No. 80-287 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

MELVIN K. PARRENT, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

MIDWAY TOYOTA, Employer and 

UNIVERSAL WJDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO. , 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court 

Honorable William Hunt, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Conner, Baiz & Olsen, Great Falls, Montana 

Tom Baiz argued, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull and Jones, Billings, 

Montana 

Rockwood Brown argued, Billings, Montana 

Submitted: March 26, 1981 

Decided: APR 16 1981 

Filed: APP l$fff 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This is an appeal from the Workers' Compensation 

Court's denial of claimant's petition to reopen a final 

compromise settlement agreement entered into after claimant 

injured himself in the course of his employment. 

The issue raised on this appeal is whether the 

Workers' Compensation Court erred in refusing to allow 

claimant, who is a minor, to disaffirm the "petition for 

final settlement" and reopen his workers' compensation case? 

On August 18, 1975, claimant, who was then fifteen 

years old, injured his lower back while in the employ of 

Midway Toyota, Inc., of Great Falls, Montana. At the time 

he was engaged in lifting heavy objects. 

Notice was properly and timely given by all parties 

in the dispute. Defendant accepted liability and paid 

claimant the appropriate amount of biweekly temporary total 

disability payments from August 18, 1975, through November 

15, 1976, at the weekly rate of $53.36. On October 6, 1975, 

a lumbar myelography was performed on claimant which 

demonstrated a herniated disk at the L4-5 level. Claimant 

underwent surgery in October 1975 performed by Dr. Robert 

Chambers. The herniated disk was removed and the 

posterolateral fusion from the fifth lumbar vertebrae to the 

sacrum was performed. 

On February 1977 claimant and defendant entered into 

a final settlement of the claim for 150 weeks of permanent 

partial disability benefits totaling $6,136.40, less credit 

in the amount of $640.32 for the permanent partial payments 

made after November 16, 1976. 

Claimant has been employed in the oil fields of 
Montana since his graduation from high school in June 1978. 

In the per forrnance of his work, he occasionally experienced 

low back pain when engaged in heavy lifting or straining, 

but he has been able to perform all work. 

Tom Mazurek, an adjuster, represented defendant in 

the settlement negotiations. He negotiated with the 

claimant's mother (natural guardian) and claimant directly. 

The petition for final settlement, based on a 23 percent 

impairment rating, was signed by claimant only -- and was 

witnessed by a friend. Claimant's mother was present at the 

time he signed the agreement. She did not object to the 

signing, nor did she or any other person of legal age or of 

"legal guardian status" cosign the agreement. Later, 

claimant and his mother requested that the money be paid in 

a lump sum amount. The Workers' Compensation Division 

denied the request. 

Claimant later filed a petition to reopen his claim 

pursuant to section 39-71-204, MCA. At the hearing, the 

Workers' Compensation Court found no evidence to indicate 

that there was any increase in claimant's disability from 

the time of the final settlement to the date of this 

hearing. The Workers ' Compensation Court found no evidence 

of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by defendant in the 

settlement. 

The Workers' Compensation Court concluded: 

"The claimant's guardian participated fully 

in consideration of the offered final 

settlement and though did not actually sign 

the final settlement petition, she nevertheless ratified and approved it on behalf of 

her ward, the claimant, to the same legal 

effect as if she had actually signed the 

petition . . ." 

Claimant argues this conclusion is contrary to the 
law. 

Claimant was a minor at the time the final compromise 

settlement agreement was entered into between the parties. 

The petition for final settlement is a contract, and 

contract principles, therefore, must be applied to determine 

the petition's validity and enforceability. Kienas v. 

Peterson (1981), Mont. , 624 P.2d 1, 37 St.Rep. 

The pertinent statutes are: 

Section 28-2-201, MCA: 

"Who may contract. All persons are capable 

of contracting except minors, persons of 

unsound mind, and persons deprived of civil 

rights. Minors and persons of unsound mind 

have only such capacity as is defined by this 

part, 28-10-104, and Title 41, chapter 1." 

Section 28-10-104, MCA: 

"Who --__-- may -- aEEoint -------Ian aqent, --- who may be an 

agent. Any person having capacity to 

contract, except a minor, may appoint an 

agent, and any person may be an agent." 

Section 41-1-302, MCA: 

"Contracts of minors--disaffirmance. A minor 

may make a conveyance or other contract in 

the same manner as any other person, subject 

only to his power of disaffirmance under the 

provisions of this chapter and to the 

provisions of Title 40, chapter 1." 

Section 41-1-304, MCA: 

"When minors -- -- may disaffirm. In all cases 

other than those specified by 41-1-303, 

41-1-305, and 41-1-306, the contract of a 

minor may, upon restoring the consideration 

to the party from whom it was received, be 

disaffirmed by the minor himself, either 

before his majority or within a reasonable 

time afterwards, or in case of his death 

within that period, by his heirs or personal 

representatives." 

Section 41-1-304, MCA, allows a minor to disaffirm 

his contract. Because the sixteen-year-old claimant signed 
the petition for final settlement in his own behalf, he 

alone was the contracting party. 

Tom Mazurek chose to contract with the claimant; he 

must, therefore, be prepared to accept the consequences of 

claimant's disaffirmance of the petition. The person who 

deals with an infant does so at his own peril. Niemann v. 

Deverich (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 787, 221 P.2d 178. 

Defendant claims that the mother, Hermoine Parrent, 

was present at all times during the signing of the contract; 

that the mother approved of the contract; that there was no 

objection to the contract; that the adjuster negotiated with 

the mother and the claimant during the weeks prior to the 

signing of the contract and that after the contract was 

signed, the mother was still aware of the contract rights of 

claimant and did not object to the same. Because of this 

close relation and continuous awareness of the mother, the 

contract is enforceable. We disagree. 

It is immaterial that Hermoine Parrent may have 

advised and counseled claimant with respect to his workers' 

compensation claim. The mother is the natural guardian of 

the minor claimant, but this relation only affects her right 

to the custody of the minor and does not enlarge her rights 

to the property of the minor. Claimant was the sole 

contracting party. He is the only party that bound himself 

legally to the contract. As a minor, he is entitled to 

disaffirm and rescind the final settlement. 

Contrary to defendant's argument in this area is Gage 

v. Moore (Okla. 1948), 198 P.2d 395. In Gage a fourteenyear-old boy brought an action to rescind a contract. The 

defendant refused, and suit was brought. The defendant 
contended that the plaintiff 's father had acquiesced in and 

ratified the purchase and, for that reason, the contract 

should not be rescinded and avoided by the plaintiff. In 

rejecting this contention and finding for the 

fourteen-year-old plaintiff, the court, quoting from 

Bombardier v. Goodrich (1920), 94 Vt. 208, 110 A. 11, 9 

A.L.R. 1028, stated: 

"'The right of an infant to rescind his 

contract is unaffected by the fact that his 

father was present advising and approving the 

transaction. The assent of the father adds 

nothing to the binding force of an infant's 

promise. . ." 198 P.2d at 396. 

It is the policy of the law to discourage adults from 

contracting with a minor. Tom Mazurek testified he knew 

claimant was a minor at the time claimant signed the 

petition for final settlement; yet, Mazurek was not 

discouraged from obtaining claimant's signature on the 

petition. 

The insurer, adjuster Mazurek and the Workers' 

Compensation Division have much greater expertise and 

knowledge in the area of workers' compensation law than have 

claimant and his mother. We are dismayed that these 

knowledgeable parties overlooked simple contract law. 

Defendant erred in not requiring claimant's legal guardian 

to sign the petition for final settlement on behalf of and 

in place of claimant himself. 

The final compromise settlement is set aside, and we 

remand this case to the Workers' Compensation Court for 

proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
We concur: