IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00001-CV

PERCY L. WAYNE ISGITT, INDIVIDUALLY,

AND ISGITT & ASSOCIATES, PC,

Appellants

v.

CHRISTINE GODWIN, AS PERMANENT 

GUARDIAN OF CRAIG GODWIN,

Appellees

From the County Court at Law

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court No. 8422-G

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court entered an order enjoining appellants, Percy L. Wayne Isgitt, 

individually, and Isgitt & Associates, P.C., from, among other things, removing, 

transferring, or taking money from an escrow account created for Craig Godwin. The 

injunction was premised on the allegation that Isgitt has failed to return the funds 

contained in the escrow account—approximately $200,000—despite numerous requests 
Isgitt v. Godwin Page 2

made by appellee, Christine Godwin, as permanent guardian of Craig.1 Appellants 

have now filed an accelerated, interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. § 51.014(a)(4) (West 2015). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial 

court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. ANALYSIS

Appellants contend inter alia that the order at issue is void because it does not 

comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. The 

requirements of rule 683 are mandatory, and “an order granting a temporary injunction 

that does not meet them is subject to being declared void and dissolved.” Qwest 

Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000); see InterFirst Bank San 

Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). Rule 683 

does not expressly require that a trial date be set. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. However, it 

provides that “[e]very order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order 

setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought.” Id. 

This Court and several of our sister courts have held that an order granting a 

temporary injunction that does not set the case for trial on the merits, such as the order 

in this case, is void. See Leighton v. Rebeles, 343 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, 

 

1

In her original petition and applications for a temporary restraining order and a temporary 

injunction, Christine, Craig’s permanent guardian, noted that Craig was left incapacitated as a result of a 

vehicular accident on or about October 27, 2012. As a result of the accident, Craig purportedly received a 

$302,500 settlement from the Texas Farm Bureau under Craig’s uninsured/underinsured motorist policy. 

According to Christine, Isgitt requested that she give him the proceeds of the settlement to be held in 

trust for Craig. Christine alleged that Isgitt requested more money from her to negotiate a settlement 

regarding Craig’s medical bills. Christine further alleged that despite receiving money to pay medical 

bills, Isgitt did not pay any of Craig’s medical bills. In addition, Christine noted that Isgitt has refused to 

return to her any of the funds contained in the escrow account established for Craig.
Isgitt v. Godwin Page 3

no pet.) (“Failure of the order to meet the requirements of rule 683 renders the order 

fatally defective and void . . . .”); Gray Wireline Serv., Inc. v. Cavanna, 374 S.W.3d 464, 472 

(Tex. App.—Waco 2011, no pet.); Bay Fin. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 586, 591 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (concluding that although error concerning the 

mandatory requirements of rule 683 was not raised on appeal, the temporary injunction 

was void because it did not include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits); 

Henke v. Peoples State Bank, 6 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. 

dism’d w.o.j.) (holding a temporary-injunction order defective for failing to set forth a 

trial date); Moreno v. Baker Tools, Inc., 808 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] no writ) (stating that an injunction order must include a specific date for trial on 

the merits); Corpus Christi Caller-Times v. Mancias, 794 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 1990, no pet.) (holding an injunction order void for failing to include the 

required trial date); Higginbotham v. Clues, 730 S.W.2d 129, 129 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (holding that an injunction order violated rule 683 because it 

failed to include a date for trial on the merits); see also Padgett v. LSKR, Inc., No. 03-06-

00262-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 530, at **5-6 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 24, 2007, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (dissolving a temporary injunction that did not set the case for trial on the 

merits). “A void order has no force or effect and confers no right; it is a nullity.” Gray 

Wireline Serv., Inc., 374 S.W.3d at 472 (citing In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding)). 
Isgitt v. Godwin Page 4

Because the trial court’s order does not set the case for trial on the merits, the 

order is void.2 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. We sustain appellants’ third issue. See EOG Res., 

Inc. v. Gutierrez, 75 S.W.3d 50, 52-53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (“We have 

held that the failure to meet the requirements of rule 683 renders the injunction order 

fatally defective and void, whether specifically raised by point of error or not.”). 

II. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s temporary-injunction order 

and order that the trial court dissolve it.3 See Gray Wireline Serv., Inc., 374 S.W.3d at 472 

(citing Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d at 641). Accordingly, we remand this matter to the 

trial court for further proceedings.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

 

2

In response to appellants’ contention that the trial court’s temporary-injunction order is void, 

Christine asserts that appellants have waived this complaint. See Texas Tech Univ. Health Sci. Ctr. v. Rao, 

105 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. dism’d). As recognized in Rao, there appears to be a 

split of authority on the question of whether a party can waive the right to complain about a temporary 

injunction that fails to comply with rule 683. See id. However, Rao concedes that the great majority of the 

Courts of Appeal who have considered the question have concluded that the Texas Supreme Court’s 

instruction in Paz that the requirements of rule 683 are mandatory means that the right to raise the issue 

on appeal is not waived by failing to make an objection in the trial court. See id. at 768; see also InterFirst 

Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). Given the wealth of 

authority holding that violations of rule 683 are not waived by failing to make an objection in the trial 

court, we decline Christine’s invitation to follow Rao. 

3 And given our resolution of this matter, we need not comment on or address appellant’s 

remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 
Isgitt v. Godwin Page 5

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Reversed and remanded

Opinion delivered and filed April 16, 2015

[CV06]