PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JORY MICHAEL NANCE, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-6188

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 5:12-CR-00267-HE-1)

Jacob L. Rowe, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant Jory Michael Nance. Brandon T. Hale, Assistant United States A ttorney (Sanford C. Coats, United States Attorney and Chris M. Stephens, Assistant United States Attorney , with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America.

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.

EBEL , Circuit Judge. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 23, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 A jury convicted Defenda nt-Appellant Jory Nance of multiple counts of transporting child pornography and receiving or attempting to receive child pornography. He challenges those convictio ns, contending 1) the distri ct court erred in admitting evidence of his uncharged bad acts under Fe deral Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2); and 2) there was insufficient eviden ce for a jury to find that he attempted to receive child pornography. Exercising jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM. I. BACKGROUND Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, see United States v. Battles, 745 F.3d 436, 453 (10t h Cir. 2014), the evidence at trial established the following. Using peer-to-peer file-s haring software, Nance downloaded child pornography on his laptop computer from someti me in 2009 through Ap ril 2012. He also used this software to share child porn ography with others, including an Edmond,

Oklahoma detective who was able to download eight files containing child pornography from Nance during March and April 2012. This resulted in the United States charging Nance with eight counts of transporting child pornography, in viol ation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1).

The detective turned the child pornography she had obt ained from Nance over to FBI agents, who began watching Nance’s home , where he lived with his wife, their twoyear-old son, and his wife’s five-year-old daughter. After Nance noticed one of the agents outside his home, he stopped downlo ading child pornography and began deleting it from his laptop; he also res earched how to reformat his co mputer. Shortly thereafter,3 FBI agents seized Nance’s laptop. At that time, Nance acknowledged that he was the only one who used the laptop, but told agen ts, falsely, that the computer had been inoperable for several months due to computer viruses. The FBI conducted a forensic analysis of Nance’s laptop. Although Nance had superficially deleted most of the child porn ography from the laptop, the FBI was able to recover 1,000 previously-deleted images of child pornography , mostly involving preteen girls. The FBI was also able to recover the names of a number of deleted files, although the images linked to those files were not re coverable. In addition, the computer’s automatic logs had documented the searches Nance conducte d on peer-to-peer networks using terms associated with child pornography. These logs also had chronicled when

Nance downloaded the images and files of child po rnography that the FBI recovered from his computer, as well as when Nance watched this pornography. Based on its forensic analysis, the United St ates charged Nance with multip le counts of receiving or attempting to receive child po rnography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).

Nance’s defense at trial was that he di d not know about the child pornography on his computer and that it must have been th ere as the result of computer viruses or hackers. The jury rejected that defense and convicted Nance of eight counts of transporting child pornography and forty-nine counts of receiving or attempting to receive child pornography. 1 The district court sentenced Nance to a total of sixty-four

1 The jury acquitted Nance of two counts of receiving or attempting to receive child pornography.4 months in prison on these convictions, follow ed by five years’ supervised release. II. DISCUSSION A. The district court properly admitted evidence of Nance’s uncharged bad acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) Nance first challenges the district court’ s decision to admit evidence of his other, uncharged bad acts, including evidence that 1) his laptop contained over 1,000 previous ly-deleted images, pictures, and videos of child pornography; 2) Nance used his computer, at a time when he claimed it was inoperable, to access the website www.purenudism.com ; and 3) two years before the charged offenses , Nance viewed two videos with file names indicating they contained child pornography. 2

2 As to each of these three categories of evidence, the record shows the following: 1) Prior to trial, the Government notified Na nce that it intended to present testimony from its computer expert that he had recovered 1,000 previously-deleted images of child pornography from Nance’s computer. Nanc e objected because those images had not been linked to him. After hearing argument, the district court rule d that the Government could present this evidence to the jury under Rule 404(b)(2 ) in order to prove Nance’s motive and intent. At trial, the Government first presented evidence that Nance admitted that only he had used the laptop. The FBI’s computer expert then testified that he had “found around a thousand” previously-del eted “pictures and videos of child pornography” on Nance’s laptop, and that the e xpert had also been able to find some, but not all, of the file names associated with th ese images. (Aplt. App. at 641). Nance did not object to this testimony at trial, and so he never reques ted any limiting instruction as to this evidence. On cross-ex amination, the computer expert initially testified that he had not looked at every one of those images, but th en stated that he ha d seen each of them displayed, and that he and the FBI case agent had deemed each of th ese images to qualify as child pornography. 2) Prior to trial, the Government also notif ied Nance that it intende d to present evidence that, on May 12, 2012, after he had noticed the FBI watching his home and had stopped downloading child pornography, and at a time when he claimed that his computer was5 inoperable, Nance used his laptop to ac cess the website purenudism.com. Nance objected because the content of the purenudis m.com website, photos of naked children, is not pornographic. (The Gove rnment does not contend that it is.) The district court allowed this evidence under Rule 404(b)(2) to show Nance’s opportunity to commit the charged offenses because this evidence rebutted his statem ent to FBI agents that his laptop was inoperable. At trial, then, the FB I’s computer expert testified that, on May 12, 2012, Nance had used his laptop to view pictures on purenudism.com for about ten minutes. The court also admitted seven pi ctures from purenudism.com that the FBI’s computer expert recovered from Nance’s laptop . (It is not clear wh en Nance downloaded these pictures.) When the Government intr oduced these photographs, Nance noted his “previous objection” and the court gave jurors a limiting instruction: THE COURT: [Exhibits] 104 through 110 will be admitted. But, ladies and gentlemen, I w ould advise you, at the outset I explained to you that there would be some types of ev idence that might come in for only a limited purpose, you may c onsider it only for a limited purpose. I would advise you that this evidence which yo u’re about to see in terms of these images to the extent that they relate to any circumstances other than those alleged in the indictment, or other than downloads or files referred to in the indictment, they are admitted for the limited purpose as they may bear on the defendant’s intent or motive, or at least with respect to - - well, essentially with respect to intent or motive. So please evaluate the evidence only for that purpose and not for another. (Id. at 637.) And, prior to jurors’ delib erations, the court again gave a limiting instruction:

You have heard evidence as to materials allegedly found on defendant’s computer relating to acti ons or conduct not related to the specific charges in this case. As I i ndicated at the time that evidence was admitted, you may consider that evidence only as it bears on the defendant’s motive, opportunity, or intent, but for no other purpose. (Id. at 238.) 3) Prior to trial, the Government notified Na nce that it intended to present evidence that, almost two years before the charged offenses occurred, he had viewed two specific files: “HotLols-Artesia 006,” viewed as early as July 5, 2010, and “stickam-2010 13 yo hot skinny bt,” viewed on Septembe r 9, 2010. (Id. at 30.) Nan ce objected because the laptop had not been linked exclusivel y to him during these times. The district court permitted6 1. District court’s ruling Nance challenges the district court’s deci sion to admit this evidence under Rule 404(b)(2) to show his intent, motive and opportunity to commit the charged offenses. To understand his arguments, however, we star t by noting that the Government actually offered this evidence, not onl y under Rule 404(b)(2), but al so under Federal Rule of Evidence 414(a) to show Nance’s prope nsity to commit crimes involving child pornography. The district court declined to admit evidence of Nance’s uncharged bad acts under Rule 414(a) for this purpose. Although “[t]he rules of ev idence generally prohibit th e admission of evidence for the purpose of showing a defendant’s prope nsity to commit bad acts,” Rule 414(a) “provides an exception to th is general rule” by allowing th e jury in a prosecution for

child molestation to consider th e fact that the defendant has committed other acts of child the Government to present th is evidence under Rule 404(b )(2) as evidence of Nance’s motive or intent. But at trial it does not appe ar that the Government’s computer expert testified to Nance’s viewing these two specific f iles in 2010. Instead, the expert testified more generally that the log on Nance’s computer indicated that in 2010 he had viewed files with names involving the word “stickam” or “Lol,” suggesting they contained child pornography. (Id. at 658.) Nance did not obje ct to this trial testimony and so did not request any limiting instruction. Any pr ejudice to the defense stemming from this testimony was ameliorated by th e expert’s earlier testimony that he found child pornography on Nance’s computer going back further in time to 2009. Nance did not object to that testimony, either. We would mention one final category of evidence. At one point in his opening brief, Nance seems to challenge, the admission of the Government’s Exhibits 101 through 103, which are files recovered from his com puter that contain child pornography not linked to any specific offense charged against him. At trial, defense counsel expressly told the trial judge he had no objection to the admission of these three exhibits.7 molestation as evidence that the de fendant committed the charged offense. 3 United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274 , 1282 (10th Cir. 2012) (inter nal quotation marks omitted).

