J-S46039-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee : 

: 

v. : 

: 

DEBORAH McKISSICK, : 

: 

Appellant : No. 131 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on October 24, 2012 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, 

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-41-CR-0000081-2011; 

CP-41-CR-0001344-2010

BEFORE: SHOGAN, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2014 

Deborah McKissick (“McKissick”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following her convictions of theft by unlawful taking, 

receiving stolen property, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a), 3925(a), 3928(a). We affirm.

McKissick was convicted of various crimes in two concurrent cases 

involving her job as a paralegal at a law firm. In CR-1344-2010, McKissick 

used her position to have an elderly widow unknowingly sign a document 

granting McKissick Power of Attorney for the purpose of stealing from the 

widow. Following a non-jury trial, McKissick was found guilty of two counts 

each of theft by unlawful taking or disposition, identity theft, forgery, and 

theft by deception and one count of criminal attempt. 
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In CR-81-2011, two clients of the firm that employed McKissick were 

instructed to surrender their vehicle to Santander Bank, as part of their 

bankruptcy proceedings. The clients turned the vehicle over to McKissick, on 

January 11, 2010, believing she would properly deliver it to the bank. 

Instead, McKissick assumed the vehicle as her own for more than eight 

months. During this time, McKissick renewed the vehicle’s registration, 

began paying for insurance for the vehicle, and made payments to the bank 

for the vehicle until it was seized by the Pennsylvania State Police, on 

September 21, 2010. Following a non-jury trial, McKissick was found guilty 

of theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized use 

of a motor vehicle. 

For sentencing purposes, the trial court merged CR-1344-2010 and 

CR-81-2011. On October 24, 2012,1

 the trial court sentenced McKissick to a 

term of 16 to 32 months in prison for her convictions at CR-81-2011, and a 

term of 35 to 70 months in prison for her convictions at CR-1344-2010, for 

an aggregate term of 51 to 102 months in prison. 

McKissick filed a timely Notice of Appeal. The trial court ordered 

McKissick to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement. McKissick filed a 

timely Concise Statement and the trial court issued an Opinion. 

 

1

 McKissick was initially sentenced on June 18, 2012; however, both parties 

agreed that the sentence was based on incorrect calculations. The trial court 

resentenced McKissick on October 24, 2012. 
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 On appeal, McKissick raises the following question for our review: 

“Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the court’s 

guilty verdict under []CR-81-2011 for count 1, theft by unlawful taking[,] 

and count 2, receiving stolen property?” Brief for Appellant at 6 

(capitalization omitted). 

Our standard of review in sufficiency of the evidence cases is wellsettled: 

[W]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner. In that light, we decide if the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence are 

sufficient to establish the elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. We keep in mind that it was for the trier of 

fact to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility 

of witnesses. The [fact-finder] was free to believe all, part or 

none of the evidence. This Court may not weigh the evidence or 

substitute its judgment [f]or that of the fact[-]finder. 

Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted). 

McKissick first contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to 

sustain her conviction of theft by unlawful taking. Brief for Appellant 11-12. 

McKissick argues that, because the victims voluntarily turned the vehicle 

over to her with no expectation of its return, she did not withhold the vehicle 

from them, nor did she dispose of the vehicle so that they could never 

recover it. Id. at 11. McKissick concedes that the vehicle was 

misappropriated and that she did not have permission to use the vehicle. 

Id. at 12. McKissick argues, however, that the evidence is not sufficient to 
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show a permanence of her possession of the vehicle, despite her renewing 

the registration, insuring the vehicle, making payments on the vehicle, and 

possessing the vehicle for more than eight months months until it was 

seized. Id. McKissick further argues that her unlawful possession may have 

benefitted the victims because she made payments on the vehicle while it 

was in her posssession. Id. 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed McKissick’s claim and 

concluded that it is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/18/14, at 2-3. 

We adopt the trial court’s sound reasoning for the purpose of this appeal and 

affirm on this basis. See id. 

McKissick next contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to 

sustain her conviction of theft by receiving stolen property.2

 Brief for 

Appellant at 12-13.

Again, in its Opinion, the trial court addressed McKissick’s second claim 

and concluded that it is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/18/14, at 

3-4. We adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court for the purpose of this 

appeal and affirm on this basis. See id. 

 

2

 We note that McKissick purports to support her second claim by 

incorporating her prior arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence 

with regard to her conviction for theft by unlawful taking. See Brief for 

Appellant at 13 (stating “[f]or the same reasons argued, supra, the 

evidence was insufficient to establish that the vehicle was stolen from the 

[victims]”). “Incorporation by reference is an unacceptable manner of

appellate advocacy for the proper presentation of a claim for relief to the 

Superior [C]ourt of Pennsylvania.” Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 

1263, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2013). However, despite McKissick’s deficient 

argument, we have addressed the merits of the claim. 
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Judgment of Sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/20/2014 
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