Filed 5/18/22; Certified for Publication 6/9/22 (order attached)

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

A.F., a Minor, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY F.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D079373

 (Super. Ct. No. 21FDV01528N)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Victor M. Torres, Judge. Reversed.

Beatrice L. Snider and John L. Romaker, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Niddrie Addams Fuller Singh, Victoria E. Fuller; DeVito & Nore and 

Nicole M. Nore, for Defendant and Respondent.

Eleven-year-old A.F. sought a domestic violence restraining order 

(DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F. (Father), who holds joint legal custody 

with her mother, Andrea F. (Mother). The petition was filed by Mother on 

A.F.’s behalf. Mother sought appointment as A.F.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) 

in the domestic violence (DV) matter at the same time. The court granted the 

request for GAL appointment the same day. A.F. was represented by 
2

attorney Edward Castro in the domestic violence matter. Castro previously 

represented Mother in her marital dissolution from Father. 

Father objected to Mother’s appointment as GAL and to Castro’s 

representation of A.F., contending Castro had a conflict of interest under 

Rule 1.7(a), (b) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, (Rule 1.7). 

The court removed Mother as GAL and granted Father’s request to disqualify 

Castro. 

A.F. appeals, contending (1) Father lacks standing to challenge Castro’s 

representation of A.F.; (2) the court incorrectly concluded Castro 

simultaneously represents Mother and A.F. and consequently abused its 

discretion by applying Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro; and (3) the court should 

have considered the rules governing successive representation and denied the 

request for disqualification.

We assume Father has standing to challenge Castro’s representation of 

his minor child A.F. However, we conclude the record lacks substantial 

evidence to support the court’s finding that Castro simultaneously 

represented Mother and A.F., and it was therefore an abuse of discretion to 

apply Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro. We decline to draw any conclusion 

regarding the propriety of disqualifying Castro under the rules and standards 

governing successive representation because it would require a fact-intensive 

evaluation not sufficiently developed in the record before us. Accordingly, we 
3

will reverse the order disqualifying Castro as attorney in the related matters 

before the court and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.1

I

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS

In 2013, when A.F. was four years old, Mother sought and received a 

DVRO and a criminal protective order against Father.2 Then, Mother and 

Father dissolved their marriage in 2015. As part of the dissolution, they 

reached a marital settlement agreement that included child custody, and the 

court retained jurisdiction over the matter for purposes of resolving disputes. 

The custody agreement gives parents joint legal care, custody, and 

control of A.F. It also states, “The child shall not be exposed to court papers 

or disputes between the parents, and each parent shall make every possible 

effort to ensure that other people comply with this order.” 

Mother was represented by Edward Castro in the dissolution 

proceedings; Castro filed a notice of withdrawal of attorney of record on 

November 17, 2015. 

1 We grant Father’s unopposed request for judicial notice of court records 

demonstrating Castro substituted out as A.F.’s attorney of record following 

his disqualification, then substituted back in as A.F.’s attorney of record 

following our grant of supersedeas relief staying enforcement of the 

disqualification order pending resolution of this appeal. (See Evid. Code, 

§ 452, subd. (d).)

2 The protective orders ran concurrently and expired in 2016. 
4

In October 2019, Mother sent an email to Father in which she 

referenced getting advice from her attorney, and she offered to have “Ed” set 

a court date if the parties could not resolve their issue.3

On April 2, 2021, Castro filed a DVRO petition on behalf of Mother as 

GAL for A.F. against Father. The petition included a request for a child 

custody and visitation order on behalf of Mother as the GAL, granting Mother 

full legal and physical custody, with no visitation for Father.4 Castro 

simultaneously sought approval of Mother as the GAL, which the court 

granted the same day. 

The petition included a declaration by Mother that detailed recent 

events between A.F. and Father told from Mother’s perspective. It also

included information about Mother’s past DVRO against Father, as well as 

allegations that she believed Father had a problem with pornography based 

on her experiences with him during the time they were married. 

Because of the custody request in the petition, the court initially 

consolidated the civil DVRO action and the family law dissolution matter in 

April 2021. It also set trial on the DVRO request. Father’s attorney notified 

the court that Father intended to seek removal of Mother as the GAL and 

request disqualification of Castro. 

3 The court sustained A.F.’s objection to Father’s statement in his 

declaration that Mother may have continued to consult with Castro as her 

attorney based on inferences he drew from this email. The court admitted 

the email itself. 

4 The court told the parties that it was not appropriate for a child, in a 

DVRO request, to seek modification of custody orders granted in a dissolution 

under Family Code section 6323. It also explained that the remaining 

requests raised by Father were not appropriate for the domestic violence case 

without a finding of domestic violence one way or the other. 
5

Father filed a request for order seeking removal of Mother as the GAL, 

disqualification of Castro as A.F.’s attorney in the DVRO matter and as 

Mother’s attorney in the family law matter, appointment of counsel for A.F., 

reunification therapy, and appointment of an individual therapist for A.F. 

Father’s memorandum of points and authorities cited Rule 1.7, which 

prohibits representation of a client absent informed written consent from 

each client when the representation is directly adverse to another client 

(Rule 1.7(a)) and provides that a lawyer shall not represent a client absent 

informed written consent from each affected client when there is a significant 

risk the responsibility to or relationship with a third party would materially 

limit the representation (Rule 1.7(b)).

In May 2021, the court unconsolidated the two matters, but the cases 

remain related. 

During the June 2021 hearing, Father’s counsel argued that Mother 

could have taken other action within family court, and that Mother was not a 

disinterested and unbiased individual who could distinguish between her 

feelings toward Father and what was in the best interest of A.F. 

The court granted the motion to replace Mother as the GAL. It 

explained: “I find that mother and her alignment so closely with the minor 

child and her past conduct of aligning against father . . . warrants the mother 

being the inappropriate party to be the guardian ad litem.” 

The court told the parties that it did not have competent evidence in 

front of it that Castro had engaged in any substantial conduct that 

disqualified him. Although the court did not believe it was appropriate for 

Castro to represent A.F., it noted that it did not see authority suggesting as 

much. 
6

Father’s counsel argued during the hearing that Castro could not 

“divorce himself . . . from the prior representation” of Mother and argued 

Father did not know “what information [Castro] obtained from a minor child, 

which now [Castro]’s going to use in his representation of [Mother].” The 

court told the parties that “as far as removing or disqualifying Mr. Castro in 

the dissolution matter,” that issue was not before the court at that time. It 

reserved on the issue of disqualification and took the matter under 

submission. 

The court issued its written statement of decision in July 2021. The 

order granted Father’s motion to disqualify Castro.5 The court applied 

Rule 1.7, addressing conflicts of interest among current clients (Rules Prof. 

Conduct, former rule 3-310), and it concluded that Mother’s act of signing a 

conflict of interest waiver suggested that Castro separately represented 

Mother and A.F. Additionally, the court noted that the petition for the DVRO 

requested custody orders, which could only be brought by Mother herself 

under Family Code6 section 6323, not by A.F. or Mother as the GAL. 

The court ultimately concluded that Rule 1.7 applied and found that 

Mother as the GAL could not provide consent to waive a conflict between 

Castro’s representation of A.F. and Castro’s representation of Mother. And it 

concluded that any waiver signed on A.F.’s behalf by Mother was not valid 

because the court had not yet granted permission for Mother to serve as the 

5 The order was issued in case No. 21FDV01528N (the DV matter), but it 

also disqualified Castro in case No. DN171362 (the dissolution matter).

6 Statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
7

GAL at the time the waivers were signed.7 Thus, while the conflict waiver 

was valid as to Mother, who had authority to sign it on her own behalf, the 

representation did not comply with Rule 1.7, which requires informed written 

consent by each client. The court also invited the parties to appear ex parte 

to set a hearing to resolve the issue of who would serve as A.F.’s GAL in the 

DV matter. 

A.F. timely appealed the disqualification of Castro.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Standing

A moving party “must have standing, that is, an invasion of a legally 

cognizable interest, to disqualify an attorney.” (Great Lakes Construction, 

Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1357 (Great Lakes).) Standing 

is a question of law, which we may determine independently of the trial 

court’s ruling. (Id. at p. 1354.) Although the complaining party generally 

“must have or must have had an attorney-client relationship with the 

attorney” he seeks to disqualify (id. at p. 1356), “no California case has held 

that only a client or former client may bring a disqualification motion” 

(Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204). Further, while 

“imposing a standing requirement for attorney disqualification motions 

protects against the strategic exploitation of the rules of ethics and guards 

against improper use of disqualification as a litigation tactic” (Great Lakes,

at p. 1358), a paramount concern is “to preserve public trust in the 

7 The court also noted that at the time the conflict of interest waiver was 

signed, Mother and Father shared legal custody of A.F. 
8

scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar” (People 

ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 1135, 1145 (SpeeDee Oil)). 

Father contends he has standing because he has a personal stake in 

protecting A.F.’s best interests, and he believes a conflict of interest between 

A.F.’s and Mother does not serve A.F.’s best interests. Father holds joint 

legal custody with Mother, and a parent’s interest in the companionship, 

care, custody, and management of his or her child is a fundamental civil 

right. (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 

Cal.App.4th 212, 223.) Thus, if Father believes Castro’s concurrent 

representation of A.F. and Mother is not in A.F.’s best interests, and Mother 

acting as the GAL is the party who waived any potential conflict, this may 

give Father standing. Further, as Father notes, even if he does not have 

standing as the joint legal custodian, the court has authority to disqualify 

counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(5).8 (See 

SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) The court here recognized 

Mother’s alignment with A.F. in the civil DVRO matter is consistent with her 

past conduct and views in the marital matter, even though the final 

agreement granted joint legal care, custody, and control to the parents. 

At least arguably, a legally cognizable interest for disqualifying an 

opposing attorney may arise from generalized policy concerns surrounding 

the rule, e.g., the integrity of the process. (Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 

Cal.App.3d 470, 482-483 [addressing an attorney-witness situation].) In this 

8 Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(5) provides that 

every court has the power to control the conduct of its ministerial officer and 

all other person connected with a judicial proceeding before it in all matters.
9

factual scenario, the court can assume without deciding that Father may 

assert standing to object to opposing counsel’s representation of his minor 

child.

B. Guardian Ad Litem

1. Role of GAL

Code of Civil Procedure section 372, subdivision (a) requires a minor 

who is a party to appear by a guardian ad litem. (See also In re Marriage of 

Lloyd (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 216, 223.) There is no statutory requirement to 

provide notice to a parent before a GAL is appointed. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§§ 372, 373; Fam. Code, § 7635; Alex R. v. Superior Court (2016) 248 

Cal.App.4th 1, 7-8; Williams v. Superior Court (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 36, 48 

(Williams).) When a minor is living with a parent without counsel and seeks 

a protective order, notice of appointment of a guardian ad litem must be sent 

to at least one parent unless the court determines the notice would not be in 

the child’s best interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (b)(2); Alex R., at p. 8.) 

When there is no conflict of interest, the appointment is usually made upon 

application. (In re Marriage of Caballero (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149.)

“[A] guardian ad litem represents the interests of a person in legal 

proceedings who lacks capacity to represent himself or herself in those 

proceedings.” (J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 965.) “In 

the adversarial context, the guardian ad litem’s function is to protect the 

rights of the [minor], control the litigation, compromise or settle the action, 

control procedural steps incident to the conduct of the litigation, and make 

stipulations or concessions in the [minor] person’s interests. [Citation.] In 

such cases, the guardian ad litem’s role is ‘more than an attorney’s but less 

than a party’s.’ [Citation.]” (In re Charles T. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 869, 

875-876.) The GAL is responsible for assisting the attorney in protecting the 
10

rights of the minor. (In re Christina B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453.) 

But the attorney does not represent the GAL, who is not a party to the action 

(J.W., at p. 964 [GAL is not party to an action]; see Shen v Miller (2012) 212 

Cal.App.4th 48, 61-62); thus, the attorney represents the minor. 

“[W]hen considering the appropriate guardian ad litem for a minor 

plaintiff in a civil lawsuit, the central issue is the appropriate protection of 

the minor’s legal right to recover damages or other requested relief.” 

(Williams, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) Further, “ ‘[w]hen there is a 

potential conflict between a perceived parental responsibility and an 

obligation to assist the court in achieving a just and speedy determination of 

the action,’ a court has the right to select a guardian ad litem who is not a 

parent if that guardian would best protect the child’s interests.” (Id. at 

p. 49.) The “court is, in effect, the guardian of the minor and the guardian ad 

litem is but an officer and representative of the court.” (Serway v. Galentine 

(1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 86, 89.)

2. Mother’s Role as GAL

When A.F. filed for a DVRO against Father, she filed a request for 

appointment of Mother as her GAL. The court granted this request the same 

day. Later the court removed Mother as the GAL. However, its analysis 

regarding the conflict of interest from Castro’s representation was based on 

Mother’s role as the GAL and not her status as a party in the related 

dissolution matter. Mother’s removal as the GAL changes her role in the DV 

matter and thus affects the propriety of Castro’s disqualification, as we 

explain. 
11

C. The Request for Attorney Castro’s Disqualification

1. Standard of Review

We review an attorney’s disqualification for an abuse of discretion 

(In re Marriage of Zimmerman (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 556, 561 (Zimmerman); 

Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 705

(Jessen)) and “accept[ ] as correct all of [the court’s] express or implied 

findings supported by substantial evidence.” (City National Bank v. Adams 

(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 315, 322 (City National Bank).) We presume the trial 

court’s order is correct, and we indulge all presumptions to support the order, 

resolving conflicts in favor of the prevailing party and the trial court’s 

resolution of any factual disputes. (Zimmerman, at pp. 561-562.) “In 

exercising discretion, the trial court is required to make a reasoned judgment 

which complies with applicable legal principles and policies.” (Id. at p. 561.) 

Further, “if substantial evidence supports the trial court’s express or implied 

findings of fact, we review the resulting legal conclusions for an abuse of 

discretion.” (Ibid.) Thus, we are bound by the substantial evidence rule as 

well. (Ibid.) “We will reverse the trial court’s ruling only where there is no 

reasonable basis for its action.” (City National Bank, at p. 323.) 

2. Types of Conflict of Interest

Typically, disqualification motions arise in two factual 

circumstances: “(1) in cases of successive representation, where 

an attorney seeks to represent a client with interests that are potentially 

adverse to a former client of the attorney; and (2) in cases of simultaneous 

representation, where an attorney seeks to represent in a single action 

multiple parties with potentially adverse interests.” (In re Charlisse C.

(2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.) “In simultaneous representation cases, ‘[t]he 

primary value at stake . . . is the attorney’s duty—and the client’s legitimate 
12

expectation—of loyalty, rather than confidentiality.’ ” (Id. at p. 160., quoting 

Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 284 (Flatt).) In successive 

representation cases, the concern is an attorney’s duty of confidentiality. 

(Western Sugar Coop v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (C.D. Cal. 2015) 98 

F.Supp.3d 1074, 1080 (Western Sugar Coop) [applying the California State 

Bar Act and the California Rules of Professional Conduct].) In successive 

representation cases, courts apply the substantial relationship test, but in 

simultaneous representation cases, the rule is per se or automatic 

disqualification in all but a few cases. (Jessen, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 705, citing Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 284.) 

Automatic disqualification can be avoided in simultaneous 

representation cases when there is informed written consent when the 

attorney represents more than one client in a matter where there is a 

potential conflict, when there is an actual conflict between the concurrently 

represented clients, or when the attorney represents clients with adverse 

interests in two separate matters. (Sharp v. Next Entertainment, Inc. (2008) 

163 Cal.App.4th 410, 429 [addressing Rules Prof. Conduct, former rule 3-

310(C)(1)-(C)(3)].) Also, when a client’s litigation costs are being paid by a 

third party, the client must provide informed written consent for the 

arrangement. (Sharp, at p. 430 [referencing Rules Prof. Conduct, former 

rule 3-310(F)].) In these situations, the attorney must disclose relevant 

circumstances as well as any actual or reasonably foreseeable adverse 

consequences. (Sharp, at p. 429.) “In order for there to be valid consent, 

clients must indicate that they ‘know of, understand and acknowledge the 

presence of a conflict of interest. . . .’ [Citation.]”) (Ibid.) 
13

3. Simultaneous Representation

On appeal, A.F. challenges the court’s conclusion that Castro was 

engaged in concurrent representation. The court considered whether Castro 

represented Mother only, first as a party to the dissolution and second as the 

GAL in the DV matter. But it concluded the representations were separate 

because Mother’s declaration stated she hired Castro to represent A.F., and 

because Mother signed a conflict of interest waiver, which would be 

unnecessary if she were the only client. It identified the possibility of 

concurrent representation based on the initial request for custody orders 

selected, because, it explained, that request cannot properly be made by a 

minor. (See § 6323.) It also considered the details Mother included in her 

declaration regarding her relationship with Father, which were not directly 

related to the incidents giving rise to the DVRO request. 

In its findings, the court did not expressly identify simultaneous 

representation or explain the conflict of interest the simultaneous 

representation created, but its application of Rule 1.7, which requires 

disqualification of an attorney without a valid waiver of conflict, shows it 

concluded Castro was simultaneously representing Mother and A.F. 

Ultimately, the court disqualified Castro because it found A.F. had not 

provided the necessary informed, written consent, as Mother was not her 

GAL at the time the waiver was signed on A.F.’s behalf.

We begin by asking if there is substantial evidence to support the 

finding that Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F. (City 

National Bank, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 322.) If so, we then evaluate 

whether the court abused its discretion by disqualifying Castro. 

(Zimmerman, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) We note that in response to 

A.F.’s petition for a DVRO, Father requested and received consolidation of 
14

the dormant dissolution matter and the DV matter, but the cases were 

subsequently unconsolidated. Father’s request for order seeking dismissal of 

a GAL or removal of Mother as GAL and disqualification of Castro as counsel 

for Mother or A.F. was initially filed in the consolidated matter, but once the 

matters were unconsolidated, the requests remained part of the DV matter.9 

The court’s implicit conclusion that Castro represented both Mother and A.F. 

had to derive from material submitted in connection with A.F’s DVRO 

petition because there was no pending activity in the dissolution matter at 

the time.10

The court mentioned Father’s contention that Mother was being 

advised on her own behalf by Castro because of a reference to “Ed” in a 2019 

email, but it found Father’s conclusion was speculative. It admitted the 

email that referenced a communication Mother had with her attorney 

regarding the meaning of an item in the custody agreement and later stated 

that she could, if Father preferred, have “Ed” set up a hearing to resolve the 

matter. But the email was from 2019, long before A.F.’s 2021 petition. Thus, 

even if it showed Mother were represented by Castro in 2019, that does not

demonstrate simultaneous representation in 2021.

The evidence the court identified as demonstrating simultaneous 

representation addressed the blurred lines between Castro’s representation 

9 The request for disqualification sought disqualification of Castro from 

representing either Mother or A.F. in the matters before the court.

10 The court also noted the dissolution matter was not before it, so any 

disqualification of Castro in that matter would be premature. We recognize 

that the outcome of the DV matter could result in actual or potential conflict 

if there are subsequent proceedings in the dissolution matter and Castro 

represents Mother there. However, those conflicts are not presently before 

the court.
15

of Mother as the GAL and Castro’s representation of A.F. For example, 

Mother’s declaration in the DVRO petition detailed conflicts she had with 

Father, including information about her past restraining orders against him 

and her suspicions and allegations about Father’s interest in pornography. 

These details were specific to Mother personally and did not provide 

information about A.F.’s relationship with Father. The information was 

provided by Mother, not by Castro in his capacity as A.F.’s attorney. And it 

raised a concern about the propriety of Mother’s role as the GAL in part 

because the custody agreement prohibits parents from exposing A.F. to court 

papers or disputes between A.F.’s parents. But it did not show that Castro 

was representing Mother.

Father argues that he and Mother had been engaged in disputes about 

custody for years, and she had previously attempted to eliminate Father’s 

contact with A.F. The declaration that supports these claims does not show 

Castro represented Mother to navigate any of these disputes. Instead, it

details that A.F. began participating in activities scheduled by Mother during 

Father’s parenting time, argues Mother has contributed to the tension 

between Father and A.F., and offers explanations of what transpired between 

A.F. and Father to provide context for the incidents described in the DVRO 

petition. 

Father contends substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion 

that Castro’s representation of A.F. would be materially limited by Castro’s 

relationship with Mother. But the evidence Father points to regards Castro’s

prior relationship with Mother, possibly as recently as 2019, and statements 

in the declaration that regarded details to which A.F. should not have had 
16

access under the terms of the custody agreement. Those statements do not 

demonstrate simultaneous representation because Mother made them as 

A.F.’s GAL. 

Father posits that Mother’s interests diverge from A.F.’s interests 

because Mother wanted to limit or eliminate A.F.’s contact with Father and 

that is the remedy A.F. sought through a DVRO. But those positions are not 

in conflict. If, as Father claims, Mother’s goal is eliminating Father’s contact 

with A.F., and A.F.’s goal is the same, there is no conflict. To the extent 

Father is concerned that Castro may have obtained evidence from A.F. that 

could prejudice Father if Castro “seek[s] to continue his representation of 

[Mother] . . . ,”, we note that such representation of Mother is speculative,

and that Castro’s duty of confidentiality is not to Father. 

We recognize, as the trial court did, that Mother’s role as the GAL was 

improper under the circumstances. Although a GAL acts in the minor’s 

interests, Mother’s statements about her personal history and impressions of 

Father fall outside that role. The trial court addressed this by removing 

Mother as the GAL, a decision neither party challenges. Thus, before us is

the claim that Castro is simultaneously representing Mother and A.F. when 

Mother is no longer a participant in the DV litigation. 

Father compares Castro’s representation of A.F. to that of a neutral 

minor’s counsel who represents a child in a custody dispute case to highlight 

his concern that Castro was meeting with Mother and A.F. together, that 

Castro was “unduly influenced” by Mother’s positions and perceptions, which 

were not in “the interests of the minor child,” and that Castro would 

influence A.F.’s perceptions of Father and thereby impinge on Father’s 

parental rights. None of these concerns demonstrates simultaneous 

representation or is unique to Castro serving as A.F.’s attorney. 
17

Further, the comparison is inapt. A neutral minor’s counsel in a 

dissolution plays an entirely different role than counsel hired in a civil 

matter. In family court, counsel for a minor has a statutorily-imposed duty to 

present to the court recommendations based on what the attorney believes is 

in the best interests of the child in addition to the child’s wishes. (§ 3151, 

subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.242 (i) & (j); In re Zamer G. (2007) 153 

Cal.App.4th 1253, 1266 [counsel for minor has duty to advocate for child’s 

best interest].) In a civil matter, attorneys representing minors—or any 

other party who has a GAL—are bound by Business and Professions Code 

section 6068 and the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, and have an 

obligation to zealously represent their clients’ interests within the bounds of 

the law. (People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 631 [duty to represent 

client zealously within bounds of law]; see Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 

Cal.App.4th 156, 167-168 [explaining application of sanctions must not 

conflict with duty to represent client zealously].) While Father may have 

preferred the allegations A.F. raises in her DVRO petition to have been 

raised in the custody context in the dissolution matter, the Domestic Violence 

Prevention Act (§ 6200 et seq.) allows a child to file a petition as a party to 

the action. (§§ 6211, subds. (f), 6301, subd. (a), 6301.5.) 

None of Father’s arguments nor the facts upon which he relies direct us 

to evidence that Castro simultaneously represents Mother and A.F. We 

cannot find substantial evidence to support the court’s implicit conclusion 

that Castro simultaneously represents Mother and A.F. It was, therefore, an 

abuse of discretion to apply Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro.

4. Successive Representations

A.F. contends the trial court should have considered whether there was 

successive representation and, if so, whether a conflict of interest between 
18

Mother and A.F. actually existed, justifying Castro’s disqualification. Father 

contends on appeal that this issue was forfeited because A.F. did not raise it 

below. (See Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 

1488, fn. 3; American Continental Ins. Co. v. C & Z Timber Co. (1987) 195 

Cal.App.3d 1271, 1281 [“An argument or theory will generally not be 

considered if it is raised for the first time on appeal”]; but see Piscitelli v. 

Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 983 [recognizing issues of law 

regarding undisputed facts can be raised on appeal].)

A.F. did not raise successive representation in her briefs to the trial 

court.11 Father’s memorandum of points and authorities in support of his 

request to disqualify Castro challenged Castro’s representation under 

Rule 1.7, and he did not explicitly raise successive representation as an issue. 

However, rather than limiting his focus to arguing the representation created 

a conflict that impacted Castro’s duty of loyalty, as is implicated by conflicts 

governed by Rule 1.7 (see Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 

Cal.App.4th 810, 822 [courts concerned with duty of loyalty in concurrent 

representation cases]; City National Bank, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 327 

[same]), Father also expressed concern that such concurrent representation 

would present a “breach of confidentiality,” the concern raised by successive 

representation, found in Rule 1.9 (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.9(c)(1) & (2); 

Western Sugar Coop, supra, 98 F.Supp.3d at p. 1080 [successive 

representation of clients with adverse interests focuses on duty of 

confidentiality].). 

11 A.F.’s contentions in her reply brief that her memorandum in 

opposition to Father’s request for order asked the court to consider successive 

representation cited to cases that addressed successive representation but did 

not offer any analysis of the issue. It focused on responding to Father’s claim 

of simultaneous representation. 
19

Although the court noted Father’s concern in its written order, it did 

not consider whether Castro successively represented Mother and A.F. or 

analyze whether there was a conflict of interest on that basis. The court did 

not ask whether the dissolution matter and the DV matter were substantially 

related. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.9(a) & cmts. 1-3; Western Sugar 

Coop, supra, 98 F.Supp.3d at p. 1088, citing Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283.) 

It did not expressly find that Castro’s relationship to A.F. could breach his 

duty of confidentiality to Mother. (Zimmerman, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 

563.) It did not discuss whether Castro’s actions would injuriously affect 

Mother. (See Id. at p. 562; City National, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 323-

324.) And it did not “ ‘weigh the combined effect of a party’s right to counsel 

of choice, an attorney’s interest in representing a client, the financial burden 

on a client of replacing disqualified counsel and any tactical abuse underlying 

a disqualification proceeding against the fundamental principle that the fair 

resolution of disputes within our adversary system requires vigorous 

representation of parties by independent counsel unencumbered by conflicts 

of interest. [Citations.]’ ” (Zimmerman, at pp. 562-563.)

Had it considered successive representations, the court could have 

considered whether Mother’s waiver was valid under the Rules of 

Professional Conduct.12 Although Father raised issues implicated by 

12 A lawyer may reveal information protected from disclosure by Business 

and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) if the client gives 

informed consent. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.6(a).) However, an attorney 

cannot use information protected via Rule 1.6 of the Professional Rules of 

Conduct to the disadvantage of the former client or reveal information 

acquired from the former relationship. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.9, 

subds. (c)(1) & (c)(2).) The waiver Mother signed on her own behalf is not in 

the record. Moreover, the parties have not argued on appeal that once a 

proper GAL is appointed, a minor is unable to provide informed consent.
20

successive representation, nothing indicates the trial court considered this 

argument when it disqualified Castro, and we decline determine whether 

there is a conflict of interest created by successive representation that 

justifies or requires Castro’s disqualification because the record is 

undeveloped on this issue.

Given Mother’s removal as the GAL and the lack of substantial 

evidence to support the court’s implied finding of simultaneous 

representation, we cannot find a reasonable basis for the court’s 

disqualification of Castro based on the record before us. Because we find the 

court abused its discretion in disqualifying Castro on the basis that he 

simultaneously represents Mother and A.F., we will reverse the 

disqualification of Castro and remand the matter for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

DISPOSITION

We reverse the order disqualifying Castro as counsel in case 

Nos. 21FDV01528N and DN171362, and we remand the matter to the trial

court for further proceedings. We express no opinion regarding whether 

disqualification would be appropriate under another rule or standard. 
21

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

DO, J.
Filed 6/9/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

A.F., a Minor, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY F.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D079373

 (Super. Ct. No. 21FDV01528N)

ORDER CERTIFYING 

OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion in this case filed May 18, 2022 was not certified for publication. It 

appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of 

Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is 

GRANTED.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication 

specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
2

ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing 

on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official 

Reports.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties