[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-15594

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-00608-JDW-TGW

SHERRIE HAMPTON-MUHAMED, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JAMES B. NUTTER & COMPANY,

BRUCE HUEY, 

VP, 

AL PITZNER, 

VP Compliance,

RONALD R. WOLFE & ASSOCIATES, P.L., 

ANDREA D. PIDALA, 

Esquire, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(May 9, 2017)

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Before WILSON, JULIE CARNES and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Sherrie Hampton-Muhamed, proceeding pro se, appeals the Northern 

District of Georgia (“NDGA”) district court’s order transferring her case to the 

Middle District of Florida (“MDFL”), and the MDFL district court’s eventual 

dismissal of her amended complaint for failure to state a claim. She brought the 

complaint against loan servicer/lender James B. Nutter & Company (Nutter & 

Company) and four individual Nutter & Company officers (the Individual Nutter

Defendants), the law firm of Ronald R. Wolfe & Associates (RRW), and sixteen 

individual RRW attorneys (the Individual RRW Defendants), for violations of the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C § 1692 et seq. (FDCPA), and the Real 

Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (RESPA).

Her claims primarily relate to the defendants’ attempt to foreclose on a 

Florida property that had been owned by Hampton-Muhamed’s brother, who is 

now deceased. The district courts concluded, among other things, that the 

foreclosure action was not “debt collection” subject to the FDCPA, that her claims 

based on letters sent to her before the foreclosure action began were time barred, 

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and that she lacked standing to sue under RESPA because she was not a party to 

her brother’s promissory note with Nutter & Company. After review,1 we affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Transfer

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil action to 

any other district where the case might have been brought, or to any district to 

which all parties have consented, “in the interest of justice,” and “[f]or the 

convenience of parties and witnesses.” Here, the NDGA court properly 

determined that the case could have been brought in the MDFL. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1404(a), 1391(b). Various facts support the NDGA court’s decision to transfer 

the case. The NDGA court did not have jurisdiction over the Individual RRW 

Defendants; the property itself is in Florida and the foreclosure proceedings are in 

Florida; the majority of witnesses and relevant documents are in Florida; and the 

MDFL is more convenient than the NDGA for RRW and the Individual RRW 

Defendants. In addition, Hampton-Muhamed did not raise her arguments 

regarding travel restrictions in the NDGA court, and her amended complaint shows 

that she traveled to Florida at least twice for hearings related to the foreclosure. 

The NDGA court did not commit a clear abuse of discretion in transferring the 

 1 We review a district court’s decision to transfer a case for “a clear abuse of discretion.” 

Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648, 654 (11th Cir. 1993). We review de novo the 

district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006).

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case to the MDFL. See Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (setting forth nine factors to be considered in deciding whether to 

transfer a case, including the convenience of the witnesses, the locus of operative 

facts, and trial efficiency and the interest of justice).

B. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

Hampton-Muhamed has not meaningfully challenged the basis upon which 

the district court concluded her amended complaint failed to state a claim under the 

FDCPA. To the extent her brief can be liberally construed to do so, the district 

court properly dismissed Hampton-Muhamed’s complaint for failure to state a 

claim, and leave to amend would have been futile. See Tannenbaum v. United 

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings 

are to be liberally construed). 

Hampton-Muhamed’s complaint is deficient with respect to her allegations 

regarding the foreclosure proceedings because, except with respect to § 1692f(6), 

foreclosing on a mortgage of real property is not subject to the FDCPA. See 15 

U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (including enforcers of security interests within the definition of 

“debt collector” only for the purposes of § 1692f(6)); see also Ho v. ReconTrust 

Company, NA, 840 F.3d 618, 621–22 (9th Cir. 2016). The rest of HamptonMuhamed’s claims were also properly dismissed. Her allegations about activities 

that occurred more than one year prior to the time she filed her initial complaint, 

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November 5, 2013, are time-barred—including allegations pertaining to the letters 

sent to her. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (providing one-year statute of limitations for 

claims under the FDCPA). As to any claims about the changed locks, abandoned 

stickers and resulting property damage on the Florida house, she alleged those acts 

were done by a third party, not any of the named defendants. Undisputed facts in 

her own complaint show that Nutter & Company did not direct the third party to do 

anything except to check the outside of the property. Thus, she failed to allege any 

facts that any defendant was responsible for changing the locks or damage to the 

property. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

(emphasis added)).

In addition, the district court did not err by failing to sua sponte offer 

Hampton-Muhamed the opportunity to amend her complaint. She had already

amended the complaint once and did not seek leave to amend a second time. Cf.

Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002) (en 

banc) (“A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his 

complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed 

a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.”). 

Though she was not represented by counsel, leave to amend claims related to the 

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mortgage foreclosure would be futile because Hampton-Muhamed has indicated no 

additional facts she would have pled that would have changed the result. See

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend a 

complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly 

dismissed . . . .”).

Hampton-Muhamed did not appeal dismissal of her claims against the 

Individual RRW Defendants, nor did she raise RESPA arguments in her initial 

brief. Accordingly, she has abandoned those issues. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 

870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Issues not briefed on appeal are considered abandoned, 

and we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). 

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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