J-S23016-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

SHARON GILBERT, EXECUTIVE FOR 

THE ESTATE OF GUY GILBERT AND 

SHARON GILBERT IN HER OWN 

RIGHT, HIS WIFE 

Appellant

v.

ADVANCE AUTO PARTS A/K/A 

ADVANCE STORES CO., INC., 

AUTOMOTIVE DISTRIBUTION 

NETWORK, LLC, AND FORD MOTOR 

COMPANY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3228 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2458 November Term, 2015

SHARON GILBERT, EXECUTIVE FOR 

THE ESTATE OF GUY GILBERT AND 

SHARON GILBERT IN HER OWN 

RIGHT, HIS WIFE 

Appellant

v.

ADVANCE AUTO PARTS A/K/A 

ADVANCE STORES CO., INC., 

AUTOMOTIVE DISTRIBUTION 

NETWORK, LLC, AND FORD MOTOR 

COMPANY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3231 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2458 November Term, 2015
J-S23016-18

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SHARON GILBERT, EXECUTIVE FOR 

THE ESTATE OF GUY GILBERT AND 

SHARON GILBERT IN HER OWN 

RIGHT, HIS WIFE 

Appellant

v.

ADVANCE AUTO PARTS A/K/A 

ADVANCE STORES CO., INC., 

AUTOMOTIVE DISTRIBUTION 

NETWORK, LLC, AND FORD MOTOR 

COMPANY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3233 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2458 November Term, 2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 23, 2018

Appellant Sharon Gilbert, as the executive of the estate of Guy Gilbert 

(Decedent) and in her own right as Decedent’s wife, appeals from the orders 

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees Advance Auto Parts, A/K/A 

Advance Stores Co., Inc. (Advance), Automotive Distribution Network, LLC 

(Automotive), and Ford Motor Company (Ford).1 Appellant claims that she 

adduced adequate evidence establishing that that Decedent was exposed to 

Appellees’ asbestos-containing products. We affirm.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This Court consolidated these appeals sua sponte on October 27, 2017. 
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We summarize the relevant allegations in Appellant’s second amended 

short-form complaint.2 Between 1975 and 1985, Decedent worked as an auto 

mechanic at Alray Tire (Alray) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During that time, 

Decedent worked on brakes and brake linings and was exposed to dust 

containing asbestos. On September 1, 2015, Decedent was diagnosed with 

mesothelioma.3 Decedent died on November 23, 2015.

Decedent was not deposed before his passing. During discovery, 

Appellant deposed E. Wayne Felgar and John L. Price, Decedent’s manager 

and coworker at Alray, respectively, and obtained expert reports. 

Appellees filed motions for summary judgment on June 20, 2017. 

Appellant filed responses, and Appellees filed replies. On August 29, 2017, 

the trial court entered the instant orders granting summary judgment in favor 

of Advance, Automotive, and Ford.4 Appellant subsequently settled the case 

as to all non-bankrupt parties without prejudice, and the case against the 

Manville Fund was dismissed without prejudice to reopening the matter in 

arbitration. See Trial Work Sheet, 9/7/17. 

____________________________________________

2 The parties utilized the pleadings and motions practices in the Philadelphia 

Court of Common Pleas for asbestos cases. Appellant filed her second 

amended complaint on September 28, 2016. 

 

3 “Mesothelioma is a malignancy involving the covering of the lung or the lining 

of the pleural and abdominal cavities; it is a rare disease associated with 

exposure to asbestos.” Linster v. Allied Signal, Inc. 21 A.3d 220 (Pa. 

Super. 2011). 

4 We discuss the details of Appellees’ motions for summary judgment, 

Appellant’s responses, Appellees’ replies, and the trial court’s ruling below. 
J-S23016-18

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Appellant timely appealed. The trial court did not require the submission 

of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but filed an opinion suggesting that 

Appellant failed to demonstrate exposure to any product sold, manufactured, 

or distributed by Appellees. 

Appellant presents the following question for review:

When the evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the 

[Appellant], does it appear more likely than not that [Decedent] 

was exposed to asbestos-containing Ford products, and asbestoscontaining products supplied by Advance . . . and Automotive . . . 

and then developed mesothelioma?

Appellant’s Brief at 1-2. 

Appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to review the record 

in a light most favorable to her as the non-moving party. Appellant notes:

Multiple people testified [Decedent] worked on Ford vehicles 

throughout his time at Alray Tire, and believed the brakes he 

changed contained asbestos. Multiple people testified asbestoscontaining products were purchased from stores owned by 

Advance Auto and Automotive Distribution Network. Ford and 

other defendants confirmed brakes on Ford vehicles contained 

asbestos. Multiple people have testified [Decedent] was a 

mechanic who did maintenance on a litany of vehicles including 

Fords. 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. As set forth in greater detail below, Appellant contends 

that the record contained genuine issues of fact that Appellees manufactured 

or supplied asbestos brakes to Alray, that Decedent was exposed to Appellees’

products, and that those exposures were frequent, regular, and proximate. 

The principles governing our review are well settled. 
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Our standard of review on an appeal from the grant of a motion 

for summary judgment is well-settled. A reviewing court may 

disturb the order of the trial court only where it is established that 

the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

with all questions of law, our review is plenary.

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary 

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the 

summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that 

where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment 

may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of 

proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or 

answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a nonmoving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential 

to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof establishes 

the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of 

law. Lastly, we will review the record in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the 

moving party.

Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 562-63 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some 

citations omitted). 

In an asbestos case,

plaintiff must establish that the injuries were caused by a product 

of the particular manufacturer or supplier. Additionally, in order 

for a plaintiff to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff 

must present evidence to show that he inhaled asbestos fibers 

shed by the specific manufacturer’s product. Therefore, a plaintiff 

must establish more than the presence of asbestos in the 

workplace; he must prove that he worked in the vicinity of the 

product’s use. Summary judgment is proper when the plaintiff has 

failed to establish that the defendants’ products were the cause of 

plaintiff's injury.

Id. at 563. 

Plaintiff bears the burden of identifying a defendant “as a manufacturer 

or seller of a particular offending product, before . . . injuries may be found to 
J-S23016-18

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be proximately caused by some negligence of [the defendant].” Cummins v. 

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963, 967 (Pa. 1985). The failure to 

identify the offending product is fatal to a plaintiff’s claim because without 

proper product identification, the plaintiff cannot show a defendant 

manufactured or sold the product. Id. at 969.

As to product identification, 

The testimony of a witness with knowledge relating to the 

plaintiff’s workplace exposure to an asbestos-containing product 

is admissible when probative. Even when the plaintiff is not able 

to identify specific products manufactured by particular 

defendants, the testimony of co-workers is admissible to establish 

that the plaintiff worked in close proximity to the asbestos 

products in question.

Wright v. Allied Signal, Inc., 963 A.2d 511, 515 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations 

omitted).

In Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. 1988), this Court

set forth a “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test for causation in asbestos 

cases. Id. at 192 (holding that fact that specific asbestos products were in 

the same facility did not show adequate exposure to those products). The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court instructs that the: 

frequency, regularity and proximity factors in asbestos litigation . 

. . are to be applied in an evaluative fashion as an aid in 

distinguishing cases in which the plaintiff can adduce evidence 

that there is a sufficiently significant likelihood that the 

defendant’s product caused his harm, from those in which such 

likelihood is absent on account of only casual or minimal exposure 

to the defendant’s product.
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Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts, Co., 943 A.2d 216, 225 (Pa. 2007). In cases 

involving mesothelioma, “the frequency and regularity prongs become less 

cumbersome” as that condition has the potential to develop after minor 

exposures to asbestos. Linster, 21 A.3d at 223.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that at summary 

judgment, it is appropriate for a court 

to make a reasoned assessment concerning whether, in light of 

the evidence concerning frequency, regularity, and proximity of a 

plaintiff’s/decedent’s asserted exposure, a jury would be entitled 

to make the necessary inference of a sufficient causal connection 

between the defendant’s product and the asserted injury.

Gregg, 943 A.2d at 227. The trial court thus bears a “duty to prevent 

questions from going to the jury which would require it to reach a verdict 

based on conjecture, surmise, guess or speculation.” Krauss 104 A.3d at 568 

(citation omitted).

Two cases inform the proper application of the frequency, regularity, 

and proximity factors: Gregg and Rost v. Ford Motor Co., 151 A.3d 1032 

(Pa. 2016). In the former case, this Court ultimately upheld the grant of 

summary judgment in favor of a parts supplier. In the latter case, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court refined the application of the frequency, 

regularity, and proximity factors with respect to causation and damages 

following trial.5 

____________________________________________

5 Although Rost involved issues that arose following trial, the decision 

highlights the proper application of frequency, regularity, and proximity 
J-S23016-18

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In Gregg, the plaintiff asserted that the decedent worked with brake 

linings and clutches on cars and trucks throughout his lifetime and died of 

pleural mesothelioma. Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts Co., 975 A.2d 1171, 1172 

(Pa. Super. 2009). The plaintiff, the decedent’s son, brought an action against 

the supplier of the parts. Id. In support, the plaintiff produced three 

depositions in support of the action against the supplier. 

First, the decedent’s daughter testified that the decedent sometimes 

worked on brakes and purchased products from the supplier’s store. Id. at 

1177. However, she was unaware of whether these products contained 

asbestos and could not recall the particular products purchased from the 

subject store or how many purchases were made. Id.

Second, the plaintiff was also deposed and testified that the decedent

worked on automobiles when plaintiff was young. Id. at 1177-78. The 

plaintiff was unsure whether the particular brakes used by the decedent 

contained asbestos and could not identify any particular manufacturer of the 

products used by the decedent. Id. at 1178. However, he later learned that 

all brakes in that period of time contained asbestos. Id. at 1178. The plaintiff 

was not able to recall what parts the decedent purchased from the subject 

store, but did recall that decedent also purchased brakes from a different 

store. Id. 

____________________________________________

factors, which may also be applied at the summary judgment stage of a 

proceeding. 
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Third, the decedent’s coworker testified that he helped the decedent 

install brakes, but could not recall how many times he did so or the parts used. 

Id. The coworker asserted he went to the subject store with the decedent to 

buy parts. Id. He assumed, but did not know for certain, that the brakes 

contained asbestos. Id.

The supplier filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the 

plaintiff could not establish any of those products contained asbestos. Id. at 

1172. The supplier asserted the plaintiff could only show that the decedent 

used brake products purchased from its store on two or three occasions. Id. 

The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the supplier 

based on insufficient product identification evidence, but later ruled that the 

plaintiff failed to establish the frequency, regularity, and proximity of the 

decedent’s exposure to the supplier’s products. Following a series of appeals 

that reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court remanded the plaintiff’s appeal from the grant of summary judgment 

against the plaintiff to this Court. 

Upon remand, this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Specifically, 

we reasoned: 

there is simply no evidence to support the conclusion that the 

decedent had more than de minimis contact with [the supplier’s]

products. The type of product bought and the type of product used 

by decedent that was purchased at [the supplier’s] store, was 

generally unknown. There is no evidence at all to support the 

conclusion that the decedent had definite contact with [the subject 

store’s] products, which contained asbestos.
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Id. at 1178.

In Rost, the plaintiff proceeded to trial against Ford. At trial, the plaintiff 

asserted that he worked at a garage for three to four months following his 

graduation from high school in 1950. Id. at 1037. He worked as a “gofer,” 

and he did basic car maintenance and was responsible for cleaning the garage. 

Id. He testified that he was exposed to asbestos, when he removed asbestos 

lining from brake shoes and threw them away, when other mechanics would 

use compressed air to blow out dirt and debris inside brake drums (blow outs), 

and when he cleaned dust and debris from “brake jobs, blow outs, and clutch 

and engine work.” Id. 

In Rost, the plaintiff presented evidence that eighty-five to ninety 

percent of the vehicles serviced at the garage were Ford vehicles. Id. Ford 

also stipulated that “all model year Ford vehicles, from 1945 until 1950, used 

asbestos brakes and asbestos clutches, and that Ford’s brakes and clutches 

were forty to sixty percent chrysotile asbestos by weight.” Id.

After working at the garage for three to four months, Appellant had 

several jobs. In at least one of those jobs, the plaintiff was exposed to 

asbestos “at pretty high levels” when working in proximity to turbines at 

Metropolitan Edison between 1960 and 1970. Id. at 1038. By 1972, however, 

the plaintiff began wearing a mask in the areas with high levels of asbestos. 

Id. 

The plaintiff in Rost presented expert evidence regarding the amount 

of asbestos fibers he would have been exposed to at the garage. Id. at 1040. 
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The plaintiff’s causation expert also opined that the exposure to asbestos at 

the garage significantly contributed to the development of the plaintiff’s 

mesothelioma. Id. 

The jury in Rost found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded a total of 

$994,800 in damages. Id. at 1041. The jury also found that the plaintiff’s 

exposure to asbestos products from three companies during the plaintiff’s 

tenure at Metropolitan Edison was a substantial cause of the plaintiff’s 

mesothelioma. Id. The trial court thus molded the verdict and awarded 

damages against Ford in the amount of $248,700. Id. 

Ford appealed, and this Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court granted allowance of appeal, in part, to illuminate further “the proper 

application of the ‘frequency, regularity, and proximity’ criteria in asbestos 

product liability litigation.” Id. at 633. 

The Rost Court reiterated two basic precepts: 

First, expert testimony based upon the notion that “each and 

every breath” of asbestos is substantially causative of 

mesothelioma will not suffice to create a jury question on the issue 

of substantial factor causation. Second, to create a jury question, 

a plaintiff must adduce evidence that exposure to defendant’s 

asbestos-containing product was sufficiently “frequent, regular, 

and proximate” to support a jury’s finding that defendant’s 

product was substantially causative of the disease.

Id. at 646 (footnote omitted). 

The Rost Court rejected Ford’s argument that the plaintiff prevailed 

based on “each and every breath” evidence. Upon a detailed review of the 

record, the Court the plaintiff’s expert testified regarding the effect of asbestos 
J-S23016-18

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exposure and offered a proper opinion that the plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos 

at the garage was a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s development of 

mesothelioma. 

The Rost Court further rejected Ford’s argument that the plaintiff failed 

to establish that his exposure to asbestos at the garage was a substantial 

causative factor compared his exposure to asbestos at Metropolitan Edison. 

The Court emphasized that “evidence of ‘frequent, regular, and proximate’ 

exposures to the defendant’s product creates a question of fact for the jury to 

decide.” Id. at 1050 (citing Gregg, 943 A.2d at 226-27). Thus, a plaintiff 

need not “exclude every other possible cause for his or her injury[.]” Id. at 

1051. 

Mindful of the foregoing principles, and before addressing Appellant’s 

specific claims, we summarize the undisputed portions of the record. Here, 

the record established that Appellant was exposed to dust containing asbestos 

at Alray Tire.6 Felgar and Price both testified that they believed the brakes 

they used contained asbestos. They indicated asbestos brakes were the best 

products at the time, and that all brakes would have contained asbestos at 

the time Decedent worked at Alray. Felgar identified Raybestos as one brand 

of brakes used at Alray, and Price identified Raybestos and Bendix as the two 

brands of brakes he remembered most. Price testified that Decedent would 

____________________________________________

6 The description of brake replacements proffered by Appellant was 

substantially similar to that in Rost. 
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have used the same brands. Price recalled that the packaging material for 

one brand of brakes indicated that it contained asbestos. 

Further, based on the record, it can be inferred that Appellant’s 

responsibilities as a mechanic required closer contact with asbestos products 

than those of the plaintiff in Rost. We also acknowledge that Decedent

worked at Alray for approximately ten years versus the Rost plaintiff’s career 

of several months as a “gofer.” 

As to Advance and Automotive, Felgar described Alray’s parts suppliers 

in the following exchange in his deposition:

Q . . . Did you order straight from the parts company? 

A From the parts store, the local parts store. 

Q Do you recall any of parts stores you ordered from at Alright 

[sic] Tire? 

A Auto Parts Plus was very close on Rodi Road. They became 

Auto Parts Plus part way through, because they were bought out 

by somebody else. What they were before that, I can’t tell you. 

Beacon Auto Parts and Advanced Auto Parts, also.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: What was that last one? 

[Felgar] Advanced. 

[Appellant’s counsel]: Advanced. 

[Appellant’s counsel] Can you provide any address for Beacon 

Auto Parts or just a city or street? 

[Felgar] Beacon was on Frankstown Road. I don’t remember 

the street address. Parts Plus was on Rodi Road. Like I said, it was 

two blocks or a half a mile from the Duff Road intersection. So we 

got most of our parts there, because of the location being close to 

us. 

Q Would the mechanics also order from these place? 
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A Yes, depending if they had the brakes that we needed or 

something specific or the price was a possibility.

R.R. at 517a.7 

As to Ford, Felgar testified that he also ordered parts from dealerships, 

including a “Ford Dealer in Monroeville” and “Biondi Lincoln Mercury/Ford 

dealer.” Id. at 445a. Additionally, Felgar testified that Alray predominantly 

serviced Chevrolets and Fords. Id. at 452. 

Price confirmed that Alray would obtain parts from the “Auto Parts Plus” 

and “Beacon Auto Parts.” Price also testified that he and Felgar worked mainly 

on Chevrolets, Fords, and Dodges.

Advance’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Advance, in its motion for summary judgment, noted that Felgar

testified that he ordered parts from three stores, including “Advanced Auto 

Parts.” R.R. at 300a-301a. Advance did not dispute that there was a 

corporate connection between Advance and the “Advanced Auto Parts” store 

referred to by Felgar. See id at 301a. However, Advance argued that Felgar’s

testimony on cross-examination revealed that he could not state with certainty 

whether he purchased parts from the “Advanced Auto Parts” store. Id. 

Specifically, Advance cited to the following portion of Felgar’s 

deposition:

____________________________________________

7 We cite to the reproduced record in this appeal for the convenience of the 

parties. We note that Appellant has not provided full transcripts of the 

depositions of Felgar and Price, and that our review is limited to the excerpts 

provided by the parties in their motions and responses. 
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[Advance’s counsel] So I want to ask you some questions 

about [the “Advanced Auto Parts” store Felgar identified during 

direct examination]. Do you know what their address was? 

[Felgar] I’m not sure. I did remember that. Beacon, I 

mentioned, was taken over by Car Quest. So it was part Beacon 

and part Car Quest during the time period. It was the one that 

was up on Frankstown Avenue. 

Q Do you know when they were taken over? 

A During the period I worked there. I can’t say for sure. 

Q When you were being asked questions earlier, you said you 

thought Advanced Auto. Do you know if Alright [sic] purchased 

from Advanced?

A To say with exact surety, I really don’t. You have to 

remember this is back 30, 40 years ago. I was trying to recall that.

Q Would I be correct in saying then that you cannot offer any 

testimony that [Decedent] would have installed or removed 

brakes that were supplied by Advanced Auto? 

A I think I bought from Advanced, but can I swear to it after 

40 years? Could you? I can’t. 

Q No, I understand. Would it be fair to say that you don’t know 

the supplier of any of the brakes that were removed at Alray? 

[Appellant’s counsel]: Objection.

Q That [Decedent] removed? Excuse me. 

A No, there’s no way of knowing when you take them off, 

unless you had remembered putting them on. 

Q And same would be true for the brand? You wouldn’t know 

what brand was being removed?

[Appellant’s counsel]: Objection. 

A No, there’s nothing on the pad of the shoe that tells you 

what brand they are. 
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R.R. at 345a-46a. Advance thus argued that there was “no evidence that 

[Decedent] removed or installed a brake supplied by Advance during his 

employment at Alray.” Id. at 301a (Advance’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5). 

In response, Appellant emphasized that Felgar testified that he ordered 

from the “Advanced Auto Parts” store. Appellant further alleged that “Beacon 

Auto Parts” was affiliated with Advance based on Felgar’s testimony that 

“Beacon Auto Parts” turned into “Car Quest.” R.R. at 506a. According to 

Appellant, “[a] cursory internet search” indicated that “Advanced Auto Parts” 

and “Carquest” were part of the same company headquartered in Roanoke, 

Virginia. Id.

Advance replied, denying any corporate connection between the 

“Beacon Auto Parts” store. 

[Appellant’s] counsel makes a last-ditch effort to hold Advance in 

this claim by claiming that they are the same company as 

Carquest and that Beacon Auto Parts, another auto parts store Mr. 

Felgar made purchases from for Alray, is affiliated with Carquest 

based on an assumption by Mr. Felgar. However, as the attached 

documents show, Beacon Auto Parts is not affiliated with Carquest 

and/or Advance.[8]

Beacon Auto Parts still exists today and it has been confirmed that 

they had a location on Frankstown Road as testified to by Mr. 

Felgar. However, Beacon Auto Parts is affiliated with the 

Aftermarket Auto Parts Alliance a/k/a Auto Value. Auto Value is 

comprised of over 50 independent shareholders. As indicated by 

the Shareholders list attached to this Reply, neither Advance nor 

____________________________________________

8 Advance attached to its reply an internet “yellow pages” that listed a “Beacon 

Auto Parts” store on Frankstown Road, as well as internet pages bearing an 

Auto Value emblem and apparently displaying (1) an image of a Beacon Auto 

Part/Auto Value store in North Carolina and (2) a list of shareholders in Auto 

Value, which did not include Advance. R.R. at 583a-606a.
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Carquest are shareholders in Auto Value. In fact, Auto Value is a 

competitor of Advance. Therefore, Carquest has no liability for 

any purchases allegedly made at Beacon Auto Parts. Additionally, 

even if the Court is to find that Advance has liability for Beacon 

Auto Parts, there is no evidence that [Decedent] installed a brake 

purchased from Beacon Auto Parts. Mr. Felgar was never asked 

which specific auto parts he purchased from Beacon.

R.R. at 579a. Appellant did not file a sur-reply to Advance’s reply or otherwise 

move to strike the attached documents. 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Advance, 

concluding that

Appellant has not produced sufficient evidence [Decedent] was 

exposed to asbestos from auto parts supplied or distributed by 

[Advance]. To the contrary, [Decedent’s] former manager, [E.] 

Wayne Felgar, only gave general deposition testimony that 

[Advance] was one of the parts stores from whom Alray Tires 

purchased auto parts. In fact, Mr. Felgar testified he could not 

specifically recall anything that might have been purchased from 

[Advance] during the time Mr. Felgar worked for Alray Tires. 

Moreover, [Decedent]’s former coworker, John Price, made no 

reference to [Advance] in his deposition testimony.

Trial Ct. Op., 12/1/17, at 24.

Appellant asserts that (1) Advance is a supply company that distributed 

asbestos-containing brakes; (2) Felgar testified he purchased brakes from 

“Carquest and Advanced Auto[;]” and (3) Felgar believed those brakes 

contained asbestos. Appellant’s Brief at 24. Thus, Appellant contends the 

record, when read in a light most favorable to her as the non-moving party, 

established Decedent’s exposure to asbestos-containing brake from Advance. 

Id. 
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Following our review, we discern no basis to disturb the trial court’s 

ruling as to Advance. There was no direct testimony that Appellant was 

exposed to an asbestos part supplied by either the “Advanced Auto Parts” 

store or the “Beacon Auto Parts.” Appellant relied on general assertions that 

Alray would have obtained parts from “Advanced Auto Parts” store or the 

“Beacon Auto Parts” and that the brakes purchased would have contained 

asbestos. This evidence provided no reasoned basis to determine the 

frequency of Appellant’s exposure to asbestos-containing parts supplied 

specifically by Advance. Thus, even assuming some products from Advance 

contained asbestos, a finder of fact would have no basis to assess whether the 

exposure to Advance’s products was substantial or de minimis. Cf. Gregg, 

975 A.2d at 1178. Thus, Appellant’s evidence that Decedent’s exposure to 

Advance’s asbestos-containing products was too speculative to survive 

summary judgment. See Krauss 104 A.3d at 568.

Automotive

Automotive, in its motion for summary judgment, averred that the 

record contained no evidence that Decedent was exposed to any product that 

it manufactured or distributed. R.R. at 210a. 

Appellant responded that Felgar testified that he usually purchased parts 

from “Auto Parts Plus,” which “was very close [to Alray] on Rodi Road.” See 

R.R. at 383a, 395a. Appellant asserted that

According to [Automotive]’s website, “The AUTOMOTIVE 

DISTRIBUTION NETWORK is the umbrella organization for three 

of the premier groups in the automotive aftermarket: Parts Plus, 
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Independent Auto Parts of America, and Auto Pride. . . .” Parts 

Plus, identified by Mr. Felgar is under the umbrella of 

[Automotive]. Asbestos-containing products including brakes 

were bought by Mr. Felgar from Parts Plus and installed by 

[Decedent]. When all the evidence is taken into consideration 

[Automotive]’s summary judgement motion must be denied.

R.R. 383a-384a (emphasis added). 

In its reply, Automotive further denied any association to the “Auto Parts 

Plus” store referred to by Felgar. R.R. at 543a. According to Automotive:

No documentary evidence is produced that demonstrates that a 

local parts store called Auto Parts Plus is the same as or is affiliated 

with Parts Plus. This is just [Appellant]’s counsel’s incorrect 

presumption that because the two entities have similar names 

that they must be the same. That presumption, as noted, is not 

supported by any testimony or document that describes Auto 

Parts Plus as part of Parts Plus. 

Attached hereto as Exhibit “A” is the affidavit of Robert Johnson, 

Vice President and General Counsel of Automotive Distribution 

Network, LLC. As noted by Mr. Johnson, Automotive Distribution 

Network, LLC was not created until 2005, thirty years after it is 

alleged [Decedent]’s employer began to buy automotive parts 

from local parts stores. Moreover, Automotive Distribution 

Network, LLC does not purchase, possess, or sell automotive 

products and only acts to negotiate purchase terms for the owners 

of the network. As a result, Automotive Distribution Network, LLC 

was not in existence at the time of [Decedent]’s alleged exposure 

to asbestos-containing products and it could not have been in the 

position to sell products to [Decedent]’s employer.[fn1]

[fn1] Defendant Automotive Distribution Network, LLC did not 

produce the affidavit of Mr. Johnson in support of its motion 

for summary judgment because there was no allegation in 

the complaint that Auto Parts Plus was the same as Parts 

Plus or that it was in any way affiliated with Automotive 

Distribution Network, LLC. It is only because the unfounded 

and conflated statements of [Appellant]’s counsel regarding 

an alleged connection that Automotive Distribution Network, 

LLC finds it necessary to produce the affidavit now.
J-S23016-18

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R.R. at 543. Appellant did not file a sur-reply to Advance’s reply or otherwise 

move to strike the attached documents. 

The trial court concluded: 

With regard to Appellee Automotive Distribution Network, LLC, 

Appellant has produced no evidence [Decedent] was exposed to 

asbestos from auto parts supplied or distributed by Automotive 

Distribution Network, LLC. To the contrary, the only two exhibits 

attached to Appellant’s Answer to Appellee Automotive 

Distribution Network, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment are the 

deposition transcripts of [E.] Wayne Felgar and John Price, and 

neither witness mentions Automotive Distribution Network, LLC 

anywhere in those transcripts.

Trial Ct. Op. at 25.

Appellant asserts that (1) Automotive “admits it is also known as Auto 

Parts Plus[,]” a supply company that distributed asbestos-containing brakes; 

(2) Felgar testified he purchased brakes from “Autoparts Plus[;]” and (3) 

Felgar believed those brakes contained asbestos. Appellant’s Brief at 25. 

Thus, Appellant contends the record, when read in a light most favorable to 

her as the non-moving party, established Decedent’s exposure to asbestoscontaining brakes from Automotive. Id.

We agree with the trial court that Appellant failed to establish a genuine 

issue of fact that Automotive supplied asbestos-containing products to Alray. 

There was no direct evidence that Automotive was affiliated with or a 

successor in interest to the “Auto Parts Plus” store on Rodi Road. Appellant’s 

further attempt to establish that Automotive was affiliated with the “Auto Parts 

Plus” store by way of a “cursory internet search” would provide no basis to 
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draw a reasonable inference that Automotive supplied parts to Alray during 

Decedent’s tenure. See Cummins, 495 A.2d at 967. Thus, we conclude that

trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Automotive was proper. 

See Krauss, 104 A.3d 556, 562-63

Ford

Ford, in its motion for summary judgment, asserted: 

[fn1] Ford is only liable for original equipment (OE) brakes 

either removed from or installed on Ford vehicles. Ford OE 

replacement brakes are purchased from a Ford dealership 

and are not available at aftermarket stores. Aftermarket 

brakes, sold under various brand names, are generally sold 

at auto supply stores and can be purchased as replacement 

brakes for Ford and other manufacturers’ vehicles. Installing 

and/or removing aftermarket brakes from a Ford vehicle 

does not result in any exposure to Ford OE brakes or any 

exposure attributable to Ford.

Ford is not liable for any alleged exposures that may have 

occurred from products it did not manufacture, i.e., aftermarket 

replacement brakes installed on Ford vehicles.[fn2] Since 

[Appellant] has not produced any evidence that [Decedent] was 

ever exposed to Ford original equipment brakes [Appellant]’s 

evidence of record fails to meet the “frequency, regularity, and 

proximity” standard for defeating summary judgment . . . .

[fn2] Ford is not liable for other manufacturers’ products, such 

as aftermarket brakes or clutches, that are used on a Ford 

vehicle. 

R.R. at 225a-26a (citations omitted). 

Additionally, Ford asserted that the record established that Appellant 

could not establish that his exposure to parts obtained from its dealerships 

was frequent and regular. R.R. at 227a. In support, Ford cited the following 

portions of Felgar’s deposition testimony on cross-examination 
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[Felgar] Like I said we normally only bought brakes from the 

dealer if the customer specified they wanted them from the dealer, 

which wasn’t very often or nonexisting, or someone else didn’t 

have a supply of them, then we’d go there to get them, but that 

was true with everything else, also.

Q But you have no specific recollection of purchasing a 

replacement brake from a Ford dealer?

A No.

R.R. 242a-43a.

Ford also noted the following exchange during Price’s deposition:

Q How about for the dealership, [were parts] delivered or did 

somebody go out and get them?

[Price] That was fifty/fifty, every once and a while we’d go 

out and get them. Sometimes they would deliver them to us. I 

mean, we didn’t have to buy parts at a dealership that often, 

because the parts stores normally had them.

Q Now, do you recall any specific dealerships that Alray 

ordered parts from?

A No. Not -- not specific names of them . . . .

R.R. 250a-51a.

Appellant responded to Ford’s motion for summary judgment as follows:

Mr. Price and Mr. Felgar testified [Decedent] did brake changes on 

Ford vehicles. Mr. Felgar testified he purchased automotive parts 

from Ford dealerships. Mr. Price testified Mr. Gilbert installed 

asbestos-containing brakes on multiple vehicles, including Ford, 

and scuffed up the brake pads prior to install. Mr. Price testified 

there was dust throughout the shop and Mr. Gilbert did not wear 

a mask. 

In discovery responses, . . . Ford admits that it sold vehicles and 

aftermarket service parts which included asbestos-containing 

brake linings. . .. Ford further admits that these linings contained 

chrysotile asbestos between 40% and 60% by weight and that
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they continued to use asbestos in brake linings until 1997.[9] When 

all the evidence is taken into consideration Ford’s motion for 

summary judgement must be denied.

R.R. 442a.

In its reply, Ford asserted: 

Mr. Felgar was unable to testify that he ever ordered Ford brakes 

for use at Alray Tires. [Appellant] mischaracterizes Mr. Felgar’s 

testimony and only cites to the portions regarding what “would 

have” happened and the possible options available if brakes were 

not available “through the aftermarket.” However, when asked 

directly, Mr. Felgar was unable to testify that he saw [Decedent] 

install a set of replacement brakes bought from a Ford dealership 

on any Ford vehicles. Accordingly, any argument that Mr. Gilbert 

installed Ford replacement brakes is speculative. 

[Appellant’s] opposition misconstrues the testimony: Mr. Felgar 

testified that “some parts” were bought from car dealerships, “but 

brakes was normally not one of them.” Mr. Felgar testified that 

brakes would be purchased from a dealership if they were not 

available through the aftermarket-and that if that had happened, 

brakes may have been purchased at the Ford dealership. In no 

way is this evidence that [Decedent] removed or installed Ford 

brakes. In fact, Mr. Felgar specifically testified that he did not have 

a specific recollection of purchasing a replacement brake from a 

Ford dealer. Mr. Felgar specifically testified that he was unable to 

testify about how many Ford vehicles worked on at Alray, and he 

____________________________________________

9 The specific admission by Ford states:

Ford believes asbestos-containing friction products were 

incorporated into its vehicles since it began selling mass 

production vehicles in the early 1900s. Ford states that the use of 

asbestos-containing friction products were phased out of the 

majority of Ford's vehicles by 1984. By 1993, the only vehicles in 

which asbestos-containing friction products were still used were 

low-volume limousine applications. Their use in limousines was 

discontinued in 1997.

R.R. at 466a. 
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was unable to testify about the brand of brakes [Decedent] would 

have removed from a vehicle before performing a brake change. 

Any allegation that [Decedent] installed Ford brakes on any of the 

Ford vehicles he may have worked on is purely speculative. 

R.R. 560a-561a (citations to exhibits omitted). 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford, reasoning:

With regard to [Ford], Appellant has not presented sufficient 

evidence [Decedent] was exposed to asbestos from brakes 

manufactured supplied, and/or distributed by [Ford]. While 

Appellant produced [Ford]’s interrogatories in which Ford stated it 

sold vehicles and aftermarket service parts, including asbestoscontaining brake linings and pads, through franchised Ford dealers 

and authorized distributors in the United States during the 

relevant time period, Appellant produced no evidence that 

[Decedent] was exposed to asbestos from working with or around 

Ford brakes. To the contrary, [Decedent]’s former manager, [E]. 

Wayne Felgar, only gave general deposition testimony that Ford 

was one of the makes of vehicles the mechanics worked on at 

Alray Tires. While Mr. Felgar referenced a “Ford Dealer in 

Monroeville” and a “Biondi Lincoln Mercury/Ford dealer” from 

whom Alray Tires purchased auto parts, when further questioned 

during his deposition he could not say whether he had any specific 

recollection of ever ordering or purchasing replacement brakes 

from Biondi Mercury. Likewise, [Decedent]’s former coworker, 

John Price, only gave general deposition testimony that Ford was 

one of the main brands of vehicles [Decedent] worked on. While 

both of the aforementioned fact witnesses gave general testimony 

about [Decedent] performing brake jobs at Alray Tires, Appellant 

has produced no evidence which specifically ties [Decedent] to 

the performance of the removal and/or installation of Ford brakes, 

or even places [Decedent] in the proximity of other Alray Tires 

employees who were doing such work with Ford brakes. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 23-24. 

Appellant reiterates in this appeal that there was evidence that (1) 

Felgar ordered parts from two Ford dealerships; (2) Ford sold vehicles and 

aftermarket parts that contained asbestos during Decedent’s entire career at 
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Alray, and during the time he did thousands of brake changes; (3) Ford sold 

brake linings that were forty to sixty percent asbestos by weight; and (4) the 

Ford used asbestos products until 1997.10 Appellant’s Brief at 46. 

Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in concluding that 

without evidence of the identity of the manufacturers of the asbestoscontaining parts installed on the Ford vehicles, Ford had no liability. Id. 

Appellant suggests that this reasoning: 

harkens to a quasi “bare metal”[11] defense. According to the trial 

court unless it could be established that the asbestos-containing

replacement component parts were also manufactured by Ford, 

Ford could not be held liable. This is simply not the case under 

current Pennsylvania law.” 

____________________________________________

10 Appellant, for the first time on appeal, suggests that Ford recommended 

the use of asbestos-containing brake linings for its vehicle. Appellant does 

not point to any portion of the record supporting that assertion. 

11 The district court for the United States Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

stated: 

Indeed, as asbestos litigation has evolved, and the major 

manufacturing defendants have declared bankruptcy, the 

litigation has moved away from the manufacturers of asbestos, 

and defendants in the cases now pending before this Court are 

typically those that manufactured so-called “bare-metal” products 

that contained or were later encapsulated in asbestos.

Although litigants often refer to the defense raised herein as 

the “bare-metal defense,” it is more properly understood, 

as explained below, as a challenge to a plaintiff’s prima facie 

case to prove duty or causation.

Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 791, 793 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
J-S23016-18

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Id. at 46-47. Appellant provides no citations to law or further discussion for

this argument. 

As to Appellant’s arguments based on the record, we are constrained to 

conclude that Appellant failed to establish a genuine issue of fact that he was 

exposed to products associated with Ford. At the outset, we reiterate that in 

Rost, there was deemed to be sufficient exposure to not only survive 

summary judgment but prevail at trial. However, in Rost, Ford conceded that 

all Ford vehicles contained asbestos parts in the five years preceding the 

plaintiff’s employment at the garage in 1950. Rost, 151 A.3d at 1037. Thus, 

there was evidence from which to draw an inference that the plaintiff would 

have been exposed to original parts on Ford vehicles, which were a substantial

portion of the garage’s business. 

Here, in contrast, Appellant relies on Ford’s admission that a phase-out 

of asbestos products did not occur in the majority of its vehicles until 1984, 

but that a full phase-out did not occur until 1997. The admission suggests 

that some Ford vehicles would have original asbestos parts installed during 

the time Decedent was at Alray from 1975 and 1985. However, Appellant did 

not adduce evidence of when Ford’s phase-out started, the scope of the phaseout, or any other information regarding how many Ford vehicles could have 

contained original asbestos-containing parts during Decedent’s time at Alray. 

Similarly, Appellant provided information in the record to assess Appellant’s 

exposure to original parts on Ford vehicles, as opposed to replacement parts

from other manufacturers or suppliers. Thus, even if Alray primarily serviced 
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Ford, Chevrolet, and Dodge vehicles, the record did not contain adequate 

information to infer that the frequency of Decedent’s contact with the asbestos 

parts original to Ford vehicles or bearing Ford’s replacement parts was more 

than de minimis. See Rost, 151 A.3d at 1037; Gregg, 975 A.2d at 1178. 

With respect to Decedent’s exposure to Ford’s aftermarket brakes

purchased from Ford dealerships, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s 

evidence was inadequate. Appellant relies on bare assertions that Alray 

ordered parts from two Ford affiliated dealerships. As noted by the trial court, 

there was no direct evidence that Felgar or any of the other mechanics ordered 

Ford brakes from the dealership. Indeed, Felgar and Price both testified that 

they did not order parts from the dealerships often and neither could 

remember whether they ordered brakes. Accordingly, Appellant has provided 

no evidence from which a finder of fact could reasonably assess the frequency 

of Decedent’s exposure to Ford products. See Gregg, 975 A.2d at 1172. 

We also discern no merit to Appellant’s argument that the trial court 

erred in concluding that Ford could not be held liable for original parts installed 

on a Ford vehicle but were manufactured by another party. Put simply, there 

is no support for Appellant’s suggestion that the trial court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Ford on that basis. Moreover, Appellant fails to develop 

any argument for his claim that Ford could be held liable for replacement parts 

installed on a Ford vehicle but were manufactured by another party. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); McCabe v. Marywood Univ., 166 A.3d 1257, 1264 (Pa. 
J-S23016-18

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Super. 2017). Thus, we decline to address that claim. Accordingly,

Appellant’s claim of legal error warrants no relief. 

In sum, we conclude that the trial court appropriately determined that 

there was insufficient evidence of Decedent’s exposure to asbestos in 

Appellees’ parts. Moreover, we conclude that Appellant failed to raise genuine 

issues of fact that the exposure to Appellees’ parts was sufficiently frequent 

and regular. Having reviewed the record, we discern no merit to Appellant’s 

overarching claim that the trial court erred in failing to apply the proper 

standard of review. 

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/23/18