J-S45039-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ACKEEM MORRIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 498 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 16, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0011393-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 1, 2023

Ackeem Morris (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder, aggravated 

assault, criminal conspiracy to commit attempted murder, conspiracy to 

commit aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license, 

carrying a firearm without a license on the public streets of Philadelphia, 

possession of an instrument of a crime, simple assault, and recklessly 

endangering another person.

1 We affirm in part and vacate in part.

The trial court summarized the factual history underlying this appeal as 

follows:

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) and 2502, 2702(a)(1), 903(a), 6106(a)(1), 

6108, 907(a), 2701(a)(1), 2705. Immediately after the jury’s verdicts, 

Appellant pled guilty to persons not to possess firearms. Id. § 6105(a)(1).
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This case stems from Appellant’s shooting of Brandon Davis 

(“Mr. Davis” [or “the victim”]) on September 17, 2016. Mr. 

Davis’s multiple gunshot[] wounds were nearly fatal and included 

a lacerated liver and kidney, kidney failure, a collapsed lung, 

respiratory failure, sepsis, internal bleeding, acute posthemorrhagic anemia, and bone fractures. On that date, officers 

investigating a shooting were advised that the victim had been

transported to Temple University Hospital in a private vehicle. Mr. 

Davis was uncooperative and refused to give an interview about 

the shooting. 

Detectives obtained video footage from the scene of the 

shooting which [occurred] outside a corner store. The videos 

show Mr. Davis, a male later [] identified as Talil Williams [(Mr. 

Williams)], and Appellant, who [wa]s wearing “a black Khimar [(, 

i.e., a traditional Muslim outerwear garment)], sunglasses, yellow 

socks with blue stripes on them, black sneakers ... [and] carrying 

a tan or goldish satchel or purse over his shoulder.”

The videos show that Appellant enters a store, exits and 

shoots Mr. Davis multiple times from a proximity of about five 

feet. After the shooting, Appellant flees northbound on Carlisle

Street from York Street. Appellant’s directions of travel led the

detectives to a nearby apartment complex at 2411 North 11

th

Street, where they obtained additional videos from the building’s 

surveillance cameras. These videos show a man wearing the 

same Muslim garments, distinctive socks and satchel as the 

shooter, along with Mr. Williams, enter and exit the building 

together just before the shooting. Within minutes after the

shooting, the two men are again on videotape entering the 

elevator together, and although Appellant had removed his 

traditional Muslim garments that covered his face and body, he 

still wore black sneakers and [the] same distinctive “yellowish 

socks with blue markings on them.” The video shows Appellant 

re-enacting to Mr. Williams how he shot Mr. Davis. 

After extensive investigation, Detectives located Mr. 

Williams, who gave a statement identifying Appellant as the other 

person wearing Muslim garb involved in the shooting.

Detectives recovered the satchel the shooter was carrying 

at the scene, along with the distinctive socks and black shorts.

DNA samples extracted from the black shorts matched the DNA 

obtained from Appellant. Gunshot residue was found in the
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purse/satchel recovered from the apartment. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 3-4 (citations to record omitted; some 

capitalization modified).

The trial court also detailed the procedural history:

On December 18, 2017, this court sentenced Appellant to 

consecutive terms of ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ incarceration 

for his convictions of attempted murder and conspiracy [to commit 

attempted murder]. This court imposed no further sentences for 

Appellant’s remaining convictions. 

On December 18, 2017, Appellant filed post-sentence 

motions, which this court denied on that same day. On January 

10, 2018, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court

(255 EDA 2018), and on April 9, 2019, Appellant filed a 

“Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal” consisting of fortyeight (48) numbered paragraphs. On June 22, 2020, the Superior

Court affirmed the convictions[;] however[,] the court vacated the 

sentence imposed and remanded for re-sentencing to correct an 

error made by the trial court whereby it sentenced Appellant for

committing two (2) inchoate crimes in error. [See generally 

Commonwealth v. Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(unpublished memorandum).]

On April 16, 2021, the trial court conducted a re-sentencing 

hearing and while changing the structure of the sentence, [the 

court] nonetheless again sentenced Appellant for two (2) inchoate 

crimes,[2]in error[, which we explain further below. Appellant’s 

c]ounsel thereafter filed an untimely post-sentence motion to 

correct the sentence; said motion was denied. However, the trial 

court appointed new counsel to represent Appellant and he filed a 

notice of appeal to the Superior Court on May 26, 2021 (1141 EDA 

____________________________________________

2 With respect to attempted murder, the court resentenced Appellant to 15 –

30 years in prison. The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 10 – 20 

years for conspiracy to commit attempted murder. Finally, for persons not to 

possess firearms, the court imposed a sentence of 5 – 10 years in prison, to 

run consecutive to the sentence for attempted murder. Thus, Appellant 

received an aggregate sentence of 20 – 40 years in prison (i.e., the 

same aggregate sentence he received in 2017).
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2021), despite the fact that the late post-sentence motion would 

render the appeal untimely.

Therefore, [Appellant’s] counsel filed a praecipe to 

discontinue the untimely appeal (1141 EDA 2021) and filed a 

timely [] petition on September 1, 2020[, pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546]. 

... [Appellant thereafter withdrew his PCRA petition,] and the trial 

court granted reinstatement of Appellant’s right to file his postsentence motion and a direct appeal, nunc pro tunc.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 1-2 (footnote added; some capitalization 

modified). 

On January 25, 2022, Appellant filed a nunc pro tunc post-sentence 

motion, seeking, inter alia, reduction of the purportedly excessive sentence 

imposed at resentencing. Appellant claimed the trial court abused its 

discretion in “increasing” the sentence originally imposed for Appellant’s 

conviction of attempted murder. See Post-Sentence Motion, 1/25/22, at ¶¶ 

13-14 (“At the [April 16,] 2021 [re]sentencing hearing, the court incorporated 

its reasoning and bases from the [December 18,] 2017 sentencing hearing. 

Despite incorporating the same bases from 2017, the court raised 

[Appellant’s] sentence on the charge of attempted murder by 50% despite the 

absence of any new facts warranting an increased sentence.”). The trial court 

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 28, 2022. This timely 

appeal followed. The trial court and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

Appellant presents two issues for review:
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1. Is the sentence imposed illegal where [A]ppellant was 

convicted of — and sentenced on — both conspiracy to commit 

attempted murder, and attempted murder in violation of 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 906?

2. Is the sentence imposed unduly harsh and excessive under the

circumstances of this case? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (issues reordered).

Appellant first claims the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because

he “was convicted of – and sentenced on – both conspiracy to commit 

attempted murder, and attempted murder ....” Id. at 21. We agree.

“The determination as to whether a trial court imposed an illegal

sentence is a question of law; an appellate court’s standard of review in cases 

dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. White, 268 

A.3d 499, 500 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Our scope of review is 

de novo. Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 697 (Pa. Super. 

2021). 

The Commonwealth agrees that Appellant’s illegal “sentence for 

conspiracy should be vacated[.]” Commonwealth Brief at 7 (bold omitted). 

The Commonwealth points out this Court’s holding, in Appellant’s direct 

appeal, that the original sentencing court improperly “imposed a sentence on 

both of [Appellant’s] attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder 
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convictions — two inchoate crimes.” Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (unpublished 

memorandum at 11);3 see also Commonwealth Brief at 7 (same). 

The trial court concedes it illegally sentenced Appellant with respect to 

his conspiracy conviction:

The trial court held a re-sentencing hearing on Aril 16, 2021, 

as per direction of the Superior Court (Commonwealth v. 

Morris, 255 EDA 2018 Opinion filed June 22, 2020) to correct a 

previous error in sentencing, whereby the trial court imposed a 

sentence on two inchoate crimes in violation of Commonwealth 

v. Maguire, 452 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. 1982). In so doing, the 

trial court again erred in the imposition of sentence by failing to 

recognize that a sentence on the 2

nd inchoate crime would still be 

illegal even if it ran concurrently, and not consecutively. While 

[Appellant’s] aggregate sentence of 20-40 years did not 

change, the structure of the sentence was illegal. Therefore, 

this court recommends the sentence for conspiracy to commit

attempted murder be vacated, and the remaining sentence be 

affirmed. It was for this reason that the PCRA petition was 

withdrawn, and Appellant’s appellate rights were reinstated nunc 

pro tunc.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 6 (emphasis added; citations altered). We 

agree. Because the sentence imposed for Appellant’s conviction of conspiracy 

to commit attempted murder is unlawful, we vacate that sentence. 

We next address Appellant’s second issue, in which he challenges the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence imposed at resentencing. Appellant

____________________________________________

3 The panel in Morris cited as support Commonwealth v. Maguire, 452 A.2d 

1047, 1050 (Pa. Super. 1982) (recognizing a trial court may not sentence a 

defendant on two inchoate crime convictions), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 (“A 

person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of 

criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy for conduct 

designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime.”).

Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (unpublished memorandum at 10-11).
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emphasizes that when the trial court originally sentenced him in 2017, it 

imposed on the attempted murder conviction a sentence of 10 – 20 years in 

prison, whereas at resentencing, the court sentenced Appellant to 15 – 30 

years for attempted murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 26-27, 28. According 

to Appellant:

The imposition of the significantly increased sentence on the 

attempted murder charge with no accompanying explanation of 

what warranted the 50 percent increase is excessive under the 

circumstances. The fact that the only new facts and information 

adduced at the re-sentencing hearing warranted a mitigation in 

the sentence, rather than an increase, results in imposition of a 

sentence on this charge which violates the “fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” The [resentencing court 

also failed] to adequately account for the additional mitigating 

factors presented at the re-sentencing hearing....

Id. at 30 (italics in original; break omitted); see also id. at 29 (detailing 

mitigating factors, including Appellant’s difficult childhood and purported 

mental health conditions).

There is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence. Summers, 245 A.3d at 691. Rather, where, as here, the appellant 

preserved his sentencing challenge in a timely post-sentence motion, he must 

(1) include in the appellate brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise statement of the 

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal of; and (2) show that there is a 

substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code. Summers, 245 A.3d at 691.

Instantly, Appellant’s brief includes a Rule 2119(f) statement, and his 

claims present a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 165 
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A.3d 925, 929-30 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“A claim that the trial court focused 

exclusively on the seriousness of the crime while ignoring other, mitigating 

circumstances, such as [the defendant’s] mental health history and difficult 

childhood, raises a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 

A.3d 110, 123 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (a claim of judicial vindictiveness 

in resentencing following a remand presents a substantial question); see also

Appellant’s Brief at 23. Accordingly, we review the merits of Appellant’s claim.

We are mindful of our standard of review: “Sentencing is a matter 

vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will 

not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Barnes, 

167 A.3d at 122 n.9 (citation omitted). 

In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an 

error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by 

reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly 

unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation 

omitted). 

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly 

deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing 

court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a 

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual 

circumstances before it. 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted).
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The Sentencing Code directs a trial court to follow the general principle 

that “the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with 

the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the 

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “A sentencing

court has broad discretion in choosing the range of permissible confinements 

that best suits a particular defendant and the circumstances surrounding his 

crime.” Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citation omitted). The court “need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its 

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in 

question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s 

consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.” 

Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

The trial court must also consider the sentencing guidelines. See 

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, it 

is undisputed that the sentences imposed for each charge fall within the 

standard range of the sentencing guidelines. See Appellant’s Brief at 32 n.19; 

Commonwealth Brief at 6. Therefore, we may only vacate Appellant’s

sentence if “the case involves circumstances where the application of the 

guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2); see 

also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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The trial court opined it did not abuse its sentencing discretion, and 

reasoned:

[T]o the extent that Appellant argues that the increase in 

his sentence for attempted murder to 15-30 years is excessive 

and an abuse of this court’s discretion, Appellant’s argument has 

no merit. The aggregate sentence remains the same: 15-30 

years for attempted murder and [a consecutive sentence of] 5-10 

years for [persons not to possess firearms].

* * *

Appellant complains that when he was re-sentenced, the 

court failed to consider numerous factors, including Appellant’s 

difficult childhood, mental health diagnosis, and various ways in 

which he has changed during his period of incarceration. As noted 

by this court, however, the lengthy discussion of the factors 

weighed by the court at Appellant’s prior sentencing hearing was 

referenced and made a part of the re-sentencing hearing. The 

court was extremely detailed when weighing the factors at 

[Appellant’s] first sentencing. In that regard, the court recognized

Appellant’s difficult circumstances:

THE COURT: Having reviewed the presentence [report 

(PSI)] information that I have regarding [Appellant], and 

all his family has already told the [c]ourt, certainly 

[Appellant] had a very, very difficult childhood with his 

mother being incarcerated and his father, who was very

forth[right] with the Court in coming here today, also 

spending time in and out of jail. [Appellant] did not have 

his parents to rely upon, but he did have his 

grandmother, Ms. Harris, who raised him and obviously 

still care[s] about him. She worked to support him. 

Because of her efforts, there was a somewhat stable 

household for [Appellant] to grow up in and his needs 

were met by his grandmother ...[.] Unfortunately, 

[Appellant] started having behavior issues very, very 

early in grade school and has a juvenile history that 

reflects that.... There are ... six commitments, I believe 

as a juvenile []. Over and over and over[, Appellant]

being discharged from placement, being put back into 

placement. ... Unfortunately, this went on all throughout 

school. Nothing [Appellant did] as a juvenile indicat[es]
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violent behavior, but certainly [Appellant’s] juvenile 

[history] ... mak[es] it clear [Appellant] was not 

particularly amendable towards the guidance that was 

being offered to him through the [c]ourt and through all 

of his placements.

(N.T., 12/8/17, pgs 16, 17).

The court went on to note [that at Appellant’s original 

sentencing,] Appellant received his high school diploma but that 

he had yet to obtain a legitimate source of employment. In that 

regard, Appellant admitted to supporting his own children by 

selling drugs on Lehigh Avenue[,] where he was earning good

money. At age 17[,] Appellant was adjudicated for statutory 

sexual assault and he was committed as a juvenile until he turned 

18 years old. Then, he amassed 6 arrests, 3 convictions, 3

commitments, 2 violation of probations, [and] 2 sentence 

revocations. All of that occurred between the ages of 18-21, when 

[Appellant] was arrested for shooting the [victim] in this case.

Thus, the record confirms that prior to imposing its 

sentence, this court closely considered Appellant’s [PSI], his 

lengthy criminal history in the City of Philadelphia, his repeated 

failure to rehabilitate, his abhorrent conduct in this case, his 

history of substance abuse and mental health issues, his 

education, his lack of employment history, and his family and 

personal circumstances. (N.T., 12/8/17, at pgs. 16-24).

Regarding Appellant’s depraved shooting of Mr. Davis, 

this court [stated at the original sentencing hearing]:

So[, Appellant’s counsel] has argued mitigation for 

you based on your childhood and upbringing and did so 

very well, but I will note that having sat through the trial 

and watched [the surveillance] video over and over 

again, ... I have to agree with the prosecution that it

shows somebody who was intent on the execution of Mr. 

Davis....

Put together, what it all shows is someone who 

disguised themselves [sic] from head, almost to toe, in 

Muslim garb, walk[ed] down to that co[r]ner store, go in, 

go out, draw your gun, and almost in point-blank range, 

try to kill [Mr.] Davis and you nearly succeeded. It’s only 
J-S45039-22

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for the grace of God that Mr. Davis is alive and that you 

did not face a homicide trial and a homicide conviction. 

In my mind ... what [Appellant] did shows the same 

type of culpability, the same type of intent to kill, the 

same cold-blooded premeditated plan to shoot and kill 

Mr. Davis. ... [A]dding to the disturbing nature of what 

we saw [on the video] was [Appellant] acti[ng] out in the 

elevator [immediately after the shooting]. Clearly[, 

Appellant was] not in the least bit disturbed by what [he]

had just done, showing almost an animated reenactment 

to Mr. Williams....

I have to say ... that there are [] few times that I 

have had on this bench for now 13 years that I’ve seen 

such intentionally, brutal behavior.

(Id. at pgs. 20-21).

Before shooting Mr. Davis, Appellant had already 

amassed a considerable criminal record that included twelve 

arrests, several adjudications or convictions, and multiple 

probation violations. Notwithstanding the many opportunities 

provided to him, Appellant made no effort toward rehabilitation. 

(Id. at pgs. 16-20).

Returning to [Appellant’s] re-sentencing hearing, the 

court clearly stated that all of the aforesaid information would not 

be reiterated but would be incorporated into the record.

THE COURT: All right. I will say, of course, that I 

remember the details of this case very, very clearly. And 

I believe I stated on the record at sentencing all of the 

reasons and all of the considerations that I have weighed 

in issuing the sentence that I did. I’m not going to go

into a full recitation of those reasons again since they are 

already of record. I will just incorporate that record into 

today’s record. However, suffice it to say, that this was 

a cold[-]blooded attempt ... to commit murder. And I did 

find that [Appellant’s] actions [after the shooting] 

seemed to indicate that he was somewhat cavalier about 

his intent immediately afterwards as we saw on the video 

that was taken when [Appellant] was in the elevator of 

the building as well as in the courtroom.
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(N.T., 4/16/21, pgs 7, 8.)

Counsel for Appellant argued [at resentencing] that the 

sentence should be lowered to a total 10-20 years because 

Appellant is still young and that a lesser sentence would enable 

him to participate in rehabilitation programs in state custody.

Appellant exercised his right to allocution and detailed the ways 

in which he believes he has tried to better himself while 

incarcerated. Notably, however, Appellant did not express any 

remorse for his actions in connection with the [victim], nor did he 

express any concern for the [victim] and his family. The court 

was not compelled to comment nor question Appellant’s assertions 

in this regard. 

* * *

Considering Appellant’s vicious and remorseless 

conduct in this case, together with his overall penchant for 

crime and disregard of its effect on his community, this 

court’s aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration 

is thoroughly justified.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 6-7, 8-11 (emphasis added; some 

capitalization, citations and punctuation modified).

Our review discloses record and legal support for the court’s reasoning.

This Court rejected a similar claim in Barnes, supra:

We have held that preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing

scheme is a legitimate sentencing concern. See

[Commonwealth v.] Walker, 568 A.2d [201,] 205 [(Pa. Super.

1989)] (“Upon resentencing, a court has a valid interest in

preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing scheme.”) (citation

omitted). Indeed, a trial court properly may resentence a

defendant to the same aggregate sentence to preserve its

original sentencing scheme. See Commonwealth v. Bartrug,

732 A.2d 1287[, 1289] (Pa. Super. 1999) (noting a resentence of

71⁄2 to 15 years for burglary was lawful after not receiving a

sentence for burglary and having been given previously the same

sentence for theft by unlawful taking).... “[I]n most

circumstances, a judge can duplicate the effect of the original
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sentencing plan by adjusting the sentences on various counts so

that the aggregate punishment remains the same.” Walker, 568

A.2d at 206. However, “[i]f a judge could have imposed the same

aggregate sentence he handed down at the original sentencing

hearing, and ... instead imposes a harsher aggregate sentence,

the presumption of vindictiveness could not be rebutted by

invoking the need to preserve the original sentencing plan.” Id. 

In Commonwealth v. McHale, 924 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. Super.

2007), overruled in part on other grounds as stated in

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15 (Pa. Super. 2007),

we upheld the trial court’s resentencing of the defendant when his

conviction on the most serious charges, two counts of aggravated

assault, previously had been reversed based on insufficient

evidence. McHale, 924 A.2d at 673-74. After remand, to

maintain the same total aggregate sentence as originally imposed,

the trial court increased the overall sentence on the surviving

counts. Id. at 667. Noting that the aggregate sentence remained

unchanged, we upheld the new sentence. Id. at 674. In so doing, 

we noted:

[O]ur conclusion is not altered by the fact that remand

and resentencing were prompted by reversal of two of

[the defendant’s] convictions.... Whether remand is the

result of reversal of one or more convictions or vacation

of an illegal sentence, we conclude that the trial court has

the same discretion and responsibilities in resentencing.

Id. at 673-74.

... [C]onsistent with [] Walker, and McHale, the trial court’s

resentencing [appellant] did not rise to vindictiveness because the

trial court here sought to preserve the integrity of the original

sentencing scheme by imposing the same aggregate sentence.

Barnes, 167 A.3d at 124-25 (emphasis in original; some citations modified).

Finally, where, as here, a sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI, “it 

will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information 

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along 

with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Conklin, 275 A.3d 
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1087, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). “[W]here the court has been 

so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. 

Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Commonwealth

v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“The sentencing judge can 

satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the 

record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the pre-sentencing 

report; thus properly considering and weighing all relevant factors.” (citation 

omitted)).

In sum, we discern no abuse of the resentencing court’s discretion. 

Contrary to Appellant’s claim, his standard-guideline-range sentences were 

neither excessive nor unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 

A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “rejection of a sentencing court’s 

imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds [should] occur 

infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges.”); 

Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating “where a sentence is within the standard 

range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code.”).

Based on the foregoing, we vacate Appellant’s unlawful sentence 

imposed for conspiracy to commit murder. Because the trial court ordered 

the conspiracy sentence to run concurrent to the sentence imposed for 

attempted murder, our disposition does not affect the overall sentencing 

scheme. See Commonwealth v. Henderson, 938 A.2d 1063, 1067 (Pa. 
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Super. 2007) (stating that “since appellant’s sentences were concurrent, the 

trial court’s overall sentencing scheme has not been compromised, and it 

[wa]s not necessary to remand for re-sentencing” after this Court held the 

sentence imposed on one count to be unlawful); cf. Commonwealth v.

Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding vacatur of a 

consecutive sentence in the context of a larger sentencing scheme

necessitates vacatur of the entire sentence). We affirm Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence in all other respects. 

Judgment of sentence vacated in part and affirmed in part. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/01/2023