[Cite as State v. Blair, 2012-Ohio-1847.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 24784 

v. : T.C. NO. 11 CRB 773 

JEREMY L. BLAIR : (Criminal appeal from 

 Municipal Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 : 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 27th day of April , 2012. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

ROBERT B. COUGHLIN, Atty. Reg. No. 0003449, 6111 Taylorsville Road, Huber Heights, 

Ohio 45424 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

KATHRYN L. BOWLING, Atty. Reg. No. 0084442, 111 W. First Street, Suite 518, Dayton, 

Ohio 45402 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

FROELICH, J. 

{¶ 1} Following a bench trial, Jeremy Blair was found guilty of disorderly 
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conduct, in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(2), and of resisting arrest, in violation of R.C. 

2921.33(A). On the charge of disorderly conduct, he was fined $150, with $100 suspended. 

On the charge of resisting arrest, he was sentenced to thirty days in jail, with twenty days 

suspended, and he was fined $250, with $200 suspended. He appeals from his conviction. 

He sought a stay of execution of his sentence in the trial court, but his request was denied.1 

{¶ 2} The State presented the following evidence about the bases for the charges 

against Blair. Blair’s actions will be discussed in greater detail under the assignment of 

error. 

{¶ 3} On May 28, 2011, Blair was involved in an altercation with Chris Lewis, at 

the home of Lewis’s family on Mill Ridge Road in Huber Heights. When police officers 

arrived, Blair berated them and Lewis’s family with abusive language and insults for thirty 

minutes to an hour, while the officers repeatedly attempted to calm him down. One of the 

officers eventually decided to arrest Blair, and Blair resisted arrest by struggling with the 

officer. Blair was cited for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. 

{¶ 4} At trial, Lewis’s brother and two police officers testified for the State; the 

defense did not call any witnesses. Blair made a Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal on 

both charges at the close of the State’s case, which was overruled. Blair was found guilty 

on both charges and sentenced as described above. 

{¶ 5} Blair raises one assignment of error on appeal, which states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION 

 1

Blair’s request for a stay demonstrates that he did not voluntarily serve his sentence and, therefore, that his appeal is 

not moot due to voluntary satisfaction of the judgment. See Lammers v. Caltrider, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21565, 

2007-Ohio-1745, ¶ 5, citing State v. Miller, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23240, 2007-Ohio-370, ¶ 18. 
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FOR A RULE 29 ACQUITTAL, AS THE STATE FAILED TO SHOW 

THAT THE ARREST WHICH APPELLANT “RESISTED” WAS A 

LAWFUL ARREST. 

{¶ 6} Blair contends that his arrest for resisting arrest was unlawful because his 

behavior did not constitute disorderly conduct and, as such, the officers did not have a lawful 

basis to arrest him. He also claims that his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal should have 

been granted. 

{¶ 7} When reviewing the denial of a Crim.R. 29(A) motion, an appellate court 

applies the same standard as is used to review a sufficiency of the evidence claim. State v. 

Thaler, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22578, 2008-Ohio-5525, ¶ 14. “A sufficiency of the 

evidence argument disputes whether the State has presented adequate evidence on each 

element of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of 

law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State 

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). When 

reviewing whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction, the 

relevant inquiry is whether any rational finder of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 

(1997). A guilty verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless “reasonable minds could not 

reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” Id.

{¶ 8} Resisting arrest is defined at R.C. 2921.33(A), which states that “[n]o 

person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest of himself or 
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another.” “Although the arrest must be ‘lawful,’ it is not necessary for the state to prove 

that the defendant was in fact guilty of the offense for which the arrest was made to uphold a 

conviction for resisting arrest. State v. Hurst, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-880706, 1989 WL 

140010 (Nov. 22, 1989). An arrest is ‘lawful’ if the surrounding circumstances would give 

a reasonable police officer cause to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. 

Id.; Parma Heights v. Kaplan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 55108, 1989 WL 30584 (Mar. 30, 

1989).” State v. Sansalone, 71 Ohio App.3d 284, 285-286, 593 N.E.2d 390 (1st Dist.1991). 

 

{¶ 9} The citation charged Blair with disorderly conduct in violation of R.C. 

2917.11(A)(2), which states: “No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or 

alarm to another by * * * making unreasonable noise or an offensively coarse utterance, 

gesture, or display or communicating unwarranted and grossly abusive language to any 

person.” The disorderly conduct statute has long been interpreted to require that a 

reasonable person “would find the defendant’s ‘language and conduct annoying or alarming 

and would be provoked to want to respond violently.’” (Internal citations omitted.) Gessner 

v. Schroeder, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21498, 2007-Ohio-570, ¶ 38, citing Warren v. 

Patrone, 74 Ohio App.3d 595, 600 N.E.2d 344 (11th Dist.1991). See, also, State v. 

Hoffman, 57 Ohio St.2d 129, 387 N.E.2d 239 (1979); State v. Glenn, 1st Dist. Hamiltion 

No. C-030356, 2004-Ohio-1489, ¶ 25. The test is objective and focuses on whether, under 

the circumstances, it is probable that a reasonable person would find the accused’s language 

and conduct annoying or alarming and would be provoked to want to respond violently; a 

person need not actually be provoked to a violent response. Sansalone at 286. 
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{¶ 10} Blair contends that his arrest was unlawful for two reasons: 1) the officers 

were not provoked to respond violently toward him and did not feel threatened by him, and 

thus were unjustified in arresting him, and 2) arrest was not permitted for this offense 

because it was a minor misdemeanor. 

{¶ 11} Huber Heights Police Officers Scott Short and Robert Bluma testified for 

the State. They responded to a house on Mill Ridge Road on the night of May 28, 2011, 

due to a report of a “disorderly subject at the residence.” Upon investigation, they 

discovered that Blair had been involved in a physical and verbal altercation with his friend, 

Chris Lewis, whose family lived at the residence. Blair had called the police. Both Lewis 

and Blair had been drinking, and Lewis left the home before the officers arrived. Blair was 

cursing loudly and disruptively. 

{¶ 12} The officers attempted to calm Blair for thirty minutes to an hour; Blair 

would appear to calm down, but then become agitated again. Blair was “belligerent and 

disorderly” during this period, calling the officers “f***ing pigs”2

 who did not know how to 

do “their f***ing jobs,” and claiming that the laws of Montgomery County did not apply to 

him because he lived elsewhere. Blair was also cursing at Lewis’s family members, who 

were sitting outside their home. Blair told the officers that he was waiting for a ride from 

someone who was coming from Washington Courthouse, so the officers “tried to be 

patient,” but the owners of the home wanted Blair off of their property and the officers had 

other calls waiting, including some priority calls. According to the officers’ testimony, 

Blair was arrested because he continued to curse after the officers had repeatedly asked him 

 2

We have modified some of the offensive language contained in the transcript. 
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to stop, and because he intended to walk to Rite Aid, despite the officers’ instructions that he 

should wait for his ride at his current location, since he was too intoxicated “to walk on his 

own.” 

{¶ 13} Although the officers found Blair’s conduct annoying and unpleasant, they 

testified that they did not feel threatened by him and that tolerating such behavior was part of 

their job. Sean Lewis, Chris’s brother, also testified that Blair was yelling in a loud voice 

and cursing for approximately half an hour. 

{¶ 14} The officers asked Blair to step off of the Lewises’ property while he 

waited for his ride. As they were preparing to clear the call and leave, Blair again started to 

yell at them and call them names. Officer Scott also testified that Blair wanted to walk to a 

Rite-Aid, which he was in no condition to safely accomplish because of his intoxication. 

Officer Bluma decided to arrest Blair. It is undisputed that Blair struggled with Bluma and 

resisted his arrest. 

{¶ 15} Blair contends that his arrest was unlawful, and therefore he did not resist a 

lawful arrest. However, the officers’ testimony, which was unrefuted, established that Blair 

had, at the very least, recklessly caused inconvenience and annoyance to the officers and his 

friend’s family members by making “unreasonable noise” or “offensively coarse 

utterance[s]” over an extended period of time. Because of the length and nature of Blair’s 

diatribe, directed at both the officers and the residents, and the fact that Blair had no safe 

means of leaving the premises, the officers could have reasonably concluded that Blair’s 

conduct and language would provoke someone to respond violently if it were allowed to 

continue and that it was lawful to arrest him. Further, the statute does not require that the 
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officers were actually provoked to violence, but that a reasonable person would be provoked. 

Sansalone, 71 Ohio App.3d 284, 286, 593 N.E.2d 390. In other words, there was evidence 

from which a rational factfinder could have concluded that Blair had engaged in disorderly 

conduct. His Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal was properly denied. 

{¶ 16} Moreover, under the circumstances presented, Blair’s arrest for disorderly 

conduct was justified, even though the offense is, in many circumstances, a minor 

misdemeanor for which a citation is issued. See R.C. 2917.11(E)(2); R.C. 2935.26. R.C. 

2917.11(E)(3)(a) provides that disorderly conduct is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree if 

the “offender persists in disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist.” 

The officers testified that, over the course of thirty minutes to an hour, they had repeatedly 

instructed Blair to stop his abusive and disruptive behavior. The officers could have 

reasonably concluded that they were permitted to arrest Blair for his failure to desist because 

his offense was a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, rather than a minor misdemeanor.3

 

Thus, the arrest was lawful as that term is used in the resisting arrest statute. 

{¶ 17} Further, R.C. 2935.26 states that a person may be arrested, rather than 

issued a citation, for a minor misdemeanor if the offender “is unable to provide for his own 

safety.” Officer Scott testified that Blair was intoxicated, that Blair was attempting to leave 

the scene to walk to a Rite-Aid store, and that he would have been unable to complete such a 

walk safely. This testimony justified Blair’s arrest, even if his conduct were classified as a 

minor misdemeanor. 

 3

Neither the citation nor the probable cause determination sets forth the degree of the disorderly conduct offense, 

although the narrative report stated that Blair “did persist using loudly vulgar language in public after multiple warnings.” The 

termination entry refers to it as a minor misdemeanor. 
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{¶ 18} We have concluded that Blair’s arrest was not an unlawful arrest, and he 

has asserted no other bases to challenge his conviction for resisting arrest. 

{¶ 19} The assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 20} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, J. and FISCHER, J., concur. 

(Hon. Patrick F. Fischer, First District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief 

Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio). 

Copies mailed to: 

Robert B. Coughlin 

Kathryn L. Bowling 

Hon. James D. Piergies