### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 26, 200 5
C A R OL Y N WO OS TE R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Dickson Coun ty

No. CR- 6603 Robert

E. Bu rch, Judge

No
. M2 0 0 5 -0 1 2 1 7 -C CA -R 3 -PC 

### - F ile d D ec em be r 12, 200 5

A Dickson County

jury convicted the Petitioner, Carol y n W o o s t er, of ag g ravated child abuse and neg lect and she was sentenc ed to fiftee n y ear s in prison



### . This court affirmed the conviction on direc t
app e a l a ndthe Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt de nie d r e view . T he Pe tit ion e r f ile d a pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction relief alleg ing ineffe ctive assistance of counsel, a nd the post-conviction court dismi ssed her pe tition. The Petitioner appea ls, c ontending that her tria l counsel re ndere d ineffe ctive assistanc e of counse l at trial by

failing to adequately

investigate her

case . After

thoroug hly

revie wing the
rec ord and the applicable law, we conclude that there exis ts no re v er s i b le er ror. Ac cording ly , we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J J ., joined.

Geof fre y Coston, Franklin, Tenne ssee f or the Appe llant, Caroly n Woost er Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Sophia S. L ee, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; Da n M. Alsobrooks, District Attorney Gene ra l ; and Suzanne M. L ockert, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION I. F acts
A. F acts on Dire ct A ppeal
On direc t appeal , t h i s C o u rt aff irmed the Petitioner’s c onvictions and sentenc e. I n our op ini on , w e su mma

ri zedthe fa c ts a s f

oll ow s: At approximately

7:00 A.M. on Marc h 5, 1998, the [P etitioner] broug ht the victim, a n ew b orn g irl, to Horizon Medical Center in Dic kson. The def endant explained that she had g iven birth at home the nig ht before and desire d to offer the-2-

infant for adoption.

Dr. Va lerie B eck, a p ediatrician at Horizon Medica l Center, examined the infant in the labor and delivery are a at about 7:15 A.M. Be cause the victim’s heart rate was only

about 70 beats per minute, Dr. B eck c lassified the victim’s condition
as critical. She explained that a newly born, cry ing infant should have a heart rate of betwee n 130 and 140 beats per minute. Dr. B eck obse rve d t hat the victim was cy anotic and g runting , indicating that the victim wa s in distre ss. She determined that there was a

substantial risk of dea th.
At trial, Dr. B eck te stified that t h e l o w heart rate w as due to a low body te mpe ratur e . A c c or din g to D r. B e c k, the he art rate dr op s w he n e xpos e d to c old temperatures, im pairing the hea rt’s ability

to operate cor

rec tly . When neither a digital thermometer or a

g lass thermometer

reg istered a

body temperature, Dr . Be ck made a diag nosis of sever e hy

pothermia. The vict i m wa s p lace d under a radia nt warmer with heated saline ba g s wrappe d in warm t o wels t o raise he r temper ature

. B y 7:4 0 A .M ., the ba

by ’s te mpe ratur e ha d rise n to 97 de g re e s.
Helen Mur

phy , a re g istered nur se t estified that the defendant c laimed that she had g iven b irth a t h e r h o me o n th e p r e v io u s e v e n in g a n d h a d b e e n a s s is te d b y her boy friend and two nurses. Acc ording to Ms. Murphy , the def endant c laimed that she had visited an obstetrician on six separ ate oc casions bef ore moving to Tennesse e. The de fenda nt informed Ms. Mur phy that her water had broken betwee n 10:30 and 11:00 P.M. and t h at her contrac tions beg an immediately there afte r. She explained that she ca me to the hospital in order to off er the infant for

adoption. Be cause the de fe nd a nt c la ime d th a t sh e wa s n ot e xpe ri e nc ing a ny ble e din g , M s. Mu rp hy

ini tia lly suspected that the defe ndant might not have g i v en b i rt h to the baby . Be cause her suspicions were further ar o u sed whe n she discover ed that the de fenda nt was not producing brea st milk and had de clined a phy sical examination, Ms. Murphy asked the Dickson Police De partment to investig ate.

L ater , the def

endant c onsented to a phy sical examination. After be ing examined, she was inter viewed by Detec tive Mike Fle aner

of t h e Di ck son Poli ce Depa rtment and R o s i e S kinner of the Depa rtment of Children’s Ser vices. The defe ndant ag ain claimed that she had given birth at home and that her boy friend and two nurses ha d assisted in t h e d elivery . During the interview , the def endant expressed particular c oncern about being late for work.

After interviewing the defe ndant, Detec tive Fleaner and Ms. Skinner travele d to the de fe nd a nt’ s r e sid e nc e to q ue sti on he r b oy fri end , Jas on Hu le r. Ac c or din g to Detec tive Fleaner, H uler stated that he was unawa re that the defe ndant was pre g nant and had not he lped in any delivery

. Af

t er interviewing Huler, D etec tive Fleaner drove t o th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s p la c e o f

e mp lo y me n t an d q u e s ti o n e d h e r a s e c o n d ti me
.-3-

Whe n h e a

rrive d, the de fe nd a nt w a s in he r v e hic le , a c a mpe r, wh ic h wa s p ark e d in he r e mpl oy e r’ s lo t.
After rec eiving permission to se arc h the campe r, Detec tive Fleaner f ound a shirt that the defendant had used t o clea n the i nfant. Upon furthe r examination at the police department, the defe ndant admitted that she wa s alone a t the time of birth, and ha d p la c e d th e vic tim

un de r the ho us e du ri ng the c ou rs e of the nig ht.

At tr ia l, the de fe nd a nt co nf

ir me d tha t she wa s alo ne wh e n s he g a ve birth t o a ba by g ir l a t he r ho me a t app ro xima te ly 6:2 0 P. M. on Ma rc h 4 , 1 99 8. Ac c or din g to the def endant, he r water broke two and a ha lf day s befor e the de livery . She held and brea st fed the ba

by until about 10:00 P.M., when he r boy friend, w ho was una war e of her pr eg nancy , was sche duled to return f rom work. T he def

endant state d that she
wra pped the in fa nt in a shirt, placed he r in a c ardboa rd box, covered he r with two towels, and then pla ced the box in a storag e ar ea unde rneath her house.

The defenda nt acknow ledg ed that she heard the baby cry around 1:00 A.M., but did not check on he r. Afte r hea ring whimp er i n g at 4:00 A.M., the def endant claimed that she went to the storag e ar ea, he ld the infant for a fe w minutes, and then place d her ba ck in t h e b o x . Even thoug h she dete cted that the inf ant was c old, the defe ndant conc eded that she returned to the house, le aving the baby o u t s ide. The defe ndant estimated that a bout one and a half hours later, she came back to the ba by and took her

into a campe r that wa s parke d outside. The def endant testified that she clea ned the ba

by and attempted to br east fe ed h er w hile in the campe r. She stated that when the ba

by would not nurse, she took the infant into her residenc e and at 6:45 A.M., she drove her to Horizon M edica l Center. State v. Caroly n A. Wooster, No.M2000-02992-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 W L440233, at *1-2 (T enn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar . 18, 2002), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2003)

. At tr ia l, De te c tiv e F le a ne r te sti fi e d th a t he c a lle d th e Natio na l We a the r S e rv ic e in o rd e r t o obtain the temper ature for Ma rch 4, 1998, a nd the National Weathe r Service rep o rt ed that the temperature wa s 31 deg ree s at the Nashville a irport. Trial c ounsel told the trial court judg e that he had no t anti cipated any

testimonyabout the temper ature for the nig ht in question and would need tim e to r e bu t th e off

ice r’s test imo ny . T he tr ia l c ou rt ob se rv e d th a t “ mos t pr

ud e nt l a wy e rs wo uld ha ve a nti c ipate d that the te mpe ratur e on thi s d a te wo uldha ve be e n a n is su e a ndwo uldha ve c ome prepa red to prove it if they

thought it was g oing to be require d.” Tria l counsel said that he c alled the National Weather

Service in Nashville, and they said the temperature was 47 deg ree s on Marc h 4, 1998, bu t th a t h e d idn o t h a v e a n y p r o o f to o f f e r in to e v id e n c e
. T h e tria l c o u r t j u d g e to ldtr ial counsel that he could bring i n evidenc e about the t emper ature on the following day of trial. The trial court noted that “I

think either temperatur e would probably be inappropriate to leave a newly born infant outside in. This child didn’t fre eze t o death. This child was cold. I t’s body temperature wa s low. I think either one w ould do that.”-4- B. Post -conviction F acts
A c op y of th e po st-c on vic tio n h e ari ng tr a ns c ri pt i s n ot i n th e re c or d o n a pp e a l be fo re thi s Cou rt . It is the du ty

of the app e lla nt t o p ro vid e a re c or d whi c h co nv e y s a fa ir , ac c ur a te , an d c omp le te acc ount of what transpired with reg ard to the i ssues which form the basis of t he appe al. See Te nn. R. App. P. 24(b); see State v.. Tay lor, 992 S

. W

. 2 d 9 4 1 , 9 44 (Tenn. 1999) . Normally , when prese nted with an inade quate r ecor d on appea l, this C ourt must presume that the trial co u rt ruled
corr ectly . See State v. I vy , 868 S.W .2d 724, 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Under the circ umstances of this c ase, howeve r, we believe the absenc e of the transcript of the post-conviction court’s hearing is not fatal to appellate revie w. We find that the re cord is suff icient to determine the issues raise d on appea l. Thus, we will revie w the issues on the merits. The post-c onviction court' s findings of fa ct ar e conc lusive on appea l unless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (T enn. 1999). Absent a re cord which would indicate otherwise, w e must pre sume that the finding s of the post-conviction court are corr ect. Ac cord i n g t o t h e post-convic tion court’s finding s, at the post-convic tion hearing , the Petitioner’s trial counse l testified that he did not c ontest the ac tual temperature on the nig ht that the baby was ke pt under the house and that he did not know why he did not i nvestig ate this issue. Ac c or din g to the de ta ile d me mor a nd um op ini on fi le d by the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt , tr ia l c ou ns e l a lso seeming ly

testified that his trial tactic wa s to “show that [the Petit ioner] was a g ood person.”

II. Ana lys is

On app e a l, the Pe tit ion e r c on te nd s that, be c a us e he r tr ia l c ou ns e l wa s ine ff e c ti ve, th e post conviction-c ourt err ed wh en i t d i s missed her pe tition. S tate v. B urns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). I n order

to obtain post-conviction relief , a petitioner must show that his or her conviction or sentenc e is void or voidable beca use of the abridg ment of a constitutional rig ht. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 ( 2003). The pe titioner bear s the b u rden of proving fac tual alleg ations in the petition for post-c onvictio nr e li e f by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) (2003). Upon re view, this Court will not re- weig h or re -eva luate the e vid en ce b el o w; all questions
conce rning the cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht an d v alue to be g iven their testimony , and the fa c tua l is su e s r a ise d b y

the e vid e nc e are to b e re so lve d b y the tr ia l ju dg e , n ot the app e llate c ou rt s. Momon v. State, 18 S.W .3d 152, 156 (Tenn. 1999) ; Henley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578-79 (Te nn. 19 97 ). A p os t- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s a re su bje c t to a

de novo re vie w b y

thi s Co urt; ho we ve r, we mus t a c c or d th e se fa c tua l f ind ing s a pr e su mpt ion of

c orrectn ess , wh ic h is ov e rc ome on ly wh e n a pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e v i d e n c ei s c on tr ary

to the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001). A post-c onviction court’s conclusions of law a re subject t o a

p u r e ly d e n o v o r e v ie w b y

th is Co u r t, w ith n o p r e s u mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tn e s s
. I d

. a t 457. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the i ssue of inef fec tive assistance of counse l is a mix ed question of law a nd fac t and, as such, is subjec t to de novo revie w. B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461.

Th e ri g ht o f a

c ri min a lly a c c us e d to re pr e se ntatio n is g ua rante e d b y

bo th the Sixth-5-

Amendment to the United States Constituti on and Article I , section 9, of the T ennesse e Constituti on. Sta te v. Whit e , 11 4 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 9 , 4 75 (Tenn. 2003) ; Burns , 6 S. W.3 d at 46 1; B a xter v. Ros e , 523 S.W. 2d93 0, 93 6 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) . T his ri g ht t o r e pr e se ntatio n in c lud e s th e ri g ht t o “ re a so na bly eff ective” assistance . Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 461. The fo l l o wing two-prong test directs a court’s
e va luatio n o f a

c la im f or e ff e c tiv e ne ss:
Firs t, the de fe nd a nt mus t sh ow that c ou ns e l’ s p e rf orma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s sho wing that counsel made err ors so serious that counse l was not fu nc tio nin g a s th e “ c ou ns e l” g ua rante e d th e de fe nd a nt b y the Sixth A me nd me nt. Second, the de fenda nt must show that th e defic ient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the defe nse. This require s showing that counsel’s err ors wer e so serious as to deprive the defe n d an t o f a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. U nless a def endant make s both showings, it ca nnot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted f rom a bre akdown in the a dversa ry proce ss that rende rs the re sult unreliable.
State v. Melson, 772 S.W .2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989) . To prevail on a claim of inef fec tive assistance of counse l, a petitioner must show that “c ounsel ’s repr esenta tion fell below an obje ctive standa rd of re a so na ble ne ss. ” Ho us e v. Sta te , 44 S.W .3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2 0 0 1 ) (c iting Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984))

. When e valuating an inef fec tive assistance of counse l claim, the revie wing court should judg e the attorney ’s per formanc e within the context of the case as a w hole, taking into account a ll releva nt circumstanc es. Strickland, 46 6 U .S. a t 69 0; Sta te v. Mit c he ll , 753 S.W .2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)

. The re viewing court must evaluate the questionable conduct f rom the attorne y ’s per spective at the time. Strickland, 46 6 U.S. a t 69 0; H e lla rdv. State , 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) . I n doing so, the revie wing cour t m ust be hig hly defe rential a nd “should indulge a strong presumption that
coun s e l’ s c o n d u c t f

a ll s w ith in th e w id e r a n g e o f r e a s o n ab le p r o f e s s io n a l a s s is tan c e
. ” Bur ns, 6 S.W .3d at 462. Fina lly , we note that criminal petitioners are not entitled to perf ect r epre sentation,
on ly c on sti tut ion a lly

a de qu a te re pr e se ntatio n. De nto n v . St a te , 9 45 S.W. 2d 79 3, 79 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). I n othe r wo rd s, “ in c on sid e ri ng c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l, ‘ we a dd re ss not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is c onstitut ionally compelled.’ ” B urg er v. K emp, 48 3 U .S. 77 6, 79 4 ( 19 87 ) ( qu oti ng Un ite d St a te s v . Cr on ic , 466 U.S. 648, 665, n.38 (1984)).

Counsel should not be dee med to have be en inef fec tive mere ly

beca use a diff ere nt proce dure
or str a te g y mig ht h a ve pr od uc e d a

dif fe re nt res ul t. Wi lli a ms v . St a te , 599 S.W .2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)

. The fact that a pa rticular strateg y

or tac tic failed or

hurt the def

ense doe s no t, st a nd ing a lon e , e sta bli sh un re a so na

ble re pr e se ntatio n. Ho us e , 4 4 S. W. 3 d a t 5 1 5 ( c it a tion omi tte d) ; T ho ma s B rand on B oo ke r v . St a te , No. W2003- 00961-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 W L 587644, at
* 4 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. , a t Ja c k s o n , M ar
. 2 4 , 2 0 04), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 2004) . Howeve r, defe renc e to matters of

strateg y and tac tical choice s appl ies only if the choic es ar e informe d ones ba se d u po n a de qu ate pr e pa ratio n. Ho us e , 44 S.W .3d at 515.

I n order to rende r ef

fec tive assistance , counsel must make a ll reasona ble investig ations-6-

rele vant to the case or must make a rea sonable decision that rende rs parti cu l ar i n v estig ations
unnece ssary . Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 462. Howeve r, “I n any ineffe ctiveness c ase, a particula r dec ision
n o tt o i n v es t i gat e m u s t b e d i re ct l y as s es s ed fo r r ea s o n ab l en es s i n al l t h e c i rc u m s t an ce s , ap p l y i n g a he a vy me a su re of

de fe re nc e to c ou ns e l’ s ju dg me nts .” I d. F a ilu re to c on du c t a re a so na ble investigation constitut es def icient per formanc e. I d.

I f the petitioner shows that counsel’s r epre sentation fell below a rea sonable standa

rd, then the pe tition e r mus t satis fy the pr e jud ic e pro ng of

the Str ic klandte st b y

de mon str a tin g “ the re is a
rea sonable probability that, but f or counsel’s unprofe ssional e rror s, the result of t h e p ro ceeding would h av e b ee n d i ff

erent.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T o s ati sfy the re qu ir e me nt o f p re jud ic e , a pe tit ion e r mus t sh ow a re a so na ble pr ob abil ity

that, b ut f

or c ou ns e l’ s u nr e a so na

ble e rr or , th e fa c t f

ind e r would h a ve ha d r e a so na ble doubt r eg arding the petitioner’s g uilt. S trickland, 46 6 U.S. a t 695. Th is r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity

mus t b e “ s u f f i c i e n t t o u n d e r m i n e c o n f

i d e n c e i n t h e o u t c o m e
. ” I d

. a t 6 9 4 ; s e e a l s o H arr i s v. Sta te , 875 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994)

. On appe al, the Petitioner claims that her trial counsel failed to f unction as ef

fec tive counsel as g uara nteed by

both the Tenne ssee and United States Constit utions. I n this reg ard, she asserts that sh e wa s d e nie d th e e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l bec a us e Cou ns e l fa ile d to ade qu a te ly inv e sti g a te her c ase a nd to present, at trial, evidenc e ab out the tempera ture on the nig ht of the crime. The Petitioner asserts that Counsel’s defic ient perf ormanc e undermines confide nce in the outc ome of he r tr ia l be c aus e the State ne e de d to show that the ba by wa s expos e d to e xtre me ly c oldte mpe ratur e s in
or de r t o e sta

bli sh a lin k b e tw e e n th e Pe tit ion e r’ s c on du c t a ndthe ba by ’s inj ury . T he Pe tit ion e r a lso contends that Counsel’s conduct prejudiced the Petitioner’s case beca use the issue of te mpera ture was e ssential to proving that the Petitioner knowing ly exposed the ch i l d t o t h e risk of substantial bodily injury

. T h e State asse rts that the Petitioner failed to de monstrate that her Counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s defic ient and failed to show how any alleg ed er rors c onstitut ed pre

judice suff

icient to undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome of her jury trial. We ag ree with the State.

I n it s o pin ion , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt state d th a t: Assuming f

or the purposes of arg ument that trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e wa s defic ient in failing to establish that the ac tual temperature wa s some six teen de g ree s warmer than that presente d in the State’s proof, P et i t i o ner must still establish t hat actua l prejudice to Petiti oner w as caused by the def icient per formanc e . . . .
At Petitioner ’s t rial, Dr. V alerie B eck te stified that the baby ’s body temperature wa s so low that it could not be mea sured by the instruments available

. Dr. B eck te stified that the baby was suff ering from sever e hy

pothermia. She further te sti fi e d th a t, w he n p la c e d in a wa rm e nv ir on me nt, the ba

by ’s bo dy te mpe ratur e ro se to 9 7 d e g re e s in fe we r tha n th irty min ute s. Dr . B e c k te sti fi e d th a t th e ba by wa s in
a c ute dis tr e ss andthat th e re wa s a su bs ta nti a l r isk

of de a th f ro m this c on dit ion . T his being the ca se, it matters little whether the outside temperature was six teen de g ree s-7-

warmer or not. The fac t is that, whateve r the tempe rature , the baby was in imminent dang er of death f rom hy pothermia. . . . Certainly , Petitioner was aw are of [what] t he outside temper ature was, a t most, in t he fort i es an d that this sit uation would be dang erous to the he alth of a newborn. To say that Petitioner did not act knowing ly in this si tuation, whether the temperature wa s in the 20' s or 40' s, defies log ic. No pre judicial defic iency

in the investigation of Petiti oner’ s trial counsel ha s be e n s ho wnby

the pr oo f. Th e iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.
The e vidence in the rec ord does not preponderate ag ainst the finding s of the post-convic tion court. Althoug h, as pre viouslynoted, the tra nscript of the evidenc e at the post-convic tion hearing is not included in the rec ord on appea l, it would appe ar f rom the memora ndum opinion filed by the post-conviction court that the Petitioner prese nted no evidenc e to establish that Counsel’s alleg ed failu re to i nv e sti g a te the te mpe ratur e on the nig ht in que sti on un de rm ine d co nf ide nc e in the ou tc ome of he r t ri a l. E ve n if

the te mpe ratur e wa s 4 7 de g re e s o n th e nig ht o f the c ri me , it is n on e the le ss abundantly

clea r in our view that the Petitioner subjected her ba by to abuse and neg lect by

leaving the baby outside overnig ht. Whether t he temperature was 31 deg ree s or 47 deg ree s, the baby ’s body te mpe ratur e be c a me too c old , a nd the ba by de ve lop e d hy

po the rm ia du e to the Pe tit ion e r’ s a c tio ns
. We conclude, as did the post-conviction court, that any alleg ed def

icient re prese ntation by

counsel do e s n ot u nd e rm ine ou r c on fi de nc e in the ju ry ’s det e rm inatio n th a t th e Pe tit ion e r kno wi ng ly subjected he r baby

to the risk of serious bodilyinjury and imminent dang er of

death. There fore , the Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.
III. Conclusi on
I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oin g authorities and r easoning , we a ffirm the judg ment of the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE