Ortiz and L auric ella ar e husband a nd wife. We wi l l re fe r t o the par ties collectively

as 1
“ a p p e l l an t s ” an d

“ a p p e l l e e s ” f

o r c l ar i t y. Ap pe lla nts de sc ri be Ol ive r’ s Co un tr y Sto re a s “a s g e ne ra l countr y sto re wi th g a s p ump s, 2 car wash, a rea s for g roce ries, fe ed store items a nd hardwar e fo r sale. The re w as the c onvenienc e store ar ea, a

n are a whe re f

ood could be c ooked, ser

ved and e aten a

nd a g ame r oom are a, as w ell.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 198 -CV
Milton R. Oliver and Vicky L. O liver , Appellan ts
v. Alexander Ort iz and Regina L auricella , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 201S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-05- 0045 91 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE B Y RNE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Milt o nR. an d

V ic ky L
. O li v e r

a p p e a l f r o m a d is tr ic t c o u rt j u d g me n t a w ar d ing dama g e s and

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Al e xan de r O rt iz and Re g ina L a ur ic e lla on

c laim s re latin g to 1 appellants’ sa le to appellee s of a busine s s , “Oliver ’s Country Store,” located in Red Rock, B a s t r o p C o u n t y. The judg ment was ba sed on jury finding s that Milton or Vicky Oliver ha d violated 2 the Texas Dec eptive Tra de Prac tices Ac t in connec tion with the sa le. Appellants c ontended at trial that a pp e lle e s h a d in du c e d th e m in to t he tr ans a c tio n b y

m i s r e p r e s e nt i n g

a nd c on c e a lin g mate ri a l f

a c ts
a bo ut t he bu sin e ss a

nd pr op e rt y , c a us ingthe m to los e the va lue of th eir in ves tm ent. On a pp e a l, appellants contend that appellee s cannot recove r on these claims as a matter of law bec ause a

ppellees2

purcha sed the business and pr operty “as is,” the reby

neg ating the eleme nt of ca usation as a matter of law. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assoc ., Ltd. , 806 S. W
. 2 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 1 -62 (Te x . 1995). F or the re a so ns e xpla ine d h e re in, we wi ll a ff ir m th e jud g me nt. I n November

2003, appellants had purcha sed t he real prope rty on which the store was located f rom Pat and Henr ietta Meuth. Appellants paid the Meuths cash a nd executed a $225,000

n o t e s e c u r e d

b y a v e n d o r ’ s l i e nan d

a d e e d o f t r u s to nt h e r e a l p r o p e rt y an d t h e s t o r e ’ s m a c h i n e r

y, equip me nt, f

u r niture, fixtures, supplies, inventory , proce eds of a nd afte r-a cquire d collater al. Among other rig hts under the a g ree ments, the dee d of trust stated t h at t h e M eu ths could decla re the debt imm e diate ly

pa y a ble and inv ok e re medi es for def

a ult if a pp e lla nts tr ans fe rr e d a

ny of the pr op e rt

y
secur ing the debt without the Meut h s’s consent to a pe rson other tha n a “pe rmitted transfe ree ,” which
we re g e ne ra lly

lim ite d to a

pp e lla nts ’ i mme diate fa

mil y or e nti tie s un de r the ir

ow ne rs hip or

c on tr ol. I n September 2005, a ppellants place d a cla ssified advertisement in the Austin American-Statesman stating, “ Gene ral S t o re w/car w ash on 3.5 ac in Ba strop are a,” a nd listi ng a conta ct phone number . On September 20, Ortiz respond ed t o the ad. A se ries of
conver sations—mostl y by telephone—f ollowed between appellants and appe llees, chie fly Ortiz and Milton Oli ver. The parties dispute the c onten t of these c onversations. Appellees cla imed that appellants re peate dly

repr esente d that the store had been grossing betwee n $30,000 and $40,000 pe r month and ne tti ng pr of it of $2 ,0 00 pe r month. Ap pe lla nts c on te nd e d th a t th e y

ha d in dic a te d o nly that the store c ou ld

make that much money , and had on occa sion. Appellants also complaine d that
a pp e lle e s h a d r e fu se d to sh owthe m th e sto re ’s bo ok s.3 The pa rties closed the transac tion only ten day s later. Or

tiz testif i ed at t ri al t hat he ha d p ur c ha se d a

nd so ld r e a l e state in t

he pas t and

ha d a lso purc ha se d, op e rate d a nd so ld various businesses. He did not seek leg al counsel or out side opinions prior to purchase , explaining that “[i] n the beg inning I

consulted lawyers a

nd expert opinions” but “later on Ig ot better at it [ and] Ire lie d le ss a

nd le ss o n th e ir

e xpe rt ise be c a

us e in my pe rs on a l e xpe ri e nc e de a lin g wi th a n e xpe rt in bu sin e ss d oe s n ot gua

ra nte e it wi ll make a g oo d inv e stm e nt o r n ot. So I re lie d mo re and

mor e on my own per sonal experience , and it has worke d for me in the past.” O rtiz t estified that whe n purcha sing a business, he focuse d primarily on anticipated r evenue s. Rely ing on the repr esentations reg arding the sto re ’s pr of

ita bil ity that he a lle g e d a

pp e lla nts ma de , Or

tiz c a lc ulate d that he c ou ld e arn a su ita ble return on his investment. He added that it was not unusual for him to conclude suc h a tra nsaction wi thi n te n d ay s.

At closing , ap p el l ees paid appellants $180,000 in ca sh. The par ties executed a

“ Com mer cia l L e a se ” wh e re by a pp e lle e s a g re e d to le a se the sto re pr e mis e s f ro m a pp e lle e s in
exc h ange f

or monthly

rent pa y ments of appr ox imately $1,500 for 157 months—$220,000 total—with the rig ht to purchase the prope rty at an amortiz ed pric e. Appe llees we re a lso provided a “B ill of Sale” for

the “Tr ansfe rre d Properties,” define d as “Entire I nventory consisting of foodstuffs, pe rishable items, dry -g oods, non-alcoholic be vera g es and a ll other items for re sale o[n] the pre mises as o f t h e d ate he reof .” Of rele vance to this appeal is the following provision of the Bill of Sale:4 WI TH THE EX CEPTI ON OF THE WARRANTI ES OF TI TL E, I NCL UDI NG THE WARRANTY THA T NO L I ENS EXI ST ON THE TRANSFE RRED PR OPERTI ES EXCE PT AS REC I TED, SEL L ER [the Ol ive rs ] HA S MA DE NO AF F I RMA TI ONOF F AC T OR PROMI S E R E L AT I NG T O T HE T R ANS FERRED PROP ERTI ES T HA T HAS BECOME A NY B ASI S OF THE BA RGAI N, AND F URTHER, SEL L ER HAS M AD E NO AFF I RMATI ON OF FA C T OR PROMI SE REL ATI NG TO T H E T R A N S F E R R E D P R O P E R T I E S T H A T W O U LD CONFO RM TO AN Y SUCH AFF I RMATI ON OR PROMI SE. SEL L ER DI SC L

A I M S A N YWA RR

A N T YO F F I T

NESS FOR ANY PARTI CUL AR PURP OSE WHATEVER WI TH R E SPEC T TO THE TRANSFE RRED PR OPE RTI ES. THE TRANSFERRED PRO PER TI ES A RE S OL D O N A N “ AS I S” B ASI S. Also pertinent ar e the f

ollowing pr ovisions of the Commercial L ease :
8. CONDI TI ON OF PREMI SES. Tenant [appellees] has examined and ac cepts the le ased pr emises a nd persona l proper ty in the prese nt as is condition as s u i t ab l e for the purposes for

which the same ar e lea sed.

* * * 33. PRI OR AGREEMENTS S UP ERCEDED. This ag ree ment c on sti tut e s the so le and

on ly a g re e me nt o f t

he pa rt ie s to thi s lease and super sedes a

ny prior under standings o r written or oral a g ree ments betwee n t h e p arties respec ting the subje ct matter of the lease
. Ap pe lle e s b e g an o pe ratin g the sto re . With in a we e k o r t wo , a c c or din g to a

pp e lle e s, they asce rtained that store revenue s wer e not close to what they contende d appellants ha d led them to believe. A f

urther c omplication arose when appellees we re infor med by the Meuths that, as
a pp e lle es un de rs too d it , th e Me uth s h a d th e ri g ht t o v oid the e nti re tr ans a c tio n b e c a us e a pp e lla ntsT h e M e u t h s d i d n o tt e s t i f y. 3 5 ha d n ot o bta ine d th e ir

pe rm iss ion

to c on ve y

th e pro per

ty to a pp e lle e s. Appellee s claim that they

3 attempted to ra ise these conce rns with a ppellants, who purportedly responde d with the g ener al view that a “de al’s a d ea l
. ” Al ex ander Ortiz testified that, fear ing he would soon lose the store to the Meuths, he beg an dee ply discounting the s t o re’ s inventory in an attempt to sell it and rec oup at least some of a

ppellees’ investment. Ortiz added that, resig ned to the fate he a nticipated, he le t the store’s i n s u ra nce la

pse, did not replenish inventory , and planne d to defa ult on his November re nt pay ment. On Saturday , October 29, Milton Oli ver e ntere d the store premises, ha d the locks cha ng ed,
an d e x c l u d e d a

p p e l l e e s f r o m t h e p r e m i s e s . B y t h i s t i m e , t h e s t o r e ’ s s h e l v e s w e r e v i rtu a l l y e mp t y. Appellee s subsequently

sued appe llants for dama g es, al l eging theorie s of statutory
an d c o m m o n - l aw f

r a u d , D T P A v i o l a t i o n s , an d b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t
. T h e s e c l a i m s w e r e t r i e d t o a j u r y. Appellee s’ basic the me at trial wa s that they wer e misled by

appel l ants reg ardingthe store’s pr ofitability

and the possibi lity that the M euths could fore close. Appe llants denied any such
c on du c t. T he y

a dd e d th a t a

pp e lle e s—

wh om t he y c ha ra c ter ize a s “ so ph ist ic a te d r e a l e state purcha sers” and “busine ss owner s”—boug ht the s tore “as i s,” wit h minimal investigation, relying
on their own experience from their prior si milar transac tions, and were simply inept in manag ing the sto re and in r e sp on din g to t

he ir e nc ounte rs wi th t

he Me uth s. The jury found for appellee s on liab il it

y th e o r ie s in c ludingstatutory and common-la

w fra ud , b rea ch of c ontrac t, and DTPA violations. Reg ardingthe DTPA cla im, the jury found that Milton or Vicky

Oliver ha d engag ed in a f alse, misleadingand dec eptive ac t or prac tice on which
a pp e lle e s h a d r e lie d a

nd that wa s a pro du c ing c a

us e of dama g e s to the m, a nd ha d f a ile d to c omp lyHoweve r, the jury found that the ne ither Mil t o n o r Vi ck y Oliver ha d eng ag ed in an 4 un c on sc ion a

ble a c tio n o r c ours e of

a c tio n th a t w a s a

pr od uc ingc a us e of dama g e s to a

pp e lle e s. 6 wi th a n e xpre ss w arra

nty tha t w a s a pr od uc ingc a us e of dama g e s to the m. Pr e dic a te d o n th e se 4 finding s, the jury awa

rded appellee s $120,000 in benef it-of-the- barg ain damag es. The jur y further found that Milton or Vicky Oliver ha d eng ag ed in such c on d u ct k nowing ly and intentionally

and
awa rded a ppellees $50,000 in a dditional damag es, plus $15,000 eac h to Ortiz and L auric el l a for mental-a ng uish da mag es. The jury apportioned r esponsibility for the D TPA damag es six ty perc ent to M ilt on Ol ive r a nd fo rt y pe rc e nt t o Vi c ky Ol ive r. Ho we ve r, the jur y fo un d in fa vo r o f a pp e lla nts on the following issue, numbere d Special I ssue No. 8 in the cha rg e:
Did Alexander Or

tiz and Reg ina L auric ella buy the business and the proper ty “As I s”? “As I s” mea

ns the seller g ives no assura nces, ex press or implied, concer

ning the value or

condition of the thing sold. Ap pe lle e s mo ve d f

or jud g me nt o n th e ve rd ic t, e le c tin g to r e c ov e r o n th e ir D T PAc la im
. Ap p e ll an ts mo v e d to d is r e g ar d

th e ju r y ’ s li a b il it y an d d a ma g e f

in d in g s u n d e r

the DTPA and fr aud theor ies on the basis that they wer e re n dere d immaterial by the jury ’s finding in Spe c ia l I s s u e N o . 8 th a t a p p e ll e e s h a d

p u r c h a s e d

th e b u s in e s s an d

p r o p e rty “ a s is
. ” Ap p e llees relied on the rule that a

n ag ree ment to purcha se property “as is” neg ates causation, as a matter of law, on claims pred i cated on acts or omissions relatingto the proper ty ’s condition or value
. See Prudential Ins. Co. , 8 96 S.W. 2d a t 16 1- 62 ; Spring W

indows Fashions Div., Inc. v. The Blind Mak er , 184 S.W .3d 840, 868-71 (Te x . App.—Austin 2005, writ dism’d by ag r.). The district court re ndere d7

j u d g m e n to nt h e v e r d i c taw ar d i n g a p p e l l e e s a t o t a l o f $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 f r o m t h e O l i v e r s , j o i n t l y an d s e v e r a l l y; an addit i o n al total of $120,000 from Milton Oliver; prejudg ment interest on these awa rds; and attorney ’s fe es in the amounts of $21,849 fr om the Olivers, jointly and sev er all y , and $32,774.55 from Milton Oliver.

The Oliver s ap p ea l ed . I n three issues, they contend that a

ppellees c annot re cover on their DTPA theor ies bec ause a ppellees a g ree d to purcha se t h e Oliver’s Country Store “a s is.”

“ B y a g re e ingto p ur c ha se so me thi ng ‘a s is, ’ a buy e r a g re e s to make his ow n a pp ra isa l of

the ba rg a in and to ac cept the r isk that he may be wr ong ,” and “ [t ]he s el l er give s no assuranc es, express or i mplied, conce rning the value or condition of the thing sold.” Prudential Ins. Co. , 896 S.W .2d at 16 1. Th is re fl e c ts the pu

bli c po lic y that “ [f]r e e do m of c on tr a c t a llo ws pa

rt ie s to ba rg a in f or mut ua lly ag ree able ter

ms and allocate risks as they see f it.” Gym- N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v . Snider , 220 S.W .3d 905, 912 (Tex. 2007). A valid “as is” ag ree ment preve nts a buy er f rom holding a

seller liable unde r claims relating to the c ondition of the proper ty conveyed bec aus e i t is leg ally impossibl e for

any injury to the buy er to have bee n cause d by the seller; in e ffe ct, the “as is” ag ree ment is an intervening and super seding cause of the buy er’ s injury
. Pru dential Ins. Co. , 896 S.W .2d at 161. Such an ag ree ment thus operate s to ne g ate, as a matter of law, the causation e lement of claims relating to the condition or value of

the prope rty
. Id. Courts will give e ff

ec t t o “as is” ag ree ments unless set aside. Id. An “ a s is ” ag ree ment may

be avoi d ed if it is fraudule ntly induced by

misrepre sentation or conc ealment of information by

the seller. See id. a t 16 2 ( “ A b uy e r i s n ot b ound by an ag re e me nt t o p ur c ha se something ‘ as i s’ t hat he is induced to make because of a fra udulent repr esentation or conc ealment8

of information by

the seller. . . . A seller cannot have it both wa y s: he ca nnot assure the buy er of the condition o f a thing to obtain the buy er’ s ag ree ment to purcha se ‘a s is,’ and then disavow the
a ssu ra nc e wh ic h p ro c ur e d th e ‘a s is ’ a g re e me nt. ” ). L ike wi se , “ a buy e r i s n ot bo un d b y

an ‘ a s is ’ ag ree ment if he is e n t i t l ed to i nspect the c ondition of what is being sold but is i mpaired by the seller’ s conduct.” Id. “ O th e r a s p e c ts o f

a tr an s a c ti o n ” ma

y a ls o ma k e an“ a s is ” a g r e e ment
un e nf orce able, inc lud ing(1 ) t

he so ph ist ic a tio n o f t

he pa rt ie s, wh ic h ma

y inc lud e wh e the r a

pa rt y is r e pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l, ( 2) the te rm s o f t he “ a s is ” a g re e me nt, (3 ) wh eth er the “ a s is ” ag ree ment was fr eely

neg otiated, and ( 4) whe ther the a g ree m en t was a n arm’s le ng th transac tion. Id .; Gym-

N-I Playgrounds, Inc . v. Snider , 158 S.W .3d 78, 8 5 (T ex . App.—Austin 2005), aff’d , 220 S.W .3d 905 (Tex. 2007).

Appellants re ly

primarily

on the contra ctual d i s cl ai m ers in the B ill of Sale and Commercial L ease . Appellee s dispute whether these provisions are enfor cea ble. Howe ver, be fore
we a dd re ss the imp lic a tio ns or e nf or c e a bil ity of the se pr ov isi on s a s “ a s is” a g re e me nts , we mus t f ir st
co n s i d er whether , under or dinary rules of c ontrac t construction, they encompa ss or addre ss the
su bje c t matte r o f t

he a lle g e d mis re pr e se ntatio ns or c on c e a lme nt ma de the ba sis fo r a pp e lle e s’ DT PA claims. See Sp rin g W

ind ows , 184 S.W .3d at 870-72. At least with respe ct to misrepre sentations or
c on c e a lme nt o f f

a c ts r e latin g to t

he sto re ’s pr of

ita bil ity , w e c on c lud e the y

do no t. As noted, the jury

hear d evidenc e that appe llants repre sented t o appellee s that the store had be en g rossing betwee n $30,000 and $40,000 per month and netting a profit of $2,000 per month, and that reve nues in fac t turned out to be lower. The disclaimers in the B ill of Sale on which appellants re ly

wer e addr essed solely

to “ the Transferred Properties ” and “ aff irmations o f fact orThis was “inc luded, but not limi ted to, trade fix tur es, equipment, furniture, 5 k i t ch en eq u i p m en t , gri l l , fr ee z er s , wa l k i n co o l er , gas o l i n e p ump s an d t an k s , t el ev i s i o ns et , s h el v i n g, car wash e quipment, propane tanks, air c ompressor, pool tables, juke box , and storag e building.” Ne ith e r p art

y a dd re ss ed any

po te nti a l st a tut e -o f- fr a

ud s im pli c a tio ns of

an o ra l “ a s is ” 6 ag ree ment in the context of a transac tion suc h as the one at issue he re, or any other issues, beyond tho se dis c us se d a

bo ve , be ari ng on

the e nf or c e a bil ity of su c h a n a rr ang e me nt. Ou

r a na ly sis a bo ve is limit ed to the ar g uments the parties ha ve ra ised. 9 pr omise” or warr anti e s “ re lat ing to t heTra ns fe rre d Pro

pe rti es. ” The Bill of Sale de fined

“ Tr ans fe rr e d Pr op e rt ie s” to m e an th e “ En tir e I nv e nto ry c on sis tin g of

fo od stu ff s, pe ri sh a ble ite ms, dry -g oods, non-alcoholic be vera g es and a ll other items fo r re s ale o[ n] t he pre mises as of the date h e r e o f

. ” I n o th e r w o r d s , th e d is c la im e r s in th e B il l o f Sa le r e late d to th e c o n d it io n o f the store’s inventor

y —e.g ., wer e there insects in the food or had the milk spoiled—not how much money the b u s i n e s s w a s m ak i n g . S i m i l ar l y , t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e C o m m e r c i a l L e a s e w a s l i mit e d to “the lea sed pre mises,” def ined as the r eal pr operty

wher e the store was locat ed , p l u s “all trade fix tures, improveme nts and p er s o n al proper ty on the lease d premises.” The “ as is” cla use in the 5 Commercial L ease thus addresse d only the p roper

ty wher e the business wa s located, not the profitability

of the business itself. The co n trac tual provision on which appe llants rely does not addre ss or enc ompass the alleg ed misrepr esentations or conce alment of facts re g ardingthe profitability

of Oliver’ s Country

Store. I n addition to these contractua l provisions, appellants sugg est that the par ties formed
an or a l “ a s is” a g re e me nt that is so me wh a t br oa de r t ha n th e wr itt e n o ne s. T h e y

p r im ar il y e mp h a s iz e 6 the jury ’s finding in Special I ssue No. 8. Special I ssue No. 8 did not ref ere nce either of the written contra ctual provisions and wa s much broade r in scope. It as k ed whether a ppellees boug ht

“ the business and

the p ro p er t y ‘As I s,’” f

urther instruc ting the jur

y that “‘A s I s’ means the sellerI n its submissi on of appellees’ DTPA laundry list theory , the di strict court instructe d the 7 jur y that “ fa lse , mi sle a din g , o r d e c e pti ve a c t or pr a c tic e ” me ant: Represe nting that Oliver ’s Country Store had or would have char acte ristics, uses or benef its that it did not have; or Re pr e se nti ng that Ol ive r’ s Countr y Sto re wa s or wi ll b e a

pa rt ic ula r s tand ard , q

ua lity or g rade if it was another ; or 10 g ives no assura

nces, e x press or implied, conc erningt h e v al ue or c ondition of the thing sold.” (Emphasis adde d). The scope of Spec ial I ssue No. 8 cor responde d to that of the d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s D T P A d am a g e s s u b m i s s i o n , w h i c h i n q u i r e d a s t o “ [ t ] h e d i f f e r e n c e , i f an y, betwee n the value of

Oliver’s Country

Store as it was re ceive d and the price [appellees] paid for it.” Special I ssue No. 8 thus en co m p assed the subject matter of any alleg ed misrepr esentation or
c o n c e a l m e n tt h a tc o u l d

h av e b e e nt h e b a s i s f

o r a p p e l l e e s ’ D T P A r e c o v e r

y. Appellants sug g est that bec ause the jury found in Special I ssue No. 8 that appe llees h a d purcha s e d

th e b u s in e s s an d

p r o p e rty “ a s is , ” a p p e ll e e s c an n o t r e c o v e r

D T PAd a ma g e s . We cannot agre e, at l ea st as that issue was submitted here . Although Spec ial I ssue No. 8 inquired wh e the r a pp e lle e s ha d bo ug ht the bu sin e ss or pr op e rt y “ a s is, ” that te rm wa s de fi ne d so le ly in t e rm s of whe ther a

ppellants g ave “ no assurances, ex press or implied, conce rning the value or condition of t hethi ng so ld .” I n oth e r wo rd s, Spe c ia l I ssu e No
. 8 inq uir ed w het her a pp e lla

nts had not

made “assur ance s . . . conce rning the value or condition” of the business. The jury was not aske d whether t h e p ar t i es had agreed

that the sale of

the business was “ as is.” Thus, Specia l I ssue No. 8, as submitt ed her e, amounted to a n infere ntial rebutt al to the DTPA liability issues, which inquired wh e the r a pp e lla nts had made repre sentations or express war ranties a bout the value or

condition of the bu sin e ss. Se e Di am on d O ffsho re Mgm t. Co . v . G uid ry , 171 S.W .3d 840, 844 (Tex. 2005) 7R e p r e s e n t i n g t h a tana g r e e m e n tc o n f e r s o r i n v o l v e s r i g h t s o r

o b l i g a t i o n s t h a ti td id not have or

involve; or Fa iling to disclose informati o n about Oli ver’ s Country Store that was known a t the time of the tra

nsaction with th e intention to induce Alexander Or tiz and Re g ina L a

ur ic e lla int o a tr ans a c tio n that the y oth e rw ise wo uld no t ha ve e nte re d into if the information had been disc losed. I n it s b re a c h- of

-w arr anty su bmi ssi on , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ins tr uc te d th e jur

y that: An express war

ranty is any aff irmation of fa ct or promise ma de by Milton Oli ver or Vicky Oliver that re lates to Oliver’ s Country Store and become s part of the basis of the barg ain. I t is not ne cessa ry that formal words such as “w arr ant[y ]” or “guara ntee” b e u s e d o r t h a tt h e r e b e a

s p e c i f i c i n t e n tt o m a k e a

w ar r an t y. Cf. Bill y Smith Enterp., In c. v. Hut chison Constr., Inc. , No. 03-06-00689- CV, 8

___ S.W .3d ___, 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 5556 at *7-19 (Tex. A pp.—Austin July 23, 2 008, no pet. h.) (jur

y finding of af

firmative c ontrac tual defe nse neg ated liabili ty predic ated on e x istence of contra ctual pay

ment obligation). Her e, the jury ’s findi ng in Special I ssue No. 8 does not re nder the jury ’s DTPA liability

finding s leg ally

immaterial, but re p r e s e nts a n in c o n s is te nt f

in d ing r eg arding the same mate ri a l f

a c ts. 11 (c i t i n g Selec t Ins. Co. v. Bouche r , 561 S.W .2d 474, 477 (Tex. 1978)) (de fining infere ntial rebuttal as a question that “prese nts a contra ry or inconsistent theory

from the c laim relied upon for
rec overy”). Consequently , appellants’ c ontentions here ultimately amount t o a complaint that the jury ’s affirmative findings on both sets of i ssues conflicte d. Amid the heat of trial, howeve r, neither party raised a conflict c omplaint before the jury was discha

rge d
. Under these cir cumstance s, the district court did not err

in rende ring judgme nt on the jury ’s DTPA liability fi n d i n gs despite the jury ’s finding in Special I ssue No. 8. See Sp rin g W ind ows , 1 84 S.W. 3d

a t 86 7; se e als o St. Pau l F ire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M

urphree , 357 S.W .2d 744, 541 (Tex. 1962). 812 We o ve rr ule a pp e lla nts ’ i ssu e s a

nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 5, 2008