2015 UT App 248

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KENNETH L. GRAY,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES,

Respondent.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20150420-CA

Filed October 1, 2015

Original Proceeding in this Court

Kenneth L. Gray, Petitioner Pro Se

Suzan Pixton, Attorney for Respondent

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., and

JOHN A. PEARCE.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Kenneth L. Gray seeks review of the final decision of the 

Workforce Appeals Board (the Board). Gray asserts that the 

Board erred in determining that he quit his position without 

good cause, thereby making him ineligible for unemployment 

benefits and also requiring him to pay back benefits that he had 

already received.

¶2 The Board’s decision concerning whether a person 

voluntarily quit his employment and the associated inquiries 

concerning that person’s qualification for benefits are mixed 

questions of fact and law that are more fact-like because the case 

“does not lend itself to consistent resolution by a uniform body 

of appellate precedent.” Carbon County v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 

2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Because of the fact-intensive conclusions 

involved at the agency level,” the Board’s determination in such 
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20150420-CA 2 2015 UT App 248

matters is entitled to deference. Id. “When a petitioner challenges 

an agency’s findings of fact, we are required to uphold the 

findings if they are supported by substantial evidence when 

viewed in light of the whole record before the court.” Stauffer v. 

Department of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 63, ¶ 5, 325 P.3d 109 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶3 Gray argues that the Board erred in denying him benefits 

on the basis that he had voluntarily quit his employment. Gray 

admits that he quit his employment,1 but he claims that 

extenuating circumstances forced him to quit. A claimant who 

voluntarily quits employment may still be entitled to benefits if 

he shows good cause for the separation or if denying benefits 

would be contrary to equity and good conscience. See Utah 

Admin Code. R994-405-101(3). 

To establish good cause, a claimant must show 

that continuing the employment would have 

caused an adverse effect which the claimant could 

not control or prevent. The claimant must show 

that an immediate severance of the relationship 

was necessary. Good cause is also established if a 

claimant left work which is shown to have been 

illegal or to have been unsuitable new work.

 

1. Gray argues briefly that he was constructively discharged, i.e., 

that his employer made his work environment so hostile that it 

could reasonably foresee that Gray would quit. Gray does not 

separately analyze this claim and supports it with the same facts 

and arguments supporting his position that he had good cause 

to quit his job. Under the circumstances, we see no reason to 

separately analyze the constructive discharge claim as it mirrors 

the arguments Gray makes to support his claim that he had good 

cause to quit his employment.
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20150420-CA 3 2015 UT App 248

Id. R994-405-102. Further, even if an adverse effect is shown, 

good cause may not be found if the claimant reasonably could 

have continued working while looking for other employment. 

See id. R994-405-102(1)(b). 

¶4 Gray asserts that he had good cause to end his 

employment with the State of Utah’s Department of Technology 

Services (Employer). Specifically, Gray argues that Employer 

added time-consuming clerical data-entry tasks to his job which

were not required when he was hired and which he could not 

perform due to arthritic conditions in his hands. Gray contends 

that because of this he had no option but to quit his job. The 

Board found that Gray’s contentions were not supported by 

the evidence. Evidence adduced at Gray’s hearing supports the 

Board’s decision. Specifically, after issues arose concerning 

whether certain tasks were being completed, Gray’s supervisor 

asked that after performing those tasks Gray input a time log 

into a spreadsheet. Gray’s supervisor estimated that performing 

the underlying tasks and inputting the information into a 

spreadsheet would take approximately one to two hours. Gray 

refused to perform this task, arguing initially that it was a 

clerical function that was not part of his job duties. He later 

asserted that he could not perform the new task because it 

required hours of typing which he could not perform due to his 

arthritis.

¶5 In response to Gray’s claim that he could not perform the 

new duty because of a medical condition, the matter was 

referred to Employer’s human resources department (HR). HR, 

in turn, sent Gray an email inviting him to apply for an 

accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA). HR also sent Gray all the information and forms 

necessary to apply for the accommodation. Gray refused, 

claiming that it would be dishonest to seek an ADA 

accommodation. Gray never adequately explained why it would 

be dishonest to seek such an accommodation given the physical 
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20150420-CA 4 2015 UT App 248

limitations he claimed. Gray’s supervisor also testified that in 

response to Gray’s complaints concerning the time and effort 

required to perform the new task, he performed the task himself. 

He indicated that the new task required only an additional 550 

characters to be typed per day and added only about twenty to 

thirty minutes of extra work. The Board found this testimony 

to be credible while conversely determining that Gray had 

consistently exaggerated the amount of typing necessary to 

complete the new assignments. Because the new typing 

requirement was minimal and because Gray was welcome to 

apply for an accommodation, if indeed he was unable to perform 

the work, the Board found that Gray did not have good cause to 

quit his employment. He could have remained employed and 

performed the work, sought an accommodation, or sought some 

other way to remedy his concerns. Based on the totality of 

circumstances, we cannot say that the Board abused its 

discretion in determining that Gray did not have good cause to 

quit his employment.

¶6 Additionally, the Board determined that denying benefits 

in this case would not be contrary to equity and good 

conscience. See id. R994-405-103. To meet this standard, a 

claimant must demonstrate that his actions were reasonable and 

that there were mitigating circumstances that would make the 

denial of benefits an affront to fairness. See id. R994-405-103(1)(a).

The Board concluded that Gray’s failures to attempt to perform 

the new assignment, to exhaust his opportunities to resolve the 

issue with Employer, and to seek an ADA accommodation, were 

not reasonable. Accordingly, the Board found that Gray failed to 

meet the standards of the equity and good conscience exception. 

Gray has provided us with no evidence to demonstrate that the 

Board abused its discretion in so finding.

¶7 Gray makes three additional arguments that were not 

preserved during the administrative process: (1) the Board 

denied him due process in adjudicating him guilty of fraud; (2) 
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the Board’s decision cannot stand because a representative of 

Employer provided “impeachable falsified testimony;” and (3) 

one of Employer’s witnesses was unqualified because she lacked 

personal knowledge of the facts presented. In order to preserve 

an argument, it must be raised in such a manner as to allow the 

court or agency an opportunity to correct any error. See State v. 

Briggs, 2006 UT App 448, ¶ 4, 147 P.3d 969 (stating that claimed 

errors must be brought to the attention of the district court to 

give the court an opportunity to correct any error). Because Gray

failed to establish that he raised these issues before the Board, he 

fails to demonstrate that the issue is preserved for review. See 

Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895, 899 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1995). We will therefore not consider those arguments.

¶8 Accordingly, we decline to disturb the decision of the 

Board.