United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30053

____________

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Taylor Chiasson,

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:21-CR-267-1 

______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit 

Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge: 

Taylor Chiasson appeals an above-guidelines sentence the district 

court imposed based on Chiasson’s extensive criminal history. He argues the 

court erred by considering testimony by two non-victim witnesses and by 

relying on “bare arrests” in Chiasson’s record. We AFFIRM. 

I.

In March 2021, Chiasson was arrested and charged with being a felon 

in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Though 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 12, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Chiasson’s explanation about how he came to possess the gun changed 

multiple times, he eventually claimed the gun belonged to an acquaintance. 

While in pretrial custody, “in an effort to have the case dismissed,” Chiasson 

unsuccessfully attempted to convince this acquaintance to sign an affidavit 

stating the gun was hers. Chiasson ultimately pled guilty to violating 

§ 922(g)(1).

Chiasson’s Presentence Report (“PSR”) listed his numerous prior 

criminal convictions and arrests. Although only 33 years old, Chiasson had 

14 prior adult convictions. All but three convictions listed in the PSR

contained descriptions of Chiasson’s conduct leading up to the arrest. The 

PSR also noted 19 arrests spanning from 2008 to 2020 that either had no 

recorded disposition or had been dismissed. The PSR described the 

circumstances for eight of the 19 arrests.

At the sentencing hearing on January 12, 2023, the district court 

confirmed there were no outstanding objections to the PSR or its guidelines 

calculation. The guidelines range was 57 to 71 months imprisonment based 

on an offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of V. No party 

objected to the PSR’s conclusion that “there [were] no identifiable victims 

in this offense.” Before Chiasson’s counsel presented argument for a 

downward variance, the court stated, “from my review of his criminal 

history, it doesn’t look like the State did much at all for 20 something years 

to this gentleman.”

Chiasson’s counsel urged a downward variance to 30 months 

imprisonment. She recounted Chiasson’s abuse as a child, his father’s recent 

diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease, and the effects Hurricanes Laura and Delta

had on Chiasson. The present firearm incident, counsel argued, was an 

outlier in Chiasson’s otherwise positive trajectory as he “pick[ed] up the 

pieces of his life.” Chiasson also addressed the court, explaining how he came 

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into possession of the gun. He acknowledged he should have called the police 

rather than take the gun. He also explained that the onset of his father’s 

illness refocused his life and motivated him to stay out of trouble.

To rebut this narrative, the government offered testimony by two of 

Chiasson’s neighbors. Defense counsel objected under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32, which, she argued, prohibits sentencing testimony by 

“anyone from the public . . . if they’re not identified as a victim.” The 

district court overruled that objection. The court observed it was “allowed 

to consider the past criminal history of the Defendant,” and the witnesses’ 

testimony “just expound[ed] on that criminal history,” similar to letters 

received “from third parties about different defendants that [the court] 

review[s] for purposes of sentencing.”

The first government witness, Toby Osborne, lived across the street 

from Chiasson. Osborne recounted how Chiasson’s presence turned a once 

close-knit family neighborhood into a volatile scene. Osborne described 

almost 30 police visits to Chiasson’s house between 2015 and 2020. He

suspected Chiasson conducted drug activity out of his house because people 

came by at all hours of day and night, including one instance when Osborne 

saw police “removing multiple illegal marijuana plants from the home.”

Osborne recounted one occasion where his children witnessed Chiasson

kicking out his own front door in the middle of the night while ignoring

officers’ commands—with weapons drawn—to exit the house. Chiasson also

violated numerous ordinances concerning clean up after Hurricane Laura, 

including one occasion where city inspectors found a dog’s rotting carcass in 

debris stacked in Chiasson’s driveway. Chiasson’s presence created so much 

anxiety that Osborne felt compelled to borrow a gun for protection. Osborne 

also discussed an arrest record he found on Google to show Chiasson had 

escaped the consequences of his actions.

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The second witness, David Benada, was a sheriff’s deputy who lived 

in Chiasson’s neighborhood. Benada also testified to the chaotic nature of 

their street after Chiasson moved in, including increased police activity. 

Since Chiasson’s arrest, however, Benada described how quiet the street had 

become. Benada also spoke to Chiasson’s many arrests, including those for 

“homicide, principal to homicide, to numerous drug charges to carnal 

knowledge charges to numerous weapons charges.” The court told Benada 

it already had that arrest information. After the government’s witnesses 

testified, it asked for an above-guidelines sentence to reflect the seriousness 

of the offense and to promote respect for the law.

The district court varied upward by 25 months, sentencing Chiasson 

to 96 months imprisonment. The court explained that the guidelines did “not 

capture the extent of [Chiasson’s] past criminal history.” It noted that the 

PSR provided “a very detailed analysis of” Chiasson’s criminal record. His 

many light sentences, the court found, had no deterrent effect: “[T]his is 

based upon his extensive criminal history and certainly is based on his 

extensive criminal history not being a deterrent which is a factor within the 

3553(a) factors.” Chiasson had “been arrested time and time and time again. 

He’s been arrested for possession of a firearm by a felon time and time again. 

He’s been arrested for drug offenses. He’s been arrested for battery, carnal 

knowledge of a juvenile. It goes on and on and on.” Most of his arrests and 

convictions resulted in dismissals or suspended sentences. Finding Chiasson 

a danger to society and undeterred by prior sentences, the court believed an 

upward variance was warranted. Chiasson’s counsel noted her “objection for 

the record to the sentence [sic] upward variance.”

Chiasson timely appealed.

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II.

We review de novo “whether a district court failed to comply with a 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.” United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 840 

F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2016). If the defendant fails to raise a specific 

objection to a substantively unreasonable sentence, then we review for plain 

error. United States v. Zarco-Beiza, 24 F.4th 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2022).

III.

On appeal, Chiasson argues the district court committed two 

reversible errors. First, he says the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32 by permitting non-victim government witnesses to testify at his 

sentencing. Second, he claims the court wrongly relied on a “bare arrest” 

record to impose a substantively unreasonable sentence above the prescribed 

guidelines range. We consider each issue in turn.

A.

Chiasson first contends the district court violated Rule 32 by 

permitting non-victim witnesses to testify on behalf of the government at 

sentencing. We disagree.

District courts have wide latitude to consider information that may be 

relevant to sentencing. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 3661 categorically provides: 

“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 

background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 

which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose 

of imposing an appropriate sentence.” Similarly, when considering a 

disputed “factor important to the sentencing determination,” the 

Sentencing Guidelines permit district courts to “consider relevant 

information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence 

applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of 

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reliability to support its probable accuracy.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines 

Manual § 6A1.3(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.). 

To be sure, though, facts supporting the imposed sentence “must be 

‘reasonably reliable.’” United States v. Washington, 232 F.3d 209, 209 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing United States v. Shacklett, 921 

F.2d 580, 584–85 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 addresses various 

circumstances in which a district court may or must permit certain persons 

to speak at sentencing. For example, Rule 32(i)(2) states: “The court may 

permit the parties to introduce evidence on the objections [to the PSR].” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(2). Rule 32(i)(4) specifies persons from whom the 

court “must” permit testimony: (1) “the defendant’s attorney,” (2) “the 

defendant personally,” (3) the “attorney for the government,” and (4) “any 

victim of the crime.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A), (B). This right to 

speak under Rule 32(i)(4) does not extend to other persons a defendant may 

want to testify on his behalf. See United States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 191 

(5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting argument that Rule 32 “gives [a defendant] the 

right to present witnesses on his own behalf” because “no cases . . . have 

recognized such a right and we are aware of none”).

Chiasson contends Rule 32 provides the only two avenues for witness 

testimony at sentencing. In his view, either (1) testimony is permitted to

support or contest an objection to the PSR, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(2), 

or (2) testimony is limited to the four persons permitted to speak by Rule 

32(i)(4). In effect, Chiasson asks us to extend our decision in Jackson, which 

held that a defendant’s Rule 32 right to allocute did not give him the right to 

call other witnesses on his behalf. Based on Jackson, Chiasson argues Rule 32 

also limits the district court’s discretion to permit non-victims to testify on 

the government’s behalf. See 700 F.2d at 191. The testimony here, he argues,

did not fall into either avenue provided by Rule 32 because there were no 

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objections to the PSR and because the witnesses were not persons described 

by Rule 32(i)(4).

Chiasson misreads Rule 32. By its terms, the Rule does not purport to 

restrict a district court’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3661 to permit 

testimony relevant to sentencing. Rather, Rule 32 specifies classes of persons

to whom “the court must” give the “[o]pportunity to [s]peak.” See Fed. R. 

Crim P. 32(i)(4) (emphasis added). But the Rule does not say or imply that 

those persons are the only ones who may be permitted to testify at sentencing.

To read the Rule that broadly would sharply reduce the “information” a 

district court may “receive and consider” in assessing a defendant’s 

sentence, contrary to the express terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3661. See ibid.

(providing “[n]o limitation shall be placed” on such information).1 Chiasson 

cites no case supporting his reading of Rule 32, nor can we find one.

The cases Chiasson does cite fail to support his argument. As noted, 

our Jackson decision held that a defendant’s personal right to allocate under 

Rule 32 does not require a court to permit testimony from other defense 

witnesses. 700 F.2d at 191. We face a different issue, however: whether a 

court can permit non-victim testimony offered by government witnesses.

Jackson does not speak to that question.

Nor is Chiasson helped by United States v. Johnson, 956 F.3d 740 (5th 

Cir. 2020). There, we vacated a sentence because the district court relied on 

facts contained in a probation officer’s undisclosed recommendation. Id. at 

_____________________

1 See also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (“[T]he fundamental 

sentencing principle [is] that a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, 

largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from 

which it may come.” (cleaned up)); Washington, 232 F.3d at 209 (permitting non-victim 

testimony); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (permitting courts to consider any “relevant information” 

if it has “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy”).

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742, 747. Contrary to Rule 32(e)(2), the defendant did not receive those facts

“at least 35 days before sentencing,” which deprived him of “reasonable 

notice . . . to engage in adversarial testing at sentencing.” Id. at 744 (citations 

omitted). Here, again, we face a different situation. Chiasson does not claim 

he was denied notice under Rule 32(e)(2). Nor did the district court’s 

variance rely on, or even reference, secret information obtained exclusively 

from government witnesses. To the contrary, before the two witnesses even 

testified, the court stated it was concerned that Chiasson’s light state 

sentences did not adequately deter him from criminal conduct. Finally, as 

discussed below, Chiasson’s PSR explained the circumstances behind each 

arrest or conviction that troubled the court, and Chiasson did not even object 

to the PSR.

In sum, the district court did not violate Rule 32 by allowing the two 

non-victim witnesses to testify on behalf of the government at sentencing.

B.

Chiasson next argues that the district court wrongly relied on bare 

arrest records to vary his sentence upward. We disagree.

We review this issue for plain error because Chiasson failed to raise it 

at sentencing. Chiasson objected to his sentence only on two grounds: the 

previously-discussed Rule 32 issue and the substantive unreasonableness of 

the upward variance. Neither objection “reasonably ‘informed the court of 

the legal error at issue’—i.e., improper reliance on a bare arrest record.” 

Zarco-Beiza, 24 F.4th at 482 (quoting Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 

140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020)).2 “Accordingly, we will reverse only if [Chiasson] 

_____________________

2 We disagree with Chiasson that his Rule 32 argument preserved the objection 

because the witnesses went on to reference bare arrests. His Rule 32 objection argued that

the witnesses should not have been allowed to testify at all, not that they would reference 

bare arrests. Chiasson could have objected to any references in their testimony to bare 

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shows error that is plain and affects his substantial rights, and even then, only 

if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” United States v. Carr, 83 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2023) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A sentencing court may consider prior criminal conduct that resulted 

in arrest but not conviction, so long as the record contains information with

“sufficient indicia of reliability” regarding the conduct at issue. U.S.S.G.

§ 6A1.3(a).

3 A court may not rely on bare arrest records, however. ZarcoBeiza, 24 F.4th at 482. “Bare” in this context means “the reference to the 

mere fact of an arrest—i.e. the date, charge, jurisdiction and disposition—

without corresponding information about the underlying facts or 

circumstances regarding the defendant’s conduct that led to the arrest.” Ibid.

(citation omitted). A record is not bare, by contrast, “when it is accompanied 

by a factual recitation of the defendant’s conduct that gave rise to a prior 

unadjudicated arrest and that factual recitation has an adequate evidentiary 

basis with sufficient indicia of reliability.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Chiasson argues the district court obviously erred by relying on his 

bare arrest records. Had the court not done so, Chiasson contends, there is a 

reasonable probability the court would not have varied upward.

Our analysis is guided by Zarco-Beiza, which held that a district court 

did not plainly err by referring to a bare arrest record at sentencing. 24 F.4th 

_____________________

arrests but did not. See, e.g., Zarco-Beiza, 24 F.4th at 482 (bare arrest objections must 

specifically alert the court to “the legal error at issue”).

3 See also United States v. Fields, 932 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding “[i]t is 

well-established that prior criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction may be considered 

by the sentencing judge” if the information “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support 

its probable accuracy” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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at 483–84. We first identified what part of the PSR constituted a bare arrest 

record. There, it was a DWI charge that “contained only ‘the date, charge, 

jurisdiction and disposition’ and included no ‘corresponding information 

about the underlying facts or circumstances regarding the defendant’s 

conduct that led to the arrest.’” Ibid. (citation omitted). We then found that 

the court had, in fact, “relied on” that charge because its “comments at the 

sentencing hearing and . . . the statement of reasons demonstrate[d] that the 

pending DWI charge was at least one factor the district court relied upon at 

sentencing.” Ibid. Nonetheless, the defendant failed “at the third prong of 

plain error review” because, viewing the whole of the sentencing hearing, it 

was not likely that the court would have reached a different sentence absent 

that improper reliance. Id. at 484.

Following Zarco-Beiza, we find no error here, plain or otherwise. 

Although the PSR and the witnesses’ testimony did reference some bare 

arrests, Chiasson fails to show that the district court relied on any of those 

records in imposing sentence. See id. at 483 (finding reliance where the 

district court “specifically noted” or “referenced the pending DWI

charge”). To the contrary, the record of the sentencing hearing shows there 

was ample factual support in the PSR for each prior arrest (or conviction) 

referenced by the court in imposing an upward variance. See, e.g., United 

States v. Whitehead, 986 F.3d 547, 550 n.3 (5th Cir. 2021) (district court did 

not err “in considering [defendant’s] arrest history” because it “was not 

dealing with a ‘bare arrest record’” when “the PSR includes details about 

the facts underlying [defendant’s] arrests, based on police reports”).

Here are a couple of examples. The district court referenced 

Chiasson’s arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm. In support of

that, the PSR explained that Chiasson was arrested in 2016 after “officers 

conducted a ‘knock investigation’ and the defendant was found to be in 

possession of an AR-15 style rifle.” The court also noted that Chiasson had 

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multiple arrests for drug related offenses. There was also factual support for 

this reference in the PSR, which stated, for instance, that in 2008 officers 

found “a bag of suspected marijuana” while arresting Chiasson at a motel 

where he fraudulently used a credit card and had sexwith a juvenile. Chiasson 

fails to identify any example of the court actually relying on a bare arrest 

record.4 To the contrary, the record shows that the court varied upward—

not because of Chiasson’s bare arrests—but because of his extensive criminal 

history (including 14 adult convictions in a mere 33 years of life) and because 

he was obviously undeterred by his numerous lenient state sentences.

IV.

The sentence is AFFIRMED.

_____________________

4 At oral argument, Chiasson contended the district court’s references to arrests 

for controlled substance and a felon-in-possession offenses were to bare arrest records. We 

disagree. First, the district court referenced a dismissed arrest for possession of a controlled 

substance. But a paragraph in the PSR explainsthe circumstancesleading up to a dismissed 

arrest for possession of marijuana and illegal use of controlled dangerous substances in the 

presence of a juvenile. Second, the district court referenced multiple arrests for being a 

felon in possession of a firearm. But the court had ample factual support for at least two 

such arrests: the instant arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm and Chiasson’s

arrest for possessing an “AR-15 style rifle.”

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