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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

FOR PUBLICATION

June 26, 2018

9:05 a.m.

v No. 330215

Muskegon Circuit Court

ANTONIO WANYA CRAWFORD, LC No. 14-065291-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

ON REMAND

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and MURPHY and METER, JJ.

MURPHY, J. 

Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and 

sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 91⁄2 to 32 years. Defendant appealed as of right, and this 

panel affirmed his convictions and sentences. People v Crawford, unpublished per curiam 

opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 16, 2017 (Docket No. 330215). In lieu of granting 

leave to appeal, our Supreme Court vacated solely that part of our judgment which held that 

other-acts evidence of a prior robbery was properly admitted to show intent. People v Crawford, 

906 NW2d 789 (2018). The Supreme Court directed us to reconsider, under People v Denson, 

500 Mich 385; 902 NW2d 306 (2017), “whether the other-acts evidence was relevant to show the 

necessary intent for armed robbery and not merely propensity for wrongdoing.” Crawford, 906 

NW2d 789. Leave to appeal was denied in all other respects. Id. We hold that evidence of the 

2011 robbery served the proper purpose of showing “intent,” MRE 404(b)(1), that it was 

logically relevant, MRE 401 and MRE 402, and that the probative value of the evidence was not 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, MRE 403. See Denson, 500 Mich at

398, quoting People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993). Moreover, 

assuming error, it was harmless. MCL 769.26; People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 

NW2d 607 (1999). Accordingly, we once again affirm. 

We begin our discussion with the pertinent testimony elicited by the prosecution at trial. 

Jaeden Kammers posted on his Facebook page that he had a video game for sale. Kammers and 

a friend, Daniel Ribon, later rode their bikes to Hackley Hospital because it had wireless Internet 

service and they wished to send a message about the game to a friend, Jainautica Watkins, who 

was attending a graduation party. From the hospital, a message was sent by Kammers, and 

Watkins responded using his cell phone, indicating that he was interested in purchasing the video 
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game. Watkins allowed defendant, who was also present at the graduation party, to use his cell 

phone to check Facebook. Defendant, using Watkins’s cell phone, began communicating with 

Kammers. Defendant learned about the video game and the presence of Kammers at Hackley 

Hospital. He then left the graduation party, telling Watkins, “I’m gonna go get that game.” 

Defendant went to the hospital, meeting Kammers and Ribon at that location. Defendant, who 

was unknown to both Kammers and Ribon, falsely identified himself, giving the name of a 

personal rival. Defendant indicated a desire to purchase the game but claimed that he first 

needed to break a couple of twenty dollar bills. He supposedly was unsuccessful in doing so at 

the hospital. Defendant next informed Kammers and Ribon that he could get change at his 

house, and the three of them biked to a house. Defendant did not go inside the home, and he

engaged Kammers and Ribon in friendly conversation outside the house. Kammers and Ribon

allowed defendant to examine the video game and their cell phones after defendant suggested the

possibility of trading phones. With the game and phones in hand, defendant began walking

toward the house, leading Kammers and Ribon to believe that he was going to get money inside. 

Defendant instead started to run away, and upon an attempt by Kammers and Ribon to stop him, 

defendant pointed a gun at the pair, asking whether they were “tryin’ to do something.”

On the day before the trial began, defendant, who had earlier told the police that he had 

an alibi, provided a new statement to the police, indicating that defendant had been at the

graduation party on the day of the offense, that he left the party after about 30 minutes, that he 

walked to nearby Hackley Hospital to use a bathroom, that he inadvertently bumped into 

Kammers and Ribon at the hospital, with the two making a request to purchase drugs from 

defendant, and that defendant refused to sell them any drugs. Defendant further asserted that 

Kammers and Ribon then pulled out a video game and asked him whether he was interested in 

buying it, and that defendant looked at the game, but then returned it to them, declining to 

purchase the game because he did not have the required gaming system. Defendant additionally 

claimed that, upon request, he allowed Kammers and Ribon to look at defendant’s cell phone, 

that they returned his phone to defendant, and that defendant then left. Defendant’s statement 

effectively constituted a claim that he went to the hospital with innocent intent, lacking any plan 

or intent to rob Kammers and Ribon, and that he indeed did not rob them. 

With respect to the other-acts evidence, the 2011 robbery committed by defendant 

entailed defendant walking behind the 15-year-old victim, suddenly attacking the teenager from 

the rear, physically assaulting him, and then stealing the victim’s MP3 player and headphones. 

The prosecutor successfully argued in favor of the introduction of the other-acts evidence, 

maintaining, in part, that it was admissible to show intent and motive, especially in light of 

defendant’s most recent statement that he had an innocent interaction with Kammers and Ribon 

at Hackley Hospital. 

We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit evidence. Denson, 

500 Mich at 396. “However, whether a rule or statute precludes admission of evidence is a 

preliminary question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Id. When a trial court admits 

evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law, the court necessarily abuses its discretion. Id. 

MCL 750.529, Michigan’s armed robbery statute, sets forth the nature of the crime, 

providing, in pertinent part, as follows:
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A person who engages in conduct proscribed under section 530 and who 

in the course of engaging in that conduct, possesses a dangerous weapon or an 

article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person present to reasonably 

believe the article is a dangerous weapon, or who represents orally or otherwise 

that he or she is in possession of a dangerous weapon, is guilty of a felony 

punishable by imprisonment for life or for any term of years.

As indicated in this statutory language, MCL 750.529 incorporates by reference MCL 

750.530, which is the general robbery statute, and which provides:

(1) A person who, in the course of committing a larceny of any money or 

other property that may be the subject of larceny, uses force or violence against 

any person who is present, or who assaults or puts the person in fear, is guilty of a 

felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years.

(2) As used in this section, “in the course of committing a larceny” 

includes acts that occur in an attempt to commit the larceny, or during 

commission of the larceny, or in flight or attempted flight after the commission of 

the larceny, or in an attempt to retain possession of the property.

Armed robbery is a specific intent crime, requiring proof that the defendant intended to 

permanently deprive the owner of his or her property. People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 

177-178, 178 n 2; 804 NW2d 757 (2010); People v Williams, 288 Mich App 67, 72 n 3, 76; 792 

NW2d 384 (2010), aff’d 491 Mich 164 (2011); People v Lee, 243 Mich App 163, 168; 622 

NW2d 71 (2000); People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 344; 584 NW2d 336 (1998); People v 

King, 210 Mich App 425, 428; 534 NW2d 534 (1995); M Crim JI 18.1 (setting forth the 

elements of armed robbery and defining the “larceny” component as the “taking and movement 

of someone else’s property or money with the intent to take it away from that person 

permanently”). Accordingly, the prosecutor in the instant case was required to establish beyond 

a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to permanently deprive the two victims of their 

property. 

MRE 404(b)(1) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, 

or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the 

conduct at issue in the case. [Emphasis added.]

In Denson, our Supreme Court examined MRE 404(b) in the context of other-acts 

evidence that was admitted on the basis of similarity and for the purpose of rebutting the 

defendant’s claims of self-defense and defense of others. The Court reviewed the test for 

admitting other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b), citing the VanderVliet factors. Denson, 500 

Mich at 398. With respect to the first prong, the Denson Court stated:
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Under the first prong of the VanderVliet test, the question is whether the 

prosecution has articulated a proper noncharacter purpose for admission of the 

other-acts evidence. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing that 

purpose. MRE 404(b) prohibits the admission of other-acts evidence when the 

prosecution's only theory of relevance is that the other act demonstrates the 

defendant's inclination for wrongdoing in general and thus indicates that the 

defendant committed the conduct in question. On the other hand, such other-acts 

evidence may be admissible whenever it is also relevant to a noncharacter 

purpose, such as one of the purposes specifically enumerated in MRE 404(b)(1).

* * *

[W]e have warned that a common pitfall in MRE 404(b) cases is that trial 

courts tend to admit other-acts evidence merely because the proponent has 

articulated a permissible purpose. The “mechanical recitation” of a permissible 

purpose, without explaining how the evidence relates to the recited purpose, is 

insufficient to justify admission under MRE 404(b). It is incumbent on a trial 

court to vigilantly weed out character evidence that is disguised as something 

else. In other words, merely reciting a proper purpose does not actually 

demonstrate the existence of a proper purpose for the particular other-acts 

evidence at issue and does not automatically render the evidence admissible. 

Rather, in order to determine whether an articulated purpose is, in fact, merely a 

front for the improper admission of other-acts evidence, the trial court must 

closely scrutinize the logical relevance of the evidence under the second prong of 

the VanderVliet test. [Denson, 500 Mich at 398-400 (citations, quotation marks, 

and alteration brackets omitted).]

The second prong of the VanderVliet test – logical relevance – implicates MRE 401 and 

MRE 402 and is the “touchstone” relative to the admissibility of other-acts evidence. Denson, 

500 Mich at 400-401.1 “Other-acts evidence is logically relevant if two components are present: 

materiality and probative value.” Id. at 401. Concerning “materiality,” it requires other-acts 

evidence to be related to a fact that is of consequence in the case, meaning that the fact sought to 

be proven must truly be at issue. Id. In relation to materiality, the Denson Court noted that the 

 1 MRE 401 and MRE 402 provide, respectively, as follows:

“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [MRE 

401.]

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 

Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these 

rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not 

relevant is not admissible. [MRE 402.]
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prosecution has the burden to prove all of the elements of a charged crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. With respect to probative value, the Supreme Court explained:

The prosecution must demonstrate the probative value of the other-acts 

evidence. . . . . 

Evidence is probative if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence. Generally, the threshold is minimal: any 

tendency is sufficient probative force. In the context of prior acts evidence, 

however, MRE 404(b) stands as a sentinel at the gate: the proffered evidence truly 

must be probative of something other than the defendant's propensity to commit 

the crime. Thus, although the prosecution might claim a permissible purpose for 

the evidence under MRE 404(b), the prosecution must also explain how the 

evidence is relevant to that purpose without relying on a propensity inference.

Ultimately, the court must determine whether the prosecution has established 

some intermediate inference, other than the improper inference of character, 

which in turn is probative of the ultimate issues in the case. If not, the evidence is 

inadmissible.

In evaluating whether the prosecution has provided an intermediate 

inference other than an impermissible character inference, we examine the 

similarity between a defendant's other act and the charged offense. In this case, 

we note that the prosecution sought to admit the other-acts 

evidence particularly based on the alleged similarities between the 2002 incident 

and the charged offense. The degree of similarity that is required between a 

defendant's other act and the charged offense depends on the manner in which the 

prosecution intends to use the other-acts evidence. [Id. at 401-403 (citations, 

quotation marks, ellipsis, and alteration brackets omitted).]

We note that “[w]hen other acts are offered to show intent, logical relevance dictates only 

that the charged crime and the proffered other acts are of the same general category.” 

VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 79-80 (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted). “The level of 

similarity required when disproving innocent intent is less than when proving modus operandi.” 

Id. at 80 n 36; see also People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 622; 790 NW2d 607 (2010).

The third prong of the VanderVliet test provides that the probative value of the other-acts 

evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Denson, 500 

Mich at 398. The Denson Court did not find it necessary to construe and discuss this prong 

because it concluded that the other-acts evidence was inadmissible where it was not logically 

relevant to a permissible purpose. Id. at 409 n 13. The third prong simply requires the trial court 

to “employ the balancing process under [MRE] 403.” VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 74-75. MRE 

403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
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issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 

or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

The fourth and final VanderVliet prong states that “the trial court, upon request, may 

provide a limiting instruction under [MRE] 105.” VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 75; see also Denson, 

500 Mich at 398.

Here, the evidence suggests that defendant’s plan was to engage Kammers and Ribon in 

an unthreatening manner and with friendly banter, all as part of a ruse to have the unsuspecting 

pair lower their guards, which obviously occurred when Kammers and Ribon voluntarily handed 

the game and their cell phones to defendant. Indeed, Kammers and Ribon were not even 

concerned when defendant initially began to walk away from them with their property. 

Subterfuge and deception were revealed when defendant provided Kammers and Ribon with a 

false name at the hospital. Under these circumstances, we believe that the crime first began 

unfolding when defendant met Kammers and Ribon at Hackley Hospital. Thus, defendant’s 

conduct and interactions with the victims associated with events at Hackley Hospital, placing 

Kammers and Ribon at ease and making them susceptible to robbery, can be viewed as occurring 

in the course of committing a larceny or during the commission of a larceny, even though the 

period was somewhat protracted. MCL 750.529; MCL 750.530. 

Regardless, as indicated earlier, the prosecution was required to prove that defendant 

acted with the intent to permanently deprive Kammers and Ribon of their property, i.e., that 

defendant intended to rob them or steal from them. As part of attempting to satisfy that burden 

of proof, the prosecution was certainly entitled to present evidence showing that defendant had 

formed the requisite intent to steal as early as the graduation party when he was using Watkins’s 

cell phone. Importantly, the prosecutor was not limited to proving intent solely by way of 

evidence pertaining to the immediate point in time when defendant walked off with the cell 

phones and video game.2 The intent to commit a crime can be developed or exist long before an 

offense is actually committed. Thus, for example, if there is testimony that a perpetrator was 

overheard stating an intent to kill a particular person and that person was murdered a week later, 

the testimony can be used to establish an intent to kill in a murder prosecution, with the 

testimony being critical on the issue of intent despite the lapse of time between the perpetrator’s 

statement and the killing. In the instant case, there was evidence that defendant told Watkins at 

the graduation party that he was leaving in order to “go get that game” and that defendant was 

just stringing Kammers and Ribon along while at the hospital, using a false identity. On the 

other hand, in defendant’s statement given to police right before trial, defendant claimed that he 

went to the hospital simply to use a bathroom and coincidentally ran into Kammers and Ribon. 

Stated otherwise, defendant asserted a completely innocent intent in going to Hackley Hospital. 

In light of this conflicting evidence, we conclude, as to the first prong of the VanderVliet test,

that admission of the other-acts evidence served the proper purpose of showing defendant’s 

“intent,” MRE 404(b)(1), even if it was developed earlier than when he and the victims were at 

the house.

 2 We note that $5 was also taken by defendant.
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With respect to logical relevance, the second VanderVliet prong, the evidence of the 2011 

robbery committed by defendant was material to a fact that was of consequence at trial, i.e., 

defendant’s intent to permanently deprive the victims of their property, which is an element of 

the crime of armed robbery. Denson, 500 Mich at 401; Harverson, 291 Mich App at 177-178, 

178 n 2. The second component of logical relevance – probative value – requires an assessment, 

in the context of this case, whether the 2011 robbery made it more probable than without the 

evidence that defendant acted with the necessary intent to steal. Denson, 500 Mich at 401-402. 

We conclude that the prosecutor established the proper intermediate inference of “intent” arising 

from the other-acts evidence, and not the improper inference of character or propensity to 

commit the crime. Id. at 402. As indicated earlier, the Denson Court explained that “[i]n 

evaluating whether the prosecution has provided an intermediate inference other than an 

impermissible character inference, we examine the similarity between a defendant's other act and 

the charged offense[,]” with the required degree of similarity being dependent “on the manner in 

which the prosecution intends to use the other-acts evidence.” Id. at 402-403. And, as also 

mentioned above, “[w]hen other acts are offered to show intent, logical relevance dictates only 

that the charged crime and the proffered other acts are of the same general category.” 

VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 79-80 (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted). 

Both offenses involved the robbery of electronic devices or personal property associated 

with electronic devices; an MP3 player and headphones in the 2011 robbery and a video game 

and cell phones in the instant prosecution. Also, both crimes involved teenage victims. 

Although different in character, both robberies involved the element of surprise, with defendant 

suddenly and unexpectedly pouncing on the victim from behind in the 2011 robbery and, here, 

defendant lulling Kammers and Ribon into a false sense of security before suddenly and 

unexpectedly walking off with their property. We recognize that there are also differences 

between the two offenses, where the 2011 robbery entailed an actual physical assault and battery 

and the instant offense did not, and where a gun was displayed in the charged offense but not in 

connection with the 2011 robbery. That said, defendant used his cunning to avoid the need to 

physically assault and injure Kammers and Ribon, while still revealing an intent to employ 

violence if necessary when he flashed and pointed the gun at Kammers and Ribon. For purposes 

of establishing an intermediate inference of “intent,” we rule that the two offenses were 

sufficiently similar. In sum, with regard to probative value, the other-acts evidence pertaining to 

the 2011 robbery made it more probable than without the evidence that defendant acted with the 

requisite intent to permanently deprive Kammers and Ribon of their property.

Finally, we conclude, under the balancing test set forth in MRE 403, i.e., the third 

VanderVliet factor, that the probative value of the 2011 robbery on the issue of intent was not 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403 “does not prohibit 

prejudicial evidence; only evidence that is unfairly so.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 

582 NW2d 785 (1998). And “[e]vidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that 

marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” Id. “In 

other words, where a probability exists that evidence which is minimally damaging in logic will 

be weighed by the jurors substantially out of proportion to its logically damaging effect, a 

situation arises in which the danger of ‘prejudice’ exists.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75-76; 

537 NW2d 909 (1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “All evidence offered by the 

parties is ‘prejudicial’ to some extent, but the fear of prejudice does not generally render the 

evidence inadmissible.” Id. at 75. Unfairness might arise when the other-acts evidence injects 
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considerations extraneous to the merits of a case, e.g., a jury’s bias, shock, sympathy, or anger. 

People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 614; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). “Unfairness might not exist 

where . . . the critical evidence supporting a party's position on a key issue raises the danger of 

prejudice within the meaning of MRE 403 . . . but the proponent of this evidence has no less 

prejudicial means by which the substance of this evidence can be admitted.” Mills, 450 Mich at 

76 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he prosecution may offer all relevant evidence, 

subject to MRE 403, on every element [of an offense],” given that the elements of an “offense 

are always at issue.” Id. at 71. 

We conclude that the other-acts evidence had significant probative value with respect to 

the issue of proving defendant’s intent. And even if the probative value was not that great, it 

cannot be said that the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice. We cannot find that the other-acts evidence injected considerations of jury bias, 

shock, or anger, or that it was given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.

In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in admitting the otheracts evidence regarding the 2011 robbery. Moreover, as we indicated in the previous opinion, 

assuming error in the trial court’s ruling, it was harmless. Crawford, unpub op at 6-7 n 3. Given 

that the testimony of the two victims was consistent, that defendant provided the police with 

conflicting accounts, having first claimed an alibi but then later acknowledging that he met with 

Kammers and Ribon, and that there was testimony that defendant confronted Kammers after the 

crime and essentially forced him to deny on camera defendant’s participation in the crime, all of 

which was untainted evidence, we hold that defendant has not shown that it is more probable 

than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the assumed evidentiary error; 

there was no miscarriage of justice. MCL 769.26; Lukity, 460 Mich at 495-496. 

Affirmed.

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter