[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Satterfield v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5023.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-5023

SATTERFIELD ET AL.; INTERMESSAGE COMMUNICATIONS, APPELLEE, v. 

AMERITECH MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ET AL.; CINCINNATI SMSA

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Satterfield v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., Slip 

Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5023.] 

Damages—Class actions—Attempted recovery under R.C. 4905.61 of treble 

damages from public utility based on prior order of the Public Utilities 

Commission—R.C. 4905.61 limits recovery of treble damages to the 

“person, firm, or corporation” directly injured as a result of the “violation, 

failure, or omission” found by the Public Utilities Commission.

(No. 2017-0684—Submitted July 18, 2018—Decided December 18, 2018) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 104211, 2017-Ohio-928. 

__________________ 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

KENNEDY, J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eighth District 

Court of Appeals, we consider the parameters established by R.C. 4905.61 

regarding the parties that have standing to bring a treble-damages action pursuant 

to that statute. Here, appellee, Intermessage Communications (“Intermessage”), 

and members of a proposed class of retail cellular-telephone-service subscribers 

seek to recover treble damages under R.C. 4905.61 for regulatory violations 

committed in the mid-1990s when those regulatory violations—as determined by 

the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”)—related to the wholesale 

cellular-service market. 

{¶ 2} Because the language of R.C. 4905.61 limits recovery of treble 

damages to the “person, firm, or corporation” directly injured as a result of the 

“violation, failure, or omission” found by the PUCO, we hold that Intermessage 

and the proposed class of retail cellular-service subscribers lack standing to bring 

an action pursuant to R.C. 4905.61. Moreover, because the resolution of the first 

proposition of law asserted by appellant, Cincinnati SMSA Limited Partnership 

(operating under the trade name Ameritech Mobile) (“Ameritech”), resolves this 

case, we decline to address Ameritech’s other proposition of law. We therefore 

reverse the judgment of the Eighth District and order the matter dismissed. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 3} The origins of the current action arose in October 1993, when 

Westside Cellular, Inc., d.b.a. Cellnet (“Cellnet”), filed a multicount complaint with 

the PUCO against Ameritech and other wholesale cellular-service providers. See 

In re Complaint of Westside Cellular, Inc. v. New Par Cos., Pub. Util. Comm. No. 

93-1758-RC-CSS, 2001 Ohio PUC LEXIS 18, *1-2, 96-100, 133-137, 230-233 

(Jan. 18, 2001) (“the Cellnet order”). We will focus on only the allegations against 

Ameritech and the resolution of those allegations in the Cellnet order because 
January Term, 2018 

3

Ameritech is the only wholesale cellular-service provider involved in the current 

dispute. 

{¶ 4} Cellnet, a cellular-telephone-service reseller, had purchased cellular 

service on a wholesale basis from Ameritech, rebranded the service, and marketed 

it on a retail basis. Westside Cellular, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 165, 

2002-Ohio-7119, 781 N.E.2d 199, ¶ 1. Cellnet alleged that Ameritech had engaged 

in rate discrimination against it. More specifically, Cellnet claimed that Ameritech 

had failed to offer cellular service, equipment, and features to Cellnet on a 

wholesale basis at the same rate Ameritech had charged its own retail businesses. 

Id.; see also the Cellnet order, 2001 Ohio PUC LEXIS 18 at *230-233. Cellnet also 

claimed that Ameritech had failed to maintain separate operations and records for 

its wholesale and retail businesses. Id. at *96-100. 

{¶ 5} In 2001, the PUCO issued the Cellnet order, finding that Ameritech 

had engaged in numerous practices that were prohibited by R.C. Chapter 4905. The 

PUCO found that Ameritech had failed to maintain its records in a manner that 

satisfied the PUCO’s overriding purpose to ensure that wholesale cellular-service 

providers were providing access on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. at *108-112. 

The PUCO further found that Ameritech had violated R.C. 4905.33 by charging 

Cellnet a higher rate than Ameritech’s retail affiliate paid for the same service under 

substantially the same circumstances and conditions. Id. at *151. 

{¶ 6} Ameritech appealed the findings of the PUCO in the Cellnet order as 

of right to this court. We affirmed. Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Pub. Util. 

Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 282, 2002-Ohio-7235, 781 N.E.2d 1012, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 7} Based upon the PUCO’s ruling regarding Ameritech’s activities in the 

wholesale cellular-service market, Intermessage and two other named plaintiffs 

who are no longer involved in this litigation—Cindy Satterfield and Cindy 

Satterfield, Inc., a.k.a. Highland Speech Services, Inc.—filed the instant classaction complaint against Ameritech and other parties in December 2003. Because 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

only the claims of Intermessage and the proposed class against Ameritech are at 

issue in this case as it comes to us, we will limit our discussion of the facts to those 

parties. 

{¶ 8} Intermessage was a retail purchaser of cellular-telephone service from 

Ameritech. It entered into contracts with Ameritech for cellular-telephone numbers 

and used the accompanying service to back up alarm systems that Intermessage 

sold to its customers. Intermessage paid Ameritech for the retail cellular service 

and then passed those costs on to its customers. 

{¶ 9} Intermessage initially sought to define the class as “all subscribers to 

Ameritech Mobile service from 1993-1998” and sought recovery under several 

different theories of relief, including under R.C. 4905.61. Intermessage claimed 

that the practices Ameritech had engaged in—practices for which the PUCO had 

already found Ameritech liable—included preventing cellular-service resellers 

from entering the Ohio market and from increasing the resellers’ market shares. 

Intermessage further alleged that these practices caused each member of the 

proposed class to pay more for cellular-telephone service than the retail market 

otherwise would have charged. 

{¶ 10} The trial court in 2006 and 2008 made several rulings that limited 

Intermessage’s class action against Ameritech to recovery only under R.C. 4905.61 

and only for the period October 18, 1993, through September 8, 1995. 

{¶ 11} The trial court eventually granted Intermessage’s motion for class 

certification, certifying a class under Civ.R. 23(A) and (B)(3) consisting of “all 

retail subscribers of [Ameritech] who purchased service with an Ohio area code 

within geographic areas in which the PUCO decision found wholesale price 

discrimination during the period October 18, 1993 through September 8, 1995” 

upon its finding that the statutory prerequisites for class certification had been 

satisfied. 
January Term, 2018 

5

{¶ 12} The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the 

trial court had not abused its discretion in certifying the class. 2017-Ohio-928, 86 

N.E.3d 830, ¶ 30. 

{¶ 13} We accepted the following two propositions of law: 

 A claimant lacks standing to sue under R.C. 4905.61 for 

“treble the amount of damages sustained in consequence of the 

violation” absent a prior determination by the Public Utilities 

Commission that the claimant’s rights under a specific public 

utilities statute or commission order were violated. 

 Where a plaintiff relies upon a damages model to establish 

that common issues would predominate, the model must 

demonstrate that injury-in-fact and damages can be proven on a 

class-wide basis. 

151 Ohio St.3d 1501, 2018-Ohio-365, 90 N.E.3d 945. 

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

{¶ 14} Ameritech contends that Intermessage’s class action cannot survive 

because the plain meaning of R.C. 4905.61 provides standing to sue only to those 

persons or entities whose rights the PUCO has expressly found were violated. In 

other words, Ameritech maintains that the statutory language unequivocally limits 

standing to persons or entities directly injured by the violations found by the PUCO. 

Ameritech asserts that there is no language in R.C. 4905.61 that authorizes a classaction lawsuit for indirect harms allegedly caused by a violation of the rights of 

some other person or entity. Intermessage counters that this court should not adopt 

Ameritech’s interpretation, because Ameritech seeks to have the court ignore the 

actual language of the statute—which gives standing to “the person * * * injured” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

by a violation—and Ameritech also seeks to have us insert the phrase “whose rights 

the PUCO expressly finds to have been violated” into the statute. 

ANALYSIS

{¶ 15} As set forth above, Ameritech’s first proposition of law asserts that 

a claimant lacks standing to bring an action under R.C. 4905.61 when the PUCO 

has never made a determination that that claimant’s rights under a specific statute 

or PUCO order were violated. Because the language of R.C. 4905.61 is controlling, 

we begin in a familiar place—the principles of statutory construction. 

{¶ 16} The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de 

novo. State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9. 

A court’s main objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. 

State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of 

Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 (1995). 

{¶ 17} The intent of the General Assembly must be determined primarily 

from the language of the statute itself. Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676 (1973). “When the statutory language is 

plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on 

what the General Assembly has said.” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 

Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. 

of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000). 

{¶ 18} “Where a statute defines terms used therein, such definition controls 

in the application of the statute * * *.” Good Samaritan Hosp. of Dayton v. 

Porterfield, 29 Ohio St.2d 25, 30, 278 N.E.2d 26 (1972), citing Terteling Bros., Inc. 

v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 236, 241, 85 N.E.2d 379 (1949), and Woman’s Internatl. 

Bowling Congress, Inc. v. Porterfield, 25 Ohio St.2d 271, 275, 267 N.E.2d 781 

(1971). Terms that are undefined in a statute are accorded their common, everyday 

meaning. R.C. 1.42. 

{¶ 19} The public-utility treble-damages statute, R.C. 4905.61, provides: 
January Term, 2018 

7

 If any public utility * * * does, or causes to be done, any act 

or thing prohibited by Chapters 4901., 4903., 4905., 4907., 4921., 

4923., and 4927. of the Revised Code, or declared to be unlawful, 

or omits to do any act or thing required by the provisions of those 

chapters, or by order of the public utilities commission, the public 

utility * * * is liable to the person, firm, or corporation injured 

thereby in treble the amount of damages sustained in consequence 

of the violation, failure, or omission. Any recovery under this 

section does not affect a recovery of the state for any penalty 

provided for in the chapters. 

{¶ 20} We have construed this provision to require that before a suit may 

be brought for treble damages, there must have been a prior declaration by the 

PUCO that the public utility violated one of the statutes enumerated within R.C. 

4905.61 or an order of the PUCO. Milligan v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 56 Ohio St.2d 

191, 194, 383 N.E.2d 575 (1978). With this understanding in mind, we turn to the 

question of the statute’s construction. 

{¶ 21} Ameritech’s argument focuses on the legislature’s use of the word 

“the”—instead of a word such as “a” or “any”—in the phrase “the person, firm, or 

corporation.” It contends that the General Assembly’s choice to use “the” to 

precede “person” demonstrates the legislative intent to confer standing only on 

those persons or entities whose rights the PUCO has expressly found were violated. 

However, this is not where our focus lies. Instead, resolution of this matter centers 

upon the phrases “injured thereby” and “in consequence of the violation, failure, or 

omission.” The General Assembly did not define “injure,” “thereby,” or 

“consequence” for purposes of R.C. 4905.61. Therefore, we first consider the 

dictionary definitions of these terms. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

{¶ 22} “Injure” is defined as “[t]o violate the legal right of another or inflict 

an actionable wrong.” Black’s Law Dictionary 785 (6th Ed.1990). “Thereby” is 

defined as “by that,” “by that means,” “in consequence of that,” “connected with 

that,” or “with reference to that.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

2372 (2002). “Consequence” is defined as “something that is produced by a cause 

or follows from a form of necessary connection or from a set of conditions” or “a 

natural or necessary result.” Id. at 482. 

{¶ 23} Applying these definitions, R.C. 4905.61 is susceptible of only one 

interpretation. “Thereby” and “in consequence of” express that the phrase “the 

person, firm, or corporation injured” specifically relates to the violation, failure, or 

omission declared by the PUCO. This reflects the General Assembly’s intention to 

limit the recovery of treble damages to only “the person, firm, or corporation” that 

was injured as a consequence of the violation declared by the PUCO. In other 

words, the ambit of “the person, firm, or corporation” that can bring a trebledamages action after legal rights have been violated depends on the terms of the 

PUCO’s finding or order declaring a violation. Therefore, to determine the persons 

or entities that have standing to bring a treble-damages action under the statute, the 

relevant order or finding of the PUCO must be examined. 

{¶ 24} In this matter, the violations found in the Cellnet order were related 

to Ameritech’s failure to maintain separate wholesale and retail operations and the 

corresponding discriminatory impact on nonaffiliated resellers. The PUCO stated 

in the Cellnet order that the duty to maintain separate operations was not solely 

owed to the PUCO but was necessary to protect unaffiliated resellers from 

discriminatory and anticompetitive conduct: 

“[I]t is necessary that Cellular licensees provide access to * * * 

cellular service pursuant to terms, conditions, and prices that are 

universally available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all customers, 
January Term, 2018 

9

affiliated and non-affiliated alike” in order to prevent frustration of 

the public policy respecting resale. 

(Emphasis added.) 2001 Ohio PUC LEXIS 18 at *112-113, quoting In re 

Commission’s Investigation into Implementation of Sections 4927.01 through 

4927.05, Revised Code, as They Relate to Competitive Telecommunications Servs., 

Pub. Util. Comm. No. 89-563-TP-COI, at 22 (Oct. 22, 1993). Moreover, the PUCO 

recognized the specific impact to Cellnet that resulted from Ameritech’s 

discriminatory practices: 

[T]he record clearly demonstrates that Cellnet was treated less 

favorably, at least in some cases, than Ameritech Mobile’s retail arm 

and, in some cases, retail customers. * * * [T]he Commission points 

to the comparisons provided relative to the terms, and conditions 

offered to Cellnet and those extended by Ameritech Mobile retail 

* * *. In addition, the Commission considers the comparison 

between the rates offered to Cellnet to the rates, terms, and 

conditions reflected in [certain] Cellnet Exhibits. * * * These 

differences exist despite the fact that [two of] the Commission’s 

* * * [past] orders [have] required that cellular licensees provide 

access pursuant to terms, conditions, and prices that are universally 

available on a nondiscriminatory basis. 

Id. at *145-146. 

{¶ 25} The Cellnet order reveals that pursuant to R.C. 4905.61, the parties 

injured by the violations—Ameritech’s discriminatory behavior—were 

nonaffiliated cellular-telephone-service resellers in the wholesale market, i.e., 

direct purchasers of wholesale cellular service from Ameritech. Intermessage was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

not a cellular-telephone-service reseller in the wholesale market. Intermessage was 

a purchaser of cellular service. It was a retail customer of Ameritech that purchased 

cellular service to back up its alarm systems, and any injuries it suffered were 

qualitatively different from those found in the Cellnet order, meaning that 

Intermessage’s injuries were indirect and remote. The fact that Intermessage 

simply passed those costs on to its customers does not make Intermessage a reseller 

in the wholesale market. Intermessage’s customers were not purchasing cellular 

service from Intermessage. Intermessage’s customers were purchasing an alarm 

system with backup features that relied on Ameritech’s cellular service. Therefore, 

Intermessage and the other retail customers of Ameritech in the proposed class that 

were similarly indirectly injured are unable to bring an action for treble damages 

pursuant to R.C. 4905.61 based upon the violations found in the Cellnet order. 

CONCLUSION

{¶ 26} Because the language of R.C. 4905.61 limits recovery of treble 

damages to the “person, firm, or corporation” directly injured as a result of the 

“violation, failure, or omission” found by the PUCO, we hold that Intermessage 

and members of the proposed class of retail cellular-service subscribers lack 

standing to bring an action pursuant to R.C. 4905.61. We therefore reverse the 

judgment of the court of appeals and order the trial court to dismiss this matter. 

Judgment reversed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and

DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 

_________________ 

Hahn, Loeser & Parks, L.L.P., Robert J. Fogarty, Dennis R. Rose, and 

Royce R. Remington; Gary, Naegele & Theado, L.L.C., and Thomas R. Theado; 

Randy J. Hart, L.L.P., and Randy J. Hart; Tricarichi & Carnes, L.L.C., and Carla 

M. Tricarichi; and Law Offices of Mark Griffin and Mark D. Griffin, for appellee. 
January Term, 2018 

11 

Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., Irene C. Keyse-Walker, and Benjamin C. Sassé; and 

Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., and James F. Lang, for appellant. 

Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, Drew Campbell, and Bryan 

Smeenk, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Counsel of Retail Merchants, Ohio 

Insurance Institute, Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice, and Ohio Association of Civil 

Trial Attorneys. 

Mac Murray & Shuster, L.L.P., Betty D. Montgomery, and Patrick W. 

Skilliter, urging reversal for amicus curiae Betty D. Montgomery, former Attorney 

General of Ohio. 

K&L Gates, L.L.P., and J. Nicholas Ranjan; and Donald T. Boyd, urging 

reversal for amici curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 

and Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 

Steven T. Nourse, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Power Company, 

d.b.a. AEP Ohio. 

Rocco O. D’Ascenzo, urging reversal for amicus curiae Duke Energy Ohio, 

Inc. 

Joshua R. Eckert, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Edison Company, 

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and Toledo Edison Company. 

Michael J. Schuler, urging reversal for amicus curiae Dayton Power and 

Light Company. 

_________________