NUMBER 13-22-00133-CR

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

GUY WILLIAMS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

of Nueces County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

On May 18, 2020, appellant Guy Williams was arrested for terroristic threat, a thirddegree felony, and criminal trespass, a Class B misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 22.02(a)(6), 30.05. The State dismissed the charge of terroristic threat before trial. 

Because appellant is a former district judge in Nueces County, to avoid conflicts of 
2

interest, a visiting judge was appointed to preside over the case and the Harris County 

District Attorney’s Office prosecuted the case instead of the Nueces County District 

Attorney’s Office. A jury convicted appellant for the offense of criminal trespass. See id.

§ 30.05. Appellant elected for the trial court to impose punishment, and it sentenced him

to one year confinement in the Nueces County Jail, probated for ninety days. By three 

issues on appeal, appellant argues that: (1–2) there was insufficient evidence to support 

his conviction; and (3) the judgment is void because the visiting judge lacked judicial 

authority. Because we agree that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support 

appellant’s conviction for the offense as charged in the misdemeanor information, we 

reverse and render a judgment of acquittal.

I. BACKGROUND1

By complaint and information, the State charged appellant with “intentionally and 

knowingly enter[ing] and remain[ing] in a building of another, namely, the Nueces County 

Court House [sic] without the effective consent of Captain Robert Garza[,] Sergeant Dana 

Richardson[,] and Sergeant Andrew Carrizales, after having received notice to depart and 

failing to do so.” See id. § 30.05(a)(2).

Trial commenced on January 3, 2022. Roberto B. Garza Jr., a former Nueces 

County Sherriff’s Office (NCSO) captain, testified that around May 15, 2020, he met with 

the Nueces County District Attorney’s Office for “a little briefing about some threats that 

had come [by] way of e-mail to Nueces County Judge, Barbara Canales.” The purpose of 

the briefing was to provide law enforcement with “guidance and direction in how to handle”

1 The State did not file a brief to assist us with the resolution of this appeal.
3

the alleged threats. When asked by the State from whom those threats originated, Garza 

answered, “From former District Judge, Guy Williams.” According to Garza, appellant’s email stated “[s]omething about we’re [going to] come in [to the courthouse] and we’re 

[going to] . . . force our way through the courthouse.” Garza noted his office “wanted to 

eliminate or prevent having to arrest anybody,” but was directed to arrest appellant if he 

forced his way past the courthouse’s security checkpoint.

According to Garza, appellant entered the Nueces County Courthouse on May 18, 

2020, and attempted to enter a secured area without having passed through the security 

checkpoint. Garza and other officers warned appellant “that if he went beyond that point

that he would be placed under arrest.” Garza “recall[ed] specifically telling 

[appellant] . . . that he could go anywhere in the courthouse that he desired” if he first 

went through the security checkpoint. Body camera footage from multiple officers which 

corroborates Garza’s testimony was admitted at trial. On cross-examination, appellant 

asked Garza whether he “ever t[old appellant], if you don’t leave we’re [going to] arrest 

you for criminal trespass?” Garza responded, “Not in that language, no.”

Sergeant Marilyn King of the NCSO testified that on May 18, 2020, she was 

advised that the courthouse security area required extra protection given appellant’s email which “went out to . . . over a hundred attorneys, . . . urging that they bypass the 

security checkpoint.” King stated that appellant entered the courthouse, attempted to pass 

the security checkpoint without getting screened, and was told he could not enter the 

secured zone without going through security or he would be arrested. Appellant ultimately 

walked into the secured area without having been inspected and positioned himself near 
4

the courthouse’s elevators. King testified that the officers “allowed [appellant] to get on 

the elevator where he was then placed under arrest.” King believed appellant could have 

been arrested for criminal trespass from the moment he entered the secured area but

stated that the officers waited to arrest appellant until he was in the elevator because it 

“is more of an isolated area to where [they] could control the situation more easily.” After 

appellant was arrested, he was immediately brought to the NCSO for processing.

The State asked King if she notified appellant “to depart.” King answered that 

appellant “was notified multiple times by multiple deputies to go through the checkpoint

or he would be arrested.” The State asked King whether “that notice to depart mean[t] 

going through the security checkpoint prior to entering the doors[ to the secured area]?”

And King answered:

Yes. That notice to depart would be going through the 

checkpoint . . . . Because to be in the courthouse you do not have to go 

through the checkpoint unless you’re [going to] go past the double doors 

that lead to the elevators that lead you to the courtrooms, to the District 

Attorney’s Office, to all of those secured areas. So not necessarily—it is to 

depart as in go through the checkpoint.

On cross-examination, appellant asked King, “Did you ever use the words, [appellant], 

you have to depart? You must depart or we’re [going to] arrest you for criminal trespass?”

King answered that she did not.

Sergeant Andrew Carrizales of the NCSO testified and largely echoed his 

colleagues’ testimony. On cross-examination, the following colloquy took place:

[Appellant]: Do you think all of this could have been avoided if 

someone would have said, [appellant], if you don’t 

leave we’re going to arrest you for criminal trespass?

[Carrizales]: I don’t believe so. I believe—
5

[Appellant]: Well, did anybody try it?

[Carrizales]: No.

The parties rested, the jury found appellant guilty, and the trial court sentenced 

appellant as noted above. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on February 3, 2022, which 

was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

By his first two issues, appellant contends that there was legally insufficient 

evidence to convict him of criminal trespass because: (1) “there was a fatal variance 

between the allegations in the information and the proof” at trial, in that Sergeant Dana 

Richardson, who was named in the information, did not testify; and (2) appellant was not

given notice to depart the Nueces County Courthouse.

2 We begin by addressing the 

second issue because it is dispositive.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider 

the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the verdict’ to determine whether any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Delagarza v. State, 635 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 

2 Rule 34.6 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the preparation of the reporter’s 

record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6. Under the rule, if an appellant raises a sufficiency of the evidence 

argument in a criminal case, “the record must include all the evidence admitted at the trial on the issue of 

guilt or innocence and punishment.” Id. R. 34.6(c)(5); see O’Neal v. State, 826 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1992) (“[A] defendant who wishes to raise a sufficiency issue on appeal has the burden of ensuring 

that the entire record of the trial before the fact finder is before the appellate court, and may not request a 

partial statement of facts . . . .”). Appellant requested a reporter’s record comprising only the testimony of 

the three witnesses noted above. However, a review of the county court’s “Notes from Case” entry shows 

that the three witnesses were the only witnesses to testify at trial, and the record included all the exhibits

admitted at trial. We thus consider the record to be complete.
6

2021, pet. ref’d) (quoting Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2020)); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We consider both direct and 

circumstantial evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 

evidence and are not mere speculation. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2017); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “We resolve 

any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the verdict, keeping in mind that the factfinder 

is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to give 

their testimony.” Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723 (first citing Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 

330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); and then citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04).

“The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by comparing the evidence produced 

at trial to ‘the essential elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct 

jury charge.’” Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Malik 

v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “A hypothetically correct jury 

charge ‘accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not 

unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s 

theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the 

defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

A person commits the offense of criminal trespass “if the person enters or remains 

on or in property of another, including . . . a building . . . , without effective consent and 

the person: (1) had notice that the entry was forbidden; or (2) received notice to depart 

but failed to do so.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a). “The offense of criminal trespass 

contains two statutory alternatives: (1) entry with notice that entry was forbidden and 
7

(2) remaining after receiving notice to depart.” Munns v. State, 412 S.W.3d 95, 98 n.2 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.). “When a statute lays out several alternative 

methods of committing the offense, and the indictment alleges only one of those methods, 

‘the law as authorized by the indictment’ is limited to the method specified in the 

indictment.” Geick v. State, 349 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Gollihar 

v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 254–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “[I]f the State unnecessarily 

chooses between statutory alternatives, it must prove what it ple[ade]d.” Geick, 349 

S.W.3d at 547. Here, the information alleges only that appellant remained in the Nueces 

County Courthouse after receiving notice to depart but failed to do so. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 30.05(a)(2). Therefore, a hypothetically correct jury charge would instruct 

the jury to find appellant guilty only if the State proved criminal trespass in this manner.

See Geick, 349 S.W.3d at 545.

“A ‘variance’ occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the 

charging instrument and the proof at trial.” Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 246. “In a variance 

situation, the State has proven the defendant guilty of a crime, but has proven its 

commission in a manner that varies from the allegations in the charging instrument.” Id.

Texas courts differentiate material from nonmaterial variances. Hernandez v. State, 556 

S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Generally, “[a] variance will be considered 

material if the variance prejudices the defendant’s ‘substantial rights.’” Id. But the “failure 

to prove the statutory language” pleaded is “always material” and “renders the evidence 

legally insufficient to support [a] conviction.” Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 294–95

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Hernandez, 556 S.W.3d at 313.
8

B. Analysis

There is no question that appellant entered the secured area of the Nueces County 

Courthouse without consent after being notified by Garza, King, and others that he was 

forbidden from—and would be arrested for—doing so. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 30.05(a)(1). However, that is not the offense charged in the information. Instead, the 

State alleged that appellant “enter[ed] and remain[ed] in . . . the Nueces County Court 

House [sic] . . . after having received notice to depart and fail[ed] to do so.” Nothing in the 

officers’ testimony, in the officers’ body camera footage, or in any other evidence

elsewhere in the record proves that appellant received notice to depart the courthouse.

See id. § 30.05(a)(2). Indeed, each of the testifying officers admitted that they never 

asked appellant to leave the courthouse or stated that if appellant failed to do so he would 

be arrested for criminal trespass.

The State attempted to develop a theory at trial that the relevant “notice to depart”

was appellant’s being informed to “go[] through the security checkpoint prior to entering 

the” secured area. But the State provided no authority at trial or on appeal to support its 

theory that asking appellant to undergo a security check before entering a secured area 

within the courthouse equates to asking him to depart the courthouse. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.2. And, again, the information does not allege that appellant was asked only to 

depart a particular area within the courthouse. Instead, it specifies that he failed to depart 

the courthouse.

In the end, the State pleaded one of two statutory alternatives of criminal trespass 

that specified the manner and means by which appellant’s purported offense was alleged 
9

to have transpired but provided no proof of the same. See Geick, 349 S.W.3d at 547–48; 

Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 294–95; see also Fricks v. State, No. 13-20-00428-CR, 2022 WL 

1669063, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication). Accordingly, the record reflects that there was legally 

insufficient evidence to prove that appellant remained in the Nueces County Courthouse 

after being informed to depart. We must therefore enter a judgment of acquittal. See

Herron v. State, 625 S.W.3d 144, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 

242, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (entering a judgment of acquittal because there was 

insufficient evidence to prove the allegations in the indictment); Cada v. State, 334 

S.W.3d 766, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (same).

We sustain appellant’s second issue.3

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal.

DORI CONTRERAS 

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the

27th day of July, 2023.

3 Having sustained his second issue, we need not address appellant’s first or third issues. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4.