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Filed 4/18/13 In re Ronin D. CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Placer) 

In re RONIN D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law. 

AMANDA D., 

 Petitioner and Respondent, 

 v. 

ALICIA O., 

 Objector and Appellant. 

C072206 

(Super. Ct. No. SAD0003019) 

 Alicia O., the mother of three-year-old Ronin D., appeals from an order of the 

Placer County Superior Court freeing Ronin from her custody and control and 

terminating her parental rights. (Fam. Code,1 § 7822, subd. (a)(3).) The court found that 

mother, with intent to abandon Ronin, had left him in the care and custody of his father, 

James D., for more than a year while maintaining only token communication with Ronin 

and providing him only token and de minimis support. (Ibid.) 

 

1 Further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2 

 On appeal, mother contends (1) the trial court failed to consider whether Ronin’s 

interests required the appointment of independent counsel, and (2) the court failed to read 

and consider the investigation report. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Mother and father met at a 12-step program and moved in together. Within a few 

months, he suspected that she had resumed using drugs. Mother moved out of their 

shared residence, but she returned when father learned that she was pregnant with Ronin. 

They lived together with a single father, Patrick F., and his young daughter. 

 Ronin was born in June 2009. Father again suspected that mother was using 

drugs, and he again asked her to leave. In August 2009, when Ronin was about two 

months old, mother left Ronin with father. She moved, first, to the residence of some 

friends; and then to the residence of her parents. That same month, father filed in family 

law court for sole legal and physical custody of Ronin. 

 For a few months after mother and father separated, she babysat Ronin at his 

residence while father was at work. Mother brought no food or baby supplies for the 

child. Mother proved to be unreliable; items, including Patrick F.’s prescription 

medication, were missing after mother’s visits. In October 2009, after mother failed a 

drug test and failed to attend co-parenting classes and mediation, the family law court 

granted father’s request for sole legal and physical custody of Ronin. 

 The family law court awarded mother generous visitation rights with Ronin while 

she was undergoing rehabilitation for drugs. In July 2010, after mother spent months 

going in and out of rehabilitation programs and jail, the family law court reduced 

mother’s visitation to one supervised three-hour visit per week. Following the court’s 

order, the maternal grandparents had two visits with Ronin in September 2010, but 

mother did not attend. Mother had just two one-hour visits with Ronin, on October 3, 

2010, and on December 9, 2010. Thereafter, mother did not request another visit. She 
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telephoned the visitation monitoring agency and left a message stating she would call 

again, but she did not do so. Ronin was 18 months old when he last saw mother. 

 Ronin has lived with father since birth. After mother’s last visit with Ronin in 

December 2010, father allowed the maternal grandparents to visit Ronin because he 

wanted the child to have a relationship with his grandparents. 

 Father met petitioner Amanda D. in late 2009. She visited with Ronin during her 

visits with father. Amanda began residing with father and Ronin when Ronin was 

10 months old. From that point on, Amanda has acted as Ronin’s mother, doing all the 

things mothers do for their children such as feeding him, bathing him, and reading stories 

to him. Amanda and father married in January 2011 and, several months later, gave 

Ronin a half brother, Rayden. Ronin loves Rayden. Amanda decided to adopt Ronin 

because she wanted to ensure that Ronin would remain with her and Rayden if anything 

were to happen to father. 

 In March 2012, Amanda filed a petition for stepparent adoption of Ronin. She 

also filed a petition to declare Ronin free from mother’s custody and control pursuant to 

sections 7822 and 7825. 

 Shortly thereafter, the maternal grandparents sought to join the family court 

proceedings and sought to increase their visitation with Ronin. The grandparents’ action 

was stayed pending the resolution of the petition to terminate mother’s parental rights. 

 Lori Coopwood of Quest Intelligence Group conducted an investigation for the 

stepparent adoption. (§ 7850.) Coopwood reviewed the parties’ criminal records, 

reviewed the social worker’s adoption investigation report, and interviewed father and 

Amanda. Coopwood talked with Ronin, but she did not formally interview him because 

of his age of slightly less than three years. Coopwood attempted to contact mother at the 

telephone number she provided to the court, which belonged to the maternal 

grandmother. Coopwood spoke briefly to the grandmother who promised to forward the 

message to mother. But at trial, the maternal grandmother acknowledged she did not 
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forward the message as promised because she believed Coopwood was working for 

father, rather than the court, and the grandmother “did not want to put [mother] through 

anymore stuff.” Coopwood recommended that the petition to free Ronin from mother’s 

custody and control be granted. Her report was filed May 31, 2012. 

 A hearing on the petition was held on June 1, 2012. The maternal grandfather 

attended but mother did not attend. The grandfather told the court that mother wanted to 

contest the petition. A court trial was set for June 12, 2012. On that date, the court 

appointed counsel for mother and set a contested hearing for July 3, 2012. The case was 

continued at the request of mother’s counsel. 

 The trial began on July 31, 2012, and continued on August 14, 2012. Amanda 

testified at trial and she presented testimony from father, former roommate Patrick F., the 

paternal grandmother, and the custodian of records for the agency that supervised 

mother’s visitation. 

 Mother testified and she presented testimony from the maternal grandparents, the 

maternal great aunt, and a friend. The trial court accepted Amanda’s exhibits including 

the Coopwood report. 

 After the case was submitted for decision, this exchange occurred: 

 “THE COURT: Return the exhibits at the time of the ruling. 

 “[COUNSEL FOR AMANDA]: Okay. I believe that all of my exhibits are in. 

 “THE COURT: Correct. But I just want to stipulate at the time of the ruling I can 

return all those.” (Italics added.) 

 In its oral ruling, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that 

Amanda had satisfied the elements of section 7822: one, mother left Ronin in father’s 

care and custody; two, mother failed to support or communicate with Ronin for a period 

of one year; and three, mother intended to abandon Ronin. The court found that the 

testimony of the maternal grandmother and maternal great aunt was “not credible” and 

that “they flat-out lied” about mother’s contacts with the child and the grandparents. In 
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contrast, the court found that Amanda’s testimony was “very powerful” on the issues of 

frequency of visits and telephone contacts. After discussing the evidence supporting each 

statutory element, the court concluded; “Based on all the above, the Court finds 

[Amanda] has clearly met her burden by clear and convincing evidence that the mother 

intended to abandon her child until she got her life back in order. Unfortunately for her, 

she took many sidesteps along the way and delayed her reunification until after the 

statutory time period had elapsed. Grandparents’ intention to maintain contact with this 

child cannot bolster mother’s case.” 

DISCUSSION 

I 

 Mother contends the trial court erred when it failed to comply with its statutory 

duty to consider whether Ronin’s interests required the appointment of counsel and 

consequently failed to appoint counsel for Ronin. We disagree. 

 A parent has standing to assert her child’s right to independent counsel. (In re 

Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377-1378.) 

 Section 7860 provides in relevant part that, “[a]t the beginning of the proceeding 

on a petition filed pursuant to this part, counsel shall be appointed as provided in this 

article.” 

 Section 7861, pertaining to counsel for the child, states: “The court shall consider 

whether the interests of the child require the appointment of counsel. If the court finds 

that the interests of the child require representation by counsel, the court shall appoint 

counsel to represent the child, whether or not the child is able to afford counsel. The 

child shall not be present in court unless the child so requests or the court so orders.” 

 “A proceeding to free a child from parental custody and control is essentially 

accusatory in nature, directed to challenges against the parent -- not against the child. 

[Citation.] The petitioner must establish that a parent is guilty of abandoning, cruelly 

treating or neglecting the child; or is addicted, morally depraved; or is a convicted felon, 
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is mentally deficient, or is otherwise incapable of caring for the child. [Citation.] Thus, 

the issue at a hearing is whether a parent is fit to raise the child. To that end are directed 

all the arguments of opposing parties, parents claiming they are fit and petitioners 

claiming otherwise, and with each side generally contending it is protecting the best 

interests of the child. It is thus likely that in a particular case the court will be fully 

advised of matters affecting the minor's best interests, and little assistance may be 

expected from independent counsel for the minor in furtherance of his client’s or the 

court’s interests. However, when the court finds a child has separate interests not 

protected in the contest between parents and a petitioner, the court must exercise its 

discretion by appointing separate counsel.” (In re Richard E. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 349, 354 

(Richard E.), italics added.) 

 Although, as a general proposition, independent counsel likely will be of little 

assistance, the trial court must consider whether this is so in the particular case. Thus, 

independent counsel must “be appointed at the commencement of proceedings absent an 

immediate showing upon which the court can exercise its discretion against making an 

appointment.” (Richard E., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 355.) 

 In this case, the trial court appointed counsel for mother on June 12, 2012, but it 

did not appoint separate counsel for Ronin. The minute order for that date does not 

indicate what the parties requested or argued; nor does it indicate what the trial court 

considered in the course of appointing counsel for mother but not for Ronin. The 

reporter’s transcript commences with subsequent proceedings on July 31, 2012. 

 “ ‘[I]n the face of a silent record, we ... apply the established principle that 

“official duty has been regularly performed” (Evid. Code, § 664) . . . .’ ” (Saraswati v. 

County of San Diego (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 917, 929.) Where, as here, the appellate 

court is not furnished a transcript for the date the trial court would have considered the 

appointment of independent counsel, the court is “justified in relying on the presumption 
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that official duty was regularly performed.” (In re Helen J. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 238, 

243 (Helen J.).) 

 Mother claims this case is not like Helen J., “where the appellant has failed to 

provide a complete record. [Citation.] Here, no oral record of the initial proceedings is 

available. [Citation.]” But Helen J. does not purport to limit the Evidence Code 

presumption to cases in which the record’s silence is attributable to the action or omission 

of a party. Mother’s argument would needlessly jeopardize official actions whenever the 

record is silent for reasons beyond the parties’ control. 

 The Helen J. court noted that the “chance that any of the five children, whose 

maximum age was eight[,] would have retained private counsel seems miniscule.” 

(Helen J, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at pp. 242-243.) Mother claims private counsel was 

necessary for Ronin, who was under age three, because Ronin had spent almost half of 

his first year with mother; Ronin remembered that mother was his “mommy”; Ronin was 

capable of being interviewed even though the investigator had not done so; and Ronin 

could have been “asked and definitively answered” the “question of whether or not 

mother had maintained regular contact by phone with him . . . .” None of these points has 

merit. 

 Nothing in the record suggests that counsels for Amanda and mother were 

incapable of fully advising the trial court as to whether, or how, Ronin’s contacts with 

“mommy” during the first year of his life affected his best interests. (Richard E., supra,

21 Cal.3d at p. 354.) Although Ronin was capable of “identify[ing]” Amanda, Rayden, 

and various objects in his bedroom, nothing in the record suggests the young child was 

capable of a meaningful or “definitive” interview about his telephone contacts with 

mother. Even if Ronin was capable of discussing telephone contacts, an acknowledgment 

by Ronin that mother had maintained regular contact would not have assisted her. As the 

trial court explained, the family court had not authorized telephone contact and all inperson contact had to be supervised by an agency. At most, an interview with Ronin 
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would have demonstrated that mother had not adhered to the family court’s visitation 

order. 

 As in Richard E., it appears the trial court had before it all factual matters that 

might have persuaded it that Ronin’s interests would best be served by not depriving 

mother of custody. (Richard E., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 356.) Under these circumstances, 

no miscarriage of justice could have resulted from the court’s failure to exercise its 

discretion to appoint counsel for Ronin. (Ibid.) 

 Mother’s reliance on Neumann v. Meglar (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 152 (Neumann) 

is misplaced. Neumann reversed an order terminating parental rights where the appellate 

court had a full transcript of the trial court proceedings and the transcript did not contain 

any showing on the issue of need for independent counsel for the children. (Id. at 

pp. 170-171.) The court concluded, “[b]ased on the record before us, the trial court did 

not undertake this consideration.” (Id. at p. 171.) Neumann is distinguishable because 

the record in the present case does not include a reporter’s transcript of the hearing at 

which counsel was appointed for mother but not for Ronin. Absent an adequate record, 

the presumption that official duty was regularly performed must prevail. 

II 

 Mother contends the trial court erred when it failed to comply with its statutory 

duty to read and consider the investigation report. The record does not support mother’s 

argument. 

 Section 7850 provides that, upon the filing of a petition to declare a child free 

from parental custody and control, the “juvenile probation officer, qualified court 

investigator, licensed clinical social worker, licensed marriage and family therapist, or the 

county department . . . shall immediately investigate the circumstances of the child and 

the circumstances which are alleged to bring the child within any of the [alleged 

statutory] provisions . . . .” Section 7851 requires the person or agency conducting the 

investigation to “render to the court a written report of the investigation with a 
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recommendation of the proper disposition to be made in the proceeding in the best 

interest of the child.” (§ 7851, subd. (a).) Section 7851, subdivision (d), provides that 

“[t]he court shall receive the report in evidence and shall read and consider its contents in 

rendering the court’s judgment.” The court has a duty to “read and consider the report 

sua sponte.” (Neumann, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 169.) 

 In this case, Lori Coopwood of Quest Intelligence Group conducted the 

investigation and rendered the requisite report to the court. During trial, Amanda’s 

counsel introduced the Coopwood report as petitioner’s exhibit 13. As mother notes in 

her reply brief, the reporter’s transcript of the introduction of the report states that 

“Exhibit No. 13 was marked for identification.” Mother argues “nowhere does the record 

reflect that Exhibit 13, or any other exhibit for that matter, was ever admitted into 

evidence.” Mother overlooks the trial court’s exchange with Amanda’s counsel in which 

she voiced her belief that all her exhibits were “in” evidence and the court said counsel 

was “correct.” Mother’s argument has no merit. 

 Following the trial court’s oral ruling, the court signed a formal “Order and 

Judgment to Declare Minor Free from Parental Custody and Control” that had been 

prepared by Amanda’s counsel. The order indicates in relevant part that the court 

“examined the parties, and evidence, both oral and documentary, [that had] been 

introduced . . . .” (Italics added.) After examining the evidence, the court found in 

relevant part that “The court-appointed investigator, Lori Coopwood with Quest 

Intelligence Group, has filed a written report of her investigation of the circumstances of 

the child as required by Family Code Section 7851, in which she recommends that Ronin 

. . . be declared free from the custody and control of Alicia . . . .” 

 Mother claims this order “does not reflect that the trial court read and considered 

the report.” But she overlooks the notation that the court examined the documentary 

evidence, which includes the report, and she makes no claim that the court somehow 

“examined” the report without “read[ing] and consider[ing] it.” (§ 7851, subd. (d).) 
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Mother’s claim that the court failed to fulfill its duty to read and consider the report has 

no merit. 

DISPOSITION 

 The order freeing Ronin D. from parental custody and control is affirmed. 

 BLEASE , J. 

We concur: 

 RAYE , P. J. 

 BUTZ , J.