IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs July 8, 2020

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RUBEN WALTON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 18-00920 James M. Lammey, Judge

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No. W2019-01762-CCA-R3-CD

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A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Ruben Walton, guilty of second-degree murder, 

and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-two years to be served at one hundred 

percent. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

his conviction, two evidentiary rulings of the trial court regarding threatening statements 

the defendant made prior to the murder, and his sentence. After our review, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,

P.J and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., joined.

Phyllis Aluko, District Public Defender; Barry W. Kuhn (on appeal) and Neil Umsted and 

Jennifer Case (at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Roy 

Robinson.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Samantha L. Simpson, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Stephanie Johnson and 

Jamie Kidd, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural History

This case stems from the strained familial relationships between the defendant, his 

wife, Melissa Walton, and members of her extended family. On September 20, 2017, the 

defendant shot and killed the victim, Israel Falkner, Jr., in Shelby County, Tennessee. 

After turning himself into police, a Shelby County grand jury ultimately indicted the 

08/20/2020
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defendant for first-degree murder. The defendant proceeded to trial which began with a 

jury-out hearing addressing the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude any out-of-court 

statements made by the defendant. The initial hearing concerned two statements the 

defendant made to Sharese Falkner, the victim’s mother and Ms. Walton’s aunt, prior to 

the shooting in 2017. 

Ms. Falkner testified that the first statement occurred after the defendant and Ms. 

Walton got into “a situation” at their home in Southaven, Mississippi. The defendant and 

Ms. Walton called Ms. Falkner and took turns speaking to her on the telephone. During 

the call, the defendant threatened to harm and kill Ms. Walton and members of her family,

and Ms. Walton expressed that she feared for her life. Ms. Falkner testified that during the 

conversation the defendant “said that he wanted [Ms. Walton] to choose a gun so he could 

kill her with it,” he “wanted to do something to hurt [Ms. Walton],” and he planned “to do 

things to hurt family members to get at [her].” 

Ms. Falkner then detailed a separate, in-person conversation she had with the 

defendant in April of 2017. After the defendant and Ms. Walton got into an altercation, 

Ms. Falkner went to their home and spoke to the defendant in the garage. During the 

conversation, the defendant again expressed that he wanted to kill Ms. Walton and 

members of her family. Specifically, the defendant planned to hurt Ms. Falkner’s sister 

and other family members “for the hurt and pain that [Ms. Walton] had caused him.” Ms. 

Falkner believed the defendant could act on his statements as he “was so passionate about 

it” and had access to guns. When further questioned by the trial court, Ms. Falkner 

explained the defendant was upset during the garage conversation and noted the defendant

“stressed to me that he wanted to kill [Ms. Walton] and kill family members because of the 

things that they had made him loose (sic) in his life, since he met her.” The trial court 

analyzed the statements under Rule 404(b) and determined both statements were 

admissible. Specifically, the trial court determined Ms. Falkner’s testimony were relevant 

as to the defendant’s motive, his premeditative intent, and to provide the jury “the complete 

story.” The State then presented its case in chief.

Ms. Falkner testified the victim lived with her periodically throughout 2017 at her 

home located in Shelby County, Tennessee. On September 29, 2017, however, the victim 

did not live with her but was visiting with his one-year-old daughter. Ms. Falkner’s sister, 

Linda Stewart, was also visiting that evening. At approximately 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., the

victim answered an unexpected knock at the door. Ms. Falkner could not see the door from 

her position in the living room but heard the victim say, “Ruben don’t come here with this 

mess.” Ms. Falkner heard a loud noise and ran to the front door where she saw “a flash of 

fire” and the defendant “tussling” with the victim. Though she did not see any blood or 

hear the victim state he had been shot, Ms. Falkner asked, “Ruben, why you killing my 

child, why you killing my son, my baby.” The defendant did not respond. 
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As Ms. Falkner attempted to intervene in the fight, the victim ran outside and

collapsed in the driveway. The defendant calmly followed the victim outside, stood over 

the victim, and fired several gunshots with “a mean, hatred look on his face.” Ms. Falkner 

again screamed, “Why are you killing my son, why would you kill my son, why would you 

do this to me, why?” She ran back inside the home and told Ms. Stewart to call 9-1-1. 

Throughout the incident, Ms. Falkner described the defendant as having a “straight, calm, 

cool, collected, look on his face.” 

After asking Ms. Stewart to call 9-1-1, Ms. Falkner went back outside and saw the 

defendant calmly walking down the street but did not see his vehicle. Vencent Thompson, 

a neighbor and the victim’s friend, ran from his house and held the victim while Ms. 

Falkner remained inside until police and paramedics arrived. Ms. Falkner spoke with 

police after the shooting and provided a written statement. Ms. Falkner denied seeing any 

weapons in her home and stated the victim was unarmed at the time of his death. 

Throughout her testimony, Ms. Falkner identified numerous photographs of the 

crime scene including the entryway and front door of her home and the exterior of her 

home depicting the area where the victim died and the path the defendant took as he exited 

the scene. She also identified the victim and the defendant in photographs and made an incourt identification of the defendant. All of the photographs were entered into evidence.

In addition, Ms. Falkner provided context to the strained familial relationships 

which led to the victim’s death. Approximately one year before the shooting, the defendant 

and Ms. Walton lived with Ms. Falkner for about thirty days prior to moving to Southaven. 

During that time, the defendant and Ms. Walton’s marriage was “[r]eally rocky,” and the 

defendant confided in Ms. Falkner about his marital problems. Several times, Ms. Falkner 

intervened in the relationship between the defendant and Ms. Walton at their request. Ms.

Falkner explained the defendant expressed his desire to hurt or kill Ms. Walton and 

members of Ms. Walton’s family. She stated at the time of the victim’s murder the 

defendant and Ms. Walton were separated. 

Linda Stewart, the defendant’s mother-in-law and the victim’s aunt, testified she 

was in a bedroom of Ms. Falkner’s home when she heard the defendant knock on the front 

door. After hearing “a lot of commotion [and] a lot of yelling,” she came out of the 

bedroom and saw Ms. Falkner and the victim trying to close the front door. Ms. Stewart 

heard the victim say, “Ruben don’t come in here with that stuff, Ruben what are you doing, 

why you rushin’ up in my house like this, man?” She heard Ms. Falkner say, “Ruben please 

don’t come in here with this, don’t kill my child, don’t kill my baby.” Ms. Stewart then 

grabbed the victim’s daughter and hid in the closet of a back bedroom. Ms. Stewart heard 

two gunshots and heard Ms. Falkner yell, “[h]e’s killing my baby.” When Ms. Stewart left 
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the bedroom and looked out the kitchen window, she saw the defendant standing over the 

victim who was lying on the ground. Ms. Stewart then heard four or five additional 

gunshots. Ms. Stewart testified the victim was unarmed prior to the shooting.

Memphis Police Department (MPD) Officers Christopher Sanders and Ricky Gray 

responded to the scene on September 29, 2017. Upon his arrival, Officer Gray found the 

victim unresponsive on the ground outside Ms. Falkner’s home surrounded by numerous 

family members. Officer Gray secured the scene, interviewed witnesses, and developed 

the defendant as a suspect. Additionally, while testifying, Officer Gray described the 

events captured on his body camera which primarily consisted of his interactions with the 

victim’s family. The State entered the body camera footage into evidence. While he was 

at the scene, Officer Sanders photographed and collected evidence which included a water 

bottle. The photographs showed the interior and exterior of Ms. Falkner’s house, the 

victim’s body lying on the sidewalk covered by a blue sheet, the house next door to Ms. 

Falkner’s, and the water bottle. The photographs were entered into evidence along with a 

diagram of the crime scene. Officer Sanders did not recover any bullets or weapons from 

the scene.

As the investigation continued, MPD Officer Charles Cathey executed a search 

warrant against the defendant’s white Ford Excursion on October 2, 2017. The search 

warrant returned a pistol, a Glock 9-millimeter handgun loaded with a live round, an assault 

rifle, a holster, a magazine with live ammunition, a mesh bag, and a box of ammunition. 

These items along with numerous photographs of the items were entered into evidence. 

Photographs of additional items found during the search, including clothing, a clothes 

hamper, a fireproof safe, and other personal effects were also entered into evidence.

Dr. Marco Ross, an expert in forensic pathology and the acting Chief Medical 

Examiner for Shelby County, performed the autopsy of the victim and determined the

victim died from two gunshot wounds to the torso. Dr. Ross located a bullet in the left

posterior of the victim’s chest, noting the bullet penetrated the victim’s chest, heart, left 

lung and left, seventh rib. Dr. Ross described the resulting wound as fatal with significant 

blood loss. The second bullet entered the right side of the victim’s mid-back area and 

traveled upward toward the right lung, the right sterno-clavicular joint, and the aortic arch, 

“which is the main blood vessel coming out of the top of the heart curving around down 

into the chest and the abdomen.” Dr. Ross recovered this bullet underneath the skin in 

front of the victim’s sterno-clavicular joint. He stated this wound likely would have caused 

bleeding in the chest cavity and caused the victim to make a gurgling sound due to the 

presence of blood in the airway. Dr. Ross stated both wounds would have been fatal 

independently of one another as each caused significant blood loss. He could not, however,

determine which wound occurred first. Photographs of both the entrance and exit wounds 

were entered into evidence along with x-rays of the victim. The two bullets recovered from 
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the victim’s body and photographs of the same were also entered into evidence. Though 

there were defects in the victim’s clothing from the bullets, Dr. Ross was unable to opine 

the distance from which each bullet was fired.

Special Agent Cervinia Braswell of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testified 

as an expert in the area of firearms identification and ballistics analysis. She examined the 

Glock 9-millimeter pistol, fifty-one 9-millimeter cartridges, and three magazines recovered 

during the search of the defendant’s vehicle along with the two .38 caliber bullets recovered 

during the victim’s autopsy. Special Agent Braswell determined the bullets recovered 

during the autopsy were not fired from the Glock 9-millimeter pistol found in the 

defendant’s vehicle. By comparing the two autopsy bullets, Special Agent Braswell 

determined the .38 caliber bullets were fired from the same, albeit unknown, firearm. She 

analyzed the bullets in the F.B.I. database and determined the bullets could have been fired 

from a different 9-millimeter pistol, a .357 Magnum revolver, a .357 Sig automatic pistol, 

or a .38 Special revolver. Special Agent Braswell testified a .38 Special would fit in the 

holster recovered from the defendant’s vehicle.

Finally, the State called Vencent Thompson to testify. At the outset of his 

testimony, the trial court conducted a 404(b) hearing outside the presence of the jury as the 

State sought testimony from Mr. Thompson regarding a threat the defendant made to the 

victim prior to the shooting. During the hearing, Mr. Thompson explained the context of 

the threat, noting it stemmed from an exchange of weapons between the defendant and the 

victim. In June or July 2017, the defendant called the victim in an attempt to get the victim 

to return the weapons the defendant had given the victim. At the time of the telephone call, 

the victim and Mr. Thompson were together, the victim put the telephone call on speaker 

phone, and Mr. Thompson heard the defendant threaten the victim and claim to be a 

member of the Gangster Disciples Crip. The trial court determined the threat was 

admissible under Rule 404(b). Specifically, the trial court determined the threats related 

to the defendant’s motive and “general animosity towards the victim’s family.” The trial 

court then offered to separately analyze the gang-related comment. The defendant declined 

but again noted his objection to all of the proffered testimony. Mr. Thompson then testified 

for the jury. 

Mr. Thompson stated he has a history of felony drug and theft convictions and was

currently in jail for an aggravated robbery conviction. Mr. Thompson described the victim 

as his friend and neighbor. On September 29, 2017, Mr. Thompson was inside his home 

when he heard three gunshots and screams. When he looked outside, Mr. Thompson saw 

a body on the ground and the defendant “squatting” over the body. After a couple of 

seconds, Mr. Thompson stated the defendant “stood up and shot [the victim] one more time 

and walked off.” Mr. Thompson then ran from his home past the defendant to the victim, 

pleading with the victim to “get up.” The victim, however, did not move. Mr. Thompson 
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did not see any weapons on the victim and did not see the defendant get into a vehicle. Mr. 

Thompson remained on the scene and spoke with the police upon their arrival. He 

identified his home and Ms. Falkner’s home in several photographs previously entered into 

evidence.

Mr. Thompson then described a threat the defendant made to the victim prior to the 

shooting. After meeting the defendant in 2017, Mr. Thompson learned the defendant gave 

the victim several weapons which included a “.22 handgun revolver[,] a .20 gauge[,] and a 

.12 gauge.” This exchange led to a disagreement between the defendant and the victim. 

One evening, the defendant called the victim while Mr. Thompson and the victim were 

together. The victim placed the call on speaker phone, allowing Mr. Thompson to hear the 

conversation. During the call, the defendant asked the victim for his weapons back. After 

the victim indicated he did not want to give the weapons back, the defendant stated, “I’m 

a Gangster Disciple Crip, or else.” The victim responded, “Don’t come over to my

momma’s house with none of that foolishness, if you do, you’re going to have to kill me.” 

According to Mr. Thompson, the defendant calmly responded, “okay, watch your back.” 

Mr. Thompson acknowledged the defendant’s claim to be a Gangster Disciple Crip was 

“gibberish” as you cannot be in multiple gangs. Finally, Mr. Thompson believed the victim 

sold the weapons at issue and denied attempting to purchase a weapon from the defendant

himself. The State then rested its case.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal after which 

the defendant testified on his own behalf. The defendant described his relationships with 

his wife, Ms. Walton, and her extended family which included the victim, Ms. Falkner, and 

Ms. Stewart. In the summer of 2016, the defendant, Ms. Walton, and their children lived 

with Ms. Falkner for approximately one month. The defendant and his family then moved 

to Southaven after which the defendant developed a relationship with the victim. In March 

2017, the victim asked the defendant for weapons, and the defendant gave him a .22 

revolver and a .12-gauge shotgun. The defendant denied giving the victim a .20-gauge 

shotgun despite Mr. Thompson’s testimony. After giving the victim the guns, the 

defendant grew uneasy and asked the victim to return the guns. The victim, however,

refused to do so and told the defendant that he had sold the guns in May of 2017. The 

defendant did not believe the victim. Additionally, as of May 2017, the defendant 

separated from Ms. Walton, and he did not see the victim again in person until the night of 

the shooting. In his continued effort to get the guns back, the defendant had several 

conversations with the victim via text messages and asked Ms. Walton to try to get the 

weapons through Ms. Falkner. 

Regarding his interest in and knowledge of guns, the defendant explained he first 

purchased a gun in 1995. He served in the military for nine years during which he learned 
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how to fire and maintain weapons. Aside from the shooting at issue, the defendant stated 

he last fired a gun in September of 2008 which caused a panic attack.

The defendant then detailed the actions he took prior to shooting the victim. At the 

time of the shooting, the defendant was separated from Ms. Walton and living in Hot 

Springs, Arkansas. On September 29, 2017, the defendant drove from Hot Springs to 

Southaven to spend time with his youngest daughter. Though he felt “a little uneasy” on 

the drive, the defendant continued to Southaven, had work done on his Ford Excursion, 

and picked up his daughter from daycare. At approximately 5:00 p.m., the defendant took 

his daughter to the park and then waited for Ms. Walton at her apartment. When Ms. 

Walton returned, the two got into a verbal argument which resulted in the defendant driving 

to an ATM in Memphis in order to get $80.00 that he owed her. Upon leaving Southaven, 

the defendant removed the .38 caliber pistol, which he often carried while in Memphis, 

from his holster and placed it in the right pocket of his hoodie.

After visiting the ATM, the defendant’s plans changed. Instead of returning to 

Southaven, the defendant went to Ms. Falkner’s home to confront the victim about the 

guns. The defendant “was determined to get the guns back” and believed he needed to ask 

the victim for the guns in person. The defendant explained, “maybe if [the victim] sees the 

seriousness of my face and how concerned I am, he’ll turn over the weapons to me.” 

Accordingly, the defendant drove to Ms. Falkner’s house and parked around the corner, 

claiming he feared the victim might shoot him if he pulled into the driveway. 

The defendant walked to the front door of Ms. Falkner’s home and knocked in a 

way that would be “familiar” to the victim. The defendant demonstrated the “special 

knock” for the jury. When the victim opened the door, the defendant stepped inside the 

entryway approximately one foot from the victim and stated he was there to retrieve his 

guns. The victim asked why he was there so late and pushed the defendant. When the 

defendant repeated that he wanted his guns, the victim pushed him again. The defendant

warned the victim not to push him again as he was holding a pistol. After the victim pushed 

the defendant a second time, Ms. Falkner intervened. At this point in the altercation, the 

defendant stated his pistol was out of his pocket, and the victim had one hand on the gun. 

According to the defendant, the first gunshot occurred when the victim attempted to grab 

the gun. The defendant stated he did not know if the victim was armed during the 

altercation.

After the initial gunshot, the defendant explained he was “devastated” and could not 

“wrap my mind around what is happening to me.” As the altercation continued, the victim 

ran out of the house, and Ms. Falkner yelled, “Ruben why are you shooting my son, why 

did you shoot my son?” As the victim crossed the front yard, the defendant worried the

victim was going to his car to retrieve a weapon. The defendant explained he was “facing 
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a moral dilemma, because I’ve got somebody that’s tried to kill me and what am I going to 

do to protect myself.” As such, the defendant fired two shots at the victim’s back, noting 

only one shot hit the victim. The victim collapsed, and the defendant approached him on 

the ground. The defendant stated: “I stood over him, I said a prayer and I said, well I don’t 

want him to suffer, so I placed one in his chest and I figured that way it would be quick 

and easy and it would be done.” The defendant then put the gun back in his pocket and 

walked away.

After shooting the victim, the defendant traveled to Blytheville, Arkansas and began 

receiving calls and messages asking why he killed the victim. Though the defendant did 

not “recall that,” he turned himself into the Memphis Police Department. The defendant 

testified he did not intend to kill the victim on September 29, 2017. At the time of trial, 

the defendant was still married to Ms. Walton and was taking anti-psychotic medication. 

The defendant denied the police ever responding because he had threatened Ms. Walton 

and members of her family. Regarding the numerous weapons found in his vehicle during 

the search, the defendant explained he was storing his weapons there in order to keep them

away from his brother’s son who had recently been diagnosed with schizophrenia.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder. After 

a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years’ 

confinement to be served at one hundred percent. The defense filed a motion for new trial 

which was denied by the trial court. This timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant presents several issues for our review. First, the defendant 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, suggesting the 

evidence might be sufficient to sustain convictions for voluntary manslaughter or 

criminally negligent homicide but not second-degree murder. The defendant also 

challenges the admission of testimony from Sharese Falkner and Vencent Thompson 

regarding threats the defendant made prior to the murder as inadmissible under Rule 404(b)

of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Finally, the defendant argues the trial court abused 

its discretion in sentencing him to twenty-two years’ incarceration. The State asserts 

sufficient evidence exists to sustain the defendant’s conviction, and the trial court did not 

err in its admission of 404(b) evidence or in sentencing the defendant. Upon our review of 

the record, we agree with the State and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction 

for second-degree murder. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant 
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question of the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by 

the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings 

by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 

190-92 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). 

All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the 

evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 

S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the 

trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts 

in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). 

Our Supreme Court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the 

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given 

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court. 

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523 

(1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant 

is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant 

has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639 

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 

779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977); 

Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for 

sufficiency of the evidence “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or 

circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting 

State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). The jury as the trier of fact must 

evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’ 

testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 

335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)). 

Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence and the 

inferences to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence are questions primarily for the jury. 
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Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006)). 

This Court, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, shall not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Id.

Second degree murder is the “knowing killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-

13-210(a)(1). Second degree murder is a result-of-conduct offense. State v. Page, 81

S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). Therefore, a person acts knowingly “when the 

person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-11-302(b) (2014). “[T]he ‘nature of the conduct’ that causes death is 

inconsequential.” Page, 81 S.W.3d at 787. A knowing intent is shown if the defendant 

acts with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the victim’s death. 

See id. at 790-93. Whether a defendant acted “knowingly” is a question of fact for the jury. 

State v. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d 101, 104-105 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). In assessing the 

defendant’s intent, the jury may rely on “the character of the assault, the nature of the act 

and [on] all the circumstances of the case in evidence.” Id. at 105 (citing State v. Holland,

860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)).

Here, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for seconddegree murder. Not only did the defendant admit to shooting the victim numerous times, 

but his testimony also corroborated the evidence presented by the State. Prior to the 

murder, the defendant loaned the victim several guns. On September 29, 2017, after getting 

into a verbal altercation with his wife, the defendant drove to Memphis armed with a .38 

caliber pistol and decided to confront the victim about the guns. The defendant was 

determined to get the guns back and hoped if the victim saw him in person, he would be 

successful. In an attempt to conceal his approach, the defendant parked his Ford Excursion, 

which was filled with weapons, out of sight from Ms. Falkner’s home. The defendant was 

armed with a .38 caliber pistol hidden in the pocket of his sweatshirt. The defendant 

knocked on Ms. Falkner’s front door in a manner the victim would recognize, and the 

victim opened the door. The victim indicated he did not want the defendant in the home, 

and an altercation ensued. The defendant fired two gunshots during the altercation at the 

front door, and the victim ran. As the victim ran, the defendant fired two additional 

gunshots at the victim’s back. The defendant testified one of the bullets hit the victim 

causing him to collapse. The defendant then approached the victim, who was incapacitated 

on the ground, and shot him in the chest. The defendant walked away from Ms. Falkner’s 

home and fled the state. 

Ms. Falkner, Ms. Stewart, and Mr. Thompson corroborated the defendant’s 

testimony, noting they heard numerous gunshots during the incident and saw the defendant 

shoot the victim. Dr. Ross testified that the victim suffered two fatal gunshot wounds and 

recovered two bullets from the victim’s body during autopsy. Special Agent Braswell 

testified the bullets recovered from the victim’s body were fired from the same weapon 
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which could have been a .38 caliber pistol. As such, the evidence supports the jury’s 

finding that the defendant committed the knowing killing of the victim as it is undisputed 

the defendant shot the victim in the back and chest. Furthermore, the defendant testified 

he intended to kill the victim with the second shot to the victim’s chest. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-11-302(b) (2014). 

In support of his argument, the defendant generally suggests the jury should have 

weighed his testimony and version of events over the State’s proof. Specifically, the 

defendant asserts “that the gun was fired after he was twice pushed by the victim” and that 

Ms. Falkner’s testimony indicates that the victim’s death might have been caused by the 

“tussle” at the front door. The defendant claims the State failed to disprove the victim’s 

death was the result of “a physical attack by the victim upon the defendant that caused a 

state of passion in the defendant that caused him to act in an irrational manner.” The 

defendant also argues the State failed to “disprove the possibility that [he] was only guilty 

of criminally negligent conduct that resulted in the death of the victim.” We respectfully 

disagree with these arguments as the jury determines the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight afforded to the evidence, and this Court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute 

its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Accordingly, this Court presumes any

conflicts in the testimonies presented by the defendant and the State were resolved by the 

jury in reaching its verdict. See Campbell, 245 S.W.3d at 335; State v. Adams, 45 S.W.3d 

46, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). As such, we conclude the evidence presented was 

sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder. The defendant 

is not entitled to relief on this issue.

II. 404(b) Evidence

The defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting testimony from Ms. Falkner 

and Mr. Thompson regarding threats he made against Ms. Walton and members of her 

family prior to the murder. Regarding Ms. Falkner’s testimony, the defendant generally 

asserts the threats she testified to are not relevant and are not admissible under Rule 404(b) 

as the threats “would only tend to show the character” of the defendant as a violent person. 

Similarly, the defendant asserts Mr. Thompson’s testimony wherein he detailed a 

threatening statement the defendant made to the victim prior to the murder is inadmissible 

under Rule 404(b) as it too was only offered to establish the defendant as a violent person. 

The State asserts the testimony at issue was both relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b)

as it was “probative of the [d]efendant’s motive and intent to murder” the victim, and we 

agree.

Evidence introduced at trial must be relevant to the issues of guilt or innocence of 

the accused. Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Evidence is “relevant” if it has “any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
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probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. Even relevant 

evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . the 

danger of unfair prejudice.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee 

Rules of Evidence, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 

the character of a person in order to show action in conformity with the character trait.” 

Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). However, Rule 404(b) allows such evidence in limited 

circumstances for purposes other than proving action in conformity with a character trait. 

Id.; State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 891 (Tenn. 2014). The rule sets out certain procedural 

requirements the trial court must satisfy before such evidence is admissible:

(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence;

(2) The court must determine that a material issue exists other than conduct 

conforming with a character trait and must upon request state on the 

record the material issue, the ruling, and the reasons for admitting the 

evidence;

(3) The court must find proof of the other crime, wrong, or act to be clear and 

convincing; and

(4) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)-(4). The comments to Rule 404(b) provide that evidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts should be excluded unless relevant to an issue other than the 

character of the defendant, such as identity, motive, intent, or absence of mistake. Jones, 

450 S.W.3d at 891; see also Tenn. R. Evid. 404, Advisory Comm’n. Cmt. The other 

purposes for which bad act evidence is admissible include motive, hostility toward the 

victim, malice, intent, and a settled purpose to harm the victim. State v. Hawkins, 519 

S.W.3d 1, 45 (Tenn. 2017); Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 574. “Tennessee courts have accepted 

the use of evidence of a homicide defendant’s threats or prior violent acts directed toward 

the homicide victim as a means of allowing the State the opportunity to establish 

intent.” State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (citing State v.

Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 574 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Turnbill, 640 S.W.2d 40, 46-47 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1982)). Further, “‘[v]iolent acts indicating the relationship between the victim 

of a violent crime and the defendant prior to the commission of the offense are relevant to 

show defendant’s hostility toward the victim, malice, intent, and a settled purpose to harm 

the victim.’” Id. (quoting Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 574). If it substantially complies with the 

procedures set forth therein, this Court affords great deference to the trial court’s decision 

to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) and will only overturn that decision if the court abused 

that discretion. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d at 45. 
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Here, the defendant does not challenge the trial court’s compliance with the 

procedural requirements of Rule 404(b), and our review of the record indicates the trial 

court adhered to the same. Rather, the defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing 

the State to question Ms. Falkner and Mr. Thompson about prior threats the defendant made 

against Ms. Walton and her family, which included the victim, as evidence of his motive 

and intent to harm the victim. The defendant argues the threats made against Ms. Walton

were not relevant to his trial and asserts the threats made against her family were 

inadmissible as it was unclear who the defendant was threatening in the statements. 

Additionally, the defendant argues the threats as testified to by both Ms. Falkner and Mr. 

Thompson were only offered to establish him as a violent person and thus, the testimony 

was inadmissible to prove action in conformity therewith pursuant to Rule 404(b). The 

defendant’s arguments, however, are unpersuasive.

The record makes clear the defendant threatened Ms. Walton and members of her 

family numerous times prior to killing the victim. Ms. Falkner testified about two 

conversations she had with the defendant in 2017 during which the defendant threatened 

to harm Ms. Walton and members of her family. The trial court considered the ongoing 

threats the defendant made against Ms. Walton and her family as “part and parcel of the 

same thing.” The trial court determined Ms. Falkner presented clear and convincing 

testimony that the threats not only illustrated “the complete story of the crime,” but also 

showed the defendant’s intent to harm the victim, a member of Ms. Walton’s family. 

Similarly, Mr. Thompson testified about a specific threat the defendant made against the 

victim after the victim refused to return the defendant’s guns. The trial court determined 

Mr. Thompson’s testimony illustrated the defendant’s motive in killing the victim, noting 

“other than the fact that [the defendant] just had general animosity towards the family, 

altogether, this [threat] as to this victim is pretty specific, so that makes its probative value 

pretty heavy.” 

Upon our review, we conclude the trial court properly allowed this line of testimony 

after complying with the requirements of Rule 404(b). The record indicates the defendant’s 

threats were directed toward the victim both specifically and as a member of Ms. Walton’s 

family, and evidence of the threats allowed the State the opportunity to establish the 

defendant’s intent and motive to harm the victim. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 758. As noted 

above, the defendant, determined to retrieve his guns from the victim, initiated the 

altercation which led to the victim’s death. During the altercation, the defendant fired 

numerous gunshots at the victim and testified the final gunshot was intended to kill the 

victim. Therefore, testimony of the defendant’s threats made against Ms. Walton and her 

family were relevant and probative to the issue of the defendant’s motive and intent to kill 

the victim, and the probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of 
- 14 -

unfair prejudice. The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the testimony. The 

defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Sentencing

Finally, the defendant argues the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence. The 

defendant contends the trial court improperly weighed the exceptional cruelty enhancement 

factor in sentencing him to twenty-two years in confinement, arguing “there were no acts 

done by the defendant that increased the pain suffered by the victim.” The State argues the 

trial court properly weighed both the exceptional cruelty and employment of a deadly 

weapon enhancement factors in sentencing the defendant as the evidence shows “that the 

[d]efendant treated [the victim] with exceptional cruelty when he prayed for [the victim] 

and shot him in the chest.” After our review, we conclude the defendant has failed to

establish that his twenty-two-year, within-range sentence is improper. Accordingly, we 

affirm the sentence.

When an accused challenges the length, manner, or range of a sentence, this Court 

will review the trial court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard with a 

presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tenn. 2012); State v. 

Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tenn. 2013). The party appealing a sentence bears the 

burden of establishing that the sentence was improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, 

Sent’g Comm’n Cmts. This Court will uphold the trial court’s sentencing decision “so 

long as it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is 

otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 

S.W.3d at 709-10.

In imposing a sentence, the trial court must also consider the following factors: (1) 

the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence 

report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the 

nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information 

offered by the parties on enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statistical information 

provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar 

offenses in Tennessee; and (7) any statement by the defendant in his own behalf. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b). In addition, the principles of sentencing provide that the 

sentence should be no greater that that deserved for the offense committed and should be 

the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is 

imposed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2), (4). To provide meaningful appellate 

review, the trial court must state on the record its reasons for the sentence chosen. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-210(e).
- 15 -

After doing so, “the trial court is free to select any sentence within the applicable 

range so long as the length of the sentence is ‘consistent with the purposes and principles 

of [the Sentencing Act].’” State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d)). The trial court shall consider, but is not bound by, the 

provision that “[t]he minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the sentence that 

should be imposed . . . [and] should be adjusted, as appropriate by the presence or absence 

of mitigating and enhancement factors.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c); Carter, 254 

S.W.3d at 346. A non-exclusive list of mitigating and enhancement factors are provided 

in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113 and -114. The weighing of both 

mitigating and enhancement factors is left to the trial court’s sound discretion, but a trial 

court’s misapplication of a mitigating or enhancement factor will not remove the 

presumption of reasonableness from its sentencing determination. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 

709. 

Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years’ incarceration as a 

Range I offender for the Class A felony of second-degree murder. As a Range I offender, 

the defendant faced a sentencing range between fifteen and twenty-five years. Tenn. Code 

Ann. §§ 39-13-210(c)(1); 40-35-112(a)(1). As such, the twenty-two-year sentence 

imposed by the trial court falls within the applicable sentencing range for the defendant’s 

offense and is presumed reasonable by this Court. Bise, 380 S.W. 3d at 707; Caudle, 388 

S.W.3d at 278-79. 

The defendant argues the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence by relying on 

the exceptional cruelty enhancement factor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(5) (“The 

defendant treated, or allowed a victim to be treated, with exceptional cruelty during the 

commission of the offense[.]”). The defendant, however, does not challenge the trial 

court’s reliance on the deadly weapon enhancement factor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

114(9) (“The defendant possessed or employed a firearm, explosive device or other deadly 

weapon during the commission of the offense[.]”). In assessing the applicable 

enhancement and mitigating factors, the trial court stated: 

All right. Looking at the enhancement factors as the State filed and of course 

the mitigating factors that the defense wishes for me to consider mental 

illness, unusual circumstances, his prior military service and lack of prior 

record.

And the fact that he was considered a good father. It seems to me like he 

loved his children. So, I suppose that is true. He is a standard Range 1 

offender.
- 16 -

Shows no prior history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior except I 

guess what was testified to at trial about prior threats perhaps.

Looking at the facts of the case and considering Number 5 the [d]efendant 

treated or allowed a victim to treated with exceptional cruelty during the 

commission of the offense. Either he said a prayer over him or he didn’t. 

Either way the fact that he came over him after having been shot in the back 

and stood over him and basically finished him off; if he in fact said a prayer 

over him how callous and cruel can you be.

And if it didn’t happen then he lied to me. So, one of the two. Either way 

it’s just -- of course we don’t know for sure whether or not victim was able 

or conscious to hear what he had to say.

But I think the very act of following him, standing over him and pumping 

another one into him is proof of premeditation. The [j]ury came back with

murder second degree, but this appears to me -- first of all, you don’t go to 

and seek out or go looking for trouble then claim post-traumatic stress. You 

don’t do that. That’s nonsense. That’s absolute nonsense to go looking for 

trouble and then claim post-traumatic stress.

