IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 2, 2021 Session

IN RE CONSERVATORSHIP OF JOHN BRUCE WILSON, JR.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Montgomery County

No. MC-CH-CV-CP-14-19 Laurence M. McMillan, Jr., Judge

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No. M2021-00145-COA-R3-CV

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This appeal arises from a conservatorship case in which the chancery court authorized the 

attorneys ad litem for the ward of the conservatorship to enter into a compromise and 

settlement regarding a dispute among the ward and his four siblings over their deceased 

father’s estate. The sole issue on appeal is whether the Chancellor abused his discretion in 

finding the settlement was in the ward’s best interest. Finding no abuse of discretion, we 

affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D.

BENNETT and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Andrea T. McKellar and Jason E. Havens, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bennett 

Gordon Scott Wilson.

Aubrey L. Brown, Jr. and Leigh T. White, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Deborah 

Laverne French, Valerie Dawn Keating, and Meredith Emily Wilson Lounge. 

R. Horton Frank, III and David J. Pflaum, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys ad litem for the 

appellee, John Bruce Wilson, Jr. 

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The ward of this conservatorship is John Bruce Wilson, Jr. (“John Jr.”). He is one 

of five children of the late John Bruce Wilson (“Father”). The other four children are 

Deborah Laverne French, Valerie Dawn Keating, Meredith Emily Wilson Lounge 

(collectively, the “Daughters”) and Bennett Gordon Scott Wilson (“Scott”). All of the 

children are adults.

03/15/2022
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On June 12, 2014, Scott filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Montgomery 

County seeking a conservatorship for the benefit of his brother, John Jr. The petition 

alleged that John Jr. had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety 

disorder, and schizoaffective disorder and was incapable of managing his own affairs. On 

August 8, 2014, following the appointment of a guardian ad litem and an evidentiary

hearing, the chancellor found that John Jr. was a disabled person as that term is defined by 

the conservatorship statute and in need of assistance, protection and supervision. Based on 

these findings, the chancellor created the conservatorship and appointed Scott as the 

conservator of the person and property of John Jr.

Father died one month later on September 9, 2014.1 Father had a substantial estate, 

including as many as fifty parcels of real estate and more than sufficient liquid assets to 

afford an attorney to provide guidance concerning his estate planning. Nevertheless, Father 

acted alone in preparing and executing his Last Will and Testament (the “Will”) and the 

John Bruce Wilson Separate Property Trust (the “Trust”).2 Although it is undisputed that

Father was a Tennessee resident, the Will and Trust were fill-in-the blank forms intended 

for use by California residents. To further complicate matters, Father executed both 

documents on May 2, 2000, when he was in Florida. Although he signed both instruments 

before a notary public, there were no witnesses to Father’s execution of either instrument. 

Pursuant to the Will, all of Father’s assets poured over into the Trust. All five of 

Father’s children are beneficiaries of the Trust; however, John Jr. was the principal 

beneficiary of the Trust while Scott was awarded a smaller beneficial interest than John Jr. 

and the Daughters an even smaller beneficial interest. More specifically, Father 

subsequently directed in an Amendment to the Trust that the successor co-trustees, 3 Scott 

and John Jr., distribute the real estate in kind following his death.4 Father directed certain 

specified parcels be conveyed to John Jr., some be conveyed to Scott, and other parcels be 

conveyed to John Jr. and Scott jointly. All remaining property was to be divided equally 

among the five children.

 

1 He was not married.

2 Father owned approximately fifty parcels of real estate in and around Montgomery County, 

Tennessee, which he conveyed to the Trust. The parcels were also listed on the Schedule A to the trust 

instrument.

3 Father was the Trustee until his death.

4 The conservatorship rendered John Jr. incompetent to serve as co-trustee of the Trust.
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In the months following Father’s death, a dispute arose among the children 

concerning the validity of the Will and Trust.5 The first of several actions relating to 

Father’s estate was commenced on May 5, 2015, when Daughters filed a Complaint for 

Declaratory Relief in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee 

(the “district court”). Scott and John Jr. were made defendants to the action. The complaint 

sought to declare the law governing the Trust and, following such ruling, leave to amend 

the complaint to seek additional relief.

On December 8, 2015, the district court issued a Memorandum Order granting the 

Daughters’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Choice of Law. Citing Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 35-15-108, the district court ruled that “the state jurisdiction provision” 

of the Trust was not valid. The court also ruled that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 

§ 35-15-107, Florida law applied because Father had executed the Trust while in Florida.

The Daughters subsequently filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory 

Judgment and for Breach of Trust. The Amended Complaint alleged that Scott and John 

Jr., in their capacities as successor co-trustees of the Trust, were guilty of breaches of trust 

and that the Trust was not executed in compliance with Florida law, which required that an 

inter vivos trust to be executed in compliance with the formalities of a will. For these and 

other reasons the Daughters contended the testamentary provisions of the Trust were 

invalid. The Daughters then filed their Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as 

to Validity and Enforceability of Certain Provisions of the Trust.

In the interim, the Daughters filed a petition in the Montgomery County Chancery 

(Probate) Court to administer Father’s intestate estate, contending he died without a will.

6

Shortly thereafter, Scott made an appearance in the probate proceeding instituted by 

Daughters and asserted that Father died testate, not intestate, and that the Will should be 

admitted to probate. On February 4, 2016, the Montgomery County Probate Court ruled 

that Father’s Will conformed to the requirements of Tennessee law for execution of a 

testamentary instrument, admitted it to probate, and appointed Scott as Executor of Father’s

estate.

On December 8, 2016, Scott filed a motion in the conservatorship action in the 

Montgomery County Chancery Court asking the court to appoint independent counsel to 

represent John Jr. due to conflicts of interest between Scott and John Jr. regarding the 

district court litigation. Finding that conflicts of interest prevented Scott from acting on 

 

5

It is undisputed that Father was a Tennessee resident at the time of his death, as well as when he 

executed the Will and Trust.

6

It is undisputed that Father was a resident of Montgomery County, Tennessee.
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John Jr.’s behalf regarding the Daughter’s challenges to the Will and Trust, the chancellor 

appointed R. Horton Frank, III and David J. Pflaum to serve as John Jr.’s attorneys ad 

litem. 

On March 14, 2018, John Jr.’s attorneys ad litem filed a Response in Opposition to 

the Daughters’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the district court. They 

argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Daughters’ claims

and that the dispositive provisions of the Trust were invalid. Four days later, John Jr.’s 

attorneys ad litem filed a Motion to Dismiss Claims for Declaratory Relief for Lack of 

Subject Matter Jurisdiction. In their motion, the attorneys ad litem asserted that the probate 

exception to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction deprived it of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

On July 27, 2018, the district court entered a Memorandum Order that denied the 

attorneys ad litems’ motion to dismiss but granted the Daughter’s second motion for partial 

summary judgment. The order contained the following findings: (1) Florida law applied; 

(2) the Trust was not properly executed pursuant to Florida law because the Decedent failed 

to properly execute it with two witnesses; and (3) the assets in the Trust “should” pass by 

intestacy as a result.

On March 28, 2019, following further proceedings and the entry of additional orders 

that disposed of all claims in the district court action, John Jr.’s attorneys ad litem timely 

filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court’s orders. Scott did not appeal from the final 

judgment of the district court nor did he make an appearance in the appellate court.

On April 1, 2019, the Office of the Circuit Mediators for the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit notified counsel of record, specifically John Jr.’s attorneys 

ad litem and the Daughters’ counsel, that the appeal had been designated for mediation.

On May 29, 2019, the attorneys ad litem filed a Motion for Instructions and/or 

Appointment of Guardian ad litem in the Montgomery County Chancery Court seeking to 

modify Scott’s duties as Conservator due to his conflict of interests. In addition, the 

attorneys ad litem sought instructions from the court as to whether they may independently 

negotiate a compromise and settlement of the Daughters’ claims in the district court action, 

subject to the chancellor’s ultimate approval.

Pursuant to an Agreed Order entered on August 6, 2019, the chancellor modified

Scott’s duties as the conservator by, inter alia, removing from Scott and vesting in John 

Jr.’s attorneys ad litem the authority to:

1) independently manage and control on behalf of John the pending litigation 

and claims in which John is named as a party and/or in which he had an 

interest, and 2) negotiate and submit directly to this Court proposed terms 

of which John may compromise, settle and/or otherwise resolve all such 
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matters in dispute between he and his siblings, including the matters of 

Deborah Laverne French, Meredith Emily Wilson Lounge, and Valerie 

Dawn Keating v. Bennett Gordon Scott Wilson, Successor Co-Trustee and as 

the Conservator of John Bruce Wilson, Jr., Successor Co-Trustee, U.S. 

District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, No. 3:15-c-0520, John’s 

appeal of a judgment in that case in the United States Sixth Circuit, Case No. 

195303, In re: Wilson Separate Property Trust v. Wilson, Montgomery 

County Chancery Court No. MC-CH-CV-TT19-1, and In re Estate of John 

Bruce Wilson, Montgomery Chancery Court, Docket No. MC-CH-CV-PB15-179, and John’s interests as an heir at law of John Bruce Wilson, Sr.

(Emphasis added). 

Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered John Jr.’s attorneys ad 

litem and counsel for the Daughters to engage in mediation. The Sixth Circuit Court did 

not order Scott to participate in the mediation because he had not made an appearance in 

the appeal. The mediation resulted in a Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”) that was 

subject to the approval of the chancery court.

On July 15, 2020, the attorneys ad litem and the Daughters filed a Joint Motion to 

Approve Settlement Agreement in the Montgomery County Chancery Court pursuant to 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-121(b). Significantly, they attached the proposed 

Settlement Agreement to the motion to inform the chancellor of the specifics of the 

settlement, the protracted litigation that had already ensued, and John Jr.’s respective risks 

and rewards of settling or not settling the contentious and protracted family dispute. 

The joint motion asserted that the settlement was in John Jr.’s best interest, would 

fully and finally resolve the dispute over Father’s estate, and did not affect or impact Scott’s 

legal interests regarding Father’s estate. As such, the attorneys ad litem requested that the 

court determine whether the proposed terms were in John Jr.’s best interest and, if so, to

approve it. Scott filed a Response in Opposition to Motion to Approve Settlement, arguing, 

inter alia, that the court lacked the authority to approve the Agreement because Scott had 

not agreed to the Agreement, and it was not in John Jr.’s best interest.

On October 1, 2020, the chancellor granted the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement 

Agreement. In response, Scott filed a Motion to Revise the Order or, In the Alternative, to 

Alter or Amend a Judgment and an Amended Response in Opposition to Motion to 

Approve Settlement. The motion was denied and this appeal followed.

ISSUES

The parties raise various issues for our consideration on appeal. We, however, have 

determined the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the chancellor presiding over the 

conservatorship of John Jr., abused its discretion by approving, pursuant to his authority 
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under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-121, a mediated settlement agreement.

7 Scott also

argues that the court erred by failing to include findings of facts and conclusions of law in 

the Order. For their part, the Daughters request an award of damages for defending Scott’s

frivolous appeal. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court’s determination of a ward’s best interests is reviewed under an abuse of 

discretion standard. In re Conservatorship of Muldoon, No. E2019-01621-COA-R3-CV, 

2020 WL 3469192, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020) (citing Crumley v. Perdue, No. 

01-A-01-9704-CH00168, 1997 WL 691532, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1997)). “An 

abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays beyond the applicable legal standards or 

when it fails to properly consider the factors customarily used to guide the particular 

discretionary decision.” Lee Medical Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 

2010) (citing State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007)). Thus, a court abuses its 

discretion “when it ‘applie[s] an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is 

against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining.’” Eldridge v. 

Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Shirley, 

6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)). “The abuse of discretion standard does not permit the 

appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. (citing Myint v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998)).

 

7 The issues of Appellant, Scott, were stated as follows: 

1. Whether a Court can order the distribution of the entire property in a disputed estate 

through an alleged settlement agreement where on the of the beneficiaries and heirs (the 

Conservator-Appellant) did not agree to the settlement. 

2. Whether a Court can force a settlement of a disputed estate through the consent of ad litem

attorneys on behalf of a Conservatee when the settlement is not in the best interest of the 

Conservatee, and neither the Conservatee nor the Conservator agreed to such settlement. 

3. Whether it is reversible error for a Court to purportedly end an estate dispute without a jury 

trial, much less a hearing, without findings of facts and conclusions of law, and over the 

filed objection of an heir and beneficiary to the estate. 

The issue of Appellee, John Bruce Wilson, Jr., was stated as follows: 

1. Whether the trial court ruled correctly when it exercised the power granted in Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 34-1-121(b) to approve and confirm the proposed compromise of the matters in 

controversy between John Bruce Wilson, Jr. and his sisters on the terms of the Settlement 

Agreement presented to the trial court. 

The issues of Appellees Deborah French, Meredith Lounge, and Valarie Keating were stated as 

follows: 

1. Did the trial court err by granting the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement? 

2. Should Appellees be awarded damages for a frivolous appeal? 
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ANALYSIS

I. BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS IN CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDING 

Scott contends the chancellor erred by granting the Joint Motion to Approve 

Settlement Agreement because the Settlement Agreement was not in John Jr.’s best 

interest. Scott argues that the Settlement Agreement contradicts Father’s intent because

John Jr. will receive a lesser portion of Father’s assets than the Will and Trust provided. 

The Daughters and John Jr.’s attorneys ad litem maintain that the Settlement 

Agreement is in John Jr.’s best interest because it settles all issues, claims, objections, and 

contests regarding Father’s estate, the district court case, and the Sixth Circuit appeal. They 

also contend that the Agreement reduces the uncertainty and eliminates the risk that the 

federal appeal would not be decided in John Jr.’s favor. 

In a conservatorship proceeding, the court has the authority to take all actions 

reasonably necessary to promote the ward’s best interests. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 

109 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Specifically, Tennessee Code Annotated § 

34-1-121, which details the court’s authority in conservatorship proceedings, provides as 

follows: 

(b) In any action, claim, or suit in which a minor or person with 

a disability is a party or in any case of personal injury to a 

minor or person with a disability caused by the alleged 

wrongful act of another, the court in which the action, claim, 

or suit is pending, or the court supervising the fiduciary 

relationship if a fiduciary has been appointed, has the power to 

approve and confirm a compromise of the matters in 

controversy on behalf of the minor or person with a disability. 

If the court deems the compromise to be in the best interest 

of the minor or person with a disability, any order or decree 

approving and confirming the compromise shall be binding 

on the minor or person with a disability.

(Emphasis added). 

Notably, the legislature “has not outlined specific factors for the trial court to 

consider in making its best interest analysis,” but this court has explained that in 

conservatorship cases, the determination of the ward’s best interest must turn on “the

specific facts presented in the particular case.” In re Conservatorship of Turner, No. 

M2013-01665-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1901115, at *25 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2014). “In 

order to determine the best interests of a disabled person, the court must consider all

relevant facts.” Crumley, 1997 WL 691532, at *3. 
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Here, the relevant facts and circumstances for the chancellor to consider were set 

forth in the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement as well as in Scott’s Response 

in Opposition to Motion to Approve Settlement. The Daughters and John Jr.’s attorneys ad 

litem filed the entire Settlement Agreement with the chancellor for review. They set forth

in their Joint Motion, inter alia, the following facts and circumstances to establish why the 

proposed Settlement Agreement was in John Jr.’s best interest: 

1. All five of Father’s children were beneficiaries of the Trust.

2. In the district court action, the Daughters contended that the 

testamentary provisions of the Trust were invalid.

3. All five children and, thus, all beneficiaries of the Trust were 

parties to the district court action. 

4. Pursuant to its July 27, 2018 order, the district court ruled that the

testamentary provisions of the Trust were invalid and the assets of the Trust 

would pass to the five children equally pursuant to the laws of intestate 

succession.

5. The district court’s declaratory judgment that the testamentary 

aspects of the separate Property Trust are invalid is highly prejudicial to John

Jr.’s best interests. 

6. John Jr.’s attorneys ad litem appealed the district court’s ruling to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

7. Scott did not appeal the district court’s ruling that the testamentary 

provisions of the Trust were invalid and its declaration that the assets of the 

Trust would pass pursuant to the laws of intestate succession to the five 

children equally. 

8. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the parties to 

participate in mediation.

9. Pursuant to its order entered on August 6, 2019, the chancery court 

authorized and directed John Jr.’s attorneys ad litem to, inter alia, negotiate 

and submit to the chancery court for approval proposed terms on which John 

Jr. may compromise and settle his appeal of the adverse district court 

judgment. 

10. Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-121 affords the chancery court 

the discretion to approve a compromise of matters in controversy for a 

disabled person, such as John Jr., if it finds the compromise to be in his best 

interest and to make the settlement binding on the disabled person. 
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11. The proposed Settlement Agreement compromised and settled all 

claims and matters in controversy related to the interests of John Jr. and the 

Daughters in the Trust and Father’s estate. The proposed Settlement 

Agreement also established terms for the distribution of the interests of John 

Jr. and the Daughters in the Trust.

12. The proposed Settlement Agreement provides John Jr. with 

certainty as to his interest in the assets of the Trust and his father’s estate; it 

eliminates the risk that his appeal of the district court judgment will not be 

decided in his favor; provides that John Jr.’s share of the first proceeds from 

the sale of trust assets will be more than his one-fifth intestate share. 

Accordingly, the proposed settlement reduces John Jr.’s risk that his share 

will be reduced if the property sells for less than expected. It also provides 

that the proceeds from sale and income from the rental of those properties 

will be distributed to and held in an Irrevocable Trust for John Jr.’s benefit 

and managed by an independent trustee. Moreover, the proposed Settlement 

Agreement will end John Jr.’s participation in the litigation concerning the 

Trust as well as the attendant attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.

The facts and circumstances set forth in the Joint Motion are fully supported by the 

record. Moreover, they provide bona fide reasons from which the court could conclude that 

entering into the Settlement Agreement was in John Jr.’s best interest. Notably, if John Jr. 

were to pursue his appeal of the district court’s declaratory judgment, and the Sixth Circuit 

Court of Appeals were to affirm the judgment, John Jr.’s inheritance would be significantly 

reduced. Specifically, he would fall from receiving the largest share of his father’s estate 

pursuant to the Trust to receiving an equal child’s share of twenty percent. Moreover, he 

would continue to incur legal fees and costs as the already protracted litigation ensued, 

with no end in sight. Accordingly, the record fully supports the trial court’s determination 

that entering into the proposed Settlement Agreement was in the best interest of John Jr. 

With the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review in mind, this record 

provides no basis for us to conclude that the chancellor strayed beyond the applicable legal 

standards when considering the joint motion or that he failed to properly consider the 

factors customarily used to guide this discretionary decision. See Lee Medical Inc., 312 

S.W.3d at 524. In fact, the record reveals that the chancellor considered the relevant legal 

principles as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-121. The record also provides 

a factual foundation that supports the chancellor’s discretionary decision. Moreover, the 

abuse of discretion standard does not permit this court to substitute our judgment for that 

of the trial court. See id. 

Accordingly, we find no basis to conclude that the chancellor abused his discretion 

in authorizing the attorneys ad litem to enter into and execute the Settlement Agreement 

on behalf of John Jr.
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II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Scott also contends that the chancellor erred by failing to make findings of fact and 

conclusions of law in its Final Order. His argument is based upon Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 52.01 which requires the trial court to make written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law in “in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury.” We, however, find 

his reliance on Rule 52 is misplaced because the challenged decision was rendered on a 

motion and findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions

except as provided in Rules 41.02 and 65.04(6), which are not at issue here. 

In pertinent part, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 states: “[f]indings of fact 

and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or 

any other motion except as provided in Rules 41.02 and 65.04(6).” Rule 41.02 deals with 

involuntary dismissal and Rule 65.04(6) deals with temporary injunctions, neither of which 

are relevant to this case. As such, the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement did 

not require the chancellor to separately state findings of facts and conclusions of law. 

Thus, the chancellor did not err by failing to include findings of facts and 

conclusions of law in the Final Order. 

III. DAMAGES FOR FILING A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 

As a final matter, we acknowledge Daughters’ request for damages from defending 

a frivolous appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122, which states: 

When it appears to any reviewing court that the appeal from any court of 

record was frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may, either upon 

motion of a party or of its own motion, award just damages against the 

appellant, which may include, but need not be limited to, costs, interest on 

the judgment, and expenses incurred by the appellee as a result of the appeal. 

“The decision whether to award damages for a frivolous appeal rests solely in our 

discretion.” Kramer v. Kramer, No. E2018-00736-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1239867, at *5 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2019) (citing Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 482, 493 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2009)). “A frivolous appeal is one that is ‘devoid of merit,’ or one in which there 

is little prospect that it can ever succeed.” Indus. Dev. Bd. of City of Tullahoma v. Hancock, 

901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). Based on our review of 

the record and in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to award damages for a frivolous 

appeal. 
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IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of appeal are assessed against Appellant, 

Bennett Gordon Scott Wilson. 

________________________________

 FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.