FOR PUBLICATION



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

A G U S T I N O R T E G A -L O P EZ , Petitioner
,

v

.

W I L L I AM P. B AR

R , Attorney General, Respondent. No. 18-72441

Agency No. A088-994-318

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Imm igration Appeals

Argued and Subm itted September 4, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed October 20, 2020

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges, and David A. Ezra
, * District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

* T he Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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SUMMARY * *

Immigration

Denying Ortega-Lopez’s petition for review o f a decision

o f th e Board of Imm igration Appeals, the panel deferred to the BIA’s conclusions that: 1 ) the offense o f knowingly sponsoring or exhibiting an anim al in a fighting venture under 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) is a crim e involving m oral turpitude; and 2) an alien who has been convicted of a crim e involving

m oral turpitude, for which a sentence of one year or longer

m ay be im

posed, has been c o n vi cted of an offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) th a t m akes the alien ineligible for cancellation of rem oval under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).

In according Chevron deference to the BIA’s conclusion that 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) is a crim e involving m or al turpitude, the panel explained that the BIA considered Nunez

v. Holder
, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010), which generalized that non-fraudulent crim es of m oral turpitude alm ost always involve an intent to h arm s om eone, the actual infliction o f harm
, or an action that affects a protected class o f victim s. The BIA concluded that the absence of an intent to injure, an injury to persons, or a protected clas s is not determ inative, explaining that this court and the B IA have concluded that the Nunez categories are not exhaustive.

The panel also explained that the BIA provided a detailed explanation o f its rationale and responded to this court’s

concern that a crim e involving harm to chickens appeared to

** This summ ary constitutes no part o f the opinion of the court. It h as been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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be outside the norm al realm of crim es involving m oral turpitude. T he BIA explained that the imm orality o f the conduct stemme d fr om its infliction of suffering on sentient beings, so i t ap p lied to anim als involved in cockfighting, as well as dom esticated anim als. T h e BIA distingu i shed this conduct f rom practices, such as hunting and food production, that are harm f

ul to anim als but necessary or acceptable. The panel also rejected Ortega-Lope z ’s retroactivity challenge, concluding that the BIA did not change the applicable law.

The panel next addressed Ortega-Lopez’s argum ent that his conviction did not m ake him ineligible for cancellation o f

rem oval. As relevant h e r e , a cross-reference, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), provi d e s tha t an alien is not eligible for cancellation under § 1 229b(b) if the a lien has “been

con v i c t e d of an o ffense under section

. . . 1227(a)(2).” Section 1 227( a )(2), in turn, m akes an alien deportable if the alien is convicted of a crim e involving m o ral turpitude

comm itted w ithin five years after the date o f adm ission, and the conviction is on e for which a sentence o f one year o r longer m ay be im

p osed. O rtega-Lopez argued that he had not been convicted of an offense under § 1227(a)(2) because the
governm ent did not p r ove that his crim e was comm itted within five years after adm ission.

In Matter of C

ortez Ca n ales
, 2 5 I. & N. Dec. 301 (BIA 2010), the BIA held that the cross-reference unam biguously incorporated only language specifically pertaining to the crim inal offense, such as th e o ffe n se itself and the sentence im posed or potentially im

pos e d. However, this court in Lozan o- Arredondo v. Sessions
, 8 66 F .3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2017), after finding the c r o ss-reference am biguous,
sug g e s ted that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) could be interpreted as inc o r p orating the within-five-years elem ent and altering theO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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m eaning of “adm ission” in § 1 227(a) to me an “ e n try.” The
court declined to defer to Cortez Canales and rem anded for the BIA to reconsider its interpretation of “offense under” in § 1 2 29b(b)(1)(C). In its decision in this case, M at te r of Ortega-Lopez
, 2 7 I. & N. Dec. 382 (BIA 2018), the B IA restated its interpretation from Cortez Can a les and rejected the potential alternative interpretation suggested by LozanoArredondo

.

The panel held that the BIA’s interpretation in OrtegaLop e z was reasonable, explaining that the BIA held that construing the word “adm ission” to mean “entry” would be contrary to the overall purpose of the Illegal Imm igration Reform and Imm igration Responsibility Act of 1996, which replaced the term “entry” with “adm ission.” Further, the B IA evaluated the legislative history cited in Lozano-Arredondo and concluded that it neither underm ined Cortez Canales nor supported an alternative interpretation. Thus, the panel deferred to the BIA’s conclusion that an alien is ineligible for cancellation of rem oval i f the alien h as been convicted of a crim e involving m oral turpitude for which a sentence of o ne year or m ore m ay be im

po s e d
, regardless whether the alien

m eets the i mmi g ration prerequisites for inadm issibility o r deportability.

C OUNSEL

Geoffrey M. Doolittle (argued), D oolittle Legal LLC, Portland, Oregon, for Petitioner.

S ab atin o F

. L eo (argu ed), Senior Litig atio n C o un sel; Anth o ny P. Nic astro, Assistant Director; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorn ey General; O ffice o f Imm igration Litigation, CivilO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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Division, United States Departm ent of Justice, W ashingt o n, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Ortega-Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitio n s for review o f a ruling by the Board of Imm igration Ap p eals (BIA) that he was ineligible for cancellation o f rem oval under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). W e hold that the BIA reas o nably concluded that Ortega-Lopez had b een convicted of a crim e involving m o ral turpitude for which a sentence of one y ear o r longer may b e im

p osed based on his conviction under 7 U.S.C. § 2 1 5 6 ( a)(1) (crim inalizing specified conduct relating t o anim al fighting ventures). W e also defer to the BIA’s conclusion that an alien wh o h a s been convicted o f such an o f

fense is an alien “convi c t ed of an offense under section

. . . 1227(a)(2),” 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 29b(b)(1)(C). Therefore, we deny the petition for review.

I

The question o n appeal is whethe r Ortega-Lopez is ineligible for cancellation of rem o v al under 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 29b(b)(1) because he was “convicted o f an o ffense under” 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 27 (a)(2) (listing grounds o f deportability). T o understand this qu e s t i o n in context, we begin with som e historical background.

