1 NOTICE Decision fi led 06/27/07. The text of this decision may be changed or correct ed prior

to t he fi ling of a Peti tio n for

Rehearing o r th e disposit ion of

the same. NO. 5-05-0354 I N THE AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS

FI FTH DI STRI CT

________________________________________________________________________ JESSICA HA LL, Individu ally an d on Beh alf ) Appeal f rom the of Others S imil arly S ituat ed, ) Circuit Co urt of ) Madison County. Plaintiff

-Appell ee, ) ) v. ) No. 04-L- 113 ) SPRINT SPECTRU M L.P., d/b/ a Spri nt ) PCS G roup, an d SPRIN TC OM , INC., ) d/b/a S print

PCS Group, ) Ho nora ble ) Nicholas G. Byron, Defendants-Appellants. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

________________________________________________________________________ JUST ICE ST EW ART delivered the op inion o f the co urt: The def end ants , Spri nt Sp ectru m L.P . an d Sp rintC om , Inc. , bo th d oin g b usiness as Spri nt PCS Gro up (c ollectively referred to as Sp rint), ap peal, p ursua nt to Il li nois Supr eme Cou rt Rule 30 6(a)(8) (210 Ill. 2d R . 306(a)(8)), from an order o f the circuit court of Madison Co unty certi fyinga 48-st ate cl ass in a putative cl ass act ion lawsui t fi led by the plai ntiff, Jessica Ha ll. We a ffirm. BACKGR OUND Spri nt provi des wirel ess communic a tions servi ces to mi lli ons of cust omers throughout the Un ited S tate s. Sprint i s headquart ered in Ove rland Par k, Kansas, but operat es an d conducts its business t

hroughout the United States , including within the State of I llinoi s. In June 2003, Hall , a resi dent of MadisonCounty, Il linoi s, ente red int o a cellphone

serv ice contrac t with S print at a Ra dio Sha ck store in Gra nite City, I llinois. In doing s o, she agree d to be bound to a one-ye ar contr act and t o pay a $15 0 early termina tion fee if she d id not remain a c ustomer for a fu ll year. Hall's account inclu ded tw o cell phon e numb ers.2

In October 2003, S print

discont inued Hall 's serv ice for nonpayment. Hallthen cal led Spri nt to cancelher contrac t, but Spri nt ref

used to canc el her s ervi ce unless she paid t he remaining balance on her account plus the early ter minati on fee. In December 2003, at t he Spri nt PC S store in Fairview He ights, Illinois, H all p aid, underprotes t, t he enti re amount ($415.61) Sprint cla imed s he ow ed on one o f her tw o cell p hon e num bers, in cludin g the ear ly termi nationfee. S he also wante d to cancelher second ce ll ph one number bu t could not afford to pay th e earl y termi nation f ee. Sprint r efused t o cancel t he account and s top the

accrual of charge s unless Hall pai d the ear ly ter minati on fee for

the second c ell phone numb er. She nev er paid t he earl y termi nation f

ee for t he second cel l phone number, and ultimate ly, Sprin t wro te off the seco nd ac coun t for no npay men t. On February 2, 2004 , Ha ll fil ed her ori gina l cla ss act ion compla int al leg ing f our

causes of acti on: (1) breach o f contract, (2) statutory fraud, ( 3) unjust enrichment , and (4) reli ef from u nlaw ful pen alties. E ach c ause of actio n reste d on th e t heor y that e arly termi nationfees ar e unlawful penalties. Hall sought damag es for a ll early t ermination fees Spri nt had c ollected from c onsu mers in the U nited Sta tes. H all brou ght her o rigin al c lass acti on complai nt under I llinois' s Consumer Fraud an d Deceptiv e Business Pr acti ces Act (Illinois Consumer Fraud Act) (815 I LCS 505/1 et seq. (W es t 2 00 2) ) fo r Il linoi s clas s membe rs and, for

non-Ill inois class mem bers, u nder the co nsum er pro tection statutes o f their respective states. W ith her c lass ac tion co mplain t, Hall fi led a mot ion for class certi fication, purs uant to section 2–8 01 o f the C ode o f Civ il Pr oced ure (735 ILCS 5 /2–801 (W est 2002)). Followinga heari ng on Februar y 18, 2005, the tri al court entere d a ha ndwritt en or der, granting the moti on and cert ifyi ng a 48-s tate clas s action. In the order, the trial cou rt directed the pa rties to submit a formal pro posed o rder. On M arch 23, 2005, Hal l fi led a first amended class a ction c omp laint, allegin g five1 In f act, many contrac ts ent ered into with defendant Sprint S pectrum L .P., the Misso uri limited partnership, co ntained a similar cho ice-of-law pro visio n stat ing t hat Misso uri law would apply. While we base our disc ussion on t he Kansas choice -of-l aw provi sion, our a nalys is would be the same r egarding the Missouri choi ce-of- law provi sion. 3 causes of acti on: (1) br each of co ntract (count I ), (2) viol ation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (K an. Stat. Ann. §50–623 et seq. (2005)) ( count I I) , (3) s tatutory fraud under the Il linoi s Consumer Fraud Act and the consumer

protection st at utes of

the other s tate s whe re Spri nt does business (count II I) , (4) unj ust enr ichment (count IV), and (5) reli ef fr om unlaw ful penalties (coun t V). In her first a men ded c omp laint, Hall al leg ed that Spri nt plac ed the following express choice- of-l aw provi sion i n all of its contrac ts: "This Agreement i s gov erned by and must be constr ued under feder al law and the laws of t he State of Kans as, without r egard to choice [-]of [-]l aw principles." 1 Acc ord ingly , un like the ori gina l complai nt, which l argely depended up on the I llinois Consumer Fr aud Act, t he fir st amended compl aint a lleg ed that Kan sa s

common law should be appl ied nat ionally (counts I, IV, and V) and t he Kansas Consumer Protection Act shoul d be appli ed nati onally ( count I I) or that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act shou ld be ap plied to Illinois reside nts an d th e consum er fr aud acts of the othe r 47 states should b e applied to reside nts of those states (cou nt II I). Also on M ar ch 23 , 2 00 5, Sp ri nt fi le d a m ot io n t o r ec on si de r t he tr ia l c ou rt 's orde r granting Hall' s moti on for cl ass certif icat ion. Fol lowing ahearing on April5, 2005, the tri al court denied Sprint's motion to reconsider. On May 20 , 2005, the tri al court entere d a formal , writt en order, certi fyingth e foll owing 4 8-state cl ass: " All pe rsons who were charg ed a Sprint Earl y Terminat ion Fee because they cancel ed thei r cellular or wireles s agr eement bef ore the e nd of it s ter

m." The ordercontempl ates t

he appli cati on of Kansas law based on the express choice- of-l aw4

provision containe d in Sprint's form contract. On June 17, 2 005 , Sprint filed a petition for leave to appe al to this cou rt, purs uant to Il lino is Su preme Court Rul e 306(a)( 8) (210 I ll. 2d R. 306(a)(8) ), which was deni ed on Septe mber 14, 2005. On October 19, 2005, S print fil ed a peti tion f

or leav e to appealto the Illinois Supr eme Co ur t. O n J an ua ry 25 , 2 00 6, th e I ll in oi s S up re m e C ou rt de ni ed Sp ri nt 's petition fo r l ea ve to ap pe al bu t i ss ue d a su pe rv is or y o rd er , o rd er in g t hi s c ou rt to gr an t S pr in t's petition for leave to appea l in light of Ave ry v. S tate Farm Mutua l Auto mo bile Insurance Co. , 216 Il l. 2d 100, 835 N.E.2d801 (20 05). Hall v. Sprint Spec trum L .P. , 217 I ll. 2d 600, 840 N.E.2d 123 2 ( 200 6) . OnFeb rua ry 2 2, 2 006 , this cou rt gran ted S prin t's petitio n fo r leave to appe al. AN AL Y SIS On appe al, Sprint firs t argues th at if the trial c ourt p redica te d t he 48-state class certi fication upon the appl icat ion of t he Il linoi s Consumer Fraud Act , the orde r is erroneous because the Il linoi s ConsumerFraud Actmay not be applied extraterri torially. Sprint al so argues that i f the trial court pr edicat ed the cl ass certif icat ion upon the a

pplication of

the diff eringstat utory andcommon law standards of 48 st ates, the order is er roneous. We need not address e ither

of th es e a rg um en ts be ca us e, de sp it e S pr in t's argume nts to th e con trary, it is clear from the t

rial court 's order t hat the class certi fication was not pr edicat ed upon the applic ationof the I llinois Consumer Fr aud Act or the differing statutory and common law standar ds of

48 stat es. Instead, the cl ass certif icat ion was predicat ed upon the appl icat ion of K ansa s law base d on the ch oice-o f-law provisio n con tained in Sprint's form contra ct. Spr int next argues that i f the 48- stat e class certi fication was predi cated upon t he applic ationof the Kansas Consumer Prote c t io n A ct , t he or de r mus t b e r ev er se d f ortwo

reasons: (1) base d on the languag e of the s tatut e, the Kansas Consumer Prote ctionAct, like the Il linoi s Consumer Fraud Act , cannot be a pplied e xtrat erri tor iall y a nd (2) the Kansas5

Consumer Protection Act cannot be applie d to all c lass me mbers becaus e the choi ce-of- law provi sion does not

gove rn noncontr actualclai ms, such as stat utory f raud. We disag ree. This is not a case like Avery , where the pl ainti ff sought extr aterritorial applic ation of a stat ute based on t

he terms of the s tatut e. See Avery , 216 I ll. 2d at 188-89, 835 N.E.2d at 855. Ins tead, in this case, t he tri al court enforced a voluntary and broadly w orded ch oice-oflaw provi sion i n an adhesioncontra ct drafte d by Sprint to d etermin e the valid ity and le gality of a prov isi on within t

he same contract–the earl y termi nation f ee provi sion. Sp ri nt 's choice- of-l aw provis ion st ates t hat the agree ment shoul d be gov erned by the law of K ansa s. Th e only issue in this cas e is the v alidity of t he earl y termi nation f

ee, and by the parties' own ch oice, that issue is governed b y Ka nsas law

. The factthat Kansas law mi ght n otothe rwi se ap pl y i s i rr el ev an t, be caus e the pa rt ie s c hos e t o apply Ka ns as law. "Ordinari ly, I ll in oi s f

ol lo ws the Restatement

(Secon d) of C onflict o f Law s (197 1) in making choice-of- law decisions." Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman , 193 Ill. 2d 560, 568, 73 9 N .E.2d 1263, 1269 (2000) . "Sec tion 187 of the Restatement

applie s when the parties, a s here, have made an e xpress choi ce of law in their contract ." Mah er & Associates, Inc. v. Qu ality C abin ets , 267 I ll. App. 3d 69, 76, 640 N .E.2d 1 000, 10 06 (199 4). Sect ion 187(2) of

the Restatement

(Second) of Confli ct of L aws provi des, in pe rti nent part: "(2) The law o f the state chos en by the pa rties to govern th eir contra ctual rights and dutie s willbe appli ed *** unless eithe r

(a) the chosen s tate has no substantial r elat ionship to the parti es or the trans acti on and there is no other reas onable basi s for t he parti es' choice, or (b) applic ation of

the law of the chosen s tate would be contrary to a fund amen tal policy of a sta te which has a materi ally greate r int erest than the chosen stat e in the determinationof the particular iss ue and which, under t he rule of §188, would be the st ate of t he appli cable l aw in the abse nce of an6 effective choice of

law by the parties. " Restate ment (S econd) of Confl ict of Laws § 187(2) (19 71). "The public pol icy of a St ate must be sought

in it s constituti on, leg isl ativ e enactment s[,] and judici al decisions." Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar , 101 Il l. 2d 315, 327, 461 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (1 984). In the present ca se, there is no question that Kan sas and M issouri have a "s ubstant ial relation ship to the parties or the tr ansacti on," because defendant Spri ntCom, I nc., i s a Kansas corporation with it s princ ipal pl ace of busi ness in Kansas and defendant Spr int Spectrum L.P. is a Missouri li mited partne rship. In a ddition , there is no ar gumen t here th at the Illinois consti tuti on or leg isl ativ e enactment s art iculat e a pu bli c po licy a gains t app lyin g a fo reign st at e's cons ume r prote ction la ws o r that Illinois h as a "m ateria lly g rea ter i nteres t" i n the litigationthan Kansas or Missouri . Therefor e, the t rialcourt properly found that the express choic e-of-law provisio n con tained in Sprint's form contra ct governs the co ntract. The se prin ciples a pply with equal force t o the int erpret ation of the contract at is sue and to the validity of its provisions. See Rest atement (Second) of

Con flict of Laws §18 7(2), Comment e , a t 5 65 ( 197 1) (" Pr im e o bj ec tive s o f c ont ra ct law a re to pr otect

the jus tif

ied expectations of the par

ties and to mak e it pos sibl e for t hem to fore tell with accuracy what will be their

rights and l iabil iti es underthe contract. These objective s may best be att ained in multist ate transactions by l etting the parties choose the l aw to gov ern the v alidity of t he contrac t and the rights created the reby. In this way, c ertainty and pre dictability of result are most likely to be secu red. G iving parties th is pow er of ch oice is also cons ist ent with t he fact that, in c ontras t to othe r areas of the la w, p erson s are fre e w ithin broad li mits to dete rmine the nature of the ir contractual obligations"). Spri nt argues that

because the Kansas ConsumerProte ction A ct doe s not p urpo rt to have any ext ra territorial a pplication, it cannot be appl ied to any trans acti on that oc curred7

outsi de Kan sas, n otwiths tanding the parties'express c hoice-of -law prov isi on stat ing t hat Kansas law wou ld apply. Sprint argues that t

he Kansas C onsu mer P rotection Act applie s only t o a "co nsumer trans action" (see K an. Stat. Ann. §§ 50–62 6(a), 50–6 27(a) (200 5)), which is defined as "asale, lease, assignment[, ] or other dis posit ion for val ue of proper

ty or services within this sta te " (empha sis added) (K an. Stat. Ann. §5 0–624 (c) (2005)). How ever, the issu e is no t the territor ia l ap plication of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act but

whether the parti es chose t o apply Kansas l aw to gov ern the val idit y of the provisions in their contract. T he fact that K ansas law might not otherw ise app ly is irr elev ant becaus e the parties expressly agree d that Kan sas law w ould app ly. See Davis v. Miller , 269 Kan. 732, 739, 7 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2000) (" Despite t he leg isl ativ e inte nt and the clear lang uage of the [ act], parti es can bind themselves to t he provisions of an otherwise inapp licable act by i ncorpor ating choic e[-]of[-]la w p rovision s in an enfo rceab le con tract. As long a s appli cati on of a st atute or act i s notcontra ry to p ublic policy , a co urt w ill upho ld applic ationof an otherwise inapplicable st atut e or ac t"); Bartlett Bank & Trust Co. v. McJunkins , 147 Il l. App. 3d 52, 59, 497 N.E.2d 398, 403 (1986) ( "Even where the [Uniform Co mme rcial] Code is other wise inappl icabl e, the parties may incorp orate th e Co de into their agree ment and that agreem ent will be given effect"). Therefo re, the tria l court p rope rly found that t

he parti es bound thems elv es to the prov isi ons of the Kansas Consumer Prot ecti on Act by inco rporating the expres s choice-of-law provision in their enforce able contract. Spri nt also ar gues tha t Hall's claim s are "non contrac tual" and, ther efore, that t he choice- of-l aw pro vision sho uld not app ly to them . H all ha s alle ged a va riety o f claims, including breach of c ontract and statutory fraud . Eac h of th ese cla ims is based o n the theory that t he early t ermination fee i s an unlaw ful pen alty. T he pr inciple that a c ontrac t pena lty is illegal and unen forcea ble is, itse lf, fund amen tally a cre ature o f con tract l aw . See Re stat ement (Secon d) of C ontrac ts §35 6, C omm ent a , at 157 ( 1981) ("[ T]he part ies t o a8

contrac t are not fr ee to prov ide a penalty for its breach. The cent

ral obj ecti ve behi nd th e systemof contr act re medies i s compensat ory, n ot punitive . Punishment of a promi sor for havi ng brok en hi s pro mise has no j ust ifi cati on on ei ther economi c or othe r gr ounds and a term provi ding s uch a penalt y is unenf

orceabl e on grounds of

public policy" ). Hall' s var ious claims do not ref

lect diff eringsources of

the law so much as al ternative theori es whereby she and the othe r cl ass members can bring an acti on to enfor ce the same underlying le gal pr in ci pl e tha t c ome s f

ro m c ont ra ct law, n otto rt

law. Before Avery , Illinois courts traditionally he ld that whe re a contra ct contai ned an express choice- of-l aw provis ion, t he consumer pr otect ion law of the designa ted state wo uld apply. See, e.g. , Potomac Leasi ng Co. v. Chuck's Pub, Inc. , 156 Ill. App. 3d 755, 757-60, 509 N.E.2d 751, 753-55 (1987) (where a choi ce-of- law provi sion i n t he part ies'contrac t designated M ichigan law, M ichigan consu mer protection law applied). In Avery , the Illinois Supre me C ourt h eld, "[A ] plaintiff m ay pu rsue a private cause of action und er the Co nsumer F raud Act if t he circ umsta nces that relat e to the disput ed trans acti on occur prima rily and substan tially in Il linois." Avery , 216 Il l. 2d at 187, 835 N.E.2d at 853 -54. T he co urt in Avery discuss ed Martin v. Heinol d Comm oditi es, Inc. , 117 Ill. 2d 67, 510 N.E.2d 840 (1987), where in the I llinois S upreme Court al lowed the certi fication of the cl aims of the pla inti ff cl ass under t he Il linoi s Consumer Fraud Act even with respe ct to the non-Illinois plaintiffs. Avery , 216 Il l. 2d at 188-89, 835 N.E.2d at 854- 55. Alth ough the court

in Martin held that the applic ation of Il linoi s law to a mul tis tate class was consist ent with pri nciple s of due proc ess, t he court i n Avery notedthat t he M artin cour t did not address the sc ope of the Illinois Con sumer Fra ud Act as a m atter of s tatut or y inter pretation. Avery , 216 I ll. 2d at 188-89, 83 5 N.E.2d at 855. The Avery court di d not

overr ule M artin but, instead, dis tingui shed it as foll ows: "In Martin ***, this cou rt specif ical ly based i ts deci sion on the foll owing facts:9

(1) the contracts contai ning the de ceptive s tateme nts w ere all ex ecute d in Il linoi s; (2) the defenda nt's principal place of busine ss was in Illinois; (3) the contract containe d express choice- of-l

aw and f

orum-selec tion cl

au s es speci

fying t hat any li tigation wouldbe cond ucte d in Illinoi s under Illinoi

s law ; (4) complai nts re garding the de fe nd an t's perfor

mance were to be di recte d to it s Chicag o offi ce; and(5) pa yme nts forthe de fend ant's services we re to be sent to it s Chicag o office. Given these circumstances, this court conc luded that the [ Il linoi s Consumer Fraud] Act cou l d apply to the wh ole class." (Em phasis add ed.) Avery , 216 Il l. 2dat 189, 835 N.E.2d at 855. The Avery court f

ound that, unlike Martin , vi rtual ly no circumstances relating t o the dis puted claims and pract ices at is sue occurr ed or exis ted in I llinois for those pl ainti ffs who were not Illinois residents. Avery , 216 I ll. 2d at 189, 835 N.E.2d at 855. Theref ore, the Avery court concluded, "[T]h e circu it court e rred in certi fyin g a nationwide class that included class membe rs wh ose claim s pro cee din gs took place outsi de Ill inois." Avery , 216 I ll. 2d at 190, 835 N.E.2d at 85 5. Because the court decided t

he propri ety of t

he cert ifi cati on order on statutory in terpr etat ion gr ounds, it decli ned to consi der whether t he cert ifi cati on of the nationwide class was unconsti tuti onal or violated express ch oice-of-law ru les. Avery , 216 Il l. 2d at 190, 835 N.E.2d at 855. In t he present

case, as in Martin and unl ike in Avery , the parti es' contrac t conta ined

an express ch oice-of-l aw provisi on. Moreover, as thi s court recent ly st ated i n Barba ra's Sales, Inc. v. I

ntel Corp. , 367 I ll. App. 3d 101 3, 1021 , 857 N .E.2d 7 17, 724 (2006), appeal allowed , 222 Ill. 2d 567, 8 61 N .E.2d 6 53 (200 6), " Avery in no w ay breaks w ith choice-oflaw precedent and does n o t chang e the choi ce-of- law analysi s to be appl ied." Ther efore, under the e xpr es s c hoi ce -o f- law pr ov is io n c ont ai ne d i n the pa rt ie s'co ntra ct , Kans as law, including the Kansas Consumer Pr otect ion Act, is applicable. See Potomac Leasi ng Co. , 15610

Il l. App. 3d at 757-60, 509 N.E.2d at 753-55. Spri nt next argues that

applying the Kansas Consumer Pr otect ion Act to non-Kansas class membe rs wou ld violate their due proce ss rights under Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Sh utts , 472 U.S. 797, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 105 S. Ct . 2965 (1985). We disagree. In Phillips Petroleum Co. , the U nited Sta tes Sup reme C ourt sta ted: "Kansas must hav e a ' sig nifi cantcontact or significant ag gregation of contacts' to the clai ms asser

ted by each member

of the plaintiff c lass, co ntacts 'crea ting state interests ,' in orde r to ensure that the c hoice of K ansas law is not arbitrary or unfa ir. [Citation.] *** Wh en cons ideri ng fairness i n this context , an important e lement is the expectation of the parties. " Phillips Petroleum Co. , 472 U.S. at 821-22, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 648-49, 105 S. Ct. at 2979-80. Because Spri nt' s form cont ract c ontaine d an express cho ice-of-l aw provision, the class membe rs had re ason t o ant icipate that Kansas l aw would g over n the ir c onsumer

fraud cl aim. According ly, enforci ng the expr ess ch oice-o f-law provisio n is consist ent with f ulfi lling the expectations of the parties and is not arbitrary or unf air. See Phillips Petroleum Co. , 472 U.S. at 821 -22, 8 6 L. E d. 2d at 648 -49, 1 05 S. C t. at 2979-80. As longas the la w c hose n in the contrac t sat isfi es the " substantial relation ship to the pa rties or th e trans action " test, as it does in this case, enforc ing it will not violate due process. S ee Restat emen t (S econd) of Con flict of Laws §18 7(2)(a) (1971 ). Relyingupon Avery and Gridley v. State F arm Mu tual Automobile Ins urance Co. , 217 Ill. 2d 158, 840 N.E.2d 269 (2005), S print also argues t

hat Il linoi s does not hav e a suff icie nt intere st in this case to proceed with a 48-state class action under the law of Kansas. How ever, neither Avery nor Gridleycontains an y such ru le. In Gridley , the cour

t held t hat a Loui siana r esident 's clai ms brought in I llinois on11

beha lf of a nati onwide class should be di smiss ed on grounds of forum non convenie ns . Gridley , 217 Ill. 2d at 171, 8 40 N .E.2d a t 277-78. H owe ver, the Gridleycourt di d not consider an y class certification issues. Gridley , 217 Ill. 2d 158, 8 40 N .E.2d 2 69. In Avery , the court hel d, "[A] pl ainti ff may purs ue a priv ate caus e of act ion under t he Consumer Fraud Act i f the circumst ances that rel ate to the di sputed t ransaction occur p rimarily and substantiall y in Il linois." Avery , 216 I ll. 2d at 187, 835 N.E.2d at 853- 54

. How ever, Avery did not establi sh an "interest" testfor multistate class actions. Avery , 216 Ill. 2d at 190, 835 N .E.2d a t 855. Adoptingsuch an "interest" t est wo uld b e direc tly con trary to Miner v. Gill etteCo. , 87 Il l. 2d 7, 10- 16, 428 N.E.2d 478, 480-83 (198 1). I n Miner , an Il linoi s plai ntif f fi led a class action complaint i n Ill inois on behalf of a nationwide class of consu mers agai nst the defen dant, Gillette Company, in con nectio n w ith the d efend ant's prom otion o f its "cricket" dispo sable butane lighters. Miner , 87 I ll. 2d at 10, 428 N.E.2d at 480. The Illinois Supr eme Cou rt all owed the Il li nois plainti ff t o ma inta in a nat ionwide cl ass act ion in I llinois ev en tho ugh the defe ndant was a Delaware cor porati on with it s headqua r ters in Massachusetts; the responses to the ad in question were dir ected t o Minnesota; no aspect of the promot ion to ok place in I llinois re garding non-I llinois re sident s; the unfulf ill ed request s came fr om persons in every state of th e U nited Sta te s, th e Di stri ct of Columbi a, Puert o Rico, and Canada; and only 12,000 of the 180,000 unf

ulfi lled r equests came frompersons in Il linois. Miner , 87 Ill. 2d at 21-22, 428 N.E.2d at 485-86 (Ryan, J., dis sent ing ). We wil l not pres ume that Miner has been ove rrul ed, absent a clear stat ement t o that

effect by the Il li nois Supr eme Cour t, and n othingin Avery or Gridleyam ounts to th at cl ea r s tate me nt . A cc or di ng ly , we find this argume nt to be with out m erit. Finally, Sprint argues that the tri al court abused its discr etion in cert ifying t he class because clas s certi fication is barred by a l ack of c ommonalit y, int racla ss confl icts , and an12

inadequacyof representation

. "Class ce rti fication is gove rned by section 2–801 of the Code of Civi l Procedur e (735 I LCS 5/2–801 ( West 1998)), which i s patt erned aft er Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Avery , 216 I ll. 2d at 125, 835 N.E.2d at 819. "Under secti on 2–8 01, a class m ay be certified only if the pro pon ent es tabli shes the four prerequi sit es set f

orth i n the st atute : (1) numerosi ty (' [t] he class is so numer ous that joinder of all members is impra c tica ble' ); ( 2) commonali ty (' [t] here are questi ons of fac t or l aw

common to the c lass, which common questi ons predomi nate ov er any questions af fecting only indiv idual me mbers' ); ( 3) adequacy of repres entat ion ('[t]he repre sentative p arties w ill fairly and adequately protect the inter est of

the cl ass' ); and(4) appropriateness (' [t]he class acti on is an ap prop riate me thod for the fair and efficient adju dication of the co ntroversy'). 735 ILCS 5/2–801 (West 1998 )." Avery , 216 Ill. 2d at 125, 8 35 N .E.2d a t 819. "Decisi ons regarding c lass c erti fication ar e w ithin the sound di scret ion of t he tri al court and should be ov ertur ned only wh ere the cour t clearly abused it s discr etion or applie d impermissibl e legal criteri a." Avery , 216 Ill. 2d at 125-26, 83 5 N.E .2d at 819 . "How ever, '[a] trial court's disc retion in decid ing wh ether to certi fy a cla ss act ion is not unlimi ted and is bo unded by and must be exe rcis ed within t he framework

of the civilproced ure rul e gove rningclass acti ons.' " Avery , 216 Ill. 2d at 12 6, 83 5 N .E.2 d at 82 0 (qu oting 4 A . Co nte & H. N ewb erg, New berg on C lass Actions §13 :62, at 475 (4 th ed. 200 2)). As to the n umerosity requirement, S print does not dispute t hat the class i s so

numerous that the joinde r of all me mbe rs wo uld b e im practic able. Accordingly, t he first prerequisite for class certification is met. See 7 35 ILCS 5/2–8 01(1) (W est 2002). "In order t o sati sfy the second requi rement of secti on 2–801 (a common quest ion of factor law predominat es over other q uestion s affec ting only individu al class m emb ers), it must be shown that ' successf ul adjudi cati on of the pur ported cl ass repr esentative s' indiv idual claims will establish a right of recovery in o ther class memb ers.' " Avery , 216 I ll. 2d at 128,13

835 N.E.2d at 821 (quot ing Goetz v. Vi llage of Hoffman Estates , 62 I ll. App. 3d 233, 236, 378 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (197 8)). "So long as th ere are ques tions o f fact or la w c omm on to the class and th ese p redo minate over ques tions affecting only indiv idual me mbers of s uch class, th e statuto ry req uisite is met." Steinbe rg v. Chicago Medical School , 69 I ll. 2d 320, 338, 371 N.E.2d 634, 643 (1977). " 'Acommon questi on may be shown when the clai ms of the individual class mem bers are based u pon the c ommo n application o f a stat ute or when the members ar e aggriev ed by the same or simi lar conduc t [citation] or a pattern of conduct [c it at io ns ]. ' " Clark

v. TAP Pharmaceutical Products, I nc. , 343 I ll. App. 3d 538, 548, 798 N.E.2d 123, 131 (2003) (quoti ng Avery v. State Far m M utual

Automobile I

nsurance Co. , 321 Ill. App. 3d 269, 2 80, 746 N.E .2d 124 2, 1252 -53 (200 1), aff'd in part & rev'd in part , 216 Ill. 2d 100 , 835 N .E.2d 8 01 (200 5)). "A class acti on can properly be prosecut ed where the defen dants alle gedl y actedwrongfully in the same basic manner as to an enti re class, and in such circumstances, the common class questi ons predomi nate the case, and t he class acti on is not defeated." Clark , 343 I ll. App. 3d at 548, 798 N.E.2d at 131.

" ' " [A] cl ass act ion willnot be defe ated sol ely be cause of some fact

ual v ariations among class members' griev ances." ' " Clark , 343 Ill. App. 3d at 548, 798 N .E.2d at 131 (quoti ng He astie v. Commu nity B ank o f Gre ater Pe oria , 125 F.R .D. 669 , 675 (N.D . Ill. 1989) (qu otin g Patterson v. General Motors Corp. , 631 F.2d 476, 481 ( 7th Cir. 19 80))). That some me mbers of a c lass are not entitl ed to rel ief wil l not bar the cl ass act ion. Steinberg , 69 I ll. 2d at 338, 371 N.E.2d at 643. Af ter t he litigation of

common questions, questi ons that are peculiar to indivi dual class members may be determined in ancillary proceed ings. Clark , 343 Ill. App. 3d a t 548, 79 8 N.E .2d at 131

. "Individua l questions o f injury and damages do not defeat class certificat ion." Clark , 343 Ill. App. 3d at 549, 7 98 N .E.2d a t 132. The fact that the class members' recove ries may be in dif ferent amounts, whic h must be det ermined s eparat ely, does not nece ssari ly mean that14

the commo n questions do not p redomina te. Clark , 343 I ll. App. 3d at 549, 798 N.E.2d at 132. If indiv idual damage det erminations ar e requir ed, the cour t ca n util ize v arious procedures to dete rmine damag es, inc ludingcreat ing subclasses. Clark , 343 I ll. App. 3d at 549, 798 N.E.2d at 132. In the pre sent ca se, the record reveals that th e c om m on qu es ti on is w he th er Sp ri nt 's early termina tion fee is an ill egalpenalty. I f the early t ermination fee is an i lleg al penal ty, then Spri nt has no r ight to charg e or coll ect i t andshould pay i t back . Sprint concedes that it c ha rges the same $150 early t ermination fee to every c ustomer who terminat es serv ice before the en d of the term, regardless o f when during the term the cu stomer canc els. Spri nt allegedly acted wro ngfully in the same bas ic manner toward the e ntir e class –by charging an early termina tion fee that wa s an illegal penalty. Acco rdingly, there are common questi ons of law o r fa c t that predominat e over any questi ons affe cting only indi vidua l members. See 73 5 ILCS 5 /2–8 01(2 ) (W est 20 02); Clark , 343 Ill. App. 3d at 548, 798 N.E.2d at 131. Turningto the adeq uacy-of- represe ntati on requir ement, S print argues that Hal l cannot adequately represent the i nterests of t he absent class members because her pursuit of clas s claims will expose abse nt class mem bers to poten tial judgme nts. Ac cord ing to Sprin t, H al l's interest in pursuing her claim s on beh alf of a class conf licts with the interest s of class members who do not want to be exposed to litigation as a result of her actions.

" 'The purpose of the a dequ ate rep resen tation re quirem ent is m erely to ensu re that a ll class membe rs will receive proper, effi cient , and appropr iate protection of their in terests in the presentation of t

he claim.' " Clark , 343 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 798 N.E.2d at 133 (quoti ng Gordon v. Boden , 224 Ill. App. 3d 1 95, 203 , 586 N .E.2d 4 61, 466 (1991)).

"The tes t app li ed to dete rmi ne adequacy of r epresent ation i s whether t he interests of those w ho are pa rties are the same as tho se wh o are not joined and15

whetherthe litigating parties fairly repre sent those not joined. [Citation.] The attor ney for the repres entat ive party 'must be qualified, expe rienced[,] and ge nerally able to condu ct the propo sed litigation.' [Ci tatio n.] A ddi tion ally, [the rep rese ntati ve party' s] interest m ust not appear collusiv e." Miner , 87 I ll. 2d at 14, 428 N.E.2d at 482. In the pre sent ca se, H all will fairly and adequately protect the interest s of the class. See 735 IL CS 5/2–801(3) (West 2002). Hall 's inter est does not appear collus ive , and it is apparent that her int erest s are t

he same as t

hose of the absent

class members–t o recove r the $150 ear ly termina tion f ee paid t o Spri nt, which was al leg edly an unl awful penal ty. S ee Miner , 87 Il l. 2d at

14, 428 N .E.2d a t 482. In addition, the re cord am pl y d em on st ra te s H al l's desire and a bility to p rosec ute the cl aim vi gorous ly on behal f of herself and the other cl ass members, and no issue has been rai sed with r espe ct to the q ualif icat ions, expe rience , and ability of Hall 's counsel. See Miner , 87 Ill. 2d at 14, 428 N.E .2d at 482

. Sp ri nt 's argument that c lass l iti gat ion willexpose cla ss members to potential judgme nts as a res ult of Hall' s acti ons is par

tly bel ied by t he fact that class mem bers are poten tially liabl e for j udgments as a resu lt o f thei r breache s of the ir cont racts and not primar ily bec ause of Hall 's acti ons. See Walczak v. Onyx Acceptance Corp. , 365 I ll. App. 3d 664 , 679 , 850 N.E .2d 3 57, 3 71 (2 006 ). Ha ll's claims are n ot anta gonis tic t o the class because she is in the s ame p osition as all putative c lass me mbe rs–the y all term inated their cell phone contra cts bef ore the end o f their terms and paid the $150 earl y termi nation f ee. See Walczak , 365 Il l. App. 3d at 679, 850 N.E.2d at 371. "[G]ener ally, indiv idual count ercl aims or defens es do not render a case unsuitable for cl ass action." Walczak , 365 Ill. App. 3d at 679, 850 N.E .2d a t 371. Even if Sprint purs ues such claims only against individu als w ho jo in in the c lass a ction, the trial c ourt' s finding would notbe un reaso nable because class memb ers have the right to opt out of the class action law suit. See Walczak ,16

36 5 Ill. App. 3d at 679, 8 50 N .E.2d a t 371; see also 7 35 ILCS 5/2–8 04 (W e st 2002 ) (addressing the ex clusion of class m embers). We turn then to the issue of wh ether a class action is an ap prop riate me thod for fairly and effi cient ly adjudi cati ng the co ntrovers y. In de ciding th is issue, a cou rt shou ld consider whether"the class action (1) c an best secu re the economi es of t ime, ef fort , and expense and prom ote a unifor

mity of decisi on or (2) c an accompli sh the ot her ends of equi ty and jus tice that class actions seek to obtai n." Clark , 343 Ill. App. 3d a t 552, 79 8 N.E .2d at 134

. In t he present

case, a cl ass act ion is an appropri ate met hod for fairly and e fficiently adjudic ating

th e co ntro ve rs y. S ee 7 35 I LCS 5/ 2–8 01( 4) (Wes t 2 002 ). I ni ti al ly , we note that

our holdingthat

the fi rst t

hree prer equisi tes of

secti on 2–801 have been es tabli shed makes it evi dent that the fourth requir ement has bee n fulf ill ed as well. See Clark , 343 I ll. App. 3d at 552 , 798 N.E .2d a t 134 . In add ition, this is a consumer cl ass act ion, whichis "of ten the last barri cade of consumer protection" ( Clark , 343 I ll. App. 3d at552, 79 8 N.E .2d at 134 ). B ecause a consumer cl ass act ion prov ides r esti tuti on to the injured and de terr ence to th e

wron gdoer, the ends of

equity and just ice ar e accompli shed. Se e Clark , 343 I ll. App. 3d at 552, 798 N.E.2d at 134. Furt hermore, because there a re numerous c lass me mbers and

common questi ons, a cl ass act ion ser ves t he ec on omies of

time, effort, and expens e and preven ts possibl e inconsi stent resul ts. S ee Clark , 343 I ll. App. 3d at 552, 798 N.E.2d at 134. In this case, l iti gat ing t he indiv idual l awsuits would be a waste of j udicia l res ources, and addressing the common is sues in one class acti on wou ld aid j udicia l admini stration. See Clark , 343 Ill. App. 3d a t 552, 79 8 N.E .2d at 134

. CONCL USI ON For the for egoi ng reas ons, the order of t he circ uit cour

t of Madison County cert ifyi ng a 48-st ate cl ass is affi rmed.17

Affi rmed.

CH APM AN a nd D ON OV AN, JJ., c oncur.NO. 5-05-0354 I N THE AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS

FI FTH DI STRI CT

___________________________________________________________________________________ JESSICA HA LL, Individu ally an d on Beh alf ) Appeal f rom the of Others S imil arly S ituat ed, ) Circuit Co urt of ) Madison County. Plaintiff

-Appell ee, ) ) v. ) No. 04-L- 113 ) SPRINT SPECTRU M L.P., d/b/ a Spri nt ) PCS G roup, an d SPRIN TC OM , INC., ) d/b/a S print

PCS Group, ) Ho nora ble ) Nicholas G. Byron, Defendants-Appellants. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opini on Fi led : June 27, 2007

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justi ces : Honorable B ruce D. Stewart, J.

Honorable Meliss a A. Chapman, J., and Hon orable Jame s K. D onovan, J., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn eys Fred eric R. Klein, S tev en A. Levy , M ary E. A nde rson , G old ber g, K ohn , B ell, B lack, for Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd., 55 East Monroe Street , Sui te 3700, Chica go, IL 60603; Appellants John L. Gilbert, Hinshaw & Culberts on, LLP, 156 Nort h Main Stre et, S uite 206, Edwardsvil le, IL62025; Michel e Fl oyd, Reed, Smith, LLP, Tw o Emb arcadero C enter, Suite 20 00, P .O. Bo x 79 36, Sa n Fra ncisco , CA 941 20-7 936 ; Do minic Su rpren ant, Qu inn, E man uel, Urq uhar t, Oliver & He dges, LLP , 865 South F igueroa Street, 10 th Floor, L os Angel es, CA 90017

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn eys Pau l M . W eiss, T od A . Lew is, Free d & W eiss, LLC , 111 W est W ashin gton Stree t, for Suit e 1331, Chicag o, I L 60602; Malik R. Diab, Phil lip A. Bock, Robert M. Hatch, Appell ee Diab & B ock, LLC , 20 N . W acker D rive, Suite 1741, Chicag o, IL 60606; Jeffr ey A.J.

Millar, Bradley M. Lakin, Richard J. Burke, The Lakin L aw Firm, P.C., 300 Evans Avenue, P. O. Box 229, W ood River , I L 62095-0229

___________________________________________________________________________________