J-S34001-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: W.A.L.W., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.N.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 751 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered May 20, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Domestic Relations at 

No(s): Docket No. 2022 AD1

IN RE: K.V.R.W., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.N.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 752 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered May 20, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Domestic Relations at 

No(s): Docket No. 2022 AD 1A

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 17, 2022

A.N.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the May 20, 2022 Order that 

involuntarily terminated her parental rights to W.A.L.W., born in September 

2017, and K.V.R.W., born in October 2018 (collectively, “Children”). Upon 

review, we affirm.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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A detailed factual and procedural history is unnecessary to our 

disposition. Briefly, on April 13, 2021, police responded to a report that 

Mother was acting erratically, and that her home was "trashed.” Trial Ct. Op., 

dated 7/19/22, at 5. Upon investigation, police contacted the Blair County 

Children, Youth, and Families (“the Agency”) to obtain emergency custody of 

Children and subsequently committed Mother to a mental health facility. On 

April 28, 2021, the trial court adjudicated then-three-year-old and then-twoyear-old Children dependent and placed them in a pre-adoptive foster care

home, where they remain. The court ordered Mother to complete a mental 

health evaluation and a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow all 

recommended treatment. The court also ordered Mother to participate in 

reunification services with Children, including visitation. 

Mother underwent inpatient drug and alcohol treatment in October 

2021, was subsequently discharged to a halfway house, and left after two 

weeks. Mother has not participated in a mental health evaluation and has not 

visited with Children since June 2021. Moreover, the Agency has not had 

contact with Mother since November 2021. 

Children are thriving in their pre-adoptive foster home and are bonded 

with their foster parents. In the home, they are receiving early intervention 

services and have received extensive medical and dental care for neglected 

issues. 

On January 14, 2022, the Agency filed Petitions for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights. The court appointed Children’s guardian ad 
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litem (“GAL”) to serve as Children’s legal counsel, after concluding that the 

dual role did not pose a conflict. After a two-day hearing, the trial court 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children on May 19, 2022. The 

Children’s GAL agreed with this decision.

Mother timely appealed. Both Mother and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Mother raises a sole issue for our review: “Whether the honorable court 

erred in terminating parental [rights] of [] Mother [] without the [Agency] 

properly investigating placement resources where [C]hildren and Mother 

might reside together.” Mother’s Br. at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

In addressing Mother’s issue, we are mindful of our well settled standard 

of review. When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a petition 

to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports them. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an 

error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent an abuse 

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial 

court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs 

termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 
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1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “The party seeking 

termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s 

conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 

2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). "If the court determines that the parent’s 

conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, the court then 

engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Mother does not challenge the trial court’s termination of her parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a) or (b), but rather avers that the Agency 

failed to explore the possibility of the Children living with her in a “Mommy 

and Me” program, and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it 

terminated her parental rights. Mother’s Br. at 5-6. Mother argues that the 

Agency was “compelled to exhaust all reasonable alternatives” prior to 

terminating her parental rights. Id. at 6. Mother further contends that the 

trial court terminated her parental rights in error when the court failed to 

consider the prospect of her “and [C]hildren entering a mutual residential 

program.” Id. Essentially, Mother argues that the Agency failed to 

demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to reunify her and Children prior 

to filing the termination petition. Mother fails to cite to the record or any 

relevant legal authority to support her arguments, and, as explained below, 

our Supreme Court has rejected this very argument. 
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In In the Interest of: D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672-75 (Pa. 2014), our 

Supreme Court rejected the argument that an agency must provide 

reasonable efforts to enable a parent to reunify with a child prior to the 

termination of parental rights. While the Court recognized that an agency 

cannot deny a parent services and then condemn him or her for a lack of 

progress in an area the services would have addressed, the Court held that 

exertion of reasonable efforts is not a statutory prerequisite to the termination 

of parental rights under the Adoption Act. Id. at 672. Stated another way,

“[n]either subsection (a) nor (b) requires a court to consider the reasonable 

efforts provided to a parent prior to termination of parental rights.” Id.

Mother’s underdeveloped argument is meritless and does not entitle her 

to relief.

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 Our review of the record supports the trial court’s termination of 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b).

Order affirmed. 

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1 We also note that Mother’s Brief is woefully insufficient. Mother fails to

include a statement of the scope of review, a statement of the case, or a 

summary of the argument in compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 2111. Further, Mother 

fails to provide a synopsis of evidence, citations to relevant legal authorities, 

or reference to the record in her argument section as required by Pa.R.A.P. 

2119. We decline to quash Mother’s appeal, however, because our appellate 

review of Mother’s sole argument was not hampered by the shortcomings in 

her Brief. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/17/2022