PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 19-1908

______________

DONALD F. DELADE

v.

JOHN CARGAN,

Appellant

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-16-cv-00415)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

____________

Argued: June 16, 2020 

Before: CHAGARES, PORTER, and FISHER, 

Circuit Judges.

(Filed:August 25, 2020)

____________
2

Josh Shapiro, Attorney General of Pennsylvania 

Michael J. Scarinci [ARGUED]

Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania

Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Counsel for Appellant

Danielle M. Mulcahey [ARGUED]

George A. Reihner

Wright Reihner & Mulcahey

148 Adams Avenue

Scranton, PA 18503

Counsel for Appellee

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Donald DeLade claims that Pennsylvania State Trooper 

John Cargan violated his constitutional rights when Cargan 

caused him to be arrested and detained him based on fabricated 

evidence. DeLade asserted that his arrest and pretrial detention 

violated both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court 

granted summary judgment to Cargan on the Fourth 
3

Amendment claims.1 But on the Fourteenth Amendment claim, 

it declined to grant summary judgment or qualified immunity 

to Cargan. 

On appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, the 

question presented is whether DeLade’s claim of wrongful 

arrest and pretrial detention is cognizable under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude 

that a claim alleging unlawful arrest and pretrial detention that 

occur prior to a detainee’s first appearance before a court 

sounds in the Fourth Amendment—and not the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For that reason, we will 

reverse the District Court’s order denying summary judgment.

I

In September 2014, a sniper attacked two Pennsylvania 

State Troopers at the Blooming Grove Barracks, killing one 

and severely injuring the other. State Troopers immediately 

commenced a manhunt to find the sniper. The next day, State 

Troopers received a report that a man with a rifle was walking

down a highway some fifteen miles from the Blooming Grove 

Barracks. 

Soon after receiving the report, State Troopers 

identified the man as DeLade. Cargan then ran DeLade’s name 

through a criminal-history database. The criminal-history 

search revealed that the sheriff’s department in Escambia 

County, Florida had issued an outstanding warrant for 

DeLade’s arrest. The warrant had a status of “no extradition,” 

1 The District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to 

Cargan on DeLade’s Fourth Amendment claims is not at issue 

in this appeal.
4

meaning that the Escambia County Sheriff’s Department did 

not seek to extradite DeLade. Cargan, however, called the 

Escambia County Sheriff’s Department and requested that it 

change the extradition status of the warrant to “full 

extradition.” The sheriff’s department complied with Cargan’s 

request and changed the status of the warrant. 

Eventually, State Troopers found and arrested DeLade, 

who was still carrying his rifle. The Commonwealth charged 

DeLade under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9134 with arrest prior to 

requisition, alleging that he had been charged with a crime in 

Florida. DeLade remained in pretrial detention for five days 

awaiting his extradition hearing—his first appearance before a 

court. The sheriff’s department informed the Commonwealth 

that it would not extradite DeLade, so the Commonwealth

dropped the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge against him. 

Before the dismissal of that charge, a second criminal 

complaint was filed against DeLade. In that complaint, the 

Commonwealth charged DeLade with being a prohibited 

person in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. 

Stat. § 6105(a)(1). DeLade then appeared at an arraignment 

hearing on this charge, and the court released him on bail. The 

Commonwealth later charged DeLade with disorderly conduct, 

in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503. He eventually pleaded 

guilty to that charge, and a court sentenced him to twelve 

months’ probation. 

DeLade filed this lawsuit in the District Court under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Cargan violated his rights under 

the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause by fabricating evidence to support the arrestprior-to-requisition charge. According to DeLade, Cargan 

fabricated evidence by calling the Escambia County Sheriff’s 
5

Department and requesting that the outstanding warrant’s 

status be changed from “no extradition” to “full extradition.” 

The District Court granted summary judgment to Cargan on 

DeLade’s Fourth Amendment claims, finding that probable 

cause existed to justify charging DeLade as a prohibited person 

in possession of a firearm. But it declined to grant summary 

judgment or qualified immunity to Cargan on DeLade’s 

Fourteenth Amendment claim. Cargan timely appealed. 

II

The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The parties dispute whether we 

have appellate jurisdiction over the denial of qualified 

immunity under the collateral-order doctrine.2“Under this 

doctrine, our review is plenary and ‘strictly limited to the legal 

questions involved.’” James v. N.J. State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 

167 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing In re Montgomery Cnty., 215 F.3d 

367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000)). But “[w]e lack jurisdiction to review 

the District Court’s determination that a factual dispute is 

genuine[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

This appeal concerns a purely legal question: whether 

DeLade’s claim of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention is 

cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. For that reason, we have appellate jurisdiction. 

See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 

2017) (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 (2007)).

2

“[A] federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its 

jurisdiction.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 

412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010).
6

III

Qualified immunity shields a government official from 

liability unless the official’s conduct violated a constitutional 

right that is clearly established. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 232 (2009). But in this case, we are presented with 

an antecedent question: whether the Fourteenth Amendment 

provides DeLade a viable vehicle for relief. 

More specifically, we must decide whether DeLade’s 

claim of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention against Cargan

is cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, as DeLade contends, or under the Fourth 

Amendment only. This distinction matters because of the 

more-specific-provision rule. Under that rule, “if a 

constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional 

provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim 

must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that 

specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 

process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 

(1997); see also Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 246 (3d 

Cir. 2017). Simply put, if DeLade’s claim of unlawful arrest 

and pretrial detention sounds in the Fourth Amendment, then 

it cannot be asserted under the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 

A

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons[ ] . . . against unreasonable 

searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme 

Court has repeatedly said that “the general rule [is] that Fourth

Amendment seizures are reasonable only if based on probable 

cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” 
7

Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has 

also long held that a claim alleging unlawful pretrial detention 

falls under the umbrella of the Fourth Amendment’s 

protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme 

Court observed that “[b]oth the standards and procedures for 

arrest and detention have been derived from the Fourth 

Amendment and its common-law antecedents.” Id. at 111 

(emphasis added). “These long-prevailing standards seek to 

safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences 

with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.” Id. at 112 

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “Under th[ese standards,] . . . a policeman’s on-thescene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification 

for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period 

of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.” 

Id. at 113–14. Thus, the Fourth Amendment is the provision in 

the Constitution that promises citizens “a fair and reliable 

determination of probable cause as a condition [of] any 

significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” Id. at 125. 

The Supreme Court reaffirmed Gerstein in Albright v. 

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality opinion). In Albright, 

the Supreme Court had to decide whether “to recognize a 

substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution 

except upon probable cause.” Id. at 268. The Court declined to 

do so. Id. Instead, the Court held that “it is the Fourth 

Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which 

[the] petitioner[’s] . . . claim must be judged.” Id. at 271. In 

reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[t]he 

Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of 
8

liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.” Id. at 

274. And it recognized that “in the past [it had] noted the 

Fourth Amendment’s relevance to the deprivations of liberty 

that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.” Id. (citing 

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114). 

All told, the Supreme Court has recognized the Fourth 

Amendment—and not the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment—as the appropriate provision of the 

Constitution under which to analyze allegations of unlawful 

arrest and pretrial restraint. See id. at 268–71; Gerstein, 420 

U.S. at 114, 125; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

388 (1989) (“This case requires us to decide what 

constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law 

enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of 

making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his 

person. We hold that such claims are properly analyzed under 

the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, 

rather than under a substantive due process standard.”). 

B

More recently, the Supreme Court came closer to

addressing the precise question before us: whether a claim of 

unlawful arrest and pretrial detention sounds in the Fourth 

Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017), 

“[t]he primary question . . . [was] whether [a detainee] may 

bring a claim based on the Fourth Amendment to contest the 

legality of his pretrial confinement.” Id. at 914. The Supreme 

Court reiterated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment[ ] . . . 

establishes the standards and procedures governing pretrial 

detention.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“And those constitutional protections apply even after the start 
9

of ‘legal process’ in a criminal case—[in that case,] . . . after 

the judge’s determination of probable cause.” Id. (emphasis 

added). In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court noted 

that, when a probable-cause determination depends on false 

statements or fabricated evidence, that reality “cannot 

extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim—or 

somehow[ ] . . . convert that claim into one founded on the 

[Fourteenth Amendment’s] Due Process Clause.” Id. at 919

(emphasis added). In the end, the Court held that “[i]f the 

complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial 

detention unsupported by probable cause, then the right 

allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

(emphasis added).

After the Supreme Court decided Manuel, we 

recognized that Manuel stands for the proposition that “the 

Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial 

detention even beyond the start of legal process.” Geness v. 

Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Manuel, 137 

S. Ct. at 920) (alterations omitted). The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agrees. “Manuel [ ] makes 

clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the [Fourteenth 

Amendment’s] Due Process Clause, governs a claim for 

wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 

F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).

C

To date, we have not delineated when a claim of 

unlawful pretrial detention stops implicating the Fourth 

Amendment and begins to fall under the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Black v. Montgomery 

Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding “that an 

acquitted criminal defendant may have a stand-alone 
10

fabricated evidence claim against state actors under the [D]ue 

[P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (emphasis 

added)), and Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 

2014) (holding that “if a defendant has been convicted at a trial 

at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the 

defendant has a stand-alone claim . . . based on the [Due 

Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment” (emphasis 

added)), with Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 

273, 279 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The Supreme Court has instructed 

that all claims that law enforcement officers have used 

excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, 

investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen should be 

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness 

standard, rather than under a substantive due process 

approach.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

This case requires us to address the question more directly. We 

conclude that the Fourth Amendment always governs claims 

of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention when that detention 

occurs before the detainee’s first appearance before a court.

Our conclusion is compelled by Manuel—even by one 

of the dissenting opinions. Although Justice Alito, joined by 

Justice Thomas,3 dissented in Manuel, they “agree[d] with the 

Court’s holding up to a point: The protection provided by the 

Fourth Amendment continues to apply after the start of legal 

process, if legal process is understood to mean the issuance of 

an arrest warrant or . . . an initial appearance under federal 

law.” Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 923 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal 

3

Justice Thomas wrote his own dissent in Manuel, but he 

noted that he “join[ed] Justice Alito’s opinion in full.”

Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 922 (2017) (Thomas, 

J., dissenting).
11

quotation marks and citations omitted). So the Supreme Court 

in Manuel unanimously agreed that the Fourth Amendment 

covers a detainee’s arrest and pretrial detention at least through 

his initial appearance before a court. Compare id. at 919–20, 

with id. at 923 (Alito, J., dissenting).4

What’s more, our rule tracks the original public 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We find persuasive thenJudge Gorsuch’s discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s 

original understanding in Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 

F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 2016). In a concurring opinion, then-Judge 

Gorsuch observed that “textually the relevant language of the 

[Fourth] Amendment speaks to ‘unreasonable searches and 

seizures.’” Id. at 662 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). And he noted 

that “the [Fourth] Amendment as originally understood 

focused on restraining police action before the invocation of 

judicial processes.” Id. (citing Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering 

the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 609–

11 (1999)); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth 

Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1298–1308 (2016).

For these reasons, we hold that the Fourth Amendment 

always governs claims of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention 

when that detention occurs prior to the detainee’s first 

appearance before a court.

D

4 We recognize that claims of unlawful pretrial detention may 

concern restraint after a criminal detainee’s initial appearance

before a court. But because such a claim is not before us, we 

will not address it here. 
12

We now consider whether DeLade’s claim of unlawful 

arrest and pretrial detention is cognizable under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not. 

DeLade claims that Cargan violated his constitutional rights by 

causing him to be arrested and detained based on fabricated 

evidence—the changed status of the extradition warrant. And 

DeLade alleges that Cargan’s conduct caused his pretrial 

confinement until his extradition hearing, when the 

Commonwealth dropped the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. 

As we have explained, all claims of unlawful arrest and 

pretrial detention occurring before a detainee’s initial 

appearance fall under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, 

DeLade’s claim sounds in the Fourth Amendment but not in

the Fourteenth Amendment.

* * *

DeLade’s claim of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention 

is not cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. We will reverse the District Court’s 

denial of qualified immunity and remand this case with 

instructions to enter summary judgment in Cargan’s favor.