1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references

are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

T.C. Memo. 2003-40

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

WILLIAM G. KOENIG, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 10236-02L. Filed February 24, 2003.

William G. Koenig, pro se.

Wendy S. Harris and Glenn Thomas, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court

on respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment And To Impose A

Penalty Under I.R.C. Section 6673, filed pursuant to Rule 121.1

Respondent contends that there is no dispute as to any material
- 2 -

fact with respect to this lien action and that respondent’s

determination to proceed with collection of petitioner’s

outstanding tax liability for 1998 should be sustained as a

matter of law. 

Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and

avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v.

Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be

granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues in

controversy "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,

depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be

rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(a) and (b); see

Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd.

17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753,

754 (1988); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). The

moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine

issue of material fact, and factual inferences will be read in a

manner most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 

Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v.

Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982).

As explained in detail below, there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact, and a decision may be rendered as a matter

of law. Accordingly, we shall grant respondent’s motion for
- 3 -

summary judgment.

Background

The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the

following:

A. Petitioner’s Form 1040 for 1998

On or about April 15, 1999, William G. Koenig (petitioner)

submitted to respondent a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax

Return, for the taxable year 1998. Petitioner listed his address

on his Form 1040 as 7820 Summer Harvest Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada

89129 (petitioner’s Las Vegas address). Petitioner did not

describe his occupation on his Form 1040, although he did attach

a Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, identifying him as an

employee. 

Petitioner entered zeros on all lines of the income portion

of his Form 1040, specifically including line 7 for wages, line

22 for total income, lines 33 and 34 for adjusted gross income,

and line 39 for taxable income. Petitioner also entered a zero

on line 40 for tax. Petitioner then claimed a refund in the

amount of $2,228.31, which was equal to the amount of Federal

income tax that had been withheld from his wages by his employer.

As previously indicated, petitioner attached to his Form

1040 a Form W-2 disclosing the payment of wages to him during the

taxable year in issue. The Form W-2 was from Tri-State Fire

Protection, Inc. of Las Vegas, Nevada; it disclosed the payment
- 4 -

of wages to petitioner in the amount of $40,592 and the

withholding of Federal income tax in the amount of $2,228.31. 

Petitioner also attached to his Form 1040 a two-page

typewritten statement that stated, in part, as follows: 

I, William G. Koenig, am submitting this as part of my

1998 income tax return, even though I know that no

section of the Internal Revenue Code:

1) Establishes an income tax “liability” * * * ;

2) Provides that income taxes “have to be paid on 

 the basis of a return” * * * ;

3) In addition to the above, I am filing even

though the “Privacy Act Notice” as contained in a 1040

booklet clearly informs me that I am not required to

file. It does so in at least two places.

 a) In one place, it states that I need only

file a return for “any tax” I may be “liable” for. 

Since no Code Section makes me “liable” for income

taxes, this provision notifies me that I do not have to

file an income tax return.

* * * * * * *

5) Please note, that my 1998 return also

constitutes a claim for refund pursuant to Code Section

6402.

6) It should also be noted that I had “zero”

income according to the Supreme Court’s definition of

income (See Note #1) * * * .

7) I am also putting the IRS on notice that my

1998 tax return and claim for refund does not

constitute a “frivolous” return pursuant to Code

Section 6702. * * *

* * * * * * *

10) In addition, don’t notify me that the IRS is

“changing” my return, since there is no statute that

allows the IRS to do that. You might prepare a return
- 5 -

(pursuant to Code Section 6020(b)), where no return is

filed, but as in this case, a return has been filed, no

statute authorizes IRS personnel to “change” that

return.

* * * * * * *

*Note #1: The word “income” is not defined in the

Internal Revenue Code. * * * But, as stated above, it

can only be a derivative of corporate activity. * * *

B. Respondent’s Notice of Deficiency

On February 18, 2000, respondent (acting through Deborah S.

Decker, Director of the Customer Service Center in Ogden, Utah)

issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner for the taxable year

1998. Respondent mailed the notice to petitioner at his Las

Vegas address. In the notice, respondent determined a deficiency

in petitioner’s Federal income tax and an accuracy-related

penalty as follows: 

 Accuracy-related Penalty

 Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a) 

 1998 $6,148 $783.93

Insofar as his ultimate tax liability was concerned,

respondent gave petitioner credit for the amount withheld from

his wages. However, we observe that the determination of a

statutory deficiency does not take such withheld amount into

account. See sec. 6211(b)(1). 

The deficiency in income tax was based on respondent’s

determination that petitioner failed to report wages in the

amount of $40,592, as well as interest in the amount of $88.
- 6 -

2 Respondent also filed the notice of Federal tax lien in

respect of petitioner’s outstanding liability for civil penalties

under sec. 6702 (relating to frivolous income tax returns) for

1998 and 1999. Petitioner’s liability for those penalties is not

before us in the instant case. See Van Es v. Commissioner, 115

T.C. 324 (2000).

Petitioner did not contest respondent’s deficiency

determination by filing a petition for redetermination with this

Court. Accordingly, on July 24, 2000, respondent assessed the

determined deficiency and accuracy-related penalty, as well as

statutory interest. On that same day, respondent sent petitioner

a notice of balance due, informing him that he had a liability

for 1998 and requesting that he pay it. Petitioner failed to pay

the amount owing. About a month later, on August 28, 2000,

respondent sent petitioner a second notice of balance due. 

Again, petitioner failed to pay the amount owing.

C. Respondent’s Lien Notice and Petitioner’s Response

On October 25, 2001, respondent filed a notice of Federal

tax lien with the County Recorder of Clark County (Las Vegas),

Nevada. Respondent filed the notice in respect of petitioner’s

income tax liability for 1998, the unpaid assessed balance of

which was $5,225.10 at the time that the notice was filed.2

On October 30, 2001, respondent mailed to petitioner at his

Las Vegas address a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your

Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 in respect of his outstanding

tax liability.
- 7 -

3 The request was postmarked Nov. 26, 2001.

On November 30, 2001, petitioner filed with respondent Form

12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing.3 The

request, which listed petitioner’s Las Vegas address, was

accompanied by a two-page typewritten statement that acknowledged

receipt of the foregoing Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and

Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320. The statement included,

inter alia, a challenge to the existence of the underlying tax

liability for 1998, as well as allegations including: (1)

Petitioner never received a “valid” notice of deficiency or a

“statutory” notice and demand for payment and (2) the Appeals

officer failed “to identify the statute that makes me ‘liable to

pay’ the taxes at issue”. Petitioner also requested verification

from the Secretary that all applicable laws and administrative

procedures were followed with regard to the assessment and

collection of the tax liability in question.

D. The Appeals Office Hearing

By letter dated March 8, 2002, Appeals Officer Jerry L.

Johnson (the Appeals officer) scheduled an administrative hearing

with petitioner in respondent’s Appeals Office in Las Vegas,

Nevada. The Appeals officer then went on to state, in part, as

follows:

Please note that in circumstances where it is allowable

to dispute the underlying liability * * * , the

administrative appeal procedures do not extend to
- 8 -

arguments involving the failure or refusal to comply

with the tax laws because of moral, religious,

political, constitutional, conscientious, or similar

grounds. To my knowledge, such arguments have never

been successful in a court of law and I will not

consider as valid any arguments of that nature in the

collection due process hearing.

In preparation for the hearing, I have requested

transcripts showing the contested assessments and plan

to have copies available for you. 

By letter dated April 1, 2002, the Appeals officer contacted

petitioner about the scheduled administrative hearing and stated,

in part, as follows:

I believe the purpose of a CDP [collection due process]

hearing is to ensure that the government’s need to

collect the proper tax is balanced with the taxpayer’s

need that the collection process be no more intrusive

than necessary. To accomplish that goal, section

6320(c)(1) of the I.R.C. first places a requirement of

investigation upon me. The section does not state that

I need to convince you that the requirements of law or

procedure have been met, or even that I provide such

evidence to you. It only requires that I obtain

verification that the requirements of applicable law or

administrative procedure have been met.

In the case of Tanner v. U.S., (CA-9) 2001-1 U.S.T.C.

50444, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that

the requirements of the section can be met by my review

of a form 4340, certificate of assessment and payment. 

I have obtained that document and though not required

to do so, it is provided to you with this letter. My

review of it and the other documents in your

administrative file have convinced me that (a) the

disputed amounts were properly assessed, and (b) the

disputed amounts were properly billed.

On April 22, 2002, petitioner attended an administrative

hearing in Las Vegas, Nevada, conducted by the Appeals officer.

At the hearing, petitioner acknowledged receiving Form 4340,
- 9 -

Certificate of Assessments, Payments and Other Specified Matters,

pertaining to his account for the taxable year 1998. At the

hearing, petitioner did not contradict the Appeals officer’s

assertion that petitioner had received the notice of deficiency

(see supra “B”). However, petitioner did allege that he never

received “a statutory notice and demand for payment” (emphasis in

the original), and he requested a copy of the “summary record of

assessment”. Petitioner also requested that the Appeals officer

provide verification that all applicable laws and administrative

procedures had been followed in the assessment and collection

process; in this regard, petitioner was informed by the Appeals

officer that the transcript provided (i.e., Form 4340) was

sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement of section

6330(c)(1). In addition, petitioner stated that he was

challenging the underlying liability. Finally, in response to

the Appeals officer’s question whether petitioner wished to

discuss collection alternatives, petitioner stated that “I’m

prepared to pay * * * if you can convince me * * * where my

liability is.” 

In a letter dated April 22, 2002, that was sent immediately

after the administrative hearing, the Appeals officer mailed

petitioner copies of relevant statutes and court cases, including

Davis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-87, in which this Court

imposed on the taxpayer a $4,000 penalty pursuant to section
- 10 -

6673(a) for making frivolous and groundless arguments in a

collection review proceeding.

E. Respondent’s Notice of Determination

 On May 7, 2002, respondent’s Appeals Office mailed to

petitioner, at his Las Vegas address, a Notice of Determination

Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330

with regard to his tax liability for 1998. In the notice, the

Appeals Office concluded that respondent’s determination to

proceed with collection should be sustained.

F. Petitioner’s Petition

On June 10, 2002, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition

for Lien or Levy Action seeking review of respondent’s notice of

determination. In the petition, petitioner identified his Las

Vegas address as his current address, and he attached as exhibits

a number of documents, including the notice of determination (see

supra “E”).

The petition includes allegations that: (1) The Appeals

officer failed to obtain verification from the Secretary that the

requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure

were met as required under section 6330(c)(1); (2) the Appeals

officer failed to identify the statutes making petitioner liable

for Federal income tax; (3) petitioner never received a “valid”

notice of deficiency; (4) petitioner never received a “statutory”

notice and demand for payment; and (5) petitioner was denied the
- 11 -

opportunity to challenge the existence or amount of his

underlying tax liability. The petition contains no facts in

support of any of these allegations.

G. Respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment

As stated, respondent filed a Motion For Summary Judgment

And To Impose A Penalty Under I.R.C. Section 6673. Respondent

also filed a Declaration in support of the motion. Attached to

the Declaration is, inter alia, Form 4340 for petitioner’s

account for 1998. The Form 4340 shows, inter alia: (1) An

Assessment on July 24, 2000, in respect of the taxable year 1998; 

and (2) the issuance of a notice of balance due on the date of

the assessment. See supra “B”.

Petitioner filed an Objection to respondent’s motion,

disagreeing, inter alia, with the imposition of any penalty under

section 6673, in part because “I.R. Code Section 6673 does not

have the ‘force and effect of law.’”. Petitioner also repeated

his allegation that he never received a “valid” notice of

deficiency; i.e., one signed by the Secretary or someone with

delegated authority from the Secretary.

Thereafter, pursuant to notice, respondent’s motion was

called for hearing at the Court's motions session in Washington,

D.C. Petitioner did not attend the hearing, nor did he submit

any written statement pursuant to Rule 50(c).
- 12 -

Discussion

Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on

all property and rights to property of a person when demand for

payment of that person’s liability for taxes has been made and

the person fails to pay those taxes. The lien arises when the

assessment is made. Sec. 6322. Section 6323(a) requires the

Secretary to file notice of Federal tax lien if such lien is to

be valid against any purchaser, holder of a security interest,

mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor. Behling v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 572, 575 (2002).

Section 6320 provides that the Secretary shall furnish the

person described in section 6321 with written notice of the

filing of a notice of lien under section 6323. The notice

required by section 6320 must be provided not more than 5

business days after the day the notice of lien is filed. Sec.

6320(a)(2). Section 6320 further provides that the person may

request administrative review of the matter (in the form of an

Appeals Office hearing) within the 30-day period beginning on the

day after the 5-day period described above. Section 6320(c)

provides that the Appeals Office hearing generally shall be

conducted consistent with the procedures set forth in section

6330(c), (d), and (e).

Section 6330(c) provides for review with respect to

collection issues such as spousal defenses, the appropriateness
- 13 -

of the Commissioner's intended collection action, and possible

alternative means of collection. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) provides

that the existence or the amount of the underlying tax liability

can be contested at an Appeals Office hearing if the person did

not receive a notice of deficiency or did not otherwise have an

earlier opportunity to dispute such tax liability. Goza v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 180-181 (2000); see Sego v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000). Section 6330(d) provides

for judicial review of the administrative determination in the

Tax Court or Federal District Court.

A. Summary Judgment

In his petition, petitioner challenges the existence of the

underlying tax liability. Respondent contends that petitioner is

barred under section 6330(c)(2)(B) from challenging the existence

or amount of his underlying tax liability in this collection

review proceeding because petitioner received a notice of

deficiency for the tax in question. Respondent deduces the 

factual predicate for this contention from the fact that the

notice of deficiency was mailed to petitioner at his last known

address and from petitioner’s failure to deny receiving the

notice of deficiency. Rather, petitioner only denied receiving a

“valid” notice of deficiency. See Kiley v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-315 (taxpayer’s denial of receiving “valid” notice of

deficiency” did not mean that taxpayer failed to receive notice
- 14 -

of deficiency); Rennie v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-296

(taxpayer’s denial of receiving “legal” notice of deficiency did

not mean that taxpayer failed to receive notice of deficiency);

Schmith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-252 (taxpayer’s denial

of receiving “valid” notice of deficiency did not mean that

taxpayer failed to receive notice of deficiency); see also Nestor

v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 165-166 (2002) (section

6330(c)(2)(B) bars a taxpayer from challenging the existence or

amount of the taxpayer’s underlying tax liability in a collection

review proceeding if the taxpayer received a notice of deficiency

and disregarded the opportunity to file a petition for

redetermination with this Court). 

Rule 121(d) provides in relevant part as follows:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and

supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party

may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of

such party’s pleading, but such party’s response, by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must

set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not

so respond, then a decision, if appropriate, may be

entered against such party.

In his petition, petitioner does not indicate on what basis

he challenges “the existence of the underlying liability”. His

failure to do so is contrary to Rule 331(b)(5), requiring “Clear

and concise lettered statements of the facts on which the

petitioner bases each assignment of error.” Cf. Parker v.

Commissioner, 117 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1997); White v.
- 15 -

4 Even if petitioner were permitted to challenge his

underlying tax liabilities, it is clear that the arguments he has

advanced (see supra Background, “A”) are frivolous and

groundless. E.g., Keene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-277. 

In addition, petitioner’s argument that the notice of deficiency

was invalid because it was not signed by the Secretary or someone

with delegated authority from the Secretary is itself frivolous

and groundless. See Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 165-

166 (2002).

5 We regard as nothing other than tax protest theatrics,

petitioner’s assertion that he was “prepared to pay the tax at

issue” if only the Appeals officer would show him “where my

liability is.” 

Regarding petitioner’s liability, suffice it to say: (1)

Petitioner is a taxpayer subject to the Federal income tax; see

secs. 1(c), 7701(a)(1), (14); (2) compensation for labor or

services rendered constitutes income subject to the Federal

income tax; sec. 61(a)(1); United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d

1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981); see also sec. 61(a)(4); (3)

petitioner is required to file an income tax return; sec.

6012(a)(1); and (4) the Commissioner and his agents are

authorized to enforce the provisions of the Internal Revenue

Code; see I.R.C. chs. 78, 80. See Davich v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-255; see also Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417,

1417 (5th Cir. 1984). 

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-459. Petitioner’s failure to do so

after the filing of respondent’s motion for summary judgment is

contrary to Rule 121(d) and justifies summary judgment for

respondent on this issue.4 See Kiley v. Commissioner, supra. 

Petitioner also challenges “the appropriateness of the

collection action”. Again, however, he fails to allege any facts

in support of this assignment of error. See Rule 331(b)(5). 

Moreover, he fails to suggest any alternative means of

collection.5 See, e.g., sec. 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii). As before,

petitioner’s failure to do so after the filing of respondent’s
- 16 -

motion for summary judgment is contrary to Rule 121(d) and

justifies summary judgment for respondent on this issue. 

We likewise reject petitioner’s argument that the Appeals

officer failed to obtain verification from the Secretary that the

requirements of all applicable laws and administrative procedures

were met as required by section 6330(c)(1). The record shows

that the Appeals officer obtained and reviewed a transcript of

petitioner’s account for 1998.

Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of

assessment. Sec. 6203. “The summary record, through supporting

records, shall provide identification of the taxpayer, the

character of the liability assessed, the taxable period, if

applicable, and the amount of the assessment.” Sec. 301.6203-1,

Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Section 6330(c)(1) does not require the Commissioner to rely

on a particular document (e.g., the summary record itself rather

than a transcript of account) to satisfy the verification

requirement imposed therein. Roberts v. Commissioner, 118 T.C.

365, 371 n.10 (2002); Standifird v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2002-245; Weishan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-88; Lindsey v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-87; Tolotti v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-86; Duffield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-53;

Kuglin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-51. In this regard, we

observe that the Form 4340 furnished to petitioner by the Appeals
- 17 -

6 To the extent that petitioner may be arguing that the

Appeals officer failed to provide him with a copy of the

verification, we note that sec. 6330(c)(1) does not require that

the Appeals officer provide the taxpayer with a copy of the

verification at the administrative hearing. Nestor v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166 (2002); sec. 301.6330-1(e)(1),

Proced. & Admin Regs. In any event, both the Appeals officer and

respondent’s counsel provided petitioner with a Form 4340 for the

taxable year in issue.

officer and attached to respondent’s Declaration contained all

the information prescribed in section 301.6203-1, Proced. &

Admin. Regs. See Weishan v. Commissioner, supra; Lindsey v.

Commissioner, supra; Tolotti v. Commissioner, supra; Duffield v.

Commissioner, supra; Kuglin v. Commissioner, supra.

6 Petitioner

has not alleged any irregularity in the assessment procedure that

would raise a legitimate question about the validity of the

assessment or the information contained in the Form 4340. See

Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 41 (2000); Mann v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48. Accordingly, we hold that the

Appeals officer satisfied the verification requirement of section

6330(c)(1). Cf. Nicklaus v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 117, 120-121

(2001).

Petitioner also contends that he never received a

“statutory” notice and demand for payment of his tax liability

for 1998. The requirement that the Secretary issue a notice and

demand for payment is set forth in section 6303(a), which

provides in pertinent part:
- 18 -

SEC. 6303(a). General Rule.-–Where it is not

otherwise provided by this title, the Secretary shall,

as soon as practicable, and within 60 days, after the

making of an assessment of a tax pursuant to section

6203, give notice to each person liable for the unpaid

tax, stating the amount and demanding payment thereof. 

* * * 

In particular, Form 4340 shows that respondent sent petitioner a

notice of balance due on the same date that respondent made the

assessment against petitioner for the tax and accuracy-related

penalty determined in the notice of deficiency. A notice of

balance due constitutes a notice and demand for payment within

the meaning of section 6303(a). See, e.g., Hughes v. United

States, 953 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1992); Schaper v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-203; Weishan v. Commissioner,

supra; see also Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th

Cir. 1993). In addition, other notices were sent to petitioner,

at least one of which (the notice of tax lien filing, discussed

supra Background, “C”) petitioner admittedly received; likewise,

petitioner received the Form 4340. Such notice and form were

sufficient to constitute notice and demand within the meaning of

section 6303(a) because they informed petitioner of the amount

owed and requested payment. Standifird v. Commissioner, supra;

Hack v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-244; Hack v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2002-243; see Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521, 525 (9th

Cir. 1990) (“The form on which a notice of assessment and demand

for payment is made is irrelevant as long as it provides the
- 19 -

7 E.g., Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252 (2002)

(imposing a penalty in the amount of $2,500); Roberts v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365 (2002) (imposing a penalty in the

amount of $10,000); Eiselstein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-

22 (imposing a penalty in the amount of $5,000); Gunselman v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-11 (imposing a penalty in the

amount of $1,000); Young v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-6

(imposing a penalty in the amount of $500); Robinson v.

(continued...)

taxpayer with all the information required under 26 U.S.C. §

6303(a).”).

Finally, petitioner has failed to raise a spousal defense,

and any such issue is now deemed conceded. Rule 331(b)(4). In

the absence of a valid issue for review, we conclude that

respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law sustaining

the notice of determination dated May 7, 2002.

B. Imposition of a Penalty Under Section 6673

We turn now to that part of respondent’s motion that moves

for the imposition of a penalty on petitioner under section 6673.

As relevant herein, section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Tax

Court to require a taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty

not in excess of $25,000 whenever it appears that proceedings

have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for

delay or that the taxpayer's position in such proceeding is

frivolous or groundless. The Court has indicated its willingness

to impose such penalty in lien and levy cases, Pierson v.

Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 580-581 (2000), and has in fact

imposed a penalty in many such cases.7
- 20 -

7(...continued)

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-316 (imposing a penalty in the

amount of $2,500); Kiley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-315

(imposing a penalty in the amount of $5,000); Rennie v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-296 (imposing a penalty in the

amount of $1,500); Tornichio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-291

(imposing a penalty in the amount of $12,500); Keene v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-277 (imposing a penalty in the

amount of $5,000), and numerous other cases cited therein at

n.14.

We are convinced that petitioner instituted the present

proceeding primarily for delay. In this regard, it is clear that

petitioner regards this proceeding as nothing but a vehicle to

protest the tax laws of this country and to espouse his own

misguided views, which we regard as frivolous and groundless. 

E.g., Tolotti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-86. In short,

having to deal with this matter wasted the Court's time, as well

as respondent's, and taxpayers with genuine controversies may

have been delayed.

Also relevant is the fact that the petitioner was made aware

of the fact that he could be subject to a penalty for instituting

or maintaining a lien or levy action primarily for delay or for

advancing frivolous or groundless arguments in such an action. 

In this regard, the Appeals officer’s letter dated April 22,

2002, furnished petitioner with a copy of Davis v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2001-87, a case in which this Court imposed on the

taxpayer a $4,000 penalty pursuant to section 6673(a) for making

frivolous and groundless arguments in a collection review
- 21 -

proceeding. Prior letters from the Appeals officer also

furnished petitioner with relevant information in this regard.

Under the circumstances, we shall grant that part of

respondent’s motion that moves for the imposition of a penalty in

that we shall impose a penalty on petitioner pursuant to section

6673(a)(1) in the amount of $2,000.

C. Conclusion

We have considered all of petitioner’s arguments that are

not discussed herein, and we find them to be without merit and/or

irrelevant. 

In order to give effect to the foregoing,

An appropriate order granting

respondent's motion and decision

for respondent will be entered.