[Cite as State v. Miller, 2015-Ohio-3529.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MARION COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 9-14-50 

 v. 

BRYAN S. MILLER, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 14CR452 

Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: August 31, 2015 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Brent W. Yager for Appellant 

 Jon L. Jensen for Appellee 
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PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the December 22, 2014 

judgment entry of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas granting 

defendant-appellee’s, Bryan S. Miller (“Miller”), motion to suppress. For the 

reasons that follow, we reverse. 

{¶2} This case stems from a January 14, 2014 traffic stop of Miller’s 

vehicle by Ohio Highway State Patrol Trooper Joshua Beynon (“Trooper 

Beynon”) after Miller failed to stop at a clearly marked stop line. As a result of 

the traffic stop, Miller was indicted on October 9, 2014 for possession of heroin in 

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6), a second-degree felony. (Doc. No. 1). 

{¶3} On November 21, 2014, Miller appeared for arraignment and entered 

a plea of not guilty. (Doc. No. 21). 

{¶4} On December 11, 2014, Miller filed a motion to suppress. (Doc. No. 

24). The State filed a response to Miller’s motion to suppress that same day. 

(Doc. No. 25). After a hearing on December 12, 2014, the trial court granted 

Miller’s motion to suppress on December 22, 2014. (Doc. No. 27). 

{¶5} The State filed its notice of appeal on December 23, 2014. (Doc. No. 

28). It raises one assignment of error for our review. 
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Assignment of Error 

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Granting the 

Defendant/Appellees’ Motion to Suppress the Traffic Stop and 

by Applying the Exclusionary Rule. 

{¶6} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by granting Miller’s motion to suppress because Trooper Beynon had 

a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Miller. In the alternative, the State 

argues that if Trooper Beynon mistakenly applied R.C. 4511.43(A) to stop Miller, 

the exclusionary rule does not apply since Trooper Beynon was acting in good 

faith because he reasonably and mistakenly applied R.C. 4511.43(A). 

{¶7} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question 

of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At 

a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, 

is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. 

See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling 

on a motion to suppress, deference is given to the trial court’s findings of fact so 

long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8, 

citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s 

conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo; and therefore, we 

must decide whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing 

State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997). “De novo review 
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is independent, without deference to the lower court’s decision.” State v. 

Robertson, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-14-16, 2015-Ohio-1758, ¶ 17, quoting State v. 

Hudson, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-38, 2013-Ohio-647, ¶ 27. 

{¶8} Because the facts are not in dispute, we proceed directly to reviewing 

de novo the trial court’s conclusion that Trooper Beynon did not have a reasonable 

articulable suspicion to stop Miller. 

{¶9} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 

I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution generally prohibit warrantless searches and 

seizures, and any evidence that is obtained during an unlawful search or seizure 

will be excluded from being used against the defendant. State v. Jenkins, 3d Dist. 

Union No. 14-10-10, 2010-Ohio-5943, ¶ 9; State v. Steinbrunner, 3d Dist. 

Auglaize No. 2-11-27, 2012-Ohio-2358, ¶ 12. 

Neither the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor 

Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution explicitly provides that 

violations of its provisions against unlawful searches and seizures 

will result in the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of such 

violation, but the United States Supreme Court has held that the 

exclusion of evidence is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment. 

Jenkins at ¶ 9, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961) and 

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). 
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{¶10} “A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and implicates the protections of 

the Fourth Amendment” but “‘is constitutionally valid if an officer has a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, 

or is about to commit a crime.’” State v. Dillehay, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-12-07, 

2013-Ohio-327, ¶ 13, citing State v. Johnson, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-07-43, 

2008-Ohio-1147, ¶ 16; State v. Aldridge, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-13-54, 

2014-Ohio-4537, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 

2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 7. “The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘reasonable 

articulable suspicion’ as ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 

rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an 

individual’s freedom of movement].’” State v. Shaffer, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 

11-13-02, 2013-Ohio-3581, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 

(1988). “In determining whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists, a 

reviewing court must look to the totality of the circumstances.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 

14, citing State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991). “A police officer’s 

testimony alone is sufficient to establish reasonable articulable suspicion for a 

stop.” State v. McClellan, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-21, 2010-Ohio-314, ¶ 38, citing 

State v. Claiborne, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19060, 2002-Ohio-2696. 

{¶11} In addition to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity, “[p]robable cause is certainly a complete justification for a traffic stop,” 
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but it is not required to justify a traffic stop. Mays at ¶ 23. “Probable cause” is a 

stricter standard than “reasonable and articulable suspicion” and subsumes 

“reasonable and articulable suspicion.” Id., citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 

405, 411 (1993). Accordingly, “an officer who witnesses a traffic violation 

possesses probable cause, and a reasonable articulable suspicion, to conduct a 

traffic stop.” State v. Haas, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-10-15, 2012-Ohio-2362, ¶ 16, 

citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002). See also 

Mays at ¶ 24. 

{¶12} Here, Trooper Beynon stopped Miller for violating R.C. 4511.43(A), 

which provides, in relevant part: 

Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every 

driver of a vehicle * * * approaching a stop sign shall stop at a 

clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk 

on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point 

nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of 

approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. 

(Emphasis added.) Because the parties dispute whether Miller stopped at a clearly 

marked stop line under R.C. 4511.43(A), we must determine what is required of a 

motorist under R.C. 4511.43(A). We review de novo the interpretation of a 

statute. Robertson, 2015-Ohio-1758, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Brennco, Inc., 3d Dist. 
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Allen No. 1-14-24, 2015-Ohio-467, ¶ 6, citing State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 

339, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 9 and State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 

2013-Ohio-4010, ¶ 9; State v. Thornsbury, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 12CA9, 

2013-Ohio-1914, ¶ 8. 

{¶13} “‘“The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give 

effect to the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.”’” Robertson at ¶ 18, 

quoting Thornsbury at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio606, ¶ 9. See also Brennco, Inc. at ¶ 6. “To determine the legislative intent, we 

first look at the language of the statute itself and if the language is clear and 

unambiguous, we apply it as written and no further construction is required.” Id., 

quoting Brennco, Inc. at ¶ 6, citing Straley at ¶ 9 and Pariag at ¶ 11. 

{¶14} However, “[a] statute is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to 

more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id., quoting Thornsbury at ¶ 8, citing 

State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513 (1996). “Only if 

a statute is unclear and ambiguous, may we interpret it to determine the 

legislature’s intent.” Id., quoting Thornsbury at ¶ 8, citing State v. Chappell, 127 

Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, ¶ 16. See also State v. Black, 142 Ohio St.3d 

332, 2015-Ohio-513, ¶ 38 (“If a statute is ambiguous, ‘courts seek to interpret the 

statutory provision in a manner that most readily furthers the legislative purpose as 

reflected in the wording used in the legislation.’”), quoting Clyde at 513. 
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{¶15} If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of 

the legislature, may consider among other matters: 

(A) The object sought to be attained; 

(B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted; 

(C) The legislative history; 

(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws 

upon the same or similar subjects; 

(E) The consequences of a particular construction; 

(F) The administrative construction of the statute. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 1.49. 

{¶16} The Revised Code does not define “at” or what it means to stop at a 

clearly marked stop line. “In the absence of a definition of a word or phrase used 

in a statute, words are to be given their common, ordinary, and accepted 

meaning.” Black at ¶ 39, citing Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231 (1948), 

paragraph five of the syllabus. 

{¶17} There is little guidance available regarding the common, ordinary, 

and accepted meaning of what it means to stop at a clearly marked stop line. In 

particular, the Supreme Court of Ohio has not addressed the proper interpretation 

of R.C. 4511.43(A) or what it means to stop at a clearly marked stop line. The 

current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary also does not define “at.” However, 
Case No. 9-14-50 

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“at” is defined by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as “used as a function 

word to indicate presence or occurrence in, on, or near.” (Emphasis added.) 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 77 (11th Ed.2009). Stopping “in, on, or 

near” can mean a multitude of things. Accordingly, we conclude that R.C. 

4511.43(A)’s requirement that a motorist stop at a clearly marked stop line is 

reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. 

{¶18} That stopping at a clearly marked stop line is reasonably susceptible 

to more than one interpretation is demonstrated by the split of courts on the issue. 

In interpreting nearly identical stop-sign statutes, some courts have concluded that 

so long as a driver stops on or near a clearly marked stop line, he or she is in 

compliance with the statute. See, e.g., State v. Drushal, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 

13CA0028, 2014-Ohio-3088, ¶ 12, abrogated on other grounds by Heien v. North 

Carolina, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014); City of Olathe v. McGregor, Ks.App. 

No. 108, 316, 2013 WL 5870040, *3 (Oct. 25, 2013); Mumper v. State, Tx.App. 

No. 05-08-00141-CR, 2009 WL 201142, *2 (Jan. 29, 2009). Other courts have 

concluded that a driver must stop before any part of his or her vehicle crosses a 

clearly marked stop line. See, e.g., People v. Wood, 379 Ill.App.3d 705, 708-709 

(2008); U.S. v. Mack, D.Vt. No. 5:14-cr-28, 2014 WL 7140604, *8, fn. 6 (Dec. 12, 

2014); U.S. v. Smith, M.D.Fla. No. 2:06-cr-42-FtM-29SPC, 2006 WL 2226313, *7 

(Aug. 3, 2006); State v. Daniels, 158 So.3d 629, 630-631 (Fla.2014); People v. 
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Binkowski, 157 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 6 (2007); State v. Denner, 298 Wis.2d 249, 

726 N.W.2d 357, ¶ 7, fn. 2 (2006). Although this court has not specifically 

defined what it means to stop at a clearly marked stop line, we previously affirmed 

a stop-sign violation in State v. Rannes where the arresting officer testified that 

Rannes “‘made an improper stop’” because “she ‘went past the clearly marked 

stop line in the roadway’” and assumed in State v. Aldridge that Aldridge’s failure 

to “stop before a marked stop line” was a violation of R.C. 4511.43(A) to justify 

the arresting officer’s stop and detention of Aldridge. State v. Rannes, 3d Dist. 

Logan No. 8-02-12, 2002-Ohio-4691, ¶ 39-40; Aldridge, 2014-Ohio-4537, at ¶ 2, 

5, 10. 

{¶19} Because we conclude that the statute is unclear and ambiguous, we 

must apply the principles of statutory interpretation to determine what R.C. 

4511.43(A) requires of a motorist. See Black, 142 Ohio St.3d 332, 

2015-Ohio-513, at ¶ 45. To determine the General Assembly’s intent, we will 

consider the consequences of a particular construction of the statute, the object 

sought to be obtained by the statute, and the administrative construction of the 

statute. R.C. 1.49(A), (E), (F). 

{¶20} We conclude that the General Assembly did not contemplate that 

stopping astride—where any portion of a vehicle extends across—a clearly 

marked stop line would constitute compliance with R.C. 4511.43(A) and hold that 
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a motorist must stop his or her vehicle before the front-most portion of the vehicle 

breaks the plane of the outermost edge of a clearly marked stop line. In other 

words, to comply with the statute, a motorist must stop his or her vehicle before 

any portion of his or her vehicle crosses the edge of the stop line that is furthest 

from the front-most portion of his or her approaching vehicle. 

{¶21} First, the consequences of interpreting “at” under R.C. 4511.43(A) to 

permit a motorist to stop on or near a clearly marked stop line does not readily 

further any legislative purpose because “[i]f a vehicle stops ‘at’ the stop line by 

straddling it, the line does not mark a definite stopping point; it marks a range of 

stopping points that varies with the length of a particular vehicle involved.” 

(Emphasis added.) Wood, 379 Ill.App.3d at 709. In crafting R.C. 4511.43(A), it 

is illogical that the General Assembly would want to establish a range of stopping 

points for a motorist as opposed to a definite stopping point. This point is best 

described by the Illinois Court of Appeals in Wood: 

In the case of a relatively small passenger automobile, it may not 

make much difference, in terms of road safety, whether the vehicle 

stops behind the line or astride it. However, the vehicles that travel 

on * * * roads come in all shapes and sizes. The trial court’s 

interpretation becomes significantly more problematic if applied to a 

40-foot-long bus that could project well into an intersection before 
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its rear wheels reach the stop line. Under the trial court’s 

interpretation of the applicable statutes, the bus would have made a 

proper stop. 

Id. See also Binkowski, 157 Cal.App.4th Supp. at 6 (concluding that the California 

legislature “could not have intended such an absurd—and potentially perilous—

result” if the court interpreted the stop-sign statute to permit a motorist to stop 

astride a clearly marked stop line). In addition, interpreting “at” under R.C. 

4511.43(A) in this manner could result in an unconstitutional disparate application 

of the statute since it could be applied differently to motorists depending on the 

size or length of the vehicle they are operating. See, e.g., State ex rel. Patterson v. 

Indus. Comm., 77 Ohio St.3d 201, 204 (1996) (discussing the constitutional 

guarantee “that all similarly situated individuals be treated in a similar manner”). 

{¶22} Moreover, the object sought to be attained in regulating Ohio’s 

highways is the safety of motorists and pedestrians. Interpreting “at” under R.C. 

4511.43(A) to permit a motorist to stop on or near a clearly marked stop line does 

not further that purpose. In Daniels, the Florida Court of Appeals concluded that 

the stop-sign statute at issue in that case requires a motorist to stop before any part 

of his or her vehicle “crosses the line” because “[a] stop line protects other 

motorists and pedestrians only if a vehicle stops when its front bumper reaches 

that line.” Daniels, 158 So.3d at 631. In making that conclusion, the Florida 
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Court of Appeals acknowledged that the purpose of a stop-sign statute is “to 

require a vehicle to stop before it is in a position where it could impede or hit 

pedestrians who might be in a crosswalk, or cross-traffic that could be in an 

intersection.” Id. In addition, stop lines are often used to protect other motorists 

by providing a point at which a vehicle must stop to allow ample room for large 

vehicles to complete turns at an intersection. As a result, we interpret the statute 

to require a motorist to stop prior to the point at which the front-most portion of 

his or her vehicle will break the plane of the outermost edge of the clearly marked 

stop line to most readily further the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting R.C. 

4511.43(A). 

{¶23} Further support that the General Assembly did not contemplate that 

stopping astride a clearly marked stop line would constitute compliance with R.C. 

4511.43(A) can be found in the administrative construction of the statute. In 

particular, the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (OMUTCD), 

which provides the official specifications for highway signs and markings as 

mandated by R.C. 4511.09, supports our holding. See State v. Phillips, 3d Dist. 

Logan No. 8-04-25, 2006-Ohio-6338, ¶ 25, 30-31 (consulting the OMUTCD for 

statutory-construction purposes), abrogated on other grounds by Mays, 119 Ohio 

St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, at ¶ 15; Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 

2006-Ohio-3563, ¶ 4 (noting that the OMUTCD was adopted by the Ohio 
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Department of Transportation under R.C. 4511.09). Specifically, the OMUTCD 

describes the use of a “stop line”: “Stop lines should be used to indicate the point 

behind which vehicles are required to stop, in compliance with a traffic control 

signal.” (Emphasis added.) OMUTCD, Section 3B.16 (2012 Ed.). 

{¶24} Therefore, we conclude that it is unlawful to stop astride a clearly 

marked stop line, and that a motorist must stop his or her vehicle prior to the point 

at which the front-most portion of his or her vehicle will break the plane of the 

outermost edge of that clearly marked stop line. 

{¶25} Based on that conclusion, we hold that Trooper Beynon had probable 

cause to stop Miller since Miller stopped his vehicle astride a clearly marked stop 

line. See Mays at ¶ 23, 24; Haas, 2012-Ohio-2362, at ¶ 23. Furthermore, since we 

hold that Trooper Beynon had probable cause to stop Miller based on his violation 

of R.C. 4511.43(A), we also hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply. Too, 

we need not analyze the State’s alternative argument—whether Trooper Beynon 

possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Miller based on a reasonable 

mistake of law under Heien. See 135 S.Ct. at 539. 

{¶26} For the reasons stated above, the trial court erred in granting Miller’s 

motion to suppress. 

{¶27} The State’s assignment of error is sustained. 
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{¶28} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment Reversed and 

Cause Remanded 

SHAW and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur. 

/jlr