7526 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 29 / Monday, February 13, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

1The Working Group is a subcommittee of the 

Regional Entity Management Group which consists 

of the executive management of the eight Regional 

Entities. 

2 Interpretation of Protection System Reliability 

Standard, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 75 FR 

81,152 (Dec. 27, 2010), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,669 

(2010). 

3 16 U.S.C. 824 (2006). 

4 Id. 824o(d)(2). 5 Id. 824o(e)(3). 6Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric 

Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the 

Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of 

Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC 

Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, order on reh’g, Order No. 

672–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006). 

7North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 

FERC ¶ 61,062, order on reh’g & compliance, 117 

FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. 

v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

8 Mandatory Reliability Standards for the BulkPower System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. 

¶ 31,242, order on reh’g, Order No. 693–A, 120 

FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007). 

and 1.5 miles south of the 096° bearing from 

the airport extending from the 2.6-mile 

radius to 3.9 miles east of the airport, 

excluding the Los Angeles Airport Class D 

airspace. This Class D airspace is effective 

during the specific dates and times 

established in advance by a Notice to 

Airmen. The effective date and time will 

thereafter be continuously published in the 

Airport/Facility Directory. 

Paragraph 6004 Class E airspace areas 

designated as an extension to Class D or 

Class E surface area. 

* * * * * 

AWP CA E4 Hawthorne, CA [Revised] 

Jack Northrop Field/Hawthorne Municipal 

Airport, CA 

(Lat. 33°55′22′′ N., long. 118°20′07′′ W.) 

That airspace extending upward from the 

surface within 2 miles north and 1.5 miles 

south of the 096° bearing from Jack Northrop 

Field/Hawthorne Municipal Airport, 

beginning 3.9 miles east of the airport 

extending to 6.3 miles east of the airport. 

This Class E airspace area is effective during 

the specific dates and times established in 

advance by a Notice to Airmen. The effective 

date and time will thereafter be continuously 

published in the Airport/Facility Directory. 

Issued in Seattle, Washington, on February 

1, 2012. 

Johanna Forkner, 

Acting Manager, Operations Support Group, 

Western Service Center. 

[FR Doc. 2012–3149 Filed 2–10–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

18 CFR Part 40 

[Docket No. RM10–5–000; Order No. 758] 

Interpretation of Protection System 

Reliability Standard 

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: On November 17, 2009, the 

North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation (NERC) submitted a 

petition (Petition) requesting approval 

of NERC’s interpretation of Requirement 

R1 of Commission-approved Reliability 

Standard PRC–005–1 (Transmission and 

Generation Protection System 

Maintenance and Testing). On 

December 16, 2010, the Commission 

issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NOPR). In the NOPR, the Commission 

proposed to accept the NERC proposed 

interpretation of Requirement R1 of 

Reliability Standard PRC–005–1, and 

proposed to direct NERC to develop 

modifications to the PRC–005–1 

Reliability Standard through its 

Reliability Standards development 

process to address gaps in the Protection 

System maintenance and testing 

standard that were highlighted by the 

proposed interpretation. As a result of 

the comments received in response to 

the NOPR, in this order the Commission 

adopts the NOPR proposal to accept 

NERC’s proposed interpretation. In 

addition, as discussed below, the 

Commission accepts, in part, NERC’s 

commitment to address the concerns in 

the Protection System maintenance and 

testing standard that were identified by 

the NOPR within the Reliability 

Standards development process, and 

directs, in part, that the concerns 

identified by the NOPR with regard to 

reclosing relays be addressed within the 

reinitiated PRC–005 revisions. 

DATES: Effective Date: This rule will 

become effective March 14, 2012. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Ron LeComte (Legal Information), Office 

of General Counsel, Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, 888 First 

Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, 

(202) 502–8405, ron.lecomte@ferc.gov. 

Danny Johnson (Technical Information), 

Office of Electric Reliability, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street NE., Washington, DC 

20426, (202) 502–8892, 

danny.johnson@ferc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, 

Chairman; Philip D. Moeller, John R. 

Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur. 

Final Rule (Issued February 3, 2012.) 

1. On November 17, 2009, NERC 

submitted the Petition requesting 

approval of NERC’s interpretation of 

Requirement R1 of Commissionapproved Reliability Standard PRC– 

005–1 (Transmission and Generation 

Protection System Maintenance and 

Testing). NERC developed the 

interpretation in response to a request 

for interpretation submitted to NERC by 

the Regional Entities Compliance 

Monitoring Processes Working Group 

(Working Group).1 In a December 16, 

2010 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NOPR),2 the Commission proposed to 

accept the NERC proposed 

interpretation of Requirement R1 of 

Reliability Standard PRC–005–1, and 

proposed to direct NERC to develop 

modifications to the PRC–005–1 

Reliability Standard through its 

Reliability Standards development 

process to address gaps in the Protection 

System maintenance and testing 

standard highlighted by the proposed 

interpretation. As a result of the 

comments received in response to the 

NOPR, in this order the Commission 

adopts the NOPR proposal to accept 

NERC’s proposed interpretation. In 

addition, the Commission accepts, in 

part, NERC’s commitments to address 

the concerns in the Protection System 

maintenance and testing standard that 

were identified by the NOPR within the 

Reliability Standards development 

process, and directs, in part, that the 

concerns identified by the NOPR with 

regard to reclosing relays be addressed 

within the reinitiated PRC–005 

revisions. 

I. Background 

2. Section 215 of the Federal Power 

Act (FPA) requires a Commissioncertified Electric Reliability 

Organization (ERO) to develop 

mandatory and enforceable Reliability 

Standards, which are subject to 

Commission review and approval.3

Specifically, the Commission may 

approve, by rule or order, a proposed 

Reliability Standard or modification to a 

Reliability Standard if it determines that 

the Standard is just, reasonable, not 

unduly discriminatory or preferential, 

and in the public interest.4 Once 

approved, the Reliability Standards may 

be enforced by the ERO, subject to 

Commission oversight, or by the 

Commission independently.5

3. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, 

the Commission established a process to 

select and certify an ERO,6 and 

subsequently certified NERC.7 On April 

4, 2006, NERC submitted to the 

Commission a petition seeking approval 

of 107 proposed Reliability Standards. 

On March 16, 2007, the Commission 

issued a Final Rule, Order No. 693,8

approving 83 of the 107 Reliability 

Standards, including Reliability 


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9 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). 

10Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242 at 

P 1475. 11NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 3A, 

Reliability Standards Development Procedure, 

Version 6.1, at 26–27 (2007). 12 In Docket No. RD11–13–000, NERC has 

proposed to revise the definition of Protection 

System effective on the first day of the first calendar 

quarter twelve months from approval. The 

Commission is approving this revision in an order 

issued concurrently with this order. See North 

American Electric Reliability Corp., 138 FERC 

¶ 61,095 (2012). 

13The revised definition of Protection System 

accepted in Docket No. RD11–13–000 includes 

battery chargers as an element of the Protection 

System and, as a result of that change, battery 

chargers must be maintained and tested. Thus, the 

modified definition of Protection System approved 

in Docket No. RD11–13–000, when effective, shall 

supersede the interpretation of Requirement R1 of 

Reliability Standard PRC–005–1 approved in this 

order. 

Standard PRC–005–1. In addition, 

pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the 

FPA,9 the Commission directed NERC to 

develop modifications to 56 of the 83 

approved Reliability Standards, 

including PRC–005–0.10

4. NERC’s Rules of Procedure provide 

that a person that is ‘‘directly and 

materially affected’’ by Bulk-Power 

System reliability may request an 

interpretation of a Reliability 

Standard.11 In response, the ERO will 

assemble a team with relevant expertise 

to address the requested interpretation 

and also form a ballot pool. NERC’s 

Rules of Procedure provide that, within 

45 days, the team will draft an 

interpretation of the Reliability 

Standard and submit it to the ballot 

pool. If approved by the ballot pool and 

subsequently by the NERC Board of 

Trustees (Board), the interpretation is 

appended to the Reliability Standard 

and filed with the applicable regulatory 

authorities for approval. 

II. Reliability Standard PRC–005–1 

5. The purpose of PRC–005–1 is to 

‘‘ensure all transmission and generation 

Protection Systems affecting the 

reliability of the Bulk Electric System 

(BES) are maintained and tested.’’ In 

particular, Requirement R1, requires 

that: 

R1. Each Transmission Owner and 

any Distribution Provider that owns a 

transmission Protection System and 

each Generator Owner that owns a 

generation Protection System shall have 

a Protection System maintenance and 

testing program for Protection Systems 

that affect the reliability of the BES. The 

program shall include: 

R1.1. Maintenance and testing 

intervals and their basis. 

R1.2. Summary of maintenance and 

testing procedures. 

6. NERC currently defines ‘‘Protection 

System’’ as follows: ‘‘Protective relays, 

associated communication systems, 

voltage and current sensing devices, 

station batteries and DC control 

circuitry.’’ 12

III. NERC Proposed Interpretation 

7. In the NERC Petition, NERC 

explains that it received a request from 

the Working Group for an interpretation 

of Reliability Standard PRC–005–1, 

Requirement R1, addressing five 

specific questions. Specifically, the 

Working Group questions and NERC 

proposed interpretations include: 

Request 1: ‘‘Does R1 require a 

maintenance and testing program for the 

battery chargers for the ‘station batteries’ 

that are considered part of the 

Protection System?’’ 

Response: ‘‘While battery chargers are 

vital for ensuring ‘station batteries’ are 

available to support Protection System 

functions, they are not identified within 

the definition of ‘Protection Systems.’ 

Therefore, PRC–005–1 does not 

currently require maintenance and 

testing of battery chargers.’’ 13

Request 2: ‘‘Does R1 require a 

maintenance and testing program for 

auxiliary relays and sensing devices? If 

so, what types of auxiliary relays and 

sensing devices? (i.e., transformer 

sudden pressure relays).’’ 

Response: ‘‘The existing definition of 

‘Protection System’ does not include 

auxiliary relays; therefore, maintenance 

and testing of such devices is not 

explicitly required. Maintenance and 

testing of such devices is addressed to 

the degree that an entity’s maintenance 

and testing program for DC control 

circuits involves maintenance and 

testing of imbedded auxiliary relays. 

Maintenance and testing of devices that 

respond to quantities other than 

electrical quantities (for example, 

sudden pressure relays) are not 

included within Requirement R1.’’ 

Request 3: ‘‘Does R1 require 

maintenance and testing of transmission 

line re-closing relays?’’ 

Response: ‘‘No. ‘Protective Relays’ 

refer to devices that detect and take 

action for abnormal conditions. 

Automatic restoration of transmission 

lines is not a ‘protective’ function.’’ 

Request 4: ‘‘Does R1 require a 

maintenance and testing program for the 

DC circuitry that is just the circuitry 

with relays and devices that control 

actions on breakers, etc., or does R1 

require a program for the entire circuit 

from the battery charger to the relays to 

circuit breakers and all associated 

wiring?’’ 

Response: ‘‘PRC–005–1 requires that 

entities (1) address DC control circuitry 

within their program, (2) have a basis 

for the way they address this item, and 

(3) execute the program. Specific 

additional requirements relative to the 

scope and/or methods are not 

established.’’ 

Request 5: ‘‘For R1, what are 

examples of ‘associated 

communications systems’ that are part 

of ‘Protection Systems’ that require a 

maintenance and testing program?’’ 

Response: ‘‘ ‘Associated 

communication systems’ refer to 

communication systems used to convey 

essential Protection System tripping 

logic, sometimes referred to as pilot 

relaying or teleprotection. Examples 

include the following: 

—Communications equipment involved 

in power-line-carrier relaying; 

—Communications equipment involved 

in various types of permissive 

protection system applications; 

—Direct transfer-trip systems; 

—Digital communication 

systems * * *.’’ 

8. In its Petition requesting that the 

Commission accept the proposed 

interpretation, NERC recognized that 

greater clarity to the requirement 

language in PRC–005–1a is necessary to 

provide a complete framework for 

maintenance and testing of equipment 

necessary to ensure the reliability of the 

Bulk Power System. In its Petition, 

NERC also stated that this activity is 

already underway in the scope of 

Project 2007–17—Protection System 

Maintenance and Testing, coupled with 

the revised definition of Protection 

System. 

IV. Commission NOPR 

9. In the NOPR, the Commission 

proposed to accept the NERC proposed 

interpretation of Requirement R1 of 

Reliability Standard PRC–005–1. In 

addition, the Commission proposed to 

direct NERC to develop modifications to 

the PRC–005–1 Reliability Standard 

through its Reliability Standards 

development process to address gaps in 

the Protection System maintenance and 

testing standard that were highlighted 

by the proposed interpretation. The 

specific modifications are discussed 

below. 

V. Comments 

10. Comments on the Commission’s 

proposed interpretation were received 

by the NERC, Edison Electric Institute 

(EEI), ISO/RTO Council (IRC), American 

Public Power Association (APPA), 

National Rural Electric Cooperative 

Association (NRECA), Transmission 

Access Policy Study Group (TAPS), 

Cities of Anaheim and Riverside, 

California (Joint Cities), Northwest 


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7528 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 29 / Monday, February 13, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

14Lincoln People’s Utility District, Columbia 

River People’s Utility District, Inland Power and 

Light Company, Northwest Public Power 

Association, Northwest Requirements Utilities, 

Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative, Public 

Power Council, Public Utility District No. 1 of 

Snohomish County, and Tillamook People’s Utility 

District. 

15Public Service Electric and Gas Company, 

PSEG Fossil LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC. 

16Constellation Energy Group, Inc., Baltimore 

Gas & Electric Company, Constellation Energy 

Commodities Group, Inc., Constellation Energy 

Control and Dispatch, LLC, Constellation 

NewEnergy, Inc., and Constellation Power Source 

Generation, Inc. (together, Constellation) and 

Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC (CENG). 

17See infra, P 15, P 18, P 20. 

18NOPR at P 11–14. 

19NERC February 25, 2011 Comments at 7. 

20 Id. 

21 Id. 

22 Id. 

23 Id. 

24 Id. at 7, 8. 

25NOPR at P 15. 

Commenters,14 International 

Transmission Company (ITC), PSEG 

Companies,15 and MidAmerican Energy 

Holdings Company (MidAmerican), 

Constellation/CENG,16 and Manitoba 

Hydro (Manitoba). In general, 

commenters support NERC’s proposed 

interpretation, and oppose the further 

directives in the NOPR. Commenters 

also state that modifications to the 

Reliability Standards should be 

addressed within the NERC standards 

development process and that certain of 

the modifications are currently being 

addressed. 

VI. Discussion 

11. As a result of the comments 

received in response to the proposal, the 

Commission adopts the NOPR proposal 

to accept NERC’s proposed 

interpretation. As discussed below, 17

the Commission accepts, in part, 

NERC’s commitments to address the 

concerns in the Protection System 

maintenance and testing standard that 

were identified by the NOPR within the 

Reliability Standards development 

process, and directs, in part, that the 

concerns identified by the NOPR with 

regard to reclosing relays be addressed 

within the reinitiated PRC–005 

revisions. 

A. Maintenance and Testing of 

Auxiliary and Non-Electrical Sensing 

Relays 

12. In the NOPR, the Commission 

noted a concern that the proposed 

interpretation may not include all 

components that serve in some 

protective capacity.18 The Commission’s 

concerns included the proposed 

interpretation’s exclusion of auxiliary 

and non-electrical sensing relays. The 

Commission proposed to direct NERC to 

develop a modification to the Reliability 

Standard to include any component or 

device that is designed to detect 

defective lines or apparatuses or other 

power system conditions of an abnormal 

or dangerous nature, including devices 

designed to sense or take action against 

any abnormal system condition that will 

affect reliable operation, and to initiate 

appropriate control circuit actions. 

13. In their comments NERC, EEI, 

Joint Cities, Manitoba, NRECA, ITC, 

MidAmerican, and PSEG expressed 

varying levels of disagreement with the 

NOPR’s proposed directive. The 

disagreements are based on a concern 

that the proposed directive will create 

an increase in scope that will capture 

many items not used in BES protection. 

NERC is concerned the scope of this 

proposed directive is so broad that any 

device that is installed on the BulkPower System to monitor conditions in 

any fashion may be included.19 NERC 

states that many of these devices are 

advisory in nature and should not be 

reflected within NERC Reliability 

Standards if they do not serve a 

necessary reliability purpose.20 NERC 

does not believe it is necessary for the 

Commission to issue a directive to 

address this issue. Instead, NERC 

proposes to develop, either 

independently or in association with 

other technical organizations such as 

IEEE, one or more technical documents 

which: 

1. Describe the devices and functions 

(to include sudden pressure relays 

which trip for fault conditions) that 

should address FERC’s concern; and 

2. Propose minimum maintenance 

activities for such devices and 

maximum maintenance intervals, 

including the technical basis for each.21

14. NERC states that these technical 

documents will address those protective 

relays that are necessary for the reliable 

operation of the Bulk-Power System and 

will allow for differentiation between 

protective relays that detect faults from 

other devices that monitor the health of 

the individual equipment and are 

advisory in nature (e.g., oil 

temperature). Following development of 

the above-referenced document(s), 

NERC states that it will ‘‘propose a new 

or revised standard (e.g. PRC–005) using 

the NERC Reliability Standards 

development process to include 

maintenance of such devices, including 

establishment of minimum maintenance 

activities and maximum maintenance 

intervals.’’ 22 Accordingly, NERC 

proposes to ‘‘add this issue to the 

Reliability Standards issues database for 

inclusion in the list of issues to address 

the next time the PRC–005 standard is 

revised.’’ 23

15. The Commission accepts NERC’s 

proposal, and directs NERC to file, 

within sixty days of publication of this 

Final Rule, a schedule for informational 

purposes regarding the development of 

the technical documents referenced 

above, including the identification of 

devices that are designed to sense or 

take action against any abnormal system 

condition that will affect reliable 

operation. NERC shall include in the 

informational filing a schedule for the 

development of the changes to the 

standard that NERC stated it would 

propose as a result of the abovereferenced documents.24 NERC should 

update its schedule when it files its 

annual work plan. 

B. Reclosing Relays 

16. In the NOPR, the Commission 

noted that while a reclosing relay is not 

identified as a specific component of the 

Protection System, if it either is used in 

coordination with a Protection System 

to achieve or meet system performance 

requirements established in other 

Commission-approved Reliability 

Standards, or can exacerbate fault 

conditions when not properly 

maintained and coordinated, then 

excluding the maintenance and testing 

of these reclosing relays will result in a 

gap in the maintenance and testing of 

relays affecting the reliability of the 

Bulk-Power System.25 Accordingly, the 

Commission proposed that NERC 

modify the Reliability Standard to 

include the maintenance and testing of 

reclosing relays affecting the reliability 

of the Bulk-Power System. 

17. NERC, EEI, IRC, ITC 

MidAmerican, NRECA, and PSEG 

opposed the NOPR’s directive to 

include reclosing relays. In general, 

commenters state that reclosing relays 

used for stability purposes are already 

included in maintenance and testing 

programs, and that reclosing relays that 

are primarily used to minimize 

customer outages times and maximize 

availability of system components 

should not be included. PSEG and 

MidAmerican contend that the NERC 

standards development process should 

be utilized to determine the 

maintenance and testing of those 

reclosing relays that affect the reliability 

of the Bulk-Power System. 

18. ISO/RTO contends that the 

primary purpose of reclosing relays is to 

allow more expeditious restoration of 

lost components of the system, not to 

maintain the reliability of the BulkPower System. Therefore, ISO/RTO 

maintains that automatic reclosing 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 29 / Monday, February 13, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 7529 

26 ITC Comments at 7. 

27NRECA Comments at 13–14. 

28NERC February 25, 2011 Comments at 9. 

29TAPs urges the Commission to use its authority 

pursuant to section 215(d)(5) in circumstances 

where there is a clear need for such a directive. 

30 Id. 

31 Id. 

32NOPR at P 15, noting one such outage resulting 

in the loss of over 4,000 MW of generation and 

multiple 765 kV lines. 

33MidAmerican Comments at 6. 

34NERC System Protection and Control 

Subcommittee, ‘‘Advantages and Disadvantages of 

EHV Automatic Reclosing, ‘‘December 9, 2009, p. 

14. 

35NRECA Comments at 13. 

36As NERC notes, there may be applications of 

reclosing relays where the misoperation or 

miscommunication may does not have a 

detrimental effect on the reliability of the BulkPower System. 

relays should not be subject to the NERC 

Reliability Standard for relay 

maintenance and testing. MidAmerican 

states that there are only limited 

circumstances when a reclosing relay 

can actually affect the reliability of the 

Bulk-Power System. MidAmerican 

contends that it would be overbroad for 

the Commission to direct a modification 

to the standard that encompasses all 

reclosing relays that can ‘‘exacerbate 

fault conditions when not properly 

maintained and coordinated,’’ as this 

would improperly include many types 

of reclosing relays that do not 

necessarily affect the reliability of the 

Bulk-Power System. 

19. ITC agrees with the Commission’s 

proposal that reclosing relays that are 

required for system stability should be 

maintained and tested under 

Requirement R1 of PRC–005–1. 

However, ITC contends that since most 

bulk electric system automatic reclosing 

relay systems are applied to minimize 

customer outage times and to maximize 

availability of system components, only 

some ‘‘high speed’’ reclosing relays will 

affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power 

System. Therefore, ITC proposes that 

the Commission should direct NERC to 

draft specific requirements or selection 

criteria that should be used in 

identifying the types of re-closing relays 

for maintenance and testing under 

Requirement R1 of PRC–005–1.26

20. While NRECA notes that reclosing 

relays operate to restore, not protect a 

system, NRECA also notes that there are 

reclosing schemes that directly affect 

and are required for automatic stability 

control of the system, but that such 

schemes are already covered under 

Special Protection Schemes that are 

subject to reliability standards. NRECA, 

notes that some transmission operators 

do not allow reclosing relays on the 

bulk power system to remove the 

possibility of reclosing in on a 

permanent fault, thus avoiding further 

potential damage to the bulk power 

system.27

21. Similarly, NERC comments that in 

most cases reclosing relays cannot be 

relied on to meet system performance 

requirements because of the need to 

consider the impact of auto-reclosing 

into a permanent fault; however, NERC 

states that applications that may exist in 

which automatic restoration is used to 

meet system performance requirements 

following temporary faults. NERC 

comments that where reclosing relays 

are applied to meet performance 

requirements in approved NERC 

Reliability Standards, or where 

automatic restoration of service is 

fundamental to derivation of an 

Interconnection Reliability Operating 

Limit (IROL), it is reasonable to require 

maintenance and testing of autoreclosing relays.28 However, NERC does 

not believe it is necessary for the 

Commission to issue a directive.29

NERC states that the proposed revisions 

to Reliability Standard PRC–005–1 that 

are under development include 

maintenance of reclosing devices that 

are part of Special Protection Systems.30

NERC proposes ‘‘to add the remaining 

concerns relating to this issue to the 

Reliability Standards issues database for 

inclusion in the list of issues to address 

the next time Reliability Standard PRC– 

005 is revised.’’ 31

22. As NERC and other commenters 

point out, reclosing relays are used in a 

broad range of applications; e.g., meet 

system performance requirements in 

approved Reliability Standards, 

derivation of IROLs, maintain system 

stability, minimize customer outage 

times, to maximize availability of 

system components, etc. While 

commenters acknowledge that reclosing 

relays have several applications, 

commenters also appear to be divided 

on which applications, if any, should be 

included in a maintenance and testing 

program. 

23. The NOPR raised a concern that 

excluding the maintenance and testing 

of reclosing relays that can exacerbate 

fault conditions when not properly 

maintained and coordinated will result 

in a gap affecting Bulk-Power System 

reliability.32 We agree with 

MidAmerican that while there are only 

limited circumstances when a reclosing 

relay can actually affect the reliability of 

the Bulk-Power System, there are some 

reclosing relays, e.g., whose failure to 

operate or that misoperate during an 

event due to lack of maintenance and 

testing, may negatively impact the 

reliability of the Bulk-Power System.33

We agree with NERC that where 

reclosing relays are applied to meet 

performance requirements in approved 

NERC Reliability Standards, or where 

automatic restoration of service is 

fundamental to derivation of an 

Interconnection Reliability Operating 

Limit (IROL), it is reasonable to require 

maintenance and testing of autoreclosing relays. 

24. In the NOPR we stated that a 

misoperating or miscoordinated 

reclosing relay may result in the 

reclosure of a Bulk-Power System 

element back onto a fault or that a 

misoperating or miscoordinated 

reclosing relay may fail to operate after 

a fault has been cleared, thus failing to 

restore the element to service. As a 

result, the reliability of the Bulk-Power 

System would be affected. In addition, 

misoperated or miscoordinated relays 

may result in damage to the Bulk-Power 

System. For example, a misoperation or 

miscoordination of a reclosing relay 

causing the reclosing of Bulk-Power 

System facilities into a permanent fault 

can subject generators to excessive shaft 

torques and winding stresses and 

expose circuit breakers to systems 

conditions less than optimal for correct 

operation, potentially damaging the 

circuit breaker.34

25. While some commenters argue 

that reclosing relays do not affect the 

reliability of the Bulk-Power System, the 

record supports our concern. For 

example, we note NERC’s concern 

regarding the ‘‘* * * need to consider 

the impact of autoreclosing into a 

permanent fault.’’ We also note 

NRECA’s comments that ‘‘* * * some 

transmission operators do not allow 

reclosing on the bulk electric system 

facilities to remove the opportunity of 

closing in on a permanent fault’’ and 

‘‘* * * by its [automatic reclosing] use 

a utility understands the potential for 

further damage that may occur by 

reclosing.’’ 35 Because the misoperation 

or miscommunication of reclosing 

relays can exacerbate fault conditions, 

we find that reclosing relays that may 

affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power 

System should be maintained and 

tested.36

26. For the reasons discussed above, 

we conclude that it is important to 

maintain and test reclosing relays that 

may affect the reliability of the BulkPower System. We agree with ITC that 

specific requirements or selection 

criteria should be used to identify 

reclosing relays that affect the reliability 

of the Bulk-Power System. As 

MidAmerican suggests, the standard 

should be modified, through the 


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7530 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 29 / Monday, February 13, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

37On December 13, 2011, NERC submitted its 

Standards Development Plan for 2012–2014. NERC 

estimates that Project 2007–17 will be completed in 

the second quarter of 2012. By July 30, 2012, NERC 

should submit to the Commission either the 

completed project which addresses the remaining 

issues consistent with this order, or an 

informational filing that provides a schedule for 

how NERC will address such issues in the Project 

2007–17 reinitiated efforts. 

38NOPR at P 16. 

39NERC February 25, 2011 Comments at 10. 

40 Id. 

41As previously noted, NERC estimates that 

Project 2007–17 will be completed by the second 

quarter of 2012. By July 30, 2012, NERC should 

submit to the Commission either the completed 

project which addresses the remaining issues 

consistent with this order, or an informational filing 

that provides a schedule for how NERC will address 

such issues in the Project 2007–17 reinitiated 

efforts. 

42 5 CFR 1320. 

43 44 U.S.C. 3507. 

44Regulations Implementing the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486, 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987). 

45 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii). 

46 5 U.S.C. 601–612. 

47 13 CFR 121.201. 

48 Id. n.1. 

Reliability Standards development 

process, to provide the Transmission 

Owner, Generator Owner, and 

Distribution Provider with the 

discretion to include in a Protection 

System maintenance and testing 

program only those reclosing relays that 

the entity identifies as having an affect 

on the reliability of the Bulk-Power 

System. 

27. We note that the original project 

to revise Reliability Standard PRC–005 

failed a recirculation ballot in July of 

2011. The project was subsequently 

reinitiated to continue the efforts to 

develop Reliability Standard PRC–005– 

2. Given that the project to draft 

proposed revisions to Reliability 

Standard PRC–005–1 continues in this 

reinitiated effort, and the importance of 

maintaining and testing reclosing relays, 

we direct NERC to include maintenance 

and testing of reclosing relays that can 

affect the reliable operation of the BulkPower System, as discussed above, 

within these reinitiated efforts to revise 

Reliability Standard PRC–005.37

C. DC Control Circuitry and 

Components 

28. In the NOPR, the Commission 

explained its understanding that a 

maintenance and testing program for DC 

control circuitry would include all 

components of DC control circuitry 

necessary for ensuring Reliable 

Operation of the Bulk-Power System, 

and that not establishing the specific 

requirements of such a maintenance and 

testing program results in a gap in the 

maintenance and testing of Protection 

System components.38

29. Joint Cities, MidAmerican, and 

NRECA expressed concern that the 

NOPR’s directive is too broad and 

unnecessarily burdensome. NERC agrees 

that maintenance and testing should be 

required for all DC control circuitry.39

NERC further stated that draft standard 

PRC–005–2 being developed in Project 

2007–17 ‘‘includes extensive, specific 

maintenance activities (with maximum 

maintenance intervals) related to the DC 

control circuits.’’ 40 The Commission 

accepts NERC’s commitment to include 

the development of specific 

requirements of such a maintenance and 

testing program described above in 

Project 2007–17.41

VII. Information Collection Statement 

30. The Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) regulations require that 

OMB approve certain reporting and 

recordkeeping (collections of 

information) imposed by an agency.42

The Commission submits reporting and 

recording keeping requirements to OMB 

under section 3507 of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995.43

31. As stated above, the Commission 

previously approved, in Order No. 693, 

the Reliability Standard that is the 

subject of the current Final Rule. This 

Final Rule accepts an interpretation of 

the currently approved Reliability 

Standard. The interpretation of the 

current Reliability Standard at issue in 

this final rule is not expected to change 

the reporting burden or the information 

collection requirements. The 

informational filing required of NERC is 

part of currently active collection 

FERC–725 and does not require 

additional approval by OMB. 

32. We will submit this final rule to 

OMB for informational purposes only. 

VIII. Environmental Analysis 

33. The Commission is required to 

prepare an Environmental Assessment 

or an Environmental Impact Statement 

for any action that may have a 

significant adverse effect on the human 

environment.44 The Commission has 

categorically excluded certain actions 

from this requirement as not having a 

significant effect on the human 

environment. Included in the exclusion 

are rules that are clarifying, corrective, 

or procedural or that do not 

substantially change the effect of the 

regulations being amended.45 The 

actions proposed herein fall within this 

categorical exclusion in the 

Commission’s regulations. 

IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

34. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 

1980 (RFA) generally requires a 

description and analysis of final rules 

that will have significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities.46 The RFA mandates 

consideration of regulatory alternatives 

that accomplish the stated objectives of 

a proposed rule and that minimize any 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The Small Business Administration’s 

(SBA) Office of Size Standards develops 

the numerical definition of a small 

business.47 The SBA has established a 

size standard for electric utilities, 

stating that a firm is small if, including 

its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in 

the transmission, generation and/or 

distribution of electric energy for sale 

and its total electric output for the 

preceding twelve months did not exceed 

four million megawatt hours.48 The RFA 

is not implicated by this Final Rule 

because the interpretation accepted 

herein does not modify the existing 

burden or reporting requirements. 

Because this Final Rule accepts an 

interpretation of the currently approved 

Reliability Standard, the Commission 

certifies that this Final Rule will not 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities. 

X. Document Availability 

35. In addition to publishing the full 

text of this document in the Federal 

Register, the Commission provides all 

interested persons an opportunity to 

view and/or print the contents of this 

document via the Internet through 

FERC’s Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) 

and in FERC’s Public Reference Room 

during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. 

to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First 

Street NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 

20426. 

36. From FERC’s Home Page on the 

Internet, this information is available on 

eLibrary. The full text of this document 

is available on eLibrary in PDF and 

Microsoft Word format for viewing, 

printing, and/or downloading. To access 

this document in eLibrary, type the 

docket number excluding the last three 

digits of this document in the docket 

number field. 

37. User assistance is available for 

eLibrary and the FERC’s Web site during 

normal business hours from FERC 

Online Support at 202–502–6652 (toll 

free at 1–866–208–3676) or email at 

ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the 

Public Reference Room at (202) 502– 

8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. Email the 

Public Reference Room at 

public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 29 / Monday, February 13, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 7531 

XI. Effective Date and Congressional 

Notification 

38. This Final Rule is effective March 

14, 2012. The Commission has 

determined, with the concurrence of the 

Administrator of the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs of 

OMB that this rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’ 

as defined in section 351 of the Small 

Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act of 1996. 

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40 

Applicability, Mandatory reliability 

standards, Availability of reliability 

standards. 

By the Commission. 

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2012–3272 Filed 2–10–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Part 52 

[EPA–R08–OAR–2011–0100; FRL–9495–9] 

Disapproval and Promulgation of Air 

Quality Implementation Plans; 

Montana; Revisions to the 

Administrative Rules of Montana—Air 

Quality, Subchapter 7, Exclusion for 

De Minimis Changes 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: EPA is taking final action to 

partially approve and partially 

disapprove State Implementation Plan 

(SIP) revisions and new rules as 

submitted by the State of Montana on 

June 25, 2010 and May 28, 2003. The 

revisions contain new rules in 

Subchapter 7 (Permit, Construction, and 

Operation of Air Contaminant Sources) 

that pertain to the issuance of Montana 

air quality permits, in addition to other 

minor administrative changes to other 

subchapters of the Administrative Rules 

of Montana (ARM). In this action, EPA 

is approving those portions of the rules 

that are approvable and disapproving 

those portions of the rules that are 

inconsistent with the Clean Air Act 

(CAA). This action is being taken under 

section 110 of the CAA. 

DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is 

effective March 14, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: EPA has established a 

docket for this action under Docket ID 

No. EPA–R08–OAR–2011–0100. All 

documents in the docket are listed in 

the www.regulations.gov Web site. 

Although listed in the index, some 

information is not publicly available, 

e.g., CBI or other information whose 

disclosure is restricted by statute. 

Certain other material, such as 

copyrighted material, will be publicly 

available only in hard copy. Publicly 

available docket materials are available 

either electronically in www.regulations.

gov or in hard copy at the Air Program, 

Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), Region 8, 1595 Wynkoop Street, 

Denver, Colorado 80202–1129. EPA 

requests you contact the individual 

listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section to view the hard copy 

of the docket. You may view the hard 

copy of the docket Monday through 

Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., excluding 

Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Kevin Leone, Air Program, Mailcode 

8P–AR, Environmental Protection 

Agency, Region 8, 1595 Wynkoop 

Street, Denver, Colorado 80202–1129, 

(303) 312–6227, or leone.kevin@epa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Definitions 

For the purpose of this document, we 

are giving meaning to certain words or 

initials as follows: 

(i) The words or initials Act or CAA 

mean or refer to the Clean Air Act, 

unless the context indicates otherwise. 

(ii) The words EPA, we, us or our 

mean or refer to the United States 

Environmental Protection Agency. 

(iii) The initials SIP mean or refer to 

State Implementation Plan. 

(iv) The words State or Montana 

mean the State of Montana, unless the 

context indicates otherwise. 

Table of Contents 

I. What action is EPA taking? 

A. Summary of Final Action 

B. Other Relevant Actions Related to the 

Montana SIP Revision Submittals 

II. What is the background? 

A. Brief Discussion of Statutory and 

Regulatory Requirements 

B. Summary of the Submittals Addressed 

in This Final Action 

III. Response to Comments 

IV. What are the grounds for this approval 

action? 

V. What are the grounds for this disapproval 

action? 

VI. Final Action 

VII. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews 

I. What action is EPA taking? 

A. Summary of Final Action 

EPA is taking final action to approve 

new rule ARM 17.8.745 as submitted by 

the State of Montana on June 25, 2010. 

Montana adopted this rule on May 14, 

2010 and it became State effective on 

May 28, 2010. We are also taking final 

action to approve all references to ARM 

17.8.745, submitted by Montana on May 

28, 2003. Specifically, the following 

phrases in 17.8.740(8)(a) and (c), 

respectively, (1) ‘‘except when a permit 

is not required under ARM 17.8.745’’ 

and (2) ‘‘except as provided in ARM 

17.8.745,’’ the phrase ‘‘and 17.8.745’’ in 

ARM 17.8.743(1) and the phrase ‘‘the 

emission increase meets the criteria in 

ARM 17.8.745 for a de minimis change 

not requiring a permit in ARM 

17.8.864(1)(b). These references were 

adopted on December 6, 2002, and 

became State effective on December 27, 

2002. EPA is also taking final action to 

disapprove the phrase ‘‘asphalt concrete 

plants, mineral crushers’’ in new rule 

ARM 17.8.743(1)(b) as submitted by the 

State of Montana on May 28, 2003. This 

rule was adopted on December 6, 2002, 

and became State effective on December 

27, 2002. 

ARM 17.8.745, as submitted by the 

State of Montana on June 25, 2010, and 

all references to ARM 17.8.745, as 

submitted by the State of Montana on 

May 28, 2003, meet the requirements of 

the Act and EPA’s minor New Source 

Review (NSR) regulations. ARM 

17.8.743(1)(b), as submitted by the State 

of Montana on May 28, 2003, does not 

meet the requirements of the Act and 

EPA’s minor NSR regulations. 

EPA proposed an action for the above 

SIP revision submittals on September 

26, 2011 (76 FR 59338). We accepted 

comments from the public on this 

proposal from September 27, 2011, until 

October 26, 2011. A summary of the 

comments received and our evaluation 

thereof is discussed in section III below. 

In the proposed rule, we described our 

basis for the actions identified above. 

The reader should refer to the proposed 

rule, and sections III and IV of this 

preamble, for additional information 

regarding this final action. 

EPA reviews a SIP revision 

submission for its compliance with the 

Act and EPA regulations. CAA 

110(k)(3). We evaluated the submitted 

Program based upon the regulations and 

associated record that have been 

submitted and are currently before EPA. 

In order for EPA to ensure that Montana 

has a Program that meets the 

requirements of the CAA, the State must 

demonstrate the Program is as stringent 

as the Act and the implementing 

regulations discussed in this notice. For 

example, EPA must have sufficient 

information to make a finding that the 

new Program will ensure protection of 

the NAAQS, and noninterference with 

the Montana SIP control strategies, as 

required by section 110(l) of the Act.

The provisions in these submittals 

were not submitted to meet a mandatory 


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