AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed August 23, 2016.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-01180-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.A.A.

On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District Court

Rockwall County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 01-09-843

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Whitehill

Opinion by Justice Brown

Appellant Sherrie Rhodes, M.A.A.’s maternal grandmother, appeals an order denying her

motion to modify a final order in a suit affecting the parent child relationship (SAPCR). Rhodes, 

representing herself pro se, presents sixteen issues on appeal in which she generally complains

about four different orders: (1) the final order in the SAPCR suit; (2) the trial court’s order 

denying her motion to modify that order; (3) the trial court’s order denying her motion to enforce 

that order; and (4) a subsequent ruling on a recusal motion. For the following reasons, we 

affirm.

Background

In 2009, M.A.A. was born with Down Syndrome. Shortly after his birth, the Texas 

Department of Family and Protective Services (TDPS) filed a SAPCR seeking, among other 

things, emergency orders for the protection of M.A.A. and for the termination of Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights. TDPS’s petition was supported by an affidavit from a Child Protective 
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Services caseworker stating that after M.A.A. was born, he tested positive for cocaine and 

opiates and suffered from withdrawals. The affidavit further stated that Mother had admitted 

drug use during her pregnancy. Mother also told the CPS caseworker there were no family 

members who could care for M.A.A. and she refused to provide contact information because she 

did not want CPS contacting her family. The trial court entered temporary orders appointing 

TDPS temporary sole managing conservator of M.A.A., and he was placed in foster care. 

Shortly thereafter, M.A.A. was placed with appellees, Nancy and Andrew Aiken, his 

paternal grandparents. Rhodes subsequently filed a petition seeking grandparent visitation rights 

and requesting to be appointed a joint managing conservator along with the Aikens. Following a 

mediation requested by TDPS, TDPS, Rhodes, the Aikens, Mother and Father signed an 

agreement whereby the Aikens would be appointed joint managing conservators of M.A.A. and 

Rhodes would be granted visitation rights. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final order 

appointing the Aikens joint managing conservators of M.A.A. with the rights and duties 

specified in section 153.371 of the family code. The trial court also granted Rhodes visitation 

rights as set out in the mediated settlement agreement. Neither Rhodes, nor any other party 

appealed, and the order became final.

A few years later, after learning the Aikens intended to relocate to New Mexico, Rhodes 

filed a motion to modify requesting the trial court place a domicile restriction on the Aikens to 

prevent them from relocating to New Mexico. Rhodes also requested to be appointed a joint 

managing conservator of M.A.A.

Following a bench trial on Rhodes’s motion to modify, the trial court denied Rhodes’s

motion, but modified her visitation schedule to accommodate for the Aikens’ relocation. The 

trial court made findings of fact and conclusion of law. The findings of fact and conclusions of 

law reflect the trial court’s determinations that the final SAPCR order appointed the Aikens as 
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joint managing conservators and granted them the right to designate the primary residence 

without a geographic restriction. The Court also made findings that at the time of the final 

SAPCR order, all of the parties resided in Rockwall County, that Rhodes subsequently relocated 

to Mount Vernon, 80 miles away, in part due to the high cost of living in Rockwall, and that the 

Aikens decided to move to New Mexico because of the high cost of living and to be closer to one 

of their adult children. The trial court further found that the Aikens have been primarily 

responsible for caring for M.A.A.’s needs and that, although Rhodes had requested to be named 

a joint managing conservator, she did not request that M.A.A. reside with her. Additionally, the 

trial court found that although Rhodes had claimed she was denied visitation from time to time, 

she also did not always exercise the visitation she had been granted. The trial court also 

determined that Rhodes and the Aikens have experienced conflicts and arguments regarding 

M.A.A., and are unable to effectively communicate with each other about M.A.A. Finally, the 

court found that the adjusted visitation schedule granted to Rhodes equaled or exceeded the time 

granted in the prior order and that the travel time necessary for the Aikens and Rhodes to 

effectuate the visitation schedule was divided between the grandparents, with the Aikens being 

required to travel slightly further than Rhodes. The trial court acknowledged that Rhodes did not 

believe M.A.A. should have to travel in a car for long distances, but the Aikens presented 

testimony from M.A.A.’s special needs teacher that, with reasonable breaks during the trip, the 

travel time would not be a problem for M.A.A. 

Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that Rhodes had failed to meet her 

burden to show a geographic restriction should be placed upon the Rhodes, Rhodes failed to 

show she should be named a joint managing conservator of the child, and it was in M.A.A.’s best 

interest to continue to reside with the Aikens, as relocated. This appeal followed.
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Discussion

In her brief, Rhodes lists sixteen issues making various complaints about the original 

mediated settlement agreement, the final SAPCR order appointing the Aikens managing 

conservators, and the trial court’s subsequent orders denying her motion to modify and her 

motion to enforce the SAPCR. However, in the body of her brief, Rhodes does not separately 

argue the issues asserted. Instead, she raises various complaints under several subheadings that 

do not coincide with the sixteen issues she listed. 

Our appellate rules have specific requirements for briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38. 

These rules require an appellant to state concisely the complaint she may have, provide 

understandable, succinct, and clear argument for why her complaint has merit in fact and in law, 

and cite and apply law that is applicable to the complaint being made, along with record 

references that are appropriate. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f),(i). Only when we are provided with 

proper briefing may we discharge our responsibility to review the appeal and make a decision 

that disposes of the appeal one way or the other. We are not responsible for identifying possible 

trial court error. Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Nor are we responsible for searching the record for facts that may 

be favorable to a party’s position. Id. And, we are not responsible for doing the legal research 

that might support a party’s contentions. Id. Were we to do so, even for a pro se litigant 

untrained in law, we would be abandoning our role as judges and become an advocate for that 

party. Id.

To comply with rule 38.1(f), an appellant must articulate the issue we will be asked to 

decide. Id. at 896. If an appellant is unable to or does not articulate the question to be answered, 

then her brief fails at that point. Id. If the issue is identified, then rule 38.1(i) calls for the brief 
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to guide us through the appellant’s argument with clear and understandable statements of the 

contentions being made. Id.

We have carefully reviewed Rhodes brief in an effort to identify the issues fairly 

presented without abandoning our duty to act as judges, not advocates. Having done so, we 

conclude Rhodes’s complaints fall into four broad categories. First, she raises various 

complaints about the final SAPCR Order. Second, she raises various complaints regarding the 

trial court’s ruling on her motion to modify. Third, Rhodes complains the trial court erred in 

denying her motion to enforce. And finally, she complains about an order denying her postjudgment motion to recuse. To the extent she raises any additional complaints, we conclude they 

are inadequately briefed. 

Collateral Attack of Final Order

We first consider Rhodes’s challenges to the final SAPCR order. Rhodes acknowledges 

that the SAPCR order is a final order. She nevertheless raises several arguments seeking to set 

aside that order on the basis that it is void. To show the SAPCR order was void, Rhodes relies 

primarily on her complaint that it was based on an invalid mediated settlement agreement. 

Although not entirely clear, Rhodes also suggests the SAPCR order was void because it did not 

take into account M.A.A.’s special needs in violation of Rhodes’s rights.

Although a void judgment may be attacked at any time by direct or collateral attack, a 

judgment that is voidable is susceptible only to a direct attack and may not be challenged 

collaterally. See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005); Browning v. Placke, 

698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex.1985). A judgment is void when it is apparent that the court 

rendering a judgment “had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject 

matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.” Placke, 698 

S.W.2d at 363. Errors other than lack of jurisdiction may render a judgment erroneous or 
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voidable; however, such errors are subject only to a direct attack. Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 

137, 140 (Tex. 1987); In re X.B., 369 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.). 

Here, the final SAPCR order recites that Rhodes appeared in person and that, after 

examining the record and hearing the evidence and arguments, the trial court determined it had 

jurisdiction over the case and the parties and that no other court had continuing, exclusive 

jurisdiction of the case. Rhodes has not otherwise shown the trial court lacked jurisdiction over 

the parties or the subject matter. Rhodes’s complaints about the validity of the mediated 

settlement agreement would not render the final order void, only voidable. See In re J.W.L., 291 

S.W.3d 79, 83–84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). Thus, we

conclude her complaints regarding the final SAPCR order are not properly before this Court. 

Modification 

Rhodes next complains that the trial court erred in denying her motion to modify and in 

ordering an alternative modification that was unsupported by the pleadings. In her motion to 

modify, Rhodes sought to impose a residency restriction on M.A.A.’s managing conservators. 

The trial court denied her requested modification, but modified Rhodes’s visitation.

 A court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction may modify an order that provides for 

the conservatorship, support, or possession of and access to a child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 156.001 (West 2014). The court may modify such an order if doing so “would be in the best 

interest of the child” and upon a showing of a material and substantial change in circumstances. 

Id. § 156.101. Because the “trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interest of a 

minor child,” we review a modification order under an abuse of discretion standard. Gillespie v. 

Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); King v. Lyons, 457 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Tex. App—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
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According to Rhodes, the trial court erred because the SAPCR order did not give the 

Aikens the right to determine the primary residence of M.A.A. We disagree. The SAPCR order

appointed the Aikens joint managing conservators with all the rights and duties specified in 

section 153.371 of the family code. Section 153.371 of the family code provides, among other 

rights and duties, the “right to designate the primary residence of the child and to make decisions 

regarding the child’s education.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.371(10) (West Supp. 2015).

Rhodes also generally asserts the trial court erred by failing to modify the SAPCR order 

and impose a geographic restriction on the Aikens. According to Rhodes, the geographic 

restriction will make it impossible for her to see M.A.A. due to financial issues. Initially, we 

note she directs us to no evidence in the record to support her contention. We also note that 

when considering residency restrictions and authorization of relocation, we should consider that 

the public policy of this state is to (1) assure children will have frequent and continuing contact 

with parents who have shown an ability to act in the best interest of the child; (2) provide a safe, 

stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and (3) encourage parents to share in the rights 

and duties of raising their child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001 (West 2014).

Here, it is Rhodes seeking to impose a geographic restriction on the Aikens, M.A.A.’s 

caretakers. The Aikens agreed to take responsibility for M.A.A. and were appointed his joint 

managing conservators. At that time, they did not agree to a domicile restriction, nor did the trial 

court order one. Although Rhodes was permitted to have possession of M.A.A. one weekend a 

month, she did not always exercise the visitation. The Aikens subsequently decided to retire in 

New Mexico because the cost of living was less and to be near one of their grown children. 

At trial, Rhodes focused on the amount of driving she would have to do to exercise her 

visitation with M.A.A., and whether such a drive would be too long for M.A.A. Rhodes did not 
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otherwise present evidence that imposing a domicile restriction on the Aikens would be in 

M.A.A.’s best interest. Nevertheless, Rhodes makes various statements that are not supported by 

citations to evidence in the record and many of which are contradicted by the record. We 

conclude she has not shown imposing a domicile restriction on the Rhodes was in M.A.A.’s best 

interest. Further, to the extent she complains the trial court erred by making a “stand alone best 

interest finding,” we conclude her argument lacks merit. Rhodes requested a modification of the 

SAPCR order. To determine whether it was appropriate to do so, the trial court is required to 

make a best interest determination.

Rhodes also complains that the trial court modified the final SAPCR order without 

pleadings to support it. It is not clear whether Rhodes is again complaining the prior order did 

not give the Aikens the right to determine M.A.A.’s primary residence and thus permitting the 

Aikens to relocate constituted a modification or whether she is complaining that the trial court 

should not have modified her visitation to accommodate for the Aikens relocation. To the extent 

Rhodes is complaining the trial court erred by modifying her visitation without a specific request 

to do so, it is apparent that the trial court modified the order in response to Rhodes’s complaints 

about the amount of driving she would be required to do under the former schedule. Thus, to the 

extent any pleading was necessary in this case to support the trial court’s modification of 

Rhodes’s visitation, that issue was tried by consent. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 67 (when issues not 

raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of parties, they shall be treated in 

all respects as if they had been raised in pleadings); Case Corp. v. Hi–Class Bus. Sys. of Am., 

Inc., 184 S.W.3d 760, 771 (Tex. App—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (unpleaded issue is tried by 

consent when evidence on issue is developed under circumstances indicating both parties 

understood issue was in case, and other party failed to make an appropriate complaint).
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Having asked the trial court to modify the order due to the Aikens’ desire to relocate, we 

cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in failing to modify it in the manner Rhodes 

requested. Moreover, we note the trial court took into account Rhodes’s right to have access to 

M.A.A. and sought to fashion a schedule that would permit her to maintain a relationship with 

M.A.A. without the prohibiting the Aikens from relocating. Although Rhodes argues imposing a 

geographic restriction on the Aikens would be in M.A.A.’s best interest, her arguments are not 

supported by citations to evidence in the record and/or are contradicted by the record. Rhodes 

also fails to direct us to evidence in the record to show appointing her as joint managing 

conservator would be in M.A.A.’s best interest. Further, our review of the record shows that 

Rhodes and the Aikens could not effectively communicate and thus it would not be in M.A.A.’s 

best interest to require them make joint decisions for M.A.A. 

Enforcement

Rhodes next asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion to enforce the final 

SAPCR order. In her motion to enforce, Rhodes generally complained she was denied visitation 

with M.A.A. on two occasions. Other than that complaint, it is unclear what relief she sought. 

In any event, the trial court’s denial of a motion for enforcement is generally not reviewable by 

direct appeal. See Norman v. Norman, 692 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. 1985) (holding that the court of 

appeals did not have jurisdiction over an order refusing to find an obligor in contempt for child 

support arrearage); In re Murphy, No. 05-05-00038-CV, 2006 WL 40770, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Jan. 9, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (order refusing to hold an obligor in contempt 

not reviewable by direct appeal, money judgment for arrearages may be reviewed on direct 

appeal). Because Rhodes is not complaining about the trial court’s failure to enter a money 

judgment, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order denying her motion 

to enforce.
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Recusal

In Rhodes’s last category of complaints, Rhodes appears to be complaining about the 

hearing conducted on her post-judgment motion to recuse. The order about which Rhodes 

complains is unconnected to any final judgment or order in this case. Consequently, we lack 

jurisdiction to consider her complaints. See In the Interest of H.M.S., No. 05-10-01351-CV, 

2012 WL 2152331, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 14, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

141180F.P05

/Ada Brown/

ADA BROWN

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF M.A.A., A Child

No. 05-14-01180-CV 

On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District 

Court, Rockwall County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 01-09-843.

Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Justices 

Lang and Whitehill participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellees James Andrew and Nancy Aikens recover their costs of 

this appeal from appellant Sherry Rhodes.

Judgment entered this 23rd day of August, 2016.