ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

James D. Crum

Catherine M. Brownson

Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Brian L. Reitz

Gary R. Rom

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

In the

Indiana Supreme Court

No. 29S02-1109-CR-542

MICHAEL B. ADAMS,

Appellant (Defendant below),

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, No. 29D06-0910-CM-005841

The Honorable Gail Z. Bardach, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A02-1008-CR-00903

February 2, 2012

Shepard, Chief Justice.

The question here is whether an automobile passenger riding down the highway with a jar 

of marijuana between his legs can be found to have “used the vehicle” in committing the offense 

of possessing marijuana. We conclude that he can.
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Facts and Procedural History

In the morning hours of September 30, 2009, Indiana State Trooper Jonathan Caddell was 

driving to Marion County to patrol an Indiana Department of Transportation construction zone. 

Around 6 a.m., Caddell observed a vehicle traveling south on Interstate 69 at ninety-four miles 

per hour.

Trooper Caddell pulled the vehicle over on the right shoulder and approached it on the 

passenger’s side. Once at the window, he noticed that the passenger, Michael Adams, had 

placed his hand between the door and the seat. (Tr. at 39.) Caddell asked Adams to remove his 

hand, but Adams initially refused to do so. (Tr. at 39.) When Caddell asked a second time, 

Adams complied, but his hand was shaking visibly. (Tr. at 39.)

As he asked both Adams and the driver Jason Johnson for their identification, Trooper 

Caddell smelled raw marijuana, a scent he could distinguish from burning marijuana based on 

his training. (Tr. at 27–28, 30–31.) Caddell returned to his own vehicle to check for invalid 

licenses and outstanding warrants.

When Trooper Caddell returned to Johnson’s vehicle, he asked both occupants to exit the 

vehicle one at a time. (Tr. at 31.) He took both occupants to the back of the vehicle, placed 

them in handcuffs, and read them their Miranda rights. At that point, Johnson admitted that he 

had smoked marijuana in the vehicle that morning before meeting Adams to carpool to work. 

(Tr. at 31, 41–42.) Both Johnson and Adams denied that the vehicle contained any marijuana or 

other illegal substances. (Tr. at 31.)

Returning to the passenger side of the vehicle to perform a search, Trooper Caddell could 

see a glass Ball Mason jar on the floorboard as he looked through the passenger-side window. 

(Tr. at 31–37.) Caddell later testified that if a person had been sitting in the passenger seat, the 

jar would have sat directly between his feet. (Tr. at 39.) In his opinion, the jar was in a position 

such that Adams could have taken possession of it. (Tr. at 39.) Although Caddell was carrying a 
3

flashlight, he could see the jar without it. (Tr. at 37.) Because the jar was in plain view and 

consisted of see-through glass, Caddell could see a “green, leafy plant material” inside it. (Tr. at 

31, 39–40.) Testing later revealed that the jar contained about twenty-four grams of marijuana. 

(Tr. at 36.)

Trooper Caddell also found a large amount of money on both occupants (Adams had 

more than Johnson—a little over $2100). Caddell thought the amount of money was large 

enough to indicate the possible sale of marijuana. (Tr. at 36.)

At trial, Adams testified that he did not smell marijuana when he got into the vehicle, as 

Johnson was smoking a cigar at the time, nor did the two of them discuss Johnson smoking 

marijuana earlier that morning. (Tr. at 47–48.) Johnson testified that to his knowledge, Adams 

did not know about the marijuana in the vehicle. (Tr. at 43.)

Adams further testified that he did not notice the jar when he got into Johnson’s vehicle 

or at any other time before Trooper Caddell stopped the vehicle. (Tr. at 47.) Both Adams and 

Johnson testified that Adams got into the front seat with his backpack, and according to Johnson, 

the jar was underneath the seat. (Tr. at 43, 47.) As a rebuttal witness, however, Trooper Caddell 

testified that he could see a backpack in the back seat, but that the jar was on the floorboard in 

the front well, out from underneath the seat. (Tr. at 50.)

Acknowledging having placed his hand between the seat and the door when Trooper 

Caddell approached the passenger-side window, Adams testified that he was reaching down to 

get his identification after dropping it in between the seat and the door. He had dropped it after 

retrieving it from his backpack, anticipating the Trooper would ask for it. In contrast, Trooper 

Caddell testified that Adams did not produce his license from between the seat and the door, but 

rather handed over his license with his other hand.
4

Johnson, who had signed a pretrial diversionary agreement admitting to possessing 

marijuana, further testified that he told Trooper Caddell that the marijuana belonged to him, not 

Adams. (Tr. at 42, 45.)

The trial court found Adams guilty of possessing marijuana. At the sentencing hearing, 

the court imposed the State’s recommended sentence of 365 days in jail, with two days’ credit 

for time served and the remainder suspended to probation. In addition to imposing fines and 

administrative fees of $464, Judge Bardach suspended Adams’s driver’s license and registration 

for 180 days under Indiana Code § 35-48-4-15(a) (2008), believing that the driver’s license 

suspension statute left her no discretion in the matter even though Adams was not driving the 

vehicle. (Tr. at 55, 64–65.)

Adams appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and 

that the trial court erred by suspending his license and registration because he was not using the 

vehicle. (Appellant’s Br. at 6, 8–9, 12.) The Court of Appeals affirmed. Adams v. State, 946 

N.E.2d 630 (2011).

We granted transfer, vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Adams v. State, ___ 

N.E.2d ___ (2011) (table). The Court of Appeals correctly rejected Adams’s sufficiency claim, 

and we summarily affirm their disposition of that issue. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). We 

therefore turn to his claim under the driver’s license suspension statute.

Standard of Review

Our statutes typically afford a trial court some discretion in setting the length of a prison 

term or the amount of a fine. See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 35-50-3-2 to -4 (2008) (class A, B, and C 

misdemeanors); see also Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-4 to -7 (2008) (class A, B, C, and D felonies). In 

general, we review a challenge to a trial court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion in setting that 

length or amount. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 
5

N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision clearly contravenes the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

But to the extent that a statute leaves the court no discretion in deciding whether to 

impose a sanction once the court finds certain facts to be true, describing our standard of review 

as a search for an abuse of discretion would seem like a misnomer. Instead, as always, we 

review for clear error the court’s findings of facts that trigger the statute, and we review de novo

any questions of law in the court’s application of the statute. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); see also

Johnson v. Johnson, 920 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. 2010). Because a question of statutory interpretation 

constitutes a question of law, we review it de novo. Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011).

Using a Motor Vehicle Under the Driver’s License Suspension Statute

A person commits possession of marijuana as a class A misdemeanor if he knowingly or 

intentionally possesses marijuana. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (2008). When a defendant is 

convicted of possessing marijuana, the court must order the person’s driver’s license, existing 

motor vehicle registration, and ability to register new vehicles suspended for no less than six 

months and no more than two years if the court “finds that a motor vehicle was used in the 

commission of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-15(a). The statute leaves the court discretion 

to decide the length of the suspension, but not whether to order it.

Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion in suspending his driver’s license 

and registration because Adams was not using a motor vehicle in committing his offense. 

(Appellant’s Br. at 8–9, 12.) Instead, says Adams, he was merely riding in a vehicle owned and 

driven by Johnson. (Appellant’s Br. at 8–9, 12.) We understand this as a claim that the court 

erred as a matter of law in applying the statute to Adams at all.

In response, the State argues that finding any use of a vehicle, whether by a defendant or 

by some other party, requires the court to suspend the defendant’s driver’s license and 
6

registration. (Appellee’s Br. at 10) (“It does not matter who uses the vehicle, it [sic] just needs to 

be used.”).

Adams relies on the legislative history of Section 35-48-4-15(a) to discredit the notion

that the Legislature intended subsection 15(a) to reach people in his situation. (Appellant’s Br. at 

9–11.) Originally, the statute required a finding that “the offense is committed in a motor vehicle 

or a motor vehicle is used to facilitate the commission of the offense” and left a trial court the 

discretion to suspend a defendant’s license and registration. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-15(a) (Supp. 

1990); see also Act of March 19, 1990, P.L. 67-1990, § 13, 1990 Ind. Acts 1555, 1571–72.

But in 1991, the Legislature removed the requirement that some nexus connect a motor 

vehicle to the offense, and made the suspension mandatory simply upon conviction for the 

underlying drug offense. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-15(a) (Supp. 1991); see also Act of May 5, 1991, 

P.L. 107-1991, § 3, 1991 Ind. Acts 1976, 1982. Finally, in 2004, the Legislature inserted the 

current requirement that a motor vehicle be “used in the commission of the offense.” Ind. Code 

§ 35-48-4-15(a) (2008); see also Act of March 17, 2004, P.L. 76-2004, § 23, 2004 Ind. Acts 

1070, 1085–86.

Adams therefore argues that the Legislature intended the 2004 amendment to abrogate 

cases decided under the 1991 text and in which no nexus whatsoever connected a motor vehicle 

with the offense. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 114, 116 (Ind. 1995) (affirming 

suspension when parties stipulated no motor vehicle involved); see also Walker v. State, 661 

N.E.2d 869, 870, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming suspension when officers found marijuana 

in defendant’s pocket after arrest for barroom brawl). As a result, whereas the State argues that 

anyone’s use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the offense should require suspending a 

defendant’s driver’s license and registration, Adams argues that only the defendant’s use of a 

motor vehicle “to contribute to the conduct of [the] crime” should require that result. 

(Appellant’s Br. at 11.) From that point, Adams seems to conclude that the defendant must 

therefore either have owned or have been driving the motor vehicle for Section 35-48-4-15(a) to 

apply. (Appellant’s Br. at 11–12.)
7

We think the State’s argument goes much too far in imposing criminal liability, and 

Adams’s not quite far enough.

Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to determine and give effect to the 

Legislature’s intent. State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. 2008). The best evidence of 

that intent is a statute’s text. Id. The first step is therefore to decide whether the Legislature has 

spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. Sloan, 947 N.E.2d at 922. When a 

statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. 

Id. There is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction. Id. As a result, we 

need not delve into legislative history if no ambiguity exists. See id.

But a statute is ambiguous when it admits of more than one reasonable interpretation. 

Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc. v. Stanley, 744 N.E.2d 939 (Ind. 2001). In that case, we resort to 

the rules of statutory construction so as to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Id. For 

example, we read the statute as a whole, avoiding excessive reliance on a strict, literal meaning 

or the selective reading of individual words. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d at 1248. In a criminal 

case, we construe an ambiguous statute in favor of the defendant. State v. Turner, 567 N.E.2d 

783 (Ind. 1991) (applying rule of lenity).

Although both parties assert that Section 35-48-4-15(a) is clear on its face, (Appellant’s 

Br. at 11; Appellee’s Br. at 9), the use of “is used” in the passive voice naturally leaves open the 

question of who must use the vehicle for the statute to apply. No surprise, Adams interprets the 

phrase narrowly to include use only by the defendant, and the State interprets it broadly to 

include use by anyone.

Reading the statute as a whole instead of reading the terms and phrases in isolation 

counsels in favor of Adams’s interpretation. Indeed, Section 35-48-4-15(a) states that a trial 

court must suspend the defendant’s driver’s license and registration whenever it finds “that a 

motor vehicle is used in the commission of the offense.” It is axiomatic that criminal liability 

attaches only to conduct, so we think the use of a motor vehicle must occur in the course of the 
8

conduct that gives rise to the defendant’s criminal liability in the first place. Accomplice liability 

aside, that will generally occur only when the defendant uses the motor vehicle. We therefore 

conclude that Section 35-48-4-15(a) requires proof that the defendant used a motor vehicle, at 

least in cases in which the defendant’s liability does not turn on an accomplice theory. The rule 

of lenity only strengthens this conclusion.

But even though we agree with Adams that the driver’s license suspension statute 

generally applies only when the defendant uses a vehicle in the commission of the offense, it 

does not follow that the defendant must therefore either own or be driving the vehicle when he 

commits the offense. Indeed, the question of whether someone “uses” some object will always 

raise the question of how one can “use” it. Compare Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 

(2007) (defendant who trades controlled substances for firearm does not “use” firearm within 

meaning of statute), with Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (defendant who trades

firearm for controlled substances does “use” firearm within meaning of statute). Still, we are 

confident that thornier textual problems exist. See, e.g., In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 

1987) (grappling with whether modern, mechanized haybine constituted “mower” for purposes 

of exemption statute drafted in 1935).

Noah Webster’s successors tell us that “to use” means, among other things, “to put into 

action or service; avail oneself of; employ,” and “to carry out a purpose or action by means of; 

utilize.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1378 (11th ed. 2004). Along these lines, 

Adams’s counsel advances the rule that a defendant must therefore employ or utilize a motor 

vehicle so as to contribute to the conduct that constitutes his offense. But, as Adams’s counsel 

acknowledged at oral argument, a defendant could just as easily use the vehicle by hiding 

controlled substances in its glove box or trunk as by driving it and transporting controlled 

substances in the process. Or the defendant could use the vehicle by selling those substances out 

the window. Or the defendant could use the vehicle by selling those substances to a buyer inside 

the vehicle so as to conceal the transaction from prying eyes. In all these situations, the 

defendant would be employing or utilizing a motor vehicle for the purpose of engaging in 
9

conduct that constituted an offense involving controlled substances without actually driving or 

even necessarily owning the vehicle.

At oral argument, counsel for the State went further and asserted that a once a defendant 

enters a vehicle, his mere possession of marijuana somewhere on his person triggers the statute 

because he was using the vehicle while possessing marijuana. We caution that a showing that 

the defendant used a vehicle in committing the offense is a necessary precondition for 

suspending his driver’s license under the statute, not merely a perfunctory box to check as a 

matter of course after convicting the defendant of possession.

Indeed, it is in evaluating this particular argument of the State’s that we find reference to 

the civil forfeiture statute most helpful. The civil forfeiture statute allows the State to seize a 

motor vehicle if is “used or . . . intended for use by the person . . . in possession of [it] to 

transport or in any manner to facilitate the transportation of . . . [a] controlled substance for the 

purpose of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit” any number of different 

offenses. Ind. Code § 34-24-1-1 (2008).

We recently held that showing merely an incidental or fortuitous connection between a 

vehicle and an underlying offense was not a sufficient showing of use for the State to seize a 

vehicle under the civil forfeiture statute. See, e.g., Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1143–44

(Ind. 2011). In Serrano, the State sought forfeiture of a person’s truck based on a slight presence 

of cocaine residue on the truck’s carpet. Id. at 1140–41. We reversed the trial court’s judgment 

in favor of the State. Id. at 1141, 1143–44. In our view, the statute required that the person in 

possession used the vehicle to transport an illicit substance or item listed in the statute, and that 

he did so for the purpose of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit 

possession of that substance. Id. at 1143 (quoting Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind. 

1995)). The second requirement served to avoid forfeiture when the operator coincidentally 

possessed drug residue but was not transporting the residue or using the vehicle in any other way 

to further possession or conspiracy to possess. Id. (quoting Katner, 655 N.E.2d at 349)).
10

So we think it is with the driver’s license suspension statute. The State must demonstrate

that a defendant made more than an incidental use of a motor vehicle in committing his offense, 

but once the State makes this showing, then a trial court must order the defendant’s driver’s 

license, registration, and ability to register other vehicles suspended. The court may exercise its 

discretion only in setting the length of that suspension.

Here, under the very rule Adams proposes, Adams used the vehicle in committing the 

offense of possessing marijuana. When viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the 

evidence shows that Adams possessed a jar of marijuana by keeping the jar on the floorboard in 

front of him while he sat in the passenger seat. As a result, this is not a situation in which a 

defendant merely happened to possess a small bag of marijuana in his pocket without making 

any direct use of the vehicle to do so. Indeed, the trial court could well have found that Adams 

used the floorboard of the front well to possess the jar so Trooper Caddell would not catch him 

holding it in his hands when Trooper Caddell came to the window.

As a result, we think the court properly ordered Adams’s driver’s license, registration, 

and ability to register other vehicles suspended, as the statute left the court no discretion in the 

matter.

Conclusion

We therefore affirm the trial court.

Dickson, Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.