PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CGM, LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS,

 No. 10-1693 INCORPORATED; AT&T BILLING

SOUTHEAST, LLC, a/k/a AT&T

Billing Southeast, Inc.; AT&T

CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(3:09-cv-00377-RJC-DCK)

Argued: September 20, 2011

Decided: December 8, 2011

Before SHEDD and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and

Damon J. KEITH, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Senior Judge Keith concurred.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Ira Thane Kasdan, KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Dennis Friedman, MAYER BROWN, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for

Appellees. ON BRIEF: Barbara A. Miller, KELLEY, DRYE

& WARREN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Patrick

W. Turner, AT&T SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South

Carolina; Jeffrey M. Strauss, MAYER BROWN, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellees.

OPINION

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

"The Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . represents a

comprehensive effort by Congress to bring the benefits of

deregulation and competition to all aspects of the telecommunications market in the United States, including especially

local markets." Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390,

391 (7th Cir. 2000). The 1996 Act imposes new duties on

incumbent local telecommunications carriers, which had previously enjoyed monopolies in local telecommunications markets; those duties include the duty to sell telecommunications

services at wholesale rates to would-be competitors for resale

to consumers.

In this case, CGM, LLC, a billing agent for competitive

local exchange carriers ("competitive LECs"), brought a

declaratory judgment action against BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., an incumbent local exchange carrier

("incumbent LEC"). CGM claimed that BellSouth offered

long-term promotional discounts to its own customers but

failed, in violation of the 1996 Act and rules implementing it,

to pass the full value of those discounts on to CGM’s client

competitive LECs, none of which is a party to this suit.

2 CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Because CGM has no statutory standing under either the 1996

Act or a seemingly broadly worded but nonetheless inapplicable statute from the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1934,

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of CGM’s complaint.

I.

In an effort to introduce competition into local telephone

markets, Congress enacted the 1996 Act, which amended and

supplemented the 1934 Act. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.

v. Sanford, 494 F.3d 439, 441, 444 (4th Cir. 2007). The 1996

Act requires, among other things, that large telephone companies with existing telecommunications infrastructure share

that infrastructure with their smaller competitors. Upon

request, the incumbent LECs must provide network access to

their competitors, the competitive LECs. Id. at 444-45; 47

U.S.C. § 251(c)(2).

In connection with the mandate to provide competitive

LECs with access, the 1996 Act also requires incumbent

LECs to offer competitive LECs "resale at wholesale rates

any telecommunications service that the [incumbent LEC]

provides at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers . . . ." Id. § 251(c)(4). Put differently, competitive LECs may purchase services from incumbent LECs at a

discounted rate and then resell those services to individual

customers at market rates. 

To implement the provisions of the 1996 Act, the Federal

Communications Commission ("FCC") promulgated regulations. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.1. Under those regulations, the "resale duty" extends to promotional offers incumbent LECs

provide to their retail customers lasting longer than ninety

days. 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(a). 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(a) prevents

incumbent LECs from devising retail promotional schemes

enabling them to offer discounts to their retail customers

without extending the value of those discounts to competitive

LECs.

CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 3
The terms and conditions of the access arrangements

between incumbent LECs and competitive LECs are developed through private contracts know as "interconnection

agreements." 47 U.S.C. § 252; Verizon Md., Inc. v. Global

NAPs, Inc., 377 F.3d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 2004). Interconnection agreements can be reached through voluntary negotiation

or compulsory arbitration, but regardless of whether negotiated or arbitrated, all interconnection agreements must be submitted to and approved by the appropriate state utilities

commissions. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 252(e).1

Interconnection agreements, not the general duties mentioned in Section 251(c), govern incumbent LECs’ 1996 Act

resale duties. In other words, "section 251(c)’s obligations are

not generally self-executing. Rather, incumbents are required

to implement them through voluntary good-faith negotiations

with prospective entrants . . . ." Peter W. Huber et al., Federal

Telecommunications Law § 5.6.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2011); cf.

Verizon Md., 377 F.3d at 364 ("Once the [interconnection

agreement] is approved, the 1996 Act requires the parties to

abide by its terms. Interconnection agreements are thus the

vehicles chosen by Congress to implement the duties imposed

in § 251." (internal citation omitted)). 

BellSouth provides local exchange telephone service in a

nine-state region in the southeastern United States.2 In each of

1The nature of the review varies, however, depending on whether the

interconnection agreement has been negotiated or arbitrated. Negotiated

agreements are reviewed simply to ensure that the interconnection agreement does not discriminate against a non-party carrier and that the interconnection agreement is not inconsistent with the public interest,

convenience, or necessity. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(2). By contrast, an arbitrated agreement is reviewed to ensure its conformity with the requirements of Section 251. Id.

2AT&T Corp. and AT&T Billing Southeast, LLC are affiliates of BellSouth. Because there are no issues on appeal that specifically relate to

either AT&T Corp. or AT&T Billing, we generally refer only to BellSouth. 

4 CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
those states, BellSouth operates as an incumbent LEC. CGM

is a billing agent for certain unidentified competitive LEC

resellers of BellSouth telecommunications services in the

nine-state BellSouth region. CGM itself, however, provides

no telecommunications services. 

CGM is neither an incumbent LEC nor a competitive LEC

and does not assert that it is a party to an interconnection

agreement. Nevertheless, in 2009, CGM filed a "Complaint

for Expedited Declaratory Judgment" in the Western District

of North Carolina. J.A. 10. CGM is the only named plaintiff,

and nothing in the record indicates that CGM was authorized

to bring, or was in fact bringing, its suit on behalf of anyone

other than itself. CGM’s primary grievance: BellSouth is

overcharging for its services to competitive LECs in violation

of 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) and 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(a). Specifically, CGM contends that BellSouth provided cash-back promotions to its retail customers but provided CGM’s

competitive LEC clients with only around eighty percent of

the value of those promotions. CGM argues that, absent a

contrary determination by the applicable state utilities commission, the competitive LECs are entitled to the full value of

those promotions. 

Significantly, CGM does not contend that BellSouth owes

it money directly. Instead, CGM maintains that BellSouth

owes CGM’s competitive LEC customers over $14 million as

a consequence of this overcharging dispute.3 According to

CGM, those competitive LECs in turn owe CGM over

$360,000 in fees. This is because CGM is paid by its client

competitive LECs based in part on the amount of money that

CGM obtains for the competitive LECs from "Credits/

Rebates/Cashbacks/Winbacks/Offsets" that BellSouth pro3We note that CGM also alleged in its complaint that "the total amount

of money currently in dispute is approximately $10.9 million . . . ." J.A.

16. For purposes of our analysis, however, the precise amount is irrelevant. 

CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 5
vides to its retail customers and is thus obligated to pass on

to the competitive LECs. J.A. 12. In its complaint, CGM primarily seeks a declaratory judgment that BellSouth "must

credit the CGM [competitive LECs] the full, dollar for dollar,

value of the credit offered to BellSouth’s retail customers in

the absence, as here, of [its] having first proved to the appropriate regulatory body that [its] contrary practice to date is

reasonable and nondiscriminatory as required by Sanford and

47 C.F.R. § 51.613(b) . . . ." J.A. 17.

In response, BellSouth filed a motion to dismiss CGM’s

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

BellSouth argued that CGM lacks standing to assert its claims

and that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. With regard to standing specifically, BellSouth contended that the pertinent inquiry is "‘whether the . . . statutory

provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood

as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial

relief.’" J.A. 70 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498

(1975)). BellSouth maintained that "[i]t is not sufficient to

allege—as CGM does (Opp. 6 n.5)—that the defendant is the

‘but for’ cause of some alleged injury. The plaintiff must have

a basis for seeking redress under the statute on which the

claim rests. . . . CGM has no rights under the 1996 Act; it thus

also lacks ‘standing’ to sue . . . ." J.A. 204.

A magistrate judge issued a memorandum and recommendation to grant BellSouth’s motion, to which CGM objected.

Nevertheless, the district court granted BellSouth’s motion to

dismiss on the basis that CGM lacked standing to bring its

claims. In essence, the district court held that the 1996 Act

granted rights and obligations to specific parties and created

a particular framework within which those parties may assert

violations of those rights and obligations. Because CGM is

not a party with rights under the 1996 Act, it has no standing

to assert its claims, which are based on alleged violations of

duties arising under the 1996 Act. And the district court determined that a general redress provision in the 1934 Act pro6 CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
vided no lifeline to CGM’s failed claims. The district court

further held that the Declaratory Judgments Act provided no

independent basis for CGM’s suit. CGM appealed.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of BellSouth’s

motion to dismiss. Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma,

Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2006). When ruling on a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a judge must accept as true

all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint."

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Further, "like the

district court, [we] draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the plaintiff." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,

Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). 

The district dismissed under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6),

that is, for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, in its decision,

the district court focused on standing, which is generally associated with Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., White Tail Park, Inc. v.

Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2005). That is because

"Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction only over cases

and controversies," and standing is "an integral component of

the case or controversy requirement." Miller v. Brown, 462

F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, the district court correctly focused on Civil

Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) because the standing inquiry at the

heart of this case is statutory standing—a concept distinct

from Article III and prudential standing. And typically, "[a]

dismissal for lack of statutory standing is effectively the same

as a dismissal for failure to state a claim." Baldwin v. Univ.

of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2011). See

also Vaughn v. Bay Envtl. Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1024

(9th Cir. 2009) ("[A] dismissal for lack of statutory standing

CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 7
is properly viewed as a dismissal for failure to state a claim

rather than a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.").

A.

Constitutional standing and prudential standing are wellcovered ground. To possess constitutional standing, a plaintiff

must be injured by the defendant, and a federal court must be

able to redress the injury. See, e.g., In re Mutual Funds Inv.

Litig., 529 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir. 2008). Prudential standing

encompasses several judicially-created limits on federal jurisdiction, "such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising

another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of

generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the

representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s

complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the

law invoked." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 

Less well-known is the concept of statutory standing,

which is perhaps best understood as not even standing at all.

Statutory standing "applies only to legislatively-created

causes of action" and concerns "whether a statute creating a

private right of action authorizes a particular plaintiff to avail

herself of that right of action." Radha A. Pathak, Statutory

Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 Okla. L. Rev. 89, 91

(2009). This Court has framed the statutory standing inquiry

as whether the plaintiff "is a member of the class given

authority by a statute to bring suit . . . ." In re Mutual Funds,

529 F.3d at 216 (examining "statutory standing" under ERISA

separately from Article III standing and deeming statutory

standing to exist). As the Third Circuit summed it up in Graden v. Conexant Sys., Inc.:

Though all are termed "standing," the differences

between statutory, constitutional, and prudential

standing are important. Constitutional and prudential

standing are about, respectively, the constitutional

8 CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
power of a federal court to resolve a dispute and the

wisdom of so doing. Statutory standing is simply

statutory interpretation: the question it asks is

whether Congress has accorded this injured plaintiff

the right to sue the defendant to redress his injury.

496 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

In a case where the question is "whether Congress intended

to confer standing on a litigant like [the one at bar] to bring

an action under [the statute at issue]", "[o]ur task is essentially

one of statutory construction." Washington-Dulles Transp.,

Ltd. v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 263 F.3d 371, 377

(4th Cir. 2001). "Normally, where the statutory language provides a clear answer, our analysis begins and ends with that

language." Wilmington Shipping Co. v. New Eng. Life Ins.

Co., 496 F.3d 326, 339 (4th Cir. 2007). In the face of

ambiguities, we then look to legislative intent. Id.; see also

Graden, 496 F.3d at 295 ("[W]e employ the usual tools of

statutory interpretation. We look first at the text of the statute

and then, if ambiguous, to other indicia of congressional

intent such as the legislative history."). 

III.

A.

In this appeal, CGM argues that it has standing under the

1934 Act to challenge BellSouth’s alleged failure to comply

with the 1996 Act. CGM relies specifically on 47 U.S.C.

§ 401(b), which states in pertinent part:

If any person fails or neglects to obey any order of

the [FCC] other than for the payment of money,

while the same is in effect, the [FCC] or any party

injured thereby . . . may apply to the appropriate district court of the United States for the enforcement

of such order.

CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 9
Id.

The term "order" is not defined, and there is disagreement

amongst the circuits as to what constitutes an "order" for Section 401(b) purposes. The First Circuit, in an opinion authored

by then-Judge, now-Justice Breyer, has held that Section

401(b) may be used to enforce only orders that emanate from

the FCC’s adjudicatory process. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v.

Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Me., 742 F.2d 1, 4–7 (1st Cir. 1984).

Adjudicatory orders are party-specific and "‘concerned with

the determination of past and present rights and liabilities.’"

Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 219 (1988)

(quoting with approval the 1947 Attorney General’s Manual

on the Administrative Procedure Act). The First Circuit held

that Section 401(b) may not be used to enforce FCC orders

promulgated through the Commission’s rulemaking process.

New Eng. Tel. & Tel., 742 F.2d at 4–7. Rulemaking orders are

general and "focus on policy considerations and results . . . ."

San Juan Cable LLC v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., Inc., 612 F.3d

25, 33 n.3 (1st Cir. 2010). 

By contrast, other circuits have held that a rule resulting

from a rulemaking proceeding can be considered an order for

purposes of Section 401(b). See, e.g., Hawaiian Tel. Co. v.

Public Utils. Comm’n, 827 F.2d 1264, 1270-72 (9th Cir.

1987). See also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public

Serv. Comm’n, 748 F.2d 879, 881 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated

and remanded, 476 U.S. 445 (1986). Those circuits, in other

words, do not limit Section 401(b)’s application to adjudicatory orders. Notably, however, even courts that have taken a

more expansive view of the term "order" have indicated that

private enforcement actions under Section 401(b) are available only when the order or rule at issue "requires a defendant

to take concrete actions." Mallenbaum v. Adelphia Commc’ns

Corp., 74 F.3d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1996). See also Hawaiian

Tel., 827 F.2d at 1272 ("The language of the particular order

in question, and the proceedings leading up to it, demonstrate

that the FCC intended [it] to require particular actions be

10 CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
taken by the [defendant] . . . . Under the circumstances, we

conclude that [the FCC order at issue] was appropriately

interpreted as an ‘order’ for enforcement by injunction in the

district court."). Private enforcement is thus improper when a

rule or order is unrelated to specific rights or obligations of

the litigants and is thus "more akin to a general rulemaking

than to an order . . . ." Mallenbaum, 74 F.3d at 469.

In this case, the FCC "orders" on which CGM seeks to rely

are the "Local Competition Order," In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 1996 WL

452885 (Aug. 8, 1996), and 47 C.F.R. § 51.613. The Local

Competition Order is a general "First Report and Order" laying out policy considerations, public feedback, and promulgating rules. Id. It cannot accurately be characterized as

setting out specific rights and obligations of these litigants

any more so than 47 C.F.R. § 51.613, which was promulgated

in the Local Competition Order. See Mallenbaum, 74 F.3d at

469.

Further, the Local Competition Order suggests that neither

it nor 47 C.F.R. § 51.613 can support CGM’s standing claim.

The Local Competition Order makes clear, for example, that

the rules regarding discount and promotion restrictions are

"best left to state commissions, which are more familiar with

the particular business practices of their incumbent LECs and

local market conditions." Local Competition Order, 1996 WL

452885, at *277. Further, in the Local Competition Order, the

FCC "emphasize[d] that, under the statute, parties may voluntarily negotiate agreements ‘without regard to’ the rules that

we establish under sections 251(b) and (c)." Id., at *18

(emphasis added). Therefore, in regulating the 1996 Act, the

FCC established a flexible framework to match the flexibility

that Congress embedded in the 1996 Act itself.

In the 1996 Act at 47 U.S.C § 251(c), Congress set out

incumbent LEC obligations to resell telecommunications serCGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 11
vices at discounted rates. Notably, Congress made clear in the

very next section of the 1996 Act that "an incumbent local

exchange carrier may negotiate and enter into a binding

agreement with the requesting [competitive LEC or competitive LECs] without regard to the standards set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 of this title." 47 U.S.C

§ 252(a) (emphasis added). In other words, Congress

expressly allowed incumbent LECs and competitive LECs

entering into negotiated (as opposed to arbitrated) interconnection agreements to contract freely around the resale obligations.4

See, e.g., Federal Telecommunications Law § 5.6.2

("the statute expressly permits the negotiating parties to reach

agreement ‘without regard’ to any specific statutory obligations"); SBC Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 407 F.3d 1223, 1226

(D.C. Cir. 2005) ("The Act also makes clear that [incumbent

LECs and competitive LECs] may enter [interconnection

agreements] that differ from the unbundling requirements of

§§ 251(b) or (c). See id. at § 252(a)(1)."); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 104

(2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]he fact that the Telecommunications Act

allows parties to negotiate interconnection agreements without regard to subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 indicates

that Congress envisioned the possibility that the negotiated

parts of the interconnection agreement could result in a different set of duties than those defined by the statute." (internal

citation omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, Verizon Commc’ns

Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398

(2004).

