NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIO GUADALUPE MORALESGONZALEZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 21-70464 

Agency No. A202-011-126 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Immigration Judge

April 17, 2023**

Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. 

Mario Guadalupe Morales-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, 

petitions pro se for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or 

torture in Guatemala and is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 25 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-70464 

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence 

the agency’s factual findings, including determinations regarding social distinction. 

Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review de 

novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except 

to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing 

statutes and regulations. Id. We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Morales-Gonzalez 

failed to establish his resistance-based particular social group is socially distinct. 

See id. at 1243 (absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction). Thus, 

the IJ did not err in concluding that Morales-Gonzalez did not establish 

membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 

1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular 

social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of 

members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with 

particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting 

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). 

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that MoralesGonzalez failed to show a reasonable possibility of persecution in Guatemala on 

account of a protected ground. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 814 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (no basis for withholding of removal where petitioner did not show a 
3 21-70464 

nexus to a protected ground). In light of this disposition, we need not reach 

Morales-Gonzalez’s remaining contention regarding whether the government was 

unable or unwilling to protect him. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 

(9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary 

to the results they reach).

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that MoralesGonzalez failed to show a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent 

or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. See Andrade-Garcia

v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836-37 (petitioner failed to demonstrate government 

acquiescence sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.