FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 07-10174 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-05-01145-SMM

CRISTINO LOPEZ-MARTINEZ,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 12, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed September 10, 2008

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, M. Margaret McKeown, and

Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

12671
COUNSEL

Michael Shay Ryan, Kent & Ryan, P.L.C., Phoenix, Arizona,

for the defendant-appellant. 

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ 12675
Tracey A. Bardorf, Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix,

Arizona, for the plaintiff-appellee. 

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: 

After a five-day trial, a jury convicted Cristino LopezMartinez of one count of conspiracy to bring aliens to the

United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I);

one count of aiding and abetting bringing aliens to the United

States resulting in death, in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv); three counts of aiding and abetting bringing aliens to the United States for profit, in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii); and one count of illegal re-entry

after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). LopezMartinez now appeals his conviction (except the illegal reentry count) on a multitude of grounds, attacking the actions

of the judge, the prosecutor, and the jury. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Lopez-Martinez was convicted based largely on the testimony of Eduardo Camacho-Reyes. The following account of

events is taken from that testimony. In the summer of 2005,

Camacho-Reyes hired Miguel Cruz-Morales to bring him, his

wife, and his two young daughters from Mexico to the United

States through the Arizona desert. For this service, CamachoReyes agreed to pay $1,800. 

In late September, the Camacho-Reyes family traveled to

Northern Mexico, where they were met by Miguel and his

brother, Cecilio Cruz-Morales, who took them to a house to

await the rest of the group that would travel with them. Two

evenings later, after the rest of the group arrived, they took a

bus into the desert and then began walking. It was at this point

12676 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ
that Camacho-Reyes first saw the man known as “Pedro,”

whom he later identified as Cristino Lopez-Martinez, the

defendant. 

As they walked, Lopez-Martinez and each of the CruzMorales brothers alternated walking at the front of the group,

with one of the others in the middle of the group, and the

other one at the back. During breaks, the three men gathered

away from the rest of the group and spoke in an indigenous

dialect. 

The group walked for two nights and two days. Around the

middle of the second day, Araceli Escobar-Villa, CamachoReyes’ wife, collapsed. When Lopez-Martinez came back to

check on the family, Camacho-Reyes, who had seen him earlier with a cell phone, asked Lopez-Martinez to call the immigration authorities. Lopez-Martinez replied that he would do

so, but only after he moved the rest of the group further ahead

“so that he didn’t lose them all.” Lopez-Martinez returned to

the Camacho-Reyes group twice more. After returning for the

second time, and learning that Escobar-Villa was dead,

Lopez-Martinez left and never returned. About twenty minutes after Lopez-Martinez left, the border patrol independently discovered the group, provided them medical care, and

then began processing them for removal to Mexico. 

Lopez-Martinez and Miguel Cruz-Morales were found by

the border patrol early the next morning, hiding under a bush

behind an Exxon station in nearby Dateland, Arizona. When

the border patrol agent asked the pair whether they had left

anyone out in the desert, Lopez-Martinez replied, “No.”

Eventually, the border patrol discovered that Lopez-Martinez

and Cruz-Morales were part of the group rescued earlier that

day. Camacho-Reyes picked Lopez-Martinez and the CruzMorales brothers out of a lineup as the leaders of the group.

Lopez-Martinez was arrested, tried, and convicted. 

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ 12677
II. ANALYSIS

A. THE TRIAL

Lopez-Martinez was tried before a jury. The trial judge

played an active role in the trial. During a break in the prosecution’s direct examination of Camacho-Reyes, after the jury

had been excused, the judge asked counsel to remain. The

judge then explained that he had “some concerns about the

quantum of evidence.” To the prosecutor, the judge directed:

[Y]ou have to get the underlying facts out . . . .

[T]here’s no indication as to when [Lopez-Martinez]

was leading what [Camacho-Reyes] observed, what

he saw [the alleged smugglers] do. And until you can

get some factual underpinnings there, just to let

[Camacho-Reyes] say, I think [Lopez-Martinez] was

a smuggler, there’s no facts by which to help the jury

out. 

The judge and prosecutor went back and forth for a time, with

the prosecutor explaining how she had made, or planned to

make, her case, and the judge explaining where he found

holes in her evidence and what sort of testimony would be

necessary to fill in the gaps. Contrary to Lopez-Martinez’s

view of the exchange, the judge’s remarks were not improper.

[1] Lopez-Martinez seems to believe that a trial judge’s

only role is to call “balls and strikes,” standing by to observe

and occasionally ruling on objections pitched out by the attorneys. This characterization misconceives the role of the trial

judge: “A trial judge is more than an umpire.” United States

v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th Cir. 1988). And during a

jury trial, the judge is surely more than a robed figurehead

who simply observes the proceedings and keeps order. As we

have explained, a judge “may participate in the examination

of witnesses to clarify evidence, confine counsel to evidenti12678 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ
ary rulings, ensure the orderly presentation of evidence, and

prevent undue repetition.” Id.

[2] Although we have not had an opportunity, until now, to

directly address the question, our sister circuits have held that

there is nothing wrong with a judge suggesting a line of questioning to an attorney. See United States v. Ramos, 413 F.2d

743, 746 (1st Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (holding suggestions

“by trial judges to prosecutors concerning elements of proof

and appropriate lines of inquiry have often been held proper,

even when made in the presence of the jury”); Fischer v.

United States, 212 F.2d 441, 444-45 (10th Cir. 1954) (noting

the “court has the power, within reasonable bounds, to question a witness . . . and there is no reason why it may not direct

an attorney to pursue a line of questioning if it is relevant to

the case”). We agree with the reasoning of these courts; it

would be disingenuous to condemn the trial judge’s inquiry

here, given that it is already well established that the judge

may question the witness directly. 

[3] We are mindful, of course, that in some cases —

although not here — the trial judge’s inquiries and suggestions may cross the line and affect the judge’s role as an

impartial participant in the trial process. “A trial judge’s participation [can] overstep[ ] the bounds of propriety and

deprive[ ] the parties of a fair trial . . . when ‘the record discloses actual bias . . . or leaves the reviewing court with an

abiding impression that the judge’s remarks and questioning

of witnesses projected to the jury an appearance of advocacy

or partiality.” United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1119

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Mostella, 802 F.2d

358, 361 (9th Cir. 1986)). The judge’s remarks objected to by

Lopez-Martinez were made outside the presence of the jury,

and evidenced no bias on the part of the judge. 

[4] On the contrary, the record suggests that the trial

judge’s intent was to protect Lopez-Martinez and the fair trial

process. After Lopez-Martinez objected to the judge’s colloUNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ 12679
quy with the prosecutor, and insinuated that the court was

encouraging the prosecution to manufacture testimony, the

judge explained that he was concerned that he could not grant

a Rule 29 motion in Lopez-Martinez’s favor without giving

the prosecution a chance to meet his concerns.1 Additionally,

the judge emphasized that Lopez-Martinez was facing a very

serious sentence, and that he did not want to see LopezMartinez convicted on accusations unsupported by evidence.

The clear import of this record, then, is not bias toward

Lopez-Martinez, but rather the judge’s desire to shore up any

Rule 29 ruling in Lopez-Martinez’s favor against appeal, and

to ensure that if Lopez-Martinez was convicted, it was on the

basis of evidence, not speculation. Given the absence of evidence of actual (or even implied) bias and the lack of any

effect on the jury, there is no basis for Lopez-Martinez’s

claim that the trial judge’s remarks were improper.

In presenting its case, the prosecution introduced expert

testimony from Border Patrol Agent Hector Martinez. After

recounting his experience and training, Agent Martinez testified about the methods and patterns of human smugglers in

the Yuma area. On appeal, for the first time, Lopez-Martinez

argues that Agent Martinez should not have been allowed to

testify as an expert.2 We disagree. 

[5] As the Supreme Court emphasized in Kumho Tire Co.,

Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), with respect to

expert testimony “the test of reliability is ‘flexible’ [and] the

law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it

1Rule 29 provides in part: “After the government closes its evidence or

after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion

must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence

is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a). 

2Because Lopez-Martinez did not raise this issue below, we review the

admission of this testimony only for plain error, and will “only reverse if

the district court committed a clear or obvious error that affected substantial rights or was prejudicial.” United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402,

408 (9th Cir. 1996). 

12680 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ
decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to

its ultimate reliability determination.” Id. at 141-42. LopezMartinez’s objections boil down to criticism of the trial judge

for not conducting a more formal Daubert hearing, or requiring Agent Martinez to give a precise description of each step

in the logical chain he used to arrive at his conclusions. See

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589

(1993). But, these procedures are not required under Supreme

Court precedent or our own case law. 

[6] Agent Martinez, who has fourteen years of experience

as a border patrol agent, including five as the intelligence

chief for the Yuma station, testified about patterns and methods common among smugglers in the Yuma area. This evidence was neither rocket science nor complex statistical

modeling. Agent Martinez’s explanation of his methods and

experience was sufficient for the trial judge to be confident in

their reliability. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating expert testimony may be admitted whenever “it will assist the trier of

fact,” and that a witness may be qualified by, inter alia, experience, training, or education). The court did not plainly err in

admitting this testimony.

[7] In light of Agent Martinez’s testimony, as well as the

testimony of the other witnesses, neither did the court err in

denying Lopez-Martinez’s Rule 29 motion. When viewed in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury

could easily have found the evidence sufficient. See United

States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Evidence

is sufficient to support a conviction if viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (internal quotations omitted).

The main fact in dispute at trial was whether the prosecution had sufficiently demonstrated that Lopez-Martinez was a

foot guide for the group, as opposed to just another client of

the smugglers. That this fact was disputed, however, does not

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ 12681
mean that the jury unreasonably found Lopez-Martinez guilty;

the jury’s job as the factfinder was precisely to resolve disputed issues of fact. 

[8] Camacho-Reyes testified that Lopez-Martinez led the

group during the times when he was in front, and that he

would regularly switch places with the Morales brothers in

what appeared to be a coordinated fashion. During breaks,

Lopez-Martinez and the Morales brothers would gather away

from the rest of the group, and talk among themselves. LopezMartinez had a cell phone with him, which would be very

unusual for a smuggling client, but common for a smuggler.

And, Agent Martinez confirmed that Lopez-Martinez’s

behavior, as described by Camacho-Reyes, fit the patterns that

he had observed among smugglers. Viewing the testimony in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that LopezMartinez was one of the guides, not simply a client of the

Morales brothers. 

[9] Lopez-Martinez’s remaining arguments in support of

his Rule 29 motion are based on misapprehensions of the

applicable law. Contrary to Lopez-Martinez’s assertion, a

defendant need not personally know a victim or directly cause

the victim’s death to be convicted of bringing aliens to the

United States resulting in death under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv). All that is required under this section is

that a defendant know he is bringing aliens to the United

States and that the bringing of those aliens to the United

States “results in the death of any person.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv). Any argument by Lopez-Martinez that he

did not know the others in the group were illegal aliens strains

credulity. 

[10] Similarly, Lopez-Martinez’s argument that the government failed to establish that he was working for financial gain

fails to appreciate the relevant law; where a defendant is

charged with aiding and abetting the bringing of aliens to the

12682 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ
United States for financial gain, as Lopez-Martinez was, the

government need only show that the principals stood to benefit financially from the smuggling. See United States v. Tsai,

282 F.3d 690, 697 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because Tsai was

charged as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the government could make out this element merely by proving that

a principal — not necessarily Tsai himself — committed the

crime with a pecuniary motive; it need not show ‘actual payment or even an agreement to pay.’ ”) (quoting United States

v. Angwin, 263 F.3d 979, 998 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also

United States v. Munoz, 412 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (9th Cir.

2005) (reaffirming the holding of Tsai with respect to aiders

and abettors). The Rule 29 motion was properly denied.

Lopez-Martinez directs his last trial challenge to the following comments made by the prosecutor during her closing

argument:

When Agent Vasquez encountered [Lopez-Martinez]

and [Miguel] . . . [Lopez-Martinez] was not worried

about that group he just left in the desert. And he

wasn’t showing it. He didn’t try to tell Agent

Vasquez: I’m with a group of 20, and there’s a

bunch of my fellow countrymen back in the desert

with a woman who died. . . . Why didn’t he just say:

I left to get water. Thank God you are here. Because

he has a guilty conscience, that’s why . . . he didn’t

want to get caught for bringing those people in and

leaving a woman who is dead in the desert. 

Lopez-Martinez did not object to this statement at the time,

however, and it was not plain error to allow it. See United

States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2000). 

[11] When Agent Vasquez first discovered Lopez-Martinez

and Miguel hiding behind the gas station, after introducing

himself and inquiring if they were okay, he asked where they

were from and whether they had left anyone behind in the

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ 12683
desert. Lopez-Martinez said “no,” no one else was with them.

Lopez-Martinez portrays the prosecutor’s reference to this

exchange as an infringement of his Fifth Amendment right to

remain silent, but this argument overlooks a key point: LopezMartinez did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain

silent; rather, he affirmatively misstated to Agent Vasquez

that no one else was with him and Miguel and that they had

not left the group alone in the desert. To be sure, the Fifth

Amendment protects a person’s right to remain silent in the

face of custodial questioning by the government, but if one

chooses to answer the government’s questions, nothing in the

Fifth Amendment protects those answers. See LaChance v.

Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 265 (1998) (“Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask

questions — lying is not one of them. A citizen may decline

to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot

with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood.”) (quoting Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72

(1969)). 

[12] Notably, Lopez-Martinez does not argue that Agent

Vasquez’s questioning that led to this admission violated

Miranda. Instead, Lopez-Martinez contends that the prosecutor’s statement broadly encompassed not only his precustodial denial, but also his later, post-Miranda silence. Such

a reference, however, cannot be divined from a fair reading of

the transcript. The remark at issue was cabined to LopezMartinez’s unequivocal denial that he had left anybody in the

desert and his failure to immediately alert Agent Vasquez that

the others might need help. The argument did not indict him

for any later silence. As such, it was not plain error for the

court to allow the prosecutor’s remarks. 

B. POST-TRIAL

By far the most troubling aspect of this case arose only

once the trial had concluded. After the jury was dismissed,

members of the judge’s staff found an envelope while they

12684 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ
were cleaning up the jury room. The envelope was unsealed,

and a piece of paper containing definitions of “reasonable

doubt” and “conspiracy” was sitting on top of it. There was

a “squiggle” on the envelope that the court believed might say

“Ellis, number 37.” The envelope and the piece of paper had

not been provided to the jury by the court. The court disclosed

the discovery to counsel the same day. Six days later LopezMartinez’s counsel moved for a new trial. 

The district court held an evidentiary hearing, at which it

questioned all of the jurors regarding the document.3 At that

hearing, Juror Number 37, who had been an alternate juror

and was dismissed before deliberations began, stated that he

created the document based on his own internet research, and

that he brought it into the jury room on the day the jury began

its deliberations. The juror explained that he crafted the document for his own edification and to be as prepared as possible,

and that he did not think he was violating “the spirit” of the

judge’s admonition against outside research. Juror Number 37

further stated that he never opened the sealed envelope, and

never discussed the envelope or its contents with the other

jurors. The other jurors all testified that they had never seen

the document. After the hearing, the district judge denied

Lopez-Martinez’s motion, finding that the jurors were “individually and collectively credible,” and that “a new trial [was]

unnecessary because not a single juror participating in the

deliberations was even aware of the extrinsic information.” 

While the presence of this extrinsic evidence in the jury

room during deliberations is very unusual, this circumstance

does not warrant a new trial. We review de novo the denial

of Lopez-Martinez’s motion for a new trial, but review for

clear error the trial judge’s underlying factual findings.4“Be3We reject Lopez-Martinez’s argument that the district court’s decision

to hold an evidentiary hearing was error. That Lopez-Martinez would prefer the court to make the decision in a vacuum, without the benefit of evaluating what actually happened, makes little common sense. 

4While the denial of a motion for a new trial is typically reviewed for

abuse of discretion, where the motion is based on juror misconduct — as

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ 12685
cause of the trial judge’s unique opportunity to observe the

jurors during trial, to hear the defenses asserted, and to hear

the evidence, the judge’s conclusion about the effect of the

alleged misconduct deserves substantial weight.” United

States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

quotations omitted). 

[13] The benchmark for a new trial when the jury obtains

or uses evidence that has not been introduced during trial is

if there is a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material

“could have affected the verdict.” Saya, 247 F.3d at 937

(internal quotations omitted). The threshold question we must

address, then, is a factual one: whether the jury obtained or

used evidence that was not introduced at the trial. If, as the

deliberating jurors all testified, none of them even saw the

paper with the alternative jury instructions on it, it is logically

impossible that this extrinsic evidence affected their verdict.

The trial judge, after holding an evidentiary hearing, determined that “not a single juror participating in the deliberations

was even aware of the extrinsic information.” This finding

was not clearly erroneous. 

Ten of the twelve jurors stated unequivocally that they did

not recall ever having seen the document in the jury room,

and that they had no memory of any of the other jurors looking at it. With another juror, Juror Number 15, the judge had

the following exchange:

THE COURT: Okay. Now, do you ever recall seeing that [document] in the jury room?

JUROR NO. 15: I — I think I — I remember

reading them, but I don’t remember this particular

page.

this one was — our review is de novo. See United States v. Saya, 247 F.3d

929, 937 (9th Cir. 2001). 

12686 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ
THE COURT: Okay. Now, remember — now,

remember, I gave you a set of jury instructions. Do

you remember that? A thick set?

JUROR NO. 15: (Nodding).

THE COURT: Now, this is — this is something

else. This was found in the jury room, was not given

to you.

So, the question is: Do you recall seeing that document in the jury room?

JUROR NO. 15: No.

THE COURT: Okay. And did you ever observe

anyone else to have looked at that particular document? 

JUROR NO. 15: No, I didn’t. 

Similarly, with Juror Number 20:

THE COURT: Okay. Now, do you recall seeing

those particular documents [the envelope and the

piece of paper] in the jury room?

JUROR NO. 20: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, are those different

from the instructions that I gave you?

JUROR NO. 20: No, I don’t think so.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, before I ask you how

— how you saw them, do you recall when you left

the jury — for your deliberations, I gave you a very

thick set of jury instructions, is that correct? 

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ 12687
[JUROR NO. 20]5

: Yes.

THE COURT: And those are different from the

set of jury instructions I gave you. Do you understand that?

JUROR NO. 20: In the fact that there’s not so

many, you’re saying.

THE COURT: The fact that those were by themself. They were not part of the packet. They were

brought in in a separate envelope.

Have you ever seen that separate envelope or seen

that particular jury instruction in the jury room, to

the best of your knowledge?

JUROR NO. 20: I don’t remember.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, did you ever observe

— did you ever observe anyone else looking at those

two — at that document there?

JUROR NO. 20: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, you recall that my jury

instructions were in a thick packet, they were all

black and white copies, correct?

JUROR NO. 20: Correct.

THE COURT: And you’ll notice on page 2 of that

there’s a colored portion on the bottom, is that right?

[The court, at this points, realizes the juror is look5The transcript erroneously says “THE DEFENDANT.” 

12688 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ
ing at a black and white photocopy, and instead

gives the juror the colored original.]

THE COURT: Do you ever recall seeing that document with the colored portion in the jury room?

JUROR NO. 20: I don’t believe so. 

[14] As the transcript reflects, these jurors confused the

paper that Juror Number 37 brought in with him, and which

they were being shown by the court, with the packet of jury

instructions provided to them by the court during deliberations. Once the court clarified that the piece of paper was not

part of that packet, both jurors testified that they did not

remember having seen it or seeing other jurors looking at it.

From this testimony, the trial judge reasonably found that

“[n]ot a single juror recalled seeing the extraneous information before the evidentiary hearing.” We see no basis to disagree with the trial judge’s finding that the jurors were

credible. 

[15] Lopez-Martinez correctly points out that this sequence

leaves unexplained exactly how the envelope containing the

alternate definitions came to be opened and by whom. As

much as it would be gratifying to know the who, what, when,

where, and why of how the envelope got opened, in the face

of the judge’s factual findings, it simply does not matter.

However the envelope got opened, given that none of the

jurors can even remember having seen the document, there is

no way it could have affected their deliberations. LopezMartinez’s motion for a new trial was, therefore, properly

denied. 

C. SENTENCING

[16] Lopez-Martinez also appeals his sentence, arguing that

the judge failed to properly consider the need to promote

respect of law, justice, deterrence, and the protection of the

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ 12689
public. Because the record reflects that the judge properly

considered all of the § 3553(a) factors and Lopez-Martinez’s

sentence was within the Guidelines range, we reject this argument and affirm Lopez-Martinez’s sentence. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.

2008) (en banc) (“A within-Guidelines sentence ordinarily

needs little explanation . . . .” ). 

AFFIRMED. 

12690 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-MARTINEZ