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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

DEBRA A. MANTEY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

July 21, 2015 

v No. 319673 

Saginaw Circuit Court 

Family Division 

DONALD E. MANTEY, LC No. 08-003051-DO 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and RIORDAN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Plaintiff, Debra A. Mantey, appeals as of right the amended judgment of divorce 

regarding the dissolution of her marriage with defendant, Donald E. Mantey. We reverse and 

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 This is the second appeal in this case and involves the dissolution of the parties’ 

marriage. They married in 1976 and plaintiff filed for divorce in 2008.1

 At the time of the 

marriage, plaintiff had a high school diploma and defendant had a bachelor’s degree in 

mechanical engineering. Defendant operated two farming business during the marriage, namely, 

Mantey Brothers and Ed Mantey & Sons. His taxable income in 2009 was $203,437. Plaintiff, 

on the other hand, worked only part-time during the marriage and never earned more than 

$12,000 a year. At the time plaintiff filed for divorce, she was 54 years old and defendant was 

59 years old. 

 In the previous appeal, plaintiff asserted error in the trial court’s property distribution and 

denial of spousal support. A panel of this Court concluded that several of the trial court’s 

findings of fact were clearly erroneous or insufficient for appellate review. Mantey v Mantey, 

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 15, 2013 (Docket No. 

309042), pp 4-5. The panel instructed that a remand was necessary to resolve issues regarding 

 

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 The parties’ children were no longer minors at the time plaintiff filed for divorce. 
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the value Mantey Hills property and the related legal questions of whether plaintiff’s interest was 

in the Mantey Hills partnership or in the partnership’s property. Id. at 4-5. It also ordered the 

trial court to make specific findings regarding the spousal support factors, and for the trial court 

to determine the issue of any spousal support arrearage. Id. at 7. 

 On remand, the trial court made additional findings, and ultimately denied plaintiff’s 

request for spousal support. However, the trial court failed to value certain assets as it was 

directed to do on remand. Plaintiff again appeals. 

II. SPOUSAL SUPPORT 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we apply the following standards of review: 

 It is within the trial court’s discretion to award spousal support, and we 

review a spousal support award for an abuse of discretion. We also review for an 

abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision whether to impute income to a party. 

An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the 

range of reasonable and principled outcomes. The object in awarding spousal 

support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties so that neither will be 

impoverished; spousal support is to be based on what is just and reasonable under 

the circumstances of the case. We review for clear error the trial court’s factual 

findings regarding spousal support. A finding is clearly erroneous if, after 

reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake was made. If the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, we must 

determine whether the dispositional ruling was fair and equitable under the 

circumstances of the case. We must affirm the trial court’s dispositional ruling 

unless we are convinced that it was inequitable. [Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich App 

21, 25-26; 826 NW2d 152 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).] 

Moreover, “[w]hether a trial court followed an appellate court’s ruling on remand is a 

question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Schumacher v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 

275 Mich App 121, 127; 737 NW2d 782 (2007). 

B. ANALYSIS 

The objective in awarding spousal support is to balance the income and needs of the 

parties, so that neither will be impoverished. Loutts, 298 Mich App at 26 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The trial court should award spousal support based on what is just and 

reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 726; 747 

NW2d 336 (2008). Among the factors the trial court should consider are: 

 (1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the 

marriage, (3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of 

property awarded to the parties, (5) the parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties 

to pay alimony, (7) the present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties, 
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(9) the parties’ health, (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether 

either is responsible for the support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to 

the joint estate, (12) a party’s fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of 

cohabitation on a party’s financial status, and (14) general principles of equity 

[Id. at 726-727.] 

 “The trial court should make specific factual findings regarding the factors that are relevant to 

the particular case.” Myland v Myland, 290 Mich App 691, 695; 804 NW2d 124 (2010) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Plaintiff first challenges the trial court’s finding regarding the length of the marriage. 

She concedes that calling it a “long term marriage” is not clearly erroneous, but contends that 

this finding was not definite enough. MCR 2.517(A)(2) provides that “[b]rief definite, and 

pertinent findings and conclusions on the contested matters are sufficient, without 

overelaboration of detail or particularization of facts.” In this case, the parties married in 1976 

and plaintiff filed for divorce in 2008. On remand, the trial court found that the parties had a 

“long term marriage.” This finding satisfies the requirements of MCR 2.517(A)(2) and is not 

clearly erroneous. 

 Next, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s finding that defendant had “some ability” to 

pay spousal support. Plaintiff contends that the trial court severely understated plaintiff’s needs 

and defendant’s ability to pay. Again, while the trial court’s finding may not have been the most 

specific, it was sufficient. Defendant had the ability to pay, which the court found. In the 2010 

tax year, plaintiff’s wages were $13,357, whereas defendant reported a taxable income of 

$203,437 in 2009. Mantey, unpub op at 1. Although the trial court used the modifier “some” 

when characterizing defendant’s ability to pay, that merely indicates an unspecified amount, not 

necessarily a minimization.2

 The court’s finding is definite enough within the meaning of MCR 

2.517(A)(2) and not clearly erroneous. The court also addressed the parties’ needs, finding that 

“[t]he division of the marital estate will provide for the needs of both parties.” 

 Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s finding that “[t]he fact that Plaintiff will receive 

$618,990.00 as her share of the marital estate (The original $536,490.00 plus $82,500.00 from 

the Court’s redetermination of her share of the value of the real estate), in addition to health 

insurance for 3 years, gives the Plaintiff ample resources.”3

 Plaintiff contends that the trial court 

ignored the fact that she had no housing, limited health insurance with a high deductible and copay, no income-producing assets, no retirement accounts, no viable employment prospects, and 

that she had to spend part of her award on attorney fees. 

 

2

 “Some” is defined as “being an undetermined or unspecified one;” “unspecified but 

considerable in number, amount, degree etc.;” “an unspecified number, amount, etc., as 

distinguished from the rest or in addition;” “to some degree or extent.” Random House 

Webster’s College Dictionary (2005). 

3

 Plaintiff asserts that the trial court used the wrong numbers; however, that issue is moot 

because the mathematical error was corrected in the judgment of divorce. 
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However, it is not clear that the court ignored these factors. The court’s findings do not 

indicate the extent of the considerations examined in reaching its finding. Even assuming that 

the court did not consider all of these factors, the award of over a half a million dollars in liquid 

assets and three years of health insurance certainly constitutes “ample” resources. The court’s 

finding is not clearly erroneous. 

 Plaintiff, however, also takes issue with the trial court’s finding regarding the parties’ 

contributions to the joint estate. The court found that the “vast majority of the marital estate was 

the result of the Defendant’s efforts or inheritance” and “contributions.” We again find no clear 

error. During the marriage, defendant operated two farming businesses: Mantey Brothers and Ed 

Mantey & Sons. Mantey, unpub op at 1. The parties’ health insurance was provided through Ed 

Mantey & Sons and the parties had a health savings account in conjunction with their insurance 

plan. Id. Defendant’s base salary in 2009 was $60,000 and he had a taxable income of 

$203,437. Id. He also owned farm parcels that were leased to Ed Mantey & Sons. Id. at 2. 

Defendant received a 1989 gift of 240 acres that he and his siblings deeded to the Mantey Hills 

partnership in 1996. Id. As for plaintiff, she testified that she mostly worked part-time and in 

the 2010 tax year, her wages were $13,357. Mantey, unpub op at 1. 

Thus, defendant earned the majority of the parties’ marital income and accumulated 

significant assets by virtue of gifts from his family. Although plaintiff contends that the trial 

court failed to recognize her contributions to the marital estate, we disagree. First, the trial court 

merely found that the vast majority of the contributions came from defendant. This finding 

implied that plaintiff at least contributed somewhat to the marital estate. Plaintiff obliquely 

references the fact that she took the primary role in raising the children and caring for the home. 

See Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 294; 527 NW2d 792 (1995). Yet, plaintiff 

highlights no evidence to support that assertion. “ ‘Facts stated must be supported by specific 

page references to the transcript, the pleadings, or other document or paper filed with the trial 

court.’ MCR 7.212(C)(7). We will not search the record for factual support for plaintiffs’ 

claims.” Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 388; 689 NW2d 145 (2004). 

Moreover, very little evidence was submitted regarding plaintiff’s precise role in 

contributing to the marital estate or in raising the children, most likely because custody was not 

at issue. Although plaintiff testified that she did not work when the children were younger, she 

provided no details regarding the parties’ roles and responsibilities in childcare or household 

services. In fact, rather than a stay-at-home mother, plaintiff asserted that she worked almost the 

entire time throughout the marriage, although it was primarily part-time and her financial 

contributions were relatively minor. Defendant testified that plaintiff “helped” to raise the 

children and that they both performed household activities such as cooking.4

 In light of 

plaintiff’s failure to highlight any evidence to the contrary, we find no clear error in the trial 

court’s finding. 

 

4

 To the extent that plaintiff may have introduced evidence to the contrary, she has not identified 

it on appeal. Derderian, 263 Mich App at 388. 
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Plaintiff, however, concludes that in light of the spousal support factors, the trial court’s 

ultimate decision to deny spousal support was an abuse of discretion. We review a trial court’s 

spousal support award for an abuse of discretion. Loutts, 298 Mich App at 25. Even if we find 

no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings, we still “must determine whether the 

dispositional ruling was fair and equitable under the circumstances of the case.” Id. at 26. 

Here, both parties received substantial assets, with plaintiff receiving over $600,000 in 

liquid assets and defendant receiving the marital home, two businesses, farm parcels, and his 

interest in the Mantey Hills partnership. On appeal, defendant contends that in light of the 

significant debt he accrued in order to pay for plaintiff’s cash award, the trial court’s decision to 

deny spousal support was correct. Plaintiff rejoins that defendant received the income-producing 

assets, whereas she received only a fixed amount. See Hanaway, 208 Mich App at 296 (in 

evaluating the equity of awarding spousal support, the trial court should be mindful that “where 

both parties are awarded substantial assets, the court . . . should focus on the income-earning 

potential of the assets” rather than myopically focus on “the value of the assets themselves.”). 

However, an impediment to our resolution of this issue is that the trial court failed to 

value all of the property, in direct violation of our previous opinion. In the first appeal, a panel 

of this Court directed as follows: 

 Donald Mantey argued that he successfully conveyed the interest, and that 

because the Mantey Hills partnership held the property with rights of 

survivorship, Debra Mantey only had a remote interest in the property. In 

contrast, Debra Mantey argued that because Donald Mantey’s attempt to convey 

his interest in the property to the Mantey Hills partnership in 1996 did not have 

her signature, the conveyance was invalid under the Michigan statute of frauds 

because she had an interest in the property. She also argued that, in the 

alternative, the Mantey Hills partnership itself had value. 

 If the trial court’s finding was meant to reject Debra Mantey’s argument 

that the conveyance was void because her dower interest in the property was 

speculative and contingent, then the trial court erred. Though a dower interest is a 

contingent interest that vests on the death of the husband, the law also protects the 

interest before it vests. “[T]he statue of frauds requires both the seller and his 

wife with a dower interest to sign a purchase agreement in order to create a valid 

contract for the sale of land.” Without further analysis, we are not definitely and 

firmly convinced that Debra Mantey’s dower interest in the property was too 

speculative and contingent to potentially void the transfer under the statute of 

frauds. 

 If the trial court’s finding was meant to accept Donald Mantey’s argument 

that Debra Mantey’s eventual interest in the partnership itself was speculative and 

contingent, we again conclude that the trial court erred. We reiterate that the trial 

court found that although some of the parties’ property was gifted, it was all 

marital property. The partnership agreement also provides that partnership 

interests themselves are valued at $160,000, which mathematically breaks down 

to a value of $40,000 for each partner. Thus, if Donald Mantey’s transfer of 
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property was valid, it appears that Debra Mantey has some interest in the 

partnership itself. The trial court should have determined a value for this disputed 

property. Thus, we conclude that the trial court made a mistake. 

 We reiterate that the trial court must make findings of fact “essential to a 

proper resolution of the legal questions” so that this Court can determine if the 

judgment was legally correct and equitable. We conclude that this portion of the 

trial court’s order requires clarification so that we can engage in meaningful 

appellate review. [Mantey, unpub at 4-5 (citations omitted).] 

We expressly commanded the trial court to “make a finding of fact on the value of the Mantey 

Hills partnership, and resolve the related legal questions about whether Debra Mantey’s interest 

is in the Mantey Hills partnership itself or the partnership’s property.” Id. at 6. 

 Rather than adhere to our ruling, the trial court declined to value Mantey Hills and merely 

found that the value of the Mantey Hills property did not matter because the property was gifted 

and plaintiff only made a de minimus contribution to the maintenance of the property during the 

marriage. Because the trial court failed to comply with this Court’s opinion, we again must 

remand. As the trial court failed to value the Mantey Hills partnership or resolve the related 

legal question of whether plaintiff’s interest is in the partnership or property, the precise nature 

and amount of assets awarded to the parties remains unclear. Without the trial court’s complete 

and final findings, we are unable to determine whether the denial of spousal support was 

inequitable.5

 Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court ignored this Court’s directive to make findings of 

fact and a determination on the merits of the arrearage issue. We previously directed as follows: 

 Debra Mantey argues that the trial court erred when it failed to address 

whether Donald Mantey was in arrears on his spousal support. The record 

supports Debra Mantey’s assertions that (1) Donald Mantey was withholding 

$918 from spousal support for health insurance costs and (2) the trial court 

already considered this amount may [sic] when it awarded temporary spousal 

support. The record also supports Donald Mantey’s assertion that the trial court’s 

order may have required him to pay for Debra Mantey’s health insurance twice. 

On remand, the trial court shall making [sic] findings of fact and a determination 

on the merits of this issue. [Mantey, unpub op at 7.] 

 

5

 Defendant claims that in the prior appeal, this Court mistakenly interpreted the trial court to 

have ruled that all property was marital property. However, defendant fails to engage in any 

analysis regarding law of the case. “Insufficiently briefed issues are deemed abandoned on 

appeal.” Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Builders & Constr Managers, 

LLC, 282 Mich App 410, 413; 766 NW2d 874 (2009). Further, on remand, the trial court never 

specifically found that, contrary to this Court’s statements, Mantey Hills was separate property. 
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Because the trial court did not even address this issue, we agree with plaintiff that the court again 

inexplicably failed to follow the remand order. Thus, we again remand for the trial court to 

address this issue.6

 

 To be clear, the trial court must resolve the spousal support arrearage issue. It also must 

“make a finding of fact on the value of the Mantey Hills partnership, and resolve the related legal 

questions about whether Debra Mantey’s interest is in the Mantey Hills partnership itself or the 

partnership’s property[,]” Mantey, unpub at 6, and consider what effect this may have on 

equitable considerations. 

III. REMAND TO DIFFERENT JUDGE 

 Plaintiff also requests that we remand this case to a different trial court judge. “We may 

remand to a different judge if the original judge would have difficulty in putting aside previously 

expressed views or findings, if reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, 

and if reassignment will not entail excessive waste or duplication.” Bayati v Bayati, 264 Mich 

App 595, 602-603; 691 NW2d 812 (2004). 

However, “[w]e have carefully reviewed the record and have found no evidence that the 

trial court harbors a bias against [plaintiff] or that it would be unable to put aside previously 

expressed views or findings.” Kaeb v Kaeb, __Mich App__; __NW2d__ (Docket No. 319574, 

issued March 12, 2015); slip op at 9. Plaintiff highlights the trial court’s statement on remand 

that the parties were to submit further briefing and the court would “doctor up” the rest. While 

perhaps a poor choice of words, we detect no bias in this statement. The trial court was merely 

communicating that it would make findings regarding any issues left unanswered. Nor is the fact 

that the trial court may have incorrectly interpreted or understood our remand order a sufficient 

basis for remanding to a different judge in this case. The fact that a judge came to a wrong legal 

conclusion is not a sufficient basis to assign the case to a different judge. Bayati, 264 Mich App 

at 603. Further, at this point in the proceedings, remanding to a different judge would require a 

significant expenditure of resources and entail excessive waste. Id. at 602-604.7

IV. CONCLUSION 

 We again reverse the trial court’s judgment. On remand, the trial court must: (1) 

determine if there is and the amount of a spousal support arrearage; and (2) make a finding 

regarding the value of the Mantey Hills partnership, and resolve the related legal questions about 

whether Debra Mantey’s interest is in the Mantey Hills partnership itself or the partnership’s 

 

6

 Defendant claims that because the trial court referenced that this issue was “preserved” in the 

amended judgment of divorce, it somehow is not properly before us. However, we clearly 

instructed the trial court to decide this issue, not cast it aside. 

7

 Nor do we find it necessary under MCR 7.216 to invade the trial court’s role and make findings 

of fact. 
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property. After determining these issues, the trial court may reexamine equitable considerations 

to determine whether a spousal support award is justified. 

We have reviewed all further issues and find them to be without merit. We reverse and 

remand. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan