2019 WI 66 

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2017AP1468 

COMPLETE TITLE: In the matter of the mental commitment of 

S.L.L.: 

Waukesha County, 

 Petitioner-Respondent, 

 v. 

S.L.L., 

 Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 832,917 N.W.2d 234 

(2018 – unpublished) 

OPINION FILED: June 12, 2019 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: February 11, 2019 

SOURCE OF APPEAL: 

 COURT: Circuit 

 COUNTY: Waukesha 

 JUDGE: William Domina 

 

JUSTICES: 

CONCURRED: 

 DISSENTED: A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 

J. and DALLET, J. (opinion filed). 

 NOT PARTICIPATING: 

 

ATTORNEYS: 

For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 

filed by Colleen D. Ball, assistant state public defender. There 

was an oral argument by Colleen D. Ball. 

For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

Robert J. Mueller, corporation counsel. There was an oral 

argument by Robert J. Mueller. 
2019 WI 66 

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2017AP1468 

(L.C. No. 2016ME478) 

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT 

In the matter of the mental commitment of 

S.L.L.: 

Waukesha County, 

 Petitioner-Respondent, 

 v. 

S.L.L., 

 Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 

FILED 

JUN 12, 2019 

Sheila T. Reiff 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. 

¶1 DANIEL KELLY, J. Ms. L. challenges an order 

extending her commitment to the care and custody of Waukesha 

County pursuant to Chapter 51 of our Wisconsin statutes. She 

raises three issues for our review. First, she says the circuit 

court lacked jurisdiction over her when it entered an order 

extending her commitment. Second, she says the circuit court 

had no statutory authority to enter a default judgment against 

her for failing to appear at a scheduled hearing. And third, 

she asserts there was insufficient evidence of record to support 
No. 2017AP1468 

2 

the circuit court's order extending her commitment. All three 

issues are moot, but we choose to address the first two. For 

the reasons below, we affirm the court of appeals. 

I. BACKGROUND 

¶2 On August 10, 2016, the Waukesha County Sheriff's 

Department detained Ms. L. on an emergency basis pursuant to 

Wis. Stat. § 51.15(1) (2017-18).1 That statute allows emergency 

detention when an individual: (1) is mentally ill, drug 

dependent, or developmentally disabled; (2) demonstrates one or 

more of the behaviors listed in the statute; and (3) gives 

reason to believe the individual is unable or unwilling to 

cooperate with voluntary treatment.2

 

1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 

2 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.15(1) provides, in relevant part: 

(ag) The purpose of this section is to provide, on an 

emergency basis, treatment by the least restrictive 

means appropriate to the individual's needs, to 

individuals who meet all of the following criteria: 

1. Are mentally ill, drug dependent, or 

developmentally disabled. 

2. Evidence one of the standards set forth in 

par. (ar) 1. to 4. 

3. Are reasonably believed to be unable or unwilling 

to cooperate with voluntary treatment. 

(continued) 
No. 2017AP1468 

3 

¶3 An emergency detention under Wis. Stat. § 51.15 is 

initiated by completing the form entitled "Statement of 

Emergency Detention by Law Enforcement Officer" (the 

"Statement"). The completed Statement must detail the subject's 

condition and the reasons that make detention necessary. In 

this case, the Statement says Ms. L. suffered from anxiety and 

depression (for which she was taking no medication), was 

homeless and without money or food, exhibited very poor hygiene, 

and experienced at least six encounters with law enforcement 

over the preceding 48 hours for "disorderly issues," which 

included having taken "a swing at a courthouse employee." The 

Deputy who completed the Statement concluded that Ms. L. was 

"mentally ill, drug dependent, or developmentally disabled," 

"evidence[d] behavior which constitutes a substantial 

 

 (ar) A law enforcement officer . . . may take an 

individual into custody if the officer or person has 

cause to believe that the individual is mentally ill, 

is drug dependent, or is developmentally disabled, 

that taking the person into custody is the least 

restrictive alternative appropriate to the person's 

needs, and that the individual evidences any of the 

following: 

. . . . 

4. Behavior manifested by a recent act or omission 

that, due to mental illness, he or she is unable to 

satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical care, 

shelter, or safety without prompt and adequate 

treatment so that a substantial probability exists 

that death, serious physical injury, serious physical 

debilitation, or serious physical disease will 

imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt 

and adequate treatment for this mental illness. 
No. 2017AP1468 

4 

probability of physical harm to self or to others," and that 

taking Ms. L. into custody was "the least restrictive 

alternative appropriate" to her needs. The Deputy also noted 

that Ms. L. was dangerous, appeared to talk to others when no 

one else was present, and "had no rational explanation for her 

basic needs[.]" Ms. L. was taken into custody, transported to 

Waukesha Memorial Hospital for medical clearance, and then 

brought to the Waukesha County Mental Health Center ("MHC"). 

¶4 The Sheriff's Department filed the Statement with the 

Waukesha County Circuit Court on August 11, 2016. This "has the 

same effect as a petition for commitment under s. 51.20," and 

requires a probable-cause hearing pursuant to Wis. Stat. 

§ 51.20(7) within 72 hours. Wis. Stat. § 51.15(5). The hearing 

occurred the next day, and the circuit court commissioner found 

probable cause to believe Ms. L. was "dangerous to self or 

others." The circuit court scheduled a final hearing for August 

30, 2016. 

¶5 Ms. L. appeared and testified at the final hearing as 

scheduled. The circuit court found her mentally ill and ordered 

her committed to the care and custody of Waukesha County for six 

months with inpatient placement at the MHC (the "Initial 

Commitment").3 The circuit court also found she was not 

competent to refuse psychotropic medication or treatment, and so 

authorized the involuntary administration of medication during 

the period of commitment. Ms. L. responded well to the 

 

3 The Honorable William J. Domina presided. 
No. 2017AP1468 

5 

treatment, so the County executed a Conditional Transfer 

allowing her to leave the MHC and reside elsewhere (the 

"Transfer"). Ms. L. signed the Transfer, thereby evidencing her 

agreement that she would abide by the Transfer's requirements, 

which included taking all prescribed medications, complying with 

all ongoing treatment and activities recommended by the Waukesha 

County Health and Human Services Department, and notifying the 

County if she changed her address from the one listed in the 

Transfer. The Transfer also stated that if she failed to comply 

with its conditions she would "be returned to an inpatient 

facility for further disposition and treatment." Ms. L. left 

the MHC on September 8, 2016. She attended an appointment to 

receive medication on November 2, 2016, but thereafter absconded 

from treatment.4 She also failed to keep the County updated on 

her current address. 

¶6 Prior to expiration of Ms. L.'s Initial Commitment, 

the County applied to the circuit court for a 12-month extension 

of her commitment (the "Extension Petition"). It alleged that 

Ms. L. had fallen out of compliance with the Transfer's 

conditions by missing scheduled treatments and failing to keep a 

 

4 The dissent says our use of the word "abscond" is 

misleading because Black's Law Dictionary defines that term to 

mean "[t]o depart secretly or suddenly, esp. to avoid arrest, 

prosecution, or service of process." Dissent, ¶50 n.3. She 

departed from her treatment program "secretly" by failing to 

periodically return for therapy, and by moving from her declared 

address without letting the County know. That is to say, 

according to Black's Law Dictionary, she absconded from 

treatment. 
No. 2017AP1468 

6 

current address on file.5 The circuit court scheduled a hearing 

on the Extension Petition for February 28, 2017 (the "Extension 

Hearing"). It also ordered a pre-hearing examination of Ms. 

L.'s mental condition.6 Notice of the Extension Hearing was sent 

to Ms. L.'s last known address and to her appointed counsel. 

The notice included the time and place of the hearing, identity 

of the witnesses who would appear, the topics of their 

anticipated testimony, and the Extension Petition. The copy of 

the notice sent to Ms. L. was returned as undeliverable. 

¶7 The Extension Hearing commenced as scheduled, with Ms. 

L. in absentia but represented by appointed counsel.7 Because of 

Ms. L.'s absence, the County asked the circuit court to issue a 

writ of capias and to reschedule the hearing for a week 

following her return to the MHC. It also asked the circuit 

court to toll the expiration of the Initial Commitment pending 

 

5 The County notes that her last listed address (as of 

October 3, 2016) was the Cathedral Center in Milwaukee. But 

upon contacting the Cathedral Center, the County discovered that 

the center banned her from staying there "due to her behavior." 

6 Ms. L. failed to either schedule or appear for these 

examinations. However, both physicians, without examining her, 

opined that she was mentally ill, that she was dangerous, and 

that she was a proper subject for treatment. They both relied 

on the recommitment report prepared by Ms. L.'s caseworker a few 

weeks before the Extension Hearing. The physician reports were 

similar in most respects except that one physician recommended 

out-patient treatment and the other recommended locked inpatient 

treatment. 

7 Her counsel said he had not communicated with Ms. L. prior 

to the hearing and did not know her whereabouts. The County did 

not know where she was either. 
No. 2017AP1468 

7 

the rescheduled hearing date. The circuit court, however, 

turned its attention to whether it had jurisdiction over Ms. L. 

Her attorney affirmed she was "subject to the jurisdiction of 

the Court through the pendency of the order." The circuit court 

then concluded that Ms. L. had "submitted to the jurisdiction of 

the Court," and that "[s]he has not appeared here today" so 

"[s]he's in default of her right to object." Relying on the 

physician reports and the County's extension petition, the 

circuit court found that Ms. L. was still mentally ill, a 

resident of Waukesha County, and a proper subject for inpatient 

treatment and commitment. So it entered an order extending her 

commitment for twelve months, and a separate order authorizing 

the County to involuntarily medicate her during the pendency of 

the commitment (we will refer to the two orders collectively as 

the "Extension Order"). The circuit court also issued a writ of 

capias. 

¶8 Ms. L. appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, 

the County moved the circuit court to dismiss the matter because 

the Extension Order would accomplish nothing unless Ms. L. could 

be located and returned to treatment. The circuit court granted 

the motion and cancelled both the writ of capias and the 

Extension Order. The County then moved to dismiss the appeal as 

moot. The court of appeals initially denied the County's 

request, but subsequently issued a one-judge opinion granting 

the motion. 

¶9 Ms. L.'s petition for review (which we granted) 

presents the following three substantive issues. First, whether 
No. 2017AP1468 

8 

the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over her for the 

purpose of issuing the Extension Order.8 Second, whether she is 

subject to a default ruling for failing to appear at the 

Extension Hearing. And third, whether a Chapter 51 extension 

order based on reports of physicians who never examined her nor 

testified at the Extension Hearing is defective for lack of 

sufficient evidence or because it violates the respondent's due 

process rights. Ms. L. recognizes that her case's procedural 

posture potentially implicates our mootness doctrine, but argues 

her issues are either not moot or are of the type we address 

even when they are. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶10 We review the circuit court's jurisdiction over Ms. L. 

de novo. Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2017 WI 71, ¶7, 376 Wis. 2d 528, 

898 N.W.2d 70 ("Whether Wisconsin courts have personal 

jurisdiction . . . is a question of law we review de novo, 

although we benefit from the analyses of the circuit court and 

court of appeals."); State v. Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 108, ¶10, 283 

Wis. 2d 336, 700 N.W.2d 4 ("Due process determinations are 

questions of law we decide de novo."). Whether Chapter 51 

allows for entry of default against a respondent for failing to 

appear at a final recommitment hearing is also a question of law 

we review de novo. State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 

 

8 Chapter 51 indifferently uses "recommitment" and 

"extension of a commitment," so we will as well. Portage Cty. 

v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶1 n.1, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
No. 2017AP1468 

9 

Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 ("The interpretation and application 

of a statute present questions of law that this court reviews de 

novo while benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals 

and circuit court."). We review a circuit court's decision on 

whether default judgment is warranted for an erroneous exercise 

of discretion because "the decision to grant a motion for 

default judgment is within the sound discretion of the circuit 

court." Shirk v. Bowling, Inc., 2001 WI 36, ¶15, 242 

Wis. 2d 153, 624 N.W.2d 375. We review the threshold issue 

(mootness) de novo: "Mootness is a question of law that we 

review independently of the determinations rendered by the 

circuit court and the court of appeals." PRN Assocs. LLC v. 

DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

¶11 Ms. L. says the circuit court did not have 

jurisdiction over her when it entered the Extension Order. Her 

challenge is two-fold. First, she argues that the County was 

obliged to personally serve her with notice of the Extension 

Hearing. Second, she asserts that the Extension Petition and 

accompanying documents were deficient. An extension petition, 

she says, must satisfy the conditions of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1), 

which requires the petition to allege she is mentally ill, a 

proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. She says the 

petition must also contain a clear and concise statement of 

facts in support of those allegations. If the County fails with 
No. 2017AP1468 

10 

respect to either prong of her challenge, she argues, the 

circuit court can exercise no jurisdiction over her. 

¶12 Ms. L. is correct that a court does not have 

jurisdiction over a party unless the circumstances of the case 

satisfy both statutory and constitutional requirements. We have 

noted before that complying with the "statutory provisions 

regarding service of process is required before a [] court has 

personal jurisdiction." Aufderhaar, 283 Wis. 2d 336, ¶27. 

Naturally, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must also 

comport with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 

S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) ("It has long been established that the 

Fourteenth Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state 

courts."). 

¶13 So if Ms. L. is right about having not received proper 

notice, the Extension Order was void from the beginning. 

"Personal jurisdiction" embodies the court's power over a party, 

without which it can enter no valid judgment. State v. Smith, 

2005 WI 104, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508 ("Personal 

jurisdiction . . . refers to a court's power 'to enter a 

judgment in personam against an individual party.'") (quoted 

source omitted); West v. West, 82 Wis. 2d 158, 167–68, 262 

N.W.2d 87 (1978) ("Because personal jurisdiction was not 

acquired over the defendant . . . the trial judge correctly 

concluded that the judgment . . . was void."); see also 21 

C.J.S. Courts § 44 ("Jurisdiction of the person is the power of 

a court to bring before it the person to be affected by the 
No. 2017AP1468 

11 

judgment and to render a judgment binding on that person."). 

Before reaching the merits of the jurisdictional issue, however, 

we must first decide whether it is prudent to do so. 

1. Mootness 

¶14 When a court purports to exercise authority with 

respect to a party over whom it has no jurisdiction, the remedy 

is normally vacatur of the offending order. As a practical 

matter, however, that has already occurred in this case. The 

Extension Order was valid for only one year, so by its own terms 

it could have no authority beyond the end of February 2018. And 

the circuit court dismissed the entirety of this matter and 

canceled the writ of capias, so there are no further orders that 

could even potentially issue from this case. Regardless of how 

we resolve the jurisdictional question, therefore, our answer 

will not affect Ms. L.'s rights. "Ordinarily, this court, like 

courts in general, will not consider a question the answer to 

which cannot have any practical effect upon an existing 

controversy." State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶13, 253 

Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341 (footnote omitted). Such questions 

are moot, and we generally do not review them. Id. 

¶15 But sometimes issues come to us that present, because 

of their characteristics or procedural posture, a need for an 

answer that outweighs our concern for judicial economy. We 

might decide a moot question, for example, if it is "capable and 

likely of repetition and yet evades review because the appellate 

process usually cannot be completed and frequently cannot even 

be undertaken within the time that would have a practical effect 
No. 2017AP1468 

12 

upon the parties." Id., ¶14 (footnote omitted). We also might 

decide such a question if it is one "of great public 

importance." Id. 

¶16 Both of these considerations bear on Ms. L.'s 

jurisdictional challenge. In the normal course of appellate 

proceedings, Chapter 51 commitment orders will expire before we 

have a chance to review them because their maximum statutory 

duration is only one year. Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1. ("[A]ll 

subsequent consecutive orders of commitment of the individual 

may be for a period not to exceed one year."). And because 

commitment orders affect a profound liberty interest, it is a 

matter of great public importance that issuing courts properly 

evaluate their jurisdiction over respondents. Addington v. 

Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("This Court repeatedly has 

recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 

significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 

protection."). These two considerations convince us that we 

must address the merits of Ms. L.'s jurisdictional issue, even 

though it is moot. 

2. Persistency of Personal Jurisdiction 

¶17 The success of Ms. L.'s argument depends, in large 

part, on her position that the Extension Petition represents the 

initiation of a new proceeding that cannot commence without all 

of the statutory and constitutional requirements attendant upon 

the commencement of an initial commitment proceeding. That is 

to say, Ms. L. assumes the circuit court lost jurisdiction over 

her sometime before the Extension Hearing, and that service of a 
No. 2017AP1468 

13 

new petition (containing all of the material required by Wis. 

Stat. § 51.20(1)) was necessary before it could regain that 

jurisdiction. Neither the relevant statutory provisions nor our 

cases support that proposition. 

¶18 Our analysis begins with Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3., 

which contains the statutory basis for extending an individual's 

commitment.9 In relevant part, it says: 

Upon application for extension of a commitment by the 

department or the county department having custody of 

the subject, the court shall proceed under subs. (10) 

to (13). If the court determines that the individual 

is a proper subject for commitment as prescribed in 

sub. (1) (a) 1. and evidences the conditions under 

sub. (1) (a) 2. or (am) or is a proper subject for 

commitment as prescribed in sub. (1) (ar), it shall 

order judgment to that effect and continue the 

commitment. The burden of proof is upon the county 

department or other person seeking commitment to 

establish evidence that the subject individual is in 

need of continued commitment. 

§ 51.20(13)(g)3. 

¶19 This paragraph provides textual indications that 

extension of a commitment does not comprise a new and separate 

proceeding. The first indication lies in the fact that the 

County files an "application for extension of a commitment." 

This necessarily establishes that there is a pre-existing 

commitment because one cannot extend what does not already 

 

9 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 

2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]tatutory 

interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute. If the 

meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 

inquiry.'") (quoted source omitted). 
No. 2017AP1468 

14 

exist. It also demonstrates the essential connection between 

the commitment and the extension proceeding inasmuch as a 

successful application will affect——"extend"——the original 

commitment. Second, the circuit court may only extend the 

commitment of an individual already in the County's custody. 

Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3. ("Upon application for extension of 

a commitment by the department or the county department having 

custody of the subject . . . .") (emphasis added). The 

"custody" to which this refers, of course, is "care and 

commitment" pursuant to an existing order. Third, the County 

bears the burden of proving the need for "continued" commitment. 

Id. ("The burden of proof is upon the county department or other 

person seeking commitment to establish evidence that the subject 

individual is in need of continued commitment."). And finally, 

if the County's request is successful, then the circuit court 

orders the subject's commitment to continue, not commence: "If 

the court determines that the individual is a proper subject for 

commitment . . . it shall order judgment to that effect and 

continue the commitment." Id. Nothing in this paragraph so 

much as hints that a commitment extension is a proceeding that 

is either new, or separate from, the initial commitment. To the 

contrary, the statute's language demonstrates a logical and 

textual continuity that cannot be interrupted without loss of 

meaning. 

¶20 The continuity of original and extended commitment 

proceedings is not a new subject for us. We addressed this 

issue in the context of a request for substitution of judge in 
No. 2017AP1468 

15 

State ex rel. Serocki v. Circuit Court For Clark County, 163 

Wis. 2d 152, 471 N.W.2d 49 (1991). There, we concentrated on 

the purpose of the extension proceeding, which was to evaluate 

the continuing needs of the committed individual. Id. at 159-60 

(quoting M.J. v. Milwaukee Cty. Combined Cmty. Serv. Bd., 122 

Wis. 2d 525, 530-31, 362 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1984)). We 

reasoned that "[t]his description of the purpose of the 

recommitment hearing and the evidence to be presented support 

the respondent's argument that at the recommitment hearing the 

circuit court continues to receive evidence in the same case." 

Serocki, 163 Wis. 2d at 160 (emphasis added). We concluded, 

therefore, "that the legislature intended an individual's 

recommitment hearing to be, in the context of a request for 

substitution, a continuation of the original commitment 

proceeding and previous recommitment hearings." Id.10

¶21 Although Serocki's specific holding was limited to the 

context of a substitution of judge request, its logic 

inescapably applies here as well. In fact, Serocki and Ms. L.'s 

argument are entirely incompatible. Ms. L. says the extension 

petition institutes a new proceeding, separate and apart from 

 

10 We said the same thing inversely, too. If the person is 

not already subject to a commitment order, then a proceeding 

that results in commitment is an original proceeding: "The 

petitioner apparently was not under any commitment order or in 

custody from September 9, 1988, until September 18, 1989. Thus 

the September 1989 commitment proceeding is an original 

commitment proceeding." State ex rel. Serocki v. Circuit Court 

For Clark Cty., 163 Wis. 2d 152, 155 n.2, 471 N.W.2d 49 (1991). 
No. 2017AP1468 

16 

the initial commitment. But Serocki says the extension hearing 

is part of the same case from whence the initial commitment 

arose: "[A]t the recommitment hearing the circuit court 

continues to receive evidence in the same case." Id. (emphasis 

added). During the pendency of a case, personal jurisdiction is 

not perishable; there is no need to periodically refresh it. 

The court either does, or it does not, have jurisdiction over 

the person. If it does, it persists to the end of the case. 

Ms. L. has presented no authority, or argument, to the contrary. 

We conclude that, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, an 

extension hearing is "a continuation of the original commitment 

proceeding and previous recommitment hearings." Id. Therefore, 

the circuit court still had jurisdiction over Ms. L. when it 

conducted the Extension Hearing and entered the Extension 

Order.11

3. Required Notice Content 

¶22 With that backdrop, we now consider the nature of 

notice the County must provide to Ms. L. before conducting the 

 

11 Although the dissent does not say so explicitly, the 

author appears to disagree with our conclusion that, for 

jurisdictional purposes, an extension hearing is a continuation 

of the original commitment proceedings. So the dissent says 

"because the service provisions of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10) were 

not followed [with respect to notice of the Extension Hearing], 

the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over S.L.L." 

Dissent, ¶57 n.9. However, based on our conclusion above, 

service of the notice can have no jurisdictional impact because 

at no point prior to the Extension Hearing did the circuit 

court's jurisdiction over Ms. L. lapse. 
No. 2017AP1468 

17 

Extension Hearing. The procedural rules governing extension 

hearings appear in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3: "Upon 

application for extension of a commitment by the department or 

the county department having custody of the subject, the court 

shall proceed under subs. (10) to (13)." This, in turn, 

incorporates our rules of civil procedure (except to the extent 

they conflict with Chapter 51): "Except as otherwise provided 

in this chapter, the rules of evidence in civil actions and s. 

801.01(2)[12] apply to any judicial proceeding or hearing under 

this chapter." § 51.20(10)(c). 

¶23 The combination of these procedural rules require the 

County to serve on Ms. L. three items prior to the Extension 

Hearing. First, by virtue of the incorporation of Wis. Stat. 

§ 801.14,13 the County must serve the Extension Petition itself. 

 

12 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.01(2) provides: 

Chapters 801 to 847 govern procedure and practice in 

circuit courts of this state in all civil actions and 

special proceedings whether cognizable as cases at 

law, in equity or of statutory origin except where 

different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule. 

Chapters 801 to 847 shall be construed, administered, 

and employed by the court and the parties to secure 

the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 

every action and proceeding. 

13 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(1), in pertinent part, 

provides: 

Every order required by its terms to be served, every 

pleading unless the court otherwise orders because of 

numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery 

required to be served upon a party unless the court 

otherwise orders, every written motion other than one 

which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, 

(continued) 
No. 2017AP1468 

18 

Second, notice of the Extension Hearing must be served pursuant 

to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) ("Within a reasonable time prior to 

the final hearing, the petitioner's counsel shall notify the 

subject individual and his or her counsel of the time and place 

of final hearing."). And third, "[w]ithin a reasonable time 

prior to the final hearing, each party shall notify all other 

parties of all witnesses he or she intends to call at the 

hearing and of the substance of their proposed testimony." Id. 

And although they need not be served, Ms. L.'s counsel must have 

"access to all psychiatric and other reports 48 hours in advance 

of the final hearing." § 51.20(10)(b). 

¶24 Ms. L. says that is not enough. She contends that the 

County must serve on her, prior to the Extension Hearing, a 

"clear and concise statement of the facts that constitute 

probable cause to believe the allegations of the petition." 

According to Ms. L., the Extension Petition was deficient 

because it did not establish probable cause to believe she is 

mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous 

within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2. or 

51.20(1)(am). But Ms. L. takes those specifics from § 51.20(1), 

which governs an initial petition for examination, not a 

petition for extension of a commitment. Although the County 

must establish all of those elements at the Extension Hearing, 

 

appearance, demand, offer of judgment, undertaking, 

and similar paper shall be served upon each of the 

parties. . . . 
No. 2017AP1468 

19 

there is no statutory mandate that it must serve a document with 

such a factual recitation in advance.14 As discussed above, the 

procedure for extending a person's commitment is governed by 

Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10) through (13), not § 51.20(1). Ms. L. 

identifies nothing in the procedures governing extension 

hearings that requires service of a document containing the 

information she demands. Therefore, there is no statutory 

support for Ms. L.'s position. 

¶25 Nor did the content of the County's notice fail any 

due process requirements. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls 

for such procedural protections as the particular situation 

demands." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) 

(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) 

(alteration in original)). That broad principle applies to the 

contents of the Extension Hearing notice. "The notice must be 

of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information 

and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to 

 

14 In Waukesha Cty. v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶20, 375 

Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783, we held: 

Upon each petition to extend a term of commitment, a 

county must establish the same elements with the same 

quantum of proof. Fond du lac Cty. v. Helen E.F., 

2012 WI 50, ¶20, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179. 

However, it may satisfy the "dangerousness" prong by 

showing "a substantial likelihood, based on the 

subject individual's treatment record, that the 

individual would be a proper subject for commitment if 

treatment were withdrawn." 

(quoting Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am)). 
No. 2017AP1468 

20 

make their appearance." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. 

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted). It is true 

that, to assert personal jurisdiction over a respondent, the 

initiating documents must contain all of the information Ms. L. 

has identified. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1). But the court 

already had jurisdiction over Ms. L. because an extension 

hearing is not the commencement of a new proceeding, it is the 

continuation of an existing case. Ms. L. has identified no 

constitutional principle requiring a respondent to receive a 

jurisdiction-conferring quantum of information every time the 

circuit court conducts a hearing. The notice sent to Ms. L. and 

her attorney provided the date, time, location, and subject 

matter of the Extension Hearing. Because the circuit court 

already had jurisdiction over Ms. L., nothing more was 

necessary. 

4. Service of Notice 

¶26 In addition to challenging the notice's content, Ms. 

L. also faults the County for not serving the notice on her 

personally. She turns to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(2)(b) for the 

service requirements she believes are applicable to extension 

hearings. This provision instructs that: 

If the subject individual is to be detained, a law 

enforcement officer shall present the subject 

individual with a notice of hearing, a copy of the 

petition and detention order and a written statement 

of the individual's right to an attorney, a jury trial 

if requested more than 48 hours prior to the final 

hearing, the standard upon which he or she may be 

committed under this section and the right to a 

hearing to determine probable cause for commitment 

within 72 hours after the individual is taken into 
No. 2017AP1468 

21 

custody under s. 51.15 . . . . The officer shall 

orally inform the individual that he or she is being 

detained as the result of a petition and detention 

order issued under this chapter. If the individual is 

not to be detained, the law enforcement officer shall 

serve these documents on the subject individual and 

shall also orally inform the individual of these 

rights. 

§ 51.20(2)(b) (emphasis added). 

¶27 But those service provisions are not applicable to a 

petition to extend a commitment. As we have already 

established, the procedures governing commitment extensions are 

located in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)-(13), not § 51.20(2). Wis. 

Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3. ("Upon application for extension of a 

commitment by the department or the county department having 

custody of the subject, the court shall proceed under subs. (10) 

to (13).").15 While the governing subsections specify the 

 

15 The dissent is worried that our statement that "the 

procedures governing commitment extensions are located in Wis. 

Stat. § 51.20(10)-(13), not § 51.20(2)," supra, ¶27, will 

displace every other provision in § 51.20. But this statement 

does not negate the generally-applicable provisions of § 51.20 

any more than it negates the application of the Wisconsin 

Constitution to extension proceedings. The question at hand, of 

course, involves identifying which procedures are specific to a 

petition to extend a defendant's commitment. And even more 

specifically, the question bears on how the County must serve 

notice of an extension hearing. While it is true that 

§ 51.20(2) directs how service must be made, by its own terms it 

applies only to the commencement of a commitment proceeding. 

Id. (Section 51.20(2) applies "[u]pon the filing of a petition 

for examination.") (emphasis added). Because a petition to 

extend a commitment is a continuation of an existing commitment 

proceeding, § 51.20(2) cannot control how notice of an extension 

hearing must be accomplished. 
No. 2017AP1468 

22 

content of the notice, and who must be notified,16 they provide 

no specific directions with respect to the notification method.17 

They do, however, point us to the answer. Because 

§ 51.20(10)(c) incorporates the rules of civil procedure to the 

extent they do not conflict with Chapter 51, we need go no 

further than Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2). There, we see that service 

on a party represented by an attorney may be accomplished by 

serving the attorney: 

Whenever under these statutes, service of pleadings 

and other papers is required or permitted to be made 

upon a party represented by an attorney, the service 

shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon 

the party in person is ordered by the court. Service 

upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by 

delivering a copy or by mailing it to the last-known 

address, or, if no address is known, by leaving it 

with the clerk of the court. 

 

16 "Within a reasonable time prior to the final hearing, the 

petitioner's counsel shall notify the subject individual and his 

or her counsel of the time and place of final hearing." Wis. 

Stat. § 51.20(10)(a). 

17 The dissent, to the contrary, says "the notice 

requirements set forth in § 51.20(2) apply to all petitions 

under Ch. 51, including petitions to extend an individual's 

commitment." Dissent, ¶56. But if that were true, it would 

make the notice requirement of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) 

entirely superfluous. We try not to read statutory provisions 

as surplusage. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("Statutory language 

is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, 

in order to avoid surplusage."). 
No. 2017AP1468 

23 

§ 801.14(2) (emphasis added). No part of this conflicts with 

§ 51.20(10)-(13), and so it controls service of the Extension 

Hearing notice.18 

¶28 The County mailed a copy of the Extension Petition and 

the Extension Hearing notice to both Ms. L. at her last known 

address and her counsel. Because notice to her counsel was 

sufficient pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2), it is irrelevant 

that the copy mailed to Ms. L. was returned as undeliverable. 

There was no statutory violation in the method of service chosen 

by the County. 

 

18 The dissent says we are mistaken, and that there really 

is a conflict between the "notification" provisions of Wis. 

Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) and the "service" provisions of Wis. Stat. 

§ 801.14(2). Dissent, ¶57 n.7. The dissent's argument, while 

not adopted by any party to these proceedings, merits some 

attention. 

Ms. L. concentrated solely on the personal service 

requirement of § 51.20(2)(b). She maintained her focus on that 

provision even after the County argued in its response brief 

that § 51.20(10)(c) incorporated the service provisions of 

§ 801.14(2). Perhaps she did not make the dissent's argument 

because reading a personal-service mandate into the phrase 

"petitioner's counsel shall notify the subject individual and 

his or her counsel of the time and place of final hearing" would 

be a difficult task. § 51.20(10)(a). The legislature is 

familiar with language that requires personal service of a 

document, as demonstrated by the mandate in § 51.20(2)(b), which 

requires that "a law enforcement officer shall present the 

subject individual with a notice of hearing . . . ." There are 

many ways one may provide "notice." But to "present" something 

to an individual, one must be (as the word implies) in the 

person's presence. The dissent would have us read the two 

provisions as requiring the same thing. Apparently, not even 

Ms. L. was willing to attempt that equation. 
No. 2017AP1468 

24 

¶29 Ms. L. also contends that the County's chosen method 

of service was constitutionally defective. It is not enough, 

she says, to go through the motions of sending notice to an 

affected party. One must use such methods as have a reasonable 

chance of actually reaching the one to be notified. She directs 

our attention to Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, which observed that 

"[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due 

process . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 

the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections." Most of Ms. L.'s concerns regarding the 

constitutional dimension of this method of service, however, 

were bound up with her belief that the Extension Hearing is a 

new proceeding for which the County must serve a jurisdictionconferring document.19 Because we have rejected that 

 

19 The dissent's insistence that Jones v. Flowers, 547 

U.S. 220 (2006), supports Ms. L.'s position is apparently also 

bound up in that belief. Jones addressed the manner in which 

the State must provide notice to a homeowner before his house 

becomes subject to a tax sale. After observing that Ms. L.'s 

interest in her own well-being is more compelling than Mr. 

Jones' interest in his property, the dissent asks: "Why, then, 

is Jones afforded more due process protections than S.L.L.?" 

Dissent, ¶71. 

The answer is that Mr. Jones was not already subject to a 

court's personal jurisdiction. It is unsurprising that, under 

that circumstance, the Supreme Court should conclude that 

something more than a certified letter was necessary before the 

State took steps to deprive him of his property interest. 

Because Ms. L. was already subject to the circuit court's 

jurisdiction, there was no need to use a jurisdiction-conferring 

method of service for the notice of hearing. 

(continued) 
No. 2017AP1468 

25 

proposition, she must demonstrate that service pursuant to Wis. 

Stat. § 801.14(2) suffers some constitutional defect when the 

court has already established jurisdiction over her. She has 

advanced no such argument, and this method of service long ago 

passed into the realm of settled law: 

[I]t is well-accepted, black-letter law that an 

attorney is not authorized by general principles of 

agency to accept on behalf of a client service of 

process commencing an action. . . . In contrast, the 

black-letter law is that once an action has begun and 

the attorney has appeared in the action on behalf of a 

party, service of papers may be upon the attorney. 

Gangler v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 110 Wis. 2d 649, 657, 329 

N.W.2d 186 (1983) (citing § 801.14(2) (1979-80)). 

¶30 Further, the very case on which Ms. L. founds her 

argument adequately answers her constitutional challenge to the 

method of service employed by the County: "Thus it has been 

 

In any event, even if we granted the dissent's premises, 

there are two reasons Jones does not create a path to Justice 

Ann Walsh Bradley's conclusion. First, the Court did not change 

the long standing rule that "[d]ue process does not require that 

a property owner receive actual notice before the government may 

take his property." Jones, 547 U.S. at 226 (citation omitted). 

And second, the Court also said "that when mailed notice of a 

tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional 

reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property 

owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do 

so." Id. at 225 (emphasis added). 

Even today, Ms. L. does not say what the County should have 

done to reach her. Neither does the dissent. That point cannot 

be emphasized enough. They both fault the County for the method 

of service, but offer nothing but a shrug as an alternative. 

That is not an argument, and there is no need to consider it 

further. 
No. 2017AP1468 

26 

recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, 

employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of 

notification is all that the situation permits and creates no 

constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights." 

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317. One of the responsibilities Ms. L. 

agreed to undertake as a condition of leaving the MHC was 

keeping the County apprised of her current address. She failed 

to do that. We are not unmindful of the difficulties that 

mental health issues and homelessness present in these 

circumstances. But they do not relieve Ms. L. of her 

obligations, and they do not defeat otherwise constitutional 

methods of service. Sending notice to her at the homeless 

shelter was probably a foreseeably futile attempt when made, and 

we know as a historical matter that she did not receive it. But 

Ms. L. has not suggested, even now, how the County was supposed 

to reach her (short of a multi-county manhunt). Ms. L. may not 

excuse herself from these proceedings through neglect of her 

duties. Because the County employed a proper method of service, 

and Ms. L.'s counsel actually did receive notice of the 

Extension Hearing, we conclude there was no statutory or 

constitutional infirmity in service of the notice. 

B. Default at a Recommitment Hearing 

¶31 The Extension Order was the product, at least in part, 

of the circuit court's determination that Ms. L. was in default 

of her obligation to appear at the Extension Hearing. The 

County says default judgment was appropriate pursuant to the 

terms of Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5), which provides that "[a] 
No. 2017AP1468 

27 

default judgment may be rendered against any party who has 

appeared in the action but who fails to appear at trial. If 

proof of any fact is necessary for the court to render judgment, 

the court shall receive the proof." 

¶32 Ms. L. disagrees, and asserts there are two reasons 

circuit courts may not enter default judgments in Chapter 51 

proceedings. First, she says she has a statutory and 

constitutionally-protected right to be present at the hearing. 

And second, she says that because Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) 

identifies what a circuit court may do when someone fails to 

appear for a hearing, it may not import the default judgment 

protocols of Wis. Stat. § 806.02.20

¶33 Ms. L. unquestionably had a right to appear at the 

Extension Hearing: "Except as may otherwise be provided by 

law, . . . a respondent in a matter listed in sub. (1) is 

entitled to be physically present in the courtroom at all trials 

and sentencing or dispositional hearings." Wis. Stat. 

§ 885.60(2)(a). Matters listed in subsection 1 include Chapter 

51 proceedings. § 885.60(1). Ms. L. also says her right to 

appear at the Extension Hearing is constitutionally protected. 

For that proposition, she cites Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 

(1979); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 

 

20 This issue is moot for the same reasons Ms. L.'s 

jurisdictional challenge is moot. However, we will nonetheless 

address it for the same reasons we chose to resolve the first 

issue. 
No. 2017AP1468 

28 

U.S. 1, (1967); and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).21 

We have no doubt that "civil commitment for any purpose 

constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires 

due process protection." Addington, 441 U.S. at 425. And we 

also do not doubt that Chapter 51 proceedings are subject to the 

full complement of due process guarantees. Having said that, 

none of the cases Ms. L. cited support the proposition that 

these due process considerations guarantee the right to appear 

at a Chapter 51 trial in the same way they guarantee the right 

to appear in a criminal trial. Although we have never directly 

considered this proposition, we will treat it as established for 

present purposes. 

¶34 To the extent Ms. L. asserts default judgment was 

inappropriate because she had the right to appear at the 

Extension Hearing, her argument does not go far enough. Rights 

may be waived or forfeited——even constitutionally-protected 

 

21 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419 (1979) (a civil 

commitment case that answered the question of what "standard of 

proof is required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

Constitution in a civil proceeding brought under state law[.]"); 

Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 505 (1972) (a writ of federal 

habeas corpus is not barred by every state procedural default, 

and an evidentiary hearing is required to determine whether 

petitioner knowingly and intelligently made a deliberate 

strategic waiver of his claims in state court); In re Gault, 387 

U.S. 1 (1967) (a review of a writ of habeas corpus where the 

Court held that a juvenile has right to notice of charges, to 

counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 

and to privilege against self-incrimination); Specht v. 

Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)(a review of a writ of habeas 

corpus where the Court held that applying a new act to bring new 

charges against defendant requires compliance with due process). 
No. 2017AP1468 

29 

rights.22 If Ms. L. is to prevail on this argument, she must do 

more than just posit the existence of her right. She must also 

explain why her failure to appear should not be counted as a 

forfeiture of that right. The fact that she did not personally 

know about the hearing is, in this case, an inadequate response 

because her own actions made it impossible for her to learn of 

it. A respondent may not insulate her rights against forfeiture 

by failing to comply with the obligations to which she agreed.23 

Because Ms. L. did not explain why the right to appear at an 

 

22 See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶56, 361 

Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10 ("We now conclude that the right to 

testify may, in appropriate cases, be subject to forfeiture 

where conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right is at 

issue."); State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 756, 546 

N.W.2d 406 (1996) ("Therefore, this court holds that there may 

be situations . . . where a circuit court must have the ability 

to find that a defendant has forfeited his right to counsel."); 

Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 190 (2013) ("[F]orfeiture of the 

privilege against self-incrimination need not be knowing."); 

State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 

N.W.2d 727 ("By failing to raise his objection to the use of a 

six-person jury, [defendant] forfeited his right to a twelveperson jury."); Ness v. Digital Dial Commc'ns, Inc., 227 

Wis. 2d 592, 602, 596 N.W.2d 365 (1999) ("A party in default for 

failing to answer forfeits its due process right to notice of 

further pleadings."); State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶51, 299 

Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518 (holding that a defendant can 

forfeit his right to confront the witnesses against him if he 

wrongfully causes them to be unavailable to testify against 

him). 

23 The Transfer, to which Ms. L. agreed, required her to 

keep a current address on file with the County. This was no 

mere technicality. This was a condition precedent to release 

from the MHC. If she had not agreed to it, presumably her 

inpatient status would have continued, and she would have 

received actual notice of the Extension Hearing in due course. 
No. 2017AP1468 

30 

extension hearing cannot be forfeited, or at least should not be 

forfeited under these circumstances, this aspect of her argument 

against default judgment is insufficiently developed for us to 

consider further. Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 

Wisconsin, 2005 WI 93, ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 

N.W.2d 768 ("We will not address undeveloped arguments.").24

¶35 Ms. L.'s second argument against default judgment is 

that Chapter 51 contains a procedure for dealing with 

respondents who do not appear at hearings that is inconsistent 

with the default protocols of Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5). If that 

 

24 The dissent apparently does not believe a defendant in a 

Chapter 51 proceeding can forfeit her rights. Dissent, ¶¶73-74. 

The author says we should be governed by Shirley J.C. v. 

Walworth Cty., 172 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 493 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 

1992), in which the court of appeals held that summary judgment 

is not available in Chapter 51 proceedings in which the 

defendant "contests the commitment request." Id. at 373. But 

Shirley J.C. said nothing about situations in which a defendant 

does not contest the commitment request. As discussed above, 

defendants can forfeit even constitutionally-protected rights 

through their choices and actions. So Shirley J.C. can teach us 

nothing here unless we were to first hold that Chapter 51 

defendants, uniquely amongst all defendants in Wisconsin's 

courts, are incapable of forfeiting their rights, regardless of 

what they do or fail to do. There is no "binding caselaw," as 

the dissent claims, that requires such an unusual conclusion. 

Dissent, ¶75. 

The dissent also says there is no evidence "to support the 

proposition that S.L.L. forfeited her right to a hearing 

'through [her] choices and actions.'" Id., ¶74 n.12 (citation 

omitted and bracketing in original). But this mischaracterizes 

the posture of the question. We are not considering whether Ms. 

L. did forfeit the right to appear at the Extension Hearing. We 

are merely considering whether it is possible to forfeit the 

right. 
No. 2017AP1468 

31 

is true, then Ms. L.'s position would be well founded inasmuch 

as Chapter 51 incorporates the rules of civil procedure 

"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter[.]" Wis. Stat. 

§ 51.20(10)(c). Therefore, a circuit court may not grant 

default judgment if doing so conflicts with a procedure 

prescribed by Chapter 51. 

¶36 Ms. L. identifies Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) as the 

provision offended by incorporation of a default judgment 

option. That provision says that "[i]n the event that the 

subject individual is not detained and fails to appear for the 

final hearing the court may issue an order for the subject 

individual's detention and shall hold the final commitment 

hearing within 7 days from the time of detention." 

§ 51.20(10)(d). From this, she concludes that "[w]hen a person 

fails to appear for a final commitment hearing, the statute only 

gives the circuit court the option of issuing a detention order 

or not issuing a detention order." "It does not," she says, 

"give the circuit court the option of dispensing with Chapter 

51." Ms. L. correctly notes that issuance of a detention order 

is optional——the statute says "the court may issue," and we 

traditionally interpret "may" as permissive. Heritage Farms, 

Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶32, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 

N.W.2d 465 ("Accordingly, when interpreting a statute, we 

generally construe the word 'may' as permissive."); see also 

Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 53, ¶54, 300 

Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240 (citing City of Wauwatosa v. 

Milwaukee Cty., 22 Wis. 2d 184, 191, 125 N.W.2d 386 (1963)) 
No. 2017AP1468 

32 

("Generally, in construing statutes, the word 'may' is construed 

as permissive."). But she incorrectly concludes that, having 

opted not to issue an order for her detention, the circuit 

court's hands were tied and it could do nothing else. The 

statute does not say the circuit court's only options are to 

issue or not issue a detention order. It simply made a 

detention order an available tool in Chapter 51 proceedings; it 

did not displace all of the other tools already in the toolbox.25

¶37 Nonetheless, Ms. L. says we should be guided by our 

decision in Walworth County v. Spalding, in which we concluded 

the circuit court lacked authority to enter default judgment 

against a defendant who failed to appear at his trial on a 

charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 

an intoxicant. 111 Wis. 2d 19, 22, 329 N.W.2d 925 (1983). The 

Spalding circuit court borrowed from Wis. Stat. § 799.22(2) 

 

25 The dissent acknowledges that Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) 

makes issuance of a detention order a discretionary decision, 

but then inexplicably agrees with Ms. L. that the statute's 

permission to issue such an order simultaneously prohibited the 

circuit court from employing any other remedy against an absent 

defendant. That's an awful lot of responsibility to place on 

the word "may," especially when there is no textual suggestion 

that the legislature offered courts the option of a detention 

order in exchange for forfeiting all of the other compliance 

tools in the toolbox. So the circuit court may enter a default 

judgment, it may issue a writ of capias, or it may do both. The 

statute does not foreclose any of these options. 
No. 2017AP1468 

33 

(1981-82) for authority to enter default judgment.26 We held 

this was error because the traffic code, specifically Wis. Stat. 

§ 345.36 (1981-82), provided the procedure for dealing with 

defendants who do not appear for trial. That provision says: 

"If a defendant fails to appear at the date set under this 

section, the court shall issue a warrant under ch. 968 and, if 

the alleged violator has posted bond for his appearance at that 

date, the court may order the bond forfeited." Id. (emphasis 

added). Because the "shall issue" language was mandatory, we 

held that "[t]he plain meaning of the statute clearly requires 

the court to issue a warrant upon the defendant's failure to 

appear . . . ." Spalding, 111 Wis. 2d at 24. Consequently, 

"[t]he trial court's entry of the default judgment was contrary 

to this specific procedure contained in ch. 345 and therefore 

inappropriate." Id. That is to say, the mandatory warrant 

procedure in § 345.36 (1981-82) emptied the circuit court's 

toolbox of all other tools for addressing a failure to appear at 

trial. 

¶38 The lesson to take from Spalding, therefore, is that a 

context-specific and mandatory procedure will displace a 

contrary general rule of civil procedure. Here, issuance of a 

detention order under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) is context 

 

26 This statute provides: "When defendant fails to appear. 

If the defendant fails to appear on the return date or on the 

date set for trial, the court may enter a judgment upon due 

proof of facts which show the plaintiff entitled thereto." Wis. 

Stat. § 799.22(2) (1981-82) (emphasis in original). 
No. 2017AP1468 

34 

specific, but it is not mandatory. Therefore, it does not 

preclude the use of non-conflicting general rules of civil 

procedure. Circuit courts have the authority, pursuant to Wis. 

Stat. § 806.02(5), as incorporated by § 51.20(10)(c), to enter 

default judgment for failing to appear at properly-noticed 

hearings in which the court has jurisdiction over the person. 

In this case, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Ms. L., 

the Extension Hearing had been properly noticed, Ms. L. had 

previously appeared in the action (specifically, at the initial 

commitment hearing), and she failed to appear for trial. That 

satisfies the prerequisites for entry of default under 

§ 806.02(5). Whether the circuit court had adequate evidence 

available upon which to make the findings necessary to support 

the Extension Order is the subject of Ms. L.'s third issue. 

C. Sufficiency of Evidence/Due Process 

¶39 Ms. L. says there was insufficient evidence of record 

to support the circuit court's entry of the Extension Order, and 

so she asks us to vacate it. But as we discussed above, the 

passage of time has acted as a functional (if not de jure) 

vacatur because the Extension Order no longer has any force or 

effect. And that would seem to make this issue moot just like 

the first two. Ms. L., however, insists this issue is not like 

the others. She believes she is still subject to legal injury 

because the simple expiration of the Extension Order does not 

"expunge the court records, or invalidate the examining 

physician reports." She is also concerned that Wis. Stat. 

§ 51.30(3)(b) allows any corporation counsel to access her files 
No. 2017AP1468 

35 

and court records for the purpose of preparing for "commitment 

and recommitment proceedings, reexaminations, appeals, 

detentions, and commitments under Chapters 55, 971, 975 or 980." 

Not only that, she says, § 51.30(4)(b)(5) "gives DHS [Department 

of Health Services] staff access to all of S.L.L.'s treatment 

records to determine her progress and the least restrictive or 

more appropriate treatment modalities and facilities," and 

§ 51.30(4)(b)(11) "gives corporation counsel full access to 

treatment records 'without modification, at any time' to prepare 

for commitments, recommitments, patient's rights claims, or 

actions under Chapters 48, 971, 975, or 980." 

¶40 For the purpose of determining whether this issue is 

moot, we will assume that Ms. L. correctly recites what may be 

done with her records. But even accepting all of that, we do 

not agree that resolving this issue can "have any practical 

effect upon an existing controversy." Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 

¶13. If we reviewed the evidentiary basis for the Extension 

Order and found it lacking, the proper response would be to 

reverse the court of appeals and direct vacatur of the order. 

But vacatur is not the same thing as expungement. The Extension 

Order would still be a matter of record; it would simply have no 

operative effect. And vacating the Extension Order would have 

absolutely no effect at all on Ms. L.'s examining physician 

reports, treatment records, court files, or records relating to 

previous proceedings in this case. So corporation counsel and 

DHS staff would still be able to access them for the purposes 

Ms. L. described. Therefore, successfully challenging the 
No. 2017AP1468 

36 

evidentiary basis of the Extension Order would not protect Ms. 

L. against any of the consequences that give her concern. This 

issue is moot. 

¶41 As we demonstrated above, we sometimes review issues 

even though they are moot. There are five recognized 

circumstances in which we will do so, two of which we have 

already discussed. The other three involve situations in which 

"the constitutionality of a statute is involved" (which is 

obviously not the case here), or "where the precise situation 

under consideration arises so frequently that a definitive 

decision is essential to guide the trial courts," or "where the 

issue is likely to arise again and should be resolved by the 

court to avoid uncertainty." Id., ¶14. Challenges to the 

sufficiency of evidence are necessarily fact-bound inquiries 

that will vary from case to case. Therefore, a definitive 

decision in this case would provide no guidance to circuit 

courts, nor would it preclude uncertainty in evaluation of 

evidentiary sufficiency in other cases. There is no reason to 

deviate from our mootness doctrine with respect to this issue. 

¶42 Additionally, the County argued that Ms. L. did not 

preserve this issue for appellate review. The Extension Hearing 

transcript reveals that Ms. L.'s counsel raised no objection 

with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence. To avoid 

waiver, litigants must lodge their trial objections 

contemporaneously with the error. See Wis. Stat. § 805.11(1) 

("Any party who has fair opportunity to object before a ruling 

or order is made must do so in order to avoid waiving error."). 
No. 2017AP1468 

37 

And when a party raises an objection, it "must specify the 

grounds on which the party predicates the objection or claim of 

error." § 805.11(2). There are no exceptions to these 

requirements. § 805.11(3) ("Exceptions shall never be made."). 

Ms. L. did not respond to the County's argument on this point, 

and so we take it as conceded. Hoffman v. Econ. Preferred Ins. 

Co., 2000 WI App 22, ¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 53, 606 N.W.2d 590 (Ct. 

App. 1999) ("An argument to which no response is made may be 

deemed conceded for purposes of appeal."). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

¶43 We hold that, for purposes of personal jurisdiction in 

a Chapter 51 proceeding, an extension hearing is a continuation 

of the original commitment proceeding and previous extension 

hearings. Therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction over 

Ms. L. both at the Extension Hearing and when it entered the 

Extension Order because both occurred prior to expiration of the 

Initial Commitment. Consequently, the method of service and 

content of the notice of the Extension Hearing were neither 

statutorily nor constitutionally infirm. We also hold that, 

with respect to extension hearings conducted pursuant to Wis. 

Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3., circuit courts have the authority to 

enter default judgments in compliance with Wis. Stat. 

§ 806.02(5). We choose not to review the evidentiary foundation 

for the Extension Order because the issue is moot and was not 

preserved for appellate review. 

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

affirmed.
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

1 

¶44 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). In seeking to 

extend the involuntary commitment of S.L.L., Waukesha County 

encountered a problem: S.L.L., a homeless individual, was 

nowhere to be found. As a result, she did not receive notice of 

the County's intent to extend her commitment. 

¶45 Regardless, the County forged ahead with commitment 

proceedings. In S.L.L.'s absence, it obtained from the circuit 

court a default order extending S.L.L.'s commitment. 

Additionally, it sought and received an order authorizing the 

involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. 

¶46 Despite the injustice apparent on the face of such an 

in absentia procedure, the majority declares that individuals 

may be defaulted into civil commitment without notice of the 

commitment hearing. It creates a procedural end-run around a 

merits hearing in which an individual's physical liberty hangs 

in the balance. 

¶47 Worse yet, it permits subjecting an individual to 

involuntary——including forced——administration of psychotropic 

medication immediately upon the individual's detention, without 

assessing dangerousness and without providing notice or an 

opportunity to be heard. 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

2 

¶48 Psychotropic medication is not aspirin. Such powerful 

medications are mind-altering and can have severe and 

irreversible side effects——immobilizing mind and body.1

¶49 Because neither Wisconsin statutes nor due process 

countenance such in absentia orders, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

¶50 S.L.L. had been previously subject to a Chapter 51 

mental commitment. Before that commitment expired, the County 

applied to the circuit court for a 12-month extension of her 

commitment. Majority op., ¶6. The circuit court scheduled a 

hearing on the petition and sent a notice of the hearing to 

S.L.L.'s attorney and to her last known address——a homeless 

shelter from which she had been banned.2 Id. Not surprisingly, 

the notice directed to S.L.L. was returned as undeliverable.3 

Id. 

 

1 The administration of psychotropic drugs is no trifling 

matter. See K.N.K v. Buhler, 139 Wis. 2d 190, 207 n.3, 407 

N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1987); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 

N.E.2d 40, 436-37 (Mass. 1981) (explaining that antipsychotic 

medication "[is] powerful enough to immobilize mind and body[,]" 

has a "profound effect . . . on the thought processes of an 

individual[,]" and has a "well-established likelihood of severe 

and irreversible adverse side effects . . . ."). 

2 A report from the Waukesha County Community Human Services 

Department in the record notes that S.L.L. was "not permitted to 

be [at the homeless shelter] due to her behavior." 

3 The majority's characterization of the facts is 

misleading. It accuses S.L.L. of "absconding" from treatment. 

Majority op., ¶5. To "abscond" means "[t]o depart secretly or 

suddenly, esp. to avoid arrest, prosecution, or service of 

process." Black's Law Dictionary 8 (10th ed. 2014). 

(continued) 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

3 

¶51 On the appointed day for the extension hearing, 

S.L.L., having received no notice, was not present. Id., ¶7. 

Nevertheless, the circuit court proceeded in her absence. Id. 

Her attorney attended and made arguments on her behalf.4 Id. 

¶52 After determining that S.L.L. remained subject to its 

jurisdiction, the circuit court found: "She has not appeared 

here today. She's in default of her right to object." See id. 

Based on S.L.L.'s alleged default, the circuit court extended 

her commitment: "I'm [going to find] the elements, based upon 

that default, to extend. . . . I'll find that she continues to 

be mentally ill. I'll find that she is a proper subject for 

treatment . . . ." 

¶53 Accordingly, the circuit court extended S.L.L.'s 

commitment for twelve months. Id. It further ordered that the 

County be authorized to involuntarily medicate S.L.L. for the 

duration of her commitment. Id. 

¶54 The majority determines that the circuit court's 

procedure as delineated above complied with both statutory and 

constitutional requirements. In the majority's view, service of 

the notice of hearing on S.L.L.'s attorney was sufficient and it 

is "irrelevant that the copy mailed to Ms. L. was returned as 

 

There is not a single shred of evidence in the record to 

support the assertion that S.L.L. "absconded" from treatment. 

Indeed, there is no evidence in the record to support any 

conclusions as to why S.L.L. stopped showing up for her 

scheduled treatments. 

4 S.L.L.'s attorney had not heard from S.L.L. and had no 

information as to her whereabouts. Majority op., ¶7 n.7. 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

4 

undeliverable." Id., ¶28. It further posits that although 

"[s]ending notice to her at the homeless shelter was probably a 

foreseeably futile attempt when made," it was nevertheless 

constitutionally sufficient due to S.L.L.'s "failure" to "keep[] 

the County apprised of her current address." Id., ¶30. 

II 

¶55 The majority errs in its interpretation of Wis. Stat. 

§ 51.20. 

¶56 In an initial misstep, the majority erroneously claims 

that Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(10)-(13) are the only provisions that 

govern the procedure for commitment extension hearings. See 

majority op., ¶27. It is true that § 51.20(13)(g)3. directs the 

court to subsections (10)-(13) "[u]pon application for extension 

of a commitment[,]" but in order to "apply" for a commitment 

extension, the government is required to file a petition under 

§ 51.20(1).5 The notice requirements set forth in § 51.20(2) 

apply to all petitions under ch. 51, including petitions to 

extend an individual's commitment. Additionally, even a cursory 

 

5 We know that compliance with Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1) is 

required for commitment extension proceedings because 

§ 51.20(1)(am) provides an alternate path to prove an 

individual's dangerousness that can only be taken "[i]f the 

individual has been the subject of inpatient 

treatment . . . immediately prior to commencement of the 

proceedings . . . ." 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

5 

review of § 51.20 as a whole reveals that other subsections are 

applicable as well.6

¶57 Even if one were to wear textual blinders as the 

majority wishes, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) explicitly requires 

the government to notify "the subject individual and his or her 

counsel of the time and place of final hearing."7 This stands in 

contrast to other provisions in § 51.20, under which 

statutorily-sufficient service can be accomplished by serving 

 

6 For example, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3) provides that at the 

time a petition for commitment is filed, the court is required 

to ensure that the subject individual is represented by 

adversary counsel by referring the individual to the state 

public defender. Is it the majority's position that this 

subsection does not apply to commitment extension proceedings? 

Similarly, § 51.20(5)(a) states that all hearings required 

to be held under Chapter 51 "shall conform to the essentials of 

due process and fair treatment including the right to an open 

hearing, the right to request a closed hearing, the right to 

counsel, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, the 

right to remain silent and the right to a jury trial if 

requested under sub. (11)." Is it the majority's position that 

this subsection does not apply to commitment extension 

proceedings? 

7 The majority relies on Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2), asserting 

that service upon S.L.L.'s attorney is sufficient. Majority 

op., ¶27. It contends that "[n]o part of this [statute] 

conflicts with § 51.20(10)-(13), and so it controls service of 

the Extension Hearing notice." Id. 

However, the majority acknowledges that Chapter 801 is 

incorporated into Chapter 51 only to the extent it does not 

conflict with Chapter 51. Id., ¶22. Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) 

requires the government to notify "the subject individual and 

his or her counsel of the time and place of final hearing" 

(emphasis added). Section 801.14(2) does not require service on 

the subject individual and therefore conflicts with 

§ 51.20(10)(a). There is no need to go to Chapter 801 for an 

answer that Chapter 51 already provides. 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

6 

only the subject individual's counsel.8 "And" does not mean 

"or." Pursuant to § 51.20(10), service of notice upon S.L.L.'s 

attorney, but not S.L.L., was statutorily insufficient.9

¶58 The majority compounds its error in statutory 

interpretation by misreading Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d). This 

subsection provides a procedure to follow in just the situation 

that arose here: "In the event that the subject individual is 

not detained and fails to appear for the final hearing the court 

may issue an order for the subject individual's detention and 

shall hold the final commitment hearing within 7 days from the 

time of detention." § 51.20(10)(d). 

¶59 Although I acknowledge, as the majority does, that the 

first clause of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) contains permissive 

"may" language, the second clause of the statute contains 

mandatory "shall" language. See majority op., ¶36. The statute 

 

8 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 51.20(8)(bg) (notice of subject 

individual's noncompliance with treatment agreement sent only to 

subject individual's counsel, not the subject individual); 

§ 51.20(11) (right to jury trial deemed waived unless demanded 

at least 48 hours in advance of final hearing provided that 

either the subject individual or her counsel received notice of 

the final hearing). 

9 As the majority acknowledges, compliance with "statutory 

provisions regarding service of process is required before a [] 

court has personal jurisdiction." Majority op., ¶12 (citing 

State v. Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 108, ¶27, 283 Wis. 2d 336, 700 

N.W.2d 4). The majority further acknowledges that "if Ms. L. is 

right about having not received proper notice, the Extension 

Order was void from the beginning" for want of personal 

jurisdiction. Majority op., ¶13. This is a correct statement. 

Accordingly, because the service provisions of Wis. Stat. 

§ 51.20(10) were not followed, the circuit court lacked personal 

jurisdiction over S.L.L. 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

7 

provides that the final commitment hearing shall be held within 

seven days from the time of detention. Pursuant to the statute, 

if there is no detention, the final hearing cannot be held. As 

S.L.L. argues in her reply brief, "When a person fails to appear 

for a final commitment hearing, the statute only gives the 

circuit court the option of issuing a detention order or not 

issuing a detention order. It does not give the circuit court 

the option of dispensing with Chapter 51." 

¶60 Chapter 51 contains no default judgment provision. 

Nevertheless, the majority ignores the statutorily mandated 

procedure and reaches out to utilize a default judgment 

procedure found nowhere in the text of the chapter.10 This 

allows for the involuntary commitment and medication of an 

 

10 The majority says that "there is no textual suggestion 

that the legislature offered courts the option of a detention 

order in exchange for forfeiting all of the other compliance 

tools in the toolbox." Majority op., ¶36 n.25. 

The issuance of a default judgment is not a "compliance 

tool." The statutorily-prescribed "compliance tool" is the 

issuance of a detention order. The subject individual's 

"compliance" is compelled by being detained and brought before 

the court within a short period of time for the purpose of 

conducting a hearing on the merits of the government's 

commitment petition. Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d). 

Here, the circuit court issued both a default judgment and 

a detention order. One wonders whether the detention order was 

a pointless "compliance tool" when issued in conjunction with a 

default judgment. That is, why would a court issue a detention 

order for the purpose of detaining the individual and holding a 

final hearing on the merits if a default order for commitment 

extension has already been issued, and the individual must first 

obtain relief from the default judgment before proceeding to the 

final ch. 51 merits hearing? 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

8 

individual without any in-person assessment regarding the 

individual's dangerousness. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. 

Additionally, it permits subjecting an individual to 

involuntary——even forced——administration of psychotropic 

medication immediately upon detention without any notice or the 

opportunity to be heard. 

III 

 ¶61 The majority further errs by approving an egregious 

violation of due process. 

¶62 "The essence of due process is the requirement that 'a 

person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case 

against him and opportunity to meet it.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 

424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). Although due process does not require 

actual notice, due process does require the government to 

provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 

the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 

306, 314 (1950). 

¶63 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), provides an apt 

comparison. In Jones, the Supreme Court discussed the notice 

that is due before the government may extinguish an individual's 

rights in real property to satisfy a tax delinquency. Id. at 

223. 

¶64 Jones was delinquent on his property taxes, and the 

State of Arkansas sought to sell his property to satisfy the 

delinquency. Id. at 223-24. The Commissioner of State Lands 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

9 

attempted to notify Jones of his delinquency and his right to 

redeem the property by mailing a certified letter to Jones at 

the delinquent property, but the letter was returned, unopened, 

and marked "unclaimed". Id. 

¶65 Two years later, and just a few weeks before the 

public sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale 

in a local newspaper. Id. at 224. The Commissioner mailed 

another certified letter to Jones at the delinquent property 

attempting to notify him that his house would be sold if he did 

not pay his taxes. Id. This second letter was also returned, 

unopened, and marked "unclaimed," and the property was sold. 

Id. 

¶66 The Supreme Court concluded "that when mailed notice 

of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take 

additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the 

property owner before selling his property." Id. at 225. Its 

determination rested on the principle that "when notice is a 

person's due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one 

desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably 

adopt to accomplish it, and that assessing the adequacy of a 

particular form of notice requires balancing the interest of the 

State against the individual interest sought to be protected by 

the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 229 (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

¶67 By way of analogy, the Court likened the 

Commissioner's inaction in the face of the unclaimed letters as 

akin to the Commissioner watching the postman accidentally drop 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

10 

the notice down a storm drain without bothering to prepare and 

send a new notice. Id. "No one 'desirous of actually 

informing' the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the 

letters disappeared and say 'I tried.'" Id. 

¶68 Here, the facts and consequences are even more 

egregious than those in Jones. In Jones, the Commissioner did 

not know that notice would be ineffective at the time he sent 

the certified letters to the delinquent property. On the other 

hand, in this case, the County sent notice to the one location 

in Wisconsin that it knew S.L.L. would not be——the homeless 

shelter from which she had been banned. No one desirous of 

actually informing S.L.L. of the commitment extension hearing 

would have mailed notice to a place known to have banned S.L.L. 

and then called it quits. The Constitution requires that 

additional reasonable steps be taken to attempt to provide 

notice to the affected party. 

¶69 Yet, the majority today accepts the very argument that 

was rejected by the Supreme Court in Jones. The Commissioner in 

Jones argued that reasonable follow-up measures were not 

required because "notice was sent to an address that Jones 

provided and had a legal obligation to keep updated." Id. at 

231. Rejecting this argument, the Court determined that Jones' 

failure to comply with a statutory obligation to keep his 

address updated did not forfeit his right to constitutionallysufficient notice. Id. at 232 (citations omitted). 

¶70 The County makes the same argument in this case. 

Rather than follow Jones, however, the majority instead places 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

11 

the blame for not receiving notice at the feet of S.L.L. This 

is particularly troubling because S.L.L., who previously was 

determined to be mentally ill, has experienced homelessness and 

may still be homeless. The government is required "to consider 

unique information about an intended recipient regardless of 

whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide 

notice in the ordinary case." Id. at 230. Yet, the majority 

relieves the County of this requirement. 

¶71 Jones dealt with the process due before extinguishing 

an individual's property rights. Id. at 223. S.L.L.'s interest 

in this case, i.e., her physical liberty and interest in 

avoiding the involuntary administration of psychotropic 

medication, must be at least as important as Jones' property 

rights. Why, then, is Jones afforded more due process 

protections than S.L.L.? The majority does not (and cannot) 

explain.11

¶72 In addition to disregarding binding federal case law, 

the majority also contradicts binding Wisconsin case law. 

Specifically, in Shirley J.C. v. Walworth Cty., 172 Wis. 2d 371, 

373, 493 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1992), the court of appeals 

concluded that granting summary judgment to the county in the 

context of a Chapter 51 commitment violated due process. 

 

11 If the Supreme Court in Jones had based its analysis on 

the court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Jones, as the 

majority claims, one would expect a discussion of personal 

jurisdiction in the opinion. See majority op., ¶29 n.19. Not 

only did the Supreme Court not discuss personal jurisdiction in 

Jones, it did not even mention the term. 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

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¶73 It observed that Wis. Stat. § 51.20 does not allow 

commitment without a hearing, and if summary judgment were 

allowed, "the hearing requirement in the statute would be 

meaningless." Id. at 378. Paramount to the court of appeals' 

analysis was that the final hearing in a Chapter 51 case 

determines whether the subject individual will lose her liberty. 

Id. at 379-80. 

¶74 If summary judgment is disallowed in a Chapter 51 

commitment case, how can it be that default judgments are 

allowed?12 Chapter 51 is explicit that a final hearing on the 

merits must be held before the subject individual is committed. 

Id. at 378 (citing Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c)). Yet, by allowing 

an individual to be defaulted into commitment, the majority 

creates a loophole by which that final hearing can be avoided 

and involuntary psychotropic medication can be administered 

immediately upon the individual's detention without an 

assessment of dangerousness and with no hearing whatsoever. 

¶75 Unlike the majority, I would follow binding case law 

and conclude that the County failed to take constitutionallysufficient steps to provide notice of the commitment extension 

 

12 The majority claims that its analysis can live in harmony 

with Shirley J.C. v. Walworth Cty., 172 Wis. 2d 371, 493 

N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1992). It says that default judgments in 

ch. 51 cases are justified because, in such instances, 

individuals have "forfeited" their rights "through their choices 

and actions." Majority op., ¶34 n.24. This statement ignores 

the fact that S.L.L. received no notice of her final hearing, 

and there is no evidence whatsoever to support the proposition 

that S.L.L. forfeited her right to a hearing "through [her] 

choices and actions." See supra, ¶7 n.3. 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

13 

hearing to S.L.L., resulting in a default judgment of commitment 

that violates due process. 

¶76 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

¶77 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 

ABRAHAMSON and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
No. 2017AP1468.awb 

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