2021 IL App (4th) 200581-UNO. 4-20-0581 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re J.S., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois,

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

Amanda W.,

Respondent-Appellant). 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

)

)

Appeal from

Circuit Court of 

McLean County 

No. 18JA81 

Honorable 

J. Brian Goldrick, 

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) it lacked jurisdiction to review

respondent’s claim the agency failed to file a timely integrated assessment and 

first service plan within 45 days of the shelter care hearing and (2) the trial court’s 

best-interest finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 2 On November 4, 2020, the trial court terminated the parental rights of respondent, 

Amanda W., as to her child, J.S. (born August 9, 2018). Respondent father, Treshon S., is not a 

party to this appeal. On appeal, respondent argues (1) the agency failed to file a timely 

integrated assessment and first service plan within 45 days of the shelter care hearing and (2) the 

trial court’s best-interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. Initial Proceedings 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not 

precedent except in the limited 

circumstances allowed under Rule 

23(e)(1). 

FILED

April 9, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
- 2 - 

¶ 5 On August 13, 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, 

alleging J.S. was neglected (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)), where the minor’s 

environment was injurious to her welfare because respondent (1) failed to correct the conditions 

which resulted in the termination of her parental rights as to J.S.’s sibling, A.B., in McLean 

County case No. 15-JA-122 and (2) exposed her to domestic violence. At an August 14, 2018, 

shelter care hearing, respondent father stipulated “to probable cause and an immediate and urgent 

necessity.” Based on the stipulation and information provided to the trial court, the court found 

probable cause to believe J.S. was neglected and that it was a matter of immediate and urgent 

necessity to remove J.S. from respondent’s care. The court granted the Department of Children 

and Family Services (DCFS) temporary custody of J.S. 

¶ 6 At an October 9, 2018, adjudicatory hearing, respondent stipulated to the 

allegation of neglect in the State’s petition that J.S.’s environment was injurious to her welfare 

where respondent failed to correct the conditions which resulted in the termination of her 

parental rights as to J.S.’s sibling, A.B., in McLean County case No. 15-JA-122. The trial court 

continued the matter under supervision for 12 months and entered a protective order. The court 

admonished respondent to cooperate with services and visitation. On October 26, 2018, the State 

filed a petition to revoke supervision because police responded to three incidents involving 

respondent or respondent father violating the supervision order. At a November 6, 2018, 

hearing, respondent stipulated to the allegations in the petition to revoke supervision. 

Subsequently, the court vacated the supervision order and entered an adjudicatory order finding 

J.S. neglected. 
- 3 - 

¶ 7 Following a February 7, 2019, dispositional hearing, the trial court found

(1) respondent unfit, (2) made J.S. a ward of the court, and (3) continued guardianship and 

custody of J.S. with DCFS. 

¶ 8 B. Termination Proceedings 

¶ 9 In March 2020, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

The State alleged respondent was unfit because she failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of 

interest, concern, or responsibility as to J.S.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2016)), 

(2) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of J.S. 

from respondent nine months after an adjudication of neglect, specifically June 16, 2019, to 

March 16, 2020 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2016)), and (3) make reasonable progress 

toward the return of J.S. within nine months after an adjudication of neglect, specifically, June 

16, 2019, to March 16, 2020 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2016)). 

¶ 10 1. Fitness Hearing

¶ 11 On July 14, 2020, the trial court conducted a bifurcated hearing on the petition to 

terminate parental rights, first considering respondent’s fitness. At the hearing, respondent 

stipulated she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of J.S. within nine months 

after an adjudication of neglect, specifically, June 16, 2019, to March 16, 2020 (750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2016)). The State dismissed the remaining allegations of unfitness. Based 

on respondent’s stipulation and an extensive factual basis offered by the State, the court found 

respondent unfit by clear and convincing evidence.

¶ 12 2. Best-Interest Hearing 

¶ 13 Over a two-day period in October and November 2020, the trial court held a 

best-interest hearing where the court heard testimony and received best-interest reports from 
- 4 - 

Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) and The Baby Fold (Baby Fold). The court also 

considered the testimony elicited during the hearing. 

¶ 14 a. Best-Interest Reports 

¶ 15 CASA reviewed the best-interest factors and recommended terminating 

respondent’s parental rights, maintaining DCFS guardianship of J.S., and keeping J.S. in her 

current foster placement with the goal of adoption. CASA reported J.S. resided with her foster 

family the entire 23 months of her life. The foster family provided J.S. unconditional love and 

security, and J.S. continued to thrive in her current environment. In October 2019, respondent 

completed substance abuse treatment, but in December 2019, respondent received a citation for 

driving under the influence (DUI). While respondent completed domestic violence services and 

attended individual counseling, CASA found her overall progress inconsistent. Respondent 

engaged in weekly two-hour supervised visits with J.S. until March 2020, when visits ceased due 

to COVID-19. Respondent then engaged in visits with J.S. via Facetime. Respondent’s and 

respondent father’s relationship remained unclear throughout the life of the case. 

¶ 16 Baby Fold reviewed the best-interest factors and recommended terminating 

respondent’s parental rights and achieving permanency for J.S. through adoption by her foster 

family. The best-interest report indicated respondent exhibited a strong bond with J.S. but the 

foster family could provide J.S. with stability, support, and a substance-free home. J.S.’s foster 

parents took J.S. into care a few days after her birth. J.S. and her foster parents exhibited a 

strong bond, and the foster parents recently adopted J.S.’s half-sister, who also exhibited a strong 

bond with J.S. 

¶ 17 Respondent’s service plan included random drug screens, substance abuse 

treatment, domestic violence services, and mental health treatment. Respondent provided 
- 5 - 

negative drug screens. Respondent also completed domestic violence treatment and substance 

abuse treatment but was arrested in December 2019 for DUI. Respondent failed to consistently 

attend mental health services. Respondent engaged in weekly two-hour visitation with J.S. from 

August 2018 to March 2020 until COVID-19 prevented in-person visits. Respondent then 

engaged in visitation with J.S. via Facetime. 

¶ 18 Baby Fold expressed concern regarding the relationship between respondent and 

respondent father. Respondent relied on respondent father as her primary source of 

transportation. When questioned by her caseworker, respondent repeatedly denied being 

pregnant. However, respondent eventually admitted she was pregnant and due in December 

2020. Respondent alleged the father was unknown. 

¶ 19 b. Tina Holzhauer

¶ 20 Tina Holzhauer, J.S.’s foster mother, testified she and her husband, Bruce Butler, 

were J.S.’s biological great aunt and uncle. Bruce was respondent’s uncle. Tina and Bruce 

previously adopted respondent’s other child and J.S.’s half-sister, A.B. Tina and Bruce also had 

a 16-year-old daughter who resided with them. Tina testified J.S. came into their care when she 

was born. At Tina and Bruce’s house, J.S. had her own bedroom with a pocket door to A.B.’s 

room. J.S. exhibited a strong bond with A.B., Tina, Bruce, and their daughter. J.S. called Tina 

and Bruce “mom” and “dad.” Tina expressed a desire to adopt J.S. stating, “I feel her best 

interest is for us to adopt her.” 

¶ 21 Tina testified she spoke with respondent on July 13, 2020, about whether 

respondent was pregnant. Respondent admitted she engaged in sexual intercourse with 

respondent father in April 2020 but denied she was pregnant. 

¶ 22 c. Respondent 
- 6 - 

¶ 23 Respondent testified that on December 29, 2019, police pulled her over for a DUI, 

and she blew a 0.12. In response, respondent completed an alcohol program prior to her 

sentencing in that case. Respondent also attended Alcoholics Anonymous. Respondent 

maintained stable housing in Carlock, Illinois, and employment at a gas station. Respondent 

acknowledged J.S. exhibited a bond with A.B., Tina, and Bruce. If J.S. returned to respondent’s 

care, she intended to move closer to Tina and Bruce to maintain that bond. Respondent testified 

she was pregnant and due in December 2020. Respondent denied respondent father was the 

baby’s father. Respondent also denied telling Tina she engaged in sexual intercourse with 

respondent father. 

¶ 24 d. Trial Court’s Findings 

¶ 25 After hearing recommendations from counsel and considering the best-interest 

factors, the trial court found it was in J.S.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

The court found multiple best-interest factors favored termination, including J.S.’s physical 

safety and wellbeing, development of J.S.’s identity by the foster parents, the foster parents’ and 

siblings’ bond with J.S., J.S.’s attachment, J.S.’s sense of security and familiarity, and 

permanency. While the court acknowledged respondent expressed genuine care, love, and 

affection for J.S., Tina and Bruce provided permanency for J.S. since her birth and continued to

provide a stable and loving home. 

¶ 26 As to visitation the court stated, 

“The [c]ourt would note that the global pandemic does not 

help the situation. I will say unequivocally here that that does not 

impact on the [c]ourt’s decision. The fact that you could not have 

face-to-face visits with [J.S.] is not something that enters into this 
- 7 - 

[c]ourt’s mind. It is not held against you. If there are other means 

by which you can have contact, albeit limited, I would look at that. 

But we weren’t banned from having visitations. We were dealing 

with a global pandemic. Nobody knew how to handle it. ***

So, again, on the issue of visitation, I’m not holding it 

against [respondent father] that we have a global pandemic or 

against [respondent]. It is what it is and in part it’s one of the 

reasons why [c]ourt doesn’t have a problem with continuing cases 

during these times to give parents an opportunity to continue to 

work on services because of what we are dealing with.

But the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights was filed in 

March, right before we had our Shelter In Place Order, before we 

all knew what we were possibly dealing with. The world turned 

upside[-]down in the middle of March. Here we are in November 

addressing these issues.” 

¶ 27 The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the best 

interest of J.S. to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Subsequently, the court entered a 

written order terminating respondent’s parental rights. 

¶ 28 This appeal followed.

¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 30 On appeal, respondent argues (1) the agency failed to file a timely integrated 

assessment and first service plan within 45 days of the shelter care hearing and (2) the trial 
- 8 - 

court’s best-interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 31 Before proceeding to the merits of this appeal, we must address our jurisdiction to 

review respondent’s complaint the agency failed to file a timely integrated assessment and first 

service plan within 45 days of the shelter care hearing. Specifically, respondent argues “[t]here 

is no evidence in the court file or in testimony these documents were ever generated.” The State 

argues respondent forfeited this argument on appeal where respondent was aware the agency 

failed to file an integrated assessment and a service plan within 45 days of the shelter care 

hearing and declined to raise this issue on appeal following the adjudicatory and dispositional 

orders. We agree with the State. 

¶ 32 The trial court’s dispositional order, entered February 7, 2019, was a final order 

subject to appeal. See In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 456, 888 N.E.2d 72, 81 (2008) (stating 

dispositional orders are regarded as final and appealable as a matter of right). Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) required respondent to file a notice of appeal within 30 

days after the trial court entered the dispositional order. Respondent failed to do so. In failing to 

timely appeal, respondent forfeited her opportunity to seek review of her claim the agency failed 

to file a timely integrated assessment and a first service plan within 45 days of the shelter care 

hearing. The shelter care hearing took place on August 14, 2018, and the dispositional hearing 

took place on February 7, 2019. At the time the court entered the dispositional order, more than 

45 days elapsed since the shelter care hearing. Because respondent failed to timely appeal the 

court’s dispositional order, we lack jurisdiction to review respondent’s timeliness claim on 

appeal. See In re Janira T., 368 Ill. App. 3d 883, 891, 859 N.E.2d 1046, 1054 (2006). We now 

turn to whether the court’s best-interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
- 9 - 

¶ 33 “At the best-interest stage of termination proceedings the State bears the burden 

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination [of parental rights] is in the 

child’s best interest.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 290-91 (2009). 

The reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s best-interest determination unless it was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. A best-interest determination is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly demonstrate the court should have 

reached the opposite result. Id. 

¶ 34 During the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, “ ‘The parent’s interest 

in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving 

home life.’ ” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 959, 835 N.E.2d 908, 912 (2005) (quoting In re 

D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (2004)). The trial court takes into 

consideration the best-interest factors in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 

ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)). 

¶ 35 It appears respondent first argues the trial court misinterpreted a DCFS rule about 

visitation and we should review de novo the court’s misinterpretation. Specifically, respondent 

argues the court misinterpreted section 301.210 of Title 89 (89 Ill. Adm. Code 301.210, amended 

at 25 Ill. Reg. 11803 (eff. Sept. 14, 2001)), when the court stated to respondent, “The fact that 

you could not have face-to-face visits with [J.S.] is not something that enters into this [c]ourt’s 

mind. It is not held against you.” 

¶ 36 Based on the record, we find the trial court in rendering its judgment as to the 

termination of respondent’s parental rights did not address a DCFS rule or interpret the law.

Rather, the court simply informed respondent her lack of in-person visitation due to the 

pandemic was no fault of her own so it would not hold the lack of in-person visits against her 
- 10 - 

when determining whether to terminate her parental rights. Because there is no legal point to 

review, de novo review does not apply. See In re K.C., 325 Ill. App. 3d 771, 777, 759 N.E.2d 

15, 20-21 (2001). We review the trial court’s best interest finding under the manifest weight of 

the evidence standard of review. 

¶ 37 Respondent challenges DCFS’s and CASA’s best-interest analysis and argues the 

decision to seek termination deprived respondent of an objective evaluation of her performance. 

Respondent alleges the State and the trial court failed to properly analyze the best-interest factors 

and emphasizes how important visitation is when bonding with an infant. We find the trial court

sufficiently analyzed the best-interest factors and the factors weighed in favor of termination. 

¶ 38 Before making a decision on termination, the court took into consideration the 

best-interest reports, recommendations from counsel, and considered the best-interest factors. 

The trial court acknowledged respondent expressed genuine care, love, and affection for J.S. 

Further, the court addressed the unusual circumstances that led to stopping the in-person 

visitation and reiterated respondent would not be penalized for the inability to visit in person. 

Even so, the court found multiple factors weighed in favor of termination, including J.S.’s 

physical safety and wellbeing, development of J.S.’s identity by the foster parents, the foster 

parents’ and siblings’ bond with J.S., J.S.’s attachment, and J.S.’s sense of security, familiarity, 

and permanency. 

¶ 39 We find permanency is paramount in this case where Tina and Bruce took J.S. 

into care immediately after her birth. Tina testified J.S. calls her and Bruce “mom” and “dad.” 

Tina and Bruce provided J.S. with stability, they met all her needs, and they expressed a 

willingness to adopt her, having already adopted her older sister. Thus, J.S. would be in a 

permanent living situation with her sibling, raised by parents who demonstrate no signs of 
- 11 - 

instability. Respondent’s ability to meet J.S.’s needs is uncertain. Specifically, the record 

demonstrates respondent’s failure to make progress toward the return of the child by completing 

services where respondent failed to consistently attend mental health treatment and was arrested 

for DUI in December 2019. Based on the evidence, we find the court’s decision to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights was in J.S.’s best interest and not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment. 

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 42 Affirmed.