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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re HUNT, Minor. June 15, 2017 

No. 335550 

Lake Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 13-001540-NA 

 

Before: GADOLA, P.J., TALBOT, C.J., and GLEICHER, J. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his 

minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to 

exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if the 

child is returned to the parent). We affirm. 

 Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it ruled that clear and 

convincing evidence was presented to establish the statutory grounds for termination and that 

termination was in the child’s best interests. We review for clear error a trial court’s decision 

that a statutory ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence, In re Mason, 486 

Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), and that termination is in the best interests of the child, 

In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). A decision is clearly 

erroneous if, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence 

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK, 468 Mich 

202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). 

 The trial court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported terminating 

respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) 

provides that a trial court may terminate a parent’s rights if “[t]he conditions that led to the 

adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be 

rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” This statutory ground exists 

when the conditions that brought the child into foster care continue to exist despite “time to make 

changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services . . . .” In re Powers 

Minors, 244 Mich App 111, 119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) states that the 

trial court may terminate parental rights if “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide 

proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be 

able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” 

Finally, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provides that the trial court may terminate parental rights if 
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“[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the 

child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” 

 Termination of respondent’s parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). It 

is undisputed that the order terminating respondent’s parental rights was entered more than 182 

days after the initial dispositional order was entered. Indeed, the order was entered three years 

after the initial dispositional order was entered. The condition that led to this adjudication was 

respondent’s continuing substance abuse. The record shows that respondent never successfully 

addressed this barrier to reunification. During the pendency of this case, respondent was 

involved in four substance abuse treatment programs, two of which he completed and two of 

which he was discharged from for rules violations. Although respondent showed progress for a 

time after his initial incarceration for failing to complete one of the substance abuse treatment 

programs, he relapsed within weeks of being released on parole after completing an outpatient 

substance abuse treatment program, and withdrew from any involvement with his son. 

Respondent was ordered to enter a third substance abuse treatment program, but was discharged 

from this program for a rules violation. He was then incarcerated before entering a fourth 

substance abuse treatment program, in which he remained at the time of the termination hearing, 

with a release date several months in the future. Given this history, the court correctly concluded 

that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent could successfully rectify his substance 

abuse, and its attendant impact on his son, within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. 

 Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence in order 

to terminate a respondent’s parental rights. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 

(2011). Nonetheless, we further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support termination 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j), considering respondent’s history of substance abuse, his 

failure to maintain stable employment and suitable housing throughout the proceedings, and his 

inconsistent interactions with his son. 

 A trial court must order termination of parental rights if a statutory ground for 

termination is established by clear and convincing evidence and the trial court finds by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 

712A.19b(5); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). In making a bestinterest determination, the court may consider a variety of factors, including the parent’s history, 

parenting ability, and participation in treatment programs, the child’s age and bond to the parent, 

the foster-care environment, and the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality. In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); In re VanDalen, 293 Mich 

App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). 

 At the time of the termination hearing, the child was six years old and had been in foster 

care in at least three different placements for over three years. The trial court waited more than 

two years for respondent to complete substance abuse treatment programs and to be released 

from prison. When respondent was released from prison and began parenting time and play 

therapy with the child, two service providers and the child’s guardian ad litem supported the goal 

of reunification. However, after just ten weeks of parenting time/play therapy, and just a number 

of weeks after completing outpatient substance abuse treatment, respondent relapsed, stopped 

communicating with the caseworker, and stopped attending parenting time/play therapy. At this 

point, the therapist directing the play therapy sessions could no longer support reunification 
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efforts. She opined that the child would be further damaged if respondent entered his life and 

disappeared again. She indicated that three years in foster care is too long and that the child 

needed stability and permanency in order to address his significant attachment issues. The trial 

court did not err in concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s 

best interests. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher