UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LNV CORPORATION, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MARY JULIA HOOK, Defendant - Appellant, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee, and DAVID LEE SMITH; PRUDENTIAL HOME MORTAGAGE COMPANY, INC.; SAINT LUKES LOFTS HOMEOWNER ASSOCATION, INC.; DEBRA JOHNSON, in her official capacity as the Public Trustee of the City and County of Denver, Colorado, Defendants. No. 20-1167 (D.C. No. 1:14-CV -00955-RM-SKC) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 12, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Before PHILLIPS , McHUGH , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Mary Julia Hook, an atto rney proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s March 2, 2020, Orde r Confirming Judicial Sale. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismis s the appeal as frivolous. Ms. Hook previously appealed from the judgment in the underlying foreclosure case. See LNV Corp. v. Hook ( Hook I ), 807 F. App’x 893 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 141 S. Ct. 939 (2020). Hook I described Ms. Hook’s arguments challenging the judgment as “wholly frivolous.” Id. at 895. “As an attorney, she should have known that they lacked any me rit before she argued them; and in large part, the appellees’ briefs ma ke that perfectly clear. We see no need to further educate Hook.” Id. Accordingly, this court dismissed her appeal in Hook I

. See id. Ms. Hook’s opening brief largely reiter ates the “wholly frivolous” arguments she offered in Hook I . But given the law of the case doctrine, we will not revisit those arguments. See Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc. , 861 F.3d 1081, 1099 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen a court deci des upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to gove rn the same issues in subs equent stages in the same case. An appellate court decision on a par ticular issue . . . gove rns the issue during all later stages of the litig ation in the district court and thereafter on any further appeal.” (citations and inte rnal quotation marks omitted)). There are exceptions to the doctrine, see id. , but none applies here. And Ms. Hook’s request that this panel vacate and set aside Hook I disregards well-established law that one panel cannot3 overrule the decision of another panel, abse nt intervening en banc or Supreme Court authority. See Strain v. Regalado , 977 F.3d 984, 993 ( 10th Cir. 2020). In addition to previously raised ar guments, the opening brief appears to advance new arguments challe nging the April 2019 judgment. But the subject of this appeal is the Order Confirmi ng Judicial Sale, not the judgm ent. All challenges to the judgment could, and should, have been raised in Hook I

. The few assertions in the opening brie f that may be relevant to the Order Confirming Judicial Sale ar e inadequately briefed. See Fuerschbach v. Sw. Airlines
Co. , 439 F.3d 1197, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2006) (collecting authorities holding that inadequately briefed and underdeveloped theories ar e waived). Ms. Hook’s conclusory assertions of pr ocedural error fail to sufficiently iden tify or argue any violations. She criticizes th e district court for not holdi ng a hearing before it issued the Order Confirming Judici al Sale, but she does not s how that she was entitled to such a hearing, or even th at she requested one. And she makes no argument for plain

error. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal . . . surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reve rsal not first presented to the district court.”). Finally, Ms. Hook asserts that the district court was biased against her because it denied her motion to proceed on appeal wit hout prepayment of fees and costs. But as we have previously explained to her, “adverse rulings alone do not demonstrate judicial bias,” meaning that an “argumen t rel[ying] solely on the district court’s4 adverse rulings . . . is devoid of merit.” Hook I , 807 F. App’x at 895 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, this appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See Ford v. Pryor , 552 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 2008) (“An appeal is fri volous when the result is obvious, or the appellant’s arguments of er ror are wholly without merit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). LNV Corpora tion’s pre-briefing motions to dismiss the appeal and to release a noti ce of lis pendens are denied as moot. The requests in Ms. Hook’s reply briefs for sanctions and attorney disc ipline are denied.

Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge