UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 97-2323
J A M ES F. F R I TZ , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
. On Appellant' s Supplemental Applications for Attorne y Fe es and Expenses
(De cided Apr il 22, 2003 )

Kenneth M. Carpenter , o f T op e ka , K a ns a s, wa s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt.
Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un sel ; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Mi c ha e l A . Le on ar

d , Deputy

Assistant Gener al Coun s el , al l of Washington, D.C., we re on the pleading s for the a

ppellee.
Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and F ARL EY and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. STEI NB ERG, Judge : Be fo r e th is Co u r t a r e th e appellant' s Dec ember 21, 1999, supplemental

a pp lic a tio n, su

bmi tte d th ro ug h c ouns e l, f or a tto rn e y fe e s a nd e xpe ns e s und er th e Equa l A c c e ss t o Ju s t i c e A c t , 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 4 1 2 ( d ) ( E A JA ) , an d h i s D e c e m b e r

1 2 , 2 0 0 1 , s u

p p l e m e n t a l E A JA application. For the rea sons that f ollow, the Court w ill g rant in pa rt and deny in part t h e 1 999

su pp le me nta l E AJA a

pp lic a tio n; t

he Court furth er wi ll dir e c t th e pa rt ie s to pr oc e e d w iththe ir pleading s as to the 2001 supplemental a pplication, wh i ch wi l l b e re turned to the sing le judg e for dispositi on.

I. Re le va nt Bac kgr ound The a ppellant filed a

n application for

EAJA fees and e x penses on Dec ember 7, 1998, and the Secre tary filed a r esponse in which he conce ded that his position was not substantially justified and stated that he did not conte st the application. Se e Fr itz v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 190, 1 9 1 (1999)2

( Fr itz I ). On De cembe r 22, 1998, the Court orde re d t h e appe llant's c ounsel to expl ain why three pr ov isi on s o f h is a

nd the a pp e lla nt' s f e e a g re e me nt, e xec ute d o n Jan ua ry 26 , 1 99 8, a nd

fi le d w iththi s Co u rt in F e b r

u a r y 1 9 9 8 , s h o u ld n o t b e f

o u n d u n r e a s onable. See ibid. On J anuar y 11, 1999, the appellant' s counsel re sponded with arguments in support of the fe e ag ree ment. S ee id. at 191-95. On April 2 9 , 1 9 9 9 , the Court order ed the Sec reta ry to respond to the appe llant's c ounsel' s fee

a g re e me nt a

rgume nts . A ft e r t

he Court g ra

nte d tw o mot ion s fo r e xten sio ns of tim e (t ota lin g 38 da

y s) to file his response, the Secre tary filed a r esponse o n J u l y

6, 1999. On Novembe r 23, 1999, the Court iss ue d a n op ini on that he ld t hat on e pr ov isi on

in t he fe e a g re e me nt, wh ic h s ta te d th a t it wo uld be up to the attorne y ' s judgme nt whether to pur sue EAJA fe es (her einaf ter the " attorney -judg ment EAJA provision"), conf

licted with 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), the EAJA provision that g ave c ontrol over the application to the clie n t ; the Court require d the appe llant to file a ver ification that he ha d approve d of the EAJA applica tion f iled by his counsel. Fr itz I , 13 Vet.App. at 192-93. The Court also held that the a

ppellant' s counsel' s interpre tation of t h e fe e agreement a s to the two other provisions – the attorney -fe es-of fset and the expenses-off

set issues – was appr opriate ba sed on the fac ts of this case. Id. at 193-95. On December 21, 1999, the appe llant's c ounsel filed a ve rification "unde r protest" and a

(first) suppleme ntal EAJA application for $2,665.98 in fe es and e x penses f or the litigation as to the r easona bleness of the fee ag ree ment. On J anuar y 18, 2000, the Court order ed the Secr etar

y to respond to the appe llant's f irst supplemental EAJA application, and the S ec retary did so on Febr

uary 17, 2000. I n a n Apr il 1 8, 20 00 , o pin ion , th e Court g ra nte d th e a tto rn e y

fe e s and e xpe ns e s r e qu e ste d in the appe llant's 1998 ( orig inal) EAJA application but denied those r equeste d in the first supplemental EAJA application. Fr itz

v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 439, 441 ( 2000) ( Fritz II ). Th e Court

de nie d th e fi rs t supplemental application on the bases that (1) the dispute surrounding the fee ag ree ment was ra ised sua sponte by

the Court in acc ordanc e with 38 U.S .C. § 7263(c) a nd, thus, the liti g ation reg arding t h at fe e a gre em en twa s n o t , fo r t h e p u rp o s es o f 2 8 U. S

. C

. § 2 4 1 2 (d )( 1 )( A) , a p ar t o f a "'c i v i l ac t i o n '" broug ht ag ainst an ag ency ; and (2) the appellant' s fee s-for- fee s claim was only collater ally related to the issues liti g ated in the a ppeal to which the g ranting of the orig inal EAJA application pertaine d. Fritz II , 1 3 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 4 4 1 (q u o t i n g Shaw v. Gober , 10 Vet.App. 498, 502 ( 1997)).3

Th e a pp e lla nt s ub se qu e ntl y

a pp e a le d to the U. S. Co ur t of Ap pe a ls for th e Fe de ra l Cir c uit (F eder al Circuit), whi ch issued a Septe mber 6, 2001, opinion that vac ated this Court' s April 2000 opinion (Fritz II

) and r emande d the matter. F r it z v. Principi , 264 F.3d 1372 ( Fe d. Cir. 2001) ( F r it z III ). The F eder al Circuit held that this Court's denia l of the appe llant's f irst supplemental application wa s err oneous as a matter of la

w in light of Commissioner, INS v. Je an , 496 U.S. 154 (1990), a nd Brewer v. A merican Battle M onuments Commission , 814 F.2d 1564 ( Fe d. Cir. 19 8 7 ). F r it z III , 2 64 F .3 d at 13 77 . T he F e de ra l Cir c uit state d th a t, u

po n r e mand , th is C ourt

" sh ou ld deter mine on the pre sent rec ord whe ther the attorn ey ' s actions wer e unre asonably dilatory or proce durally

defe ctive" , either of

which " would justify a denial of some portion" of the fe es-f or-f ees
awa rd. Ibid. On Octobe r 29, 2001, the F eder al Circuit issued its mandate in the ca se. On Dec ember

12, 2001, the appe llant filed a sec ond supp lemental EAJA application – for the re presen ta tio n p ro vid e d to him by his c ouns e l in

c on ne c tio n w iththe lit ig a tio n o ve r t he fi rs t supplemental application, including his repr esentation in the Fede ral Circuit. On Februa ry 12, 2002, the Secr etar

y filed a motion for a

stay of proc eeding s as t o the sec ond supplemental application; he argues that he " cannot r easona bly respond to it until the Court is sues an or der e ither dete rmining the

rea sonablene ss of [t he a]ppellant' s first [s] upplemental [a]ppli cation, or r equesting that the par ties provide supplementa l briefing on that issue." Fe bruar y 2002 Motion at 2. On Fe bruar y 25, 2002, the appe llant filed a response in oppositi on to the Secre tary ' s reque st for a stay of proc eeding s. On J une 7, 2002, the Court g rante d in part the Sec reta ry ' s motion for a st ay o f p ro ce edings as to the second suppleme ntal application and held the proce eding s on that application in abey ance pending the disposition of Hensley v. Principi , U.S. Vet. Ap p
. No

. 9 6 -978 (May 10, 2002, Court order direc ting briefing on jurisdictional issue). Fritz v . Principi , 16 Vet.App. 179, 182 ( 2002) (pe r cur iam

o rd er ) ( ci t i n g Hensley

v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 108 ( 2002) (per curiam order) (orde ring briefingon question whether Court has j urisdiction to awa rd fees for repr esentation by counsel be fore Fe dera l Circuit)). In that order , the Court al s o direc ted the Secr etar y to file an a dditional response to the appellant' s first supplemental EAJA application in light of the F eder al Circuit' s opinion in Fritz III

. Ibid. The Sec reta

ry filed a r esponse on June 28, 2002, and the a ppell an t s u bmitted a reply on J u l y 1 5 , 2 0 0 2

. T h e C o u rtw i l l a c c e p tf o r f i l i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s l o d g e d

r e p l y.4

I nN o v e mb e r

2 0 0 2 , th is Co u rt i s s u e d

it s o p in io n in Hensley , whichhe ld t hat th is C ourt

is empower ed to award EAJA fee s for re prese ntation provided in the F eder al Circuit in an appe al from

a decision of this Court. Hensley v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 491, 497 ( 2002). He nce, the Court's June 2002 stay has expired and, a s indicated in Par t I I I , below, the Court, bef ore disposing of the sec ond supplemental applicatio n , wi l l al low the par ties to file supplemental re sponses and re plies to that second suppleme ntal application in accorda nce with Rule 39(d)( 5) of this Court's Rules of Pra ctice

and Pr oc e dure . U .S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 39(d)( 5) (e ffe ctive F eb. 14, 2003, In Re: Rules of Practice and Pr oced ure , U

. S. V e t. A p p
. M is c
. N o
. 1

- 0 3 ( Ja n
. 1 5 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( e n b a n c o r d e r ) ( te mp o r a r il y f o u nd at 16 Ve t.A pp . Ct . R- 1, a t Ct. R- 21 -2 2 ( a dv a nc e sh e e t N o. 2, F e b. 20 03 )) (r e vis ing Court ' s Ru le s, including Rule 39) ).

II. Ana lys is As no te d a

bo ve , in re mand ingthi s c a se the F e de ra l Cir c uit state d th a t th is C ourt

" sh ou ld deter min e on the present re cord w hether the attorne y ' s actions wer e unre asonably dilatory or proce durally

defe ctive, which w ould justi fy a deni al of some portion of the f ee[-]for[-]fee aw ard" that the appe llant had re quested in his first supplemental applica tion. Fritz III

, 264 F.3d at 1377. I n li g ht o f t

hat di re c tio n, the Se c re tary argue s th a t th e Cou

rt sh ou ld d e ny in fu ll the a

pp e lla nt' s f ir st supplemental application on the gr ounds that the time and re source s expended wer e the r esult of the appellant' s counsel' s proce durally defe ctive fe e ag ree ment and his dilatory conduct in not corre cting that defe ct sooner. June 2002 Response (Resp.) at 4. He a rg ues that the de fec ts in the ag ree ment
wer e appa rent fr om this Court's case law reg arding28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) as that ca selaw e x isted at the time of the litigation. Resp. at 7. The a ppellant counter s that this C ourt' s review of t he fe e ag ree ment was not pre dicated upon a proc edura lly

defe ctive fe e application , but rather upon the Court' s review

of the fe e ag

re e ment , and that the Court sh ou ld thu s re je c t the Se c re tary ' s a tte mpt to e xten d to t he re vie w o f f

e e a g re e me nts t h e conclusion in Jean , 496 U.S. at 163, that courts may reduc e EAJA fee awa

rds base d on "pr ocedur ally

defe ctive fe e applications". J u l y 2 0 02 Reply at 2-3, 5. With respec t to that fee

a g re e me nt, he a rgue s th a t th e re is no e vid e nc e of a ny un re a so na

ble dil a tor

y c on du c t by

him or his counsel in eith er i ts prepar ation or the re sponse to the Court' s inquiry reg ardingit. Id. at 3-4.5

F ina lly , h e a rgue s th a t th e Court ' s c a se law c on str uin g the EA JA and

38 U. S.C. § 590 4 la c ke d c lari ty in re gar d t o the issues raise d by the Court; that he could not have predic ted the Court' s conce rns reg ardingthe fe e ag ree ment; and t h at, t here fore , his counsel' s arguments in support of the fe e ag ree ment should not be held to have unr easona bly protrac ted the litigation. Reply at 3-4. "[ A] b sent unrea sonably

dilatory conduct by

the pre vailing pa

rty in 'a ny portion' of the litigation, which would justify denying f ees for t hat porti on, a fe e aw ard pr esumptively encompa sses all asp ect s of th e civ il act io n. " Jean , 496 U.S. at 161. That Supreme Court holding was ba sed on EA JA se c tio n 2 41 2( d) (1 )( C) , w hic h p ro vid e s:

The c ourt, in its dis cre tion, may reduc e the amount to be awa rded pursuant to this subsection, or deny an aw ard, to t h e ex tent that the pr e va ili ngpa

rt y duri ngthe co urs e of

the pr oc e e din g s e ng a g e d in conduct whic h unduly

and unre asonably

protrac ted the fina l r e s o l u t i o n o f

t h e m a t t e r

i n c o n t r o v e r s y. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)( C). The Supreme Court also stated that " [e] x orbitant, unfounded, or pr oc e dura lly de fe c tiv e fe e a pp lic a tio ns – lik e a ny oth e r imp ro pe r po sit ion that may un reas ona

bly pro tr actpro ceedi ngs – are mat ter s th at th e
. . . cou rtcan r ecogni z e anddi sco un t. " Jean , 496 U.S. at 163. "T he EAJA further provides . . . cour

ts [ with ] di scre tion to adjust t he amount of f ees f or vari ou s p ort io ns of t he l it igat io n, guid ed b y reas on andst atu to ry

cri ter ia. " Id. at 165-66. R ega rd i n g t h e f

i rs ts u p p l em en t al E AJ A ap p l i ca t i o n , t h e C o u rt n o t es t h a t t h e ap p el l an t 's application itself is not defe ctive and pr esumes that the Sec reta ry is basing his arg ument conce rning de fe c ts o n a

n im pr op e r p os iti on

take n b y the a pp e lla nt' s c ouns e l in

de fe nd ingthe fe e a g re e me nt – that is, the Secre tary

is employ ing the Supreme Court's s tatement that "a ny
. . . improper position that may unrea sonably

protrac t proce eding s . . . [i s a] ma tter[] that the . . . cour t can r ecog nize and discount", Jean , 496 U.S. at 163. T h at ar gu m ent appe ars to be, in e ssence , the same a s the Secre tary ' s argument that the appellant's c ounsel unrea sonably protrac ted the litigation by resisting compliance with the Court's c asela w. See Resp. at 7. I n its Dece mber 1998 orde r, this Court raised questi ons about three provisions of the

a pp e lla nt' s fe e a g re e me nt wit

h his co un se l and or de re d the a pp e lla nt' s cou ns e l to e xpla in wh y

tho se provisions were not unrea sonabl e u n d er the EAJA. Fr itz I , 1 3 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 1 9 1

. T h e ap p el l an t 's counsel re sponded and a

rg ued in support of all three provisions, and the Secreta ry responde d to the6

ap p el lant' s counsel' s arguments. The Court in Fr itz I a g r e e d w it

h a r g u me n ts p r e s e n te d by the appellant' s counsel as to two pro v i s ions only but determined that the third provision, the attorney -judg ment EAJA provision, was unreasona ble. Id. at 193. The lawreg ardingthe application of sec tion 2412(d) to the two fe e-a g ree ment provisions uphe ld by the Court w as not a s clea r as the Secre tary contends. As to those two provisions on which the a ppellant' s counsel' s interpre tation was vin dic a te d, the Se c re tary

c a nn ot l e g iti ma te ly

c omp la in t

hat th e a pp ell ant' s c ouns e l unre a so na bly pr otr a c te d th e lit ig a tio n b a se d o n a n im pr op e r p os iti on

take n in de fe nd ingthe fe e a g re e me nt. Howeve r, as to the third fe e-a g ree ment provision, which the Court held invalid in Fr itz I , 1 3 V e t. A p p
. a t 1 9 2

- 9 3 , th e qu e s ti o n p r e s e n te d is w h e th e r it w a s r e a s o n a b le , in li g h t o f th e prior d ec i s i o n s o f t h i s C o u rt t h at h adre j ec t edi d en t i ca l fe e- agr ee m en tp ro v i s i o n s , f o r t h e ap p el l an t 's counsel to have argued in sup p o rt of the attorney -judg ment EAJA provision. R elying on Jean , 49 6 U .S. a t 16 3 n .1 0, the F e de ra l Cir c uit state d th a t " to t

he e xten t that the a

pp lic a nt u lti ma te ly

fa ils to prove justification for

eac h item of fee claimed, c harg es g ener ated in defense of such unfounde d fee cl aim s ar e no t r ecov erab le. " Fritz III , 2 64 F .3 d at 13 77 n. 1. B e c a us e thi s Co ur

t is bo un d to consider the relationship between th e amount of the fe e aw arde d and the r esults obtained,

" fe e [-]f or [-] f e e lit ig a tio n [is to] b e e xclu de d to the e xten t th a t th e a pp lic a nt ult imate ly

fa ils to p re va il i n su ch l it igat io n. " Jean , 4 9 6 U. S

. at 1 6 3 n
. 1 0 (c i t i n g He ns le yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 4 6 1 U

. S. 4 2 4 , 4 37 (1983))

