RICHARD BUEHLER v. LILACH BUEHLER

(AC 38740)

Alvord, Prescott and Mullins, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the postjudgment order of the trial

court denying in part her motion to hold the plaintiff in contempt. The

trial court reasoned that the defendant failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the plaintiff had wilfully and intentionally violated a clear and unambiguous order regarding payment for their minor

children’s extracurricular activities. On appeal, the defendant claimed

that the trial court, in denying in part the contempt motion, improperly

determined that the extracurricular expenses were unreasonable under

the facts and circumstances of the case because there had been no

meaningful discussion between the parties prior to the incurrence of

those costs. Held that the record was inadequate for review of the

defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly determined that the

extracurricular expenses were unreasonable; this court was provided

with transcripts for only three of the four days of the hearing on the

contempt motion, the issue of what expenses were reasonable under

the circumstances involved an issue of fact, the trial court’s decision

provided no further explanation of what facts and circumstances the

court relied on in reaching its conclusion, and, in light of the missing

transcript, this court did not know the full extent of what may have

been discussed by the parties regarding those expenses and would not

speculate as to the substance of the defendant’s testimony concerning

the issue, which was included in the omitted transcript.

Argued April 19—officially released August 8, 2017

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the matter was transferred to the Regional Family Trial Docket at

Middletown, and tried to the court, Gordon, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other

relief; thereafter, the court granted the defendant’s

motion for contempt and entered certain postjudgment

orders, and the plaintiff appealed to this court, which

reversed in part the trial court’s judgment and remanded

the case for further proceedings; on remand, the court,

Shay, J., entered certain orders in accordance with the

parties’ stipulation; subsequently, the court, Colin, J.,

granted in part the defendant’s motion for contempt,

and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Lilach Buehler, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).

Jon T. Kukucka, with whom, on the brief, were

Campbell D. Barrett and Johanna S. Katz, forthe appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, Lilach Buehler,

appeals from the postjudgment order of the trial court

denying in part her motion for contempt against the

plaintiff, Richard Buehler, after concluding that she had

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

the plaintiff had wilfully and intentionally violated a

clear and unambiguous order regarding payment for

their children’s extracurricular activities. On appeal, the

defendant claims that the court improperly determined

that the extracurricular expenses were unreasonable

because there had been no meaningful discussion

between the parties prior to the incurrence of those

costs.1 We conclude that the record is inadequate for

our review, and, accordingly, we decline to review this

claim and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record contains the following relevant facts and

procedural history. The court, Gordon, J., dissolved the

parties’ ten year marriage on June 4, 2008. At the time

of the dissolution, the parties had three minor children,

aged nine, six, and two. Following a contested trial, the

court rendered its judgment orally and entered orders

with respect to custody, visitation, child support, alimony, and the division of real and personal property.

The order at issue in this appeal provides in relevant

part as follows: ‘‘The parties shall share equally in the

cost of all extracurricular summer camp and lessons

for the children, which are not to be unreasonably

incurred. . . .’’

The parties have filed several postjudgment motions

in the years following the dissolution of their marriage,

including motions for contempt and motions for modification. On October 7, 2014, the defendant filed the

motion for contempt that is the subject of the present

appeal. In her motion for contempt, the defendant

alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiff wilfully and deliberately failed to pay his one-half share of the children’s

extracurricular expenses. The defendant requested that

the court find the plaintiff in contempt, that the court

order him to immediately pay $7135.62 as his ‘‘share of

the children’s activities,’’ and that the court punish him

for his contempt, ‘‘including incarceration.’’

The court, Colin, J., scheduled a hearing on the defendant’s motion for contempt. It is undisputed that the

court heard testimony and admitted exhibits over a four

day hearing that commenced on April 22, 2015.2 The

hearing concluded on November 4, 2015, and the court

issued its memorandum of decision on November 5,

2015. The relevant portions of the court’s decision provide as follows: ‘‘The defendant has failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff wilfully

and intentionally violated a clear and unambiguous

court order regarding the payment of the children’s

extracurricular activities and uninsured medical and
dental expenses. . . . As for the defendant’s claim for

nonpayment of extracurricular activity costs, the defendant’s incurrence of these costs without a meaningful

prior discussion between the parties leads this court

to conclude that the expenses were not reasonably

incurred under the facts and circumstances of this

case.’’ (Citation omitted.)

The defendant, a self-represented party, filed this

appeal from the postjudgment ruling on December 14,

2015, and she challenges the court’s determination that

the extracurricular expenses were unreasonably

incurred. The trial court file reflects that the transcript

orderforthe appeal, signed by the defendant on December 14, 2015, placed an order for ‘‘[the] [e]ntire transcript for 7/8/15, 7/29/15, 9/9/15, 11/4/15.’’ The court

reporter’s acknowledgement of the transcript order,

filed with this court on February 8, 2016, provides a

total page estimate for three days of hearings of 445

pages. The box for an estimated number of pages for

July 29, 2015, was left blank. On August 15, 2016, the

defendant filed three transcripts for the proceedings

that had occurred on July 8, 2015, September 9, 2015,

and November 4, 2015. No transcript was filed for April

22, 2015, the first day of the hearing on the defendant’s

motion for contempt.

The defendant filed her appellate brief with this court

on August 15, 2016. The plaintiff filed his brief on

November 14, 2016, and, as his first argument, stated

that this court should decline to review the defendant’s

claim because she failed to provide an adequate record.

Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that there were four

days of hearings and that this court had been provided

with only three of the four necessary transcripts. The

plaintiff identified the missing transcript as being the

transcript from the April 22, 2015 hearing. The defendant did not file a reply brief addressing that first

argument.

We have thoroughly reviewed the file, which contains

more than 400 filings, to determine whether the court

or the parties ever ordered a transcript of the April 22,

2015 proceedings, the first day of the hearing on the

defendant’s motion for contempt. At the July 8, 2015

hearing, the court stated that it had the April 22, 2015

transcript. The transcript in the file, however, is merely

an excerpt from the April 22, 2015 hearing that sets

forth the court’s interim orders: ‘‘I’m going to stop the

hearing and enterthe following interim orders.I’ll order

a transcript of these orders. The hearing is not concluded. These are only interim orders that are being

entered pursuant to the court’s inherent authority to

control its docket and to manage its proceedings. And

the purpose of this order is to give me the information

that I need to appropriately decide the motion for contempt.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Following a discussion of preliminary matters on July
8, 2015, the parties were ready to proceed with their

evidence. The court stated: ‘‘We left off with [the defendant] on the witness stand I believe. They’re in crossexamination if I’m not mistaken. Is that correct?’’ The

parties confirmed that the plaintiff’s counsel had been

cross-examining the defendant at the time the hearing

had been stopped. Neither the excerpt from the April

22, 2015 hearing nor the transcript of the July 8, 2015

hearing discloses at what point the court stopped the

hearing and entered interim orders. We do know that

the defendant already had completed her direct testimony and was being cross-examined, and the list of

exhibits shows that a few exhibits had been admitted

by the court on April 22, 2015.

The lack of a full transcript from the April 22, 2015

hearing precludes our review of the defendant’s claim

on appeal. In its memorandum of decision, the trial

court stated: ‘‘As for the defendant’s claim for nonpayment of extracurricular activity costs, the defendant’s

incurrence of these costs without a meaningful prior

discussion between the parties leads this court to conclude that the expenses were not reasonably incurred

under the facts and circumstances of this case.’’

(Emphasis added.) What is reasonable under the circumstances is clearly an issue of fact. The court’s decision provides no further explanation of what facts and

circumstances the courtrelied on in reaching its conclusion. We do not have the defendant’s testimony on

direct examination or cross-examination from the April

22, 2015 hearing.

Judge Gordon’s June 4, 2008 dissolution order, at

issue in this case, also had been the subject of several

prior disagreements and motions by the parties. It is

possible that, in connection with the present motion

for contempt, there had been testimony as to previous

interactions between the parties relative to the children’s extracurricular expenses. There may have been

testimony as to how the parties had been interpreting

the language ‘‘extracurricular summer camp and lessons’’ in the June 4, 2008 order.3 Simply put, we do not

know what was discussed, and we will not speculate

as to the substance of the defendant’s testimony.

Practice Book § 61-10 (a) provides: ‘‘It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record

for review. The appellant shall determine whether the

entire record is complete, correct and otherwise perfected for presentation on appeal.’’ ‘‘The general purpose of [the relevant] rules of practice . . . [requiring

the appellant to provide a sufficient record] is to ensure

that there is a trial court record that is adequate for an

informed appellate review of the various claims presented by the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Donald, 325 Conn. 346, 353–54, 157 A.3d

1134 (2017).

In Crelan v. Crelan, 124 Conn. App. 567, 571–72, 5
A.3d 572 (2010), this court determined that the plaintiff

had provided an inadequate record for review because

she had filed a transcript of the court’s oral ruling and

nothing else. In that case, the plaintiff only provided a

transcript of the court’s oral judgment rendered on the

day following the trial, and never requested or provided

a transcript of the prior day’s proceedings. Id., 571. We

concluded: ‘‘Under these circumstances, [w]e, therefore, are left to surmise or speculate as to the existence

of a factual predicate for the trial court’s rulings. Our

role is not to guess at possibilities, but to review claims

based on a complete factual record developed by a

trial court. . . . Without the necessary factual and legal

conclusions furnished by the trial court, any decision

made by us respecting the plaintiff’s claims would be

entirely speculative. . . . As it is not the function of

this court to find facts, we decline to review this claim.’’

(Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 571–72.

So too, in the present case, we are lacking a complete

record of the trial court proceedings. The hearing was

held over four days, but the defendant has provided

only three days of transcripts. Accordingly, we decline

to review the defendant’s claim on appeal.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 We also note that, to the extent the defendant has attempted to raise a

legal question as to whether the language of the order at issue can be

construed to require consultation before extracurricular expenses can be

incurred, we decline to review such claim because it was inadequately

briefed. The defendant failed to provide this court with an analysis as to

the meaning and construction of the order in the dissolution judgment,

including citations to relevant case law regarding interpretation of a

court’s judgment.

‘‘It is well settled that [w]e are not required to review claims that are

inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather

than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an

issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously

and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties

must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not

reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings

that have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not merely

cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts

of the case and the law cited. . . . [A]ssignments of error which are merely

mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed

abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Pryor v. Pryor, 162 Conn. App. 451, 458, 133 A.3d 463 (2016).

2 On July 8, 2015, the second day of the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘So this

is a continuation that started on April 22, 2015, on the defendant’s motion

for contempt, motion number 409. We started the hearing. I stopped the

hearing and ordered some documentation to be provided and exchanged

to hopefully make this a more efficient process.’’

On September 9, 2015, the third day of the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘By

my notes, this is the third day of a hearing on the defendant’s motion for

contempt, motion number 409, which was dated October 7, 2014. The first

day was April 22, and the second day was July 8.’’

On November 4, 2015, the final day of the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘So

this is day four of our hearing on motion number 409, the defendant’s motion

for contempt, which started on April 22, then to July 8, then to September 9.’’

3 At oral argument before this court, the defendant stated that the order

related to all of the children’s extracurricular activities. The plaintiff argued

it applied solely to expenses for summer camp and lessons. It appears

that Judge Gordon’s order may not have been clear and unambiguous to

the parties.