2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-7-2013

Tyrone Green v. Cynthia Sneath

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-2157

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Recommended Citation

"Tyrone Green v. Cynthia Sneath" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 1421.

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BLD-048 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-2157

___________

TYRONE GREEN,

Appellant

v.

DET SNEATH;

LT. HOLTZ; 

SUPT.LAWLER;

DEPUTY FISHER;

C/O SETTLE;

C/O TRESS; 

C/O EBERLING;

LT. KENDRICKS;

HEARING EXAM. MITCHELL;

JOHN DOE I all are employed at SCI Huntingdon;

JOHN DOE II all are employed at SCI Huntingdon;

DEPUTY CORBIN;

CHAPLAIN KORHORCHIK

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-00154)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 21, 2012

Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 7, 2013 )
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_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

On January 26, 2009, Tyrone Green, a Pennsylvania state inmate currently

incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Forest, filed a pro se civil rights 

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of Pennsylvania, naming as defendants numerous state corrections and law 

enforcement officials. Green’s complaint included allegations of retaliation, violations of 

his right to the free exercise of religion, violations of his due process rights, and the 

denial of his right of access to the courts. On March 26, 2012, the District Court granted 

the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Green timely filed this appeal.

We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we 

agree with the District Court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on 

each of Green’s claims, we will affirm.

I.

At the time Green filed his complaint, he was incarcerated at the State 

Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (“SCI-Huntingdon”). On August 24, 2006, 

Pennsylvania State Trooper Daniel Sneath was assigned to investigate a complaint by 

Green that he had been pushed down the stairs at SCI-Huntingdon by Corrections Officer 

Trainee Montgomery. Sneath first interviewed Green about this allegation at J.C. Blair 
3

Memorial Hospital, where Green was recovering from the fall, and his investigation 

continued for several months after Green was returned to SCI-Huntingdon. After being 

discharged from the hospital, Green was transported to the State Correctional Institution 

at Smithfield (“SCI-Smithfield”) to recuperate. While at SCI-Smithfield, Green was

placed in disciplinary custody in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) after receiving 

multiple misconduct reports charging him with threatening corrections staff.

On September 6, 2006, Green returned to SCI-Huntington and was placed in the

facility’s RHU. Green’s request to be released into the general population was denied by 

prison officials, who informed Green that when an inmate alleges that he was assaulted 

by corrections staff, he is placed in administrative custody for his own safety pending an 

investigation. In the ensuing months, Trooper Sneath’s investigation into Green’s 

allegations continued, and included additional interviews with Green as well as

interviews with Officer Montgomery and at least one other corrections officer who was 

present at the time Green alleged that he was pushed down the stairs. During his followup interviews with Sneath, Green alleged that while at SCI-Smithfield he was tortured 

and issued fabricated misconduct reports. On October 3, 2006, Green filed a civil lawsuit 

in Pennsylvania state court, naming numerous corrections officials as defendants.

On December 19, 2006, Sneath interviewed Green again at SCI-Huntingdon. 

Green contends that during this interview, Sneath and a corrections official from SCISmithfield threatened that if he did not drop his complaint against Officer Montgomery, 

he would remain the RHU for the duration of the investigation, which could take years. 
4

Green also alleges that Sneath told him that SCI-Smithfield employees were interviewed 

and had no recollection of Green. Green did not thereafter drop his complaint against 

Officer Montgomery. On February 26, 2007, Sneath terminated the investigation after 

finding no evidence to corroborate Green’s claims that he was pushed down the stairs by 

Office Montgomery or that he was mistreated while recuperating at SCI-Smithfield.

On April 10, 2008, Green was placed in the RHU pending the completion of an 

unrelated investigation into whether he violated prison rules. Green was released into the 

general population three weeks later, after sufficient evidence was not found to warrant a 

misconduct charge. On December 8, 2008, Green was again placed in the RHU, this time 

because a search of his cell on December 4, 2008, uncovered an unauthorized razor and, 

according to corrections officials, Green became agitated and threatening when he was 

ordered to leave his cell. Green was thereafter taken to the infirmary and placed on 

suicide watch before being transferred to the RHU because corrections officials 

determined that he was a danger to himself. On December 5, 2008, Green was issued a 

misconduct report relating to the incident, charging him with threatening an employee, 

refusing to obey an order, and possession of contraband in the form of a weapon.

On December 16, 2008, Green was transferred to a different cell within the RHU. 

According to Green, the corrections officer who moved him to his new cell made

negative remarks about Green’s complaint against Officer Montgomery. After moving to 

the new cell, Green was no longer in possession of his Quran. On December 17, 2008, 

Green filed a grievance charging that his Quran was purposely taken from him during the 
5

cell transfer. He requested the names of the officers who discarded his Quran, as well as 

$50,000 in damages. On January 19, 2009, the grievance officer found the claim without 

merit, informing Green that pursuant to prison policy it was his responsibility to bring the 

Quran with him when he moved to a new cell, and because he failed to do so the Quran 

was discarded along with any other property that remained in his old cell. The grievance 

officer also noted that Green had since been supplied with a new Quran, albeit a different 

translation, and that prison officials were working on obtaining a replacement copy of 

Green’s preferred version. Green’s direct administrative appeal of the decision was 

denied, as was his final appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Grievances and Appeals.

II.

Green advances a number of retaliation claims in his § 1983 complaint, arguing 

that his First Amendment right to free expression was infringed. We agree with the 

District Court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on these claims.

Green’s claim that Sneath and the SCI-Smithfield official coerced him into 

dropping his criminal complaint against Officer Montgomery during the December 19, 

2006, interview is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Kach v. 

Hose

Green’s remaining retaliation claims allege that as a result of his pursuing a 

criminal complaint against Officer Montgomery and filing a civil action against prison 

, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). Green does not dispute that this claim accrued 

on December 19, 2006. The instant complaint was signed by Green on January 21, 2009, 

more than one month beyond the two-year deadline for the claim to be considered timely.
6

officials in state court, he was placed in the RHU on April 10, 2008, and December 8, 

2008, and then moved from one RHU cell to another on December 16, 2008, during 

which time his Quran was destroyed. We agree with the District Court that, at least with 

respect to Green’s filing of a civil suit against prison officials in state court, he was 

engaged in conduct protected from retaliation under the First Amendment. See Smith v. 

Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002). We also agree that placement within the 

RHU for filing a civil action may be sufficient to constitute adverse action. However, as 

the District Court observed, Green is required to demonstrate a causal connection 

between the exercise of his constitutionally protected rights and his placements within the 

RHU in order to prevail on a retaliation claim under § 1983. See Allah v. Seiverling

III.

, 229 

F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000). Green attempts to demonstrate such a causal link by 

asserting that an April 10, 2008, order of the state court in his civil suit, which had at that 

time been pending for 18 months, directly resulted in the prison’s repeated decisions to 

place him in the RHU. We agree with the District Court that this scenario is implausible

not only because the state court’s order was temporally attenuated from the allegedly 

retaliatory responses, but also because the order was actually favorable to prison officials.

Green also argues that his right to the free exercise of religion was infringed based 

on his allegation that his Quran was intentionally taken from him during his RHU cell 

transfer on December 16, 2008. The defendants responded on summary judgment with 

evidence that prison policy is that inmates are responsible for taking all property with 
7

them during cell transfers, and any property left behind is discarded. We agree with the 

District Court that Green fails to establish that he was prohibited from practicing his 

religion in violation of the First Amendment under the four-factor test set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The first Turner factor asks 

whether the action that is alleged to have infringed on the inmate-plaintiff’s religious 

rights is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Sharp v. Johnson, 

669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012). On this factor, courts afford substantial deference to 

the judgment of prison officials, who undertake the “formidable task” of administering a 

prison. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 254 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, we find that 

Green points to no evidence in the record that his Quran was intentionally thrown out 

rather than discarded pursuant to prison policy regarding inmate property left behind 

during cell transfers. See McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 424 (3d Cir. 

2007) (when burden in summary judgment shifts back to non-moving party, that party 

must point to “specific facts” in the record such that a reasonable jury could find in its 

favor). Accordingly, we find that the first Turner factor, which is “foremost” in the 

analysis, weighs against finding a First Amendment violation here. See Sutton, 323 F.3d 

at 253; see also Sharp

Moreover, we find that the remaining 

, 669 F.3d at 156 (noting that the burden on prisons to show that an 

action is reasonably related to a legitimate interest is “slight”).

Turner factors also weigh against finding 

that Green’s First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion was infringed. The 

second factor asks whether the prisoner has an alternate means of exercising their 
8

constitutional right. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. In this context, the relevant inquiry is 

whether the inmate has other means of practicing his religion generally, not whether he 

has other means of engaging in any particular practice. See Sutton, 323 F.3d at 255. 

Here, after Green’s lost possession of his Quran, corrections officials provided him with a 

replacement within one day. When Green rejected the replacement because it was not the 

translation he preferred, officials sought to obtain a satisfactory version. Although there 

was a bureaucratic delay in finally delivering the new version of the Quran to Green, we 

cannot conclude under these circumstances that he lacked an alternate means of 

practicing his religion generally. We conclude that the third and fourth Turner

We also agree with the District Court that Green fails to establish that he suffered 

a substantial burden on the practice of his religion in violation of the Religious Land Use 

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2009). 

This Court has explained that in order to establish a substantial burden on the practice of 

his religion under RLUIPA, an inmate-plaintiff must show that (1) following the precepts 

of his religion would force him to forfeit the benefits otherwise available to other 

inmates; or (2) he faced substantial pressure to modify his behavior and violate his 

beliefs. 

factors, 

which focus on the impact that accommodating the inmate’s religious practice would 

have on prison staff and other inmates, also do not sufficiently weigh in Green’s favor.

See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277-80 (3d Cir. 2007). Under this 

standard, we do not find that the circumstances surrounding Green’s loss of his Quran, or 
9

the prison’s administrative delay in obtaining for him a replacement of his preferred 

translation, was sufficient to constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA.

IV.

Green further claims that his due process rights were violated on December 5, 

2008, when he was issued a misconduct report for threatening an employee, refusing to 

obey an order, and possession of a weapon. Green alleges that the report was fabricated 

and that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him. The Due Process 

Clause does not provide inmates with protection against the imposition of discipline 

unless it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). We have 

held that confinement in administrative or punitive segregation is insufficient, without 

more, to establish the requisite “atypical” hardship necessary to implicate a liberty 

interest. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-07 (3d Cir. 1997). Here, Green was 

issued a misconduct report because a search of his cell uncovered a weapon and he 

became threatening when ordered to leave his cell. Green was read the charges contained 

in the misconduct report, rather than being provided with a copy of the report, because 

inmates on suicide watch are prohibited from having paperwork in their cell. Following a 

hearing at which he was found guilty, Green was sent to the RHU for 60 days of

disciplinary custody. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Green was 

subjected to the sort of “atypical and “significant” discipline contemplated in Sandin and 
10

Griffin. See Smith v. Mensinger

V.

, 293 F.3d 641, 652 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding 7-month 

term of disciplinary custody insufficient to trigger due process violation).

Finally, Green alleges that he was denied his right of access to the courts when

Trooper Sneath and an official from SCI-Smithfield threatened him into dropping the 

complaint against Officer Montgomery. We agree with the District Court that this claim, 

which accrued on December 19, 2006, and was not filed until January 21, 2009, is barred 

by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Kach

VI.

, 589 F.3d at 634.

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 

Court.