Filed 8/16/16 The Inland Oversight Committee v. City of Covina CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE INLAND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY OF COVINA,

Defendant and Respondent;

SAGE AUTOMOTIVE GROUP et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

 B268735

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS152268)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Richard L. Fruin, Judge. Reversed.

Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs and Anthony N. Kim for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Richards, Watson & Gershon and Ginetta L. Giovinco for Defendant and 

Respondent.

Feldman/Berman/Schwartz and Craig S. Berman for Real Parties in Interest and 

Respondents.
2

In this action under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources 

Code, § 21000 et seq. (CEQA)), plaintiff, The Inland Oversight Committee, appeals from 

the judgment (order) of dismissal based on the sustaining of a demurrer. In light of our 

determination that plaintiff is entitled to proceed under the public interest litigation 

exception to the personal interest requirement, we reverse. 

 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant, the City of Covina (City), owns the subject property at 633-635 South 

Citrus Avenue in that city. Citrus Avenue has a Metrolink stop and intersects with the 10 

and 210 freeways.

In 2014, Covina MJL, LLC1(Covina MJL) and its affiliate Sage Automotive 

Group (Sage) expressed interest in renovating and leasing the property for a new

automobile dealership business, Sage Covina Chevrolet. At the time, the existing 

structure on the property, formerly used by Enterprise Rent-A-Car, was in need of 

renovation. Covina MJL and Sage sought financial assistance from City to build an 

approximately 8,000 square-foot addition.

2

After completing its initial CEQA study, City concluded that although the 

proposed project would have “potentially significant impacts related to Aesthetic 

Resources, Cultural Resources, Hazards and Hazardous Materials, and Noise,” these

impacts could be mitigated to “less than significant levels.” It prepared a mitigated 

negative declaration under CEQA, developed a mitigation monitoring program for the 

proposed project, and distributed the mitigated negative declaration for public comment. 

During the comment period, plaintiff objected that no consideration had been given to the 

 

1 The record indicates that “Covina MJL, LLC is a subsidiary of Sage Holding 

Co., which is an established automobile dealership operator.” 

2 City granted Covina MJL and Sage an economic subsidy with a sales tax 

incentive. In the original complaint’s second cause of action, “Unlawful Expenditure of 

Public Funds,” plaintiff challenged the tax incentive and alleged violation of the 

prevailing wage law. That cause of action is no longer at issue. 
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project’s cumulative and long-term environmental impacts, and requested preparation of 

a full EIR. 

In October 2014, City granted final CEQA approval based on the mitigated 

negative declaration. City approved all relevant documents—the lease with option to 

buy, mitigated negative declaration, and economic development subsidy report—for the 

project.

The following month, plaintiff filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and 

complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against City, with Sage and Covina MJL 

as real parties in interest. It filed an amended complaint with causes of action for failure 

to prepare an EIR (first cause of action) and violation of mitigation measures (second 

cause of action). 

City and real parties in interest demurred to the first amended complaint, 

questioning plaintiff’s beneficial interest in the project. Code of Civil Procedure section 

1086 authorizes a writ of mandate “upon the verified petition of the party beneficially 

interested.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086 (section 1086).) 

Plaintiff argued that in compliance with section 1086, its petition was verified by a 

member, Stephen Millard, who resides “in or near” City and has “an interest in ensuring 

open, accountable, responsive government and in protecting the region’s environment.” 

In addition, plaintiff sought to proceed under the public interest litigation exception to the 

beneficial interest requirement. 

In sustaining the demurrer, the court stated that “[p]er Braude v. City of Los 

Angeles [(1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 83], petitioner’s interest in the action must be 

‘substantial[, i.e., a writ will not issue to enforce a technical, abstract or moot right,] and 

must be an interest over and above an interest held in common by the public in general.’” 

In addition to its failure “to allege facts showing that petitioner has ‘a beneficial interest 

that is clear, direct, substantial, and over and above an interest held in common by the 

public in general,’” the complaint failed to describe “‘the dealership’s location, its 

proximity to any of Petitioner’s members, the ways in which the Project will harm any of 
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Petitioner’s members, or what interest in this specific Project any of Petitioner’s members 

have.’” 

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint clarifying the project’s impact on its 

members (see italicized language below). The amended complaint specifically alleged 

that at least one member lives in the city: “18. There is a fair argument that the project 

will have significant environmental impacts; by way of example and without limitation, 

the administrative record is replete with evidence that the Project will result in significant 

traffic, hazards/hazardous materials, hydrology/water quality, noise, and public services

impacts. The Project will also result in cumulative impacts unaccounted for in the 

[mitigated negative declaration]. The Project’s environmental impact particularly affect 

Petitioner in a number of ways. By way of example and without limitation:

“A. The Project is located at 633-635 South Citrus Avenue, Covina, CA.

“B. Citrus Avenue is a major throughway in the City as it intersects with 

two freeways, Interstate 10 and Interstate 210, and also a Metrolink stop.

“C. The significant traffic impact resulting from construction of a car 

dealership on a 100,000 square-foot lot that currently produces minimal traffic will 

impact Covina residents, including members of Petitioner, at least one of whom resides in 

the City of Covina.” (Italics added.) 

The second amended complaint was followed by another demurrer by City and 

real parties in interest. They requested dismissal based on plaintiff’s failure, despite 

several opportunities, to “allege that the auto dealership is in close proximity to any of 

[its] members; how any of its members will be adversely impacted by traffic, including 

any specific routes; or what specific interests in the Project any of [plaintiff’s] members 

have over and above that of all citizens, particularly given that [it] has alleged that the 

Project’s traffic ‘will impact Covina residents’ in general.” 

The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. It cited plaintiff’s

failure to allege a beneficial interest in the project, or a geographical nexus between any 

of its members and the project. It distinguished Bozung v. Local Agency Formation 

Commission (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263 (Bozung), in which one of the plaintiffs lived about 
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1,800 feet from the annexed property and thus had a special interest in the litigation to 

challenge the annexation (id. at p. 268). The court also distinguished Save the Plastic 

Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, in which the plaintiff 

had a direct economic interest in the ordinance banning plastic bags. 

Based on the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court 

entered a judgment (order) of dismissal. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we accept 

all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact 

or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blumhorst v. Jewish 

Family Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.)

The sole legal issue presented on appeal is whether plaintiff—a “non-profit, 

social-advocacy organization formed and operating under the laws of the State of 

California”—has standing to sue. The basic rule is that “if the complaint shows that [the 

plaintiff] is not a real party in interest and therefore lacks ‘standing’ to sue, a ‘general’ 

demurrer will be sustained. [Citations.]” (Friendly Village Community Assn., Inc. v. 

Silva & Hill Constr. Co. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 220, 224.) But in cases involving threats 

to the public interest, which include threats to the environment, the rule is greatly relaxed: 

“[E]nvironmental problems clearly present justiciable issues. In a mandamus proceeding 

such as that presented here, it has been recognized that a petitioner must seek to protect a 

clear interest [citations]. But ‘[the] conditions of petitioner’s right and respondent’s duty 

. . . may be greatly relaxed, if not virtually abandoned, where the question is one of public 

interest’ [citation]. This rule was set forth by the California Supreme Court in Board of 

Soc. Welfare v. County of L.A. [(1945)] 27 Cal.2d 98, 100–101: ‘[Where] the question is 

one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a 

public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the 

result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed 
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and the duty in question enforced. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. 

Los Angeles (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 117, 127.)

In Bozung, supra, 13 Cal.3d 263, the City of Camarillo’s annexation of real 

property was challenged by several plaintiffs: “Richard Bozung, a Ventura County 

resident and taxpayer; Roger Boedecker, a Ventura County resident and taxpayer who 

lives near the annexed property, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; and 

the Ventura County Environmental Coalition, Ventura County residents and taxpayers, 

many of whom live in Camarillo or in the area of the annexation.” (Id. at p. 268.) In 

their demurrer, the defendants (the City of Camarillo and the local agency that approved 

the annexation) argued that none of the plaintiffs had the necessary beneficial interest to 

bring an action in mandamus. (Id. at p. 271.) 

In concluding that all of the plaintiffs had standing, the court found the allegation 

“that they will be harmed by the environmental effects of the challenged annexation

. . . is sufficient. (United States v. SCRAP (1973) 412 U.S. 669, 683–685.)” (Bozung, 

supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 272.) In addition, the plaintiffs had “standing ‘to procure 

enforcement of a public duty, . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The Bozung court rejected any 

distinction based on “whether plaintiffs live within or without the Camarillo city 

boundaries. Effects of environmental abuse are not contained by political lines; strict 

rules of standing that might be appropriate in other contexts have no application where 

broad and long-term effects are involved. (See United States v. SCRAP, supra, 412 U.S. 

at pp. 687–688.)” (Ibid.)

United States v. SCRAP, supra, 412 U.S. 669 is similar. The failure of a federal 

commission to halt a proposed railway freight increase was challenged by several 

environmental protection groups on various grounds, including the lack of an 

environmental impact statement. (Id. at p. 679.) In concluding the plaintiffs had standing

to bring the action, the Supreme Court held it was sufficient to allege that the 

commission’s illegal action “would directly harm them in their use of the natural 

resources of the Washington Metropolitan Area.” (Id. at p. 687.) The fact that the rate 

increase was applicable to substantially all railroads, and thus “all persons who utilize the 
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scenic resources of the country, and indeed all who breathe its air, could claim harm 

similar to that alleged by the environmental groups” was not a basis on which to deny 

standing. (Ibid.) “[W]e have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied 

simply because many people suffer the same injury. . . . To deny standing to persons who 

are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most 

injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We 

cannot accept that conclusion.” (Id. at pp. 687–688.)

Applying this reasoning, plaintiff may not be denied standing simply because the

injuries suffered by its members are identical to the injuries suffered by the public at 

large. The correct analysis is whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the project 

will result in long-term environmental impacts on its members, regardless whether they 

live in or near the city, and that City, contrary to CEQA’s requirements, has yet to 

consider those impacts. 

According to the allegations of the complaint, the project—which is located on a 

major throughway that intersects with two freeways and contains a Metrolink stop—will 

create “significant traffic impacts” that will affect all “Covina residents, including 

members of Petitioner, at least one of whom resides in the City”; and the “Project’s 

significant direct, indirect, or cumulative adverse impacts on the environment give rise to 

Respondent’s legal obligation to prepare an environmental impact report.” We conclude 

that under United States v. SCRAP, supra, 412 U.S. at pp. 687–688 and Bozung, supra, 

13 Cal.3d at p. 272, the complaint has sufficiently alleged plaintiff’s right to proceed 

under the public interest litigation exception to the personal interest requirement. 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is reversed. The matter is remanded for further 

proceedings. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EPSTEIN, P. J.

We concur:

MANELLA, J.

COLLINS, J.