The Honorab le James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1 District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-2973

_____________ Jo Ann Eubanks, As Administratrix * of The Estate of Joseph Daniel Dehart, * Deceased, * * Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Eastern District of Arkansas. * Gary Lawson, * * Defendant - Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: April 15, 1997 Filed: August 28, 1997

_____________ Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

_____________ JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Sheriff Gary Lawson appeals from an order of the district court denying hi s 1 motio n for summary judgment in Jo Ann Eubanks's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against-2-

him. Lawson argues that the district court erred in using the wrong legal standard to determine whether he is entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm.

Inthe early morning hours of February 28, 1993, several men attacked Joseph Daniel Dehart and his brother, Carroll Joe Eubanks, in a rural part of Perry County , Arkansas. In that a

ttack Dehart was stabbed, and Carroll Joe Eubanks loaded Dehart into his truck and started for the hospital.

Noise from the attack awoke residents who called the Perry County Sheriff, and Sheri ff Lawson responded to their call. While driving to the location of the attack , Law son received a message on his radio that another officer had spotted Carroll Jo e Eubanks 's truck leaving the scene of the attack. Lawson told the officer to stop th e truck. Not long after, Lawson drove to where the officer had stopped the truck.

Lawson i mmediately noticed Dehart's injuries and called for an ambulance

. Lawson spoke with Carroll Joe Eubanks about what had happened. Carroll Jo e Eubanks repe atedly asked Lawson to allow him to take Dehart on to the hospital

. Laws on, however, required everyone to wait for the arrival of the ambulance. Afte r Laws on talked to Carroll Joe Eubanks, neither Lawson nor any of his later arrivin g deputies conducted any further investigation.
Jo Ann Eubanks, who is the mother of Carroll Joe Eubanks and Dehart, arrived at the scene before the ambulance. Dehart asked his mother to tak e him to the hospital. Lawson refu sed to allow Jo Ann Eubanks to take her son to the hospital becaus e Lawson had already decided that everyone should wait for the ambulance.
The ambulance arrived and picked up Dehart. Dehart died later that morning.

Jo Ann Eubanks as administratrix of Dehart' s estate brought this action claiming that Lawson violated Dehart's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rightsJo Ann Eubanks does not appeal from the district court's ruling that Lawson is 2 entitled to qualified i mmunity from the time he stopped Dehart to that moment in time when the Constitution clearly required Lawson to let Dehart go. -3- by unreasonably detaining Dehart. Lawson moved for summar y judgment based on his qu alified immunity. The district court held that Lawson was entitled to qualifie d immunity for stopping the truck and initially detaining Dehart. The court determined, 2 however, that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lawson learned while h e detained Dehart that Dehart had not committed a crime but was only th e victim of a crime. The court concluded that if Law son continued to detain Dehart after lear ning that Dehart was only the victim of a crime, then Lawson's continue d detainment

of Dehart was unreasonable and Lawson was not entitled to qualifie d immunity for that action. Lawson appeals.
We review the district court's denial of summary judgment de novo and apply the same standards as the district cour t. See Miller v. Citizens Sec. Group, Inc. , 116 F.3d 343, 345 (8th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuin e issu es of material fact and Lawson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. We view all th e evidence in the light most favorable to Jo Ann Eubanks, and give her the benefi t of all reasonable inferences. See id. Jo Ann Eubanks can establish a genuine issue of material fact by presenting evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for her on that issue. See id.
Quali fied immunity shields Sheriff Lawson from liability for civil damages a s long as his conduct did not violate Dehart's clearly established constitutional rights

. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For a constitutional right to be clearly established, the contours of that right must be su fficiently clear and specific that a reasonable l aw enforcement officer would understand that what he is doing violates that r ight. See Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). If a reasonabl e officer, acting on the information that was available to Laws on, would have known that-4-

his actions violated clearly established law, then Lawson is not entitled to qualifie d immunity. See Hummel-Jones v. Strope , 25 F.3d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1994).

When Lawson detained Dehart it was clearly established under the Fourth Am endment

that an officer of the law could only arrest someone if the officer ha d probable cause to arrest that person. See United States v. Miller , 974 F.2d 953, 956 (8th C ir. 1992). An officer could stop someone to investigate a crime, but only if the off icer had a reasonable suspicion that that person had committed or was committing a crime. See id. An investigative stop may only last solong as is necessary to conduct a reasonable investigation. See U nited States v. Willis , 967 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1992). Bec ause an investigative stop is supported by less than probable cause, a n officer must diligently investigate and use the least intrusive means rea sonably available to confir m or dispel his suspicion in a short period of time. See United States v

. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985). An investigative stop may become an arres t requiring probable cause if it lasts for an unreason ably long time. See Miller , 974 F.2d at 956.
Lawson argues that the dist rict court erred in applying the wrong legal standard to determine if he was entitled to qualified immunity. Lawson contends that once he sto pped the truck in which Dehart was riding, Dehart became a pretrial detainee. As a pretrial detainee, Lawson argues Dehart had the clear ly established right that Lawson not be de liberately indifferent to Dehart's medical needs. Lawson concludes that h e was not d eliberately indifferent because he immediately called for an ambulance, and therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity.

We rejec t Lawson's argument because it ignores the issue of whether Lawso n detained Dehart longer than the Constitution allows. Lawson does not argue that he had probable cause to arrest Dehart during his detention of Dehart, and t he record would not support such an argument. The record shows that initially Lawson's stop of the truck was a valid investigative stop supported by a reasonable suspicion that DehartA reasonable officer is not required to believe everyt hing he is told. See United 3 St ates v. Hughes , 940 F.2d 1125,1127 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 896 (1991)

. The record shows, however, that Lawson and ano ther officer present knew Carroll Joe Euba nks, Dehart, and their attackers and this evidence has some bearing on the issue of whether a reasonable officer under the circumstances would have believed Carroll Joe Eubanks and therefore known that Dehart had not committed a crime. -5- and his brother had committed a crime. Once stopped, Dehart had the clearl y establ ishedrights that Lawson could only detain him if Lawson had reasonabl e suspicion or probable cause, and that Lawson could not detain him without probabl e cause for an unreasonably long time.

There is evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether Lawso n viola ted clearly established law in two different ways. Lawson may have violate d clearly established l aw by continuing to detain Dehart after a reasonable officer would have known that Dehart h ad not committed a crime. Lawson and Carroll Joe Eubanks test ified that Lawson spoke with Carroll Joe Eubanks about what had happened

. Carroll Joe Eubanks further testified that what had happened to Dehart was that tw o
men had atta cked and stabbed Dehart. Carroll Joe Eubanks stated that after tellin g 3 Law son what had happened, he asked Lawson to allow him to take Dehart to th e hospital and that Lawson refused to let him do so. Jo Ann Eubanks also testified that Dehart asked her to take h im to the hospital and Lawson refused to allow her to do so. Viewing the evidence in t

he light most favorable to Jo Ann Eubanks, we conclude that La wson continued to detain Dehart after a reasonable officer would have known tha t Dehart had not committed a crime. See Brown v. Texas , 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979). See also United States v. Watts , 7 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[A]n investigative stop must cease once reasonable suspicion or pr obable cause dissipates."), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1078 (1994).

Law son may also have violated clearly established law by conducting a n unreasonably long investigative stop. The Fourth Amendment required Lawson to-6-

conduct his investigation quickly and either arrest Dehart based on probable cause or release Dehart. Lawson investigated by t alking to Carroll Joe Eubanks about what had happened. After speaking with Carroll Joe Eubanks, Lawson conducted no furthe r investi gation, and yet Lawson continued to detain Dehart without probable cause t o arrest Dehart. Under

the Fourth Amendment Lawson could not constitutionally detain Dehart wit hout probable cause once he had finished his investigation, and it was a violation of clearly establishe d law for Lawson to prevent others from taking Dehart to the hospital when Lawson had no constitutional authority to continue to detain Dehart.

Even if Lawson continued to investigate after he spoke to Carroll Joe Eubanks, there is a genuine issue as to whether Lawson violated clearly established law. Th e Fourt h Amendment requires that Lawson use the least intrusive means reasonabl y avai lable to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion in a short period of time

. Lawson has not argued that it was reasonably necessary for him to detain Dehart i n order to conduct his investigat ion, and the record would not support such an argument. The re cord suggests that Lawson could have dispelled his reasonable suspicion b y briefly qu estioning Carroll Joe Eubanks. Cf. Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143, 14 6 (1972) ("A brief stop of a

suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to main tain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be mos t reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time."). The evidence in the record als o suggests that Lawson detained Dehart for thirty to forty minutes, wel l beyondthe time reasonably necessary for questioning Carroll Joe Eubanks. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jo Ann Eubanks, we conclude that Lawson's detention of Dehart violated clearly established l aw by exceeding the permissible scope of an investigative stop.
We recognize th at the United States Supreme Court and this court have upheld the cons titutionality of rather lengthy investigative stops. See , e.g. , United States v

. Montoya de Hernandez , 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v. Bloomfield , 40 F.3d-7-

910 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1113 (1995). These decisions do not control this case because it was reasonably necessary to detain the suspects in those
cases for a long period of time so that the officers could conduct their investigations. See Montoya de Hernandez , 473 U.S. at 543-44 (officers held suspect fo r sixteen hours wai ting for suspect to have bowel movement after concluding that the suspect ha d swallowe d balloons containing cocaine); Bloomfield , 40 F.3d at 917 (officer hel d suspect and his truck for one hour waiting for other officers to bring a drug dog to sniff suspect 's truck for the presence of drugs). Again, Lawson has not argued that h e needed to d etain Dehart after he spoke with Carroll Joe Eubanks so that he coul d conduct a reasonable investigation, and the record would not support su ch an argument.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.