J-A02016-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHARRAN DEV CHAKRAVORTY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 39 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 6, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0009259-2018

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2020

Appellant, Sharran Dev Chakravorty, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on December 6, 2018 in the Criminal Division of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history in this 

matter as follows.

On December 10, 2017[,] around 2:00 [a.m.,] Mt. Lebanon police 

were dispatched to a [crashed vehicle] at St. Bernard’s Church

[along Washington Road in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.]. 

The vehicle, a white Jaguar, was located, crashed in the parking 

lot [of the church], while the driver was not present in the 

immediate area. Police began a search of the area and located 

[Appellant] walking on the sidewalk approximately 100 yards 

away from the church parking lot. [A] police officer, while driving 

up to [Appellant], noticed that [Appellant staggered] while he 

walked. The officer pulled alongside [Appellant] and, through the 

passenger side window, asked [Appellant] if he had been driving. 

[Appellant] responded that he had not been driving. The police 

officer then asked what [Appellant] was doing at that time, to 

which [Appellant] responded that he was waiting for an Uber. The 
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police officer then activated his rear warning lights, exited his 

vehicle, and approached [Appellant] on the sidewalk. During the 

interaction, the police officer smelled the odor of alcohol beverage 

on [Appellant’s] breath. The police officer asked if [Appellant] had 

wrecked his Jaguar, which [Appellant] denied. The police officer 

followed-up by asking if [Appellant] wrecked his father’s Jaguar, 

[to which Appellant admitted]. The police officer noticed that 

there was blood dripping from [Appellant’s] right hand. A second 

police officer arrived on the scene, allowing the first police officer 

to return to St. Bernard’s parking lot to inspect the Jaguar. During 

the inspection, it was noticed that the right steering wheel control 

lever was damaged, and had a sharp edge on it. [Appellant] was 

arrested following a field sobriety test.

****

At [docket number 9259-2018, Appellant] was charged with 

driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance [75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1)], careless driving [75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3714(a)], and accident involving unattended vehicle or property 

[75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3745(a)]. On December 6, 2018, a hearing was 

held on [Appellant’s] motion to suppress[. Following the denial of 

Appellant’s motion, a non-jury trial ensued and Appellant] was 

found guilty of all charges. [Appellant] waived his presentence 

report and was sentenced to [] thirty (30) days in the county 

intermediate punishment program, six (6) months of probation, 

and a fine of $750[.00 for] driving under the influence[.]

Post-sentence motions were not filed in this matter. A timely 

notice of appeal was filed on January 4, 2019. [Appellant] was 

ordered to file a [concise statement of errors] complained of on 

appeal [and the trial court issued its opinion on June 6, 2019.]

Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/19, at 1-3 (not paginated; superfluous capitalization 

omitted).

Appellant raises the following claim on appeal.

Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s [m]otion to 

[s]uppress when the uniformed officer exited his marked police 

vehicle, which had either overhead or rear flashing lights 

activated, to question Appellant because a seizure occurred and 
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the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to support the 

seizure?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant challenges a trial court order that denied his motion to 

suppress. We review such claims using the following standard and scope of 

review. 

Our standard of review ... is whether the record supports the trial 

court's factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are free from error. Our scope of review is limited; we 

may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much 

of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when 

read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record 

supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its 

legal conclusions based upon the facts.

Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 40 A.3d 120 

(Pa. 2012). Additionally, “[a]ppellate courts are limited to 

reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing 

when examining a ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress.” 

Commonwealth v. Bush, 166 A.3d 1278, 1281–1282 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 176 A.3d 855. “It 

is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass 

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their 

testimony.” Id. at 1282 (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Koonce, 190 A.3d 1204, 1211-1212 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Appellant claims that his encounter with the police ripened from a mere 

encounter into an investigative detention when the officer activated his rear 

warning lights, exited his vehicle in a no parking zone, and approached 

Appellant to make further inquiries. Under these circumstances, Appellant 

maintains that no reasonable person would feel free to leave. See Appellant’s 
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Brief at 12. Appellant further contends that the officer lacked reasonable 

suspicion to support the detention because, at the moment when the officer 

encountered Appellant staggering along the sidewalk, Appellant was 

equidistant from the crash scene and several bars and restaurants on 

Washington Road and the officer did not know when the accident occurred or 

whether Appellant was operating the vehicle involved in the crash. Id. at 

11-12. The Commonwealth argues that the interaction was a mere encounter 

that required no particular level of suspicion or, alternatively, that reasonable 

suspicion supported Appellant’s detention. 

Contrary to the Commonwealth’s first contention, we assume, solely for 

purposes of this appeal, that the interaction constituted an investigative 

detention since the officer activated the rear emergency lights on his cruiser. 

See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 621 (Pa. 2017) 

(activation of police vehicle’s overhead lights and sirens to initiate a traffic 

stop constitutes an investigative detention since reasonable people would not 

assume they are free to leave when confronted with such signals).1 After 

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1 Although neither party cited or discussed Livingstone in this appeal, we 

acknowledge there may be grounds for distinguishing Livingstone’s 

application in this case. In Livingstone, our Supreme Court reasoned that 

the activation of police overhead lights and sirens was universally understood 

by motorists as a command to pull over or, if already stopped, to remain in 

place. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621. As such, the initiation of a traffic 

stop through the activation of police lights constitutes an investigative 

detention. Id. at 619. Obviously, the present case does not involve a traffic 

stop or the activation of police sirens. Nevertheless, in the absence of
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careful review, we agree with the trial court that reasonable suspicion 

supported Appellant’s detention.

Having [concluded that Appellant was subject to an investigative 

detention], we must now determine whether [the police] had 

reasonable suspicion to detain [Appellant]. An officer may stop 

and briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes when that 

officer has “reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable 

facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.” Commonwealth v. 

Allen, 725 A.2d 737, 740 (Pa. 1999). “[T]he fundamental inquiry 

is an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to the 

officer at the moment of the intrusion warrant a man of reasonable 

caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” 

Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

We must consider the totality of the circumstances, including such 

factors as “tips, the reliability of the informants, time, location, 

and suspicious activity, including flight.” Id., citing

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. 2000).

Commonwealth v. Smith, 172 A.3d 26, 33 (Pa. 2017).

The record emerging from Appellant’s suppression hearing shows that 

at approximately 2:00 a.m. on December 10, 2017, the Mt. Lebanon Police 

Department received a report of a vehicle crash in the parking lot of St. 

Bernard’s Church on Washington Road. Thereafter, an officer responded to 

the scene and confirmed that a white Jaguar had been involved in the accident

and that the vehicle was unattended. Having confirmed significant details of 

the incoming report, the officer possessed reason to believe that the crash

occurred recently and that the driver remained on foot in the local vicinity. 

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advocacy concerning the application of Livingstone, we shall treat the instant 

case as involving an investigative detention that required reasonable 

suspicion.
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Armed with this information, the officer drove north past the church parking 

lot and, within 100 yards, observed Appellant staggering along the sidewalk 

adjacent to Washington Road. In response to the prosecutor’s question 

concerning why he initially stopped and approached Appellant, the officer 

testified: “He was within a very close distance to a crash where nobody was 

still in the car, and there’s very little foot traffic [in the area at 2:00 a.m.] in 

the morning, and he was staggering when I saw him.” N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 12/6/18, at 22-23. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, 

including the verified information in the initial report, the late hour, the 

sparsity of foot traffic in the area, Appellant’s close proximity to the accident, 

and Appellant’s drunken gait, we are satisfied that the officer possessed 

reasonable suspicion to initiate a detention when he parked his police cruiser 

and approached Appellant to make further inquiries. Hence, Appellant’s 

challenge to the trial court’s suppression ruling merits no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2020