United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1852

___________

Danny Ridling, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Larry Norris, Director, *

Arkansas Department of Correction, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 3, 2008

Filed: October 8, 2008

___________

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges

___________

PER CURIAM.

Danny Ridling was sentenced to 420 months in prison after an Arkansas jury

found him guilty of rape. See Ridling v. State, 72 S.W.3d 466, 468-76 (Ark. 2002).

In a state postconviction proceeding, Ridling raised a claim that his counsel was

ineffective for failing to inform him about parole-eligibility rules, but the claim was

denied and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, noting the state trial court had

found that Ridling was fully apprised of the consequences of his failure to accept the

plea offer, and concluding that counsel’s advice to go trial was a matter of strategy

and did not amount to ineffective assistance. See Ridling v. State, No. CR 03-428,

2004 WL 2250718, at **2, 4 (Ark. Oct. 7, 2004) (unpublished per curiam). In this
1

The Honorable Beth Deere, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

-2-

subsequent 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, Ridling repeated his claim that his counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inform Ridling during the plea

negotiations that he would have to serve 70% of his sentence before becoming eligible

for parole if convicted of a crime constituting rape under Arkansas law. The district

court1

 denied relief, but granted Ridling’s request for a certificate of appealability on

the issue. We affirm. 

When a state prisoner files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal

court, this court, like the district court, undertakes a limited and deferential review of

the state court decisions adjudicating his claims. See Morales v. Ault, 476 F.3d 545,

549-50 & n.3 (8th Cir.) (standard of review), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 177 (2007).

Specifically, habeas corpus relief is not granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in a state court unless the state court decision was contrary

to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court, or unless the decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The Arkansas courts rejected Ridling’s argument that his counsel was

ineffective for failing to provide him with information about the minimum amount of

time he would have to serve before parole would be considered. In Buchheit v.

Norris, 459 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2006), another case involving a claim that counsel

failed to inform his client of Arkansas’s 70% parole-eligibility rule, we stated that we

could “hardly conclude that the Arkansas courts unreasonably determined that

[petitioner’s] representation was constitutionally effective” where the Supreme Court

had not yet addressed the question of whether the failure to inform a defendant of his

parole eligibility was professionally unreasonable. See Buchheit, 459 F.3d at 852.

Although we have found that erroneous parole-eligibility advice could constitute
-3-

ineffective assistance, see Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc),

Ridling did not meet his burden of rebutting the state court’s presumptively correct

factual finding that his counsel fully informed him about the plea and the

consequences of refusing to accept it, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Hill, 894

F.3d at 1010 (noting that, in some situations, incorrect advice about parole eligibility

is merely collateral matter). 

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________