UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4695

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PHILLIP RADFORD POTTER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District 

Judge. (1:13-cr-00010-JPJ-PMS-55)

Submitted: August 26, 2014 Decided: September 11, 2014

Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph W. Rasnic, Jonesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy 

J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Phillip Radford Potter of five counts 

of passing false and fictitious checks with the intent to 

defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2) (2012), and 

conspiracy to pass false and fictitious checks with the intent 

to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). On appeal, 

Potter challenges his conviction, arguing that the Government 

did not meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

he had the intent to defraud. We affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 

motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Strayhorn, 

743 F.3d 917, 921 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2689 

(2014). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a 

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93 

(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

The test is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 

States v. Madrigal-Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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We consider “the complete picture” created by the 

evidence, United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir. 

1996) (en banc), including both circumstantial and direct 

evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from such evidence 

in the government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 

326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). If the evidence supports different 

interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to 

believe, and we “may not overturn a substantially supported 

verdict merely because [we] find[] the verdict unpalatable or 

determine[] that another, reasonable verdict would be 

preferable.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862. Rather, “[a] defendant 

bringing a sufficiency challenge must overcome a heavy burden, 

and reversal for insufficiency must be confined to cases where 

the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Engle, 

676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

To sustain convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 

§ 514(a)(2), the government must prove, among other elements, 

that the defendant had the intent to defraud when cashing the 

false or fictitious instrument. See 18 U.S.C. § 514(a) 

(“Whoever, with the intent to defraud . . . .”); Ingram v. 

United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (“Conspiracy to commit a 

particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the 

degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense 
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itself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like other facts, 

“[f]raudulent intent may be inferred from the totality of the 

circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.” 

United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993). 

Moreover, under the doctrine of willful blindness, knowledge may 

be inferred where a defendant deliberately avoids enlightenment. 

United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992).

Here, although there was no direct evidence of

Potter’s intent to defraud, we conclude that the jury could have 

determined that the circumstances surrounding the check-cashing 

scheme were suspicious enough to alert Potter to the fraudulent 

nature of the scheme. Moreover, the evidence suggests that 

Potter passed up opportunities to confirm that the checks were 

legitimate, even after he expressed his concern that the scheme 

was illegal. Thus, the jury could have concluded that Potter 

“subjectively believe[d] that there [was] a high probability 

that” the checks were invalid and that he took “deliberate 

actions to avoid learning” that they were in fact invalid. 

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070

(2011).

Accordingly, we conclude that the Government met its 

burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Potter had the 

intent to defraud, and we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED