[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-14283

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TYREE ARVELL MONROE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00007-TFM-N-1

____________________

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Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Tyree Monroe appeals his sentence of five months’ imprisonment, imposed upon the district court’s second revocation of his 

supervised release, under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). He argues that the

sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

After careful consideration, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In 2014, Monroe pleaded guilty to stealing eleven firearms

from a person licensed to engage in the business of dealing in firearms, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). His plea arose out of his 

participation, alongside three other individuals, in an armed robbery of a Quick Pawn store in Mobile, Alabama. The district court 

imposed a sentence of seventy months’ imprisonment and three 

years of supervised release. As a special condition of release, Monroe was required to participate in a testing and treatment program

for drug and alcohol abuse. He was also required to refrain from 

excessive use of alcohol and forbidden from purchasing, possessing, using, distributing, or administering any controlled substances. 

Monroe began his term of supervised release on August 6, 

2019. Over the next several months, he tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana two times, once in October 2019 and again

in January 2020. After each failed test, the probation office

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21-14283 Opinion of the Court 3

recommended that Monroe participate in individual counseling 

and continue in the drug testing program. The district court concurred. On August 4, Monroe tested positive for cocaine, and on 

August 12 he tested positive again for cocaine and methamphetamine. When confronted, Monroe admitted to his probation officer 

that he had been using cocaine and other illegal substances over 

the past two weeks. Despite his positive tests, the probation office

continued to recommend that Monroe proceed with supervision, 

counseling, and drug testing, although he was warned that continued noncompliance could result in revocation. On November 23,

the probation office, with Monroe’s consent, petitioned to again 

modify his conditions of supervision to include weekly mental 

health sessions. The petition noted Monroe’s failure to attend substance abuse treatment, failure to report for his most recent drug 

test, complete unavailability for more than a week, and admission

to using Ecstasy while he was unavailable. Monroe continued to 

test positive for illegal substances and failed to attend counseling 

sessions, and on December 7, the probation office recommended 

revocation of his supervised release. As Monroe had admitted to 

violating his conditions of release, the district court revoked release 

and sentenced him to one month of imprisonment followed by

thirty-one months of supervised release. 

Monroe’s new term of release, which began on January 15, 

2021, included the same special conditions as before. On August 17, 

the probation office requested another modification: that Monroe 

be required to spend six months at a Residential Re-Entry Center,

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explaining that he had failed to report for a scheduled drug test and

had once again been unavailable for more than a week. As Monroe 

had signed a waiver of hearing and agreed to the condition, the district court again modified the terms of his supervised release. Monroe began his stay at the Center on September 9, but was discharged a month later for violating sign in/sign out proceduresthat 

he had agreed to obey upon admission. The probation office again

recommended revocation, this time suggesting a new sentence of

eight months of imprisonment to be followed by twenty-four 

months of supervised release. The guidelines called for a term of 

imprisonment between five and eleven months. 

On December 2, Monroe signed another waiver of hearing 

and admitted that he had violated the Center’s policy. He admitted 

the violation again at his sentencing hearing. The district court 

found that Monroe had violated the terms of his supervised release 

and sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment followed by 

twenty-seven months supervised release, incorporating all previous conditions. In doing so, the court stated that it had “considered 

the Chapter 7 provisions and [found] that they [were] appropriate 

in this matter.” Monroe did not initially object to the sentence, but 

later timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION 

Upon determining that a defendant violated a condition of 

supervised release, the district court may revoke the term of supervision and impose a prison term. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). When 

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imposing such a sentence, the court must consider certain of the 

factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Specifically, it must consider “[S]ection[s] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), 

(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7),” which include

the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to 

afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed correctional treatment in the most effective 

manner; and the applicable guideline range and any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. Because 

Monroe waived his revocation hearing and admitted the violations 

alleged by the probation office, we decline to review the district 

court’s revocation decision. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 

860, 872–873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). On appeal, we review a 

sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for 

reasonableness, both procedural and substantive. See United States 

v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014).

A. Monroe’s Sentence was Procedurally Reasonable

Monroe first argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable under Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). We 

disagree.

When analyzing procedural reasonableness, we normally 

consider legal issues de novo and review factual findings for clear 

error. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 

2010). But because Monroe did not object, we review only for plain 

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error. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307. To prevail on plain error review, Monroe must show that the district court erred, that the 

court’s error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial 

rights. Id.

In Tapia, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court 

may not impose or lengthen a federal defendant’s prison term to 

promote the defendant’s rehabilitation. 564 U.S. at 321. In Vandergrift, we applied Tapia’s holding to a resentencing upon revocation 

of supervised release. 754 F.3d at 1309. We also declined to limit 

Tapia to situations where a sentencing court “either 1) specifically 

tailors the length of a defendant's sentence to permit completion of 

a rehabilitation program or 2) makes rehabilitation the ‘dominant’

factor in the sentencing court’s calculus.” Id. at 1310. Instead, we 

held that “a district court errs when it considers rehabilitation 

when imposing or lengthening a sentence of imprisonment.” Id.

(emphasis in original). 

Here, the district court never mentioned rehabilitation or 

stated that it considered rehabilitation in imposing Monroe’s sentence. Nevertheless, Monroe contends that the court erred by not 

affirmatively stating that it did not consider rehabilitation. But neither Tapia nor Vandergrift imposes such an affirmative duty on 

sentencing courts. And even assuming arguendo that the district 

court’s consideration of “the [Section] 3553(a)(2) provisions in 

whole” was an error under Tapia, that error was certainly not

plain, as it must be for Monroe to prevail in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307. 

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B. Monroe’s Sentence was Also Substantively Reasonable 

To the extent that Monroe argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable, that claim also fails. 

When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

Under this standard, we will affirm any sentence that falls within 

the range of reasonable sentences, even if we would have decided 

that a different one was more appropriate. United States v. Irey, 

612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Thus, Monroe bears 

the heavy burden of establishing that his sentence was unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the Section 3553(a) factors. 

United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018).

A court abuses its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence when it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant 

weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear

error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Irey, 612 F.3d 

at 1189 (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th 

Cir. 2006) (en banc)). A district court’s “unjustified reliance” on any 

one factor may also suggest error. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 

1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). But a court may nonetheless lawfully 

“attach great weight to one factor over others.” United States v. 

Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014). And a sentencing court

need not state on the record that it explicitly considered each factor 

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or discuss them all individually, so long as the record reflects that 

the court considered the party’s arguments and the sentencing factors. United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 2007).

Monroe first argues that the district court ignored available 

alternatives to imprisonment. But the court specifically stated that 

it considered “the Chapter 7 provisions,” which include those substitute options. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(c)(1)(B). He also concedes that 

the court’s “blanket” consideration of the Chapter 7 provisions

meant that it considered Section 3553(a)(2). Although the district 

court did not specify which factors it considered, it was not required to do so. Dorman, 488 F.3d at 938. 

To the extent that Monroe argues that his sentence was 

greater than necessary, we also disagree. He repeatedly violated 

the terms of his supervision, and his previous revocation and onemonth sentence had not deterred him from continued violations. 

The district court’s five-month sentence was also at the bottom of 

the guideline range, which is an indication of its substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 

2008). Thus, the sentence was substantively reasonable because it 

was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, given the totality of 

the circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Monroe’s sentence is 

AFFIRMED. 

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