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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re MORGAN, Minors. July 23, 2015

Nos. 325818; 325821

Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 2009-000238-NA

Before: M ARKEY

, P.J., and M URPHY and S TEPHENS , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent mother and respondent father appeal by right the tr ial court’s order terminating their parental rights to their four minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (failure to rectify conditions t hat led to adjudication), (c)( ii ) (failure to rectify other conditions), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reas onable likelihood that the children

will be harmed if returned to t he parents’ care). We affirm.

Respondents first contend that the trial court clearly erred i n finding statutory grounds for terminating their parental rights. “In order to terminate pare ntal rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met.” In re VanDalen , 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). The trial court’s determination is reviewed for clear error. Id .; MCR 3.977(K). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial cour t’s special opportunity to observe

the witnesses.” In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (citation omitted).

The primary conditions leading to the adjudication in this mat ter were respondents’ substance abuse, domestic viole nce, and unsatisfactory living c onditions. Further, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Department of Human Services (DHS) identified emotional stability and parenting skills as barriers to reunification for both respondents. To address these various issues, DHS referred resp ondents to a number of service s, including counseling, psychological evaluations, parenting skills training through th e Early Intervention Program, random drug screens through SPAN, i ntensive outpatient substanc e abuse treatment, and Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) meetings. The record throughout this case reveals that respondents’ participation in these services was sporadic at best and at times completely non-existent. For example, respondents participated in only three counseling sessions with their first outreach counselor, missed multiple a ppointments for psychological evaluations, participated in only a handful of meetings with th e Early Intervention specialist,-2- visited their children inconsiste ntly (and at one point during the proceedings did not see them for over a month), repeatedly failed to meet with caseworkers, and failed to submit to a single drug screen through SPAN. When respondents did submit to drug scree ns, administered by DHS, they tested positive for illegal substances such as marijuana a s recently as June and October 2014, respectively. At the time o f the October 31, 2014 termin ation hearing—i.e., approximately 16 months after these proceedings were initiated—respondents ha d only just begun to show even minimal compliance with services. Nonetheless, it was abundantl y clear that they had not rectified any of the above barri ers to reunification. Specific ally, they had not adequately

addressed their emotional stabil ity, substance abuse, or domest ic violence concerns, did not have suitable housing, and had not impr oved their parenting skills. Thus, at the time of termination, there was no reasonable likelihood that respondents would recti fy their barriers to reunification within a reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), and likewise no reasonable likelihood existed that they could provide their children with proper care and custody within a reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Finally , based upon their continuing issues, it was reasonably likely

that the children would be harme d if returned to respondents’ c are. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). As a result, there was clear and convincing evidence to support term ination of both respondents’ parental rights under the cited statutory grounds, and the tria l court did not clearly err in so finding.

Respondents further argue that DHS failed to provide them adeq uate services in light of their inconsistent access to a telephone and problems securing transportation in order to comply with their drug testing require ments. This argument lacks meri t. First, respondents’ claims that they were unable to call in to SPAN on a consistent basis becau se of telephone issues is unsupported, and, in fact, contradicted, by the record: the re cord demonstrated that respondents almost always had access to a telephone when they needed one, e ither because they had their own cellular telephone or because they had access to friends’ a nd neighbors’ telephones. In fact, they were frequently able to correspond with caseworkers and th e foster parent via telephone. Thus, as respondents themselves admitted at the termination hea ring, their repeated failures to

call in to SPAN had less to do with inconsistent access to a te lephone and more to do with their general lack of willingness to c omply with a service they felt they did not need. Moreover, to the extent respondents had transporta tion problems, the caseworkers repeatedly informed them that if they notified the caseworkers early enough on days they were required to submit to drug screens, the caseworkers would come to respondents’ home and pe rsonally administer them. Respondents rarely took adva ntage of this offer.

Respondent father also specifica lly argues that DHS failed to make reasonable efforts when it failed to provide him with timely substance abuse servi ces. According to father, the extent of DHS’s efforts to help him with this issue at the outs et of the case was offering him drug screens. And, while father acknowledges that he was eventually referred to intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment, he claims that this service was not timely and that the caseworker failed to assist him with setting up the service because she me rely provided him with the telephone number for the treatme nt center while knowing that fa ther had telephone issues. Again, father’s argument lacks merit. As a threshold matter, c ontrary to father’s assertion, DHS did more than simply provide him with drug screens at the outse t of the case. Rather, DHS also referred father for outreach counseling, which was designed in part to address substance abuse. Additionally, DHS referred father for a psychological evaluatio n. But, as discussed above, father substantially failed to partici pate in counseling, and he only participated in a psychological-3- evaluation in June 2014, after th e termination petition had bee n filed and after months of missed appointments. When father eventually did complete his psycholo gical evaluation, it was recommended that he participate in intensive outpatient substan ce abuse treatment. However, once DHS referred father for that service, he failed to even make an appointment. And, while father argues on appeal that his failure to comply stemmed from his not having access to a telephone, his own testimony at the October 31, 2014 terminatio n hearing belies that claim. To the contrary, father explained—r ather unconvincingly—that he fa iled to make an appointment because mother lost the telephone number for the treatment cent er. When asked why he did not just call his caseworker or someone else to obtain the telephon e number, father responded that it was “pointless.”

Finally, respondent mother generally argues that DHS failed to make reasonable efforts in other ways, such as when the caseworker failed to offer resp ondents counseling services “for an eight-month period,” never viewed respondents’ home, merely mailed them a copy of their parent-agency treatment plan, an d “only had personal contact wi th the[m] at review hearings at court.” Again, these assertions are belied by the record which establishes that the caseworker made repeated efforts to meet with respondents at their home to discuss the parent-agency treatment plan and to view their home. Still, respondents repe atedly cancelled appointments, so except during review hearings, the caseworker was never able to meet with respondents in person. It was therefore out of necessity, not indifference, t hat the caseworker mailed respondents a copy of their parent-agency treatment plan. Like wise, the gap between counseling

services was not the result of the caseworker’s indifference to ward respondents, but rather the

fact that after the first round of outreach counseling services ended, respondents expressed no desire to participate in further counseling until June 2014. W hen they did, the caseworker promptly referred them to additional services.

In sum, the record in this case supports that DHS made substan tial efforts to assist respondents with their many barriers to reunification. Respond ents simply failed to meet their “commensurate responsibility” to participate in the services of fered. In re Frey , 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).

Respondent father finally argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best i nterests. We disagree. “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial cou rt must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rig hts.” In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); see MCL 712A.19b(5). “[W]heth er termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In

re Moss , 301 Mich App at 90. We review this determination for clear e rror. In re Olive/Metts

, 297 Mich App at 40.

At the time of termination, the minor children, who ranged in age from two to six years old, had been outside of respondents’ care for approximately 18 months, the majority of which was spent in foster care. Patently, the children were in stron g need of permanency, stability, and finality. In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App at 41-42. At the time of termination, responden ts were unable to provide those things because they had substantia lly failed to participate in

services and had not rectified t he barriers to reunification. Thus, there was no real likelihood that the children “could be returned to [respondents’] care within t he foreseeable future, if at all.” In-4- re Frey , 297 Mich App at 249. On the other hand, the children were pl aced together in a loving foster home where their needs were being met, and the foster parent expressed an interest in adopting all four of them. Finally, throughout these proceedin gs, respondents displayed an inability to develop adequate parenting skills and were inconsi stent in their parenting time visits. And when they did visit, they di splayed inappropriate behaviors . So, by the time of termination, the two oldest children had repe atedly expressed that they did not wish to return to respondents’ care. We have no problem concluding that a preponderance of th e evidence supported that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the children ’s best interests. In re Moss , 301 Mich App at 90. The trial court did not clearly err in so find ing. In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App at 40.

We affirm.

/s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ William B. Murphy /s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens