In th e S u p re m e Co u rt o f Ge o rg ia

De c id e d: Ma rc h 2 5, 2 0 1 6

S 1 5 A1 7 3 4 . P YATT v . THE S TATE.

B L ACKW EL L , Ju stic e

.

T r ema i n e P y a tt wa s trie d b y a Mu sc og e e Co u n ty ju ry a n d c o n vic te d o f

fe lo ny m u rd e r a n d two a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lts, a ll in c o n n e c tio n with a sh oo tin g in

wh ic h Me re d ith “ Ta g ” Rh o d e s wa s fa ta lly wo un de d

. P y a tt a p pe a ls, c o n te n d in g

th a t th e e v id e n c e is in su ffi c i e n t t o su sta in h is c o n v ic tio n s, th a t th e tria l c o urt

e rre d wh e n it a d m itte d c e rta in e v id e nc e , th a t th e tria l ju dg e m a d e a n im p ro p e r

c o m m e n t in th e p re se n c e of th e ju ry , th a t th e tri a l c o u rt e rre d wh e n it c h a rg e d

th e ju ry , th a t h e wa s d e n ie d a tria l b e fo re a fa ir a n d im p a rtia l ju d g e , a nd th a t h e

wa s d e n ie d th e e ffe c tiv e a ssista n c e o f c o un se l. We a ffirm

. 1

1 The shooting occurred on June 17, 2007. Py att was indicted on Decem ber 18, 2007,
and he was charged w ith m alice m urd e r , f e lony m urder, a nd three aggravated assaults (against Rhodes and two o t her persons). Py att w as tried in A ugust 2009, and the jury returned
its verdict on August 6, acquitting Py att of m alice m u rder a nd f

inding h im g uilty on all other

counts. Py att was sentenced to im prisonm ent f

or l if e f or f elony m urder and c o ncurrent term s of im prisonm ent f

or twenty y ears f

or each of the aggravated a ssaults. P y a t t f i l e d a tim ely

m otion f o r new trial on A ugust 17, 2009, which he am ended f i ve tim es over t he next f

ive

y ears. On April 7, 2015, the trial court granted t he m otion in part, vacating his sentence f or aggravated assault u

pon Rhodes and m erging t hat aggravated assault with the f elony m urder.1

. Vie we d in th e lig h t m o st fa v o ra ble to th e v e rd ic t, th e e v id e nc e sh o w s

th a t Rh o d e s a n d th re e frie n d s — Ma rc u s Ja c kso n , F itz g e ra ld Na sh

, a n d Re g in a ld

Go o dwin — d e c id e d o n th e e v e n in g o f Ju n e 1 6

, 2 0 07 to v isit so m e n ig h tc lu b s

in th e Co lu m

b u s a re a

. At first, th e y d ro ve to th e VIP Lo un ge , 2 on ly to fin d th a t

e sta b lish m e n t a lre a d y c ro wd e d

. In th e v ic in ity o f th e VIP Lo un g e , h o we v e r, th e

m e n e n c o u n te re d S a le tta P e rry a n d Bre ana Bro a d n a x , w h o as k e d fo r a rid e

.

Rh o d e s a g re e d

, a n d th e two y ou n g wo m e n jo in e d Rh o de s in h is c a r. Rh o d e s, h is

frie n d s, a n d th e two y o u n g wo m e n th e n p ro c e e d e d to th e Ro g e rs Ta p Ro o m

.

Rh o de s p a rk e d h is c a

r in th e fro n t o f th e Ro g e rs Ta p R o om

. In th e p a rk in g

lo t, Rh o d e s a n d h is frie n d s stru c k u p a c o n v e rsa tio n with a n o th e r gro u p o f

wo m e n. Me a nwh ile

, P e rry a n d Bro a d n a x wa ite d ne a r Rh o d e s’s c ar

. At so m e

p o in t, P y a tt a n d h is frie nd s e m e rg e d fro m th e Ro g e rs Ta p Ro om

. P y a tt an d P e rry

p re v io u sly h a d b e e n in a ro m a n tic re la tio n sh ip

, a nd wh e n th e y c a m e a c ro ss o n e

a n o th e r in th e p a rk in g lo t, th e y b e g a n to a rg u e

. Rh od e s g o t in to h is c a r to le a v e

The t rial court otherwise denied the m o tion f or new trial. Py att tim e ly f iled a notice of appeal on April 10, 2015. H is appeal was docketed in this Court f or the Septem

ber 2015 term

and
subm itted f

or decision on the brief

s.

2 Rhodes drove his o wn car, and he was accom panied by Jackson. Nash drove another vehicle, and Goodwin rode with Nash.

2th e Ro ge rs Ta p Ro o m , a n d P e rry a n d Bro a d n a x j oin e d h im

. As Rh o de s d ro v e

o u t o f th e p a

rk in g lo t, Pe rry a n d Bro a d n a x le a n e d o u t o f th e o p e n win d o ws o f

h is c a r a n d c o n tin u e d th e a rg u m e n t with P y a tt, sh o utin g a t h i m. P y a tt sh o u te d

b a c k

, a n d h e fire d a h a n d g u n in th e dire c tio n o f th e c a r. 3 On e o f P y a tt’s frie n d s

re c o g n iz e d Rh od e s a n d s a i d th a t, if Rh o d e s re tu rn e d, he w o u ld sh o ot R h o d e s.

In th a t c a se , P y a tt re sp on d e d , “ I’msh o o tin g .”

Rh o de s, P e rry , a n d Bro a d n a x d ro v e a wa y , b u t Rh o d e s e v e n tu a lly tu rn e d

h is c a r a ro u n d . Rh o d e s a n d th e y o u n g wo m e n th e n re tu rn e d to th e Ro g e rs Ta p

R o om , an d a s th e y d ro v e b y th e n ig h tc lu b

, se v e ra l m o re g un sh o ts we re f i r e d

.

Th e se g u n sh o ts frig h te n e d P e rry a n d Bro a d n a x , an d a t th a t p o in t, th e y e x ite d th e

c a r. No w driv in g a lo n e , R h o d e s tu rn e d h is c a r a ro u n d a g a in a n d dro v e p a st th e

n ig h tc lu b o n c e m o re

. As h e d id

, h e sp o k e by ph on e with Ja c k so n , wh o wa rn e d

Rh o d e s th a t se v e ra l p e o p le we re “ c o m in g a fte r [h im ] .” P y a tt a n d se v e ra l o th e r

m e n we re sta n d in g a lo n g th e stre e t, a n d th e g ro u p fire d m ultip le sh o ts a t Rh o de s

a s h e p a sse d by th e n ig h tc lu b fo r th e la st tim e

. Rh od e s wa s wo u nd e d

, a n d h e

c ra sh e d his c a r in to a p a rk ed v e h ic le

. Ja c k so n fo u n d Rh o de s, p u lle d h im fro m

3 M uch of the ey ewitness testim ony i n t his case conf licted, includin g o n t h i s point.
Som e witnesses said that Py att only f ired a shot into the air.

3th e c a r , a n d p u t h im in to Na sh ’s ve h ic le

. Na sh

, Ja c kso n , a n d Go o dwin th e n

a tte m p te d to d riv e Rh o d e s to a h o sp ita l, b u t th e y wre c ke d a lo n g th e wa y

.

Rh o d e s la te r d ie d o f a g u nsh ot wo u n d to h is ne c k

, wh ic h h a d le ft h is sp in a l c o rd

se v e re d

.

In th e m e a n t im e , P y a tt a n d Jo se p h T ay lo r le ft th e Ro g e rs Ta p Ro o m fo r

a n o th e r n ig h tc lu b

. A s th e y dro v e , P y a tt wa s sp e a kin g b y p h o n e with so m e o n e

.

In th e c o u rse o f h is c o n v e rsa tio n , P y a tt a sk e d : “ [W] hy a re y o u te llin g m e ? I

wa sn ’t th e o n ly o n e sh o o tin g.” 4 At th e sc e n e o f th e sh oo tin g , in v e stig a to rs la te r

fo u n d c a r trid g e c a sin g s e je c te d fro m a t le a st th re e d iffe re n t h a n dg u n s. On e o f

th o se c a sin g s wa s c on siste n t with th e p ro je c tile th a t fa ta lly wo un d e d Rh o d e s.

No tin g th a t n o e y e witn e ss c o uld sa y w h o f ire d th e sh o t th a t fa ta lly

wo u nd e d R h o d e s , P y a tt c la im s th a t th e e v id e n c e is in su ffic ie n t to su sta in h is

c o n v ic tio n s. W h e n we c on sid e r w h eth e r th e e v id e n c e is le ga lly su ffic ie n t,

h o we v e r, w e m

ust v ie w it in th e lig h t m o st fa v o ra b le to th e v e rd ic t. S e e Bry a n t

v . S ta te

, 2 9 6 G a

. 4 5 6

, 45 7 (1 ) (7 6 9 S E2 d 5 7 ) (2 0 1 5 ). S o v ie w e d , th e e v id e n c e

in th is c a se sh o ws th a t P y a tt wa s e n g a g e d in a n a n gry d isp ute with P e rry , wh o

4 Again, the evidence of exactly what Py a tt said is conf

licting.

4wa s a c c o m

p a n y in g Rh o d e s. A s Rh o d e s, P e rry , a n d Bro a d n a x d ro v e a wa y fro m

th e Ro ge rs Ta

p R o o m fo r th e first tim e , P y a tt fire d a sh o t in th e ir d ire c tio n

. P y a tt

th e n sa id th a t, if Rh o d e s re tu rn e d, h e wo u ld sh o o t a g a in

. Wh e n R h o d e s a n d th e

two y o u n g wo m e n re tu rn e d

, se v e ra l a dd itio n a l g un sh o ts w e re fire d

. An d wh e n

Rh o d e s d ro v e p a st th e n ig h tc lu b fo r th e la st tim e , P y a tt wa s a m o n g a g ro u p th a t

fire d a t le a st th re e h a n d g u n s, o n e of wh ic h fa ta lly wo u n d e d Rh o d e s. Th e S ta te

wa s n o t re q u ire d to p ro v e th a t P y a tt h im se l f f ire d th e fa ta l sh o t, so lo n g a s it

p ro v e d th a t h e w a s a p a rty to th e fa ta l sh o otin g

. S e e OCGA § 1 6 -2 -2 0

. 5 An d th e

S ta te p ro p e rly c o u ld c a rry its b u rd e n o f p ro o f b y c i r c u msta n tia l e vid e n c e , so

lo n g a s th e c irc um sta n tia l e v id e n c e wa s su ffic ie n t to e xc lu d e e v e ry hy p o th e sis

5 OCGA § 16-2-20 provides: (a) Every person concerned in t he com m ission of a crim e is a party thereto
and m ay be charged with and convicted of com m ission of the crim e. (b) A person is concerned in the com m ission of a crim e only

if he: (1) Directly

com m its the crim e ; (2) Intentio n ally causes som e o ther person to c om m it the
crim e under such circum stances t ha t t h e o ther person is not guilty of any crim e either in f act or because o f legal incapacity ; (3) I n t entionally aids or abets in t he com m ission of the
crim e; or (4) Intentionally ad v i s es, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to com m it the crim e.

5o th e r th a n h is g u ilt. S e e fo rm e r OCGA § 2 4 -4 -6

. 6 Vie w in g th e e v id e nc e in th e

lig h t m o st fa v o ra

b le to th e v e rd ic t, we c on c lu d e th a t it wa s su ffic ie n t to p e rm it

a ra tio n a l ju ry to fin d be y o n d a r ea s o n a b le d o ub t th a t P y a tt wa s g u ilty o f th e

c rim e s o f wh ic h h e wa s c o n v ic te d

, wh e th e r a s a p rin c ip a l o r o n ly a n a c c o m p lic e

.

S e e Ja c k so n v

. Virg in ia

, 44 3 U. S

. 3 0 7

, 3 19 (III) (B) (9 9 SCt 2 7 8 1, 6 1 LE2 d

5 6 0 ) (1 97 9 ).

2

. D e te c tiv e Ro b e rt Ja c k so n in v e stig a te d th e sh o o tin g , a n d h e te stifie d a s

a witn e ss fo r th e S ta te a t tria l. In th e c o u rse o f h is te stim o n y , De te c tiv e Ja c k so n

twic e m a d e c o m m e n ts th a t, a c c o rd in g to P y a tt, a m o u nte d to im p ro p e r op in io n s

o n u ltim a te issu e s in th e c a se

. P y a tt c la im s th a t th e tria l c o u rt e rre d wh e n it

6 This case was t ried i n 2009, and so, it was tried u nder our old Evidence Code. At the
tim e of trial, f

orm er OCGA § 24-4-6 provided that, “[ t]o warrant a c onviction on circum stantial evidence, the proved f acts shall not o nly be consistent with the hy pothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other rea s o nable hy pothesis save that o f the g uilt of the
accused.” This provision of f orm er OCGA § 24-4-6 was carried f orward into the new Evidence Code, and it now can be f ound at OCGA § 24-14-6. Apply i ng this provision, we have explained: [ N]ot every h y

pothesis is a reasonable one, a n d the evidence n eed n ot e xclude

every c onceivable i nf

erence or h y

p o t h e sis
— only t hose that are reasonable.

W h ether a n a l ternative hy pothesis raised b y the def e ndant i s reasonable is a question com m itted principally to the j ury , and where the jury is a uthorized to
f ind that the evidence, though circum s tantial, was suf f icient t o e xclude e very reasonable hy

p othesis save that of the guilt of the accused, we will not disturb
that f inding unless it is insupportable as a m atter of law.
Black v. State, 296 Ga. 658, 660 (1) (769 SE2d 898) (2015) (punctuation, c itations, and

em phasis om i tted).

6a llo w e d th o se c o m m e n ts

. S e e F o rd h a m v

. S ta te

, 2 5 4 Ga

. 5 9

, 5 9 -6 0 (4 ) (3 2 5

S E2 d 7 5 5 ) (1 9 8 5 ). P y a tt, h o we v e r, did no t ob je c t to th e te stim o n y a

bo u t wh ic h

h e n o w c o mp l a i n s , a n d fo r th a t re a so n , th is c la im o f e rro r is n ot p re se rv e d fo r

a p p e lla te re v ie w. 7 Se e Co lto n v

. S ta te

, 2 9 2 Ga

. 5 09

, 5 1 3 (3 ), n

. 2 (7 39 S E2 d 3 8 0 )

(2 0 1 3 ); S a n c h e z v . S ta te , 2 8 5 Ga . 7 4 9, 7 51 -7 5 2 (3 ) (6 8 4 S E2 d 2 5 1 ) (2 0 0 9 ).

3

. Py a tt a lso c o m

p la in s th a t th e tria l ju d g e m a d e a n im p ro pe r c o m m e n t in

th e p re se n c e o f th e ju ry

. As De te c tiv e J ac k so n wa s te stify in g , th e p ro se c u tin g

a t t o r n e y a sk e d h im to re a d a lo u d a writte n sta te m e n t th a t Jo se ph Ta y lo r h a d

g iv e n to in v e stig a to rs. T a y l o r h a d te stifie d e a rlie r, a n d P y a tt ob je c te d th a t th e

ju ry a lre a d y h a d he a rd a b o u t h is sta te m e n t a n d th a t it w a s u n n e c e ssa ry fo r

De t ec t i ve Ja c kso n to g o th ro ug h th e sta te m e nt a g a in

. Th e ju d g e d isc u sse d th e

7 E ven when n o t i mely objection is m ade in the trial court, our new Evidence Code

p e r m its appellate review of evidentiary rulings f or plain e rror. See OCGA § 24-1

- 1 0 3 ( d ) (court m ay “tak[ e] notice of plain errors af f ecting s ubs t a

n tial r ights a lthough such errors were
not brought to the a ttention of the [ trial] court”). See a l so Gates v. S tate, 298 Ga. 324, 326-
327 (3) ( 781 SE2d 772) (2016). But as w e h ave noted, see n ote 6, supra, this case was tried
in 2009 under the old Evidence Code. Although “ an appellate court [ ty pically ] applies the
law as it exists at the tim e its opinion i s r e n d e r e d

, ” E lm ore v. State, 2 69 G a. 5 28, 529 (4) (501 SE2d 215) (1998) (citation om itted), the new Evidence Code explicitly applies only to “any m otion m ade or hearing or trial com m enced o n o r af ter [ January 1

, 2013].” Ga. L. 2011,

p. 99, § 101. The new Evidence C ode does n ot app l y i n t h i s c a se, and in the absence of a tim ely o bjection, t here is no appellate review o f evidentiary r ulings under the old Evidence
Code in a c ase like t his one. See Durham v. State, 292 Ga. 239, 240 (2) (734 SE2d 377) (2012).

7o b

je c tio n w i t h th e la wy e rs, a n d in th e m id d le o f th e ir e x te n d e d c o llo q u y , th e

j u d g e a p p e a rs to h a v e a g re e d with th e p ro se c u tin g a tto rn e y th a t th e sta t e me n t

wa s “ c ritic a l e v id e n c e .” 8 It is th a t c o m m e n t with wh ic h P y a tt n o w ta k e s issu e

.

8 The colloquy

went as f o l lows: [ Prosecuting a ttorney ]: All right, sir. A ll right, sir. W o uld y o u p l e ase read Mr. Tay lor’s statem ent? [ Detective Jackson]: Beginning to end? [ Detective Jackson beg i n s to read f rom the statem ent.] [ Def ense counsel]: Your Honor, why would we be reading this again?

We ’ v e already had Joseph Tay lor testif y and we’ve gone over the stateme n t with him on his testim ony

. S e e ms l i k e w e’re violating the rule about the continuing witness here in court. [ The Court]: I don’t think it’s a continuing witness violation, but h ow

— y o u’v e h a d the m an here and covered t he statem e nt with him

. Are y ou try ing to go back and do it again? [ Prosecutin g a ttorney ]: W ell, I m ean, this i s the c r itical statement, critical evidence, Judge. [ The Court]: It i

s. But it’s adm itted on som e basis. Now, th e w itness Tay lor was exam ined about this at great length, the statem ent he g a v e

. A nd

y ou covered the statem ent at that tim e. I think [ def ense counsel] is right f

or the

wrong reason. [ Prosecuting a tt o r n e y ]: So y ou are not perm itting us to read the

statem ent? [ The C ourt]: That’s correct. Do y o u have a n y thoughts that y ou can bring to m y

m ind as to why

it would be adm issible? I can’t think of one[ .] [ Prosecuting attorney ]: W ell, I just believe his p r i or statem ents are adm issible. And we rolled the v ideotape verbatim f rom s tart t o f

inish[ ,] and I
would j ust like to do that s tatem ent v e rbatim f rom start to f

inish so the jury
will have the benef

i t of all those statem ents as well as his live testim o ny

. [ The Court]: W ha t y o u h a ve j ust said is y ou want to sustain y o ur witness with this. Is there a signif icant dif f erence between the
— wasn’t there a videotape of

him taken with [ Tay l or’s lawy er] present? [ Prosecuting a ttorney ]: The two videota p e s [ depict statem ents given
when Tay l or’s lawy er was not present]. W h ereas, [ t he lawy e r ] was p resent during the written statem ent that he s igned in F ebruary [ 2008]. I believe we

8P y a tt re lie s on fo rm e r OCGA § 1 7 -8 -5 7

, wh ic h fo rb id a tria l ju d g e in th e

p re se nc e o f th e ju ry to “ e x p re ss o r in tim a te h is o p in io n a s to wh a t h a s o r h a s n o t

b e e n p r o v e d o r a s to th e g u ilt o f th e a c c u se d .” Assu m in g th a t th e c o m m e n t in

q u e s t i o n e v e n i m p l i c a t e s f o r m e r O C G A § 1 7

- 8

- 5 7

, 9 w e

have a right to go into prior inconsistent statem ents as w ell as prior consistent

s tatem ents. And his m otivation has been called i nto question because of s o

called plea deals a nd every thing else. So I b elieve, I b elieve we’re e ntitled to go into it. [ The Court]: [ De f

e n s e counsel], since I’ve reasoned on it[ ,] if it’s
of f ered to sustain the witness would it not be adm issible? I f not, why not? [ Def ense counsel]: Your Honor, if t here’s som e point. But the point is
we’ve a lready gone over that statem ent. And, in f act, just about read the whole

statem ent in the record one tim e. . . . . [ The Court]: To tell y ou the truth, y ’all have worn m e out to the point I don’t have a good recollection. [ Def ense counsel]: W e ll, Your Honor — [ The Court]: Hold on. Hold o n

. T h i s is what I ’m going to do. W h ile
we’re s i t t i n g here doing a ll this law stuf f and [ the j urors] are sitting there wondering what the heck is going on[ ,] I’m going to a llow [ t he jury ] a recess.

. . . (Em phasis added). At that point, the trial judge sent the jury out, and af ter additional
discussion of the objection, Py att withdrew his objection. The judge then gave a break to the
attorney s, and when the trial eventually resum ed, Detective Jackson read Tay lor’s statem ent.

9 T o b egin, w e note that P y att f ailed to object to t he com m ent i n questio n

. U n d e r f orm er OCGA § 17-8-57, the absence of an objection did not lim it appellate r eview, and so, the f ailure to o bject in this case w ould be inconsequential. See Ledf ord v. State, 289 Ga. 70,
84-85 (14) (709 SE2d 2 39) (2011). See also Rouse v. State, 296 Ga. 213, 234-238 (765 SE2d 879) ( 2014) (Nahm i as, J., dissenting). In 2015, however, t he G eneral Assem bly am ended the

statute and a dded a provision that lim its the scope of appellate review in c ases in which no tim ely obj e c t i o n w a s m a de at trial. See OCGA § 1 7-8-57 ( b). Today

, in the a bsence of a tim ely o b jection, a judicial com m ent

— other than a com m ent on the guilt of the accused, see OCGA § 17-8-57 (c)
— am ounts to reversible error u nder the s t atute only to t he extent that
it is “ [ a] plain error which af f ects substantial rights.” O CGA § 17-8-57 (b). Unlike the new

9Evidence Code, see note 7, s upra, the 2015 am endm ent of OCGA § 17-8-57 i s not lim ited

expressly to cases tried on or af ter its ef f e c tive d ate. See Ga. L

. 2 015, p. 1050. And as we have n oted, unless the statutory law indicates otherwise, “an appell a t e c o urt [ ty pically ] applies the law as it exists a t the tim e its opinion is rendered.” Elm ore v. State, 269 Ga. 528,
529 ( 4) (501 SE2d 215) (1998) (citation om itted). This is especially true of law that is only procedural in nature. See Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55 (2) (365 SE2d 273) (1988) (“[ W ] here a statute governs only procedure o f the c ourts, including the rules of e vidence, it
is to be given retroactive ef f ect absent an expressed contrary intention.” (Citations om itted)).
See also Deal v. C olem an, 294 Ga. 170, 175 (1) (b), n.12 (751 SE2d 337) (2013). And the provision of the 2015 am endm ent with w hich w e are concerned
— OCGA § 1 7-8-57 (b)

— applies not to proceedings in the trial court, which, in this case, p redated the am endm ent. Rather, that provision is specif ically directed to a

ppellate r eview. The appeal in this case, of

course, f ollowed the am endm ent. See Landgraf v

. USI Film Products, 5 1 1 U. S. 244, 291 (114 S Ct 1522, 1 2 8 L E2d 229) (1994) (Scalia, J., c o ncurring) (“The critical issue

. . . is the
relevant activity that the rule regulates. Absent clear statem e nt otherwise, only such relevant activity which o ccurs after t he ef f ective date of the s t a t u t e is covered. Most statutes are

m eant to regulate prim a ry c onduct, and hence will not be applied in trials involving conduct
that occurred bef

o re their ef

f ective date. But other statutes have a dif f erent p u rpose and
theref ore a dif f erent relevant retroactivity event. A new r ule of evidence g o v e r n ing expert testim o ny , f

or exam ple, is aim ed at regulating the conduct of trial, and t he event relevant to retroactivity of the rule is the introduction of t estim o ny

. Even though it is a procedural rule,
it would unquesti o n a b l y n o t b e applied to testimony a lready taken

. . . .” (Em phasis in original ) )

. S e e also United S tates v. Nunem acher, 362 F3d 682, 686 (10 t h Cir. 2004) (new
standard of appellate review applied, notwithstanding t h a t i t was adopted af ter the proceedings in the trial court were concluded); United States v. Mallon, 345 F3d 943, 946 (7 t h Cir

. 2 003) ( sam e). But because there i s no reversible error in t his case even under the
f orm er version of the s tatute, we need not decide whether the 2015 am endm en t properly applies. I n s t e a d

, we will assum e — without deciding

— that f o rm er OCGA § 17-8-57 applies.

W e also note that, by his agreem ent that Tay lor’s statem e nt was “critical evidence,”
the j udge did not express or i ntim a te any thing a bout the guilt of the accused. A nd in a sense, the judge also did n o t express or intim ate a ny t hing about “what ha[ d] or ha[ d] n o t b e e n proved.” A statem ent, a f

ter a ll, is evidence of

f e r ed t o prove f

acts, and proof of a f

act is not the f act itself

. Sig n i f i c a ntly

, t he judge in t his case d id not com m e nt on t he credibility of Tay lor’s statem ent or w hat, if any thing, the statem ent proved. Accordi n g l y , there is som e

reason to dou b t t h at the com m ent in question even im plicates f orm er OCGA § 17-8-57. Nevertheless, we f

i nd som e authority f

or t he proposition t h a t f

o r me r O CGA § 17-8-57 applies to such a com m ent. See Carruth v. S tate, 286 Ga. App. 431, 434-435 (3) (649 SE2d

1 0c o n c lu d e th a t it d id n o t v io la te th e sta tu te

. T h e ju dg e m a d e th e c o m m e n t in a n

e x te n d e d c o llo qu y with c o u n se l, a s th e ju d ge wa s e x p la in in g his th in k in g a b o u t

P y a tt’s o b je c tio n to De te c tiv e Ja c k so n re a din g th e Ta y lo r sta te m e n t. As we h a v e

e x p la in e d b e fo re , fo rm e r O CGA § 1 7 -8 -5 7 “ d o e s n o t g e ne ra lly e x t e n d to

c o llo qu ie s b e twe e n th e ju d g e a n d c o un se l re ga rd in g th e a dm issib ility o f

e v id e n c e

. F urth e rm o re , we h a v e p re v io u sly de te rm in e d th a t re m a rk s o f a ju d g e

a ssig nin g a re a so n fo r h is ru lin g a re n e it h e r a n e x p re ssio n o f o p in io n n o r a

c o m m e n t on th e e v id e n c e .” Ellis v

. S ta te

, 2 9 2 Ga

. 27 6, 2 8 2 (3 ) (7 36 S E2 d 4 1 2 )

(2 0 1 3 ) (c ita tio n s o m itte d). S e e a lso R id le y v . S ta te , 2 9 0 Ga . 7 9 8 , 8 0 0 (2 ) (7 2 5

S E2 d 22 3 ) (2 0 1 2 ). Mo re o v e r, in d isc u ssin g th e a d m issib ility qu e stio n with

c o u n se l, th e ju d g e “ n e v e r e x p r e sse d a n y o p in io n a b o u t th e ve ra c ity o f th e

e v id e n c e itse lf. In a n y c a se , wh e n th e c o llo q u y is c o n sid e re d a s a wh o le

, it is

c le a r th a t th e tria l c o u rt wa s le a v in g it u p to th e ju ry to d e c id e wh a t th e e v id e n c e

d id o r d id n o t sh o w.” F o rd v

. S ta te

,

_ _ _ Ga

.

__ _,

_ _ _ (5 ) (Ca se No

. S 1 5 A1 6 2 6

,

d e c id e d Ma rc h 7

, 2 0 1 6 ). Alth o u g h i t m ig ht ha v e b e e n b e tte r fo r th e ju d g e to

h a v e a v o id e d a n y a g re e m e n t with th e n o tio n th a t Ta y lo r’s s t a t e me n t wa s

557) ( 2 0 0 7 ) (addressing judicial com m ent that allegedly violated O CGA § 17-8-57 by highlighting the signif

icance of certain t estim ony ). Accordingly

, we again will assum e

— without deciding — that the com m ent in question im plicates the statute.

1 1“ c ritic a l e v i d en c e ,” “ th e ju dg e ’s c o m m e nt he re in n o w a y c o n stitu te d th e ty p e

o f d ire c t c o m m e n t o n th e su b sta n c e o r we ig h t o f th e e v id e nc e th a t we h a v e h e ld

to v io la te [fo rm e r] OCGA § 1 7 -8 -5 7 .” Da ile y v. S ta te

, 2 9 7 Ga

. 4 42

, 4 4 3 (2 )

(7 7 4 S E2 d 6 7 2) (2 0 15 ) (c ita tio n o m itte d). T he c o m m e n t d id n ot v io la te fo rm e r

OCGA § 1 7 -8 -5 7.

4

. P y a tt c o n te n d s th a t th e tria l c ou rt e rre d wh e n it c h arg e d th e ju ry o n th e

la w c o n c e r n in g c o n sp ira c y a n d p a rtie s to a c rim e

. Ac c o rd in g to P y a tt, th e se

c h a rg e s we re n o t wa rra n te d b e c a u se th e in d ic tm e n t d id n o t a lle g e a c o n sp ira c y

o r th a t h e w a s a n a c c o m

p lic e , a n d th e re wa s no e v id e n c e to su p po rt th e c h a rg e s,

h e sa y s, in a n y e v e n t. We d i s a g r e e

. I t is n o t e rro r “ fo r th e tria l c o u rt to c h arg e

th e ju ry o n th e la w o f c on sp ira c y wh e n th e e v id e n c e in tro d u c e d a t tria l su p p o rts

th e in stru c tio n , e v e n wh e n th e d e fe n d an t is n o t in dic te d fo r c o nsp ira c y .” Ha y e s

v

. S ta te

, 2 9 8 Ga

. 9 8, 1 0 0 (2 ) (a ) (7 7 9 S E2 d 6 09 ) (2 0 1 5 ). Lik e w ise

, a c h a rg e o n

p a rtie s to a c rim e m a y b e p e rm issib le

, n o twith sta n d in g th a t th e de fe n d a n t wa s

n o t in d ic te d a s a n a c c o m p lic e

. S e e M a n n v

. S t a te

, 2 97 Ga

. 10 7

, 1 0 8 (2 ) (7 7 2

S E2 d 6 6 5 ) (2 0 1 5 ). An d slig h t, c irc u m sta n tia l e v i d e n c e c a n fo rm a p ro p e r

e v id e n tia ry fo u n d a tio n fo r b o th c h a rg e s. S e e Bra g g v . S ta te , 2 9 5 Ga . 6 7 6 , 6 7 8

(3 ) (7 6 3 S E 2 d 4 7 6 ) (2 0 1 4 ); Willia m s v. S ta te

, 2 6 7 Ga

. 30 8, 3 0 9 (2 ) (4 7 7 S E2 d

1 25 7 0 ) (1 9 9 6 ). In th is ca s e, b o t h c h a rg e s we re a uth o riz e d

, in a sm

u c h a s th e

e v id e n c e s h o w ed th a t Py a tt w a s a p a rt o f a g ro up th a t a m b ush e d Rh o d e s a n d

fire d th e fa ta l sh o t, a fte r Py a tt a n d a n oth e r h a d e x p re sse d th e ir m u tu a l in te n tio n

to sh o o t a t Rh o d e s if h e re tu rn e d to th e Ro g e rs Ta p Ro o m

. Se e Bra g g , 2 9 5 Ga

.

a t 6 7 8 (3 ); Willia m s, 2 6 7 Ga . a t 3 0 9 (2 ).

5

. Co n te nd in g th a t th e tria l ju d g e wa s p a rtia l to th e S ta te

, P y a tt c la im s th a t

h e wa s d e n ie d a tria l b e fo re a fa ir a n d im pa rtia l j u d g e. Th e re c o rd sh o ws,

h o we v e r, th a t P y a tt a t th e tim e o f tria l wa s a wa re o f th e c irc u m sta n c e s th a t, h e

sa y s o n a pp e a l, e v id e n c e th e p a rtia lity o f th e ju d ge

. Ev e n so , P y a tt file d n o

m o tio n to re c u se th e tria l ju d g e

. Ge n e ra lly sp e a kin g , “ [w] he n a p a rty le a rn s o f

g ro u n d s fo r th e po te n tia l disq u a lific a tio n o f th e ju d g e , h e m u st p ro m p tly m o v e

fo r th e re c u sa l o f th e ju d g e , a n d if h e do e s n o t, th e qu e stio n o f d isq ua lific a tio n

is n o t p re se rv e d fo r a

pp e lla te re v ie w .” Sta te v

. Ha rg is, 2 9 4 G a

. 8 18

, 8 2 1 (1 ) (7 5 6

S E2 d 52 9 ) (2 0 1 4 ) (c ita tio ns a n d fo o tn o te o m itte d ). S e e a lso Ba ttle v

. Sta te

,

_ _ _

Ga

.

_ _ _,

_ _ _ (2 ) (a ) (Ca se No

. S 1 5 A1 5 1 0

, d e c id e d Ma rc h 2 1

, 2 0 1 6 ); Wo o d a ll

v

. S ta te

, 2 9 4 Ga

. 62 4

, 63 3 (9 ) ( 7 5 4 S E2 d 3 3 5 ) (2 0 14 ); In re Ad a m s, 2 9 2 Ga

.

6 1 7

, 6 1 7 (1 ) (7 4 0 SE2 d 1 3 4 ) (2 0 1 3 ). “ Ev e n a fte r [P y a tt] le a rn e d o f th e g ro u n d s

fo r th e p o te n tia l d isq u a lific a tio n o f th e tria l ju d g e , h e a pp a re n tly d e c id e d to ta k e

1 3h is c ha n c e s with th e sa m e ju d g e

. . . . T h a t wa s h is c ho ic e to m a ke

, b u t h e c o u ld

n o t d o so a n d still p re se rv e th e d isq u a lific a tio n issu e fo r re v ie w in th e a p p e lla te

c o u rts.” Harg is, 2 9 4 Ga . a t 8 2 2 (1 ) (fo o tn o te o m itte d ). As we h a v e e x p la in e d

,

[t] o h o ld oth e rwise wo uld b e to sa n c tio n g a m e sm a n sh ip

. Mo re o v e r, th e re q u i r e me n t th a t a m otio n to re c u se b e file d p ro m p tly is
in te n d e d to p ro m o te ju d ic ia l e c o n o m y , th a t is, to e n su re th a t “ lo n g

a n d c ostly p ro c e e din g s” b e fo re a d isq u a lifie d ju d g e a re a v o id e d

. Th e id e a th a t a p a rty c ou ld a llo w a

ju dg e wh om

th e p a rty b e lie v e s
to b e d isq u a lifie d to c o n t i n u e to p re sid e o v e r th e c a se with o u t

o b je c tio n , o n ly la te r to u rg e th e d isq u a lific a tio n , is in c o n siste n t w ith
th e p rin c ip le s o f fa ir p la y a n d ju d ic ia l e c o n o my th a t a re e m b o d ie d
in th e re q u ire m e nt th a t a

m o tio n to re c u se b e file d p ro m p tly

.

Id

. a t 8 22 -8 2 3 (1 ) (c ita tio n s a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d ). S e e a lso Ba ttle

,

_ _ _ Ga

.

a t

_ _ _ (2 ) (a ); Ge o rg ia Ca rry .o rg , In c

. v

. Ja m e s,

_ _ _ Ga

.

_ _ _ ,

_ _ _ (1 ) (Ca se No

.

S 1 5 A1 9 0 1

, d e c id e d F e b

. 1

, 2 0 1 6 ). Un d e r o u r p r e c ed e n ts, P y a tt h a s fa ile d to

p re se rv e a n y c la i m o f erro r a b o u t th e p a rtia lity o f th e tria l ju dg e fo r a p p e lla te

re v ie w.

In a n e ffo rt to e sc a

p e th is c on c lu sio n , P y a tt u rg e s th a t th is is n o o rd in a ry

c a se

. He re , h e sa y s, th e b ia s o f th e tria l ju d g e wa s s o p ro fo u nd a n d p e rv a siv e

th a t it wo rk e d a d e n ia l o f h is c o n s t i t u tio n a l rig h t to d u e p ro c e ss, a n d P y a tt

c o n te n d s th a t su c h a d e n ia l c a n b e re v ie we d on a p pe a l, e v e n in th e a

b se n c e o f

a tim e ly m otio n to re c u se t h e tria l ju dg e

. Ou r p re c e d e n ts, h owe v e r, d o n o t

1 4re c o g n iz e su c h a d istin c tio n. An d a lth ou gh th e d e n ia l o f a tria l b e fo re a fa ir a n d

im p a rtia l ju dg e in v io la tio n o f th e c o n stitu tio n a l g u a ra n te e o f d u e p ro c e ss m a y

a m o u n t to a “ stru c tu ra l e rro r,” e v e n stru c t u r a l e rro rs a re c a p a b le o f fo rfe itu re

.

S e e Un ite d S ta te s v

. Ch risti, 6 8 2 F 3 d 1 3 8

, 1 4 2 -1 4 3 (1 st Cir. 2 01 2) (S o u te r, J.).

S e e a lso Jo h n so n v. Un ite d S ta te s, 5 2 0 U

. S

. 4 61

, 4 6 6 (I) (1 1 7 S C t 1 5 4 4

, 1 3 7

LE2 d 7 1 8 ) (1 9 9 7) (e v e n a “ stru c tu ra l e rro r” is su b je c t t o p la in e rro r re v ie w

u n d e r F e d e ra l Ru le o f Crim in a l P ro c e d u re 3 0 in th e a b se n c e of a tim e ly

o b je c tio n ).

E v e n as s u m in g th a t b ia s o n th e p a rt o f a tria l ju d g e so p ro fo u n d a n d

p e rv a siv e a s to im

p lic a te th e c o n stitu tio n a l g u a ra n te e o f d u e p ro c e ss ne e d n o t b e

ra ise d in th e tria l c o u rt b y way o f a tim e ly m otio n to re c u se , th is c a se pre se n ts

n o su c h b ia s. As e v id e n c e o f b i a s , P y a tt re lie s p rin c ip a lly o n a d isc u ssio n in

c h a m b e rs, in wh ic h th e tria l ju d g e g a v e so m e a d v ic e a bo u t tria l stra te g y to th e

p ro se c u tin g a tto rn e y

. Wh e n th e tria l b e g a n , th e p ro se c utin g a tto rn e y a p p a re n tly

h a d it in m in d to c o n v in c e th e ju ry th a t P y a tt wa s th e p rin c ip a l with re sp e c t to

th e m u rd e r — th a t is, th a t P y a tt h im se lf fire d th e fa ta l sh o t. As th e e v id e n c e wa s

p re se nte d , h o we v e r, it b e c a m e a p p a re n t th a t th e re wa s so m e u n c e rta in tya b o u t

th e id e ntity o f th e p e rso n w h o fire d th e fa ta l sh ot. At so m e p o in t in th e tria l, th e

1 5ju d g e re tire d to c h a m b e rs a n d m e t with th e p r o s ec u t in g a tto rn e y a n d d e fe nse

c o u n se l. Th e re , t h e j u d g e su g g e ste d th a t th e p ro se c utio n wo u ld b e be tte r o ff

a rg u in g sim

p ly th a t P y a tt wa s a p ar t y t o th e m u rd e r, w h e th e r a s a prin c ip a l o r

a c c o m p lic e

. 1 0

A tria l ju d g e g e ne ra lly o u g h t n o t g iv e a dv ic e to a la wy e r a b o u t tria l

s tra te g y in a c a se in wh ic h th e ju d g e is p re sid in g

. At le a st in so m e

c i r c u ms ta n c e s, th e g iv in g o f su c h a d v ic e c ou ld c re a te a n a p p e ara n c e o f

p a rtia lity

, wh ic h is a p ro p e r g ro u n d fo r a m otio n to re c u se u n d e r o u r Co d e o f

Ju d ic ia l Co n d u c t. S e e Co d e o f Ju dic ia l Co n d u c t, Ru le 2 .1 1 (A) (“ Ju d g e s sh a ll

d isq u a lify th e m se lv e s i n a n y p ro c e e d in g in wh ic h th e ir im p a rtia lity m ig h t

re a so na b ly b e q u e stio n e d

. . . .” ). 1 1 An d fo r th e p u rp o se s o f th is a p p e a l, we will

a ssu m e — with o u t d e c id in g — th a t th e c o n v e rsa tio n in c h a m be rs c re a te d su c h

a n a p p e a ra n c e o f p a rtia lity

. Bu t n o t e v e ry v io la tio n o f th e C o d e o f Ju d ic ia l

1 0 Precisely

when this m e eting o ccurred, and exactly what was said, is not ref lected
i n t h e r e c ord. But it appears undisputed that the m eeting occurred af ter the trial was underway and that the judge suggested to t he p rosecuting attorney t hat he pursue a theory that Py att was a party to the m

urder, rather than f

ocusing on evidence that P y att was the p rincipal.

1 1 As of January 1, 2016, this Court a d opted a new Code of Judicial Conduct, and that

new Code is cited in the text above. Our f orm er Code of Judicial Conduct
— which was in

e f f e c t a t t h e tim e of trial in this case — sim ilarly provided, however, that “[ j]udges shall disqualif y them selves i n a ny proceeding in which their im partiality m i ght reasonably be questioned . . . .” Form er Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 (E) (1).

1 6Co n d u c t im

p lic a te s th e c o n stitu tio n a l g u a ra nte e o f d u e p ro c e ss. A s th e Un ite d

S ta te s S u p re m e Co urt h a s e x p la in e d

, “ [t] h e Du e P ro c e ss C la u se d e m a rk s o n ly

th e o u te r b o u n d a rie s o f

ju d ic ia l d isq u a lific a tio n s,” Ae tn a Life In s. Co

. v

. La v o ie

,

4 7 5 U. S

. 8 1 3

, 8 2 8 (III) (1 0 6 S Ct 1 5 8 0

, 8 9 L E2 d 8 2 3 ) ( 1 9 8 6 ), an d g e n e ra lly

sp e a kin g , “ t h e co d e s of ju d ic ia l c o n d u c t p ro v id e m o re p ro te c tio n th a n d u e

p ro c e ss re qu ire s.” Ca

p e rto n v . A.T. Ma sse y Co a l Co

., 5 56 U. S

. 8 68

, 8 9 0 (IV)

(1 2 9 S Ct 2 2 5 2

, 17 3 LE2 d 1 2 0 8 ) (2 00 9). Ac c o rd in g ly

, th e c o n stitu tio n a l

sta n d a rd fo r ju d ic ia l d isq u a lific a tio n is “ c on fin e d to ra re in sta n c e s.” Id

. S e e a lso

F e d e ra l Tra d e Co m m issio n v

. Ce m e nt In stitu te

, 3 3 3 U. S

. 6 8 3

, 7 0 2 (6 8 S Ct 7 9 3

,

9 2 LE 1 01 0 ) (1 9 4 8 ) (“ [M] ost m a tte rs re la tin g to ju d ic ia l d isq u a l i f i c a t i o n d [o ]

n o t rise to a

c o n stitu tio n a l le v e l.” (Cita tio n o m itte d )).

Un lik e o u r Co d e o f Ju d ic ia l Co n d u c t, th e c o nstitu tio n a l g u a ra n te e o f d u e

p ro c e ss is n o t c o n c e rn e d with m e re a p p e a ra n c e s o f p a rtia lity

. To th e c o n tra ry ,

d u e p ro c e ss is c o n c e rn e d with a c tu a l b ia s, se e Ca p e rto n, 5 5 6 U. S. a t 8 8 3 (III),

a n d a b se n t a sh o win g of a c tu a l b i a s , d u e p ro c e ss re q u ire s re c u sa l o n ly in

p a rtic u la r c irc u m sta n c e s in wh ic h “ th e p ro b a b ility o f a c tu a l b ia s o n th e p a rt o f

th e ju d g e o r d e c isio n ma k e r i s t o o h ig h to b e c o n stitu tio n a lly to le ra ble .” Id

. a t

8 7 2 (c ita tio n a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d ). F o r in sta nc e , d u e p ro c e ss m a y re q u ire

1 7re c u sa l wh e n a ju d g e h a s a d ire c t p e c un ia ry in te re st in th e o u tc o m e o f a c a se , se e

Tu m e y v

. Oh io

, 27 3 U. S

. 5 1 0

, 5 3 5 ( 4 7 S C t 4 37

, 7 1 LE 7 4 9 ) (1 9 27 ), wh e n a

ju d g e ha s a n in d ire c t, b u t su b sta n t i a l

, p e c u n ia ry in te re st in th e o utc om e , se e

La v o ie

, 4 7 5 U. S

. a t 8 2 3

- 8 2 4 (III) (B), wh e n a ju dg e h a s e x e c u tiv e

re sp o n sib ilitie s fo r th e fin a nc e s o f a n o rg a n iz a tio n with a d i r e c t p e c u n ia ry

in te re st in th e o u tc o m e , se e Wa rd v

. Mo n ro e v ille

, 4 09 U. S

. 5 7

, 6 0 (9 3 S Ct 8 0

,

3 4 LE2 d 2 6 7 ) (1 97 2 ), w h e n “ a p e rso n w ith a p e rso n a l sta k e in a pa rtic u la r c a se

h a d a sig n ific a

n t a n d d isp ro po rtio n a te in flu e nc e in p la c in g th e ju d g e o n th e c a se

b y ra isin g fu n d s o r d ire c tin g th e ju d g e ’s e le c tio n c a m pa ig n wh e n th e c a se wa s

p e n d in g o r im m in e n t,” Ca p e rto n , 5 5 6 U. S

. a t 8 8 4 (III), wh e n a ju d g e p e rso n a lly

wa s re sp o n sib le fo r th e b rin g in g o f th e c h a rg e s to b e trie d, se e In re Mu rc h iso n ,

3 4 9 U. S

. 1 3 3, 1 3 7 (7 5 S Ct 62 3

, 99 L E 9 4 2 ) (1 9 5 5 ), a n d wh e n a ju dg e h a s b e e n

so p e rso n a lly “ v ilifie d ” b y a p a rty c h a rg e d w ith c o n te m p t a s t o “ n e c e ssa rily

b e c o m e [] e m

b ro ile d in a ru n n i n g , b itte r c on tro v e rsy ” with th e c o nte mn o r.

Ma yb e rry v

. P e n n sy lv a nia

, 4 0 0 U. S

. 4 5 5

, 4 6 5 ( 9 1 S C t 4 9 9, 2 7 LE2 d 5 3 2 )

(1 9 7 1 ). Th e re c o rd in th is c a se , h owe v e r, d isc lo se s n o a c tu a l b ia s 1 2 a n d in v o lv e s

1 2 No doubt, the “coaching” of the prosecution by the t rial judge in this case might be
indicative of an a ctual bias in f avo r o f the State. But i t is not inevitably a nd necessarily
indicative of such bias. In the f irst place, we note that the “coaching” i n q uestion occurred

1 8n o c irc u m sta nc e th a t h a s b e e n re c o g n iz e d a s p re se n tin g a n in t o l e ra b ly h ig h

p ro b a b ility o f a c tu a l b ia s. Th e la w p re su m e s “ h o n e sty an d in te g rity [o n th e p a rt

not in secret, but i n a m eeting between the trial judge, the prosecuting attorney

, and defense
counsel

. Second, the record does not disclose exactly what was said or t he context in which
it was said, which m akes it dif f icult, if not im

p ossible, to assign actual bias as the m otivation
f or th e s o

- c a l l e d “coaching.” Third, although a trial judge ordinarily ought n ot “coach” a lawy er on trial strategy

, a trial judge is legitim ately concerned in p rom oting an ef f icient and
clear presentation of the case to the jury

. W hen a j udge sees a lawy er p resenting his case in

a w ay that seem s to be wasting the tim e of the j ury or conf using the j urors, we are aware of

no absolute rule against t he judge say ing som e t hing to the lawy er, although the judge m ust take care not to do so by way of an im perm issible ex p arte conversation. Even a wellm eaning judge, we supp o s e , mi g h t inadvertently cross the line between prom oting an ef f i c i e n t a n d clear presentation of the issues a n d “coaching” a lawy er about strategy

. Cf

. Scott v. Rosenthal, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12803, *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (alleged “ coaching”
of party was done to prom ote “a f air presentation of evidence” and did n o t

, theref ore, indicate a bias); State v. Melde, 2014 Minn. A pp. U npub. LEXIS 746, *13-14 (Minn. App. 2014) (alleged “coa c hing” of prosecuting attorney in closing argum ent was attributable to

a l egitim ate ef

f ort “to clarif

y the evidence in the record”). Finally

, the “coaching” i n this case

m ight well be as indicative o f judicial f r ustration with the prosecuting a ttorney as of a bias
in f avor o f the State. Indeed, Py att’s trial lawy er testif ied at the h earing on the mo tion f or

new trial about the “ coaching” of the p rosecution, and h is t estim o ny hints at tension between
the trial judge and prosecuting attorney

. Cf

. People v

. C a r denas, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1068, *11-12 (Ct. App. 2005) (“It is u nlikely any trial court com m ents or coaching suggested a prosecutorial bias. If any thing, the t r i al court’s com m ents highlighted its
f rustration and i m

p a tience with the prosecutio n

. ” )

. W i thout som ething m ore, we are

u nwilling to f

ind actual bias s olely on the basis of t he sort of “coaching” t hat a p p a r e n t l y occurred in this case. That said, w e do not condone any judge “coaching” a lawy er about trial
strategy i n a case to be tried bef ore the judge. Py att argues that there is som ething m o re in this case, but we do not see i t. Py att points

to t he judge instructing deputies to return a witness to j ail, f or instance, but t he witness was, in f a c t, to be returned to jail, and the jury already knew that the witness h ad been in jail. Py att

notes that the judge f

orm erly had served as t he district attorney

. But prior service as a

p rosecuting attorney is not a c ircum stance t hat f o rever disqualif

i es a j udge f

rom sitting in
crim inal cases. Finally

, Py att m akes a num b er o f additional allegations about the t rial judge, but those allegations are not established by the record in this case.

1 9o f] th o se se rv in g a s a d ju d ic a to rs,” With ro w v

. L a rk in

, 4 2 1 U. S

. 3 5

, 4 7 (III) (9 5

S Ct 1 4 5 6

, 4 3 LE2 d 7 1 2 ) (1 97 5 ), a n d P y a tt h a s fa ile d to ov e rc o m e th e

p re su m p tio n in th is c a se

. His c la im th a t h e wa s d e n ie d a tria l be fo re a fa ir a n d

im p a rtia l ju d g e in v io la tio n o f th e c o n stitu tio n a l gu ara n te e o f d u e p ro c e ss is

with ou t m e rit.

6

. F in a lly

, P y at t c o n te n d s th a t h e wa s d e n ie d th e e ffe c tiv e a ssista n c e o f

c o u n se l a t tria l. To p re v a il o n a c la im o f in e ffe c tiv e a ssista n c e , P y a tt m u st p ro v e

b o th th a t th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f h is la wy e r wa s d e fic ie n t a n d th a t h e w a s p re ju d ic e d

b y th is d e fic ie n t p e rfo rm a n c e

. S tric k la n d v

. Wa sh in gto n, 4 6 6 U. S

. 6 6 8

, 6 8 7

(III) (1 0 4 SCt 2 05 2

, 8 0 LE2 d 6 7 4 ) (1 9 8 4 ). To p ro v e th a t th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f h is

la wy e r wa s d e fic ie n t, P y a t t mu s t sh o w th a t th e la wy e r p e rfo rm e d h is d u tie s a t

tria l in a n o b

je c tiv e ly u n re a so n a

b le w a y , c o n sid e rin g a ll th e c irc u m sta n c e s, a n d

in th e lig h t o f p re v a ilin g p ro fe ssio n a l n o rm s. Id . a t 6 8 7 -6 8 8 (III) (A). S e e a lso

Kim m e lm a

n v

. Mo rriso n , 4 7 7 U. S

. 36 5

, 3 8 1 (II) (C) (1 0 6 S C t 2 5 7 4 , 9 1 LE2 d

3 0 5 ) (1 9 8 6 ). A n d to p ro v e th a t h e w a s p re ju d ic e d b y th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f h is

la wy e r, P y a tt m

u st sh o w “ a re a so n ab l e p r o b a b ility th a t, bu t fo r c o u n se l’s

u n p ro fe ssio n a l e rro rs, th e re su lt o f th e p ro c e e d in g wo uld h a v e b e e n d iffe re n t.

A re a so n a b le p ro b a b ility is a p ro b a

b ility su ffic ie n t to u n d e rm in e c o nfid e n c e in

2 0th e o u tc o m e .” S tric k la n d

, 4 6 6 U. S

. a t 6 9 4 (III) (B). Se e a lso Willia m s v

. Ta y lo r,

5 2 9 U. S

. 3 6 2

, 39 1 (III) (1 20 S Ct 1 4 9 5

, 1 4 6 L E2 d 3 89 ) (2 0 00 ). Th is b u rd e n is

a h e a v y o n e , se e Kim m e lm a n, 4 77 U

. S

. a t 38 2 (II) (C), a n d we c o n c lu d e th a t

P y a tt h a s fa ile d to c a rry it.

(a ) P y a tt c o n te n d s th a t h is la wy e r wa s in e ffe c tiv e in th re e re sp e c ts, b u t we

c a n d isp o se o f t w o w i t h little d isc u ssio n

. First, h e sa y s, h is la wy e r wa s

in e f f e ctiv e b e c a

u se h e fa ile d to “ o b

je c t” on d u e p ro c e ss g ro u n d s to th e tria l

ju d g e “c o a c h in g ” th e p ro se c u tin g a tto rn e y

. Bu t a s w e h a v e e x p la i n e d

, se e

Div isio n 5

, su p ra , th e so -c a lle d “ c oa c h in g ” d o e s n o t e sta b lish a c tu a l b ia s o n th e

p a r t o f th e tria l ju d g e , a

n d it d o e s n o t, th e re fo re , im p lic a te th e c o nstitu t i o n a l

g u a ra n te e o f d u e p ro c e ss. A n y “ ob je c tio n ” o n du e p ro c e ss g ro u n d s wo u ld h a v e

b e e n with o u t m e rit, a

n d th e fa ilu re to m a ke a n o bje c tio n with o u t m e rit d o e s n o t

a m o u n t to in e ffe c tiv e a ssista n c e

. S e e Bra d le y v

. S ta te

, 2 9 2 Ga

. 60 7, 6 1 4 (5 ) (7 4 0

S E2 d 1 0 0 ) (2 0 1 3 ). S e c o n d

, P y a tt c la im s, his la wy e r w a s in e ffe c tiv e b e c a u se h e

fa ile d to in te rp o se a n “ u ltim a te i s s u e ” o bje c tio n wh e n D e te c tiv e Ja c k so n

te stifie d th a t Tra vo ris Bo rn — wh o h a d b e e n a p e rso n o f in te re st to in v e stig a to rs

e a rly in th e in ve stig a tio n o f th e k i l l i n g o f Rh o d e s — h a d b e e n “a h u n d re d

p e rc e nt c le a re d.” Bu t th a t te stim o n y wo u ld n o t p ro p e rly h a ve b e e n o b je c tio n a b le

2 1o n “ u ltim a te issu e ” g ro u n d s p re c ise ly be c a u se th e c u lp a

b ility o f B o rn (o r la c k

th e re o f) wa s n o t a n issu e fo r th e ju ry to d e c id e in th is c a se

. S e e La m a r v

. S ta te

,

2 9 7 Ga

. 8 9

, 9 2 -9 3 (3 ) (7 7 2 S E2 d 6 3 6) (2 0 1 5 ). We tu rn , th e r e f o r e , t o th e th ird

g ro u n d fo r th e c la im

o f in e ffe c tiv e a ssista n c e

.

(b ) P y a tt a lso c o nte n d s th a t h is la wy e r wa s in e ffe c tiv e b e c a u se h e fa ile d

to o b je c t o n “ ultim a te issu e ” g ro un d s wh e n De te c tiv e Ja c k so n te stifie d th a t, in

h is o p in io n , th e sh o t fire d b y P y a tt a s Rh o d e s d ro v e a wa y fro m th e Ro g e rs Ta p

Ro o m fo r th e first tim e wa s a n a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. On d ire c t e xa m in a tio n ,

De te c tiv e Ja c k s o n t e s t i f

ie d a t le n g th a

b o u t h is in v e stig a tio n , a n d h e te stifie d th a t,

in th e c o u rse o f h i s in v e stig a tio n , h e h a d o b ta in e d a wa rra n t fo r th e arre st o f

P y a tt fo r a g gra va te d a ssa u lt. He th e n te stifie d a s fo llo ws:

Q. An d y o u sp o k e to a

n u m be r o f witn e sse s, c orre c t?
A. Ye s, sir, q u ite a fe w. An d th e re we re a lo t we c o u ld n ’t fin d

. A lo t o f p e o p le d o n ’t wa n t to ge t in v o lv e d wh e n so m e th in g lik e th is
h a p p e n s. Th e y e ith e r h id e o u t o r we ju st c a n’t fin d th e m

. Th a t’s still

tru e to th is d a y o n th is c a se a n d m a n y o th e rs. Q. I’m so rry . I c a n ’t h e a r y o u ?
A. I sa id th a t’s s till tru e to th is d a y th a t we c a n ’t fin d th e se
p e o p le on th is c a se a

n d m a n y oth e rs. P e o p le ju st d o n ’t wa nt to g e t in v o lv e d so m e tim e s. Bu t th e in itia l a g gra v a te d a ssa u lt wa rra n t wa s b a se d o n th e c a r b e in g fire d a t. Th e re ha s b e e n so m e c o m m e n ts

m a d e [a b o u t] a wa rn in g sh ot b y [d e fe n se c o u n se l] a n d y o u rse lf, y o u
p ic k e d u p o n

. At n o tim e d id I e v e r c o n s i d e r th is a wa rn in g sh o t. Th e in itia l ro u n d wa s fire d

, a c c o rd in g to witn e sse s, in th e d ire c tio n

2 2o f th e c a r[,] o v e r th e c a r. No w, I’m no t g o in g to ge t in to in c h e s o r

fe e t b u t I d o n ’t k n o w. I wa sn ’t th e re . Bu t I c a n te ll y ou a c c o rd in g , in c lu d in g h is o wn a

u n t

, t h a t it wa s fire d to wa rd th e c a r. In m y

o p in io n a n d in wh a t I c o n s i d e r th e la w[

,] th at is a gg ra v a te d

a ssa u lt. Th a t’s w h y h e w a s c h a rg e d with th re e c ou n ts o f a g g ra va te d

a ssa u lt. Q. F o r th e sh o t to wa rd s th e c a r?
A. Th e first sh o t, y e s, sir. Q. First sh o t with [Bro a d n a x ], [P e rry ]

, a n d [Rh o de s] in th e

c a r?
A. Th a t is c o rre c t. I n e v e r c o n sid e re d it a wa rn in g sh o t. T h a t

wa s a n assa u lt.

(Em p h a sis su pp lie d ).

Un d e r o u r o ld Ev id e n c e Co de

, it wa s se ttle d th a t “ a witn e ss [o rd in a r ily ]

m a y no t e x p re ss his o p in io n a s to a n u ltim at e f a c t

, b e c a u se to d o so wo u ld

in v a de th e p ro v in c e o f th e ju ry .” 1 3 F o rd h a m , 2 5 4 Ga

. a t 5 9 (4 ) (c ita tio n o m itte d ).

F o r th e p u rp o se s o f th is a

p p e a l, we will a ssu m e — w ith o u t d e c id in g — th a t th e

te stim o n y a t issu e p ro p e rly wa s o b je c tio na b le o n “ u ltim a te issu e ” gro u n d s. We

a lso will a ssu m e — a g a in

, with o u t d e c id in g — th a t th e fa ilu re to ra ise su c h a n

o b je c tio n w a s u n re a so na

b le

. 1 4 Ev e n so , P y a tt still m u st sh o w th a t th e fa ilu re to

1 3 Opinions on ultim ate issues are addressed i n t he n ew Evidence C ode at OCGA §
24-7-704.

1 4 In som e circum s t ances, it m ay be reasonable trial strategy to f orgo a n objection to testim o ny th a t a mo u n t s to an opinion o n the ultim ate issue. See, e.g., W a lker v. State, 329
Ga. App. 369, 376 (3) (d) ( 765 SE2d 599) (2014). I n this case, at the hearing o n t he m otion

2 3o b

je c t wa s p re

ju d ic ia l. S e e F u lto n v

. S ta te

, 2 7 8 Ga

. 5 8

, 6 3 (8 ) (5 9 7 SE2 d 3 9 6 )

(2 0 0 4 ). We c on c lu d e th a t P y a tt h a s fa ile d to m a k e th a t sh owin g

.

To b e g in

, w e n o te th a t th e ju ry a lre a d y k ne w th a t De te c tiv e Ja c k so n h a d

so u g h t a nd o b ta in e d a w a rra n t fo r th e a rre st o f P y a tt fo r a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. Th a t

De te c tiv e Ja c k so n su b

je c tiv e ly b e lie v e d th a t P y a tt h a d c o m m itte d a g g ra v a te d

a ssa u lt w a s, th e re fo re , p a te ntly ob v io us. Alth o u g h i t m a y h a v e b e e n im p ro p e r

fo r De te c tiv e Ja c k so n to sh a re h is su b je c tiv e b e lie f with th e ju ry e x p lic itly

, a n y

ra tio n a l ju ro r wo u l d h a v e gu e sse d th a t De te c tiv e Ja c k so n be lie v e d a s m u c h

with ou t b e in g to ld

. As we ha v e e x p la in e d b e f o r e , “ [s] u c h c o m m e n ts u p o n th e

p a te n tly o b v io u s g e n e r a lly p o se little

, if a ny , d a ng e r of p re ju d ic e .” Bu tle r v

.

S ta te

, 2 9 2 Ga

. 4 0 0

, 4 0 7 (3 ) (a ) (7 3 8 S E2 d 7 4 ) ( 2 0 1 3 ). We n o te a s w e ll th a t

De te c tiv e Ja c k so n te stifie d o n ly a s a la y witn e ss, an d so , we n e e d n o t wo rry th a t

a n y im p ro p e r o p in io n a

b o u t th e u ltim a te issu e w a s b o lste re d b y th e d e sig n a tio n

f or new trial
— nearly f

ive y ears af

ter the trial itself
— Py att’s t rial counsel testif ied that he
had no strategic reason to f orgo an objection. But the best evidence o f trial strategy is the trial transcript itself

, which e stablishes def

initively what trial counsel did and did not do at trial. Here, the transcript shows that trial counsel used the testim ony in question as the basis f or

a line of cross-exam ination in which counsel suggested that Detec t i ve Jackson had

m isunderstood a num

ber of th e w itnesses. Such cross-exam ination, of course, f urnishes a strategic reason t o f

orgo a n objection. See V a n stavern v. State, 293 Ga. 123, 126-127 (3) (c) (744 SE2d 42) (2013). Nevertheless, we w ill assum e f or the purposes of this a

ppeal that the
f ailure to object was not a part of a reasonable strategy

.

2 4o f th e w itn e ss a s a n e x p e rt. 1 5 Cf. Willia m s v

. S ta te

, 2 54 G a

. 5 0 8

, 51 0

- 5 1 1 ( 2 )

(3 3 0 S E2 d 3 5 3 ) (1 9 8 5 ). Mo re o v e r , t h i s i s n o t a c a se in w h ic h an im p ro p e r

o p in io n a b o u t th e u ltim a te issu e wo u ld h a v e c o n fu se d o r m isle d th e ju ry a b o u t

th e la w to th e p re

ju d ic e of th e d e fe n d a n t. 1 6 De te c tiv e Ja c k so n sp e c ifie d c le a rly

th a t h e b e lie v e d th e in itia l sh o t wa s a n a g g ra v a te d a ssa ult b e c au se h e u nd e rsto o d

th e witn e sse s to sa y th a t P y a tt fi r ed th e in itia l sh o t a t R h o d e s’s c a r. Un d e r th e

p re c e de n ts, e v id e n c e th a t th e a c c use d in te n tio n a lly fire d a sh ot a t a c ar o c c u p ie d

b y a n o th e r wo u ld b e a su ffic ie n t b a sis fo r a ju ry to in f e r t h e s p e c ific in te n t to

c a u se in ju ry a n d to fin d th e a c c u se d g u ilty o f a g g r a v a t ed a ssa u lt. S e e Ho wa rd

v

. Sta te

, 2 8 8 G a

. 7 4 1

, 7 4 3 (1 ) (7 0 7 S E2 d 80 ) (2 0 1 1 ) (“ De lib e ra te ly firin g a g u n

in th e dire c tio n o f a

n o th e r pe rso n c o n stitu te s a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt.” (Cita tio n s a n d

p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d )); Tille r v

. S ta te

, 26 7 Ga

. 8 8 8

, 8 9 1 (4 ) (4 85 S E2 d 7 2 0 )

1 5 No doubt, there is som e d anger that a jury m ight lend credence to an opinion about
the ultim ate issue of

f e red by an experienced law enf orcem e n t of

f icer. But here, when
Detective Jackson o f

f ered the opinion in q

uestion, he seem e d to take issue with the lawy ers in t he case — both the def e nse counsel and t h e p r o s ecuting attorney — who had
characterized the f

irst shot as a “warning shot.” That seem s less worrisom e.

1 6 T o the extent that Detective Jackson m isled the jury about the law by drawing a clear distinction between a warning shot, on the one hand, and an aggravated assault, on the
other
— a warning shot, af ter all, can be an aggravated ass ault
— he did so in a way that would have inured to Py a tt’s benef it. Py att cannot com

plain about that.

2 5(1 9 9 7 ) (in te n tio n a lly sh o o tin g in to a h o u se ), o v e rru le d o n o th e r g ro u n d s,

Du n a g a n v . S ta te , 2 69 G a . 5 9 0 , 5 9 3 (2 ) (a ), n . 3 (5 0 2 S E2 d 7 2 6 ) (1 9 9 8 ).

Ev e n m o re im

p o rta nt, we n o te th a t P y a tt’s o wn c o un se l e lic ite d

su b sta n tia lly th e sa m e te stim on y o n c ro ss-e x a m in a tio n :

Q. I wa n t to sta rt with a sta te m e n t b y y o u a t th e b e g in n in g o f

y o u r te stim o n y th a t fro m th e g e t-g o y o u fe lt lik e Tre m a in e P y a t t

wa s g u ilty o f a g g ra va te d a ssa u lt b e c a u se wh e n h e fire d th a t first
sh o t fro m t h e p a r k i n g l o t o f th e Ta p R o om a t th e c a r a s it wa s le a v i n g th a t y o u fe lt lik e th a t w a s a gg ra v a te d a ssa u lt b e c a u se h e sh o t a t th e c a

r. A. We ll, y ou sa id g u ilty

. I d o n ’t d e te rm in e th e g u ilt p a rt. Q. All rig h t. Yo u c h arg e d h im with a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt b a se d

o n th a t a c t?
A. Th a t is c orre c t. Q. An d th a t’s th e b a sis o f th e c h a rg e in th is c a se ?
A. Th a t is c orre c t.

Tria l c o u n se l th e n c o n firm e d th a t De te c tiv e Ja c k so n h a d b a se d h is

u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e in itia l sh o t o n th e sta te m e n ts o f witn e sse s a nd th a t h e h a d

u n d e rsto o d th o se witn e sse s to sa y t h a t t h e first sh ot wa s fire d “ a t th e c a r.” At

th a t p o in t, tria l c o u nse l c o n fro n te d De te c tiv e Ja c k s o n wi t h th e te stim o n y a n d

sta te m e n ts o f witn e sse s w h o in d ic a te d o n ly th a t th e in itia l sh o t wa s fire d in th e

a ir o r a t n e a rb y tre e s. Th is lin e o f c ro ss-e x a m in a tio n is re le v a nt to o u r in q u iry

in to pre ju dic e i n s e v e ra l re sp e c ts. F irst, th e c o n c e rn a b ou t o pin io n s o n th e

2 6u ltim a te issu e is th a t th e y in v a d e th e p ro v in c e o f th e ju ry , se e F o rd h a m , 2 5 4 Ga

.

a t 5 9 (4 ), b u t t h a t co n c e rn is m itig a te d in th is c a se b y De te c tiv e Ja c k so n ’s

e x p lic it c o n c e ssio n on c ro ss-e x a m in a tio n th a t “ I d o n ’t d e te rm in e th e gu ilt p a rt,”

w h i c h re fe rs to th e re sp on sib ility o f th e ju ry to d e c id e th e ultim a te is s u e

.

S e c o n d

, th e c ro ss-e x a m in a tio n c a lle d in to q ue stio n t h e b a sis fo r De te c tiv e

Ja c k so n ’s o p in io n, th e re by re d u c in g th e lik e lih o o d th a t th e ju ry wo uld b lin d ly

a c c e p t th a t o p in io n

. S e e S ta te v . Be a v e rs, 9 6 3 A2 d 9 5 6 , 9 7 8 (II) (Co nn . 2 0 0 9 )

(with re sp e c t to e rro r in a d m ittin g o p in io n of a rso n in ve stig a to r o n u l t i m a te

issu e , no tin g th a t “ th e d e fe n d a n t h a d a m p le o p po rtu n ity to c ro ss-e x a m in e

Mc Gu rk a

b ou t his in v e stig a tio n , an d e m p h a siz e d d u rin g su m m a tio n s th a t

Mc Gu rk h a d c la ssifie d th e fire a s in te n tio n a l de sp ite th e e x iste n c e o f a Na tio n a l

F ire Pro te c tio n Asso c ia tio n g u id e lin e c a u tio n in g in v e stig a to rs a g a in st dra win g

su c h c o n c lu sio n s in th e a b se n c e o f p h y sic a l e v id e n c e o f a n in c e n d ia ry fi r e ” )

.

Th ird

, a n d m o st im

p o rta nt, th e c ro ss-e x a m in a tio n e lic ite d su b sta n tia lly th e sa m e

o p in io n — th a t De te c tiv e Ja c k so n b e l i ev e d th a t th e first sh o t a m o u n te d to

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt
— a s th e d i r e c t e x a m in a tio n to wh ic h P y a tt n ow sa y s h is

la wy e r sh o u ld ha v e o b

je c te d

. P y a tt n o ta

b ly

, h o we v e r, d o e s n ot c o n te n d th a t h is

la wy e r c ro ss-e x a m in e d De te c tiv e Ja c k so n in a n u n re a s o n a ble wa y

. In th e se

2 7c irc u m sta n c e s, Py a tt wa s n o t p re ju d ic e d b y te stim o n y on d ire c t e x a m in a tio n to

th e e x te n t th a t his o wn c o u n se l re a so n a b ly b ro u g h t o u t th e sa m e te stim o n y o n

c ro ss- e x a min a tio n

. S e e Bu tle r, 29 2 Ga

. a t 4 0 8 -4 0 9 (3 ) (c ). S e e a lso S ta te v

.

Mille r, 2 0 12 -Oh io -1 2 6 3

, a t ¶ 6 1 (Ct. Ap p

. 2 0 1 2 ) (“ Ta y l o r an d Mille r d o n o t

e x p la in h o w t h e y we re p re ju d ic e d b y th e a d m issio n of De te c tiv e S iv e rt’s

u ltim a te issu e te stim o n y [th a t th e d e fe n d a nts we re g a n g m e m b e rs]

, g iv e n th a t

Mille r’s c o u n se l re p e a te d ly a sk e d o th e r o ffic e rs to id e n tify th e m e m b e rs o f th e

g a n g to wh ic h th e d e fe nd a n ts b e lo n g e d .” (Cita tio n o m itte d )).

F in a lly

, we n o t e t h e a

b se n c e o f a n y in d ic a tio n in th e re c o rd th a t th e

p ro se c u tin g a tto rn e y m a d e u se o f a n y im p ro p e r te stim o n y b y De te c tiv e Ja c k so n

.

To th e c o n tra ry , th e tra n sc rip t sh o ws q u ite c le arly th a t D e te c tiv e Ja c k so n sh are d

h is o p in i o n a b o u t th e u ltim a te issu e fo r th e first tim e with o u t a n y pro m p tin g

f r o m th e p ro se c u tin g a tto rn e y ; h is o pin io n wa s no t re sp on siv e to th e q u e s t i o n

th a t th e pro se c u tin g a tto rn e y h a d p o se d. A n d a lth o ug h th e c lo sin g a rg u m e n ts

we re n ot tra nsc rib e d

, P y a tt d o e s n o t a lle g e th a t th e c lo sin g o f t h e p ro se c u tin g

a tto rn e y in c lu de d a re fe re nc e to th e o p in io n o f De te c tiv e Ja c k so n

. Cf. S h a rp v

.

S ta te

, 28 6 Ga

. 7 99

, 8 0 4 ( 5 ) ( 6 9 2 S E2 d 3 25 ) (2 0 10 ). We no te a s we ll th a t, if

P y a tt’s la wy e r h a d ob

je c te d (a s P y a tt sa y s h e sh ou ld h a ve d o n e ), th e tria l c o urt

2 8m ig h t we ll h a v e re sp o n de d w i t h c u ra tiv e in stru c tio n s, c h arg in g th e ju ry th a t

d e te rm in in g g u ilt, a sse ssin g th e c re d ib ility o f th e e v id e n c e , re so lv in g c o n flic ts

in th e e v id e n c e , a n d we ig h in g th e e v id e n c e a re ta sk s so le ly fo r th e ju ry

. Ye t, th e

tria l c o u rt g a v e p re c ise ly th ose so rts o f in stru c tio n s a t th e c lo se o f th e c a se , so o n

a fte r De te c tiv e Ja c k so n te stifie d

. “ Th e ju ry w a s th o ro u g h ly a n d d ef i n itiv e ly

in stru c te d th a t th e y we re n o t bo u n d b y th e o p in io n te stim o n y o f a n y w itn e ss b u t

we re by la w th e so le a n d e x c lu siv e ju d ge s o f th e c re d ib ility o f th e witn e sse s, a n d

it wa s so le ly with in th e ir p ro v in c e to d e te rm in e th e o u tc o m e o f th e c a se .” No lto n

v

. S ta te

, 1 96 Ga

. Ap p

. 6 9 0

, 6 9 2 (2 ) (3 9 6 S E2 d 6 0 5 ) (1 99 0 ) (fin d in g a n y e rro r

in a d m ittin g u ltim a te issu e te stim o ny w a s ha rm le ss). S e e a lso Be a v e rs, 9 6 3 A2 d

a t 9 7 8 -9 7 9 (“ [T] h e tria l c o urt e m p h a siz e d d u rin g its c h a rg e th a t th e e x p e rts’

c o n c lu sio n s we re no t b in d in g o n th e ju ry , wh ic h c o u ld d isre ga rd th e m e ith e r in

wh o le o r in p a rt.” ); F ra n k l in v

. S ta te

, 86 9 A2 d 3 2 7 (3 ) (De l. 2 0 0 5 ) (“ th e tria l

c o u rt’s in stru c tio n c u re d a n y p o ssib le p re ju d ic e ste m m in g fro m

th e c o m m e n ts

[o n th e u ltim a te issu e ] a n d re n d e re d th e m h a rm le ss b e y on d a re a so n a ble d o u b t”

(fo otn o te s o m itte d )). Lik e wise

, to th e e x te n t th a t th e op in io n sh are d b y D e t e c tiv e

Ja c k so n im

p lie d a n y th in g a

b o u t th e la w o f a g g ra v a te d a ssa ult, th e tria l c o urt

c h a rg e d th e ju ry th a t it wa s th e re sp o n sib ility o f th e c o u rt to d e te rm in e th e la w

2 9th a t a

p p lie d

, in stru c te d th a t th e ju ry wa s to ta k e th e la w a s c h a rg e d b y th e c o u rt,

a n d g a v e th e ju ry a n a c c ura te c h a rg e o n th e e le m e n ts o f a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt.

On th e p e c u lia r fa c ts o f th is c a se , w e c o n c l u d e th a t P y a tt h a s fa ile d to

sh o w a re a so n a

b le p ro b a b ility th a t, if o n ly his la wy e r h a d o b j e c te d to th e

o p in io n o ffe re d b y De te c tiv e Ja c k so n o n d ire c t e xa m in a tio n a b o u t th e first sh o t

a m o u n tin g to a n a g g ra va te d a ssa u lt, th e o u tc o m e o f th e c a se wo uld h a v e b e e n

d iffe re n t. 1 7 As su c h

, P y a tt h a s fa ile d to s h o w t h a t h e w a s pre ju d ic e d b y th e

a lle g e dly de fic ie n t p e rfo rm a nc e o f h is la wy e r. His c la im th a t h e wa s d e n ie d th e

e ffe c tiv e a ssista n c e o f c o u n se l is u n a v a ilin g

.

Ju d g m e n t a ffirm e d

. All th e Ju stic e s c o n c u r, e x c e pt Hin e s, P .J., Be n ha m

a n d Hu n ste in , JJ., wh o d isse n t.

1 7 W e no t e t h a t

, e v en if the f ailure to object had som e how prejudiced P y att with
respect t o the convictions aris i n g f r o m the f irst shot, that prejudice a lone would not be enough to set aside his conviction f or f elony m urder, which i ndisputably was based on the
f iring o f dif

f erent shots, s e p a r a t ed in tim e f rom t he f irst s hot by a m eaningf

ul interval. To
have his m

urder conviction set aside, Py a t t would have to dem o nstrate t hat the prejudice extended specif

i cally to the f elony m urder.

3 0S 1 5 A1 7 3 4 . P YATT v . THE S TATE.

HINES , P re sid in g Ju stic e , d isse n tin g

.

As I d isa g re e with Div isio n 6 (b ) o f th e m a jo rity o pin io n, wh ic h a ffirm s

th e d e n ia l o f th e m o tio n fo r n e w tria l on th e a sse rte d g r o u n d o f in e ffe c tiv e

a ssista n c e o f c o u n se l b a se d u p o n th e fa ilu re to o b je c t to th e “ u ltim a te issu e ”

te stim o n y o f De te c tiv e Ja c k so n , I m u st re sp e c tfu lly d isse n t.

Alth o u g h th e m a

jo rity is willin g to a ssu m e th a t th e q u o te d te stim o n y o f

D e t e c t iv e Ja c k so n wa s im p ro p e r, an d th a t th e fa ilu re to o b je c t to it wa s

u n re a so n a

b le

, I h a v e n o h e sita tio n in fin d in g th a t it wa s d e fic ie n t p e rfo rm a n c e

fo r tria l c ou n se l to fa il to ob je c t to th e c ite d p ortio n o f D e t e c t i v e Ja c k so n ’s

te stim o n y ; it wa s a n im

p e rm issib le c om m e n t o n th e u l t i m a t e issu e o f P y a tt’s

g u ilt re g a rd in g t he c ha rg e s o f a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt, a n d re su lte d in p re ju d ic e to

P y a tt. F o r a witn e ss to e x p re ss a n o p in io n a t tria l a s to th e c om m issio n o f th e

c h a rg e d c rim e c le a rly in v a d e s th e p ro v i n c e o f th e ju ry

. F ord h a m v

. S ta te

, 2 5 4

Ga

. 5 9 (4 ) (3 2 5 S E2 d 7 5 5 ) (1 9 8 5 ). S e e a lso Pro c to r v

. Sta te

, 2 3 5 Ga

. 7 2 0

, 7 2 5

-

7 2 6 (2 2 1 S E2 d 5 5 6 ) (1 9 7 5 ) (Th e tria l c o urt p ro p e rly e x c lu d e d a n a n swe r to th e

q u e stio n “ [w] h a t c h a rg e d id y o u m a k e a g a i n s t th e d e fe n d a n t? ” a s “ th e o n lyp ro b a tiv e v a lu e o f [th e a ntic ip a te d ] re sp o nse , is th e witn e ss’ [sic ] o p in io n a t th e

tim e h e o b t a in e d th e wa rra n t a s to th e n a tu re o f th e a pp e lla n t’s c rim in a l

c u lp a b ility . Th is wa s a n u ltim a te issu e fo r th e ju ry .” )

An d

, I c a n n o t a gre e with th e m a

jo rity ’s su g g e stio n th a t tria l c o u n se l

a llo w e d th e te stim o n y to p a ss with o u t o b je c tio n in fu rth e ra n c e o f a re a so n a b le

tria l stra te g y

. S e e fo o tn o te 1 6 o f th e m a jo rity op in io n

. R a t h er , wh e n a sk e d

d u rin g t h e h e a r i n g o n th e m o tio n fo r n e w tria l wh y h e d id n o t o b je c t, tria l

c o u n se l te stifie d th a t he h a d n o stra te g ic re a so n , b u t “ju st m isse d it.” Alth o u g h

t h e m a jo rity n o te s th a t c o u n se l’s c ro ss-e x a m in a tio n o f De te c tiv e Ja c k s o n

a d d re sse d th e c o n flic tin g v e rsio n s o f re p o rts re g a rd in g P y a tt’s in itia l g u n sh o t,

fo r c o u n se l to c a ll a tte n tio n to th e se c o n flic ts d o e s n o t su p po rt a c o n c lu sio n th a t

c o u n se l wo u ld we lc o m e u ltim a te issu e t e s tim o n y fro m De te c tiv e Ja c kso n , b u t

c o m p o rts with c o u n se l’s te stim o n y th a t h e “ ju st m isse d ” th e f

a c t o f u ltim a te

issu e te stim o n y

. Co m

p a re Va n sta v e rn v

. S t a t e , 29 3 G a

. 12 3, 1 2 6 -1 2 7 (3 ) (c )

(7 4 4 SE2 d 4 2 ) (2 0 13 ), in wh ic h tria l c o u n se l a sk e d d u rin g th e c r o sse x a m in a tio n o f th e in te rro g a ti n g d e te c tiv e wh e th e r, a t a c e rta in p o in t o f th e

in te rro g a tio n , c h a rg in g th e d e fe n d an t with m u rd e r wa s “ a fo re g o n e c o n c lu sio n ”

a s p a rt o f c o u n se l’s p u rsu it o f a stra te g y o f un de rm in in g th e in v e stig a tio n a n d

2d e m o n stra tin g th a t th e d e te c tiv e s su m m arily d ism isse d th e d e fe n d a n t’s v e rsio n

o f e v e n ts.

F u rth e r, my v ie w o f D e te c tiv e Ja c k so n ’s te stim o n y o n th e u ltim a te issu e

is d iffe re n t fro m th a t o f th e m a jo rity

. Alth o u g h th e m a

jo rity fo c u se s o n e x c e rp ts

o f th e te stim o n y th a t su g g e st a c o n c lu sio n o n De te c tiv e Ja c k so n ’s p a rt th a t

P y a tt’s first sh o t c o n stitu te d a n a ssa u lt be c a u se P y a tt sh o t “ a t” th e c a r in wh ic h

Rh o d e s wa s driv in g Bro a d n a x a n d Pe rry awa y , a c o mp le te re a d in g o f th e

te stim o n y sh o ws th a t De te c tiv e Ja c k so n to o k th e w itn e sse s’ sta te m e n ts n o t to b e

th a t P y a tt fire d “ a t” th e c a r, b u t “ to wa rd ” it, a n d sp e c ific a lly “ o v e r” it, a lth o u g h

De te c tiv e Ja c k so n wo u ld n o t “ g e t in to in c h e s o r fe e t” a s to h o w fa r o v e r th e c a r

th e p ro je c tile p a sse d

. Th u s , D e t e c tiv e Ja c k so n to ld th e ju ry th a t th e a c t o f

sh o o tin g o v e r th e c a r c o n stitu te d a n a ssa ult, in tru din g on its ro le of d e te rm in in g

wh e th e r a n a g g ra v a te d a ssa u l t h a d b ee n c o m m itte d b y a tte m ptin g to c a

u se a

v io le nt in ju ry with a

fire a rm

. 1

1 As to aggravated assault, the jury w as instructed that:

A person com m i ts the o f

f ense of aggravated assault when that p erson a ssaults
another with a deadly w eapon. To constitute s uch an assault, actual injury to the alleged v ictim need n ot be shown. It is only necessary that the evidence
show b ey ond a reasonable doubt that the def endant a ttem

p ted t o c a u s e a

v i o lent injury to the alleged victim

. T he S tate m u st also prove as a m ateri a l

3As to p re ju d ic e , I d o n o t a g r e e with th e sta te m e n t in fo o tn ote 1 8 o f th e

m a jo rity o p in io n th a t De te c tiv e Ja c k so n ’s te stim o n y th a t sh o o tin g o v e r th e c a r

– c ha ra c te riz e d a s a w a rn in g sh o t o r n o t – in u re d to P y a tt’s be n e fit; th e ju ry wa s

c h a rg e d with d e te rm in in g w h e t h e r P y a tt a tte m p te d to c a u se v io le n t in

ju ry b y

th a t a c t, a n d De te c tiv e Ja c k so n to ld th e ju ry th a t h e d id

. 2

Th e m a jo rity fu rth e r po sits th a t if tria l c o u n se l h a d ob je c te d to De te c tiv e

Ja c k so n ’s te stim o n y on th e ultim a te issu e , th e tria l c o u rt m ig h t h a v e re sp o n d e d

with a c u ra tiv e in stru c tio n

. Bu t, th is ov e rlo o k s th e fa c t th a t, fa c e d with a p ro p e r

o b je c tio n , it wo u ld h a v e b e e n fo r th e tria l c o u rt’s b ro a d d isc re tio n to d e te rm in e

wh e th e r g ra n tin g a m istria l wo u ld b e e sse ntia l to pre se rv e P y a tt’s rig h t to a fa ir

tria l. S h arp e v

. S ta te

, 2 8 6 Ga

. 7 9 9

, 8 0 3 -8 0 4 (5 ) (6 9 2 S E2 d 3 25 ) (2 01 0). Th u s,

elem e nt of aggravated assault, such as alleged in this case, that the a s sault was

m ade with a de a d l y w e a p o n that, w hen u sed of f ensively against a person, is likely t o o r actually does result in serious bodily i njury

. A f irearm

, when used as such, is a deadly weapon as a m a tter of law.

The jury was not instructed t hat an assault could be com m itted by an act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury . See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2).

2 The indictm ent charged Py att with: Count (1)
- the m alice m urder of Rhodes; Count (2)
- the f elony m u rder of Rhodes while in the com m ission of the c rim e of aggravated assault by shooting him with a f

irearm ; Count (3)
- the aggravated assault of Rhodes by m aking an assault upon his p erson with a handgun; Count (4)

- t he a ggravated a s s a u l t of Perry by

m aking an assault upon her person with a handgun; and Count (5)
- the a ggravated assault
of Broadnax by

m aking an assault upon her person with a handgun.

4th e m a

jo rity a ssu m e s th a t h a d c o u n se l m a d e th e n e c e ssa ry o b je c tio n , th e tria l

c o u rt wo u ld ha v e e x e rc ise d its d isc re tio n to d e n y a m istria l, th a t th e c o u rt wo u ld

h a v e n o n e th e le ss g iv e n p ro p e r c u ra tiv e in stru c tio n s, a n d th a t th e se h y p o th e tic a l

c u ra tiv e in stru c tio n s wo u ld h a v e b e e n a d e q u a t e t o re m o v e fro m th e ju ry ’s

c o n sid e ra tio n th e in a dm issa b le u ltim a te issu e te stim o n y

. In my v ie w, th e se a re

sim p ly to o m a n y sp e c u la tiv e a n d v a g u e a c tio n s fo r th is Co u rt to a ssu m e a n d re ly

u p o n in re m e d y in g th e situ a tio n

. Alth o u g h th e b u rd e n p la c e d o n o n e wh o

c la im s th a t h e wa s d e nie d th e e ffe c tiv e a ssista n c e o f tria l c o u n se l is a he a v y o n e ,

Bla c k v

. Sta te

, 29 6 Ga

. 6 5 8

, 6 6 2 (2 ) (7 6 9 SE2 d 8 9 8 ) (2 0 1 5 ), I be lie v e th a t it ha s

b e e n m e t h e re ; th e re is a re a so n a b le p r o b a b i l i ty th a t th e ju ry c on sid e re d th e

im p ro p e r te stim o n y in it s d e lib e ra tio n o f a ll a g g ra va te d a ssa ult c h a rg e s,

in c lu din g t h e fa ta l sh o o tin g

. Id

. Wh a t is m o re , th e m a jo rity ’s h y

p o th e tic a l

sc e n ario m a k e s th e bu r d e n p la c e d u po n Py a tt n o t m e re ly a rd u o u s, b u t

in su rm o u n ta

b le

. In lig h t o f th e d ire c t r e l at io n sh ip o f D e te c tiv e Ja c k so n ’s

te stim o n y to th e u ltim a te d e te rm in a tio n o f g uilt b y th e ju ry , I c a n no t c o n c lu d e

th a t it is h ig h ly pro b a

b le th a t th e im

p r o p e r e v id e n c e d id n o t c o n trib u te to th e

ju ry ’s v e rd ic ts. Se e Mc C a rtn e y v

. S ta te

, 2 6 2 Ga

. 1 5 6

, 1 5 9 (1 ) (4 1 4 SE2 d 2 2 7 )

(1 9 9 2 ), ov e rru le d o n oth e r gro u n d s, L in so n v

. S ta te

, 2 8 7 Ga

. 88 1, 8 8 6 (4 ) (7 0 0

5S E2 d 39 4 ) (2 0 1 0 ). Co m p a re Brid g e s v

. S ta te

, 2 8 6 Ga

. 5 3 5

, 5 4 0 (5 ) (6 9 0 S E2 d

1 3 6 ) (2 01 0 ).

F u rth e r, I d o n o t a g re e with th e m a jo rity ’s c o n c lu sio n th a t De te c tiv e

Ja c k so n ’s te stim o n y re g a rd in g th e u ltim a te issu e we n t o n ly to P y a tt’s

c o n v ic tio n s fo r th e a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lts o f Pe rry a n d Bro a d n a x. S e e fo o tn o te 1 9

o f th e m a jo rity o p i nio n

. Be c a

u se De te c tiv e Ja c k so n te stifie d th a t firin g th e

g u n sh o t o v e r th e c a r w a s a n a c t o f a gg ra v a t e d a s s a u lt, a n d th e fa ta l a ssa u lt

u n d e r ly in g th e fe lo n y m

u rd e r a s a lle ge d w a s b a se d u p o n a n a c t o f firin g th e

p isto l in th e d ire c tio n o f th e c a r, th e u ltim a te issu e te stim o n y a lso im p lic a te d th e

c h a rg e o f fe lo ny m

u rd e r b a se d u p o n a n a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt u p o n Rh o d e s. Th u s,

Ja c k so n ’s te stim on y “ we n t to th e v e ry h e art o f th e c a se ,” Fo rd h a m , su pra , a s to

a ll th e c h a rg e s of wh ic h P y a tt wa s fo u n d g u i l t y

. A s th e re is a re a so n a b le

p ro b a b ility th a t th e ju ry c o n sid e re d th e im p ro p e r te stim on y in its d e lib e ra tio n o f

a ll a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt c h a rg e s, in c lu d in g th e fa ta l sh o o ti n g , P y a tt sh o u ld b e

re trie d a s to a ll c ha rg e s.

I a m a u th o riz e d to sta te th a t Ju stic e Be nh a m a n d Ju stic e Hu n ste in jo in in

th is d isse n t.

6