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[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 7 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. CON. RES. 7

   Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the conditions for the 
  United States becoming a signatory to the United Nations Arms Trade 
         Treaty, or to any similar agreement on the arms trade.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 13, 2013

 Mr. Moran (for himself, Mr. Alexander, Ms. Ayotte, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. 
 Boozman, Mr. Burr, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Coburn, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Crapo, 
Mr. Cruz, Mr. Enzi, Mr. Flake, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Heller, Mr. 
 Hoeven, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Isakson, Mr. Johanns, Mr. Paul, Mr. Portman, 
 Mr. Risch, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Thune, Mr. Toomey, Mr. Vitter, 
 and Mr. Wicker) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which 
           was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
   Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the conditions for the 
  United States becoming a signatory to the United Nations Arms Trade 
         Treaty, or to any similar agreement on the arms trade.

Whereas in October 2009, the United States voted in the United Nations General 
        Assembly to participate in the negotiation of the United Nations Arms 
        Trade Treaty;
Whereas in July 2012, the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty 
        convened to negotiate the text of the Arms Trade Treaty;
Whereas in December 2012, the United Nations General Assembly voted to hold a 
        final negotiating conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in March 2013, on 
        the basis of the text of July 2012;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty poses significant risks to the national security, 
        foreign policy, and economic interests of the United States as well as 
        to the constitutional rights of United States citizens and United States 
        sovereignty;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty fails to expressly recognize the fundamental, 
        individual right to keep and to bear arms and the individual right of 
        personal self-defense, as well as the legitimacy of hunting, sports 
        shooting, and other lawful activities pertaining to the private 
        ownership of firearms and related materials, and thus risks infringing 
        on freedoms protected by the Second Amendment;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty places free democracies and totalitarian regimes 
        on a basis of equality, recognizing their equal right to transfer arms, 
        and is thereby dangerous to the security of the United States;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty's criteria for assessing the potential 
        consequences of arms transfers are vague, easily politicized, and 
        readily manipulated;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty's model for using these criteria is incompatible 
        with the decisionmaking model for arms transfers employed by the United 
        States under Presidential Decision Directive 34, which dates from 1995;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty will create opportunities to engage in ``lawfare'' 
        against the United States via the misuse of the treaty's criteria in 
        foreign tribunals and international fora;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty could hinder the United States from fulfilling its 
        strategic, legal, and moral commitments to provide arms to allies such 
        as the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the State of Israel;
Whereas the creation of an international secretariat to administer and assist in 
        the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty risks the delegation of 
        authority to a bureaucracy that is not accountable to the people of the 
        United States;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty urges the provision of capacity building 
        assistance from signatory nations to implement the Arms Trade Treaty, 
        which could create a source of permanent funding to a new international 
        organization that would be susceptible to waste, fraud, and abuse;
Whereas the Arms Trade Treaty risks imposing costly regulatory burdens on United 
        States businesses, for example, by creating onerous reporting 
        requirements that could damage the domestic defense manufacturing base 
        and related firms;
Whereas an Arms Trade Treaty that has not been signed by the President and 
        received the advice and consent of the Senate should not bind the United 
        States in any respect as customary international law, jus cogens, or any 
        other principle of international law that bypasses the treaty power in 
        article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution;
Whereas an Arms Trade Treaty that has merely been signed by the President but 
        has not received the advice and consent of the Senate should not bind 
        the United States in any respect, including any obligation to refrain 
        from defeating the object and purpose of the Arms Trade Treaty, under 
        any provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which 
        the United States is not a party;
Whereas an Arms Trade Treaty that has merely been signed by the President but 
        has not received the advice and consent of the Senate should not bind 
        the United States in any respect, as an international agreement other 
        than a treaty, as a sole executive agreement, or in any other way; and
Whereas an Arms Trade Treaty that has been signed by the President and has 
        received the advice and consent of the Senate, is a non-self-executing 
        treaty that has no domestic legal effect within the United States, 
        unless and until it has been adopted by the enactment of implementing 
        legislation by the Congress: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That it is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the President should not sign the Arms Trade Treaty, 
        and that, if he transmits the treaty with his signature to the 
        Senate, the Senate should not ratify the Arms Trade Treaty; and
            (2) until the Arms Trade Treaty has been signed by the 
        President, received the advice and consent of the Senate, and 
        has been the subject of implementing legislation by Congress, 
        no Federal funds should be appropriated or authorized to 
        implement the Arms Trade Treaty, or any similar agreement, or 
        to conduct activities relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty, or any 
        similar agreement.
                                 <all>
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