### NOTICE: SLIP OPINION (not the court’s final written decision) The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the written opinionsthat areoriginally filed by the court. Aslip opinionis not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions can bechanged by subsequentcourtorders. For example,a court may issue an order makingsubstantive changesto a slip opinionor publishing for precedential purposesa previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally,nonsubstantive edits (forstyle, grammar,citation,format, punctuation, etc.)are madebefore the opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court decisions:the Washington Reports 2dand the Washington Appellate Reports. An opinion in theofficial reports replacesthe slip opinion as the official opinion of the court. The slip opinion that begins on the next pageis for a published opinion, and it has since been revised forpublication in the printed official reports. The official textof thecourt’sopinion is foundin the advance sheets and the bound volumes of theofficial reports. Also, an electronic version(intended to mirror the language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of charge, at this website:https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports

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# FILE
IN CLERKS OFFICE IUPR!:MECOU:tT, STATEOFWASHING'TON 

## DATjEB 1 32014

# 111a_~Cr;· JUS1i 

## IN THE SUPREMECOURTOFTHE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OFWASHINGTON, ) ) Respondent, ) No. 88020-4 v. ) ) En Bane PHILLIP BARRARAGARCIA, JR., ) ) 

## FEB 1 32014 Petitioner. ) Filed )

WIGGINS, J.-Phillip Garcia Jr. challenges his convictions for kidnapping in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the first degree. He argues that that there is insufficient evidence to support each of the alternative means of kidnapping presented tothejury, thatthetrial courtviolated his confrontation rights by limiting his cross-examination ofan adversewitness, thatthe trial court erroneously admitted evidence ofa prior crime ofdishonesty,.and thatthe prosecutorincorrectlydefined "burglary" during closing arguments. We reverse Garcia's convictions for kidnapping in the first degree because there is insufficient evidenceto support each ofthe alternative means of kidnapping presented to the jury. We reverse his conviction for burglary in the second degree because ofprejudicial trial error. Weaffirm his conviction forcriminaltrespass in the firstdegree becausethe errorswere notprejudicial astothatconviction.State

