[Cite as State v. Wampler, 2024-Ohio-2833.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee

v. 

CHARLES KEITH WAMPLER

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 29889

Trial Court Case No. 1982 CR 00764

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on July 26, 2024

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TIMOTHY B. HACKETT, Attorney for Appellant

 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Charles Keith Wampler appeals from his 2023 

resentencing for aggravated murder and other offenses that were committed several 

decades ago. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
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I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} In 1982, after his case was transferred from the juvenile court to the general 

division of the common pleas court and after a jury trial, Wampler was convicted of 

aggravated murder, rape, abduction, and abuse of a corpse. Wampler was 15 years old 

on the night the offenses were committed; he turned 16 at midnight. Wampler was 

sentenced to an aggregate sentence of life with an additional nine to 30 years in prison. 

{¶ 3} In 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Patrick, 164 Ohio St.3d 

309, 2020-Ohio-6803, 172 N.E.3d 952, which held that a trial court must expressly 

consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a sentence 

of life imprisonment, even if the sentence includes eligibility for parole. This holding was 

“essentially codified” in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b), which lists factors to consider when 

sentencing a juvenile defendant. State v. Watson, 2023-Ohio-1469, 213 N.E.3d 1175 

(5th Dist.). In July 2021, Wampler filed a motion for resentencing in which he argued that

he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing in accordance with Patrick, because the trial 

court did not take his youth into consideration at his original sentencing. The trial court 

granted the motion, and a hearing was conducted on July 7, 2023. 

{¶ 4} At the hearing, the trial court heard arguments from the State and defense 

counsel. The court also discussed certain factors relevant to the issue of Wampler’s 

youth at the time he committed the offenses. Wampler was then permitted to address 

the court. Following Wampler’s allocution, the trial court found that Wampler’s youth at 

the time of the offense did “not mitigate the sentence that was originally imposed and [did]

not warrant a lesser sentence being imposed.” Tr. p. 27. The court resentenced 
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Wampler to the same sentence that it had originally imposed. 

{¶ 5} Wampler filed a timely appeal. During the appellate process, it was 

discovered that the transcript of the sentencing hearing, specifically Wampler’s allocution, 

contained numerous instances where the transcriptionist typed “(indiscernible)” because 

she could not understand what Wampler had said. Specifically, in six pages of 

statements by Wampler, there were over 80 “indiscernible” notations. Wampler filed a 

notice that he was unable to complete the record due to the inadequate recording of the 

hearing. He subsequently filed a second notice detailing steps taken to amend the 

record to adequately reflect the statements he had made to the court. However, no filing 

comporting with App.R. 9(C) was tendered to the trial court or this court. This matter is 

now ripe for review. 

II. Analysis

{¶ 6} Wampler’s first and second assignments of error state:

THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO PRODUCE AN ADEQUATE 

RECORDING OF MR. WAMPLER’S ALLOCUTION AT RESENTENCING, 

A RIGHT THE OHIO SUPREME COURT HAS DEEMED “ABSOLUTE,” 

VIOLATED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL APPELLATE 

REVIEW. CRIM.R. 32(A); APP.R.9(A)92); FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 

AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. WAMPLER’S 
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CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR, NONARBITRARY, AND IMPARTIAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING, IN 

VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 

U.S. CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION.

{¶ 7} Wampler claims his allocution during the resentencing hearing refuted the 

findings and judgment of the trial court about his resentencing. Thus, he contends the 

lack of a complete transcript of his statements prevents him from being able to “raise 

various constitutional arguments” regarding the resentencing and also prevents this court 

from properly reviewing the trial court’s decision. 

{¶ 8} “The importance to meaningful appellate review of a complete, full, and 

unabridged transcript of the trial proceedings is well-established.” State v. Walton, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 20615, 2006-Ohio-1974, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Spirko v. Judges 

of the Court of Appeals, 27 Ohio St.3d 13, 17-18, 501 N.E.2d 625 (1986). Nevertheless, 

it is incumbent upon the defendant “to demonstrate how incompleteness in the record 

precludes effective appellate review. A general assertion that this is so will not suffice.” 

Id. at ¶ 13. “Defendant must demonstrate that effective review will be precluded, and 

that prejudice will result from the incompleteness of the record.” Id., citing State v. 

Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 652 N.E.2d 721 (1995). Without an indication that the 

defendant has been prejudiced by the absence of items from the record, reversible error 

will not be found. Id. 

{¶ 9} As noted above, the portion of the sentencing hearing transcript setting forth 
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Wampler’s allocution to the court contains numerous instances where the transcriptionist

indicated she was unable to discern his words. However, we disagree with Wampler’s 

claim that these omissions prevent us from properly reviewing his statements. We also

disagree with his claim that the statements rebut the trial court’s findings. 

{¶ 10} Instead, despite the omissions, it is quite clear that Wampler’s statements 

were directed at claims unrelated to whether his youth at the time of the offenses was a 

mitigating factor sufficient to require a reduction in his sentence. Specifically, Wampler, 

who maintained his innocence at resentencing, argued that his convictions were improper 

because they were not supported by sufficient evidence. He further argued that he had 

been denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that his trial had been marred 

by prosecutorial misconduct. In short, Wampler did not make any statements supporting 

his claim that his youth should have been considered a mitigating factor at sentencing. 

Thus, his statements had no bearing on the decision of the trial court. Because Wampler 

has not shown that the transcript of the sentencing hearing was so inadequate as to 

prevent us from reviewing his statements, we conclude that his assignments of error are 

without merit. 

{¶ 11} We note that, other than disagreeing with the trial court’s findings, Wampler 

fails to set forth any claim of error in the resentencing judgment. A review of the record 

demonstrates the trial court considered the evidence presented by Wampler and 

discussed the factors relevant to his youthfulness at the time of the offenses. The record 

does not reveal any error in the court’s findings, reasoning, conclusions, or judgment. 

{¶ 12} Furthermore, though not discussed by either party, this court has limited the 
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application of Patrick. In State v. Wiesenborn, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29388, 2022-

Ohio-3762, this court addressed the holding in Patrick in relation to a defendant who had 

completed all of his appeals, stating:

“A new judicial ruling may be applied only to cases that are pending on the 

announcement date. * * * The new judicial ruling may not be applied 

retroactively to a conviction that has become final, i.e., where the accused 

has exhausted all of his appellate remedies.” Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 

328, 2004-Ohio-6592, 819 N.E.2d 687, ¶ 6. Wiesenborn had no legal right 

to the application of Patrick to his case, even if we assume purely arguendo 

that it had some benefit to him, because he had no appeal pending when 

Patrick was decided. See State v. Hawkins, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-16 

(Decision and Entry, March 2, 2022) (refusing to apply Patrick on delayed 

reconsideration and holding that the rule of Patrick is procedural and does 

not apply retroactively). Furthermore, the trial court had no authority simply 

to vacate Wiesenborn's sentence, which was final, and to hold a new 

sentencing hearing. State v. Carlisle, 131 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio6553, 961 N.E.2d 671.

(Footnotes omitted.) Id. at ¶ 26. Other appellate districts have considered this issue and 

have likewise concluded that Patrick cannot be applied retroactively. See State v. 

Jarrett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111659, 2023-Ohio-811, ¶ 24; State v. Hale, 12th Dist. 

Butler Nos. CA2023-03-019 and CA2023-03-021, 2023-Ohio-3199, ¶ 11; State v. White, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230093, 2023-Ohio-4499, ¶ 12. 
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{¶ 13} Simply put, Wampler was not entitled to resentencing because Patrick does 

not apply retroactively. However, any error in permitting a review of his sentence under 

Patrick was harmless, because the trial court imposed the same sentence as it had 

originally imposed. 

{¶ 14} Wampler’s assignments of error are overruled. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 15} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

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WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.