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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re HUNT, Minor. June 15, 2017

No. 335550 Lake Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 13-001540-NA

Before: G ADOLA , P.J., T ALBOT , C.J., and G LEICHER , J.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order termina ting his parental rights to his minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j ) (reasonable likelihood of harm if the child is returned to the parent). We affirm.

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it r uled that clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish the statutory gr ounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interests. We review for c lear error a trial court’s decision that a statutory ground has been established by clear and convi ncing evidence, In re Mason , 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), and that termination is in the best interests of the child, In re LaFrance Minors , 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). A decision is cl early erroneous if, “although there is evidence to support it, the re viewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha s been made.” In re JK , 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).

The trial court concluded that c lear and convincing evidence s upported terminating respondent’s parental righ ts under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) provides that a trial court may terminate a parent’s rights if “[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likel ihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. ” This statutory ground exists when the conditions that brought t he child into foster care con tinue to exist despite “time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of s ervices . . . .” In re Powers Minors , 244 Mich App 111, 119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). MCL 712A.19b(3)( g) states that the trial court may terminate parental rights if “[t]he parent, wit hout regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable tim e considering the child’s age.” Finally, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provid es that the trial court may t erminate parental rights if-2- “[t]here is a reasonable likeli hood, based on the conduct or ca pacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of th e parent.”

Termination of respondent’s paren tal rights was proper under M CL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ). It is undisputed that the order terminating respondent’s parental rights was entered more than 182 days after the initial dispositional order was entered. Indeed , the order was entered three years after the initial dispositional order was entered. The conditi on that led to this adjudication was respondent’s continuing substance abuse. The record shows that respondent never successfully addressed this barrier to reunif ication. During the pendency o f this case, respondent was involved in four substance abuse treatment programs, two of whi ch he completed and two of which he was discharged from f or rules violations. Although re spondent showed progress for a time after his initial incarceration for failing to complete on e of the substance abuse treatment programs, he relapsed within weeks of being released on parole after completing an outpatient substance abuse treatment program , and withdrew from any involv ement with his son. Respondent was ordered to enter a third substance abuse treatme nt program, but was discharged from this program for a rules violation. He was then incarcera ted before entering a fourth substance abuse treatment program, in which he remained at the time of the termination hearing, with a release date several mont hs in the future. Given this h istory, the court correctly concluded that there was no reasonable lik elihood that respondent could s uccessfully rectify his substance abuse, and its attendant impact on his son, within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and con vincing evidence in order to terminate a respondent’s parental rights. In re Ellis , 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). Nonetheless, we further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j), c onsidering respondent’s hist ory of substance abuse, his failure to maintain stable empl oyment and suitable housing thro ughout the proceedings, and his inconsistent interactions with his son.

A trial court must order termin ation of parental rights if a s tatutory ground for termination is established by clear and convincing evidence and the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence th at termination is in the child’ s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). In making a bestinterest determination, the court may consider a variety of fac tors, including the parent’s history, parenting ability, and participa tion in treatment programs, the child’s age and bond to the parent, the foster-care environment, and the child’s need for permanenc y, stability, and finality. In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); In re VanDalen , 293 Mich App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).

At the time of the termination hearing, the child was six year s old and had been in foster care in at least three different placements for over three year s. The trial court waited more than two years for respondent to complete substance abuse treatment programs and to be released from prison. When respondent was released from prison and bega n parenting time and play therapy with the child, two serv ice providers and the child’s g uardian ad litem supported the goal of reunification. However, afte r just ten weeks of parenting t ime/play therapy, and just a number of weeks after completing outpatient substance abuse treatment, respondent relapsed, stopped communicating with the caseworke r, and stopped attending parent ing time/play therapy. At this point, the therapist directing the play therapy sessions could no longer support reunification-3- efforts. She opined that the child would be further damaged if respondent entered his life and disappeared again. She indicated that three years in foster ca re is too long and that the child needed stability and permanency in order to address his signifi cant attachment issues. The trial court did not err in concluding that termination of respondent’ s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola /s/ Michael J. Talbot /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher