NUMBER 13-20-00220-CR

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

PETER ISIAH UVALLE, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 139th District Court 

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Peter Isiah Uvalle was convicted of murder, a first-degree felony, and 

sentenced to thirty-five years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional 

Division and a fine of $5,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b), (c). In his first three 

issues Uvalle argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress and 

(2–3) denying his motions for mistrial. In his fourth issue, Uvalle argues that he received 
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ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Uvalle was indicted for the first-degree felony offense of murder. See id. In the 

indictment, the State alleged that Uvalle intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 

Jonathan Alcala by shooting him with a firearm.

Uvalle filed a motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement, arguing 

that his statements were involuntary and coerced, that he was deprived of his right to 

counsel, that he was illegally detained, and that the statements were taken “without the 

safeguards required by and in violation of Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure.” During the subsequent hearing on Uvalle’s motion, the State called 

Investigator Enrique Ontiveros of the Pharr Police Department (PPD). Investigator 

Ontiveros testified that he works in the crimes against children unit. Investigator Ontiveros 

along with Sergeant Garza, also with PPD, interviewed Uvalle in a hospital room at 

Doctor’s Hospital at Renaissance (DHR) after he had been treated for a gunshot wound. 

Investigator Ontiveros brought a video recorder, which was set up on a table next to 

Uvalle’s hospital bed. At the outset of the video recorded interview, Investigator Ontiveros 

read Uvalle his Miranda warnings and Uvalle initialed and signed the document reflecting 

that he understood and waived his rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Uvalle did not invoke his rights at any time during the interview, nor did he request to stop 

the interview. Investigator Ontiveros testified that Uvalle was not coerced or threatened 

in any way and that Uvalle was awake and lucid for the interview. Investigator Ontiveros 

explained that, prior to going to the hospital to interview Uvalle, he called DHR to inquire 
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about Uvalle’s status and the nurses indicated that Uvalle was “stable and not sedated.”

The video recording of the interview was admitted for purposes of the hearing 

without objection and played for the trial court. The recording begins with Investigator 

Ontiveros discussing the Miranda warnings with Uvalle. Uvalle acknowledges his 

understanding of his rights and signs a waiver of the rights. The interview proceeds and 

Uvalle answers the questions asked of him. During the course of the interview, Uvalle’s 

story of how he was injured changes, and he eventually implicated himself in Alcala’s 

shooting.

On cross-examination, Investigator Ontiveros stated he could not recall if he had 

spoken with medical personnel when he arrived at the hospital. Investigator Ontiveros 

stated that, prior to starting the recording, he introduced himself to Uvalle and asked how 

he was feeling. He agreed that he got to the hospital around 1:00 p.m. and the recording 

of the interview did not begin until 1:46 p.m., but he could not specifically account for what 

took place during the forty-six minute period between the time he arrived and the time the 

recording began. Investigator Ontiveros and Sergeant Garza were armed with their 

service weapons during the interview. Another officer was also present during the 

interview and was standing by the door. While Investigator Ontiveros stated that Uvalle 

understood his rights when he waived them, on cross-examination he agreed that he was 

unaware of Uvalle’s mental capacity.

According to Investigator Ontiveros, the nurses informed him that Uvalle had 

received pain medication at 6:30 a.m. When presented with Uvalle’s emergency 

department medical records, Investigator Ontiveros agreed with Uvalle’s counsel that 
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Uvalle was noted in the records as unable to sign or consent to medical treatment upon 

his arrival. Because of the ongoing investigation, Uvalle was not permitted to have any 

visitors outside of officers from PPD. PPD consented on Uvalle’s behalf to the medical 

treatment. As per Uvalle’s medical records, he was given an antibiotic, which Uvalle’s 

counsel argued can cause dizziness, headaches, and seizures. Uvalle was also receiving 

morphine through an IV drip. Investigator Ontiveros did not change his opinion that Uvalle 

was competent to give an interview, even knowing the medications he received and the 

potential side effects. He agreed that having just had surgery could affect a person’s 

mental and physical state, but he did not recall Uvalle undergoing surgery prior to the 

interview. He could not recall whether Uvalle stated he was in pain and wanted to call a 

nurse, but he did not disagree with Uvalle’s counsel’s suggestion that this occurred. 

Investigator Ontiveros further agreed that being injured could potentially influence a 

person’s ability to understand and waive their rights, but he believed Uvalle was coherent 

at the time of the interview.

On re-direct examination, Investigator Ontiveros testified that Uvalle never 

complained of any side effects of the medication he was administered. He stated that 

Uvalle seemed to understand and comprehend the questions being asked of him and did 

not appear impaired.

Uvalle testified that he was eighteen years old at the time of the interview. At that 

time, he was in the hospital for gunshot wounds to his arm and chest. As part of his 

treatment in the hospital, a tube was placed into his lung for drainage. While hospitalized, 

he was not allowed to contact his family. Uvalle recalled that he “passed out” three times 
5

while hospitalized and stated that one time when he woke up, there were “like 10 officers” 

in his hospital room. The presence of the officers in his room made him “feel scared and 

nervous.” During the interview, Uvalle stated that he had pain in his chest and a migraine. 

He asked Investigator Ontiveros to contact the nurse because he was in pain, but 

Investigator Ontiveros denied his request, stating the interview was almost over. Uvalle 

testified that on the day of the shooting, he had taken “like 10 Xanax” and on the night of 

the shooting he had taken five Xanax. At the time of the interview, he felt like he was 

“intoxicated.” Uvalle said he had been given “heavy” medication at the hospital and had 

not been given any food. During his hospitalization, there was always an officer present 

at his bedside, which he stated made him feel scared and intimidated. He did not feel free 

to leave. He testified that, when he was given his Miranda warnings, he signed them 

“under the influence of medication.”

On cross-examination, Uvalle agreed that he had never told anyone that he was 

scared or nervous, and that he was not threatened by the officers. He was not forced to 

talk to the officers and he agreed that Investigator Ontiveros was respectful. He admitted 

that he did not tell Investigator Ontiveros that he was in pain during the interview. He 

further agreed that he was coherent that afternoon and understood what was going on 

when he talked to Investigator Ontiveros “freely and voluntarily.” He also agreed that he 

was able to move his hands, fingers, and head, and was able to communicate with the 

officers.

The trial court then heard argument from both sides and denied the motion to 

suppress. After the notice of appeal was filed, we abated the appeal and instructed the 
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court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the voluntariness of 

Uvalle’s recorded statement. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6; Vasquez 

v. State, 411 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[W]ritten findings are required in 

all cases concerning voluntariness.”). The trial court subsequently issued the following 

pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law:

b. Restraint: [Uvalle] was not under arrest at any point during his 

interactions with Inv. Ontiveros.[1]

c. Attitude and demeanor of [Uvalle]: [Uvalle] understood the questions 

asked of him.

d. [Uvalle] was advised his [Miranda] rights and agreed to waive his 

rights and indicated this by initialing next to each right and placing 

his signature on the statement.

e. No coercion or intimidation: [Uvalle] admits on cross examination that 

he was not threatened by the officers, with a gun or otherwise, or 

bribed to provide a statement. He was treated respectably by them.

f. [Uvalle] at no point made a request or demand for counsel.

g. [Uvalle] at no point asked for the interview to cease.

h. [Uvalle] had been administered medication for the pain resulting from 

his gunshot wounds to the arm and chest but the side effects he felt, 

if any, did not prohibit him from giving a voluntary statement to the 

officers.

i. [Uvalle] was lucid and talking freely while providing his statement. 

[Uvalle] does not stutter. [Uvalle] does not tell the officers he does 

not want to talk.

j. The interview was not a result of a custodial interrogation but a 

voluntary statement.

k. [Uvalle] was not nervous or anxious such that his statement is 

rendered involuntary.

1 Each finding includes a reference to the reporter’s record. We omit those references herein.
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l. [Uvalle] did not appear to be stressed or under the influence of any 

medication.

m. [Uvalle] understood the questions and knew where to sign the 

statement.

The trial court concluded that “the statement was freely and voluntarily made by [Uvalle]” 

and that “as a matter of law that all prerequisites for a voluntary statement were satisfied.”

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress for an abuse of 

discretion. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We employ “a 

bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to a trial court’s determination 

of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a 

witness,” but “applying a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed 

questions that do not depend on credibility determinations.” Id. “We view the record in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s conclusion and reverse the judgment only if it is 

outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d. 587, 590 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is the sole 

judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the “weight to be given their testimony.” 

Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). A statement of an accused 

may be used in evidence against him if it appears that the same was freely and voluntarily 

made without compulsion or persuasion, under the rules prescribed in the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.21. Article 38.22, § 3 of the code 

of criminal procedure provides that an oral custodial statement is inadmissible as 

evidence unless, among other things, the accused is warned prior to the statement as 
8

provided in § 2 of article 38.22 and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the 

rights set out in the warning; an electronic recording is made of the statement; and all 

voices on the recording are identified. Id. art. 38.22, § 3(a).

B. Analysis

Statements “given under the duress of hallucinations, illness, medications, or even 

a private threat, for example, could be involuntary” under Articles 38.21 and 38.22. 

Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We assess the 

voluntariness of a statement by considering the totality of the circumstances under which 

it was made. Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Arizona 

v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1991)); Williams v. State, 502 S.W.3d 262, 272 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). In this consideration, we take into 

account Uvalle’s experience, background, and conduct, as well as his characteristics. 

Umana v. State, 447 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) 

(citations omitted).

The totality of the circumstances supports the trial court’s determination that 

Uvalle’s statements were voluntary. Although Uvalle argues that he was on a “cocktail of 

medications” and could have been experiencing side effects of those medications, the 

record shows he was advised of his rights, indicated he understood his rights, and 

consented to questioning. He appeared lucid during questioning, providing answers to 

the questions posed and formulating exculpatory, defensive responses. At no time during 

the interview was Uvalle threatened or otherwise coerced to speak with the officers. 

Uvalle testified at the hearing on his motion that the officers treated him respectfully. 
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Although Uvalle testified that he was “under the influence of medication” and felt 

“intoxicated” when he signed the waiver of his Miranda rights, the trial court could have 

disbelieved that testimony, and we must defer to that decision. See Martinez, 348 S.W.3d 

at 922.

Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Uvalle’s motion to suppress pursuant to his claim 

of involuntariness under Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Rocha v. 

State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (finding appellant’s statement voluntary 

where appellant was ill and on medication); see also Torres v. State, No. 04-16-00622-

CR, 2017 WL 5759380, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (finding appellant’s statement voluntary where 

appellant was in pain and argued his state of mind was altered). Uvalle’s first issue is 

overruled.

II. MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL

In his second and third issues, Uvalle argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his motions for mistrial when: (1) “prosecutors spoke with witnesses in the hallway, as a 

group, regarding testimony once the rule had been revoked”; and (2) “prosecutors failed 

to provide a report from an investigator, which [the investigator read] from during his 

testimony.”

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

“Appellate courts review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Browne v. State, 483 S.W.3d 183, 203 (Tex. 
10

App.—Austin 2015, no pet.). A mistrial will only be required under extreme circumstances 

where the prejudice is incurable. Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007); see also Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (explaining 

that mistrial may be used as “remedy for improper conduct that is ‘so prejudicial that 

expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile’” (quoting Ladd v. 

State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999))).

1. Communication with Witnesses

In Uvalle’s first motion for mistrial, he argued that the prosecutors improperly met 

with witnesses in the hallway of the courthouse after the first day of trial had concluded. 

According to Uvalle, his mother Nereyda Uvalle “overheard prosecutors speaking with 

witnesses in the hallway” regarding certain testimony from that day. Nereyda testified 

before the trial court, outside the presence of the jury, regarding what she had seen and 

heard in the hallway. She explained that she saw the two prosecutors speaking with 

multiple witnesses regarding an incident that occurred between Uvalle and a detention 

officer at the jail where he was being held.

Texas Rule of Evidence 614 provides for the exclusion of witnesses from the 

courtroom during trial. See TEX. R. EVID. 614. The purpose of “the Rule” is to prevent 

corroboration, contradiction, and the influencing of witnesses. Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 

35, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Webb v. State, 766 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App.

1989). Once it is invoked, a witness should not be allowed to hear any testimony in the 

case or talk to any other person about the case without the court’s permission. White v. 

State, 958 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. ref’d). While the trial court is 
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obligated to exclude witnesses from the courtroom during other witnesses’ testimony, the 

court’s decision to allow testimony from a witness who has violated “the Rule” is 

discretionary. See Bell, 938 S.W.2d at 50. We review that decision for abuse of discretion. 

Id.

In reviewing the trial court’s decision to allow the testimony, we look at whether the 

defendant was harmed by the witness’s violation of “the Rule.” Id. Two suggested criteria 

for determining injury or prejudice in this situation are: (1) whether the witness actually 

conferred with or heard testimony of other witnesses; and (2) whether the witness’s 

testimony contradicted testimony of a witness from the opposing side or corroborated 

testimony of a witness he had conferred with or heard. Id. (citing Webb, 766 S.W.2d at 

240).

Assuming arguendo that “the Rule” was in fact violated by the prosecutors’ 

discussions with the witnesses outside of the courtroom, Uvalle has failed to meet his 

burden to show how this supposed violation harmed him. At the hearing on the motion for 

mistrial, Uvalle’s counsel repeatedly stated that the violation of “the Rule” would impact 

their ability to cross-examine the witnesses, but did not explain how. Further, on appeal, 

Uvalle merely states that the behavior of the prosecutors was improper and “unfair,” but 

does not address how the potential violation impacted testimony or the trial itself. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the 

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Because 

of this, we do not find any harm or prejudice resulted from the violation of “the Rule.”

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
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See Potter v. State, 74 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (finding that it 

was not an abuse of discretion to allow witnesses to testify after violation of “the Rule” 

where there was no evidence that the violation influenced any testimony through 

corroboration or contradiction). Accordingly, Uvalle’s second issue is overruled.

