~·-KAPLAN !(I RSCH ROCKWELL 

October 8, 2015 

VIA HAND DELIVERY 

Sharon Long 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

RECEIVED 

ocr o 8 2015 

PARr 16 DOCKETS 

Attn: FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket, AGC-61 0 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Re: National Business Aviation Association, Inc .. et al. v. Town of East Hampton, NY, 

FAA Docket No. 16-15-08 

Dear Ms. Long: 

Enclosed please fmd for filing in the above-referenced docket one original and three 

copies of Respondent Town of East Hampton, New York's Answer to the Complaint and 

Respondent Town of East Hampton, New York's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 

Support of Its Answer to the Complaint. Also enclosed is an extra copy of the Answer and 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities to be file-stamped and returned to the courier. 

Please feel free to contact me at (202) 955-5600 if you have any questions or require 

additional information. 

Enclosures 

cc: Mr. Steve Brown 

Atto:rneys at Law 

Denver m Washington, DC 

Sincerely, 

jv:~ W. Eric Pilsk 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell Ll.P tel: (202) 955·5600 

1001 Connecticut Ave., :i.W., Suite 800 fax: (202) 955·5616 

Washington! DC 20036 11/\Yw.kaplankirsch.com 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

National Business Aviation Association, Inc., et al. 

Complainants, 

v. 

Town of East Hampton, NY 

Respondent. 

FAA Docket No. 16-15-08 

RECEIVED 

OCT 0 8 2015 

PART 16 DOCKETS 

RESPONDENT TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, NEW YORK'S 

ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT 

Designation of persons to receive service for the Town of East Hampton, New York: 

Elizabeth Vail 

Town Attorney 

Town of East Hampton 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 1193 7 

EVail@EHamptonNY.Gov 

W. Eric Pilsk 

Catherine van Heuven 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 

1001 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 800 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

epilsk@kaplankirsch.com 

cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com 

Telephone: (202) 955-5600 

Facsimile: (202) 955-5616 
ANSWER 

The Town of East Hampton, New York (the "Town"), by and through counsel, pursuant 

to 14 C.P.R.§ 16.23(h), responds to the allegations of the Complaint filed by National Business 

Aviation Association, Inc., Shoreline Aviation, Inc. (Connecticut); PlaneSense, Inc.; Fly the 

Whale, Inc.; Eastern Air Express, Inc.; FL Aviation Corporation; Tuckaire, Inc.; Autonomic 

Controls, Inc.; Shoreline Aviation, Inc. (Massachusetts); Wes Rae Contracting Corporation; 

Eagle Air, Inc.; and JET AS, Inc. (collectively, "Complainants") as set forth in the numbered 

paragraphs below. The Town denies all allegations contained in the Complaint except to the 

extent such allegations are specifically admitted in this Answer. 

In further support of its Answer, and pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 16.23(i), the Town submits 

a Brief in Support of Its Answer to the Complaint, filed herewith and incorporated herein by 

reference ("Brief'), with a concise statement of the facts upon which the Town relies and 

discussion of the legal principles demonstrating that the Complaint should be dismissed and the 

Town found to be in compliance with its federal obligations. 

Complainants 

I. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 1 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are. 

2. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 2 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, where their members operate aircraft, and what aircraft their members operate. 

2 
3. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 3 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, and what aircraft they operate. 

4. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 4 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, and how many operations they conduct at the East Hampton Airport ("Airport" or 

"HTO"). 

5. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, how many operations they conduct at the Airport and how many based aircraft 

they have at the Airport. 

6. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 6 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, and how many operations they conduct at the Airport. 

7. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 7 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, what aircraft they operate, and how many operations they conduct at the Airport. 

8. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, what aircraft they operate, and how many operations they conduct at the Airport. 

9. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 9 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, and how many operations they conduct at the Airport. 

3 
I 0. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 10 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, and how many operations they conduct at the Airport. 

II. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph II of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, how many operations they conduct at the Airport and how many based aircraft 

they have at the Airport. 

12. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 12 of the Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, and how many operations they conduct at the Airport. 

13. The Town is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of 

Paragraph 13 ofthe Complaint, but states that it does not contest the Complainants' statements of 

who they are, what aircraft they operate, and how many operations they conduct at the Airport. 

14. In response to Paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the Town admits only that the 

Complainants are tenants and users of the Airport. The Town otherwise denies the allegations in 

Paragraph 14. 

Subject ofthe Complaiut 

15. The Town admits the allegations in Paragraph 15 of the Complaint. 

16. The Town admits the contact information for Supervisor Larry Cantwell, Town 

Attorney Elizabeth Vail and Airport Director Jemille Charlton. The Town otherwise notes that 

the Town Board includes Supervisor Cantwell and four additional elected Council members, 

namely Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman Sylvia Overby, Councilman 

Peter VanScoyoc, and Councilman Fred Overton. 

4 
17. The Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 17 of the Complaint. 

18. The Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 18 of the Complaint. 

Facts 

19. The Town admits the allegations of Paragraph 19 of the Complaint. 

20. In response to the allegations of Paragraph 20 of the Complaint, the Town admits 

only that there was litigation in federal court and also before FAA, and that the litigation initiated 

by the Committee to Stop Airport Expansion resulted in a Settlement Agreement between FAA 

and the Committee and the dismissal of the litigation. The Town is not a party to that Settlement 

Agreement. The terms of the Settlement Agreement and the litigation speak for themselves. 

21. In response to the allegations of Paragraph 21 of the Complaint, the Town states 

only that the terms of the Settlement Agreement speak for themselves and that the terms ofF AA 

Order 5190.6B speak for themselves. The Town otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph 21. 

22. The Town admits that it has engaged in a lengthy public process to develop and 

implement reasonable noise restrictions at the Airport. The Town otherwise denies the 

allegations of Paragraph 22. 

23. The Town admits the allegations in Paragraph 23 of the Complaint. 

24. In response to the allegations of Paragraph 24, the Town admits that it adopted 

three resolutions affecting airport operations on Aprill6, 2015, and states that the terms of these 

local laws speak for themselves. 

25. In response to the allegations of Paragraph 25, the Town admits that Town of East 

Hampton Local Laws Nos. 3, 4, and 5 were filed with the New York Secretary of State on April 

30, 2015. The Town also states that, at the request of the federal judge regarding pending 

litigation, the Town agreed to not enforce the restrictions - even after the filing with the 

5 
Secretary of State - until the court ruled on a preliminary injunction. The Town otherwise 

denies the allegations in Paragraph 25 of the Complaint. 

26. In response to the allegations of Paragraph 26, the Town admits that it adopted 

Local Law No.7 on May 7, 2015 and states that the terms of Local Law 7 speak for themselves. 

The Town also states that Local Law No. 7 was filed with the New York Secretary of State on 

May 19, 2015. 

27. In response to the allegations of Paragraph 27, the Town admits that some of the 

Complainants have filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 

and that the terms of that action speak for themselves. The Town admits that the court held a 

hearing on May 18, 2015, and that the judge initially anticipated a ruling by June 8, 2015. The 

Town admits that it agreed to defer enforcement of the laws until the court ruled. The Town 

states that the court ultimately issued a ruling on the request for injunctive relief on June 26, 

2015, in which the court affirmed the Town's legal right to adopt use restrictions to address the 

problem of excessive airport noise; upheld the two curfew laws; and preliminarily enjoined 

enforcement of the one-trip per week law. The Town further states that it began enforcing the two 

curfews on July 2, but that it is not yet enforcing the one-trip per week law due to the injunction. The 

Town otherwise denies the allegations in Paragraph 27 of the Complaint. 

Efforts at Pre-Complaint Resolution 

28. The Town admits the allegations in Paragraph 28 of the Complaint. 

29. The Town admits the allegations in Paragraph 29 of the Complaint. 

30. The Town admits the allegations in Paragraph 30 of the Complaint. 

31. The Town admits the allegations in Paragraph 31 of the Complaint. 

6 
32. The Town states that the findings in Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. City of Santa 

Monica FAA Docket No. 16-03-11 (Director's Determination Jan. 4, 2005) speak for 

themselves. 

Applicable Law - Exclusive Rights 

33. Paragraph 33 makes an allegation of law to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 33 of the Complaint. 

34. Paragraph 34 makes an allegation oflaw to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 34 of the Complaint. 

35. Paragraph 35 makes an allegation oflaw to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 35 of the Complaint. 

36. Paragraph 36 makes an allegation of law to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 36 of the Complaint. 

37. Paragraph 37 makes an allegation of law to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 37 of the Complaint 

except to the extent it includes an accurate quote from one paragraph of the Airport Compliance 

Manual. 

38. Paragraph 38 makes an allegation of law to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 38 ofthe Complaint. 

39. Paragraph 39 makes an allegation of law to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 39 of the Complaint. 

40. Paragraph 40 makes an allegation oflaw to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 40 of the Complaint. 

7 
Applicable Law - Revenue Diversion 

41. The Town states that the terms of its April21, 2015, Press Release (Exhibit 10 to 

the Complaint) speaks for itself. The Town otherwise denies the allegations in Paragraph 41. 

42. Paragraph 42 makes an allegation oflaw to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required the Town states that the terms of FAA Order 5190.6B speak for 

themselves and otherwise denies the allegations in Paragraph 42. 

43. Paragraph 43 of the Complaint sets forth allegations oflaw to which no response 

is required. To the extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 43 

of the Complaint. 

44. Paragraph 44 of the Complaint sets forth allegations of law to which no response 

is required. To the extent a response is required the Town denies the allegations in Paragraph 44 

of the Complaint. 

45. Paragraph 45 of the Complaint sets forth allegations oflaw to which no response 

IS necessary. To the extent that a response is necessary, the Town denies all allegations of 

Paragraph 45 that are inconsistent with applicable law and FAA guidance. 

Relief Sought 

46. The Town denies the allegations of Paragraph 46 of the Complaint. 

47. The Town denies the allegations of Paragraph 47 of the Complaint. 

8 
CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint should be dismissed. 

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 2015. 

Elizabeth Vail 

Town Attorney 

Town of East Hampton 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 1193 7 

EVail@EHamptonNY.Gov 

9 

k;#fl/ 

W. Eric Pilsk 

Catherine van Heuven 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 

1001 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 800 

Washington, DC 20036 

epilsk@kaplankirsch.com 

cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com 

Telephone: (202) 955-5600 

Facsimile: (202) 955-5616 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I have this 8th day of October, 2015, served the foregoing 

Respondent Town of East Hampton, New York's Answer to the Complaint on the following 

parties as follows: 

Via Hand Delivery: 

Office ofthe Chief Counsel 

Attn: FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket, AGC-610 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence A venue, SW 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Via Email and U.S. Mail: 

Steve Brown 

Chief Operating Officer 

National Business Aviation Association, Inc. 

1200 G Street, NW 

Suite 1100 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

Dated this 8th day of October, 2015. 

10 

W. Eric Pilsk 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

National Business Aviation Association, Inc., 

et al. 

Complainants, 

v. 

Town of East Hampton, NY 

FAA Docket No. 16-15-08 

RECEIVED 

OCT 0 8 2015 

Respondent. PART 16 DOCKETS 

RESPONDENT TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, NEW YORK'S 

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 

OF ITS ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT 

Designation of persons to receive service for the Town of East Hampton, New York: 

Elizabeth Vail 

Town Attorney 

Town of East Hampton 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 1193 7 

EV ail@EHamptonNY. Gov 

W. Eric Pilsk 

Catherine van Heuven 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 

1001 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 800 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

epilsk@kaplankirsch.com 

cvanheuven@kaplank.irsch.com 

Telephone: (202) 955-5600 

Facsimile: (202) 955-5616 
INTRODUCTION 

National Business Aviation Association, Inc. ("NBAA"), on behalf of itself and a number 

of its members 1 (collectively, "Complainants") challenge two of three laws (the "Local Laws") 

adopted by the Town of East Hampton ("Town") on April 16, 2015, as amended on May 7, 

2015, that: (1) impose an extended curfew on "noisy"2 aircraft between 8:00p.m.- 11:00 p.m. 

and 7:00 a.m. - 9:00a.m. (the "Extended Curfew");3 and (2) limit operations by noisy aircraft to 

two operations (one takeoff and one landing) per week for the summer season between May I -

September 30 (the "One-Trip per Week Rule"). 

This Complaint is part of a scorched-earth strategy by NBAA and a number of users of 

East Hampton Airport (the "Airport") to litigate every conceivable issue in an effort to prevent 

the Town from implementing reasonable use restrictions designed to reduce impacts from 

aircraft noise. To date, there are five other matters (in addition to this proceeding) that are 

The other Complainants are: Shoreline Aviation, Inc. (Connecticut); PlaneSense, Inc.; Fly the Whale, 

Inc.; Eastern Air Express, Inc.; FL Aviation Corporation; Tuckaire, Inc.; Autonomic Controls, Inc.; Shoreline 

Aviation, Inc. (Massachusetts); Wes Rae Contracting Corporation; Eagle Air, Inc.; and JET AS, Inc. 

2 In the Local Laws, the term "Noisy Aircraft" is defined as: "any airplane or rotorcraft for which there is 

a published Effective Perceived Noise in Decibels (EPNdB) approach (AP) level of91.0 or greater." See Town of 

East Hampton, Local Law 4 of 2015 at Section 2, codified in the Code of the Town of East Hampton at § 75-38 

(A)(4) (available at Exhibit 2 to the Complaint). In both their Complaint and their July 20 Answer to the Motion to 

Dismiss, Complainants argue that the Town's list of "noisy aircraft" is incorrect. See Complaint at n. 1; Answer to 

Motion to Dismiss at n. 6. 

The List of Noisy Aircraft clearly instructs readers that: "Published data for shaded aircraft types include 

ranges of noise levels that extend across the 91.0 EPNdB threshold. These ranges result from multiple published 

noise levels for varying aircraft configurations (e.g., differing powerplants, maximum operating weights, etc.)." In 

response to the comments at page 1 of the Complaint, the Town notes that the Bombardier Challenger 

600/601/604/605 entry is a shaded entry, thus clearly signaling to readers that some of these aircraft types could be 

exempt and further inquiry is appropriate. The Tmvn also appreciates the comment raised in the Answer to the 

Motion to Dismiss regarding the Mitsubishi MU 300 Diamond I. The Town has updated the List of Noisy Aircraft 

accordingly. See http:/ I ehamptonny. gov/HtmlPages/A...imort/ AimortHome.htm. 

3 The Town also adopted a curfew on all operations between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00a.m., but Complainants 

do not challenge that Local Law here. 

2 
pending in various tribunals and that directly or indirectly challenge the Local Laws 4 In this 

case, Complainants rely on general legal arguments and virtually no factual support, apparently 

satisfied merely to have filed a Complaint and forced the Town to respond. Complainants appear 

to be more concerned with compelling the Town to spend resources to defend itself rather than 

meeting their own obligation to prove their case. 

In addition to the lack of factual support, the Complaint lacks legal merit as well. The 

Complaint rests on two novel theories. First, Complainants argue that the Extended Curfew and 

One-Trip per Week Local Laws violate Assurance 23 simply because they restrict operations by 

certain aircraft. Second - making crystal clear their strategy of financial warfare - Complainants 

argue that the use of Airport revenue to pay the legal fees incurred in the litigation Complainants 

and their allies have initiated (including this Part 16 proceeding) constitute impermissible 

revenue diversion under Assurance 25. Both claims, however, rest on false legal premises and 

must be dismissed as a matter of law as well as for lack of evidentiary support. 

Complainants' Assurance 23 claim relies entirely on the notion that an exclusive rights 

violation is a "mirror image" of an Assurance 22(a) violation, such that any "unreasonable 

restriction" on access to an airport automatically violates Assurance 23. Complaint at ~ 33. 

Complainants are wrong. The FAA has expressly rejected the "mirror image" theory of 

4 There are two lawsuits pending in federal court. First, a number of Airport users and interested parties, 

including NBAA, have challenged the Local Laws in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 

on preemption and Commerce Clause grounds. See Friends of the East Hampton Airport v. Town of East Hampton, 

Case No. 15-Civ-2246 (E.D.N.Y, filed Apr. 22, 2015). Second, a slightly different coalition of Airport users have 

filed a related lawsuit against the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 

District of New York, challenging certain positions of the FAA upon which the Town relied in enacting the Local 

Laws. Friends of the East Hampton Airport v. FAA, Case No. 15-Civ-441 (E.D.N.Y, filed Jan. 29, 2015). 

In addition, there are two other pending Part 16 Complaints: Friends of the East Hampton Airport v. Town 

of East Hampton, FAA Docket No. 16-15-02, which challenges the Local Laws indirectly based on Assurances 19 

and 24; and Sound Aircraft Services v. Town of East Hampton, FAA Docket No. 16-14-07, which challenges airport 

rates and charges adopted in 2014, which new fees were developed, in part, based on analysis of likely revenue 

flows with reduced traffic from noisy aircraft. There is also a parallel proceeding in state court regarding the 

propriety of the 2014 rate increases. 

3 
Assurance 23. Instead, the agency requires proof that a measure restricting access would have 

an anti-competitive or monopolistic effect before it will find a violation of Assurance 23. 

Complainants fail to present any evidence to support their claim under the correct Assurance 23 

standard (or even under their own "mirror image" theory) and the Assurance 23 claim should be 

dismissed. 

Complainants' revenue diversion claim rests on the notion that the Town may not use 

airport revenue to pay legal fees and other costs incurred in defending the Local Laws because 

the Local Laws do not serve an airport purpose. There is no support for that notion. The FAA 

explicitly recognizes that an airport sponsor may use airport revenues to pay legal fees. 

Moreover, to the Town's knowledge, the FAA has never required an airport sponsor to forego 

using airport revenue to defend itself, even in cases where a sponsor was ultimately found to be 

in violation of sponsor assurances. Tellingly, Complainants cite no decision to the contrary. 

Complainants' theory, if adopted, would wreak havoc with airport finances by prohibiting airport 

sponsors from using airport revenue to defend Part 16 cases, civil litigation alleging unlawful 

sponsor action, and would further prevent an airport sponsor from using airport revenue to adopt 

appropriate corrective measures. In short, Complainants' theory is baseless and fraught with 

difficulty, and should be dismissed. 5 

Complainants also challenge the One-Trip per Week Local Law even though it has been 

enjoined by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York and has 

never been applied to Complainants. The claim is simply not ripe, and Complainants' zeal to 

litigate over a law that is not in effect serves to underscore their strategy to litigate for the sake of 

5 On June 24, 2015, the Town filed a Motion to Dismiss the underlying Complaint pursuant to 14 C.F.R. 

§ 16.26. The Town is filing this Answer because the FAA did not rule on the Motion within 30 days. Nevertheless, 

the reasons for dismissal stated in the Motion to Dismiss remain valid, and the Town respectfully asks the FAA to 

grant its Motion to Dismiss. 

4 
litigation rather than substance. Complainants' challenge to the One-Trip per Week Local Law 

is not ripe and should therefore be dismissed. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The Town owns and operates the East Hampton Airport. The Airport serves a range of 

private recreational, personal, and corporate aircraft operations, as well as charter and for-hire 

operations, by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. In recent years, the frequency of operations 

has increased dramatically. In particular, operations by helicopters increased by almost 50% 

between 2013 and 2014, the last full years for which data is available. Town Resolution 2015-

411 at 1 (available at Exhibit 1 to the Complaint). 

Aircraft noise has long been a source of concern and controversy in the Town. The Town 

is renowned for its peace and quiet and natural beauty. Increased operations by loud aircraft and 

helicopters in particular have disrupted that natural quiet and calm and led to years of litigation 

and a growing demand for action by the Town to reduce aircraft noise levels. In the past few 

years, these calls for action have mushroomed. The Town has received petitions signed by 

hundreds of residents. It has received resolutions from the leadership in surrounding towns and 

villages. Town Board members have received thousands of informal complaints. Hundreds of 

residents have attended public hearings to demand action and testify to the numerous ways that 

aircraft noise disrupts their lives. Newspaper articles, editorials, and letters to the editor 

demanding action to reduce aircraft noise appear constantly. !d. at 1-3. 

For over a decade, the Town has been studying solutions to the problem of aircraft noise. 

!d. The Town has worked with Airport users to adopt voluntary measures, and has considered 

and rejected a wide range of alternative measures. In 2012, recognizing the problem, the FAA 

adopted mandatory helicopter routes between New York City and the East End to keep 

5 
helicopters over open water as much as possible. 77 Fed. Reg. 39,911 (July 6, 2012) (New York 

North Shore Helicopter Route, Final Rule); 79 Fed. Reg. 35,488 (June 23, 2014) (extension of 

expiration date of New York North Shore Helicopter Route). Unfortunately, none of the 

voluntary or mandatory measures addressed the problem, particularly in the face of rapid 

increases in operations. Town Resolution 2015-411 at 2-3. 

Over the course of2014 and early 2015, the Town engaged in a more focused, deliberate, 

and very public analysis of the noise problem. The Town updated old noise studies, 

commissioned new noise studies using a variety of noise metrics and methodologies, and 

retained nationally respected airport noise consultants to assist the Town. It carefully considered 

the expert testimony, advice from the business community, concerns of airport users and 

businesses, and opinions of its constituents. It reviewed data regarding airport operations and 

formal complaints logged on the Town's noise complaint management system. It examined 

whether prior efforts to address noise concerns had been successful, including voluntary and 

mandatory flight paths, curfews, and other noise rules. It met with representatives of aviation 

interest groups and FAA to discuss the Town's options. !d. at 2-6. In short, the Town engaged 

in an exhaustive, comprehensive, and highly-transparent examination of the problem and 

potential solutions. 

Ultimately, the Town determined that a serious noise problem was present that had not 

been addressed by existing noise abatement efforts and that further action was needed. !d. at 6-8. 

The Town considered more than a dozen options, ranging from the onerous to the purely 

symbolic. After much deliberation and public debate, the Town decided that the three Local 

Laws strike the appropriate balance between providing meaningful noise relief and retaining 

adequate access to the Airport. April 7, 2015, PowerPoint Presentation, Regulations To Address 

6 
Noise and Disturbance from Operations at East Hampton Airport (available at Exhibit 11 to the 

Complaint). Using 2013-2014 data (the full year of data analyzed by Town consultants), the 

Local Laws would have affected under 23% of total operations, while addressing the cause of 

over 60% of the complaints logged on the Town's noise complaint system. !d. at 4. The Local 

Laws are a carefully-crafted, reasonable compromise that minimizes impacts on Airport users 

while providing meaningful noise relief to residents. 

Almost immediately upon adoption, the Local Laws were challenged in federal court by a 

number of Airport users. See Friends of the East Hampton Airport v. Town of East Hampton, 

No. 15 Civ. 2246 (E.D.N.Y, filed April 21, 2015) 6 The Friends of the East Hampton Airport 

sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). Judge Seybert of the U.S. District Court for the 

Eastern District of New York construed the motion as one for preliminary injunction. On June 

26, 2015, after extensive briefing and oral argument, Judge Seybert affirmed the Town's legal 

right to adopt use restrictions to address the problem of excessive airport noise. The Judge held 

that the Town's use of complaint data and other empirical evidence of the noise problem was 

reasonable, noting that "it cannot be argued that the Town lacked the data to support a finding of 

a noise problem at the Airport." Mem. & Order at 41, Friends of the East Hampton Airport, No. 

15 Civ. 2246 (June 26, 2015) (available at Exhibit 1 to Complainants' Answer to the Motion to 

Dismiss). She rejected Plaintiffs' arguments that the Local Laws created a safety issue. Id. at 39 

("there is no evidence that the mandatory curfews would force any pilot to operate his or her 

aircraft in an unsafe manner"). Finally, she affirmed that the Town's use of the 91 EPNdB 

threshold to define noisy aircraft is appropriate. !d. at 42 ("The 91 EPNdB threshold appears to 

6 As discussed above, supra n. 4, Complainants and others have also flied five other actions challenging 

the Local Laws directly or indirectly. 

7 
be a valid indicator of noise as it affects individuals.") Accordingly, she found that the curfews 

were reasonable measures to address a legitimate local noise problem and she therefore refused 

to enjoin the two curfews. Id. at 44 ("[T]he Town's desire to protect its residents during sleeping 

hours clearly outweighs the inconvenience Plaintiffs may experience by having to minimize their 

flight schedules."). 

With respect to the One-Trip per Week Local Law, however, Judge Seybert found that, 

based on the evidence presented in the record in the TRO hearing, the effects of that measure 

would have "drastic" effects on plaintiffs' businesses and that there was no sufficient proof that 

there were not less restrictive measures. Accordingly, she held that the Plaintiffs had shown a 

strong likelihood of success on the merits on that issue and she issued a preliminary injunction 

blocking enforcement of the One-Trip per Week Local Law pending a final decision in the case. 

Id. at 44-45. 

Subsequently, both the Town and the Friends of the East Hampton Airport appealed 

Judge Seybert's decision and the case is now pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit. Notice of Appeal, Friends of the East Hampton Airport, No. 15 Civ. 2246 (July 

22, 2015); Notice of Cross Appeal, Friends of the East Hampton Airport, No. 15 Civ. 2246 

(Aug. 4, 2015). A decision from the Court of Appeals is not expected for approximately another 

18 months, at which time the case will return to the District Court for further proceedings. 

The Town began enforcing the Extended Curfew on July 2, 2015. Press Release, Town 

of East Hampton, Court Affirms Town Of East Hampton's Right To Regulate Airport Noise 

(June 26, 20 15) (Exhibit 1 ). 

8 
The One-Trip per Week Local Law has not been applied or enforced, pursuant to the 

Preliminary Injunction. Based on preliminary data, it does not appear that the two curfews have 

had a significant, if any, impact on total operations. 7 

ARGUMENT 

I. COMPLAINANTS' CHALLENGE TO THE ONE-TRIP PER WEEK LOCAL 

LAW IS NOT RIPE 

Complainants' claim that the One-Trip per Week Local Law violates Assurance 23 is not 

ripe because the One-Trip per Week Local Law has not been implemented or applied. Northwest 

Airlines, Inc., et al. v. Indianapolis Airport Auth., et al., FAA Docket No. 16-07-04 at 28, 

Director's Determination (Aug. 18, 2008). hnplementation of the One-Trip per Week Local Law 

has been enjoined by the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of New York and is not 

currently in effect. Mem. & Order at 44-45, Friends of the East Hampton Airport, No. 15 Civ. 

2246 (July 26, 2015). The injunction will remain in effect pending the outcome of that litigation, 

which is expected to continue for 1-2 years, at least. Although the Town is confident that the 

Local Law will be affirmed on appeal, that outcome is not certain. 

The One-Trip per Week Rule is not in effect; it has not been applied to Complainants and 

its potential future application is uncertain due to the pending litigation. As a result, 

Complainants have not suffered any injury due to the One-Trip per Week Rule and have not been 

adversely affected by it. Complainants' challenge to the One-Trip per Week Rule is therefore 

not ripe. 

7 Year-to-date, 2015 operations through August 31 appear to have decreased by just 1% compared to 2014. 

The Town does not yet have the full set of data on the "season" as defmed in the Local Laws (i.e., May 1 -

September 30) and reserves the right to supplement this Answer when it obtains that data. 

9 
II. COMPLAINANTS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM THAT THE TOWN HAS 

VIOLATED THE PROHIBITION AGAINST GRANTING AN EXCLUSIVE 

RIGHT 

A. The Prohibition Against Granting An Exclusive Right Bars Only Those 

Sponsor Actions That Would Create A Monopoly Or That Would Have An 

Anti-Competitive Result 

Grant Assurance 23 states, in part, that: 

[The airport sponsor] will permit no exclusive right for the use of the 

airport by any person providing, or intending to provide, aeronautical 

services to the public ..... [The airport sponsor] further agrees that it 

will not, either directly or indirectly, grant or permit any person, firm, 

or corporation, the exclusive right at the airport to conduct any 

aeronautical activities ... , and that it will terminate any exclusive 

right to conduct an aeronautical activity now existing at such an airport 

before the grant of any assistance under the Airport and Airway 

Improvement Act of 1982. 

Assurance 23 implements two statutes: 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4) (requiring that airport sponsors 

assure the FAA that "a person providing, or intending to provide, aeronautical services to the 

public will not be given an exclusive right to use the airport" as a condition of receiving aviation 

grant funds) and 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e) ("a person does not have an exclusive right to use an air 

navigation facility on which Government money has been expended."). 

As the phrase "exclusive right" indicates, the purpose of those two laws is to prohibit 

airport sponsors from granting monopolies or otherwise limiting competition for aeronautic 

services at publicly funded airports. Senator McCarran, one of sponsors of the original 1938 

provision8 that became 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e), explained that: "The Senator from Missouri [Sen. 

Truman] and myself have tried to work into this proposed law provisions which would guard 

against anything savoring of monopoly." 83 Cong. Rec. 6729 (1938). Similarly, Senator 

8 See, Section 303 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (June 23, 1938) 52 Stat. 973, 986 ("There shall be 

no exclusive right for the use of any landing area or air navigation facility upon which Federal funds have been 

expended.") 

10 
Truman explained that, "we wanted to write it so that there will not be a monopoly." !d. at 6730. 

Based on that legislative history, the U.S. Attorney General, in a 1941 opinion, stated that: 

The restrictions imposed by [the predecessor statute to 49 U.S.C. § 40103] 

upon the expenditure of Federal funds upon landing areas and air navigation 

facilities make it clear that the term "exclusive right" as used in the section was 

intended to describe a power, privilege, or other right excluding or debarring 

another or others from enjoying or exercising a like power, privilege or right. 

This meaning is confirmed by the legislative history which shows that the 

purpose of the provision is to prohibit monopolies and combinations in 

restraint of trade or commerce and to promote and encourage competition in 

civil aeronautics .... " 

40 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 71, 72 (1941) (citing 83 Cong. Rec. 6729, 6730). 

Courts construing the prohibition against exclusive rights have also concluded that it is 

intended to prevent monopolies and other anti-competitive conduct typically prohibited by the 

antitrust laws. In Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth. of NY, 305 F. Supp. 93, 105 

(E.D.N.Y. 1969), the court stated that "the type of exclusive right ... forbidden is one of the sort 

noxious to the anti-trust laws." The court went on to conclude that the legislative history 

suggested a narrow interpretation of the prohibition against exclusive rights. !d. at l 05-l 06; see 

also City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (llth Cir. 1985) (same). 

The FAA itself recognizes that the prohibition on exclusive rights is intended to prevent 

the creation of monopolies and other practices that tend to restrain trade. Exclusive Rights at 

Airports, FAA Order No. 5190.1A § ll(c) (Oct. 10, 1985), states: "It is the intent of [the 

prohibition against exclusive rights] to promote fair competition at public-use airports." Even 

more explicitly, Exclusive Rights at Federally Obligated Airports, FAA Advisory Circular 

150/5190-6 -,r 1.2 (Jan. 4, 2007) states that: "The purpose of the exclusive rights provision as 

applied to civil aeronautics is to prevent monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade and 

to promote competition at federally obligated airports" (emphasis added). In tum, FAA Airport 

11 
Compliance Manual, FAA Order No. 5190.6B '1)8.1 (Sept. 30, 2009) (hereinafter "Compliance 

Manual") provides that: 

... the sponsor may not grant a special privilege or a monopoly to anyone 

providing aeronautical services on the airport or engaging in an aeronautical 

use. The intent of this restriction is to promote aeronautical activity and 

protect fair competition at federally obligated airports. 

Similarly, paragraph 8.4(c) states: 

The FAA has taken the position that the existence of an exclusive right to 

conduct any aeronautical activity at an airport limits the usefulness of the 

airport and deprives the public of the benefits of competitive enterprise. The 

FAA considers it inappropriate to provide federal funds for improvements to 

airports where the benefits of such improvements will not be fully realized by 

all users due to the inherent restrictions of an exclusive monopoly on 

aeronautical activities. 

1n the context of evaluating local laws that have the effect of restricting airport operations, the 

FAA has made clear that such measures violate Assurance 23 only if there is a clear nexus 

between the local law and a monopolistic, anticompetitive result. In the Matter of the City of 

Santa Monica, FAA Docket No. 16-02-08, Final Agency Decision at 51 (July 8, 2009). 

In Santa Monica, the FAA considered, inter alia, whether Santa Monica's ban on 

Approach Category C & D aircraft violated Assurance 23. The Director initially found that the 

ban violated Assurance 23 because it unreasonably distinguished between aircraft types, 

essentially applying a "mirror image" theory. In the Matter of the City of Santa Monica, FAA 

Docket No. 16-02-08, Director's Determination at 52-53 (May 27, 2008). 

Santa Monica appealed the Director's Determination. Following an evidentiary hearing, 

the Hearing Officer reversed the Director's findings on Assurance 23, and expressly rejected the 

"mirror image" theory, even though he affirmed the Director's finding that the ban violated 

Assurance 22( a). The Hearing Officer carefully considered the language and legislative history 

of Assurance 23, 49 U.S.C. § 47104(a)(4) and 49 U.S.C. § 40103, relevant Attorney General 

12 
Opinions, case law, and the FAA's own explanation of Assurance 23. Based on that body of 

law, the Hearing Officer concluded that Assurance 23's purpose is "to prohibit anti-competitive, 

monopolistic behavior at airports receiving federal funds." In the Matter of the City of Santa 

Monica, FAA Docket No. 16-02-08, Hearing Officer's Decision at 101 (May 14, 2009). The 

Hearing Officer specifically relied on language from FAA Advisory Circular 150.5190-6, and 

stated that: "The purpose of the exclusive rights provision as applied to civil aeronautics is to 

prevent monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade and to promote competition at 

federally obligated airports." Id. at 105. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer held that in order to 

show a violation of Assurance 23, the Director had to show a nexus between the City's Category 

C & D ban and the kind of anti-competitive result covered by Assurance 23. Id. at 106. Because 

the Director had not presented evidence that could support such a nexus, the Hearing Officer 

reversed the Director's finding that there had been a violation of Assurance 23. !d. 

The Director appealed the Hearing Officer's decision on Assurance 23 9 The Acting 

Assistant Administrator10 found that the Hearing Officer had correctly considered and applied 

law to conclude that an exclusive rights violation must depend on a showing of monopolistic, 

anticompetitive conduct. Santa Monica, Final Agency Decision, at 47-51. The Acting Assistant 

Administrator expressly rejected the Director's arguments that existing language from the 

Compliance Manual and Advisory Circulars "support its expansive reading of 'exclusive right' 

as a right that applies broadly to use of an airport and not just to activities that involve 

competition." Id. at 49. Instead, the Acting Assistant Administrator held that any broad 

language in the Compliance Manual or FAA Advisory Circulars must be read consistently with 

9 The City appealed other aspects of the decision as well. 

10 The appeal was assigned to the Acting Assistant Administrator for Aviation Policy, Planning and the 

Environment and not the Associate Administrator due to conflict of interest concerns. 

13 
the language in the "statutes, legislative history, and other FAA publications" that narrowed the 

scope of exclusive rights to monopolistic, anti competitive results. Id. Accordingly, the Acting 

Assistant Administrator concluded that in order to find a violation of Assurance 23, the FAA 

"needed to prove that an anti-competitive result would occur if the Ordinance were 

implemented." ld. at 51. Because the Director had failed to make that showing, the Acting 

Assistant Administrator affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision dismissing the Assurance 23 

claim. 11 

Among other points raised in the appeal, the Director argued that pnor Directors' 

Determinations supported the "mirror image" theory upon which the Director had relied in the 

underlying decision. I d. at 50-51. The Acting Assistant Administrator expressly rejected that 

approach, holding that "to the extent that those decisions conflict with the instant decision, they 

are incorrect." Id. at 51. Ultimately, the Acting Assistant Administrator affirmed the Hearing 

Officer's decision that the Category C & D ban violated Assurance 22(a) and affirmed the 

Hearing Officer's decision that the Category C & D ban did not violate Assurance 23 for the 

reasons summarized above. 

B. Complainants' Assurance 23 Claim Has No Legal Support 

I. Complainants Rely On An Outdated And Incorrect Standard 

Complainants' claim of an exclusive rights violation rests entirely on the "mirror image" 

theory that the FAA rejected in Santa Monica. Complaint at~~ 33-34, 37. In Santa Monica, 

FAA made clear that a violation of Assurance 23 in the context of operational access restrictions 

requires a showing of "anti-competitive, monopolistic behavior." Santa Monica, Final Agency 

11 While the case was further appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the FAA 

did not appeal the Assistant Administrator's decision rejecting the "mirror image" theory. City of Santa Monica v. 

FAA, 631 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

14 
Decision at 51. See also Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass 'n, 305 F. Supp. at 105 ("the type of 

exclusive right ... forbidden is one of the sort noxious to the anti-trust laws"); 40 U.S. Op. Att'y 

Gen. at 72 (the purpose of the exclusive rights provision is to "prohibit monopolies and 

combinations in restraint of trade or commerce and to promote and encourage competition in 

civil aeronautics."). 

Moreover, Complainants' "mirror image" theory runs afoul of basic principles of 

statutory construction. Under Complainants' theory, any action that violates 49 U.S.C. 

§ 47107(a)(l), prohibiting unjust discrimination and guaranteeing reasonable access, would 

necessarily violate 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4) and 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e), barring exclusive rights. 

That would make the two exclusive rights statutes redundant, rendering them unnecessary 

surplusage. Basic principles of statutory construction bar such a result. Duncan v. Walker, 533 

U.S. 167, 174 (2001) ("It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 

statute ... We are thus reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.") (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). Congress clearly intended to address two different 

issues. 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(l) and Assurance 22(a) are intended to prohibit unjust 

discrimination and assure reasonable access to federally funded airports. Compliance Manual at 

-,r9.1. By contrast, 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e), and Assurance 23 are 

intended to prevent airport sponsors from granting monopolies or preventing fair commercial 

competition at publicly funded airports. 12 Supra at 10. The "mirror image" theory ignores the 

manifest differences between the statutes in violation of established principles of statutory 

construction. 

12 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4) and 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e) are not redundant because they have different scopes 

of application. Section 47107(a)(4) requires that the FAA receive adequate assurance that a grant recipient will not 

create an exclusive right as a condition of awarding a federal aviation grant. Section 40103(e) imposes a broader 

prohibition against exclusive rights at all airports receiving any federal funds. 

15 
2. FAA Decisions and Guidance That Predate the Santa Monica Decision 

Are No Longer Reliable 

Complainants rely on three legal authorities that pre-date the Santa Monica Final Agency 

Decision. See Complaint at~ 36 (citing 1965 FAA guidance); id at~ 38 (citing Bardin v. County 

of Sacramento, California, FAA Docket No. 16-00-11, Director's Determination (Aug. 9, 

2001)); and id. at~ 38 n. 6 (citing Self Serve Pumps, Inc. v. Chicago Executive Airport, FAA 

Docket No. 16-07-02, Director's Determination (Mar. 17, 2008)). To the extent those decisions 

relied on the "mirror image" theory, they must now be rejected. See Santa Monica, Final 

Agency Decision at 51 ("to the extent that those decisions conflict with the instant decision, they 

are incorrect."). 

Self Serve Pumps is further distinguishable on its facts. In Self Serve Pumps, the Director 

affirmed an airport sponsor's denial of an application to operate a commercial self-service 

fueling operation that did not comply with applicable Minimum Standards. The Director's 

conclusion regarding exclusive rights makes clear that the focus is on preventing harm to 

competition rather than unjust discrimination: 

The Director finds that the Complaint has not presented a 

preponderance of substantial evidence that the Airport has 

explicitly protected the two full-service FBOs from fuel price 

competition at PWK in a manner to constitute an explicit granting 

of an exclusive right. 

Self Serve Pumps, Director's Determination at 32. The Director went on to find insufficient 

evidence of a constructive exclusive right, given the lack of threshold evidence of unjust 

discrimination: 

While public-use airports may impose qualifications and minimum standards 

upon those who engage in aeronautical activities, the FAA has taken the 

position that the application of any unreasonable requirement or any standard 

that is applied in an unjustly discriminatory marmer may constitute the 

constructive grant of an exclusive right. However, a sponsor is under no 

obligation to permit aircraft owners to introduce onto the airport equipment, 

16 
personnel, or practices which would be unsafe, unsightly, detrimental to the 

public welfare, or which would affect the efficient use of airport facilities. 

!d. at 16, citing FAA Order 5190.68. 

Thus, Self Serve Pumps stands for the principle that a grant of an exclusive right must 

harm competition and that an airport may adopt uniform standards that have the effect oflimiting 

- or even denying- access to the airfield for commercial purposes without violating Assurance 

23. Self Serve Pumps supports the Local Laws by affirming the authority of an airport sponsor 

to adopt uniform rules that may limit access to the airfield for purposes of protecting the public 

welfare provided they do not unreasonably impair competition. 13 

3. The Post-Santa Monica Cases Cited by Complainant Do Not Restore the 

Mirror-Image Theory or Otherwise Invalidate the Santa Monica Final 

Agency Decision 

The post-Santa Monica decisions cited by Complainants do not in any way undermine 

the agency's rejection of the mirror image theory. For example, Complainants cite Hinshaw, 

Skydiving School, Inc. d/b/a/ Skydive Hawaii and Island Skydiving, L.L. C., FAA Docket No. 16-

12-04, Director's Preliminary Determination (August 18, 2014) (Complaint ~39). In Hinshaw 

the Director stated the standard under Assurance 23 as follows: 

FAA has taken the position that the application of any unreasonable 

requirement or any standard that is applied in an unjustly discriminatory 

marmer may constitute the constructive grant of an exclusive right. Courts 

have found the grant of an exclusive right where a significant burden has 

been placed on one competitor that is not placed on another. [See e.g., 

Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 1529 (lith Cir. 1985)]. 

!d. at 13 (emphasis added). 

13 Bardin is also distinguishable because it banned an entire class of operations - ultralight vehicle 

operations- in violation of the FAA's exclusive authority under 49 U.S. C. § 40 I 03. Director's Determination at 11-

12. 

17 
Two things are noteworthy in this oft-repeated statement. 14 First, evidence of unjust 

discrimination "may" - but not must - constitute a constructive grant of an exclusive right. 

Second, the reference to a "competitor" underscores that there must be a burden on competition. 

This is evident in the FAA's preliminary determination in the Hinshaw case, where the 

Director's analysis under Assurance 22 focusses on the inaction and extreme delay in processing 

complainant's initial request for aeronautical access, Hinshaw, Preliminary Determination, at 36-

37, but the analysis under Assurance 23 addresses the application of inconsistent standards to 

similarly-situated operators. !d. at 46Y Were the "mirror image" theory valid, the Director's 

additional analysis on Assurance 23 would have been unnecessary. 

Other post Santa-Monica cases cited by Complainants also conduct the requisite analysis 

of anti-competitive effects when analyzing the Assurance 23 claims. In Gary R. Ernest, the 

Director concluded that an airfield access fee of $500 imposed only on through-the-fence 

operators did not grant a constructive exclusive right to on-airport tenants because: 

The development of aeronautical enterprises on land off airport and not 

controlled by the sponsor can result in an economic competitive advantage for 

the 'through-the-fence" operator to the detriment of on-airport tenants. To 

equalize this imbalance, the sponsor should obtain from any off-base 

enterprise or entity a fair return for its use of the airfield by assessing access 

fees from those entities having "through-the-fence" access." 

Gary R. Ernest, Director's Determination at 19. 

14 See. e.g .• Gary R. Ernest v. Leitchfield-Grayson County Airport Board, FAA Docket No. 16-09-01, 

Director's Determination at 9 (Dec. 17, 2009) (same); Desert Wings Jet Center, LLC, Spirit Flight Inc. dba Wings of 

the Cascades, v. City of Redmond, Redmond, Oregon, FAA Docket No. 16-09-07, Director's Determination at 13 

(Nov. 10, 2010) (same); Isaac W. Jones, Jr. and Alabama Hang Gliding Ass'n, FAA Docket No. 16-11-07, 

Director's Determination at 13 (Sept. 19, 2013) (same); Truman Arnold Companies d/b/a/ TAC Air v. Chattanooga 

Metropolitan Airport Authority, FAA Docket No. 16-11-08, Director's Determination at 18 (Oct 4, 2013) (same). 

15 Further, the decision in Hinshaw is a preliminary determination that cannot overrule the Final Agency 

Decision in Santa Monica, nor does it purport to do so. 

18 
By contrast, in 41 North 73 West, Inc. v. County of Westchester, New York, FAA Docket 

No. 16-07-13, Final Agency Decision (Sept. 18, 2009), the Associate Administrator simply 

concluded that the sponsor's leasing policy did not bar the complainant from conducting a 

particular aeronautical activity, and therefore could not constitute an exclusive right. Id. at 37-38 

("All in all, competition exists at this Airport and no one [fixed base operator (FBO)] enjoys a 

right not granted to at least one other FBO at the Airport."). The Second Circuit confirmed this 

on appeal: 

Avitat claims that the County granted an exclusive right to LGA [light-general 

aviation J FBOs when it gave them "subsidies" while allowing them to 

compete with A vi tat in the sale of jet fuel. A vi tat argues that the FAA 

erroneously required a similar situation between the parties, and consequently 

a violation of Grant Assurance 22, to find a violation of Grant Assurance 23. 

A vi tat is mistaken .... 

While acknowledging that unjust discrimination can result in the constructive 

grant of an exclusive right, the Associate Administrator of the FAA found no 

such discrimination where two parties were not similarly situated. Thus, there 

was no exclusive right granted to the LGA FBOs because "[i]t is ... denying 

others a similar right that creates a violation of Grant Assurance 23." .... To 

the extent Avitat suggests that the LGA FBOs' ability to sell jet fuel without 

paying market rent constituted an exclusive "subsidy," the FAA found no 

evidence that A vi tat was subsidizing the LGA FBOs, or that the LGA FBOs 

were Avitat's real competitors. We find no reason to disturb the FAA's 

findings. 

41 N 73 W, Inc. v. United States DOT, 408 Fed. Appx. 393, 400 (2d. Cir. 2010). See also 

Truman Arnold Companies, Director's Determination at 49 (finding no Assurance 23 violation 

where "the record shows that the sponsor's rationale for developing a second FBO was to 

promote competition ... "). The possibility that a restriction may be unjustly discriminatory and 

also, separately, create a constructive grant of an exclusive right does not mean that the two are 

mirror images. 

19 
Finally, Complainants' reliance on a line of sky-diving cases is also inapposite. See, 

Complainants' Answer to the Motion to Dismiss (July 20, 2015) at 4 and id. at n. 5, citing 

Skydive Sacramento v. City of Lincoln, California, FAA Docket No. 16-09-09, Director's 

Determination (May 4, 2011); Jeff Bodin and Garlic City Skydiving v. County of Santa Clara 

California, FAA Docket No. 16-11-06, Director's Determination (Dec. 19, 2011); and Skydive 

Paris, Inc. v. Henry County, Tennessee, FAA Docket No. 16-05-06, Director's Determination, 

(Jan. 20, 2006). Complainants argue that FAA declined to review the Assurance 23 violations in 

Skydive Sacramento and Jeff Bodin because, in both cases, FAA had already found an Assurance 

22 violation "and the analysis of ... grant assurance #23 would be duplicative." Answer at 5. 

This is misleading at best. 

In those cases, FAA completed an exhaustive review of Assurance 22 violations, and 

then concluded that it was "unnecessary to consider the related allegation regarding exclusive 

rights because the remedies are the same." Skydive Sacramento, Director's Determination at 35 

(emphasis added), citing Skydive Paris, Director's Determination at 19; see also Jeff Bodin, 

Director's Determination at 38-39 (same), citing Skydive Paris, Director's Determination at 19. 

In other words, corrective action to address an Assurance 22 violation would also address any 

Assurance 23 violation, so it was unnecessary to consider separately whether there was an 

Assurance 23 1ssue. These cases in no way stand for the proposition that a violation or 

Assurance 22 is automatically a violation of Assurance 23. 

C. Complainants Have Not Presented Any Evidence That Could Support A 

Violation Of Assurance 23 

Complainants bear the burden of proving their claims. 14 C.F.R. § 16.25. Accordingly, 

Part 16 requires Complainants to present all documents and facts in support of their claims in 

their Complaint. I d. at § 16.23(b )(2) and (3). Complainants have offered no evidence to support 

20 
their claim. Complainants offered no facts showing a nexus between application of the Local 

Laws and an anti-competitive result. More pointedly, Complainants offered no facts showing 

any evidence of any adverse effect suffered by the Complainants. Therefore, Complainants have 

failed to meet their burdens of proof and production. 

In response to the Town's Motion to Dismiss, Complainants offered a single piece of 

anecdotal evidence: a newspaper article stating that an operator intended to initiate service to the 

Airport using helicopters that would not be classified as "noisy" under the Local Laws. Answer 

Br. at 4; id. at Exhibit 2. This evidence fails to demonstrate any purported monopoly, anticompetitive restraint, or the creation of an exclusive right. First, Complainants do not 

demonstrate that the operator has begun operations or that any operations have impaired 

competition in any way. Second, on its face, it is difficult to understand how the entry of a new 

competitor could possibly demonstrate that the Local Laws have had an anti-competitive effect. 

If anything, that evidence demonstrates that competition has increased at the Airport, not been 

harmed. Truman Arnold Companies, Director's Determination at 49 (finding no Assurance 23 

violation where "the record shows that the sponsor's rationale for developing a second FBO was 

to promote competition ... "). Complainants may not like more competition, but evidence of 

increased competition cannot possibly support an Assurance 23 violation. Moreover, nothing 

about the Local Laws gives that new operator, or any other operator, a monopoly at the Airport. 

Third, Complainants present no evidence whatsoever that there is a distinct "market" for 

flights in the Extended Curfew Hours. See Santa Monica, Final Agency Decision at 53 

(requiring evidence of a market for the restricted activity). Without evidence that the Extended 

Curfew law impairs competition in a specific market, Complainants cannot show the creation of 

21 
an exclusive right. Complainants' Assurance 23 claim fails for the same reason that the 

Director's claims failed in Santa Monica. 

Fourth, Complainants present no facts or documents that show how the Local Laws 

impair competition, and it is difficult to see how they could. The Local Laws do not confer a 

monopoly on any entity or group of entities. The Local Laws do not bar any aircraft from 

operating at the Airport. The Local Laws do not prevent any user from operating at the Airport. 

No user is given any preferential right to use the Airport. No entity has unique access to nonnoisy aircraft. Nothing about the Local Laws prevents any operator from competing for business 

at the Airport using compliant aircraft. Any operator can operate with a non-noisy aircraft. As 

Complainants' limited evidence demonstrates, compliant aircraft exist and can be used to start 

new business at the Airport. Indeed many current and long-time operators have compliant 

aircraft in their fleets already. Moreover, despite the apparent presence of a new operator with 

all-compliant aircraft, Complainants cannot show that such operations have impaired overall 

competition at the Airport. Complainants have utterly failed to meet their burden of proof that 

the Local Laws are the kinds of monopolistic, anticompetitive measures barred by Assurance 23. 

Finally, the pattern of actual operations at the Airport suggests that the Extended Curfew 

Law has had no effect on competition at the Airport. 16 Although data is still preliminary, it 

appears that the total number of operations by noisy aircraft has not changed significantly as a 

result of the Extended Curfew Law. The suggests the Extended Curfew Law has not affected or 

16 As discussed above, the One-Trip per Week Rule has not gone into effect and therefore cannot have 

impaired competition or imposed any harm whatsoever. 

22 
impaired competition at the Airport. Complainants offer no evidence to support the notion that 

competition has been impaired. 17 

At most, Complainants imply that individual operators will be harmed by the Local 

Laws. But preserving a competitive market does not require protecting individual competitors; it 

only requires preserving fair access to the relevant market. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-

Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (the antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of 

competition, not competitors); see also Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 51 

(2d Cir. 1997) ("The antitrust laws do not guarantee competitors the right to compete free of 

encumbrances, however, so long as competition as a whole is not significantly affected."). 

Here, even assuming that all three Local Laws were in place and being enforced, the 

allegation that some individual operators may lose some business does not show that competition 

is harmed. The Local Laws are neutral measures intended to address a noise problem. Unlike 

the complete bans struck down in Hinshaw and the skydiving cases discussed above, supra at 20, 

neither the Extended Curfew nor the One-Trip per Week Rule bar an entire class of operations. 

Even aircraft classified as noisy may continue to operate, albeit subject to restrictions. These are 

uniform rules of operation that do not, on their face, limit competition. No operator or group of 

operators is entirely harmed from operating at the Airport and no operator is barred from the 

airfield. Conversely, any operator may operate without restriction using compliant aircraft and 

the Local Laws do not prevent any operator from obtaining compliant aircraft, which are 

available as Complainants' evidence of a new entrant demonstrates. Ultimately, the Local Laws 

are not intended to regulate economic activity as such, and certainly are not intended to (and do 

17 As noted above, supra n. 7, the Town is in the process of collecting more detailed data about operations 

in the 2015 as part of its commitment to reevaluate the effect of the Local Laws. Towu Resolution 2015-569 at 4 

(available at Exhibit 7 to the Complaint). The Town reserves the right to supplement its Answer when that 

additional information is available. 

23 
not, in fact) limit competition for aeronautic services at the Airport. This case simply does not 

present a claim that could be considered a violation of Assurance 23. 

D. Complainants Have Not Presented Any Evidence That Could Support A 

Violation Of Assurance 23 Even Under Their "Mirror-Image" Theory 

Even under their own "mirror image" theory, Complainants have failed to meet their 

burden of proof. Complainants present no evidence or meaningful argument to show that the 

Local Laws unjustly discriminate between operators. Complaints assume that any restriction on 

access would automatically violate Assurance 23. Complaint at ,-r 34. That is not the law. The 

FAA has made clear that access restrictions only violate Assurance 22(a) if they "unjustly 

discriminate" and do not allow access on "reasonable terms." Santa Monica, Final Agency 

Decision at 34 (quoting and discussing Assurance 22(a)). See also Compliance Manual at ,-r 9.1. 

Here, Complainants have presented no evidence whatsoever to support their claim that the Local 

Laws umeasonably distinguish between aeronautical users. In the absence of any evidence that 

the Local Laws draw an unreasonable distinction or have imposed any harm on any operator, the 

claims must be dismissed. 

III. COMPLAINANTS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM OF REVENUE DIVERSION 

A. Attorney Fees Are A Permissible Use Of Airport Revenue 

Complainants argue that the Town has violated Assurance 25 by spending airport revenue 

to pay legal and other professional fees in order to defend the Local Laws from the many legal 

challenges brought by NBAA and others. Complaint at ,-r 45. Complainants' case for revenue 

diversion rests on the simplistic notion that an airport operating rule that restricts access for noise 

purposes cannot be considered to advance an airport purpose. From that premise, Complainants 

argue that the Town may not spend airport revenue to defend an access restriction. Complaint at 

,-r 42 (arguing fees are not allowable in this case because the restrictions at issue are contrary to 

24 
federal law). This theory is without legal support or justification, and Complainants themselves 

fail to cite any controlling authority. 

Complainants concede, as they must, the Town can use airport revenues to pay for legal 

fees. Complaint at -,r 42; see also Compliance Manual at -,r 15.9(d) (airport revenue may be spent 

on attorney fees). Thus Complainants' argument rests on the theory that the Local Laws are not 

related to an "airport purpose" because they are the product of what Complainants call an "antiairport agenda", and as such, the Town may not use airport revenue to defend these laws. !d. at 

-,r-,r 42 - 44. But Complainants do not cite any authority for that proposition for the simple reason 

that there is none. 

Airport sponsors may use airport revenue for the capital or operating costs of the airport, 

the local airport system, or other local facilities owned or operated by the airport owner or 

operator and directly and substantially related to the air transportation of passengers or property. 

49 U.S.C. §§ 47107(b) & 47133; Compliance Manual-,r 15.9(a). Conversely, unlawful revenue 

diversion is "the use of airport revenue for purposes other than airport capital or operating costs 

or the costs of other facilities owned or operated by the sponsor and directly and substantially 

related to air transportation." Compliance Manual -,r 15.13(a). The Compliance Manual also 

expressly provides that airport revenue may be used for attorney fees "to the extent these fees are 

for services in support of airport capital or operating costs that are otherwise allowable." 

Compliance Manual at -,r 15. 9( d). 

FAA articulated the outer limits of permissible use of airport revenue for legal fees in 

Boca Airport, Inc., d/b/a Boca Aviation v. Boca Raton Airport Authority, FAA Docket No. 16-

00-10, Director's Determination (Apr. 26, 2001). That case addressed the sponsor's agreement 

25 
to pay a bonus of $500,000 to private law firms if the firms successfully terminated an airport 

tenant's lease. In relevant part, the FAA found that: 

The FAA's Policy Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue was not 

intended to provide a vehicle for a party to challenge the 

reasonableness of fees paid to private entities for airport-related 

services provided. Rather, it was to ensure that airport sponsors do not 

use airport revenues to create non-airport related benefits for other 

governmental activities .... [T]he clear intent of the policy is to avoid 

airport revenue being used for non-airport public purposes, and in 

particular airport sponsor's subsidy of its non-airport public functions. 

A payment of airport revenue to a private firm can be considered 

unlawful revenue diversion if it is not for an airport purpose (i.e., for 

general economic development). 

Id. at 42; see also Boca Airport, Inc., d/b/a Boca Aviation v. Boca Raton Airport Authority, FAA 

Docket No. 16-00-10, Final Agency Decision and Order at 3 (Mar. 20, 2003) ("The Associate 

Administrator concurs . . . that the Revenue Use Policy was intended to ensure that airport 

sponsors do not use airport revenues for non-airport related purposes, and in particular to provide 

a subsidy for the airport sponsor's non-airport public functions). 

The Department of Transportation ("DOT") has further clarified that it is permissible to 

pay attorneys to defend challenges under federal obligations, even when there is an underlying 

violation of the grant assurances. Second Los Angeles International Airport Rates Proceeding, 

Docket No. OST-95-474, Final Decision (Dec. 22, 1995) ("LAX If'). At issue in LAX II was the 

question of which costs could be included in the airport's rate base. Airlines challenged the 

inclusion of: (I) legal fees associated with the defense of the airport's rates and charges; and (2) 

legal fees incurred in defending against allegations of revenue diversion. Even though some of 

the underlying expenses were found to be revenue diversion, the Department allowed all of the 

legal fees to be included in the rate base, stating: "we do not view the overall defense of the 

police department charges [much of which were found to be revenue diversion] as equivalent to 

26 
diversion." !d. at 49. The Department drew a clear distinction between funds illegally diverted 

(impermissible use of airport funds) and funds spent to defend the charge of diversion 

(permissible use of airport funds). Similarly here, the Town's use of airport revenue to defend 

the Local Laws is a permissible use of Airport revenue, even if the Local Laws are ultimately 

struck down. 

That result is consistent with practice. The Town is not aware of the FAA disallowing 

the use of airport revenue to defend a Part 16 complaint or Notice of Investigation, even when 

the sponsor has been found to violate its obligations. That practice applies to challenges to 

access restrictions as well. Over the years, many airport sponsors have proposed and/or 

implemented access restrictions that have been challenged in courts and before the FAA. 18 The 

Town is not aware of a single instance in which the FAA has advised that it was impermissible 

for the airport sponsor to use airport revenue to defend those restrictions - even when the 

underlying restrictions were ultimately found to violate federallaw. 19 Nor is the Town aware of 

an instance in which has the FAA limited the use of airport revenue to develop and pursue access 

restrictions that were not approved, such as rejected Part 161 applications. 

In their August 5, 2015, Surreply to the Motion to Dismiss, Complainants attempt to 

distinguish LAX !!by noting that the portion offees ultimately spent to defend impermissible use 

18 E.g., City of Naples Airport Auth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d 431 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding Stage 2 ban as 

reasonable under Grant Assurances); Nat'/ Helicopter C01p. of Am. v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998) 

(upholding curfew and weekend ban on helicopters); Alaska Airlines v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 

1991) (upholding overall cap on number of commercial operations and curfew on noisy aircraft); Global Int'l 

Airway Corp. v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 727 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding restriction on operations by noisy 

aircraft); Nat'/ Bus. Aviation Ass'n v. City of Naples Airport Auth., 162 F. Supp.2d 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2001) 

(upholding ban on noisy aircraft); Arrow Air, Inc. v. Port Auth. of NY. & N J, 602 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 

(upholding ban on noisy aircraft); Santa Monica Airport Ass 'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 

1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding curfew, weekend helicopter training ban, ban on noisy aircraft, 

and certain touch and go operations). 

19 E.g., City oj'Santa Monica v. FAA, 631 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ban on approach category C & D 

aircraft violated grant obligations). 

27 
of airport funds were merely de minimis. Surreply Br. at 3. But that portion of the decision was 

not related to the propriety of spending airport revenue for attorney fees to defend a revenue 

diversion claim; it was to justify including those attorney fees in the airport's rate base for 

purpose of setting its rates and charges. LAX II at 49. 

B. The Town's Use Of Airport Revenue To Pay Attorney Fees Is A Permissible Use 

Of Airport Revenue 

The Town's use of Airport revenue to pay legal fees associated with the defense of the 

Local Laws fits comfortably within the principles set forth in Boca Airport and LAX II. The 

Town has not used airport revenues to subsidize the Town's non-airport public functions, nor has 

it used airport revenues to acquire land for non-airport purposes. The legal fees at issue have 

been used to defend the Town's adoption of airport operating rules. By definition, airport 

operating rules serve an airport purpose because they relate directly to the operation of the 

Airport. Complainants may not agree with the substance of the Local Laws, but this does 

nothing to change the plain fact that the Local Laws are related to the operation of the Airport 

and serve a legitimate airport purpose- i.e., the regulation of aircraft noise. 20 

Complainants argue that it is improper to spend airport revenue for measures that, they 

assert, violate federal law. Complaint at~ 42. Complainants are wrong. First, as LAX II makes 

clear, an airport sponsor may spend airport revenue to defend actions that are ultimately found to 

violate sponsor assurances. Supra at 26. Second, Complainants' argument is particularly 

2

° Complainants attempt to use rhetoric to mask the inherent airport purpose of the Local Laws by 

branding them part of an "anti-airport agenda." Complaint at '\144. But that rhetorical flourish proves nothing. The 

Town has demonstrated again and again its commitment to the Airport by embarking on an ambitious program to 

improve the Airport and address a number of long-deferred maintenance and improvement projects. See Exhibit 2 -

Town Resolution 2015-588 (accepting bid for delivery of new Automated Weather Observation System) (May 21, 

2015); Town Resolution 2015-473 ($500,000 bond for airport engineering) (April 21, 2015); Town Resolution 

2015-418 (Airport goals) (April 16, 2015); Town Resolution 2014-838 ($270,000 bond for reconstruction of 

Taxiway 4-22) (July 3, 2014). Just because Complainants do not agree with the Town's actions does not make those 

actions a non-airport purpose. 

28 
misplaced here where there has been no final determination that the Local Laws are unlawful in 

any way. To the contrary, the recent decision by Judge Seybert in Friends of East Hampton 

Airport demonstrates that the Town has already shown a strong likelihood of success on the 

merits of two of the three Laws. Complainants cannot conjure a violation of any sponsor 

assurance by simply asserting a conclusion of law. Nor can Complainants deny an airport 

sponsor the ability to defend itself against an alleged violation of law based only on an allegation 

of a violation. 

C. Complainants' Revenue Diversion Theory Lacks Any Legal Support 

Complainants offer no legal or policy support for their position. The main authority they 

cite, In the Matter of Compliance with Federal Obligations by the City of Chicago, Illinois, FAA 

Docket No. 16-04-09, is a Notice oflnvestigation, not a decision document. Moreover, that case 

involved actions to close an airport and terminate all aeronautical activity at the airport, which is 

entirely different than a sponsor's effort to adopt rules for the continued use of an airport. Here, 

the Local Laws plainly serve an airport purpose because they relate directly to the operation of 

the Airport. 

Complainants also cite Boca Airport for the proposition that the use of airport revenue to 

fund general economic development is improper. Complaint at n. 8. General economic 

development is plainly not an airport purpose. See Compliance Handbook at ~ 15.13(d). 

Attorney fees, in contrast, plainly are a proper use of airport revenue. Nothing in Boca Airport 

or any other authority cited by Complainant supports the notion that using airport revenue to 

defend airport operating rules is not an airport purpose. 

Finally, in their July 20, 2015, Answer to the Motion to Dismiss, Complainants cite to the 

DOT Inspector General's Report on Diversion of Airport Revenue, Augusta-Richmond County 

Commission, No. AV-1998-093 at 8 (March 12, 1998), noting that DOT recommended that the 

29 
airport sponsor at issue should not pay outstanding legal fees for acquisition of land that could 

not be used for airport purposes and the purchase of which had violated 49 U.S.C. § 471 

07(b)(l). Answer Br. at 5. The purchase ofland to develop an office park is clearly a prohibited 

use of airport revenue. Compliance Manual at ,-r 15.13(d) (Using airport revenue for general 

economic development is a prohibited use of airport revenue.) Again, that conclusion in no way 

bolsters Complainants' argument that defending airport operating rules is not an airport purpose. 

D. Complainants' Revenue Theory Would Hamstring Airport Sponsor's Ability To 

Defend Themselves In Legal Disputes 

In addition to lacking legal support, Complainants' theory lacks any rational policy 

justification and would lead to disastrous results for all airport sponsors. First, pursuant to 

Assurance 5, an airport sponsor must retain the power to comply with federal obligations. 

Denying an airport sponsor the ability to use airport revenue to defend airport operating rules 

would make that all but impossible by denying airport sponsors the financial resources to defend 

itself against any alleged violation of its federal obligations and demonstrate compliance. 

Complainants' theory, moreover, would apply with equal force to all allegations of noncompliance, including common claims by FBOs and other commercial tenants? 1 By cutting off 

access to airport revenues to defend controversial measures, Complainants would make it 

impossible for airport sponsors to defend themselves and demonstrate compliance with their 

federal obligations.22 

Second, Complainants' theory would place airport sponsors in an impossible position of 

having to secure assurance that controversial measures are consistent with grant obligations 

21 Indeed, Complainants argue that the Town may not use airport revenue to defend against this 

Complaint. Complaint at 1]43. 

22 This is particularly true for independent airport authorities that have no non-airport sources of revenue. 

30 
before adopting them, or risk being unable to defend challenges to those measures. Given the 

financial consequences of being wrong, airport operators would be compelled to seek preapproval from the FAA for controversial measures and/or for incurring legal fees to avoid being 

placed in a financial bind. That would represent a major change in the current relationship 

between the FAA, airport operators, and airport users that has no basis in current law or the grant 

assurances. Complainants' parochial focus on preventing the Town from defending its Local 

Laws should not create a precedent that would compel the need for FAA pre-clearance on the use 

of airport revenue. 

Third, Complainants' theory would give opponents of airport actions enormous leverage 

because the mere threat of litigation would have the effect of precluding the use of airport 

revenues to defend airport actions. The debate over the use of airport revenue would spawn 

paralyzing preliminary controversy and perhaps litigation over how to fund the response to the 

threat, giving airport users enormous leverage in negotiations with airport sponsors. 

Complainants' theory would effectively give airport users a veto over an airport sponsor's ability 

to pursue measures opposed by airport sponsors, a result fundamentally inconsistent with an 

airport sponsor's proprietary authority and responsibility to assure compliance. 

Finally, the logic of Complainants' theory extends beyond the compliance context and 

applies to any litigation alleging unlawful conduct by a sponsor. This would fundamentally 

undermine airport sponsors' ability to obtain legal counsel to defend themselves because airport 

sponsors are frequently accused of violating the law. In addition to "routine" legal actions 

involving contracts and torts, airport sponsors would be prevented from using airport revenue to 

defend against inverse condemnation claims, which necessarily rest on an allegation of unlawful 

conduct, or politically motivated litigation seeking to change airport policy. Complainants' 

31 
theory would simply prevent airport sponsors from being able to mount a professional legal 

defense to the myriad legal challenges airport sponsors face. 

Ultimately, there is no legal authority to support, and no sound policy basis upon which 

to accept, Complainants' argument. If adopted, Complainant's theory of revenue diversion 

would undermine the ability of airport sponsors to defend themselves, give airport users a 

practical veto over airport measures they opposed, and place the FAA in the position of having to 

pre-approve fees to airport counsel. Simply put, in their zeal to challenge particular restrictions 

at one airport, Complainants would impair the ability of all airport sponsors to meet their federal 

obligations and protect the public. Complainants offer no legal support or policy justification for 

such a radical and destructive outcome, and the Complaint should be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint should be dismissed. 

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 2015. 

jy:~v 7/ 

Elizabeth Vail W. Eric Pilsk 

Town Attorney 

Town of East Hampton 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 1193 7 

EVail@EHamptonNY.Gov 

32 

Catherine van Heuven 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 

1001 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 800 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

epilsk@kaplankirsch.com 

cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com 

Telephone: (202) 955-5600 

Facsimile: (202) 955-5616 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I have this 8th day of October, 2015, served the foregoing 

Respondent Town of East Hampton, New York's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 

in Support of Its Answer to the Complaint on the following parties as follows: 

Via Hand Delivery: 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

Attn: FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket, AGC-61 0 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Via Email and U.S. Mail: 

Steve Brown 

Chief Operating Officer 

N ationa1 Business Aviation Association, Inc. 

1200 G Street, NW 

Suite 1100 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

Dated this 8th day of October, 2015. 

33 

k~~ W. Eric Pilsk 
TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, New York 11937 

June 26, 2015 

COURT AFFIRMS TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON'S RIGHT TO 

REGULATE AIRPORT NOISE 

Airport Curfews to Take Effect on July 2, 2015 

The federal court today affirmed the Town of East Hampton's legal right to adopt use restrictions 

to address the problem of excessive airport noise, noting that "it cannot be argued that the Town 

lacked the data to support a finding of a noise problem at the Airport." 

Federal District Court Judge Joanna Seybert upheld the Town's legal authority to adopt restrictions 

to address noise problems, the fundamental issue in the litigation. The Court upheld two local laws 

instituting year-round curfews: one, a mandatory nighttime curfew, from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., and 

the other, an extended curfew on noisy aircraft, from 8 p.m. to 9 a.m. The Court preliminarily 

enjoined a third law imposing a one-trip-a-week restriction. A fourth law was not challenged. 

The Town of East Hampton adopted four laws to provide meaningful noise relief, while 

minimizing both the impact on users and the potential diversion to other airports: 

• Local Law #3 calls for a mandatory nighttime curfew, from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. 

• Local Law #4 calls for an extended curfew on noisy aircraft, from 8 p.m. to 9 a.m. 

• Local Law #5 calls for a limit on noisy aircraft to one trip- a single landing and takeoffeach week during the summer season. 

• Local Law #7 refines the penalties provision and definitions and codifies the Town's intent 

to evaluate the effectiveness of the restrictions. 

A group of opponents filed a legal action in federal court in April seeking to delay implementation 

of the local laws. Judge Seybert heard oral arguments on May 18, and at her request, the Town 

agreed to postpone enforcement of the laws pending today's decision. 

The plaintiffs challenged three of the laws under a number of federal statutes and constitutional 

claims. In today' s 45-page order, the Judge reviewed each of the applicable laws and constitutional 

principles in considerable detail. In her order, the Judge found there was no basis for enjoining the 

nighttime curfew and the extended curfew. However, she issued a preliminary injunction against 

Local Law #5 (the one-trip-per-week restriction on noisy aircraft). 

Town Supervisor Larry Cantwell said, "We're pleased the judge has acknowledged that the Town 

was justified in adopting restrictions to provide relief to the growing number of people who are 

negatively affected by aircraft noise. Although we regret that one of the key laws cannot be 
enforced for the time being, we are gratified that the Court recognized that the law allows the kind 

of restrictions that are essential to protect the residents of this Town." 

Enforcement of the local laws will begin on Thursday, July 2, 2015, at 12:01 a.m. 

Town Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez said, 'The Court's decision today is an important 

first step, but we must recognize that our opponents are well funded and will not give up easily. 

This will be a long process, not just for the pending case in federal court but also for the many 

other actions filed against operations at the Airport. In light of today's ruling, however, we 

encourage our opponents to rethink their strategy. It's time to do what's best for the Town and 

adapt aircraft operations to fit our reasonable restrictions." 

Information on these laws as well as the court filings is available at www.htoplanning.com. 

CONTACT: 

Peter Kirsch 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 

1675 Broadway #2300 

Denver, CO 80202 

pkirsch@kaplankirsch.com 

Office: (303) 825-7000 

Cell: (303) 898-1665 

Larry Cantwell 

Supervisor, Town of East Hampton 

lcantwell@ehamptonny.gov 

Office: (631) 324-4140 

Cell: (631) 445-9602 

### 
East Hampton Town Board 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 11937 

ADOPTED 

RESOLUTION 2015-588 

Meeting: 05/21/15 06:30PM 

Department: Purchasing 

Category: Bids Accepted 

Prepared By: Jeanne Carroza 

Initiator: Jeanne Carroza 

Sponsors: Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez 

DOC ID: 15457 

Accept Bid EH15-023- Furnish & Deliver Automated Weather 

Observation System Ill PTZ (AWOS) for the East Hampton 

Airport - Vaisala, Inc. 

WHEREAS, the Town Board solicited bids to Furnish & Deliver Automated Weather 

Observation System III PTZ (AWOS) for the East Hampton Airport, EH15-023; and 

WHEREAS, the bid of Vaisala, Inc., was the lowest bid received meeting the bid 

specifications and being in proper form; and 

WHEREAS, the bids submitted have been reviewed by Michael Baker Engineering, Inc., and 

Jeanne Carroza, CPPB the Town's Purchasing Agent; and have recommended the award of 

the bid to the lowest responsive, responsible bidder; now, therefore, be it 

RESOLVED, that the bid of Vaisala, Inc., in the amount of $122,269.78 to Furnish & Deliver 

an Automated Weather Observation System III PTZ (AWOS) for the East Hampton Airport 

from fund HA5610 52104 15001 is hereby accepted, and the Purchasing Agent is hereby 

authorized to issue a purchase order in accordance with the Town's bid specifications and 

the bid submission of the contractor. 

FINANCIAL IMPACT: 

HA56l0 52104 15001-$122,269.78 

RESULT: 

MOVER: 

SECONDER: 

AYES: 

ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS] 

Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman 

Peter Van Scoyoc, Councilman 

Burke-Gonzalez, Van Scoyoc, Overby, Overton, Cantwell 

Updated: 5/20/2015 2:17PM by Jeanne Carroza Page 1 

1.' .. ,·.·.· __ -_. --1 . 4;~~1~ . 
East Hampton Town Board 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 11937 

ADOPTED 

RESOLUTION 2015-473 

Meeting: 04/21/15 10:00 AM 

Department: Town Clerk 

Category: Bond 

Prepared By: Carole A. Brennan 

Initiator: Carole A. Brennan 

Sponsors: Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez 

DOC ID: 15285 A 

BOND · $500,000 Planning Engineering Airport 

BOND RESOLUTION OF THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK, 

ADOPTED APRIL 21, 2015, AUTHORIZING THE PREPARATION OF SURVEYS, PRELIMINARY 

PLANS AND DETAILED PLANS, SPECIFICATIONS AND ESTIMATES FOR FUTURE CAPITAL 

IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EAST HAMPTON AIRPORT, STATING THE ESTIMATED MAXIMUM 

COST THEREOF IS $500,000, APPROPRIATING SAID AMOUNT FOR SUCH PURPOSE AND 

AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF BONDS OF THE TOWN IN THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF 

NOT TO EXCEED $500,000 TO FINANCE SAID APPROPRIATION 

THE TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, IN THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, NEW 

YORK, HEREBY RESOLVES (by the favorable vote of not less than two-thirds of all the 

members of said Town Board) AS FOLLOWS: 

Section 1. The Town of East Hampton, in the County of Suffolk, New York (herein called the 

"Town", is hereby authorized to prepare surveys, preliminary plans and detailed plans, 

specifications and estimates for future capital improvements at the East Hampton Airport. 

The estimated maximum cost thereof, including preliminary costs and costs incidental 

thereto and the financing thereof, is $500,000 and said amount is hereby appropriated for 

such purpose. The plan of financing includes the issuance of bonds of the Town in the 

principal amount of not to exceed $500,000 to finance said appropriation, and the levy and 

collection of taxes on all the taxable real property in the Town to pay the principal of said 

bonds and the interest thereon as the same shall become due and payable. Debt service on 

the obligations herein authorized is expected to be paid from the Town's Airport Fund, as 

determined by the Town Board. 

Section 2. Bonds of the Town in the principal amount of not to exceed $500,000 are hereby 

authorized to be issued pursuant to the provisions of the Local Finance Law, constituting 

Chapter 33-a of the Consolidated Laws of the State of New York (herein called the "Law"), 

to finance said appropriation. 

Section 3. The period of probable usefulness applicable to the object or purpose for which 

said bonds are authorized to be issued, within the limitations of Section 11.00 a. 62 of the 

Law, is five (5) years. 

Section 4. The proceeds of the bonds herein authorized, and any bond anticipation notes 

issued in anticipation of said bonds, may be applied to reimburse the Town for expenditures 

made after the effective date of this resolution for the purpose for which said bonds are 

authorized. The foregoing statement of intent with respect to reimbursement is made in 

conformity with Treasury Regulation Section 1.150-2 of the United States Treasury 

Department. 

Section 5. The proposed maturity of the bonds authorized by this resolution will not exceed 

five years. 

Section 6. Each of the bonds authorized by this resolution, and any bond anticipation notes 

issued in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, shall contain the recital of validity as 

prescribed by Section 52.00 of the Law and said bonds, and any notes issued in anticipation 

Updated: 4/20/2015 4:34PM by Carole A. Brennan A Page 1 
Resolution 2015-473 Meeting of April 21, 2015 

of said bonds, shall be general obligations of the Town, payable as to both principal and 

interest by general tax upon all the taxable real property within the Town. The faith and 

credit of the Town are hereby irrevocably pledged to the punctual payment of the principal 

of and interest on said bonds, and any notes issued in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, 

and provision shall be made annually in the budget of the Town by appropriation for (a) the 

amortization and redemption of the bonds and any notes in anticipation thereof to mature in 

such year and (b) the payment of interest to be due and payable in such year. 

Section 7. Subject to the provisions of this resolution and of the Law and pursuant to the 

provisions of Section 21.00 relative to the authorization of the issuance of bonds with 

substantially level or declining annual debt service, Section 30.00 relative to the 

authorization of the issuance of bond anticipation notes and Section 50.00 and Sections 

56.00 to 60.00 and 168.00 of the Law, the powers and duties of the Town Board relative to 

authorizing bond anticipation notes and prescribing the terms, form and contents and as to 

the sale and issuance of the bonds herein authorized, and of any bond anticipation notes 

issued in anticipation of said bonds, and the renewals of said bond anticipation notes, and 

the powers and duties relative to executing contracts for credit enhancements and providing 

for substantially level or declining annual debt service, are hereby delegated to the 

Supervisor, the chief fiscal officer of the Town. 

Section 8. The validity of the bonds authorized by this resolution, and of any notes issued 

in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, may be contested only if: 

(a) such obligations are authorized for an object or purpose for which the Town is not 

authorized to expend money, or 

(b) the provisions of law which should be complied with at the date of the publication of 

such resolution, or a summary thereof, are not substantially complied with, 

and an action, suit or proceeding contesting such validity is commenced within twenty days 

after the date of such publication, or 

(c) such obligations are authorized in violation of the provisions of the constitution. 

Section 9. This bond resolution shall take effect immediately, and the Town Clerk is hereby 

authorized and directed to publish the foregoing resolution, in summary, together with a 

Notice attached in substantially the form prescribed by Section 81.00 of the Law in "The 

East Hampton Star." which is hereby designated the official newspaper of the Town for such 

publication. 

RESULT: 

MOVER: 

SECONDER: 

AYES: 

ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS] 

Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman 

Peter Van Scoyoc, Councilman 

Burke-Gonzalez, Van Scoyoc, Overby, Overton, Cantwell 

Updated: 4/20/2015 4:34PM by Carole A. Brennan A Page 2 

5.A.2 
East Hampton Town Board 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 11937 

ADOPTED 

RESOLUTION 2015-418 

Meeting: 04/16/15 06:30PM 

Department: Town Attorney 

Category: Approvals 

Prepared By: Elizabeth Vail 

Initiator: Elizabeth Vail 

Sponsors: Councilwoman Kathee Burke~Gonzalez 

DOC ID: 15264 A 

Resolution Memorializing Goals for the East Hampton Airport 

Whereas, the Town Board committed to studying and resolving the disturbance from noise 

associated with East Hampton Airport ("Airport") operations for the 2015 calendar season; 

and 

Whereas, the Town Board, in furtherance of its commitment, adopted three local laws 

restricting the use of the Airport in an effort to address noise disturbance; and 

Whereas, the Town Board recognizes that the adoption of these local laws represents only 

an initial step in the Town's commitment to studying and resolving Airport matters; and 

now, therefore be it 

Resolved, that in furtherance of these commitments the Town Board hereby adopts the 

following goals regarding the Airport: 

1. Maintain the Airport as Safe and Efficient. The Town Board as proprietor and 

operator of the Airport, shall commit to implementing a methodical capital and 

maintenance plan for Airport facilities to operate a safe and properly maintained self 

-sufficient facility without burdening taxpayers; The Town shall work closely with the 

Airport engineer to identify priorities for maintenance and capital improvements, with 

a focus on maintaining and enhancing safety. 

2. Local Laws. The enactment of the three local laws amending Chapter 75 shall 

address restrictions on the use of the Airport to ensure peace and quiet at night and 

in the evening and morning hours, limit the number of noisy helicopters and jets 

while still allowing reasonable access to the Airport. 

3. Study the Effectiveness of the New Laws. The Town shall professionally study 

and evaluate the effectiveness of our initial efforts - including the new local laws -

following the 2015 summer season. These studies will include analysis of the 

financial impact of the restrictions, their effect on noise and complaints, the diversion 

of traffic to other airports, and the effects of the restrictions on aircraft operators. 

The Town shall convene a public meeting after the 2015 season to present the 

results of these studies and to hear from the public to determine whether any 

changes are required in the restrictions for the 2016 season. 

4. Airport Management Advisory Committee. The Town Board shall appoint an 

Airport Management Advisory Committee to be responsible for advising the Town 

Board and the Airport Director on the operation, maintenance, finances, capital 

improvements, and preservation of the East Hampton Airport. The Committee will 

consolidate the several existing advisory committees into a single advisory group. 

5. Coordinate with the Congressional Delegation. The Town shall continue to work 

closely with Congressman Zeldin in his efforts to convince the FAA to require 

Updated: 4/15/2015 3:53PM by Elizabeth Vail A Page 1 

I 4A1.a 
Resolution 2015-418 Meeting of April 16, 2015 

helicopters to maintain a minimum altitude in their flights from New York City to the 

East End. The Town will also seek assistance from Senators Schumer and Gillibrand 

and other interested Members of Congress to ensure that our concerns are part of 

Congress' debate over reauthorization of the FAA. 

6. Partner with Eastern Region Helicopter Council. The Town Board shall continue 

to work with the Eastern Region Helicopter Council and other industry stakeholders 

to pursue its offer to develop voluntary procedures to mitigate helicopter noise in the 

short-term. 

7. Work with the FAA on Flight Tracks. The Town shall invite the FAA, airport users, 

and industry groups, to join it in finding long-term solutions to noise problems that 

can be resolved by addressing flight tracks, altitudes, and flight procedures. The 

Town shall request and work with the FAA to establish a regional task force to review 

problems throughout the East End in furtherance of a regional solution. 

B. Improved Technology. The Town shall improve its ability to record and track 

airport operations and noise problems through installation of an Airport Noise and 

Operations Monitoring System (ANOMS) and will work with the Air Traffic Control 

Tower, our operations billing contractor, Vector, and the operator of our complaint 

system, PlaneNoise, to ensure the Town has the best data available on airport 

operations. 

RESULT: 

MOVER: 

SECONDER: 

AYES: 

ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS] 

Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman 

Peter Van Scoyoc, Councilman 

Burke-Gonzalez, Van Scoyoc, Overby, Overton, Cantwell 

Updated: 4/15/2015 3:53PM by Elizabeth Vail A Page 2 
East Hampton Town Board 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 11937 

ADOPTED 

RESOLUTION 2014-838 

Meeting: 07/03/14 06:30PM 

Department: Town Clerk 

Category: Bond 

Prepared By: Carole A. Brennan 

Initiator: Carole A. Brennan 

Sponsors: Councilwoman Kathee Burke-Gonzalez 

DOC ID: 14126 

BOND · $270,000 - Reconstruction of Taxiway 4-22 

BOND RESOLUTION OF THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK, 

ADOPTED JULY 3, 2014, AUTHORIZING THE RECONSTRUCTION OF TAXIWAY 4-22 AT EAST 

HAMPTON AIRPORT, STATING THE ESTIMATED MAXIMUM COST THEREOF IS $270,000, 

APPROPRIATING SAID AMOUNT FOR SUCH PURPOSE AND AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF 

BONDS IN THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF NOT TO EXCEED $270,000 TO FINANCE SAID 

APPROPRIATION. 

THE TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, IN THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, NEW 

YORK, HEREBY RESOLVES (by the favorable vote of not less than two-thirds of all the 

members of said Town Board) AS FOLLOWS: 

Section 1. The Town of East Hampton, in the County of Suffolk, New York (herein called the 

"Town"), is hereby authorized to reconstruct taxiway 4-22 at East Hampton Airport. The 

estimated maximum cost thereof, including preliminary costs and costs incidental thereto 

and the financing thereof, is $270,000 and said amount is hereby appropriated for such 

purpose. The plan of financing includes the issuance of bonds of the Town in the principal 

amount of not to exceed $270,000 to finance said appropriation, and the levy and collection 

of taxes on all the taxable real property in the Town to pay the principal of said bonds and 

the interest thereon as the same shall become due and payable. Debt service on the 

obligations herein authorized is expected to be paid from the Town's Airport Fund, as 

determined by the Town Board. 

Section 2. Bonds of the Town in the principal amount of not to exceed $270,000 are hereby 

authorized to be issued pursuant to the provisions of the Local Finance Law, constituting 

Chapter 33-a of the Consolidated Laws of the State of New York (herein called the "Law"), 

to finance said appropriation. 

Section 3. The period of probable usefulness applicable to the object or purpose for which 

said bonds are authorized to be issued, within the limitations of Section 11.00 a. 14 of the 

Law, is ten (10) years. 

Section 4. The proceeds of the bonds herein authorized, and any bond anticipation notes 

issued in anticipation of said bonds, may be applied to reimburse the Town for expenditures 

made after the effective date of this resolution for the purpose for which said bonds are 

authorized. The foregoing statement of intent with respect to reimbursement is made in 

conformity with Treasury Regulation Section 1.150-2 of the United States Treasury 

Department. 

Section 5. The proposed maturity of the bonds authorized by this resolution will exceed five 

years. 

Section 6. Each of the bonds authorized by this resolution, and any bond anticipation notes 

issued in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, shall contain the recital of validity as 

prescribed by Section 52.00 of the Law and said bonds, and any notes issued in anticipation 

of said bonds, shall be general obligations of the Town, payable as to both principal and 

interest by general tax upon all the taxable real property within the Town. The faith and 

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Resolution 2014-838 Meeting of July 3, 2014 

credit of the Town are hereby irrevocably pledged to the punctual payment of the principal 

of and interest on said bonds, and any notes issued in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, 

and provision shall be made annually in the budget of the Town by appropriation for (a) the 

amortization and redemption of the bonds and any notes in anticipation thereof to mature in 

such year and (b) the payment of interest to be due and payable in such year. 

Section 7. Subject to the provisions of this resolution and of the Law and pursuant to the 

provisions of Section 21.00 of the Law relative to the authorization of the issuance of bonds 

with substantially level or declining annual debt service, Section 30.00 relative to the 

authorization of the issuance of bond anticipation notes and Section 50.00 and Sections 

56.00 to 60.00 and 168.00 of the Law, the powers and duties of the Town Board relative to 

authorizing bond anticipation notes and prescribing the terms, form and contents and as to 

the sale and issuance of the bonds herein authorized, and of any bond anticipation notes 

issued in anticipation of said bonds, and the renewals of said bond anticipation notes, and 

the powers and duties relative to executing contracts for credit enhancements and providing 

for substantially level or declining annual debt service, are hereby delegated to the 

Supervisor, the chief fiscal officer of the Town. 

Section 8. The validity of the bonds authorized by this resolution, and of any notes issued 

in anticipation of the sale of said bonds, may be contested only if: 

(a) such obligations are authorized for an object or purpose for which the Town is not 

authorized to expend money, or 

(b) the provisions of law which should be complied with at the date of the publication of 

such resolution, or a summary thereof, are not substantially complied with, 

and an action, suit or proceeding contesting such validity is commenced within twenty days 

after the date of such publication, or 

(c) such obligations are authorized in violation of the provisions of the constitution. 

Section 9. This bond resolution is subject to a permissive referendum and the Town Clerk 

of said Town of East Hampton is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be published, in 

full, within ten (10) days after the adoption of this resolution, in "The East Hampton Star" 

which is hereby designated the official newspaper of the Town for such publication, and 

posted on the sign board of the Town maintained pursuant to the Town Law, a Notice in 

substantially the following form: 

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Resolution 2014-838 Meeting of July 3, 2014 

LEGAL NOTICE 

TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, NEW YORK 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 3, 2014, the Town Board of the Town of East Hampton, 

in the County of Suffolk, New York, adopted a bond resolution entitled: 

"Bond Resolution of the Town of East Hampton, Suffolk County, New York, adopted July 3, 

2014, authorizing the reconstruction of taxiway 4-22 at East Hampton Airport, stating the 

estimated maximum cost thereof is $270,000, appropriating said amount for such purpose 

and authorizing the issuance of bonds in the principal amount of not to exceed $270,000 

bonds to finance said appropriation," an abstract of such bond resolution, concisely stating 

the purpose and effect thereof, being as follows: 

FIRST: AUTHORIZING the reconstruction of taxiway 4-22 at East Hampton Airport; 

STATING the estimated maximum cost thereof, including preliminary costs and costs 

incidental thereto and the financing thereof, is $270,000; APPROPRIATING said amount for 

such purpose; STATING the plan of financing includes the issuance of bonds of the Town in 

the principal amount of not to exceed $270,000 to finance said appropriation, and the levy 

of a tax upon all the taxable real property within the Town to pay the principal of said bonds 

and interest thereon; and STATING that debt service on the obligations herein authorized is 

expected to be paid from the Town's Airport Fund, as determined by the Town Board; 

SECOND: AUTHORIZING the issuance of not to exceed $270,000 bonds of the Town 

pursuant to the Local Finance Law of the State of New York (the "Law") to finance said 

appropriation; 

THIRD: DETERMINING and STATING the period of probable usefulness applicable to the 

purpose for which said bonds are authorized to be issued is ten (10) years; the proceeds of 

said bonds and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation thereof may be applied to 

reimburse the Town for expenditures made after the effective date of this bond resolution 

for the purpose for which said bonds are authorized; and the proposed maturity of said 

$270,000 bonds will exceed five (5) years; 

FOURTH: DETERMINING that said bonds and any bond anticipation notes issued in 

anticipation of said bonds and the renewals of said bond anticipation notes shall be general 

obligations of the Town; and PLEDGING to their payment the faith and credit of the Town; 

FIFTH: DELEGATING to the Supervisor the powers and duties as to the issuance of said 

bonds and any bond anticipation notes issued in anticipation of said bonds, and the 

renewals thereof, and other related powers; and 

SIXTH: DETERMINING that the bond resolution is subject to a permissive referendum. 

DATED: July 3, 2014 

CAROLE A. BRENNAN 

Town Clerk 

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4.A.4 
Resolution 2014-838 Meeting of July 3, 2014 

Section 10. The Town Clerk is hereby directed, after said bond resolution shall take effect, 

to cause said bond resolution to be published, in summary, in the newspaper(s) referred to 

in Section 9 hereof, and hereby designated the official newspaper(s) for said publication, 

together with a Notice in substantially the form as provided by Section 81.00 of the Local 

Finance Law, constituting Chapter 33-a of the Consolidated Laws of the State of New York. 

RESULT: ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS] 

MOVER: Kathee Burke-Gonzalez, Councilwoman 

SECONDER: Peter Van Scoyoc, Councilman 

AYES: Burke-Gonzalez, VanScoyoc, Overby, Overton, Cantwell 

Updated: 6/30/2014 2:34PM by Carole A. Brennan Page 4