IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-221

Filed 7 November 2023

Union County, No. 22 JT 129

IN THE MATTER OF: N.J.R.C.

Appeal by Respondent-Father from order entered 1 December 2022 by Judge 

William Helms, III, in Union County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 

3 October 2023.

Jeffrey William Gillette for Respondent-Appellant Father. 

No brief filed for Petitioner-Appellee Mother.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to 

Nathan.1 Father contends the trial court erred in determining grounds existed to 

terminate his parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(4), (5), and (11). 

Specifically, Father argues there was insufficient evidence to support a termination 

under section 7B-1111(a)(4) and (5), and that neither ground was pled in the petition, 

thus leaving him without reasonable notice of what would be contested. Further, 

Father argues there was insufficient evidence to support a termination under section

7B-1111(a)(11) because he was not convicted of a sexually related offense. We hold 

1 We use a pseudonym for ease of reading and to protect the identity of the juvenile. See N.C. 

R. App. P. 42(b).
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the trial court did not commit error.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In or around January 2019, Father and Mother were twenty-one and fifteen

years old, respectively. The couple engaged in sexual relations through which they 

conceived a child, Nathan, who was born 17 October 2020. As a result of his relations 

with Mother, Father was convicted, on 16 October 2020, of taking indecent liberties 

with a child. On 28 June 2022, Mother filed a petition alleging there existed facts 

sufficient to warrant a determination that Father’s parental rights should be 

terminated, including:

a. [Father] has not provided any financial support or 

care to the minor child and has neglected the minor child. 

b. [Father] has been convicted of a sexually related 

offense under Chapter 14 of the General Statutes that 

resulted in the conception of the minor child.

The petition came on for hearing in Union County District Court on 17 November 

2022. On 1 December 2022, the trial court entered an order terminating Father’s 

parental rights after finding clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support 

grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(11) and 

that termination would be in Nathan’s best interest. On 3 January 2023, Father 

timely filed a notice of appeal.

II. Standard of Review

Termination of parental rights proceedings are conducted in two phases—an 
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adjudicatory phase and a dispositional phase. In re I.E.M., 379 N.C. 221, 223, 864 

S.E.2d 346, 348 (2021). “At the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines 

whether any of the statutory grounds for terminating a parent’s parental rights 

delineated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 exist, . . . with the petitioner being required to prove 

the existence of any applicable ground for termination by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Where the trial court determines there 

exists grounds for termination, the case will move to the dispositional phase where 

“the court shall determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s 

best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2021). Upon the conclusion of these 

proceedings, the trial court shall enter an order as to the termination of parental 

rights. See id. 

Where such an order is on appeal before this Court with the respondent 

specifically challenging the court’s adjudication decision, we must review the decision 

to determine “whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and 

convincing evidence and whether [the] findings, in turn, support the conclusions of 

law.” In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2004) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Further, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de 

novo. In re A.S.T., 375 N.C. 547, 556, 850 S.E.2d 276, 282 (2020) (citations omitted).

III. Analysis

Father contends the trial court erred in concluding grounds existed to 
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terminate his parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(4), (5) and (11).2 

Father argues the trial court erred in its conclusion as the crime for which he was 

convicted, taking indecent liberties with children under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1, is 

not a sexually related offense because it does not require a sexual act. We disagree.

Under our North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(11), the trial 

court may terminate a parent’s rights upon finding “[t]he parent has been convicted 

of a sexually related offense under Chapter 14 of the General Statutes that resulted 

in the conception of the juvenile.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(11) (2021). Chapter 

14, section 202.1, defines the crime of taking indecent liberties with children stating, 

in relevant part:

(a) A person is guilty of taking indecent liberties with 

children if, being 16 years of age or more and at least five 

years older than the child in question, he either:

(1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any immoral, 

improper, or indecent liberties with any child of 

either sex under the age of 16 years for the purpose 

of arousing or gratifying sexual desire; or

(2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any 

lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body or any 

part or member of the body of any child of either sex 

under the age of 16 years.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1(a)(1), (a)(2) (2021). We recognize this statute, by its plain 

2 We recognize “an adjudication of any single ground for terminating a parent’s rights under 

[section 7B-1111(a)] will suffice to support a termination order.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815, 845 

S.E.2d 66, 71 (2020) (citations omitted). Therefore, where we hold the trial court did not err in 

terminating Father’s parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(11), we need not address Father’s 

contentions regarding § 7B-1111(a)(4) or (a)(5).
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language, criminalizes certain actions which are not explicitly required to be sexual 

acts. Moreover, we note this Court has previously stated “[a] lewd or lascivious act 

constituting an indecent liberty need not include [a] sexual act[.]” State v. Manley, 

95 N.C. App. 213, 216, 381 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1989) (citation and internal marks 

omitted). 

Nevertheless, Father’s argument is misplaced. Section 7B-1111(a)(11) does 

not require a respondent to be convicted of a sexual act or offense, but only of a 

“sexually related offense.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(11) (emphasis added). 

While neither our Juvenile Code nor our General Statutes specifically state what 

constitutes a “sexually related offense” as referenced in section 7B-1111(a)(11), 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Related” as “[c]onnected in some way; having 

relationship to or with something else.” Related, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 

2019). It is clear section 7B-1111(a)(11) was intentionally drafted in a manner broad 

enough to encompass not only acts and offenses which may explicitly involve sex, but 

also offenses associated with sex or that have some sexual component.

A conviction of indecent liberties with children pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

14-202.1 certainly constitutes a conviction of a “sexually related offense” under 

section 7B-1111(a)(11) as the crime unequivocally contains a sexual component. Most 

notably, section 14-202.1(a)(1) requires an act or attempted act to be taken “for the 

purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1(a)(1) 

(emphasis added). Similarly, a “lewd or lascivious act,” as referenced in section 14-
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202.1(a)(2), is defined as an act which is “obscene or indecent; tending to moral 

impurity or wantonness.” Lewd, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Although 

section 14-202.1(a)(2) does not explicitly contain language of a sexual nature, our 

Courts have repeatedly recognized, without distinguishing between the alternative 

subparts of section 14-202.1, “[t]he offense of taking indecent liberties with children 

requires proof that the crime be willful and that it be for the purpose of arousing or 

gratifying sexual desire.” State v. Williams, 303 N.C. 507, 514, 279 S.E.2d 592, 596 

(1981) (internal marks omitted); see also State v. Elam, 302 N.C. 157, 162, 273 S.E.2d 

661, 663 (1981) (“[N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1] clearly prohibits sexual conduct with a 

minor child.”); State v. Wilson, 87 N.C. App. 399, 402, 361 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1987); 

State v. Moir, 369 N.C. 370, 386, 794 S.E.2d 685, 696 (2016). Additionally, our 

General Statutes indicate indecent liberties with children, per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

202.1, is a sexually related offense. Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 208.6(5), defines 

“Sexually violent offense[s]” to include, among other offenses, taking indecent 

liberties with children, specifically citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1. See N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 208.6(5) (2021). 

Here, Father concedes he and Mother engaged in sexual relations around 

January 2019 while he was twenty-one and she was fifteen years old; that those 

relations resulted in the birth of their child Nathan; and that he was convicted of 

taking indecent liberties with a child. Further, the “Related” language provided in 

the statute, together with our Courts’ precedent, indicates the offense of taking 
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indecent liberties with children under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1 constitutes a 

sexually related offense within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(11). 

Because Father was convicted of taking indecent liberties with children under 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1—a sexually related offense—and because the relations 

which resulted in the conception of Nathan also led to Father’s conviction under 

Chapter 14, the trial court did not err in finding grounds for termination of Father’s 

parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(11). 

IV. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in 

terminating Father’s parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.

Judges COLLINS and THOMPSON concur.