J-A24010-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KINGSLEY CHIN 

Appellant

v.

KIM WALKER-CHIN

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:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 641 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 191201586

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 17, 2022

Kingsley Chin appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his motion to strike a judgment. After 

our careful review, we affirm on the well-reasoned opinion authored by the 

Honorable Joshua H. Roberts. 

Judge Roberts set forth the relevant factual and procedural history of 

this matter as follows:

[T]his case has had a lengthy and contentious history in the Family 

Court Division and on appeal to the Superior Court.

[] Chin and [] Walker-Chin reached a divorce settlement on or 

about September 5, 2008. Since April 2014, the parties have been 

engaged in on-again[,] off-again enforcement and contempt 

proceedings in the Family Court Division related to the divorce 

settlement. [The Honorable Holly J.] Ford presided over the 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A24010-21

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proceedings that ultimately resulted in the judgment that [] 

Walker-Chin transferred to the civil judgment index. 

On June 29, 2018, Judge Ford granted [] Walker-Chin’s motion to 

enforce property settlement. On April 18, 2019, Judge Ford 

entered an order finding [] Chin in contempt for his failure to 

comply with her June 29, 2018 order. In her April 18, 2019 order, 

Judge Ford specifically stated “[a] judgment shall be entered on 

the $1,238,164.46 due to [Walker-Chin,] plus post-judgment 

interest of 6% in accordance with the statute. Execution of the 

judgment may commence immediately.” Further, Judge Ford 

stated that “[Chin] is ordered to pay [Walker-Chin’s] additional 

attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $3,000.00 

regarding this respective petition, within thirty (30) days of the 

date of this order.” 

[] Chin appealed Judge Ford’s order to the Superior Court, which 

resulted in a recalculation of the amounts due. In an order dated 

June 27, 2019, Judge Ford noted that the applicable interest rate 

on the stipulated debt should have been calculated at 4.5%, and 

not 6%.

On December 10, 2019, [] Walker-Chin, through counsel, filed a 

praecipe to transfer and index the judgment against [] Chin with 

the Office of Judicial Records in the amount of $1,222,426.16[,] 

plus 4.5% post-judgment interest.

* * *

[Chin] filed a motion to strike the judgment, which, because the 

judgment had been docketed on the civil judgment index, was 

assigned to this court for disposition. Following briefing by both 

parties and oral argument, this court denied [] Chin’s motion to 

strike on February 17, 2021. [] Chin filed this timely appeal. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted; 

paragraphs reordered for clarity).

Chin raises the following claims for our review:

1. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying [Chin’s] motion to 

strike praecipe to transfer and index judgment and strike/vacate 

any judgment entered thereon (“Motion to Strike”) where 

[Walker-Chin] filed a “Praecipe to Transfer and Index Judgment” 
J-A24010-21

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(“Praecipe”) and the Philadelphia Office of Judicial Records (“Office 

of Judicial Records”) entered judgment thereon without the 

authority of any rule or statute?

2. Whether the [trial] court erred in not striking the Praecipe and 

judgment entered thereon due to Walker-Chin’s violations of 

Philadelphia Family Division Administrative Regulation 97-1 

(“Admin. Reg. 97-1”) (impounding Family Division Records and 

barring disclosure of same absent order permitting disclosure), 

which violations justified striking Walker-Chin’s Praecipe attaching 

impounded records of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas

Family Division (the “Family Division”), and the judgment entered 

upon such Praecipe?

3. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying the Motion to Strike, 

thereby permitting an intra-county, interdivisional transfer of four 

Family Division orders . . . to the Philadelphia Court of Common 

Pleas Civil Division (the “Civil Division”) without any authority for 

the transfer?

4. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying the Motion to Strike, 

which motion asserted that the Civil Division lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over [the] four Family Division orders that WalkerChin transferred to the Civil Division, where the four orders

transferred to the Civil Division arose exclusively from a domestic 

relations matter, over which the Civil Division lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction?

5. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying the Motion to Strike, 

which motion asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction over [Chin] 

in the civil action Walker-Chin initiated by filing the Praecipe . . ., 

where the undisputed record reflects that [Chin] did not reside in 

Pennsylvania, had no property in Pennsylvania, and conducted no 

business in Pennsylvania at the time that Walker-Chin 

impermissibly transferred four Family Division orders to the Civil 

Division and entered judgment thereon in the Civil Division?

6. Whether the [trial] court erred in applying a discretionary 

standard in connection with denying [Chin’s] Motion to Strike, 

where the Motion to Strike did not implicate the discretion of the 

[trial] court, but rather questions of law?

Brief of Appellant, at 5-7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

“A petition to strike a judgment operates as a demurrer to the 

record and must be granted whenever some fatal defect appears 
J-A24010-21

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on the face of the record.” First Union Nat. Bank v. Portside 

Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 827 A.2d 1224, 1227 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (quoting PNC Bank v. Bolus, [] 655 A.2d 997, 999 ([Pa. 

Super.] 1995)). “When deciding if there are fatal defects on the 

face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a 

judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record when 

the judgment was entered.” Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning 

Servs., Inc., [] 700 A.2d 915, 917 ([Pa.] 1997) (citing Linett v. 

Linett, [] 254 A.2d 7, 10 ([Pa.] 1969)). “Importantly, a petition 

to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the allegations of 

a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that 

affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the petitioner, 

as a matter of law, to relief.” City of Philadelphia v. David J. 

Lane Advertising, 33 A.3d 674, 677 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citing

First Union Nat’l Bank, 827 A.2d at 1227). Importantly, “[a] 

petition to strike does not involve the discretion of the [trial] 

court.” Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 919 (citing Dubrey v. 

Izaguirre, [] 685 A.2d 1391, 1393 ([Pa. Super. 1996)).

Oswald v. WB Pub. Square Associates, LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 793–94 (Pa. 

Super. 2013).

Section 2731 of the Judicial Code provides that “[i]n the first judicial 

district there shall be one prothonotary for the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County and the Philadelphia Municipal Court, who shall be known 

as the ‘Prothonotary of Philadelphia.’” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731. The office of the 

prothonotary has the power and duty to . . . enter all civil judgments[.]” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2737(3) (emphasis added). “The prothonotary shall 

immediately enter in the judgment index . . . a judgment, whether entered by 

the court, on order of court or on praecipe of a party.” Pa.R.C.P. 3021

(emphasis added). “[J]udgment means a judgment, order[,] or decree 

requiring the payment of money entered in any court which is subject to 

these rules, including a final or interlocutory order for payment of costs, 
J-A24010-21

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except a judgment against the Commonwealth or a political subdivision.” 

Pa.R.C.P. 3020 (emphasis added). 

Finally, section 4303(a) of the Judicial Code provides as follows:

(a) Real property.--Any judgment or other order of a court of 

common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien upon 

real property on the conditions, to the extent and with the priority 

provided by statute or prescribed by general rule adopted 

pursuant to section 1722(b) (relating to enforcement and effect 

of orders and process) when it is entered of record in the 

office of the clerk of the court of common pleas of the county 

where the real property is situated, or in the office of the clerk of 

the branch of the court of common pleas embracing such county.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(a) (emphasis added).

Here, we have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, and 

the thorough and well-written opinion authored by Judge Roberts. We agree 

with Judge Roberts that: (1) Judge Ford entered a valid, enforceable 

judgment against Chin pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(e)(1) (granting court 

authority to enter judgment where party fails to comply with equitable 

distribution order); (2) the judgment index for the Philadelphia Court of 

Common Pleas as a whole is maintained by the Office of Judicial Records 

(formerly Office of the Prothonotary), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2737(3); (3) there 

is no fatal defect on the face of the record that would affect the validity of the 

judgment, see Oswald, supra; and (4) at all times, the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia maintained personal jurisdiction over Chin and subject 

matter jurisdiction over the matter giving rise to the judgment in question.

See Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 4-10.
J-A24010-21

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We further conclude that Philadelphia Family Court Administrative 

Regulation 97-1 does not act as a bar to the indexing, by praecipe of a party, 

of a duly entered judgment, issued by a Family Court judge, on the sole 

judgment index maintained in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. It is 

apparent that the purpose of Administrative Regulation 97-1 is to prevent the 

dissemination of the type of sensitive, personal, financial, and/or confidential 

information that is inherent to domestic relations and other matters heard 

before the Family Court. Here, the judgment in question contains no sensitive 

information of the type contemplated by Administrative Regulation 97-1. 

Rather, it simply evidences the debt owed by Chin as a result of the judgment 

entered by Judge Ford. In this way, it is no different than any other judgment 

entered in a civil matter.

Because the trial court did not err as a matter of law, Oswald, supra, 

we affirm the order denying Chin’s motion to strike the judgment. The parties 

are instructed to attach a copy of Judge Roberts’ opinion in the event of further 

proceedings. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/17/2022
Circulated 04/28/2022 08:11 AM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

TRIAL DIVISION  CIVIL 

KINGSLEY CHIN Superior Court Docket: 

Plaintiff 641 EDA 2021 

V. Trial Court Docket: 

KIM WALKER-CHIN December Term 2019 

No. 1586 

Defendant 

1925(a) OPINION  

The matter before this Court originated as a domestic relations case in the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Family Court Division. In the Family Court 

Division, Judge Holly J. Ford considered a series of escalating enforcement and 

contempt motions filed by the parties, which culminated in Judge Ford entering 

judgment against Plaintiff Kingsley Chin ("Mr. Chin") and in favor Defendant Kim 

Walker-Chin ("Ms. Walker-Chin"). 

On December 10, 2019, Ms. Walker-Chin, through counsel, filed the 

appropriate papers to have the judgment transferred from the Family Court 

Division and entered on the civil judgment index maintained by the Office of 

Judicial Records in Philadelphia. 

Mr. Chin filed a Motion to Strike the judgment, which, because the judgment 

had been docketed on the civil judgment index, was assigned to this Court for 

disposition. Following briefing by both parties and oral argument, this Court 

OPFLD-Chin Vs Walker-Chin 

1 ÿýIINVIIVÿýIMIIIÿýINIÿý 

19120158600025 

Circulated 04/2802022 0811 AM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

TRIAL DIVISION - CIVIL 

KINGSLEY CHIN 

Plaintiff 

KIM WALKER-CHIN 

Defendant 

Superior Court Docket: 

641 EDA 2021 ; ' • ' ,,. 

- 

c 

Trial Court Docket: • c 

2 

G ' December Term 2019 • 

No. 1586 > 

, 2 

- ' • c 

• 

19256a) OPINION 

The matter before this Court originated as a domestic relations case in the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Family Court Division. In the Family Court 

Division, Judge Holly J. Ford considered a series of escalating enforcement and 

contempt motions filed by the parties, which culminated in Judge Ford entering 

judgment against Plaintiff Kingsley Chin ("Mr. Chin") and in favor Defendant Kim 

Walker-Chin ("Ms. Walker-Chin"). 

On December 10, 2019, Ms. Walker-Chin, through counsel, filed the 

appropriate papers to have the judgment transferred from the Family Court 

Division and entered on the civil judgment index maintained by the Offi ce of 

Judicial Records in Philadelphia. 

Mr. Chin filed a Motion to Strike the judgment, which, because the judgment 

had been docketed on the civil judgment index, was assigned to this Court for 

disposition. Following briefing by both parties and oral argument, this Court 

OPFLD-Chin Vs Walker-Chin 

I III AI IL 

19120158600025 

Circulated 04/2802022 0811 AM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

TRIAL DIVISION - CIVIL 

KINGSLEY CHIN 

Plaintiff 

KIM WALKER-CHIN 

Defendant 

Superior Court Docket: 

641 EDA 2021 ; ' • ' ,,. 

- 

c 

Trial Court Docket: • c 

2 

G ' December Term 2019 • 

No. 1586 > 

, 2 

- ' • c 

• 

19256a) OPINION 

The matter before this Court originated as a domestic relations case in the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Family Court Division. In the Family Court 

Division, Judge Holly J. Ford considered a series of escalating enforcement and 

contempt motions filed by the parties, which culminated in Judge Ford entering 

judgment against Plaintiff Kingsley Chin ("Mr. Chin") and in favor Defendant Kim 

Walker-Chin ("Ms. Walker-Chin"). 

On December 10, 2019, Ms. Walker-Chin, through counsel, filed the 

appropriate papers to have the judgment transferred from the Family Court 

Division and entered on the civil judgment index maintained by the Offi ce of 

Judicial Records in Philadelphia. 

Mr. Chin filed a Motion to Strike the judgment, which, because the judgment 

had been docketed on the civil judgment index, was assigned to this Court for 

disposition. Following briefing by both parties and oral argument, this Court 

OPFLD-Chin Vs Walker-Chin 

I III AI IL 

19120158600025 
denied Mr. Chin's motion to strike on February 17, 2021. Mr. Chin filed this timely 

appeal. 

On appeal, Mr. Chin complains this Court erred in denying the motion to 

strike because (1) the judgment was not transferrable from the Family Court 

Division to the Civil Division; (2) the transfer of the judgment violated Family 

Division Administrative Regulation 97-1 because documents ordinarily maintained 

under seal in the Family Court were transferred and filed of record in the Civil 

Division; (3) this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (4) this Court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over Mr. Chin; (5) the Court improperly considered Ms. 

Walker-Chin's equitable arguments in denying the motion to strike; and (6) this 

Court improperly considered facts outside the face of the record. 

Upon reviewing the procedural history and the petition, this Court concluded 

that the judgment had been properly transferred to the civil judgment index, and 

this Court had jurisdiction over Mr. Chin. Thus, this Court's denial of the petition 

to strike was proper and this Court's Order should be affirmed. 

A. Procedural and Factual Background 

It is clear from the briefs and this Court's review of Judge Ford's Orders 

attached to those briefs that this case has had a lengthy and contentious history in 

the Family Court Division and on appeal to the Superior Court (Family Court 

Docket No. D07038460, Superior Court docket No. 2118 EDA 2018). 

Mr. Chin and Ms. Walker-Chin reached a divorce settlement on or about 

September 5, 2008. Since April 2014, the parties have been engaged in on-again off2 

denied Mr Chin's motion to strike on February 17, 2021. Mr. Chin filed this timely 

appeal. 

On appeal, Mr. Chin complains this Court erred in denying the motion to 

strike because (1) the judgment was not transferrable from the Family Court 

Division to the Civil Division; (2) the transfer of the judgment violated Family 

Division Administrative Regulation 97-1 because documents ordinarily maintained 

under seal in the Family Court were transferred and filed of record in the Civil 

Division; (3) this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (4) this Court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over Mr. Chin; (5) the Court improperly considered Ms. 

Walker-Chin's equitable arguments in denying the motion to strike; and (6) this 

Court improperly considered facts outside the face of the record. 

Upon reviewing the procedural history and the petition, this Court concluded 

that the judgment had been properly transferred to the civil judgment index, and 

this Court had jurisdiction over Mr. Chin. Thus, this Court's denial of the petition 

to strike was proper and this Court's Order should be affirmed. 

A. Procedural and Factual Background 

It is clear from the briefs and this Court's review of Judge Ford's Orders 

attached to those briefs that this case has had a lengthy and contentious history in 

the Family Court Division and on appeal to the Superior Court (Family Court 

Docket No. D07038460, Superior Court docket No. 2118 EDA 2018). 

Mr Chin and Ms. Walker-Chin reached a divorce settlement on or about 

September 5, 2008. Since April 2014, the parties have been engaged in on-again off2 

denied Mr Chin's motion to strike on February 17, 2021. Mr. Chin filed this timely 

appeal. 

On appeal, Mr. Chin complains this Court erred in denying the motion to 

strike because (1) the judgment was not transferrable from the Family Court 

Division to the Civil Division; (2) the transfer of the judgment violated Family 

Division Administrative Regulation 97-1 because documents ordinarily maintained 

under seal in the Family Court were transferred and filed of record in the Civil 

Division; (3) this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (4) this Court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over Mr. Chin; (5) the Court improperly considered Ms. 

Walker-Chin's equitable arguments in denying the motion to strike; and (6) this 

Court improperly considered facts outside the face of the record. 

Upon reviewing the procedural history and the petition, this Court concluded 

that the judgment had been properly transferred to the civil judgment index, and 

this Court had jurisdiction over Mr. Chin. Thus, this Court's denial of the petition 

to strike was proper and this Court's Order should be affirmed. 

A. Procedural and Factual Background 

It is clear from the briefs and this Court's review of Judge Ford's Orders 

attached to those briefs that this case has had a lengthy and contentious history in 

the Family Court Division and on appeal to the Superior Court (Family Court 

Docket No. D07038460, Superior Court docket No. 2118 EDA 2018). 

Mr Chin and Ms. Walker-Chin reached a divorce settlement on or about 

September 5, 2008. Since April 2014, the parties have been engaged in on-again off2 
again enforcement and contempt proceedings in the Family Court Division related 

to the divorce settlement. Judge Ford presided over the proceedings that ultimately 

resulted in the judgment that Ms. Walker-Chin transferred to the civil judgment 

index. 

On June 29, 2018, Judge Ford granted Ms. Walker-Chin's motion to enforce 

property settlement. On April 18, 2019, Judge Ford entered an Order finding Mr. 

Chin in contempt for his failure to comply with her June 29, 2018 Order. In her 

April 18, 2019 Order, Judge Ford specifically stated "A judgment shall be entered 

on the $1,238,164.46 due to wife plus post-judgment interest of 6% in accordance 

with the statute. Execution of judgment may commence immediately." Further, 

Judge Ford stated that "Husband is ordered to pay wife's additional attorney's fees 

and expenses in the amount of $3,000.00 regarding this respective petition, within 

thirty (30) days of the date of this Order." 

Mr. Chin appealed Judge Ford's Order to the Superior Court, which resulted 

in a recalculation of the amounts due. In an Order dated June 27, 2019, Judge Ford 

noted that the applicable interest rate on the stipulated debt should have been 

calculated at 4.5%, and not 6.0%. 

On December 10, 2019, Ms. Walker-Chin, through counsel, filed a praecipe to 

transfer and index the judgment against Mr. Chin with the Office of Judicial 

Records in the amount of $1,222,426.16 plus 4.5% post-judgment interest. 

Ms. Chin's Petition to Strike the judgment followed, which eventually led to 

this appeal. 

3 

again enforcement and contempt proceedings in the Family Court Division related 

to the divorce settlement. Judge Ford presided over the proceedings that ultimately 

resulted in the judgment that Ms. Walker-Chin transferred to the civil judgment 

index. 

On June 29, 2018, Judge Ford granted Ms. Walker-Chin's motion to enforce 

property settlement. On April 18, 2019, Judge Ford entered an Order finding Mr. 

Chin in contempt for his failure to comply with her June 29, 2018 Order. In her 

April 18, 2019 Order, Judge Ford specifically stated "A judgment shall be entered 

on the $1,238,164.46 due to wife plus post-judgment interest of 6% in accordance 

with the statute. Execution of judgment may commence immediately." Further, 

Judge Ford stated that "Husband is ordered to pay wife's additional attorney's fees 

and expenses in the amount of $3,000.00 regarding this respective petition, within 

thirty (30) days of the date of this Order." 

Mr. Chin appealed Judge Ford's Order to the Superior Court, which resulted 

in a recalculation of the amounts due. In an Order dated June 27, 2019, Judge Ford 

noted that the applicable interest rate on the stipulated debt should have been 

calculated at 4.5%, and not 6.0%, 

On December 10, 2019, Ms. Walker-Chin, through counsel, filed a praecipe to 

transfer and index the judgment against Mr. Chin with the Office of Judicial 

Records in the amount of $1,222,426.16 plus 4.5% post-judgment interest. 

Ms. Chin's Petition to Strike the judgment followed, which eventually led to 

this appeal 

3 

again enforcement and contempt proceedings in the Family Court Division related 

to the divorce settlement. Judge Ford presided over the proceedings that ultimately 

resulted in the judgment that Ms. Walker-Chin transferred to the civil judgment 

index. 

On June 29, 2018, Judge Ford granted Ms. Walker-Chin's motion to enforce 

property settlement. On April 18, 2019, Judge Ford entered an Order finding Mr. 

Chin in contempt for his failure to comply with her June 29, 2018 Order. In her 

April 18, 2019 Order, Judge Ford specifically stated "A judgment shall be entered 

on the $1,238,164.46 due to wife plus post-judgment interest of 6% in accordance 

with the statute. Execution of judgment may commence immediately." Further, 

Judge Ford stated that "Husband is ordered to pay wife's additional attorney's fees 

and expenses in the amount of $3,000.00 regarding this respective petition, within 

thirty (30) days of the date of this Order." 

Mr. Chin appealed Judge Ford's Order to the Superior Court, which resulted 

in a recalculation of the amounts due. In an Order dated June 27, 2019, Judge Ford 

noted that the applicable interest rate on the stipulated debt should have been 

calculated at 4.5%, and not 6.0%, 

On December 10, 2019, Ms. Walker-Chin, through counsel, filed a praecipe to 

transfer and index the judgment against Mr. Chin with the Offi ce of Judicial 

Records in the amount of $1,222,426.16 plus 4.5% post-judgment interest. 

Ms. Chin's Petition to Strike the judgment followed, which eventually led to 

this appeal 

3 
B. Standard of Review 

Mr. Chin contends that the judgment was improperly transferred from the 

Family Court Division to the civil judgment index. 

"A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which operates 

as a demurrer to the record." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Copley Qu- WayneAssocs, 

683 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. 1996). A motion to strike is appropriate if the judgment that 

was entered contains a fatal defect or irregularity apparent from the face of the 

record and, as a result, the prothonotary lacked authority to enter the judgment. Id. 

The denial of a petition to strike a judgment is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion or error of law. Vogt v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). An abuse of discretion in this context means that this Court, in 

reaching its conclusion, exercised its judgment in a manifestly unreasonable 

manner, or demonstrated partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the 

evidence or the record. Smith v. Morrell Beer Distributors, Inc., 29 A.3d 23, 25 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

C. The Judgment Was Properly Transferred 

Judge Ford entered a valid enforceable judgment on the docket. Pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e)(1): 

If, at any time, a party has failed to comply with an order 

of equitable distribution, as provided for in this chapter or 

with the terms of an agreement as entered into between 

the parties, after hearing, the court may, in addition to 

any other remedy available under this part, in order to 

effect compliance with its order: 

(1) enter judgment; ... 

4 

B. Standard of Review 

Mr. Chin contends that the judgment was improperly transferred from the 

Family Court Division to the civil judgment index. 

A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which operates 

as a demurrer to the record." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne Assocs, 

683 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. 1996). A motion to strike is appropriate if the judgment that 

was entered contains a fatal defect or irregularity apparent from the face of the 

record and, as a result, the prothonotary lacked authority to enter the judgment. Id 

The denial of a petition to strike a judgment is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion or error of law. Vogt v. Liberty Muut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). An abuse of discretion in this context means that this Court, in 

reaching its conclusion, exercised its judgment in a manifestly unreasonable 

manner, or demonstrated partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the 

evidence or the record. Smith v. Morrell Beer Distributors, Ine., 29 A.3d 23, 25 (Pa. 

Super 2011) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

C. The Judgment Was Properly Transferred 

Judge Ford entered a valid enforceable judgment on the docket. Pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e)(l) 

If, at any time, a party has failed to comply with an order 

of equitable distribution, as provided for in this chapter or 

with the terms of an agreement as entered into between 

the parties, after hearing, the court may, in addition to 

any other remedy available under this part, in order to 

effect compliance with its order: 

(1) enter judgment; . 

4 

B. Standard of Review 

Mr. Chin contends that the judgment was improperly transferred from the 

Family Court Division to the civil judgment index. 

A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which operates 

as a demurrer to the record." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne Assocs, 

683 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. 1996). A motion to strike is appropriate if the judgment that 

was entered contains a fatal defect or irregularity apparent from the face of the 

record and, as a result, the prothonotary lacked authority to enter the judgment. Id 

The denial of a petition to strike a judgment is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion or error of law. Vogt v. Liberty Muut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). An abuse of discretion in this context means that this Court, in 

reaching its conclusion, exercised its judgment in a manifestly unreasonable 

manner, or demonstrated partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the 

evidence or the record. Smith v. Morrell Beer Distributors, Ine., 29 A.3d 23, 25 (Pa. 

Super 2011) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

C. The Judgment Was Properly Transferred 

Judge Ford entered a valid enforceable judgment on the docket. Pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e)(l) 

If, at any time, a party has failed to comply with an order 

of equitable distribution, as provided for in this chapter or 

with the terms of an agreement as entered into between 

the parties, after hearing, the court may, in addition to 

any other remedy available under this part, in order to 

effect compliance with its order: 

(1) enter judgment; . 

4 
Thus, pursuant to Section 3502(e)(1), Judge Ford was empowered to enter 

judgment against Mr. Chin. "The judgment represents a binding judicial 

determination of the rights and duties between the parties, and establishes their 

debtor-creditor relationship for all the world to notice when the judgment is 

recorded in a Prothonotary's Office. When entered of record, the judgment also 

operates as a lien upon all real property of the debtor in that county." In re Upset 

Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks County, 479 A.2d 940, 943 (Pa. 1984). 

Thus, in order to effectuate the purpose of Judge Ford's judgment, Ms. 

Walker-Chin was then permitted to transfer the judgment to the civil judgment 

index. See, e.g., Mid-State Bank & Trust Co. v. Globalnet Intl, Inc., 710 A.2d 1187, 

1192-94 (Pa. Super. 1998) (recognizing validity of lien or judgment pursuant to 

section 3502 docketed in civil judgment index). Mr. Chin argues, without any 

support, that the judgment was not transferable to the civil judgment docket index. 

Mr. Chin similarly does not cite to any authority in any statute or rule providing for 

a special "family court division" judgment index that would accomplish the same 

purpose as the civil judgment index. 

Instead, the maintenance by the Prothonotary (or Office of Judicial Records) 

of a single common pleas judgment docket or index dates back well over 150 years. 

See, e.g., Coral Gables, Inc. v. Kerl, 6 A.2d 275, 276 (Pa. 1939); Russeck v. Shapiro, 

84 A.2d 514, 515 (Pa. Super. 1951) (citing Act of March 29, 1827, P.L. 154, section 3, 

17 P.S. § 1903, and Act of April 22, 1856, P.L. 532, section 3, 17 P.S. § 1922). The 

5 

Thus, pursuant to Section 3502(e)(1), Judge Ford was empowered to enter 

judgment against Mr Chin. "The judgment represents a binding judicial 

determination of the rights and duties between the parties, and establishes their 

debtor-creditor relationship for all the world to notice when the judgment is 

recorded in a Prothonotary's Office. When entered of record, the judgment also 

operates as a lien upon all real property of the debtor in that county." In re Upset 

Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks County, 479 A.2d 940, 943 (Pa. 1984). 

Thus, in order to effectuate the purpose of Judge Ford's judgment, Ms. 

Walker-Chin was then permitted to transfer the judgment to the civil judgment 

index. See, e.g., Mid-State Bank & Trust Co. v. Globalnet Int'l, Inc., 710 A.2d 1187, 

1192-94 (Pa. Super. 1998) (recognizing validity of lien or judgment pursuant to 

section 3502 docketed in civil judgment index). Mr. Chin argues, without any 

support, that the judgment was not transferable to the civil judgment docket index. 

Mr. Chin similarly does not cite to any authority in any statute or rule providing for 

a special "family court division"judgment index that would accomplish the same 

purpose as the civil judgment index. 

Instead, the maintenance by the Prothonotary (or Office of Judicial Records) 

of a single common pleas judgment docket or index dates back well over 150 years. 

See, e.g., Coral Gables, Inc. v. Kerl, 6 A.2d 275, 276 (Pa. 1939); Russeck v. Shapiro, 

84A.2d 514, 515 (Pa. Super. 1951) (citing Act of March 29, 1827, P.L. 154, section 3, 

17PS. $ 1903, and Aet of April 22, 1856, P.L. 532, section 3, 17P.S. $ 1922). The 

5 

Thus, pursuant to Section 3502(e)(1), Judge Ford was empowered to enter 

judgment against Mr Chin. "The judgment represents a binding judicial 

determination of the rights and duties between the parties, and establishes their 

debtor-creditor relationship for all the world to notice when the judgment is 

recorded in a Prothonotary's Offi ce. When entered of record, the judgment also 

operates as a lien upon all real property of the debtor in that county." In re Upset 

Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks County, 479 A.2d 940, 943 (Pa. 1984). 

Thus, in order to effectuate the purpose of Judge Ford's judgment, Ms. 

Walker-Chin was then permitted to transfer the judgment to the civil judgment 

index. See, e.g., Mid-State Bank & Trust Co. v. Globalnet Int'l, Inc., 710 A.2d 1187, 

1192-94 (Pa. Super. 1998) (recognizing validity of lien or judgment pursuant to 

section 3502 docketed in civil judgment index). Mr. Chin argues, without any 

support, that the judgment was not transferable to the civil judgment docket index. 

Mr. Chin similarly does not cite to any authority in any statute or rule providing for 

a special "family court division"judgment index that would accomplish the same 

purpose as the civil judgment index. 

Instead, the maintenance by the Prothonotary (or Offi ce of Judicial Records) 

of a single common pleas judgment docket or index dates back well over 150 years. 

See, e.g., Coral Gables, Inc. v. Kerl, 6 A.2d 275, 276 (Pa. 1939); Russeck v. Shapiro, 

84A.2d 514, 515 (Pa. Super. 1951) (citing Act of March 29, 1827, P.L. 154, section 3, 

17PS. $ 1903, and Aet of April 22, 1856, P.L. 532, section 3, 17P.S. $ 1922). The 

5 
purpose of such an index is to provide notice to purchasers, subsequent 

encumbrancers, and others in interest. Coral Gables, 6 A.2d at 276. 

The current version of the judgment index statute, 42 Pa. C.S. § 4303(a), 

provides 

(a) Real property. Any judgment or other order of a court 

of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien 

upon real property on the conditions, to the extent and 

with the priority provided by statute or prescribed by 

general rule adopted pursuant to section 1722(b) (relating 

to enforcement and effect of orders and process) when it is 

entered of record in the office of the clerk of the court of 

common pleas of the county where the real property is 

situated, or in the office of the clerk of the branch of the 

court of common pleas embracing such county. 

(b) Order of court as lien. Any other order of a court of 

common pleas shall be a lien upon real and personal 

property situated within any county embraced within the 

judicial district on the conditions, to the extent and with 

the priority provided by statute or prescribed by general 

rule adopted pursuant to section 1722(b). 

(c) Transfer of domestic judgments and orders. An order 

of any court of this Commonwealth which is a lien on real 

or personal property situated within any county of this 

Commonwealth pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) shall be 

a lien upon real or personal property situated within any 

other county to the same extent as if resulting from an 

order of the court of common pleas of such other county 

upon compliance with such transfer and filing procedures 

as may be prescribed by general rule. 

The language in section (a) is clear and unequivocal: "[a]ny judgment or other 

order of a court of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien upon real 

property on the conditions ...." The statute does not delineate between common 

pleas divisions. It applies to any judgment entered in the court of common pleas. 

6 

purpose of such an index is to provide notice to purchasers, subsequent 

encumbrancers, and others in interest. Coral Gables, 6 A.2d at 276. 

The current version of the judgment index statute, 42 Pa. C.S. $ 4303(a), 

provides 

(a) Real property. Any judgment or other order of a court 

of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien 

upon real property on the conditions, to the extent and 

with the priority provided by statute or prescribed by 

general rule adopted pursuant to section 1722() (relating 

to enforcement and effect of orders and process) when it is 

entered of record mn the office of the clerk of the court of 

common pleas of the county where the real property is 

situated, or in the office of the clerk of the branch of the 

court of common pleas embracing such county. 

(b) Order of court as lien. Any other order of a court of 

common pleas shall be a lien upon real and personal 

property situated within any county embraced within the 

judicial district on the conditions, to the extent and with 

the priority provided by statute or prescribed by general 

rule adopted pursuant to section 1722(). 

(c) Transfer of domestic judgments and orders. An order 

of any court of this Commonwealth which is a lien on real 

or personal property situated within any county of this 

Commonwealth pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) shall be 

a lien upon real or personal property situated within any 

other county to the same extent as if resulting from an 

order of the court of common pleas of such other county 

upon compliance with such transfer and filing procedures 

as may be prescribed by general rule. 

The language in section (a) is clear and unequivocal: "[a]ny judgment or other 

order of a court of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien upon real 

property on the conditions ..," The statute does not delineate between common 

pleas divisions. It applies to any judgment entered in the court of common pleas. 

6 

purpose of such an index is to provide notice to purchasers, subsequent 

encumbrancers, and others in interest. Coral Gables, 6 A.2d at 276. 

The current version of the judgment index statute, 42 Pa. C.S. $ 4303(a), 

provides 

(a) Real property. Any judgment or other order of a court 

of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien 

upon real property on the conditions, to the extent and 

with the priority provided by statute or prescribed by 

general rule adopted pursuant to section 1722() (relating 

to enforcement and effect of orders and process) when it is 

entered of record mn the offi ce of the clerk of the court of 

common pleas of the county where the real property is 

situated, or in the offi ce of the clerk of the branch of the 

court of common pleas embracing such county. 

(b) Order of court as lien. Any other order of a court of 

common pleas shall be a lien upon real and personal 

property situated within any county embraced within the 

judicial district on the conditions, to the extent and with 

the priority provided by statute or prescribed by general 

rule adopted pursuant to section 1722(). 

(c) Transfer of domestic judgments and orders. An order 

of any court of this Commonwealth which is a lien on real 

or personal property situated within any county of this 

Commonwealth pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) shall be 

a lien upon real or personal property situated within any 

other county to the same extent as if resulting from an 

order of the court of common pleas of such other county 

upon compliance with such transfer and filing procedures 

as may be prescribed by general rule. 

The language in section (a) is clear and unequivocal: "[a]ny judgment or other 

order of a court of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien upon real 

property on the conditions ..," The statute does not delineate between common 

pleas divisions. It applies to any judgment entered in the court of common pleas. 

6 
There is a single, statutorily created judgment index, which provides the most 

efficient way to provide notice of a judgment or lien to potential creditors. 

This statute is derived from the longstanding principles applicable to 

judgments, and notice of judgments: 

The great weight of authority is that the entry of 

judgment is a ministerial or clerical act, required to be 

done by the clerk of the court.... and consists of placing a 

judgment previously rendered on the record, by which 

enduring evidence of the judicial act is afforded. While 

the term "entry of judgment" is sometimes used in a 

general sense so as to include rendition of judgment, it is 

most often used in a more limited and precise sense as 

meaning the ministerial act of spreading the judgment at 

large on the record as distinguished from the judicial act 

of giving or pronouncing judgment. There must be a 

compliance with statutes or rules of court regulating the 

entry of judgments. 

A judgment is entered when it is spread at large on the 

record, and under some statutes not until then. 

Under some statutes, however, a judgment is entered 

when a signed copy of it is delivered to the clerk and filed 

by him, although not actually transcribed on the record, 

or when the judgment is duly signed and filed by the 

clerk. So it has been held that a judgment is in law 

entered, at least for some purposes, at the time a proper 

entry thereof is formulated and given to the clerk to be 

entered of record. 

As a general rule, the decisions of all courts must be 

preserved in writing in some record provided for that 

purpose. Where a statute so requires, judgments should 

be entered, and for many purposes a judgment is not 

complete, perfect, and effective until it has been duly 

entered. Thus it has been broadly held that judgments 

take effect only from the date of entry, and that there is 

no judgment until it is entered of record. 

7 

There is a single, statutorily created judgment index, which provides the most 

efficient way to provide notice of a judgment or lien to potential creditors. 

This statute is derived from the longstanding principles applicable to 

Judgments, and notice of judgments: 

The great weight of authority is that the entry of 

judgment is a ministerial or clerical act, required to be 

done by the clerk of the court, . and consists of placing a 

judgment previously rendered on the record, by which 

enduring evidence of the judicial act is afforded. While 

the term "entry of judgment" is sometimes used in a 

general sense so as to include rendition of judgment, it is 

most often used in a more limited and precise sense as 

meaning the ministerial act of spreading the judgment at 

large on the record as distinguished from the judicial act 

of giving or pronouncing judgment. There must be a 

compliance with statutes or rules of court regulating the 

entry of judgments. 

A judgment is entered when it is spread at large on the 

record, and under some statutes not until then. 

Under some statutes, however, a judgment is entered 

when a signed copy of it is delivered to the clerk and filed 

by him, although not actually transcribed on the record, 

or when the judgment is duly signed and filed by the 

clerk. So it has been held that a judgment is in law 

entered, at least for some purposes, at the time a proper 

entry thereof is formulated and given to the clerk to be 

entered of record. 

As a general rule, the decisions of all courts must be 

preserved in writing in some record provided for that 

purpose. Where a statute so requires, judgments should 

be entered, and for many purposes a judgment is not 

complete, perfect, and effective until it has been duly 

entered. Thus it has been broadly held that judgments 

take effect only from the date of entry, and that there is 

no judgment until it is entered of record. 

7 

There is a single, statutorily created judgment index, which provides the most 

effi cient way to provide notice of a judgment or lien to potential creditors. 

This statute is derived from the longstanding principles applicable to 

Judgments, and notice of judgments: 

The great weight of authority is that the entry of 

judgment is a ministerial or clerical act, required to be 

done by the clerk of the court, . and consists of placing a 

judgment previously rendered on the record, by which 

enduring evidence of the judicial act is afforded. While 

the term "entry of judgment" is sometimes used in a 

general sense so as to include rendition of judgment, it is 

most often used in a more limited and precise sense as 

meaning the ministerial act of spreading the judgment at 

large on the record as distinguished from the judicial act 

of giving or pronouncing judgment. There must be a 

compliance with statutes or rules of court regulating the 

entry of judgments. 

A judgment is entered when it is spread at large on the 

record, and under some statutes not until then. 

Under some statutes, however, a judgment is entered 

when a signed copy of it is delivered to the clerk and filed 

by him, although not actually transcribed on the record, 

or when the judgment is duly signed and filed by the 

clerk. So it has been held that a judgment is in law 

entered, at least for some purposes, at the time a proper 

entry thereof is formulated and given to the clerk to be 

entered of record. 

As a general rule, the decisions of all courts must be 

preserved in writing in some record provided for that 

purpose. Where a statute so requires, judgments should 

be entered, and for many purposes a judgment is not 

complete, perfect, and effective until it has been duly 

entered. Thus it has been broadly held that judgments 

take effect only from the date of entry, and that there is 

no judgment until it is entered of record. 

7 
As between the parties, a judgment duly rendered may be 

valid and effective, although not entered, that is, the 

neglect or failure of the clerk to make a proper entry of 

the judgment, or his defective or inaccurate entry of it, at 

least in the absence of statute to the contrary, will not 

deprive it of the force of a judicial decision. The 

enforcement of a judgment does not depend on its entry, 

or docketing, ...; and, as discussed in Executions § 9 if the 

judgment has been duly rendered, a valid execution 

generally may be issued and levied, without either entry 

or docketing of the judgment, unless specially required by 

statute. 

In the entry or record of a judgment, a clerical error, 

misdescription, irregularity, omission, or other defect not 

going to the jurisdiction of the court will not vitiate the 

judgment or give it an effect which it would not have had 

if correctly entered provided there is enough in the entry 

or record to constitute a judgment. 

As a general rule, entry of a judgment must be made in 

the judgment book, journal, or other designated book of 

record, in accordance with the statutory provisions in that 

respect. Where the clerk is directed by law to keep 

certain books for the entry of judgments, or to record 

judgments in a book specially designated by statute for 

that purpose, or to enter different kinds of judgments or 

decrees in different books, and deviates from the course 

prescribed, the validity and operation of the judgment are 

not impaired thereby as between the parties, although it 

may be otherwise as to third persons who are misled, or 

who fail to receive the notice which a proper entry would 

have afforded them, and ... entry in the wrong book may 

prevent the judgment from becoming a lien. 

Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Sustrik, 533 A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. Super. 1987) 

(quoting Lansdowne v. G. C. Murphy Co., 517 A.2d 1318, 1321-22 (Pa. Super. 1986) 

(quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments, §§ 106, 107 & 109 n. 97)). 

In sum, the order signed by Judge Ford entering judgment in favor of Ms. 

Walker-Chin and against Mr. Chin required an additional step to reflect the 

8 

As between the parties, a judgment duly rendered may be 

valid and effective, although not entered, that is, the 

neglect or failure of the clerk to make a proper entry of 

the judgment, or his defective or inaccurate entry of it, at 

least in the absence of statute to the contrary, will not 

deprive it of the force of a judicial decision. The 

enforcement of a judgment does not depend on its entry, 

or docketing, ...; and, as discussed in Executions $ 9 if the 

judgment has been duly rendered, a valid execution 

generally may be issued and levied, without either entry 

or docketing of the judgment, unless specially required by 

statute, 

In the entry or record of a judgment, a clerical error, 

misdescription, irregularity, omission, or other defect not 

going to the jurisdiction of the court will not vitiate the 

judgment or give it an effect which it would not have had 

if correctly entered provided there is enough in the entry 

or record to constitute a judgment. 

As a general rule, entry of a judgment must be made in 

the judgment book, journal, or other designated book of 

record, in accordance with the statutory provisions in that 

respect. Where the clerk is directed by law to keep 

certain books for the entry of judgments, or to record 

judgments in a book specially designated by statute for 

that purpose, or to enter different kinds of judgments or 

decrees in different books, and deviates from the course 

prescribed, the validity and operation of the judgment are 

not impaired thereby as between the parties, although it 

may be otherwise as to third persons who are misled, or 

who fail to receive the notice which a proper entry would 

have afforded them, and..entry in the wrong book may 

prevent the judgment from becoming a lien 

Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Sustrik, 533 A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. Super. 1987) 

(quoting Lansdowne v. G.C. Murphy Co,, 5IT A.2d 1318, 1321-22 (Pa. Super. 1986) 

(quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments, 8$$ 106, 107 & 109 n. 97)). 

In sum, the order signed by Judge Ford entering judgment in favor of Ms. 

Walker-Chin and against Mr. Chin required an additional step to reflect the 

8 

As between the parties, a judgment duly rendered may be 

valid and effective, although not entered, that is, the 

neglect or failure of the clerk to make a proper entry of 

the judgment, or his defective or inaccurate entry of it, at 

least in the absence of statute to the contrary, will not 

deprive it of the force of a judicial decision. The 

enforcement of a judgment does not depend on its entry, 

or docketing, ...; and, as discussed in Executions $ 9 if the 

judgment has been duly rendered, a valid execution 

generally may be issued and levied, without either entry 

or docketing of the judgment, unless specially required by 

statute, 

In the entry or record of a judgment, a clerical error, 

misdescription, irregularity, omission, or other defect not 

going to the jurisdiction of the court will not vitiate the 

judgment or give it an effect which it would not have had 

if correctly entered provided there is enough in the entry 

or record to constitute a judgment. 

As a general rule, entry of a judgment must be made in 

the judgment book, journal, or other designated book of 

record, in accordance with the statutory provisions in that 

respect. Where the clerk is directed by law to keep 

certain books for the entry of judgments, or to record 

judgments in a book specially designated by statute for 

that purpose, or to enter different kinds of judgments or 

decrees in different books, and deviates from the course 

prescribed, the validity and operation of the judgment are 

not impaired thereby as between the parties, although it 

may be otherwise as to third persons who are misled, or 

who fail to receive the notice which a proper entry would 

have afforded them, and..entry in the wrong book may 

prevent the judgment from becoming a lien 

Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Sustrik, 533 A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. Super. 1987) 

(quoting Lansdowne v. G.C. Murphy Co,, 5IT A.2d 1318, 1321-22 (Pa. Super. 1986) 

(quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments, 8$$ 106, 107 & 109 n. 97)). 

In sum, the order signed by Judge Ford entering judgment in favor of Ms. 

Walker-Chin and against Mr. Chin required an additional step to reflect the 

8 
judgment on the civil judgment index. Ms. Walker-Chin had to transfer the 

judgment to the civil judgment index. Orders entered in the family court division 

are not automatically transferred. Ms. Walker-Chin took the appropriate steps to 

transfer the judgment, and Office of Judicial Records appropriately accepted 

transfer of the judgment. In the absence of these steps, the judgment would not 

appear on any inquiries made by potential creditors or others with interest in any 

liens or encumbrances against Mr. Chin. In other words, the purpose and priority 

of the judgment would be negated. 

Mr. Chin does not point to any defect or irregularity in the record of the 

judgment being recorded that would render the judgment as invalid or leave the 

Office of Judicial Records without the authority to enter judgment. Thus, the Ms. 

Walker-Chin properly transferred the judgment to the civil judgment index and this 

Court properly denied the petition to strike. 

D. Mr. Chin's Other Issues Lack Merit 

Mr. Chin raises several arguments in his 1925(b) statement which are not 

applicable and/or for which he cites no supporting authority. 

As an initial matter, Mr. Chin argues that this Court lacked personal and 

subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Chin and, presumably, the judgment. A court 

must have jurisdiction over a party to enter judgment against him. An action taken 

by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. Dubrey v. Izaguirre, 685 A.2d 1391, 1393 

(Pa. Super. 1996). 

9 

judgment on the civil judgment index. Ms. Walker-Chin had to transfer the 

judgment to the civil judgment index. Orders entered in the family court division 

are not automatically transferred. Ms. Walker-Chin took the appropriate steps to 

transfer the judgment, and Office of Judicial Records appropriately accepted 

transfer of the judgment. In the absence of these steps, the judgment would not 

appear on any inquiries made by potential creditors or others with interest in any 

liens or encumbrances against Mr. Chin. In other words, the purpose and priority 

of the judgment would be negated. 

Mr. Chin does not point to any defect or irregularity in the record of the 

judgment being recorded that would render the judgment as invalid or leave the 

Office of Judicial Records without the authority to enter judgment. Thus, the Ms. 

Walker-Chin properly transferred the judgment to the civil judgment index and this 

Court properly denied the petition to strike. 

D. Mr. Chin's Other Issues Lack Merit 

Mr. Chin raises several arguments in his 1925() statement which are not 

applicable and/or for which he cites no supporting authority. 

As an initial matter, Mr. Chin argues that this Court lacked personal and 

subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Chin and, presumably, the judgment. A court 

must have jurisdiction over a party to enter judgment against him. An action taken 

by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. Dubrey v. Izaguirre, 685 A.2d 1391, 1393 

(Pa. Super. 1996). 

9 

judgment on the civil judgment index. Ms. Walker-Chin had to transfer the 

judgment to the civil judgment index. Orders entered in the family court division 

are not automatically transferred. Ms. Walker-Chin took the appropriate steps to 

transfer the judgment, and Offi ce of Judicial Records appropriately accepted 

transfer of the judgment. In the absence of these steps, the judgment would not 

appear on any inquiries made by potential creditors or others with interest in any 

liens or encumbrances against Mr. Chin. In other words, the purpose and priority 

of the judgment would be negated. 

Mr. Chin does not point to any defect or irregularity in the record of the 

judgment being recorded that would render the judgment as invalid or leave the 

Offi ce of Judicial Records without the authority to enter judgment. Thus, the Ms. 

Walker-Chin properly transferred the judgment to the civil judgment index and this 

Court properly denied the petition to strike. 

D. Mr. Chin's Other Issues Lack Merit 

Mr. Chin raises several arguments in his 1925() statement which are not 

applicable and/or for which he cites no supporting authority. 

As an initial matter, Mr. Chin argues that this Court lacked personal and 

subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Chin and, presumably, the judgment. A court 

must have jurisdiction over a party to enter judgment against him. An action taken 

by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. Dubrey v. Izaguirre, 685 A.2d 1391, 1393 

(Pa. Super. 1996). 

9 
The jurisdictional arguments make little sense in context. Mr. Chin availed 

himself of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas when he initiated proceedings 

in this court's family division in March 2007. He is the named plaintiff. When Ms. 

Walker-Chin transferred the judgment from the family division to the civil 

judgment index, she never "left" the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. She 

simply reduced Judge Ford's order entering judgment to the only civil judgment 

index maintained in Philadelphia. At all times, the Philadelphia Court of Common 

Pleas, whether through Judge Ford or this Court, had jurisdiction over Mr. Chin. 

And the Family Court will continue to have jurisdiction over Mr. Chin in the 

domestic relations case. Thus, this Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over 

both Mr. Chin and the judgment. 

Mr. Chin also argues that Ms. Walker-Chin violated Family Division 

Administrative Regulation 97-1 because she filed documents ordinarily maintained 

under seal in the family court to the civil dockets. It is this Court's view that any 

enforcement of any alleged violation of the family division's administrative 

regulation — and this Court does not offer a view one way or another — lies with the 

family division. Mr. Chin could seek the appropriate remedy with Judge Ford. 

Whether or not Ms. Walker-Chin violated the regulation by transferring the 

judgment to the civil judgment index, however, was not a basis for this Court to 

strike the judgment. 

Finally, Mr. Chin argues, without citing any facts or legal authority, that this 

Court improperly considered Ms. Walker-Chin's equitable arguments and/or facts 

10 

The jurisdictional arguments make little sense in context. Mr. Chin availed 

himself of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas when he initiated proceedings 

in this court's family division in March 2007. He is the named plaintiff. When Ms. 

Walker-Chin transferred the judgment from the family division to the civil 

judgment index, she never "left" the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. She 

simply reduced Judge Ford's order entering judgment to the only civil judgment 

index maintained in Philadelphia. At all times, the Philadelphia Court of Common 

Pleas, whether through Judge Ford or this Court, had jurisdiction over Mr. Chin. 

And the Family Court will continue to have jurisdiction over Mr. Chin in the 

domestic relations case. Thus, this Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over 

both Mr. Chin and the judgment. 

Mr. Chin also argues that Ms. Walker-Chin violated Family Division 

Administrative Regulation 97-1 because she filed documents ordinarily maintained 

under seal in the family court to the civil dockets. It is this Court's view that any 

enforcement of any alleged violation of the family division's administrative 

regulation -- and this Court does not offer a view one way or another -- lies with the 

family division. Mr. Chin could seek the appropriate remedy with Judge Ford. 

Whether or not Ms. Walker-Chin violated the regulation by transferring the 

judgment to the civil judgment index, however, was not a basis for this Court to 

strike the judgment. 

Finally, Mr. Chin argues, without citing any facts or legal authority, that this 

Court improperly considered Ms. Walker-Chin's equitable arguments and/or facts 

10 

The jurisdictional arguments make little sense in context. Mr. Chin availed 

himself of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas when he initiated proceedings 

in this court's family division in March 2007. He is the named plaintiff. When Ms. 

Walker-Chin transferred the judgment from the family division to the civil 

judgment index, she never "left" the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. She 

simply reduced Judge Ford's order entering judgment to the only civil judgment 

index maintained in Philadelphia. At all times, the Philadelphia Court of Common 

Pleas, whether through Judge Ford or this Court, had jurisdiction over Mr. Chin. 

And the Famil y Court will continue to have jurisdiction over Mr. Chin in the 

domestic relations case. Thus, this Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over 

both Mr. Chin and the judgment. 

Mr. Chin also argues that Ms. Walker-Chin violated Family Division 

Administrative Regulation 97-1 because she filed documents ordinarily maintained 

under seal in the family court to the civil dockets. It is this Court's view that any 

enforcement of any alleged violation of the family division's administrative 

regulation -- and this Court does not offer a view one way or another -- lies with the 

family division. Mr. Chin could seek the appropriate remedy with Judge Ford. 

Whether or not Ms. Walker-Chin violated the regulation by transferring the 

judgment to the civil judgment index, however, was not a basis for this Court to 

strike the judgment. 

Finally, Mr. Chin argues, without citing any facts or legal authority, that this 

Court improperly considered Ms. Walker-Chin's equitable arguments and/or facts 

10 
outside the face of the record. Because Mr. Chin does not provide any support for 

these arguments in his 1925(b) statement, this Court is unable to address them. In 

any event, in considering the petition to strike, this Court only considered the face 

of the judgment itself, as filed on the civil docket. 

Thus, none of the other arguments raised by Mr. Chin have merit. 

E. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully submits that its Order 

denying the Petition to Strike was not an abuse of discretion and was an 

appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. The Superior Court should affirm this 

Court's Order denying the Petition to Strike. 

BY THE COURT: 

Josh a Roberts, J. 

Dated: June 3, 2021 

11 

outside the face of the record. Because Mr. Chin does not provide any support for 

these arguments in his 1925(b) statement, this Court is unable to address them. In 

any event, in considering the petition to strike, this Court only considered the face 

of the judgment itself, as filed on the civil docket. 

Thus, none of the other arguments raised by Mr. Chin have merit 

E. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully submits that its Order 

denying the Petition to Strike was not an abuse of discretion and was an 

appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. The Superior Court should affirm this 

Court's Order denying the Petition to Strike. 

BY THE COURT: 

Joshu Roberts, J. 

Dated: June 3, 2021 

II 

outside the face of the record. Because Mr. Chin does not provide any support for 

these arguments in his 1925(b) statement, this Court is unable to address them. In 

any event, in considering the petition to strike, this Court only considered the face 

of the judgment itself, as filed on the civil docket. 

Thus, none of the other arguments raised by Mr. Chin have merit 

E. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully submits that its Order 

denying the Petition to Strike was not an abuse of discretion and was an 

appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. The Superior Court should affirm this 

Court's Order denying the Petition to Strike. 

BY THE COURT: 

Joshu Roberts, J. 

Dated: June 3, 2021 

II