# ~·- KAPLAN !(IRSCH ROCKWELL

October 8, 2015

VIA HANDDELIVERY Sharon Long Office ofthe ChiefCounsel 

# RECEIVED 

# ocr

# o 82015 

## PARr 16 DOCKETS
Attn: FAAPart 16 Airport ProceedingsDocket,AGC-610 Federal AviationAdministration 800 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, D.C. 20591 Re: 

### National BusinessAviationAssociation, Inc
.. et al. v. Town of EastHampton, NY, FAADocketNo. 16-15-08 DearMs. Long: Enclosedplease fmd for filing inthe above-referenced docket one original and three copies ofRespondent Town ofEastHampton, NewYork's Answerto the Complaint and RespondentTownofEastHampton,NewYork'sMemorandum ofPoints and Authorities in Support ofIts Answerto the Complaint. Also enclosed is an extracopy ofthe Answer and Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities to be file-stamped and returned to the courier. Please feel free to contact me at (202) 955-5600 ifyou have any questions or require additional information.

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Steve Brown

Atto:rneys at Law Denver m Washington, DC Sincerely,



# jv:~

W. Eric Pilsk

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell Ll.P tel: (202) 955·5600 1001 ConnecticutAve., :i.W., Suite 800 fax: (202) 955·5616 Washington! DC 20036 11/\Yw.kaplankirsch.comUNITED STATESDEPARTMENT OFTRANSPORTATION FEDERALAVIATIONADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

NationalBusiness AviationAssociation, Inc., etal. Complainants,

v. Town ofEast Hampton, NY Respondent. FAA DocketNo. 16-15-08 

## RECEIVED OCT 08 2015 PART 16 DOCKETS RESPONDENTTOWN OFEASTHAMPTON,NEWYORK'S ANSWERTO THE COMPLAINT

Designation ofpersonsto receive service for theTown ofEastHampton,NewYork:

ElizabethVail TownAttorney Town ofEast Hampton 159 Pantigo Road East Hampton, NY 11937 EVail@EHamptonNY.Gov W. Eric Pilsk CatherinevanHeuven Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 1001 ConnecticutAve., NW, Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 epilsk@kaplankirsch.com cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com Telephone: (202) 955-5600 Facsimile: (202) 955-5616ANSWER 

### The Town ofEast Hampton, New York (the "Town"), by and through counsel, pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 16.23(h), responds to the allegations ofthe Complaint filed byNational Business Aviation Association, Inc., Shoreline Aviation, Inc. (Connecticut); PlaneSense, Inc.; Fly the Whale, Inc.; Eastern Air Express, Inc.; FL Aviation Corporation; Tuckaire, Inc.; Autonomic Controls, Inc.; Shoreline Aviation, Inc. (Massachusetts); Wes Rae Contracting Corporation; Eagle Air, Inc.; and JET AS, Inc. (collectively, "Complainants") as set forth in the numbered paragraphs below. The Town denies all allegations contained in the Complaint except to the extent such allegations are specifically admitted in this Answer. In further support ofits Answer, and pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 16.23(i), the Town submits
a Briefin Support ofIts Answer to the Complaint, filed herewith and incorporated herein by reference ("Brief'), with a concise statement of the facts upon which the Town relies and discussion ofthe legal principles demonstrating that the Complaint shouldbe dismissed and the Townfound to bein compliance withits federal obligations. Complainants 

### I. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 1 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are. 2. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 2 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are, wheretheir members operate aircraft, and what aircraft theirmembers operate.

23. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 3 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are, and what aircraft theyoperate. 4. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 4 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are, andhow many operations they conduct at the East HamptonAirport ("Airport" or "HTO"). 5. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 5 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are, how many operations they conduct at the Airport and how many based aircraft theyhave at theAirport. 6. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 6 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of whotheyare, and howmanyoperations they conductat theAirport. 7. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 7 ofthe Complaint, but states thatit does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are, whataircraft they operate, andhowmanyoperations they conduct attheAirport. 8. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 8 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are, what aircraft they operate, andhowmanyoperations theyconduct attheAirport. 9. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 9 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are, and howmanyoperations theyconduct attheAirport.

3

### I0. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 10 ofthe Complaint, but states thatit does not contest the Complainants' statements of who they are, and how many operations theyconduct at the Airport. II. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph II ofthe Complaint, but states thatit does not contestthe Complainants' statements of who they are, how many operations they conduct at the Airport and how many based aircraft theyhave attheAirport. 12. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 12 ofthe Complaint,but states thatit does not contestthe Complainants' statements of who they are, andhowmanyoperations theyconduct at the Airport. 13. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 13 oftheComplaint,but states thatit does not contestthe Complainants' statements of who they are, what aircrafttheyoperate, and how many operations theyconduct atthe Airport. 14. In response to Paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the Town admits only that the Complainants are tenants and users ofthe Airport. The Town otherwise denies the allegations in Paragraph 14. Subject ofthe Complaiut 

### 15. TheTown admits the allegations inParagraph 15 ofthe Complaint. 16. The Town admits the contact information for Supervisor Larry Cantwell, Town Attorney Elizabeth Vail and Airport Director Jemille Charlton. The Town otherwise notes that the Town Board includes Supervisor Cantwell and four additional elected Council members, namely Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman Sylvia Overby, Councilman PeterVanScoyoc, and CouncilmanFred Overton.

417. TheTown denies the allegations inParagraph 17 ofthe Complaint. 18. TheTowndenies the allegations inParagraph 18 ofthe Complaint. Facts 19. TheTown admits the allegations ofParagraph 19 ofthe Complaint. 20. In response to the allegations ofParagraph 20 ofthe Complaint, the Town admits onlythatthere was litigationinfederal court and also beforeFAA, and that thelitigationinitiated bythe Committee to Stop AirportExpansion resulted in a Settlement Agreement between FAA andthe Committee and the dismissal ofthelitigation. The Townis not apartyto that Settlement Agreement. Theterms ofthe SettlementAgreement and the litigation speakfor themselves. 21. In response to the allegations ofParagraph 21 ofthe Complaint, the Town states onlythat the terms ofthe SettlementAgreement speak for themselves and that theterms ofFAA Order 5190.6B speakfor themselves. TheTownotherwise denies the allegations ofParagraph21. 22. The Town admits that it has engaged in a lengthy public process to develop and implement reasonable noise restrictions at the Airport. The Town otherwise denies the allegations ofParagraph 22. 23. TheTown admits the allegations inParagraph23 ofthe Complaint. 24. In response to the allegations ofParagraph 24, the Town admits that it adopted three resolutions affecting airport operations onAprill6, 2015, and states that the terms ofthese local laws speak for themselves. 25. In response to the allegations ofParagraph 25, the Town admits that Town ofEast Hampton Local Laws Nos. 3, 4, and 5 were filed with the New York Secretary ofState onApril 30, 2015. The Town also states that, at the request of the federal judge regarding pending litigation, the Town agreed to not enforce the restrictions

- even after the filing with the

5Secretary of State

- until the court ruled on a preliminary injunction. The Town otherwise denies the allegations inParagraph 25 ofthe Complaint. 26. In response to the allegations ofParagraph 26, the Town admits that it adopted Local Law No.7 on May 7, 2015 and states that the terms ofLocal Law 7 speak for themselves. The Town also states that Local Law No. 7 was filed with the New York Secretary ofState on May 19, 2015. 27. Inresponse to the allegations ofParagraph 27, the Town admits that some ofthe Complainants have filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District ofNew York and that the terms ofthat action speak for themselves. The Town admits that the court held a hearing onMay 18, 2015, and that thejudge initially anticipated a ruling by June 8, 2015. The Town admits that it agreed to defer enforcement ofthe laws until the court ruled. The Town states that the court ultimately issued a ruling on the request for injunctive relief on June 26, 2015, in which the court affirmed the Town's legal right to adopt use restrictions to address the problem of excessive airport noise; upheld the two curfew laws; and preliminarily enjoined enforcement ofthe one-trip per week law. The Town further states that it began enforcing the two curfews onJuly 2, but thatit is not yet enforcing the one-tripperweek law due to the injunction. The Town otherwise denies the allegations inParagraph 27 ofthe Complaint. Efforts at Pre-Complaint Resolution 28. The Town admits the allegations inParagraph 28 ofthe Complaint. 29. TheTown admits the allegations inParagraph 29 ofthe Complaint. 30. TheTown admits the allegations inParagraph 30 ofthe Complaint. 31. TheTown admits the allegations in Paragraph 31 ofthe Complaint.

632. TheTown states that the findings inBombardierAerospace Corp. v. City of Santa Monica FAA Docket No. 16-03-11 (Director's Determination Jan. 4, 2005) speak for themselves. ApplicableLaw- ExclusiveRights 33. Paragraph 33 makes an allegation oflawto whichno response is required. To the extent aresponse is requiredtheTown denies the allegations inParagraph 33 ofthe Complaint. 34. Paragraph 34 makes an allegation oflawto whichno response is required. To the extent aresponse isrequiredtheTowndenies the allegations inParagraph 34ofthe Complaint. 35. Paragraph 35 makes an allegation oflawto whichno response is required. To the extent aresponse is requiredtheTowndenies the allegations inParagraph 35 ofthe Complaint. 36. Paragraph 36 makes an allegation oflawto whichno response is required. To the extent aresponse is required theTowndenies the allegations inParagraph 36 ofthe Complaint. 37. Paragraph 37 makes an allegation oflawto whichno response is required. To the extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 37 ofthe Complaint except to the extent it includes an accurate quote from one paragraph ofthe Airport Compliance Manual. 38. Paragraph 38 makes an allegation oflawto whichno response is required. To the extent aresponse is requiredtheTowndenies the allegations inParagraph 38 oftheComplaint. 39. Paragraph 39 makes an allegation oflawto whichno response is required. To the extent aresponse is requiredtheTown denies the allegations inParagraph 39 ofthe Complaint. 40. Paragraph40 makes an allegation oflawto which no response is required. To the extent aresponse is requiredtheTowndenies the allegations inParagraph 40 ofthe Complaint.

7ApplicableLaw- Revenue Diversion 

### 41. The Town states that the terms ofits April21, 2015, Press Release (Exhibit 10 to the Complaint) speaks for itself. The Townotherwisedenies the allegations inParagraph 41. 42. Paragraph42 makes an allegation oflawto which no response is required. To the extent a response is required the Town states that the terms ofFAA Order 5190.6B speak for themselves and otherwise denies the allegations inParagraph42. 43. Paragraph 43 ofthe Complaint sets forth allegations oflawto which no response is required. To the extent aresponse is required the Towndenies the allegations in Paragraph43 ofthe Complaint. 44. Paragraph 44 ofthe Complaint sets forth allegations oflaw to which no response is required. To the extent aresponse is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph44 ofthe Complaint. 45. Paragraph 45 ofthe Complaint sets forth allegations oflawto which no response
IS 

### necessary. To the extent that a response is necessary, the Town denies all allegations of Paragraph45 that are inconsistent with applicable law and FAA guidance. ReliefSought 

### 46. TheTowndenies the allegations ofParagraph46 ofthe Complaint. 47. The Towndenies the allegations ofParagraph47 ofthe Complaint.

8CONCLUSION Forthereasons set forth above, the Complaint shouldbe dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this 8th dayofOctober, 2015.

ElizabethVail Town Attorney TownofEast Hampton 159Pantigo Road EastHampton, NY 11937 EVail@EHamptonNY.Gov

9 

# k;#fl/

W. EricPilsk Catherinevan Heuven KaplanKirsch & Rockwell LLP 1001 ConnecticutAve., NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 epilsk@kaplankirsch.com cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com Telephone: (202) 955-5600 Facsimile: (202) 955-5616

### CERTIFICATE OFSERVICE Ihereby certifythat Ihave this 8th day ofOctober, 2015, served the foregoing RespondentTownofEastHampton,New York'sAnswerto the Complaintonthe following parties as follows: Via HandDelivery: 

### Office oftheChiefCounsel Attn: FAAPart 16 Airport Proceedings Docket, AGC-610 Federal Aviation Administration 800 IndependenceAvenue, SW Washington, D.C. 20591 Via Emailand U.S. Mail: 

### SteveBrown ChiefOperating Officer NationalBusiness AviationAssociation, Inc. 1200 G Street, NW Suite 1100 Washington,D.C. 20005
Datedthis 8thday ofOctober, 2015.

