[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-10597

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cr-60042-JIC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

CINDY MORAN-SANCHEZ, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(August 13, 2015)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Cindy Moran-Sanchez was employed as a Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 

Officer when she conspired to use her government position and contacts to 

smuggle cocaine and heroin into the United States. She appeals the denial of her 

motion for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 782 to the sentencing 

guidelines. 

I.

The factual statement attached to Moran-Sanchez’s plea agreement tells the

story of her crime. In February 2005, she traveled to the Dominican Republic to 

meet with Juan Baez, a convicted felon who had recently been deported from the 

United States. Less than one year later, in September 2006, she began her 

employment as a CBP Officer in the Miami International Airport. At the time, 

Moran-Sanchez’s husband and sister worked at Fort Lauderdale International 

Airport — he as a Transportation Security Administration Officer and she as a 

CBP Officer. 

On June 28, 2006, Moran-Sanchez traveled again to the Dominican Republic

to meet Baez, this time with her husband and sister along for the trip. While there, 

the group formed a plan to smuggle drugs into the United States. They agreed that 

Baez would reenter the country using the false identity “Anibal Acosta” and that he 

would recruit couriers to travel back and forth between the two countries with the 

illegal narcotics. Moran-Sanchez, her husband, and her sister would use their 

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government positions and contacts to assist Baez with his illegal reentry and then 

assist the couriers with passing through customs and TSA checkpoints with the 

narcotics. Moran-Sanchez provided Baez with information related to the manner 

in which the couriers should dress, the days on which they should travel, and the 

best way to purchase their tickets to decrease the likelihood of detection. The

group agreed that Baez would pay a fee to his co-conspirators, including MoranSanchez, for each kilogram of narcotics successfully smuggled into the United 

States.

Baez reentered the United States using the identity of “Anibal Acosta” on 

September 17, 2006. He then recruited a drug courier by the name of David 

Rosario. He provided Rosario’s name to Moran-Sanchez, who in turn provided it 

to her sister. Baez and Moran-Sanchez discussed dates on which Rosario would 

attempt to enter the United States through the Fort Lauderdale International 

Airport, and she agreed to coordinate the shipment of the narcotics by commercial 

carrier to New York. On April 22, 2007, Rosario was arrested attempting to enter 

the United States with a suitcase containing 16.1 kilograms of heroin. MoranSanchez informed Baez that Rosario had been arrested and the narcotics seized.

Moran-Sanchez was arrested and charged with knowingly conspiring to 

import controlled substances — five kilograms or more of a substance containing a 

detectable amount of cocaine, and one kilogram or more of a substance containing 

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a detectable amount of heroin — in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963. She 

pleaded guilty.

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated an adjusted offense 

level of 37 and a criminal offense category of I, resulting in an advisory guidelines 

range of 210 to 262 months imprisonment. The district court sustained MoranSanchez’s unopposed objection to the PSR’s drug quantity calculation, which 

reduced the adjusted offense level to 35 and the advisory guidelines range to 168 to 

210 months imprisonment. 

In addition to the drug quantity objection, Moran-Sanchez moved for a 

downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (diminished mental capacity). 

At her sentence hearing on September 21, 2010, Moran-Sanchez argued that she 

was vulnerable to Baez’s corruption because she suffered from posttraumatic stress 

disorder after many years of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her mother, 

a family friend, and her husband. The government responded with evidence 

showing that Moran-Sanchez was actually “the driving force” behind the 

conspiracy and the “boss” of her co-conspirators, and that she had a “longstanding 

relationship” with Baez. It introduced a recording of Moran-Sanchez “yelling at 

[Baez],” “questioning him,” and “frisking him to see if he was wearing a wire.” 

The government further argued that even if posttraumatic stress disorder had 

impacted Moran-Sanchez’s reasoning abilities, she had failed to establish a “causal 

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connection” between it and the crime. The district court denied the motion for a 

downward departure, finding that Moran-Sanchez’s “ability to reason was not 

compromised in any way as a result of any form of mental defect.”

The court then heard argument on the § 3553(a) factors. Moran-Sanchez 

maintained, contrary to the government’s assertions, that her role in the conspiracy 

was minimal. She asserted that a downward variance was appropriate because it 

would bring her sentence in line with those of her “equally culpable” husband and 

sister. In response, the government reiterated its position that Moran-Sanchez was 

“more culpable” than her sister and her husband. Even before this particular 

conspiracy, the government noted, she was a “longstanding drug partner[]” of 

Baez. And during this conspiracy, Moran-Sanchez spoke to Baez on the phone 

621 times. By comparison, her sister and husband spoke to him only 13 and 11 

times, respectively. The government asserted that Moran-Sanchez “corrupted her 

sister and . . . her husband” and then “use[d] their positions as United States 

officers to corrupt and circumvent the system.” The government also noted that 

Moran-Sanchez, while a CBP Officer, had aided and abetted at least two 

aggravated felons with illegal reentry. 

The court sentenced Moran-Sanchez to 168 months imprisonment — the 

low end of the advisory guidelines range — followed by 5 years supervised 

release. The court stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors and that the 

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sentence imposed was necessary “to provide just punishment and to afford 

adequate deterrence to future criminal conduct, not only by this defendant, but by 

others.” 

Moran-Sanchez appealed. Her counsel filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel, supported by an Anders brief. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 

S. Ct. 1396 (1967). We granted the motion and affirmed Moran-Sanchez’s 

conviction and sentence, concluding that “examination of the entire record 

reveal[ed] no arguable issues of merit.” United States v. Moran-Sanchez, No. 10-

14648 (11th Cir. Aug. 3, 2011). 

On September 10, 2014, Moran-Sanchez filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion to 

reduce her sentence based on Amendment 782 to the sentencing guidelines, which 

lowered the penalties for most drug offenses by reducing offense levels on the 

§ 2D1.1 drug quantity table. She argued that the court should reduce her sentence 

because she had strong family ties and had participated in extensive postsentencing rehabilitation and training. The government conceded that Amendment 

782 was applicable to Moran-Sanchez’s case and noted that the correct advisory 

guidelines range, once the 2-level reduction was applied, was 135 to 168 months. 

But it argued that the § 3553(a) factors did not support a sentence reduction. 

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In its order denying Moran-Sanchez’s motion, the district court agreed with 

the government that Amendment 782 applied and also that the § 3553(a) factors 

weighed against a sentence reduction. The court explained: 

The history and characteristics of the Defendant and the nature and 

circumstances of the offense strongly militate against a reduction of 

her sentence. She utilized her position as a [CBP] Officer, her sister’s 

position as a [CBP] Officer, and her husband’s position as a TSA 

supervisor to import heroin into the United States. In addition, Mrs. 

Moran-Sanchez aided and abetted the illegal entry into the United 

States of aliens. She engaged in this conduct for approximately three 

years. The Court finds no mitigation here. 

This is Moran-Sanchez’s appeal. 

II.

“We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on a subsequent change in the sentencing 

guidelines, for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343 

(11th Cir. 2003). Once it is determined that an amendment to the sentencing 

guidelines is applicable to the incarcerated defendant, a district court must follow a 

two-part analysis. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2000). 

First, the court must recalculate the defendant’s sentence by “substituting the 

amended guideline range for the originally applied guideline range.” Id. Second, 

the court must decide whether, in its discretion and in light of the § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors, it will impose the newly calculated sentence or retain the 

original sentence. Id. at 781. “The district court is not required to articulate the 

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applicability of each [§ 3553(a)] factor, as long as the record as a whole 

demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into account.” United States v. 

Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moran-Sanchez’s 

§ 3582(c)(2) motion. Although Amendment 782 altered Moran-Sanchez’s original 

base offense level, we have explicitly rejected her suggestion that a district court 

must reduce a defendant’s sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) where a retroactive 

amendment lowers the guidelines range. United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 

760 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The grant of authority to the district court to reduce a term 

of imprisonment [under § 3582(c)(2)] is unambiguously discretionary.”). The 

district court stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors and specifically

identified “the history and characteristics of [Moran-Sanchez]” and “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense” as two factors that weighed heavily in favor of 

retaining the original sentence. 

Moran-Sanchez asserts that the court erred by considering “information” that 

it had not considered during her original sentencing. That assertion is not 

supported by the record. And even if it were, that would not matter: we have held 

that a resentencing court has discretion to consider information that it did not 

consider during the original sentencing. See Williams, 557 F.3d at 1256 (stating 

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that a resentencing court may consider, among other things, a defendant’s postsentencing conduct). 

AFFIRMED.

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