Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1198 | October 29, 2019 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Daniel A. Moon

Daniel Moon Law Office, LLC

Princeton, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Josiah Swinney

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Gregory A. Davis,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

October 29, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1198

Appeal from the Gibson Superior 

Court

The Honorable Robert Krieg, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

26D01-1811-CM-1209

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1198 | October 29, 2019 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] Gregory A. Davis was charged with class A misdemeanor operating while 

intoxicated (“OWI”) with endangerment, class C misdemeanor OWI, and three 

infractions. The trial court found that he had knowingly refused a certified 

chemical breath test (“chemical test”) and suspended his driver’s license

pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-30-6-7. He filed a petition for judicial 

review of his license suspension, which the trial court denied in an order 

reaffirming its finding of a knowing refusal to submit to the chemical test. 

Davis now appeals the denial of his petition. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts most favorable to the judgment are as follows. Around 2:00 a.m. on 

November 2, 2018, Indiana State Trooper Taylor Fox was patrolling U.S. 

Highway 41, where the posted speed limit was sixty miles per hour. A vehicle 

passed him traveling at eighty-seven miles per hour. When the driver, Davis,

saw his vehicle, he suddenly applied his brakes. Shortly thereafter, he passed a 

semi and accelerated to more than seventy-five miles per hour. He passed 

several other vehicles and changed lanes without signaling. Trooper Fox 

conducted a traffic stop, and as he stood at the window of Davis’s vehicle, he 

detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage. Davis had glazed eyes and poor 

balance, and his speech was slurred as he explained that he had been playing in 

a pool tournament. He admitted that he had consumed some alcoholic 

beverages. Trooper Fox explained that he was going to conduct some tests to 

ensure that Davis could safely operate his vehicle. Davis failed both field 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1198 | October 29, 2019 Page 3 of 7

sobriety tests that he took and refused to take a third test. He took a portable 

breathalyzer test, which registered a blood alcohol concentration of .146. 

Trooper Fox informed Davis that he would need to undergo a chemical test and 

read him “implied consent from a card.”1

 Tr. Vol. 2 at 6. Davis initially agreed 

to submit to the chemical test, and Trooper Fox placed him in handcuffs and 

took him to the Gibson County Jail. Once there, Davis refused to take the 

chemical test and was remanded to the jail. 

[3] The State charged Davis with class A misdemeanor OWI with endangerment, 

class C misdemeanor OWI, and infractions for speeding, failure to signal, and 

an unsafe lane movement. At Davis’s initial hearing, the trial court found 

probable cause that Davis had refused to submit to a chemical test and 

suspended his driving privileges. Davis filed a petition for judicial review, 

requesting a judicial determination as to whether he had knowingly refused to 

take the chemical test. He claimed that Trooper Fox had failed to inform him 

that his refusal to submit to a chemical test would result in the suspension of his 

driving privileges. The trial court conducted a hearing and issued an order 

affirming its earlier finding that Davis had knowingly refused the chemical test. 

Davis now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

1

 Implied consent is based on the statutory provision that a person who operates a vehicle “impliedly 

consents” to submit to a chemical test as a condition of operating a vehicle in this state and is subject to 

license suspension if he refuses to do so. Ind. Code §§ 9-30-6-1, -7.
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Discussion and Decision

[4] Davis challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for judicial review. “The

trial court’s denial of a petitioner’s petition for judicial review is a final 

appealable judgment in the manner of a civil action.” Burnell v. State, 56 N.E.3d 

1146, 1149-50 (Ind. 2016). As the petitioner below, Davis bore the burden of 

proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; Ind. Code § 9-30-6-10(f). He

therefore appeals from a negative judgment. Burnell, 56 N.E.3d at 1149-50.

On appeal from a negative judgment, this Court will reverse the 

trial court only if the judgment is contrary to law. A judgment is 

contrary to law if the evidence leads to but one conclusion and 

the trial court reached an opposite conclusion. In determining 

whether the trial court’s judgment is contrary to law, we will 

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. We 

neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of 

witnesses. Further, [w]hen appealing from a negative judgment, 

a party has a heavy burden to establish to the satisfaction of the 

reviewing court that there was no basis in fact for the judgment 

rendered. 

Id. at 1150 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[5] “A person who operates a vehicle impliedly consents to submit to the chemical 

test provisions of [Indiana Code Chapter 9-30-6] as a condition of operating a 

vehicle in Indiana.” Ind. Code § 9-30-6-1. “If a person refuses to submit to a 

chemical test, the arresting officer shall inform the person that refusal will result 

in the suspension of the person’s driving privileges.” Ind. Code § 9-30-6-7(a). If 

he refuses to submit to a chemical test after having been advised that his refusal 
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will result in the suspension of his driving privileges, the arresting officer is 

required either to obtain his driver’s license pending a hearing or to submit a 

probable cause affidavit to the prosecuting attorney. Ind. Code § 9-30-6-7(b).

[6] Davis claims that Trooper Fox did not read him the card and that he therefore 

was not properly informed that he could lose his driver’s license for refusing to 

submit to a chemical test. The record shows that Davis initially agreed to take 

the chemical test but changed his mind after he arrived at the jail. He does not 

dispute that he, in fact, refused to take the chemical test. Instead, he asserts that 

his refusal did not amount to a “knowing” refusal because he was not properly 

informed concerning implied consent. See Hurley v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1074, 1078 

(Ind. 2017) (“a person does not refuse a chemical test if the officer failed to 

comply with the rules for conducting it.”) (emphasis added). 

[7] Trooper Fox testified with respect to implied consent, “I read it from a card 

there on scene. He [Davis] agreed to it, and we went to Gibson County 

Sheriff’s Department where the certified test is.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 6. He explained

his standard procedure, saying, “I know it verbatim, but I never recite it 

verbatim.” Id. “I read it the same way every time. I have a backup card. I 

believe I have three of them in my pocket ... I never just say it.” Id. at 14. He 

further explained, “Standard procedure is we just have to read them implied 

consent and go from there. We have to read it to them one time, offer them the 

chemical test, and proceed however they choose to proceed with either an 

acceptance or a refusal.” Id. at 7. He testified that he always reads implied 

consent to the driver at the scene of the traffic stop and typically again at the 
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jail, though not always. Id. at 7-8. He elucidated, “typically, if somebody has 

refused [the chemical test] on scene, upon reading it to them again, they will 

sometimes change their mind and then take the test. That wasn’t the case with 

[Davis].” Id. at 13. 

[8] Davis points to inconsistent evidence concerning whether Trooper Fox read 

him the implied consent at the jail. The trooper’s original affidavit indicated 

that he had done so, but video footage from the jail, admitted as an exhibit, did 

not capture any such reading during the time when Trooper Fox was setting up 

the chemical test. Trooper Fox explained that he used a template when 

composing his affidavits and that he either mistakenly failed to delete his 

standard information about rereading the implied consent or had already reread 

the implied consent before the video footage began. He nevertheless believed 

that he had reread it, as it was his practice to reread it and to fill out his 

paperwork accurately. He testified repeatedly and unequivocally that he read 

the implied consent to Davis at the scene of the traffic stop. The implied 

consent statute does not require more than one reading, and while we are not 

unmindful that the evidence is conflicting as to whether Trooper Fox read the 

implied consent card to Davis a second time, we remind Davis that we may not

reweigh evidence. Burnell, 56 N.E.3d at 1150. With respect to Davis’s selfserving testimony that there was no mention of license suspension during the 

traffic stop and that to his knowledge, Trooper Fox did not read information to 

him from a card, id. at 18, we again decline his invitation to reweigh evidence. 

To the extent that he now claims that there was no evidence as to the contents 
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of the card, he did not raise this in the trial court, where the contents would 

have been easily ascertainable through testimony or as an exhibit. As such, he 

has waived this issue for consideration on appeal.

2

 See Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 

799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (claims are generally waived if raised for first time 

on appeal), trans. denied.

[9] Simply put, Davis has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the 

evidence leads to but one conclusion and that the trial court reach an opposite 

conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.

2

 Waiver notwithstanding, we note that during questioning, Davis’s counsel described the contents of the 

implied consent card as follows:

I can tell you, having done this for some 37 years, that card is essentially going to say, I have 

probable cause to believe you operated a vehicle while intoxicated and I must now offer you the 

opportunity to take a chemical test. Will you take a chemical test? If you fail to take the 

chemical test, your license can be suspended for one year or will be suspended for one year.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 18. In a quasi-civil proceeding such as probation revocation, “a clear and unequivocal 

admission of fact by an attorney is a judicial admission which is binding on the client.” Parker v. State, 676 

N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Similarly, here, where Davis sought judicial review and had the 

burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of the evidence, his counsel’s admission concerning the 

contents of the implied consent card could be considered binding on Davis.