alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 28, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50240

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RODIMIRO MURILLO-TORRES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:05-CR-186-ALL

--------------------

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Rodimiro Murillo-Torres appeals his guilty-plea conviction

of, and sentence for, violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326 by being found in

the United States without permission after deportation. He

argues, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),

that the 41-month term of imprisonment imposed in his case

exceeds the statutory maximum sentence allowed for the § 1326(a)

offense charged in his indictment. He challenges the

constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and
No. 06-50240

-2-

aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than

elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. 

Murillo-Torres’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). 

Although he contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly

decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule

Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly

rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres

remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268,

276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). MurilloTorres properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light

of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here

to preserve it for further review. 

Murillo-Torres also contends that the sentence imposed in

his case is unreasonable because the district court failed to

properly weigh the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) and imposed a term of imprisonment greater than

necessary to meet § 3553(a)’s objectives. After considering the

§ 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced Murillo-Torres to

a 41-month term of imprisonment. Murillo-Torres’s sentence fell

at the lowest end of his properly calculated advisory guidelines

range and is presumptively reasonable. See United States v.

Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2006). Murillo-Torres has

failed to rebut that presumption. See id.

AFFIRMED.
#### In the Matter of Ralph W. Kerbs, on Behalf of Himself and Other Tenants in Premises 308 East 79th Street, New York, New York, Petitioner, against State Rent Administrator, Respondent, and Sitek Realty Co., Inc., Intervenor-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

July 21, 1958.

*William L. Messing*for petitioner.

*Nathan Keller*and *Sam L. Simon*for respondent.

*McLaughlin $ Fougner (Robert S. Fougner*of counsel), for intervener.

Sidney A. Fine, J.

The determination of the Rent Administrator that the operation of the two passenger elevators between midnight and 8:00 a.m. by only one attendant, instead of by two, did not deprive the tenants of an *11 essential*service ” may not be held arbitrary or capricious. The tenants’ acquiescence for many years was a factor entitled to be considered in evaluating the importance of having two manual operators during the hours in question, as was the fact that the number of passengers requiring elevator service during those hours is relatively small. The effect of giving up one elevator operator on the protection of the lobby of the building was not necessarily substantial or serious, in view of the fact that while both elevators were in operation neither attendant would be in the lobby. There was, *100in the circumstances, substantial basis for the determination that although the elimination of one operator curtailed services which had existed on March 1, 1950, it did not eliminate an “ *essential*service ”. In this situation, the court may not substitute its own views for those of the Administrator. This may be done only when the Administrator’s determination is without basis and, therefore, arbitrary or whimsical.

Motion denied.
III 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 325 

Designating the week of December 22 through December 28, 2013, as 

‘‘National Toy Week’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 20, 2013 

Mr. PRYOR (for himself and Mr. BOOZMAN) submitted the following 

resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

Designating the week of December 22 through December 

28, 2013, as ‘‘National Toy Week’’. 

Whereas the goal of ‘‘National Toy Week’’ is to recognize 

toys as the ‘‘tools of play’’, enriching the lives of young 

people for generations; 

Whereas through play, children develop active minds, active 

bodies, and necessary social skills; 

Whereas National Toy Week encourages recognition of play 

as a universal pastime that gives children of all ages the 

opportunity to spend time together and have fun; 

Whereas according to the Toy Industry Association, the toy 

industry supports over 600,000 full-time jobs, accounting 

for more than $26,000,000,000 in wages; 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 325 ATS 

Whereas the toy industry is estimated to have an economic 

impact of over $75,000,000,000 in 2013 alone; and 

Whereas throughout the history of the toy industry, such industry has provided a wealth of creativity and innovation 

across the United States: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) designates the week of December 22 

3 through December 28, 2013, as ‘‘National Toy 

4 Week’’; 

5 (2) recognizes the necessary role of toys and 

6 play in the development of children across the 

7 United States; 

8 (3) recognizes that, for 97 years, the toy indus9 try has promoted fun and safe play; and 

10 (4) encourages the people of the United States 

11 to observe the week by enjoying toys and play. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 32.1





WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND


CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES — OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of HMS Income Fund, Inc. (“the Company”), each hereby certifies that to his or her knowledge, on the date hereof:





(a) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2014 , filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section l3(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(b) information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:August 11, 2014By:/s/ SHERRI W. SCHUGARTSherri W. SchugartChairperson, Chief Executive Officer and PresidentDate:August 11, 2014By:/s/ RYAN T. SIMSRyan T. SimsChief Financial Officer and Secretary
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000869801
<NAME> GEODYNE INSTITUTIONAL/PENSION ENERGY INCOME LTD PSHP P-6
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         319,699
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  428,072
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               747,771
<PP&E>                                      12,658,755
<DEPRECIATION>                               8,691,849
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,714,677
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,714,677
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,714,677
<SALES>                                      2,002,957
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,041,191
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  959,881
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,081,310
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,081,310
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,081,310
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     6.97
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Murray L. Jacobs, Appellant, *v.*Foelly Crane et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

November 20, 1958.

*173*Robert B. Levin, Copal Mints*and *Murray L. Jacobs*for appellant.

*Gross <& Kech (Thomas Grimes*of counsel), for respondents.

Hofstadter, J.

Since our public policy strongly favors the preservation of the marriage relation, a reconciliation of husband and wife, parties to a matrimonial action, can never be treated as the frustration either in letter or spirit of a judgment or order of this court in the action.

The plaintiff, an attorney, sues the defendants, husband and wife, to recover compensation for services rendered to the wife in an action for separation instituted in the Supreme Court, Kings County. An order in that action awarded the wife a counsel fee of $500, paid by the husband, with permission to apply to the trial court for an additional counsel fee. On the eve of trial the parties became reconciled and the wife instructed the plaintiff to discontinue the action, to effect its discontinuance, and discharged him as her counsel on the consummation of the discontinuance. By letter she agreed to pay plaintiff $1,000, of which $500 was to be paid the following day and the other $500 about a month later. Though the appeal was taken solely upon the judgment roll, on the argument the parties stipulated that this letter be deemed part of the record, and the same has accordingly been submitted to us. The wife paid the first $500 in accordance with this letter, but not the second. Thereupon the plaintiff instituted this action, in which he asserts a first cause against both defendants for the reasonable value of his services in the separation suit, and a second cause of action *174against the wife alone for the balance of $500 due under the letter. The Trial Justice dismissed the first cause of action and awarded plaintiff $500 against the wife on the second cause of action. The judgment for this sum has been satisfied. Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his first cause of action. He urges that by the discontinuance of the separation action following their reconciliation, the defendant made it impossible for him to apply to the trial court for an additional counsel fee and thereby relegated him to his common-law rights.

It is crystal clear from the wife’s letter that the $1,000 agreed to be paid was intended to discharge in full any claim of the plaintiff for his services in the separation action against either of the defendants. His complaint virtually, if not explicitly, admits as much. Since he has recovered the balance of $500, and this sum has been paid to him, he has no further claim and his first cause of action was properly dismissed.

The judgment so far as appealed from should be accordingly affirmed, with costs.

Aurelio and Tilzer, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed, etc.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 19

- 00856

- CR

Curtis Strahan, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 264TH DISTR ICT COURT OF BELL CO UNTY NO. 77106, THE HONOR ABLE PAUL L. LEPAK, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Curtis Str ahan seeks to appeal from a judgment adjudicating guilt for

the offense of ass a ult of a public servant

. S ee Tex. P enal Code § 22.0 1

. The trial court ’ s origi nal

certification in th e record state d that this is a p lea

- bargain case and the defendant has no right of

appeal. S e e Tex. R . A pp. P. 25.2(a)(2) ( requir ing that trial court enter certification of defendant ’ s

right o f appeal “ each time it enters a judgment of guilt or other appe alable order ” ). Because t he

r e cord did not support th is certification , we abated t he appeal and i nstruc ted the trial court to

prepare and file in this Court an amended cert if ication that accurately reflects Strahan ’ s right of

appea l

. S ee Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 6 1 4 (Tex. Cr im

. A pp. 2005)

.

The tri al court has now filed a supplemental clerk ’ s record containing an amended

certificatio n stating that defendant has waived the right of appeal. This certification i s support ed

by the record, which contai ns a document signe d by S tr aha n stating that he conf esses to violating

the term s of his community sup ervisions and that he “ waives a ny right to a motion for new trial2

an d appea l

. ” Acc ordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.

25.2(a)(2) , (d)

.

_____ _____________________________ ______ __ Chari L. Kelly, Justic e

Before Justice s Goodwin, Baker, an d Kel ly

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: May 1, 20 20

Do Not Publish
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Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 24, 2021

t0317 

# Order

Clerk March 24, 2021

161646

In re CARLSEN ESTATE

.

________________________________________

MINDY CARLSEN and ALLEN CARLSEN,

Co

- Personal Representatives of the ESTATE OF

KINZIE RENEE CARLSEN,

Petitioners

- Appellants,

v SC: 161646

COA: 352026

Van Buren PC: 2012

- 001118

- DE

SOUTHWEST MICHIGAN EMERGENCY

SERVICES, PC,

Respondent

- Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 24, 2020 order

of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of

granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for

consideration as on leave granted.
EXHIBIT 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual
Report of Cost-U-Less, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended January 1, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Martin P. Moore, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)    The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
and




(2)    The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.




Date: March 29, 2006




/s/ Martin P. MooreMartin P. Moore Chief Financial Officer


---
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#### FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE # 114, Appellant, v. CITY OF DEL CITY, Appellee.

No. 70233.

Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 3.

April 4, 1989.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1989.

Certiorari Denied Jan. 9, 1990.

Richard Mildren, Oklahoma City, for ap-pellee.

Ted Pool, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REYNOLDS, Judge:

Appellant Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge # 114 (FOP) sought to negotiate with City of Del City (City) pursuant to 11 O.S. Supp. 1987. §§ 51-101 et seq. and §§ 5.2 and 5.3 of Article V of the collective bargaining agreement between FOP and City. As these negotiations progressed, two issues remained, wages and longevity pay, that were to be submitted for arbitration, pursuant to 11 O.S. Supp. 1987 § 51-106. City of Del City filed an application and petition for Temporary Injunction to enjoin arbitration one day before the scheduled arbitration hearing. FOP’s subsequent motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court and City of Del City’s injunction granted. FOP now appeals that decision.

The language in 11 O.S. 1981, § 51-106 is mandatory and provides that it is the obligation of the City to meet and confer with firefighters or police officers within certain prescribed time frames. As set out in Sections 51-101 et seq, because public policy does not allow firefighters and police officers the right to strike, these groups of municipal employees are accorded the right to collectively bargain. *Stone v. Johnson,*690 P.2d 459 (Okl.1984). This includes arbitration hearings. 11 O.S. 1981, § 51-106.

*754Refusal to follow the mandatory nature of collectively bargaining is deemed to be “unfair labor practices” as set out in §§ 51-102(6) and (6a). The duty to bargain in good faith is mandatory. *Stone v. Johnson,*(supra).

The City may not circumvent arbitration by claiming budget deficit. 11 O.S. 1981, § 51-109(4) allows an arbitrator to find for the City if financial distress is found. Otherwise, the City has an adequate remedy at law in its ability to reject the arbitration findings.1

In *Taylor v. Johnson,*706 P.2d 896 (Okl.1985), the Supreme Court said:

> any question regarding application and interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitration, and the district court is without jurisdiction to usurp that function.

Therefore, the trial court’s temporary injunction enjoining FOP from submitting certain issues to arbitration is VACATED.

REVERSED.

GARRETT, P.J., and BAILEY, C.J., concur.

1

. In *Mid West City v. Cravens,*532 P.2d 829 (Okl.1975) the Supreme Court noted the municipal authorities’ right to make the final decision on all issues presented and discussed.