J-S20029-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALLISON RENEE CHERRY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1293 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 10, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001775-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2018

Allison Renee Cherry appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

on August 10, 2017 in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, following 

her revocation from a county intermediate punishment (“IP”) program. The 

court sentenced Cherry to a term of 12 months to five years’ incarceration. 

Cherry raises claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in sustaining 

her IP violations and the discretionary aspects of her sentencing. Based on 

the following, we affirm.

On July 4, 2013, a State College police officer found Cherry passed out 

in a gas station parking lot. The officer detected a strong odor of alcohol and 

observed Cherry to have bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. She admitted 

she had been drinking and she performed unsatisfactorily on the field sobriety 
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tests. Video surveillance from the gas station confirmed that Cherry was 

driving. Cherry was taken to the hospital and after agreeing to a blood draw, 

the results revealed her blood alcohol content was 0.226%. See generally, 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 8/12/2013. She was charged with various crimes 

related to the incident and on January 23, 2014, she pled guilty to driving 

under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”).

1

 On March 27, 2014, the court 

sentenced Cherry to a term of five years’ IP in the Centre County DUI Court 

program.

Since that time, Cherry committed numerous violations of her IP 

sentence and received five notices of those violations in the form of written 

warnings on April 8, 2015, August 25, 2015, September 21, 2015, October 

13, 2015, and June 28, 2017.2 Subsequently, on July 31, 2017, Cherry 

____________________________________________

1

 See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).

2

 With respect to each violation notification, the court did not revoke Cherry’s 

IP but did warn of potential ramifications for misconduct. As to her first 

violation, the court imposed a sanction of one month of enhanced curfew 

compliance/electronic monitoring. As to her second violation, the court 

instructed Cherry to follow her plan of action until she could be placed in a 

rehabilitation facility. Subsequently, on August 27, 2015, the court issued an 

order, requiring that Cherry attend and successfully complete an inpatient 

treatment program at Pyramid Healthcare. With respect to her third violation, 

Cherry received a sanction of one month of enhanced curfew 

compliance/electronic monitoring, followed by 60 days of Transdermal Alcohol 

Detection. Cherry did not receive any new sanctions with regard to her 

remaining violations.
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received her sixth notice of violations. No sanctions were imposed at the time, 

but she was notified of a revocation hearing.

At the conclusion of the revocation hearing3 on August 10, 2017, the 

court found Cherry violated conditions #1, #2, #4, #10, and #11 of her IP 

sentence. The court explained its determination as follows:

[T]his Court revoked [Cherry]’s Intermediate Punishment 

because it found that [she] had violated Conditions 1, 2, 4, 10, 

and 11 of the Intermediate Punishment. DUI Condition 1 states 

that [Cherry] had to comply with all municipal, county, state, and 

federal criminal laws, as well as provisions of the Vehicle Code, 

Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act, and the 

Liquor Code. It was alleged that [Cherry] violated DUI Condition 

1 when she pled guilty to a Public Drunkenness and Similar 

Misconduct charge for incidents occurring on August 23, 2015. 

[Cherry] also allegedly violated Condition 2, In-Home 

Detention/Electronic Monitoring, by leaving her residence on 

February 22, 2015 without authorization. [Cherry] allegedly 

violated Condition 4, Leaving the Commonwealth Without 

Permission, when she travelled to the Carolinas from July 25-29, 

2017 without permission.

[Cherry] allegedly violated condition 10, Abstention from 

Alcohol/Non-Prescribed Drugs on several occasions. First[,] she 

admitted to having alcoholic beverages on August 15, 21, and 22, 

of 2015. Several alcoholic beverages/empty alcoholic beverage 

containers were found at her approved residence on June 27, 2017 

allegedly violating Condition 10. [Cherry] allegedly violated 

condition 10 when she tested positive for EtG (alcohol). She 

admitted that she had consumed alcoholic beverages at an 

establishment selling alcohol on April 30, 2017 and June 26, 2017.

[Cherry] allegedly violated Condition 11, Entering an 

Establishment that Sells Alcohol. [Cherry] allegedly violated 

condition 11 after she admitted that she was at Indigo Night 

Club/Bar drinking alcohol on August 21 and 22 of 2015. [Cherry] 

also admitted to violating condition 11 on April 30, 2017 and June 

____________________________________________

3

 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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26, 2017 by drinking alcohol at Pickles Bar. In total [Cherry] 

received six notifications of violations for the incidents listed above 

since entering the DUI Court Program by Court Order of March 27, 

2014.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/2017, at 1-2. The court then revoked Cherry’s IP 

sentence and imposed a term of 12 months to 5 years in state correctional 

institution. This timely appeal follows.4

In her first argument, Cherry challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

regarding her revocation, complaining the court should not have revoked her 

IP sentence based on her prior conduct in 2015 because those violations had 

been previously subject to court sanctions, and therefore, the double jeopardy 

clause5 applies. See Cherry’s Brief 15. Specifically, she states:

The double jeopardy clause of the constitution does not 

preclude, as double punishment, a second sentencing where there 

have been violations of a conditional sentence like probation or 

intermediate punishment. Double jeopardy does not preclude the 

remand for a new revocation hearing where a reviewing court has 

determined that the evidence presented at the first revocation 

hearing was insufficient to sustain the violation.

It does not follow, as the Commonwealth suggests, that 

principles grounded in double jeopardy do not apply to the 

revocation process. Collateral estoppel bars the Commonwealth 

____________________________________________

4

 On August 17, 2017, the trial court ordered Cherry to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Cherry filed a concise statement on September 1, 2017. The trial court issued 

an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on October 6, 2017.

5

 See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 147 A.3d 7, 13 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“The

double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a

defendant when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to

prejudice the defendant to the point of denying him a fair trial.”) (citation

omitted).
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from revoking parole based on conduct for which the probationer 

was tried and acquitted prior to the violation hearing. It also 

invalidates a probation violation based solely on a new conviction 

that is subsequently vacated on appeal.

Res judicata differs from collateral estoppel only in that the 

latter contemplates different adjudicative forums while the former 

contemplates identical adjudicative forums. Res judicata

recognizes the sanctity of final judgment on a litigated claim and 

protects the rights of the parties by barring the re-litigation of that 

claim in a subsequent proceeding in the same forum. In the 

context of probation and parole, it has been used by the

Commonwealth Court to bar a second revocation hearing where 

the Parole Board found insufficient evidence of the claim at the 

first hearing.

In the instant matter, revoking Ms. Cherry’s intermediate 

punishment based on the 2015 conduct was barred by res 

judicata. Unarguably, she was served with a notification of 

violations for the 2015 conduct and a final determination was 

made by the court that sanctions short of revocation and resentencing was appropriate punishment for that conduct.

Id. at 15-17 (citations omitted).

We are guided by the following:

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law

subject to plenary review. We must determine whether the

evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to support all

elements of the offenses. A reviewing court may not weigh the

evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(citations and internal quotations omitted), appeal denied, 945 A.2d 169 (Pa.

2008).
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“Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the sound

discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision will not be disturbed on

appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Id.

6

 

When assessing whether to revoke probation, the trial court must

balance the interests of society in preventing future criminal

conduct by the defendant against the possibility of rehabilitating

the defendant outside of prison. In order to uphold a revocation

of probation, the Commonwealth must show by a preponderance

of the evidence that a defendant violated his probation.

Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33 A.3d 31, 37 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation

marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 441 (Pa. 2012). “A 

probation violation is established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the 

probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an ineffective 

vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter against future 

antisocial conduct.”7 Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d 879, 886 (Pa.

Super. 2010), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2011). “A trial court does 

not necessarily abuse its discretion in imposing a seemingly harsh postrevocation sentence where the defendant originally received a lenient 

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6

 This Court has previously held the revocation of a county intermediate 

punishment sentence is equivalent to the revocation of probation. See 

Commonwealth v. Philipp, 709 A.2d 920, 921 (Pa. Super. 1998); see also 

Commonwealth v. Melius, 100 A.3d 682, 685-686 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

7

 “[T]he reason for revocation of probation need not necessarily be the

commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal conduct. Rather, this

Court has repeatedly acknowledged the very broad standard that sentencing

courts must use in determining whether probation has been violated[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d at 886 (citations and internal

quotations omitted).
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sentence and then failed to adhere the conditions imposed on him.” 

Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013). Lastly, “technical violations 

are sufficient to trigger the revocation of probation.” Commonwealth v.

Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773, a trial court may “revoke a sentence of 

county intermediate punishment upon proof of a violation of specific conditions 

of the sentence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773(b). Additionally, Subsection (c) requires 

that before doing so, the trial court must conduct a hearing “at which the court 

shall consider the record of the initial sentencing proceeding as well as the 

conduct of the defendant while serving a sentence of county intermediate 

punishment.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773(c). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 708 (violation of 

probation, intermediate punishment, or parole: hearing and disposition).

Moreover, because Cherry argues the doctrines of collateral estoppel 

and res judicata apply, we note: Both doctrines "preclud[e] parties from 

contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate." 

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Collateral estoppel “means simply that when an issue of 

ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that 

issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future 

lawsuit.” Commonwealth v. Castro, 856 A.2d 178, 181-82 (Pa. Super. 

2004). “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action 
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precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could 

have been raised in that action[.]” In re Stevenson, 40 A.3d 1212, 1222 

(Pa. 2012), quoting Allen v. McCurry, 49 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).

Here, the court explained its rationale for revoking Cherry’s IP sentence 

as follows:

This Court found that the preponderance of evidence 

presented supported the allegations that [Cherry] violated [] 

Conditions 1, 2, 4, 10, [and] 11. This Court notes, with heartfelt 

regret, that [Cherry] was unable to follow the DUI Court 

Conditions despite [Cherry] receiving leniency on many 

opportunities in the hopes of rehabilitation. The six notices of 

violations demonstrate that [Cherry] had continuously struggled 

with rehabilitation while involved in the Intermediate Punishment. 

The evidence before the Court demonstrated that Intermediate 

Punishment was no longer a viable means of rehabilitating 

[Cherry] and therefore revocation was in order.

The first issue complained of by [Cherry] concerning

Conditions 1 and 2 is that the incidents occurred at least two years 

ago. This statement demonstrates that [Cherry] had difficulty 

adhering to the Conditions of the Intermediate Punishment for 

several years. This was further evidence that Intermediate 

Punishment was not a viable means of rehabilitating [Cherry] and 

therefore revocation was in order.

The second issue complained of by [Cherry] concerning 

Conditions 1 and 2 is that [she] already suffered court sanctions 

for the conduct at the time. This argument seems to implicate 

collateral estoppel as the argument being asserted by [Cherry]. 

Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate 

fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that 

issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any 

future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).

Sanctions are a part of the Intermediate Punishment and 

are an appropriate condition since they are intended to effectuate 

rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The sanctions allow 

the Court to discipline a [probationer] without having to revoke 

the Intermediate Punishment. The sanction process starts when 
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the DUI team discovers a [probationer] violated a condition of the 

Intermediate Punishment. Then the DUI team meets with this 

Court to discuss whether the violation requires a sanction and if 

so what sanction should the Court issue. Then on the day of the 

DUI Court the DUI team initiates the discussion of the violation. 

The [probationer] then has an opportunity to respond before the 

sanction is issued. The sanctioning process for DUI Court is not a 

judicial one but an administrative one. There is not an ultimate 

fact which has been determined by a valid and final judgment in 

the DUI Court sanctioning process which would trigger collateral 

estoppel. Furthermore these violations demonstrate that the DUI 

Court had tried to be lenient in the past in order for the 

rehabilitation to succeed but [Cherry] was not able to comply with 

the Conditions and therefore the Intermediate Punishment was 

revoked.

...

Assuming arguendo, [Cherry]’s violations of Conditions 1, 2, 

and 4 were not proper for consideration, this Court would still have 

grounds for finding revocation was in order for the violations of 

Conditions 10 and 11. [Cherry] admitted to entering an 

establishment that sells alcohol, admitted to consuming alcohol, 

and alcohol was found at her residence. These violations alone 

demonstrate that Intermediate Punishment was not a viable 

means of rehabilitating [Cherry] and therefore revocation was in 

order.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/2017, at 3-5.

We agree with the court’s sound rationale.

The Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide the defendant with

the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact

limit of his punishment will turn out to be. Congress has 

established many types of criminal sanctions under which the 

defendant is unaware of the precise extent of his punishment for 

significant periods of time, or even for life, yet these sanctions

have not been considered to be violative of the Clause. Thus, 

there is no double jeopardy protection against revocation of

probation and the imposition of imprisonment. (citation omitted). 