. Fur

ther guidance was provide d by this Court i n Hensley

v. Principi , wher e thi s Court noted that " an a pp e llant may rec ov e r f

e e s und e r t

he EA JA f

or un su c c e ssf

ul b ut r e a so na

ble argume nts if the litigant wa s ultim ately succe ssful on the claim" ; we stresse d that "the touchstone in deter mining whe th er fees ou ght to be award ed in su ch a ca se i s w het her t he ar gumen t w as r easo nab le. " Hensley , 1 6 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 5 0 1 (c i t i n g People W ho Care v. Roc kford Bd. of Educ. , 90 F.3d 1307, 1314 ( 7th Cir. 1996)). Apply

ing this principle, the Court in Hensley deter mined that it wa s unrea sonable for the appellant' s counsel ther e to have expended consider able e ffor ts on a n a r g u me n t, presente d in opening and re ply briefs, be fore a pane l of the Fe dera l Circ uit, whic h argument related to the overturningof a prior pa

nel dec ision of that court, whe n that panel lac ked author ity to rule in the appe llan t 's counsel' s favor

on the issue. Hensley , 16 Vet.App. at 502. (I n H e n se ly , the Court reduc ed by approximately

half the total hours c laimed by the attorne y

as havingbeen e x pended in pr epar ing that argument. Ibid. The Court explained that it did not exclude from the fee awa rd t he entire time spent7

on the ar g ument beca

use the a ppellant' s counsel " could have provided a succinc t sy nopsis of the .

. . argument in his brief to the panel, there by prese rving the issue for a later en ban c a rgu m en t ." Ibid. ) The Court conc ludes that it was unreasona ble i n this case for the a

ppellant' s counsel to have

ex pended his time on the a rg ument defe nding his attorney -judg ment EAJA provision i n the fe e ag ree ment. The c asela

w, as demonstrated by the opinions a nd order s cited by

the Court in Fr itz

I , is clear as t o the i nvalidity of t he attorney -judg ment EAJA provision. Fr itz I , 13 Vet.App. at 192-93 (c i t i n g W ingo v . W est , 1 2 Vet .App. 3 05 , 3 06 (1 99 9) (p e r c ur iam or de r) ; In re Fe e Agree ment of Mason , 11 Ve t.A

pp
. 51 4, 51 6 (1 99 8) (p e r c uriam order ); Sim ile s v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 115, 118 (1998); an d Shaw v. Gober , 10 Vet.App. 498, 506 ( 1997)). In two of the c ases c ited in the Fr itz I op ini on , th e lang ua g e of the fe e a g re e me nt, wh ic h wa s he ld in tho se c a se s to be un re a so na ble and invalid, was identical to that in this case. See W ingo and Fee Agreem ent of Mason , both su pr a . I n fac t, the appellant' s counsel in one of those c ases wa s the appe llant's c ounsel in this case, see Fe e Agreem ent of Mason , 11 Vet.App. at 5 1 5 , an d t h e C ourt would have expected counse l to have

c on fo rm e d th e te rm s o f h is f e e a g re e me nt t o th a t c a se law a ft e r it wa s iss ue d. I n a dd iti on , in r e sp on se to t he a pp e lla nt' s c ouns e l' s argume nt t

hat th e Court

la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n to re vie w t

he fe e a g re e me nt, the Court conclude d that "it is .

. . clea r that this Court has jurisdiction to revie w the fee ag ree ment at is su e." Fr itz

I , 13 Vet.App. at 192. Be cause the appe llant's c ounsel ultimately failed to justify

the attorney -judg ment EAJA provision, and because the arg ument in support of it was unre asonable , the char g es g ener ated in defe nse of that provision are not rec overa ble. Ther efor e, the Court will deny that part of the first supplemental EAJA application that seeks fee s for time e x pended in de fense of that provision. I n contra st, as discussed above , the Court conclude s that the arguments of the appel l an t 's co u n s el wi t h re s p ec tt o t h e o t h er t wo fe e- agr ee m en tp ro v i s i o n s we re n o tu n re asonable and will gr ant that par

t of the first supplemental application that seeks f ees f or time expended def

ending tho se tw o p ro vis ion s. Th e Court

no te s th a t it

is d if fi c ult to de te rm ine , a s to a ll a c tiv iti e s, the e xac t amou nt o f t ime de vo te d to the a rgume nt re la tin g to the un re a so na ble a tto rn e y -j ud g me nt E AJA p ro vis ion , b e c a us e the ite mizatio n o f f

e e s atta c he d to the fi rs t su pp le me nta l a

pp lic a tio n d oe s n ot b re a k d ow n th e tim e in terms of ar g uments prese nted. See Ex hibit 1 at 2 to De c. 1999 Supplemental Application. The8

a pp e lla nt s e e ks $2 ,6 31 .2 2 in

a tto rney fees (b a se d o n 1 9. 40 ho ur s) a nd $3 4. 76 in e xpe ns e s. I n it s discretion, the Court will reduce t h e t o t al num ber of hours claimed by

(a) the 6 hours billed on Dec ember

14, 1999, and Decembe r 15, 1999, solely for the unrea sonable fe e-a g ree ment-provision

argume nt, a nd

(b ) 4 .5 ho ur s ( on e -t

hir d o f a ll r e ma ini ngho ur s b ill e d fo llo wi ngthe Court ' s o rd e r t o show cause that issued on Dec ember 22, 1998) for

a total of 10.5 hours. See Jean , 496 U.S. at 163- 66 (n oti ngthat c ourt s h a ve wi de dis c re tio n in awa rd of EA JA f e e s) ; Hensley , 1 6 V e t. A p p
. at 497 (s a me ). Th e Court wi ll thu s re du c e by 10 .5 , fr om 19 .4 0 to 8. 90 , the tot a l ho ur s c la ime d in the fi rs t
s u p p l em en t al ap p l i ca t i o n
. T h e C o u rt wi l l ca l cu l at e t h e f ee a t t h e r at e p ro p o s edb y t h e ap p el l an t 's counsel a nd will awar d to the appellant r eimbursement f or all expenses and c osts claimed. L e st the re be a ny

do ub t, the Court no w c lari fi e s th a t any futur e fe e a g re e me nts e nte re d in to containing a provision pre viously held invalid, or filing s i n d ef en s e of a previously

invalidated fee -ag ree ment provision, may be conside red g rounds for a ction under Rule 38 of the Court' s Rules of Prac tice and Proc edure (re g ardingfrivolous filings) or other a ppropriate Court rules. Finally , in light of our pa

rtial awa rd of f ees a nd expenses reque sted in the first supplemental application and the rec ent holding in Hensley , su pra , that this Court has jurisdiction to awa rd fe es fo r w or k a sso cia ted w itha n a

pp e a l to the F e de ra l Cir c uit , w e wi ll o rd e r t he pa rt ie s to a dd

re ss, pursuant to Rule 39, the impact on the second supplemental EAJA application of those matters and will return the se cond supplementa l application to the sing le judg e for dispositi on. See U. S. V e t. App. R. 39.

III. Conclusi on Uponc o n s id e r a ti o n o f

th e f o r e g o in g an a ly s is an d

th e p le a d in g s o f

th e p a rti e s , th e Court g r an t s i np a rta n d

d e n i e s i n p a rtt h e a pp e l l a n t ' s D e c e m b e r 2 1 , 1 9 9 9 , f

i r s ts u p p l e m e n t a l E A JA application and a

war ds the appe l l ant EAJA fees a nd expenses in the amount of $1,241.87. The Clerk will file, as of t he day befor e the date of this opinion, the appellant's reply , which wa s lodge d wi t h t h e C o u rt o n J u l y

1 5 , 2 0 0 2

. T h e C o u rt l i ft s t h e s t ay o f p ro ce ed i n gs as t o t h e ap p el l an t 's De ce m ber 12, 2001, se cond supplementa l EAJ A application. Pursuant to Rule 39(d)( 5), the Secre tary will have 30 day s to file a re sponse to that second suppleme ntal application, and the appellant will have 30 day s to file a re ply to the Secre tary ' s response. S ee U.S. V ET
. A PP . R.9

3 9 ( d ) ( 5 ); see al

so U.S. V ET
. A PP . R. 39 (b ), (c ). Th e pa rt ie s are to i nc lud e in t

he ir su bmi ssi on s a discussion as to the impact on the second supplemental application of this Court' s decision her e and in Hensley , su

pra . The Court re turns the sec ond supplemental application to the scree ning judge for dispositi on.

FIRS T SU PP L E M EN T A L A PP L I CA T I O NG RA

N T E D I N PART AND DEN I ED I N PART.