If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

January 4, 2024

v No. 364483

Allegan Circuit Court

STEVEN LEE FOUPHT, LC No. 2021-024926-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and RICK and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by leave granted1the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to eight 

counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (individual 17 years 

of age or older against an individual less than 13 years of age); eight counts of aggravated 

producing of child sexually abusive activity or material, MCL 750.145c(2)(b); and eight counts of 

using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 

concurrent terms of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for each count of CSC-I, 16 to 25 years’

imprisonment for each count of aggravated producing of child sexually abusive activity or 

material, and 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment for each count of using a computer to commit a crime. 

We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case stems from defendant’s sexual abuse of two victims: HD, a three-year-old 

toddler, and ND, a 10-year-old girl. The abuse occurred over a two-year period. During that time, 

defendant produced 29 videos and a multitude of images of himself sexually assaulting, by 

penetration, both HD and ND. A search of defendant’s home revealed various media drives; a 

camera; a shotgun; a rifle; sex toys and other paraphernalia. In a shed attached to the house, police 

found a hidden panel that contained various sex items, a cell phone, and three pairs of underwear. 

 

1 People v Foupht, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 9, 2023 (Docket 

No. 364483).
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Defendant admitted that the items found in his home were his and that he was in the images and 

videos found on the several devices that police searched during a police interview. Defendant 

identified both of the victims. He denied having any additional victims.

Defendant was charged with 10 counts of CSC-I, 10 counts of aggravated producing of 

child sexually abusive activity or material, and 10 counts of using a computer to commit a crime. 

The prosecutor offered defendant a plea deal, which required defendant to plead guilty to 

eight counts of CSC-I, eight counts of aggravated producing of child sexually abusive activity or 

material, and eight counts of using a computer to commit a crime. In exchange, a total of six 

counts would be dismissed: two counts of CSC-I, two counts of aggravated producing of child 

sexually abusive activity or material, and two counts of using a computer to commit a crime. The 

prosecutor also agreed to recommend concurrent sentences for all the offenses to which defendant 

pleaded guilty. Defendant accepted the plea deal.

In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 50 to 75 years’

imprisonment for each count of CSC-I, to be served concurrently. The trial court noted that, when 

issuing a sentence for the CSC-I convictions, it was required to impose the statutory minimum 

term of 25 years, but it was also permitted to depart from the statutory minimum if the sentence 

was reasonable and proportionate. The trial court justified its upward departure from the statutory 

minimum on the basis of factors not accounted for by the guidelines, including defendant’s 

predatory conduct, the length of the abuse, the relationship that defendant had with the victims, 

and the serious psychological impact that defendant’s conduct had on the victims. The court also 

addressed factors given inadequate weight by the guidelines, including the number and egregious 

nature of the offense, defendant’s minimal potential for rehabilitation, and his perceived lack of 

remorse. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that his sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment was unreasonable and 

disproportionate. Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously relied on factors that the 

guidelines already considered, as well as wholly impermissible reasons, and that the court 

ultimately failed to justify the extent of the departure. We disagree.

A trial court’s upward departure from a defendant’s calculated guidelines range is reviewed 

for reasonableness. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). This Court 

reviews “the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” People v 

Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 351; 901 NW2d 142 (2017). Generally, “[a] trial court abuses its 

discretion if the minimum sentence imposed falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” 

People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 300; 754 NW2d 284 (2008). A trial court also abuses its discretion

if it imposes a sentence that “violates the principle of proportionality, which requires sentences 

imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding 

the offense and the offender.” People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).

In Lockridge, 498 Mich at 391, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the minimum 

sentencing guidelines are only advisory. However, those guidelines “remain a highly relevant 

consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion.” “[T]he relevant question for 

appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness” is “whether the trial court abused its 
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discretion by violating the principle of proportionality . . . .” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 

471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). To determine if an upward departure is more proportionate than a 

sentence within the guidelines range, a trial court may consider factors including “(1) whether the 

guidelines accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime, (2) factors not considered by the 

guidelines, and (3) factors considered by the guidelines but given inadequate weight.” People v 

Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (citations omitted). In making a 

proportionality determination, a trial court must “justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate 

appellate review.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392. “This includes an explanation of why the sentence 

imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would have 

been.” Smith, 482 Mich at 311.

A. FACTORS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE GUIDELINES

Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering factors that 

it believed were not accounted for by the guidelines, including the predatory nature of his conduct, 

the youth of the victims, the impact on the victims and their families, and the length of the abuse. 

He claims that these factors were already accounted for by the offenses with which he was charged. 

The first factor the trial court considered was defendant’s predatory conduct. Predatory conduct 

is accounted for by the guidelines through offense variable (OV) 10. MCL 777.40(1)(a).

MCL 777.40 provides that, in assessing points to a defendant for exploiting a vulnerable victim, 

15 points may be assessed if “[p]redatory conduct was involved[.]” Id. In People v Cannon, 481 

Mich 152, 162; 749 NW2d 257 (2008), the Supreme Court held that, in scoring OV 10, a trial court 

must answer three questions in the affirmative:

(1) Did the offender engage in conduct before the commission of the offense? 

(2) Was this conduct directed at one or more specific victims who suffered from a 

readily apparent susceptibility to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or 

temptation? (3) Was the victimization the offender’s primary purpose for engaging 

in the preoffense conduct?

In this case, the trial court noted it was hesitant to assess 15 points to defendant for OV 10 on the 

basis of defendant’s predatory conduct because OV 10 requires a conviction-specific score. Given 

the sheer number of defendant’s convictions, the court reasoned that it would be difficult to

determine whether predatory conduct was involved in every one of the acts. The court appeared 

to believe it would be safer to score OV 10 at 10 points. Ten points may be assessed under this 

OV if “[t]he offender exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental disability, youth or agedness, 

or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her authority status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b).

Nevertheless, the court later noted that it considered defendant’s predatory conduct in 

departing from the guidelines. The court explained:

[W]hen considering [defendant]’s predatory conduct, although it wasn’t scored 

under the guidelines, I—because that offense variable requires offense specific 

conduct, it’s clear that [defendant] did engage in predatory conduct. That con—

that predatory conduct is not considered by the guidelines in this scoring, 

specifically because of the courts of appeals ruling regarding offense specific 

scoring.
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But he certainly did engage in predatory conduct with regards to all of these 

incidents involving both of these victims. And that’s another reason to justify a—

a departure sentence.

The record supports the trial court’s reasoning on this point. Predatory conduct generally involves 

“preoffense” conduct. See Cannon, 481 Mich at 162. This Court has previously concluded that a 

defendant engaged in preoffense conduct when the victims “testified about numerous sexual 

assaults going on for a very long time before disclosure.” People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 

491; 769 NW2d 256 (2009). Likewise, in this case, defendant carried out his abuse of the children 

for over two years before his actions were discovered. There were also allegations against 

defendant for CSC related to the abuse of HD over a year before defendant was charged with the 

current convictions. This lengthy period of abuse before defendant was charged indicates that he

engaged in preoffense conduct.

Further, defendant’s relationship with the victims before the criminal conduct occurred 

could also be considered preoffense conduct. The victims were both very young—one a toddler 

the other just ten years old. They believed defendant was someone they could trust. Defendant 

was related to HD and was formerly close friends with ND’s father. Because of the victims’ tender

ages and defendant’s position in their lives as a trustworthy adult figure, defendant’s actions 

suggest that his conduct was directed at these two victims specifically because of their apparent 

susceptibility to persuasion and physical restraint. Id. Defendant was also aware of these factors 

through his preoffense conduct in interacting with the victims to gain their trust.

The last and most challenging question to answer is whether the victimization of the 

children was defendant’s primary purpose for engaging in the preoffense conduct. Id. Defendant’s 

relationship with the victims presents a unique circumstance. It is difficult to ascertain whether

defendant’s actions in getting to know the victims and earning their trust was primarily to victimize 

them. However, the record indicates that defendant would offer to babysit ND, who was his 

girlfriend’s child. He would then wait for his girlfriend to go to sleep before undressing in front 

of ND and forcing her to engage in sexual acts with him. The Supreme Court has stated that “[a] 

lion that waits near a watering hole hoping that a herd of antelope will come to drink is not 

engaging in conduct directed at a victim”; however, “a lion that sees antelope, determines which 

is the weakest, and stalks it until the opportunity arises to attack it engages in conduct directed at 

a victim.” Cannon, 481 Mich at 160. Defendant purposefully chose victims who trusted him, who

were easily accessible to him, and whose parents trusted him. Defendant did not merely stumble 

upon these victims by chance—he chose them specifically. Because of that, his actions constitute 

predatory conduct. The trial court was unable to consider defendant’s predatory conduct under 

OV 10, see People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 124; 771 NW2d 655 (2009), but properly considered 

such conduct when imposing a sentence that departed from the statutory minimum.

The trial court also considered the well-being of the victims to justify defendant’s sentence.

The trial court acknowledged that OV 7 addresses psychological injury to a victim, 

MCL 777.34(1), but it noted that nonserious psychological injury to the victims, which is not 

contemplated by OV 7, should also be considered. The trial court explained that defendant’s 

conduct would “impact these victims for a very long time” and would impair their ability to have 

normal romantic relationships. Once again, the record supports the trial court’s ruling. ND’s 

father stated that ND has not wanted to discuss what defendant did to her and he fears that she has 
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fallen behind developmentally as a result of defendant’s abuse. HD’s mother stated that HD is 

confused about boundaries and appropriate behavior for children and adults, and often experiences

angry outbursts and meltdowns. She also noted that, following the initial CSC allegations against 

defendant, her family verbally abused HD, calling her a liar and a bad child for disclosing 

defendant’s actions. Because the guidelines do not account for this type of psychological injury 

to the victims, the trial court properly considered its impact in departing from the statutory 

minimum sentence.

The trial court also concluded that the length of the abuse justified an upward departure 

from the statutory minimum. The trial court reasoned that the fact that the abuse occurred over a 

lengthy period created a larger impact on not just the victims, but also the victims’ families. Our

Supreme Court has held that when sexual abuse occurs over a long period, it is a justifiable reason 

for departure from the statutory minimum. Smith, 482 Mich at 301. This is because “the victim 

undoubtedly suffered psychological stress from the realization that defendant might abuse her 

again and again.” Id. Further, a long period of abuse “is a fact that does not exist in all criminal 

sexual conduct cases”; therefore, it can be properly considered in departing from the statutory 

minimum. Id. Thus, the trial court justifiably determined that the two-year long period of abuse 

HD and ND underwent was not properly accounted for by the guidelines.

And while the sentencing guidelines permitted the trial court to consider serious 

psychological injury to members of the victims’ families, the guidelines did not consider the longterm effects of defendant’s conduct on the victims’ families. This Court previously held that,

“[a]lthough OV 4 accounts for psychological injuries suffered by victims, it does not adequately 

consider the ways in which an offense affects familial relationships, nor does it always account for 

the unique psychological injuries suffered by individual victims.” People v Anderson, 298 Mich 

App 178, 189; 825 NW2d 678 (2012) (citations omitted). This Court has also held that the 

guidelines “do not take into account the violation of the victim’s parents’ trust in [a] defendant”

when a defendant victimizes their child. People v Armstrong, 247 Mich App 423, 425; 636 NW2d 

785 (2001).

Here, HD’s mother stated that she was sexually abused as a child and that defendant’s 

conduct triggered her post-traumatic stress disorder. Further, she stopped working in order to be 

there for HD because she was afraid to leave her in the care of anyone else. The trial court stated 

that dealing with a situation of this kind “leads to stress and anguish on behalf of the parents and 

people who are caring for the children.” Defendant was someone whom HD’s and ND’s parents

believed that they could trust around their children, and that kind of betrayal of trust is not 

contemplated by the guidelines. Defendant’s actions impacted not only the victims but the victims’

parents to such a degree that they felt lost and uncertain about how to move forward. Accordingly, 

the trial court properly considered the psychological toll that defendant’s actions took, and will 

continue to take, on the victims’ parents.

