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19-1439

United States v. Pellistri

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order 

filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

2 at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 28th 3 day of April, two thousand twenty.

4

5 PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI,

6 RICHARD C. WESLEY,

7 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

8 Circuit Judges.

9

10

11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

12

13 Appellee, 19-1439-cr

14

15 v.

16

17 GARY PELLISTRI, JR.,

18

19 Defendant-Appellant.

20

21

22 For Appellee: Andrew D. Beaty, Assistant United 

23 States Attorney, for Grant C. Jaquith, 

24 United States Attorney for the Northern 

25 District of New York, Syracuse, NY.

26

27 For Defendant-Appellant: Molly K. Corbett and James P. Egan, 

28 Assistant Federal Public Defenders, for 

29 Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public 

30 Defender, Northern District of New 

31 York, Albany, NY.

32
2

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2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

3 New York (Sharpe, J.).

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

5 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in 

6 part and REMANDED for further proceedings.

7 Defendant-Appellant Gary Pellistri, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on 

8 May 9, 2019 following Pellistri’s guilty plea for attempted coercion and enticement of a minor, 

9 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Pellistri challenges the length of his supervised release and 

10 four of the special conditions of supervised release imposed on him—namely, special conditions 

11 three and four, which place limits on Pellistri’s ability to be in locations where minors are likely 

12 to be present or for the purpose of viewing minors; special condition 11, which requires Pellistri 

13 to participate in a substance abuse program; and special condition 13, which prohibits alcohol 

14 use. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the 

15 case, and the issues on appeal. 

16 DISCUSSION

17 I. Lifetime Supervised Release

18 Pellistri argues that the district court’s imposition of a life term of supervised release was 

19 unreasonable. Although Pellistri did not explicitly state whether he is challenging the procedural 

20 and/or substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we address both given the nature of his 

21 arguments. 

22 A. Procedural Reasonableness

23 Where, as here, a defendant fails to raise a procedural objection at sentencing, we review 

24 those claims for plain error. United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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1 Under the plain error standard, Pellistri bears the burden of showing: (1) there was an error; (2) 

2 the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute;” (3) “the error affected 

3 [his] substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district 

4 court proceedings;” and (4) the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

5 of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (quotation marks 

6 omitted and alteration in original).

7 We conclude that the district court’s sentence of a life term of supervised release was 

8 procedurally reasonable. Pellistri argues that the district court committed procedural error 

9 because it failed to adequately explain its reasons for imposing a life term of supervised release 

10 and inappropriately stated that it was “compensat[ing] for any potential error” in the district 

11 court’s judgment to impose a below-Guidelines incarceratory sentence. Pellistri Br. at 12. 

12 We disagree. District courts are required to consider certain factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

13 § 3553(a) when determining the length of a term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c).

14 “Absent record evidence suggesting the contrary, we presume that a sentencing judge has 

15 faithfully discharged her duty to consider the statutory factors, and have steadfastly refused to 

16 require judges to explain or enumerate how such consideration was conducted.” United States v. 

17 Olsen, No. 19-1104-cr, 2020 WL 1514742, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2020) (summary order) 

18 (quoting United States v. Kimber, 777 F.3d 553, 565 (2d Cir. 2015)). Applying that presumption 

19 here, we find that the district court considered the applicable Section 3553(a) factors and stated 

20 “the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). At sentencing, 

21 the district court noted that Pellistri had a history of conduct directed at young, prepubescent 

22 girls and that it was “extraordinarily concerned” about other allegations of conduct with minors 

23 reflected in the presentence report (“PSR”) that “fit the very profile of what [Pellistri] did in this 
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1 case.” App’x at 86-88. Based on its assessment, the district court concluded that a life term of 

2 supervised release was “absolutely warranted” because he posed “a real threat to young 

3 females.” App’x at 87-88. When understood as part of the district court’s broader discussion of 

4 the seriousness of Pellistri’s offense and his pattern of similar behavior, the district court’s 

5 explanation for its imposition of a life term of supervised release was sufficient. 

6 We also reject Pellistri’s argument that the district court’s statement that it was 

7 “compensat[ing] for any potential error,” App’x at 88, violated Section 3553(a)’s parsimony 

8 clause because that statement does not suggest that the district court understood the term of 

9 supervised release to be greater than necessary. Instead, while imposing a 15-year term of 

10 imprisonment that was substantially below the Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months’ to 

11 life imprisonment, the district court determined that, when the defendant was no longer 

12 incarcerated, a life term of supervision (with the accompanying special conditions) was 

13 necessary to adequately protect the public. Therefore, we hold that the district court committed 

14 no procedural error by imposing a life term of supervised release.

15 B. Substantive Reasonableness

16 We review sentences for substantive reasonableness under a “deferential abuse-of17 discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); see also United States v. 

18 Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[O]ur standard is reasonableness, a particularly 

19 deferential form of abuse-of-discretion review . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)). A sentence is 

20 substantively unreasonable “only if it cannot be located within the range of permissible 

21 decisions.” United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 

22 omitted). As we have observed before, “in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines 

23 sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in 
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1 the particular circumstances.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006), 

2 abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364 (2007). 

3 We also reject Pellistri’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his term of 

4 supervised release. In this case, the Sentencing Guidelines call for a life term of supervised 

5 release. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2) & cmt. 1. However, we have emphasized that “[t]he fact 

6 that the Sentencing Guidelines recommend a lifetime term of supervised release does not, of 

7 course, suffice to make [a defendant’s] sentence reasonable.” United States v. Hayes, 445 F.3d 

8 536, 537 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005)). 

9 Moreover, “the severity of a life sentence of supervised release justifies a closer look at the 

10 district court’s decision to impose such a sentence.” United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95, 101 

11 (2d Cir. 2018). Here, there was a more than adequate basis to support the life term of supervised 

12 release given the gravity of the instant offense involving an attempt through online 

13 communications to entice a 13-year-old girl to engage in sexual activity, as well as a history of 

14 similar behavior towards minors. See also, e.g., Hayes, 445 F.3d at 537 (holding that a life term 

15 of supervised release was reasonable where defendant transported child pornography). 

16 Therefore, the district court’s imposition of a life term of supervised release was not 

17 substantively unreasonable. 

18 II. Special Conditions

19 Pellistri argues that we should vacate four of the special conditions imposed upon him, 

20 specifically, special conditions three and four, which place limits on Pellistri’s ability to be in 

21 locations where minors are likely to be present or for the purpose of viewing minors; special 

22 condition 11, which requires Pellistri to participate in a substance abuse program; and special 

23 condition 13, which prohibits alcohol use.
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1 “District courts possess broad discretion in imposing conditions of supervised release.” 

2 United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018). A district court may impose special 

3 conditions that are reasonably related to “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

4 history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the need for the sentence imposed to afford 

5 adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “the need to protect the public from further crimes of 

6 the defendant,” and “the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 

7 training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner,” which 

8 “involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” for these purposes. 

9 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b); see also United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 123-25 (2d Cir. 2005). 

10 Nevertheless, a district court’s discretion to impose special conditions is not “untrammelled,” 

11 and we will “carefully scrutinize unusual and severe conditions.” Myers, 426 F.3d at 124 

12 (quotation marks omitted). 

13 When determining whether to impose special conditions, “[a] district court is required to 

14 make an individualized assessment . . . , and to state on the record the reason for imposing it; the 

15 failure to do so is error.” Betts, 886 F.3d at 202. However, even when the district court does not 

16 provide such an explanation, the condition at issue can be upheld “if the district court’s reasoning 

17 is self-evident in the record.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Because Pellistri received notice of 

18 these conditions prior to sentencing and failed to object to them, we review the district court’s 

imposition of these special conditions for plain error.1 19 See United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 

20 343 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2008).

1 Pellistri argues that plain error review is inapplicable because the special conditions were 

not included in the PSR. Pellistri Br. at 17 (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 80 (2d 

Cir. 2003)). We have previously applied plain error standards less rigorously in cases where the 
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1 A. Contact with Minors

2 Pellistri requests vacatur of special condition three, which states that Pellistri “must not 

3 go to, or remain at, any place where [he] know[s] children under the age of 18 are likely to be, 

4 including parks, schools, playgrounds, and childcare facilities without the permission of the 

probation officer,”2 5 and special condition four, which states that Pellistri “must not go to, or 

6 remain at, a place for the primary purpose of observing or contacting children under the age of 

7 18.” App’x at 95. Pellistri argues that these conditions are overly broad and unconstitutionally 

8 vague. His argument is not persuasive. 

9 We recently affirmed identical special conditions Olsen. 2020 WL 1514742, at *1-2. 

10 The reasoning in that case—where the defendant was convicted of sexual exploitation of a 

11 child—applies with equal force here, where the defendant was convicted of attempting to lure a 

12 minor across state lines to engage in sexual acts with her. Moreover, as discussed supra, the 

13 district court noted that Pellistri has a history of exhibiting inappropriate sexual behavior towards 

14 minors. At sentencing, the court noted that the offense at issue in this case and Pellistri’s history 

15 of inappropriate behavior towards minors warranted a need to protect the public from the 

PSR failed to give the defendant notice that the condition of supervised release might be 

imposed. See, e.g., Dupes, 513 F.3d at 343. However, Pellistri had prior notice of the special 

conditions that the district court intended to impose via a court exhibit, Gov. App’x at 1, and had 

an opportunity to object to them in advance of sentencing, at the time his sentence was imposed, 

and afterwards, see App’x at 89 (defense counsel reserving right to object to conditions of 

supervised release during the week after sentencing). He did not do so. Therefore, it is

Pellistri’s burden to demonstrate plain error. See Dupes, 513 F.3d at 343 & n.2 (“In this case, the 

presentence report, which Dupes reviewed with counsel, recommended the conditions to which 

he failed to object and now challenges on appeal. We see no circumstances warranting the 

relaxation of the plain error standard in this case.”). 

2

 We have previously treated the phrase “likely to be” as synonymous with the phrase “likely 

to congregate.” See United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008). We view the 

two phrases as having the same meaning here.
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1 defendant. Therefore, we find these special conditions are narrowly tailored to “involve no 

2 greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve that goal. See U.S.S.G. 

3 § 5D1.3(b); see also Olsen, 2020 WL 1514742, at *1-2. Moreover, as set forth in Olsen, these 

4 conditions provide a defendant with sufficient notice as to what conduct is prohibited and, thus, 

5 the unconstitutional vagueness challenge fails. See Olsen, 2020 WL 1514742, at *2 (holding that 

6 identical conditions were not unconstitutionally vague). 

7 B. Substance Abuse Program

8 Pellistri next challenges special condition 11, requiring him to participate in a substance 

9 abuse program. The Sentencing Guidelines specifically provide that, if the court has reason to 

10 believe that the defendant has a drug or alcohol problem, special conditions requiring that the 

11 defendant participate in abuse programs that include testing for those substances to ensure 

12 abstinence are appropriate. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4). We have previously vacated special 

13 conditions requiring participation in substance abuse programs where the conditions were not 

14 “reasonably related to the circumstances of [the defendant’s] offense” and there was no history 

15 of substance abuse. See United States v. Mears, 758 F. App’x 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2018). In this 

16 case, Pellistri admitted that he began using marijuana approximately weekly in his late twenties 

17 and continued until the time of his arrest. Therefore, given that defendant has a history of using 

18 illegal drugs, the district court did not plainly err in requiring the defendant to participate in a 

substance abuse program. See Betts, 886 F.3d at 202.3 19

3 Although this condition is warranted based upon the record before the district court at

sentencing, the Court recognizes that the defendant’s rehabilitation in jail, as well as potential 

future changes to federal and state laws with respect to marijuana use, could materially impact 

whether this condition will still be necessary by the time the defendant serves his 15-year term of 

imprisonment and is placed on supervised release. However, the procedural mechanism for 
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1 C. Use of Alcohol

2 Finally, both the defendant and the Government agree that the district court did not 

3 adequately articulate its reasons for imposing special condition 13: that Pellistri refrain from the 

4 use of alcohol. Nor is the district court’s reasoning self-evident in the record—which indicates

5 only that Pellistri drank alcohol once or twice per month at most. Pellistri’s underlying crime did 

6 not involve the use of alcohol, and the district court was not presented with “any evidence 

7 suggesting that defendant ever seriously abused alcohol.” Id. at 202-03 (vacating special 

8 condition banning all alcohol use where none of the defendant’s underlying conduct involved the 

9 use of alcohol). Thus, we conclude that the special condition banning all alcohol use for life is 

10 not reasonably related to any of the factors outlined in Section 5D1.3(b) and necessitates vacatur. 

11 Accordingly, the district court’s imposition of special condition 13 is vacated, and the case is 

12 remanded for further consideration. Upon remand, the district court should either articulate 

13 individualized reasons for imposing special condition 13 or remove that special condition.

14 We have considered Pellistri’s remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. 

15 Accordingly, judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part and 

16 REMANDED for further consideration. 

17

18 FOR THE COURT:

19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

addressing any such changed circumstances would be for the defendant to seek modification of 

the special condition in the district court at that time.