2. Witness Report

Uvalle’s third issue concerns the alleged withholding of evidence by the State. A 

violation of constitutional due process rights occurs when the state suppresses, willfully 

or inadvertently, evidence favorable to appellant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

There can be no Brady violation without suppression of favorable evidence in the State’s 

possession. Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in part:

[A]s soon as practicable after receiving a timely request from the defendant 

the state shall produce and permit the inspection and the electronic 

duplication, copying, and photographing, by or on behalf of the defendant, 

of any offense reports, any designated documents, papers, written or 

recorded statements of the defendant or a witness, including witness 

statements of law enforcement officers but not including the work product 

of counsel for the state in the case and their investigators and their notes or 

report, or any designated books, accounts, letters, photographs, or objects 

or other tangible things not otherwise privileged that constitute or contain 

evidence material to any matter involved in the action and that are in the 

possession, custody, or control of the state or any person under contract 

with the state.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a). The State’s statutory obligation to disclose 

evidence under article 39.14 “is much broader” than the constitutional obligations 

imposed by Brady. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2021); Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d 681, 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. ref’d).
13

Uvalle argues that an investigator testifying for the State was relying on and 

testifying from a report that had not been previously disclosed to the State nor to the 

defense. While Uvalle goes into details regarding the pre-trial discovery process and the 

alleged “delays” by the State to produce discovery as required under the rules, Uvalle’s 

discussion in his brief regarding the investigator’s report is minimal. Uvalle explains that 

when it was determined that the witness was reading from an undisclosed report, a 

continuance was requested by the defense and granted, and a hearing was subsequently 

held. Initially, on its own motion the trial court indicated that it would be granting a mistrial 

and resetting for a new trial date. After some discussion with the attorneys and some 

argument from the State, the trial court decided to “hold the mistrial in abeyance” and 

continued the trial. Uvalle makes a blanket assertion that the trial court erred in failing to 

grant the mistrial “after cumulative delays by the State for failure to not [sic] comply with 

39.14 discovery requests.”

The defense was granted a continuance to review the report before the witness 

continued his testimony. In his briefing, Uvalle does not address the report that was 

discovered during trial, nor does he explain how the late discovery of the report was the 

fault of the State or harmful to his presentation of his defense. Outside of his detailed 

account of the proceedings, Uvalle presents no analysis regarding the issue he brings on 

appeal aside from his conclusory statement that it was error to deny a mistrial. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the 

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). 

Accordingly, Uvalle’s third issue is overruled as inadequately briefed.
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III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

By his final issue, Uvalle argues that his counsel was ineffective for (1) “initially 

fail[ing] to ask for a [m]istrial when a new report was discovered during testimony of the 

witnesses”; (2) failing to get a final ruling on the motion for mistrial related to the new 

report; (3) failing to request a mistrial when “a phone was found in [Uvalle’s] clothing 

retrieved from the hospital”; and (4) failing to file a written and sworn motion for a 

continuance to preserve error.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, Uvalle must prove (1) his trial 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687, 694 (1984); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A 

defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must affirmatively prove prejudice 

from counsel’s deficient performance. Mitchell v. State, 989 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1999). There is a strong presumption that the trial counsel provided effective 

assistance. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Though Uvalle 

filed a motion for new trial, he did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

and therefore the record is silent as to any trial strategy by Uvalle’s trial counsel. See 

Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“If counsel’s reasons for his 

conduct do not appear in the record and there is at least the possibility that the conduct 

could have been legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to counsel’s decisions and deny 
15

relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.”).

B. Analysis

Aside from Uvalle summarizing the reporter’s record by providing a factual “playby-play” of the alleged errors he believes occurred, Uvalle’s brief makes little attempt to 

affirmatively prove either of the prongs under Strickland. See Mitchell, 989 S.W.2d at 748. 

Uvalle makes a general assertion that there was a cumulative effect of the alleged errors 

that resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. After acknowleding that trial counsel 

was “a zealous advocate,” Uvalle states that there were many issues with his 

performance that arose over the course of the case, including late discovered evidence 

and reports. However, Uvalle presents no explanation as to how counsel’s strategy fell 

below the objective standard of reasonableness as to be deficient, nor does he explain 

what, if any, prejudice resulted from the alleged errors. See id. To meet his burden, Uvalle

must show by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and 

that this deficient performance rendered the result of the proceeding unreliable. Mathis v. 

State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). His bare assertion that, had counsel 

undertaken the actions he suggests, it “appeared” that the trial court would have granted 

a motion for mistrial or some other relief to provide a “fair trial” contains no legal analysis 

or explanation. Accordingly, Uvalle has not met his burden. See id.; see also TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.1(i). Uvalle’s fourth issue is overruled.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the

7th day of November, 2023.