NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 17

- 2408

_____________ CHAZON QTA QUANTITATIVE TRADING ARTISTS, L.L.C. , and LAWRENCE I. FEJOKWU , Petitioners

v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

____________ On Petition for Review from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ( CFTC Docket No. CRAA 16

- 01 ) Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) October 29 , 2018 Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE , Circuit J udges

. (Filed: December 13, 2018 )

____________ OPINION *

____________ CHAGARES, Circuit Judge

. Lawrence Fejokwu and his company Chazon QTA Quantitative Trading Artists,
L.L.C. (“Chazon”) were permanently barred from membership in the National Futures

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Association (NFA) for failing to cooperate promptly and fully with an NFA investigation. They appealed to the Commodity Futures Trading Co mmission (CFTC), which upheld the NFA’s finding and sanction. Now they petition this Court to review that decision under 7 U

. S

. C . § 21(i)(4). We will deny the petition

. I. Because we write only for the parties, we recite just those facts necessary to ou r decision. Fejokw u is the founder of two foundations, the Vision Foundations, that focus on
pan - African socioeconomic development. In April 2011 , Chazoneering, S.A., an entity solely owned and operated by Fejo kwu, transferred $1.6 million to the Vision Foundations. The Vision Foundations used that money to fund the Maria Funds, a pair of commodity pools operated by Chazon. Fejokwu registered Chazon with the NFA as a commodities pool operator , with himself as its principal. From the beginning , t he Maria Funds suffered significant losses. T he funds had only $125,000 remaining by March 2014

. At that point, Fejokwu applied to withdraw Chazon from the NFA to save costs

. Fejokwu argued that he and Chazon were exempt from NFA registration un der the so called small

- pool exemption, 17 C

. F

. R . § 4.13(a)(2). That exemption provides that a commodities pool operator need not register with the NFA if none of its pools has more than 15 participants and the total gross capitalization of all of its pools does not exceed $400,000 , excluding the operator’s and principal’s own money.3 Fejokwu’s withdrawal request triggered an NFA investigation. Fejokwu at first cooperated with the investigation, providing on request the Vision F oundation s ’ organizational documents , balance sheets, and ledgers, the Maria Funds’ 2013 bank statements, and Chazon’s bank and broker statements. On further request , Fejokwu also provided the Maria F unds’ and the Vision Foundation s ’ bank statements from 2011. The NFA then asked for Chazone ering’s bank statements

. Fejokwu balked at this request

. He felt that he had already provided sufficient evidence that the small

- pool exemption applied and that the NFA was not entit led to Chazoneering’s documents since that entity was not an NFA member and did not trade futures. He ultimately provided the LLC agreement and 2013 and 2014 bank statements for Chazoneering, LLC

— a different entity than the one that indirectly capitalized the Maria Funds. 1 But he refused to provide an y Chazoneering bank statements from 2011, when the Vision Foundations were funded

. H e then added the Vision Foundations as listed principals of Chazon, which arguably made review of Chazoneering ’s bank statements unnecessary

— because listing the Visions Foundations as Chazon principals made clear that all the Maria Funds’

mo ney came from Chazon principals

. When the NFA still insisted, Fejokwu asked to discuss the request with NFA lawyers or supervisors. Rather than give him that opportunity , the NFA con cluded its investigation with a finding that Fejokwu had failed
to cooperate.

1 In this opinion, we differentiate between the Chazoneering entities only when the distinction is relevant

.4 The NFA then filed a formal complaint charging Fejokwu and Chazon with violating NFA Compliance Rule 2

- 5. That rule requires each NFA m ember and a ssociate
to cooperate promptly and fully with the NFA in any NFA investigation, inquiry, audit, examination , or proceeding regarding compliance with NFA requirements or any NFA disciplin ary or arbitration proceeding

. Fejokwu and Chazon filed an answer, and the NFA held a hearing, at wh ich Fejokwu and an NFA examiner testified. The NFA hearing panel issued a decision finding that Fejokwu and Chazon had willfully violated Rule 2

- 5. The panel determined that the NFA legitimately requested Chazoneering’s bank statements from the time it funded the Vision Foundations because the NFA questioned the ultimate source of Chazon’s capital contributions and thus its eligibili ty for the small

- pool exemption , among other reasons

. The panel found that Fejokwu was “ very vague” about where Chazoneering got the money and that he “actually appeared to be trying to deceive NFA” about the different Chazoneering entities, which raised issues about his credibility. Appendix (“ App. ”) 39. “Moreover,” the panel explained, “ t he sudden list ing of the Vision Foundations .

. . appeared to have been an attempt by Fejokwu to find a reason not to provide the Chazoneering statements,” which “gave NFA legitimate concerns as to the funding of Chazoneering.” App. 40. Since the NFA’s r equest for the Chazoneering bank statements was legitimate, the panel found that Fejokwu and Chazon willfully violated Rule 2

- 5 by refusing to provide them . As a sanction, the panel permanently barred Fejokwu and Chazon from NFA membership.5 Fejokwu and C hazon appealed to the NFA Appeals Committee, which upheld the panel’s conclusion and declined to modify its sanction. On the sanction, the appeals committee emphasized the importance of member cooperation to the NFA’s effectivenes s. It also rejected Fejo kw u’s argument that the violations were not willful, finding them to be “ a conscious decision” and pointing out that Fejokwu “knowingly misled” the examination team about the different Chazoneering entities. App. 21

– 22. While there was no evidence that F ejokwu harmed customers or committed fraud, the committee explained, “that may simply be because the documents [Fejokwu and Chazon] refused to produce co ntained or led to such evidence. ” App. 22. Given this “very grave violation” and the “significance of ” Rule 2

- 5, the appeals committee found the sanction “completely appropriate.” App. 22. Fejokwu and Chazon appealed this decision to the CFTC, which summarily affirmed. They then timely petitioned for review

. II. The NFA and CFTC had jurisdiction over th e underlying disciplinary proceeding under 7 U.S.C. § 21(b), (h). We have appellate jurisdiction to review the CFTC’s order upholding the NFA’s decision under 7 U.S.C. § 21(i)(4). We are satisfied that jurisdiction is proper in this Court rather than in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit despite Chazon’s New York post

- office box since the record suggests that Fejokwu carried out Chazon’s business out of his home office in Guttenberg, New Jersey. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(11)(B)(ii)(I), 21(i)(4). We are also satisfied

— and the CFTC does6 not contest

— that we have jurisdiction over the now - represented corporate appellant Chazon

. We review the factual determinations of an administrative agency “to deter mine whether there is substantial evidence to support [its] decision.” Plummer v. Apfel , 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). We review the agency ’ s decision to uphold sanctions for abuse of discretion

. See, e.g. , Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’ n Co., Inc. , 411 U.S. 182, 185

– 86 (1973)

. III. Fejokwu and Chazon argue that substantial evidence does not show that they willfully violated Rule 2

- 5 and that a permanent bar was unwarranted and unjustified. We disagree.
A. There is no dispute that Fejokwu and Ch azon could have provided Chazoneering’s 2011 bank statements but refused

. Fejokwu instead argues that his refusal to cooperate did not violate Rule 2

- 5 because the NFA had no legitimate regulatory reason for requesting those statements. The NFA found that there was a legitimate regulatory need to confirm Chazon’s eligibility for the small

- pool exemption. We conclude that

s ubstantial evidence supported that finding

. Fejokwu relied on the small

- pool exemption to withdraw from the NFA, giving it a legitimate reason to investigate Chazon’s eligibility for this exemption. Since the exemption requires aggregate nonproprietary capital contributions to be under $400,000,
the NFA h ad legitimate grounds to confirm that Chazoneering’s $1.6 million investment7 was in fact proprietary

— that is, legitimate business income of Chazoneering (and thus of Fejokwu) and not merely customer contributions funneled through Chazoneering to invest i n the Maria Funds without proper registration. Inquiring where Chazoneering got the $1.6 million was fair game. And Fejokwu gave the NFA reason to be suspicious of
its source . He was cagey about the different Chazoneering entities, vague on Chazoneering ’s actual business, and protective of only the bank statements that showed where Chazoneering got these funds. The NFA thus legitimately insisted on reviewing Chazoneering’s 2011 bank statements to confirm Chazon’s eligibility for the small

- pool exemption

. 2 Fejok w u’s refusal may not have been in bad faith, but no doubt it was voluntary and intentional

— which makes it “willful” in the civil context. See, e.g. , Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr , 551 U.S. 47, 57 & n.9 (2007); Vineland Fireworks Co. v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives , 544 F.3d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T] he legal definition of ‘willful’ .

. . is ‘[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious

. ’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1630 (8th ed. 2004)) (alteration in

o riginal) )

. Thus , substantial evidence shows that Fejokwu and Chazon willfully violated Rule 2

- 5.

2 The NFA hearing panel also concluded that the NFA had legitimately asked for Chazoneering’s 2011 bank statements to determine whether Chazon had any unlisted principals. Fejokwu argues that Chazoneering’s bank statements would not show anyone’s direct contributions to Chazon or direct or indirect ownership interests in Chazon, and so could not show unlisted principals. Since we conclude that confirming eligibility for the small

- pool exemption was a legiti mate regulatory reason to review the 2011 statements, we do not reach this alternative justification

.8 B. Fejokwu also argues that the CFTC abuse d its discretion by upholding the NFA’s permanent membership ban. We will overturn an agency ’ s decision to uphol d sanctions as an abuse of discretion only if the sanctions are “unwarranted in law or

. . . w ithout justification in fact. ” Butz , 411 U.S. at 185

– 86 (alteration in original) . “Typically, such an abuse of discretion will involve either a sanction palpabl y disproportionate to the violation or a failure to support the sanction chosen with a meaningful statement of ‘findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discr etion presented on the record.’ ” Reddy v. Commodity Futures Trading
Co mm’ n , 191 F.3d 109, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A))

. Fejo kw u first argues that a permanent ban was palpably disproportionate to the violation. In comparison to other cases, he argues, his would be “the only instance where the NFA has permanently banned a first

- time offender for violating Rule 2

- 5 without any additional aggravating” circumstances. Fejo kw u Br. 46

. But, on the contrary, there were aggravating circumstances here

. Fejokwu was not mere ly intransigent; the NFA found him deceptive, misleading , and intentionally vague . No doubt the sanction is severe, but given these circumstances we cannot say that it is unwarranted in law or w ithout justification in fact. Thus the CFTC did not abuse it s discretion by upholding it. Fejo kw u next argues that the CFTC’s summary decision fails to provide a meaningful statement of the reason for the sanction . We disagree. Both the NFA panel and appeals committee discussed the reasons for the sanction at so me length. These decisions emphasized the importance of Rule 2

- 5, but also Fejokwu’s misleading conduct9 in the investigation and hearing. The CFTC expressly adopted these findings and conclusions , and it also held that “the choice of sanction is neither excessive nor oppressive in light of the violation and the public interest.” App. 7. No doubt Fejokwu wishes that the NFA had credited other, mitigating factors, but he still received a meaningful statement of the findings, conclusions, and reasons underpinning the chosen sanction. We cannot conclude that the CFTC abused its discretion by adopting the NFA’s reasons and upholding its sanction.
I V. For these reasons , we will de ny the petition for review

.