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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM DOUGHLAS

Appellant No. 697 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Dated February 22, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003070-2015

BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2016

Appellant, William Doughlas, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed by the trial court after it convicted Appellant of violating three 

sections of the Uniform Firearms Act — 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105 (persons not to 

possess firearms), 6106 (firearms not to be carried without a license), and 

6108 (carrying firearms on the public streets of Philadelphia) — for 

possessing a firearm under the seat of a vehicle in which he was riding as a 

passenger. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history of this 

case as follows:

On October 14, 2015, Appellant unsuccessfully litigated a 

Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence. On the same date, 

following a bench trial before this Court, Appellant was convicted 

of Persons Not to Possess Firearms, Firearms Not to Be Carried 

without a License, and Carrying Firearms on Public Streets in 
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Philadelphia. On February 22, 2016, upon review of the presentence investigation report and consideration of all relevant 

facts and circumstances of this case, this Court sentenced 

Appellant to three (3) to seven (7) years’ incarceration for 

Persons Not to Possess Firearms, and imposed no further penalty 

on his remaining convictions. Appellant filed a timely Motion for 

Arrest of Judgment and/or New Trial, which this Court denied on 

February 29, 2016.

* * *

At the suppression hearing, Appellant contended that the 

police lacked probable cause to search the vehicle in which he 

was a passenger. The Commonwealth presented the testimony 

of Philadelphia Police Officer Vincent Visco. Officer Visco testified 

that on March 7, 2015, at approximately 10:00 p.m., he was on 

patrol with his partner, Officer Martin, in the vicinity of 2100 

North Marsden Street, a high crime area in Philadelphia. At said 

time and location, Officer Visco observed a red Ford Expedition 

driving eastbound on Diamond Street without any rear lights 

illuminated. Given that it was nighttime, the officers activated 

their lights and sirens to stop the vehicle, which came to a stop 

after traveling four (4) car lengths. As Officer Visco approached 

the passenger side of the vehicle with his flash light illuminated, 

Appellant quickly leaned toward the floor and then immediately 

sat back upward with nothing in his hands. Officer Visco 

testified that he had encountered that precise type of furtive 

movement dozens of times before, and it often yielded a firearm 

on the floor or under the seat. Additionally, he observed 

Appellant breathing heavily and shaking uncontrollably; when he 

asked him for identification, Appellant began stuttering and was 

unable to produce same. At that time, fearing for his and his 

partner’s safety, Officer Visco asked Appellant to step outside 

the vehicle, and placed him in the back of his squad car without 

handcuffs. He returned to the vehicle, shone his flashlight under 

the passenger seat, and observed a black semiautomatic 

handgun.

Officer Visco testified that the driver of the vehicle was 

asked for his license, registration and insurance paperwork; in 

return, he produced a non-driver’s license ID card and a vehicle 

rental agreement. Officer Visco ran the ID through his computer 

(MDT), which revealed that the male was, in fact, an unlicensed 

driver. Accordingly, he radioed for a “Live Stop” of the vehicle. 
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Significantly, neither the driver nor Appellant was listed in the 

rental agreement as an authorized user.

Appellant did not testify at the suppression hearing; nor 

did he proffer any information establishing his connection to, let 

alone authorization to use, the vehicle at issue. Based on the 

foregoing evidence, this Court denied Appellant’s motion to 

suppress, principally on the basis that he had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the area searched.

At the ensuing bench trial, after moving for incorporation 

of the above into evidence, the Commonwealth briefly re-called 

Officer Visco to the stand. He testified that when he and his 

partner activated their emergency lights, they used their 

spotlight to illuminate the stopped vehicle. Officer Visco 

additionally testified that the driver of the vehicle remained 

seated and did not move at any point; further, the vehicle’s front 

seats were “captain’s seats” separated by a large center console.

The Commonwealth thereafter introduced a certificate of 

non-licensure establishing that Appellant did not have a license 

to possess a firearm. Finally, by way of stipulation, the 

Commonwealth established that Appellant was ineligible to 

possess a firearm, having previously been convicted of a felony.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/5/16, at 1-4 (footnotes and citations omitted). The trial 

court concluded that “the evidence plainly was sufficient to sustain 

[Appellant’s] convictions,” and expressly found “the testimony of Officer 

Visco entirely credible.” Id. at 10-11. 

The trial court rendered its guilty verdicts based on the foregoing facts 

of record, and sentenced Appellant to an aggregate three to seven years’ 

incarceration. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging, 

among other issues, the weight of the evidence, which the trial court denied. 

This timely appeal followed.

Appellant presents two issues for appellate review, stated as follows:
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1. [The e]vidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter 

of law to find [Appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. The verdict rendered was against the weight of the evidence 

presented at trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

The basis for both of Appellant’s evidentiary claims is that the trial 

court “had to speculate whether Appellant constructively possessed the 

firearm and could not have been convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt based on the trial record.” Id. at 11.

Appellant was convicted of violating the following three provisions of 

Pennsylvania’s Uniform Firearms Act:

§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, 

control, sell or transfer firearms

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated 

in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, 

regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the 

criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, 

transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, 

control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this 

Commonwealth.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).1

§ 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who carries 

a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm 

 

1 The parties stipulated that Appellant was previously convicted of a felony 

listed in Section 6105(b), which made him ineligible to possess a firearm 

under Section 6105(a)(1). N.T., 10/14/15, at 78-79.
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concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or 

fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued 

license under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

§ 6108. Carrying firearms on public streets or public 

property in Philadelphia

No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time 

upon the public streets or upon any public property in a city of 

the first class unless:

(1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or

(2) such person is exempt from licensing under section 6106(b) 

of this title (relating to firearms not to be carried without a 

license).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6108.

Possession of a firearm is an essential element of Sections 6105, 6106 

and 6108. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 757 

(Pa. Super. 2014); Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). “Possession can be found by proving actual possession, 

constructive possession or joint constructive possession.” Commonwealth 

v. Heidler, 741 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. Super. 1999). Constructive possession 

is an inference arising from a set of facts that possession of the contraband 

was more likely than not. Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 

(Pa. Super. 2004). In order to prove that a defendant had constructive 

possession, “the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had both 

the ability to consciously exercise control over it as well as the intent to 

exercise such control.” Commonwealth v. Harvard, 64 A.3d 690, 699 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). “An intent to maintain a conscious dominion may be inferred 
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from the totality of the circumstances, and circumstantial evidence may be 

used to establish a defendant’s possession.” Id. In the absence of direct 

evidence in this case, the Commonwealth was required to establish that 

Appellant had constructive possession of the firearm found underneath his 

seat in the vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 831 A.2d 607, 610 

(Pa. Super. 2003) (holding where contraband a person is charged with 

possessing is not found on the person, the Commonwealth is required to 

prove constructive possession).

Regarding our standard of review as it pertains to Appellant’s 

sufficiency argument, this Court recently explained: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 A.3d 759, 767 (Pa. Super.) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 145 A.3d 725 (Pa., Sep. 6, 2016). We review a 
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conviction based on circumstantial evidence under the same standard as one 

based on direct evidence, that is, a decision by the trial court will be 

affirmed “so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 818 A.2d 

514, 516 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Instantly, Officer Visco testified to initiating a traffic stop and 

encountering Appellant in the City of Philadelphia. N.T., 10/14/15, at 18. 

Appellant was seated in the right front passenger seat. Id. at 20. The 

officer “saw the front passenger, [Appellant], lean forward toward the floor 

and sit back upward . . . in a hurried motion.” Id. at 22. He described 

Appellant as “nervous [and] breathing heavily. His hands were shaking. . . . 

He was stuttering.” Id. at 23. Officer Visco explained:

When [Appellant] bent forward and sat back up in a 

hurried motion, and then when I approached the passenger’s 

side and observed there was nothing in his hands, I didn’t feel 

comfortable due to the high crime area we were in and also due 

to him sitting – while [I was] walking up, [Appellant was] 

reaching forward, being out of sight and sitting back upward, I 

didn’t feel safe for me or my partner.

Id. at 24. Officer Visco continued:

I had him step out of the vehicle. I did a pat down for 

weapons. Then I placed him back in my vehicle. Then I walked 

back up to the car. I used my flashlight to shine it underneath 

the seat, at which time I observed – looking at my notes, Your 

Honor – it was a High-Point black semiautomatic handgun, a []9 

millimeter with a serial number of 026313.

It was loaded with six live rounds in the magazine and one 

additional chamber round, which I later placed on property 

receipt no. 3169685. The male did not have a permit to carry.
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Id.

Despite Officer Visco’s testimony, Appellant maintains that the 

evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because “there was a 

lack of evidence concerning the possession of the firearm.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 16. Citing Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 453 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super. 

1982) (per curiam), Appellant asserts that his case also warrants reversal 

because there was no evidence presented about Appellant’s breathing and 

stuttering, “exactly where the gun was actually found,” and “whether the 

weapon was registered to an owner,” as well as “no investigation done to 

see who the individual was that actually rented the vehicle,” and “no 

testimony of an investigation of the driver of the vehicle.” Id. at 16-17.

In Boatwright, the defendant was seated in the front passenger seat 

of a vehicle in which two other people were riding. Boatwright, 453 A.2d

at 1058-59. When the vehicle was stopped, police officers observed the 

defendant move toward the left rear seat of the vehicle. Id. After the 

occupants exited the vehicle, police officers found a gun on the left rear floor 

of the vehicle. Id. The defendant was found guilty of possession, but on 

appeal, this Court reversed, finding that the defendant’s mere presence in 

the car with two other individuals, one of whom was sitting in the rear 

passenger seat, was not enough to prove possession. Id. 

Boatwright is distinguishable because Appellant was sitting in the 

passenger seat directly above where Officer Visco found the gun, was 
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separated from the driver by the vehicle’s large center console, and was 

hunched over the passenger seat while Officer Visco approached the vehicle. 

Accordingly, viewing the record in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the trial court, 

as the finder of fact, to determine that Appellant had the intent and ability to 

control the firearm that was found under the passenger seat, and thus to 

establish that Appellant was in constructive possession of that firearm. That 

is all that was necessary to prove the element of possession relative to 

Appellant’s firearms convictions. See Harvard, 64 A.3d at 699; Johnson, 

818 A.2d at 516. Appellant’s first claim that the Commonwealth failed to 

present sufficient evidence to prove his constructive possession of the 

firearm therefore is without merit.

Appellant’s second claim is that he is entitled to a new trial because 

the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We review such a claim 

to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined 

that the weight of the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. 

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054–55 (Pa. 2013). In order for 

an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, “the 

evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks 

the conscience of the court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 

806 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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Appellant does not present a separate argument on this issue in his 

brief. Instead, he states that his weight of the evidence “argument is very 

similar to the above section on sufficiency, therefore it is not necessary to 

repeat, and [Appellant] ask[s] that it be incorporated into this section’s 

argument by reference.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. However, as the 

Commonwealth notes, “when an appellant fails to distinguish between a 

sufficiency and weight of the evidence claim, the weight claim is waived.” 

Commonwealth Brief at 17-18 (citing Commonwealth v. Birdseye, 637 

A.2d 1036, 1039-1040 (Pa. Super. 1994)).

Even had Appellant not waived his weight claim, we would find no 

support for Appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence of his constructive possession of the firearm. The 

evidence recounted in the preceding section of this brief provides a strong 

nexus between Appellant and the firearm Officer Visco discovered under the 

passenger seat of the vehicle where Appellant was seated. Nothing about 

the evidence is “so tenuous and vague” as to “shock the conscience.” 

Sullivan, 820 A.2d at 806. 

We therefore affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2016