This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 31,076 9 BARNABIE BEGAY, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 12 John A. Dean, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acti ng Chief Public Defender 17 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 18 Santa Fe, NM 19 for Appellant 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 VIGIL, Judge. 22 Barnabie Begay (Defendant) appeals from the Judgment, Sentence and Order 23 Suspending Sentence, filed pursuant to Defendant’s guilty plea to the offenses of child 24 abuse–negligently caused (no death or great bodily harm), aggravated driving while 252 under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs (.16 or above), and driving 1 while license suspended or revoked. [RP 82] Defendant reserved the right to appeal 2 from the district court’s denial of his the motion to suppress. [RP 72] This Court’s 3 calendar notice proposed summary affirmance. [Ct. App. File, CN 1] Defendant has 4 filed a memorandum in opposition. [Ct. App. File, MIO] After due consideration, 5 however, we affirm. 6 DISCUSSION 7 Defendant’s memorandum relies on State v. Franklin , 78 N.M. 127, 129, 428 8 P.2d 982, 984 (1967) and State v. Boyer , 103 N.M. 655, 658, 712 P.2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 9 1985) to support his opposition to the calendar notice’s proposed disposition. [MIO 10 1, 8] We further note that Defendant ha s not provided this Court with additional or 11 conflicting facts or authority that would persuade us that the proposed disposition was 12 incorrect or inappropriate. Defendant conti nues to argue that the district court erred 13 when it interpreted the exception to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-369(B) (2005) to 14 apply only if all seating positi ons equipped with safety be lts are occupied by children 15 and therefore erred in denying the motion to suppress. [DS 3; MIO 5] Defendant also 16 continues to argue that the traffic stop conducted by the officer was not supported by 17 reasonable suspicion, because the officer made a mistake of law when he pulled over 183 Defendant’s vehicle based on his belief that De fendant had violated Section 66-7- 1 369(B). [RP 51-52, 53-56; MIO 8-9] We are not persuaded. 2 The parties stipulated that the offi cer decided to activate his emergency 3 equipment and pull the truck over because th ere were three occupants sitting in the 4 pick up truck in addition to the driver and due to the officer’s “training and 5 experience,” he knew that there were not e nough seatbelts in the truck for each of the 6 four occupants. [DS 2] After the stop, the officer determined that the two middle 7 occupants were ten and twelve years old. [Id.] 8 “A reasonable suspicion is a particul arized suspicion, based on all the 9 circumstances that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking, or has broken, 10 the law. Unsupported intuition and inarticulate hunches are not sufficient.” State v. 11 Rivas , 2007-NMCA-020, ¶ 7, 141 N.M. 87, 150 P.3d 1037 (internal quotation marks 12 and citation omitted). To determine whether the officer made a mistake of law in 13 stopping Defendant’s vehicle, we examine Section 66-7-369 [Child passenger 14 restraint; enforcement] and NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-372 (2001) [Safety belt use 15 required; exception–for vehicles over a certainweight or with physician’s statement]. 16 “Statutory interpretation is an issu e of law, which we review de novo.” State v. 17 Duhon , 2005-NMCA-120, ¶ 10, 138 N.M. 466, 122 P.3d 50. In addition to the plain 18 meaning examination, “[w]e al so consider the statutory s ubsection in reference to the 194 statute as a whole and read the several sec tions together so thatall parts are given 1 effect.” Bishop v. Evangelical Good Samaritan Soc’y , 2009-NMSC-036, ¶ 11, 146 2 N.M. 473, 212 P.3d 361. 3 Section 66-7-369 provides, in applicable part, as follows: 4 A. A person shall not operate a passenger car, van 5 or pickup truck in this state, except for an authorized 6 emergency vehicle, public tr ansportation or a school bus, 7 unless all passengers less than eighteen years of age are 8 properly restrained. 9 B. Each person less than eighteen years of age 10 shall be properly secured ina child passenger restraint 11 device or by a safety belt, unless all seating positions 12 equipped with safety belts are occupied, as follows: 13

. . . . 14 (4) children seven years of age through twelve 15 years of age shall be properl y secured in a child passenger 16 restraint device or by a seat belt. 17 Section 66-7-372(A) provides in applicable part that 18 each occupant of a motor vehicle having a gross vehicle 19 weight of ten thousand pounds or less manufactured with 20 safety belts in compliance withfederal motor vehicle safety 21 standard number 208 shall have a safety belt properly 22 fastened about his body at all times when the vehicle is in 23 motion on any street or highway. 245 The annotations to Section 66-7-372, indicate that the 2001 amendment, effective June 1 15, 2001, in Subsection A, deleted the word s “unless all seating positions equipped 2 with safety belts are occupied” fro m the end of the subsection. 3 The district court determined that the officer did not make a mistake of law, 4 because the exception that allows children to be unrestrained in Section 66-7-369(B), 5 if “all other seating positions equipped with safety belts are occupied” only applies 6 when those positions are all occupied by ch ildren. [DS 3] Th e district court’s 7 determination is correct, given that Sec tion 66-7-369 deals specifically with children, 8 and given that, in 2001, the Legislatur e deleted the same exception language from 9 Section 66-7-372, which deals with the restraint of passengers generally. 10 Be that as it may, however, the officer inthis case testified that he decided to 11 stop Defendant’s vehicle because he knew th at there were more occupants in the 12 vehicle than seat belts. After stopping the vehicle, the officer determined that none 13 of the passengers were weari ng a seat belt [RP 22] and that the two middle occupants 14 were unrestrained juveniles aged ten and tw elve. We hold that because, at the time 15 the officer decided to stop Defendant’s vehi cle, the officer knew that there were more 16 occupants in the vehicle than seat belts, he had reasonable susp icion that Defendant 17 was driving his vehicle in violation of Section 66-7-369 and/or Section 66-7-372. 18 See, e.g., State v. Ruiz , 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 38, 141 N.M . 53, 150 P.3d 1003 (stating 196 that as a general rule, we will uphold the deci sion of a district court if it is right for 1 any reason). 27 CONCLUSION 1 We affirm the district court’s decisi on to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3

_______________________________ 4 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 5 WE CONCUR: 6

_________________________________ 7 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 8

_________________________________ 9 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 10