1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11

- 4630

_____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. YUNIO CANACA, a/k/a Jairo Garcia

- Canaca, a/k/a Luis Fernandez

- Mensias, a/k/a Jose Antonio Romero

- Canaca, a/k/a A lberto Soto

- Mendez, a/k/a Daniel Hernandez

- Martinez Yunio Canaca, Appellant

______________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ( M.D. Pa. 4:11

- CR

- 0128

- 001 ) District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III

___ ___________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 26 , 2012

______________ Before: HARDIMAN , GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE , Circuit Judges. (Opinion Filed: November 14, 2012 )

______________ OPINION

______________2 GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit J udge. Yunio Canaca (“Canaca”) pled guilty to illegal re

- entry into the United States after having been convicted of an aggravated felony . The District Judge concluded that although Canaca was subject to a Sentencing Guidelines ran ge of 15 to 21 months of imprisonment, he would grant a downward variance . Canaca received a 12 month sentence followed by three years of supervised release. Appellate counsel has filed a brief, pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that no non

frivol ous issues exist for appeal, and now seeks to withdraw as counsel representing Canaca. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court

.

Canaca first ente red the United States from Mexico in February of 1996, without inspection by an immigration officer. Between February of 1996 and December of 2006, Canaca entered the U.S. illegally on numerous occasions. Each time, he was removed from the country, eithe r by being deported following a criminal conviction, or by agreeing to leave voluntarily after being detained by immigration officials. I. Background

On February 24, 2011 Pennsylvania State Poli ce stopped Canaca during a routine traffic stop. He admitted to Immig ration and Customs Enforcement ( “ ICE ” ) agents that he had re

- entered the country without being admitted or paroled. Canaca pled guilty in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to a one
- count i ndictment for i llegal r e - entry a fter being convicted of an a ggravated f elony

.3 Canaca request ed a downward variance to time served because : (1 ) although Canaca wa s being sentenced in a non

- fast

- track district, he would have qualified for a fast

- track disposition in such a district and would have ple d guilty, waiving his appellate rights , if he had been offered such a disposition and (2 ) that the seriousness of his criminal history was overstated. While recognizing that Canaca’s fast

- track disparity argument had some merit, the Court sought to ba lance Canaca’s argument against his
own criminal history, which included multiple illegal re

- entries and deportations and two convictions for the sale of a controlled substance

. Ultimately , the District Court imposed a sentence of 12 months of imprisonmen t, representing a do wnward variance of three months.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction pu rsuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. Jurisdiction

“In III. Standard of Review Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Supreme Court explained the general duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal when the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued representation on the grounds that there are no nonf rivolous issues to appeal.” United States v. Marvin , 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000). Under Anders , counsel seeking to withdraw from representation must “satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.” Id. at 780. “The Court’s inquiry when counsel submits an Anders brief is thus twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately4 fulfilled [Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2’s] requirements; and (2) whether an in dependent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla , 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). Where frivolousness is patent, however, “we will not appoint new counsel even if an Anders brief is insufficient to discharge curr ent counsel’s obligations to his or her client and this court.” United States v. Coleman
We review a district court’s sentence in two stages: first, we ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error; second, we consider whether or not the sentence is substantively reasonable. , 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009).

United States v. Tomko , 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Counsel’s brief identifies three potential issues for appeal, none of which is non frivol ous. First, he proffers that Canaca might challenge the jurisdiction of the District Court. Second, counsel suggests that Canaca may dispute the procedural validity or voluntariness of his guilty plea. Finally, counsel proposes that Canaca may seek revi ew of the legality or reasonableness of the sentence. IV. Analysis

The government agrees with Canaca’s counsel tha t no non
- frivolous issues exist. F urthermore, Canaca has not filed a pro se brief to suggest otherwise. We agree with counsel and the government that no non - fr ivolous issues exist. Counsel has reviewed the record in a genuine effort to identify any potentially appealable issues, and has discovered none. Because counsel’s Anders brief “ initially appears to be5 adequate on its face ...[ a] complete scouring o f the record ” is unnecessary. Youla
The first argument counsel identifies is that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Canaca’s case. This argum ent is entirely without merit. District courts have jurisdiction over all offen ses against the laws of the Uni ted States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Canaca was charged with federal criminal offenses. T he District Court had jurisdiction

. Moreover, Canaca did not object to the District Court ’s jurisdiction prior to entering his guilty plea, thus waiving any challenge to personal jurisdiction. , 241 F.3d at 300.

See Fed. R. Cr im. P. 12(b)(3) and (e)

. The second argument identified by counsel is that Canaca’s guilty plea was , in fact, procedurally invalid or involuntary. This argument is also frivolous. In challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea, Canaca bears the burden of establishing that the trial court failed to comply with Boykin v. Alabama

The final argument raised by counsel is that the sentenc e imposed by the District Court was unreasonable. The arg ument is without merit. T he District Court complied with the procedural safeguards outlined in , 395 U.S. 238 (1969) and Federal Rule of Crimin al Procedure 11. Here, Canaca is unable to meet such a burden. The i ndictment itself was clear on its face. Furthermore, during the p lea h earing the District Court and the g overnment were careful to en sure that Canaca understood the underlying charge against him, the rights he was waiving by virtue of a guilty plea, and the consequences that would f low from his plea , includin g exposure to incarceration

. Based on these facts, there is no issue of arguable merit as to the validity or voluntariness of Canaca’s plea.

Tomko

. 562 F.3d at 567 ; s ee a lso United6 States v. Gunter

T he only remaining question is whether the sentence was substantive ly reasonable. This step requires us to determine whether the District Court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider the relevant sentencing factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). When explaining the sentence, the District Court was obli gated to “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it]...ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decision making authority.” , 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). The Court calc ulated the Guidelines range, ruled on requests for departures and variances , and then considered the §3553(a) factors prior to imposing sentence. The sentence was procedurally reasonable.

Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). An examination of the record shows that t he District Co urt heard and considered all of Canaca’s arguments . There was no abuse of discretion.

We find that no non

- frivolous issues exist for consideration on appeal. We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, pursuant to V. Conclusion

Anders , and affirm the ju dgment and sentence of the District Court. Counsel is relieved from any obligation to file a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States

. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b) (2012).