This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0466

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Todd Timothy Clark, 

Appellant.

Filed December 29, 2014

Affirmed

Hooten, Judge

Douglas County District Court

File No. 21-CR-12-779

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad M. Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jade M. Rosenfeldt, Lisa N. Borgen, Vogel Law Firm, Moorhead, Minnesota (for 

appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Smith, Judge; and Klaphake, 

Judge.



 

 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HOOTEN, Judge

On appeal from his conviction for second-degree possession of a controlled 

substance, appellant argues that (1) the canine sniff leading to the discovery of 

methamphetamine in his vehicle was unsupported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion 

of criminal activity; (2) the district court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his 

agreement to a stipulated-facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4; and (3) the 

district court erred in denying his motion to reopen the omnibus hearing. We affirm.

FACTS

Around 10:30 a.m. on May 6, 2012, Minnesota State Patrol trooper Scott Ras was 

dispatched to the Burgen Lake rest stop on I-94 in response to a report from the rest- stop

custodian that, around 8:00 a.m., a male individual parked his vehicle in an unusual 

position at the rest stop, entered the nearby woods with a saw or sword, and had not yet 

returned. Trooper Ras arrived at the rest stop and encountered a vehicle parked 

diagonally across two parking spots. The doors of the vehicle were locked, the windows 

were up, and the interior appeared to be “very messy,” with food wrappers, a Minnesota 

road map, and a suitcase1all visible from the exterior. 

Trooper Ras first spoke with the rest- stop custodian, who gave the trooper a 

description of the individual. Trooper Ras checked the registration of the vehicle and 

learned that the owner was appellant Todd Timothy Clark’s father, a resident of Fargo, 

 

1 Officers later determined that the suitcase was labeled with a different name than that of 

Clark or Clark’s father.
3

North Dakota. Trooper Ras further learned that the vehicle had been subjected to a traffic 

stop near Maple Grove, Minnesota at 11:00 p.m. the previous night because the vehicle 

was weaving in and out of the driving lane. During that traffic stop, the driver was 

identified as Clark. Clark had not been arrested in connection with the traffic stop.

Trooper Ras then conducted a search of the nearby woods and found tracks in the 

grass, but failed to locate anyone. He asked to have other officers continue canvassing 

the area and requested a K-9 unit to assist with the search. While waiting for assistance, 

Trooper Ras was informed by dispatch that Fargo police had contacted Clark’s father. 

Trooper Ras learned that Clark’s father had told a Fargo officer that Clark did not have a 

drug or alcohol problem, but may be depressed and would “stay[] up for long periods of 

time and fall[] asleep in inappropriate places.” 

A Douglas County sheriff’s deputy eventually arrived to assist with the search, 

and located Clark about a half mile from the rest stop. While en route to the rest stop 

with his trained narcotics-detection canine, Vinny, another Douglas County sheriff’s 

deputy, Wade Lerfald, witnessed Clark being placed into a squad car. Deputy Lerfald 

proceeded to the rest stop and was updated by Trooper Ras on the situation, including the 

information provided by Clark’s father. Based on their training and experience, the 

officers believed that Clark’s actions were consistent with the use of methamphetamine 

and decided to have Vinny conduct a sniff search of the vehicle. Vinny alerted while 

sniffing the front driver’s side door, and methamphetamine was discovered in a 

subsequent search of the vehicle by the officers after they obtained a key for the vehicle 
4

from Clark. In connection with the recovered drugs, Clark was arrested and charged 

with, among other things, second-degree possession of a controlled substance.

Clark moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle as a result of the 

dog sniff, and a contested omnibus hearing on his motion was held on December 20, 

2012. The district court heard testimony from Trooper Ras, Deputy Lerfald, and Clark’s 

father. The two officers detailed the course of events at the rest stop and Clark’s father

testified as to what he told Fargo police, although he denied telling police that Clark fell 

asleep in odd places as claimed by Trooper Ras. The district court denied the motion to 

suppress, concluding that based on all of the information available to Trooper Ras and 

Deputy Lerfald, there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal behavior to 

justify the dog sniff of Clark’s vehicle.

The parties agreed to a stipulated-facts trial in accordance with Minn. R. Crim. P. 

26.01, subd. 4, which was held on September 10, 2013. After reviewing the evidence 

stipulated to by Clark, the district court found Clark guilty of second-degree possession 

of a controlled substance and not guilty of two other fifth-degree drug-possession 

charges. Prior to sentencing, Clark obtained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw 

his consent to the stipulated-facts trial and reopen the omnibus hearing. He claimed that 

a Fargo police report, which had been in the possession of his former counsel, proved that 

the officers at the rest stop could not have learned the information communicated by 

Clark’s father to Fargo police prior to conducting the sniff search of Clark’s vehicle. The 

district court denied the motion, concluding that Clark had waived his right to withdraw 

his jury-trial waiver, that his waiver was knowing and voluntary, that the evidence was 
5

not “newly discovered” under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 1(1), and that reopening the 

omnibus hearing was not warranted. Clark was subsequently sentenced to a stayed prison 

sentence, six months in jail, and 25 years of probation. This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

I.

Clark argues that the district court erred in finding a reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity and failing to suppress the evidence recovered by police in connection 

with the dog sniff of his vehicle. In reviewing the district court’s pretrial order on a

motion to suppress, we review its factual findings for clear error and then review its legal 

determinations, including the finding of a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 

behavior, de novo. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2012).

The United States and Minnesota constitutions protect all individuals from 

“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. 

Const. art. 1, § 10. Under federal law, a dog sniff of a vehicle is generally not considered 

a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 

125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005). But our supreme court has held that a dog sniff of a stopped 

vehicle requires police to have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related 

criminal activity” before the sniff can be conducted. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 

135 (Minn. 2002). The parties agree that the dog sniff of Clark’s parked car is governed 

by the reasonable-suspicion standard laid out in Wiegand, but dispute whether the totality 

of the circumstances present in this case are sufficient to show that the officers at the 

scene had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Clark’s vehicle contained drugs.
6

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, 

taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] 

intrusion’” upon a defendant’s person or property. State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182

(Minn. 2007) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)). It is 

an “objective, totality-of-the-circumstances test,” which asks “whether the facts available 

to the officer at the moment of the [search would] warrant a man of reasonable caution in 

the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 351–

52 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted). This includes consideration of “possible innocent 

explanations for the alleged suspicious activity.” State v. Baumann, 759 N.W.2d 237, 

240 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). But even “wholly lawful

conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity is afoot” in some circumstances. 

State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted).

While the needed showing for reasonable suspicion is “not high” and “less 

demanding than [that for] probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence,” State v. 

Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted), police may not use dog 

sniffs “at random and without reason,” State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 211 (Minn. 

2005) (quotation omitted); see also Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 134 (“[T]he officer may not 

be motivated by mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” (quotation omitted)). An officer 

must articulate the “factual basis for his suspicion,” and merely claiming to have such a 

basis is insufficient. Baumann, 759 N.W.2d at 240. However, “‘by virtue of the special 

training they receive, police officers articulating a reasonable suspicion may make 
7

inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.’” Smith, 814 

N.W.2d at 352 (quoting State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 251–52 (Minn. 2007)).

Here, the district court found that the state had presented sufficient facts to show 

that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related activity. The 

district court cited several circumstances as the basis for its finding. It relied on 

information learned by the officers while at the scene, including the abnormal manner in 

which Clark’s vehicle was parked, the report of the rest-stop custodian that Clark had 

disappeared into the woods with a saw or sword hours earlier, and the officers’ 

observations of the “very messy” interior of Clark’s vehicle, which included food 

wrappers, open maps, and luggage that did not appear to be the property of Clark or 

Clark’s father. The district court further cited the information given to the officers by 

dispatch, including the fact that Clark had been pulled over for poor driving the night 

before, and the information from Clark’s father that Clark was depressed and had “very 

unusual sleeping patterns.” Because the officers indicated that, based on their training 

and experience, these circumstances were consistent with methamphetamine use, the 

district court found the circumstances sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion of drugrelated activity and the resulting dog sniff.

Clark argues that these facts are insufficient to have created a reasonable suspicion 

of drug-related activity. He contends that these circumstances do not “allow for an 

inference of drug activity,” especially the specific inference of methamphetamine use, 

and that the officers “acted on . . . a hunch while they had idle time to observe the car 

until [Clark] returned.” He believes the district court overlooked innocent explanations 
8

for these circumstances. The state contends that the “abnormalities” present here were 

more than enough to raise a reasonable suspicion of officers trained in narcotics 

detection, especially in light of cases like Baumann where a single suspicious fact was 

sufficient to meet the reasonable-suspicion threshold. See 759 N.W.2d at 240–41.

Taken individually, the facts articulated by the officers and relied upon by the 

district court in finding reasonable suspicion did not overtly indicate criminal activity. 

However, the officers in this case, particularly Deputy Lerfald, had “special training” 

allowing them to “make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained 

person.” Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 352 (quotation omitted). We have held before that 

reports of seemingly innocent activity, even without direct observation of the defendant 

by officers, can lead to inferences of criminal activity justifying reasonable suspicion. 

This court in Baumann upheld an apartment hallway dog sniff based solely on the 

apartment manager’s report that defendant had a high volume of short-term traffic to and 

from his apartment. 759 N.W.2d at 240–41. We held that because this facially innocent 

fact gave the police detective “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” the “low 

threshold” of reasonable suspicion was met. Id. at 240 (quoting Davis, 732 N.W.2d at

182). When we have found a lack of reasonable suspicion in connection with a dog sniff, 

it has been because an officer noted suspicious behavior but failed to relate that behavior 

to drug-related activity, Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 137, or the officers’ testimony was 

discredited by the district court due to inconsistencies showing that the dog sniff was 

“predetermined” and not based on articulable facts, State v. Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 

279–80 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003).
9

Here, there were several facts noted by the officers in support of their 

determination of reasonable suspicion. While each fact on its own may not be enough to 

support a reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity, we are directed to examine these 

circumstances under an “objective, totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis. Smith, 814 

N.W.2d at 351. The district court credited the testimony of both officers that, given these 

circumstances and their police training, they inferred that Clark was a methamphetamine 

user. This was more than an unarticulated hunch; Trooper Ras testified that Clark’s 

sleeping habits were consistent with those of a methamphetamine user, and Deputy 

Lerfald testified that all the odd circumstances, including the poorly parked vehicle with a 

“very messy” interior and Clark’s reported erratic behavior, led him to also conclude that 

Clark was using methamphetamine. The officers were able to provide numerous

“historical facts” that “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 

officer, amount[ed] to reasonable suspicion” that Clark was in possession of 

methamphetamine. See Martinson, 581 N.W.2d at 850 (quotation omitted). Therefore,

the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motion to suppress evidence resulting 

from the dog sniff because the sniff was supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion 

of drug-related activity.

II.

Clark argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his 

agreement to a stipulated-facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. He claims 

that a Fargo police report indicates that Trooper Ras and Deputy Lerfald could not have 

learned the information provided to Fargo police by Clark’s father prior to the dog sniff. 
10

Clark asserts that while his prior attorney was in possession of this report, Clark was only 

apprised of its existence after obtaining new counsel.2

As a preliminary matter, Clark is not entitled to have the merits of his withdrawal 

claim considered by this court. As noted by the district court, while a defendant can 

withdraw a jury-trial waiver “at any time before commencement of the trial,” the 

defendant’s right to withdraw the waiver becomes unavailable after the stipulated-facts 

trial has been held. State v. Johnson, 689 N.W.2d 247, 253 (Minn. App. 2004) (quoting 

Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(3) (2004)). In this case, Clark did not file his motion to 

withdraw his agreement to the stipulated-facts trial until after the trial had concluded and 

the district court had found him guilty. Therefore, Clark waived his right to withdraw the 

stipulated-facts trial agreement.

Even if the merits of Clark’s withdrawal claim are considered, the district court 

did not err in determining that his jury-trial waiver was knowing and voluntary. In 

moving to withdraw a waiver of jury-trial rights, a defendant “must establish that the 

agreement was not made knowingly and voluntarily.” State v. Prax, 686 N.W.2d 45, 49

(Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004). By contending that he was 

entitled to withdraw his jury-trial waiver, Clark was in essence moving the district court 

for a new trial, and therefore we review the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion for 

an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 676 (Minn. 2011).

 

2 Clark’s arguments could also be construed as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

However, the effectiveness of Clark’s prior counsel was not litigated below, and we will 

not analyze that issue on appeal. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).
11

The record establishes that Clark waived his right to a jury trial after consulting 

with his prior counsel and expressly stipulated to the evidence introduced by the 

prosecution. While Clark asserts that the existence of the Fargo police report meant his 

waiver was not made knowingly, the report was in the possession of his counsel 

throughout the proceedings. Further, the district court found that the Fargo police 

report’s potential exculpatory value was “purely speculative,” as the report did not clearly 

establish at what time the information from Clark’s father was relayed to the officers at 

the rest stop. Because Clark’s counsel had the document and its exculpatory value is 

questionable at best, there is sufficient evidence supporting the district court’s decision. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clark’s motion to withdraw his 

rule 26.01, subd. 4, waiver and stipulation.

Furthermore, to the extent that Clark is contending that this evidence necessitates a 

new trial, his argument fails. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 1(1) allows the district court 

to grant a new trial on the grounds of “[n]ewly discovered material evidence, which with 

reasonable diligence could not have been found and produced at trial.” A defendant is 

required to prove “that the evidence was not known to the defendant or his/her counsel at 

the time of the trial” in order to receive a new trial upon a postverdict motion. Rainer v. 

State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997). It is undisputed that Clark’s prior counsel had 

this report in his possession prior to the stipulated-facts trial. Therefore, the district court 

did not err in finding that Clark had not met his burden of proof in moving to vacate his 

guilty verdict.
12

III.

Clark argues that the district court also erred in denying his motion to reopen the 

omnibus hearing due to his discovery of the Fargo police report. We review the district 

court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 356–57 

(Minn. App. 2002). While not explicitly authorized by the rules of criminal procedure, 

district courts have the inherent authority to grant a party’s motion to reopen or 

reconsider omnibus rulings. See id. (citing State v. Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d 103, 107–08 

(Minn. 1985)). The purpose of a motion to reopen omnibus proceedings is to “spar[e] 

everyone the time, trouble, and expense of an appeal” by having pretrial issues clarified 

and reconsidered “in a timely fashion.” See Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d at 107–08. 

Accordingly, district courts have used this inherent authority before trial occurred. See, 

e.g., State v. Farah, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2014 WL 4798944, at *4 (Minn. App. Sept. 

29, 2014); Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d at 107. Here, Clark’s new counsel moved to reopen 

omnibus proceedings on December 17, 2013, after Clark had already been convicted and

over 10 months after the district court issued its order denying his motion to suppress 

following the omnibus hearing. Clark’s motion was therefore untimely and could not 

have been considered by the district court.

Notwithstanding the untimeliness of the motion, the district court acted within its 

discretion in declining to reopen the omnibus hearing. The district court concluded that 

reopening the omnibus hearing in this circumstance “would not save the time and cost of 

an appeal,” as Clark had already been convicted. The district court reasoned that 

reopening the omnibus hearing would require vacation of the conviction, and the 
13

defendant could face all four of the charged offenses again at a new trial. Further, the 

district court doubted the effect that the new evidence would have on its initial omnibus 

ruling. The district court gave thorough consideration to the issue and did not err in 

denying Clark’s motion to reopen the omnibus hearing.

Affirmed.