J-A25003-17 

2017 PA Super 364

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MIGUEL ANGEL RODRIGUEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 210 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 12, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-48-CR-0003835-2014

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2017

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Northampton County following Appellant’s conviction by a 

jury on the charge of first degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). After a 

careful review, we affirm. 

The trial court has extensively set forth the factual and procedural 

history underlying this appeal as follows:

[Following a Grand Jury investigation, Appellant was 

arrested and charged with Criminal Homicide.] The 

Commonwealth provided discovery[,] and defense counsel filed 

[an] omnibus pretrial motion on April 28, 2015, seeking additional 

discovery and suppression of [Appellant’s] statements to the 

police. A suppression hearing was held on June 11, 2015, to 

address a number of issues raised by [Appellant] in his omnibus 

pretrial motions. 

***
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Following the pretrial hearing, both parties submitted briefs 

to the court. On September 10, 2015, the court denied 

[Appellant’s] motions to suppress statements he made to the 

police and his motion to reveal the identify [of the 

Commonwealth’s confidential informant]. On the same day, the 

Commonwealth issued subpoenas to twenty-seven witnesses 

whose addresses and phone numbers were not disclosed [in 

order] to ensure their safety. Defense counsel was given an 

opportunity to meet with these witnesses at the Courthouse.

The [jury] trial in this case[, at which Appellant was 

represented by counsel,] began on February 1, 2016[,] and ended 

on February 5, 2016. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to one 

count of Criminal Homicide-First Degree Murder....The following 

evidence was presented at trial in support of this verdict. 

On February 9, 2013, Easton Police responded to a report of 

shots fired at Eddie G’s bar in Easton. [N.T., 2/2/16, at 8-9.] 

Officer Brian Burd of the Easton Police Department was the first 

officer on the scene. [Id. at 9.] Officer Burd was directed to the 

“Employee’s Only” area of the bar, where he observed the victim, 

Damien Robinson, lying on the floor. [Id. at 10.] At the time of 

the officer’s arrival, the victim was still alive, but he was 

unconscious and his breathing was shallow. [Id. at 12.] Jennifer 

Delgado, an employee at Eddie G’s and a witness, was 

administering CPR to the victim. [Id. at 10-11.] Officer Burd 

directed her to stop CPR so that he could check the victim’s vital 

signs and administer life saving measure[s]. Id. Officer Burd 

then radioed for backup[,] EMS[,] and Fire. [Id. at 12.] While 

treating the victim, Officer Burd observed a gunshot wound to the 

victim’s left upper chest area and a gunshot [wound] at his right 

armpit. [Id. at 14.] 

Once backup officers, [F]ire[,] and EMS arrived, they 

managed to secure the scene and began looking for a gun. [Id.

at 16.] The victim was removed from the scene and taken to the 

hospital. [Id. at 16-17.] Officer Burd then began interviewing 

witnesses, including Ms. Delgado, Darryl Williams, Rico Garnet, 

and Mike King. [Id.] Of those witnesses, only Mr. King saw the 

shooting and could provide a description of the shooter. [Id. at 

17.] Mr. King worked as a bouncer at Eddie G’s. Id. He described 

the shooter as a five feet, eight inch[] tall black male with 

medium-toned skin. [Id. at 18.] The shooter was wearing a dark 

hoodie with the hood up and dark sweatpants. Id. He described 

the gun as a black semi-automatic handgun. Id.
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Officer Burd [] observed a shell casing outside the 

“Employee’s Only” door leading [to] the back room where the 

victim was found. [Id.] On the left side (if entering through the 

“Employee’s Only” door) of the room, officers observed a cartridge 

casing with an unfired round, an empty shell casing, and a bag of 

what was suspected to be marijuana. [Id.] In the same room 

was another closed door with a bullet hole through it. [Id. at 18-

19.] Officers found two bullets inside the room behind the door. 

Id. Officers further observed a broken cell phone and a sweatshirt 

near the rear door of the building. [Id. at 19.]

Next, Dr. Zhongxue Hua testified as an expert in forensic 

pathology. [Id. at 57-58.] Dr. Hua reported the findings of his 

autopsy to the jury. This included the discovery of two gunshot[] 

wounds on the victim, one of which was fatal, and their trajectory 

through the body. [Id. at 65-67.] Dr. Hua opined that the cause 

of death was a gunshot wound to the chest with no contributing 

factors. [Id. at 92.] During this testimony, two colored pictures 

of the injuries were presented to the jury, one of the victim’s chest 

wound and one of the victim’s back where exit wounds were 

observable. [Id. at 52.] These photographs were entered into 

evidence over the objections of [Appellant]. [Id. at 51.] The 

pictures were displayed for approximately a minute while in use 

by Dr. Hua to describe the location of entry and exit wounds on 

the victim. [Id. at 63-64.] An instruction was given to the jury 

by the court prior to the introduction of the photographs, 

explaining their purpose and instructing the jury to not allow their 

emotions to prejudice [Appellant]. [Id. at 61-62.] 

Detective Darren Snyder was responsible for processing the 

crime scene at Eddie G’s bar. Along with evidence observed by 

Officer Burd, Detective Snyder also collected another 9mm Luger 

casing, an orange lighter, and bullet fragments. [Id. at 114, 141-

42.] Detective Snyder also collected DNA samples from a blood 

smear on a closet door, the push bar of the “Employee’s Only” 

door, the rear exit door, and from the cell phone discovered by 

Officer Burd. [Id. at 125-26, 128, 132, 181.] 

Corporal Jeffery Dietz of the Pennsylvania State Police 

Regional Crime Lab testified at trial as an expert in firearm and 

tool mark examination. [Id. at 254.] He asserted that all three 

cartridge casings recovered from the scene were fired from the 

same firearm. [Id. at 261.] He also compared the two intact 

bullets and the fragments found at the scene and discovered that 

all three items were fired from the same gun. [Id. at 264-66.] 
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Detective Matthew Rush, the affiant in the present case, 

testified regarding his investigation at trial. Specifically, Detective 

Rush spoke about his conversations with [Appellant] at the Easton 

Police Department. At an interview on February 21, 2013, 

[Appellant] stated that he had arrived at Eddie G’s on the night of 

the incident around 9:00 pm and had not witnessed the gunshots. 

(Commonwealth Ex. 76). He also denied ever being in the back 

room of the bar. [Id.] [Appellant] also denied losing his phone 

at Eddie G’s and insisted it was at his house, but later in the 

interview said that a man named Devol James borrowed his phone 

and lost it. [Id.]

On March 11, [2013,] Detective Rush obtained a search 

warrant for [Appellant’s] DNA to be compared with the evidence 

at the scene. [N.T., 2/4/16, at 42-45.] The DNA sample was 

collected from [Appellant] at which time [Appellant] told Detective 

Rush he had gone to New York for a few days before coming back 

to Easton. [Id. at 46.] The two spoke again on April 29, 2013[,] 

and [Appellant] denied having anything to do with the homicide. 

[Id. at 47-48.] [Appellant] testified before the Grand Jury on June 

27, 2013. In his testimony, [Appellant] stated that he has two 

cell phones and sometimes gives one of them to a man identified 

as “Hood” for drug transactions. [Id. at 58.]....[Appellant 

admitted that on the night in question he was] at Eddie G’s 

wearing a grey sweat suit. [Id. at 61, 69.] He claimed that Hood 

had told him that he lost the cell phone [that Appellant] gave him 

at Eddie G’s. [Id. at 89.] He testified that he stayed at the 

Ramada Inn briefly after the shooting and then went to New York 

around February 12, 2013[,] for a few days. [Id. at 100-02.] 

[Appellant] denied having a gun that night. [Id. at 91.] 

The Commonwealth also called Catherine Palla, who was 

qualified as an expert in DNA profiling. [Id. at 166-67.] She 

tested the known samples from [Appellant] with the various 

collected samples found at the crime scene. [Id. at 174.] The 

bag of marijuana found at the scene had DNA from two people, 

one of which was [Appellant]. [Id. at 175.] None of the casings 

had enough DNA to test. [Id. at 176.] The cell phone contained 

a mixture of three different DNA profiles, with a major contributor 

of the mixture being [Appellant]. [Id.] 

The Commonwealth called a number of eyewitnesses, the 

two most significant of which was Jennifer Delgado and Mike King.

Mike King worked as a bounced [sic] at Eddie G’s on the 

night of the shooting. He testified that he recalled seeing 
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[Appellant] and Hood at Eddie G’s on the night in question. [N.T., 

2/3/16, at 7-10.] He saw [Appellant] and Hood arguing with a 

man known as “La[l]a,” who was at the bar with the victim, known 

as “Head.” [Id. at 11-12.] Mr. King was required to break up the 

argument between the two groups. [Id. at 15.] Mr. King was 

called to break up a fight in the back later that night, which was 

taking place on the other side of the “Employee’s Only” door. [Id.

at 19-20.] When he entered the back area through the door, he 

saw [Appellant] pulling a gun up in his right hand. [Id. at 20-21.] 

He heard three gunshots. [Id. at 17-24.] He then went into the 

back room and observed the victim, leaning against the closet 

door trying to breathe. [Id. at 26.] He then ran back to the bar 

and called an ambulance. [Id. at 27.] When speaking to the 

police that night, Mr. King did not identify [Appellant] because he 

says [that] he was scared of retaliation and did not want 

[Appellant] to be arrested. [Id. at 30.] Mr. King testified twice 

in front of the Grand Jury, the first time he did not identify 

[Appellant]. The second time, his testimony changed and he 

identified [Appellant] as the shooter. [Id. at 42]. Mr. King 

state[d] the reason his testimony changed is because his girlfriend 

became pregnant with twins and he did not want to risk going to 

jail. [Id.]

Jennifer Delgado was a bartender at Eddie G’s that night. 

At the time of the shooting, Ms. Delgado was “hooking up” with a 

friend of [Appellant,] known as “City,” whom she had known for 

about a year. [Id. at 123-24.] She was behind the bar when she 

heard two or three gunshots that night. [Id. at 136-37.] While 

the police were on the scene, Ms. Delgado was contacted by City 

and ordered to sneak out of the bar. [Id. at 144.] She then went 

to the Ramada Inn where she met up with City, Hood, and 

[Appellant], as well as three other men. [Id. at 146-47.] The 

next day, before going to speak to the police who were looking for 

her, she went with City to look for the gun down by Eddie G’s. [Id.

at 151.] After being instructed by City on what to say, Ms. 

Delgado told the police that Lala was the shooter. [Id. at 153-

54.] Ms. Delgado then drove [Appellant] to New York to get him 

out of town. [Id. at 155.] During the drive[,] [Appellant] told her 

that he was scared[,] [he] thought the victim was going to pull 

something[,] and [the victim] was bigger than [Appellant]. [Id.

at 157.] 

In June of 2013, Ms. Delgado spoke to Detective Rush after 

she had been stabbed ten times by friends of [Appellant]. [Id. at 

158-69.] At this time[,] Ms. Delgado began giving more 
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information to the police. [Id. at 159.] The District Attorney’s 

Office dismissed a pending DUI [charge] against Ms. Delgado and 

gave her immunity for her role in the homicide. [Id. at 160-62.] 

Ms. Delgado testified to this information before the Grand Jury.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/28/16, at 1-8. 

Following the jury’s verdict, on February 12, 2016, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to a term of life imprisonment without parole. On that 

same date, Appellant was given his post-sentence and appellate rights. See

Post Sentencing Colloquy, filed 2/12/16. On February 17, 2016, Appellant 

filed a timely, counseled post-sentence motion1in which he presented 

numerous claims, and on February 18, 2016, the trial court ordered that the 

necessary notes of testimony be transcribed. 

On March 21, 2016, Appellant filed a counseled motion averring that, 

despite having ordered the necessary transcripts, he had not yet received the 

transcripts, and therefore, under Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b), he sought a 

thirty-day extension of time in which to supplement his post-sentence motion. 

By order entered on that same day, the trial court granted Appellant’s request, 

indicating that, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a), a thirty-day extension 

would be added to the 120-day decision period. Thus, the post-sentence 

____________________________________________

1 The record contains a copy of Appellant’s motion, which is labeled an 

“Omnibus Post-Sentence Motion Pursuant to Rule 720(B)[.]” We note the 

certified docket entries mistakenly indicate that, on February 17, 2016, 

Appellant filed an “Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion.” 
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motion decision period was extended to July 18, 2016.2 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(B)(3)(a), (b). 

On June 24, 2016, prior to the expiration of the extended period, the 

Clerk of Courts purported to deny Appellant’s post-sentence motion by 

operation of law. On June 27, 2016, Appellant received the requested 

transcripts and, on June 29, 2016, having received the Clerk of Court’s notice, 

Appellant filed a motion requesting permission to file a supplemental postsentence motion nunc pro tunc. Therein, Appellant averred that he had 

recently received the necessary transcripts, and he believed that he had or 

should have had additional time to file a supplemental post-sentence motion

pursuant to the trial court’s previous order. 

By order entered on June 29, 2016, the trial court granted Appellant’s 

request to file a supplemental post-sentence nunc pro tunc and directed 

Appellant to file his supplemental post-sentence motion within seven days of 

the order (by July 6, 2016). On June 30, 2016, the trial court additionally 

directed Appellant to file a brief addressing his post-sentence motions within 

twenty days of the date of the order. 

On July 6, 2016, Appellant filed a supplemental post-sentence motion 

nunc pro tunc raising additional claims. On October 3, 2016, Appellant filed a 

____________________________________________

2 The 150th day fell on Saturday, July 16, 2016, and thus, the post-sentence 

motion decision period was extended to Monday, July 18, 2016. See 1 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (“Computation of time”).
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brief in support of his motion, as well as a motion for the trial court to accept 

the brief late. By order entered on December 28, 2016, the trial court entered 

an order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion. This counseled appeal 

followed on January 5, 2017. The trial court directed Appellant to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant timely complied, and the trial court 

filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues, which we set forth 

verbatim:

I. Did the trial court erroneously deny Appellant’s motion for a 

new trial where the verdict was so contrary to the weight of 

the evidence as to make the awarding of a new trial 

imperative?

II. Did the trial court erroneously deny Appellant’s request for 

access to identifying and contact information regarding over 

50 eyewitnesses interviewed by the police, where the 

alternative approach adopted by the trial court virtually 

guaranteed that none of these witnesses would discuss their 

information with the defense and where withholding this 

information denied Appellant his constitutional right to 

prepare and present a defense?

III. Did the trial court erroneously permit a prosecution witness 

to testify that she was stabbed by “acquaintances of the 

defendant” and that acquaintances of the defendant killed 

her friend, where no evidence indicated that Appellant had 

any involvement in these alleged attacks or that he was 

acquainted with the attackers?

IV. Did the trial court erroneously permit a detective to provide 

hearsay testimony to the effect that (1) Appellant’s 

girlfriend and her mother would not corroborate Appellant’s 

claim that Appellant was at his girlfriend’s home at the time 

of the incident, and (2) that an alternative suspect denied 

Appellant’s claim that Appellant had given his cell phone to 

the alternative suspect immediately prior to the incident?
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V. Did the trial court erroneously deny Appellant’s request to 

inform the jury of the penalty for first degree murder in 

Pennsylvania, where that information was probative of the 

alternat[e] suspects’ reasons for either refusing to testify or 

denying any participation in the shooting?

VI. Did the trial court erroneously impose a sentence of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon an 18 

year old defendant, in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 [ ] (2012)? 

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. 

As a preliminary matter, we consider whether Appellant filed his notice 

of appeal in a timely manner. “In cases where no post-sentence motions...are 

filed, a defendant must file an appeal within 30 days of imposition of 

sentence[.] If a defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, the appeal 

period does not begin to run until the motion is decided.” Commonwealth 

v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d 1242, 1244 (citations omitted).

Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A), a post-sentence motion is timely if it is filed 

no later than ten days after the imposition of sentence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 sets 

forth the procedure to be followed when a timely post-sentence motion is filed. 

Under this Rule, the trial court must decide the post-sentence motion within 

120 days of the filing of the motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). The trial 

court may grant one 30-day extension for a maximum of 150 days. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b). If the trial court fails to decide the post-sentence 

motion within this time period, it is deemed denied by operation of law. Id. 

When a post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law, the Clerk of 

Courts is directed to enter an order on behalf of the court and “furnish a copy 
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of the order...to...the defendant(s) and defense counsel....” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(B)(3)(d).

In the case sub judice, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on 

February 17, 2016. Furthermore, prior to the expiration of the 120-day 

period, since the necessary notes of testimony had not yet been transcribed, 

Appellant filed a motion on March 21, 2016, seeking a 30-day extension with 

regard to his post-sentence motions. The trial court granted Appellant’s 

extension request, thus indicating a 30-day extension would be added to the 

120-day decision period. Accordingly, at this point, the trial court had 150 

days from February 17, 2016 (or until July 18, 2016) to rule on Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion. 

However, prior to the expiration of the 150-day mark, the Clerk of 

Courts prematurely deemed Appellant’s post-sentence motion to be denied by 

operation of law on June 24, 2016, which was 128 days after Appellant filed 

his post-sentence motion. Since the Clerk of Court’s denial of the postsentence motion was in contravention of the court-approved extension, we 

deem the Clerk of Court’s action to be a “breakdown in the system.” See 

Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d 734 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding that, 

where the Clerk of Courts does not follow the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

such constitutes a breakdown in the lower court’s processes). 

This breakdown by the Clerk of Courts led to Appellant filing another 

motion seeking an extension of time in which to file a supplemental post-
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sentence motion, and the trial court directed Appellant to file his supplemental 

post-sentence motion by July 6, 2016. Thereafter, on July 6, 2016, Appellant 

filed a supplemental post-sentence motion; however, the trial court did not 

rule on the motion by July 18, 2016 (150 days after the filing of Appellant’s 

original post-sentence motion). Moreover, the Clerk of Courts did not provide 

proper notice after the 150-day mark indicating that the post-sentence motion 

was denied by operation of law. Rather, on December 28, 2016, the trial court 

entered an order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion, and within thirty 

days thereof, on January 5, 2017, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. 

Under these circumstances, we are constrained to find that Appellant’s

facially untimely appeal was caused, at least in part, by a breakdown of the 

processes of the court below, and thus, we decline to quash this appeal on the 

basis it was untimely filed. See Commonwealth v. Khalil, 806 A.2d 415 

(Pa.Super. 2002) (declining to quash appeal that was facially untimely due to 

breakdown in the court’s system). Accordingly, we will address the issues 

presented by Appellant. 

In his first issue, Appellant contends the jury’s verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence.3 Specifically, Appellant contends that the jury’s 

verdict is unreliable since it is based upon the testimony of a single 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant adequately preserved his weight of the evidence claim in his postsentence motion and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Pa.R.A.P. 1925
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eyewitness, Mike King, and, thus, “[t]his mater belongs to a troubling subset 

of criminal cases that continues to confound the criminal justice system: the 

one-witness ID case.” Appellant’s Brief at 28. Further, Appellant contends 

Mr. King’s identification of Appellant as the shooter at trial was inherently 

unreliable since Mr. King failed to identify Appellant as the shooter on the night 

of the crime and in his initial testimony before the Grand Jury.

Additionally, he contends that the testimony presented at trial from Mr. 

King and Jennifer Delgado was untrustworthy given the fact that both 

witnesses sought leniency and/or feared perjury charges if they did not testify 

favorably for the Commonwealth. He further contends that, since there were 

over 50 people in the bar at the time of the shooting, and thus, there existed 

several alternate suspects, the jury’s verdict concluding that Appellant was 

the shooter “shock’s one’s sense of justice.” Finally, he contends that the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence since the Commonwealth’s “DNA 

evidence showed only that [Appellant] at one point held [a] phone and [a] 

bag containing drugs.” Appellant’s Brief at 33. 

The Supreme Court has set forth the following standard of review for 

weight of the evidence claims:

The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears 

to lie in ensuring that the trial court’s decision has record support. 

Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial 

court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

* * *

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 
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of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a 

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the 

role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the 

facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore 

them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 

justice.

* * *

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with 

a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight 

claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Clay, 619 Pa. 423, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (2013) 

(quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted). In order for an appellant 

to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, “the evidence must be 

so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the 

court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa.Super. 2003) 

(quotation marks and quotations omitted). 

Initially, with regard to Appellant’s broad assertion that a jury’s verdict 

of guilt, which is based upon the testimony of a single eyewitness, is inherently 

suspicious or unreliable, we disagree. Rather, as with all testimony and 

evidence offered at trial, in passing upon the credibility of a single eyewitness, 

the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the witness’s testimony. 

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en 

banc). Further, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, in the case sub judice, the 

jury was presented with direct and circumstantial evidence of Appellant’s guilt 
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beyond that presented by Mr. King, i.e., Ms. Delgado’s testimony and DNA 

evidence left at the scene. 

With regard to Mr. King’s reluctance in identifying Appellant as the 

shooter, Mr. King admitted on direct-examination that he did not inform the 

police that he observed Appellant shoot the victim because he does not like to 

cooperate with the police, he thought Appellant was otherwise “a good kid,” 

and he was worried about retaliation. N.T., 2/3/16, at 29-30. Mr. King also 

admitted at trial that he initially lied to the Grand Jury about the identity of 

the shooter; however, he indicated that, when he testified the second time 

before the Grand Jury, he decided to tell the truth and identify Appellant. Id.

at 40-41. Mr. King explained at trial that he decided to tell the truth because 

he had just found out that he was going to be a father and he did not want to 

risk going to jail for perjury. Id. at 41. We find the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in concluding that, while Mr. King’s identity of Appellant as the 

shooter was not entirely consistent throughout his interaction with the police 

and presentation of Grand Jury testimony, the “jury was in the best position 

to view the demeanor of [Mr. King] and [ ] assess [his] credibility.” Trial Court 

Opinion, filed 12/28/16, at 12 (citation omitted). 

With regard to Appellant’s assertion that Mr. King’s and Ms. Delgado’s 

trial testimony was untrustworthy since both witnesses sought leniency and/or 

feared perjury charges if they did not testify favorably for the Commonwealth, 

the jury was made aware of each witness’s criminal history, the 
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Commonwealth’s promises of leniency, and the witness’s fear of perjury. See

N.T., 2/3/16, at 31-32, 41 (Mr. King admitted he had pending criminal charges 

but that the Commonwealth had not made any promises to him in exchange 

for his testimony, and he explained his fear of being charged with perjury); 

Id. at 186-90 (Ms. Delgado admitted that, in exchange for her trial testimony, 

her DUI charge was withdrawn by the Commonwealth, she was given 

immunity for her part in transporting Appellant to New York after the murder, 

and she was hoping to gain leniency with regard to a pending theft charge, 

although the Commonwealth had not made any promises to her with regard 

to the theft charge). Appellant, in essence, asks us to reweigh the testimony 

in his favor. However, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

conclusion that the weight to be given to Mr. King’s and Ms. Delgado’s 

testimony, and the consideration of their motives to lie, was a matter of 

credibility rightfully left to the jury. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/28/16, 

at 12. 

With regard to Appellant’s claim that the jury’s verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence since there were over 50 people in the bar at the time 

of the shooting, and thus, there existed several alternate suspects, we 

conclude the jury was free to weigh and consider this fact in rendering its 

verdict. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the fact Appellant chose to commit 

the murder in “a loud nuisance bar, filled with drug buyers and sellers” does 

not require a finding that no reliable, credible eyewitness was available. See
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Appellant’s brief at 33. Here, the jury clearly chose to believe Mr. King’s 

testimony that he observed Appellant shoot the victim, as well the 

Commonwealth’s DNA evidence and other circumstantial evidence of guilt. 

With regard to Appellant’s final specific weight claim, Appellant suggests 

the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence since there is an 

absence of corroborating DNA evidence. He suggests the “DNA evidence 

showed only that [Appellant] at one point held [a] phone and [a] bag 

containing drugs.” Appellant’s Brief at 33. As with the testimonial evidence 

presented at trial, the jury was free to weigh the significance of the DNA 

evidence. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the 

finder of fact, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection 

of Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. See Clay, supra.

In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying 

his request for access to information identifying over 50 witnesses, who were 

interviewed by the police. Appellant admits that the Commonwealth provided 

him with the names of the witnesses, but he contends the trial court erred in 

failing to direct the Commonwealth to also provide “addresses or any other 

information which would [have] enable[d] the defense to contact and 

interview these people.” Appellant’s Brief at 37. 

Moreover, while Appellant admits the trial court attempted to 

accommodate Appellant by gathering all of the witnesses in open court to be 

interviewed at a pretrial hearing, Appellant contends the trial court’s approach 
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was inadequate since it “virtually assured that everyone would adhere to the 

‘street’s rule’ of silence and that no one would speak [in public] to the 

defense.” Appellant’s Brief at 41. Appellant avers the Commonwealth’s 

withholding of the witnesses’ contact information prevented his investigators 

from speaking to the witnesses in private, and thus, denied him the 

constitutional right to prepare and present a defense. He also suggests the 

trial court abused its discretion under Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 by failing to require 

the Commonwealth to reveal the addresses and other contact information of 

the eyewitnesses. 

Initially, we note that our standard of review of claims that a trial court 

erred in its disposition of a request for the disclosure of an eyewitness’s 

address and other contact information is confined to an abuse of discretion. 

See Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 801 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 provides, in relevant part, the following:

In all court cases, except as otherwise provided in Rules 230 

(Disclosure of Testimony Before Investigating Grand Jury) and 

556.10 (Secrecy; Disclosure), if the defendant files a motion for 

pretrial discovery, the court may order the Commonwealth to 

allow the defendant’s attorney to inspect upon a showing that they 

are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the 

request is reasonable:

(i) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses[.]

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(i). 

If materiality and reasonableness are proven [by the 

defendant], then the courts must balance the public interest in the 

police’s ability to obtain information against the defendant’s right 

to prepare his defense. In this connection, we consider the crime, 

the potential defense, and the significance of the [witness’s] 
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testimony....Furthermore, the safety of the [witness] can be a 

controlling factor in determining whether to reveal a [witness’s] 

identity.

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 125 A.3d 55, 63 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc). 

In the case sub judice, in addressing Appellant’s issue, the trial court 

indicated the following in its opinion:

[Appellant] filed a motion for supplemental discovery as part 

of his Omnibus Pretrial Motion. [Appellant] avow[ed] that the 

discovery provided by the Commonwealth in this case [was] 

incomplete particularly with respect to the disclosure of the 

identity of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Specifically, 

[Appellant] petition[ed] th[e] [trial] court to direct the 

Commonwealth to disclose “the names, addresses, and phone 

numbers of the witnesses interviewed by the Easton Police 

Department” in preparation of his defense.

It is unquestioned that the United States Constitution 

assures the right of an accused to be provided with an adequate 

opportunity to present his version of the incident to the trier of 

fact. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 S.Ct. 1920 (1967). 

With respect to the discovery of eyewitnesses,...there is no 

requirement that identifying information of eyewitnesses be 

disclosed by the Commonwealth under the mandatory disclosure 

provisions of Rule 573. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573; Commonwealth 

v. Hood, 872 A.2d 175 (Pa.Super. 2005). However, th[e] [trial] 

court may exercise [its] discretion and direct the Commonwealth 

to provide such information if [the court] deem[s] it material to 

the preparation of [a defendant’s] defense.

[The trial court’s] review of the record indicates that the 

Commonwealth, through informal discovery,...provided 

[Appellant] with a police report which include[d] the names of 

approximately fifty-six (56) witnesses or individuals who[] 

provided statements to the Easton Police Department in this case. 

The Commonwealth, in the interest of public safety[,]...provided 

only the witnesses’ names to [Appellant] and...removed their 

addresses and other contact information. At the time of the 

omnibus pretrial hearing, the Commonwealth stated that it “has 

concerns about the safety of the witnesses and that is not 

generalized. We have concerns.” See N.T., 6/77/15, at 13. The 

Commonwealth further recounted for [the trial] court how the 
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witnesses in this homicide case “fear for their safety.” Id. at 15. 

Specifically, “that a witness, Jennifer Delgado, was stabbed in an 

assault or stabbed by a known associate of [Appellant], that’s Carl 

Willbright[,] in large part as she was cooperating with the police 

in this homicide.” Id. at 13-14. In addition, “[Appellant] had a 

preliminary hearing scheduled...in an unrelated attempted 

homicide case,” and “there were associates of [Appellant] in 

court” and “outside the courthouse in three strategic places.” Id.

at 14. “The victim of that attempted homicide, [Eric Edwards],” 

“did not show up because he feared for his and his family’s safety.” 

Id. Under [these] circumstances, [the trial court agreed] with the 

Commonwealth’s position that, in the interests of the witnesses’ 

safety[,] [ ] their addresses and other contact information, 

including telephone number[,] [should] not be disclosed to 

[Appellant]. 

However, [the trial court] firmly believe[d] that counsel for 

[Appellant] should have access to the Commonwealth witnesses 

to present an effective defense. [The trial court] recognize[d] that 

[Appellant] [was] charged with homicide and that counsel should 

have the ability to conduct an investigation into the incident which 

led to the charges. [Appellant was] provided with the names of 

all witnesses interviewed. [The trial court] was “concerned about 

access to [defense counsel]” and, as such, [the trial court] 

directed the Commonwealth to “make the witnesses available to 

[defense counsel] and/or his investigator.” 

***

As such, [the trial court] stated on the record...that the 

Commonwealth [was] directed to make th[e] “eyewitnesses 

available for [defense counsel] for interviews.” Id. at 18.....[The 

trial court indicated that, if] some witnesses were reluctant to be 

interviewed by defense counsel for safety concerns, [the trial 

court] would direct the Commonwealth to provide a brief summary 

of that witness’s statement to defense counsel. The 

Commonwealth indicated its agreement with this procedure [while 

defense counsel argued the trial court’s solution had a “coercive 

effect” and would not yield the same information as was provided 

in the police reports.]

On September 10, 2015, [the trial court] held a hearing[4]

as discussed [supra]. All investigative resources—possible 

____________________________________________

4 We note that this Court has not been provided with a transcript pertaining 

to the September 10, 2015, hearing. 
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witnesses—were subpoenaed by the Commonwealth to show up 

for the hearing, and [Appellant] and defense counsel were able to 

ask each witness that showed up if they would like to give their 

information and speak with defense counsel privately about the 

incident. Several witnesses [ ] indicate[d] a willingness to speak 

to counsel, many did not. With respect to the discovery of 

potential witnesses, as outlined [above], there is no requirement 

that identifying information of potential witnesses be disclosed to

the Commonwealth under the mandatory disclosure provisions of 

Rule 572. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573; [Hood, supra.] Therefore, the 

Commonwealth [was] not required to disclose the identifying 

information of the witnesses, and the [trial court] provided 

[Appellant] with the ability to speak with the witnesses in a safe 

environment for all....Therefore, this argument is not grounds for 

a new trial[.]

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/28/16, at 17-19 (citations to record omitted) 

(footnotes added). 

We agree with the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis and find no abuse 

of discretion. See Washington, supra. Specifically, in ruling the 

Commonwealth was not required to disclose the addresses and other contact 

information of the witnesses, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that 

the safety of the eyewitnesses weighed against providing the information to 

Appellant. Moreover, we note that, with regard to the trial court’s approach 

of requiring the witnesses to appear in court so that defense counsel would 

have access to the witnesses, Appellant speculates that the approach was 

“doomed to fail” because the people who patronize Eddie G’s are the type of 

people who “play by the street’s rules of keeping their mouths shut.” See

Appellant’s Brief at 38-39. Such speculation, however, does not persuade us 
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that the trial court abused its discretion. See Washington, supra. Thus, we 

find no relief is due on this issue.

In his third issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting 

Jennifer Delgado to testify at trial that “acquaintances” of Appellant stabbed 

her ten times five months after the shooting, as well as killed one of her friends 

in New York. Appellant contends Ms. Delgado’s testimony constituted 

evidence of Appellant’s “prior bad acts” and was improper since there was no 

foundation for the assertion that Appellant was acquainted with the culprits. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court suggests Appellant’s issue is waived 

for appellate review since he failed to lodge an objection to Ms. Delgado’s 

testimony or otherwise present the issue to the trial court prior to the filing of 

his Rule 1925(b) statement. We agree.

The record reveals the following relevant exchange between Ms. 

Delgado and the prosecutor on direct-examination at trial: 

Q: Eventually, Ms. Delgado, you came and spoke to Detective 

Rush about the shootings?

A: Correct.

Q: Now, I think that might have been around June of 2013, does 

that sound right?

A: Yeah.

***

Q: And were you willing to speak with him then?

A: I was hesitant.

Q: Did [the detective] keep at it?

A: Yes.

Q: Were you assaulted in June?
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A: I was stabbed 10 times.

Q: Who stabbed you?

A: Acquaintances of Dolo’s.[5]

Q: Do you know did City have anything to do with the stabbing?

A: Of course he had something to do with it.

***

Q: But after that, did you start opening up even more about what 

you had observed?

A: Yes, because then they killed my friend Chi-Chi, so I wasn’t 

like—it was just like, when is enough.

Q: And that was in New York?

A: Yeah.

Q: But you’re not saying Dolo did that?

A: No. No. I’m saying his acquaintances did that, just like his 

acquaintances did that to me. 

N.T., 2/3/16, at 158-61 (footnote added). 

Our Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and our case law provide 

the well-established requirements for preserving a claim for appellate review. 

It is axiomatic that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). “The absence 

of a contemporaneous objection below constitutes a waiver” of the claim on 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Powell, 598 Pa. 224, 956 A.2d 406, 423 (2008); 

Tindall v. Friedman, 970 A.2d 1159, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2009) (“On appeal, 

we will not consider assignments of error that were not brought to the 

____________________________________________

5 Testimony at trial revealed that Appellant’s nickname was “Dolo.” 
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tribunal’s attention at a time at which the error could have been corrected or 

the alleged prejudice could have been mitigated.”) (citation omitted)). 

In the case sub judice, during trial, Appellant did not lodge an objection 

to the portions of Ms. Delgado’s testimony that he now challenges on appeal. 

Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Appellant has waived his issue 

on appeal.6 See id.

In his fourth issue, citing to the notes of testimony from February 4, 

2016, at pages 75, 80, and 98, Appellant contends the trial court erred in 

permitting Detective Rush to provide hearsay testimony to the effect that (1) 

Appellant’s girlfriend would not corroborate Appellant’s statement that he was 

at his girlfriend’s home at the time of the shooting, (2) Devol James denied 

having Appellant’s cell phone in his possession at the time of the shooting, (3) 

the rumor on the street was that Appellant had something to do with the 

shooting, and (4) Appellant’s girlfriend did not inform the police that Appellant 

was with her at the time of the shooting. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial 

court suggests Appellant’s issue is waived for appellate review since he failed 

to lodge an objection to the testimony or otherwise present the issue to the 

trial court prior to the filing of his Rule 1925(b) statement. We agree.

____________________________________________

6 Although Appellant included this issue in his Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement, 

such inclusion does not “resurrect” a waived claim. Steiner v. Markel, 600 

Pa. 515, 968 A.2d 1253 (2009).
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Initially, we note that in his fourth issue Appellant has mischaracterized 

the record. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the statements which Appellant 

is now challenging on appeal were not statements made by Detective Rush. 

Rather, at trial, the Commonwealth read into evidence excerpts from 

Appellant’s testimony before the grand jury. The statements, which Appellant 

contends were hearsay statements made by Detective Rush, were actually 

questions posed by the prosecutor to Appellant during the grand jury 

proceedings, which were then read to the jury at trial by the prosecutor.7 See

N.T., 2/4/16, at 53-108. 

In any event, the transcript reveals that Appellant neither objected to 

the specific statements at trial nor objected to the prosecutor reading to the 

jury the portion of the grand jury transcript now at issue. In fact, the record 

reveals that, during the jury trial, the prosecutor indicated he was reading 

Appellant’s testimony from the grand jury hearing “by agreement.” See id.

at 53. Also, defense counsel specifically acknowledged that the prosecutor 

was reading to the jury Appellant’s answers, as well as the prosecutor’s 

questions, from the grand jury proceedings, and he had “no objection to that, 

because I don’t think it hurt[s] our case.” Id. at 108. Accordingly, we agree 

____________________________________________

7

In reading the relevant portion of Appellant’s grand jury testimony to the 

jury at trial, the prosecutor “played the role of himself in the reading” and 

“Detective Frank Jordan....play[ed] the role of [Appellant] for the reading[.]” 

N.T. 2/4/16, at 53. 
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with the trial court that Appellant has waived his fourth issue for review.8 See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Powell, supra.

In his fifth issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his 

request to charge the jury regarding the penalty for first degree murder.

9

 

Specifically, Appellant contends that, since the defense presented evidence of 

two alternate suspects (Jaquan Frazier and Devol James), the jury should have 

been instructed regarding the “magnitude of the penalty” that Mr. Frazier and 

Mr. James faced so that the jury was “able to assess fully the alternat[e] 

suspects’ motivation to deny responsibility.”10 Appellant’s Brief at 56.

Initially, we note the following: 

[W]hen evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this Court will 

look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated 

portions, to determine if the instructions were improper. We 

further note that, it is an unquestionable maxim of law in this 

Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing 

____________________________________________

8 As indicated supra, Appellant’s inclusion of this claim in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement did not “resurrect” the waived claim. Steiner, supra.

9 We note that, as one of his proposed points for charge, Appellant requested 

the jury be instructed as to the mandatory penalty for first degree murder. 

N.T., 2/4/16, at 117. Further, following the trial court’s instruction to the jury, 

Appellant specifically objected to the omission of his proposed point from the 

instruction. Id. at 158. 

10 Mr. Frazier testified on direct-examination at trial that he did not see who 

shot the victim, and he specifically denied that he shot the victim. N.T., 

2/3/16, at 106, 109. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Frazier 

if he would ever “admit to shooting and killing someone in open court in front 

of a jury[.]” Id. at 109. Mr. Frazier indicated, “No, I wouldn’t.” Id. The 

parties stipulated that, if Devol James were to testify, he would have invoked 

his Fifth Amendment privilege. N.T., 2/4/16, at 157. 
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its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the 

law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for 

its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion or 

an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(quotation and citation omitted). 

Here, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s 

request for a jury instruction as to the punishment for first degree murder. 

This Court has held that “[t]he jury’s function is to determine guilt or 

innocence.” Commonwealth v. Carbaugh, 620 A.2d 1169, 1171 (Pa.Super. 

1993) (citation omitted). “[P]unishment is a matter solely for the court and 

not for the jury to know or consider in its deliberations.” Commonwealth v. 

Golinsky, 626 A.2d 1224, 1231 (Pa.Super. 1993) (citations, quotation marks, 

and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the length of punishment Appellant, or 

any other person convicted of first degree murder could receive, was not a 

proper scope of inquiry for the jury, whose function was to act as factfinder 

and, from those facts, determine guilt or innocence.11 Commonwealth v. 

____________________________________________

11 Moreover, even if properly within the scope of the jury’s inquiry, we are not 

persuaded by Appellant’s argument that his proposed instruction would have 

more fully assessed the alternate suspects’ motivation in denying 

responsibility, and thus, Appellant would have benefited from the instruction. 

In making its credibility determinations, the jury was free to surmise that a 

suspect may lie about his involvement in a shooting simply because he would 

not want to face the criminal charges associated therewith. Also, as the trial 

court concluded, the potential influence to the jury by way of the jury 

correlating this information regarding the potential penalties with the charges 

Appellant was facing outweighed any potential benefit to Appellant. 
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White, 504 A.2d 930 (Pa.Super. 1986). Thus, the trial court did not err in 

denying Appellant’s proposed jury instruction. 

In his sixth issue, Appellant contends the trial court erroneously imposed 

a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon him in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 

(2012). 

Appellant presents a legality of sentencing claim. 

It is [ ] well-established that [i]f no statutory authorization exists 

for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to 

correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. Issues relating 

to the legality of a sentence are questions of law[.]...Our standard 

of review over such questions is de novo and our scope of review 

is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748, 750 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations and quotations omitted).

On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. 

Alabama that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at 

the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel 

and unusual punishments.’” 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460. However, 

while the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller set forth a bright-line rule that 

mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are 

unconstitutional for juvenile offenders, it did not prevent a trial court from 
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imposing such a sentence upon an individual such as Appellant, who had 

already reached the age of eighteen at the time he committed the murder.

12

 

Appellant acknowledges that he was eighteen years old at the time he 

committed the murder; however, he argues, nevertheless, that he may invoke 

Miller because his immature and/or impulsive brain made him similar to a 

juvenile. Thus, Appellant seeks an extension of Miller to persons convicted 

of murder who were older at the time of their crimes than the class of 

defendants subject to the Miller holding. However, this Court has previously 

rejected such an argument. See Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (holding the nineteen-year-old appellant was not entitled to 

relief under Miller; rejecting argument that he should be considered a 

“technical juvenile”). Accordingly, we conclude Appellant’s issue is meritless.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/15/2017

____________________________________________

12 Appellant was born on May 25, 1994, and he committed the instant murder 

on February 9, 2013.