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******************************************************IN RE YASIEL R.—FIRST CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT ZARELLA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. In the present case, the majority correctly determines that the trial court did not violate the constitutional rights of the respondent, Ashley P., when it allowed her to forgo a trial without canvassing her to
ensure that she understood the rights that she forfeited in doing so. Nevertheless, the majority invokes this court’s supervisory authority in order to reverse the judgments ofthe trial court. In my view, this use ofthe court’s supervisory authority is entirely unwarranted. Moreover, I write separately to emphasize that this court never should exercise its supervisory authority to reverse a judgment in the absence of independent grounds for reversal. Although I recognize that this courtpreviouslyhas exercisedits supervisoryauthority in this manner, and that I have joined in some ofthose decisions; see, e.g., State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 505–506, 973 A.2d 627 (2009); I no longer believe that it should. Proceduralrules announcedunderthe court’s supervisory authority should be given only prospective effectandnotbeusedtoreversejudgmentsinindividual
cases. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part.
I begin by briefly outlining the principles that previously have guided this court in its use of supervisory authority. ‘‘It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts possess aninherentsupervisoryauthorityoverthe administration of justice.

. . . Supervisory powers are exercised to direct trial courts to adoptjudicial procedures that will address matters that are of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also fortheperceivedfairness ofthejudicial system
as a whole.

. . . Under our supervisory authority, we have adopted rules intended to guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process

. . . and on the civil side, as well. Thus, this court has exercised its supervisory authority
over a wide variety of matters

. . . . We ordinarily invoke our supervisory powers to enunciate a rule that is not constitutionally required but that we think is preferable as a matter of policy.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kervick v. Silver Hill Hospital, 309 Conn. 688, 710, 72 A.3d 1044 (2013). ‘‘Supervisory authority is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly

. . . . Although [a]ppellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority
over the administration ofjustice

. . . [that] authority

. . . is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle.

. . . Our supervisory powers are not
a last bastion of hope for every untenable appeal. [Rather] [t]hey are an extraordinary remedy

. . . . Constitutional, statutory andprocedural limitations are generallyadequatetoprotecttherights ofthe defendantandthe integrity ofthejudicial system. Our supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance [in which] these traditional protections are inadequate to
ensure the fair and just administration of the courts.

. . . Overall, the integrity of the judicial system serves
as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate
use of our supervisory powers.

. . . Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is
a pervasive and significant problem

. . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internalquotationmarks omitted.) State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465, 498–99, 102 A.3d 52 (2014). ‘‘[W]e recently [have] explained that the cases in which this court has invoked its supervisory authority
can be divided into two different categories. In the first category are cases [in which] we have utilized our supervisory power[s] to articulate a procedural rule as
a matter of policy, either as holding or dictum, but without reversing [judgments] or portions thereof. In the second category are cases [in which] we have utilized our supervisory powers to articulate a rule or otherwise take measures necessary to remedy a perceived injustice with respect to a preserved or unpreserved claim on appeal. Although we recently have noted that [o]ur cases have not always been clear as to the reason for this distinction

. . . a review of the
cases in both categories demonstrates that, in contrast to the second category, the first category consists of
cases [in which] there was no perceived or actual injustice apparent on the record, but the facts of the case lent themselves to the articulation ofprophylactic procedural rules that might well avert such problems in the future.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carrion, 313 Conn. 823, 850, 100 A.3d 361 (2014); seealsoStatev.Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 768–70 n.30, 91 A.3d 862 (2014) (listing cases in both categories).
In my view, it is the second category of cases, in which we have used our supervisory authority to
reversejudgments, that is problematic. The fundamental problem with this practice is that it undermines the rule oflaw. To understandhow, we must examine more closely how we have used our supervisory authority to
reverse judgments in individual cases. The question of whether we should use our supervisory authority to reversejudgments in individual cases is really a question of whether we should retroactively applythe newruleswe announce underoursupervisory authority to the facts of the cases in which they are announced. In the past, we have not been consistent in how we have applied such new rules. In some cases,
we have announced rules underthe court’s supervisory authorityonlyprospectively. See, e.g.,Statev.Medrano,308 Conn. 604, 631, 65 A.3d 503 (2013) (directing trial courts to refrain from giving certain jury instruction and upholding judgment even though trial court had given such instruction); State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173, 191–92, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010) (directing trial courts to inquire into nature ofpleaagreements and upholding judgment even though trial court had failed to so inquire); State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 209–10, 749 A.2d 1192 (2000) (directing trial courts to refrain from using certain instructional language and affirmingjudgment even though trial court had used such language). Yet, in other cases, we have applied such rules retroactively to the facts of the case in which the rule is announced. Inthose cases, wesometimeshaveaffirmed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the court had unknowingly complied with the new rule; see, e.g., State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 534–35, 700 A.2d 14 (1997) (requiring trial courts to articulate reasons for imposing longer sentence after trial than state and defendant previously had agreed on pursuant to vacated guiltyplea and upholding defendant’s sentence because trial court sufficientlyhad articulatedsuchreasons); and sometimes have reversed the judgment on the groundthatthe trial courthad failedto complywith the new rule, even though the rule was not in effect at the time of trial. See, e.g., State v. Elson, supra, 311 Conn. 764, 784–85 (cautioning trial courts against commenting negatively on, at sentencing, defendant’s decision to exercise his right to trial and remanding case for new sentencing because trial court had done so); Statev.Rose, 305 Conn. 594, 605–606, 46A.3d 146 (2012) (adopting per se rule of reversibility when defendant is compelledto standtrialinidentifiableprison clothing andupholdingAppellate Court’s reversal oftrial court’s judgment because defendant had stood trial in such clothing); State v. Santiago, 245 Conn. 301, 332, 340, 715A.2d 1 (1998) (requiringtrialcourtsto conductmore extensive inquiry in order to investigate allegations of racial or ethnic bias on part of juror and reversing judgmentbecause trial courthadfailedto conduct such inquiry).1 Thus, there has been no rhyme or reason as to when the court has applied a new rule prospectively
or retroactively.
Scholars suggest that the decision to apply a new rule retroactively in the context of an individual case involves countervailing interests. See L. Fuller, The Morality ofLaw (1964) p. 57; see alsoJ. Fisch, ‘‘Retroactivity andLegal Change: An EquilibriumApproach,’’ 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1084–87 (1997). On the one hand, retroactively applying a new rule destroys the parties’ reliance interests by subjecting them to a rule ofwhich theyhad no priornotice. See, e.g., KaiserAluminum & Chemical Corp

. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 108 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (‘‘[t]he principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed whenthe conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal’’); see also L. Fuller, supra, p. 57 (‘‘[i]f [the] overruling is made retrospective, then the [party relying on the decision being overruled] loses out though he relied on a legal decision that was clearly in his favor’’). On the other hand, if the new rule is not appliedretroactively, andthepartywho soughtthe new rule doesnotreceivethebenefitofitseffect, thatparty’s incentive to suggest the promulgation of a new rule to enhance the administration of the judicial system is undermined. See L. Fuller, supra, p. 57; J. Fisch, supra, 1085–86. This concern, itseemsto me, pales in comparison to the fairness and due process concerns that are raisedwhen apartyis subjectedto arule ofwhichithad
no prior notice. Nevertheless, the impact of imposing retroactive rules also should be examined from the perspective ofnot onlyindividual cases, butthejudicial system as a whole.
When viewed from the perspective ofthe entirejudicial system, it is clear to me that we should not give retroactive effect to new rules announced under our supervisory authority because doing so subverts the rule of law. At its essence, the rule of law ‘‘conveys

an ideal of governmental power and discretion being exercised and constrained within a framework of rules.’’ J. Waldron, ‘‘Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach,’’ 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2012). ‘‘Theruleoflawrequirespeopleinpositions ofauthority to exercisetheirpowerundertheauthority, andwithina constraining framework, ofpublic norms (laws) rather than on the basis of their own preferences or ideology

. . . .’’ Id., 3; cf. R. Kozel, ‘‘Precedent and Reliance,’’ 62 Emory L.J. 1459, 1464 (2013) (rule of law ensures that ‘‘bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The judiciary’s adherence to the rule of law is a defining characteristic of any healthy democracy, as it provides individuals with ‘‘clarity, certainty, predictability, [and] trustworthiness’’ as to the rules that govern their lives. J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) p. 272.
We undermine the rule of law when we promulgate
a new rule under the court’s supervisory authority and then reverse atrial court’sjudgment on the ground that the trial court had failed to comply with that new rule, which did not exist at the time of trial. As I previously discussed, this court has observed that ‘‘the integrity ofthejudicial system serves as a unifying principle’’ to guide our use of supervisory authority; (internal quotation marks omitted) Statev. Edwards, supra, 314 Conn. 498; and that we use our supervisory authority to
reverse ajudgment onlywhen it ‘‘is necessaryto ensure that justice is achieved in [a] particular case.’’ State v. Carrion, supra, 313 Conn. 852. When, however, the only principles constraining ouruse ofsupervisoryauthority
are concepts such as ‘‘integrity’’ and ‘‘justice,’’ we arenot really constrained at all. See KaiserAluminum & Chemical Corp

. v.Bonjorno, supra, 494U.S. 857 (Scalia, J., concurring) (‘‘Manifestinjustice, Ifear, isjustasurrogate for policy preferences.

. . . [When discussing the standard of manifest injustice] one is not really talking about justice at all, but about mercy, or compassion,
or social utility, or whatever other policy motivation might make one favor a particular result.’’ [Internal quotationmarks omitted.]). Indeed, we openlyacknowledge the fact that the rules that we craft pursuant to the court’s supervisory authority are simply rules that ‘‘we think [are] preferable as amatter ofpolicy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kervick v. Silver Hill Hospital, supra, 309 Conn. 710. Thus, when we retroactively apply such rules to reversejudgments, we decide
cases not on the basis of controlling legal principles, but on the court’s policy preferences. Constantly exercising the court’s supervisory authority in this manner compromises the legitimacy of this court. SeeStatev. Carrion, supra, 313 Conn. 854 (Zarella, J., concurring) (‘‘invoking this authority too easily and too often can undermine the very integrity of the judicial system that this authority is designed to protect’’). As the final arbiter oflegal disputes in this state, thereisnothingtorestrainthecourtinitsuse ofsupervisory authority but the court itself. As long as this court allows itself to reverse judgments in individual cases under its supervisory authority, litigants cannotbe sure whether we will decide such cases on the basis of our constitution, statutes, and precedent, on the one hand,
orourownpolicypreferences, onthe other. Suchuncertainty erodes the predictability and public confidence that adherence to the rule oflaw fosters. State v. Elson, supra, 311 Conn. 771 (expansive use of supervisory authority may lead to ‘‘arbitrary, result oriented, and undisciplined jurisprudence’’). Moreover, byinvokingthe court’ssupervisoryauthority to reversejudgments in individual cases, we contradict our continual assertion that our supervisory authority does not serve as ‘‘a last bastion of hope for every untenable appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, supra, 314 Conn. 498. That is exactly what we have turned our supervisory authority into by using it, as we do in the present case, to
reverse judgments in the absence of legal grounds for reversal. Aslongaswe continueto exercise oursupervisory authority in this manner, claimants willjustifiably seek to prevail under the court’s supervisory authority, regardless ofwhethertheirlegalclaims are meritorious.
In my view, these considerations significantly outweigh the aforementioned policy considerations that support the retroactive application of new rules. As I previously discussed, the interests of the party that wouldbenefitfromhavingthe newrule appliedretroactively always will be offset by the interest ofthe oppos-ing party who had no notice of the new rule. Most importantly, whatever the cost to individual litigants of not applying a rule retroactively, it would be vastly outweighed by the benefits of adhering to the rule of law. With respect to our ability to supervise thejudicial system, prospectively applying new rules articulated under our supervisory authority will not diminish the number of opportunities we have to do so. In the vast majority of cases, including the present case, requests to exercise our supervisory authority are accompanied by legal claims. See, e.g., State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 506 (exercisingsupervisoryauthorityafterrejecting defendant’s constitutional claims). Thus, when this court is presented with an unsuccessful legal or constitutional claim, we nevertheless willbe ableto recognize the needforandto implementaproceduralfixbypromulgating aprospective rule. Limiting our use ofsupervisory authority to creating only prospective rules therefore will not constrain our ability to appropriately
oversee and administer the system ofjustice.2 Accordingly, we no longer should invoke the court’s supervisory authority to reverse judgments in the absence of independent grounds for reversal, as this practice risks ‘‘entrenching the rule of men rather than the rule of law.’’ J. Waldron, supra, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 7.
To be sure, I do not suggest that the court never should exercise its supervisory authority. The court can properly continueto announceprophylacticprocedural rules in order to ensure the sound administration of the judicial system. Such an exercise of supervisory authority does not diminish the rule of law because it does not require the court to change the outcome of
an individual case on the basis ofjudge made rules that
are essentially creatures of policy rather than the law. We properly may articulate new rules pursuant to our supervisory authority regardless of whether we are reversing ajudgment on the basis ofindependent legal grounds raised on appeal, as long as we apply the new rule prospectively and not to the facts of the case in which it is announced. Applying new rules prospectively ‘‘ensure[s] public confidence in the integrity of thejudicial system’’; (internal quotationmarks omitted) Statev. Elson, supra, 311 Conn. 773; without contravening the rule of law. Finally, I note that an alternative to limiting our use of supervisory authority to announce only prospective rules would be to self-impose additional limitations on the use of our supervisory authority to reverse judgments. I have no confidence, however, that this more moderate proposal would be effective. Justices of this court, including myself, have, for decades, authored dissenting and concurring opinions counseling against the excessive use of supervisory authority. See, e.g., State v. Carrion, supra, 313 Conn. 854 (Zarella, J., concurring);Statev.Rose, supra, 305 Conn. 629–33 (Zarella, J., dissenting); State v. Santiago, supra, 245 Conn. 341,351 (Callahan, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Coleman, supra, 242 Conn. 549–50 ( Norcott, J., concurring). As Justice Espinosa details in her concurring and dissenting opinion, those calls for restraint have gone unheeded, as the court has only exercised its supervisory authority with increasing frequency.3 This makes it highly doubtful that additional self-imposed conditions on the use of supervisory authority would lead this court to resist the use of its supervisory authority to reverse judgments in individual cases. In sum, I disagree with the majority that the facts of the present case warrant the use of our supervisory authorityto require trial courts, inparental rightstermination proceedings, to canvass parents who elect to forgo acontestedtrial. Furthermore, I disagree withthe majority’s retroactive application of that new canvass requirement in the present case and its use ofits supervisory authority to reverse the judgments of the trial court on the ground that the trial court had failed to conduct such a canvass, which was not required at the time of the termination proceedings. Finally, I emphasize that, in future cases, the court should give only prospective effect to new rules articulated pursuant to its supervisory authority and not use its supervisory authority to reverse judgments in individual cases. If
we are to uphold the ideal of the rule of law, we must decide cases on the basis of existing legal principles, not on the basis ofour own policyjudgments regarding the administration of the judicial system. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

1 Further complicating this history of our inconsistent application ofnew rules crafted under our supervisory authority is the fact that the prospective effect of such new rules is not always clear. See State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 242, 881 A.2d 160 (2005) (declining to reversejudgmentwhen trial court had failed to heed this court’s prior direction, pursuant to its supervisory authority, to discontinue use of certain jury instruction).

2 Furthermore, the Rules Committee of the Superior Court entertains improvements to our rules of practice on an ongoing basis. Proposed improvements can be and are submitted to the Rules Committee byjudges, lawyers, bar associations, members of the legislature, and members of the public, as well as other associations.

3 Justice Espinosa offers two possible explanations for this increase: (1)

aself-conferredpowersuch as oursupervisory authority ‘‘lacks limits unless [they] are self-imposed’’; and (2) ‘‘after the court announced the existence ofits supervisory authority in [State v. Ubaldi, 190 Conn. 559, 575, 462 A.2d 1001, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916, 104 S. Ct. 280, 78 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1983)], the court seems simplyto have assumed itsvalidity and has not given significant consideration to establishing and adhering to any parameters for its exercise.’’ Iagreewiththose explanationsbutwouldaddathirdpossible explanation—the court in Ubaldi, which first established limitations on the use of the court’s supervisory authority, failed to comply with its own limitations. See State v. Ubaldi, supra, 572–73. Thus, Ubaldi, sub silencio, fostered a low bar for future use of this court’s supervisory authority. In Ubaldi, the defendant, Charles F. Ubaldi, claimed that the trial court improperly had denied his motions for a mistrial after the assistant state’s attorney (prosecutor) engaged in deliberate prosecutorial misconduct. See id., 561. The state claimed that, even if the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct, Ubaldiwasrequiredtoprove thatsuchmisconductwasharmful in order to receive a new trial. See id., 565. The court rejected this argument andorderedanewtrialpursuanttoits supervisoryauthority; id., 575; withoutdetermining whether the trial court had abused its discretion or whether Ubaldi had been deprived ofa fair trial. See id., 564–75. As Justice Espinosa explains inher concurring and dissenting opinion, the court in Ubaldi apparently established that supervisory authority should be ‘‘invoked only when its exercise is necessary and the interests involved are ofthe utmost importance, and when an evaluation of the interests involved reveals that the balance weighs in favor of invoking the authority.’’ The circumstances in Ubaldi, however, failed to meet this standard. It unquestionably was not necessary to reverse Ubaldi’s conviction through the use of the court’s supervisory authority in order to undo the harm wrought by the prosecutor’s deliberate misconduct because, as the court in Ubaldi acknowledged, other states deter such misconduct ‘‘through contempt sanctions, disciplinaryboards or othermeans.’’ Statev. Ubaldi, supra, 190 Conn. 571. Additionally, in weighing the countervailing interests to reversing Ubaldi’s conviction, the court failed to account for the inherent cost to the state and the judiciary in requiring them to use resources to retry a case in which the guilt ofthe defendant was not in doubt. Cf. Teague

v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting cost of retrying cases after retroactive application of new rule). Because this court was unable to adhere to the limitations on the use ofits supervisory authority in the very case in which those limitations were announced, itshouldcome asno surprisethatthose limitations subsequently have rung hollow.