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******************************************************MICHAEL TAVANI v. MAUREEN RILEY (AC 37034)
Alvord, Keller and Harper, Js. Argued March 3—officially released October 27, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Windham, Graziani, J.)
J. Colin Heffernan, with whom, on the brief, was John C. Heffernan, for the appellant (plaintiff).Opinion HARPER, J. The plaintiff, Michael Tavani, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action foradeclaratoryjudgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his action, sua sponte, on the ground that his case was not justiciable.1 We agree, and reverse thejudgment ofthe trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s claim. On December 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed a one count complaint against the defendant, Maureen Riley, seeking declaratory relief ‘‘that [he] has fully complied with his child support obligation and that there are no arrearages relating to the care and support of either of [his] children, who
are now adults, or [the defendant].’’ The trial court stated the following facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint: ‘‘On March 24, 1994, the Essex County, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court grantedthe plaintiffand the defendant a divorce. Both parties and their children resided in Massachusetts at the time of the divorce. Between 1994 and 2000, the plaintiffrelocated to Connecticut and the defendant relocated to Virginia. OnApril 28, 2000, the defendantpetitioned the Virginia Department of Social Services to pursue the plaintiff for his alleged failure to pay child support from 1994 through 2000. The Massachusetts support order was registered in Connecticut onJuly 11, 2000. The Virginia Department of Social Services contacted the Connecticut Support Enforcement Services in Putnam, which contacted the plaintiff and directed him to appear in court on September 14, 2000, and provide proof of his gross income from March, 1994, to September, 2000. The Connecticut Support Enforcement Services determinedthattherewasno arrearage andfacilitatedfuture child support payments from 2000 to 2009. ‘‘The plaintifffurther alleges that onAugust 10, 2009, the Connecticut Superior Court terminated the plaintiff’s child support obligation at the plaintiff’s request because his children were emancipated. The court did not find any arrearage owed at the time the support order was terminated.2 On January 3, 2012, the defendant, who was now living in New Hampshire, filed a complaintforcontemptintheEssexCounty, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. The Massachusetts court dismissed the complaint on April 25, 2012, for lack of jurisdiction because neither party resided in [Massachusetts]. The plaintiffseeks a declaratoryjudgment that he ‘has fully complied with his child support obligation and that there are no arrearages relating to the care and support ofeither of [his] children, who are now adults, or [the defendant]. The purpose in seeking declaratoryjudgmentistoprevent [the defendant] from engaging in any further forum shopping that would require [the plaintiff] to once again prove to a court’ssatisfaction that he has fully met his obligations.’ The plaintiff wishes to enforce ajudgment from this court underthe full faith and credit clause ofthe constitution in any state and at any time the defendant brings a claim against him. ‘‘On February 6, 2013, the defendant was defaulted for failure to plead. On March 6, 2013, the plaintifffiled
a motion forjudgment after default, which was denied
onMarch22, 2013. OnAugust27, 2013,thecourtgranted the plaintiff’s August 15, 2013 motion to transfer and the matter was transferred to the family docket. The plaintiff then filed a motion for judgment on October 17, 2013.’’ (Footnote added.) On November 6, 2013, the court heard oral argument and referred the matter to the FamilySupportMagistrate Division, andonJanuary 30, 2014, the Family Support Magistrate Division referred the case back to the family division ofthe trial court.3 ‘‘ThematterwasheardonJuly 10, 2014, atwhich time the court deniedthe motionforjudgment and [sua sponte] dismissed the case for a lack of substantial question in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations. The plaintiff filed a motion for articulation
on July 11, 2014.’’
OnAugust 7, 2014, the court issued its memorandum of decision, concluding that there was no justiciable controversy or substantial issue to allow it to declare judgment. The court explained that ‘‘[t]here is no pending action concerning a complaint of contempt against the plaintiff. The last action against the plaintiff, filed
onJanuary3, 2012, wasdismissedbytheMassachusetts Probate and Family Court for lack ofjurisdiction. The Massachusetts child support order, which was registered in Connecticut, has been terminated and there is
no pending contempt case in Connecticut. The action for declaratory judgment itself is not an uncertainty that requires settlement; it is an action by which the court may determine a question that is already in dispute and distinctly separate from the issue of whether the court should declare judgment for the moving party.’’ The court concluded that ‘‘when there is no justiciable controversyorsubstantialissueforthe court to rule in a declaratory judgment action, a default for failure to plead does not require the court to declare judgment.’’ Because the court had no information as to what the defendant may or may not claim in a future action, it stated that ‘‘the defendant’s previous act of bringingaclaimofcontemptdoesnotallowtheplaintiff to ascertain with reasonable certainty that the defendantwillbringthe same actionin anotherjurisdiction.’’ In otherwords, the court determinedthattheplaintiff’s complaint was not justiciable. For those reasons, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for judgment and dismissed his case. This appeal followed. On appeal, the plaintiffclaims that the court improperly dismissed his action on the ground that the casewas not justiciable. He argues that ‘‘[t]he trial court erroneously interpreted the plaintiff’s complaint as seeking an advisory opinion as to whether or not the defendant could pursue an action against the plaintiff in another forum.’’ He further argues that this was not his request; his request was for the court to find a specific fact, which presently exists, that there was a previous finding of zero arrearages of child support owed to the defendant.4
As apreliminary note, we treat the plaintiff’s request for a declaratoryjudgment as a request for an accounting to clarify whether he owes the defendant any child support arrearage. See Drahan v. Board ofEducation, 42 Conn. App. 480, 489, 680 A.2d 316 (‘‘[W]e emphasize that the construction of a pleading is a question ultimately for the court.

. . . When a case requires this court to determine the nature of a pleading filed by a party, we are not required to accept the label affixed to that pleading by the party. In this vein, we analyze the pleadings at issue in the present case.’’ [Internal quotationmarks omitted.]), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921, 682A.2d 1000 (1996). Uponreviewoftherecordandthe plaintiff’s complaintfor declaratoryrelief, we conclude that the plaintiff sought an accounting by the court, thatasofAugust 10, 2009,whenhischildsupportobligationwasterminated dueto his children’s emancipation, he owed no arrearage in his child support obligations.
The plaintiffseeks to prove, by review ofthe records of the Connecticut Support Enforcement Services, a division ofthe court operations ofthe judicial branch, that no arrearage exists and to have the court issue a specific finding to that effect. Our Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[e]ven beyond the four month time frame set forth in Practice Book § 17-4

. . . courts have continuingjurisdiction to fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a prior

. . . judgment

. . . pursuant to [their] inherent powers

. . . . When an ambiguity in the language of a prior judgment has arisen as a result of postjudgment events

. . . a trial court may, atanytime, exercise its continuingjurisdictionto effectuate its prior [judgment]

. . . by interpreting [the] ambiguousjudgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mickey v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 604, 974 A.2d 641 (2009). Next, we set forth the applicable standard ofreview for issues regarding justiciability. ‘‘A court will not resolve a claimed controversy on the merits unless it is satisfied that the controversy isjusticiable.

. . . Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute

. . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse

. . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power

. . . and (4) that the determination ofthe controversywillresultinpracticalreliefto the complainant.

. . . As we have recognized, justiciability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court’s subject matterjurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate aparticular matter.

. . . Finally, because an issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate reviewisplenary.’’ (Citationomitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) Shenkman

-Tyler v. Central Mutual Ins

. Co., 126 Conn. App. 733, 738–39, 12A.3d613 (2011). Here, we hold thatthe plaintiff’s complaint wasjusticiable. Although the court found that there was not an actual controversy, we determine that the plaintiffwas entitled to obtain an accounting or clear ruling that he does not owe any arrearage for child support to the defendant. Although the defendant has taken no action in this matter, the interest ofthe plaintiffin seeking an accounting is adverse to that of the defendant, who recentlyhadattemptedtopursuecollectionofaclaimed child support arrearage against the plaintiff in Massachusetts. This Massachusetts filing by the defendant
was despitehersuccessfulpetitiontohave Connecticut Support Enforcement Services enforce and collect the child support payment from 2000 to 2009, when all the children had attainedthe age ofmajority.5Additionally, thematteris capable ofbeingadjudicatedbythe court,6 and ifthe court can augment its August 10, 2009 order by permitting the plaintiff to establish he owes no arrearage, the plaintiff can achieve practical relief by havingthe abilityto prove to anotherforum thathe has met his obligation. Therefore, the plaintiff’s case meets the requirements ofjusticiability.
The judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for
ahearing onthe accountingactionto ascertainwhether the plaintiff owes any arrearage for child support to the defendant.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly refused to grant him

ajudgment on the default for failure to plead that was entered against the defendant, Maureen Riley, on February 12, 2013, and improperly denied his request for a declaratoryjudgment following that order of default. Because

we agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly dismissed his action

on the ground that it was not justiciable, we remand the case for further proceedings and do not reach these claims. We also note that the defendant never filed a briefin this appeal and this court ordered that the appeal would be considered only on the basis ofthe plaintiff’s brief and appendix.

2 The court’s order lacked any finding on the child support arrearage, if any existed at that time. This ambiguity is the root of the problem.
3 Number 15-71 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-71) modified the law of interstate support orders. The power of the Family Support Magistrate Division, however, remains unchanged. In particular, § 89 (m) (2) (A) of P.A. 15-71 authorizes the Family Support Magistrate to hear interstate matters, and § 19 provides that the magistrate shall: ‘‘(1) apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available inthose proceedings; and (2) determine the duty ofsupport and the amount payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.’’ Public Acts 2015, No. 15-71, § 19.4 We emphasize that there was never a previous finding of zero child supportarrearage. Theplaintiffcouldhave requested, atthetime oftermination of his child support obligation, a finding of the arrearage, if any.
5 We note that the support obligor who seeks an accounting bears the burden of proving the payment of the court order. Therefore, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove, on remand, that there is a zero arrearage owed to the defendant as of the date of termination of the child support order.
6 Because the records of the Connecticut Support Enforcement Services may be necessary evidence in a hearing, on remand, the court, in its discretion, may order the matter placed on the family support magistrate list for hearing and determination. See Practice Book § 25a-1 (c).