In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-2595

FRED CARTWRIGHT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SILVER CROSS HOSPITAL and

CROTHALL HEALTHCARE, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15 CV 6759 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED MARCH 19, 2020 — DECIDED JUNE 18, 2020

____________________

Before MANION, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Fred Cartwright sued his former 

employer asserting claims of discrimination based on his 

race, sex, and age. Throughout four years of litigation, he 

repeatedly failed to appear for his deposition, missed a 

status hearing, would not follow the local rules regarding

motion practice, refused to respond to discovery despite 

repeated orders to do so, and ignored the judge’s multiple 
2 No. 19-2595

warnings that his conduct would lead to dismissal of the 

suit. Despite this obstructive behavior, the judge continued 

to recruit a succession of pro bono attorneys to assist 

Cartwright, each of whom invested many hours of valuable 

time in the case before moving to withdraw because the 

client would not cooperate. After permitting the fourth—yes, 

fourth—volunteer lawyer to withdraw, the judge finally 

dismissed the case as a sanction for want of prosecution.

We affirm the dismissal and take this opportunity to remind judges that they need not and should not recruit 

volunteer lawyers for civil claimants who won’t cooperate 

with the basic requirements of litigation. Pro bono representation of indigent civil litigants is a venerable tradition in the 

legal profession. The courts must be careful stewards of this 

limited resource.

I. Background

In August 2015 Fred Cartwright filed a pro se complaint 

against his former employer Silver Cross Hospital and its 

management company Crothall Healthcare alleging claims 

of discrimination based on his race and sex in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; discrimination based on his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 

age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623. The district judge appointed counsel for Cartwright through the Settlement 

Assistance Program in the Northern District of Illinois for 

the limited purpose of attempting to negotiate an early 

settlement. The parties did not reach an agreement, so the

pro bono attorney was relieved of the limited representation.
No. 19-2595 3

While representing himself, Cartwright failed to respond 

to the defendants’ discovery requests and refused to schedule his deposition. Cartwright also filed many motions to 

compel discovery and moved to hold the defendants in 

contempt despite the court’s order that he must meet and 

confer with the defendants concerning these discovery 

disputes. Without explanation and despite Cartwright’s

refusal to cooperate, the judge recruited a lawyer to represent him pro bono. Counsel filed an amended complaint 

adding several additional claims. But shortly after that filing, 

the judge permitted the attorney to withdraw because of 

fundamental disagreements with Cartwright about the case. 

The judge—again without explanation—recruited another pro bono lawyer to assist Cartwright and noted that this 

would be the final time. With Cartwright represented once 

again, the parties engaged in another unsuccessful settlement conference and then continued with discovery. But 

after 14 months and more than 530 hours of work, this third 

attorney (and his associate) also moved to withdraw citing 

substantial and irreconcilable disagreements with 

Cartwright.

The judge thereafter entered partial summary judgment 

for the defendants on two of Cartwright’s claims, narrowing 

the case. Cartwright responded with multiple motions, 

including several accusing the judge of bias and demanding 

that he recuse himself. At the same time, the defendants 

moved to compel discovery and requested sanctions because 

Cartwright refused to answer interrogatories or provide 

other discovery responses in violation of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Cartwright refused to respond to these 

motions despite the judge’s repeated orders to do so. He also 
4 No. 19-2595

missed a status hearing without notifying the court of any 

scheduling conflicts. 

The judge ordered Cartwright to appear at the next hearing and warned that “any future failure to appear may result 

in a dismissal for want of prosecution.” Surprisingly, however, the order also explained that if Cartwright promised

that he would work with counsel in good faith, the court 

would be “inclined to grant [p]laintiff yet another (and final) 

opportunity to enjoy the professional assistance of recruited 

counsel.”

Prior to the rescheduled status hearing, the defendants 

moved to dismiss the case with prejudice for failure to

prosecute because of Cartwright’s persistent refusal to 

respond to discovery and noncompliance with the court’s

orders. Cartwright appeared at the status hearing and 

assured the judge that he would work with counsel in good 

faith. Although Cartwright had repeatedly refused to follow 

court orders and the rules of litigation, the judge recruited

yet another pro bono attorney to assist him. The judge held 

the defendants’ motion to dismiss in abeyance to give newly 

appointed counsel a chance to get up to speed on the case

and then denied it as moot.

Several months later, on the eve of Cartwright’s scheduled deposition, his attorney notified the defendants that 

Cartwright would not attend the deposition. No explanation 

was given. Counsel then moved to withdraw based on 

irreconcilable differences with the client. The judge granted 

the withdrawal motion. The defendants again moved to 

dismiss based on Cartwright’s continued obstructive conduct, including his failure to appear for his deposition, the 

missed status hearing, and Cartwright’s persistent refusal to 
No. 19-2595 5

resolve discovery disputes or comply with court orders. The 

judge took the motion under advisement and gave 

Cartwright time to find new representation on his own. 

After four months with no appearance by new counsel, 

the judge set a date for Cartwright’s deposition, cautioning

him that failure to appear “may result in dismissal of the 

case with prejudice for failure to prosecute or otherwise to 

comply with the orders of this [c]ourt.” Cartwright then 

bombarded the court with multiple motions, including 

several to cancel his deposition because of his anxiety. The 

judge denied these motions but limited the deposition to a 

four-hour session (with additional sessions, if necessary) to 

address his concerns. 

Cartwright appeared at the deposition but refused to answer many of counsel’s questions. He said that he was not 

feeling well and that his doctor had advised him not to 

attend. Because the defendants could not finish their questioning, the judge scheduled a date for Cartwright’s continued deposition, warning that his failure to appear “[would] 

result in the case being dismissed for failure to prosecute this 

case and for failure to comply with court orders.” The judge

also told Cartwright that none of his motions complied with 

court rules or standing orders and that his continued noncompliance could result in dismissal of the case. In addition, 

the judge rejected Cartwright’s very belated attempt to file a 

second amended complaint without leave of court, explaining that “the rambling[,] 88-page filing” was not a proper 

amendment but “merely contain[ed] a list of personal and 

discovery-related grievances [p]laintiff has with [d]efendants and their attorneys.”
6 No. 19-2595

When Cartwright failed to appear for his rescheduled 

deposition, the judge at long last followed through on his 

repeated warnings and dismissed the case with prejudice for 

failure to prosecute. He noted that Cartwright did not seek a 

continuance, “which would potentially have allowed defense counsel to avoid the costs of coming to Chicago, yet 

again, for the properly-noticed and long-overdue deposition 

of [p]laintiff.” The judge also cited Cartwright’s “persistent 

and willful failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the Local Rules of this [c]ourt, and this [c]ourt’s

orders and standing orders.” By now it was June 2019, and 

Cartwright had been litigating his case for nearly four years.

II. Discussion

On appeal Cartwright does not engage with the district 

court’s reason for dismissing his case but instead argues the 

merits of his claims and accuses the judge of bias. We could 

affirm on that basis alone. See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 

544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). For completeness we note that this 

case presents a clear “record of delay or contumacious 

conduct” amply justifying a dismissal for failure to prosecute. Salata v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 757 F.3d 695, 699 (7th Cir. 

2014) (quotation marks omitted). Cartwright’s willful failure 

to appear at his deposition was cause enough. See Collins v. 

Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2009). Yet his misconduct was far broader in scope.

During four years of litigation, Cartwright skipped three 

scheduled depositions, missed a status hearing, filed dozens 

of motions that violated local rules and the court’s standing 

orders despite repeated warnings, served noncompliant 

discovery responses and otherwise refused to satisfy with 

his discovery obligations, and ignored many court orders. 
No. 19-2595 7

The judge warned Cartwright at least eight times that his 

conduct put his lawsuit in jeopardy of dismissal before 

finally following through and dismissing the case after 

nearly four years of incorrigible obstruction.

Indeed, the judge had ample grounds to dismiss the case

much earlier in the litigation. The defendants’ first motion to 

dismiss for failure to prosecute catalogued Cartwright’s 

wanton disregard of basic litigation obligations and court

rules. The case should have ended then. Had the judge

granted the first dismissal motion, the defendants would 

have been spared the time and expense of defending against 

a plaintiff so obviously unwilling to prosecute his own case.

Inexplicably, the judge persisted in using the discretionary authority codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to recruit a 

succession of pro bono attorneys to represent this willfully 

uncooperative litigant. That was a serious mistake. Setting 

aside whether this case met the standards for recruitment of

volunteer counsel—the judge did not make any findings1—

Cartwright’s persistent noncompliance with his discovery 

obligations and the court’s orders should not have been 

rewarded with pro bono legal assistance. Yet the judge

ensured that Cartwright enjoyed the professional services of

no fewer than four different volunteer attorneys. Three of 

the court-appointed lawyers, who together spent nearly

1 A decision to recruit pro bono counsel for an indigent civil litigant

requires the court to make the following inquiries: “(1) has the indigent 

plaintiff made reasonable efforts to obtain counsel or been effectively 

precluded from [doing so];” and if so, “(2) given the difficulty of the case, 

[does] the plaintiff appear to be competent to try it himself?” Pruitt v. 

Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).
8 No. 19-2595

700 hours on the case, withdrew because of Cartwright’s

lack of cooperation.

It’s worth reemphasizing that the assistance of a pro 

bono lawyer in civil litigation is a privilege. See Pruitt v. 

Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007). “The valuable help of 

volunteer lawyers is a limited resource. It need not and 

should not be squandered on parties who are unwilling to 

uphold their obligations” as litigants. Dupree v. Hardy, 

859 F.3d 458, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2017).

AFFIRMED