### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 16

‐ 1019

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA

, Plaintiff

‐ Appellee

,

v.

T ERRY N. T AYLOR

, Defendant

‐ Appellant

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 04 CR 50038

— Philip G. Reinhard

, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED A UGUST 9, 2016

— D ECIDED A UGUST 15, 2016

____________________

Before B AUER

, P OSNER

, and S YKES

, Circuit Judges

.

P OSNER

, Circuit Judge

. In 2005 the defendant had been

sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 300 months in prison for

federal gun

‐ related offenses (namely for possessing a shot

‐

gun illegally), but the sentence was later determined to be

invalid and in December of last year the defendant was re

‐

sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 176 months, even though by

that time the defendant was 54 years old, had a serious vi

‐

sion problem, and had been a model prisoner during the 1402 No. 16

‐ 1019

months that he’d been in prison before he was resentenced.

Indeed as a result of his good behavior he was credited with

having served 160 months of imprisonment, so that Judge

Reinhard’s 176

‐ month sentence was effectively a sentence of

sixteen more months in prison. The sixteen months will end

on December 16 of this year, and the defendant has already

been moved from prison to a halfway house in preparation

for his imminent release.

The 176

‐ month sentence, however little it will affect the

defendant’s incarceration, was more than double the high

end of Taylor ʹ s recalculated guidelines range of 70 to 87

months. And so, unsurprisingly, at his resentencing hearing

both the probation service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office

recommended that he be sentenced to time served. Had the

judge gone along with the recommendations, the defendant

would have been released immediately.

The judge refused to take the advice of the U.S. Attor

‐ ney’s Office and the probation service on two grounds: the

gravity of the defendant’s criminal history before the offens

‐

es of which he had been convicted in 2005 (a history mostly

predating the twenty

‐ first century) and the fact that the de

‐

fendant, while he had never threatened any officials, had

filed complaints (and one civil suit) critical of judicial behav

‐

ior by Judge Reinhard and other judges and alleging con

‐ spiracies linking judges and various other officials to griev

‐

ances the defendant had suffered decades ago. Conceivably,

Judge Reinhard supposed, the defendant might follow up

the complaints with criminal harassment upon his release.

The judge thought these two grounds predictive of the like

‐

lihood that upon release from prison the defendant will

commit further crimes.No. 16

‐ 1019 3

These were flimsy grounds. Most of the defendant’s

criminal history prior to the shotgun incident consisted of

driving offenses, and he presumably can’t drive any longer

because of his vision problem. As for pestering federal judg

‐

es (including the author of this opinion!) with seemingly

groundless complaints about how he’s been treated by the

criminal justice system, he has a constitutional right to peti

‐

tion the government for redress of grievances, though if he

becomes an utter nuisance his petitioning activity can be

reined in. He has not threatened anybody with violence or

other criminal harm, and the judge offered no adequate rea

‐

son for inferring a risk of recidivism from the contents of his

complaints. See United States v. Bradley

, 628 F.3d 394, 400 (7th

Cir. 2010) (“Due process requires that sentencing determina

‐

tions be based on reliable evidence, not speculation or un

‐

founded allegations.” (quoting United States v. England

, 555

F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2009))).

The judge did cite 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which specifies fac

‐

tors that a sentencing judge must consider in deciding what

sentence to impose, but he did not align the factors with the

defendant’s situation. So far as relevant to this case, the stat

‐

ute provides that “The court shall impose a sentence suffi

‐

cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the

purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection,” to wit

“the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seri

‐

ousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to

provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford ade

‐

quate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the pub

‐

lic from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide

the defendant with needed educational or vocational train

‐ ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most

effective manner.” (D) is obviously irrelevant. As for (A),4 No. 16

‐ 1019

nearly twelve years in prison for a crime that caused no

harm (except perhaps to frighten the person whom the de

‐

fendant supposedly brandished his shotgun at the day be

‐

fore he was arrested) should be enough to satisfy the re

‐ quirements of that subsection. And with further crimes by

the defendant unlikely, (C) falls out of the picture, leaving

(B); and again his decade

‐ plus in prison should provide ade

‐

quate deterrence to anyone thinking of emulating the de

‐

fendant’s crimes.

In sum, the district judge did not adequately justify the

sentence that he imposed and indeed based it in part on

sheer speculation. The sentence is therefore vacated and the

case remanded for another round of resentencing—we trust

it will be the last. Time is of the essence, since under the sen

‐

tence that we’re vacating Taylor could be expected to be re

‐

leased from the halfway house just four months from now.

We are therefore issuing the mandate forthwith and remind

‐ ing Taylor’s attorney that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143 he can

move the district judge, pending resentencing, to release

Taylor immediately.

V ACATED AND R EMANDED