Before enactm ent o f the Illegal Imm igration Reform and Imm igrat io n Responsibility A ct of 1996 (IIRIRA), “United States imm igration law established two types of proceedingsO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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in which alien s c an b e denied the hospitality of the United States: deport a tion hearings and exclusion hearings.” Vartelas v. Holder
, 566 U.S. 25 7
, 2 6 1 (2012) (quoting Landon v. Plasencia
, 459 U.S. 2 1
, 25 (1982)). “ Ex clusion hearings w ere held for certain aliens seeking e n try to the United States, and deportation hearings were held for certain aliens who had already entered this country.” Id.

Under pre-IIRIRA law, “entry” was defined as a person’s physical entry into the United States
, whether lawfully o r unlawfully. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994) (defining “entry”
to m ean “any com ing of an alien into the United States, from

a foreign port or p lace”). Under this la w, an alien who entered the United States cou l d be charged with grounds o f deportability in a deportation hearing. See, e.g. , Mendoza v. INS
, 16 F.3d 335, 336–37 (9th Cir. 1994). An alien who was stopped at the border or a port o f entry (even if subsequently paroled into the United States) could be charged with grounds of exclusion in an e x c l u si o n hearing. See, e.g. , RamirezDurazo v. INS
, 794 F. 2 d 491, 4 95–97 (9th Cir. 1986). The
governm ent had the burden o f proof at a deportation hearing, whi le th e alien had the burden of proof at an exclusion hearing. Compare Gameros-Hernandez
, 883 F.2d 839, 841 (9th C ir. 1 989) (deportation), with Clark v

. S mith
, 967 F.2d 1 32 9
, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992) (exclusion). Because th e governm ent had to prove that any alien who had entered the United S tates m e t the requirem ents for d eportation, an alien who e n t e r ed unlawfully had an advantage over an alien stopped at the border. Se e, e.g. , Ramirez-Durazo
, 794 F.2d at 496–97 & n.2.

IIRIRA am ended this fram ework. Congress intend ed to elim inate the anom aly “under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities andO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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privileges in imm igration proceedings that are not available
to aliens who present th e m selves f or inspection at a port o f entry.” T

orres v. B arr , ___ F.3d

___ ,

_ _ _ , 2020 W L 5668478, at *8 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting H.R. R ep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996)); see also Matter of ValenzuelaFelix
, 26 I. & N

. Dec. 53, 60 n .7 (BIA 2012) (s a m e ). Therefore, Co n g r ess replaced the term “entry,” see § 1101(a)(1 3) (1994), w ith the term “adm ission,” § 1101(a)(13)(A) (stating th a t “[t]he term s ‘adm ission’ and ‘adm itted’ m ean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry o f the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization b y an imm igration officer”). IIRIRA also replaced the term “excludable aliens” with “ i nadm issible aliens,” and replaced grounds for exclusion with groun d s o f inadm issibili ty

. See Xi v. INS
, 2 9 8 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2002). Under this new fram ework, a person who physically entered the United States but was not adm itted is subject to grounds of inadm issibility, rather than d eportability, and has
to bear the corresp o n ding burden of proving adm issibility. Congress also elim inated separate exclusion and d eportation hearings, and i t channeled all aliens into rem oval hearings. Vartelas
, 566 U.S. at 262. Despite this procedural unification, the substantive bases for excluding and deporting aliens rem ained d istinct and addressed in different statutory sections. Judulang v. Holder
, 5 65 U.S. 42, 46 ( 2 01 1 )

. The list of offenses related to inadm issibility rem ained in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), an d the list of offenses related to deportability

rem ained in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). These lists are “som etim es overlapping and som etim es divergent.” Judulang
, 565 U.S. at 46.

Both inadm issible and de p o rt able aliens m ay apply for

c an c ellation o f rem oval under § 1 229b(b)(1). Under § 1229b(b)(1), the Attorney General has discretion to cancelO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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rem oval of an alien who is inadm issible or deportable if the alien m eets four statutory requirem ents. One such

re qu ir e me nt is that the alien “has n o t been convicted o f an offense under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a ) (3) of this title.” 1 § 1229 b ( b)(1)(C). The three cross-referenced sections list various crim inal offenses. The sec t i o n at issue here, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), relat e s to deportability and crim es involving m oral turpitude:

(i) C rim es of m oral turpitude. Any alien who—

(I) is convicted of a crim e invol v i ng m oral turpitude comm itted within five y ears (or 10 y ears in the case o f an alien provided law f u l p erm an ent resident status under sectio n 1255(j) of this title) after the d a te o f adm ission, and

(II ) is convicted of a crim e for which a sentence o f o ne year or longer m ay be im posed,

is deportable.

II

W e now turn to the facts of this case. Ortega-Lopez, a native and citizen of M ex ico, unlawfully entered the United States in 1994. In January 2008, O rtega-Lopez was indicted

on several crim inal counts, including violations o f 7 U.S.C.

1 This requirem ent i s subject to the dom estic violence w a i v e r not applicable here. § 1229b(b)(1), (5).O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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§ 2156(a)(1) for sponsoring or exhibiti n g an anim al in an anim al fighting venture

. In 2 009, Ortega-Lopez pleaded guilty to a single count under § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) for knowingly aiding and abetting another person who
spons o r ed or exhibited an anim al in an anim al fighting
venture. 2

While his crim inal case w as pending, the governm ent

comm enced rem oval proceedings against Ort ega-Lopez. Because Ortega-Lopez h ad not been adm itted into the United States, he was subject to grounds of inadm issibility. The
governm ent serve d him with a notice to appear which charged him as being rem ovable o n the ground that he was an “alien present in the United States without being adm itted o r paroled.” § 1 1 8 2 (a)(6 )(A )(i). O r teg a-Lopez conceded he was

r em ovable and applied f or cancellation of rem o val und e r § 1229b(b)(1). The imm igration judge (IJ) denied OrtegaL o p ez’s ap p lication for cancellation of rem oval on the groun d that he had been convicted of a v i o l a t ion of § 2156(a)(1), a crim e involving m ora l turpitude for which a sentence of a year or longer m ay be im posed. Ort e g a -Lopez appealed to the BIA. The B IA dism issed Ortega-Lopez’s appeal, Matter of Ortega-Lop e

z , 2 6 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 2013) ( OrtegaLopez I ).

We granted Ortega-Lopez’s p etition for review and

rem anded the case to the BIA for further consideratio n. Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch
, 834 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2 016)

2 The G overnm ent filed an unopposed m o t i o n to supplem ent the certified adm inistrative r ecord with the superseding inform ation t o which Ortega-Lopez p l e aded guilty. ECF No. 21. The unopposed m otion is GRANTED and the superseding inform ation shall be considered as part of the adm inistrative record.O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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( O rtega-Lopez I

I ). W e ordered the BIA to consider the language in N

unez v. Holder
, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th C ir. 2010), which had conducted an overview of our cases and generalized that “non-fraudulent crim es of m oral tur p itude alm ost always involve an intent to harm som eone, the actual infliction of harm upon som eone, or an action that affects a protected class of victim .” 594 F.3d at 1131. 3 W e also noted that “the crim e at issue involving harm to chickens is, at first blush, outside the norm al realm of CIMTs.” Ortega-Lopez II
, 834 F.3d at 1018.

On rem and, the BIA issued a precedential decision reaffirm ing its dism issal of O rtega-Lopez’s appeal. Matter of Ortega-Lopez
, 27 I. & N

. Dec. 382 (BIA 2018) ( OrtegaLopez III ). T he BIA explained its view that m oral turpitude

was broader than the categories identified b y Nunez
, and it concluded that § 2 156(a)(1) w as categorically a crim e involving m o ral turpitude because the offense involved intentional conduct tha t was m orally reprehensible. Id.
at 386–87. It also address e d o ur intervening opinion in Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions
, 866 F.3 d 1 0 82 (9th Cir. 201 7)
, and reaffirm ed the interpretation of a prior B IA

3 Based on its review, Nunezheld that a conviction in California f o r indecent exposure was not categorically a cri m e i n v o l v i n g m o r al t

ur p i t u d e, because the full range of conduct prohibited by the statute (which included

nu de dancing at bars) was not “base, v ile, and depraved.” 59 4 F. 3d
at 1133, 1136. Nunez did n ot defer to the BIA’s contrary d ecision, because it was unpublished and provided only conclusory analysis. Id. at 1133. After the BIA issued a preced e n t ia l opinion reaffirm ing its conclusion that the California indecent exposure statute was a crim e involving m oral turpitude, we deferred to the BIA’s published opinion and overruled Nunez

. See Betansos v. Barr
, 928 F.3d 1133, 1 141–42 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.
, 545 U.S. 967 (2005)).O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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decision holding that the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated only “the offense-specific characteristics contained in the cross-referenced sections—that is, the listed
gen e r i c o ffe ns e an d any c orr e s p o n d i ng s e n t e ncing requirem ents,” but did not incorporate the requir e m ent that the crim e be “comm itted within five years

. . . a fter the date of adm ission.” Ortega-Lopez III
, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 391–92 (citing Matter of Cortez Canales
, 25 I. & N. De c. 301, 307 (BIA 2010)). The BIA then determ ined th a t Ortega-Lopez

was ineligible for cancellation of rem oval and dism issed his appeal. Id. at 398. Ortega-Lopez again petitions for review. W e have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).

III

Ortega-Lopez raises two prim ary challenges to the denial of his application f

or cancellation o f rem oval. F irst, he
argues that 7 U.S.C. § 2 156(a)(1) is not categorically a crim e involving m o ral turpitude. Second, h e argues that the B IA erred in concluding that he had been “convicted of an o ffense under section

. . . 1227(a)(2)” because the governm ent failed
to prove that the crim e was “comm itted w ithin f ive years

. . . after the date of adm ission,” § 1 227(a)(2)(A)(i). W e consider each argum ent in turn.

A

W e first consider O rtega-Lopez’s argum ent th a t his conviction for violation of § 2156(a)(1) was not a crim e involving m o ral turpitude. W e determ ine whether an o ffense is a crim e involving m ora l turpitude by applying the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United Sta t es , 495 U .S. 5 75 (1990). See Marmolejo-Campo s v

. Holder
, 558 F.3d 903, 9 1 2 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Under theO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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categorical ap p r oach, we d eterm ine whether the crim e o f convicti o n contains all the elem ents o f the g eneric federal offense; in g eneral, we first define the elem ents of the federal generic offense, and then com pare it to the s t a tute o f conviction. Id.

W e accord Chevron deference to the B IA’s exercise o f its authority to g i v e “am

biguous statutory term s concrete

m eaning through a p r o cess of case-by-case adjudication.” INS v. Aguierre -Aguierre
, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); Marmolejo-Campos
, 5 5 8 F .3d at 909. That m eans we are lim ited to determ ining whether the agency’s interpretation o f

an am biguous term in the Imm igration and Naturalization A ct (INA) “is based on a p erm issible construction of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. D ef. Council, Inc.
, 467 U.S. 837, 8 43 (1984). An agency’s interpretation is perm issible so long as it is “not clearly contrary to the p lain m eaning of the statute.” Parrilla v. G onzales
, 414 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005).

W e have acknowledged that the phrase “crim e involving

m oral turpitude” is inherently am biguous, and neither we nor the BI A h ave established any clear-cut criteria “for determ ining which crim es fall within that c l a s si fication and which crim es do not.” Nunez
, 594 F.3d at 1130. Because the BIA h as authority to interpret the term “crim e involving

m oral turpitude” as u sed in the INA, interpretations provided b y the BIA in published opinions are entitled to deference under Chevron

. C

eron v. Holder
, 747 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

The BIA has defined a crim e involving m oral turpitude as h av in g “tw o essential elem ents: [ 1 ] rep reh en sib le co n d u ct an d [2] a culpable m ental state.” Matter ofSilva-Trevino
, 26 I. &O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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N D ec. 826, 83 4 ( BI A 2016). Conduct is reprehensible if it is “inhe r e n t ly base, vile, o r depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of m o rality and the duties owed between
persons or to society in general.” Matter of Jimenez-Cedillo
, 27 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 2017) (citation om itted). 4 Because this definition does not m eaningfully delin e a t e the elem ents of the offense, the BIA “has sensibly m oved fr om trying to define the phrase itself to instead g iving exam p les of the
types o f offenses that qualify as ‘crim es involving m or al turpitude.’” Silva v. Barr
, 965 F.3d 7 24, 731 (9th Cir. 2020). W e have deferred to the BIA’s approach of identifying “exa mples of the types of offenses that qualify as crim es i n v ol v ing m oral turpitude,” when the BIA sets out th e

exam p le in a published opinion. Id. ; see also MarmolejoCampos , 558 F.3d at 909.

Applying this approach here, th e BIA determ ined that “knowingly sponsoring o r exhibiting an anim al in an anim al fighting v enture is a crim e i n v o l ving m oral turpitude.” Ortega-Lopez III

, 2 7 I. & N. Dec. at 387. The BIA derived these elem ents of t

h e o f f e n se f r o m C o n gr ess’s crim inalization of this conduct in § 2 156(a). To be convicted under 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (2006), a person m ust “knowingly sponsor o r exhibit an anim al in an anim al fighting venture.” 5 The statute

4 W e h a v e held that crim es involving m oral turpitude fall into t wo categories: “[1] those involving fraud and [2] those involving g r ave acts of baseness or d epravity.” Robles-Urrea v. Holder
, 678 F.3d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 2012). Our definition of moral turpitude for nonfraudulent offenses is s ub st antially t

he sam e as the BIA’s. Silva v. B arr , 965 F.3d 724, 7 3 1 (9th Cir. 2020).

5 The statute also included a jurisdictional elem ent : th e governm ent

m ust prove that “any anim al in the ven ture was m o ved i n interstate o r foreign comm erce.” § 2 156(a)(1). Such jurisdic t i o n a l elem ents areO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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defined the term “anim al” to m ean “any live bird, or any live dog or o ther m amma l, except m an.” § 2156(g)(5) (2006) (current version at § 2156(f)(4)). It defined the term “anim al fighting v enture” to m ean “any event which involves a fight between at least two anim als and is conducted for purposes o f sport, wagering, o r entertainm ent.” § 2156(g)(1) (2006 ) (current version at § 2156(f)(1)). Excepted from the definition of “anim al fi g hting venture” is “any activity the prim ary purpose o f wh ich involves the use of one or m ore

an im als in hunting another anim al or anim als, such a s waterfowl, bird, raccoon, or fox hunting.” Id

. 6

The BIA explained why the language in N unez , wh i c h provided a categorization o f crim es involving m oral turpitude, d id not change its conclusion that the o ffense des c r i b ed in § 2156(a) is a crim e involving m oral turpitude. First, Nunez ’s categories are “not exhaustive,” as th e Ni n th Circuit h as acknowledged. Ortega-Lopez III
, 27 I. & N. D ec. at 386 (citing Rivera v. Lynch
, 816 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir.

im m aterial in applying a categorical approach. Torres v. L ynch
, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1622 (2016).

6 Although there have been am endm ents to § 2 156(a)(1) s ince the tim e of Ortega-Lopez’s o ffe n s e , the statute has not changed m aterially. Ortega-Lopez was charged with an offense comm itted in March 2007. I n May 2007, Congress am ended § 2156 to m o ve the i n t e rstate-comm erce

nexus f rom § 2156(a)(1) to § 2 1 5 6(f)(1) and to m odify slightly the definitions o f “ anim al ” an d “anim al fighting venture.” See, e.g. , § 2156(f)(4) (deleting the r eference t o “live dog” in th e d efinition o f “anim al”); § 2156(f)(1) (am ending the term “anim al fighting venture” to include fights “to be conducted”).O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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2016); N unez , 594 F.3d at 1131 & n.4.). 7 Moreover, the B IA did not d eem crim es involving m oral turpitude “to be strictly lim ited” to the categories described in N unez. Id. According
to the BIA, the phrase “crim e involving m oral turpitude” was “not am enable to a clear-cut com prehensive defi n i tion that identifies certain offenses to the exclusion of all others.” Id. The BIA o bserved that the Ninth Circuit had likewise f ound that som e non- fr au du lent crim es, such as incest and prostitution, are crim es involving m oral turpitude even if they d o n o t r e q

uire proof of an intent to injure, an injury to persons, or a protected class of victim s. Id. (citing Rohit v. Holder
, 6 70 F.3d 1085, 1088–91 (9th C ir. 2012) (solicitation of prostitution); Gonzales-Alvarado v. INS
, 39 F.3d 245, 246–47 (9th Cir. 1994) (inces t ) )

. 8 Based on this reasoning, the BIA concluded that, “in assessing whether an offense that does not involve fraud is a crim e involving m o ral turpitude, the absence of an intent to injure, an i n j ury to persons, or a protected class of v i c t i ms is not determ inative.” Id. at 387. The BIA adopted this principle as a nationwide rule “because

a single rule furthers th e param ount need for ‘uniform ity in the adm inistration of imm igration laws.’” Id

. ( qu o t ing

7Indeed, Nunezitself stated that it did not “suggest that everycrim e that has been held b y us to involve m oral turpitude falls within t h i s grouping.” 594 F. 3 d at 1 131 n .4. Rather, Nunez confirm ed that its generalization “does not seek t o encom pass every single c rim e t hat h as been h eld to involv e m o ral turpitude (largely because we do not think there is any m eaningful characterization that can do so).” I d.

8 W e h ave also held, i n caselaw n ot cited by Or t e ga -Lo pez III
, t hat solicitation of possession of m arijuana for sale i s a crim e involving m oral turpitude for i mm i gration purposes. Barragan-Lopez v. Mukasey
, 508 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2 007); see also Atl. R ichfield Co. v. Guerami
, 820 F .2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing possession of heroin for sale

as a cri m e i n volving m oral turpitude for p urposes of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act).O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft
, 382 F.3d 905, 912 (9th Ci r. 2004)).

Having addressed our instruction to consider Nunez ’s categorization of crim es involving m oral turpitud e , the B IA turned to providing a detailed explanation of its rationale for the conclusion that sponsoring or exhibiting an anim al in an anim al fighting venture is reprehensible. Id. at 387–89. The BIA reiterated that anim al fighting entails extrem e suffering (and som etim es death) of the anim als involved, an d g a ve

exam p les of the b rutal m anner in which such anim al fighting
events were c o n duc t ed. Id. The BIA reasoned that “the exhibition and celebration o f su ffering in anim al fighting events” was “contrary to basic st an d ar d s of decency and hum anity” and “debased and brutalized the c it i zenry who flocked to w itness such spectacles.” Id. at 388 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973 ) ). It also “desensitizes spectators to brutality and violence.” Id.

Responding to Ortega-Lopez II ’s concern that a crim e “involving harm to chickens” appeared to be o uts i d e th e “norm al realm ” of crim es involving m o ral turpitude, Ortega Lopez II
, 834 F.3d at 1018, the BIA expla i n e d th at the imm o rality o f the conduct stemm ed from its inflicti o n of suffering o n sentient beings, so it applied to anim als involved in co c k fi ghting, as w ell as dom esticated anim als. OrtegaLopez III
, 27 I. & N

. Dec. at 388–89 & n. 7

. The B IA distinguished this c on duct from other practices, such as hunting and food production, that are “inevitably harm ful to anim als” but are “necessary or acceptable to accom plish the

und er l ying utilitarian objective.” Id. at 389. The BIA also acknowledged that som e jurisdictions in the United States do
not crim inali z e cockfighting, but d id not give this fact any

we ight. The BIA reaffirm ed that the “clear consensus i nO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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contem porary Am erican society” holds “sponsoring o r exhibiting the spectacl e of anim al suffering” to be “m orally reprehensible.” Id. at 390. Further, the BI A noted that offenses such as prostitution “that are wid e ly v iewed as

m orally turpitudinous” are not crim inalized in every state. Id.

W e conclude that the BIA has provided a well-reaso n e d basis for dete rm ining that “knowingly sponsoring o r exhibiting an anim al in an anim al fighting v enture is a crim e involving m oral turpi tu d e .” Id. at 387. Because this explanation is in a published o p i n ion, it is entitled to deference under Chevron

. Ceron
, 7 47 F.3d at 778. W e m ust defer to such a perm issible interpretation, eve n if it is “not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deem ed most reasonab l e by the courts.” Ent e rgy Corp. v. R iverkeeper, Inc.
, 556 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2009). Accor d i n g ly, we conclude that a conviction under § 2156(a)(1) is categorically a crime in v olving m oral turpitude.

Ortega-Lopez raises one additional argum ent. He claim s that the BIA’ s determ ination regarding § 2156(a)(1) should
not be applied to him
, because he was convicted of an o ffense under thi s statute m any years before the BIA announced its i n t e r p r etation. W e d isagree. If “an agency consciously overrules or otherwise a l t er s its own rule or regulation” o r “expressly considers and openly departs from a circuit court d ec i s i on,” we m

ust analyze whether the new rule applies to conduct that took plac e b e fore the agency reached its conclusion. See Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder
, 702 F.3d 504, 518–19 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); acc o rd Ol ivas-Motta v. Whitaker
, 910 F.3d 1271, 1 277 (9th Cir. 2018). W e

som etim es refe r to this inquiry as a retroactivity analysis. Ga r f i as-Rodriguez
, 702 F.3d at 517. W e do not engage i nO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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such an analysis here, however, because the BIA did not change the law. It is undisputed that the B IA did not overrule it s p r e cedent. Nor did the BIA reach a conclusion “that is contrary to a ruling previously set forth b y a court o f

ap p e a l s

. ” Id. at 516. Although the B IA concluded th at Nunez ’s categories w ere n o t exclusive, Nunez did not p urport to provide a lim iting definition of crim es i n v o lving m oral turpitude an d e xp ressly stated that it was n ot doing so. 594 F.3d at 1131 n. 4. The BIA’s case-by-case application o f the categorical approach here does not constitute a change in the law “any m ore than a judicial d et e rm ination construing and ap p lying a statute to a case in hand.” Olivas-Motta
, 910 F.3d at 1278 (internal quotation m arks om itted) (quoting Manhattan Gen. Equip. C o. v. Comm’r
, 297 U.S. 129, 135 (1936)). W ith no change in the law, there are no retroactivity concerns, and therefore Ortega-Lopez’s argum ent fails. 9

9 In hi s re p ly brief, Ortega-Lopez argues for the first tim e that h is

o ffense is not a categorical m atch f or a crim e involving m oral turpitude, because he was convicted of aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). This argum ent is m eritless. Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense; it is “sim ply one m eans o f comm itting” the underlying cri m e

. United States v

. Garcia
, 400 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir. 2005). There is n o distinction between aiding and abetting liability and liability as a p rincipal under federal l aw. See Roman-Suaste v. H older
, 766 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2). A person who aids or abets a crim e “falls, l ike a p ri n cipal, within t he scope” of the generic definition of the underlying offense. G onzales v. Duenas-Alv a r e z , 5 49 U.S. 183, 1 8 9 (2007). W e look to the “underlying crim es in determ ining whether convictions for inchoate offenses constitute crim es involving m oral turpitude.” Ba rr agan-Lopez
, 508 F .3d at 9 03 (solicitation); accord McNaughton v. I

NS
, 612 F.2d 4 57, 459 (9th Cir. 1980) (p er curiam) ( co n sp i r acy)

. T h er ef

o re, Ortega-Lopez’s aiding and abetting liability does not alter the categorical approach analysis here.O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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In sum , we defer to the BIA’s perm issible conclusion that knowingly sponsoring or exhibiting an ani ma l i n an anim al fighting venture is a crim e involving m oral turpitude, and we reject Ortega-Lopez’s argum ents to the contrary. Because no dispute exists that a sentence of a year or longe r could be im posed for a violation of § 2156(a)(1), we d eterm ine that a conviction under this section was a conviction of a crim e involving m oral turpitude f or wh i c h a sentence of a y ear o r longer m ay be im

posed. 1 0

B

We next turn to the question whether the BIA erred i n concluding that Ortega- Lo p e z h ad b een “convicted of an offense under section

. . . 1 2 27(a)(2),” § 1229b(b)(1)(C), because the governm ent f ailed to prove that the crim e was “comm itted within five years

. . . after the date of adm ission,” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).

1

W e again begin w ith som e background. To be eligible for cancellation of rem oval under § 1229b(b), the alien m ust not have “been convicted of an o ffense under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3),” amo n g other things. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). In Go nzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft
, we

10 Ortega-Lopez argues that the phrase “crim e involving m oral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague. W e have repeatedly rejected this
argum ent on t

he ground that i t is forecl o s e d b y both S uprem e Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. See, e.g. , I slas-Veloz v. Whitaker
, 914 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 2 019), cert. denied sub nom. , Islas-Veloz v. Barr
, 140 S. Ct. 2704 (2020); Martinez-de Ryan v. Whitaker
, 909 F.3d 247, 2 5 1

– 5 2 (9th Cir. 2 018), cert. denied sub nom. , Martinez-de Ryan v. Barr
, 140 S. Ct. 134 (2019). Bound by that precedent, we reject the argum ent again.O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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concluded that “the p lain language of § 1229b indicates that it should b e read to cross-reference a list of offenses in three statutes, rather than the statutes as a wh o l e .” 3 90 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, we held tha t “[t]he m ost logical reading of ‘convicted of an o ffense und e r’ is that reached by the BIA: ‘ convicted of an offense described under ’ each of the three sections.” Id

. W e reasoned that an alien cannot b e “convicted under” § 1227, because it is n o t a crim inal statute. Id. R ather, the elem ents of § 1227 are “prerequisites to deportability.” Id

. Be cause the crossreference in § 1229b(b) focused on the list of crim inal offenses (not the other prerequisites to d eportability), we held i t wa s irrelevant whether the alien seeking cancellation o f

rem oval was in the country unlawfully (and therefore subject
to g rounds of inadm issibility) or was in the country lawfully (an d th e r efore subject to grounds of deportability). Id. at 651–53. Regardless o f the alien’s status, the alien did not qualify for canc e l lation of rem oval if the alien had been convicted of an offense listed in any o f the three statutes. Id.

In light of Gonzalez-Gonzalez
, the B IA subsequently held that the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) unam biguously incorporate d “only language specifically pertaining to the crim inal offense, such as the offense i t se l f and the sentence im posed o r potentially im

posed.” C

o rtez Canales
, 25 I. & N

. Dec. at 30 7

– 0 8. In Cortez Canales
, the BIA rejected the alien’s argume n t that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) also incorporated language i n § 1227(a)(2) “pertaining only to aspects o f imm igration law, such as the requirem e n t th at the alien’s crim e be comm i tt e d ‘ within five years

. . . after the date o f adm ission.’” Id

. According to the BIA, this exclusi o n o f imm igration-related elem ents “clearly follows” fr om the conclusion in Gonzales-Gonzales that “the plain language o f section [ 1229b(b)(1)(C)] should be read to cross-reference aO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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list of offenses in three st a tutes, rather than the statutes as a whole.” Id. at 308.

To further support this conclusion, the BIA com pared the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to the cross-reference in § 1229b(d)(1) (the stop-tim e rule), which relates to an o ffense “that renders the alien inadm issible to the United States under section 1 1 82(a)(2) of this title or rem ovable from the United Sta t e s under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title.” The BIA noted that the stop-tim e rule showed Congress knew “h ow to draft statutory language requiring an alien to be inadm issible o r rem ovable under a specific charge” in a cross-referenced section. Cortez Canales
, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 308. The BIA concluded that, “[s ]ince Congress did not include language requiring that an alien be inadm issible o r

rem ovable in section [1229b(b)(1)(C)], it is clear that i t d id
not intend for the imm igration-related elem ents” of the three

c r o s s

- r e f e r e n c e d s t a t u t e s t o b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Id. The BIA e xpl a ined in the alternative that, “even if the language of [§ 1 2 29b(b)(1)(C)] were f ound
to b e am biguous, we would interpret it in the sam e m anner.” Id.

In L oza n o -A rredondo
, w e addressed the question whether the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to an “offense under” § 1227(a)(2) incorporates o nly the offens e

- related elem ents

or a l so included the imm igration-related elem ents, nam ely, that an alien is deportable if the alien comm its a listed o ffense “m ore than five years after his adm ission to the United States.” 866 F.3d at 1 085. Although we a c kn owledged the BIA’s decision in Cortez-Canales
, we declined to defer to it because the “BIA erroneously concluded Congress’ intent had been clearly expressed at Chevron step one, and thus did
not exercise its exp e rtise and discretion in interpreting theO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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statute at Chevron step two.” Id

. ( c itation om itted). Even though the BIA explaine d i t would have reached the sam e conclusion if the cross-reference were am bi g u ous, LozanoArredondo classified this statem ent as an insufficient “onesentence caveat” that failed to exercise the BIA’s “expertise and discretion in interpreting the statute.” Id. a t 1093 (quoting Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Un ited S tates , 729 F.3d 1139, 1149, 1150 (9th Cir. 2013)).

Contrary to the BIA’s view, Lozano-Arredondo deem ed the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to be am b iguous and

sus c e p tible to several interpretations. Id. at 1089. LozanoA r r e do n do e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e c r o s s

- r e f e r e n c e i n § 1229b(b)(1)(C) could refer to “(1) o nly the crim inal o ffense itself—a crim e involving m o ra l turpitude; (2) the crim inal offense plus one additional elem ent o f the deportable o ffense (i.e., the cr i m i nal offense plus either the within-five-years lim itation or the sentence-length lim itatio n ) ; o r (3) all three elem ents of the deportable offense.” Id. at 1085, 1089–90.

L oza n o -A rredondo suggested that th e “all thr ee elem ent s ” interpretation w as the m ost reasonable. Id. at 1091. It noted that Gonzales-Gonzales “did n ot foreclose” an interpretation of the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) tha t incorporates the elem ent in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) requiring the crim e to have been “c o mm i t t e d within five y ears

. . . after the date o f adm ission.” Lozano-Arredondo
, 866 F.3d at 1090. LozanoArredondo also noted its v iew that the leg i s l a t ive history o f § 1 2 2 9 b ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) “ i n d i c a t e s C o n g r e s s u n d e r s t o o d § 1 2 29b(b)(1)(C) to incorporate all elem ents of the d e p o rtab le offenses under § 1 227(a)(2),” including the five year requi r e m ent. Id. at 1090–91. In reaching this conclusion, Lozano-Arredondo relied on a House Conference Report

w h i c h d e s c r i b e d § 1 2 2 9 b ( b ) ( 1 ) a s fo l l o w s :O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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“Section 1229b(b)(1) provides that the Attorney General m ay cancel rem oval in the case of an alien wh o has at n o tim e been convicted of an offense that wou l d r ender the alien inadm issible under § 1 1 82(a)(2)(A) or deportab l e under § 1227(a)(2).” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104- 828, at 213 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), 1996 W L 563320).

Under the all-three-elem ents interpretation, an alien who had comm itted a crim e involving m oral turpitude would still be eligible for cancellation o f rem o val if the crim e had been

comm itted m or e than five y ears after the date of adm ission. Lozano-Arredondo acknowledged that som e aliens se e k i ng cancellation of rem oval were never adm itted and, if the crossreference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated the within- fivey ears elem ent, aliens who were in the country unlawfu ll y “could never be deem ed ineligible for cancellation under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).” 866 F .3d at 1092. Such a result “would b e co ntrary to our holding in Gonzalez-Gonzalez that o ffenses under § 1227(a)(2) do apply to non-adm itted aliens in the cancellation context.” I

d. E xcluding the within-five-years elem ent altogether, as the BIA had done, was perm issible to

av oi d this conflict. But Lozano-Arredondo proposed a different option: The BIA could interpret “adm ission” in this lim ited context to m ean “physical ‘entry’ when applied to an alien who has not been ‘adm itted’” as defined in the INA. Id.

W ithout holding that any o ne interpretation was the “only reasonab l e interpretation,” Lozano-Arredondo “decide[d] only that the inclusion of the word ‘adm ission’ as p art of the within-five-years elem ent d oes not com pel the conclusion that Congress intended to exclude this elem ent from the ‘offense under’ § 1227(a)(2)(A)(I).” 866 F.3d at 1 0 9 2–93. Given its holding tha t § 1229b(b)(1)(C) was am biguous, Lo z ano-Arredondo stated that “[t]he BIA erred at C hevro nO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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step one by c oncluding C ongress clearly intended not to i n c o r p o r a t e t h e w i t h i n

- fi v e

- y e a r s e l e m e n t o f § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).” Id. at 10 93. T herefore, LozanoArredondo declined to defer to Cortez Canales and rem anded the c ase to the BIA for the BIA to “reconsider its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p h r a s e ‘ o f f e n s e u n d e r ’ i n § 1229b(b)(1)(C).” Id.

2

Th e BIA’s analysis in this case responded to LozanoA r r e d o n d o ’ s r u l i n g t h a t t h e c r o s s

- r e f e r e n c e i n § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to “an o ffe nse under” § 1227(a)(2) was

am biguous. The BIA first restated its prior interpretation in Cortez C anales
, that the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated only the offense itself and the sentence im p osed

or potentially im

posed. Or t ega-Lopez III
, 27 I. & N. D ec. at 392. The BIA then turned to the potential alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s u g ge st e d b y Loz a n o

- Arr e d o n d o , th at § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated the within-five-years elem ent and simultaneously altered the m eaning of adm iss i o n “ as tha t term is used throughout [ section 1227(a)]” to m ean “entry.” Id. The B IA gave a reasoned explanation for declining t o adopt this alternative interpretation and for reaffirm ing the interpretation it h ad adopted in Cortez Canales

. First, the BIA noted that “one of the overarching them es” of IIRIRA “was to replace th e term ‘entry’ with the term ‘adm ission,’ thereby p roviding that a person who h ad entered the United S tates without m eeting the s p e cific statutory requirem ents for an adm ission would be subject to grounds o f inadm issibili ty , rather than deportability.” Id. at 392–93. Drawing on the explicit distinctions between “entry” an dO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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“adm ission” that w ere m ade in IIRIRA am endm ents to the INA, the BIA held that “[c]onstruing the word ‘adm ission’ to

m ean ‘entry’ would be contrary to that overall purpose.” Id.
at 393. For instance, “Congress dem onstrated that it considered the term s to have d ifferent m eanings b e cause it retained the term ‘entry’ in certain p rovisions.” I d

. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1 227(a)(1)(E)); see also
, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(13)(A) (defining “adm ission” to m ean “the lawful entry o f the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an imm igration officer”). The BIA noted that we had previously rejected the argum ent that the term s “entry” and “adm ission”

were interchangeable. Ortega-Lopez I I I
, 27 I. & N. D ec. at 397 (citing X

i , 298 F.3d at 838).

The B IA also reasoned that a statute’s cross-reference to

a different statutory secti o n functions as an “incorporation” of the referenced section and not as a “ modification ” o f the referenced section. Id. at 393 (citing T orres v. Lynch
, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1626 n.5 (2016)). Th u s , the “m ost reasonable reading” of the cros s

- r e fe rence in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to an “offense unde r ” § 1227(a)(2) was that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated the offense-related elem ents of § 1227(a)(2) but
not the immi g ration-related elem ents. Id. (citing Torres
, 136 S. Ct. 1619, as an exam ple of a partial i n c o rp oration by reference in the INA).

The BIA rejected the suggestion that this reading would render superfluous the w ithin-five-years elem ent in § 1227(a)(2). Id. at 393–94. The BIA instead explained that its interpreta ti o n “actually avoids rendering language in the

can cellation o f rem o v al statute superfluous,” because the B IAO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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recognized the difference be tween lists of offenses that prevent an alien from b e ing eligible for relief from rem oval and the prerequisites that render an alien rem o vable. Id. at 394.

Second, the BIA evaluated the legislative history cited in Lozano-Arredondo and concluded that it neither underm ined Cortez Canales n o r supported an alternative interpretation. Id. The BIA determ ined that, notwithst anding the language i n the House Conference Report on IIRIRA, it would b e unreasonable to conclude that Congr e s s intended to require that an alien who had never been a dmi tt e d (and was subject
to grounds of inadm issibility, no t g r ounds of deportability)

wa s deportable for purposes of cancellation of rem oval
, y et not actually deportable “in the sense that the term is norm ally understood.” Id. at 395. Moreover, Congr e s s d i d not adopt the specific language set out in the House Conference Report ( an d quoted in Lozano-Arredondo ), even though it h a d

a d opted sim ilar language f or the stop-tim e rule. Id. at 395–96.

Based on its reasoned analysis of the statutory language, and after giving detailed consideration to Lozano-Arredondo and relevant legislative h istory, the BIA concluded again that
the best interpretation o f § 1229b(b)(1)(C) “is that the ‘offense under’ language is a lim ited cross-reference, one that incorporates only the offense-specific characteristics o f th e

cro s s-referenced sections.” Id. at 397. Therefore, the B IA reaffirm ed its decision in Cortez Canales.

Presented with am

biguous statutory language, “we m ay not supply the i n t e r

p retation of the statute w e think best (as

we would without an agency pronouncem ent).” MarmolejoCampos
, 558 F.3d at 9 08. W e are in s t e a d lim ited underO R T E G A -L O P EZ V

. B AR

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Chevron to determ ining whether the agency’s interpretation is perm issible and “not clearly contrary to the plain m eaning of the statut e. ” Pa rrilla
, 414 F.3d at 1041. Here, LozanoA r r e do n do r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e c r o s s

- r e f e r e n c e i n § 1229b(b)(1)(C) is am

biguous and could be inte r p r e t ed as referring only to the “crim inal offense plus

. . . the sentencelength lim itation,” 8 66 F .3d at 1085, 1089–90. And although

we offered our own possible interpretation of the statute, we expressly noted that “we are not yet prepared to hold it is the

o n ly reasonable interpretation” and acknowledged that o ur suggested interpretation “goes b eyond the ordinary imm igration d efinition of adm issi o n

. ” Id. at 1 092–93. W e also cautioned the BIA that holding constant the m eaning o f “adm ission” in § 1227(a)(2) wo u l d require “ignoring either the legislative history or o ur holding in Gonzal ez-Gonzales that § 1227(a)(2) applies both to adm itted and n on-adm itted aliens.” Id. at 1092.

The B IA ignored neither legislative history n or our p rior holding in Gonzales-Gonzales

. It grappled w ith legislative history b efore it d eclined to adopt Lozano-Arredondo ’s alternativ e ap p ro ach th at w o u ld require “reconstruing a crossreferenced statute for the purpose of resolving an am b iguity in the referencing provision.” Ortega-Lope z III
, 27 I. & N

. Dec. at 3 93. T he BIA instead favored a reasonable approach that in t e r preted “an am

biguous statute in a m anner that is consistent with its statutory cross-reference.” Id.

We conclude that the BIA adopted a perm is s i b le interpretation of the statute b a s e d on its expertise and discretion. I t i s reasonable to conclude that the offenses descr ibed under the cross-referenced sections “apply to all aliens—regardless of adm ission status—for p urposes o f § 1229b(b)(1)(C)’s bar on cancellation o f rem oval.” Lozano-O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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Arredondo
, 866 F.3d at 1090 (citing G onzales-Gonzales
, 390 F.3d at 6 52). I t also reasonable to conclude that

am biguous statutory cross-references will not always incorporate every component of the referenced section. See Torres
, 136 S. Ct. at 1 625, 1634. And, in light of th e statutory text and legislative history, it was reasonable f or the BIA to reject an i n t e r pretation that would require a redefinition of a s t a tutorily defined term , “adm ission,” that

was central to the changes m ade b y I I RI RA to the INA. Thus, given that Lozano-Arredondo determ ined that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) was susceptible to the BIA’s interpretation and the BI A’ s interpretation is not clearly contrary to the plain m eaning of the statute, we defer to th e BIA’s interpretation. 1 1

11 O rtega-Lopez also raises an argum ent based o n Matter of GarciaHernandez
, 2 3 I

. & N

. D ec. 590, 593 (BIA 2003). Garcia-Hernandez held that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated the “petty-offense” exception set forth i n § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), so that an alien who has been convicted o f

a crim e involving m oral turpitude that falls within t his excep tion is not ineligible f

or cancellation of rem oval. In explaining i t s r easoning, GarciaH e rn a n de z st a t e d th a t i t “ v i e w [ e d ] th e p l a i n l an g u ag e of [§ 1 2 2 9 b (b)(1)(C)] as incorporating t he entirety of [§ 1182(a)(2)], including t

he exception for petty offenses set forth th e rein.” This broad

s ta tem ent has been abrogated in part by Gonzalez-Gonzalez
, which he l d that “[t]he p lain language o f § 1229b in d i c a t es th a t it should be read to cross-reference a list of offenses in three statutes, rather than the statutes

as a whole.” 3 90 F.3d at 6 52. In light of t his ruling, Ortega-Lopez cannot rely o n G a rcia-Hernandez for t he principle that § 1229b i ncorporates § 1227(a)(2) as a whole (including the within-five years elem ent). The r efore, we reject Ortega-Lopez’s argum ent that the BIA’s interpretation here conflicts with Garcia-Hernandez

.O R T E G A -L O P EZ V

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IV

In sum , we defer to the BIA’s conclusion that knowingly sponsoring o r exhibiting an anim al in an an i ma l fighting
venture is a crim e involving m oral turpitude described under § 1227(a)(2). W e also defer to the B IA’s con c l u sion that, pursuant to the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C), an alien is ineligible f

or cancellation of rem oval if the alien has been convicted of a crim e involving m oral tur pitude for which a sentence of one year or m ore m ay be im posed, reg ar d less wh e ther the alien m eets the imm igration prerequisites for inadm issibility or deportability. B ecause Ortega-Lopez was

c onvicted of a violation of § 2 156(a)(1), a crim e involving

m oral turpitude, he is ineligible for cancellation of rem oval.

PETITION DENIED

.