[Cite as State v. Freeman, 2021-Ohio-1489.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 109744 

 v. : 

MAURICE FREEMAN, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 29, 2021 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-01-410924-ZA 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Katherine E. Mullin and Daniel Cleary, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

Maurice Freeman, pro se.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

Defendant-appellant, Maurice Freeman (“Freeman”), pro se, appeals 

from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 
The facts of this appeal have been set forth by this court in Freeman’s 

direct appeal, State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80720, 2002-Ohio-4572. 

He was found to be guilty of aggravated murder with firearm specifications and 

having a weapon while under disability. Id. at ¶ 15. The court sentenced Freeman 

to a term of 20 years to life in prison for aggravated murder to be served subsequent 

and consecutive to three years for the firearm specification on that count. Id. 

Further, he was sentenced to a concurrent term of one year on the weapons charge. 

Id. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction. Id. at ¶ 2. 

In State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99351, 2013-Ohio-3004, 

appearing pro se, Freeman challenged his convictions asserting that they should be 

vacated because postrelease control was not properly imposed at the sentencing 

hearing or in the journal entry. Id. at ¶ 4. He also raised several other issues which 

were summarily denied as being barred by res judicata. Id. at ¶ 3-5. 

In that appeal, this court sustained his assignment of error to the 

extent that Freeman was not properly notified of postrelease control for his 

conviction of having a weapon while under disability. Id. at ¶ 13. This court 

remanded the matter to the trial court for a hearing “that is limited to the imposition 

of postrelease control for that conviction.” Id. 

The trial court conducted a hearing as ordered by this court and 

imposed “post release control on count 3 (formerly count 4) is mandatory 3 years 

for the above felony(s) under R.C. 2967.28” 
Freeman, through counsel, appealed that order assigning for error 

that the trial court erred in its order of postrelease control when it imposed a 

mandatory, rather than discretionary, period contrary to the requirement of R.C. 

2967.28(B) and 2901.01(A)(9). This court sustained that assignment of error and 

reversed and remanded to the trial court “for the limited purpose of imposing 

discretionary postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(C) on appellant’s 

conviction for having weapons while under disability.” State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 100521, 2014-Ohio-1732, ¶ 11. 

In State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104711, 2017-Ohio-1281, 

this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Freeman’s motion to withdraw waiver 

of jury trial. Id. at ¶ 10. 

In State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106363, 2018-Ohio2936, Freeman appealed, asserting three assignments of error: 1. That the trial court 

violated due process, erred to his prejudice and acted outside its authority when it 

imposed a sentence at the sentencing hearing that failed to comply with the 

sentencing statute, and was not authorized by law; 2. The trial court abused its 

discretion, violated due process, and erred to the prejudice of Appellant when it 

entered and refused to correct an incorrect journal entry of sentencing and did not 

dispose of both firearm specifications and 3. The trial court abused its discretion, 

violated due process, and committed a prejudicial act against Appellant when it 

entered a judgment entry contradicting what actually occurred at the sentencing 

hearing. This court affirmed the decisions of the trial court. 
Freeman then filed, pro se, a “POST CONVICTION PETITION 

pursuant to Crim.R. 35 and R.C. 2953.21-2953.23, motion to vacate and set aside 

conviction and sentence for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” which was 

summarily denied on April 13, 2020. This appeal follows. 

Freeman’s current appeal cites six assignments of error: 

[1] The trial court abused it’s [sic] discretion, erred, and activated Sixth 

Amendment jurisdictional bar to any valid sentence or conviction when 

it did not provide defendant with the assistance of counsel during all 

trial proceedings. 

[2] The trial court abused it’s [sic] discretion, erred, when it denied 

defendant his Sixth Amendment right to present closing argument with 

the assistance of counsel for Count 3 the weapons while under disability 

offense. 

[3] The trial court abused discretion, erred, when it denied defendant 

his right to jury trial, absent any jury trial waiver for Count 3 weapons 

while under disability, and still imposed sentence of confinement. 

[4] The trial court abused it’s [sic] discretion, erred when it entered 

judgment entry of conviction and sentence on Count 3 weapons while 

under disability, but the court failed to make a finding of guilt during 

the guilt phase and failed to impose a sentence during sentencing 

phase. 

[5] The trial court abused it’s [sic] discretion, erred, when it made a 

finding of guilty and imposed a sentence on a non-existent Count 4 

during the sentencing hearing. 

[6] Trial counsel was ineffective, deficient, and failed to subject the 

state’s entire case to the adversarial testing process, thereby denying 

the protections of the sixth amendment. 

As set forth above, this appeal relates to convictions entered in 2001. Since that 

time, five appeals have been fully addressed by this court based upon those 

convictions. 
We begin by stating that Freeman’s petition for postconviction relief 

was untimely filed to wit: on February 19, 2020. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(D), a 

trial court shall consider a petition that is timely filed under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). R.C. 

2953.21(A)(2), provides that generally, such a petition shall be filed no later than 

365 days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in 

the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication. The record in this 

case was filed with this court on February 19, 2002. As Freeman’s petition was filed 

on February 19, 2020, a total of 5425 days passed since the filing of the record for 

the direct appeal. Ergo, it is untimely. 

Where a petition for postconviction relief is untimely pursuant to R.C. 

2953.21(A)(2), absent demonstrated compliance with both conditions set forth in 

R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) the trial court does not have jurisdiction to consider the petition. 

State v. Porter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106032, 2018-Ohio-1200, ¶ 8-10. R.C. 

2953.23(A)(1) requires a petitioner to demonstrate that the following conditions 

apply: 

(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably 

prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must 

rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period 

prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or 

to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court 

recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to 

persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim 

based on that right. 

(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found 

the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted 

or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for 
constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence. 

R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). 

Here, Freeman does not demonstrate that he was unavoidably 

prevented from discovering the facts upon which he relies, citing information 

contained in the record of the proceedings. He does not identify a new federal or 

state right upon which to base his claim and he does not show by clear and 

convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error no reasonable factfinder 

would have found him guilty. Accordingly, the court did not have jurisdiction to 

consider Freeman’s petition. See Porter at ¶ 8-10. 

Further, Freeman’s claims as set forth in his petition are barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata. Under the doctrine of res judicata, 

“[A] final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was 

represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding 

except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack 

of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the 

defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or 

on an appeal from that judgment.” 

State v. Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82, 2019-Ohio-5206, 147 N.E.3d 623, ¶ 35, quoting 

State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the 

syllabus. The Ohio Supreme Court has also held that the doctrine of res judicata 

bars a defendant from asserting in a motion for postconviction relief any issue that 

could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 

679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997), citing State v. Duling, 21 Ohio St.2d 13, 254 N.E.2d 670 

(1970). 
Finally, the claims in Freeman’s petition for postconviction relief are, 

once again, without merit. 

Freeman was arraigned on these charges on August 9, 2001, at which 

time he was appointed counsel who continued to represent him throughout the 

pretrial and trial process and through conviction. Postconviction, counsel was 

appointed to represent him on his direct appeal and in one of his subsequent appeals 

he was represented by counsel. 

As to his current claims regarding the charge of having a weapon 

while under disability, this issue has been previously litigated. It is meritless. On 

November 26, 2001, Freeman executed a jury waiver as to the weapons charge only. 

On that same date, the state of Ohio recommended that Count 2 be nolled and the 

trial court renumbered the indicted charges. He was found to be guilty by the trial 

court of the weapons charge in renumbered Count 3 and was sentenced accordingly. 

We overrule the assignments of error. 

Judgment affirmed. 

As appellant has filed a duly notarized affidavit of indigency with this court, 

costs of this proceeding are waived. 

 The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution. 

 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_________________________ 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and 

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR