N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e , v. XIAOYING TANG DOW AI, De fe nda n t-Appe l la

nt. No. 14-10277

D.C . No. 1:13-c r-00014-R

VM -1
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of the Northe rn M ariana Isla nds R am ona V. M an glona , C hie f Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d

June 15, 2016 Honolulu, Ha

wa ii B e fore : THOM AS, C hie f Judge , a nd C ALLAHAN a

nd M U R GUIA, C irc uit Judge s . Xia oy ing Ta

ng Dowa i (“ Tang” ), a

native of C hina , a

ppe a ls he r c onvic tions for visa fra u d, m aking a fa lse sta

te m e nt, a nd c onspira c y to de fraud the Unite d Sta t e s. On a

ppe a l, in a ddition to c ha lle nging thea uthority of the Northe rn M ariana 

# F IL ED
OCT 17 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.Isla

nds Distric t C ourt (“

NM I Distric t C ourt” ) to try he r, 1 she a s se rts tha

t: (1) the re
wa s insuffic ie nt e vide n c e to c onvic t he r due to a la c k of e vide nc e c onne c t ing he r to the fa lse sta

te m e nt in theI-130 form ; (2) the distric t c ourt e rre d in re fusing he r instruc tions on m a te ria lity and m arria ge ; a

nd (3) following Unite d

State s v . W indsor , 133 S. C t. 2675 (2013), the unde rly ing sta

tute de fining m arria ge is
unc onstitutiona

lly va gue and viola

te s due proc e s s. W e a ffirm he r c onvic tion. 1. Tang c la im s tha

t the re wa s insuffic ie nt e vide n c e to support he r c onvic tion for visa fra u d. She argue s tha

t a ne c e ssa ry e le m e n t of C ount II wa s not only knowle dge tha

t Dowa i m a de a

fa lse sta te m e nt on his I-130 form , but a lso “ spe c ific knowle dge tha

t he did so unde r pe na lty

of pe rjury .” Ta

ng a d m its tha t the re is no doubt tha t Dowa i m a de a

fa lse sta te m e nt tha

t the y ha d live d toge t he r, but a sse rts that “ the re is no e v ide nc e from whic h it c an be infe rre d . . . tha t [she ] kne w tha

t the form c onta ine d e ithe r this que stion or this a nswe r, m uc h le ss tha

t the answe r
wa s give n unde r pe na lty

of pe rjury .” She furthe r a sse rts tha t the re is no e vide nc e that she signe d the doc um e nts. W e re vie w de novo the de nia l of a m otion for a c q

uitta l ba se d on the suffic i e nc y

of the e v ide nc e . Unite d

State s v . Tuc k e r , 133 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th C ir.

1 W e re

je c t this c ha lle nge in a

publishe d opinion file d c onc urre ntly with this m e m orandum

disposition. 21998). Howe ve r, a m otion for a c quitta l c an not be grante d if “ a fte r vie wing the
e vide nc e in the light m o st fa vora ble to the prose c u tion, a

ny ra tiona l trie r of fa c t
c ould ha v e found the e sse ntia l e le m e nts of the c rim e be y ond a re a sona ble doubt.” Id . (quoting J

ac k son v . Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). De spite Ta

ng’ s a rgum e nts to the c ontra

ry , the re is m o re tha

n suffic ie nt
e vide nc e from whic h the jury c ould ha ve found tha

t she kne w of the
m isinform a tion in the

a pplic a tion a

nd tha t it wa s a sse rte d unde r pe na lty of pe rjury
. Am ong the e vide nc e supporting suc h a finding is he r signa ture on the I-485 form in rom an (English) c ha

ra c te rs just be low a

pe na lty of pe rjury

wa rning, a nd the fa c t that Ta ng a nd he r boy frie nd ga

ve Dowa i a

pre -c om ple te d I-130 form

tha t ha d a sim ila r pe na lty of pe rjury warning. Give n a ll the unc onte ste d e v ide nc e of he r
e fforts to sta

y in the Unite d State s through he r m arria ge to Dowa i , the jury , ha ving vie w e d he r on the sta

n d at tria l, re a sona

bly c o uld ha ve infe rre d that she c ould, in fa c t , re a d and unde rsta

nd English—

a s she indic a t e d on the I-485 form

— de spite he r
use of a tra nsla tor at tria l . In sum , a “ ra tiona l trie r of fa c t c o uld ha ve found the
e sse ntia l e le m e nts of the c rim e be y ond a re a s ona ble doubt.” J

ac k son , 443 U.S. a

t 319. 2. Tang c onte nde d at tria l tha t a ny m isre pre se ntation she m a de a b out the
m arria ge wa s im

m a te ria l , “ be c a

use , if the truth we re told— i.e
. , tha t she an d
3[Dowa i] , a lthough the y did not live

toge the r, ne ve rthe le s s did inte nd to e s ta blish a life toge the r a t the tim e of the ir m arria ge
— she would still ha ve be e n e ligible for the v isa she sought, be c a

use inte nt to e sta

blish a life toge the r— a ny kind of life , howe v e r, unusua l or unc onve ntiona l— is a ll tha t is re quire d for e ligibility .” Tang propose d an instruc tion on m a te ria l ity , whic h sta te d tha t “ a fa c t suppre sse d or
m issta te d is not m a te ria l to a

n a lie n’ s e ntry , unle ss it is one whic h, if known, would have justifie d a

re fusa l to issue

the visa , or one whic h, if known, would ha ve ra ise d
a fa i r infe re nc e tha

t a sta tutory disqua lify ing fa c t a c tua l ly e x iste d.” W e re vie w de novo whe the r the distric t c o urt’ s jury instruc tions a d e quate ly pre s e nte d the de fe nda

nt’ s the o ry

of the c a se and whe the r the distric t c ourt pre s e nte d the jury with e ve ry e l e m e nt of the c rim e . Unite d State s v . J inian , 725 F.3d 954, 960 (9th C ir. 2013). If the distric t c ourt’ s instruc tions fa irly an d
a de quate ly

c ove re d the e le m e nts of the offe nse , we re v i e w the instruc tions’ pre c ise form ulat ion for a

n a buse of disc re tion. 2 Id
. The distric t c ourt prope rly de c line d Tang’ s propose d instruc tion on
m a te ria l ity

be c a use it de fine d “ m a t e ria lity ” too na rrowly
. Ta

ng ha d a sse rte d tha

t a

2 In a ddition, the

gove rnm e nt c onte nds tha t Ta n g’ s a rgum e nt c onc e rning the m ate ria l i ty e le m e nt of § 371 should be re vie we d only

for pla in e rror be c a use Ta ng did not make that pa

rtic ula r argum e n t in the distric t c ourt. W e do not re a c h this issue

a s Ta ng’ s a rgum e nt fa i ls unde r de novo re vie w.

4fa lse sta

te m e nt is m a te ria l only

if it “ ra ise d a

fa i r infe re nc e tha

t a sta tutory disqua lify ing fa c t a c tua lly e xiste d,” but the instruc tion give n by the distric t c ourt prope rly de fine d a fa lse sta t e m e nt a s m a te ria l if it “ h a s a natura l te nde n c y

to influe n c e .” Se e De nnis v
. Unite d State s , 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966) (“ It ha s long be e n e s ta blishe d tha

t this sta t utory la ngua g e is not c onfine d to fra ud a s tha t te rm ha s be e n de fine d in the c om m on la w. It re a c he s a

ny c onspira c y

for the purpose of im pa iring, obstruc ting, or de fe a ting the la wful func tion of a

ny de pa rtm e nt of gove rnm e nt.” ) (inte rna l quota tion m arks om itte d); se e also K ungy s v . Unite d State s, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)) (de fining “ m a te ria l” fa lse sta te m e nt a s one tha

t

“ ha s a natura l te n de nc y

to influe nc e , or wa s c a

pa ble of influe nc ing, the de c ision of the d e c isionm aking body

to whic h it wa s a ddre s se d” (inte rna l quota tion m arks
om i tte d)); Unite d State

s v . C he n , 324 F.3d 1103, 1104 (9th C ir. 2003). The distric t c ourt did not err in de c lining Ta ng’ s propose d m arria ge instruc tion a s it would only have be e n a

ppropria te if he r m a te ria lity

instruc tion wa s prope r. 3. Tang a rgue s tha t he r a lle ge d m isre pre se ntations a re im m a te ria l be c a

use the s tat utory de finition of m arria ge is unc onstitutiona lly va gue and viola

te s due proc e s s following Unite d State s v . W indsor , 133 S. C t . 2675 (2013). Shenote s tha t the s tat ute s (8 U.S.C . §§ 1154 a

nd 1151) de fine “ im

m e diate re lative s” to inc lude
5“ spouse s.” Ta ng a rgue s tha t Lutw a k v . Unite d State

s , 344 U.S. 604 (1953) a

nd Bark v . IN S , 511 F.2d 1200 (9th C ir. 1975), whic h de fine spouse s, c annot survive W indsor . Ta

n g furthe r note s tha

t the re gula

tion of m arria ge s is ordina rily within the p rovinc e of sta

te s a nd tha t following W

i ndsor ’ s re a s oning for striking down the fe de ra l De fe nse of M arria ge Ac t, a ny a tte m pt to inc orporate the sta

t e s’ diffe re nt
re gula tions of m a

rria ge into fe d e ra l im

m i gra tion la

w is unc onstitutiona

l. W e re vie w the c onstitutiona lity of a sta t ute de novo. Unite d State s v . Harris , 185 F.3d 999, 1003 (9th C ir. 1999). W e a gre e with the gove rnm e nt tha t the le ga lity

of a m arria ge and a

“ bona fide de sire to e sta

b lish a life toge the r” are distinc t issue s. In Agy e m an v . IN S , 296 F.3d 871, 879 n.2 (9th C ir. 2002), we note d tha t for a m arria ge to c o nfe r im m igration be ne fits, it m

ust be le ga lly

va lid and “ the c ouple m

ust ha ve m arrie d out of a

bona fide de sire to e sta

blish a life toge the r, not to e va de im m igration la

ws.” W indsor doe s not a lte r our position be c a use , for purpose s of our im m igration la ws, it re de fine d the “ le ga l va lidity ” prong of the de finition of marria ge , but did not a lte r the “ bona

fide de s ire to e sta

blish a life toge the r” re q

uire m e nt. Inde e d, W indsor a ffirm e d tha

t “ [i] n a ddre ssing theinte ra c tion of sta t e dom e stic re l a tions
and fe de ra l im

m igration la

w C ongre ss de te rm ine d tha t m arria g e s ‘ e nte re d into for the p urpose of proc uring a n a lie n’ s a dm ission [to the Unite d State s] a s a

n
6im

m igra nt’ will not qua

lify the nonc itiz e n for tha

t sta tus, e ve n if the nonc itiz e n’ s
m arria ge is va lid a

nd prope r for state -law purpose s.” W indsor , 133 S. C t. at 2690. Tang ha s not m a de a

pe rsua sive c a s e for va g ue ne s s. The e v ide nc e indic a t e s that Ta ng a nd he r boy frie nd C hic o a

pproa c he d Dowa i with theinte n t to e va de the im m igration la

ws. The e vide nc e is ove rwhe lm ing tha t Ta ng’ s m arria ge to Dowa i
wa s not ba se d on a

de sire to e sta

blish a life toge the r but wa s sole ly de s igne d to
e va de im m igration la

ws. W e find tha

t the re wa s suffic ie nt e vide n c e to c onvic t Ta ng, tha t the distric t
c ourt did not err in re fusing he r instruc tions on m a te ria lity and m arria ge , a

nd tha t the unde rly ing sta

t utory de finition of m arria ge is not unc o nstitutiona lly va gue . For the s e re a s ons a

nd for the re a sons se t forth in our c onc urre ntly file d opinion, Ta

ng’ s
c onvic tion is AFFIRM E D
.

7