NOTE: This order is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

CAROL G. MEAD, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2012-7128 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in case no. 10-3897, Judge William P. 

Greene, Jr. 

__________________________ 

ON MOTION 

__________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, PROST, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

O R D E R 

Carol G. Mead appeals from a ruling of the United 

States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans 

Court”) sustaining the decision of the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals (“Board”) denying her service connection claim 

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CAROL MEAD v. SHINSEKI 2

for the cause of the death of her husband, veteran John R. 

Mead. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs also moves for 

leave to respond to Mrs. Mead’s supplemental brief. 

Mr. Mead served in the U.S. Army from 1950 to 1969. 

Although he was knocked unconscious for 5-10 minutes 

during combat in Korea in 1953 from a shell burst, his 

separation examination showed no abnormalities or 

neurological conditions except for noted hearing loss in 

his right ear. In 2003, Mr. Mead suffered a stroke and 

was admitted to the hospital, where he passed away a 

short time later. 

In August 2003, the appellant, Mrs. Mead, filed a 

claim with the Denver, Colorado Regional Office of the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), asserting that her 

husband’s combat injury was the principal, or a contributory, cause of his death. 

After an extensive claims development process, the 

Board sustained the Regional Office’s denial of Mrs. 

Mead’s claim. The Board held that the preponderance of 

the evidence suggested Mr. Mead’s death was unrelated 

to the injury he sustained in service. In reaching that 

conclusion, the Board relied heavily on the opinions of VA 

medical examiners who concluded that Mr. Mead’s stroke 

was more likely attributable to post-service risk factors, 

including advanced age and history of smoking. In finding these medical opinions more probative than those in 

the record suggesting a possible nexus between a traumatic brain injury and stroke, the Board emphasized the 

lack of reported medical cases linking a stroke to a head 

injury multiple years after the event, such as in this case, 

and the lack of evidence suggesting any brain injury 

leading up to and at the time of Mr. Mead’s death. 

Mrs. Mead appealed to the Veterans Court, alleging 

the Board erred in relying on inadequate unfavorable 

medical opinions and rejecting favorable medical opinions, 

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3 CAROL MEAD v. SHINSEKI

but the Veterans Court rejected these arguments. The 

Veterans Court found no error in the Board assigning less 

weight to favorable opinions provided by a chiropractor 

and two physicians who were not neurologists. The 

Veterans Court further agreed with the Board’s determination that several of the favorable opinions “were not 

based on the correct facts,” because those opinions “did 

not discuss or otherwise account for how . . . additional 

identified risk factors [including age, history of smoking, 

and history of heart- or vascular-related disease] did not 

significantly influence [Mr. Mead’s] death.” As a result, 

the Veterans Court concluded that the Board did not 

clearly err in concluding that the unfavorable opinions 

were adequate and relying on them to make its decision. 

Mrs. Mead now appeals. 

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), 

this court has jurisdiction over rules of law or the validity 

of any statute or regulation, or an interpretation thereof 

relied on by the court in its decision. This court may also 

entertain challenges to the validity of a statute or regulation and may interpret constitutional and statutory 

provisions as needed for resolution of the matter. 

38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). In contrast, except where an appeal 

presents a constitutional question, we lack jurisdiction 

over challenges to factual determinations or laws or 

regulations as applied to the particular case. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). 

Mrs. Mead does not present an issue within this 

court’s jurisdiction. First, Mrs. Mead appears to take 

issue with the weight afforded the medical opinion of 

neurologist Dr. Michael Hehmann, which opined that Mr. 

Mead’s 1953 injury was likely a major contributing factor 

leading to his death. The Board found that Dr. Hehmann’s opinion was less probative than the opinion of 

other neurologists in the record because Dr. Hehmann 

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CAROL MEAD v. SHINSEKI 4

failed to take into account any post-service risk factors, 

including Mr. Mead’s advanced age and history of smoking. To the extent that Mrs. Mead contends that the 

Board gave too little weight to Dr. Hehmann’s opinion, 

that factual determination is outside of this court’s jurisdictional review. See Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 

1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The evaluation and weighing of 

evidence and the drawing of appropriate inferences from 

it are factual determinations committed to the discretion 

of the factfinder. We lack jurisdiction to review such 

determinations.”). 

For similar reasons, we must also decline to address 

Mrs. Mead’s argument regarding the opinion of ophthalmologist Dr. Horace Gardner. Despite Mrs. Mead’s suggestions to the contrary, the Board did not overlook Dr. 

Gardner’s experience in conducting trauma research for 

the U.S. Army. Instead, while considering Dr. Gardner’s 

opinion, the Board found it deserving of less weight than 

the opinions of neurologists in the record who had more 

specialized expertise in evaluating the medical inquiry at 

issue. To the extent that Mrs. Mead challenges the 

weight afforded Dr. Gardner’s opinion, that argument, 

too, is outside of this court’s limited jurisdiction. 

Finally, Mrs. Mead argues that she was prejudiced by 

the Board’s improper finding that her husband suffered 

from hypertension. But this argument was already 

addressed and rejected by the Veterans Court. That court 

explained that the Board relied most heavily on the 

opinions of medical examiners who made no reference to 

hypertension. Any challenge to the Veterans Court’s 

finding that Mrs. Mead was not actually prejudiced in 

that regard is also outside of this court’s limited review. 

See generally Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298, 1302 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Our jurisdictional statute precludes 

appellate review of factual matters and the application of 

law to facts. This statute prevents us from reviewing [the 

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5 CAROL MEAD v. SHINSEKI

appellant’s] contentions regarding actual prejudice.”) 

(citation omitted). 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

(1) The appeal is dismissed. 

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs. 

(3) The Secretary’s motion for leave to respond is 

granted. 

FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Jan Horbaly 

 Jan Horbaly 

 Clerk 

s25 

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