IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2016-KM-00546-SCT CHRISTOPHER SCOTT ROUTH

v. STATE OF MISSISIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/13/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JEFF W EILL, SR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DAVID NEIL McCARTY MERRIDA COXW ELL ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOSEPH SCOTT HEMLEBEN NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - MISDEMEANOR DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/27/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE WALLER, C.J., KING AND MAX W ELL, JJ.
MAX WELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Crim inal contem

pt “involves an act ‘which tends t o bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.’” 1 In this case, Christopher Scott Routh w a s f ound i n direct crim inal contem pt af ter he d isrespected t he court—specif ically by s tanding up to dispute a j udge’s b ond ruling after the bond hearing had been concluded and de s p i t e b e i n g directed b y the judge to sit

1 Purvis v. Purvis , 657 So. 2d 794, 797 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Lawson v. State , 573 So. 2d 684, 686 (Miss. 1990)).down and m ake any f urther argum ent by w ritten m otion. B ecause the record supports the crim inal-contem

pt f inding bey ond a reasonable doubt, we af f irm

. B ackground Facts and Procedural History ¶2. O n A

p r i l 2 3 , 2 0 16, C hristopher Routh represented Loren Shell-Blackwell (Blac k w e l l )

at her arraignm e nt hearing. Routh is a n attorney with the Hinds County Public Def

ender’s Of f ice. Blackwell had been indicted f or capital m

urder. ¶3. P r i o r t o t h e hearing, Blackwell had been out on b ond, under house arrest. Routh requested Blackwell r em ain on bond and under house a r rest. Routh argued h is client had a constitutional right to reasonable b ail. He also a s serted the State had no evidence linking her to the crim e. ¶4. The S tate responded t hat its policy is to request bond be denied to those charged with capital m urder, and B lackwell should be no e xception. The State argued, c ontrary t o Routh’s no-evidence claim , t hat Blackwell’s DNA had been f ound at the m

urder scene, plus she had given incrim inating statem ents to the police. Moreover, B lackwell p osed a f light risk, having

no ties to Hinds County

. The State also pointed out t hat the only reason Blackwell had been granted bond previously was because she was pregnant. And now that her child was born, there was no longer any

reason she rem ain out of jail. ¶5. At this point, the circuit j udge asked Routh about Blackwell’s inf ant, whom she had brought with her to the hearing. Routh responded that the baby had a certain digestive condition that required his m other breast-f eed him . The judge asked what evidence Routh had to support this contention. At f irst, Routh equivocated, say ing he w as n ot f am iliar with

2the exact condition but that was what his client told him

. But then R outh began talking about

a hospital discharge f

orm . W hen asked i f he wanted to i ntroduc e t h e f o r m into e vidence, Routh said y es. B ut bef

ore o f f ering it, the judge perm i tted the State to review the f orm . The
State pointed out that the docum ent was a general discharge f orm f rom t h e h o s p i t a l

. It

m erely directed the baby be regularly f ed breast m ilk o r

formula

. Af

t er reviewing the record him self , the judge agreed the docum ent contained no diagnosis of a gastrointestinal issue and

n o p rescription f

or breast m ilk only

. Because the f orm Routh presented stated t h e i n f a n t could be f ed f orm ula instead of breast m ilk, the judge f ound no com

pelling reason to grant bond on this basis. ¶6. The judge then announced his decision—
I’m going t o d e n y b ond. It’s a capital m u rder charge. Another purpose of bond is to protect the public. C apital m urder is an ext r e m ely serious charge which can carry the d eath penalty , and t he D NA evidence cited by the State, alo n g with t he other sum m ary of the evidence presented b y t he State, is com pelling. So I’m

going to deny

bond.
But the judge then im m ediately advised he would “reconsider [ his decision] upon the f iling of the proper m o tion with proper evidence.” ¶7. At this point, the judge turned to Blackwell a n d asked if s h e h a d f u n d s to hire a lawy er. W hen she answered “no,” the judge told her h e would appoint som eone to represent her. Blackwell, audibly upset, 2 then asked if she could speak. T he j udge responded that he did not “believe now would be the tim e.” But he reassured her that her appointed attorney would be in touch with her.

2 T h e au d i o -reco rd i n g o f

th e arraig n m en t

h earin g is p art o f t h e reco rd

. 3¶8. As a f inal m atter, the judge asked if there w as a f am ily m em

ber w ho could take care of Blackwell’s c hild o r should social services be called. Af ter Routh assured the judge the baby could go with Blackwell’s relative who was in the courtroom , the judge concluded the hearing. ¶9. At this point, Routh interjected, asking if he could m ake an argum ent. The judge told him he could not because the hearing was over. R outh launched into his argum ent any way . At the sam e tim e t he judge was asking him to sit d own, R outh a sserted that the Constitution required t he reason deny ing b ail be placed on the r e c o r d

. H e t h en accused t he judge of f ailing to do so. ¶10. The judge f

ound R outh in direct crim i nal contem pt. A f ter a ten-m inute recess, the judge sentenced Routh. At sentencing, the judge told Routh—
Mr. R outh, y ou had p lenty of opportunity to m ake a record today an d ma k e y our argum ents. I ’ll note that y ou blatantly m i srepresented som ething on the record today

. Af

t er I m ade m y

ruling, I had told y ou I was not going to h ear any f urther argum ent and y ou repeatedly ref u sed m y d irective to sit d own. I advised y ou to f

ile a detailed written m otion if y ou h ad any thing else to p resent on this issue, and I’ll still consider any written m otion on the bond issue.
Because y ou were held in direct crim inal c o ntem pt and because of y our r ef

usal to a bide b y the rules o f this court, I’m going t o s e n t e n ce y ou to s pend som e tim e in jail. I’m going to c om m it y ou to the custody of the sherif f of Hinds County f or the af ternoon until 5:00 p.m

. ¶11. Routh im m ediately f iled an em e rgency petition w ith thi s C ourt, w h ich was deem ed in part to be a notice of a ppeal of the contem

pt f inding. Th i s C o u r t also g ranted Routh’s request f o r bond, perm itting Routh to be released that d ay upon p osting a $500 supersedeas bond.

4Discussion

¶12. The o nly question on appeal is whether the record, viewed ab initio, supports f inding Routh in direct c rim inal c ontem pt bey ond a reasonable doubt. S ee Mingo v. State , 944 So. 2d 18, 32 (Miss. 2 0 06) ( proceeding “ab initio” o n crim inal-contem pt appeals, “determ in[ ing]

on t h e record whether the person in contem pt is guilty o f contem

pt b ey ond a r easonable doubt”). 3 Af

t er review, we f

ind that it does. ¶13. “Conduct direc t e d a g ainst the c ourt’s dignity and a u thority is crim inal contem pt.”
Purvis v. Purvis , 657 So. 2d 794, 797 (Miss. 1994). “It involves an act ‘which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.’” Id. (quoting Lawson v. State , 573 So. 2d 684, 686 (Miss. 1990)). Here, Routh challenged the d ignity and authority of the trial court when he interjected his argum ent af ter the judge had ruled on the bond issue, c l early instructed Routh
any f urther a rgum ent should be m ade by written m otion, ended the hearing, denied Routh’s request to m ake f

urther oral argum ent, and directed Routh to sit down. ¶14. On appeal, Routh argues he was asserting his client’s c onstitutional right—nam ely , the constitutional r equirem ent that, “[ i]n a ny case where bail is denied bef ore conviction, the judge s hall place in the r e c o r d h i s r e a sons f o r deny ing bail.” Miss. C onst. art. 3, § 29(4). According to Routh, “an attorney respectf ully asking f

o r a t rial court to f

ollow C onstitutional

3 Wh eth er th e co n tem

p t is civ i l o r crim in al h i n g e s o n t h e p u rp o se o f th e co n tem p t f i n d in g . “If th e p rim ary p u rp o se o f th e co n tem p t o rd er is to en f

o rce th e rig h ts o f p riv at e p arty litig an ts o r en f

o rce co m p lian ce w i th a co u rt o rd er, th en th e co n tem p t is c i v il.” M

in g o , 9 4 4 S o . 2 d at 3 2

. B u t if t h e p u rp o se is “to p u n ish th e co n tem n o r f o r d iso b ed ien c e o f a co u rt o r d e r , ” th en th e co n tem

p t is crim in al. Id

. H ere, th e p u rp o s e o f th e c o n tem p t f in d in g w as to p u n ish R o u th f

o r d iso b ey in g th e j u d g e’s o rd er to sit d o w n . S o t h e co n tem p t w as clearly crim in al, p ro m

p tin g th is C o u rt’s h eig h ten ed rev i ew . 5law can never warrant crim in a l c o n t e m pt.” The problem w ith this argum e nt is that the transcript clearly shows the judge had followed the Constitution. Bef ore deny i ng bond, the judge e xplained his reasons f or doing so—(1) the f

act the crim e was capital and punishable by death, (2) the need to protect the public, (3) the S tate’s strong evidence against Blackwell, and (4) the l a c k of e vidence to support Routh’s contention that Blackwell’s baby required breast m ilk. See Miss. C onst. art. 3, § 29(1) (providing “all persons shall, bef ore conviction, be bailable by s u f

f icient sureties, e

xcept for capital offenses

. . . when the proof i s evident or
presum ption great” ( em

phasis added)). So the judge had alrea d y c o m p l ied with this constitutional requirem ent bef o r e the acts giving r ise to the crim inal contem pt. Thus, Routh

cannot rely on “ invoking a constitutional saf eguard” as j ustif

ication to continue arguing af ter the hearing had ended and while he was being asked to s it down. At this point, Routh was sim ply disputing the judge’s decision to deny bond. ¶15. Moreov e r , had Routh believed the judge had not f ollowed the Constitution when deny ing bond, Routh could have m ade this argum ent in a written m otion. W hile the judge d e n i e d bond, he prom ised to reconsider his decision “upon the f iling of the prope r mo t i o n with proper evidence.” But instead of f iling a m otion, Routh chose to disrupt the court. ¶16. “The contem

pt po w er is a n im

portant tool f

or keeping order and m aintaining an ef f icient court sy stem .” In re Hoppock , 849 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (Miss. 2003). W e f ind the judge was try ing to m aintain o rder in his courtroom in the m idst of a dif f icult situation—a

new m other distraught over being denied bond and having to leave her b aby with a relative. Routh m a d e the courtroom more chaotic by standing up t o dispute the judge’s ruling af ter the

6hearing had ended and despite b eing o rdered to sit down, t hereby “prevent[ ing] the orderly

adm inistration of justice.” In re William son , 838 So. 2d 226, 2 3 7 ( M i s s. 2002) (“Direct crim inal contem

pt involves words spoken o r actions com m i tted i n the p resence of the court that are calculated to e m

b arrass or prevent the orderly adm inistration of justice.”). In doing so, he “engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal,” in violation of Mississippi Rule of Prof essional Conduct 3.5(d). Thus, we f ind the j udge was w i t h i n h is authority to f ind Routh in direct crim inal contem pt. Conclusion ¶17. Disrupting the c ourt by disp u t i n g a j u d g e ’ s r uling—af ter b eing expressly told not to—supports a f

i nding o f crim i nal c o n t e mp t. W e t heref ore af f irm Routh’s conviction of direct crim inal contem

p t. ¶18. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

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