Filed 1/15/14 P. v. Rusher CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
FANIEL RAMON RUSHER,
Defendant and Appellant. B249334
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YA079263)

THE COURT: * Defendant and appellant Fani el Ramon Rusher (defendant) appeals his attempted burglary conviction. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 ( Wende ), raising no issues. After defendant was notified of his counsel’s brief he filed his own letter brief, as serting ineffective assistance of counsel.
We have reviewed the entire record and fi nd that defendant’s contentions are not amenable to review on appeal. Finding no ot her arguable issues, we affirm the judgment. In 2011, after defendant pled no contes t to attempted first degree burglary and admitted a prior serious felony conviction and prior prison term , the trial court sentenced him to nine years in prison, suspended exec ution of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation. Conditions of probation in cluded one year in co unty jail, payment of mandatory fines, fees, and vic tim restitution, as well as main taining a residence approved

* BOREN, P. J ., ASHMANN-GE RST, J., CHAVEZ, J.,2 by the probation officer, obeying all laws and regulations of the pr obation department and the court, and submitting himself to the s upervision of the probation department. In October 2011, the trial court summar ily revoked defendant’s probation after learning he had been sentenced to prison by a court in San Francisco. The court later reinstated defendant’s probatio n nunc pro tunc, as his reques t for immediate sentencing in this case was not processed within the tim e required by Penal C ode section 1203.2a. 1 In February 2013, the court again summa rily revoked defenda nt’s probation upon learning he had been arrested in San Fr ancisco on a new charge. At the probation violation hearing on May 23, 2013, the trial court also heard defendant’s oral motion to suppress evidence brought pursuant to secti on 1538.5. Deputy Probation Officer Michael Reich testified that in his initial meeting w ith defendant in Apr il 2011, he informed defendant that defendant was prohibited from leaving Los Ange les County without permission and that he was required to report to the probation office in Compton on April 25, 2011. Defendant failed to report on the scheduled date or at any other time. Further, although he was given a monthly payment plan, defendant failed to make any court ordered payments. San Francisco Police Officer Christina Haye s testified that she arrested defendant on January 17, 2013, after finding methamphe tamine on his person during a consensual stop at a hotel known for drug and prostitution activities. She had en countered defendant before and determined that he was on prob ation in Los Angeles County, as well as on postconviction supervised release 2 in San Francisco County, which included a search
condition. 3 After Officer Hayes searched defenda nt and found a plastic bag containing white powder, defendant admitted the subs tance contained meth amphetamine. The

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 See section 3450 et seq.

3 Persons supervised under section 3450 et seq. “shall be subject to search at any time of the day or night, with or without a warrant, by an agent of the supervising county agency or by a peace office r.” (§ 3453 , subd. (f).)3 preliminary (“presumptive”) test Officer Ha yes conducted on the substance indicated the presence of methamphetamine.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress ev idence and found him in
violation of the terms and cond itions of his probation. The court imposed the previously suspended sentence of nine years, awarded cu stody credit of 494 days, which include the 365 days defendant had originally served, plus an add itional 126 actual days and 63 days
of conduct credit. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Defendant contends that hi s counsel rendered ineffective assistance, although it is
unclear from his letter whether he refers to hi s original conviction, his probation violation hearing, or some other procee ding. Defendant’s contention is based upon representations allegedly made by his attorney, probation officer, a judge, and the Board of Prison Terms, 4 which he has enumerated in his letter. As these representati ons do not appear in
the record defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of co unsel must be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266- 267.)
We are satisfied from our examination of the entire record that defendant’s attorney has fully co mplied with his responsibilities and th at no arguable issue exists.
We conclude that defendant has, by virtue of coun sel’s compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered agai nst him in this case. ( Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124.) The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

4 The Board of Prison Terms is now the Board of Parole Hearings. (Pen. Code, § 5075, subd. (a).)