RYAN WILDER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-5705

_____________________________/

Opinion filed June 15, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Clay County.

Don H. Lester, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Courtenay H. Miller, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

WETHERELL, J.

The appellant, Ryan Wilder, was convicted of first-degree felony murder, 

second-degree felony murder, and trafficking in methamphetamine. He raises four 

issues in this direct appeal, only one of which merits discussion: whether the 
2

liquid by-product from the manufacture of the methamphetamine was properly

included when calculating the weight of the methamphetamine for purposes of 

meeting the threshold weight for trafficking. We affirm this issue for the reasons 

that follow, and we affirm the other issues raised by Wilder without discussion.

In February 2012, after hours of surveillance, four deputies with the Clay 

County Sheriff’s Office approached the front door of a residence that was 

suspected to be the site of a methamphetamine lab to conduct a “knock and talk.”

Other deputies were positioned around the house. After several knocks, the door 

opened, and a man inside the house started shooting at the deputies. One deputy 

was killed, and another was injured. The shooter then ran out the back door where 

he was shot and killed by a deputy who was stationed in the back yard. During the 

incident, the deputies commanded the other occupants, including Wilder, to exit 

the house. Wilder complied and was taken into custody without incident.

After everyone was outside, the deputies entered the house and found items 

indicative of a methamphetamine lab. They collected items containing a total 

weight of approximately 1 gram of methamphetamine at various stages of the 

production process, along with a glass vase containing 26.2 grams of a liquid byproduct left over from the manufacturing process. The liquid by-product was 

toxic, but it contained a trace amount (less than 1%) of methamphetamine and 
3

there was testimony that the liquid could be reused to manufacture additional 

methamphetamine. 

Based on the total weight of the liquid by-product and the other items 

containing methamphetamine, Wilder was charged with trafficking in 

methamphetamine under section 893.135(1)(f)1., Florida Statutes (2011). He was 

also charged with first-degree felony murder (for the deputy’s death) and seconddegree felony murder (for the shooter’s death), with the trafficking offense serving 

as the predicate felony for both murder charges.1

 The jury found Wilder guilty of 

these charges, and the trial court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of life in 

prison for the murders and a concurrent 30-year term for trafficking in 

methamphetamine.

On appeal, Wilder argues that the 26.2 grams of liquid by-product should 

not have been included in calculating the total weight of methamphetamine for the 

trafficking offense because even though the liquid contained a trace amount of 

methamphetamine, it was not a consumable or marketable mixture. If Wilder is 

correct, then his trafficking conviction must be reversed because the weight of the 

remaining methamphetamine recovered at the scene was well below the 14 gram 

 

1

 Wilder was also charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and 

attempted second-degree murder (three counts) of the other deputies at the front 

door who were shot at. The trial court granted a judgment of acquittal on the 

possession of a firearm charge, and the jury acquitted Wilder of the attempted 

murder charges.
4

threshold for trafficking, and if Wilder’s trafficking conviction is reversed, his 

first-degree and second-degree felony murder convictions must also be reversed

because the trafficking offense was the predicate felony for those convictions.2

 

See §§ 782.04(1)(a), (3)(a), Fla. Stat.

Resolution of the issue raised by Wilder begins – and ends – with the plain 

language of the applicable provisions of section 893.135: subparagraph (1)(f)1. 

and subsection (6). See Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 121 So. 3d 433, 439 

(Fla. 2013) (“When construing a statute, this Court attempts to give effect to the 

Legislature’s intent, looking first to the actual language used in the statute and its 

plain meaning.”); M.D. v. State, 993 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) 

(“[W]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the 

statute’s plain language for legislative intent, or resort to rules of statutory 

construction to ascertain intent.”).

Section 893.135(1)(f)1. provides in pertinent part: 

Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, 

 

2

 This would be a hollow victory for Wilder because he would still be subject to a 

mandatory life sentence since the jury was instructed on – and the evidence was 

more than sufficient to support convictions for – the lesser included offenses of 

possession of less than 14 grams of methamphetamine and third-degree felony 

murder of the deputy. See §§ 893.13(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2011) (possession of 

methamphetamine is a second-degree felony); 782.04(4), Fla. Stat. (third-degree 

felony murder is an unlawful killing that occurs while the defendant is engaged in 

a non-enumerated felony); 782.065, Fla. Stat. (defendant convicted of third-degree 

felony murder “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for 

release” if the victim is a law enforcement officer).
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or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive 

possession of, 14 grams or more of . . . methamphetamine as 

described in section 893.03(2)(c)4., or of any mixture[3] containing . . . 

methamphetamine . . . in conjunction with other chemicals and 

equipment utilized in the manufacture of . . . methamphetamine 

commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as 

“trafficking in amphetamine,” . . . . 

(emphasis added). And, section 893.135(6) provides in pertinent part:

For the purpose of clarifying legislative intent regarding the weighing 

of a mixture containing a controlled substance described in this 

section, the weight of the controlled substance is the total weight of 

the mixture, including the controlled substance and any other 

substance in the mixture. 

There is no ambiguity in these statutes. Section 893.135(1)(f)1. clearly 

contemplates the punishment for trafficking of “any” mixture of methamphetamine 

and does not set a minimum threshold amount of methamphetamine that must be 

part of the mixture, and section 893.135(6) clearly states that, when a mixture 

contains a controlled substance, the total weight of the mixture is used, not just the 

weight of the controlled substance in the mixture. Accordingly, when these 

statutes are read together, it is clear that so long as there is some amount – no 

matter how small – of methamphetamine in the mixture, the weight of the

methamphetamine for purposes of the thresholds in the trafficking statute is the 

total weight of the mixture.

 

3 “Mixture” is defined by section 893.02(16) to mean “any physical combination of 

two or more substances.”
6

We find no merit in Wilder’s argument that these otherwise clear statutes 

become ambiguous when read in conjunction with subsection (7) of section 

893.135, which provides:

For the purpose of further clarifying legislative intent, the 

Legislature finds that the opinion in Hayes v. State, 750 

So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999) [Hayes II] does not correctly 

construe legislative intent. The Legislature finds that the 

opinions in State v. Hayes, 720 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1998) [Hayes I] and State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 

831 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) correctly construe legislative 

intent.

This argument is based on the flawed premise that subsection (7) reflects a 

legislative intent to adopt the “market approach” discussed in Chapman v. United 

States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), and thus, exclude the weight of any unmarketable 

portion of a mixture from the weight of the controlled substance. 

Subsection (7) does not mention the “market approach” or Chapman, and on 

its face, the statute simply reflects the Legislature’s disapproval of the result of the 

Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Hayes II in favor of the result reached by the 

district courts in Hayes I and Baxley: i.e., that a defendant can be charged with 

trafficking in hydrocodone based on the aggregate weight of the tablets in the 

defendant’s possession, regardless of the dosage of hydrocodone in each tablet. 

Indeed, the legislative staff analysis of the bill through which subsection (7) was 

enacted demonstrates that the Legislature was primarily focused on remedying 

Hayes II’s “effective nullification” of the offense of trafficking in hydrocodone:
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[Hayes II] effectively nullified the trafficking provision 

as it relates to hydrocodone because, almost without 

exception, the trafficking that occurs in hydrocodone is 

trafficking in prescription medications containing not 

more than 15 mg. of hydrocodone per dosage unit. It is 

not clear from the Hayes decision if the Court was aware 

of the preclusive effect of its decision.

Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 232 (2001) Staff Analysis,4 at 5 (Mar. 7, 

2001). To that end, the analysis explained that the purpose of subsection (7) was to 

indicate that “hydrocodone or mixtures containing hydrocodone, whether listed in 

Schedule II or Schedule III are, for the purpose of charging trafficking, to be 

weighed no differently than any other controlled substances, e.g., cocaine or cut 

cocaine.” Id. at 8.

Moreover, to adopt the interpretation of subsection (7) advocated by Wilder, 

we would have to interpret subsection (6) of section 893.135 to read in pertinent 

part: “. . . the weight of the controlled substance is the total weight of the 

marketable or usable portion of the mixture, including the controlled substance and 

any other substance in that portion of the mixture.” We have no authority to 

judicially amend the statute in this (or any other) manner. See Genesis Ministries, 

Inc. v. Brown, 186 So. 3d 1074, 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Am. Bankers 

Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)).

 

4

 The staff analysis is available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2001/

Senate/bills/ analysis/pdf/2001S0232.CJ.pdf. 
8

In this case, the liquid found in the glass vase was a “mixture” of 

methamphetamine because it contained methamphetamine in addition to the waste 

by-product from the manufacturing process. Accordingly, based on the plain 

language of sections 893.135(1)(f)1. and 893.135(6), the jury was properly 

instructed on and allowed to consider the liquid by-product in determining whether 

Wilder was guilty of the trafficking offense,5 and because the combined weight of 

 

5 This conclusion is not undermined by the methamphetamine cases relied on by 

Wilder arising under the federal counterpart to section 893.135. First and 

foremost, the federal statutes discussed in those cases differ from the applicable 

Florida statute in a significant respect because the federal statutes do not contain 

language similar to that in section 893.135(6) specifying how the weight of a 

mixture containing a controlled substance is to be calculated. Additionally, the 

federal circuits are split on the question of whether the weight of the unmarketable 

by-product resulting from the production of methamphetamine should be included 

in the weight of the methamphetamine under the applicable federal statutes, with a 

slight majority of the cases holding that the weight of the by-product mixture 

should be included. Compare United States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 

2003) (including unusable toxic waste solution containing small amount of 

methamphetamine in total weight for sentencing purposes based on plain language 

of statute and determination that waste products are necessarily part of 

manufacturing process), United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1996) 

(en banc) (rejecting “market” approach to calculating weight of liquid solution of 

methamphetamine because nowhere in the applicable federal statutes are the words 

“marketable” or “usable mixture”), United States v. Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49 

(5th Cir. 1993) (including waste by-products in total weight determination because 

they were necessary to manufacturing process), and United States v. Walker, 960 

F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1992) (including entire weight of toxic liquid containing small 

percentage of methamphetamine in computing sentence), with United States v. 

Stewart, 361 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that “only the amount of pure drug 

contained in an unusable solution, or the amount of usable drug that is likely to be 

produced after that unusable solution is fully processed, may be included in the 

drug quantity under the statute”), United States v. Newsome, 998 F.2d 1571 (11th 

Cir. 1993) (excluding weight of unusable sludge mixture containing only trace 
9

all of the liquid and other methamphetamine found at the scene exceeded the

statutory weight threshold for a trafficking offense, Wilder was properly convicted 

of that offense and the two felony murders predicated on that offense.

Accordingly, we affirm Wilder’s convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.

KELSEY, J., and DEMPSEY, ANGELA, Associate Judge, CONCUR.

 

amount of methamphetamine), and United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129 (6th 

Cir. 1991) (holding that if methamphetamine mixture contained poisonous byproducts then entire weight of mixture is not considered because entire mixture 

could not be distributed). See also United States v. Long, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1334 

(M.D. Fla. 2013) (surveying the conflicting federal circuit court decisions). And, 

finally, the federal sentencing guidelines for drug crimes define “mixture or 

substance” for sentencing purposes to specifically exclude materials such as the 

“waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled substance” 

that must be separated from the controlled substance before it can be used. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 1 (2012).