NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

STEPHEN ONEAL WASHINGTON, JR., Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0589 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-144973-001

The Honorable Richard L. Nothwehr, Judge Pro Tempore

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By David R. Cole

Counsel for Respondent

Stephen ONeal Washington, Jr., Eloy

Petitioner

FILED 1-11-2018
STATE v. WASHINGTON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma

joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Stephen O’Neal Washington, Jr., petitions for review of the 

dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. We have considered the 

petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant review, but deny relief.

¶2 The State charged Washington with the following offenses:

possession of marijuana for sale, a class 2 felony; unlawful flight from a law 

enforcement vehicle, a class 5 felony; assault, a domestic violence offense, 

criminal damage, a domestic violence offense, and criminal trespass, all

class 1 misdemeanors. The State further alleged that Washington had one 

historical prior felony conviction and had committed the offenses while on 

probation for that conviction.

¶3 Facing a potential sentence of 23 years, Washington agreed to 

accept the State’s plea offer. He met with his retained counsel, Melinda 

Kovacs, and signed the plea agreement. When Washington failed to appear 

for the change of plea proceeding, the superior court issued a bench warrant 

for his arrest. Washington was later arrested out of state and returned to 

Arizona. He subsequently terminated his counsel, Kovacs, and the superior 

court appointed new counsel, Adrian Little. 

¶4 Four months later, and two weeks prior to trial, Washington 

retained the services of private counsel, Stephen Crawford. At a settlement 

conference, Washington told the court that he wanted to resolve his case

and did not want to proceed to trial. He further stated he wanted to “move 

forward” with the previous plea agreement. That agreement, however, was 

no longer available and the State refused to tender the same offer. 

¶5 Instead, the State offered a new plea agreement with a longer 

sentence than the previous offer. Under the terms of the new plea 

agreement the State would agree to the mandatory minimum sentence of 

9.25 years for the possession of marijuana for sale charge, followed by a 

term of probation on the unlawful flight charge. The State offered to 
STATE v. WASHINGTON

Decision of the Court

3

withdraw the allegation of a prior felony for the unlawful flight charge, if 

Washington pled guilty to all charges. Washington agreed to the new plea 

agreement. After ascertaining that Washington’s pleas were knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent, the superior court accepted the new plea 

agreement and set the matter for sentencing. 

¶6 Prior to sentencing, Washington retained his fourth attorney, 

Robert Standage. Standage filed a motion to allow Washington to withdraw 

his guilty pleas arguing that he had been induced into entering into the new 

plea by “fraud, duress, coercion, and misapprehension,” generally, because 

he did not have a written plea offer. Accordingly, he argued that Crawford 

should have asked for a continuance of the settlement conference, and a 

plea colloquy with the court demonstrated Washington’s pleas were not

voluntary. After hearing argument, the superior court made detailed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the motion. The superior 

court later sentenced Washington accordingly.

1

¶7 Washington timely commenced post-conviction relief 

proceedings. He raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his

three previous attorneys—Kovacs, Little, and Crawford. He later filed an 

amended petition for post-conviction relief identifying additional claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the pleadings, the 

superior court summarily dismissed one of the claims and set an 

evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims.

¶8 At the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Washington began by 

clarifying that the case “boils down to three main issues.” First, he claimed 

Kovacs failed to notify Washington of the date and time of the change of 

plea hearing and as a result, he lost the benefits of the previous plea

agreement, supra ¶ 3, which “ultimately cost [Washington] 5.75 additional

years” of imprisonment. Secondly, he claimed Crawford provided 

Washington with incorrect information that caused Washington to give up 

his right to trial. He claimed that Crawford was “unprepared and unwilling 

to represent Mr. Washington at trial because of a monetary conflict of 

interest,” and that the combination of these factors rendered Washington’s 

pleas involuntary. Lastly, he claimed that Crawford failed to investigate 

mitigating evidence and thus “improperly induced” Washington to give up 

his right to trial. 

¶9 Washington as well as Crawford, Kovacs, and Little, all 

testified at the evidentiary hearing. Notably, Kovacs testified that when 

 

1 Washington further received time served for counts 3, 4, and 5. 
STATE v. WASHINGTON

Decision of the Court

4

Washington signed the previous plea agreement, supra ¶ 3, she advised him 

of the court date for the change of plea hearing, and he told her he would 

be there. Crawford testified that Washington retained him for the sole 

purpose of getting “a plea on the table.” He further testified that the notes 

in his file indicated that Washington’s initial fee was for a “plea deal only” 

and reflected a plea agreement was “what the client wants.” Additionally, 

he testified that Washington had raised issues with Crawford, including 

that he “didn’t want to take a case to [a] trial that he would lose on.” 

Crawford also testified that he discussed the aggravating and mitigating 

evidence with Washington. 

¶10 After the hearing, the superior court entered detailed findings 

of fact and thorough conclusions of law. The court found Washington’s 

testimony was “not credible.” Relying on the testimony of counsel and the 

case history, the superior court concluded that Washington had failed to 

establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. This petition for 

review followed.

¶11 In his petition for review to this court, Washington reargues 

the claims contained in the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 

without reference to the testimony at the evidentiary hearing or the detailed 

factual findings by the superior court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(1) (petition 

should contain facts material to consideration of issues presented and 

reasons why petition should be granted). Even absent these omissions, 

reviewing the superior court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, State v. 

Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012), Washington has failed to show that 

the superior court abused its discretion, see State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 

538, ¶ 1 (App. 2011).

¶12 First, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it

summarily dismissed one of Washington’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims regarding Kovacs. In his petition for review, Washington alleges

Kovacs was ineffective by failing to have the marijuana reweighed and for 

failing to have the “marijuana packages” fingerprinted. “To state a 

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

both that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards 

and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 

562, 567, ¶ 21 (2006) (citation omitted). At minimum, Washington is unable 

to establish any prejudice from Kovac’s failure to do either—Washington 

signed the new, less favorable, plea agreement after he failed to appear for 

court to enter in the previous plea he initially signed. Washington does not 

show how the outcome or the plea offers would have been any different
STATE v. WASHINGTON

Decision of the Court

5

had Kovacs done either. He has therefore failed to raise a colorable claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Bennett, 213 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 21 (2006).

¶13 Regarding Washington’s remaining claims, the superior 

court’s order clearly identified and correctly ruled upon the issues raised. 

Further, the court did so in a thorough, well-reasoned manner that will 

allow any future court to understand the court’s rulings. Under these 

circumstances, “[n]o useful purpose would be served by this court 

rehashing the trial court’s correct ruling in a written decision,” State v. 

Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993), and we adopt the superior court’s 

ruling.

¶14 Accordingly, we grant review, but deny relief.