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___________ * Appellant, * * Dan Flowers, Head of Arkansas State Highway & Transportation; John Bailey, Chief, Arkansas Appeal from the United States * Lipton, Commissioner, Arkansas Eastern District of Arkansas. * Hopper, Commissioner, Arkansas State Highway Commission; Herby Branscum, Jr., Commissioner, Arkansas State Highway Commission; J. W. Benefield, Commissioner, Arkansas State Highway Commission; L.W. Clark, Commissioner, Arkansas State Highway Commission, * *

Submitted: September 6, 1996

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Den Coggins appeals from the district court's g 1 summary judgment to A U.S.C. § 1983 action. Upon de novo review, we a See Seltzer-Bey v. , 66 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 1995).

### -2- Coggins w as discharged from his position as a highway patrolman for the State of Arkansas in 1993. Coggins claimed that the Arkansas Stat e Highway Department's Operations Manual and vario us state statutes gave him an expectation of con tinued employment, and defendants violated the terms of his employment and denied him due process of law by terminating him for alleg edmisconduct (sexual harassment) without a fair and impartia l hearing; his liberty interests were implicated when defendants disseminate d stig matizing information concerning the facts and circumstances of hi s termination; and defendants denied him compensation pay.

On defendants' motion, the district court granted defendants summary judgment, holding that the undisputed facts show ed that Coggins was an atwill employee under Arkansas law and that Coggins had not demonstrate d either a p roperty interest or a liberty interest entitling him to du e process. Alternatively, the court held that Cog gins was provided adequate proced ural due process. The district court dismissed without prejudic e Coggins’s supplemental state law claim for accrued compensation time.

We agre e with the district court that Coggins did not rebu t defendants' evidence that he was an at-will employee and thus failed t o state a breach of con tract claim based on his discharge. See Mertyris v. P.A .M. Transp., Inc. , 832 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ark. 1992) (Arkansas follow s employment-at-will doctrine with two exceptions: express provision against termination except for cause, or employment agre ement containing provision for a definite term). We also reject Coggins's argument that the Operation s Manual's list of non- exclusive grounds for termination created an implied contract term. See G ladden v. Arkansas Children’s Hosp. , 728 S.W.2d 501, 503-05 (Ark. 1987). Furthermore, none of the statutes cited by Coggin s support the creation of a contract.

### -3- Accordingly, the district court was correct that Coggins did no t establish he had a property interest in continue d employment entitling him to due process. See Skeets v. Johnson , 816 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1993) ( employee terminable at will under Arkansas law has no propert y interest triggering due process protections).
We also agree with the district cour t that Coggins did not establish that he had a protected liberty interest. See Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972) (plaintiff must show official publicly mad e allege dlyuntrue charges against him in connection with discharge t o stig matize him). Coggins's evidence showed, at most, that a Sherif f Hutton, who is not a defendant, repeated to others that Coggins had been accused of sexual harassment. Coggins offered n o evidence to suggest that any of the named defendants could be held accountable for Hutton's remarks

. Further , even assuming a protected interest was involved, defendants ' unrebu tted evidence showed that Coggins received notice of the charge s against him and a pre-termination hearing at which he was represented by counsel and could present evidence and witnesses; thus Coggins was afforde d all the process he was due. See Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Communit y Sch. Dist

. , 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 42 6 (1994) (deprivation of liberty and property inte rests requires opportunity to be heard at meaningful time and in meaningful manner).

The order is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.