United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 24-40138

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Wesley Alan Ryan, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:22-CR-131-1 

______________________________

Before Smith, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Wesley Alan Ryan was convicted of possession of unregistered 

firearms, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and sentenced to 24 months of 

imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. On appeal, he 

contends that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress and 

to dismiss the indictment.

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 2, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 24-40138

2

When reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion, we generally review 

legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States 

v. Carrillo, 660 F.3d 914, 922 (5th Cir. 2011). However, because Ryan’s 

motions to suppress and to dismiss were untimely, review is for plain error 

only. See United States v. Dennis, 41 F.4th 732, 740 (5th Cir. 2022).

Ryan argues that the district court erred in denying the motion to 

suppress because the search of the metal shed behind his residence exceeded 

the scope of the search warrant. “Under the good faith exception, evidence 

obtained during execution of a warrant later determined to be deficient is 

nonetheless admissible if the executing officer’s reliance upon the warrant 

was objectively reasonable and made in good faith.” United States v. Woerner, 

709 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 2013). This exception does not apply, however, 

if: (1) the issuing judge was misled by information in an affidavit that the 

affiant knew or should have known was false; (2) the issuing judge abandoned 

his impartial judicial role; (3) the affidavit supporting the warrant so lacks 

indicia of probable cause that reliance on it is entirely unreasonable; or (4) the 

warrant on its face is so deficient in identifying the place to be searched or the 

things to be seized that it cannot reasonably be presumed valid. United States 

v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2022).

While Ryan claims that the good faith exception was inapplicable 

because the warrant was so facially deficient in identifying the place to be 

searched that it was unreasonable for the officers to presume it was valid, the 

warrant authorized the search of outbuildings, including the metal shed 

behind his residence. In fact, the warrant provided for the search of “the 

suspected place and premises” described in the affidavit. The affidavit then 

described the suspected place and premises as “[a]residence and outbuildings

located at” the address in question. Because the affidavit provided sufficient 

specificity in identifying the place to be searched, it was not unreasonable for 

the officers to presume that the warrant was valid. See id.

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Moreover, the affidavit supporting the search warrant was not bare 

bones. “Bare bones affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which 

lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently 

determine probable caus.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). In this case, the affiant explained how he was aware of Ryan, 

detailed incidents between Ryan and his neighbors, and specified that a stolen 

trailer had been observed on Ryan’s property. Because the affidavit provided 

more than conclusory statements or boilerplate, the reliance on the search 

warrant, issued on the basis of the affidavit, was not unreasonable. See United 

States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the district 

court did not plainly err when it denied the motion to suppress the evidence. 

See Morton, 46 F.4th at 336; Dennis, 41 F.4th at 740-41.

Ryan also argues that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New 

York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), § 5861(d) is 

unconstitutional because this provision is not part of this country’s historical 

tradition of firearm regulation. To establish plain error, Ryan “must at least 

show error in the straightforward applications of existing cases.” United 

States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1081 

(2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Arguments that 

require the extension of existing precedent cannot meet the plain error 

standard.” Id. Because there is no binding precedent holding § 5861(d) 

unconstitutional, and it is not clear under Bruen that such a result is 

mandated, Ryan is unable to demonstrate an error that is clear or obvious. 

See id. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in denying the 

motion to dismiss the indictment. See Dennis, 41 F.4th at 740.

AFFIRMED.

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