United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-2224

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United States of America, *

 *

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

 Mark E. Tuley, * District of Nebraska.

 *

Defendant-Appellant. *

 *

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Submitted: October 22, 1998

 Filed: November 12, 1998 

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Before McMILLIAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Mark Tuley was detained by Franklin, Nebraska, Police Officer Kirk Rust early

one morning after Rust blocked Tuley's vehicle in order to investigate Tuley's purpose

for being at a closed gas station. Tuley moved to suppress evidence obtained from his

person and his vehicle, and statements made subsequent to his arrest, which led to

Tuley's conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, arguing
The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the District 1

of Nebraska, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Thomas D.

Thalken, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska. 

Tuley does not appeal the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made 2

after his arrest.

2

the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Tuley appeals the district court's denial of 1

his motion to suppress the evidence. We affirm. 2

I.

Officer Rust observed Tuley as he returned with a can of pop to his pickup truck,

which was parked at a closed gas station at 3:00 a.m. across the diagonal lines of the

parking lot. He also observed that his truck had an in-transit sticker but no license

plates and was parked over the station's gasoline storage tanks. A coil of garden hose

was tied to the side of the truck near its gas tank. There had been recent attempted

robberies of gas stations in the area. Suspicious that Tuley may be attempting to steal

gas out of the storage tanks, Rust pulled his patrol car behind Tuley's truck, which was

blocked in the front by an awning. He approached Tuley in his truck and requested

identification. Tuley had no identification but gave Rust his name and birth date. Rust

noticed Tuley's eyes were bloodshot and he slurred his speech. Rust radioed his

dispatcher to verify that Tuley had a valid driver's license and was informed Nebraska

had a warrant for Tuley's arrest. Rust then requested a verification that the warrant was

still outstanding, which was received twenty minutes after Rust first pulled behind

Tuley's truck. Rust arrested Tuley and obtained controlled substances and drug

paraphernalia during a search of his person and his truck incident to the arrest. 

The district court found that the initial contact was consensual but turned into a

seizure upon Rust's approach to the truck. The court further found that the

circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion, justifying the investigatory stop. 
3

Tuley claims he was seized as soon as Rust blocked his truck and that Rust did not

have reasonable suspicion for doing so. 

II.

Where the district court's findings of fact are undisputed, as here, we review de

novo the ultimate decision as to whether the facts amount to reasonable suspicion. See

United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 215 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dixon, 51

F.3d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir. 1995). We may affirm the district court on any basis

supported by the record. See Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 356, 362 (8th

Cir. 1997). An officer may constitutionally "seize" a person under the Fourth

Amendment for a brief, investigatory stop if he has a reasonably articulable suspicion

that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). The officer's

actions must be both "justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably related in scope to

the circumstances which justified the [initial] interference." Id. at 19-20.

Officer Rust observed a truck, with a garden hose attached to its side near the

gas tank, parked directly over a gas station's gasoline storage tanks in the middle of the

night. There had been recent attempted robberies of gas stations in the area. Though

Rust observed Tuley returning to his truck with a can of pop, Rust knew criminals often

hid their actions with innocent activities. The truck had an in-transit sticker and no

license plates. Though there was nothing illegal about this, Rust knew criminals often

hid their identity by removing license plates from their vehicle. A reasonable suspicion

may be justified even if there are innocent explanations for a defendant's behavior when

the circumstances are considered in the totality. See United States v. Bloomfield, 40

F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995); United

States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1040 (1992);

United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 642-43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837

(1985). Blocking a vehicle so its occupant is unable to leave during the course of an

investigatory stop is reasonable to maintain the status quo while completing the purpose
4

of the stop. See United States v. Doffin, 791 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479

U.S. 861 (1986); Jones, 759 F.2d at 638-39 (noting factors such as the lateness of the

hour, a deserted area, and a lone officer). We conclude that blocking Tuley's truck with

the squad car resulted in a Fourth Amendment seizure. The seizure, however, was

based on a reasonably articulable suspicion and satisfies the first prong of Terry that

the initial stop be justified. 

Rust proceeded to ask for identification, a proper action in investigating

suspicious activity. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). All of Rust's

actions were in furtherance of determining Tuley's identification and purpose for being

at the closed station; Officer Rust ran a check on the name given and verified an

outstanding warrant. Thus, the whole of the investigatory stop, which lasted the twenty

minutes it took to confirm that the warrant was still outstanding, complied with Terry's

mandate to stay within the scope of the circumstances justifying the initial stop. 

III.

We find Officer Rust's original detention to be an investigatory stop based on a

reasonably articulable suspicion and his actions during the stop to be within the scope

of the original detention. As such, we affirm the district court's denial of Tuley's motion

to suppress evidence obtained subsequent to the investigatory stop. The judgment of

the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.