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MICHAEL TAVANI v. MAUREEN RILEY

(AC 37034)

Alvord, Keller and Harper, Js.

Argued March 3—officially released October 27, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Windham, Graziani, J.)

J. Colin Heffernan, with whom, on the brief, was

John C. Heffernan, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

HARPER, J. The plaintiff, Michael Tavani, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his

action for a declaratory judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his

action, sua sponte, on the ground that his case was not

justiciable.1 We agree, and reverse the judgment of the

trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s claim. On December 27, 2012,

the plaintiff filed a one count complaint against the

defendant, Maureen Riley, seeking declaratory relief

‘‘that [he] has fully complied with his child support

obligation and that there are no arrearages relating to

the care and support of either of [his] children, who

are now adults, or [the defendant].’’ The trial court

stated the following facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s

complaint: ‘‘On March 24, 1994, the Essex County, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court granted the plaintiff and the defendant a divorce. Both parties and their

children resided in Massachusetts at the time of the

divorce. Between 1994 and 2000, the plaintiff relocated

to Connecticut and the defendant relocated to Virginia.

On April 28, 2000, the defendant petitioned the Virginia

Department of Social Services to pursue the plaintiff

for his alleged failure to pay child support from 1994

through 2000. The Massachusetts support order was

registered in Connecticut on July 11, 2000. The Virginia

Department of Social Services contacted the Connecticut Support Enforcement Services in Putnam, which

contacted the plaintiff and directed him to appear in

court on September 14, 2000, and provide proof of his

gross income from March, 1994, to September, 2000.

The Connecticut Support Enforcement Services determined that there was no arrearage and facilitated future

child support payments from 2000 to 2009.

‘‘The plaintiff further alleges that on August 10, 2009,

the Connecticut Superior Court terminated the plaintiff’s child support obligation at the plaintiff’s request

because his children were emancipated. The court did

not find any arrearage owed at the time the support

order was terminated.2 On January 3, 2012, the defendant, who was now living in New Hampshire, filed a

complaint for contempt in the Essex County, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. The Massachusetts

court dismissed the complaint on April 25, 2012, for

lack of jurisdiction because neither party resided in

[Massachusetts]. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that he ‘has fully complied with his child support

obligation and that there are no arrearages relating to

the care and support of either of [his] children, who are

now adults, or [the defendant]. The purpose in seeking

declaratory judgment is to prevent [the defendant] from

engaging in any further forum shopping that would

require [the plaintiff] to once again prove to a court’s
satisfaction that he has fully met his obligations.’ The

plaintiff wishes to enforce a judgment from this court

under the full faith and credit clause of the constitution

in any state and at any time the defendant brings a

claim against him.

‘‘On February 6, 2013, the defendant was defaulted

for failure to plead. On March 6, 2013, the plaintiff filed

a motion for judgment after default, which was denied

on March 22, 2013. OnAugust 27, 2013, the court granted

the plaintiff’s August 15, 2013 motion to transfer and

the matter was transferred to the family docket. The

plaintiff then filed a motion for judgment on October

17, 2013.’’ (Footnote added.) On November 6, 2013, the

court heard oral argument and referred the matter to

the Family Support Magistrate Division, and on January

30, 2014, the Family Support Magistrate Division

referred the case back to the family division of the trial

court.3

‘‘The matter was heard on July 10, 2014, at which

time the court denied the motion for judgment and [sua

sponte] dismissed the case for a lack of substantial

question in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal

relations. The plaintiff filed a motion for articulation

on July 11, 2014.’’

On August 7, 2014, the court issued its memorandum

of decision, concluding that there was no justiciable

controversy or substantial issue to allow it to declare

judgment. The court explained that ‘‘[t]here is no pending action concerning a complaint of contempt against

the plaintiff. The last action against the plaintiff, filed

on January 3, 2012, was dismissed by the Massachusetts

Probate and Family Court for lack of jurisdiction. The

Massachusetts child support order, which was registered in Connecticut, has been terminated and there is

no pending contempt case in Connecticut. The action

for declaratory judgment itself is not an uncertainty

that requires settlement; it is an action by which the

court may determine a question that is already in dispute and distinctly separate from the issue of whether

the court should declare judgment for the moving

party.’’ The court concluded that ‘‘when there is no

justiciable controversy or substantial issue forthe court

to rule in a declaratory judgment action, a default for

failure to plead does not require the court to declare

judgment.’’ Because the court had no information as to

what the defendant may or may not claim in a future

action, it stated that ‘‘the defendant’s previous act of

bringing a claim of contempt does not allow the plaintiff

to ascertain with reasonable certainty that the defendant will bring the same action in another jurisdiction.’’

In other words, the court determined that the plaintiff’s

complaint was not justiciable. For those reasons, the

court denied the plaintiff’s motion for judgment and

dismissed his case. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his action on the ground that the case
was not justiciable. He argues that ‘‘[t]he trial court

erroneously interpreted the plaintiff’s complaint as

seeking an advisory opinion as to whether or not the

defendant could pursue an action against the plaintiff

in another forum.’’ He further argues that this was not

his request; his request was for the court to find a

specific fact, which presently exists, that there was a

previous finding of zero arrearages of child support

owed to the defendant.4

As a preliminary note, we treat the plaintiff’s request

for a declaratory judgment as a request for an accounting to clarify whether he owes the defendant any child

support arrearage. See Drahan v. Board of Education,

42 Conn. App. 480, 489, 680 A.2d 316 (‘‘[W]e emphasize

that the construction of a pleading is a question ultimately for the court. . . . When a case requires this

court to determine the nature of a pleading filed by a

party, we are not required to accept the label affixed

to that pleading by the party. In this vein, we analyze

the pleadings at issue in the present case.’’ [Internal

quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921,

682 A.2d 1000 (1996). Upon review of the record and the

plaintiff’s complaint for declaratory relief, we conclude

that the plaintiff sought an accounting by the court,

that as ofAugust 10, 2009, when his child support obligation was terminated due to his children’s emancipation,

he owed no arrearage in his child support obligations.

The plaintiff seeks to prove, by review of the records

of the Connecticut Support Enforcement Services, a

division of the court operations of the judicial branch,

that no arrearage exists and to have the court issue a

specific finding to that effect. Our Supreme Court has

stated that ‘‘[e]ven beyond the four month time frame

set forth in Practice Book § 17-4 . . . courts have continuing jurisdiction to fashion a remedy appropriate to

the vindication of a prior . . . judgment . . . pursuant

to [their] inherent powers . . . . When an ambiguity

in the language of a prior judgment has arisen as a

result of postjudgment events . . . a trial court may,

at any time, exercise its continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior [judgment] . . . by interpreting [the]

ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate

the judgment as interpreted . . . .’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Mickey v. Mickey,

292 Conn. 597, 604, 974 A.2d 641 (2009).

Next, we set forth the applicable standard of review

for issues regarding justiciability. ‘‘A court will not

resolve a claimed controversy on the merits unless it

is satisfied that the controversy is justiciable. . . . Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . .

(2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . .

(3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being

adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the

determination of the controversy will result in practical
relief to the complainant. . . . As we have recognized,

justiciability comprises several related doctrines,

namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political

question doctrine, that implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter. . . . Finally, because an issue regarding

justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate

review is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Shenkman-Tyler v. Central Mutual

Ins. Co., 126 Conn. App. 733, 738–39, 12 A.3d 613 (2011).

Here, we hold that the plaintiff’s complaint was justiciable. Although the court found that there was not an

actual controversy, we determine that the plaintiff was

entitled to obtain an accounting or clear ruling that he

does not owe any arrearage for child support to the

defendant. Although the defendant has taken no action

in this matter, the interest of the plaintiff in seeking an

accounting is adverse to that of the defendant, who

recently had attempted to pursue collection of a claimed

child support arrearage against the plaintiff in Massachusetts. This Massachusetts filing by the defendant

was despite her successful petition to have Connecticut

Support Enforcement Services enforce and collect the

child support payment from 2000 to 2009, when all the

children had attained the age of majority.5 Additionally,

the matter is capable of being adjudicated by the court,6

and if the court can augment its August 10, 2009 order

by permitting the plaintiff to establish he owes no

arrearage, the plaintiff can achieve practical relief by

having the ability to prove to another forum that he has

met his obligation. Therefore, the plaintiff’s case meets

the requirements of justiciability.

The judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action is

reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for

a hearing on the accounting action to ascertain whether

the plaintiff owes any arrearage for child support to

the defendant.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly refused to grant him

a judgment on the default for failure to plead that was entered against the

defendant, Maureen Riley, on February 12, 2013, and improperly denied his

request for a declaratory judgment following that order of default. Because

we agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly dismissed his action

on the ground that it was not justiciable, we remand the case for further

proceedings and do not reach these claims.

We also note that the defendant never filed a brief in this appeal and this

court ordered that the appeal would be considered only on the basis of the

plaintiff’s brief and appendix.

2 The court’s order lacked any finding on the child support arrearage, if

any existed at that time. This ambiguity is the root of the problem.

3 Number 15-71 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-71) modified the law

of interstate support orders. The power of the Family Support Magistrate

Division, however, remains unchanged. In particular, § 89 (m) (2) (A) of

P.A. 15-71 authorizes the Family Support Magistrate to hear interstate matters, and § 19 provides that the magistrate shall: ‘‘(1) apply the procedural

and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating

in this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available

in those proceedings; and (2) determine the duty of support and the amount

payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.’’

Public Acts 2015, No. 15-71, § 19.
4 We emphasize that there was never a previous finding of zero child

support arrearage. The plaintiff could have requested, at the time of termination of his child support obligation, a finding of the arrearage, if any.

5 We note that the support obligor who seeks an accounting bears the

burden of proving the payment of the court order. Therefore, it is the

plaintiff’s burden to prove, on remand, that there is a zero arrearage owed

to the defendant as of the date of termination of the child support order.

6 Because the records of the Connecticut Support Enforcement Services

may be necessary evidence in a hearing, on remand, the court, in its discretion, may order the matter placed on the family support magistrate list for

hearing and determination. See Practice Book § 25a-1 (c).