# OAR Box 1142 Prepped by Ollie Stewart



### Document

Number: 

# 20)IV-F-1 8 Docket Number: 

# A-87-1 1

Printed 4/23/200810:21:21 AM Sheet 20of 30 P. 1P. 2 

# A-87- H W-F-1 8 Environmenta l Activitie s Staf f Genera l Motors Corporatio n Genera l Motors Technica l Cente r

3040 0 Moun d Roa d Bo x901 5 Warren , Michiga n 48090-901 5 Fax : (313 ) 947-179 7 Octobe r3 , 199 1 FE-476 6

Mr
. Do n Kopinsk i Standard s Developmen t an d Suppor t Branc h Emissio n Contro l Technolog yDivisio n U.S
. Environmenta l Protectio n Agency 2565 Plymout h Roa d An n Arbor , Michiga n 4810 5 RE : Onboar d refuelin g vapo rrecover yHearin g 9/26-27/9 1 (Docke t No
. A-87-11 ) Dea rMr
. Kopinski : GM' s hearin g statement s fro m th e EP Aonboar d refuelin g vapo rrecover y(ORVR ) hearin g whic h wa s hel d o n Septembe r26-2 7 ar e enclosed
. Al l o f th e informatio n tha t wa s availabl e i n specifi ctex t for m o rdetaile d overhead s i s enclosed
. Harol d Haskew' s an d Bil l Wecker' s presentation s di d no t includ e a writte n tex t s o I a m unabl e t o sen d yo u an ydetail s o n thei rspecifi cpresentations
. Detail s o n eac h of th e presentation s wil l b e include d i n ou rwritte n comments . Pleas e le t m e kno wi f yo u hav e an y questions
. Sincerely ,
Lis a M
. Fio r

cc : S
. Beale , Cour t Reporte r

Printed On Recycled

Paper Let's Get It Together SAFET YBELT S SAV E UVE S *P. 3



### Overvie wTestimon y fo r ORV R Hearin g Septembe r 26 , 199 1

S.A
. Leonar

d SLID E 1 : Goo d Afternoon
. M

ynam e i s Samue l A
. Leonard , th e Directo ro f th e Automotive Emissio n Contro l departmen t of Genera l Motor s Environmenta l Activitie s Staff
. Wit h m e toda yare Bo b Sinke , Directo rof GM' s Engineerin g Analysi s Department , Harol d Haske wof th e G M Powertrai n Division , Bo b Lang e of Failure Analysi s Associate s (FaAA) , Bil l Wecke ro f Wecke ran d Associates , Dic k Kirkpatric k

of GM' s platfor m organization , Kevi n Culle n o f GM' s Emissio n Lab , an d Ti m McCan n of GM' s Lega l Staff
. SLID E 2 : There are man yfacet s t o th e onboar d refuelin g vapo rrecover y(ORVR) issue , o rI believe mor

e correctl ystated , t o th e publi cpolic yissu e o f wha t i s th e best wa yt o contro l refuelin g emissions
. Effectiveness , cost , timelines s of implementation , th e synerg yo rlac k ther e of betwee n onboar d refuelin g an d vehicl e evaporative emissio n controls , consideratio n o f possibl e toxi cemissions , an d technolog ydevelopmen t o f onboard an d Stag e I I are subjects we wil l b e addressin g fo rth e record , eithe ri n th e remainde ro f m ystatemen t o ri n th e testimon yof other

s o n ou rteam . I thin k i t i s importan t t o recogniz e at th e outse t tha t th e issu e toda yi s not clea n ai ro remission s control
. Congres s has establishe d Stag e I I refuelin g emission s contro l requirements i n Titl e I of th e 199 0 Clea n Ai rAc t Amendments
. Stag e I I wil l contro l refuelin g emission s i n th e absence o f ORV R rules
. Congres s thu s assure d that EP

Aca n decid e th e merit s of th e ORV R safet yissue , withou t an yconcer n that a decisio n against ORV R wil l leave th e nee d fo rrefuelin g emission s contro l unaddressed
.P. 4

As a result , th e foca l point o f thi s hearin g shoul d b e th e safet y implication s o

f a n ORV R rule . W e wil l addres s th e safet y issu e a

t som e length . SLID E 3 : Perhap s th e best wa

y t o place th e man y facet s o f refuelin g emission s contro l i n prope r contex

t i s t o trac e som e o

f th e histor

y o f th e issues . Refuelin g emission s wer e firs

t recognized a s a volatil e organi c compoun d (VOC ) sourc e i n th e earl y 70's . I n its 198 7 Notice o f Propose d Rulemakin g (NPRM) , EPA estimate d refuelin g emission s t o b e les s tha n 2 % o

f th e tota l VO C emission s inventory . Becaus e refuelin g emission s ar e proportiona l t o th e Rei d Vapo r Pressur e (Rvp ) o

f th e fuel , regulation s reducin g fue l volatilit y have , an d wil l continue , t o reduce th e amount o f refuelin g emissions . I n th e mid-1970's , EP A proposed Stag e I I fo r stat e implementatio n plans . Earl y Stag e I I system s were installed i n Californi a an d i n Washington , D.C . Since then , othe r area s hav

e adopte d Stag e I I system s an d Stag e I I technology has evolve d dramaticall y ove r th e intervenin g years . Earl y system s ha d heav y nozzle s wit h stif

f sealin g boot

s an d twi n hoses . Th e newest , mos t advance d system s hav

e singl e hose

s an d light , bootles s nozzles . I n th e 197 7 Clea n Ai r Ac t Amendments , EP A wa s directe d t o asses s th e viabilit y o f onboard refuelin g vapo r recovery . Eve n then , Congres s expresse d concer n fo r th e safet

y o f ORV R system s an d specifie d that EP A shoul d consul t wit h th e DOT . EP A studie d th e issue , bu t neve r determine d that ORV R control s shoul d b e used . I n 1981 , a tas k

force lea d b

y the n vice-presiden t Bus h concluded that ORV R shoul d no

t b e required .P. 5

SLID E 4 : I n 1983 , interest i n refuelin g control s an d ORV R system s wa s renewe d whe n laborator y test s conducted fo r th e America n Petroleu m Institut e (API ) reported tha t wholl y volatilize d gasolin e cause d a n elevate d incidence o f kidne y tumor s i n mal e rats an d live r tumor s i n femal e mice . A s a resul t o f furthe r wor k

an d understandin g o

f th e exposur

e criteri a an d tumo r formin g mechanism s involved , th e implication s o

f thes e AP I studies fo r huma n cance r ris k hav e bee n dramaticall y reduced , i f no t eliminated . First , th e anima l studie s deal t wit h hig h leve l exposures to volatilize d whol e gasolin e fo r lon g an d continuou s period s wherea s human s ar e expose d to lo w level s o f refuelin g vapor

s an d generall y fo r onl y ver y short , intermitten t periods . Second , th e compositio n o f refuelin g vapors i s significantl y differen t fro m whol e gasolin e an d th e heavie r hydrocarbo n compound s o f whol e gasolin e whic h mos t directl y affecte d th e animal s i n th e experiment , ar e almos t totall y absen t fro m refuelin g vapors . Third , th e mal e ra

t has a uniqu e protei n know n a s alph a 2u~globuli n tha t i s no t i n humans , bu t i s integra l t o th e developmen t o f kidne y tumor s i n th e mal e rat . Fourth , th e applicabilit

y o f femal e mous

e live r tumor

s i n associatio n wit h huma n risk ha s bee n eve n mor

e questionabl e tha n th e mal e ra t rena l tumor

s becaus e o f th e errati c natur

e o f th e findings . A s a result , bot h th e Healt h Effect s Institut e an d th e EP A Science Advisor y Boar d have cautioned agains t th e us e o

f thes e anima l studies i n huma n ris k assessment . Th e SA B has suggeste d that rena l tumor s produced b

y aP. 6

mechanis m that i s no t operativ

e i n human s i s no

t relevan t fo r huma n risk assessment , an d endorses th e Februar y 199 1 document b y th e Ris k Assessmen t Foru m tha t i f th e ra t specifi c mechanis m i s th e sol e explanatio n o f tumor s it shoul d no

t be use d fo r huma n cance r hazard identification . SLID E 5 : I n addition , ther e has bee n debat e ove r th e huma n healt h concern s o f benzen e i n gasolin e refuelin g vapors . Benzen e wa s classified a s a huma n carcinoge n base d o n occupationa l studies o f worker s exposed to ver

y hig h concentration s o f benzen e ove r lon g periods . However , curren t evidence indicates tha t lo w level , shor

t term , intermitten t benzen e exposur e a s experience d durin g norma l refuelin g operations , i s highly unlikel y t o hav e a significant effec

t o n huma n health . Moreover , th e us e o

f reformulate d gasolin e wil l reduce th e benzen e conten t o f gasolin e vapors an d th e additiona l requirements fo r furthe r reduction s i n exhaust emission s wil l continu e t o reduce ambien t levels . Finally , i f it i s EPA' s inten t t o furthe r reduce benzen e exposur e fro m gasolin e vapo r beyon d thes e limits , EP A has th e authorit

y t o eliminate benzen e fro m gasolin e an d als o th e authorit y unde r sectio n 11 2 o

f th e 199 0 Clea n Ai r Ac t Amendment

s to requir

e Stag e I I technology i n al l area s o f th e country . Thi s approac h woul d b e fa r preferabl e t o requirin g ORVR , wit h th e adde d benefi t o f improved service statio n safet y nationwide . SLID E 6 : I n it s 198 7 NPR M o n ORVR , EP A state d tha t "no increase i n overal l safet y ris k shoul d b e accepte d becaus e o f th e presence o

f onboar d contro l systems. " However , th e Agenc

y i n its proposa l tende d to dismiss th e safet y concern s raised an d faile d t o discuss o r evaluat e th e safet y advantages o

f Stag e I I contro lP. 7

systems . Becaus e th e safet y issu e ha d remaine d a seriou s problem , organization s suc h a s th e Insurance Institut e fo r Highwa

y Safet y (IIHS) , automobil e manufacturers , an d other s raise d thei r continued concern s at th e publi c hearin g an d durin g th e writte n commen t perio d tha t followe d th e issuance o f th e NPRM . Als o i n 1987 , Californi a ha d discussion s concernin g ORV R an d Stag e I I refuelin g control s an d decide d to retai n use o f existin g Stag e I I contro l system s an d no t adop t ORV R controls . Th e CAR B concluded tha t implementin g ORV R control s i n area s that have existin g Stag e I I system s i s redundan t an d actuall y increases emission s du e t o th e "breathin g loss emissions " fro m undergroun d storag e tanks . SLID E 7 : I n 1989 , H.R . 3030 , th e Administration' s Clea n Ai r Amendmen t proposa l containe d n o provisio n fo r ORVR , becaus e th e Administratio n ha d determine d that Stag e I I control s were a mor e cost-effective , quicker , an d safe r mean s o f abatin g refuelin g emissions . I n testimon y t o a Senat e committee i n 1989 , EPA Administrato r Reill y summarize d th e Administration' s positio n a s follows : "W e looke d carefull y at bot h [Stag e I I an d onboar d control ] options.. . There are concern s tha

t th e Transportatio n Departmen t an d other s hav e raise d abou t th e safety o

f onboard systems . W e had a n electio n t o make . W e mad e i t fo r Stag e I I refuelin g control s which , i n fact , d o target th e reduction s t o th e area s mos t i n nee d o

f the m an d ca n b e brough t o n an d have a quicke r impac

t o n th e proble m - o n reducin g pollutio n - sooner. " SLID E 8 : I n th e fina l 199 0 Clea n Ai r Ac t Amendments , Congres s require d th e installatio n o f Stag e I I control s i n nonattainmen t areas . Attainmen t deadline s fo r moderate , serious , severe , an d extrem e area s ar e Novembe r 15 , 1996 , 1999 , 2005 , an d 201 0 respectively . Th e 199 0 Amendments t o th e Clea n Ai r Ac t requir e state sP. 8

t o revise Stat e Implementatio n Plan s (SIP ) b y Novembe r 15 , 199 2 an d tha t Stag e I I control s be required withi n 2 year s o f th e state adoptio n date . Implementatio n o

f Stag e I I control s a s require d b y th e CA

A i n non-attainmen t area s ca n achiev

e reduction s fro m al l refuelin g emission s b y Novembe r 15 , 1994 . Eve n i

f ORV R control s ar e promulgated , th e benefi t o f ORV R control s woul d no

t b e gaine d fo r man y year s du e t o th e lengt h o f tim e require d fo r flee

t turnover . Therefore , ORV R control s coul d no t assis t moderate , serious , severe , o r extrem e area s i n reachin g attainmen t prio r t o thei r respectiv e deadlines a s easily , effectively , o r safel y a s Stag e I I controls . This , i n conjunctio n wit h th e mor e importan t issu e o

f th e inheren t safet

y risk o f ORV R contro l systems , makes th e continued pursuit o f ORV R illogica l an d inappropriate , Congres s als o require d EP A t o promulgat e ORV R rules afte r consultin g wit h th e DO To n th e safet

y o f vehicle-base d system s an d a n EP A determinatio n tha t suc h system s ar e safe . Thus , Congres s specificall y expresse d its inten t whe n i t stated : "N o on e wants a rul e tha t requires control s fo r th e consume r tha t presen t safet

y problems. " (H.R . Rep . No . 49 0 101st Cong . 2d . Sess . pt 1 at 30 4 (1990)) . SLID E 9 : Afte r th e 199 0 Amendments t o th e Clea n Ai r Act were completed , th e EP A an d NHTS A continued t o consul t o n th e safet y o f ORV R contro l systems . Severa l correspondences were exchange d betwee n th e Agencie s an d culminated wit h th e NHTS A Safety Assessmen t o f ORV R system s date d Jul y 1991 . Th e NHTS A repor

t clearl y state s that ORV R control s system s wil l increas e safet y risks. Thi s i s i n compariso n t o th e lac k o f increase d moto r vehicl e safet y risk wit h th e Stag e I I contro l o f refuelin g emissions .P. 9

SLID E 10 : W e believ

e tha t th e NHTS A safet

y repor t i s comprehensiv

e an d definitiv

e a s to th e increase d safet

y risk o f ORV R systems . Th e NHTS A evaluate d al l o f th e availabl e dat a an d informatio n concernin g ORV R safety , supplemented tha t informatio n wit h tests to asses s th e fir e risk inheren t wit h ORV R systems , an d the n compared those risks t o th e situatio n o f usin g Stag e II . Thi s process lea d t o thei r conclusio n that: " Since ORV R system s increas e safet y risk an d Stag e I I does not , f

t seem s reasonabl e fo r EP A t o conclud e tha t ORV R system s constitut e a n unreasonabl e safet y risk." W e agre e wit h tha t assessment . I n th e Clea n Ai r Ac

t Amendments passe d las t year , Congres s require d th e installatio n o

f Stag e I I equipmen t i n nonattainmen t area s an d promulgatio n o f ORV R rules provided that ORV R system s were determine d to b e safe afte r consultatio n wit h th e Departmen t o f Transportatio n (DOT) . Thus , th e decisio n a s t o whic h syste m t o requir e wa s lef

t t o EPA , afte r consultatio n wit h DOT . Th e NHTS A repor

t i s ver y clea r i n its conclusions . W e strongl y believ e tha t it woul d b e ba d publi c polic y an d inconsisten t wit h th e Clea n Ai r Ac t Amendments an d Congressiona l inten t t o subjec t th e publi c t o th e vehicl e safet y risks o

f ORVR . Thi s i s especiall y tru e whe n refuelin g emission s ca n b e controlled withou t risk

b y Stag e I I whic h ha s bee n show n to increas e service statio n safety . T o summarize : Th e debate ove r th e contro l o f refuelin g emission s has bee n goin g o n fo r almos t 2 0 years . Th e recor

d i s establishe d tha

t ORV R contro l system s wil l increase th e risks t

o moto r vehicl e safety . I n th e pursui t o f emissio n reductions , it i s bad publi c polic

y fo r EPA to subjec

t th e publi c t o th e vehicl e safet y risks o f ORV RP.1 0

whe n th e emissio n reduction s ca n b e achieve d an d publi c safet y enhance d b

y enforcin g th e Stag e I I requirements o f th e Clea n Ai r Ac

t Amendments . EPA has th e opportunit y t o en d th e debate o n thi s issu e b y no t promulgatin g ORV R controls . W e woul d lik

e t o continu e ou r testimon y an d discuss i n mor e detai l ou r concern s regardin g thi s rulemaking . o Bo b Sink

e o f GM' s Engineerin g Analysi s organizatio n wil l addres s fue l syste m safety , o Harol d Haskewwil l tal k abou t th e differences betwee n evaporativ e contro l system s an d ORVR , o Bob Lang e wil l discuss th e NHTS A conclusions , o Bil l Wecke r wil l discuss th e benefits o f ORV R an d Stag e I I controls , an d o Dic k Kirkpatric k

an d Kevi n Culle n wil l discuss vehicl e safet y fro m a produc

t developmen t standpoint .P.1 1



## Genera l Motors Testimon y

o n Refuelin g Emissio n Regulation s

S . A . Leonard R . A . Sink

e H . M . Haskew R . C . Lang e W . E . Wecke r R . L. Kirkpatric k K . Culle n T . C . McCan n

Septembe r 26-27 , 199 1

Slid e 1P.1 2

•

Slid e 2 0
0
0

0
0
0 

## Refuelin g Emissio n Control s
Cost-effectivenes s implementatio n timin g Onboar d refuelin g vapo rrecover y(ORVR ) compare d t o evaporativ e emissio n control s Consideratio n of toxi cemission s Technolog yDevelopmen t Safet y -P.1 3



### History of Refuelin g Emission s

o Recognize d a s a VO C Source i n earl y 1970' s

Les s tha n 2 % o

f th e tota l VO C emission s inventor y
o EP A proposed Stag e I I fo r state implementatio n plan s i n th e mid-1970' s Severa l area s hav

e adopte d Stag e I I control s an d th e technology ha s evolve d dramaticall y 197 7 Clea n Ai r Ac

t Amendments introduced ORV R Safet y concern s expresse d b y Congres s EP A neve r concluded ORV R shoul d b e used
o 198 1 Tas k

Force Lea d b

y the n Vic e Presiden t Bus h declare d ORV R shoul d no t b e require d

Slid e 3P.1 4



### History of Refuelin g Emission s

o Renewe d EPA interes t i n 198 3 du e to AP I ra t study

o Anima l studies no t applicabl e to huma n healt h ris k Hig h exposur

e level s fo r long , continuou s period s vs . lo wexposur

e level s fo r ver

y short , intermitten t period s Compositio n o

f volatilize d whol e gasolin e vapor s vs . refuelin g emissio n vapor s Uniqu e protei n (alph a 2u-globulin ) o f mal e ra

t Errati c natur

e o f femal e mous

e finding s
SAB/HEI/EP A Ris k

Assessmen t Foru m Cautio n use o

f studies fo r huma n ris k assessmen t an d Suppor t statemen t tha

t if mal e ra

t rena l tumor

s are produced b

y a mechanis m tha

t i s no t operativ

e i n humans , it i s no

t relevan t fo r huma n ris k assessmen t

Slid e 4P.1 5



### Histor y of Refuelin g Emission s Benzen e Concer n Controvers

y o f huma n healt h effec

t du e to refuelin g vapo r exposur

e Hig h exposur

e level s fo r long , continuou s period s vs . lo wexposur

e level s fo r ver

y short , intermitten t period s Benzen e reduction s wil l occu r Introductio n o

f reformulated gasolin e Implementatio n o

f ne wexhaus

t emission s standard s EP A authorit

y to : Eliminate benzen e fro m gasolin e Requir e Stag e I I pe r Sectio n 11 2 o f 199 0 Clea n Ai r Ac t Amendments

Slide SP.1 6



### History o

f Refuelin g Emission s

o 198 7 EP A NPR M o n refuelin g emission s

EP A state d that : "no increas e i n overal l safet y ris k shoul d b e accepte d becaus e o

f th e presence o

f onboard control s systems " EPA the n dismissed safet y concern s Safet y remaine d a seriou s proble m an d severa l organization s voice d continued concer n fo r safet y o f ORV R system s throughou t commen t perio d

o I n 1987 , CAR B rejecte d th e adoptio n o f ORV R control s

Slid e 6P-1 7



### Histor y of Refuelin g Emission s

o 198 9 Administratio n Proposa l fo r Clea n Ai r Ac t Amendments Delete d ORV R requiremen t Required Stag e I I control s "W e looked carefull y at bot h [Stag e I I an d onboar d control ] options.. . There are concern s that th e Transportatio n Departmen t an d other s have raise d abou t th e safet y o f onboard systems . W e ha d a n electio n to make . W e mad e i t fo r Stag e I I refuelin g control s which , i n fact , d o targe t th e reduction s t

o th e area s mos

t i n nee d o

f the m an d ca n be brough t o n an d have a quicke r impac t o n th e proble m - - o n reducin g pollutio n - sooner. "

—EP A Administrato r Reill y

Slid e 7P.1 8



### Histor y of Refuelin g Emission s

199 0 Clea n Ai r Ac

t Amendments Require d Stag e I I Require d EP A to consul t wit h DO To n ORV R safet y Congressiona l intent : "N o on e wants a rul e tha t requires control s fo r th e consume r that presen t safet y problems. "

SlidesP.1 9



## Histor y o f Refuelin g Emission s

o Jul y199 1 NHTSASafet yAssessmen t ORV R contro l system s wil l increas e safet yris k Stag e I I control s have a lowe rris k o f fir e compare d t o non-Stag e I I station s "Sinc e ORV R system s increas e safetyris k an d Stag e I I doe s not , i t seem s reasonabl e fo rEP At o conclud e tha t ORV R system s constitut e a n unreasonabl e safety risk. "

Slid e 9P.2 0



### Conclusio n

NHTS A safet

y repor t i s comprehensiv

e an d definitiv

e as t o th e increase d safet

y ris k o f ORV R
Th e 199 0 Clea n Ai r Ac t Amendments (CAAA ) state tha

t it i s EPA' s decisio n afte r consultatio n wit h th e Departmen t o f Transportatio n
Bad publi c polic

y an d inconsisten t wit h th e CAA A an d Congressiona l inten t t o subjec t th e publi c to th e vehicl e safet y risk s o f ORV R whe n Stag e I I control s ar e required an d ca n b e used

Slid e 1 0P.2 1

R . A . SINK E 

### ORV R EP A HEARIN G9/26/9 1
SLID E 1

SLID E 2 GOO D MORNING . M Y NAM E I S BO B SINKE . I AM

TESTIFYIN

GTODA YO N BEHALF O

F GENERA

L MOTORS . I A

M CURRENTL

YDIRECTO

RO F ENGINEERIN

GANALYSI S FO

RCURREN

T PRODUC T ENGINEERIN G O F GM . I NTHI S POSITION , I A M RESPONSIBLE FO

RPRODUC T DEFEC T INVESTIGATION , RECALL CAMPAIGNS , AN

D FIEL D SAFET YCLAIM S INVESTIGATIONS . I HAV E SPEN T OVE RTHE PAS T 2 3 YEAR S O F M YENGINEERIN

G CAREE RWITH G

M I N VARIOU S ASSIGNMENT S DEALIN GWITH VEHICL E SAFET

YDEVELOPMEN

T AN D EVALUATION . I AM , THEREFORE , VER

YFAMILIA

RWITH TH E EVOLUTIO N O F FUEL SYSTE M DEVELOPMEN

T AN D THE PROCESSE S FO

REVALUATIN

G LABORATOR

YAN D FIEL D PERFORMANCE OF FUEL SYSTEMS . I WIL L PROVIDE GM' S VIEWS I N SUPPORT OF TH E NHTSA CONCLUSIO

N THA T ORV RSYSTEM S WIL L RESUL T I N A N INCREASE

D SAFET YRIS K AN D THU S HAV

E A NEGATIV

E IMPAC T O

N SAFETY . M

YTESTIMON

Y WILL FOCU S O

N FUEL SYSTE

M EVALUATIO

N HISTORY , GM' S EXPERIENCE WITH FUEL SYSTE M SAFETY , AN

D OU RVIEW S O N THE JUN E 

### 199 1 GA

O AN D JUL Y 

### 199 1 NHTS

AREPORT S O N

### ORV

R A S THE Y

### SLID

E 3 RELAT E T O FUE L SYSTEM S DEVELOPMEN T I N GM .

I N TH E 

### 1950' S AN

D 1960'S , TH E SOCIET YO F AUTOMOTIV E ENGINEER S (SAE ) WA S ACTIVE DEVELOPINGCRAS H TES T PROCEDURE S T

O EVALUATE FUE

L SYSTEMS . THES E EARL YTES T PROCEDURE S FOCUSE

D O N BROA D CRAS H CONSIDERATION S I N THA T THEYDEFINED TH E FLA T FACE MOVIN

GBARRIE

RA S A GENERI C TES T DEVICE . TH E FEDERA L GOVERNMEN

T ADOPTED TH E GENERA L SERVICE S ADMINISTRATION (GSA ) STANDAR D FO RGOVERNMEN T VEHICLE S USIN

GTHE SA

E PROCEDURES . TH E NHTSA FOLLOWE

D WIT H THE FMVS S 30 1 FO RFRONTA

L IMPACT S I

N 1967 . TH E NHTSA ADDED TH E 3 0 MP

H REA RAN D 2 0 MP H SIDE MOVIN G BARRIE RIMPAC T REQUIREMENT S I N 1976 . ALSO , A

REQUIREMEN

T TO PERFOR

M A STATI C ROL

L TES T AFTE

RAL L IMPACT S WA S ADDED I N 197S . TH E JUSTIFICATION FO RTHES E STANDARD S HA S BEE N T O REDUC E TH E CHANCE S O F INJURYAND FATALIT YDU E T O FIRE S WHIC H RESUL T FRO

M FUE L LEAK S I N

MOTO RVEHICL E CRASHES .


### SLID E 4 TH E 

### NHTS A HA S CONDUCTE D PERIODI C REVIEW S O F 

### FMVS S 30 1 A S REQUIRED B

YEXECUTIV

E ORDER . TH E MOS T RECEN T REVIE W OF FMVS S 30 1 WA

S REPORTE

D B YTHE NHTSA

I N NOVEMBE

R 

### 1990 . I N

THEI RREPORT , TH E 

### NHTS A OBSERVE D THA T MOTO R VEHICL E FIRE S I

N TRAFFI C CRASHE S ARE RELATIVEL YRARE ,P.2 3

OCCURRIN

GA T TH E RAT E O F APPROXIMATEL

YTHRE E FIRE S FO

R EVER Y100 0 VEHICLE S INVOLVE D I N CRASHES . HOWEVER , THE Y OBSERVED THA

T FO RALL VEHICLE S INVOLVE D I N FATA L CRASHES , FIRE S ARE CONSIDERABL YMOR E FREQUENT , WIT H ABOUT 2 6 FIRE S PE R100 0 VEHICLE S I

N CRASHE S (NEARL

YNIN E TIME S THE RAT

E FO RAL L CRASHES) . THE YALS O OBSERVED THA T FIR E I S ASSOCIATED WITH SUBSTANTIALL YMORE SEVERE IMPAC T CRASHES .


### SLID E 5 GM' S OBSERVATIONS FRO M FIELD ACCIDENT STUDIE S ARE CONSISTEN

T WIT H THE NHTSA'S . MOS T FUEL FE D FIRE S AA

E RELATED T

O SEVER E CRASHES . I

N ADDITION , G

M HA S OBSERVE

D THAT MAN

YFUEL FE

D VEHICL E FIRE S AR E RELATED TO SPECIFI C VEHICL E DESIG

N CHARACTERISTICS . A s A RESULT , GENERA

L TES T PROTOCOL S ARE NOT SUFFICIEN T T O ADDRES S FUEL SYSTE M SAFETYRISKS . SINCE MILLION S O F CRASHE S OF EVER Y CONCEIVABL E KIN

D OCCU RANNUALLY , I T I S LIKEL YTHA T EVER Y FUEL SYSTE

M I N PRODUCTIO

N WIL L SUFFE

RVIOLATIO

N N O MATTE R WHAT IT S DESIG

N CHARACTERISTIC S AND/O REVALUATIO

N PROTOCOL . N

O FMVS S O

RGENERA

L TES T PROTOCOL CA N MINIMIZ E TH E VEHICL E SPECIFI C AN D CRAS H SPECIFI C FACTOR S WHICH PRODUC E TH E MAJORIT YO F THE REMAININ

GCRAS H RELATED FIRES . THE CHALLENG E FO RTH E FUEL SYSTE

M DESIG N ENGINEE

R I S T O MINIMIZ E THES E OCCURRENCE S B YOTHE RMEAN S SUC

H A SREDUCE D DESIG

N COMPLEXITY .


### SLID E 6 THOUG H CRASHE S WIT H FIRE S AR E RELATIVEL YRARE , FIRE S

I N MOTO RVEHICL E CRASHE S HAV E LON GBEE N A TOPI C O F INTERES T AN

D CONCER

N T O TH E AUTOMOBIL E MANUFACTURERS , TH E NHTSA , AND TH E PUBLIC . B YIT S VER YNATURE , TH E OCCURRENC E O F FIR E CA N SIGNIFICANTL YINCREAS E TH E RIS KO F INJURY , AN

D BUR N INJURIE S AR E DISFIGURING , PAINFUL , AND RECOVERYI S DIFFICULT . TH E PUBLIC , I N GENERAL , BECOME S VER YUPSE T WIT H FIR E RELATE D FATALITIE S AND INJURIE S BECAUS E THE YABHO RTH E THOUGH T O F BEINGBURNED . SO , EVEN THOUG H VEHICL E FIRE S AR E INFREQUENT , EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT S AR E NEEDE D T O MINIMIZ E THEM .



### SLID E 7 WIT H THI S BACKGROUND , LE T M E REFLEC T O N TH E RECEN T 

### GA O AND 

### NHTS

A RECOMMENDATIONS . 

### I PARTICIPATE D I N BRIEFIN

GTH E GA

O FORTHEI RREPOR T WHIC H WA S ISSUE D JUN E 1991 . I WAN

T T O MAK E I T CLEA

RTHA T THE GA

O REPOR

T DOE S NOT RECOGNIZ E THE PRIMAR YTHRUS T O

F OU RCONCERN S WITH 

### ORVR .

FIRST , WE EMPHASIZE D TO 

### GA O THA T 

### ORV

R SYSTEM S POS E INHEREN

T SAFET

YRISK S WHIC

H ARE SIGNIFICANTL YGREATE

RP.2 5

THA N RISK S RELATE D TO EVAPORATIVE EMISSION SYSTEMS . THES E RISK S RELAT E T O TH E INCREASE D VOLUM E O F COMBUSTIBL E FUE L VAPORCARRIE D B YORV RSYSTEM S AND TH E INCREASE D VULNERABILIT YT O COLLISION DAMAG E SUC H SYSTEM S PRESEN T DU E T O LARGE RCOMPONENT S AN D INCREASE D COMPLEXITY .

SECOND , GA

O HA S NOT FULL YACKNOWLEDGE D OURCONCER N THA T ORV

RMA YRESUL T I N

A N INCREAS E I N

TH E NUMBE RO F MOTO RVEHICL E FIRES , TH E SEVERIT YO F SUC H FIRES , AND ASSOCIATE D BUR

N INJURIES. THI S WIL L B E S O EVEN AFTE R MANUFACTURER S APPL YTHEI RBES T EFFORT S T O LIMI T ORV R RISK S AND T O CORREC T ANYSPECIFI C PROBLEM S WHIC H AR E BOUND TO B E ENCOUNTERE D I N TH E DEVELOPMEN T PROCESS . STUDIE S I N

TH E DOCKE T SHO

W THA T IMPLEMENTATION O F 

### ORV R COUL D INCREAS E MOTO

RVEHICL E FIRE S B YSEVERA

L HUNDRE

D T O SEVERA L THOUSAN

D ANNUALLY , AN

D THA T FATA L MOTO RVEHICL E FIRE S COUL

D INCREAS E B

YA S MAN

YA S SEVERA

L HUNDRE

D ANNUALLY . A s I MENTIONED EARLIER , THES E TRAGI C ACCIDENT S EVOK E STRON

G PUBLI C EMOTION .


### SLID E 8 I N THEI RREPORT , TH E 

### GA

O RECOMMENDE D THA T TH E 

### EP A AN D TH E NHTS A DEVELO P A

JOIN T ACTION

PLA N TO "PERFOR

M A SAFET YEVALUATIO

N OF MANUFACTURERS ' ONBOAR D SYSTEM S T

OP.2 6

IDENTIF YAN D CORREC T AN

YSAFET YDEFECT S O

RFLAW S WELL I

N ADVANCE O

F THE 199 6 MODEL YEA RS O THA

T A N ORDERL YPHASE I N OCCURS. "


### SLID E 9 FORTUNATELY , TH E GA O REPOR T APPEAR S TO RECOGNIZ E THA T THE PROPOSE

D "ACTIO

N PLAN " DOE S NOT APPL YI F ORV

R SYSTEM S INHERENTL

YINCREAS E SAFETYRISK , A S THE GA O SAI D THE FOLLOWIN

GI N IT S COVE

RLETTE RO F JUL Y30 , 1991 :
"OU RRECOMMENDATIO

N FO RA N ACTIO N PLA N WAS NOT MAD

E T O PROVIDE A

BASI S FO RCHANGIN

GEPA' S RESPONSIBILIT YFO R SAFETYRELATE

D DECISION-MAKIN

GPRIO R T O PROMULGATIN

GA REGULATION. "



### SLID E 1 0 A S THE GA O RECOGNIZES , EP

A CANNOT REQUIR

E ORV R SYSTEM S I F I T DETERMINE S THA T SUC H SYSTEM S CREAT E A

N INCREASE

D SAFETYRISK . I T I S REASONABLE T O CONCLUDE THA

T SUC H A DETERMINATIO

N WIL L B

E MAD E I N LIGHT O

F THE NHTSA' S DEFINITIV

E REPORT REGARDIN

GTH E SAFET

YOF SUC

H SYSTEMS , AN D THE NHTSA' S STATEMEN T I N IT S JUL

Y199 1 REPOR

T THAT :

"SINC E 

### ORV

R SYSTEM S INCREAS E SAFET YP.2 7



### SLID E 1 1 RIS KAN D STAG E I I DOE S NOT , I T SEEM S

. . REASONABLE FO

REP A T O CONCLUDE THA

T ORV RSYSTEM S CONSTITUT E A N UNREASONABLE SAFET

YRISK. "

WHA T TH E GA

O PROPOSAL FO RA

N "ACTION

PLAN " OVERLOOKED I S THA

T TESTIN

GB YITSELF I S NO T SUFFICIEN T T O PRODUC E ACCEPTABL E NE W FUEL SYSTEMS . I A M UNABL E T

O ACCEP T TH E NOTIO

N THA T TH E RISK S O

F ADDITIONA

L FIRE S FRO

M ONBOAR D SYSTEM S COUL

D BE APPROPRIATEL

YHANDLE

D THROUG

H PRE-SAL E VEHICL E CERTIFICATIO N O RTES T PROGRAMS . N O TES T PROTOCOL O

RCERTIFICATIO

N PROGRA M COULD ELIMINAT E THE ADDITIONA

L ORV RPART S AN

D CONNECTION S THA

T A N ORV RRULE WOULD REQUIRE , O

RELIMINAT E TH E INVENTOR YO F FUEL VAPO

R THAT CA N B E RELEASE

D AN D CATCH FIRE . FURTHER , MANUFACTURER S CANNOT ACCEP T IN-US E VEHICL E SAFETYRECALL CAMPAIGN S A S A

MEAN S O

F MANAGIN

GFIR E RISKS . THE GA

O RECOMMENDATIO

N MAKE S N

O PROVISIO

N FO RTH E FAC T THA

T THE ORV RSAFETYCONCERN S ARE INCAPABL E O F RESOLUTIO N BECAUS E THEYAR E INHEREN

T T O A N ORV RCANISTER-BASED DESIGN .


### SLID E 1 2 A

s TH E 

### NHTS

A JUL Y

### 199 1 REPOR T FOUND :P.2 8

"DURIN GTH E REFUELIN

GPROCESS , VAPO R FLO W FRO M TH E FUE L TAN

KT O A N ORV R- . CANISTE RFORVAPO RSTORAG E CA N B E 4 5 TO 6 5 GRAM S PE RMINUTE . THI S I S MUC H GREATE RTHA

N CURREN T EVAPORATIVE FLO W RATES , WHIC H RAREL YEXCEE D 6 TO 8 GRAM S PE RMINUT E AND AR E GENERALL Y LESS THA

N 1 GRA M PE RMINUTE . SHOUL D THI S VAPO RESCAPE , DU E T O A DESIG N O R MANUFACTURINGERROR , IMPROPE R MAINTENANCE , O RTAMPERING , UNCONTROLLE D VAPORWOUL D FLO W INT O TH E ENGIN E COMPARTMEN T O RUNDE RTH E VEHICL E AN D IGNITE , SHOUL D A N IGNITION

SOURC E B E PRESENT . THI S RESULT S I N

A N INCREASE D SAFET YRISK. " 

### 8

SLID E 1 3 MOREOVER , TH E GA O "ACTIO

N PLAN " DOE S NOT RECOGNIZ E THE TECHNICA

L COMPLEXITYO

F THI S ISSUE . I T WOUL D HAV E TH E NHTS A

AN D EP A SOMEHO

W TES T AN

D EVALUATE 60 0 MODEL S PRODUCE

D B Y3 0 MANUFACTURER S EVER YYEA R"T O IDENTIF

YAN D CORREC T AN

YSAFET

YDEFECT S O

RMANUFACTURIN

G FLAWS. " ORV

RP.2 9

SYSTEM S WOULD INVOLV E TH E INTERACTIO

N O F MAN YVEHICL E SYSTEMS , INCLUDIN

GCHASSIS/BOD

YDESIGN , THE . EXHAUS T EMISSIO N CONTROL SYSTEM , AN D THE FUEL SYSTE

M ITSELF . N

O PRACTICA

L TES T PROTOCO

L COUL D AOORES S AL L THES E VEHICL E SPECIFIC S AN

D THE CHANGE S WHIC

H OCCU RFRO M YEA RT O YEA R I N VEHICL E SYSTEMS . THI S APPROACH I S TOTALLY INCOMPATIBL E WITH THE PRACTICALITIE S O F A NE W FUEL SYSTE

M DESIG N SUC H A S ORVR . I T DOE S NOT PROVIDE A N ADEQUAT E MEAN S T O DEA L WITH UNFORESEE

N FIEL D EVENT S WHICH WIL L MOS T ASSUREDLYOCCU RAS A RESULT O

F INCREASE

D COMPLEXITY OF PROPOSED ORV

RSYSTEMS . 

### SLID E 1 4 GAO' s POSITIO N IS , I N M YVIEW , INCONSISTENT WIT H 

### NHTSA' s JULY

### 1991 STUDY . THE 

### GA O ANALYSI S WAS NO T BASED O N TECHNICA

L EVALUATIO

N O F TH E SAFET YDATA , AN D APPARENTLYWA S NO T WRITTE N O RREVIEWED BYFUE L SYSTE M O R VEHICL E SAFET YENGINEERS . I N RECOGNITIO

N O F THI S POINT , GA O PROPERLYACKNOWLEDGED , AFTERRELEAS E O F IT S MEMORANDUM , THA

T IT S PROPOSED "ACTIO N PLAN " APPROAC H WOUL D NO T B E APPROPRIAT E I F ORV RSYSTEM S WER E UNSAFE , GA O HA S ACKNOWLEDGED THA T EP A CANNO T REQUIRE ORV RSYSTEM S I F SUCH SYSTEM S CREAT E A N INCREASED SAFETYRISK . GIVE NP.3 0



### 1 0 THE NHTSA

FINDIN GREGARDIN

GTH E INHEREN

T SAFET YRISK S ASSOCIATED WIT

H ORV RSYSTEMS , TH E GA

O ANALYSI S I S OBSOLETE .


### SLID E 1 5 I N CONCLUSION , TH E PROPOSE D

### ORV R SYSTEM S WIL L CLEARL YINTRODUCE A

STEP FUNCTIO

N INCREAS E I

N FUE L SYSTE M COMPLEXIT

YAN D SAFET YRISK . I

N THI S REGARD , G

M AGREE S WIT H THE NHTS

A REPOR T THA T "THE INCREASED DESIG N COMPLEXIT

YO F ORV RSYSTEM S WIL L RESUL T I N A N INCREAS E I

N SAFET YRISK. " FURTHER , W E AGRE E WIT H TH E NHTSA REPOR T THA T "SINCE ORV

RSYSTEMS INCREAS E SAFETYRISKAN D STAG E I I DOE S NOT , I T SEEMS REASONABL E FO REP A T O CONCLUD

E THA T ORV RSYSTEMS CONSTITUT E A N UNREASONABL E SAFET YRISK. "

GIVE N THES E FINDING S AN D CONCLUSIONS , G M STRONGL Y BELIEVE S THA

T THE PROPOSE

D ORV RSYSTEM S ARE NO

T ACCEPTABL E FRO

M TH E STANDPOIN

T O F MOTO RVEHICL E SAFETY . ACCORDINGLY , THE YSHOUL D B E REJECTE D B YEP A A S A N UNREASONABLE SAFET

YRISK , AN

D STAGE I I SYSTEMS , REQUIRE D B YCONGRES S I N

OTHE RPROVISION S O F TH E CAA , SHOUL D B E INSTALLE

D AS PROMPTL

YA S POSSIBLE .P.3 1



# EP A HEARING , SEPTEMBE R26 . 199 1

ONBOAR DREFUELINGVAPORRECOVER Y(ORVR )

TESTIMONYBY : ROBER T A . SINK E FOR : GENERAL MOTOR S

SHO E 1P.3 2



# TESTIMONYFOCUS :

a FUE L SYSTE M

EVALUATION

HISTORY

a 

# FUE L SYSTE M

SAFET Y

a GA O ANDNHTS A

REPORT S

SLID E 2

# VEHICL E FUE L SYSTE M HISTORY

SAE CRAS H TES T PROCEDURE S

GENERAL SERVICE S ADMINISTRATION (GSA ) STANDARD S

NHTS A STANDAR D30 1

SLID E 3P.3 4



# NHTS A REVIEW S O F FMVS S 30 1

Q 

# FIRE S AR E RELATIVEL YRAR E FO RFATAL CRASHE S FIR E MOR E FREQUEN T
nFIR E ASSOCIATE DWIT H MOR E SEVER E CRASHE S

SLID E 4P.3 5



# G M OBSERVATION S FRO

M ACCIDEN T STUDIE S

a CONSISTEN T WIT H NHTS A

D

# FIRE S RELATE DT O SEVER E CRASHE S
a FIRE S RELATE DT O SPECIFI C DESIGN
a GENERAL TES T PROTOCO L NO T SUFFICIEN T T O ADDRES S RISK S

SLID E SP.3 6



# FIRE S AR E A

CONCERN

D

# INCREAS E RIS KO F INJUR Y

a PUBLI C BECOME S UPSE T WIT H FIRE S

D

# EXTRAORDINARYEFFORT S NEEDE D

SLIOE . 6P.3 7



# RRTFFTNGTH E GA

O

a 

# EMPHASIZE DORV

RSYSTEM S POS E INHEREN T SAFET YRISK S

a 

# ORV RSYSTEM S WIL L INCREAS E VEHICL E FIRE S EVE N

AFTE R MANUFACTURER S BES T EFFORT S

SLIDE 7

# GA

O RECOMMENDATION S
EPA/NHTS A

JOIN T "ACTION

PLAN " TO :

"PERFOR M A SAFET YEVALUATION

O F MANUFACTURERS ' ONBOAR DSYSTEM S T O IDENTIF YAN DCORREC T ANYSAFET Y DEFECT S ORFLAW S A S WEL L I N ADVANC E O F TH E 199 6 MODE L YEA

RS O THA T A

N ORDERL YPHASE-I N

OCCURS. "

SLIDE 8P.3 9



# GA O REPOR T APPEAR S T O RECOGNIZ E PROPOSE D"ACTIO

N PLAN " DOE S NO T APPL Y I F ORV RINHERENTL YINCREASE S SAFET YRIS K

GA O COVE RLETTER :

"OU RRECOMMENDATIO

N FO RA N ACTIO N PLA N WA S NO T MAD E T O PROVIDE A

BASI S FO

RCHANGIN

GEPA' S RESPONSIBILITYFO

RSAFETYRELATED DECISION-MAKIN G PRIO RT O PROMULGATIN

GA REGULATION. "

SLIO E 9P.4 0



# NHTSA' s STATEMEN

T THAT :

"SINC E 

# ORV

R SYSTEM S INCREAS E SAFET Y RIS KAND STAG E II DOE S NOT , I T 

# SEEM S REASONABLE FO REP A TO CONCLUDE THA

T ORV RSYSTEM S CONSTITUT E A

N UNREASONABL E SAFETY RISK . i t

SLID E 1 0P.4 1



# GA O "ACTION

PLAN "

OVERLOOKED :

D

# TESTINGNO T SUFFICIEN T

MANUFACTURER S CANNO T ACCEP T RECAL L CAMPAIGN S

SLID E 1 1P.4 2



# INHEREN T T O ORV

RCANISTE RDESIGN

NHTS A JULY , 199 1

"DURIN GTHE REFUELIN

GPROCESS , VAPO

RFLO W FOR M THE FUE L TAN KT O A N ORV RCANISTE

RFO RVAPO RSTORAG E CA

N B E 4 5 TO 6 5 GRAMS PE

RMINUTE . THI S I S MUC H GREATE RTHA N CURREN T EVAPORATIV

E FLO W RATES , WHIC H RARELYEXCEE D 6 T O 8 GRAM S PE

RMINUT E AN

D AR E GENERALLYLES S THA N 1 GRA M PE R MINUTE . SHOULD THI S VAPO RESCAPE , DU E T O A DESIG N O R MANUFACTURIN

GERROR , IMPROPERMAINTENANCE , OR TAMPERING , UNCONTROLLED VAPO RWOUL D FLO

W INT O TH E ENGIN E COMPARTMEN

T O RUNDERTH E VEHICL E AN D IGNITE , SHOULD A

N IGNITIO

N SOURC E B E PRESENT . THI S RESULT S IN A N INCREASED SAFETYRISK. "

SLID E 1 2P.4 3



# GA O "ACTION

PLAN "

DOE S NO T RECOGNIZ E COMPLEXIT Y O F THI S ISSU E

D

# NHTS A ANDEPA TES T ANNUALL Y
a INVOLVE S MAN

YVEHICL E SYSTEM S
a YEAR-TO-YEA

RCHANGE S
a INCOMPATIBL E WIT H NEW FUE L SYSTEM S

SLID E 1 3

# GA

O INCONSISTEN T WIT H NHTS A

D

# NO T BASE DO

N SAFET YDATA

D

# NO T WRITTE N

B YSAFET YENGINEER S RECOGNIZE D"ACTION

PLAN " WOUL D B E INAPPROPRIAT E I F ORV RUNSAF E
o ACKNOWLEDGE DEPA

CANNO T REQUIR E ORV RI F THE YINCREAS E SAFET Y RIS K GIVE N NHTS A FINDING , GA

O ANALYSI S OBSOLET E

SLIO E 1 4P.4 5


# G M CONCLUSION S

D

# HORV RSYSTEM S CLEARL YINCREAS E SAFET Y RIS K
a G M AGREE S WIT H TH E NHTS A

REPOR T THAT :

"THE INCREASED DESIG N COMPLEXITYOF 

### ORV

R SYSTEM S WIL L RESUL T I N A N INCREAS E I N

SAFET YRISK. "

"SINC E 

### ORV

R SYSTEM S INCREAS E SAFETYRIS KAN D STAG E 

### II DOE S NOT , I T SEEM S REASONABLE FO REP A T O CONCLUDE THA

T ORV R SYSTEM S CONSTITUT E A N UNREASONABLE SAFET YRISK. " 

# G M STRONGL YBELIEVE S ORV RSYSTE M NO T ACCEPTABL E
a ORV RSYSTEM S SHOUL DB E REJECTE DI N FAVORO F STAG E I I

SLID E 1 5

# COMMENT S ON "DEPARTMEN

T O F TRANSPORTATIO

N SAFET YSTUDY" 0


# "A N ASSESSMEN TO F TH E SAFET YO F ONBOAR D REFUELIN G VAPO R RECOVERYSYSTEMS " ENFORCEMEN T- NATIONA L HIGHWA YTRAFFI C SAFET YADMINISTRATION , JUL Y199 1

< D Federa l Register , Tuesday Septembe r 3,199 1

# INTRODUCTION

NHTSA' S Assessmen t i s wel l reasone d NHTSA' S Assessmen t i s base d partiall y o n origina l researc h an d ne

wdat a NHTSA' S Assessmen t i s wel l supporte d by dat a an d informatio n i n th e publi c recor d regardin g ORV R safet y

# CONCLUSIONS - ORVR SAFETY
ORV R system s are mor e complex an d require large r component s tha n d o evaporative emissio n system s ORV R syste m complexity an d componen t siz e woul d increas e th e risk o f moto r vehicl e collisio n fir e ORV R system s regularl y ar e require d t o handl e greate r inventorie s o f hazardou s materia l (gasolin e vapor) a t greate r flo wrate s tha n are evaporative emissio n system s Unschedule d releas e o f a gasolin e refuelin g vapo r charg e fro m a n ORV R syste m woul d increas e non-collisio n fir e ris k

# CONCLUSIONS - ORVR SAFETY ORV R collisio n an d non-collisio n fir e risks are incrementa l an d woul d hav

e a n advers e impac

t o n moto r vehicl e safety Stag e I I doe s not adversel y affect moto r vehicl e safety bu t doe s favorabl y impact ga s statio n safety As ORV R increase s ris k an d Stag e I I doe s not , i t i s reasonabl e tha t EP

A conclud e ORV R safety risk s ar e unreasonabl e

C O

# CONCLUSION

ORV R system s are more complex an d require large r component s tha n d o evaporative emissio n system s 

# BASIS NHTSA evaluation s o

f ORV R "Simpl e System " Manufacturers ' evaluatio n o f ORV R "Simpl e System " Manufacturers ' description s o f prototyp e ORV R system s

bt

# TYPICAL



# = omm SYsn

Filte rNec k

00159. x

# ONBOARD

REFUELING

VAPOR RECOVERY "SIMPLE

SYSTEM"

3/8 " dia . purg e lin e vapo r lin e

Purg e valv e Anti-spitbac k valv e Rollove r valve Carbo n caniste r

# NHTSA EVALUATIONS OF ORVR SYSTEMS

•198 7 Buic k

L e Sabre —"Simpl e System " + experience d refuelin g difficultie s + driveability afte r refuelin g unacceptabl e + liqui d fue l spi t bac k

a t nozzl e shutof

f + gasolin e odo r afte r ho t soak , an d durin g hig h temperature operatio n + driveability a

t moderate ambient s acceptabl e
•198 8 Ford Tauru s —EPA "Vehicl e Base d (i.e. , modified ) Simpl e System " + driveability a

t moderate ambient s acceptabl e

# MANUFACTURER'S EVALUATIONS

OF EPA "SIMPLE

SYSTEM'® EMISSION MA NUFA CTURER

CONTROL FILL

QUALITY SAFETY DRIVEABILITY Genera l Motor s Corp . Unacceptabl e Unacceptabl e tes t Unacceptabl e tes t Unacceptabl e tes t tes t result s result s results result s For d Moto r Co . Unacceptabl e Unacceptabl e tes t Unacceptabl e tes t Unacceptabl e tes t tes t result s result s results result s Toyot a Unacceptabl e Unacceptabl e Unacceptabl e Mitsubish i BM W Unacceptabl e Require s testin g Increase d ris k

Volv o Jagua r Advers e impac t o n exhaus t emission s Require s additiona l ne w technolog y Require s additiona l ne w technolog y Potentia l proble m Require s additiona l ne wtechnolog y Potentia l proble m
Require s additiona l ne wtechnolog y Require s additiona l ne wtechnolog y ( D SeeFaAA-PA-R-88-11-1 6

# MANUFACTURER'S DESCRIPTIONS

OF PROTOTYPE ORVR SYSTEMS

MANUFACTURER Genera l Motor

s Ford Moto r Co . Hond a Toyota Saa b Nissa n Chrysle r Subar u Mitsubish i LARGE OR MULTIPLE CARBON CANISTER Ye s Ye s Ye s Yes Yes Yes Yes Ye s Yes LIQ/VAP

SEPARATOR OR EQUIVALENT Ye s Ye s

— 

### Ye s

— 

### Ye s N o Ye s Yes LARGE

VAPOR LINES Ye s Ye s

— 

### Yes Yes Yes Yes

— 

### Yes ADDITIONAL

VENT VALVE • Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s

U l U l

# CONCLUSION

ORV R syste m complexit y an d componen t siz e woul d increas e collisio n fir e ris k 

# BASIS NHTS A caniste r ignitio n testin g Collisio n testin g wit h prototyp e ORV R system s Functional/Packag e requirement s whic h gover n ORV R componen t locatio n Previou s experienc e wit h a revolutionar y fue l syste m chang e whic h increase d syste m complexit y —197 1 evaporative system s

# SUMMARY—

NHTSA CANISTER

IGNITION

TESTING

GASOLINE VAPOR CHARGE

NUMBER

OF UNITS IN CANISTER

TESTED NUMBER OF GAS VAPOR FIRES FREQUENCY OF IGNITION 

## 100 % (saturated ) 

## 1 1 1 1 100 % 75 % —99 % 8 62 % 50 % —74 % 1 0 90 % 

## 0 —

## 49 % 0 % Data fro m "Fue l Vapo rCaniste rFir e Simulatio n Tests" , VRTC-71-0211 , July , 199 1
OI806. q

U l

# ORVR

COLLISION TESTING ®

STRIKIN G VEHICL E 197 8 Chevrole

tMallb u Impact Speed : 29. 4 mp h Tes tWeight : 386 6 l

b Impac t locatio n a t C o f fue l doo r

h=£Zz Fron t

Fron t ~f ~ Strikin g vehicl e 1 ft STRUC KVEHICL E 198 5 Buic

kCentur y wit h Mobi l Oi l ORV R Syste m Tes t Weight : 304 0 l b

—(^crashrai l


### Cras h Test Configuratio n 68.5 % <27,00 0 31.5 % >27,000 13.4 %

>SO,000

0.64 % Fir e Collision s
3.5 % >100,000 ,07 %

Fir e Collision s

1.75 % Fir e Collision s 

### 1982-1984 NAS S Energ y Absorbe d Durin g Impact (ft-lbs ) 

## Results : Fue l lea k

a t liquid-vapo r separato r an d vapo r deliver y tub e Conclusion : ORV R coul d resul t i n additiona l collision s wit h fir e

< D Se e FaAA-AZ-R-87-10- 6

U l o o

# ONBOARD

REFUELING

VAPOR RECOVERY

SYSTEM (SEALED

FILLER NECK) GENERAL

MOTORS

Larg e Caniste r Larg e

Vapo r Lin e Liquid/Vapo r Separato r Tan k Ven t Valve Assembl y (TVVA )

Mechanica l Sea l

# ONBOARD

REFUELING

VAPOR RECOVERY

SYSTEM (LIQUID SEAL) GENERALMOTORS

DETAI L B

DETAI L A

01B17. g

# ONBOARD

REFUELING

VAPOR RECOVERY

SYSTEM FORD Emergenc y

Relie f Valv e Vapor/Liqui d Discriminato r Ga s Nozzl e

Vapo r

T o Canister s Carryove r Evap . Syste m Nozzl e Sea l Tra p Doo r W/Sea l Vapor/Liqui d Discriminato r Ven t Tub e

DETAI L A

Modula r Carbo n Canister s

b >

# ONBOARD

REFUELING

VAPOR RECOVERY

SYSTEM NISSAN

Wate r Separator- . 

# ~ 5 Ai r
Refuelin g Canister— 1 

### •« —Contro l Uni t

Variabl e Orific e Contro l Rollove r Valve - i (wit h fue l chec k valve ) Ven t Cu t Valve 

# a
^Mechanica l Nozzl e Sea l

Ove r Fil l Limite r Vapor/Liqui d Separato r 01617. J

# ONBOARD

VAPOR RECOVERY

SYSTEM MITSUBISHI

Purg e Contro l Valv e Contro l Uni t Ven t Lin e Vapo r Liqui d Separato r n 

### Overfil l Limite r - i r-Vapo r

Lin e Purg e Lin e Rollove r Valv e Nozzl e Actuate d Ven t Valv

e

Wate r Separato r Fille r Ca p -Nozzl e Sea l

Fille r Pipe Fue l Tan k

-* L 

### Overfil l Limite r Valve

# ONBOARD

REFUELING

VAPOR RECOVERY

SYSTEM TOYOTA Purg e Contro l Valv e 

## TM \ 

### Refuelin g Caniste r 6-8 L 

### Engin e (



### f= z 

# (f JJ Vapo r Ven t Valv e W/Vapo r Liqui d Separato r Wate r Separato r

Liqui d Sea l

Evap . Caniste r 1 -1.8 L Valv e Overfil l Limite r

# EVAPORA TIVE

EMISSION

SYSTEM

RISK ANALYSIS NCSA - July 8, 1991 VEHICL E SELECTIO N Flee t wit h evaporativ e systems : 1971-197 3 passenge r car s Flee t withou t evaporativ e systems : 1968-197 0 passenge r car s DATA BAS E SELECTIO N Illinoi s 1982-198 3 Ohi o 1982-198 3 Michiga n 1980-198 2 Pennsylvani a 1977-198 0 METHO D Logisti c regressio n fo r acciden t outcome , evaporativ e emissio n system , vehicl e age , vehicl e mode l yea r weighte d fo r th e fou r states . RESULT S Evaporativ e emission-equippe d vehicle s experience d a collisio n fir e rat e 27 % greate r tha n vehicle s no t s o equipped .

# EVAPORATIVE

EMISSION

SYSTEM

RISK ANALYSIS FaAA 1988, 1989 ELEVE N STATE S COMBINE D ANALYSIS * 1975-198 6 FAR S

COLUSIO N FIRE S PE R 1,00 0 COLUSION S

1968-197 0 1971-197 3 M YM Y COLLISIO N FIRE S PE R 1,00 0 COLLISION S 26.3 1

1968-197 0 1971-197 3 M YM Y 

## Conclusions : 1 . Evaporativ

e emission s system s are associate d wit h a n increas e o

f 12 % i n al l collisio n fire s an d 18 % i n fata l collisio n fire s 2 . I f ORV R performanc e i s similar , we coul d experienc e 600-5,50 0 additiona l collisio n fire s an d 130-24 0 additiona l collisio n fir e fatalitie s '1975-8 2 Alabama , 1976-8 6 Idaho , 1981-8 6 Illinois , 1977-8 5 Maryland , 1981-S 5 Michigan , 1976-8 5 Ne wYork , 1982-8 5 Ohio , 1977-8 5 Pennsylvania , 1971-8 5 S
. Carolina , 1978-81 , '84 , '8 5 Texas , 1970-8 5 Washingto n

# CONCLUSION

ORV R system s regularl y are require d t o handl e greate r inventorie s o f hazardou s materia l (gasolin e vapors ) at greate r flo wrate s tha n are evaporative emissio n system s 

# BASIS
___ _

•NHTSA dat a fro m manufacturers
•Refuelin g tes t dat a

# NHTSA DATA FROM MANUFACTURERS
MANUFACTURE R EVAP . 9. 0 RV P @ 72°F-96° F DIURNA L SOA K 9. 0 RV P REFUELIN G
Nissa n Chrysle r Rate

0. 2 g/min. ® Total

2 1 g ® 5 1 g ® 12 0 g Rate

4 3 g/min. ® 4 6 g/min. ® 6 4 g/min. ® Total

54. 2 g® ® 58. 0 g® ® 236. 5 g® ® 

## For d 0.3-0. 6 g/min.® 35-5 0 g

® 18-5 6 g/min.®

72. 0 g @

® 

## Genera l Motor s 0.05 5 g/min.® 32. 9 g

® 4 5 g/min.® t o 0.11 7 g/min . t o 70. 3 g 67. 5 g ©(3 )

< D Tes t resul t @ Estimate d @ 1 5 gal
. fil l ® 1 0 gal
. fil l <S

) 33. 4 gal
. fil l ©

12. 5 gal
. fil l

01}16. .

# REFUELING

TEST DA TA PROCEDUR E
•Fil l tan k

wit h 1 4 gal . 8. 9 RV P gaso l delivere d at 8. 5 gal./min . (tan k initia l fil l = 1 gal. , 89° F fuel )
•Collect RESULTS

Tota l fue l vapo r Rat e in e dispense d a t 9 1 °F , vapors fro m disconnecte d tan k ven t

1985 Buick Century production

evaporative emission

system 0.7 3 g 0.0 5 g/ga l 1985 Buick Century with mechanical

seal 5/8" dia. refuel

vent 93.0 5 g 6.6 7 g/ga l !

01816. 1

# CONCLUSION

Unschedule d releas e o f a refuelin g gasolin e vapo r charg e fro m a n ORV R syste m woul d increas e non-collisio n fir e ris k 

# BASIS NHTSA refuelin g vapo r ignitio n testin g

FaA A refuelin g vapo r ignitio n testin g

^ 1

# NHTSA REFUELING VAPOR IGNITION

TESTING
EQUIPMEN T •Modifie d 13. 7 gal . Dodg e picku p fue l tan k •5/8 " an d 3/8 " refuelin g ven t •Close d syste m fil l at botto m of tan k •Spar k ignitio n at en d o

f refuelin g ven t •Fil l rat e 8 gal./min . RESULTS •Vapo r flo wrate = 4 9 g/min . •Expansiv

e flam e fron t 2- 3 fee t i n lengt h

# FaAA REFUELING VAPOR IGNITION

TESTING® PROCEDUR E •Driv e ca r t o stabilize d •Fil l tan k "warm "

•Replac e dispensin g nozzl e •Star t ca r RESULTS ORV R Self-sustainin g fir e o n engin e star

t
( D Se e FaA A AZ-R-87-10- 6 

# EVA P N o sel f fire temperatur e

-sustainin g

018I6. I

# CONCLUSION

ORV R collisio n an d non-collisio n fir e risk s ar e incrementa l an d woul d hav e a n advers e impac t o n moto r vehicl e safet y 

# BASIS Collisio n risk

s associate d wit h ORVR :

- Componen t siz e

- Additiona l syste m complexity

- Additiona l connection s

- Large r inventor

y o f hazardou s material s Non-collisio n risk

s are associate d wit h unschedule d discharg e o f a n ORV R vapo r clou d du e to :

- Imprope r assembl y o r manufacturin g

- Imprope r servic e

- Tamperin g an d deliberat e disconnect

- Componen t deterioratio n

- Componen t damag e

# CONCLUSION

Stag e I I doe s no

t adversel y affect moto r vehicl e safety an d reduce s th e frequency o

f ga s statio n gasolin e fir e 

# BASIS Stag e I I i s entirel y containe d a t fue l dispensin g station s Stud y o f Stag e I I safety effect s a t dispensin g station s

# MOTOR

VEHICLE

FLEET STAGE II

Fue l tan k Muffle r Engin e Evap . emiss contro l Catalyti c converte r Electroni c engin e contro l Pressur e sensitiv e cut-of f

Accordia n sea l (optional ) Undergroun d gasolin e storag e Vapo r recover y syste m wit h lin e t o undergroun d storag e

# STAGE

II SAFETY

EFFECTS? Gasolin e ga s statio n fir e rate s i n installation s

Fire Rate (Fire pe r 10 10 

# gal. ) Casualt y Rate (Casualtie s pe r 10 10 

# gal. ) Stage II (California) 84. 1

4. 0 Stag e I I an d non-Stag e I I

Non-Stage

II (18 Statef 169. 5

10. 3

<J > Alaska , Connecticut , Delaware , Hawaii , Illinois , Louisiana , Maryland , Massachusetts , Michigan , Montana , Nebraska , Ohio , Oregon , Rhod e Island , Sout h Dakota , Vermont , Wes t Virginia , Wisconsi n a Se e FaA

A AZ-R-87-tO- 6

01816.fT i

# SAFETY

EFFECTS

OF RVP CONTROLS 

# BACKGROUN

D Californi a limit s gasolin e RV P durin g th e 7 mont h summe rperiod
. Texas , a stat e wit h th e sam e AST M gasolin e clas s a s California , ha d n o RV P control s i n th e stud yperiod
. 1982-198 5 NFIR S RESULT S

California

Texas (Stage II) (Non-Stage

II) Summer Winter Summer

Winter Fir e Rate 0 

# B5J

76^ 0 167. 7 143. 0 Seasona l 62 % 38 % 63 % 37 % Distributio n Conclusion : RV P control s d o no t affec t ga s statio n gasolin e fir e rates . tfl ) Fire s pe r1 0 gallon s

# CONCLUSION

As ORV R increase s ris k an d Stag e I I doe s not , i t i s reasonabl e tha t EPA conclud e ORV R safety risk s are unreasonabl e 

# BASIS NHTSA ha s analyze d th e record , conducte d testin g an d conclude d ORV R woul d presen t incrementa l safety risks Stag e I I ha s n o incrementa l ris k fo r moto r vehicl e safety an d reduce s ga s statio n gasolin e fir e ris k Desire d VO C reduction s ca n b e achieve d by implementatio n o

f Stag e I I control s Thus , th e desire d VO C reduction s ca n b e achieve d wit h n o incrementa l ris k

t o moto r vehicl e safety Incrementa l ris k

t o moto r vehicl e safety i s unnecessary , therefore an y incrementa l ris k i s als o b

y definitio n unreasonabl e

o o

# ONBOARD

REFUELING

VAPOR RECOVERY SAFETY RESEARCH

PROJECTS Automobile Industry NHTSA OMS Manufacturers ' Comment s FaAA Studie s ORV R Fil l Test s ORV R Driveabilit y Test s ORV R Functio n Test s ORV R Cras h Test s ORV R Ignitio n Tes t Evap . Syste m an d Componen t Test s Caniste r Ignitio n Test s FAR S Ris k

Analysi s 1 1 State s Ris k

Analysi s NAS S Revie w Stag e I I Ris k

Analysi s ORV R Safet y Assessmen t

AD L Stud y ORV R Fil l Test s ORV R Driveabilit y Test s ORV R Ignitio n Test s Caniste r Ignitio n Test s

4 Stat e Ris k

Analysi s ORV R Safet y Report s

Batell e Stud y ORV R Fil l Test s ORV R Functio n Test s

FAR S Assessment * 3 State s Dat a Review *
Derivativ e o f Dat a Lin k Repor t

C O

# CONCLUSIONS

OMS REPORTED

AUGUST, 1988

•ORV R system s are simpl e an d are simila r t o evaporativ

e emissio n system s

•ORV R relate d fir e risk s ca n be overcom e b

y manufacturers s

•Stag e I I doe s no

t adversel y effect moto r vehicl e safet

y 

## NHTSA REPORTED JULY, 1991

•ORV R system s ar e mor e complex an d require large r components tha n d o evaporativ e emissio n system s
•ORV R syste m complexit y an d componen t size increas e collisio n fir e ris k •ORV R system s regularl y handl e greate r inventorie s o

f hazardou s materia l at greate r flowrate s tha n d o evaporative emissio n system s •Release o

f a gasolin e vapo r refuelin g charg e fro m a n ORV R syste m increase s non-collisio n fir e ris k •ORV R relate d fir e risk s ar e incrementa l an d wil l hav e a n advers e impac

t o n moto r vehicl e safet y •Stag e I I doe s no

t adversel y effec t moto r vehicl e safety an d improve s ga s statio n safety •A s ORV R increase s risk , an d Stag e I I doe s not , i t i s reasonabl e fo r EP

A t o fin d ORV R safet

y risk s unreasonabl e
OI806. d

XI c o

_oP.8 1



### R . L. Kirkpatric k

Testimon y fo r ORV R Septembe r 26
. 199 1 Hearin g Goo d afternoon
. I a m Richar d L
. Kirkpatrick
. I a m a Staf f Projec t Enginee ri n Vehicl e Developmen t at Genera l Motors
. I have 3 3 year s o f experience i n th e desig n an d testin g o

f automotive component s an d systems , an d since 197 9 have bee n primaril yinvolve d i n fue l system s development
. M ypurpos e toda

yi s t o offe rcomments o n th e prototyp e onboar d vapo rrecover

y desig n describe d i n a n earl y199 0 pape rb ythre e Exxo n Researc h an d Developmen t personnel
. Wit h m e t b respon d t o emissio n question s concernin g th e Exxo n pape ran d th e Exxo n desig n i s Kevi n Cullen , o f th e G M Vehicl e Emissio n Laborator

ya t th e Milford Provin g Grounds
. I n th e EP

Adocumen t of August 199 1 entitled , "Summar yo f Change d Circumstances " unde rth e headin g of "Technolog yImprovements " i t i s state d that eve n furthe rdesig n simplificatio n i s possible
. Th e onl ydocumente d desig n sinc e th e EP

A"simple " syste m desig n tha t I' m awar e of i s a Societ

yof Automotive Engineerin g pape r90015 5 b yExxo n entitled , "Improve d Desig n of Onboard Contro l o

f Refuelin g Emissions " publishe d ove ra yea ran d a hal f ago . Th e Exxo n pape ronl ydescribe s th e concept s of suc h a syste m an d doe s not provid e an ydetail s o

f ho wth e syste m wa s specificall ydesigne d o rth e ke y testin g parameter

s an d vehicl e condition s encountere d durin g th e authors ' experimenta l work
. Contrar yt o th e OM S conclusio n tha t it s previou s "simple " syste m me t th e propose d refuelin g standard an d performe d satisfactoril yi n in-us e testing , Genera l Motor

s testin g foun d th e "simple " syste m unacceptabl e fo rrefuelin g emissio n recovery , evaporative emissions , an d vehicl e safety , an d onl yfurthe r complexit ycoul d begi n t o addres s th e unacceptabl e aspects of th e system .P.8 2

Exxon' s so-calle d improved desig n purport s to no t only hav

e improved refuelin g emission s an d evaporativ e emissions , but , a

t th e sam e tim e addresse d th e safet y issues . Slid e 1 : Th e basi c premis e o

f th e Exxo n desig n i s tha t th e safet

y concern s presente d b y Onboard Refuelin g Vapo r Recover y (ORVR ) system s o n passenge r cars ca n be addresse d b

y locatin g th e vapo r storag e caniste r near , o r inside , th e fue l tank . That premise i s incorrect . Th e locatio n o f th e caniste r has neve r bee n th e primar y - o r eve n a dominan t - issu e regardin g ORV R safety . Th e 198 9 Arthu r D . Littl e study fo r NHTSA , fo r example , identified severa l safet y concern s mor

e seriou s tha n caniste r location , including : o Th e risk

o f combustibl e vapo r release s durin g refueling , du e t o tamperin g o r syste m malfunction ; o Increase d exhaust an d underbody temperature s du e t o highe r purg e requirements ; o Greate r ris k

o f post-cras h fires du e t o enlargemen t o f vapor-handlin g components ; and , o Poo r vehicl e performance durin g acceleratio n du e t o inadequate controlled caniste r purg e o r othe r onboard-relate d factors . Th e Jul y 199 1 NHTS A safet y evaluatio n prepare d b y th e NHTS A gave specia l emphasi s t o non-cras h failure modes . As th e repor t state d an d I quote : "ORV R system s wil l no t merel y b e a simpl e extensio n o f evaporativ

e system s where vehicl e operatio n an d safet y ar e concerned . Whil e th e tw o system s are structurall y similar , functiona l difference s exist . ORV R system s wil l hav e additiona l components , valves , mor

e canisters an d large r vapo r hoses compare d toP.8 3

evaporative systems . Th e increas e i n th e numbe r o f connection s an d numbe r o

f component

s an d valves , increase d canisters , an d th e presenc e o

f mor e an d large r hoses , wil l increas e th e likelihoo d o f syste m failure . Failur

e coul d b e du e t o design , manufacturing , o r assembl y errors , a s wel l a s damage , imprope r servicing , o r deliberat e disconnectio n throug h tampering... " "Durin g th e refuelin g process , vapo r flo wfro m th e fue l tan k

to th e ORV R caniste r ca n be 4 5 t o 6 5 gram s pe r minute . Thi s i s muc h highe r tha n evaporativ e flo wrates , whic h rarel y excee d 6 t o 8 gram s pe r minut

e an d are generall y les s tha n 1 gra m pe r minute . Shoul d thi s vapo r escape , du e t o a desig n o r manufacturin g error , imprope r maintenance o r tampering , uncontrolled vapo r woul d flo w into th e engin e compartmen t o r unde r th e vehicl e an d create a fire , shoul d a n ignitio n sourc e b e present. " 

### Slide 2 : Locatin g th e caniste r insid e o r nea r th e fue l tan k does no

t addres s thos e significan t concem s expresse d b y th e NHTS A o r b

y th e Arthu r D . Littl e Report . Indeed , i t ca n creat e additiona l problems . Havin g a caniste r insid e a fue l tan k subjects th e caniste r t o a ver y hostil e environment . Ther e i s a n increase d risk o f liqui d intrusio n into th e caniste r throug h permeatio n o r interna l leak s tha t woul d contaminate th e syste m an d rende r it inoperative . I n addition , an y liqui d leak s withi n th e hose connection s woul d caus e th e caniste r to b e continuousl y saturated , thu s makin g th e syste m inoperative . I n addition , th e sudde n rus h o f refuelin g vapors into a caniste r locate d insid e th e tan k durin g refuelin g wil l hea t th e canister . Consequently , th e fue l i n th e tan k wil l b e heate d du e t o th e increased caniste r temperature an d wil l increas e th eP.8 4

amoun t o

f vapors generate d withi n th e tank . Also , a caniste r insid e th e tan k displaces fue l volum e an d vapo r spac e whic h reduces drivin g rang e an d therefore wil l increas e th e numbe r o f refuelin g events . Equall y important , i n a crash , th e fue l tan k ca n b e mor

e vulnerabl e t o ruptur

e durin g a cras h du e to th e interactio n betwee n th e canister , it s attachments , an d th e fue l tan k

whethe r mounted insid e o r outsid e o f th e tank . A plasti c o r meta l caniste r ful l o

f charcoa l ca n presen t a significan t hazar d to a fue l tan k durin g th e unpredictabl e events o f a crash . Slid e 3 : Althoug h I hav

e no t examine d th e Exxo n hardware o r desig n firs t hand , ther e ar e a numbe r o

f fundamenta l problem s tha t ar e importan t to examine . First , it i s important to inquir

e abou t Exxon' s s o calle d "simulated " rollove r tests . Th e FMVS S 30 1 stati c rollove r evaluatio n i s intende d to chec k fo r fue l syste m leak

s du e t o a crash . Th e stati c rollove r tes t mus t follo wth e prescribed FMVS S 30 1 cras h test . Th e 199 0 Exxo n pape r states , however , tha t th e barrie r cras h portio n o

f th e test wa s no

t performed. " Consequently , th e "rollove r tests described i n th e pape r ar e trivial , an d provid e n o meaningfu l indicatio n o f th e crashworthiness o

f thes e reportedl y "improved designs. " I n addition , there apparentl y wa s n o extensiv e testin g t o evaluate : o Hot-weathe r fue l handlin g durin g vehicl e maneuverin g o n stee p grades ; o Fue l tan k

fil l qualit

y testin g unde r hot-weathe r conditions ; no r o Hot-weathe r cit

y traffi c operation . Th e eliminatio n o

f th e liquid-vapo r separato r make s thos e tests particularl y important . Th e conclusion s draw n b y Exxo n fro m its refuelin g test results ar e als o subjec

t t o question , give n th e real-worl d extreme s i n ambien t temperature sP.8 5

an d fil l rates , an d th e variation s i n nozzl e geometry , tha t were apparentl y no

t full y included i n Exxon' s evaluation . I t i s critica l tha

t EPA recogniz

e tha t unresolved functiona l issue s are , i n th e cas e o f ORVR , no

t jus t custome r satisfactio n issues fo r th e manufacturer s o r th e dealers ; the

y ar e potentia l cause s fo r vehicl e tamperin g tha t creat e bot h safet

y an d emission s problems . That i s on e reaso n wh y w e ar e s o concerne d abou t th e seriou s functiona l problem s presente d b y system s lik

e th e latest Exxo n design . Additiona l functiona l testin g .woul d no t mak e th e Exxo n syste m safe . Th e ke y point i s that appropriate functiona l testin g woul d hav e demonstrate d tha

t th e radica l simplification s i n th e ORV R desig n describe d i n th e 199 0 Exxo n pape r woul d no

t b e workable . B

y th e tim e th e functiona l problem s were addressed , th e syste m woul d ceas e t o b e eithe r "simple " i n its operatio n o r les s comple x i n its desig n tha n th e othe r type s o f system s th e NHTS A ha s alread y foun d t o increas e safet

y risks. Sinc e a detaile d descriptio n o f thi s specifi c desig n has neve r bee n disclosed , there are probabl y othe r problem s wit h th e Exxo n desig n tha t I hav e no t bee n abl e t o identify . Slid e 4 : Turnin g no

wt o th e emissio n test s reporte d fo r thi s system , mos t o f th e refuelin g an d evaporativ

e emissio n results reporte d i n th e pape r were fro m test s conducted usin g a n obsolete tes t procedure . Thi s fac t furthe r undercuts an y clai m tha

t th e Exxo n syste m i s a viabl e desig n fo r ORV R control . Th e point ca n b e illustrated b y examinin g th e runnin g loss test s reporte d i n th epaper . Th e runnin g los s tests reported i n th e pape r were conducted usin g 1 2 Rv p fue l a

t laborator

y ambien t temperature s betwee n 95 ° an d 105°F . I n ligh t o f th e existin g volatilit

y contro l regulations , thi s combinatio n o f fue l volatilit

y an d ambien t temperature i s inappropriate . Th e results presente d i n thi s pape r o f runnin g los s test s at 100° F o n 1 2 Rv p fue l obscur e th e fac

t tha t man y curren t productio n vehicle s perfor m quite wel l i n controllin g runnin g losses durin g realisti c condition s o

f 9 Rv p at 95°F , a s show n b y EPA' s runnin g loss testing . Th e authors acknowledg e i n th e pape r th e importance o f matchin g th e fue l tan k temperature s i n th e laborator y durin g runnin g loss test s t o those measure d o n th e road . Bu t th e fue l tan k temperature rise-over-ambient value s reported i n th e pape r an d use d b

y th e author

s durin g th e runnin g loss tests are unrealisticall y lo wcompare d t o thos e use d b y EPA i n thei r runnin g loss testing . EPA' s tan k temperature dat a were collected at simila r ambien t temperature s t o those use d durin g thei r runnin g loss tests : th e ambien t temperature s encountered b y th e authors durin g thei r on-the-roa d measurements o f fue l tan k

temperature s were no t reporte d i n th e paper . Considerin g th e unrealisti c combination s o f temperature an d fue l volatilit y used i n th e runnin g loss tests reported i n th e paper , th e authors ' conclusion s regardin g runnin g loss contro l o f th e ORV R syste m compared to curren t productio n vehicle s i s irrelevant . Havin g a lo

wpressur

e dro p desig n a s describe d i n th e pape r wil l actuall y contribut e t o increase d runnin g losses du e t o increase d vapo r generatio n unde r ho t urba n condition s becaus e unpressurized fue l boil s a t lowe r temperatures . I n addition , th e possibilit y o f fue l tan k

overfill s als o exists becaus e o f th e unrestricte d ven t orific

e an d th e bal l chec k

valve whic h create s a har d shutof f an d th e possibilit

y o f fue l spillage . Moreover , havin g a lo wpressur

e desig n wil lP.8 7

requir e a n enlarge d caniste r t o handl e th e increas e i n vapors . Th e large r th e caniste r th e les s efficien t th e evaporativ e emissio n contro l system . I n sum , th e Exxo n desig n does rio t resolv e th e mai n safety-relate d problem s wit h ORV R control s identified b y independen t researchers an d engineers . Moreover , th e emissio n testin g wor k describe d appear s to hav e followed obsolete o r unrepresentativ e procedures whic h she d littl e light o n th e real-worl d emission s o

f th e test vehicles .P.8 8


## Exxo n ORV R Desig n Premis e regardin g reductio n o f th e safety risk

s throug h "relocatio n o

f th e caniste r i s incorrect . NHTSA found : "ORV R system s wil l not merel yb e a simpl e extensio n of evaporativ e system s where vehicl e operatio n an d safet yar e concerned
. Whil e th e tw o system s ar e structurall ysimilar , functiona l difference s exist
. ORV R system s wil l have additiona l components , valves , more canisters an d large r vapo rhose s compare d t o evaporativ e systems . Th e increas e i n th e numbe rof connection s an d numbe rof component s an d valves , increase d canisters , an d th e presenc e o f mor

e an d large rhoses , wil l increas e th e likelihoo d of syste m failure
. Failure coul d b e du e t o design , manufacturing , o rassembl yerrors , a s wel l a s damage , imprope rservicing , o rdeliberat e disconnectio n throug h tampering... " "Durin g th e refuelin g process , vapo rflo wfro m th e fue l tan k t o th e ORV R caniste rca n b e 4 5 t o 6 5 gram s pe r minute
. ( 

## Thi s i s muc h highe rtha n evaporativ e flo w rates , whic h rarel yexcee d 6 t o 8 gram s pe rminut e an d ar e generall yles s tha n 1 gra m pe rminute
. Shoul d thi s vapo rescape , du e t o a desig n o r manufacturin g error , imprope rmaintenanc e o r tampering , uncontrolle d vapo rwoul d flo wint o th e engin e compartmen t o runde rth e vehicl e an d creat e a fire , shoul d a n ignitio n sourc e b e present. "

Slid e 1P.8 9



## Additiona l Problem s

o "In-tank " Design :

Liqui d intrusio n Cras h risk

s - tan k rupture Exother m durin g refuelin g
o "Near-tank " Design :

Caniste ras a hazard t o th e fue l tan k N o reductio n i n connection s that creat e cras h risks

Slid e 2

## Som e Unanswere d Question s abou t th e Exxo n Desig n

Slid e 3 

## o FMVS S 30 1 "simulated " rollove r test s

o Hot-weathe r functiona l evaluation s

o Steep-grade/extrem e maneuverin g

o Fil l rate/operator/nozzl e variation sP.9 1



## Emission s Test s

o Exxon' s Februar

y 199 0 Results : Unrealisti crunnin g los s test s Obsolet e evaporative emissio n tes t procedure s Reason s fo r Concern : Low-pressure dro p desig n i s inferio rfo rreal-tim e evaporative contro l Low-pressure desig n an d tank-integra l locatio n wil l require enlarge d caniste r Large rcanisters are muc h les s efficien t i n evaporative emissio n contro l

Slid e 4