J-A04017-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

JOHN FARRELL,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 590 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 4, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004372-2014

CP-51-CR-0004375-2014

CP-51-CR-0004378-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STRASSBURGER, J.* and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2020

John Farrell (Appellant) appeals1from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his convictions for aggravated assault, conspiracy, and 

possession of an instrument of crime (PIC). We affirm.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that Appellant should have filed a separate notice of appeal from 

each of the three separate trial court docket numbers. See Pa.R.A.P. 

341(a); see also Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 

2018) (holding that “where a single order resolves issues arising on more 

than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for each of those 

cases”). However, our Supreme Court’s mandate applies prospectively to 

appeals filed after the date of the Walker decision, i.e., June 1, 2018. 

Because the instant appeal was filed on February 20, 2018, the Walker

holding does not apply and we decline to quash the appeal on this basis.
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The underlying charges stem from an incident on March 21, 2014, 

where Appellant and four co-defendants attacked a group of high school 

students, stabbing and seriously injuring three of them. We glean the 

following facts from the record. On March 21, 2014, at about 10 p.m., 

Appellant and co-defendants Hellena Andro, David Cramp, Ryan Palen, and 

Tyler Bollinger encountered the group of students, including Joseph Galasso, 

James Galasso, and Thomas Bayer (collectively, the Victims2). Appellant 

and the co-defendants initiated a physical fight with the Victims by throwing 

glass beer bottles at them. The Victims, who were unarmed, responded by 

engaging in a fistfight, punching Appellant and the co-defendants. In the 

end, the Victims were stabbed multiple times with knives and suffered 

critical injuries that required hospitalization. Joseph suffered three stab 

wounds, James suffered eight, and Thomas suffered five. Appellant and the 

co-defendants ran from the scene to the residence of Bollinger’s father, 

where Bollinger hid two knives that were used in the assault. The knives 

were recovered pursuant to a search warrant executed the following day. 

Based on investigation, the police identified Appellant as one of the 

individuals suspected of stabbing the Victims.

Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with aggravated 

assault and related offenses at three separate lower court docket numbers 

____________________________________________

2 We will refer to individual victims by their first names as two of the Victims 

share the same last name.
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for each victim, and was listed for a consolidated jury trial with his codefendants. Prior to trial, co-defendants Andro, Cramp, and Palen pleaded

guilty. Thereafter, the Commonwealth agreed to sever the trials of 

Appellant and Bollinger. Appellant’s trial, which was held first, resulted in a 

mistrial due to a hung jury. The Commonwealth then moved to consolidate 

Appellant’s and Bollinger’s cases for a joint jury trial, which the trial court 

granted. After several continuances, the consolidated jury trial was 

scheduled for October 10, 2017. Before trial started on that date, Bollinger 

entered into a negotiated guilty plea. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial 

from October 10 to 16, 2017. 

At the conclusion of the jury trial Appellant was found guilty of three

counts of aggravated assault, and one count each of conspiracy to commit 

aggravated assault and PIC. On January 4, 2018, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to the following terms of incarceration: 5 to 15 years each for

aggravated assault of Joseph and James, 6 to 18 years for aggravated 

assault of Thomas, 5 to 10 years for conspiracy, and 21⁄2 to 5 years for PIC. 

The aggravated assault convictions are to run consecutive to each other, 

with the other sentences to run concurrent, resulting in an aggregate term 

of incarceration of 16 to 48 years. N.T., 1/4/2018, at 75-78. Appellant was 

also ordered to undergo anger management and parenting classes, comply 

with the recommendations of a dual diagnosis assessment, receive 
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vocational training, have no contact with the Victims or witnesses, pay 

restitution to Thomas, and pay court costs and fines. Id. at 74-75, 77.

On January 16, 2018, Appellant timely3filed a post-sentence motion 

for reconsideration of sentence, in which he challenged the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. Aside from amending Appellant’s sentence to 

provide Appellant credit for time served while on house arrest, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 23, 2018.

This timely-filed appeal followed.4 On appeal, Appellant challenges the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence of 16 to 48 years of incarceration. 

Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant alleges there is an unexplained disparity 

between his sentence and that of his co-defendants, and claims the trial 

court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs and lack of criminal record.5 

Id. at 10-11. Thus, we consider his issue mindful of the following.

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3 See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall 

on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of 

this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from 

the computation.”). 

4 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

5

Insofar as Appellant claims in his brief that the trial court failed to consider 

the sentencing guidelines, the nature of the offense, and evidence of 

mitigation concerning Appellant’s character, Appellant waived these issues 

by failing to raise them in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(3)(iv) (“[A]ny issue not properly included in the [s]tatement timely 

filed and served pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be deemed waived.”); see 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

* * *

When imposing [a] sentence, a court is required to 

consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the 

character of the defendant. In considering these factors, the 

court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, 

personal characteristics and potential for rehabilitation. 

Commonwealth v. DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1074-75 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 

2014)). 

An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an 

appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the 

appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the 

following four factors: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a 

fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

also Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) ("Any issues 

not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”).
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DiClaudio, 210 A.3d at 1075 (quoting Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 

A.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Pa. Super. 2014)). 

Appellant has satisfied the first three requirements: he timely filed a 

notice of appeal, preserved the issue in a post-sentence motion, and 

included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. Therefore, we now 

consider whether Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review.

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 

825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question exists only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, Appellant asserted three instances 

in which the trial court abused its discretion: 1) penalizing Appellant for 

exercising his right to a trial as his co-defendants who entered negotiated 

guilty pleas received shorter sentences; 2) failing to consider his lack of 
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criminal record; and 3) failing to consider his rehabilitative needs.6 

Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.

We conclude Appellant has raised a substantial question with each of 

his claims. Commonwealth v. Cleveland, 703 A.2d 1046, 1048 (Pa. 

Super. 1997) (holding substantial question raised where Cleveland averred 

an unexplained disparity between his sentence and that of his codefendant); Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (“It is well-established that a sentencing court’s failure to consider 

mitigating factors raises a substantial question.”). Accordingly, we review 

the merits of his claims.

Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion because the 

disparity between his sentence and co-defendants’ is “astonishing,” and to 

justify the sentencing disparity “based solely on pleading guilty or 

proceeding to trial, would have the effect of punishing a defendant for 

exercising his right to a jury trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. Additionally, 

Appellant argues the trial court failed to consider his lack of criminal record 

and rehabilitative needs. Id. at 15. In support, he states he was a victim of 

abuse as a child, had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, mood swings, and oppositional 

defiance disorder. Id.

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6 As stated supra, Appellant included other issues that he waived by failing 

to raise them in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
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In addressing these claims, the trial court posited that Appellant failed 

to raise a substantial question. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 2/14/2019, at 13, 17. 

Regardless, the trial court stated that even if Appellant did raise a 

substantial question, the trial court “thoroughly addressed the reasons for 

differences in the sentencing schemes” at sentencing between Appellant and 

his co-defendants. Id. at 12. The court noted before it imposed Appellant’s 

sentence, it thoroughly reviewed the pre-sentence investigative (PSI) report

and mental health assessments. Id. at 19. Moreover, the court stated it 

“clearly acknowledged Appellant’s lack of prior criminal record” during 

discussions involving the computation of the offense gravity score of each 

offense coupled with the zero prior record score. Id. The court concluded

that it considered all relevant sentencing factors, and Appellant’s sentences 

accounted for his multiple victims. Id. at 21-22.

This Court has held that a co-defendant who has entered a negotiated 

guilty plea and a defendant who is sentenced after a jury trial “are not 

similarly situated for sentencing purposes.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 

992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). Thus, any disparity 

in sentencing between a co-defendant sentenced pursuant to a negotiated 

plea deal and a defendant sentenced after trial “does not demonstrate the 

trial court penalized the defendant for exercising his right to a jury trial.” 

Id. Furthermore, a defendant is not entitled to the same sentence as that 

imposed on another person involved in the same crime. Commonwealth v. 
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Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 589 (Pa. Super. 2010). Rather, “when there is 

a disparity between co-defendants’ sentences, a sentencing court must give 

reasons particular to each defendant explaining why they received their 

individual sentences.” Id. (citation omitted).

At sentencing, the trial court offered extensive reasons for imposing

Appellant’s sentence, including, inter alia, the seriousness of the crime,

impact on the victims, the need to protect the public, and Appellant’s lack of 

remorse. N.T., 1/4/2018, at 67, 71, 73. Specifically, the trial court noted

that Appellant displayed an “extreme level of violence[,]” he inflicted severe 

damage upon the Victims that will last throughout their lifetimes, he posed

“a danger to the community at large,” and he displayed “absolute lack of 

remorse.” Id. Furthermore, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the trial court 

stated on the record that Appellant’s longer sentence was not punishment 

for going to trial; rather, the disparity was a result of the foregoing, and his 

co-defendants having pleaded guilty and “accept[ing] responsibility for their 

actions.” Id. at 28, 36, 73. Additionally, the trial court noted Appellant’s 

co-defendants, except for Bollinger, were sentenced “before a different 

judge.” Id. at 73.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court sufficiently explained the 

reasons for Appellant’s sentences. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in imposing upon Appellant a higher aggregate 

sentence than what his co-defendants received as part of their guilty pleas.
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In fashioning Appellant’s sentence, the trial court noted that Appellant 

suffered abuse as a child, used drugs, and suffers from extreme mood 

swings. Therefore, the trial court ordered Appellant to undergo anger 

management and parenting classes, receive vocational training, and comply 

with the recommendations of a dual diagnosis assessment and any 

recommended treatment for mental health and drug use. In addition, the 

trial court possessed and reviewed Appellant’s PSI report, and stated it 

reviewed the sentencing guidelines prior to imposing Appellant’s sentence.

See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 154 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(stating that where the sentencing court has the benefit of a PSI report, it is 

presumed to have considered all relevant information). Therefore, contrary 

to Appellant’s claim, the record indicates that the trial court referred to 

Appellant’s lack of criminal record and considered Appellant’s rehabilitative 

needs when imposing Appellant’s sentence. Accordingly, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentence.

Because Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief 

on any of his claims, we affirm Appellant’s judgments of sentence.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/22/2020