L e de sma ’s laws uit did no t in vo lve any

c la im f or bo dil y inj ur ie s. 1 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00634- CV

F or d M ot or Co m pany , A ppe lla nt

v.
Tib urcio Ledesm a, Jr., Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BASTRO P COUNTY , 335TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 23,425 , HO NORAB LE TERRY L. FLENNI KEN, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N
Tiburcio L edesma , J r. sued For d Motor Company for damag es in c onnection with a collision between L edesma ’s truck a nd two parke d car s. Th e cr i t i cal f actua l dispute at trial was wh e the r t he tr uc k’ s a xle d isl od g e d a

nd c a us e d th e tr

uc k to hit th e pa

rk e d c ars , o r w he the r t

he a xle dis lod g e d a s a re su lt o f t

he c oll isi on s. F ind ingthat a manu fa c tur ingde fe c t w a s a pr od uc ingc a us e of the a c c ide nt, and

that L e de sma ’s ne g lig e nc e wa s n ot a pr oximate c a us e , the jur

y awa rd e d L e de sma $215,380 in da

mag es for the cost of repa irs to his truck, the loss of use of the truck, prof its lost from the period the t ruck was out of service for his business, and dama g e to his cre dit reputation. The 1 tr ia l c ourt a lso awa rd e d p re jud g me nt i nte re st.2 For d raises proce dural and substantive complaints. I t a rg ues that the c ourt err ed by allowing L edesma ’s experts to testify beca use thei r o p i nions were not reliable, a nd by excluding
so me te sti mony

by F or d’ s e xpe rt

on the ba sis that he wa s not a qu a lif ie d a c c ide nt r e c on str

uc tio nis t. For d also argues that the c ourt s u b mi tt e d in c orre ct def

initions of manufa cturing defe ct and pr oducing
cause to the jury
. For d also contends that leg ally insufficient evidence supports the j ury ’s finding that L e de sma ’s tr

uc k co nta ine d a man

uf a c tur ing de fe c t th a t w a s a

pr od uc ingc a us e of thi s a c c ide nt. We w ill a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.

BACK GR OUND L e de sma bo ug ht a ne w 19 99 F or d F -3 50 pic ku p tr uc k in Ma rc h 1 99 9 f

or us e in h is construction business. The tr uck had dua l r ear tires housed in w heel wells that protruded f rom the sides of the truc k. I n J une 1999, the truc k had about 4,100 miles on it, had not bee n in any collisions, and had no mecha nical problems. On June 5, 1999 at approximately 5 p.m., L edesma

had
an ac cident while dr iving the tr uck o n a d ry , t wo-lane stree t on which seve ral c ars we re pa rallel pa rk e d. At so me po int

duri ngthe a c c ide nt s e qu e nc e , th e tr uc k’ s re ar le a f- sp ri ng and a xle a sse mbl y
came apar t and the drive shaft diseng ag ed fr om the transmission. The truck c ollided with at least two of the parked c ars. The parties pr esente d differ ent ac counts of the a ccide nt and diffe rent theor ies of
causation. The jury

resolved this dispute in L edesma ’s favor.
Ledesm a’s ver sion

L edesma ’s theory

of the a ccide nt is that the re ar ax le displace d and the dr iveshaft diseng ag ed and “ prong ed” into the stre et, ca using him to lose control of his truc k and cr ash into the pa rk e d c ars .3 L edesma testified that he wa s driving the truck at a little more than thirty miles per hour. He felt a jolt while shifting into third g ear . The truck slid to the rig ht a nd its back end w ent into the a ir. L edesma said he then turned the steering whee l to the left to a void a Pontiac Fir ebird parke d along the curb
. T h e ri gh t back e nd of his truck struc k the left ba ck end of the Fir ebird. L edesma said he wa s unable to control the tr uck because the re ar e nd kept “bounc ing.” The truc k the n h it a se c on d p ark e d car be fo re c omi ng to r e st w ithits ri g ht r e ar t ir e up on the c ur b. L e de sma denied that the tr

uck stopped on a

ny one’s law n. Gee rt Aer

ts, a mecha

nical eng ineer , testified about two possible cause s of the
acc ident. Both theories arose from a manufa cturing asy mmetry involving the u-bolt that clamps the
a xle i n susp e ns ion be low the le a f- sp ri ng a sse mbl y . Th is sc he ma tic of the a sse mbl ie s wa s an e xhibi t
a t tr ia l:

Aer ts testified that, during the manufa cturing proce ss, one of the leg s on the u-bolt was made longe r than the other

leg . Aer ts theorized that the unequal leng ths of the leg s on the u-bolt preve nted the
nu ts f ro m be inga de qu a te ly

tig hte ne d. As a

re su lt, the u- bo lt d id n ot a de qu ate ly c lamp t he a xleThe police office r who investigated the acc ident testified that his inve stigative repor t list ed 2 no ey ewitnesses to the a ccide nt, al t h o u gh h e d id talk to the owners of the par ked ca rs, including Py lant. 4 ho us ing . A e rt s’ s se c on d th e or y wa s th a t th e fl a tte ne d p or tio n o f t he u- bo lt was off cent e r. As a
re su l t , t h e r o u n d

p o rt i o no f

t h e b o l tc o u l d

c a u s e ani n d e n t a t i o ni nt h e a xl e h o u s i n g an d e v e n tu a lly
cause the axle housing to be come loose. Under both the ories, the loose axle housing shifted ba ck
and a llo we d th e dr ive sh a ft

to d ise ng a g e and

fa ll o nto the str e e t. David Ha ll, a

n acc ident rec onstructionist, testified based on photogr aphs taken of the
acc ident scene . Hall said that there wer e mar ks prese nt in the street that we re c aused b y the driveshaf t striking the pa

vement. On the t ruck’ s path, t hese marks wer e before the collision with t he first parke d car , the Fir ebird. Ha ll also testified that the impact betwe en the truc k and the F irebird
occur red at a ver

y low speed.
F ord’s ver sion

F or d’ s th e or

y is that L e de sma wa s dri vin g inatte nti ve ly and hit the pa rk e d c ars wi th the truck’ s protruding whee ls, sending the truck out of control, car eening into car s and over a c urb onto a lawn. F ord conte n d s t h at t h e i m p act with the curb ca used the a x le to shift back a nd the driveshaf t to disenga g e. Edwar d Py lant, the owner of t he Firebird that was hit, testified by deposition that he witnessed the a ccide nt. Py lant said that L edesma was speeding at betwee n 40 and 50 mph. Py lant 2 test i fi ed t h at L edesma

was not pay

ing attention and drove ve ry close to the c ars pa

rked a long the curb. A s the truck passed the Firebird, the r ight whe el tub, the re ar ax le, and the outside r ight r ear5

tire of the truck hit the Fire bird. Py lant claims the impact cause d the truck’ s back e nd to come off the g rou n d an d b o u n ce awa y from the F irebird. The truck then hit a H onda Civic. The truc k’s whee ls hit t he cur

b, went over

the cur b, and sepa

rate d from the truc k. Ba sed on L edesma ’s pretria l motion, the court excluded some testimony from Da n May , For d’s expert witness. May is a mecha

nical eng ineer

with thirty -one y ear s of ex p er i ence at For d, including twe nty -five y ear s as a truck e ng ineer . For seven y ear s, May

worke d as a pr oduct desig n eng ineer

and wa s involved in the manufac ture a nd assembly

of components. The trial court allowed May to te stify about matters relating to de sign and manufa cture but pr evente d him from testify ing on matters relating to a ccide nt r econstruc tion be cause he was not an ac ci d ent
rec onstructionist. During trial, the court said it would let For d question May about t he cause of the
acc ident but would then admit the repor t of Ralph Stern, For d ’s o ri gi nal ac cident re construction
e xpe rt . In h is r e po rt , St e rn op ine d th a t th e re ar sp ri ng re ar sp ri ngbo lt b ro ke , c a us ingthe re ar w he e ls to slip far enoug h to pull the drive shaft out of the tr ansmission. For d elec ted not to have Ma y testify about the ca

use of the a ccide nt. The jury verdict

Th e tr ia l c ourt

re tu rned a v e rd ic t in

fa vo r o f L e de sma . T he jur y c on c lud e d th a t a manufa cturing defe ct was the cause of the a ccide nt and that L edesma was not neg lige nt. The jury
awa rded L edesma

$215,380 as da m ages f

or the re pair of the truck, loss of the use of the truc k, L edesma ’s lost profits, and damag e to L edesma ’s cr ed i t re p u tation. I n addition, the trial court
awa rd e d L e de sma

$6 5, 91 2 in

pr e jud g me nt i nte re st.6 DI SCU SSIO N For d raises four issues on appea l that relate to L edesma ’s fa ilure to ca rry the burde n of proof that should be im posed upon a plainti ff alleg ing a m anufa cturing defe ct. I n Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , th e Te xas S up re me Court de sc ri be d th e pla int if

f’ s b ur de n a s f

oll ow s:
A m an u f a c tu r i n g d e f

e c te x i s t s w h e na

p r o d u c t d e v i a t e s , i n i t s c o n s t r

u c t i o no r qu a l i t y, fr om t he sp e c if ic a tio ns or

pla nn e d o utp ut i n a

mann e r that rende rs it unr e a so na bly dang erous. Torringt on Co. v. Stutzman , 46 S. W.3 d 8 29 , 8 44 (T e x. 20 00 ); American Tob ac c o Co. v . G rin ne ll , 951 S.W .2d 420, 434 (Tex. 1997). A plainti ff must prove that the produc t was defec tive when it left t he hands of the manufa cture r and that the defe ct was a producingcause of the plaintiff’ s injuries. Torringt on Co. , 46 S.W .3d at 844.
135 S.W .3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). For d complains that L edesma ’s experts did not supply such evidenc e, that the c ourt err oneously excluded s o m e of its expert’s testimony , that the cour t’s instruction did not require L edesma to prove all of the e lements of his ca use of a ction, and that the
e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly

ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jud g me nt. Expert witnesses

E x p er tw i t n e s s e s ar e p e r

m i t t e d i f s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l , o r

o t h e r s p e c i a l i z e d

k n o wl ed ge will assist t he trier of fac t to understand the evidenc e or to de termine a fac t issue. Tex. R . Evid. 702. Ex perts may

be qualifie d by

knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation. Id
. Upon objection by

the opponent of t he evide nce, the proponent of e x pert testimony has the burde n to prove that the e vidence is admissibl e. E.I. du Pont de Nem ours & Co. v. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995)
. A two-par t te st g overns whether expert testimony is admissibl e: (1 ) the e xpe rt

mus t be qu a lif

ie d; a nd (2 ) t he te sti mony

mus t be re le va

nt a nd be ba se d o n a

re lia ble7

foundation. Helena Chem. Co. v. W ilkins , 47 S.W.3 d 486 , 499 (T e x. 20 01 ). Th e pr op on e nt m us t show th at the witness has spec ial knowledg e on the subjec t of his testimony
. Gammill v. Jac k W illiams C hevrole t, Inc. , 972 S.W .2d 713, 718 (Tex. 1998) . The testimony must be shown to be reliable befor e it is admitted. Id
. at 726. The trial c ourt is require d to assess the re liability —not the truth or falsity

—of t he ex pert’s opinion. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d at 558. The c riteria f or asse ssing reliability vary depending on the t y

pe of ex pert a

nd the nature of the e vidence
. Ga mm ill , 972 S.W .2d
a t 72 6- 27 ; s e e a ls o Ku m h o Ti r e Co

. v . Ca rmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). In some ca ses, an expert’s experience alone may provide a sufficie nt basis for such te stimony
. Ga mm ill , 972 S.W .2d at 726. But the court is not require d to a dmit an e x pert’s opinion mere ly beca use the e x pert opines that his conclusion is valid. Gene ral Elec. Co. v. J oiner , 52 2 U. S. 13 6, 14 6 (1 997) ; Merre ll Dow Pharm., Inc . v. Hav ner , 953 S.W .2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997)
. There must not be too g reat a n analy tical g ap betwe en the data or obser vations and the e x pert’s c onclusions. Joiner , 522 U.S. at 1 4 6; Volkswagen of Am., Inc . v. Ramirez , N o . 0 2

- 0 5 5 7 , s li p o p . a t 8 , 2 0 0 4 T e x. L E X I S 1 4 2 9 , a t * 1 2 ( T e x. Dec . 31, 2004). The tr ial court ha s broad discr eti o n in determining admissibili ty of an e x pert’s testimony
. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d at 556-57.

We can reve rse the district c ourt’s dete rmination reg ardingadmission of the expert testimony only if the trial cour

t abuses its discretion. Id . at 558. We g aug e abuse of discretion by whether the trial court a cted without re fer ence to any g uiding r ules or princ iples. Se e id . We cannot find an abuse of discretion mer ely beca use we disag ree with the decision of the tr ial court. Se e id
. For d challeng es the trial c ourt’s admission of testimony by L edesma ’s ex perts, Ge ert A e rt s an d D a v i d H a l l , an d t h e e x c l u s i o no f

s o m e o f t h e t e s t i m o n y f

r o m F o r d ’ s e x p e rt , D anM a y.8

Ge e rt A e rts For d does not cha lleng e Ae rts’s qualification to give opinions , but contends that the fo un datio na l data

un de rl y inghis op ini on

is unr e liable and

that hi s me tho do log y

in a rr ivi nga t hi s opinion was flawe d.

Aer ts i s a metallurg ical and me chanic al eng ineer . His job is analy zing automotive components and a ccide nts that happen to a utomobiles. His primary

expertise conce rns leaf

-spring
su sp e ns ion s in

tr uc ks . In th e fi ve or

six y e ars pr e c e din g tr ia l, h e ana ly zed 15 0 f a ile d le a f s pr ing s. He a nd his c ompany beg an examining lea f spring s at the re quest of a le af- spring manufa cture r that had a p ro b lem with its product. The manufa cture r made 40-50% of all leaf spring s in the United States, including the one on L edesma ’s truck.

The lea f spring is a st ack of metal s trips that para llel the leng th of the truck on e ach side of the truc k. On top of ea ch lea f spring is a spring plate, or tie plate, to w hich two u-bolts are bo lte d, on e on e a c h side of the le a f spr ing
. Th e le g s of the u- bo lts e xten d thro ug h a nd a bo ve the tie p l at e, wi t h t h e l egs s ec u re d b y a n u t t i gh t en edo n t o ea ch l eg. T h er e i s al s o a p i nt h at p as s es t h ro u gh th e l e a v e s u

p t h r o u g h t h e c e n t e r

o f t h e t i e p l a t e . T h e a xl e h o u s i n g r e s t s i nt h e b a s e o f t h e u - b o lt, which is flattene d to provide a strong er a nd more stable c radle for the housing
. Ae rt s o pin e d th a t th e a xle dis pla c e d and the dr ive sh a ft dis lod g e d b e c a us e a u- bo lt i n the re ar le af- spring and axle assembly was defec tively

manufa cture d. He testified that the u-bolt was
manu fa c tur e d so that the le g s of the u- bo lt we re of dif fe re nt le ng ths and the fl a tte ne d p art of the ba se of the u-bolt was off cente r. Aer ts found t hat t he nuts on the u-bolt s on the spring assemblies we re9

tightene d well below f

actor y standards, but sa id some of the loosening might be attributed to either use or the f

orce of the c ollisi on.
Un e ve n le g le ng th

Aer ts testified that the unequa l leg leng ths of a u-bolt cause d the nuts to be tighte ned unevenly on that u-bolt—thirteen thre ads down on one leg , and only ten threa ds down on the other—diminishing its ability to clamp and a llowing vibration in the tie-plate holding toge ther the leaf spring and the a x le housing . This movement, he opined, e ventually broke the cente r pin of the tie plate and a llowed the axle to shift back enoug h to allow the drivesha ft to separ ate, f all, and strike the g round, pushi ng the ax le back and causing L edesma to lose control of the vehicle. Aer ts based his theory on measure ments of u-bolts, For d specific ations, and his experience
. Aer ts measured t h e u -bol t that failed, a u-bolt that did not fail, and an e x emplar ubolt. He also looked at For d’s design specifications. He found that the nut s on the u-bolt wer e not
a t th e sp e c if

ie d ti g htn e ss; he fo un d th a t th e y we re tor qu e d b e tw e e n 30 an d 1 30 fo ot- po un ds —w e ll short of the 185 foot- pounds sp ecif ied. On cr oss-examination, he admitted that this was not conclusiveevide nce of the tig htness at the assembly line beca use they might have loosened during use or b ec ause of

the ac cident. He found that the leg s of the def ective u- bolt differe d from ea ch other by 5 mm; Ford’s de sign spe cifications permit only a ± 2 mm va

ri anc e be tw e e n the le g s. Ae rt s testified that, althoug h the u-bolts twisted, these mea surements indicated that t h ey did not stretch during the ac cid en t o r, i f they did, that they

eac h stretche d the same a mount. He testified that no fo rc e s d ur ingthe a c c ide nt w ou ld c a us e the nu ts t o mo ve a lon g the bo lt w ith ou t stri pp ingthe thr e a ds
. Be cause he found no stripped threa ds, he conc luded that the position of the nuts on the bolts did not10

chang e betwe en the manuf actur e and the acc ident. He c oncluded that the u- bolt was outside of For d’s manufa cturing specific ations, rende ring the truck de fec tive.

Ae rt s th e or ize d th a t the de fe c tiv e u- bo lt a llo we d vib ratio n that c a us e d th e a sse mbl y to fail. He noted dents in the t ie pl ate holding the springassembly toge ther, indicating to him that the c e nte r p in o f t

he a sse mbl y

wa s v ibr a tin g and

kn oc kin g the nu t on

top of the c e nte r p in a g a ins t the tie plate. Aerts t estified that the indentation pattern showed that the vibration had be en g oing on for “ quite a while” and fa

tigue d the center pin. He said that, when the assembly is properly secur ed, t h er e i s n o s u ch v i b ra t i o nan d n o co n t ac tb et we en t h e n u tan d t h e t i e p l at e. He t es t i fi ed t h at , al t h o u gh the ce nter pin re mained in place afte r the a ccide nt, the t op of t he pin and the nut shea red of f in a wa y inconsistent with a fatig ue fr actur e. He said that the forc e of the driveshaf t f alling to the g round and pr on g ingin t

he str e e t w ou ld pr ov ide e no ug h fo rc e to sh e ar the c e nte r pin
. He sa id that the tr uc k d id not show damag e indicating sufficie nt forc e fr om the collision that would have shea red the pin; he
c on c e de d, ho we ve r, that he is n ot a n a c c ide nt r e c on str

uc tio nis t. For d contends that Aerts’s opinion is subjective belief a nd unsupported spec ulation beca use his foundational data was e ither suspec t or absent
. Fo rd co mplains that Aerts neve r inspected the torquing equipment that tightene d the nuts on the u-bolt, had no idea how d ee p the
so c ke ts o n th e e qu ipm e nt w e re , a nd did no t kn owwh eth er it cou ld t ig hte n th e nu ts s uf fi c ie ntl y despite the dispar ity

in t h e l en gth of the leg s. Aerts c oncede d on cross-e x amination that For d’s torquing equipment as de scribed by counsel could acc ommodate any differ ence in the leng th of the leg s of the u-bolt and tig hten the nuts sufficie ntly to meet the specific ations. He a lso conce ded that the ind e ntatio ns on

the tie plate we re de e pe r o n th e fr on t sid e , wh ic h F or d po sit s is c on sis te nt w ith11

the sudden impac t wi th the Fire bird. For d’s expert, Dan Ma y , testified that the socke ts on the tor qu ing e qu ipm e nt we re de e p e no ug h (4 inc he s) to of fs e t any ine qu a lity

in t he le ng th o f t

he u- bo lt le g s and that th e wr e nc h c ou ld t ig hten th e nu ts to t he re qu isi te tor qu e . F or d c omp la ins that A e rt s calc ulated the f

orce s cre ated by

the ac cident without knowing how fast L edesma was drivingor how much damag e was done to t he F irebird. F ord also complains that Ae rts rea soned bac kwar d from the
c on c lus ion

that th e u- bo lt w a s d e fe c tiv e , r a the r t ha n f or wa rd fr om a sse mbl e d f

a c ts. For d’s challeng e to A erts’s theory does not persua de us that the district cour t abused its discretion by

admitting Ae rts’s testimony
. For d’s attacks on Aerts’s the ory of whythe nuts were not tightene d sufficie ntly do not undermine his observa tion that the nuts on the u-bolt were ins uf fi c ie ntl y tig hte ne d in

a wa y tha t a llo we d th e u- bo lt t o f

a il. To prov e a

manu fa c tur ingde fe c t, L edesm a n ee d n o t prove that the manufa cturing proce ss is flawed, only that it produced a

flawe d p ro d u ct. See R idgway , 1 35 S.W. 3d a t 60 0; see also Parsons v. Ford M otor Co. , 8 5 S. W.3d 323, 329-30 (Te x . App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied)
. The plaintiff can prove the condition of the produc t by di rec t evidence , circ umstantial evidence , or infer ence s. See R idgway , 135 S.W .3d at 601; T orrington , 4 6 S. W. 3 d

a t 8 4 4

- 4 5
. A e rts me a s u r e d th e f a il e d u - b o lt an d f o u n d th a t t h e le g s w e re
uneven a nd that the nuts wer e not tightene d the s ame depth on those leg s or as on other bolts. He fo un d th a t, a ft e r the a c c ide nt, the nu ts we re no t a t the le ve ls of tig htn e ss s e t by F or d’ s sp e c if

ic a tio ns ;
a lth ou g h h e c on c e de d th a t th e nu ts mi gh t po ssi bly have loosened during use or the ac cident, he sa w no signs ( such as stripping of threa ds) that t he nuts moved s uddenly as a r esult of the ac cident. He
a lso ob se rv e d th e ind e nte d ti e plate and c on c lud e d th a t it sh ow e d that the re ar a sse mbl y wa s lo os e
and vib ratin g fo r q

uit e a wh ile be fo re the a c c ide nt. He a lso no te d th a t th e c e nte r p in o f t he tie plate12

shear ed off

, indicating a sudden f

ailure. A erts theor ized that the deviations from manu fa ct u ri ng specific ations, the signs of unusual wea r, and the nature of the detac hment of the drive shaft all show that the u-bolt on this three-month-old truc k was defec tively manufa cture d in a wa y that cause d the
a c c ide nt. Ae rt s d oe s n ot ap pe ar to ha ve ta ilo re d this a c c umu la te d d a ta to s up po rt

his op ini on . Cr os se xami na tio n o f A e rt s and

May ’s te sti mony c a st so me do ub t on Ae rt s’ s the or y , b ut d o n ot r e nd e r i t so unreliable a s to make the district cour t’s admission of Aerts’s testimony an abuse of discre tion.
Of f- c e nte r f la tte ne d b a se of

u- bo lt Aer ts also testified that the manufa cturing asy mmetry of the u-bolt manifested in a flattene d portion of the base of the u-bolt beingoff- cente r by three -quar

ters of an inch. He testified that flatte nin g the pa

rt of the u- bo lt sur

ro un din g the a xle hou sin g he lps it mat e be tte r w iththe a xle ho us ingand

be tte r b e ar t

hat lo a d. He state d th a t th e fl a t part bei ng off cent e r c a us e d it to m a te improperly

with the axle housing. Ae rts theorized that the round por tion of the u-bolt could have ind e nte d th e a xle h ou sin g and re la xed the u- bo lt n

ut t or qu e ; he state d a lte rn a tiv e ly that th e u-bolt could have been deforme d by the ax le, leadingto the same re duction in the u-bolt’s clamping power . He asserted that this, by itself or in conjunction with the unequa l leg leng th of the u-bolt, could have allowed the ax le to move awa y from the spring assembly and allowingthe drivesha ft to diseng ag e. Un de r c ro ss- e xami natio n, Aert s adm itted that he did

no t kn owwh e the r t

he a xle ho us ingwa s a c tua lly

ind e nte d. He c on c e de d th a t th e a xle h ou sin g c ou ld h a ve be e n h ard e no ug h to resist indentati o n , an d t h at he did not know how ha rd the a x le housing was. He never looked at L edesma ’s truck’ s axle housing
. For d’s expert, Dan May , inspected the truck a nd testified that he did not see any

indentation on the axle housing.13 For d argues that Aer

ts’s theory reg arding the eff ect of the off- cente r flatteningof the
u- bo lt l a c ks so lid

fo un datio n. F or d a

rgue s th a t hi s f

a ilure to r e se arc h th e ha

rd ne ss o f t he a xle housing or

to examine the axl e itself under mines his theory
. For d contends that the unc ontroverte d t e s t i m o n y t h a tt h e a x l e w a s u n d e n t e d d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e i n v a l i d i t y o f A e rt s ’ s t h e o r

y. We conclude that Ford ha s not shown an ana ly tical g ap sufficie nt to make the district court’s a dmission of thi s part of A erts’s testim ony err or. Evidence casting doubt on whether Aer ts’s the or y wa s re a lize d in this c a se may a ff e c t th e c re dib ili ty

of his op ini on , b ut i t do e s n ot d e mon str a te that the district court a

bus ed i t s d i scre tion by

finding that his theory

reg ardingthe ef

fec t of an asy mmetrically

flattene d u-bolt was re liable. See R obinson , 923 S.W .2d at 658.
Da v id H all Hall testified as L edesma ’s ac cident re constructi o n e xp e r t b a s e d larg ely

on his review of photog raphs. He s ai d that marks on the pavement and the damag e to the vehic les supported L edesma ’s ver sion of ev en ts. Hall testified that his testimony was ba sed on his experience and training , and that his methods wer e ac cepta ble in the field of a ccide nt rec onstruction. Hall said that an e nlarg ement of a photo of the accident scene, taken the day afte r the
a c cid ent by L edesma ’s fathe r w itha on e -u se c a me ra , s ho we d a mark on the pave me nt t

hat H a ll believed w as consistent with “prong ing” by the drivesha ft. He c oncede d that he could not tell how far fr o m t h e F irebird the ma rks wer e bec ause he did not know the foca l leng th of the ca mera that took the picture. H all opined that the mar k was in adva

nce of the Fir ebird in the di rection from wh i ch L ed es m a’ s t ru ckwa s t ra v el i n g, t h u s s u p p o rt i n g L ed es m a’ s v iew that the driveshaft diseng ag ed befor e the truck hit the Firebird. Hall di d not visit the s ite until long after the accident and after the14

marks on the pa

vement shown in the picture had disappea red. He did not test to see how e asy it was to make a ma

rk on the roa d. Hall said that the photo of the da mag e done to the F irebird indicated to him that the imp a c t w a s at a

low sp e e d a nd that the fe nd e r on the sid e of the tr uc k— no t th e tir e or

the wh e e l—h it the Fir ebird. He never persona lly examined the t ruck or the Fir ebird involved in the a ccide nt, but he did look at a F irebird with a similar body sty le. He note d that the truck’ s fende r wa s made of plastic and the e x emplar F irebird wa s mad e of metal. Hall testified that the low spee d of the collision supported his view that the drivesha ft dislodge d b ef o re t h e accident, be cause the impact forc es we re not suff

icient to have c aused the driveshaf t to disl odg e. For d contends that Ha ll’s testimony contains too many

assumptions and logic al leaps to be re liable. For d complains that his c onclusion about the prongmark wa s based on his view of
a m a r k i na g r a i n y p h o t o . F o r d

a t t a c k s t h e r e l i a

b i l i t y o f H a l l ’ s a s s e rt i o nt h att h e r e w a s a c tu a l l y a mark on the paveme nt ( rathe r than a flaw in the film) and his dec ision that thi s mark wa s made by the truck’ s driveshaf

t. Ford a sserts that Hall’s testimony is further unde rmined by

his failure to take
measure ments, prepa

re dia g rams, or othe rwise r ec o n s t ru ct t he ac cident. F ord noted that a police of fi c e r w ho re sp on de d to the a c c ide nt r e c a lle d n o g ou g e mark s in the pave me nt. For d also attac ks Hall’s testimony about the impact on the Fire bird. For d complains that H a ll’ s f

a ilure to e xami ne e ith e r v e hic le re nd e rs sp e c ulativ e his c a lc ulatio ns ba se d o n th e de pth of indentation of the Fire bird. For d also complains that Hall failed to c onsider damag e t o t he F ir e bir d not ev ide nt fr om the pic tur e s, inc lud ing the le ft wh e e l and

a xle h ou sin g be ingbe nt, the a xle tube and se am beingbroken, a s well as dama g e to the left re ar c ontrol arm, the pa nhard ba r, and the15

left re ar shoc k absorbe r—all of which amounted to $2568 in r epair s. For d criticizes Hall’s re liance on the picture despite this repa ir evidenc e. F ord conte nds that this deliberate r ef u s al to consider contra ry evidenc e re nders Ha ll’s opinion unreliable. W e d o n o tfi n d

an y erro r i nt h e ad m i s s i o n o f Ha l l ’s t es t i m o n y . Fo rd ’s cr i t i ci s m s go to the cre dibilit y , not the reliability of Hall’s theories. He wa s subject to vigor ous cross-e x amination reg ardingthe ac cura cy

of his opinions. W e find no a buse of discr etion in its admiss ion. Dan May May

testified for F ord reg arding its manufa cturing proce ss, but the cour t prohibited him from offeringopinions related to ac cident re construction bec ause he was not traine d in acc ident
re c on str uc tio n. Th e c ourt a lso pr e ve nte d him fr om g ivi ng his op ini on that th e dama g e to t he u- bo lt demonstrated that it broke bec ause of a collision, not simpl e fa ilure. For d argues that the lawdoes not requir e spec ial training in acc ident rec onstruction and that it need only s h o w t h at an expert possesses spe cial knowledg e on the matter on which he proposes to g ive an opinion. Se e Br od e rs v . H e ise , 924 S.W .2d 148, 15 2 -5 3 (T ex . 1996). F ord
c o n te n d s th a t M ay ’ s e n g in e e r in g tr a in in g ( b a c h e lo r ’ s an d ma s te r ’ s d e g r e e s in

mecha nical eng ineer ing) and his experience in the desig n and manuf actur e of truc ks (31 y ear s at For d, 25 of whi c h w e re sp e nt a s a

“ tr uc k e ng ine e r” ) q

ua lif y him to g ive an e xpe rt

op ini on . F or d p art ic ula

rl y touts his y ear s planning the manufa cture of lea f-springand re ar- axle assemblies in medium and he a vy tr uc ks sim ila

r t o th e pa

rt s at is su e he re an d his mo re tha n s ix y e ars a s a

de sig n a na ly sis
e ng ine e r, wh ic h r e qu ir e d him to inve sti g a te a pp ro xima te ly 12 0 “e ve nts ” to de te rm ine the ro ot c a us e of any fa ilure in t

he ve hic le s. F or d a sse rt s th a t th is w a s h arm fu l be cause M ay ’s te sti mony wo uld16

have suppor

ted For d’s theory

that the u-bolt failed a s a re sult of direct contact between the tires of the truck a

nd the Fir ebird, a

nd that the drivesha ft did not disenga g e until after the collision. We f in d n o a b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n in th e e xc lu s io n o f M ay ’ s te s ti mo n y r e g ar d in g the

cause of the a x le displace ment. May undisputedly

lacks tra ining in ac cident re construction. He has
so me pr a c tic a l expe ri e nc e in his job wi th F or d, bu t hi s te sti mony c on ta ine d s uf

fi c ie nt u nc e rt a int y to
su pp or t the c ourt ’s de c isi on . M ay did no t e xpla in h owthe re la tiv e ly min or e xter na l da ma g e to b oth vehicles squa

red w ith his t heory

that the tire-to -t i re co l l i sion caused the axle to dis place . He repe atedly

insisted that the u-bolt stretched dur ing the acc ident sequenc e, eve n though he did not
measure it, before eventua lly conce ding that he had no wa y of knowing whether

it stretched. Ma

y had no test data

to know the likelihood that the collision could cause the axle to dis place
. The standa

rd of revie w defeats F ord’s c omplaint. The abuse- of-discr etion standard require s that we let court decisions s tand s o long as the court acted w ith refe renc e to g uiding r ules
or p ri nciples. Robinson , 9 23 S.W. 2d a t 55 8. We m ay

no t r e ve rs e fo r a

bu se of dis c re tio n me re ly beca use we disag ree with the decision of t he trial court. Se e id
. The rang e of discre tion means that the same r ecor d could support af firming opposite conclusions on the same expert. I n this case, no abuse of discretion is shown.
The court’s c harge

For d contends that the dis trict court g ave le g ally incorre ct def

initions of manufa cturing defe ct and producing cause in the jury char g e. Although the court’s de finitions track tho se pr ov ide d in

the patte rn

jur y c ha rg e , F or d c on te nd s th a t th e patte rn jur y c ha rg e is i nc or

re c t. Whether def

initions used in the cha

rg e misstate t he law is a leg al question that we r eview de novo
.17

St. J os e ph Ho sp . v . W

olf f , 94 S.W .3d 513, 525 (Tex. 2003). But we reve rse f or er ror in a c ivil jury char g e only

if, in light of the e ntire re cord, the err or proba bly cause d the rendition of an imprope r judgme nt. Reinhart v. Y

oung , 9 06 S.W. 2d

47 1, 47 3 ( Te x. 19 95 ); se e als o Tex. R. App. P
. 44.1. An incorre ct instruction is more likely to cause reve rsible er

ror with shar

ply contra sting evidenc e in a contested tria l. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies , 47 S.W .3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001).
Manu facturing defec t The supreme court has written that “[a] manufa cturing defe ct ex ists when a product deviates, in its construction or quality , from the spe cifications or planned output in a manner that rende rs it unrea sonably

dang erous.” Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d at 600. A plaintiff must prove that the product wa s defe ctive whe n it left the hands of the manufa cture r and that the defe ct was a produc ing
cause of the plaintiff’ s injuries. Id
.

For d asser

ts that the court misstated the law be cause it omit ted lang uag e that dis tin g uis he s manu fa c tur ing de fe c ts fr om oth e r c on dit ion s re nd e ri ng a pro du ct unr e a so na bly dang erous. The court asked, “Was there a manufa cturing defe ct in the 1999 For d F- 350 pickup truck
a t th e tim e it l e ft

F or d’ s p os se ssi on

tha t w a s a pr od uc ingc a use o f t he June 5, 19 99 inc ide nt i n question? ” The district court then provide d the following definition:
A “ de fe c t” me ans a

c on dit ion of the pr od

uc t tha t r e nd e rs it unr e a so na

bly da ng e ro us . An “unr easona

bly dang erous” product is one that is dange rous to an extent bey ond that which would be c ontemplated by the ordinar

y user of the product, with the or din ary kn ow le dg e c omm on

to t he c omm un ity a s to the pr od

uc t’ s c ha ra c te ri sti c s.18

For d reque sted that m anufacturing defe ct be de fined a s “a phy sical depa rture f rom the produc t’s intended desig n that rende rs i t u n rea sonably dang erous.” For d contends that the omission of lang uag e re quiring proof of deviation fr o m the manufa cture r’s plans or specific ations omits an
e sse nti a l ele me nt of L e de sma ’s c a us e of a c tio n on whi c h he bo re the burd e n o f p ro of . Witho ut t

his
e le me nt, F or d a

rgue s, L e de sma

c ann ot r e c ov e r f

ro m F or d f

or a manu fa c tur ingde fe c t. The issue pre sented, therefor e, is whether the di strict court mi sstated t he law by using the term “ condition” in the definition instead of F ord’s more detailed r equeste d lang uag e: “phy sical depar ture fr om the product’s intende d desig n.” The El Paso court re cently fac ed a striking ly

simil ar challeng e to an a lmost i dentical jury instr u ct i o n for whic h the manufa cture r propose d, but was d en i ed , a similar alter

native def

inition of manufactur ing de fec t. Co o p e r Ti r e & R u b b e r Co . v. Mende z , 155 S.W .3d 382, 390-91 (Te x . App.—El Paso 2004, pet. fil ed). The El Paso court conclude d that the m ore specific definition reque sted by the manufa cture r wa s not require d by Texas law. Id . at 391. We find no ca se holding that this charg e is err oneous.

Even i f t he def

inition were e rrone ous, we find no ha rm in this case. Althoug h the evidenc e contr asts sharply , the clar ity of the c o n t ra s t and the nature of the instructions give n and de nie d ma

ke s th e e rr or , if

any , h arm le ss. Manuf

act urin g de fe c t is the on ly the or y tha t L e de sma pr e se nte d. I n f

a c t, F or d d ir e c tly

a sk e d A e rt s, “ Th e op ini on that y ou ’r e of

fe ri ng he re tod a y

is a
manu fact urin g de fe c t r e la te d to the U- bo lt, is t hat r ig ht?” A e rt s r e sp on de d, “ Ye s. ” Th e on ly
e vid e nc e of de fe c t pre se nte d to the jur y is the de viatio n of the u- bo lt f ro m sp e c if

ic a tio ns , w hic h is the e sse nc e of

manu fa c tur ingde fe c t un de r F or d’ s de fi nit ion
. L e de sma ’s the or ie s of the a c c ide nt r e ly19

on the manu fa c tur ing de fe c t pe rm itt ingthe dr ive sh a ft to d isl od g e a

br up tly and c a us e the a c c ide nt. Th e jur y fo un d L e de sma ’s e vid e nc e of de fe c t c re dib le and , a s a

re su lt, fo un d a

manu fa c tur ingde fe c t. Th e omi ssi on

of the wo rd s li mit ingthe natur e of the de fe c t di d n ot a ff e c t th e ve rd ic t be c a

us e the on ly evidenc e of de fec t was t hat t he truck as manufa cture d depar ted phy sically

from the manuf

actur er’ s sp e c if ic a tio ns . E ve n if the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d by re je c tin g F or d’ s re qu e ste d d e fi nit ion , th e e rr or did not harm F ord.
Pr od uc ing c aus e A produc ing c ause is “a

substantial fac tor which brings about the i njury and without which the injury

would not have oc curr ed.” Doe v . Boys Clubs of Gre ater Dallas, Inc. , 907 S.W .2d 472, 481 (Tex. 1995). The c ourt define d producing cause in acc ord with the patter n jury char g e as

“ an e ff ic ie nt, e xcit ing , o r c on tr ibutin g c a us e that, i n a

natur a l se qu e nc e , p ro du c e s th e inc ide nt i n question.” F ord objec ted that this definition doe s not a ccur ately state the law. For d asser ts that the char g e g iven is wrong b ecause it err oneously repla ces “ substantial” with the words “ eff icient,” “exciting,” and “c ontributing” to modify the term “ca

use.” F ord also complains that the de finition g iven did not info rm t he jury that the ca

use must be one without which the e vent would not have
occur red. I n sum, Ford contends that the court should ha ve told the jury

that it must find ca

usationin-fac t. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd. , 896 S.W .2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).

For d ignor es supre me cour t prec edent using lang uag e almost ident i ca l to that used in the char g e: Producing cause require s that the acts be both a cause -in-fa ct a n d a “ s u bstantial fac tor” in ca

using the injuries. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton , 898 S.W .2d 773, 77520

(T e x. 19 95 ); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Je fferson Assocs. Ltd. , 8 9 6 S. W. 2 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 1 ( T e x. 19 95 ). A p ro ducing c a

us e is a n e ff ic ie nt, e xcit ing , o r c on tr ibutin g c a us e , w hic h in th e n a tu r a l s e qu e n c e o f e v e n ts , p r o d u c e s in ju r ie s o r d a ma g e s . Ha

yn es & Boone v

. Bowser Bouldin, Lt d. , 896 S.W .2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1995). Brown v. Bank of Galve

ston, Nat’l Ass’n , 963 S.W .2d 511, 514 (Tex. 1998). Even in the c ases c ited by For d, there is no indication that the supreme c ourt has re jected the “ef

ficient, ex ci t i n g, or contributing ” def

inition quot ed in Br own . Se e ge ne ra lly , Trini ty Unive rsal Ins. Co. v. Bleek er , 966 S.W .2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1998) (dec ided less than one month af ter Br own ); Doe , 907 S.W .2d at 481. A ca se F ord uses to def

in e producing cause as ca usation-in-fa ct uses the “ eff icient, exciting or contribut i n g” d ef

i n i t i on of produc ing c ause. See U nion Pump , 898 S.W .2d at 775. For d cites no authority reje cting the def

inition given. We find no err or. The district c ourt’s re quirement that the c au s e be one that “produc es t h e in c id e n t” is n o t d is c e r n ib ly d if f e r e n t f r o m F o r d ’ s r e qu e s t t

h a t t h e c a u s e b e o ne “wi t h o u t wh i ch the eve nt would not have occ urre d.” Althoug h the terms “e fficie nt, exciti ng , or contributing cause ” do not ne cessa rily conjure prec isely the same me aning as the ter m “substantial fa c tor ,” the y

do no t c le arl y

dif fe r sig nif ic antl y ; mor e imp or

tant, the su

pr e me c ourt

ha s u se d b oth

to define producingcause . Se e Trin ity , 9 66 S.W. 2d a t 49 1; se e als o B ro wn , 9 63 S.W .2d at 514. Absent a supr eme c ourt dec laration that “eff icient, exciting, or c ontributing c ause” is improper, the district c ourt did not err by using that definition. See Carousel’s Cream ery, L.L.C. v. Marble Slab Creamery , Inc. , 134 S.W .3d 385, 399 (Tex. App.—Hous t o n [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. filed) ( using Br own de fi nit ion ); se e als o Co mp ton & Ad am s W ar e ho us e, I

nc . v . P owe rs , No. 04-04-00099- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 9192, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 20, 2004, no pet.) (me m. op.).21

Legal suf fi ciency of the evidence F or d c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the ve rd ic t. Apa

rt y attackingthe leg al suffic iency of an a dverse finding of an issue on which it did not have the burde n of proof must de monstrate on appea l that the re is no evidenc e to support the adve rse f inding. See Croucher v. Crouche r , 660 S.W .2d 55, 58 (T ex. 1983). I n revie wing a no-e vidence issue, we a re to consider only

the evidenc e fa

voring the finding , d is r e g a r d in g a ll d ir e c t and circ umstantial evidence to the contra

ry . Lenz v. Lenz , 7 9 S. W.3 d 10, 1 3 ( Te x. 20 02 ); Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez , 937 S.W .2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1996). We must determine whe ther the pr offe red e vidence as
a wh ole ri ses to a

le ve l th a t w ou ld e na

ble re a so na

ble and fa ir -m ind e d p e op le to d if fe r i n th e ir conclusions. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel , 879 S.W .2d 10, 25 (Tex. 1994).

F or d’ s ce ntr a l con te nti on re g ard ing the la c k of ev ide nc e is that L e de sma ’s e xpe rt s’ testimony was unreliable and provided no evidenc e of a manuf actur ing de fec t. We have discussed these a rg uments above. We have conc luded that the testimony was suff iciently reliable to support its a dmi ssi on . I t is lik e wi se so me e vid e nc e to s up po rt the jur y ’s ve rd ic t. L edesma ’s t estimony provides som e evidence to support his theory of manufa cturing de fe c t. E vid e nc e of

ma lf un c tio n c an p ro vid e c ir c ums tanti al evi de nc e of manu fa c tur ingde fe c t. Gene ral Motors Corp. v. Hopkins , 5 48 S.W. 2d 34 4, 34 9- 50 (T e x. 19 77 ); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Gonzalez , 9 S.W. 3d

19 5, 19 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 19 99 , n o p e t.) ; Sip es v . G e ne ra l M oto rs Corp. , 946 S.W .2d 143, 155 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1997, writ denied) . The c ircumstantial evidenc e must provide more than mere suspicion. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d at 601. I n Ridgway , the supreme c ourt found that cir cumstantial evidenc e of the source of a ve hicle fire provided no evidence22

of a ma nufac turing defe ct. Id
. But the court’s determination centere d on fac ts not prese nt here : the truck had been driven 54,000 miles by previous owners who had modi fied and repa ired the truc k, the plaintiff testified only that a fire occurre d, and the expert testified t hat he suspec ted the ele ctrica l sy stem was to blame a

nd could not rule out the fue l sy stem as a c ause. Id . Her e, L edesma testified that he wa s the sole owner , that he had dr iven the truc k 4100 miles in his t hree months of ownership, and that the truc k had not bee n repa ired or modifie d. I n addition to evidence that the drivesha ft diseng ag ed, ther e wa s evidenc e that it happene d suddenly and while the truck was driving down a clea r stree t. L edesma ’s experts pinpointed the u-bolt that did not meet manufa cturing specific ations as the c ause, a

nd the d i s en gag ement of the driveshaf t under the c onditions L edesma descr ibed provide some e vidence of a ma nufac turing defe ct. See Parsons v . Ford Motor Co. , 85 S.W .3d 323, 329-30 (Te x . App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied)
.

F or d p ro vid e d e y e wi tne ss t e sti mony that c on tr a dic te d L e de sma ’s ve rs ion of e ve nts and expert testimony

contra dicting his e x perts’ te sti m o ny . The jury reje cted F ord’s ve rsion and be lie ve d L e de sma ’s e vid e nc e . M or e imp or tantl y , the e vid e nc e c on tr ary to the ve rd ic t is no t w ith in the scope of our r eview unde r the leg al suffic iency standard. See Lenz , 79 S.W .3d at 13. The re cord c ontains more than a scintilla of evidenc e that L edesma ’s truck diff ere d, in i ts c on str

uc tio n o r q

ua lity , f ro m th e sp e c if

ic a tio ns in a

mann e r t hat r e nd e red i t unr e a so na bly dang erous. The rec ord also conta ins evidence that this defec t cause d this accide nt and L edesma ’s dama g e s.23 CO NC LU SION The district cour

t did not ab u s e it s d is c retion by admitting the testimony

of L edesma ’s experts and excluding some of the testimony

of F ord’s e x pert re g ardingthe ac cident. The instructions challeng ed we re not e rrone ous and, eve n if they wer e, did not harm F ord. The r ecor d
c on ta ins le g a lly

su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the jud g me nt. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton: Opinion by Chief J ustice L aw; ConcurringOpinion by

J ustice Pemberton Affir med Filed: May

5, 2005