In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-2656

LYNN FAAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 5299—William J. Hibbler, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 9, 2008—DECIDED JULY 10, 2008

____________

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Lynn Faas worked as a store

general manager for Sears, Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”) until

she was fired in September 2004. One year later, Faas

filed suit against Sears, claiming that Sears wrongfully

terminated her employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621

et seq. Following discovery, the district court granted

summary judgment to Sears, which claimed that it had

not dismissed Faas because of her age, but as a result of

her poor performance. After conducting our own review

of the record, we agree and affirm.
2 No. 07-2656

I. HISTORY

The following facts are recounted in the light most

favorable to Faas, the non-moving party. Hemsworth v.

Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007).

Lynn Faas, age 53, began her career with Sears as a parttime sales associate in 1974. For nearly twenty years,

Faas worked her way up the company ladder, and she

became the store general manager of Sears’s Sheboygan,

Wisconsin store in 1993. Faas received subsequent promotions to larger stores until finally settling in as the store

manager of Sears’s Fox Valley Mall store in Aurora, Illinois, in April 2000.

As store general manager, Faas held the top management position in the Fox Valley store. This meant that

Faas was ultimately accountable for everything that

happened within the store, including customer service,

income generation, sales development, and special

events. Eight assistant store managers headed the store’s

various departments and worked under Faas. Faas reported to the district general manager of the Chicago South

District, who managed the fourteen Sears stores in the

district. Each district general manager was supervised

by a regional vice-president.

In late 2002, Sears developed a new method of evaluating the performance of its stores (and its store general

managers). Part of this initiative included tabulating a

“balanced scorecard” that analyzed each store’s performance in four categories: customer satisfaction, personnel data, sales, and profits. Sears utilized a 5.0 point

scale to rate each category—a score of 1.0 was considered

the worst possible score, a 5.0 was a perfect score, and a

3.0 indicated “acceptable” performance. The balanced

scorecard then averaged the scores for each of the four
No. 07-2656 3

categories, which yielded a store’s overall balancedscorecard rating. Sears’s corporate office issued balanced

scorecards for each Sears store every month, and tracked

the cumulative monthly scores for each store. The store

managers were responsible for leading and coaching

their teams to meet Sears’s customer service and performance expectations, and were held accountable for

their stores’ balanced-scorecard scores.

When a district general manager felt that a store general manager was underperforming, the district manager

could attempt to rehabilitate the store manager through a

procedure called a “Performance Plan for Improvement.”

Sears outlined the Performance Plan for Improvement

process in a policy guide issued to all Sears managers:

a manager identifies the associate’s performance deficiencies; the manager then discusses the performance shortfalls with the associate, and together they outline a plan

for correcting the performance problems; finally, the

manager follows up to ensure adherence to the corrective plan. Sears’s policy guide explained that “[t]he

manager . . . should use discretion to determine the exact

timing for each follow-up step, considering the severity

of the issue at hand and the opportunity to observe

changes in performance; however, the manager must

treat similar performance situations among associates in

a consistent manner.”

In November 2002, Robert Poss, Faas’s district general

manager, placed Faas on a Performance Plan for Improvement because of her inconsistent execution, lack of organization, and inability to train and to provide leadership to

her sales associates and assistant store managers. Poss

commented in a memo explaining his decision to place

Faas on a Performance Plan, “[i]t appears to me at this
4 No. 07-2656

point [that] Lynn is not capable of running this size

store.” Poss also noted that Faas’s store lagged behind

the other stores in the Chicago South District, and that

her deficiencies as a manager resulted in unacceptably

low customer-satisfaction scores for the Fox Valley store.

Faas provided Poss with a corrective plan that acknowledged that she needed to better coach her employees.

Faas remained on the Performance Plan for Improvement until July 2003. Between November 2002 and July

2003, Poss followed up with Faas several times. On each

occasion, Poss acknowledged that Faas had made some

progress, but he also noted that Faas had not rectified

many of her performance problems. Poss explained that

the Fox Valley store’s customer-satisfaction scores were

still below the company average and those of the other

stores in the district. Poss also called into question Faas’s

leadership skills because of her failure to develop her

assistant store managers. And Poss noted on several

occasions that if Faas did not improve, further action

would be necessary, “including termination of employment.” Poss finally removed Faas from the Performance

Plan in July 2003, but he told her that she still needed to

improve her customer-satisfaction scores. Around the same

time, Poss issued a mid-year review to Faas in which he

rated her a two out of five for results, and a three out of

five for leadership. Faas later explained that she

viewed Poss as “an excellent leader” and “a fair manager,”

and she did not believe that his decision to place her

on a Performance Plan was related to her age.

Poss retired in October 2003, and was replaced by Wendy

Carges as district general manager for the Chicago South

District. When Carges took over for Poss, the Chicago

South District stores had balanced-scorecard ratings that
No. 07-2656 5

ranked among the worst of Sears’s 63 districts nationwide. In order to improve the chronically underachieving

stores in the Chicago South District, Carges assessed the

individual performance of each of the twelve store general managers in her district, and determined that all but

two of the store managers were underperforming. The

two store managers that Carges believed to be adequately

managing their stores, Ray Morris (age 59) and David

Allen (age 62), were both older than Faas. Among the ten

underperforming store managers, one had started with

Sears only six months before Carges’s hire and had only

been at his store for one month, and four others did not

begin at their stores until after Carges became district

manager—one of these four store managers was also

new to Sears. Carges discussed the situation with her

regional vice-president, Steve Sunderland, who told her

to take her time evaluating the store general managers in

her district and gave her latitude to decide whether to

place store general managers on Performance Plans for

Improvement.

Faas was among the remaining five store general managers whom Carges considered to be underperforming.

Carges’s initial impression of Faas was that she had

poorly managed the 2003 holiday season and that her

team was not cohesive. Carges observed, as Poss had,

that the balanced-scorecard numbers for the Fox Valley

store were unacceptably low and were particularly weak

in the customer-satisfaction category. The Fox Valley

store was particularly important to Carges’s plan for

rejuvenating her district because it was the third largest

volume store in the Chicago South District, and was

scheduled to undergo remodeling beginning in November 2003.
6 No. 07-2656

After Carges spoke to Sunderland, she met with Faas

twice in early 2004 and told Faas that she was considering placing her on a Performance Plan for Improvement. Carges did not immediately place Faas on a Performance Plan, and instead explained to Faas that she

did not think that Faas had the requisite skill sets to run

the large Fox Valley store, nor did she think that Faas

was right for Sears’s “current matrix.” Carges encouraged

Faas to consider “any and all options,” such as a position

in Sears’s corporate offices or leaving Sears to run a

specialty store. Faas told Carges that she liked her position as a store general manager and that she did not want

to leave voluntarily.

In February 2004, Carges conducted a performance

review of Faas and rated her a two out of five for both

results and leadership. The review also contained a selfassessment section, in which Faas rated herself a two out

of five for results and a three out of five for leadership.

But Carges’s performance review was not entirely critical: Carges complimented Faas for her handling of the

remodeling of the Fox Valley store, and Carges noted

that Faas seemed to understand what was required of

her while other store general managers did not.

In March 2004, Carges received complaints from two

of Faas’s assistant store managers because Faas allegedly

mistreated them and berated her team during a meeting.

Carges discussed the complaint with Faas and again

encouraged her to pursue other employment options

because having a fragmented store would make it difficult for her to improve as store general manager. Faas

again informed Carges that she wanted to retain her

current position and that she believed she could remedy

the situation. Soon after the incident, Carges was told by
No. 07-2656 7

Sunderland that the Fox Valley store needed a “new

person” because something was wrong with the “culture”

at the store.

In May 2004, Carges determined that Faas’s performance

had still not improved, and Carges placed Faas on a

Performance Plan for Improvement. At that time, the

Fox Valley store had a year-to-date balanced-scorecard

rating of 1.9, and the store’s customer-satisfaction component was 1.0. The Performance Plan explained that Faas

failed to demonstrate an ability to successfully lead her

team, that her store’s balance-scorecard rating was unacceptable, and that its customer-satisfaction score was

“substandard.” Carges also noted that Faas neglected

to coach or train her assistant store managers and that

her inconsistent performance would “result in further

action, which may include termination.” In June 2004,

Carges met with Faas and noted some progress but also

stated that the leadership concerns still needed immediate improvement.

By July 2004, Faas’s store had the lowest balancedscorecard rating (1.6) in the entire Chicago South District,

and the store’s customer-satisfaction score remained a 1.0,

which Carges later noted was “one of the poorest within

the district, region, and nation.” On August 13, 2004,

Carges issued a memo to Faas informing her that her

store’s balanced-scorecard ratings were “completely

unacceptable,” and that she had 30 days to correct her

performances issues or she would be terminated.

From September 4 through September 12, 2004, Faas

took a vacation to celebrate her 50th birthday. Sears had

scheduled two special events at the Fox Valley store for

that week: a fall-apparel promotion and an autograph
8 No. 07-2656

1 Barrett was traded from the Cubs to the San Diego Padres in

June 2007 after an infamous dugout brawl with his “batterymate,” pitching-ace Carlos Zambrano. The North Siders,

perhaps motivated by the spat, went on to win the National

League Central Division title in 2007.

signing by ex-Chicago Cubs catcher Michael Barrett.1

Carges considered the events to be important marketing

opportunities for the Fox Valley store. When Faas left for

vacation, she placed her loss-prevention manager and

three assistant store managers—who had been in their

positions for just over one month—in charge of the promotional events.

On September 8, 2004, the day of the Barrett signing,

Carges visited the Fox Valley store and disapproved of

how the apparel area had been set up for the fall promotion. Carges also discovered that the assistant store managers planned to have customers line up for the Barrett

signing through the parking lot instead of inside the

store, where they would be able to view the merchandise while waiting. Carges noted that the assistant

store managers seemed overwhelmed and frustrated,

and she changed her plans and stayed at the Fox Valley

store for the day to guide the assistant store managers

through the promotional events. Faas was terminated

on September 13, 2004. The termination letter stated,

“Lynn continues to fail to lead her team to the level of

execution and performance necessary . . . . Key events,

critical to the success of the store that heavily impact

our customers, are poorly executed, recently the fall

apparel reset and a marketing/P.R. event.”

Faas filed this age-discrimination lawsuit under the

ADEA in September 2005. After the case proceeded
No. 07-2656 9

through discovery, Sears filed a motion for summary

judgment in November 2006, arguing that Faas could

not prove a prima facie case of age discrimination

through either direct or indirect evidence because the

undisputed facts showed that Faas was fired for her

consistently deficient performance. In response to Sears’s

summary-judgment motion, Faas argued that she could

prove age discrimination through both direct and indirect

evidence, and that an adverse inference should be

drawn against Sears because of Sears’s destruction of

certain employee records.

Faas’s direct-evidence and adverse-inference arguments in opposition to summary judgment stemmed

from her discovery of “Leadership Overviews”—documents that Sears created as part of its “Sears Leadership

Overview and Talent Management Process,” which it

implemented to ascertain what potential talent the company had within its ranks. Sears evaluated the confidential Leadership Overviews at annual planning meetings

to determine who might be a good candidate for promotion in the future. The Leadership Overview forms contained biographical information such as age, education,

and gender, and also provided an assessment of an employee’s potential by placing the employee in one of five

categories—“high potential,” “promotable,” “solid performer,” “blocker,” or “above capacity.” The “blocker”

category referred to someone whose performance was

adequate, but whom management did not perceive to

have the skills to move beyond their current assignment,

and who might be limiting the development of other

employees by remaining in their current position. Sears did

not terminate employees it classified as “blockers”; however, the company had a policy of motivating “blockers” to
10 No. 07-2656

pursue other positions because they limited the development of more promising employees. Poss rated Faas a

“blocker” in the “Overall Assessment of Potential” category on her 2003 Leadership Overview, which Sears

produced to Faas during discovery.

Sears did not show the Leadership Overviews to its

employees and did not keep the forms in the employees’

personnel files. Sears retained the forms only until it

completed the next cycle of overviews—typically six

months to one year—at which point, Sears shredded the

documents. During a deposition, Donna Deselits, Sears’s

Human Resources Director for stores in the North

Central Region, explained that the Leadership Overviews listed confidential factors such as age and salary,

and for this reason, among others, Sears destroyed the

documents. Faas’s summary-judgment response contended that the document destruction supported an

inference that the documents contained information

adverse to Sears’s case. See Park v. City of Chicago, 297

F.3d 606, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2002). Faas also argued that

Deselits’s comment about the document shredding and

Deselits’s decision to shred the documents were direct

evidence of age discrimination.

Faas’s indirect-evidence argument in her response to

Sears’s motion for summary judgment claimed that she

had presented circumstantial evidence of age discrimination because younger, similarly situated store general

managers were not disciplined or terminated, while

older, similarly situated store managers were disciplined

and encouraged to retire. Faas pointed to the fact that

the Fox Valley store was not the only struggling Sears

store in the Chicago South District in 2004; in fact, every

store had a score below the 3.0 benchmark. Faas claimed
No. 07-2656 11

that by selecting Faas and two older store managers—

David Johnson (age 62) and John Spencer (age 59)—for

Performance Plans for Improvement, Carges had failed

to consistently apply Sears’s disciplinary standards. As

with Faas, Carges encouraged both Johnson and Spencer

to pursue other employment options, and both men

eventually elected to retire voluntarily.

Sears countered by explaining that Carges decided that

she could not handle putting all of the store general

managers on Performance Plans for Improvement simultaneously, so she elected to focus on the store managers with the lowest balanced-scorecard ratings—Faas’s

store had a 1.6, Johnson’s store had a 1.8, and Spencer’s

store had a 1.9. Sears also explained that Carges did not

place Scott Kraatz (age 50), whose store had the secondlowest rating (1.7) on a Performance Plan because Kraatz

was one of the store managers who was new to Sears and

new to his store, and also because Kraatz’s store had

started 2004 with a score that was “quite good” that

slipped as the year went on. Carges eventually placed

Kraatz on a Performance Plan in 2005.

The district court evaluated the parties’ arguments,

reviewed the summary-judgment record, and granted

summary judgment to Sears. The district court first explained that Deselits’s testimony about the Leadership

Overviews was not direct evidence of age discrimination

because Deselits’s comment “simply [was] not related” to

Carges’s decision to terminate Faas, and because the term

“blocker” was age-neutral. The district court next explained that it would not draw an adverse inference

against Sears about the contents of the Leadership Overviews. Finally, the district court rejected Faas’s attempt

to show discrimination by circumstantial evidence, noting
12 No. 07-2656

that “Sears provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for Carges’s decision to place Faas, and not the

other [store general managers], on a [Performance Plan

for Improvement],” and that Faas did not present any

evidence that the proffered reason was pretextual.

II. ANALYSIS

Faas now reiterates two of the three arguments she

made to the district court in opposition to summary

judgment. First, Faas contends that she presented a prima

face case of age discrimination under the indirect method

of proof because she offered “strong evidence” that Sears

treated similarly situated, younger store general managers

more favorably than it treated Faas and other similarly

situated, older store managers; Faas claims that her evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect

to whether Sears’s justification for the disparate treatment of its store managers was pretextual. Second, Faas

argues that the district court should have drawn an

adverse inference against Sears based upon Sears’s destruction of the Leadership Overviews.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Sears de novo, examining the record in the light

most favorable to Faas. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796

(7th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper where “the

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file,

and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). To raise a

genuine issue of material fact, Faas must do more than

“simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
No. 07-2656 13

the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also Springer v.

Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008). “ ‘A genuine

issue of material fact arises only if sufficient evidence

favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit a jury to

return a verdict for that party.’ ” Springer, 518 F.3d at

483 (quoting Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820, 826

(7th Cir. 2007), and Brummett v. Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc.,

414 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2005)).

A. Faas’s prima facie case of age discrimination

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an individual because of her age. 29 U.S.C.

§ 623(a)(1). To establish her claim under the ADEA, Faas

must show that her age “ ‘actually motivated’ ” Sears’s

decision to terminate her employment. Hemsworth, 476 F.3d

at 490 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000), Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.

604, 610 (1993), and Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d

569, 573 (7th Cir. 2003)). In other words, Faas must show

that her age “ ‘actually played a role in [Sears’s decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on

the outcome.’ ” Id. (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141, Hazen,

507 U.S. at 610, and Schuster, 327 F.3d at 573).

Faas may establish her ADEA claim through either the

direct or indirect methods of proof. Hemsworth, 476 F.3d

at 490; Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 695 (7th

Cir. 2006). We have noted that because a plaintiff may

utilize circumstantial evidence under both methods of

proof, “[t]he distinction between the two avenues of proof

is ‘vague,’ and the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ themselves

are somewhat misleading in the present context.” Luks v.
14 No. 07-2656

Baxter Healthcare Corp., 467 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453

F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2006)) (internal citation omitted).

The direct method of proof involves direct evidence,

such as near-admissions by the employer, as well as more

attenuated circumstantial evidence that “ ‘suggests discrimination albeit through a longer chain of inferences.’ ”

Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (quoting Luks, 467 F.3d at

1052). In contrast, the indirect method of proof involves

a certain subset of circumstantial evidence that includes how the employer treats similarly situated employees, and “ ‘conforms to the prescription of McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).’ ” Id. at 490-

91 (quoting Luks, 467 F.3d at 1052).

On appeal, Faas has failed to raise, and has therefore

waived, her direct-method-of-proof argument. See Local

15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779,

783 (7th Cir. 2007) (“ ‘A party waives any argument that . . .

if raised in the district court, it fails to develop on appeal.’ ” (quoting Williams v. REP Corp., 302 F.3d 660, 666

(7th Cir. 2002))). We therefore turn to whether Faas’s

claim under the indirect method of proof can withstand

summary judgment. We evaluate whether Faas has

raised a genuine issue of material fact under the indirect

method using the familiar burden-shifting approach

outlined by McDonnell-Douglas. See Barricks v. Eli Lilly &

Co., 481 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2007).

In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the indirect method, Faas must to prove that

(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) her performance met Sears’s legitimate expectations; (3) despite her

performance, she was subject to an adverse employment

action; and (4) Sears treated similarly situated em-
No. 07-2656 15

ployees outside of her protected class more favorably. See

id.; Ptasznik, 464 F.3d at 696. Assuming that Faas can

successfully lay out a prima facie case, the burden then

shifts to Sears to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its decision to terminate her employment. See

Barricks, 481 F.3d at 559; Ptasznik, 464 F.3d at 696. Once

Sears meets this minimal threshold, Faas may attack Sears’s

proffered reason as mere pretext for discrimination. See

Barricks, 481 F.3d at 559; Ptasznik, 464 F.3d at 696.

Where a plaintiff claims, as Faas does, that an employer’s

legitimate expectations were disparately applied, the

second and fourth elements of the prima facie case are

closely intertwined with the pretext analysis, and the two

inquiries may be merged and considered together. See, e.g.,

Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1064 n.8 (7th Cir. 2003);

Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 329 (7th Cir.

2002); Curry v. Menard, 270 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2001); see

also Hague v. Thompson Distribution Co., 436 F.3d 816, 823

(7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]f the plaintiffs argue that they have

performed satisfactorily and the employer is lying about

the business expectations required for the position, the

second prong and the pretext question seemingly merge

because the issue is the same—whether the employer is

lying.”). We will therefore analyze whether Faas presented

sufficient evidence of pretext because without such evidence, Faas cannot show that she was meeting Sears’s

legitimate expectations. See Hague, 436 F.3d at 823.

“Pretext ‘means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than

an oddity or an error.’ ” Id. (quoting Kulumani v. Blue Cross

Blue Shield Ass’n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000)); see

also Hudson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552, 561 (7th

Cir. 2004) (“Pretext is more than a mistake on the part of

the employer; it is a phony excuse.”). “Showing pretext
16 No. 07-2656

requires ‘[p]roof that the defendant’s explanation is

unworthy of credence.’ ” Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi.,

526 F.3d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Reeves, 530

U.S. at 147).

Sears explained that it terminated Faas because of her

consistently poor performance and for poorly executing

two key marketing events. Faas does not dispute that

she had a track record of sub-par leadership and customer service in the larger stores. And Faas’s managerial

insufficiencies are well documented—the Performance

Plans for Improvement, the deposition testimony of

Carges, and even Faas’s own admissions indicate that

Faas was a less-than-exemplary store general manager. Yet

Faas insists that Sears is lying when it claims that she

was terminated for her poor performance and for

botching the promotional events because Sears disparately

applied its performance expectations—younger store

managers with similar performance problems were

given a chance to improve, while older store managers

were disciplined and terminated.

Faas’s disparate treatment argument is untenable because she has not come forward with evidence that the

store general managers who escaped reprimand shared

a “ ‘comparable set of failings’ ” with her. Burks v. Wis.

Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir.

2003). Faas had a long history of poor customer service

(characterized at one point as “substandard”) and of an

inability to motivate her team (epitomized by the dissension among her assistant store managers after Faas allegedly chastised her team at a meeting in March 2004). Faas’s

extensive record of poor management without improvement dated back to Poss’s tenure as district general man-
No. 07-2656 17

ager, and Faas concedes that Poss, who harbored the same

concerns about Faas’s management that Carges later

observed, was unbiased. Faas also mismanaged two

major marketing initiatives. Perhaps most importantly,

Faas had the lowest balanced-scorecard rating in her

district. This idiosyncratic “set of failings” distinguishes

Faas from the other managers supervised by Carges, and

we cannot say that any of the other store general managers

were similarly situated to Faas. See Burks, 464 F.3d at 751;

Haywood, 323 F.3d at 530.

Even if we thought that the other store general managers were similarly situated to Faas, other facts in the

record belie Faas’s conclusion that Carges disparately

applied Sears’s disciplinary procedures in a discriminatory manner. When Carges initially evaluated the

twelve store general managers in the Chicago South

District, she believed that two—Morris and Allen—were

adequately performing their jobs. Significantly, both

Morris and Allen were several years older than Faas.

Indeed, Morris and Allen were two of the four oldest

store managers in the district. A pattern where the

protected-class members “sometimes do better” and

“sometimes do worse” than their comparators is not

evidence of age discrimination. Cf. Bush v. Commonwealth

Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Such a

pattern, in which blacks sometimes do better than whites

and sometimes do worse, being random with respect

to race, is not evidence of racial discrimination.”).

Of the ten underperforming store general managers,

Carges chose to discipline three—Faas, Johnson, and

Spencer—by placing them on Performance Plans for

Improvement. Faas was the low manager on the balancedscorecard totem pole, and Johnson and Spencer had the
18 No. 07-2656

third and fourth lowest balanced-scorecard ratings,

respectively. The manager with the second-lowest rating,

Kraatz, was not disciplined; but Kraatz had been at his

store for less than a year when Carges became district

general manager, and Kraatz had started the year

with strong balanced-scorecard ratings before struggling.

Carges eventually placed Kraatz on a Performance Plan

after Faas was terminated. Moreover, Kraatz is less than

four years younger than Faas—not a significant enough

disparity in age to present a prima face case under the

ADEA without further proof. See Bennington v. Caterpillar

Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (five year age difference is not significant); Hartley v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d

887, 892 (7th Cir. 1997) (seven year age difference is not

significant).

So Carges—faced with the daunting task of improving

ten of her twelve store managers—prioritized three of

the worst four. Carges selected whom to discipline using

an objective metric, the balanced-scorecard ratings, and

Faas makes no argument that Sears improperly used age

in calculating those ratings. Moreover, Carges’s decision

to discipline her worst-performing manager, Faas, seems

even more justified considering Faas’s habitual failures,

and considering that Carges believed the Fox Valley

store to be key to her plan to revitalize the Chicago

South District. And Carges’s decision to wait to discipline Kraatz given his inexperience and strong start

also appears quite legitimate. In light of the fact that

Carges had only limited time to manage many stores,

her decision to focus on the measurably least-competent

managers (with one justifiable exception) does not strike

us as pretext, it strikes us as wise.

Faas makes one additional argument that she claims

established a genuine issue of material fact with respect
No. 07-2656 19

to pretext: Faas contends that Carges’s refusal to place

all of the underperforming store general managers within the Chicago South District on Performance Plans for

Improvement contravened Sears’s “policy” of treating

performance problems in a consistent manner. See Rudin

v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 727 (7th Cir.

2005) (“This court has held in the past that an employer’s

failure to follow its own internal employment procedures

can constitute evidence of pretext.” (citing Giacoletto v.

Amax Zinc Co., Inc., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992))). Faas

claims that Sears had such a policy based on a statement

in a Sears guide that outlined the Performance Plan for

Improvement process for its managers: “the manager

must treat similar performance situations among associates in a consistent manner.”

However, Faas has taken this statement completely out

of context. The language directly before the above quotation refers to a manager’s discretion in determining how

to follow up during the Performance Plan for Improvement process, “[t]he manager . . . should use discretion to

determine the exact timing for each follow-up step, considering the severity of the issue at hand and the opportunity to observe changes in performance; however, the

manager must treat similar performance situations

among associates in a consistent manner.” In our view,

this language does not create a policy that Sears’s managers must discipline all underperforming subordinates;

rather, it limits the discretion of managers once they

choose to initiate the disciplinary process (i.e., the manager cannot be inconsistent in how she follows up with an

employee). The fact that Carges was given discretion by

Sunderland to select which store general managers to

focus on supports this reading. Nevertheless, even if we
20 No. 07-2656

were to view the language as creating a policy of treating

similar performance situations consistently, we have

already explained how Faas’s performance deviated from

that of the other store general managers. Carges’s actions

did not clearly violate such a policy.

We cannot say that Carges or Sears is lying when they

claim to have disciplined and discharged Faas for her

inability to manage the Fox Valley store. Hague, 436 F.3d

at 823; Kulumani, 224 F.3d at 685. The district court correctly held that Faas did not raise a genuine issue of

material fact on her ADEA claim under the indirect method of proof.

B. The district court’s denial of an adverse inference for Sears’s

document destruction

Finally, we turn to Faas’s contention that she was entitled to an inference that Sears’s Leadership Overviews

contained discriminatory content. In order to draw an

inference that the Leadership Overviews contained information adverse to Sears, we must find that Sears

intentionally destroyed the documents in bad faith. See

Park, 297 F.3d at 615; see also Rummery v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co.,

250 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2001); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.

v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 695 F.2d 253, 258-59

(7th Cir. 1982). “Thus, ‘[t]he crucial element is not that

evidence was destroyed but rather the reason for the

destruction.’ ” Park, 297 F.3d at 615 (quoting S.C. Johnson &

Son, Inc., 695 F.2d at 258). A document is destroyed in bad

faith if it is destroyed ” ‘for the purpose of hiding adverse

information.’ ” Rummery, 250 F.3d at 558 (quoting Mathis v.

John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998)).
No. 07-2656 21

Faas has failed to advance any evidence that Sears

destroyed the Leader Overviews in order to hide adverse

information. Rather, she claims that we should assume

as a matter of “common sense” that Sears shredded the

forms evasively. To the contrary, the record shows that

Sears shredded the Leadership Overviews as a regular

business practice in order to protect confidential information about its employees. And Sears’s legitimate motivation for shredding the documents is not transformed

into a disingenuous one merely because Deselits uttered

the word “age” (in addition to “salary”) when discussing

what kind of confidential information the Leadership

Overviews contained.

The district court also properly denied Faas an adverse

inference because the Leadership Overviews are not

relevant to Faas’s case. See Crabtree v. Nat’ l Steel Corp.,

261 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding district

court’s decision not to grant adverse inference where

irrelevant documents were destroyed); Coates v. Johnson &

Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (same). The

record shows that Sears did not use the Leadership Overviews when deciding whether to discipline or terminate

employees—the undisputed evidence in the record is

that the Leadership Overviews were merely a talent

assessment tool that allowed Sears to ascertain who

among its employees had the potential for a promotion.

Even still, Sears preserved, and produced, Faas’s personal Leadership Overviews. This disclosure is pertinent

because Faas had access to at least one of the Leadership

Overview forms, which should have revealed the “adverse

information” that Sears sought to hide by destroying

the Leadership Overviews. But Faas’s Leadership Overview did not contain any discriminatory material. The
22 No. 07-2656

word “blocker,” as Sears defined it, had nothing to do

with age, but with an employee’s potential for ascent

within the company. The form listed Faas’s age, but also

included other biographical data. The fact that Faas had

access to her own Leadership Overview and could not

articulate what adverse information it contained is proof

enough that Sears did not destroy the documents to hide

adverse information. Faas “has offered no evidence,

other than [her] own speculation, that they were destroyed to hide discriminatory information.” Rummery,

250 F.3d at 558. The document destruction therefore does

not raise any issue of material fact with respect to Faas’s

discrimination claim. See id. at 558-59.

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the entry of summary judgment in favor

of Sears.

USCA-02-C-0072—7-10-08