This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
CAROL J. BLANCH and 2 ROBERT J. BLANCH, 3 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 4
v. NO. 33,918 5 CUSTOM PLUMBING & HEATING 6 CO., LLC, 7 Defendant-Appellee. 8
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 9 Clay Campbell, District Judge 10
Robert J. Blanch 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellants 13 Custom Plumbing & Heating, Co., LLC 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 Pro Se Appellee 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 172 WECHSLER, Judge. 1 {1} Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s affirmance of the metropolitan court’s 2 determination that Defendant Custom Plumbing & Heating did not commit a breach 3 of contract. This Court issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm. Plaintiffs have 4 filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly considered . Unpersuaded, we 5 affirm. 6 {2} In this Court’s calendar notice, we propos ed to conclude that, given that the 7 existence of the contract and its terms were in dispute, there was a factual question for 8 the metropolitan court. See Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque, Inc. , 9 1998-NMCA-017, ¶ 39, 124 N.M. 549, 953 P.2d 722 (“When the existence of a 10 contract is at issue and the evidence is conflicting or permits more than one inference, 11 it is for the finder of fact to determine whether the contract did in fact exist.” 12 (alteration, internal quotati on marks, and citation omitted)). Further, we proposed to 13 conclude that, based on th e evidence presented, there was sufficient evidence to 14 support the metropolitan court’s determinati on that the “full inspection” agreed upon 15 was limited to the HVAC units. [CN 2, 5] 16 {3} In response, Plaintiffs contend that this Court improperly assumed that the 17 metropolitan court found an ambiguity, and th erefore applied the incorrect standard 18 of review. [MIO 3-4] Plaintiffs contend that, absent the metropolitan court 193 determining that an ambiguity exists, the co rrect standard of review is de novo. [MIO 1 3-4] We disagree. 2 {4} We acknowledge that written instruments such as notes, deeds of trust, and 3 guarantees that are clear and unambi guous must be enforced as written. Brown v. Fin. 4 Sav. , 1992-NMSC-025, ¶ 5, 113 N.M . 500, 828 P.2d 412. Our st andard of review in 5 that context is de novo. See Smith & Marrs, Inc. v. Osborn , 2008-NMCA-043, ¶ 10, 6 143 N.M. 684, 180 P.3d 1183 (“We review a di strict court’s interpretation of an 7 unambiguous contract de novo[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 8 However, what Plaintiffs rely on is a letter that Defendant drafted that Plaintiffs 9 contend “embodies the terms of the contract .” [MIO 4] It is not a written agreement 10 that contains the requirements of a legally enforceable contract. See Hartbarger v. 11 Frank Paxton Co. , 1993-NMSC-029, ¶ 7, 115 N.M. 665, 857 P.2d 776 (“Ordinarily, 12 to be legally enforceable, a contract mu st be factually supported by an offer, an 13 acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent.”). Rather, it is a memorialization of the 14 work completed and evidence of an unwritten agreement. Accordingly, it is part of 15 what the metropolitan court reviewed in determining the terms of the agreement 16 reached; a determination that is not subject to de novo review. See ConocoPhillips 17 Co.v. Lyons , 2013-NMSC-009, ¶ 10, 299 P.3d 844 (“If the proffered evidence of 18 surrounding facts and circumstances is in dispute, turns on witness credibility, or is 194 susceptible of conflicting inferences, the meaning must be resolved by the appropriate 1 fact-finder.” (alteration, internal quot ation marks, and citation omitted)). 2 {5} Plaintiffs also contend that the metropolitan court’s decision is not entitled to 3 deference because it is not supported by substantial evidence. In this Court’s calendar 4 notice, we summarized testimony by Defendant that supported the metropolitan 5 court’s conclusion that the agreement wa s limited to inspection of the HVAC units. 6 [CN 4] Plaintiffs challenge the districtcourt’s reliance on De fendant’s testimony by 7 arguing that consideration of Defendant’s testimony is in violation of the parol 8 evidence rule. However, given the lack of a fully integrated, written agreement, 9 Plaintiffs’ argument is inapposite. See Drink Inc. v. Martinez , 1976-NMSC-053, ¶ 8, 10 89 N.M. 662, 556 P.2d 348 (“As a general rule, parol evidence will not be allowed to 11 change the terms of an integrated, written agreement. However, parol evidence may 12 always be introduced to establish that the document is not the true agreement of the 13 parties—that in fact there was no meeti ng of the minds; that, by reason of mistake, 14 there was no consent to the apparent agreement.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, to the 15 extent Plaintiffs contend that there is insufficient evidence to support the metropolitan 16 court’s determination because the judge relied on irrelevant personal experience 17 regarding building codes, we note that the comments excerpted by Plaintiffs do not 18 actually pertain to the HVAC units themselves. [MIO 8-9] Rather, the comments 195 excerpted by Plaintiffs relate to the duc twork and whether someone inspecting the 1 ductwork should have suggested modifications or repairs. Because the metropolitan 2 court ultimately concluded that the “limite d scope of the contract” did not extend to 3 the ductwork, these contentions do not appear to have affected the metropolitan 4 court’s decision. As such, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ have failed to demonstrate 5 reversible error in this regard. See Erica, Inc. v. N.M. Regulation & Licensing Dep’t , 6 2008-NMCA-065, ¶ 24, 144 N.M. 132, 184 P. 3d 444 (“On appeal, error will not be 7 corrected if it will not change the resu lt.” (internal quotation marks and citation 8 omitted)). 9 {6} Accordingly, for the reasons explaine d above and in this Court’s notice of 10 proposed disposition, we affirm. 11 {7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

__________ ______________________ 13 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 14
WE CONCUR: 15

________________________________ 16 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 17

________________________________ 18 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 19