NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-86

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ALEXIS MIDDLETON.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2008, following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the 

defendant, Alex Middleton, and his co-defendant, Donnell 

Nicholson, were each convicted of home invasion, aggravated 

rape, armed assault in a dwelling, four counts of kidnapping,

two counts of indecent assault and battery, and four counts of 

assault and battery. The defendant's convictions were affirmed 

by a panel of this court in 2011. Commonwealth v. Middleton, 80 

Mass. App. Ct. 1110 (2011). In 2022, a panel of this court

affirmed the denial of the defendant's second motion for a new 

trial in part and remanded the matter solely on the issue of

whether, under the applicable Massachusetts standard, the 

failure of the Commonwealth to provide certain personnel records 

of Massachusetts State Police crime laboratory employees

warranted a new trial. Commonwealth v. Middleton, 101 Mass. 
2

App. Ct. 1115 (2022). On remand, the motion judge, utilizing 

the proper standard, denied the defendant's motion for a new 

trial. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the motion 

judge erred in concluding that the Commonwealth's failure to 

provide exculpatory evidence would not have made a difference in

the outcome of his trial. We affirm.

Background. We take the background facts from the judge's 

summary of the evidence admitted at trial which is largely 

consistent with the defendant's recitation of the facts, and 

where it is not, the judge's summary is supported by the record. 

Around midnight on January 11, 2005, S. M. and three of his 

friends returned to S. M.'s home in Braintree to find two masked 

intruders inside looking for money and drugs. Over the next 

hour, the intruders beat all four victims, ordered them to strip 

naked, and bound them. The masked men continued to beat S. M.

while demanding money and drugs, beat one victim in the head 

with a gun so severely he required stitches, threatened to kill 

all of the victims, forced one victim to take the defendant's 

penis into her mouth and perform oral sex, and threatened to 

rape a third victim.

During the assaults, the intruders heard someone pull into 

the driveway of the home and they fled to the basement. One of 

the victims heard one of the intruders yelling, "Bitch, you need 

to come pick us up" and heard the two intruders communicating 
3

with a Nextel two-way radio. That victim remembered that at 

least once during the assaults, he heard a female's voice on the 

other end of the Nextel. Although none of the victims were able 

to identify either of the attackers (because they were masked),

the Commonwealth tied the defendant to the crimes using 

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, wiretap evidence, and the 

testimony of a cooperating witness (Tia) who was present when 

the defendant and codefendant planned and prepared for the 

robbery,1 and was also present with the defendant and codefendant after the assaults, when the co-defendant made 

incriminating statements.

After an investigation, the defendant was arrested in 

January of 2005 and later indicted. On separate dates and at 

separate locations, the investigators gathered DNA samples of 

the rape victim and the two co-defendants; the DNA samples were 

then analyzed in the State Police Crime Laboratory (crime lab). 

Carol Courtright, a criminologist working at the crime lab,

detected sperm cells from the oral swab collected from the rape 

victim. Massachusetts State Trooper Bruce Tobin separately 

obtained buccal swabs of each of the co-defendants in the 

1 The witness testified that the day before the attack, she went 

for a drive with both defendants. During the trip, co-defendant 

Nicholson procured a shotgun and a bulletproof vest, and drove a 

few times by the home where the victims were attacked while 

talking about robbing the owner of money and marijuana.
4

presence of their attorneys. Tobin individually labeled each 

buccal swab and affixed the name of the defendant from whom he 

took the sample, before he sealed and stored the swab at the 

crime lab. In late 2005, at the crime lab, Hillary Griffiths 

took the three known samples and developed a DNA profile for 

each sample. Another DNA analyst, Rachel Chow, analyzed the 

sperm that was preserved from the oral swab of the rape victim. 

Chow determined that the male DNA profile from the oral swab of 

the victim matched the DNA profile from the defendant's buccal 

swab.

In anticipation of the Commonwealth's introduction of the 

DNA evidence, defense counsel made pretrial discovery requests 

for "background information" about each person involved in 

conducting or reviewing DNA testing in this case. Before trial,

the Commonwealth produced information about Hilary Griffiths and 

Rachel Chow including proficiency test results and resumes. At 

trial, the Commonwealth did not call Chow or Griffiths to 

testify about the DNA, but rather the DNA evidence was presented 

through a supervisor of the DNA unit, Caitlin Drugan. Drugan 

did not perform the analysis but independently evaluated Chow's 

and Griffiths's work, confirmed their analyses, and offered her 

own opinion that the defendant was a statistical match for the 

DNA found in the rape victim's mouth.
5

More than a decade after the defendant was convicted, the 

defendant's ongoing discovery efforts revealed additional,

previously undisclosed personnel file information about 

Griffiths's and Chow's employment at the crime lab. This 

additional information included documents dated in 2006, by 

which Griffiths and Chow were separately notified that they were 

suspended from certain analytical duties. The suspensions 

referenced "instances of DNA . . . discrepancies" in the few 

months preceding the suspensions, and issues with their "skill 

set to focus on tasks without sample mix-ups, as aliquots are 

not placed in appropriate tubes/rows." As we noted in our 

August 12, 2022 decision, "the personnel files also contained 

information prepared after the date of trial but that related to 

Griffiths's work performance at and around the time of her work 

on the samples in this case -- a 2009 State Police report 

including indirect reports that Griffiths 'was not capable of 

performing daily exemplar work until shortly before June 3,

2008,' and indications from Griffiths in an undated transcript 

excerpt and an e-mail exchange with a supervisor in 2013 

suggesting that lab personnel were hiding mistakes made during 

testing." Middleton, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 1115.

The defendant moved for a new trial based upon the 

Commonwealth's failure to produce exculpatory evidence. Id. 

Initially, the defendant argued that Chow may have mixed up the 
6

DNA profiles and mistakenly identified the defendant, instead of 

Nicholson, as the individual whose DNA matched the sperm DNA 

found in the victim's mouth. Upon learning that Chow did not 

handle or analyze the exemplars of either Middleton or 

Nicholson, the defendant changed his argument, instead claiming 

that Griffiths may have mixed up the samples and mistakenly 

generated a DNA profile from Nicholson's sample and assigned it 

to Middleton. The defendant contends that, despite the fact 

that the DNA samples of each of the co-defendants were 

separately collected and labeled by Trooper Tobin before being 

stored at the crime lab, Griffiths switched the exemplars of 

Middletown and Nicholson. The defendant claims that, had the 

evidence of the personnel files been timely provided to him, he 

could have impeached Drugan's opinion testimony and it would 

have had an impact on the outcome of the trial.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "Under Mass. R. Crim. 

P. 30 (b), [as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001)], a judge may 

grant a motion for a new trial at any time if it appears that 

justice may not have been done." Commonwealth v. Williams, 89 

Mass. App. Ct. 383, 387 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott,

467 Mass. 336, 344 (2014). "We review a judge's decision to 

deny a motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary 

hearing 'for a significant error of law or other abuse of 

discretion.'" Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 162 (2020),
7

quoting Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 482 Mass. 838, 843-844 (2019). 

In our review for abuse of discretion "must give great deference 

to the judge's exercise of discretion; it is plainly not an 

abuse of discretion simply because the reviewing judge would 

have reached a different result." L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). In other words, an abuse of 

discretion occurs if a judge makes "'a clear error of judgment 

in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision'" (citation 

omitted). Id. "[W]e 'extend[ ] special deference to the action 

of a motion judge who was also the trial judge.'" Commonwealth

v. Conley 103 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 512 (2023), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).

2. Exculpatory evidence. In order to obtain a new trial 

on the basis of nondisclosed exculpatory evidence, "a defendant 

must establish (1) that the evidence [was] in the possession,

custody, or control of the prosecutor or a person subject to the 

prosecutor's control; (2) that the evidence is exculpatory; and 

(3) prejudice." Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 487 Mass. 370, 375 

(2021).

As to the third element -- prejudice -- the motion judge 

analyzed the defendant's request for "background information" of 

the crime lab employees as a "specific request." When a motion 

for a new trial is based upon a specific request for exculpatory 

evidence, "a defendant need demonstrate only that a substantial 
8

basis exists for claiming prejudice from the nondisclosure."

Commonwealth v. Pope, 489 Mass. 790, 801 (2022), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 472 Mass. 401, 412 (1992).2 See 

Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 680 (2003), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 729 (1992) ("In cases 

involving a specific request for evidence, we look to the record 

to determine 'whether we can be confident that even if the 

prosecution had supplied the report to the defendant[] in a 

timely fashion, the report or available evidence disclosed would 

not have influenced the jury'"). The defendant bears the burden 

of establishing that he was prejudiced by the failure to 

disclose the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 

575, 583 (2018).

In her analysis, the judge applied the most favorable 

standard of review for the defendant, but nevertheless denied 

his second motion for a new trial. On this record, we perceive 

no abuse of discretion. The judge properly considered whether 

the evidence, had it been disclosed, "would have influenced" the 

jury, Daye, 411 Mass. at 729, and concluded that the defendant 

failed to show that there was a "reasonable possibility that the 

2 If the request for evidence is non-specific, the test is 

"whether there is a substantial chance that the jury might not 

have reached verdicts of guilt if the undisclosed evidence had 

been introduced in evidence." Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 413.
9

nondisclosed evidence would have made a difference." Imbert, 

supra.

The judge carefully considered the nondisclosed evidence in 

the context of the strength of the entire case against the 

defendant. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 329-330

(2008). The judge described how the DNA evidence was just a 

part of the Commonwealth's case against the defendant. In 

particular, Tia, a witness for the Commonwealth, testified at 

trial that she and the defendant had been friends for a couple 

of years, and that the day before the home invasion she went on 

a drive with the defendant and Nicholson. Tia's testimony 

placed the defendant in the car when they drove by S. M.'s home 

in Braintree and Nicholson spoke about robbing S. M. of money 

and marijuana. On the drive Nicholson, who already had a 

handgun in the car, retrieved a shotgun and a bulletproof vest. 

During the intrusion, Nicholson called Tia on the Nextel radio. 

Later, Tia asked Nicholson what happened with the female victim 

at the house and Nicholson laughed and told her "it wasn't him." 

Tia's testimony also placed the defendant in the car with 

Nicholson and Tia the day after the home invasion, at which time

Nicholson threatened to kill Tia's mother, daughter, and Tia, 

herself, if Tia spoke to the police.

Furthermore, as the judge explained, it was Caitlyn Drugan,

not Griffiths or Chow, who testified at trial that the DNA of 
10

the defendant matched the DNA of the sperm taken from the 

victim's mouth.3 The judge concluded that "at no time up to and 

including the present (and despite having filed two motions for 

a new trial and a revised motion) has the defendant actually 

identified any errors in the DNA analysis . . . or offered any 

scientific basis for challenging its accuracy." Moreover, the 

judge noted that, with the evidence provided, the defense was 

able to argue strenuously at trial that the jury should 

disbelieve that Chow or Griffiths "performed in a manner that 

was appropriate" and that "there's no indication that the oral 

swab that was presented to the DNA lab was that of 

Mr. Middleton[]." Although the additional personnel files no 

doubt could have been used for additional impeachment, nothing 

in these documents indicated that the concerns with the work of 

Chow or Griffiths had to do with their work on the defendant's 

sample, and more importantly, it remains that Drugan 

independently reviewed the DNA testing and provided an opinion

that was subject to thorough cross-examination.

Simply put, the defendant's claim that Griffiths may have 

swapped the DNA samples of the defendant and Nicholson remains

3 Drugan's opinion testimony at trial relating to the DNA 

evidence was upheld in an earlier ruling of this court because 

she independently reviewed the DNA evidence. See Commonwealth

v. Middleton, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 1110. The defendant's claim 

that Drugan did not independently analyze the evidence is 

without support in the record.
11

entirely speculative, with no grounding in the personnel files

or in the other evidence presented or available. Recognizing 

the special deference we owe to the motion judge, who was the 

trial judge and had a superior insight into how the jury reacted 

to Drugan's testimony and the defense's attacks upon it, we 

discern no error in her determination that there was not enough 

to establish a substantial basis for a claim of prejudice.

Order entered January 4, 

2023, denying second motion 

for new trial affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff,

Englander & Walsh, JJ.4),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: January 19, 2024.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.