(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

BARTON v. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 18–725. Argued November 4, 2019—Decided April 23, 2020 

When a lawful permanent resident commits certain serious crimes, the 

Government may initiate removal proceedings before an immigration 

judge. 8 U. S. C. §1229a. If the lawful permanent resident is found

removable, the immigration judge may cancel removal, but only if the

lawful permanent resident meets strict statutory eligibility requirements. §§1229b(a), 1229b(d)(1)(B). 

Over the span of 12 years, lawful permanent resident Andre Barton 

was convicted of state crimes, including a firearms offense, drug offenses, and aggravated assault offenses. An Immigration Judge found 

him removable based on his state firearms and drug offenses. Barton 

applied for cancellation of removal. Among the eligibility requirements, a lawful permanent resident must have “resided in the United 

States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” §1229b(a)(2). Another provision, the so-called stop-time rule, 

provides that a continuous period of residence “shall be deemed to end”

when the lawful permanent resident commits “an offense referred to 

in section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the alien inadmissible to the 

United States under section 1182(a)(2).” §1229b(d)(1)(B). Because 

Barton’s aggravated assault offenses were committed within his first 

seven years of admission and were covered by §1182(a)(2), the Immigration Judge concluded that Barton was not eligible for cancellation 

of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Eleventh Circuit agreed. 

Held: For purposes of cancellation-of-removal eligibility, a §1182(a)(2) offense committed during the initial seven years of residence does not 

need to be one of the offenses of removal. Pp. 6–17.

(a) The cancellation-of-removal statute functions like a traditional 
 

 

 

 

2 BARTON v. BARR 

Syllabus 

recidivist sentencing statute, making a noncitizen’s prior crimes relevant to eligibility for cancellation of removal. The statute’s text clarifies two points relevant here. First, cancellation of removal is precluded when, during the initial seven years of residence, the noncitizen 

“committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2),” even if (as in

Barton’s case) the conviction occurred after the seven years elapsed.

Second, the offense must “rende[r] the alien inadmissible” as a result. 

For crimes involving moral turpitude, the relevant category here, 

§1182(a)(2) provides that a noncitizen is rendered “inadmissible” when 

he is convicted of or admits the offense. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 

As a matter of statutory text and structure, the analysis here is 

straightforward. Barton’s aggravated assault offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude and therefore “referred to in section 

1182(a)(2).” He committed the offenses during his initial seven years 

of residence and was later convicted of the offenses, thereby rendering 

him “inadmissible.” Barton was, therefore, ineligible for cancellation 

of removal. Pp. 6–10.

(b) Barton’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, he claims 

that the statute’s structure supports an “offense of removal” approach. 

But §1227(a)(2) offenses—not §1182(a)(2) offenses—are ordinarily the

basis for removal of lawful permanent residents. Therefore, Barton’s 

structural argument falls apart. If he were correct, the statute presumably would specify offenses “referred to in section 1182(a)(2) or section 1227(a)(2).” By contrast, some other immigration law provisions

do focus only on the offense of removal, and their statutory text and 

context support that limitation. See, e.g., §§1226(a), (c)(1)(A), 

1252(a)(2)(C). 

Second, seizing on the statutory phrase “committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the alien inadmissible 

to the United States under section 1182(a)(2),” §1229b(d)(1)(B), Barton

argues that a noncitizen is rendered “inadmissible” when actually adjudicated as inadmissible and denied admission to the United States, 

something that usually cannot happen to a lawfully admitted noncitizen. But the statutory text employs the term “inadmissibility” as a 

status that can result from, e.g., a noncitizen’s (including a lawfully 

admitted noncitizen’s) commission of certain offenses listed in 

§1182(a)(2). See, e.g., §§1182(a)(2)(A)(i), (B). And Congress has made 

that status relevant in several statutory contexts that apply to lawfully admitted noncitizens such as Barton. In those contexts, a noncitizen faces immigration consequences from being convicted of a

§1182(a)(2) offense even though the noncitizen is lawfully admitted

and is not necessarily removable solely because of that offense. See, 

e.g., §§1160(a)(1)(C), (a)(3)(B)(ii). Such examples pose a major hurdle

for Barton’s textual argument, and Barton has no persuasive answer. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Syllabus 

Third, Barton argues that the Government’s interpretation treats as

surplusage the phrase “or removable from the United States under 

section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4).” But redundancies are common in 

statutory drafting. The Court has often recognized that sometimes the 

better overall reading of a statute contains some redundancy. And redundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text. 

Finally, Barton argues alternatively that, even if inadmissibility is

a status, and even if the offense that precludes cancellation of removal 

need not be one of the offenses of removal, a noncitizen must at least 

have been capable of being charged with a §1182(a)(2) inadmissibility

offense as the basis for removal. Because the cancellation-of-removal 

statute is a recidivist statute, however, whether the offense that precludes cancellation of removal was charged or could have been charged

as one of the offenses of removal is irrelevant. Pp. 10–17. 

904 F. 3d 1294, affirmed. 

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed 

a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., 

joined. 
 

 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–725 

ANDRE MARTELLO BARTON, PETITIONER v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[April 23, 2020] 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Under the immigration laws, a noncitizen who is authorized to live permanently in the United States is a lawful

permanent resident—also commonly known as a greencard holder. But unlike a U. S. citizen, a lawful permanent 

resident who commits a serious crime may be removed from

the United States. 

Andre Barton is a Jamaican national and a longtime lawful permanent resident of the United States. During his

time in the United States, Barton has been convicted of 

state crimes on three separate occasions spanning 12 years.

The crimes include a firearms offense, drug offenses, and 

aggravated assault offenses. By law, the firearms offense

and the drug offenses each independently rendered Barton 

eligible for removal from the United States. In September

2016, the U. S. Government sought to remove Barton, 

and a U. S. Immigration Judge determined that Barton was

removable. 

Barton applied for cancellation of removal, a form of relief 

that allows a noncitizen to remain in the United States de-
2 BARTON v. BARR 

Opinion of the Court 

spite being found removable. The immigration laws authorize an immigration judge to cancel removal, but Congress 

has established strict eligibility requirements. See 8 

U. S. C. §§1229b(a), (d)(1)(B). For a lawful permanent resident such as Barton, the applicant for cancellation of removal (1) must have been a lawful permanent resident for 

at least five years; (2) must have continuously resided in 

the United States for at least seven years after lawful admission; (3) must not have been convicted of an aggravated 

felony as defined in the immigration laws; and (4) during 

the initial seven years of continuous residence, must not 

have committed certain other offenses listed in 8 U. S. C. 

§1182(a)(2). If a lawful permanent resident meets those eligibility requirements, the immigration judge has discretion to (but is not required to) cancel removal and allow the 

lawful permanent resident to remain in the United States. 

Under the cancellation-of-removal statute, the immigration judge examines the applicant’s prior crimes, as well as 

the offense that triggered his removal. If a lawful permanent resident has ever been convicted of an aggravated felony, or has committed an offense listed in §1182(a)(2) during the initial seven years of residence, that criminal record 

will preclude cancellation of removal.1 In that way, the 

statute operates like traditional criminal recidivist laws, 

which ordinarily authorize or impose greater sanctions on 

offenders who have committed prior crimes. 

In this case, after finding Barton removable based on his 

state firearms and drug offenses, the Immigration Judge 

and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that 

—————— 1As the statute makes clear, and as we discuss below, committing a 

§1182(a)(2) offense precludes cancellation of removal only if the offense

also “renders” the noncitizen inadmissible. See infra, at 10. Section 

1182(a)(2) specifies what that means for each of its enumerated offenses. 

For the offense at issue in this case, the noncitizen must also have been 

convicted of or admitted the offense. 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Barton was not eligible for cancellation of removal. Barton 

had committed offenses listed in §1182(a)(2) during his initial seven years of residence—namely, his state aggravated 

assault offenses in 1996. Barton’s 1996 aggravated assault 

offenses were not the offenses that triggered his removal.

But according to the BIA, and contrary to Barton’s argument, the offense that precludes cancellation of removal 

need not be one of the offenses of removal. In re JuradoDelgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 31 (BIA 2006). The U. S. Court 

of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the BIA’s

reading of the statute and concluded that Barton was not

eligible for cancellation of removal. The Second, Third, and 

Fifth Circuits have similarly construed the statute; only the 

Ninth Circuit has disagreed. 

Barton argues that the BIA and the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted the statute. He contends that the §1182(a)(2) 

offense that precludes cancellation of removal must be one 

of the offenses of removal. We disagree with Barton, and 

we affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 

Eleventh Circuit. 

I 

Federal immigration law governs the admission of

noncitizens to the United States and the deportation of 

noncitizens previously admitted. See 8 U. S. C. §§1182(a), 

1227(a), 1229a.2 The umbrella statutory term for being 

inadmissible or deportable is “removable.” §1229a(e)(2).

A noncitizen who is authorized to live permanently in the

United States is a lawful permanent resident, often known

as a green-card holder. When a lawful permanent resident 

commits a crime and is determined by an immigration

judge to be removable because of that crime, the Attorney

General (usually acting through an immigration judge) may 

—————— 2This opinion uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory

term “alien.” See 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(3). 
 

 

4 BARTON v. BARR 

Opinion of the Court 

cancel removal. §1229b(a). But the comprehensive immigration law that Congress passed and President Clinton

signed in 1996 tightly cabins eligibility for cancellation of 

removal. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 8 U. S. C. 

§1101 note.

For a lawful permanent resident, the cancellation-ofremoval statute provides that an immigration judge “may

cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible 

or deportable from the United States if the alien—(1) has 

been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for 

not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the United States

continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any 

status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.” §1229b(a).3 

The statute imposes one other requirement known as the

“stop-time rule.” As relevant here, the statute provides that 

a lawful permanent resident, during the initial seven years 

of residence, also cannot have committed “an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the 

alien inadmissible to the United States under section 

1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States

under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title.” 

§1229b(d)(1)(B).

Andre Barton is a Jamaican national and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. In 1996, he was convicted in a Georgia court of a firearms offense stemming

from an incident where Barton and a friend shot up the

house of Barton’s ex-girlfriend. In separate proceedings in

2007 and 2008, he was convicted in Georgia courts of state 

drug offenses. One case involved methamphetamine, and 

the other involved cocaine and marijuana. 

—————— 3The immigration laws impose a similar but even stricter set of eligibility requirements for noncitizens who are not lawful permanent residents. §1229b(b). 
 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

In 2016, the U. S. Government charged Barton with deportability under 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2) based on the 1996

firearms offense and the 2007 and 2008 drug crimes. See 

§§1227(a)(2)(B)(i), (C). Barton conceded that he was removable based on his criminal convictions for the firearms offense and drug offenses, and an Immigration Judge found 

him removable. 

Barton applied for cancellation of removal. All agree that 

Barton meets two of the eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal. He has been a lawful permanent resident 

for more than five years. And he has not been convicted of 

an “aggravated felony,” as defined by the immigration laws.

The Immigration Judge concluded, however, that Barton

had committed an offense listed in §1182(a)(2) during his 

initial seven years of residence. In 1996, 61⁄2 years after his 

admission to this country, Barton committed aggravated

assault offenses for which he was later convicted in a Georgia court. The Immigration Judge concluded that those aggravated assault offenses were covered by §1182(a)(2) and 

that Barton was therefore not eligible for cancellation of 

removal. 

The Board of Immigration Appeals and the U. S. Court of 

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit likewise concluded that

Barton was not eligible for cancellation of removal. Barton 

v. United States Atty. Gen., 904 F. 3d 1294, 1302 (2018). 

The key question was whether the offense that precludes

cancellation of removal (here, Barton’s 1996 aggravated

assault offenses) must also be one of the offenses of 

removal.4 The Board of Immigration Appeals has long 

interpreted the statute to mean that “an alien need not 

actually be charged and found inadmissible or removable

on the applicable ground in order for the criminal conduct 

—————— 4The term “offense of removal” describes the offense that was the 

ground on which the immigration judge, at the removal proceeding,

found the noncitizen removable. 
 

6 BARTON v. BARR 

Opinion of the Court 

in question to terminate continuous residence in this 

country” and preclude cancellation of removal. JuradoDelgado, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 31. In this case, the Eleventh 

Circuit likewise indicated that the §1182(a)(2) offense that 

precludes cancellation of removal need not be one of the 

offenses of removal. 904 F. 3d, at 1299–1300. And the 

Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have similarly construed

the statute. See Heredia v. Sessions, 865 F. 3d 60, 68 (CA2 

2017); Ardon v. Attorney General of United States, 449 Fed. 

Appx. 116, 118 (CA3 2011); Calix v. Lynch, 784 F. 3d 1000, 

1011 (CA5 2015).

But in 2018, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with those

courts and with the BIA. The Ninth Circuit ruled that a 

lawful permanent resident’s commission of an offense listed 

in §1182(a)(2) makes the noncitizen ineligible for 

cancellation of removal only if that offense was one of the

offenses of removal. Nguyen v. Sessions, 901 F. 3d 1093, 

1097 (2018). Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, Barton

would have been eligible for cancellation of removal because 

his §1182(a)(2) offenses (his 1996 aggravated assault 

offenses) were not among the offenses of removal (his 1996

firearms offense and his 2007 and 2008 drug crimes).

In light of the division in the Courts of Appeals over how 

to interpret this statute, we granted certiorari. 587 U. S. 

___ (2019). 

II 

A 

Under the immigration laws, when a noncitizen has committed a serious crime, the U. S. Government may seek to

remove that noncitizen by initiating removal proceedings

before an immigration judge. If the immigration judge determines that the noncitizen is removable, the immigration

judge nonetheless has discretion to cancel removal. But the 

immigration laws impose strict eligibility requirements for 

cancellation of removal. To reiterate, a lawful permanent 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

resident such as Barton who has been found removable because of criminal activity is eligible for cancellation of removal “if the alien—(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted 

for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has

resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after 

having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been 

convicted of any aggravated felony.” §1229b(a).

To be eligible for cancellation of removal, the lawful permanent resident, during the initial seven years of residence

after admission, also must not have committed “an offense 

referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the 

alien inadmissible to the United States under section 

1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States

under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title.” 

§1229b(d)(1)(B).

The law therefore fashions two distinct ways in which a 

lawful permanent resident’s prior crimes may preclude cancellation of removal. 

The law precludes cancellation of removal if the lawful

permanent resident has been convicted of an “aggravated 

felony” at any time. The statutory list of aggravated felonies is long: murder, rape, drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, obstruction of justice, treason, gambling, human

trafficking, and tax evasion, among many other crimes. 

§§1101(a)(43)(A)–(U).

In addition, the law precludes cancellation of removal if 

the lawful permanent resident committed certain other serious crimes during the initial seven years of residence. The 

law defines those offenses by cross-referencing §1182(a)(2), 

which specifies the offenses that can render a noncitizen

“inadmissible” to the United States. Section 1182(a)(2) includes “crime[s] involving moral turpitude,” which is a general category that covers a wide variety of crimes. Section 

1182(a)(2) also expressly encompasses various violations of 

drug laws, prostitution, money laundering, and certain

DUIs involving personal injury, among other crimes. 
8 BARTON v. BARR 

Opinion of the Court 

§§1182(a)(2)(A)(i), (C), (D), (E), (I); see §1101(h). 

In specifying when cancellation of removal would be precluded because of prior criminal activity, Congress struck a

balance that considers both the nature of the prior crime

and the length of time that the noncitizen has resided in the 

United States. If a lawful permanent resident has been 

convicted at any time of certain crimes (what the immigration laws refer to as an “aggravated felony”), then the

noncitizen is not eligible for cancellation of removal. If during the initial 7-year period of residence, a lawful permanent resident committed certain other offenses referred to 

in §1182(a)(2), then the noncitizen likewise is not eligible

for cancellation of removal. 

In providing that a noncitizen’s prior crimes (in addition

to the offense of removal) can render him ineligible for cancellation of removal, the cancellation-of-removal statute 

functions like a traditional recidivist sentencing statute. In 

an ordinary criminal case, a defendant may be convicted of 

a particular criminal offense. And at sentencing, the defendant’s other criminal offenses may be relevant. So too 

in the immigration removal context. A noncitizen may be

found removable based on a certain criminal offense. In applying for cancellation of removal, the noncitizen must detail his entire criminal record on Form EOIR–42A. An immigration judge then must determine whether the 

noncitizen has been convicted of an aggravated felony at 

any time or has committed a §1182(a)(2) offense during the

initial seven years of residence. It is entirely ordinary to

look beyond the offense of conviction at criminal sentencing, 

and it is likewise entirely ordinary to look beyond the offense of removal at the cancellation-of-removal stage in immigration cases.5 

—————— 5 If the offense of removal itself was an aggravated felony or was an 

offense listed in §1182(a)(2) that was committed during the initial seven

years of residence, then the offense of removal alone precludes cancellation of removal, regardless of whether the noncitizen has an additional 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

It is not surprising, moreover, that Congress required immigration judges considering cancellation of removal to 

look in part at whether the noncitizen has committed any 

offenses listed in §1182(a)(2). The offenses listed in 

§1182(a)(2) help determine whether a noncitizen should be

admitted to the United States. Under the cancellation-ofremoval statute, immigration judges must look at that 

same category of offenses to determine whether, after a previously admitted noncitizen has been determined to be deportable, the noncitizen should nonetheless be allowed to 

remain in the United States. If a crime is serious enough

to deny admission to a noncitizen, the crime can also be serious enough to preclude cancellation of removal, at least if 

committed during the initial seven years of residence.

Importantly, the text of the cancellation-of-removal statute does not simply say that cancellation of removal is precluded when, during the initial seven years of residence, the

noncitizen was convicted of an offense referred to in 

§1182(a)(2). Rather, the text says that cancellation of removal is precluded when, during the initial seven years of 

residence, the noncitizen “committed an offense referred to 

in section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the alien inadmissible.” §1229b(d)(1)(B). That language clarifies two points of 

relevance here. 

First, cancellation of removal is precluded if a noncitizen 

committed a §1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven

years of residence, even if (as in Barton’s case) the conviction occurred after the seven years elapsed. In other words, 

as Congress specified in the statute and as the BIA and the 

Courts of Appeals have recognized, the date of commission 

of the offense is the key date for purposes of calculating 

whether the noncitizen committed a §1182(a)(2) offense 

during the initial seven years of residence. See In re Perez, 

—————— 

record of prior crimes. 
10 BARTON v. BARR 

Opinion of the Court 

22 I. & N. Dec. 689, 693–694 (BIA 1999) (date of commission is controlling date); see also Heredia, 865 F. 3d, at 70– 

71 (“the date of the commission of the offense governs the

computation of a lawful permanent resident’s continuous 

residency in the United States”); Calix, 784 F. 3d, at 1012 

(“Once he was convicted of the offense” referred to in 

§1182(a)(2), “he was rendered inadmissible to the United 

States. His accrual of continuous residence was halted as 

of the date he committed that offense”). 

Second, the text of the law requires that the noncitizen

be rendered “inadmissible” as a result of the offense. For 

crimes involving moral turpitude, which is the relevant category of §1182(a)(2) offenses here, §1182(a)(2) provides that

a noncitizen is rendered “inadmissible” when he is convicted of or admits the offense. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i). As the 

Eleventh Circuit explained, “while only commission is required at step one, conviction (or admission) is required at 

step two.” 904 F. 3d, at 1301. 

In this case, Barton’s 1996 state aggravated assault offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude and therefore 

“referred to in section 1182(a)(2).” Barton committed those 

offenses during his initial seven years of residence. He was 

later convicted of the offenses in a Georgia court and 

thereby rendered “inadmissible.” Therefore, Barton was ineligible for cancellation of removal.

As a matter of statutory text and structure, that analysis

is straightforward. The Board of Immigration Appeals has

long interpreted the statute that way. See Jurado-Delgado, 

24 I. & N. Dec., at 31. And except for the Ninth Circuit, all 

of the Courts of Appeals to consider the question have interpreted the statute that way. 

B 

Barton pushes back on that straightforward statutory interpretation and the longstanding position of the Board of 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

Immigration Appeals. Barton says that he may not be denied cancellation of removal based on his 1996 aggravated 

assault offenses because those offenses were not among the

offenses of removal found by the Immigration Judge in Barton’s removal proceeding. Rather, his 1996 firearms offense 

and his 2007 and 2008 drug offenses were the offenses of 

removal. 

To succinctly summarize the parties’ different positions 

(with the difference highlighted in italics below): The Government would preclude cancellation of removal under this

provision if the lawful permanent resident committed a 

§1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of residence. Barton would preclude cancellation of removal under this provision if the lawful permanent resident committed a §1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of 

residence and if that §1182(a)(2) offense was one of the offenses of removal in the noncitizen’s removal proceeding. 

To support his “offense of removal” approach, Barton advances three different arguments. A caution to the reader: 

These arguments are not easy to unpack. 

First, according to Barton, the statute’s overall structure

with respect to removal proceedings demonstrates that a 

§1182(a)(2) offense may preclude cancellation of removal 

only if that §1182(a)(2) offense was one of the offenses of 

removal. We disagree. In removal proceedings, a lawful

permanent resident (such as Barton) may be found “deportable” based on deportability offenses listed in §1227(a)(2). 

A noncitizen who has not previously been admitted may be

found “inadmissible” based on inadmissibility offenses

listed in §1182(a)(2). See §§1182(a), 1227(a), 1229a(e)(2).

Importantly, then, §1227(a)(2) offenses—not §1182(a)(2) offenses—are typically the basis for removal of lawful permanent residents. 

Because the offense of removal for lawful permanent residents is ordinarily a §1227(a)(2) offense, Barton’s structural argument falls apart. If Barton were correct that this 
12 BARTON v. BARR 

Opinion of the Court 

aspect of the cancellation-of-removal statute focused only 

on the offense of removal, the statute presumably would

specify offenses “referred to in section 1182(a)(2) or section 

1227(a)(2).” So why does the statute identify only offenses

“referred to in section 1182(a)(2)”? Barton has no good answer. At oral argument, when directly asked that question,

Barton’s able counsel forthrightly acknowledged: “It’s a little hard to explain.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.

This point is the Achilles’ heel of Barton’s structural argument. As we see it, Barton cannot explain the omission

of §1227(a)(2) offenses in the “referred to” clause for a simple reason: Barton’s interpretation of the statute is incorrect. Properly read, this is not simply an “offense of removal” statute that looks only at whether the offense of 

removal was committed during the initial seven years of

residence. Rather, this is a recidivist statute that uses 

§1182(a)(2) offenses as a shorthand cross-reference for a 

category of offenses that will preclude cancellation of removal if committed during the initial seven years of

residence. 

By contrast to this cancellation-of-removal provision, 

some other provisions of the immigration laws do focus only 

on the offense of removal—for example, provisions governing mandatory detention and jurisdiction. See §§1226(a), 

(c)(1)(A), (B), 1252(a)(2)(C). But the statutory text and context of those provisions support that limitation. Those provisions use the phrase “inadmissible by reason of ” a 

§1182(a)(2) offense, “deportable by reason of ” a §1227(a)(2) 

offense, or “removable by reason of ” a §1182(a)(2) or

§1227(a)(2) offense. And the provisions make contextual 

sense only if the offense justifying detention or denying jurisdiction is one of the offenses of removal. The cancellationof-removal statute does not employ similar language. 

Second, moving from overall structure to precise text,

Barton seizes on the statutory phrase “committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

alien inadmissible to the United States under section 

1182(a)(2).” §1229b(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). According

to Barton, conviction of an offense listed in §1182(a)(2)—for 

example, conviction in state court of a crime involving

moral turpitude—does not itself render the noncitizen “inadmissible.” He argues that a noncitizen is not rendered 

“inadmissible” unless and until the noncitizen is actually 

adjudicated as inadmissible and denied admission to the 

United States. And he further contends that a lawfully admitted noncitizen usually cannot be removed from the

United States on the basis of inadmissibility. As Barton 

puts it (and the dissent echoes the point), how can a lawfully admitted noncitizen be found inadmissible when he

has already been lawfully admitted? 

As a matter of common parlance alone, that argument 

would of course carry some force. But the argument fails

because it disregards the statutory text, which employs the 

term “inadmissibility” as a status that can result from, for 

example, a noncitizen’s (including a lawfully admitted 

noncitizen’s) commission of certain offenses listed in

§1182(a)(2).

For example, as relevant here, §1182(a)(2) flatly says that 

a noncitizen such as Barton who commits a crime involving 

moral turpitude and is convicted of that offense “is inadmissible.” §1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Full stop. Similarly, a noncitizen

who has two or more convictions, together resulting in aggregate sentences of at least five years, “is inadmissible.” 

§1182(a)(2)(B). A noncitizen who a consular officer or the 

Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is a drug 

trafficker “is inadmissible.” §1182(a)(2)(C)(i). A noncitizen 

who receives the proceeds of prostitution within 10 years of

applying for admission “is inadmissible.” §1182(a)(2)(D)(ii).

The list goes on. See, e.g., §§1182(a)(2)(C)(ii)–(E), (G)–(I). 

Those provisions do not say that a noncitizen will become 

inadmissible if the noncitizen is found inadmissible in a 

subsequent immigration removal proceeding. Instead, 
 

 

14 BARTON v. BARR 

Opinion of the Court 

those provisions say that the noncitizen “is inadmissible.” 

Congress has in turn made that status—inadmissibility 

because of conviction or other proof of commission of 

§1182(a)(2) offenses—relevant in several statutory contexts 

that apply to lawfully admitted noncitizens such as Barton. 

Those contexts include adjustment to permanent resident

status; protection from removal because of temporary protected status; termination of temporary resident status; 

and here cancellation of removal. See, e.g., §§1160(a)(1)(C),

(a)(3)(B)(ii), 1254a(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A)(iii), 1255(a), (l)(2). In 

those contexts, the noncitizen faces immigration consequences from being convicted of a §1182(a)(2) offense even 

though the noncitizen is lawfully admitted and is not necessarily removable solely because of that offense.

Consider how those other proceedings work. A lawfully

admitted noncitizen who is convicted of an offense listed in 

§1182(a)(2) is typically not removable from the United 

States on that basis (recall that a lawfully admitted noncitizen is ordinarily removable only for commission of a

§1227(a)(2) offense). But the noncitizen is “inadmissible” 

because of the §1182(a)(2) offense and for that reason may 

not be able to obtain adjustment to permanent resident status. §§1255(a), (l)(2). So too, a lawfully admitted noncitizen

who is convicted of an offense listed in §1182(a)(2) is “inadmissible” and for that reason may not be able to obtain temporary protected status. §§1254a(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A)(iii). A 

lawfully admitted noncitizen who is a temporary resident 

and is convicted of a §1182(a)(2) offense is “inadmissible” 

and for that reason may lose temporary resident status.

§§1160(a)(1)(C), (a)(3)(B)(ii). 

Those statutory examples pose a major hurdle for Barton’s textual argument. The examples demonstrate that 

Congress has employed the concept of “inadmissibility” as 

a status in a variety of statutes similar to the cancellationof-removal statute, including for lawfully admitted noncitizens. Barton has no persuasive answer to those examples. 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

Barton tries to say that some of those other statutes involve 

a noncitizen who, although already admitted to the United 

States, is nonetheless seeking “constructive admission.” 

Reply Brief 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. But that ginned-up label 

does not avoid the problem. Put simply, those other statutes show that lawfully admitted noncitizens who are, for 

example, convicted of §1182(a)(2) crimes are “inadmissible”

and in turn may suffer certain immigration consequences, 

even though those lawfully admitted noncitizens cannot 

necessarily be removed solely because of those §1182(a)(2) 

offenses. 

The same is true here. A lawfully admitted noncitizen

who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude during his initial seven years of residence is “inadmissible” and 

for that reason is ineligible for cancellation of removal.

In advancing his structural and textual arguments, Barton insists that his interpretation of the statute reflects congressional intent regarding cancellation of removal. But if 

Congress intended that only the offense of removal would 

preclude cancellation of removal under the 7-year residence 

provision, it is unlikely that Congress would have employed 

such a convoluted way to express that intent. Barton cannot explain why, if his view of Congress’ intent is correct,

the statute does not simply say something like: “The alien 

is not eligible for cancellation of removal if the offense of 

removal was committed during the alien’s initial seven 

years of residence.” 

Third, on a different textual tack, Barton argues that the

Government’s interpretation cannot be correct because the

Government would treat as surplusage the phrase “or removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 

1227(a)(4) of this title.” Recall that the statute, as relevant 

here, provides that a lawful permanent resident is not eligible for cancellation of removal if, during the initial seven 

years of residence, he committed “an offense referred to in 
 

16 BARTON v. BARR 

Opinion of the Court 

section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of 

this title or removable from the United States under section 

1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title.” §1229b(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

To begin with, all agree that under either side’s interpretation, the reference to §1227(a)(4)—as distinct from

§1227(a)(2)—is redundant surplusage. See §1229b(c)(4);

Brief for Petitioner 32–33 & n. 7. Under the Government’s 

interpretation, it is true that the reference to §1227(a)(2) 

also appears to be redundant surplusage. Any offense that

is both referred to in §1182(a)(2) and an offense that would 

render the noncitizen deportable under §1227(a)(2) would 

also render the noncitizen inadmissible under §1182(a)(2).

But redundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes

because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, 

or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human

communication. The Court has often recognized: “Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains 

some redundancy.” Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 

586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 11); see Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., 

at 7); Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385 

(2013); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 536 

(2004). So it is here. Most importantly for present purposes, we do not see why the redundant statutory reference 

to §1227(a)(2) should cause us to entirely rewrite §1229b so

that a noncitizen’s commission of an offense referred to in 

§1182(a)(2) would preclude cancellation of removal only if it 

is also the offense of removal. Redundancy in one portion

of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another 

portion of the statute contrary to its text, as Barton would

have us do. 

One final point: Barton argues in the alternative that 

even if inadmissibility is a status, and even if the offense 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

that precludes cancellation of removal need not be one of 

the offenses of removal, the noncitizen must at least have 

been capable of being charged with a §1182(a)(2) inadmissibility offense as the basis for removal. The dissent seizes 

on this argument as well. But as we have explained, this

cancellation-of-removal statute is a recidivist statute that 

precludes cancellation of removal if the noncitizen has committed an offense listed in §1182(a)(2) during the initial 

seven years of residence. Whether the offense that precludes cancellation of removal was charged or could have 

been charged as one of the offenses of removal is irrelevant 

to that analysis. 

* * * 

Removal of a lawful permanent resident from the United 

States is a wrenching process, especially in light of the consequences for family members. Removal is particularly difficult when it involves someone such as Barton who has 

spent most of his life in the United States. Congress made

a choice, however, to authorize removal of noncitizens— 

even lawful permanent residents—who have committed 

certain serious crimes. And Congress also made a choice to

categorically preclude cancellation of removal for noncitizens who have substantial criminal records. Congress may

of course amend the law at any time. In the meantime, the 

Court is constrained to apply the law as enacted by Congress. Here, as the BIA explained in its 2006 JuradoDelgado decision, and as the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have indicated, the immigration laws enacted

by Congress do not allow cancellation of removal when a 

lawful permanent resident has amassed a criminal record 

of this kind. 

We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for 

the Eleventh Circuit. 

It is so ordered. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–725 

ANDRE MARTELLO BARTON, PETITIONER v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[April 23, 2020] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, 

JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The stop-time rule ends a noncitizen’s period of continuous residence, making him or her ineligible for certain relief 

from removal. But to trigger the rule, it takes more than 

commission of a specified criminal offense: The offense 

must also render a noncitizen either “inadmissible” or “deportable.” In applying these important limitations, the rule

directly references the two-track nature of the Immigration

and Nationality Act (INA), a statute that has long distinguished between noncitizens seeking admission and those 

already admitted. Inadmissibility, of course, pertains to 

noncitizens seeking admission; deportability relates to

noncitizens already admitted but removable.

The majority errs by conflating these two terms. It concludes that the term “inadmissible,” for the purposes of the

stop-time rule, refers to a status that a noncitizen could acquire even if he or she is not seeking admission. Under this 

logic, petitioner Andre Barton is inadmissible yet, at the 

same time, lawfully admitted. Neither the express language of the statute nor any interpretative canons support 

this paradox; Barton cannot and should not be considered 

inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule because he

has already been admitted to the country. Thus, for the 
 

2 BARTON v. BARR 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

stop-time rule to render Barton ineligible for relief from removal, the Government must show that he committed an 

offense that made him deportable. Because the Government cannot meet that burden, Barton should prevail. 

I respectfully dissent. 

I 

A 

Cancellation of removal is a form of immigration relief

available to lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and other 

noncitizens, including those who have never been lawfully 

admitted. 8 U. S. C. §1229b. To obtain this relief, both 

groups must continuously reside in the United States for a

certain amount of time. §1229b(a)(2) (seven years for 

LPRs); §1229b(b)(1)(A) (10 years for non-LPR noncitizens).

The stop-time rule ends a noncitizen’s period of continuous residence (1) when the noncitizen “has committed an 

offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title” that 

either (2) “renders” the noncitizen “inadmissible to the 

United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title” or (3) 

renders the noncitizen “removable from the United States 

under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title.” 

§1229b(d)(1). The second clause directly invokes grounds of 

inadmissibility; the third clause, although using the term

“removable,” directly invokes grounds of deportability. See 

§1227(a) (specifying “[c]lasses of deportable aliens”).1 Both 

the second and the third clauses are cabined by the first: In

addition to rendering a noncitizen either inadmissible or 

deportable, the offense must also be one “referred to” in 

§1182(a)(2). That provision includes some—but not all—of 

the grounds of deportability in §1227. 

This distinction between “inadmissible” and “deportable” 

matters. Indeed, both are terms of art, so it is critical to 

—————— 1Because the third clause refers to grounds of deportability, the Government appears to agree that the terms “removable” and “deportable” 

are interchangeable. See Brief for Respondent 21–22. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

understand their histories and their attached meaning over 

time. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 312 n. 35 (2001) 

(noting that “‘[w]here Congress borrows terms of art,’” with

settled meaning, it “‘presumably knows and adopts the

cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word’” 

(quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 

(1952))).

Until Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform 

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), noncitizens seeking physical entry were placed in “‘exclusion proceeding[s],’” while those already physically present were 

placed in “‘deportation proceeding[s].’” Judulang v. 

Holder, 565 U. S. 42, 45 (2011). Although the grounds for

exclusion and deportation—and the procedures applying to

each—evolved over time, the immigration laws retained a 

two-track system; different procedures and processes applied to noncitizens who were deportable and noncitizens

who were excludable. Brief for Immigration Law Professors 

as Amici Curiae 3–8. 

IIRIRA changed the proceedings and some of the language. All noncitizens are now channeled into “‘removal 

proceeding[s],’” and noncitizens previously labeled “excludable” are now labeled “‘inadmissible.’” Judulang, 565 

U. S., at 46. IIRIRA also altered when a noncitizen faces 

grounds of inadmissibility, formerly exclusion: Rather than

focusing on whether a noncitizen had physically entered the

country, the statute now asks whether the noncitizen had 

been lawfully admitted, in any status, to the country. See 

§§1101(a)(13)(A), 1182(a). 

Still, the immigration laws have retained their two-track 

structure. Inadmissibility and deportability remain separate concepts, triggered by different grounds. With few exceptions, the grounds for inadmissibility are broader than 

those for deportability. Compare §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) with

§1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (reflecting different treatment for crimes 

involving moral turpitude). Further, while a noncitizen 
 

 

 

4 BARTON v. BARR 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

charged with inadmissibility bears the ultimate burden to 

show that he is admissible, the Government bears the burden of demonstrating that a noncitizen is deportable.

§§1229a(c)(2), (c)(3).

Whether a noncitizen is charged with inadmissibility or 

deportability also affects what the noncitizen or the Government must show to carry their respective burdens. A 

criminal ground for inadmissibility can be made out by

showing either that the noncitizen admitted to conduct

meeting the elements of a crime or that she was actually

convicted of an offense. See, e.g., Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 

292 F. 3d 1209, 1213–1215 (CA9 2002) (noncitizen inadmissible because he admitted to health officer that he smoked 

marijuana in his youth); see also §1182(a)(2)(A). By contrast, most criminal grounds for deportability can be established only through convictions. See §§1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(v), 

(a)(2)(B)(i).

Finally, the substantive standards for cancellation of removal are also less stringent for a subset of deportable 

noncitizens: LPRs like Barton. Among other things, while

an otherwise-eligible LPR must merely demonstrate that

he or she deserves the relief as a matter of discretion, see 

In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10–11 (BIA 1998), non-LPRs

must demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship to an LPR or citizen parent, spouse, or child, 

§1229b(b)(1)(D).

These separate categories and procedures—treating deportable noncitizens more generously than inadmissible 

noncitizens, and treating one group of deportable noncitizens (LPRs) the most generously of all—stem from one animating principle. All noncitizens in this country are entitled to certain rights and protections, but the protections 

afforded to previously admitted noncitizens and LPRs are

particularly strong. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 543– 

544 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

part). Indeed, “[t]he immigration laws give LPRs the opportunity to establish a life permanently in this country by

developing economic, familial, and social ties indistinguishable from those of a citizen.” Id., at 544. Because those 

already admitted, like Barton, are often presumed to have

greater connections to the country, the immigration laws 

use separate terms and create separate procedures for 

noncitizens seeking admission to the country on the one 

hand, and those who were previously admitted on the other.

The stop-time rule carries that distinction forward. The 

rule specifies how a period of continuous residence ends for 

noncitizens who are seeking admission and thus are inadmissible, as well as noncitizens who are already admitted

and thus are deportable. By using separate terms and

grounds for two groups of people, the stop-time rule thus 

reflects the two-track dichotomy for inadmissible or deportable noncitizens that pervades the INA. 

B 

Barton is a longtime lawfully admitted resident of the

United States. He and his mother moved to the United 

States from Jamaica when he was about 10 years old. They

both entered legally and, through Barton’s stepfather, soon

adjusted their status to LPRs. When Barton was placed in 

removal proceedings, all of his immediate family—his

mother, his children, his fiancee—were living in the United

States. He had not returned to Jamaica in 25 years. 

Barton was first arrested in 1996, when he was 17 or 18, 

after a friend shot at his ex-girlfriend’s house while he was 

present. Both he and his friend were convicted of, among

other things, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm. Barton later testified before an immigration judge

that he was unaware that his friend had a gun or was planning to shoot it.

After attending a boot camp and obtaining his GED, Barton led a law-abiding life for several years. But in the mid-
 

6 BARTON v. BARR 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

2000s, Barton developed a drug problem and was convicted

twice on possession charges. After attending two drug rehabilitation programs, Barton was never arrested again. 

He graduated from college, began running an automobile 

repair shop, and became a father to four young children.

Just a few years ago—nearly 10 years after his last arrest—the Government detained Barton and placed him in

removal proceedings. Because he had been lawfully admitted to the country, the Government could not charge him 

with any grounds of inadmissibility. Rather, the Government charged, and Barton conceded, that he was deportable 

based on prior firearms and drug convictions. (All agree

that Barton’s aggravated-assault offense did not qualify as

a deportable offense under §1227.) Barton then sought cancellation of removal. 

Perhaps recognizing that Barton had a strong case for

cancellation of removal on the merits, see C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. 

Dec., at 11 (factors such as “family ties within the United 

States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly when the inception of residence occurred at a young

age),” and “business ties” all favor a noncitizen seeking cancellation), the Government contended that Barton was categorically ineligible for that relief. It reasoned that Barton’s prior offenses triggered the stop-time rule and that

Barton therefore could not meet the continuous-residence 

requirement.

The problem (for the Government) was finding a prior offense that actually triggered the stop-time rule. None of the 

offenses that had made Barton deportable—his firearms

and drug convictions—satisfied the stop-time rule’s first

clause because §1182(a)(2) does not “refe[r] to” those offenses. The Government therefore could not argue that 

Barton’s firearms and drug offenses ended Barton’s period

of continuous residence under the stop-time rule. As for 

Barton’s aggravated-assault offense, it was not a ground for 

deportability under §1227(a) and therefore did not render 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

him deportable under the third clause of the stop-time rule. 

So the Government took a different tack: It argued that,

even though Barton had already been admitted (and was

not seeking readmission), his aggravated-assault offense 

“render[ed him] inadmissible” under the second clause of 

the stop-time rule. That is, although the Government could

not charge Barton with inadmissibility, it relied upon a 

ground of inadmissibility to assert that Barton was not entitled to relief from removal. 

The Immigration Judge agreed with the Government. 

The judge made clear, however, that she would have

granted Barton’s cancellation application had he satisfied 

the continuous-residence requirement. The judge cited,

among other things, Barton’s strong family ties, including

his four young children who were all U. S. citizens. The 

judge concluded that because “his last arrest was over 10

years ago,” Barton “is clearly rehabilitated.” The judge also

concluded that Barton’s family “relies on him and would 

suffer hardship if he were to be deported to Jamaica.” App. 

to Pet. for Cert. 36a. 

II 

Barton makes two arguments to this Court. The Court 

focuses on the first—that the stop-time rule will “rende[r]”

a noncitizen inadmissible only if the person is actually adjudicated inadmissible based on the given offense. But 

whether Barton is right on that score is irrelevant because

Barton’s second argument—which the Court fails to grapple with meaningfully—is surely correct: At the very least, 

an offense cannot “rende[r]” someone inadmissible unless

the Government can legally charge that noncitizen with a 

ground of inadmissibility. That is, the stop-time rule is consistent with basic immigration law: A noncitizen who has 

already been admitted, and is not seeking readmission, cannot be charged with any ground of inadmissibility and thus

cannot be deemed inadmissible. 
 

 

8 BARTON v. BARR 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Because the stop-time rule uses the terms “removable” 

(i.e., deportable) and “inadmissible” in the disjunctive, the 

Court must analyze the rule against the INA’s historic twotrack backdrop. That context confirms that the term “inadmissible” cannot refer to a noncitizen who, like Barton, has 

already been admitted and is not seeking readmission. Indeed, the terms “inadmissible” and “deportable” are mutually exclusive in removal proceedings: A noncitizen can be 

deemed either inadmissible or deportable, not both. 

§1229a(e) (for the purposes of removal statute and 

§1229b—governing cancellation of removal—a noncitizen is 

“inadmissible under section 1182” if “not admitted to the 

United States,” and “deportable under section 1227” if “admitted to the United States”). For the purposes of the stoptime rule, a person is not “inadmissible” unless that person 

actually seeks admission, and thus is subject to charges of 

inadmissibility. 

After all, if the provision applied to those who could hypothetically be rendered inadmissible, it could have said so. 

For example, the statute would have said that it applied 

when “the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title” that either (2) “could render the 

alien inadmissible to the United States under section 

1182(a)(2) of this title” or (3) could render the noncitizen 

“removable [i.e., deportable] from the United States under 

section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title.”2 

—————— 2The Court seems to suggest that the stop-time rule’s tense simply

mirrors §1182(a)(2). See ante, at 13–14. It is true that §1182(a)(2)

speaks in the present tense, stating that a noncitizen “is inadmissible” if

she has been “convicted of ” or “admits having committed” certain offenses. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i). But the Court’s argument does not follow. Section 1182, by its terms, applies only to “[c]lasses of aliens ineligible for 

visas or admission.” §1182(a). Because the provision applies only to 

noncitizens seeking admission, it is only natural that the clause uses the 

present tense to describe when such a noncitizen “is inadmissible.” By 
 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

The Government’s reading—that a noncitizen can be inadmissible under the stop-time rule without seeking admission at all—flouts basic statutory-interpretation principles.

Among “the most basic interpretative canons” is “that a 

statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its

provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 

U. S. 303, 314 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Were the stop-time rule agnostic to whether 

the noncitizen actually seeks admission, then the rule’s 

third clause—regarding deportability—would be meaningless. When a noncitizen is “removable”—i.e., deportable—

under §1227 for an offense “referred to” in §1182(a)(2), he

or she is also “inadmissible” for an offense “referred to” in 

§1182(a)(2). The third clause has meaning only if inadmissibility and deportability apply, as they always have, to separate groups of noncitizens—noncitizens seeking admission

on the one hand, and noncitizens already admitted on the 

other. 

To be sure, there are limited exceptions to the general 

rule that questions of admissibility apply only to noncitizens seeking formal admission. Noncitizens applying for 

adjustment of status must establish admissibility. 

§§1255(a), (l)(2). But that is because adjustment of status

is an express proxy for admission: “Congress created the

[process] to enable an alien physically present in the United 

States to become an LPR without incurring the expense and 

inconvenience of traveling abroad to obtain an immigrant

visa” and then presumably demonstrating admissibility on 

return. DHS, U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. A, ch. 1 (2020),

https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. Far from a “ginned-

—————— 

contrast, the stop-time rule, under the Government’s and Court’s reading, purports to apply to noncitizens not seeking admission at all—and 

who therefore could not possibly be adjudicated inadmissible. 
 

 

10 BARTON v. BARR 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

up label,” ante, at 15, the term “constructive admission” expresses precisely how the INA conceives of adjustment of 

status: an admissions process that occurs inside the United 

States as opposed to outside of it.

Alternatively, the Government also relies on two narrow 

provisions of the INA applicable to “[s]pecial agricultural

workers,” 8 U. S. C. §1160(a)(3)(B)(ii), and “certain entrants before January 1, 1982,” §1255a(b)(2)(B). These provisions, it argues, demonstrate that throughout the INA,

inadmissibility is a status untethered to admission. But 

these provisions, too, refer to noncitizens seeking adjustment of status. §1160(a)(1) (setting procedures for adjustment of status of certain noncitizens); §1255a(a) (same).3 

Even if the Government were correct that these statutes 

deem a noncitizen inadmissible outside of an application for 

admission, its argument would rise and fall on a few provisions within the expansive INA.4 In any event, neither of

these provisions is similar in structure and purpose to the 

stop-time rule. Neither refers to grounds of inadmissibility 

and grounds of deportability in tandem. What is more, neither appears to confer or deny relief exclusively in removal

proceedings—where the dichotomy between inadmissibility 

and deportability is most important. 

—————— 3 Indeed, one of the provisions suggests that, outside the context in 

which a noncitizen seeks adjustment of status (and thus seeks constructive admission), a noncitizen’s status can be terminated “only upon a determination . . . that the alien is deportable.” §1160(a)(3)(A). 4The Government also notes that a noncitizen would be deportable 

were she inadmissible at entry (or during adjustment of status) but erroneously admitted (or allowed to adjust status). Brief for Respondent 

18–19 (citing §1227(a)(1)(A)). But this provision directly undermines the

Government’s reading of the statute. Were inadmissibility a status untethered to admission, a noncitizen inadmissible at the time of entry

would always be inadmissible. But because a noncitizen who was already admitted cannot be adjudicated inadmissible, Congress made erroneous admission a ground of deportability, not inadmissibility. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

By contrast, the Government concedes that the term “inadmissible” in the mandatory-detention statute—a provision structurally similar to the stop-time rule—applies only 

to noncitizens capable of being charged with inadmissibility. Brief for Respondent 30. That provision specifies, in

relevant part, that the Government “shall take into custody

any alien who—(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2)” or “(C) is 

deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) . . . on the basis of 

an offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a 

term of imprisonment of at least 1 year.” §1226(c)(1) (footnote omitted).

Although the term “inadmissible” in this context does not 

refer to an actual adjudication of inadmissibility, see 

Demore, 538 U. S., at 513, 531, the Government accepts

that it must at least refer to a possible charge on a noncitizen seeking admission. Brief for Respondent 30. Otherwise, the statute would subject already-admitted noncitizens—even those who are not deportable for any criminal

offense—to mandatory detention, simply because they occupy the “status” of inadmissibility. This provision’s structure is virtually the same as the stop-time rule: It refers to

grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportability separately and applies to a noncitizen in removal proceedings. 

Given the similar structure, the stop-time rule should be

read the same as the mandatory-detention provision: to refer to adjudications that are possible rather than impossible. If a noncitizen seeking admission has committed a

crime under §1182(a)(2) and is convicted of or admits to the 

offense, that offense “renders” the noncitizen “inadmissible” 

because the noncitizen can be charged and found inadmissible based on that crime. But such an offense does not render a noncitizen inadmissible if, like Barton, he or she was 

admitted years earlier and does not seek readmission. For 

a noncitizen who has already been admitted, Congress 

carved out a separate category of offenses in both the stop-
 

 

12 BARTON v. BARR 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

time rule and the mandatory-detention provision: here, 

those referred to in §1182(a)(2) that render a noncitizen deportable under §§1227(a)(2) and (a)(4). 

III 

The Court reaches a different result only by contorting

the statutory language and by breezily waving away applicable canons of construction. At various points the Court

seems to ignore the rule’s second and third clauses entirely—clauses that, as mentioned above, distinguish between grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportability. The Court insists that the statute “operates like

traditional criminal recidivist laws” because it precludes 

cancellation of removal for a noncitizen who “has committed 

an offense listed in §1182(a)(2) during the initial seven

years of residence.” Ante, at 2; see also ante, at 7, 8, n. 5, 

17. 

Had Congress intended for commission of a crime in 

§1182(a)(2) alone to trigger the stop-time rule, it would 

have said so. In fact, it would have stopped at the rule’s

first clause, which (without more) states the Court’s rule:

that the time of continuous residence stops whenever a 

noncitizen “has committed an offense referred to in section 

1182(a)(2) of this title.” §1229b(d)(1).

But that reading ignores the rest of what Congress wrote.

Congress specified that it is not enough for a noncitizen to

commit a crime listed in §1182(a)(2); that crime must also

“rende[r] the alien inadmissible to the United States under 

section 1182(a)(2) of this title” or “removable from the 

United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this 

title.” §1229b(d)(1). Those words have meaning—invoking 

the two-track structure of the INA and the distinction between grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportability—and the Court cannot simply will them out of existence. 

Even when the Court finally discusses the second clause,

“renders the alien inadmissible,” the Court raises more 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 13 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

questions than it answers—and answers questions that it 

need not address at all. First, the Court claims, the clause 

makes clear that “cancellation of removal is precluded if an 

alien committed a §1182(a)(2) offense during the initial

seven years of residence, even if (as in Barton’s case) the 

conviction occurred after the seven years elapsed.” Ante, at 

9. Despite the emphasis the Court lays on this point, it is

irrelevant to this case: Barton does not dispute that the 

stop-time rule is triggered by the date of commission of a

crime rather than a later date of conviction. Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 4. The question in this case is whether certain

offenses can possibly render Barton inadmissible when he

does not seek admission and has already been admitted—

regardless of whether one looks to the date of commission

or the date of conviction of those offenses.5 

Even if this question mattered and were properly before 

us, Congress could have made the same point—that the 

stop-time rule is triggered by commission of a crime—by 

omitting the second and third clauses entirely. It again 

could have written what the Court, at various points, seems 

to wish it had written: The stop-time rule is triggered whenever a noncitizen “has committed an offense referred to in 

section 1182(a)(2) of this title.” The second and third 

clauses—which refer to later events, when a noncitizen is 

actually “render[ed]” inadmissible or deportable—make the 

Court’s aside less plausible, not more. 

The Court next insists that the second clause makes clear 

that the crime must “rende[r]” the noncitizen “inadmissible”—which, in the Court’s view, requires only that a 

noncitizen admit the crime or be convicted of it. Ante, at 10. 

—————— 5Courts have split over what event triggers the stop-time rule—commission of the offense or a second, later point at which the offense “render[s]” the noncitizen inadmissible. Brief for Momodoulamin Jobe et al. 

as Amici Curiae 12–13. Because this point about the trigger date is neither disputed here nor briefed by either party, the Court’s opinion should 

not be read to resolve a Circuit split that is not before this Court. 
 

 

14 BARTON v. BARR 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

But given the INA’s historic two-track structure, a noncitizen is not “render[ed]” inadmissible when convicted of an 

offense that cannot serve as a ground of removal at all. The 

Court also fails to clarify why, if conviction or admission 

alone renders any noncitizen inadmissible regardless of admission status, Congress chose to add a third clause referring to grounds of deportability. 

Indeed, what does the Court do about the canon against 

surplusage? The Court does not dispute that its reading 

makes the entire third clause of the stop-time rule meaningless. It offers only two rejoinders: (1) that the reference 

to subsection (a)(4) in the third clause is superfluous under 

either party’s reading, and (2) that a bit of surplusage 

makes no difference in any event. Ante, at 15–16. To be 

sure, “[s]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute 

contains some redundancy.” Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle 

USA, Inc., 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 11). But the 

Court relies on more than just “some redundancy.” It dismisses out of hand one of only three clauses in the stop-time 

rule—without regard for the clause’s pedigree or the core 

difference between deportability and inadmissibility. 

It remains this Court’s “‘duty “to give effect, if possible, 

to every clause and word of a statute.”’” Duncan v. Walker, 

533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (quoting United States v. 

Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1955)). It must therefore be “‘reluctan[t] to treat statutory terms as surplusage’ 

in any setting,” 533 U. S., at 174 (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet 

Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 

698 (1995))—especially in this context, where each word 

could dictate categorical ineligibility for relief from removal. It also does not matter that, as the Government 

points out, §1227(a)(4) did not initially refer to any crimes 

cross-referenced in §1182(a)(2). Brief for Respondent 32– 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 15 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

33.6 Congress’ decision to make a noncitizen ineligible for 

cancellation based on a to-be-determined class of crimes is 

far different from excising and giving no meaning to an entire clause. 

* * * 

At bottom, the Court’s interpretation is at odds with the

express words of the statute, with the statute’s overall 

structure, and with pertinent canons of statutory construction. It is also at odds with common sense. With virtually

every other provision of the INA, Congress granted preferential treatment to lawfully admitted noncitizens—and 

most of all to LPRs like Barton. But because of the Court’s 

opinion today, noncitizens who were already admitted to

the country are treated, for the purposes of the stop-time

rule, identically to those who were not—despite Congress’

express references to inadmissibility and deportability.

The result is that, under the Court’s interpretation, an immigration judge may not even consider whether Barton is

entitled to cancellation of removal—because of an offense 

that Congress deemed too trivial to allow for Barton’s removal in the first instance. Because the Court’s opinion

does no justice to the INA, let alone to longtime LPRs like

Barton, I respectfully dissent. 

—————— 6Barton acknowledges that, even now, the reference to §1227(a)(4)

“does little or no work” for a separate reason: Noncitizens who are deportable under that subsection are ineligible for cancellation of removal. 

Brief for Petitioner 33, n. 7. But, according to Barton, there are scenarios 

in which the reference to §1227(a)(4) nevertheless “ ‘may . . . not be a redundancy,’ ” ibid., and perhaps for this reason, the Government does not 

focus on this argument in its brief.