The district court determined that the evidence of Nance’s other bad acts was admissible in this case under Rule 414, but that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice it posed to Nance. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its proba tive value is substantially outw eighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . .”); see also Sturm, 673 F.3d at 1284 (notin g evidence “that satisfies Rule 414 must [also] be evaluated under Rule 403). For that reason, the district court

declined to admit the evidence of Nance’s uncharged bad acts under Rule 414(a) to prove his propensity to commit crimes involving child pornography. Unlike Rule 414(a), Rule 40 4(b)(1) does not allow evidence of a defendant’s prior

bad acts when that evidence is offered to prove his propensity to commit crimes. See United States v. McGlothin, 705 F.3d 1254, 1263 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2406 (2013). Instead, Rule 404(b)(2 ) only permits the in troduction of such evidence to prove other things, such as “mot ive, opportunity, intent , preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absen ce of mistake, or lack of accident.” And, if requested, the trial

3 Rule 414(a) specifically provides that, “[i] n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.” Rule 414(d)(2)(B) defines “child molestation” to include “a crime under federal or state law . . . involving . . . any conduct prohibited in 18 U.S.C. chapter 110,” which includes the offenses with which the United States char ged Nance in this prosecution, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and (2).8 court must instruct jurors to consider this evidence ad mitted under Rule 404(b)(2) only for the purposes for which it was admitted. See Huddleston v. Un ited States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988). In the ruling Nance challenges on appeal, the district court determined that the evidence of his uncharged other bad acts was admissible in this case under Rule 404(b)(2) to prove his intent, motive and, “t o the extent that it’s offered to rebut a suggestion that the computer was inoperable, it comes in . . . to prove opportunity.” (Aplt. App. at 443.) In making this determin ation, the district court concluded that the probative value of this evid ence, for these purposes, was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice to Nance. At trial, wh en requested, the court instructed jurors to

limit their consideration of th is evidence to the specif ic purposes for which it was

admitted.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitti ng this evidence under Rule 404(b)(2) Nance challenges the district court’s d ecision to admit the evidence of his uncharged bad acts un der Rule 404(b). 4 We review that decision for an abuse of

4 Nance argues for the first time on appeal th at, because Rule 414 a pplies to this “child molestation” prosecution, what he views as “t he far more general” Rule 404(b)(2) does not apply here at all. (Aplt. Br. at 20). Re viewing this argument for plain error, we reject it because Rule 414 specifica lly provides that it “does not limit the admission or consideration of evidence under any other rule,” Fed. R. Evid . 414(c). See United States v. Seymour, 468 F.3d 378, 383-85 (6th Cir. 2006 ) (relying in part on Ru le 414(c) to reject argument that Rule 414, which permits evidence that the de fendant previously sexually assaulted a child, “is the excl usive rule governing child-mo lestation cases, and not the more general Rule 413,” whic h permits evidence that the de fendant previously sexually9 discretion and “will not reverse . . . as long as the district c ourt’s decision falls within the bounds of permissible choice in the circumst ances and is not arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.” Battles, 745 F.3d at 45 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nance first complains about the seeming inconsistency between the district court’s

determination that the other bad acts evidence at issue here was too unfairly prejudicial to be admitted under Rule 414, but that eviden ce was, nonetheless, admissible under Rule 404(b)(2). We do not address the propriety of the district court’s Rule 414 determination because no one has appeal ed from that decision. It could be that the district court erred in excluding the evidence under Rule 414, but that issue is not before us. It is sufficient for us now just to note that the applicati on of Rule 403 may differ depending upon which rule is applied in determini ng the admissibility of the evidence. Here, we consider only the Rule 403 analysis for evidence admitted under Rule 404(b)(2). In arguing that that decision was an abus e of discretion, Nance challenges only the

district court’s determination that the 40 4(b)(2) evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prej udice to the defense under Rule 403. We cannot agree. The evidence at issue was clearly prob ative under Rule 404(b)(2). Nance’s

defense at trial was that he did not know ab out the child pornography on his computer.

Evidence that Nance had viewed child pornography on his co mputer at least two years

assaulted either an adult or a child); see also United States v. Meachum, 115 F.3d 1488, 1490-95 (10th Cir. 1997) (addressing admission of evidence under bot h Rules 404(b) and 414 where it was not clear under which rule the district court admitted it).10 before the charged offenses occurred and that the FBI recovered over 1,000 images of superficially deleted child porn ography from his computer undercut that defense. Nance also claimed that his computer had been in operable for several months before the FBI seized it. Thus, evidence th at Nance used his computer to access purenudism.com just a week before the FBI seized his computer was probative of whether his laptop was inoperable at that time. Despite the probative value of this evidence, Rule 403 , nevertheless, “mandates excluding [such] evidence . . . if the danger of unfair prej udice substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative value.” United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 940 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1526 (2013), and 2014 WL 1384914 (U.S. May 5, 2014) (No. 13-9606). Applying Rule 403, the district court ruled that the probative value of this evidence, offered for the purpose of proving Nance’s intent, motive, and opportunity, was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice because the court would, upon the defense’s request, inst ruct jurors to consider th e evidence only fo r the limited purposes for which it was admitted. We cannot say that determinati on falls outside “the bounds of permissible choice in the[se] ci rcumstances,” nor that it is “arbitrary, capricious or whimsical,” Battle s, 745 F.3d at 452 (interna l quotation marks omitted). See United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding

introduction of evidence was not unfairl y prejudicial where court gave limiting instruction). Nance goes on to contend that the only purpose for which juro rs actually could11 have considered the Government’s Rule 404(b)(2) evidence was to prove Nance’s propensity to commit crimes involving child pornography. But this argumen t ignores the fact that, when requested by the defense, the district court instructed jurors to limit their

consideration of this evidence to the purposes for which it was admitted. Nance did not challenge at trial, and does not challenge now, the manner in which the district court gave these instructions. “And, absent a showi ng to the contrary, we presume jurors will conscientiously follow the trial court’s [limiti ng] instructions.” Brooks, 736 F.3d at 941 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nance di d not request a limiting instruction each time any of the challenged evidence was admitted. But such an instruction was available had he requested it. See United States v. Ship pley, 690 F.3d 1192, 11 99 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting district court does not err in not gi ving limiting instruction when the defense does not request one), cert. deni ed, 133 S. Ct. 901 (2013). We cannot say that the district court abus ed its discretion in refusing to exclude

this evidence under Rule 403 where the evidence at issue was probative of Nance’s intent, motive and opportunity to commit the charged offens es and any unfair prejudice was ameliorated by the court’s limiting instru ctions, which the court gave when the defense requested such an instruction. Se e United States v. Mangiameli, 668 F.2d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting “limiting in struction ameliorated any potential for prejudice in the admission of [the challenged] evidence”). The fact that the jury acquitted Nance of several counts lends further suppo rt to our conclusion that jurors did not improperly return verdicts here based on th eir emotional response to the Government’s12 Rule 404(b) evidence. 5

B. There was sufficient eviden ce to support Nance’s conv ictions for attempting to receive child pornography Nance next challenges his forty-two convi ctions for attempted receipt of child pornography, Counts 16-40 and 43-59 (the “attempt accounts”), asserting there was insufficient evidence to supp ort them. “We review this claim de novo, asking only whether taking the evidence—both direct and ci rcumstantial, together with the reasonable

inferences to be drawn ther efrom—in the light most favor able to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Battles, 745 F.3d at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted). The attempt counts were based on computer files that Nance deleted, for which the Government was able to recover the file names, but not any of the images associated with the files. For example, in support of Coun t 22, the Government pr esented evidence that, on January 22, 2012, Nance do wnloaded a file named “PTHC [meaning preteen hard core] 5th October 2011 10yo [year old] Arina masturbates on Webcam.avi.” (Aplt. App. at 319.) Although the Government was unable to recover the visual images associated

with this deleted file and so could not prove that it cont ained child pornography, the Government charged Nance with attempting to receive child po rnography when he

5 Even if the district court did abuse its disc retion in admitting the Ru le 404(b) evidence, which it did not, any error woul d have been harmless in this case because, in light of the other overwhelming evidence of Nance’s guilt, the challenged Rule 404(b) evidence did not have “a substantial influence on the outc ome,” nor does it “leave[] [us] in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” United St ates v. Sierra-Ledesma, 645 F.3d 1213, 1226 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).13 downloaded that file becau se he believed it containe d child pornography. Nance argues that a reasonable jury coul d not convict him on the attempt counts without the Government proving that each of the downloaded file s actually contained child pornography. But Nance did not object when the district cour t instructed jurors that, [i]n counts 9 through 59, to prove th at defendant attempted to knowingly receive visual depictions of minors engaged in sexuall y explicit conduct, the government does not have to prove that defendant knew the downloaded file actually contained a vi sual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Rather, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant believed that the downloaded file contained such a visual depiction. (Id. at 244) And Nance does not object to that instruction on appeal. In any event, that instruction was proper. “While the underlying offense in this case requires the receipt of images of real-life minors engaged in sexu ally explicit conduct, th e government in an ‘attempt’ case has no burden to prove that th e appellant knew that the downloaded file actually contained such images . Rather, the government is required to prove that the appellant believed that the received file contai ned such images.” United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing United St ates v. Bauer, 626 F.3d 1004, 1007 (8th Cir. 2010); further citation omitted).

There was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have found beyond

a reasonable doubt that Nance believed th at the files underlying the attempt counts contained child pornography. Each of the atte mpt counts resulted from an Internet search that Nance conducted using search terms that are connected to child pornography,14 including “pthc,” meaning “pre teen hard core,” “stickam,” “vichatter,” “kidcam,” and “preteen.” As a result of these search es, Nance found and downloaded the files underlying the attempt counts, each w ith a title suggesting it contained child pornography. The title of each of those files included a girl’s name , the terms preteen or “pthc” or “lol” (short for Lolita 6 ), and/or a specific age between six and thirteen years old; for example, “(pthc) loli Linda 12 yo” (Aplt. App. at 319 (count 16)). 7 Some of the file names are much more graphic, for exam ple, “PTHC_Tara fuck ed like a grownup.” (Id. (count 21).) The names of each of th ese files would support a reasonable jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Nance believed the files contained child pornography. See United States v. Fabian o, 169 F.3d 1299, 1 306 (10th Cir. 1999) (relying, in part, on evidence of graphic titles of files to uphold conviction for knowingly receiving child pornography).

The circumstances surround ing Nance’s downloading th ese files further supports such a finding. Nance downloaded all of th ese files when his wife and their children were out of town visiting her family. This was the same pattern that Nance followed when he downloaded most of the images of child pornography that the Government was able to retrieve from his computer. Moreove r, the Government was able to retrieve over

6 “Lolita” refers to Vladimir Nabokov’s nov el about a thirty-s even-year-old man’s obsession and sexual relationship with his twelve-year-old stepdaughter. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lolita.

7 The two attempt counts of which the jury acquitted Nance were th e only attempt counts that did not include an age or a pthc or preteen designation.15 one thousand images of child pornography th at Nance downloaded over several years’

time. Cf. United States v. Fa biano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1305-06 (relying in part on evidence of defendant’s participation for five mont hs in chat room di scussions about child pornography as proof that he knew he was re ceiving child pornography). From all of this evidence, a rationale jury could have fo und, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Nance believed when he downloaded the particular files underlying each of the attempt counts that those files contained child pornography. That is sufficient to support his convictions on the attempt counts. 8 In arguing to the contrary, Nance unpersua sively likens his case to United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199 (10th Ci r. 2011). In Dobbs, the Gove rnment failed to prove that the defendant had knowingly received or a ttempted to receive two images of child pornography found on the hard drive of his computer. 629 F.3d at 1200. But those two images were found only in the hard drive’s “t emporary Internet files folder, or ‘cache.’”

8 At a more basic level, Nance argues brie fly that there was insu fficient evidence to establish that he knew “of the presence of files containing child pornography on the computer.” (Aplt. Br. at 29.) But there wa s evidence from which the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Nance took affirmative steps to search for and download files containing child pornography; that he viewed most of the images contained in these files; that he deleted thes e files and took steps to reformat his computer soon after noticing an FBI agen t watching his house; and that he lied to FBI agents when asked about his downloading child pornograph y. See United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding defendan t’s use of software to remove child pornography from computer was evidence that he knew those pornographic images were on the computer). Further, the Government’s computer expert refuted Nance’s defense that these files must have go tten onto his computer as the result of computer viruses or hackers. This evidence wa s sufficient for a reasonable ju ry to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Nance knew there was (or had be en) child pornography on his computer.16 Id. at 1201. [W]hen a person visits a website, the web browser automatically downloads the images of the web page to the computer’s cache. The cache is populated with these imag es regardless of whether they are displayed on the computer’s monitor. In other words, a user does not necessarily have to see an image for it to be captured by the computer’s automatic-caching function. . . . [T]here was no evidence that Mr. Dobbs actually viewed the charged images, much less clicked on , enlarged, or otherwise exercised actual control over any of them. Furt hermore, while the forensic specialist explained that a user may manipulate and control an image stored in the computer’s cache, he rep eatedly admitted that ther e was no evidence that Mr. Dobbs had accessed his computer’s cache, or that he even knew it existed.

Id. at 1201-02. Here, unlike in Dobbs, the files underlying the attempt counts were not found in the hard drive’s cache, nor we re they “received” without Nance’s knowledge. Instead,

the evidence established that Na nce obtained these files after using peer-to-peer software to search deliberately for ch ild pornography, which he then intentionally downloaded. See United States v. Haymon d, 672 F.3d 948, 955-57 (10th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Dobbs and upholding convicti on for knowingly possessing ch ild pornography that was downloaded using peer-to-peer file-shari ng software, following search using terms

associated with ch ild pornography). For these reasons, then, there was su fficient evidence to support Nance’s convictions on the attempt counts. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM all of Nance’s convictions.