J-A27034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ROUTE 901 DEVELOPMENT LLC 

Appellant

v.

BARBARA R. DAVIS, EXECUTRIX FOR 

THE ESTATE OF MARY W. 

REYNOLDS, RICHARD A. LEWIS, 

BONNIE J. STANSKI, EXECUTRIX 

FOR THE ESTATE OF BARBARA A. 

LEWIS A/K/A BARBARA B. LEWIS 

AND UNKNOWN HEIRS, 

SUCCESSORS, ASSIGNS, AND ALL 

OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHT 

TITLE OR INTERST FROM OR UNDER 

MARCINE P. WOLVERTON 

(DECEASED) AND/OR KEITH 

WOLVERTON; (DECEASED); AND/OR 

WILLIAM WOLVERTON (DECEASED); 

AND JEFFREY S. WOLVERTON

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 252 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered January 18, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at 

No(s): CV-2021-01039

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 20, 2024

Route 901 Development LLC (“Appellant”) appeals from the order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County granting the preliminary 

objections in the nature of a demurrer filed by Appellees Richard Lewis

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“Lewis”), Jeffrey S. Wolverton (“Wolverton”), and Bonnie Stanski, Executrix 

for the Estate of Barbara A. Lewis (hereinafter “Stanski”). We affirm.

On June 29, 2021, Appellant filed a complaint to quiet title to a 1.27

acre parcel of land located in Ralpho Township, Northumberland County.

Appellant claims this land was abandoned by the Appellees who are the heirs 

of Thomas L. Wolverton. In an amended complaint filed on January 7, 2022, 

Appellant named the defendants as Lewis, Wolverton, Stanski, and Barbara 

R. Davis, Executrix for the Estate of Mary W. Reynolds.

1

Appellant, owner of an adjacent parcel of land, claims it acquired title in 

fee to the subject property through adverse possession. Appellant 

acknowledged that while it had not adversely possessed the subject property

itself for the full statutory period of twenty-one years, it could establish its 

claim by tacking on the adverse possession period of its predecessors.

In its complaint, Appellant alleges that its predecessor, Split Vein Coal 

Company, Inc. (“Split Vein”) “had been conducting its coal operations on the 

disputed 1.27 acre parcel of land in excess of 21 years and adversely to the 

interests of the heirs of the Thomas L. Wolverton Estate.” Amended Complaint, 

at ¶ 12. In a deed dated June 6, 2008 and recorded June 9, 2008, Split Vein 

made a conveyance of its land to Kenneth Deitrick (“Deitrick”), who “continued 

to occupy the property and utilize the property consistent with his ownership.” 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant also named as defendants all the unknown heirs, successors, and 

all other persons claiming right title or interest from or under Marcine P. 

Wolverton (deceased), Keith Wolverton (deceased), and/or William Wolverton 

(deceased).
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Amended Complaint, at ¶ 13. The parties have stipulated that the 2008 deed 

from Split Vein to Deitrick “describes by metes and bounds a 1.25 acres parcel 

of land which is separate from the acreage being claimed by the 

Plaintiff/Appellant by adverse possession.” Stipulation, 9/14/23, at 1. 

Thereafter, Deitrick conveyed his interests to Appellant in a quitclaim deed 

dated August 13, 2020 and recorded August 14, 2020.

On February 22, 2022, Appellee Wolverton and Appellee Lewis filed 

preliminary objections asserting inter alia that Appellant’s complaint was 

legally insufficient as Appellant could not tack to meet the required statutory 

period of twenty-one (21) years for adverse possession. On April 10, 2022, 

Appellee Stanski filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s amended 

complaint, which included inter alia, a claim that Appellant cannot meet the 

statutory period to prove his adverse possession claim.

On October 5, 2022, the trial court held oral argument on the 

preliminary objections. In an order entered January 18, 2022, the trial court 

dismissed Appellant’s claim with prejudice. On February 13, 2022, Appellant 

filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently complied with the trial court’s 

direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

[1.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a 

matter of law in sustaining Appellee’s preliminary objections to the 

Appellant[’]s amended complaint for legal insufficiency in the 

nature of a demurrer, finding that Appellant cannot tack to meet 
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the statutory period required for adverse possession, and 

dismissing Appellant’s amended complaint with prejudice?

[2.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as 

a matter of law in finding there was no other indicia of record 

outside of a deed to show required “privity” to permit tacking 

between Appellant and its predecessors in title to the adjacent 

adversely possessed land, ending the action at the preliminary 

objection stage of the litigation?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

Our standard of review of an order granting preliminary objections is 

well-established:

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should be 

granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient. 

Cardenas v. Schober, 783 A.2d 317, 321 (Pa.Super. 2001) 

(citing Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4)).“Preliminary objections in the 

nature of a demurrer require the court to resolve the issues 

solely on the basis of the pleadings; no testimony or other 

evidence outside of the complaint may be considered to 

dispose of the legal issues presented by the demurrer.” 

Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 805 

(Pa.Super.2007) (quoting Cardenas, 783 A.2d 317 at 321). 

All material facts set forth in the pleading and all inferences 

reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as true. 

Id.

Cooper v. Church of St. Benedict, 954 A.2d 1216, 1218 

(Pa.Super. 2008). In reviewing a trial court's grant of preliminary

objections, the standard of review is de novo and the scope of 

review is plenary. Martin v. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., 80 

A.3d 813, 814 (Pa.Super.2013). Moreover, we review the trial 

court's decision for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. 

Lovelace ex rel. Lovelace v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas. Ins.

Guar. Ass'n, 874 A.2d 661, 664 (Pa.Super. 2005).

Kilmer v. Sposito, 146 A.3d 1275, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2016).

2

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2 We recognize that the trial court cited precedent relevant to the standard of 

review for resolving a motion for summary judgment instead of a preliminary 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to grant Appellees’

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer after it found that Appellant 

could not prove his claim of adverse possession. This Court has held that:

Adverse possession is an extraordinary doctrine which permits one 

to achieve ownership of another's property by operation of law.” 

Recreation Land Corp [v. Hartzfield, 947 A.2d 771, 774

(Pa.Super. 2008)] (citation omitted). Claimants seeking to assert 

title by adverse possession have the burden to show each of the 

following elements: “actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, 

notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for twentyone years.” Id. (citation omitted). They must demonstrate each 

element by “credible, clear[,] and definitive proof.” Johnson v.

Tele-Media Co. of McKean Cnty., 90 A.3d 736, 741 (Pa. Super. 

2014).

Gruca v. Clearbrook Cmty. Servs. Ass'n, Inc., 286 A.3d 1273, 1278 

(Pa.Super. 2022).

In order to claim title by adverse possession, a plaintiff must prove 

“actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile

possession of the land for twenty-one years.” Baylor v. Soska, 658 A.2d 743, 

744 (Pa. 1995). 

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objection in the nature of a demurrer. This Court has recognized that “an 

appeal from the sustaining of preliminary objections in the nature of a 

demurrer, as well as the granting of a motion for summary judgment, our 

standard of review is essentially the same. We must accept as true all wellpleaded material facts set forth in the pleadings as well as all inferences 

reasonably deducible therefrom.” Kilmore v. Erie Ins. Co., 595 A.2d 623, 

625 (Pa.Super. 1991) (citing DiMarco v. Lynch Homes, 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 

1990); Jefferson v. State Farm Insurance, 551 A.2d 283 (Pa.Super. 

1988)). We note that the trial court did resolve the issues raised in the 

preliminary objections solely on the basis of the pleadings in this case.
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However, under certain circumstances, the periods of possession 

of prior owners may be added on to the period of possession of 

the present owners [by] a process, called ‘tacking’ ... but only 

where there is privity between [successive occupants]. For our 

purposes, ‘privity’ refers to a succession of relationship to the 

same thing, whether created by deed or other acts or by operation 

of law.

Northern Forests II, Inc. v. Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, 35 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (quoting Baylor, 658 A.2d at 744–45).

In Baylor, the Baylors presented a similar adverse possession claim

which was dependent on the Baylors’ ability to tack the period that their 

predecessor in title held in the disputed land. However, the Supreme Court 

held that the Baylors could not tack their predecessors’ period of adverse 

possession because the predecessor did not identify the subject property in 

their deed to the Baylors. The Supreme Court provided that:

[the only method by which an adverse possessor may convey the 

title asserted by adverse possession is to describe in the 

instrument of conveyance by means minimally acceptable for 

conveyancing of realty that which is intended to be conveyed. In 

this case, the predecessor in title did not meet this requirement 

so far as regards the disputed tract.

Baylor, 658 A.2d at 746.

The Supreme Court explained its rationale as follows:

Interested parties have a right to discern from the record the state 

of the title of any parcel of land. If tacking were to be permitted 

because of vague, undefined “circumstances,” there could and 

most likely would be no way for one not a party to the conveyance 

to know this. But the law mandates that a person asserting a claim 

of adverse possession make this assertion openly and notoriously 

to all the world. There must be no secret that the adverse 

possessor is asserting a claim to the land in question. Tioga Coal

Co. v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 519 Pa. 66, 75, 546 A.2d 1, 3

(1988) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court). If the 
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adverse possessor's claim is to be passed on to a successor in 

title, therefore, there must be some objective indicia of record by 

which it can be discerned with some degree of certainty that a 

claim of title by adverse possession is being made and that the 

duration of this claim has been passed on to a successor in title.

Id. at 745-46. See also Northern Forests II, Inc., 130 A.3d at 36 (finding 

plaintiff’s adverse possession claim failed as the deed it received from its 

predecessor in title did not purport to convey subsurface rights or any adverse 

possession interest of subsurface rights).

Likewise, in this case, Appellant’s adverse possession claim depends on

its ability to tack the alleged adverse possession period of its predecessors in 

title, Split Vein and Deitrick. As noted above, the parties have stipulated that 

the 2008 deed from Split Vein to Deitrick “describes by metes and bounds a 

1.25 acres parcel of land which is separate from the acreage being claimed by 

the Plaintiff/Appellant by adverse possession.” Stipulation, 9/14/23, at 1.

Appellant seemingly concedes that the 2008 deed from Split Vein to 

Deitrick did not include any claim to the disputed property or refer to any 

adverse possession interest in the disputed property. Instead, Appellant 

asserts that the trial court was required to look beyond the deed to determine 

the intent of the parties to assess whether inchoate rights were transferred.

This Court rejected a similar claim in Wolfe v. Porter, 592 A.2d 716, 

719 (Pa.Super. 1991) in which the appellant argued that parties’ intent to 

include the disputed tract within the conveyance could be inferred from the 

language of the deed. This Court noted that as the deed did not contain any 

reference to the disputed tract or any inchoate right, the deed created no 
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privity for land outside the deed description. This Court provided that “[i]n the

absence of a conveyance of the grantor's inchoate rights, we assume that

appellant's predecessors either occupied the disputed land permissively or

that they abandoned every intention of holding adversely before the

conveyance.” Id.

In sum, Appellant’s own possession of the subject property does not 

meet the twenty-one year statutory period and Appellant cannot tack its 

predecessors’ alleged periods of adverse possession because it has not shown 

that its predecessors included a description of their purported interest in the 

subject property within the relevant deeds. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in granting Appellees’ preliminary objections in the nature 

of a demurrer.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/20/2024