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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

JENNIFER CURTS and GERALD CURTS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellants, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 23, 2017 

v No. 330525 

Genesee Circuit Court 

MOTT COMMUNITY COLLEGE and MOTT 

COMMUNITY COLLEGE BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES, 

LC No. 15-105037-CK 

 Defendant-Appellees. 

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MURPHY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Plaintiffs, Jennifer and Gerald Curts,1 appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting 

summary disposition in favor of defendant Mott Community College Board of Trustees (Mott 

Community College). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm. 

I. BASIC FACTS 

 In October 2014, Curts, a student at Mott Community College, was injured when she 

tripped and fell on a step in a classroom auditorium. As a result of her fall, Curts received a 

laceration on her lip and sustained severe injuries to her neck, back, and hip. In August 2015, 

Curts filed a negligence suit against Mott Community College, and her husband brought a claim 

for loss of consortium.2

 In response, Mott Community College filed a motion for summary disposition, asserting 

that it was a governmental agency entitled to governmental immunity under the governmental 

tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq. The college also asserted that any attempt to amend the 

complaint to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity would be futile because Curts had 

 

1

 Because plaintiff Gerald Curts only alleged derivative claims based on plaintiff Jennifer Curts’s 

injuries, we will refer to Jennifer Curts, individually, as “Curts” in this opinion. 

2

 Curts’s original complaint named the Mott Community College Education Association as the 

sole defendant, but she later voluntarily dismissed that claim without prejudice. 
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failed to provide the college with statutory notice as required under the public building exception 

in MCL 691.1406. Curts countered that she believed the college was not a governmental agency 

because it was not created by a local vote, the constitution, or an act of the legislature. In the 

alternative, she asked the court to grant her leave to amend her complaint to plead in avoidance 

of governmental immunity. She claimed that she could satisfy the statutory notice requirements 

because a police report detailing the incident and her injuries had been filed, because Mott 

Community College’s insurer had sent her a letter indicating that it had been notified by the 

school about her injury, and because she averred in an affidavit that she had met with and 

discussed the incident with several Mott Community College employees. In a reply brief, Mott 

Community College argued that the police report, insurance letter, and affidavit were insufficient 

to satisfy the notice requirements. 

 After oral argument, the trial court held that Mott Community College was a 

governmental agency entitled to governmental immunity as provided in the governmental tort 

liability act. Further, the court held that Curts had failed to give proper notice under MCL 

691.1406, so the public building exemption did not apply. Accordingly, the court granted the 

college’s motion for summary disposition and did not grant Curts’s motion for leave to amend 

her complaint. 

 This appeal follows. 

II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 On appeal, Curts argues that the trial court erred in granting the college summary 

disposition and that it abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend her 

complaint. A trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Barnard 

Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 

(2009). Likewise, the applicability of governmental immunity is a question of law that we 

review de novo. Dybata v Wayne Co, 287 Mich App 635, 638; 791 NW2d 499 (2010). A trial 

court’s decision to deny a leave to amend a pleading is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 654; 563 NW2d 647 (1997). 

B. ANALYSIS 

 The governmental tort liability act “broadly shields and grants to governmental agencies 

immunity from tort liability when an agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a 

governmental function.” Moraccini v City of Sterling Hts, 296 Mich App 387, 391; 822 NW2d 

799 (2012), citing MCL 691.1407(1). Curts argues that it is not “facially evident” that Mott 

Community College is a governmental agency. She asserts that, under Hall v Medical College of 

Ohio, 742 F 2d 299 (CA 6, 1984), whether a college is actually a governmental agency should be 

determined on a case-by-case basis and that it is a “misuse of justice” to merely grant summary 

disposition on the assumption that she should have known that Mott Community College was a 

governmental agency. Hall, however, addressed immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of 

the United States Constitution, and is inapposite to this case. See id. at 302. Moreover, the plain 

language of the governmental tort liability act provides that by definition Mott Community 
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College is a governmental agency for purposes of the act. See MCL 691.1401(1)(a) (defining 

“governmental agency” as either “this state” or a “political subdivision.”) and MCL 

691.1401(1)(e) (defining a “political subdivision” in relevant part as a “community college 

district.”). Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that Mott Community College was a 

governmental agency entitled to governmental immunity under the governmental tort liability 

act. 

 Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Curts’s motion for 

leave to amend her complaint to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity. Curts argues 

that because the public building exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1406, applies in 

her case she should be allowed to proceed. The trial court, however, found that an amendment 

would be futile because Curts cannot satisfy the statutory notice requirements for the public 

building exception. MCL 691.1406 provides: 

As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any dangerous 

or defective public building, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the 

injury occurred, shall serve a notice on the responsible governmental agency of 

the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact 

location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the 

witnesses known at the time by the claimant. 

 The notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or by 

certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with civil 

process directed against the responsible governmental agency, anything to the 

contrary in the charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding. 

Curts argues that she satisfied the notice requirement. In support, she directs our attention to a 

campus police report filed after her accident, a letter she received from Mott Community 

College’s insurance provider that indicated the college had notified the insurance company about 

her accident and injuries, and an affidavit she signed stating that she had discussed the accident 

and her injuries with various employees at Mott Community College. 

 In Ward v Michigan State Univ (On Remand), 287 Mich App 76, 81: 782 NW2d 514 

(2010), this Court held that the statute’s notice requirements were a precondition to recovery 

under the public building exception. Further, we held: 

The statute specifies who must serve the notice (“the injured person”), on whom 

the notice must be served (“any individual . . . who may lawfully be served with 

civil process directed against the responsible governmental agency”), what 

information the notice must contain (“the exact location and nature of the defect, 

the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the 

claimant”), and the manner in which the notice must be served (“either personally, 

or by certified mail, return receipt requested”). Although the statute does not 

explicitly provide, it patently implies that these elements of the required notice be 

in writing. [Id.] 
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Here, it is undisputed that Curts, the injured person, did not serve a written notice on anyone. 

Although she orally recounted her accident to the campus police, the police report was 

undeniably not a written notice that Curts served on Mott Community College. Further, the 

police report only states in general terms that Curts tripped on a step while leaving the 

auditorium after someone pulled the fire alarm. It does not state which step she tripped on, how 

the step was defective, or how the defective step caused her fall and injuries. The police report 

also does not state all of the injuries sustained by Curts, nor does it provide the names of any 

witnesses known to Curts. As a result, the police report was insufficient to satisfy the notice 

statutory notice requirements. 

 Further, although Curts had oral conversations about the incident with various individuals 

associated with Mott Community College, those communications are also insufficient to satisfy 

the notice requirement. It is axiomatic that a written notice requirement cannot be satisfied by an 

oral account of the incident. Thus, even assuming that Curts’s oral accounts contained sufficient 

detail to otherwise satisfy MCL 691.1406, the fact that the conversations were not in a writing 

properly served by Curts on an appropriate individual is fatal to her claim. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause