UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ RUSSELL G. GREER, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. GARY R. HERBERT, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Utah; SEAN D. REYES, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah; SIM S. GILL, in his official capacity as District Attorney of t he City and County of Salt Lake; KATHY BERG, in her official capacity as Director of the Division of Commerce, Defendants - Appellees, and JAMES ALLRED, in his official capacity as Business Licensing Manager for the City of Salt Lake; JACKIE BISKUPSKI, in her official capacity as Mayor of the City of Salt Lake; BEN MCADAMS, in his official capacity as Mayor of the County of Salt Lake; ROLEN YOSHINAGA, in his official capacity as Director of Planning and Development for the County of Salt Lake, Defendants. No. 18-4075 (D.C. No. 2:16- CV-01067-DBP) (D. Utah)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 9, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 ________________ _________________ Before McHUGH , BALDOCK , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Pro se litigant Russell Greer appeal s the dismissal of his decl aratory action challenging Utah’s laws crimina lizing prostitution, solicitatio n, and the operation of brothels. We exercise jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND Mr. Greer sought to open a brothe l in Utah, despite state laws criminalizing prostitution and solicitation, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1302 through 1305, and declaring brot hels a nuisance, see id. § 47-1-1. He claimed that due to a facial-paralyzing deformity and di sability that prevents him fr om closing his lips, he is unable to have intimacy and se x unless he pays for it. Ther efore, he applied for a business license for a brothel, but the initial approval for a business license was revoked because his registration was for an illegal business pu rpose. Mr. Greer filed the underlying la wsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, making various claims th at the Utah statutes are uncons titutional. The parties consented to proceed before a ma gistrate judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1.3 magistrate judge dismissed the c ase for lack of standing and fo r failure to state a claim. 1
II. DISCUSSION Mr. Greer first argues that the magistrate judge should have re cused because his impartiality might be questioned. Mr. Greer contends that the magistrate judge’s personal religious beliefs demons trate that he could not be imp artial in this matter. Ordinarily, “[w]e review the deni al of a motion to recuse for a n abuse of discretion.” Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colo. , 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002). But Mr. Greer d id not seek recusal in the di strict court, and we generally do not consider matters not first presented to the di strict court. See McDonald v. Ki nder-Morgan, Inc. , 287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider arguments rai sed for the first time on appeal.”). In any event, Mr. Greer’s claim does not adequat ely establish grounds for recusal. See Bryce , 289 F.3d at 660 (holding “membe rship in a church does not create sufficient appearance of bias to require recusal”); see also United States v. Cooley , 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that factors “which will not ordinarily satisfy the requireme nts for disqualification” inclu de “speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo , suspicion, opinion, and similar non-fact ual matters”). Thus, Mr. Greer has not demonstrated tha t the magistrate judge was re quired to recuse.

1 Appellees Biskupskif, Allred, McAda ms, and Yoshinaga were dism issed from this appeal, pursu ant to orders issued on August 7, 2018, and September 11, 2018.4 Cf. Bryce , 289 F.3d at 659 (stating that a judge “has as strong a duty t o sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Greer assigns error to the magistrate judge’s refusal to a llow him to amend his complaint or to supplement it for a second time. He argues that amendment or supplementation should have been p ermitted “for any arguments [ he] may not have listed clearly or coherently.” A plt. Opening Br. at 35. We de cline to address this argument because it is conclusory and unsupported by evidence o r legal authority. Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver , 784 F.3d 1364, 1370 (10th Cir. 2015) (“A brief must contain an argument consisting of more than a gen eralized asser tion of error, with citations to supporting authority . . . .” (brackets and intern al quotation marks omitted)); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding issues are inadequa tely briefed if they are supp orted only by “mere conclusory allegations with no c itations to the record or any l egal authority”). Mr. Greer’s mere citati on to the order granting in part and den ying in part his motion to supplement the complaint is inadequate. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 35 (citing R. Doc. 53). Mr. Greer advances several chall enges to the magistrate judge’s determination that his complaint, as supplemente d, failed to sta te a claim fo r relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and that he lacked standing to sue on behalf of others. “We review de novo a district cour t’s dismissal for lack of sta nding.” Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1 , 859 F.3d 1243, 1250 (1 0th Cir. 2017).5 Similarly, “[w]e review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo.” Nixon , 784 F.3d at 1368 (internal quotation marks omit ted). In doing so, “[w]e accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as t rue and construe them in the l ight most favorable to [Mr. Greer].” Id. (ellipsis and internal quotati on marks omitted). To withstand dismissal, “a complaint must cont ain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relie f that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factu al content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleg ed.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citati on and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the el ements of a cause of action, su pported by mere conclusory statements,” are not s ufficient to state a claim for relief. Id. We liberally construe Mr. Greer ’s pro se filings, but we do not act as his advocate. See Garrett , 425 F.3d at 840. Moreover, “pro se parties [must] follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Greer contends the magistr ate judge erred in (1) holding t hat while he had standing to bring claims on his own behalf, he lacked prudentia l standing as an unestablished business owner to b ring claims on behalf of other s; (2) analyzing his challenges to the Utah statutes criminalizing prostitution as f acial challenges, even though he argued that the statu tes were unconstitutional as app lied; (3) refusing to acknowledge that a refer ence to prostitution in Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558 (2003), is non-binding dicta; (4 ) applying the wrong standard—r ational basis, rather6 than strict scrutiny or rational basis with bite—to Utah’s stat utes criminalizing prostitution; and (4) dismissing hi s equal-protection claims. Mr. Greer also argues that “a robust consensus of per suasive authority” supports his position. Aplt. Opening Br. at 34. The magistrate judge provided a thorough explanation that we n eed not repeat here. We have reviewed the magi strate judge’s Memorandum Decis ion and Order, along with the record, the contro lling law, and the parties’ ar guments. We agree with the magistrate judge’s analysis and thus do not adopt Mr. Greer ’s asserted authority to the contrary. We therefore af firm the dismissal of Mr. Gree r’s complaint, as supplemented, for substantially t he same reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s May 8, 2018 Memorandum Decision and Order.
III. CONCLUSION The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge