### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT N ASHVILLE N ove m be r 2, 200 4 S es sio n MA RILY NN E MA CLE OD REE D v. JOHN WILLIAM RE ED
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Rutherford County

No. 02-5606DR

Royce Taylor, Chancellor

No. M2003- 02428-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 30, 2004

Th is i s a div or c e c a se . Prior

to the ir marria g e , th e pa

rt ies ent ered in to an a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt, desig ned to kee p separ ate a ll property bro ug ht into the marriag e, as w ell as all prope rty acquir ed during the marriag e unless ac quired jointly . The trial c ourt gra n ted Wife a divorc e on the g round of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial cou rt cl assi fied a nd divided the parties’ sepa rate and marital prope rty

in a ccor dance with the antenuptial ag ree ment. As a re sult, Husband was a llowed to r e tain mu c h o f h is s e p ar a te p r o p e r ty a n d r e ti r e me n t. T h e tria l c o u r t d e n ie d Wi f e ’s re quests for a lim on y a nda tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Wif e ha s a pp e a le d. F or

the re a so ns state d b e low , w e a ff ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
David W. Garr ett, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Marilynne Mac leod Reed. Sony a W. Hender son, Murfre esboro, Te nnessee , for the a ppellee, John W illiam R eed.
OP IN ION
Fac tua l an d P

ro c e dur al B ac kg ro und
J ohn Wil liam Reed (“Husband” ) and Marily nne Mac L eod Ree d (“Wife” ) we re ma rried on Dec ember

28, 1994. At the t ime of t he marriag e, Husband was forty -one (41) y ear s old and Wife wa s f if ty -o ne (5 1) y e ars old . T he pa rt ie s e nte re d th e marria g e wi th c hil dr e n f ro m pr e vio us marria g e s, ong oing busine sses, and substantial sepa rate property . Prior to and throug hou t t h e mar riag e, Husband wor

ked as Capta in I nspector f or the Ci ty of Murfree sboro Fire De partment a nd also owned and oper ated Shady

Creek F arm, a

horse training and boarding fac ility

. Wife beg an tra ining hor ses-2-

in 1967 and had been professionally involved in the horse training business since at least 1991, whe n she met Husband and beg an tra ining at Shady Creek F arm.
Pr ior to the marria g e , th e pa

rt ie s e nte re d in to an a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt, de sig ne d to h a nd le the disposition of the parties’ pr operty in the event of death or

divorce . The a ntenuptial ag ree ment pr ov ide d, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
SECTI ON ONE : PR OPERTY OF TH E PARTI ES Prospective wif

e owns prope rty

as sche duled in E x hibit A. Prospective hu sb and own s p rop ert y

as s ched ul ed i n E x hi bi t B.
SECTI ON TWO: I NTENT O F TH E PARTI ES The pa rties intend and desire that all property owned r espec tively

by eac h of them at the time of the ma rriag e shall be his/ h er re s pective pr operty fre e fr om any cl a im s o f th e o th e r p ar ty

. T h e p ar ti e s f u r th e r in te n d th a t a ll p r o p e r ty in h e r it e d by h i m / h er during the course of marriag e shall be his/her respe ctive prope rty . The parties f urther intend and desire that all property acquir ed by eac h of them fr om any source during their marriag e shall be his/her respe ctiv ep r o p e r

ty , e xcept a s here inafter provided.

. . . . SECTI ON SIX: AFT ER-ACQUI RED PROP ERTY
Al l pr op e rty

a c qu ir e d a ft e r the marria g e of the pa rt ies sh all be the se pa

rate p r o p e r t y o f

t h e p ar t i e s , w i t h a l l r i g h t s , t i t l e , a n d i n t e r e s te x c l u s i v e l y i n t h a tp ar t y, un le ss the pa

rt ie s ac qu ir e joi nt titl e to sa id pr op e rty , in whic h ca se the pr op e rty sh a ll b e j o i n tp r o p e r t y.
SECTI ON SEVEN: MANA GEMENT OF PROP ERTY
E a c h p ar t y s h a l l h a v e s o l e m a n a g e m e n ta n d c o n tr o l o v e r h i s /h e r p r o p e r t y.

. . . . SECTI ON TWEL VE: SCOPE OF AGREEMENT The provisions containe d in this agr eeme nt re p r e s e n t t h eentire unde rstanding betwee n J ohn Wil liam Reed and Ma rily nne Or

r pertaining to their

respe ctive pr op e rty a ndmari ta l pr op e rty

ri g hts

.-3-

Pursuant to section one of the ag ree ment, the parties attache d separ ate e x hib i t s to the prema rital ag ree ment, listi ng the sepa rate property eac h maintained entering the marriag e. Included a mon g the ite ms Wife lis te d as he r se pa rate pr op e rty we re the fo llo wi ng : a “ No te ” fo r r e a l pr op e rty located in California, sec ured by a dee d of trust in the principal amount of $175 , 000.00; a “Note ” in the principal a mount of $30,000.00; a one-ha lf (1⁄2) inte re s t i n real property located at 4398 Sul ph ur Spring s Ro a d, Mu rf

re e sb or o, Te nn e sse e ; f

ou r w a lki ng ho rs e s a nd a on e -h a lf (1⁄2 ) int e re st i n another ; two vehicles; two I RAs worth $4,000.00; $ 9 , 0 0 0.00 in saving s at Third National Ba nk; household furnishing s; a Steinway g rand pia no; I ntarsia 17 Century Picture; jewe lry ; and antique th dolls.
I n Husband’ s ex h i b i t to the antenuptial ag ree ment, he listed, among other thing s, the following as hi s separ ate property : a “F arm” located at 4337 Sulphur S pring s Road, Murfre esboro, Tenne ssee; a “ Home” loc ated at 4383 Sulphur S pring s Road; “Rental Propert y ” l o cate d at 4317 Sulphur Sprin gs R o ad ; $35,000.00 in saving s at Third National Ba nk; his pension with the Murfre esboro F ire De partment; five w alking horses a nd one pony ; “Fa rm Equipment;” horse and uti lit y tr a ile rs ; a coi n, kn if

e , a ndg un c oll e c tio n; thr e e ins ur a nc e po lic ie s; a on e -h a lf (1⁄2 ) i nte re st i n rea l property

located at 4398 Sulphur S pring s Ro ad ; two vehicles; $3,000.00 in che cking acc ount with Third National B ank; four g rave lots; and eig ht acr es of “ rea l property /hay fields locate d on the east side of

Sulphur Springs Road.”
Dati n g fr o m at l east 1991, whe n Wife beg an tra ining hor ses at Shady Creek F arm, a nd c on tin uin g thr ou g ho ut the marria g e , th e pa rt ie s mai ntaine d a con sis te nt bus ine ss re la tio ns hip wi th reg ards to the ope ration of S h ad yCreek F arm a nd the handling of clients’ a ccounts. Husba nd
m ai n t ai n ed t wo b an k

ac co u n t s t h atar e r el ev an tt o t h i s ap p ea l , a s av i n gs ac co u n t(t h e “ S av i n gs Acc ount”), a nd a chec king acc ount thr oug h which he contr olled the financ es of the f arm (the “F arm Ac c ou nt” ). Clie nts bo ard ing a nd /or tr a ini ng the ir

ho rs e s at Sh a dy

Cr e e k F a rm wo uldmake pay me nts direc tly to Husband or to Shady Creek Farm. Husband would deposit thos e payments into the Farm Acc ount and then re mit t o W i fe an amount that repr esente d her c ompensation for training a nd reimburse ment for her ex penses. Wife would then deposit those funds into her own se parate bank a c c ou nt. Al tho ug h H us ba ndha nd le d a ll the bo ok ke e pin g a ndc he c k w ri tin g , Wif e wa s h e a vil y involved in the day -to-day manag ement and ope ration of the f arm. At s o me point during the marria g e, Wife’s na me was added to the F arm Ac count, as we ll as the Saving s Acc ount, but Husband testified that her name was a dded to these a ccounts solely for e merg ency

purposes. Wife claimed that the a ccounts, ba sed on her understanding , wer e “all joint ac counts.” Prior to filing for divorce , Wife withdrew $40,000 f rom the Saving s Acc ount. By November

2002, the parties’ re lationship had deterior ated, and Wife filed for divor ce, a sse rt ing the g ro un ds of

a du lte ry , i nap prop ri a tema ri ta l c on du c t, i nd ig nit ie s, a ndir re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s. I n h e r c omp la int , Wif e a sk e d the c ou rt to , amo ng oth e r thin g s, make a n e qu ita ble div isi on of

the ho rs e tr a ini ng bu sin e ss; c e rt a in p arc e ls o f r e a l pr op e rty ; ve hic le s; f arm e qu ipm e nt; chec king and saving s acc ounts; and Husba nd’s pension plan with the City of Murfr eesbor o. Hu sb a ndfi le d a n a ns we r andc ou nte rc la im f or div or c e , a sse rt ing g ro un ds of ir re c on cila ble differ ence s and inapp ropriate marital conduc t. I n his answer , Husband took issue with Wife’s-4-

classification of many

of the a ssets as marital prope rty . Further, Husba nd asserted that the issues of property division shoul d be g overne d by the parties’ antenuptial a g ree ment.
F oll ow ing a

tr ia l, the c ou rt

e nte re d a F ina l D e c re e of

Di vo rc e , o rd e ri ng a s f

oll ow s: 1. That [W ife] is hereby

g rante d a divorc e from [Husband] upon the g rounds of ina pp ro pria te ma

ri ta l c on du c t, r e sto ri ng bo th t o th e status of un marrie d p e rs on s;
2. That the a ntenuptial ag ree ment executed by the parties on Dec ember

22, 1994, is a valid ag ree ment and incor porate s the intent of the parties. The Court finds that said ag ree ment has not bee n modified or ame nded since Dec ember 22, 1994[,] and the a g ree ment shall be enf orce d in this m atter;
3. The Court finds that Husband’ s chec king and saving s acc ount[ s] wer e not tr e a t e d a n d/ o r

a c t[ s i c ] a s m ar i t a l a c c o u n t s d u r i n g t h e m arr i a g e a n d , a c c o r d i n g l y, [we re ] not

“ a ft e r- a c qu ir e d” pr op e rty a s d e fi ne d b y

the an tenu pti a l a g re e me nt. Husband is her eby

awa rded a ll funds in said acc ount s and Wife shall re turn the $4 0, 00 0. 00 , p re se ntl y

he ld i n h e r b a nk

a c c ou nt, to H us ba nd [;]
4

. T h a tH u s b a n d i s a w ar d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g i t e m s o f

m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y: (a) 5276 L eanna

Swamp Road - value $131,000.00 (b) 7.5 a cre s an d home at 3970 L eanna Road - equity

value $17,000.00 (c ) 1 99 7 F or d F -3 50 - v a lue $2 2, 00 0. 00

. . .[;]
5

. T h a tW i f

e i s a w ar d e d t h e f

o l l o w i n g i t e m s o f

m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y: (a) 4398 Sulphur Springs Road - va lue $91,000.00 (b) 10 a cre trac t at 3970 L eanna Road - value $70,000.00 (c) Hawaii tim e shar e - va lue $4,500.00 (d) computer, laptop computer, stove, horse business prog ram, DV D play e r - tot a l va lue $2 ,5 00 .0 0[;]
6. Th a t Hu sb a nd sh a ll p a y Wif e $1 ,0 00 .0 0 to “ e ve n- ou t” themari ta l pr op e rty division;
7

. T h a tt h e f

o l l o w i n g i s H u s b a n d ’ s s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y: (a ) A ll farm e qu ipm e nt w ithe xce pti on be ing g ive n to the ite ms awa rded to Wife in Para g raph # 8 (b) Entire value of

Husband’s pe nsion plan (c) Husband’s hor ses and livestock-5- (d) 1990 F ord F -150
8

. T h a tt h e f

o l l o w i n g i s W i f

e ’ s s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y: (a) Wife’s horses (b ) m ic ro sc op e kit (c) equine de nsimeter (d) a rtificial bre eding mount (e) sewing machine 9. That Wife shall assume sepa rate responsibilityfor pay ment of the outstanding pr operty

tax fo r 4 398 Sulphur Springs Road[,] her c redit ca rd debts[,] a nd$7 00 .0 0 to John B ake r f or the pr op e rty

app raisa ls;
10. That Husband sha ll ass u m e separ ate r esponsibilityfor pay ment of the mortg ag e on the 7.5 acr es at 3970 L eanna Road and $600.00 to John Baker for the pr op e rty app raisa ls;
11

. Th e C o u r tf

i n d s t h a tW i f

e i s f i n a n c i a l l y s e l f

- s u f f i c i e n ta n d h e r

i n c o me e xce e ds he r e xpe ns e s, the re fo re , Wife ’s c la im fo r al imo ny is d e nie d. Wif e ’s re qu e st for Husband to pay

for c ontinuing hea lth insurance c overa g e is denied.
12. That Wife is here by

restore d to the use of he r maiden name, Mac L eod;
13. That ea ch party

shall pay their re spective attorney ’s fe es and lit i gat i on e xpe ns e s, inc lud ing e xpe rt wi tne ss f e e s;
14. That court costs in this matter shall be divided e qually betwee n the p ar t i e s , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y. Wife appea ls from the trial court’s judgme nt and prese nts, a s we pe rce ive them, the following issues for our revie w: (1) Whether

the trial court erre d in interpreting the parties’ antenuptial ag ree ment and, thus, err ed in cl assi fying the separ ate and marital prope rty of the pa rt ie s; (2) Whether

the trial court erre d in the division o f t h e m arital assets of the pa rt ie s; (3) Whether

the trial court erre d by

failing to awar d Wife a divorce on the g ro un d o f a du lte ry

ins te a d o f i na

pp ro pria te mari ta l c on du c t;-6- (4) Whether

the trial court erre d by

failing to awar d Wife alimony ; and (5) Whether

Wife should have bee n awa rded he r attorne y ’s fee s by the trial c ou rt , a ndwh e the r s he sh ou ld b e a wa rd e d h e r f e e s o n a pp e a l.
Stan dard of Revie w
I n so far as these issues involve que stions of fact, we revie w the trial c ourt’s finding s of fa c t de novo up on the re c or d a c c omp a nie d b y a pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ) ( 20 04 ); Sm ith v . S

mi th , 93 S.W .3d 871, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). T he trial c ourt’s fac tual finding s will be upheld as long as they are not contrary

to the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Sm ith , 93 S.W .3d at 875. Howe ver, the interpre tation of antenuptial a g ree ments, like any other c ontrac t, is a matter of la w, subject to pure de novo revie w. See B ryant v. Bry ant , No. W2003-01906-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 948844, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2004)( no perm. app. filed). “[T] rial courts have broa d discretion to determine whether spousal support is neede d and, if so, its nature, amount and dur ation.” Miller v. Miller , No. M2002-02731-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 22938950, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 10, 2003)( no perm. app. filed )( ci t i n g Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W. 3d46 5, 47 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ). An a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in div or c e c a se s is g e ne ra lly rec og nized as alimony

and, ther efor e, is subject to the same standards that gove rn alimony determinations. See Miller , 2003 WL 22938950, at *5–6. Thus, the trial c ourt’s dec isions reg arding alimony

and attorne y ’s fe es will not be reve rsed a bsent a c lear

showing of an a

buse of discretion. Se e id

. (1 ) A nte nupt ial Agr e e ment
Wife’s first issue involves the trial court’s c lassification of the pa rties’ sepa

rate and marital pr op e rty . T he pa

rt ie s, ho we ve r, e nte re d in to an a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt. Th e re fo re , w e wi ll l oo k f ir st to that ag ree ment to decide to what ext ent the issues of prope rty classification and division have bee n previously

ag ree d upon. Although not spe cifica lly raised a s an issue, we will address, as a pre liminary matter, the enfor cea bilityof the a ntenuptial ag ree ment. Wife inti mates that the a ntenuptial ag ree ment was draf ted by a client- friend of

Husband an d t h at W ife wa s without independent counse l during the ne g oti a tio n o f the a g re e me nt. Hu sb a nd a sse rt s th a t th e a tto rn e y wh o d ra ft e d th a t a g re e me nt w a s, in fac t, a c lo s e f

r ie n d o f Wi f

e
. Se c ti o n 3 6

- 3

- 5 0 1 o f th e T e n n e s s e e Co d e , w h ic h g o v e r ns the enfor ceme nt of prema

rital ag ree ments, provides that an antenuptial ag ree ment will be binding on the c ou rt on ly “ if su c h a g re e me nt i s d e te rm ine d, in the dis c re tio n of [the ] co urt, t o h a ve be e n e nte re d in to by [t he] spouses free ly , knowledg eably an d in good f aith and without exertion of duress or undue influence upon either spouse .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-501 (2001). Repr esentation by independe nt counsel, howe ver, is not a pr ere quisite to a find i n g t h at t he parties entere d into a prema rital ag ree ment fre ely

and knowledg eably

. Bryant , 2004 WL 948844, at *4, (ci t i n g Randolph v.T h e a g r e e me n t di d n ot de f i n e t h e t e r m “ pr op e r t y
. ” T h e r e for e , a s t h e r e i s n o l i mi t i n g de f i n i t i on for t h e t e r m, 1

we w i l l l oo k t o t he pl ai n mean i ng of t he t er m “ propert y
. ” Pl ant er s G i n Co. v
. Fede r al Com pr es s and War ehous e Co. , 78 S. W

. 3d 885 , 889 –9 0 (T enn
. 200 2). B l ack ’ s L aw D i ct i onar y d ef i nes “pr op er t y ” b r oadl y as “ [ a] ny ext er nal t hi ng over w hich t he ri gh t s o f

p o ssessi o n, use, and en jo ym en t are ex erc i sed .” B l ac k’s L aw D i cti o na ry 1 2 3 2 (7 t h ed

. 1 9 9 9 ). T hu s, w e c o n c lude t hat t he p art i es i nt end ed t hat “al l p rop ert y ” shoul d b e i nt erpret ed t o enco m p ass p rop ert y o f any so rt, i ncl udi ng ea r ni ng s f

r om empl oy ment , r et i r ement or el s ewh er e. -7- Randolph , 937 S.W .2d 815, 822 (Tenn. 1996)). Fr om our revie w of the r ecor d, it appear s that the a tto rn e y wh o d ra ft e d the a g re e me nt c ou ld pr op e rl y be c ha ra c te ri zed a s a “ mutua l” frie nd

. Th e re is nothing e lse in the rec ord to sug g est that the parties entered i n t o t he ante nuptial ag ree ment in a manner other than “fr eely , knowledg eably and in g ood faith.” Likewise, the rec ord does not revea l an yevidenc e of dur ess or undue influence . There fore , we c onclude that the e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding that the ag ree ment was va lid and enfor cea ble.
Tu rn in g t o the la ng ua g e of the a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt at is su e he re , th e pa rt ie s sp e c if

ic a lly set forth their intent in Section Two of the ag ree ment, entitled “Intent of t he P arties.” Wit hin that p ar a g r ap h , t h e p ar t i e s s t at e t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t h a t e a c h p ar t y w o u l d r e t a i n , a s h i s /h e r s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y, the prope rty

owned r espec tively

by eac h of them at the tim e of the marria g e. Section Two f urther state s tha t “ [t]he pa

rt ie s f urthe r i nte nda ndde sir e that all prop e rty a c qu ir e d b y

e a c h o f the m from 1 any source during their marriag e shall be his/her respe ctive prope rty , exc ept as hereinafter provided .” Unde r Section Six of the a g ree ment, entitled “Af ter-A cquire d P ro p er t y ,” the pa rties pr ov ide d th a t “ [a]ll pr op e rty a c qu ir e d a ft e r the marria g e of the pa rt ie s sh a ll b e the se pa

rate pr op e rty of the pa rties . . . un le ss the pa rti e s acq uire joi nt titl e to sai d pro pe rty, in wh ic h c as e the prop e rty sh all be joi nt p ro

pe rty .” ( a) Ba nk Ac c ou nts
Nei ther pa rty dis pu te s th e fa c t th a t H us ba ndow ne d b oththe F arm a ndSa vin g s A c c ou nts prior to the mar

riag e. I t is also undisputed that, at s ome poi nt during the m arriag e, Husba nd added Wife’s name to both t he Farm Ac count and the Saving s Acc ount. L ikewise, Wife adde d Husband’s name to all but one of her separate bank acc ounts. Husband, however, claims that the parties a g ree d to add the other ’s name to his/her respe ctive ac counts for use in the event of an eme rg ency . Husband fu rthe r a sse rt s th a t, d uring the ma rria g e , n e ith e r p arty

ma de a ny

de po sit s in , o r w ith draw als fr om, the other’ s acc ount. Wi fe c laims that she had on occa sion written chec ks from the F arm Ac count at Husband’ s direction, althoug h, at trial, she c ould not produce any evidenc e of this claim. Wife arg ues t hat, by titli ng the bank acc ounts in both parties’ names, Husband has conve rted the funds in these a ccounts to joint property , there by trig g ering Section Six of the pa rties’ a ntenuptial ag ree ment. Acc ording ly , Wife contends that these bank ac counts should be cons i d ere d marital property , and the f

und s i n t h o se ac counts should be subject to equitable division. The trial court fo u n d t h att h e b an k

ac co u n t s we re n o t tre at ed as m ar i t al ac co u n t s b y t h e pa rt i es d u ri n g t h e m arri age and, thus, wer e not “a fter- acquir ed” pr operty as def ined by the antenuptial ag ree ment. This led theAs par t of t h e di v or ce dec r ee , W i fe wa s or der ed t o r et u r n t o H u s ban d t h e $40, 000. 00 t h at s h e r emov ed f r om 2 the S a v ing s A c c o u n t p rio r to fi ling fo r d ivo rc e
. -8- trial court to conclude that the bank accounts we re H usband’s sepa rate property , and, ther efor e, he sh ou ld r e c e ive the fu nd s in tho se a c c ou nts

. 2

I t is well-settled that parties may control the disposition of property upon divorce by way of a va lida nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 3- 50 1 ( 20 01 ); Kahn v. Kahn , 756 S.W .2d 685, 694 (Tenn. 1988)

. A valid antenuptial a g ree ment is the same a s an y other c ontrac t and should be interpre ted using principles of construction that apply to other written a g ree ments. W ils on v . M oo re , 929 S.W .2d 367, 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). In construing a contr act, courts should se ek to identify the intent of the pa

rties as set f

orth in the lang uag e of the contra ct. Cityof Coo k e v ill e ex re l. Cookev ille Regional Med. Ctr. v. Humphre y , 12 6 S.W. 3d 89 7, 90 4 (T e nn . 2 004) ; W ilson , 929 S.W .2d at 373. Antenuptial ag ree ments, because they are favor ed by

public policy , are construed liberally to give eff

ect to the intention of t he parties. Sa nd e rs v . San de rs , 288 S.W .2d 473, 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955). I n g ener al, t he provisions of a contrac t must be ex amined in the conte x t of the entire ag reem ent. W

ilson , 929 S.W .2d at 373. Contractua l terms should be g iven their plain, or din ary me a nin g a nd“ sh ou ld b e c on str ue d h arm o nio us ly

to g ive e ff

e c t to a ll p ro vis ion s a ndto a vo id cre ating internal conflicts.” Id . With r e sp e c t to a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nts , th e su bs ta nc e of the pa rt ie s’ intent will prevail over the form of the instrument, and the ag ree ment “will not be held invalid for technica l or trifling rea sons.” Sa nd e rs , 288 S.W .2d at 478. By construing the antenuptial ag ree ment as a whole, there i s a clear indication that the parties intended that they would eac h reta in and control their respe ctive property throug hout the course of the marriag e. Upon revie wing Section Six in the contex t of t he entire antenuptial a g ree ment, we a re led to the conclusion that the parties intended this provision to addre ss the situation where the parties purcha sed prope rty toge ther as joint tenants during the marria g e. We do not believe that the “AfterAcquire d Property ” sec tion was designe d to addre ss the situation presently befor e this Court, where the parties ag re ed during the marriag e to add the othe r’s na me to previously held ac counts for c on ve nie nc e or

in the c a se of

a n e me rg e nc y
. I n a dd iti on , w e no te that th e re c or d o ve rw he lmi ng ly ref lects that ea ch party

maintained exclusive control over his/her re spective bank acc ounts during the marriag e, re g ardle ss of how the a cco u nt was titled. I t is equally evident that the pa

rties adama ntly

adher ed to this separate pro p er t yreg imen throug hout the course of the mar riag e. Th e re fo re , w e a ff

ir m the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on fi nd ing that Hu sb a nd ’s ba nk a c c ou nts re ma ine d h is s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y. ( b) Farm Equipment
I n the divorce decr ee, the trial court a war ded Husba nd, as his se parate prope rty , all the fa rm equipment, except for a mi crosc ope kit, equine de nsimeter, and an artificia l bree ding mount, which the tr i a l c o u r ta w ar d e d t o W i f e
. I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h h e r

ar g u m e n tt h a tt h e b a n k

a c c o u n t s s h ou ld have be en cla ssified as joint marital property , Wife arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in not classifying as marital pr operty various items of farm equipment purcha sed during the marriag e with funds fr om-9-

tho se a c c ou nts . H ow e ve r, be c aus e we hav e det e rm ine d th a t H us ba nd ’s ba nk a c c ou nts we re his separ ate pr operty , it follows that the farm e quipment purcha sed wi t h t h o s e funds would not ne c e ssa ri ly be mari ta l pr op e rty

a s Wif e c on te nd s. At trial, Husband testified in r efe renc eto th er e le v ant aspe cts conc erning the purc hase of eac h ind ivi du a l it e m of

fa rm e qu ipm e nt. Du ri ng his te sti mon y , he e xpla ine d th e va lue of the e qu ipm e nt; from whom the e quipment wa s purcha sed; whethe r the item wa s purcha sed bef ore or during the
m arr i a g e a n d b y w h o m ; a n d w h e t h e r h e d e s i r e d t o r e t a i n t h e e q u i p m e n ta s h i s s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y. Husband testified that much of the equipment was either purcha sed prior to the ma rriag e, wa s listed as his separ ate pr operty

under Exhibit “B” to the antenuptial ag ree ment, or wa s purcha sed during the marria g e with funds fr om the Farm Acc ount. I n light of our decision re g arding the antenuptial ag ree ment and the ev i dence in the rec ord, we conclude that the trial court appropriately classified and divided the f

arm e quipment in this case
. ( c ) In c re as e in V

alu e of H us ba nd ’s Pe ns ion as Ma rit al P ro pe rty
I n h is e xhibi t to the a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt l ist ing his se pa rate pr op e rty , Hu sb a nd lis te d h is

“ Pe ns ionwi th the Mu rf

re e sb or o F ir e De pa

rt me nt. ” Wif

e a sse rt s tha t the a g re e me nt d oe s n ot a dd re ss th e in c r e a s e inv a lu e o f

th e p e n s io n a c c o u n t th a t a c c ru e d d u r in g th e ma rr ia g e
. T h e r e f

o r e , Wi fe arg ues that the a mount of t hat i ncre ase should be considered marital property . Wife further contends that, beca use the antenuptial ag ree ment was prepa red by “Husba nd’s attorney ,” any ambig uity in the contra ct’s lang uag e should be c onstrued ag ainst Husband. First, the r ecor d does not support Wife’s claim th at t he ante nuptial ag ree ment was dra fted or pre pare d by

“Husba nd’s attorney

. ” Thus, Wife’s arg ument that this ag ree ment should be c on tr oll e d b y

the ru le of

int e rp re ta tio n r e qu ir ing a mbi g uo us c o n t r a c t l an g u a g et o b ec on str

ue d a g a ins t its dr a ft e r i s w ith ou t me ri t.
Un de r S e c tio n T wo of

the a g re e me nt, thepa

rt ie s st a te d that the y

“ int e nda ndde sir e that a ll property acquir ed by

eac h of them fr om any source during their marria g e shall be his/her respe ctive property . . . .” The parties further restated that intention under Section Six of the a g ree ment. Even without specifica lly

listi ng the incre ase in value of Husband’s pension, the intent of the a ntenuptial ag ree ment is clear . We conclude that the parties intende d that any incre ase in va lue of Husband’ s pension during the m ar ri age was to remain Husband’s sepa rate property . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing in that r e sp e c t. (2) D iv isi on o

f t he Ma rit al A sse ts
After classifying the parties’ property as either marital or separate, the trial c ourt divided the mari ta l pr op e rty

a s set fo rth ab ov e
. Wif

e arg ue s tha t the tr ia l cou rt ’s div isi on of themari ta l a sse ts should be set aside be cause the trial court erre d by classifying a s Husban d ’s s epar ate pr operty the Fa rm and Saving s Acc ounts, his pension, and the farm equipment. W ife’s a rg ument is premised on the notio n that, should this C ourt hold that the bank a ccounts, pe nsion, and farm equipment wer eS e c tio n 3 6 -4 -1 2 1 (c ) se ts fo rth th e fo llo w ing fac to rs trial c o u rts sh o u ld c o n sid e r w h e n m a k ing a n e q u itab le 3 di vi s i on of

t he mari t al es t at e: ( 1) T he dur at i on of

t he marr i age ; (2 ) T h e a g e , p h ysic a l an d m e n ta l he a lth, vo c a tio n a l skills, em p lo ya b ili ty, e a rn ing c a p a c ity, estate, f i na nc i al l i ab i l i t i es a nd f i na nc i al nee d s o f

ea ch o f t he p arti es; ( 3) T h e t an g i bl e or i n t angi b l e co nt ri bu t i on by on e ( 1) pa r t y t o t h e edu ca t i on , t r ai n i n g or inc re a se d e a rn ing p o w e r o f t h e o the r p a rty;

( 4) T he r el at i ve abi l i t y of ea ch part y f

or f ut ur e a cqui s i t i ons of

ca pi t al as s et s an d i ncome; ( 5) T h e con t r i bu t i on of

ea ch par t y t o t h e ac qu i s i t i on , pr es er v at i on , a ppr ec i at i on , de pr ec i at i on o r di ss i p at i o n of t he m ari t al or separat e p rop ert y , incl ud i ng the co nt ri b ut i o n o f a p art y to t he m arri age as homemaker , wag e e ar ner or pare nt , wi t h t he cont r i but i on of a par t y as homemaker or wag e e ar ner t o be gi ven t he s ame wei gh t i f ea ch part y ha s f

ul f i l l ed i t s r ol e; (6 ) T h e va lue o f t h e se p a ra te p ro p e rty o f ea c h p a rty; ( 7) T he es t at e of

ea ch part y at t he t i me of t he marr i age ; (8 ) T h e e c o n o m ic c irc u m s ta n c e s o f ea c h p a rty a t t h e ti m e the d ivisio n o f p ro p e rty is to becom e e f

fect i ve; (9 ) T h e tax c o n se q u e n c e s to e a c h p a rty, c o sts a sso c ia te d w ith the re a so n a b ly f o re se e a b le sa le
o f t h e a sse t, a n d o the r fo re se e a b le e x p e n se s a sso c ia te d w ith the a sse t;

(10 ) T he am o unt of social s ecuri t y be nef i t s avai l ab l e t o each spo use; and (1 1 ) S uc h o t he r fac t o rs as are ne ce ssary t o co nsid er the e q uit i es b etwe en t he p arti es.
T en n
. Code An n
. § 36- 4- 121( c) ( Su pp. 2004) -10- marital prope rty , Wife would be ent i t l ed t o an equitable division of those items. However , as we ha ve c on c lud e d th at th ese it ems r e ma ine d H us ba nd ’s se pa rate pr op e rty , th e y

areno t su bje c t to equitable division.
Trial courts are gr anted broad di scre tion when dividi ng the m arital estate, and such decisions are “entitled to g reat wei gh t o n ap p eal.” W atte rs v . W

atte rs , 9 59 S.W. 2d58 5, 59 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Batson v. Batson , 7 69 S.W. 2d84 9, 85 9 ( Te nn Ct. Ap p. 19 88 )) . A pp e llate c ou rt s will ge nera lly

defe r to a trial c ourt' s division of property u nless it is i nconsistent with the fac tors enumer ated in sec tion 36-4-121(c ) of the Tenne ssee Code or is ag ainst the weig ht of the evide nce. 3 Id . I n issuing its ruling f

rom the benc h, the trial court addre ssed ea ch of the fac tors listed in section 36-4-121( c), a

pply ing those fac tors applicable to this case. I n the di vorce decr ee, the parties r ece ived a roug hly equal division of the value of the marital estate. Upon r eview of the re cord, w e conc lude that the tri al co u rt ’s division of the marital proper ty was in line with the we ight of the evidenc e. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court on this issue. (3) Grounds for Divorce During the t rial, Husband stipulated that he was g uiltyof adultery . Additionally , the re cord re fl e c ts that H us ba ndwa s in vo lve d inoth e r e xtra -mari tal af fair s d uring the c ou rs e of the pa rt ie s’ marria g e. The rec ord also re veale d evidenc e of some phy sical alterc ations and alleg ations by Wife involving domestic a

buse by Husband. Althoug h Husband stipulated to adultery , he al l ege d that Wif e wa s g uil ty of ina

pp ro pria te mari ta l con du c t. Hu sb a ndc omp la ine d th a t Wif e mis tr e a te d h im by pu tti ng he r so n a ndhe r b us ine ss a he a d o f h im. Al so , d uring his te sti mon y he a llu de d to c e rt a in-11-

non-traditional re lationships in which he believed Wife w as involved. Notwithstanding H usband’s sti pu la tio n to a du lte ry , th e tr ia l c ou rt g rante d a

div orce to W if

e on the g ro un d o f i na

pp ro pria te marital conduc t. Wi fe a sserts that it was er ror f or the court not to gr ant the divorc e on the g round o f a d u l t e r y, i n l i g h to f

H u s b a n d ’ s a d m i s s i o n s
. W h i l e i t i s tru e t h a t H u s b a n d a d m i t t e d t o a d u l t e r y, the re cord a lso suppo rt s the trial court’s decision to g rant the divorc e to Wife on the g round of inappr o p riate ma

rital conduc t. See F

ulbright v. Fulbright , 64 S.W .2d 359, 364 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 01 ) ( “ [W]e d o n ot b e lie ve the Tria l Court wa s re qu ir e d to sta te wi th spe c if ic ity in i ts o rd e r e xac tly what Husba nd’s inappropriate marital conduct wa s[,] g iven his admitted adultery .”). The ref ore, w e aff irm the trial court’s decision in this reg ard. (4 ) A limony We beg in by n o t i n g t hat the parties’ antenuptial a g ree ment did not address the issue of alimon y
. Ho we v er , the parties were marrie d in 1994, prior to the Tenne ssee Supre me Court’s opinion in Car

y v . Ca ry , 937 S.W .2d 777 (Tenn. 1996), which approve d for the first time the rig ht of parties to waive or lim i t al i m o n y throug h an ante nuptial ag ree ment. Se e id . There fore , we a re unable to inf

er from the a

bsence of such a

provision whether

the parties contemplated that alimony might be w arr anted in the e vent of a divorce

. The trial c ourt denied Wife’ s reque st for alimony . I n issuing it s ruling from the bench, the trial court c orre ctly

stated that the two most important fac tors t o co n s i d er in making an alimony determination were the nee d of the re cipient spouse and the obligor spouse’s ability

to pay . The trial c ou rt the n ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:
I n th is p art ic ula

r c ase[ ,] Mr s. Re e d c a me int o th e ma rria g e se lf

-s uf fi c ie nt. She ha s rem ainedse lf

-s uf fi c ie nt d uring the marria g e . T he y ha ve ma int a ine d th e ir property separ ately

. I n looking at her list of ex penses, I noted y esterday

that we ha d some $2,000 worth of ex penses that wer e li sted basica lly as business expenses for he r horse business. B ut there w as not any indication of income f

rom that business. So[ ,] either that horse business is losing money , which if that is the ca se she ne eds to g et rid of the business. I f she is making money , then obviously those expenses are being cover ed by

whateve r she’ s making . So taking those out of the mix , she has suff icient inc ome fo r h e r l ivi ng e xpe ns e s. I n f a c t, s he ha s we ll ov e r a tho us a nd do lla rs a mon th in excess of her e x penses that she has listed, if we take those out. So the reque st for alimony is denied.
Wif e arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt faile d to pr op e rl y c on sid e r the statut ory fa c tor s a pp lic able to alimony determinations. S he further a rg ues that the c ourt’s finding that Wife “c am e i n t o the marria g e self- sufficie nt” is inacc urate beca use, prior to the marria g e, Wife wa s rec eiving $4,000.00 per month in alimony

payments from her

former husband. Additionally , Wife arg ues t hat t he trial court inappr opriately

discounted the e x penses r elated to the br eeding , training , and upkee p of her persona l horses.-12-

Simi lar to the di vision of m arital property , the trial court’s determination of whether to awar d alimony is guide d by statutory fac tors found in se ction 36-5-101( E) of the Tenne ssee Code. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(E) ( Supp. 2004). Section 36-5-101(E ) p ro vides that, in determining the nat ure, a mou nt, le ng th o f t e rm , a ndma nn e r o f a lim on y pay me nt, the tria l c ou rt

sh a ll c on sid e r a ll re l ev an tfa ct o rs , i n cl u d i n g:

(I ) The r elative e arning capa city , obligations, needs, and f inancial r esourc es of ea ch party , including inc ome from pension, profit s haring or re tirement plans and a ll o the r s ou rc e s; (ii) The r elati v e ed u ca tion and training of ea ch party , the ability and opportunity

of ea ch party to secur e such e ducation and tr aining , and the ne cessity of a party to se cu re fu rt h er e ducation and tr aining to improve such party ’s ea rning c apa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (iii) The duration of the marriag e; ( i v ) T h e a g e a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n o f e a c h p ar t y; (v) The phy sical condition of ea ch party , including, but not limited to, phy sical disability

or inca pacity due to a c hronic de bilitating disease ; (vi) The extent to which it would be u n d es i rable for a party to seek employ m en t o u t s i de the home be cause such party will be the custodian of a minor child of the mar

riag e; (vii) The se parate assets of e ach part y , b o t h rea l and per sonal, tang ible and intang ible; (v iii ) T he pr ov isi on s mad e wi th re g ardto the ma ri ta l pr op e rty

a s d e fi ne d in § 36-4-121; (ix ) The sta ndard of

living of the parties e stablished during the marriag e; (x) Th e e xt e n tt o w h i c h e a c h p ar t y h a s m a d e s u c h t a n g i b l e a n d i n t a n g ibl e c on tr ibu tio ns t o th em a

r ri a g ea s m o n e t a

ry a ndho me make r c on tr ibu tio ns , andta ng ibl e and intang ible contributions by a party to the education, training or incre ased e arning p o w e r o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (xi ) The r elative f

ault of the pa

rties i n case s wher e the court, in i ts discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and (xi i) Such other f

actor s, including the tax consequence s to eac h party , as ar e ne c e ssa ry to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 1(E)(i) –( xii) . Wh ile the statut e se ts f orth m a ny

fa c tor s, the tw o mo st i m p o r t a n tf

a c t o r s ar e ( 1 ) t h e n e e d o f

t h e r e c i p i e n ts p o u s e a n d ( 2 ) t h e o b l i g o r s p o u s e ’ s ab i l i t y t o p a y, with the single most im portant fa ctor be ing the rec ipient spouse ’s nee d for support. Pe rryv . P e rry , 11 4 S.W. 3d46 5, 46 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Scarbrough v. Sc arbrough , No. W2000–01807-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 640368, at * 2, 4 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 8, 2001)( no perm. app. filed ). The trial courts have broad discretion in apply ing the fac tors set forth in sec tion 36-5-101(E)

. Anderton v. Ande rton , 988 S.W. 2d67 5, 68 2 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 199 8)

. Th e re fo re , “ [a]p pe llate c ou rt s a reg e ne ra lly

dis inc lin e d to se c on d- g ue ss a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s sp ou sa l su pp ort de c isi on un le ss i t is no t su pp orte d b y the e vid e nc e or

is contra ry to the public policies ref

lected in the a

pplicable statutes.” Id

.U nder Rul e 1 2. 02 o f t he R ut her ford C ount y Chanc er y Co ur t ’ s l ocal r ul es of pra ct i ce, par t i es i n a ny cont es t ed 4 d i vo rce act i o n m ust f

i l e a st at em ent wi t h t he co urt s et t i ng fo rt h al l i ss ues r el evant t o t he d i vo rce, i ncl ud i ng a s t at em ent
o f i nc o m e a nd a li st o f

i t em i ze d ex p en ses. -13- Tu rn ing to the qu e sti on of Wif e ’s ne e d fo r sp ou sa l su pp ort, in Wi fe ’s state me nt o f i nc ome and expenses she stated that she is self-employ ed as a walking horse trainer. She re ceive s $2,500.00 4 pe r m on th i n g ro ss i nc ome fr om t raini ng te n hor se s. She re c e ive s a n a dd iti on a l $1 ,4 58 .3 3 p e r m on th from note pay ments from her sister. Wife also rec ei v es a y ea rl y dividend from Standar d Saving B a nk sto c k, wh ic h in20 03 e qu a le d $ 75 0. 00 pe r mon th. Wif e ’s tot a l mo nth ly

inc ome , b e fo reta xes, is $4,708.33. This amount, as the trial co u rt fo u n d , does not include a ny income ea

rned f rom the br e e din g a ndtr a ini ng of

he r thr e e pe rs on a l ho rs e s.
Wif e ’s Rul e 12 .0 2 s ta te me nt l ist e d to ta l mo nth ly e xpe ns e s a mou nti ng to $ 5, 79 4. 83 . T his am o u n ti n cl u d ed ap p ro x i m at el y $ 2 , 0 0 0

. 0 0 p erm o n t h i n ex p en s es re l at ed t o b o ar d i n g, tra i n i n g, bree ding, and maintenanc e of he r three persona l horses. The trial court de ducted this amount from Wife’s total expenses because Wife had not adeq u at el y s hown wher e she g ener ated income from those three horses. The ref ore, the trial court found that, by “taking those [ex penses] out of the mix ,” Wife earned income r oug hly $1,000.00 in excess of her living expenses. As a

result, the trial c ourt d e n i e d W i f

e ’ s r e q u e s tf

o r a l i m o n y.
The trial c ourt’s finding that Wife earned enoug h income to offse t her e x penses is supported by the re cord. Furthermor e, the r ecor d supports the trial court’s find i n g that Wife was “se lfsufficie nt” when she enter ed the mar riag e and r emained so throug hout the marria g e. We ar e unpersua ded by

Wife’s arg ument that she wa s not self-suff icient bec au s e she was re ceiving $4 ,0 00 .0 0 p e r m on th i n a lim on y fr om a pr e vio us marria g e . I t app e ars ins te a d th a t Wif e c on sc iou sly a ndvo lun tari ly

fo rf e ite d th at ali mo ny wh e n s he a g re e d to marry Hu sb a nd . A dd iti on a lly , th e re is nothin g in th e r e c o r d to in d ic a te th e a mo u n t o f So c ia l Se c u r ity r e ti r e me n t b e n e f it s Wi f e ma ybe entitled to in the future. More over, a s part of the property division, W ife rece ived, along with her separ ate pr operty , the debt-fr ee marital home, as we ll as an additional par cel of rea l property

valued at $70,000.00. Althoug h the trial court did not make specific findings as to e ach f actor under se ction 36-5-101, there is nothing to sug g est that the court did not consider the othe r fa ctors whe n making its determination. I n view of the conclusion that Wife has failed t o demonstrate that she i s in need of alimony , we a ffirm the tria l court on this issue. (5) Attorneys’ Fee s
Both parties reque sted their respe ctive attorney ’s fee s at trial. Finding that eac h par t yhad sufficie nt assets to pay

his/her own attorne y ’s fees, t he court denied both requests and orde red that the court costs be divided equally betwee n the parties. Wife appea ls the denial of he r attorne y ’s fe es at trial and a lso requests an a war d t o d ef ra y her le g al expenses on appe al. Wife asserts that she should not be responsible for her attorney ’s fe es bec ause she was g rante d the divorce based upon the fault of Husband and wa s not awar ded liquid assets or alimony

.-14-

“An awar d of l eg al ex penses is consider ed to be a limony .” W allace v. W

allace , 733 S.W .2d 102, 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). As with de cisions involving alimony , decisions involving attorney s’ fe es ar e within the sound discre tion of the court and will not be disturbed absent e vidence preponde rating to the contra ry
. Luna v. Luna , 7 1 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 7 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 6 ) ( ci t i n g Fox v. Fox , 6 57 S.W. 2d74 7, 74 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) ; Ha rd in v . H ar din , 689 S.W .2d 152, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). As w ith the trial court’s de cisio n reg arding alimony , we c annot say that the trial court abused its discre tion in ordering the parties to bear their own l eg al ex penses. W ife’s r equest for her attorney ’s fe es on appe al is respe ctfully denied. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm on this issue.
Conclu sion
For the re asons stated he rein, the judg ment of the trial court is affirme d. Costs of this appea l are taxed ag ainst the Appellant, Mary ly nne MacL eod Ree d, and her surety , for whic h execution may i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE