PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 05-4430

_____________

MIGUEL MONTANEZ

v.

PAT THOMPSON, RECORD SPECIALIST I, STATE

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT ALBION; 

JOHN DOE, I SUPERVISOR OF INMATE RECORDS,

STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT ALBION; 

JOHN DOE, II, SUPERVISOR OF INMATE RECORDS,

STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT

GRATERFORD; SUPERINTENDENT, PHILADELPHIA

PRISON SYSTEM; ROBERT DURISON, DIRECTOR,

CLASSIFICATION, MOVEMENT & REGISTRATION,

PHILADELPHIA PRISON SYSTEM

PAT THOMPSON,

 Appellant.
* Honorable Yvette Kane, Chief Judge of the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,

sitting by designation.

2

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-6713)

District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez

_______________

Argued January 26, 2010

Before: FUENTES, FISHER, Circuit Judges, and KANE,

*

Chief District Judge.

(Filed: April 22, 2010)

_______________

Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Esq. 

Claudia M. Tesoro, Esq. (Argued)

John G. Knorr, III, Esq.

Office of Attorney General

21 South 12th Street

Third Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellant
3

Miguel Montanez

4245 North Fairhill Street

Philadelphia, PA 19140

Pro Se Appellee

Craig R. Gottlieb, Esq.

City of Philadelphia

Law Department

1515 Arch Street

One Parkway

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellee Robert Durison

Marianne Consentino, Esq.

M. Jared Littman, Esq. (Argued)

Harkins Cunningham LLP

2800 One Commerce Square

2005 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Court Amicus on Behalf of Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT
Under Pennsylvania law, the “maximum term” represents 1

the sentence imposed for a criminal offense. The minimum term

merely sets a date after which the prisoner may be paroled.

Martin v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 840 A.2d 299,

302 (Pa. 2003).

4

KANE, Chief District Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal by Pat Thompson

(“Thompson”), a Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

(“DOC”) Records Specialist at SCI Albion, from the District

Court’s order denying her motion for summary judgment based

on qualified immunity. In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, Plaintiff Miguel Montanez (“Montanez”) alleges that he

was incarcerated beyond the expiration of his maximum term of

imprisonment as a result of the Defendants’ deliberate

indifference in responding to his inquiries and challenges.

Because we find that we may properly exercise appellate

jurisdiction over this appeal and that Thompson was entitled to

qualified immunity on this claim, we will reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 11, 1992, Judge Quinones of the Court of

Common Pleas sentenced Montanez for burglary, imposing a

maximum 60-month term of imprisonment with a 30-

month minimum term, effective July 23, 1992 (“Quinones 1

Sentence”). As such, his period of incarceration on this sentence

ran through July 23, 1997. On January 28, 1995, shortly after his

minimum term of imprisonment had expired, the Pennsylvania
 A defendant convicted in municipal court has an 2

automatic right to appeal his conviction to the Court of Common

Pleas for a trial de novo. See 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 1123

5

Board of Probation and Parole (“Parole Board”) paroled

Montanez from the Quinones Sentence. 

On February 9, 1996, after about a year at liberty from the

Quinones Sentence, Montanez was arrested and detained on

several new state charges, including multiple counts of luring a

child into a motor vehicle, harassment, open lewdness, indecent

exposure, and corrupting the morals of a minor. Montanez first

went to trial on these charges in Philadelphia Municipal Court,

where he was convicted after a bench trial; the municipal court

sentenced him on April 30, 1996, to a 60-month maximum term

of imprisonment with a 30-month minimum term. Montanez

appealed the conviction to the Court of Common Pleas on May

24, 1996, nullifying the conviction and sentence of the municipal

court. Over a year later, on June 9, 1997, he pleaded guilty to 2

the charges before Judge Smith of the Court of Common Pleas

and was again sentenced to a 60-month maximum term of

imprisonment with a 30-month minimum term (“Smith

Sentence”). The court’s judgment did not provide Montanez with

any credit for time served while awaiting his sentence.

While the proceedings were underway against Montanez

for these new charges, the Parole Board lodged a detainer against

him for possible violation of his parole on the Quinones Sentence.

The Parole Board held a hearing on July 29, 1996, and found that

Montanez was a convicted and technical parole violator. He was

recommitted on the Quinones Sentence to serve 36 months of
 Montanez had also brought his concerns regarding his 3

sentence to Robert Durison, Director of Classification,

Movement, & Registration for the Philadelphia Prison System.

While named as a codefendant in this case, Durison did not argue

he was entitled to qualified immunity before the District Court.

Thus, he was not able to file an interlocutory appeal of the

District Court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment.

6

backtime as a convicted violator and recommitted to serve a

concurrent six months of backtime as a technical violator.

Despite this, the Parole Board later realized that recommitting

Montanez as a convicted violator was untimely, likely due to

confusion resulting from the nullification of Montanez’s municipal

court conviction. The Parole Board eventually rescinded the 36-

month backtime sentence on November 26, 1997, but retained its

finding that Montanez was a technical violator. Accordingly, only

the Parole Board’s six-month recommitment for Montanez’s

technical violation was left intact. The Parole Board order

rescinding the 36-month sentence noted that the case was

retroactively closed effective July 23, 1997, the maximum release

date on the Quinones Sentence.

After the Quinones Sentence had officially expired,

Montanez remained in prison on the Smith Sentence. Montanez’s

first contact with Thompson occurred on October 10, 1998, when

he submitted an inmate request form seeking copies of his

commitment papers. (App. at 90.) Thompson responded that he 3

would have to submit a fee of $.10 for each copy of commitment

papers before she could process his request. Shortly after

receiving Thompson’s response, on October 16, 1998, Montanez
7

was transferred from SCI Albion to Philadelphia County Prison,

and there is no indication that he followed through with his initial

document request at that time. Montanez served time in county

custody until January 26, 2001, and, upon returning to the state

prison system, resumed his communications with Thompson. On

May 22, 2001, he submitted another inmate request form, in

which he sought, inter alia, information about commitment credit

and his commitment papers from Judge Smith. (App. at 91.) As

to his question about commitment credit, Thompson responded

that she had sent a letter to Judge Smith regarding Montanez’s

commitment credit on February 8, 2001. She further noted that

no commitment credit would be applied towards Montanez’s

sentence until the records office received a response from Judge

Smith because “it is not appropriate to give pre-commitment

credit for time being served in satisfaction of a separate and

distinct sentence.” (Id.) Although there is no indication in the

record that Judge Smith responded to Thompson’s inquiries,

Montanez’s DOC record reveals that at some point he received

30 days of commitment credit on the Smith Sentence for this

incarceration period: (1) five days for the period between his

arrest and the lodging of the Parole Board’s detainer, and (2) 25

days for the period between his municipal court conviction and

the filing of his appeal to the Court of Common Pleas.

Eventually, after a review of Montanez’s sentence computation,

Thompson and her superiors determined Montanez was entitled

to full commitment credit for time served during his incarceration

between arrest on the new charges (February 9, 1996) and

eventual sentencing by Judge Smith (June 9, 1997). After

application of this credit, Montanez had served the maximum
8

term of imprisonment on the Smith Sentence. As such, on

December 15, 2001, Montanez was released.

Montanez filed a complaint in the District Court on

October 6, 2005, alleging that the named Defendants took

ineffectual action in resolving the supposed errors in his

sentencing calculation, resulting in violations of his constitutional

rights. Initially, Thompson filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint partly on the basis of qualified immunity, which the

District Court denied. When discovery was completed,

Thompson filed a motion for summary judgment, again based

partly on qualified immunity. The District Court denied this

motion without elaboration. Thompson then moved for

reconsideration, which the District Court also denied without

elaboration. 

Thompson thereafter timely filed this interlocutory appeal.

In response to Thompson’s notice of appeal, the District Court

entered a memorandum opinion explaining its prior denial of

Thompson’s motion for summary judgment. The District Court

noted that the parties had advanced different calculations of

Montanez’s maximum release date and found that the difference

in proposed release dates presented a factual dispute that

precluded entry of summary judgment:

Montanez believes his release date should have

been February, 2001. The state argues his release

in December, 2001 was too early because

Montanez was never reparoled after serving his six

months' back time and, therefore, he did not begin

serving Judge Smith's two-to-five year sentence

until July 23, 1997. The difference in dates
9

presents a factual question which prevents the

entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant

Thompson.

(Dist. Ct. Op. at 2.) The District Court held, without explanation,

that evaluating these disparate calculations and determining the

correct maximum release date was a question of fact for the jury

to decide. The District Court also noted that the jury would need

to determine whether Montanez adequately demonstrated that

Thompson acted with deliberate indifference to succeed on his

Eighth Amendment claim. Additionally, the District Court

determined that, if Montanez was held beyond his maximum term

of imprisonment, Thompson would not qualify for qualified

immunity because there is a clearly established right “not to be

held.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 5.)

II. DISCUSSION

The District Court had jurisdiction over Montanez's federal

civil rights claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).

Our jurisdiction is contested. We necessarily exercise de novo

review over an argument alleging a lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2008).

To the extent that we do have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal,

“[w]e review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de

novo. We apply the same test required of the district court and

view inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Bayer v. Monroe

County Children and Youth Serv., 577 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir.

2009) (quoting Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Prob. &

Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
10

A. Jurisdiction

Montanez argues that we do not have jurisdiction to

entertain the issues raised in this interlocutory appeal. Typically,

a denial of summary judgment is not a final appealable order, but

the Supreme Court has held that “a district court's denial of a

claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue

of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28

U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.”

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). The Supreme

Court has made clear, however, that this qualified immunity

exception does not include interlocutory appeals of a district

court’s evidence sufficiency determinations at summary judgment,

“i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at

trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). Accordingly,

“our jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order denying

summary judgment depends on whether the defendants’ appeal

raises pure questions of law or whether it challenges the District

Court’s determination of which facts were sufficiently supported

by evidence.” Reilly, 532 F.3d at 224 (quoting Blaylock v. City

of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2007)). For instance,

an appeals court cannot review whether the district court erred in

denying a qualified immunity motion because the judge was

mistaken as to the facts that are subject to genuine dispute. See

Forbes v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir.

2002). Our review in these circumstances is therefore somewhat

analogous to the review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “where we

would not evaluate the underlying evidence to support the

plaintiff’s claims which the District Court chose to accept.”

Walter v. Pike County, Pa., 544 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 2008)

(quoting Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 261 n.4 (3d Cir.
11

2003)). Despite this, we may review “whether the set of facts

identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a violation

of a clearly established constitutional right.” Reilly, 532 F.3d at

224 (citing Forbes, 313 F.3d at 147). Additionally, “[i]f there are

minor gaps in the District Court’s factual recitation, ‘we can

determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, likely assumed.’” Walter, 544 F.3d at

190 (quoting Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 196 n.10 (3d

Cir. 2004)).

Montanez argues that we should dismiss this interlocutory

appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appeal does not raise

a pure question of law, but rather is a challenge to the District

Court's factual determination that the record evidence presented

at summary judgment sufficiently raised a genuine dispute. This

argument seems to be based on the District Court’s holding that

the parties’ differently-computed final release dates for the

disputed term of imprisonment presented “a factual question” that

prevented the entry of summary judgment. Montanez suggests

that we would not be able to review this holding to the extent it

indicates that the District Court found sufficient record factual

support for his proffered calculation. Thompson disputes this

contention, arguing that this appeal does not raise evidence

sufficiency issues because an inmate's release date is a mixed

question of fact and law. Thompson further points out that, in

denying summary judgment, the District Court identified the

applicable historical facts, including Montanez’s convictions,

incarceration time, and parole history, and they have not been

challenged on this appeal. 
12

Though we will briefly examine Montanez’s claim that he

was held beyond his maximum release date as an aid to our

analysis, we do not need to finally determine the claim to resolve

this appeal. We can determine whether Thompson is entitled to

qualified immunity under the “clearly established” prong of

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). As Montanez concedes,

we clearly do have appellate jurisdiction over this issue. (Amicus

Br. at 16 n.3.) We may therefore properly exercise jurisdiction

over this appeal to determine whether the set of facts identified

by the District Court was sufficient to establish a violation of a

clearly established right. See Reilly, 532 F.3d at 224.

B. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity

applies regardless of whether the government official’s conduct

results from a mistake of law, mistake of fact, or mistake based

on mixed questions of law and fact. Id. In Saucier, the Supreme

Court provided a sequential two-step inquiry for analyzing claims

of qualified immunity:

First, a court must decide whether the facts that a

plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation

of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff

has satisfied this first step, the court must decide

whether the right at issue was clearly established

at the time of a defendant’s alleged misconduct.
 Montanez has also claimed that his term of imprisonment 4

resulted in a violation of his due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment. This claim was unaddressed by the

District Court and has not been significantly raised by either of

13

Qualified immunity is applicable unless the

official’s conduct violated a clearly established

constitutional right. 

Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 815-16 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201

(2001)) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Recently,

however, the Supreme Court has eliminated the requirement that

Saucier’s two steps be analyzed in sequential order: 

On reconsidering the procedure required in

Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set

forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer

be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the

district courts and the courts of appeals should be

permitted to exercise their sound discretion in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified

immunity analysis should be addressed first in light

of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.

Id. at 818.

In this case, the parties focus on the first prong of Saucier

in analyzing whether Montanez has shown that he was held

beyond his maximum release date. Montanez claims that his

Eighth Amendment rights were violated when his detention

exceeded the maximum release date on his term of

imprisonment. This Court has previously held that an inmate’s 4
the parties on appeal. Accordingly, we will remand to the District

Court to review this claim in accordance with Forbes v. Twp. of

Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 149-50 (3d Cir. 2002).

14

detention beyond his or her maximum term of imprisonment could

constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. See Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1107-08 (3d

Cir. 1989). Thompson argues that Montanez has not shown a

viable constitutional deprivation because the undisputed historical

facts about Montanez's conviction and incarceration history reveal

that he was not subjected to unjustified incarceration. Montanez

claims that he has shown a genuine dispute of fact on this issue

that would preclude summary judgment. 

Considering the facts adopted by the District Court, it

would seem unlikely that Montanez could show he was held

beyond his maximum release date under these circumstances.

The Pennsylvania parole statute provides that parole violators are

to be recommitted for the remainder of their original sentence; a

technical parole violator may be “reentered to serve the remainder

of the original sentence or sentences. . . . from the date the

parolee is taken into custody on the warrant of the board.” 61 Pa.

Con. Stat. Ann. § 6138(c). It is true, as Montanez points out, that

he was ultimately recommitted for only six months of backtime

for technical violation of his parole on the Quinones Sentence

because the board rescinded its finding that he was a convicted

parole violator. Despite this, he was not necessarily entitled to be

released after his six-month backtime sentence had expired. In

Pennsylvania, backtime is considered to be a new minimum

sentence, which only affects a parole violator’s entitlement to
15

seek reparole. See Riverbark v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob.

and Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 n.4 (Pa. 1985) (“The period of

recommitment set by the Board, which may be less than the

unexpired term of the parolee'ssentence,simply establishes a new

parole eligibility date for the parolee—it does not entitle him to

release after that period of time. Upon completion of this period

of backtime, the parolee has the right to again apply for parole

and have his application considered by the Board.”) (emphasis

added). Additionally, Montanez contends that he received no

credit for the time-period between his arrest on the new charges

and eventualsentencing by Judge Smith. However, the maximum

release date for the five-year Quinones Sentence was July 23,

1997, which is the date the case was closed by the final Parole

Board order on that matter. Accordingly, every day between the

date the Quinones Sentence was imposed (July 23, 1992) and the

Quinones case closing (July 23, 1997) was fully credited towards

that five-year sentence, which appears to be a correct application

of Pennsylvania law. See Martin v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and

Parole, 840 A.2d 299, 309 (Pa. 2003) (“[W]e hold that, where an

offender is incarcerated on both a Board detainer and new

criminal charges, all time spent in confinement must be credited

to either the new sentence or the original sentence.”). 

As is clear from this discussion, however, the issue of

whether Montanez was held beyond his maximum release date

without penological justification turns on interpretation of

Pennsylvania sentencing and probation law. Even before Pearson,

we found that such cases are more appropriately resolved first

under Saucier’s “clearly established” inquiry. See Egolf v.

Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 110 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We agree that, in

cases such as this, federal courts do a disservice to state actors
16

who would be induced to rely on a ruling that might change

altogether upon subsequent review by the state court.”).

Therefore, in light of these considerations and because we find

that Thompson is entitled to qualified immunity under Saucier’s

clearly established analysis, we need not finally determine

whether Montanez was held beyond his maximum release date.

“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether

a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (citing Wilson v. Layne,

526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). Because this inquiry focuses on the

official’s actual situation, the analysis “must be undertaken in light

of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition . . . .” Id. The second prong of the qualified

immunity analysis therefore “turns on the ‘objective legal

reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules

that were clearly established at the time it was taken.’” Pearson,

129 S.Ct. at 822 (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614). “[I]f the law

did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly

unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is

appropriate.” Bayer v. Monroe County Children and Youth

Serv., 577 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Saucier, 533

U.S. at 202). Accordingly, qualified immunity analysis “gives

ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

Egolf, 526 F.3d at 110-11 (quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197,

203 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986).
17

We begin this analysis by reviewing the established legal

rules during the relevant time period. In the context of an Eighth

Amendment claim for incarceration without penological

justification, this Court has held that a plaintiff must demonstrate

three elements to establish § 1983 liability against a prison

official: (1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner’s

problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was

being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or

took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating

that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate

indifference to the prisoner’s plight; and (3) a causal connection

between the official’s response to the problem and the unjustified

detention. Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110. Relevant circumstances in

assessing these factors are the scope of the official’s duties and

the role the official played in the life of the prison. Id. In

Sample, we found an Eighth Amendment violation where the

record demonstrated that Diecks (the prison official):

(1) believed Sample’s inquiry might well have

merit, (2) knew that the matter needed to be

clarified, (3) believed Sample had to rely on his

(Diecks’) efforts alone to rectify the problem, (4)

did not follow the relevant procedures mandated

by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, (5) took

no other remedial action, and (6) did not inform

Sample of any other action he (Sample) might take

to resolve his problem.

Id. at 1111. The Sample articulation of this legal standard was

reaffirmed in Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1993).

In Moore, parole officials initially misinterpreted a judge’s
18

sentencing order resulting in a six-month delay of Moore’s

release. Id. at 683-684. The officials denied Moore’s initial

requests for release, but did launch an investigation of his claims

that lasted over five months and eventually resulted in his release.

Id. We noted that deliberate indifference was more typically

shown “in those cases where prison officials were put on notice

and then simply refused to investigate a prisoner’s claim of

sentence miscalculation.” Id. at 686. Expanding on this

proposition, we highlighted Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350

(9th Cir. 1985), and Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392

(9th Cir. 1990), two pertinent cases decided by the Ninth Circuit:

In Haygood the prisoner was incarcerated almost

five years beyond his lawful term as a result of

prison officials’ failure to investigate. Because

prison officials failed to address Haygood's

credible evidence that he was entitled to release,

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

concluded that the prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to Haygood’s constitutional

rights. Similarly, in Alexander v. Perrill, a prisoner

presented credible evidence that prison officials,

after being put on notice, simply refused to

investigate a computational error. There prison

officials “stood idly by after an inmate raised the

proposition that he was being unlawfully

incarcerated and had provided documentary

evidence in support of his claim.”

Moore, 986 F.2d at 686. Noting the undisputed facts showed

that the Parole Board did not ignore Moore’s complaint or
19

operate outside standard operating procedures, we declined to

find that the Parole Board’s investigation of Moore’s claims,

though taking five months, was inept or ineffectual such that it

could constitute deliberate indifference. Id. at 687. 

In this case, the District Court found that the evidence was

sufficient to show Montanez communicated with Thompson at

least twice and maybe three times during his incarceration.

Though not referenced in its opinion, presumably the District

Court was referring to the two inmate request forms sent by

Montanez to the prison record office. Montanez submitted the

first communication on October 10, 1998, in which he requested

copies of his commitment papers. (App. at 90.) He noted in the

request that he needed the commitment papers to write the “Clerk

of Courts” to fix his detainer. (Id.) Within three days, Thompson

responded and informed Montanez that the Department of

Corrections required $.10 for each copy of commitment papers

requested by an inmate and instructed him to submit a cash slip so

that she could process his request. (Id.) Montanez was

thereafter transferred to Philadelphia County Prison, and

Thompson herself had no further contact with Montanez until

2001 when he returned to SCI Albion. At that point, on May 22,

2001, he submitted another inmate request form, referencing the

commitment credit issue and asking if Judge Smith had

responded to Thompson’s letter about the subject. Thompson

again responded within three days, explaining the progress on

Montanez’s inquiry:

In answer to the your first question regarding

Commit. Credit, we sent the letter to Judge Smith

on 2-8-01, not 4-16-01, that was the last time I sent
20

you correspondence. Until I hear from the Judge,

I cannot give you credit per DOC policy, it is not

appropriate to give pre-commitment credit for time

being served in satisfaction of a separate and

distinct sentence.

(App. at 91.) The District Court did not identify any other

communication between Thompson and Montanez. At her

deposition, Thompson explained that in investigating Montanez’s

claim, she reviewed his file with her local supervisor in

accordance with standard DOC policy and determined there was

a viable question with regard to his proper commitment credit.

(App. at 105.) Thompson and her supervisor therefore involved

DOC’s main recordssupervisor and itslegal counsel at the central

DOC office. This process resulted in Montanez receiving

commitment credit for the period of incarceration before the

Smith Sentencing. After applying this credit, Montanez’s revised

sentence calculation placed him beyond his maximum

incarceration date. Therefore, Montanez was immediately

released on December 15, 2001.

Considering the legal rules, which were well established

at the relevant time, in light of the facts and circumstances of this

case as recounted above, it was objectively reasonable for

Thompson to have believed that her particular conduct in this

case was lawful and in keeping with Montanez’s constitutional

rights. There are no facts in the record, either identified by the

District Court or found by our own review, suggesting that

Thompson ignored Montanez’s claims or even failed to follow

established DOC policy during her involvement with the

investigation of Montanez’s claims. In both of Thompson’s
21

recorded exchanges with Montanez, she responded quickly and

related material information back to Montanez. It is clear from

her second exchange and Montanez’s subsequent release that she

took Montanez’s claims seriously: she forwarded the commitment

credit issue to the appropriate parties for review, including her

supervisor, the sentencing judge, and even DOC’s central office

and legal department. The process did take a significant amount

of time to resolve, but Montanez’s claim for commitment credit

did not involve simple determinations, which is demonstrated by

the parties’ extensive briefing on this issue and our own

discussion above. As amicus argues on behalf of Montanez, his

release date was “complicated by multiple convictions, parole,

parole violations, ‘backtime,’ and vacated sentences.” (Amicus

Br. at 20.) Additionally, the District Court did not identify any

facts that would suggest Thompson’s actions were in any way

responsible for the delay in releasing Montanez. Accordingly, we

do not believe the established law in this case would have put

Thompson on notice that her conduct was clearly unlawful;

summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Thompson is entitled

to qualified immunity with respect to Montanez’s Eighth

Amendment claims. Accordingly, we will reverse the District

Court’s denial of summary judgment on this issue and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.