United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 22-60322 

Cactus Canyon Quarries, Incorporated, 

Petitioner, 

versus

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission; 

Martin Walsh, Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, 

Mine Safety and Health Administration, 

Respondents. 

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 

Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission 

Docket No. CENT-2021-0090 

Before Wiener, Stewart, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges. 

Per Curiam:

Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals 

a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety 

and Health Review Commission (“Commission”). 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

April 4, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 
No. 22-60322 

2 

In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety 

and Health Administration (MSHA). At issue here is Citation No. 9641812 

(“Citation”), which alleges that: 

The air brake system on the #34 yellow International end dump truck 

. . . was not maintained in functional condition. When inspected[,] the 

operator (CDL license holder) demonstrated the correct method of 

testing the low brake pressure alarm[;] the low brake pressure alarm 

system failed to work in two attempts. 

Sec’y of Labor v. Cactus Canyon Quarries Inc., 44 FMSHRC 289, 298 (Apr. 

2022).1

 The low brake pressure alarm failure violated Section 56.14101(a)(3), 

which requires that “[a]ll braking systems . . . be maintained in functional 

condition.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.14101(a)(3). 

Cactus Canyon contested its citations before an ALJ. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 

815(d). The ALJ heard fact witness testimony and concluded that the alarm 

was part of the braking system. Cactus Canyon, 44 FMSHRC at 295. The 

Citation was maintained, but Cactus Canyon’s negligence determination was 

reduced from moderate to low. Id. at 296–99. A penalty of $123 was assessed. 

Id. Cactus Canyon appealed. 

As the circuit in which the violation occurred, we have jurisdiction to 

review this agency adjudication. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). We review the ALJ’s 

legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. 

Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2015). 

We hold that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to 

include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking 

1

 The ALJ vacated the remaining citations. Cactus Canyon also raises issues 

regarding the vacated citations on appeal, but it cannot pursue those arguments here—

Cactus Canyon is no longer “adversely affected or aggrieved by” the Commission on those 

citations. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). 
No. 22-60322 

3 

system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component, 

because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold 

equipment. But the standard’s plain language and purpose support the 

inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.” 

In interpreting this standard, we must first determine whether the 

standard is “genuinely ambiguous.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2415 

(2019). We find that it is not, so the standard “just means what it means.” 

Id. at 2416. The Commission engaged in this exercise in Secretary of Labor v. 

Daanen & Janssen, when it determined that “the plain language of the standard mandates a finding of violation when a component of the braking system 

is not maintained in functional condition, regardless of whether the braking 

system is capable of stopping and holding the vehicle.” 20 FMSHRC 189 

(Mar. 1998). 

When we independently do the same, we conclude that the braking 

standard unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since a 

“system”—by definition at the time of the standard’s passage—is composed 

of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its related 

components, including those that do not simply function to stop and hold the 

vehicle. WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 2322 (1986) (defining “system” as “a complex unity formed of 

many often-diverse parts subject to a common plan or serving a common purpose.”). The maintenance of this component advances the standard’s purpose of ensuring miner safety, and the plain text of the standard is not counter 

to this interpretation—an alarm that sounds based on the condition of the 

braking system is a component of the “braking system[].” 30 C.F.R. § 

56.14101(a)(3); see Sec’y of Labor v. Dolese Bros. Co., 16 FMSHRC 689, 693 

(Apr. 1994) (“A safety standard ‘must be interpreted so as to harmonize with 

and further . . . the objectives of’ the Mine Act.”) (quoting Emery Mining Co. 

v. Sec’y of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir. 1984)). 
No. 22-60322 

4 

The ALJ’s findings of fact corroborate this interpretation and are 

supported by substantial evidence.2

 The inspector testified that (1) the alarm 

alerts drivers whenever the brake pressure is low and (2) if the air pressure 

drops too low, backup brakes could suddenly stop the truck. The alarm serves 

to prevent actual failure and injury. 

The ALJ did not need expert testimony to come to this conclusion, as 

Cactus Canyon lengthily contends.3

 Specifically, Cactus Canyon asserts that 

the Secretary’s evidence should have been admitted only as expert testimony 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because of the technical complexities of 

the braking system. The ALJ correctly addressed Cactus Canyon’s 

arguments—the inspector testified on personal knowledge which he was 

equipped to do in light of the simplicity of the issues—but the Federal Rules 

of Evidence also do not control Commission hearings. See Sec’y of Labor v. 

Mid-Continent Res., Inc., 6 FMSHRC 1132, 1139 n.6 (May 1984) (“While the 

Federal Rules of Evidence may have value by analogy, they are not required 

to be applied to our hearings—either by their own terms, by the Mine Act, or 

by our procedural rules.”); see also Fed. R. Evid. 1101 (identifying 

proceedings to which the rules apply). 

We finally address Cactus Canyon’s due process arguments regarding 

notice. Cactus Canyon contends that it was not provided requisite notice of 

this standard because no prior inspector had issued a citation related to the 

2

 Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that the alarm was not 

functional, which the parties do not dispute. The witnesses unanimously agreed that the 

alarm did not work. 

3

 Cactus Canyon’s contention that it was denied due process because of the ALJ’s 

evidentiary errors accordingly fails. We note that this argument has other defects including 

the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701, et seq., does not apply to 

Commission hearings or to this court’s review of Commission decisions. 30 U.S.C. § 956; 

Noranda Alumina, L.L.C. v. Perez, 841 F.3d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 2016). 
No. 22-60322 

5 

low air pressure warning alarms on any of its vehicles. But inconsistent 

enforcement is no excuse here. See Mainline Rock & Ballast, Inc. v. Sec’y of 

Labor, 693 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he MSHA cannot be 

estopped from enforcing its standards simply because it did not previously 

cite the mine operator.”). Cactus Canyon had adequate notice of this 

interpretation based on the Commission’s longstanding decision in Daanen 

& Janssen. See Corbesco, Inc. v. Dole, 926 F.2d 422, 427–28 (5th Cir. 1991). 

Fair notice does not require “explicit prior notice of a specific prohibition or 

requirement.” Sec’y of Labor v. Ideal Cement Co., 12 FMSHRC 2409, 2416 

(Nov. 1990). 

We thus DENY Cactus Canyon’s petition for review and AFFIRM 

the ALJ’s Decision and Order.