If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re THE MARVIN ADELL CHILDRENS’

FUNDED TRUST.

RALPH LAMETI, Trustee,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

KEVIN ADELL,

Respondent,

UNPUBLISHED

May 19, 2022

v No. 357133

Oakland Probate Court

MICHAEL ADELL, RHONDA ADELL 

SATOVSKY, LINDA ADELL FITZERMAN, and 

CLASSIC AMERICANA, LLC,

LC No. 2020-397042-TV

Petitioners-Appellees.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, trustee of the Marvin Adell Childrens’ Funded Trust (MACFT), appeals as of 

right the probate court’s order denying his motion for summary disposition in part, granting it in 

part, and ordering that he not make any change in the ownership of certain real property. Appellant 

challenges only the portion of the probate court’s order prohibiting him and respondent, Kevin 

Adell, from making any changes in ownership to the property. Appellant argues that the probate 

court abused its discretion because it did not consider the necessary factors before issuing a 

preliminary injunction. He also argues that the probate court deprived him of due process by 

failing to notify him it was considering issuing a preliminary injunction. We affirm.
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I. FACTS

This case arises from appellant’s performance as trustee of the MACFT. Appellees are 

beneficiaries of the MACFT. Until 2015, the MACFT held an interest in a tract of real property 

in Novi, Michigan (the Novi property). In 2015, the Novi property was foreclosed on and sold to 

another party, thus depriving the MACFT of a significant asset.

In 2020, appellees petitioned the probate court to remove appellant as trustee and surcharge 

him for alleged breaches of his fiduciary duties. Soon after, appellant moved for summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10). Appellant argued that appellees’ claims

were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches. He also argued that 

appellees failed to state a claim because the MACFT had been terminated after the foreclosure in 

2015; hence, there was no trustee for the probate court to remove. And, in any case, appellant 

argued, there was no evidence he breached his duties. The probate court denied in part and granted 

in part appellant’s motion for summary disposition. Additionally, and most germane to this appeal, 

the probate court temporarily enjoined appellant from making any changes in ownership of the 

Novi property:

I’m also ordering that there be—Kevin Lameti—I’m sorry, [appellant] and Kevin 

Adell shall make no changes in the ownership of the Novi Expo Center property, 

the property at issue here, whatever proper description that is, I guess it’s described 

in the real estate mortgage, it’s described in the Discharge of Mortgage, that there 

be no—that they make no changes whatsoever in the ownership of that property 

until further order of this court. So, that’s my order.

The probate court issued this preliminary injunction sua sponte, for there is nothing in the record 

to suggest either party requested an injunction. This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellant argues the probate court erred on two grounds. First, he argues the 

probate court abused its discretion by failing to apply correct legal principles when issuing a 

preliminary injunction. Second, he argues, by failing to notify appellant it was considering issuing

a preliminary injunction, the probate court deprived him of due process. We address each 

argument in turn.1

II. ANALYSIS

We review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to grant injunctive relief. Pontiac 

Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v Pontiac, 482 Mich 1, 8; 753 NW2d 595 (2008). A court “abuses 

its discretion when its decision falls outside [the] range of principled outcomes.” Id. “An error of 

 

1 We reject appellees’ argument that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal as of right. MCR 

5.801(A)(2)(i) defines a final order as one “allowing, disallowing, or denying a claim.” Because 

the probate court’s order denied appellant’s motion for summary disposition, the probate court’s 

order was one “allowing” appellees’ claims to proceed. See MCR 5.801(A)(2)(i). Accordingly, 

we conclude we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under MCR 5.801(A)(2)(i). And for the same 

reason, we conclude that appellant has standing to pursue this appeal.
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law necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Denton v Dep’t of Treasury, 317 Mich App

303, 314; 894 NW2d 694 (2016). To the extent this appeal requires us to interpret statutes or court 

rules, this Court reviews de novo the interpretation of both. Anderson v Myers, 268 Mich App 

713, 714; 709 NW2d 171 (2005); Hyslop v Wojjusik, 252 Mich App 500, 505; 652 NW2d 517

(2002). Finally, we review de novo whether a party has been afforded due process. Elba Twp v 

Gratiot Co Drain Comm’r, 493 Mich 265, 277; 831 NW2d 204 (2013).

To begin, the probate court had authority to issue the preliminary injunction at issue under 

MCL 700.1309 and MCR 5.204(A). When MCL 700.1309 and MCR 5.204(A) are read together, 

these provisions provide, under certain circumstances, a probate court may enter an injunction on 

its own initiative and without notice to the parties. MCL 700.1309 states:

Upon reliable information received from an interested person, county or state 

official, or other informed source, including the court’s files, the court may enter 

an order in a proceeding to do either or both of the following:

(a) Appoint a special fiduciary to perform specified duties.

(b) Enjoin a person subject to the court’s jurisdiction from conduct that presents an 

immediate risk of waste, unnecessary dissipation of an estate’s or trust’s property, 

or jeopardy to an interested person’s interest. Under this subdivision, the court shall 

not enjoin a respondent in a proceeding to appoint a guardian or conservator or 

enjoin a ward or protected individual. An enjoined person shall be given a prompt 

hearing, if requested, to show cause why the order should be terminated.

And, MCR 5.204 states:

(A) The court may appoint a special fiduciary or enjoin a person subject to 

the court’s jurisdiction under MCL 700.1309 on its own initiative, on the notice it 

directs, or without notice in its discretion.

Accordingly, the probate court had authority to issue the preliminary injunction, and that authority 

was not contingent on whether appellant owned the Novi property. MCL 700.1309(b) allows the 

probate court to enjoin “a person subject to the court’s jurisdiction . . . .”

Nevertheless, appellant argues the probate court abused this authority by failing to apply 

the four factors courts must consider before entering a preliminary injunction. See Slis v State, 

332 Mich App 312, 336-337; 956 NW2d 569 (2020). Those factors are:

(1) whether the applicant has demonstrated that irreparable harm will occur without 

the issuance of an injunction, (2) whether the applicant is likely to prevail on the 

merits, (3) whether the harm to the applicant absent an injunction outweighs the 

harm an injunction would cause to the adverse party, and (4) whether the public 

interest will be harmed if a preliminary injunction is issued. [Id.].

While the probate court did not consider these factors on the record, appellant cannot 

establish reversible error. It is undisputed that appellant had no interest in the Novi property when 

the probate court issued its preliminary injunction. Consequently, the probate court’s injunction 
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had no effect on him, and any error was harmless. This Court does not reverse on the basis of a 

harmless error. Ypsilanti Fire Marshal v Kircher, 273 Mich App 496, 529; 730 NW2d 481 (2007), 

citing In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 675; 692 NW2d 708 (2005), superseded in part on other 

grounds by MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 2.613(A).

For the same reason, appellant’s due-process claim also fails. The United States 

Constitution and the Michigan Constitution both provide that no person may be deprived of life, 

liberty, or property without due process of law. US Const, Am V; US Const, Am XIV; Const 

1963, art 1, § 17; Elba Twp, 493 Mich at 288. But due-process protections are triggered only when 

the government deprives a person of a life, liberty, or property interest. Mettler Walloon, LLC v 

Melrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184, 209; 761 NW2d 293 (2008). If the interest allegedly deprived 

is not life, liberty, or property, the Due Process Clause does not apply. Bonner v Brighton, 495 

Mich 209, 225; 848 NW2d 380 (2014). Because appellant had no interest in the Novi property, 

the probate court’s order did not deprive him of anything. Accordingly, appellant has not shown 

that his due-process rights were violated.

Further, appellant received constitutionally sufficient notice in this case. To satisfy the 

requisites of due process, notice “must be means that one who actually desires to inform the 

interested parties might reasonably employ to accomplish actual notice,” Sidun v Wayne Co 

Treasurer, 481 Mich 503, 509; 751 NW2d 453 (2008), and it must be reasonably calculated to 

apprise interested parties of the action and afford them an opportunity to present objections, Elba 

Twp, 493 Mich at 287-288. See also Dusenbery v United States, 534 US 161, 168, 170; 122 S Ct 

694; 151 L Ed 2d 597 (2002). “However, ‘[d]ue process does not require that a property owner 

receive actual notice before the government may take his property.’ ” In re Treasurer of Wayne 

Co for Foreclosure, 478 Mich 1, 9; 732 NW2d 458 (2007), quoting Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220, 

226; 126 S Ct 1708; 164 L Ed 2d 415 (2006) (emphasis omitted).

Appellant received notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of this action and afford 

him an opportunity to present objections. Appellees served each of their filings on appellant, and 

so appellant was aware of the claims against him. Most importantly, he was aware that one of the 

claims was that he mishandled the Novi property. Though appellant did not receive notice in 

advance of the preliminary injunction, appellant offers nothing to suggest due process entitled him 

to specific notice of a temporary remedy the probate court may impose. And “[a]n appellant may 

not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for 

his claims, nor may he give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting 

authority.” Movie Mania Metro, Inc v GZ DVD’s Inc, 306 Mich App 594, 605-606; 857 NW2d 

677 (2014), quoting Houghton v Keller, 256 Mich App 336, 339; 662 NW2d 854 (2003).

Equally important, in other contexts, we have recognized that a court may act sua sponte 

without necessarily violating a litigant’s due-process right to notice. For instance, we have

recognized that a court may sua sponte enter summary disposition on an issue not raised by the 

parties. To ensure the nonmoving party is afforded due process, however, the court must give that 

party an opportunity to be heard on the issue before its order becomes final. See Lamkin v 

Hamburg Twp Bd of Trustees, 318 Mich App 546, 549, 550-551; 899 NW2d 408 (2017); Al-Maliki 

v LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 489; 781 NW2d 853 (2009). Though the instant case arises in the 

context of a preliminary injunction entered sua sponte, the same logic applies. Though the probate 

court did not notify appellant in advance that it was considering entering a preliminary injunction, 
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appellant had an opportunity to be heard regarding the preliminary injunction. Though appellant 

did not take advantage of this opportunity, appellant could have objected to the probate court’s 

entering the injunction at the April 26, 2021 hearing, or appellant could have moved for 

reconsideration.

In summary, appellant has not established reversible error.

Affirmed. Appellees may tax costs as the prevailing parties. See MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Michael J. Riordan