IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Oakcliffe Community Organization, :

Oakland Planning and Development :

Corporation, Joan Dickerson, :

David Panasiuk, Millie Sass and :

Elena Zaitsoff, :

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

Zoning Board of Adjustment :

of the City of Pittsburgh and the : No. 813 C.D. 2017

City of Pittsburgh : Argued: February 5, 2018

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge 

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: March 13, 2018

Oakcliffe Community Organization, Oakland Planning and 

Development Corporation, Joan Dickerson, David Panasiuk, Millie Sass and Elena 

Zaitsoff (collectively, Objectors) appeal from the order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court), dated May 9, 2017, which affirmed the 

decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) of the City of Pittsburgh (City) 

determining that the two-unit use of the subject property may continue.1 We reverse. 

 

1 For context, the parties in this zoning appeal refer to three different iterations of the City’s 

Zoning Code. The current version was effective February 26, 1999 (1999 Zoning Code). 1999 

Zoning Code § 901.05. The current iteration amended and reenacted in its entirety the City’s 
2

Andrew and Nicole Redlinger (Applicants) are the owners of property 

located at 3202 Niagara Street (Property) in the South Oakland neighborhood of the 

City. Board’s Findings of Fact (F.F.) No. 1. The Property is currently located in a 

R1A-VH (Residential Single-Unit Attached, Very-High Density) zoning district. Id. 

The Property measures 25 feet by 200 feet (5,000 sq. ft.) and is improved with a 

3,200 square-foot, three-story building. Id. at No. 2. The building contains six 

bedrooms, two kitchens, two bathrooms, two furnaces and one electric meter. Id. at 

No. 4. There are three off-street parking spaces located at the rear of the building. 

Id. 

On October 13, 2015, Applicants filed an application with the Board 

seeking “continued use of structure as two family dwelling” (Application). 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 27a-28a; Certified Record (C.R.), Exhibit (Ex.) 4. On 

January 21, 2016, the Board held a public hearing at which it took evidence from 

Mr. Redlinger and from people who opposed the Application, some of whom are 

Objectors. 

 

zoning code that was effective May 10, 1958 (1958 Zoning Code). 1999 Zoning Code § 901.06. 

Prior to the 1958 Zoning Code, the operative zoning code was effective August 9, 1923 (1923 

Zoning Code). See Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 1b. The zoning codes were not 

submitted into evidence at the zoning hearing. Pursuant to an order of this Court, the City and the 

Board (Appellees) filed copies of the various versions of the Zoning Code with this Court. See

S.R.R. This Court may take judicial notice of ordinances. 42 Pa. C.S. § 6107.

The City’s current 1999 Zoning Code defines “Two-Unit Residential” as “the use of a 

zoning lot for two dwelling units that are contained within a single building.” 1999 Zoning Code 

§ 911.02. The 1999 Zoning Code defines “dwelling unit” as:

a building or portion thereof designed and used for residential 

occupancy by a single family and that includes exclusive sleeping, 

cooking, eating and sanitation facilities. Buildings with more than 

one (1) set of cooking facilities are considered to contain multiple 

dwelling units unless the additional cooking facilities are clearly 

accessory, such as an outdoor grill.

1999 Zoning Code § 926 (Definition #72). 
3

At the hearing, Mr. Redlinger testified that he purchased the Property 

in April 2015 and began to “rehab” it when he became aware that the City prohibits 

more than three unrelated people from living together in a single-family home. 

Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 5. Mr. Redlinger stated that the “property is a singlefamily home” and that “[i]t’s the largest single-family home in that whole area of 

south Oakland.” Id. When the Board chairwoman questioned Mr. Redlinger as to 

whether he was stating that it was always a single-family home with no separation, 

Mr. Redlinger referred to an affidavit by Nancy J. Norkus (Affidavit), from whom 

he purchased the Property. Id. at 5-6. Referring to the Affidavit, he stated that Ms. 

Norkus’ grandmother owned the property for many decades and lived on the first 

floor. Id. He also stated, “[f]or many decades her grandmother lived on the first 

floor, rented out the second and third floor. So for many, many decades it was used 

as a multi-unit.” Id. at 6-7. He stated that there were two kitchens, one on the first 

floor and another on the second floor, and that those existed when he purchased the 

Property. Id. at 6. Mr. Redlinger also provided photos of the Property taken during 

his initial walkthrough when he purchased the property, showing a kitchen and bath 

on the first floor and a kitchen and bath on the second floor. C.R., Ex. A-2, Appendix

(App.) C; C.R., Ex. 14; see F.F. No. 7.

When asked if there is an interior separation between the units, Mr. 

Redlinger replied, “[n]ot anymore.” N.T. at 7. When questioned whether his intent 

was to have separate units or to have sufficient space for six unrelated adults, Mr. 

Redlinger explained that his “intent is to put it to what it was for many decades back 

to what, you know, as a multi-unit, that there would be living on the first floor, and 

then living on the second and third floor.” Id. at 9. When questioned whether there 

were separate utilities, Mr. Redlinger explained that when he had the gas and electric 
4

utilities put into his name, they said “Niagara Street Floor 1.” Id. He asked the 

utility companies about it and was told that at one time the utilities would have been 

billed “differently.” Id. at 9-10. Mr. Redlinger also stated that there were two 

separate furnaces and ductwork but only one electric service. Id. at 10. He also 

explained that two furnaces are needed to heat the home because it is such a large 

home. Id. at 11.

The two-page Affidavit was submitted as evidence. C.R., Ex. A-2, 

App. B; R.R. at 49a-50a. The first page is a pre-printed City form that asks questions

to which Ms. Norkus responded: that she is personally acquainted with the Property 

“from 1954 to 2015”; that the building has been occupied as “multi-unit”; that there 

are “two” dwelling units within the building; and that she regards the occupancy to 

be a “rooming house.” R.R. at 49a. On the second page, which is a typewritten 

statement, Ms. Norkus stated that her mother is the former owner of the Property 

and that prior to her mother’s ownership, her mother’s parents owned the Property. 

R.R. at 50a. Ms. Norkus stated that she, her parents and her brother lived on the 

second floor since the late 1960s and that her grandmother lived on the first floor.2 

Id. She stated that the first floor had a kitchen, a bath, and other rooms, and that the 

second floor had a separate kitchen and bath, and there were additional rooms on the 

second and third floors. Id. She stated that prior to her family moving in, her 

grandmother used the Property as a two-family dwelling, with her grandmother 

living on the first floor and others living on the second and third floors. Id.

David Panasiuk, who has lived in the neighborhood and serves as 

president of the Oakcliffe Community Organization, appeared and submitted a letter 

and petition expressing opposition to the use of the Property as two units. F.F. No. 

 

2 We note the Affidavit does not state when their occupancy ended.
5

8; N.T. at 14-15, 17; R.R. at 72a-75a. Mr. Panasiuk asserted that although the 

structure has two kitchens and two bathrooms, it was never truly used for two units; 

that other single family homes in the area have two kitchens; and that the two-unit 

use would have a negative impact on the surrounding neighborhood. F.F. No. 8. 

Mr. Panasiuk asserted that members of the same family lived in any “dual units” that 

were in the Property. N.T. at 15-16. Mr. Panasiuk admitted that he has not been in 

the Property since he was a child and that he was basing his assumptions on the 

house next door. Id. at 16-17. 

Millie Sass, who lives in the neighborhood, also testified. N.T. at 18. 

She objected to any change from a single home to two units. Id. at 19. She admitted 

that she has never been in the Property, but stated she observed one gas meter, one 

electric meter and one water meter on the Property. Id. 

Wanda Wilson, a neighboring property owner representing the Oakland 

Planning and Development Corporation, appeared and opposed the proposed use. 

F.F. No. 9; N.T. at 28; R.R. at 76a.

Caroline Mitchell, a retired attorney who formerly lived in South 

Oakland and who continues to volunteer with Oakland community groups, also 

appeared to oppose the two-unit use. N.T. at 32, 34. Ms. Mitchell submitted 

information from historic Polk directories3 and census records demonstrating past 

residents of the Property. F.F. No. 10. The records indicate that a number of related 

individuals resided at the Property over the years and that at various points, only one 

phone number was listed for the Property. Id.; N.T. at 22-25. Ms. Mitchell also 

submitted records purporting to show the chain of title from Ms. Norkus’ 

 

3 The Polk directory appears to be a list of property addresses and names associated with 

each address. See R.R. at 60a, 62a-63a.
6

grandmother to her mother, Lucille Norkus, and that Lucille Norkus died on 

September 24, 2009. See N.T. at 21-22. Ms. Mitchell also offered records 

purporting to show that the house on the Property was vacant from 2013 to 2015. 

See N.T. at 26. Ms. Mitchell objected to the Affidavit, stating it was hearsay, and 

she also requested that the hearing be continued in order to bring in Ms. Norkus to 

testify. N.T. at 27. The chairwoman stated that the Board was not going to subpoena 

anyone. N.T. at 27; see also N.T. at 33.

On April 14, 2016, the Board issued its written decision. The Board 

concluded that Ms. Mitchell lacked standing to participate in the proceeding because 

she is a resident of Squirrel Hill and does not own property proximate to the 

Property. Board’s Conclusions of Law (C.L.) No. 2. The Board denied Ms. 

Mitchell’s request to subpoena Ms. Norkus. C.L. No. 3. The Board concluded that 

the two-unit use of the Property is a legal pre-existing nonconformity which has not 

been abandoned and may continue. C.L. No. 9. Although the Board’s decision 

indicated that Applicants sought only a “Review” under section 911.04 of the 1999 

Zoning Code for a “continued use of structure as two family dwelling,” Board’s 

Decision at 1, the Board concluded that the proposed use could also be approved 

under the use variance standards. C.L. No. 11. Ultimately, the Board decided “[t]he 

two-unit use of the Subject Property may continue, subject to the condition that the 

Applicant[s] provide at least two off-street parking spaces.” Board’s Decision at 4.

Objectors filed a timely appeal from the Board’s decision with the trial 

court, and the City intervened. See C.R., Docket Entries at 2. The trial court did not 

take any additional evidence, and the parties submitted briefs for the trial court’s 

review. See id. Thereafter, the trial court issued an opinion and order affirming the 
7

Board’s decision and dismissing Objectors’ appeal. Objectors now appeal to this 

Court. 

Before this Court, Objectors raise a number of questions which are 

condensed and reordered as follows. (1) Did the Board err by granting a 

nonconforming use permit based on hearsay? (2) Was there a lawful pre-existing 

two-family use (i.e., a legal non-conforming use) in existence on the date of a change 

in the Zoning Code and does such use continue to the present? (3) If there was a 

legal nonconforming use, was that use abandoned? (4) Did the Board err in granting 

a use variance?

Where, as here, the trial court does not take additional evidence, this 

Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Board committed an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion. See Valley View Civic Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of 

Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 639 (Pa. 1983). A zoning board abuses its discretion 

“only if its findings are not supported by substantial evidence.”4Id. at 640. We are 

mindful that this Court may not substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that 

of the Board. Tidd v. Lower Saucon Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 118 A.3d 1, 13 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015). Further, the Board is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight afforded their testimony. Id. 

Under the current 1999 Zoning Code, a nonconforming use is a use 

“which does not comply with the use regulations of the zoning district in which such 

use is located, but which complied with the use regulations in effect at the time the 

use was established.” 1999 Zoning Code § 926 (Definition #152). “A

nonconforming use which has a valid Certificate of Occupancy and lawfully 

 

4 Substantial evidence is such evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Valley View, 462 A.2d at 640. 
8

occupies a structure or vacant site on the date that it becomes nonconforming may 

be continued as long as it remains otherwise lawful . . . .”

5

 1999 Zoning Code § 

921.02. The burden of establishing that a nonconforming use lawfully exists is on 

the property owner. 1999 Zoning Code § 921.01.F; see Lamar Advantage GP Co. 

v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 997 A.2d 423, 438 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2010). 

A nonconforming use creates a vested right in the landowner. Pappas 

v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Philadelphia, 589 A.2d 675, 676 (Pa. 1991). 

Importantly, however, this Court has emphasized:

[t]he right to maintain a nonconforming use is only 

available for uses that were lawful when they came into 

existence and which existed when the ordinance took 

effect. It is the burden of the party proposing the existence 

of such a use to establish both its existence and legality

before the enactment of the ordinance at issue. “This 

burden includes the requirement of conclusive proof by 

way of objective evidence of the precise extent, nature, 

time of creation and continuation of the alleged 

nonconforming use.” 

“The manner of use and the dates of its existence are 

questions of fact on which a reviewing court defers to the 

fact-finder; however, the legality of a use is a question of 

law over which our review is plenary.”

 

5 One of Objectors’ arguments is that an occupancy permit would have been required under 

the 1923, 1958 and 1999 Zoning Codes and that occupancy without the required occupancy 

permits is not a lawful use. At the hearing, Ms. Mitchell stated that she checked the Property’s 

records, and that from 1940 through 2015, no one applied for an occupancy permit for the Property. 

N.T. at 24. Because of our disposition, we need not address the question of what effect the lack 

of a certificate of occupancy has with regard to the question of whether there was a lawful preexisting nonconforming use.
9

Lamar Advantage, 997 A.2d at 438 (emphasis in original omitted) (citations omitted)

(emphasis added).

Objectors argue that there is not substantial evidence to establish that 

there was a lawful pre-existing nonconforming use on the date of the change in the 

zoning code and that the use continues. In particular, Objectors contend that 

Applicants failed to establish that the two-family occupancy use existed lawfully 

under either the 1923 or 1958 Zoning Code in order to allow its nonconforming 

status to continue under the current 1999 Zoning Code. Objectors contend that there 

is only direct evidence that there were two kitchens and two baths existing at the 

time of Applicants’ purchase of the Property in 2015. Objectors contend that the 

Board’s finding regarding the creation and existence of a two-unit use and the 

continuation of that use is based only on the Affidavit. Objectors argue that the 

Affidavit cannot serve as substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination 

because it is hearsay.6

The City and the Board (Appellees), on the other hand, argue that there 

was substantial evidence that a two-unit residential use lawfully pre-existed the 

enactment of the 1958 Zoning Code.7 Appellees argue that the Board did not err in 

 

6 Objectors additionally argue that the Board’s reliance on the Affidavit was erroneous 

because it was in violation of the Board’s hearing notice, which states, “[l]etters or petitions are 

not accepted; therefore, your presence is required to present testimony.” R.R. at 40a. Objectors 

maintain, therefore, that all testimony must be in person. Objectors failed to raise this argument 

before the Board; therefore, it is waived. See Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight v. Zoning 

Bd. of Adjustment, 804 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). 

Objectors also argue that the Board denied their request to subpoena Ms. Norkus and in 

doing so, the Board denied Objectors a right to cross examine Ms. Norkus and denied them due 

process. We need not address this issue. Because of our disposition, the deprivation of due 

process, if any, is moot.

 

7 Appellees’ argument appears to concede that the two-unit use of the Property was also 

prohibited, and thus nonconforming, under the 1958 Zoning Code. Indeed, when questioned at 
10

admitting the Affidavit, but acknowledge that this Court has held that an 

adjudication cannot be founded entirely on hearsay. Appellees’ Brief at 23. 

Appellees contend that the Board did not rely solely on the Affidavit and that the 

Affidavit merely supplements substantial record evidence of a legal nonconforming 

use.8 Id. at 24.

The Board found that the building at issue was constructed in 

approximately 1900, and that it contains six bedrooms, two kitchens, two bathrooms, 

two furnaces and one electric meter. F.F. Nos. 2, 4. In addressing Applicants’ 

photographs taken during Mr. Redlinger’s walk-through when he purchased the 

Property in 2015, the Board stated that the photographs demonstrated the “historic 

condition” of the Property, “including the separate kitchens, two furnaces and 

separate bathrooms.” F.F. No. 7. The Board also found that “[t]he Applicant 

submitted an [A]ffidavit from Nancy J. Norkus, who owned[9]the [P]roperty from 

1954 to 2015 and who averred that the structure had been used for two units during 

that time.” F.F. No. 6. The Board credited Applicants’ evidence. C.L. No. 9. Thus, 

 

oral argument regarding under what Zoning Code Appellees claim the use was legal and 

conforming, Appellees’ counsel stated the 1923 Zoning Code. Objectors disagree that the use 

complied with the 1923 Zoning Code. 

8 Appellees also point to the current 1999 Zoning Code definition of “dwelling unit” and 

“family” to argue that the use is a two-unit residential use, in particular, because two kitchens exist. 

Appellees’ Brief at 17-19; see n.1, supra. However, the definitions that are relevant for Applicants

to establish that the use is a legal nonconforming use are not those contained in the 1999 Zoning 

Code. The two-unit use is not a permitted use of the Property under the current 1999 Zoning Code. 

See F.F. No. 1; 1999 Zoning Code § 911.02. Therefore, Applicants must establish that the use was 

legal at some time prior to the enactment of the current 1999 Zoning Code; this burden includes 

establishing the nature of the use and when the use was created. See Lamar Advantage. Thus, the 

relevant definitions are those contained in the operative zoning code under which Applicants claim

the use was legal, i.e., the 1923 Zoning Code.

9 We note the Affidavit does not state that Ms. Norkus herself owned the Property, only 

that she was familiar with it. 
11

the Board found that a two-unit use was created in 1954 and continued to 2015. 

Because the Board’s finding regarding the creation, nature, extent and continuation 

of the use is based on the Affidavit, we must address Objectors’ arguments 

concerning the Affidavit and whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

Board’s findings.

An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted, such as an affidavit, is hearsay. Pa. R.E. 801(c); see In re Farnese, 948 

A.2d 215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). However, the formal rules of evidence do not apply 

in local zoning board hearings. Zitelli v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of Munhall, 

850 A.2d 769, 771 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). “[A]ll relevant evidence of reasonably 

probative value may be received.” 2 Pa. C.S. § 554. Nonetheless, while “‘local 

agencies are not bound by technical rules of evidence, findings based solely on 

hearsay cannot stand.’” 1400 N. Third St. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Harrisburg 

License & Tax Appeal Bd., 175 A.3d 450, 454 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (emphasis in 

original) (quoting Goodman v. Commonwealth, 511 A.2d 274, 277 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1986)); see also McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm’n, 339 A.2d 634, 636 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1975), aff’d, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (stating that in a local agency 

proceeding, hearsay evidence can be admitted, but that an adjudication cannot be 

founded entirely on hearsay). Further, in the zoning context, this Court has stated 

that even where hearsay is introduced into evidence without objection, the hearsay 

statement must be sufficiently corroborated by other evidence in order to be 

considered competent evidence.

10

 See Lake Adventure Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dingman 

Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 79 A.3d 708, 715 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

 

10 Ms. Mitchell objected to the Affidavit on hearsay grounds, N.T. at 26-27; however, the 

Board, in its decision, determined that Ms. Mitchell lacked standing to participate in the 

proceeding, C.L. No. 2. We need not address whether her lack of standing makes it as though no 
12

After review of the record, we conclude that there is no corroborating 

evidence to establish that there was a legal pre-existing nonconforming use that 

predated the current 1999 Zoning Code. As stated, Applicants had the burden to 

establish the precise extent, nature, time of creation and continuation of the alleged 

nonconforming use. See Lamar Advantage, 997 A.2d at 438. Although Applicants

submitted photographs of the Property, including the separate kitchens and 

bathrooms, these photographs do not corroborate the Affidavit for the relevant time 

period. Indeed, Mr. Redlinger testified that the photographs depicted the Property 

at the time of purchase in 2015. However, there must be testimony to corroborate 

the Affidavit’s evidence of the use of the Property at the time when the prohibitory 

zoning code took effect and the two-unit use became a prohibited use under that 

zoning code. In other words, these photographs do not corroborate the use during a 

time prior to the adoption of the 1958 Zoning Code. Appellees also point to census 

records from 1940 which they assert demonstrate that two unrelated families were 

living in the Property in 1940. Appellees’ Brief at 22. Additionally, Appellees point 

to the Polk directories which list two names in 1940, two names in 1956 and three 

names in 1957, id., and they maintain that Ms. Mitchell conceded that two separate 

families occupied the Property in 1940 and 1956, id. at 26. However, these 

documents do not corroborate the nature of the use at the time of the enactment of 

the 1958 Zoning Code, May 10, 1958. Additionally, neither the census records nor 

the Polk directories corroborate the requisite continuity of the use. Because there is 

not corroborating evidence to support any statements in the Affidavit regarding the 

extent, nature, time of creation and continuation of the alleged nonconforming use, 

 

objection was made. Even treating the Affidavit as if it were admitted without any objection, it 

can support a finding of the Board only if it is sufficiently corroborated by competent evidence in 

the record. See Lake Adventure Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dingman Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 79 A.3d 

708, 715 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
13

there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the findings. See Lake Adventure. 

The lack of substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings is an abuse of 

discretion. See Valley View. 

Additionally, Applicants failed to present any evidence regarding the 

nature of the use and its relation to the 1923 Zoning Code, the Zoning Code under 

which Appellees argue the use was permitted. It was Applicants’ burden to establish 

that the two-unit use was both in existence and was lawful before the enactment of 

the zoning code under which the two-unit use was prohibited. See Lamar 

Advantage, 997 A.2d at 438; Moros v. City of Pittsburgh, Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 

527 A.2d 1117, 1119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). However, Applicants failed to present 

any evidence to establish the zoning status of the Property under the zoning code 

under which Applicants claim the use was permitted. Indeed, Applicants did not 

even present any evidence to establish in which zoning district the Property was 

located under the 1923 Zoning Code and did not present any evidence regarding

compliance with that Code. Applicants’ failure to address the relation of the 1923 

Zoning Code to the Property in question is fatal as matter of law.

11

 See Moros. 

Furthermore, because Applicants failed to establish that the two-unit 

use was a lawful pre-existing nonconforming use that continued, we need not 

address Objectors’ argument that the use was abandoned.

Lastly, Objectors argue that the Board erred by granting a use variance. 

Appellees, however, admit that the Board did not expressly grant a use variance. 

Appellees’ Brief at 8. Additionally, Applicants did not apply for a use variance, but 

rather sought a continued use of a structure as a two-family dwelling requiring 

 

11 Even if Applicants were to claim the use was permitted under the 1958 Zoning Code, 

Applicants also failed to present any evidence concerning the zoning status of the Property under 

that Code.
14

review under Section 911.04 of the 1999 Zoning Code. See Application, C.R., Ex. 

4; N.T. at 3. Thus, we need not address Objectors’ argument that the Board erred 

by granting a use variance. 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s 

order affirming the Board’s decision.12

 

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

 

12 In the “Conclusion” section of their brief, Objectors ask this Court for an award of all 

costs on appeal in their favor and against the City. Objectors’ Brief at 63. Objectors’ request is 

denied without prejudice to Objectors to renew their request through the proper procedures. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Oakcliffe Community Organization, :

Oakland Planning and Development :

Corporation, Joan Dickerson, :

David Panasiuk, Millie Sass and :

Elena Zaitsoff, :

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

Zoning Board of Adjustment :

of the City of Pittsburgh and the : No. 813 C.D. 2017

City of Pittsburgh :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of March, 2017, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County, dated May 9, 2017, is REVERSED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge