2018 UT App 155

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EVERETT P. WILSON JR. AND DARLA WILSON,

Appellants,

v.

EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20150150-CA

Filed August 16, 2018

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Samuel D. McVey

No. 110400083

Jack C. Helgesen and Craig Helgesen, Attorneys

for Appellants

Randall R. Smart and Jeffrey A. Callister, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER1 authored this

Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and KATE A.

TOOMEY concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 This case is before us on remand from the Utah Supreme 

Court. See generally Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance Ass’n 

(Wilson II), 2017 UT 69, 416 P.3d 355, rev’g Wilson v. Educators 

Mutual Insurance Ass’n (Wilson I), 2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471. 

In Wilson II, our supreme court reversed this court’s 

determination in Wilson I that Educators Mutual Insurance 

Association (EMIA) lacked standing to pursue a subrogation 

 

1. Due to a change in marital status, the authoring judge is now 

known as Judge Michele M. Christiansen Forster.
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20150150-CA 2 2018 UT App 155

action against the tortfeasor in its own name, concluding that

EMIA had standing to sue for subrogation in its own name 

under the terms of the insurance policy in question. Id. ¶ 22. On 

remand, we are instructed to address the parties’ remaining 

contentions. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.

¶2 Appellants Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson 

contend that EMIA’s claim was barred by Utah Code section 

78B-3-107 and that the district court erred in its allocation of 

interpleaded funds. Regarding their first contention, the Wilsons 

have failed to provide any meaningful analysis and have 

therefore failed to meet their burden of persuasion on appeal. See 

Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 12–13, 391 P.3d 196. As to 

the Wilsons’ second contention, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in equitably dividing the 

interpleaded funds between the Wilsons and EMIA. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s order allocating the 

interpleaded funds.

BACKGROUND

¶3 This case began in September 2010 with the tragic death 

of Jessica Wilson, who was struck by a car while walking in a 

crosswalk. Jessica died at the hospital a few hours later. Jessica’s 

insurance provider, EMIA, covered $78,692.34 of her medical

expenses.

¶4 In 2011, Jessica’s parents, the Wilsons, filed a wrongful 

death claim against the driver of the car that struck Jessica, 

seeking funeral expenses and compensation for the loss of 

Jessica’s companionship, love, and affection. In 2013, the Wilsons 

reached a tentative settlement with the driver’s insurer for the 

$100,000 limit of his liability insurance policy.

¶5 In January 2014, EMIA filed a “Complaint for Subrogation 

Claim” against the driver, seeking reimbursement for the 
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20150150-CA 3 2018 UT App 155

$78,692.34 in medical expenses it had paid out on Jessica’s 

behalf, with accrued interest.2 EMIA asserted its subrogation 

claim under the terms of its insurance policy with Jessica. The 

driver filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that EMIA lacked 

standing to bring suit in its own name. The district court denied 

the driver’s motion, observing that (1) Utah Code sections 78B-2-

105, 78B-3-106, and 78B-3-107 did not apply; (2) Utah Code 

section 31A-21-108 applied and allowed an insurer to bring “an 

action to subrogate in either its name or the name of its insured”; 

and (3) pursuant to EMIA’s insurance policy with Jessica, EMIA 

“was entitled to recovery against a third-party tortfeasor.” 

Consequently, the court determined that EMIA had standing to 

file its lawsuit.

¶6 Eventually, the parties agreed to consolidate the cases 

against the driver, and the driver filed an interpleader 

counterclaim3 against EMIA and the Wilsons, in which his 

 

2. “The doctrine of subrogation allows an insurer, having paid a 

loss resulting from a peril insured against, to step into the shoes 

of its insured and recoup its losses from a tort-feasor whose 

negligence caused the loss.” Birch v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2005 UT App 

395, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d 696 (quotation simplified).

3. An interpleader is an action in which a person deposits money 

or property claimed by others with the court so that the court 

can determine the respective ownership rights of the claimants. 

See Interpleader, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also

Terry’s Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah 1980)

(explaining that interpleader is an action “in which a person who 

has possession of money or property which may be owned or 

claimed by others seeks to rid himself of risk of liability, or 

possible multiple liability, by disclaiming his interest and 

submitting the matter of ownership for adjudication by the 

court”).
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20150150-CA 4 2018 UT App 155

insurer agreed to interplead with the court the $100,000 policy 

limit. EMIA and the Wilsons agreed to accept the $100,000 in 

settlement of their claims against the driver and to dismiss him 

from the lawsuit with prejudice, but they disagreed on how to 

allocate the funds.

¶7 After a hearing on the matter, the district court concluded 

that it was “equitable to divide the $100,000.00 equally between 

the parties, specifically, $50,000.00 to the Wilsons and $50,000.00 

to EMIA.” However, in recognition of the fact that the Wilsons 

had “labored more than EMIA to acquire the $100,000.00 that 

was deposited with [the] Court by [the driver],” the court 

determined that it was “equitable to reimburse the Wilsons for 

one half of their attorneys’ fees and costs from EMIA’s 

portion”—$16,667 in attorney fees and $9,150.69 in costs. 

Accordingly, the court awarded $75,817.69 of the interpleaded 

funds to the Wilsons and $24,182.31 to EMIA. The Wilsons 

appealed.

¶8 In Wilson I, this court determined that Utah Code section 

31A-21-1084 “contains no language granting an insurance 

company the right to bring a subrogation action in its own 

name.” 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8, 368 P.3d 471. We also observed that 

“‘it has been generally held that a suit at law to enforce [a] right 

of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the name of 

the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own 

name and right.’” Id. ¶ 10 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 104 (Utah 1944)).

Thus, we concluded that “EMIA lacked standing to bring a 

subrogation action [against the driver] in its own name rather 

than in the name of Jessica or Jessica’s estate.” Id. ¶ 7. Therefore, 

 

4. “Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the 

name of its insured.” Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 (LexisNexis 

2017).
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20150150-CA 5 2018 UT App 155

we further concluded that the district court erred in dividing the 

interpleaded funds between the Wilsons and EMIA, and we 

“reverse[d] the [district] court’s order and remand[ed] with 

instructions for the [district] court to dismiss EMIA’s claims and 

award all of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons.” Id. ¶ 13. 

Given our determination that EMIA lacked standing, we 

declined to address the Wilsons’ other arguments. Id. ¶ 7. EMIA 

petitioned our supreme court for certiorari, which was granted. 

See Wilson II, 2017 UT 69, ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 355.

¶9 The supreme court reversed, concluding that EMIA had 

standing to sue for subrogation in its own name pursuant to the 

express terms of its insurance policy with Jessica Wilson. Id. 

¶¶ 9–10, 19. First, the court discussed the law of equitable 

subrogation and observed that “[t]he law of equitable 

subrogation places limits or conditions on the insurer’s right of 

subrogation.” Id. ¶¶ 11–13. “One of those conditions is the 

‘made-whole’ principle, which states that an insurer is at least 

sometimes required to fully compensate its insured for any 

losses before it asserts a claim for subrogation.” Id. ¶ 13. The 

court then discussed subrogation by the express terms of a 

contract and explained that “[a]n insurer and an insured may 

agree to contract away the requirements of the common law of 

equitable subrogation. They may provide in an insurance policy 

that the insured need not be made whole before the insurer may 

sue for subrogation . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 18–19. With regard to the madewhole principle, the court explained that the principle “arise[s] 

as a matter of our common law of equitable subrogation” and 

that it “can be modified by contract.” Id. ¶ 18 (quotation 

simplified). Observing that EMIA’s insurance policy with Jessica 

“recognized EMIA’s authority ‘to pursue its own right of 

Subrogation against a third party’ without regard to whether the 

insured ‘is made whole by any recovery,’” the court stated that 

“[i]t is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of EMIA’s 

authority to sue for subrogation in its own name and without 

regard to full ‘make-whole’ compensation for the Wilsons.” Id.
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¶ 19. Consequently, the supreme court upheld EMIA’s standing 

to sue for subrogation in its own name. Id. ¶ 22. The court 

remanded the case to this court with instructions to identify and 

address any issues that remained for decision after Wilson II. 

Id. ¶ 23.

¶10 On remand from the supreme court, we asked the parties 

to submit supplemental briefing advising this court as to which, 

if any, of the issues raised in the original briefing in Wilson I

remained outstanding and needed resolution. The Wilsons 

identified two remaining issues: (1) whether EMIA’s claim was 

barred by Utah Code section 78B-3-107, and (2) whether the 

district court erred in its allocation of the interpleaded funds.5

ANALYSIS

¶11 The Wilsons first contend that EMIA’s claim was barred 

by Utah’s survival action statute, Utah Code section 78B-3-107.6

 

5. Aside from brief references to this court’s decision in Wilson I, 

the Wilsons’ supplemental briefing on the two identified issues

is almost identical to its original briefing on the same issues in 

Wilson I.

6. Utah Code section 78B-3-107 provides,

A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a 

person, or death caused by the wrongful act or 

negligence of a wrongdoer, does not abate upon 

the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. 

The injured person, or the personal representatives 

or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of 

action against the wrongdoer or the personal 

representatives of the wrongdoer for special and 

general damages . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017).
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More specifically, they assert that section 78B-3-107 “expressly 

gives the cause of action for a pre-death injury (all special and 

general damages suffered) to ‘the personal representatives or 

heirs of the person who died’” and that “[p]re-death medical 

expenses are part of an injury claim.” Thus, although they do not 

explicitly state as much, the Wilsons appear to be arguing that 

EMIA could not seek reimbursement for the medical expenses it 

paid out on Jessica’s behalf as part of its subrogation claim. We 

decline to address the merits of this contention because it is 

inadequately briefed.

¶12 An appellant’s brief “must explain, with reasoned 

analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record, 

why the party should prevail on appeal.” Utah R. App. 

P. 24(a)(8). “An appellant who fails to adequately brief an issue 

will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on 

appeal.” Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12, 391 P.3d 196 

(quotation simplified). An appellant “must cite the legal 

authority on which its argument is based and then provide 

reasoned analysis of how that authority should apply in the 

particular case, including citations to the record where 

appropriate.” Id. ¶ 13; see also Hess v. Canberra Dev. Co., 2011 UT 

22, ¶ 25, 254 P.3d 161 (observing that “a party’s brief must 

contain meaningful legal analysis”; that “a brief must go beyond 

providing conclusory statements and fully identify, analyze, and 

cite its legal arguments”; and that “meaningful analysis requires 

not just bald citation to authority but development of that 

authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority”

(quotations simplified)).

¶13 Here, the Wilsons’ argument is devoid of any meaningful 

analysis. See Hess, 2011 UT 22, ¶ 25. First, the Wilsons quote a 

paragraph from this court’s decision in Wilson I, wherein we 

referred to EMIA’s action as a personal injury action and stated 

that EMIA should have brought the action “in the name of the 

estate or intervened in the Wilsons’ action against [the driver]” 
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20150150-CA 8 2018 UT App 155

instead of in its own name. See 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 

471. However, the Wilsons have failed to provide any analysis of 

that paragraph or, more importantly, to explain how it supports 

their argument in light of our supreme court’s conclusion in 

Wilson II that EMIA could file a subrogation action in its own 

name based on the express terms of its insurance policy with 

Jessica. See 2017 UT 69, ¶ 22, 416 P.3d 355. Indeed, we are 

inclined to agree with EMIA that the Wilsons’ argument is 

merely an “attempt to categorize EMIA’s cause of action as one 

for personal injury” instead of as a subrogation action. Next, the

Wilsons simply quote Utah Code section 78B-3-107, providing 

no analysis. And lastly, they assert, without providing any 

pinpoint citations, that Morrison v. Perry, 140 P.2d 772 (Utah 

1943), stands for the proposition that “[p]re-death medical 

expenses are part of an injury claim.”

¶14 That is the extent of the Wilsons’ analysis, and it is 

inadequate. As we have stated many times, “an appellate court 

is not a depository in which a party may dump the burden of 

argument and research.” See, e.g., Wachocki v. Luna, 2014 UT App 

139, ¶ 14, 330 P.3d 717 (quotation simplified); see also State v. 

Davie, 2011 UT App 380, ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 770 (“An issue is 

inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so 

lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the 

reviewing court.” (quotation simplified)). The Wilsons have 

offered only bald citation to authority and conclusory statements 

without any meaningful analysis—they have failed to explain 

why, given the supreme court’s opinion, EMIA could not seek 

reimbursement of the medical expenses it paid out on Jessica’s 

behalf in its subrogation action. Consequently, they have failed

to carry their burden of persuasion on appeal.

¶15 The Wilsons next contend that the district court erred in 

its allocation of the interpleaded funds. “An action in 

interpleader is a proceeding in equity in which a person who has 

possession of money or property which may be owned or 
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20150150-CA 9 2018 UT App 155

claimed by others seeks to rid himself of risk of liability, or 

possible multiple liability, by disclaiming his interest and 

submitting the matter of ownership for adjudication by the 

court.” Terry’s Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah 

1980). “When a district court fashions an equitable remedy, we 

review it to determine whether the district court abused its 

discretion.” Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2006 UT 72, ¶ 13, 149 

P.3d 348. “This standard recognizes the district court’s unique 

ability to balance facts and craft equitable remedies and our 

corresponding hesitance to act as a Monday morning 

quarterback in such matters.” Id. (quotation simplified).

¶16 Here, the district court found that the Wilsons suffered 

damages for the loss of the love and affection of their daughter, 

as well as funeral expenses, which amount exceeded the 

$100,000.00 deposited with the court. The court also found that 

EMIA disbursed a substantial amount7 for Jessica’s medical 

expenses. The court then noted that the $100,000 interpleaded by 

the driver was “insufficient to satisfy the damages claimed by 

the Wilsons and EMIA.” The court further found that the 

Wilsons had been in litigation with the driver for a longer period 

of time than EMIA and that the Wilsons had “labored more than 

EMIA to acquire the $100,000.00 that was deposited with [the] 

Court by [the driver].” Lastly, the court found that both parties 

had incurred attorney fees and costs, and the Wilsons 

 

7. The district court’s order states, “The amount of damages 

claimed by EMIA for the medical expenses paid [on] behalf of 

Jessica Wilson also exceed[s] $100,000.00.” The amount EMIA 

sought to recoup for medical expenses in its subrogation action, 

however, was $78,692.34. See supra ¶ 5. We also note that, in 

briefing the issue of allocation in the district court, the parties 

did not dispute that $78,692.34 represented the full amount 

EMIA paid in medical expenses for Jessica.
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specifically had paid $33,334 in attorney fees and $18,301.38 in 

litigation costs.

¶17 The district court then observed that “[i]nterpleader

actions filed pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure are equitable in nature” and that, because the parties’ 

claims to the $100,000 exceeded that amount, the court had to 

“balance the equities and determine how that amount should be 

allocated.” Relying on its factual findings, the court stated that 

“[t]he equities that should be balanced in this matter are the 

Wilsons’ loss of their daughter and EMIA’s claim for 

reimbursement for the medical expenses it paid out [on] behalf 

of Jessica Wilson.” The court determined that it was equitable to 

divide the $100,000 equally between the parties, that is, 

$50,000.00 to the Wilsons and $50,000.00 to EMIA. However, 

recognizing that the Wilsons’ efforts to obtain the $100,000 were 

disproportionate to those of EMIA, the court further determined

that it was equitable to reimburse the Wilsons for one-half of 

their attorney fees and costs from EMIA’s portion of the funds. 

Accordingly, the court awarded $75,817.69 to the Wilsons and 

$24,182.31 to EMIA.

¶18 The Wilsons do not challenge the district court’s factual 

findings. Instead, they assert that the district court’s allocation of 

the interpleaded funds was incorrect for two reasons: 

(1) “wrongful death claimants have ‘superior equity’” over an 

insurer attempting to enforce its subrogation rights, and (2) there 

is a “priority of payment” in situations, like this one, where there 

are multiple parties competing for the same settlement proceeds. 

We address these arguments in turn.

¶19 First, relying on Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988), the Wilsons assert that 

“parents in a Utah wrongful death action have ‘superior equity’ 

over a subrogated insurer and are entitled to be made whole.” 

We are not persuaded.
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20150150-CA 11 2018 UT App 155

¶20 In Hill, our supreme court explained that “[s]ubrogation is 

an equitable doctrine and is governed by equitable principles.” 

Id. at 866. “This doctrine,” the court continued, “can be modified 

by contract, but in the absence of express terms to the contrary, 

the insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to 

be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor.” 

Id. In other words, in the absence of a clear contract to the 

contrary, an insurer cannot assert its equitable subrogation rights 

against a tortfeasor unless its insured has been made whole. See 

id.

¶21 The equitable-subrogation and made-whole principles 

described in Hill are inapplicable to this case. Indeed, in Wilson 

II, our supreme court ruled that EMIA’s authority to sue for 

subrogation was based in contract—EMIA’s insurance policy 

with Jessica Wilson. 2017 UT 69, ¶¶ 9–10, 19, 416 P.3d 355. The 

court explained that “[t]he made-whole principle . . . arise[s] as a 

matter of our common law of equitable subrogation” and that 

the made-whole principle “‘can be modified by contract.’” Id.

¶ 18 (quoting Hill, 765 P.2d at 866). Observing that EMIA’s 

policy with Jessica specifically “recognized EMIA’s authority ‘to 

pursue its own right of Subrogation against a third party’ 

without regard to whether the insured ‘is made whole by any 

recovery,’” the supreme court stated that “[i]t is difficult to 

imagine a clearer statement of EMIA’s authority to sue for 

subrogation in its own name and without regard to full ‘makewhole’ compensation for the Wilsons.” Id. ¶ 19. Because Jessica’s 

policy with EMIA was sufficiently clear to contract away the

common law principles of equitable subrogation, the 

made-whole principle—the general rule that the insured be 

made whole before the insurer can recover from the tortfeasor—

does not apply in this case.

¶22 Second, the Wilsons assert that Utah law establishes “[a] 

priority of payment in competing claims.” More specifically, 

they assert that “[w]hen victims (like the Wilsons) and a 
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20150150-CA 12 2018 UT App 155

subrogated insurer (like EMIA) compete for the same settlement 

proceeds, Utah law establishes a priority of payment, and gives 

first priority to the claimant with ‘superior equity.’” (Emphasis 

omitted.) The Wilsons cite Section 5 of Article 16 of the Utah 

Constitution, and Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., 598 P.2d 

1320 (Utah 1979), to support their “first priority” argument.

¶23 Section 5 of Article 16 of the Utah Constitution provides, 

“The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in 

death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable 

shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases 

where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided 

for by law.” Utah Const. art. XVI, § 5. Our supreme court has 

observed that Article 16, Section 5 “enshrines two separate 

protections on the right to recover for wrongful death”: (1) “that 

the right to recover damages ‘shall never be abrogated’” and 

(2) “that the amount of the damages ‘shall not be subject to any 

statutory limitation.’” Smith v. United States, 2015 UT 68, ¶ 18, 

356 P.3d 1249. The Wilsons provide no explanation or analysis as 

to how either protection has been implicated or violated in this 

case. Moreover, as EMIA correctly observes, the Wilsons 

“provide no argument or analysis as to how Article Sixteen of 

the Utah Constitution supposedly supports their proposition 

that [they] have a superior right of recovery over EMIA.” 

Because the Wilsons’ argument is “devoid of any meaningful 

analysis,” we conclude that it is inadequately briefed and decline 

to address it further. See State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ¶ 12, 

52 P.3d 467 (quotation simplified).

¶24 Citing Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., 598 P.2d 1320 

(Utah 1979), the Wilsons also assert that “heirs have a superior 

right to be made whole ahead of the insurer which paid medical 

expenses, even in light of an arguably conflicting statutory 

scheme.” But Oliveras does not stand for the proposition 

advanced by the Wilsons. In that case, after the decedent was 

killed in a workplace accident, the State Insurance Fund (the 
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20150150-CA 13 2018 UT App 155

Fund) paid out compensation benefits to the decedent’s 

dependent heirs who qualified for such benefits under the 

workers’ compensation statute then in effect. Id. at 1321–22. The 

decedent also had two nondependent heirs who did not receive 

any worker’s compensation benefits, but they were later 

awarded damages in a separate wrongful death action. Id. at 

1322. The dependent heirs also received damages in the 

wrongful death action. Id. The workers’ compensation statute 

then in effect authorized the Fund to seek reimbursement from 

any amount received in the wrongful death action “for the 

payments made by the Fund to dependents.” Id. The Fund 

sought to be reimbursed from both the dependent and 

nondependent heirs for the compensation benefits it had paid 

out. Id. The Utah Supreme Court ultimately determined that, 

while the Fund was entitled to reimbursement from the 

dependent heirs’ share of the recovery in the wrongful death 

action, the Fund was not entitled to reimbursement from the 

share of the nondependent heirs’ recovery, as the nondependent 

heirs had received no workers’ compensation benefits from the 

Fund. See id. at 1324–25.

¶25 Essentially, the Oliveras case dealt with the Fund’s 

statutory right to reimbursement from certain heirs and the 

limitations of those rights as against other heirs. As EMIA 

correctly observes, Oliveras had nothing to do “with the general 

priority of an heir’s claim versus an insurer’s claim against a 

third-party tortfeasor.” Accordingly, we conclude that Oliveras is 

inapplicable to the present case. The Wilsons have not cited any 

other authority to support their “first priority” argument, and 

they have therefore failed to demonstrate that they have a 

superior right to the interpleaded funds.

¶26 Turning to the district court’s equitable allocation of the 

interpleaded funds, as previously discussed, “[w]hen a district 

court fashions an equitable remedy, we review it to determine 

whether the district court abused its discretion.” Collard v. Nagle 
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20150150-CA 14 2018 UT App 155

Constr., Inc., 2006 UT 72, ¶ 13, 149 P.3d 348. Here, the district 

court recognized that the interpleaded funds were insufficient to 

satisfy either of the Wilsons’ or EMIA’s claims, and it divided 

the funds equally between the parties. The court then equitably 

reimbursed the Wilsons, out of EMIA’s portion of the funds, for 

one-half of their attorney fees and costs. Although equity might 

have countenanced the court awarding more of the interpleaded 

funds to the Wilsons, equity did not demand that the court do 

so. The Wilsons received approximately three-fourths of the 

interpleaded funds, and we are unable to conclude that the court 

abused its discretion in allocating the funds as it did. See id.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We conclude that the Wilsons’ argument that EMIA’s 

claim was barred by Utah Code section 78B-3-107 is 

inadequately briefed. We further conclude that the district court 

acted within its discretion in allocating the interpleaded funds. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s allocation of those funds.