Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People ex rel. McGuire v. Cornelius, 2014 IL App (3d) 130288

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE ex rel. PATRICK McGUIRE, County Treasurer and 

ex officio County Collector of Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff, v. 

LORRAYNE M. CORNELIUS; MELVIN R. CORNELIUS; 

NANCY SCHULTZ VOOTS; WILL COUNTY CLERK; 

OCCUPANTS; AND UNKNOWN OWNERS OR PARTIES 

INTERESTED IN SAID LAND OR LOTS, Defendants (DG 

Enterprises, LLC-Will Tax, LLC, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Vincent F. 

Cornelius, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Lorrayne M. 

Cornelius, Deceased, Respondent-Appellee).

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-13-0288

Filed

Modified upon denial

of rehearing

December 19, 2014

January 23, 2015

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

In a tax deed case, the trial court properly vacated its order issuing a 

tax deed to petitioner, since petitioner failed to provide proper notice 

to respondent by omitting the address and telephone number of the 

county clerk on the take notice forms.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 11-TX-249; the 

Hon. Bobbi Petrungaro, Judge, presiding.
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Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Robert S. Krockey and Timothy Clark (argued), both of Krockey, 

Cernugel, Cowgill & Clark, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellant.

George F. Mahoney (argued), of Mahoney, Silverman & Cross, of 

Joliet, and Vincent F. Cornelius, of Law Office of Vincent F. 

Cornelius, of Wheaton, for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion 

Justice Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

Justice Schmidt dissented, with opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Petitioner, DG Enterprises, LLC-Will Tax, LLC, appeals from an order of the trial court 

granting the combined motion of respondent, Estate of Lorrayne M. Cornelius, challenging 

personal jurisdiction under section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-301 

(West 2010)) and seeking relief under section 22-45 of the Property Tax Code (the Tax Code) 

(35 ILCS 200/22-45 (West 2010)) and section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the 

Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). The trial court concluded that the petitioner failed to 

fulfill the notice requirements of the Tax Code depriving the court of in personam jurisdiction 

to issue the tax deed for the petitioner. The trial court vacated its previous order of the tax deed 

issuance to the petitioner. The petitioner appeals, arguing that tax deed cases are in rem rather 

than in personam proceedings; thus, the issue is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue 

the tax deed, not whether there was personal jurisdiction. Petitioner further argues that the 

respondent’s combined motion was insufficient to afford her the relief of vacating the tax deed 

issuance order. In a decision issued December 19, 2014, this court held that this is an in rem

proceeding but otherwise affirmed the trial court’s vacating of the tax deed issuance order. 

¶ 2 The petitioner has filed a petition for rehearing noting a discrepancy in dates in the “facts” 

for prior proceedings and party designations. It also raises three issues with this court’s 

decision: (1) the court misapplied the requirements of section 2-1401 of the Code and section 

22-45 of the Tax Code and sustained the order vacating the tax deed issuance order where the 

respondent cannot sustain its burden of proof; (2) this court elevated rote completion of the 

form section 22-10 notice into a jurisdictional requirement which is contrary to the statute’s 

plain language and case law; and (3) the court has blurred the line between void orders and 

voidable orders by relying on the petitioner’s lack of strict compliance with the requirements 

of the notice in section 22-10 of the Tax Code. The petition is denied with slight modification 

of the opinion. We have corrected the dates of prior proceedings in the “facts.” However, as 

noted on the court’s fact sheet as well as in the petitioner’s briefs, the petitioner has remained 
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the petitioner of record and not the respondent. Thus the designations remain unaltered in this 

decision. The substance of the petitioner’s challenges to the court’s decision was fully 

addressed in the original opinion. For further clarification, we include identifying terms for the 

personal jurisdiction issue and a one-sentence elucidation of the court’s concurrent need for 

subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court’s ruling remains affirmed. 

¶ 3 FACTS 

¶ 4 The facts are undisputed. The petitioner purchased the 2007 delinquent real estate taxes for 

the property known as 716 Henderson Avenue, Joliet, Illinois, from the Will County collector 

at a public auction on November 6, 2008. On February 4, 2009, in accord with the 

requirements of section 22-5 of the Tax Code, the petitioner drafted and then requested that the 

county clerk send by certified mail the completed “Notice of Sale and Redemption Rights” 

(Take Notice I) form to the respondent. 35 ILCS 200/22-5 (West 2010). This section of the Tax 

Code specifies that in order to be entitled to a tax deed, the tax purchaser shall tender to the 

clerk the provided form “completely filled in.” 35 ILCS 200/22-5 (West 2010). The form has a 

section for the tax purchaser to provide the address and telephone number of the county clerk: 

“For further information contact the County Clerk

 ADDRESS: .......... 

TELEPHONE: ........” 35 ILCS 200/22-5 (West 2010). 

The petitioner did not include this information in the prepared Take Notice I form sent to the 

respondent. 

¶ 5 After extending the period for redemption from May 6, 2011, to November 4, 2011, as well 

as identifying other interested parties for the tax deed through a commitment for title insurance 

order, the petitioner filed its petition for tax deed. The petitioner then requested the county 

clerk send by certified mail a completed “Notice of Expiration of Period of Redemption” (Take 

Notice II) form to all of the known interested parties. The required format of Take Notice II in 

section 22-10 of the Tax Code is nearly identical to that of Take Notice I required in section 

22-5 of the Tax Code. 35 ILCS 200/22-5, 22-10 (West 2010). Although the contact 

information for the county clerk is still a requirement, the petitioner again failed to include it. 

¶ 6 The Take Notice II was sent by certified mail by the county clerk and the petitioner also 

took additional steps to complete personal service on the respondent and all other interested 

parties. The petitioner enlisted the services of a licensed process server who attempted 11 times 

to personally serve the respondent and all other interested parties. The petitioner also had the 

Take Notice II published in the Times Weekly in accordance with section 22-20 of the Tax 

Code. 35 ILCS 200/22-20 (West 2010). 

¶ 7 No redemption from sale was made on or before November 4, 2011, the expiration date. 

¶ 8 On November 17, 2011, a hearing was held on the petitioner’s application. The trial court 

ordered issuance of a tax deed to the petitioner. Neither respondent nor any other person with 

an interest in the property appeared at the hearing. 
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¶ 9 On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed her appearance through counsel1 and filed her 

combined motion objecting to the court’s jurisdiction and seeking relief from the judgment 

ordering the tax deed to issue. 

¶ 10 On October 12, 2012, following a hearing, the court granted the respondent’s combined 

motion and vacated its previous order issuing the tax deed to the petitioner. The petitioner’s 

motion to reconsider was denied. 

¶ 11 Petitioner appealed. 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 On appeal, the petitioner raises two arguments. First, it argues that the court did have 

jurisdiction to issue the tax deed to the petitioner even though the court found insufficient 

notice had been given to the respondent. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that this is an in rem

rather than in personam proceeding requiring jurisdiction of the property rather than the 

respondent. Second, it argues that the respondent’s combined motion was insufficient for the 

relief granted by the trial court. The respondent counters that personal jurisdiction is required 

in tax deed proceedings and is secured through strict compliance with the Tax Code notice 

requirements. The respondent further argues that the notices of the tax deed sale and petition 

for issuance provided by the petitioner to the respondent were defective, rendering the tax deed 

issuance order void. Thus the respondent claims the combined motion was sufficient as a 

matter of law. We consider both issues. 

¶ 14 Jurisdiction 

¶ 15 Review of a trial court’s ruling on a matter concerning in personam jurisdiction is de novo, 

where the trial court held no evidentiary hearing on the motion attacking jurisdiction. Viktron 

Ltd. Partnership v. Program Data Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 111, 116 (2001). However, it is well 

settled that a tax sale is an in rem action. Smith v. D.R.G., Inc., 63 Ill. 2d 31, 35 (1976). A court 

acquires personal jurisdiction over the property or land after the county collector makes his 

application for judgment and order of sale. Id. See also In re Application of the County 

Collector, 397 Ill. App. 3d 535, 547 (2009) (hereinafter Devon); In re Application of the 

County Treasurer & ex-officio County Collector of Cook County, Illinois, for Order & 

Judgment of Sale of Lands & Lots Upon Which All or a Part of the General Taxes For 5 or 

More Years are Delinquent Pursuant to Section 235a of the Revenue Act of 1939, as Amended, 

194 Ill. App. 3d 721, 724 (1990) (hereinafter Zadik). It is the personal jurisdiction over the land 

itself that gives the court the power to act. Novak v. Smith, 197 Ill. App. 3d 390, 395 (1990). 

¶ 16 Consequently, the matter presented before the court requiring it to determine whether a 

party has been given the notice required by section 22-15 of the Tax Code goes to whether the 

court should order the tax deed to issue and not to whether the court has personal jurisdiction in 

the proceeding. Zadik, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 724. The failure of the tax deed petitioner to give the 

notices required by statute will neither divest the court of in rem jurisdiction nor prevent it 

from finding that all the necessary notices have been given and directing that a tax deed issue. 

In re Application of County Treasurer, 51 Ill. App. 3d 697, 702 (1977) (hereinafter Walsh). 

 

1Mrs. Lorrayne Cornelius has died and Vincent Cornelius, as independent administrator of the 

estate of Lorrayne M. Cornelius, has been substituted as party respondent. 
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Even if the court erred in finding that proper notice had been given, it is still not divested of 

in rem jurisdiction to decide whether it can or cannot issue the tax deed. Walsh, 51 Ill. App. 3d 

at 702-03. The trial court’s ruling regarding in personam jurisdiction is error. 

¶ 17 Respondent claims that Devon’s in personam jurisdictional analysis is dispositive. Devon, 

397 Ill. App. 3d at 548. It is, however, distinguishable on its facts and this court declines to 

extend it to include matters involving actual attempts of notice to the known property owner. In 

Devon, the court found that the property owner’s due process rights were violated because the 

tax deed petitioner failed to attempt or provide any notice whatsoever of the tax deed purchase 

or the property owner’s redemption rights. Id. The tax deed petitioner in that case did not 

conduct a diligent inquiry to ascertain the identity of all interested parties of the property. Id. at 

545. He used a significantly insufficient and expressly unreliable tract search index, as well as 

conducted an expanded search of several lots instead of just the property in question. Id. at 546. 

This resulted in his failure to identify the property owner as an interested party and his 

subsequent failure to provide the property owner with notices required by the Tax Code. Id. 

The court reasoned that because (1) a property owner has interest in the property for purposes 

of due process and (2) due process requires some notice prior to a governmental taking of an 

owner’s property, as well as the fact that (3) the statutory notices of the Tax Code do comport 

with due process, the trial court would have to acquire in personam jurisdiction when there is a 

total lack of notice. Id. at 548. 

¶ 18 In the present case, the Will County collector ordered the property for sale and the property 

was purchased by the petitioner on November 6, 2010. The trial court acquired in rem

jurisdiction over the property at issue when the Will County collector made an application for 

judgment and order of sale. The petitioner adhered to the requirements of the Tax Code in 

identifying the respondent as a party in interest through a commitment for title insurance order. 

It also attempted to serve the respondent with Take Notices I and II, as well as employed the 

use of a licensed process server who attempted 11 times to personally serve the respondent. 

Notwithstanding the technical defectiveness of the Take Notices I and II, to be discussed later, 

in personam jurisdiction is not required in this case because the property owners were 

identified and reasonable attempts required by statute were made to serve them with notice. 

¶ 19 The trial court’s finding that its order issuing a tax deed to the petitioner was void because 

it lacked in personam jurisdiction was erroneous; the defects in the notice did not divest the 

trial court of in rem jurisdiction to resolve the matter. 

¶ 20 Sufficiency of Combined Motion 

¶ 21 Moving now to address the petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the combined 

motion, the respondent argues that she was not given proper notice of the property sale or her 

redemption rights because the petitioner did not include the county clerk’s address and phone 

number on Take Notices I and II in strict compliance with the Tax Code. Because of this failing 

under section 22-45(4) of the Tax Code, she claims her prayer for relief in the combined 

motion was sufficient and the order issuing the tax deed to the petitioner is void. We agree. 

¶ 22 Once the trial court has issued a tax deed to a tax deed petitioner it is incontestable except 

by direct appeal from the order directing the entry of the tax deed or by a petition pursuant to 

section 2-1401 of the Code. See 35 ILCS 200/22-45 (West 2010). The party seeking to have 

the tax deed set aside bears the burden of proving its invalidity. Devon, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 542. 

If the trial court grants a section 2-1401 petition after an evidentiary hearing, we review that 
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judgment under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. Domingo v. Guarino, 402 Ill. App. 

3d 690, 699 (2010); S.I. Securities v. Powless, 403 Ill. App. 3d 426, 440 (2010). However, in 

People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (2007), the supreme court held that a de novo standard of 

review was appropriate in cases in which the trial court either summarily dismissed the section 

2-1401 petition or ruled on the petition based on the pleadings alone, without an evidentiary 

hearing. Id. at 14-18. 

¶ 23 In the case at hand, the trial court ruled on the section 2-1401 petition on the pleadings 

alone. Therefore, we review de novo whether the order issuing the tax deed was void and the 

section 2-1401 petition was properly granted.2

¶ 24 A judgment is void when, inter alia, the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or 

the parties. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 103 (2002). As 

previously noted, a void judgment may be attacked either directly or collaterally at any time. 

Id. Section 2-1401 of the Code provides a means for collaterally attacking void judgments. 735 

ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2010); Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 104. 

¶ 25 Section 22-45 of the Tax Code works in conjunction with section 2-1401 of the Code by 

allowing a party to collaterally attack a tax deed. 35 ILCS 200/22-45 (West 2010); see Devon, 

397 Ill. App. 3d at 543. As set forth in section 22-45 of the Tax Code, the grounds for relief 

under section 2-1401 of the Code are limited to: (1) proof that the taxes were paid prior to the 

sale; (2) proof that the property was exempt from taxation; (3) proof by clear and convincing 

evidence that the tax deed was procured by fraud or deception; or (4) proof by a person or party 

holding a recorded ownership or other interest in the property that he was not named as a party 

in the section 22-20 publication notice and that the tax purchaser did not make a diligent 

inquiry and effort to serve the person or party with the notices required pursuant to sections 

22-10 through 22-30. 35 ILCS 200/22-45 (West 2010). Such a finding on any of these grounds 

would render the order for the tax deed issuance void.3

¶ 26 This court reviews de novo the respondent’s argument that the notice was insufficient 

according to section 22-45(4) of the Tax Code. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 14. Additionally, we are 

called upon to resolve a question of statutory interpretation of section 22-10 of the Tax Code in 

reviewing the trial court’s allowance of the section 2-1401 petition. In doing so, we again apply 

a de novo standard of review. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Sharlow, 2014 IL App (3d) 130107, ¶ 14. 

¶ 27 The petitioner’s argument regarding the respondent’s deficiency in complying with the 

general requirements of section 2-1401 is without merit because “[a] section 2-1401(f) petition 

alleging voidness is exempt from the general requirements of section 2-1401 petitions, such as 

alleging a meritorious defense and due diligence.” In re Application of the County Treasurer,

2012 IL App (1st) 101976, ¶ 31. 

 

2Only void judgments can be collaterally attacked. People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155-56 (1993). 

Section 22-45 of the Tax Code provides grounds for relief under section 2-1401 of the Code to 

collaterally attack judgments issuing tax deeds despite the desired finality of tax deed judgments. 

Therefore, petitions validly granted under section 22-45 render the judgment issuing the tax deed void. 

3

Petitioner incorrectly relies on In re Application of the County Collector, 217 Ill. 2d 1 (2005), and 

failed to advise the court that the decision in that case has been vacated. Estate of Lowe v. Apex Tax 

Investments, Inc., 547 U.S. 1145 (2006). 
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¶ 28 Our courts have long striven to avoid involuntary divesture of property interests. The main 

purpose of the tax deed process is to compel tax delinquent property owners to pay their taxes, 

not to assist others in depriving the true owners of their property. In re Application of the 

County Collector, 295 Ill. App. 3d 703, 710 (1998) (hereinafter Midwest Real Estate 

Investment). Thus the tax purchaser must strictly comply with all of the mandatory notice and 

procedural requirements of the Tax Code regardless of how minute. 35 ILCS 200/22-40 (West 

2010); see In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 2013 IL 

App (1st) 130463. “The court shall insist on strict compliance with Section 22-10 through 

22-25.” 35 ILCS 200/22-40 (West 2010). 

¶ 29 The Tax Code requires the petitioner to provide notice to the property owner and other 

interested parties of the tax sale and the property owner’s redemption rights using detailed 

formats provided directly in the statute. 35 ILCS 200/22-5, 22-10 (West 2010). Sections 22-5 

and 22-10 of the Tax Code specifically state that the provided format must be “completely 

filled in.” 35 ILCS 200/22-5, 22-10 (West 2010). 

¶ 30 This court has previously noted and upheld the Tax Code requirement of strict compliance. 

In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 361 Ill. App. 3d 504, 

507 (2005) (hereinafter H&H Investments). In H&H Investments, the tax deed petitioner failed 

to provide either proof of publication with a signed certificate of publication by the publisher 

or an authorized agent and to name the interested party in the publication as required by section 

22-20 of the statute. Id. at 508. The party was named using its former legal name and this court 

held that due diligence could have revealed the current interested party, and found the 

publication notice insufficient because it did not comply with the strict requirements of the Tax 

Code. Id. at 509. 

¶ 31 Midwest Real Estate Investment is instructive regarding the requisite level of strict 

compliance when dealing with omitted information. Midwest Real Estate Investment, 295 Ill. 

App. 3d at 710. In that case, the tax deed petitioner omitted the first four digits of the tax sale 

certificate number, thereby failing to comply with the strict requirements of section 22-15 of 

the Tax Code by not “ ‘completely fill[ing] in’ ” the notice forms. Id. at 707. The court even 

acknowledged that the property owner had never been misled and had actually followed up 

with the county clerk regarding the delinquent taxes. Id. at 708. It also rejected the tax deed 

petitioner’s argument that the omitted certificate numbers were extraneous information and 

that the omission was “harmless.” Id. at 707-10. The court noted that strict compliance was 

necessary to further the legislative intent to create a “bulwark.” Id. at 710. A tax purchaser’s 

failure to comply with the requirements without deviation must result in denial of a tax deed. 

Id. A favorable judgment would be void and subject to collateral attack. See supra ¶ 23 n.2. 

The court found that strict compliance to the forms meant full and complete compliance with 

all required information. Midwest Real Estate Investment, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 710. 

¶ 32 In the present case, the petitioner did not include the address and phone number of the 

county clerk following the statement “For further information contact the County Clerk,” thus 

failing to strictly comply with the requirements of section 22-5 and section 22-10 of the Tax 

Code. 35 ILCS 200/22-5, 22-10 (West 2010). This omission could be seen as far more 

egregious than the incomplete sale certificate number which the Midwest Real Estate 

Investment court found to be noncompliant with the statute. Midwest Real Estate Investment, 

295 Ill. App. 3d at 710. The failure to include the contact information of the county clerk on 

Take Notices I and II sent to the property owner both impedes the ease with which he or she 
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can remedy the tax delinquency and keep the property and also frustrates the legislature’s 

intent to encourage the property owner to pay the delinquent taxes rather than aid the purchase 

efforts of tax deed petitioner. 

¶ 33 Neither Take Notice I4nor II was “completely filled in,” as required by section 22-5 and 

section 22-10 of the Tax Code, and the petitioner did not, therefore, “serve that [respondent] 

with the notices required by sections 22-10 through 22-30.” 35 ILCS 200/22-5, 22-10, 

22-45(4) (West 2010). The trial court properly vacated the order issuing the tax deed to the 

petitioner because the order was void for failure of proper statutory notice. 

¶ 34 We affirm the trial court on the basis that the petitioner failed to provide proper notice to 

the respondent by omitting the address and phone number of the county clerk on the take notice 

forms. We decline to reach the parties’ additional arguments regarding the trial court’s ruling.

¶ 35 CONCLUSION 

¶ 36 We find the trial court had jurisdiction to resolve this matter and affirm its order granting 

the respondent’s combined motion and vacating its order issuing the tax deed.

¶ 37 Affirmed. 

¶ 38 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting. 

¶ 39 I agree with the majority’s finding that the trial court had in rem jurisdiction over the 

subject property. This is where my agreement begins and ends. I would find that the technical 

defect did not render the tax deed void and that respondent’s section 2-1401 motion was 

insufficient. I would reverse the trial court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 

¶ 40 The Tax Deed Is Not Void 

¶ 41 Having determined that the trial court had in rem jurisdiction over the subject property, the 

majority goes on to find that the tax deed is void. Supra ¶ 32. This is so, says the majority, due 

to petitioner’s failure to include the circuit clerk’s address and telephone number in the written 

notices, which respondent claimed she never received. 

¶ 42 The majority cites no authority to support its holding that a technical defect renders the tax 

deed void, nor have I uncovered any. In fact, once a trial court acquires jurisdiction over the 

land, any subsequent challenge to the issuance of the tax deed renders its order voidable, not 

void. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159, 165 (1983); see also In re 

Application of the County Collector for Judgment & Order of Sale Against Lands & Lots 

 

4

In In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 2013 IL App (1st) 

130463, ¶ 15, the court affirmed the vacating of the tax deed because the tax buyer failed to strictly 

comply with the requirements of the first take notice form by omitting the municipality of the property. 

There, the tax deed petitioner failed to include the municipality on the original postsale notice sent to 

the property owner per the requirements of section 22-5 of the Tax Code. Id. Even though the 

municipality was included on all of the other take notice documents sent to the property owner in 

accordance with section 22-10, the court held that the omission rendered the postsale notice form 

insufficient and the tax deed petitioner was not entitled to a tax deed. Id.
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Returned Delinquent for Non-Payment of General Taxes & Special Assessments for the Year 

1983 & Prior Years, 206 Ill. App. 3d 22, 27 (1990). S.I. Securities v. Powless, 403 Ill. App. 3d 

426, 444 (2010), held that minor mistakes do not render a tax deed void. The court stressed that 

the incorrect description of the property contained in the notice, at most, rendered the tax deed 

voidable, not void. Id.

¶ 43 The government and homeowner hold competing interests with regard to collateral attacks 

upon tax deed orders. In re Application of the County Collector, 217 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2005). As the 

majority identifies, the main purpose of the tax deed process is to compel delinquent 

homeowners to pay taxes. In re Application of the County Collector, 295 Ill. App. 3d 703, 710 

(1998). Marketable tax deeds aid the government in collecting taxes where the homeowner 

fails to pay them. Killion v. Meeks, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1188, 1193 (2002). However, the forced 

sale of a home can have serious consequences for the delinquent taxpayer; thus, a collateral 

attack affords the delinquent homeowner an opportunity to ensure that the order was properly 

obtained. Mary Lowe, 217 Ill. 2d at 17. 

¶ 44 The majority’s holding that a technical defect voids tax deeds and thus subjects them to 

collateral attack at any time (Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 103 

(2002)) will destroy the marketability of tax deeds. Query: What rational person would buy a 

tax deed knowing that any technical deficiency in the notice renders the deed void and subject 

to attack at any time? This reality did not escape the attention of the General Assembly, ergo, 

section 22-45 of the Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/22-45 (West 2010)). The majority’s holding also 

ignores section 22-45. 

¶ 45 Section 22-45: Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Combined Motion

¶ 46 The majority finds that respondent’s petition is exempt from the general requirements of 

section 2-1401 due to the fact that the petition alleges voidness. Supra ¶ 26. I agree that a 

section 2-1401 petition based on voidness is exempt from the usual section 2-1401 pleading 

requirements. However, respondent failed to satisfy any requirement necessary for relief. 

¶ 47 Section 22-45 of the Tax Code works in conjunction with section 2-1401 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure by allowing a party to collaterally attack a tax deed in limited circumstances. 

Thus, in contrast to the majority’s position, even voidable tax deeds can be collaterally 

attacked pursuant to section 2-1401. A tax deed need not be void for the property owner to 

contest it. However, section 22-45 limits the grounds for relief on collateral attack: 

“§ 22-45. Tax deed incontestable unless order appealed or relief petitioned. Tax 

deeds issued under Section 22-40 are incontestable except by appeal from the order of 

the court directing the county clerk to issue the tax deed. However, relief from such 

order may be had under Sections 2-1203 or 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 

the same manner and to the same extent as may be had under those Sections with 

respect to final orders and judgments in other proceedings. The grounds for relief under 

Section 2-1401 shall be limited to: 

 (1) proof that the taxes were paid prior to sale; 

 (2) proof that the property was exempt from taxation; 

 (3) proof by clear and convincing evidence that the tax deed had been procured 

by fraud or deception by the tax purchaser or his or her assignee; or 
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 (4) proof by a person or party holding a recorded ownership or other recorded 

interest in the property that he or she was not named as a party in the publication 

notice as set forth in Section 22-20, and that the tax purchaser or his or her assignee 

did not make a diligent inquiry and effort to serve that person or party with the 

notices required by Sections 22-10 through 22-30.” (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 

200/22-45 (West 2010). 

¶ 48 Respondent failed to allege any of the four grounds for relief in the section 2-1401 petition. 

It is clear from the record that respondent had not paid the taxes prior to the sale of the property 

and that the property was not exempt from taxes. Respondent requested that the court grant 

relief under sections 22-45(3) and (4), but failed to support either ground. The petition did not 

include any allegations regarding fraud or deception; thus respondent did not satisfy grounds 

for relief under section 22-45(3). Respondent’s failure to allege that petitioner did not name her 

in the notice prevented respondent from establishing grounds for relief under section 22-45(4). 

Conspicuously absent from section 22-45 is the basis relied upon by the majority: a failure to 

provide the name and phone number of the county clerk in the take notice.

¶ 49 Furthermore, respondent failed to comply with even the general requirements under 

section 2-1401. Petitions under section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)) 

must meet several requirements. The petition must: (1) allege and prove due diligence in 

defending the original action; (2) plead due diligence in bringing the petition to vacate the 

order in question; and (3) plead a meritorious defense. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 

221 (1986). “The petition must be supported by affidavit or other appropriate showing as to 

matters not of record.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b) (West 2010). The respondent did not sign the 

affidavit; her attorney signed it. Furthermore, respondent did not include a statement 

concerning respondent’s own due diligence in defending the original action, nor did the 

petition allege a meritorious defense.

¶ 50 I find that respondent’s section 2-1401 petition is insufficient on its face. Therefore, I 

would reverse the trial court’s ruling.

¶ 51 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.