UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4147

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSHUA CARDELL NEWELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:13-cr-00165-CCE-1)

Submitted: September 4, 2014 Decided: January 8, 2015

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, Gregory Davis, Senior Litigator, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Joshua Cardell Newell pleaded guilty to one count of 

brandishing a firearm in connection with a violent crime, 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and two counts of armed bank robbery,

id. § 2113(a), (d). Newell argues on appeal that the district 

court erred at sentencing by applying a four-level enhancement 

for abduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

A.

On October 11, 2012, Newell robbed a branch of the Southern 

Community Bank and Trust (“SCB”). When one of SCB’s tellers, 

BV, approached the bank’s front door, Newell, armed with a gun 

and wearing a ski mask, told BV to “open up.” Newell then 

forced BV inside the bank. Once inside, Newell walked with BV

to the vault and ordered ES, a teller already in the bank, to 

open it. In complying with Newell’s demands, both ES and BV 

moved from the front of the bank to the vault. After ES opened 

the vault, Newell took $101,000 and fled the bank on foot. 

Roughly three months later, on January 7, 2013, Newell 

robbed a branch of the Branch Banking and Trust Company

(“BB&T”). After EB, one of BB&T’s tellers, opened the bank’s 

back door and let two fellow tellers in, Newell came up behind 
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EB and pushed her inside the bank. Newell then ordered the 

three tellers to walk to the vault and open it. After the 

tellers attempted to open the vault without success, Newell 

ordered the tellers at gunpoint to empty their cash drawers. 

Newell took $7,650 from the drawers and left the bank.

B.

On April 30, 2013, a grand jury returned a four-count 

indictment charging Newell with two counts of armed robbery and 

two counts of brandishing a firearm in connection with those 

robberies. Newell pleaded guilty to all but the fourth count, 

which charged him with brandishing a firearm in connection with 

the BB&T robbery.*

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which the 

trial court adopted in its entirety, recommended a four-level 

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) for abduction. 

Newell objected to the enhancement, but the trial court found 

that Newell had abducted the tellers by forcing them to move 

into and within the banks. The court sentenced Newell to two 

concurrent 97-month terms of imprisonment for Counts One and 

 * The government agreed not to “oppose a motion to dismiss 

the remaining count of the Indictment” if Newell pleaded guilty 

to the other three counts. J.A. 18; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(c)(1)(A). The district court granted the government’s motion 

to dismiss this count at Newell’s sentencing. See J.A. 57, 60.
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Three, and a consecutive 84-month term of imprisonment for Count 

Two.

II.

A.

In assessing whether a sentencing court properly applied 

the Guidelines, “we review the court’s factual findings for 

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States 

v. Allen, 446 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2006). 

B.

Newell makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues 

that the district court erroneously determined that he forced an 

employee into each of the respective banks. Appellant’s Br. at 

7–8. Second, he claims that “forcing the employees to move 

around inside the bank branch does not satisfy the definition of 

abduction” in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(A). Appellant’s Br. at 

8. We reject Newell’s first argument, so we find it unnecessary 

to consider his second argument.

The abduction enhancement applies “[i]f any person was 

abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to 

facilitate escape.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). The Guidelines

commentary defines “abducted” as when “a victim was forced to 

accompany an offender to a different location.” Id. § 1B1.1

cmt. n.1(A). We apply a “flexible, case by case approach to 
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determining when movement ‘to a different location’ has 

occurred.” United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 390 (4th 

Cir. 2008). 

Newell argues that the district court erroneously 

determined that he forced an employee into each of the banks. 

The trial court stated that “the robberies actually began 

outside the bank, and the tellers were forced into the bank.” 

J.A. 27. This finding is not clearly erroneous because the 

facts recited in the PSR support the court’s finding, and Newell 

presents no reason to believe that the PSR is unreliable. See

United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990)

(holding that district courts may adopt findings in a 

presentence report unless the defendant “make[s] a showing that 

the information in the presentence report is unreliable, and 

articulate[s] the reasons why the facts contained therein are 

untrue or inaccurate”).

The PSR states that both tellers were outside their

respective banks when the robberies began. During the first 

robbery, BV “went to the front door of the bank to enter the 

door” when Newell, holding a handgun, told her to “open up.” 

J.A. 72. The second robbery began when Newell, “holding a 

pistol, . . . came up from behind [EB] and pushed her inside the 

bank.” Id. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion that the 

robberies began outside the bank is not clearly erroneous.
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The PSR also supports the conclusion that Newell forced

the tellers inside the banks. As to the first robbery, the PSR 

indicates that the teller did not enter the bank until after 

Newell threatened her with a weapon. See id. As to the second 

robbery, the PSR states that Newell pushed the teller through 

the bank’s back entrance. See id. Therefore, the trial court’s 

conclusion that Newell forced the tellers inside the banks is 

not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the district court did not 

err in concluding that Newell’s actions constituted abduction 

within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). See United 

States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 278–79 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying 

the abduction enhancement where a bank teller was inserting her 

key into the bank’s outside door when the defendant announced 

the robbery and forced her inside); cf. United States v. 

Whooten, 279 F.3d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that “the 

abduction enhancement . . . applies whether the abduction is 

carried out by threat or by physical force”).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Newell’s sentence. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED