Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1409-CR-645 | March 26, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Adam Lenkowsky

Roberts & Bishop

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Juan Humberto Lara-Molina,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 26, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

12A02-1409-CR-645

Appeal from the Clinton Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Bradley K. Mohler, 

Judge

Cause No. 12C01-1311-FA-1101

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] On November 20, 2013, Appellant-Defendant Juan Humberto Lara-Molina 

was stopped while driving on Interstate 65 in Clinton County. Lara-Molina, 
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who initially provided a false name to the Indiana State Trooper who stopped 

him, was found to be in possession of approximately 1238 grams of cocaine and 

did not have a valid driver’s license. Soon thereafter, Lara-Molina was charged 

with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class D felony synthetic identity 

deception, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle without ever having 

received a license. Lara-Molina subsequently pled guilty as charged. LaraMolina’s plea agreement left sentencing to the discretion of the trial court and 

did not include a sentence recommendation from Appellee-Plaintiff the State of 

Indiana (the “State”). 

[2] At sentencing, the State notified the trial court that the parties wished to amend 

Lara-Molina’s guilty plea for dealing in cocaine from a Class A felony to a 

Class B felony and that the State wished to add a recommendation for a sevenyear executed sentence. Both the State and Lara-Molina conceded that the trial 

court would not be bound by this recommended sentence, however, because the 

original plea agreement contained no such recommendation. The trial court 

ultimately allowed the parties to amend Lara-Molina’s plea to dealing in 

cocaine from a Class A felony to a Class B felony, but declined to impose the 

seven-year executed sentence recommended by the State. Finding that the 

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and noting that LaraMolina received a substantial benefit from the reduction of his plea from a Class 

A felony level to a Class B felony level, the trial court imposed an aggregate 

eighteen-year executed sentence. We affirm. 
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Facts and Procedural History

[3] The factual basis entered during the March 31, 2014 guilty plea hearing 

provides as follows: on November 20, 2013, Lara-Molina was stopped by 

Indiana State Police Trooper Ryan Winters while driving a vehicle in Clinton 

County. At the time he was stopped, Lara-Molina possessed, with the intent to 

deliver, more than three grams of cocaine. Lara-Molina, who was driving 

without ever receiving a driver’s license, falsely identified himself to Trooper 

Winters as Juan Carlos Gomez Esparza. 

[4] On November 22, 2013, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State) 

charged Lara-Molina with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class D felony 

synthetic identity deception, and Class C misdemeanor operating a motor 

vehicle without ever receiving a license.1 On March 31, 2014, Lara-Molina pled 

guilty as charged. According to the terms of Lara-Molina’s guilty plea, 

sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court as the State did not make a 

sentencing recommendation. 

[5] The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on August 18, 2014, during 

which the State informed the trial court that:

the history of this case is that Mr. Lara-Molina pleaded guilty to the 

Class A felony ... but due to circumstances that have occurred since 

 

1 The State filed an amended charging information on December 2, 2013. The amended charging 

information is identical to the original charging information filed on November 22, 2013, except that 

it appears to correct a spelling error that was contained in the original charging information.
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the time of the plea, uh, the State now wishes to provide Mr. LaraMolina with a consideration uh, that is not possible uh, under the 

potential sentencing for the Class A felony to which he -- he pleaded. 

And so in order to be able to recommend to the Court uh, the 

consideration that we wish him to have uh, we uh, would need to --

and then propose to do so today, amend the uh, Count 1, Dealing in 

Cocaine, a Class A felony, to a Class B felony, uh, carrying a range of 

penalties of six to twenty years. Uhm, and the recommendation we 

would then make is that the executed portion of the sentence be uh, 

seven years. Uh, now that recommendation would be non-binding 

because we stand here today uh, poised for a sentencing in a situation 

in which there was no agreement uh, between the parties at the time 

that the plea agreement was entered. So even if we make a 

recommendation today at the Class A level, it would not be binding on 

the Court and we don’t propose to make it binding on the Court at the 

Class B level. But, it is an attempt to uh, be able to make the 

recommendation to the Court, the consideration that we think uh, we 

would like Mr. Lara-Molina to have. Now we recognize also and we 

hope he does that the minute we uh, amend the Class A to a Class B if 

the court approves that and he is in agreement with it, he gets a fairly 

substantial consideration anyway because the maximum on a Class B 

is the minimum on a Class A, and uh, so that -- that’s a meaningful 

opportunity for him. But, at any rate, that’s what the State proposes 

here uh, if the defense table is in agreement with our proceeding in that 

manner. 

 

Tr. pp. 15-16. Defense counsel indicated that the State’s comments were 

consistent with counsel’s understanding. In addition, through the aid of an 

interpreter, the trial court and Lara-Molina engaged in the following discussion:

The Court: And -- Mr. Lara-Molina, have you been able to 

understand the attorney’s summary and outlining of the changes to the 

Plea Agreement that they are proposing?

Interpreter: Yes.

The Court: Do you understand that I would not uh, authorize or 

accept any changes at this point until accepting a plea pursuant to this 

agreement? And what that means is you’ve already pled guilty to a 
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Class A felony. We’re scheduled for sentencing on that Class A felony 

today. Uh, the attorneys have further negotiated and are proposing 

that, that Plea Agreement be modified to a Class -- ... So then the Plea 

Agreement if accepted, would be modified so that the Dealing in 

Cocaine would be a Class B felony as opposed to Class A felony. 

Additionally in the portion of that Plea Agreement that originally said 

the State would not make a sentencing recommendation, the parties 

would be making the recommendation that has just been outlined. 

Understand though that the Court is not bound by that 

recommendation. As an A felony or as you originally pled and were 

originally charged, the penalty range is anywhere from twenty to fifty 

years with thirty years being the advisory sentence and the fine 

possible from Zero to Ten Thousand Dollars. If the Court would 

accept this modification, the penalty would range for a B felony would 

be anywhere from six years to twenty years. The advisory sentence 

would be ten years and the fine could range from Zero to Ten 

Thousand Dollars. Do you understand those possible penalties both 

for the charge as it currently stands as an A felony and as a reduced B 

felony charge that is contemplated with these amendments?

Interpreter: Yes sir.

The Court: And again, do you understand that any 

recommendations to the sentence that would be made either by the 

attorneys individually or by the attorneys jointly, would be just that, 

only recommendations and the Court would still have the authority to 

sentence you within the full range for that [B] felony, which is six to 

twenty years of incarceration? Do you understand that?

Interpreter: Yes.

****

The Court: Other than what I have reviewed with you and what has 

been outlined by the attorneys, have you been promised anything else, 

threatened or forced to get you to plead guilty?

Interpreter: No sir.

The Court: Have you been able to understand everything I’ve said 

through the translation provided by Miss Garza?

Interpreter: Yes sir.

****
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The Court: Okay. And again just to make sure you’re aware of this, 

if the Court does accept this new plea to a B felony level, the Court has 

the full range of possible penalties, which would be six to twenty years 

and the attorneys can make arguments and recommendations, but 

none of those arguments or recommendations are binding on the 

Court and the Court will decide upon the pos -- the actual penalty 

within that six to twenty year range. Do you understand that?

Interpreter: Yes sir. 

Tr. pp. 16-21. Lara-Molina also again admitted that he possessed cocaine, with 

the intent to deliver, on November 20, 2013. 

[6] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court allowed Lara-Molina to amend 

his guilty plea from a plea of guilty to a Class A felony to a plea of guilty to a 

Class B felony. The trial court, however, found that the seven-year sentence 

recommended by the State was inadequate, instead sentencing Lara-Molina to 

an aggregate eighteen-year term. In arriving at this sentence, the trial court 

found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.2 The trial 

court also found that Lara-Molina was a high risk to re-offend and noted that 

Lara-Molina received a substantial benefit from the reduction of his conviction 

for dealing in cocaine from a Class A felony level to a Class B felony level. 

 

2

 Lara-Molina does not challenge the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the trial court on 

appeal. The aggravating factors include: Lara-Molina’s criminal history, which includes convictions 

for crimes of violence, several weapons charges, and at least one federal conviction for illegal reentry; his status as an illegal alien; and the fact that he had previously been deported. The mitigating 

factors include: Lara-Molina accepted responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty, cooperated 

with law enforcement, and had family obligations. 
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Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, Lara-Molina contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing him. Generally, sentencing decisions rest within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of 

discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other 

grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if 

the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

[8] Specifically, Lara-Molina argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to give him an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea after the trial 

court determined that it would not impose the seven-year executed sentence 

that was recommended by the State. The record establishes, however, that both 

parties understood that the seven-year executed sentence recommendation 

presented for the first time by the State at sentencing would not be binding upon 

the trial court.

Under a “nonbinding” sentence recommendation, the defendant 

extracts a promise from the prosecutor to advocate the imposition of a 

particular sentence (or that the prosecutor will remain mute at the 

sentencing hearing), but the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently submits to the agreement with the understanding that the 

sentence recommendation is “nonbinding” and that he or she is not 

entitled to withdraw the guilty plea if the trial court rejects the 

recommended sentence. This type of sentence recommendation is 

made as another fact relevant to sentencing for the trial court to 
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consider when it exercises its sentencing discretion.

Walker v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1374, 1378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); see also Hedger v. 

State, 824 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (providing that where the 

defendant’s written plea agreement included no specific sentence term, the trial 

court was not bound to follow the State’s oral sentence recommendation), trans. 

denied.

[9] Again, both the State and Lara-Molina explicitly stated that they understood 

that the State’s recommendation of a seven-year executed sentence would not 

be binding on the trial court. After both counsel for the State and defense 

counsel indicated that the sentence recommendation would not be binding 

upon the trial court, the trial court, through the aid of an interpreter, engaged in 

a discussion with Lara-Molina in which the trial court repeatedly asked LaraMolina whether he understood that the sentence recommendation was 

nonbinding and sentencing would be left to the trial court. Each time, LaraMolina indicated that he understood. Lara-Molina further indicated that he 

had been able to understand everything that the trial court had said through the 

translation. 

[10] The record clearly demonstrates that all of the relevant parties, including 

counsel for the State, defense counsel, and Lara-Molina, understood that the 

seven-year sentence recommendation was not binding upon the trial court and 

that the trial court retained the discretion to sentence Lara-Molina as the trial 

court saw fit. We therefore conclude that the trial court acted within its 
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discretion in sentencing Lara-Molina to an aggravated eighteen-year term 

without first offering Lara-Molina the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. 

[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.