J-S64031-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JORDON SCOTT BROWN 

Appellant No. 719 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 1, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-31-CR-0000577-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD,* J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2017

Appellant, Jordon Scott Brown, appeals from his aggregate sentence of 

eighteen to thirty-six years’ imprisonment for attempted manslaughter of a 

law enforcement officer1 and arson (placing person in danger of death or 

bodily injury).2 Appellant argues that the trial court erred by, inter alia,

miscalculating his standard range sentence for attempted manslaughter and 

failing to provide reasons for imposing an aggravated range sentence for 

attempted manslaughter. We affirm. 

On November 28, 2015, Appellant set his family’s trailer on fire and 

fired a shotgun at two state troopers who were responding to his girlfriend’s 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2507.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i).
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call for help. On September 2, 2016, Appellant pleaded guilty to the above 

offenses and to reckless endangerment3in return for a “capped plea” of 18 

to 36 years’ imprisonment, i.e., a sentence that could not exceed 18 to 36 

years. 

Sentencing took place on December 1, 2016. Appellant’s Sentencing 

Guidelines form for attempted manslaughter indicates that his prior record 

score (“PRS”) was 3, and that he was subject to a deadly weapon 

enhancement for firing a shotgun during the offense. Noting that Appellant’s 

offense gravity score (“OGS”) for attempted manslaughter was 13, the trial 

court stated that the standard range sentence for this offense was 96 to 114 

months’ imprisonment. N.T., 12/1/16, at 1-2. The trial court also observed 

that the standard range sentence for arson was 30 to 42 months’ 

imprisonment.4 Id. at 2.

The trial court continued:

[I]t’s my duty to look at the rehabilitative needs of the 

Defendant and I’ve done that but there also comes a time 

when I have to look at the protection of the public and in 

this case more importantly the gravity of the offenses as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim. I heard from 

these victims and what it did to them and what it did [to] 

their family. You can’t take that back. You can show 

remorse here and everybody can tell me what a good guy 

you’ve been up to that night and after that night but you 

 

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. The trial court ultimately did not impose any penalty 

for this offense.

4 Appellant’s Sentencing Guidelines form for arson indicates that there was 

no deadly weapon used in the commission of this offense.
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can’t take that back. You can’t take back what you did to 

Trooper Harris and the fact that every time he goes on call 

he’s placed at risk. You shot at a law enforcement officer 

and I’m not sure how they do things in Portland, Oregon or 

Charlotte, North Carolina, but when you’re in Huntingdon 

County, Pennsylvania and you shoot at a law enforcement 

officer there are going to be significant consequences. 

Id. at 11. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 to 20 years’ 

imprisonment for attempted manslaughter and a consecutive term of 8 to 16 

years’ imprisonment for arson. Id. at 12. The attempted manslaughter 

sentence was in the aggravated sentencing range of 115 to 127 months,

5

and the arson sentence exceeded the aggravated sentencing range of 53 to 

64 months.

6

 Appellant’s aggregate sentence of 18 to 36 years’ 

imprisonment was the lengthiest sentence permissible under the terms of his 

guilty plea.

Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions, which the trial court 

denied, and a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

In this appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

1. The [s]entencing [c]ourt abused its discretion when it 

sentenced [Appellant] to the statutory maximum sentence 

for Criminal Attempt—Manslaughter of a Law Enforcement 

Officer of a minimum period ten years to a maximum

period of twenty years, when the standard guideline range 

for this offense with an OGS of 13 and a PRS of 3 is 78-96 

 

5 See 204 Pa. Code 303.18 (deadly weapon enhancement/used Sentencing 

Guidelines matrix).

6 See 204 Pa. Code 303.16 (standard range Sentencing Guidelines matrix).
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months with an aggravated range of up to 108 months

[w]hile providing no reasons on the record for an

aggravated sentencing[] nor [providing] a 

contemporaneous written statement giving reasons for 

going outside the guidelines.

