97-106

 No. 97-106

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

JAMES R. McKENZIE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

VALENTINE M. SCHEELER,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Missoula,

 The Honorable John W. Larson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Terry Wallace, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana

 For Respondent:

 John R. Gordon; Reep, Spoon & Gordon, Missoula, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: June 19, 1997

 Decided: December 2, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 James R. McKenzie (McKenzie) appeals from the judgment entered by the Fourth

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Judicial District Court, Missoula County, on its order dismissing his complaint with

prejudice and from the District Court's subsequent order denying his motion to alter 

or

amend the order of dismissal. We affirm.

 We restate the issue on appeal as whether the District Court erred in dismissing

McKenzie's complaint with prejudice for failing to comply with discovery procedures 

and

scheduling orders.

 BACKGROUND

 On December 8, 1994, McKenzie, a Canadian citizen, filed a complaint against

Valentine M. Scheeler (Scheeler) for damages allegedly resulting from a vehicle 

accident

which occurred north of St. Ignatius, Montana, on December 9, 1992. The complaint

alleged that McKenzie had suffered property damages, personal injuries, pain and

suffering, emotional stress, medical expenses and loss of wages as a result of the

accident. After Scheeler answered the complaint, the District Court issued an order

directing McKenzie to consult with Scheeler regarding the scheduling of pretrial 

matters

and submit a proposed scheduling order by June 23, 1995. When McKenzie failed to

submit a proposed order, Scheeler filed his own proposed scheduling order and the 

court

adopted it. The scheduling order set deadlines for amending pleadings, providing 

expert

witness disclosure statements, exchanging lay witness and exhibit lists, completing

discovery and filing pretrial motions. The order also designated dates by which a

settlement conference would be held and a pretrial order would be filed.

 Scheeler served McKenzie with interrogatories and requests for production of

documents on April 17, 1995, which included requests for medical records regarding 

any

injury or medical condition McKenzie suffered from prior to the December 9, 1992,

accident; records of medical expenses incurred by McKenzie as a result of the 

accident;

copies of all documentary evidence McKenzie expected to offer at trial; copies of

McKenzie's income tax returns for a ten-year period; and copies of prescriptions and

prescription receipts for any drugs McKenzie purchased or used during the year prior 

to

the accident. McKenzie did not respond until November 13, 1995. In addition to his

failure to serve the discovery responses within the 30-day time limit provided in 

Rules

33(a) and 34(b), M.R.Civ.P., McKenzie's responses to many of the interrogatories and

requests for production admittedly were incomplete, erroneous or otherwise 

inadequate. 

During his deposition in January of 1996, McKenzie stated he would produce additional

medical, employment and financial records. He eventually provided Scheeler with

several additional documents in June of 1996, but the documents did not include the

medical records and tax returns Scheeler had requested in April of 1995.

 The District Court's scheduling order required the parties to conduct a 

settlement

conference by March 25, 1996. The settlement conference was not held and, when the

court noted that a settlement master report had not been filed, it ordered the 

parties to file

a status report. McKenzie's status report stated that the case was behind schedule, 

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in

part, because of his inability to provide the complete information Scheeler had 

requested. 

McKenzie requested the court to modify the scheduling order to reopen discovery, 

which

originally was to have been completed by February 1, 1996.

 Scheeler's status report outlined McKenzie's failure to respond adequately to 

the

requests for production of medical and financial documents. Scheeler also pointed 

out

that McKenzie had failed to meet the deadlines contained in the court's scheduling 

order

for serving Scheeler with expert witness disclosure statements, lay witness lists and

exhibit lists. Additionally, Scheeler reported that McKenzie had not arranged for a

settlement conference or even proposed a settlement master; nor had he submitted a

proposed pretrial order to Scheeler. Scheeler advised the District Court that he was

reluctant to agree to any extensions of the time frames set out in the scheduling 

order and

requested that, in the event the court extended those time frames, specific 

deadlines be

set which would result in dismissal of the complaint if not met by McKenzie.

 In light of the status reports, the District Court set a hearing for June 26, 

1996,

regarding the parties' scheduling and discovery disagreements. At the hearing,

McKenzie's counsel admitted that McKenzie's discovery responses had been both late 

and

inadequate, but asserted that he was experiencing some difficulties in obtaining the

information required because of McKenzie's Canadian residency. The District Court

granted McKenzie until August 15, 1996, to provide the information Scheeler requested

and stated that, if McKenzie failed to provide the necessary information by that 

deadline,

it likely would impose sanctions, which could include dismissal of the action, for 

failure

to comply with the scheduling order under Rule 16, M.R.Civ.P. The District Court

further stated that Scheeler would have 10 days after McKenzie's response to object 

to

any insufficient response and scheduled a hearing for September 4, 1996, to review 

the

status of discovery matters. It also expressly ordered McKenzie to be present, 

personally

and with counsel, at the September 4, 1996, hearing. The Minutes and Note of Ruling

following this hearing reiterated that McKenzie was granted until August 15, 1996, to

provide the requested information and that sanctions could be imposed if he failed to

comply by that date. 

 McKenzie delivered some of the requested documents to Scheeler by the August

15, 1996, deadline. Thereafter, Scheeler filed a timely "Notice of Insufficiency and

Objection to Plaintiff's Tender of Discovery" stating that McKenzie still had not 

produced

the complete medical records and income tax returns requested. The notice also

summarized McKenzie's continued failure to provide full expert witness disclosure

statements, a lay witness list, an exhibit list, a proposed pretrial order and a 

suggested

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settlement master, as required by the original scheduling order. Scheeler pointed 

out that

McKenzie had not offered any explanation for failing to comply with either the 

discovery

requests or the court's orders, and requested that the court dismiss the complaint.

 Neither McKenzie nor his counsel appeared at the September 4, 1996, hearing as

ordered by the District Court. Scheeler's counsel appeared and reiterated his 

objections

to McKenzie's failure to comply with the original scheduling order and the court's 

June

26, 1996, order. The District Court entered a Note of Ruling in which it dismissed

McKenzie's complaint, but specifically allowed 10 days within which McKenzie could

move to set aside the dismissal order on a showing of good cause for his failure to

respond or appear; alternatively, the court scheduled a hearing for September 13, 

1996,

at which, if he appeared with all the requested discovery documents, McKenzie could

move to set aside the dismissal.

 McKenzie's counsel appeared at the hearing on September 13, 1996, and

apologized for his absence from the prior hearing, stating that he had misread the 

notice

scheduling the September 4, 1996, hearing; McKenzie did not appear. McKenzie's

counsel then moved the District Court to set aside its dismissal of the complaint, 

asserting

that there had been no violations of the scheduling order and that, after reasonable 

and

diligent efforts, he simply had been unable to locate the additional documents 

requested

by Scheeler. The District Court subsequently entered a written order dismissing the

action with prejudice for McKenzie's failure to comply with discovery requests, 

courtordered pretrial scheduling procedures and scheduling orders, and denying McKenzie's

motion to set aside the dismissal. McKenzie filed a Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., motion 

to

alter or amend the judgment dismissing his complaint, which the District Court 

denied,

and McKenzie appeals.

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court err in dismissing McKenzie's complaint with prejudice for

failing to comply with discovery procedures and scheduling orders?

 It has long been the law in Montana that a party's abuse of discovery procedures

which results in needless delay of a case should not be dealt with leniently; 

transgressors

should be punished rather than patiently encouraged to cooperate in the discovery 

process. 

Smith v. Butte-Silver Bow County (1996), 276 Mont. 329, 332, 916 P.2d 91, 92-93

(citing Owen v. F.A. Buttrey, Co. (1981), 192 Mont. 274, 277-78, 627 P.2d 1233,

1235). Concerns related to crowded dockets and the responsibility to maintain fair 

and

efficient judicial administration have shifted the traditional reluctance to impose

discovery-related sanctions to a judicial intolerance of discovery abuses. Smith, 

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916 P.2d

at 92. Thus, the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery 

procedures

is regarded with favor. Huffine v. Boylan (1989), 239 Mont. 515, 517, 782 P.2d 77, 

78

(citations omitted).

 This Court generally defers to the decision of a trial court regarding 

sanctions for

failure to comply with discovery procedures because the trial court is in the best 

position

to know whether parties are disregarding the rights of opposing parties in the 

course of

litigation and which sanctions for such conduct are most appropriate. Smith, 916 

P.2d

at 93 (citing Dassori v. Roy Stanley Chevrolet Co. (1986), 224 Mont. 178, 180, 728

P.2d 430, 431). As a result, we review a district court's imposition of sanctions 

for

failure to comply with discovery procedures to determine whether the court abused its

discretion. Smith, 916 P.2d at 93.

