Filed 11/24/20 In re Melody I. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re Melody I., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MONIQUE I.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B305843

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

18CCJP03647C)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Jana Seng, Judge. Affirmed.

Deborah Dentler, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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______________________

We affirm the juvenile court’s order finding a child 

adoptable and terminating a mother’s parental rights. All 

unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

I

Monique I. and Sergio L. had a daughter, Melody I., born in 

March of 2018. The mother has four other children who are not 

directly involved in this appeal. 

The mother was inconsistent in her efforts to obtain 

prenatal care while pregnant with Melody. The mother had a 

history of using methamphetamine. She first became addicted to 

drugs when she was 12 years old and had been addicted to drugs 

for 17 years. 

The father used methamphetamine and he was violent with 

the mother. The mother went to the emergency room while 

pregnant with Melody because the father hit the mother’s face 

and belly. 

In June 2018, the Department filed a petition under section 

300 on behalf of two-month-old Melody. The petition alleged 

Melody was at substantial risk of serious harm due to the 

mother’s drug abuse and the mother’s failure to protect Melody 

from the father, who abused methamphetamine and beat the 

pregnant mother. Two other allegations were about the mother 

driving Melody’s half siblings while under the influence of 

marijuana. 

The court found section 300 applied to Melody and detained 

Melody from the mother. 

On June 12, 2018, Melody began living with her paternal 

aunt and uncle and their six children. Melody had known the 
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family since she was born. She appeared comfortable in their 

home and she had started to bond with her cousins. 

The aunt and uncle had to meet certain guidelines for 

Melody to remain in their care. The uncle had been arrested in 

October 2002 for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 

The Department told the aunt and uncle they would need to get a 

waiver because of the arrest. 

On August 28, 2018, the court held a jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing. The court dismissed the allegations related 

to Melody’s half siblings and otherwise sustained an amended 

section 300 petition. The court declared Melody a dependent, 

removed her from the mother’s custody, and ordered family 

reunification services with monitored visitation. 

The mother missed 12 drug tests between August 2018 and 

January 2019. 

In October 2018, Melody’s maternal grandfather reported 

the mother broke a window at his home. The same month, a 

Department social worker said the mother appeared under the 

influence of drugs at the Department’s office. The mother 

decided not to enroll in an inpatient drug program. 

In November 2018, the mother said she stopped visiting 

Melody because she had been using drugs and did not want 

Melody to see her that way. 

In December 2018, the mother broke into the paternal 

aunt’s home. 

In January 2019, the mother told a social worker she was 

over four months pregnant and had not been getting prenatal 

care. She tested positive for marijuana twice that month. 

In February 2019, the mother entered a drug treatment 

program but the program discharged her early “due to her 
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temperament.” The mother failed to complete several courtordered programs. 

Melody remained with her aunt and uncle. In March 2019, 

the Department reported Melody was thriving. The aunt took 

her to medical appointments. Melody had no medical, emotional, 

or behavioral issues, but her motor skills lagged. The aunt 

secured services for Melody to address this situation. 

The mother did not call the aunt and uncle to check on 

Melody, did not attend Melody’s medical appointments or therapy 

sessions, and did not maintain regular visits. 

On April 17, 2019, the court terminated the mother’s 

reunification services, ordered permanency placement services 

for Melody, and set the matter for a section 366.26 selection and 

implementation hearing. 

In June 2019, a court detained the mother’s newborn son 

from her custody because she used methamphetamine during her 

pregnancy. The mother tested positive for the drug two weeks 

before he was born. 

In August 2019, the Department reported Melody was 

adoptable and her aunt and uncle wanted to adopt her. The aunt 

and uncle met Melody’s psychological, emotional, and physical 

needs. Melody continued to receive therapy for her motor skills. 

The aunt and uncle facilitated Melody’s contact with her brother 

and maternal grandfather. 

The mother admitted she and the father used 

methamphetamine on August 24, 2019 and they got into a fight. 

The mother punched the father. She threw a bike at the paternal 

grandmother, who observed the fight. Days later, the mother 

entered an inpatient treatment program, where she tested 

positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. 
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On September 17, 2019, the resource family approval 

program, which assesses whether families are fit to care for 

dependent children (see § 16519), denied approval for the aunt 

and uncle. According to the Department, the approval program 

had denied the uncle’s waiver for his 2002 arrest. 

The aunt and uncle said they were committed to providing 

permanency for Melody and were in the process of appealing the 

denial. The uncle enrolled in a class to help resolve the arrest 

issue. A social worker involved in the approval program did not 

foresee any “further barriers” in the approval process. 

In October 2019, the Department reported Melody 

continued to thrive with her aunt and uncle. Melody had been 

meeting developmental milestones. She attended weekly 

physical therapy. She had bonded with her aunt, uncle, and six 

cousins. Melody saw her half siblings at a barbeque her aunt and 

uncle hosted in September 2019. She had no medical, mental, or 

emotional issues. 

On October 16, 2019, the juvenile court ordered adoption as 

Melody’s permanent plan. 

On December 12, 2019, the mother filed a petition under 

section 388 requesting the court order Melody to be in her care or 

in the alternative, to reinstate family reunification services. 

The mother offered evidence she completed 82 days at an 

inpatient drug treatment program; completed parenting, 

domestic violence, and anger management classes; had several 

negative drug tests between October 2019 and January 2020; and 

visited Melody. 

In January 2020, the Department submitted an interim 

review report. Melody continued to thrive and meet 

developmental milestones. Her language development was good. 
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She was making progress through her weekly physical therapy. 

She was well-liked by her six cousins, who were “extremely 

bonded” to her. She was “very bonded” to her aunt and uncle. In 

November 2019, the approval program confirmed receipt of the 

aunt and uncle’s appeal and the aunt and uncle were awaiting a 

resolution hearing date. The uncle completed the class in which 

he had enrolled. 

The court held a section 388 and section 366.26 hearing on 

February 5, 2020. Melody was 22 months old. The court denied 

the section 388 petition. 

For the section 366.26 portion of the hearing, the mother 

requested the court make Melody’s permanent plan legal 

guardianship, not adoption. She said the parent-child beneficial 

relationship exception to adoption applied and terminating her 

parental rights would not be in Melody’s best interests. 

Melody’s counsel disagreed with the mother and said no 

exception applied. The mother consistently visited Melody only 

after she was in a treatment program or sober living home, and 

only when the Department transported Melody to the mother. 

Furthermore, the mother visited Melody just once a week. 

Melody did not see the mother as a parental figure. In contrast, 

Melody had bonded with the aunt, uncle, and their children. 

Melody’s counsel said adoption would provide Melody with the 

highest level of permanency. The Department agreed with 

Melody’s counsel. 

The court found Melody adoptable and found adoption was 

in her best interests. The mother maintained regular visits but 

had not established a bond with Melody nor taken on a parental 

role. The court found it would be detrimental to return Melody to 

the mother, no exception to adoption applied, and there were no 
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legal impediments to adoption. The court terminated the 

mother’s parental rights. The court designated the aunt and 

uncle as Melody’s prospective adoptive parents. 

The mother timely appealed. 

II

The order finding Melody adoptable was proper. 

At a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, the 

court determines whether, by clear and convincing evidence, it is 

likely someone will adopt the child within a reasonable time. 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406.) 

The shorthand for this inquiry is “adoptable” or “adoptability.” If 

a child is adoptable, the court must terminate parental rights and 

order the child placed for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) 

Absent certain statutory exceptions, the legislature’s preferred 

choice for adoptable children is adoption and termination of 

parental rights. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)

The focus of the adoptability inquiry is the child, not the 

potential adoptive parents. (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 

Cal.App.4th 725, 733 (Josue).) Indeed, the court may find a child 

adoptable even absent a placement with someone prepared to 

adopt the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) 

A child may be generally adoptable, meaning the child’s 

individual attributes make it likely someone will adopt the child 

irrespective of whether there is a prospective adoptive family. (In 

re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313 (A.A.).) 

Factors supporting a child’s general adoptability include 

young age, good physical and emotional health, intellectual 

growth, and ability to develop interpersonal relationships. (In re 

Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562.) A person’s 

interest in adopting the child tends to show someone, either that 
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prospective parent or another parent, will adopt the child. (In re 

Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649–1650 (Sarah).)

A child who is not generally adoptable may be specifically 

adoptable. If a particular prospective family wishes to adopt a 

child, the child may be specifically adoptable notwithstanding 

factors such as the child’s older age, poor health, physical 

disability, or emotional instability. (Sarah, supra, 22 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.) In such a circumstance, the court 

examines whether legal impediments may prevent that family 

from adopting the child. (Ibid.)

The court must make an express finding of adoptability but 

it need not make an express finding about whether the child is 

generally or specifically adoptable. (See A.A., supra, 167 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1313 [no requirement to make express finding 

of general adoptability].) 

We review a juvenile court’s finding of adoptability for 

substantial evidence. (Josue, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 732.) 

We must determine whether the record contains substantial 

evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made 

the finding of high probability demanded by the clear and 

convincing standard of proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 

Cal.5th 989, 1005, 1009.) We do not reweigh evidence. (Id. at p. 

1008.) 

The mother incorrectly contends substantial evidence did 

not show Melody was likely to be adopted within a reasonable 

time. On appeal, she raises no arguments about statutory 

exceptions. We therefore do not analyze exceptions. 

Substantial evidence supported the adoptability finding. 

The evidence showed Melody was generally adoptable. Her 

young age made adoption more likely. She was thriving. She 
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had good language development. She had no medical, mental, or 

emotional issues. While her motor development had lagged, she 

attended therapy and was progressing. Her close bonds with her 

aunt, uncle, and six cousins showed she could develop 

interpersonal relationships. With the aunt and uncle’s 

coordination, she also maintained relationships with her siblings 

and maternal grandfather. The aunt and uncle’s interest in 

adopting Melody tended to show it was likely someone would 

adopt her. 

The mother incorrectly says there was “no evidence” the 

aunt and uncle would adopt Melody in a reasonable time because 

the resource family approval program had not approved them. 

Evidence showed the aunt and uncle had taken steps to resolve 

the approval issue. Even absent that evidence, the mother’s 

argument dismisses the possibility Melody was generally 

adoptable. The Department made this argument in its 

respondent’s brief and the mother decided not to reply. As we 

explained, substantial evidence showed Melody was generally 

adoptable. 

Contrary to the mother’s argument, this case is unlike In re 

Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200. In Jerome, the evidence 

was insufficient to support a finding of general adoptability. (Id.

at p. 1205.) The child was eight years old, had a close 

relationship with his mother, with whom he had lived for most of 

his life, and had a prosthetic eye that needed care and treatment. 

(Id. at pp. 1205, 1207.) Melody does not share these 

characteristics. 

The court properly found Melody adoptable and therefore 

properly terminated the mother’s parental rights. 
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DISPOSITION

We affirm.

WILEY, J. 

WE CONCUR:

GRIMES, Acting P. J. 

STRATTON, J.