Stilwell moved the district court for his attorney fees and court 

costs, citing NRS 176.115, 1which reads in full as follows: 

1. In all cases of criminal prosecution where the 

defendant is not found guilty, the court may 

require the complainant, if it appears that the 

prosecution was malicious or without probable 

cause, to pay the costs of the action, or to give 

security to pay the same within 30 days. 

2. If the complainant does not comply with the 

order of the court, judgment may be entered 

against the complainant for the amount thereof. 

3. Such judgments may be enforced and appealed 

from in the same manner as those rendered in 

civil actions. 

Stillwell argued that Nevada's helmet law is unconstitutionally 

indeterminate and that his ticketing and prosecution were without 

probable cause and malicious, entitling him to recover attorney fees as 

"costs of the action" under NRS 176.115. The district court disagreed. In 

its view, the municipal court convictions provided prima facie evidence of 

probable cause, see Chapman v. City of Reno, 85 Nev. 365, 369, 455 P.2d 

618, 620 (1969), and malice was not independently claimed. 2Because the 

district court denied Stillwell's motion for fees on this basis, it did not 

answer the statutory construction questions of whether NRS 176.115 

authorizes attorney fees to be awarded as a subset of "costs of the action," 

'He simultaneously brought suit in federal court. The federal cases 

are not relevant to this appeal. 

2Acknowledging Stillwell's request for an evidentiary hearing on 

entitlement to fees, the district court invited him to make an offer of proof. 

The offer of proof focused on the prosecution's dismissals following appeal, 

not the specifics of the charged offenses themselves. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

2 
or who the "complainant" is. The district court also rejected Stillwell's 

argument that dismissing the charges after they were appealed itself 

evidenced malice and lack of probable cause. From these orders, Stilwell 

appeals. 

Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution states that 

district courts "have final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising 

in. . . inferior tribunals as may be established by law." This court has 

repeatedly held that "[d]istrict courts have final appellate jurisdiction in 

cases arising in municipal courts," such that a municipal court conviction, 

once appealed to and decided by the district court, "is not subject to 

further review by appeal to this court." Tripp v. City of Sparks, 92 Nev. 

362, 363, 550 P.2d 419, 419 (1976); see Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 

521, 458 P.2d 359, 359-60 (1969) (noting appeal to Supreme Court from 

district court's review of justice court decision is improper, though there 

may be an exception if such an appeal is provided for by statute). This 

rule applies even when the district court reverses the municipal court, 

meaning its decision escapes direct appellate review. Compare City of Las 

Vegas v. Carver, 92 Nev. 198, 198, 547 P.2d 688, 688 (1976) (rejecting 

appeal by city from district court judgment reversing municipal court 

conviction and holding, "[w]e have no jurisdiction for appellate review of a 

district court judgment, which has been entered on an appeal from a 

municipal court"), with Tripp, 92 Nev. at 362, 550 P.2d at 419 (holding 

this court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal by defendant whose municipal 

court conviction was upheld by the district court). 

Nevada's Constitution and these cases are directly controlling 

here. Stilwell's cases originated in the municipal courts and were heard 

3 
by the district court on appeal. The district court's appellate jurisdiction is 

final, and this court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear them. 

Stilwell argues that the above cases do not apply because in 

each, the inferior court and then the district court decided the issue on the 

merits, whereas here the municipal courts convicted Stillwell and so did 

not entertain his fee requests. But this is a distinction without a 

difference. If Stillwell had established that his ticketing and prosecution 

lacked probable cause and were malicious, NRS 176.115 would have been 

equally available to him in municipal as district court. While the 

prosecution's dismissal of the charges in district court may have 

strengthened Stillwell's claim to fees and costs, it did not change his 

fundamental position that the charges lacked probable cause and were 

malicious—claims he asserted both in municipal and district courts. 

Exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the district court rejected these 

claims based on the municipal court convictions and Stillwell's offer of 

proof. Here, as in Carver, "[w]e have no jurisdiction for appellate review of 

a district court judgment, which has been entered on an appeal from a 

municipal court," and, as for Stillwell's constitutional claims, his "remedy, 

if any, would have been to timely petition for certiorari, under NRS 

34.020(3)." 92 Nev. at 198-99, 547 P.2d at 688. 

As a fallback, Stillwell argues that NRS 176.115(3) licenses 

this appeal. But this argument is clearly wrong. Subparagraph 1 of NRS 

176.115 authorizes an order directing "the complainant" to pay the "costs 

of the action . . . within 30 days" if the defendant is "not found guilty" and 

it appears "the prosecution was malicious or without probable cause"; 

subparagraph 2 provides that, if "the complainant" does not timely comply 

with the order, "judgment may be entered against the complainant for the 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

4 
Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

C.J. 

Saitta 

J. 

J. 

J. 

1.71. .; • : 

amount thereof'; and subparagraph 3 provides that "[s]uch judgments 

may be enforced and appealed from in the same manner as those rendered 

in civil actions." (Emphasis added.) "Such judgment[ I" in subparagraph 3 

refers back to its antecedent in subparagraph 2—the judgment 

subparagraph 2 says can be entered against a complainant who flouts an 

order entered pursuant to subparagraph 1 to pay the "costs of the action" 

within 30 days. As written, NRS 176.115 does not create an additional 

right of appeal in favor of a defendant who unsuccessfully seeks costs and 

has already been afforded a right of appeal. See Blackburn v. State, 129 

Nev. „ 294 P.3d 422, 425 (2013) (in interpreting a statute, "[o]ur 

analysis begins and ends with the statutory text if it is clear and 

unambiguous"). 

This court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER these consolidated appeals DISMISSED. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

5 
cc: Chief Judge, The Eighth Judicial District Court 

Hon. J. Charles Thompson, Senior Judge 

Gallian Welker & Beckstrom, LC 

Marquis Aurbach Coffing 

Boulder City Attorney 

North Las Vegas City Attorney 

City of North Las Vegas City Attorney's Office 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

6