* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

REVISED May 19, 2011

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-31047

Summary Calendar

RAYMOND SIMMONS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TWIN CITY TOWING; CITY OF SHREVEPORT, Code Enforcement,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:00-CV-2595

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 17, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 10-31047

1 Supposedly, Simmons was living in the vehicle because his house had been damaged

in a fire. The vehicle was inoperable, but Simmons claims that he was restoring it so that he

could travel and attend law school.

2

Raymond Simmons appeals, pro se, the denial of various motions. We dismiss the appeal as frivolous.

I.

Sometime in the 1990’s, Simmons’s automobile was towed by the City of

Shreveport pursuant to a local ordinance governing inoperable vehicles.1In

1999, Simmons sued the city, alleging that the ordinance violated his constitutional rights. His complaint was dismissed as frivolous. He appealed to this

court, but the appeal was dismissed as untimely. 

A few months thereafter, Simmons filed an almost-identical complaint

against the city, which was dismissed as barred by res judicata. Simmons again

appealed to this court, but the appeal was dismissed because he failed to file a

brief and record excerpts within the permitted time.

While his second appeal was pending, Simmons filed yet another complaint alleging substantially the same facts. This time, however, in addition to

suing the city, he sued Twin City Towing, which had towed his car at the behest

of the city. With respect to the city, Simmons’s third complaint was again dismissed as barred by res judicata. His complaint against Twin City Towing was

dismissed as time-barred. We dismissed his appeal as frivolous, and his petition

for en banc rehearing was denied. Simmons then filed a certiorari petition,

which was denied, and an unsuccessful motion for rehearing of that denial, in

September 2003.

In 2004, Simmons asked this court for permission to file a second petition
No. 10-31047

2 We note that the traditional writ of coram nobis, issued by a court to correct an error

of a fundamental character in order to achieve justice where no other remedy is available, has

been abolished in civil cases by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(e). 

3

for rehearing, which was denied. In July 2007, he filed a “Motion To Examine

the Court Records of Harmless Error For Review.” We sent a letter to him explaining that the case was closed and no action would be taken on his motion.

Less than six months later, Simmons filed a “Motion To Examine and Discover,”

for which we again sent a letter explaining that his case was closed and no action would be taken on his motion.

Years passed. Then, in September 2010, Simmons reappeared in the district court, filing a motion seeking review ofthe original judgment and monetary

damages for the alleged taking of his property, which the court deemed to be an

inartfully phrased motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b). That motion was denied because Simmons had failed to

satisfy any of the grounds, and because of corresponding time limitations, specified in Rule 60(b).

Less than a month later, Simmons filed a “Motion For Conformation [sic]

Of The Default Judgment With Respect, Their [sic] Was Fraud Of The Court.”

That motion was denied, with the district court stating that it was essentially

the same as the motion filed two weeks before and that the reasons for denying

that motion applied with equal force. The court also stated that, because Simmons’s case has been closed since 2002, the court did not have jurisdiction to

review any motions related to the case.

A month after his motion for “conformation” was denied, Simmons filed a

“Motion For Error Of Coram Nobis”2 and a “Motion To Object The Order Of Denial By Chief Judge Robert James On The Conformation [sic] Of The Default
No. 10-31047

3 Specifically, Simmons argues that the district court (1) denied his “personal property

rights according to the property rights that are adjudicated through the United States Constitution,” (2) erroneously dismissed “a personal property rights case under 28 section 1915(e),

whereas the statement of poverty is true, the appeal is not frivolous or malicious, it is a specific

constitutional rights of [his], [he] did not failto state a claim for relief that [he] sought, and the

defendants or [sic] not a [sic] infant nor or [sic] incompetent, or immune [sic] form such relief”;

(3) erred in depriving a pro se litigant from “conforming [sic] the default” against defendants

that failed to respond to his claim; (4) erred by “contradicting Constitution Article I section 4,

right to property, with respect to Title 28 section 1652 of the Federal Civil Judicial Procedure

and Rules, in Civil” (Simmons does not continue his description of this claim of error beyond

the word “Civil”); and (5) “erred with respect to Rule 55 (a) (c) by the clerk, according to the

Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules.”

4

Judgment.” The motions were denied on the ground that the case has been

closed since 2002.

II.

On appeal, Simmons raises a hodgepodge of indecipherable constitutional

and statutory claims,3 all of which are irrelevant to any of the motions that he

could be appealing (Simmons does not explicitly state which of the many denied

motions he is appealing, so we assume he is attempting to appeal all of them).

Even if we liberally construe Simmons’s pro se brief, there are no coherent

arguments that even attempt to explain why the district court erred in denying

his motion for relief from a final judgment or his motion to “conform” the default

judgment. Nor can we imagine any arguments that would succeed, given the

facts of this case. 

Rule 60(b) allows for relief from a final judgment on six grounds. Simmons

cannot avail himself of the first three, because a motion for relief under those

grounds must be filed within a year after entry of judgment. Two of the remaining grounds—(1) that the judgment is void and (2) that the judgment has been

satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
No. 10-31047

5

been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable—are

plainly not applicable. 

The final ground for relief in Rule 60(b) is “any other reason that justifies

relief,” but that provision is also inapplicable. FED. R. CIV.P. 60(b)(6). As an initial matter, a motion for relief under that provision must be made “within a reasonable time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). In the absence of any known exceptional

circumstances, nine years after the entry of judgment cannot be considered

“within a reasonable time” under any understanding of that phrase. Furthermore, even if Simmons had filed his motion within an acceptable time, relief

under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances,” which

are plainly not present here. See Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 400 (5th Cir.

2010). Thus, Simmons’s motion for relief from judgment was properly denied.

As for his motion to confirm the default judgment, Simmons does not appear to understand what happened in his case. Although a “Notice of Entry of

Default” was filed by the clerk’s office because the city did not respond to his first

complaint,thatis notthe end ofthe defaultjudgment process. Under the federal

rules, after the entry of default, the plaintiff must request that a default judgment be entered. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b). Simmons failed to request a default

judgment. The district court later entered a judgment and dismissed with prejudice Simmons’s claim as frivolous—an entry of default can be set aside “for

good cause.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c). Simmons appealed the dismissal, but it

was affirmed. He filed a certiorari petition, but it was denied, and the dismissal

became final. The default judgment Simmons seeks to confirm never existed—

and the entry of default from which it would flow was long ago vacated.

In sum, Simmons has not raised any coherent legal arguments in his briefs

that are worth addressing, because none of them raises any errors with the mo-
No. 10-31047

6

tions that Simmons is appealing. Nor can we imagine any legal arguments he

could have levied againstthe district court’s various orders, which were all proper. We conclude with a phrase that Simmons must be all-too-familiar with, and

we hope that he now comprehends their import and alters his future conduct:

The appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. We warn

Simmons that any further frivolous filings in any court can result in sanctions,

including the payment of money damages. See, e.g., FED. R. APP.P. 38; Coghlan

v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (sua sponte imposition of

sanctions on pro se appellant); Emmett v. Ebner, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8862, at

*4 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Coghlan).