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___________

___________

 *

Appellant,

 *

 *

Dan Flowers, Head of Arkansas

State Highway & Transportation;

John Bailey, Chief, Arkansas Appeal from the United States

 *

Lipton, Commissioner, Arkansas Eastern District of Arkansas.

 *

Hopper, Commissioner, Arkansas

State Highway Commission; Herby

Branscum, Jr., Commissioner, 

Arkansas State Highway 

Commission; J. W. Benefield,

Commissioner, Arkansas State 

Highway Commission; L.W. Clark,

Commissioner, Arkansas State

Highway Commission,

 *

 *

 Submitted: September 6, 1996

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Den Coggins appeals from the district court's g

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summary judgment to A

U.S.C. § 1983 action. Upon de novo review, we a See Seltzer-Bey v.

, 66 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 1995). 
-2-

Coggins was discharged from his position as a highway patrolman for

the State of Arkansas in 1993. Coggins claimed that the Arkansas State

Highway Department's Operations Manual and various state statutes gave him

an expectation of continued employment, and defendants violated the terms

of his employment and denied him due process of law by terminating him for

alleged misconduct (sexual harassment) without a fair and impartial

hearing; his liberty interests were implicated when defendants disseminated

stigmatizing information concerning the facts and circumstances of his

termination; and defendants denied him compensation pay. 

On defendants' motion, the district court granted defendants summary

judgment, holding that the undisputed facts showed that Coggins was an atwill employee under Arkansas law and that Coggins had not demonstrated

either a property interest or a liberty interest entitling him to due

process. Alternatively, the court held that Coggins was provided adequate

procedural due process. The district court dismissed without prejudice

Coggins’s supplemental state law claim for accrued compensation time. 

We agree with the district court that Coggins did not rebut

defendants' evidence that he was an at-will employee and thus failed to

state a breach of contract claim based on his discharge. See Mertyris v.

P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ark. 1992) (Arkansas follows

employment-at-will doctrine with two exceptions: express provision against

termination except for cause, or employment agreement containing provision

for a definite term). We also reject Coggins's argument that the Operations

Manual's list of non-exclusive grounds for termination created an implied

contract term. See Gladden v. Arkansas Children’s Hosp., 728 S.W.2d 501,

503-05 (Ark. 1987). Furthermore, none of the statutes cited by Coggins

support the creation of a contract. 

 
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Accordingly, the district court was correct that Coggins did not

establish he had a property interest in continued employment entitling him

to due process. See Skeets v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (8th Cir.

1993) (employee terminable at will under Arkansas law has no property

interest triggering due process protections). 

We also agree with the district court that Coggins did not establish

that he had a protected liberty interest. See Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972) (plaintiff must show official publicly made

allegedly untrue charges against him in connection with discharge to

stigmatize him). Coggins's evidence showed, at most, that a Sheriff

Hutton, who is not a defendant, repeated to others that Coggins had been

accused of sexual harassment. Coggins offered no evidence to suggest that

any of the named defendants could be held accountable for Hutton's remarks.

Further, even assuming a protected interest was involved, defendants'

unrebutted evidence showed that Coggins received notice of the charges

against him and a pre-termination hearing at which he was represented by

counsel and could present evidence and witnesses; thus Coggins was afforded

all the process he was due. See Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Community

Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 426

(1994) (deprivation of liberty and property interests requires opportunity

to be heard at meaningful time and in meaningful manner).

The order is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.