I mean, if the victim may come to his house and banged on his door, kicked 

his door in and then maybe I don’t know that [would] spur something in him 

to react because of post-traumatic stress. But to claim - to go to this house 

and of course I guess it was his - the victim’s mother that testified how did 

he know the victim was there.

That’s something I never even considered. Said he was angry at trial, angry 

with him. Like I say you don’t go looking for trouble and then try to claim 

post-traumatic stress. So the mental illness really doesn’t jive as far as 

claiming post-traumatic stress. A lot of us have post-traumatic stress for 

things that happen in our lives. Things that you can’t get out of your mind.

But then to use that to claim that well, I went over there and then all of a 

sudden this post-traumatic stress kicked in. That’s just nonsense. So -- then 

this claim self-defense and then accident and then -- it appears to me by a 

preponderance of the evidence this with (sic) a murder first degree.

The [j]ury came back murder second and we have to accept their verdict. So,

I think that 5 does apply. I think it was cruel. I think whether or not he said 

a prayer over him or whether or not [the] victim actually heard the prayer, 
- 17 -

the fact that he was dying and he pumped another one into him I guess I don’t 

know. I forgot if he said he did it to put him out of his misery. I don’t know. 

That’s pretty twisted right there.

So 5 I do believe applies. It doesn’t apply as much as Number 9. Here we 

have a guy that claims that he had all these mental problems and yet he was 

in the service helping people with problems in the same situation that he had 

supposedly. That’s what I gathered from his testimony and from what his 

job was until 2016 helping people readjust to society and whatnot.

He should have known better to even have possessed a gun. He shouldn’t 

have had a gun. So, we have someone who is very intelligent. I didn’t see 

any evidence of when he started taking these meds. For all I know he didn’t 

start taking them until after he was arrested.

I don’t really see what the unusual circumstances were unless you want to 

try and claim it was post-traumatic stress, but like I say that’s nonsense.

Well, he was military and served honorably apparently. Did the military 

record show that he was discharged for mental reasons?

. . . 

Of course he possessed and employed a firearm during the commission of 

this offense. A fireman that apparently he shouldn’t have had. Did y’all find 

anything with the Administrative Office of the Court?

. . . 

Anyway, there were two aggravating circumstances starting at 15 like I guess 

the statute says. These [are] advisory, but yet taking into consideration the 

fact that by a preponderance of the evidence this was a murder first degree. 

I mean, how could it be self-defense and an accident and a post-traumatic? 

It’s just not.

You don’t shoot someone in the back, follow them and while they’re laying 

(sic) on the ground pump one into their chest. I find that the mental illness 

had nothing to do with this. I don’t believe it was unusual circumstances. 

He said he was mad at him and he went there to confront him. Again, I don’t 

know how he knew he was there, which you take into consideration 404(b)

and that the testimony of the mother he could have just as well had been for 

the victim’s mother.
- 18 -

Prior military service I put weight in that. But then again, special training 

from that. And he had every opportunity to address whatever issues he had 

if that case in fact were true. Then this wouldn’t have happened I suppose. 

If he had addressed those issues. Very intelligent.

So, I guess his military service, serving his country [is] something to 

consider, but then again, it was also the other part of it that he had this special 

training he had and he should have availed himself for whatever things they 

have for people supposedly with post-traumatic stress. He didn’t avail 

himself of that.

He’s done a lot of things since he’s been in jail, but that’s kind of like I don’t 

know a day late and a dollar short. He should have those -- he should have 

done those things I suppose before all of this happened.

So, I put great weight in the fact that there was the use of a handgun that he 

shouldn’t have had and that he really committed a murder first degree in my 

opinion. By a preponderance of the evidence this was a murder first.

I think the fact that it was done with a handgun and I think it was cruel. I 

think it outweighs, far outweighs the lack of prior record that he has, which 

is good I suppose and his military service.

So, weighing them against each other I think 22 years is an appropriate 

sentence.

As evidence above, the record indicates the trial court properly considered all of the 

statutory factors and weighed the applicable enhancement and mitigating factors before 

determining the defendant’s sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b). In doing so, the 

trial court determined the use of a deadly weapon and exceptional cruelty enhancement 

factors outweighed any mitigating factors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(5), (9). Nothing 

in the record indicates the trial court abused its discretion in making that determination as 

it is clear the defendant fired numerous fatal shots at the victim, first in the back and then, 

after consideration, in the chest, from a close range. Furthermore, our supreme court has 

made clear that “mere disagreement with the trial court’s weighing of the properly assigned 

enhancement and mitigating factors is no longer a ground for appeal.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d 

682, 706 (Tenn. 2012). Accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to relief, and we affirm 

the twenty-two-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction.
- 19 -

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed.

____________________________________

 J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE