Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-31187

Summary Calendar

UMEKKI L GREEN

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND

AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:07-CV-1819

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Umekki Green, proceeding pro se, contests the summary judgment

awarded the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and

Agricultural and Mechanical College (LSU), but only on two procedural points:

the district court’s not giving Green adequate time to obtain new counsel; and,

(2) its denying Green’s motion to supplement the record. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 8, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-31187

2

Green, a black female, was employed at the R.L. Redd Swanson Center for

the Youth as a graduate social worker. Louisiana law, and Green’s job, required

her to be licensed by the State Board of Social Workers. Although Green was

warned in November and December 2005 that her provisional license would

expire on 31 December 2005, she allowed it to do so. In January 2006, she was

suspended without pay until she renewed it. She did so and returned to work

at the end of that month. 

Upon her return, she appealed her suspension without pay; the State Civil

Service Commission determined suspension without pay was an inappropriate

sanction; a Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed; and Green received back pay for

the suspension period. She resigned from her position in March 2006. 

In October 2006, she filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC,

claiming the January 2006 suspension constituted racial discrimination. The

EEOC mailed a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter in July 2007. 

Green filed this action in November 2007, claiming discrimination on the

basis of race and gender, retaliation for having engaged in protected activity, a

hostile-work environment, and constructive discharge. In September 2008,

Green’s counsel withdrew, and she was given 45 days to obtain new counsel or

to proceed pro se. 

LSU moved for summary judgment that October. On 24 October, Green

advised she would proceed pro se. On 10 November, 2008, the district court

granted LSU summary judgment, concluding: Green failed to make a prima facie

case of her racial-discrimination claims; and Green had failed to exhaust her

non-racial-discrimination claims, because her EEOC complaint only addressed

discrimination on the basis of race. 

As noted, Green challenges only the amount of time the district court

granted her to obtain new counsel and that court’s denial of her motion to

supplement the record. In other words, she does not contest the summary
No. 08-31187

3

judgment on the merits. Accordingly, she has abandoned this issue. See, e.g.,

Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Although we

liberally construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require that arguments

must be briefed to be preserved.”) (citations omitted). Assuming she does

challenge the summary judgment, it was proper, essentially for the reasons

stated by the district court. In addition, Green falls far short of adequately

briefing either issue presented. 

Because Green failed to object to the time given her to obtain new counsel,

we review this issue only for plain error. E.g., Love v. Nat’l Med. Enter., Inc.,

230 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 2000) (error raised for the first time on appeal

regarding “procedural propriety of the summary judgment ruling” is reviewed

for plain error only.) “To obtain relief, [Green] must show: (1) error; (2) that is

plain (clear or obvious); and (3) that affects [her] substantial rights.” United

States v. Rojas-Gutierrez, 510 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2007). Even if this showing

is made, it is within our discretion to correct the error; generally, we will do so

only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. 

Green has not established that the 45 days granted her to obtain new

counsel was error. “A trial court’s exercise of its discretion to either grant or

deny a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). The

summary record does not indicate that 45 days constituted an inadequate

amount of time for Green to obtain new counsel, nor that she was otherwise

afforded an inadequate amount of time to respond to the summary-judgment

motion. Accordingly, Green has not shown plain error.

For her other issue, Green contends the district court erred by denying her

motion to supplement the record. On 22 December 2008, more than a month

after the 10 November 2008 final judgment and 17 days after Green filed her
No. 08-31187

4

notice of appeal, she moved the district court to supplement the record. (The

district court did not deny Green’s motion; it rejected it as deficient.) “The filing

of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance–it confers

jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control

over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident

Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). In short, the district court

lacked jurisdiction to consider Green’s motion.

AFFIRMED.