MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 201 6 ME 81 Docket: Ken

- 15

- 510 Argued : May 3, 2016 Decided: May 31, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY , JJ.

ADOPTION OF PRISCILLA D.

PER CURIAM [¶1] The parents 1 of Priscilla D. appeal from a judgment of the Kennebec County Probate Court ( J. Mitchell, J. ) granting the child’s maternal grandmother’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the parents’ pet ition to annul the child’s adoption by the grandmother. Because the Probate Court’s termination of parental rights, affirmed in In re Priscilla D. , 2010 ME 103, 5 A.3d 67 7, governs the parents’ rights regarding the c hild, and because the court’s error in excluding certain testimony offered by the parents was harmless, we conclude that the Probate Court did not err in declining to annul the 2009 adoption.
I. CASE HISTORY [¶2 ] The child is thirteen years old. Since h er birth, her mother and her
maternal grandmother have had a strained relationship. At this point, there has

1 The “parents” are the child’s birth parents. Their parental rights were terminated in 2009 and the child’s maternal grandmother adopted the chi ld. For ease of reference, the birth parents are referred to in this opinion as the child’s parents.2 been nearly a decade of litigation between these parties over responsibility for the
child . That history is detailed in our 2010 opinion. See In re Priscilla D ., 2010 ME 103, ¶¶ 3

- 7, 5 A.3d 67 7

. [¶3 ] After approximately three years of disputes and litigation between the parents and the grandmother, the court, in 2009, terminated the parents’ parental rights. The parents appeared at the 2009 hear ing and conse nted to termination.
B ecause of the parent s ’ hesitation about consenting to termination expressed in a statement read by the parents’ attorney and in a colloquy between the court and the
mother , the court indicated that it would decide the te rmination question based on evidence, rather than act solely on the parents’ consent

. [¶4 ] Referencing the record from prior proceedings , which the parties agreed the cour t could consider, the court found that the parents were unfit and that
termination of the parents ’ parental rights was necessary and in the best interest of
the child

. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2015). In making the findings that supported its conclusions , the court addressed comments made at the hearing indicating th at the grandmo ther had suggested during settlement discussions that the parents might have limited access to the child and information about the child following an adoption. The court noted that any continued contact with the child was unlikely unless the relationship between the parents and the grandmother improved considerably.3 [¶5 ] The parents appealed the termination of their parental rights , and, in the 2010 opinion noted above, we affirmed. The grandmother then adopted the child. [¶6 ] In August 2014, the parent s petitioned to annul the adoption, 2 arguing
that it was obtained by means of fraud or duress. See 18

- A M.R.S. § 9

- 315(a)(1) (2015)

. The court held a one

- day hearing on the petition. At the hearing, the court
excluded certain evidence offered by the parents, including statements allegedly
made during settlement discussions that occurred immediately before the termination of parental rights hearing

. The excluded statements included those that were referenced in the 2009 hearing regardin g the possibility of the parents’
continued limited contacts with the child. The court found that such statements

were inadmissible pursuant to M.R. Evid. 408 (a)(2) (barring admission of evidence
of “[c] onduct or a statement made during compromise negotia tions or in mediation
about the claim ” where it is offered “ to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim ” )

. [¶7 ] At the conclusion of the parents’ case, the grandmother moved f or judgment as a matter of law. The court orally granted th e grandmother’s motion, finding that “the evidence does not indicate and does not prove that without

2 Wheth er parents whose parental rights regarding a child have been terminated h ave standing to seek to annul a post

- termination adoption of the child is a question that we need not address because the Probate Court, after apparently inferring that the parents ha d standing, reached the merits of their petition to annul and denied the petition.4 consent, there would not have been a termination.” The court entered a written judgment the same day.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS [¶8 ] On appeal, the parents challenge the court’s evidentiary rulings , including the exclusion of statements made during settlement negotiations and offered in support of the ir claims of fraud and duress

. Assuming that the claim of fraud or duress was a viable claim, M.R. Evid. 408 ( a)(2) creates no bar to the
admission of the excluded statements in this case because the statements were not offered to prove the validity or amount of the claim about which the parties were negotiating. Instead, the evidence was offered in a subsequent proceeding in an attempt to demonstrate fraud or duress in the 2009 proceeding

. Without such evidence, fraud or duress in settlement negotiations would be difficult to prove.
Rule 408 (a)(2) does not require exclusion of such evidence. See Union River
As socs. v. Budman , 2004 ME 48, ¶ 18 , 850 A.2d 334 ( holding that Rule 408(a)
excludes evidence offered to prove liability, validity , or amount of a claim, but does not exclude evidence of settlement discussions offered for other purposes.)

. [¶9 ] T he court’s error in excluding the evidence is insufficient to vacate the court’s judgment because the error w as harmless. 3 See M.R. Civ. P. 61; Starrett v.

3 The parents also argue that the court erred by excluding evidence of the mother and grandmother’s past relationship. It is unclear whether this evidence would have been relevant, but any error in the court’s exclusion of this evidence was likewise harmless.5 Starrett , 2014 ME 112, ¶ 16, 101 A.3d 435

. In 2009 , the court informed the

par ents that any expectations crea ted during settlement discussions regarding
futur e contact with the child might not be fulfilled . Further, e ven i f the par ents had been permitted to present the excluded evidence and the court had found that such
evidence demonstrated that the parents’ co nsent to termination was obtained based

on fraud or duress, the parents would not have been entitled to an annulment of the adoption. T he termination of parental rights was based on a finding that the statutory requirements for termination had been met. We affirmed that finding on appeal , addressing issues the parents later presented in support of their petition to annul the adoption

. See In re Priscilla D. , 2010 ME 103, ¶¶ 19

- 20, 5 A.3d 67 7. [¶1 0 ] The parents have not raised any issue suff icient to warrant prolonging
this litigation. It is contrary to the child’s interests to continue a legal battle over a termination of parental rights and an adoption that was finalized approximately six

years ago. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.

On the briefs and at oral argument: Erika S. Bristol, Esq., Auburn, for appellant parents Pamela J. Ames, Esq., Waterville, for appellee maternal grandmother