Docket No . 109711.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

FIRSTAMERICA

N BANK CORPORA

TION et al. , Appe llants, v. GW EN HENRY, Du Page County Treasurer and ex officio Du Page Cou n ty Coll ector, Appel

le e (The Forest Preserve Di strict of Du Page Coun ty, In terve nor-A ppel l ee).
Opinion filed January 21, 2011.

JUSTICE THEIS deli

vered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our

t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Ju st ice Kilbr ide an d J us t ice s F r ee man , T ho mas , Ga r man , Karmeier , a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

The iss ue in t his case i s whether the F orest Pr eserve Di strict of Du Page County (the Di strict) wa s r eq uir ed by se ct ion 7 –17 1 o f the I llino is Pensi

on Code (40 ILCS 5/7–171 (West 2008)) to enact an appropri ati

on or di na nc e f or i ts c ontr i bu ti on to the Ill in ois Mun ic ipa l Ret irement Fund (IMRF) before it enacted a levy ord in ance to r aise
revenue that woul d, i n pa rt, cover thi s con trib uti on. The ci

rcui t court of Du Page County en

tered summ

ary j ud g ment in favo r o f the Distr i ct, an d th e a pp el l ate courtaff irm ed. For the reasons that foll ow, we als o affir m.1 The IM RF does not cover employees of the Cit y of Chica go or Coo k County. Se e 40 ILCS 5/7–132(A)(a) (We st 2008).

2 IMR F employer r at es ar e on a “ two-ye ar la g. ” S ee ht tp :/ /w ww. imr f. or g/ inf

o/ pr ess _r oom/ IM RF _1 01 .h tm. For exa mple, in formationfr om 1 998 w

as se nt toactu arie s i n 1 999, and

th ey used t hat inform ation to calculate

con tributio n rates for 2000.
-2- BACK GROUND The IMR F was est ablished by the Il lino is G en er al As se mbly in 1939 an d b eg an operati ng i n 1 941 asa p ub l i c p en si

on program

f or five m uni ci pal i tie s. Today

, the f und adm i nisters$22 .3 b i l l i on

i n as sets f ornearl y 275,000 curren

t and form

er empl oy ee s of 2,950 local go ver nment entities across the state. 1 Ea ch m un i ci pal i ty pa y s i ts own empl oyees’ dis abi

li ty, retirem

ent, and death b enef

its i nto its own
ac cou n t, pur sua nt t o a co nt ribut ion r at e de t er mined by independ ent actuariesbased upon the e mpl oyees’ salaries , age s, a

nd yea rs of servi ce. Every

June, the Reti

remen t Fund Board notif

ie s each
m un i ci pal i ty of t he preli

mi nary contributi on rate, and every Novem ber of the fi nal contributi on rate, for t he f ol l owi ng y ear. 2 Then ea

ch municipality must ra ise re venue t o s upp or t its c ont ribut ion. In Jun e 199 9, t he Dis trict r eceiv ed an “A

dvance IMRF Con tri bu ti on No t ice, ” and in N o ve mbe r19 99 , it recei ved an “Of fi ci al Notice of Illi

nois Muni ci p al Reti rem en t Fu nd Con tri bu ti on R atef or Cal endar Year 2000.” On Novem ber 16, 1999, t he Di strict

passed a levy o r din an ce , wh ich inc lud ed $9 81 , 51 1 fo rit s co nt ribut ion t o t he IMRF for t he fo llowing year . O n June 20, 2000, t he Di strict passed a appropri ati

on ordinan ce, which i

ncl ud ed $1 ,10 2,6 28 f

or i ts
con tri bu ti on to the IMRF an

d ref e rred to the Novem

ber 16, 1999, le vy ordinan ce. On Novem ber 15, 2000, Fi

rst Ame rican Bank Co rp or at ion and three ot her compa

nies (the pl ai

ntif fs ) fi le d a t ax o bject ion, co nt ending that the D i stri ct l acke d auth ority to lev

y f or i ts IM RF con tri bu ti on be f ore it ap pr op riat ed fo r it beca use sec t ion 7 –17 1( b)( 1) of t he Pen si on Co de limits t he t ax t o t he “amo unt appropr ia ted.” See 40 IL CS 5/ 7– 17 1(b )(1 ) (W

est 20 08 ). In

Ju l y 20 08 , the D i str

i ct wa s granted le ave to in

tervene i n the case , and t he pa rt ies ag re ed t hat any fi nal order in t his c as e w o uld govern the pl ai nti f f s’ tax obj ec ti ons

f or-3- 1999-2006. The D i str

i ct th en f i l ed a m oti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t,
ar guing that it act ed withi n i ts a ut ho rit y under sec t ion 7 –17 1 and
sec t ions 13. 1 and 13. 3 o f the Do wnst at e Fo re st Pr ese rve Di str i ct A ct. See 70 ILCS 805/13.1, 13.3 (West 2008). The tr ia l c ourt concl

uded that se cti on 7–1 71( b)( 1) set s a c eiling on, but not a t imetable fo r, t he IMRF lev y, a nd en t er ed su mm ary j udgm en

t i n f av or of th e D i str i ct. The plai ntif fs appealed. The appe l l ate

courtaf f i rm ed . 39 7 I l l . A

pp . 3d 30 1. Th e a

pp el l ate court agreed wi

th the pla

in tif fs that section 7–171(b)(1) gi ves mun ic ipa li tiest he au th ori ty to lev y taxe s f or IMRF contri buti ons. Id. at 30 4. T h e a pp el l ate co ur t , ho weve r, disag re ed w ith t he pla in tif fs that
se cti on 7–171(b)(1) requires m

unici palities to appro priat e first and levy sec ond. Id. at 30 5. Suc h an i n ter pr eta ti on , s tate d th

e a pp el l ate court , goes bey

ond the statut ory language: “While th e u se

of th e p h ra se ‘th e am ount appro priated’ m

ay ce r t ain ly b e i n ter pr ete d to refer to the amount ‘al ready appropriated’ o r‘p r ev io us ly appropri ate d’ f

or a c ontr i bu ti on to t he Fund , it is equ ally poss ible to re ad it as meaning t he
amou nt ‘sub sequentl

y a pp ropri at ed ’ o r ‘e ve nt ua lly appropriated’ for suc h a co nt ribut ion. The mere u se o f the term ‘appropriated’ does no t sig nify a pre f ere nc e f or ei the r of t hese inter pr et at ions, and no t hing abo ut t he la

nguage quoted in dic ates th at t

he le gislat ur e inte nded t o impo se a t imi ng sequ en ce man da ti ng tha t a m un i ci pal i ty adopt a n a ppr opri ati on ordinan ce be fo r e it adopts its lev

yi ng ordin ance. Rather than imposing a t iming r eq uir eme nt , t he pla in lan gu ag e o f t his prov i si on i m pos esa l i m i t on the amount

that may be l evi ed: a m un i ci pal i ty ma y not levy taxe s t hat wo uld exc eed t he amo unt appr opri ate d f

or i ts con tri bu ti on to th e Fun d. Th i s r es tri cti on pr ev en ts a mun ici pali ty from accum

ulatin g excess funds a t t he expense of t he taxp ay

er. Thereis n

o hint of any

ot her purpo se in tended by the le g isla ture i

n enacti ng th i s prov i sion.” (Em phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Id. at 305. The appe l l ate

court further stated that section 7–171(e) co nt ains
a provision perm

i ttin g m uni ci pal i tie s to ref

er to other sta

t ut es in est ablishing

pro cedures for levy

in g and coll ecting taxes for IMRF contr ib utions. Id. at 3 08. Here, the ge ne ral taxesf orthe D i stri ct are le vied and c ollect ed p ur sua nt to sec t ions 1 3. 1 and 13. 3 o f the-4- Dow n sta te Forest Preserve D i stri ct Act. Id. at 308 . B eca use t he Dis trictcompl

ie d wit h t ha t st at ut e, t he t r ial c o ur t did no t er rin
en teri ng s um mary j udgm en t in i ts f av or. Id. at 309. Thi s c ourt a

l l owe d the p l ai

nti f f s’ pe ti ti on fo r lea ve t o ap pe al. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Fe

b. 26, 2010). Our standard of reviewis de novo

. See DesP ain v. City

of Collinsville , 382 Ill . App. 3d 572, 577 (2008) (ho ldingt hat st at ut or y inter pr et at ion issu es a nd su mmary judgment ruli ngs are b ot h revi

ewed de novo ).

AN AL YSIS To resolve the i ssuein

this case, we mus

t construe section 7–171 of t he Pe nsion C od e. The ca rdi n al ru l e of sta tutor y con str uc ti on i s to
as ce r t ain and gi

ve ef fec t t o t he leg isla t ur e’ s int en t , an d t he pla in la nguage of the stat ute is the best ind ica t io n of that i nten t. Acme Markets, Inc. v. Cal lana n , 2 36 I ll. 2d 2 9, 37- 38 ( 200 9) . Whe n t he la nguage is unam bi guous, t he statute must be ap plied as wr itt en. DeLuna v. Burciaga , 223 Ill . 2d 49, 59 ( 200 6) . Ad dit ionally, t he entire stat ute must be read as a whole , considerin

g all relevan t par ts. Kraft, Inc. v. E dgar , 138 Il l . 2d 178 , 189 (1 990). Section 7–171 g overns “f in ance” and “taxes” an

d pro vides: “(a) Ea ch mun

ic ipa lit y o t he rt ha n a sc ho o l dis t r ict sha ll appr opri ate

an am ount su ff icient t o p ro vide fo r t he cu rr ent
m un i ci pal i ty contributi ons requi

redby Se ct io n 7 –1 72 o f t his Articl e, for the fi

scal ye ar fo rwh ich t he ap pr o pr iat io n is ma de and al l a mounts due f

or muni ci pal co nt ribut ions for previ

ous ye ars. *** (b ) F orthe

pur pos e of pr ov i di n g m oni es f or m un i ci pal i ty contr ib utions, begi

nni ng f or t he y ear in whi ch a m unici pa lit y i s i ncl uded i n this f und: (1) A mun ic ipa li ty other than

a sc hoo l distr ict may levy
a tax whi ch sh al l n ot exceed the am oun t ap propri ate d f

or mun ici pal contributions.

* * * (e) Such tax sh

al l b e l evi ed an d col

l ected i n l i ke m an ner, wi th t h e g en er al t ax es o f t he mun icip alit y and sha ll be in addi ti on t o all othe

r tax eswh i ch the m un i ci pal i ty i s n ow or-5- ma y her eaft er be au t hor ized t o levyupon al l tax ab l e p rop er

ty there i n ** *.” 40ILCS 5/7–1 71 (W est 200 8). In t his app eal, t he plaint i ffs arg ue t hat t he phr ase “amou nt appropriated” in se ct io n 7 –1 71 ( b) ( 1) un amb igu o us ly li mi ts lev ie s f or IMRF co nt ribu t io ns t o pa st , n o t fut ur e, ap pr o pr iat io ns. Th e p laint iffs off er a s ho rt gr ammar less o n. Add ing “- ed ” t o t he r o o t o f ave rb creates th e s i

m pl e p ast ten se f orm of th e v er b . W h en th e p ast t ense f orm o f a v er b mo difie s a no un , t he ve r b be co me s a past partici

ple , and use of the p ast pa rticipl e connot es action in

the past . The past tense of the verb

“appropriate”is “app ro pr iate d. ” Acc or dingly, t he pla int iffs contend, an “ am ount appro priated” is a n amou nt appropriatedin

the past. The pl aint iff

s con tend that the l egi slature
us ed t his ph

ras e i n s ec ti on 7–1 71( b)( 1) t o s et not only a qu ant itat ive limit on IMRF lev

ies, but also a temporal one. That is, the pla int iffs
ass ertthat t he l

egi sl ature im

pli ci tly directed m

un ic i pal i ti es to appropriate fi

rst and l evy

second f or t hei r contributi ons to t he f

und. We agree wi

th the pla in tif fs that section 7–171(b)(1), when rea d in isolat ion, se em

s to indicat e t hat t he ap pr op riat ion must pr ece de t he lev y. But we mus

t consider section 7–171 i

n i ts entirety , and i

nterpret
se cti on 7–1 71( b)( 1) in its co nt ext. As the appel la te court noted,
se cti on 7–171(e) stat es that I MRF taxes “s hal l b e l evi ed and colle cted in li ke mann er, with the general taxes of the muni cipal ity.” 40 ILCS 5/7–171(e) (West 2008). The general taxes of the District are le vied
an d c oll ec ted

un der the D ownsta

te F ore st Pre se

rve D i str i ct A ct. Sec ti on 13.1 of that statut e governs f orest pr eserve district tax lev ies an d stat es: “After t he firs t Mo nd ay inOctober and by the fi rst Monday in Decem ber i n each ye ar, the boa rd sha ll l

evy the general t axes for t he Dist rict by gener al cat ego ries fo r t he next fiscal ye ar. ***

*** All suc h t axes and r at es a re exclus iveof the taxes requi red f ort he pa yment o f the pri

nc i pal of and int er est on bo nds, and exclus iveo f t ax es lev ie d f or emp lo yee s’ an nu it y and be ne fit purpos es.”

70 IL CS 80 5/13.1 (We st 2008 ). Sec ti on 13.3, t itled “F is cal

year; appro priation ordinance,” states: “§13.3. (a) The b oard

o f e ach f

orest pr eserve district-6- organize d under thi s Act

sha ll f i x a f i sc al yea r f or th e d i str i ct. The board shall , within

or before t he f

irst quarter of each

fiscal year, ad op t an annu al app ro pr iatio n or dinance app ro pr iating such su m s of mone y as m ay be requi red to def ray al l ne ces sary expenses and l

ia bi li ties of the Di strict to be pai

d or incurred duri ng th e f i sca l year. (b) T he fa il

ure of the board to ado pt an ann ual appropri ati

on or dinance or t o o t her wise c omp ly with t he pr ovisio ns of this Section shall n ot affect t he validity o f any tax le vy of the f

ores t pres erve di strict. The ann ual appropri ati

on o r di na nc e f

o ran y f is cal year ne ed no t be in tended or re quir ed t o be in supp or t of o r in re latio n t o a ny tax le vy made d

uri ng th at f i sca l year.” 70 IL CS 80 5/13.3 (We st 2008 ). Thus, for fiscal year be g in ni ng Jul y 1, 2000, the Di strict was required to pass a l

evy ordinan ce between e arly

October a nd ea r ly Decem ber 199 9, and a n app ro pr iatio n or dinance no lat er t han Septembe r30, 2 0 00. The Downstate Forest P reserve District Act cle ar ly allows t he mun icip alit ies it gov er n s to l ev y f i rs t an d a pp rop riate second. The plaint iff

s co nced e t his po inti

n thei r repl y bri ef : “ [T]he re is no doubt t hat for general pur po ses ( i.e. , e xcep t ing bo nd r et irement and pe nsio n p ur po se s) a d o wn st at e fo r es t pr es er ve dis t r ict is
m andated by sections 13.1 and 13.3 of the [Downstate Fores t Pr ese rve Di stri ct Act] to lev y be f ore t he st ar t of t he ‘n

ex t fisca l year’ and, m uch l ater, t o appro priate f

or expenses

of t he next f

i sca l year.” Wha t t he pla int iffs fa il

t o gr as p is that t here i s no exception. Though
se cti on 13 .1 o f th e D ownsta

te Fo re st Pr ese rve Act provides that t axes under the Act do not i

nc l ude taxes f orI MR F c o nt r ibu t io ns, it simp ly recogniz es the fac

t that “[t]he Ill

in ois Mun ic ipa l R etirem ent Fund A

ct [c it a t ion] is

a compl ete stat uto ry en

actmen t t o pro vi de for ann

uities and be ne f i ts to m un i ci pal em pl oyee s,” an d a m un i ci pal i ty m us t l ook to that sta tute f or a uth ori ty to l ev y i n su pp ort of i ts co nt ribut ion t o t he fund. People ex rel. Kr

apf v. Hayes , 13 Il

l . 2d 143 , 152 (1 958). Pu rsu ant to section 7–1 71(e), m un icip alities m

ust lev y a nd col le ct taxe s to supp ort their IMRF contributi ons i n the sam e way that t hey levy and colle ct their gene

ral taxes . Thus, the s a me st at ut e–t he Dow n sta te F ore st Pr ese rve Act –co nt ro ls the t imi ng o f bot h t he Dist rict ’s I MRF levy and its g ener al ta x levy, and per mits t he levy to-7- pr ece de a n app ro pr iatio n. The pla in tif fs attempt t o expl ai

n away se cti on 7–1 71( e) by arg uing that “levied and coll

ected in li ke m ann er, with the gen

eral t axes of t he
m un i ci pal i ty ” is a term of art whi

ch m eans, si mpl y, col le cted. They qu ote and r ely upo n Peo

ple e x re l. Kel ly v. Baltimore &

Ohio R.R

. Co. , 376 Ill . 393 (1 941 ). In Kelly , vo t er s a ut ho r ize d a t ax in supp ort of a tow n sh i p l i b ra ry pu rs ua n t to s ec ti on

10 of “ th e act rel

ati n g to li braries” (se e I ll. Rev. St at . 1 939 , c h. 81, par. 10), and that t ax was la ter ext ende d wit ho ut fur th er ac ti on b y th e tow n sh i p’ s c orp ora

te autho rities. I n determi

ni ng whether the tax could b e extended, we noted t ha t , pr io rt o 19 31 , o nly vot er s, no t t he corp orat e autho rities, could l evy the tax. We stated: “W hen th e de cisio n in t he c as e o f People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. [, 240 Ill. 42 6 ( 190 9) ,] was made, t he
on l y pr ov i si on of se cti on 10re f er ri n g to the ma

nne r in whi ch t he t ax sho uld be le vi ed wa s th e p rovi si on th at a maj ori ty of t he vo t er s a t t he ‘a nnu al e lec t io n’ in su ch t o wn sho uld vo t e in f av orof t he t ax b y rate, wh ich rat e wa s re quir ed t o be specifi ed in the notice of the e le ction. It then provided f urther that upon such

vot e being cas t t he t ax so aut hor ized ‘s hall be le vied and c ollected in

li ke mann er with ot her general taxes’ of a t ow n. We thin k the deci si on in

*** Illinois Central Railroad ***
was c orrect i

n h old i ng th at the v ote in the e l ection, as th e statute then read, constituted t he l evy of the tax voted without any f ur th er ac t b y th e t ow nship. Unde r t hat dec ision, t he phrase last abo ve qu ot ed s hou ld be read as th ough th e word ‘levi ed’ wa s fo llo we d b y a

comm a, and that the words ‘in

li ke
ma nne rw i th oth er g en era l taxes ’ ref

er on l y to the col l ec ti on an d n ot to the l ev

y of the tax .” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Kelly , 376 Ill . at 395-96. Af ter 193 1, when t he st at ut e wa s amend ed, t he corpo rate author ities co uld l ev y thi s tax

. Kelly , 376 Ill . at 396. “By the provisi ons of other statutes,” the c orporate auth

oriti es w ere“the el ectors” at the ann ual t o wn ship meeti

ng. Kelly , 376 Ill . at 396, cit ing I ll. Rev. St at . 1 939 , c h. 139, par. 39 . Thus, we co ncl uded, t he electo rs hav e a du ty “ to determi ne, annua lly

, t he amo unt ne ed ed fo r the cur re n t yea r a n d to levy the sam e *** i n the sam

e m an n er th at ta xes f or o ther ***-8- purposes are lev

ie d.” Kelly , 376 Ill . at 398. T his hol din g is co nsist ent wit h ou r ho lding in People ex rel

. Schlaeger v. Jarmut h , 3 98 I ll. 66 ( 194 7) . I n Jarmut h , a taxpaye

r obje cted to a tax l evi

ed under section 11 o f the act est ablishing the Ci ty of Chi cago’s Mun

ic ipal E mployees ’ Annuit y and Be nefit Fu nd (see I ll. Rev. Stat. 1941, ch. 24, par. 1054), arguing that that sta tute vested th e p owe r to t ax in the fund’s Ret irement Bo ar d, and not t he
cor porate au th ori ti es of th e c i ty . Th e statu te prov i de d th at a tax to supp ort t he fun d mu st be “lev ied an d c o llec t ed in li ke m ann er wit h t he general t axes ” o f the city. In cons tru i ng tha t l an gua ge , we di d n ot
me n ti on Kelly , but we hel d that t axes f

or t he f und m ust be l evi

ed i n “the man ne rin w hic h t he ge ne r al t ax es o f t he cit y ar e le vi ed b y the
cor porate au thor i ti es of the ci ty.” Jarmut

h , 398 Ill . at 71. Co ns eq ue nt ly, we re f

er re d t o a not her st at ut e–s ect ion 1 6–1 of t he Revised Ci

ties an d Vil la ges Act–to det ermi

ne h ow the city ’s gen

eral taxes were

l evi ed. Jarmut

h , 398 Ill . at 71, quo ting Il l. Rev . Stat . 1945, ch. 24, par. 16–1. No tably , section 16–1 stated that no t ax co uld be le vied unl ess an appropri ati on had b een

made. Jarmut

h , 398 Ill . at 71. He re, there is

no corresponding l

im itation. Li

ke the a c t
e st ablishing

the ci ty’s a nnui ty an d ben efi t fund, section 7–171 (e ) i n str uc ts m un i ci pal i ti es t o lev y and co llec t t ax es t o su pp o r t t he ir
re t irement fund c ont ribut ions in t he sam e m ann er in whi ch they levy and coll ect the i r ge ne ral taxes . Bu t un l i kese cti on 1 6–1 of

the Revised Ci tiesand V ill

age s Act , se ct ion 1 3. 3 o f the Dow n sta te Fo re st Pr ese rve Dis trictAct do es no t pr ohibit a levy without an

appropriation. Instead, it states that t he f

ai lure to adopt an appropriation ordinan ce does not in val ida te any le vy ordinan ce. The pl ai ntif f s’ argum en t, as the appe l l ate court

he re no t ed , dis t ills downto a poli

cy argu men t th at m un i ci pal i ti es sh oul d a pp rop riate

fi rst and l ev y se con d. W e a reaw ar e of

th e m eri ts of such a procedure, but
we ar e a lso aw ar e o f t he d if fi cul ties i nhe rent in the long-ran

ge fi nan ci al forecasting that wo uld be n ecessary i f the Di st rict wer e forced to appropriate we l l

be f ore i ts f i sca l year b egi

ns

. Cf. In re Application of the County Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for Taxes for the Year 1993 , 1 87 I ll. 2d 3 26, 334 -3 5 ( 199 9) (d et ailing t he pr oblems t hat scho ols d istr icts wo uld face unde r su ch a requi rem en t). Ind eed , t he Dist rict ’s levy here was $121,117 le ss than it s ultim ate appr opr iation m

ore t han sev

en m onths l ater, des pit e t he-9- fact t ha t it r ec eiv ed a p ur po r t ed ly ac cu rate con tri bu ti on ra t e fro m the Ret irement Fu nd Bo ar d. Ce r t ain ly t his p r o ble m is n ot un i qu e to forest pr ese rve di str

i cts , but th

e statu tes estab l i sh i n g oth er sp ec i al di str i cts are not before us here. “The power to det ermi ne wh en a b u dge t or dinance shall be passed, an d t he o r de ro f pa ss ag e a s be t we en le vy and budget ordinan ces, rests excl

usi vel y w ith the Ge neral Asse mbly .” People ex rel. Rockw

ell v. Chicago, Burlington & Quinc y R.R. Co

. , 386 Ill . 114, 117 (1944 ). Here , we h

old that the l egi slature al

l owe d th e D i str i ct to pass a lev y ordi na nc e b ef ore it passe d an appropriation ordinan ce. The Distr i ct h ad au th ori ty f or i ts IMRF lev y, a nd t he t r ial c o ur t co rr ec t ly
en tered su m mar y j udgm en t i n f av or of th e D i str i ct.

CONCLUSION For t he rea sons th

at w e h ave s tate d, th

e j udg men t of th e a pp el l ate court is aff irm ed.

Af fi rmed.