Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1605-CR-1238 | February 28, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven Knecht

Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C.

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Zackary L. Schulz,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No. 

79A02-1605-CR-1238

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court 

The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-1508-F4-7

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Following a bench trial in Tippecanoe Superior Court, Zackary L. Schulz 

(“Schulz”) was convicted of Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine and 
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Class B misdemeanor false informing. Schulz appeals and argues that the State 

presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for dealing in 

methamphetamine. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2015, Adam (“Adam”) Wright lived with his mother, Elizabeth 

Wright (“Elizabeth”) in Lafayette, Indiana. On the evening of August 10, as 

Adam returned home from work, he entered the house to find his brother, John 

Wright (“John”), in the house with an undetermined number of other people, 

one of whom was Schulz. The interior of the house was smoky or foggy and, as 

later reported by the police, contained a strong chemical smell. Adam suspected 

that his brother was manufacturing methamphetamine, so he telephoned 911.1 

[4] Officers from the Lafayette Police Department arrived on the scene a few 

minutes later and were flagged down by Adam, who directed them to the 

house. As the police approached the house, they noted a strong chemical smell 

associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Looking through an 

open window, the police saw that the house was filled with a hazy smoke. They 

also saw John in the kitchen with a folded piece of aluminum foil. A fan was 

blowing smoke away from the stovetop. The police delayed going into the 

 

1 Adam, in an apparent effort to get the police to arrive quickly, also falsely told the dispatcher that shots had 

been fired. 
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house until they received the approval of the tenant, Elizabeth. Before they 

could obtain her permission, John and Schulz came out of the front of the 

house. The police apprehended John, but Schulz ran back into the house and 

peered out the blinds in the window. The police yelled at Schulz to come out of 

the house, but he remained inside and, at some point, ran upstairs and hid in a 

bedroom. 

[5] The police spoke with John, who gave them Schulz’s name. The police ran a 

check on Schulz and discovered that he had an active warrant for his arrest on 

another matter. After obtaining Elizabeth’s permission to search the house, the 

police entered and again noticed a haze inside the home and a strong chemical 

smell. One of the officers in the house had a police dog with him, and this dog 

located Schulz in the upstairs bedroom closet. The police told Schulz to come 

out of the closet, and he initially stated that he would. When he did not, 

however, the police sent the dog in after him. The dog bit Schulz, who quickly 

surrendered. At first, Schulz lied about his name but eventually admitted who 

he was and that he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. 

[6] The police searched the house and discovered an active methamphetamine 

manufacturing setup in the kitchen. The items the police found in the kitchen 

included a hydrochloric gas generator that was still smoking, table salt, coffee 

filters, sulfuric acid, pseudoephedrine, lithium batteries, and scissors used to cut 

lithium strips from the batteries. Also found was a fan blowing across a glass 

bowl that appeared to have been used to mix the ingredients to make the 

methamphetamine. A search of the garage revealed a “one pot” container that 
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was actively making methamphetamine. Tr. pp. 123, 131. A test of this vessel 

revealed the presence of methamphetamine. 

[7] On August 10, 2015, the State filed a four-count information against Schulz 

alleging that he committed the following crimes: Count I, Level 4 felony 

dealing in methamphetamine by manufacture; Count II, Level 5 felony 

possession of chemical reagents or precursors with the intent to manufacture; 

Count III, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement; and Count IV, 

Class B misdemeanor false informing. 

[8] A bench trial was held on March 22, 2016, at the conclusion of which the court 

found Schulz guilty of Counts I, II, and IV, but not guilty of Count III. At a 

sentencing hearing held on May 4, 2016, the trial court merged Count II into 

Count I for sentencing purposes sentenced Schulz to seven years, with four 

executed and three suspended to probation. The court imposed a concurrent 

180-day sentence on Count IV. Schulz now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[9] Schulz argues on appeal that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to 

support his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine by manufacture. Our 

standard of review on claims of insufficient evidence is well settled:

When reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to 

support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge 

the credibility of the witnesses; instead, we respect the exclusive 

province of the trier of fact to weigh any conflicting evidence. We 

consider only the probative evidence supporting the [judgment] 
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and any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from this 

evidence. We will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a 

reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (citing 

McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)). Circumstantial evidence 

alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Bush v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 

[10] Here, Schulz challenges his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine by 

manufacture. The relevant statute provides that “A person who . . . knowingly 

or intentionally . . . manufactures . . . methamphetamine, pure or adulterated,

commits dealing in methamphetamine . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a). The 

crime of dealing in methamphetamine is generally a Level 5 felony. Id. 

However, the crime is elevated to a Level 4 felony if “the amount of the drug 

involved is less than one (1) gram and an enhancing circumstances applies.” Id. 

at § 1.1(c)(2). One of these “enhancing circumstances” is that the offense was 

committed “in, on, or within five hundred (500) feet of . . . a public park while a 

person under eighteen (18) years of age was reasonably expected to be present.”

I.C. § 35-48-1-16.5(3)(B)(ii). 

[11] Here, Schulz does not deny that the evidence was sufficient to establish that 

someone manufactured methamphetamine in the Wright household, nor does he 

deny that the was evidence sufficient to establish that the Wright home was 

within 500 feet of a public park at a time when a person under the age of 
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eighteen was reasonably expected to be present. He instead argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to establish that he was involved in the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. Schulz notes that no witness saw him participate in the 

manufacturing process or in proximity to the labs found in the kitchen or 

garage. Schulz contends that his mere presence at the scene and the opportunity 

to have participated in the manufacture of the methamphetamine is insufficient 

to establish that he, as opposed to John Wright, manufactured 

methamphetamine.

[12] Schulz is correct that “[m]ere presence at the crime scene with the opportunity 

to commit a crime is not a sufficient basis on which to support a conviction.” 

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Pratt v. State, 744 

N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ind. 2001)). However, “presence at the scene in connection 

with other circumstances tending to show participation, such as companionship 

with the one engaged in the crime, and the course of conduct of the defendant 

before, during, and after the offense, may raise a reasonable inference of guilt. 

Id. (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000)). Here, there were such 

other circumstances. 

[13] John Wright was seen in the kitchen where the manufacturing “lab” was set up 

and at least partially operational. John’s brother Adam was concerned about his 

brother because he was “running around” with Schulz. Tr. p. 158. Schulz and 

John were seen together at the scene. Thus, Schulz was John’s companion. The 

course of conduct in which Schulz engaged is also highly indicative of his guilt. 

Schulz was in a house that was filled with smoke or fumes and reeked of the 
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smell of chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. A

methamphetamine lab was set up in the kitchen of the house, with fans blowing 

the fumes out of the window. Thus, Schulz was in a house with an active 

methamphetamine manufacturing process underway and in plain view in the 

kitchen, yet he claimed that no smoke in the house other than from cigarettes. 

After John was apprehended by the police, Schulz went back into the house and 

peeked out of a window, from which it can reasonably inferred that he saw the 

police. Instead of obeying their commands to exit the house, he hid in a closet 

and did not come out of the closet until a police dog bit him. 

[14] All of these circumstances support a reasonable inference that Schulz knew that 

methamphetamine was being manufactured in the home and was, at the very 

least, an accomplice to the manufacture of the methamphetamine. See Schaaf v. 

State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting rule that a person can 

be charged as a principal and convicted as an accomplice even if he did not 

participate in each and every element of the crime).

[15] Our supreme court has identified four factors that can be considered by the factfinder in determining whether a defendant aided another in the commission of a 

crime: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another 

engaged in a crime; (3) failure to oppose the commission of the crime; and (4) 

the course of conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime. Id. 

(citing Wieland v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ind. 2000)). Here, Schulz was 

present at the scene of an active methamphetamine lab, he was a companion of 

John Wright, there is no suggestion that he opposed the crime, and he fled from 
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police. From this, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Schulz was 

guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine under a theory of accomplice 

liability. See id. at 1043-44 (holding that evidence was sufficient to support 

defendant’s conviction of dealing heroin as an accomplice where defendant was 

present at the scene of the crime, was companions with the principal, failed to 

oppose the crime, suggested the place for the controlled buy to occur, and 

allowed the controlled buy to take place in his vehicle). 

[16] Schulz’s remaining arguments are little more than a request that we reweigh his

testimony of and that of John Wright and come to a conclusion other than that 

reached by the trial court.2 This is not our role as an appellate court. See 

Harrison, 32 N.E.3d at 247 (citing McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126). 

[17] In conclusion, sufficient circumstantial evidence supports Schulz’s conviction 

for dealing in methamphetamine. 

[18] Affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur. 

 

2

 Schulz also claims that the testimony of Adam Wright was incredibly dubious. However, the incredible 

dubiosity rule is inapplicable here, where several witnesses testified and there was considerable circumstantial 

evidence. See Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that application of the 

incredible dubiosity rule is limited to those situations where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory 

testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of 

the defendant’s guilt). Moreover, even though it was apparent that Adam was a reluctant witness, there was 

nothing about his testimony that was so inherently improbable that it ran counter to human experience such 

that no reasonable person could believe it. See id.