2. The [s]entencing [c]ourt abused its discretion when it 

sentenced [Appellant] for Arson—Danger of Death or 

Bodily Injury, by sentencing [Appellant] to a minimum 

sentence of eight years to a maximum sentence of sixteen 

years, when the standard guideline range for this offense 

with an OGS of 9 and a PRS of 3 is 30-42 months with an 

aggravated range of up to 54 months [w]hile providing no 

reasons on the record for an aggravated sentencing[] nor

[providing] a contemporaneous written statement giving

reasons for going outside the guidelines.

Appellant’s Brief at 1-2.

This Court has stated that:

[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do 

not entitle an appellant to appellate review as of right. 

Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing 

issue:

[W]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, 

see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue 

was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion 

to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are 

generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing 

hearing or raised in a motion to modify the sentence 

imposed at that hearing.
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Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533-34 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(quotation marks and some citations omitted). 

The Rule 2119(f) statement

must specify where the sentence falls in relation to the 

sentencing guidelines and what particular provision of the 

Code is violated (e.g., the sentence is outside the 

guidelines and the court did not offer any reasons either on 

the record or in writing, or double-counted factors already 

considered). Similarly, the Rule 2119(f) statement must 

specify what fundamental norm the sentence violates and 

the manner in which it violates that norm . . . .

Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en 

banc). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is 

sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary 

only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Here, Appellant timely appealed, preserved his discretionary aspects of 

sentencing issue in his motion for reconsideration of sentence, and included 

a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. See Evans, 901 A.2d at 533. 

Appellant’s first argument—the trial court miscalculated the standard 

sentencing range for attempted manslaughter—raises a substantial question, 

because we have held that “the [trial] court must begin its calculation of a 

sentence from the correct starting range,” and “[w]hen a sentencing court 

fails to begin its calculation of sentence from the correct starting point, this 

Court will vacate the sentence and remand for reconsideration of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Raybuck, 915 A.2d 125, 129 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(citations omitted). Appellant’s second argument—the court failed to 
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provide any reasons on the record or in a contemporaneous writing for 

imposing an aggravated sentence—raises a substantial question as well, 

given the Sentencing Code’s directive that “[i]n every case where the court 

imposes a sentence ... outside the guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania 

Commission on Sentencing ... the court shall provide a contemporaneous 

written statement of the reason or reasons for the deviation from the 

guidelines.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). We thus turn to the substance of 

Appellant’s arguments.

We find no merit in Appellant’s challenge to the calculation of his 

standard range sentence for attempted manslaughter. The trial court 

correctly calculated the standard range as 96 to 114 months’ imprisonment

in view of Appellant’s PRS of 3, his OGS of 13 and the deadly weapon 

enhancement for firing a shotgun.7 See 204 Pa. Code § 303.16. As a 

result, the trial court arrived at Appellant’s aggravated sentence of ten to 

twenty years’ imprisonment from the correct starting point. See Raybuck, 

915 A.2d at 129.

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to provide any 

explanation for imposing aggravated range sentences. We disagree. The 

trial court stated on the record (somewhat rhetorically) that the gravity of 

Appellant’s crime of shooting at two law enforcement officers justified an 

 

7 The trial court correctly calculated Appellant’s standard range sentence for 

arson as 30 to 42 months’ imprisonment. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.16.
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aggravated range sentence. We disagree with Appellant’s alternative 

argument that the trial court failed to provide a contemporaneous written

explanation for Appellant’s sentence in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721. The 

requirement of a written statement “is satisfied when the judge states his 

reasons for the sentence on the record and in the defendant’s presence.” 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 667 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. Super. 1995), 

reversed on other grounds, 689 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1997) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). The trial court fulfilled this duty by stating its reasons for 

Appellant’s sentence on the record and in Appellant’s presence.

Because Appellant merely argued that the trial court gave no reasons 

at all and did not directly take issue with the reasons given by the trial court 

for imposing an aggravated sentence, we have no further basis to disturb 

the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. 

Super. 2003).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2017