### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 4, 200 7 S es sio n
CIT Y OF JACKS ON, TENNES SEE, EX REL 

### . v. STATE OF TENNESS EE, EX REL 

### . Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 05-1751-III Ellen Hobb s Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2006- 01995-COA-R 3-CV - F iled May 27, 2008

The City of Jackson appea ls the trial court’s dismissal of its action ag ainst the Commis sioner of Commerce a

nd Insuranc e s ee k i n g reimburse ment for building demolition ex penses unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-102-122. F inding that sove reig n immunit y prohibits monetary

claims ag ainst the state whe n broug ht seekinga dec larat o ry order under e ither the De clar atory J udg ment Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-14-101 et seq., or the Administrative Procedur es Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §4- 5-225,
we a ffirm.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed
J UDG E R OB E R T H OL L OW AY , S P

. J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J . and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , S P .J ., joined.

L ewis L . Cobb, Cli nton H. Scott, J ackson, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, C ity of Jackson, Tennesse e ex rel. J im Campbell as Building Offic ial for the City of Jackson. Robert E. Cooper, J r., Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; D oug las Earl Dimond, Senior Counsel for the appellee , State of Tenne ssee, e x rel. Paula F lowers a s Commi ssioner of the Dept. of Commerce & Insuranc e.
OP IN ION This appea l conce rns the City of Jackson’s eff

ort to be reimbursed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6 8- 10 2- 12 2 b y

the Commis sio ne r o f Com mer c e and Ins ur anc e fo r c os ts t

he c ity inc ur re d in demolishing a

building. The trial c ourt dismissed the city ’s suit ag ainst the Commis sioner (“ Commis sio ne r” ) se e kin g re imb ur se me nt. Sin c e the matte r be low wa s dis po se d of on a mot ion to dismiss , the followingfac ts alleg ed in the City of Jackson’s complaint are taken a s true.W h i l e t h e compl ai n t a l l eg ed T en n
. Code An n
. § 27- 9- 101 ets eq
. as a ju r i s di ct i onal b as i s , t he ci t y wi t hdr ew 1
t hat pa rt i cul ar gr o und when b ef o re t he t ri al co urt

. I n ad d i t i o n, t he co m p l ai nt m akes r ef erence t o request i ng a de cl arat o ry j u dg men t a n d c i t es on l y T en n
. Code An n
. § 16- 11- 101 ets eq
. W e as s ume t hat t he ci t y ar gu es on appeal t hat t hey s eek t o e s t abl i s h j u r i s di ct i on u n der t h e D ec l ar at or y J u dg men t Act , T en n
. Code An n
. § 29- 14- 101 ets eq
. -2- The City of Jackson Building Offic ial decla red the Fox Building to be unsafe and unfit for human use unde r th e city ’s building c ode. The ultimate owner of the Fox Building , Wil liam T. Di amon d, Jr., wa s n oti fi e d i n Februar y of 20 04 of the pr ob le ms a

nd re qu e ste d to take imm e diate action. When no action was taken, the Building Offic ial filed a misdemeanor citation on Marc h 2, 2004 ag ainst Mr. Diamond. Afte r a he aring , Mr. Diamond was ordere d by the court to remedy the dang erous c onditions i n the Fox Building . When Mr. Diamond aga in failed to act, in April of 2004, the Building Official found the bui lding to constit ute a da ng erous a nd/or defe ctive building unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 68- 102-101 et seq

. an d o rd er edM r. Di am o n d

t o d em o l i s hth e F o x Bu i l d i n g.
Be fore proce edingwith the demoli tion, the city hired a n arc hitectura l and eng ineer ing f irm to inspect the building. As a re sult, the city rec eived a

repor t from the firm ve rifying that the Fox Buildingcompromised public safe ty and that immediate action should be taken to a ddress the risk.
The c ity held an a dminist rative he aringin J une of 2004 r eg ardingthe risks posed by the Fox B ui ld in g . T he B uil din g Of fi c ia l pr e sid e d a

nd Mr . D iamon d w a s p re se nt. Th e he ari ngre su lte d in Mr. Diamond beingorder ed to demolish the building, whic h he aga in failed to do. Mr. Diamond, howeve r, did not appea l the order

. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 68- 102-121, the c ity demolish ed t h e Fox Building at an expense of $80,125.62. The ci t y has not bee n reimburse d by Mr. Diamond for

the demolition
e xpe ns e s.
There afte r, the Building Offic ial reque sted reimburse ment of the de moliti on expenses from the C o mm issioner

of Commerce and Insuranc e (“ Commi ssioner”) under Te nn. Code Ann. § 68-102- 122. When the C ommissi oner declined the city ’s request for reimbursement fr om the statutory Fire Pr e ve nti on

F un d, the c ity

fi le d th e laws uit

. The c ity fi l ed a “Petition for Review/Complaint” in the Davidson County Chance ry

Court naming as def

endant the State of

Tenne ssee ex re l ., Paula Flowe rs as Commissioner seekingrelief
un de r t he Ad min istrativ e Pr oc e dure s A c t, T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 -5 -3 22 , a nd a de c lara

tor y jud g me nt. 1 The g rava men of the pe tition alleg ed that the Commissioner violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-102-122 when she denied r eimbursement a nd the city

seeks a decla

ratory order to that effe ct and or deringthe Commis sio ne r t o re imb ur se the c ity fo r t he e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d. Spe c if

ic a lly , th e re lie f r e qu e ste d in the c ity ’s c omp la int

is that the c ourt fi nd that the Commis sio ne r “i s re qu ir e d to r e imb ur se the c ity of Jackson” for

the demoli tion expenses under Tenn. C ode Ann. § 68-102-122. The city also asked the cour t to “order

the Commiss ioner . . . to rei m b u rs e t h e city . . . $80,125.62 from the F ire Prevention F und” and a

war d the city

“any and all dama g es suffe red.”T h i s s i t u at i on wi l l not ar i s e i n t h e f u t u r e s i n ce ef

f ec t i v e Ju n e 5, 2006, T en n
. Code An n
. § 68- 102- 122 doe s n ot 2
p ro vid e fo r reim b urse m en t f ro m t he F i re P rev en t i o n F un d

. T he am en d ed ve rsi o n o f t he st atute p ro vid es a s f o l l o w s:
If a p a rty fails, n e g le c ts, o r re fus e s to re p a y the o ff ic e r th e e x p e n se inc u rr e d b y the o ff ic e r w ithin thirty (30 ) d ays a f

t er t h e occ u r r en ce , t h e of f i ce r ma y i mmedi at el y pl ac e a l i en u pon t h e pr oper t y f or t he exp e n ses i ncurred p urs uant t o T enn. C o d e A nn. § 6 8

- 1 0 2

- 1 2 1 , t o get her wi t h a t wenty

- f i ve p ercent (2 5 % ) p e n a lty. T h e li e n sh a ll b e a lien o n the p ro p e rty, inc lud ing the re a l es ta te o n w h ic h the p ro p e rty i s l oca t ed, a n d t h e l i en s h al l be s u per i or an d pr i or t o al l ot h er l i en s on t h e pr oper t y , e x ce pt a l i en f or t ax es a ssessed an d d ue t he state, c o un t y a nd c i t y in w hich the p ro p erty is lo ca t ed , an d ve nd o rs’ l i en s. -3- T h e Co mm is s io n e r f

il e d a mo ti o n to d is mi s s a ll e g in g a lt e r n a ti v e ly th a t th e c ourt lacke d subject matter jur isdiction and that the city was not en t i t l ed t o reimburse ment. The trial c ourt conclude d that it had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s dec ision under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5- 22 5. Af

te r c on c lud ingthat it

ha d ju ri sd ic tio n, the c ourt g ra

nte d th e Commis sio ne r’ s mo tio n to dismiss finding that the city was not entitled to reimburse ment. The trial court found that the re cord shows that the Fox Building safe ty problems arose from structura l and wate r problems a nd not fire preve ntion. Since Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-102-122 allows reimburse ment from the F ire Preve ntion Fund to addr ess fire safe ty issues, the city did not qualify for reimbursement unde r the statute. As
a conse quence , the trial cour t gr anted the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismis s. The city appea led.

I. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW
A T e nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 12 .0 2( 6) mot ion to d ism iss fo r fa ilure to s tate a c la im tests the l eg al s ufficie ncy of t he complaint it self. W illis v. Dept. of Corrections , 113 S.W .3d 706, 71 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; D o e v

. S u n d q u ist, 2 S.W. 3d

91 9, 92 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . T he sta nd ard of a pp e llate revie w of a

dismiss al under

Rule 12.02(6) re quires that we t ak e t he fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint as true. Willis, 113 S .W.3d at 710. Si nce r eview of the trial court’ s interpre tation of a statute is a question of law, our revie w is de novo, without a pre sumption of corre ctness. Fahrner v. SW Manu., Inc

. , 4 8 S. W.3 d 1 41 , 1 44 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T he tr ia l c ourt shou ld gra

nt a mot ion to dismiss only

“whe n it a

ppear s that the plaintiff can prove no set of fa cts in support of the cla im that would entitle the plaintiff to re lief.” W ill is , 113 S.W .3d at 710.

II. A N A L Y SIS
Ce rt a i no f

f i c e r s ar e a

u th o r i z e d b y T e n n
. C o d e A n n
. § 6 8

- 1 0 2

- 1 1 7 t o o r d e r th a ts p e c i f

ic dang erous building conditions be remedied. I f the owne r of the buildingdoes not comply with the order and the c ondition is not remedie d, then Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-102-121 a uthorizes the office r to repa ir or demolish the building. A t all times relevant to the c ity ’s ac tions, Tenn. Code Ann. 2 § 6 8- 10 2- 12 1 p ro vid e d a s f oll ow s w ithre g ard

to e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d b y the of fi c e rs ;
I f a pa rty within thirty

(30) da y s therea fter f

ails, neg lects, or r efuse s to repay the officer t h e ex pense the reby incurre d by

the offic er, the office r shall ce rtify the
e xpe ns e to t

he c omm iss ion e r

o f c o mm e r c e and

ins ur anc e , a

nd the c omm iss ion e r s ha ll immediately

pay the expenses out of the fir e pre vention fund.-4-

Th e Commis sio ne r a

rgue s th a t it is no t a

pp ro pr iate to re a c h th e me ri ts o f t he c ity ’s re qu e st sin c e the tr ia l c ourt

la c ke d s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n to e nte rt a in t he c la im.

I t is well settled that the doctrine of sover eig n immunit y provides that the state may not be sued i n its own courts absent legislative c onsent. W e lls v

. Te nn esse e Bo ar

d o f R e ge nts , 231 S.W .3d 9 1 2 , 9 1 6 ( T e n n
. 20 07 ); Da v ids on v . Le wis Br oth e rs B ak e ry , 227 S.W .3d 17, 19 (Tenn. 2007)

. Article I , section 17 of the T ennesse e Constituti on authorizes the Gene ral Asse mbly to waive
sovere ign immunity

“in such manne r and in such c ourts as t he L eg islative may by law dire ct.” W

e lls , 23 1 S. W.3 d at 91 6; Davidson , 227 S.W .3d at 19.

Be cause Tenn. Const. art. I , § 17 is not self-e x ecuting , the Gene ral Asse mbly has the exclusive constituti onal pre rog ative to establish the proce dures for making monetary claims ag ainst the state.

W hite v . S tate , No. M1999-00713-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 134601, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2 0 0 1 ) ( n o T en n
. R

. Ap p
. P

. 1 1 ap p l i ca t i o nfi l ed ) ( ci t i n g Ge ne ra l O il Co . v . Crain , 95 S.W . 824, 826 (1906)) W

illiams v. Re

gister , 3 Tenn. (1 Cooke) 213, 217 (1812)) . Fur thermore , Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102( a) pr ohibits courts from hea ringcase s ag ainst the state abs ent waive r and r equire s dismiss al. W

e lls , 231 S.W .3d at 916. Ther efor e, sover eig n immunit y is both constitut ional and statutory

. Id .; W

ill iam s v . Ni c e ly , 230 S.W .3d 385, 388-89 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2007).
Th e Ten nes see S up rem e C ou rthas con si st ent ly hel d t hata wai ver o f so vere ign i mm un ity wi ll not be found “ unless there is a statute clea rly and unmi stakably disclosing an intent upon the par t of the L eg islature to per

mit such l i t i gat i o n.” Davidson , 2 2 7 S

. W

. 3 d at1 9 (q u o t i n g Scates v . Bd. of Com m’rs o

f U nio n Ci ty , 265 S.W .2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1954) ). The Court of Appea ls in W

hite v . S tate succinc tly descr ibed the standards we are to a pply when decidingwhether the leg islature has w aived
s o v e r e i g ni m mun i ty. Statutes permitting the State to be sue d for money damag es must be strictly

construed beca use they are in de rog ation of the c ommon law. He mb re e v . S tate , 925 S.W .2d 51 3, 51 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Beare Co. v . Olsen , 7 11 S.W .2d 603, 605 (Tenn. 1986) ; Stokes v. University of Tennesse e , 737 S.W .2d 545, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). Any statute purporting to waive the State’s s overe ign immunity must be “so plain, clea

r and unmistakable as to leave no r oom for doubt of the intention of the le g islature.” Quinton v. Board of Claims , 16 5 Te nn
. a t 21 4- 15 , 54 S.W. 2d a t 95 7; Hi se v . S tate , 968 S.W .2d 852, 853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). T hus, the courts may not pr esume that the Ge ne ra l As se mbl y

wa ive d s ov e re ig n immun ity any mor e tha

n th e e xpre ss statutory languag e. Da le

yv . S tate , 869 S.W .2d 338, 340 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

W hite , 2001 WL134601, at *3.
A r e vie w o f Te nn . Code Ann. § 6 8- 10 2- 12 2 le a ds to t he c on c lus ion

tha t it do e s n ot e xpre ssl y p e r m i ts u i ta g a i n s tth e s t a t e an d i s n o ta w a i v e r o f th e s t a t e ’ s s o v e r e i g ni m mun i ty.T he ci t y ’ s co m p l ai nt , how ever, did no t al l ege t hi s st at ut e as a juri sdi ct i o nal b asi s b ut rel i ed i nst ead upo n T enn. 3 C o d e A nn
. § 4

- 5

- 3 2 2 wh i ch go ve rns jud i cial review o f co ntested ca ses. -5- The ci t y , howeve r, appe are d to argue below that it is proce edingunder the Dec laratory J udg ment Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-14- 101 et seq ., and, as such, the court is vested w ith subject
matte r j ur isd ic tio n to he ar i ts c la im. Th e Commis sio ne r, ho we ve r, argue s that so ve re ig n immun ity prec ludes the cour

t from hea

ringa decla

ratory judgme nt action ag ainst it since the Dec laratory J u d g m e n tA c tc o n t a i n s n o w a i v e r o f s o v e r e i g ni m mun i ty.
This issue is not novel and our cour ts have a ddresse d whether the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act
can se rve a s a devic e to bringsuit ag ainst the state. Our Supreme Court and intermediate c ourts have
c on sis te ntl y

he ld t hat th e De c larator

y Judg me nt A c t do e s n ot c o nt a i n a wa ive r o f s ov e re ig n immun ity
s u c hth a ts u i tm ay b e b r o u g h tun d e r i ta g a i n s tth e s t a t e th a ti s d e s i g n e d t o r e a c hth e s t a t e ’ s tr e a s u r y. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. B racey , 8 17 S.W. 2d 29 2, 29 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) ; Northern Telecom, Inc . v. Taylor, 781 S.W .2d 837, 838 (Tenn. 1989) ; Hill v. Bee ler , 28 6 S .W. 2d 86 8, 87 1 ( Te nn . 1 95 6) ; W illiams v. Nic e ly , 230 S.W .3d at 389-90. The same holds true when the action is a g ainst a s t at e o ff i ce r. W illiams , 2 30 S.W. 3d

a t 38 9; Carter v. McW

herter , 859 S.W .2d 343, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
The c ity also argues that the t ri al court wa s corr ect whe n it determined that it had subjec t matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedur es Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-5- 225. The statut e re lie d u

po n b y the tr ia l c ourt

pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: 3 (a ) T he le g a l va lid ity

or a pp lic a bil ity of a statute, rul e or or de r o f a n a g e nc y to specifie d circ umstances may be deter mined in a suit for a dec laratory judgme nt in the chanc ery court of D avids o nC o un ty , un l es s o th erwi s e s p ec i fi ca l l y p ro v i d edb y

statute, if the cour t finds that the statute, rule or order , or its thre atene d application, interf ere s with or impairs, or thre atens to interf ere with or impair, the leg al rig hts or privileg es of the c omp la ina

nt. Th e a g e nc y

sh a ll b e ma de a

pa rt y to t he su it. The que stion i s whether

the leg islature intended T enn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-225 to waive the state’s sover eig n i m m u n i t y wh en the clea r and e x press purpose of the suit is to reac h the state’s trea sury . Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-225 does not expressly waive the state’s immunity so as to allow
an assa ult upon the t rea sury . Wit hout a clea r statement of

such intent, we a

re not at liberty

to infer
o n e
. A s d is c u s s e d

e ar li e r , w e mu s t s tr ic tl y

c o n s tr u e T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 4

- 5

- 2 2 5 in th is c o n te xt beca use it is in derog ation of the c ommon law. Fur thermore , there must be no “doubt of the int e nti on of the le g isl a tur e ” to a llo w s uit s in e ff e c t to re a c h th e tr easury . Co ns e qu e ntl y , w e mus t conclude that Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225( a) is not a waiver of sovere ign immunity such that it can be used to make monetary claims ag ainst the state.
This conclusion i s further buttressed by the s tatutory sovere ign immuni ty provision, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13- 102, which expressly prohibit such a r esult. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20- 13-102(a ) pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s:-6-

No cour t in the state shall have a

ny power , jurisdiction, or authority to enterta in any suit a g ainst the state, or ag ainst any office r of the state acting by authority of the state, wi th a vie w t o r e a c h th e state , its tr e a sury , fu nd s, or pr op e rt y , a nd a ll s uc h s uit s sh a ll be dismissed as to the state or suc h office rs, on motion, plea, or demurrer of the law office r of the state, or c ounsel employ ed for the state.
As state d b e fo re , it

is c le arl y and e xpre ssl y th e c ity ’s int e nt, a s e vid e nc e d b y the a lle g a tio ns in i ts complaint , t o re cover reimburse ment of its demolition ex penses whic h is clear ly “a vie w to rea ch the stat e, its treasur

y , funds.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 20-13- 102(a) require s that such a suit be dismiss ed.
We do not believe the re is a conflict betwe en Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-5- 225(a) allowing decla ratory actions ag ainst state age ncies and the i mmunity provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20- 13- 102(a) . The provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5- 225(a) provide that a party may seek a decla ratory order “unless other

wise spec ifically

provided by

statute.” The sov er eign immunity provisions of Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 0- 13 -1 02 (c ) s pe c if ie s o the rw ise if

the purp os e t o a sse rt

a mon e tary c la im a g a ins t the state . I n othe r wo rd s, de c larator y a c tio ns may be br ou g ht ag a ins t sta te a g e nc ie s as d e sc ri be d in Te nn . Code Ann. § 4-5 -2 25 (a ), ho we ve r, Te nn . Code Ann. § 20- 13 -1 02 (a ) p ro hib its su c h s uit s “ wi th a view” , i.e. , with the purpose, to re ach the state trea sury
. The c ity argues on appe al that its suit is permissible since its petition seeks an or der r eg arding the applica

bility of a statute. The city ’s complaint clea rly asked the court to find the Commissioner was oblig ated to make the re imbursement and to orde r it to be d o n e. S imply beca use the applicability

of a statute ma

y be at issue doe s not vest the court with jurisdi ction to hear a monetar

y claim ag ainst the s tate. One may not use a “ bootstrap” a

rgument to effe ctuate a

waiver of the state’ s immunit y ag ains t m o n et ary

claims. Such a wa iver must be express and le ave “ no doubt” that the l e g i s l a tur e i n t e n d e d

t o a l l o wa

s u i ta f f e c t i n g th e tr e a s ur

y.
Si n c e th e s tate an d it s o f f ic e r s ar e p r o te c te d b y s o v e r e ign immu n it y w h ic hhas not bee n waived by

the leg islature, the tria l court did not have subject matter jurisdi ction to enterta in the city ’s claim. Consequently , the trial co u rt ’s d i s m i s sal of the a ction is upheld on the g rounds discussed here in.
Whil e we do not rely on these g rounds to su s t ai n t h e dismissal since subject matter jurisdiction is absent, there are two alternative g rounds that likewise support dismissal of this action. First, we ag ree with the trial court that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-102- 121, as it exi sted at the time of pr oc e e din g s b e low , a llo we d r e imb ur se me nt t o a dd re ss f ir e sa fe ty iss ue s and no t the ty

pe of pr ob le ms that b e s e t t

h e F o x B u il d in g
. Se c o n d , p la inti f f ma y n o t j o in ano r ig in a l a c ti o ns e e k in g mo n e tary relief , such as that r equeste d here , with an appe llate ca use of a ction, such as a petiti on seekingrevie w of the Commissioner’s dec ision as reque sted here in. An appe llate ca

use of a ction ( i.e. , a

pe tit ion fo r c omm on -l aw wri t of c e rt ior ari )
c a nn o t b e j o i n e d w i th an o r i g i n a l c a u s e o f a c t i o n ( i

. e
. , a c o mp l a i n t f or inv e rs e-7-

condemnation). W

inkler v. Tipton County Bd. of Educ. , 63 S.W .3d 376, 383 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 01 ); Go od

win v . Me tro . B d. of H

e alt h , 656 S.W .2d 383, 386-87 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that “[t] he nece ssity of a separ ation of appe llate re view of
a matte r a nd tr ia l of an oth e r matte r ought to be se lf e vid e nt.

. . . L ike wate r a nd oil , the tw o w ill no t mix.” ) Whe re an or ig ina l a c tio n f or dama g e s h a s b e e n jo ine d w ith a petition for wr it of cer

tiorari, the c laim for dama g es should be dismiss ed at the ve ry outset. Byra m v. C i t

y of Brentw ood , 833 S.W .2d 500, 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Go od win v . M e tro Bd . o f H e alt h , 656 S.W .2d at 387.

W atson v. C ity of Lavergne , M2006-00351-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL 1341767, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 7, 2007) (no Te nn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).
The dismissal of the trial cour t is affirmed for the rea sons stated her ein. Costs of this appeal
are taxed ag ainst the City of Jackson.

____________________________________ ROBERT HO L L OWAY, SPEC I AL J UDGE