The trial court also supported its departure from the statutory minimum on the basis of 

defendant’s relationship with the victims. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n some 

cases, there may be important sentencing factors that are not included in the sentencing 

guidelines,” and “[p]erhaps the clearest example of such a factor is the prior relationship, if any, 

between the victim and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 660. Therefore, “[a] prior 

relationship between a victim and an offender can be a very mitigating circumstance or a very 
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aggravating circumstance, depending upon the history of interaction between the parties.” Id. 

at 660-661. In this case, the relationship between defendant and the victims is certainly an 

aggravating circumstance. Defendant is related to HD and was close friends with ND’s father.

Therefore, defendant had access to both victims and could easily take advantage of their trust. The 

trial court properly determined that the relationship between defendant and the victims in this case 

warranted a departure from the statutory minimum.

Ultimately, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it considered 

factors not accounted for by the guidelines in supporting its departure from the statutory minimum 

sentence.

B. FACTORS GIVEN INADEQUATE WEIGHT BY THE GUIDELINES

Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering factors that 

it believed were given inadequate weight by the guidelines because those factors were already 

correctly scored by the guidelines. The trial court specifically supported its departure from the 

statutory minimum with factors it believed were given inadequate weight by the guidelines, 

including the number of offenses and the egregious nature of those offenses. Although “[a] 

departure cannot be justified on the sole basis that a crime is heinous,” because “[a]ll criminalsexual-conduct cases involving young children are heinous,” Smith, 482 Mich at 311 n 42, the 

number of offenses and the egregious nature of those offenses was properly considered by the trial 

court.

The trial court noted that the sheer number of offenses committed helped justify the 

sentence that it imposed. Although the court assessed the highest number of points possible for 

OV 11—50 points—those points only contemplate “[t]wo or more criminal sexual 

penetrations . . . .” MCL 777.41(1)(a). This Court has held that “points can be assessed under OV 

11 on the basis of uncharged sexual penetrations” so long as “they arise out of the sentencing 

offense.” People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 119; 933 NW2d 314 (2019). There are 29 videos 

with multiple penetrations in each video. Even if the trial court calculated the number of 

penetrations conservatively by only accounting for one penetration per video, that is still 27 more 

penetrations than the 50 points assessed under OV 11 accounts for. It seems unlikely that 50 points 

adequately accounted for a number of penetrations that was at least 13 times more than the base 

number contemplated by the points. Since defendant’s score for OV 11 grossly underscored the 

number of individual acts of sexual abuse perpetrated against HD and ND, the trial court properly 

considered the additional penetrations in departing from the statutory minimum.

Defendant was also assessed 50 points—the highest score available—for OV 13, which is 

proper when “[t]he offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more 

sexual penetrations against a person or persons less than 13 years of age[.]” MCL 777.43(1)(a).

In determining the score, all crimes within a five-year period are considered, regardless of whether 

the offense resulted in a conviction. MCL 777.43(2)(a). In this case, there were 29 videos that 

each contained multiple penetrations. The trial court properly considered the fact that the 50 points 

it assessed for OV 13 did not fully account for the number of individual acts of sexual abuse that 

occurred. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by considering the number of 

penetrations beyond those accounted for by OV 13 in departing from the statutory minimum.
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In addition to the OVs, defendant was assessed 20 points—again, the maximum score 

available—for prior record variable (PRV) 7. Twenty points are assessed under PRV 7 if “[t]he 

offender has 2 or more subsequent or concurrent convictions[.]” MCL 777.57(1)(a). In this case, 

defendant pleaded guilty to 24 charges, including eight counts of CSC-I. Including all defendant’s 

convictions related to the sentencing offense, defendant’s concurrent convictions are equal to 

12 times the amount contemplated by the 20 points assessed to PRV 7. The trial court could 

properly consider this in departing from the statutory minimum.

Our Supreme Court has held that “[i]f a defendant has a low PRV score but an OV score 

over 100, the court may render a proportionate sentence above the highest minimum for someone 

with a similar PRV score.” Smith, 482 Mich at 308. “This is because the Legislature did not 

contemplate a defendant with such a high OV score, given that it used 100 OV points as the 

maximum for the grid.” Id. at 308-309. In Smith, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court 

abused its discretion by departing from the recommended guidelines on this basis. Id. at 307. “The 

trial judge sentenced defendant as if his OV and PRV scores corresponded to the E–VI, F–V, or 

F–VI cell of the grid”; however, in order for the defendant’s sentence to fall within those 

guidelines, “the judge would have had to assess 20 to 40 additional OV points and 30 to 

45 additional PRV points.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not justify 

such an extensive departure. Id.

In contrast, defendant has a low PRV score, but a very high OV score. He was scored at 

the highest level possible—OV Level VI—which is the proper level for any defendant with a total 

OV score of 100 points or higher. Defendant’s total OV score was 185 points—85 points higher 

than the amount necessary to land him in the highest OV level. In order for the sentence imposed 

to fall within the recommended guidelines, defendant would have had to score at an OV Level VI 

and a PRV Level E. See MCL 777.62. When a defendant scores at those levels, the recommended 

sentence is 225 to 375 months or life imprisonment. See id. Defendant would have needed to be 

assessed 30 additional PRV points and no additional OV points for these recommended guidelines 

to apply. On the basis of defendant’s high OV score—a score that does not even adequately 

account for the number of convictions and criminal sexual penetrations involved in this case—the 

trial court rendered a proportionate sentence that was higher than would have been appropriate for 

a defendant with the same PRV score and a lower OV score. In doing this, the trial court viewed 

defendant and his conduct holistically, finding that the egregious nature of his offenses warranted 

a more severe punishment than the guidelines called for, despite the fact that defendant had no 

prior convictions.

Beyond defendant’s OV and PRV scores, defendant also pleaded guilty to only eight counts 

of criminal sexual conduct. This Court “has recognized that a sentencing court may consider the 

nature of a plea bargain and the charges that were dismissed in exchange for the plea for which the 

court is sentencing.” People v Coulter (After Remand), 205 Mich App 453, 456; 517 NW2d 827 

(1994). Defendant’s plea deal eliminated the possibility of serving consecutive sentences, which 

greatly restricted his sentence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by contemplating this 

fact, and the fact that six of defendant’s charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea deal, in 

justifying its departure from the statutory minimum. That defendant could have been sentenced to 

250 years’ imprisonment through consecutive terms of the statutory minimum term of 25-years 

for each of his 10 original CSC-I charges is a compelling factor for the trial court to consider in 

determining a proportionate sentence to defendant and his criminal conduct.
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For the foregoing reasons the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering factors 

not given adequate weight by the guidelines, including the number of offenses and egregious 

nature of those offenses, in supporting its departure from the statutory minimum sentence.

C. ADDITIONAL FACTORS

Defendant last argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering his 

inconsistent remorse, inability to justify his actions, crying during his presentence interview, and 

recording of the acts as indicators that defendant had minimal potential for rehabilitation. The 

Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s lack of remorse is a legitimate consideration in 

determining a sentence. People v Houston, 448 Mich 312, 323; 532 NW2d 508 (1995). Further, 

“evidence of a lack of remorse can be considered in determining an individual’s potential for 

rehabilitation.” People v Wesley, 428 Mich 708, 711; 411 NW2d 159 (1987). It is also

“permissible to infer a defendant’s lack of remorse from statements contained in presentence 

reports.” Id. at 714.

In departing from the statutory minimum, the trial court reasoned that there were several 

indications that defendant lacked the ability to rehabilitate, including the inconsistent nature of his 

remorse and his selfish behavior. The trial court stated that while defendant expressed remorse at 

the sentencing hearing, the presentence investigation report indicated that defendant “did not 

express remorse during the process of the presentence interview,” which is “relevant with regards 

to rehabilitation.” The trial court also noted that defendant cried during the presentence interview 

because he feared that he would not be able to see his own children again, which showed that 

defendant was only focusing on himself and “not the effect that his behavior had on someone else.”

Even though defendant expressed remorse for his actions at the sentencing hearing, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it considered defendant’s lack of remorse during the 

presentence interview. Defendant argues that the trial court’s consideration of him crying during 

the presentence interview was improper but presents no basis as to why it was improper. It is clear 

that the court’s main focus was on the fact that defendant seemed to only be crying during the 

presentence interview out of concern for himself and his ability to see his own children in the 

future. The trial court relied on defendant’s behavior during the presentence interview to support 

a conclusion that defendant had minimal potential for rehabilitation and lacked remorse, which are 

proper factors to consider in departing from the statutory minimum sentence. Therefore, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it considered defendant’s inconsistent remorse and crying 

during the presentence interview to support its departure from the statutory minimum sentence.

The trial court also held that defendant’s minimal potential for rehabilitation was supported 

by the fact that defendant gave no insight into why he engaged in this egregious conduct and 

continued abusing the victims despite the fact that he knew it was very wrong. Defendant’s failure 

to provide any reasoning for his actions concerned the trial court about whether rehabilitation 

would be possible. Defendant argues that he needs counseling and an assessment from a 

professional to discover why he behaved in this manner. The trial court did not, however, require 

defendant to diagnose himself. Rather, the trial court wanted defendant to provide some kind of 

reasoning for his actions that could allow the trial court to assess whether rehabilitation was 

possible.
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However, whether this specific factor was permissible for the trial court to consider does 

not change that the other factors in this case led the trial court to conclude that a lengthier sentence

was appropriate. The record supports the trial court’s position that defendant requires a structured 

environment away from children. It is best for society and defendant alike. This conclusion was 

bolstered by the fact that defendant recorded these heinous acts, which allowed him to victimize 

these children over and over again. This Court has held that materials “produced by child 

pornographers permanently record the victim’s abuse, and the continued existence of these images 

causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.” People v 

Needham, 299 Mich App 251, 256; 829 NW2d 329 (2013). Defendant argues that the fact that he 

recorded the acts was already contemplated by his other convictions; however, the act of recording 

and accessing this kind of material is nevertheless pertinent to defendant’s potential for 

rehabilitation and for the protection of society. Although the trial court may not have been able to 

properly attribute a lengthier sentence on the basis of elements accounted for by defendant’s 

concurrent convictions, the trial court’s consideration of defendant recording the acts as it pertains 

to rehabilitation was not an abuse of discretion.

Relatedly, defendant argues that the trial court impermissibly considered items seized from 

his house an indicator that he intended to continue abusing children. He asserts such a conclusion 

was speculative. This Court has held that “the need to protect other children by the sentence 

imposed is another factor not adequately considered by the guidelines” and may be legitimately 

considered by a trial court. Armstrong, 247 Mich App at 425. Further, a “trial court may base a 

sentencing departure on a defendant’s future dangerousness if objective and verifiable facts 

support the court’s conclusion . . . .” Anderson, 298 Mich App at 189. The trial court reasoned 

that the items seized from defendant’s home indicated that “the abuse would’ve continued if he 

wasn’t discovered.” On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it considered 

defendant’s minimal potential for rehabilitation and the great risk that he posed to children in the 

future in departing from the statutory minimum sentence.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court relied on permissible factors to support its upward departure from the 

sentencing guidelines and statutory minimum in imposing defendant’s sentence. The sentence that 

the trial court imposed was proportionate to defendant and the seriousness of his criminal conduct.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney 

/s/ Michelle M. Rick 

/s/ Noah P. Hood