2020 IL App (1st) 190910-U 

No. 1-19-0910 

Order filed March 17, 2020. 

Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ) Appeal from the 

as Trustee for Blue Water Investment Trust 2018-1, ) Circuit Court of 

successor in interest to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., ) Cook County. 

 ) 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

v. ) No. 2017 CH 16998 

 ) 

RITA Y. SHAH, a/k/a RITA SHAH, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

(Yogeshchandra Shah; Phoenix Reo, LLC; CitiBank ) The Honorable 

National Association, f/k/a CitiBank (South Dakota), N.A.; ) Patricia S. Spratt, 

and Unknown Owners and Non-Record Claimants, ) Judge Presiding. 

Defendants). ) 

JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Pucinski and Coghlan concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: In this mortgage foreclosure case, the circuit court neither erred in denying the 

property owner’s vacatur motion, nor in confirming the judicial sale. 
No. 1-19-0910 

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¶ 2 Plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust National Association (U.S. Bank), succeeded to this action 

under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Foreclosure Law) (735 ILCS 5/15-1101, et seq. 

(West 2016)), seeking foreclosure on property owned by defendant, Rita Shah. The circuit court 

entered summary judgment against Shah, as well as a judgment of foreclosure and sale, 

permitting U.S. Bank to sell the property. Shah later moved, unsuccessfully, for a vacation of 

those judgments under section 2-1301(e) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 

ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2016)). The property was sold at a judicial sale and the sale was 

confirmed. We affirm.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In late December 2017, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), filed a foreclosure 

complaint against Shah, after she defaulted on a loan obligation that was secured by a mortgage 

on her home, located at 1100 Porter Road in Park Ridge. Shah was served with process ten days 

later. Nevertheless, she waited nearly five months before filing her appearance and answer, 

which, notably, alleged no affirmative defenses to Wells Fargo’s complaint. 

¶ 5 Shortly thereafter, Wells Fargo filed motions for summary judgment and a judgment of 

foreclosure and sale against Shah. Wells Fargo filed and mailed Shah a notice of those motions 

on June 20, 2018. The notice indicated that the motions would be presented to the circuit court at 

a hearing on July 10, 2018. 

¶ 6 Following that hearing, the circuit court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary 

judgment and entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale against Shah. Meanwhile, U.S. Bank 

stepped into the shoes of Wells Fargo, having been assigned the mortgage for Shah’s property.1

 

1

U.S. Bank became the successor in interest on August 15, 2018. The record shows that the 

assignment was recorded with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds on August 16, 2018. 
No. 1-19-0910 

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¶ 7 About three months after the circuit court hearing, Shah filed a motion to vacate the

judgments against her, claiming they had been entered before she received notice of Wells 

Fargo’s motions for summary judgment and a judgment of foreclosure. We note, however, that

Shah is inconsistent in her claim as to when she received notice of Wells Fargo’s motions.2 In 

any event, the circuit court denied her motion, finding, albeit incorrectly, that a section 2-1301(e) 

motion was “improper at [the] current juncture of the matter.” 

¶ 8 Shah’s property was sold at a judicial sale to Wells Fargo, and the sale was confirmed on 

March 27, 2019. 

¶ 9 Shah now appeals, contending that the circuit court’s denial of her vacatur motion 

deprived her of due process because the underlying summary judgment and judgment of 

foreclosure had been entered before she received notice of Wells Fargo’s motions. For the same 

reasons, Shah contends that the court erred in confirming the sale because justice was otherwise 

not done. 

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Initially, we note that Shah has not included transcripts or a report of proceedings from 

any hearing below, or an appropriate alternative under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c), (d) 

(eff. July 1, 2017), such as a bystander’s report or an agreed statement of facts. As the appellant, 

Shah bears the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings below to 

support her claims of error, and any doubts arising from the record’s inadequacy are resolved 

against her. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Furthermore, in the absence of a 

2

Shah’s vacatur motion alleges that she received the notice on July 11, 2018, yet Shah’s affidavit 

attached to that motion contrarily alleges that she received it on July 12, 2018. Shah, still unsure, alleges 

in her appellate brief that she received the notice on July 11, 2018. 
No. 1-19-0910 

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complete record, we must presume that the circuit court acted in conformity with the law and had 

a sufficient factual basis for its ruling. Id. at 392. 

¶ 12 This first issue is whether Shah’s vacatur motion was timely. Section 2-1301(e) of the 

Code allows a party “to seek relief from any nonfinal order of default or default judgment or 

from a final default judgment within 30 days of its entry.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 12; see also 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) 

(West 2016)). Where, as here, the judgment of foreclosure does not contain a finding under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2018), then the order confirming the sale 

operates as the final and appealable order. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 12. Thus, a motion to 

vacate a foreclosure judgment brought before the order confirming the sale would be timely. Id. 

¶ 13 Because Shah filed her section 2-1301(e) motion in this case before the order confirming 

the sale was entered, it was timely. It is unclear, then, why the circuit court’s order contains a 

finding that her motion was “improper at [the] current juncture of the matter” and, as stated, 

Shah has not provided a report of proceedings containing the court’s oral explanation of its 

ruling. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). Nevertheless, we may affirm the lower court’s 

judgment on any basis supported by the record, regardless of whether the court relied on that 

basis or whether its reasoning was correct. Lake Environmental, Inc. v. Arnold, 2015 IL 118110, 

¶ 16. Also, we will not disturb the circuit court’s decision denying a motion to vacate absent an 

abuse of discretion. Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Madonia, 2011 IL App (1st) 103516, ¶ 8. 

¶ 14 With that in mind, we reject Shah’s entirely specious argument that the circuit court’s 

denial of her vacatur motion was in error because she did not receive timely notice of Wells 

Fargo’s motions for summary judgment and a judgment of foreclosure. We note, however, that 

Shah does not assert that the notice was improperly served and has failed to develop a legal 
No. 1-19-0910 

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argument in her appellate brief, asserting that proper service of a notice is determined by the 

recipient’s availability to receive it, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. 

May 25, 2018).3

 

¶ 15 In any event, Shah was timely served with the notice of Wells Fargo’s motions, 

regardless of when she received it. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12 (eff. July 1, 2017) provides 

that “[s]ervice by U.S. mail is complete four days after mailing.” As set forth above, Wells Fargo

mailed the notice to Shah on June 20, 2018.4 Therefore, service of the notice was complete on 

June 24, 2018. The fact that Shah did not personally receive the notice of Wells Fargo’s motions 

until after the hearing on them does not invalidate the service. 

¶ 16 To the extent Shah asserts that a “due process violation exists” notwithstanding Wells 

Fargo’s satisfaction of the notice requirements, she has again failed to provide a reasoned 

argument or citation to pertinent authority to support her claim of error. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 

341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018). Accordingly, we conclude that Shah’s due process rights in this 

case were not violated and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying her 

vacatur motion. 

¶ 17 Turning to Shah’s challenge to the circuit court’s order confirming the sale, section 15-

1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law provides that, upon a motion to confirm a judicial sale, the court 

must confirm the sale unless one of the four exceptions applies, including where “justice was 

3

To the extent Shah asserts, for the first time in her reply brief, that the notice of Wells Fargo’s 

motions was improper under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12 (eff. July 1, 2017), this issue is forfeited. See 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (stating that “[p]oints not argued are forfeited and shall not be 

raised in the reply brief); see also In re Marriage of Winter, 2013 IL App (1st) 112836, ¶ 29 (stating that 

an appellant’s arguments must be made in the opening brief and cannot be raised for the first time in the 

reply brief). 

4

Notably, Wells Fargo mailed the notice 20 days before the circuit court hearing was held on July 

10, 2018, in accordance with Cook County Circuit Court Rule 2.1(c)(i) (Aug. 21, 2000). 
No. 1-19-0910 

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otherwise not done.” See 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b)(iv) (West 2018); see also Deutsche Bank 

National Trust v. Cichosz, 2014 IL App (1st) 131387, ¶ 13. 

¶ 18 While the statute does not expressly define what constitutes injustice, courts have 

exercised discretion in refusing to confirm a judicial sale under the justice provision only where 

fraud or unfairness has been shown that is prejudicial to an interested party. See McCluskey, 

2013 IL 115469, ¶ 19. Additionally, the party opposing the sale bears the burden of proving that 

an exception exists. Cichosz, 2014 IL App (1st) 131387, ¶ 13. We will not disturb the circuit 

court’s decision to confirm a judicial sale absent an abuse of discretion. Id. 

¶ 19 Here, it was Shah’s burden to show that justice was otherwise not done and she fell 

manifestly short of fulfilling it. In addition to the fact that Shah has not provided any legal 

authority to support her claims of error (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018)), she has 

not shown, or even argued, the existence of fraud or unfairness, such that she was prejudiced by 

the confirmation of the sale. Instead, Shah has asserted an affirmative defense by arguing that 

Wells Fargo lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure action. Shah, however, has forfeited this 

issue, having failed to raise it before U.S. Bank moved to confirm the sale.5 See McCluskey, 

2013 IL 115469, ¶ 26 (stating that “[a]fter a motion to confirm the sale has been filed, it is not 

sufficient under section 15-1508(b)(iv) to merely raise a meritorious defense to the complaint”); 

see also Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Snick, 2011 IL App (3d) 100436, ¶ 9. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the sale. 

¶ 20 CONCLUSION

¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 

¶ 22 Affirmed.

5

Shah first asserted the defense of standing on March 6, 2019, more than three months after U.S. 

Bank’s motion to confirm the sale had been filed.