J

- S45039

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NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ACKEEM MORRIS

Appellant :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 498 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 16, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at CP

- 51

- CR

- 0011393

- 2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 1, 202 3

Ackeem Morris (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder, aggravated

assault , criminal conspiracy to commit attempted murder , conspiracy to

commit aggravated assault

, firearm s not to be carri ed without a license,

carrying a firearm without a license on the public streets of Philadelphia

,

possessi on of an instrument of a crime

, simple assault, and recklessly

endangering another p erson

. 1 We affirm in part and vacate in part

.

The trial court summarized the factual history underlying this appeal as

follows :

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901 (a) and 2502

, 2702(a)(1), 903(a)

, 6106(a) (1)

, 6108, 907(a), 2 701(a)(1) , 2705. I mmediately after the jury’s verdicts, Appellant pled guilty to persons not to possess firearms. Id. § 6105(a) (1)

.J

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- 2

- This c ase stems from Appellant ’ s shooting of Brandon Davis ( “ Mr. Davis ” [or “the victim” ] ) on September 1 7 , 2016. Mr.

Davis ’ s multiple gunshot [] wounds were nearly fatal and included

a lacerated liv e r and kidney, kidney failure, a collapsed lung, respiratory failure, sepsis, internal bleeding, ac u te post

hemorrhagic anemia, and bone fractures. On th a t date, officers investigating a shooting were advised that the victim had been transported t o Temple University Hospital in a private vehicle. Mr. Davis was uncooperative and refused to gi v e an interview about the shooting.

Dete ct ives obtained video footage from the scene of the shooting which [occ urred] outside a corner store. The videos show Mr. Davis, a male later [] identified as Talil Williams [(Mr. Williams)] , and Appellant, w h o [wa] s wearing “ a black Khimar [(

, i.e. , a traditional Muslim outerwear garment)] , sunglasses, yellow

socks with blu e stripes on them, black sneakers ... [and] carrying a tan or goldish satchel or purse over his shoulder. ”

The vid eos show that Appellant enters a store, exits and shoots Mr. Davis multiple times from a proxi m ity of about five

feet. After the shooting, Appellant flees northbound on Carlisle

Street from Y ork Street. Appellant ’ s directions of travel led the

detectives to a nearby apartment complex at 2411 North 1 1 th Street, where they obtained additional vi d eos from the building ’ s surveillance cameras. These videos show a man wearing the

same Mu s lim garments, distinctive socks and satchel as the shooter, along with Mr. Williams, e nte r and exit the building together just before the shooting. Within minutes afte r the shooting, the two men are again on videotape entering the elevator together, and although Appellant ha d removed his traditional Muslim garments that covered his face and body, he

still wore black sneakers and [the] same distinctive “ yellowish

socks w ith blue markings on them. ” The video shows Appellant

re

- enacting to Mr. Williams how he shot Mr. Davis.

After extensive investigation, Detectives located Mr. Williams, who gave a statement identifying Ap pellant as the other person wearing Muslim garb involved in the shooting.

Det ec tives recovered the satchel the shooter was carrying at the scene, along with the distinctive so c ks and black shorts. DNA samples extracted from the black shorts matched the DNA
obtai ne d from Appellant. Gunshot residu e was found in theJ

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- 3

-

purse/satche l recovered from the apartment.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22 , a t 3

- 4 ( citations to record omitted; some

capitalization modified ).

The trial court also detailed the procedural history:

On December 1 8, 2017, this c ourt sentenced Appellant to

consecutive terms of ten (10) to twenty (20) years ’ incarceration for his convictions of attempted murder and conspiracy [to commit attempted murder] . This c ourt impo se d no further sentences for Appellant ’ s remaining convictions.

On D e cember 18, 2017, Appellant filed post

- sentence motions, which this c ourt denied on that same day. On January 10, 2018, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court (255 EDA 2 0 18), and on April 9, 2019, Appellant filed a

“ Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal ” co ns isting of forty

eight (48) numbered paragraphs. On June 22, 2020, the Superior

Court affirm e d the convictions [;] however [,] the court vacated the sentence impos ed and remanded for re

- sentencing to correct an error made by the trial court whereby it sentenced Appellant for committing two (2) inchoate crimes in error. [ See generally

Commonwealth v. Morris

, 237 A.3d 1072 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum) .]

On April 16, 2021, the trial court conducted a re

- sentencing hearing and while changing the structure of the sentence, [the court] nonetheless again sentenced Appellant for two (2) inchoate crimes, [ 2 ] in error [, which we explain further bel ow

. Appellant’s c] ou n sel thereafter filed an untimely post

- sentence motion to correct the sentence; said motion was denied. However, the trial court appointed new counsel to represent Appellant and he filed a

no ti ce of appeal to the Superior Court on May 26, 2021 (1141 EDA

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 With respect to attempted murder, t he court res entence d Appellant to 15

– 30 years in prison

. T he court imposed a concurrent sentence of 1 0

– 2 0

years for conspiracy to commit attempted murder

. Finally, for persons not to possess firearms, the court imposed a sentence of 5

– 1 0 years in prison , to
run consecutive to the s entence for attempted murder

. Thus, Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 20

– 40 years in prison ( i.e. , the

same aggregate sentence he received in 2017).J

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- 4

-

2021), despite the fact that the l a te post

- sentence motion would render the appeal untimely.

The re fore, [Appellant’s] counsel filed a praecipe to discontinue the untimely appeal (1141 EDA 2021) and filed a

ti m ely [] petition on September 1, 2020 [, pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546 ]

.

... [Appellant thereafter withdrew his PCRA petition, ] and the trial court granted reinstatemen t of Appellant ’ s right t o file his post

sentence motion and a direct appeal, nunc pro tunc

.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 1

- 2 ( footnote added; some capitalization

modifi ed).

On January 25, 2022, Appellant filed a nunc pro tunc post

- sentence

motion, seeking

, inter alia

, reduction of the purportedly excessive sentence

imposed at resentencing. Appellant claimed the trial court abused its

discretion in “increasing” the sentence originally imposed for Appellant’s

conviction of attempted murder. See Post

- Sentence Motion, 1/25/22, at ¶¶

13

- 14 (“At the [April 16,] 2021 [re]sentencing hearing, the court incorporated

its reasoning and bases from the [December 18,] 2017 sentencing hearing.

Despite incorporating the same bases from 2017, the court raised

[Appellant’s] sentence on the charge of attempted murder by 50% despite the

absence of any new facts warranting an increased sentence.”). The trial court

denied Appellant’s post

- sentence motion on January 28, 2022. Th is timely

appeal followed. The trial court and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

Appellant presents two issues for review:J

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- 5

-

1. Is the sentence imposed illegal where [A] ppellant was

convicted of

— and sentenced on

— both conspiracy to commit attempted murder, and attempted murder in v iolation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906?

2. Is the sentence imposed unduly harsh and excessive under the

circumstances of this case?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (issues reordered ).

Appe llant first claims the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because

he “was convicted of

– and sentenced on

– both conspiracy to commit

attempted murder, and attempted murder ....” Id. at 21. We agree

.

“The determination as to whether a trial court imposed an illegal

sen tence is a question of law ; an appellate court’s standard of review in cases

dealing with questions of law is plenary .” Commonwealth v. White , 268

A.3d 499, 500 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Our scope of review is

de novo

. Commonwealth v. Summers

, 245 A.3d 686, 69 7 (Pa. Super.

2021).

The Commonwealth agrees that Appellant’s illegal “sentence for

conspiracy should be vacated [.] ” Commonwealth Brief at 7 ( bold omitted).

The Commonwealth points out this Court’s holding

, in A ppellant’s direct

appeal

, that the original sentencing court improperly “ imposed a sentence on

both of [Appellant’s] attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murderJ

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- 6

-

convictions

— two inchoate crimes.” Morris

, 237 A.3d 1072 (unpublished

memorandum at 11); 3 see also Commonwealth Brief at 7 (same)

.

The trial court concedes it illegal ly sentence d Appellant with respect to

hi s conspiracy conviction :

The tr ial court held a re

- sentencing hearing on Aril 16, 2021, as per direction of the Superior Co u rt ( Commonwealth v.

Morris , 255 EDA 2018 Opinion filed June 22, 2020) to correct a

pre v ious error in sentencing, whereby the trial court imposed a

sentence on two inchoate cri m es in violation of Commonwealth v. Maguire , 452 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super

. 1982). In so doing, th e trial court again erred in the imposition of sentence by failing to recognize that a sentence on the 2 nd inchoate crime would still be illegal even if it ran concurrently, and not consecutivel y

. While [Appellant’s] aggregate sen tence of 20

- 40 years did not change, the structure of the sentence wa s illegal

. Therefore, this court recommends the sentence for conspiracy to commit attempted m u rder be vacated, and the remaining sentence be

affirmed. It was for this reason that the PCRA p eti tion was withdrawn, and Appellant ’ s appellate rights were reinstated nunc

pro tunc

.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 6 ( emphasis added; citations altered). We

agree. Because the sentence imposed for Appellant’s conviction of conspiracy

to commit attempted murder is unlawful, we vacate that sentence.

We next address Appellant’s second issue, in which he challenges the

discretionary aspects of his sentence imposed at resentencing . Appellant

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

3 The panel in Morris cited as support Commonwealth v. Maguire , 452 A.2d

1047 , 1050 (Pa. Super. 1982) (recognizing a trial court may not sentence a defendant on two inchoate crime convictions), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 (“A person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal c onspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime.”)

. Morris

, 237 A.3d 1072 (unpublished memorandum at 1 0

- 11).J

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- 7

-

emphasizes that when the trial court originally sentenced him in 2017, it

imposed on the attempted murder conviction a sentence of 10

– 20 years in

prison , whereas at resentencing, the court sentenced Appellant to 15

– 30

years for attempted murder

. See Appellant’s Brief at 26

- 27, 28. According

to Appellant:

The imposition of the significantly increased sentence on the attempted murder charge with no accompanying explanation of

what warranted the 50 percent increase is excessive under the

circumstances. The fact that the only new facts and information

adduced at the re

- sentencing hearing warranted a mitigation in the sentence, rather than an increase, results in imposition of a

sentence on this charge which violates the “ fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” The [resentencing court also failed] to adequately account for the additional mitigating

factors presented at the re

- sentencing hearing

....

Id. at 30 (italics in original ; break omitted ) ; see also id. at 29 (detailing

mitigating f actors , including Appellant’s difficult childhood and purported

mental health conditions).

There is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a

sentence. Summers

, 245 A.3d at 691 . Rather, where , as here, the appellant

preserved his sentencing challenge in a timely post

- sentence motion, he must

(1) include in the appellate brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise statement of the

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal of ; and (2) show that there is a

substant ial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code. Summers

, 245 A.3d at 691.

Instantly, Appellant’s brief includes a Rule 2119(f) statement, and his

claims present a substantial question. See C ommonwealth v. Knox , 165J

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- 8

-

A.3d 925, 929

- 30 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“ A claim that the trial court focused

exclusively on the seriousness of the crime while ignoring other, mitigating

circumstances, such as [the defendant’s] mental health history and difficult

childhood, raises a su bstantial question .”) ; Commonwealth v. Barnes , 167

A.3d 110, 123 (Pa. Super. 2017) ( en banc ) ( a claim of judicial vindictiveness

in resentencing following a remand presents a substantial question) ; see also

Appellant’s Brief at 23. Accordingly, we review the merits of Appellant’s claim

.

We are mindful of our standard of review: “ S entencing is a matter

vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will

not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Barnes

,

167 A.3d at 122 n.9 (citation omitted).

In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arriv ed at a manifestly

unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Fullin , 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. S uper. 2006) (citation

omitted).

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual

circumstances before it.

Commonwealth v. Moury

, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted).J

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- 9

-

The Sent encing Code directs a trial court to follow the general principle

that “ the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with

the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “ A sentencing

court has broad discretion in choosing the range of permissible confinements

that best suits a particular defendant and the circumstances s urrounding his

crime. ” Commonwealth v. Celestin , 825 A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citation omitted). The court “ need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in

question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court ’ s

consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender. ”

Commonwealth v. Schutzues , 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted)

.

The trial court must also consider the sentencing guidelines. See

Commonwealth v. Sheller , 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008)

. Here

, it

is undisputed that the sentence s imposed for each charge fall within the

standard range of the sentencing guidelines. See App ellant’s Brief at 32 n.19;

Commonwealth Brief at 6 . Therefore, we may only vacate Appellant ’s

sentence if “the case involves circumstances where the application of the

guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2); see

als o Commonwealth v. Raven , 97 A.3d 1244

, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2014)

.J

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- 10

-

The trial court opined it did not abuse its sentencing discretion , and

reasoned :

[ T ] o the extent that Appellant argues that the increase in his sentence for attempted murder to 15

- 30 years is excessive and an abuse of this court’s discretion, Appellant’s argument has

no merit. The aggregate sentence remains the same : 15

- 30 years for atte mpted murder and [a consecutive sentence of] 5

- 10 years for [persons not to possess firearms]

.

* * *

Appellant complains that when he was re

- sentenced, the

court failed to consider numerous fa c tors, including Appellant ’ s difficult childhood, mental health diagnosis, and various ways in

wh ic h he has changed during his period of incarceration. As noted by this c ourt, however, the l engthy discussion of the factors weighed by the c ourt at Appellan t’ s prior sentencing h ear ing was referenced and made a part of the re

- sentencing hearing. The

c ourt was extremely d et ailed when weighing the factors at [Appellant’s] first sentencing. In that regard, the c ourt recognized

A ppellant ’ s difficult circumstances:

THE COURT: Having r eviewed the presentence [report (PSI)] information that I have regarding [Appellant]

, and

all his family has already told the [c] ourt, certainly [Appellant] had a very, very diffic u lt childhood with his mother being incarcerated and his father, who was ver y forth [ right] with the Court in coming here today, also spending time in and out of jail. [Appellant] did not have his parents to rely upon, but he did have his grandmother, Ms. Harri s , who raised him and obviously still care[s] about him. She worked to support him.

Beca u se of her efforts, there was a somewhat stable

household for [Appellant] to grow up in an d his needs were met by his grandmother ...[.] Unfo r tunately, [Appellant] started having behavior issues very, very early in grade sch ool and has a juveni l e history that

reflects that

.... There are

... six commitments, I believe as a juvenile []

. Over and over and over [, Appellant] being disch a rged from placement, being put back into placement.

... Unfortunately, this went on all throughou t
school. Nothing [Appellant did] as a juvenile indicat [es]J

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- violent behavior, but certainly [Appellant’s] j u venile [history] ... mak [es] it clear [Appellant] was not particularly amendable towards the guidance that was being offered to him through the [c] ourt and throu g h all of his placements.

(N.T.

, 12/8/17

, pgs 16, 17).

The c ourt went on to note [ that at Appellant’s original sentencing

, ] Appellant received his high school di ploma but that

he had yet to o bt ain a legitimate source of employment. In that regard, Appellant admitted to supporting hi s own children by selling drugs on Lehigh Avenue [,] where he was earning good

money. At a g e 17 [,] Appellant was adjudicated for stat utory
sexual assault and he was committed as a juvenile un til he turned 18 years old. Then, he amassed 6 arrests, 3 convictions, 3

commitmen ts , 2 violation of probations, [and] 2 sentence

revocations. All of that occurred between the ages of 18

- 2 1 , when [Appellant] was arrested for shooting the [victim] in this case.

Thus, the record confirms that prior to imposing its sentence, this c ourt closely considered A ppellant ’ s [ PSI] , his lengthy criminal hi story in the City of Philadelphia, his repeated failure to rehabilitate, his abhorrent conduct in this case, his history of substance ab u se and mental health issues, his education, his lack of employment history, and his family and

p e rsonal circumstances. (N.T., 12/8/17

, at pgs. 16

- 24).

Rega r ding Appellant ’ s depraved shooting of Mr. Davis,

this c ourt [stated at the original sentencing hearing ] :

So [, Appellant’s counsel ] has argued mitigation for you based on your childhood and upbrin ging and did so very well, but I will note that having sat through the trial

and wa t ch ed [the surveillance] video over and over again,

... I have to agree with the prosecution that i t
shows som ebody who was intent on the execution of Mr.

Davis

....

Put together, what it all shows is someone who disguised themselves [ sic ] from head, almost to toe, in Muslim garb, walk [ed] down to that co[r]ner store, go in, go out, draw your g un, and almost in poi nt

- blank range, try to kill [Mr.] Davis and you nearly succ ee ded. It ’ s onlyJ

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- 12

- for the grace of God that Mr. Davis is alive and that you

did not face a h om icide trial and a homicide conviction.

In my mind ... what [Appellant] did shows the same type of c ulpability, the same type of intent to kill, the

same cold

- blooded premeditated plan to shoot and kill

Mr. Davis. ... [A] dding to the disturbing nature of what

we saw [on the video] was [Appellant] acti [ng] out in the

elevator [immediately after the shooting]

. Clearly [, Appellant was ] not in the least bit disturbed by what [he] had just done

, showing almost an animated reenactment

to Mr. Williams

....

I have to say

... that there are [] few times that I

have had on this bench for now 13 years that I ’ ve seen such intentionally, brutal behavior.

( Id. at pgs. 2 0

- 21).

Before shooting Mr. Davis, Appellant had already

amassed a considerable criminal record that i ncl uded twelve arrests, several adjudications or convictions, and multiple probation violations. Notwithstanding the many opportunities provided to him, Appellant made no effort toward rehabilitation

. ( Id. at pgs. 16

- 20).

Retu rn ing to [Appellant’s] re

- sentencing hearing, the

c ourt clearly stated that all of the aforesaid information w ould not be reiterated but would be incorporated into the record.

THE COURT: All right. I will say, of course, that I remember the details of this case very, very cl ear ly

. And I believe I stated on the record at sentencing all of the

reasons and all of the consi d erations that I have weighed in issuing the sentence that I did. I ’ m not going to go into a full recitation of those reasons again since they are already of record. I will just incorp orate that record into today ’ s record. However, suffice it to say, that this was

a col d [

- ] bloode d attempt

... to commit murder. And I did

find that [Appellant’s] actions [ after the shooting]

seemed to indica te that he was somewhat cavalier about his intent immediately afterwards as we saw on the video

that was taken when [Appellant] was in the elevator of the building as well as in the co urtroom.J

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-

(N.T.

, 4/16/21

, pgs 7, 8.)

Coun s el for Appellant argued [at resentencing] t hat the

sentence should be lowered to a total 10

- 20 years because App ell ant is still young and that a lesser sentence would enable him to participate in rehabilitat ion programs in state custody. Appellant exercised his right to allocution and detailed the ways in which he believes he has tried to better himself while incarcerated. Notably, however, Appellant did not express any remorse for his actions in connection with the [victim], nor did he express any concern for the [victim] and his family. The c ou rt was not compelled to comment nor question Appellant’s assertions in this regard.

* * *

Considering Appellant’s vicious and remorseless conduct in this case, together with his overall penchant for crime and disregard of its effect on his communi ty, this

c ourt’s aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years ’ incarceration is thoroughly justified

.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 6

- 7, 8

- 11 ( emphasis added; some

capitalization , citations and punctuation modified ).

Our review discloses record and legal support for the court’s reasoning

.

This Court reject ed a similar claim in Barnes

, supra :

We have held that preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing

scheme is a legitimate sentencing concern. See [ Commonwealth v. ] Walker

, 568 A.2d [201,] 205 [(Pa. Super. 1989)] ( “ Upon resentencing, a court has a valid interest in preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing scheme. ” ) (citation omitted). Indeed, a trial court properly may resentence a defendant to the same aggregate sentence to preserve its original sentencing scheme. See Commonwealth v. Bartrug

, 732 A.2d 1287 [, 1289 ] (Pa. Super. 1999) (noting a resentence of

7 1⁄2 to 15 years for burglary was lawful after not receiving a
sentence for burglary and having been given previously the same
sentence for theft by unlawful taking)

.... “ [I]n most circumstances, a judge can duplicate the effect of the originalJ

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- 14

-

sentencing plan by adjusting the sentences on various counts so that the aggregate punishment remains the same. ” Walker

, 568

A.2d at 206. However, “ [i]f a judge could have imposed the same aggregate sentence he handed down at the original sentencing hearing, and

... instead imposes a hars her aggregate sentence,
the presumption of vindictiveness could not be rebutted by invoking the need to preserve the original sentencing plan. ” Id.

In Commonwealth v. McHale

, 924 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. Super. 2007), overruled in part on other grounds as stat ed in
Commonwealth v. Robinson

, 931 A.2d 15 (Pa. Super. 2007),

we upheld the trial court ’ s resentencing of the defendant when his

conviction on the most serious charges, two counts of aggravated assault, previously had been reversed based on insufficient

e vidence. McHale

, 924 A.2d at 673

- 74. After remand, to

maintain the same total aggregate sentence as originally imposed,

the trial court increased the overall sentence on the surviving

counts. Id. at 667. Noting that the aggregate sentence remained

unch anged, we upheld the new sentence. Id. at 674. In so doing,

we noted:

[O]ur conclusion is not altered by the fact that remand

and resentencing were prompted by reversal of two of [the defendant ’ s] convictions

.... Whether remand is the

result of reversal of one or more convictions or vacation
of an illegal sentence, we conclude that the trial court has

the same discretion and responsibilities in resentencing.

Id. at 673

- 74.

... [C] onsistent with [] Walker

, and McHale

, the trial court ’ s resentencing [appellant] did not rise to vindictiveness because the

trial court here sought to preserve the integrity of the original sentencing scheme by imposing the same aggregate sentence.

Barnes , 167 A.3d at 124

- 25 (emphasis in original ; some citations modified ).

Finally , where, as here, a sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI, “it

will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those consider ations along

with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Conklin , 275 A.3dJ

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- 15

-

1087, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). “[W]here the court has been

so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v.

Ventura

, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Commonwealth

v. Fowler , 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“The sentencing judge can

satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the

record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the pre

- sentencing

report; thus properly considering and weighing all relevant factors.” (citation

omitted)).

In sum, w e discern no abuse of the resentencing court’s discretion

.

C ontrary to Appellant’s claim, hi s standard

- g uideline

- range sent ences were

n either excessive n or unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Walls , 926

A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “rejection of a sentencing court’s

imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds [should] occur

infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges.”);

Moury

, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating “where a sentence is within the standard

range of the guidelines , Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate

under the Sentencing Code.”).

Based on the foregoing, we vacate Appellant’s unlawful sentence

imposed for conspiracy to commit murder

. Because the trial court ordered

the conspiracy sentence to run concurrent to the sentence imposed for

attempted murder, our disposition does not affect the overal l sentencing

sc heme. See Commonwealth v. Henderson

, 938 A.2d 1063, 1067 (Pa.J

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- 16

-

Super. 2007) (stating that “since appellant’s sentences were concurrent , the

trial court’s overall sentencing scheme has not been compromised, and it

[wa]s not necessary to remand for re

- sentencing” after this Court held the

sentence imposed on one count to be unlawful); cf. Commonwealth v.

Tanner , 61 A.3d 1043, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding vacatur of a

consecutive se ntence in the context of a larger sentencing scheme

necessitates vacatur of the entire sentence). We affirm Appellant’s judgment

of sentence in all other respects.

Judgment of sentence vacated in part and affirmed in part. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/01/2023