IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0626

Filed December 20, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

STEPHANIE LESHANTI DENISE HARRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Thomas G. Reidel, 

Judge.

Stephanie Harris appeals the sentence imposed following a guilty plea to 

two charges. AFFIRMED. 

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.

The following facts are not disputed. In October 2014, Stephanie Harris 

was caring for several children, including her cousin’s two children, A.B. and M.B. 

At that time, the children’s mother was incarcerated. As a result of Harris’s lack 

of supervision, A.B., a two-year-old girl, fell down the stairs and injured her head. 

After the fall, the child began having seizures. Harris merely placed frozen food 

on the bump on the child’s head. Harris did not seek medical attention for the 

child until six days later. The child ultimately died. The child’s sibling, M.B., a 

four-year-old boy, suffered a bodily injury while in Harris’s care. Again, Harris did 

not facilitate medical treatment for the child for six days.

The State initially charged Harris with child endangerment resulting in 

death as to A.B. The State subsequently amended the trial information to include 

two additional counts: child endangerment resulting in serious injury as to A.B. 

and child endangerment resulting in bodily injury as to M.B. See Iowa Code 

§ 726.6(1)(d), (5), (6) (2014). The State agreed to dismiss the first count in 

return for Harris’s guilty plea to counts two and three. The plea agreement left 

open whether the sentences on the respective offenses would run consecutively 

or concurrently. Harris ultimately pled guilty to both charges. At the sentencing 

hearing, the State requested Harris’s sentences run consecutively, given the fact 

that two separate children were injured. Harris, noting her “intellectual disability 

that is mild” and the fact that the charges stemmed from “one night,” requested 

her sentences run concurrently. 

The district court sentenced Harris to, among other things, ten years of 

imprisonment on the charge relating to A.B. and five years of imprisonment on 
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the charge relating to M.B. The court ordered the sentences to run 

consecutively. 

Harris appeals. She contends, the district court failed to consider the 

mitigating circumstances that she (1) suffers from a mental impairment and (2) 

has “no criminal history beyond traffic tickets and one resisting a police officer 

conviction,” and the district court therefore abused its discretion in ordering her 

sentences to run consecutively. She also contends the sentencing court’s 

consideration of A.B.’s death was improper.

When a defendant’s sentence is within the statutory limitations, we review 

the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, our most deferential 

standard of review. State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017) (quoting 

State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015)). “When assessing a district 

court’s decision for abuse of discretion, we only reverse if the district court’s 

decision rested on grounds or reasoning that were clearly untenable or clearly 

unreasonable.” State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa 2017). “Grounds or 

reasons are untenable if they are ‘based on an erroneous application of the law 

or not supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Dudley, 856 

N.W.2d 668, 675 (Iowa 2014)). 

“If a person is sentenced for two or more separate offenses, the 

sentencing judge may order the second or further sentence to begin at the 

expiration of the first or succeeding sentence.” Iowa Code § 901.8; accord State 

v. Criswell, 242 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Iowa 1976). A sentencing court must state its 

rationale for imposing consecutive sentences and, “[a]lthough the reasons do not 

need to be detailed, they must be sufficient to allow appellate review of the 
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discretionary action.” State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2002). 

A sentencing court is also required “to consider any mitigating circumstances 

relating to a defendant.” State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998); see

Iowa Code § 901.3(1)(g). 

In choosing to impose consecutive sentences, the district court stated:

In doing this, I look at the seriousness of the crime, the effect 

that this crime has upon members of our community, your 

willingness to accept change and treatment and what we have 

available to assist you in that regard.

. . . . I always do look at the least restrictive alternatives first 

before moving on to more restrictive alternatives. 

I have reviewed your entire presentence investigation report. 

I actually took time to review your entire file this morning based on 

the seriousness of these charges and the mental health issues that 

I know you have suffered from. I’ve not given any consideration to 

any entries in your criminal history section that do not show an 

admission or adjudication of guilt.

Ms. Harris, as I stated under count 2, it’s a forcible felony. 

It’s mandatory that I sentence you to 10 years in prison on that 

count. The real fighting issue here is whether count 3 would be 

consecutive to count 2, in other words, will it be a total of 15 years 

or will it just be 10. 

It’s obvious that you’ve had some substance abuse issues, 

that you have intellectual and mental health issues, and that you’ve 

already spent 212 days in jail. I’ve considered all those on your 

side on the positive ledger. 

But on the negative ledger, it’s just the atrocity of these 

crimes and the needlessness of these crimes. I do not find it to be 

an excuse – I understand having six children with a seventh on the 

way is a daunting task for anybody, but nonetheless you had an 

obligation to those children. 

And when I think of all the things the law is to protect, I think 

protecting children should be first and foremost on that list. And in 

this case, your actions resulted in serious injury to a child and that 

child eventually died. You also had a second child in your care that 

suffered bodily injury. These are two distinct children with two 

distinct injuries. You’re responsible for both. 

. . . .

In this case, Ms. Harris, the Court finds that consecutive 

sentences are warranted. The reason for the consecutive 

sentences are that we have two separate victims here who suffered 
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separate and distinct injuries, one that resulted in serious injury that 

culminated in death and the other that sustained bodily injury.

Additionally, I believe the need to protect the children and 

protect the community is the best way to deter this – the best way 

to do that is to deter this conduct from others by imposing this 

sentence upon you. I also believe it will give you an opportunity to 

maximize your own personal rehabilitation. 

The foregoing makes clear the sentencing court considered the mitigating 

circumstances Harris complains it did not. The court expressly considered 

Harris’s intellectual disabilities and noted it placed them “on [her] side on the 

positive ledger.” The court also made clear that it reviewed Harris’s “entire 

presentence investigation report” and, specifically, its “criminal history section,” 

while ignoring “any entries . . . that do not show an admission or adjudication of 

guilt.” The court weighed these mitigating circumstances against the aggravating 

circumstances in deciding to impose consecutive sentences. We find no abuse 

of discretion in this determination. 

Harris additionally complains the sentencing court considered the fact that 

one of the children ultimately passed away and, because the childendangerment-resulting-in-death charge was dismissed, the child’s death was an 

inappropriate sentencing consideration. However, Harris stated in her plea 

colloquy that A.B., in fact, died as a result of her head injury. She also agreed to 

the accuracy of the minutes of testimony, which reflected the same. The child’s 

death was admitted to by the defendant and was therefore a proper sentencing 

consideration. See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a 

well-established rule that a sentencing court may not rely upon additional, 

unproven, and unprosecuted charges unless the defendant admits to the charges 

or there are facts presented to show the defendant committed the offenses.” 
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(emphasis added)); see also State v. Rhode, 503 N.W.2d 27, 40 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1993) (“An injury which is life-threatening, such as an injury which does in fact 

cause death, is by definition a “serious injury.”). 

We affirm Harris’s sentence. 

AFFIRMED.