COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MELVIN A. RICHARDSON 

v. Record No. 0687-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA APRIL 23, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Paul F. Sheridan, Judge 

 Janell M. Wolfe for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 The appellant, Melvin A. Richardson, was convicted of 

possession of cocaine following a jury trial. On appeal he 

raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing 

to suppress the evidence found during an allegedly unlawful 

search; and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence that he 

possessed the cocaine. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 BACKGROUND

 After receiving "complaints about drug activity" at a 

single-family residence located at 1315 South 13th Street, 

Detective Lowell Tolliver supervised at least five "controlled 

[drug] buys from that location." The controlled buys occurred 

between May and August of 1994. Tolliver conducted surveillance 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

of the house, during which he "noticed a lot of short term 

traffic." Specifically, Tolliver "observed a lot of foot 

traffic, people going into the house and coming right back out, a 

lot of cars stopping in front of the house." There was also 

"dealing that would occur right out in front of it [the house]." 

During his surveillance, Tolliver often saw "a group of people 

standing out in front of the house." 

 Based on this information, Tolliver obtained a search 

warrant for the house. On August 4, 1994, Tolliver and 

approximately twelve other police officers approached the house 

in three or four cars to execute the warrant. Appellant was 

outside the house with a group of five or six men. Tolliver got 

out of his car and ran toward the house. As he "was running up 

to the residence Mr. Richardson [appellant], who was out front, 

ran in to the house. I called to him, I said stop, police[,] but 

he continued in, I was right behind him." Tolliver apprehended 

appellant in the living room. Tolliver wore a jacket with a 

police badge on one side and the words "Police" on the other side 

and on the back. 

 The police secured the residence and handcuffed everyone 

found inside. Tolliver "started doing a search of the 

residence." 

 Within minutes of entering the residence, Sergeant Trumble 

searched appellant. After patting him down, Trumble reached in 

appellant's right front pants pocket and pulled out a white, 
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"super glue container." The contents were not visible. Trumble 

handed the container to Tolliver, who "opened it and looked 

inside and noticed that there was like a white residue in there." 

 The residue was analyzed as cocaine. 

 Tolliver provided the following testimony to explain why he 

opened the container: 

 In my experience I have made some undercover 

purchases and on several occasions the 

purchases that I have made for crack, the 

people that were selling to me before would 

dump or pour crack in my hand from containers 

like that. 

 Tolliver recalled seeing super glue containers used on two 

prior occasions. In addition, he stated, "I have gotten 

information from informants on other search warrants where those 

type of containers were located." Tolliver had been a police 

officer for eleven years and on the vice unit for over five 

years. He had attended drug enforcement training sessions, and 

had been responsible for "at least a hundred search warrants." 

 Although appellant's name was not listed on the search 

warrant, at the February 1, 1995 suppression hearing, Tolliver 

was asked, "Do you know who any of the occupants of the house 

were?" Tolliver responded, "The one occupant that I knew of was 

a person known to me as wink-eye. His name is Melvin 

Richardson." 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTENTS OF THE CONTAINER

 Because appellant concedes the propriety of the search 

disclosing the closed container, the narrow issue before us is 
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whether the police officer lawfully opened the container. 

 In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, 

"the burden is upon [the appellant] to show that this ruling, 

when the evidence is considered most favorably to the 

Commonwealth, constituted reversible error." Fore v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. 

denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). 

 "[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . proscribes--except in certain 

well-defined circumstances--the search of [] property [seized 

pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] unless accomplished 

pursuant to judicial warrant issued upon probable cause." Smith 

v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 542 (1990). 

 A lawful search of fixed premises generally 

extends to the entire area in which the 

object of the search may be found and is not 

limited by the possibility that separate acts 

of entry or opening may be required to 

complete the search. Thus, a warrant that 

authorizes an officer to search a home for 

illegal weapons also provides authority to 

open closets, chests, drawers, and containers 

in which the [contraband] might be found. 

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982). 

 "As an articulated legal standard, probable 

cause deals with probabilities concerning the 

factual and practical considerations in 

everyday life as perceived by reasonable and 

prudent persons. It is not predicated upon a 

clinical analysis applied by legal 

technicians. In determining whether probable 
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cause exists courts will test what the 

totality of the circumstances meant to police 

officers trained in analyzing the observed 

conduct for purposes of crime control." 

Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354, 359, 228 S.E.2d 685, 687 

(1976) (quoting Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 876-77, 223 

S.E.2d 883, 889 (1976)). 

 "Courts have held that certain containers are 

so distinctive in nature that an officer may, 

based on his [or her] experience with such 

containers in previous arrests, have probable 

cause to search or seize such a distinctive 

container in plain view. Examples of such 

containers are paper bindles, heroin 

balloons, and brick-shaped packages smelling 

like marijuana. However, where the container 

is a common one with legitimate purposes, its 

presence is not enough to establish probable 

cause. 

* * * * * * * 

 "'. . . whether a common container 

constitutes a suspicious circumstance, 

capable of contributing to the totality of 

circumstances necessary for probable cause, 

depends on the total factual context in 

which the container is observed, including 

the prior experience of the observing 

officer with the containers of the sort at 

issue. . . .'" 

People v. Limon, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 

(upholding warrantless search of "hide-a-key" container of type 

officer had once before seen store illegal drugs where officer 

also observed suspicious behavior) (quoting People v. Nonette, 

271 Cal. Rptr. 329, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087 (1990)) (other 

citations omitted). See also People v. Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201 
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(Colo. 1989) (after defendant became linked to searched premises, 

search of canister on defendant was within scope of warrant); In 

re J.D.R., 637 A.2d 849 (D.C. 1994) (officer saw corner of 

"ziplock bag" sticking out of defendant passenger's arm cast; 

that fact and officer's knowledge through police experience that 

such bags commonly used as drug containers were sufficient to 

support trial court's denial of motion to suppress); State v. 

Maguire, 523 A.2d 120 (N.H. 1987) (holding that officer had 

probable cause to seize "amber-colored vial" he saw defendant 

furtively try to hide in his pocket; officer saw defendant and 

three others in public restroom). 

 Viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, we find that there was sufficient 

evidence from which the trial court could find that Tolliver had 

probable cause to open the container. The evidence established 

the following: 

 1. The police had received complaints about drug 

activity at the location; 

 2. The police made at least five controlled drug buys 

from the location, the last one within a week of the 

search; 

 3. The police conducted extensive surveillance of the 

house and observed a lot of short term traffic; 

 4. Tolliver testified that some drug dealing occurred 

outside, "right out on front" of the house; 

 5. During surveillance, Tolliver often saw groups of 

people standing in front of the house; 

 6. A detached, neutral magistrate found probable cause 

to issue a search warrant for the house; 

 7. Appellant ran into the house when he saw the 

officers approach; 

 8. Tolliver was highly experienced in drug 

investigations; 

 9. During undercover buys made by Tolliver, "on 

several occasions" the sellers used "containers like 
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that [the glue container]" to store drugs; 

 10. Tolliver has seen super glue tubes used on two 

prior occasions; and 

 11. Tolliver has received information from informants 

on other search warrants where "those types of 

containers were located." 

 This case is distinguishable from situations where searches 

are conducted without a warrant or where there are no 

circumstances to link the searched item or person to the 

contraband being sought. See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 

Va. 146, 400 S.E.2d 191 (1991) (reversing conviction where police 

stopped car in which defendant was passenger based on information 

from informant that driver was fugitive being sought; subsequent 

search of canister held illegal because officer was not looking 

for weapon; mere possession of canister that officer's experience 

led him to believe contained drugs, absent evidence that the 

informant supplying the tip was reliable or credible, was not 

enough); Helms v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 368, 392 S.E.2d 496 

(1990) (reversing conviction where defendant was located outside

residence for which warrant was being executed and did not act 

suspicious; moreover, there was no evidence that searching police 

officer had seen such containers used to conceal drugs). 

 Here, appellant ran into the house just ahead of the police, 

who wore identifiable clothing, thereby linking himself to the 

house for which a warrant had been issued upon probable cause. 

Appellant's testimony that he visits the house "all the time," 

and the fact that he was present outside where Tolliver had seen 

prior transactions occur linked appellant more closely with the 
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house. Moreover, Tolliver testified that he knew one occupant of 

the house, and "[h]is name is Melvin Richardson." 

 Based on the facts of this case, the officer possessed 

probable cause to believe that the container contained contraband 

that was the subject of the search warrant. Accordingly, 

appellant has failed to show that the trial court's denial of the 

motion to suppress constituted reversible error. 

 POSSESSION

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

 It is uncontested that the container was in appellant's 

pocket. Moreover, appellant testified that he looked inside the 

container before placing it in his pocket. Tolliver testified 

that, when he opened the container, he saw "white residue inside" 

that field tested positive for cocaine. 

 A conviction for possession of illegal drugs requires proof 

that the "defendant was aware of the presence and character of 

the drugs, and that he intentionally and consciously possessed 

them." Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 99, 390 S.E.2d 

491, 497 (1990) (en banc). "Possession of a controlled drug 

gives rise to an inference of the defendant's knowledge of its 

character." Josephs, 10 Va. App. at 101, 390 S.E.2d at 498-99. 

"[E]vidence of flight may be considered as evidence of guilt 
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along with other pertinent facts and circumstances." Hope v. 

Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 381, 386, 392 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1990) 

(en banc). 

 The following facts support the jury's determination that 

appellant knowingly possessed the cocaine: 

 1. Appellant physically possessed the container; 

 2. Appellant testified that he looked into the 

container before placing it in his pocket; 

 3. Appellant fled from the yard into the house when he 

saw the police; 

 4. The police were executing a search warrant on the 

house based on probable cause that drugs were sold from 

the house on numerous occasions; 

 5. When Tolliver opened the container, it contained no 

glue, however, Tolliver saw a white, powdery substance 

in it; and 

 6. Appellant testified that he was a frequent visitor 

at the house, indicating his awareness of the ongoing 

drug activity forming the basis for the warrant. 

 The Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant possessed cocaine. The fact 

finder need not accept appellant's claim that he did not know the 

glue tube contained cocaine. See Crumble v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. 

App. 231, 236, 343 S.E.2d 359, 362 (1986). Thus, the fact finder 

was entitled to accept only those parts of appellant's evidence 

that it found plausible and credible when considering all the 

facts presented to it. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

 Affirmed.