[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-14117

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00087-TPB-MRM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

SALVADOR AGUILAR-GIL, 

a.k.a. Salvador Aguilar, 

a.k.a. Pedro Aguilar, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(July 2, 2020)

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Salvador Aguilar-Gil appeals his within-guidelines 34-month1 prison 

sentence imposed following his guilty plea to illegal reentry after being deported 

and convicted of a felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). AguilarGil did not object to the sentence during the district court proceedings. On appeal, 

he argues that his sentence is (1) procedurally unreasonable because the district 

court failed to state in open court the reasons for imposing its sentence as required 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1)2 and (2) substantively unreasonable because the 

district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors.

3 We address each 

1 Aguilar-Gil’s applicable advisory guideline range was 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. 

He faced a statutory maximum of ten years’ imprisonment.

2 Section 3553(c)(1) provides that: 

The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its 

imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence—

(1) is of the kind, and within the [Sentencing Guidelines] range, described in 

subsection (a)(4), and that range exceeds 24 months, the reason for imposing a 

sentence at a particular point within the range.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). The parties do not dispute that § 3553(c)(1) applies here. 

3 Section 3553(a) mandates that the district court “impose a sentence sufficient, but not 

greater than necessary” to: (1) “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 

law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; (2) “afford adequate deterrence to criminal 

conduct”; (3) “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; and (4) “provide the 

defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 

treatment in the most effective manner[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). In addition, the court 

must consider: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant”; (2) “the kinds of sentences available”; (3) the guideline 

sentencing range; (4) any pertinent policy statements; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentencing disparities; and (6) the need to provide restitution to any victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), 

(3)–(7). 

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argument in turn and conclude that Aguilar-Gil’s sentence is both procedurally and 

substantively reasonable. We therefore affirm his sentence. 

I.

Aguilar-Gil’s central argument on appeal is that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because it did not comply with § 3553(c)(1). We review de novo

whether the district court complied with § 3553(c)(1) regardless of whether the 

defendant objected below. See United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 

608 n.39 (11th Cir. 2020).

At the time of sentencing, a district court must state in open court the 

reasons that it imposed a particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). “In doing so, 

the district court should ‘tailor its comments to show that the sentence imposed is 

appropriate’ in light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” To meet its obligations 

under 3553(c)(1), “the district court need only set forth enough to satisfy us that it 

considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own 

legal decisionmaking authority.” Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 609. 

Where a party presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different 

sentence, the district court “will normally go further and explain why [it] has 

rejected those arguments.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007). 

Nevertheless, a brief explanation may be legally sufficient when the sentence 

imposed is within the guideline range, the arguments before the court are 

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“straightforward [and] conceptually simple,” and the record establishes that the 

court considered the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 356. We consider the record as a

whole to determine if the district court did, in fact, consider the evidence, 

arguments, and § 3553(a) factors, as required by § 3553(c). Id. at 359; CabezasMontano, 949 F.3d at 608–09.

Here, the district court met its obligations under § 3553(c)(1) in imposing 

Aguliar-Gil’s sentence. Prior to sentencing, Aguliar-Gil filed a sentencing 

memorandum, in which he discussed § 3553(a) factors—specifically, his history 

and characteristics, and the advisory guideline range—and requested a downward 

variance of 24 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the court confirmed that it 

had reviewed Aguilar-Gil’s sentencing memorandum. And it heard Aguilar-Gil’s 

argument as to why a below-Guidelines sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment was 

appropriate, as well as the government’s argument for a 30 months’ sentence. But 

the court expressed its concern with Aguilar-Gil’s criminal record, specifically his 

history of resistance to law enforcement, which goes to his personal characteristics

and lack of respect for the law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Before pronouncing 

its sentence, the court cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 and 3553 and stated that it had also 

considered “the presentence report and the advisory guidelines.” And after 

pronouncing the 34-month sentence, the court concluded “[a]fter considering the 

advisory guidelines and all the factors identified in Title 18 U.S. Code Sections 

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3553(a)(1) through (7), I find the sentence imposed is sufficient but not greater 

than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing.” This explanation is 

sufficient for purposes of § 3553(c). See Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 609

(holding that district court provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence 

imposed where the “district court judge expressly articulated that it had considered 

the parties’ arguments, the PSRs containing the advisory guidelines ranges, and the 

§ 3553(a) factors”). Accordingly, because the record clearly establishes that the 

court “considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its 

own legal decisionmaking authority,” Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 609, AguilarGil has not shown that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.

II.

Aguilar-Gil also raises in passing a substantive reasonableness challenge, 

arguing that because the district court did not provide any reasons for the sentence 

it imposed, it “failed to afford consideration to the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors that 

were due significant weight, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant 

factor, and committed a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” 

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion.4

 

United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1234 (11th Cir. 2015). 

4

 Although Aguilar-Gil did not object to his sentence, by advocating for a downwardvariance sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, he preserved his argument that the 34-month 

sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 

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The weight given to each § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound 

discretion of the district court, and this Court will not substitute its judgment in 

weighing the relevant factors. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 

2007). A district court abuses its discretion by: (1) failing to consider relevant 

factors that were due significant weight; (2) giving an improper or irrelevant factor 

substantial weight; or (3) committing a clear error of judgment by balancing proper 

factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(en banc). That said, the district court is not required to discuss each of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1195. It is sufficient for the district court to acknowledge 

that it has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 

1194-95. Moreover, this Court ordinarily expects a sentence within the guideline 

range to be reasonable. United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309−10 (11th 

Cir. 2016). That the sentence imposed falls well below the statutory maximum 

penalty also indicates reasonableness. Id. at 1310.

Nothing in the record supports Aguilar-Gil’s contention that the district 

court failed to consider certain factors or gave weight to improper or irrelevant 

factors. The district court properly considered Aguilar-Gil’s criminal record, 

specifically his history of resistance to law enforcement, which goes to his personal 

S. Ct. 762, 767 (2020) (holding that a defendant sufficiently preserved a challenge to the 

substantive reasonableness of his sentence by arguing at sentencing for a shorter sentence). 

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characteristics and lack of respect for the law and it then § 3551. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(2). Moreover, the 34-month sentence was within the middle of the 

guideline range and well below the statutory maximum of ten years, which are 

indicators of reasonableness. See Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1309–10. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and Aguilar-Gil’s 

sentence is substantively reasonable. 

AFFIRMED.

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