UN IT ED ST AT ES CO UR T O F A PP EA LS FO R V ET ER AN S C LA IMS

N O . 04-0452(E)
R OBERT J. KI DDEY , A P P EL LA NT ,

V
. E RI C K. S HI NS EK I , S ECR ETA RY OF V ETER A N S A FF AI RS , A PP ELL EE
.
On Ap pe llant' s App lic ati on

fo r A tto rne y F ees an d E xp en ses
(Decided February 12, 2009)

Ke nn eth M. C

ar pe nte r , o f T op ek a, Kans as, wa s o n th e p lea din g f or t he ap pe llant. Paul J. Hutter , G en era l C ouns el; R. Ra nd all Ca mp be ll , A ssi stant G en era l C ouns el; Br ian B. Rippel, Deputy AssistantGeneral Counsel; and Br ian P . T ier ne y , all of W ash ing ton , D. C. , w ere on the ple ad ingfo r th e ap pe lle e. Before GREEN E, Chief Judge , and MOORMAN and LA NCE, Ju dges. MOORMAN, Judge : The appellant , Robert J. Kiddey, filed an applicat ion for an award of $8 ,5 44 .3 9 in

att orn eyfe es and

expe nses pursu ant to the Eq ua l A cce ss t o Jus tic e A ct ( EA JA ), 28 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d). On June 16 , 2 00 8, the Co urt iss ue d an o pin ion

that di sm iss ed

the EA JA applicat ion as untimely because i t was filed m ore than 30 days after the C ourt's October 23, 2006, judgment became f

inal and notapp ea lable. Se e 28 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d)(1 )(A ); 3 8 U .S .C . § 72 91 (a)

. Th e Co urt

held that its jud gm ent bec am e fi na l on March 5, 20 07 , wh enthe U .S . Co urt of Ap pe als fo r t he F ed era l C irc uit

(F ed era l C irc uit ) ha d g ranted the ap pe llant' s uno pp os ed m oti on to w ith draw the ap pe al t o th e F ed era l C irc uit , be cau se th e Fe de ral Circ uit ' s ord er w as " fi na l an d n ot a pp eal ab le"
un de r 28 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d)(2)(G). The a pp ell ant su

bs eq ue ntl y f ile d a m oti on fo r pane l
rec on sid eratio n o f this Co urt ' s o pin ion in l ight of

the Fe de ral Ci rcu it' s Ju

ne 27 , 2 00 8, de cis ion

in Im presa Co ns tru

zio ni G eo m. Do me nic o G arufi v. United S tates , 5 31 F. 3d

13 67 (F ed . C ir. 20 08 ). Th e S ecr etary f

ile d a res po ns e in

wh ich he co nc ed es t

hat Im presa is persuas ive authority, does not op po se t he C ourt' s rec on sid eratio n, and n ote s no o pp os iti on

to an EA JAp aym ent up to t he req ue ste d2

am ount. Fo r th e re aso ns that f oll ow , th e Court wi ll g rant th e ap pe llant' s m oti on fo r pane l
rec on sid eratio n, wi thd

rawits June 16 , 2 00 8, op ini on , and iss ue thi s o pin ion

in its st ead . In

thi s n ew opinion, the Courtholds that t he EAJA application i s timely and grants t he EAJA application.

I. BACKGROUND The Court must satisfy itsel f that the EAJA applicat ion was timely filed. The que stion presented i s wh end id thi s Co urt ' s jud gm ent b eco m e fi na l s o as to co mm en ce the 3 0-d ay period within which to file an EAJA applicat ion? On October 23, 2006, this Court affirmed, in part, and reversed, i n part, a December 17, 2003, Board of Vet erans' Appeals (Board) decision. Se e K idd ey v. Nicholson , No . 0 4-4 52 , 2 00 6 W L 3 00 13 1 (V et. Ap p. Oc t. 2 3, 20 06 ). O n N ov em be r 16 , 2 00 6, thi s Co urt enter ed jud gm ent. T he rea fter, the appell ant ap pe ale d th is C ourt' s d eci sio n to the Fe de ral Ci rcu it, wh ich

granted , in a March

5, 20 07 , ord er, the a

pp ell ant' s m oti on

to v olu ntaril y d ism iss his appeal. Kiddey v. Nicholson , 21 9 Fe d. App ' x. 9 84 (F ed

. Ci r. 20 07 ). T he F ed era l C irc uit's dock et in t his cas e (N o. 07 -71 01 ) re fl ect s th at the ap pe llant' s m oti on to v olu ntaril y d ism iss his ap pe al w as
un op po sed

bythe Se cre tar

y. The dism iss al o rde r w as a lso iss ue d a s th e F ed era l C irc uit ' s m an date on March 5, 2007. Se e F ED
. C IR
. R. 41 ("An ord er di sm iss inga case on co ns ent . . . w ill co ns tit

ute the man date. "); seeals o F ED
. R. A PP
. P. 4 1(c ) ( "T he m an date is ef fe cti ve whe n iss ued."). On Mar ch21 , 2 00 7, thi s C ourt e nte red m an date o n it s d oc ke t. Th e ap pe llant, thr ou ghco un sel , s ub m itt ed his EA JAap pli cat ion

on Ap ril 12 , 2 00 7, m ore than 30 days after t he Mar ch 5, 2007, Federal Cir cuit orderthat dismissed the c ase, but pri or to the expirati on of the 90-day period for fili ng a petiti on for certior ari to t he U. S. S upreme Court, i.e., June 3, 20 07 . T he app ell ant arg ue s that the pla in l an gu ag e o f 3 8 U .S .C . § 72 91 (a) (1) su pp ort s h is po sit ion that th e expir ati on

of the tim e f

or f ili nga p eti tio n f

or certiorari at t he Su

pre m e C ourt i s dispositi ve of the issue and t hat this Court 's judgment, therefore, became final on June 3, 2007. Re ply at 3- 7 (c iti ng38 U. S. C. § 7 29 1(a )(1 ) (p rov idi ngthat whe n a de cis ion of thi s C ourt i s ap pe ale d to and a ffirm ed or dismissed by the Fede ral Circui t, this Court 's decision becomes final "upon the expirati on of the time all owe d forfi li ng a petiti on for certior ari with t he Supreme Court of the Un ite d S tat es" )). He argue s th at h is E AJA a pp lic ati on

wa s f ile d n ot l ate , b ut pre m aturel y, be cau se the time for f

iling his EAJA applicat ion did not run until 30 days after June 3, 2007. Reply at 4-5. Although the Secre tary ini tiall y argued that this Court's judgment became final upon the entry of theT h e U .S . S u p re m e C o u rt h a s h e ld th a t t h e E A JA "p ro v isio n ' s 3 0 -d a y d e a d lin e fo r fe e a p p lica tion s a n d it s 1 appl i cat i on- cont ent specif i cat i on s ar e no t properl y [t erm ed] ' j uri sdi ct i on al ' " but r el at e "on l y t o po st j ud gm ent pr ocee di ngs aux i l i ary t o cases al r ead y w i t hi n t he cou r t ' s adj ud i cat ory aut ho r i t y." Scar borough v. Pri nci pi , 54 1 U .S. 40 1 , 4 1 4 (20 0 4 ). 3 Federal C ir cu it 's order on Mar ch 5, 2007, the Secret ary, in res ponse to the motion for
rec on sid eratio n, co nc ed es t hat th is C ourt' s ju dg m ent be cam e f ina l on June 3, 20 07 , be cau se " ap pe al rig hts do att ach

to a vo luntar y d ism iss al o f an a

pp ealun les s expre ssl y d isc lai m ed or s pe cif ica lly prohibite d." Secreta ry's Response at 2 (cit ing Im presa , 531 F.3d at 1372).

II. ANALYS IS A. Tim eliness of EAJA Applicati on The EAJA's 30-day filing pe riod is asta tutory re quirement. Se e 28 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d)(1 )(B ). 1 Th e ac t re qu ire s th at a

pp lic ati on s th ere un de r be su bm itt ed to t he Co urt "w ith in t hir ty days o f f

ina l jud gm ent in

the act ion [. ]" 28 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d)(1 )(B ). T he actdefines "f ina l ju dg m ent" a s "a judgment that is final and notappealable ." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G). Purs uant t o Rule 39 of the Co urt ' s Ru les of P rac tic e and Pro ced ure , anapp lic ati on

for atto rne y f

ees an d e xp en ses m

us t be fi led with the Clerk of Court " not laterthan 30 days after the Court's judgment becomes final pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7291(a) (which oc curs 60 days afterentry of judgment under Rule 36) or, cons istent with Rule 41(b), upon the i ssuance of an order on consent di smissing, terminating, or remanding a case." U.S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 39(a). Our Court's Rule 41(b) i s not applic able here be cau se we d idnot iss ue the ord er o n c on sent. S ect ion 72 91 (a) co nta ins pro vis ion s re lat ingto t he date whe n a

Co urt de cis ion be co m es f

ina l, and the ap pe llant s pe cif

ica llyrel ies on sec tio n 72 91 (a) (1) in su pp ort of his po sit ion that hi s ap pli cat ion

wa s ti m ely

fi led . S ect ion

72 91 (a) (1) pro vid es, in p ert ine nt p art : (a ) A de ci si onof [ th is Cou rt ] sh al l b ec ome f in al up onth e e xp ir at io no f the ti me all ow ed fo r f ili ng , und er s ect ion

72 92 o f t

his tit le, a not ice of

ap pe al f rom su ch de cis ion , if

no su chno tic e is du ly f

ile d w ith in s uc h time. I f such a no tic e is fi led within such ti me, such a decision shall become final– (1) u po n the expir ati on

of the tim e al low ed

fo r f ili nga p eti tio n f

or c ert ior ari wi th t he Su pre m e C ourt o f t

he Un ite d St ate s, if

th e de cis ion

o f the Co urt

of Ap pe als fo r V ete ran s C lai m s is af

fi rm ed or thea pp ea l i s dis mi sse d b y th e [ Fe de ra l Circ uit

] an d n o p eti tio n fo r ce rti orar i is du ly f ile d [.] 38 U.S.C. § 7291(a)(1) (emphasis added).4

Th e ap pe llant argu es t

hat be cau se h is a

pp eal ha d be end ism iss ed b y the F ed era l C irc uit , th is Court's judgment did not become f inal under section 7291(a)(1) "unt il VA' s ti me for appeal [to the Su pre m e Co urt ] ran. " Rep ly at 7, 9-1 0. He co nte nd s th at the Se cre tar y re tai ne d th e ri ght to ap ply fo r ce rti ora

ri " at anytim e u

p unti l th e d ead lin e f

or s uc h an a

pp lic ati on ." Id. at 8. The Federal Circ uit in Im

presa ad dre sse d th e q

ue sti on of the fi na lity o f j ud gm ent f or E AJA purposes where t he Federal Cir cuit iss ued an order gr anting a motion to wi th dr aw an appeal on consent and issued m andate on the same day. Im presa , 5 31 F. 3d

at 1 36 8-6 9. Th e F ed era l C irc uit held that t he 90-day peri od for filing a petit ion for a writ of cert iorari to t he Supreme Court must be
co unted in cal cu lat ingwhe n the F ed era l C irc uit ju dg m ent be cam e "f

ina l an d n ot a

pp eal ab le" un de r 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) and tha t a judgment entered upon a voluntary dismissal of an appeal from the Co urt of F ed era l C lai m s do es no t b eco m e "f ina l" until e xp iratio n of

the tim e f or f ili nga ce rti orari petiti on. Id. at 1371. The Federal Circuit st ated: Pr ece de nt w eig hs ag ain st c reatin g a sp eci al c ate go ry f

or v olu ntary d ism iss als in cas es o rig inatin g in

the Co urt of Fe de ral Cl aim s, whe reb y it wo uld b e ne ces sar

y to de ter m ine wh eth er a pe tit ion

for cert ior ari can be fil ed

or m ight be g ranted , in

ord er to c alc ulate the pe rio d f

or f ili nganap pli cat ion

un de r th e E AJA. Takin g c og niz an ce of ruli ng s of

the C ourt an d the regi on al ci rcu its , we con clu de that a clear ru le b ett er serves the int ere sts of

lit igants an d th e co urt s, rathe r th anen co ura gin g, as h ere , sat ell ite li tig ati on

on ' fu nc tio na l' pre m ise s, ad din g c os t an d d elay whil e n ot y et reaching t he merits. We adopt a uniform rule for EAJA petiti ons in the Court of Fe de ral Cl aim s, wh ere byap pe al r ights f rom vo luntary

dis m iss als are pre sum ed unless expre ssly discl aimed or specifically pr ohibited. Id . at 1371-72. Applying t his rule, t he Federal Cir cuit concl uded that Impresa's period for filing the EA JAap pli cat ion

starte d o n expir ati on

of th e per iod

for fi lin g a pe tit ion fo r ce rti orari f

rom the fi na l judgment of the Federal Circuit

. Id. at 1 37 2. Th e F ed era l C irc uit rev ers ed the de cis ion

of th e C ourt of Federal Claims that the EAJA applic ation was unti mely and remanded f or a determination of the merits of the EAJA application. Id. Although the Feder al Circuit's discuss ion was focused on EAJA applicati ons filed in the Court of Federal Claims, we see no r eason why the Federal Circuit's interpretati on of the definition of a ju dg m ent th at i s "f

ina l and not a

pp eal ab le" fo r E AJA p urp os es, 28 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d)(2 )(G ), sh ou ld n ot a lso ex ten d to thi s C ourt, wh ich de cid es E AJA a

pp lic ati on s p urs uant t o th e sam e st atutor y pro vis ion s. W e the ref

ore ad op t th e "c lear ru le" a nd un if orm ap pro ach fo r E AJA a

pp lic ati on s in

thi s Co urt that whe re a

no tic e o f a

pp eal to the Federal Ci rcu it i s f ile d and the Fe de ral Ci rcu it i ssu es aThe C our t not es t hat t he " di smi ss al " l anguage i n 38 U

. S. C

. § 7291( a) ( 1) does not s peci f y w het her t he di smi ss al 2
con t em pl at ed b y t he st at ut e i s a volunt ary di sm i ssal or an inv o l u n t ary di sm i ssal

. Th e pl ai n l ang uag e of t he st at ut e i s, t her ef or e, no t l i mi t ed t o i nvol unt ar y di smi ss al s. The Feder al C i r cui t ' s i nt er pr et at i on of t he t er m " f

i nal and not appe al abl e" i n t he EA JA s t at ue, 28 U

. S. C

. § 2412( d) ( 2) ( G ) , i s, t her ef or e, not i ncons i st ent w i t h t he l anguage def i ni ng "f i nal " i n s ect i on 7 2 9 1 (a)(1).

T he M ar ch 5, 2007, Feder al C i r cui t di smi ss al or der gr ant ed t he appel l ant ' s mot i on t o vol unt ar i l y di smi ss t he 3 appea l and di r ect ed t hat " [ a] l l s i des s hal l bea r t hei r ow n cos t s. " Thi s al l ocat i on of cos t s w as i n ac cor dance w i t h Feder al C i r cui t R ul e 42. Feder al C i r cui t R ul e 42, " V ol unt ar y D i smi ss al , " pr ovi des , i n per t i nent par t : " A n appe al m ay be d ism iss e d o n th e a p p e llan t' s m o tio n o n term s a g re e d to b y th e p a rties o r fix e d b y th e C o u rt." T h e p ra c tice n o te a c c o m p a n y in g th e ru le p ro v id e s in p e rtine n t p a rt:
R e q u e st to W ith d r a w A p p e a l o r P e titio n . A n appel l ant or pet i t i oner m ay r eques t t o w i t hdr aw an app eal or peti t i on at any t i m e before dec i si on , and t he reque st w i l l be gra n t ed in al l but t he m ost unusua l ci r cum st ance s. A n oppos i ng par t y i s or di nar i l y expe ct ed t o cons ent t o t he w i t hd r aw al on te rm s re q u iring e a c h p a rty to b e a r it s o w n c o sts o n a p p e a l. 5 dismissal order, appe al right s from those voluntary dismissals "a re presumed unless disc laimed or sp eci fi cal ly pro hib ite d. " Im presa , 5 31 F. 3d

at 1 37 2; bu t se e Pelea v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 93, 94
n. 1 (2 00 6) (pe r curiam

ord er) (re lyi ngon

Fe de ral Ci rcu it Rule 41 an d 3 8 U .S .C . § 72 91 (a) (1) to
co nc lu de th at , b y o pe ra ti onof law, the jud gmen t of the U.S. Cour t of

Appe al s forVe te ra ns Cl ai ms (U SC AV C) be cam e f

ina l on December 1, 20 05 , th e d ate on wh ich the Fe de ral Ci rcu it i ssu ed an ord er d ism iss ingthe ap pe al o n c on sent of part ies , whic h order wa s al so iss ue d a s th e F ed era l Ci rcu it' s m an date, an d th e U SC AV C d ire cte d it s C ler k o f t he Co urt to e nte r m an date on

th e d oc ke t as of December 1, 2005), aff 'd, 49 7 F. 3d

12 90 (F ed. Cir. 2007 ); seeals o Bowers v. Brown , 8 Vet.App. 25, 27 (1995) (holdi ng that USC AVC o rder grant ing consensual motion for rem and pursuant to U.S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 41(b) was "final and not appe alable," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2 41 2(d)(2 )(G ), and

dis m iss ingEA JAap pli cat ion wh ere ap pli cation was untim ely fi led). W ith

2 the adoption of that ruling to EA JA applications in this Court, the parti es to any li tigati on before the Fe de ral Ci rcu it are n ot p rec lud ed fr om inc lud ingin any m oti on

for a vo luntar

y d ism iss al a

sp eci fi c provision expr essly prohi biting appea l rights from the voluntary dismissal. The Court holds that because ther e were no conditi ons that pre vented a part y from filing a
ce rt i o r a r i p et it io n t o the Supr eme Cou rtas to th e M ar ch5, 20 07 , o rd erof d is mis sa l, th is Cou rt 's 3 judgment became "final and not appealable ," under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)( G), upon the expiration of the period for fili ng ap et it io n for certior ari from the judgment of the Federal Circuit , and the appellant 's period for filing his EAJA applica tion star ted on expir ation of the peri od for filing a6

certior ari peti tion. Accordingl y, the ti me f orfiling a n EAJA application st arted on June 4, 2007 (June 3 was a Sunday). Th e ap pe llant' s E AJA a

pp lic ati on

wa s su bm itt ed outsi de the ap pli cat ion pe rio d. Be cau se jud gm ent be cam e f

ina l on June 4, 20 07 , th e E AJA a pp lic ati on

s ho uld have be ensu

bm itt ed be tw een June 4, 20 07 , and

Ju ly 5 , 2 00 7. Be cau se i t w as subm itted on Ap ril 12 , 2 00 7, the ap pli cat ion wa s pre m atu re. If a p rem ature EA JAapp lic ati on is not returne d to an

app ell ant, it

wi ll b e tr eat ed

as i f it had been l ater filed wit hin the appli cation per iod. Se e Mol de n v . P ea ke , 22 Vet.App. 177, 181 (2008) (ci ting March v. Brown , 7 Vet.App. 163, 16 6 (1 99 4) ). The Court"has established a procedure underwhich an E AJ A applic ation rec eived after t he underlying de cision is issued and before the . . . appeal periodh as run wi ll be marked by the Clerk of the Courtas 'received' by the Court on t he dat e itis received, and will be so docke ted; then, on t he first day of the 30-da y EAJAapplicat ion period, the Clerk will stamp the applicati on filed as of that date and will so docke t it." March , 7 Ve t.A

pp . at 16 6. Be cau se t

he que sti on

of wh enthi s C ourt' s ju dg m ent be co m es f ina l whe re the re w as a

vo luntar y d ism iss al o f an a

pp eal at t he Fe de ral Ci rcu it h ad

no t been decided

until presented i n this case, when the Court rece ived the appel lant's EAJA application i n April 2007, the procedure expl ained in Mar ch was not followed. The Court wil l now deem the EAJA application in t his cas e, rec eiv ed

on Ap ril 12 , 2 007, and

no t re tur ne d to the ap pe llant, as h av ingbe entim ely filed on June 4, 2007. Although thi s Court's docket reflects the entry of mandate on March 21, 2007, th e i ss ua nc e o f man da te is mer el y a min is te ri al actref le ct in g th atthe Cour t's ju dg mentha s b ec ome final. Se e Pe lea , su

pra ; seeals o Strouth v. Brown , 8 Ve t.A pp . 5 02 , 5 04 (19 96 ) (p er c uri am ord er) ("T he is su an ce of

m an date is a m ini ste ria l f

un cti on whic h is i rre lev ant to the tim eli ne ss o f t he EA JA applicat ion in this case."). The Courtwill dire ct t he Clerk to enter mandate nunc pr o tunc June 4, 2007, and to file the EAJA appli cation nunc pr o tunc June 4, 2007. B. EA JAAw ard Th e ap pe llant' s E AJA a

pp lic ati on

see ks $8 ,4 07 .2 6 in

attorney fees f

or 5 5. 3 h ours o f w ork at an hourly r ate of $152.03, and $137.13 in costs and expense s, for a total of fees and expens es of $8,544.39. As discussed above, Mr. Kiddey's EAJA applicati on was timely filed. The applicat ion is contentcompliant. Se e 28 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d)(1 )(A ), ( 1)( B) , (2 )(B ); Scarb or ough v. Princ ipi , 54 1 U .S . 4 01 , 4 07 -08 (20 04 ); Cullens v. Go be r , 1 4 V et. Ap p. 23 4, 23 7 (2 00 1) ( enbanc ) (E AJA applicat ion must be filed within 30 days of a final judgment and contai n (1) as ho wi ng that the7

ap pe llant i s a p rev ail ingparty , (2 ) a s howing that the appe llant i s a p arty e lig ibl e f or an award be cau se h is n et w ort

h do es no t exc eed

$2, 00 0, 00 0, (3) an

alle gatio n that the Se cre tar y' s p os iti on

wa s
no t su bs tantia llyjus tif

ied , and (4) anite m ize d s tat em ent of the att orn eyfe es and

expe ns es s ou ght). Th e S ecr etary d oe s n ot c ontes t th at an award o f f ees is ap pro pri ate in thi s cas e and has no t di sp ute d the reasonableness of the amount sought. Th is C ourt h as j uri sd ict ion to award rea so na

ble att orn eyfe es and

expe ns es p urs uant t o 28 U.S .C . § 24 12 (d) (2) (F ). Alt ho ug h "th e Co urt

has w ide disc ret ion

in t he aw ard of att orn eyfe es under the EAJ A," i t is "i ncumbent upon the Court to permit an award only of reas onable fees." Ch ess er v . We

st , 1 1 V et. Ap p. 4 97 , 50 1 (19 98 ). T he ap pe llant h as t he burde n o f d em on str ati ngthat the fees request ed are rea sonable. See Scarborough v. Nichol son , 1 9 V e t. Ap p . 2 5 3 , 2 6 1 (2 00 5); Baldridge v. Nichol

son , 1 9 V et. Ap p. 22 7, 23 3 (2 00 5). In d ete rm iningrea so na ble ne ss, the Co urt considers many factors, incl uding whether the hours clai med are unr easonable on t heir face, the difficulty of the issue pr esented, the skill required to per form the legal service, the r esults obt ained, and whether the fee sought is pe rsuasivel y opposed by the Secre tary. See Scarborough v. Nichol son , su pra ; McCormick v. Princi pi , 1 6 V et. Ap p. 40 7, 41 3 (2 00 2); seeals o H en sle y v. Ec ker

ha rt , 46 2 U.S. 424, 430 n .3 (19 83 ). I n th is c ase , th e ap pe llant' s attor ne y h as s ub m itt ed

anite m ize d f

ee statem e n t d e ta il in g th e h o urs s p e n t o nh is c a s e . T h e e xp e n s e s c la im e d i nth e a p p e ll an t' s E AJA applicat ion are re asonable, as a re the hours and hourly rat es claimed for attorney se rv ic es. Se e Baldridge , su

pra ; Sandoval v. Brown , 9 Ve t. App . 1 77 , 1 81 (1 996) (using the U.S. At to rn ey 's O ffi ce 's "L af fe y M atr ix" as an in dic ato r of pre va ili ngm ark et r ate an d ho ldi ngthat on ce a partyest ab lis he s a p rev ail ingm ark et r ate , th e o pp os ingpartyha s th e b urd enof pro du cin g e vidence to s ho w that
m ark et r ate is e rro ne ou s). Th ere fo re, the Co urt wi ll g rant th e ap pli cat ion in f ull

.

III . C ON CL US ION Ba sed on th e fo reg oin g an aly sis and a re vie w of th e parti es' p lea din gs , th e C ler k is dir ect ed to enter mand ate nun c pro tunc Jun e 4, 200 7, and to f ile the ap pe llant' s E AJA a pp lic ati on

nunc pro tunc June 4, 2007. Mr. Kidde y's EAJA application is GRANTED in the amount of $8,544.39.