NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATTA JUAN SANTOS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

K. HOLLAND and MATTHEW CATE, 

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17-16271 

D.C. No. 

1:12-cv-01651-LJO-EPG 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O'Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 6, 2018

San Francisco, California

Before: BERZON and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,** District 

Judge.

Petitioner-Appellant Matta Juan Santos appeals the district court’s denial of 

his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 2011, Santos was validated as an 

associate of the Mexican Mafia prison gang and transferred to the Secured Housing 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

FEB 6 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Unit (“SHU”) at Pelican Bay prison. After exhausting his administrative appeals 

and the state habeas process, Santos filed a federal writ of habeas corpus under the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). In a prior appeal, we 

held that there was habeas jurisdiction over Santos’s claim, because the primary 

remedy sought by Santos—release from the SHU—would result in a quantum 

change to his level of custody. See Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992, 1004–06

(9th Cir. 2015).

On remand, the district court denied relief on the ground that the state 

habeas courts’ adjudication of his due process claims were not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. We affirm.

I.

Before considering the merits of Santos’s petition, we must consider our 

jurisdiction to hear this case in light of Santos’s release from the SHU in 2016. We 

review de novo whether an inmate’s claims are cognizable under the habeas 

statute. Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). We likewise review de 

novo questions of mootness. Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1116 

(9th Cir. 2003).

A panel of this Court already concluded that Santos’s claims are “cognizable 

under the federal habeas statute.” See Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1006 n.12. And the 

Supreme Court has explained that “once the federal jurisdiction has attached in the 
3 

District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion 

of proceedings on such application.” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238

(1968); see also Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1997); Cox v. 

McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 802–03 (9th Cir. 1987).

Nor are Santos’s claims moot. A habeas case is not moot if collateral 

consequences necessarily flow from a challenged decision or ruling. See 

Robertson v. Pichon, 849 F.3d 1173, 1177 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017); cf. Spencer v. 

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 9–14 (1998) (holding collateral consequences that are 

discretionary and speculative are not sufficient to maintain habeas claim). 

California regulatory provisions that govern the treatment of inmates in the state 

prison system indicate that collateral consequences necessarily flow from the 

challenged gang validation. Once inmates are validated, prison officials “shall 

track their movement, monitor their conduct, and take interdiction action, as 

necessary.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 3378.2(c). Consequently, as long as Santos 

remains incarcerated, he is automatically branded a threat to prison safety and 

subjected to specialized treatment among inmates by virtue of his status as a 

validated gang associate. See id. §§ 3023(a), 3378.2(c). Additionally, given that 

inmates “shall be immediately removed from the [general population] and placed 

in administrative segregation” if they present an immediate threat to the safety of 

others or “endanger institution security,” it seems hardly speculative that Santos’s 
4 

validation might form the basis of a decision to return him to the SHU. See id. § 

3335. We therefore conclude that Santos’s claims are not barred by the mootness 

doctrine.

II.

Santos argues that his right to due process was violated because he did not 

receive adequate notice concerning the evidence against him; because he did not 

receive a hearing with the prison official tasked with transferring him to SHU; and 

because prison officials did not have sufficient evidence to identify him as a gang 

associate. We review de novo the district court’s decision to deny habeas relief. 

Hardy v. Chappell, 832 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016).

A.

Santos’s argument regarding notice implicates the process by which prison 

officials disclosed the evidence supporting his validation providing him with an 

opportunity to respond. Santos asserts that he did not receive one document 

(“CDC Form 1030”) to which he was entitled, and that redactions in a separate 

document (“CDC 128-B”) concealed the relevant information depriving him of a 

meaningful response. Given these deficiencies, Santos argues, his right to due 

process was violated because he could not present a defense against the prison’s 

charges. Although Santos received only limited notice as to the basis for his 

alleged gang affiliation, he cannot show that the state habeas courts’ decisions as to 
5 

the adequacy of notice are “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law,” as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The relevant Supreme Court precedent 

applicable to Santos’s claim is Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). In Hewitt, 

the Court held that before a prisoner can be transferred to administrative 

segregation, due process requires that he “must merely receive some notice of the 

charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official 

charged with deciding whether to transfer him.” Id. at 473–76. More recently, the 

Court indicated that notice is adequate if prison officials disclose “the factual 

basis” of their allegations against the inmate. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 

209, 226 (2005) (discussing the procedural protections required before an inmate 

can be transferred to a “Supermax” facility). 

Even assuming the facts are as Santos argues, there is little doubt that he 

understood the factual basis of the charges against him. The documents he 

acknowledges receiving listed the evidence that prison officials relied on to 

validate him. That evidence included a necklace featuring a gang-related symbol 

that was found in Santos’s cell, his possession of a validated gang member’s 

contact information, and a confidential memorandum from an informant. 

Furthermore, the documents Santos received were replete with references to the 

Mexican Mafia and specified that prison officials suspected him of being “an 
6 

active associate.” Although the CDC Form 1030 that was allegedly withheld 

contained an accusation that Santos was the Mexican Mafia’s representative in a 

particular facility as of a specific date, another document he received disclosed the 

relevant date. And while the CDC 128-B that Santos initially received was 

redacted, he was subsequently given an unredacted version and allowed a second 

opportunity to submit a written response. Given that only “some notice” is 

required, the state court decisions here were not contrary to clearly established 

Supreme Court law. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476.

B.

Santos’s second due process claim turns on whether the relevant prison 

official reviewed Santos’s written responses prior to his validation. Santos 

contends that, at the very least, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine 

who the relevant official was and whether that official reviewed his responses. 

Again, we disagree.

In Hewitt, the Supreme Court explained that an inmate is entitled to “an 

opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding 

whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.” 459 U.S. at 476. Santos 

avers that the relevant decisionmaker in this case is likely the Institutional Gang 

Investigator (“IGI”), which comports with our precedent. See Toussaint v. 

McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. 
7 

Supp. 1146, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Assuming the accuracy of Santos’s averment, 

we must defer to the state court’s decision “so long as the state court could have 

reasonably concluded that the evidence already adduced was sufficient” to 

determine that the IGI reviewed Santos’s responses. See Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 

F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012).

There is evidence in the state court record from which a reasonable inference 

can be made that the IGI reviewed both of Santos’s written responses. According 

to the opinion from Santos’s third level administrative appeal, the IGI is the 

official who determined that Santos should receive the unredacted CDC 128-B and 

provided Santos the opportunity to submit a second written response because the 

redacted version “did not provide [Santos] with enough information.” The third 

level opinion further states that both of Santos’s written responses were included in 

the validation package submitted by the IGI and considered prior to his validation. 

Under AEDPA, the standard is not “whether the state court’s [factual] 

determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a

substantially higher threshold.” Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473. Given that the IGI is 

the official who concluded that the redacted CDC 128-B was inadequate and that 

he submitted the validation package with both responses, we cannot say that it was

unreasonable to infer that the IGI reviewed both responses. See id. at 473–74; 

Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1147.
8 

C.

Santos final claim is that the prison’s evidence was unreliable and thus does 

not meet the “some evidence” standard.

The “some evidence” standard “does not require examination of the entire 

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the 

evidence.” Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institute, Walpole v. Hill, 

472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Rather, “the relevant question is whether there is any 

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the 

disciplinary board.” Id. at 455–56. Due process “does not require evidence that 

logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” 

Id. at 456. 

A state court could reasonably conclude that the decision to validate Santos 

was supported by some evidence. The Hill standard is fulfilled where a single 

piece of evidence bearing the requisite indicia of reliability supports the prison’s 

decision. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Santos’s 

possession of a necklace featuring a gang-related symbol and the contact 

information of a validated gang member constitutes some evidence. See Castro v. 

Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1314 (9th Cir. 2013) (inmate’s possession of a picture 

with a gang-related symbol and of a birthday card signed by validated gang 

members fulfilled the “some evidence” standard). The same is true regarding the 
9 

confidential memorandum in light of the fact that the memo’s source incriminated 

himself in providing the information. See Bruce, 351 F.3d 1287–88 (statement of 

confidential prison informant constituted some evidence). Accordingly, we reject 

Santos’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. 

AFFIRMED.
1

Santos v. Holland, No. 17-16271

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I believe that the Government mooted Santos’s original claim about

avoiding placement in solitary confinement by agreeing to settle with a class of 

prisoners, including Santos, who had been confined in segregated housing units 

(“the SHU”) based solely on their validation as gang members. See Settlement 

Agreement, Ashker v. Governor of California, No. C-09-05796 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 

2016) (“Ashker”). As a result, Santos’s only remaining due process claim about

avoiding the gang validation now falls outside the “core of habeas” under Nettles v. 

Grounds. 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Nettles II”). I therefore believe 

we lack habeas jurisdiction and that we should remand for Santos to be given the 

opportunity to re-plead his case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In my view, the majority errs by misunderstanding the nature of Santos’s 

current claims. At the start of this litigation, Santos’s interests in avoiding gang 

validation and confinement in the SHU were intertwined—he was confined in the 

SHU precisely because he had been validated as a member of the Mexican Mafia. 

And, as the majority notes, we previously held that Santos’s claims in that posture 

were cognizable in habeas. See Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992, 1004-06 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (“Nettles I”). But Santos’s claims are not in the same posture today. 

After Nettles I was decided, the state of California reached the settlement in 

FILED

FEB 6 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Ashker, agreeing that it would no longer place inmates in solitary confinement 

solely on the basis of their gang validation status. 

The majority overlooks the complications that the settlement created for 

Santos’s claims. Under the State’s post-Ashker regulations, Santos cannot be 

transferred to the SHU on the basis of his gang validation alone—he would have to 

commit some new violation to justify such confinement. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, § 3314(a)(3)(L) (possessing or displaying gang symbols); id. § 3315(a)(3)(Z)

(demonstrating “status as a recognized member and/or leader of a[] [Security 

Threat Group]”). Accordingly, even though collateral consequences necessarily 

flow from Santos’s validation in the form of increased monitoring, preventing 

Santos’s challenge to his validation from being moot, placement in the SHU on 

that status alone is not one of those consequences. 

The majority suggests that because the regulations consider “Security Threat 

Groups” as “jeopardiz[ing] public safety,” id. § 3023(a), and because prison 

officials have the authority to place any inmate in the SHU if they present an 

immediate threat to the safety of others or institution security, see id. § 3335, “it 

seems hardly speculative that Santos’s validation might form the basis of a 

decision to return him to the SHU.” But the fact remains that the Ashker 

settlement expressly guarantees that gang validation alone cannot support removal, 

meaning that it is entirely speculative to say that Santos’s validation will be used to 
3

justify his return to the SHU absent some additional reason. In addition, because 

there must be an added reason, prison officials have at least some discretion over 

whether to return Santos to the SHU even though he is gang validated. Because 

the Ashker settlement rendered Santos’s return to the SHU both speculative and 

within the discretion of prison officials, Santos cannot maintain his habeas claim 

on the basis of anticipated return to the SHU. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 

9-14 (1998) (holding that collateral consequences that are discretionary and 

speculative are not sufficient to maintain habeas claim).

Because Santos is left only with an interest in avoiding gang validation

based on the extra monitoring it causes him to endure, his claim is not within the 

“core of habeas” defined by the en banc decision in Nettles II. I believe that we

therefore no longer have statutory jurisdiction over Santos’s remaining claim. In 

assessing whether there is statutory habeas jurisdiction, Nettles II instructs us to 

ask whether resolution of the petitioner’s claim would “necessarily affect the 

length of time to be served,” 830 F.3d at 929, or “reduc[e] the level of custody.” 

Id. at 930 (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 534 (2011)). In Nettles II

itself, we held that such a rule left Nettles’s challenge to disciplinary proceedings 

underlying a rules violation to be outside the core of habeas “because the 

expungement of the challenged disciplinary violation would not necessarily lead to 

a grant of parole” or otherwise shorten his time in custody. Id.at 934-35, 34 n.12. 
4

Holding that the prison’s gang validation procedures violated due process would 

similarly have no automatic effect on Santos’s release from custody.1

Although habeas is no longer the proper vehicle for Santos’s claims, “a 

district court may construe a petition for habeas corpus to plead a cause of action 

under § 1983 after notifying and obtaining informed consent from the prisoner.” 

Id. at 936. Accordingly, I would vacate the district court’s judgment on the merits 

and remand with instructions to dismiss Santos’s habeas petition for lack of 

jurisdiction, but with leave to amend to assert claims under § 1983 if he chooses. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 1

 The majority also contends that the “core of habeas” statutory 

jurisdictional requirement is similar to the “in custody” jurisdictional requirement 

in that, once habeas jurisdiction attaches, “it is not defeated by the release of the 

petitioner prior to completion of proceedings on such application.” Carafas v. 

LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). But the majority cites to no authority for this 

proposition. And the rule that release from custody does not defeat jurisdiction in a 

habeas case where the petitioner still seeks a traditional habeas remedy (such as 

vacating a conviction, which was the remedy sought in Carafas) does not seem to 

me to address what should happen here given the holding in Nettles II that the 

remedy Santos seeks in what is left of his lawsuit is no longer a habeas remedy at 

all.

The majority has also cited to Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 

1997), in which we observed that statutory habeas jurisdiction “is not necessarily 

affected by [the petitioner’s] release from custody.” Id. at 1097. Like this case, 

Munoz involved a petitioner challenging a gang validation on Due Process 

grounds. But I read our decision there as essentially assuming without deciding 

that there was statutory jurisdiction, as that issue did not matter in light of the 

holding that the petition needed to be dismissed as moot under Article III. Id. 

And, to the extent Munoz could be read as holding anything about statutory habeas 

jurisdiction existing for all challenges to gang validation, it was superseded at least 

in part by the en banc decision in Nettles II.