UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

LNV CORPORATION, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

MARY JULIA HOOK, 

 Defendant - Appellant, 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant - Appellee, 

and 

DAVID LEE SMITH; PRUDENTIAL 

HOME MORTAGAGE COMPANY, 

INC.; SAINT LUKES LOFTS 

HOMEOWNER ASSOCATION, INC.; 

DEBRA JOHNSON, in her official 

capacity as the Public Trustee of the City 

and County of Denver, Colorado, 

 Defendants. 

No. 20-1167 

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00955-RM-SKC) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 12, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Mary Julia Hook, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from the district 

court’s March 2, 2020, Order Confirming Judicial Sale. Exercising jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss the appeal as frivolous. 

Ms. Hook previously appealed from the judgment in the underlying 

foreclosure case. See LNV Corp. v. Hook (Hook I), 807 F. App’x 893 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 939 (2020). Hook I described Ms. Hook’s arguments 

challenging the judgment as “wholly frivolous.” Id. at 895. “As an attorney, she 

should have known that they lacked any merit before she argued them; and in large 

part, the appellees’ briefs make that perfectly clear. We see no need to further 

educate Hook.” Id. Accordingly, this court dismissed her appeal in Hook I. See id.

Ms. Hook’s opening brief largely reiterates the “wholly frivolous” arguments 

she offered in Hook I. But given the law of the case doctrine, we will not revisit 

those arguments. See Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 

1081, 1099 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen a court decides upon a rule of law, that 

decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same 

case. An appellate court decision on a particular issue . . . governs the issue during 

all later stages of the litigation in the district court and thereafter on any further 

appeal.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). There are exceptions to 

the doctrine, see id., but none applies here. And Ms. Hook’s request that this panel 

vacate and set aside Hook I disregards well-established law that one panel cannot 
3 

overrule the decision of another panel, absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court 

authority. See Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 993 (10th Cir. 2020). 

In addition to previously raised arguments, the opening brief appears to 

advance new arguments challenging the April 2019 judgment. But the subject of this 

appeal is the Order Confirming Judicial Sale, not the judgment. All challenges to the 

judgment could, and should, have been raised in Hook I. 

The few assertions in the opening brief that may be relevant to the Order 

Confirming Judicial Sale are inadequately briefed. See Fuerschbach v. Sw. Airlines 

Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2006) (collecting authorities holding that 

inadequately briefed and underdeveloped theories are waived). Ms. Hook’s 

conclusory assertions of procedural error fail to sufficiently identify or argue any 

violations. She criticizes the district court for not holding a hearing before it issued 

the Order Confirming Judicial Sale, but she does not show that she was entitled to 

such a hearing, or even that she requested one. And she makes no argument for plain 

error. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal . . . surely marks 

the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district 

court.”). 

Finally, Ms. Hook asserts that the district court was biased against her because 

it denied her motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees and costs. But 

as we have previously explained to her, “adverse rulings alone do not demonstrate 

judicial bias,” meaning that an “argument rel[ying] solely on the district court’s 
4 

adverse rulings . . . is devoid of merit.” Hook I, 807 F. App’x at 895 (brackets and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

For these reasons, this appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See Ford v. Pryor, 

552 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 2008) (“An appeal is frivolous when the result is 

obvious, or the appellant’s arguments of error are wholly without merit.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). LNV Corporation’s pre-briefing motions to dismiss the 

appeal and to release a notice of lis pendens are denied as moot. The requests in 

Ms. Hook’s reply briefs for sanctions and attorney discipline are denied. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge