IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No.259A19

Filed 3 April 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: C.J.C.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 4 April 

2019 by Judge Wesley W. Barkley in District Court, Burke County. This matter was 

calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 25 March 2020, but was 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

No brief for petitioner-appellee mother.

David A. Perez for respondent-appellant father.

MORGAN, Justice.

This appeal arises from a private termination of parental rights action between 

a child’s two parents. Respondent, the natural father of C.J.C. (Caleb),1 appeals from 

the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights to the child. We affirm

the determination of the trial court.

 

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity and to facilitate the ease of 

reading.
IN RE: C.J.C.

Opinion of the Court

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At the time of Caleb’s birth in September 2014, petitioner—Caleb’s mother—

and respondent were living together. They were not married. The parents ended their 

relationship in November 2015, after which Caleb resided with petitioner.

Following her separation from respondent, petitioner filed a custody action in 

District Court, Burke County. In an order entered on 21 March 2016, the trial court 

incorporated the terms of the parties’ Parenting Agreement, and in accordance with 

the agreement, granted primary physical and legal custody of Caleb to petitioner, 

with respondent exercising specific visitation rights. Respondent was ordered to pay 

child support in the sum of $50 per week in an order entered on 16 May 2016.

On 8 March 2017, petitioner and respondent entered into a Consent Order in 

which respondent was relieved of ongoing child support payments. Petitioner

continued to have primary legal and physical custody of Caleb, and respondent was 

granted visitation with Caleb “as the parties mutually agree.”

On 8 October 2018, petitioner filed a petition to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights on the grounds that Caleb was born out of wedlock, and that 

respondent failed to provide substantial financial support or consistent care with 

respect to Caleb and petitioner; and that respondent had willfully abandoned Caleb.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5)(d.), (7) (2019). Respondent filed an answer on 31 October 

2018, denying that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights.

After multiple continuances, the trial court held a hearing on the petition on 

21 March 2019. On 4 April 2019, the trial court entered an order concluding that 
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grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on willful 

abandonment and that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Caleb’s 

best interests2. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights.

Respondent appealed.

Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in failing to appoint a 

guardian ad litem (GAL) for Caleb. Respondent contends that while an attorney 

advocate was appointed in the matter, nonetheless, this attorney was not appointed 

in the capacity of GAL, and that the trial court’s failure to appoint a GAL in this case 

is prejudicial error requiring reversal. We reject respondent’s argument and conclude 

that the attorney at issue was appointed to serve as both GAL and attorney advocate 

for Caleb.

The record here contains the Administrative Office of the Courts Form AOCJ-207—“ORDER TO APPOINT OR RELEASE GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND 

ATTORNEY ADVOCATE”—filed on 11 December 2018. The preprinted portions of 

this form note that appointments which appear in the form are made pursuant to 

N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-6013 (abuse, neglect, and dependency petitions) and 7B-1108

 

2 The phrases “best interest” and “best interests” are utilized interchangeably by legal 

sources which are cited in this opinion. In order to harmonize the usage of this phrase 

throughout this opinion and in light of the lack of any substantive difference in the 

terminology, the phrase “best interests” will be employed, even if a quoted source used the 

alternative terminology.

3 Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-607, a GAL for the juvenile must be appointed in abuse 

and neglect cases and may be appointed in dependency matters. N.C.G.S. § 7B-601(a) (2017). 

The instant matter does not fall under section 7B-607.
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Opinion of the Court

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(termination of parental rights). In termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings, 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1108(b) requires the appointment of a GAL for the juvenile where a

respondent parent denies material allegations in the TPR petition. N.C.G.S. § 7B1108(b) (2017) (“If an answer or response denies any material allegation of the 

petition or motion, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the juvenile to 

represent the best interests of the juvenile . . . .”). In addition, this subsection provides 

that “[a] licensed attorney shall be appointed to assist those guardians ad litem who 

are not attorneys licensed to practice in North Carolina.” Id. § 7B-1108(b) (emphasis 

added). In other words, where a respondent parent files an answer denying material 

allegations in the petition as Caleb’s father has done in the present case, the trial 

court (1) must appoint a GAL for the juvenile, and (2) must appoint a licensed 

attorney (or “attorney advocate”) if the appointed GAL is not an attorney licensed to 

practice in this state. In conformance with these statutory provisions, there are 

sections on Form AOC-J-207 to designate a GAL and to designate an attorney 

advocate. In the space where an attorney advocate’s name is to appear, there is a box 

to be checked if “Attorney Advocate is also acting as Guardian ad Litem.”

In the instant case, the information entered on the Form AOC-J-207 displays 

the name “Steve Cheuvront” in the space to designate an “Attorney Advocate” and 

leaves blank the document’s section for a GAL. The district court judge who signed 

the form failed to check the box denoting that the designated attorney advocate 

Cheuvront was also acting as the guardian ad litem. However, a review of the other 
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documents and transcripts in the record on appeal plainly indicates that this failure

of the district court judge to check the GAL box was merely a clerical error, not a 

prejudicial substantive or procedural error. See In re A.D.L., 169 N.C. App. 701, 707, 

612 S.E.2d 639, 643 (stating that where “the [GAL] carried out her respective duties, 

failure of the record to disclose [GAL] appointment papers does not necessitate 

reversal of the district court’s decision”), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 852, 619 S.E.2d 

402 (2005). For example, Cheuvront is referred to as “the Guardian ad Litem,” both 

in the written adjudication and disposition order, as well as on the cover page of both

the hearing and trial transcripts. The transcript contains an exchange on 13 

December 2018 between the trial court and respondent’s trial counsel during which 

counsel explained the need to continue a hearing because “Mr. Cheuvront was 

appointed as guardian ad litem yesterday.” On 10 January 2019, the transcript shows 

that there was a discussion among the parties and the trial court about another 

continuance in which respondent’s trial counsel mentioned that “the guardian ad 

litem” had not yet been able to meet with him. 

At the hearing on the TPR petition when the trial court called the matter on 

21 March 2019, it noted, “All parties are present. We have Mr. Cheuvront, who’s 

guardian ad litem in this matter. Anything before we begin the hearing from the

petitioner?” Neither respondent nor his counsel expressed any concerns or raised any

issues regarding Cheuvront’s role as GAL during the TPR hearing. After the parties 

presented their evidence, the trial court asked Cheuvront, “[a]s guardian ad litem in 
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this matter,” if Cheuvront had anything to add to assist the trial court in making its 

decision. Cheuvront then provided an account of his interactions with the parties and 

with Caleb. Again, neither respondent nor his trial counsel registered any question 

or matter about Cheuvront’s role as GAL in the case. It is clear from the record and 

transcript that the trial court did, in fact, appoint Cheuvront as GAL for Caleb. 

Respondent’s contention to the contrary, based on an apparent clerical error, is 

without merit.

Respondent also contends that Cheuvront did not fulfill the duties of a GAL

because Cheuvront failed to “offer evidence and examine witnesses at adjudication” 

and “explore options with the court at the dispositional hearing.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-601 

(2019). Section 7B-601(a) of our General Statutes provides that 

[t]he duties of the guardian ad litem program shall be to 

make an investigation to determine the facts, the needs of 

the juvenile, and the available resources within the family 

and community to meet those needs; to facilitate, when 

appropriate, the settlement of disputed issues; to offer 

evidence and examine witnesses at adjudication; to explore 

options with the court at the dispositional hearing; to 

conduct follow-up investigations to insure that the orders 

of the court are being properly executed; to report to the 

court when the needs of the juvenile are not being met; and 

to protect and promote the best interests of the juvenile 

until formally relieved of the responsibility by the court.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-601(a). “[I]f the GAL is an attorney, that person can perform the duties 

of both the GAL and the attorney advocate.” In re J.H.K., 365 N.C. 171, 175, 711 

S.E.2d 118, 120 (2011). Here, Cheuvront investigated the case prior to the 
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termination hearing by contacting the parties, visiting the child Caleb at petitioner’s 

home, and going to petitioner’s workplace. As noted above, Cheuvront reported his 

observations to the trial court at the TPR hearing. Cheuvront competently fulfilled 

his role as guardian ad litem—a status which was unquestioned and unchallenged 

upon repeated references to Cheuvront’s role in this regard—and the trial court’s 

clerical oversight in its execution of Form AOC-J-207 regarding its failure to check 

the GAL designation box for the person whom it properly designated on the same 

form to serve as Attorney Advocate was not prejudicial error. Consequently, we are 

not persuaded by this argument.

In his second contention, respondent asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion by concluding that it would be in Caleb’s best interests to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights. Specifically, respondent claims that the trial court 

failed to make sufficient findings regarding the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B1110(a) and did not properly balance those factors. 

Once the trial court finds that at least one ground exists to terminate parental 

rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it proceeds to the dispositional stage where 

it must “determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best 

interest[s]” based on the following factors:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 
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the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 

juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 

the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or 

other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).

“The district court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interest at the dispositional 

stage is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion results where the 

court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not 

have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 199, 835 

S.E.2d 417, 423 (2019) (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact in determining that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Caleb’s best interests:

1. That the [c]ourt has the authority to terminate the 

parental rights of the Respondent pursuant to the findings 

of fact and conclusions of law. As to best interests, the 

[c]ourt has previously found grounds for termination exist

and as to this portion, the [c]ourt has considered all those 

factors that are under the statute, particularly focusing on 

the age of [Caleb] . . . [who is] 41⁄2 years old. He’s been in 

one family care unit his entire life, with that particularly 

being with the mother. For the last two years he’s only 

known one parent caretaker, that being the 

Petitioner/mother. As found with grounds, the 

Respondent/father has been minimally involved even prior 

to the filing of this Petition. Therefore, he essentially has 

no bond at all with the child. If there is a bond it is very 
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tenuous, particularly the fact that he’s had no contact with 

the child directly since 2017. He’s also provided, as 

indicated, no maintenance, love, support, affection. He’s 

made a couple of contacts with the mother.

2. Certainly the [c]ourt does find that the family of the 

father is concerned for the child and does show some 

genuine care for the child. However, essentially the [c]ourt 

is looking at the child’s best interest[s] in regards to the 

father and his situation and, while [respondent’s attorney] 

does make a point that termination essentially doesn’t 

change what’s happening as we sit here today, the [c]ourt 

is going to find that it’s in the best interest[s] due to the 

fact that this young child does need some consistency and 

needs to as the statute requires develop a bond of 

significance. I agree that we are not in a position to 

anticipate adoption given where we are right now; 

however, the lack of any bond with the father, the young 

age of the child, and the fact that a termination of parental 

rights would assist in achieving a consistency along with 

the factors that were found in the adjudication, the [c]ourt 

will grant the order of termination and find that 

termination of the Respondent’s rights are in [Caleb’s] best 

interests.

Respondent has not challenged these findings, and therefore, they are binding 

on appeal. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831 S.E.2d 49, 54 (2019) (citing Koufman 

v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)). On the other hand, 

respondent argues that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings regarding the 

factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Specifically, he contends that the trial court 

failed to make findings addressing petitioner’s relationship with her boyfriend,

Clayton Dennis4, and the quality of Caleb’s relationship with petitioner’s boyfriend.

 

4 A pseudonym is again employed to protect the juvenile’s identity due to the 
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Although the trial court must consider all of the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B1110(a), it “is only required to make written findings regarding those factors that are 

relevant.” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 199, 835 S.E.2d at 424. “[A] factor is relevant if 

there is conflicting evidence concerning the factor, such that it is placed in issue by 

virtue of the evidence presented before the [district] court[.]” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) (second and third alteration in original).

There was no conflict in the evidence regarding either petitioner’s or Caleb’s 

relationship with Clayton Dennis that would require the trial court to make specific

findings. Both petitioner and Dennis testified that although they were not engaged 

to be married at the time of the hearing, they had been dating for two years and 

planned to get married. Dennis testified that his relationship with Caleb was 

“awesome” and that Caleb “just wants to be around [him]”; petitioner testified that 

Caleb has benefitted from his relationship with Dennis. Both petitioner and Dennis

offered testimony that Dennis was like a father figure for Caleb and did “what a 

father figure should do.” Respondent reasons that if the plan was for Dennis to adopt 

Caleb in the future, then the trial court failed to make any findings regarding how 

termination of parental rights would aid such a plan. Aside from the fact that the 

private nature of this termination proceeding means that there is no permanent plan 

as that term is used in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(3), respondent acknowledges in his brief 

 

relationship of “Clayton Dennis” with the juvenile’s mother.
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that the trial court observed that it could not anticipate adoption at the time of the 

hearing, since petitioner and her boyfriend Dennis had not set a wedding date.

Consequently, the factor of petitioner’s relationship with Clayton Dennis was not 

sufficiently relevant to require the trial court to make findings concerning the impact 

of said relationship on termination of respondent’s parental rights or on the adoption 

of Caleb.

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court improperly balanced the factors

set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and abused its discretion in determining that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Caleb’s best interests. He deduces 

that since the trial court found that it was “not in a position to anticipate adoption 

given where we are right now[,]” it therefore implicitly found that there was not a 

likelihood of adoption in the future. Respondent further asserts that because Dennis

was not in a position to adopt Caleb, termination of respondent’s parental rights 

“accomplished nothing except to make another child fatherless[,]” and that 

termination “legally destroyed” valuable relationships with paternal family members 

without creating a new paternal relationship. In our view, the trial court’s findings 

demonstrate that it considered the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and 

determined that Caleb’s young age, the child’s lack of any bond with respondent, and 

the child’s need for consistency—combined with respondent’s lack of involvement 

with the child—supported a finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights 

was in Caleb’s best interests. Although the trial court found that it was “not in a 
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position to anticipate adoption[,]” this is only one factor which the trial court must 

consider. This factor becomes more relevant in a TPR case in which a child is in the 

custody of a Department of Social Services agency and termination of the parent’s 

rights leaves the child as a ward of the State. The present case, however, involves a 

private termination of parental rights initiated by the child’s mother, who had full 

custody of the child at the time of the TPR hearing. Therefore, the likelihood of Caleb’s 

potential adoption under this set of circumstances is not a sufficiently relevant factor 

as respondent depicts it in determining whether termination of respondent’s parental 

rights was in Caleb’s best interests.

Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court is satisfied that the trial court’s 

conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Caleb’s best

interests was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported by reason. Therefore, we

affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.