NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LARRISSA P., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.H., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0068 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD22891 

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa

By H. Clark Jones

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee 

FILED 8-28-2018
LARRISSA P. v. ADCS

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

T H O M P S O N, Judge:

¶1 Larrissa P. (mother) appeals the decision of the juvenile court 

terminating her parental rights to J.H. (the child), arguing that the court 

erred in finding that the Department of Child Safety (DCS) made reasonable 

efforts to provide mother with rehabilitative services. Mother also appeals 

the juvenile court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. 

For the following reasons we affirm the juvenile court’s order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother had her parental rights severed to two children in 

April 2015. The child was born later that year on December 12, 2015, 

substance exposed to marijuana and methadone. The child spent a month 

in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit for withdrawal symptoms. During the 

child’s hospital stay, mother tested positive for methamphetamine. When 

the child was discharged from the hospital in January 2016, DCS took her 

into custody, and the juvenile court found her dependent in February 2016. 

¶3 The child has a number of developmental delays and health 

conditions caused by a genetic disorder and her in-utero substance 

exposure. One of these health conditions is reactive airway disorder, which 

causes her to struggle to breathe when exposed to certain irritants such as 

cigarette smoke. 

¶4 For the child to be returned to mother’s care, mother needed 

to demonstrate sobriety, find and maintain employment, and find suitable 

and stable housing. After fifteen months in care mother was still using 

methadone, had not found employment, and had not found suitable 

housing. Additionally, in August 2017, mother tested positive for 

marijuana and in December 2017, tested positive for methamphetamine. 

DCS moved to terminate the parent-child relationship September 11, 2017, 

alleging that the child had been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen 
LARRISSA P. v. ADCS

Decision of the Court

3 

months pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-

533(B)(8)(c) (2018)1. 

¶5 The court held an evidentiary hearing on January 25, 2018, 

and February 9, 2018. The court found that although mother had completed 

many of her services, she still had not been able to wean off the methadone 

as was discussed by her TERROS counselors, and had relapsed on both 

marijuana and methamphetamines. The court also found that mother 

continued to struggle with appropriate housing and maintaining 

employment. The court found that mother was unemployed through the 

majority of the dependency and only obtained part-time employment in 

November 2017. The court also found that mother had not found suitable 

housing in the cumulative five-years that she had been involved with DCS. 

The court therefore found that mother had not remedied the reasons for the 

out-of-home placement and that there was a substantial likelihood that she 

would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and 

control in the near future. Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) (2018), 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018), and 12-2101(B) 

(2018). 

DISCUSSION

¶6 A parent’s right to custody and control of his own child, while 

fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 248-49 ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). Severance of a parental relationship may be 

warranted where the state proves one of A.R.S. § 8-533’s statutory grounds 

for termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id.; A.R.S. § 8-863(B) 

(2018). “Clear and convincing” means the grounds for termination are 

“highly probable or reasonably certain.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 

284-85, ¶ 25 (2005). Additionally, the court must also determine what is in 

the best interests of the child by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 283, 

¶¶ 16, 22. 

¶7 “[W]e will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact unless 

no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a 

severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We do not reweigh the evidence, 

but “look only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the court’s 

 

1 We cite to the current version of any statute unless the statute was 

amended after the pertinent events and such amendment would affect the 

result of this appeal.
LARRISSA P. v. ADCS

Decision of the Court

4 

ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 

2004). 

I. Statutory Grounds

¶8 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), termination of the parent-child 

relationship is appropriate when the child has been in an out-of-home 

placement for a period of fifteen months or longer, the agency responsible 

for the child has made diligent efforts to provide reunification services, the 

parent has been “unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child 

to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that 

the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental 

care and control in the near future.” In determining whether the parent has 

been able to remedy the circumstances causing placement, we consider the 

circumstances existing at the time of the severance rather than at the time 

of the initial dependency petition. Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-8441, 

175 Ariz. 463, 468 (App. 1993). 

¶9 On appeal, mother argues that DCS failed to provide her with 

assistance in obtaining suitable housing, which she argues was the only 

remaining barrier to the child being returned to her care.2 We disagree. 

¶10 DCS is not required to provide every conceivable service or to 

ensure that the parent participates in every service that it offers. Maricopa 

Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). 

Additionally, it is only required to provide services that have a reasonable 

prospect of success. Marry Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 

192 ¶ 34 (App. 1999). 

¶11 Here, the DCS case manager testified that he knew of only one 

service that DCS could provide to parents for housing, a subsidy to help 

cover housing expenses. However, the case manager testified that the 

subsidy is only offered to parents who have a stable job and can 

demonstrate that they will be able to maintain the housing after the subsidy 

has ended. Here, mother did not obtain a job until December 2017, and 

even then it was only a part-time job at a fast-food restaurant. The case 

manager testified that this employment was not enough to qualify for the 

housing subsidy. Additionally, mother tested positive for marijuana in 

August 2017, and for methamphetamine in December 2017, and parents are 

required to demonstrate at least six months of sobriety before children can 

 

2 Mother does not argue that the other services DCS offered were 

inappropriate or unhelpful. 
LARRISSA P. v. ADCS

Decision of the Court

5 

be returned to their care. Thus, housing was not the only remaining barrier 

for mother to regain custody of the child. As such, the court did not err in 

finding that DCS provided mother with reasonable services when 

terminating the parent-child relationship. 

II. Best Interest 

¶12 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred in finding 

that severance was in the child’s best interest. Severance is in a child’s best 

interest if she would benefit from severance or be harmed by continuation 

of the parent-child relationship. Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 

Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). Relevant factors include whether the child’s existing 

placement is meeting the child’s needs, whether the child is adoptable, and 

whether an adoptive placement is immediately available. Raymond F. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379-80 ¶¶ 30-33 (App. 2010). 

¶13 In this instance the placement is willing to adopt and is

meeting the child’s needs. Additionally, the case manager testified that the 

child is adoptable should the current placement not be able to adopt. We 

therefore find that the juvenile court did not err in finding that termination 

of the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of the child. 

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating mother’s parental rights.