09 -25 02 -cv (L), 09-28 80 -cv (CON) W ils on v . Em ond UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 

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RUL I NGS BY S UM M ARY O R DE R DO NOT HAVE PR E CE DE NT I AL E FF E CT . CI T AT I ON TO A S UM M ARY O R D ER FI LED O N O R AFTER JAN U A R Y 1, 20 07 , I S PER M I TTED A N D I S GO V ERN ED B Y FEDER A L RU LE OF AP PE L L AT E P ROCEDU RE 3 2 . 1 AND T HI S COURT’ S L OCAL RUL E 3 2 . 1 . 1 . W HEN CI T I NG A S UM M ARY ORDER I N A D OCUM E NT F I LED W I TH TH I S COURT , A P ART Y M US T CI T E E I T HER T HE F E DE RAL A PPEN D I X O R AN ELECTR O N I C DA TAB A SE ( W I TH TH E NO TATI O N “S U M M A R Y O R D ER”) . A PA R TY CI T I NG A S U M M A R Y ORDE R M US T S E RVE A COP Y OF I T ON ANY P ART Y NOT RE PR E S E NT E D BY C O U N SEL. Ata s ta te d t e r m of t he Uni te d St at e s C our t o f Appe als forth e Se c ond C ir c uit , he ld at the Daniel P atric k Moynih an United S tate s Courthouse, 500 P earl Str eet , in the City of Ne w Yo r k, o n t he 21 dayof A pr il, two th ous and t e n. st 1 PRES ENT: 2 J OHN M. WAL KER, J R., 3 CH ES TERJ . S TRAUB, 4 DEB RA ANN L I VI NGSTON, 5 Circuit Judges

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__________________________________________ 7 8 TONY A . WI L SON, 9 10 Plaintif f-Appellant , 11 12 v. 09-2502-c v (L ), 13 09-2880-c v (CON) 14 15 HOWARD E. EMOND, JR., 16 17 Defendant- Appellee

. 18

__________________________________________ 19 20 FOR APPEL L ANT: Tony A. Wils on, pr o s e , Milton, DE. 21 22 FOR APPEL L EE: Richard B lumenthal, Attorney Gene ral for

the State of 23 Conne c tic ut; Rob e rt J. De ic he rt , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, 24 Har tford, CT. 252 1 Appea l from a judg ment and orders of the United States District Court for the District of 2 Connecticut (Kr avitz, J. ). 3 UP ON DU E CONSIDERATION i ti s h e r e b y ORDERED, ADJUDG ED, AND 4 DECREED that the judg ment and orde rs of the district c ourt be AF F IRM ED

. 5 Plaintiff-Appellan t T o n y A. Wil son, pr o s e , appea ls from a judg ment and orde rs of the 6 Un it ed States District Court for the District of Connecticut ( Kravitz , J. ) gr an t i n g Def endant- Appellee 7 Howar d E. Emond, J r.’s motion to dismiss Wil son’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 c omplaint ag ainst him. The 8 complaint alleg ed constitutional violations and sought injunctive a nd decla ratory relief

, as we ll as 9 damag es ag ainst Emond in his individual capa city , arising out of Emond’s par ticipation in a hear ing 10 of the Connec ticu t Ba r E x am i ning Committee (“ CBEC”) that resulted in a de nial of Wilson’s 11 application for admission to the Connec ticut state bar. The district c ourt held that it lac ked subjec t 12 matter j urisdiction over Wilson’s claims for dec laratory and injunctive re lief pursua nt to the 13 abstention doctrine of Y ou nge r v . H

arris , 4 01 U. S. 3 7 (197 1) , a nd that E mon d w a s e nti tle d to 14 absolute immunity as to Wil son’s claims for da mag es. The d i strict court a lso denied Wilson’s 15 motion for rec onsideration of its g rant of Emond’s motion to dismiss , as well as Wilson’s mot ion 16 fo r r e lie f f

ro m ju dg me nt p ur su ant t o F e d. R. C iv. P. 6 0( b)

. We a ssume the pa rt ie s’ fa mil iari ty wi th 17 the under lying f acts, the pr ocedur al history of the c ase, a

nd the issues prese nted for r eview. 18 Be cause Y ounger abstention is mandatory

“and its application deprives the f eder al cour

t of 19 jurisdiction” over t h e ca se, we revie w the district cour t’s dismiss al pursuant to Y ounger de novo. 20 Diamond “D” Const r. Corp. v. McGowan , 282 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2002) . Simi larly , we r eview 21 de novo a district court’s dismi ssal of a complaint pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6), “c onstruing 22 the c omp la int lib e ra lly , a c c e pti nga ll f

a c tua l a lle g a tio ns in t

he c omp la int

a s tr ue , a nd dr awi nga ll3 1 rea sonable inferenc es i n the pl aintiff’s f avor.” Chambers v. Time W arner, Inc

. , 282 F.3d 147, 152 2 (2d Cir. 2002). F inally , we r eview the district court’s denial of a motion for r econside ration and a 3 motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for abuse of discre tion. See RJE Corp. v

. Northville Indus. Corp. , 4 329 F.3d 310, 316 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (motion for r econside ration); Tra ns ae ro , I nc . v . La 5 Fuerza Aere a Boliviana , 162 F.3d 724, 729 ( 2d Cir. 1998) (Rule 60(b) ). 6 Among other c ontentio ns, Wi lson argues on appe al that (1) Y ounger sh ou ld n ot b ar h is 7 c la ims be c a

us e he c ou ld n ot a c tua lly

have purs ue d th e m in

state c ourt ; ( 2) his c a se is co ve re d b y bo th 8 the “ba d faith” a nd the “e x traordina

ry circ umstances” exc ep t ions to Y ounger abstention; and (3) 9 Em on d is no t e nti tle d to a bs olute immun ity

c on c e rn ingte sti mony

he g ave be c a

us e he wa s a 10 “complainingwitness.” Wilson di d not raise a ny of t hese arguments in response to Emond’s motion 11 to d ism iss , a

nd ra ise d th e m on ly

fo r t he first tim e in h is m oti on s f or re c on sid e ra

tio n a nd fo r R ule 12 60(b) r elief. “ Ge ne ra lly , w e wi ll n ot c on sid e r a n a rgume nt o n a

pp e a l that wa s ra ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me 13 below in a motion for reconsider ation.” Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color T ile, Inc. 14 v . Co op e rs &

Ly bran d, LLP , 322 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir. 2003). Neve rtheless, even i f we do consider 1 5 th es e a rgu m en t s , th ey ar e a l l un av ai l i n g. 16 Under Y ounger , fede ral courts must abstain fr om exercising subje ct matter jurisdiction over 17 fede ral c onstitut ional claims that involv e o r ca l l i nto question ongoingstate proc eeding s. See 18 You n ger , 4 01 U. S. at 43 -4 4. Ab ste nti on is m and a tor

y wh e re “ 1) the re is a

n o ng oin g state 19 proce eding ; 2) an important state intere st is im plicated; and 3) the plaintiff has a n avenue open for 20 revie w of constitutional c laims in the state court.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut , 585 F.3d 639, 21 647 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotin g P h i l i p Mo r r is, Inc. v. B lumenthal , 123 F.3d 103, 105 ( 2d Cir. 1997)) 22 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n mark s omi tte d)

. Th e Sup re me Court ha s r e c og nize d tw o n arr owe xce pti on s to4 1 Y

ounger : ( 1) ba d f

a ith —“ c a se s o f p ro ve n h ara ssm e nt o r p ro se c uti on s und e rt ake n b y state of fi c ia ls 2 in bad fa ith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction,” Diamond “D” Const r. Corp. , 282 F.3d 3 at1 9 8 (qu o t i n g Perez v . Ledesma , 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)) (interna l quotation marks omitted); and 4 (2) e x traordina ry circ umstances—whe re “ ‘extraordinar y circ um s t an ce s’ re nder the state cour t 5 inc a

pa ble of fa ir ly and fu lly a dju dic a tin g the fe de ra l iss ue s be fo re it,

. . . c re a tin g an e xtra or din ari ly 6 pressingneed f or immediate fe dera l equitable re lief,” id. at2 0 1 (q u o t i n g Kugler v. Helfant , 421 U. S. 7 117, 124-25 (1975) ). 8 Wils on ’s argume nt t hat Y ounger sh ou ld no t a

pp ly be c a us e he c ou ld no t a c tua lly

purs ue his 9 constitutional claims in st ate c ourt is w ithout mer it. Wilson only argues that he c ould not raise such 10 claims befor e the CB EC, but this is irreleva nt beca use the state c ourts offe re d the re lief Wilson 11 soug ht. See Spargo v . N.Y . State Comm’n on Judic ial Conduct , 351 F.3d 65, 79 ( 2d Cir. 2003). 12 Nothing pr eclude d Wil son from plea ding his const itutional claims in hi s state cour t complaint 13 appea ling the de nial of his bar a pplication (in fac t, he did so), and to the e x tent those claims wer e 14 dismiss ed by

the Connecticut Superior Court, he was f

ree to appea l that decision. 15 Wil son’s attempt to invoke the two exceptions to Y ounger also fails. Be cause it was Wil son 16 himself who filed the bar application that initiated the CBEC proce eding , he cannot de monstrate that 17 “the state proce edingwas initiated with and [was] animated by a re taliatory , har as s ing, or other 18 illegitimate motive” so a s to satisfy the “ba d faith” e x c eption, Diamond “D” Const r. Corp., 282 F.3d 19 at 199, ev en i f s ome alleg ed constitutional violation occurr ed duringthat proce eding , see id. (“A 20 state proc eedingthat is leg itimate in its purposes, but unconstit utional in its execution . . . will not 2 1 war

r an t th e a p p li c ati o n o f th e b a d f

a it h e xc e p ti o n . ” )

. M o r e o v e r , b e c a u s e th e r e c o r d

shows that 22 Wil son had rec ourse to state judicial revie w of the CBEC proc eedingand ther e is no evidenc e that5 1 the C onnecticut Superior Court would not fairly and fully adjudicate his claims, he could not show 2 that “extraordinar y circ umstances” justified an exception to Y ounger abstention. See id. at 202. 3 Finally , beca use Emond’s testimony

at the CBE C hearingdid not serve to initiate the CBEC 4 proce eding , Emond was not a “ complainingwitness,” and thus the district court prope rly deter mined 5 that he wa s entitled to absolute immunit y with reg ard to his testimony

. See Sykes v . Jame s , 13 F.3d 6 515, 520 (2d Cir. 1993). 7 For the fore g oing rea sons, the district court prope rly dismiss ed all of Wilson’s claims, and, 8 for thi s rea son, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wilson’s motions for rec onsideration 9 and for

relief under Rule 60(b). W e have considered Wilson’s remainingarguments and conc lude 1 0 th a t th e y ar e w i th o u tm e r i t

. T h e j u d g m e n tan d o r d e r s o f th e d i s tr i c tc o urt

ar e h e r e b y AF F IRM ED

. 11 12 13 FOR THE COURT: 14 Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk 15