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PARKS v. HY-VEE

Cite as 307 Neb. 927

Donna Parks, appellee, v. 

Hy-Vee, Inc., appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed December 4, 2020. No. S-20-195.

1. Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 48-185 (Cum. Supp. 2018), an appellate court may modify, 

reverse, or set aside a Workers’ Compensation Court decision only when 

(1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) 

the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not 

sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the 

order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award.

2. ____: ____. On appellate review, the factual findings made by the trial 

judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.

3. Workers’ Compensation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In testing 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact in a workers’ compensation case, an appellate court considers the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the successful party, every controverted fact must 

be resolved in favor of the successful party, and the appellate court gives 

the successful party the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible 

from the evidence.

4. Workers’ Compensation. As the trier of fact, the Workers’ Compensation 

Court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 

be given their testimony.

5. Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. An appellate court is 

obligated in workers’ compensation cases to make its own determinations as to questions of law.

6. Actions: Appeal and Error. The law-of-the-case doctrine reflects the 

principle that an issue litigated and decided in one stage of a case should 

not be relitigated at a later stage.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

01/29/2021 08:08 AM CST
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7. Stipulations. In Nebraska, parties are free to make stipulations that govern their rights, including the issues to be decided, and such stipulations 

will be respected and enforced by courts so long as the agreement is not 

contrary to public policy or good morals.

8. Workers’ Compensation. A preexisting disease and an aggravation of 

that disease may combine to produce a compensable injury.

9. Statutes: Intent. When interpreting a statute, the starting point and 

focus of the inquiry is the meaning of the statutory language, understood 

in context.

10. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain 

and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous.

11. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning 

into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of 

a statute.

Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Court: Daniel R. 

Fridrich, Judge. Affirmed.

Paul T. Barta and Micah C. Hawker-Boehnke, of Baylor 

Evnen, L.L.P., for appellant.

Travis Allan Spier and Nolan Niehus, Senior Certified Law 

Student, of Atwood, Holsten, Brown, Deaver & Spier Law 

Firm, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Funke, Papik, 

and Freudenberg, JJ.

Papik, J.

Donna Parks incurred a work-related injury in 2008 while 

employed by Hy-Vee, Inc., and sought workers’ compensation 

benefits. The initial award granted compensation for past and 

future medical expenses for her low-back injury but found that 

she had not reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). It 

did not address aggravation of Parks’ mental health issues.

In 2017, following the filing of motions by both parties, 

the parties stipulated to the compensation court’s resolution of 

several issues. After a trial, the compensation court resolved 
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Cite as 307 Neb. 927

those issues and entered a further award. Relying on expert 

opinions, the compensation court granted Parks compensation for chronic pain and aggravation of her mental health 

issues, both caused by the work-related low-back injury. The 

compensation court later modified the further award upon 

Parks’ motion pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-180 (Cum. 

Supp. 2018).

Hy-Vee now appeals, alleging that the compensation court 

failed to properly apply the law-of-the-case doctrine and 

exceeded its power in modifying the further award. Finding no 

merit to Hy-Vee’s arguments, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Injury and Initial Award.

In 2008, Parks was working in the Hy-Vee floral department 

when she was partially pulled into a trash compactor while 

emptying a heavy bin. In 2010, she sought workers’ compensation benefits for injuries she claimed to have incurred.

At trial on the matter, the compensation court received evidence that Parks had sustained a work-related low-back injury. 

Further, Parks testified on direct examination that she was not 

claiming an aggravation of preexisting mental health issues as 

a result of the work accident. She further testified that her state 

of mind had been stable since she began working for Hy-Vee in 

2004. Parks did not seek temporary disability benefits, because 

she was employed by Hy-Vee at the time of trial.

The compensation court determined that Parks suffered a 

compensable low-back injury during her employment with 

Hy-Vee. It did not address Parks’ mental health issues. The 

award concluded that Parks had not reached MMI regarding 

her low-back injury and made no finding as to permanent loss 

of earning power or entitlement to vocational rehabilitation 

services. It ordered Hy-Vee to pay past and future medical 

expenses reasonably necessary for evaluation and nonsurgical 

treatment of the low-back injury.

Thereafter, Parks received regular and varying treatment 

for her compensable low-back injury, but she continued to 
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experience pain. In 2012, her treating physician, Dr. Daniel 

M. Wik, recommended implanting a spinal cord stimulator. In 

2014, Wik and an orthopedic surgeon agreed that Parks had 

reached MMI, and she was assigned work restrictions. Shortly 

thereafter, a functional capacity evaluation by the agreed-upon 

vocational rehabilitation counselor concluded that Parks was 

permanently and totally disabled. Hy-Vee voluntarily paid permanent partial disability benefits from 2014 until 2018.

Subsequent Motions.

Meanwhile, in 2017, Parks filed a motion to enforce the 

award. She requested that Hy-Vee pay for or authorize (1) a 

psychological evaluation to determine her candidacy for a spinal cord stimulator, (2) a back brace and massage therapy, and 

(3) various medications. Parks also sought medical expenses 

incurred after April 28, 2011, permanent disability benefits, 

and vocational rehabilitation.

Hy-Vee subsequently filed a petition for modification of the 

award. It asserted, among other things, that after the initial 

award, Parks had alleged she suffered a compensable mental 

health injury that Hy-Vee disputed, and that she was not totally 

disabled. In response, Parks filed an answer admitting that she 

was alleging a mental health injury and requesting that the 

compensation court dismiss Hy-Vee’s petition for modification for failure to state a claim because Hy-Vee sought judicial 

determinations on MMI and disability status, issues not previously ruled upon by the compensation court.

Evidence at Trial.

The parties presented evidence at a consolidated trial to 

determine the extent and nature of Parks’ compensable disability and associated expenses. Prior to the trial, the parties stipulated the issues to be resolved. Relevant here, those 

issues included (1) whether the work accident caused Parks 

to have chronic pain or a chronic pain syndrome, (2) whether 

the work accident aggravated her preexisting mental health 

issues, (3) whether medical and mileage expenses identified 
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in exhibit 69 were reasonable and necessary for treatment of 

Parks’ work-related conditions, (4) the extent of Parks’ permanent disability resulting from the work-related injuries, and (5) 

“any additional benefits the [c]ourt deems warranted based on 

evidence at the time of hearing.” The parties also stipulated 

that Parks had reached MMI on March 3, 2014, regarding her 

low-back injury and associated lower extremity symptoms.

Parks presented evidence that her chronic pain was caused 

by the work accident. Parks had received treatment from Wik 

monthly since 2010 for persistent low-back pain. In 2011, Wik 

attributed Parks’ low-back pain to the work injury. In 2018, 

Wik reported that it remained his opinion that all of Parks’ lowback diagnoses were caused by the work accident.

Parks also presented the report of Dr. Dennis P. McGowan, a 

spine surgeon who examined her in March 2019. He diagnosed 

Parks with “[s]prain to low back caused by 6/2/2008 work 

injury with continuous disabling low back pain.”

Parks testified that she had experienced constant and varying degrees of low-back pain since the accident. The pain 

radiated down her legs and involved some numbness and tingling in her right leg and foot. Parks acknowledged significant 

struggles with her mental health in the past, particularly after 

her husband suffered an aneurysm in 1990. At that time, Parks 

was hospitalized for what she called a nervous breakdown. 

Parks testified that as a result, she obtained Social Security 

disability benefits. Parks testified that when she started working for Hy-Vee in 2004, she was off those disability benefits 

and her physical and mental health were good. She stated that 

she was happy to be working and that it was a good point in 

her life. Other than Parks’ testimony about a cut to her finger, 

there is no evidence that Parks received medical treatment 

from 2004 to 2008. Parks testified about her efforts to remain 

employed in some form after her work accident, within her 

physical restrictions.

Contrary to Parks, Hy-Vee posited that Parks’ chronic pain 

was caused by a somatic symptom disorder or psychological 
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Cite as 307 Neb. 927

disorder unrelated to the work accident. It presented the 

February 2017 report of Dr. Terry Davis, a psychiatrist who 

conducted a psychiatric evaluation and mental status examination and reviewed a chronology of Parks’ medical records 

and the records produced by Wik. He opined that all of Parks’ 

current pain was the result of a preexisting somatic symptom disorder that was not caused or aggravated by the work 

accident. Davis described the disorder as a state in which 

psychological factors initiate, exacerbate, or maintain bodily 

symptoms. That is, Parks’ ongoing back pain complaints were 

most likely psychogenic and not due to any physical, medical, 

anatomical, or physiologic cause. He noted that Parks had a 

history of serious emotional and psychological problems that 

predated the 2008 work accident and included somatic symptoms as early as 1990. Davis explained that a somatic episode 

can be brought about unconsciously to manipulate or control 

relationships, express emotions, or cope with stress. Because 

of his opinion that Parks’ back pain was psychogenic and due 

to the subjective nature of her complaints, Davis concluded 

that Parks’ symptoms were unlikely to respond to any medical 

or physical treatment, including a spinal cord stimulator.

Dr. John R. Massey conducted a medical examination of 

Parks in September 2018 and reviewed Davis’ evaluation. He 

agreed with Davis’ opinion that Parks’ pain was caused by a 

somatic symptom disorder rather than the work accident.

The parties also presented evidence regarding the causal 

connection between Parks’ mental health issues and the work 

accident. Parks’ evidence showed that her mental health issues 

were exacerbated by the low-back injury she incurred at work 

in 2008. In her testimony, Parks acknowledged that she was 

diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress 

disorder in the 1990’s, but, as noted above, she testified that 

her mental health had stabilized before she began working for 

Hy-Vee and that it continued to be stable through the initial 

trial. However, Parks testified that her mental health changed 

when Hy-Vee denied coverage for the spinal cord stimulator 

and she had “no hope for any other treatment.”
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Cite as 307 Neb. 927

In February 2017, Wik, who consistently attributed Parks’ 

low-back pain to the work accident, diagnosed Parks with 

“anxiety due to chronic low back pain.” In January 2019, 

Parks began treatment with Dr. Dianna M. Clyne, a psychiatrist. Parks reported to Clyne that her low-back pain made her 

depression and anxiety worse. Clyne reviewed Parks’ medical documentation, including that of her previous psychiatric 

hospitalizations. She diagnosed Parks with depressive disorder 

and anxiety disorder, which she attributed to the work injury 

and low-back pain. According to Clyne, Parks was at MMI for 

her depression and anxiety, at least until her low-back condition improved. In March 2019, McGowan reported that Parks’ 

preexisting psychiatric conditions were not related to the work 

accident, but a few months later, he opined that Parks’ preexisting anxiety and depression had worsened as a result of the 

work-related low-back injury.

Hy-Vee denied any causal connection between the work accident and Parks’ depression and anxiety. As explained above, 

Hy-Vee presented opinion evidence that Parks’ chronic pain, 

which Parks identified as the source of her worsening anxiety 

and depression, was not caused by the work accident but by a 

somatic symptom disorder. Further, Davis specifically opined 

that Parks did not suffer from any psychological symptoms or 

injury that was caused by or exacerbated by the work accident. 

He noted that Parks suffered from depression and anxiety for 

many years before the work accident.

Exhibit 69 set forth medical expenses that Parks alleged 

were work related. The parties stipulated that exhibit 69 accurately reflected the total billed charges, third-party payments, 

and writeoffs; Parks’ out-of-pocket expenditures and mileage 

incurred; and the outstanding balances as set forth in itemized 

billing statements from providers. Parks’ testimony did not 

specifically request compensation for the expenses itemized 

in exhibit 69, and according to statements in posttrial orders 

made by the compensation court, nor did her counsel’s written 

closing arguments.
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PARKS v. HY-VEE

Cite as 307 Neb. 927

Further Award.

Following trial, the compensation court dismissed with prejudice Hy-Vee’s petition for modification and entered a further 

award. It awarded Parks permanent total disability benefits but 

denied vocational rehabilitation.

The compensation court found that while the evidence did 

not show that Parks had a chronic pain syndrome, it supported a finding of chronic pain caused by the work accident. 

In analyzing the issue, the compensation court concluded that 

the opinions of Davis and Massey violated the law-of-thecase doctrine and “should be rejected for that reason alone,” 

but additionally observed that even “[p]utting aside the legal 

problem with [Hy-Vee’s] position,” it found Parks’ witnesses 

more persuasive on the issue than Hy-Vee’s. In particular, 

the compensation court noted that it was not persuaded by 

the opinions of Davis and Massey that Parks’ pain was psychogenic in nature and noted that it was persuaded by Wik’s 

opinion that Parks was suffering physical pain caused by her 

work accident. The compensation court also cited the opinion 

of McGowan, who had diagnosed Parks with a work-related 

low-back sprain “with continuous disabling low back pain.” 

Further, the compensation court found Parks’ testimony about 

her pain credible and observed that she had sought treatment 

for her pain and continued to work. In the court’s view, these 

factors demonstrated that Parks suffered “actual physical pain 

caused by her work accident,” not pain caused by a somatic 

symptom disorder.

As to Parks’ depression and anxiety, the compensation court 

again relied on the opinion of Wik, whose office notes showed 

a causal connection between Parks’ depression and anxiety, 

her work accident, and her low-back pain. The compensation 

court also noted McGowan’s opinion that Parks’ depression 

and anxiety were worsened by the work-related low-back 

injury and Clyne’s opinion that her depression and anxiety 

were exacerbated by it. Further, the compensation court relied 

on Parks’ own testimony that her depression and anxiety were 

made worse by her pain. It again rejected Hy-Vee’s assertion, 
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PARKS v. HY-VEE

Cite as 307 Neb. 927

based on Davis’ opinion, that Parks suffered from a somatic 

symptom disorder and that her depression and anxiety were 

not caused or exacerbated by the work accident.

Finally, the compensation court awarded Parks the mileage expenses identified in exhibit 69. It noted that exhibit 

69 also identified medical expenses, but it did not include 

those expenses in the further award. The compensation court 

expressed confusion about whether Parks sought an order 

directing Hy-Vee to reimburse her for medical expenses. It 

noted that in her testimony, Parks had not asked the compensation court to order that she be reimbursed for those expenses, 

and that Parks’ counsel had not mentioned the medical expenses 

identified in exhibit 69 in written closing arguments.

Modification of Further Award.

Less than a week after the further award, Parks filed a 

motion to modify it pursuant to § 48-180. Parks sought past 

medical expenses identified in exhibit 69, which were not part 

of the further award.

At the hearing on the motion, the compensation court 

explained that there was no failure of proof as to compensability for the medical expenses at issue. Instead, the court stated 

it had not awarded compensation for the medical expenses 

because Parks had not explicitly asked for it in her testimony 

or written closing arguments.

The compensation court modified the further award to 

include all of the medical expenses identified in exhibit 69 and 

ordered Hy-Vee to pay providers for outstanding balances and 

reimburse anyone who had already paid the providers, including Parks.

Hy-Vee appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Hy-Vee assigns, consolidated and renumbered, that the compensation court erred in (1) applying the law-of-the-case doctrine to disregard the somatic symptom disorder diagnosis and 

relying on that determination to reject every argument made 
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by Hy-Vee, (2) failing to apply the law-of-the-case doctrine to 

Parks’ alleged mental health injury, and (3) using § 48-180 to 

correct a mistake made by Parks’ counsel.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-185 (Cum. Supp. 2018), 

an appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers’ 

Compensation Court decision only when (1) the compensation 

court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not 

sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact 

by the compensation court do not support the order or award. 

Aboytes-Mosqueda v. LFA Inc., 306 Neb. 277, 944 N.W.2d 

765 (2020).

[2,3] On appellate review, the factual findings made by 

the trial judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court have the 

effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly 

wrong. Id. In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the findings of fact in a workers’ compensation case, an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the successful party, every controverted fact must be resolved 

in favor of the successful party, and the appellate court gives 

the successful party the benefit of every inference reasonably 

deducible from the evidence. Id.

[4] As the trier of fact, the Workers’ Compensation Court is 

the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 

be given their testimony. Id.

[5] An appellate court is obligated in workers’ compensation cases to make its own determinations as to questions of 

law. Frans v. Waldinger Corp., 306 Neb. 574, 946 N.W.2d 

666 (2020).

ANALYSIS

Chronic Pain.

We begin our analysis with Hy-Vee’s argument that the compensation court erred in finding that Parks’ chronic low-back 
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pain was caused by her work injury and not a somatic symptom disorder. Hy-Vee claims that the compensation court 

entirely based its finding on an incorrect application of the 

law-of-the-case doctrine. We are not persuaded.

[6] The law-of-the-case doctrine reflects the principle that 

an issue litigated and decided in one stage of a case should 

not be relitigated at a later stage. Gardner v. International 

Paper Destr. & Recycl., 291 Neb. 415, 865 N.W.2d 371 (2015). 

The compensation court concluded this doctrine precluded it 

from relying on the opinions of Davis and Massey that Parks’ 

chronic pain resulted from a somatic symptom disorder. The 

compensation court viewed these opinions as contradictory 

to the initial award’s finding that Parks had injured her lower 

back in the work accident. Hy-Vee asserts that nothing in the 

opinions of Davis or Massey calls the work injury itself into 

question and that thus, the compensation court erroneously 

based its rejection of a somatic symptom disorder on the lawof-the-case doctrine.

But while the compensation court relied on the law-of-thecase doctrine as a basis for finding that a somatic symptom 

disorder was not the cause of Parks’ pain, that was not the only 

basis upon which it relied. After analyzing the law-of-the-case 

doctrine as it related to the opinions of Davis and Massey and 

stating that their opinions “should be rejected for that reason 

alone,” the compensation court went on to say that even if the 

“legal problem” posed by the law-of-the-case doctrine were 

set to the side, it was not persuaded by Davis and Massey that 

Parks’ pain was caused by a somatic symptom disorder. The 

compensation court then explained why it was not persuaded 

by Davis and Massey and why it was persuaded by Wik that 

Parks was suffering from pain due to her work-related lowback injury. The compensation court thus made a factual finding, independent of any of its legal conclusions regarding the 

law-of-the-case doctrine, that Parks’ pain was caused by her 

work-related low-back injury.

Given the compensation court’s independent factual finding regarding the cause of Parks’ pain, we need not consider 
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Hy-Vee’s law-of-the-case argument so long as the compensation court’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous. We agree 

with Parks that it was not. In support of its factual finding, the 

compensation court cited the opinion of Wik, who attributed 

Parks’ current low-back pain to the work accident. The compensation court acknowledged that this opinion conflicted with 

the opinions of Davis and Massey but expressly found Wik 

more persuasive. Hy-Vee is critical of this finding, but it was a 

credibility determination that the compensation court alone was 

entitled to make. See Aboytes-Mosqueda v. LFA Inc., 306 Neb. 

277, 944 N.W.2d 765 (2020). The compensation court further 

relied on the report of McGowan, who in 2019 diagnosed Parks 

with “[s]prain to low back caused by 6/2/2008 work injury 

with continuous disabling low back pain.” This evidence was 

sufficient to support the compensation court’s factual determination that Parks’ chronic low-back pain was caused by her 

work accident.

Reading the further award and the record as a whole, we 

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the compensation court’s factual finding that Parks’ chronic low-back 

pain resulted from her work accident, as well as the portions 

of the further award, as modified, stemming from that determination, including the conclusion that Parks was entitled to 

coverage for various treatments and the expenses set forth in 

exhibit 69.

Aggravation of Depression and Anxiety.

In challenging the compensation awarded for Parks’ depression and anxiety, Hy-Vee again turns to the law-of-the-case 

doctrine. But this time Hy-Vee assigns that the compensation court should have applied the doctrine to bar Parks from 

receiving compensation for an aggravation of her preexisting 

depression and anxiety. In large part, Hy-Vee argues that the 

compensation court violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by 

making determinations that it could not make in modifying 

the initial award. As we will explain, however, we do not 

agree that the court entered a modification order and Hy-Vee’s 
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reliance on the law-of-the-case doctrine is misplaced. Further, 

contrary to Hy-Vee’s assertions otherwise, the compensation 

court’s award of compensation for an aggravation of Parks’ 

mental health issues was supported by the evidence.

We first address Hy-Vee’s argument that the procedural 

posture of this case precluded Parks from receiving compensation for an aggravation of her depression and anxiety. Hy-Vee 

classifies the further award as a modification order pursuant 

to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-141(2) (Reissue 2010). According to 

Hy-Vee, even if Parks’ mental health conditions worsened after 

the initial award, it was not within the scope of a modification 

order to award compensation for that change in her condition, 

because it represented a “completely new” injury. Reply brief 

for appellant at 11.

Section 48-141 provides that “the amount of any agreement 

or award payable periodically may be modified” upon an application of a party “(2) . . . on the ground of increase or decrease 

of incapacity due solely to the injury.” To establish a change 

in incapacity as the term is used in § 48-141, an applicant 

must show a change in impairment and a change in disability; 

impairment refers to a medical assessment whereas disability 

relates to employability. See Rader v. Speer Auto, 287 Neb. 

116, 841 N.W.2d 383 (2013), citing Jurgens v. Irwin Indus. 

Tool Co., 20 Neb. App. 488, 825 N.W.2d 820 (2013).

The procedural history of this case demonstrates that the further award was not a modification order pursuant to § 48-141. 

The initial award made no determinations regarding the degree 

and duration of Parks’ disability; nor did it award periodic 

payments. Hy-Vee subsequently paid some periodic benefits 

by agreement for a time, but those payments ceased before the 

trial that produced the further award. In the meantime, Parks 

filed her motion to enforce the award, raising several issues 

disputed between the parties, and Hy-Vee filed its motion to 

modify. In response, Parks asked that Hy-Vee’s motion to modify be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because Hy-Vee 

sought judicial determinations on issues not previously ruled 

upon by the compensation court.
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The parties thereafter stipulated that the compensation court 

should consider whether Parks’ work-related low-back injury 

caused chronic pain; whether Parks’ work-related low-back 

injury and resulting chronic pain aggravated her preexisting 

mental health conditions; and whether, having reached MMI, 

she was permanently disabled, along with “any additional benefits the [c]ourt deems warranted based on evidence at the time 

of the hearing.” The court tried these issues, among others, at 

a consolidated trial. These issues were aimed at determining 

the degree and duration of Parks’ disability for the first time. 

Because they had not yet been determined and there was no 

agreement pertaining to them in effect, there was no “agreement or award” regarding “incapacity” for the compensation 

court to modify. See § 48-141(2). Indeed, the further award 

recognized as much by dismissing Hy-Vee’s motion to modify 

the initial award, with prejudice.

Hy-Vee maintains that Parks could obtain compensation for 

the aggravation of her mental health conditions only by filing 

a “new petition for this newly emerged claim.” Reply brief 

for appellant at 12. But Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-162.03(1) (Cum. 

Supp. 2018) grants the compensation court broad authority to 

rule on any motion except motions for new trial. The requests 

for relief that prompted the further award—Parks’ motion to 

enforce the award, Hy-Vee’s motion to modify the award, and 

Parks’ prayer for dismissal of Hy-Vee’s motion to modify—

were all related to that pending case and “encompassed by the 

motion practice under the broad language of § 48-162.03(1).” 

See Fentress v. Westin, Inc., 304 Neb. 619, 630, 935 N.W.2d 

911, 921 (2019). No new petition was necessary.

[7] Further, Hy-Vee stipulated that the compensation court 

could decide whether the work accident aggravated Parks’ 

preexisting mental health issues. Hy-Vee is thus now asking 

us to find that the compensation court erred in taking up an 

issue that the parties stipulated it should resolve. However, 

we have said that in Nebraska, parties are free to make 

stipulations that govern their rights, including the issues to 

be decided, and that such stipulations will be respected and 
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enforced by courts so long as the agreement is not contrary 

to public policy or good morals. See Archer Daniels Midland 

Co. v. State, 290 Neb. 780, 861 N.W.2d 733 (2015). In this 

case, we see nothing to persuade us that the compensation 

court erred in honoring the parties’ stipulations regarding the 

issues to be decided.

Hy-Vee contends that whatever the parties’ stipulations, 

they did not authorize the compensation court to disregard the 

law-of-the-case doctrine. Hy-Vee argues the doctrine applies 

here because the compensation court did not find in its initial 

award that Parks’ mental health was affected by the work accident. According to Hy-Vee, this precludes the compensation 

court from considering the issue. As we have noted, however, 

the doctrine reflects the principle that an issue litigated and 

decided in one stage of a case should not be relitigated at a 

later stage. Gardner v. International Paper Destr. & Recycl., 

291 Neb. 415, 865 N.W.2d 371 (2015). See, also, 18B Charles 

Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 at 

628 (5th ed. 2019) (“[a]ctual decision of an issue is required 

to establish the law of the case”; “[l]aw of the case does not 

reach a matter that was not decided”). Here, the question of 

whether Parks had suffered an aggravation of her depression 

and anxiety as a result of her work-related low-back injury 

was not litigated and decided in the initial trial. Parks did not 

assert any mental health injuries at that time, and therefore, the 

initial award made no finding pertaining to the matter. Hy-Vee 

is thus mistaken that the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded the 

compensation court from finding compensable mental health 

injuries in the further award.

Lastly, Hy-Vee contends that the compensation court erred 

in determining that Parks’ aggravated mental health condition 

was caused by the work accident, contrary to the opinions 

of Davis upon which Hy-Vee based much of its evidence. 

However, the compensation court made credibility determinations, discounted Davis’ hypotheses, and relied on Parks’ 

evidence, all of which were within its authority to do. See 
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Aboytes-Mosqueda v. LFA Inc., 306 Neb. 277, 944 N.W.2d 765 

(2020). And Parks’ evidence regarding her mental health was 

sufficient to support the compensation court’s award.

Parks herself acknowledged her preexisting mental health 

issues, but said they had stabilized before the accident. Parks 

testified that her mental health condition continued to be stable 

until after the initial trial, when Hy-Vee denied coverage for 

the spinal cord stimulator and she had “no hope” for other 

treatment of her chronic low-back pain. In 2017, Wik, who 

attributed Parks’ low-back pain to the work accident, diagnosed Parks with anxiety due to chronic low-back pain. And 

in 2019, Parks reported to Clyne that her low-back pain made 

her depression and anxiety worse. Clyne diagnosed Parks with 

depression and anxiety disorders due to the work injury and 

low-back pain. A few months later, McGowan opined that 

Parks’ preexisting anxiety and depression had worsened as a 

result of the work-related low-back injury.

[8] A preexisting disease and an aggravation of that disease 

may combine to produce a compensable injury. Manchester v. 

Drivers Mgmt., 278 Neb. 776, 775 N.W.2d 179 (2009). To be 

compensable, a subsequent injury or aggravation related to the 

primary injury must be a direct and natural result of the work 

accident. See Sweeney v. Kerstens & Lee, Inc., 268 Neb. 752, 

688 N.W.2d 350 (2004). Parks’ evidence demonstrated such a 

direct and natural connection: Her evidence showed that the 

aggravation of her depression and anxiety was caused by her 

work-related low-back injury. Accordingly, the compensation 

court did not err in finding it compensable.

Section 48-180 Modification.

Finally, Hy-Vee claims that the compensation court exceeded 

the authority granted to it in § 48-180 by modifying the further 

award to make Hy-Vee responsible for all of the expenses 

listed in exhibit 69. Section 48-180 provides:

The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court may, on 

its own motion or on the motion of any party, modify 
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or change its findings, order, award, or judgment at any 

time before appeal and within fourteen days after the date 

of such findings, order, award, or judgment. The time for 

appeal shall not be lengthened because of the modification or change unless the correction substantially changes 

the result of the award.

Before addressing Hy-Vee’s argument, we briefly note some 

relevant history regarding § 48-180. Prior to a 2011 amendment, § 48-180 authorized modification by the compensation 

court, but only “for the purpose of correcting any ambiguity, 

clerical error, or patent or obvious error.” See 2011 Neb. Laws, 

L.B. 151, § 11. In its earlier form, § 48-180 was understood as 

a “statutory embodiment of nunc pro tunc principles.” Walsh 

v. City of Omaha, 11 Neb. App. 747, 755, 660 N.W.2d 187, 

194 (2003). As a result of the 2011 amendment, the compensation court’s authority to modify previously entered findings, 

orders, awards, and judgments is no longer limited to nunc pro 

tunc orders. See Carr v. Ganz, 26 Neb. App. 14, 916 N.W.2d 

437 (2018).

Hy-Vee acknowledges that the 2011 amendment to § 48-180 

expanded the compensation court’s modification authority, but 

contends that the compensation court nonetheless lacked the 

authority to modify the further award here. Hy-Vee argues 

that in its current form, § 48-180 authorizes the compensation 

court to make substantive modifications to its prior rulings, but 

only to correct its own mistakes, not to remedy a mistake or 

oversight of a party. Hy-Vee contends that the compensation 

court did not initially award compensation for all of the medical expenses identified in exhibit 69 because Parks failed to 

specifically request such relief and that the compensation court 

could not, under Hy-Vee’s understanding of § 48-180, remedy 

her failure to do so.

In response to Hy-Vee’s argument, we observe initially that 

the modification at issue is not, in our view, easily categorized as a correction of a mistake or oversight on the part of 

Parks. The compensation court stated that it did not initially 
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include all of the medical expenses identified in exhibit 69 

in the further award because Parks did not, in her testimony, 

express a desire to be reimbursed for medical bills and because 

the written closing arguments submitted by her counsel also 

did not specifically request such reimbursement. Hy-Vee does 

not, however, point us to any procedural rule or other legal 

authority that required such a request from Parks. Neither are 

the written closing arguments at issue a part of our record on 

appeal. Furthermore, the parties stipulated prior to trial that 

one of the issues to be determined was “[w]hether medical and 

mileage expenses identified in Trial Exhibit 69 were reasonable 

and necessary for treatment of [Parks’] work-related injuries/

conditions.” And, as the compensation court stated in its modification order, it did not omit the medical bills identified in 

exhibit 69 from its initial further award because Parks failed 

to prove an entitlement to compensation for them. Although 

the compensation court may not have initially understood that 

Parks was seeking compensation for all of the medical bills 

identified in exhibit 69, given the foregoing facts, we have 

doubts about whether that can be attributed to a mistake or 

oversight of Parks.

In any event, we need not decide whether Parks or the compensation court is to blame for the initial omission from the further award of the medical bills identified in exhibit 69. Such an 

assignment of fault is not necessary, because the compensation 

court’s modification authority under § 48-180 does not turn on 

whether modification is being made to correct a mistake of the 

court or of a party. We reach this conclusion through application of familiar principles of statutory interpretation.

[9-11] When interpreting a statute, the starting point and 

focus of the inquiry is the meaning of the statutory language, 

understood in context. Rogers v. Jack’s Supper Club, 304 Neb. 

605, 935 N.W.2d 754 (2019). Statutory language is to be given 

its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not 

resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory 

words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Id. It is not 
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within the province of the courts to read meaning into a statute 

that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a 

statute. Id.

Hy-Vee’s argument that § 48-180 authorizes modification 

only to correct an error made by the court cannot survive an 

application of these principles. The text of § 48-180 does not 

differentiate between “mistakes” made by the court and those 

made by parties. Indeed, it does not mention “mistakes” or a 

similar concept at all. Nor does it otherwise limit the reasons 

for which a compensation court may modify its findings, order, 

award, or judgment: Under § 48-180, the court may do so “on 

its own motion or on the motion of any party.” The interpretation advanced by Hy-Vee thus requires that meaning not found 

in the text of § 48-180 be read into the statute. We do not interpret statutes in this manner. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 301 Neb. 

912, 920 N.W.2d 708 (2018).

Unable to make an argument in support of its preferred 

interpretation based on the statutory text, Hy-Vee resorts to the 

absurd results doctrine. Under that doctrine, a court may deviate from the plain language of the statutory text if application 

of the plain language would lead to “‘manifest absurdity.’” 

See Rogers v. Jack’s Supper Club, supra, 304 Neb. at 613, 935 

N.W.2d at 761, quoting Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 283 

Neb. 868, 813 N.W.2d 467 (2012). But the bar of manifest 

absurdity is not easily cleared. We have refused to apply the 

doctrine if the result dictated by the plain language is not “so 

absurd that the Legislature could not possibly have intended 

it.” Thomas v. Peterson, ante p. 89, 97, 948 N.W.2d 698, 705 

(2020), citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 234-39 (2012). See, 

also, Blank v. Blank, 303 Neb. 602, 930 N.W.2d 523 (2019) 

(Papik, J., concurring).

Rather than arguing that application of the plain language 

will result in an absurd result in this case, Hy-Vee primarily 

contends that if its preferred interpretation is not adopted, 

there will be absurd results in other cases. Hy-Vee asks us 
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to consider various hypothetical scenarios in which parties, 

for example, fail to offer key pieces of evidence or fail to 

adequately plead the relief sought and then later seek to remedy their failure by asking for modification under § 48-180. 

Hy-Vee’s hypothetical scenarios, however, are not before us in 

this case.

The question raised by Hy-Vee’s absurdity argument is 

whether applying the plain language of § 48-180 to authorize 

the modification of the further award under these circumstances 

is a result so absurd that the Legislature could not possibly have 

intended to allow for it. Hy-Vee comes nowhere near clearing 

that high bar. As noted above, the parties stipulated prior to 

trial that whether the medical expenses identified in exhibit 69 

were reasonable and necessary for treatment of Parks’ workrelated injuries was one of the issues presented for resolution. 

There is also no dispute on appeal that Parks adequately proved 

at trial that such expenses were, in fact, reasonable and necessary. We see no basis to conclude that the Legislature, in enacting § 48-180, could not possibly have intended to authorize the 

compensation court to modify the further award in the manner 

it did under these circumstances.

CONCLUSION

We find that the compensation court’s further award was not 

premised on legal error, that the record supports the findings of 

fact upon which the further award was based, and that the compensation court did not act in excess of its powers in modifying 

the further award. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Stacy, J., not participating.