[Cite as State v. Dawson, 2016-Ohio-2800.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 CASE NO. 2015-L-109

 - vs - : 

DAVID D. DAWSON, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 15 CR 

000232. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Karen A. Sheppert, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, 

Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Charles R. Grieshammer, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa R. Clapp, 

Assistant Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For 

Defendant-Appellant). 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, David D. Dawson, appeals his sentence following his guilty plea 

to trafficking in cocaine and related felonies. At issue is whether appellant’s sentence 

was contrary to law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} On July 2, 2015, appellant pled guilty to trafficking in cocaine, a felony of 

the fifth degree; attempted tampering with evidence, a felony of the fourth degree; 
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possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree; and attempted illegal assembly or 

possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, a felony of the fourth degree. 

{¶3} The statement of facts that follows is derived from evidence presented at 

appellant’s guilty-plea and sentencing hearings. On March 16, 2015, a special agent 

with the Lake County Narcotics Agency received information from a confidential 

informant that appellant was selling crack cocaine from a crack house in Painesville, 

Ohio. The confidential informant made arrangements to buy crack cocaine from 

appellant and was wired by agents from the Narcotics Agency. The confidential 

informant went to the crack house and purchased crack from appellant using recorded 

funds. 

{¶4} Two days later, on March 18, 2015, Narcotics Agency agents executed a 

search warrant at the crack house. They knocked loudly on the front door. An 

occupant pulled the window shade on the inside of the front door to the side. The 

agents yelled, “police, open the door right now!” However, the occupant did not comply. 

After the agents pounded on the front door several times, the occupant finally unlocked 

and opened the door. Upon entering the residence, the officers announced they had a 

search warrant and walked through the house. While in a bedroom, they heard a toilet 

flushing in the adjoining bathroom. The agents entered the bathroom and found 

appellant attempting to flush crack cocaine down the toilet. After he was handcuffed, 

one of the agents noticed a clear plastic bag containing crack cocaine floating in the 

running toilet bowl. The agent recovered the bag and preserved it as evidence. 

{¶5} During a search of the crack house, the agents also recovered a second 

plastic bag containing crack cocaine on the bathroom sink countertop and $194 in cash 

in appellant’s pants pocket. Appellant was also in possession of a scale and a 
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measuring cup that contained crack cocaine residue, indicating the manufacture of 

crack. 

{¶6} In a colloquy between the trial court and appellant during the guilty-plea 

hearing, in response to the court’s questions, appellant admitted that he knowingly sold 

or offered to sell cocaine on March 16, 2015; that on March 18, 2015, he attempted to 

get rid of the cocaine in his possession because he knew the police were in the house 

and he did not want them to find the drugs; that on March 18, 2015, he knowingly 

possessed cocaine; and that between March 1, 2015 and March 18, 2015, he attempted 

to illegally assemble or possess chemicals for the manufacture of crack cocaine. 

{¶7} The court found appellant’s guilty plea to be voluntary; accepted the plea; 

found appellant guilty of the foregoing offenses; and referred the matter to the probation 

department for a pre-sentence report. 

{¶8} At the sentencing, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the court 

merged attempted tampering with evidence, possession of cocaine, and attempted 

illegal manufacture of drugs. Among these offenses, the state elected to proceed to 

sentencing on attempted tampering with evidence, a felony-four, in addition to trafficking 

in cocaine. 

{¶9} The court noted that appellant, who is 33 years old, has a significant 

criminal history. He was sentenced to prison twice, once in 2002 and again in 2006. 

{¶10} At sentencing, appellant’s counsel recommended that appellant be 

sentenced to seven months in prison on each of the two offenses that did not merge 

and that these terms be served consecutively, for a total of 14 months. On the other 

hand, the prosecutor recommended a consecutive sentence of 30 months, which was 

the maximum potential sentence for these two offenses. The court sentenced appellant 
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to 11 months for trafficking in cocaine and 17 months for attempting tampering with 

evidence, for a total of 28 months in prison. 

{¶11} Appellant appeals his sentence, asserting the following for his sole 

assignment of error: 

{¶12} “The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant-appellant to a 

consecutive, twenty-eight month prison term.” 

{¶13} Appellant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him to 28 months 

because, in his view, the court did not consider: (1) the less seriousness factor that he 

did not cause physical harm to anyone (R.C. 2929.12(C)(3)), or (2) the inapplicability of 

the recidivism factor that he refuses to acknowledge a pattern of drug abuse that was 

related to the instant offenses (R.C. 2929.12(D)(4)). 

{¶14} The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Marcum, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 

2016-Ohio-1002, held that appellate courts must apply the standard of review set forth 

in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) when reviewing felony sentences. Id. at ¶1. Thus, applying the 

plain language of that statute, the Supreme Court held that “an appellate court may 

vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and 

convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under 

relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Id. The Court 

further held that “appellate courts may not apply the abuse-of-discretion standard in 

sentencing-term challenges.” Id. at ¶10. 

{¶15} Absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court will presume the trial 

court considered all appropriate sentencing factors, even if the record is silent. State v. 

Kish, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-138, 2011-Ohio-4172, ¶8. Further, there is no 

requirement that the court state on the record that it considered the statutory sentencing 
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criteria. Id. However, the trial court satisfies its obligation to consider the statutory 

principles and factors by stating that it considered them. State v. Brown, 11th Dist. Lake 

No. 2014-L-075, 2015-Ohio-2897, ¶34. Moreover, this court has stated, “[a] trial court is 

not required to give any particular weight or emphasis to a given set of circumstances; it 

is merely required to consider the statutory factors in exercising its discretion.” State v. 

Delmanzo, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-218, 2008-Ohio-5856, ¶23. In this case, the trial 

court met its obligations under the law. 

{¶16} The trial court stated on the record during the sentencing hearing and in 

its sentencing entry that it considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing 

in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. 

{¶17} Further, during the sentencing hearing, the court said it considered the 

complete record in this case, including the presentence report, the recommendation of 

the probation department, the sentencing memorandum presented on behalf of 

appellant, and the statements made by appellant. 

{¶18} With respect to the less seriousness factors, the court considered the fact 

that none of the current offenses involved violence. With respect to the factors making 

recidivism less likely, the court noted that appellant pled guilty to his crimes, accepted 

responsibility for his involvement, and has shown genuine remorse. 

{¶19} However, the court placed greater emphasis on factors in appellant’s case 

that made recidivism more likely. These included appellant’s history of a juvenile 

delinquency adjudication and his long history of criminal convictions as an adult. The 

court noted that appellant has 21 prior convictions between 2001 and prior to the instant 

conviction (not counting his probation violations), seven of which were for felonies, 

including felonies involving violence. The court noted that appellant had not responded 
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favorably when sanctions were previously imposed in that he had probation violations in 

2002 and 2004. The court also noted that appellant served two prison terms that were 

imposed concurrently in two separate cases in 2002. He served another prison term 

between 2006 and 2011. And, appellant served two prison sentences consecutively 

between 2013 and 2015. The court noted that appellant had only been out of prison for 

some 10 days between March 6, 2015 and March 18, 2015, and was on post-release 

control when he committed the instant crimes. 

{¶20} While appellant may not agree with the emphasis placed by the trial court 

on his criminal record and the fact that he was only out of prison for ten days and on 

post-release control when he committed these crimes, he cannot reasonably dispute 

that the court considered the sentencing criteria in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. 

{¶21} In view of the foregoing, we do not clearly and convincingly find that the 

trial court’s sentence was contrary to law. 

{¶22} For the reasons stated in this opinion, the assignment of error lacks merit 

and is overruled. It is the order and judgment of this court that the judgment of the Lake 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J., 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

concur.