Supreme Court 

No. 2021-276-Appeal. 

(PC 19-5924) 

 

Michael G. Meeks :

v. :

The Stop & Shop Supermarket 

Company, LLC, et al.

 : 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any 

typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 

 

March 23, 2023
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 Supreme Court 

No. 2021-276-Appeal. 

(PC 19-5924) 

Michael G. Meeks :

v. :

The Stop & Shop Supermarket 

Company, LLC, et al. 

: 

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. 

O P I N I O N 

Justice Robinson, for the Court. The plaintiff, Michael G. Meeks, appeals 

from an August 19, 2021 final judgment of the Superior Court, granting summary 

judgment in favor of the defendant, the Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, LLC 

(Stop & Shop).1 The plaintiff contends before this Court that the hearing justice 

erred: (1) in holding that no duty in tort existed as to Stop & Shop and in 

“disregarding” the affidavit of the plaintiff’s medical expert; and (2) in denying the 

plaintiff’s motion made pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

1

 We pause to note that the plaintiff’s complaint additionally named “John 

Does, Inc. 1-5” as defendants in this case. The record indicates that judgment was 

entered solely in favor of the defendant Stop & Shop, and “John Does, Inc. 1-5” 

are not named as parties on appeal. 
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This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the 

parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be 

summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions 

and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this 

case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set 

forth in this opinion, we affirm the Superior Court judgment. 

I 

Facts and Travel 

The following facts are gleaned from plaintiff’s complaint; Stop & Shop’s 

memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment; and from the 

exhibits attached to that memorandum. 

This case arises out of an incident in which plaintiff purchased fish at the 

Stop & Shop supermarket in Bristol, Rhode Island, and allegedly subsequently 

became ill due to the consumption of fish. On May 23, 2019, plaintiff filed a 

complaint in Providence County Superior Court alleging one count of negligence 

against Stop & Shop. 

In plaintiff’s complaint, he alleged that Stop & Shop had “a duty of care to 

process, prepare, cook, and sell food free from unreasonably dangerous defects.” 

The plaintiff asserted that Stop & Shop “manufactured, prepared and/or sold the 

food product which was defective and unsafe” and that said defect “made the food 
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product unreasonably dangerous.” The plaintiff further contended that Stop & 

Shop breached its alleged duty to him and caused him to incur damages. In due 

course, Stop & Shop filed an answer, denying that it owed plaintiff a duty and also 

denying that it had breached any duty, even if there were a duty. 

On July 29, 2020, plaintiff was deposed. During that deposition, plaintiff 

testified that, on June 7, 2016, he handed a Stop & Shop seafood clerk a piece of 

paper that constituted his fish order, which order called for packages of cod and 

tuna. He further testified that, after leaving the paper containing his fish order with 

the clerk, he continued doing his shopping and later returned to the seafood counter 

to pick up his order. The plaintiff stated that, when he initially handed the clerk 

the piece of paper, he noticed that the clerk was cutting salmon “on a cutting board 

with a knife” and that the clerk was wearing gloves. 

The plaintiff further testified that, upon returning home after shopping, he 

proceeded to prepare some of the fish that he had just purchased. He stated that, 

within twenty minutes of his starting to eat the fish, he began to have an allergic 

reaction, “beginning with [his] skin turning red, starting to heat up.” The plaintiff 

testified that he then called 911 “because [he] knew what was coming, which was 

the closing of [his] throat.” The plaintiff also testified that, before that event, he 

had a known allergy to salmon. Significantly, however, he added that he did not 

inform the employees at Stop & Shop that he was allergic to salmon. 
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As a result of his call to 911, plaintiff was taken to Rhode Island Hospital, 

where he was treated for what he characterized as an allergic reaction. Thereafter, 

plaintiff made an appointment with a doctor specializing in allergies, who 

conducted an allergy test. The plaintiff testified that the doctor informed him that 

he should “stay away from all fish, all shellfish, everything.” The plaintiff’s lab 

diagnostic report indicated that he had an allergy to cod at a moderate level. The 

lab report, which was contained within plaintiff’s medical records, stated that a 

moderate level allergy range is 0.70 to 3.49 and that plaintiff’s level was 0.96. 

On March 4, 2021, Stop & Shop proceeded to file a motion for summary 

judgment, asserting that summary judgment would be appropriate because there 

was no basis for a finding that it owed a duty to plaintiff, nor was there any 

admissible evidence that, if there were a duty owed, Stop & Shop had breached 

that duty. Stop & Shop further asserted that plaintiff had “knowingly and 

voluntarily assumed any and all risks.” 

On April 30, 2021, plaintiff filed an objection to Stop & Shop’s motion for 

summary judgment, although he did not file a memorandum in support of his 

objection. Several weeks later, on June 16, 2021, plaintiff moved pursuant to Rule 

56(f) to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment (which hearing 

was scheduled for June 23, 2021) because, plaintiff argued, Stop & Shop had not 

responded to his request for the production of documents, thereby causing him to 
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need additional time to conduct depositions and identify an expert.2 Stop & Shop 

subsequently filed (although not in a timely manner) an objection to plaintiff’s 

Rule 56(f) motion. 

A hearing on both the motion for summary judgment and the Rule 56(f) 

motion commenced on June 23, 2021. The hearing justice first denied plaintiff’s 

Rule 56(f) motion. He emphasized that the case was five years old, and he stated 

to plaintiff’s counsel: “[I]f you get involved in a case that’s four years old and then 

you wait nine months to file interrogatories, that’s not grounds for me to continue 

this to conduct discovery * * *.”3 After initial argument, the hearing justice 

continued the case so as to allow plaintiff the opportunity to identify an “expert 

opinion that [the] contamination was caused by salmon out of the gate to begin 

2

 A review of the record indicates that plaintiff had not served any requests for 

the production of documents on Stop & Shop as of the time of his filing the Rule 

56(f) motion. At the June 23, 2021 hearing, plaintiff represented to the hearing 

justice that he had propounded interrogatories approximately one month prior to 

the hearing. At the hearing, Stop & Shop confirmed that, as of that time, plaintiff 

had only propounded interrogatories, not a request for the production of 

documents. 

3

 The attorney who represented plaintiff in connection with the motion for 

summary judgment stated that he had assumed responsibility for the case (as a 

result of a referral from another attorney) approximately nine months before the 

hearing on the motion for summary judgment. 

Although the hearing justice stated that the instant case was five years old at 

the time of the hearing, the record indicates that the complaint was actually filed in 

May of 2019. However, this chronological inaccuracy is of no consequence to our 

analysis.
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with * * *.” The hearing justice stated that, without such an expert opinion, 

plaintiff would have “no case.” The hearing resumed on August 3, 2021, at which 

time the hearing justice opened the proceedings by noting that plaintiff had filed 

the expert affidavit of Marc Serota, M.D., although that affidavit had not been 

notarized.4 

The hearing justice rendered a bench decision on the motion for summary 

judgment that same day. He ultimately granted defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, reasoning that plaintiff had failed to point to any evidence regarding any 

state or federal regulations that might create a duty for Stop & Shop in these 

specific circumstances. The hearing justice further noted that, even if the court 

determined that a duty existed, plaintiff could not “get to the point of connecting * 

* * [p]laintiff’s allergic reaction to even the existence of salmon contamination.” 

He went on to find that there was no reliable and non-speculative evidence upon 

which a conclusion could be based that “the allergic reaction must have been 

caused by salmon contamination and not cod.” The hearing justice specifically 

rejected Dr. Serota’s affidavit, noting that the affidavit was “based on the beliefs of 

[plaintiff] and his reported history to the doctor,” and he noted that there was 

nothing “actually connecting a potential salmon contamination, if one existed, to 

4

 In the course of the August 3, 2021 hearing, plaintiff advised the hearing 

justice that a notarized affidavit had eventually been filed with the court. 
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this particular reaction.” He determined that, while there might be issues of fact in 

dispute, there were “no genuine issues of fact in dispute” due to the lack of 

evidence suggesting that cross-contamination had occurred. 

An order entered on August 19, 2021, granting Stop & Shop’s motion for 

summary judgment. On that same day, a separate judgment was entered in favor 

of Stop & Shop. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on August 6, 2021.5

II 

Standard of Review 

This Court has made clear that it “reviews the granting of summary 

judgment de novo and applies the same standards as the motion justice.” Belmore 

v. Petterutti, 253 A.3d 864, 867 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, 

Inc., 968 A.2d 271, 274 (R.I. 2009)). In addressing a motion for summary 

judgment, the evidence is to be examined “in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, and we will affirm the judgment if we conclude that there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630, 632 (R.I. 2009)). This 

Court has “emphasized that the ‘purpose of the summary judgment procedure is 

5

 The plaintiff’s notice of appeal was prematurely filed; however, this is of no 

consequence to the instant case. See, e.g., United Lending Corporation v. City of 

Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 631 n.9 (R.I. 2003) (noting that the defendant’s 

premature appeal would not be fatal and that this Court would “treat the appeal as 

if it had been timely filed after judgment was entered”). 
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issue finding, not issue determination.’” Id. (quoting Walsh v. Lend Lease (US) 

Construction, 155 A.3d 1201, 1205 (R.I. 2017)). In conducting our review, we 

bear in mind that “[s]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy that should be 

applied cautiously.” Sjogren v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance 

Company, 703 A.2d 608, 610 (R.I. 1997). The “party opposing summary 

judgment * * * ‘bears the burden of proving, by competent evidence, the existence 

of facts in dispute.’” Hall v. City of Newport, 138 A.3d 814, 818 (R.I. 2016) 

(quoting Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin, 46 A.3d 835, 838 (R.I. 2012)). 

III 

Analysis 

A 

Duty 

The plaintiff contends that Stop & Shop “created” its own argument to the 

effect that it owed no legal duty to plaintiff—which argument, plaintiff contends, 

“does not comport with reality as they are governed by the State of Rhode Island 

Department of Health, Department of Health and US Federal Code regarding the 

cross-contamination, and best practices of cutting fish for consumer purchase per 

[plaintiff’s] own testimony * * *.” The plaintiff maintains that there is a lack of 

evidence that Stop & Shop adhered to regulations concerning cross-contamination 
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and that there is evidence that Stop & Shop “did violate regulations, customs, and 

laws concerning food safety.” 

For its part, Stop & Shop argues that plaintiff produced no evidence that it 

“failed to adhere to regulations, customs, and laws concerning cross-contamination 

* * *.” Stop & Shop avers that there are no requirements—in either Rhode 

Island’s laws or regulations—“that a food worker wash or change out utensils 

before handling different types of fin-fish (of which both salmon and cod are 

categorized).” 

To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove “a legally 

cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate 

causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or 

damage.” Mills v. State Sales, Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Jenard 

v. Halpin, 567 A.2d 368, 370 (R.I. 1989)). While we have more than once 

“frowned upon the disposition of negligence claims by summary judgment,” we 

have also expressly stated that “the existence of a duty is nonetheless a question of 

law.” Wyso v. Full Moon Tide, LLC, 78 A.3d 747, 750 (R.I. 2013). Once a legal 

duty is established, a plaintiff is generally entitled to factual findings on the 

remaining elements of a negligence claim. See Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 

1252 (R.I. 2012). In conducting a duty analysis, “we examine all relevant factors, 

including the relationship of the parties, the scope and burden of the obligation to 
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be imposed upon the defendant, public policy considerations, and notions of 

fairness.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, if the hearing justice 

determines that no such duty exists, “the trier of fact has nothing to consider and a 

motion for summary judgment must be granted.” Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, 

Inc., 968 A.2d 271, 274 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 

A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987)). 

We are not persuaded that Stop & Shop owed plaintiff a duty under this 

particular set of facts. The plaintiff relies on the argument that Stop & Shop failed 

to adhere to regulations concerning cross-contamination in order to establish that 

Stop & Shop owed him a duty and subsequently breached that duty. However, 

plaintiff’s argument in this regard is fatally flawed because he did not submit to the 

Superior Court the purported laws and regulations to which he has alluded.6 The 

hearing justice, in determining that no duty existed, stated that “[t]he [p]laintiff has 

twice in argument argued that there are certain duties contained in either state or 

federal regulations which are not before the [c]ourt. I don’t see them here. I have 

not seen them in the record.” We similarly view plaintiff’s failure to provide this 

6

 On appeal, plaintiff makes reference to the fact that he was denied the ability 

to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of “the person most knowledgeable of [the] 

Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point Plan as required by the Rhode Island 

Department of Health.” The plaintiff argues that that plan would incorporate 

procedures “for washing cutting boards and knives after use with food,” pursuant 

to the “FDA Food Code.” However, the record is devoid of evidence that Stop & 

Shop had such a plan or what its contents might be. 
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Court with any legal authority as fatal. See McGarry v. Pielech, 108 A.3d 998, 

1005 (R.I. 2015) (“Even when a party has properly preserved its alleged error of 

law in the lower court, a failure to * * * develop it in its briefs constitutes a waiver 

of that issue on appeal and in proceedings on remand.”). 

Quite apart from that fatal shortcoming, we have grave difficulty 

ascertaining how the facts in the record could provide a basis for finding liability 

on the part of Stop & Shop. The record does not indicate that plaintiff ever 

disclosed to Stop & Shop that he had an allergy to salmon, and it is uncontested 

that he did not remain in the location where he handed his fish order to the clerk so 

as to be able to observe how his fish order was being prepared. There is no basis 

for us to rule that the alleged presence of an undisclosed allergy creates the 

existence of a duty on the part of Stop & Shop to a particular customer. For these 

reasons, we perceive no error in the hearing justice’s ruling as to duty. 

Having determined that plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a legal 

duty on the part of Stop & Shop (a sine qua non requirement in the law of 

negligence), we need not address plaintiff’s contention concerning the affidavit of 

Dr. Serota. See Grady v. Narragansett Electric Company, 962 A.2d 34, 42 n.4 (R.I. 

2009) (noting this Court’s “usual policy of not opining with respect to issues about 

which we need not opine”); see also Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc. v. Yurdin, 276 

A.3d 915, 933 n.15 (R.I. 2022). 
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B 

Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) Motion 

The plaintiff’s additional claim of error is that the hearing justice committed 

reversible error in denying his motion invoking Rule 56(f). The plaintiff asserts 

that, based upon his Rule 56(f) motion, Dr. Serota’s affidavit, and “counsel’s 

statements, as the [plaintiff] demonstrated through his expert’s opinion, and 

through the lack of any affidavit disputing the [plaintiff’s] assertions concerning 

the [defendant’s] duties, * * * [he] was entitled to his full responses to discovery 

and his [Rule] 30(b)(6) depositions of the [d]efendant concerning food safety.” 

Stop & Shop responds to plaintiff’s contention by pointing out that plaintiff failed 

to comply with the affidavit requirement of Rule 56(f). 

Rule 56(f) provides: 

“Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 

the motion [for summary judgment] that the party cannot 

for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 

justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the 

application for judgment or may order a continuance to 

permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 

or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 

just.” Super. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 

 

We have held that “a decision to grant or deny a continuance in accordance 

with Rule 56(f) * * * is discretionary in nature.” Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 

1215, 1219 (R.I. 2013). In Constantino v. Ford Motor Company, 178 A.3d 310 

(R.I. 2018) (mem.), the plaintiff argued that “the hearing justice should have 
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granted him a continuance so that he might have conducted additional discovery.” 

Constantino, 178 A.3d at 312 n.2. We noted that the plaintiff “neither moved for a 

continuance nor submitted an affidavit, as required by Rule 56(f), explaining why 

he was unable to present evidence supporting his opposition to” a motion for 

summary judgment. Id. We concluded in that case that the plaintiff’s argument 

regarding Rule 56(f) was not properly before the Court. Id. Similarly, in Berard, 

the plaintiff neither filed “an affidavit in opposition to the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment or an affidavit to substantiate the need for a continuance,” nor 

did she “present a memorandum in support of her objection to the defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment until the morning of the hearing.” Berard, 64 A.3d 

at 1220. 

We are of the opinion that the plaintiff’s argument pertaining to its Rule 

56(f) motion is unavailing. As in Berard, the plaintiff in the instant case did not 

file an affidavit explaining why he was unable to present evidence in opposition to 

Stop & Shop’s motion for summary judgment. (The plaintiff also did not file a 

memorandum in support of his objection to Stop & Shop’s motion for summary 

judgment.) As such, the plaintiff did not comply with the clear language of Rule 

56(f) in view of the fact that he failed to file an affidavit accompanying his Rule 

56(f) motion. See Holley, 968 A.2d at 276 (stating that “Rule 56(f) clearly 

mandates that the party opposing the motion for summary judgment file affidavits 
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stating why he or she cannot present facts in opposition to the motion”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). It is also important to note that the hearing justice, when 

the motion for summary judgment was first before him, actually did grant the 

plaintiff one continuance so that he might obtain an affidavit containing “an expert 

opinion that th[e] contamination was caused by salmon * * *.” 

For those reasons, it is our view that it was well within the hearing justice’s 

discretion to deny the plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) motion. 

IV 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the 

Superior Court. The record may be returned to that tribunal. 
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Michael G. Meeks v. The Stop & Shop Supermarket 

Company, LLC, et al.

Case Number No. 2021-276-Appeal.

(PC 19-5924)

Date Opinion Filed March 23, 2023

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard D. Raspallo

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Lawrence Almagno, Jr., Esq.

For Defendant:

Stephen P. Cooney, Esq.