In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 21-2874, 21-3056 & 21-3382 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

DERRICK GRANGER, CLIFFORD R. KING JR., and ERIC WALKER, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:20-cr-00097-JRS-DLP — James R. Sweeney II, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 15, 2023 — DECIDED JUNE 9, 2023 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Derrick 

Granger, Clifford King, and Eric Walker of conspiring to distribute heroin and methamphetamine in and around Indianapolis, Indiana. The jury also convicted them of some firearms 

offenses. The judge sentenced Granger and King to 360 

months’ imprisonment and Walker to 330 months. They present seven issues on appeal. Five of these do not require 
2 Nos. 21-2874, 21-3056 & 21-3382

discussion, beyond saying that we agree with how the district 

judge handled them. We address the other two in this opinion.

Defendants’ principal argument is that the court should 

have struck Juror 70 for cause. He was subject to voir dire examination after all three defendants had exhausted their peremptory challenges. The judge asked a group of potential jurors whether any of them thought that a law enforcement officer’s testimony should receive extra weight. Juror 70 raised 

his hand. The judge asked what “greater weight” meant to 

him, and he replied:

Well, being a retired police officer with 30 years of service, the vast 

majority of police officers in my experience take their oath very, 

very seriously; and I can’t think of too many times or any times 

actually in my entire career where I have seen or heard of evidence being presented by a police officer that wasn’t the straightup truth.

So yes, police officers lie. We’ve all seen coverage of those kind of 

things; but in the day-to-day actions, the vast majority of them 

take their, as I said, oath very, very seriously; and I’m inclined to 

give them the benefit of the doubt if they say something.

Juror 70 added that he evaluated honesty on the “totality of 

the circumstances and the evidence”, and if that evidence contradicted a person’s statements then “that person is not being 

honest.” He allowed that factual mistakes “happen[] to everybody, including police officers, especially in quick-timeframe type of situations”. Indeed, Juror 70 said that he had 

“done it myself.” This followed:

THE COURT: ... [S]o the question is, can you listen to the testimony here, judge each witness by their testimony, how they present themselves, how it aligns with the other evidence, so on and 

so forth?
Nos. 21-2874, 21-3056 & 21-3382 3

JUROR 70: Yes, because I think the truth is the most important 

thing here.

THE COURT: So you can do that with an open mind?

JUROR 70: Yes, sir.

Defendants asked the judge to strike Juror 70 for cause. Before 

ruling, the judge asked some additional questions:

THE COURT: I think you said to me that you can afford these defendants their presumption of innocence; is that right?

JUROR 70: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you can judge each witness by their testimony?

JUROR 70: I have had a lot of experience with witnesses and informants and their credibility ranges. So you just have to just take 

it as face value and make the best decision you can as to their credibility.

THE COURT: What does that mean?

JUROR 70: You have the full spectrum of people being straight up 

honest, and you have some that couldn’t tell the truth if you were 

dangling them over the edge of a cliff. So you have to just judge 

what they’re saying and whether it meets the logic test and if it 

backs up what other people are saying and what evidence says.

Basically, what I’m saying is there’s no presumption with any of 

them. You’ve got to approach each one with a completely open 

mind because you’ll get a full range there.

Defense counsel asked Juror 70 whether he would give 

greater weight to testimony by police officers. This ensued:

JUROR 70: I would like to believe I’m fair and take everything at 

face value; but I mean, it’s what I’ve done for over 30 years, and 

I’m still involved in an ancillary role as a rider. So I would say that 

police officers—I look at them as coming in veaed already. The 

guys and gals that aren’t doing a good job generally get taken care 

of preay quickly.
4 Nos. 21-2874, 21-3056 & 21-3382

And again, I go back to it’s an oath and it’s a calling. So I have to 

look at it from that regard, whereas other people testifying, they’re 

a witness or a victim or whatever. So they have maybe a liale different motivation.

So again, the overarching thing here is I want to be fair and honest; 

but being completely and uaerly honest, it’s hard to disassociate 

myself from what I did for a long, long time.

Defense counsel asked one more question:

[QUESTION]: So I mean, you know, you can’t put your experience and training aside. We all get that. So is it fair to say you 

would probably be more inclined to believe a police officer than 

you would be a civilian witness who you know nothing about?

JUROR 70: Well, if you want an honest answer, yes, sir.

The judge then denied the motion to disqualify Juror 70, remarking that he had promised to keep an open mind when

evaluating all witnesses’ testimony. The judge observed that 

he understood Juror 70’s use of the word “vefed” to mean 

that officers are subject to background checks, not that police 

officers take tests to ensure that they invariably tell the truth. 

The judge summed up: “I think that he has been honest and 

has said that he will be fair.”

Appellants ask us to discard the district judge’s conclusion 

and make an independent (“de novo”) decision about Juror 

70’s suitability. Our decisions say, to the contrary, that deferential review is appropriate. See, e.g., Thompson v. Altheimer & 

Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2001). That approach is 

wise. The district judge can hear the prospective juror’s tone 

of voice, which can help make a reliable assessment of honesty. A transcript lacks that information. The district judge 

can see the prospective juror’s facial expressions and body 

language. These, too, are valuable when assessing how a person will behave, but they are missing from the appellate 
Nos. 21-2874, 21-3056 & 21-3382 5

record. A court of appeals could not do befer than a district 

judge in evaluating whether a prospective juror not only 

promises to keep an open mind but also is likely to keep that

promise. Some people may think they will keep such a promise but are fooling themselves. The cues available during a live 

colloquy may help separate those who will keep the promise 

from those who can’t or won’t. The perspective available on a 

wrifen record is less helpful in making that decision.

Appellants have a separate legal argument: that a prospective juror’s assurances must be the last thing he says. They 

recognize that Juror 70 made an unequivocal promise to evaluate all testimony appropriately, but they observe that this 

was not his final word. Instead, while answering a question 

from defense counsel, Juror 70 conceded that he would be inclined to give more weight to a police officer’s testimony than 

to that of a witness he knew “nothing about.” That was his 

final word (no one asked him any more questions) and, appellants insist, falls short of the necessary assurance.

Some language in Thompson could be read to imply a lastin-time requirement for evaluating the statements of a prospective juror. The opinion mentions that the “last thing” a 

prospective juror mentioned was that an issue may cloud her 

judgment. 248 F.3d at 626. It observed that the judge should 

have followed up but didn’t, and that if the prospective juror 

had “finally given unequivocal assurances” the judge would 

have been entitled to credit them. Ibid. But these passages do 

not announce (or even consider) a last-in-time rule; they are 

instead descriptions of what happened. Other decisions consider everything the prospective juror said, without any suggestion that only the final statement mafers. See, e.g., Griffin 

v. Bell, 694 F.3d 817, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2012). Wesley v. Pfister, 
6 Nos. 21-2874, 21-3056 & 21-3382

659 Fed. App’x 360, 363 (7th Cir. 2016), deems the holistic approach so well established that it resolves a contest in a nonprecedential order, observing that a prospective juror’s “expression of doubt” in response to defense counsel’s questioning did not require her exclusion when “[s]he had previously answered unequivocally to the court’s questions that 

she understood that the case of her relative’s murder had 

nothing to do with [defendant].” That’s the same sort of sequence that happened in today’s proceeding.

It is not appropriate to read descriptive language in

Thompson as establishing a per se final-answer rule. The norm 

in this circuit has been, and remains, that a district judge may 

take into account everything a potential juror says when deciding whether that person can be impartial. We do not see 

any clearly erroneous factual finding or abuse of discretion in 

the district judge’s resolution of these defendants’ objections 

to the seating of Juror 70. This was undoubtedly a closely balanced situation; other judges might have granted the request 

to remove Juror 70 for cause, given the equivocation in several 

of his statements. But Juror 70 also recited the correct standard, and the district judge was entitled to find that he possessed enough self-awareness and honesty to carry out his 

promises.

The only other argument we need consider concerns the 

propriety of Walker’s sentence. The district judge deemed 

him accountable, under the relevant-conduct Guideline, for 

all drugs that the conspiracy as a whole distributed during 

Walker’s time as a participant. Guideline 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) provides that, for jointly undertaken criminal activity, each participant is accountable for “all acts and omissions of others 

that were—(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken 
Nos. 21-2874, 21-3056 & 21-3382 7

criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, 

and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity”. The district judge made findings (i) and (ii) but 

not finding (iii). He did not address what conduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to Walker. That omission requires a remand for resentencing.

The judgments of conviction are affirmed, as are the sentences of Granger and King. Walker’s sentence is vacated, and 

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.