IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2016-CA-00414-COA IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LOUIS LABASSE, JR., DECEASED: WENDY CHESTER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EX ECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF LOUIS LABASSE, JR. APPELLANT

v. RUBY D. LABASSE APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/08/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBORAH J. GAMBRELL COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: G. CHARLES BORDIS IV ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JAMES L. GRAY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - W ILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/12/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ. CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Louis L abasse Jr. died on June 11, 2014. He was survived by his wif e, Ruby Labasse, and his daughters f

rom a prior m a rriage, W endy Chester and Pam ela Ortis. The Pearl River County Chancery C ourt granted W endy ’s petition t o p r o b ate h er f ather’s last will and

testam ent and to be appointed executor of his estate. Throughout the probate proceedings,
R u by f iled m u ltiple petitions and m otions requesting various relief

. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s grant of relief t o Ruby , W endy appeals and argues the chancellor erred by : (1) considering Ruby ’s petition to contest the w ill; (2) rul i n g upon t he f inal a ccounting, thepetition to close the estate, and Ruby ’s objections t o the f inal accounting; (3) awarding Ruby

a o n e-third interest in Louis’s e state; (4) ruling on Ruby ’ s “Motion f or Citation of Contem

pt” against W endy ; and (5) a warding Ruby attorney ’s f ees. Through two m otions f iled at the

sam e tim e as her appellate b r ief , Ruby raises additional issues f or this Court’s c onsideration: (1) w hether Pam ela should be dism issed a s a n appellant f rom this appeal; and (2) whether she is entitled to attorney ’s f ees and expenses on appeal. ¶2. Upon review, we af f irm the chancellor’s judgm ent. W e also f ind Ruby ’s m otion to dism iss Pam ela as a n appellant i s well taken, a nd we theref o re dism iss Pam ela in this m atter. However, although W endy ’s c laim s on appeal ultim ately prove unsuccessf ul, we d ecline to f ind her appeal f

rivolous. W e theref

ore d eny R

uby ’s m o tion f

o r attorney ’s f

e es and expenses on appeal.
FACTS ¶3. On May

22, 2014, less than a m onth bef o re h is death, Louis published and declared

an instrum ent that purported to be his last will and testam ent. Subject to certain restrictions, the will lef

t Ruby a lif

e estate i n real property that served as the couple’s hom estead. Ruby also received Louis’s interest in the couple’s joint checking accoun t

. L o u i s’s d aughters
W e ndy and Pam ela received the rem ainder of Louis’s property

. On J uly 18, 2014, W endy
f iled a petition to p robate her f a ther’s will and to be appointed executor o f his estate. On July 24, 2014, the chancellor entered an order to adm it the will to probate in com m on f orm and to appoint W endy

executor.

2¶4. On October 1 0, 2014, Ruby renounced the bequest and devise o f the probated will and

f iled a spousal-share election pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 9 1-5-25 (Rev. 2013). The f

ollowing m onth, on Novem ber 20, 2014, Ruby f

iled a petition t o contest the will and rem ove W endy as executor, and she requested an a c counting and a widow’s allowance. The s am e day , Ruby also f iled a petition to establish her widow’s right to the possession and use of the couple’s hom e stead. ¶5. On February 11, 2015, the chancellor entered a n ord e r on Ruby ’s v arious petitions. The chancellor f

ound that W endy h ad changed the locks on Louis and Ruby ’s hom e stead and had rem oved property f

rom the hom estead. I n addition, the chancellor determ ined that, prior

t o L ouis’s death, W endy u sed a power of attorney to write checks to herself and withdra w $24,795.98 in f

unds f rom Louis and Ruby ’s joint checking a ccount. In her Febru a r y 11,
2015 order, the chancellor (1) dism issed Ruby ’s petition to c ontest the will af ter acknowl e d g i ng that Ruby h ad withdrawn the petition; (2) d enied Ruby ’s petition f or a widow’s allowance; ( 3) denied R uby ’s peti t i o n t o rem ove W e ndy as e x ecutor, subject to W e ndy ’s com

pliance with t he requirem ents t h e c h ancellor established in the order; (4) granted Ruby ’s p etition to establish her right to t he possession and use of the hom estead; and (5) granted Ruby a spousal-share election and awarded h er a o n e - t h ird interest in Louis’s

estate. In addition t o the other requirem ents, the chancellor ordered W e ndy to return all the personal property she h ad rem oved f rom the hom estead and to deliver the hom estead key s to Ruby

.

3¶6. On May 1 8, 2015, Ruby f iled a “ Motion f

or C itation of C o n t e mp t ” against W endy , claim ing that W endy h ad willf u l l y d i s o bey ed the chancellor’s February 11, 2015 order. Following a hearing on Ruby ’s contem pt m otion, the chancellor entered an agreed o rder that,

am ong other t hings, directed W endy , as estate executor, to f ile an inventory and accounting, place certain f

unds into the account f

or Louis’s estate, a nd pay Ruby attorney ’s f ees related to the contem

pt action. ¶7. On July 2 , 2015, W endy f i led her inventory and accounting, to which Ruby t i m e ly

o b j e c t e d

. A t a telephonic hearing, the chancellor ruled that, i n lieu of ordering W endy to deposit certain f

unds into the estate account , s h e w o u l d award Ruby a m onetary j udgm ent against W endy

. Thus, on Septem ber 2, 2 015, the chancellor entered an order awarding Ruby $18,795.98 plus interest against W endy f or W e ndy ’s f

ailure to com

p ly with the chancellor’s earlier order. The chancellor reserved a ruling on Ruby ’s request f or attorney ’s f

ees until the close of Louis’s estate. ¶8. On Novem

ber 24, 2015, af

ter W endy f

ailed to com

p ly with t he chancellor’s order to f i l e a f i n a l accounting and close the estate, the a ttorney f or the estate signed and f iled th e f inal account i n g a nd the petition to close the estate and discharge W endy as executor. On February 8, 2016, the chancellor g ranted the petition t o close the estate. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s grant of

Ruby ’s various requests f or relief , W endy appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9. This Court declines to d isturb a chancellor’s f actual f indings unless the f

i ndings were

4m anif

estly wrong or clearly erroneous or the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard. Turnage v. Brooks , 213 So. 3d 103, 105 ( ¶ 2) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2016). “As long as s u bstantial evidence supports the chancellor’s f indings, an appellate court is without a uthority to disturb them , even if it w ould have f ound otherwise as an o riginal m atter.” Id. ( citing Joel v. Joel , 43 So. 3d 424, 429 (¶14) (Miss. 2010)). However, we review questions of law de novo. Id.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether Pam ela should be dism i ssed as an appellant. ¶10. As an initial m atter, we address the issue raised in Ruby ’s m otion t hat Pam ela should be dism issed as an appellant f rom this appeal. Mississippi Code Annotated s ection 11-51-3 (Rev. 2012) provides f

or an appeal “f

rom any f i nal judgm ent of a circuit or chancery court in a civil case, not being a judgm ent by d ef ault, by a ny of the parties or legal representatives of such parties

. . . .” (Em phasis added). The M ississippi S uprem e Court h as explained that
“statutes w hich allow a ‘party ’ t o a ppeal, as a rule, l im it t he r ight to those who were original parties to the action or proceeding.” Ridgway v. Scott , 237 M iss. 400, 405, 114 So. 2d 844,
845 (1959) (citation o m itted). As Ruby correctly asserts, Pam ela was never a party to this

m atter at the trial level and only purportedly becam e a party once the m a tter was a ppealed.
W e theref ore grant R

uby ’s m otion to dism iss Pam ela as an a ppellant f rom this appeal. W e
next t urn t o a review of W endy ’ s various assi gnm ents of error bef o re addressing the f

inal issue Ruby

raises in her second m otion.
II. Whether t he chancellor erred b y c o n s i d e r ing Ruby ’s petition to contest the w ill.
5¶11. W e ndy argues the chancellor erred by “consi d e r i n g , h e a r i n g , a n d a d j u d i c a t i n g ” R

u b y ’s petition to contest the will. According to W endy , error occurred because Ruby f ailed to join
Pam ela a s a necessary party to the will contest. See Garrett v. Bohannon , 621 So. 2d 935,
937 (Miss. 1993) (recognizing that a decedent’s heirs-at-law generally constitute necessary and interested parties to a will contest). However, as j ust discussed, the record ref lects that
Pa mela was n ever a party to this m atter in chancery court. In addition, the chancellor’s February 11, 2015 o rder ref lects that Ruby withdrew her petition t o contest t he will and that the chancellor t hereaf

ter dism issed t he petition without prejudice. Thus, d espite W endy ’s assertions, the recor d f

a ils t o dem onstrate that the chancellor ever considered, heard, or adjudicated the m erits of Ruby ’s petition to c o n t e s t t h e w ill. In f act, as W endy herself adm its, no h earing was ever conducted in open court, and “no evidence in the f orm of exhibits or l ive testim on y o n the record was presented.” For t hese reasons, we f ind this assignm ent of error lacks m erit.
III. Whether the c hancellor erred by ruling upon the final accounting, the petition to c lose the estate, and Ruby ’s objections t o t h e final accounting. ¶12. W e ndy next argues that the chancellor erred by considering the f inal accounting, the petition to close the estate, and R uby ’s o bjections to t he f

inal accounting. W endy contends that the f inal a ccounting and the petition to close t he e state were neit h e r signed by her nor contained “a statem ent u nder oath [ that] s et f orth the nam es and addresses of [ Louis’s] devisees, legatees[ ,] and [ heirs-at-law.]” W endy f urt h e r a r g u e s that, af

ter the f iling of the

6f

inal accounting and the petition to close the estate, no s um m ons ever issued f or Pam ela,
Pam ela was never served w ith process, no n otice of hearing ever i ssued, and the chancellor

never conducted a hearing. Finally , W endy claim s that, “[ d]espite the f act that the heirs and creditors were n ever listed i n the pleadings and never served with p rocess, the [ c hancellor] proceeded without a hearing and entered a [ ‘]Final Order Closing the E state[ ,’] which awarded Ruby

. . . a one-third (1/3) interest in real estate.” ¶13. The record shows that, pursuant t o h e r F e b r u a r y 11, 2015 o rder, the chancellor ordered W endy , as executor, to f ile an e state i nve n t o r y and accounting. However, W endy
f ailed to do so, which partially prom pted Ruby to f

ile h er May 18, 2015 “Motion f o r Citation of Contem

pt.” On J une 8, 2015, t he chancellor entered an agreed order directing W endy to f ile the inventory and accounting “within ten

. . . d ay s[ or] on o r bef ore June 18, 2015[ ,]” and

to “take all necessary steps to properly adm inister a nd close [ the estate] by August 3 0, 2015.” The chancellor then entered a second agreed order g ranting W endy an extension until July 3, 2015, to f

ile the inventory and accounting. On July 2, 2015, W endy f iled the inventory and accounting, to w h i c h Ruby tim ely o bjected. In her Septem ber 2, 2015 order on Ruby ’s objections, the chancellor awarded Ruby a judgm ent against W e ndy and directed W endy to “take all necessary steps t o pr o p e r ly adm inister and close [ the estate] by Septem ber 30,
2015.” However, the f

i n a l accounting and the petition to close the estate and discharge
W e ndy as the executor were not f iled until Novem

ber 24, 2015. A s the parties agree, these docum ents were signed by the estate attorney alone.

7¶14. Our suprem e court has explained that “[ a]n appellant cannot com plain o n appeal of alleged errors which he invited or induced.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Jackson , 179 So. 3d 1037,
1044 (¶15) (Miss. 2 015) (quoting HW C C-Tunica Inc. v. Jenkins , 907 So. 2d 941, 942 (¶4) (Miss. 2005)). 1 The record reveals that W endy repeatedly f ailed to com

p ly with the chancellor’s orders. As executor, W endy bore a r esponsibility t o adm inister a n d c l o s e the estate, and she cannot now com plain of errors s he c aused by f ailing to p roperly f

ulf ill her duty

. 2 Furtherm ore, the record shows that W endy fa i l e d t o o b j e c t

— e i t h e r c o n t e m

p o r aneously

o r t hrough p osttrial m otions—to t he estate a ttorney signing and f iling t he f inal accounting and the petition to close the estate. As our caselaw clearly states, “a trial judge c annot be put in error on a m atter w hich was n e ver presented to [ her] f o r d e cision.” City of Hattiesburg

v. P recision Constr. LLC , 1 92 So. 3d 1089, 1093 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 016) (citation and internal quotation m arks om i tted). Accordingly , we f ind this assignm ent of e rror lacks m erit.
IV. Whether the chancellor erred b y aw arding Ruby a o n e-third interest in Louis’s estate. ¶15. W e ndy next asserts that the chancellor erred by awarding Ruby a one-third interest in Louis’s estate a f

ter a llowing Ruby to renounce Louis’s will and f i le a spousal-share election.

1 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 1 -7 -4 9 ( R ev . 2 0 1 3 ) (d i scu ssin g t h e ex ecu to r’s d u ty to p u b lish n o tice so c red ito r s can p ro b ate th eir claim s); In re E sta te o f C a rter , 9 1 2 S o . 2 d 1 3 8 , 1 4 4 ( ¶2 1 ) (M iss. 2 0 0 5 ) ( statin g t h at an ex ecu to r is an o f f icer o f th e co u rt, h as a f

id u c iary relatio n s h ip to all p arties w ith an i n terest in th e estate, an d is h eld to th e sam e stan d ard o f care as a g en eral tru stee).

2 S ee H a r p er v. H a rp e r , 4 9 1 S o . 2 d 1 8 9 , 1 9 4 ( M iss. 1 9 8 6 ) (h o ld in g th at an ex ecu to r m u st act in g o o d f

aith a n d em

p lo y th e sam e v ig ilan ce, d ilig en ce, an d p ru d en ce a p erso n o f in tellig en ce an d d iscretio n w o u ld em p lo y in th e m a n ag em en t o f

h is o w n af

f a irs). 8¶16. Section 91-5-25 allows a widow t o renounce her husband’s will and t o instead elect

her legal share of

her husband’s estate. As section 91-5-25 states:
W h en a husband m a k e s h i s l a st will and testam ent and does not m ake satisf actory p rovision therein f or his wif e , she m ay , at any tim e within ninety (90) day s a f

ter the probate of the will, f ile in t he of

f ice where probated a renunciation to t he f

ollowing ef

f ect, viz.: “I, A B, the widow of C D, hereby renounce the provision m ade f or m e by the will of m y deceased husband, and elect to take in lieu t hereof m y legal share of his estate.” Thereupon she shall be entitled to such p art o f his estate, r eal a nd personal, as she w ould have been entitled to if

he had died intestate[ .] ¶17. As discussed, W endy f i led a petition in Pearl River County C hancery Court to probate her f a ther’s w ill, and the chancellor granted the petition on July 2 4, 2014. W i thin the ninety

d a y t i m e period established by section 91-5-25, R uby f iled i n the sam e chancery court a renunciation of t he provision m ade f or her in the will and her intention to elect her spousal share. Although the record b ef ore us contains no trial t ranscript, the chancellor’s February 11, 2015 order a c k n o w ledged that she conducted a hearing on Ruby ’s r enunciation and spousal-share election. T he chancellor’s order f urther f ound that Ruby

had com plied with section 91-5-25 in electing her spousal share. As a result, pursuant to section 91-5-25, the

c h a n cellor awarded Ruby a one-third interest in Louis’s estate. See Robert A. W eem s, Mississippi Practice S

eries: W ills and Administration of Estates in Mississippi § 6:6 (3d ed. 2003) (“Wh ere t he deceased spouse lef t two children, [ the surviving spouse’s legal share] is one-third.” (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-25)). ¶18. Despite W endy ’s argum ent that the c h a n c e l l o r e rred by awarding Ruby a one-third interest in Louis’s estate, w e f i n d that substantial evidence supports t he chancellor’s

9judgm ent. See Turnage , 213 So. 3d at 105 (¶2). As a result, w e f ind this assignm ent of error lacks m e rit.
V. Whether t he chanc e l l or erred by ruling on Ruby ’s “Motion for Citation of Contem pt” against Wendy . ¶19. On May 1 8, 20 1 5 , R u b y f i led a “Motion f

or Citation of Contem

pt” against W endy , in W endy ’s capacity as estate executor. The chancellor subsequently ente r e d a n order awarding Ruby attorney ’s f ees against W endy , as executor of the estate. On appeal, W endy

asserts the chancellor’s o rder violated her i ndividua l d u e-process rights b ecause she never received proper notice of the contemp t a c t i o n . She theref ore asks this Court t o r everse the chancellor’s order. ¶20. As an ini t i a l ma t t e r , w e n o t e t h a t R u b y a r gues her M ay 18, 2 015 f iling was a “m otion.” She f

urther argues the f

iling was governed by and com plied with the service requirem ents o f R

ule 5 of t he Mississippi Rul e s of C ivil Procedure. H owever, Ruby ’s
“m otion” a ctually constituted a petition f or c o ntem pt and was theref

ore subject to the service

r e q u i rem ents established in Rule 81 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. S e e Pearson v. Browning , 106 So. 3d 845, 849 (¶¶15-18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). ¶21. “Calling a ‘petition f or contem

pt’ a ‘m otio n ’ a n d u s i n g mo t i o n p r ocedures with

contem pt actions is incorrect a ccor d i n g t o Rule 81.” Pearson , 106 So. 3d at (¶17) (citing
Harris v. Harris , 879 So. 2 d 457, 458 n.1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). “Motions m a y be served by f i rst-class m ail.” Id. at ( ¶18 ) (citing M.R.C.P. 5 (b)). H owever, “ [ t]he p rocedural

m echanism s that apply

to m otions do not apply to contem pt m atters.” Id. (citing Sanghi v.
1 0Sanghi , 759 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)). “[ I]n Rule 81 m atters, a Rule

81 sum m o ns m

ust be issued; otherwise, service is d ef ective. Ac t u a l n o t i c e d oes not cure def ective process.” Clark v
. Clark , 43 So. 3d 496, 499 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations om itted). ¶22. The record here ref lects that Ruby ’s attorney m ailed a c opy of t he contem pt “m otion”

to the e state attorney and that the chancery court i ssued a Rule 81(d) sum m ons to W endy in
“care of ” the estate attorney

. T hese actions, however, f ailed t o constitute proper service of
process. Our caselaw and rules of civil p rocedure e s t a b lish that W e ndy , not the estate
attorne y , s h o uld have been served with Ruby ’s contem p t “m otion” and the Rule 81 sum m ons. See M .R.C.P. 4; M.R.C.P 81; Sanghi , 759 So. 2d a t 1255-58 (¶¶27-37). Having f ound that Ruby f a iled to p roperly serve notic e t o Wendy of h er contem pt action, we next determ ine whether W endy waived the issue f or appeal. ¶23. “It is a long-established rule in this state that a question not raised in the trial court will not be considered o n a ppeal.” Taylor v. Taylor , 201 So. 3d 420, 421 (¶6) (Miss. 2016) (citations om it t e d )

. Mississippi caselaw h as also repeatedly held t hat a def endant who
appears an d d e f

ends against the m erits of a R ule 81 m atter without asserting his or her objection to insuf

f icient s ervice waives the c laim f or appeal. See Reasor v. Jordan , 110 So. 3d 307, 311-12 (¶¶14-17) (Miss. 2013); Dennis v. Dennis , 824 So. 2d 604, 6 10-11 (¶¶16, 18) ( M i s s . 2002); Chasez v. C hasez , 9 35 So. 2d 1058, 1062 (¶12) ( Miss. Ct. A pp. 2005). S e e also Schustz v. Buccaneer Inc. , 850 So. 2 d 209, 2 1 3 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (“[ A]

1 1def

endant appearing and f

i ling an answer or otherwise proceeding to d ef end the c ase on the

m erits i n som e way

— such as participating in hearings or discovery —m ay not s u

bsequently

attem pt to assert jurisdictional q uestions based on claim s of def ects in service of p rocess.”). ¶24. As previously discussed, Ruby f i led h er con t e mp t “ mo t i o n” against W endy in her capacity as estate executor. The a ttorney f or Louis’s estate, o n W endy ’s behalf , then f iled

a response to Ruby ’s contem pt “m otion.” The response presen t e d a d e f e n s e on the m erits of Ruby ’s Rule 81 contem pt action without asserting an objection to the s uf f iciency of the service of the “Motion f

or Citation of Contem

pt.” The r ecord f

urther ref l ects that, along with the estate attorney , W endy , as estate e xecutor, e lectronic ally signed the response to the

contem pt “m otion.” The chancellor subsequently entered an order o n June 8, 2015, which,

am ong other things, directed W endy to pay Ruby ’s attorney ’s f ees related to the contem

pt action. ¶25. Despite participating in the response to t he m erits of Ruby ’ s Rule 81 contem pt action without objecting to def

ective service, W endy still contends on appeal that t he record shows

a clear v iolation of her d

ue-process rights. To support her claim , W endy points to a letter the

court reporter below sent to the Mississippi Suprem e Court Clerk’s Of f ice, in which the court reporter stated s he f

o und no recorded proceedings i n the i nstant m a t t e r . A ccording to W e ndy , t his letter dem o n s t r a t e s “[ t]here was def initely no hearing conducted or evidence received by

the [ chancellor]” related to the contem pt action. ¶26. In addressing W endy ’s assertions, we f i rst note t hat, at the beginning of her June 8,

1 22015 order, the c hancellor acknowledged that the m a tter be f o r e h e r had “com e on f

or consideration a t the joint request of the parties” and that s h e had r eached her d ecision af ter “having been f

ully advised in the prem i ses” of the m a t ter. The chancellor then w ent on to award a ttorney ’s f

ees t o Ruby and direct W endy to take certain other specif i ed actions. In addition, the chancellor entered a subsequent “agreed order” on July 2, 2015, in which she granted W endy an e xtension to comp l y w ith the obligations im posed in the J u ne 8, 2015 order. The record ref

lects that, without asserting any objection to the chancellor’s previous order awarding attorney ’s f e es, bot h Ruby ’s attorney and the estate attorney , on behalf of
W e ndy as the executor, signed the July 2, 2015 agreed o rder. I n addition, in ref erencing the earlier o r d e r t h at awarded attorney ’s f ees, the chancellor’s July 2 , 2015 order once again acknowledged that the m atter b ef ore her had “com e on f

or consideration at the joint request of the parties[ .]” ¶27. Upon review, we f ind that, despite the im

proper service of Ruby ’s Rule 81 contem pt action, W endy f

ailed to raise the issue a t her “f irst opportunity ” or at any tim e thereaf ter in the proceedings bef

ore the chancellor. See Chasez , 935 So. 2 d at 1 062 ( ¶12); S& M Trucking
L L C v. Rogers O il Co. of Columbia , 195 So. 3d 217, 223 (¶24) ( Miss. Ct. A pp. 201 6 )

. W e ndy n ot only p articipated in r esponding to the m erits of t he cont e mp t a ction without objecting to the def

ective s ervice, but the estate attorney , on W endy ’s behalf , also signed a subsequent a greed order without r aising t he issue. As a r esult, w e conclude that W endy has waived the issue f

or appeal. See Reasor , 110 So. 3d at 311-12 (¶¶14-17); Dennis , 824 So.

1 32d at 610-11 (¶¶16, 18); Chasez , 935 So. 2d at 1 062 (¶12). W e t heref o re f ind this a rgum ent lacks m e rit.
VI. Whether the chancellor erred by aw arding Ruby attorney ’s fees. ¶28. I n h e r June 8, 2015 order, the chancellor ordered W endy , as estate e xecutor, t o p a y $1, 5 0 0 i n a t t o rney ’s f

ees related to Ruby ’s action f or contem

pt. O n appeal, W endy now challenges the award of

attorney ’ s f

ees. ¶29. Ou r c a s e l a w establishes that contem pt m atters, including whether to award related attorney ’s f

ees, are m atters largely within a chancellor’s discretion. S ee Gardner v. Gardner , 130 So. 3d 1162, 1167 (¶21) ( M i ss. Ct. App. 2013); McDonald v. McDonald , 850 So. 2d
1 1 8 2 , 1192 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). “Awarding costs and attorney [ ’]s f ees b ecaus e a
contem ptuous party has necessitated the holding of a hearing to enf orce a prior order of the

court i s appropriate.” McDonald , 850 So. 2d a t 1192 (¶40) (citing Mount v. Mount , 624 So. 2d 1001, 1005 (Miss. 1993)). As this Court has explained: [ I]n contem

pt actions, a c hancellor is j ustif ied in awarding attorney ’s f ees t hat are incurred in purs u i ng a contem pt m otion. Although chancellors are i nstructed to apply the f

a ctors in McKee v. McKee , 418 S o. 2d 7 64 (Miss. 1982), when granting or deny ing attorney ’s f ees, this Cou r t h as held t hat establishm ent of the McKee f actors is not necessary f

or a contem nee to recover attorney ’s f

ees where the contem n or has willf ully violated a l awf

ul court order. A specif i c f inding of inability to p ay

is not required when attorney ’s f ees are assessed against a party

f ound to be in contem

pt. Vincent v. Rickman , 167 So. 3d 2 45, 251 (¶22) (Miss. C t. App. 2015) (internal citations and quotation m arks om itted). ¶30. In her May 18, 2015 “Motion f or Citation of

Contem pt,” Ruby asserted that W endy
1 4had willf

ully disobey ed the chancellor’s February 11, 201 5 o r d e r . Af ter a hearing on the

m atter, the chancellor awarded R uby $1,500 i n attorney ’s f e es f or the necessity of f

iling the

contem pt action. Because the record indeed ref lects that W endy f

ailed to com

ply with the

c h a n c e llor’s p rior o rder, we f ind suf f icient evidence t o support the chancellor’s award of attorney ’s f

e es r e lated to Ruby ’s action f or contem p t. S ee id. at 252 ( ¶24). W e t heref ore f ind no abuse of

discretion. Id. As a result, this assignm e nt of error lacks m erit.
VII. Whether Ruby is entitled to attorney ’ s fees and e x penses on appeal. ¶31. As previously st a t e d , a l o n g w i t h her brief , Ruby f iled two m otions on appeal. In addition to requesting Pam e la’s dism issal as an appellant , R u b y a rgues she is entitled to attorney ’s f

ees and expenses because W endy ’ s claim s o n appeal are f rivolous. Although we conclude that W endy ’s assignm ents of error l ack m erit, we f ind that she raised a nonf

rivolous issue. W e theref

ore decline to f

ind her appeal f

r ivolous. ¶32. Furtherm ore, in asserting her claim to attorney ’s f ees and expenses on appeal, Ruby
f a i ls to cite any relevant statutory law, caselaw, or r ules. See Miss. Code Ann

. § 1 1

- 5 5

- 5 (Rev. 2012); M.R.A.P. 11; M.R.A.P 38. Instead , s h e c i t e s t wo divorce cases in which the

court awarded appellate a ttorney ’s f ees either based on t he h usband’s f ailure to prosecute the appeal or the wif

e’s inability t o pay . See Bullock v
. Bullock , 2 01 Miss. 180, 183, 2 9 So. 2d 79, 79 (1947); Hall v. Hall , 77 Miss. 741, 741, 27 So. 636, 6 37 (1900). Our suprem e court has previously declined to a ward attorney ’s f ees where the party m a king the request cited no “autho r i t y b e y ond the b a re code section and rule num bers” a nd f

ailed to a rgue the point.

1 5Theobald v. Nosser , 784 So. 2d 142, 147 (¶15) (Miss. 2001). 3

¶33. Because we f

ind that W endy asserted a nonf rivolous issue o n a p p e a l , and because Ruby f ailed to cite relevant authority to support her claim , w e deny Ruby ’s r e q u e s t f or attorney ’s f

ees and expenses on appeal. ¶34. AFFIRMED. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND G R IFFIS, P .JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, FAIR, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

3 S ee a lso M .R .A

. P

. 2 8 ( a ) ( 7 ) (“T h e arg u m e n t sh all co n tain th e co n ten tio n s o f [ th e p arty ] w ith resp ect to th e issu es p resen ted , an d th e r easo n s f o r t h o s e co n ten tio n s, w ith citatio n s to th e au th o rities, statu tes, an d p arts o f th e reco rd relied o n .”). 1 6