In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐2115

RODNEY ROLLINS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH WILLETT, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 7211 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 22, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2014

____________________

Before CUDAHY, POSNER, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment

in favor of police officers, the chief of police, and the mayor

of the Village of Glenwood, Illinois. They are the defendants

in a suit brought by Rodney Rollins under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

charging an unlawful seizure. Rollins had driven into the

parking lot of an Aldi’s grocery store and gotten out of his

car when a police officer emerged from a police car that had

pulled up behind him and ordered him to get back into his
2 No. 14‐2115

car and show the officer his driver’s license, registration, and

proof of insurance. He refused to cooperate with the officer,

as well as with two other officers who later arrived at the

scene, was arrested, and two months later pleaded guilty to

driving on a suspended or revoked license. He then brought

this suit, charging that the police had no basis for ordering

him back into his car, and that their doing so constituted an

unreasonable seizure of him. The district court dismissed the

suit on the authority of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), which held that a section 1983 suit can’t be brought if

a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply that his

conviction in a prior proceeding had been invalid. Or as ex‐

plained in a later Supreme Court decision, “civil tort actions

are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of

outstanding criminal judgments. Congress ... has deter‐

mined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state

prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their

confinement, and that specific determination must override

the general terms of § 1983.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 392

(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). So

suppose a defendant convicted of possessing illegal drugs

found on his person sued the officer who had found the

drugs, alleging that the officer planted them. If he won the

suit, it would imply the invalidity of his drug conviction.

The suit would therefore be barred by the rule of Heck v.

Humphrey. See, e.g., Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488 (7th Cir.

2003).

This case is different. Rollins pleaded guilty. There isn’t

any doubt that he was guilty—that he’d been driving on a

suspended or revoked license. If he can prove that the action

of the police in forcing him to get back in his car and show

them his driving papers was unconstitutional, that cannot
No. 14‐2115 3

change the fact that he was driving without a valid license.

Illegal searches and seizures frequently turn up irrefutable

evidence of guilt. The evidence can be suppressed if the gov‐

ernment attempts to present it at trial, but there was no trial.

A finding that the defendant was illegally seized—the find‐

ing he seeks in this suit—would therefore have no relevance

to the validity of his guilty plea and ensuing conviction.

The case is like Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756 (7th Cir.

2007). The plaintiff had pleaded guilty to telephone harass‐

ment and then brought a false‐arrest claim. Whether the ar‐

resting officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff had

no bearing on the validity of the guilty plea and conviction,

and so Heck was irrelevant. Id. at 767. Lockett v. Ericson, 656

F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011), is similar. The plaintiff had pleaded

nolo contendere to charges that he was driving under the

influence and then sued the police for having searched his

home without probable cause and in the course of the search

having obtained evidence concerning the DUI charge. The

court held that whether the search had been unlawful could

not affect the plaintiffʹs conviction because the conviction

had not been based on any evidence introduced against him,

so again Heck was inapplicable. Id. at 896–97. And in this

case as well.

The district judge did say that the “plaintiff should also

understand that his remaining claims fail, even if they are

not Heck‐barred,” such as his claim that the police had un‐

lawfully demanded that he show them his driver’s license

and when he refused ordered him out of the car and sub‐

jected him to a full custodial search and arrest. But the

judge ignored the fact that there was no evidence that the

police had seized the plaintiff lawfully by ordering him
4 No. 14‐2115

back into his car—the action that precipitated his arrest,

thus extending the seizure.

The case must be remanded for reconsideration of the

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, unclouded by Heck.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.