific evidence establishing actual innocence; 

and (3) the invalidation of convictions underlying an enhanced sentence. T.C.A. § 40-30-

102(b).

In this case, indictments 98-006751 and 98-06752 were nolle prosequied on March 

15, 2000. Petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief on these two 

indictments on August 12, 2002, more than two years after their dismissal. Likewise on

indictments 99-03924 and 99-03925, which were disposed of by the Tennessee Supreme 

Court on July 1, 2002, Petitioner missed the statute of limitations by filing his petition for 

post-conviction relief on December 11, 2015, more than thirteen years later. Petitioner in 

this case does not meet any of the three exceptions to the statute of limitations set forth in 

T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b), nor does he purport to so qualify. 

Likewise petitioner does not qualify for due process tolling. Tennessee courts 

have recognized that, in certain circumstances, strict application of the statute of 
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limitations would deny a petitioner the reasonable opportunity to bring a post-conviction

claim and that, in these instances, due process requires the tolling of the statute of 

limitations. In Whitehead v. State, our supreme court discussed due process in a postconviction context. The court identified three scenarios in which due process requires 

tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations. 402 S.W.3d 615, 623-24 (Tenn. 2013); 

see also Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459 

(Tenn. 2001); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000); Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 

297 (Tenn. 1995); Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992). The first of the three 

circumstances involves claims for relief that arise after the statute of limitations has 

expired. Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 623. The second due process basis for tolling the 

statute of limitations involves prisoners whose mental incompetence prevents them from 

complying with the statute’s deadline. Id. at 624. The third exception is when attorney 

misconduct necessitates the tolling of the statute of limitations. Id.

Elaborating on this third exception, our supreme court concluded that a petition for 

post-conviction relief is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations based 

upon the conduct of the petitioner’s attorney when (1) the petitioner had been diligently 

pursuing his or her rights and (2) extraordinary circumstances prevented the timely filing 

of the petition. Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631 (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

649 (2010)). The court clarified that “pursuing his or her right diligently” did “not 

require a prisoner to undertake repeated exercises in futility or to exhaust every 

imaginable option, but rather to make reasonable efforts” to pursue the claim. Id.

(quoting Downs v. McNeil, 520 F. 3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The second prong is met when a petitioner’s attorney of record abandons 

the petitioner or acts in a way directly adverse to the petitioner’s interests, such as by 

actively lying or otherwise misleading the petitioner to believe things about his or her 

case that are not true. Id. (citations omitted).

“‘Whether due process considerations require tolling of a statute of limitations is a 

mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo with no presumption of 

correctness.’” Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 355 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Harris v. State, 

301 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2010)). As this court has previously explained, “due process 

serves to toll the post-conviction statute of limitations for petitioners who face 

circumstances beyond their control . . . which preclude them from actively raising their 

post-conviction claims.” Crystle D. Rutherford v. State, No. M2013-01575-CCA-R3-PC, 

2014 WL 1669960, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Apr. 25, 2014) (citing Williams v. State, 44 

S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tenn. 2001)).
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Our review of the record shows that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on either due 

process grounds or pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b). Petitioner was not diligent in 

asserting his claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

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THOMAS T. WOODALL, PRESIDING JUDGE