J-S24029-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHN ROBERT MCCOOL,

Appellant No. 1056 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 8, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County

Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-55-CR-0000142-1980

CP-55-MD-0000136-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES, AND MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2016

John Robert McCool appeals pro se from the order dismissing as 

untimely his serial PCRA petition. We affirm and we deny Appellant’s motion 

to strike the Commonwealth’s brief.1

On June 2, 1980, the Commonwealth charged Appellant in Snyder 

County, Pennsylvania with, inter alia, kidnapping, rape, and involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse. At that time, Appellant was awaiting trial in New 

York for robbery. On July 30, 1980, the New York court convicted him, 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant sought to strike the Commonwealth’s brief because it was filed 

forty-three days late. Significantly, however, Appellant does not assert that 

the delay was prejudicial. At most, he notes that this case was submitted on 

briefs without oral argument, which is typical for PCRA appeals. Thus, upon 

review of the motion and the applicable rules of appellate procedure, we 

deny the motion to strike the Commonwealth’s brief. 
J-S24029-16

- 2 -

imposed a sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment, and incarcerated 

him in that state. On February 16, 1981, Appellant was temporarily 

transferred to Pennsylvania pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers Act (“IADA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101 et seq., to be tried on the 

kidnapping and sex offenses in Snyder County and unrelated offenses in 

Northumberland County that are not relevant herein. 

In addressing a prior appeal, this Court succinctly summarized the 

remaining procedural history as follows:

On February 26, 1981, McCool, represented by former 

Snyder County Public Defender Harry L. Wilcox, Esquire 

(“Attorney Wilcox”), was convicted of rape, involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), and kidnapping. Attorney Wilcox 

filed a post-trial [m]otion on McCool’s behalf, which the trial 

court subsequently denied for failure to file a brief. On June 10, 

1981, the trial court sentenced McCool to consecutive prison 

terms of ten to twenty years for his conviction of rape, ten to 

twenty years for his conviction of kidnapping, and five to ten 

years for his conviction of IDSI [an aggregate term of twentyfive to fifty years imprisonment]. McCool filed no direct appeal of 

his judgment of sentence.

On July 1, 1996, McCool filed his first [p]etition for relief 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), after which 

appointed counsel filed an amended [p]etition. In that [p]etition, 

McCool alleged that (a) he was deprived of due process under 

the [IADA]; (b) a new trial was warranted based upon after 

discovered facts regarding the manufacture of black duct tape; 

and (c) that Attorney Wilcox rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to file a brief in support of McCool’s post-trial [m]otions.

On February 11, 1997, the PCRA court denied McCool 

relief on his claim pertaining to the IAD[A], but concluded 

that Attorney Wilcox had rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to file a brief supporting McCool’s post-trial [m]otions. 

McCool, with new counsel, filed [m]otions for a new trial and for 
J-S24029-16

- 3 -

arrest of judgment. The trial court denied McCool’s post-trial 

[m]otions and re-imposed its judgment of sentence on June 10, 

1981. On July 29, 1998, this Court affirmed McCool’s judgment 

of sentence, after which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 

allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. McCool, 724 A.2d 957 

(Pa. Super. 1998) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 

751 A.2d 187 (Pa. 2000). In his nunc pro tunc direct appeal, 

McCool raised no claim regarding the IAD[A].

Commonwealth v. McCool, 724 A.2d 957 (Pa.Super. 2013) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1-3) (emphases added, footnotes omitted). 

Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

federal court, six PCRA petitions, and a futile civil action. In all but one of 

the filings, he asserted some version of the claim that his convictions were 

unsound because the Commonwealth violated the IADA in trying him in 

Snyder County and returning him to New York following the imposition of the 

twenty-five to fifty year sentence herein.2 The federal court denied relief 

because Appellant had not exhausted his state court remedies. All of the 

iterations of the claim that were leveled in PCRA petitions failed either due to 

the fact that the issue was waived pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b), as a 

result of Appellant’s failure to raise it on direct appeal, or due to the PCRA 

time bar. 

On April 27, 2015, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his sixth. 

Again, Appellant challenged the application of the IADA. Thereafter, having 

____________________________________________

2 One of the PCRA petitions challenged only the discretionary aspect of his 

sentence. 
J-S24029-16

- 4 -

issued notice on May 19, 2015, of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition 

without hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court dismissed the 

petition on June 8, 2015, as untimely filed. This appeal followed.

Appellant presents several intertwined arguments in support of his 

elaborate contention that the trial court’s misapplication of the IADA 

required that the PCRA court set aside the underlying convictions. His 

arguments assail the PCRA court’s factual findings and its legal conclusions 

regarding the trial court’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis the IADA. He also asserts 

purported breakdowns in the trial court’s machinery and invokes the 

principle of stare decisis, again, in relation to the trial court’s application of 

the IADA. He concludes that since his convictions were void ab initio, he is 

currently serving an illegal sentence. No relief is due.

At the outset, we address the irregularity of Appellant’s reply brief. 

Prior to the date that the Commonwealth’s brief was originally due, Appellant 

purported to file a reply brief that raised for the first time in any of the 

proceedings an assertion that he was entitled to relief under the doctrine of 

coram nobis.

3

 The claim fails for at least three reasons.

____________________________________________

3 While Appellant’s precise argument is unclear, the crux of his assertion is 

that a writ of coram nobis provides an alternative basis for this Court to 

accord him relief. Our Supreme Court recently explained, “[a] writ of coram 

nobis ‘is generally available to challenge the validity of a judgment based on 

facts not before the court when the judgment was entered.’’ 

Commonwealth v. Descardes, No. 27 MAP 2015, slip op. at 1 n.1 (Pa. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S24029-16

- 5 -

First, the reply brief is defective. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2113 (a) and 

(c), reply briefs are required to be “in reply to matters raised by appellee’s 

brief” and “[n]o further briefs may be filed except with leave of court.” The 

note following Rule 2113 further explains, “the scope of the reply brief is 

limited . . . in that such brief may only address matters raised by appellee 

and not previously addressed in appellant’s brief.” Thus, insofar as 

Appellant’s purported “reply” brief is not in response to any matters raised 

by the Commonwealth, it is defective. 

Second, even to the extent the reply brief was not defective, the 

substance of Appellant’s argument is waived because he did not file a 

petition for a writ of coram nobis or invoke the principles of that doctrine 

before the PCRA court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302 (“Issues not raised in the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Since 

the issue is waived, we cannot address the merits herein. 

Finally, assuming both that the reply brief is not defective and that 

Appellant requested coram nobis relief in the PCRA court, we would reject 

the request on its merits. Stated plainly, our Supreme Court recently 

reaffirmed that where a PCRA petitioner’s request for relief can be 

entertained under the PCRA, the petition is considered a PCRA petition and is 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

filed March 29, 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465, 

467 (Pa. 1971)). As explained in the body of this memorandum, coram 

nobis review is inapplicable in this case. 
J-S24029-16

- 6 -

subject to that statute’s dictates. Commonwealth v. Descardes, No. 27 

MAP 2015, slip op. at 17 (Pa. filed March 29, 2016) (“where a petitioner’s 

claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of 

obtaining collateral review”); see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 

1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (if the defendant’s PCRA claims “are cognizable under 

the PCRA, the common law and statutory remedies now subsumed by the 

PCRA are not separately available” to him); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (PCRA is the 

“sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common 

law and statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including habeas 

corpus and coram nobis). 

Instantly, Appellant’s claims fall within the PCRA. Appellant is eligible 

for PCRA relief pursuant to § 9543(a)(1) in that he has been convicted of a 

crime under the laws of Pennsylvania and is currently serving the sentence 

imposed on those convictions. Moreover, his claims regarding the trial 

court’s jurisdiction, the purported break down in court operations, the 

propriety of the convictions, and the legality of his sentences are all 

cognizable issues under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(viii) (the 

tribunal conducting proceeding lacked jurisdiction); §9543(a)(2)(iv) (the 

improper obstruction by governmental officials); §9543 (a)(2)(vii) 

(imposition of illegal sentence). As appellant is eligible for PCRA relief and 

his claims are cognizable under the Act, his petition is subsumed by the 

PCRA and its statutory time-bar. Hence, Appellant cannot invoke coram 
J-S24029-16

- 7 -

nobis as an alternative basis for relief. Descardes, supra. For all of the 

foregoing reasons, the assertions leveled in Appellant’s reply brief are 

unavailing. 

Next, we address the merits of the appeal. As noted previously, the 

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. Initially, we note our 

standard of review. “An appellate court reviews the PCRA court's findings of 

fact to determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its 

conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). “The scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial 

level.” Id.

It is well settled that an untimely PCRA petition renders the courts of 

this Commonwealth without jurisdiction to award relief. Commonwealth v. 

Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091 (Pa. 2010). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b), a 

petition must be filed within one year of the date that judgment became final 

unless the petitioner alleges and proves one of the timeliness exceptions 

found under 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b). The statute provides:

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves that: 
J-S24029-16

- 8 -

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

Presently, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 1, 

2000, ninety days after the Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal, 

when the period expired to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Appellant’s 

sixth petition was not filed until April 27, 2015. Thus, it is facially untimely. 

Appellant declined to assert a specific timeliness exception and even a 

charitable reading of his protracted arguments relating to the trial court’s 

application of the IADA do not implicate any of the statutory exceptions to 

the time bar. His references to the legality of sentence, the purported 

breakdowns of trial court’s machinery, and the court’s ability to correct 

clerical errors are all futile. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 

214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to 

review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits 

or one of the exceptions thereto.”). Tellingly, Appellant does not assert that 
J-S24029-16

- 9 -

the purported breakdowns and clerical errors that he relies upon were 

recently discovered or that they implicated a newly-recognized constitutional 

right that has been held to apply retroactively. Hence, the certified record 

and governing law supports the trial court’s determination that it lacked 

jurisdiction to address the untimely petition. See Albrecht, supra. 

Motion to strike the Commonwealth’s brief denied. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/14/2016