There are other situations where probation may be revoked and 

sentence of imprisonment imposed. (citations omitted). 
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Commonwealth v. Mysnyk, 527 A.2d 1055, 1056-1057 (Pa. Super. 1987)

(italics in original), appeal denied, 538 A.2d 498 (Pa. 1987).

Here, Cherry’s 2015 violations of Conditions 1 and 2, and resulting 

sanctions, were not being relitigated by the trial court during the August 10, 

2017, revocation hearing. Moreover, the Commonwealth was not pursuing 

these claims for a second time but rather, was requesting the trial court to 

consider Cherry’s multiple failures to adhere to the conditions of her IP in 

determining whether or not to revoke it.

8

 N.T., 8/10/2017, at 3-4, 7-8. 

Additionally, as noted by the trial court, these sanctions were administrative 

in nature, not criminal, and based on the circumstances, it was evident that 

Cherry was incapable of following simple DUI Court conditions despite 

receiving numerous leniency opportunities.9 Cherry’s arguments concerning 

collateral estoppel and res judicata do not persuade us otherwise.

Nevertheless, as the trial court found, even if the prior violations were 

not proper for review, it would still have grounds for finding revocation based 

on the fifth and sixth violations of Conditions 4, 10, and 11 in 2017.

10

 The 

____________________________________________

8

 With respect to the first four violations, there were no formal proceedings, 

resulting in revocation. The court either ordered Cherry to one-month periods 

of enhanced curfew compliance/electronic monitoring, placement at a 

rehabilitation facility, or imposed no sanction.

9

 It merits repeating that Cherry committed six violations since her sentencing 

in March of 2014.

10

 Cherry’s counsel admitted to her conduct supporting those violations. See

N.T., 8/10/2017, at 7.
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court acted within its province when it determined that IP did not satisfy 

Cherry’s rehabilitative needs. See Allshouse, supra. Furthermore, it merits 

mention that when Cherry signed her “Centre County DUI Court Program –

Conditions of In-Home Detention/Electronic Monitoring,” she agreed to the 

following:

I acknowledge that the Intermediate Punishment Program/Inhome Detention Program has been explained to me, and I have 

been advised that under the law, the Court may at any time, for 

cause, revoke or modify any condition of your Intermediate 

Punishment Sentence.

I realize I am subject to arrest and incarceration, for cause, by 

the Centre County Probation Department. The Court may, if it 

sees fit, revoke my Intermediate Punishment Sentence and 

impose an appropriate sentence.

N.T., 8/10/2017, Exhibit - Centre County DUI Court Program – Conditions of 

In-Home Detention/Electronic Monitoring, 6/24/2014, at unnumbered 2.11 

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly revoked Cherry’s IP 

sentence, and her first argument fails.

In her second argument, Cherry contends that her sentence is 

excessive. Cherry’s Brief at 18. Specifically, she states:

Absent the summary public drunkenness conviction and [the] 

2015 technical violations, the [trial] court articulated that the April 

2017 conduct of entering a bar, consuming, and possessing 

alcoholic beverages “... alone demonstrated that Intermediate 

____________________________________________

11

 In her written guilty plea colloquy, Cherry indicated that she understood 

her DUI offense carried a possible maximum prison term of five years, her 

simple assault offense carried a possible maximum prison term of two years, 

and that her DUI offense had a mandatory minimum sentence of one year. 

See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 3/13/2014, at unnumbered 2.
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Punishment was not a viable means of rehabilitating [Cherry] and 

therefore revocation was in order.” This reasoning ignores the 

fact that at the time of the relapse it deemed her continued 

outpatient counseling sufficient to address this brief relapse. One 

is left with the inescapable conclusion that she was not 

“disingenuous” in her [concise statement] and she was revoked 

because that vacation she took with her girlfriend was the last 

straw for her probation officer. There were no allegations of other 

violations during this [sic] four days in July.

No one challenged her testimony she retained her sobriety. 

There was nothing in the 2017 violations which would indicate that 

it was likely that she would commit a future crime. There was no 

allegations of operating an automobile during the entire course of 

her intermediate punishment. There was no challenge to 

testimony that she had a good job that she would lose if sent to 

state prison.

Cherry’s Brief at 19-20 (record citation omitted).

12

 Cherry’s complaint

challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence.

"[T]his Court’s scope of review in an appeal from a revocation

sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” Commonwealth

v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Furthermore,

“[t]here is no absolute right to appeal when challenging the

discretionary aspect of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. Crump,

995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). 

Rather, an “[a]ppeal is permitted only after this Court determines

that there is a substantial question that the sentence was not

appropriate under the sentencing code.” Crump, supra at 1282. 

In determining whether a substantial question exists, this Court

does not examine the merits of the sentencing claim. 

Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (Pa.

1987).

____________________________________________

12

 In her Rule 2119(f) statement, Cherry maintains that the trial court “abused 

its discretion in sentencing her to an excessive sentence of state incarceration 

based on mere technical violations of supervision.” Cherry’s Brief at 12.
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In addition, “issues challenging the discretionary aspects of

a sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by

presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing

proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary

aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth v. Kittrell,

2011 PA Super 60, 19 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Furthermore, a defendant is required to preserve the issue in a

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement and a

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement. Commonwealth v. Naranjo, 2012

PA Super 183, 53 A.3d 66, 72 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Cartrette, at 1042.

A review of the record reveals that while Cherry filed a timely notice of 

appeal, and included in her appellate brief a statement of reasons relied upon 

for appeal pursuant to Tuladziecki, supra, and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), she did 

not raise any objections to the sentence at sentencing and she did not file a 

post-sentence motion for reconsideration. However, there is no indication in 

the record that the trial court advised her of those post-sentence rights when 

she was sentenced following the revocation of her IP. See N.T., 8/10/2017, 

at 15-16. Therefore, we decline to find waiver on this basis. See

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“The 

courts of this Commonwealth have held that a court breakdown occurred in 

instances where the trial court, at the time of sentencing, either failed to 

advise Appellant of his post-sentence and appellate rights or misadvised 

him.”), appeal denied, 960 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2008). Therefore, we must 

determine whether she has raised a substantial question justifying our review.

A substantial question exists when an appellant sets forth “a colorable 

argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a specific 
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provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms 

underlying the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 

1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 161 (Pa. 2009) 

(citation omitted). An allegation that the trial court failed to consider the 

requirements of Section 9771(c) before imposing a sentence of total 

confinement raises a substantial question that the sentence imposed was 

“inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code.” Id. Moreover, 

“a claim that a particular probation revocation sentence is excessive in light 

of its underlying technical violations can present a question that we should 

review.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we proceed to an evaluation of Cherry’s

claim on appeal.

The Sentencing Code provides that, similar to the revocation of a 

probationary sentence, when a trial court revokes a county intermediate 

punishment sentence, “the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall 

be the same as the alternatives available at the time of initial sentencing.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9773(b). Moreover, Section 9771(c) precludes a trial court from 

imposing a sentence of total confinement upon revocation of probation unless 

the court finds one or more of the following: 

(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or

(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that 

[s]he will commit another crime if [s]he is not imprisoned; or
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(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the 

court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c). 

In explaining Cherry’s sentence, the court stated:

The final issue complained of on Appeal concerns whether 

the Court abused its discretion in sentencing [Cherry] for going on 

a short vacation without first receiving written permission. 

[Cherry] travelled to the Carolinas from July 25-29,2017 without 

permission from her probation officer. This violation was one of 

many considered by the Court including the violation of Conditions 

10 and 11. It would be disingenuous to state that this Court 

sentenced [Cherry] to state incarceration for a short vacation 

without receiving permission when there was evidence of other 

violations before the Court.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/2017, at 5.

We find no abuse of discretion. “Technical violations can support 

revocation and a sentence of incarceration when such violations are flagrant 

and indicate an inability to reform.” Commonwealth v. Carver, 923 A.2d 

495, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007). Cherry’s conduct has repeatedly demonstrated 

that a term of imprisonment was essential to vindicate the authority of the 

court. While focusing on the incidents that took place in 2017, Cherry

committed multiple, new violations, which broke three conditions of her IP 

sentence. Even after Cherry received her fifth warning concerning her 

violations, she still violated the terms for a sixth time within a one month 

period. It is evident from the record that Cherry was not taking advantage of 

the opportunities given to her by the trial court, including inpatient treatment 

program, she was not reforming her behavior, and she had a clear disregard 
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for the authority of the court when she left the state without informing her 

probation officer. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

sentencing Cherry to a period of total confinement with regard to her IP 

revocation. Therefore, Cherry’s discretionary aspects of sentencing claim 

fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/29/2018