Executive Order 13650 Public Listening Session, DC

Date: November 15, 2013

Location: GSA Building – 7th & D Streets; Washington, DC 20004

Introduction and Opening Remarks

Jack Eisenhauer, Moderator: 

• Welcome to the Public Listening Session for Executive Order (EO) 13650: Chemical Facility Safety 

and Security.

• This is the second in a series of sessions that will be held at different locations and dates.

• I will be your moderator for today.

• Those on the phone are in listening-mode only.

• Anyone, including those in the room, is welcome to submit written comments. Please send

comments to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov.

• This session will be recorded only for the purposes of note-taking. 

• We are here to provide an opportunity for each of you to provide comments regarding the 

contents of the EO.

Mathy Stanislaus, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Response, Environmental 

Protection Agency, EO Tri-Chair, commented:

• Our intention is to use today and upcoming listening sessions to inform the EO Working Group 

of the various options for improving chemical plant safety.

• The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is committed to improving facility safety and human 

health around chemical facilities, as well as improving inter-agency collaboration.

• To date, we have several accomplishments that we would like to bring your attention:

o We have started a pilot program bringing together State and local responders in the 

New York/New Jersey area. The pilot is defining high risk and inspection prioritization

among agencies and is identifying best practices for sharing information among agencies 

and first responders. 

o After the event in West, Texas, the EPA issued an update to the Ammonium Nitrate 

Advisory. On August 30th, EPA, working with the Occupational Safety & Health 

Administration (OSHA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF), delivered an advisory that provides lessons learned by facility operators and first 

responders from recent incidents involving ammonium nitrate. 

o EPA is drafting a Request for Information (RFI) and will be evaluating feedback from 

stakeholders regarding the Risk Management Program.

o EPA is also developing a set of high-level options for improving chemical safety based 

upon collaboration with our agency partners and feedback from stakeholders. 

• We are looking forward to listening and learning from you.

EO Public Listening Session Page 1

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
Caitlin Durkovich, Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), EO Tri-Chair, remarked:

• Thank you for coming today. We appreciate you taking the time to speak with us on ways to 

improve chemical security safety and security.

• November is Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency Month.

• While EPA and the Department of Labor (DOL)/OSHA have important roles in chemical safety, 

DHS brings a unique security-specific focus on the chemical industry.

• The DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) identifies and regulates high-risk 

chemical facilities to ensure that they have security measures in place to reduce risks associated 

with these chemicals. DHS requires facilities to maintain performance-based security standards 

to address their facilities’ unique risks.

• Due to the Ammonium Nitrate Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, DHS is limited in its 

ability to comment on the regulation of ammonium nitrate (AN) at this time.

Marvin Richardson, Deputy Assistant Director, Enforcement Programs and Services, ATF, commented:

• ATF is pleased to be here today with our Federal partners.

• Our role with respect to this Executive order is somewhat limited to areas dealing specifically 

with explosives.

• We are working with other Federal, State, and local agencies to coordinate responses for 

efficiency.

• We look forward to hearing your input regarding issues that we can improve upon.

Captain Drew Tucci, Chief of Office of Ports and Facilities, DHS/United States Coast Guard (USCG),

remarked:

• Thank you for taking the time out of your day to share your expertise and advice.

• The USGC has a long history of chemical safety and security as related to waterfront areas. For 

example, we have been overseeing explosive loading operations on the waterfront since World 

War I. 

• The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) sets security standards for waterfront 

facilities. The USCG oversees the administration of that program.

Bill Hoffman, Program & Analysis Officer, National Institute of Food and Agriculture, U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA), remarked:

• USDA assists rural communities in prospering so that they are self-sustaining, repopulating, and 

economically thriving. While enhancing our water resources, we ensure that our national 

forests and private working lands are conserved, restored, and made more resilient to climate 

change. We help America promote agriculture production and biotechnology exports as America 

works to increase its food security. Finally, we ensure that our Nation’s children have access to 

EO Public Listening Session Page 2

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
safe, nutritious, and balanced meals. To fulfill this mission, we need the help and collaboration 

of our stakeholders, both within and outside the Government.

• Many of our partners are involved in emergency response. Although that may not come to mind 

when you think of the USDA, please keep in mind that we are involved in firefighting through 

the forest service.

• We also have a large environmental conservation mission in the USDA. 

Jordan Barab, Deputy Assistant Secretary, DOL/OSHA, remarked:

• Thank you for participating today. This is the second listening session we have held regarding

this EO. 

• We understand that there are different views and perspectives relating to chemical security. 

We welcome those differences and look forward to hearing from all of you.

• In the wake of the disaster in West, Texas, the President signed this EO to review and improve 

the security of chemical facilities throughout the country. The goal of this working group is to 

improve the way that all stakeholders work together to improve the safety and security of 

chemical facilities and surrounding communities.

• DHS is primarily focused on the security of chemical facilities. OSHA is primarily focused on 

worker health and safety. EPA’s role is facility safety and the protection of human health in and 

around these chemical facilities. 

• Provided an overview of the EO sub-working groups:

o Section 3 & 4: Involves operational and Federal coordination. Chaired by the EPA and 

DHS/USGC, the group is currently formulating a plan to improve how Federal agencies 

work together and with other stakeholders to improve regulatory efficiencies. The 

group is also evaluating methods for sharing information, specifically explosive material 

storage data and CFATS data. A pilot program was established in EPA Region II and is 

working to define high risk and inspection prioritization, to determine how best to share 

information between agencies and first responders, and to determine methods for 

improving access to and the content of Emergency Planning and Community Right to 

Know Act (EPCRA)Tier II filings. 

o Section 5: Chaired by DHS, Office of Infrastructure Protection, this group is tasked with 

examining the ways that we collect and disseminate chemical facility information. It is

looking at possible improvements to information collection, as well as methods for 

sharing that information with Federal, State, and local partners. It is in the process of 

developing a proposal for a coordinated and flexible data-sharing process.

o Section 6: Chaired by the OSHA, this group is primarily focused on policy issues and 

modernizing standards and regulations. The working group is developing options for 

improving risk management practices through agency programs, private sector 

initiatives, Government guidance, outreach, standards, and regulations. A document 

describing the options will be issued soon. A 3-month comment period will follow to 

gather feedback based on the proposed operations. Section 6 also requires OSHA to 

EO Public Listening Session Page 3

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
issues a RFI regarding the modernization of the Process Safety Management (PSM) 

standard.

o Section 7: Chaired by DHS, Office of Infrastructure Protection, this group addresses

stakeholder outreach. 

• We have been organizing public listening sessions to ensure that the working group receives a 

broad range of feedback from our stakeholders.

• On August 30th, EPA, OSHA, and ATF issued a chemical advisory regarding the handling and 

storage of ammonium nitrate. The advisory provides lessons learned for facility 

owners/operators, emergency planners, and first responders based upon recent incidents 

(including the West, Texas incident). As part of the effort of this Executive order, we will also be 

seeking comments to improve this advisory information. 

• We cannot forget that the Executive Order is in response to a recent tragedy. We cannot forget 

the loss of life; we must keep this tragedy in our thoughts as we move forward with our efforts.

We are sobered by the tragedy in West, Texas that brought us together today, but we are united 

in our efforts to improve the safety of our chemical facilities.

The moderator provided an overview of the ground rules for those who would comment:

• This is a listening session. The purpose is to hear a diverse set of opinions. We are not here to 

debate. We are not seeking consensus.

• Speakers are asked to limit their comments to those covered in the Executive Order.

• Specific suggestions will be the most helpful.

• We hope to allow everyone an opportunity to speak today. However, if that is not possible, we 

encourage stakeholders to submit written comments.

• Presenters are asked to state their name, organization, and stakeholder group.

• Each presenter will have a maximum of 5 minutes each.

• Before the end of each session, we will open the floor for comments to anyone, including those 

who did not previously register to speak.

• We have a timekeeper here today. When you have less than 1 minute remaining, he will hold up 

a yellow card. When time is up, he will hold up a red card.

Topic I: Improving Operational Coordination with Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Partners 

Barry Breen, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Solid Waste & Emergency Response, EPA, provided a brief 

overview of Sections 3 & 4:

• We are grateful to DHS/USGC for co-leading this effort with us.

• This group is focused on Sections 3 & 4 of the Executive Order. We would like your thoughts on 

this entire area, which includes coordination among agencies at all levels.

• We are interested in your advice for what would be included in a unified Federal approach, such 

as standard operating procedures and best practices. Additionally, it would be helpful to hear 

ways in which we can support State, local, and tribal governments, such as through technical 

assistance.

EO Public Listening Session Page 4

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• We would like to hear about ways that we can foster coordination and joint collaborative 

planning efforts, where agencies support one another to improve efficiency. 

Ed Chapman, BNSF Railway/ Transportation, Community Awareness, and Emergency Response

(TRANSCAER), provided the following comments:

• I am the Director of Hazardous Materials with BNSF Railway in Texas.

• I am also the current chairman of TRANSCAER.

• The best way to improve safety is to engage everyone to reach the common goal.

• TRANSCAER was founded in 1986 as a voluntary national outreach to help communities and first 

responders prepare for transportation emergencies.

• Our members are volunteers from the chemical manufacturing sector, distribution, 

transportation, emergency response, and various Government agencies.

• Our mission is threefold: (1) promote the safe transport of hazardous materials; (2) help 

communities prepare for emergency response situations; and( 3) aid in preparing plans and 

exercises.

• The Executive Order really underscores the importance of everyone coming together to prevent 

and mitigate emergency incidents.

• TRANSCAER offers free training, both classroom and hands-on. We utilize subject matter experts 

to provide the instruction. We prepare community emergency responders with plans and 

exercises. 

• Perhaps the most important thing we provide is an opportunity for stakeholders to meet and 

work together before an incident occurs.

• TRANSCAER developed an anhydrous ammonia training program that includes transportation 

packages and information on its chemical properties and emergency incident response. Since 

2011, there have been more than 8,000 emergency responders trained in the program. We have 

received more than $50,000 in grants, which have helped us provide this training.

• We recently trained over 100 responders in Waco, Texas, a nearby neighbor of West.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: Is your organization focused primarily on 

transportation, or are you focused on other areas as well?

o Mr. Chapman responded: We are focused primarily on the transportation area. 

However, we do participate in training inside the fenceline as well. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: Are you working with unions, Local Emergency 

Planning Committees (LEPCs), or others?

o Mr. Chapman responded: The answer is all of the above. We reach out to all 

stakeholders.

Jennifer Gibson, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, National Association of Chemical Distributors 

(NACD), provided the following comments:

• As the trade association representing the nation’s chemical distribution industry, NACD offers a 

unique and important perspective on chemical safety.

EO Public Listening Session Page 5

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• Members of the NACD process, formulate, blend, repackage, warehouse, transport, and market 

chemicals for a customer base of 750,000.

• NACD members operate in all 50 States through 1,700 facilities.

• Most NACD members are small businesses. A typical member is privately owned, with about 

$26M in annual sales, three facilities, and 28 employees. More than 40% of our members are 

family-owned businesses.

• To be a member of NACD, a member must make a commitment to responsible distribution. Each 

member must follow the Responsible Distribution program, which consists of 13 codes of 

management practice to protect the environment, promote the health and safety of employees 

and community members, enhance product stewardship, and ensure the security of their 

facilities and products. Each member must undergo third-party verification of policies and 

procedures for their adherence to the codes, which include:

o Risk Management

o Carrier Selection

o Handling and Storage

o Emergency Response & Public Preparedness

o Product Storage

o Security

• Owners and managers of NACD companies have a personal stake in the safety of their facilities.

• Chemical distributors are highly regulated by several agencies. We have created a 14-page 

regulatory checklist for NACD members. While compliance is challenging, our members 

understand its necessity.

• There are three points that should be considered for effective chemical regulation:

o Regulations must be clear.

o They must be consistent.

o Agencies should adopt a culture of compliance assistance rather than simply strict 

enforcement.

• NACD has serious concerns about the potential mandate for the use of inherently safer 

technologies, especially if those mandates are not clearly defined, may not be achievable, 

and/or could transfer risk elsewhere along the supply chain.

• Regulations and enforcement must be consistent. Often, regulatory compliance is subject to the 

judgment of an individual inspector. 

• While NACD understands the needs for sharing information among Government agencies, we 

are concerned about the prospect of having one agency acting as a proxy for another. This could 

lead to additional inconsistency in interpreting the various regulations. 

• Compliance assistance and outreach is important. Most agencies, including OSHA, EPA, and 

DHS, have excellent materials available. However, it can be difficult to find these materials 

unless you know what you are looking for. NACD can assist with this effort, taking time to 

educate our members about available information and resources.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: You mentioned that many of your members are 

small businesses. OSHA has a consultation service specifically for small businesses, which can 

EO Public Listening Session Page 6

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
help clarify regulations and achieve compliance. Can you recommend what we should do with 

companies that are not members of your organization? Specifically, how do we reach out to 

them?

o Ms. Gibson answered: One thing NACD does is seek out non-members. I’m not sure if it 

would be appropriate for the Government to direct facilities to the NACD, but we 

recognize this as a problem. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Ms. Durkovich: Our inspector cadre spends a lot of time 

helping facilities to understand CFATS. Sometimes the hardest part is to identify companies that 

are not NACD members. How do we reach companies that are not part of your membership?

o Ms. Gibson answered: We will do everything we can to help in this area.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: Can you speak a little more about the 

development of your codes and the process for verification?

o Ms. Gibson answered: We began developing our codes in 1991, with third-party 

verification starting in 1998. Each facility is required to write and implement its own 

policies and procedures. We hire verification firms. We are about to start our fifth cycle. 

Every one of our members will receive a visit from one of our third-party verifiers to 

ensure compliance with our codes. Occasionally, some deficiencies are found, and the 

facility is given a period to achieve compliance. However, if there is a significant failure, 

a company is asked to leave the membership. We had one member in this position last 

year.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: It’s my understanding that you hire the thirdparty verifiers. 

o Ms. Gibson replied: Yes, we hire third-party verifiers, but companies do not get to 

choose which one visits their particular facility.

Michael Jacoby, a private citizen, provided the following comments:

• I am addressing the working group today from the perspective of protecting first responders and 

the public.

• I would like to ask the working group a simple question. You’ll hear a lot from industry and other 

stakeholders today, but when was the last time you looked at the data in your systems to see if 

it is accurate or correct?

• I’ve found a flaw in the EPCRA law that will take the President’s Executive Order or an act of 

Congress to bring EPCRA up-to-date with the standards.

• The quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) for EPCRA is based on an honor system. 

• While stakeholders may be doing their own data verification, no one is looking at the big 

picture. 

• When I ask a member of Congress or industry about the last time they verified the data, I never 

receive a clear answer. 

• When it comes to data, one thing is paramount, especially to first responders: location, location, 

location. First responders need to know where the hazards exist.

EO Public Listening Session Page 7

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• A clarifying question was asked by Ms. Durkovich: Thank you for your comments. We have 

certainly been aware of the need for better location data quality. You refer to working with an 

agency on this issue; what agency have you been working with?

o Mr. Jacoby replied: EPA. They have the ability to look at audited names, as well as to 

look forward and backward. We are cleaning up data that has been provided; you have 

to get people at the State level to verify that information is correct. Environmental 

justice has been crying about this for years. Any information submitted to the Federal 

Government should be subject to a QA/QC check.

• A clarifying statement was made by Mr. Stanislaus: From what I hear, you’re saying that we 

need to have a consistent application of QA/QC. I think we can do that without any legal 

amendments.

o Mr. Jacoby responded: It’s possible. I was challenged by a lawmaker to throw up my 

imagination and put a proposal together. Yes, that involves Congress, and with the way 

things are going in Congress, I doubt that anything will ever get done. I’ve put years of 

efforts into this, and one of the goals was to bring together organizational groups as we 

have here today. If a 7th grade student can figure out what’s wrong with this picture, 

I’m sure we can, and we can start the process. It’s an education thing. We’ve got to get 

the word out.

Lee Anderson, Blue-Green Alliance, Labor Union Coalition, provided the following comments:

• My organization is a coalition of 10 national labor unions, including those of the steel workers, 

auto workers, transit workers, service employees, teachers, communications workers, utility 

workers, food and commercial workers, sheet metal workers, and pipe fitters.

• I am here today to offer our comments, as workplace health and safety is one of our core areas 

of work, tied to one of our central organizing principals: good jobs that are safe for workers are 

healthy for the environment.

• I’d like to emphasize the importance of the EO and the process in implementing the order. The 

Government is still capable of addressing issues of workplace safety, and we welcome their 

efforts in this area.

• We see many opportunities for regulatory improvement and harmonization among agencies 

within the Federal Government.

• Perhaps the single largest opportunity we see is the use of inherently safer technologies. We 

saw this in California Governor Jerry Brown’s interagency task force report that required 

refineries to institute inherently safer systems to the greatest extent feasible. The EPA has the 

authority to issue a similar requirement under the Clean Air Act. 

• There are several opportunities for improving the collecting, storing, and sharing of facility

information. 

• Developing a single definition for what constitutes a high-hazard facility would be helpful. 

Additionally, it would be helpful to have an expanded and uniform definition of “hazardous 

substances” in Risk Management Programs and Process Safety Management requirements.

EO Public Listening Session Page 8

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• There is an opportunity to improve chemical disaster response procedures, including through 

contingency plans and training. The Worker Training and Education Program of the National 

Institute of Environmental Health Sciences has a long tradition of providing this type of training,

and it should be called upon to do this work.

• Access to information could be improved by, developing and maintaining a publicly accessible 

joint working group and State inspection database that encompasses all high-hazard facilities 

using a common definition and showing results of the inspections conducted. This could be used 

as a targeting database to identify potentially non-compliant facilities. 

• We see an opportunity for evaluating and identifying most electronic methods for identifying 

high-hazard chemical inventories across all Federal agencies.

• To meaningfully share information and engage with communities, we need an open process to 

solicit comments from stakeholders, and that process should include evening hours on 

weekdays and on weekends.

• From personal experience in a small rural farming community, farmers there know where 

ammonium nitrate is and where it is stored. But there are people living in towns who do not 

understand what ammonium nitrate is or how it is stored.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: You referenced the refinery task force in 

California – was that a recommendation?

o Mr. Anderson responded: As far as I know, that was a recommendation. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: So are you saying that you would place the 

burden of data analysis upon the facility?

o Mr. Anderson responded: Yes, analysis of inherently safer systems would be evaluated 

by the facility.

Anna Fendley, United Steelworkers Union, provided the following comments:

• I am here representing the 850,000 workers of the United Steelworkers Union, which includes 

the majority of workers in the U.S. chemical industry.

• The EO could be a major step forward in improving chemical worker safety.

• Our union has seen far too many incidents involving injury and death, and I could spend days 

discussing them.

• Inherently safer technologies (IST) and chemical processes are the most effective way to prevent 

disasters. Earlier this year, our union issued a report regarding the replacement of hydrofluoric 

acid in refineries. We would encourage you to look at our report and other similar reports 

regarding the use of IST.

• Operational coordination in the field could be improved. Inspections for each agency are 

triggered by different criteria. We believe that agencies could coordinate joint inspections, 

utilize cross-training, share best practices for facility inspections, and use a common definition 

for high-risk and high-hazard chemical facilities.

• Agencies should see workers as agents for safety and not as a security risk.

• Voluntary efforts by industry are simply not enough. 

EO Public Listening Session Page 9

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• We are pleased to hear that OSHA and EPA are moving forward with RFIs regarding updates to 

Process Safety Management (PSM) and Risk Management Program (RMP). We are looking 

forward to being involved in those efforts.

• We need more opportunities to engage during this process, especially at convenient times for 

workers, such as evenings.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: You can have inherently safer technology in a 

single facility. Sometimes, the use of IST can create other hazards, such as through more 

frequent transport of lesser hazard chemicals. How do we mitigate that?

o Ms. Fendly replied: A holistic process is needed to evaluate these issues on a case-bycase basis.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: How can IST use be implemented?

o Ms. Fendly replied: We would recommend developing a comprehensive process that 

involves workers who understand the process. We would be happy to follow-up with 

more specifics.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: You mentioned that the National Insitute of 

Health (NIH) has a grantee training program that you can use. How exactly would you use the 

grantee training? 

o Ms. Fendly replied: The grantee training program has been in existence for decades. 

They have a number of grantees that do excellent training on hazardous operations and 

emergency response. They are already doing training in the field for workers and 

community groups. Simply plugging in with that agency and working with the grantees 

for additions would be very straightforward and doable. 

John Gustafson, U.S. National Response Team (retired), gave a handout to each member of the panel 

and provided the following comments:

• I have been involved in the chemical industry since 1977, when I served as Special Assistant and 

Acting Chief of Staff to Doug Costle, the EPA Administrator. This was during the time of Love 

Canal, the major oil spill in Europe, and other incidents.

• I want to help serve as a voice of emergency responders, contingency planners, and 

investigators. 

• I would like to direct your attention to a document in your packets called “What Should Be 

Done?” Please look at the solutions section. There are approximately 50 ideas there that should

be considered.

• In 1995, the National Response Team went through a process of revitalization. The agencies 

represented here are part of the 16 agency organizations on the National Response Team. What 

we are doing here now is very similar and represents the beginning of revitalization in chemical 

safety. 

• Many agencies have not been able to support adequate training due to sequestration. Agencies 

should focus on coordination to address this concern. There needs to be better coordination 

and collaboration. 

EO Public Listening Session Page 10

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• This is a Federal, State, and local process. The States have a large stake in this process. In West, 

Texas, the LEPC structure was not a robust as other areas.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: You briefly mentioned funding training. Can you 

elaborate on that?

o Mr. Gustafson responded: The National Response System used to have four meetings 

per year, but it was dropped to two per year before eventually being suspended due to 

budget concerns. The on-scene coordinators all need training, but the funding for that 

has evaporated. Attorneys need to be educated on how the Oil Trust Fund works.

• A comment was made by Mr. Stanislaus: I will look at this document and will perhaps reach back 

to you.

Bill Erny, Senior Director at the American Chemistry Council (ACC), provided the following comments:

• In addition to my comments today, I will submit a written document for inclusion in the docket.

• Nothing is more important to our members than the safety and security of our communities and 

facilities.

• ACC stands ready to offer the expertise of our membership. We have valuable programs and 

broad experience that can assist in this area.

• ACC-member companies have reduced worker reportable injury and illness rates by 79% since 

1990, currently at a rate five times lower than the U.S. manufacturing sector as a whole.

• ACC has been tracking process safety incidents and has seen a reduction of more than 58% in 

this area as well.

• Our members are committed to the ACC ResponsibleCare® Program. 

o One difference in this program versus others is that compliance is mandatory for 

membership in the ACC.

o A core element of the program is to work with first responders.

• ACC operates CHEMTREC, which provides millions of safety data sheets and can provide realtime emergency response guidance to first responders when needed.

• ACC also sponsors TRANSCAER. Combined, these efforts paint a picture of an organization 

committed to safety and security.

• Increased leveraging of existing programs, such as ResponsibleCare®, is important.

• We encourage the Government to dedicate more resources for outreach, education, and 

training.

• ACC agrees that sharing chemical information and emergency response plans with those who 

have a legitimate need to know is critical. ACC objects to releasing sensitive security information 

or confidential business information to the general public.

• ACC believes that existing regulations offer the necessary incentives required for using

inherently safer technologies. Additional regulation in this area is not feasible.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: How do you reconcile the need for more stringent 

ResponsibleCare® requirements when compared to the possibility of losing members with more 

strict requirements?

EO Public Listening Session Page 11

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
o Mr. Erny responded: We have a pretty robust process, which includes the use of a 

steering committee. We have not considered if changes to the program will affect 

membership numbers. We recently added several new components to the program, 

including a new process safety code. 

o Mr. Erny also added: Agencies recognizing programs like ResponsibleCare® in 

regulations would go a long way toward getting other organizations to adopt these best 

practices. We spend a lot of time reaching out to other organizations and participate in 

outreach efforts that go beyond our existing membership. I don’t know how to get 

everyone, but we can collectively work together to do a better job.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Hoffman: You mentioned a regulatory recognition of 

these programs. Is there a model you can point to that has been successful in this area? 

o Mr. Erny responded: Yes, in fact MTSA is a great example. We have a security program 

established with USCG that is based upon our ResponsibleCare® program. It helps both 

us and the USCG to cover a large swath of a specific industry sector and to take care of it 

from a regulatory context.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: What has been the experience of your 

members with respect to the New Jersey program? 

o Mr. Erny responded: Our understanding is that our members were involved in 

developing the program in New Jersey. The issue of IST use is very site-specific. If it 

works in New Jersey, that doesn’t mean it would work elsewhere. I would caution 

against making that change throughout the Nation.

Michele Roberts, Co-Director, Environmental Justice and Health Alliance for Chemical Policy Reform, 

handed the panel a photo and provided the following comments:

• My organization is a national coalition of grassroots community groups across the United States. 

I believe in always making sure that I travel with the communities that I serve. For those of you 

on the phone, I just handed the panel a photo of a community in Westlake, Louisiana. The 

communities that I serve are from Alaska, New Mexico, California, Kentucky, Delaware, Texas, 

Louisiana, Arkansas, New York, New Jersey, and Indiana. I also bring you greetings and thoughts 

from the National Black Farmers Association. They too are represented in this process.

• I am a bi-State person if you will, like Joseph Biden, our Vice President. I too live in Washington, 

D.C. but have strong roots in Delaware.

• Today, I wish to speak and focus on the DuPont Edgemoor facility, located in Edgemoor, 

Delaware. It’s also helpful for you to know that I am a former environmental scientist from the 

State of Delaware, where I have put myself on the front lines as a first responder in these 

facilities. I have actually responded to the standard chlorine gas leak; I was also present at the 

2001 Motiva Corporation (now known as PBF) explosion, where we lost a worker in that space, 

never to be recovered.

• There are 11 dangerous facilities along the Interstate I-95 corridor between Wilmington and 

Philadelphia. Several of these facilities put more than 1 million people at risk. Four put more 

than 200,000 people at risk in the event of a dangerous chemical release. One such facility is the 

EO Public Listening Session Page 12

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
DuPont facility in Edgemoor, which uses chlorine to produce titanium dioxide, a pigment used to 

make paper, paints, and plastic opaque or white. The bulk use and storage of chlorine at this 

facility puts 600,000 people at risk within 14.2 miles. 

• With one strong incident, my entire family, my entire life, everything that I know of, is gone in 

an instant. The State of Delaware, like many States, are not adequately prepared, and as 

Congress debates over budgets, the State has not prepared its own budget to handle a severe 

emergency response. Now, environmental justice communities across this country have 

appealed to all of you for the past 10 years about needing to better protect our communities 

and the workers inside these facilities. 

• I appreciate that agencies are holding these listening sessions and Webinars. However, the 

timing is not conducive to the full participation of those who are most affected; they cannot 

travel. Furthermore, we are still grappling with rural America and even getting them connected 

to broadband, as Mr. Hoffman will know, representing the farm communities via the USDA. All 

this is to say that we respectfully challenge the way in which these listening sessions are 

conducted, and we would like to partake in how that too is structured. They should be able to 

meet the needs of those who are most affected. 

• Ms. Durkovich provided a clarifying statement: I want to let you know what we have heard you 

regarding making these sessions more accessible during the day. We are working to schedule 

sessions in the evening in California, New Jersey, and Texas. There are some challenges with 

finding facilities available during these times.

Richard Gupton, Senior Vice President, Public Policy & Counsel, Agriculture Retailers Association (ARA), 

provided the following comments:

• ARA represents the farm supplier retailer/distributor industry segment, located in all 50 States, 

ranging in size from small to large operations. 

• Our industry is highly regulated due to the products we carry. We understand the importance of 

the safe handling and storage of ammonium nitrate and other products like anhydrous 

ammonia. 

• We are saddened by the tragedy that occurred in West, Texas, and we are hopeful to avoid 

another such incident through the common sense solutions that this EO will produce.

• Employees in our represented facilities live in the same communities where they operate.

• We oppose having a statute requiring the use of IST. It is too difficult to define what is inherently 

safer. The Government should not decide for a facility what products should be carried.

• There should be clear and consistent regulations that are practical and economically feasible for 

industry. 

• There should be more first responder training, including exercises.

• Many local emergency planning committees are poorly funded.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: Do you think that a change in the regulation is 

needed to change the way that Tier II filings are amended?

o Mr. Gupton replied: No, our members are telling us that this is an issue because of the 

way the system works; you cannot simply amend the report, you have to resubmit the 

EO Public Listening Session Page 13

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
entire report. These are simple things that could be done to improve the Tier II 

reporting process. 

• Mr. Stanislaus mentioned: The EO also calls for looking at best practices in the use of IST. You 

may want to be thinking about what are the best practices when it comes to safe practices.

o Mr. Gupton responded: When it comes to safer practices, it’s really an issue for the 

individual facility to evaluate what solutions will work best. It should be left up to those 

facilities. At the end of the day, who decides if they made the right decision? We 

believe that should be up to the facility and the private market place to decide.

Elizabeth O’Neal, Senior Manager, Government Relations, Society of Chemical Manufacturers and 

Affiliates (SOCMA), provided the following comments:

• We are the leading trade association representing the batch chemical industry.

• Two hundred member companies employ more than 100,000 workers and provide more than 

50,000 products. Over 80% of our members are small businesses.

• Members are required to implement ChemStewards®—our third-party verify environment 

health safety and security management program—which is based upon continuous 

improvement.

• Our members are subject to OSHA’s PSM and EPA’s RMP, and many are subject to DHS’s CFATS.

• We filed formal comments in October, which emphasize three major recommendations:

o Maximize stakeholder involvement.

 We are thankful for the working group listening sessions.

 We wish that the working group would have reached out to the stakeholders 

before crafting the EO.

 We hope that the working group will reach out to stakeholders concerning 

specific options as they are formulated. 

o Make the most of existing law.

 We are glad to see OSHA using the existing law in regards to the incident in 

West, Texas.

 We are glad to see DHS and EPA comparing CFATS Top Screen and RMP lists. 

 We believe that Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA)

has the greatest potential to address the gaps found following the incident in 

West, Texas. EPCRA did not perform as intended at West, Texas. The first 

responders, despite being informed, did not appear to understand the risks 

involved with the facility.

 EPCRA revitalization should be the key of the EO working group, mostly because 

it empowers local communities to oversee and raise questions about emergency 

planning.

o Use the regulatory program most appropriate to the task.

 The OSHA explosives and blasting agents standard is the best tool to address 

storage of AN fertilizer. We do not need additional AN regulation. 

EO Public Listening Session Page 14

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
 We commend Assistant Administrator Stanislaus for stating that the EPA would 

not use the Clean Air Act General Duty Clause to enact chemical plant security.

 Some people have advocated for the use of IST. The RMP and CFATS programs 

in just a few years have caused more than 3,000 facilities to voluntarily alter 

their facilities to reduce risk.

 We suggest that you reconsider the development of a reactive chemical 

database. We opened a discussion on this subject in the 1990s, and we are open 

to reopening the discussion.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: You mentioned that EPCRA revitalization has the

single greatest opportunity. Do you mean re-energizing local access to information?

o Ms. O’Neil responded: With the data sheets that are already required, we are working 

to coordinate planning better. In looking throughout the country, it appears to be a 

patchwork, with some areas working better than other. Perhaps there would be an 

opportunity to improve training throughout the country. 

• Ms. Durkovich made a clarifying comment: Part of our discussions about IST has been about 

how we can leverage our best practices and lessons learned throughout the chemical 

community. 

Cynthia Hilton, Executive Vice President, Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), handed a packet to 

each of the panel members and provided the following comments:

• This package includes some best practices regarding the handling of AN. This was also provided 

in July.

• We welcome this opportunity to address the panel. Our mission is to promote safety and 

security in the commercial explosives industry.

• We come with a “tough love” message for the working group. Ever since the August 2nd kick-off 

call, we have wanted to be here, but the clock is ticking toward the deadlines. The lack of 

stakeholder outreach is causing concern. Our organization submitted best practice guidelines, 

which were not incorporated into the advisory. We were asked to help distribute the advisory, 

but we cannot because it contains information that we do not agree with.

• We care about safety and security. We learned from the West, Texas incident, and we’ve made 

changes in our recommendations accordingly.

• Executive Order 13576 promises Government transparency and accountability; the current 

status of that effort is inadequate. We have provided more than two dozen recommendations. 

Stakeholders should be able to review comments submitted by others and respond to them. The 

working group should provide a periodic summary of actions, issues, and recommendations 

being addressed and should provide an opportunity for responses.

• We support the sharing of information with the emergency response community but not 

through the LEPC community. LEPC has had varied success. The security sensitivity of the 

information of our business operations argues against broadening existing disclosures to these 

entities. We would recommend working with the first responder community directly.

EO Public Listening Session Page 15

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• Mr. Barab provided a clarifying comment: By the nature of the AN guidance, we will be receiving 

conflicting recommendations depending upon the users involved (agriculture versus explosives). 

o Ms. Hilton responded: While the Department of Transportation (DOT) classifies AN as an 

explosive, the commercial sector does not have a use for that. Chemically, it is the 

same, but the difference is only the density. In a fire, you cannot tell the difference.

• A clarifying comment was made by Mr. Barab: We intend to create a docket to share the 

information we’ve collected as part of this process.

Leslie Fields, Director of Environmental Justice and Community Partnerships, Sierra Club, provided the 

following comments:

• Our organization has 2.1 million members.

• I would urge the EPA to issue new guidance that requires chemical facilities to utilize safer and 

more cost effective chemicals and technologies. 

• Every day, according to EPA, the 472 facilities that handle hazardous chemicals each expose 

more than 100,000 people to possible chemical disaster.

• I will speak concerning Detroit. This is a community of people of color. The Marathon Refinery 

there exploded in April. The emergency response at that time was completely lacking. The town 

next door was evacuated, but the local community was not. 

• There are other facilities that also have and produce toxic substances in that same area.

Yesterday, there was another toxic chemical fire at another facility. The Detroit Free Press has 

covered the incident and included several very graphic photos of the event.

• Dr. Paul Mohot from University of Michigan conducted a study concerning extended exposure 

to air pollution. The study evaluated whether the air pollution can be linked to student 

performance. Public schools in Michigan are disproportionately located in more polluted areas.

The majority of students located near the worst pollution are disproportionately of minority 

backgrounds.

• We would like to see the EPA enforce the Clean Air Act to enhance chemical disaster prevention.

• We would also like to see listening sessions conducted in the evenings.

Topic II: Information Collection and Sharing 

Opening Remarks, Scott Breor, Deputy Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, DHS:

• Many of the presenters who addressed the previous topic this morning also spoke to areas 

regarding information collection and sharing. We too recognize the inter-relation of these 

topics. 

• Limited information leads to poor decision making. 

• Section 5 is divided into three areas:

o Section a deals with analysis. 

o Sections b and c are concerned with recommendations for information collection and 

sharing.

EO Public Listening Session Page 16

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• We have heard some great feedback from you the stakeholders, and we look forward to the 

continued discussion today.

Sofia Plagakis, Policy Analyst, Center for Effective Government (formerly OMB Watch), provided the 

following comments:

• We are an independent non-profit organization that advocates for a more transparent and 

accountable Government. 

• Excessive secrecy and information restrictions contribute to gaps, oversights, and indecisions in 

chemical security efforts. When programs are allowed to operate behind closed doors, with 

little to no ongoing public oversight, they often suffer from delays, wasted resources, and 

management problems. The public has a fundamental right to know the oversight that the 

Government has in place. The citizens deserve more than a “trust us” approach to safety. 

• Further collaboration and disclosure among Federal and State agencies is sorely needed. 

However, many programs have such significant restrictions on accessing their information that 

even other Government agencies can have difficulty using the data. The most effective way to 

promote information sharing is to only protect a narrow scope of information necessary, with 

the rest being made public. EPA should establish online access to RMP data and should collect 

and post EPCRA Tier II inventory reports. DHS should make portions of the CFATS data public

(such as facilities and tiering data).

• Engaging and informing the public is essential to preparing them for emergencies. Citizens, first 

responders, plant workers, and local officials all need to be better informed. Excessive secrecy 

can cost lives in the event of an emergency. 

• Citizens should have access to chemical facility information and should be permitted to 

participate in emergency planning. For instance, disclosing the names and locations of facilities, 

the chemicals contained, and the status of inspections would allow members of the community 

to better understand which facilities are compliant with safety regulations and which are not.

• It is essential to harmonize the scope of chemicals, hazards, and facilities covered by the various 

agencies’ regulatory programs that address Federal chemical security regulations. 

Harmonization would ensure that the broadest list of chemicals of concerns, types of hazards, 

and facilities are covered in a consistent manner. This should include creating a system to 

regularly review and select chemicals for addition to the RMP and other regulatory programs.

• Regulations and statutes should be updated to establish clear authorities for agencies in 

requiring facilities to use safer technologies and chemicals, which would better protect citizens 

in the process. Despite the benefits of safer alternatives, only a fraction of facilities have 

converted, thus demonstrating the need for Federal regulation. EPA should implement its 

authority under the General Duty Clause of the Clean Air Act. 

EO Public Listening Session Page 17

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
David Case, Executive Director, Environmental Technology Council, provided the following comments:

• We are the trade association for the hazardous waste management industry. We have 11 

member companies representing about 90% of the commercial hazardous waste management 

industry.

• Our members provide technologies and services to their customers regarding issues such as 

chemical recycling and the proper management and disposal of waste materials.

• We have prepared our own best practices document for the proper management of reactive 

materials in response to the Chemical Safety Board’s recommendation. 

• We are very interested in the EO, especially Section 5. We have some ideas for how to 

streamline data collection while also lessening the burden to industry. We believe that we 

should embrace the electronic manifest system being developed by EPA.

• Today, manifests are paper-based. Unfortunately, these documents are largely unavailable to 

first responders who respond to incidents where vehicles are involved. This is because it is 

difficult to gather a paper document when a significant incident has occurred.

• Last year, Congress passed a law to mandate EPA to construct the electronic manifest system.

The Government initially allocated the necessary funds for constructing this new system, and a

fee-for-service structure will, in time, allow industry to repay those costs back to the Treasury.

Essentially, the system will not cost the tax payers anything.

• Today, none of the money needed to construct the system has been funded by Congress. 

Without funding, the development cannot proceed. I would urge the working group to endorse 

the construction of this system in hopes that Congress will then allocate the necessary funding. 

• A clarifying comment was made by Mr. Stanislaus: I would agree that this new system has the 

potential to provide several benefits, including the ability to track individual shipments, but also 

to facilitate data analysis at a higher level.

Michael Kennedy, Agriculture Retailers Association, provided the following comments:

• Retailers play an important part in feeding the world. We provide farmers with seed and crop 

protection products.

• We are in the process of standing up a new system called “Responsible Ag.” to help facilities 

establish foundational environmental health, safety, and security practices.

• We’ve created a first responder document to get participants from the industry and first 

responders on the same page and to coordinate events and training. It consists of a preinspection and a post-inspection checklist. 

• Outreach is an integral component of notifying facilities of the need to protect their assets. I 

thought that the AN guidance document was a great move in that effort. It was produced in a 

relatively quick period, by Government standards. It’s a great first step in demonstrating 

cooperation between Government and industry.

• A facility cannot comply with a regulation if they do not know how it applies to them. 

• We recommend looking more closely at OSHA’s Alliance Program, which effectively engages 

industry stakeholders to produce documents and share information. 

EO Public Listening Session Page 18

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• Regulations need to be economically feasible and practical. 

• We do not believe that OSHA’s PSM standards should apply to retailers. The economic burdens 

exceed the potential safety benefits.

• Regarding EPCRA, we support eliminating the fertilizer agriculture exemption 311 and 312 

reporting requirements. It is worth noting that the facility in West, Texas did include information 

on their AN Tier II reports submitted to local first responders.

• Adding AN to the RMP is unnecessary and difficult, if not impossible, to measure as a regulator.

• There would be no chemical security and safety without CFATS. We support the permanent

authorization of CFATS.

• We support a solid AN fertilizer registration rule that does not include mixtures or a broad base 

of nitrogen fertilizer products. Any program should be modeled after the restricted use pesticide 

programs administered by States. 

David LeGrande, Director, Occupational Safety and Health, Communications Workers of America (CWA),

provided the following comments:

• These remarks are provided on behalf of the CWA, as well as the Coalition to Prevent Chemical 

Disorders.

• We are all too familiar with the tragedy in West, Texas. That incident killed 15 individuals and 

injured more than 160 workers and community members. Clearly this incident should never 

have occurred. 

• CWA commends President Obama for his response to this tragedy by issuing this Executive 

Order.

• Time is of the essence. Actions to improve chemical safety and security are of national 

importance. While delays relating to the Government shutdown are understandable, we 

encourage the working group to develop an early 2014 timetable for completing their efforts.

• According to a recent poll conducted by Coalition to Prevent Chemical Disasters, 59% of 

responding voters believe that the Federal Government should require chemical facilities to use 

safer chemicals and processes when they are affordable. This can be done by expanding EPA’s 

2002 Chemical Safety and Security Plan. 

• Every day, more than 100 million people live or work near chemical facilities that store large 

quantities of chemicals, with the potential to kill and/or injure thousands of individuals. Nearly 

500 of these facilities each put more than 100,000 individuals at risk. We encourage the group 

to put forth a requirement for chemical facilities to move toward safer technologies. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Hoffman: Are any of the organizations you cited part of 

the Blue-Green Alliance?

o Mr. LeGrande responded: They are not.

Michael Jacoby, Private Sector, provided the following comments:

• Information collection should be done at the beginning of the process. For example, capturing 

the latitude and longitude of the facility can be done during the planning process. 

EO Public Listening Session Page 19

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• Data verification is key to solving many of the problems of first responders and fenceline 

communities.

Cynthia Hilton, Executive Vice President, Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), provided the following 

comments:

• We want to work with you and have in the past on many important initiatives.

• Everyone should understand that we are not trying to hide information. We are trying to 

provide it to those who would make the best use of it: the first response community.

• Our most effective recommendation regarding the identification of outliers is to expand EPA’s 

List of Lists. I was around when this was initially done, and it was very helpful. We could add to 

that the DHS Chemicals of Interest, the ATF List of Explosives, the OSHA PSM List, and the DOT 

Security Sensitive Hazmats. This could serve as a tool for industry to understand what 

regulations apply based upon their individual chemical holdings.

• (Ms. Hilton presented the panel a small sample of AN).

• 29 CFR 1910.109(i) is the bedrock of AN safety. In the wake of the incident in West, Texas, we 

support strengthening this standard to remove obsolete references, to eliminate the option to 

store AN in combustible structures, and to advise first responders not to fight fires involving AN. 

• We disagree with some who assert that the DHS Ammonium Nitrate Security Program would 

have prevented the disaster in West, Texas. The program’s ill-conceived chain of custody 

procedures will have disastrous consequences for our industry. We urge you to issue a 

supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to include an exception for transportation 

activities that are under the authority of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

Additionally, it doesn’t make sense to overlay redundant vetting for individuals who handle AN 

when those same individuals have been vetted by ATF for the safe handling of high explosives. 

• No one is against vetting individuals, but we need to avoid duplication in vetting individuals. It is 

costly and unnecessary.

• As we are unaware of any accidental detonation of AN in a facility compliant with OSHA’s 

standards, and given that OSHA is enforcing their standards, IME believes that OSHA’s program 

is sufficient. We oppose expanding EPA’s RMP program to include AN. 

Introduction of afternoon panelists: 

• Jordan Barab, OSHA, Department of Labor

• Mathy Stanislaus, EPA

• Dave Wulf, DHS 

• Capt. Andrew Tucchi, USCG

• Jessica Pultz, USDA

Topic III: Policy, Regulation and Standard Modernization

Lisa Long, Office of Engineering Safety, OSHA, provided opening remarks on Section 6, covering the 

content of Section 6a through 6e and providing an update on the working group’s activities . 

EO Public Listening Session Page 20

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
Jim Cooper, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM ), provided the following comments:

• Fuel and petrochemical manufacturing is complex. They are all within custom-designed facilities,

and it takes years to build them at great expense.

• AFPM provides an opportunity for petrochemical manufacturers to share best practices.

• Policies must not stifle innovation in the private sector. They should not pick winners and losers, 

nor should they define the laws of physics.

• Regarding IST, this is a philosophical approach. There is no objective way of measuring if one 

process is safer than another.

• Chemistry and engineering are bound by the laws of physics. Opportunities for improving an 

existing facility are often difficult to identify. IST is generally engineered into facilities when they 

are planned, not after they are constructed.

• We are concerned that the burden of increased regulation may drive manufacturing outside the 

U.S.

• The employees of fuel and petrochemical companies are members of the communities. No one 

is more concerned with improving facility safety than the people who work there.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: You talked about some of the difficulties 

concerning IST. Are there parameters or guidelines to do it well?

o Mr. Cooper responded: Certainly. Many of our members are large companies that 

belong to organizations like the Center for Chemical Process Safety and the Mary K. 

O’Conner Safety Institute. They are very involved and at the forefront of the discussion 

concerning process safety and safer design.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: Regarding the use of IST, we understand that the 

Government should not be dictating how a facility operates a proprietary process. What role 

could the Government have in this area?

o Mr. Cooper responded: The primary role of value is as a facilitator to help with 

information sharing.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: You have discussed problems with definition and 

with measurement. These seem like things that could be worked through your organization. Is 

that something you would be willing to do? 

o Mr. Cooper responded: Yes, but we have to be careful because sometimes companies 

gain a competitive advantage through their differences in process. We have to be 

careful not to violate that proprietary value.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: Do you have an opinion regarding other 

organizations and the guidance they have issued regarding IST? What has been the experience 

in New Jersey with its IST requirement?

o Mr. Cooper responded: In New Jersey, it is a paperwork exercise. It’s something you 

have to do anyway and it is simply repeating itself. It will not yield a different result than 

other existing programs. I was able to work on a book on site vulnerability assessments 

(SAVs). We view these SAVs as the models that people should be striving for. To take 

these documents and have them adopted by a broader range of stakeholders would 

EO Public Listening Session Page 21

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
likely be appropriate, but we need to have a neutral party convene the stakeholders and 

allow them to participate at no additional cost. 

Peter Weaver, International Liquid Terminals Association (ILTA), provided the following comments:

• ILTA represents facilities that store and handle petro-chemical products. Our facilities interface 

with all modes of transportation, and our members operate in all 50 States.

• One observation I have made regarding the EO is that there is a blurring of lines of authority 

between the agencies addressed in the order. While this may not have been the intention of the

EO authors, it is worth considering. 

• If you go back about 8 years, my first project dealt with how to clarify the lines of authority 

between EPA and DOT regarding the transfer of hazardous materials. What resulted was a chart,

still used today, that clearly illustrates the line between the two agencies. My concern is that 

agencies may create unclear lines of authority in their efforts to collaborate, which could lead to 

pursuit of activities that go beyond congressional authority. We should be careful to avoid that 

when discussing standards modernization and new approaches to chemical safety.

• A clarifying statement was made by Mr. Barab: The EO didn’t give us any new powers for 

anything that we were not already authorized to do. Regarding the PSM standard, there are very 

strict rules about how we justify changes. We will continue to be careful about the concerns you 

are raising.

Rick Hind, Legislative Director, Greenpeace, provided the following comments:

• We represent about a quarter million Americans in the U.S. We have been working on this issue 

since the time before the Bhopal, India incident.

• We thank you for the listening sessions. We are encouraged by both the Executive Order and 

the listening sessions. 

• We think you have the authority under Section 112r of the Clean Air Act’s General Duty Clause

to mandate the use of IST. All you need to do there is update the guidance.

• Regarding section 112r 7(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA never issued regulations on its authority to 

prevent disasters in the first place. Typically the General Duty Clause is used after an incident, 

not before.

• We are very focused on the legal opportunities and authority to operate in favor of accident 

prevention and/or national security requirements. That’s because the 1999 amendment of the 

Clean Air Act injected provisions for Homeland Security.

• We believe that the worst-case scenarios provided to EPA are showing catastrophic potential 

more than 1,000 times more horrific than the incident in West, Texas. As such, we encourage 

the mandate for the use of inherently safer technologies.

• We encourage you to take a look at our petition and House of Representatives bill (H.R.) 2868, 

which passed the House in 2009. The packets we provided you earlier this morning present 

section 2111 on IST implementation and assessment. It also provides a definition of IST that you 

may find useful.

EO Public Listening Session Page 22

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• We agree with our industry brothers and sisters that there is no one-size-fits-all solution when it 

comes to the use of IST. We agree that each facility is unique and must evaluate IST according to 

its own unique situation. However, facilities still need to demonstrate that they have put 

forward the effort to evaluate these alternatives.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: How could you implement a requirement for 

facilities to adopt IST?

o Mr. Hind responded: This is partially addressed in H.R.2868, which addresses privately 

held chemical facilities and public water treatment facilities. Some facilities have 

voluntarily switched chemicals in response to CFATS, but we don’t have data as to which 

facilities have done so. 

• A clarifying statement was made by Mr. David Wulf (DHS): CFATS has resulted in more than 

3,000 facilities reducing or eliminating hazardous chemicals of interest.

o Mr. Hind responded: I would agree, but we would like to see the data comparison 

between CFATS data and RMP data.

Gerald Poje, Society for Occupational and Environmental Health, provided the following comments:

• I served on the National Academy of Sciences review of the post-9/11 vulnerabilities. I would 

urge the group to review the report that was conducted post-9/11 regarding chemical safety. 

• IST approaches are woefully under-assessed in meeting the needs of communities. IST is the 

most effective way to prevent catastrophic events.

• Please evaluate the results of communities that have required the use of IST. 

• Evaluate industries’ adopted best practice methods and their barriers to adopting IST. 

• Produce annual reports with facilities that have used IST, which thereby qualify them to 

unregister with EPA, OSHA, or DHS programs. 

• Explore technical assistance grants for communities located in vulnerability zones surrounding 

hazardous facilities so that workers and communities can benefit from expert opinion regarding 

the availability and feasibility of safer processes. 

• Ensure effective rights-to-know for workers and community members about catastrophic risks, 

chemical hazards, processes, and their alternatives. The alternatives are the crucial definition 

here. 

• Adopt common Federal definitions for high hazardous facilities and expand the definition for 

high-hazard chemicals based upon Chemical Safety Board (CSB) recommendations. 

• Develop a publically accessible Federal database with inspection information to help facilities 

from falling through the cracks.

• Identify the most effective electronic methods for communicating with chemical facilities.

• Ensure that employees are sufficiently trained in areas of safety and security systems. 

• We support greater analysis of PSM, RMP, and CFATS training needs applicable to three 

audiences: managers and line workers at high-hazard facilities, those involved in facility 

redesign, and those involved in emergency response.

EO Public Listening Session Page 23

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: What role do you see the Federal Government 

playing with regards IST?

o Mr. Poje responded: There needs to be a broad partnership. There is no one stakeholder 

who can make this work perfectly, but by working together we can advance this 

significantly. After the 1984 incident in Bhopal, where 8,000 people were killed, with 

300,000 ultimately suffering from that tragedy, many facilities began changing their 

technologies. Perhaps the last American facility to do that was in Institute, West 

Virginia, when they changed their technologies in 2008 or 2009. That’s an incredibly 

slow process to adapt to inherently safer technologies. However, there are many other 

choices in industry that are now beginning to be well-known. Industry should become 

an agent of transformative change by being a broker of information and getting the 

word out. There is great potential for learning in industry, but we need everyone 

working together to facilitate that change.

Randy Manner, a private citizen, provided the following comments:

• I retired last year as a Major General for the U.S. Army. I was the second officer for the National 

Guard Bureau, the organization that often serves as the back-up to first responders during largescale incidents. 

• I also served as Deputy and Acting Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). One 

mission of that organization is to measure the terrorist threat against a number of facilities 

throughout the country.

• One job at DTRA was to plan, detect, and mitigate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

Unfortunately, we don’t have to look for WMD, as they are here right now, existing in nearly 

every major city right now.

• For decades, our country has failed to address a security risk at home that puts large numbers of 

our citizens at risk, even though the problem has common sense solutions. Of course, the 

problem is the vulnerability of our chemical facilities to an industrial accident or terrorist attack. 

In my opinion, some of the best methods of reducing the chance of a terrorist attack is by simply 

making the chemical facilities less appealing. Catastrophic consequences can be minimized by 

replacing hazardous chemicals with safer alternatives and by curtailing the amounts used and 

stored.

• The National Guard is often called upon to assist during a large chemical facility incident, 

especially in cases where local first responders do not have adequate manpower, equipment, or 

training to address the situation.

• I applaud the efforts of industry in making our plants safer, but it simply is not enough. 

Meaningful, positive change can happen. Hundreds of facilities, including several Clorox 

facilities, have already switched to more cost effective and safer solutions. 

• Regulations and guidelines must be thoughtful and well-designed.

• Full and proactive Federal action is urgently needed. The lives of millions of Americans are 

depending upon your actions.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: What do you mean by being proactive?

EO Public Listening Session Page 24

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
o Gen. Manner (Ret.) responded: Many others have spoken regarding various approaches. 

One example is to have smaller chemical holdings or to switch to a safer chemical.

• Mr. Barab asked: Do you think there should be a Federal role in requiring these activities?

o Gen. Manner (Ret.) responded: No. However, these changes need to be negotiated. 

Government, working with industry and environmental groups, need to work 

collectively to make change.

Steve Ardent, Vice President, ABS Group, provided the following comments:

• I’m with ABS Group in Houston, but I’m here today representing myself and my three 

grandchildren as a process safety expert. I have over 35 years of experience in industry. I was 

present when many of these rules were developed and have worked to help them grow up and 

mature. I have worked to develop guides and industry best practice documents for PSM and 

RMP.

• If we want to improve chemical facility safety and security, then we need to improve an increase 

in performance or a reduction of risk regarding our current investments.

• We need to analyze the root causes of safety and security lapses. I suggest that you review how 

the Department of Interior Mineral and Management Service the Bureau of Ocean, Energy 

Management, Regulation and Enforcement, and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 

Enforcement address changes to their offshore safety and environmental management 

requirements. Prior to the Macondo accident, they were making an attempt to define the 

regulations that identified the root cause of performance-lapse.

• We must have a robust, transparent, fact-based, and technical approach to improving any rule;

otherwise, these rules will not be easily owned and implemented by everyone.

• In my experience, I have seen that there are four kinds of companies:

o Companies that know what to do and do it pretty well

o Companies that know what to do and occasionally fail

o Companies that know what to do and intentionally don’t (those are the criminals)

o Companies that don’t know what to do 

• We need to be careful about trying to create a new framework or regulation that addresses all 

four of these groups with the same solution. 

• Change needs to be based on direct targeting and enforcement activities. Regulators need to 

improve their enforcement efforts with high-hazard and non-compliant facilities. You need more 

people, and those people need to be well-trained and competent.

• We need more effective gathering and sharing of performance information with industry. 

• CSB has regulatory authority to write rules on accident reporting. This is also something to 

consider working with.

• Smart changes to the existing regulations would be setting better goals for companies that are 

likely to generate better or more cost-effective solutions. Alternatively, you can establish new 

requirements when we learn of new hazards. In the past few years, we’ve become more aware 

of reactive chemicals, and we now realize that we may need to do more to manage those risks.

EO Public Listening Session Page 25

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: You are the only speaker who has advocated for 

better quality enforcement. Targeting enforcement has always been a challenge for us. The 

resource requirements are enormous. Given those constraints, can you elaborate?

o Mr. Ardent responded: Of course. OSHA, in establishing the PSM, had to pass their own 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirement concerning paperwork reduction 

and the costs associated with that. There were probably some things people wished had

been in the rule but did not make it. One was that companies did not need to announce 

if they were covered or not. There are other ways to find out if people do not know, but 

that would, of course, require data sharing among State and Federal agencies. There can 

be smarter ways of identifying these people and making sure they understand. We may 

also be able to create some incentives for companies relating to IST. The challenge is in 

dealing with companies with existing facilities, rather than those who are working on 

new designs.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: Do you have recommendations on reactive 

chemicals?

o Mr. Ardent responded: It might be better if I sent you a few papers on that topic. There 

are a few different strategies you could take. A more global approach would be 

something like changing a few words in the PSM standard, but this would have other 

effects. You could say, “Let’s cover processes capable of generating a threshold 

quantity.” You would have to address reactive chemicals differently for the generation 

of energy. If you did something like that, you would run into some situations where the 

change was simply not justified.

Jim Brinkley, Director, OSHA, International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), provided the following 

comments:

• IAFF is a labor organization that represents more than 300,000 paid professional employees in 

the U.S. and Canada. 

• The profession of firefighting is and has always been a hazardous occupation, but there are 

hazards we face on a daily basis that can be minimized or eliminated completely. When the fire 

broke out at the West, Texas fertilizer facility, firefighters did what they do best: they went in to 

protect the citizens. The massive ammonium nitrate explosion rocked the community, killing 13 

people, including 11 firefighters. It injured hundreds and leveled scores of homes, a school, and 

a nursing home. The incident could have been worse had it occurred during school hours.

• An entire patchwork of regulation was not enough to prevent the incident in West, Texas. We 

now know that the AN in question was stored in wood bins inside a wood building, with no 

sprinkler protection. 

• We now know that the facility was cited twice in the past 7 years for improperly storing 

anhydrous ammonia. 

• We now have this recent history to know that we can and we must do better.

• Better information sharing, stricter rules, and updated first responder training is needed.

• To help decrease the danger, critical regulations must be tightened. 

EO Public Listening Session Page 26

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• First responders must be provided with additional information and training regarding the 

location and storage of these unsafe substances.

• These issues are not unique to remote areas. Every day, hundreds of facilities storing hazardous 

materials put more than 100,000 citizens at risk in nearby communities. Millions more are put 

at risk when these chemicals are in transit. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: We need to protect our first responders, but even 

if you have perfect regulations, in half the States public employees are not covered by OSHA. 

Volunteers, like volunteer firefighters, are not covered in any of the States.

o Mr. Brinkley responded: The increase in regulations would not be intended to cover first 

responders, but rather to reduce the number of incidents.

Ron Chittim, American Petroleum Institute (API), provided the following comments:

• API is a national trade association representing all segments of the oil and natural gas industry. 

Our 500 members include large integrated companies, exploration production, refinery, 

marketing, and other oil-related companies.

• We believe that regulatory programs should consist of rules that are feasible and that can be

understood and complied with. There should be effective enforcement of those rules, and 

lessons should be effectively learned from performance data, incidents, and near-misses.

• We believe that regulation should be risk-based or performance-based and should be based 

upon sound scientific data. Root causes should be analyzed to ensure that changes are focused 

on real regulatory proficiencies. 

• Regulatory changes should not pursue a mythical “zero-risk.” They should only be considered 

when there is evidence that there is regulatory deficiency and not just evidence of lack of 

performance with established regulations. 

• API believes that the current PSM and RMP rules have worked well to support industry. If 

changes are made, they should be reasonable and should not create adverse unintended 

consequences.

• We believe that standards play an important role in the regulated community. API has been 

developing standards for over 95 years and currently manages over 600. They are often 

incorporated into other standards, such as OSHA’s.

• IST is essentially risk-management or risk-reduction. This is just one risk-reduction strategy. 

Passive risk reduction and procedural risk reduction are other methods that should also be 

looked into also.

• IST is not just chemical substitution. Other aspects of IST include facility simplification, chemical 

minimization (volume reductions), and moderation (using lower temperatures and pressures).

• A clarifying question asked by Mr. Barab: If I understand correctly, you’re not opposed to IST, 

correct?

o Mr. Chittim responded: I would suggest that the regulations focus on risk reduction. Let 

the sites and companies determine how to accomplish that goal. The use of IST may be 

a chosen approach, but there may be other reasonable alternatives to reduce the risk.

EO Public Listening Session Page 27

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: What role do you see for Government in 

laying out elements of risk reduction?

o Mr. Chittim responded: This is one of the things I was trying to mention earlier. Set a 

performance bar and have the inspectors check to see if they are meeting that 

performance level. The difference is that you are letting the companies decide how to 

meet the performance objectives. Some will choose to implement safer technologies, 

while others may reduce inventories or seek other alternatives.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: I believe your organization is using third-party 

verification today. Do you see a role for any kind of third-party verification?

o Mr. Chittim responded: We have a voluntary program that we started about a year and 

a half ago in which some assessors verify refineries against a set of protocols. These 

facilities are left with a final report that includes observations and a set of comments on 

things that they were doing well. It is entirely voluntary, and there is no follow-up to see 

if the facility took action on the report’s comments. The assessors are veterans with 

decades of experience, so they know what success looks like. 

Jenny Levin, U.S. Public Interest Research Group (U. S. PIRG), provided the following comments:

• I am the public health advocate for our organization. Our organization is a citizen-based political 

non-profit that advocates on behalf of ordinary citizens. 

• We have members living in the shadow of chemical facilities throughout the United States. 

Across the country, more than 110 million Americans live within the vulnerability zone of more 

than 300 facilities. 

• The 9/11 terrorist attacks showed us that conventional fence line security cannot prevent a 

successful attack and its devastating consequences. A successful attack against a facility could 

yield more casualties than the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the 1984 Bhopal, India disaster. 

• Across the county, many facilities store large quantities of dangerous chemicals. The good news 

is that more secure facility processes exist that can replace virtually all of these hazards. Nearly 

280 facilities, ranging from oil refiners to drinking water refineries, are already using safer 

processes and chemicals. This demonstrates that we don’t have to put communities at 

unnecessary risk. 

• In 2009, Congress passed the Chemical and Water Security Act. Unfortunately, the bill faced a 

vigorous lobbying effort in the Senate and was not successful in gaining full approval.

• Today, chemical companies and trade associations are spending millions in contributions to 

reelection campaigns and lobbyists. Many of these lobbyists are former committee members. 

• When Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, it required EPA to publish 

regulations and guidance for chemical accident prevention at facilities using extremely 

hazardous substances. EPA established the risk management program that requires companies 

of all sizes to develop an RMP, including a hazard assessment, and an evaluation of worst-case 

scenarios. We have reviewed the RMP submissions and determined that a single facility or 

company can put thousands of people at risk.

EO Public Listening Session Page 28

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• We know that safer technologies are available for many of the chemical processes in use today. 

For example, following 9/11, the Blue Plains Sewage Treatment Plant in Washington, D.C. 

switched from using chlorine gas and sulfur dioxide onsite to using sodium hypochlorite bleach 

in its processes. In 2009, Clorox announced plans to modify manufacturing processes in in the 

U.S. bleach operations by transitioning from chlorine gas to high-strength bleach as a raw 

material for making its namesake product. 

• According to a national poll commissioned by the Coalition to Prevent Chemical Disasters, 

Americans of both parties believe that the Government should require companies to use safer 

chemical processes. 

• Since the incident in West, Texas and the Federal Government shutdown, there have been 

several accidents at chemical facilities resulting in injuries and deaths. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: Regarding safer technologies, the question is 

how we should proceed. What is your recommendation?

o Ms. Levin responded: The previous speaker mentioned that once we make industry 

invest in safer alternatives, those things will develop. We’ve seen large corporations 

invest in putting some of these alternatives to use. Of course, we would not want the 

fox to guard the hen house, so the Government would need to ensure that the facilities 

are putting the right protections in place. 

John Bresland, a private citizen, provided the following comments:

• I was a member of the Chemical Safety Board from 2002 to 2012. I was the chairman of the 

Chemical Safety Board from March 2008 until June 2010. 

• I’m associated with Texas A&M University as a research fellow. I work with students pursuing a 

PhD in Chemical Process Safety.

• Before my time with the Chemical Safety Board, I worked for Honeywell International, formerly 

Allied Signal, for 35 years. 

• I am speaking today on behalf of myself and not for any of the organizations I’m currently or 

formerly have been working with.

• I toured the West, Texas incident scene with six PhD students just a few weeks after the 

accident. 

• The tragedy in West, Texas was avoidable. The hazards of AN are well-known. I hope that the 

investigations will explore what information was available to the firefighters.

• The facility in West was regulated by several agencies, including: OSHA, EPA, DHS, the DOT 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the Texas Department of 

State Health Services, the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality, and the Office of the 

Texas State Chemist. There needs to be a clear understanding of each agency’s role in West. We 

need to take a careful look at all of the regulations and decide what, if anything, needs to be 

changed.

• Each facility storing or using AN needs to be identified and inspected. There are limited 

inspectors available, but we could turn to third-party inspectors.

EO Public Listening Session Page 29

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• Information on chemical hazards is available to the local communities and emergency 

responders via Tier II reports, as required under EPCRA. It typically gets to the local level from 

the LEPCs and State emergency response agency.

• The effectiveness of LEPCs varies considerably by location. 

• Facility siting is an important issue in this discussion. It is my understanding that in West, Texas, 

the facility was in a rural area outside of town, but the town eventually grew out and around it. 

There are several facilities in the United States that store AN. How close are they to the 

communities they serve? I’m not suggesting that these facilities should move, but the members 

of the community have a right to know about hazards located nearby. 

• It is likely that small fertilizer facilities will assess their own risks and may decide to stop using 

AN in their fertilizer blends. Higher insurance rates may be a factor in encouraging facilities to 

stop using AN. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: You mentioned concerns with facility siting. 

What is the role for Federal Government? Is it disclosure or informational?

o Mr. Bresland responded: Following the BP Texas City accident, which I was involved in 

investigating, one recommendation we made was that the Government needs to look 

inside the facility. As a result, I know that industry has moved towards relocating some 

assets inside the facility (such as control rooms), away from dangerous areas. I live in 

West Virginia, and I know that I do not have any hazardous facilities near me; however, I 

would want to know if there were. 

Pam Guffain, Vice President, Member Services, The Fertilizer Institute (TFI), provided the following 

comments:

• We’d like to thank you all for hosting these public listening sessions. 

• TFI’s membership consists of manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and importers of all types of 

fertilizers. Our industry makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy through jobs and 

the sale of goods and services. Fertilizer is responsible for approximately 50% of world food 

production. 

• The fertilizer industry lives with the West, Texas fertilizer explosion every day. Our thoughts and 

prayers continue to be with the victims, their families, and the community at large. 

• We support efforts for coordination among State and Federal agencies, including crossreferencing databases and synchronizing inspections. 

• We have asked our members to meet with local emergency responders and to invite them into 

their facilities so they will have a clear understanding of the fertilizer business.

• There is currently an exception for retail fertilizer facilities under EPCRA. We support the 

removal of this exclusion. We feel that everyone, without exception, should report hazardous 

chemicals stored onsite to the LEPC, the State Emergency Response Commission, and the local 

fire department. This reporting should be limited to hazardous chemicals so that these 

responders and agencies are not overburdened with excessive information.

• TFI supports the long-term authorization of CFATS, and we look forward to our continued 

cooperation with DHS.

EO Public Listening Session Page 30

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• TFI has worked closely with EPA on RMP, as it pertains to agriculture retailers. We’re currently 

undergoing a 5-year update of a software product that we developed in cooperation with EPA. 

We look forward to that continued cooperation. 

• Our members are currently working with NFPA and serve on a special task force established to 

examine which changes need to be made to the AN code under NFPA. We’ve been meeting with 

OSHA on 1910.109(i), and we look forward to continued cooperation in this area as well.

• To address differences in crops and climates, farmers need to have choice in the fertilizers they 

use. 

• As an industry, we have several voluntary efforts underway. We are working with the 

Agriculture Retailers Association (ARA) and have made available a regulatory compliance tool. It 

is a Web-based program for agricultural retailers to assess their compliance with Federal 

regulations. 

• TFI and ARA are developing a fertilizer code of practice, with third-party audits for retailers 

handling fertilizer materials. The program will help to ensure that those handling and storing 

crop nutrients are doing so in accordance with Federal regulations.

• We will be providing detailed comments in the upcoming RFI.

Christina Morgan, U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), provided the following comments:

• Its legislative mandate specifically directed the CSB to issue recommendations on reducing the 

likelihood or consequences of accidental releases and to propose corrective steps for making 

chemical production, processing, handling, and storage as safe and free from risk of injury as 

possible.

• Since 1998, the board has issued a number of recommendations to OSHA and the EPA. Several 

important regulatory recommendations to these agencies remain unaddressed, and therefore 

critical safety gaps that the CSB has identified in OSHA’s PSM standard and EPA’s RMP remain. 

For example, in fall 2002, CSB released its study on the management of reactive chemical 

hazards. At that time, CSB research identified 167 serious incidents in the U.S. between 1980 

and 2001. Nearly one-third of these incidents affect the public, and nearly half involved 

chemicals that were not (and still are not) covered by PSM or RMP. Therefore, the Board issued 

recommendations to OSHA and EPA, calling for revisions to these standards that would achieve 

more comprehensive control of reactive hazards. 

• CSB was encouraged by the spring 2013 announcement by OSHA that it would consider revisions 

to the PSM standard to include reactive chemicals. We are hopeful that the EPA RMP standard 

will also address these hazards. 

• As this group works to improve chemical safety, we generally agree that IST can be achieved 

through four principals:

o Material substitution

o Minimizing inventory

o Moderating temperatures and pressures

o Less complex processes

EO Public Listening Session Page 31

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• Many will advocate against IST due to costs, but those costs must be weighed against the 

potential loss of life and property under existing practices.

• The CSB is examining the potential benefits of alternative regulatory regimes for improving 

chemical facility safety. For example, the safety case regime requires facilities to demonstrate 

that they can operate safely and in conformance with the latest industry standards to the 

satisfaction of regulators. This approach provides industry the opportunity to tailor regulations 

to their specific facilities, with the overall goal of continuous risk reduction and major accident 

prevention. The success of this approach will be dependent upon well-funded and competent 

regulators.

Maria Cabrera, Councilmember, City of Wilmington, Delaware, provided the following comments:

• A year ago today, I was sworn in as the first Hispanic council member in our community. 

• We live in a poor community with poor air quality and cancer clusters. We have EPA laws that 

are not being enforced or are being enforced with no more than a hand slap to those who are 

breaking them. 

• It seems that industry settles into poor communities, but we also need jobs in our community.

• I live within a mile from the DuPont Edgemoor plant, which produces titanium dioxide. 

• We do not have the resources to handle a significant accident in our community.

• We have three rivers that flow through our community. 

• Our Emergency Management Center is located close to the port of Wilmington, where many 

chemicals are stored. It is within 2 miles of the DuPont Edgemoor facility. 

• The evacuation route for the DuPont Edgemoor facility is within 300 feet of the facility. The 

second evacuation route is about 1.5 miles away. How are we going to evacuate the community 

if there is a release into the air?

• Our first responders do not have the resources needed to deal with a significant incident.

• I-95 runs through our city. 50 years ago, we lost a lot of our homeowners. The majority of 

residents are renters. Due to the exodus of citizens, we do not have the necessary tax revenue 

to deal with a catastrophic incident. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: How well is the LEPC working in your community? 

Have you participated with them?

o Ms. Cabrera responded: I have not worked with them, but my colleague Michele 

Roberts will be speaking later.

Libby Foley, Environmental Working Group, provided the following comments:

• The Environmental Working Group is an environmental-based non-profit, operating here in 

Washington, D.C.

• According to chemical facility reports to EPA RMP, there are 473 other chemical facilities that 

each put 100,000 or more at risk. Part of the reason for this risk is the bulk storage of inhalation 

hazards such as chlorine gas, anhydrous ammonia, sulfur dioxide, and hydrofluoric acid. 

EO Public Listening Session Page 32

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• In 2004, the Homeland Security Council determined that a sudden release of chlorine gas, such 

as from a 90-ton rail car, could kill 17,500 people , seriously injure 10,000 more, and send an 

additional 100,000 people to the hospital.

• We urge the EPA to use its authority to close loopholes in guidance and standards, requiring 

disaster prevention. 

• Safe and cost effective chemical processes are already in use. Since 2001, hundreds of chemical 

facilities have switched to safer chemical processes. These conversions have eliminated risks to 

thousands of people. Famous examples of this are at the Washington, D.C. waste water plant

that converted from chlorine gas and the 2012 conversion of Clorox facilities from chlorine gas. 

However, at this rate, it will take decades to convert all existing facilities, and it does not prevent 

someone from creating a new facility using older, more dangerous processes and chemicals. 

• The hazards presented by many of these chemical facilities are generally in communities with 

residents of economic disadvantage or people of color. 

• In a March 14, 2012 letter, the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council urged the EPA 

administrator to adopt new rules. 

• Former EPA administrator Gov. Christine Todd Whitman wrote the EPA administrator on April 3, 

2012, warning that the 2006 chemical plan security law is extremely limited in preventing 

chemical disasters. She supported implementing the recommendations of the National 

Environmental Justice Advisory Council. 

Michele Roberts, Co-coordinator, Environmental Justice and Health Alliance for Chemical Policy Reform, 

provided the following comments:

• I want to thank you for this opportunity to share. 

• I just want to piggy back on something from earlier today. Many communities that live fence line

to these industries experience disproportionate medical effects, such as asthma, cancer, and 

heart disease. When these communities were told to shelter in place, there’s no way to get 

them the medicine and assistance needed to help them through these disasters. Often this lack 

of supplies can exacerbate a severe asthma attack and the like. 

• We need a deeper source of training and interconnection between Federal, State, and local

governments so that we in the community are number one. These governments need to be not 

only mindful of where these harmful chemicals are stored, but also mindful of where high 

populations of serious health challenges are. 

• First of all, we should make sure that where possible and proven, safe alternative chemical 

substitution can be made. Number two, we should minimize the bulk storage of chemicals in 

these facilities and use these chemicals only as needed. Number three, we should encourage the 

market to become more innovative, creating opportunities to go deeper into research and 

development to produce the safer alternatives necessary to better protect all people in this 

country and beyond. These suggestions address the issues of economics raised by some of the 

chemical corporations.

• At the end of the day, we are about protecting the public health of workers and communities.

EO Public Listening Session Page 33

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
• In my former role as an environmental scientist working in a local community, I was called 

personally to go and respond to the standard chlorine leak in Delaware City. I will be honest; I 

did not have any training that year. We would go through a series of ongoing repetitive trainings 

that are calendared for the year. In that particular year, I did not yet have that training. I 

received an emergency call to go down to Standard Chlorine into a chlorine cloud leak. At that 

time, (1) I didn’t have all the necessary materials in my truck to respond to, and (2) I did not yet 

have the training (or at least refresher training). There needs to be some type of training for 

local government responders. Not only that but many health professionals are not trained to 

really put those processes together, as related to toxic chemicals and human health. In some 

cases, those are elective school courses. 

• There needs to be some type of program in place to address these concerns. I don’t know if it

should be run through the Department of Health and Human Services, along with a piece that 

OSHA and EPA address to ensure that everyone across the board is trained on a core response.

We also must make sure that there is a plan in place for communities, such as Mossville. When 

it is necessary for them to evacuate or to shelter in place, there should be a process to follow 

after that. 

• Around 2009, there was an inadequate response to a fire in a Mossville home , and ever since 

then, the Mossville community appealed to the local LEPC. The residents wanted to have a 

community meeting to discuss how to better respond. Unfortunately, they are still waiting for 

that meeting, and they are still waiting for that training. Meanwhile, they’re surrounded by 14 

toxic industry facilities. 

• We need to have a better integration of local, State, and Federal governments, as well as having 

training, risk and bulk storage minimization, , and, when possible, safer alternatives substituted. 

Cynthia Hilton, Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), provided the following comments: 

• I wanted to clarify an earlier point regarding the forms of AN.

• I would like to start off by saying that Texas City was a disastrous event. Industry is not a 

monster; we no longer manufacture wax-coated prills.

• Companies are not faceless entities. People who work at our facilities are members of our 

families and communities. We have a vested interest in workplace safety.

• The classification of hazardous materials is done through the United Nations. With the exception 

of explosives, you can self-classify. If you have an explosive, you have to run a set of tests and 

submit your application, which DOT will review and then classify.

• The explosive form of AN, UN0222, has a descriptor with it, something like 0.2% of a 

combustible. DOT has not issued this classification to any AN product. 

• The AN we are talking about here is an Oxidizer 5.1.

• IME looks at issues and then develops best practices. When doing so, we invite industry and 

agencies to the table. ATF has been coming to our meetings and sitting in on our discussions. I 

would invite the members of Government here today to attend our discussions and meetings.

Topic: Best Practices

EO Public Listening Session Page 34

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
Amy Graydon presented opening remarks for the “Best Practices” topic:

• The EO calls for us to identify and share best practices.

• The sub-working group has been working to develop a definition for “best practice.” So far, we 

have a draft definition we would like to share with you: 

o Best practices include methods, techniques, processes, systems, tactics, or approaches 

that result in successful, productive, safer, and more secure operations. These practices 

have been identified through means that include stakeholder experiences, with results 

supported by data, which can range widely in terms of rigor, from observations to 

scientific studies. Best practices are voluntary and, if instituted, can promote effective 

safety and security at chemical facilities.

• We would like feedback on our definition. We would also like to see ideas about how to gather 

and share best practices within the stakeholder community.

Meghan Housewright, Associate General Counsel for Government Affairs, NFPA, provided the following 

comments:

• We are an over 100-year-old ANSI-accredited organization that develops consensus standards. 

• One of the most applicable codes to the discussion here today is the Hazardous Materials Code,

NFPA 400. This is applicable to the handling and storage of hazardous materials. Currently in the 

revision cycle, we are reviewing the handling and storage of ammonium nitrate.

• We also have NFPA 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous 

Materials/Weapons of Mass destruction Incidents.

• I’d also like to touch on NFPA 1620, Standard for Pre-incident Planning. This guides first 

responders through pre-incident planning, so they know the types of hazards in their 

community.

• NFPA has an established group of stakeholders and a history of bringing industry and first 

responders together to collaborate on our NFPA recommendations.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: One of the problems with NFPA is the number of 

recommendations and the associated costs to access them. Is there a way to address that 

challenge?

o Ms. Housewright responded: The NFPA posts all codes on our Website in a read-only 

format. Regarding the complexity of the documents themselves, I believe that speaks 

the need for better training of first responders. 

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Stanislaus: Do you have an opinion on the use of your 

codes in training, including private training?

o Ms. Housewright responded: Our codes are used extensively in first responder training, 

normally through a State fire academy. The standard of training for firefighters is NFPA 

standards. I can get back to you with more information about how the standards are 

used and to what extent.

• A clarifying question was asked by Mr. Barab: One issue in West, Texas is that the State does not 

have mandatory fire codes. How would this Executive Order address that issue?

EO Public Listening Session Page 35

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
o Ms. Housewright responded: The Federal Government would have a hard time 

mandating the adoption of fire codes at the State and local levels; however, it could 

strongly recommend it.

Michael Jacoby, a private citizen, provided the following comments:

• Today, we’ve heard a lot of concerns about policy, funding, and how to support different 

approaches. 

• Data quality needs to be a focus, specifically regarding location.

• Through the EPA, I came up with an approach for finding solutions by reversing how a system 

was designed. This approach enables systems to find latitude and longitude coordinates in 

seconds and to produce an image. 

• We expanded that approach to include bulk submission of hundreds of submittals at a time. 

• The process is in place and is working. We need the support of the President to take this 

monumental step of checking the data in our systems.

Rick Hind, Greenpeace, provided the following comments:

• In your package this morning, we prepared a copy of a letter written to Administrator Jackson, 

dated last April. We also have the draft proposal that was developed in 2002, which I believe 

addresses earlier questions about specifics. 

• We are careful not to direct what you do, but in terms of outcomes and goals, those are the 

ideas we are trying to share.

• In the 1920s, a blue ribbon panel recommended that lead be removed from gasoline. It was 

allowed to be a voluntarily measure. It took until the 1980s for us to mandate the removal of 

lead in the U.S. 

The moderator initiated closing remarks:

• There are several additional listening sessions scheduled and being scheduled:

o The next session will be in Springfield, IL on November 19.

o First Webinar will be on November 25.

• We are also working to establish a docket, where the notes from today’s session will be posted.

• Thank you all for coming and for speaking here today.

Jordan Barab provided the following closing remarks:

• Thanks to all who have joined us here today. This is a very important activity for us.

• We certainly heard your requests for more resident-friendly and worker-friendly times. We will 

work on that. Public input is critically important to us.

EO Public Listening Session Page 36

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013
Participant Analysis

Stakeholder Group

11/15/2013 

Washington, 

DC

Chemical Producer8

Ag Supply3

Chemical Storage0

State/Local Regulator2

First Responder2

Media1

Owner/Operator5

Industry Association 19

Labor Organization7

Federal Representative 29

Environment/Community 14

Consensus Organization2

Other: 

Unk0

Citizen3

Education2

Security2

Vendor0

State/Local 0

Tribal0

Health/Research0

TOTAL 99

Conference Call Attend 119

Registered 126

Attended (In-Person 

& Conf Call) 218

Speakers 32%

EO Public Listening Session Page 37

Washington, DC

November 15, 2013