### v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 FACTS On June 6, 2010, Garcia was convicted of burglary in the second degree, criminal trespass in the first degree, and kidnapping in thefirst degreewith adeadly weapon enhancement. The convictionswere based on thefollowing testimony: In the early morning of December 24, 2009, Garcia was cut off by three cars while driving near Sedro-Woolley. He heard two gunshots coming from the cars. Believing that the people in the cars were chasing him, he tried to escape. In the process, he hit a railway track, and the car became stuck. Garcia abandoned the
car and a passenger on the tracks and ran. Eventually, he made it to a nearby Valero gas station. He testified that he thought the gas station would be open and that he could ask for help. However, the gas station's doors were locked. After trying to kick the doors open, Garcia picked up a cinder block and broke the glass door. Surveillance cameras showed him entering the store, turning around, and walking out, without going nearthe cash register or causing other property damage inside. Garciatestified that he walked out ofthe gas station after hearing an alarm because he had outstandingwarrants and did notwantto gotojail. After leaving the gas station, hetried knocking on the doorofa nearby house. The occupantwould not open the door but spoke with him briefly through the door. Garcia told herthat he needed help and that people were trying to kill him. When the occupant told him that she would call 911 but would not open the door, Garcia left. He next ran to a mobile home park where Juliana Wilkins happened to be asleep on the sofa of her late father's home. Garcia saw the television on and
2State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 entered the trailerthrough an unlocked door. It was 3:55 a.m. when Garcia tapped Wilkins on her upperthigh to wake her up. She had neverseen Garcia beforethese events. Garcia remained with Wilkins in the mobile home for around two hours. She testified that during that time he "was extremely agitated," on "an adrenaline rush, very jumpy and out of breath." She also testified that his "behavior was very unpredictable." The timeline of what happened inside the mobile home is not clear. There
was testimonythat Garcia sat in a chairfive or sixfeet awayfrom where Wilkins sat
on the couch and the two talked. He explained his situation to Wilkins and asked her to give him a ride. She declined. He also made numerous·telephone calls, trying to find someone else to pick him up. At some point during the two hours, Garcia grabbed a knife from the kitchen. He briefly held the knife two feet away from Wilkins. Otherwise, he kept the knife in his pocket. At trial, he explained that the knife was to protect himself and Wilkins from the people Garcia believed were afterhim. During their conversations, they talked abouttheirfamilies, and Wilkins gave him advice. She told him that she had 10 children and hoped to go hometo them. She testified that she desired to keep the situation calm, while Garcia testified that hefelt likeWilkinswas helping him and tagging along. At one point, Garcia decided to leave without having found a ride. Wilkins walked him to the doorand gave him a necklacewith religious significance. Garcia, however, returned within moments. Eventually, he was able to find a friend who
3State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 agreedto pick him up. Thisfriend talked with Wilkins on the phoneto get directions. As Garcia was leaving, he offered to give Wilkins backthe necklace. She declined and hugged Garcia. Wilkins testified that she was very, very terrified during the event. She believed that she might be killed, and her fear did not decline while Garcia was in the residence. Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to have all statements made by Garcia to others excluded as hearsay. The prosecutor argued thattheywere being offered to prove the truth ofthe matter asserted, and argued at multiple times that Garcia was trying to get the statements into evidence without taking the stand. Defense counsel countered thatthe statements were necessary to give a complete picture of what happened in the mobile home and were important for determining Garcia's intent. Thejudge did not make afirm ruling as to the statements but said hewould considerthem objection by objection. During trial, the court allowed the jury to know that Garcia had previously been convicted of felonies of dishonesty. The prosecutor used statements in a police report to establish that a previous burglary conviction involved intent to committheft. During the prosecutor's closing argument, he told thejurythat Garcia
was guilty of burglary in the second degree if he intended to commit malicious mischiefwhilethrowing acinderblock intotheValero gas station. Following thejurytrial, Garcia was sentenced to 173 months ofconfinement. The CourtofAppeals affirmedthe convictions.

4State

### v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 ANALYSIS Garcia's kidnapping in the first degree and burglary in the second degree convictions are reversed and remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. The kidnapping conviction is reversed because there is insufficient evidence to support each of the three alternative means presented to the jury. The Court of Appeals also misinterpreted and misapplied the statutory elements of kidnapping in the first degree. The burglary conviction is reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior crimes of dishonesty. This error was prejudicial. In the following discussion, we analyze whetherthere was sufficient evidence to support the kidnapping in the first degree conviction. We then address Garcia's argumentthatthe trial court unjustifiably restricted his cross-examination ofWilkins. Finally, we analyzethe trial court's admission ofGarcia's prior convictions forcrimes ofdishonesty. 

### I. Insufficiencyofevidenceforthe alternative means ofkidnapping in thefirst degree presentedto the jury We reverse Garcia's conviction for kidnapping in the first degree and remand for newtrial becausethere is insufficientevidenceto supporteach alternative means of kidnapping in the jury instructions. When alternative means of committing a single offense are presented to ajury, each alternative means must be supported by substantial evidence in order to safeguard a defendant's right to a unanimous jury determination. State 

### v. Smith, 159Wn.2d 778, 783, 154 P.3d 873 (2007); see State
v. Sweany, 174 Wn.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012). On review, we view the

5State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 "evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State 

### v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). The three alternative means presented during Garcia's trial were intentionally abducting Wilkins with intent "(a) to hold [her] as a shield or hostage, or (b) to facilitate the commission of Burglary in the Second Degree orflightthereafter, or (c) to inflict extreme mental distress on [her]." Jury Instruction 18; see RCW 9A.40.020(1) (kidnapping inthe first degree). Garcia also disputes the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the kidnapping elements. We first review statutory interpretation of the kidnapping elements de novo, and then determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support each alternative means. See Engel, 166 Wn.2d at576. A. The shieldandhostageprongofkidnapping in the firstdegree The first alternative means of kidnapping in the first degree is to hold the victim as ashield or hostage. RCW 9A.40.020(1)(a). "Shield" and "hostage" are not defined in RCW 9A.40.020 or the accompanying provisions. And no clear interpretations have developedthrough ourcase law. When determining the meaning of a statute, "[t]he court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry outthe legislature's intent." In re Oet. ofDanforth, 173 Wn.2d 59, 67, 264 P.3d 783 (2011). "The legislature is presumed to intend the plain meaning ofits language." State

### v. Gibson, 16Wn.App. 119, 127, 553 P.2d 131 (1976). "In determining the plain meaning ofa provision, we lookto the text ofthe statutory provision in question, as well as 'the context of the statute in which that
6State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as awhole."' State
v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) (quoting State 

### v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). Courts may also turn to the common lawfor the meaning of undefined terms. Engel, 166 Wn.2d at 578-79. In criminal cases, fairness dictates that statutes should be literally and strictly construed and that courts should refrain from using possible but strained interpretations. See State v. Bell, 83Wn.2d 383, 388, 518 P.2d 696 (1974). The history of the kidnapping statute sheds light on the plain meaning of "hostage" and "shield." See Ervin, 169 Wn.2d at 820. The current kidnapping statutes, RCW 9A.40.020 and 9A.40.030, were adopted in 1975 as part of a comprehensive revision ofthe criminal code. See LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, 

### §§ 9A.40.020, 9A.40.030, at 836-37. The pre-1975 kidnapping statute stated: Every person who shall wilfully, (1) Seize, confine or inveigle anotherwith intentto cause him without authority of lawto be secretly confined or imprisoned, or in any way held to service with the intentto extort or obtain money or reward for his release or disposition, shall be guilty of kidnapping in the first degree

.... (2) Lead, take, entice away or detain a child underthe age of sixteen years with intent to conceal him from his parent, parents, guardian or other lawful person having care, custody or control over him, or with intent to steal any article from his person, but without the intentto extortorobtain moneyor reward for his return, orshall abduct, entice, or by force orfraud unlawfully take or carry away anotherto or from a placewithoutthe state, and shall afterwards send, bring or keep such person, or cause him to be kept or secreted within the state withoutthe intentto extort or obtain money or reward for his release or disposition, shall be guiltyofkidnapping in the second degree

.... Former RCW 9.52.010 (1933) (repealed by LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, 

### § 9A.92.010, at 863). The statute did not includetheterms "hostage" or"shield." See

7State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 

### id. Not only did the 1975 statute add the terms "hostage" and "shield," it also redefined the difference between kidnapping in the first degree and second degree and set forth three related crimes that are less serious in nature (i.e., unlawful imprisonment in the first and second degree and custodial interference). See JUDICIARY COMM. OF WASH. LEGIS. COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL'S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REVISED WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE 157-63 (Dec. 3, 1970) (Orange Code). The resultwas agradation ofrelated offenses. The currentfirst degree statute states: (1) 

### A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree if he or she intentionallyabductsanotherpersonwith intent: (a) To hold him or her for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or (b) To facilitate commission ofanyfelony orflightthereafter; or (c) To inflict bodily injury on him or her; or (d) To inflict extreme mental distress on him, her, or a third person; or (e) To interfere with the performance of any governmental function. (2) Kidnapping in thefirst degree is aclass

### Afelony. RCW 9A.40.020. "Kidnapping in the second degree" is defined as intentionally abducting another person under circumstances not amounting to kidnapping in the first degree and is a class B felony. RCW 9A.40.030. The defendant's intent distinguishes the two degrees of kidnapping. While kidnapping in the second degree requires only an intentional abduction, kidnapping in the first degree requires
an additional specific intent. See RCW9A.40.010, .020. One purpose ofthe newcriminal codewasto establish this graded scheme of crimes, which distinguishes among the severity of different gradations and leads to
8State

