COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

WOOD VENDING, INC. 

AND 

PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1237-95-1 PER CURIAM 

 NOVEMBER 28, 1995 

DANIEL HAROLD MINESKY 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (William C. Walker; Donna White Kearney; Bradford C. 

Jacob; Taylor & Walker, on briefs), for appellants. 

 (Daniel H. Minesky, pro se, on brief). 

 Wood Vending, Inc. and its insurer (hereinafter collectively 

referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in (1) finding that Daniel Harold Minesky 

("claimant") proved that he made a reasonable effort to market 

his residual work capacity after May 9, 1994; and (2) considering 

certain documents submitted by claimant as after-discovered 

evidence. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 

5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 In order to establish entitlement to benefits, a partially 

disabled employee must prove that he has made a reasonable effort 

to procure suitable work but has been unable to do so. Great 
 2 

Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459, 464, 359 S.E.2d 

98, 101 (1987). "What constitutes a reasonable marketing effort 

depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." The 

Greif Companies v. Sipe, 16 Va. App. 709, 715, 434 S.E.2d 314, 

318 (1993). We have discussed factors which the commission 

should consider in deciding whether a claimant has made 

reasonable good faith efforts to market his remaining capacity: 

 (1) the nature and extent of employee's 

disability; (2) the employee's training, age, 

experience, and education; (3) the nature and 

extent of employee's job search; (4) the 

employee's intent in conducting his job 

search; (5) the availability of jobs in the 

area suitable for the employee, considering 

his disability; and (6) any other matter 

affecting employee's capacity to find 

suitable employment. 

National Linen Serv. v. McGuinn, 8 Va. App. 267, 272, 380 S.E.2d 

31, 34 (1989) (footnotes omitted). In reviewing the commission's 

findings, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to . . . the party prevailing before the commission." Id. at 

270, 380 S.E.2d at 33. "However, where, as here, there is no 

conflict in the evidence as to the relevant factors, the question 

of sufficiency is one of law." Sipe, 16 Va. App. at 716, 434 

S.E.2d at 318. 

 In awarding temporary total disability benefits to Minesky, 

the commission found that Minesky made a reasonable effort to 

market his remaining capacity. We cannot say that the commission 

erred as a matter of law in making this determination. The 

evidence before the deputy commissioner and the full commission 
 3 

showed that Minesky contacted at least thirty potential employers 

between May 19, 1994 and September 28, 1994. He also registered 

with the Virginia Employment Commission ("VEC") and the West 

Virginia Employment Commission. The commission reasonably 

inferred from Minesky's testimony that he satisfactorily 

documented potential employment contacts in order to continue to 

receive unemployment benefits in West Virginia.1

 Taking into account this undisputed evidence, Minesky's 

ninth grade education, and his lifting restriction which 

precludes most employment as a welder or mechanic, we find 

sufficient credible evidence exists to support the commission's 

finding that Minesky made a reasonable effort to market his 

residual work capacity. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.

 

 1The commission did not indicate in its review opinion that 

it relied upon the VEC job contact forms, Minesky's 

correspondence with the Virginia Department of Labor and 

Industry, or Dr. Gold's November 7, 1994 work excuse to support 

its finding on the marketing issue. Accordingly, employer's 

second question presented is without merit.