COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Frank and Humphreys 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

SHAHEEM LABEEB RASHEED, A/K/A 

 ALVIN ANTONIO BARNES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2740-00-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 FEBRUARY 5, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Joseph A. Leafe, Judge 

 (Carl C. LaMondue, on brief), for appellant. 

Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (Randolph A. Beales, Acting Attorney General; 

John H. McLees, Jr., Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Shaheem Labeeb Rasheed (defendant) appeals the revocation of 

suspended sentences previously imposed by the trial court, 

contending the court's finding that he failed to complete the 

Detention and the Diversion Center Incarceration Programs, a 

condition of the suspended sentence and related probation, 

constituted an abuse of discretion. We disagree and affirm the 

order. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 
I. 

 On May 21, 1999, defendant was convicted by the trial court 

for concealment of merchandise and possession of burglarious 

tools, violations of Code §§ 18.2-103 and -94, respectively. At 

sentencing, upon joint motion of the Commonwealth and defendant, 

the court ordered "defendant . . . referred to the Department of 

Corrections (DOC) . . . for evaluation and diagnosis . . . to 

determine suitability for participation in the Diversion Center 

Incarceration Program and/or Southampton Detention Incarceration 

Program" pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2.1 See Code §§ 19.2-316.2, 

-316.3; Code §§ 53.1-67.7, -67.8. Subsequently, the DOC 

reported to the court that defendant was eligible for placement 

in such programs, and the trial court imposed suspended 

sentences and probation for each offense, conditioned upon 

certain conditions, including successful completion of the 

"Detention and the Diversion Center Incarceration Programs," a 

proviso mandated by Code § 19.2-316.2(3). 

On August 21, 2000, defendant entered Southampton Detention 

Center to commence a referenced DOC program. However, by 

correspondence, dated September 6, 2000, defendant's probation 

officer advised the court that defendant "was terminated from 

 1

 Such programs are alternative sentencing options available 

to the court, expressly subject to conditions imposed by 

statute, including a "motion from [the] defendant" to 

participate and a favorable suitability evaluation by DOC. Code 

§ 19.2-316.2. 

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the Program" on August 25, 2000, "after refusing to obey all 

rules, regulations and to participate in training . . . ." In 

response, the trial court, on September 13, 2000, issued a 

capias for defendant's arrest, commanding he "show cause" 

against revocation of the previously suspended sentences. 

 At the attendant hearing, a "Major Violation Report," dated 

October 3, 2000, and prepared by defendant's probation officer, 

was received into evidence, without objection. The report 

advised the court that defendant had 

entered the Detention Center Program on 

August 21, 2000. He was terminated from the 

program four days later for non-compliance 

with the rules and regulations of the 

program. [Defendant] signed documents 

agreeing that he would obey all rules and 

regulations of the program. These 

regulations also cover the religious areas. 

Paragraph five of Southampton Detention 

center Pre-admission Agreement Form states, 

"I will not be allowed any special religious 

paraphernalia beyond a Bible, Quran, etc. 

The practice of any/all religious activity 

will have to comply with the structure of 

the Detention Center[sic] normal daily 

operation and procedures." 

[Defendant] immediately began making demands 

regarding his religious practices which 

conflicted with the Southampton Detention 

Center Daily Activity Schedule for the 

detainees in the transition phase of our 

program. . . . 

[Defendant] was seen by staff at this 

facility on numerous occasions. During 

these contacts he made demands in the area 

of religion. Each time [he] was given an 

opportunity to practice his religious 

beliefs within the guidelines of this 

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program. Each time [he] rejected the offer 

and offered more demands of his own. 

On August 24, 2000, [defendant] received 

four infractions which all violated our 

General Orders: 

 1. Giving food to another detainee 

2. Demanding staff to get him out of 

here, refusing to go to his dormitory. 

Speaking without permission, and 

deliberately taking off his belt with 

his canteen, and throwing them on the 

floor, disrupting the transition group. 

3. When instructed to return to the 

transition group and train, [he] 

refused to do so, stating, "I am ready 

to be removed, I am not training 

anymore." 

4. When offered time to pray, [he] did 

not answer . . . yes or no, but said he 

"did not want to do the program any 

more." 

On August 25, 2000, the Institutional Review 

Committee heard the above mentioned charges. 

Based on [defendant's] statement that he was 

ready to be removed and was not going to 

train anymore, the committee members voted 

to terminate [him] from the program. 

 Defendant did not dispute the contents of the violation 

report but contended participation in the program infringed upon 

the free exercise of his religion in violation of the First 

Amendment. The court, however, rejected the argument, noting 

that "[defendant is] not being penalized for . . . any of the 

religious aspects of his inability to complete detention and 

diversion. It's just the fact that it couldn't be done." The 

court, therefore, found defendant in violation of the terms and 

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conditions of the suspended sentences and probation, revoked 

such suspensions and sentenced him to five years in the 

penitentiary for the concealment offense, resuspending two years 

of the sentence, and to two years confinement for the possession 

of burglarious tools, again resuspended. 

II. 

 By statute, a trial judge in Virginia 

"may, for any cause deemed by [the judge] 

sufficient which occurred at any time within 

the probation period . . . revoke the 

suspension of sentence." The revocation of 

the suspended sentence "must be based on 

reasonable cause," and must be based upon 

cause that occurred within the suspension or 

probation period. 

Bailey v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 355, 357, 451 S.E.2d 686, 

687 (1994) (citations omitted); see Code § 19.2-306. "[T]he 

power of the courts to revoke suspensions and probation for 

breach of conditions must not be restricted beyond the statutory 

limitations." Briggs v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 338, 344, 464 

S.E.2d 512, 514 (1995) (citations omitted). Thus, "the issue on 

review of a revocation is 'simply whether there has been an 

abuse of discretion.'" Connelly v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 

888, 890, 420 S.E.2d 244, 245 (1992) (quoting Marshall v. 

Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 221, 116 S.E.2d 270, 274 (1960). 

 Here, defendant expressly requested admission into the 

"Detention and the Diversion Center Incarceration Programs," a 

sentencing option available at the discretion of the court upon 

certain circumstances, and submitted to the requisite 

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suitability review by DOC. Once approved by DOC and with 

defendant's continuing concurrence, the court imposed suspended 

sentences and probation, specifically conditioned upon 

defendant's "successful complet[ion of] the Detention and the 

Diversion Center Incarceration Programs" in accordance with 

statute. However, defendant immediately refused "to obey all 

rules, regulations and to participate in training . . .," 

committing several enumerated violations, and repeatedly 

declaring "he was ready to be removed" and "was not going to 

train anymore." Thus, "[b]ased upon [defendant's] statement," 

administrators "voted to terminate" his participation. 

 Defendant's conduct was clearly contrary to his request to 

the court for referral to the program and his subsequent 

informed commitment to abide by the attendant protocols. Under 

such circumstances, defendant evinced an "unwillingness to avail 

[himself] of the opportunity afforded by the court," Connelly, 

14 Va. App. at 890, 420 S.E.2d at 245, and provided reasonable 

cause for revocation of the suspended sentences pursuant to Code 

§ 19.2-316(A)(4),2 without implicating religious precepts or 

constitutional constraints. 

 2

 Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(4) provides: 

Upon a finding that the defendant 

voluntarily withdrew from the program, was 

removed from the program by the Department 

for intractable behavior, or failed to 

comply with the terms and conditions of 

probation, the court may revoke all or part 

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 We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court in the revocation of defendant's suspended sentences and 

affirm the disputed order. 

 Affirmed. 

 

of the probation and suspended sentence and 

commit the defendant as otherwise provided 

in this chapter. 

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