 We have not previously stated the standard for reviewing a district court's

imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with a Rule 16(b), M.R.Civ.P., 

scheduling

order. We observe, however, that failing to abide by a scheduling order constitutes 

a

failure to comply with the rules of procedure as well as a failure to comply with a 

court

order and, in most instances, delays the timely resolution of the action. In that 

regard,

the District Court's sanction for McKenzie's noncompliance with the scheduling order

was in the nature of a Rule 41(b), M.R.Civ.P., dismissal for failure "to prosecute 

or to

comply with these rules or any order of court . . . ." Our standard in reviewing a 

district

court's Rule 41(b) dismissal is whether the court abused its discretion. HobbleDiamond

Cattle Co. v. Triangle Irr. Co. (1995), 272 Mont. 37, 40, 899 P.2d 531, 533 (citation

omitted). We adopt that same abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the District

Court's dismissal of McKenzie's complaint for failure to comply with scheduling 

orders.

 Here, the District Court determined that McKenzie failed to comply with both

discovery procedures and its scheduling orders. On that basis, it dismissed 

McKenzie's

complaint with prejudice. We review the court's determination of McKenzie's

noncompliance and the propriety of its dismissal sanction in turn.

 NONCOMPLIANCE

 As stated above, the District Court determined that McKenzie had failed to 

comply 

with both discovery procedures and the court's scheduling orders. We first address

McKenzie's arguments regarding the court's determination that he had not complied 

with

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discovery procedures, then address his arguments regarding his noncompliance with the

scheduling orders.

 a. Noncompliance with discovery procedures

 With regard to the District Court's determination that McKenzie's noncompliance

was an abuse of discovery procedures, McKenzie first asserts that any failure on his 

part

to respond adequately to discovery requests was not an intentional trial strategy. 

On that

basis, he contends that his noncompliance did not rise to the level of abuse of 

discovery

procedures sufficient under our case law to warrant imposition of sanctions. 

 It is true that in First Bank (N.A.)--Billings v. Heidema (1986), 219 Mont. 373,

711 P.2d 1384, for example, we stated that " '[w]hen litigants use willful delay, 

evasive

responses, and disregard of court direction as part and parcel of their trial 

strategy, they

must suffer the consequences.' " First Bank, 711 P.2d at 1386 (quoting Owen, 627 P.2d

at 1236). However, it is equally clear that, in First Bank and Owen, "willful 

delay" was

only one of three examples of conduct stated to be sufficient to warrant sanctions. 

Moreover, sanctions for abuse of discovery procedures are imposed in order to deter

unresponsive parties in an action; it is the attitude of unresponsiveness to the 

judicial

process, regardless of the intent behind that attitude, which warrants sanctions. 

See, e.g.,

Huffine, 782 P.2d at 78; Landauer v. Kehrwald (1987), 225 Mont. 322, 325, 732 P.2d

839, 841; Audit Services v. Kraus Const., Inc. (1980), 189 Mont. 94, 102, 615 P.2d

183, 187-88.

 In this case, McKenzie's initial responses to Scheeler's discovery requests were

untimely under Rules 33(a) and 34(b), M.R.Civ.P., and, in addition, were either

incomplete or erroneous. Despite assurances to Scheeler that the requested 

information

existed and would be forthcoming, McKenzie failed to deliver complete medical and

financial records. The District Court eventually granted McKenzie's request for an

extension of time in which to respond to the discovery requests, but warned that

sanctions--including dismissal--could result if noncompliance continued. McKenzie 

did

not comply. Moreover, both McKenzie and his counsel failed to appear at the hearing

set for September 4, 1996.

 When McKenzie's counsel did appear on September 13, 1996, he still did not

produce the requested discovery. Instead, he attempted to justify the noncompliance 

by

raising new arguments that the information requested by Scheeler was unavailable and

that the requests were unreasonable. These assertions were directly contrary to

McKenzie's previous assurances that the information existed and would be produced. 

Moreover, McKenzie's counsel did not support his arguments with any testimony,

affidavits or other evidence establishing that the requested documents were 

unavailable. 

Unsupported arguments of counsel are not evidence and do not establish the existence 

of

the matters that are argued. See, e.g., Montana Metal Buildings, Inc. v. Shapiro 

(Mont.

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1997), 942 P.2d 694, 698, 54 St.Rep. 731, 733.

 McKenzie repeatedly failed to respond adequately to Scheeler's discovery 

requests. 

In addition, he did not comply with the District Court's order that he respond in 

full to

those discovery requests and offered no reasonable justification for his 

noncompliance. 

The record clearly reflects an ongoing attitude of unresponsiveness to discovery

procedures and disregard of the court's authority on McKenzie's part throughout the

course of this action.

 McKenzie also argues that, pursuant to Rule 26(e), M.R.Civ.P., he was allowed

to supplement or amend his previous discovery responses at any time prior to trial 

and

that the District Court's determination that he failed to comply with discovery 

procedures

by not providing complete responses to Scheeler's discovery requests effectively 

nullified

that Rule. McKenzie's argument is without merit.

 First, Rules 33(a) and 34(b), M.R.Civ.P., require a party to respond to

interrogatories and requests for production in full, unless objected to, within 30 

days of

being served with the interrogatories or requests. Accepting McKenzie's 

interpretation

of Rule 26(e) would effectively nullify that duty by allowing a party to drag out the

discovery process indefinitely through continuous "supplementing" of previous 

responses

in a piecemeal fashion, without ever fully responding to the interrogatory or 

request for

production. 

 Second, McKenzie misapprehends the nature of Rule 26(e). Rule 26(e),

M.R.Civ.P., addresses the limited circumstances under which a party who has responded

to a discovery request "with a response that was complete when made . . . " must

supplement that complete response. In the present case, it is undisputed that 

McKenzie's

initial responses to Scheeler's discovery requests were not complete. Thus, Rule 26

(e),

M.R.Civ.P., is inapplicable here.

 We conclude that McKenzie repeatedly failed to fully and timely comply with

discovery requests propounded by Scheeler and that the District Court did not err in

determining that McKenzie's noncompliance was an abuse of discovery procedures.

 b. Noncompliance with scheduling orders

 McKenzie also contends that the District Court erred in determining that he 

failed

to comply with its scheduling orders. In this case, the scheduling orders at issue 

consist

of the original June 30, 1995, scheduling order and the June 26, 1996, order 

extending

the deadline by which McKenzie was to respond fully to the discovery requests. While

the June 26, 1996, order is a discovery-related order in that it ordered McKenzie to

respond fully to Scheeler's long-pending discovery requests, it also constitutes a

scheduling order in that the District Court made a limited modification of the 

discovery

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deadline contained in the original scheduling order. See Rule 16(b), M.R.Civ.P.

 Rule 16(b), M.R.Civ.P., provides that a district court shall enter a scheduling

order in each case delineating the time frames within which all pretrial matters 

will be

completed by the parties. The District Court duly entered a scheduling order in this

action on June 30, 1995, and it is undisputed that McKenzie failed to comply with 

those

portions of the scheduling order which required him to provide Scheeler with an 

exhibit

list, a lay witness list, expert witness disclosure statements, a proposed pretrial 

order and

a suggested settlement master. 

 McKenzie asserts, however, that, because the court amended the time frames in

the scheduling order, it was impossible for him to comply with the original schedule

deadlines. We disagree. At the June 26, 1996, hearing, the District Court extended 

the

deadline by which McKenzie was required to fully respond to Scheeler's earlier 

discovery

request until August 15, 1996. The court did not extend any of the other deadlines

contained in the original scheduling order. Absent such an extension of the other 

original

deadlines, McKenzie's failure to provide Scheeler with witness and exhibit lists and

expert witness disclosure statements constituted a continuing violation of the 

court's

original scheduling order. 

 Moreover, at the time the District Court granted McKenzie's request for an

extension of the discovery deadline, the other deadlines set in the original 

scheduling

order had passed. Thus, McKenzie already had failed to comply with those deadlines. 

The court's extension of the time in which McKenzie was to respond to the discovery

requests had no bearing on the fact that McKenzie had already failed to provide 

Scheeler

with a witness list, an exhibit list and expert witness disclosure statements by the

originally set deadlines, and apparently made no effort to comply even after the 

June 26,

1996, order extending one--and only one--deadline.

 Additionally, the District Court's June 26, 1996, order extending the time in 

which

McKenzie was to respond to Scheeler's discovery requests and requiring McKenzie to

appear on September 4, 1996, was, in essence, a revised scheduling order with which

McKenzie also failed to comply. He neither fully responded to the discovery requests

by the August 15, 1996, deadline nor appeared at the subsequent hearing. We conclude

that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that McKenzie 

failed

to comply with its scheduling orders. 

 REVIEW OF SANCTION IMPOSED

 After determining that McKenzie had committed discovery and scheduling abuses,

the District Court dismissed McKenzie's complaint with prejudice. We review the 

court's

dismissal sanction to determine whether the court abused its discretion. Smith, 916 

P.2d

at 95. 

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 McKenzie does not contend that the District Court lacked authority to impose the

sanction of dismissal. Indeed, Rules 16 and 37, M.R.Civ.P., provide the District 

Court

with the authority to impose the dismissal sanction. Rule 16(f), M.R.Civ.P., 

provides

that, if a party fails to obey a scheduling order, the court may make such orders as 

are

just, including the dismissal sanction authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(C), M.R.Civ.P.

Additionally, Rule 37(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P., provides that if a party fails to obey an 

order

to provide discovery, the court may make such orders as are just, including "(C) [a]n

order . . . dismissing the action . . . ." 

 McKenzie argues, however, that any noncompliance on his part did not warrant

the imposition of sanctions at all and that, if sanctions were warranted, the court's

dismissal of his complaint with prejudice was too extreme under these 

circumstances. 

 a. Imposition of sanctions

 McKenzie asserts that he should not have been sanctioned for not complying with

the original scheduling order because the District Court's June 26, 1996, order 

directing

him to comply with Scheeler's discovery requests did not also require him to comply 

with

the original scheduling order and the court did not warn him that sanctions would be

imposed if he did not comply with the scheduling order. We disagree.

 The June 30, 1995, scheduling order was an order of the court which, by its

terms, required McKenzie to comply with all of the deadlines set forth therein, at 

all

times thereafter, unless modified by the court upon a showing of good cause. Rule 16

(b),

M.R.Civ.P. McKenzie had a continuing obligation to comply with the scheduling order

and that obligation did not evaporate merely because the deadlines set out in the 

order had

passed without being met.

 Moreover, even though Rule 16(f), M.R.Civ.P., which provides that a district

court may impose sanctions for failure to obey a scheduling order, does not require 

that

a party be given notice of failure to comply or that sanctions could be imposed, it 

is clear

that McKenzie did have such notice. Scheeler's status report, filed before the 

hearing in

June of 1996, summarized McKenzie's failure to meet the various deadlines set out in 

the

scheduling order and requested that, in the event the court extended any of the 

originally

scheduled deadlines, any failure by McKenzie to comply with the new deadlines should

result in dismissal of the complaint. When the District Court granted McKenzie

additional time to respond to the discovery requests, it warned that failure to 

comply with

the extended deadline could result in a Rule 16 sanction for not complying with a

scheduling order and that such sanction most likely would consist of dismissal of his

complaint. Further, Scheeler's subsequent notice of insufficiency--to which McKenzie

also did not respond--reiterated McKenzie's noncompliance with the original 

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scheduling

order and requested the District Court to enter an order dismissing the complaint. 

McKenzie had clear notice that he was not in compliance with the original scheduling

order and that the court was considering the possibility of sanctions--specifically,

dismissal of the action--if the noncompliance continued.

 McKenzie also asserts that Scheeler was required to file a motion requesting the

imposition of sanctions for his failure to comply with the discovery requests and the

scheduling orders before the District Court could impose any sanction, and that 

Scheeler

failed to file such a motion in this case. McKenzie's foundational premise is 

flawed. 

Rule 16(f), M.R.Civ.P., provides that, if a party fails to comply with a Rule 16(b)

scheduling order, the court may impose such sanctions as are just on its own 

initiative. 

It contains no requirement that a party move for imposition of such sanctions. 

 As to McKenzie's failure to comply with discovery procedures, sanctions for such

conduct are governed by Rule 37, M.R.Civ.P. As discussed above, Rule 37(b)(2),

M.R.Civ.P., provides that "[i]f a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or 

permit

discovery, . . . the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in 

regard

to the failure as are just . . . ." It contains no requirement that an opposing 

party move

for sanctions. Here, the District Court entered a specific order on June 26, 1996,

requiring McKenzie to provide discovery responses to Scheeler by August 15, 1996. 

The

June 26, 1996, order was, therefore, "an order to provide . . . discovery" under Rule

37(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P. McKenzie did not comply with that order. Thus, Rule 37(b)(2),

M.R.Civ.P., authorized the court to sanction McKenzie for that noncompliance.

 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining 

that

McKenzie's noncompliance with the scheduling orders and discovery procedures

warranted the imposition of sanctions.

 b. Dismissal sanction

 First, McKenzie argues that the District Court erred in relying on Dassori as

support for dismissal of the complaint in the present case. He contends that 

Dassori is

clearly distinguishable because "[t]here was no pattern in this case of either the 

type or

extent of dilatory 'tactics' referred to in Dassori." We disagree. 

 In Dassori, the plaintiff requested and received an additional month in which to

answer interrogatories served on him the previous month. The plaintiff failed to 

respond

within the extended time. Dassori, 728 P.2d at 431. Seven months later, the 

defendants

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff's failure to respond; 

a

hearing was held on the motion to dismiss approximately five months thereafter. 

Dassori,

728 P.2d at 431. Although the plaintiff appeared at the hearing and presented the 

court

with the required discovery responses, the district court dismissed the complaint. 

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Dassori, 728 P.2d at 431. We affirmed the dismissal sanction, reiterating our 

deference

to a district court's decision regarding the imposition of sanctions on parties who 

fail to

comply with discovery procedures. Dassori, 728 P.2d at 431.

 In the present case, Scheeler served his discovery requests on McKenzie on April

17, 1995. McKenzie did not object or request an extension of the time in which to

respond, and did not respond at all until November 13, 1995. Moreover, his tardy

responses were incomplete. Two months later, during his deposition, McKenzie stated

that he would produce additional financial and medical records for Scheeler, but he

produced nothing until June of 1996, and his production of documents at that time 

also

was incomplete. Eventually, the District Court set a hearing to discuss the parties'

discovery and scheduling disagreements, at which the court granted McKenzie 

additional

time to respond to the discovery requests. McKenzie still failed to comply, despite

assurances to both Scheeler and the District Court that the requested documents 

existed

and were available. Finally, seventeen months after Scheeler served the initial 

discovery

requests on McKenzie, the court dismissed McKenzie's complaint for failure to comply

with discovery procedures and scheduling orders.

 The present case reveals a pattern of conduct by McKenzie throughout the

proceedings at least comparable to, if not more egregious than, that before us in 

Dassori. 

In Dassori, the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint resulted from a twelve-month 

delay

in providing discovery responses. Here, the delay was sixteen months. Furthermore,

unlike the plaintiff in Dassori, McKenzie never produced complete responses to

Scheeler's discovery requests. On the basis of McKenzie's discovery abuses alone,

Dassori provides sufficient authority for the District Court's dismissal of the 

complaint.

 Moreover, in addition to his discovery abuses, McKenzie also failed to comply

with the deadlines set out in the court's original scheduling order and he and his 

attorney

both failed to appear at a hearing the court specifically ordered them to attend. 

He also

failed to comply with the court's order requiring him to fully respond to the 

discovery

requests and provided no reasonable justification for his failure to comply. 

McKenzie's

disregard of the District Court's orders provides significant additional support for 

the

court's determination that the sanction of dismissal was appropriate.

 As discussed above, this Court generally defers to the decision of a district 

court

regarding sanctions for abuses of controlling procedural rules because that court is 

in the

best position to know which sanction is most appropriate under the circumstances of 

the

case. See Smith, 916 P.2d at 93. While dismissal is an extreme sanction, the record

before us indicates a pattern of discovery abuses and disregard of court orders by

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McKenzie throughout the course of this litigation which effectively halted the 

discovery

process and delayed any progress toward resolving the action. 

 Notwithstanding this abysmal record, McKenzie contends that the District Court

abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint. First, he argues that, because 

he did

produce at least some of the requested documents and made a good faith effort to

substantially comply with the requested discovery, the court should have imposed a

sanction less extreme than dismissal. 

 Scheeler's requests for production included requests for medical records 

regarding

any injury or medical condition from which McKenzie suffered prior to the December

9, 1992, accident; medical records relating to any injuries McKenzie claimed to have

suffered as a result of the accident; records of medical expenses incurred by 

McKenzie

as a result of the accident; copies of prescriptions and receipts for any medications

McKenzie purchased or used during the year prior to the accident; and copies of his

income tax returns for a ten-year period.

 While the record before us is not altogether clear regarding what documents were

produced by McKenzie or the extent to which he complied with the discovery requests,

it appears that McKenzie's initial responses to the requests for production 

consisted of

two letters from doctors, a credit card charge slip and incomplete tax records 

covering

a period of four years. The additional documents produced by McKenzie on June 4,

1996, apparently consisted of two letters and several forms relating to McKenzie's

employment history with two trucking companies, a letter signed by Mrs. Donna

McKenzie stating that McKenzie was disabled and in bed between June and November

of some unspecified year, and a computer printout from a physical therapy clinic 

listing

the dates on which McKenzie visited the clinic. Finally, McKenzie apparently 

produced

tax returns for a portion of the time period requested, two medical reports and a 

computer

printout of visits to a physician during June and July of 1993. 

 Considering the limited documents of record and the absence of any testimony,

affidavits or other evidence detailing the efforts McKenzie may have made to procure

additional documents or the reasons for any inability to procure such documents, we 

are

reluctant to determine whether McKenzie's efforts were, indeed, in good faith and

substantial. When this Court cannot make a ready, confident and accurate 

determination

of a party's good faith compliance with the discovery process, we will presume the

correctness of a district court's action in imposing sanctions. Landauer, 732 P.2d 

at 840

(citations omitted); Dassori, 728 P.2d at 431(citations omitted). On the record 

before us,

we will not disturb the District Court's determination that dismissal of the 

complaint was

the appropriate sanction for McKenzie's failure to comply with the discovery 

requests.

 Finally, McKenzie asserts that, contrary to the requirements set forth in Smith,

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dismissal of his complaint was inappropriate because there was no indication that his

failure to comply with discovery procedures or the scheduling order resulted in any

prejudice to Scheeler. In this regard, we stated in Smith that "[t]he extent of the

'consequences' imposed by a district court . . . should relate to the extent and 

nature of

the actual discovery abuse and the extent of the prejudice to the opposing party 

which

results therefrom." Smith, 916 P.2d at 97. 

 The accident at issue in this case occurred in December of 1992 and McKenzie

filed his complaint against Scheeler in December of 1994. Scheeler subsequently 

served

interrogatories and requests for production on April 17, 1995. Over the course of 

the

following seventeen months, McKenzie continuously failed to provide complete 

responses

to the discovery requests and offered no justification for his failure to respond 

fully; he

also failed to comply with a court order requiring him to provide complete discovery

responses to Scheeler. Thus, when the District Court dismissed McKenzie's complaint,

nearly four years had passed since the accident and two years had elapsed since he 

filed

his complaint. In that period of time, McKenzie still had not provided Scheeler 

with the

most basic information documenting his various claims for personal injuries, pain and

suffering, medical expenses and lost wages. Without such information, Scheeler was

prevented from assessing the bases for, and developing a defense against, McKenzie's

claims. 

 Such a refusal to provide discovery essentially prevents the case from 

progressing

and is the precise reason for the availability of sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, M.R.

Civ.P. 

See In re Marriage of Massey (1987), 225 Mont. 394, 398, 732 P.2d 1341, 1344. When

a party's failure to comply with discovery procedures effectively halts the discovery

process, it results in impermissible prejudice to the opposing party. See First 

Bank, 711

P.2d at 1386 (citation omitted). Thus, McKenzie's failure to comply with discovery

procedures was, in itself, prejudicial to Scheeler.

 Moreover, while the District Court made no finding regarding the extent to which

Scheeler had been prejudiced by McKenzie's failure to comply with discovery 

procedures

and scheduling orders, it clearly found McKenzie's noncompliance, which it 

characterized

as "flagrant, repeated and continuous," to be so extensive as to warrant a dismissal 

in its

own right. We agree. McKenzie repeatedly ignored the rules governing discovery and

disregarded court orders. Although the extent of the discovery abuse and prejudice 

to an

opposing party are both factors to be considered in determining an appropriate 

sanction,

a party's disregard of the court's orders and authority is an additional 

consideration. In

this case, McKenzie's continuous discovery abuses, his unresponsive attitude toward 

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the

judicial process and his disregard of the District Court's authority, combined with 

the

inherent prejudice to Scheeler, clearly warranted the sanction of dismissal. We 

conclude

that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing McKenzie's 

complaint

with prejudice as a sanction for his failure to comply with discovery requests and

scheduling orders.

 Finally, we address the District Court's denial of McKenzie's motion to alter or

amend its order dismissing his complaint which was based, in part, on McKenzie's 

failure

to present the court with any reason justifying his continued failure to comply with 

the

court's orders. Our standard of review of a district court's denial of a motion to 

alter or

amend is whether the court abused its discretion. Estate of Nielsen v. Pardis 

(1994), 265

Mont. 470, 478, 878 P.2d 234, 238.

 In light of our conclusion that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 

in

dismissing the complaint, we further conclude that the court did not abuse its 

discretion

in denying McKenzie's motion to alter or amend the order of dismissal. We hold that

the District Court did not err in dismissing McKenzie's complaint with prejudice 

based

on his failure to comply with discovery procedures and scheduling orders.

 Affirmed.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

Justice W. William Leaphart, dissenting.

 I concur with the conclusion that McKenzie's failure to timely respond to the

discovery requests constitutes noncompliance with both the rules of procedure and the

court's scheduling order. I further agree that the court did not abuse its 

discretion in

determining that McKenzie's conduct was sanctionable. I would hold, however, that 

the

District Court abused its discretion in its choice of sanctions; that is, in 

dismissing the

complaint with prejudice. 

 The Court notes that a dismissal for failure to comply with a Rule 16, M.R.Civ.

P.,

scheduling order is akin to a dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b),

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M.R.Civ.P. The Court cites our decision in Hobble-Diamond Cattle Co. v. Triangle 

Irr.

Co. (1995), 272 Mont. 37, 40, 899 P.2d 531, 533, for the proposition that we review

Rule 41(b) dismissals for an abuse of discretion. As noted in Hobble-Diamond, "we 

have

established four factors to be considered in determining whether a district court 

abused

its discretion in dismissing an action under Rule 41(b), M.R.Civ.P.: 1) plaintiff's

diligence in prosecuting the claim; 2) prejudice to the defense caused by 

plaintiff's delay;

3) availability of alternate sanctions; and 4) existence of a warning that the case 

is in

danger of dismissal." Hobble-Diamond, 899 P.2d at 534. 

 Here we have a period of 16 months in which the plaintiff failed to adequately

respond to discovery requests. While I agree that a 16-month delay is sanctionable, 

I

seriously question whether a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Although 

there is

no definitive standard as to how long a delay must be before a dismissal is 

warranted, I

note that we have held that dismissal after a delay of "slightly more than two and 

one-half

years" was held an abuse of discretion in Becky v. Norwest Bank Dillon, N.A. (1990),

245 Mont. 1, 8, 798 P.2d 1011, 1016. 

 Accordingly, given that the 16-month delay was not as egregious as others we 

have

addressed, combined with the fact that the only prejudice to the defendant was the

prejudice which is presumed from the delay itself, I would require that the District 

Court

consider alternate sanctions before invoking the extreme sanction of dismissal. 

"[D]ismissals should be imposed sparingly and must remain the exception rather than 

the

rule." Hobble-Diamond, 899 P.2d at 535. In Hobble-Diamond, we reversed a dismissal

under Rule 41(b) where there had been a one-year delay. We determined that "the

'availability of alternate sanctions' factor weighs in Hobble-Diamond's favor given 

the

plethora of alternate sanctions and remedies available and the period of delay at 

issue." 

Hobble-Diamond, 899 P.2d at 535. The 16-month period in the present case is not

significantly longer than the 12-month delay in Hobble-Diamond. As in HobbleDiamond, the District Court should have looked to the plethora of less severe 

alternate

sanctions, for example refusing to allow McKenzie to support designated claims or

prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence. Rule 37(b)(2)(B),

M.R.Civ.P. For these reasons, I would reverse the dismissal and remand for 

appropriate

alternate sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P. 

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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