In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-3251

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Robert L. Baronia,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 CR 702--Milton I. Shadur, Judge.

Argued February 21, 2002--Decided April 19, 2002

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Harlington

Wood, Jr., and Williams, Circuit Judges.

 Williams, Circuit Judge. Rather than

making money the old-fashioned way,

defendant Robert Baronia produced more

than $1,600 in counterfeit currency by

scanning the front and back of genuine

$1, $5, $10, and $20 bills onto his

computer. After scanning the bills, he

printed, cut, and crumpled them up to

give them an aged appearance. Though it

took him 15 attempts to correctly line up

the front and back of the bills, he

finally produced ones that were good

enough to fool employees at four

different commercial establishments

before arousing suspicion.

 After Baronia pleaded guilty to

counterfeiting in violation of 18 U.S.C.

sec. 471, the trial court found that the

counterfeit bills he produced were not

obvious forgeries and enhanced his

sentence pursuant to sec. 2B5.1(b)(2) of

the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

Baronia appeals his sentence, arguing

that the enhancement does not apply to

him because he was not a large-scale

producer and because the method he used

to produce the bills was unsophisticated.

We affirm.

ANALYSIS
 According to the guideline in effect at

the time Baronia was sentenced, the base

offense level for violating 18 U.S.C.

sec. 471 is 9, but is increased to 15 if

the defendant "manufactured or produced"

the counterfeit currency. U.S.S.G.

sec.sec. 2B5.1(a) & (b)(2) (2000). The

purpose of the enhancement is to punish

more severely "a defendant who produces,

rather than merely passes, the

counterfeit items." U.S.S.G. sec. 2B5.1,

cmt. background.

 Baronia first argues that the word

"manufacture" in subsection (b)(2)

requires that a defendant be a "large

scale" producer. Whether the district

court properly interpreted the sentencing

guideline is a question we review de

novo. United States v. Mayberry, 272 F.3d

945, 948 (7th Cir. 2001). There is no

reference to quantity in the language of

subsection (b)(2), and we see no basis

for inferring such a requirement.

Subsection (b)(1) already provides for a

level enhancement if the amount

counterfeited is more than $2000, so it

would be somewhat redundant to read

subsection (b)(2) as providing an

enhancement for producers of an undefined

"large amount" of currency.

 Baronia next argues that the subsection

(b)(2) enhancement is intended to apply

only to counterfeiters who use

sophisticated methods to produce the

counterfeit items. At the time of

Baronia’s sentence, the commentary to

sec. 2B5.1 identified the following

exception to the enhancement for certain

counterfeiters:

Subsection (b)(2) does not apply to

persons who merely photocopy notes

or otherwise produce items that are

so obviously counterfeit that they

are unlikely to be accepted even if

subjected to only minimal scrutiny.

U.S.S.G. sec. 2B5.1, cmt. n.4. Baronia

reads Application Note 4 as exempting

from the enhancement counterfeiters who

either (1) produce fake bills by

photocopying or (2) produce an obvious

forgery by some other method. He does not

contend that the bills he made were

"obviously counterfeit." Instead, he

argues that because his method of

scanning the bills onto his computer was

the functional equivalent of

photocopying, section (b)(2) should not
apply.

 We disagree with Baronia’s reading of

Application Note 4. We do not read the

language as creating two separate and

distinct situations in which section

(b)(2) would not apply. The "obviously

counterfeit" language in the note

modifies and limits both the "merely

photocopy" and the "otherwise produce"

language, and therefore the note

describes only one situation: when the

method used by the counterfeiter produces

an obvious forgery--whether by

photocopying or some other method. See

United States v. Stanley, 23 F.3d 1084,

1086 (6th Cir. 1994).

 The proper inquiry for exclusion from

subsection (b)(2) is not how the bills

were made, but rather how well they were

made. Under Baronia’s reading, the

counterfeiter who uses a photocopier is

off the hook regardless of the quality of

the counterfeit items. This reading

conflicts with the purpose of the

enhancement and has been rejected by

every circuit to consider the question.

See United States v. Wyjack, 141 F.3d

181, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1998); United

States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 76 (4th

Cir. 1996); Stanley, 23 F.3d at 1086;

United States v. Taylor, 991 F.2d 533,

535-36 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.

Bruning, 914 F.2d 212, 213 (10th Cir.

1990).

 The purpose of the enhancement is to

punish those who produce counterfeit

items more harshly than those who simply

pass the items. U.S.S.G. sec. 2B5.1, cmt.

background. If the items are obviously

counterfeit, there is less reason to

punish that counterfeiter more severely

because the items are unlikely to be

accepted and the harm done by the

producer is less. United States v.

Barnes, 188 F.3d 893, 894 (7th Cir.

1999). A producer of obvious forgeries is

also "more likely to be caught and so the

punishment need not be so severe in order

to maintain the proper level of

deterrence." Id. at 894.

 By contrast, the particular technology

used to make the counterfeit items may,

but will not always, directly correlate

with the likelihood of detection. A

relatively primitive method may produce a

good imitation; a sophisticated method
might produce an obvious fake. It would

be arbitrary and unreasonable to apply

the lighter sentence to certain

defendants simply because they happen to

use photocopiers. See Bruning, 914 F.2d

at 213.

 As further support for his argument,

Baronia points to a recent amendment to

Application Note 4 (which took effect

after he was sentenced), which removes

the "merely photocopy" language from the

application note, but we think the

amendment and the accompanying commentary

conclusively rebuts his interpretation.

See Amendment 618, U.S.S.G. app. C supp.

(Nov. 1, 2001). In its explanation for

the amendment, the Commission

acknowledged that language in the earlier

commentary to sec. 2B5.1 suggested "that

[section (b)(2)] did not apply if a

defendant ’merely photocopies.’" Id. It

explained, however, that "that commentary

was intended to make [section (b)(2)]

inapplicable to notes that are so

obviously counterfeit that they are

unlikely to be accepted." Id. The

amendment and explanation not only

eliminate Baronia’s argument for cases

arising under the amended guideline, it

also demonstrates that his argument was

contrary to the Commission’s intent to

begin with.

CONCLUSION

 The court’s enhancement of Baronia’s

sentence pursuant to section (b)(2) was

proper and the sentence is therefore

Affirmed.