NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________ No. 19

- 3024

__________ REYNOLDS ALLEY

v. MTD PRODUCTS, INC; MTD PRODUCTS LTD.; MTD LLC; MTD HOLDINGS, INC.; MTD CONSUMER GROUP, INC.,

Appellants

__________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ( D.C. Civ. No. 3 :1 7

- c v - 00003 ) District Judge: Hon. Kim R. Gibson

__________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on July 2 , 2020
Before: KRAUSE and PHIPPS , Circuit Judges , and BEETLESTONE, * District Judge

. (Filed: July 10, 2020 )

* Honorable Wendy Beetlestone, United States Distric t Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.2 __________ OPINION †

__________
BEETLESTONE , District Judge

. In January 2017, Appellee Reynolds Alley , sued Appellants MTD 1 for strict liability and negligence in connection with injur ies he sustained to his hand wh en the tire rim of a snow thrower designed and manufactured by MTD failed and burst. In ruling on MTD ’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict in favor of Alley , the D istrict C ourt rejected MTD’s argument that Pennsylvania’s choice

- of

- law principles require d application of Ohio’s ten

- year statute of repose for product liability actions

— a
statu t e which , if imposed , would h ave bar red Alley’s causes of action

. The sole question on appeal is whether the District Court err ed in so doing. 2
The re is no dispute that the choice

- of

- l aw rules of Pennsylvania apply 3 and that we are presented with an actual or real conflict between Ohio and Pennsylvania law in that while Pennsylvania has not enacted a statute of repose for product liability claims , Ohio

† This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

1 We shall refer to MTD Products , Inc., MTD Products Ltd., MT D LLC, MTD Holdings , Inc., and MTD Consumer Group , Inc. collectively as “MTD” or Appellants.

2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this product liability action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and this Court has jurisdiction to review the Distr ict Court’s final decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court exercises “plenary review over the District Court’s choice

- of

- law determination.” Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co. , 480 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2007).

3 See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec

. Mfg. Co. , 313 U.S. 487 (1941).3

has. See O hio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.10(C)(1). Accordingly, Alley’s cause of action would be barred under Ohio’s statute of repose but could proceed under Pennsylvania law. Further, neither part y challenges the D istrict C ourt’s determination that there is a “ true ” conflict here

. See Hammersmith , 480 F.3d at 2 30 (finding that a true conflict exists where bot h states have an interest in applying their own law )

. To resolve a true conflict under Pennsylvania law, we first evaluat e the parties’ contacts and relationships by conducting a qualitative analy sis of each state’s contacts under Section 145(2)(a)

- (d) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws , 4
with the aim of determining which sta te has t he most significant contacts or relationships with the incident as well as the greatest governmental interest in seeing its laws enforced. 5 See Cipolla v. Shaposka , 267 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. 1970) ; see also Griffit h , 203 A.2d at 805 (requiring “ analy sis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the
court ”); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971). 6

4 The relevant contacts for a tort include: “(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) ; Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Argonaut

- Midwest Ins. Co. , 880 F.2d 685, 689 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).

5 Contrary to the Distri ct Court’s assertion, this interest analysis does not require a normative judgment about the respective merits of each state’s law. Rather, we are tasked with assessing which state is “most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigat ion.” Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc ., 203 A.2d 796, 806 (Pa

. 1964) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

6 Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws , which establishes choice

- of

- law principles, enumerates factors for consideration in the choice

- of

- law analysis, the relevant ones here being: ( a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and th e4

Certainly MTD has identified contacts that weigh in favor of applying Ohio’s law: Specifically, MTD is headquartered and has its principal place of business in Ohio ; its product quality, safety, and testing departments as well as some of its manufacturing, warehouse , and distribution facilities are also located in Ohio ; and, it employs 100 engineers in Ohio

. Further, the snow thrower in question was designed, engineered , and tested in Ohio , not in Pennsylvania

. On the other hand, the situs of the accident in Pennsylvania was not happenstance : Appellant lives in Pennsylvania , purchased the snow thrower in Pennsylvania from a third

party retailer selected by MTD, only ever used it in Pennsylvania, was injur ed by it in Pennsylvania , and was treated for th at injury in Pennsylvania. Where, as here , the location of the accident was not fortuitous “the place of injury assumes much greater importance, and in some instances may be determinative.” LeJeune v. Bliss

- Salem, Inc. , 85 F.3d 1069 , 1072 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted) ; see also Shuder v. McDonald’s Corp. , 859 F.2d 266 , 272 (3d Cir. 1988) ; cf

. Griffith , 203 A.2d at 80 5

- 06 (site of plane crash in Colorado was fortuitous whe n a Pennsylvania resident flying from Philadelphia to Phoenix, Arizona , was killed )

. MTD argues strenuously that Ohio’s codification of its public policy rationales 7 for its statute of repose weighs in favor of applying Ohio law, while Pennsylvania’s lack of a relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and ( g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971).

7 Ohio’s codified rationales include its recognition of a manufacturer’s lack of control over a product after the product leaves it ha nds, the difficulty in presenting evidence5

statute of repose and any such codification suggests “mere inaction , ” Appellant’s Brief at 22, which weighs against applying Pennsylvania law. But it does not necessarily follow from Pennsylvania ’s lack of a statute of repose that Pennsylvania’s interests are less strong than Ohio’s

. Certainly we cannot make the leap from one ’ s non
- existence to a lack of interest in the policy issues that underpin the decision to enact or not to enact a statute of
repose. T h at the Pennsylvania legislature has enacted statutes of repose but not in the product liability context , s ee, e.g. , 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5536 (statute of repose in construction project context) , that the issue has been raised for discussion in
Penn sylvania’s legislature numerous time, 8 and that after the legislature passed a seven

year statute of repose for medical malpractice claims, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional in part because it “ deprive [d] malpractice victims who [did] not discover their injury or its cause within seven years of their right to a remedy , ”

s ee Yanakos v. UPMC , 218 A.3d 1214, 1226

- 27 (Pa. 2019) , suggests there is a robust debate in the Commonwealth about the value and legitimacy of statutes of re pose. While Ohio may have resolved the issue in favor of a statute of repose at least in the product liability context, Pennsylvania has no t. Reading the tea leaves as to why it has not does
regarding the design process long after the design occurred, and the inappropriateness ofapplying current standards to products manufactured many years earlier than the commencement of a product liability action. See 2004 Ohio Laws File 144 (S.B. 80) (Am Sub. S.B. 80), Section 3.

8 The Pennsylvania Legislative Journals document several debates regarding the advisability of statute s of repose : Appellee points in particular to statements made by legislators in 1976, 1980, 1983, 1990, and 1992 that speak to the importance of consumer protection and how statutes of repose hurt consumers. One pithy example: “ What happens with the statute of repose is not only do you not level the playing field, you make sure that the other side does not even have a chance to suit up for the game.” 1990 Penn. Legis. J.

– House 59 2

.6

not fall within our bailiwick

— but Pennsylvania’s legislative an d judicial engagement on the issue illustrate that there is an ongoing discussion which, at least as of now, h as been resolved purposefully in favor of no statute of repose for product liability claims. Where , as her e, each state has an interest in the ap plication of its laws and “ the application of the foreign state’s law would frustrate the purposes of the forum state, the presumption is to apply the law of the forum.

. . . The law of the forum should be applied even though a foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy. ” Lebegern v.
Forman , 471 F.3d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here specifically, Appellee, as a Pennsylvania resident who purchased and used the product in Pen nsylvania , had a justifiabl e expect ation that Pennsylvania law would apply should the untoward happen

. See Cipolla , 267 A.2d at 856 (noting that “ it seems only fair to permit a defendant to rely on his home state law when he is acting within that state ”). By contrast, MTD as a manufacturer of a nationally marketed product , could not expect Ohio law to apply everywhere. Viewing “ the factors qualitatively as opposed to quantitatively ,” Carrick v. Zurich

American Ins. Grp. , 14 F.3d 907 , 910 (3d Cir. 1994) , as Pennsylvania requires us to do, the parties’ relationship is centered in Pennsylvania, not Ohio

. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.