UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4560

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARK SHANNON MANUEL,

Defendant – Appellant.

No. 14-4561

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES CHAPPELL DEW,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District 

of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior

District Judge. (3:13-cr-00479-CMC-2; 3:13-cr-00479-CMC-3)

Submitted: August 31, 2015 Decided: September 16, 2015

Before DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark Shannon Manuel, James Chappell Dew, Appellants Pro Se. 

Tommie DeWayne Pearson, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Mark S. Manuel and James C. Dew were convicted by a jury of 

eight counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341 

(2012), and were each sentenced to 120 months in prison. 

Defendants raise several arguments on appeal, including 

challenges to the district court’s decision to admit certain 

evidence against Defendants; the district court’s interruption 

during the Government’s direct examination of one of its 

witnesses; and the district court’s failure to dismiss the mail 

fraud charges against them after it granted Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss a charge of uttering counterfeit government 

obligations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514 (2012). We have 

reviewed the record and have considered Defendants’ arguments 

and find no reversible error by the district court. 

For instance, we discern no reversible error in the 

district court’s interruption of the Government’s examination of 

one of its witnesses. Under Fed. R. Evid. 611, trial courts 

have the authority to organize the mode and order of witnesses 

in order to make effective procedures for determining the truth. 

Moreover, trial judges have the right, and often the obligation, 

to “interrupt the presentations of counsel in order to clarify 

misunderstandings.” United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 332 

(4th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, 

we find that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district 
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court to ask clarifying questions and allow the witness to 

return to the stand to clarify his testimony. See United States 

v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 877 (4th Cir. 1970) (finding no 

reversible error where the “obvious purpose of the [trial 

court’s] questioning was to clear up a confusing factual 

situation and the triers of fact (the jury in Cassiagnol’s case 

. . .) were entitled to information necessary to a correct 

determination of the facts[,]” and holding that “where the 

evidence is in conflict it is proper for a judge to ask 

questions designed to bring before the jury the facts and 

circumstances pertinent to the alleged offense”).

We also discern no reversible error in the district court’s 

jury instructions. In particular, although Defendants did not 

request that the jury be instructed regarding the dismissal of 

one of the counts with which they were charged, such an 

instruction was not legally supported. In particular, the 

counts of which Defendants were convicted required that the 

Government prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendants:

“(1) devised or intended to devise a scheme to defraud and (2) 

used the mail or wire communications in furtherance of the 

scheme.” United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 477 (4th Cir. 

2012).

In contrast, the dismissed charge, which charged Defendants 

with uttering counterfeit government obligations, required that 
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the Government prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

Defendants: (1) with intent to defraud; (2) passed uttered, 

presented, offered, brokered, issued, sold, or attempted or 

caused the same, or with like intent possessed within the United 

States; (3) a false or fictitious instrument, document, or other 

item appearing, representing, purporting, or contriving through 

scheme or artifice to be an actual security or other financial 

instrument issued under the authority of the United States. See

18 U.S.C. § 514 (2012). As separate and distinct elements were 

required to prove the counts, there was no need for the trial 

court to instruct the jury about the dismissed count. 

We have reviewed Defendants’ arguments in their entirety 

and find them to be meritless. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s judgments. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED