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MILDRED HORNBLOWER v. JOHN HORNBLOWER

(AC 35550)

Bear, Sheldon and Harper, Js.*

Argued March 19—officially released July 1, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Shay. J. [dissolution judgment];

Emons, J. [motion to dismiss].)

Thomas M. Shanley, for the appellant (defendant).
Allen Gary Palmer, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SHELDON, J. In this appeal, we must examine the

provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support

Act (UIFSA), General Statutes § 46b-212 et seq. UIFSA,

which has been adopted by all states, including Connecticut,1 governs the procedures for establishing,

enforcing and modifying child and spousal support, or

alimony, orders, as well as for determining parentage

when more than one state is involved in such proceedings. See General Statutes §§ 46b-212 to 46b-213w. The

parties agree that because the subject alimony order

was issued in Connecticut, Connecticut has continuing

exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to modify the alimony order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-212h (f)

(1).2 Their dispute arises from their differing interpretations of other provisions of UIFSA, as adopted in Connecticut, as they bear on the court’s personal

jurisdiction over the parties, more specifically, the

plaintiff, Mildred Hornblower.

The defendant, John Hornblower, appeals from the

judgment of the trial court dismissing his postjudgment

motion to modify alimony3 on the ground that the court

lacked personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff because,

although the parties were divorced in Connecticut, she

no longer resided in this state. We reverse the judgment

of the trial court.

The parties were divorced in Connecticut on September 16, 2005. Pursuant to the judgment of dissolution,

the defendant was ordered, inter alia, to pay the plaintiff

alimony in an amount that was modifiable as to the

amount. In 2009, the defendant filed an initial motion

to modify his alimony obligation in Connecticut. That

motion was resolved by a stipulation between the parties that was made an order of the court in March,

2010. Both parties thereafter moved out of the state of

Connecticut, the plaintiff to Georgia and the defendant

to Colorado. No additional action in this case was taken

by either party until October 22, 2012, when the defendant filed the motion to modify alimony that ultimately

gave rise to this appeal.4 The plaintiff filed a motion to

dismiss the defendant’s motion to modify on the ground

that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her

pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46b-46 and 46b-212d

(a). The trial court agreed that those statutes controlled

its decision and that neither of those statutes permitted

the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the

plaintiff. The trial court thus dismissed the defendant’s

motion to modify and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court

improperly relied on §§ 46b-46 and 46b-212d (a) in

determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over

the plaintiff because neither statute applies to a postjudgment motion to modify financial orders. We agree.

Section 46b-46 (a) permits the exercise of jurisdiction
over a nonresident ‘‘[o]n a complaint for dissolution,

annulment, legal separation or custody . . . .’’ Section

46b-212d (a) provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident ‘‘in a proceeding to establish

or enforce a support order or to determine paternity

. . . .’’ Because those statutes explicitly prescribe the

circumstances to which they pertain, and a motion to

modify an existing alimony order is not one of those

situations, neither pertains to the issue at hand. The

defendant claims, rather, that because the Superior

Court of this state has already exercised jurisdiction

over the parties in entering a judgment of dissolution

of the parties’ marriage and issuing the accompanying

financial orders, including the order here at issue, the

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is controlled

by § 46b-212d (c).

A challenge to the trial court’s personal jurisdiction

over a party is a question of law, over which our review

is plenary. Myrtle Mews Assn., Inc. v. Bordes, 125 Conn.

App. 12, 15, 6 A.3d 163 (2010). Because, moreover, the

jurisdictional challenge raised in this appeal is premised

upon the interpretation of § 46b-212d (c), our review

of the question of law thus presented also is plenary.

Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild

Heights, Inc., 310 Conn. 797, 808–809, 82 A.3d 602

(2014). ‘‘The process of statutory interpretation

involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.

. . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental

objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent

intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek

to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id.

Section 46b-212d (c) provides: ‘‘Personal jurisdiction

acquired by the Family Support Magistrate Division in

a proceeding under sections 46b-212 to 46b-213w, inclusive, or otherlaw of this state relating to a support order

continues as long as the Family Support Magistrate

Division has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order or continuing jurisdiction to enforce its

order as provided by sections 46b-212h and 46b-212i.’’

Although § 46b-212d (c) provides for the retention of

personal jurisdiction by the family support magistrate,

and not explicitly by the Superior Court, the defendant

argues that it must be read to apply as well to the
Superior Court. In support of that position, the defendant argues that § 46b-212d (c) embodies the spirit and

intent of § 202 of UIFSA, and thus permits the court to

exercise personal jurisdiction over the parties. Indeed,

the historical and statutory notes to § 46b-212d draw a

parallel between that statute and §§ 201 and 202 of

UIFSA. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-212d (West

2009), historical and statutory notes. We thus turn to

an examination of the mandates of UIFSA.

As with continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the

subject matter involved in a dispute concerning a spousal support order, the language of UIFSA is clear and

unambiguous as to personal jurisdiction overthe parties

involved in such a dispute. Under UIFSA, only a tribunal

of the state that issues a spousal support order may

modify that order. Section 202 of UIFSA provides: ‘‘Personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of this State

in a proceeding under this [Act] or other law of this

State relating to a support order continues as long as

a tribunal of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order or continuing jurisdiction to

enforce its order as provided by Sections 205, 206, and

211.’’ The comment to § 202 further explains as follows:

‘‘It is a useful legal truism after a tribunal of a state

issues a support order binding on the parties, which

must be based on personal jurisdiction by virtue of

Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 [98 S. Ct. 1690,

56 L. Ed. 2d 132] (1978) and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,

354 U.S. 416 [77 S. Ct. 1360, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1456] (1957),

jurisdiction in personam continues for the duration of

the support obligation absent the statutorily specified

reasons to terminate the order. The rule established by

UIFSA is that the personal jurisdiction necessary to

sustain enforcement or modification of an order of child

support or spousal support persists as long as the order

is in force and effect, even as to arrears. . . . This is

true irrespective of the context in which the support

order arose, e.g., divorce, UIFSA support establishment,

parentage establishment, modification of prior controlling order, etc. Insofar as a child support order is concerned, depending on specific factual circumstances a

distinction is made between retaining continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify an order and having continuing jurisdiction to modify an order. . . . Authority to

modify a spousal support order is permanently

reserved to the issuing tribunal. . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.)

This principle is further explicated in the comment

to UIFSA § 211, the counterpart to § 46b-212h (f) (1),

which explains: ‘‘Under UIFSA . . . only the tribunal

in the original issuing State may modify the order under

its law. . . . The prohibition of modification of spousal

support by a nonissuing state tribunal under UIFSA is

consistent with the principle that a tribunal should

apply local law to such cases to insure efficient handling

and to minimize choice of law problems. Avoiding con-
flict of law problems is almost impossible if spousal

support orders are subject to modification in a second

state.’’ The comment goes on to explain that the restriction of modification to the issuing state is based upon

the varying views of different states regarding the factors that may or may not affect a modification of spousal

support, such as cohabitation or remarriage, or

increases or decreases in the incomes of the parties.

Because different states accord various levels of weight

to such factors, the goal of uniformity propounded by

UIFSA is best served if the jurisdiction to modify is

reserved to the state in which the order initially was

issued.

The defendant’s position is further supported by the

well established principle that once a court has exercised personal jurisdiction over the parties in an action,

jurisdiction over those parties continues for subsequent

proceedings that arise out of that action. 1 Restatement

(Second), Conflict of Laws § 26 (1971). This court has

long abided by that principle in stating that ‘‘[u]nder

the doctrine of continuing personal jurisdiction, once

a divorce judgment is granted by a court with personal

jurisdiction, neither party can escape jurisdiction in

future proceedings that attempt to modify or alter the

judgment.’’ Cashman v. Cashman, 41 Conn. App. 382,

390, 676 A.2d 427 (1996). In other words, once a party

has availed him or herself of the benefits of bringing a

dissolution action in Connecticut, personal jurisdiction

over the parties to that action is retained for the life of

the orders rendered therein. Id.

Moreover, to construe the statutes in the manner

asserted by the plaintiff would lead to the absurd result

of allowing a party to escape modification of a spousal

support order simply by moving out of state. See Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn. App. 634, 641–42,

736 A.2d 190, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 920, 742 A.2d

359 (1999). According to the plaintiff’s reading of the

statutes, once a party moves out of state, only the state

that issued the order has subject matter jurisdiction

over that order, but that state cannot modify, or even

enforce, that order because it will have lost personal

jurisdiction over the departing party. In that scenario,

no other state could modify the order, including the

domicile state of the nonresident party, because only

the issuing state has continuing exclusive jurisdiction,

or subject matter jurisdiction, over that order.5 To conclude that a party can simply move out of state to

avoid a modification of a spousal support order would

frustrate the intent of UIFSA and its related jurisdictional provisions. That certainly cannot be the meaning

of our interstate mandates.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion to

dismiss the defendant’s motion to modify on the ground

that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to deny the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss

and for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 666 (f), states must enact the provisions of

UIFSA in order to receive federal funding for the states’ child support

enforcement agencies.

2 General Statutes § 46b-212h (f) (1) provides: ‘‘The Family Support Magistrate Division or Superior Court issuing a spousal support order consistent

with the law of this state has continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify the

spousal support order throughout the existence of the support obligation.’’

3 The defendant’s postjudgment motion actually is entitled ‘‘Defendant’s

Postjudgment Motion to Modify Alimony and Support.’’ Because the motion

sought only a modification of the defendant’s alimony obligation, which

was the only remaining support obligation of the defendant at the time that

he filed that motion, we refer to it in this opinion as a motion to modify

alimony or spousal support.

4 On that date, the defendant also moved for a modification of the order

that he pay for life insurance premiums for so long as he has an alimony

and/or child support obligation. It does not appear that any action was taken

on that motion.

5 General Statutes § 46b-212h (f) (2) provides: ‘‘The Family Support Magistrate Division and the Superior Court may not modify a spousal support

order issued by a tribunal of another state having continuing exclusive

jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state.’’

Both Georgia and Colorado have statutes that prevent each of those states

from modifying a spousal support order issued by a court of another state

that has continuing exclusive jurisdiction. Connecticut is thus the only forum

in which the alimony order in this case may be modified.