4This Court’s opinion in AT&T Commc’ns of the S. States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 229 F.3d 457 (2000), in no way holds otherwise—nor could it, in the face of the clear statutory language. Instead, in

that opinion, we simply noted that interconnection agreement provisions

that are "not arbitrated are also not necessarily negotiated ‘without regard

to the standards set forth in’" Section 251. Id. at 465. "In other words,

some provisions may be negotiated and agreed upon ‘with regard’ to the

1996 Act and law thereunder . . . ." Id.

12 CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Indeed, 47 C.F.R. § 51.613, upon which CGM seeks to rely

for purposes of Section 401(b) standing, goes to these wideopen resale obligations. The regulation, titled "Restrictions on

resale," provides additional detail regarding the resale duty

addressed in Section 251(c). 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(a). Given

that Congress expressly allowed negotiating parties to contract around Section 251(c)’s resale obligations, and given

that the FCC specifically "emphasize[d]" that "parties may

voluntarily negotiate agreements ‘without regard to’ the rules

that we establish under sections 251(b) and (c)", we cannot

read 47 C.F.R. § 51.613 as an order setting out specific rights

or obligations of these litigants. We find it telling that, for all

we know (based on CGM’s nonspecific allegations), every

one of CGM’s competitive LEC customers could have a

negotiated interconnection agreement that exempts BellSouth

from many of Section 251(c)’s resale requirements and the

related 47 C.F.R. § 51.613 regulation. Under such circumstances, BellSouth would have no obligations—and CGM,

certainly, no rights. Consequently, 47 C.F.R. § 51.613 is not

an order for Section 401(b) purposes and cannot provide

CGM with standing. See Mallenbaum, 74 F.3d at 469. 

Further, the obligations set out in Section 251(c) are not

free-standing; instead, they exist only to the extent a competitive LEC and incumbent LEC enter into an interconnection

agreement. "For companies that are subject to them, section

251(c)’s obligations are generally not self-executing. Rather,

incumbents are required to implement them through voluntary

good-faith negotiations with prospective entrants . . . ." Federal Telecommunications Law § 5.6.2. Stated differently,

"[w]hile the duties regulating [incumbent LECs] enumerated

in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 appear at first glance

to be free-standing, in practice, section 251 envisions that

these duties will be implemented through state approved contracts between the carrier requesting interconnection and the

[incumbent LEC]." Trinko, 305 F.3d at 103. See also Verizon

Md., 377 F.3d at 364 ("Interconnection agreements are thus

CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 13
the vehicles chosen by Congress to implement the duties

imposed in § 251.").

Again, CGM has no interconnection agreement with BellSouth. CGM has not brought this suit pursuant to any interconnection agreement. And no party to an interconnection

agreement is a plaintiff in CGM’s suit. Because Section

251(c)’s resale duties and the related 47 C.F.R. § 51.613 are

not free-standing but exist, to the extent that they do at all

(given parties’ freedom to contract around them), only as

embodied in interconnection agreements, CGM has no rights,

and BellSouth no duties, under the circumstances of this case.

B.

CGM also asserts that it has standing under the Declaratory

Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. That act, however, is remedial only and neither extends federal courts’ jurisdiction nor

creates any substantive rights. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950); Volvo GM Heavy

Truck Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 118 F.3d 205, 210 (4th

Cir. 1997). Stated differently, "[a] request for declaratory

relief is barred to the same extent that the claim for substantive relief on which it is based would be barred." Int’l Ass’n

of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,

108 F.3d 658, 668 (6th Cir. 1997). Here, CGM’s substantive

claims fail. Accordingly, so must its Declaratory Judgments

Act claim.

IV.

At the end of the day, CGM seeks to shoehorn claims

against its own competitive LEC clients into a claim against

BellSouth. In reality, CGM appears to complain that its own

client competitive LECs have failed to enforce their rights

under the 1996 Act against BellSouth. Yet neither the 1996

Act nor a seemingly broadly worded but nonetheless inapplicable statute from the Federal Telecommunications Act of

14 CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1934 provides statutory standing for CGM to bring this action

against Bellsouth. Accordingly, we hold that the district court

properly dismissed this case.

AFFIRMED

CGM, LLC v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 15