2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
12-24-2003 

# U S A v . B a r nes P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 02-2566

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/26NON-P RECEDE NTI AL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT


### No. 02-2566
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. VERNON E. BARNES, a/k/a Tex VERNON E. BARNES,

Appellant App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the M iddle D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. Crimi nal Acti on No. 01-cr- 00172-1) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Yvett e Kane Argued January23, 2003 Be for e: N YG AA RD , AM BR O a nd L OU RIE *, Circuit Judges (Opinion: December 24, 2003)

L. Rex Bickley , Equir e (Argued) 121 South Stre et Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorneyfor Appell

ant

* H ono rable A lan D . Lou rie, Un ited Sta tes C ircuit Jud ge fo r the F edera l Circu it, sitting by designation.1 When a court departs from the Sentencing Guidelines custody r ange, Congress

requ ires it to state “the sp ecific re ason ” for th e dep arture. 1 8 U .S.C. § 355 3; see also 18 U.S .C. § 374 2(e )(3)( C) ( “[T ]he cou rt of app eals sha ll det erm ine w heth er th e se nten ce . . . departs to an unrea sonable degree from the appl icabl e guidel ines r ange, havi ng regard for . . . the reasons for the im position of the particular sentence , as stated by the district court pursu ant to th e pro vision s of se ction 3 553 (c).”). W e hav e repe atedly em phas ized th is req uire me nt in con texts relev ant to the D istrict Co urt’s dec ision to d epa rt. See, e. g. , Un ited Sta tes v. C icirello , 301 F .3d 13 5, 146 (3d C ir. 2002 ) (“W e are n ot alon e in mand ating that sentencin g courts . . . reflect their reasoning . . . .”) (citations omitted); Un ited Sta tes v. H arris , 44 F.3d 1206, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the Dist rict Cou rt’s “cryptic articulation of its reasoning” w as “too con clusory to permit us to pe rform our review function and attempt to assure the uniformityof sentencing that Congress 2 Thomas A. Marino United States Attorney Theodore B. Smith, III ( Argued) Assist ant U.S. Attorney Office of United St ates Attorney Federal Bui lding 228 Walnut Stre et P.O. Box 11754 Harrisburgh, PA 17108 Attorney s for Appel lee

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

AM BR O, Circuit

Judge Vernon E. Barnes chal lenges t he District Court ’s deci sion t o depart upward from the Unite d States Sentenci ng Guideline s custody range of 151 t o 188 months to s entence him to 240 months i mprisonment. The Distri ct Court’ s fail ure to s et out t he reasons for the de partur e has ham pered our a bility to review it. 1 We nonetheless conclude that thesought t o achieve”) . The District Court’s c onclusory expl anati on here did l ittle more than parro t the pro vision s of th e G uidelin es that a utho rized it to depa rt.
2 A f our -co unt ind ictm ent w as b rou ght aga inst B arn es o n th e ba sis o f this rob ber y. Count I charge d him with conspiracyto commit t he offenses charged in t he remaini ng coun ts, in viola tion of 18 U .S.C. § 371 . Cou nt II ch arged him w ith ban k rob bery, in violat ion of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and Count IIIwith armed bank r obbery , in vi olati on of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) . Count IV charge d a violation of 18 U.S. C. § 924(c)( 1)(A)(I ) for the use of a f irearm in com mitting a crime o f violence. B arnes pled g uilty t o Co unt II, pur sua nt to a ple a ag reem ent in wh ich th e G ove rnm ent a gre ed, inter alia , to di smiss t he remaining counts. 3 dep ar tu re was p er mit

te d, and th er efo re aff

irm. BACKGROUND Th e pa rties a re fa milia r w ith th e fa cts o f the cas e, so we des crib e the m o nly brie fly. Within a tw o-wee k period B arnes and two oth er men, E rick Ho bbs and Ernest W eidner,

com mitte d th ree b ank rob ber ies. B arn es sto le the geta wa y cars f or e ach of th e ro bbe ries. At each bank, he pointed a gun at a teller. And he used the robbery proceeds to purchase larg e qu antit ies o f m ariju ana . Barn es w as co nvicte d of the O ctobe r 13, 1 999 , robb ery of the Ad ams Co unty National Bank in Cashtown, Pennsy lvania
. 2 Under the Sente ncing Guidel ines, he has 27 crimina l his torypoints , putt ing him i n crimina l his torycategory VI, and an offense l evel of 29, res ulti ng in a cust ody r ange of 155 to 181 months . As noted above, the Dist rict Cou rt departed up ward to sentence B arnes to 24 0 mo nths in prison, the statutory

max imum und er 18 U.S .C. § 2 113 (a). Th e Co urt exp lained its decisio n, in rele vant p art, as follows:4 [U.S.S .G. §] 4A 1.3 . . . warrants dep arture. The d efenda nt’s criminal history is underrepres ented eve n by a category VI. It does not adequately

refle ct the past criminalconduct of which he’ s be en a dju dica ted n or h is like lines s to re off end
. 5K2 .21 also w arrants departure in this case. There are uncha rged crime s, auto theft and drug traffick ing[,] that were not take n i nt o c ons id er atio n i n the ch ar gi ng, as wel l a s two additional bank robberies. I have st ruggled might

ily with thi s case, Mr. Bickley[counsel for Barnes] , in fairnes s to y our defendant , and I can’t t hink of a s in gl e mi ti gatin g fa ct orin hi s be hal f that woul d mak e me want to sentence him to anything l ess than the maximum penalty i n this case. Barn es time ly appea led to th is Co urt. The Distri ct Court’ s juri sdiction aros e under 18 U.S .C. § 32 31; we ha ve j ur is di ct io n pu rs uan t t o 28 U.S .C. § 12 91 a nd 1 8 U. S. C. § 3742 (e). DIS CUSS ION We review the Dist

rict Court’s f

indings of fact under

the cl early

erroneous stan dar d. Id. Traditionally, we hav e review ed for an abuse o f discretion a district court’s decisi on to depart

from the Sent encing Guidel ines and ac corded defer entia l revi ew to the deg ree o f de par ture . United Stat es v. Warre n , 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). Si nce the District

Court’s decision and the submission of this case for our revi ew C ongress enacted t he PROTE CT Act, Pub. L. No. 108- 21, § 401, 117 St at. 650, 667 (Apr. 30, 2003), which appe ars t o requir e de novo review of “the dist rict court’ s appli cati on of the guideli nes to t

he facts .” § 3742(e) (2003). But we need not deci de which standard of review applie s to this c ase (an d thu s infer entially w hethe r the P RO TE CT Ac t is3 Sectio n 5K 2.21 p ermits a cour t to “inc rease th e sen tence abov e the g uidelin e rang e to

refle ct the actualseri ousness of t he offense base d on conduct (1)
. . . underly ing a potenti al char ge not purs ued in the case as part of a pl ea agreement or for anyother reason; and (2) that did not enter i nto the de termination of t he appli cable gui deline range.” Id. ; see also § 1B 1. 4, co mmen t. (b ac kg’ d) (“ [I ]f th e d ef en da ntco mmi tted two robberies, but as p art of a plea n egotiation entered a guilty plea to only one, the robbe ry that was not

taken i nto account

by the guidel ines would pr ovide a re ason for se ntenci ng at the top of

the guide line r ange and may pr ovide a re ason for se ntenci ng above the guideline rang e.”). It is not clear to us that a dep arture on the g round tha t Barnes’ crim inal history category unde rrepresents his crim inal history (or likelihood of recidivism ) is warranted or, if it is, the degre e of departure that would be warrante d. We need not deci de this issue, however, because the D istri ct Court’s departure decisi on is fullysupported by Barnes’ unch arged cond uct.
4 If, as we do, we reject Barnes’ fi rst argument, he does not cha llenge the Dist rict Court’s de cisi on to depart upward, but onl y the degree of depar ture. 5 retr oacti ve), as we would affirm under ei ther s tandard. We do so on th e bas is of th e D istrict Co urt’s de cision to depa rt upw ard p ursua nt to U.S .S.G . § 5K 2.21 f or un charg ed co ndu ct. 3 Barnes makes two argument s concerni ng the departure o n the basis of uncha rged con duct. First, he argues th at the District Cou rt should not

have rel ied on the uncharged crimes described in t he PSR without dis cussion at the sentenci ng hearing of those crimes or addi tionalevidentiarybasis. Second, he contends t

hat the degree of departure on t he basis of uncharged conduct was not warranted. 4 1. The District

Court’s reliance on the uncharged conduct wit hout addit

ional discu ssion o f it wa s not im prop er. Th e PS R rec om men ded a n up wa rd de partur e on th is grou nd, an d B arnes had th e opp ortun ity to discuss this issue in his w ritten ob jection s to6

th e P SR an d a t th e s en ten cin g h ea rin g. H e c ho se no t to do so . T he C ou rt h ad no du ty sua spon te to ini tiate discus sion of the uncharged conduct in order to consi der it

in the sentence imposed. Barnes furt

her objec ts t o the Dist

rict Court’s reliance on the i nformati on contai ned in paragrap hs 18 throu gh 23 o f the PS R, wh ich describe the two oth er bank ro bberies. In the sen tencin g con text, “the cour t may co nside r releva nt info rmatio n w ithout re gard to its admissi bili ty under the r ules of evi dence appli cable at tri al, provided t

hat the information has suf ficie nt in dicia of r eliab ility to su ppo rt its p rob able acc ura cy.” U .S.S .G. § 6A 1.3. The requir ement that

the inf ormation ha ve “suffic ient i ndicia of reli abili ty ” “should be applie d rigor ously .” Warren , 186 F.3d at 365. Nonethel ess, that requirement is met here. The PSR states t

hat Hobbs admitted that he robbed the three banks with Barnes and Weidner and rec ounts spec ific detai ls about the robberies. Barnes himsel f admitted that he committed t

he robberyfor which he was convic ted. The modus operandi of each of the other two robberies was not ablysimil ar to t he one of conviction (t

he PSR further report s that

nine witne sses des cribed one of the other robberies t o the FBI). The three robberi es occurr ed in cl ose temporaland geographi c proximit y. And although Barnes denied i n his obj ecti ons to the PSR that he provi ded guns for the bank robberi es, he has not d enied com mitting the oth er tw o rob beries , stealing the ge tawa y cars, or traf fickin g in5 In hi s writ te n ob je ctio ns to th e PS R, Barne s d idnot obj ec t to para gr ap hs 16- 23. He did, however, object

general ly to the PSR’s s uggesti on that an upward departure might be wa rran ted, a nd t he U nited Sta tes c onc ede s tha t Ba rne s pre serv ed th e issu e on app eal. Nonetheless , it

is si gnific ant that Barnes s pecifi call y obj ected t o the PSR’s ass erti on of oth er all ege d fa cts, b ut n ot to tho se d iscu ssed her e. 6 To the extent

that Barnes additionall y ar gues that the unchar ged conduct was not suffici ently

proved, “f

acts dee med relevant

to a departure fr om the Guideli nes sent encing range gener ally ” – and here – “need beproved onlyby a pr eponderance of t he evidence. ” United States v. Baird , 109 F.3d 856, 865 n.8 (3d Cir . 1997). The Distri ct Court di d not cle ar ly er r in fin di ng th e a dd itio na l ro bb er ies , ca r th ef t, a nd dr ug tra ff ick in g p ro ve d b y a prep ond eranc e of th e evid ence . Altho ugh the am oun t of dru gs traf ficke d is arg uably insuf ficien tly proved for se ntenc ing p urpo ses, w e sha ll not rely on the dru g traff icking in uph old ing Ba rne s’ se nten ce. 7 drugs with the robbery proceeds. 5 Inde ed, B arnes adm itted that h e “us ed the mo ney to buy drugs .” Wit

h thi s context, the d escription of the r obber ies describedin the PSR

co nt ain s s uf fic ien t in di cia of re lia bi lity. 6 2. Barnes fur

ther contends that

the unchar ged conduct di d not warrant the ext ent of the up ward d eparture. Th e degree o f departure m ust be “reaso nable,” § 37 42(e)(3), when considered by

“objective st andards. ” United States v. Kikumura , 918 F.2d 1084, 1110 (3d Cir. 1990). I n Kikumura , we e xplain ed tha t wh ere ag grav ating c ond uct w ould consti tute a

separate offense, courts may eval uate the reasonabl eness of a depar ture “by treat ing the a ggravati ng factor as a separ ate crime and aski ng how the defendant would be treated [under the Guideli nes] i f convict ed of it .” Id. at 11 12 ( inter nal c itatio n om itted ). If the Dis tri ct Court ha d not engaged i n the requi sit e reasoni ng by anal ogy t o the Gu ideli nes , we wo uld ord inar ily rem and for app licatio n of it. Id. at 1114. B ut we w ere “convinced bey ond any doubt ” that the Court would i mpose the same sentence if appl yi ng8

the p rop er sta nda rd. Id. Here, too, we have no doubt the Dis tri ct Court would reach the

sam e res ult ag ain. In this context, w e conclud e that the D istrict Court did not err in de parting upw ard from the Guidel ines. For sente ncing purpos es, t he three bank robberi es would not be grouped toget

her. U.S. S.G. § 3D1.2(d) . We consider the robbery of convi ction a s the off ens e w ith th e hig hes t off ens e lev el, an d so cou nt th at ro bbe ry as o ne u nit. U .S.S .G. § 3D 1.4. B ecau se w e hav e no r easo n to b elieve that the other tw o rob beries are no t equa lly seri ous (or are great er than f our level s less seri ous), each additional robbery adds another uni t. Id. When, as here, the number of uni ts t otals three, the offense level is i ncreased by thre e. Id. Inc reas ing Ba rne s’s o ffe nse leve l (29 ) by thr ee re sults in an off ens e lev el of 32. Barnes’s a djust ed offense l evel of 32 combine d with a cri minal hi story category VI y ields a custodyrange of 210 t o 262 months. The 240 month s entence fal ls within thi s range. In li ght of th e t wo a ddi ti ona l r obb er ie s a nd B ar ne s’ s the ft of th e g et awa y ca rs , w e

con cl ude th atth e Di stri ctCourt j ust if iabl y se nt enc ed Barn es to th e s ta tu to rymaxi mum. CONCLU SI ON The Distri ct Court di d not err both in rely ing on the i nformati on concerni ng unch arged cond uct co ntaine d in the PSR and, a fter so doin g, in de parting upw ard to

se nt enc e Barnes to th e s ta tu to rymaxi mum. We th er efo re aff irm.9

TO THE C LERK: Please fi le the foregoing Opini on. By the C ourt,

/s/ Thomas L. Ambro, Circui t Judge