UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

RUSSELL G. GREER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

GARY R. HERBERT, in his official 

capacity as Governor of the State of Utah; 

SEAN D. REYES, in his official capacity 

as Attorney General of the State of Utah; 

SIM S. GILL, in his official capacity as 

District Attorney of the City and County of 

Salt Lake; KATHY BERG, in her official 

capacity as Director of the Division of 

Commerce, 

 Defendants - Appellees, 

and 

JAMES ALLRED, in his official capacity 

as Business Licensing Manager for the City 

of Salt Lake; JACKIE BISKUPSKI, in her 

official capacity as Mayor of the City of 

Salt Lake; BEN MCADAMS, in his 

official capacity as Mayor of the County of 

Salt Lake; ROLEN YOSHINAGA, in his 

official capacity as Director of Planning 

and Development for the County of Salt 

Lake, 

 Defendants. 

No. 18-4075 

(D.C. No. 2:16-CV-01067-DBP) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 9, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

_________________________________ 

Before McHUGH, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Pro se litigant Russell Greer appeals the dismissal of his declaratory action 

challenging Utah’s laws criminalizing prostitution, solicitation, and the operation of 

brothels. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Mr. Greer sought to open a brothel in Utah, despite state laws criminalizing 

prostitution and solicitation, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1302 through 1305, 

and declaring brothels a nuisance, see id. § 47-1-1. He claimed that due to a 

facial-paralyzing deformity and disability that prevents him from closing his lips, he 

is unable to have intimacy and sex unless he pays for it. Therefore, he applied for a 

business license for a brothel, but the initial approval for a business license was 

revoked because his registration was for an illegal business purpose. 

 Mr. Greer filed the underlying lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive 

relief, making various claims that the Utah statutes are unconstitutional. The parties 

consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The 

 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 
3 

magistrate judge dismissed the case for lack of standing and for failure to state a 

claim.1

 

II. DISCUSSION 

Mr. Greer first argues that the magistrate judge should have recused because 

his impartiality might be questioned. Mr. Greer contends that the magistrate judge’s 

personal religious beliefs demonstrate that he could not be impartial in this matter. 

Ordinarily, “[w]e review the denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of 

discretion.” Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 659 

(10th Cir. 2002). But Mr. Greer did not seek recusal in the district court, and we 

generally do not consider matters not first presented to the district court. See 

McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[A]bsent 

extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider arguments raised for the first time 

on appeal.”). In any event, Mr. Greer’s claim does not adequately establish grounds 

for recusal. See Bryce, 289 F.3d at 660 (holding “membership in a church does not 

create sufficient appearance of bias to require recusal”); see also United States v. 

Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that factors “which will not 

ordinarily satisfy the requirements for disqualification” include “speculation, beliefs, 

conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters”). Thus, 

Mr. Greer has not demonstrated that the magistrate judge was required to recuse. 

 1

 Appellees Biskupskif, Allred, McAdams, and Yoshinaga were dismissed 

from this appeal, pursuant to orders issued on August 7, 2018, and September 11, 

2018. 
4 

Cf. Bryce, 289 F.3d at 659 (stating that a judge “has as strong a duty to sit when there 

is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 Mr. Greer assigns error to the magistrate judge’s refusal to allow him to amend 

his complaint or to supplement it for a second time. He argues that amendment or 

supplementation should have been permitted “for any arguments [he] may not have 

listed clearly or coherently.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 35. We decline to address this 

argument because it is conclusory and unsupported by evidence or legal authority. 

Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1370 (10th Cir. 2015) (“A brief must 

contain an argument consisting of more than a generalized assertion of error, with 

citations to supporting authority . . . .” (brackets and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 

2005) (holding issues are inadequately briefed if they are supported only by “mere 

conclusory allegations with no citations to the record or any legal authority”). 

Mr. Greer’s mere citation to the order granting in part and denying in part his 

motion to supplement the complaint is inadequate. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 35 

(citing R. Doc. 53). 

Mr. Greer advances several challenges to the magistrate judge’s determination 

that his complaint, as supplemented, failed to state a claim for relief under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and that he lacked standing to sue on behalf of others. 

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of standing.” Am. Humanist 

Ass’n v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 859 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017). 
5 

Similarly, “[w]e review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo.” Nixon, 784 F.3d at 1368 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, “[w]e accept all the well-pleaded 

allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to 

[Mr. Greer].” Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). To withstand

dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements,” are not sufficient to state a claim for relief. Id. 

We liberally construe Mr. Greer’s pro se filings, but we do not act as his 

advocate. See Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840. Moreover, “pro se parties [must] follow the

same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 Mr. Greer contends the magistrate judge erred in (1) holding that while he had 

standing to bring claims on his own behalf, he lacked prudential standing as an 

unestablished business owner to bring claims on behalf of others; (2) analyzing his 

challenges to the Utah statutes criminalizing prostitution as facial challenges, even 

though he argued that the statutes were unconstitutional as applied; (3) refusing to 

acknowledge that a reference to prostitution in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 

(2003), is non-binding dicta; (4) applying the wrong standard—rational basis, rather 
6 

than strict scrutiny or rational basis with bite—to Utah’s statutes criminalizing 

prostitution; and (4) dismissing his equal-protection claims. Mr. Greer also argues 

that “a robust consensus of persuasive authority” supports his position. Aplt. 

Opening Br. at 34. 

 The magistrate judge provided a thorough explanation that we need not repeat 

here. We have reviewed the magistrate judge’s Memorandum Decision and Order, 

along with the record, the controlling law, and the parties’ arguments. We agree with 

the magistrate judge’s analysis and thus do not adopt Mr. Greer’s asserted authority 

to the contrary. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Mr. Greer’s complaint, as 

supplemented, for substantially the same reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s 

May 8, 2018 Memorandum Decision and Order. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge