[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13971

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WENDELL TERRY LOCKE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus

CHARLES CANADY,

Justice, 

RICKY POLSTON,

Justice,

JORGE LABARGA,

Justice, 

ALAN LAWSON,

Justice, 

CHIEF JUSTICE OF FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, et al., 

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13971

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cv-00116-AW-MAF

____________________

Before GRANT, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Wendell Locke appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 

§ 1983 suit against the Justices and Clerk of the Florida Supreme 

Court. Because he abandoned any claim against the Clerk, and 

because his claims against the Justices are barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment, we affirm.

I.

On March 1, 2022, following a lengthy investigation, the 

Florida Supreme Court suspended appellant Wendell Locke from 

the practice of law for one year and ordered a taxation of costs. 

Locke’s suspension was to be effective on March 31, 2022, whether 

or not he filed a motion for rehearing. And that’s precisely what 

he did, petitioning for rehearing on March 16. On the same day, 

Locke filed this § 1983 suit against the Justices and Clerk of the 

Florida Supreme Court.

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22-13971 Opinion of the Court 3

In this suit, Locke challenges the suspension order on several 

grounds. He claims that he was denied due process and equal 

protection of the law during the state proceedings and that the 

defendants initiated the investigation in retaliation for 

constitutionally protected speech. As a result of those asserted 

violations, he prays for this Court to enter an order “declaring the 

March 1, 2022, Order null and void” and “enjoining the [Justices 

and Clerk] from enforcing the sanctions of suspension and taxing 

of costs.” More generally, because the suspension order was not 

final at the time of suit, Locke asks this Court to prevent the Justices 

and Clerk from “admonishing, reprimanding, suspending, 

disbarring or otherwise disciplining” him.

Locke admits that he raised similar constitutional challenges 

to the Florida Supreme Court. In fact, the Florida court rejected 

the very same due process and equal protection challenges that he 

reasserts in federal court. Locke’s only novel claim is his First 

Amendment retaliation argument. The district court dismissed his 

claims against the Clerk for lack of standing, and dismissed his 

remaining claims against the Justices because of judicial immunity 

and the Eleventh Amendment. This is his appeal. 

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 

Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 2022). Likewise, this Court 

reviews the grant of immunity de novo. Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 

1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001).

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An appellant forfeits any argument not briefed on appeal, 

made in passing, or raised briefly without supporting arguments or 

authority. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681–

82 (11th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); see also United States v. 

Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

III.

At the outset, we note that Locke does not challenge the 

district court’s conclusion that he lacked standing to pursue his 

claims against the Clerk. He has thus forfeited any challenge to 

that decision, and we do not disturb the district court’s conclusion. 

See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82.

Locke’s remaining claims against the Justices are precluded 

by the Eleventh Amendment, which bars suits against the State of 

Florida and its agencies—here, the Justices.1 Summit Med. Assocs., 

1 The Justices assert that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine also strips this Court of 

jurisdiction to hear Locke’s claims. Rooker–Feldman is a “narrow and limited 

doctrine” that precludes federal district courts from reviewing or rejecting 

state-court judgments rendered before the district court litigation began. Behr 

v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2021). For it to apply, the relevant 

state-court proceedings must have ended at the time of the federal suit. 

Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, Locke moved 

the Florida Supreme Court for reconsideration on the same day he filed this 

§ 1983 suit, preventing the state proceedings from ending. Rooker–Feldman

does not apply. To be sure, because the state court subsequently rejected 

some of Locke’s constitutional claims, preclusion law may still bar his claims. 

Behr, 8 F.4th at 1210. But that is “separate and distinct from Rooker–Feldman’s 

jurisdictional prohibition.” Id. And it can only be addressed after resolving 

other threshold jurisdictional issues, including immunity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(c)(1).

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P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 1999). A narrow 

exception exists, however, under Ex Parte Young, for “suits against 

state officers seeking prospective equitable relief to end continuing 

violations of federal law.” Id. at 1336; see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 

123 (1908). But the Ex parte Young doctrine applies “only to ongoing 

and continuous violations of federal law”—a plaintiff “may not use 

the doctrine to adjudicate the legality of past conduct.” Summit 

Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1337 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 

277–78 (1986)). So when determining whether a suit falls within 

this exception, we need only conduct a “straightforward inquiry 

into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of 

federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” 

Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 

645 (2002) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

That standard is not satisfied here, so Ex parte Young does not 

help Locke avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar. On May 16, 2022, 

the Florida Supreme Court denied Locke’s petition for rehearing. 

Florida Bar v. Locke, No. SC19-1913, 2022 WL 1533436 (Fla. May 16, 

2022). Locke’s one-year suspension from practicing law—which 

began on March 31, 2022—has thus ended. The end of the 

suspension proceedings, and the end of the suspension itself, also 

ended any ongoing constitutional violation. The asserted 

violations occurred entirely in the issuance of the suspension order 

or the events leading up to it. Locke argues that he was denied due 

process and equal protection of the laws during the disciplinary 

proceedings (for various reasons), and the initiation of the 

proceedings was an unconstitutional retaliation against protected 

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speech. None of these claims allege an ongoing or continuing 

violation of federal law; all asserted violations ended when the state 

proceedings ended. See Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1336–37.

Ex parte Young applies only in “cases in which the relief 

against the state official directly ends the violation of federal law.” 

Florida Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Health & 

Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2000). None of Locke’s 

requested relief would remedy whatever constitutional violations 

(if any) occurred during or as a result of the suspension 

proceedings. The Eleventh Amendment thus strips this Court of 

subject matter jurisdiction over Locke’s claims against the Justices. 

See S&M Brands, Inc. v. Georgia, 925 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2019).

* * *

Locke has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s 

conclusion that he lacks standing to sue the Clerk. And his claims 

against the Justices are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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