THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Jaycoby Terreak Williams, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-000872 

Appeal From Allendale County 

Perry M. Buckner, III, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5791 

Heard December 12, 2019 – Filed January 13, 2021 

AFFIRMED 

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for 

Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy 

Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney 

General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy 

Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Assistant 

Attorney General Samuel Marion Bailey, Assistant 

Attorney General William Joseph Maye, and Assistant 

Attorney General Michael Douglas Ross, all of 

Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of 

Bluffton; all for Respondent. 

MCDONALD, J.: Jaycoby Terreak Williams appeals his murder conviction, 

arguing the circuit court erred in refusing to allow him to cross-examine one of the 
 

State's key witnesses about the potential sentences the witness faced on his pending 

charges for drug possession and armed robbery. We affirm, as the circuit court's 

error in denying this line of questioning was harmless in this case. 

Facts and Procedural History 

In the early evening of May 26, 2015, James Spellman (Victim) was shot outside 

his Allendale apartment; he later died at the hospital. Williams was subsequently 

arrested, indicted, and tried for Victim's murder. 

Several witnesses from Victim's apartment complex testified at trial. Just before 

the shooting, Victim's neighbor, Franklin Williams (Franklin), was taking out his 

trash when he saw people he did not recognize in the apartment complex 

breezeway. Shortly thereafter, while on the phone with his uncle, Franklin heard a 

gunshot and looked out the window to see a "blue car pull off." He further 

described the car as "small." Franklin could not identify who was in the car, he 

"just saw the blue car." 

Debentris Breeland, another of Victim's neighbors, spoke with South Carolina Law 

Enforcement Division (SLED) Agent Richard Johnson after the shooting. 

Although Breeland initially denied telling Agent Johnson that Victim was afraid of 

Williams, he reluctantly admitted "I was saying he was scared of him. I knew he 

didn't want no problems or nothing with him."1 Breeland denied seeing the blue 

car but testified he heard one gunshot while inside his apartment. 

Tiffany Loadholt lived with Victim at the time of the shooting. She testified they 

had been dating on and off for three years. Williams is the father of Loadholt's two 

children, who were four and eight at the time of trial. 

Victim's cousin, Dequincy Best, was with the victim in an outdoor stairwell at the 

time of the shooting. While Best and Victim were talking, a blue Ford Focus drove 

up to the complex; Williams and Rehem Devoe exited the vehicle. Devoe shook 

Best's hand, spoke to Victim, and continued up the stairs. Williams followed 

Devoe up the stairs and also shook Best's hand. Best testified that when Williams 

shook his hand he saw "a pistol tucked on the side of his shoulder, on the side of 

his pants." He identified the weapon as an automatic, "probably a .40 Glock." As 

1

 Later in the trial, Fourteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office Investigator Donnie Hutto 

confirmed that Breeland said the victim "told him he was scared" of Williams. 
 

 

Best walked up the stairs, Williams turned to come down. Best then heard a 

gunshot, turned, and saw Williams pointing the gun at Victim. Best yelled—and 

he heard Devoe yell—"Stop, don't shoot my cousin" because "Williams was over 

him with the gun, getting ready to shoot him again." Williams then fled, and Best 

did not know where he went. When asked to identify the man who shot his cousin, 

Best identified the defendant, Williams. 

Devoe, who was riding with Williams on the day of the shooting, also testified. 

Prior to this testimony, the circuit court held a bench conference to consider 

whether Williams could cross-examine Devoe about his pending armed robbery 

and drug possession charges. The circuit court ruled that under Rule 608, SCRE, 

Williams could cross-examine Devoe about pending charges, but not any potential 

penalty because "the penalty was a matter for the court."2 

On direct examination, Devoe testified that he saw Williams on a regular basis and 

had known Williams for "[b]asically, all [his] life." Devoe was at his uncle's house 

when Williams and two other men picked him up in a blue car he identified as a 

Ford Escort. The group rode around for a while and eventually ended up at the 

apartment complex. Many people were outside the complex, including Devoe's 

cousins, Breeland and Victim. Devoe claimed he did not see Williams exit the 

vehicle, but heard the car door shut behind him. He heard the gunshot as soon as 

he reached the top of the outdoor stairs. Devoe ducked, turned, and saw Williams 

standing over Victim, who was on the ground. Williams was holding a handgun, 

which Devoe described as an automatic. He identified Williams as the man he saw 

standing over his cousin with a gun. 

The solicitor then asked Devoe whether he had "any current pending charges." 

During his direct examination, Devoe acknowledged his pending "sale undercover" 

and robbery charges. On cross-examination, when asked about the substance he 

was charged with selling, Devoe responded, "Marijuana, methamphetamine, 

whatever it is. I don't know." When asked about the pending armed robbery 

charge, Devoe admitted both charges were from Allendale County, would be 

2 "Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the 

witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." 

Rule 608(c), SCRE. The circuit court further noted Devoe had "been convicted of 

failing to stop for a blue light" and "under Rule 609, [SCRE,] " it would permit 

Williams's counsel to use this to attempt to "attack the witness's credibility or 

believability." 
prosecuted by the same Solicitor's office, and were investigated by the same police 

department. On redirect, Devoe testified the State did not promise anything or tell 

him his charges would be dropped in exchange for his assistance in the case 

against Williams. 

Williams's cousin, Dwain Dean, testified he gave Williams a ride to Columbia on 

the night of the shooting. On cross-examination, Dean denied making a prior 

statement to police that "[Williams] wanted a ride back to Allendale to turn himself 

in because he said he didn't do it." 

Detective Qutique R. Manor of the Allendale Police Department (APD) testified 

that when he interviewed Williams following his arrest, Williams claimed he was 

in Columbia at the time of the shooting. On cross-examination, Manor confirmed 

Williams turned himself in to law enforcement. 

SLED assisted the APD with the investigation of the shooting. At trial, Agent 

Johnson did not recall "any items of evidentiary value being collected" from the 

scene, and the gun was never recovered. No shell casings were found at the scene. 

Agent Dawn Claycomb of SLED's Crime Scene Unit responded to the secured 

scene, where she marked items of interest, took photographs, and collected 

evidence. Her work including marking any areas of interest the investigators could 

swab or dust. She also attended the victim's autopsy at Newberry County 

Memorial Hospital, where she received sealed evidence from the forensic 

pathologist. 

Agent James William Green, a SLED forensic firearms examiner, received and 

analyzed the fired bullet and bullet jacket fragment that Agent Claycomb collected 

from victim's autopsy. He determined the bullet "was most consistent with being a 

bullet loaded into some .40 S&W caliber cartridges or some 10 millimeter auto 

caliber cartridges." Based on his analysis and information from the database the 

FBI provides to SLED, Agent Green determined the bullet was likely fired from a 

semi-automatic pistol manufactured by Smith and Wesson. On cross-examination, 

Agent Green noted that while the database provided a number of firearms models 

meeting the specifications of the bullet, a "Smith & Wesson in a .40" would be the 

easiest way to describe the firearm sought in connection with this shooting. The 

jacket fragment provided no useful information. 

Dr. Janet Ross, the forensic pathologist who performed the victim's autopsy, was 

the State's final witness. The jury unanimously found Williams guilty of murder, 

and the circuit court sentenced him to thirty-five years' imprisonment. 
 

Standard of Review 

In criminal cases, this court only reviews errors of law. State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 

41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on the 

proper scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion." State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 450, 527 S.E.2d 105, 109 (2000). 

"An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack 

evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." State v. Douglas, 369 

S.C. 424, 429–30, 632 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2006). Additionally, the circuit court's 

decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of prejudice. State v. 

Colf, 337 S.C. 622, 625, 525 S.E.2d 246, 247–48 (2000). "The right to a 

meaningful cross-examination of an adverse witness is included in the defendant's 

Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers." State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 

33, 538 S.E.2d 248, 255 (2000). "This does not mean, however, that trial courts 

conducting criminal trials lose their usual discretion to limit the scope of crossexamination." Id. at 33–34, 538 S.E.2d at 255. "On the contrary, 'trial judges 

retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose 

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other 

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, witness' safety, or 

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.'" Id. at 34, 538 S.E.2d 

at 255 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). 

Law and Analysis 

Williams argues the circuit court erred in preventing him from cross-examining 

Devoe regarding the potential sentence he faced on the pending armed robbery 

charge because the possibility of a serious penalty was proper impeachment 

evidence relevant to Devoe's bias and motive to testify against him. Williams 

asserts the circuit court's error could not be harmless because the State presented 

no forensic evidence connecting him to the murder, the State's other witnesses 

either did not witness the crime or were not credible, Devoe and Best are both 

related to Victim, and there were multiple unidentified individuals at the scene of 

the shooting. We disagree. 

"The Confrontation Clause provides 'in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .'" State v. 

Gracely, 399 S.C. 363, 372, 731 S.E.2d 880, 885 (2012) (alteration in original) 

(quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). "The Confrontation Clause guarantees a 

defendant the opportunity to cross-examine a witness concerning bias." Id. "A 
defendant demonstrates a Confrontation Clause violation when he is prohibited 

from 'engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a 

prototypical form of bias . . . from which jurors . . . could draw inferences relating 

to the reliability of the witness.'" State v. Clark, 315 S.C. 478, 481, 445 S.E.2d 

633, 634 (1994) (alterations in original) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 at 680). 

In Gracely, a State Grand Jury investigation of the sale of methamphetamine in 

Pickens County resulted in an indictment alleging fifty-two separate crimes against 

various individuals. 299 S.C. at 366, 731 S.E.2d at 881. To establish its case 

against Gracely, the State relied on the testimony of seven individuals also named 

in the indictment. Id. at 366, 731 S.E.2d at 881–82. Gracely "sought to show the 

potential bias of each witness by presenting to the jury information regarding the 

significantly lighter sentences th[o]se witnesses received in exchange for their 

testimony." Id. at 366–67, 731 S.E.2d at 882. However, following the State's 

objection, the circuit court limited the cross-examination and "instructed defense 

counsel that the State's witnesses could be questioned about the maximum 

punishment, but not the mandatory minimum punishment, for those charges they 

had in common with Appellant." Id. at 367, 731 S.E.2d at 882. 

Our supreme court reversed, explaining the circuit court "allowed defense counsel 

to cross-examine the witnesses regarding possible bias, but improperly prevented 

questioning which would have examined the extent of that bias and the witnesses' 

possible motivations for testifying against Appellant." Id. at 373–74, 731 S.E.2d at 

885. The supreme court held, "[t]he fact that a cooperating witness avoided a 

mandatory minimum sentence is critical information that a defendant must be 

allowed to present to the jury." Id. at 374–75, 731 S.E.2d at 886. Additionally, the 

court applied the five factor test set forth in Van Arsdall, to determine whether the 

violation of the Confrontation Clause constituted harmless error: 

The factors include [1] the importance of the witness's 

testimony in the prosecution's case, [2] whether the 

testimony was cumulative, [3] the presence or absence of 

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of 

the witness on material points, [ 4] the extent of cross 

examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, [5] the 

overall strength of the prosecution's case. 

Id. at 375, 731 S.E.2d at 886 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684); see also State 

v. Graham, 314 S.C. 383, 386, 444 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1994) (explaining the list of 
factors set out in Van Arsdall is not exhaustive). Ultimately, the Gracely court 

found: 

[A]ll of the witnesses in the present case had significant 

involvement with illegal drugs and other criminal 

activities, and cooperated following arrest and the 

possibility of long prison terms. In a case built on 

circumstantial evidence, including testimony from 

witnesses with such suspect credibility, a ruling 

preventing a full picture of the possible bias of those 

witnesses cannot be harmless. 

399 S.C. at 377, 731 S.E.2d at 887. 

Here, the circuit court erred in limiting Williams's cross-examination of Devoe 

because Devoe's potential sentencing exposure on his pending charges impacted 

his potential bias and motive for testifying. See e.g., State v. Pradubsri, 403 S.C. 

270, 280, 743 S.E.2d 98, 103–04 (Ct. App. 2013) (finding the circuit court's refusal 

to allow Pradubsri to question Martin on the exact potential sentence she faced on 

each charge was error; the evidence was critical to showing Martin's potential bias, 

and "Martin's potential legal exposure was relevant to her bias and potential motive 

in testifying."); State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 331–32, 563 S.E.2d 315, 318 (2002) 

("The jury is, generally, not entitled to learn the possible sentence of a defendant 

because the sentence is irrelevant to finding guilt or innocence. However, other 

constitutional concerns, such as the Confrontation Clause, limit the applicability of 

this rule in circumstances where the defendant's right to effectively cross-examine 

a co-conspirator witness of possible bias outweighs the need to exclude the 

evidence."). 

However, we find any error in limiting this cross-examination was harmless. 

Devoe was one of two witnesses who positively identified Williams as the shooter, 

and the circuit court did not otherwise limit his cross-examination. The State 

presented independent testimony reflecting the strained relationship between 

Williams and the victim, placing Williams at the crime scene, and identifying 

Williams as the shooter. Although Devoe's eyewitness testimony was significant, 

it mirrored that of DeQuincy Best, who testified he saw Williams standing over the 

fallen victim, pointing his gun at him before fleeing the scene. Moreover, even 

with the limitation placed on his cross-examination, Williams's counsel was able to 

muddy Devoe's credibility. Devoe falsely claimed he was charged with selling 

marijuana—as opposed to methamphetamine—to an undercover officer; this is 
hardly an insignificant distinction, and defense counsel seized upon it. Further, 

Devoe acknowledged both the drug charge and the armed robbery charge were still 

pending in Allendale County, the same solicitor's office was prosecuting him, and 

the same law enforcement agency investigating his charges was involved in the 

investigation of Williams. Thus, we find Williams was able to effectively adduce 

evidence of Devoe's "[b]ias, prejudice or . . . motive to misrepresent" for 

impeachment purposes despite the circuit court's exclusion of the sentencing line of 

inquiry. See Rule 608(c); see, e.g., State v. Whatley, 407 S.C. 460, 469–471, 756 

S.E.2d 393, 397–98 (Ct. App. 2014) (trial court's error in preventing crossexamination of witness Ussery as to mandatory minimum sentence she faced for 

reduced charges pending at time of trial was deemed harmless where the defendant 

had ample opportunity to otherwise demonstrate Ussery's bias, testimony of 

another witness established same material facts Ussery recounted, and Ussery's 

testimony did not contradict that of the other witness on any essential point). 

Accordingly, after considering the Van Arsdall factors in this instance, we find the 

circuit court's limitation of Williams's cross-examination of Devoe was harmless, 

and Williams suffered no prejudice. See e.g., State v. Young, 420 S.C. 608, 628, 

803 S.E.2d 888, 899 (Ct. App. 2017) ("[T]he harmless-error doctrine recognizes 

the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual 

question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the 

criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on 

the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error." (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 

U.S. at 681)). 

Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, Williams's conviction is 

AFFIRMED. 

HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.