10 W. Eric PilskUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFTRANSPORTATION FEDERALAVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

National Business AviationAssociation, Inc., etal. Complainants,
v. TownofEastHampton, NY FAADocketNo. 16-15-08 

## RECEIVED OCT 

### 0 82015 Respondent. PART 16 DOCKETS RESPONDENT TOWN OFEAST HAMPTON, NEWYORK'S MEMORANDUM OFPOINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OFITSANSWERTOTHE COMPLAINT

Designation ofpersonsto receive servicefor the Town ofEastHampton,New York:

ElizabethVail TownAttorney Town ofEastHampton 159 Pantigo Road EastHampton, NY 11937 EVail@EHamptonNY.Gov W. EricPilsk Catherine vanHeuven KaplanKirsch & Rockwell LLP 1001 ConnecticutAve., NW, Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 epilsk@kaplankirsch.com cvanheuven@kaplank.irsch.com Telephone: (202) 955-5600 Facsimile: (202) 955-5616INTRODUCTION 

### National BusinessAviation Association, Inc. ("NBAA"), onbehalfofitselfand anumber ofits members 1 

### (collectively, "Complainants") challenge two ofthree laws (the "Local Laws") adopted by the Town ofEast Hampton ("Town") on April 16, 2015, as amended on May 7, 2015, that: (1) 

### impose an extended curfew on "noisy"2 

### aircraft between 8:00p.m.- 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. - 9:00a.m. (the "Extended Curfew");3 

### and (2) limit operations bynoisy aircraft to two operations (one takeoffand one landing) per week for the summer seasonbetween May I - September 30 (the "One-TripperWeekRule"). This Complaint is part ofa scorched-earth strategy byNBAA and a number ofusers of East Hampton Airport (the "Airport") to litigate every conceivable issue in an effort to prevent the Town from implementing reasonable use restrictions designed to reduce impacts from aircraft noise. To date, there are five other matters (in addition to this proceeding) that are

The other Complainants are: Shoreline Aviation, Inc. (Connecticut); PlaneSense, Inc.; Fly the Whale, Inc.; Eastern Air Express, Inc.; FL Aviation Corporation; Tuckaire, Inc.; Autonomic Controls, Inc.; Shoreline Aviation, Inc. (Massachusetts); Wes Rae Contracting Corporation; Eagle Air, Inc.; and JETAS, Inc. 2 Inthe Local Laws, the term "NoisyAircraft" is defined as: "anyairplane orrotorcraft for whichthere is a published Effective Perceived Noise in Decibels (EPNdB) approach (AP) level of91.0 or greater." See Town of East Hampton, Local Law 4 of2015 at Section 2, codified in the Code ofthe Town ofEast Hampton at § 75-38 (A)(4) (available atExhibit 2 to the Complaint). In both their Complaint and their July 20 Answerto the Motionto Dismiss, Complainants argue that the Town's list of"noisy aircraft" is incorrect. See Complaint at n. 1; Answer to Motionto Dismiss at n. 6. The List ofNoisy Aircraft clearly instructs readers that: "Published data for shaded aircraft types include ranges ofnoise levels that extend across the 91.0 EPNdB threshold. These ranges result from multiple published noise levels for varying aircraft configurations (e.g., differing powerplants, maximum operating weights, etc.)." In response to the comments at page 1 of the Complaint, the Town notes that the Bombardier Challenger 600/601/604/605 entry is a shaded entry, thus clearly signaling to readers that some ofthese aircraft types could be exempt and further inquiry is appropriate. The Tmvn also appreciates the comment raised in the Answer to the Motion to Dismiss regarding the Mitsubishi MU 300 Diamond I. The Town has updated the List ofNoisy Aircraft accordingly. See http:/I ehamptonny.gov/HtmlPages/A...imort/AimortHome.htm.
3 The Townalso adopted a curfew on all operations between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00a.m., but Complainants do notchallenge thatLocal Lawhere. 2

### pending in various tribunals and that directly or indirectly challenge the Local Laws4 

### In this case, Complainants rely on general legal arguments and virtually no factual support, apparently satisfied merelyto have filed a Complaint and forced the Town to respond. Complainants appear to be more concerned with compelling the Town to spend resources to defend itselfrather than meetingtheir ownobligationto provetheircase. In 

### addition to the lack offactual support, the Complaint lacks legal merit as well. The Complaint rests on two novel theories. First, Complainants argue that the Extended Curfew and One-Trip perWeek Local Laws violate Assurance 23 simplybecause theyrestrict operations by certain aircraft. Second

- making crystal cleartheir strategy offinancial warfare

- Complainants argue that the use ofAirportrevenue to paythe legal fees incurred in the litigation Complainants and their allies have initiated (including this Part 16 proceeding) constitute impermissible
revenue diversion under Assurance 25. Both claims, however, rest on false legal premises and mustbe dismissed as amatter oflaw as well as for lack ofevidentiary support. Complainants' Assurance 23 claim relies entirely on the notion that an exclusive rights violation is a "mirror image" of an Assurance 22(a) violation, such that any 

### "unreasonable restriction" on access to an airport automatically violates Assurance 23. Complaint at

**~** 

### 33. Complainants are wrong. The FAA has expressly rejected the "mirror image" theory of

4 There are two lawsuits pending in federal court. First, a number ofAirport users and interested parties, including NBAA, have challenged the Local Laws in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District ofNew York, onpreemption and Commerce Clause grounds. SeeFriends of theEastHamptonAirportv. Town of EastHampton, Case No. 15-Civ-2246 (E.D.N.Y, filed Apr. 22, 2015). Second, a slightly different coalition ofAirport users have filed arelatedlawsuit against the Federal AviationAdministration ("FAA") inthe U.S. DistrictCourtforthe Eastern District ofNewYork, challenging certain positions ofthe FAA upon which the Town relied in enacting the Local Laws. Friends of the EastHamptonAirportv. FAA, CaseNo. 15-Civ-441 (E.D.N.Y, filed Jan. 29, 2015). In addition, there are two other pending Part 16 Complaints: Friends of the EastHampton Airportv. Town of EastHampton, FAA Docket No. 16-15-02, which challenges the Local Laws indirectlybased onAssurances 19 and 24; and SoundAircraftServices v. Town of EastHampton, FAA DocketNo. 16-14-07, which challenges airport rates and charges adopted in 2014, which new fees were developed, in part, based on analysis oflikely revenue flows with reduced traffic from noisy aircraft. There is also a parallel proceeding in state court regarding the proprietyofthe 2014 rate increases. 3

### Assurance 23. Instead, the agency requiresproof

### that a measure restricting access would have

an anti-competitive or monopolistic effect before it will find a violation of Assurance 23. Complainants fail to present any evidence to support their claim under the correct Assurance 23 standard (or even under their own "mirror image" theory) and the Assurance 23 claim shouldbe dismissed. Complainants' revenue diversion claim rests on the notion that the Town may not use airport revenue to pay legal fees and other costs incurred in defending the Local Laws because the Local Laws do not serve an airport purpose. There is no support for that notion. The FAA explicitly recognizes that an airport sponsor may use airport revenues to pay legal fees. Moreover, to the Town's knowledge, the FAA has never required an airport sponsor to forego using airport revenue to defend itself, even in cases where a sponsor was ultimately found to be in violation ofsponsor assurances. 

### Tellingly, Complainants cite no decision to the contrary. Complainants' theory, ifadopted, would wreakhavoc with airport finances byprohibiting airport sponsors from using airport revenue to defend Part 16 cases, civil litigation alleging unlawful sponsor action, and would further prevent an airport sponsor from using airport revenue to adopt appropriate corrective measures. In short, Complainants' theory is baseless and fraught with difficulty, and shouldbe dismissed.5 

### Complainants also challenge the One-Trip per Week Local Law even though ithas been enjoined by the United States District Courtfor the Eastern District ofNew York and has

never been applied to Complainants. 

### The claim is simply not ripe, and Complainants' zeal to litigate over alaw that is not in effect serves to underscore their strategyto litigate for the sake of

5 OnJune 24, 2015, the Town filed a Motion to Dismiss the underlying Complaint pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 16.26. The Town is filing this Answerbecause the FAAdidnotrule onthe Motion within 30 days. Nevertheless, the reasons for dismissal stated in the Motion to Dismiss remain valid, and the Town respectfully asks the FAA to grant its Motionto Dismiss. 4

### litigation rather than substance. Complainants' challenge to the One-Trip per Week Local Law is not ripe and should therefore bedismissed. 

### FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Town owns and operates the East Hampton Airport. The Airport serves a range of private recreational, personal, and corporate aircraft operations, as well as charter and for-hire operations, by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. In

### recent years, the frequency ofoperations has increased dramatically. In particular, operations by helicopters increased by almost 50% between 2013 and 2014, the last full years for which data is available. Town Resolution 2015- 411 at 1 (available at Exhibit 1to the Complaint). Aircraftnoisehas longbeen a source ofconcern and controversyinthe Town. The Town is renowned for its peace and quiet and naturalbeauty. Increased operations byloud aircraft and helicopters inparticular have disrupted that natural quiet and calm and led to years oflitigation and a growing demand for action by the Town to reduce aircraft noise levels. In 

### the past few years, these calls for action have mushroomed. The Town has received petitions signed by hundreds ofresidents. It

### has received resolutions from the leadership in surrounding towns and villages. Town Board members have received thousands ofinformal complaints. Hundreds of residents have attended public hearings to demand action and testify to the numerous ways that aircraft noise disrupts their lives. Newspaper articles, editorials, and letters to the editor demanding action to reduce aircraft noise appear constantly. !d. 

### at 1-3. For over a decade, the Townhas been studying solutions to the problem ofaircraft noise. !d. 

### The Town has worked with Airport users to adopt voluntary measures, and has considered and rejected a wide range ofalternative measures. In 2012, recognizing the problem, the FAA adopted mandatory helicopter routes between New York City and the East End to keep



### 5

### helicopters over open water as much as possible. 77 Fed. Reg. 39,911 (July 6, 2012) (NewYork North Shore Helicopter Route, Final Rule); 79 Fed. Reg. 35,488 (June 23, 2014) (extension of expiration date of New York North Shore Helicopter Route). Unfortunately, none of the voluntary or mandatory measures addressed the problem, particularly in the face of rapid increases in operations. TownResolution 2015-411 at 2-3. Over the course of2014 and early 2015, the Townengaged in amore focused, deliberate, and very public analysis of the noise problem. The Town updated old noise studies, commissioned new noise studies using a variety of noise metrics and methodologies, and retained nationallyrespected airport noise consultants to assist the Town. It

### carefully considered the expert testimony, advice from the business community, concerns of airport users and businesses, and opinions ofits constituents. It 

### reviewed data regarding airport operations and formal complaints logged on the Town's noise complaint management system. It 

### examined whether prior efforts to address noise concerns had been successful, including voluntary and mandatory flight paths, curfews, and other noise rules. It 

### met with representatives of aviation interest groups and FAA to discuss the Town's options. 

### !d. at 2-6. In 

### short, the Town engaged in an exhaustive, comprehensive, and highly-transparent examination of the problem and potential solutions. Ultimately, the Town determined that a serious noise problem was present that had not been addressed byexistingnoise abatement efforts and that further action was needed. 

### !d. at 6-8. The Town considered more than a dozen options, ranging from the onerous to the purely symbolic. After much deliberation and public debate, the Town decided that the three Local Laws strike the appropriate balance between providing meaningful noise relief and retaining adequate access to the Airport. April 7, 2015, PowerPoint Presentation, Regulations To Address



### 6Noise andDisturbancefrom Operations atEastHamptonAirport 

### (available at Exhibit 11 to the Complaint). Using 2013-2014 data (the full year ofdata analyzed by Town consultants), the Local Laws would have affected under 23% oftotal operations, while addressing the cause of
over 60% ofthe complaints logged on the Town's noise complaint system. 

### !d. at 4. The Local Laws are a carefully-crafted, reasonable compromise that minimizes impacts on Airport users whileprovidingmeaningful noise reliefto residents. Almostimmediatelyupon adoption, the Local Laws were challenged in federal courtby a number ofAirport users. See Friends ofthe East Hampton Airport v. Town of East Hampton, 

### No. 15 Civ. 2246 (E.D.N.Y, filed April 21, 2015)6 

### The Friends ofthe East Hampton Airport sought a temporaryrestraining order ("TRO"). Judge Seybert ofthe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District ofNew York construed the motion as one for preliminary injunction. On June 26, 2015, after extensive briefing and oral argument, Judge Seybert affirmed the Town's legal right to adopt use restrictions to address the problem ofexcessive airport noise. The Judge held that the Town's use ofcomplaint data and other empirical evidence ofthe noise problem was reasonable, noting that "it cannotbe argued thatthe Town lacked the data to support a finding of
a noise problem at the Airport." Mem. & 

### Order at 41, Friends of the EastHamptonAirport, 

### No. 15 Civ. 2246 (June 26, 2015) (available at Exhibit 1 to Complainants' Answer to the Motion to Dismiss). She rejected Plaintiffs' arguments thatthe Local Laws created a safetyissue. 

### Id. at 39 ("there is no evidence that the mandatory curfews would force any pilot to operate his or her aircraft in an unsafe manner"). Finally, she affirmed that the Town's use of the 91 EPNdB threshold to define noisy aircraft is appropriate. 

### !d. at 42 ("The 91 EPNdB threshold appears to

6 As discussed above, supra n. 4, Complainants and others have also flied five other actions challenging the LocalLaws directlyorindirectly. 7be a valid indicator ofnoise as it affects individuals.") Accordingly, she found that the curfews
were reasonable measures to address a legitimate local noise problem and she therefore refused to enjointhetwo curfews. Id. at 44 ("[T]heTown's desire to protectits residents during sleeping hours clearlyoutweighs the inconvenience Plaintiffs mayexperiencebyhavingto minimizetheir flight schedules."). With respect to the One-Trip per Week Local Law, however, Judge Seybert found that, based on the evidence presented in the record in the TRO hearing, the effects ofthat measure would have "drastic" effects on plaintiffs' businesses and that there was no sufficient proofthat there were not less restrictive measures. Accordingly, she held that the Plaintiffs had shown a strong likelihood ofsuccess on the merits on that issue and she issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement ofthe One-TripperWeek Local Lawpending a final decision inthe case. Id. at 44-45. Subsequently, both the Town and the Friends of the East Hampton Airport appealed Judge Seybert's decision and the case is now pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Notice ofAppeal, Friends of the EastHamptonAirport, No. 15 Civ. 2246 (July 22, 2015); Notice of Cross Appeal, Friends ofthe East Hampton Airport, No. 15 Civ. 2246 (Aug. 4, 2015). A decision from the Court ofAppeals is not expectedfor approximately another 18 months, atwhichtime the case will returnto the DistrictCourtfor furtherproceedings. The Townbegan enforcing the Extended Curfew on July 2, 2015. Press Release, Town ofEast Hampton, Court Affirms Town Of East Hampton's Right To Regulate Airport Noise (June 26, 2015) (Exhibit 1 ).

8The One-Trip per Week Local Law has not been applied or enforced, pursuant to the PreliminaryInjunction. Based onpreliminary data, it does not appear that the two curfews have had a significant, ifany, impacton total operations.7 ARGUMENT I. COMPLAINANTS' CHALLENGE TO THE ONE-TRIP PERWEEKLOCAL LAWIS NOT RIPE Complainants' claim that the One-Trip perWeek Local Lawviolates Assurance 23 is not ripe becausethe One-TripperWeek Local Law has notbeenimplemented or applied. Northwest Airlines, Inc., et al. v. Indianapolis Airport Auth., et al., FAA Docket No. 16-07-04 at 28, Director's Determination (Aug. 18, 2008). hnplementationofthe One-TripperWeekLocal Law has been enjoined by the U.S. District Court ofthe Eastern District ofNew York and is not currently in effect. Mem. & Order at 44-45, Friends of the EastHampton Airport, No. 15 Civ. 2246 (July26, 2015). Theinjunction will remain ineffectpendingthe outcomeofthat litigation, which is expected to continue for 1-2 years, at least. Although the Town is confident that the Local Lawwill be affirmed on appeal, that outcome is not certain. The One-Trip perWeek Rule is notin effect; ithas notbeen applied to Complainants and its potential future application is uncertain due to the pending litigation. As a result, Complainants havenot suffered any injurydueto the One-Trip perWeekRule and have notbeen adversely affected by it. Complainants' challenge to the One-Trip per Week Rule is therefore notripe.

7 Year-to-date, 2015 operations through August 31 appear to have decreasedbyjust 1% compared to 2014. The Town does not yet have the full set of data on the "season" as defmed in the Local Laws (i.e., May 1 - September 30) and reserves theright to supplement this Answerwhenit obtains that data. 9II. COMPLAINANTS FAIL TO STATEA CLAIM THAT THE TOWNHAS VIOLATED THE PROHIBITION AGAINST GRANTINGANEXCLUSIVE RIGHT A. TheProhibitionAgainst Granting AnExclusiveRightBars OnlyThose SponsorActions ThatWould Create AMonopoly Or ThatWouldHaveAn Anti-Competitive Result Grant Assurance 23 states, inpart, that: [The airport sponsor] will permit no exclusive right for the use ofthe airport by any person providing, or intending to provide, aeronautical services to the public
..... [The airport sponsor] further agrees that it will not, either directly or indirectly, grant or permit any person, firm, or corporation, the exclusive right at the airport to conduct any aeronautical activities
... , and that it will terminate any exclusive rightto conduct an aeronautical activitynow existing at such an airport before the grant of any assistance under the Airport and Airway ImprovementAct of1982. Assurance 23 implements two statutes: 49 U.S.C. §47107(a)(4) (requiring that airport sponsors
assure the FAA that "a person providing, or intending to provide, aeronautical services to the public will notbegiven an exclusiveright to use the airport" as a condition ofreceiving aviation grant funds) and 49 U.S.C. §40103(e) ("a person does not have an exclusive right to use an air navigationfacility on which Governmentmoneyhas been expended."). As the phrase "exclusive right" indicates, the purpose ofthose two laws is to prohibit airport sponsors from granting monopolies or otherwise limiting competition for aeronautic services at publicly funded airports. Senator McCarran, one of sponsors ofthe original 1938 provision8 that became 49 U.S.C. §40103(e), explained that: "The Senator from Missouri [Sen. Truman] and myselfhave tried to work into this proposed law provisions which would guard against anything savoring of monopoly." 83 Cong. Rec. 6729 (1938). Similarly, Senator

8 See, Section 303 ofthe Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (June 23, 1938) 52 Stat. 973, 986 ("There shall be no exclusive right for the use ofany landing area or air navigation facility upon which Federal funds have been expended.") 10Truman explainedthat, "wewanted to write it so that there will notbe a monopoly." !d. at 6730. Based onthatlegislativehistory, theU.S. Attorney General, in a 1941 opinion, statedthat: The restrictions imposed by [the predecessor statute to 49 U.S.C. §40103] upon the expenditure ofFederal funds upon landing areas and air navigation facilities make it clearthattheterm "exclusiveright" as used inthe sectionwas intended to describe a power, privilege, or other right excluding or debarring another or others from enjoying or exercising a like power, privilege or right. This meaning is confirmed by the legislative history which shows that the purpose of the provision is to prohibit monopolies and combinations in restraint oftrade or commerce and to promote and encourage competition in civil aeronautics

...." 40U.S. Op. Att'yGen. 71, 72 (1941) (citing 83 Cong. Rec. 6729, 6730). Courts construing the prohibition against exclusive rights have also concluded that it is intended to prevent monopolies and other anti-competitive conduct typically prohibited by the antitrust laws. InAircraft Owners andPilots Ass'n v. PortAuth. of 

### NY, 305 F. Supp. 93, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), the court stated that "the type ofexclusive right
... forbidden is one ofthe sort noxious to the anti-trust laws." The court went on to conclude that the legislative history suggested a narrow interpretation ofthe prohibition against exclusive rights. !d. at l05-l06; see also City of PompanoBeach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (llthCir. 1985) (same). The FAA itselfrecognizes that the prohibition on exclusive rights is intended to prevent the creation ofmonopolies and other practices that tend to restrain trade. Exclusive Rights at Airports, FAA Order No. 5190.1A § ll(c) (Oct. 10, 1985), states: "It is the intent of [the prohibition against exclusive rights] to promote fair competition at public-use airports." Even

more explicitly, Exclusive Rights at Federally Obligated Airports, FAA Advisory Circular 150/5190-6 

### -,r 1.2 (Jan. 4, 2007) states that: "The purpose ofthe exclusive rights provision as appliedto civil aeronautics is topreventmonopolies andcombinations in restraint of trade and
topromote competition at federally obligated airports" (emphasis added). In tum, FAA Airport

11Compliance Manual, 

### FAA Order No. 5190.6B '1)8.1 (Sept. 30, 2009) (hereinafter "Compliance Manual")provides that:

... the sponsor may not grant a special privilege or a monopoly to anyone providing aeronautical services on the airport or engaging in an aeronautical use. The intent of this restriction is to promote aeronautical activity and protectfair competition at federally obligated airports. Similarly, paragraph 8.4(c) states: The FAA has taken the position that the existence of an exclusive right to conduct any aeronautical activity at an airport limits the usefulness of the airport and deprives the public ofthe benefits ofcompetitive enterprise. The FAA considers it inappropriate to provide federal funds for improvements to airports wherethebenefits ofsuch improvements will notbe fully realized by all users due to the inherent restrictions of an exclusive monopoly on aeronautical activities. 

### 1n the context ofevaluating local laws that have the effect ofrestricting airport operations, the FAA has made clear that such measures violate Assurance 23 only 

### if there is a clear nexus between the local law and a monopolistic, anticompetitive result. In the Matter ofthe City of SantaMonica, 

### FAADocketNo. 16-02-08, Final AgencyDecision at 51 (July 8, 2009). In Santa Monica, 

### the FAA considered, inter alia, 

### whether Santa Monica's ban on Approach Category C & 

### D aircraft violated Assurance 23. The Director initially found that the ban violated Assurance 23 because it unreasonably distinguished between aircraft types, essentially applying a "mirror image" theory. In the Matter ofthe City of Santa Monica, 

### FAA DocketNo. 16-02-08, Director's Determination at 52-53 (May27, 2008). Santa Monica appealed the Director's Determination. Following an evidentiaryhearing, the Hearing Officerreversed the Director's findings on Assurance 23, and expresslyrejected the "mirror image" theory, even though he affirmed the Director's finding that the ban violated Assurance 22(a). The Hearing Officer carefully considered the language and legislative history of Assurance 23, 49 U.S.C. §

### 47104(a)(4) and 49 U.S.C. §

### 40103, relevant Attorney General
12Opinions, case law, and the FAA's own explanation ofAssurance 23. Based on that body of law, the Hearing Officer concluded that Assurance 23'spurpose is "to prohibit anti-competitive, monopolistic behavior at airports receiving federal funds." In the Matter ofthe City ofSanta Monica, FAA Docket No. 16-02-08, Hearing Officer's Decision at 101 (May 14, 2009). The Hearing Officer specifically relied on language from FAA Advisory Circular 150.5190-6, and stated that: "The purpose ofthe exclusive rights provision as applied to civil aeronautics is to prevent monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade and to promote competition at federally obligated airports." Id. at 105. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer held that in order to show a violation ofAssurance 23, the Directorhad to show anexus betweenthe City's Category C & Dban and thekind ofanti-competitiveresult coveredbyAssurance 23. Id. at 106. Because the Director had not presented evidence that could support such a nexus, the Hearing Officer reversed theDirector'sfinding that therehad beena violation ofAssurance 23. !d. The Director appealed the Hearing Officer's decision on Assurance 23 9 The Acting Assistant Administrator10 found that the Hearing Officer had correctly considered and applied law to conclude that an exclusive rights violation must depend on a showing ofmonopolistic, anticompetitive conduct. SantaMonica, Final AgencyDecision, at 47-51. The Acting Assistant Administrator expressly rejected the Director's arguments that existing language from the Compliance Manual and Advisory Circulars "support its expansive reading of 'exclusive right'
as a right that applies broadly to use of an airport and not just to activities that involve competition." Id. at 49. Instead, the Acting Assistant Administrator held that any broad language in the Compliance Manual or FAA Advisory Circulars must be read consistently with

9 The Cityappealed otheraspects ofthe decision as well. 10 The appeal was assigned to the Acting Assistant Administrator for Aviation Policy, Planning and the Environment and notthe Associate Administrator due to conflict ofinterest concerns. 13

### the language in the "statutes, legislative history, and other FAA publications" that narrowed

### the scope ofexclusive rights to monopolistic, anticompetitive results. Id. 

### Accordingly, the Acting Assistant Administrator concluded that in order to find a violation ofAssurance 23, the FAA "needed to prove that an anti-competitive result would occur if the Ordinance were implemented." ld. 

### at 51. Because the Director had failed to make that showing, the Acting Assistant Administrator affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision dismissing the Assurance 23 claim. 11 

### Among other points raised in the appeal, the Director argued that pnor Directors' Determinations supported 

### the "mirror image" theory upon which the Director had relied in the underlying decision. I d. 

### at 50-51. The Acting Assistant Administrator expressly rejected 

### that approach, holding that "to the extent that those decisions conflict with the instant decision, they
are incorrect." Id. 

### at 51. Ultimately, the Acting Assistant Administrator affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision that the Category C & 

### D ban violated Assurance 22(a) and 

### affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision that the Category C & 

### D ban did not 

### violate Assurance 23 for the
reasons summarized above. B. Complainants' Assurance23 ClaimHas No LegalSupport I. ComplainantsRely OnAnOutdated AndIncorrect Standard Complainants' claim ofan exclusive rights violation rests entirely on the "mirrorimage" theory that the FAA rejected in Santa Monica. 

### Complaint

**at~~** 

### 33-34, 37. In Santa Monica, 

### FAAmade clearthat aviolation ofAssurance 23 inthe context ofoperational access restrictions requires a showing of"anti-competitive, monopolistic behavior." Santa Monica, 

### Final Agency

11 While the case was further appealed to the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the District ofColumbia, the FAA did not appeal the Assistant Administrator's decision rejecting the "mirrorimage" theory. City of Santa Monica v. FAA, 631 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

### 14Decision at 51. See also Aircraft Owners and PilotsAss 'n, 305 F. Supp. at 105 ("the type of exclusive right
... forbidden is one ofthe sort noxious to the anti-trust laws"); 40 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. at 72 (the purpose of the exclusive rights provision is to "prohibit monopolies and combinations in restraint oftrade or commerce and to promote and encourage competition in civil aeronautics."). Moreover, Complainants' "mirror image" theory runs afoul of basic principles of statutory construction. Under Complainants' theory, any action that violates 49 U.S.C. §47107(a)(l), prohibiting unjust discrimination and guaranteeing reasonable access, would necessarily violate 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4) and 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e), barring exclusive rights. That would make the two exclusive rights statutes redundant, rendering them unnecessary surplusage. Basic principles ofstatutory constructionbar such a result. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) ("It is our duty to give effect, ifpossible, to every clause and word of a statute...We are thus reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Congress clearly intended to address two different issues. 49 U.S.C. §47107(a)(l) and Assurance 22(a) are intended to prohibit unjust discrimination and assure reasonable access to federally funded airports. Compliance Manual at -,r9.1. By contrast, 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e), and Assurance 23 are intended to prevent airport sponsors from granting monopolies or preventing fair commercial competition at publicly funded airports. 12 Supra at 10. The "mirror image" theory ignores the manifest differences between the statutes in violation of established principles of statutory construction.

12 49 U.S.C. §47107(a)(4) and 49 U.S.C. §40103(e) are notredundantbecause theyhave different scopes ofapplication. Section47107(a)(4) requires that the FAAreceive adequate assurance that a grant recipient will not create an exclusive right as a condition ofawarding a federal aviation grant. Section 40103(e) imposes a broader prohibition against exclusive rights at all airports receiving anyfederal funds. 15

### 2. FAA Decisions and Guidance That Predate the Santa Monica 

### Decision AreNo LongerReliable Complainants rely on three legal authorities thatpre-date the Santa Monica 

### Final Agency Decision. See 

### Complaint

**at~** 

### 36 (citing 1965 FAA guidance); id

**at~** 

### 38 (citingBardin v. County ofSacramento, California, 

### FAA Docket No. 16-00-11, Director's Determination (Aug. 9, 2001)); and id.

**at~** 

### 38 n. 6 (citing SelfServe Pumps, Inc. v. Chicago Executive Airport, 

### FAA DocketNo. 16-07-02, Director's Determination (Mar. 17, 2008)). To the extent those decisions relied on the "mirror image" theory, they must now be rejected. See Santa Monica, 

### Final Agency Decision at 51 ("to the extent that those decisions conflict with the instant decision, they
are incorrect."). Self Serve Pumps 

### is further distinguishable onits facts. InSelf Serve Pumps, 

### the Director affirmed an airport sponsor's denial of an application to operate a commercial self-service fueling operation that did not comply with applicable Minimum Standards. The Director's conclusion regarding exclusive rights makes clear that the focus is on preventing harm to competitionratherthanunjust discrimination: The Director finds that the Complaint has not presented a preponderance of substantial evidence that the Airport has explicitly protected the two full-service FBOs from fuel price competition at PWK in a manner to constitute an explicit granting ofan exclusiveright. SelfServe Pumps, 

### Director's Determination at 32. The Director went on to find insufficient evidence of a constructive exclusive right, given the lack of threshold evidence of unjust discrimination: While public-use airports may impose qualifications and minimum standards upon those who engage in aeronautical activities, the FAA has taken the position that the application ofanyunreasonable requirement or any standard that is applied in an unjustly discriminatory marmer may constitute the constructive grant of an exclusive right. However, a sponsor is under no obligation to permit aircraft owners to introduce onto the airport equipment, 16personnel, or practices which would be unsafe, unsightly, detrimental to the publicwelfare, orwhich would affectthe efficientuse ofairport facilities. !d. at 16, citingFAA Order 5190.68. Thus, SelfServe Pumps stands for the principle that a grant ofan exclusive right must harmcompetition and that an airportmayadopt uniform standards thathavethe effect oflimiting

- or even denying- access to the airfield for commercial purposes withoutviolatingAssurance 23. Self Serve Pumps supports the Local Laws by affirming the authority ofan airport sponsor to adopt uniform rules that may limit access to the airfield for purposes ofprotecting the public welfareprovidedtheydo notunreasonablyimpair competition. 13 3. ThePost-SantaMonica Cases CitedbyComplainantDo NotRestorethe Mirror-ImageTheoryor Otherwise Invalidatethe SantaMonica Final AgencyDecision The post-Santa Monica decisions cited by Complainants do not in any way undermine the agency's rejection ofthe mirror image theory. For example, Complainants cite Hinshaw, Skydiving School, Inc. d/b/a/Skydive Hawaii andIslandSkydiving, L.L.C., FAA DocketNo. 16- 12-04, Director's Preliminary Determination (August 18, 2014) (Complaint

**~39).** InHinshaw the Director stated the standardunderAssurance 23 as follows: FAA has taken the position that the application of any unreasonable requirement or any standard that is applied in an unjustly discriminatory marmer may constitute the constructive grant of an exclusive right. Courts havefound the grant of an exclusive right where a significant burden has been placed on one competitor that is notplaced on another. [See e.g., PompanoBeach v. FAA, 774F.2d 1529 (lithCir. 1985)]. !d. at 13 (emphasis added).

13 Bardin is also distinguishable because it banned an entire class of operations

- ultralight vehicle operations- inviolationofthe FAA'sexclusive authorityunder49 U.S.C. §40I03. Director'sDeterminationat 11- 12. 17

### Two things are noteworthy in this oft-repeated statement. 14 

### First, evidence of unjust discrimination "may"

- but not must
- 

### constitute a constructive grant of an exclusive right. Second, the reference to a "competitor"underscores that there mustbea burden on competition. 

### This is evident in the FAA's preliminary determination in the Hinshaw 

### case, where the Director's analysis under Assurance 22 focusses on the inaction and extreme delay inprocessing complainant's initialrequest for aeronautical access, Hinshaw, 

### PreliminaryDetermination, at 36- 37, but the analysis under Assurance 23 addresses the application ofinconsistent standards to similarly-situated operators. 

### !d. at 

### 46Y Were the "mirror image" theory valid, the Director's additional analysis on Assurance 23 wouldhavebeenunnecessary. Otherpost Santa-Monica 

### cases citedbyComplainants also conduct the requisite analysis of anti-competitive effects when analyzing the Assurance 23 claims. In Gary R. Ernest, 

### the Director concluded that an airfield access fee of $500 imposed only on through-the-fence operators did not grant a constructive exclusiverightto on-airporttenants because: The development of aeronautical enterprises on land off airport and not controlled bythe sponsor can result in an economic competitive advantage for the 'through-the-fence" operator to the detriment of on-airport tenants. To equalize this imbalance, the sponsor should obtain from any off-base enterprise or entity a fair return for its use ofthe airfield by assessing access fees from those entities having "through-the-fence" access." GaryR. Ernest, 

### Director's Determination at 19.

14 See. e.g .• Gary R. Ernest v. Leitchfield-Grayson County Airport Board, FAA Docket No. 16-09-01, Director'sDetermination at 9 (Dec. 17, 2009) (same); Desert Wings Jet Center, LLC, SpiritFlightInc. dba Wings of the Cascades, v. City of Redmond, Redmond, Oregon, FAA Docket No. 16-09-07, Director's Determination at 13 (Nov. 10, 2010) (same); Isaac W. Jones, Jr. and Alabama Hang Gliding Ass'n, FAA Docket No. 16-11-07, Director's Determination at 13 (Sept. 19, 2013) (same); Truman Arnold Companies d/b/a/TACAir v. Chattanooga MetropolitanAirportAuthority, FAADocketNo. 16-11-08, Director'sDetermination at 18 (Oct4, 2013) (same).
15 Further, the decision inHinshaw is apreliminary determination that cannot overrule the Final Agency Decision inSantaMonica, nordoes itpurportto do so. 

### 18

### By contrast, in 41 North 73 West, Inc. v. County ofWestchester, New York, 

### FAA Docket No. 16-07-13, Final Agency Decision (Sept. 18, 2009), the Associate Administrator simply concluded that the sponsor's leasing policy did not bar the complainant from conducting a particular aeronautical activity, and therefore could not constitute an exclusiveright. Id. 

### at 37-38 ("All in all, competition exists at this Airport and no one [fixed base operator (FBO)] enjoys a right not granted to at least one other FBO at the Airport."). The Second Circuit confirmed this
on appeal: Avitat claims that the County granted an exclusiveright to LGA [light-general aviation

## J FBOs when it gave them "subsidies" while allowing them to compete with Avitat in the sale ofjet fuel. Avitat argues that the FAA erroneouslyrequired a similar situationbetween the parties, and consequently aviolation ofGrant Assurance 22, to find aviolation ofGrant Assurance 23. Avitat is mistaken
.... While acknowledging that unjust discrimination can result in the constructive grant ofan exclusive right, the Associate Administrator ofthe FAA found no suchdiscrimination where two parties were not similarly situated. Thus, there was no exclusive right granted to the LGA FBOs because "[i]t is
... denying others a similar 

### right that creates a violation ofGrant Assurance 23."
.... To the extent Avitat suggests that the LGA FBOs' ability to selljet fuel without paying market rent constituted an exclusive "subsidy," the FAA found no evidence that Avitat was subsidizing the LGA FBOs, or that the LGA FBOs were Avitat's real competitors. We find no reason to disturb the FAA's findings. 41 N 73 W, Inc. v. United States DOT, 

### 408 Fed. Appx. 393, 400 (2d. Cir. 2010). See also Truman Arnold Companies, 

### Director's Determination at 49 (finding no Assurance 23 violation where "the record shows that the sponsor's rationale for developing a second FBO was to promote competition

..."). The possibilitythat a restriction maybe unjustly discriminatory and also, separately, create a constructive grant ofan exclusive right does not

### mean that the two are mirrorimages.

19Finally, Complainants' reliance on a line of sky-diving cases is also inapposite. See, Complainants' Answer to the Motion to Dismiss (July 20, 2015) at 4 and id. at n. 5, citing Skydive Sacramento v. City ofLincoln, California, FAA Docket No. 16-09-09, Director's Determination (May 4, 2011); Jeff Bodin and Garlic City Skydiving v. County ofSanta Clara California, FAA Docket No. 16-11-06, Director's Determination (Dec. 19, 2011); and Skydive Paris, Inc. v. Henry County, Tennessee, FAA Docket No. 16-05-06, Director's Determination, (Jan. 20, 2006). Complainants argue that FAA declined to review the Assurance 23 violations in Skydive Sacramento and Jeff Bodin because, in both cases, FAAhad alreadyfound anAssurance 22 violation "and the analysis of
... grant assurance #23 would be duplicative." Answer at 5. This is misleading at best. In those cases, FAA completed an exhaustive review ofAssurance 22 violations, and then concluded that it was "unnecessary to consider the related allegation regarding exclusive rights because the remedies are the same." Skydive Sacramento, Director's Determination at 35 (emphasis added), citing Skydive Paris, Director's Determination at 19; see also JeffBodin, Director's Determination at 38-39 (same), citing Skydive Paris, Director's Determination at 19. In other words, corrective action to address an Assurance 22 violation would also address any Assurance 23 violation, so it was unnecessary to consider separately whether there was an Assurance 23 1ssue. These cases in no way stand for the proposition that a violation or Assurance 22 is automatically a violation ofAssurance 23. 

### C. Complainants Have Not Presented Any Evidence That Could Support A Violation OfAssurance23 Complainantsbeartheburden ofproving their claims. 14 C.F.R. § 16.25. Accordingly, Part 16 requires Complainants to present all documents and facts in support oftheir claims in theirComplaint. Id. at § 16.23(b)(2) and (3). Complainants have offered no evidenceto support
20

### their claim. Complainants offered no facts showing a nexus between application ofthe Local Laws and an anti-competitive result. More pointedly, Complainants offered no facts showing any evidence ofany adverse effect sufferedbythe Complainants. Therefore, Complainants have failed to meettheirburdens ofproofandproduction. In response to the Town's Motion to Dismiss, Complainants offered a single piece of anecdotal evidence: a newspaper article stating that an operator intendedto initiate service to the Airport using helicopters that would notbe classified as "noisy" under the Local Laws. Answer Br. at 4; id. 

### at Exhibit 2. This evidence fails to demonstrate any purported monopoly, anticompetitive restraint, or the creation of an exclusive right. First, Complainants do not demonstrate that the operator has begun operations or that any operations have impaired competition in any way. Second, on its face, it is difficult to understand how the entry ofa new competitor could possibly demonstrate that the Local Laws have had an anti-competitive effect. Ifanything, that evidence demonstrates that competition has increased 

### at the Airport, not been harmed. Truman Arnold Companies, 

### Director's Determination at 49 (finding no Assurance 23 violation where "therecord shows that the sponsor's rationale for developing a second FBO was to promote competition

..."). Complainants may not like more competition, but evidence of increased competition cannot possibly support an Assurance 23 violation. Moreover, nothing aboutthe LocalLaws gives thatnew operator, or anyother operator, amonopoly atthe Airport. Third, Complainants present no evidence whatsoever that there is a distinct "market" for flights in the Extended Curfew Hours. See Santa Monica, 

### Final Agency Decision at 53 (requiring evidence ofa market for the restricted activity). Without evidence that the Extended Curfew law impairs competition in a specificmarket, Complainants cannot show the creation of

21

### an exclusive right. Complainants' Assurance 23 claim fails for the same reason that the Director's claims failed inSantaMonica. 

### Fourth, Complainants present no facts or documents that show how 

### the Local Laws impair competition, and it is difficult to see how they could. The Local Laws do not confer a monopoly on any entity or group of entities. The Local Laws do not bar any aircraft from operating at the Airport. The Local Laws do not prevent anyuser from operating at the Airport. No user is given any preferential right to use the Airport. No entity has unique access to nonnoisy aircraft. Nothing aboutthe Local Laws prevents anyoperator from competingfor business at the Airport using compliant aircraft. Any operator can operate with a non-noisy aircraft. As Complainants' limited evidence demonstrates, compliant aircraft exist and can be used to start
new business at the Airport. Indeed many current and long-time operators have compliant aircraft in their fleets already. Moreover, despite the apparent presence ofa new operator with all-compliant aircraft, Complainants cannot show that such operations have impaired overall competition at the Airport. Complainants have utterly failed to meet their burden ofproofthat the Local Laws are thekinds ofmonopolistic, anticompetitivemeasuresbarredbyAssurance 23. Finally, the pattern ofactual operations at the Airport suggests that the Extended Curfew Law has had no effect on competition at the Airport. 16 

### Although data is still preliminary, it appears that the total number ofoperations bynoisy aircraft has not changed significantly as a result ofthe Extended Curfew Law. The suggests the Extended Curfew Law has not affected or

16 As discussed above, the One-Trip per Week Rule has not gone into effect and therefore cannot have impaired competitionor imposedanyharm whatsoever. 

### 22

### impaired competition at the Airport. Complainants offer no evidence to support the notion that competitionhas beenimpaired. 17 

### At most, Complainants imply that individual operators will be harmed by the Local Laws. Butpreserving a competitive market does not require protectingindividual competitors; it onlyrequires preserving fair access to the relevant market. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0- Mat, Inc., 

### 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (the antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors); see also Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 

### 117 F.3d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The antitrust laws do not guarantee competitors the right to compete free of encumbrances, however, so long as competition as awhole is not significantly affected."). Here, even assuming that all three Local Laws were in place and being enforced, the allegation that some individual operators maylose somebusiness does not showthat competition is harmed. The Local Laws are neutral measures intended to address a noise problem. Unlike the completebans struck down inHinshaw 

### and the skydiving cases discussed above, supra 

### at 20, neither the Extended Curfew nor the One-Trip per Week Rule bar an entire class ofoperations. Even aircraft classified as noisymay continueto operate, albeit subject to restrictions. These are uniform rules ofoperation that do not, on their face, limit competition. No operator or group of operators is entirely harmed from operating at the Airport and no operator is barred from the airfield. Conversely, any operator may operate without restriction using compliant aircraft and the Local Laws do not prevent any operator from obtaining compliant aircraft, which are available as Complainants' evidence ofanew entrant demonstrates. Ultimately, the Local Laws
are not intended to regulate economic activity as such, and certainly are not intended to (and do

17 As noted above, supra n. 7, the Town is in the process ofcollecting more detailed data about operations in the 2015 as part ofits commitment to reevaluate the effect ofthe Local Laws. Towu Resolution 2015-569 at 4 (available at Exhibit 7 to the Complaint). The Town reserves the right to supplement its Answer when that additional information is available. 23

### not, in fact) limit competition for aeronautic services at the Airport. This case simply does not present a claimthat could beconsidered aviolation ofAssurance 23. D. ComplainantsHaveNotPresentedAnyEvidence ThatCouldSupportA Violation OfAssurance 23 EvenUnderTheir "Mirror-Image"Theory 

### Even under their own "mirror image" theory, Complainants have failed to meet their burden ofproof. Complainants present no evidence or meaningful argument to show that the Local Laws unjustly discriminate between operators. Complaints assume that any

### restriction on
access would automatically violate Assurance 23. Complaint at 

### ,-r34. That is not the law. The FAA has made clear that access restrictions only violate Assurance 22(a) if they "unjustly discriminate" and do not allow access on "reasonable terms." Santa Monica, 

### Final Agency Decision at 34 (quoting and discussing Assurance 22(a)). See also 

### Compliance Manual at 

### ,-r 9.1. Here, Complainants have presented no evidence whatsoever

### to support their claimthat the Local Laws umeasonably distinguish between aeronautical users. In the absence ofany evidence that the Local Laws draw an unreasonable distinction orhave imposed anyharm on any operator, the claims mustbedismissed. III. COMPLAINANTS FAILTO STATEA CLAIM OFREVENUEDIVERSION A. AttorneyFeesAreA PermissibleUse OfAirportRevenue 

### Complainants argue that the Townhas violated Assurance 25 byspending airportrevenue to pay legal and other professional fees in order to defend the Local Laws from the many legal challenges brought byNBAA and others. Complaint at 

### ,-r45. Complainants' case for revenue diversionrests on the simplistic notion that an airport operatingrule that restricts access for noise purposes cannot

### be considered to advance an airport purpose. Fromthat premise, Complainants argue that the Townmaynot spend airport revenue to defend an access restriction. Complaint at 

### ,-r 42 (arguing fees are not allowable in this case because the restrictions at issue are contrary to
24

### federal law). This theoryis without legal support orjustification, and Complainants themselves fail to cite anycontrolling authority. Complainants concede, as theymust, theTown can use airport revenues to payfor legal fees. Complaint at -,r42; see also 

### ComplianceManual at-,r 15.9(d) (airport revenue maybe spent
on attorney fees). Thus Complainants' argument rests on the theory that the Local Laws are not related to an "airport purpose" because they are the product ofwhat Complainants call an "antiairport agenda", and as such, the Town may not use airport revenue to defend these laws. 

### !d. at -,r-,r42

- 44. But Complainants do not cite any authorityfor that propositionfor the simplereason that there is none. Airport sponsors mayuse airport revenue for the capital or operating costs ofthe airport, the local airport system, or other local facilities owned or operated by the airport owner or operator and directly and substantiallyrelated to the airtransportation ofpassengers orproperty. 49 U.S.C. §§ 

### 47107(b) & 

### 47133; Compliance Manual-,r 15.9(a). Conversely, unlawful revenue diversion is "the use ofairport revenue for purposes other than airport capital or operating costs
or the costs ofother facilities owned or operated by the sponsor and directly and substantially related to air transportation." Compliance Manual -,r 15.13(a). The Compliance Manual also expresslyprovides that airportrevenue maybeused for attorney fees "to the extentthese fees are for services in support of airport capital or operating costs that are otherwise allowable." ComplianceManual at-,r 15.9(d). FAA articulated the outer limits ofpermissible use ofairport revenue for legal fees in BocaAirport, Inc., d/b/a Boca Aviation v. Boca RatonAirportAuthority, 

### FAA Docket No. 16- 00-10, Director's Determination (Apr. 26, 2001). That case addressed the sponsor's agreement

25

### to pay a bonus of $500,000 to private law firms ifthe firms successfully terminated an airport tenant's lease. Inrelevantpart, the FAAfound that: The FAA's Policy Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue was not intended to provide a vehicle for a party to challenge the reasonableness of fees paid to private entities for airport-related services provided. Rather, it was to ensure that airport sponsors do not use airport revenues to create non-airport related benefits for other governmental activities
.... [T]he clear intent ofthe policy is to avoid airport revenue being used for non-airport public purposes, and in particular airport sponsor's subsidy ofits non-airport public functions. A payment of airport revenue to a private firm can be considered unlawful revenue diversion ifit is not for an airport purpose (i.e., 

### for general economic development). Id. 

### at 42; see also BocaAirport, Inc., d/b/a BocaAviation v. Boca RatonAirportAuthority, 

### FAA Docket No. 16-00-10, Final Agency Decision and Order at 3 (Mar. 20, 2003) ("The Associate Administrator concurs .. . that the Revenue Use Policy was intended to ensure that airport sponsors do notuse airport revenues for non-airportrelated purposes, and inparticularto provide
a subsidyfor the airport sponsor's non-airportpublic functions). The Department ofTransportation ("DOT") has further clarified that it 

### is permissible to pay attorneys to defend challenges under federal obligations, even when there is an underlying violation ofthe grant assurances. SecondLosAngeles InternationalAirportRates Proceeding, 

### DocketNo. OST-95-474, Final Decision (Dec. 22, 1995) ("LAXIf'). 

### Atissue inLAXII

### was the question ofwhich costs could be included in the airport's rate base. Airlines challenged the inclusion of: (I) 

### legal fees associated with the defense ofthe airport's rates and charges; and (2) legal fees incurred in defending against allegations ofrevenue diversion. Even though some of the underlying expenses were found to be revenue diversion, the Department allowed all ofthe legal fees to be included in the rate base, stating: "we do not view the overall defense ofthe police department charges [much ofwhich were found to be revenue diversion] as equivalentto

26

### diversion." !d. 

### at 49. The Department drew a clear distinction between funds illegally diverted (impermissible 

### use of airport funds) and funds spent to defend the charge of diversion (permissible 

### use ofairport funds). Similarly here, the Town's use ofairport revenue to defend the Local Laws is a permissible use ofAirport revenue, even ifthe Local Laws are ultimately struck down. That result is consistent with practice. The Town is not aware ofthe FAA disallowing the use ofairport revenue to defend a Part 16 complaint or Notice ofInvestigation, even when the sponsor has been found to violate its obligations. That practice applies to challenges to
access restrictions as well. Over the years, many airport sponsors have proposed and/or implemented access restrictions thathave been challenged in courts and before the FAA. 18 

### The Town is not aware ofa single instance in which the FAA has advised that it was impermissible for the airport sponsor to use airport revenue to defend those restrictions

- even when the underlying restrictions were ultimately found to violate federallaw. 19 

### Nor is the Town aware of
an instancein whichhas the FAA limitedtheuse ofairport revenue to develop and pursue access restrictions that werenot approved, such as rejected Part 161 applications. In 

### their August 5, 2015, Surreply to the Motion to Dismiss, Complainants attempt to distinguishLAX!!by

### noting that theportion offeesultimately spent to defend impermissibleuse

18 E.g., City of Naples AirportAuth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d 431 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding Stage 2 ban as reasonable under Grant Assurances); Nat'/Helicopter C01p. of Am. v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding curfew and weekend ban on helicopters); AlaskaAirlines v. City of LongBeach, 951 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding overall cap on number of commercial operations and curfew on noisy aircraft); Global Int'l Airway Corp. v. PortAuth. of NY& NJ, 727 F.2d246 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding restriction on operations bynoisy aircraft); Nat'/ Bus. Aviation Ass'n v. City ofNaples Airport Auth., 162 F. Supp.2d 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (upholding ban on noisy aircraft); ArrowAir, Inc. v. PortAuth. of NY. & N J, 602 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding ban onnoisy aircraft); SantaMonicaAirportAss'n v. City of SantaMonica, 481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding curfew, weekendhelicopter trainingban, banonnoisyaircraft, and certain touch and go operations). 19 E.g., City oj'SantaMonica v. FAA, 631 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ban on approach category C & D aircraftviolatedgrant obligations). 

### 27

### ofairport funds were merely de minimis. 

### SurreplyBr. at 3. But that portion ofthe decision was not 

### related to the propriety of spending airport revenue for attorney fees to defend a revenue diversion claim; it was to justify including those attorney fees in the airport's rate base for purpose ofsettingits rates and charges. LAXII

### at 49. B. The Town's Use OfAirport Revenue To Pay Attorney Fees Is A Permissible Use OfAirportRevenue 

### The Town's use ofAirport revenue to pay legal fees associated with the defense ofthe Local Laws fits comfortably within the principles set forth in Boca Airport 

### and LAXII. 

### The Townhas notused airportrevenues to subsidize the Town's non-airport public functions, nor has it used airport revenues to acquire land for non-airport purposes. The legal fees at issue have been used to defend the Town's adoption of airport operating rules. By definition, airport operating rules serve an airport purpose because they relate directly to the operation of the Airport. Complainants may not agree with the substance of the Local Laws, but this does nothing to change the plain fact that the Local Laws are related to the operation ofthe Airport and serve a legitimate airportpurpose- i.e., 

### the regulation ofaircraft noise.20 

### Complainants argue that it is improper to spend airport revenue for measures that, they assert, violate federal law. Complaint

**at~** 

### 42. Complainants are wrong. First, as LAXII

### makes clear, an airport sponsor may spend airport revenue to defend actions that are ultimately found to violate sponsor assurances. Supra 

### at 26. Second, Complainants' argument is particularly

2

### ° Complainants attempt to use rhetoric to mask the inherent airport purpose of the Local Laws by branding thempart ofan "anti-airport agenda." Complaint at '\144. Butthatrhetorical flourish proves nothing. The Town has demonstrated again and again its commitment to the Airport by embarking on an ambitious program to improve the Airport and address a number oflong-deferredmaintenance and improvementprojects. See Exhibit 2 - Town Resolution 2015-588 (accepting bid for delivery ofnew Automated Weather Observation System) (May 21, 2015); Town Resolution 2015-473 ($500,000 bond for airport engineering) (April 21, 2015); Town Resolution 2015-418 (Airport goals) (April 16, 2015); Town Resolution 2014-838 ($270,000 bond for reconstruction of Taxiway4-22) (July3, 2014). Justbecause Complainants do not agree with the Town'sactions does notmake those actions anon-airportpurpose. 28

### misplaced here where there has been no final determination that the Local Laws are unlawful in any way. To the contrary, the recent decision by Judge Seybert in Friends of East Hampton Airport 

### demonstrates that the Town has already shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of two of the three Laws. Complainants cannot conjure a violation of any sponsor assurance by simply asserting a conclusion of law. Nor can Complainants deny an airport sponsorthe ability to defend itselfagainst an alleged violation oflawbased onlyon an allegation ofaviolation. C. Complainants' Revenue DiversionTheoryLacks Any LegalSupport 

### Complainants offer no legal orpolicy support for their position. The main authority they cite, In the Matter of Compliance with Federal Obligations by the City of Chicago, Illinois, 

### FAA Docket No. 16-04-09, is aNotice oflnvestigation, not a decision document. Moreover, that case involved actions to close 

### an airport and terminate all aeronautical activity at the airport, which is entirely different than a sponsor's effortto adopt rules for the continued use 

### ofan airport. Here, the Local Laws plainly serve an airport purpose because they relate directly to the operation of the Airport. Complainants also citeBocaAirport

### for the proposition that the use ofairportrevenue to fund general economic development is improper. Complaint at n. 8. General economic development is plainly not an airport purpose. See 

### Compliance Handbook at

**~** 

### 15.13(d). Attorney fees, in contrast, plainly are 

### a proper use ofairport revenue. Nothing inBocaAirport


### or any other authority cited by Complainant supports the notion that using airport revenue to defend airport operatingrules is not an airportpurpose. Finally, in their July20, 2015, Answer to the Motion to Dismiss, Complainants cite to the DOT Inspector General's Report on Diversion ofAirport Revenue, Augusta-Richmond County Commission, No. AV-1998-093 at 8 (March 12, 1998), noting that DOT recommended that the 29airport sponsor at issue should not pay outstanding legal fees for acquisition ofland that could not be used for airport purposes and the purchase of which had violated 49 U.S.C. § 471 07(b)(l). AnswerBr. at 5. Thepurchase oflandto develop an officeparkis clearly a prohibited
use of airport revenue. Compliance Manual at ,-r 15.13(d) (Using airport revenue for general economic development is a prohibiteduse ofairportrevenue.) Again, that conclusion in no way bolsters Complainants' argumentthat defending airport operatingrules is not an airportpurpose. D. Complainants' Revenue TheoryWould HamstringAirportSponsor's Ability To DefendThemselves In LegalDisputes In addition to lacking legal support, Complainants' theory lacks any rational policy justification and would lead to disastrous results for all airport sponsors. First, pursuant to Assurance 5, an airport sponsor must retain the power to comply with federal obligations. Denying an airport sponsor the ability to use airport revenue to defend airport operating rules wouldmakethat all butimpossibleby denying airport sponsors the financial resources to defend itself against any alleged violation of its federal obligations and demonstrate compliance. Complainants' theory, moreover, would apply with equal force to all allegations of noncompliance, including common claims byFBOs and other commercial tenants? 1 By cutting off
access to airport revenues to defend controversial measures, Complainants would make it impossible for airport sponsors to defend themselves and demonstrate compliance with their federal obligations.22 Second, Complainants' theory would place airport sponsors in an impossible position of having to secure assurance that controversial measures are consistent with grant obligations

21 Indeed, Complainants argue that the Town may not use airport revenue to defend against this Complaint. Complaintat 1]43. 22 This is particularly true for independent airport authorities thathave no non-airport sources ofrevenue. 30before 

### adopting them, or risk being unable to defend challenges to those measures. Given the financial consequences of being wrong, airport operators would be compelled to seek preapproval from the FAA for controversial measures and/or for incurring legal fees to avoid being placed in a financial bind. That would represent a major change in the current relationship betweenthe FAA, airport operators, and airportusers thathas no basis in current law orthe grant
assurances. Complainants' parochial focus on preventing the Town from defending its Local Laws shouldnot create aprecedentthatwould compelthe need for FAA pre-clearance ontheuse ofairport revenue. Third, Complainants' theory would give opponents ofairport actions enormous leverage because the mere threat 

### of litigation would have the effect of precluding the use of airport
revenues to defend airport actions. The debate over the use of airport revenue would spawn paralyzing preliminary controversy and perhaps litigation over how to fund the response to the threat, giving airport users enormous leverage in negotiations with airport sponsors. Complainants' theorywould effectively give airportusers aveto over an airport sponsor's ability to pursue measures opposed by airport sponsors, a result fundamentally inconsistent with an airport sponsor'sproprietary authorityand responsibilityto assure compliance. Finally, the logic of Complainants' theory extends beyond the compliance context and applies to any 

### litigation alleging unlawful conduct by a sponsor. This would fundamentally undermine airport sponsors' ability to obtain legal counsel to defend themselves because airport sponsors are frequently accused of violating the law. In addition to "routine" legal actions involving contracts and torts, airport sponsors would be prevented from using airport revenue to defend against inverse condemnation claims, which necessarilyrest on an allegation ofunlawful conduct, or politically motivated litigation seeking to change airport policy. Complainants'

31

### theory would simply prevent airport sponsors from being able to mount a professional legal defense to themyriadlegal challenges airport sponsors face. Ultimately, there is no legal authority to support, and no sound policy basis upon which to accept, Complainants' argument. If adopted, Complainant's theory of revenue diversion would undermine the ability of airport sponsors to defend themselves, give airport users a practicalveto over airportmeasures they opposed, andplacethe FAAintheposition ofhavingto pre-approve fees to airport counsel. Simply put, in 

### their zeal to challenge particular restrictions at one airport, Complainants would impairthe ability ofall

### airport sponsors to meet their federal obligations and protectthe public. Complainants offer no legal support orpolicyjustification for such aradical and destructive outcome, andthe Complaint shouldbedismissed. CONCLUSION 

### Forthe reasons set forth above, the Complaint shouldbedismissed.
Respectfully submitted this 8th dayofOctober, 2015.



# jy:~v 7/ 

### ElizabethVail W. EricPilsk TownAttorney Town ofEast Hampton 159 Pantigo Road East Hampton, NY 

### 11937 

### EVail@EHamptonNY.Gov

32 CatherinevanHeuven KaplanKirsch & 

### Rockwell LLP 1001 ConnecticutAve., NW, Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 epilsk@kaplankirsch.com cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com Telephone: (202) 955-5600 Facsimile: (202) 955-5616CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Ihereby certifythat Ihavethis 8thdayofOctober, 2015, servedthe foregoing RespondentTown ofEastHampton,NewYork's Memorandum ofPoints andAuthorities in SupportofItsAnswer tothe Complaintonthe followingparties as follows: Via HandDelivery: Office ofthe ChiefCounsel Attn: FAAPart 16 AirportProceedings Docket, AGC-610 FederalAviationAdministration 800 IndependenceAvenue, SW Washington,D.C. 20591 Via Emailand U.S. Mail: SteveBrown ChiefOperating Officer Nationa1 BusinessAviationAssociation, Inc. 1200 G Street, NW Suite 1100 Washington,D.C. 20005
Datedthis 8th day ofOctober, 2015.

33 

# k~~ W. EricPilsk

# TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON 159 Pantigo Road East Hampton, New York 11937

June 26, 2015 

## COURT AFFIRMS TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON'S RIGHT TO REGULATE AIRPORT NOISE AirportCurfews to TakeEffecton July2, 2015 The federal courttoday affirmed the Town ofEast Hampton's legal right to adopt use restrictions to address the problem ofexcessive airport noise, noting that "it cannot be argued that the Town lacked the data to support a finding ofa noise problem at the Airport." Federal DistrictCourtJudgeJoannaSeybertupheldthe Town'slegal authorityto adoptrestrictions to address noiseproblems,the fundamental issue in the litigation. The Courtupheld two local laws instituting year-round curfews: one, a mandatory nighttime curfew, from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., and the other, an extended curfew on noisy aircraft, from 8 p.m. to 9 a.m. The Court preliminarily enjoined athird law imposing a one-trip-a-weekrestriction. A fourth law was not challenged. The Town of East Hampton adopted four laws to provide meaningful noise relief, while minimizingboth the impact on users and the potential diversion to other airports:

• Local Law#3 calls for a mandatory nighttime curfew, from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. • Local Law #4 calls for an extended curfew on noisy aircraft, from 8p.m. to 9 a.m. • Local Law #5 calls for a limit on noisy aircraft to one trip- a single landing and takeoffeach week during the summer season. • Local Law#7 refinesthe penaltiesprovision and definitions and codifiestheTown's intent to evaluate the effectiveness ofthe restrictions. A group ofopponents filed a legal action in federal court in April seekingto delay implementation ofthe local laws. Judge Seybert heard oral arguments on May 18, and at her request, the Town agreed to postpone enforcement ofthe laws pending today's decision. The plaintiffs challenged three ofthe laws under a number offederal statutes and constitutional claims. Intoday's45-page order,theJudgereviewed eachofthe applicable laws andconstitutional principles in considerable detail. In herorder, the Judge found therewas no basis for enjoining the nighttime curfew and the extended curfew. However, she issued a preliminary injunction against Local Law #5 (the one-trip-per-week restriction on noisy aircraft). Town Supervisor Larry Cantwell said, "We'repleased thejudge has acknowledged thatthe Town wasjustified in adopting restrictions to provide reliefto the growing number ofpeople who are negatively affected by aircraft noise. Although we regret that one ofthe key laws cannot beenforced for the time being, we are gratifiedthatthe Courtrecognized thatthe law allows the kind ofrestrictions that are essential to protectthe residents ofthis Town." Enforcement ofthe local laws will begin on Thursday, July 2, 2015, at 12:01 a.m. Town Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez said, 'The Court's decision today is an important first step, but we must recognize that our opponents are well funded and will not give up easily. This will be a long process, notjust for the pending case in federal court but also for the many other actions filed against operations at the Airport. In light of today's ruling, however, we encourage our opponents to rethink their strategy. It's time to do what's best for the Town and adaptaircraft operations to fit our reasonable restrictions." Information onthese laws as well as the court filings is available at www.htoplanning.com. CONTACT: Peter Kirsch Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 1675 Broadway#2300 Denver, CO 80202 pkirsch@kaplankirsch.com Office: (303) 825-7000 Cell: (303) 898-1665 Larry Cantwell Supervisor, Town ofEast Hampton lcantwell@ehamptonny.gov Office: (631) 324-4140 Cell: (631) 445-9602

###East Hampton Town Board 159 Pantigo Road East Hampton, NY 11937 ADOPTED RESOLUTION 2015-588 Meeting: 05/21/15 06:30PM Department: Purchasing Category: Bids Accepted Prepared By: Jeanne Carroza Initiator: Jeanne Carroza Sponsors: Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez DOC ID: 15457 

## Accept Bid EH15-023- Furnish 

## &DeliverAutomated Weather Observation System Ill PTZ (AWOS) for the East Hampton Airport - Vaisala, Inc. WHEREAS, the Town Board solicited bids to Furnish & Deliver Automated Weather Observation System III PTZ (AWOS) for the East Hampton Airport, EH15-023; and WHEREAS, the bid of Vaisala, Inc., was the lowest bid received meeting the bid specifications and being in proper form; and WHEREAS, the bids submitted have been reviewed by Michael Baker Engineering, Inc., and Jeanne Carroza, CPPB the Town's Purchasing Agent; and have recommended the award of the bid to the lowest responsive, responsible bidder; now, therefore, be it RESOLVED, that the bid of Vaisala, Inc., in the amount of $122,269.78 to Furnish & Deliver an Automated Weather Observation System III PTZ (AWOS) for the East Hampton Airport from fund HA5610 52104 15001 is hereby accepted, and the Purchasing Agent is hereby authorized to issue a purchase order in accordance with the Town's bid specifications and the bid submission of the contractor.

FINANCIAL IMPACT: HA56l0 52104 15001-$122,269.78

RESULT: MOVER: SECONDER: AYES: ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS] Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman Peter Van Scoyoc, Councilman Burke-Gonzalez, Van Scoyoc, Overby, Overton, Cantwell

Updated: 5/20/2015 2:17PM by Jeanne Carroza Page 1 1. '

..,·.·.·

__ -_. --1 

### .

**4;~~1~** 

### .East Hampton Town Board 159 Pantigo Road East Hampton, NY 11937 ADOPTED RESOLUTION 2015-473 Meeting: 04/21/15 10:00 AM Department: Town Clerk Category: Bond Prepared By: Carole A. Brennan Initiator: Carole A. Brennan Sponsors: Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez DOC ID: 15285 A 

## BOND · $500,000 Planning Engineering Airport BOND RESOLUTION OF THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK, ADOPTED APRIL 21, 2015, AUTHORIZING THE PREPARATION OF SURVEYS, PRELIMINARY PLANS AND DETAILED PLANS, SPECIFICATIONS AND ESTIMATES FOR FUTURE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EAST HAMPTON AIRPORT, STATING THE ESTIMATED MAXIMUM COST THEREOF IS $500,000, APPROPRIATING SAID AMOUNT FOR SUCH PURPOSE AND AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF BONDS OF THE TOWN IN THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF NOT TO EXCEED $500,000 TO FINANCE SAID APPROPRIATION THE TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, IN THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, NEW YORK, HEREBY RESOLVES (by the favorable vote of not less than two-thirds of all the members of said Town Board) AS FOLLOWS: Section 1. The Town of East Hampton, in the County of Suffolk, New York (herein called the "Town", is hereby authorized to prepare surveys, preliminary plans and detailed plans, specifications and estimates for future capital improvements at the East Hampton Airport. The estimated maximum cost thereof, including preliminary costs and costs incidental thereto and the financing thereof, is $500,000 and said amount is hereby appropriated for such purpose. The plan of financing includes the issuance of bonds of the Town in the principal amount of not to exceed $500,000 to finance said appropriation, and the levy and collection of taxes on all the taxable real property in the Town to pay the principal of said bonds and the interest thereon as the same shall become due and payable. Debt service on the obligations herein authorized is expected to be paid from the Town's Airport Fund, as determined by the Town Board. Section 2. Bonds ofthe Town in the principal amount of not to exceed $500,000 are hereby authorized to be issued pursuant to the provisions of the Local Finance Law, constituting Chapter 33-a of the Consolidated Laws of the State of New York (herein called the "Law"), to finance said appropriation. Section 3. The period of probable usefulness applicable to the object or purpose for which said bonds are authorized to be issued, within the limitations of Section 11.00 a. 62 of the Law, is five (5) years. Section 4. The proceeds ofthe bonds herein authorized, and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of said bonds, may be applied to reimburse the Town for expenditures made after the effective date of this resolution for the purpose for which said bonds are authorized. The foregoing statement of intent with respect to reimbursement is made in conformity with Treasury Regulation Section 1.150-2 of the United States Treasury Department. Section 5. The proposed maturity of the bonds authorized by this resolution will not exceed five years. Section 6. Each ofthe bonds authorized by this resolution, and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, shall contain the recital of validity as prescribed by Section 52.00 of the Law and said bonds, and any notes issued in anticipation
Updated: 4/20/2015 4:34PM by Carole A. Brennan A Page 1Resolution 2015-473 Meeting of April 21, 2015

of said bonds, shall be general obligations of the Town, payable as to both principal and interest by general tax upon all the taxable real property within the Town. The faith and credit ofthe Town are hereby irrevocably pledged to the punctual payment ofthe principal of and interest on said bonds, and any notes issued in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, and provision shall be made annually in the budget ofthe Town by appropriation for (a) the amortization and redemption of the bonds and any notes in anticipation thereofto mature in such year and (b) the payment of interest to be due and payable in such year. Section 7. Subject to the provisions of this resolution and of the Law and pursuant to the provisions of Section 21.00 relative to the authorization of the issuance of bonds with substantially level or declining annual debt service, Section 30.00 relative to the authorization ofthe issuance of bond anticipation notes and Section 50.00 and Sections 56.00 to 60.00 and 168.00 ofthe Law, the powers and duties ofthe Town Board relative to authorizing bond anticipation notes and prescribing the terms, form and contents and as to the sale and issuance of the bonds herein authorized, and of any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of said bonds, and the renewals of said bond anticipation notes, and the powers and duties relative to executing contracts for credit enhancements and providing for substantially level or declining annual debt service, are hereby delegated to the Supervisor, the chief fiscal officer of the Town. Section 8. The validity ofthe bonds authorized by this resolution, and of any notes issued in anticipation ofthe sale of said bonds, may be contested only if: (a) such obligations are authorized for an object or purpose for which the Town is not authorized to expend money, or (b) the provisions of law which should be complied with at the date ofthe publication of such resolution, or a summary thereof, are not substantially complied with, and an action, suit or proceeding contesting such validity is commenced within twenty days afterthe date of such publication, or (c) such obligations are authorized in violation ofthe provisions of the constitution. Section 9. This bond resolution shall take effect immediately, and the Town Clerk is hereby authorized and directed to publish the foregoing resolution, in summary, together with a Notice attached in substantially the form prescribed by Section 81.00 of the Law in "The East Hampton Star." which is hereby designated the official newspaper of the Town for such publication.

RESULT: MOVER: SECONDER: AYES: ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS] Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman Peter Van Scoyoc, Councilman Burke-Gonzalez, Van Scoyoc, Overby, Overton, Cantwell

Updated: 4/20/2015 4:34PM by Carole A. Brennan A Page 2 5.A.2East Hampton Town Board 159 Pantigo Road East Hampton, NY 11937 ADOPTED RESOLUTION 2015-418 Meeting: 04/16/15 06:30PM Department: Town Attorney Category: Approvals Prepared By: Elizabeth Vail Initiator: Elizabeth Vail Sponsors: Councilwoman Kathee

**Burke~Gonzalez** DOC ID: 15264 A 

## Resolution Memorializing Goals for the East Hampton Airport Whereas, the Town Board committed to studying and resolving the disturbance from noise associated with East Hampton Airport ("Airport") operations for the 2015 calendar season; and Whereas, the Town Board, in furtherance of its commitment, adopted three local laws restricting the use of the Airport in an effort to address noise disturbance; and Whereas, the Town Board recognizes that the adoption of these local laws represents only an initial step in the Town's commitment to studying and resolving Airport matters; and now, therefore be it Resolved, that in furtherance of these commitments the Town Board hereby adopts the following goals regarding the Airport: 1. Maintain the Airportas Safe and Efficient. The Town Board as proprietor and operator of the Airport, shall commit to implementing a methodical capital and maintenance plan for Airport facilities to operate a safe and properly maintained self -sufficient facility without burdening taxpayers; The Town shall work closely with the Airport engineer to identify priorities for maintenance and capital improvements, with a focus on maintaining and enhancing safety. 2. Local Laws. The enactment of the three local laws amending Chapter 75 shall address restrictions on the use of the Airport to ensure peace and quiet at night and in the evening and morning hours, limit the number of noisy helicopters and jets while still allowing reasonable access to the Airport. 3. Study the Effectiveness of the New Laws. The Town shall professionally study and evaluate the effectiveness of our initial efforts
- including the new local laws
- following the 2015 summer season. These studies will include analysis of the financial impact of the restrictions, their effect on noise and complaints, the diversion of traffic to other airports, and the effects of the restrictions on aircraft operators. The Town shall convene a public meeting after the 2015 season to present the results of these studies and to hear from the public to determine whether any changes are required in the restrictions for the 2016 season. 4. Airport Management Advisory Committee. The Town Board shall appoint an Airport Management Advisory Committee to be responsible for advising the Town Board and the Airport Director on the operation, maintenance, finances, capital improvements, and preservation of the East Hampton Airport. The Committee will consolidate the several existing advisory committees into a single advisory group. 5. Coordinate with the Congressional Delegation. The Town shall continue to work closely with Congressman Zeldin in his efforts to convince the FAA to require
Updated: 4/15/2015 3:53PM by Elizabeth Vail A Page 1 

### I 4A1.aResolution 2015-418 Meeting of April 16, 2015

helicopters to maintain a minimum altitude in their flights from New York City to the East End. The Town will also seek assistance from Senators Schumer and Gillibrand and other interested Members of Congress to ensure that our concerns are part of Congress' debate over reauthorization of the FAA. 6. Partner with Eastern Region Helicopter Council. The Town Board shall continue to work with the Eastern Region Helicopter Council and other industry stakeholders to pursue its offer to develop voluntary procedures to mitigate helicopter noise in the short-term. 7. Work with the FAA on Flight Tracks. The Town shall invite the FAA, airport users, and industry groups, to join it in finding long-term solutions to noise problems that can be resolved by addressing flight tracks, altitudes, and flight procedures. The Town shall request and work with the FAA to establish a regional task force to review problems throughout the East End in furtherance of a regional solution. B. Improved Technology. The Town shall improve its ability to record and track airport operations and noise problems through installation of an Airport Noise and Operations Monitoring System (ANOMS) and will work with the Air Traffic Control Tower, our operations billing contractor, Vector, and the operator of our complaint system, PlaneNoise, to ensure the Town has the best data available on airport operations.

RESULT: MOVER: SECONDER: AYES: ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS] Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman Peter Van Scoyoc, Councilman Burke-Gonzalez, Van Scoyoc, Overby, Overton, Cantwell

Updated: 4/15/2015 3:53PM by Elizabeth Vail A Page 2East Hampton Town Board 159 Pantigo Road East Hampton, NY 11937 ADOPTED RESOLUTION 2014-838 Meeting: 07/03/14 06:30PM Department: Town Clerk Category: Bond Prepared By: Carole A. Brennan Initiator: Carole A. Brennan Sponsors: Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez DOC ID: 14126 

## BOND · $270,000 - Reconstruction ofTaxiway 4-22 BOND RESOLUTION OF THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK, ADOPTED JULY 3, 2014, AUTHORIZING THE RECONSTRUCTION OF TAXIWAY 4-22 AT EAST HAMPTON AIRPORT, STATING THE ESTIMATED MAXIMUM COST THEREOF IS $270,000, APPROPRIATING SAID AMOUNT FOR SUCH PURPOSE AND AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF BONDS IN THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF NOT TO EXCEED $270,000 TO FINANCE SAID APPROPRIATION. THE TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, IN THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, NEW YORK, HEREBY RESOLVES (by the favorable vote of not less than two-thirds of all the members of said Town Board) AS FOLLOWS: Section 1. The Town of East Hampton, in the County of Suffolk, New York (herein called the "Town"), is hereby authorized to reconstruct taxiway 4-22 at East Hampton Airport. The estimated maximum cost thereof, including preliminary costs and costs incidental thereto and the financing thereof, is $270,000 and said amount is hereby appropriated for such purpose. The plan of financing includes the issuance of bonds of the Town in the principal amount of not to exceed $270,000 to finance said appropriation, and the levy and collection of taxes on all the taxable real property in the Town to pay the principal of said bonds and the interest thereon as the same shall become due and payable. Debt service on the obligations herein authorized is expected to be paid from the Town's Airport Fund, as determined by the Town Board. Section 2. Bonds ofthe Town in the principal amount of not to exceed $270,000 are hereby authorized to be issued pursuant to the provisions of the Local Finance Law, constituting Chapter 33-a of the Consolidated Laws of the State of New York (herein called the "Law"), to finance said appropriation. Section 3. The period of probable usefulness applicable to the object or purpose for which said bonds are authorized to be issued, within the limitations of Section 11.00 a. 14 of the Law, is ten (10) years. Section 4. The proceeds of the bonds herein authorized, and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of said bonds, may be applied to reimburse the Town for expenditures made after the effective date of this resolution for the purpose for which said bonds are authorized. The foregoing statement of intent with respect to reimbursement is made in conformity with Treasury Regulation Section 1.150-2 of the United States Treasury Department. Section 5. The proposed maturity ofthe bonds authorized by this resolution will exceed five years. Section 6. Each of the bonds authorized by this resolution, and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, shall contain the recital of validity as prescribed by Section 52.00 of the Law and said bonds, and any notes issued in anticipation of said bonds, shall be general obligations of the Town, payable as to both principal and interest by general tax upon all the taxable real property within the Town. The faith and
Updated: 6/30/2014 2:34PM by Carole A. Brennan Page 1 4A4Resolution 2014-838 Meeting of July 3, 2014

credit ofthe Town are hereby irrevocably pledged to the punctual payment ofthe principal of and interest on said bonds, and any notes issued in anticipation ofthe sale of said bonds, and provision shall be made annually in the budget ofthe Town by appropriation for (a) the amortization and redemption ofthe bonds and any notes in anticipation thereof to mature in such year and (b) the payment of interest to be due and payable in such year. Section 7. Subject to the provisions ofthis resolution and of the Law and pursuant to the provisions of Section 21.00 ofthe Law relative to the authorization ofthe issuance of bonds with substantially level or declining annual debt service, Section 30.00 relative to the authorization ofthe issuance of bond anticipation notes and Section 50.00 and Sections 56.00 to 60.00 and 168.00 ofthe Law, the powers and duties ofthe Town Board relative to authorizing bond anticipation notes and prescribing the terms, form and contents and as to the sale and issuance ofthe bonds herein authorized, and of any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of said bonds, and the renewals of said bond anticipation notes, and the powers and duties relative to executing contracts for credit enhancements and providing for substantially level or declining annual debt service, are hereby delegated to the Supervisor, the chief fiscal officer ofthe Town. Section 8. The validity ofthe bonds authorized by this resolution, and of any notes issued in anticipation ofthe sale of said bonds, may be contested only if: (a) such obligations are authorized for an object or purpose for which the Town is not authorized to expend money, or (b) the provisions of law which should be complied with at the date ofthe publication of such resolution, or a summary thereof, are not substantially complied with, and an action, suit or proceeding contesting such validity is commenced within twenty days after the date of such publication, or (c) such obligations are authorized in violation ofthe provisions ofthe constitution. Section 9. This bond resolution is subject to a permissive referendum and the Town Clerk of said Town of East Hampton is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be published, in full, within ten (10) days after the adoption ofthis resolution, in "The East Hampton Star" which is hereby designated the official newspaper ofthe Town for such publication, and posted on the sign board ofthe Town maintained pursuant to the Town Law, a Notice in substantially the following form:

Updated: 6/30/2014 2:34PM by Carole A. Brennan Page 2Resolution 2014-838 Meeting of July 3, 2014

LEGAL NOTICE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, NEW YORK PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 3, 2014, the Town Board of the Town of East Hampton, in the County of Suffolk, New York, adopted a bond resolution entitled: "Bond Resolution of the Town of East Hampton, Suffolk County, New York, adopted July 3, 2014, authorizing the reconstruction of taxiway 4-22 at East Hampton Airport, stating the estimated maximum cost thereof is $270,000, appropriating said amount for such purpose and authorizing the issuance of bonds in the principal amount of not to exceed $270,000 bonds to finance said appropriation," an abstract of such bond resolution, concisely stating the purpose and effect thereof, being as follows: FIRST: AUTHORIZING the reconstruction of taxiway 4-22 at East Hampton Airport; STATING the estimated maximum cost thereof, including preliminary costs and costs incidental thereto and the financing thereof, is $270,000; APPROPRIATING said amount for such purpose; STATING the plan of financing includes the issuance of bonds of the Town in the principal amount of not to exceed $270,000 to finance said appropriation, and the levy of a tax upon all the taxable real property within the Town to pay the principal of said bonds and interest thereon; and STATING that debt service on the obligations herein authorized is expected to be paid from the Town's Airport Fund, as determined by the Town Board; SECOND: AUTHORIZING the issuance of not to exceed $270,000 bonds of the Town pursuant to the Local Finance Law of the State of New York (the "Law") to finance said appropriation; THIRD: DETERMINING and STATING the period of probable usefulness applicable to the purpose for which said bonds are authorized to be issued is ten (10) years; the proceeds of said bonds and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation thereof may be applied to reimburse the Town for expenditures made after the effective date of this bond resolution for the purpose for which said bonds are authorized; and the proposed maturity of said $270,000 bonds will exceed five (5) years; FOURTH: DETERMINING that said bonds and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of said bonds and the renewals of said bond anticipation notes shall be general obligations of the Town; and PLEDGING to their payment the faith and credit of the Town; FIFTH: DELEGATING to the Supervisor the powers and duties as to the issuance of said bonds and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of said bonds, and the renewals thereof, and other related powers; and SIXTH: DETERMINING that the bond resolution is subject to a permissive referendum. DATED: July 3, 2014 CAROLE A. BRENNAN Town Clerk

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Section 10. The Town Clerk is hereby directed, after said bond resolution shall take effect, to cause said bond resolution to be published, in summary, in the newspaper(s) referred to in Section 9 hereof, and hereby designated the official newspaper(s) for said publication, together with a Notice in substantially the form as provided by Section 81.00 ofthe Local Finance Law, constituting Chapter 33-a ofthe Consolidated Laws ofthe State of New York.

RESULT: ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS] MOVER: Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman SECONDER: Peter Van Scoyoc, Councilman AYES: Burke-Gonzalez, VanScoyoc, Overby, Overton, Cantwell

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