### v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4

moreappropriate sentences. See Orange Code, supra, at staff preface ("Finally, the introduction of a structure of degrees of felonies should allow for more rational grading of individual offenses because of the greater ease with which comparative judgments about the relative severity of different offenses may be made. Consequently, this proposed code provides afairerand more consistenttreatmentof various similar criminal activitiesthan does present law."). A broad interpretation of the specific intent element undermines the legislature's purpose for creating a graduated scheme because it blurs the line between first and second degree kidnapping. Turning to common law, courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted the meaning of "hostage." As background, many states adopted statutes that included the terms "hostage" and "shield" around the same time as Washington. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 

### § 13A-6-43 (1975); ALASKA STAT. 

### § 11.41.300 (1978), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 

### § 13-1304 (1977), ARK. CODE ANN. 

### § 5-11-102 (1975). The drafters in Washington examined criminal statutes from other states and looked to the American Law Institute's Model Penal Codewhen crafting the 1975 revisions to the criminal code. Orange Code, supra, at ii, 158; see MODEL PENAL CODE 

### § 212.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (intent element of kidnapping is satisfied if defendant's purpose is "to holdfor ransom or reward, oras ashield or hostage"). Most judicial definitions of "hostage" are the same: a hostage is someone "held as securityforthe performance, or forbearance, ofsome act by athird person." State v. Crump, 82 N.M. 487, 493, 484 P.2d 329 (1971); see Jenkins 

### v. State, 248 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Ingle 

### v. State, 746 N.E.2d 927, 939 (Ind.
9State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 2001); State v. Moore, 315 N.C. 738, 746, 340 S.E.2d 401 (1986); State 

### v. Stone, 122 Ariz. 304, 309, 594 P.2d 558 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). One emphasis in these
cases is that the person held as a hostage cannot b.e the person from whom performance or an act is requested, meaning the hostage must be held to coerce
someone else to act. See Crump, 82 N.M. at 493; Jenkins, 248 S.W.3d at 297; Ingle, 746 N.E.2d at939; Moore, 315 N.C. at746; Stone, 122Ariz. at309. The definition of "shield" has not been widely addressed in courts throughout the country. In the only case cited in the briefs that defined "shield" for kidnapping purposes, it was held to imply "the holding or detaining of a person by force as defenseorpotential protection against interception, interference, orretaliation by law enforcement personnel." Stone, 122Ariz. at 309. This definition encompasses the situation in In re PersonalRestraintofGlasmann, in which the defendant positioned
a woman between several police officers and himself while the officers had their guns drawn and the defendant held the woman "around the neck so that she could not breathe." 175Wn.2d 696, 720-21, 286 P.3d 673 (2012) (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (reversed and remanded because of prosecutorial misconduct). A "shield" was defined in a nonkidnapping case as "a felon's use ofan innocent person byforce as
a potential protection against retaliation." Kress, 105 N.J. Super. at 521-22 (A murder case involving a victim who was used as a shield during a bank robbery. Thevictim was used as coverwhen one ofthe defendantswas attemptingto exitthe bank.).In lightofthis statutory background, proofoffirst degree kidnapping underthe hostage/shield means requires proof that the defendant intended to use the victim
10State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4

as security forthe performance of some action by another person orthe prevention ofsome action by another person. It is not sufficientthatthe defendant intentionally abducts another person, which would be second degree kidnapping. Rather, there must be some intent to use the victim as protection for the perpetrator. Anything lesswould collapsethe distinction between first and second degree kidnapping. The evidence here established an intentional abduction ofWilkins, but it was insufficientto find that Garcia intended to useWilkins as a hostage orshield. There is simply no evidence of such an intent. The Court ofAppeals reasoned: Garcia wanted to avoid arrest; ifhe releasedWilkins, shewould notifythe police; so long as Garcia detained Wilkins, she could not notify police; therefore, ajury could find that Garcia harbored the intentto use Wilkins as a hostage or a shield. State

### v. Garcia, noted at 168Wn.App. 1018,2012WL 1918961, at *7. The appellate court decision is entirely speculative, hypothesizing possible intentions that are unsupported by any evidence. Moreover, the theory that Garcia awakened Wilkins so that he could restrain her in order to prevent her from calling the police is inherently illogical; ifGarcia's intentwasto keepWilkinsfrom calling the police, he never would have entered and awakened her in the first place. Most important, this speculationwould elevate incidents ofsecond degree kidnapping into first degree kidnapping based solelyon speculation. We must avoid this strained interpretation. See Bell, 83 Wn.2d at 388. We hold, therefore, that the evidence fails to support the hostage and shield prong because no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Garcia intended to hold Wilkins as a hostage or shield. No evidence was admitted


### 11State

### v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 at trial to support a claim that Garcia intended to hold Wilkins as security for the performance, or forbearance, of some act by a third person. No demands were. made on third persons. The incident involved primarily communications between Garcia (the abductor) and Wilkins (the abducted). This does not meetthe definition of"hostage." Similarly, therewas no evidence attrial indicating that Garcia intended to useWilkins as a shield because there is no evidencethat Garcia used Wilkins as protection from intervention or retaliation. He did not physically putWilkins between himself and others trying to pursue him. Therefore, this alternative means fails for insufficient evidence. To hold otherwise would frustrate the graduated scheme created bythe legislatureand be contrarytothe plain languageofthe statute. B. The extreme mentaldistressprongofkidnappingin the firstdegree The second alternative means of committing first degree kidnapping is to act with intent "[t]o inflict extreme mental distress." RCW 9A.40.020(1)(d). "Extreme mental distress" is not defined by statute, and case law has failed to provide aclear interpretation. Again, examining the provision in the context of the legislative scheme is helpfulto determine legislative intent. Engel, 166Wn.2d at578. The first element of kidnapping is an intentional abduction. RCW 9A.40.020(1), .030(1). '"Abduct' means to restrain a person by

. . . using or threatening to use deadly force." RCW 9A.40.010(1). Therefore, intentionally restraining someone bythreatening use of deadlyforce is, without more, kidnapping in the second degree. See RCW 9A.40.010(1), .030(1). If while doing this a defendant intends to "inflict extreme mental distress" on the victim, the defendant has committed kidnapping in the first degree. RCW 9A.40.020(1)(d). The
12State

### v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 Washington State Training Commission's manual, published shortly after the 1975 revisions, noted: Both the kidnaping [sic] sections require an intentional abduction, the difference between then [sic] being the first degree's requirement of proof that the victim was kidnaped [sic] to accomplish a further purpose, e.g. the obtaining ofransom, to inflict injury, etc. WASH. STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICETRAINING COMM'N, REVISED CRIMINAL CODE TRAINING AND SEMINAR MANUAL, at 9A.40-1 (GordonA. Golob 

### &Gerald K. Mooneyeds., 1976) (Manual). Reading the requirements of kidnapping in the first and second degree together makes it clear that some additional intent must be present to elevate a crime from kidnapping in the second degree to kidnapping in the first degree. Otherwise, the statutorydistinctionwould be meaningless. Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of "extreme mental distress" is an intention to cause more mental distress than a reasonable person would feel when being restrained by the threat ofdeadlyforce. When measuring the level ofmental distress intended, thefocus must be on the mental state ofthe defendant ratherthan the actual resulting distress. This is because kidnapping in the first degree focuses
on the intent of the defendant rather than the result on the victim. See RCW 9A.40.020(1); Manual, supra, at 9A.40.020-2. Therefore, the extreme mental distress prong requires an intent to cause mental distress above that of "regular" abductions, meaning those falling under kidnapping in the second degree. This is a fact-specific determination. In some cases, the method ofabduction (i.e., threatofdeadlyforce) may be so extreme asto evidence an intent to cause extreme mental distress. However, it should not be

13Statev: Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 assumed that everytime a person is abducted by someone showing aweapon that the defendant intendsto inflict extreme mental distress. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, no reasonable jury could havefound beyond a reasonable doubtthat Garcia abducted Wilkins with the intent to inflict extreme mental distress. There was no evidence that Garcia threatened to kill or physically harm Wilkins. He showed Wilkins a kitchen knife for only a shortwhile, and Wilkins testified that Garcia neithertold her he was going to
use the knife nor made threatening movements with it. This does not evidence intentto cause extreme mental distress. Because there is not sufficient evidence to support two of the three alternative means of kidnapping presented to the jury, Garcia's kidnapping conviction must be reversed, and we remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. See State 

### v. Wright, 165Wn.2d 783, 802 n.12, 203 P.3d 1027 (2009) ("The Washington Constitution provides greater protection of the jury trial right [than the federal constitution], requiring reversal ifit is impossible to rule outthepossibilitythe jury relied on acharge unsupported by sufficient evidence. Significantly, however, a defendant in such a position is entitled only to a new trial, not an outright acquittal, unless the record shows the evidence was insufficient to convict on any charged alternative." (citations omitted)). The trial court may not retry Garcia on the two alternative means for which we hold there is insufficient evidence. See State v. Ramos, 163 Wn.2d 654, 660-61, 184 P.3d 1256 (2008); State v. Joy, 121 Wn.2d 333, 345-46, 851 P.2d 654 (1993).

14State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 II. Restriction ofGarcia's rightto cross-examineWilkins Garcia argues that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by limiting his cross-examination ofWilkins. An impermissible limitation on the scope ofcrossexamination is a violation of a defendant's right to confrontation. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State 

### v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 620-21; 41 P.3d 1189 (2002). The scope of cross-examination is within the discretion ofthe trial court and will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. 

### /d. at 619. "Atrial court
f abuses its discretion if its decision 'is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons."' State 

### v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 127, 285 P.3d 27 (2012) (quoting State 

### v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995)). Therefore, the court erred ifthere was no lawfuljustification for restricting the crossexamination. "All relevant evidence is admissible" unless it is limited by the constitution, the rules of evidence, or other applicable rules. ER 402. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination ofthe action more probable or less probable than itwould be without the evidence." ER 401. The court excluded statements made by Garcia that evidenced his state of mind. These statements were of consequence for the kidnapping charges because conviction for kidnapping in the first degree hinges on Garcia's intent. See RCW 9A.40.020(1). The only witnesses to Garcia's state of mind were himselfand Wilkins. Wilkins's perception of his state of mind is relevant and would have been based, at leastin part, on Garcia'sstatementsto her.



### 15State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 Relevanttestimony may be excluded from trial if it is hearsay. '"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth ofthe matter asserted." ER 801(c). "Whetherastatement is hearsaydepends upon the purposeforwhich the statement is offered. Statements not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather as a basis for inferring something else, are not hearsay." State v. Crowder, 103 Wn. App. 20, 26, 11 P.3d 828 (2000). The excluded statements were not offered forthe truth ofthe matter asserted butwere offered to prove Garcia's intent. Therefore, thetrial courterroneouslyexcludedthe statements. We analyze only the prejudicial effect of the error on the convictions for burglary in the second degree and criminal trespass in the first degree because we reversed the kidnapping conviction on other grounds. The error is not prejudicial,
even underthe constitutional harmless errortest, becausethe error had 

### no effect on his conviction forthese crimes. Wilkins offered no testimony about Garcia's actions at the Valero gas station, which formed the basis for the burglary in the second degree charge. She had no personal knowledge aboutwhattranspired and offered
no testimony about the event. Therefore, the erroneous limitation on her crossexamination had no effecton the conviction for burglary in the second degree. Similarly, the limitation was not prejudicial with regard to Garcia's conviction forcriminal trespass in thefirst degree. "Aperson is guiltyofcriminal trespass in the first degree if he or she knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building." RCW 9A.52.070(1). The entry is unlawful if "he or she is not

... licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to" do so. RCW9A.52.010(5). "Onlythe person who resides in
16State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4

or otherwise has authority over that property may grant permission to enter or remain." State 

### v. J.P, 130 Wn. App. 887, 892, 125 P.3d 215 (2005). There are statutory defenses available to defendants, including when the defendant "reasonably believed thatthe owner ...would have licensed him

...to enter

...." RCW 9A.52.090(3). Garcia did not raisethese defensesattrial. The testimony unaffected by the trial court's restriction on Wilkins crossexamination established that Garcia entered the mobile home through a door that
was ajar and thatWilkins had neverseen Garcia before, did not know him, and was not expecting anyone to visit the home that night. There is no evidence that she granted him permission to enter in the mobile home. Even underthe constitutional
error test, Garcia was not prejudiced because the "'overwhelming untainted evidence"' necessarily led the jury to a finding of guilt. See State 

### v. McDaniel, 83 Wn. App. 179, 187-88, 920 P.2d 1218 (1996) (quoting State 

### v. Gu/oy, 104 Wn.2d 412,426, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985)).

Ill. Admission ofthe priorfelonyfordishonesty Garcia argues that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence to establish that his prior burglary-related convictions were crimes of dishonesty. We review evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. State 

### v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 34, 941 P.2d 1102 (1997). "A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision 'is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons."' 

### Lamb, 175Wn.2d at 127 (quoting Powell, 126Wn.2d at258). ER 609(a) allows impeachment of the credibility of a witness through evidence of past crimes. Admission is limited to crimes punishable by death or
17State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 imprisonment of one year and crimes involving dishonesty. 

### /d. This evidence may be "elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination

...." 

### /d. We narrowly construe ER 609(a) because of the danger for injustice associated with admitting evidence of a criminal defendant's past convictions. See State 

### v. Newton, 109 Wn.2d 69, 70, 75, 743 P.2d 254 (1987). When determining whetheraconviction is acrime ofdishonesty, atrial court is limitedto examining "the elements and date of the prior conviction, the type of crime, and the punishment imposed." 

### /d. at 71. The inquiry is slightly modified for burglary in the second degree because it is not a per se crime ofdishonesty. State 

### v. Watkins, 61 Wn.App. 552, 556-57, 811 P.2d 953 (1991). To determine whether a specific prior conviction for burglary is a crime of dishonesty, the trial judge may identify the crime the witness intended to commit inside the unlawfully entered building and look to the elements of that crime. State v. Schroeder, 67 Wn. App. 110, 117, 834 P.2d 105 (1992). The trial judge's inquiry into the facts ofthe underlying conviction is forthe limited purpose of determining the predicate crime for the burglary conviction. See id. at 119. Ifthe predicate crime was theft, a burglary conviction may be used as a crime of dishonesty under ER 609(a)(2). /d. at 115; see Watkins, 61 Wn. App. at 555-57. The prosecution sought to impeach Garcia's credibility as a witness by proving that Garcia previously pleaded guilty to a burglary involving theft and a related conspiracy charge. It could not prove this through the record, meaning that the information, probable cause statement, judgment and sentence, and statement
18State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4

on plea of guilty were devoid of evidence that Garcia intended to commit theft. Instead, the prosecution used a statement made by a coconspiratorthatwas noted in a police report matching up with the documents in the court file. The Court of Appeals heldthisto be errorbut concludedthat itwas harmless. We agree thatthe trial court abused its discretion butwe disagree that it was harmless. Instead, we hold that the error requires reversal of Garcia's burglary conviction. The trial court improperly went beyond the court file when determining the predicate crime for Garcia's burglary conviction and relied on hearsay evidence. Washington case law has clearly established that an ER 609(a)(2) inquiry disfavors making broad factual inquiries into prior crimes. See Newton, 109 Wn.2d at 70-71. While a specific factual inquiry is necessary for burglary, the trial court should not have gone beyond the court file and relied upon a coconspirator's statement in a police record. See Schroeder, 67Wn. App. at 120 (Burglarywas used as acrime of dishonesty when the recordwas "replete with information that

... prior burglaries
were performed with intent to commit theft."). A statement in a police report is generally inadmissible hearsay unless it falls within a hearsay exception. See In re Det. ofCoe, 160 Wn. App. 809, 829, 250 P.3d 1056 (2011), aff'don othergrounds, 175Wn.2d482, 286 P.3d 29 (2012). An error in admitting evidence is groundfor reversal ifit is prejudicial. State

### v. Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d 389, 403, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997). An error is "'not prejudicial unless, within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected had the error not occurred."' /d. (quoting State 

### v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 599, 637 P.2d 961 (1981)). The Court ofAppeals found the errorto be
19State v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 harmless because the trial court "sanitized" the prior convictions by excluding the fact that they involved burglary, one of the crimes for which Garcia was on trial. Garcia, 2012WL 1918961, at *9. It also notedthat Garcia did not "demonstratethat the

. . . prior convictions negatively impacted the jury's evaluation of his credibility

...." 

### /d. at *10. The Court ofAppeals based this finding on the fact that thejury "was not persuaded [that] Garcia lacked all credibility" because it acquitted him ofone countofburglary. 

### /d. at *9. Wefind this reasoning unpersuasive. The purpose of proving that Garcia had two prior felony convictions for dishonestywas to discredit histestimony. Forthe burglary charge, there was scant evidence from which ajury could infer Garcia's intentto commit a predicate crime. Although a surveillance camera captured him breaking into the Valero gas station, hearing the alarm, and leaving, Garcia testified that he entered the gas station only to seek safety. However, after hearing oftwo prior felonies for dishonesty, thejury discredited histestimony. The prejudice against Garcia was magnified by the prosecution's incorrect description of burglary. Burglary in the second degree requires that Garcia enter or remain in the Valero gas station with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein. See RCW 9A.52.030(1). Therefore, a conviction required that he not only trespass, but also intend to commit a crime against a person or property inside the burglarized building. State 

### v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 4, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985); see RCW 9A.52.070 (The act of knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a building without the additional intent element is criminal trespass in the first degree.). In his closing and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor argued that Garcia
20State

### v. Garcia, Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4 committed burglary by throwing the cinder block through the door ofthe Valero gas station because the act of breaking the door became the predicate crime for the burglary. This is a misstatement ofthe law. It omits the requirement thatthe State provethe additional specific intentto commit acrime insidethe building. 1 Coupling the scant evidence of the intent element with the prosecutor's mistaken description ofthe crime of burglary and the improper admission ofcrimes ofdishonesty, there is a reasonable probabilitythatthe trial court's error in admitting the crimes ofdishonesty materially affected the outcome. Therefore, the burglary in the second degreeconviction is reversed and remandedfora newtrial. The error did not prejudice Garcia with respect to the conviction for criminal trespass in the first degree. Garcia testified that he entered the home and did not indicatethat hewas invited or had permissionto do so. In fact, he said thatwhen he entered, he did not see Wilkins at first. Wilkins also testified that she did not know Garcia and had neverseen him before. It unlikelythat absentthe errorthe outcome would have been different. CONCLUSION Garcia's convictions for kidnapping in the first degree and burglary in the second degree are reversed and remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. We affirm Garcia's convictionforcriminal trespass in thefirst degree.

1Alone, the prosecutor's misstatement is not a reversible error. Ifa defendantfails to object to the prosecutor's error at trial, the error is waived unless the defendant "establishes that the misconductwas so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice." In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d at 704. Garcia fails to establish that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard arguments not supported by the law as given in the jury instructions. Italso instructedthejuryas to the correctelements ofburglary. 21State v. Garcia, .Jr. (Phillip Barrara), No. 88020-4

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