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2023 IL App (5th) 230268-U 

NO. 5-23-0268 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Clinton County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 02-CF-105 

 ) 

GEORGE C. ATCHISON, ) Honorable 

 ) Douglas C. Gruenke, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Cates and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court properly dismissed defendant’s successive postconviction petition 

where he alleged neither cause nor prejudice and, in any event, his fully negotiated 

guilty plea waived any issue that a subsequently enacted sentencing credit program 

should be applied to him. As any argument to the contrary would lack merit, we

 grant defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal leave to withdraw and affirm the 

circuit court’s judgment. 

¶ 2 Defendant, George C. Atchison, appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing his 

postconviction petition. His appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State Appellate 

Defender (OSAD), has concluded that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the circuit 

court erred. Accordingly, it has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel along with a supporting 

memorandum. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). OSAD has notified defendant 

of its motion and this court has provided him ample opportunity to file a response. However, he 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 11/28/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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has not done so. After considering the record on appeal, OSAD’s memorandum, and its supporting 

brief, we agree that this appeal presents no reasonably meritorious issues. Thus, we grant OSAD 

leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In 2002, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a 40-year prison 

sentence. The State had previously sought the death penalty. The State also agreed to dismiss six 

other counts of the indictment. Defendant confirmed his understanding that he was “not eligible 

for any type of good-time credit.” The court found the plea voluntary and imposed the agreed 

sentence. 

¶ 5 Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal. However, in 2013, he filed a petition pursuant 

to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)), which 

challenged the validity of his indictment, the 3-year term of mandatory supervised release, and the 

40-year sentence. He contended, inter alia, that the truth-in-sentencing provision requiring him to 

serve 100% of the sentence had never been validly reenacted after being held unconstitutional. 

See People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). The circuit court dismissed the petition and denied 

defendant’s motion to reconsider. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, but we dismissed the appeal 

for want of prosecution.

¶ 6 In 2014, defendant filed a postconviction petition renewing his claim that the truth-insentencing statute had never been reenacted in the wake of Reedy. The circuit court summarily 

dismissed the petition. This court affirmed. People v. Atchison, 2017 IL App (5th) 140435-U.

¶ 7 On January 25, 2023, defendant filed a second postconviction petition. He argued that the 

earned program sentence credit statute, which became effective July 1, 2021, allowed some 

inmates to earn credit against their sentences but that the provision did not apply to inmates who, 
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like him, had to serve 100% of their sentences. He argued that this deprived him of equal 

protection. On January 27, 2023, the circuit court denied leave to file, noting that defendant raised 

issues related to the sentencing credit in the earlier petition. After the court denied defendant’s 

motion to reconsider, he timely appealed.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 OSAD concludes that it can advance no good-faith argument that the circuit court erred in 

dismissing the petition. We agree.

¶ 10 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)) provides 

a mechanism by which a criminal defendant may assert that his conviction resulted from a 

substantial denial of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2022); People v. 

Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 253 (2008). Proceedings under the Act are collateral. People v. Edwards, 

2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. As a result, issues that were decided on direct appeal or in previous 

collateral proceedings are barred by res judicata. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 458 

(2002). Issues that could have been raised earlier, but were not, are forfeited. People v. Blair, 215 

Ill. 2d 427, 443-44 (2005).

¶ 11 The Act contemplates the filing of only one petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022). 

A defendant must obtain leave of court to file a successive petition. People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 

150, 157 (2010). Leave to file a successive petition will be granted only if the petitioner 

demonstrates cause for failing to bring the claim in the initial postconviction proceedings and 

resulting prejudice. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022); Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 458-63. Cause 

is an objective factor that impeded the ability to raise the claim in prior proceedings; prejudice is 

occasioned by an error which so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated 

due process. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022).
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¶ 12 Here, defendant’s most recent filing did not acknowledge that it was his second 

postconviction petition and, accordingly, did not allege cause or prejudice. OSAD posits that 

defendant could arguably establish prejudice given that he relied on a statute that did not become 

effective until 2021, but concludes that he cannot establish prejudice.

¶ 13 At all relevant times, the truth-in-sentencing provisions required that “a prisoner who is 

serving a term of imprisonment for first degree murder *** shall receive no sentence credit and 

shall serve the entire sentence imposed by the court.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West 2020). 

These provisions became effective June 19, 1998. When he pleaded guilty, defendant was 

correctly informed, and stated that he understood, that he would have to serve the entire sentence.

¶ 14 Effective July 1, 2021, the legislature established a system that allows a defendant to earn 

up to 365 days of sentence credit for completing various programs while in prison. See Pub. Act

101-652 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending, inter alia, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3), (4.1), (4.7)). However, 

a prisoner required to serve 100% of his or her sentence is ineligible. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4.7)(iii) 

(West 2022). 

¶ 15 Defendant argued that making him ineligible for the new credit provisions while implicitly 

applying them to others, such as those who committed murders prior to June 19, 1998, violated his 

right to equal protection. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. However, the supreme court has consistently 

held that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives any constitutional challenge based on 

subsequent changes in the applicable law. People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 26. This is because 

a negotiated guilty plea is essentially a contract with the State by which a defendant agrees to 

accept a particular sentence in exchange for concessions from the State. Accordingly, to allow a 

defendant to unilaterally modify a fully negotiated plea agreement while holding the State to its 

part of the bargain “ ‘flies in the face of contract law principles’ ” because “ ‘the guilty plea and 
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the sentence “go hand in hand” as material elements of the plea bargain.’ ” People v. Absher, 242 

Ill. 2d 77, 87 (2011) (quoting People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 327, 332 (1996)).

¶ 16 Here, defendant agreed to a 40-year sentence with the express understanding that he would 

serve 100% of it. By agreeing to that sentence, the State effectively took the death penalty off the 

table. It also agreed to dismiss additional charges in the indictment. Thus, even if he could 

otherwise establish an equal protection violation, a dubious proposition at best, defendant waived 

the right to do so by his guilty plea.

¶ 17 CONCLUSION

¶ 18 As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and 

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 19 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.