### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT S eptember 13 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble Adria n G. Duplantier , United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * L ouisiana, sitting by

desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1071 9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 00-02762 -CV -A R-S EQUAL E MPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM ISSI ON, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us PEMCO AEROPLEX, INC., De fendant-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 13, 200 4) Before MAR CUS and W I L S O N , C i r c ui t Judg es, and DU PL AN TI ER , D istrict Judg e. * MAR CUS , C ircuit Judg e:2

A t i ssu e tod ay

is w he the r the pla int if

f, E qua l E m

plo ym en t O ppor

tun ity Co m m iss ion( “ E E O C” ), m ay

pr oc ee d w ithaT itl e V II e nf or ce m en t a ct ionc harg ing the defendant Pem co Ae roplex, Inc. (“ Pem co”) w ith com panywide r acial hara ssm en t, notw ith standi ng an a dve rs e j udgm en t r en de re d inase parate a ct ion br ough t by

anum be r of ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff

s w ho a lle ge d r ac ia l hara ssm en t by the sam e de fe ndant. T he dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d sum m ar y j udgm en t f

or the de fe ndant hol din g th at

the E E O C w as bound b y the pr ior j udgm en t e ve n th oughthe Co m m iss ion ’ s su it co ve rs e m

plo y ee s w ho w er e not

part of the e ar lie r pr ivate sui t an d no tw ith standi ng tha t the E E O C w as tw ic e de nie d th e oppo rt uni ty to co nsol idate it s c as e w iththe pr ivate sui t. B ec au se w e co nc lud e that the re w as no privity betwee n the EE OC and the private plaintiffs in the prior action, the district co ur t erredin ap pl y in g t he do ct rin es of r es jud ic at a an d c ol la te ral est op pe l. A cc or din gly , w e re ve rs e an d r em an d f or f urthe r pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt w iththi s opi nio n.

I The fact s an d p ro cedur al hi st ory of t hi s ca se are s tra ig ht fo rward . On De cem ber 9, 1999 , thirty -six Afr ican-A m erican em ploy ees of P em co, a

m ilitary ai rp lane r ep ai r an d m ai nte nanc e fa ci lity , f ile d su it in the N orthe rnD istri ct of3

A la ba m a ag ai nst

the ir e m plo y er , c la im ing that P em co vio la te d 42 U . S. C. § 19 81 by sub jecti ng th em

to raci al ha ras sm en t an d o th er fo rm s o f rac e d is cri m in at io n. Se e T hom as v. P em co A er opl ex , N o. CV -9 9- A R- 3280 -S ( N . D . A la . ). T he c as e w as ini tia lly

br ough t a s ac la ss a ct ion , but the pla int if

fs w ith dr ewthe ir

c la ss c la im after Pem co oppo sed certific ation, and prosecuted the case as thirty -six indi vidu al pla int if fs c onso lid at ed

in one a ct ion . A t the sam e tim e, the E E O C w as inv es tig at ing m ult ipl e ch ar ge s of dis cr im inatio n a t P em co , havin g un co ve re d po ssi ble e vid en ce of noo se s, r ac ia lly inflam m atory graff iti, ra cial slurs by

coworker s and sup ervisors, and other dis co nc er tin g in ci de nts of

r ac e- re la te d c ondu ct

a t P em co ’ s B irm ing ha m

f ac ili ty da tin g ba ck

a t l ea st t o th e la te 198 0s. I n S ep te m be r 2000 , the E E O C b ro ught it s ow n su it (the ins tant c as e) a ga ins t P em co und er T itl e V II of

the Ci vil Ri ght s A ct , 42 U. S. C. § 200 0e, a lleging that Pem co subjecte d its 20 0 or m ore black em ploy ees to a r ac ia lly hos til e w ork e nvi ro nm en t. T he E E O C s ough t i nj unc tiv e re lie f an d m on et ary co m

pe ns at io n fo r al l o f th e co m pa ny’ s 2 00 or m or e b la ckem pl oyees. T his c as e w as a ssi gne d to the sam e dis tr ic t j udge w ho w as he ar ing the Thom as case. InO ct obe r 2000 , the E E O C m ove d to c onso lid at e thi s su it w iththe pr ivate action (the Thom as case) , noting that th e tw o cases involv ed the sam e w itnessesBy this point , sever al of the or igina l plaintiffs’ claims had be en dismissed on proce dural 1 g ro un ds . 4 and issu es, and raised com m on iss ues of law and fact. Pem co vigorou sly oppo sed the m otion , arguing th at the suits were subst antially differ ent and that consoli dation wouldcause the com pany extrem e prej udice. S pecifically , P em co argued that the EE OC’ s suit in volv ed only one subs tantive claim

-- a hostile work en vir onm en t c la im

c ove re d by

T itl e V II - - w hil e the T hom as sui t i nvol ve d do ze ns of ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff

s, e ac h w ithhis ow n c la im s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d, w ith out e xpl an at ion , the r eque st t o c onso lid at e the c as es f or tr ia l, but gr an te d th e E E O C’ s a

ppl ic at ionthat di sc ove ry

und er take n ine ith er

c as e co uld

be use d to the extent relevant in the other case. InF eb ru ar

y 200 2, a ft er

dis co ve ry

in the pr ivate sui t w as c om ple te d, the EE OC again m oved to con solid ate the ca ses for trial, and offer ed to forgo further dis co ve ry in its ow n c as e fo r the c hanc e to try the c as es tog ethe r. P em co a ga in oppo se d th e m oti on, c ontra sti ng the E E O C’ s br oa d su it al le gin g c la ss- w ide dis cr im inatio n w iththe thi rty -o ne pr ivate pla int if fs ’ ind ivi dua l c la im s. I nde ed , 1 Pe m co arg ue d th at

m uc h of the e vid en ce of

c la ss- w ide dis cr im inatio n pe rt ine nt t o the EE OC’ s suit wouldbe not onl y irrele vant butalso prej udicial to th e individ ualA c c o r d i n gt o th e d i s tr i c tc o urt ’ s o r d e r , th e E E O C ’ s at t o r n e y s at , “ w i ths o m e f

r e qu e n c y, 2 in the audienc e as a

n aler t and intere sted observe r.” EE OC v. Pemco Aer oplex, I nc., No. 00- AR-2762-S, slip. op. at 3. 5 cl ai m s. A ga in, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e co nsol idatio n m oti on w ith out e xpl an at ion . D ur ing dis co ve ry , the E E O C h ad a tte nde d m ost

of the de posi tio ns o f the w itn es se s. T he E E O C’ s a tto rn ey s m et or c onf er en ce d w ithc ouns el f

or the ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff

s onm an y

oc ca sio ns p ri or

to tr ia l. I n Apr il 2002 , nin e of the T hom as pla int if

fs , inc lud ing the le ad

pla int if f, se ttl ed w ithP em co . T he r em ai nin g twenty -two plaintiffs -- who had wor ked in various parts of Pe m co’ s facility -- w en t t o tr ia l be fo re aj ur

y in June . D ur ing that tri al , an E E O C atto rn ey w as pr es en t in the courtroom

about half the tim e acc ording to the EE OC, and virtually each day , a cc or din g to P em co . N ota bly , E E O C’ s c ouns el did

not sit a t c ouns el ta

ble 2 dur ing the tr ia l, of

fe r ev ide nc e, e xa m ine w itn es se s, or oth er w ise part ic ipate in the trial of the T hom as case. On June 26, the j ury

found that no ne of the twe nty -two plaintiffs had been subj ec te d to ahos til e w ork e nvi ro nm en t be tw ee n D ec em be r 9, 199 7 and June 3, 2002 . The j ury

wa s not asked to determ ine whether a ra cially hostil e w ork environm ent existed at Pem co during th at tim e fr am e. Rather , the j ury wa s asked to decide whether e ach individ ual plaintiff had been subjected to a hostile work en vir onm en t ona cc ount

of r ac e. T he j ur

y answ er ed

“ no” a s to e ac h pl ai nti ff

. T he6

co urt e nte re d j udgm en t a ga ins t the tw en ty -tw o pl ai nti ff s w ho h ad

gon e to tri al in the T hom as c as e, and a ga ins t P em co a s to the pla int if fs w ho h ad

a cc ep te d of

fe rs of j udgm en t. So on a ft er , P em co m ove d f or sum m ar y j udgm en t i n th e E E O C’ s su it, al le gin g th at

it w as barr ed

on the gr ound s of

r es j udi cataand c oll at er al e sto ppe l i n lig ht o f the a dve rs e ve rd ic ts i n th e T hom as sui t. P em co c la im ed that the tw o su its ad dr es se d th e sam e que sti on - - w he the r a ra ci al ly hos til e w ork e nvi ro nm en t pe rv ad ed the w ork a tm osph er e at

P em co - - an d th at

the j ur y ve rd ic t answ er ed

thi s que sti on i n th e ne ga tiv e. P em co a lso arg ue d th at the E E O C w as in pr ivi ty w iththe t w e n t y- t w o p l a i n t i f

f s - - an dc o u l dth e r e f

o r e b e b o u n db y t h e v e r d i c ta g a i n s tth e m -

- es se nti al ly

be ca use E E O C atto rn ey s a tte nde d th e tr ia l, part ic ipate d inj oin t discovery , and m et w ith plain tiffs’ counsel on num erous occasions. T he district co urt gr an te d P em co ’ s m oti on, f ind ing that the iss ue s and the e vid en ce in the EE OC’ s suit were “ the sam e” as those in the Thom as case. See EE OC v. Pe m co A er opl ex , I nc . , N o. 00- A R- 2762 -S ( N . D . A la . D ec . 13, 200 2) . W ith out unam big uous ly f ind ing pr ivi ty

be tw ee n th e E E O C and the pr ivate pla int if fs , the dis tr ic t c ourt ob se rv ed

that the E E O C h ad

the opp ortun ity

to part ic ipate in discovery in Thom as, and that EE OC counsel sat in o n the Thom as trial as an

“ al er t and i nte re ste d ob se rv er . ” S lip op. a t 3. T he E E O C a ppe al ed .7 II T he thr es hol d is sue in thi s c as e is whe the r the E E O C w as in pr ivi ty w iththe tw en ty -tw o pr ivate pla int if fs in the T hom as a ct ion . I f the y w er e not , the n pl ai nly the EE OC cannot be bou nd bythe j udgm ent in that case no m atter how identical the c la im s or

sim ilar the e vid en ce m ay have be en . S im

ply put , be fo re the doc tr ine s of

e ith er r es j udi cataor

c oll at er al e sto ppe l m ay

be a sse rt ed

a ga ins t a party , it m ust be e sta bli she d th at

the party in the se co nd a ct ionw as e ith er aparty in the pr ev iou s a ct ionor

apr ivy of the party in that a ct ion . T his pr inc ipl e is particularly

im portant where the party

in the second action is a governm ental ag en cy r ep ose d w ithind ep en de nt s ta tut or y pow er to en fo rc e the lawand h av ing i n d e p e n d e n ti n t e r e s t s n o ts h a r e db y ap r i v a t e p a rt y. Inthe c as e be fo re us, w e ap ply f ed er al law , be ca

use “ fe de ra l pr ec lus ion pr inc ipl es appl y

to pr ior f ed er al de ci sio ns, w he the r pr ev iou sly de ci de d indiv er sity or f ed er al que sti on j ur isd ic tio n. ” CS XT ransp. , I nc . v. Br oth er hood of Ma int . of W ay Em ploy ees, 327 F.3d 1309 , 1316 (11th Cir. 2003). W e have held that res j udi catac anbe appl ie d on ly if a ll of f our f ac tor s are sho w n: “ (1 ) the pr ior de ci sio n m ust have be enr en de re d by

ac ourt of

c om pe te nt j ur isd ic tio n; ( 2) the re m ust have been a final j udgm ent on the m erits; (3) both cases m ust inv olve the sam e parties or their privies; and (4) both cases m ust inv olve the sam e causes of a ction.” I n re8

Pi pe r A ir cr af

t C or p. , 244 F . 3d 1 289, 129 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( ci tin g I sr ae l D isc ount Ban k Lt d. v . Ent in , 95 1 F .2d31 1, 3 14 (11 th Cir . 19 92 ); I n re Ju st ic e Oak s II , Ltd ., 898 F.2d 154 4, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990 )). L ikewise, in this Circuit, collatera l es top pe l c anappl y

onl y “ w he n th e part ie s are the sam e (o r in p ri vity ) [and] if the party a ga ins t whom

the iss ue w as de ci de d ha d af ull and f ai r oppo rt uni ty to lit igate the iss ue in the e ar lie r pr oc ee din g. ” I n r e So uth ea st B an kin g C or p. , 69 F . 3d 1 539, 1552 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ( ci tin g A lle n v. Mc Curr y , 449 U . S. 90, 95, 101 S . Ct . 411 , 415, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980); In re St. La urent, 991 F. 2d 67 2, 675 (11th Cir. 1993 )). If identityor privity

of parties cannot be established, then there is no need to exam ine the other factors in determ ining whether res j udicata or collatera l estoppel app lies. T hus, if there wa s no privi ty betwee n the EE OC and the Thom as p l ai n t i ff s , s u m m ary ju d g m en twa s i m

p ro v i d en t l y g ra n t ed an dth e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s or de r m ust be r ev er se d. W e re view a district court’ s order granting summ ary j udgm ent de novo . See Mad ray v. Pu bl ix Supe rm ark et s, In c., 20 8 F .3d12 90 , 12 96 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ). A m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t sh oul d be gr an te d w he n “ the ple ad ing s, de posi tio ns, answ er s to int er ro ga tor ie s, and a dm iss ion s onf ile , tog ethe r w iththe af fi da vit s, if

any , sho wthat the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to any m at er ia l f

ac t and that the m ovin g party

is entitled to a judgm ent as a m atter of law. ” Fe d. R. Civ. P .9

56( c) . W e al so r ev ie wde nov o adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n of r es j udi cataor co llate ra l e sto ppe l. S ee Jang v . U nit ed T ec hs. Co rp , 206 F . 3d 1 147, 114 9 ( 11th Ci r. 200 0) . H ow ev er , w he the r a party is in p ri vity

w ithanothe r fo r pr ec lus ion pur pose s is aque sti on o f fa ct that i s r ev ie w ed

f or c le ar e rr or . S ee Me saP etro le um Co . v. Co nig lio , 787 F . 2d 1 484, 148 9- 90 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) ( ci tin g A str on I ndus . Assocs., Inc. v. Chr

y sler Motors Corp., 405 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1968 )). This Circ uit’s pre clusion standards reflec t the long standin g and deep-rooted pr inc ipl e of

A m er ic anlawthat a

party c an not be bound b y

aj udgm en t i n apr ior sui t i n w hic h it

w as ne ith er

aparty nor in pr ivi ty w ithaparty . S ee Mart in v . W ilks, 490 U.S . 755, 761-62, 109 S. Ct. 2180 , 2184, 104 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1989); Park lane H osi er

y Co . , I nc . v. S hor e, 439 U . S. 322 , 327 n. 7, 99 S . Ct . 645 , 649 n. 7, 58 L . E d. 2d 5 52 ( 1979 ); Bl onde r- T ongu e L ab s. , I nc . v. U niv . of I ll. F ound . , 402 U . S. 313 , 328 -3 29, 91 S . Ct . 143 4, 144 2- 1443 , 28 L . E d. 2d 7 88 ( 1971 ); Z en ith Ra dio Co rp . v. H az el tin e Re se ar ch , I nc . , 395 U . S. 100 , 110 , 89 S . Ct . 156 2, 156 9, 23 L . E d. 2d 1 29 ( 1969 ); H an sbe rr y v. L ee , 311 U . S. 32, 40, 61 S . Ct . 115 , 117 , 85 L. Ed. 22 (1940 ). A s the Suprem e Court has w ritten, “ [a] j udgm ent or decre e am ong part ie s to alaw sui t r es olv es iss ue s a s am ong the m , but it doe s no t c onc lud e the r igh ts o f str an ge rs to tho se pr oc ee din gs. ” Mart in, 490 U . S. a t 76 2, 109 S . Ct . at 218 4. “ T his r

ule is part of our ‘ de ep -r oot ed

his tor ic tr ad iti on tha t e ve ry one10

shou ld have his own day

in court.’ ” Richar ds v. Jeffe rson Count y , A la., 517 U.S . 793, 798, 116 S. Ct. 1761 , 1766, 135 L. Ed. 2d 76 (199 6) (quoting 18 C. W right et al . , F ed er al P ra ct ic e an d P ro ce dur e § 44 49, a t 41 7 ( 1981 )) . P em co doe s no t, and cannot , de ny

that the E E O C w as not

aparty in the T hom as a ct ion . T he re fo re , the E E O C c anonl y

be bound b y

the r es ult in that c as e if

it w as in pr ivi ty

w iththe plaintiffs in that case.

“ Pr ivi ty ” is a

f le xib le le ga l t er

m , c om pr isi ng s ev er al dif

fe re nt ty pe s of re la tio nshi ps and g en er al ly appl y ing w he n ape rs on, a lth oughnot aparty , ha s hi s int er es ts a de quate ly

r ep re se nte d by

som eo ne w iththe sam e int er es ts who i s a party . H an sbe rr

y , 311 U . S. a t 41 -4 3, 61 S . Ct . a t 11 7- 19. A de quate r ep re se ntatio n can ari se in a num

be r of c ir cum stanc es . F or

e xa m ple , “ a j udgm en t tha t i s bi ndi ng on a guardian or trustee m ay also bindthe ward or the beneficiar ies of a trust. ” Richards, 517 U.S . at 798, 116 S. Ct. at 1766. T he j udgm ent in a class action m ay be bindi ng on m em

bers of that class. H ansberry , 311 U. S. at 41-42, 61 S. Ct. at 117- 118. O r, “ w he re aspe ci al r em ed ia l sc he m e ex ist s e xpr es sly f or ec los ing successive litigatio n by

nonli tigants, as for exam ple in bankrup tcy

or probate, le ga l pr oc ee din gs m ay

te rm inate pr ee xis tin g r igh ts i f the sc he m e is o the rw ise co ns is te nt wit h due pro ces s.” M art in , 49 0 U.S. at76 2 n .2, 1 09 S. Ct. at 21 84 n.2 (c iti ng N L RB v. Bi ldi sc o & Bi ldi sc o, 465 U . S. 513 , 529 -5 30 n . 10, 104 S . Ct .11

1188 , 119 8 n. 10, 79 L . E d. 2d 4 82 ( 1984 ); T uls a Pr of ’ l C oll ec tio n S er

vs. , I nc . v. Po pe , 48 5 U.S. 4 78 , 10 8 S . Ct. 1 34 0, 9 9 L. Ed. 2 d 5 65 (19 88 )). Obviously , none of these f orm s of privity

are present in this case. A s we see it, the n, onl y

tw o of the r ec ogni ze d ty

pe s of pr ivi ty are e ve n r em ote ly

pla usi ble he re : the the or

y of “ virtua l r ep re se ntatio n, ” or “ co ntr ol” ove r the pr ev iou s lit igatio n. A lth oughthe dis tr ic t c ourt ne ve r em plo y ed e ith er of the se te rm s init s order granting summ ary

j udgm ent, the r elationshi p the district court and Pem co describe betwe en the EE OC and the Thom as plaintiffs m ore closely resem bles the se tw o f

orm s th at pr ivi ty m ay take . O the r w ay s inw hic h pr ivi ty c anbe dem onstrated -- class re presentatives or trustee/beneficiary , f or exam ple -- are obvi ouslyinapplicable. W e theref ore address the tw o ty

pes of privity

that form the core of P em co’ s argum ent. O ur reviewof the rec ord, howe ver, suggest s that ne ith er vir tua l r ep re se ntatio n no r co ntr ol o ve r the pr ev iou s li tig at ionc anbe f ound in this case. A . V ir tu al R ep re se nt at ion Fi rs t, P em co say s th at

pr ivi ty is pr es en t he re be ca

use the T hom as pla int if

fs ’ i n t er es t s we re s o s i m i l art o th o s e o f t h e E EOC th at th ey ac t ed as th e E EOC ’s virtua l r ep re se ntativ es . “ V irtua l r ep re se ntatio n” is a te rm of art that w e ha veTec hnically , the Delta pa nel was not e ntirely

clea r whe ther this was its specific definition 3 of “virtua l repre sentation,” or whether it was denotingchar acte ristics that applied for a number of conce pts of prec lusion, of which virtual re prese ntation was only one. See D elta, 708 F .2d at 587 (“Under r es judicata

doctrines suc h as ‘virtua l repre sentation,’ a litig ant may be pre cluded f

rom lit ig atin gan is su e ba se d o n a pr ior laws uit in whic h, a lth ou g h h e wa s n ot a pa rt y , h is i nte re sts we re re pr e se nte d b y

a pa rt y . T his pr inc ipl e a

pp lie s, ho we ve r, on ly

wh e n th e re sp e c tiv e int e re sts are closely

alig ned and the party

to the prior litigation adequate ly repr esente d those interests.” (c itatio n o mitte d) ). Ho we ve r, a late r d e c isi on

in t his Cir c uit

qu ote d th is l angua g e a s sp e c if ic a lly definingvirtual repr esentation. J aff ree v. Wallace, 837 F .2d 1461, 1467 (11th Cir. 1988). Th e El e ve nth

Cir c uit ha s a do pte d a s p re c e de nt t he de c isi on s o f t

he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit 4 rende red pr ior to October 1, 1981. Bonne r v. City

of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (e n banc) . 12 de fi ne d a s a

ppl y ing “ w he n th e re spe ct ive int er es ts are c los el y a lig ne d and the party to the pr ior

li tig at iona de quate ly

r ep re se nte d th ose int er es ts. ” D el taA ir L ine s, I nc . v. Mc Co y

Re sts . , I nc . , 708 F . 2d 5 82, 587 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) ( ci tin g Southwest Air lines Co. v. Te xas Int’ l Airlines, Inc. , 546 F. 2d 84 , 100 (5th Cir. 1977 )) ( em

pha sis a dde d) . T he doc tr ine of vir tua l r ep re se ntatio n pr ovi de s in 3 es se nc e that “ a pe rs on m ay be bound b y

aj udgm en t e ve n th oughnot aparty if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his int erests as to be his virtual represe ntative.” A eroj et G en. C orp. v. Askew , 511 F. 2d 71 0, 717 (5th Cir. 1975). 4 Whe the r a party

is a virtua l r ep re se ntativ e of anothe r is a

que sti on o f fa ct . Me sa Petroleum , 787 F. 2d at 148 9-90(citing Astron Indu s. A ssocs.). W e have em

ploy ed four fa ctors in determ ining whether there is virtual re pr es en ta tio n: whe the r the re w as “part ic ipatio n inthe f ir st l iti ga tio n, appare nt co nse nt t o be bound, appare nt t ac tic al m an euve ri ng, [ an d] c los e re la tio nshi ps13

be tw ee n th e part ie s and n onpart ie s. ” Ja ff re e v. W al la ce , 837 F . 2d 1 461, 146 7 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting 18 Wright & Miller, Federa l Prac tice & P rocedure § 4457 , a t 49 4- 99) ( al te ratio n inor igi na l) . A ll of the se f ac tor s ne ed

not be f ound to m ee t the vir

tua l r ep re se ntatio n st an dard , nor is it ne ce ssari ly

e noug h th at

one of the m is fo und; r athe r, w e ex am ine the m in co nc er t t o de te rm ine w he the r the re is virtua l r ep re se ntatio n. A s f or the f ir st f ac tor , the E E O C “part ic ipate d” in the f ir st l iti ga tio n on ly

in the se nse that i t c ondu ct ed dis co ve ry

j oin tly , m et

w ithpr ivate pla int if

fs ’ c ouns el , an d a tt en de d (b ut di d n ot an d c ou ldno t p art ic ip at e in ) pa rt o f th e tr ia l. Sp ec if ic al ly , the E E O C t ook part in dis co ve ry

a ft er the dis tr ic t c ourt a llo w ed j oin t dis co ve ry in both c as es . E E O C r ep re se ntativ es a lso part ic ipate d inm ed ia tio n w ith the plaintiffs when Pem co sough t an overall resolution to both action s and refused to m ed ia te in Tho m as un le ss EEOC als o a gr eedto pa rti ci pa te in th e m ed ia ti on . T he part ie s di sa gr ee ove r howm uc h ti m e anE E O C atto rn ey spe nt s itt ing in the courtroom

during th e T hom as trial and how often they conferr ed with the T hom as pla int if fs ’ c ouns el . B ut, m ost

not ab ly , the E E O C w as not aparty and the re is no ind ic at ionthat i t t ook the le ad in the li tig at ion , w as he ar d a t a ll dur ing the tr ia l, or s er v edi n an yth i n g o t h erth an an ad v i s o ry cap ac i t y t o th e p l ai n t i ff s . Th e E EOC ’s re pr es en ta tiv es did

not sit a t c ouns el ’ s ta

ble , a tte nd e ve ry

day of the tr ia l, e xa m ine14

an y w itn es se s, pr of

fe r an y e vid en ce , or

e xe rt any c ontro l ov er

the pla int if

fs ’ decisions . Indeed, the E EO C had no power to decide which claim s the plaintiffs co uld a sse rt , nor

c oul d it or did it de ci de howto ar gue the T hom as c as e, nor did it ha ve any auth or ity to se ttl e or

r ef use to se ttl e that su it. F ina lly , the E E O C h ad no au tho ri ty to de ci de w he the r an y

appe al sho uld

be take n f

ro m the a dve rs e j udgm ents in the Thom as case. Ove ral l, t he se fact or s d o n ot warran t a f in di ng of v irt ua l re pr es en ta ti on . In de ed , thi s f

ind ing is al tog ethe r co nson an t w iththe r es ult r ea ch ed in So uth Ce ntr al Be ll T el . Co . v. A la ba m a, 526 U . S. 160 , 119 S . Ct . 118 0, 143 L . E d. 2d 258 (199 9), where the S uprem e Court found that privit y did no t exist even when the pla int if

fs in the tw o c as es share d th e sam e law y er . 526 U . S. a t 16 8, 119 S . Ct . at 1185; see also Sec ’ y

of L abor v. F itzsimm ons, 805 F.2d 682, 691-94 (7th Cir. 1986 ) (f indin g that there w as no privityeven thoug h the Secr etary of L abor had taken part in a j oint d iscovery with the plaintiffs in the prior action; had int ervened to object to the settlem ent in the private action; and th e private litigants had statutorilybeen required to provide noti ce of their suit to the Sec retar y ). Inthe se co nd p la ce , the E E O C p la inl y did not “ co nse nt t o be bound” by the j udgm en t i n th e lit igatio n inw hic h inw as not a llo w ed to be aparty . T he re is no ind ic at ionany

w he re in the r ec or d th at

the E E O C e ve r ag re ed

to dr op i ts c as e if

the15

private plaintiffs lost th eir ca se against Pem co, or, for that m atter, if the individual pla int if fs w on. The third fa ctor is “ tactical m aneuvering,” which has been described as

“ m aneuvering to avoi d preclusion.” 18A W right & Miller, Federa l Prac tice & Pr oc ed ur e 2d § 445 7, a t 54 4- 45 ( 2003 ). T he E E O C d id n o su chthi ng; ind ee d, it tr ie d r ep eate dly

to ge t i nto the e ar lie r lit igatio n, am ove w hic h, if suc ce ssf ul, would obv iousl y

have barre d it from

asserting the sam e or sim ilar claim s later. In fa ct , it ha s be ensug ge ste d th at

f or the re to be af

ind ing that t ac tic al m an euve ri ng oc curr ed , “ it is n ot e noug h th at anonparty

de lib er at el y

r es ist ed inc lus ionin the earl ie r lit igatio n. ” I d. a t 54 5 ( ci tin g B oge nhol m v. H ouse , 388 N . W . 2d 4 02, 407 & n.5 (Minn. App. 1986)). S o it would be truly anom alous to findtactical m an euve ri ng whe n aparty vig or ousl y

sou ght but w as pr ev en te d f

ro m be ing inc lud ed in the e ar lie r lit igatio n. F urthe rm or e, “ ta ct ic al m an euve ri ng” by the oppo sing p arty

to create preclusion m ay be a powe rful indicator that virtual represe ntation shoul d not b e found to exist . See id. (c iting Chase Manhattan Bank, N . A . v. Ce lot ex Co rp . , 56 F . 3d 3 43 ( 2d C ir . 199 5) ). P em co arg uably did j ust that, by

try ing to keep the E EO C as a party out of the origin al T hom as lit igatio n and the n pu shi ng t o pr ec lud e it fr om br ing ing it s own su it.16

The fou rth fact or , “ cl os e rel at io ns hi ps be twee n t he pa rti es an d n on pa rti es ,” ha s be ende sc ri be d by

apane l of

the f orm er F if th C ir cu it as r equir ing “ ane xpr es s or im pli ed le ga l r el at ion shi p inw hic h part ie s to the f ir st s uit are a cc ount ab le to non- part ie s w ho f

ile asub se que nt s uit

r ai sin g id en tic al iss ue s. ” P oll ar d v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 , 1008 (5th Cir. 1978). In that case, the Court listed ex am ple s of suc h r el at ion shi ps a s “ es ta te be ne fi ci ar ie s bo und by a dm ini str at or s, pr es ide nts and s ole sto ckhol de rs by the ir c om panie s, pare nt c or

por at ion s by

the ir subs idi ar ie s, and a

tr ust be ne fi ci ar

y by the tr ust ee . ” I d. a t 10 08- 09 ( quot ing So uth w es t A ir lin es Co . , 546 F . 2d at 97 ). T he P oll ar d C ourt’ s li st o f “ cl ose re la tio nshi ps” c onsi sts of le ga l r el at ion shi ps i nvol vin g asig nif ic an t de gr ee of ac co unt ab ili ty

or c ontro l by

one party

ove r the oth er . P la inl y , the r el at ion shi p be tw ee n th e E E O C and i ndi vid ua l pl ai nti ff

s onw hose be ha lf

the y a ct doe s no t ha ve an y of t he se tra it s. So of the four fa ctors that could establi sh virtual representation, three are cl earl y abse nt and o ne ( part ic ipatio n inthe or igi na l l iti ga tio n) is onl y bare ly pr es en t. T hus, not

sur pr isi ngl y , w e co nc lud e that the T hom as pla int if fs w er e not the vir tua l r ep re se ntativ es of

the E E O C, af

ind ing that i s f

urthe r supp orte d by

our hol din g inD ill s v. Ci ty

of Mari etta , G a. , 674 F . 2d 1 377 (1 1thCi r. 198 2) . I n D ill s, a p an el o f t h i s Co u rt re fu s edt o b ac kaw ay fr o m wh at i t d es cr i b ed as Po l l ar d ’s17

ba sic hol din g th at

“ the doc tr ine of

vir tua l r ep re se ntatio n r equir e[ s] an e xpr es s or im pli ed le ga l r el at ion shi p inw hic h part ie s to the f ir st s uit are a cc ount ab le to non- part ie s w ho f

ile asui t r ai sin g id en tic al iss ue s. ” I d. a t 13 79 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar ks o m itt ed ) (e m

pha sis a dde d) . T hus, if

the party to the pr ior

li tig at ionw as not le ga lly a cc ount ab le to the party

in the latte r, the n vi rt

ua l r ep re se ntatio n c an not be pr es en t, r eg ar dle ss o f an y oth er f ac tor . Appl y ing thi s st an dard , it is cl ear en ough that the E E O C and the or igi na l pr ivate pla int if fs ha d no suc h c onne ct ion . T he pr ivate pla int if

fs w ho s ue d P em co w er e in n o w ay le ga lly a cc ount ab le to the E E O C, the y

w er e not und er the E E O C’ s c ontro l, and the E E O C h ad no p ow er

to re qui re the m

to do anythi ng. I n sh ort, w e thi nk the re is little que sti on tha t the Thom as plaintiffs wer e not virtual representatives of the E EO C. Other cases re lied upo n by Pem co are plainly

differ ent. I n urging the trial co urt t o f ind pr ivi ty , P em co c ite d th e E le ve nthCi rc uit ’ s de ci sio n inN A A CP v. H unt , 891 F . 2d 1 555 (1 1thCi r. 199 0) . I n H unt , apane l of thi s C ourt f

ound that a ch al le nge to the c onst itu tio na lity of A la ba m a’ s pr ac tic e of

f ly ing the Co nf

ed er at e flag on top of the state capitol was precluded by an adverse j udgm ent in a sim ilar suit brou ght th irteen y ears e arlier. T he original plain tiff and the later plaintiffs w er e both st at e le gis la tor s and m em be rs of the N A A CP , and w e fo und that the18

int er es ts o f the or igi na l pl ai nti ff w er e “ so c los el y

a lig ne d to the N A A CP ’ s in te re sts in the or igi na l su it that he w as the ir vir tua l r ep re se ntativ e. ” I d. a t 15 61. T he re are se ve ra l po w er fu l di ff er en ce s be tw ee n th is c as e an d H unt , however. First, Hunt applied Alabam a’ s law of preclusion rather than feder al preclusion law. Id. at 1560. And fe deral privity principles, as detailed above, em pl oy a di sc ern ib ly hig he r st an da rdth an th e Alaba m a la w app li edin Hun t. Mor eo ve r, the S upr em e Co urt’ s po st- H unt de ci sio ns i n R ic hard s and S outh C e n t r a l B e l l b o t h n a rr o w e dA l ab a ma ’s p r e c l u s i o n l a w , r e v e r s i n g A l ab a ma Su pr em e Co urt ho ldi ngs that pr ec lus ionappl ie d. Ina ddi tio n, H unt

inv olv ed age ne ra l pu

bli c lawiss ue that a ff

ec te d th e plaintiffs’ private interests only indirectly , unlike the alleged rac ial harassm ent at Pem co. The S uprem e Court has explicitly distin guish ed betwee n such generalized publ ic lawc ha lle nge s and m or e ind ivi dua liz ed c as es , sug ge sti ng tha t the re is le ss pr ec lus ionpr ote ct ionf

or apla int if f w ho “ co m

pla in[ s] about

an a lle ge d m isu se of publ ic f unds , or about oth er pub lic a ct ionthat ha s on ly an in dir ec t i m

pa ct on h is in te res ts .” Ric ha rd s, 5 17 U.S. at 8 03 , 11 6 S . Ct. at 17 68 (ci ta ti on s o m it te d) . In de ed , the S upr em e Co urt ha s su gge ste d th at in ca se s in vol vin g br oa d publi c int er es t m atte rs , “ w e m ay a ssum e that the S ta te s have w ide latit ude to es ta

bli sh pr oc ed ur es . . . to lim it the num

be r of j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs tha t m ay bePe mc o’ s argume nt t hat th e EE OC ’s int e re sts we re a de qu ate ly re pr e se nte d b y

the pr ivate 5 litigants also re lies on Petit v. C ity of Chicag o, No. 90-C-4984, 1999 WL66539 (N.D. I ll., Feb. 8, 1999), an unr eporte d case in which a district cour t found that a suit challeng ing a city ’s se rg e ant q

ua lif yinge xam a s r a c ia lly

dis c ri min ator

y wa s e sto pp e d b e c a

us e of a pr e vio us su it b ri n gi n g th e s am e c l ai m . I d . at* 8 . T h e c o urtn o t edth atth er e w as p ri v i ty b ec au s e “ [ a] l th o u gh not all the plaintiffs wer e par ties to [ the pre vious case], 19 of the pr esent plaintiffs we re pla intiffs in [ that case ], t he same attorney repr esents the plaintiffs in both ca ses, and the pr ior history of consolidated discove ry

means that the a

vailable e vidence reg ardingpast discrimination is the same for both case s.” I d. at *5. This was pure ly dicta, howe ver, be cause the plaintiffs had ma de no privity argument and ther efor e wa ived that leg al issue. I d. Moreove r, the Thomas pla intiffs used non-EEO C lawy ers; the EEO C’s interests and leg al re sponsibili ties are wholly distinct from those of the pr ivate plaintiffs; and the re is no indication that any of the Petit plaintiffs had tried and fa ile d to joi n th e e arl ie r s uit a g a ins t th e c ity , a s th e EE OC tr ie d to c on so lid ate its a c tio n w ith the private action ag ainst Pemco. 19 en te rt ai ne d, ” as opp ose d to sui ts i n w hic h in div idu al int er es ts are c le ar ly and dir ec tly im pli cate d. I d. 5 In short, w e can f

ind no suppo rt for the suggestion that the Thom as plaintiffs wer e “ virtual representatives” of the E EO C in this case, and therefore conclude that it would h ave been clearly err oneous to im

pute privityto the parties on this ba sis . B. C on tr ol Ana lytic al ly sep arat e fro m a fi nd in g o f vi rtu al rep res en ta ti on , th e EEOC co uld sti ll be f ound in pr ivi ty w ithapr ivate party

if it e ff ec tiv el y c ontro lle d th e pr ivate party ’ s li tig at ion . H ow ev er , in thi s c as e, suc h c ontro l i s e ve n le ss e vid en t than vi rt ua l r ep re se ntatio n. I n M ont an a v. U nit ed S ta te s, 440 U . S. 147 , 99 S . Ct .20

970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979), the Suprem e Court held that preclusion prin ciples ap pli ed to the f ed er al gov er

nm en t, barr ing it

f ro m br ing ing sui t a ga ins t the state of Montana when a pre viou s sim ilar suit by a private c ontractor had been adj udicated on i ts m er its . T he Co ur

t f ound pr ivi ty be tw ee n th e fe de ra l go ve rn m en t and a pr ivate c ontra ct or

w he n: T he G ove rn m en t ha s st ipu la te d th at it : (1 ) re qui re d th e [o ri gin al ] law sui t t o be f ile d; (2 ) re vie w ed

and a ppr ove d th e co m

pla int ; (3 ) pa id the a tto rn ey s’ f

ee s and c ost s; (4 ) dir ec te d th e ap pe al f

ro m S ta te D istri ct

Co urt t o th e Mon tana Su pr em e Co urt; ( 5 ) ap p e a r e dan ds ub mi t t e dab r i e f a s a mi c u s i n th e M o n t a n aS up r e me Co urt; (6 ) dir ec te d th e fi lin g of

anot ic e of

a ppe al to thi s C ourt; an d (7) ef fectuated [ the plaintiff] ’ s abandon m ent of that appeal on advice of the S oli ci tor

G en er al . I d . a t1 5 5 , 9 9 S . C t . a t9 7 4 . U n d e r th e s e p e c u l i a r

c i r c u ms t a n c e s , th e S up r e me Co urt f ound that the U nit ed

S ta te s “pla inl y

ha d asuf fi ci en t ‘ la bor ing oar’ in the co nduc t of

the state -c ourt l iti ga tio n to a ct ua te pr inc ipl es of

e sto ppe l. ” I d. Inthi s c as e, the E E O C d id n ot c ontro l the T hom as pr oc ee din gs. I t c oul d no t an d di d no t r equir e the or igi na l l aw sui t t o be f ile d. I t di d no t hi re or

pay the pr ivate pla int if

fs ’ a tto rn ey s, f

ee s, and c ost s, and the E E O C n ev er dir ec te d th e Thom as plaintiffs to file or abandon their suit o r, for that m atter, do anything else.21

N or did the E E O C d ir ec t the f

ili ng o f a not ic e of

appe al to thi s C ourt, or

oth er w ise re qui re the T hom as pla int if fs to ab an don the ir

c la im s. I n sh ort, the re is no co m pari son be tw ee n th e co ntr ol the gov er nm en t e xe rt ed

ove r the pr ivate li tig at ion pr io r to th e Mo nt an a cas e an d t he rol e th e EEOC pl ay edin th e Tho m as act io n. As far as w e can te ll, no p an el of thi s C ourt ha s e ve r be fo re f ound pr ivi ty be tw ee n a gove rn m en ta l a ge nc y

and p ri va te c iti ze ns d

ue to the a ge nc y ’ s c ontro l ov er the pr ivate c iti ze ns’ sui t. T his c as e w oul d no t be agoo d pl ac e to s tart . C. Inde pend ent Agen cy Au thority W e ad d th at

it is part ic ularl y

r ar e to f ind pr ivi ty be tw ee n apr ivate party

in one a ct ionand a

party in a la te r ac tio n w he n th e party in the late r ac tio n is a gove rn m en ta l a ge nc y . I t i s a“ w el l- es ta bli she d ge ne ra l pr inc ipl e that the gove rn m en t i s no t bo und by pr ivate li tig at ionw he n th e gove rn m en t’ s a ct ionse ek s to enforce a

feder al statute that im

plicates both p ublic and priv ate interests. ” Herm an v. So ut h C aro li na Nat’l Ban k,1 40 F.3d14 13 , 14 25 (11 th Cir . 19 98 ). Indeed, if we we re to hold that there wa s privitybetwee n the Thom as plaintiffs a n dth e E E O C du e t o v i rtu a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r c o n t r o l , i tw o u l db e th e f i r s tt i me thi s C ourt ha s e ve r fo und thi s ki nd o f pr ivi ty be tw ee n agov er

nm en ta l a ge nc y

and the pr ivate pla int if

fs in a pr ior

a ct ion . A s th e Se ve nthCi rc uit ha s pu t i t, “ [t ] he22

G ove rn m en t i s no t barr ed by the doc tr ine of

r es j udi cataf

ro m m ai nta ini ng ind ep en de nt a ct ion s a ski ng c ourts t o e nf or ce f ed er al statut es im

pli catin g bo th publ ic and p ri va te int er es ts m er el y be ca use ind ep en de nt p ri va te li tig at ionha s a lso be enc om m en ce d or

c onc lud ed . ” S ec re tary

of L ab or v. F itz sim

m ons, 805 F . 2d 682, 692 ( 7thCi r. 198 6) . Mo re ove r, m ost S upr em e Co urt c as es a ddr es sin g th e subject have f

oundthat governm ental agencies w ere not bo und b y the final j udgm en t i n apr ivate sui t si m ilar to the one the y w er e br ing ing . S ee H athor n v. L ovor n, 457 U . S. 255 , 268 n. 23, 102 S . Ct . 242 1, 243 0 n. 23, 72 L . E d. 2d 8 24 (1 982) ; C ity

of Ri ch m ond v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 422 U . S. 358 , 373 n. 6, 95 S . Ct . 229 6, 2305 n. 6, 45 L . E d. 2d 2 45 ( 1975 ); S am F ox P ubl ’ g C o. , I nc . v. U nit ed S ta te s, 366 U. S. 683, 689- 90, 81 S. C t. 1309, 1313, 6 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1961). Quite sim ply , it is so unusu al to find privitybetwee n a governm ental agency an d pr ivate pla int if

fs be ca use gov er nm en ta l a ge nc ie s have statut or y dut ie s, responsib ilities, and interests that are f ar broader

than the discrete interests of a pr ivate party . I n U nit ed

S ta te s v. E as t B at on R ouge P ar ishS ch . Bd . , 594 F . 2d 5 6 (5 th C ir . 197 9) , the f

orm er F if th C ir cu it expla ine d th is p ri nc ipl e in the se te rm s: [T ] he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ion[ that the pr ivate pla int if fs and the United States w ere identical] is directly contrary to the general pr inc ipl e of

lawthat the U nit ed

S ta te s w ill not

be barr ed

f ro m ind ep en de nt l iti ga tio n by the f ai lur e of apr ivate pla int if

f. T his principle is based prim arily upon the rec ogni tion th at the U nited23

St at es ha s an in te re st i n e nf or ci ng f ed er al lawthat i s in de pe nde nt o f a n y c l a i ms o f

p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s . I n th e p r e s e n tc o n t e x tth e S up r e me Co urt ha s c hara ct er iz ed

thi s a s “ the hig he st p ubl ic int er es t i n th e due ob se rv an ce o f al l co ns ti tu ti on al gu aran te es .” Id . a t 58 ( quot ing U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ra ine s, 362 U . S. 17, 80 S . Ct . 519 , 4 L . E d. 2d 524 (196 0)) (c itations om itted). I t is precisely this pu blic interest function th at dis tin gui she s go ve rn m en ta l a ge nc ie s f ro m pr ivate li tig an ts, and the E E O C i s certa inly no exception to the principle that these agencies have responsib ilities w ithasc ope f

ar be y ond the le ga l i nte re sts of ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff

s. In fac t, a s the Suprem e Court has observed about th e statutory responsib ilities of the EE OC: A lth oughthe E E O C c anse cure spe ci fi c re lie f, suc h a s hi ri ng o r re ins ta te m en t, c onstru ct ive se nio ri ty , or dam ag es f

or ba ck pay or be ne fi ts d en ie d, on b eh al f of dis cr im inatio n vi ct im s, the a ge nc y is gui de d by “ the ove rr idi ng p ubl ic int er es t i n e qua l e m plo ym en t oppo rtunity

. . . asserted through direct Federa l enforcem ent.” When the E E O C a ct s, a lbe it at

the be he st o f an d f

or the be ne fi t of

spe ci fi c ind ivi dua ls, it

a ct s a lso to vin dic at e the pub lic int er es t i n pr ev en tin g em pl oym en t d is cri m in at io n. G en er al T el . Co . of

the N orthw es t, I nc . v. E E O C, 446 U . S. 318 , 326 , 100 S . Ct . 1698 , 1704, 64 L. Ed. 2d 319 (quoting 118 Cong . R ec. 4941 (1972)). T he E E O C h as br oa d auth or ity to en fo rc e em

plo ym en t l awa s it

se es f it, goi ng b ey ond the r igh ts o f ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff s. A s it s auth or iz ing statut e say s: The C omm issio n shall have po we r --24

(1) to cooperate w ith and, with their consent, utilize r egional, State, loc al , and o the r ag en ci es , both publi c an d pr ivate , and i ndi vid ua ls; (2) to pay to witnesses whose depositio ns are taken or who are s u mmo n e db e f

o r e th e C o mmi s s i o n o r

an y o f i t s a g e n t s th e s a me w itn es s and m ile ag e fe es a s are pa id t o w itn es se s in the c ourts o f the U nit ed S ta te s; (3) to furnish to persons subject to this subchapter such technical as sis tanc e as the y

m ay r eque st t o f

urthe r the ir

c om pli an ce w iththi s subchapt er or an order issued thereunder; (4 ) uponthe r eque st o f (i ) an y e m plo y er , w hose e m

plo y ee s or

som e of t h e m, o r ( i i ) an y l ab o r

o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h o s e me mb e r s o r s o me o f th e m, re fu se or thr eate n to r ef

use to co ope rate in ef

fe ct ua tin g th e pr ovi sio ns of thi s su bc ha pte r, to as sis t i n su che ff

ec tuatio n by

c onc ili at ionor such oth er r em edial action as is provid ed by this su bchapter; (5 ) to m ak e suc h te ch nic al stu die s a s are appr opr ia te to ef fe ct ua te the pur pose s and p oli ci es of

thi s su bc ha pte r an d to m ak e the r es ult s of such stu dies available to the pub lic; (6 ) to i nte rv en e in a

c ivi l a ct ionbr ough t un de r se ct ion200 0e -5 of thi s tit le by an a ggr ie ve d party

a ga ins t a r es pond en t othe r than a gove rn m en t, gov er

nm en ta l a ge nc y

or pol iti ca l su

bdi vis ion . 42 U . S. C. A . § 20 00e -4 (g ). A ll of the se pow er s e xte nd f

ar be y ond the auth or ity given to indiv idual aggrieved plain tiffs. The enforcem ent provisi on of the Equal E m plo ym en t O ppor

tun iti es sub ch ap te r of

the F ed er al Co de say s th at “ [t ] he Co m m iss ionis em

pow er ed , a s he re ina ft er

pr ovi de d, to pr ev en t any pe rs on f ro m en ga gin g inany

unl aw fu l e m

plo ym en t pr ac tic e. ” I d. § 20 00e -5 (a ) (e m pha sis ad de d) . If co nc il ia ti on effo rts be twee n a n e m pl oyer an d e m

pl oyees fa il , th e EEOC m ay a lso se ek c la ssw ide r el ie f w ith out

be ing c er tif ie d a s ac la ss r ep re se ntativ e under Fed. R. Civ. P ro. 23. See id. § 2000e-5(f)( 1); Ge n. T el. Co., 446 U.S . at25

320; se e al so i d. § 20 00e -5 (b )- (g ) (d et ai lin g th e E E O C’ s e nf or ce m en t po w er s and the ty pe s of r el ie f it m ay

obt ai n purs uant t o it s st at uto ry auth or ity ). O r, a s th e Se ve nthCi rc uit

ha s pu t i t, “ [t ] he E E O C’ s pr im ar y r ole is that of

alawe nf or ce m en t ag en cy and i t i s m er el y

ade ta il that i t pay s ov er

any m one tary

r el ie f obt ai ne d to the vic tim s of

the de fe ndant’ s vi olatio n r athe r than po ck et ing the m one y it se lf and puttin g th em

to the bothe r of

sui ng s ep ar at el y . ” I n r e Be m is C o. , I nc . , 279 F . 3d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 2002 ). In this case, the EE OC has convin cingly established th at its enforcem ent role is incom patible with a finding that its authority to bring an en fo rc em en t a ct ionis barr ed by aj udgm en t i n apr ivate sui t. W e add that the courts have concluded th at the E EO C m ay proceed w ith an en fo rcem en t ac ti on ev en wher e th e ch arg in g p art y ’s act io n h as be en res ol ve d. Re ce ntl y , in E E O C v . W af fl e H ouse , I nc . , 534 U . S. 279 , 122 S . Ct . 754 , 151 L . E d. 2d 7 55 ( 2002 ), the S upr em e Co urt he ld that the c harg ing party ’ s a gr ee m en t t o arbitrate c laim s did no t lim it the EE OC’ s authority to bring su it, although it was still “ an open quest ion whether a settlem ent or arbitration j udgm ent would affe ct the validityof the E EO C’ s claim or the chara cter of relief the EE OC m ay seek.” Id. at 297, 122 S. Ct. at 766. In a dditi on, the form er F ifth Circuit has held that

“ af te r the te rm inatio n of

ac harg ing party ’ s pr ivate sui t the E E O C c anbr ing sui t pr ed ic at ed

on, but not li m ite d to , the sam e ch ar ge . ” E E O C v . H utt ig S as h & D oor26

Co., 511 F.2d 453, 454 (5th Cir. 1975 ). In that case, the previous su it had been vol unt ar ily

dis m iss ed

w ithpr ej udi ce . I d. St il l o th er co ur ts ha ve reac he d s im il ar re su lt s, re jecti ng pre cl us io n o f EEOC suits because of prior private actions against th e sam e defe ndants. See Ne w Orle an s St eam sh ip Ass ’n v. EEOC, 68 0 F .2d23 , 25 (5t h C ir. 1 98 2) (“ [T]he EEOC m ay c ha lle nge atr an sa ct ionw hic h w as the sub j ec t of pr ior j udi ci al sc ru tiny

in a pr ivate sui t, if

the sub se que nt c ha lle nge se ek s di ff er en t r el ie f. ”) ; E E O C v . K im be rl y -C lark

Co rp . , 511 F . 2d 1 352, 136 1- 62 ( 6thCi r. 197 5) ( hol din g th at the E E O C w as not

pr ivy to a pr ivate se ttl em en t) ; se e al so E E O C v . H ar ri s C he rn in, In c. , 10 F . 3d 1 286, 129 1 ( 7thCi r. 199 3) ( hol din g th at the re w as no p ri vity be tw ee n asin gle pla int if

f an d th e E E O C a ct ing sol el y on h is b eh al f ins of

ar a s th e relief the EE OC soug ht was not indiv idual dam ages and reinstatem ent but rather aninj unc tio n a ga ins t f

urthe r vio la tio n) ; E E O C v . G oody ear A er ospa ce Co rp . , 813 F. 2d 15 39, 1542-43 (9th Cir. 1987 ) (sam e). If the E E O C m ay

pur sue a ct ionon b eh al f of asol e pe rs on whose pr ivate sui t ha s be enr es olv ed , the n it w oul d be tr

uly anom al ous to h old

that the E E O C c oul d be barr ed f ro m br ing ing a ct ionhe re , w he n it is ac tin g onbe ha lf

of m an y pe opl e who w ere not parties at all in the previous action. T he oppo site is equally true; re sol uti on o f anE E O C c as e doe s no t ne ce ssari ly bar pr ivate sui t f

ro m the pe rs on27

on whose be ha lf

the E E O C o ri gin al ly

a ct ed . E ve n w he n th e E E O C’ s so le ba sis f or suit is th e allegations of one indi vidu al, final j udgm ent on that claim does not b ar he r fr om sui ng p ri va te ly

in thi s C ir cu it. I n R idd le v. Ce rr o W ir e an d C ab le G ro up, In c. , 902 F . 2d 9 18 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) , an e m plo y ee w as uns at isf

ie d w ithac onse nt de gr ee a gr ee d up on b y

the E E O C, a ct ing on h er be ha lf , and h er e m plo y er . S he thus filed her own Title V II suit, and her em ploy er argued that res j udicata barre d her ac tion. The district court agreed and granted sum m ary j udgm ent, but a panel o f t h i s Ci rc u i tre v er s ed , f i n d i n g th at th er e w as n o p ri v i t y. Id . a t9 2 2 -2 3 . We re ac he d th is r es ult

e ve n th ough“ the E E O C’ s su it ag ai nst Ce rr o w as ba se d so le ly on Riddl e’ s charge of discrim ination ; it did no t invo lve a class of e m ploy ees or an allegation of pattern and practice discrim ination ,” and the consent decree

“ spe ci fi ca lly

pr ovi de d pe rs ona l r el ie f fo r Ri ddl e. ” I d. a t 92 2. A ga in, the Co urt art ic ulate d ho wthe int er es ts o f the ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff and the EE OC differ: T he E E O C i s pr im ar ily

int er es te d inse curi ng e qua l e m plo ym en t oppo rt uni ty in the w orkpl ac e. T ha t i nte re st i s of te n m ost c om ple te ly advanc ed thr oughc onc ili at iona gr ee m en ts o r co nse nt d ec re es of the kindinvol ved in thi s case, wher e the em ploy er a grees to take broad re m ed ia l st ep s to e ra dic at e dis cr im inatio n. T he a ggr ie ve d in div idu al , on the oth er hand, is prim arily interested in securing specific personal re lie f of the kin d R idd le is se ek ing in he r pr ivate a ct iona ga ins t C er ro .28

Id . a t 92 2- 23. A lth oughthe sui ts a ga ins t P em co a lso dif fe r ins of ar a s th e pr ivate suit cam e first, that fact m akes the case f or a finding of privityeven we aker. A fter all, since the E EO C is capable of see king broader r elief than an individual plaintiff m ay achieve, if there is no priv ity when the nar

rowe r suit follows the broader cl ai m , itm ak es no sen se forth ere t o b e p riv it y when th e b ro ad er s ui t co m es lat er. Ina ddi tio n to the E E O C’ s own br oa d m an da te , the re are a lso 165 or m or e A fr ic an A m er ic ane m

plo y ee s of

P em co w ho d id n ot p ar

tic ipate in the or igi na l su it (thoug h the y m igh t have be enc ove re d by it ha d th e pla int if

fs not dr oppe d th ei r cl as s a ct ion due to Pem co’ s oppo sition ). Ur ging us not to follow the prec edents working against it , P em co argues that this is a ca se of first im pression because the private suit was ended with a j ury verdict, while m ost of the oth er r elevant previous cases invo lving the EE OC we re settled or arbitrated. Pem co point s particularly to Huttig Sash, which was volu ntarily

dism issed, and in which the court, in deny ing privi ty , w arned that “ an em plo y er m igh t se ek

to se ttl e a part ic ular ind ivi dua l’ s gr ie vanc e in o rd er to prevent the EE OC from

bringing suit on other discrim inatory practice s discov ered in inv estigating the original charge.” H uttig Sash, 511 F.2d at 455. Pem co ap pe al s to thi s c onc er

n to hig hli ght

the f ac t tha t i t m ay

be le ss o f a w or

ry w he n th e pr ior a ct ionis re sol ve d by

aj ur y ve rd ic t r athe r than by

m utu al ly a gr ee d- upon29

se ttl em en t. H ow ev er , asim ilar dange r ex ist s e ve n w he n th e pr ior a ct ionis fu lly contested to a jury

verdict, because the private plaintiffs m ight h ave fe we r re sour ce s, le ss e xpe ri en ce d or able a tto rn ey s, or

w eake r le ga l c la im s th andoe s th e EEOC. A s th is r ev ie wof

the c as e lawm ak es abund an tly c le ar , the ove rwhe lm ing w ei ght of pr ec ed en t i n th is C ir cu it an d e lse w he re w ei ghs he av ily a ga ins t f ind ing pr ivi ty be tw ee n th e E E O C and the pr ivate pla int if fs . T he E E O C’ s c om

pr eh en siv e m an da te and a

uth or ity to pe tit ionf

or br oa d in j unc tiv e an d pe cuniary

r el ie f stands in s tark c ontra st t o th e int er es ts o f ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff s ine m plo ym en t a ct ion s. Fi na lly , our

hol din g is part ic ularl y

w ar rante d inli ght

of the e qui tie s of

thi s ca se , w hic h w ei gh s tr ongl y a ga ins t a f ind ing of pr ivi ty . A s Ju sti ce S ton e put it ,

“ [i] t is a principle of general a pplication in Anglo-Am erican jurisprudence that one is not bound b y

aj udgm en t i n pe rs onam

in a lit igatio n inw hic h he is not de sig na te d a s aparty

or to w hic h he ha s no t be enm ad e a party by se rv ic e of pr oc es s. ” H an sbe rr

y v. L ee , 311 U . S. 32, 40, 615 S . Ct . 115 , 117 ( 1940 ) (c iti ng Pennoy er v. Ne ff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (187 7)). Pem co did its b est to keep the EE OC out of the origin al litigation , obj ecting strenuou sly that allowing it in as a party w oul d c re at e anund

uly bur de nsom e tr ia l and “pow er fu lly ” pr ej udi ce the de fe ndant. N owP em co is tr y ing to bin d th e E E O C t o th e adve rs e re sul t i n th e sui t30

th atitsu cces sf

ul ly kep t t he EEOC from pa rti ci pa ti ng in . Thatres ul t wo ul d, we thi nk, se t a

gr oss ly ine qui ta ble pr ec ed en t: it w oul d op enthe doo r fo r de fe ndants to se ekto ke ep th e EEOC ou t o f pr iv at e li ti ga ti on , and th entry to p recl ud e th e EEOC -- which m ay

have m ore re sources and effe ctive legal repre sentation, and therefore a be tte r ch an ce of

w inn ing a t tri al , than pr ivate pla int if fs do - - fr om

sui ng o n it s ow n. A llo w ing the r es olu tio n of apr ivate sui t t o bar a fe de ra l a ge nc y ’ s se parate ac tio n “ w oul d im

pose an on er ous an d e xte nsi ve bur de n up on the U nit ed S ta te s to m oni tor pr ivate li tig at ionin or de r to e nsur e that po ssi ble m ish an dli ng o f a cl ai m by apr ivate pla int if

f co uld be c or re ct ed by int er ve nti on. ” E as t B at on R ouge Pari sh S ch . Bd . , 594 F . 2d at 58 . T his c oul d se ve re ly c urta il the e nf

or ce m en t powers of the E EO C and other governm ental agencies by allowing the dism issal of their case s due to the result of litig ation ov er which they have no control. In thi s c as e the r es ult

w e re ac h is not

dif fi cu lt be ca

use w e can f

ind ne ith er the ind ic ia of “ vi rtu al rep res en ta ti on ” n orth os e o f “ co nt ro l.” Insho rt , w e ar e pe rs ua de d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt c le ar ly

e rr ed in fi ndi ng pr ivi ty be tw ee n th e E E O C and the T hom as pla int if fs . Mo re ove r, it

se em s to us w hol ly ine qui ta ble to hol d th e E E O C b ound by the r es ult in a ca se that i t w as not allowed to take part in. Bec ause there is no privity betwee n the parties, w e need not and d o not exam ine the other factors nec essary to find res j udicata or collatera l31

es top pe l. T he dis tr ic t c ourt, in en te ri ng j udgm en t a ga ins t the E E O C, not ed w ry ly that “ [a ] ft er

asuf fi ci en t num

be r of ba ttl es , e ve n th e H at fi el ds and M cC oy s pu t down their guns.” Slip op. at 7. In this case, however, the district court erroneously

prevented the McCoy s from picking up their guns in the first place. REVERSED an d R EMANDED.