SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3673-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LAMAR A. JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted October 15, 2020 – Decided 

Before Judges Ostrer and Accurso.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 10-11-

1702.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 17, 2020
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Lamar A. Jones appeals from the trial court's order denying, without an 

evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Jones 

collaterally challenges his conviction of second-degree conspiracy to commit 

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5–2, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1(a), second-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b), and second-degree possession of 

a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4(a). We affirmed those 

convictions on direct appeal, but we reversed defendant's conviction of fourthdegree criminal trespass, N.J.S.A. 2C:18–3, which was charged as a lesserincluded offense of attempted armed robbery. See State v. Jones, No. A-4115-

13 (App. Div. Aug. 1, 2017). 

We affirm.

Jones presents the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

AS MR. JONES HAS ESTABLISHD A PRIMA FACIE

CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL, HE WAS ENTITLED TO POSTCONVICTION RELIEF, OR, AT A MINIMUM, TO 

AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

(1) Trial counsel's failure to pursue a speedy trial 

prejudiced his client.

(2) Trial counsel's opening statement prejudiced Mr. 

Jones' right to effective assistance of counsel.
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(3) Trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine the 

State's primary witness against his client.

POINT II

AS THERE WAS A GENUINE DISPUTE OF 

MATERIAL FACT, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

WAS REQUIRED.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant (1) 

must prove that his counsel's performance fell below the standard established in 

the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and he (2) "must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 

(1987). Because the PCR court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, we review

de novo both the PCR court's factual inferences and its legal conclusions. State 

v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420–21 (2004). However, we shall not disturb the PCR 

court's determination if we are persuaded by the soundness of its reasoning. See

State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380 (2017).

Applying that standard, we affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth 

in Judge Alberto Rivas's cogent oral opinion. Where a defendant asserts that his 

attorney was ineffective by failing to file a motion, he must establish that the 

motion would have had merit. See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618–19 (2007)
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(discussing failure to file suppression motion). "It is not ineffective assistance 

of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion . . . ." Id. at 619. 

As Judge Rivas found after applying the four-factor Barker test, Barker v. 

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972), Jones would not have prevailed on a 

motion to dismiss based on an alleged denial of his right to a speedy trial. We 

discern no error in that finding.

As did Judge Rivas, we also find no merit in Jones's contention that his 

trial attorney was ineffective in his opening statement and in his crossexamination of Keree Wade, the State's primary witness and Jones's fellow coconspirator, who was convicted at an earlier trial and then cooperated with the 

State. Essentially, Jones argues that the opening statement was not extensive 

enough, and that the cross-examination was not incisive enough. But Judge 

Rivas concluded that trial counsel's performance, despite Jones's critique, did 

not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness as Strickland requires. 

Mindful that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 

deferential," and that "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment," we agree that trial counsel's performance fell "within 
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the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." See Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689–90. 

We add a comment on one aspect of trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. 

Jones contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he tried to undermine 

Wade's credibility by eliciting his gang-member status. Yet, on direct appeal, 

defendant effectively endorsed that strategy by contending — albeit 

unsuccessfully — that the court infringed upon his constitutional right to 

confrontation by prohibiting that line of questioning. If nothing else, Jones's 

inconsistent positions at least demonstrate that trial counsel's strategy was a 

reasonably debatable one that did not fall below the constitutional floor. See

State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 255–56 (1997) (rejecting claims of trial counsel 

ineffectiveness that "all involve clearly debatable issues of strategy").

To the extent not addressed, Jones's remaining points lack sufficient merit 

to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11–3(e)(2).

Affirmed.