Filed 1/12/21 P. v. Young CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER DUKE 

YOUNG,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B303766

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA070637)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with directions.

Robert H. Derham, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Michael R. Johnson and Peggy Huang, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

In 2009 Cindy CeCe Young1 was convicted of first degree 

burglary and receiving stolen property. The trial court sentenced 

Young as a third strike offender under the three strikes law (Pen. 

Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).2 In 2014 Young petitioned 

for recall of her sentence under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes

Reform Act of 2012 (§ 1170.126) (Proposition 36), seeking to 

resentence her as second strike offender. In 2017 Young again 

petitioned for recall of her sentence, this time under Proposition 

47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (§ 1170.18) 

(Proposition 47), seeking to recall her sentence and reclassify her

felony conviction for receiving stolen property as a misdemeanor. 

While her petitions were pending, Young filed a motion to strike 

her two prior convictions of a serious or violent felony pursuant to 

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 

(Romero).

The superior court granted Young’s petition pursuant to 

Proposition 47 on count 3 for receiving stolen property, rendering 

her Proposition 36 petition moot, but it declined to exercise its

discretion to strike her two prior convictions as to count 1 for her 

first degree burglary conviction because her “lengthy criminal 

history leading up to the commitment offenses does not put her 

out of the spirit of the Three Strikes law.” Young contends the 

superior court abused its discretion in denying her Romero 

motion. We agree and reverse. We remand for the superior court 

1 Young legally changed her name from Christopher Duke 

Young to Cindy CeCe Young and her gender identification to 

“nonbinary.” We will use Young’s preferred pronouns “she” and 

“her” in this opinion.

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
3

to reconsider Young’s Romero motion in light of her background, 

character, and prospects, taking into account changed 

circumstances since her initial sentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Incidents, Jury Verdict, and Sentence

On June 7, 2006 Susan Margeson and Kim Dupree 

returned to their home at lunch time and discovered certain 

items were missing, including an iPod, camera, night-vision 

scope, rings, and cash.3 The next day Georgia Case returned to 

her home and found her kitchen door wide open. She called the 

police, and while she was on the phone she saw Young go over 

her neighbor’s fence. When she went inside her home, Case 

discovered three laptops were missing. When the police arrived, 

they found Young hiding in a nearby garage. The police later 

recovered Margeson’s iPod and camera from Young’s car. Case 

received a letter from Young saying she regretted her actions and 

offering to pay for Case’s laptop.

A jury convicted Young of first degree burglary (§ 459; 

count 1) and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 3). 

Young admitted she had suffered two prior strike convictions, a 

prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, 

subdivision (a)(1), and six prior prison terms within the meaning 

of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Young filed a Romero motion to 

strike her prior strike convictions, but the court denied the 

3 The facts are taken from this court’s opinion affirming the 

judgment. (People v. Young (June 30, 2011, B222220) [nonpub. 

opn.].)
4

motion based on Young’s history of criminal conduct and the 

seriousness of the present convictions. The court sentenced 

Young to an aggregate term of 74 years to life in prison. On 

count 1 for burglary, the court sentenced Young to a third strike 

sentence of 25 years to life, plus 10 years for the two prior serious 

felony convictions, and four years for four of the prior prison 

terms. On count 3 for receiving stolen property, the court 

sentenced Young to a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life plus

10 years for the two prior serious felony convictions. On appeal 

we struck the two 5-year sentence enhancements on count 3 as 

unauthorized and otherwise affirmed. (People v. Young (June 30, 

2011, B222220) [nonpub. opn.].)

B. Young’s Postconviction Petitions To Recall Sentence

On July 3, 2014 Young filed a petition for recall of sentence 

under Proposition 36.4 On November 17, 2015 the superior court 

denied the petition as to count 1 because the offense was a 

serious or violent felony, and it issued an order to show cause 

why relief should not be granted as to count 3. The People 

4 Prior to approval of Proposition 36, the three strikes law 

provided that defendants who committed a felony and had two or 

more prior convictions for serious or violent felonies were to be 

sentenced to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a 

minimum term of at least 25 years. (§ 1170.12, former subds. (b), 

(c)(2)(A); People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1061-1062; People 

v. Estrada (2017) 3 Cal.5th 661, 666-667.) “Following enactment 

of Proposition 36, defendants are now subject to a lesser sentence 

when they have two or more prior strikes and are convicted of a 

felony that is neither serious nor violent, unless an exception 

applies.” (Estrada, at p. 667.)
5

opposed the petition, arguing Young posed an unreasonable risk 

of danger to public safety.

While her Proposition 36 petition was pending, Young filed 

a petition to recall her sentence pursuant to Proposition 47 

(§ 1170.18).5 On November 29, 2017 the court issued an order to 

show cause why relief should not be granted as to count 3. The 

People opposed the petition, arguing the value of the stolen 

property was $7,500, exceeding the $950 maximum amount for 

an offense to be eligible for reclassification as a misdemeanor. In 

her reply, Young argued the value was less than $950.

C. Young’s Romero Motion

In anticipation of her sentence being recalled under 

Proposition 47, Young filed a Romero motion to strike one or both 

of her prior strikes as to count 1.6 Young argued she committed 

the underlying offenses 13 years earlier and the two strikes (also 

burglaries) were even more remote, committed 19 and 23 years 

earlier. Young was 22 and 26 years old when she committed the 

prior strikes, at which time she was “still in a developmental 

phase marked by ‘immaturity, irresponsibility, impetuousness 

and recklessness.’” Further, none of the offenses involved 

violence, physical injuries, or weapons, although a person was 

home during the 2000 burglary.

5 The appellate record does not include Young’s Proposition 

47 petition.

6 Young incorporated into her motion the arguments she 

made in her reply brief and exhibits filed in support of her 

Proposition 36 petition.
6

Young detailed “significant factors during [her] early 

development that appear to have influenced her criminal 

history,” including being abandoned by her father, her mother’s 

alcohol abuse that led to her being adopted, and the death of her 

foster father. Young suffered from gender dysphoria, which she 

believed contributed to her drug and alcohol use beginning when 

she was nine years old.

Young also highlighted her extensive participation in 

rehabilitation activities during her 10 years in prison. She took 

numerous college courses, obtained vocational training in office 

services, and developed job skills, including as a medical 

disability worker. Young participated in programs to help her 

gain insight and maturity, including Lifer’s Group, Breaking 

Barriers, and Project S.P.E.A.K. She enrolled in Narcotics 

Anonymous to address substance abuse problems that 

contributed to her past criminality. Young also became involved 

with the community, donating money to Shriners Hospitals for 

Children and volunteering with the Victims Awareness 

Offender’s Program’s National Crime Victims’ Week at Mule 

Creek State Prison, for which she received the program’s 2019 

Restorative Justice Achievement Award.

Young had the opportunity while in prison to address her 

gender dysphoria. She received hormonal treatment and was 

approved for sex reassignment surgery. As noted, she legally 

changed her name and gender identity. According to Young, 

these steps have allowed her to “cultivate a greater sense of selfworth and resolve past issues borne out of her gender dysphoria, 

including her substance abuse problem.”

During her incarceration, Young was never disciplined for 

drug or alcohol use and never tested positive for drugs or alcohol. 
7

She was never involved with a prison gang. In addition, Young 

was determined to be eligible for entry into a residential 

treatment program focusing on substance use disorders that 

provided transitional housing and job training. She located 

Alcoholics Anonymous meetings she would attend if released and 

planned to pursue her bachelor’s degree. Young also noted she 

was less likely to reoffend given her current age (52).

Young acknowledged she received three serious rule 

violations and one administrative rule violation during her 10 

years in prison. In 2010 Young received a serious rule violation 

for “willfully delaying any peace officer in the performance of 

duty by refusing to accept assigned housing” based on her refusal 

to accept a housing assignment. (Capitalization omitted.) Young 

explained she did not accept the housing because she believed her 

assigned cellmate wanted the assignment because of Young’s 

sexual orientation.7 In 2011 Young was found guilty of a serious 

rule violation for “refusal to follow direct observation therapy

procedures” in connection with taking her medication.

(Capitalization omitted.) In 2015 she was found guilty of an

7 Young was cleared for housing in a double cell, and she was 

required to house with a “compatible” inmate. Young was 

ordered to share a cell with an inmate determined to be 

compatible. Young refused, stating, “We can’t cell together.” 

Young was not receptive to counseling and refused to comply with 

the housing order. Young explained at the hearing on the 

violation, “The [o]fficer was under the impression I was black. I 

am homosexual, and the only reason the inmate wanted to cell 

with me was for that reason. On my ‘J’ number, I was single 

celled at R. J. Donovan.” The rules violation report interpreted 

Young’s statement as an admission of her intent to be housed in a 

single cell and that she committed the violation.
8

administrative offense of “disobeying written orders” in 

connection with the use of the library law clerk’s computer to 

compose a document. (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) 

More significantly, in 2014 Young was found guilty of a serious 

rule violation for “fighting resulting in the [use of force] (OC 

grenade/OC pepper spray).”8 (Some capitalization omitted.)

The People opposed Young’s Romero motion, arguing her 

“ongoing history of criminal conduct has only been interrupted by 

periods of incarceration,” and her “brazen conduct, targeting 

occupied homes . . . during daylight hours, demonstrates that she 

poses a danger to society.” The People also relied on Young’s 

disciplinary record while incarcerated to argue she showed “a 

continued pattern of violence and disobedience.”

D. The Superior Court’s Rulings

On July 22, 2019 the superior court held a hearing on 

Young’s petitions under Propositions 36 and 47. The People 

conceded Young met the criteria for reclassification of her 

conviction on count 3 of receiving stolen property pursuant to 

Proposition 47, and the court made a finding of eligibility. 

However, the court found Young ineligible for relief on count 1 for 

8 Young and her cellmate were engaged in a fight and were 

observed striking each other in the face and upper torso. At the 

hearing, Young stated she did not hear the orders to get down. 

Young sustained an abrasion to her forehead, a scratch on the 

neck area, and redness from the pepper spray. Her cellmate 

sustained exposure to the pepper spray. Young accepted 

responsibility for the incident, and Young and her cellmate 

signed a “Peaceful Coexistence Agreement.” (Some capitalization 

omitted.) This was Young’s only fight while in prison.
9

residential burglary under either proposition. The court set 

Young’s case for a combined suitability hearing as to count 3 with 

respect to both propositions.

The court held the suitability hearing on October 29, 2019, 

and it also addressed Young’s Romero motion. The court stated it 

was inclined to grant the Proposition 47 petition, which would 

moot the Proposition 36 petition. But the court stated as to 

Young’s Romero motion that it could address it “in short order.” 

The court explained, “I would deny the Romero. I don’t think 

there’s any basis. [She] certainly earned a third strike sentence 

on [her] record. And I’m not inclined—it’s been my practice all 

along, I’m not inclined to unwind the sentence as to count one. 

[She] earned that, it was properly imposed, it went up to the 

Court of Appeal, they found it was properly imposed.” The court 

added, “I read your papers, I’ve read your pitch. I’m not inclined 

to strike the one or both of the strikes as to count one, I’m not 

inclined to remove the two [5-]year priors. Basically I’m not 

inclined to make any change, although I have discretion to do so, 

I also have discretion to not . . . make any changes as to the 

sentence in count one. I would leave that.” Young’s attorney 

submitted on her papers.

In its 13-page written ruling, the court addressed the 

statutory factors under Proposition 47 relating to dangerousness, 

considering Young’s criminal history, disciplinary history, 

rehabilitative programming, age, and postrelease plans. The 

court observed Young’s convictions were becoming remote in 

time, and there was no evidence any victim had been injured 
10

during the course of Young’s criminal conduct.9 The court noted, 

however, that in one burglary the home was inhabited at the time 

of the offense, and during a burglary Young committed as a 

juvenile, she was armed with a knife. The court concluded that 

“taken as a whole,” Young’s criminal convictions “do[] not support 

a finding of current dangerousness for purposes of Proposition 

47.”

As to Young’s serious rule violations while in prison, the 

court noted that only the 2014 incident involved violence, and 

Young’s “ability to stay mostly discipline free during her ten 

years in state prison is some evidence of her ability to follow the

9 Young was first referred to probation when she was 14 

years old for taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, 

followed by a sustained juvenile petition two years later for 

displaying a weapon (a knife). As an adult, Young suffered 

convictions of petty theft (1992); grand theft (1993); misdemeanor 

convictions of being under the influence of a controlled substance, 

presenting false identification to a peace officer, and resisting a 

public officer (1993); receiving stolen property (1994); and second 

degree burglary of a pickup truck (1995). Young was sentenced 

to 16 months in state prison for the second degree burglary. 

Young committed her first strike offense (for first degree 

burglary) in 1996, for which she was sentenced to three years in 

state prison. She was paroled in 1998, then was again convicted 

of first degree burglary in 2000, during which offense the victim 

awoke to find Young in his apartment rummaging through his 

clothing. Young was sentenced to two years in state prison. In 

2002 Young was sentenced to 32 months in state prison for 

possession of a controlled substance, and in 2005 to 30 days in 

county jail for presenting false identification to a peace officer. 

Young committed the commitment offenses in 2006, while she 

was on parole.
11

rules.” Further, despite having been previously incarcerated for 

a drug offense, Young never possessed or tested positive for a 

controlled substance while in prison. The court also summarized 

Young’s “extensive self-help and education upgrades while 

incarcerated,” including taking college courses and receiving 

vocational training. The court acknowledged Young’s current age 

(52) and her postrelease plans, including organizational and 

family support, which also supported granting relief.

The court concluded, although Young’s “past criminal 

conduct is lengthy, her lack of a ‘super strike,’ along with her 

minimal disciplinary history since incarceration and her 

eagerness to improve herself through self-help, vocational 

training, and education are all evidence of her suitability for 

relief pursuant to Proposition 47.” The court noted that 

“Proposition 47’s standard is very narrow and criminal past 

cannot support a finding of current dangerousness without 

evidence establishing a rational nexus to an unreasonable risk 

that [Young’s] will commit a ‘super strike.’” The court found that 

evidence was not present here “[i]n light of [Young’s] performance 

in prison, age, participation in rehabilitative, educational and 

vocational programming, and release plans . . . .”

After finding Young eligible for relief under Proposition 47, 

the court denied Young’s Romero motion, explaining, “The People 

argue [Young’s] criminal history ‘interrupted only by periods of 

incarceration’ does not fall within the spirit of . . . Romero or 

section 1385. . . . The court agrees. [Young’s] lengthy criminal 

history leading up to the commitment offenses does not put her 

out of the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The court declines to 

strike the two prior strikes pursuant to Romero.” The court 
12

added, “For the same reason, the court will not strike the 

remaining enhancements alleged as to Count 1.”

The court granted the Proposition 47 petition and 

dismissed the Proposition 36 petition as moot. At the January 6, 

2020 resentencing hearing, the court sentenced Young to 25 years 

to life on count 1 under the three strikes law plus an additional 

10 years pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). On count 3 

the court sentenced Young to 364 days in county jail to run 

concurrently with her sentence on count 1, with credit for time 

served. The court struck the four 1-year prison prior

enhancements.

Young timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review

1. Proposition 47

“Approved by voters in 2014, Proposition 47 . . . reduces 

many common theft- and drug-related offenses from felonies to 

misdemeanors for offenders who do not have prior convictions for 

specified violent or serious offenses. The measure also permits 

eligible defendants who were serving felony sentences as of 

Proposition 47’s effective date to obtain the benefit of these 

changes by petitioning for resentencing.” (People v. DeHoyos

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 597; accord, People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 

1175, 1179.)

If the superior court determines the petitioner meets the 

criteria for reclassification of his or her conviction as a 

misdemeanor, the court “must recall the felony sentence and 

resentence the petitioner based on the new classification of the 
13

offense as a misdemeanor, ‘unless the court, in its discretion, 

determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an 

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’” (People v. Valencia

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 355 (Valencia); see § 1170.18, subd. (b).) An 

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is defined in section 

1170.18, subdivision (c), as “an unreasonable risk that the 

petitioner will commit a new violent felony” listed in section 667, 

subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), commonly referred to as “super strikes,” 

including any homicide or attempted homicide offense, 

solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a 

peace officer or firefighter, specified sex offenses, and any serious 

or violent felony offense punishable by life imprisonment or 

death.

In exercising its discretion to determine whether a 

petitioner presents an unreasonable risk of danger, the 

resentencing court may consider “(1) the petitioner’s ‘criminal 

conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the 

extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison 

commitments, and the remoteness of the crimes’; (2) his or her 

‘disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while 

incarcerated’; and (3) ‘[a]ny other evidence’ the court deems 

relevant. (§ 1170.18, subd. (b)(1)-(3).)” (Valencia, supra, 

3 Cal.5th at p. 355.) Courts considering whether to resentence 

petitioners under Proposition 47 may consider evidence outside 

the record of conviction and, if necessary, make factual findings. 

(See People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1095 [“‘[a]n 

evidentiary hearing is required if . . . there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the petitioner may be entitled to relief and the 

petitioner’s entitlement to relief depends on the resolution of an 

issue of fact’”].)
14

2. The full resentencing rule

When a sentence is recalled pursuant to Proposition 47,

“the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of 

the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall.” 

(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 (Buycks) [at 

resentencing following grant of Proposition 47 petition, trial court 

must reconsider sentence in light of changes in the law, including 

whether prison prior enhancement is still valid].) At 

resentencing, “it is well settled that . . . the defendant is entitled 

to ‘all the normal rights and procedures available at his original 

sentencing’ [citations], including consideration of any pertinent 

circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was 

imposed [citation].” (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 

460.) “‘[A] full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the 

trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the 

changed circumstances.’” (Buycks, at p. 893; accord, People v. 

Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681 [where appellate court 

reversed sentence on greater offense, trial court on remand was 

required to exercise sentencing discretion on all counts in light of 

changed circumstances]; see People v. McDowell (2016) 

2 Cal.App.5th 978, 981 [“If the trial court grants a section 

1170.18 petition, it then has jurisdiction to resentence the 

defendant, and must do so under the generally applicable 

sentencing procedures found in section 1170 et seq.”]; People v. 

Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 299 [“[A] resentencing hearing 

on a petition under section 1170.18, subdivision (a), under the 

circumstances of this case, is akin to a plenary sentencing 

hearing.”]; People v. Garner (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118

[trial court must exercise its sentencing discretion as to all 
15

aspects of the sentence following grant of Proposition 36 petition]; 

People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1258, 1257 [on 

remand for resentencing following partially successful appeal, the 

“‘trial court is entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme’” 

given the “‘interlocking nature’” and “inherently integrated 

nature” of felony sentencing for a multiple-count conviction].) 

This includes the court’s ability to consider a request for 

discretionary relief under Romero based on the circumstances at 

the time of resentencing. (People v. Hubbard (2018) 

27 Cal.App.5th 9, 11 [following a recall of a sentence pursuant to 

Proposition 36, trial court has jurisdiction to consider a request 

for discretionary relief under § 1385 and Romero].)

3. Request for discretionary relief under section 1385 

and Romero

A trial court has discretion under section 1385, subdivision 

(a), to dismiss a strike conviction allegation for purposes of 

sentencing in furtherance of justice. (People v. Williams (1998) 

17 Cal.4th 148, 158; Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) In 

determining whether to strike a prior conviction, the trial court 

“must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances 

of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony 

convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and 

prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [three 

strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be 

treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or 

more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Williams, at p. 161; 

accord, People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 689; People v. 

Solis (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124.)
16

“[A] court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction 

allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of 

discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 

374 (Carmony); accord, In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550

[petitioner failed to rebut “‘strong presumption’ [citation] that the 

trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing to strike a 

prior conviction allegation”].) A trial court does not abuse its 

discretion unless its ruling “is so irrational or arbitrary that no 

reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 

33 Cal.4th at p. 377; accord, People v. Leavel (2012)

203 Cal.App.4th 823, 830.) The party challenging the sentence 

has the burden to show the sentence was irrational or arbitrary. 

(Carmony, at p. 376; Leavel, at p. 830.) “‘“In the absence of such 

a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve 

legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary 

determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set 

aside on review.”’ [Citations.] . . . ‘“‘An appellate tribunal is 

neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment 

for the judgment of the trial judge.’”’” (Carmony, at pp. 376-377.)

Because the three strikes “law creates a strong 

presumption that any sentence that conforms to [the law’s] 

sentencing norms is both rational and proper,” there are very 

limited circumstances under which the appellate court will find 

an abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)

These circumstances include where the court is unaware of its 

discretion to strike a prior conviction, it considers impermissible 

factors, or, under the circumstances, imposition of a three strikes 

sentence would be irrational or arbitrary. (Ibid.; People v. Leavel, 

supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 837.) Only under extraordinary 

circumstances does the court’s failure to strike a prior conviction 
17

constitute an abuse of discretion. (Carmony, at p. 378; People v. 

Finney (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1040 [“Once a career 

criminal commits the requisite number of strikes, the 

circumstance must be ‘extraordinary’ before he can be deemed to 

fall outside the spirit of the three strikes law.”].)

B. The Superior Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying 

Young’s Romero Motion

Young contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying her Romero motion because it found with respect to her 

Proposition 47 petition she “does not pose a current risk of danger 

to public safety if released,” but it still found she was outside the 

spirit of the three strikes law based only on her criminal record. 

The People contend the court properly considered Young’s 

rehabilitation record and prospects, but her criminal history and 

disciplinary record supported denial of the motion. Young’s 

contention has merit.

The superior court in its written ruling made clear it was 

aware it had “the authority to reconsider [Young’s] entire 

sentence,” citing to Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th 857 and People v. 

Hubbard, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 9. Further, in its written ruling 

the court detailed Young’s record of rehabilitative programming

in prison, her age, and postrelease plans, although this discussion 

was in the section discussing her Proposition 47 petition. 

Generally a court “is presumed to have considered all of the 

relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the 

contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310; 

accord, People v. Galvez (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264

[“‘[A]bsent a showing to the contrary, the trial court is presumed 
18

to have known and followed the applicable law and to have 

properly exercised its discretion.’”].)

But here the record affirmatively shows the superior court 

denied Young’s Romero motion based on its single finding that 

Young’s “lengthy criminal history leading up to the commitment 

offenses does not put her out of the spirit of the Three Strikes 

law.” The court similarly stated at the suitability hearing in 

expressing its inclination to deny the Romero motion that Young 

“certainly earned a third strike sentence on [her] record,” which 

on appeal was found to be “properly imposed.” We do not agree 

with Young that the superior court’s finding that Young did not 

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under 

Proposition 47 necessarily meant the court should have granted 

her Romero motion, because section 1170.18 defines 

“unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” narrowly as an 

unreasonable risk the defendant will commit one of the specified 

super strikes. (See Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 351-352 

[holding the narrower definition of “unreasonable risk of danger

to public safety” under Proposition 47 does not apply to 

proceedings under Proposition 36].) But here, the superior 

court’s review of Young’s rehabilitative record and prospects all 

favored Young. Although Young had multiple rule violations

while in custody, the court noted her last serious rule violation 

was in 2014 and Young’s “ability to stay mostly discipline free 

during her 10 years in state prison is some evidence of her ability 

to follow the rules.” Similarly, the court found Young’s 

“eagerness to improve herself through self-help, vocational 

training, and education are all evidence of her suitability for 

relief pursuant to Proposition 47.” The court found that Young’s 
19

current age and postrelease plans, including organizational and 

family support, also weighed in favor of granting relief.

It may well be that the superior court concluded these 

positive factors were outweighed by the court’s conclusion 

Young’s prior criminal record placed her within the spirit of the 

three strikes law. But the incongruity of the court’s favorable 

factual findings on issues relating to Young’s background, 

character, and prospects with its denial of the Romero motion 

with reference only to Young’s then-19- and 23-year-old strike 

convictions and our affirmance on direct appeal of the original 

sentence suggest the court did not reconsider the Romero motion 

“‘in light of the changed circumstances.’” (Buycks, supra, 

5 Cal.5th at p. 893; accord, People v. Navarro, supra, 40 Cal.4th 

at p. 681.)

We are also troubled by the court’s statement at the 

hearing that “it’s been my practice all along, I’m not inclined to 

unwind the sentence as to count one,” suggesting it was not the 

court’s practice to reduce a defendant’s sentence further following 

a successful Proposition 47 or other petition for resentencing. We 

recognize Young was initially sentenced to 74 years to life, and as 

a result of her appeal, changes in the law, and the granting of 

Young’s Proposition 47 petition, her sentence was reduced to 35 

years to life, but the court was still required to exercise its 

discretion in deciding Young’s Romero motion based on the 

circumstances in effect at the time of resentencing. We remand 

for this purpose.
20

DISPOSITION

The December 9, 2019 order denying Young’s motion to 

dismiss her prior strike convictions is reversed. The matter is 

remanded to the superior court to allow the court to exercise its 

discretion whether to strike one or both prior strike convictions 

after consideration of Young’s background, character, and 

prospects, including evidence of changed circumstances since her 

original sentencing. On remand the court should also reconsider 

whether to strike the two 5-year enhancements under section 

667, subdivision (a)(1).

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

DILLON, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.