MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 2 ME 17 Docket: Kno

- 21

- 56 Argued : November	3,	2021 Decided: March	15,	2022 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HUMPHREY,	HORTON , and CONNORS , JJ. Majority : STANFILL,	C.J.,	and	MEAD,	GORMAN,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON, and	CONNORS, JJ. Dissent : JABAR,	J.

KAREN	S.	KLEIN

v. UNIVERSITY	OF	MAINE	SYSTEM et	al.

GORMAN ,	J. [ ¶1] Karen S.	Klein	appeals	 from	a	 summary	judgment	entered in the Superior	Court	(Knox	County, Mallonee , J .)	in	favor	of	the	University	of	Maine System	 and	 the	 University	 of	 Maine	 (collectively,	 the	 University)	 on her complaint	 asserting	 negligent	 maintenance and	 o peration of	 a	 parking	 lot located	on	 the	University	of	Maine’s	Orono	campus

. Klein	contends	 that	 the court	erred	in determining that	the	parking	lot	was	not	an	appurtenance	to	a public	building as	that	term	is	used	in 14	M.R.S.	§	8104

- A(2)	(2021)	of	the	M aine Tort	 Claims	 Act	 (MTCA)	 and,	 therefore, that no	 exception	 to the immunity conferred	 on	 governmental	 entities	 by	 the	 MTCA	 applie d .	 	 W e	 affirm the judgment

.2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	following	facts	are	undisputed. See	McDonald	v.	City	of Portland , 2020	ME	119,	¶	2,	239	A.3d	662. On	or	about	January	6,	2019,	Klein	drove	her vehicle	 to	 the	 University	 of	 Maine’s	 Orono	 campus	 for	 the	 purpose	 of conducting	business at Fogler	Library.		Klein	was	instructed	by	the	University to	use	a	parking	lot contiguous	to	Holmes	Hall. Fogler	Library	is	located across Moosehead	Road from Holmes	Hall.		The p arking l ot	is	used	primarily	by	faculty and	staff	working	at	Holmes	Hall	and	by	faculty,	staff,	and	visitors	using	Fogler Library. [¶ 3 ] After parking her	 vehicle ,	 Klein walked	 through the p arking l ot , crossed	Moosehead	Road , and	entered	Fogler	Library.		A	few	hours	later,	Klein exited	 Fogler	 Library, walked	 a cross	 Moosehead	 Road,	 and walked	 into the
p arking l ot ,	where	she	slipped	and	fell	on	a patch	of	untreated	ice	and	sustained injuries.		No	road	construction,	street	cleaning,	or	repair	was	being	performed at	 the p arking l ot ,	and t he	University has no	insurance that would	cover the incident. See 14	M.R.S.	§	8116	(2021). [¶ 4 ] After her	fall,	Klein	filed	a	complaint	in	the	Superior	Court	alleging that	 the	 University	 was	 negligent	 in	 its	 maintenance	 and	 operation	 of	 the
p arking l ot .	 	 The	 University	 filed	 a	 motion	 for	 summary	 judgment,	 claiming3 immunity	from	Klein’s suit pursuant	to	th e	MTCA.		Klein	opposed	the	motion, arguing	 that	 the p arking l ot fell	within	 the	 “public	building	exception”	 to	 the MTCA’s	otherwise	comprehensive	grant	of	immunity. See 14 M.R.S.	§ §	8103(1),
8104

- A(2) (2021) .		On	February	5,	2021,	the	court	entered	an	order	granting the	University’s	summary	judgment	motion on	the	grounds	that the p arking l ot was	 not	 an	 appurtenance as	 that	 term	 is	 used	 in section	 8104

- A(2)	 and therefore that no	exception	 to	governmental	immun ity	applied. Klein	 timely appealed. S ee 14	M.R.S.	§	1851 (2021);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(1)

. II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 5 ] Klein argues	that	the	court	erred	by	granting	the	University’s	motion for	summary	judgment	based	on	immunity.		She	contends	that	the	undisputed facts	show	that	the p arking l ot where	she	fell was an	appurtenance	to Holmes Hall	 and Fogler	 Library	 and	 therefore	 fa lls	 within	 the	 “public	 building exception ” to	immunity provided	by section	8104

- A(2)

. [¶ 6 ] We	 review a	 grant	 of	 a	 motion	 for	 summary	 judgment	 de	 novo, viewing	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	nonmoving	party. See Picher	v.	Roman	Cath

. Bishop	of	Portland ,	2009	ME	67,	¶	7,	974	A.2d	286 .		A	grant of	summary	judgment	will	be	affirmed	if	there are	no	genuine	issues	of	material fact	and	the	undisputed	facts	show	that	the	prevailing	party	was	entitled	to	a4 judgment	as	a	matter	of	law. Id. “A	genuine	issue	of	material	fact	exists	when there	 is	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 require	 a	 fact

- finder	 to	 choo se	 between competing	 versions	 of	 the	 truth	 at	 trial.” Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted). “Absent	 a	 dispute	 of	 material	 fact,	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 governmental	 entity	 is entitled	to	immunity	is	a	question	of	law	that we review	de	novo.” McDonald , 2020	ME 119,	¶	11,	239	A.3d	662

. [¶ 7 ] Our	main	objective	in	construing	a	statute	is	to	give	effect	to	the	will of	the	Legislature. See Est.	of	Stone	v.	Hanson ,	621	A.2d	852,	853	(Me.	1993)

. In determining	the Legislature’s intent, we	look	first	to	the	plain	lan guage	of	the

statute

. Adoption	of	Patricia	S. ,	2009	ME	76,	¶	11,	976	A.2d	966. In	considering the	plain	language,	however, “ w e	must	consider	the	entire	statutory	scheme	in order	to	achieve	a	harmonious	result.		Finally,	[o]nly	if	the	meaning	of	a statute is	 not	 clear	 will	 we	 look	 beyond	 the	 words	 of	 the	 statute	 to	 examine	 other potential	 indicia	 of	 the	 Legislature ’ s	 intent,	 such	 as	 the	 legislative	 history.”
A.S. v.	 Lincolnhealth ,	 2021	 ME	 6,	 ¶	 15,	 246	 A.3d	 157 (quotation	 marks and citation	omitted)

. [¶ 8 ] Governmental	immunity	is	the sole subject	of	the MTCA , 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101

- 8118	 (2021)

. The MTCA	 expressly	 provides	 that,	 as	 a	general	 rule , governmental	entities	are	immune	from	suit	on	any	and	all	tort	claims	seeking5
recovery	 o f damages. Reid	 v.	 Town	 of	 M ount Vernon ,	 2007	 ME	 125,	 ¶	 20,
932 A.2d	539 ; 14	M.R.S.	§	8103(1)

. T he	MTCA does ,	however, include in	section
8104

- A “ a cautious waiver	of	sovereign	immunity by	the	Legislature in	certain carefully	 circumscribed	 circumstances .” Searle	 v.	 Town	 of	 Bucksport , 2010 ME 89,	 ¶ 27, 3	 A. 3 d	 390 .	 	We	 construe	 this	 waiver strictly in	 order	 to adhere	to the	Legislature’s	directive	that immunity for a government al entity
remain s the general	 rule. See Est

. of	Fortier	v.	City	 of	 Lewiston ,	2010	ME	50, ¶	 8,	 997	 A.2d	 84 (“In	 construing	 section	 8104

- A, we recognize	 that	 the MTCA	 employs	 an exception

- to
- immunity	 approach rather	 than	 an exception

- to
- liability approach .”	(quotation	marks	omitted)). [¶ 9 ] The public	 building	 exception to	 immunity provides	 that	 “[a] governmental	 entity	 is	 liable	 for	 its	 negligent	 acts	 or	 omissions	 in	 the
constru ction,	 operation	 or	 maintenance	 of	 any	 public	 building	 or	 the appurtenances	to	any	public	building.”		14	M.R.S.	§8104

- A(2). The	MTCA	does not	 define	 the	 term	 “appurtenance,”	 and	 we	 have	 adopted	 a	 restrictive definition	 of	 the	 term,	in	 accordance	 with	 “the exacting	 approach	 we	 follow when	construing	the	exceptions	to	immunity	under	the	MTCA.” Sanford	v.	Town of	 Shapleigh ,	 2004	 ME	 73 , ¶	 10,	 850	 A.2d	 325.	 	 “ [ F ] or	 purposes	 of	 section
8104

- A(2) ,	an	appurtenance	is	an	object	or	thing	that	belongs	or	is	attached	to6 a	public	building.” Id. ¶	11.		“In	determining	whether	something	‘belongs’	to	a building	.	.	. we ha ve rejected	a	function

- based	approach	in	favor	of	using	the ‘well

- established	defini tion	of	a	fixture	to	determine	whether	an	object	[is]	an appurtenance.’” McDonald ,	2020	ME	119,	¶	15,	239	A.3d	662	(quoting Searle , 2010	ME	89,	¶ ¶	13

- 14,	3	A.3d	390). Thus,	to be an	appurtenance under	section
8104

- A(2) , the	object	in	question	must	be “(1)	physically	annexed	to	the	realty, (2)	adapted	to	the	realty,	and	(3)	intended	to	be	irremovable	from	the	realty.” McDonald ,	2020	ME	119,	¶	15,	239	A.3d	662. [¶1 0 ] Klein	 relies	on our	recent	decision	in McDonald 1 to	support	her argument	 that	 the p a rking l ot is	 an	 appurtenance	 to Holmes	 Hall or Fogler Library

. 2 Id

. ¶¶	15

- 1 6

. In McDonald , we held	that	a	paved	brick	plaza	leading

1 Klein	 contends	 that McDonald	v.	 City	 of Portland , 2020 ME 119,	 239	A.3d	 662 , supports	 her position	that	the p arking l ot	is	an	appurtenance	on	the	grounds	that	we	adopted	a	new	“multi

- factor balancing	 test	 for	 whether	 a	 paved	 outdoor	 area	 contiguous	 to	 a	 public	 building	 constitutes	 an appurtenanc e.”	 	 Contrary	 to	Klein’s	 contentions,	we	 neither	 created	 nor	adopted	a	 new	 test.	 	We applied	 existing	 law	 by	 employing	 the	 “fixture	 test”	 as	 originally	 outlined	 in Searle	 v.	 Town	 of Bucksport ,	2010	ME	89,	¶¶	13

- 22,	3	A.3d	390

. See	McDonald ,	2020	ME	119,	¶ ¶	15

- 16,	239	A.3d 662.

2 Klein	also	resorts	 to	dictionary	definitions	of	“appurtenance”	and	out

- of

- state	case	law	in	an attempt	 to	 persuade	 us	 that	 it	 is	 an	 object’s	 “irremovable,	 essential,	 subordinate

- to
- principal relationship	 that	 dictates	 whether	 the	 area	 outside	 a	 public	 bu ilding	 is	 an	 appurtenance	 to	 that building ” and,	in	offering	this	approach,	implicitly	argues	that	we	overrule	the	“fixture	test”	we	laid out	in Searle ,	2010	ME	89,	¶¶	13

- 22,	3	A.3d	390 .		The	approach	offered	by	Klein,	however,	is	the	very “function

- based approach”	 to	 determining	 whether	 an	 object	 is	 an	 appurtenance	 that	 we	 have rejected	on	numerous	occasions. See	McDonald ,	2020	ME	119,	¶	15,	239	A.3d	662; Sanford	v.	Town of	 Shapleigh ,	 2004	 ME	 73,	 ¶¶	 8

- 12,	 850	 A.2d	 325. We	 have	 already	 determined	 that	 the MTCA “employs	 appurtenance	 as	 a	 technical	 term”	 and	 have	 defined	 “appurtenance”	 and	 adopted	 the “fixture	 test”	 to	 analyze	 whether	 an	 object	 constitutes	 an	 “appurtenance”	 under	 that	 definition. Sanford , 2004	ME	73,	¶	10,	850	A.2d	325; Searle ,	2010	ME	89, ¶¶	15

- 22,	3	A.3d	390	(enumerating	the factors	of	the	“fixture	test”	for	analyzing	purported	appurtenances).		In	formulating	the	“fixture	test,” we	 expressly	 considered	 dictionary	 definitions	 and	 out

- of

- state	 case	 law,	 along	 with	 the	 express7 to	the	entrance	of	the	Portland	Police	Department	headquarters	building was an	appurtenance	to	a	public	building	under section 8104

- A(2). Id. ¶¶	1 6 ,	22

. Applying the	 three

- part	 definition	 of	 a	 fixture	 to	 the	 facts	 of	 that	 case, we concluded , first , that	 t he	 plaza was “ annexed	 to	 the	 Department	 building because	it	serve [d] as	the	roof	to	the	portion	of	the	building	underneath	it	and [could	not] be	freely	moved	or	relocated.” Id. ¶	16. Second, we	concluded that the	 plaza was “adapted	 to	 the	 unique	 needs	 of the	 Department	 building” because	 “the	building’s	lobby	would	be	wholly	inaccessible	without [ it ] .” Id

. Third , we	 concluded that the	 “annexation	 and	 essential	 nature	 of	 the	 plaza” displayed the	City’s	intent	to	make	it	“an	irremovable	part	of	the	Department building.” Id. (quot ation	marks	omitted ). The	fact	that	the	plaza was physically annexed	to

— formed	the	roof	of	a	portion of

— the	Portland	Police	Department headquarters	building	was	crit ical	to	the	outcome in McDonald

. See	id. ¶ 16

. [¶1 1 ] The uncontroverted	facts	demonstrate	that	the p arking l ot here is materially	 distinguishable	 from	 the	 plaza	in McDonald because although the
p arking l ot is	 contiguous	 to	 Ho l mes	 Hall

— in	 that the p arking l ot share s a

language	 and	 th e	 purposes	 behind	 the	 MTCA. See	 Sanford , 2004	 ME	 73,	 ¶¶	 9

- 11,	 850	 A.2d	 325 (considering	 Black’s	 Law	 Dictionary	 and	 Am.	 Jur.	 2d	 Vendor	 and	 Purchaser	 § 99	 definitions,	 as informed	by	the	narrow	construction	of	exceptions	under	the	MTCA	and	the	purpose	of	th e	MTCA,	in defining	“appurtenance”) ; Searle ,	2010	ME	89,	¶¶	15

- 22,	3	A.3d	390.		We	are	unpersuaded	by	Klein’s arguments	that	we	should	adopt	a	new	definition	of “ appurtenance ” for	purposes	of	the	MTCA,	and as	such,	the	“fixture	test”	as	adopted	in Searle controls	here.8 common	border with	Holmes	Hall

— the p arking l ot is not an	object	or	thing	that
is “physically	 annexed	 to” Holmes	 Hall	 or	 Fogler	 Library

. Id. ¶ 15 ; s ee	 also
Annex ,	 Black’s	 Law	 Dictionary	 (11th	 ed.	 2019) (defining	 “annex”	 as “[s]omething	 that	is	attached	 to	 something	else,	 such	as	 .	 . .	an	addition	 to	a building”). The p arking l ot is not attached	 to	 either Holmes	 Hall	 or	 Fogler Library	 nor	 is	 it	 incorporated	 into	 the se public	 buildings	 in	 any	 way

. Cf. Ro driguez	v.	Town	of	Moose	River, 2007	ME	68,	¶ ¶ 8, 28	n.3, 38, 922	A.2d	484 (noting	 that	 external	 stairs	 leading	 into	 a	 public	 building	 fall	 within	 the definition	of	an	appurtenance); Donovan	v.	City	of	Portland ,	2004	ME	70,	¶ 15, 850	A.2d	319 ( referring	to “stairs and	other	building appurtenances”). [¶1 2 ] B ecause	 the p arking l ot is	not	annexed	 to	either	Holmes	Hall	or Fogler	Library , it	cannot	be	“an	irremovable	part	of	the	.	.	.	building.” McDonald , 2020	ME	119,	¶	16,	239	A.3d	662	(quotation	marks	omitted). Thus,	there	is	no evidence	to	support	two	of	the	three	neces sary	factors. [¶1 3 ] Even	if	t he p arking l ot were annexed to	one	of	the public buildings, however,	it would not	satisfy	the remaining factor	necessary	to the	definition of a fixture. T he p arking l ot is	 not	 “adapted	 to	 the	 realty”	 because	it	is	 not unique or	integral	 to	Holmes	Hall	 or	 Fogler	 Library	in	 any	 way. S ee	 S earle , 2010 ME	 89,	 ¶¶	 19

- 20,	 3	 A.3d	 390 ; McDonald ,	 2020	 ME	 119,	 ¶ ¶ 15

- 16,9 239 A.3d 662

. M any buildings border parking	areas that facilitate	the	arrival and	 departure of	 visitors	 to	 the	 building , and there	is	 no	 factual	 basis	 upon which	 to	determine	 that this p arking l ot serve s any	special	purpose

— it	does not	 serve	 as	 an	 entryway	 to	 any building, and	it	 has	 no	 desi g nated purpose other	than	parking

. [¶1 4 ] The p arking l ot outside	of	Holmes	Hall	and	Fogler	Library	is	not	an appurtenance as	that	term	is	used	in section	8104

- A(2) because it	meets	none of	the	requirements	necessary	to	qualify	as	a	fixture

. See Searle ,	2010	ME	89, ¶¶ 17

- 22,	3	A.3d	390. To	deem	a	parking	area	appurtenant	to	a	public	building merely	because someone parks her vehicle in	it	to	gain	access	to an other	public building	 would	 constitute	 an	 impermissible	 extension	 of	 the	 statutory exceptions	to	governmental	immunity. See 14	M.R.S.	§	8104

- A(2),	(4). Because the p arking l ot is	 not	 an	 appurtenance,	 Klein’s	 injury	 is	 one	 for	 which	 the University	is	afforded	governmental	immunity	 from	 suit	 by	 section	 8103(1). Accordingly,	 the Superior	 Court	 correctly	 determined	 that	 the University	 is entitled	to	entry	of	a	summary	judgment. The entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.10 JABAR,	J.,	dissenting. [¶1 5 ] I respectfully	 dissent	 because	 I	 believe	 a	 “function

- based approach”	is	more	sensible	and	practical	than	a	“fixture

- based	approach”	and aligns	more	closely	with	the	intent	of	the	Legislature	when	it	enacted	the	Maine Tort	Claims	Act	(MTCA).		Although	we	hav e	never	been	asked	to	decide	whether a	parking	lot	meets	the	definition	of	“appurtenance,”	dictum	in	a	previous	case indicated	that	parking	lots	are	not	appurtenances. See	K itchen	v.	City	of	Calais , 666	A.2d	77,	78	(Me.	1995) .		To	determine	if	something	is	an	appurtenance	as that	 term	 is	 used	 in 14	 M.R.S.	 §	 8104

- A (2) (2021) , we	 have	 adopted	 a fixture

- based	approach,	r ejecting a	function

- based	approach. Sanford	v.	Town of	 Shapleigh ,	 2004	 ME	 73,	 ¶	 11,	 850	 A.2d	 325 ; Searle	 v.	 To wn	 of	 Bucksport , 2010 ME	89,	¶¶ 14

- 15,	3	A.3d	390

. I	believe	conducting	a	 fixture	analysis	is proper	 when	 considering	 whether	 personal	 property	 constitutes	 an appurtenance,	 but,	 as	 currently	 employed	 by	 the	 Court,	 a	 fixture

- based approach	unnecessarily	li mits	the	definition	of	appurtenance	when	considering other	things	that	may	be	an	appurtenance	to	a	building.		This	narrow	definition is	inconsistent	with	a	plain	 reading	of	 the	statute	and	 the	legislative	history. Although	all	fixtures	may	be	appurtenance s,	all	appurtenances	are	not	fixtures. Searle ,	2010	ME	89,	¶ 40 ,	3	A.3d	390 (Jabar,	J.,	dissenting)

.11 I. DISCUSSION
A. Maine	Tort	Claims	Act [¶1 6 ] The legislative	history	of	the	MTCA	demonstrates	that	the	concept of	 governmental	 liability,	 and	 consequently	 a	 remedy	 for	 wrongly	 injured citizens,	is	equally	important	to	that	of	governmental	immunity. [¶1 7 ] In	1976,	 this	Court	abolished	common

- law	sovere ign	immunity.
S ee	generally Davies	v. City	of Bath ,	364	A.2d	1269	(Me.	1976) ; Bale	v.	Ryder , 286 A.2d	 344,	 345	 (Me.	 1972) .	 	 Forced	 into	 action,	 the	 Legislature	 hastily passed	 the	MTCA	in	early	1977. See P.L.	1977,	ch.	2 .		 In	 the	same	legislative session, the	Legislature	revised	the	MTCA	two	more	times. See P.L.	1977,	ch. 78, §§	 113

- 116 ; P.L.	 1977,	 ch.	 578,	 § § 1

- 5A.	 	 The	 latter	 enactment	 added appurtenances	to	the	public	building	exception	to	immunity;	under	the	initial stop
- gap	 measure,	 the	 public	 buildi ng	 exception	 applied	 only	 to	 buildings. Compare P.L.	1977,	ch.	2,	§	2, with P.L.	1977,	ch.	578,	§	2.		Legislators	were	not concerned	 with	 appurtenances	 and	 parking	 lots	 at	 that	 time;	 instead,	 they debated	whether	state	employees	should	automatically	recei ve	immunity	when the	 state	 is	 also	 immune	 from	 suit. See,	 e.g. , 2	 Legis.	 Rec.	 1644

- 45	 (1977) (remarks	of Sens. Mangan,	Collins,	Curtis,	and	Merrill )

.12 [¶1 8 ] That	debate	reveals	the	true	legislative	purpose	of	the	MTCA.		In the	words	of	Senator	Collins:
T here	 were	 some	 who	 felt	 that	 government	 should	 have	 no immunity	whatsoever.

. . .		There	were	[others]	who	would	not	have opened	the	door	to	any	sort	of	liability	on	the	part	of	government, and	 we	 said,	 well,	 that	 is	 not	 really	 the	 best	 way	 to	 go	 either, b ecause	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 civil	 wrongs	 that	 ought	 to	 be redressed,	and	can	we	find	some	middle	ground. Well,	we	 did	 find	 some	middle	ground	and	 the	middle	ground	is based	on	the	idea	that	we	should	open	to	liability	those	areas	where insurance	can	be	o btained	at	a	reasonable	cost,	and	we	were	very attentive	to	the	fact	that	this	involves	not	only	the	State	of	Maine, but	 all	 of	 our	 cities	 and	 towns	 and	 districts	 and	 so	 on	 that	 are governmental	entities. 2	Legis.	Rec.	1827	(1977)

. [¶1 9 ] The Legislature	intended	 the	MTCA	 to	serve	as	both	sword	and shield.		It	empowers	citizens	to	obtain	compensation	when	they	are	injured	by certain	enumerated	negligent	acts.		The	acts	are	those	for	which	municipalities, in	 particular,	 can	 obtain	 reasonably	 pr iced	 liability	 insurance.	 	 In	 fact,	 the Legislature	specifically	studied	the	cost	of	liability	insurance	for	municipalities and	amended	the	MTCA	to	reflect	those	findings. See 2	Legis.	Rec.	1593	(1977) (remarks	of	Rep.	Spencer). [¶ 20 ] At	 the	 same	 time, the	 MTCA	 shields	 government	 entities	 from excessive	tort	liability.		Both	aspects	are	equally	important	to	our	interpretation13 of	 the	 law,	 just	 as	 both	 aspects	 were	 equally	 important	 to	 the	 Legislature’s forged	compromise.		As	I	explain	in	more	detail	below ,	the	Court’s	insistence	on narrowly	 construing	 exceptions	 to	 governmental	 immunity	 is	 wrong	 partly because	it	disrupts	this	balance,	which	we	have	recognized	before. See Searle , 2010	ME	89,	¶	42,	3	A.3d	390 (Jabar,	J.,	dissenting)	( “The	Legislature	enact ed the	MTCA	 to	afford	citizens	a	remedy	 to	which	 they	otherwise	would	not	be entitled	 due	 to	 sovereign	 immunity

. ” ); Rodriguez	 v.	 Town	 of	 Moose	 River , 2007 ME	 68,	 ¶	 34	 n.4,	 922	 A.2d	 484 ( “ The	 Legislature created	 the	 narrow exceptions	 to	 governmental	 immunit y	 under	 the	 assumption	 that governmental	 entities	 would	 acquire	 insurance	 to	 cover	 liability	 for	 claims outside	immunity	protection

. . . . ” ).
B. Fixture
- based	Approach [¶ 2 1] The Court	 today	 makes	 clear	 that	 under	 the	 MTCA	 an appurtenance	 must	 be	 a	 fixture.	 	 Referencing	 our	 previous	 decision	 in McDonald	v.	City	of	Portland ,	2020	ME	119,	¶ ¶ 15

- 16,	239	A.3d	662 , the Court says,	 “We	 applied	 existing	 law	 by	 employing	 the	 ‘fixture	 test ’	 as	 originally outlined	in Searle	v.	Town	 of	Bucksport ,	2010	ME	89,	¶¶	13

- 22,	3	A.3d	390.” Court’s	Opinion	¶	10	n.1.		By	adopting	a	 fixture

- based	approach,	we	have	so narrowed	the	definition	of	appurtenance	that	it	means	only	fixtures.		I	disagree14 with	 t he	Court’s	limiting	interpretation	of	 the	 term	appurtenance.		The	plain meaning	of	the	term	demonstrates	that	all	appurtenances	are	not	necessarily fixtures.		The	plain	meaning	demands	additional	analysis. [¶ 22 ] The	Court’s	current fixture

- based approach does	not	account	for this	need

. For	the	purpose	of	the	MTCA,	we	have	defined	appurtenance	as	“an object	 or	 thing	 that	 belongs	 or	 is	 attached	 to	 a	 public	 building.” Sanford , 2004 ME	73,	¶	11,	850	A.2d	325.		Although	this	definition	suggests	that	things

o ther	 than	 fixtures	 could	 be	 appurtenances,	 it	 presents	 a	 false	 choice:	 “the proper	analysis” simply asks if	a	thing	that	may	be	an	appurtenance	is	either	a fixture	or	personal	property. S ee	S earle ,	2010	ME	89,	¶¶	11,	15,	3	A.3d	390

. After	we	defined	appurtenance	in Sanford ,	2004	ME	73,	¶	11,	850	A.2d	325, a majority	 of	 this	 Court later described that	 case as	 “apply[ing]	 the well

- established	definition	of	a	fixture	to	determine	whether	an	object	was	an appurtenance , ” Searle , 2010	 ME 89,	 ¶	 14,	 3	 A.3d	 390.	 	 This	 description	 is misleading. Sanford created	a	common	law	definition	of	appurtenance that	was informed	by	(1) dictionary	definition s of	appurtenance and	appurtenant ;	(2)	a legal	treatise’s	description	of	appurtenances;	and	(3)	a dictionary	definition	of fixture.		2004	ME	73,	¶ ¶ 9

- 11 ,	850	A.2d	325. We then	applied	that	common	law definition,	 which	 more	 closely	 resembles	 the	 dictionary	 definition	 of15 appurtenance	 than	 it	 does	 fixture,	 to	 determine	 if	 a	 trash	 bin	 was	 an appurtenance. Id. ¶¶	 11

- 12. Our application	 of	 that	 definition	 did	 not	even mention	the	word	“fixture.” Id. [¶ 23 ] I	agree that it	is	necessary	 to	distinguish	 fixtures	 from	personal property, as	was	done	in Sanford , because a	governmental	entity	is	not	liable “for	 its	 negligent	 acts	 or	 omissions	 in	 the	 construction,	 operation	 or maintenance”	of	its	personal	property. See 14	M.R.S.	§	8104

- A(2 )

. T he	Court’s definition	 for	 fixture,	 as	 articulated	 in Searle , is well	 suited	 to determine	 if personal	property has	become a	fixture.		2010	ME	89,	¶	16,	3	A.3d	390. But	our prior	cases	involving	the	public	building	exception	to	immunity	have	primarily dealt	with	things	that	are	commonly	considered	personal	property. See,	e.g. , id. , ¶ 1 5	(bleachers); Sanford , 2004	ME	73,	¶ 12 ,	850	A.2d	325 (freestanding	trash bin); Donovan	 v.	 City	 of	 Portland ,	 2004	 ME	 70,	 ¶	 5,	 850	 A.2d	 319 (exterior lighting); Peterson	 v.	 City	 of	 Bangor ,	 2003	 ME	 102,	 ¶¶	 7

- 8,	 831	 A.2d	 416 (monkey	 bars); Petillo	 v. City	 of	 Portland ,	 657	 A.2d	 325,	 327	 (Me.	 1995) (irrigation	 system)	 (dicta). But	 see	 McDonald ,	 2020	 ME	 119,	 ¶¶ 4

- 5,
239 A.3d 662	(plaza); Kitchen ,	666	A.2d at 78 (“The	City’s	statement	of	material facts	places	the	raised,	blacktopped	curbing	in	the	parking area.		A	parking	area constitutes	neither	a	public	building	nor	an	appurtenance	to	a	public	building.”)16 (predating Sanford ); Stretton	v. City	of Lewiston ,	588	A.2d	739,	741	(Me.	1991) (holding	that	an	athletic	field	is	neither	a	public	building	nor	an	app urtenance because	it	is	similar	to	“a	camouflaged	underground	assault	shelter,”	which	“ is not	a	public	building	within	the	meaning	of	the [MTCA]” (citing Lovejoy	v.	State , 544	A.2d	750,	751	(Me.	1988) ))	(predating Sanford ). [¶ 24 ] Here,	we	are	asked	 for	t he	 first	time	to	determine	on	the	merits whether	 a	 parking	 lot

— a	 piece	 of	 realty	 rather	 than	 an	 object	 or	 personal property

— is	an	appurtenance	to	a	public	building.		A	fixture

- based	approach cannot	answer	the	question.
C. Function
- based	Approach [¶ 25 ] To	 correct	 this limited	and	 narrow	 view	 of	what	 constitutes	an appurtenance ,	we	should	adopt	a more	sensible	and	practical function

- based approach. I	 recognize	 that	 we	 have	 previously	 rejected	 this	 approach. In Sanford ,	we	“decline[d]	to	adopt	a	funct ion

- based	approach	and	rel[ied]	instead on	a	more	restrictive	understanding	of	the	term,”	despite	“acknowledg[ing]	that the	function

- based	definition	employed	by	the	Superior	Court	.	.	.	[was]	sensible and	 offer[ed]	 a	 practical	 standard.”	 	 2004	 ME	 73,	 ¶	 8, 850	 A.2d	 325. An examination	 of	 the	 plain	 language	 of	 the	 MTCA	 requires	 us	 to	 revisit	 our rejection	of	the	function

- based	approach.17 1. Plain	Language [¶ 26 ] As	the	Court	notes,	our	main	objective	in	construing	a	statute	is	to give	effect	to	the	will	of the	Legislature. Desgrosseilliers	v.	Auburn	Sheet	Metal , 2021	ME	63,	¶	8,	264	A.3d	1237 .		We	achieve	this	objective	by	first	examining the	plain	language	of	the	statute. Wuori	v.	Otis ,	2020	ME	27,	¶	6,	226	A.3d	771

. When	 we	 give statutory	 language	 its plain	 and	 ordinary	 meaning , we “have often	 relied	 on	 dictionaries	 to	 determine	 such	 meanings.” Rockland	 Plaza Realty	Corp.	v.	City	of	Rockland ,	2001	ME	81,	¶	12,	772	A.2d	256 ; see Mortg

. Elec. Registration	 Sys. ,	 Inc. v.	 Saunders ,	 2010	 ME	 79,	 ¶	 11,	 2	 A.3d 289

. We	 also
i nterpret	statutory	language	to	avoid	absurd,	illogical,	or	inconsistent	results. Jackson	 Lumber	 &	 Millwork	 Co.	 v.	 Rockwell	 Homes,	 LLC ,	 2022	 ME	 4,	 ¶	 10,
266 A.3d 288

. [¶ 27 ] The public	 building	 exception	 to	 immunity	 provides	 that	 “[a] governmental	 entity	 is	 liable	 for	 its	 negligent	 acts	 or	 omissions	 in	 the construction,	 operation	 or	 maintenance	 of	 any	 public	 building	 or	 the appurtenances	to	any	public	building.”		14	M.R.S.	§	8104

- A(2).		The	Legislature did	not	define	the	term	appurtenance	in	the	MTCA. [¶ 28 ] I	 note	 here	 that in	 our	 jurisprudence we	 have	 inconsistent ly applied	a	rule	of	statutory	construction	when interpret ing this	undefined	term.18 In Searle , we	 said	 that “ [a] s	 a general	 rule,	 words	 and	 phrases	 that	 are	 not expressly	defined	in	a	statute	must	be	given	 their	plain	and	natural	meaning and	 should	 be	 construed	 according	 to	 their	 natural	 import	 in	 common	 and approved	usage.” 2010	ME	89,	¶	8,	3	A.3d	390	(quotation	marks omitted)

. In Sanford , however,	we	said	that “ b ecause	the	MTCA	employs	appurtenance	as	a technical	term,	we	are	guided	by	the	rule	that	technical	words	and	phrases	and such	as	have	a	peculiar	meaning	convey	such	technical	or	peculiar	meaning.”
2004	ME	73 ,	¶	10,	850	A.2d	325	( alteration	and quotation	marks	omitted). The Sanford Court	did	not	explain	why	it	thought	the	MTCA	employed	appurtenance as	a	technical	term,	nor	does	either	party	here,	so	“the	plain	meaning	of	[this undefined]	 term	 controls.” Stat e	 v.	 York ,	 1997	 ME	 209,	 ¶	 9,	 704	 A.2d	 324 ; Ethyl Corp.	 v.	 Adams ,	 375	 A.2d	 1065,	 1075	 (Me.	 1977) (“ Since	 we	 find	 no indication	 that	 the	 Legislature	intended	 that	 the [statutory	 term] be	 given	 a peculiar	 or	 technical	 meaning,	 we	 construe	 it	 according	 to	 the	 common meaning	of	the	language. ” (quotation	marks	omitted)). [¶ 29 ] To	begin	with,	the	Legislature	used	the	term	appurtenances,	not fixtures. See Court’s	Opinion ¶ 9.		We	can	assu me	that	the	Legislature	knew	the difference	 between	 an	 appurtenance	 and	 a	 fixture.	 	 “Fixture”	 is	 defined	 as “[p]ersonal	property	that	is	attached	to	land	or	a	building	and	that	is	regarded19 as	an	irremovable	part	of	the	real	property .	.	.	.” Fixture ,	Blac k’s	Law	Dictionary (11th	ed.	2019); cf.	Personal	Property ,	Black’s	Law	Dictionary	(11th	ed.	2019) (“Any	 movable	 or	 intangible	 thing	 that	 is	 subject	 to	 ownership	 and	 not classified	as	real	property.”). In contrast ,	we have noted	that	appurtenance	is define d	as	“‘something	that	belongs	or	is	attached	to	something	else.’” Sanford , 2004	ME	73,	¶	9,	850	A.2d	325	(quoting Appurtenance ,	Black’s	Law	Dictionary (7th	ed.	1999)).		By	the	plain	meaning	of	the	word,	then,	something	can	be	an appurtenance	in	one	of	 two	ways:	either	it	belongs	 to	something	else	or	it	is attached	to	something	else. A	plain	reading	of	the	term	does	not	support	t he conclusion	that	an	appurtenance	can	be	only	a	fixture. [¶ 30 ] Furthermore,	I	note	that	the	Court	relies	on	the	rule	of	statutory construction	that	says	that	we	consider	the	entire	scheme	when	construing	a statute’s	plain	language. Court’s	Opinion ¶ 7. Accordingly,	we	have	narrowly construed	 exceptions	 to	 immunity	 and	 restrictively	 defined	 the	 term appurtenance	 to	give	effect	 to	 the	structure	of	 the	MTCA,	which	“employs	an exception

- to
- immunity	 approach	 rather	 than	 an	 exception

- to
- liability approach.” Est.	 of	 Fortier	 v.	 City	 of	 Lewiston ,	 2010	ME	 50,	 ¶	 8,	 997	 A.2d	 84 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 As	 discussed	 above,	 this	 construction	 is	 not consistent	with	the	balance	between	immunity	and	liability	that	the	Legislature20 diligently	crafted.		A	function

- base d	approach	is	much	more	attuned	to	striking this	balance	than	a	fixture

- based	approach.
2. Operation	of	a	Function
- based	Approach [¶ 3 1] A	function

- based	approach	begins	with	the	dictionary	definition	of appurtenance	 that	 we	 cited	 in Sanford : a thing bel ongs	 to

— and,	 thus,	 is appurtenant	 to

— a	 public	 building	 if	 that	 thing is	 “integral”	 or	 “significantly connected”	 to	 the	 building ’ s	 function	 or	 purpose. 3 2004	 ME	 73,	 ¶ ¶ 5, 9, 850 A.2d	 325 .	 	 We	 recognized	 in Sanford that	 appurtenances	 must	 be something	 other	 than	 personal	 property,	 but	 we	 mistakenly	 limited	 the definition	to	fixtures	without	considering	that	a	parking	lot,	or	similar	realty, may	be	an	appurtenance	to	a	building. Id. ¶	11. We	explained : Appurtenance s	are	things	belonging	to	another	thing	as	principal and	which	pass	as	incidents	to	the	particular	thing

. . . . The	term	is commonly	 employed	 in	 connection	 with	 land	 conveyances	 to describe	objects	or	things	that	pass	to	a	grantee	as	an	incident	of the	t ransfer.		As	used	in	conveyances,	the	term	passes	nothing	but the	land	and	 such	 things	as	 belong	 thereto	and	are	a	 part	 of	 the realty.

3 Alternatively,	a	thing	may	be	an	appurtenance	if	it	is	attached	to	a	public	building. See Sanford v. Town	Shapleigh ,	2004	ME	73,	¶	9,	850	A.2d	325.		To	determine	if	an	object	is	attached	to	a	public building	under	a	function

- based	approa ch,	follow	the	fixture	analysis	outlined	in Searle .		2010	ME	89, ¶¶	16

- 21,	3	A.3d	390.21 Id. ¶	9	(quotation	marks	and	citation	omitted)	(citing	77	Am.	Jur.	2d Vendor	and Purchaser §	99 (1977) ). In	other	words ,	an	appurtenance	belongs	to	a principal thing	if	it	is	incidental	to the principal	thing.		In	this	context,	“incident”	means

“ [ d ] ependent	 upon,	 subordinate	 to,	 arising	 out	 of,	 or	 otherwise	 connected with.” Incident , Black ’ s	 Law	Dictionary	 ( 11 th	 ed. 20 19). A n	appurtenance is integral	or	significantly	connected	to	a	principal	thing	if it	serves	that	principal thing ’s	essential	purpose. [¶ 32 ] Our	 recent	 decision	in McDonald highlights	 the	 practicality	 of	a function

- based	 approach,	 which	 we	 essentially	 employed	 to	 determine whether	a	plaza	was	a	fixture. See 2020	ME	119,	¶	16,	239	A.3d	662.		We	used the	 definition	 of	 fixture	 to	 determine	 whether	 a	 plaza	 “‘belong[ed]’	 to”	 the Portland	Police	Department	and,	therefore,	was	an	appurtenance	to	that	public building. Id. ¶¶	1,	15.		We	held	the	plaza	was	an	appurtenance	because	it	was (1)	annexed	to	the	Department,	serving	as	the	roof	to	a	portion	of	the	building; (2) “necessary	 fo r	 the	 proper	 function	 of	 the	 building”	 because	 the	 “lobby would	be	wholly	inaccessible	without	the	plaza”;	and	(3)	“‘an	irremovable	part’” of	the	building	as	shown	by	“the	annexation	and	essential	nature	of	the	plaza	to the	 functioning	 of	 the	 Department	 bu ilding.” Id. ¶	 16	 (quoting Searle , 2010 ME 89,	¶	22,	3	A.3d	390).22 [¶ 33 ] This	result	was	correct	under	our	precedent	only	because	we	used a	 fixture

- based	approach,	but	the	 fact	remains	that	a	plaza	is	obviously	not	a fixture. A s	noted	above,	a fixture	i s	“[p]ersonal	property	that	is	attached	to	land or	a	building	and	that	is	regarded	as	an	irremovable	part	of	the	real	property.”
Fixture , Black’s	Law	Dictionary	( 11 th	ed. 20 19) .		The	plaza	was	intended	to	be irremovable	not	because	of	the	purpose	it	serve s	when	attached	to	the	building, but	because it	is	actually	a	part	of	the	building

. See McDonald ,	2020	ME	119,	¶ 5, 239	A.3d	662.		It	never	was	and	never	could	become	freely	movable	personal property,	 and	 therefore	 it	 could	 never	 become	 a	 fixture	 as	 that term	 is commonly	understood.		But	our	reliance	upon	a	fixture

- based	approach	forced us	to	pretend	otherwise. [¶ 34 ] In	contrast,	under	a	function

- based	approach,	we	would	be	free	to hold	 that	 the	 plaza	 was	 an	 appurtenance	 not	 because	 it	 was	 a	 fixture	 but because	it	served	the	building’s	essential	purpose	by	enabling	access	and	acting as	a	roof	to	a	portion	of	the	building. See	id. ¶	14	(“Our	caselaw	suggests	that whether	the	plaza	is	an	external	part	of	the	building	or	an	appurtenance	to	the building	is	a distinction	without	a	difference.”).		It	is	integral	to	the	building’s essential	purpose	because	of	its	function,	not	because	of	the	legal	fiction	that	it23 is	 a	 fixture.	 	 A	 function

- based	 approach	 avoids	 the	 absurd	 fiction	 that	 we created	in McDonald

— that a	plaza	is	a	fixture. [¶ 35 ] C ontrary	to	what	this	Court	has	previously	said,	a	function

- based approach	 does	 not	 “expand	 governmental	 liability	 by	 including	 personal property	 integral	 to	 the	 activities	 undertaken	 at	 a	 public	 building	 without regard	to	whe ther	the	property	belongs	or	is	attached	to	the	building.” Sanford , 2004	ME	73,	¶	11,	850	A.2d	325.		Rather,	a	function

- based	approach	confers	the exact	degree	of	liability	the	Legislature	intended	by	immunizing	governmental entities	from negligent	acts	for	which	insurance	is	unavailable	or	too	expensive while	simultaneously	affording	citizens	a	remedy	for	injuries	suffered	through no	 fault	 of	 their	 own. 2	 Legis.	 Rec.	 1827	 (1977)	 (remarks	 of	 Sen.	 Collins).
A judicially

- created,	narrowly	c onstrued	fixture

- based	approach	to	the	public building	exception	to	immunity	results	in	an	interpretation	that	contradicts	the plain	meaning	of	the	statute	and	the	clear	intent	of	the Legislature. It	expands immunity	 for	 the	government	and	 frustrates	citi zens	who	seek	a	 remedy	 for injuries	caused	by	the	government’s	negligence.		Those	fortunate	enough	to	be injured	in	the	government’s	building	will	be	compensated,	while	those	injured in	the	government’s	parking	lot	will	not.24 II.		APPLICATION [¶ 36 ] Adopti ng a	 function

- based	 approach	 here,	 I	 would	 vacate	 the Superior C ourt’s	summary	judgment	and,	based	on	the	record	before	us,	hold that	the	parking	lot	is	an	appurtenance

. The	parking	lot	where	Klein	slipped	on untreated	ice	is definitely not	a fixture	beca use	a	parking	lot	does	not	possess the	 hallmarks	 of	 personal	 property.	 	Namely,	it	is	 not	 freely	moveable,	 so	it could	never	make	the	transition	from	being	personal	property	to	being	affixed to	a	building. [¶ 37 ] Rather,	 the	 summary	 judgment	 record	 demons trates	 that	 the parking	 lot	 is	 an	 appurtenance	 because it	 belongs	 to two	 public	 buildings, Holmes	Hall	and	Fogler	Library. The	University	stipulated	t hat	the	parking	lot serves	these	buildings :	“The P arking L ot’s	only	function	is	to	facilitate	the Public Buildings ’	 operations.”	 	 The	 University	 also	 stipulated	 that	 the	 only	 way	 to

access Fogler	L ibrary	by	vehicle	is	by	using	the	parking	lot	and	that	it	maintains the	parking	lot	to	facilitate	the	library’s	essential	functions	and	operations. In sum,	 the	 par king	 lot	 serves	 the buildings’	 essential	 purposes	 by	 facilitating

access. Moreover, contrary	to	the	Court’s	characterization, Court’s	Opinion	¶	3, the	 University stated	 in	 its	 Statement	 of	 Material	 Facts	 that	 it has	 liability25 insurance	 that	 may	 cover	 Klei n’s	 injuries,	 demonstrating	 that	 the	 MTCA	 is operating	as	the	Legislature	intended. [¶ 38 ] Furthermore ,	we	have	previously	said	that	a	governmental	entity’s failure	to	treat	icy	conditions	could	be	considered	a	negligent	act	or	omission in	 the	 maintenance	 of	 an	 appurtenance	 to	 a	 public	 building. McDonald , 2020 ME	119,	¶¶	16,	21,	239	A.3d	662	(defining	“ma intenance”	as	“the	care	and work	put	into	a	property	 to	keep	it	operating	and	productive;	general	repair and	upkeep” (quotation	marks	and	alteration	omitted)). Here,	the	University admitted	that	it	acted	negligently	when	it	failed	to	maintain	the	parking lot	by allowing	it	to	become	icy	and	that	its	negligence	directly	caused	Klein’s	injuries. Klein	 should	 be	 entitled	 to	 pursue	 her	 claim	 for	 damages	 for	 her	 injuries. Instead,	the	Court’s	interpretation	leads	to	yet	another	“absurd”	result:	Klein	is
not	e ntitled	to	pursue	damages	for	slipping	on	ice	in	a	parking	lot	even	though the	plaintiff	in McDonald was	entitled	to	damages	for	slipping	on	ice	in	a	plaza. See	id. ¶	22. [¶ 39 ] I	point	out	one	last	flaw	with	a	fixture

- based	approach .		The	Court contends that	 the	parking	lot	“is	materially	distinguishable	 from	 the	plaza	in McDonald ” because the	 parking	 lot is	 not	 physically	 annexed	 to	 a	 public building,	 it	 is	 simply	 contiguous	 to	 one. Court’s	 Opinion	 ¶	 11. The	 Court26 explains	that	“[t]he	fact	that	the	pl aza	was	physically	annexed	to

— formed	the roof	 of	 a	 portion	 of

— the	 Portland	 Police	Department	 headquarters	 building was	 critical	 to	 the	 outcome	 in McDonald .”	 	 Court’s	 Op inion ¶ 10

. However, similar	to	appurtenance,	the	Court’s	own	definition	of	fixture	is not	limited	to something	 physically	 annexed	 to	 a	 building. Searle ,	 2010	 ME	 89,	 ¶¶	 15

- 16,
3 A.3d	 390.	 	 In Searle ,	 we	 defined	 fixture,	 in	 relevant	 part,	 as	 something “physically	 annexed, at	 least	 by	 juxtaposition ,	 to	 the	 realty	 or	 some appurtenance	 thereof. ” Id. ¶	16 (emphasis	added) .		 Juxtaposition	means	 “an instance	 of	 placing	 two	 or	 more	 things	 side	 by	 side	 or	 near	 one	 another.” Juxtaposition ,	 Black’s	 Law	 Dictionary	 ( 11 th	 ed. 20 19).	 	 An	 object	 can	 be physically	annexed,	then, by	being actually	attached	to	the	building,	such	as	the plaza	 in McDonald ,	 or by	 being physically	 annexed	 by	 juxtaposition

— contiguous ,	to	be	concise

— such	as	the	parking	lot	here. [¶ 40 ] I	 also	 do	 not	 agree that	 the	 parking	 lot	 is	 not	 adapted	 to	 the buildings	it	serves. The	parking	lot	is	adapted	to	the	unique	needs	of	Holmes Hall	and	Fogler	Library	because,	“[u]nlike	other	parking	areas	on	campus	that serve	 the	University’s	non

- specific,	at

- large	parking	ne eds,	 the	Parking	Lot	is primarily	used	by	faculty	and	staff	working	at	Holmes	Hall;	and	by	faculty,	staff, and	 visitors	 using	 the	 Fogler	 Library	 across	 the	 street.”	 	 The	 University27 constructed	 and	 maintain ed the	 parking	 lot	 to	 facilitate access	 to these
pa rticular public	buildings	and	it	“restrict[s]	use	of	the	Parking	Lot	to	faculty and	 visitors	 who	 wish	 to	 conduct	 business	 inside	 the	 Public	 Buildings consistent	with	[their]	essential	functions	and	operations.”		Indeed,	Klein	“could not	access	Fogler	Libra ry	without	first	passing	through	the	Parking	Lot.”		The University	stipulated	to	these	facts	and,	as	such,	they	are	the	“factual	basis	upon which	to	determine	that	this P arking L ot	serves	[a]	special	purpose.”		Court’s Op inion ¶ 13 .		Just	as	the	entrance	t o	the	police	department	in McDonald was inaccessible	but	for	the	plaza,	the	entrance	to	Fogler	Library is	inaccessible	but for	the	parking	lot .		Both	were	specifically	designed	to	 facilitate	access	in	the manner	 intended	 by	 the governmental entities	 that	 c onstructed	 the m . The outcomes	of	these	cases	should	be	the	same;	the	different	results	demonstrate the	 inherent	 problem	 with	 the	 fixture

- based	 approach’s	 definition	 of appurtenance	under	the	MTCA.
III.		CONCLUSION [¶ 4 1] I would	change	our	approach	to	defining	the	term	appurtenance, replacing	 the	 fixture

- based	 approach	 with	 a	 function

- based	 approach.	 	 A function

- based	 approach	 is	 a	 sensible,	 practical	 approach	 that	 accurately reflects	 the	statute’s	plain	language	and	 the	in tent	of	 the	Legislature	when	it28 enacted	the	MTCA.		I	would	further	hold	that	the	parking	lot	that	serves	Holmes Hall	and	Fogler	Library	is	an	appurtenance	to	those	buildings	and	that	Klein	is entitled	to	pursue	damages	for	the	injuries	caused	by	the	Univer sity’s	failure	to maintain	the	parking	lot.

William	C.	Herbert,	 III,	Esq.,	and	Sean	V.	Walton,	Esq. (orally) ,	Hardy	Wolf	& Downing,	P.A.,	Lewiston,	for	appellant	Karen	S.	Klein Christopher	C.	Dinan,	Esq.,	and	Laura	A.	Maher,	Esq. (orally) , Monaghan	Leahy, LLP,	Portland,	for	appellee s University	of	Maine	System	and	University	of	Maine

Knox County Superior	Court	docket	number	CV

- 2020

- 16 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY