COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. COPELAND 

v. Record No. 0654-95-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MARCH 12, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DINWIDDIE COUNTY 

Thomas V. Warren, Judge 

 C. David Whaley (Elizabeth Dashiell Scher; 

Morchower, Luxton and Whaley, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Robert B. Beasley, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 In this appeal by Michael E. Copeland (appellant) from a 

judgment of the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County (trial court) 

that approved his jury trial conviction "of operating a motor 

vehicle after his privilege to drive had been suspended or 

revoked," the sole issue presented is whether the evidence is 

sufficient to support the conviction. 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the record discloses that at approximately 1:30 in 

the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Virginia State Trooper Mark 

Haygood (Haygood) was patrolling the parking lot of a rest stop 

off Interstate 85 in Dinwiddie County. At that time, Haygood 

observed appellant seated behind the wheel of a Cadillac 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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automobile that was parked on the lot. The Cadillac's motor was 

not running and there was no key in the ignition switch. There 

were no other people in the vicinity of the vehicle. 

 Haygood drove approximately twenty-five yards past the 

Cadillac then observed appellant exit and walk around the front 

of the vehicle. Haygood returned to where appellant was, 

approached him, and engaged him in a casual conversation. At 

Haygood's request, appellant produced St. Paul's College and 

Virginia identification cards, one of which Haygood used to check 

for any motor vehicle violations. Haygood learned that 

appellant's license to drive had been suspended or revoked and 

cautioned appellant not to drive. Nothing in the record 

discloses that appellant disregarded that instruction. In 

addition, nothing in the record reveals who owned the Cadillac or 

to whom its license plates had been issued. Appellant made no 

incriminating statement. 

 Haygood remained on the parking lot approximately forty 

minutes during which time he saw no other person approach the 

Cadillac or enter the lot on which the vehicle was parked. 

Haygood left the parking lot without charging appellant with any 

driving offense; however, the next day he caused a warrant of 

arrest to be issued against appellant, charging that appellant 

"did unlawfully in violation of Section 46.2-301, Code of 

Virginia: Operate a motor vehicle on a public highway in this 

Commonwealth to wit: Drive on Suspended or revoked license, 2nd 
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or Subsequent offense." In relevant part, Code 46.2-301 

provides: 

 B. Except as provided in §§ 46.2-304 and 

46.2-357, no resident or nonresident (i) 

whose driver's license, learner's permit, or 

privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been 

suspended or revoked or (ii) who has been 

directed not to drive by any court, by the 

Commissioner, or by operation of law pursuant 

to this title or (iii) who has been 

forbidden, as prescribed by law, by the 

Commissioner, the State Corporation 

Commission, the Commonwealth Transportation 

Commissioner, any court, or the 

Superintendent of State Police, to operate a 

motor vehicle in the Commonwealth shall 

thereafter drive any motor vehicle or any 

self-propelled machinery or equipment on any 

highway in the Commonwealth until the period 

of such suspension or revocation has 

terminated. A clerk's notice of suspension 

of license for failure to pay fines or costs 

given in accordance with § 46.2-395 shall be 

sufficient notice for the purpose of 

maintaining a conviction under this section. 

 For the purposes of this section, the phrase 

"motor vehicle or any self-propelled 

machinery or equipment" shall not include 

mopeds. 

Code § 46.2-301(B). 

Penal statutes are to be strictly construed 

against the Commonwealth and in favor of the 

citizen's liberty. . . . Such statutes may 

not be extended by implication; they must be 

applied to cases clearly described by the 

language used. . . . And the accused is 

entitled to the benefit of any reasonable 

doubt about the construction of a criminal 

statute. 

Stevenson v. City of Falls Church, 243 Va. 434, 436, 416 S.E.2d 

435, 437 (1992) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 298, 

300-01, 295 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1982)). Code § 46.2-301(B) requires 
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that the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

appellant operated a motor vehicle on a highway in the 

Commonwealth. There is no evidence that appellant drove the 

Cadillac onto or off of the parking lot. There appears to be 

some conflict in the cases as to whether if there is a key in the 

ignition, and the defendant is seated behind the wheel, the 

switch needs to be in the "ON" position. Here, it has not been 

shown that a key was in the ignition or even whether appellant 

had keys that would fit the switch. Therefore, not only has it 

not been shown that appellant "drove" the Cadillac, it has not 

been shown whether he possessed the capability of "operating" the 

vehicle. 

 For the reasons stated, we hold that the Commonwealth has 

not met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

appellant drove or operated a motor vehicle after his license to 

drive had been suspended or revoked. 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and 

the charge dismissed. 

 Reversed and dismissed.