The Honor able John D. Holschuh, Senior United States District J udg e for the Southern District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0829n.06 No. 08-3932 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

DA L E E DWA RD MI CH AE L , JOHN R

. HASENAUER, ROY G. A RNOL D, and JI MMY D. EU B AN KS, Pla int if fs -A pp e lle e s,

v. MAL COL M B. F UTHEY a nd J R., UNI TED TRANSPORTATI ON UNI ON, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s, and J AMES M. BRUNKEN HOEF ER, ROY G. BO L I NG, C.A. I ANNON E, J .R. CUMBY, JOHN W. BAB L ER, J .D. FI TZ GERAL D, VI CTOR BA FF ONI , and PAUL

THOMPSON, I nte rv e nin g De fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts

. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DI STRI CT OF O H IO A M E N D E D O P I N I O N

BEFORE: CLAY and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; and H OLS CHUH, Senior District Judge. * McK EA GU E , Ci rcuit Ju dge. The pa nel issues three separ ate opinions but rea ches one result. J udg es Clay

and Holschuh w ould find that we have subjec t matter jurisdiction. J udg e Clay would uphold the preliminary injunction. J udg e Holschuh would not, a nd finds that the dec ision ofNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 2 - the dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nti ngthe pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n sh ou ld b e re ve rs e d a nd , f ur the rm or e , th a t th is action should be dis missed beca use there is absolutely

no claims or evide nce of

any discrimination and no cla im or evidenc e of a ny fra ud or wrong doing on the part of the union officials. B eca use I find that we do not have subjec t matter jurisdiction, I also would reve rse the de cision of the district

c ourt g ra nti ngthe pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n a

nd dis mis s th e a c tio n. Con se qu e ntl y , the de c isi on of thi s

c ourt is t o r e ve rs e the de c isi on

of the dis tr ic t cou

rt g ra nti ngthe pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n a

nd to d ism iss the ac tion. Plaintiffs, members of a

trade union, sued their union and its preside nt in order to block a merger wi t h an o ther union. They argued that the mer g er pr ocess wa s flawe d. The district cour t g rante d them a temporary restra ining or der a

nd preliminary

injunctive relief

. I nterve ning union members have appe aled, a rg uing that the district court abuse d its discr etion in g ranting injunctive

re lie f. Th e y a lso argue that the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t have su bje c t- ma tte r jur isd ic tio n. B e c a us e thi s

case involves a di spute about which union prope rly repr esents Plaintiffs and be cause such disputes

are within the sole jurisdiction of the National Mediation Boar d, we rema nd this c ase to the district court with instructions to dismi ss for lac k of subject- matter jurisdiction.

I A. P roposed Mer ger I n 2004, Paul Thompson became president of the United Tra

nsportation Union (“U TU”) , a labor union re prese nting the ope rating employ ees of fre ight a nd passeng er r ailway s. Upon taking office , Thompson expl ored the possibili ty of merg ing the UTU with anothe r labor union in an e ffor tNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 3 - to bol ste r i t s o w nb ar g a i n i n g s t r e n g t h an d p o l i t i c a l i n f

l u e n c e . T h e U T U u l t i m a t e l y e n t e r e d i n to neg otia t i o n s wi th the Sheet Metal Worker s I nternational Association (“SMWI A”) . I n J une 2007, Thompson introduced the f inalized Merg er A g ree ment betwee n the UTU a nd the SMW I A at the UT U’ s re gi o n al m ee t i n g. Th e re , th e UT U’ s B oa

rd of Di re c tor s li ste ne d to Th omp son’s pre se ntatio n a nd vo te d to submit t he Mer g er A g ree ment to the UTU membe rship for their approva l in accor dance wi t h the UTU Constituti on. On J une 11, 2007, the UT U member ship rece ived an e mail that summarized the Me rg e r A g re e me nt. A m or e c omp re he ns ive ma ili ngwa s su bs e qu e ntl y

se nt t o th e UT U m e mbe rs hip on J u ly 17, 2007, and the voting period wa s to ex tend from that date until August 7, 2007. The mailing c ontained the Me rg er Ag ree ment, supporting materia ls, a nd instructions for telephone and el ec t ro n i c v o t i n g. I n pertinent pa

rt, the Mer ger Agr ee m ent stated that the two e ntities—the UTU and the SMW I A—would tog ether become t h e I nternational Association of Sheet Meta l, Air, Rail and Transpor tation Workers (“SMART”) afte r the c onsummation of the merg er. A s to the g overning document, the Ag ree ment provided: S M A R T s h a l l b e g o v e r

n e d b y t h e S M A R T C o n s t i tu t i o n , w h i c h s h a l l b e t h e S M W IA Constit ution amended to implement the provisions of t his Ag ree ment. This Merg er Ag ree ment i s intended only to serve a s a mec hanism for integ ration of the two org anizations a

nd as a foundation for that Constit ution. I n the event of any conflict be tw e e n a ny pr ov isi on of thi s Me rg e r A g re e me nt a nd any pr ov isi on

of the SMA RT Constit ution, the latter sh al l go v er n, and if a ny dispute should arise that ca nnot be resolved by

the Gene ral P resident of SMW I A (a nd SMART) and the International President of the U TU (SMART President, Tra nsportation Division), i t shall be r e f e r r e d t o ar b i t r a t i o na s p r o v i d e d

i nA rt i c l e X II.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 4 - ROA 98. For

the SMW I A Constitut ion to become the SMART Const itution, t he SMWI A’s thene xistin g Ar

tic le 21 wa s to be re numbe re d as Ar tic le 21 A an d th e UT U C on sti tut ion wa s to be c ome Article 21B “to the extent not in conflict with the curr ent SMW I A Constit ution or the terms of th[e] Ag ree ment.” ROA 105. SMA RT w ou ld b e g ov e rn e d b y of fi c e rs fr om b oth of the fo rm e r u nio ns . T he Ag re e me nt a lso proposed the c reation of a Tra nsportation Division withi n SMART that would be g overne d by the UTU off icer s elec ted at the UT U conve ntion. Th e Me rg e r Ag re e me nt pr ov ide d that a lon g wi th the Merger Agreem ent , t he SMA RT Constit ution had to be appr oved by the UTU me mber s h i p . I n addit ion, the UTU Constituti on require d that the member ship be provided with copie s, by mail, of an y agreements or me rg er d o cu m ents that they

wer e aske d to ratify

in a re fer endum. Neither the UTU Constitution nor the SMW I A Constitut ion was included in the ma iling sent to the UTUmembers, a lthough both we re po sted on th e UT U’ s w e bs ite thr ou g ho ut t he vo tin g pe ri od . Afi na lize d v e rs ion of the SMA RT Con sti tut ion , w hil e re fe rr e d to in t he Me rg e r Ag re e me nt, wa s n ot p ro vid e d to the UT U m e mbe rs hip befor e the mer g er w as appr oved. Of the UTU’s 68,000 members, 8,625 voted in f avor of the merg er

and 3, 47 2 v ote d a g a ins t it

. Fr om Aug ust 13 to August 17, 2007, the UT U held i t s q u ad rennia l convention, when international UTUoffice rs wer e elec ted and amendments to the UTU Constituti on wer e conside red. Be cause the convention took place afte r t he voti ng period for the m erg er had ended, the extent of any conflicts betwe en the UTU and SMW I A Constit utions could not be fully known at the time of the

vo te

. Ultimately , the UTU membership approve d two amendments to the UTUConstit ution: oneNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

Th e Se pte mbe r 2 00 7, iss ue of th e “ UT U N e ws ” ann ounc e d th a t te n in te rn a tio na l vi c e pr e sid e nts 1 wer e ele cted at the quadre nnial convention. This number pr esumably includes Glenn J. King , who was e lected “I nternational vice president/Canadian leg islative direc tor.” The position of Canadian leg islative direc tor is a ccounte d for separ ately in the merg er materials, and K ing’ s officia l positi on wo uld a pp are ntl y no t be a ff

e c te d b y the me rg e r’ s e lim inatio n o f s ix vic e -p re sid e nt p os iti on s.

- 5 - requiringthe g ener al sec reta ry and tre asure r to submit his office ’s annua l budg et to the pre sident and the oth e r i nc re a sin g be ne fi ts f or str iki ngun ion

me mbe rs . Th e UT U’ s e le c tio ns pr oc e ss wa s c ha ng e d fr om the wa

y it ha d b e e n c on du c te d in pr ior y e a rs . Mi ch a el v. Thompson , N o . 1 :0 7

- c v - 3 8 1 8 , 2 0 0 8 WL 4 5 9 3 9 8 4 , a t * 3

- 4 ( N

. D

. O h io O c t. 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 ). As explained on the UTU’ s website: The UTUnow has 20 international office rs. Will these off icer s keep the ir jobs under new na mes when the UTU-SMWI A merg er is implemented on Jan. 1, 2008? No. Ten inter

national off

i ce r p o s i t ions will be eliminated. The UTUnow has 15 international vice presidents , a U.S. national leg islative director , a Cana dian legi s l at i v e dire ctor, a

president, a

n assistant president, a

nd a g ener al sec reta

ry and trea surer (20 full-time international office rs). E ff ec t ive J an. 1, 2008, six vice president positions will be immediately eliminated. I n addition, t h e assistant president, g ener al sec reta

ry and treasure r and two a dditional vice pre sident positions wi ll b e a bo lis he d b e tw e e n 2 00 8 a

nd the fir st SM AR T Inte rn a tio na l Co nv e nti on in 2011. ROA 1511. Acc ording ly , only nine internat i o n al v i ce presidents wer e ele cted at the UTU’s 1 quadre nnial convention, rather than the fiftee n who wer e ele cted in the past. Additionally , besides elec ting numer ous alternate offic ers, the U TU member ship chose a ne w pre s ident, assistant president, g ener al sec reta ry and tre asure r, and national leg islative director . I n the e v en t t hat the merg er w as ef

fec tuated, those off

icer s would become vice pr esidents of SMART.

B. Lawsu itNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 6 - On Dec ember

3, 2007, Plaintiffs Dale Edwar d Michae l, John R. Ha senaue r, Roy G. Arnold,

and Jimmy D. Eu ba nk s f ile d s uit a g a ins t T ho mps on

and the UT U in the Sou the rn Di str ic t of I lli no is. Pla int if fs so ug ht d e c larator

y and e me rg e nc y inj un c tiv e re lie f, c la imi ng that the pe nd ingme rg e r w ith the SMWI A wa s unla

wf ul be c a us e the UT U me mbe rs hip wa s not g ive n suf fi c ie nt i nf or ma tio n w ith wh ic h to e va luate the imp lic a tio ns of the me rg e r. Th omp so n a nd the UT U f

ile d a mot ion to d ism iss for imprope r venue . The dist rict cour t found that venue was improper and tra nsfer red the case to the Norther n District of Ohio, whe re the UTU is hea dquarte red. Th omp so n a

nd the UT U de fe nd e d a g a ins t Pla int if fs ’ c la ims , f

ili ngop po sit ion s to Pla int if fs ’ motions for a TRO and a

preliminary

injunction. The dist rict court held a hear ing on Dec ember 27, 2007, on the TRO motion, which it gr anted. Shortly afte r t he hearing , on J anuar y 3, 2008, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgme nt, w hich they later ag ree d the district c ourt could hold in ab ey ance pe nd ingthe ou tc ome of

dis c us sio ns be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Sinc e th a t ti me , th e o f

f ic e r s w h o w e r e e le c te d a t th e A u g u s t U T U c o n v e n ti o n have ta ken of fi c e , a nd Th omp so n h a s b e e n s uc c e e de d a s p re sident by Ma lc olm F uth e y . Pl a int if

fs so ug ht t o substitut e F uthey

for Thompson as a

defe ndant. Futhey

had pre viously

submitt ed a de clar ation on be ha lf of Pla int if fs in t he ir mo ti on for a

pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n a

nd ha d e xpre sse d o pp os iti on to Th omp so n’ s me tho d o f p ro mot ingthe me rg e r an d pro c e e din g to a vot e on the iss ue . Upo n Pl a int if fs ’ mot ion to s ub sti tut e F uth e y , s e ve ra l of fi c e rs of the UT U w ho supp ort ed the me rg e r m ov e d to int e rv e ne in t

he c a se be c a

us e the y we re c on c e rn e d tha t Fu the y wo uld no t def e nd a g a ins t Pla int if

fs ’

c la ims

. Prior to the district court’s rulingon the motion to int erve ne, Plainti ff s an d the cur

rentNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 7 - Def endants (F uthey

and the UT U) a g ree d to attempt to produce a SMART Constit ution so that a new vote could be ta

ken amongthe member ship. This ag ree ment was set f orth in terms of an extension of the TRO, whic h amounted to an a g ree ment not to g o forwa rd wit h the m erg er until the par ties had be e n a ble to d isc us s th e iss ue s in the c a se . T he pa

rt ie s a g re e d th a t th is p e ri od wo ul d la st unti l F e br ua ry 13 , 2 00 8. On F e br

ua ry 1, 20 08 , the dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d Pl a int if

fs ’ m oti on

to s ub sti tut e

and he ld a te le ph on e c on fe re nc e wi th t he pa rt ie s and the pr op os e d Inte rv e no rs , at w hic h ti me P l ai n t i ff s a n d D e f

en d an t s aga i nagr ee d

t o fo re s t al l t h e c o n s u m m at i o no f t h e m er ger p en d i n g a discovery period on the motion to intervene

. The district court held an evidentiar y hear ing on the motion to int erve ne on May 28, 2008,

a t w hic h ti me the pr op os e d Inte rv e no rs pr e se nte d tes ti mo ny and Pla int if fs and De fe nd ants c ro ssexamined the wi t n es s es . On J une 18, 2008, the district cour t gr anted the motion as to all of the

curr ent UTU of

fice -holders, but de nied the motion as to Thompson.

C. Interve nors’ Mot ion to Dism iss f or Lack of S ubject- Matt er Jurisdiction Previously , on J anuar

y 30, 2008, the proposed I nterve nors had filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. As the proposed I nterve nors had not y et bee n g rante d intervenor status, the district c ourt denied the motion, but did so without pr ejudice so that the motion could be

rene wed if the reque st to intervene was subseque ntly g rante d. The propose d I nterve nors appe aled,

a sk ingthi s c ourt

to s tay the TRO and

to i ssu e a

wr it o f m and amu s di rect ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt to dismiss for lac k of jurisdiction. The cour t denied the m o t i o n t o s t ay and the pe tition for a writ of mandamus, noting that the jurisdictional issue could be r eviewe d in the event of a future a ppeal. OnNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

Inote that both of the other opinions would find that this court ha s jurisdiction. J udg e Holschuh’ s 2 concur renc e ar g ues that § 101(a) (1) of the L MRDA should be rea d to only require an equa l, as opposed to a meaning ful, vote. Howeve r, wer e I to r eac h the merits of this case , Ido not believe that h i s re ad i n g of Blanchard is consistent with that decision’s require ment that there be suff icient information to permit a mea ningf ul vote . I t is a longstandingrule in the Six th Circuit that “[a] panel

- 8 - re mand and a ft e r it g ra

nte d the m inte rv e no r s ta tus , th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d Inte rv e no rs ’ m oti on to dismiss

. Thompson , 2008 WL 4593984, at *1.

D. P laintif

fs’ Motion f

or a P relim inary Injun ction On J une 26, 2008, the district c ourt g rante d Plaintiffs’ motion for a pre liminary injunction, which enjoined the UTU a nd the SMW I A from c onsummating the me rg er in a ccor dance wit h the Merg er A g ree ment. I n weig hing the likelihood of succe ss, the district court noted the U TU’s fa ilure to submit the SMART Constituti on to its membership befor e asking them to vote

. The district cour t found that this effe cti v el y d eprive d members of a mea ningf ul vote, as re quired by

the L aborMana g e me nt R e po rt ingand Di sc los ur e Ac t of

19 59 (“ L MRD A” ), 29 U. S.C. § 4 11 (a )( 1) , b e c a us e the re levant ter

ms of the proposed me rg er w ere not fully known to them. The district cour t further found that the re maining f actor s weig hed in favor of pr eliminary injunctive relief

. I nterve nors appe aled.

II On appe al, I nterve nors take issue w ith the district court’s preliminary injunction as well as its fi nd ingtha

t it ha d s ub je c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n. We be g in our ana ly sis by c on sid e ri ng the thr e sh old question of jurisdiction. Sc hu ltz v . G e n. R. V. Ctr

. , 512 F.3d 754, 756 ( 6th Cir. 2008). 2No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

of this Court cannot over

rule the de cision of another panel. The prior dec ision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent dec ision of the United S tates S upreme Court require s modification of the de cision or t his Court sitti ng en banc overrules t he prior decision.” Dingle v. Bioport Corp. , 3 8 8 F. 3 d 2 0 9 , 2 1 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Sa lm i v. Se c 'y of He alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985)). Blan c ha rd re qu ir e d that su ff ic ie nt i nf or ma tio n mu st b e dis c los e d f or the re to be a me aning ful vote, and it wa s not an abuse of discretion for the di strict court to conclude , in the proce ss of g ranting the pre liminary injunction, that the Plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of su c c e ss o n the ir c la im that the y we re de pr ive d of a me anin g fu l vote on the me rg e r r e fe re nd um. I n t er v en o rs al s o ar gu e o nap p ea l t h at t h e p re l i m i n ary i n j u n ct i o nh adt h e e ff

ec to f u n d o i n g a 3 c omp le te d o ff

ic e r e le c tio n, imp lic a tin g Ti tle I V o f L MRD A. 29 U. S.C. §§ 48 1- 48 3. B e c a us e Ti tle I V re quires that a f

eder al suit see king to e nforc e that title’s pr otections be initiated by the Secr etar

y of L abor, the Secre tary ’s abse nce from this lawsuit means that the court lac ks jurisdiction, accor ding to I nterve nors. Be cause we find that the l awsuit must be dis missed under the RL A, se e inf ra , we do no t r e a c h Inte rv e no rs ’ a lte rn a te jur isd ic tio na l argume nt. - 9 - I nterve nors contend that Plainti ffs’ c omplaint raises a “ repr esentation disput e” unde r the Railway L abor Act (“RL A”) , 45 U.S.C. § 151 et s eq. The National Mediation B oard ( “B oard” ) has

exc l u s i v e jurisdiction over re prese ntation disputes and, there fore , I nterve nors ar g ue that the c ourt does not ha

ve subject-matter jurisdiction. Although the matter w as ra ised befor e the district cour t in t he br ie f o pp os ingthe re qu e st f or a TRO and duri ng the su

bs e qu e nt he a

ri ng , the dis tr ic t c ourt

did not directly

addre ss this j urisdictional issue. 3 The RL A cove rs air a

nd rail ca rrier s en gaged in interstate or for eig n commerc e and the

car riers’ employ ees. 45 U .S.C. §§ 151, 181. The act is “ a unique blend of mora l and leg al duties looking towa

rd settlement throug h concilia t i on, mediation, voluntary arbitration, presidential intervention, and f

inally , in c ase of

ultimate failure of

the statutory

machiner y , resor t to traditional self-he lp measure s.” Chicago & N. W . Ry. v . United Trans. Union , 402 U.S. 570, 589 (1971) (B renna n, J ., dissenting) . The a ct was de signe d to “avoi d an y interruption to commerc e or to theNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 10 - operation o f an y ca rrier

eng ag ed ther ein” c aused by labor-ma

nag ement disputes. 45 U.S.C. § 151a(1)

. Pla int if fs argue tha

t th e ir dis pu te is n ot s ub

je c t to th e RLA be c a

us e the SMWI A i s predominate ly

a construc tion union and a “sig nificant minority ” of UTU members are bus drivers

e mpl oy e d b y

pr ivate c omp anie s and

pu bli c sc ho ols , n ot empl oy e e s o f c ov e re d c arr ie rs . T his

argume nt w a s n ot, ho we ve r, de ve lop e d in Pla int if fs ’ b ri e fs , b ut r a th e r w a s r a ise d in a fo otn ote in their primar

y brief a nd in a short par agra p h i n a letter brief submitted af

ter ora l argument. See Plaintiffs-Appellee s’ B r. at 46 n.21; Apr. 23, 2009, L etter. It is well-settled that a pa rty waives a ny issue that is “‘adve rted to in a pe rfunc t o ry m anner , unacc ompanied by some eff ort at deve loped argumentation.’” Lan gle

yv . D aim le rCh ry

sle r Co rp ., 502 F.3d 475, 483 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (quot ing Indec k Ene rgy Serv

s. v. Consumers Energy , 250 F.3d 972, 979 ( 6th Cir. 2000)). I n any event, it is undisputed that the UTU ha s traditionally been considere d a ra ilway -labor org anization. See, e .g. , United T ransp. Union v. Gateway W . Ry. Co. , 78 F.3d 1208, 1210 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the UTU r epre sented tra in-servic e employ ees a nd was subjec t to the RL A). P l ai n t i ff s ad m i tt h at t h e m aj o ri t y o f UT U m em b er s ar e co v er ed em p l o y ee s . A d i s p u t e i n v o l v i n g a labor org anization composed predominately of covered employ ees will not fall out side the RL A’s

cover ag e simply

beca use a minority of the org anization’s me mbers ar e not cove red e mploy ees. Ai r Li n e P ilo ts Ass’ n v. NLRB , 525 F.3d 862, 870 ( 9th Cir. 2008). The make up of the SMWI A’s membership is beside the point. Resolution of the par ties’ dispute will determine w hether the cur rent members of

the UTU r emain member s of that union or instead be come membe rs of a new union. I t is the curre nt membership of the U TU, not the m ember ship of t he S MWI A, t hat is at issue here

.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 11 - Th e RL A d ivi de s la

bo r dis pu te s int o fo ur c a te g or ie s: re pr e se ntatio n dis pu te s, ma jor dis pu te s, minor disputes, and collateral disput es gover ned by independe nt state or fe dera l laws. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. UPS Co. , 447 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2006). Represe ntation disputes involve the rig ht of the “ majority

of any cra ft or cla ss of employ ees” to “deter mine who shall be the rep re s en tative of the craf

t or class for the purposes” of t he RL A. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fo ur th . These disputes c enter

on “def ining the barg aining unit a nd deter mining the employ ee repr esentative for co l l ec t ive barg aining .” W

. A irl ine s, In c . v . I nt’ l B hd . o f Te am ste rs , 480 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1987) (O ’Connor, J ., g ranting application for stay ). Section 2, Nin th of

the RL A g ov e rn s r e so lut ion of re pr e se ntatio n d isp ute s: I f any dispute shall ari s e amonga ca rrier ’s employ ees a s to who are the repr esentatives of such employ ees desig nated and authorized in acc ordanc e with the re qu ir e me nts of

thi s c ha pte r, it s ha ll be the du ty

of the Me diatio n B oa

rd , u po n r e qu e st of e ith e r p art

y to the dis pu te , to inve sti g a te su c h disp ute and to ce rt if y to b oth pa rt ie s, in wr i t ing, w ithin thi rty

day s after

the re ceipt of the invocation of its service s, the name or names of the individuals or org anizations that have been d es i g nated a nd a uth or ize d to re pr e se nt the e mpl oy e e s invo lve d in the dis pu te , an d ce rt if y the same to the car rier. 45 U.S.C. § 152. This provisi on “g ives the Mediation B oard the power to resolve c ontroversie s

conce rning it and as an incident there to to de termine what is the appropriate cr aft or c lass in which the elec tio n s h o u l dbe held.” Switchmen’s Union of N. Am. v. NMB , 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943) (discussing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Nin th ). Th e B oa rd ’s jur isd ic tio n to re so lve re pr e se ntatio n d isp ute s is exclusive. Gen. Comm. v . Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. , 320 U.S. 323, 336 (1943). Thus, if “ a

c omp la int a lle g e s w hat is pr op e rl y c ha ra c te ri zed a s a re pr e se ntatio n dis pu te , the dis tr ic t c ourt mus t dismiss the ca se for

lack of subject matter jur isdiction.” United Transp. Union , 78 F.3d at 12 1 3

.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 12 - A f e de ra l c ourt

“ may no t . . . g ra

nt i nju nc tiv e rel ief to ma int a in t he status qu o, be c a

us e to d o s o would nece ssarily

have the eff

ect, at least d uring the per iod of the injunction, of dec iding the repr esentation issue.” Id. (interna l quotation mar ks omitted). The decision of the Boa rd is final and not review able in fe dera l court. In t’ l B hd . o f Te am ste rs , 447 F.3d at 497. Major disputes occ ur aft er certific ation “over the formation of collective a g ree ments or ef fo rt s t o s ec u re t h em ” an d “a ri s e wh er e th er e is n o s u ch agr ee m en to r w h er e i ti s s o u gh tt o ch an ge the terms of one , and ther efor e the issue is n o t whether an existi ng ag ree ment controls the controve rsy . They

look to the acquisition of rig hts for the futur e, not to asser tion of rig hts claimed to have ve sted in the past.” Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley , 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). Minor disputes con t em p late “the exis tence of a c ollective ag ree ment.” Id. They relate “e ither to the

me anin g or pr op e r a

pp lic a tio n of a pa

rt ic ula r pr ov isi on wi th re fe re nc e to a sp e c if ic sit uati on or to an omitted case .” Id . F ina lly , disp ute s ove r ri g hts g ra nte d b y oth e r p ro vis ion s o f f

e de ra l and

state law, w hi ch ar e no t ot

he rw ise c ov e re d b y

any of the pr e vio us dis pu te c a te g or ie s, are larg e ly unaff ecte d by the RL A. Ha wai ian Ai rli ne s v . No rri s , 5 12 U. S. 24 6, 26 0 (1 99 4) (“ [A] st a te -l aw c a us e of ac tion is not pre- empted by the R L A i f i t involves rig hts and obli g ations that exis t independent of the CB A.”)

. P l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s d o n o tf

a l l w i t h i ne i t h e r

t h e m a j o r - d i s p u t e o r

t h e m i n o r - d i s p u t e c a t e g o r y. Thus , w e are le ft

to c on sid e r w he the r P la int if fs ’ c la ims ra ise a

re pr e se ntatio n d isp ute or a dis pu te g overne d by

other fe dera l law, spec ifically the L MRDA. We beg in with the tex t of the statute. The pa rt ie s’ dis pu te fi ts n e a tly

wi thi n th e re pr e se ntatio n- dis pu te langua g e of the RL A: the ir s is a

“ dis pu te . . . among ” cove red e mploy ee s co ncer ning “ who ar e the r epre sentatives of suc h employ ees.” 45No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 13 - U.S.C. § 152, Nin th . U nd e r t he pr ima ry c ano n o f s ta tut or

y c on str uc tio n, we “ mus t pr e su me that a leg islature say s in a statute what it means and mea ns in a statute what it say s there. When the w ords of a statute a

re una mbiguous, then, this first ca non is also the last: judicial inq u iry is complete.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. , 534 U.S. 438, 461- 62 (2002) ( quotation marks and c itation omit ted). The dissent by

passes the te x t of Section 2, Nin th in concluding that the parties’ dispute is not

a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l o n e u n d e r t h e R L A

. W e h a v e n o d o u b tt h a tt h e d i s s e n ti s c o r

r e c tt h a tt h e R LA

cover s labor-ma

nag ement dis putes betwee n union members on one si de and cover ed employ ers on the other, see Di s. a t 1- 3, bu t th a t is no t th e iss ue —r a the r, the iss ue is w he the r t he RL A i s e xclu siv e ly limited to such disputes. The statute itself is not so narrowly draw n and in fa ct would see m to cover th e ty p e s o f d is p u te a t i s s u e in

th is c a s e mo r e r e a d il y

th an th o s e h ig h li g h te d b y th e d is s e n t, a s th e te xt expli citly states that the RL A cove rs dispu t es “a m o n g” employ ees but fa ils to m ention disputes betw ee n an em p l o y ee g roup and a car rier. N either the dissent nor Plaintiffs have pointed to any leg islative history

or judicial dec ision that persuasively shows that Congr ess intended the ty pe of

narr ow construction of S ection 2, Nin th a do pte d b y the dis se nt, and

our o wn re se arc h h a s li ke wi se come up empty

. (That labor-mana g ement dis putes can r eadily take the f orm of employ ee- employ ee disputes may

explain why

Congr ess did not so lim it the rea ch of the RL A.) Moreove r, whe n

f a c e d w ith sim ilar questions, other c ourts have g iven the bene fit of the doubt to finding a repr esenta

tion dispute. “[W ]hen the precise chara cter of the dispute is in doubt (when the dispute, in other words, is only ‘ar g uably ’ represe ntational), a fede ral court should not procee d, for the N MB ha s primary jurisdiction to determine whe ther it has ex cl u s i v e jurisdiction over the d ispute .’” United Transp. Union , 7 8 F. 3 d at 1 2 1 3 -1 4 (q u o t i n g United Transp. Union v. UnitedNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 14 - States , 9 87 F .2 d 7 84 , 7 89 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 3) ); see also Air Line Pilot s Ass’n v. Tex . Int’l Airlines, Inc. , 656 F.2d 16, 24 ( 2d Cir. 1981) (conc luding that the c ourt had n o j u ri sdiction over lawsuit eve n though the question whether the dispute was a

repr esentat i o n o n e wa s “murky”); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Ne. Airlines , 536 F.2d 975, 977 (1st Ci r. 1976). In resolving whether a complaint involves a re prese ntation dispute, we ar e to “pier ce[] the technical issues of pleading ” and c onsider the substance of the a lleg ations. Bhd. of Locomotiv e F i r em en & Engineme n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. , 400 F.2d 572, 575 ( 6th Cir. 1968). Plaintiffs arg ue that the B o ar d t re ats a dispute over the validity

of a me rg er a s an interna l union matter out side the reach of its jurisdiction under Sec tion 2, Nin th . T his g oe s to o f ar. Whil e it is true that the Board has routinely ref err ed to merg er disputes a s internal-union matter s, the Boa rd has, in fac t, review ed cla ims in several actions attackingthe validity of merg ers a

nd elec tions. For example, in Northw est Airlines , 18 N.M.B. 446, 1991 WL 519551 (1991), a majority of member s of the Nor thwest Airlines F oreme n’s Association voted in favor of merg ing with a nother union. The Boa rd wa s asked to tra

nsfer the ce rtification held by the Foremen’ s union to the other union. The Boa rd re ceive d complaints from two for emen a bout the polling pr ocedur es used by the For emen’ s union in connection with the merg er vote . The B oard inve stigated the polling pr ocedur es; following its investigation, the B oard de termined that a transfe r of c ertification was proper : The B oard vie ws an org anization’s decision to merg e into another org anization as an internal matter

and will gra n t reque sts for transf ers of cer tification based on union me rg e rs un le

ss it discovers evide nce of fraud or gross abuse in t

he me rg e r p ro c e ss. . . . I n the cour se of its investigation the B oard f ound neither a lleg ations nor evidenc e of fr aud or g ross abuse in the me rg er pro ce s s . . . . Ba sed on its investigation, the National Mediation Boar d here by finds that Northwe st Airlines Fore men’s Association has mer g ed into Transpor t Workers Union of Amer ica.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 15 - Id. at 448-49 (e mphasis added) . The B oard ha s simil arly revie wed mer g er a

nd elec tion processe s for f raud or g ross abuse in other

actions. See, e .g. , Re: AirTr ain Airways , 36 N.M.B. 114, 115-16, 20 09 WL14 30 35 2, at *1 -2 (2 00 9) (r e vie wi ngme rg e r a nd e le c tio n p ro c e sse s f

or “ fr a ud or g ro ss

a bu se ” ); Re: E

vergre en Int’l Airlines, Inc

. , 35 N.M.B. 11, 12- 13, 2007 WL 4125523, at *2 (2007) (same); Capital

Cargo Int’l Airlines, Inc. , 3 4 N

. M

. B

. 1 9 0 , 2 0 0 7 W L2 1 5 3 2 8 6 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ( s a m e ) ; Re: Con so l. R ail

Cor p. /F OP , NLC -C on ra il 1 /U

TU , 29 N.M.B. 265, 2002 WL 533476 (2002) ( same); see also Cont’l Airli nes, Inc . v. NMB , 793 F. Supp. 330, 332 (D.D .C. 1991) (“[T]he RL A does not prohibit the Boa

rd fr om investigating the c ircumstance s of a union mer g er r at i fication vote and g ranting a transfe r of cer tifications based on t h at v ote if the circumstance s warrant .” (e mph a sis added) ). T h e F i f t h C i r c u i t w a s f

a c e d w i t h a qu e s t i o na l m o s ti d e n t i c a l t o t h e o n e p r e s e n th e r e . In Mi nja re s v . I nd e pe nd e nt Assoc iat ion of C

on tin e nta l P ilo ts , 293 F.3d 895 ( 5th Cir. 2002), sever al members of

a pil ots’ union sued t o block a vote on the proposed mer g er of their union with another union. The propose d merg er ha d been a pproved by

the boar d of direc tors, b u t just day s befor e members we re to be g in voting, the plaintiffs f iled suit claiming, among othe r thing s, that the proposed mer g er violate d their union’s constit ution. The dist rict court held an e x pedited benc h trial

and fo un d a g a ins t th e pla int if fs

. On appe al, the F ifth Circui t d i d not rea ch the mer its of the plaintiffs’ cla ims. I nstead, the court found that the plaintiffs’ suit involved a re prese ntation dispute and the di s t ri ct court did not have jur isdiction to resolve the dispute. The c ourt did so e ven afte r the Boa rd had ear lier conc ludedNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 16 - that its “prec edent e stablishes that an org anization’s de cision to me rg e into a nother org anization as

ani n t e r n a l u n i o nm a t t e r . T h e r e f o r e , t h e m e r g e r

p r o c e s s h a s n o r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e R LA repr esentation process.” Re: I ndep. Ass’n of Cont’l Pilots/Ai r Li n e Pil ots Ass’n , 28 N.M.B. 473, 483-84, 2001 WL 812219, at *5 (2001). I n finding a lac k of jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit explained: I n Int’l Ass’n of Mac hinists & AerospaceW orkers v . Northeast Airl ines, Inc. , the plaintiff union had been the repr esentative of ce rtain Northe ast Airlines employ ees prior to a merg er with D elta. 536 F.2d 975, 976 (1st Cir. 1976)

. The u n i o n sued Delta, claiming that Delta’ s failure to ba rg ain violated its substantive duties under the RL A. I n aff

irming the dismiss al of the c omplaint, the court stated that “ at the ver y le a st, the me rg e r c re a te d r e a l doub ts ab ou t whe the r pla int if fs re pr e se nt the ma

jor ity of any De lta c ra ft or c la ss o f e mpl oy e e s, and wh e re the re is suc h d ou bt, fe de ra l c ourt s leave resolution of the dispute to the National Mediation Boa rd.” Id. at 977. We rec og nize that, unlike the issue presente d in In t’ l Ass’n o f M ac hin ist s, a union’s decision to merg e into another union could be viewe d as a pur ely internal union matter, having no r elationship to the RL A proc ess. Howeve r, t he practica l eff ect of our i nte rf e ri ngwi th t

he me rg e r w ou ld b e a

c ourt imp os e d decision

e ff e c tiv e ly decidingwho re prese nts the Pil ots. This f act, toge ther with the historica lly limit ed role of the courts in enf

orcingthe RL A, l eads us to conclude that the RL A “a ffor ds the sole and ma

ndatory means for resolving ” the dispute. See Sum mit Airlines, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 295 , 628 F.2d 787, 793 (2d C ir. 1980). B eca use we c on c lud e that th e c ourt s la c k ju ri sd ic tio n ove r thi s mat te r, we do no t r e a c h th e me ri ts of Independe nt’s argument reg ardingthe merg er. Minjares , 293 F.3d at 898-99. Whil e not binding in this circ uit, we ag ree with the rea soning of the Fif th Circuit in Minjares and find it applica

ble to Plaintiffs’ dispute. Plainti ffs asser ted in the ir complaint that this was not

a mer g er, “ but rather

an ac quisiti on of the UTU by the Sheet Metal Workers.” ROA 27. They asked the district court to find tha t t h e M er ger Ag ree ment was “ null and void” and to enjoin the consummation of the merg er. ROA 30-31. Plaintiffs a sserted that beca use of a n improper mer g er vote, the UTU(and not SMART) con t i n u ed t o represent them. The se and othe r asse rtions byNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 17 - Pla in ti f f s f o c u s th e d is p u te o nw h a t o r g an iz a ti o nr e p r e s e n ts th e c o v e r e d e mp lo y e e s . B y

g r a n ti ng Plaintiffs’ reque st for pre liminary injunctive relief

, the district court deter

mined as a pr actica l matter th a t Pl a in ti f

f s an d th e ir f

e ll o w me mb e r s w il l c o n ti n u e to b e r e p r e s e n te d b y U T U, ra ther than SMART, at least during the pende ncy of this lawsuit. That was, a fter a ll, the entire point of the injunctive relief

—to keep the e g g s unscrambled, so to speak. Her e ag ain, we a

re puzzled by

an asse rtion of the dissent. To buttress the proposition that la bo r- mana g e me nt n e g oti a tio ns wi ll n ot b e a ff e c te d b y the pr op os e d me rg e r, the dis se nt a sse rt s, “[E] ven if the me rg er g oes forwa rd, under the terms of the Merg er Ag ree ment, the UTU’ s elec ted officia ls will continue to repr esent their employ ees in transportation industry disputes.” is. at 3. As

we e x plained above , the RL A is not exclusively limit ed to la bor-mana g ement disputes. Setting that aside, the dis s en t’s observation adds litt le to the forc e of the analy sis. All parties ag ree that the

“ UT U” wi ll c e a se to e xist a s an ind e pe nd e nt un ion if the me rg e r g oe s f or wa rd —th a t is the purp os e and ef fec t of the merg er. U nder the Merg er Ag ree ment, the UTU would become a division of the

ne w SMA RT un ion and

the UT U’ s Co ns tit

uti on wo uld c on tin ue to e xist bu t on ly

“to the extent not in c on fl ic t w iththe c ur

re nt SMWI A C on sti tut ion or the te rm s o f t

h[e ] Ag re e me nt. ” RO A 1 05 . I t is not unrea sonable to believe that office rs of a n independe nt union will behave much diff ere ntly than of fi c e rs of a div isi on of a muc h lar g e r uni on duri ng la bo r- mana g e me nt ne g oti a tio ns , c e te ri s p a ri bu s. Pla int if fs argue that the ir dis pu te is no t on e g ro un de d in r e pr e se ntatio n, bu t r a the r t he ri g hts g uara nteed to union member s under Title I of the L MRDA. I ncluded among those rig hts is the right to an informed vote on union refe rendums. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a) (1), 414. They point out that theyNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 18 - are unawa

re of any action in which the B oard a sserted jurisdicti on to resolve issues a rising unde r Title Iof the L MRDA. Whil e Pla int if

fs may be c or re c t th a t the y ra ise a Ti tle I c la im, it i s in e sc a pa ble that th e y

a lso raise a lleg ations and seek relief related to a repr esentation dispute. Eve n when alawsuit raises nonre pr e se ntatio n ma

tte rs , a c ourt wi ll n ot h a ve su

bje c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r t hat law su it if the su it also involves a re prese ntation dispute. S wi tc h m e n ’

s U n ion , 320 U.S. at 303; Air Line Employee s Ass’n, Int’l v. Republic Airlines, Inc. , 79 8 F .2 d 9 67 , 9 68 (7 th C ir . 1 98 6) (“ A c ourt may no t e nte rt a in

an a c tio n invo lvi ng[a r e pr e se ntatio n] di sp ute e ve n if it ar ise s in the c on te xt of

oth e rw ise jus tic ia

ble claims.”). Plaintiffs have not shown how t heir Titl e I claim can be meaningf ully separ ated f

rom the repr esentation disput e they have r aised. F ina lly , Pla int if

fs ma int a in that the B oa

rd do e s n ot h a ve jur isd ic tio n to he ar t his c a se in i ts prese nt form bec ause the merg er ha s not y et become effec tive. We note that the lawsuit in Minjares was filed prior to the merg er vote even taking pla ce. Minjares , 293 F.3d at 896-97. Putti ng aside the fact that the m erg er has not become e ffe ctive as a d ire c t re su lt o f the injunctive relief

reque sted by Plaintiffs, if whether a cause of action invol ved a repr esentation dispute hinge d critica lly on the eff ective date of the me rg er, the n the B oard’ s jurisdiction could alway s be circ umvented by filing suit be fore the eff

ective da te. That ty

pe of g amesmanship ca

nnot be used a s a mea

ns of conjuring

su bje c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n in fe de ra l c ourt

. Had the merg er been allowed to become eff ective, the UTU and SMW I A would have joined to b e c ome SMA RT. Th e B oa rd c ou ld h a ve the n b e e n re qu e ste d to t ra ns fe r U TU ’s c e rt if

ic a tio n to SMART and, in that procee ding, c oncer ns about the merg er vote could have been r aised. B ased onNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 19 - Northw est Airlines and si milar Boa rd decisions, it is clea

r t hat t he B oard w ould have r eviewe d the merg er pr ocess f

or fr aud or g ross abuse.

III For the re asons set for

th a b o ve, we find that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit raises a repr esentation disput e. The B o ar d h a s p r im ar

y ju r is d ic ti o n to d e te r

mi n e w h e th e r it h a s e xc lu s iv e ju r is d ic ti o n over the parties’ dispute. Acc ording ly , the dist ri ct co u rt should not have proc eede d to gr ant pre liminary injunctive relief

to Plainti ffs but, rather, should have g rante d I nterve nors’ motion to dismi ss for lac k of jur isd ic tio n. Th e c a se is REMAND ED to the di strict court for DISMISSAL c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 20 - AMENDED DISSENT CLAY, C i rcuit Judge, dissentin g. Iwould uphold the district court’s pre liminary injunction. The district court had jur isdiction under the L ab o r M anag ement Reportingand Disclosure Act of 1959 (“L MRDA”), 29 U .S.C. §§ 401 et seq. , to hear the par ties’ dispute, and the court did not abuse its discr etion in g ranting the pre liminary injunction ag ainst the UTU. I there fore

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. Th e g ra nt o f t he pe tit ion fo r r e he ari ngha s r a ise d s ome a dd iti on a l is su e s th a t I sh ou ld a dd

re ss bef o r e r e a c h in g th e me r it s o f th e c a s e . I a g r e e th a t th e p e ti ti o n f o r r e h e ar in g s h o u ld have be en g rante d, but for the purpose of vacating our previous opinions a nd assig ning the case to a diffe rent panel. I do not ag ree with the additi on of t he first para g raph to the l ead opinion which doe s nothing but rec ite what wa s alrea dy said in the opinions and makes the misleadingas s er tion that the three op ini on s r e a c h “ on e re su lt. ” Th e thr e e se pa ra te op ini on s, re lyingon

differ e nt r a tio na le s, fa il t o provide prope r g uidance to either these litigants or f uture li tiga

nts on the important issues of labor law b e fo re the Court

. The proble ms raised by

Plaintiffs and Def

endants in their joint petition for re hear ing a re not addre ssed or re solved by the lang uag e adde d t o t h e lead opinion in response to the petition for

re he ari ng . T he pa

rt ie s und e rs too d the ano ma lou s r e su lt c re a te d b y our t hr e e div e rg e nt o pin ion s b ut, like me, were troubled by the conf usion created by

the three opinions as well as the likely collater al conseque nces of that result. Plaintiffs ha ve no venue to pur sue their claim, a c laim that two judge sNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

Judg e Ho lsc huh misc on str ue s this argume nt. I do no t alle g e , as he a sse rt s, that tw o ju dg e s o f t his 1 court do not believe that Plaintiff s ha ve no venue to pursue their c laim; to the contrary , it is apparent that both I and J udg e Holschuh believe this Court has j urisdiction. I am refer encing the fact that the petition for re hear ing states that the National Mediation Boa rd has spe cifica lly

disavowed jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

his ty pe of claim. Th e re fo re , Pl a int if fs have no fu

rt he r a ve nu e fo r r e lie f. Th is result is troubling when t wo judg es of this Court (Clay and McK eague) be lieve Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of succ ess on the mer its. I t is an unfor tunate re sult that P laintiffs succe ssfully convince d a majority of this pa

nel that they are entitled to r elief but a re unable to f

ind a n avenue to pursue that relief

. - 21 - of this court fe lt had merit. This anomalous result wa s rea ched beca use t he concurringopinion by 1 J u d g e H o l s c h u h , a tb e s t , i n c o r r e c t l y r e a d s e x i s t i n gc i r c u i tp r e c e d e n te x t r e m e l y n ar r o w l y. Fur thermore , the conc urringopinion recommends dismissal of the entire suit without considering Plaintiffs’ claims under the L MRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and Section 101(a)( 2) of the L MRDA. The diff eringrationale s offe red by eac h member of the panel continue to cre ate a somewhat incong ruous r e s u lt

. I n th is c a s e , w e h a v e tw o s e p ar a te is s u e s : ju r is d ic ti o n an d th e p r o p r ie ty of

e nte ri ngthe pr e l i m i n a

ry inj un c tio n. Al tho ug h Jud g e Mc Ke a g ue ins tr uc ts the dis tr ic t c ourt

to d ism iss fo r l a c k o f j ur isd ic tio n, dis mis sa l by the dis tr ic t court on that bas is wo uld be ina pp ro pr ia te be c a

us e

a ma jor ity of the pa

ne l (Jud g e s Cla

y and Ho lsc huh) ha s de c ide d that jur isd ic tio n is pr op e r. Whil e two of the opinions believe juri s d i ct i o n is proper, the y diverg e on whe ther to uphold the district

c ourt ’s inj un c tio n. Th e thi rd op ini on take s th e po sit ion that the re is no j ur isd ic tio n to pr ov ide a ba sis for e ntering an injunction, but that opinion seems to impl y that it might favor

enter ing a

n injunction if the c ourt c ou ld h a ve a dd

re sse d th e me ri ts. I n li g ht of the c omp e tin g ratio na le s a nd po te nti a l f

or c on fu sio n, Ibe lie ve the pa ne l sh ou ld have va cate d our opi nions upon g ranting the m otion for rehea ring and reassig ned the case to another p an el , i nt h e h o p e t h at an o t h er p an el m i gh tb e c ap ab l e o f p ro d u ci n g a t wo -j u d ge m aj o r i t y . J u d geNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 22 - Holschuh make s much of his contention that there is no prece dent for rea ssigning the case to another pa ne l. He com pl ete ly

mis a pp re he nd s my

po sit ion . I

a m no t su g g e sti ngthat w e are re qu ir e d to

re a ssi g n th e c a se a s a

ma tte r o f l aw. I n th e int e re st o f jus tic e , the pa ne l c ou ld c e rt a inl y

e xer c ise its discretion to vac ate its opinions and order rea ssignment pur su an t t o the petition for re hear ing. I simply believe that rea ssignment would be a prudent measure the pane l could take to diminish the confusion cr eate d by

our three opinions, in t he hope that another pa nel could re ach a

decision of g reater c ohere nce a

nd clar ity than our pa

nel has be en able to achieve in order to a id the parties a nd advanc e the Court’s jurisprude nce. I. Jurisdi ction A. RL A Th e le a d o pin ion

wo uld dis mis s th e su it f

or la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n, fi nd ingthat th e disp ute is a “repre sentation dispute” under the Railway

L abor A ct (“ RL A”) , 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. , and that the Natio na l Me diatio n B oa rd (t he “ NM B ” ) the re fo re ha s e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n to h e ar P la int if fs ’

cause . The lea d opinion’s view that a r epre sentat i o n d i s p u te includes disputes betwe en union members ove r the va lidity of the union’s mer g er vote is misguided for sever al re asons. First, Co n gre s s clea

rly did not intend the RL A’s re solution procedure s for re prese ntation disputes to apply to a

n internal union dispute over the validity of its mer g er vote. A “r epre sentation dispute” is descr ibed in the statute as a dispute “amonga ca

rrier ’s employ ee s as to who are the

re pr e se ntativ e s o f s uc h e mpl oy e e s d e sig nate d and a uth or ize d in

a c c or da nc e wi th t he re qu ir e me nts of [the RL A].” 45 U.S.C. § 152, Nin th . Although the words “a mong a car rier’ s employ ees,” takenNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 23 - ou t of c on te xt, c ou ld b e re a d to imp ly that r e pr e se ntatio n d isp ute s in c lud e int e rn a l un ion dis pu te s, both the statutory

context and the leg islative history of § 152, Nin th u n d er m i n e s u ch a r ea d i n g. Co n gr e s s in

te nded the RL A to addre ss disputes between union membe rs an d t hei r em plo y e rs . Se e Ha wai ian Ai rli ne

s, In c . v . No rri

s , 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (“ Congr ess’ purpose in passing the RL A was to promote sta bility in labor-mana g ement re l at i o n s by providing a compr ehensive fr a me wo rk fo r re so lvi ngla bo r d isp ute s. ” ); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. She ehan , 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) (“In enac ting [ the R L A], Congr ess endeavore d to promote st ability in labor-ma nag ement re lations . . . by providing eff

ective a nd eff icient re medies for

the re solution of railroad-employ ee disputes

ari sin g ou t of

the int e rp re ta tio n o f c oll e c tiv e -b arg a ini nga g re e me nts .” ); s ee also 45 U.S.C. § 151a ( s e t t i n g f o rt h s t a tu t e ’ s f

i v e p u r p o s e s , a l l o f

w h i c h c o n c e r

nl a b o r - m an a g e m e n tr e l a t i o n s )

. Un d e n i a b l y, no such dispute betwe en union member s and their e mploy er is pre sent here

. The Supreme Court rec og nized in Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fe d ’n N o . 40 , 300 U.S. 515 (1937) that a

repr esentation disput e is part of the g ener al discord betwee n labor and manag ement that Congr ess s o u g h t t o a me li o r a te in p a s s in g th e RLA

. E xa mi n in g th e le g is lati v e h is to r y o f § 1 5 2, Nin th , th e Court

state d: Ex perie nce had shown, befor e [t he ena ctment of § 152, Nin th ], t hat when the re w as no dispute as t o the orga

nizations authorized to repr esent the e mploy ees, a nd when there was willing ness of the e mploy er to mee t suc h re p re s entative f or a discussion of their g rieva

nces, a micable a djustment of differ ence s had g ener ally followed a

nd strikes had be en avoide d. On the other hand, a pro l i fi c sourc e of dispute ha d been the maintenanc e by

the ra ilroads of c ompany unions and th e d en i al by railwa y manag ement of the authority of re prese ntatives chosen by their employ ees. Sec tion [152, Nin th ] was specifica lly aimed at this prac tice.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 24 - Virginia Ry. Co. , 300 U.S. at 545- 46 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court made clea r that the purpose of § 152, Nin th was to pre vent an employ er from dictating the spec ific union,

or un ion of fi c e rs , w ithwh om i t w ou ld b e wi lli ngto n e g oti a te . T he pl ain langua g e of the statut e confirms this g oal. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Nin th (authorizing NMB to resolve r epre sentation disputes “in such manne r as sha ll insure the choice of re prese ntatives by the employ ees w ithout int erf ere nce, influence or coe rcion exe rcised by the carrier ”) (empha sis a dded). The statute also explains that as

a re sult of seeking cer

tification from the N MB a s to the identity of the e mploy ees’ repr esentative,

“ thec arrie r sh a ll tr e a t wi th the re pr e se ntativ e so c e rt if ie d a s th e re pr e se ntativ e of the c ra ft or c la ss for the pur

poses of this chapte r.” 45 U.S.C. § 152, Nin th (empha sis added). Thus, both the statutory lang uag e and long- established Supreme Court pre cede nt dictate that § 152, Nin th was simply meant to be another

means by

which org aniz ed l ab o r could counter manipulative tactics by

employ ers

ne g oti a tin g c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini nga g re e me nts wi th t he ir e mpl oy e e s. The dispute in the instant ca se does not conc ern a n employ er’ s d en i al of a labor repr ese n tati v e ’ s c la im s o f b ar g a in in g a u th o r it y . N e it h e r p arty ma

k e s an y r e f

e r e n c e to

– le t a lone submits evidence of

–any employ er’ s position wit h respe ct to this disput e, or to the e x istence of any collective barg aining ag ree ment which g ave r ise to the dispute. See H awaiian Air lines , 512 U.S. at 260 (“[A] state-law c ause of action is not pre- empted by the RL A if it involves rig hts and obligations that exis t independe nt of t he C BA [.] ”). I n fac t, there is no evidenc e that the m erg er vote will have any impact on the entities with which the union membe rs’ em p l o y er s must neg otiate in future disputes, beca

use eve n if the merg er go es fo rward, under the terms of the Merg er A g ree ment, theNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

I nterve nors see k to have it both way s. On t he one hand, they argue that it was unnec essar y for UT U 2 members to examine th e S M W I A constitution before voting, be cause UTU membe rs’ rig hts and repr esentation would not be substantively aff ecte d by the merg er. Y et her e, t h ey ar gu e that the me rg e r wo uld a ff

e c t the ide nti ty of UT U me mbe rs ’ re pr e se ntatio n, and the re fo re , the dis pu te sh ou ld be re serve d for the N MB. - 25 - UTU’s e lected of

fice rs will continue to repr esent their e mploy ees in transportation industry dis pu te s. 2 Second, as the lead opinion appe ars to recog nize, the L MRDA expressly g rants author ity

for fede ral c ourts to hear

this ty pe of c laim. Congre ss enac ted t h e L MRDA “to eliminate or pr event improper pr actice s on the p ar t o f l abor org anizations, employ ers, labor relations consultants, and their off icer s and re prese ntatives[.] ” 29 U.S.C. § 4 0 1 (c ). T i tle Iof the L MRDA, §§ 411-15, g uara ntees e ach union membe r an e qual rig ht t o p articipate in union elections, mee tings a nd ref ere nda. S pecif

ically , under § 411(a) (1) of the L MRDA, “[e]very member of

a labor org anization sh a ll h a ve e qu a l r ig hts and pr ivi le g e s w ith in s uc h o rg anizatio n to no min a te c and idate s, to vo te in

e le c tio ns or

re fe r e n d u m s o f the la bo r o rg anizatio n, to a

tte nd me mbe rs hip me e tin g s, and to p art ic ipate in the deliberations a

nd voting upon the business of such meeting s, subject to rea sonable rule s and regulations in such org anization’s c onstitut ion a nd by laws.” The Supreme Court has interpre ted § 41 1( a )( 1) a s “ a

c omm and

that me mbe rs and

c la sse s o f m e mbe rs sh a ll no t be dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t” with r espec t to the rig hts specified. Calhoon v. Harvey , 379 U.S. 134, 139 (1964). This Court has int e rp re te d unio n me mbe rs ’ r ig ht t o ta ke par t in no nd isc ri min a tor

y un ion vo tin g un de r T itl e Ito include “the rig ht of a mea ningf ul vote[.] ” Se rti c v . Cu

y ah og a, Lak e, G e auga an d A sh tab ula Cou nti es Ca rp e nte rs D ist . Co un c il , 423 F.2d 515, 521 ( 6th Cir. 1970 ). Thus, when a union

me mbe rs hip vo te s on a pr op os a l of fe re d by its le a de rs hip , § 41 1( a )( 1) re qu ir e s th e un ion le a de rs hipNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 26 - to provide “suf

ficient infor

mation . . . to allow a re asoned a nd informed vote on the proposal whic h appea rs on the ballot.” Blanchard v. J ohnson , 532 F.2d 1074, 1079 (6th Cir. 1976). Union members alleg ing violations of Title I may file suit a g ainst their union in fede ral district c ourt. 29 U.S.C. § 412. Plaintiffs alleg e violations of Title Iin their complaint, both expressly identifying T itle I

of the L MRD A a s the re le va

nt statut e and a lle g ing fa c ts that, if tr ue , wo uld c e rt a inl y g ive ri se to a c la im under Title I

–i.e., that the UTU’s members did not cast meaning ful votes on t h e r ef er endum

c on c e rn ingthe me rg e r. Thus , th e su bje c t matte r o f t

his dis pu te is o ne tha

t Co ng re ss e x press ly intended this Court to hear. Ar g ua bly , th e L MRD A is no t the on ly fe de ra l statut e that c on fe rs a uth or ity on fe de ra l c ourt s to resolve c halleng es to the fa irness of union mer g er vote s. Another statute, the L abor Ma nag ement Relations Act (“ L MRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, provides that “[s]ui ts for violation of contra cts betwe en an employ er and a labor

org anization repre senting employ ees in a n industry aff ectingcommerc e as define d in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations , may be broug ht in any

district court of the Un ite d St a te s h a vin g jur isd ic tio n o f the pa rt ie s, wi tho ut re sp e c t to the a mou nt in c on tr ov e rs y or without reg ard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U .S.C. § 185(a) (e mphasis added) . “A union constitution i s a contra ct betwee n labor org anizations unde r [§ 185(a)].” Millwri ght Local No. 1079 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and J oiners of Am. , 878 F.2d 960, 962 n.4 ( 6th C i r. 1989). Acc ording ly , this Court has routinely exercised jurisdiction pur suant to the L MRA over i n t er n al union disputes concer

ning the validity

of vot es conducted pursuant to union constituti ons. See, e .,g., Millwri ght , 878 F.2d at 962-64 (considering merits of challeng e to merg er be tween two loc al unionNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 27 - branc hes base d on alleg ed denia l of members’ rig ht to vote under their c onstitu t i o n ). Gi v en that Con g re ss a

uth or ize d th e fe de ra l c ourt s to re so lve dis pu te s su c h a s the ins tant o ne in m ult ipl e statut e s, the le a d o pin ion ’s e xclu siv e re se rv a tio n o f t he iss ue in t his c a se to t he NM B is p art ic ula

rl y inappropriate. The lea d opinion concede s that “Plaintiffs may be cor rec t that the y raise a Title I[L MRDA]

c la im, ” bu t ne ve rt

he le ss d ism iss e s th e c la im a s st ri c tly re se rv e d f

or the NM B be c a

us e “ it i s inesca pable that [Plainti ffs] also raise a lleg ations and see k relief related to a re prese ntation dispute.” L ead O p. at 17. Yet if an interna l union disput e over the validity

of its merg er vote falls within the exclusive jurisdiction o f t h e NMB, and a lso constitutes a cog nizable fede ral c laim under the L MRDA, then th e R L A and L MRDA would seem to be in c onflict and the L MRDA, as the late renac ted statute, would trump the exclusivi ty provision of the RL A. See Lock hart v. United States , 546 U.S. 142, 149 (2005) (“ When the plain import of a later statute dir ectly conflicts with an e arlier statute, the later

enac tment gove rns[.] ”). O f cour se, the two statutes are easily rec oncilable if § 152, Nin th is read not to cove r interna l union disputes ove r merg er votes, and the RL A and the L MRDA sh ou ld b e re a d to avo id t

he kin d o f t e ns ion

the le a d o pin ion

c re a te s. Th e Sup re me Court sim ila rl y

av oided re ading a conf

lict betwee n the RL A and a nother fe dera l statute in Atchison, Topeka and S a n t a F e R y . C o . v . B ue ll , 4 8 0 U.S. 557 (1987), in which the pla intiff, a ra ilroad worke r alleg ing workplac e injuries, brought suit under a fede ral statute pr oviding a cause of ac tion for ra ilroad worke rs injured due to their employ ers’ neg lige nce. T he rai l road company tried to argue that the plaintiff’s suit was also a “minor dispute” under the RL A, and that minor disputes w ere the exclusive jurisdiction of o n e o f t wo fede ral a rbitration boar ds. Id. at 563. The Supre me Court reje cted theNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 28 - defe ndant’s argument, rea soning that beca use Cong ress spec ifically

enac ted the ra ilroad neg lige nce statut e to r e me dy

the ty pe of inj ur y a lle g e d in

thi s c a se , d e fe nd ants we re a dv oc a tin g an im pli c it repe al of the ra ilroad neg lige nce statute without basis. Id. a t 56 6. We s ho uld re je c t Inte rv e no rs ’ RL A ar g ument here for the sa me re ason. As the for eg oing a

naly sis makes clea

r, the lea d opin i on’s asser tion that “[t ]he dissent by passes the te x t of [§ 152] , Nin th in c oncluding that the parties’ dispute is not a r epre sentational one under the R L A[,] ” L ead Op. at 12, is entirely misplaced. While the text of § 152, Nin th c ou ld encompa ss a dispute over a union merg er, nothing in the statute re q u i res such a re ading , and there fore , the key q uestion is whether a nother statute g rants fe dera l jurisdiction over this kind of dispute; if so, then t he dis pute cannot be represe ntational, or § 152, Nin th would contra dict the other statute’s conf

err al of fe dera l jurisdiction. The lead opinion plainly rec og nizes thi s, stating that “ we

are left to consider

whether Plaintiffs’ claims raise a re prese ntational dispute or a dispute governe d by other feder a l l a w , s

pecifically the LMRD

A .” L e a d O p. a t 12 (e mph a sis a dd e d) . D e sp ite

rec og nizi ng th is d ic h o to my , th e le a d o p in io nn e v e r

f o ll o w s thr o u g h o nit s d

u ty to c o n s id e r

the

a pp lic a bil ity of the L MRD A– and

wi th g oo d r e a so n, sin c e the le a d o pin ion wo uld have a dif fi c ult time expl aining how L MRDA Title Idoes not apply . I n short, the lead opinion is wrongto require proof that § 152, Nin th e x p r e s s l y exc ludes internal union merg er disputes ; gi v en the ex istence of another fede ral statute c onfer

ring jurisdiction, the lead o p i n i o n should provide proof that § 152, Nin th e x p r e s s l y includes su c h d isp ute s b e fo re it c re a te s a c on fl ic t be tw e e n th e statut e s. I n f ur the r s up po rt

of its pr op os iti on

that u ni on membe rs ’ c ha lle ng e to t he va lid ity

of the ir union’s merg er f

alls within the ex clusive jurisdiction of the NMB, the lead opinion r elies hea vily onNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

Oddly , the lead opinion quot es an NMB decision holding that a cha lleng e to an or g anization’s 3

“ me rg e r” pr oc e ss i s an in te rn a l un ion ma tte r un re la te d to the RL A, bu t th e n a pp e ars to d ist inguis h the instant case by

noting that Plaintiffs once ref err ed to the SMART merg er in their c omplaint as an “a cquisition,” as opposed to a “ mer ger . ” L ead O p. at 16. I f there is a rea son why a union “ac quisiti on” should be tre ated a s a re prese ntation dispute while a union “mer g er” should not, such - 29 - a dec ision by

our sister cir cuit, Mi nja re s v . Ind e p. As s’ n o

f Co nt’ l P ilo ts , 293 F.3d 895 ( 5th Cir. 2002). I n Minjares , the pl aintiffs were union members who soug ht, in advance of an imminent union

vo te on a pr op os e d me rg e r, to b loc k th e me rg e r b e c a us e its pr op os e d te rm s a lle g e dly vio la te d th e ir union’s constitution. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ a ppeal f or lac k of jurisdiction, citing t h e N M B ’ s e x c l u s i v e a

u t h o r i t y: We rec og nize that . . . a union’s decision to m er ge into another union could be vie we d a s a

pure ly int e rn a l un ion ma tte r, havin g no re la tio ns hip to t he RL A p ro c e ss. Howeve r, the pra ctical e ffe ct o f our inter fer ing w ith the merg er w ould be a c ourt imposed decision ef

fec tively decidingwho re prese nts the Pil ots. This fac t, toge ther wi th t he his tor ic a lly

lim ite d r ole of

the c ourt s in

e nf orcin g t he RLA, le a ds us to conclude that the RL A af fords the sole a

nd mandatory m ea n s for re solving the dispute. Id. at 899 (quotations and citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit thereby found a la ck of jurisdiction in Minjares wi tho ut e xami nin g the te xt or le g isl a tiv e his tor y of the RL A. Mo re ov e r, in r e a c hin g its conclusion, the c ourt eve n acknow ledg ed that interna l union matters do not r eadily fall within the

a mb i to f t h e R L A , w h i c h t y

p i c a l l y r e g u l a t e s d i s p u t e s b e t w e e nt r an s p o rt a t i o nc o mp an i e s an d t h e ir employ ees. This Court is cer tainly not under a

ny obligation to follow the case, a nd no other appellate court a

ppear s to ha

ve followed it e ither. I n light of the dubious basis for the F ifth Circuit’s decision, the lea d opinion’s emphasis on Minjares is not convincing

. I n short, the RL A simply does no t prec lude this Court from consideringthe merits of Pla int if fs ’ s uit

. 3No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

a re ason esc apes me , and the lea d opinion certa inly does not provide one

. - 30 - B. Title IV of the LMRDA I nterve nors offe r a se cond, alter native jurisdictional ar g ument: that T itle I V of the L MRDA prec ludes a fe dera l court fr om enjoining the merg er be cause the ef fec t of such a de cision would be to a bo lis h n e w SM AR T unio n o ff ic e r p os iti on s f

or wh ic h e le c tio ns have a lr e a dy be e n h eld . Thi s argument, which the lea d opinion does not reac h, is without m erit

. T i t l e I V of the L MRDA, 29 U. S.C. §§ 48 1- 83 , “ e sta

bli sh e s a se t of su bs tanti ve ru le s g ov e rn ingun ion e le c tio ns , [§ 4 81 ], and

it provides a c omprehe nsive proce dure f or enf orcing those rules, [ § 482].” Trbovich v. United M ine W orkers o f Am. , 4 04 U. S. 5 28 , 5 31 (1 97 2) . U nd e r t his statut e , a

ny un ion me mbe r w ho se e ks to challeng e the f

airne ss of elec tion results may , afte r exhausting inter nal union proce dures , file a complaint with the secr etar y of labor. 29 U .S.C. § 482(a). The secr etar y must then investigate the complaint, and, upon finding probable cause of a violation, must file a civil action ag ainst the union in f e de ra l c ourt . 2 9 U .S. C. § 48 2( b) . T he L MRD A p ro vid e s th a t “ [t]he re me dy pr ov ide d b y

[Tit le I V ] f o r c h a ll e n g in g ane le c ti o na lr e a dy c o n d u c te d s h a ll b e e xc lu s iv e , ” 2 9 U

. S. C. § 4 8 3 , an d the Supreme Court has c onfirmed that “ suit by the S ecr etar y [i s] the ‘e x clusive’ post-e lection re medy for a violation of Title I V.” Trbovich , 4 04 U. S. at 53 1. Ac c or din g ly , thi s Co ur t ha s h e ld t

hat “ Ti tle Icannot support a

cause of ac tion that se eks to inva lidate a pr eviously conducte d union election.” Da v is v . U

nit e d A uto W

or k e rs , 390 F.3d 908, 912 ( 6th Cir. 2004). C i t i n g Da v is , I nterve nors argue that Plaintiffs’ complaint is substantively a cla im based on Title I V, and not Tit l e I

. Howeve r, the fa cts of Da v is dif fe re d s ig nif

ic antl y fr om t he fa c ts i n th is

case . I n Da v is , the plaintiff, a dir ector of one of hi s union’s g eog raphic unions, disguised his intentNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 31 - to seek re -ele ction in order to r un unopposed; when he announce d his c andidac y on the eve of the convention at whic h the elec tion would take place , a g roup of union members pe titioned the convention to en ac t a constitutional amendment reor g anizing the union’s r eg ions and eliminating the plaintiff’s r eg ion, so as to defe at hi s eleve nth-hour candidacy

. Id. at 909-10. The plaintiff then filed suit in the di strict court, seeking resc ission of t he ame ndment and his reinstate ment as direc tor. Th is C ourt

no te d th a t a lth ou g h th e pla int if f c la ime d a vio la tio n of Ti tle I of the L MRD A, his c la im

w a s in s u b s ta n c e a c la im th a t h is u n io n e n g a g e d in u n f a ir e le c ti o n p r a c ti c e s . Id

. a t 91 2. B e c a us e only the sec reta

ry of labor ma

y file a suit in fede ral court alleg ing violations of Title I V, this Court dismiss ed the suit. Id. I nte rv e no rs are c or

re c t th a t Da v is teac hes to look bey ond the surfa ce la ng uag e of a

plaintiff’s complaint to determine w hether the claim is substantively a claim pursuant to Title Ior Title I V of the L MRDA. Howeve r, i n this case , the gravamen of Plainti ffs’ c omplaint is not the invalidity of the UTU’ s Aug ust 2007 office r ele ctions, but rather the i nvalidity of t he merg er vote; in contrast, the complaint in Da v is a lle g e d th a t th e un ion pa sse d a n ame ndme nt for the sole purpose of preve nting the plaintiff

from winning r e-e lection , and thus, was in substance an alleg ation of u n fair election pr a c tic e s. I nterve nors’ ar gu ment is based on the pr emise that the UTU ’s Aug ust 2007 convention

e le c te d SM AR T o ff

ic e rs , a nd that th e in

ju nct io n wo uld

c anc e l th e ne w o ff

ic e rs ’ e le c tio n b e c a

us e they would not be able to take the office they wer e ele cted to ser ve. Howe ver, the evidenc e in the

rec ord does not support a finding that enjoining the merg er w ould somehow ca ncel the r esults of the UTU’s Aug ust 2007 elec tions. The Mer g er A g ree ment only states that

if the merg er is complete d,No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 32 - t h o s e o f f i c e r s w o u l d b e c o m e o f

f i c e r s i n S M A R T ’ s n e w T r an s p o rt a t i o n D i v i s i o n ; t h e f a ilu re to consummate the me rg er me ans that those office rs elec ted in Aug ust 2007 w ill si mply rema in UTU of fi c e rs . Inte rv e no rs of

fe r t he de c laratio n o f on e of the c and idate s fo r the of fi c e of UT U p re sid e nt, who s tate d

th a t h e u n d e r s to o d

th a t t h e r a c e w a s f

o r th e to p s p o t o f

SM A RT ’ s T r an s p o rtati on Di vis ion . H ow e ve r, the Se pte mbe r 200 7 ed iti on of the UT U n e ws le tte r, in w hic h th e e le c tio n r e su lts

we re announce d, clea

rly states that the ele ction winners “ have be en ele cted to lea d the United Transport ation Union int o it s r e c e ntl y ratif ie d me rg e r[. ]” ( RO A a t 15 41 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T hu s, the UTU a cknowledg ed what was cle ar f rom the Merg er Ag ree ment: that the elections were for the purpose of

elec ting UT U offic ers, not SMART office rs, and the failure to c lose the merg er the ref ore do e s n ot i nv a lid a te the re su lts of tho se e le c tio ns . Moreove r, there is no alleg ation in the complaint that the Aug ust 2007 elections wer e unfa ir, or that t he UTUviolated the L MRDA in the manner in which the ele ctions were conducte d–nor do I nte rv e no rs make su c h a

n a rgume nt i n th e ir

mot ion to dis mis s. B e c a

us e the fa ir

ne ss of the Au g us t 2007 elec tions is not at issue her e, and beca u s e P l ai n tiffs’ complaint is entirely focuse d on the validity of the mer g er vote itself, the complaint was proper ly broug ht pur suant to Title Iof L MRDA,

and the dis tr ic t c ourt

ha d ju ri sd ic tio n to he ar i t. II. P r e lim ina r y I nj unc ti on Havingfound that the district cour t properly exercised jurisdiction over Plainti ffs’ suit, I would further

find that the district co urt did not abuse its discretion in g ranting the pre liminary injunction enjoining the mer g er.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 33 - This Court reviews a district cour t’s order g ranting a pre liminary

injunction for abuse of dis c re tio n, re vie wi ngthe c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s fo r c le ar e rr or

and its le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo

. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C . v. TenkeCorp. , 511 F.3d 535, 540- 41 (6th Cir. 2007). “A n appellate court in re viewing the proprie ty of a preliminary injunction should refr ain from the unnece ssary comment on the evidenc e or r eview of the merits of the c ase since the ca se has y et to be hea rd in f ull on the me rits.” Christ ian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heilem an Brewing Co. , 753 F.2d 1354, 1356 ( 6th Cir. 1985). A district court must consider four fac tors in deciding whether to issue a pre liminary injunction: “(1) the plaintiff’ s likelihood of succe ss o n the merits; (2) whe ther the pla intiff may

su ff e r i rr e pa ra ble ha rm a bs e nt t he in ju nct ion ; ( 3) wh e the r g ra nti ngthe inj un c tio n w ill c a us e substantial harm to others; and (4) t he im pact of an inj unction upon the public intere st.” Tucker v

. City of F air fie ld , 398 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omi tted). These four fac tors are “fa ctors to be ba lance d, not prere quisites that must be met,” a nd “the district cour

t’s weig hing a

nd balanc ing of

the equiti es i s overr

uled only in the rar est of ca ses.” Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sy

stems , 119 F.3d 393, 400 ( 6th Cir. 1997). Although the district c ourt’s decision that a litigant is likely to suc cee d on the merits is a leg al question that is reviewe d de novo , “the district c ourt’s ultimate de termination as to w hether the four pr e lim ina ry inj un c tio n fa c tor s we ig h in fa vo r of g ra nti ng or de nying pr e lim ina ry inj un c tiv e re lie f i s revie wed f

or abuse of discre tion.” Ce rti fie d Resto ra tio n Dry

Cle an ing Ne two rk, 511 F.3d at 541.

“ Th e dis tr ic t cour t’ s det erminatio n w ill be dis tur be d o nly if the dis tr ic t c ourt

re lie d u po n c le a rl y

erro neous finding s of fa ct, improperly applied the g overninglaw, or use d an er roneous leg alNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 34 - standard.” Id. (citations om itted). “A finding is clea rly err oneous whe n, althoug h there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidenc e is left wit h the def inite and firm convic tion that a mistake a s been c ommitt ed.” An de rso n v . City of Be sse me r Ci ty , 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quotations and citation omitted). “In order to establish a likelihood of succe ss on the merits of a c laim, a plaintiff must show

more than a mer e possibility of succ ess.” Six Clinics , 119 F .3 d a t 40 2. “ Ho we ve r, it i s o rd ina ri ly sufficie nt if the plaintiff has ra ised questions g oing to the me rits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the m a fa ir g round for litigation and thus for

more de liberate investigation.” Id. As previously

discussed, Title I of the L MRDA safe g uards union member s’ rig ht to take par t in nondiscriminatory

union voting by

rec og nizi ng “the r ight of

a mea ningf ul vote,” Se rti c , 423 F.2d at 521, including the rig ht to “suff icient i nformation .

. . to allow a r easone d and informe d vote on the proposal whic h appea rs on the ballot.” Blan c ha rd , 532 F.2d at 1079. Plainti ffs c laim that the UT U’ s fa i l u re to include the two unions’ constitutions i n the J uly 2007 mailing that pr epar ed the UTU’s me mbers for

the merg er vote deprive d the UTU’ s members of a meaning ful, informed vote ; they wer e unable to discern the e x tent to which the two constitutions were in conflict, and the ref ore, could not deter

mine if the merg er would weaken their rig hts a s they curr ently exis ted under the UTU constitution. I n g ranting Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction m o tion, the district court found that Plaintiffs had shown “a

substantial likelihood of success on their claim that they

wer e depr ived of

a mea ningf ul vote in the merg er r efe rendum” as a r esult o f the UTU’ s failure to include the constitutions i n the merg er voting materia ls. (ROA at 1568-69.)No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 35 - The UTU-SMWI A Merg er Ag ree ment specific ally conditioned completion of the me rg er on UTU membe rs’ “ approv al of this Merg er A g ree ment and of the SMART Cons tituti on.” (ROA at 209.) Althoug h the SMART constituti on had not bee n finalized by the time of the mer g er vote , a

com p ar is o n o f th e U T U an d SM WI A c o n s ti tuti o n s w o u ld h a v e a t le a s t g iv e n U T U members the opportunity

to understand whic h provisions of their own c onstitut ion might not be im ported into the

ne w o ne . A lth ou g h th e UT U’ s we bp a g e de vo te d to the me rg e r i nc lud e d b oth c on sti tut ion s, the re is a dea rth of evide nce c oncer

ning w hether

the UTU ha d previously used website postings to inform its me mbe rs , o r w he the r w e b po st ing s c ou ld h a ve be e n a re lia ble me ans of

inf or min g the m. Reg ardle ss, none of the U TU’s a nnounceme nts conce rn i n g the merg er e ven spec ified that the constitutions could be located on the U TU we bsite; the “spec ial edition” SMART newsletter included in the mailing only stated that “[t] o stay

curr en t, [ members c ould] g o to www.utu.org .” (ROA at 222.) This r efe renc e to the UTU’s website hardly constitutes a dequate notice that t he constitutions could be found there . Be cause Plaintif fs appea r at lea st to have ra ised substantial

e no ug h q ue sti on s r e g ard ingthe e xten t to wh ic h the memb e rs ’ v ote wa s me anin g fu l to make the ir L MRDA claim “a fair gr ound for litigation,” see Six Clini cs , 11 9 F .3 d a t 40 2, the dis tr ic t c ourt did

no t e rr in f ind inga lik e lih oo d o f s uc c e ss. The othe r factors in the pre liminary injunction analy sis all favor Plaintiffs. F irst, the ir re pa ra ble natur e of the ha

rm a lle g e d in t

his a c tio n is se lf

-e vid e nt; it w ou ld b e e xtre me ly dif fi c ult for the district c ourt to undo the merg er once completed, or calculate plaintiffs’ damag es re sulting fr om t he in fr ing e me nt o f t he ir vo tin g ri g hts . Se c on d, a lth ou g h th e los s o f t he imm e diate c os t eff iciencie s the merg er w ould ge nerate if complete d could be ha rmful to t h e UT U’ s financ ialNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 36 - int e re sts , the h ar

m t o u n i o nm e mb e r s w o u l d b e f ar g r e a t e r i f t h e m e r g e r

g o e s f o r w ar d c o n t r a r y to their intere sts. Moreover , it is di fficult to discer n any harm to SMWI A from the merg er be ing de lay e d, and

I nte rv e no rs do no t pr e se nt a ny argume nt c on c e rn ingthe ha rm to S MWI A o n a

pp e a l. Finally , with respec t to the impact of an injunction upon the public intere st, the L MRDA ref lects Cong ress’ be lief that, “in the public inte re s t , i t co ntinues to be the re sponsibili ty of the F e de ra l G ov e rnme nt t o p ro te c t e mpl oy e e s’ ri g hts to o rg anize , c ho os e the ir ow n r e pr e se ntativ e s, barg ain collec tively , and other wise enga g e in conc erte d activities for the ir mutual aid or prote ction; . . . in order to acc o m p l i s h the objective of a fr ee f low of commer ce it is essential that labor

or g anizatio ns . . . a dh e re to t he hig he st s tand a

rd s o f r e sp on sib ili ty

and e thi c a l c on du c t in

a dmi nis te ri ngthe a ff

a ir s o f t he ir or g anizatio ns [.]” 29 U.S .C . § 40 1( a ). Thus , th e fe de ra l c ourt s’ enfor ceme nt of the rig ht of union members to par ticipate in important union ref ere nda ser

ves the public interest. Interve nors ar g ue that the district cour t’s injunction “promises to para ly ze u n io nselfg ov ern anc e [.]” Ap pe lla

nt’ s B r. a t 64 . Wh ile me mbe rs ’ v oti ngri g hts un do ub te dly c omp lic a te

un ion s’ a bil ity to m a ke de c isi on s, Con g re ss s pe c if ic a lly fo un d th is c on str a int

to b e “ ne c e ssar

y to eliminate or pre vent improper pr actice s on the part of labor org anizations[ .]” 29 U.S.C. § 401(c ). I nterve nors also ar g ue that injunctions in case s such as this one will ultim ately cause the UTU a

nd other unions to ref

rain fr om ho l d i n g m embership votes on such important decisions like this one, for f ear of judicial scr

utiny . Howeve r, g iven that the UT U’s constitution requires its le a de rs to

su bmi tp r o p o s e d

m e r g e r s t o i t s m e mb e r s f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n , t h i s c o n c e r

na p p e ar s o v e r s t a t e d , a tl e a st with respec t to the union at issue here

.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 37 - Witha ll f our f a c tor s w e ig hin g in f

a vo r o f a n in jun c tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in g ranting Plaintiffs’ motion and enjoining the merg er pending the outcome of the case . Ithe re fo re re sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 38 - HOLS CHUH, District

Judge, am ended opini o n c o nc ur r in g in t her e v e r s a l o f t hedi s t rict court’ s judgme nt. Ifully concur with the first para g raph of J udg e McK eague’s amended opinion. Contrary to J udg e C l ay ’s cr iticism of J udg e McK eague’s introduc tory para g raph, that p ar agr ap h s er v es t o el i m i n at e a n y co n fu s i o nt h at m ay ar i s e fr o m o u r t h re e s ep ar at e o p i n i o n s . J u d ge McKe ag ue states that I

concur in the judgme nt of reve rsal and dismiss al of this c ase and believe that the inj un c tio n s ho uld

no t ha ve be e n is su e d. Th a t is an a c c ur a te de sc ri pti on of my op ini on . I t is my strong belief that under the undisputed fac ts, no claim has bee n stated by the plaintiffs upon which relief can be gra

nted under § 101(a) (1) of the L abor- Manag ement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“L MRDA”). A ccor dingly , i t may have be en unnec essar

y for me to f

urther state that the i n j u n ct i o ns h o u l d

n o th av e b ee ni s s u edo nt h e m er i t s , al t h o u gh Ial s o b el i ev e t h at t o b e t ru e. J u d ge Clay ’s footnote, howe ver, is not cor rec t when he states that “t wo j udg es of this court” felt that

“ Pla int if fs have no ve nu e to p ur su e the ir c la im. ” Pla int if

fs did have a ve nu e to p ur su e the ir c la im, i.e. , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio n und e r the L MR DA, bu t c omp le te ly fa ile d to su

pp or t a c la im which could be g rante d under that Act bec ause of the undisputed fac ts of this particular c ase. Judg e Cla y c ri tic ize s Judg e Mc Ke a g ue ’s state me nt that a lth ou g h the re are thr e e op ini on s in this case, one result i s re ached. His ac cusation is that this is a “misleading asser tion.” To the

c on tr ary , it

is a tr ue and a c c ur a te de sc ri pti on of our op ini on s. Th e re a so nin g ind e e d ma y be dif fe re nt, but there is only one result from the leading , concur ring , and dis senting opinions—rever sal of the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

Judg e Cla y is a lso c ri tic a l of my op ini on be c a us e he is of the be lie f t

hat I have re a d c ir c uit 1 prec edent “ extremely narr owly ,” an obvious ref ere nce to the decision of t his court in Blanchard v. Johnson , 523 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1976). I find that ca se to be distinguisha ble, but it certa inly

is not unus ua l f or jud g e s to dis a g re e in t

he ir re a din g of

the c a se law. He a lso fa

ult s my op ini on

be c a us e it do e s n ot d i s c u s s p l a i nt if

fs ’ c la ims un de r t

he L a bo r M ana g e me nt R e la tio ns Ac t ( “ L MRA ” ), 29 U. S.C. § 185, and § 101(a )(2) of the L MRDA. The undisputed fa cts, howeve r, cle arly establish that the fre edom of spee ch cla im under § 101(a )(2) o f t h e L MRDA is frivolous and that there was no violation of the L MRA beca use no b re ac h o f the Mer g er A g ree ment or the UTUConstit ution occur red. The union members voted o v e r wh e lm in g ly

in favor of

the Merg er A g ree ment that set forth, in gr eat de tail, how the merg er w ould be ac complished and the me rg ed constitution crea ted. - 39 - J udg e Clay

cites no Six th Circuit prece dent for his re marka ble position that because of our disag ree ments, we should ag ree to vacate all of our opinions and a sk that a diffe rent pa nel of judg es be assig ned to hear this case . Even if such ex traordina ry prec edent ex ists in this circuit, and I know of none, I respe ctfully

disag ree . 1 Fo r t h e r ea s o n s s et fo rt h b y J u d ge C l ay i nh i s d ec i s i o n , Ire s p ec t fu l l y d i s agr ee wi t h J u d ge McKe ag ue’s de cision that the district court lac ked subjec t matter jurisdiction in this case on the g round that plaintiffs’ c laims involved a represe ntation dispute within the ex clusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Boa rd. Whil e I ag ree with Judge Clay that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction under the L MRDA, and also that the Secre tary of L abor ne ed not have broug ht this suit , I am of the opi nion that the evidence and the law in this case cannot support the issuanc e of an in jun c tio n und e r t

hat A c t, a nd I the re fo re wo uld re ve rs e the de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt , v a c a te its judgment, and or der that this action be dismissed.

I. IntroductionNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 40 - Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is based entire ly on a claim that althoug h a g reat amount of information

re g ard inga

pr op os e d me rg e r o f t

he ir un ion wa s g ive n b y un ion

of fi c e rs to t he me mbe rs , it

a lle g e dly was not enoug h in their opi nion to permit their vot e to be a “mea ningf ul” vot e. Of

g reat importance is the fac t that the y do not a lleg e—nor could they —that there was any discrimination by the offic ers of the un ion

in t he a mou nt o f i nf or ma tio n g ive n to the me mbe rs of the un ion

or in t he mann e r i n which it was g iven. All members of the union indisputably

wer e tre ated e qually

throug hout the entire vot i n g p ro cess. The claim is that the union officia ls failed to provide c opies of the nonexis tent SMART constitution and hard copies of the 149-pag e SMWI U constitution to every union member be fore the vote, and t h at t h is failure de prived the me mbers, under Six th Circuit law, of a

“ me an in g f

u l” v o te

. I p e r s o n a ll y b e li e v e th a t th is c o u rt h a s ju d ic ia ll y in s e rte d a r e qu ir e me nt in a statut e , § 10 1( a )( 1) of

the L MRD A, tha

t do e s not e

x ist , i.e. , a requirement that not only must there be no discrimination in voting , but a lso that a ll votes cast must be “mea ningf ul” votes as dete rmined b y a federa l court examining e very bit of information provided in orde r to rende r an opinion that enoug h information has be en g iven or not enoug h information has be en g iven. The discussion that follows considers the Six th Circuit’s decisions, albeit fewin number, re g ardingthis court’s cr eation of thi s a dd e d r e qu ir e me nt. II. Th e Right To Have An Equ al Vote Section 101 (a)(1) of

the L MRDA (sometimes ref err ed to as Title I

of the Ac t or the Ac t’s

“ B ill of Rig hts ” ) i s a gu ara

nte e of the ri g ht t o b e tr e a te d e qu a lly by un ion of fi c ia ls. I t pr ov ide s th a t: Ev e ry me mbe r of a la

bo r or g anizatio n sha ll h a ve e qu a l r ig hts and pr ivi le g e s w ith in such org anization to nomi nate candidates, to vote in e lections or re fer endums of the labor org anization, to attend membership m ee t ings, a nd to participate in theNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 41 - de lib e ratio ns and

vo tin g up on

the bu sin e ss o f s uc h me e tin g s, su bje c t to re a so na

ble ru le s and re g ulatio ns in s uc h o rg anizatio n' s c on sti tut ion and bylaws . 29 U.S.C. § 4 1 1 (a )( 1 ) (2 000). B y its terms, the statute is directed to c oncer ns of equa lity

of treatment; it requires that all union members be treated equa lly wi t h respe ct to a spec ific set of actions: nominations, voting, attenda nce at membership meeting s, and par ticipation in deliberations and voting . The obvious re ading of the plain languag e of the statu t e i s t h at it prevents off icer s of

un ion s f ro m di sc ri min a tin g a mon g the me mbe rs of the un ion in t he se sp e c if

ic e ve nts

. This c lear rea ding of the statute wa s announce d by the Supreme Court in Calhoon v. Harv ey , in which union members c laimed their rig ht to nominate candidate s under § 101(a) (1) wa s violated when their

union’s by laws and c onstitut ion set strict, but uniform, require ments for nominations for office r elections. 379 U.S. 134, 139 (1964). Specif ically , the two complaints of the union member s

wer e, first, that the by

laws prohibited self-nomination and, sec ond, that the constitution prohibited any one fr om being nominated who had not be en a “ member of the national union for f ive y ear s and ha d s e rv e d 1 80 da

y s o r more of seat im e in ea c h o f t wo of the pr e c e din gthr e e y e ars on ve sse ls

cover ed by

collective ba

rg aining ag ree ments with the national or its subsidiary bodies.” Id. at 135–36. I n its consideration of these complaints, the Court noted that whether the re quirements ar e

rea sonable a

nd valid “is a que stion separate and distinct from whether the r ight to nominate on a n equal ba sis given by

§ 101(a) (1) wa s violated.” Id. a t 13 9. As fo r § 10 1( a )( 1) : Pla inl y , this is no mor e tha n a com mand that memb e rs and c la sse s of m e mbe rs sh a ll not be dis criminated ag ainst in their right t o nominate and vote. .

. . The c omplaining union members have not been discr iminated ag ainst in any way and have been de nied no pr ivi le g e or

ri g ht t o n omi nate wh ic h th e un ion ha s g ra nte d to oth e rs .No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 42 - Id. Be cause “the same qualifications were require d equally of all members,” the Court continued, th e r e w a s n o “ d is c r im in a ti o n a g a in s t th e ir r ig h t to n o mi n a te

. ” Id. Thus , th e Court re fu se d to acknow ledg e that § 101(a) (1) could be violated in the absenc e of alleg ations of some union members being treated diffe rently

from other s. Id. at 138–39. This circuit has r epea

tedly applied the pr inciple that an e qual vote claim may not be broug ht in the a bs e nc e of a lle g a tio ns of

un e qu a l tr e a tme nt b e tw e e n me mbe rs . See Nienaber v. Ohio Valley Car pe nte rs D ist

ric t Co un c il , 652 F.2d 1284, 1 2 8 6 (6 th Cir. 1981) (re fusing to rec og nize a § 101(a) (1) violation bec ause “ [t ]he District Court pr o p e r ly c o n c lu d e d that there was no discr imination be tw e e n me mbe rs of

the un ion and no de nia l of the e qu a l r ig ht t o v ote .” ); Cor e a v . W e lo , 937 F.2d 1132, 1141 (6th Cir. 1991) (“ Where ther e is no discrimination betwee n members of a union there is no denial of the equal rig ht to vote.

. . . Thus the issue under [§ 101(a) (1)] is not whether membe rs

we re tr e a te d p ro pe rl y

or fa ir ly , b ut w he the r t

he y we re tr eate d e qu a lly .” ); Ri c ha rd s v . O hio Civ il S er vi ce E mp l o

yee s Ass’n , 2 0 5 F

. A p p ’ x 3 4 7 , 3 5 3 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( c o n c lu d in g th a t e v e nw h e r e an optional vote was de nied to members completely , “the claim must stil l alleg e discrimination linked to the absenc e of a

vote”) ; Angel v. U

nited Pap er w o r ke r

s Int’l Union (

Pace ) Local 1967 , 2 21 F. Ap p ’x 3 93, 400 (6th Cir. 2007) (“ Be cause the alleg ed violation of the Union’s c onstitut ion and bylaws re su lte d in

the un ive rs a l de nia l of a ratif ic a tio n vo te , rathe r t

ha n th e de nia l of

a vo te to s ome but not others, plaintiffs fail to alleg e the discr imination required by [§ 101(a)(1) .]”). Acc ordin g ly , b e c a

u s e p la in ti f

f s h e r e h a v e ma d e n o a ll e g a ti o n s th a t t h e y w e r e tr e a te d differ ently

from any other membe r i n the i nformation they rec eived f rom UTU of

ficials, ther e is no do ub t th a t § 1 01 (a )( 1) wa s n ot v iol a te d b a se d o n a n e qu a l vo te c la im.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

Se c tio n 1 01 (a )( 3) , c od if

ie d at 29 U. S.C. § 4 11 (a )( 3) (2 00 0) , p ro vid e s in pa rt : 2 Du e s, ini tiatio n f

e e s, and a sse ssm e nts Ex cept in the c ase of a federa tion of national or international labor org anizations, the rate s o f d ue s and ini tiatio n f

e e s p ay a ble by me mbe rs of

any la bo r o rg anizatio n in eff ect on Septembe r 14, 1959 shall not be incr ease d, and no gen er al or spec ial assessment shall be le vied upon such membe rs, except-- (A) in the c ase of

a loca l labor org anization, (i) by majority vote by secr et ballot of t h e me mb er s i n go o d s t an d i n g v o t i n g at a gen er al o r sp ec i al m em b e r s h i p m e et i n g, a ft e r r e a so na

ble no tic e of

the int e nti on

to v ote up on

su c h q ue sti on , o r ( ii) by

ma jor ity vote of the member s in good standingvoting in a me mbership re fer endum conduc ted by secr et ballot; . . . - 43 - III . The Six th Ci r c uit ’s Judi c ial ly A dde d Re quir e m e nt To T he St at ut e That A V ot e M ust Not Only Be Eq ual, It Must Also Be “Meaningf ul.” Th is c ir c uit

ha s r e a d into § 101 (a )( 1) the no tio n tha t a pla int if f may ba se a § 1 01 (a )( 1) c la im

on the denial of the rig ht to a “mea ningf ul” vote, not just an “equa l” vote. This addit ional

r e qu i r e m e n ti s s o m e t i m e s s a i d t o c o m e f

r o m a f e w c a s e s o f

t h i s C o u r t , p r i m ar i l y Blanchard v. Johnson , 523 F.2d 1074 ( 6th Cir. 1976) and Brown v. IBEW Local Union No. 58 , 9 36 F .2 d 2 51 (6 th Cir . 1 99 1) . I ts r oo ts, ho we ve r, we re pla nte d in a 1970 c a se that di d n ot e ve n me nti on the Sup re me Court’s decision in Calhoon

. Se rti c v . Cu

y ah og a, Lak e, G e au ga an d A sh tab ula Cou nti es Ca rp e nte rs D ist ric t Co un c il , 423 F .2 d 5 15 (6 th Cir

. 19 70 ), us he re d in to t his Cir c uit

the c on c e pt t

hat un de r t

he L MRD A v ote s mu st be “me aning ful.” Co m ing just a f ew y ear s after Calhoon , Se rti c involved a dispute not under § 10 1( a )( 1) , b ut r a the r u

nd e r § 10 1( a )( 3) , w hic h e xplic itl y g ua ra nte e s un ion me mbe rs the ri g ht t o v ote

on the rate s of du e s and

ini tiatio n f

e e s. Se rti c , 423 F.2d 515. The issue in Se rti c was whe ther it was 2 a violation of § 101(a) (3) for t he union officers to re quire that a question reg ardingdues be c ombinedNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 44 - with a question r e g ar d in g a w a g e in c r e a s e in to ju s t o n e v o te o nth e b a ll o t. I no th e r w o r d s , the members ha d no opportunity to vote aga inst a dues incre ase without also voti ng , at the same time, ag ainst neg otiations for a wa g e incr ease , and vice -ver sa. Holding that such a ba llot did vi olate § 101(a) (3), the c ourt noted that the purpose of the L MRDA was to e n s u re “t he full and a ctive participation by

the ra nk and file in t h e af

fa i rs of the union.” Id. at 521 (quoting American Fe de ra tio n of Mu sic ian s v . W it tst e in , 379 U.S. 171, 182–83 (1964)). F rom this bare state ment of the purpose of

the L MRDA, the court said that “[u] nion me mbers are entitled under the Act to the rig ht of a mea

ningf ul vote on incre ases in dues or ass es s ments.” Id. Although § 101( a)( 3) wa s clea rly violated in Se rti c , b e c a

us e the ba llo t de pr ive d me mbe rs e nti re ly of the a bil ity to ca st a

pla in

“ y e s” or “ no ” vo te on

e a c h q ue sti on , th e c ourt

did no t dis c us s wh a t w ou ld c on sti tut e a “ me anin g fu l” vote on in c r e a s e s in d

u e s o r a s s e s s me n ts

. O b v io u s ly , a b a ll o t th a t w a s w o r d e d to in clude two differ ent issues in one question was not in any sense a fair ba llot, but by

inserting the words “mea ningf ul vote,” the se ed for adding a judicially -cr eate d require ment to the statute was plante d. Six y ear s later, this court hear d a claim that sufficie nt inf ormation conce rning a vote had not been g iven by

union office rs to the member s. This tim e the c laim was made under § 101( a)( 1), and t h e v o te was on a

proposed mer g er, f

or which a

vote is not require d by

the L MRDA, instead of a vote on a due s increa se, for which a vote is specifica lly require d. Blan c ha rd , 532 F.2d at 1075–76. Th e of fi c e rs of a loc a l un ion

that ha d d isaffil iat e d it se lf fr om a natio na l un ion

re c e ive d p ro po sa ls from thre e national unions for a mer g er. The office rs voted to ac cept the pr oposal from the I nternational L ong shoreman’ s Association (I L A) a nd reje cted all other proposals. A f ew membe rs of t h e l ocal union who wa nted a mer g er w ith one of the re jected unions (the MEBA ) broug ht anNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 45 - action to obta in a

n injunction blocking a vote on the proposed merg er with the I L A. T h e d i s t rict court a cknowledg ed that the unions’ c onstitut ion permitted only one proposal to be on a ballot but

ne ve rt he le ss i ssu e d a

n inj un c tio n re qu ir ing that the of fi c e rs wh o ha d re

je c te d the oth e r p ro po sa ls a lso pla c e on the ba llo t the ME B A pr op os a l fa vo re d by the dis g ru

ntl e d un ion me mbe rs . I n re sp on se to the of fi c e rs ’ r e fu sa l to pla c e the re je c te d p ro po sa l on

the ba llo t, t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

sa id: Suc h a re fusal by

union office rs, who ar e, af ter a ll, fiduciaries, r

uns afoul of the policies which underlie ss 411 and 501, because seriatim balloting in this case may re su lt i n u nfa ir a dv an tage for thepr op os al f

av or e d b ytheun ion leade rsh ip . Thus th e C ou rtwi ll enj oi n t he u s e o f t he co ns ti tu ti on al p rov is io n an d o rder th e ME BA proposal plac ed on the ba llot along with the I L A proposal. Id. at 1077 (e mphasis added)

. The ba sis for the distri ct court’s injunction was not that a vote on the I L A proposal a lone

wo uld no t ha ve be e n a “ me anin g fu l” vo te , b ut t

hat a vo te on the I L A pr op os a l f

ir st w itha po ssi ble vote on t he MEB A proposal late r could “ result in unfair a dvantag e for the proposal f

avore d by the union le ader ship.” Id. I n othe r wo rd s, the dis tr ic t court be lie ve d tha t ser ia tim vo tin g wo uld pe rm it the union’s offic ers to discriminate in favor of the officers who liked the I L A proposal a s opposed to th e me mb ers who wan ted th e ME BA pro po sal

. Th e di st ri ct ju dge th en o rder ed t hat th e ME BA proposal fa

vored by t h e plaintiffs a lso be place d on the same ba llot. As a result, the pre cise issue

on appea l w as whether the district c ourt err ed in r equiring the reje cted MEBA proposal to be put on the ballot along side the I L A proposal a cce pted by the union’s offic ers. Id. a t 10 77 –7 8. I n th e c ours e of holding that the district court e rre d, this court first discussed re levant ca se law. It reiterated the purpose of

the L MRDA, as stated by the Supreme Court in W

itt ste in , i.e. , “ther e should be full and active pa rticipation by the rank and file in the affairs of the uni on,” and then, citing the Se rti c case ,No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 46 - injected the Se rti c proposition that “(u)nion member s are entit l ed u n d er the Act to the r ight of a meaning ful vote . . .”, id. at 1078, omitting the re maining la ng uag e of that sentence —“on incr ease s in due s or a sse ssm e nts .” Th e c ourt , v ia an in c omp le te qu otatio n f ro m Se rti c , cre ated an additional

re qu ir e me nt r e g ard ingvo te s th a t is no t c on ta ine d in the statut e , a g a in n ot e la

bo ra tin g on wh a t c ou ld constitute a “me aning ful” vote. The Blan c ha rd

court va cate d the district court’s judg ment issuing an injunction bec ause the dis tr ic t c o u rt’ s in

ju n c ti o n in tr

u d e d in to th e in te r

n a l a f f a ir s o f th e u n io n , b u t in d o in g so the court ag ain re fer

red to the “ informed vote” conce pt. I t r ecog nized that the Supreme Court, in Calhoon , had found that § 101(a)( 1) is purely a prohibition ag ainst discrimination, and that there is nothing in the L MRDA reg ardingvoting r ights that pe rmits a court to interf ere in the internal a ffa i rs of a union. Refer

ring to the Sertic case , the cour t said: This Court, after r evie wi n g t h e leg islative history and judicial conside ration of the L MRDA, conclude d in Se rti c v . Di str ic t Co un c il o

f Ca rp e nte rs , 423 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1970), that “( u)nion m em b er s ar e entitled under the Act to the r ight of

a meaning ful vote . . ..” Ho we v e r , t h i s C o u rt i s n o t u n f e t t e r e d i n i t s d e t e r

m i n a t i o n o f w h a t c o n s t i tu t e s “ fu ll and a c tiv e pa rt ic ipatio n” or

a “ me ani ngful vote .” As the Sup re me Cou rt no te d in Calhoon v. Harvey , 3 79 U. S. 1 34 , 1 38 –3 9 ( 19 64 ), iss ue d the same da y a s [ W itt ste in ]: Con g re ss c are fu lly

pr e sc ri be d tha t e ve n th is r ig ht a g a ins t discrimination is ‘subject to rea sonable rules and regulations’ by the union.” T h e Co u rt a ls o s tate [d ]: Plainly , (s 101(a)(1)) is no more than a command that members and c la sse s o f m e mbe rs sh a ll not be dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t in the ir ri g ht t o nominate and vote. 379 U .S. at 139.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 47 - The Second Circuit in Sheldon v. O’ Callaghan , 497 F.2d 1276, 1281 ( 2d Cir. 1974), subscribed to the r easoningin Allen v. Inte rnational All iance of Theatri cal Employe es , 3 38 F .2 d 309 , 317 (5 th Cir . 196 4) , “( t) his Court re c og nize s th e ne e d to e xer c ise wh a t Judg e Wisd om r e fe rr e d to a s a ‘sound re luc tanc e . . . to int e rf

e re in internal union af

fairs’ . The Sheldon Court a dd e d: Th e du ly e le c te d o ff

ic e rs of a un ion have a ri g ht a nd a re sp on sib ili ty to le a d, and to g ive the member s t h e b en ef it of their advice on questions that arise.” 497 F.2d at 1282. Id. at 1078 (pa

rallel c itations omi tted). I n response to the district c ourt’s conce rn about a ballot that included only

one proposa l, and

wo uld re su lt i n dis c ri min a tio n in fa vo r of the of

fi c e rs wh o fa

vo re d the I L A p ro po sa l, t

he c ourt sa id that seriatim voting is pe rmitted “so long as sufficie nt inf ormation about all proposals re ceive d by the Executive Boa

rd is disseminated to the membership to allow a r easone d and informe d vote on the proposal which appear s on the ballot .” Blan c ha rd , 532 F.2d at 1079. This, the court c ontinued, would enable the member s to e x erc ise their “statutorily g uara nteed rig ht to an informed vote.” Id. Acc ording ly , Blan c ha rd

stands basica lly

for th e p roposi tion that where a union re ceive s merg er proposals fr om a number of differ ent suitors, union office rs nee d not present e very proposal to the members f

or a vote on eac h proposal (unle ss the constitution or by laws re quire other wise); instead, the un ion of fi c ia ls m ay

pr e se nt j us t on e pr op os a l f or ra tif ic a tio n, a s lo nga s th e y

g ive so me information about the other prop o s al s i n o rd er that the vote on the pr oposal on the ballot be a n

“ inf or me d” vo te a

nd thu s n ot a

ny dis c ri min a tio n b y

the unio n offic e rs in f

a vo r o f t he un ion on its ba llo t. What Blan c ha rd

do e s not inv olv e , ho we ve r, is an a tte mpt by dis g ru ntl e d un ion me mbe rs to tell the district court that the infor mation provided by

the union of

ficials of the terms of the pr oposalNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

J udg e McKeague, in footnote 2 of his opinion, incorr ectly states that my

argument is “that 2 § 1 0 1 (a)(1) of

the L MRDA should be rea d to only require an equa l, as opposed to a mea ningf ul vote.” My

argument is that (1) the Supreme Court in Calhoun and t h e S i x t h Circuit in numerous decisions have held that § 101(a )(1) of the L MRDA is p u re l y an anti-discr imination provision cre ated f or the purpose of ensur ing that ever y union member has an equal vote; and (2) a fe w ca ses in this C ircuit neve rtheless c ontain lang uag e, ty pically in dic ta, that has judicially eng raf ted another require ment on the statute, i.e. , that a vote m u s t n ot only be an e qual vote, it also must be a “mea ningf ul” vote, Se rti c , or an “in fo rm ed ” v o te, Blan c ha rd . A s st a te d a bo ve , I be lie ve that § 1 01(a) (1) can be vio la te d w he re the un ion of fi c ia ls’ dis c ri min a tor

y c on du c t wou ld

r e n d e r the members’ votes meaning less, as in Blan c ha rd , b ut no t wh e n mer e ly le ss inf or ma tio n th an p os sib le has bee n provided the vote rs in a non-discr iminatory manner . Iam well aw are that a decision by one panel of t his court c annot over rule the de cision of a pr ior pa ne l. I do no t su g g e st that Blan c ha rd is no longe r the lawin the Six th Circuit; I do - 48 - on the ballot was insuffic ient. I nstead, it involved the conc ealment by the office rs of the terms of other proposa ls which the officers did not like. Be fore order ing that the MEBAproposal also a ppear

on the ballot f

or a vote, the district c ourt had a lrea dy order ed that simply

the terms of

a ll p ro po sa ls must be disclosed, and pre sumably this is the s ame information which the district court provide d on

rema nd. I t is clear that the Blan c ha rd court did not discuss, beca use it was outside the scope of the qu e sti on pr e se nte d, wh e the r mor e inf or ma tio n wo uld be re qu ir e d to be pr ov ide d r e g ard ingthe te rm s of t he other proposals. Se e Cor e a v . W e lo , 937 F.2d 1132, 1140 ( 6th Cir. 1991) (“ Blan c ha rd

me re ly require s full disclosure of the te rm s of a ll p ro po sa ls submitt ed to the m ember ship for a r efe rendum in order to e nsure that the vote is meaning ful and that the me mbership has fully participated i n the decision making proce ss.”) (e mphasis in origina l). Blan c ha rd obviously does nothing to adva nce the ide a that the “ statut or ily g ua ra nte e d r ig ht t o a

n in fo rm e d v ote ” un de r § 10 1( a )( 1) re qu ir e s c ourt s to d ic ta te a t pr e c ise ly wh a t po int the inf or ma tio n pr e se nte d to u

nio n me mbe rs be c ome s “ su ff ic ie nt” and their vote s become “informe d” or at what point the i nformation provide d to members bec omes insufficient a

nd their votes bec ome uninformed. 2No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

sugg e st— ind e e d a

rgue —th a t Blan c ha rd

is completely

distinguishable f

rom the pre sent ca se and should not be considere d as any binding pr ece den t fo r t he proposition that § 101(a) (1) g ives any union member who ha s cast a losing vote in a n elec tion the rig ht to have the major ity vote set aside if the disg runtled member ca n co nvince a

district judge that some piece of possibly rele vant information could have bee n provided but wa s not, without any evidenc e whatsoever of any discrimination or other wr ong doing on the part of the uni o n ’s l ea d ers a nd without any

evidenc e whatsoeve r that if the mis sing piece of information had been provided, i ts importance was so g reat that the outcome of

the elec tion probably

would have be en diffe rent. Finally , J udg e McK eague’s opinion that the district cour t in the pre sent ca se prope rly issued an injunction beca

use, in his view, the plaintiffs had shown “a substantial likelihood of suc cess on their cla im that they

wer e depr ived of a

meaning ful vote on the mer g er r efe rendum,” is obvious dic tum to h is po sit ion that the dis tr ic t c ourt iss uin gthe inj un c tio n h a d n o ju ri sd ic tio n to do so . T his iss ue , ho we ve r, is on e on wh ic h jud g e s c an le g iti ma te ly dis a g re e re g ard ing wh e the r it wa s an a bu se of discre tion on the part of a district court in issuing a n injunction. - 49 - I n Knox Cou n t

y L o ca l v. Nat’l Rural Letter Carri ers’ Ass’n , this court noted that judicial intervention in Blan c ha rd was wa rra nted bec ause the union “ac t[ ed] in such a manne r as to make th a t r ig h t [ to a ne qu a l v o te ] me an ing le ss .” 720 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1984) (empha sis added). The clea r import of t his statement is that the Blan c ha rd c ourt wa s f oc us e d o n r e qu ir ingthat th e un ion of fi c ia ls provide some information about the other competing unions before a v o t e could be taken on the

u n i o nl i s t edo nt h e b al l o t , w h i c h h a d n o tb ee nd o n e i nt h at ca s e, ra t h er t h an o nd et er m i n i n g how much information nee ded to be g iven to me mbers. As a result, I believe that the “mea ningf ul vote” line of Six th Circuit cases should be r ead to hold that § 101(a )(1) is violated when alleg ations are

ma de that un ion

of fi c ia ls’ omi ssi on s o r actions r e nd e re d th e me mbe rs ’ v ote s me anin g le ss, a s in Blan c ha rd

wh e re union

of fi c e rs c on c e a le d f

ro m th e me mbe rs anyinformation about compe ting p r o p o s a l s , b u tn o tw h e nm e r e l y le ss information than ult i m at el y could be possible wa s furnished. Otherw ise, any

disgr untled union members who voted a g ainst a merg er could bring an ac tion under the L MRDA by

simply alleg ing that even the sma llest amount of information not provided ha dNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

“ C IR ” r e f e r s t o t h e C o u n c i l o nIn d

u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s f

o r t h e E l e c t r i c a l C o n t r a c t i n g In d u s t r y. 3 A “standa rd CI R” clause would have allowed unilatera l submission of barg aining issues to a J oint Union-Employ er Committee at the national level. A “modifie d CI R” c la u s e w o u ld h a ve only allowed su bmi ssi on to t he Com mit te e by

a g re e me nt o f b oth

pa rt ie s. - 50 - re nd e re d th e ir

vo te “ me anin g le ss” in or de r to stop or de lay a me rg e r of the un ion that th e ma jor ity of the membe rs had a

pproved a

nd the plaintiffs h ad o p p o s ed

. S uch a r ule might a lso, as the int e rv e nin g de fe nd ants po int ou t, d isc oura g e un ion s f

ro m ha vin g any op tio na l vo te s, l i k e t

h e o n e he ld here . I nterve ning D efe ndants-Appe llants Reply Br ief, at 4. Plaintiffs cite Brown v. IBEW Local Union No. 58 , 936 F. 2 d 2 5 1 (6th Cir. 1991) as a n

ex amp l e o f t h i s co u rt i n t er p re t i n g Blan c ha rd

to require a full-f

ledg ed inquiry

into the sufficienc y

of the information provided to union members. The prec ise issue in Br own , howeve r, wa s whether the district court fa iled to rec og nize certa in issues of m at er i al fa ct, making its gra nt of summary judgme nt improper. Br own , 936 F.2d at 253–54. Specifica lly , Br own involved a vote on a new collective ba

rg aining ag ree ment (CBA ) by I BEW L ocal 58. At an April 1989 meeting of the membership to d iscuss the neg otiations for the propose d CBA, a member of

the L ocal 58 Ne g otiating Commi ttee, Thomas B utler, expressed his view that a n ew “s t andar d CI R” clause should be considere d, but the union treasur er oppose d it and wanted to have a “modified CI R” in the CBA. 3 Id. at 253. On May 24, 1989, the neg otiating tea ms reac hed an a g reem en t fo r a new CBA, whic h inc lud e d a

sta nd ard CI R c la us e . T he te ntativ e a g re e me nt a nd ba llo ts we re ma ile d to t

he me mbe rs hip fo r a vot e . Thi s cou

rt fo un d tha t th e re wa s a

g e nu ine iss ue of

fa c t r e g ard ing(1 ) w he the r B utl e r d id in fac t adequately

inform his fe l l o w u n i o n members that a chang e in the CI R clause wa s beingNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 51 - considere d, and (2) whether the union members rec eived the ballots in tim e to org anize opposition to the proposed CB A, there being a dispute as to whe n the ballots wer e ac tually mailed, either

May 25 or May

31, with a re turn dea dline of June 14. Id. at 2 5 3

– 5 4

. T h e co u rt , m ak i n g t h i s f i n d i n g,

reve rsed the district c ourt’s summary judgme nt f or the defe ndants and rema nded the case for f

urther proce eding s in the district court. Id. at 254. There are sever al important fac ts reg ardingthe Br own c a se . Fi rs t, e ve ry thi ngthi s c ourt

sa id afte r its d ec i s i on on the only issue befor e the c ourt—whethe r the district cour t erre d in gr anting defe ndants summary

judgme nt—was pure dicta. The discussion plaintiffs cite re g ardinga re view of the suff

iciency of information by

the district court on re mand was not re lated to the issue on appea l, much less essential to the disposition of t h e ca s e. S econd, there w as no finding of any violation of the L MRDA by any on e. T hird, Br own inv olv e d th e c on du c t of un ion me mbe rs in neg otiating a

CBA, i.e. , conduct of what one union membe r told other union member s during a union

mee ti ng; co nduct of t he u ni on ’s o ffi cers in sen di ng a pack et of mat eri als abo ut th e pro po sed CBA that did not specifica lly

point out the inclusion of a standa rd, rather than a

modified, CI R clause; and

c on du c t of

of fi c e rs a g re e ingto a de bata ble tim e ta ble fo r a vo te on the pr op os e d CB A. Th e se a re a ll uniquely matters involving the internal a ffa irs of the union. I f Br own sta

nds f or the pr op os iti on

that a dis g ru ntl e d unio n me mbe r w ho vo te d a g a ins t a proposed CB A, appr oved by a vast majo ri t y of the union member ship, can stop or de lay that ag ree ment from bec ominge f f e c ti v e me r e ly

b y f il in g s u it u n d er the L MRDA, alleg ing misinformation gi v en b y a f el l o w m em b er

d u ri n g a u n i o nm ee t i n g o r a fa i l u re o f t h e o ff i ce rs t o h i gh l i gh to n e c h an ge in a proposed ne w CBA, the n Br own is, inde ed, a troublesome prec edent. The ref ere nce to Se rti cNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 52 - and Blan c ha rd

and stateme nts as t o wh at m i gh t take plac e bac k in the district court on re mand, ho we ve r, are dic ta , w hic h doe s n ot b ind the pa ne l of the pr e se nt c a se . “ [O]ne pa ne l of thi s c ourt is

n o t b o und by

dicta in a pr eviously

published panel opinion.” U n it e d S ta te s v . B u r r o ug

hs , 5 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1993). Se e als o , J oh ns on v . City of Cinc inn ati , 310 F.3d 484, 493 ( 6th Cir. 2002). Fur thermore , the pre sent ca se is clea rly distinguish ab l e fr o m the claims made in Br own . Unlike Br own , the r e is n o d is p u te a b o u t w h a t w a s s a id o r n o t s a id in a u n io n me e ti n g ; th e r e is no dispute reg ardingthe amount of time g iven for c onsideration of a ny issues involved in the voting proce ss; and there is no issue about the union failing to call the members’ attention to a clause in the ag ree ment being considere d. I t is undisputed that the member ship rece ived a c omplete copy of the ag ree ment, an d n o cl aim is made that the ter ms of the ag ree ment wer e not fully disclosed or that some provision of the ag ree ment should have been explained to the membership but w as not. T he

a lle g e d v iol a tio n of t

he L MRD A i n th e pr e se nt c a se is that th e me mbe rs hip wa s n ot p ro vid e d w ith

a c o p y o f a n o n - e x i s t e n td o c u m e n t , t h e S M A R T c o n s t i tu t i o n , an d a h ar d c o p y o f t h e S M W IA constitution, which, beca

use of the pr ohibitive c ost, w as instead posted on the union’s website—a decision cle arly

within the discretion of union officia ls a nd a matter

direc tly involving the inter

nal aff airs of the union. A re c e nt de c isi on of thi s c ourt e mph a size d that § 1 01 (a )( 1) is so le ly an anti-discr imination statute. One of

the issues in Richards v. Ohio Civil Servic e Employ ees Ass’n involved a cla im by

sever al union members that a provision in the union’s CBA violated the votingprovi s ion in § 101(a) (1) of the L MRDA beca use i t deprive d the uni on members of their rig ht to vote on all chang es in the CBA. 205 F . App’x 347, 351 (6th Ci r. 2006).No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 53 - I n aff irming the district court’s dismissal of the claimed violation of the L MRDA for f

ailure to state a claim upon which relief c an be g rante d pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6), this court made it very clea r that it is n o w we l l -established la w that § 101(a )(1) is solely an anti-discr imination pr ov isi on of the L MRD A: As the Supreme Court ha s noted, this statute “is no more than a co mmand that me mbe rs and c la sse s o f m e mbe rs sh a ll n ot b e dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t in the ir ri g ht t o nominate and vote.” Calhoon v. Harvey , 379 U.S. 134 (1964). F rom this proposition flows the cor ollary

that “[w]here there is no discrimination between members of a union there is no denial of the equal r ight to vote.” Cor e a v . W e lo , 937 F.2d 1132, 1141 (6th Cir. 1991). This Court further pointed out that “the issue under § 411(a)( 1) is not whether membe rs wer e tre ated pr operly or fairly , but w hether they wer e tre ated equally .” Id.

*** Appellants ar e cor

rec t that this Court ha s also indicated that an abse nce of a vote may be g rounds for a

claim of the de nial of the e qual rig ht to vote, Corea , 937 F.2d at 11 42 , b ut t

his do e s n ot m e an th a t it mu st be. In order

to surmount the 12(b)(6) hurdle, the claim must still all ege discrimination linked to the absence of a vote , and Appellants simply have not a lleg ed a colora ble claim of discrimination in this case.

*** And while this result flows fr om our Circuit’s own prec edent, neither are we out of step with othe r circ uits in re achingthis conclusion. See , e.g. , L abor Union L aw a nd Reg ulation 34–35 (Will iam W. Osborne , J r., ed., 2003) (noting that the “major ity of the appe llate cour

ts require dis c rim ina tor

y un ion a c tio n an d re

je c t the no tio n th a t a denial of a

rig ht or bene fit to all

members constitutes a basis for f inding a [L MRDA] Section 101(a) (1) violation”) (empha sis in original). Richards , 205 F. App’ x at 353 (pa rallel c itations omi tted). These statement s o f t h e Six th Circuit in Richards , albeit in an unpublished dec ision,

acc urate ly

descr ib e t h e est ablished law a s announce d by the Supreme Court in Calhoon that § 101(a) (1) of

the L MRDA is purely an anti-discrimination provision, and there is no violation of theNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 54 - rig ht to vote unless there is a f inding of discrimination. T here being absolutely no discrimination i nt h e p r e s e n tc a s e , t h e a l l e g e d f a i l u r e s t o p r o v i d e m o r e i n f o r m a t i o na p p l yi n g t o a l l m e mb e r s e qu a l l y, there has bee n no violation of the L MRDA. Additionally , it is i ntere sting to note that in Richards , the pla int if fs in a co mpa

nio n c a se a lso prese nted, in the words of the cour t, “an ‘ informed vote’ claim for damag es . . . ” unde r the L MRDA § 101(a) (1). In fac t, during the course of its de cision, this c ourt consistently ref err ed to a n “informe d vote” c laim as b eing a cla im within quot ation marks. As a n initial matter, putting the wor ds

“ inf or me d v ote ” c la im i n q

uo ta tio n ma

rk s c ou ld w e ll be c on sid e re d s ke pti c ism that su c h a

c la im,

a bs e nt d isc ri min a ti o n, e xists un de r § 10 1( a )( 1) of the L MRD A. Mo re ov e r, the c ourt po int e d o ut t

hat, “[t] he dis trict court noted corr ectly that a federa l court ‘is not unfettere d in its determination of what constitutes ‘full and ac tive participation’ or a ‘ meaning ful vote’’ when reviewing a union’s voti ng aff airs. Blanchard v. J

ohnson , 532 F.2d 10 7 4 , 1 0 7 8 (6th Cir. 1976),” but “the district court

never theless conduc ted a thoroug h analy sis of the fac ts” and conclude d that the vote in question was “informe d.” Id. a t 35 4. Th e imp re ssi on g ive n is that it was no t necessary fo r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

to have pur sued the issue of w hether the vote wa s an “infor

med vote,” but having “neve rtheless” done so, the court of

appea ls simpl y

found it was not ne cessa ry to revisit the issue. Id. I n this manner, the cour t did not have to find ag ain—as the court found ear lier i n the opi nion—that absent evide nce of discrimination there can be no violation of § 101(a) (1) of the L MRDA. Ithink Richards casts g reat doubt that the judicially added require ment to § 101(a) (1) of the L MRDA that a vote by

union members on any subject, e.g. , a propose d merg er, a collective ba rg a ini nga g re e me nt, a

c ha ng e in l oc a tio ns fo r t

he mon thl y

me e tin g s, e tc . mu st n ot o nly be e qu a l,No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 55 - but also must be “informed,” is stil l considere d a re asonable interpre tation of the statute. I

am convince d that it is not . Fur thermore , this case is cle arly distinguishable f

rom the misinterprete d Se rti c and its unfortunate prog eny .

IV. The Issu ance of the P relim inary Injun ction A. The P relim inary Injun ction Shou ld Not Have Been Issued as a Matterof L aw Although the g rant of a preliminary injunction is revie wed for abuse of discre tion, Golden v. Kelsey -Hay es , 73 F.3d 648, 653 ( 6th Cir. 1996), the improper a pplicat i o n o f the g overninglaw by the district court is re ason to reve rse its dec ision, id. ; Bl ueCro ss & Blue Sh ie ld M

utu al o f O hio v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n , 1 10 F .3 d 3 18 , 3 22 (6 th C ir . 1 99 7) . A s d isc us se d e arl ie r, Ifi rm ly believe, a s the Supreme Court has said, that § 101(a) (1) of the L MRDA deals solely with assuring that there is equality

in voting and the preve ntion of union office rs from discr iminating amongthe membership. There being absolutely no claims or evidence of any discrimination and no claim or evidenc e of a

ny fra ud or wrong doing on the part of the union of fi ci als , the dec ision of the district

court t o is s u e anin

ju n c ti o ns h o u ld

b e r e v e r s e d , th e ju d g me n t s h o u ld b e v a c a te d , an d

th is action

s h o u l d be dismissed. The Six th Circuit’s judicially cre ated a ddition to t he statute, i.e. , the require ment that the members not only have equal rig hts in the voting proce ss, but the vote of ea ch member must be a

n “informe d” or a “mea

ningf ul” vote, is the result of dicta that has cre pt into the jur isp ru de nc e of

thi s c ir c uit . That re qu ir e me nt is cle arl y a t od ds wi th t

he te xt of the statut e and

thi s court’s de scription of § 101(a )(1) of the L MRDA in the Ro be rts case , and it is also clear ly at odds with the fundame ntal policy of permitti ng unions to handle their own interna l affa irs, as expressed b y this court in Dr esd

e n Lo c al 2 67

v . S ou th C e ntral O hio Di

str ic t Co un c il , w h e n the cour t said,No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 56 - “ [t]he re is a

we ll- e sta bli sh e d, so un dly

ba se d p oli c y

of a vo idi ngun ne c e ssa

ry jud ic ia l in tr

us ion int o the af fairs of labor unions.” 992 F .2d 1418, 1425 (6th Cir. 1993) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Acc ording ly , the district court intruded into the inter nal af fairs of the UTU in the pr esent c ase w hen it h e ld t hat § 10 1(a) (1) wa s a

pp lic a ble to p la int if

fs ’ c la im, makin g the inj un c tio n im pr op e r a s a matter of la

w. B. In A d d i ti o n , the P relim inary Injun ction Shou ld Not Have Been Issued on the Re cord P rese nted to the Distr ict Court . The fir st of the well-e stablished preliminary injunction f actor s—and an extremely important fac tor—is the plaintiffs’ likelihood of succ ess on the mer its. “The district cour t’s deter mination of wh e the r t he mo van t is li kely

to s uc c e e d o n th e me ri ts i s a qu e sti on of la w a nd is a c c or din g ly revie wed de n ovo .” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Netw ork, LLC v. Tenke Corp. , 511 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 2007), ci t i n g T u mb lebus, Inc. v . Cranmer , 399 F.3d 754, 760 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Fur thermore , “a pr eliminary

injunction issued wher e ther e is simply no likelihood of succe ss on the merits must be reve rsed.” Michigan State AFL-CIO v. M iller , 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 ( 6th Cir. 1997). Se e als o , Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n , 64 F.3d 1026, 10 3 7 (6th Cir. 1995) (re versinga g rant of injunctive r elief ba sed solely o n t h e l ac kof any likelihood of succe ss on the

me ri ts) ; Morgan v. Tenne ssee De p’t of Corrections , 92 F. App’ x 302, 303 (6th Cir. 2004). Wit h respe ct to this critically important fac tor, the only thing the district c ourt said in support of its fi nd ingof

thi s f a c tor wa s a s f oll ow s: Def endants c oncede that the SMART C onstitut ion was neve r provided to UT U members pr ior t o t h ei r approval of the Mer g er A g ree ment. As more f ully detailed below in desc ribing the har m suffer ed by

Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the fa ilure to provide s u ch re levant information constitut ed a f ailure to disclose the rele vantNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 57 - terms of the proposal betwee n the par ties. Plainti ffs, ther efor e, have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of succe ss on their claim that they wer e depr ived of a meaning ful vote. ROA 1569. The undisput ed fact, of c ourse, is that there was no SMART Constit ution in ex istence that possi b ly c o u ld h a v e b e e ns e n t t o th e U T U me mb e r s . E a c h o f th e me mb e r s , h o w e v e r , r e c e iv e d an information pac ket that included a hard c opy of t he Merg er Ag ree ment that specific ally informed the UTU membe rs about the c ontents of the propose d S MART Consti tution. Article Iof the Mer g er Ag re e me nt s ta te s th a t th e SMAR T Co nstitutio n w ill c on sis t of the c ur re nt U TUCon sti tut ion , in

c on fo rm ity

wi th t he SMWI A C o n s t itu tio n. Ar tic le I I Ie la

bo rate s th a t th e SMA RT C on sti tut ion “ sh a ll be the SMWI A Constitut ion amended to implement the pr ovisions of this Agre ement,” inc luding the insertion of the U TU Constitut i o n as Article 21B. ROA 209–10. A ny conflicts betwe en the President of SMART (for

merly the President of the SMW I A) and the P resident of the Tra nsportation Division of SMART (formerly the President of U TU) over t he ter ms of the SMART Const itution and the Me rg er A g ree ment are to be resolved throug h arbitration by an ar bitrator appointed by

the President of the AFL -CI O. ROA 209–19. I n light of all this infor mation, the failure to send the UTU

me mbe rs a

c op y of a c on sti tut ion of the me rg e d un ion , wh ic h wa s no t e ve n in e xiste nc e a t th e tim e of the vote on the Merg er A g ree ment, is, indeed, a t h i n re ed upon which to r est a finding that pla int if fs are lik e ly

to s uc c e e d o n th e me ri ts o f t he ir c la im o f n ot havin g e no ug h inf or ma tio n to c a st a “me aning ful” vote. The sec ond fac tor to be consider ed in the issuance of a pr elimi n ar y injunction is whether plaintiffs would suffe r irre para ble har m if the injunction is not issued. The dist rict court found thatNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 58 - plaintiffs would suffe r i rre para ble harm if the injunction were not issued beca use, “[n]o amount of leg al maneuve ring will be able to ‘undo’ the merg er once it has been completed.” ROA 1570. The fa c t th a t a

com pl ete d me rg e r i s n ot e a sil y re ve rs e d, ho we ve r, is n ot, sta nd ing a lon e , a ny ba sis whatsoeve r for

stopping the merg er from g oing forwa rd. Ther e ca

n be no irre para

ble har m if there h a s b e e n n o w r o n g f

u l c o n d u c t o n t h e p art o f

a d e f e n d an ta g a i n s tw h o m t h e i n j u n c t i o ni s s o u g h t

. It is here that, although pla intiffs cannot show that de fenda nts have been guilty

of any discrimination or any wrong doing, they claim that defe ndants have violated the judicial require ment that a vote on any me r g e r o f u n io n s mu s t b e a “ me an in g f u l v o te

. ” Pl a in ti f

f s ’ B r ie f a t 2 0

. T h e district court’s finding of “substantial e vidence ” supporting a violation of this judi cially

cre ated r ule was ba sed on (1 ) a fa ilure to s e nd

a no n- e xiste nt S MA RT c on sti tu ti on to t he UT U m e mbe rs and

(2 ) a fa ilure to send a ha rd copy of the SMWI A constitution to t he UTUmembers. ROA 1568–73. As alre ady

noted, there was no SMART constitution t o send to the UTU members, and the Merg er A g ree ment expressly told the members in d et ai l exactly how that constitution would be

cre ated. I f a me mber wa s not satisfied with t h i s m et h o d of cr eatinga new constitution for the

me rg e d unio ns , the me mbe r obv iou sly c ou ld vot e his or he r dis satis fa c tio n by c a sti ng a vo te a g a ins t the Me rg e r A g re e me nt. Th e fa c t is that the Me rg e r Ag re e me nt, wh ic h d e sc ri be d h owthe SMA RT Constit ution would be cre ated, wa s approve d by the UTU members by a vote of more than 2 to 1. ROA 183. Wit h respe ct to the failure t o send a hard copy of t he S MWI A C onstitut ion, that document

c on sis te d o f 1 49 pa g e s, and se nd inga

ha rd c op y to t he UT U’ s some 68,0 00 me mbe rs wa s c os t prohibitive, so theref

ore a copy was plac ed on the UT U’s we bsite. ROA 811. Should the financialNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 59 - ina bil ity to p ro vid e a

le ng thy wr itt e n d oc ume nt that is oth e rw ise ob ta ina ble on the un ion ’s we bs ite be conside red by

the district court? Should there be som e indi cation of what impact the lac k of that document had on the voting, i.e. , the inability of an U T U m em b er to lay a copy of the UTU C o n s t i tu t i o nal o n gs i d e aco p y o f t h e 1 4 9 -p age S M W I A C o n s t i tu t i o ni n o rd er t o go t h ro u gh ea ch p age of the two c onstitut ions to see what conflicts could exis t that w ould ultimately have to be dec ided by ag ree ment or by

arbitration? The district cour t obviously

did n o t co n s i d er e ither of these two important questions, beca use they are not mentioned in the court’s de cision. The UTUoffice rs and dire ctors, havingunanimously approve d the Merg er A g ree ment, sent

a pa c ke t of

de ta ile d in fo rm a tio n a

bo ut t he me rg er and

the re su lti ngSMA RT u

nio n a nd SMA RT constitution t o eac h of the UTU members at the last known addr ess of e ach me mber. Ea ch pac ket

c on ta ine d a

c omp le te ha

rd c op y of the Me rg e r Ag re e me nt. I t a lso c on ta ine d a DV D a nd ma te ri a ls explaining the mer g er, including a four- pag e letter from President Thompson disc ussing the history and impact of

the merg er, le tters from SMWI A President S ullivan and AF L -CI O President John Sweene y , and a “ Special Edition” SMART newsletter w ith high l i gh t s ab o ut the merg er a nd that urg ed member s, “[t] o stay curr ent, g o to www.utu.org ,” the UT U’s we bsite. ROA 199–229. Copies of the UTU a

nd SMW I A Constit utions we re made available on UTU’s w ebsite. As noted ea rlier, these documents we re not mailed because the SMW I A C onstitut ion alone totaled 149 pag es and the UTU could not a ffor d to ma il pa per copies to a ll of

its members. ROA 811. Also, the UT U p u b l i s h e d o n i t s w e b s i t e h u n dr e d s o f p a g e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a s e r i e s o f F re qu e ntl y As ke d Q ue sti on s re g ard ing the me rg e r, in wh ic h the UT U Pre sid e nt an sw e re d q ue sti on s se nt i n to him. ROA 1368, 536–807, 1509–29. Plaintiff UTU member s Dale Micha el, J immy Eubanks, andNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 60 - J ohn Hase nauer

eac h spent time review ing a nd analy zing the UTU ’s ratification materia ls from the UTU we bsite. ROA 51, 58, 62. Ag ainst this ve ry ex tensive information provided to the UTU membe rs, the district cour t found that it was still not enough. “A bsent information about the possible c hang es to their own g overningdocument, the UT U member s’ votes ca nnot be s aid t o be meaningf ul. Acc ording ly , the Court fi nd s th a t U TUme mbe rs we re ha rm e d thro ug h th e fa ilure of the ir ow n e le c te d o ffici als to provide them a dequate information prior to the vote on the Merg er a g ree ment.” ROA 1573. The mem b er s , h oweve r, did rec eive spe cific infor

mation in their copies of the Merg er Ag re e me nt “ a

bo ut the po ssi ble c ha

ng e s to the ir ow n g ov e rn ingdo c ume nt” and ho w tho se po ssi ble

c ha ng e s c ou ld c ome a

bo ut a nd be re so lve d. What wa s unk no wn a t th e tim e —a

nd c ou ld n ot p os sib ly have be en known until afte r the UTUconventi o n , wh en amendments were made to the UT U constitution—was the extent of conflicts, if any , betwee n the two consti tutions. The fa ct that there

wer e som e c o n f

li c ts , ma n y b e in g in s ig n if

ic an t, d o e s n o t m e anth a t t h e v o te a p p r o v in g th e M e r g er Ag re e me nt’ s me tho d o f r e so lvi ngany c on fl ic ts w a s n ot a

“ me anin g fu l vo te .” As thi s c ourt sa id i n Cor e a v . W

e lo , 937 F.2d 1132, 1140 (6th Cir. 1991), “Blan c ha rd mere ly require s full disclosure of the terms of all proposals submitt ed to the membership for a ref ere ndum in order to ensur e that the vote is meaning ful and that the membe rship has fully participated in the dec ision making proc ess.” I n the pre sent ca se, it is undisput ed that all terms of t he proposal to be voted upon we re contained in the Merg er A g ree ment, a copy of which w as sent to ea ch member of the union. Plainti f f s w o u ld n o t s u f f e r an y h ar m, mu c h le s s ir

r e p ar a b le h ar m, h a d th e p r e li minary injunction not have bee n issued, beca use considering the entire rec ord in this case , there clea rly wasNo. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 61 - no showing that the fa ilure to receive a copy of a non- exis tent document or a hard c opy

of the SMW I A Constitut ion deprived the plaintiffs of a “ meaning ful vote.” Finally , with respec t to the “irre para ble” a spect of the alleg ed harm, even if it is ag ree d that beca use complete d merg ers c an be dif ficult to “unwind,” plaintiffs would automatically , by nature of the re lief soug ht, suffer “irre para ble har m” if an injunction we re not issued, this fa ctor is but one of the four

fac tors to be consider ed. N o rm al l y , n ot one fa ctor a lone is determinative; a ll must be considere d and bala

nced in or der to de termine whether , under the particula r fac ts of the ca se and the law to be a

pplied to those fa ct s , t h e d efe ndant should or should not be enjoined. Connection Distributi ng Co. v. Reno , 1 5 4 F. 3 d 2 8 1 , 2 8 8 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Golden v. Kelsey-Haye s Co. , 73 F.3d 648, 653 ( 6th Cir. 1996). Withre sp e c t to the thi rd

fa c tor , th e g ra

nti ng of the pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n in

thi s case did

cause substantial harm to the UTU union, not just beca use it cost the union over $200,000 to pr epar e and mail the informational packe ts and to conduct the ratification vote, ROA 183, (money which ca n

never b e r e c o v e r e d ) b u t a ls o , an d o f mo r e im p o rta n c e , b e c a u s e th e p r e li mi n ar

y in ju n c ti o n , on the

rec ord of this c ase, violated what this c ourt has descr ibed as the “we ll-established, s o u n d l y b ased policy of avoiding unnece ssary judicial intrusion into t he af fairs of labor unions.” Dresden Local 267 , 9 9 2 F. 2 d

at 1 4 2 5 (qu o t i n g Loc al No. 48 v . Un ite d Br oth e rh oo d o f Ca rp e nte rs , 920 F.2d 1047, 1051 (1st Cir. 1990)). I n th is c a se , f

or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , th e oth e r fa c tor s, e sp e c ia lly the fa ilure fa c tua lly to show a likelihood of succ ess and, leg ally , the application of err on eo u s l aw g reatly outweig h the dubious ha

rm to the plaintiffs. This c onclusion is r einforc ed by consideration of the fi n al fa ct or.No. 08-3932

Michae l v. Futhey

- 62 - Wit h respe ct to the impact of the injunction on the public interest, the district cour t found that, “[t] he cle ar policy

of the [L MRDA] i s to bid far ewe ll to the reg ime of bene volent well-mea ning union autocrats and to g ive favor t o a s y s t em of union democr acy with its concomitants of fre e choice and self- deter

mination,” quoting the district c ourt’s dec ision in Blanchard v. Johnson , 388 F.Supp. 208, 215 (N.D . Ohio 1974), aff ’d in r e le v an t pa rt , 532 F.2d 1074 ( 6th Cir. 1976). ROA 1573–74. Iag ree with this st atement, but ther e is absolutely no ev idence that UTU’s of fice rs and dir e c tor s in thi s c a se we re “ be ne vo le nt and we ll- me anin g a uto c ra ts. ” To the c on tr ary , the y we nt t o g reat leng ths to infor

m the ir members of the terms and conditions of the proposed merg er, and ther e is n o c la im a

nd no t a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e of

any dis c ri min a tio n. F ur

the rm or e , th e re is an e qu a lly clea r, and just as important policy of Cong ress, i.e. , that Congr ess did not intend by the passag e of Title Iof the L MRDA to interfer e in the interna l affa irs of unions, which is ex actly what the district court did in the pre sent ca se. V. Conclusion Ithere fore believe that while the di strict court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ complaint, the district cour t, for the rea sons give n, should not have issued the injunction

as a matter of la

w, bec ause the re w as no evide nce of any discrimination by

the offic ers a

nd direc tors of UTU, a nd, further

more, the district c ourt abused its discr etion in issuing a pr eliminary injunction on the re cord pr esente d to that court. The de cision of the dis trict court, therefor e, shoul d be re verse d, the judg ment vacated, and this ca se re manded to the district cour t with inst ructions to dismiss the action.