[Cite as In re C.W., 2020-Ohio-2660.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

IN RE: C.W. 

 B.W. 

 

 

 

C.A. No. 19CA011521 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 10 JG 30837 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: April 27, 2020 

 

SCHAFER, Judge. 

{¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants, Melva Sherwood and Scott Sherwood (collectively, the 

“Sherwoods”), appeal the June 10, 2019 judgment entry of the Lorain County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting the motion of Defendant-Appellee, Lindsay Eberhardt, to 

dismiss pending matters for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. 

{¶1} Due to the exceedingly complicated and lengthy history of this matter, we 

summarize the essential facts relevant to the present appeal as follows. 

{¶2} Ms. Eberhardt is the mother of two minor children born to her and father, Andrew 

Weaver. C.W. was born October 3, 2007. B.W. was born June 3, 2009. Melva Sherwood is the 

paternal grandmother of C.W. and B.W. Scott Sherwood is Melva’s husband and the paternal 

step-grandfather to the children. 
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{¶3} This appeal stems from a dispute regarding custody and visitation rights over C.W. 

and B.W. Melva and Scott Sherwood (the “Sherwoods”) initially filed a complaint on September 

14, 2010, seeking custody of C.W. and B.W. pursuant to R.C. 2151.23. Then, on May 10, 2011, 

the Sherwoods filed a motion seeking to establish grandparent visitation and companionship rights 

pursuant to R.C. 3109.12 in the alternative to an award of custody. 

{¶4} In October 2011, all parties involved reported a complete resolution of the case 

pursuant to a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement stated that they reached “a 

resolution of all matters in regards to [the September 14, 2010 c]omplaint” and “all pending 

motions before the court are hereby resolved and otherwise disposed of as a result of the resolution 

set forth herein.” The parties assented to a visitation schedule, detailed certain terms and 

conditions of the visitation, and agreed that a court mediator would provide assistance in resolving 

disputes that might arise pertaining to the children’s visits. The agreed journal entry was submitted 

to the trial court, signed by the judge, and filed in the record on November 1, 2011. 

{¶5} Nearly a year after the parties entered the visitation agreement, Mr. Weaver passed 

away due to a drug overdose. Still, Ms. Eberhardt and the Sherwoods continued on with the 

visitation schedule for the next two years. On October 17, 2014, the Sherwoods filed a motion in 

the underlying case, Case No. 10JG30837, requesting that the trial court modify the visitation 

schedule to increase the Sherwood’s visitation time with the children. Ms. Eberhardt responded 

with her own motion to modify companionship time, contending that visitation was not in the best 

interest of her children and seeking to discontinue the visitation schedule with the Sherwoods. The 

Sherwoods then filed a supplemental motion to modify companionship time. On October 6, 2015, 

the Sherwoods filed a motion for legal custody of C.W. and B.W. pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(2). 
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{¶6} The Sherwoods filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on August 29, 2016, 

dismissing their motion for custody and motion to modify grandparent visitation time. Thereafter, 

the trial court issued a journal entry acknowledging the Sherwoods’ dismissal of the motions 

seeking custody or visitation. The trial court indicated that Ms. Eberhardt’s motion to modify 

visitation remained pending and set a contested hearing to commence on September 19, 2016. 

{¶7} On October 14, 2016, the trial court issued its judgment entry ruling on matters it 

considered after the contested hearing. Ms. Eberhardt appealed that judgment entry arguing, in 

pertinent part, that “the trial court was without ‘jurisdiction to issue the November 1, 2011 

Grandparent Visitation Order and was without [j]urisdiction to issue the October 14, 2016 

Grandparent Visitation Order.’” In re C.W., 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 16CA011044, 17CA011162, 

17CA011165, 2018-Ohio-5265, ¶ 21 (“In re C.W. I”). 

{¶8} In In re C.W. I, this Court determined that the juvenile court had “usurped the 

statutory authority of R.C. 3109.11” and that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the 

October 14, 2016 judgment entry. Id. at ¶ 43. This Court concluded that the Sherwoods had never 

invoked the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to order companionship or visitation rights pursuant to 

R.C. 3109.11. Id. at ¶ 42. Because Ms. Eberhardt’s motion to modify or terminate visitation was 

the only issue before the juvenile court at the September 19, 2016 hearing, this court further 

concluded that the juvenile court erred when it sua sponte asserted jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.11 

as a basis for modifying the parties’ agreed visitation schedule and granting the Sherwoods 

companionship visitation pursuant to that statute. Id. at ¶ 43. Having concluded that the October 

14, 2016 judgment entry was void ab initio, we reversed and remanded the matter to the juvenile 

court. 
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{¶9} During the pendency of the appeal in In re C.W. I, and following our remand of the 

matter, the parties presented numerous filings and motions to the juvenile court in the underlying 

case, and the court issued several rulings. During that time, several other appeals were taken from 

the juvenile court’s rulings. The relevance of all that transpired in the record is not readily apparent 

in the context of the present appeal. 

{¶10} Eventually, the judge who issued the October 11, 2016 judgment entry recused, and 

a visiting judge was appointed in the case. Thereafter, Ms. Eberhardt filed a motion to dismiss 

any pending matters for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sherwoods opposed the motion. 

On June 10, 2019, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry granting the motion to dismiss. The 

juvenile court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address “the later contempt and the motion 

to modify [the parties’ agreement] filed by both [the Sherwoods] and [Ms. Eberhardt].” The 

judgment entry stated “[t]his case is now concluded and no further [c]ourt action is appropriate.” 

{¶11} The Sherwoods timely appealed the trial court’s decision raising one assignment of 

error of our review. 

II. 

Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred as a matter of law by finding that it did not have subject 

matter jurisdiction over any pending motion and proceeding in Case No. 

10J[G]30837 where the parties entered into a legally-binding settlement 

agreement on October 17, 2011 which was memorialized into a legally binding 

judgment entry on November 1, 2011 and where this Court has already 

determined that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the 

November 1, 2011 judgment entry memorializing that settlement. 

{¶12} In their sole assignment of error, the Sherwoods argue the juvenile court erred as a 

matter of law by dismissing the underlying case. The Sherwoods contend that the juvenile court 

erred by misconstruing this Court’s decision in In re C.W. I and concluding that it had no 
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jurisdiction to act on any “pending motion and proceeding” because a visitation order pursuant to 

R.C. 3109.12 had never been issued in the underlying case. The Sherwoods assert the juvenile 

court “had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce” the parties’ “legally-binding settlement 

agreement” set forth in the agreed journal entry of November 1, 2011. 

{¶13} “Ohio’s juvenile courts have limited jurisdiction: they can exercise only the 

authority conferred on them by the General Assembly.” State ex rel. C.V. v. Adoption Link, Inc., 

157 Ohio St.3d 105, 2019-Ohio-2118, ¶ 14, citing In re Z.R., 144 Ohio St.3d 380, 2015-Ohio3306, ¶ 14. The juvenile court does not have “inherent equitable jurisdiction” to determine 

grandparent visitation, and “possesses only the jurisdiction that the General Assembly has 

expressly conferred upon it.” In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 172 (1991), citing Ohio 

Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B). “The juvenile court’s determination regarding its subject 

matter jurisdiction implicates a question of law which this Court reviews de novo.” In re J.L.M., 

9th Dist. Summit No. 28867, 2018-Ohio-2175, ¶ 9. 

{¶14} “Visitation” encompasses the right of a party—who does not have custody of that 

child—to visit the child. In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 171 (1991). “The law does not provide 

grandparents with inherent legal rights based simply on the family relationship.” In re H.W., 114 

Ohio St.3d 65, 2007-Ohio-2879, ¶ 9. However, “Ohio law provides various methods for 

grandparents to obtain a legal right of access to their grandchildren outside of the juvenile custody 

situation.” In re M.N., 9th Dist. Wayne No. 07CA0088, 2008-Ohio-3049, ¶ 20. 

{¶15} R.C. 3190.12 is one statutory method grandparents may use to seek visitation rights 

with a grandchild if the child’s mother is unmarried. R.C. 3109.12(A) provides in pertinent part 

that 

[i]f a child is born to an unmarried woman and if the father of the child has 

acknowledged the child and that acknowledgment has become final * * *[,] the 
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parents of the father * * * may file a complaint requesting that the court grant them 

reasonable companionship or visitation rights with the child. 

A court may grant the companionship or visitation rights requested under R.C. 3109.12(A) “if it 

determines that the granting of the * * * companionship or visitation rights is in the best interest 

of the child[ren].” R.C. 3109.12(B). 

In determining whether to grant * * * reasonable companionship or visitation rights 

with respect to any child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but 

not limited to, the factors set forth in [R.C. 3109.051(D)].” “Divisions (C), (K), 

and (L) of [R.C. 3109.051] apply to the determination of * * * reasonable 

companionship or visitation rights under this section and to any order granting any 

such rights that is issued under this section. 

R.C. 3109.12(B). 

{¶16} Additionally, R.C. 3109.11 allows a grandparent to file a complaint in the juvenile 

court for companionship or visitation rights when a parent of the child is deceased. A juvenile 

court may award visitation pursuant to R.C. 3109.11 based on the same considerations stated in 

R.C. 3109.12(B), including the relevant factors of R.C. 3109.051(D). “Even though [R.C. 3109.11 

and 3109.12] grant standing to a nonparent to request visitation, the ability to have visitation 

awarded is conditional upon a finding that visitation with the nonparent is in the best interest of 

the child.” In re N.C.W., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-12-229, 2014-Ohio-3381, ¶ 25. 

{¶17} In their brief on appeal, the Sherwoods argue that the juvenile court erred when it 

misconstrued this Court’s decision in In re C.W. I to hold that the juvenile court “had no [] subject 

matter jurisdiction to act in the case whatsoever, and thus it had no jurisdiction to act further on 

any pending motion, including enforcing the Sherwoods’ visitation rights and the trial court’s 

contempt findings, because a visitation order pursuant to R.C. 3109.12 had never been issued.” 

{¶18} Although Ms. Eberhardt moved the court to “dismiss” any pending matters for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction, Ms. Eberhardt essentially moved the court to stop acting or 
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exercising authority regarding the November 1, 2011 agreed judgment entry and to cease any 

additional “proceedings” in the matter. In its June 10, 2019 judgment entry ruling on the motion, 

the juvenile court indicated that, in In re C.W. I, this Court “held that the agreement did not have 

the necessary language pursuant to law to meet the requisite standard to be an order for grandparent 

visitation.” The judgment entry noted that both parties had petitioned the juvenile court to modify 

their settlement agreement. The juvenile court concluded “[i]t appears that the original pending 

motions of the [p]arties were resolved with a reliance upon this agreement, however, the decision 

of the Court of Appeals clearly states that the agreement was deficient and as a result the court did 

not exercise the requisite subject matter jurisdiction over this matter to make said agreement an 

enforceable court order.” 

{¶19} In In re C.W. I, Ms. Eberhardt raised an argument challenging the juvenile court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.12 to issue the “‘November 1, 2011 Grandparent 

Visitation Order.’” In re C.W. I at ¶ 21. We determined that her argument lacked merit because

the November 1, 2011 agreed journal entry memorializing the settlement agreement between the 

parties did not involve an exercise of jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.12. The journal entry did not 

reflect any finding as to the statutory factors or determination as to the best interest of the children 

as required by R.C. 3109.12, nor did it expressly grant the Sherwoods a right to grandparent 

visitation or companionship. Id. at ¶ 29-30. Thus, we rejected Ms. Eberhardt’s argument because 

we concluded the juvenile court could not have erred by exercising jurisdiction in the November 

1, 2011 agreed journal entry when, in fact, it had not exercised such jurisdiction. While the 

juvenile court appears, at least in part, to have based its June 10, 2019 ruling on conjecture and a 

mischaracterization of our decision, the ultimate conclusion that the juvenile court reached in its 
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June 10, 2019 judgment entry was that the court lacked jurisdiction to take further action in the 

matter. 

{¶20} In their merit brief, the Sherwoods argue that the juvenile court erred by 

“dismissing” the case and by “finding that all claims and proceedings in Case No. 10JG30837 

were void for want of subject matter jurisdiction.” However, the June 10, 2019 judgment entry 

did not dismiss a pending action or make a finding regarding all claims and proceedings. Further, 

the Sherwoods’ contention that the juvenile court erred “by finding that it did not have subject 

matter jurisdiction over any pending motion and proceeding[,]” overstates the holding of the June 

10, 2010 judgment entry. The juvenile court found that it was without authority to enforce the 

November 1, 2011 agreed journal entry and concluded that it “lack[ed jurisdiction to address the 

later contempt and the motion to modify [the parties’] agreement filed by both [the Sherwoods] 

and [Ms. Eberhardt].” The judgment entry further stated that the case was “concluded and no 

further [c]ourt action is appropriate.” 

{¶21} Any jurisdictional argument notwithstanding, the Sherwoods have not 

demonstrated prejudice from the juvenile court’s ruling, and it is unclear exactly what relief the 

Sherwoods are seeking. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Though the record is replete with motions and 

filings—including some purporting to assert new claims—the Sherwoods have not identified any 

particular motion or proceeding they believe to be within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. 

Reviewing the June 10, 2019 judgment entry, it is unclear what the juvenile court was referring to 

when it stated that it lacked jurisdiction over “the later contempt” or the motions to modify the 

agreement. While the Sherwoods argue in their merit brief that the juvenile court’s error was in 

concluding that it lacked “jurisdiction to act further on any pending motion, including enforcing 

the Sherwoods’ visitation rights and the trial court’s contempt findings,” they do not point to the 
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record to explain what they believe to have been wrongly “dismissed” or to show how they were 

otherwise impacted by the court’s June 10, 2019 decision. 

{¶22} As the Sherwoods have not identified any motion or proceeding as having been 

improperly dismissed, the Sherwoods are essentially asking this Court for an advisory opinion 

declaring that the juvenile court may, or must, continue to “exercise jurisdiction” with respect to 

the terms of the settlement agreement memorialized in the November 1, 2011 agreed journal entry. 

A decision reversing the June 10, 2019 judgment entry upon speculation that the juvenile court 

may be capable of exercising jurisdiction in some undefined manner with regard to the November 

1, 2011 agreed entry “‘would be completely advisory, and have no practical effect on the 

proceedings. This Court may not issue an advisory opinion.’” In re Guardianship of Bakhtiar, 

9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010721, 2016-Ohio-8199, ¶ 10, quoting In re Emergency Guardianship 

of Stevenson, 9th Dist. Medina No. 04CA0036-M, 2005-Ohio-997, ¶ 11. 

{¶23} Based on the foregoing we conclude that the Sherwoods have failed to show how 

they were prejudiced by the June 10, 2019 judgment entry. See Civ.R. 61; R.C. 2309.59. See also 

Ohio Edison Co. v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23530, 2007-Ohio-5028, ¶ 10 (“An appellant 

bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the error on appeal, and substantiating his or her 

arguments in support.”). Because the Sherwoods have failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court 

committed prejudicial error as a result of the June 10, 2019 judgment entry, and because this Court 

cannot issue an advisory opinion, this Sherwood’s assignment of error is not well taken. 

III. 

{¶24} The Sherwoods’ assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 
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 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellants. 

 

 JULIE A. SCHAFER 

 FOR THE COURT 

CALLAHAN, P. J. 

TEODOSIO, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

BRENT L. ENGLISH, Attorney at Law, for Appellants. 

JONATHAN E. ROSENBAUM, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.