J-S27003-24 

 2024 PA Super 218 

 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

JAHIMEL WILLIAMS 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2320 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 23, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001329-2016 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2024

 Jahimel Williams appeals from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant 

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After 

careful review, we affirm. 

 The PCRA court set forth the facts of this matter as follows: 

On October 31, 2015, shortly after 9:00 pm, [Sergeant] Matthew 

White and his partner were traveling southbound on 23rd Street at 

[its intersection with] Tasker Street [in the City of Philadelphia] 

when he noticed a white 2016 Jeep Grand Cherokee traveling 

westbound on Tasker Street across 23rd Street. [Sergeant] White 

testified that the vehicle had “extremely dark” tint on the side and 

rear windows. A[ mobile data terminal] scan of the vehicle’s 

license plates returned that it was a rental vehicle. The officers 

attempted to stop the vehicle at the 2500 block of Tasker Street, 

but the vehicle did not immediately stop despite several 

opportunities to do so. [Sergeant] White testified that this 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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“heightened [his] suspicion.” The officers eventually stopped the 

vehicle at 26th [] and Dickinson Street[s]. 

[Sergeant] White and his partner approached the driver’s side and 

front passenger side windows, respectively. Robert McCrae [] was 

the driver, [Williams] was seated behind the driver’s seat, and an 

unidentified third passenger was seated in the front passenger 

seat. [Sergeant] White then obtained [McCrae’s] information. 

[Sergeant] White testified that he had intended to remove and 

frisk the occupants of the vehicle due to the totality of events that 

led to the stop, citing several reasons: 1) the [location] is a high 

crime area; 2) the vehicle had an excessive amount of tint; 3) the 

“long delay” between the first attempt to stop the vehicle and 

when it finally did stop; and 4) the fact that it was a rental vehicle 

with excessive tint. Specifically, [Sergeant] White testified that[,] 

due to the excessive tint on the vehicle[’s windows], he would not 

be able to maintain observation of the occupants should he return 

to his vehicle to check [McCrae’s] information. 

As [Sergeant] White removed [McCrae] from the car, he observed 

a small, translucent container fall from [McCrae’s] lap and land on 

the floorboard. [Sergeant] White testified that its contents 

appeared to be marijuana. He immediately placed [McCrae] under 

arrest and summoned additional police units to assist with the 

removal of [Williams] and [the] third passenger. Once [McCrae] 

was secured in the back of the police vehicle, [Sergeant] White 

returned to inspect the container that had fallen from [McCrae’s] 

lap and verified that it did, in fact, contain marijuana. [Williams] 

and [the] third passenger were removed from the vehicle and 

placed in separate police cars. [Sergeant] White then proceeded 

to inspect the car and noticed some loose paneling on the center 

console. He knew from his training and experience that natural 

voids frequently exist within this area of the vehicle where 

firearms and narcotics are often hidden. As [Sergeant] White 

further inspected the area, he felt a thick cloth beneath the 

paneling that was not part of the vehicle. He removed a sock with 

a single bullet wrapped inside of it. 

[Sergeant] White testified that the bullet “heightened [his] 

suspicion” that a firearm was in the vehicle. He proceeded to 

inspect an air vent with a loose panel, misaligned grates, and an 

attached air freshener. He recovered a plastic bag containing 133 

clear bags of heroin stamped “Monroe,” a loaded firearm, and a 

torn piece of black cloth. He also recovered six cell phones from 

inside the vehicle and a car rental agreement in [Williams’] name. 
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Finally, the officers searched all of the passengers and recovered 

a cell phone and $202 from [McCrae], a cell phone (but no money) 

from [Williams], and $544 from the third passenger. 

PCRA Court Opinion, at 3-5 (citations omitted) 

 Williams was arrested and charged with numerous offenses. Following 

a non-jury trial, the Honorable Glynnis D. Hill convicted Williams of possession 

with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of a firearm prohibited, firearms 

not to be carried without a license, carrying a firearm in public, carrying a 

loaded weapon, and possession of a controlled substance. On September 15, 

2017, the court sentenced Williams to a term of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration 

for PWID, followed by 5 years of probation for possession of firearm 

prohibited. The court imposed no further penalties on the remaining 

convictions. 

 Williams filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which affirmed his 

judgment of sentence on October 22, 2019. See Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 955 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 22, 2019) (unpublished 

memorandum decision). Williams did not file a petition for allowance of appeal 

to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Thus, for purposes of the PCRA, Williams’ 

judgment of sentence became final on November 21, 2019, when the time for 

filing a petition for allowance of appeal expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113; 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes final at conclusion of 

direct review or at expiration of time for seeking review). As such, Williams 

had until November 21, 2020, to file a timely PCRA petition. See id. at § 
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9545(b)(1) (any PCRA petition, including second or subsequent petition, shall 

be filed within one year of date judgment of sentence becomes final). 

 On May 2, 2022, Williams filed a pro se PCRA petition, in which he 

alleged, inter alia, that he had originally mailed his PCRA petition to the Clerk 

of Courts on July 7, 2020, via First Class U.S. Mail. See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 

5/2/22, at 3. He further stated that, 

[i]n November 2020, after having a family member check the 

docket online, it was discovered that the first PCRA [petition] was 

never docketed[,] and this copy is being sent certified registered 

mail with return receipt under the timeliness exception for 

interference by government. 

Id.

 On July 14, 2022, Williams filed an “Application for Relief,” which the 

court docketed as an amended PCRA petition. On November 23, 2022, 

Williams filed a second amended petition, this time represented by counsel, in 

which he alleged that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

represent him and for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct; (2) 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a petition for allowance of 

appeal to the Supreme Court; and (3) he is entitled to a new trial based on 

after-discovered evidence. See Second Amended PCRA Petition, 11/23/22, 

at ¶ 18. 

With regard to his after-discovered evidence claim, Williams asserted 

that, on August 30, 2022, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office sent his 

PCRA counsel a police misconduct disclosure notice involving Sergeant White, 

who admitted to, and was officially reprimanded for, intentionally striking 
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someone with his vehicle to prevent him from fleeing. See Memorandum of 

Law in Support of Second Amended PCRA Petition, 11/23/22, at 19. Williams 

asserted that Sergeant White’s “role in the case is major” and his “testimony 

was very influential in proving [Williams’] guilt.” Id. at 19-20. Accordingly, 

Williams claimed that the outcome of his trial would have been different had 

evidence of Sergeant White’s misconduct been presented at trial. Id. at 20. 

 On March 22, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss 

Williams’ PCRA petition. In its motion, the Commonwealth stated that it did 

not oppose an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a time-bar exception 

applied to Williams’ facially untimely ineffectiveness claims. The 

Commonwealth further argued that, while Williams arguably met the newlydiscovered facts exception to the time bar, the underlying after-discovered 

evidence claim involving Sergeant White’s misconduct failed on its merits. 

 On April 10, 2023, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of 

intent to dismiss Williams’ petition. In its Rule 907 notice, the court found 

that Williams’ claim regarding the misconduct disclosure as to Sergeant White 

satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception to the time bar, but that the 

underlying after-discovered evidence claim failed on its merits. With respect 

to Williams’ claim that the governmental interference exception to the time 

bar rendered his ineffectiveness claims timely, the court stated as follows: 

[Williams] claims that his [ineffectiveness] claims meet the 

timeliness exception enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9545(b)(1)(i), alleging that the timely filing of his [p]etition was 

frustrated by governmental interference. However, the earliest 

documentary evidence presented by [Williams] on this point is the 
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December 27, 2021 letter to Judge [Sheila] Woods-Skipper[,] in 

which [Williams] claims to have filed two prior petitions on July 7 

and December 3, 2020. While [Williams] asserts that he sent the 

[p]etition on December 3, 2020[,] via certified mail and has the 

receipts, the December 3, 2020[,] receipts are not attached [to 

his petition]. Therefore, the only evidence that the [c]ourt could 

consider to find that [Williams] timely filed his initial petition on 

July 7, 2020[,] or that he sent a second [p]etition via certified mail 

on December 3, 2020[, consists of] his own assertions. 

Nevertheless, in fairness to [Williams], it should be noted that 

the [c]ourt does recall the poor state of both the postal service 

and the First Judicial District’s filing systems during the Covid-19 

pandemic, specifically during 2020 and 2021. At that time, it was 

not uncommon for pleadings to be misfiled or lost in the mail. For 

this reason, the [c]ourt will address the merits of each of 

[Williams’] claims regardless of whether his [p]etition was 

timely. 

Rule 907 Notice, 4/10/23, at 2-3 (unpaginated; emphasis added). 

 Thus, the court addressed Williams’ ineffectiveness claims, ultimately 

finding them to be meritless. On August 23, 2023, the court dismissed 

Williams’ petition without a hearing. This timely appeal follows, in which 

Williams raises the following claims for our review: 

1. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying [Williams’] PCRA 

petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues presented in 

the [second] amended PCRA petition. 

A. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

properly represent [Williams]. 

B. Whether app[elate] counsel was ineffective for failing to 

file a [petition for allowance of appeal]. 

C. Whether [Williams] is entitled to a new trial based on 

newly-discovered evidence of police misconduct. 

Brief of Appellant, at 7. 
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 Prior to addressing Williams’ claims, we must determine whether the 

PCRA court possessed jurisdiction to consider Williams’ petition. The 

timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional threshold and may not be 

disregarded in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition 

that is untimely. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 

2014). Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

of sentence becomes final unless the petitioner alleges, and proves, that an 

exception to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.1 A PCRA petition invoking one of these 

statutory exceptions must be filed within one year of the date the claims could 

have been presented. See id. at § 9545(b)(2). 

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1

 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference of government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii). 
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As noted above, Williams’ judgment of sentence became final on 

November 21, 2019, at the expiration of the 30-day period for filing a petition 

for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. See id. at § 9545(b)(3); 

Pa.R.A.P. 1113. Thus, Williams had until November 21, 2020, to file a timely 

PCRA petition. Williams’ instant PCRA petition was filed on May 2, 2022, 

nearly 21⁄2 years after his judgment of sentence became final. Accordingly, 

Williams’ petition is untimely, unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading 

and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez,

supra. 

 Here, with respect to his ineffectiveness claims, Williams asserts that 

the governmental interference exception under section 9545(b)(1)(i) renders 

his petition timely, as he attempted to file his petition in July 2020, but it was 

either never delivered to, or never docketed by, the clerk of courts. However, 

as the PCRA court noted in its Rule 907 notice, Williams presented no evidence 

that he mailed his petition in July 2020. Nevertheless, the court chose to 

overlook Williams’ failure to plead and prove that he mailed his petition, as 

the court “recalled” that, at the time Williams purported to have mailed his 

petition, “it was not uncommon for pleadings to be misfiled or lost in the mail.” 

Rule 907 Notice, 4/10/23, at 3 (unpaginated). Accordingly, the court 

addressed the merits of Williams’ ineffectiveness claims. The court did so in 

error. 

 It is well-settled that “[t]he [PCRA] timeliness requirement is mandatory 

and jurisdictional; therefore, no court may disregard, alter, or create 
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equitable exceptions to the timeliness requirement in order to reach the 

substance of a petitioner's arguments.” Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 

A.2d 782, 784–85 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis added). Here, the PCRA court 

cited no authority—and we can find none—that would allow a court to take 

judicial notice of purported inefficiencies in either the U.S. Postal Service or 

the office of the clerk of courts to overlook the jurisdictional time bar. See 

Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838, 845 (Pa. 2002) (“The PCRA confers 

no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the 

PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the 

Act.”). It was Williams’ burden to plead and prove that he timely attempted 

to file his PCRA petition. Despite this requirement, Williams did not attach to 

his petition, or any of the amendments thereto, copies of certified mail receipts 

or prisoner cash slips evidencing the fact that he mailed his petition in a timely 

manner. See, e.g., Smith v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 683 

A.2d 278, 282 (Pa. 1996) (cash slip may be considered as evidence of timely 

filing by pro se prisoner); Commonwealth v. Gregory, 240 A.3d 205 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (Table) (affirming PCRA court’s factual finding that petition was 

timely filed on basis of cash slip attached to PCRA petition)2. Accordingly, the 

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2

 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished memorandum decisions of this 

Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value. 
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PCRA court erred in reviewing the merits of Williams’ ineffectiveness claims 

and, instead, should have dismissed them as untimely.3

 Williams also invokes the newly-discovered fact exception to the time 

bar, set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(ii), with respect to his claim concerning 

the disciplinary action taken against Sergeant White. The newly-discovered 

facts exception “renders a petition timely when the petitioner establishes that 

‘the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner 

and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.’” 

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2020), quoting 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). A PCRA court first must determine “whether the 

facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner[.]” 

Id. at 1282 (quotation marks omitted). If the PCRA court concludes that the 

facts were unknown, then the PCRA court must next examine whether “the 

facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, including 

an assessment of the petitioner’s access to public records.” Id. (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). “Due diligence demands that the petitioner take 

reasonable steps to protect his own interests.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 

111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015). Additionally, the claim must be filed 

within one year of the date the claim could have been presented as required 

by section 9545(b)(2). The newly-discovered fact exception “does not require 

any merits analysis of the underlying claim,” and application of the time-bar 

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3

 We note that we may affirm a decision of the trial court affirmed on any valid 

basis appearing of record. In re T.P., 78 A.3d 1166, 1170 (Pa. Super. 2013). 
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exception therefore does not necessitate proof of the elements of a claim of 

after-discovered evidence. Small, 238 A.3d at 1286 (citation omitted). 

Here, we concur with the PCRA court that Williams’ claim satisfies the 

newly-discovered facts exception to the time bar under section 9545(b)(1)(i). 

The district attorney sent the notification to counsel on August 30, 2022, and 

Williams could not have discovered the evidence of Sergeant White’s 

misconduct prior to receipt of that notification. Moreover, counsel filed a 

second amended PCRA petition on November 23, 2022, well within the oneyear window contemplated by section 9545(b)(2). Accordingly, the PCRA 

court properly concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of 

Williams’ underlying substantive claim. 

In rejecting Williams’ after-discovered evidence claim, the PCRA court 

reasoned as follows: 

[Williams’] third claim is that the [c]ourt erred when it dismissed 

his [PCRA p]etition [] because he is entitled to a new trial based 

on newly discovered “exculpatory evidence.” This claim lacks 

merit because [Williams] failed to demonstrate that the proffered 

evidence is exculpatory. 

To obtain relief via after-discovered evidence, the evidence must 

1) have been discovered after the trial (or could not have been 

discovered before or during the trial with due diligence), 2) not be 

merely corroborative or cumulative, 3) not be used solely for 

impeaching a witness’s credibility, and 4) would likely result in a 

different verdict if introduced in a new trial. Commonwealth v. 

Brosnick, 607 A.2d 725[, 728] (Pa. 1992). To support this claim, 

[Williams] stated that he received a police misconduct disclosure 

notice from the District Attorney’s Office on August 30, 2022[,] 

relating to Sergeant Matthew White (the arresting officer in this 

case). The report indicates that Sergeant White violated police 

policies when he struck a suspect fleeing on a bicycle with his 
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police vehicle. However, [Williams] failed to explain why this 

particular misconduct impacts his case or would result in a 

different verdict. Moreover, all the evidence supporting 

[Williams’] conviction can be corroborated by Sergeant White’s 

partner, Officer Diaz-Avada.[4]

Officer Diaz-Avada was present when [Williams] was arrested and 

has no record of misconduct. Since [Williams] cannot explain how 

this misconduct report is exculpatory, his [] claim must be 

dismissed. 

PCRA Court Opinion, at 9-10 (citation to record omitted). 

 We agree with the PCRA court’s conclusions. In his memorandum of law 

supporting his second amended petition, Williams baldly averred that “he has 

certainly established by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case 

that [trial] would have concluded in a different result had the newlydiscovered evidence been offered” because Sergeant White’s “role in the case 

is major” and his “testimony was very influential in proving [Williams’] guilt.” 

Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Amended PCRA Petition, 11/23/22, 

at 19-20. However, Williams did not explain specifically how the evidence 

would change the result of his trial, nor did he address the factors necessary 

to prevail on an after-discovered evidence claim. See Brosnick, supra. 

Assuming, arguendo, that Williams intended to use the misconduct 

report to impeach Sergeant White’s credibility,5 we note that “a defendant 

seeking a new trial must demonstrate that he will not use the alleged afterdiscovered evidence solely to impeach the credibility of a witness.” 

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4

 Officer Diaz-Avada’s first name does not appear in the certified record. 

5

 Indeed, we can discern, and Williams has suggested, no other relevant 

purpose for this evidence to be admitted in this case. 
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Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 365 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Moreover, as the PCRA court aptly noted, all the evidence supporting Williams’ 

conviction could be corroborated by Sergeant White’s partner, Officer DiazAvada, who was also present for the events leading to Williams’ convictions. 

Accordingly, Williams has failed to demonstrate that the evidence of Sergeant 

White’s misconduct would not be used solely for purposes of impeachment or 

that a different verdict would likely result if the evidence were admitted at 

trial. As such, the PCRA court properly denied relief. 

 Order affirmed. 

 

Date: 9/20/2024