NO. 4-03-0150

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

HELEN K. BRUCE,

          Plaintiff-Appellee,

          v.

JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, 

State of Illinois,

          Defendant-Appellant.	)

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)	  Appeal from

  Circuit Court of 

  Sangamon County

  No. 02MR340

  Honorable

  Leslie Graves,

  Judge Presiding.

________________________________________________________________

		JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

		Illinois Secretary of State, Jesse White (Secretary),

appeals a Sangamon County circuit court order, reversing his June

13, 2002, order that denied the petition for the rescission of an

order of suspension filed by plaintiff, Helen K. Bruce.  We

reverse the circuit court's judgment and reinstate the Secre

tary's denial of plaintiff's petition.

	I. BACKGROUND

		Plaintiff was born in July 1967 and got her first

driver's license at age 16 under the name Helen K. Chamberlin. 

On June 4, 1989, plaintiff received a suspension for failing to

appear, which was cleared on August 12, 1998.  In August 1990,

plaintiff got married and changed her name to Helen K. Bruce.  In

1995, she obtained a driver's license in her married name.  

		Pursuant to section 6-206(a)(9) of the Illinois Vehicle

Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(9) (West Supp. 1997)),

the Secretary entered an order of suspension, effective June 10,

1998, based on plaintiff's "having made a false statement or knowingly concealed a material fact or having used false informa

tion or identification in an application for a license, identifi

cation card[,] or permit."  The suspension had a termination date

of June 10, 1999.  The Secretary also entered an order, effective

June 15, 1998, cancelling plaintiff's driver's license because

section 6-103(3) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-103(3) (West

Supp. 1997)) prohibited her from obtaining a license during a

period of suspension.

		In April 2002, pursuant to section 2-118 of the Vehicle

Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118 (West 2002)), plaintiff filed a request

for a formal hearing, seeking to clear her record of the 1998

suspension.  On May 3, 2003, the hearing officer, Gary Cline, held a hearing. 

Plaintiff first testified she got a driver's license in her

married name at the time of her August 1990 marriage.  She later

testified she got a driver's license in her married name in 1995. 

She explained that she did not drive after she got married

because she lived in Chicago, and her husband did all of the

driving.    

		When she got her driver's license in her married name,

plaintiff recalled an employee filling out the application and

asking her several questions, including whether her license had

ever been suspended, to which she replied no.  When presented

with the application, plaintiff stated it was her signature on

the application.  Plaintiff denied knowing at that time that her

license was suspended. 

		In 1998, a police officer pulled plaintiff over and informed her that her license was suspended.  She called the

Secretary's office and learned she had failed to pay a ticket. 

According to the certification of traffic violation disposition,

on July 21, 1998, plaintiff paid the fine for a case disposed of

on March 22, 1989.  She did not remember getting the 1989 ticket. 

Plaintiff testified she never got notice the Secretary suspended

her license and did not know of the suspension when she obtained

her driver's license in her married name.  She also denied

knowingly making a false statement to the Secretary's office. 

Plaintiff admitted she had moved a lot and had not notified the

Secretary's office of her address changes.  However, she did have

her mail forwarded.  Plaintiff also testified she did not recall

moving for a period of time when she did not have a driver's

license.

		After the hearing, the hearing officer entered an

order, finding, inter alia, the following:  (1) plaintiff admit ted she applied for a driver's license on February 21, 1995, in

the name of Helen K. Bruce; (2) plaintiff answered no to the

application's question of whether her driver's license had "'...***

ever been suspended, revoked, cancelled[,] or refused in any

state under this or any other name?'"; (3) plaintiff also admitted

she previously held a license in the name Helen K. Chamberlain;

(4) that license was suspended on June 4, 1989, pursuant to

section 6-306.3 of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95

1/2, par. 6-306.3), when plaintiff failed to appear in court on a

traffic citation where she had posted her driver's license in lieu of bail; (5) plaintiff did not deny the suspension was

entered but did deny she was aware of the suspension when she

applied for a license in February 1995; (6) plaintiff's demeanor

was indignant; and (7) plaintiff's testimony was not credible.    

		The hearing officer concluded plaintiff failed to meet

her burden of proof, noting that, if plaintiff did not receive

the notice of the 1989 suspension, it was because she failed to

fulfill her obligation of informing the Secretary of her change

in address.  He also noted plaintiff did not have a license in

her possession for nearly six years.   

		On June 13, 2002, the Secretary adopted the hearing

officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law and thus denied

plaintiff's petition.

		On June 26, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint in the

circuit court pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS

5/3-101 through 3-113 (West 2002)), seeking review of the Secre

tary's decision.  After a January 2003 hearing, the circuit court

reversed the Secretary's June 13, 2002, decision; reversed the

June 1998 order suspending plaintiff's driver's license; and

ordered the June 1998 suspension stricken from plaintiff's

record.  This appeal followed. 

	II. ANALYSIS

		A reviewing court may not overturn an administrative

agency's decision unless the administrative agency exercised its

authority in an arbitrary and capricious manner or its decision

was against the manifest weight of the evidence.  An administra tive agency's findings and conclusions on questions of fact are

prima facie true and correct.  If anything in the record fairly supports the agency's decision, that decision is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.  Mohr v. White, 324 Ill. App. 3d 643, 647, 756 N.E.2d 434, 437 (2001).  Additionally, we review

the administrative agency's decision and not the circuit court's

decision.  Mefford v. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d 167, 173, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (2002). 

		Initially, we begin by setting forth who had the burden

of proof at the hearing and what the standard of proof was.  In

this case, plaintiff had the burden of proof to demonstrate she

was entitled to rescission of the suspension order.  See 92 Ill.

Adm. Code §1001.100(s) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002). 

Citing Sutton v. Edgar, 147 Ill. App. 3d 723, 498 N.E.2d 295 (1986), and section 1001.440(b) of Title 92 of the Illinois

Administrative Code (Administrative Code) (92 Ill. Adm. Code

§1001.440(b) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002)), the hearing

officer found the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard was the

appropriate standard of proof.  However, section 1001.100(s) of

Title 92 of the Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm. Code

§1001.100(s) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002)) provides that,

at formal hearings of the Secretary, "[t]he standard of proof is

the preponderance of the evidence, except as provided for in

[s]ubpart D [(92 Ill. Adm. Code §§1001.400 through 1001.490

(Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002))]."  The provisions of

[s]ubpart D that provide for a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard do not apply to this case.  See 92 Ill. Adm. Code

§1001.420 (restricted driving permits), §1001.430 (reinstatement

of driving privileges after revocation), §1001.440 (alcohol- and

drug-related revocations, suspensions, and cancellations),

§1001.485 (reinstatement application based upon another state's

issuance of a driver's license) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January

2002)).  Moreover, Sutton addressed the standard of proof as provided for in a former version of section 1001.100 of Title 92

of the Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm. Code §1001.100(8)

(1984)), which has sinceubsequently been amended.  See Sutton, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 729, 498 N.E.2d at 299.  Accordingly, plaintiff had to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to

rescission of the 1998 suspension.

		While the hearing officer applied the incorrect stan

dard of proof, that misapplication does not require reversal of

the Secretary's denial of the petition.  At the hearing, plain

tiff did not dispute the fact that her driver's license was

suspended in 1995 when she applied for a driver's license in her

married name.  Moreover, she admitted that, on the 1995 driver's

license application, she answered no to the question of whether

her driver's license had ever been suspended.  Her only argument

for rescission was that she did not know her license was sus

pended when she answered no on the application.  

		Section 6-206(a)(9) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-

206(a)(9) (West Supp. 1997)) allows the Secretary to suspend a

person's driving privileges, without a preliminary hearing, upon a showing of the person's records or other sufficient evidence

that the person "[h]as made a false statement or knowingly

concealed a material fact or has used false information or

identification in any application for a license, identification

card, or permit."  Section 6-206(a)(9) does not contain any

language that the person had to know or should have known he or

she was making a false statement.  

		Plaintiff cites Prime Leasing, Inc. v. Kendig, 332 Ill. App. 3d 300, 773 N.E.2d 84 (2002), in support of her assertion that she must have knowingly made the false statement.  However,

Prime Leasing addressed the common-law action of fraud, not the Secretary's authority to suspend a person's driving privileges. 

See Prime Leasing, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 308-09, 773 N.E.2d at 92.

		Other provisions in the Vehicle Code do not require

knowledge of a suspension of driving privileges.  For example,

the offense of driving while license is suspended is a strict

liability offense, which only requires proof of the act of

driving while privileges are suspended.  Thus, evidence of the

defendant's actual receipt of notice or knowledge of suspension

is immaterial.  People v. Johnson, 170 Ill. App. 3d 828, 832, 525 N.E.2d 546, 550 (1988).

		We find section 6-206(a)(9) of the Vehicle Code (625

ILCS 5/6-206(a)(9) (West Supp. 1997)) only requires evidence that

a person made a false statement in an application for a license,

identification card, or permit.  Knowledge that the statement was

false is immaterial.  Thus, even if plaintiff lacked knowledge of the 1989 suspension, the Secretary still had the authority to

suspend her license under section 2-602(a)(9).  Accordingly,

plaintiff failed to prove she was entitled to rescission. 

	III. CONCLUSION

		For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court's

judgment and reinstate the Secretary's decision of the Secretary.

		Circuit court rReversed; Secretary's decision rein

stated.

		STEIGMANN and APPLETON, JJ., concur.