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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALSHIEM THOMPSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1156 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 22, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): Cp-51-CR-0011042-2007

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALSHIEM THOMPSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1157 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 22, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0007558-2007

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2020

Appellant, Alshiem Thompson, appeals from the post-conviction court’s 

March 22, 2019 order denying his petition filed under the Post Conviction 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, in his two separate cases that 

were consolidated below.1 We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history 

of Appellant’s case, as follows:

On January 15, 2009, at docket number CP-51-CR0007558-2007, following a non-jury trial before the Honorable 

Linda A. Carpenter of this [c]ourt, [Appellant] was convicted of 

one count of ... possessing a controlled substance (35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(16)). On April 9, 2009, Judge Carpenter imposed a 

sentence of three to eighteen months[’] incarceration, to be 

followed by eighteen months of reporting probation. However, on

March 12, 2012, following a violation of parole or probation 

(“VOP”) proceeding, Judge Carpenter revoked [Appellant’s] 

probation and resentenced [him] to time served to twenty-three

months[’] incarceration.

On April 28, 2009, at docket number CP-51-CR-0011042-

2007, [Appellant] pled guilty, before the Honorable Rayford A. 

Means of this [c]ourt, to one count of possession with intent to

deliver a controlled substance (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30)). On 

that date, Judge Means imposed the negotiated sentence of nine 

to twenty-three months[’] incarceration, to be followed by a fiveyear period of reporting probation.

On September 24, 2012, [Appellant] was arrested for

multiple firearms violations after he was discovered to be 

concealing a loaded handgun in the vehicle. Because the alleged 

firearms violations would be a direct violation of [Appellant’s] 

parole in the case at docket number CP-51-CR-0007558-2007 and 

of his probation in the case at docket number CP-51-CR-0011042-

2007, VOP proceedings were initiated in each case. Both of these 

matters were transferred to the undersigned judge under the First 

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1 Appellant properly filed separate notices of appeal in each case. See 

Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018) (holding that “the 

proper practice under [Pa.R.A.P.] 341(a) is to file separate appeals from an 

order that resolves issues arising on more than one docket”). We consolidate 

his appeals herein.
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Judicial District’s Focused Deterrence Program.1 The [c]ourt held 

a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701 

(Pa. 1973) (“Daisey Kates hearing”)[,] on September 3, 2013, and 

found [Appellant] in direct violation of his parole and probation in 

the above cases and therefore revoked both. That same day, the 

[c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] to back[-]time for the parole 

violation case, while continuing sentencing for the probation 

violation case. On November 14, 2013, the [c]ourt resentenced 

[Appellant] to 11⁄2 to 5 years[’] incarceration, to be followed by 3 

years[’] reporting probation, for the probation violation case. 

[Appellant] filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which 

the [c]ourt denied on April 10, 2014. Rania Major, Esquire[,]

represented [Appellant] at VOP proceedings, sentencing, and on

post-sentence motions. On May 15, 2014, Ms. Major was 

permitted to withdraw as counsel. The [c]ourt subsequently 

appointed Jennifer Ann Santiago, Esquire[,] on May 16, 2014.

1 Focused Deterrence was a First Judicial District program 

aimed at reducing gun violence arising from gang-related

activity.

On appeal, Ms. Santiago filed a petition to withdraw with the 

Superior Court, along with a brief stating that the appeal was 

frivolous pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967)[,] and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 

2009). On April 14, 2015, the Superior Court affirmed the 

judgment of sentence and granted counsel’s petition to withdraw,

agreeing that the appeal was wholly frivolous. [Commonwealth 

v. Thompson, 121 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished 

memorandum).]

On May 11, 2015, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition under 

the [PCRA].... On April 18, 2018, David S. Rudenstein, Esquire[,] 

was appointed to represent [Appellant]. ... [Attorney] Rudenstein

subsequently ... filed an amended PCRA petition (“Amended

Petition”) on August 24, 2018, claiming that VOP counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to [Appellant’s] VOP cases being 

placed in the Focused Deterrence Program because the program

violated [Appellant’s] rights to equal protection and due process. 

Amended Petition at ¶ 15. On February 8, 2019, the [c]ourt ruled 

that the claim set forth in [Appellant’s] petition was without merit. 

That day, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the [c]ourt issued notice 

of its intention to dismiss the petition without a hearing (“907 

Notice”). On March 22, 2019, the [c]ourt formally dismissed

[Appellant’s] PCRA Petition.
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PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 6/26/19, at 1-3.

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal in each of his underlying cases, 

and he complied with the PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. The PCRA court filed a Rule 

1925(a) opinion on June 26, 2019. Herein, Appellant states two issues for our 

review: 

I. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it denied relief and dismissed the 

PCRA [p]etition even though []Appellant received ineffective 

assistance of trial/hearing and appellate counsel, where trial 

counsel should have objected to the case being placed in the

Focused Deterrence Program, as it violated law, and where 

appellate counsel filed an Anders Brief with the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania?

II. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it denied relief and dismissed 

the PCRA [p]etition even though the case should have been 

remanded to the courtrooms of the two Judges who originally had 

jurisdiction in Appellant’s matters, as both were/are still sitting 

judges in the Court of Common Pleas?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. Appellant’s arguments in support of these issues are 

related and, therefore, we will address them together.

Preliminarily, we observe that,

“[o]n appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and 

scope of review is limited to determining whether 

the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and without 

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 

(Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “[Our] scope of review is limited to 

the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at 

the PCRA court level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, ... 36 A.3d 

121, 131 ([Pa.] 2012) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s 

credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are 

binding on this Court.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, ... 18 A.3d 

244, 259 ([Pa.] 2011) (citation omitted). “However, this Court 
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applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214–15 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en

banc).

Additionally, where, as here, a petitioner claims that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel, our Supreme Court has stated that:

[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place.” Generally, counsel’s 

performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and 

counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing 

by the petitioner. To obtain relief, a petitioner must demonstrate 

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency 

prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner establishes prejudice when 

he demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” ... [A] properly pled claim of 

ineffectiveness posits that: (1) the underlying legal issue has 

arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective 

reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice befell the petitioner 

from counsel’s act or omission. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (Pa. 2009) (citations 

omitted). 

Presently, Appellant contends that his trial/VOP counsel acted 

ineffectively by not objecting to each of his cases “being listed before [a new 

judge] in the Focused Deterrence Program instead of going before each of the 

original judges[,] for each of the violations, separately.” Appellant’s Brief at 

9. Appellant insists that the transfer of his cases violated the mandate of 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 700(A) that, “the judge who presided at the trial or who received 
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the plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall impose sentence unless there are 

extraordinary circumstances which preclude the judge’s presence.” Appellant 

also claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for filing an Anders brief 

on direct appeal from his VOP sentences, rather than raising a claim that Rule 

700 was violated.

We begin by noting that, according to the PCRA court, the only claim 

presented in Appellant’s petition was an assertion that his trial/VOP counsel 

was ineffective for not objecting to the transfer of Appellant’s cases to the 

Focused Deterrence Program.2 Thus, Appellant waived his contention that his 

appellate counsel acted ineffectively. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not 

raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.”).3

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2 We cannot verify whether the PCRA court is correct in its characterization of 

Appellant’s petition, as that document is not contained in the certified record

that was electronically filed with this Court. However, we note that Appellant 

raises no objection to the court’s description of the claim presented in his 

petition. Additionally, “[i]t is well[-]settled that the [a]ppellant bears the 

burden of ensuring a completed record.” Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 932 

A.2d 992, 996 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation and footnote omitted). 

Consequently, we accept the court’s statement that Appellant set forth in his 

petition only a claim of trial/VOP counsel’s ineffectiveness.

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In any event, we would reject this ineffectiveness claim. In arguing that his 

appellate counsel should have challenged the transfer of his cases to the 

Focused Deterrence Program as violating Rule 700, Appellant relies on 

Commonwealth v. McNeal, 120 A.3d 313 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that 

the transfer of McNeal’s VOP hearing from the judge who presided over his 

trial and sentencing, to the judge overseeing his new charges, violated Rule 

700, as the basis for the transfer was mere convenience, and not an 

‘extraordinary circumstance’). Appellant also improperly relies on our non-
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In regard to Appellant’s assertion that his trial/VOP counsel acted 

ineffectively by not objecting to the transfer of his cases to the Focused 

Deterrence Program, the record clearly belies this claim. As the PCRA court 

points out, VOP counsel did object - at length - to Appellant’s cases being 

placed in the Focused Deterrence Program. See PCO at 5 (citing N.T., 9/3/13, 

at 6-17; N.T., 11/14/13, at 7-27). Counsel also “raised and extensively 

briefed the issue in [Appellant’s] motion for reconsideration of sentence.” Id.

(citing Appellant’s Post-Trial Motion for Reconsideration, 11/25/13, at 3-5, 

10). We agree with the PCRA court that, “VOP counsel could not have been 

ineffective for failing to raise a claim that she did, in fact, extensively raise in 

the VOP court.” Id. Moreover, Appellant makes no attempt to explain 

how/why counsel inadequately raised this issue. Instead, he simply states 

that counsel “should have raised an objection” and her “[n]ot objecting was 

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precedential decision in Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 88 EDA 2017, 

unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 31, 2017) (determining that, 

under McNeal, Smith’s selection for the Focused Deterrence Program was not 

an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ permitting the transfer of his case under Rule 

700). See 210 Pa.Code § 65.37 (“An unpublished memorandum decision filed 

prior to May 2, 2019, shall not be relied upon or cited by a Court or a party in 

any other action or proceeding,” except in limited circumstances). Notably, 

however, both McNeal and Smith (which, again, is not binding precedent) 

were both filed after we affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Our 

Supreme Court has held that “[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 

failing to predict developments or changes in the law.” Commonwealth v. 

Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 464 (Pa. 2004) (citation omitted). 
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ineffective.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Because counsel did object, Appellant’s 

argument fails to overcome the presumption that counsel acted effectively.4

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/6/20

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4

In any event, we note that, according to the PCRA court, Appellant “has fully 

served his parole violation sentence at docket number CP-51-CR-0007558-

2007....” PCO at 6 n.3. Thus, even if his ineffectiveness claims were 

meritorious, he would be ineligible for PCRA relief in that case. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9543(a)(1)(i) (directing that, to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner 

must be currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole 

for the crime). The PCRA court also noted that in the case docketed at CP51-CR-0011042-2007, Appellant is currently serving probation and, “on 

August 23, 2018, the supervision of [his] probation was transferred back to 

Judge Means with the agreement of all parties.” PCO at 6 n.3. 
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