[Cite as State v. Kapcar, 2022-Ohio-3959.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

v.

CHRISTINE KAPCAR

Appellant

C.A. No. 21CA0049-M

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

WADSWORTH MUNICIPAL COURT

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO

CASE No. 19CRB00531

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: November 7, 2022

CARR, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, Christine Kapcar, appeals the judgment of the Wadsworth Municipal 

Court. This Court affirms. 

I.

{¶2} Kapcar was charged with six counts of animal cruelty involving six different horses. 

Kapcar pleaded not guilty to the charges.1 The trial court proceedings were continued on multiple 

occasions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Kapcar also retained new counsel on a number of 

occasions. The matter ultimately proceeded to a jury trial and Kapcar was found guilty of all six 

counts. The trial court imposed a 90-day jail sentence which was suspended as 

1 The parties initially entered into stipulated factual findings and agreed to have the trial 

court decide the matter after briefing. The trial court issued a journal entry finding Kapcar guilty 

after she failed to file a brief. Thereafter, Kapcar successfully moved to vacate the stipulated facts 

and the finding of guilt and the matter eventually proceeded to a jury trial.
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well as a five-year term of probation. The trial court ordered forfeiture of the horses in question 

and further ordered that Kapcar could not own horses for five years. 

{¶3} On appeal, Kapcar raises two assignments of error. 

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

KAPCAR’S CONVICTION WAS BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS 

A MATTER OF LAW[.]

{¶4} In her first assignment of error, Kapcar argues that her convictions were not 

supported by sufficient evidence. This Court disagrees.

{¶5} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the 

trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).

An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to 

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of 

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶6} Kapcar was convicted of six counts of cruelty to animals in violation of R.C. 

959.13(A)(1), which states, “[n]o person shall * * * [t]orture an animal, deprive one of necessary 

sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, needlessly mutilate or kill, or impound or confine an 

animal without supplying it during such confinement with a sufficient quantity of good wholesome 

food and water[.]”
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{¶7} “A violation of R.C. 959.13 ‘requires proof that the defendant acted with a reckless 

state of mind.’” State v. Brooks, 9th Dist. Medina No. 07CA0111-M, 2008-Ohio-3723, ¶ 5, 

quoting State v. Howell, 137 Ohio App.3d 804, 813 (11th Dist.2000).

{¶8} Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(C), “[a] person acts recklessly when, with heedless 

indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 

person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is 

reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the 

person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.”

{¶9} At trial, the State presented evidence supporting the following narrative. The 

Medina County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“SPCA”) first received a 

complaint about Kapcar’s horses in May 2018. Carrie Moore, who serves as a humane agent for 

the Medina County SPCA, helped investigate an allegation that Kapcar had been evicted from a 

barn yet her horses had not been removed from the premises. Ms. Moore traveled to the property 

and observed that several of Kapcar’s horses were underweight. Kapcar’s daughter, Melissa 

Beckman, helped Kapcar in caring for the horses.2 After the sheriff’s department imposed a 

deadline, Kapcar moved the horses to a different property. Kapcar and Beckman had the horses 

moved on several other occasions that year. Ms. Moore received additional complaints about the 

condition of Kapcar’s horses over the course of 2018. Upon traveling to view the horses, Ms. 

Moore found that several of the horses were underweight and lacking appropriate care. Ms. Moore 

also observed problems with the condition of the stalls. Kapcar gave multiple assurances that the 

situation would be remedied. At one point, however, Kapcar sent a letter to Ms. Moore requesting 

that the SPCA no longer contact her. In November 2018, after again observing that several horses 

2 Beckman was also charged with animal cruelty in relation to the horses. 
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were underweight, Ms. Moore reached out to the prosecutor to prepare a search warrant. On the 

date that the search warrant was given to the judge for review, the horses were moved to an 

undisclosed location. Ms. Moore indicated that the SPCA unsuccessfully attempted to locate the 

horses for several months.

{¶10} On July 3, 2019, Ms. Moore received an anonymous tip through the SPCA’s 

emergency line about six horses that were thin and located in stalls that were filled with manure. 

The tipster also provided photographs of the six horses that were located at a barn in Seville.3 Ms. 

Moore recognized the horses as belonging to Kapcar. Because the horses were thinner than when 

Ms. Moore had last seen them in November, she took the steps necessary to secure a search 

warrant. 

{¶11} Ms. Moore reached out to Dr. Sandra Gebhart to seek an opinion about the 

condition of the horses. Dr. Gebhart testified on behalf of the State at trial as an expert in equine 

veterinary care. Upon reviewing photos of Kapcar’s horses, Dr. Gebhart observed signs of 

malnourishment and recommended physical examinations. Dr. Gebhart testified that each of the 

six horses had an extremely low body condition score, which measures the physical condition of 

a horse in light of its weight, age, and breed. Dr. Gebhart testified that the horses’ feet appeared 

to be overgrown, a condition that can place strain on ligaments and cause pain. Dr. Gebhart further 

testified that the horses’ fur appeared to be matted from manure, urine, and bedding.

3 One of Kapcar’s horses that Ms. Moore observed in 2018 named Captain passed away 

prior to July 2019. 
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{¶12} On July 11, 2019, Dr. Gebhart met Ms. Moore and the SPCA team at the barn in 

Seville in order to evaluate the horses. Dr. Gebhart gave testimony based on her records from the 

visit. All six of Kapcar’s horses at the barn appeared to be malnourished, underweight, and dealing 

with an array of medical issues. Dr. Gebhart determined that the horses were in urgent need of 

treatment. Ms. Moore gave similar testimony, noting that the horses were extremely underweight, 

that their feet were overgrown, and that their coat conditions were poor. Ms. Moore feared that 

the horses could starve to death if there was not an immediate intervention. The SPCA took control 

of the horses that day. As the SPCA team was finishing at the farm, Kapcar’s daughter, Beckman, 

arrived and asked what was going on. Ms. Moore explained to Beckman that the condition of the 

horses necessitated their removal. 

{¶13} Kapcar challenges the sufficiency of her convictions on the basis that the State 

failed to demonstrate that she acted recklessly. Stressing that she was dealing with an array of 

health problems, Kapcar maintains that she entrusted the care of her six horses to her daughter and 

that she was unaware of their poor condition. Kapcar points to Mulhauser v. State, 15 Ohio C.D. 

81 (1900) and State v. York, 11th Dist. Lake No. 97-L-037, 1998 WL 257055 (May 1, 1998) in 

support of the proposition that an owner cannot be convicted of animal cruelty when they have 

placed their animals in the care of another.

{¶14} Kapcar’s sufficiency challenge is without merit. We remain mindful that we view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State in resolving a sufficiency challenge. Jenks, 

61 Ohio St.3d at 279. The State presented evidence that several complaints were filed with the 

SPCA regarding the condition of Kapcar’s horses over the course of 2018. Kapcar was made 

aware that her horses were underweight and experiencing a number of additional problems. 

Kapcar initially informed Ms. Moore that those issues would be addressed. Notably, however, 
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Kapcar subsequently sent Ms. Moore a letter indicating that she no longer wanted to be contacted 

and she moved the horses to an undisclosed location. When the horses were located in July 2019, 

their condition had worsened and the SPCA determined that their immediate removal was 

necessary. The aforementioned evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to the State, 

was sufficient to sustain Kapcar’s convictions for animal cruelty. 

{¶15} Kapcar’s reliance on Mulhauser and York is also misplaced. We note that 

Mulhauser involved a predecessor statute that required the State to show that the defendant was 

willfully cruel to animals. Mulhauser at 87. By contrast, the State here was only required to show 

that Kapcar was reckless in violating R.C. 959.13(A)(1). See Brooks, 2008-Ohio-3723, at ¶ 5. 

Furthermore, unlike the circumstances here, the record in Mulhauser showed that the defendant 

was “wholly ignorant” of any concerns regarding the care of her animals. Mulhauser at 87. The 

facts of York are similarly distinctive. There, the defendant purchased a pony as a gift but his wife 

owned the pony and served as the primary caregiver. York at *3-4. The defendant had no 

knowledge that the pony was in a malnourished state and he was never informed that there were 

concerns with the condition of the pony. Id. at *4. Unlike York, the evidence presented by the 

State in this case showed that Kapcar was made aware that there were issues with the condition of 

her horses and those issues only worsened when she moved her horses to an undisclosed location. 

Accordingly, contrary to Kapcar’s assertion, the holdings in Mulhauser and York do not mandate 

reversal on sufficiency grounds. 

{¶16} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

KAPCAR’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF 

THE EVIDENCE.
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{¶17} In her second assignment of error, Kapcar argues that her convictions were against 

the weight of the evidence. Specifically, Kapcar contends that the weight of the evidence did not 

support the conclusion that her horses did not receive proper care. Kapcar points to the testimony 

of several witnesses in support of her position that, after suffering a series of injuries, she made 

arrangements to ensure that there would be adequate care for her horses. This Court disagrees.

{¶18} A conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence may still be found to be 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).

In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine 

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way 

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). An appellate court should exercise the 

power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional 

cases. Id.

{¶19} At trial, Kapcar testified that she was born into a horseman’s family and that she 

had owned horses her entire adult life, a period that has spanned over 50 years. In regard to the 

six horses in question, Kapcar explained that she moved them to the barn in Seville in December 

of 2018. Kapcar indicated that she was only able to visit the facility on one occasion because she 

was dealing with a knee and back injuries that impacted her ability to walk.4 In order to provide 

4 Kapcar testified that in 2017, a tree fell on her house while she was in the kitchen. She 

suffered an injury to her knee during the incident. The knee injury ultimately led to back issues. 
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care for the horses, Kapcar began to rely on her daughter, Beckman, who worked full time. The 

situation was further complicated by the fact that Kapcar’s husband passed away in 2018 after 

spending time in hospice care. Kapcar testified that the decision to move the horses on multiple 

occasions in 2018 was driven by a desire to increase their level of care. Kapcar testified that she 

was shocked to learn that the horses were not receiving adequate care in Seville in 2019. Kapcar 

indicated that she knew there were issues with the stalls but she did not know the horses were not 

getting enough food and water. Kapcar suggested that the problems stemmed from 

miscommunications with Beckman and the barn owner.

{¶20} Beckman testified that she was responsible for caring for the six horses in Seville 

from April 15, 2019, until the time they were seized. Prior to that time the barn owner was 

responsible for caring for the horses, although Beckman did make frequent visits. Beckman 

testified that she intervened because she did not believe the barn owner was giving the horses 

proper care. Beckman explained that, from that point on, she made at least two trips per day to the 

barn to care for the horses. During her testimony, Beckman acknowledged that the horses had lost 

weight and that their feet were overgrown. Although Beckman further admitted that she should 

have sought additional help, she testified that the situation was heading in a positive direction at 

the time the horses were seized. Beckman’s friend, Shannon Stack, also testified on behalf of the 

defense. Stack was driving for Lyft when she met Beckman. Stack explained that she frequently 

gave Beckman rides to the barn in Seville so that Beckman could care for Kapcar’s horses between 

April 2019 and July 2019. Stack testified that as she grew closer to Beckman, she began to assist 

in giving the horses food and water as well as cleaning out their stalls. Stack indicated that she 

travelled to the barn on ten occasions by herself to help care for the horses during that timeframe. 

Stack testified that she did not notice any problems with the horses’ condition. 
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{¶21} Upon a thorough review of the record, we cannot conclude that this is the 

exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against conviction. See Otten, 33 Ohio 

App.3d at 340. Several witnesses who testified on behalf of the defense suggested that Kapcar 

had made arrangements for the care of the horses and that the concerns regarding the condition of 

the horses were overstated. This testimony stands in contradiction to the evidence presented by 

the State that the horses were in dire condition at the time of their removal by the SPCA. Beckman 

herself acknowledged that the horses had lost a significant amount of weight and that their feet 

were overgrown. “[T]his Court will not overturn the verdict[s] on a manifest weight challenge 

simply because the trier of fact chose to believe the State’s witnesses rather than [Kapcar’s] 

witnesses.” State v. Crowe, 9th Dist. Medina No. 04CA0098-M, 2005-Ohio-4082, ¶ 22. Under 

these circumstances, where the State presented ample evidence that the horses had not received 

adequate care, we cannot conclude that the trier of fact clearly lost its way. 

{¶22} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

III.

{¶23} Kapcar’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Wadsworth 

Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wadsworth Municipal 

Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

DONNA J. CARR

FOR THE COURT

TEODOSIO, P. J.

CALLAHAN, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

WESLEY JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

THOMAS MORRIS, Prosecuting Attorney, and BRADLEY J. PROUDFOOT, Assisttant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.