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IV

PREFACE

In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA) to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The 

purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a 

comprehensive and accurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military 

Power. DIA produced more than 250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that 

was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report 

conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public 

for the first time.

In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of the 

major foreign military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on 

Iran’s defense and military goals, strategy, plans, and intentions; the organization, structure, 

and capability of its military supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and 

industrial base. This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, 

our leaders, the national security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face 

in the 21st century.
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY V

Throughout its 40-year history, the Islamic Republic of Iran has remained implacably opposed to the 

United States, our presence in the Middle East, and our support to Israel. While attempting to strengthen 

its deterrence against foreign attack and influence, Tehran has committed itself to becoming the dominant 

power in the turbulent and strategic Middle East. Its ambitions and identity as a largely Persian Shia 

power in a region composed of primarily Arab Sunni states often put it at odds with its neighbors, most of 

which look to the United States and the West to guarantee their security.

Iran sees itself as closer than ever to achieving its goals. Tehran has played the cards dealt it by the fall of 

Saddam, the uprising in Syria, the rise and retreat of ISIS, and the conflict in Yemen. It leads a cohesive 

if informal bloc of Shia and Alawi state and nonstate actors—its “Axis of Resistance” against the West. 

Meanwhile, a perception that the United States is disinterested and disengaged pervades the region.

By applying a rigorous lessons-learned process during decades of conflict in the Middle East, Iran has 

adapted its military capabilities and doctrine to account for developments by the United States and its 

allies. Although still technologically inferior to most of its competitors, the Iranian military has progressed 

substantially over the past few decades. 

To achieve its goals, Iran continues to rely on its unconventional warfare elements and asymmetric capabilities—

intended to exploit the perceived weaknesses of a superior adversary—to provide deterrence and project power. 

This combination of lethal conventional capabilities and proxy forces poses a persistent threat. The Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force leads Iranian power projection through a complex network of state and 

nonstate partners and militant proxies. Iran’s conventional military emphasizes niche capabilities and guerillastyle tactics against its technologically advanced adversaries. Its substantial arsenal of ballistic missiles is 

designed to overwhelm U.S. forces and our partners in the region. Its swarms of small boats, large inventory of 

naval mines, and arsenal of antiship missiles can severely disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz—a 

strategic chokepoint critical to global trade. Each of these forces are becoming increasingly survivable, precise, 

and responsive.

In more recent years, with the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, Iran has taken nascent steps toward developing 

a limited expeditionary capability. Iran’s conventional forces are now in the regional power projection game 

as well. At the same time, modern conventional capabilities will be open to Iran for the first time since 

the revolution, as the UN arms embargo is scheduled to end by October 2020. With these opportunities, 

we could begin to see significant changes in Iranian strategy and capabilities, as Iran becomes a more 

traditional military force. 

As Tehran expands its capabilities and role as both an unconventional and conventional threat in the 

Middle East, it is more important than ever that we understand Iran’s military power and the threat it 

poses to our interests, our allies, and our own security. 

Robert P. Ashley Jr

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s address to graduates of the Iranian Naval Academy, 

9 September 2018:

“Today, the policy that the Front of Arrogance—headed by the oppressive and cruel United States—

has adopted is a malicious policy. They have defined their interests in causing instability throughout 

many parts of the world, particularly in our region...Their goal is to prevent an Islamic power in the 

region from emerging and rising...The Islamic Republic has stood up against this policy with complete 

power... My dear ones, what has astounded intelligent people around the world is that with reliance 

on Allah the Exalted and with reliance on national power, the Islamic Republic has managed to defeat 

the United States in achieving its main goal in the region.”

1
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IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VII

CONTENTS

Introduction/Historical Overview1

1921–1979: The Shah’s Army1

1979–Present: The Guardians of the Revolution3

National Military Overview.  

Threat Perceptions . 

National Security Strategy. 

Stability Issues. 

External Defense Relations. 

Defense Budget. 

Nuclear Program. 

Military Doctrine and Strategy.  

Perceptions of Modern Conflict. 

Military and Security Leadership . 

Major Military and Security Institutions. 

National Military Command and Control . 

Key Military Leaders. 

Core Iranian Military Capabilities.  

Ballistic Missiles . 

Antiaccess/Area Denial. 

Unconventional Operations. 

Expeditionary Operations. 

Cyberspace . 

Intelligence . 
VIII

Space/Counterspace. 

Chemical and Biological Warfare. 

Denial and Deception. 

Underground Facilities. 

Outlook: Building a More Capable Conventional Force  

Appendix A: Missile Force.  

Appendix B: Naval Forces.  

Appendix C: Unconventional Forces.  

Appendix D: Air and Air Defense Forces.  

Appendix E: Ground Forces.  

Appendix F: Special Operations Forces  

Appendix G: Reserves.  

Appendix H: Intelligence Services  

Appendix I: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs  

Appendix J: Arms Transfers  

Glossary of Abbreviations.  

References  .
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IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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1

Introduction/Historical Overview

ersia, as Iran was known before 1935, 

was one of the great empires of the 

ancient world. Its military history dates 

back more than 2,500 years. The country in its 

present form—the Islamic Republic of Iran—

was established in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution. Iran is a theocratic republic with a supreme 

leader appointed for life as head of state and 

the highest-ranking political, military, and religious authority under the principle of velayat-e 

faqih (rule of the Islamic jurist), a philosophy in 

Shia Islam reinterpreted by Iran’s first supreme 

leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, that calls 

for clerical oversight of elected institutions. 

1921–1979: The Shah’s Army

The modern Iranian military originated in the 

early 1920s after Reza Khan, a general in the 

Persian Cossack Brigade, helped lead a coup 

to strengthen the power of the Persian shah 

(king), Ahmad Shah Qajar. In 1921, Reza was 

made the commander of all of Iran’s disparate 

military elements, which he combined to form 

the basis of the modern Iranian military, the 

Artesh (“army” in Persian). As a top priority 

for Ahmad Shah, the Imperial Iranian Armed 

Forces then began a long-term effort to grow 

P

Iranian clerics watch a Shahab 3 MRBM launch in 2006.

Image Source: AFP
2

and modernize.2,3 After becoming prime minister, Reza Khan orchestrated his own appointment as shah in 1925. Renamed Reza Shah 

Pahlavi, the new king enacted a secular civil 

code and set out on a broader modernization of 

the country, to include the military.4

Events throughout the 20th century contributed 

to Iran’s long-held suspicion of foreign powers. 

During World War II, British and Soviet forces 

invaded Iran to secure oil resources and protect Allied supply lines to the Soviet Union. 

Although Iran was officially neutral in the war, 

the Allied powers considered Reza Shah to be 

too close to Nazi Germany and forced him to 

abdicate, installing his son—Mohammad Reza 

Pahlavi—as shah in 1941. A decade later, the 

elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, nationalized the British-owned Iranian 

oil industry. Britain imposed an economic 

embargo, and a power struggle between the 

shah and Mossadegh ensued. After the shah 

fled Iran, the United States and the United 

Kingdom in 1953 organized a successful coup—

called Operation AJAX—with support from 

Iranian royalists to overthrow Mossadegh and 

strengthen the power of the shah.5,6

After the 1953 coup, Mohammad Reza Shah 

accelerated efforts to transform Iran into a Westernized and dominant regional power. One of 

his top priorities was to build a strong military, 

leveraging close ties to the United States during 

the Cold War. Funded by increasing oil revenue, 

the Artesh acquired a wide range of advanced 

weapon systems during the 1960s and 1970s, 

primarily from the United States. Tehran’s procurement of American arms included F-4, F-5, 

and F-14 fighter aircraft; AH-1 Cobra attack 

helicopters; M60 tanks; HAWK and SM-1 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); and TOW antitank 

guided missiles (ATGMs). Iran also purchased 

British tanks and corvettes, French patrol craft, 

and Soviet armored vehicles.7,8,9,10,11

By the mid-1970s, Tehran became the largest 

customer of U.S. military equipment. At the 

time of the revolution, its military was one of 

the most capable in the region, with more than 

400,000 personnel. However, Iran still required 

extensive U.S. training and technical support 

to operate and maintain its advanced military equipment. Iran ordered other advanced 

systems from Western suppliers before the 

revolution—including F-16s, F-18s, frigates, 

destroyers, and submarines from the United 

States—but these were never delivered.12

The Iranian military was largely unproven in 

combat until the mid-1970s, when the shah 

deployed Artesh forces to Oman alongside the 

British at the request of the sultan to help 

quell an insurgency. Iran first deployed special forces to Oman in late 1972, followed by 

a battalion of paratroopers in 1973. By 1974, 

the Imperial Iranian Task Force numbered 

more than 3,000 troops, with artillery, heli- Iranian protestors during the 1953 coup.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 3

copter, fighter aircraft, air defense, and naval 

support. Tehran rotated its deployments every 

3 months to maximize the number of return-

ing personnel with combat experience. By the 

withdrawal of most Iranian forces after 1975, 

some 15,000 Iranian troops had served in 

Oman with more than 500 killed in action.13,14

Under Mohammad Reza Shah's rule, Iran became 

increasingly autocratic. Public disapproval for the 

regime grew, furthered by an economic recession 

and public perceptions of the shah as a corrupt 

U.S. puppet.15 In the late 1970s, widespread pro-

tests representing most segments of Iranian soci-

ety increased across the country. By 1979, the 

unrest grew into a revolution. Popular Shia cleric 

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been in 

exile, had become the central figure of the revolu-

tion and opposition to the shah, who then fled Iran 

in January 1979. Khomeini returned to Tehran on 

1 February and called for nationwide demonstra-

tions. Clashes between armed opposition groups 

and government forces broke out. Ten days later, 

the Artesh declared that it would remain neutral 

to prevent further casualties, effectively ending 

the revolution with Khomeini in power.16

1979–Present: The Guardians of 

the Revolution

In a referendum on 1 April 1979, Iranians 

approved a new constitution establishing a theo-

cratic republic based on velayat-e faqih with 

Khomeini as supreme leader, ending 2,500 years 

of monarchical rule. On 5 May, Khomeini estab-

lished the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

(IRGC), consolidating various militias that had 

formed during the revolution into a single force 

loyal to the new regime, in parallel with the 

Artesh.17 During the first few years after the rev-

olution, fearing internal unrest stemming from 

old-regime allegiances and antirevolutionary 

activity, the regime conducted a series of purges 

through arrests, trials, and executions that 

affected as many as 4,500 military personnel 

and nearly 6,000 activists, effectively eliminat-

ing any remaining opposition.18,19

On 4 November 1979, a group of Iranian stu-

dents loyal to Khomeini took over the U.S. 

Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 Americans 

hostage and leading the United States to 

sever diplomatic relations with Iran. The cri-

sis lasted 444 days before the regime returned 

the hostages to the United States. On 24 April 

1980, an attempted rescue by U.S. Special 

Forces—called Operation EAGLE CLAW—

failed when two aircraft collided during a 

sand storm at a staging area in the Iranian 

desert, killing eight U.S. servicemembers.

The Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis left 

Iran diplomatically isolated and militarily weak-

ened. Iran also lost access to tens of thousands 

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returns to Iran from 

exile on 1 February 1979.

Image Source: AFP
4

of foreign technicians to support the advanced 

military equipment it had purchased under the 

shah, while deliveries for U.S. and British spare 

parts were canceled under an arms embargo. 

Desertions and purges drained roughly 40–60 

percent of the Artesh's manpower, leaving the 

military with a severe shortage of trained personnel and professional leadership.21

Saddam Hossein sought to capitalize on Iran’s 

post-revolutionary turmoil after years of territorial disputes and competition for regional 

influence. On 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded 

Iran. Saddam justified the attack as necessary to 

prevent Iran from exporting the revolution and 

overthrowing his regime, which Iranian leaders 

had advocated.

Initially disorganized and poorly trained, the 

IRGC was forced to begin to professionalize to 

repel the Iraqi invasion, which the diminished 

Artesh was unable to do on its own. The IRGC 

and Basij, a volunteer paramilitary reserve force, 

relied on guerrilla-warfare tactics and later used 

extremely costly human wave attacks along the 

front.

22,23 By June 1982, Iran had pushed back 

Iraqi forces and recovered nearly all of its lost 

territory. Saddam proposed a ceasefire, but 

Khomeini rejected the offer. Tehran’s goals had 

shifted from liberating captured land to overthrowing Saddam and expanding the revolution. 

The next month, Iran launched a counterattack 

into Iraq and generally remained on the offensive for the remainder of the war.

24

An Ideological Army

In establishing and equipping the defense forces of the country, it shall be taken into consideration that faith and ideology are the basis and criterion. Therefore, the Army of the Islamic 

Republic of Iran and the Revolutionary Guards Corps will be formed in conformity with the 

above objective, and will be responsible not only for protecting and safeguarding the frontiers 

but also for the ideological mission, that is, Jihad, for God’s sake and struggle for promoting 

the rule of God’s law in the world ("And prepare against them whatever you are able of power 

and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others 

besides them whom you do not know but whom Allah knows." [Quran 8:60]).

-The Iranian Constitution, Preamble20

Iranians students scale the wall of the U.S. Embassy 

in Tehran on 4 November 1979.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 5

Iran struggled to contend with the deadly 

facets of modern warfare, including chemical 

weapons and ballistic missiles, which Bagh-

dad used extensively throughout the war.26

Iraq reportedly began using chemical weap-

ons as early as November 1980. Estimates of 

the total casualties resulting from Iraqi chem-

ical weapons use vary widely, ranging from 

about 7,500 to more than 25,000, with tens of 

thousands more injured.27,28 Iraq first began 

IRGC-Artesh Tension

In the aftermath of the revolution, there was considerable tension between the IRGC 

and Artesh at the outset of the war. The Artesh suffered from leadership purges and 

was distrusted by the new regime and the IRGC. By the end of the war, however, the 

Artesh had demonstrated its worth and loyalty to the regime. Although today both 

militaries provide essential security functions for Iran and coordinate regularly, some 

rivalry remains, resulting from their uneven access to resources, varying levels of 

influence with the regime, and inherent overlap in missions and responsibilities.25

Major Iran-Iraq War Events 1805-17889

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

Sep: Iraq invades Iran

Nov: Iraq’s first use of chemical weapons

Jul: Iran invades Iraq

Oct: Iraq’s first use of ballistic missiles

Mar: Iran’s first use of ballistic missiles

Jul: UN ceasefire (UNSCR 598); Operation EARNEST WILL starts

Apr: USS Samuel B. Roberts mined; Operation PRAYING MANTIS

Jul: Iran Air Flight 655 shot down by USS Vincennes; Iran accepts UN ceasefire

Aug: War ends

Feb: Beginning of the War of the Cities

Mar: Iraq begins attacks on Gulf shipping (beginning of the Tanker War)

May: Iran begins attacks on Gulf shipping
6

using Soviet-supplied Scud missiles in October 1982 after Iran invaded Iraqi territory. 

By 1984, Iraq had expanded its attacks on 

population centers, using strategic air raids, 

artillery shelling, and Scud missiles, in what 

became known as the “War of the Cities.”29

Iran purchased its own Scuds from Libya and 

North Korea for use against Iraqi population 

centers, launching its first ballistic missiles in 

March 1985. By the end of the war, however, 

Iran had acquired and launched significantly 

fewer missiles than Iraq.

30

Starting in 1984, attacks on merchant shipping and oil infrastructure in the Persian 

Gulf—called the Tanker War—became an 

increasingly significant part of the conflict. 

In 1987, the U.S. Navy began to escort reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers as part of Operation EARNEST WILL. On 14 April 1988, 

the USS Samuel B. Roberts was struck by 

an Iranian naval mine. In response 4 days 

later, the United States launched Operation 

PRAYING MANTIS against Iranian naval 

forces, sinking several Iranian vessels. On 

3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down 

Iran Air Flight 655, mistaking the aircraft 

for an attacking Iranian F-14. All 290 passengers and crew were killed. Tehran still 

believes the United States deliberately shot 

down the civilian airliner.

31,32

By mid-July 1988, Iraqi troops had driven 

back into Iranian territory, and Tehran 

had grown increasingly weary of the war’s 

progress. Believing they lacked the support 

and resources to defeat Saddam, military 

leaders convinced the supreme leader of 

the need to end the war. On 20 July, Khomeini accepted a UN ceasefire resolution 

with great reluctance, stating publicly the 

decision was more painful than drinking 

from a “poisoned chalice.” The war officially 

ended on 20 August 1988 with the ceasefire 

observed across the front.

33

Iraqi soldiers deface an image of Iranian Supreme 

Leader Khomeini in 1988 near the end of the IranIraq War.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7

The Iran-Iraq War—which Iran refers to as 

the “Imposed War” and the “Sacred Defense”—

lasted 8 years with more than 200,000 Iranian 

troops and civilians killed.34,35 Although devastating for Iran, it helped solidify popular 

support for Khomeini’s new regime.36 The war 

had a significant psychological impact on the 

future of the Iranian military and Tehran’s 

security policy. Tehran viewed Western support for Saddam as proof of efforts to counter 

the Islamic Revolution. Syria was one of the 

few countries to support Iran during the war, 

establishing a key relationship that has persisted for decades. Heavy military and civilian losses, Saddam’s use of chemical weapons 

and ballistic missiles, the West’s embargo 

of Iran and support for Iraq, and military 

engagements with U.S. forces in the Persian 

Gulf all led the regime to emphasize asymmetric capabilities and reinforce the necessity 

of self-reliance for decades to come. The war 

contributed to Tehran’s belief in the necessity 

of working with Shias, disenfranchised Sunnis, and nonaligned countries as an “Axis of 

Resistance” against the West.

37,38

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has 

adapted its military thinking and approach 

to modern conflict. During the 1990s, Iran 

expanded its outreach to Shia communities and 

U.S. naval forces escort oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987 during the Tanker War.

Image Source: AFP
8

other potential allies throughout the Middle 

East—particularly Hizballah and Syria. Tehran 

established the IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the 

clandestine external operations element of the 

IRGC, in 1990 to better facilitate these networks 

and strengthen its covert presence in the Middle 

East and beyond. As Iran’s primary conduit of 

support and guidance to nonstate partners, the 

IRGC-QF provides training, funding, and equipment for militias and political groups with common anti-Western ideologies and objectives.

Evolution of the Iranian Military 1805-17887

Year Event

1921 Artesh established

1923 Imperial Iranian Ground Force (IIGF) established

1924 Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) established

1932 Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) established

1979 IRGC established; Imperial Iranian Armed Forces become Islamic Republic of Iran 

Ground Force (IRIGF), Air Force (IRIAF), and Navy (IRIN)

1980 Basij formally established

1981 Basij incorporated into the IRGC

1985 IRGC split into Ground Force (IRGCGF), Air Force (IRGCAF), and Navy (IRGCN)

1990 IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF) established

2007 Basij comes under IRGC command

2008 Khatemolanbia Air Defense Headquarters (KADHQ) established from IRIAF

2009 IRGCAF renamed IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF); some Basij units integrated 

with IRGCGF

2019 KADHQ elevated to Artesh HQ; Artesh air defense force renamed Islamic Republic 

of Iran Air Defense Force (IRIADF)
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 9

Tehran also invested heavily in advancing its 

conventional weapons capabilities, particularly 

ballistic missiles, to better prepare itself against 

future Iraqi attacks. Iran acquired significant 

assistance from other countries, including 

North Korea and China, to establish domestic 

production capabilities for major weapons pro-

grams. In the late 1980s, Iran also established 

a nuclear weapons program, which it halted in 

the early 2000s.39

After the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 

2001 and Iraq in 2003 and the 2006 Isra-

el-Hizballah War, Tehran began to adjust its 

military doctrine to better deter and counter 

the threats from technologically advanced 

Western militaries. Tehran concentrated on 

equipping its armed forces with niche capa-

bilities emphasizing asymmetric tactics. The 

U.S. presence in the region created a sense 

of encirclement in Tehran, which continued 

to believe that Washington ultimately sought 

to overthrow the regime. During the Iraq 

War, Iran established strong ties with Shia 

militia groups, some of which have received 

Iranian financial backing for decades. Using 

Iranian-provided weapons, these groups were 

responsible for at least 603 U.S. personnel 

killed in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.40,41

Since the Arab Spring, the start of the Syrian 

civil war, and the rise of the Islamic State of 

Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), Tehran has become 

increasingly involved in regional conflicts—

particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—as it 

responds to new security threats and seeks to 

strengthen its position as a regional power. 

Iran has committed extensive resources and 

deployed military forces to support key part-

ners in these struggles, adapting its long-

standing model of proxy warfare to incor-

porate a more conventional application of 

military power.42

In 2015, Tehran agreed to the Joint Compre-

hensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed 

restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange 

for sanctions relief. Although Iran saw some 

improvement in its economy and a correspond-

ing increase in government spending, including 

the defense budget, the benefits of integration 

into the world economy that Tehran and the 

Iranian public expected after the JCPOA never 

fully materialized. In May 2018, the United 

States withdrew from the JCPOA and began 

reimposing unilateral sanctions on Iran.

In April 2019, the U.S. State Department for-

mally designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist 

organization (FTO) and announced it would not 

renew exemptions for select countries to import 

Iranian oil.43,44 In response to these actions, 

Iran began its own counter-pressure campaign, 

which has included gradually exceeding some 

of the nuclear-related limits stipulated in the 

JCPOA and conducting provocative maritime 

actions and unconventional warfare attacks 

against U.S. allies and interests. Amid this 

tension, Iran also shot down a U.S. unmanned 

aerial vehicle (UAV) and seized a British oil 

tanker.45
10

ran’s armed forces consist of two separate, parallel militaries—the Artesh, 

or regular forces, and the IRGC. The 

Artesh, which long predates the revolution, focuses on defense against external 

threats; the mission of the IRGC, formed 

from armed militias during the revolution, 

is to defend the regime and its Islamic system of government from any threat, foreign or 

domestic. Iran’s national police force, the Law 

Enforcement Force (LEF), is also considered 

part of the armed forces.

National Military Overview

IRGC soldiers during the September 2018 Holy Defense Week parade in Tehran marking the anniversary of the 

outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War.

I

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11

Iranian Military Structure and Size Estimates 1805-17887

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regular Forces (Artesh)

IRGC Ground Force 

(IRGCGF) 150,000

Islamic Republic of 

Iran Ground Force 

(IRIGF)

350,000

IRGC Navy (IRGCN) 20,000 Islamic Republic of 

Iran Navy (IRIN) 18,000

IRGC Aerospace Force 

(IRGCASF) 15,000 Islamic Republic of 

Iran Air Force (IRIAF) 37,000

IRGC Qods Force 

(IRGC-QF) 5,000

Islamic Republic of 

Iran Air Defense Force 

(IRIADF)

15,000

Basij (Reserves) 450,000

Total (excl. Basij) 190,000 Total: 420,000

Total (incl. Basij) 640,000

Total Military (Active): 610,000

Total Military (incl. Reserves): 1,060,000

The Iranian Armed Forces at a Glance

Services

Artesh: Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Force

IRGC: Ground Force, Navy, Aerospace Force, Qods Force, Basij

LEF

Personnel

Active military: Approximately 600,000

Reserve: Approximately 450,000 active reserve, at least 500,000–1 

million inactive reserve 

LEF: Approximately 200,000–300,000

Recruit Base Universal male conscription (18–24 months), some volunteer

Equipment Profile Mostly legacy Western, Chinese, and Soviet-era weapon systems, with 

some newer domestically produced systems

Core Strengths Large ballistic missile inventory, littoral naval capabilities, and 

unconventional partners and proxies abroad

Key Vulnerabilities Dual military structure and lack of access to modern technology

and weapons

Note: Basij number only includes estimated active reserve personnel; Iran may be able to mobilize an additional 

500,000 to 1 million Basij in wartime.
12

Threat Perceptions

Iran views the United States as its greatest 

enduring threat and believes the United States 

is engaged in a covert and “soft war” to subvert 

the regime, undermining what Iran perceives 

as its rightful place as a regional power.46,47,48 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei maintains a deep, long-standing distrust of U.S. intentions.49 Many regime elites view regional dynamics through the lens of perceived U.S. aggression, 

leading some to adopt the extreme view that the 

United States created ISIS in part to weaken 

Iran and its allies.50 Distrust of the United States 

predates the regime’s founding, dating back to 

the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh that returned the shah to power.51

Iran has focused on preparing and equipping 

its military forces for defense against air attack 

and ground invasion by a technologically superior adversary, primarily the United States. 

The U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in 

the early 2000s and international scrutiny of 

Iran’s nuclear program raised Iran’s fears of 

encirclement and potential Western attack.52,53 

Tehran recognizes that it cannot compete with 

the United States on a conventional level and 

has prioritized the development of defensive 

capabilities that emphasize asymmetric tactics 

to protect the country and the regime.54

In recent years, Tehran’s immediate perceived 

threats have shifted to those coming from 

regional state and nonstate actors. Iran probably 

views Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Sunni extremist groups, such as ISIS, as its next most dangerous threats because of their immediacy and 

proximity to Iran’s territory, allies, and regional 

influence.

55 Iran’s expanding regional activities 

have only exacerbated these views. The growth 

in militant Sunni extremism, particularly ISIS, 

and Iran’s perception of its regional adversaries’ 

growing military capabilities has prompted Tehran to adjust some of its military modernization 

priorities.56,57 Iran’s latest national development 

plan reflects this shift in threat perceptions by 

emphasizing a broader range of conventional 

capabilities than previous plans.58,59

National Security Strategy

Tehran’s national security strategy aims to 

ensure continuity of clerical rule, maintain stability against internal and external threats, secure 

Iran’s position as a dominant regional power, and 

achieve economic prosperity.60 Iran has developed its security and military strategies based on 

these four enduring strategic objectives.

An anti-U.S. mural on the wall of the former U.S. 

Embassy in Tehran.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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• Ensure Continuity of Clerical Rule. The 

supreme leader’s position is based on the pop-

ular acceptance of velayat-e faqih. To ensure 

the regime’s continued legitimacy with the 

Iranian populace, Tehran attempts to con-

trol much of the domestic political, social, 

and cultural environment and promote its 

interpretation of Islamic ideology.61,62

• Secure the Nation From Internal and 

External Threats. The regime uses its 

military and security capabilities to counter 

internal threats from political and ethnic 

opposition movements and terrorist groups 

and to prevent neighboring states’ instabil-

ity from spilling over or causing violence in 

Iran.63 The military defends Iranian terri

-

tory from foreign adversaries—including 

perceived existential threats, such as the 

United States, and regional rivals, such 

as Israel and Saudi Arabia—and provides 

support to allies and partners to counter 

regional threats.64

• Become a Dominant Regional Power. 

Tehran aspires to lead a stable regional 

order in which it has dominant influence. 

In Iran’s vision for the region, its allies 

remain intact, the influence of the United 

States and U.S. regional partners is 

degraded, and Sunni extremist groups are 

defeated.65,66,67 In pursuit of these goals, 

Iran provides extensive military, advisory, 

and financial assistance to allies and part-

ners, seeking to protect its regional inter-

ests and pressure adversaries.

• Attain Economic Prosperity. Domestically, 

President Hasan Fereidun Ruhani’s priority 

is to achieve national economic prosperity by 

reducing subsidies to the populace, curbing 

corruption, reforming the financial sector, and 

attracting foreign investment.

68,69,70 Tehran 

aims to balance foreign investment and part-

nerships with the priority it places on economic 

self-sufficiency, in part to reduce the effects 

of U.S. and multilateral sanctions.

71,72,73

Iran remains committed to modernizing its mil-

itary, forging new partnerships, and building 

the capacity of its partners across the region—

including designated FTOs—all while balanc-

ing a desire to benefit from integrating into the 

global economic system. Despite some internal 

instability, Iranian military and security forces 

have also proven able to manage public unrest 

and low-level insurgencies from several ethnic 

opposition movements.74,75

Stability Issues

Since the 1979 revolution, the regime has reg-

ularly cracked down on dissent to maintain 

political stability. Iranian political and ethnic 

opposition groups are largely localized and lack 

unity, posing little threat to the regime. Iran’s 

internal stability continues to be threatened by 

a growing schism between the country’s lead-

ers, dominated by military and clerical elites, 

and the common people. The past 40 years have 

seen a growth in income inequality, increased 

IRGC political influence and control of key 

economic sectors, sustained sectarian and eth-

nic tension, violent suppression of dissent and 

reformists, persistent gender inequality, and 

tension stemming from the military’s involve-

ment in regional conflicts.
14

In 2009, after the disputed reelection of conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a loosely 

organized opposition called the Green Movement 

emerged with large-scale protests demanding 

democratic reforms. The demonstrations marked 

the country’s most significant unrest since the 

revolution. Bolstered by the Internet, hundreds 

of thousands of protesters turned out across the 

country. The government responded by ordering 

security services to crack down, which resulted in 

dozens of deaths, hundreds of arrests, restricted 

access to social media, and the closure of several 

newspapers. The regime quelled the unrest and 

nearly eliminated the Green Movement.76

Between December 2017 and January 2018, 

small incidents of civil disobedience converged 

into widespread public protests, the largest 

unrest Iran has faced since 2009. Some protestors challenged Iran’s foreign policy—including 

its involvement in regional conflict and support to 

proxy groups—but most focused on economic and 

social issues. Elected in 2013, President Ruhani 

promised increased financial benefits and economic growth, but these have not translated into 

an improved standard of living for everyday Iranians. While oil output had risen before the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, significant economic 

growth did not follow, and domestic prices for 

both food and fuel increased.77

Some longstanding opposition groups, mostly 

originating from minority ethnic and religious 

groups, continue to challenge Iran’s internal security. Along the western border, the regime faces 

several militant Kurdish opposition groups—

including the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran 

(KDPI) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan 

(PJAK)—which advocate for increased autonomy and the right to Kurdish self-determination. 

Armed opposition from PJAK has been especially 

violent, resulting in dozens of Iranian deaths 

annually since 2005.78 Iran also faces periodic 

violence from Baluchi militants in southeastern 

Iran along the Pakistani border. The most prominent of these groups, Jaish ul-Adl (JAA), periodically attacks Iranian military facilities, border 

posts, and security patrols and occasionally takes 

military and security personnel hostage.79,80 JAA 

hampers Iran-Pakistan relations, with Tehran 

accusing Islamabad of failing to curb Baluchi 

militants operating from Pakistani soil.81 The 

Iranian military conducts counterinsurgency 

campaigns against the Kurdish and Baluchi militants in these regions on a nearly annual basis.

The most well-known group opposed to the 

regime is the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran 

Iranian protestors after the disputed 2009

presidential elections.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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(MEK). The MEK, founded in 1965 by Muslim 

students advocating a combination of Marxist 

communism and Islamist ideology, is an Ira-

nian political-militant organization in exile that 

proposes the overthrow of the Iranian regime to 

establish itself as a new government. After ini-

tially supporting the 1979 revolution, the MEK 

fought on behalf of Saddam late in the Iran-Iraq 

War and was responsible for a series of bomb-

ings and assassinations in the 1990s and early 

2000s. Widely unpopular in Iran, the MEK 

remains one of the regime’s foremost internal 

security concerns. Formerly designated as an 

FTO by the United States, the Iranian govern-

ment still considers the MEK a terrorist group.82

External Defense Relations

Tehran maintains defense and security ties to 

both state and nonstate actors to project power 

and support Shia groups and Shia-led govern-

ments in the Middle East. Iran relies on its 

regional partnerships to help counter perceived 

threats from Sunni extremist groups, adversar-

ial states, and Western military presence in the 

region. Iran refers to its efforts to build a regional 

network to counter Israeli and Western influence 

as the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Iran, 

Syria, Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, the Huthis, 

and some Palestinian militants. Beyond these 

closer allies, Tehran seeks to cultivate relations 

with other countries; Iran is also a member of the 

Nonaligned Movement and has observer status 

with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Particularly in recent years, Tehran has commit-

ted extensive resources and deployed military 

personnel to support key partners facing internal 

conflicts. Since at least 2012, Iran has escalated 

its involvement in the Syrian civil war to include 

providing arms, training, advisers, and select 

combat personnel to support the Syrian regime. 

Since at least 2014, Iran has also provided direct 

military assistance—including IRGC advisers, 

training, and materiel support—to Iraqi Shia 

militias to help combat ISIS, which Tehran 

views as a critical national security threat, and 

to strengthen its influence in Iraq.

Iran maintains strong defense ties to Hizbal-

lah in Lebanon—its most significant and oldest 

nonstate partner and a core member of Teh-

ran’s “Axis of Resistance”—and provides sup-

port to some Palestinian groups in an attempt 

to pressure Israel. Iran also provides advanced 

The “Axis of Resistance”

Iran uses the term “Axis of Resistance” to describe its loose confederation of like-minded 

state and nonstate actors across the Middle East to counter Western influence. These part-

ners, proxies, and allies include the Asad regime in Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Shia mili-

tias in Iraq, the Huthis in Yemen, Bahraini militants, and some Palestinian groups. Most 

of these are Shia entities, but select Sunni groups—like HAMAS—also align with Iran on 

key issues. The axis helps Tehran extend its influence in the region and provides a degree of 

strategic depth for Iran.83
16

weapons support to the Huthis in Yemen and 

calibrated support to Shia militants in Bahrain 

and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The IRGC-QF, 

the IRGC’s external operations element, is 

Iran’s primary conduit of support and guidance 

to these nonstate partners and proxies.84,85

Tehran maintains particularly close military-to-military ties with Syria and Iraq and 

has signed basic military cooperation agreements with Afghanistan, Belarus, China, 

Oman, Russia, South Africa, Sudan, and Venezuela.86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93 Iran has also held discussions on defense and security issues with a 

wider range of countries, including Azerbaijan, 

Bolivia, Djibouti, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, 

Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Tanzania, Turkey, 

and Turkmenistan.94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105

Djibouti and Sudan have since severed diplomatic ties with Iran. Tehran has also purchased military equipment from Russia, 

China, North Korea, Belarus, and Ukraine.106

Military cooperation between Russia and Iran 

has grown significantly in recent years, despite 

Tehran’s uncertainty about Moscow’s long-term 

regional objectives.107 Iran and Russia have cooperated to support Asad’s regime in Syria since 

at least 2015. Iran has briefly allowed Russian 

combat aircraft to use its Hamadan Airbase as a 

stopover to launch strikes in Syria, marking the 

first time Tehran has permitted a foreign military to use its territory since the Islamic Revolution. Iran also seeks to procure Russian military 

hardware. In 2016, it completed its high-profile 

purchase of the Russian SA-20c air defense system, which provided Iran with its first capability 

to defend against a modern air force.108

The Iranian military is also increasing its 

defense diplomacy efforts, particularly through 

near-continuous naval deployments beyond its 

immediate neighbors. Since 2009, Iran has sent 

small naval groups to "show the flag" through a 

series of port calls overseas and counterpiracy 

operations in the Gulf of Aden. Intended to 

enhance its soft power, Iran’s use of naval diplomacy has demonstrated its capability to conduct out-of-area operations increasingly farther 

from Iranian shores, extending from the Mediterranean Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait in the 

west to the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca 

in the east.

In 2011, the IRIN made its first transit through 

the Suez Canal since the Islamic Revolution, followed by its first ever port visits to China in 2013 

and South Africa in 2016. Sometimes in conjunction with these port calls, Iran has conducted 

basic joint naval exercises—such as search and 

rescue drills—with China, Djibouti, India, Italy, 

Oman, Pakistan, and Russia.109,110,111,112,113 Iran 

is also a member of the Indian Ocean Naval 

In 2011, the Iranian Navy transited the Suez Canal 

for the first time since the Islamic Revolution.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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Symposium (IONS), a 35-member regional 

naval cooperation forum. Tehran participated 

in the IONS’s inaugural International Maritime 

Search and Rescue Exercise in Bangladesh in 

2017 and hosted the sixth biannual IONS con-

ference in April 2018 in Tehran.114,115

Iranian Port Visits and Joint Naval Exercises

1805-17885

IRAN SYRIA

CHINA

SAUDI

ARABIA

SRI LANKA

TANZANIA

KAZAKHSTAN

QATAR

SOUTH

AFRICA

PAKISTAN

DJIBOUTI

OMAN

RUSSIA

SUDAN

INDONESIA

AZERBAIJAN

INDIA

BANGLADESH

Kochi

Vishakhapatnam

Latakia

Dar es Salaam

Baku

Doha

Djibouti

Jakarta

Salalah

Makhachkala Aktau

Colombo

Karachi

Astrakhan

Chittagong

Durban

Jeddah

Port Sudan

Muscat

Zhanjiang

Mumbai

Makhachkala Aktau

Arabian

Sea

INDIAN

OCEAN

Bay of

Bengal

South

China

Sea

Mediterranean

Sea

Suez

Canal

Bab el

Mandeb

Strait

Strait of

Malacca

Strait of

Hormuz

Gulf of Aden

NOTE: Iran currently lacks diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Djibouti. 

Joint Naval Exercises

Counterpiracy Operating Area

Port Visits

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
18

Defense Budget

Following a significant increase in Iranian 

defense spending from 2014 to 2018 after the 

implementation of the JCPOA, Iran’s security 

forces have experienced a funding decrease 

in 2019. Key drivers of this defense budget 

decrease include the reimposition of U.S. oil 

and banking sanctions, the depreciation of the 

Iranian rial, and chronic economic mismanagement. Iran’s official defense budget for 2019 is 

approximately $20.7 billion, roughly 3.8 percent 

of gross domestic product (GDP), as passed by 

the Iranian Majles. This total includes funding 

for the major components of Iran’s security apparatus, including the IRGC, Artesh, and LEF, as 

well as the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), 

the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and security forces pensions. 

The decline in funding for 2019 is similar to the 

decrease following the implementation of multilateral oil and financial sanctions in 2012. Iran’s 

current defense funding may face further cuts as 

Iranian oil export revenue continues to decline.

Although it is smaller in size, the IRGC 

receives a greater proportion of the defense 

budget than the Artesh. In 2019, Iran allocated 

29 percent of the defense budget to the IRGC, 

compared with 12 percent for the Artesh. 

Official Iranian Defense Expenditures 2011–2019 1805-17889

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Real defense expenditure 

(Billions 2019 USD, Adjusted for Inflation)

Projected

(Subject to change) $ % of GDP

2019

24.3

19.9

16.9

19.5 19.9 20.7

23.9

27.3

3.8 3.9

4.6

3.8

3.2

4.3 4.1

5.3

6.1

27.4
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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The government allocated 34 percent of the 

budget to pensions for all military person-

nel, and law enforcement personnel received 

about a third of the budget.116,117,118 Iran also 

distributes funding to its many partners and 

proxies, expenditures not fully accounted for 

in the official budget. Between 2012 and 2018, 

Iran provided more than $16 billion to the Syr-

ian regime, Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, the 

Huthis, and Palestinian groups.119

Tehran has a variety of off-budget sources of 

funding, making it difficult to accurately esti-

mate the true size and scope of Iranian defense 

spending. The supreme leader can authorize 

transfers to defense and security organizations 

from the National Development Fund, Iran’s 

reserve fund, as it reportedly has done to sup-

port military activities in Syria.120 Moreover, 

the IRGC runs numerous private companies—

most notably the wide-ranging Khatemolanbia

(“seal of the prophets”) Construction Head-

quarters—and exploits its far-reaching politi-

cal and social influence to raise additional rev-

enue. The IRGC and IRGC-QF can also gain 

extra income through smuggling and other 

illicit activities in the region.121,122,123,124

Iran’s new 5-year national development plan, 

released in July 2017, emphasizes a broader 

range of conventional capabilities than past 

plans. The plan continues to prioritize missiles 

and naval forces, but it also emphasizes air 

power, including the first public reference to 

offensive air capabilities in an Iranian strate-

gic document. The plan also provides new focus 

on electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.125

Nuclear Program

Iran’s overarching strategic goals of enhancing 

its security, prestige, and regional influence 

have led it to pursue nuclear energy and the 

capability to build missile-deliverable nuclear 

weapons, if it chooses to do so.

Iran has no nuclear weapons and, under the 

JCPOA, agreed not to seek, develop, or acquire 

nuclear weapons. The JCPOA limits Iran’s 

uranium enrichment capabilities until at least 

2026 and requires Iran to redesign its Arak 

reactor, making it more difficult to produce plu-

tonium for weapons. Without a sufficient source 

of weapons-usable fissile material, Iran cannot 

produce a nuclear weapon.

Official 2019 Iranian

Defense Spending 1805-17889

IRGC

29% $6.09B

Pensions

34% $7.08B

LEF

17% $3.60B

Artesh

12% $2.44B

MODAFL

4% $0.86B

Other

4% $0.67B
20

Iran’s interest in nuclear technology dates back 

to the 1950s, when it began receiving assistance through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program, which later included the Tehran Nuclear 

Research Center and a 5-megawatt-thermal 

research reactor. Iran signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonweapons state and 

ratified the agreement in 1970. In the mid1970s, Iran unveiled ambitious plans to expand 

the nuclear power program. These plans, however, did not come to fruition because of the 

1979 revolution.

In the late 1980s, Iran established an undeclared nuclear program, managed through the 

Physics Research Center (PHRC) and overseen 

through a scientific committee by the Defense 

Industries Education Research Institute. The 

PHRC was subordinate to MODAFL. In the late 

1990s, the PHRC was consolidated under the 

“Amad Plan,” Iran’s effort to develop a nuclear 

weapon. Iran’s Project 111 was an attempt to 

integrate a spherical payload into a Shahab 3 

missile reentry vehicle. However, Iran halted 

its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and subsequently announced the suspension of its 

declared uranium enrichment program. Iran 

also signed an Additional Protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement in 2003.

The halt was primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny resulting from 

the exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared 

nuclear work. After this halt, and in line with 

its history of poor transparency, Iran continued 

its efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology with gas centrifuges and constructed 

an undeclared uranium enrichment plant near 

Qom, where it began producing near-20-percent 

enriched uranium in mid-2011. The IAEA also 

reported in 2011 that Iran may have conducted 

some dual-use research relevant to nuclear 

weapons after the 2003 halt. In late 2011, a 

Department of State compliance report found 

Iran to be in violation of obligations under the 

NPT because Iran’s past nuclear activities and 

its failure to report ongoing activities were 

contrary to its Safeguards Agreement. That 

same year, the IAEA began an effort to clarify 

issues surrounding Iran’s lack of transparency 

dating back to 2002, noting that by failing to 

declare some nuclear activities, including the 

construction at Qom, Iran was not implementing the Additional Protocol. In 2015, the IAEA 

concluded that it had no further indications of 

undeclared work.

Then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tours the 

Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility in 2008.

Image Source: AFP
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In April 2015, a framework was announced to 

limit Iran’s nuclear program that built on the 

interim Joint Plan of Action. Under the deal, 

Iran would commit that under no circumstances 

would it seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weap-

ons, and it would limit its enrichment pro-

gram and redesign a heavy-water reactor near 

Arak; in exchange, all nuclear-related sanc-

tions against Iran would be suspended. On 14 

July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 (the five perma-

nent members of the UN Security Council plus 

Germany) finalized the JCPOA, whereby Iran 

agreed to curtail its nuclear program signifi-

cantly in exchange for sanctions relief. On 16 

January 2016, the IAEA reported that Iran had 

taken the technical steps required to meet its 

Implementation Day obligation. As long as Iran 

adheres to the agreement, the JCPOA limits 

the pathways to a nuclear weapon and hampers 

Iran’s ability to conduct activities that could 

contribute to nuclear explosive device design 

and development.

Under the JCPOA, Iran must maintain a total 

enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 

300 kilograms of up to 3.67 percent enriched 

uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or its equivalent 

in other chemical forms until 2031. Iran also 

had reduced its low-enriched uranium stock-

pile of about 8,500 kilograms to below 300 

kilograms by shipping the material to Rus-

sia and downblending the remaining scrap to 

natural uranium.126,127

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 

2231, which endorses the JCPOA but is sepa-

rate from the nuclear agreement, sets out the 

specific limitations on Iran’s nuclear program 

and places additional restrictions on Iran’s 

ballistic missile program and its import and 

export of conventional arms.128

Recent Developments

In May 2018, the United States ceased par-

ticipation in the JCPOA and began reimpos-

ing unilateral U.S. sanctions on Iran. Tehran 

announced it would continue upholding its 

commitments while negotiating with remain-

ing JCPOA participants to try to sustain the 

deal.129,130 However, Khamenei warned that 

Iran would exit the deal if Iran were unable to 

achieve sufficient economic benefits from the 

JCPOA absent the United States.131 In June 

2018, Tehran announced that it would begin 

taking steps to expand Iran’s enrichment infra-

structure within the bounds of the JCPOA.132

Iran announced, in May 2019, that it would 

begin to cease adhering to some of its JCPOA 

obligations and warned it would take further 

action if JCPOA members did not meet cer-

tain economic demands.133 In early July 2019, 

the IAEA confirmed that Iran had exceeded 

the JCPOA limit on the size of its low-en-

riched uranium stockpile and had produced 

uranium with an enrichment level exceeding 

the JCPOA limit of 3.67 percent.134,135 Tehran 

threatened to continue gradually ceasing other 

JCPOA commitments unless it receives suffi-

cient sanctions relief.136
22

Military Doctrine and Strategy

ehran employs a complex set of military and security capabilities, including a combination of conventional and 

unconventional forces. Iran’s conventional 

military strategy is primarily based on deterrence and the ability to retaliate against an 

attacker. Its unconventional warfare operations and network of militant partners and 

proxies enable Tehran to advance its interests in the region and attain strategic depth 

from its adversaries. If deterrence fails, Iran 

would seek to demonstrate strength and 

resolve, impose a high cost on its adversary, 

and reestablish deterrence using the full 

range of these capabilities.

This strategy is unlikely to change considerably 

in the near term because of Iran’s perception 

that its military remains technologically inferior to the United States—its primary adversary. However, since 2016, Khamenei and other 

senior leaders have suggested that Iran be more 

proactive in defending its territory and interests 

abroad.137 Iran may seek to undertake other missions, such as small-scale expeditionary operations in the region and some participation in 

multilateral peacekeeping missions overseas.138

T

Iranian ballistic missiles on display during the annual Holy Defense Week parade in Tehran on 22 September 2014.

Image Source: Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA)
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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Iran’s “way of war” emphasizes the need to 

avoid or deter conventional conflict while 

advancing its security objectives in the region, 

particularly through propaganda, psycho-

logical warfare, and proxy operations. Iran’s 

deterrence is largely based on three core capa-

bilities: ballistic missiles capable of long-range 

strikes, naval forces capable of threatening 

navigation in the Persian Gulf and Strait of 

Hormuz, and unconventional operations using 

partners and proxies abroad.139

Perceptions of Modern Conflict

The 8-year Iran-Iraq War underscored the 

importance of strategic depth, ballistic mis-

siles, and self-sufficiency in military capabili-

ties—areas Iran continues to prioritize today. 

Most of Iran’s senior military leaders fought in 

the war, and their experiences have played a 

critical role in shaping Iranian military strat-

egy and capabilities.140

During the past two decades, Iran has 

gradually shifted its military thinking and 

approach to warfare based on the 21st-cen-

tury conflicts of the Middle East. It developed 

its military doctrine to face technologically 

advanced Western militaries, aiming to raise 

the human and financial costs to a potential 

adversary to deter an attack. Iran has sought 

to build its armed forces with niche capabili-

ties emphasizing asymmetric tactics intended 

to exploit the perceived weaknesses of its ene-

mies, such as an aversion to casualties and 

overreliance on technology.141,142

Iran probably views modern warfare as a spec-

trum with multiple levels of conflict, including 

“soft” and “hard” war.143,144 Iranian decisionmak

-

ers realize the importance of engaging an adver-

sary in competition short of armed conflict across 

all domains of state power: diplomacy with neigh-

boring states and international bodies; informa-

tion and psychological operations; conventional 

and unconventional military posture and pres-

ence; and economics through its ability to influ-

ence global energy markets. Tehran believes 

the United States is engaged in a hybrid war to 

subvert the regime and its objectives, blending 

conventional and unconventional tactics with all 

elements of state power. Iran views this situa-

tion as short of armed conflict.145,146

Since at least 2014, Iranian senior officials have 

stressed the need to improve military capabilities 

against a wider range of conventional and uncon-

ventional threats, such as terrorism and insurgen-

cies, rather than focusing overwhelmingly on the 

United States and Israel as Iran’s primary adver-

saries.147,148 Senior Iranian officials, including 

Khamenei, have called publicly for the military 

to better address these threats and support Iran’s 

rising regional involvement.149,150 In 2016, Khame

-

nei for the first time called on the military to boost 

its offensive capabilities in addition to defensive 

capabilities.151 Military officials have since noted 

Iran’s need to invest more in offensive capabilities 

and missions, such as combat air power and main-

taining forward presence, areas it has tradition-

ally neglected. Iranian leaders frequently describe 

the Middle East’s instability as requiring a strat-

egy of “active deterrence,” involving intervention 

in regional conflicts to confront national security 

threats before they endanger the homeland.152,153
24

Military and Security

Leadership

The regime often views political, cultural, and 

social dynamics as national security issues 

because these domains can affect the regime’s 

ability to maintain clerical rule. Iran’s power 

structures and decisionmaking bodies reflect 

this clerical oversight in all aspects of military 

and security policy.

Supreme Leader Khamenei, Iran’s head of state 

since 1989, is the ultimate decisionmaker in the 

Iranian political system. Khamenei is responsible for delineating and supervising "the general 

policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran," according to the Iranian constitution, giving him the 

authority to direct all of Iran's domestic and 

foreign policies. As commander in chief, the 

supreme leader can declare war or peace. He has 

the power to appoint and dismiss military officials and the head of the judiciary, and appoints 

6 of the 12 members of the Council of Guardians, 

which vets Iranian legislation and candidates for 

public office.154,155

President Ruhani is a pragmatic conservative 

cleric who serves as the popularly elected head 

of government. The president oversees the cabinet ministries, manages the budgetary process, 

and chairs the Supreme Council for National 

Security (SCNS). However, the Iranian constitution limits the authority of the president, who 

has no operational control of the military and 

can operate only within the boundaries set by 

the supreme leader.156

Major Military and

Security Institutions

Supreme Council for

National Security

The SCNS is the seniormost body for formulating foreign and security policy. The SCNS 

is formally chaired by the president, who also 

appoints the SCNS secretary, currently Vice 

Admiral Ali Shamkhani. Its members also 

include the speaker of the Majles; the head 

of the judiciary; the chief of the AFGS; the 

commanders of the IRGC and Artesh; and 

the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, the 

interior, and intelligence. As SCNS chair, the 

president holds some influence in Iranian foreign and defense policy. The SCNS reports to 

President Ruhani speaks in front of portraits of 

Supreme Leader Khamenei and former Supreme 

Leader Khomeini on the 25th anniversary of Khomeini’s death in 2014.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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25

the supreme leader, who makes all final secu-

rity policy decisions and gives orders to the 

armed forces.157

Armed Forces General Staff & Khate-

molanbia Central Headquarters

The AFGS is the seniormost military body 

in Iran, setting military policy and strategic 

guidance as directed by the supreme leader. 

The Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters 

(KCHQ) is responsible for coordinating mili-

tary operations. The AFGS and KCHQ moni-

tor and coordinate the activities of Iran’s two 

militaries. In 2016, the KCHQ was separated 

from the AFGS as a standing independent 

command responsible for operational com-

mand and control (C2); previously, the KCHQ 

would only be stood up in wartime. At that 

time, the supreme leader appointed IRGC 

Major General Mohammad Bagheri as the 

AFGS chief—Iran’s chief of defense (CHOD)—

and IRGC Major General Gholam Ali Rashid 

as the KCHQ commander.158

Regular Forces (Artesh)

The Artesh primarily focuses on defending 

Iran’s borders from external threats. It con-

sists of ground, naval, air, and air defense 

components, which in total number about 

420,000 personnel. Although generally not as 

fervent in ideology as the IRGC, the Artesh 

still adheres to velayat-e faqih and remains 

loyal to the supreme leader. The Artesh com-

mander, currently Major General Adolrahim 

Musavi, reports to the AFGS chief.159

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Supreme Leader Khomeini established the IRGC, 

also known as the Sepah (corps) or Pasdaran 

(guard), shortly after the Islamic Revolution. It has 

a broader mission to defend the Iranian revolution 

from any foreign or domestic threat. The IRGC—

designated as an FTO by the United States—con-

sists of ground, naval, aerospace, and unconven-

tional components, which in total number about 

190,000 personnel. Including the estimated active 

personnel from Iran’s paramilitary reserve force, 

the Basij, the IRGC numbers roughly 640,000 per-

sonnel. The IRGC commander, currently Major 

General Hossein Salami, reports to the AFGS 

chief. Informally, however, IRGC leaders have 

close access to the supreme leader’s office and rou-

tinely advise the supreme leader and his advisers 

on foreign policy matters.160

Law Enforcement Force

Iran’s national police force, the LEF, is responsible 

for maintaining internal stability and other police 

functions, such as counternarcotic operations and 

border security. The LEF formally falls under the 

Ministry of Interior, which reports to the presi-

dent, but the supreme leader as commander in 

chief appoints the LEF commander, who is usually 

an IRGC general officer. In the event of escalating 

domestic unrest, the Basij and IRGC would rein-

force the LEF.

161,162 In 2018, after the December 

2017–January 2018 unrest, the LEF saw a sub-

stantial increase in its budget, even eclipsing the 

amount allocated to the Artesh.

163 The LEF has 

roughly 200,000–300,000 personnel nationwide, 

though estimates vary.

164,165
26

Ministry of Defense and Armed

Forces Logistics

MODAFL is responsible for supporting and 

equipping the Iranian armed forces through 

military research, development, production, 

acquisition, and personnel support. Unlike 

many ministries of defense, MODAFL does not 

develop Iran’s defense policy and is not in the 

chain of command.166 The current defense minister is Artesh Brigadier General Amir Hatami.

Ministry of Intelligence and Security

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) 

is Iran’s national-level civilian intelligence service. 

It is responsible for domestic security and intelligence, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, 

monitoring Iranian expatriate communities, liaising with foreign intelligence services, and conducting sanctioned lethal operations. The current 

head of the MOIS is Mahmud Alavi-Tabar.167

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is 

nominally responsible for executing Iranian 

foreign policy. However, in practice, other elements of the Iranian government, particularly 

the IRGC-QF, have more control of Iranian 

affairs in some countries.168 The current MFA 

head is Mohammad Javad Zarif.

National Military Command

and Control

Iran’s constitution designates the supreme leader, 

not the president, as commander in chief of the 

armed forces, with the power to exercise military 

C2, declare war and peace, and approve military 

operations. Khamenei traditionally issues orders 

through the AFGS and KCHQ, which oversee 

and coordinate between the IRGC and Artesh, 

but sometimes bypasses these organizations to 

give orders directly to lower-level commanders.169

During a crisis, the supreme leader probably would 

consult with the SCNS to coordinate national policy. The president chairs the SCNS, and its members include key ministers and military leaders, 

Supreme Leader Khamenei delivers a graduation 

speech at a military academy in 2006.

Image Source: AFP

Iranian Armed Forces Organizations Insignia 1805-17889

AFGS ARTESH IRGC MODAFL LEF
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National Military Command and Control 1805-17889

Formal C2 Informal C2 Coordination

IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF)

Al Ghadir Missile Command

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) HQ

IRGC Ground Force (IRGCGF)

Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Khatemolanbia Central HQ (KCHQ)

Islamic Republic of

Iran Ground Force (IRIGF)

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN)

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)

Islamic Republic of

Iran Air Defense Force (IRIADF)

IRGC Navy (IRGCN)

IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF)

Basij Organization of the Oppressed (BOO)

Regular Forces (Artesh) HQ

Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS)

Supreme Leader

Artesh Services Insignia 1805-17889

IRIGF IRIN IRIAF KADHQ/IRIADF

including the head of the AFGS and the highestranking officials in the IRGC and Artesh, per the 

Iranian constitution. The SCNS has an advisory 

role in policy decisions but no C2 authority.

The AFGS and KCHQ command the Artesh and 

the IRGC. Both militaries have their own ground, 

naval, air, and air defense forces; the IRGC also 

operates Iran’s missile force and oversees its 

external operations element. The Artesh and 

IRGC usually conduct operations independent 

of each other. However, IRGC and Artesh com-

manders are increasingly focused on improving 

collaboration and joint operations as the militar-

ies seek to undertake a wider range of missions 

domestically and abroad.

170

Although the supreme leader and political elites 

depend on the IRGC more than the Artesh, the 

two organizations increasingly work together to 

confront internal and external threats. The IRGC 

is well connected within the Iranian government 

and the economy, and the supreme leader uses it 

to help maintain his authority.

171,172
28

IRGC Major General Mohammad Hossein 

Bagheri has served as AFGS chief since June 

2016. He is responsible for overseeing all Iranian military forces as Iran’s highest-ranking 

military officer. Bagheri is tasked with overseeing and coordinating Iran’s two parallel military forces—the Artesh and the IRGC—and 

reports directly to the supreme leader.173

Major General

Mohammad Hossein Bagheri

AFGS Chief (CHOD)

IRGC Major General Gholam Ali Rashid has 

served as commander of the KCHQ, Iran’s 

top operational headquarters, since June 

2016. He has longstanding connections with 

other IRGC leaders dating back to the IranIraq War.174

Major General

Gholam Ali Rashid

KCHQ Commander

Promoted and appointed IRGC commander in 

April 2019, IRGC Major General Hossein Salami 

is a key decisionmaker on foreign and domestic 

security issues because the IRGC retains a dominant role in the country’s affairs. He oversees 

all IRGC activities, but has less control of the 

IRGC-QF, whose commander has a separate 

line of communication to Khamenei.175

Major General

Hossein Salami

IRGC Commander

Key Military Leaders

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Appointed Artesh commander and promoted 

to major general in August 2017, IRIGF Major 

General Abdolrahim Musavi’s career in the 

Artesh dates back to before the Islamic Revolution. Musavi’s top priorities as Artesh commander include improving coordination of 

Artesh and IRGC operations and advancing 

Iran’s defense self-sufficiency. As Artesh commander, he also holds a position on the SCNS 

and informs national security decisions.176

Major General

Abdolrahim Musavi

Artesh Commander

As commander of the IRGC-QF, IRGC Major 

General Qasem Soleimani is a key architect 

and chief executor of Iran’s foreign policy in 

regional conflict zones, including Afghanistan, 

Iraq, the Levant, and Yemen. He is one of the 

most recognized and popular military leaders 

in Iran and wields significant influence in Iranian foreign policy decisionmaking. His close 

relationship with Khamenei allows him to 

often directly advise and receive orders outside 

the traditional chain of command.177

Major General

Qasem Soleimani

IRGC-QF Commander

IRIGF Brigadier General Amir Hatami—notably the first Artesh defense minister since 

MODAFL’s inception in 1989—is responsible 

for overseeing research, development, production, and personnel support for the Iranian 

military. Although as defense minister Hatami 

plays a significant role in military modernization and defense diplomacy, he has no authority in the military chain of command. Brigadier General 178

Amir Hatami

Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Image Source: AFP Image Source: AFP Image Source: AFP
30

ran’s ballistic missiles constitute a primary 

component of its strategic deterrent. Lacking a modern air force, Iran has embraced 

ballistic missiles as a long-range strike 

capability to dissuade its adversaries in the 

region—particularly the United States, Israel, 

and Saudi Arabia—from attacking Iran. Iran 

has the largest missile force in the Middle East, 

with a substantial inventory of close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range ballistic 

missiles (SRBMs), and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that can strike targets 

throughout the region as far as 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders. Iran is also developing land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which 

present a unique threat profile from ballistic 

missiles because they can fly at low altitude and 

attack a target from multiple directions.179,180

Decades of international sanctions have hampered Iran’s ability to modernize its military 

forces through foreign procurement, but Tehran has invested heavily in its domestic infrastructure, equipment, and expertise to develop 

An Iranian Qiam-1 SRBM unveiled in 2010.

Core Iranian Military Capabilities

Ballistic Missiles

I

Image Source: AFP
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and produce increasingly capable ballistic and 

cruise missiles. Iran will continue to improve 

the accuracy and lethality of some of those sys-

tems and will pursue the development of new 

systems, despite continued international coun-

terproliferation efforts and restrictions under 

UNSCR 2231. Iran is also extending the range 

of some of its SRBMs to be able to strike targets 

farther away, filling a capability gap between 

its MRBMs and older SRBMs. [For more details 

on UNSCR 2231, see Appendix J.]

Iran can launch salvos of missiles against largearea targets, such as military bases and population centers, throughout the region to inflict 

damage, complicate adversary military oper-

ations, and weaken enemy morale. Although 

it maintains many older, inaccurate missiles 

in its inventory, Iran is increasing the accu-

racy of many of its missile systems. The use 

of improved guidance technology and maneu-

verability during the terminal phase of flight 

enables these missiles to be used more effec-

tively against smaller targets, including spe-

cific military facilities and ships at sea. These 

enhancements could reduce the miss-distance 

of some Iranian missiles to as little as tens of 

meters, potentially requiring fewer missiles 

to damage or destroy an intended target and 

broadening Iran’s options for missile use.

Iran’s more-accurate systems are primarily short 

range, such as the Fateh-110 SRBM and its 

derivatives. Iran’s longer-range systems, such as 

the Shahab 3 MRBM, are generally less accurate. 

However, Iran is developing MRBMs with greater 

precision, such as the Emad-1, that improve 

Iran’s ability to strike distant targets more effec-

tively. Iran could also complicate regional missile 

defenses by launching large missile salvos.

Iran lacks intermediate-range ballistic missiles 

(IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs), but Tehran’s desire to have a strate-

gic counter to the United States could drive it 

to develop and eventually field an ICBM. Iran 

continues to develop space launch vehicles 

(SLVs) with increasing lift capacity—including 

boosters that could be capable of ICBM ranges 

and potentially reach the continental United 

States, if configured for that purpose. Progress 

in Iran’s space program could shorten a path-

way to an ICBM because SLVs use inherently 

similar technologies.

181,182,183,184,185

[For more details on Iran’s missile force, see 

Appendix A.]

Other Long-Range Strike Options

To supplement its long-range strike capabilities, Iran could also attempt to use its regional 

proxies and limited airstrike capability to attack an adversary’s critical infrastructure. Iran 

maintains an aging inventory of combat aircraft—such as decades-old U.S. F-4 Phantoms—

which it could attempt to use to attack its regional adversaries. However, these older plat-

forms would be more vulnerable to air defenses than modern combat aircraft.

186 Iran could 

also use its armed UAVs for limited long-range airstrikes, potentially in combination with 

missiles, as it demonstrated during strikes against ISIS in Syria in 2018.187
32

Antiaccess/Area Denial

Iran’s antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) strategy seeks to prevent an adversary from entering or operating in areas that it considers 

essential to its security and sovereignty. Iranian A2/AD relies primarily on Iran’s naval 

forces and geostrategic position along the 

Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz—a critical 

chokepoint for the world’s oil supply. Iran’s 

layered maritime defenses consist of numerous platforms and weapons intended, when 

used in a combined fashion, to overwhelm 

an adversary’s naval forces. Iran emphasizes asymmetric tactics, such as small boat 

attacks, to saturate a ship’s defenses. The 

full range of Iran’s A2/AD capabilities include 

ship- and shore-launched antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), fast attack craft (FAC) and 

fast inshore attack craft (FIAC), naval mines, 

submarines, UAVs, antiship ballistic missiles 

(ASBMs), and air defense systems.188,189

Maritime Threat Capabilities

Capitalizing on the strategic nature of its littoral, Iran’s maritime A2/AD strategy employs a 

combination of surface combatants, undersea 

warfare, and antiship missiles to deter naval 

aggression and hold maritime traffic at risk. 

Particularly with its large fleet of small surface 

vessels—high-speed FAC and FIAC equipped 

with machine guns, unguided rockets, torpedoes, ASCMs, and mines—Iran has developed a 

maritime guerrilla-warfare strategy intended to 

exploit the perceived weaknesses of traditional 

naval forces that rely on large vessels. Iran can 

also use its undersea warfare capabilities, which 

include Yono class midget submarines and Kilo 

class attack submarines, to attack surface ships 

in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf 

of Oman. Iran operates coastal defense cruise 

missiles (CDCMs) along its southern coast, 

which it can launch against military or civilian ships as far as 300 kilometers away. Iran 

also maintains an estimated inventory of more 

than 5,000 naval mines, including contact and 

influence mines, which it can rapidly deploy in 

the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz using 

high-speed small boats equipped as minelayers.190,191,192 [For more details on Iran’s naval 

forces, see Appendix B.]

Long-Range Strike

During a conflict, Iran probably would attempt 

to attack regional military bases and possibly 

energy infrastructure and other critical economic targets using its missile arsenal. Even 

with many of its missile systems having poor 

accuracy, Iran could use large salvos of missiles 

to complicate an adversary’s military operations 

IRGCN FAC/FIAC attack a mock U.S. aircraft carrier 

during an exercise in 2015.

Image Source: AFP
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in theater, particularly if some of Iran’s newer, 

more-accurate systems are incorporated. Iran 

has also developed short-range ASBMs based 

on its Fateh-110 system. Iran could use these 

ASBMs, in concert with its other countermar-

itime capabilities, to attack adversary naval 

or commercial vessels operating in the Persian 

Gulf or Gulf of Oman.193

Air Defenses

Iran operates a diverse array of SAM and radar 

systems intended to defend critical sites from 

attack by a technologically superior air force. 

Operational since 2017, Iran’s Russian-provided 

SA-20c long-range SAM system is the most capa-

ble component of its integrated air defense sys-

tem (IADS).194 Iran is also fielding more-capable, 

domestically developed SAM and radar systems 

to help fill gaps in its air defenses.195

Unconventional Warfare

Iran’s unconventional warfare capability serves 

as a means of power projection and as part of its 

A2/AD strategy. Iran could use its strong ties 

to militant and terrorist groups in the region—

such as Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, and the 

Huthis—to target critical adversary military 

and civilian facilities. Proxy attacks against 

adversary military bases in the region could 

complicate operations in theater.196

Unconventional Operations

Iran has consistently demonstrated a prefer-

ence for using partners, proxies, and covert cam-

paigns to intervene in regional affairs because 

of limitations in its conventional military capa-

bilities and a desire to maintain plausible deni-

ability, thereby attempting to minimize the risk 

of escalation with its adversaries.

197

Iran’s reliance on unconventional operations—

which is enabled by its relationships with a 

wide range of primarily Middle Eastern militias, 

militant groups, and terrorist organizations—is 

central to its foreign policy and defense strat-

egy. The IRGC-QF is Tehran’s primary tool for 

conducting unconventional operations and pro-

viding support to partners and proxies. The com-

mander of the IRGC-QF, Major General Solei-

mani, has a close relationship with Khamenei, 

often communicating with and taking orders 

from him directly.

Through the IRGC-QF, Iran provides its part-

ners, proxies, and affiliates with varying levels 

of financial assistance, training, and materiel 

support. Iran uses these groups to further its 

national security objectives while obfuscating 

Iranian involvement in foreign conflicts. Teh-

ran also relies on them as a means to carry out 

retaliatory attacks on its adversaries. Most of 

these groups share similar religious and ideo-

logical values with Iran, particularly devotion 

to Shia Islam and, in some cases, adherence to 

velayat-e faqih. However, Iran has also estab-

lished relationships with more diverse groups 

based on shared enemies, common threats, and 

mutually beneficial goals.

The strength of Iran’s relationship with these 

groups varies widely. Iran’s strongest and most 

successful regional partnership is with Hizbal-

lah, dating back to 1982. The relationship today 

involves Iranian sponsorship, cooperation, and 

shared sectarian and political interests, espe-
34

cially against Israel and the United States. 

However, Hizballah retains its decisionmaking in internal Lebanese affairs.

198,199,200

In recent years, the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, 

and Yemen have placed new demands on the 

IRGC-QF to manage Iranian involvement in 

multiple combat zones, including some support 

from Iranian conventional forces. In Syria, Iran 

maintains a strong relationship with the Asad 

regime, which it views as a critical ally and 

conduit to Hizballah.201 In Iraq, the IRGC-QF 

has strong influence with Iranian-aligned Shia 

groups operating within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), many of whom have cooperated with Baghdad to defeat ISIS.202 In Yemen, 

Iran has supported the Huthi rebels with financial assistance, weapons, military training, and 

operational advice.203

Iran also uses the IRGC-QF to provide varying levels of support to Shia groups in Bahrain, some Palestinian militant groups, and 

the Taliban in Afghanistan.204 As active combat operations have drawn down in Syria and 

Iraq, Tehran could choose to increase support 

to historical unconventional lines of effort in 

the region or pursue new opportunities.

[For more details on Iran’s unconventional 

forces, see Appendix C.]

Expeditionary Operations

Iran has limited expeditionary warfare and 

force projection capabilities. It has shown itself 

capable of sending small groups of conventional 

forces—including ground forces, military airlift, and UAV operators—into permissive allied 

countries to support larger operations. Since the 

outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran has 

become increasingly involved in regional conflicts, with varying levels of military intervention in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The IRGC-QF 

remains the lead for these operations, but Iran 

has adapted its approach to external operations 

by incorporating conventional Iranian forces in 

addition to large numbers of Shia foreign fighters. Iran’s military has also revised professional 

military education to emphasize lessons learned 

from operations in Syria and Iraq, where it also 

has gained its first experience conducting combined operations with allied military forces.

In Syria, Iran has worked to defeat ISIS and 

defend the Asad regime against insurgent 

groups, with Iranian and Iranian-affiliated 

forces serving as critical force multipliers 

for the regime. In the spring of 2016, Tehran 

deployed a small number of ground forces from 

the Artesh to Syria—the first such deployment 

outside Iran since the Iran-Iraq War.205

Soldiers carry the caskets of IRGC personnel killed in 

Syria in 2016.

Image Source: AFP
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As early as 2014, Iran deployed military advis-

ers and some conventional ground forces to Iraq 

to combat ISIS and prevent the state’s frag-

mentation, although Iran maintains a larger 

conventional military presence in Syria. The 

IRGC-QF has strong ties to many Iraqi Shia 

groups that have participated in operations to 

retake Iraqi territory from ISIS.206,207

In Yemen, Iran provides military support to 

the Huthis against the Saudi-led coalition, 

enabling Tehran to indirectly pressure Riyadh 

without entering into a direct military conflict. 

Huthi missile launches against targets in Saudi 

Arabia and attacks on Saudi-led coalition ships 

demonstrate Iran’s provision of increasingly 

lethal capabilities to the Huthis. Tehran’s pro-

vision of explosive boat technology and Irani-

an-made missiles, including the extended-range 

Qiam SRBM, provides the Huthis with systems 

exceeding the capabilities of the pre-conflict 

Yemeni inventory.208,209

Iran does not participate meaningfully in 

international peacekeeping operations, con-

tributing only a few personnel to the African 

Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in 

Darfur (UNAMID). However, Tehran has 

expressed interest in expanding its military 

support to international peacekeeping missions, 

potentially as a way to increase legitimacy, par-

ticipate in multilateral initiatives, and develop 

expeditionary-like capabilities through opera-

tions other than war.210,211

Iran can also conduct limited out-of-area naval 

operations as far as China, South Africa, and 

the Mediterranean Sea. The Islamic Republic of 

Iran Navy (IRIN) maintains regular rotations 

of deployed naval groups (DNGs) for counter-

piracy, presence, and naval diplomacy missions 

in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and sometimes 

the Indian Ocean. Often plagued with mainte-

nance issues, the DNGs are largely symbolic, 

showcasing Iran’s projection of force beyond its 

territorial waters.212,213

Cyberspace

Iran uses cyberspace operations as a tool of state-

craft and internal security, and it continues to 

improve its capabilities. Tehran views these oper-

ations as a safe, low-cost method to collect informa-

tion and retaliate against perceived threats. Teh-

ran often masks its cyberoperations using proxies 

to maintain plausible deniability. However, there 

are often clear indications that link these opera-

tions to Iran’s security apparatus. Domestically, 

Then-IRIN Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah 

Sayyari discussing Iranian naval operations during a 

press conference in 2010.

Image Source: AFP
36

the Iranian government pursues domination 

of the cyberspace environment to influence the 

population’s ideological and cultural exposure. 

Abroad, Tehran intimidates, harasses, and influences adversaries by conducting cyberoperations 

and empowers its proxy networks to do the same. 

Compared to more technologically advanced 

states, such as the United States, China, and 

Russia, Tehran’s offensive cyberspace capabilities 

remain underdeveloped. Although accounts of 

Iranian hacking first emerged in the early 2000s, 

state-sponsored cyberspace activities did not 

appear publicly until 2007. Prompted by the 2010 

Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, 

Iran recognized the need to develop its cyberspace 

capability as a strategic priority. Tehran receives 

technical assistance for cyberspace defense from 

Russia and China, and Ruhani has repeatedly 

made commitments to increase Iran’s cyberspace 

budget. Iran has quickly evolved from using web 

defacements and basic censorship to conducting 

more-sophisticated internal information controls, 

destructive attacks, and espionage campaigns.

Iranian cyberspace actors use phishing and 

defacing campaigns against commercial enterprises, as well as cyberespionage against military and government data. Iranian cyberactors 

frequently target aerospace companies, defense 

contractors, energy and natural resource companies, and telecommunications firms for cyberespionage operations. Since at least 2014, Iranian cyberactors have stolen credentials and 

spread malware on business networks. These 

cyberespionage efforts can support Iran’s military research and development efforts and commodities industries.214,215,216

Iran has shown it is capable of disruptive and 

destructive offensive cyberattacks, including 

against U.S. targets. After a 2012 malware 

attack targeting an Iranian oil facility, Iran 

responded with a cyberattack on Saudi Aramco 

and Qatari RasGas, using malware to cause 

irreparable damage to thousands of computers. 

During 2012–2013, Iranian hackers launched a 

distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaign 

against major U.S. banks and the U.S. Stock 

Exchange, and in 2014 conducted a data-deletion attack on a U.S. casino. During the 

2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, Iranian cyberactors 

launched a DDoS attack against Israel Defense 

Forces infrastructure. From late 2016 to early 

2017, Iran conducted another larger and more 

damaging malware attack against Saudi targets, including the civil aviation authority, 

labor ministry, and central bank.217

Iranian cyberactors also conduct ongoing information operations aimed at promoting pro-Iranian 

political interests via the use of a network of fake 

social media accounts. These accounts promote 

anti-Saudi and anti-Western stances and support 

policies that Tehran views as favorable.218

Intelligence

Iran’s intelligence services are capable of sophisticated operations worldwide to counter potential 

threats to the regime, its revolutionary ideology, 

and its interests. Iran’s intelligence community 

is composed of 16 organizations charged with foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal monitoring and security missions.219 These 

organizations include the MOIS and headquar-
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ters elements and subcomponents within the 

IRGC and Artesh. Overlapping missions and par-

allel chains of command—particularly between 

the MOIS and elements of the IRGC—fuel com-

petition between the organizations for resources, 

missions, and prestige. The Intelligence Coordi-

nation Council, chaired by the MOIS, is charged 

with coordinating and deconflicting the opera-

tions of Iran’s intelligence organizations.

The MOIS is Iran’s national-level civilian intelli-

gence service. It is responsible for domestic secu-

rity and intelligence, foreign intelligence, monitor-

ing Iranian expatriate communities, liaising with 

foreign intelligence services, counterintelligence, 

and sanctioned lethal operations. The MOIS pri-

marily collects information regarding the inten-

tions and capabilities of foreign governments and 

dissidents Iran regards as hostile.220 The IRGC 

Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) is Iran’s 

foremost military intelligence service, capable of 

all-source collection, analysis, and investigations. 

The IRGC also operates a Counterintelligence 

Organization that is charged with protecting 

IRGC personnel, operations, and facilities from 

espionage, information leaks, and other counter-

revolutionary threats. The Artesh has a joint mil-

itary intelligence capability tasked with tactical 

intelligence gathering, counterintelligence opera-

tions, and internal security.221

[For more details on Iran’s intelligence services, 

see Appendix H.]

Space/Counterspace

Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and 

counterspace capabilities. Tehran claims to have 

developed sophisticated capabilities, including 

SLVs and communications and remote sensing 

satellites. Iran’s simple SLVs are only able to 

launch microsatellites into low Earth orbit and 

have proven unreliable with few successful sat-

ellite launches. The Iran Space Agency and Iran 

Space Research Center—which are subordinate 

to the Ministry of Information and Communica-

tions Technology—along with MODAFL, over-

see the country’s SLV and satellite development 

programs. Iran initially developed its SLVs as 

an extension of its ballistic missile program, 

but it has genuine civilian and military space 

launch goals.

Iran has conducted several successful launches 

of the two-stage Safir SLV since its first attempt 

in 2008. It has also revealed the larger two-stage 

Simorgh SLV, which it launched in July 2017 

and January 2019 without successfully placing 

a satellite into orbit. The Simorgh could serve 

as a test bed for developing ICBM technologies. 

Because of the inherent overlap in technology 

between ICBMs and SLVs, Iran’s development 

IRGC-IO Chief Hossein Taeb.

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons
38

of larger, more-capable SLV boosters remains a 

concern for a future ICBM capability. In 2005, 

Iran became a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), 

which is led by China, in order to access space 

technology from other countries.222,223

Iran’s counterspace capabilities have centered 

around jamming satellite communications and 

GPS, and Iran is reportedly making advancements in these areas.224,225 Iran is also seeking to 

improve its space object surveillance and identification capabilities through domestic development and by joining international space situational awareness projects through APSCO.226

Chemical and Biological Warfare

Iranian leaders have long been concerned about 

the threat of chemical and biological warfare 

because of the considerable loss of life from chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran 

is a States party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and 

Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which ban 

the development, production, and stockpiling 

of certain chemical and biological agents. Iran 

publicly denounces the use of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD), and Khamenei has reportedly issued a fatwa (Islamic legal ruling) against 

chemical weapons.227

In November 2018, the United States found 

Iran noncompliant with its CWC obligations. 

Iran failed to declare its transfer of chemical 

weapons to Libya in the 1980s or its holdings 

of riot control agents, such as the tearing agent 

CR, and has not submitted a complete chemical weapons production facility declaration. The 

United States is also concerned that Iran is pursuing central nervous system-acting chemicals 

for offensive purposes. Although these chemicals have legitimate uses as pharmaceuticals, 

they can be lethal at certain doses.228,229

An Iranian Safir SLV is prepared for launch in 2009.

Image Source: AFP
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Denial and Deception

Denial and deception (D&D) is a core compo-

nent of Iranian military doctrine, and Iran 

uses D&D techniques extensively to reduce the 

vulnerability and increase the survivability of 

its military forces. To apply these techniques 

across the military, Tehran has established 

what it calls a “passive defense” doctrine. The 

effort was based on lessons learned from past 

military conflicts, including U.S. operations in 

the Middle East and the 2006 Israel-Hizballah 

conflict. Iran’s nationwide passive defense pro-

gram comprises a wide range of D&D tactics to 

hinder foreign intelligence collection and ensure 

the survivability of critical infrastructure and 

core military capabilities. Key Iranian passive 

defense measures include camouflage and con-

cealment, force dispersals, underground facili-

ties, and highly mobile units. For example, Iran 

configures some military vehicles to resemble 

civilian trucks. Iran’s passive defense doctrine 

also includes aspects of cyberdefense, mainly to 

protect networks from cyberattack and intru-

sion from outside influences.

The National Passive Defense Organization 

(NPDO) sends guidance and regulations to 

passive defense offices embedded across Ira-

nian industries and civilian organizations. 

The NPDO has pressed the importance of the 

passive defense doctrine beyond the military 

in public forums, including Friday prayers. In 

2012, Iran established Passive Defense Week, a 

nationwide effort to promote awareness for key 

passive defense measures.230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237

Underground Facilities

Iran has the largest underground facility (UGF) 

program in the Middle East. Based on the central 

pillars of Iran’s passive defense doctrine, Tehran 

has invested heavily in constructing UGFs to con-

ceal and protect critical military and civilian infra-

structure throughout the country. Iran designed 

and built these facilities to support various aspects 

of its defense industries, key nuclear infrastruc-

ture, and military forces, including naval sites, 

missile bases, and equipment storage.

238

In late 2009, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic 

Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), stated Iran 

would build nuclear facilities in mountains as a 

response to international pressure for Tehran to 

abandon its nuclear ambitions.

239 Iran houses 

portions of its nuclear program within deep tun-

nels and underground bunkers at locations such 

as Natanz and Fordow (Qom).

240,241 However, 

both sites are subject to restrictions outlined in 

the JCPOA and closely monitored by the IAEA.

UGFs support most facets of Tehran’s ballistic 

missile capabilities, including the operational 

force and the missile development and produc-

tion program. Missile-related UGFs house weap-

ons and equipment storage, underground basing 

of mobile missiles, and hardened launch sites.

242 

In recent years, Iran has used state media to 

broadcast the launch of ballistic missiles from 

underground launch chambers and showcase 

underground missile garrisons.

243 Regional 

media also indicates Iran is aiding proxies in the 

Middle East by helping them construct under-

ground missile production facilities.

244
40

Outlook: Building a More Capable 

Conventional Force

ran will continue to use a combination of 

conventional and unconventional capabilities to achieve its objectives at home 

and abroad, as Tehran’s core national security 

objectives are unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Seeking to strengthen its regional 

position, Tehran is attempting to bolster its 

ties in the international community and build 

the capacity of its partners in the Middle East, 

while advancing its military capabilities at 

home for defense and deterrence. Recognizing 

its inability to defeat an advanced Western military, such as the United States, Iran in the near 

term probably will continue to emphasize its 

three core capabilities: ballistic missiles capable 

of striking targets throughout the region, littoral naval forces capable of threatening navigation in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, 

and support for partners and proxies capable of 

unconventional operations abroad.

Although the IRGC-QF and its network of proxies 

will remain central to Iran’s military power, Tehran will improve its conventional forces and seek 

new capabilities. Iran’s latest 5-year development 

plan continues priority for missiles, naval forces, 

and air defenses, but it also adds new emphasis 

on combat air power and EW capabilities. Iran 

probably will continue to focus on domestic development of increasingly capable missiles, naval 

platforms and weapons, and air defenses, while 

it attempts to upgrade some of its deteriorating 

air and ground capabilities primarily through 

foreign purchases. Under UNSCR 2231, Iran is 

prohibited from procuring most types of conventional weapon systems from abroad. However, 

these restrictions are set to expire by October 

2020, providing Tehran with the opportunity to 

acquire some advanced capabilities that have 

been beyond its reach for decades.

• Missile Force. Iran will deploy an increasing number of more accurate and lethal theater ballistic missiles, improve its existing 

missile inventory, and field new LACMs. It 

will also pursue technical capabilities that 

could enable it to produce an ICBM.

• Naval Forces. Iran’s naval forces will field 

increasingly capable platforms and weapons, including improved naval mines, faster 

and more lethal surface platforms, more-advanced ASCMs, larger and more-sophisticated submarines, and new ASBMs.

• Air and Air Defense Forces. Iran will 

modernize its IADS with new air surveillance radars, SAMs, and command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

systems. Once the UN arms embargo ends, 

Tehran can purchase advanced fourth-generation fighter aircraft. Iran will also 

develop and field more-capable UAVs, 

including armed platforms.

I
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• Ground Forces. The ground forces will 

continue structural changes, including the 

creation of new rapid-response brigades, 

which could enable them to become more 

agile and effective in countering threats. 

Iran also will be able to buy modern main 

battle tanks after the UN embargo ends.

Despite these goals, ongoing financial con-

straints and sanctions will challenge Iran’s 

military modernization efforts. Tehran will 

be unable to meet all of its acquisition prior-

ities and requirements in this environment. 

The complex security situation of the Middle 

East—with the continued presence of U.S. 

forces, the superior force projection capabili-

ties of Israel, and the growing military means 

of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—will fur-

ther complicate Iran’s efforts to build its con-

ventional force.

As Iran’s perception of the threats it faces 

evolves during the coming years, the military 

will be forced to contend with new roles and 

missions. Iran’s current modernization plans 

emphasize a broader range of conventional 

capabilities than in the past. Iranian leaders 

have repeatedly noted that Iran must improve 

its capabilities against a wider range of con-

ventional and unconventional threats, such 

as terrorism and insurgencies, and be more 

proactive in defending Iranian territory and 

interests abroad. Since the supreme leader’s 

mandate in 2016 for Iran to improve both its 

defensive and offensive capabilities, military 

officials have stressed the need to invest in 

new capabilities and missions, such as combat 

air power and maintaining forward presence, 

areas it has traditionally neglected. Beyond 

Iran’s unprecedented deployment of conven-

tional forces to Iraq and Syria, officials have 

taken steps—including changes in force struc-

ture, training, and tactics—toward revising its 

military doctrine.

As its capabilities improve and its approach 

to the region evolves during the next decade, 

Iran’s military could consider undertaking 

broader missions, such as multilateral peace-

keeping missions, expeditionary operations 

elsewhere in the region, or permanent bas-

ing in allied countries. Nevertheless, Iran’s 

conventional forces today remain primarily 

oriented for defensive missions and continue 

Evolving Military Training

Some recent Iranian exercises have begun to demonstrate changes in Iranian military doc-

trine. In December 2018, Iran conducted its first major amphibious assault exercise in many 

years, NOBLE PROPHET 12. The IRGCGF commander described the exercise as Iran’s first 

demonstration of offensive aspects of its defensive doctrine, noting that an ability to conduct 

offensive operations is a key element of Iran’s deterrence. In January 2019, the IRIGF also 

employed offensive tactics during its EQTEDAR 97 exercise. Officials noted the event dis-

played Iran’s resolve to proactively attack its enemies instead of waiting to respond.

245,246,247
42

Iranian Military Modernization Goals248,249

1805-17887

Capability Stated Goals

Missile Increase the accuracy, lethality, and production of ballistic and cruise missiles

Air Defense Develop longer-range SAMs and improve short- and medium-range systems

Air Develop advanced offensive and defensive air power

Navy Attain regional and deterrent sea power

Ground Strengthen ground combat and rapid-reaction capability

EW/C4ISR Improve EW and C4ISR posture, including space-based capabilities

Cyberspace Increase cyberspace presence and hold adversary infratructure at risk

to rely on asymmetric tactics. More substantial and sustained institutional reforms 

and investments in new equipment will be 

required for Iran to develop a more balanced 

military capable of both defensive and expeditionary operations.
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Appendix A: Missile Force

Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic 

missile arsenal in the Middle East, with a sub-

stantial inventory of close-range ballistic mis-

siles (CRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles 

(SRBMs), and medium-range ballistic missiles 

(MRBMs) that can strike targets throughout 

the region up to 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s 

borders, as far as Israel and southeastern 

Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges 1805-17885

Mediterranean

Sea

Arabian Sea

Bay of

Bengal

Black Sea

INDIAN

OCEAN

Tehran

MONGOLIA

FRANCE

BURMA

LIBYA

TURKEY GREECE

IRAN IRAQ

UKRAINE

INDIA

SOM.

ROM.

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

SAUDI

ARABIA

TURKM.

AFG.

OMAN

CHINA

YEMEN

PAK.

SYRIA

EGYPT

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. 0 500 1,000 Kilometers

System (Max Range)

Shahab 1 (300 km)

Fateh-110 (300-500 km)

Shahab 2 SRBM (500 km)

Zolfaghar SRBM (700 km)

Qiam-1 SRBM (750 km)

Shahab 3/Emad-1/

Sejjil MRBMs (2,000 km)

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
44

Europe. Iran’s missile force—the Al-Ghadir 

Missile Command (AGMC), which falls under 

the control of the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF)—serves as a critical strategic deterrent 

and a key tool of Iranian power projection.

The AGMC periodically conducts highly publicized national-level exercises demonstrating 

the capabilities and readiness of the force, often 

as part of the IRGC’s NOBLE PROPHET series 

of exercises. In 2017, Iran for the first time used 

the name EQTEDAR-E VELAYAT for its major 

AGMC exercise. These show-of-force events 

typically include publicized missile launches 

and statements highlighting Iran’s missile 

capabilities and deterrent posture. Prior exercises have showcased launches against a mock 

U.S. airfield and naval targets.250,251,252

Iran has also used its missiles in combat on 

several occasions in recent years. In June 2017 

and October 2018, Iran launched SRBMs from 

western Iran in high-profile strikes against ISIS 

targets in Syria. Iran conducted both operations 

in direct response to terrorist attacks in Iran, 

although some officials noted the attacks were 

also intended as a message to any of Iran’s potential adversaries.253,254,255 In September 2018, Iran 

launched SRBMs against Kurdish militant targets in Iraq, damaging the Kurdish Democratic 

Party of Iran (KDPI) headquarters.256

Iran’s continued production of missiles and 

refinement of ballistic missile technology pose 

a growing threat to U.S. forces and allies in the 

Middle East. Tehran is also a major proliferator 

of ballistic missile technology to regional state 

actors and proxy groups. Although Iranian 

leaders emphasize self-reliance, Iran continues 

to depend on foreign suppliers for critical components and technology.

Iran has an extensive missile development 

program, and the size and sophistication of its 

missile force continues to grow despite decades 

of counterproliferation efforts aimed at curbing its advancement. Iran continues to attempt 

to increase the lethality, reliability, and accuracy of its missile force. In recent years, Iran 

has unveiled SRBMs with increasingly greater 

range and precision as well as MRBMs with 

claimed accuracy and warhead improvements. 

Iran is fielding an increasing number of theater 

ballistic missiles, improving its existing inventory, and developing technical capabilities that 

could enable it to produce an intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM).257,258,259,260,261

Close- and Short-Range

Ballistic Missiles

Iran’s liquid-propellant SRBMs—the Shahab 1, Shahab 2, and Qiam-1—are based on 

Scud technology. The Qiam-1 has a range of at 

least 750 kilometers, and variants of the system have been used as part of Iranian strikes 

on ISIS in Syria. Tehran has also supplied 

extended-range Qiam-1 variants to the Huthis 

in Yemen. These missiles, launched mostly at 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, have flown to a range of 

more than 900 kilometers.262,263,264

Iran’s solid-propellant CRBMs and SRBMs primarily consist of the many variants of the Fateh110 family of missiles. Most of these systems 

have ranges up to about 300 kilometers, but Iran 
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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has unveiled a variant called the Fateh-313 with 

a 500-kilometer range. Iran has also advertised 

several variants of these missiles configured with 

different terminal seeker technologies, including 

electro-optical and antiradiation homing, which 

makes them capable of targeting ships. These 

systems—which include the Khalij Fars, Hormuz 1, and Hormuz 2—reportedly have ranges of 

about 300 kilometers.265 In September 2016, Iran 

unveiled the new Zolfaghar SRBM, a solid-propellant system with a 700-kilometer range. Iran 

used these missiles in its 2017 and 2018 strikes 

against ISIS in Syria.266

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles

The liquid-propellant Shahab 3 is the mainstay of Iran’s MRBM force. Iran has modified 

the Shahab 3, which is based on the North 

Korean No Dong MRBM, to extend its range 

and effectiveness, with the longest range variant being able to reach targets at a distance of 

about 2,000 kilometers. In 2015, Iran publicized 

the first launch of a Shahab 3 variant—called 

the Emad-1—equipped with a maneuverable 

reentry vehicle (MARV), which could allow the 

system to strike targets up to potentially 2,000 

kilometers away with near-precision accuracy. 

Iran has also conducted multiple launches of the 

solid-propellant Sejjil MRBM, which also has a 

range of 2,000 kilometers. Iranian officials have 

announced plans for an Emad-2 with greater 

A Shahab 3 MRBM is launched during an exercise 

in 2016.

Image Source: AFP

A Shahab 1 SRBM is launched during an exercise 

in 2012.

Image Source: AFP
46

precision as well as a new Sejjil variant, which 

can also be guided all the way to the target.267

In September 2016, Iran claimed production of 

the new Khorramshar MRBM would begin in 

2017. The Khorramshahr, which Iran states has 

a 2,000-kilometer range, appears to be derived 

from North Korean Musudan technology.268,269

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles

In 2012, Iran announced the development of its 

first land-attack cruise missile (LACM), called 

Meshkat. In 2015, Iran displayed what it called 

the Soumar LACM, a ground-launched system 

that appears to be based on the Russian airlaunched AS-15. Iran claims the Soumar has 

a 2,000-kilometer range. LACMs can provide 

Iran with a precision-strike capability up to 

MRBM ranges that could further complicate 

missile defenses.270

Space Launch Vehicles

Since 2008, Iran has launched multi-stage space 

launch vehicles (SLVs) that could also aid Iran’s 

development of longer-range ballistic missiles 

The unveiling of the Simorgh SLV in 2010.

Image Source: AFP
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because SLVs use inherently similar technol-

ogies. Iran has conducted multiple launches of 

the two-stage, liquid-propellant Safir SLV, a mix 

of successes and failures. It has also launched 

the larger two-stage, liquid-propellant Simorgh 

SLV, which is designed to carry satellites higher 

into orbit and could also serve as a test bed for 

developing ICBM technologies. The Simorgh 

could be capable of ICBM ranges if configured as 

a ballistic missile.271,272

Note: This chart does not include all systems in development. All ranges are approximate.

Selected Iranian Ballistic Missiles273

1805-17887

System

Maximum 

Range (km) 300–500 300 500 700 At least 

750

Up to 

2,000

Up to 

2,000 2,000

Propellant 

Type Solid Liquid Liquid Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid Solid

Deployment 

Mode

RoadmobileRoadmobileRoadmobileRoadmobile

Roadmobile,

Silo

Roadmobile,

Silo

RoadmobileRoadmobile

Fateh-110 SRBM (and variants)

Shahab 1 SRBM

Shahab 2 SRBM

Zolfaghar SRBM

Qiam-1 SRBM

Shahab 3 MRBM

Emad-1 MRBM

Sejjil (Ashura) MRBM
48

Iran operates two independent naval forces—the 

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), the Artesh’s 

naval branch, and the IRGC Navy (IRGCN). Iran 

established the IRGCN in 1985; the IRIN existed 

as part of the Artesh before the 1979 revolution. 

The commander of the IRIN is Rear Admiral 

Hossein Khanzadi, and the commander of the 

IRGCN is Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri.274

Appendix B: Naval Forces

Iranian Naval Headquarters and Areas of Responsibility 1805-17885

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

0 300 600 Kilometers

IRIN HQ

IRGCN HQ

IRGCN AOR

IRIN AOR

Shared AOR

Arabian Sea

Caspian

Sea

Gulf of Oman

Persian

Gulf

Bandar-e Anzali

Bandar-e Mahshahr

Bandar-e

Lengeh

Jask Chah Bahar

Bandar-e Bushehr

Bandar Abbas

Bandar-e

Asaluyeh

Tehran

TURKEY

IRAN

IRAQ

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

OMAN

PAKISTAN

BAHR.

ARM.

KUW.

QATAR U.A.E.

AZERBAIJAN

IRIN 4th ND

IRGCN 3rd ND

IRIN HQ

IRIN 2nd ND* IRIN 3rd ND

IRGCN 2nd ND

IRGCN 4th ND

IRGCN 5th ND

IRIN 2nd ND* IRIN SNFHQ

& 1st ND

IRGCN HQ

& 1st ND

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
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In 2007, the two naval forces reorganized, and 

Iran assigned specific areas of operation for each. 

Tehran assigned the IRGCN sole responsibility 

for the Persian Gulf and assigned the IRIN the 

Gulf of Oman and Caspian Sea. Both services 

continued to share responsibility for the Strait 

of Hormuz. The geographic split helped stream-

line command and control (C2) while reducing 

confusion, miscommunication, and duplication 

of efforts. With the added responsibility, the 

IRGCN established two new naval districts 

(NDs) in the central and southern Persian Gulf. 

The reorganization also provided the IRIN with 

a greater mandate to operate farther from the 

Iranian coast.275

U.S. and Iranian naval forces interact on a 

routine basis in the Persian Gulf. Histori-

cally, more than 90 percent of such interac-

tions have been deemed safe and professional, 

and the vast majority continue to be.276,277

However, Iran has increased maritime sur-

veillance of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf 

using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and 

the potential remains for additional unsafe 

and unprofessional interactions.278

Amid increased tension with the United States 

in mid-2019, Iran has used its naval forces to 

demonstrate resolve and threaten freedom of 

navigation. In May and June 2019, Iran con-

ducted limpet mine attacks against several 

merchant vessels in the Gulf of Oman. In July 

2019, the IRGCN also seized a UK-flagged 

oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz after the 

United Kingdom seized an Iranian-flagged oil 

tanker near Gibraltar. 279,280,281,282

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy

The IRIN comprises approximately 18,000 

personnel and is considered Iran’s “blue water 

navy” with its larger and more traditional 

surface ships compared with the IRGCN. Iran 

is the only Persian Gulf nation with a sub-

marine force, which the IRIN operates. The 

service’s primary mission is to defend Iranian 

territorial waters and protect the country’s 

economic interests in the Caspian Sea, Gulf 

of Oman, and beyond. It consists of primarily 

older, small surface combatants along with 

mostly small submarines and some logistic 

support vessels. As part of Iran’s layered mar-

itime defenses, the IRIN provides antisurface 

warfare capabilities focused on the Gulf of 

Oman with coastal defense cruise missiles 

(CDCMs), naval mines, surface combatants, 

and submarines. The IRIN is Iran’s first line 

of defense in the Gulf of Oman and the Ara-

bian Sea. The IRIN also aims to secure Ira-

nian economic interests by safeguarding the 

flow of commerce in the region from piracy 

and interdiction.283,284

The IRIN is geographically divided into four NDs, 

with the central IRIN headquarters in Tehran. • 1st ND: Headquartered at Bandar Abbas 

(Strait of Hormuz); also the location of the 

IRIN’s Southern Forward Naval Head-

quarters (SFNHQ), which coordinates 

across all southern IRIN NDs

• 2nd ND: Headquartered at Bushehr (Per-

sian Gulf) and Jask (Gulf of Oman); 2nd 

ND HQ moving to Jask following 2007 

reorganization
50

IRIN Order of Battle285

1805-17887

Class Type Inventory

Kilo Attack submarine 3

Fateh Coastal submarine 1

Yono (Ghadir) Midget submarine 14

Nahang Midget submarine 1

Jamaran (Mowj) Corvette 3

Vosper Mk 5 Corvette 3

PF 103 (Bayandor) Corvette 2

Combattante II (Kaman) Fast attack craft, missile 13

Hendijan Patrol craft, missile 3

PGM-71 (Parvin) Patrol craft, missile 3

Cape (Kayvan) Patrol craft, missile 3

U.S. Mk II Patrol craft, coastal 6

U.S. Mk III Patrol craft, coastal 10

C-14 Patrol craft, coastal 9

FB 40 Patrol craft, inshore 6

Hengham Landing ship, tank 3

Karbala Landing ship, logistic 6

Wellington Mk 4 Hovercraft 2

Wellington Mk 5 Hovercraft 4

Kharg Replenishment ship 1

Bandar Abbas Fleet supply ship 2

Delvar Support ship 6

Hendijan Tender 7

Shahsavar Training ship 1
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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• 3rd ND: Headquartered at Chah Bahar 

(Gulf of Oman)

• 4th ND: Headquartered at Bandar Anzali 

(Caspian Sea)

One of the IRIN’s key missions is to conduct outof-area operations and naval diplomacy in the 

region and beyond. Since 2009, the IRIN has 

maintained near-continuous out-of-area naval 

deployments for counterpiracy operations in the 

Gulf of Aden, foreign port visits, and bilateral 

exercises with regional navies.

Despite its aging platforms, the IRIN has been 

moderately effective in maintaining readiness 

and sustaining operations. If the IRIN is to ful-

fill its longer term ambitions to function as a true 

blue-water navy, it will have to invest in more 

modern combatants and support ships. Iran has 

been able to domestically build corvettes and 

patrol boats for the IRIN and upgrade legacy 

platforms with new capabilities, including ant-

iship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Despite its need 

for new auxiliaries, Iran has given no indication 

it is planning to invest in acquiring new support 

vessels. Iran acquired three Russian Kilo class 

attack submarines in the 1990s and began domes-

tically producing North Korean Yono class midget 

submarines in the mid-2000s. Iran continues to 

invest in domestically developing and producing 

more-capable subsurface platforms, including 

larger coastal submarines.286

The IRIN typically conducts a major nation-

al-level exercise each year called VELAYAT. 

The event usually entails a series of naval 

maneuvers involving IRIN surface combatants, 

submarines, and CDCM forces.287,288

Islamic Revolutionary Guard

Corps Navy

The IRGCN, which comprises approximately 

20,000 personnel, is tasked with protecting pri-

marily the Iranian littoral. It employs an asym-

metric doctrine that emphasizes speed, mobility, 

large numbers, surprise, and survivability and 

takes advantage of Iran's geography with the 

shallow and confined waterways of the Persian 

Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Although the IRGCN 

has significantly upgraded its fleet in terms of 

size and lethality since the end of the Iran-Iraq 

War, it remains a force composed of smaller 

platforms. Rather than acquire larger ships as 

a more traditional navy might, the IRGCN has 

pursued smaller, faster vessels armed with a 

variety of weapon systems. Iran views acquiring 

these types of vessels in sufficient numbers will 

allow it to threaten foreign navies and overcome 

wartime attrition.

The IRGCN aims to overwhelm an adversary's 

defenses by using multiple platforms and weap-

ons together to achieve tactical surprise. These 

Iran’s first domestically produced corvette,

the Jamaran.

Image Source: AFP
52

systems include small boats armed with guns, 

rockets, torpedoes, and missiles; CDCMs; naval 

mines; and maritime special operations forces. 

IRGCN units train to use hit-and-run attacks 

against larger enemy naval vessels using 

swarms of small boats. The IRGCN could also 

restrict access or even attempt to fully close the 

Strait of Hormuz. Iran has modified a range of 

small boats to be able to deliver naval mines rapidly. In support of these goals, IRGCN acquisition efforts have focused on fielding a large fleet 

of faster and more-capable small boats; developing more-advanced ASCMs to be launched from 

sea, ground, or air; and building a large inventory of more-sophisticated naval mines.

289,290

The IRGCN is geographically divided into five 

NDs, with the central IRGCN headquarters at 

Bandar Abbas.

• 1st ND: Headquartered at Bandar Abbas 

(Shahid Bahonar); responsible for the 

Strait of Hormuz

• 2nd ND: Headquartered at Bushehr; 

responsible for the north-central Persian 

Gulf

• 3rd ND: Headquartered at Bandar 

Mahshahr; responsible for the northern 

Persian Gulf

• 4th ND: Headquartered at Asaluyeh; 

responsible for the central Persian Gulf

• 5th ND: Headquartered at Bandar Lengeh; 

responsible for the southern Persian Gulf, 

including the disputed islands of Lesser 

Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa291

Many of Iran’s NOBLE PROPHET exercises—

the IRGC’s typical large-scale annual exercise—

are naval-focused with IRGCN elements leading the activities. IRGCN NOBLE PROPHETs 

are usually deterrent-themed events intended 

largely for strategic messaging, primarily aimed 

at the West and regional states.292,293

Major Naval Capabilities

Fast Attack Craft and Fast Inshore

Attack Craft

The IRGCN is the primary operator of Iran’s hundreds of fast attack craft (FAC) and fast inshore 

attack craft (FIAC). These platforms have been 

the mainstay of the IRGCN since its inception 

in the 1980s, although the Iranian FAC/FIAC 

inventory has grown significantly in terms of 

size and lethality since that time. Larger and 

more-capable, Iranian FAC are usually armed 

with ASCMs or torpedoes. The largest of these 

vessels are Iran’s 10 Chinese-built Houdong missile boats acquired in the mid-1990s, which serve 

as the capital ships of the IRGCN fleet; these 

IRGCN small boats during a ceremony on 2 July 2012 

to commemorate the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 

by the USS Vincennes in 1988.

Image Source: AFP
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IRGCN Order of Battle 294

1805-17887

Class Type Inventory

Houdong (Thondor) Fast attack craft, missile 10

Peykaap I Patrol craft, coastal, torpedo 15

Peykaap II Patrol craft, coastal, missile 25

Peykaap III Patrol craft, coastal, missile

5

Mk 13 Patrol craft, coastal, missile 10

C-14 Patrol craft, coastal, missile

5

Tir Patrol craft 10

Tarlan Patrol craft, inshore 15

Kashdom II Patrol craft, inshore 15

Ashoora Patrol craft, inshore Unknown*

Cougar Patrol craft, inshore Unknown*

FB RIB-33 Patrol craft, inshore Unknown*

Gashti Patrol craft, inshore Unknown*

Kuch Patrol craft, inshore Unknown*

Bladerunner (Siraj) Patrol craft, inshore Unknown*

Boghammar Patrol craft, inshore 20

Hormuz 21 Landing ship

2

Hormuz 24 Landing ship

3

Harth 55 Support ship

1

Safir Kish Transport

3

Naser Transport

3

*Note: The exact numbers for many Iranian small boat types are unknown, but the IRGCN has hundreds of 

small boats throughout the Persian Gulf.
54

vessels are frequently used in Persian Gulf and 

Strait of Hormuz patrols. Originally equipped 

with C802 missiles, Iran has since upgraded the 

Houdongs with extended-range Ghader ASCMs. 

Iranian FIAC, which are smaller but far more 

numerous, are lightly armed and usually fitted with only machine guns or rockets. Used en 

masse, these vessels can harass merchant shipping and conduct swarm tactics during a forceon-force naval engagements.

Surface Combatants

The IRIN operates Iran’s larger surface combatants, which include three 1960s-era British-built Vosper Mk 5 class corvettes and several French-built Combattante class patrol 

craft acquired before the Islamic Revolution. 

To expand the IRIN fleet, Iran has since 

domestically built several of its own Combattante patrol craft and three new Jamaran 

class corvettes, which closely resemble Iran’s 

Vospers with modifications, such as an added 

helicopter flight deck. Iran has commissioned 

three of the vessels, including one on the Caspian Sea, which was severely damaged in early 

2018.295 The IRIN has also expanded its number of missile combatants by upgrading older 

auxiliaries and patrol ships with short- and 

medium-range ASCMs.

Submarines

Submarines are a critical component of the 

IRIN, which has undertaken an ambitious 

construction program to increase its subsurface production capabilities and expand its 

fleet. Iran has four classes of submarines in 

its order of battle. Iran’s largest and most 

capable subsurface platforms are the three 

Kilo class attack submarines it purchased 

from Russia in the 1990s. The IRIN also has 

14 North Korean-designed Yono class midget 

submarines, which it can arm with Iranian 

Valfajar heavy-weight torpedoes. In February 2019, Iran presented its first submarine-launched ASCM, the Jask-2, which can 

be launched from the Yono.296 Iran also has 

a single domestically designed and produced 

Nahang midget submarine, which lacks torpedo tubes and may serve as a special operations platform.297 Also in February 2019, the 

IRIN officially commissioned its first coastal 

submarine, the Fateh. Iran claims the Fateh 

class, Iran’s largest domestically built submarine, can launch both torpedoes and ASCMs.298

Naval Mines

Mine warfare has been an integral part of 

Iran’s naval strategy since the Tanker War. 

Iran has an estimated inventory of more 

An Iranian Yono class midget submarine.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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than 5,000 naval mines, which include con-

tact and influence mines. Both navies have 

devised strategies to rapidly deploy mines 

while improving force survivability. Iran 

has a variety of vessels that can lay mines, 

but the IRGCN has integrated its doctrine of 

using smaller, faster vessels into its mine-lay-

ing strategy. Iran has equipped many of its 

Ashoora small boats with mine rails capable 

of holding at least one mine.299,300

Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles

CDCMs have been one of Iran’s primary lay-

ers of defense for both navies to protect the 

country’s littoral and maritime approaches. 

Iran initially gained experience with CDCMs 

using Chinese-built Silkworm missiles during 

the Tanker War. Both the IRGCN and IRIN 

operate CDCM forces, and Iran has invested 

greatly in developing and producing more-ca-

pable ASCMs, primarily based on Chinese 

Iranian CDCM Ranges 1805-17885

C704 Nasr ASCM (35km)

C802 Noor ASCM (120km)

Ghader ASCM (200km)

Ghadir ASCM (300km)

All ranges shown from 

mainland coast

Claimed by

Iran and UAE

Abu

Musa

Lesser

Tunb

Greater

Tunb

Arabian Sea

Gulf of Oman

Persian

Gulf

IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA

AFGHANISTAN

OMAN

PAKISTAN

BAHR.

KUW.

QATAR

UNITED ARAB

EMIRATES

IRAN

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. 0 150 300 Kilometers

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
56

C802 and C700-series missiles. Based on its 

domestic copy of the C802, called the Noor, 

Iran has developed the 200-kilometer-range 

Ghader and the 300-kilometer-range Ghadir 

ASCMs.301 Iran also domestically produces 

the 35-kilometer-range Chinese C704 ASCM 

as the Nasr.302

Antiship Ballistic Missiles

The IRGCASF has publicly announced and 

tested its ability to target ships with several ballistic missile models—including the 

Khalij Fars, Hormuz 1, and Hormuz 2—

based on the Fateh-110 SRBM. These antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) have ranges 

of up to 300 kilometers and are equipped 

with terminal seekers that steer the missile 

to its target. These systems use a variety of 

seekers, including electro-optical and antiradiation homing.303

Iran’s Khalij Fars ASBM.

Image Source: AFP

An Iranian C700-series CDCM is launched during an 

exercise in 2006.

Image Source: AFP
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Appendix C: Unconventional Forces

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Qods Force

Iran depends on a variety of unconventional and 

proxy forces to bolster its conventional military. 

The IRGC-QF (Qods meaning “Jerusalem”) is 

Iran’s primary means for conducting uncon-

ventional operations abroad, with connections 

of varying degrees to state and nonstate actors 

globally. It was founded in 1990 in the after-

math of the Iran-Iraq War as the IRGC unit 

responsible for covert operations and unconven-

tional warfare operations abroad. Before the 

IRGC-QF’s creation, a variety of government 

organizations, including the IRGC’s Office of 

Liberation Movements, handled Iran’s support 

to Islamic militant, terrorist, and resistance 

groups. Since its establishment, the IRGC-QF 

has become an increasingly professional unit 

trusted by the supreme leader to conduct oper-

ations outside Iran, provide support to Islamic 

militants, and collect intelligence against Iran’s 

enemies. IRGC-QF personnel number roughly 

5,000, though some estimates are higher.

Tehran uses the IRGC-QF to provide finan-

cial, training, and materiel support—includ-

ing facilitating terrorist attacks—mainly to 

regional Shia militant groups ideologically 

aligned with Iran. These partner and proxy 

groups provide Iran with a degree of plausible 

deniability, and their demonstrated capabili-

ties and willingness to attack Iran’s enemies 

serve as an additional deterrent.

Major General Qasem Soleimani commands 

the IRGC-QF and has a close relationship with 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, often communi-

cating with and taking orders from him directly. 

Soleimani oversees all IRGC-QF external oper-

ations, including support for active combat mis-

sions and clandestine activities. In recent years, 

he has traveled frequently to Iraq and Syria to 

support Iran’s involvement in battlefield opera-

tions against ISIS and Syrian opposition groups, 

and has become one of Iran’s most visible—and 

popular—military leaders.

The IRGC-QF receives official funding from 

Iran’s defense budget, but it augments its 

operating budget through a network of 

IRGC-QF-affiliated companies worldwide. The 

IRGC-QF and some affiliated companies have 

come under international sanctions because 

of their involvement in terrorist activities and 

weapons proliferation.304,305,306,307,308

IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani during Ten 

Days of Dawn celebrations in 2016.

Image Source: AFP
58

Partners, Proxies, and Affiliates

The IRGC-QF maintains a wide and varied network of nonstate partners, proxies, and affiliates 

primarily in the Middle East. Iran provides a 

range of financial, political, training, and materiel support to these groups. Iran’s provision 

of military hardware has included small arms, 

ammunition, explosives, improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs), explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), vehicles, antitank guided missiles 

(ATGMs), man-portable air defense systems 

(MANPADS), artillery, rockets, UAVs, and 

some more-advanced systems, such as ASCMs 

and ballistic missiles, despite UN resolutions 

prohibiting Iranian arms exports.309

Selected Iranian Partners, Proxies, and Affiliates 1805-17885

YEMEN

LEBANON

IRAQ AFGHANISTAN

SYRIA

Palestinian

Territories

IRAN

BAHRAIN

Note: Numerous Iranian 

partners and proxies 

are active in Syria.

Hizballah

Iraqi Shia militias

Huthis

Palestinian militants

Taliban

Bahraini militants

Shia foreign fighters

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
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Tehran’s partners, proxies, and affiliates 

include Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, the 

Huthis, some Palestinian groups, the Taliban, 

and Bahraini militants. The level and type of 

support Iran provides to these groups depends 

on the nature of the relationship and the objec-

tives Iran seeks to achieve. Stronger partners, 

such as Hizballah, are highly capable, reliable, 

and receptive to Tehran. Other groups, such 

as the Afghan Taliban, are less receptive to 

Iranian guidance but still help further Iran’s 

regional objectives because they combat com-

mon enemies.310,311,312

Hizballah

Hizballah is Iran’s most important and lon-

gest-standing nonstate partner and a core 

member of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance.” 

Shared goals, ongoing personal relationships, 

and enduring ideological, cultural, and reli-

gious ties have contributed to the strength 

of the partnership. The IRGC-QF has collab-

orated closely with Hizballah to grow Iran’s 

influence and capacity throughout the region 

and beyond, using the group to help train and 

equip other proxies. Iran has attempted to 

help temper international perceptions of Hiz-

Supporters wave Hizballah flags in front of portraits of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah (left) 

and Supreme Leader Khamenei (right).

Image Source: AFP
60

ballah as a terrorist organization and increase 

Hizballah’s legitimate political standing in 

Lebanon. In recent years, both groups have 

focused their cooperation on immediate needs 

in Syria and Iraq.313

Hizballah, a highly adaptable and malleable 

organization, has evolved from its insular origins as a sectarian actor in Lebanon into a far 

more complex regional actor. Hizballah’s role 

in Lebanon—in its formal political institutions, 

as a social provider for Shia society and as a 

self-proclaimed defender against Israeli aggression—primarily defines its reason for existence. 

However, the group has increasingly defined its 

other regional activities—including involvement 

in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—as working in concert with its internal Lebanon-centric goals. This 

concept of Hizballah as a regional power directly 

contradicts Lebanon’s policy of disassociation 

and has increased sectarian tensions at home.314

Hizballah has steadily grown as a military power 

during the past several decades. Asymmetric 

attacks against Israel in the 1980s and 1990s, 

followed by a major conflict in 2006, initially 

confirmed Hizballah’s self-imposed title as a 

“resistance” force against Israel. Since the 2006 

Israel-Hizballah War, Hizballah has steadily 

increased its military arsenal, promising that 

any future conflict will be more devastating. 

Hizballah’s concentration of power has allowed 

it to transform from a hybrid guerilla force into 

a nascent conventional military, with the capacity to deploy an expeditionary force in Syria in 

support of the Asad regime and Iran. Hizballah 

maintains a stockpile of approximately 120,000–

150,000 rockets, a massive expansion in capability compared with the approximately 13,000 

it had available during the 2006 conflict.315 Hizballah has an estimated 45,000 fighters, divided 

between as many as 21,000 full-time personnel 

and a 24,000-person reserve force.316

Iraqi Shia Militias

One of Tehran’s strongest levers of influence in 

Iraq is through the many Iran-backed Shia militias. Iran has provided financial backing for some 

of these groups for decades. The Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah 

have long served as reliable partners for Tehran, 

including conducting attacks on U.S. military 

personnel in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 using Iranian-provided munitions. Following ISIS’s widespread territorial gains in Iraq in mid-2014 and 

the subsequent formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Iran sent IRGC advisers, 

weapons, and other military support for the 

PMF and Iraqi counter-ISIS operations.317

Since 2011, the IRGC-QF has also deployed 

these Shia militants outside Iraq in support 

of Iranian interests. Since at least 2013, Iraqi 

Shia militias have greatly expanded their 

strength, influence, and combat capabilities, 

owing largely to Iranian support and their 

experience fighting in Iraq and Syria. Shia 

militias under the Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) played a leading role in counter-ISIS operations in Iraq, and the majority 

of these groups have had elements fighting in 

Syria at Iran’s behest as part of Syrian proregime forces. During the counter-ISIS campaign, Shia militias staffed more than 50 PMF 

brigades under the PMC. There are an esti-
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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mated 75,000–145,000 mainly Shia fighters 

active in more than 35 Iraqi militias.318,319,320

Huthis

Iran probably sees supporting the Huthi rebels 

in Yemen as a low-cost, high-reward opportu-

nity to indirectly confront Saudi Arabia, embar-

rass Riyadh militarily, and establish an ally on 

the Arabian Peninsula.325 Iran provides a wide 

range of support—including advisers, training, 

and lethal aid—to the Huthis to support their 

operations against the Saudi-led coalition in the 

Yemen conflict.326 Tehran claims Riyadh is the 

aggressor and the cause of the humanitarian cri-

sis in Yemen and has refuted accusations that it 

is supporting the Huthis with missiles and other 

advanced military equipment.327

Estimates of Huthi fighters range from 

10,000 to 30,000 personnel consisting of core 

believers, tribal supporters, and familial alli-

ances.328,329 The Huthis seek to rule the north

-

ern Yemen region or, at a minimum, retain 

a dominant role in northern Yemen and sub-

stantial political and military influence in 

any future government.330 Huthi leaders seek 

to use negotiations, international pressure, 

military operations, and ballistic missile and 

maritime attacks to pressure the Saudi-led 

coalition into accepting settlement terms 

favorable to the Huthis.

Shia Foreign Fighters

To support its operations in Syria, Iran has employed a variety of Shia foreign fighters from 

the region, including the Fatemiyun, Zeinabiyun, and Heidariyun, who are fighters of Afghan, 

Pakistan, and Iraqi origin, respectively. The Fatemiyun and Zeinabiyun are recruited primar-

ily from refugee populations in Iran, while the Heidariyun generally come from established 

Iraqi Shia militias. These groups have served as a proxy force to fight alongside proregime 

forces in Syria under the direction of the IRGC-QF and Hizballah. Before being sent into 

combat, these foreign fighters receive basic training in military skills from Iran or Hizballah. 

Training usually lasts only 20–45 days, although some fighters reportedly receive additional 

specialized training, such as sniper courses. Tehran is likely to continue using these fighters 

in Syria, and it is unclear if there are plans to deploy them to other locations.

321,322,323,324

Debris from an Iranian Qiam SRBM provided by Iran 

to the Huthis that was fired into Saudi Arabia on 

display at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling in Washing-

ton, DC. The numbered placards identify the unique 

positioning of valves on the missile’s propellant tanks.

Image Source: DVIDS
62

The Huthis depend on Iran for military equipment and support, including ballistic missiles, 

UAVs, and explosive boat technology. Tehran 

is using covert means to support this effort 

while publicly denying its military involvement 

in Yemen. Although the Huthis have always 

maintained a sense of identity as Shia Zaydis 

and Yemenis, they probably are receptive to 

further strengthening ties with Iran.

Huthi forces hold and defend territory in 

northern Yemen, disrupt Saudi-led coalition 

movement and supply efforts, and conduct 

retaliatory and offensive strikes against the 

coalition. Huthi fighters are armed with small 

arms, artillery, and tanks from preconflict 

Yemeni stockpiles.331 Iranian-supported Huthi 

missile forces have conducted multiple ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia—with 

targets including the capital, Riyadh, and a 

Saudi oil refinery—using Iranian SRBMs. 

Huthi maritime forces have ASCMs, naval 

mines, manned and unmanned explosive 

boats, and other small boats used for smallarms attacks.332,333 The Huthis possess most 

of the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from 

Yemen’s prewar stockpiles and have modified 

air-to-air missiles (AAMs) for use as SAMs. 

In 2018, Saudi-led coalition forces also seized 

advanced Iranian SAMs en route to the Huthis 

during countersmuggling operations.334 The 

Huthis have also used Iranian UAVs to attack 

Saudi-led coalition Patriot batteries.335

Palestinian Militant Groups

Iran provides support—including training, funding, and military equipment—to HAMAS and 

other Palestinian groups because of their strategic location and shared hostility toward Israel. 

Tehran seeks to increase international support 

in favor of a Palestinian state and desires to be 

seen as a stronger champion of Palestinians than 

its Arab rivals, such as Saudi Arabia. However, 

these primarily Sunni groups are not always 

receptive to Iranian guidance. During the past 

year, some Palestinian militant groups, particularly HAMAS, have improved ties to Iran. Relations had deteriorated after 2011, as most Palestinian militant groups refused to support the 

Asad regime in the Syrian civil war.

HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 

and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 

Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) 

share some common capabilities to conduct 

both limited conventional military operations, such as cross-border ATGM attacks and 

rocket salvos, and terrorist attacks, such as 

kidnappings and suicide bombings. HAMAS 

is the best-armed Palestinian militant group 

with around 25,000 active members in its milAustralian HMAS Darwin interdicts a dhow in the Gulf 

of Oman with Iranian arms intended for the Huthis.

Image Source: Commonwealth of Australia
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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itary wing. PIJ has around 8,000 militants, 

and PFLP-GC numbers around 800 militants. 

These groups use a variety of small and heavy 

arms, including antiarmor weapons and 

small- to mid-range rockets.336,337,338,339

Taliban

Iran’s relationship with the Taliban has 

evolved over the years. Following the Tali-

ban’s rise to power in the 1990s, Iran refused 

to recognize the group as a legitimate gov-

ernment. In 1998, Iran nearly went to war 

with Afghanistan after the Taliban captured 

and killed nine Iranian diplomats. However, 

relations began to thaw after the U.S. inva-

sion of Afghanistan. Since at least 2007, Iran 

has provided calibrated support—including 

weapons, training, and funding—to the Tal-

iban to counter U.S. and Western influence 

in Afghanistan, combat ISIS-Khorasan, and 

increase Tehran’s influence in any post-rec-

onciliation government. Iran balances this 

support as part of its dual-track strategy for 

engaging both local groups and the Afghan 

government in Kabul to achieve its broader 

security goals. Tehran does not seek to return 

the Taliban to power but aims to maintain 

influence with the group as a hedge in the 

event that the Taliban gains a role in a future 

Afghan government.340,341,342,343
64

Appendix D: Air and Air Defense Forces

Iran’s air and air defense capabilities are 

split primarily across three services: the 

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) 

and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense 

Force (IRIADF), both under the Artesh, 

and the IRGCASF. The Khatemolanbia 

Air Defense Headquarters (KADHQ) is the 

national-level command responsible for coordinating between the IRIADF and IRGCASF.

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force

Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the shah 

invested heavily in equipping the Imperial 

Iranian Air Force with modern combat air 

capabilities, viewing the service as a symbol of Iran’s strength and security. After 

decades of international sanctions following 

the revolution and combat losses during the 

Iran-Iraq War, many of the U.S. aircraft Iran 

acquired during the 1960s and 1970s still 

constitute the most-capable platforms in the 

IRIAF today. Iran later acquired some Soviet-made aircraft during the early 1990s.

The IRIAF has proven adept at maintaining these outdated aircraft to sustain routine flight operations. Despite some domestic efforts to upgrade older airframes, Iran’s 

combat aircraft remain significantly inferior 

to those of its regional adversaries equipped 

with modern Western systems. Nevertheless, the IRIAF maintains a basic capability 

to achieve its assigned missions. 

The IRIAF has approximately 37,000 personnel and operates the majority of Iran’s 

combat aircraft. The IRIAF operates multiple combat, transport, and tanker squadrons across 11 major fighter bases. The commander of the IRIAF is Brigadier General 

Aziz Nasirzadeh.

The IRIAF operates a wide range of aircraft 

sourced from the United States, Russia, and 

China, including the U.S. F-14 Tomcat, F-4 

Phantom II, and F-5 Tiger II; the Russian 

MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-24 Fencer; and the 

Chinese F-7 Airguard. Iran is the only country in the world still operating F-14s. IRIAF 

missions include air intercept, ground-attack, 

and close air support, and some aircraft are 

capable of mid-air refueling. The IRIAF’s F-4s 

serve as Iran’s primary attack aircraft, but it 

has increasingly incorporated use of its Su-24 

Iranian F-4s, which it acquired from the United 

States prior to the Islamic Revolution.

Image Source: AFP
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Iranian Fighter Bases 1805-17885

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. 0 150 300 Kilometers

Bandar-e Bushehr

Hamadan

Chah Bahar

Esfahan

Tehran-Mehrabad Mashhad

Bandar Abbas

Tabriz

Dezful

Shiraz

Omidiyeh

Caspian

Sea

Gulf of Oman

Persian

Gulf

Tehran

TURKEY

IRAN IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

SYRIA

BAHR.

KUW.

QATAR U.A.E.

1st FB Mashhad Air Base

2nd FB

3rd FB

4th FB 8th FB

Omidiyeh Air Base

6th FB

7th FB

9th FB

10th FB

1st FB MiG-29, C-130, B707 (cargo and 

tanker), B747 (cargo and tanker), 

Falcon 20, Jetstar, RC-707, RC-130, 

IL-76, An-74

8th FB F-14A/AM, F-7/FT-7N, 

PC-7

2nd FB MiG-29, F-5E/F, Saeghe I/II 

(Iranian F-5 variants)

9th FB F-4E, P-3

3rd FB F-4E, RF-4E 10th FB F-4D, Mirage F1

4nd FB F-5E/F Omidiyeh Air Base F-7N

6th FB F-4E Mashhad Air Base F-5E/F

7th FB Su-24MK, C-130, P-3, IL-76, Su-22, 

Y-12

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
66

fighter-bombers. Although less capable in an 

attack role, Iran’s F-5s and F-7s have also 

served as multirole platforms.344,345,346

The IRIAF usually conducts one major national-level air power exercise each year, called 

DEVOTEES OF THE VELAYAT SKIES. The 

event traditionally entails a ground-attack 

competition among multiple fighter bases 

and features fighter intercept, air-to-air 

engagement, electronic warfare (EW), and 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) training.348,349

Once the UN arms embargo ends, the IRIAF 

is likely to purchase advanced fourth-generation fighters, most likely from Russia. Tehran 

and Moscow have already discussed the sale 

of Su-30s to Iran.350

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Aerospace Force

The IRGCASF was founded in 1985 when 

Supreme Leader Khomeini established the 

IRGC’s three distinct ground, air, and naval 

services.351 Previously named the IRGC Air 

Major Iranian Combat Aircraft 347

1805-17887

Platform Delivered to Iran (Origin) Role

F-4D/E Phantom II 1968-1978 (USA) Multirole Fighter

F-5E/F Tiger II (and later 

Iranian variants) 1973-1976 (USA) Multirole Fighter

F-14A/AM Tomcat 1976-1978 (USA) Fighter

Su-22 Fitter 1991 (Iraq) Fighter-Bomber

Su-24MK Fencer 1990 (Russia); 1991 (Iraq) Fighter-Bomber

MiG-29 Fulcrum A 1990 (Russia); 1991 (Iraq) Multirole Fighter

Mirage F1 1991 (Iraq) Multirole Fighter

F-7N Airguard 1987-1996 (China) Multirole Fighter
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Force, Iran renamed the service in 2009 to 

reflect its broader mission.352 Dating back 

to the Iran-Iraq War, rivalries between the 

IRGCASF and IRIAF have historically hin-

dered cooperation between the two air ser-

vices.353 The IRGCASF also operates Iran's 

ballistic missile force, the Al-Ghadir Missile 

Command. [For more details on Iran’s mis-

sile force, see Appendix A.]

The IRGCASF is a relatively small force of 

around 15,000 personnel. It provides close air 

support and lift capabilities with military air-

craft and helicopters as well as commercially 

owned aircraft under the IRGCASF’s control. 

Although the IRGC’s manned aviation compo-

nent historically focused on airlift and logistic 

support, its mission evolved to include a squad-

ron of its own combat aircraft after Iran began 

incorporating Iraqi aircraft evacuated to Iran 

in 1991 during the First Gulf War. The com-

mander of the IRGCASF is Brigadier General 

Amir Ali Hajizadeh.

The aviation arm of the IRGCASF maintains 

a fleet that includes Su-22 Fitters, EMB-312 

Tucanos, Y-12s, Dassault Falcon 20s, MFI-17s, 

IL-76s, and An-74s. In 2014, Iran supplied Iraq 

with most of the Su-25 Frogfoots that the IRG-

CASF had maintained since Iraq transferred 

them to Iran in 1991. Iran still maintains a small 

number of Su-25 aircraft.354,355,356, 357

UAVs are Iran’s most rapidly advancing air 

capability. Iran uses these versatile platforms 

for a variety of missions, including ISR and 

air-to-ground strikes. The IRGCASF is the pri-

mary operator of Iran’s growing fleet of UAVs, 

although most Iranian military services employ 

them. Iran regularly conducts ISR flights 

along its border and littoral, including the Per-

sian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The IRGCASF 

has also deployed various armed and unarmed 

UAVs to Syria and Iraq for ISR and strike mis-

sions to support counter-ISIS operations and 

the Syrian regime. In 2018, Iran for the first 

time employed UAVs to conduct long-range, 

cross-border strike operations, using armed 

An IRGCASF Su-25 during a naval exercise in 2006.

Image Source: AFP

Newly built Iranian Shahed-129 armed UAVs on 

display in September 2013.

Image Source: AFP
68

Major Iranian UAVs 363,364

1805-17887

Platform Family System Role

Ababil

Ababil-2 Multirole

Ababil-3 ISR

Qasef-1 Multirole

Shahed

Shahed-129 Multirole, including ISR and air-to-ground strike365,366

Shahed-123 ISR

Mohajer

Mohajer-2 ISR

Sadegh Multirole

Mohajer-4 ISR

Mohajer-6 Multirole, including ISR and air-to-ground strike367

Toufan Toufan 1 One-way attack

Fotros Fotros Multirole, including ISR and air-to-ground strike368,369

Karrar Karrar Multirole

Hemaseh Hemaseh Multirole

IRN-170 IRN-170 variants Multirole
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UAVs in concert with ballistic missiles as part 

of a retaliatory attack against ISIS in eastern 

Syria. Iran has also provided UAV platforms 

and technology to Hizballah and the Huthis to 

challenge its regional rivals.358,359,360,361,362

The IRGCASF also maintains its own air 

defense assets and mission—conducted in par-

allel, but coordinated with the IRIADF and 

KADHQ. The IRGC has been involved in the 

domestic development and production of many 

recent Iranian SAM systems—such as the Raad 

series, Sayyad series, Tabas, and Third of Khor-

dad—which reportedly have multi-target capa-

bilities and ranges up to 120 kilometers.370,371 In 

June 2019, the IRGCASF used a Third of Khor-

dad SAM system to shoot down a U.S. RQ-4 

UAV in international airspace over the Strait of 

Hormuz.372,373 This followed an Iranian attempt 

to shoot down a U.S. MQ-9 UAV in international 

airspace over the Gulf of Oman a week earlier.374

The IRGCASF sometimes participates in the 

IRGC’s typical annual national-level exercise, 

NOBLE PROPHET, although these usually 

focus on demonstrating missile, naval, or ground 

forces capabilities.375 In 2017, the IRGCASF 

conducted its own air defense exercise called 

DEFENDERS OF VELAYAT SANCTUM.376

Islamic Republic of Iran

Air Defense Force

Iran originally established the Artesh’s air 

defense force in 2008 as the KADHQ and 

renamed it the IRIADF in 2019. In 2008, air 

defense personnel were separated from the 

IRIAF to form an independent service within 

the Artesh, consistent with Tehran’s goal to 

expand defense missions in response to a per-

ceived increase in air threats. The IRIADF 

maintains and operates most of the country’s 

air defense systems and has approximately 

15,000 personnel.377,378 

As the KADHQ, the force was previously 

responsible for overseeing Iran’s air defenses 

at the national level and coordinating with 

the IRGCASF. In May 2019, Tehran elevated 

the KADHQ to a higher echelon command and 

rebranded the remaining Artesh air defense 

service as the IRIADF, separating the national 

C2 responsibilities from the force. The supreme 

leader appointed Artesh Commander Major 

General Abdolrahim Musavi to also serve as 

commander of the KADHQ, raising it to the 

Artesh HQ level. Former KADHQ Commander 

Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard was 

retained as the IRIADF commander.379

Iranian SA-20c mobile launcher on parade for Artesh 

Day in 2017.

Image Source: AFP
70

Long-Range Air Defense Coverage 1805-17885

SA-20c (200km)

SA-5 (300km)

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

0 200 400 Kilometers

Bandar-e Bushehr

Hamadan

Esfahan

Tehran-Mehrabad

Bandar Abbas

Caspian Sea

Gulf of Oman

Persian

Gulf

Tehran

TURKEY

IRAN

IRAQ

SAUDI

ARABIA

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

KUW.

U.A.E.

NOTE: Only standard and fixed sites shown. 

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

Khatemolanbia Air Defense Headquarters

The KADHQ maintains responsibility for overseeing and coordinating Iran’s national-level 

air defenses across both the IRIADF and IRGCASF. It controls the country’s air defense C2, 

air surveillance radars, SAM systems, and network of visual observation posts. KADHQ C2 

is centralized during peacetime at the national Air Defense Operations Center and can be 

decentralized during crisis or conflict, transferring decisionmaking authority down to a network of fixed and mobile regional sector operations centers (SOCs). SOCs manage air defense 

operations within their areas of responsibility and coordinate with adjacent sectors.380,381,382
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Iranian Air Defense Systems 391,392,393

1805-17887

Type Systems

Long-Range SA-20c Gargolye (S-300 PMU2), SA-5 Gammon (S-200),

Bavar-373, Sayyad-3

Medium-Range I-HAWK/Mersad, CSA-1, Third of Khordad, Raad, Talash, 

Sayyad-1, Sayyad-2

Short-Range SA-15 Gauntlet (Tor M1), Rapier

The IRIADF operates Iran’s most capable air 

defense system, the SA-20c, which Russia sold 

to Iran in 2016. This system is highly mobile 

and designed to defend against aircraft, ballis-

tic missiles, and cruise missiles. Iran is most 

likely to use the SA-20c to protect its most criti-

cal infrastructure, such as its nuclear sites and 

Tehran. Most of Iran’s other SAMs are a mix 

of U.S., Russian, and Chinese legacy systems, 

including the long-range SA-5, medium-range 

I-HAWK and CSA-1, and short-range SA-15 

and Rapier.383,384

In addition to procurements from abroad, 

Iran has invested heavily in domestically 

developing and producing SAMs, radars, 

and C2 systems.385 Iran is developing the 

long-range Bavar-373 SAM system, which it 

claims is more advanced than the Russian 

S-300.386 Iran has also undertaken a number 

of projects to domestically improve its legacy 

SAMs, including the Mersad, a medium-range 

air defense system that improves the track-

ing and engagement range of the U.S.-made 

I-HAWK SAM.387 Iran has also worked exten-

sively to upgrade its legacy C2 systems to a 

modern, software-based system.388

Iran’s typical annual national-level air defense 

exercise is called DEFENDERS OF THE 

VELAYAT SKIES. The event usually involves 

testing and live fires of variety of SAMs, radars, 

and ISR and EW equipment, along with a small 

contingent of aircraft, to exercise a large-scale 

defense of Iranian airspace.389,390
72

Appendix E: Ground Forces

Iran maintains two independent ground 

forces: the Islamic Republic of Iran Ground 

Force (IRIGF) under the Artesh and the IRGC 

Ground Force (IRGCGF) under the IRGC. 

Despite deploying some ground forces to Iraq 

and Syria in recent years, their mission continues to focus primarily on Iran’s territorial 

defense and internal security.394 The IRGC also 

oversees Iran’s reserve paramilitary force, the 

Basij, which comprises some units aligned with 

the IRGCGF as well as the larger Basij Organization of the Oppressed. [For more details on 

the Basij, see Appendix G.]

Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force

The IRIGF maintains approximately 350,000 

soldiers and serves as Iran’s first line of 

defense against an invading force.395 Many of 

its personnel consist of conscripts who serve 

for 2 years.396 The IRIGF consists of about 

50 combat arms brigades, many of which are 

light infantry units with a sizable contingent 

of armored and mechanized infantry units. 

The IRIGF also has its own special operations 

units and several artillery groups for fire 

support. Most units are concentrated along 

IRIGF soldiers march in formation during the Artesh Day parade in 2018.

Image Source: AFP
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the Iran-Iraq border, reflecting the force’s 

primary mission to defend against foreign 

invasion. The IRIGF commander is Brigadier 

General Kiomars Heidari.

For more than a decade, the IRIGF has 

focused on improving its abilities to defend 

against a technologically superior enemy. In 

2011, the IRIGF began a service-wide reor-

ganization, transitioning from a division-cen-

tric to a brigade-centric structure. This 

transformation was intended to decentralize 

C2 and enable main force units to operate 

with greater flexibility and mobility. Under 

this model, the IRIGF is better postured to 

conduct counteroffensives against a superior 

invading adversary, giving brigade command-

ers the ability to act independently while 

decreasing response times. The IRIGF also 

has five regional headquarters, each of which 

is responsible for multiple provinces.397,398,399

IRIGF units generally are organized with three 

main subordinate units per higher echelon unit. 

For example, each infantry brigade usually con-

sists of three infantry battalions, each armored 

brigade usually consists of two armored battal-

ions and a mechanized infantry battalion, and 

IRIGF Regional Headquarters 1805-17885

NE OPERATIONAL HQ

IRIGF HQ

SE OPERATIONAL HQ

SW OPERATIONAL HQ

W OPERATIONAL HQ

NW OPERATIONAL HQ

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. 0 150 300 Kilometers

Caspian

Sea

Gulf of Oman

Persian

Gulf

Mashhad

Kermanshah

Orumiyeh

Kerman

Ahvaz

TURKEY

IRAN IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

SYRIA

BAHR.

ARM.

KUW.

U.A.E.

AZERBAIJAN

Tehran

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
74

each mechanized infantry brigade generally 

consists of two mechanized infantry battalions 

and an armored battalion.400,401

The IRIGF also has an Army Aviation (AA) 

component, called Islamic Republic of Iran 

Army Aviation (IRIAA), which serves as 

Iran’s primary helicopter force, with about 

90 percent of the helicopters in the Iranian 

ground forces. The IRIAA has several hundred attack, transport, and reconnaissance 

helicopters in its inventory—including AH-1 

Cobras, Bell 214s, CH-47 Chinooks, and AB 

206s—nearly all of which are legacy U.S. platforms that predate the Islamic Revolution.402

In 2016, the IRIGF began deploying a small 

number of personnel to support combat operations in Syria. Although Iran claimed they were 

sent in an advisory capacity, press reports indicate they have played an active role in combat 

operations. This marked the first Artesh deployment abroad since the Iran-Iraq War.403,404

The IRIGF usually holds two major annual exercises each year. The MUHAMMAD RASULOLLAH exercises occur along Iran’s border and 

coastal regions, emphasizing either a defense 

against a conventional military invasion or counterterrorism operations.405.406 The BEIT OL-MOQADDAS exercises typically occur in May near 

Esfahan. The IRIGF often uses these events to 

unveil new ground forces equipment and as a 

capstone exercise for graduating cadets.407

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Ground Force

The IRGCGF is the largest component of the 

IRGC, consisting of approximately 150,000 personnel. In addition to its conventional military 

role of protecting Iranian territory against external threats, the IRGCGF along with the IRGC’s 

paramilitary reserve component, the Basij, also 

have responsibilities to counter internal threats. 

For many years, the IRGCGF has regularly 

conducted counterinsurgency missions against 

Kurdish militants along Iran’s northwest border 

and Baluchi militants in the southeast. Since 

as early as 2012, IRGCGF units have deployed 

to support combat operations in Syria and Iraq, 

with a surge of IRGCGF soldiers sent to Syria in 

2015.408,409410 The commander of the IRGCGF is 

Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpur.411

The IRGCGF is structured with 31 provincial 

corps and a Tehran city corps, which are postured 

to counter ground invasion and internal unrest, 

along with independent conventional maneuver formations, such as infantry and armor. The 

IRGCGF consists of primarily light infantry and 

commando units, fairly evenly distributed around 

Iranian M-109 self-propelled artillery.

Image Source: Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA)
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the country, particularly owing to the internal 

security aspects of its mission set. Its artillery 

batteries employ towed- and self-propelled guns 

and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) while 

its air defense groups mainly use Soviet-origin 

mobile antiaircraft artillery. IRGCGF armored 

units use 1970s-era Soviet tanks and tracked 

vehicles, as well as pre-1979 U.S.-imported tanks. 

The IRGCGF also maintains special operations 

forces, called Saberin (“patient ones”).412 In 2016, 

the IRGCGF established its own AA component, 

transferring helicopters from the IRGCASF. The 

new unit provides the IRGCGF with its first 

organic helicopter support.413

Many iterations of the IRGC’s main annual 

exercise series—NOBLE PROPHET—incor-

porate IRGCGF elements demonstrating 

defensive operations against a potential 

invading force. The IRGCGF also frequently 

uses these exercises to test or display new 

military hardware.414,415

An IRGCGF tank crew salutes from a T-72 during the 

annual Holy Defense Week parade in 2014.

Image Source: AFP

Key Ground Forces Equipment416,417,418

1805-17887

System Approx. Total Most Capable Source

Tanks 1,900 T-72S Russia

Armored Vehicles 2,600 BMP-2 Russia

Self-Propelled 

Artillery 400 M-109 USA

Towed Artillery 2,900 GHN-45 Austria

Multiple Rocket 

Launchers 2,000 Fajr-5 Iran
76

Appendix F: Special Operations Forces

The Artesh and IRGC both maintain groundbased special operations forces (SOF) and 

maritime special operations forces (MARSOF) of varying levels of capability. Within 

the Artesh, IRIGF SOF include commando, 

airborne, and special forces brigades, and the 

IRIN operates a Special Boat Service (SBS) 

unit. Within the IRGC, IRGCGF SOF include 

commando and special forces brigades in 

addition to an elite special unit; the IRGCN 

also operates a MARSOF unit.

Islamic Republic of Iran Ground

Force SOF

The IRIGF has three types of SOF units—

airborne, commando, and special forces. 

These include several commando brigades, 

the 55th Airborne Brigade, the 35th Special Forces Brigade, and the 65th Airborne 

Special Forces Brigade. Of these units, the 

65th, also known as the NOHED (Persian 

abbreviation for “airborne special forces”) 

brigade, is the most elite. The 55th and 65th 

are jump-qualified, and commando brigades 

deploy via airmobile insertion.

419 Several 

commando brigades have recently transitioned into special forces and rapid reaction 

brigades, including the 35th and 25th.

420,421

Iran's first SOF units formed in the late 1950s 

under the tutelage of U.S. advisers. During the 

Iran-Iraq War, SOF units expanded to meet operational requirements. IRIGF SOF would regularly 

conduct reconnaisance of enemy lines to identify 

weak points and launch night attacks to initiate major offensive operations. Iranian airborne 

brigades also conducted airmobile operations in 

advance of Iranian offensives to seize key objectives and overrun enemy forces in rear areas.

422

Based on their U.S. Army Special Forces lineage, 

IRIGF SOF share similar mission sets, probably 

including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, 

and hostage rescue. Some of these units also 

provide a quick-reaction force that can deploy 

rapidly anywhere inside Iran or potentially 

abroad.

423 As of April 2016, Iran had deployed 

personnel from the 65th Airborne Special Forces 

Brigade to Syria, part of the IRIGF’s first external deployment since the Iran-Iraq War.

424

Islamic Republic of Iran

Navy MARSOF

The IRIN operates an SBS based on the British Royal Navy SBS, which provided training 

for IRIN special forces personnel before the 

Islamic Revolution. The IRIN SBS probably 

is trained in a variety of capabilities, including combat diving, parachuting, amphibious 

assault, airborne assault, underwater demolitions, special reconnaisance, and maritime 

visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations. IRIN SBS personnel are also capable 

of covert insertion from the IRIN’s midget 

submarines.

425,426,427
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IRGC Ground Force SOF

The IRGCGF maintains several SOF units—

called Saberin (“patient ones”)—including the 

110th Salman Farsi Commando Brigade, the 

33rd Al Mahdi Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 

and the elite Saberin Special Forces Brigade 

(or Saberin Special Unit). Some regular IRG-

CGF divisions and brigades at the provincial 

level also have dedicated Saberin detachments 

directly subordinate to them.

428

The IRGCGF is upgrading select SOF units, 

transforming commando units into special 

forces units. The 33rd Al Mahdi Brigade also 

transitioned from an airborne to a special forces 

brigade. With these changes, Iran is attempting 

to create a more agile and responsive force, par-

ticularly following the rise of ISIS and Iranian 

combat deployments to Syria.

429,430

IRGCGF Saberin units are highly trained in 

specialized capabilities, such as raiding, hostage 

rescue, and heliborne assault. Some Saberin 

personnel use ultralight aircraft and are capa-

ble of conducting operations in a wide range of 

terrain and environmental conditions, includ-

ing mountains, deserts, and swamps. Saberin 

have also deployed to Syria to support Iranian 

combat operations.

431,432,433

IRGC Navy MARSOF

The IRGCN has a MARSOF component known 

as the Sepah Navy Special Force (SNSF). The 

unit is based on Forur Island, strategically 

located near the Strait of Hormuz. SNSF per-

sonnel train in combat diving, direct action, 

counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, 

underwater demolitions, amphibious assault, 

hostage rescue, and maritime VBSS opera-

tions. Among the unit’s missions is to protect 

Iranian commercial vessels, and SNSF person-

nel have deployed to the Gulf of Aden to assist 

with Iranian counterpiracy operations.

434

IRGCGF SOF during an exercise in April 2006.

Image Source: AFP
78

Appendix G: Reserves

Iran established its volunteer paramilitary 

reserve force, called the Basij (“mobilization” in 

Persian), in April 1980 after Supreme Leader 

Khomeini called for the creation of a 20 million-man army following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij 

deployed alongside the IRGC and regular forces. 

They became known for “human wave” assaults 

and martyrdom and suffered a large proportion 

of the total combat casualties during the war. 

It was incorporated into the IRGC structure in 

1981, but it did not come under formal IRGC 

command until 2007. These changes brought 

about greater unit discipline and a formal rank 

structure. In 2009, Iran further integrated the 

more militarily capable components of the Basij 

with the IRGCGF, with the remaining personnel forming the much larger Basij Organization of the Oppressed (BOO), which focuses on 

domestic security and social outreach. The force 

is composed of mostly young male and female 

Iranians who volunteer often in exchange for 

official benefits.

435,436

Today, the Basij forms a core part of the regime’s 

internal security apparatus. On multiple occasions, Tehran has used the Basij to help quell 

domestic unrest, including the widespread 2009 

election protests. With branches in almost every 

Iranian city and town, Basij units aid internal 

security, law enforcement, suppression of dissent, and moral policing. The Basij has specialized branches for different segments of Iranian 

society, including the Labor Basij, Tribal Basij, 

Public Servants’ Basij, Students’ Basij, and 

Pupil Basij, which serves as a youth organization. In recent years, Basij personnel have also 

been part of the contingent of deployed Iranian 

forces supporting operations in Iraq and Syria.

There are five types of Basij members—potential, general, regular, active, and special—with 

increasing levels of capability and training, 

although the precise terms and descriptions 

for these tiers vary. Potential Basij are not formally enrolled in the BOO but are firm believers in the revolution who participate in Basij 

activities. General Basij are unpaid and receive 

a minimum level of training. Regular members 

are also unpaid part-time volunteers, but they 

receive more ideological indoctrination and 

rudimentary training to perform basic security 

duties during peacetime. Active Basij receive 

Basij personnel during an exercise in September 2015.

Image Source: AFP
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greater ideological training and are paid fulltime members under temporary contracts. The 

Special Basij are the most highly trained and 

experienced members, comparable to full-time 

IRGC soldiers.

437,438

The Basij has several core security components 

with specific missions, including the Ashura, 

Al Zahra, Beyt ol Moghaddas, Kowsar, Imam 

Ali, Imam Hossein, and Fatehin battalions. 

The Ashura (male) and Al Zahra (female) bat-

talions provide local security, neighborhood 

defense, infrastructure protection, and lowlevel antiriot support. The Beyt ol Moghaddas 

(male) and Kowsar (female) battalions are 

rapid-reaction units, formed from the Ashura 

and Al Zahra battalions, intended to help 

defend cities and villages from potential inva-

sion. The more-capable Imam Ali battalions 

are primarily set up to counter more signif-

icant internal security threats and domestic 

unrest. The Imam Hossein battalions train as 

light infantry and work closely with the IRG-

CGF, including some deployments to Syria. 

Finally, the Fatehin are Basij special forces 

units, some of which have also deployed to 

Syria to assist the IRGCGF.

There are widely varying estimates for the 

size of the Basij, which are further compli-

cated by the organization’s different capa-

bility levels, unit types, and social groups. 

Some Iranian officials have claimed there 

are as many as 22 million Basij, which would 

constitute about a quarter of Iran’s popula-

tion. Such large estimates, if remotely accu-

rate, would include the many men, women, 

and children who perform social service and 

outreach functions as part of the BOO and 

have little to no military or security training. 

These members probably significantly out-

number the militarized Basij components.

Basij Types 1805-17889

Special

Basij

Active Basij

Regular Basij

General Basij

Potential Basij

(Nonmembers) 

TRAINING

Additional political-ideology training

Attend IRGC military academy

Basic military and political-ideology training; optional

 supplementary military and intelligence training

Introductory military training

None
80

The Basij probably has around 450,000 active 

reserve personnel—those with military training who serve in operational units on a semiregular basis and help staff much of the IRGC 

provincial corps throughout the country. The 

Basij may have another 500,000 to one million 

inactive reserve personnel—those with at least 

some military training who could be mobilized 

in wartime. There may be an additional 3–4 

million Basij within the BOO with at most 

basic military training, making roughly 4–5 

million a more realistic estimate of the total 

number of military-age Basij of all types. Estimates in the range of 10-20 million could be 

possible if they include all nonmilitary components of the BOO.

439,440,441,442,443

Female Basij members during a ceremony in 2005.

Image Source: AFP
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The Ministry of Intelligence and Security 

(MOIS) and the IRGC are the most robust 

intelligence services in Iran. The MOIS, as a 

government ministry, remains accountable 

to the president, while the IRGC remains 

accountable only to the supreme leader. This 

bifurcated intelligence structure is intended to 

ensure that no single organization becomes too 

powerful. However, tension between the IRGC 

and MOIS has been a constant fixture of their 

relationship because their duties overlap and 

their responsibilities are poorly delineated.

444

Ministry of Intelligence and Security

The MOIS was founded in 1984 to collect intel-

ligence and lead Iran’s domestic security and 

counterterrorism missions. Minister of Intelli-

gence Mahmud Alavi leads the service, which 

has about 30,000 officers and support staff. 

The MOIS is the only Iranian intelligence and 

security service that reports to both the presi-

dent and the supreme leader.

According to Iranian law, the MOIS’s func-

tions are to: • Collect, analyze, produce, and categorize 

internal and external intelligence.

• Uncover acts of conspiracy, subversion, 

espionage, sabotage, and sedition against 

the independence, security, and territorial 

integrity of Iran.

• Protect the intelligence, news, docu-

ments, records, facilities, and personnel 

of the ministry.

• Train and assist organizations and institu-

tions in protecting their significant records, 

documents, and objects.

Domestic activities are a priority for the MOIS, 

unless the Supreme Council for National Secu-

rity (SCNS) or the supreme leader deem it 

necessary for the ministry to become involved 

directly with Iran’s interests abroad. MOIS 

intelligence officers conduct the majority of 

their operations in the Middle East, Central 

Asia, Europe, and the United States. MOIS 

collection and influence operations beyond 

Iran’s borders are typically embassy- and 

consulate-based under official, commercial, 

academic, or nongovernmental organization 

cover. The ministry liaises with other foreign 

intelligence agencies, as well as organizations 

such as Hizballah that protect and promote 

Iran’s foreign agenda.

445,446 During the 1980s 

and 1990s, the MOIS was linked to an assas-

Iranian Minister of Intelligence Mahmud Alavi-Tabar.

Image Source: AFP

Appendix H: Intelligence Services
82

sination campaign that killed dozens of Iranian dissidents, many of them in Europe. More 

recently, it has been implicated in the murder 

of two dissidents in the Netherlands and a 

foiled plot last year against a People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK) rally in Paris.

447,448,449

The MOIS changed its organizational structure in 2017 by elevating its Bureau for Foreign Intelligence, providing the organization 

with a direct line of accounting in Iran’s annual 

budget separate from the rest of the MOIS.

450

IRGC Intelligence Organization

The IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO)—

Iran’s foremost military intelligence service, 

capable of all-source collection, analysis, and 

investigations—exercises primary dominance 

over internal Iranian military intelligence 

responsibilities. Hossein Taeb has led the organization since its inception in October 2009. 

Taeb reports directly to the supreme leader, 

although he must also coordinate with the IRGC 

commander. Regime critics claim the IRGC-IO 

includes more conservative and violent elements 

than the MOIS, its parallel intelligence and security organization. However, despite evidence of 

rivalries between the MOIS and IRGC-IO, both 

services share the common goal of preserving 

Iran’s clerical regime.451,452

IRGC Counterintelligence

Organization

The IRGC Counterintelligence Organization 

(IRGC-CIO) was created in 1983 and is charged 

with protecting IRGC personnel, operations, 

and facilities from espionage, information 

leaks, and other counterrevolutionary threats. 

Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi is the 

commander of the IRGC-CIO.

453

Artesh Intelligence

The Artesh maintains a joint military intelligence capability in the form of a Directorate 

for Intelligence (or J2).

454,455 It focuses on traditional tactical intelligence as well as intelligence and counterintelligence operations, 

security within the Artesh, and coordination 

with other intelligence bodies.

456

Law Enforcement Force

Iran’s Ministry of Interior controls the Law 

Enforcement Force (LEF), created in 1991 to 

incorporate urban police, the rural gendarmerie, and various revolutionary committees.

457 One of the LEF’s three main branches 

is the Counterintelligence Organization, and 

it maintains an operational unit charged with 

intelligence gathering, the Intelligence and 

Public Security Police.

458
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Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution—and the sub-

sequent end of Western arms sales to Tehran—

Iran has developed domestic capabilities and fos-

tered new relationships to supply and equip its 

armed forces, as well as its partners and proxies 

in the region. During the past few decades Iran 

has built a domestic defense industry capable 

of developing and producing select categories of 

weapon systems, maintaining aging systems, 

retrofitting older-generation platforms, and 

reverse-engineering captured technology to meet 

Iranian military requirements.

Appendix I: Defense Industry and

Modernization Programs

Key MODAFL Subordinates459,460,461

1805-17887

Entity Key Fields of Activity

Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, 

ammunition, explosives

Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, SAMs,

AAMs, ATGMs

Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO) Light aircraft, UAVs

Marine Industries Organization (MIO) Small boats, surface combatants, submarines

Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Radars, communications equipment,

EW equipment

Defense Industries Research and Training

Institute (DIRTI)

Oversees education and research to promote 

defense science and technology and achieve 

self-sufficiency in military industries

Malek-Ashtar University of Technology (MUT)

Military research and development, including 

in the fields of aerospace, marine, materials, 

and applied science and engineering
84

The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces 

Logistics (MODAFL) oversees Iran’s defense 

industry. MODAFL’s mission is to arm and 

equip the armed forces through military 

research and development, production, acquisition, and personnel support. The major industrial organizations subordinate to MODAFL 

are responsible for the research, development, 

and production of nearly all types of military 

hardware, including ballistic and cruise missiles, SAMs, radars, armored vehicles, UAVs, 

naval vessels, small arms, ammunition, and 

communications equipment.

462

Iranian officials and state media often exaggerate the capabilities of Iran’s defense industries, stressing the country’s self-sufficiency in 

military production in the face of international 

sanctions. Tehran often showcases its military 

capabilities, highlighting new weapon systems 

and platforms, with public displays that coincide with holidays and historic events.

463 The 

regime uses such propaganda to message its 

adversaries and build popular confidence in 

Iran’s capabilities.

464

Major Modernization Programs

Through 2021, Iran has prioritized the development and production of missile, naval, air 

defense, UAV, and EW systems, based on priorities published in its sixth 5-year development 

plan (2017–2021). The plan lists specific defense 

and security objectives designed to increase 

Iran’s military capabilities.

465 Tehran will also 

strive to develop its domestic technological 

base to rely less on foreign suppliers, mitigate 

the negative effect of sanctions, reduce costs, 

and enhance economic stability. Iran is slowly 

increasing the domestic content of its weapon 

systems and developing the ability to produce 

key components and materials.

466

Missile Sector

Within the Aerospace Industries Organization 

(AIO), the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group 

(SHIG) and Shahid Bakeri Industries Group 

(SBIG) are the primary entities responsible for 

ballistic missile development and production. 

Iran domestically develops and produces liquid- and solid-propellant CRBMs, SRBMs, and 

MRBMs and continues to improve the range, 

lethality, and accuracy of its missile systems. 

In recent years, Iran has unveiled SRBMs 

with increasingly greater range and precision 

as well as MRBMs with claimed accuracy and 

warhead improvements.

467

An Ashura MRBM at a production facility in 2009.

Image Source: AFP
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Iran is fielding an increasing number of the-

ater ballistic missiles, improving its existing 

inventory, and developing technical capabili-

ties that could enable it to produce an ICBM. 

Iran also continues to pursue development of 

more powerful SLVs. In July 2017 and Janu-

ary 2019, Iran launched its liquid-propellant 

Simorgh SLV, which could be capable of ICBM 

ranges if configured as a missile. Tehran also is 

pursuing long-range, precision LACMs, which 

present a new type of threat in the region.

468,469

Naval Sector

Iran’s naval programs are primarily aimed at 

deterring adversaries from operating close to 

Iranian territorial waters. As such, Tehran’s 

naval modernization efforts focus on providing 

the IRIN and IRGCN with increasingly lethal 

platforms and weapons—including advanced 

mines and torpedoes, small submarines, 

fast attack craft, and ship- and shore-based 

ASCMs—that further complicate freedom of 

navigation throughout Iran’s littoral. Although 

a somewhat lesser focus, Tehran also aims to 

establish a more far-reaching, strategic naval 

force. In order to progress toward a “blue water” 

naval capability, Iran has also invested in 

developing and producing some larger surface 

and subsurface platforms.

The Marine Industries Organization (MIO) 

and its subsidiaries are the primary domestic 

producers of naval platforms for both of Iran’s 

navies. These industries build a wide range of 

small high-speed boats equipped with guns, 

rockets, and missiles primarily for the IRGCN. 

Iran has built an inventory of hundreds of 

small boats, and Tehran continues to invest in 

producing increasingly faster and more-capa-

ble platforms armed with more-sophisticated 

weapons and equipment.

MIO also builds small submarines and surface 

combatants for the IRIN. After receiving at least 

one Yono class midget submarine from North 

Korea in 2004, Iran began domestic production 

of the platform. Iran has since developed the 

larger Fateh class coastal submarine, the first 

of which the IRIN commissioned in February 

2019. Iran also domestically produces patrol 

craft and corvettes for the IRIN. Iran has com-

pleted three Jamaran class corvettes, including 

one on the Caspian Sea. The Jamaran is Teh-

ran’s largest naval construction project to date, 

and Iran has several more under construction.

Iran also produces a variety of naval weapon 

systems, including ASCMs, mines, and torpe-

An Iranian ASCM-equipped FAC manufactured by MIO.

Image Source: AFP
86

does. Iran’s domestically produced ASCMs are 

based on the Chinese C704 and C802. AIO produces the 35-kilometer-range C704 as the Nasr 

and the 120-kilometer-range C802 as the Noor. 

It has also developed extended-range variants 

of the C802/Noor. With these systems—the 

200-kilometer-range Ghader and 300-kilometer-range Ghadir ASCMs—Iran has ASCM 

coverage for nearly the entire Persian Gulf 

and Gulf of Oman from its shores. In February 2019, Iran revealed footage of its first submarine-launched cruise missile, the Jask-2, a 

variant of the C704/Nasr ASCM, which can be 

launched from the IRIN’s Yono class midget 

submarines.

470 During the next 5 years, new 

naval weapons probably will include additional submarine-launched ASCMs, the Hoot 

supercavitating torpedo, and potentially a 

supersonic ASCM.

471,472

Air Defense Sector

Iran can develop and produce SAM systems and 

radars, including those reverse-engineered from 

its legacy U.S. and Russian equipment. Iran 

continues to improve its integrated air defense 

system (IADS), which is concentrated around 

Tehran and the nuclear sites, with new air surveillance radars, SAMs, and C4ISR systems.

In recent years, Tehran has unveiled several 

domestically developed air defense systems, 

incorporating new SAMs and radars, including 

the medium-to-long-range Third of Khordad, 

the medium-range Sayyad-2, and the longrange Sayyad-3. Iran is also domestically developing a long-range air defense system called 

the Bavar-373 that it claims is more capable 

than the Russian SA-20c, which Iran acquired 

in 2016.

473,474 Iran has also announced it is producing more-capable long-range radars, including the Fath 14, with a reported range of 600 

kilometers, and the Ghadir phased-array radar, 

with a reported range of 1,100 kilometers.

475,476

An Iranian Sayyad-2 SAM at a production facility.

Image Source: AFP

An Iranian C704/Nasr ASCM at a production facility.

Image Source: AFP
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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Aircraft Sector

Iran is unable to produce complete combat air-

craft, but it has established a robust capabil-

ity to maintain, upgrade, and modify its aging 

U.S. and Russian military aircraft. Iran has 

demonstrated its capability to overhaul fixedwing transport and combat aircraft, including 

the U.S.-made F-4, F-5, F-14, and C-130 and 

the Russian Su-24 and MiG-29. Iran is simi-

larly capable of maintaining and overhauling 

its helicopter fleet, such as the Russian Mi-17. 

Iran uses a combination of domestic and for-

eign components and seeks to modernize air-

craft by procuring foreign technologies. Iran 

aims to be able to produce a modern jet air-

craft but is unable to do so without significant 

foreign assistance. Iran has displayed what it 

claims are domestically built fighter aircraft, 

including platforms with low-observable tech-

nology, but these have been modifications 

to existing airframes or mock-ups of aspira-

tional designs.

477

Iran has steadily expanded its domestic UAV 

inventory by developing and producing a wide 

range of lethal and nonlethal UAV platforms. Iran 

has reverse-engineered many of these systems 

based on captured Western UAVs. Some of Iran’s 

newer UAV platforms, such as the Shahed-129 

and the Mohajer-6, can be armed and are capa-

ble of conducting precision air-to-ground strikes 

with small guided munitions.

478 However, despite 

advances in its UAV manufacturing capabilities, 

Iran remains reliant on Western manufactured 

engines and components to support its UAV 

production. Iran is developing a domestic UAV 

engine but is struggling with quality issues.

479

Ground Arms Sector

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran 

has invested relatively less in its ground arms 

sector compared with missile, naval, and air 

defense capabilities. Iran is unable to fully 

produce main battle tanks (MBTs), but it has 

proven able to maintain and upgrade its leg-

acy armor equipment. Iran also produces a 

wide range of basic ground forces equipment, 

including small arms, artillery, ammunition, 

and ATGMs.

480,481
88

Appendix J: Arms Transfers

Imports

Procurements for the IRGC and Artesh have 

largely served to maintain aging systems 

and modernize the military to be able to better defend against a technologically superior 

adversary. After the Iran-Iraq War, combat 

losses and a Western arms embargo made it 

difficult for Iran to replace its military materiel 

or obtain spare parts for equipment. However, 

during the 1990s, Tehran was able to purchase 

some tanks and armored vehicles, combat aircraft, ASCMs, and attack submarines from 

Russia, China, and North Korea.

482,483,484 Iran 

was also able to illicitly procure spare parts 

for some of its U.S.-origin equipment sold to 

the country under the shah.

485 More recent 

arms suppliers to Iran have included Russia, 

China, North Korea, Belarus, and Ukraine. 

In 2016, after canceling an earlier contract in 

2010, Russia delivered the SA-20c air defense 

system to Iran—one of the most high-profile 

Iranian weapons acquisitions in many years.

486

Tehran continues to face significant procurement obstacles as it remains under an international arms embargo, and many countries 

are unwilling to sell military equipment to 

Iran. Passed in 2015, UN Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR) 2231, which endorses the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 

extends ballistic missile and conventional 

arms restrictions on Iran. Although Tehran 

prefers to produce what it can domestically to 

meet military acquisition requirements, Iran 

remains reliant on countries such as Russia 

and China for procurement of advanced conventional capabilities.

487

Under UNSCR 2231, the arms embargo on Iran 

is set to be lifted by October 2020, allowing Iran 

to purchase new advanced weapon systems from 

foreign suppliers to modernize its armed forces, 

including equipment it has largely been unable 

to acquire for decades. Iran will be permitted to 

purchase conventional systems it is unable to 

produce domestically, such as advanced fighter 

aircraft and main battle tanks. Iran is already 

evaluating and discussing military hardware 

for purchase primarily from Russia and, to a 

lesser extent, China. Iran’s potential acquisitions after the lifting of UNSCR 2231 restrictions include Russian Su-30 fighters, Yak-130 

trainers, and T-90 MBTs.

488,489 Iran has also 

shown interest in acquiring S-400 air defense 

systems and Bastian coastal defense systems

from Russia.

490

Exports

Under UNSCR 2231, as with its predecessor 

resolutions, Iran is prohibited from exporting 

arms and related equipment without UN Security Council (UNSC) approval. Since UNSCR 

2231 came into effect, no export proposals have 

been submitted to the UNSC. Since the Islamic 

Revolution, Iran has transferred a wide range 

of weapons and military equipment to state and 
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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UN Security Council Resolution 2231

UNSCR 2231 Annex B restricts Iranian ballistic missile activity and the provision of certain 

weapons and technology to Iran unless preapproved by the UNSC. UNSCR 2231 endorses the 

JCPOA but is separate from the nuclear agreement, which does not address ballistic missiles 

or conventional weapons. Unlike the JCPOA, Iran does not accept UNSCR 2231 Annex B 

restrictions as legitimate and has not agreed to abide by them. The various military-related 

restrictions apply for 5 or 8 years from JCPOA Adoption Day—18 October 2015—or when the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reaches a Broader Conclusion that all nuclear 

material in Iran is for peaceful purposes, whichever is earlier.

491,492

• Designated Entities: All states are to freeze financial assets and economic resources 

and block travel of entities and individuals on the 2231 List, drawn from past UNSCRs on 

Iran. The 2231 List contains 23 individuals and 61 entities associated with Iran’s nuclear, 

missile, and conventional arms programs. These restrictions last for 5 years (travel ban) 

and 8 years (asset freeze) absent a Broader Conclusion.

• Conventional Arms Restrictions: The UNSC must preapprove the supply, sale, or 

transfer to Iran of seven categories of arms as defined by the UN Register of Conven-

tional Arms (UNROCA) and related materiel, spare parts, training, financial resources, 

advice, or other services. The seven UNROCA categories are battle tanks, armored com-

bat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, 

and missiles and missile systems, including MANPADS but excluding all other SAMs. All 

states are also to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iran 

unless preapproved by the UNSC. These restrictions last for 5 years (October 2020) absent 

a Broader Conclusion.

• Ballistic Missile Restrictions: Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to 

ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches 

using such ballistic missile technology. The United States uses Missile Technology Control 

Regime (MTCR) Category I criteria to assert that missiles capable of delivering at least a 

500-kg payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers are inherently capable of delivering 

nuclear weapons. The UNSC must also preapprove the supply, sale, or transfer to or from 

Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology set out in the MTCR or that 

could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. These restric-

tions last for 8 years (October 2023) absent a Broader Conclusion.

The MTCR is a 35-member voluntary, multilateral agreement that establishes export control 

standards for missiles and missile technology. The MTCR is not a treaty or legally binding, 

but UNSCR 2231 establishes it as a global standard for restricted transfers to and from Iran. 

Member states enforce the MTCR regardless of the status of UNSCR 2231.
90

nonstate actors, including designated terrorist 

organizations. Iran has also provided technical 

assistance to help nonstate actors produce and 

assemble their own equipment. Although some 

Iranian shipments have been interdicted, 

Tehran is often able to get high-priority arms 

transfers to its customers.

Over the years, Iranian transfers to state and 

nonstate actors have included: communications equipment; small arms—such as assault 

rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, mortars, 

and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)—and 

ammunition; ATGMs; MANPADS; artillery 

systems, including MRLs and battlefield rockets and launchers; armored vehicles; FAC; 

equipment for unmanned explosives boats; 

ASCMs; SAMs; UAVs, including ISR and 

attack platforms; ground-attack aircraft; and 

C/SRBMs and associated technology.

Iran’s biggest customers include Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, and Iraqi Shia militias, but 

Iran has also provided weapons to the Huthis 

in Yemen, Palestinian groups, and the Taliban 

in Afghanistan. Since UNSCR 1747, which first 

established the arms export ban on Iran, was 

adopted in 2007, other state customers of Iranian military equipment have included Iraq, 

Sudan, and Venezuela. In late 2013, Iran agreed 

to a $195-million deal to sell arms to the Iraqi 

government, including small arms, ammunition, artillery rounds, and communications 

equipment.

493,494,495,496,497,498,499 Significant quantities of Iranian small arms, light weapons, and 

ammunition can also be found on the international gray arms market and have been identified in various war zones, including throughout 

central Africa. However, it is difficult to determine if these are instances of direct transfers or 

sales from the Iranian government.

500

Recipients of Iranian Arms 1805-17885

State recipient 

Nonstate recipient

State and nonstate recipients

HUTHIS

(YEMEN)

HIZBALLAH

(LEBANON)

SHIA MILITIAS

(IRAQ)

IRAN

TALIBAN

(AFGHANISTAN)

SUDAN

SYRIA

Palestinian militants

(Palestinian Territories)

Note: Does not include Iranian gray arms.

VENEZUELA

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
92

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD antiaccess/area denial

AA army aviation

AAM air-to-air missile

AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

AFGS Armed Forces General Staff

AGMC Al-Ghadir Missile Command

AIO Aerospace Industries Organization

ASBM antiship ballistic missile

ASCM antiship cruise missile

ATGM antitank guided missile

BOO Basij Organization of the Oppressed

BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons 

Convention

C2 command and control

C4ISR

command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance

CDCM coastal defense cruise missile

CHOD chief of defense

CRBM close-range ballistic missile

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

D&D denial and deception

DIO Defense Industries Organization

DIRTI Defense Industries Research and 

Training Institute

DNG deployed naval group

EFP explosively formed penetrator

EW electronic warfare

FAC fast attack craft

FIAC fast inshore attack craft

FTO foreign terrorist organization 

GDP gross domestic product

IADS integrated air defense system

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IAIO Iran Aviation Industries Organization

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IED improvised explosive device

IEI Iran Electronics Industries

IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

IRGCASF Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Aerospace Force

IRGC-CIO Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Counterintelligence Organization

IRGCGF Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Ground Force

IRGC-IO Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Intelligence Organization

IRGCN Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy

IRGC-QF Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Qods Force
IRAN MILITARY POWER Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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IRIADF Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense 

Force

IRIAF Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force

IRIGF Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force

IRIN Islamic Republic of Iran Navy

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

JAA Jaish ul-Adl

JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

KADHQ Khatemolanbia Air Defense

Headquarters

KCHQ Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters

KDPI Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran

LACM land-attack cruise missile

LEF Law Enforcement Force

MANPADS man-portable air defense system

MARSOF maritime special operations forces

MARV maneuverable reentry vehicle

MBT main battle tank

MEK People’s Mujahedeen of Iran

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MIO Marine Industries Organization

MODAFL Ministry of Defense and Armed 

Forces Logistics

MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile

MRL multiple rocket launcher

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

MUT Malek-Ashtar University of Technology

NPDO National Passive Defense Organization

NPT Nonproliferation Treaty

PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of 

Palestine–General Command

PHRC Physics Research Center

PIJ Palestine Islamic Jihad

PJAK Free Life Party of Kurdistan

PMC Popular Mobilization Committee

PMF Popular Mobilization Forces

RPG rocket-propelled grenade

SAM surface-to-air missile

SBIG Shahid Bakeri Industries Group

SBS Special Boat Service

SCNS Supreme Council for National Security

SHIG Shahid Hemmat Industries Group

SLV space launch vehicle

SNSF Sepah Navy Special Force

SOC sector operations center

SOF special operations forces

SRBM short-range ballistic missile

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UF6 Uranium hexafluoride

UGF underground facility

UN United Nations

UNAMID African Union-United Nations Hybrid 

Operation in Darfur

UNSC UN Security Council

UNSCR UN Security Council Resolution

VBSS visit, board, search, and seizure

WMD weapons of mass destruction
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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