No. 3-07- 0566

______________________________________________________________________________ File d January

14, 2009 IN THE

APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS THIRD DI STRICT A.D., 2009

______________________________________________________________________________ In re MARR IAGE OF ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) f or th e 1 2th Judi ci al Ci rc ui t, LORIANNE REIMER, a/k/a ) Wi ll County, Illi

nois, Lo rianne Az t lan, ) ) Pe ti ti on er -A pp el l an t, )

) 91-D-160 and ) ) THOMAS REIME R, ) Ho nor able Ro ber t P. Bru mund ) Judge, Presi din

g. Responden

t-Appell ee. )

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CEMc DA

DEde l i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t:

______________________________________________________________________________ Petitioner, Loria

nne Rei me r appeal s f

rom the trial

court ’s order requiri

ng he r to pay respondent, Thomas R

ei me r, child s upport arrearages i

n the am ount o f $59,299.42. Petitioner al so appeals

from the court ’s order requiri

ng he r to pay respondent’s couns el

the sum of $1,755 in fees an d cost s. We reverse and reman d for further pr oceedings. FA CTS On Ja n ua ry 7, 1 99 1, p eti

ti on er f i l ed an ac ti on f or di ss ol uti on of h er mar riag e to res pon de nt. Th e p arti

eswere e ve ntu al l y gra nte d a su ppl em en tal j udg men t f or diss ol ution of ma rriage on Ma

y 9, 1991. Pursuan

t t o t he terms

of that judgm

ent, petitioner was a

warded2

re sident ial cust od y of t he pa rt ies’ t hre e childr en. Pet itio ner re t ained r eside nt ial cust od y of t he chi ldren until June 18, 1991, when

respondent was awarded sole custody pursuant to an eme r ge nc y o r de ro f pr o t ec t io n. A su bse qu en t o r de r r eq uir ing pe t it io ne rt o pa y re sp o nd en t ch ild support at the rate of $85 per week was entered on October 20, 1992. On December 20, 1993, respo ndent fil ed a pet ition thro ugh t he Wi ll Cou nty Sta te’s Atto rney ’s off

ic e seeki ng pay me nt of chi ld s upport arrearages. On March 2, 1994, petitioner f

il ed a petition to abate chi

ld s upport alle gin

g a l oss of em

ploy me nt. The trial

court ’s m

in utes refl ect that a support arrearage of $3,695 was f ound on that same day

. On March

30, 1994, t he trial cou rt en tered an ord er : (1 ) d en

y i n g a n y f i n di n g of con tem pt, (2 ) a b ati n g p eti ti on er ’s ob l i ga ti on to pay chi ld s upport to respondent, (3) requiri ng petitioner to ma

in tain a job s earch di

ary, an d (4) con ti nu i ng the matte r f or s tatus on A pri l 27, 199 4. Th

e s pe cif i c p ortion as to th

e a ba tem en t of support st ated: “A

ll support due and owing b y [peti tioner] i s hereb

y a bated nunc pro tunc to M arch

2, 1 99 4, t

h e date of th e f i l i n g of h er peti ti on to abate.” The co ur t subs equ ent ly held multiple st at us he ar ings co ncer ning pet itio ner ’s emplo yment eff ort s. Fi nal ly , on Decem

ber 21, 1994, the trial

court ’s m

in utes refl ect that t he m

atter was co nt inued g ener ally on t he mot ion o f the St at e. Pet itio ner fil ed no furt her plead ings re gar ding t he ab atemen t of ch i l d suppor t. Th e p arti es ’ th ree ch i l dre n r em ai ne d i n th e re si de nti al ca re a nd cu stod y of res pon de nt f rom the ef f ec ti ve da te of the ab ate men

t, Ma rch 2, 1 994 , th

roug h th ei r re sp ec ti ve da tesof em an ci pa ti on , e x ce pt w h en two of th e ch i l dr en

werei n th e c are of

th e S tate of Il l i n oi s d ue to3

em ot iona l probl em s. Specif

ic ally , the eldes t chil d was i n the care of the

Stat e from

February 1995 to Apri l 1997. Th

e y ounge st ch

i l d was i n the ca re of the State f rom March

1996 to A

pril 1997. Responden

t receive d no fi

nan ci al support from the State o r chi ld s upport from

petitioner su b se qu en t to the e f f ec ti v e date of th e a b atemen t. On May 11, 2006, respondent fi

le d a pro se pl eadi

ng s eeki ng to col l ect ch i l d sup port arrearages owin

g pursuant to t he trial

court ’s order dated, Oct ober 20, 1992. On Jul y 3, 2006, respondent fi

le d a three-count pleadi

ng seeki ng colle ction of the prev

iousl y a djudi cated arrearage, a co nt empt finding for failure t o r epo rt employment , a nd ad judicat ion o f arr ear age s ac cr uing dur i ng the ab ate m en t pe riod. C oun

t I wa s res ol

ve d by agree men t of the pa rti esby vi rtue of petitioner’ s tenderi

ng of $7,355.26 toward satisfa ction of the M arch 2, 1994, arrearage adjud icat ion. Co unt s II and I II wer e r epled as a mended co unt II I. Resp ond ent ’s amend ed c ou nt III pl eadi n g i n cl uded a l ette r d ate d M ay

12 , 20 03 , f

rom peti ti on er an d h er n ew h us b an d to re sp on den

t. Th e l ette r s tate s, i n perti n en t pa rt:

“ The tacti c to a v oi d h er h av i n g to p ay ch i l d suppor t wa s to send her t o s cho ol, and it wo rk ed; s he gr adu at ed t wo years ago and is now teachi

ng f ull tim e i n pri vate school, an

d she n ever ha d to pay a c en t i n c hi l d supp ort or tui

ti on, be ca us e of the de sp era te n ee d f or teach ers. S o we actuall

y cam e out ahead on

that one .” Pet itio ner fil

ed a re spo nse t o r esp ond ent ’s amend ed c ou nt II I. The re spo nse a lleged t he aff irm ative defen ses of equi

table estoppel and laches . Af ter t he m atter was contin

ued on m ulti ple occasions , the court conducted a three-day h ea ri n g on re sp on den

t’s am en de d c oun t III . Res pon den t testi f i ed th at h e m ade n o atte m pts to4

co nt ac t pe t it io ne rbe t we en 19 94 an d t he da t e h e file d h is init ial pro se plead ing in 200 6, st at ing that he di d not kn ow where pe

titi oner l i ve d an d tha t he was af

raid of peti tion er’s new h usb and. Re sp o nd en t ac kn o wle dg ed ha ving a s er vic e a dd r es s fo rpe t it io ne rin 1 99 4, bu t wa s u na wa r e if t ha t ad dr es s w as st ill valid aft er 19 94 . Re sp o nd en t wa s u na ble t o ide nt ify Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 296 (1 34 Il

l . 2d R. 2 96). Pet itio ner also t est ifi

ed t hat she w as u nawa re of Ru le 296 or t he law c onc er ning abatem ent. She stated that she did n ot have any

ide a that she had to pay

chi ld s upport after March 1994. She testi fi

ed that her understandi

ng of ab atemen

t was that she di d not have to pay ch i l d supp ort wh

i l e she wa s u ne m pl oyed . Sh e adm i tted th at s he turn ed dow n m ul ti ple of f ers of em ploy me nt in fav or o f educa

tional pursuits. She di

d not apply

for any jobs whi le pursuin g her degre e. She ea

rne d he r degre e i n D ecem ber 2001 and obtai

ne d em ploym en t in Marc h 20 02. Peti ti one r ea rned $22 ,90 6 i

n g ros s i nc ome d uri ng the yea r of 200 2 a nd $36 ,30 0 du

ri ng the yea r of 2003. Petitioner m

ade no ef forts to contact respo nden t prior to her letter dated May 12, 2003. On Jun e 11, 2 007, the court de cl i ne d to hold peti

tion er i n i ndi rect ci vi l contem pt. However, the court found that petiti oner owed respondent a chi ld s upport arrearage from

March 30, 199 4, t o F ebr uar y 26, 200 3, in the a mou nt of $ 85 p er wee k. Sp ecifically, the co ur t , r elying up o n R ule 29 6( f) , fo un d t ha t as o f No ve mbe r22 , 20 06 , pe t it io ne ro we d r es po nd en t a c hild suppo rt arre arage with interest in the amount o f $59,29 9.42 . The co urt rejecte d pet itioner’s aff irm ative defen ses of equi

table estoppel and laches , statin g: “So there is

no confus ion a

gai n, [the court’s or der dated Oct obe r 2 0, 199 2, ] o bligat ed [ plaint iff ] t o p ay to [r esp ond ent ] t he sum of $85.00 per week. Sometim e prior to March 30, 1994,5 act ually Marc h 2, 199 4, [p laintiff] re que st ed t he co ur t by and through an atto rney

that her obli

gation to pay support be abated, not suspended. The cl

ear la nguage of the

order and the cle ar la nguage of the

motion di

d not request a suspensi

on. It r equested an ab at eme nt . Whe t he ro rno t t he at t o rne y fo r[ pla int iff] at t he t ime knew the di

ff erence, sh e knew the di

ff erence or any

body e ls e knew the dif feren ce, there was, in

eff ect at t he tim

e Rule 296, which prov i de s i n p art th at a pa rty may se ek a te m pora ry ab ate men

t of supp ort. That tem

porary ab atem en t of su pport i s i n existen ce f or a period of si x mon th s. A n d a n y period of ab ate men t wh i ch a p ar ty se ek s to h av

e th ereaf ter th ey m us t com e i n an d r eq ue st th e c our t to do so. I t further provides that t he support shal

l c ontinue to accrue at t he sa me amou nt which wa s aba t ed. Tha t ’s my under st anding and be l i ef of the i nterpretati on of

*** R ul e 296 [f ].” Cou ns el f or re sp ond

en t al so f i l ed a p eti ti on f or attor ne y f ee s s eeki ng con tri bu ti on f rom peti tion er. The b alance of

coun sel ’sf

ees was$2,708 . The

parties e ach

provi ded the tri al

court wi th f i na nc i al di sc l osu re s tate men ts. P eti ti one r’ s a men de d a f f i da vi t ref l ec ts b udg eta ry ex pe ns esof $3 ,84 1. T

h i s a moun t i n cl udes th e m on th l y $7 50 ar re arag e p ay

men t peti ti on er wa s obl i ga

ted to pay respondent. Petitioner’s

aff ida vi t refl ects net monthl

y i ncom e of $3,119. Petitioner testif ie d that sh e sa tis f i es 4 0% of

her reported expe

ns es a nd h er h usb and sa tis f i es the rem

ai ni ng 6 0%. Res ponde nt’s af f i dav i t ref l ects h ouseh old ex pen ses of $ 4,246 a

nd n et m onthl y i nc ome of $ 4,910. On Ju ly 13 , 20 07 , t he co ur t en t er ed an o r de rfind ing t he fee s a nd co st s p led t o be us ua l,6

cus t omar y and r eas ona ble. T he o rd er also re quir ed p et itio ner t o p ay res po ndent ’s co unse l the sum of $ 1,755 i

n f ees and costs. Petitioner n

ow appeals the

trial court ’s orders requiri

ng he r to pay respondent $59,299.42 in arrearag es and respondent’s co unsel $1,755 in fees an

d cost s. AN AL YSIS In thi s appeal , petitioner f irst contends that the trial court erred in

fi ndi ng that she owed respondent a chi

ld s upport arrearage with i

nterest in the am ount o f $59,299.42. Petitioner pres en ts thre e argu

men ts i n s upport of thi s as serti

on. In i tia l l y , peti tion er con tend s tha t the court erred by not app l y i ng th e doctri ne s of (1) equ i tabl e estoppel and (2) laches t o r es po nd en t ’s cla im t hat pet itio ner ow ed p ast -d ue c hild supp or t when r esp ond ent has no t at t empt ed t o e nfor ce t he su ppor t orde r s i nc e 1 994 . A ddi

ti ona l l y , peti ti one r ar gue s th at the tri al cou rt er red i n r el y i ng upon Rule 2 96( f) bec aus e t he Will Co unt y Judicial Circ uit has yet t o s pec ifi cally ado pt Rule 2 96. We begi n by dis cussi ng the relevan

t case law concerni ng ab atemen

t and Rule 296. A t th e ou tse t, w e n ote th at I l l i n oi s “cou rtsh av e l ong p oss es se d th

e a uth ori ty to ab ate support under cert ai

n ci rcumstances.” Peo

ple e x re l. Greene v

. You ng, 367 Ill . App. 3d 211, 216, 854 N .E.2d 300 , 305 (2 006). In Coons v. Wilder, 93 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 12 7, 416 N .E.2d 785 (1981 ), t he t r ial c o ur t ab at ed ha lf o f r es po nd en t ’s mo nt hly su pp o r t o blig at io n fr o m De ce mbe r19 77 un t il Ja nu ar y 1, 19 80 , at wh ich t ime t he su pp o r t wo uld r es ume at 1. 5 t imes t he o r igin al p ayme nt un t il al l ab ated pa

y men ts were sati sf i ed. Coons , 93 I ll. A pp . 3d at 13 0, 41 6 N . E . 2d at 78 9. On ap pe al, t he Se co nd Dist rict st at ed “[ w] e find no aut hor ity in the Act *** for t he pr oviso or der ed by t he co ur t t ha t t he ** * b ala nc e o f t he o r igin al s up po r t o r de rwo uld o nly t emp o r ar ily aba t e a nd wo uld continue to accrue as an

even tual obl iga tion to be paid.” Coons , 93 Ill . App. 3d at 134, 4167

N.E.2d a t 792. Coons cle ar ly held t ha t pa yment s c an no t ac cr ue wh ile t he su pp o r t o blig at io n is ab ated. Coons , 93 Ill . App. 3d at 134, 416 N.E .2d at 792. Eigh t years af ter t he Coons deci si on, our supreme court pro mul gated Rule 296, en

titled

“ En f orce men t of Ord er f or Su ppor t.” 1 34 I l l . 2d

R. 2 96. Rul e 2 96( f

) gov ern s a pe ti ti on f or abatem ent and states the f

oll owing: “Upon wri

tt en peti tion of the obl

igor, and af

ter due not ic e t o o blig ee ( an d t he De pa r t men t o f Pu blic A id, if t he o blig ee is recei vi ng publ ic ai d), and upon heari

ng by the court , the court ma

y temporaril

y reduce or t ot ally abate the pay

me nts of support, subjec

t to the understandi

ng that those paym

ents will continue to accrue as they com e due , to be pa

i d at a l ater ti me. The reduction or abatement may not exceed a per iod of six months except that, upon further w ritten petition of the obligor, notice to the obligee, and hearing, the reduction or abatement may be continued for an additional period not to exceed six months .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) 134 Il l . 2d R. 2 96(f

). The comm

ittee comm

ents to Rule 296(f

) state:

“ Thi s p ara

gra ph appl i esonl y to the sh ort-term i na bi l i ty of the obl i gor to p ay

su ppor t due to a te m pora ry l ay of f f rom em ploy me nt or o ther factors. It recogniz es that obli gors often becom e temporaril

y un em ploy ed, renderi

ng them unab le to me et their s upport obli

gations. This provis ion i

s short of a written8 modi f i ca ti on of th e O rd er

f or S uppor

t. It a l l ows th e ob l i gor

to pe ti ti on th e c ourt, p rior to th e f

i l i ng of a p eti ti on f or ad j udi ca ti on of co nt emp t , fo ran o pp o r t un it y t o r ep ay t ho se amo un t s in s mall in creme nts af ter employm

ent is regain ed. T his r ule is c o nt r ar y t o t he ho ldin g o f t he ap pe llat e c o ur t in Coons v. Wilder, ( 19 81 ) 93 I ll. A pp . 3d 12 7, [ 41 6 N . E . 2d 78 5, ] in wh i ch the cou rt sta ted , ‘ W e f

i nd no s tatutor y or ca se au thor i ty f or the trial court to temporaril

y a bate that port ion of

a support o rder the sup por ting pare nt is without means to p resent ly pay ***.’ [ Coons ,] 93 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 135 [, 416

N.E.2d a t 792]. The obligo r ha s t he o pt ion o f fi ling for a mod ifi

cat ion o f the Or der for Su ppo rt unde r se ct ion 5 10 o f the Illinois Mar riag e and Dis soluti on of Marri age Act (Ill . Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 510) [(now 750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2006))]. If a court ma y m odif y a n Or de rfo rSu pp o r t un de rse ct io n 5 10 o f t he Ac t , it fo llo ws t ha t it may also t em porari l y ab ate th e O rd er

f or S uppor

t, sub j ec t to acc ru al, d ur ing a pe rio d o f te mpo ra ry une mployment of t he obl i gor.” 134

Il l . 2d R. 2 96(f

), Com m i ttee Com men ts, at 225- 26. The tr i al cou rt re l i ed up on Ru l e 2 96 (f ) i n deter m i n i n g th at p eti ti on er owe d r es pon den t a child sup po rt ar re ar age wit h inter est in the a mou nt of $ 59, 299 .4 2. Pet itio ner co nt ends t hat t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in r elying up o n Rule 29 6( f) t o de t er mine t ha t she o we d r es po nd en t pa st - du e c hild su pp o r t . Sp ec ifica lly, p et it io ne rcit es su bse ct io n ( n) o f Ru le 2 96 fo rt he pr o po sit io n t ha t Ru le9

296(f) i s not appli

cabl e to t he i nstant case. Rul

e 296(n) states the followi ng:

“ Effective Date . The Supreme C ourt wil l a uthorize ex pe r iment al s it es t o o pe r at e p ur su an t t o t his r ule , in c o un t ies in whi ch both th e ch i ef ci rcui t ju dge a nd th e cl erk of the c i rcui t court have agreed to undertake t he ex perim ental use of the procedures con tai n ed h erei n , a n d h av e j oi n tl y sou gh t th e C our

t’s perm i ss i on to do so, by f

il in g a petition w

ith the A dmi ni strative Di

rector .” 134 Il l . 2d R. 2 96(n

). The comm

ittee comm

ents to Rule 296(n) state: “In those counti es i

n wh ic h the ch ie f j udges and the c le

rks of the ci rcuit courts agree to partici pate in an ex perim ental i n sta l l ati on , a n d p eti ti on th e A dm i n i strati v e O f f i ce f or l ea v e to i m pl em en t it at thi s ti

me, the rule woul

d al l ow the Su

prem e Court to autho rize a county to oper ate under t he new rule.” 134 Ill . 2d R. 296(n), Comm

ittee Comm

ents, at 230. Here, petitioner al

le ges that Wi

ll County i s not one of the counties wh ic h has petiti oned the su pre me c ourt f

or au thor iza ti on to e m pl oy the prov i si ons of Rul e 2 96. Re sp ond

en t doe s n ot dis pute this cl

ai m. Ins tead, respondent argues that t he m ere exi stence of Rul

e 296 provides authority f

or a cour t in a c ounty whi ch h as not adopt ed the rule to abate support paym ents subj ect to accrual of the abated amount. Respondent cites In re Marriage of Fink, 275 Ill . App. 3d 960, 65 6 N . E . 2d 11 31 ( 19 95 ) in su pp o r t o f his c laim. The Att or ney Gene ra l in Fink fi le d an i nterveni ng bri ef b ecause the responden

t raised a10

peri ph eral ch al l en ge to th e c on sti

tuti on al i ty of Ru l e 2 96 . Th

e res pon den t, a re si den t of Piatt Cou n ty , had argu ed th at i f ac cr ual of th e red uc ti on of h i s ch i l d suppor

t pa y men ts to b e rep ai

d a t a la ter dat e was m

andatory pursuan

t t o Rule 296, the rule deni ed hi m e qual prot ection of the l

aws be ca us e h e w oul d n ot be su bj ec t to su ch

an ac crual i f he were l i vi ng i n a cou nty wh i ch ha d n ot ado pt ed t he r ule. The Fo ur t h Dist rict , r elying on it s ea rlier d ecisio n in In re Marriage o f Horn , 272 Ill. App . 3 d 47 2, 650 N. E. 2d 1 103 (1 995 ), fou nd no co nst itu t ional vio latio n. S pec ifi cally, t he court stated: “We no t e t hat Piat t Co unt y has cho sen t o o per at e pu rsu ant

to Rul e 2 96. [Ci

tation. ] Th

i s c ourt h ashe l d that the e xi

stenc e of Rul e 2 96 provi de s a

uthori ty f or a c ourt i

n a cou nty wh i ch has n ot ado pt ed t he r ule t o a bat e su ppo rt payment s su bject t o a ccr ual o f the abat ed a mou nt in appr op riat e circ umst ance s. [ Cita t ion. ] [ The re spo ndent ] ha s no t been d enied e qua l pro t ect ion o f the laws by virt ue o f the fact t hat he r eside s in a co unt y which has ad op t ed t he rule.” Fink

, 275 Ill . App. 3d at 965-66, 656 N.E .2d at 1135. The re spo ndent in Horn f i l ed a p eti ti on to m odif y ch i l d supp ort i

n th e tri al cou rt of Macon County af ter his union went on strike. The tria l c ourt reduced the pay

me nts but al so ordered t hat t he o r igin al c hildsu pp o r t o r de rwo uld be r ein st at ed t he firs t Fr ida y aft er t he st r ike en de d. While the pertinen

t question on appeal

was whethe

r the respondent’s v

oluntary partici pation i n the strike con sti tute d a l eg i ti mate b as i s f or re du ci n g suppor t, the F our

th Distr i ct too k th

e op por tun i ty to address Coons and the

appl i cab i l i ty of Rul e 296i n a coun ty w hi ch ha s n ot adopted the

rule. Speci fi cally , the court stated:11 “We re co gnize t he co ur t in Coons obs er ved t her e wa s no statut ory or case authority f or t he trial

court to temporaril

y a bate a port ion of a support o rder the support in g parent was wi

thout pr es en t mea ns t o pa y. [ Cit at io n. ] As a ge ne r al r ule , t ha t pr inc iple is correct si nce the Il li nois Marriage and Dissolution of Marri age Act [ci tation ] i s ge ared towa

rd a pre sen

t abi l i ty to pay supp ort. Ho we ve r , t he r e a r e limit s t o t ha t ge ne r al r ule . I f a p ayo ro f ch ild su ppor t sacri f i ce s $ 10, 000

of i nc ome th i s y ea r i n e xc ha ng e f or rec ei vi ng $20 ,00 0 of

i nc ome i n f uture y ea rs , we sh oul d n ot al l ow hi m to im pose the burden of

chi ld s upport on the custodian b ased on h i s curren t sacri f i cean d i gn ore h i s f uture b en ef i t (wh i ch may not be r eac hable for child sup po rt at t he t ime it is rec eived) . T he Supreme Court of

Il l i noi s has re cen

tly prom ulgated S uprem

e Court Ru l e 2 96 (f ) [c i tati on ], w h i ch perm i ts s us pen de d p ay

men ts to accrue. Based on thi s authority, we conc lude the Coons rej ec ti on of [ t empo ra ry] a bat ement is no lo nger app licable to situ at ions wh ich , by t he irve ry na t ur e, ar e in he r en t ly t emp o r ar y. We t ake judicial not ice t hat Mac on is no t one of t he cou nti eswh i ch has p eti ti one d the supr

em e c ourt f or au thor iza ti on t o e mploy t he full pano ply of pr oc edu ra l and su bst ant ive pr ovisio ns of Rule 296. We b elie

ve, nev ertheles s, the exi stence of the rul e, wh i ch pe rm i ts a cou rt to tem pora ril y red uc e p ay men ts f or a p eri od12 of si x mon th s, b ut r eq

ui re s th at th e a b ate d a moun t con ti n ue to acc ru e and be r epa id at a lat er dat e, pr ovid es a ut hor ity for any cou rt to do th

e s am e i n a ppr opri ateci rcu m sta nc esi rre sp ec ti ve of whet her t he co unt y is ope ra t ing und er t he br oa der pr ovisio ns o f the rule.” Horn , 272 Ill . App. 3d at 478-79, 650 N.E .2d at 1108. Fink and Horn are the only

appella te opinions i

nterpreting sub section (n

) of Rule 296. Bo t h ar e Fo ur t h Dist rict op inions, how ever , a nd we ar e no t bou nd t o fo llow ap pellat e de cisions out si de our district. See American Economy Insurance Co. v. Holabird & Root , 382 Ill . App. 3d 1017, 1034, 886 N.E. 2d 1166, 1181 (2008). T heref ore, upo n our own revi ew of Rul e 296, we b el i ev e th at th e tr i al cou rt erre d i n re l y i n g u pon su b se cti on (f ) w h en ex am i n i n g w h eth er pa y men ts ac cr ue d a f ter i t ab ate d p eti

ti on er ’s su pp ort ob l i ga

ti on . R ul e 2 96 wa s n

ot i n ef f ec t i n W i l l Cou n ty either at t he tim

e the abatement or der was enter ed or at t he tim e the respo ndent fi

led h is pro se pl eadi ng s eeki ng to col l ect ch i l d sup port arrear

ages . T he lan gu ag e o f Ru le 2 96 ( n) is c lea ran d u na mbig uo us – R ule 29 6 is o nly ap plic ab le “in cou n ti es i n wh i ch b oth th e ch i ef ci rc ui t j udge an d th e c l er k of th e c i rc ui t cou rt hav e a gr ee d to unde rt ake t he exp er imental us e o f the pr oc edu re s co nt ained he re in, and have jo intly sou ght t he Court ’s permission to do so, by f il in g a petition with the Admi ni strat iv e Director .” 134 I ll . 2d R. 296 (n) . B y put t ing t hese re quir ement s in a sec t ion ent itled “Effect ive Dat e, ” we believe t he supreme court has clearly sign aled an i ntent t hat the applicab il

ity of the new rule i s conditional on com pl i ance wi th i ts requ i rem en ts. None of these requi rem en ts ha s b een

met i n the pres en

t case . The Fo ur t h Dist rict ’s ho ldings in Fink and Horn si

m pl y i gn ore th e e xpres s l

an gua geof Rule 2 96( n). Inst ead , t he Fo ur t h Dist rict has c re at ed it s o wn judicial exc ept ion t o t he limi t ing13

lan gu ag e fo un d in su bse ct io n ( n) . While we be lieve it wo uld be eq uit ab le fo rus t o als o ign o r e t his l anguag e, we a

re req ui red to strictl

y com pl y wi th the rules promu

l gated b y our suprem

e court. The court has stated:

“‘ The rules of court we h

av e prom ulgated a re not aspi

rati onal . The y are no t sug ges t ions. The y have t he fo rc e o f law, a nd t he presum ption m ust be that they wi

ll be obeyed and enforced as
w ritten .’” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich , 211 Ill . 2d 106, 116, 810 N.E .2d 13, 20 (2004), quot in g Bright v. Dicke , 166 Il

l . 2d 204 , 210, 65 2 N.E.2d 275, 27 7 (199 5). Subsection (n) provides , in pertinen t part , that “[t] he Suprem e Court will

authorize experi me ntal s ites to operat e pursuant to t hi s rule .” 134 Ill . 2d R. 296(n). Because the court has ne ve rr ev isit ed Ru le 2 96 in t he 19 yea r s s inc e it s a do pt io n, we mus t as su me t ha t it st ill o nly intend s for Rule 2 96 t o be app licable in cou nt ies “in which bo t h t he chief cir cuit judg e and t he cl erk of the ci

rcuit court have agreed to undertake the experi me ntal us e of the procedures con tai n ed h erei n , a n d h av e j oi n tl y sou gh t th e C our

t’s perm i ss i on to do s o, by

f i l i n g a peti ti on wi th the Admi ni strat iv e Director .” 134 I ll . 2d R. 2 96(n). With that in m in d, we respect ful

ly suggest that the tim e has c ome

f or our supre

me court to exa

m i ne the overal

l appl i cab i l i ty of Rul e 296 . The procedu re al l owi ng tri al courts to tem

porari l y reduc e or totall

y ab ate su pport payment s su bject t o t he und er st anding t hat t hos e pa yments w ill co nt inue t o a ccr ue a nd must be pai d at a l ater ti me se rve s the i ntere st of both the c

ustodial paren t and the n oncu stodi al

paren t. On o ne ha nd , it pr o vid es t he t r ial c o ur t flex ibilit y t o ac co mmo da t e t he no nc us t o dia l pa r en t in tim es of tem porary lay

off from em ploy me nt or o ther instances wh

ere he/sh e i s unab le

to me et14

t he ir s up po r t o blig at io ns. On t he o t he rha nd , it en su r es t ha t t he cu st o dia l pa r en t ev en t ua lly rece i ve s al l the s upport provi ded f

or in the re l ev an

t chi l d sup port order. A b se n t Ru l e 2 96 , non cu sto di

al pa re n ts a repr es en ted wi th th e i n eq ui tab l e op por tun i ty to escape com

ple tely from ful fi ll in g their s upport obli

gations. See Coons , 93 Ill . App. 3d at 134, 416 N.E.2d at 792. We be li eve such a scena rio vi olates the publ

ic policy of thi s state as codif

ie d in the Ill in ois Paren tage Act of 1984 (Act) (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq . (W es t 200 6)) . Se cti

on 1 -1. 1 of t he Ac t ex pr es sly p r o vid es t ha t “I llino is r ec o gn ize s t he r igh t o f ev er y child t o t he ph ysic al, men t al, emotional an

d monetary support of hi s or her par ents under t hi s Act.” 750 I LCS 45/1-1. 1 (West 2006). Moreo ver, ou r supreme cour t has specif ical ly recog ni zed that Ill

in ois has a strong interest i n pr ese rvi ng a nd promoti

ng th e wel f are of chi l dren . People ex rel. Sheppard v . Money , 12 4 I ll. 2d 265 , 277, 52 9 N.E.2d

542, 54 7 (198 8). The court has n oted that “ [a] pa

ren t’s du ty to su pport hi s or her mi

nor chi ld i s am ong the oldest pri

nci ple s of l aw.” Sheppard , 124 Ill . 2d at 269-70, 529 N. E . 2d at 54 4. Un les s e xp r es sly p r o vid ed in a co ur t o r de r , “t he o blig at io n t o su pp o r t a c hildo nly termi nates upon the em

anci pation of the ch

il d.” Finely

v. Finely , 81 Ill . 2d 317, 325, 410 N.E .2d 12, 16 ( 198 0). Non

cu stod i al pa ren ts shou l d n ot be al l owe d the opportu

ni ty to es ca pef rom pa y i ng su ppor t mere l y be ca us e they ch oose to rem ai n u ne m pl oyed . If an y thi ng , th ei r ob l i ga ti on shoul d en courage them to obtai n em ploym en t sooner ra

ther th an l ater. In c oncl usi on, we are re qui red b y the l anguag e of

Rul e 296 (n) to f

i nd th at the tri al court erred i n re l y i ng u pon R ul e 296 (f ) to determ

i ne that petiti

oner owe d res

ponde nt a chi l d sup port arrea rag e, wi th i nte res t, i n th e a moun t of $59 ,29 9.4 2. W

e re f rai n f rom taki ng an y pos i ti on on wh ethe r the d octri ne s of equi tabl e estoppel or laches bar responden

t’s cl ai m that petitioner owed pa st- du e ch i l d suppor

t. In ste ad , w e rem

an d w i th i n str uc ti on s f or th e tr i al cou rt to c on du ct a15

he ari ng i n or de r to determ

i ne what e f f ec t, i f an y , th e M arc

h 3 0, 1 994 , ab ate men

t orde r had upon the su ppor t orde r en tere d O ctob er 2 0, 1 992 . Th i s f i nd i ng m us t be mad e a bs en t an y consi de rati on of Ru le 296 due t o t he fact t hat Rule 2 96 w as no t in effect in Wil l Cou nt y at t he t ime the abatement order was entered o r at t he tim e the respo ndent fi

led h is pro se pl

eadi n g s eeki n g to coll ect ch i l d sup port arrear

ages . Moreover, t he record must be devel oped in order t o understand why the ma tt er was co nt inu ed ge ne r ally o n D ec emb er 21 , 19 94 , an d w ha t t he effe ct o f t ha t o r de rwa s. As p r ev io us ly no t ed , t he t r ial c o ur t ’s minu t es o n t ha t da y mer ely r efle ct t ha t t he mat t er wa s c o nt inu ed ge ne r ally on the motion of

the Stat e. The March 30, 1994, ab atemen t o rder, however, speci fi

cally required th at p eti ti on er mai n tai n a j ob se arch

di ar y an d c on ti n ue d th e m atte r f or s tatu s, ap

pa re n tl y to monit or pet itio ner ’s emplo yment effo rt s. T he r eco rd , ho weve r, fails to pr ovid e us wit h any answer as to why no further status heari

ngs were h

el d after Decem

ber 21, 1994, even

though pet itio ner did no t obt ain employment unt il March 2 002 . Mo re ove r, we a re ext re mely tro ubled by th e f ac t th at p eti

ti on er si m pl y de ci de d to c ea se

se arch i n g f or em pl oy men t b ec au se sh e w an ted to attend sch ool. It ap pears she was requi red, by court order, t o c ont inue t o s ear ch fo r e mployment and he r f ail ure to do so m

i ght b e con

tem pt of the court’ s order. Petitioner al

so contends i

n thi s appeal

that t he trial

court erred in

ordering h

er to pay r es po nd en t ’s co un se l t he su m o f $1 , 75 5. in fe es an d c o st s. Pe t it io ne ras se r t s t he pa r t ies ar e n o t in si m i l ar f i n an ci al ci rc um sta n ce s. Sp ec i f

i ca l l y , pe ti ti on er argu es th at th e p ar ti es ’ f i n an ci al af f i da v i ts rev eal a sub sta nti al di screp an

cy of i nc ome a nd ex pe ns es . A

tri al cou rt’ s dec i si on to a wa rd or den y f ees wil l be reverse d onl

y i f the tri al court ab use d i ts di scre tion . In re Marriage of Schneider , 214 Il

l . 2d 152 , 174, 82 4 N.E.2d 177, 19 0 (200 5).16

Secti on 508 of the Il

l i noi s Ma rri age a nd D i ssol uti on of Marri age A ct al l ows f or an a ward of attor n ey f ee s w h ere on e p ar ty l acksth e f

i n an ci al re sou rc es an d th e oth er pa rty h as th e a b i l i ty to pay. 750 ILCS 5/508 ( West 2006). The part y seeki ng an award of att orney fees “m ust est abl ish his o wn ina bilit y t o pa y and the othe r spous e’s

ab i l i ty to do so.” ( Em

phasi s ad ded.) In re Marriag e of Puls , 26 8 I l l . A

pp . 3d 88 2, 8 89 , 64 5 N .E. 2d

52 5, 5 30 (1 99 4) . “Fi

n an ci al i n ab i l i ty ex i sts where req ui ri ng pa y men t of f ee s w oul d s tri p that p arty

of hi s m ea ns of su ppor t or underm in e the party’s

fi nan ci al stabili ty.” Puls , 268 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 889, 645 N.E.2d a

t 530. In addi tion , the tri

al court m ay cons i der a p arty ’sm

i scon duct wh en determ i ni ng w hether to awa

rd attorney f ees . In re Mar

riage of Hale , 278 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 53 , 58, 662N.E.2d 1 80, 184 (1996 ). He r e, pe t it io ne rr ep o r t ed mo nt hly ex pe nse s o f $3 , 84 1. T his a mo un t inc lud es t he mo nt hly $7 50 ar r ea r ag e p ayme nt pe t it io ne rwa s o blig at ed t o pa y re sp o nd en t . Pe t it io ne r ’s ne t mo nt hly in come is $3,119. Petitioner testif ie d that she sati sf

ie s 40% of her reported expense s and h er hus ba nd s ati sf i es the rem

ai ni ng 6 0%. Re spon

den t reported m

onthl y ex pen ses of $ 4,246. Responden

t’s net monthl

y i ncom e i s $4,910. Reviewi

ng the parties ’ f

in anci al aff ida vi ts, we beli eve respo ndent has failed t o sho w an inabi li ty to pay hi s own at to rney fees. Respo ndent’s monthl y i ncome exceeds h

is m onthly expenses b

y $664. Whi

le petitioner’s m

onthly in come als o exceeds her m onthly expenses, i

ncorporat in

g the fact t hat she onl

y pa ys 40% of her ex

penses does n ot al on e j us ti f y an aw ard of attor n ey f ee s. Re sp on den

t wa s req ui re d to prove b oth

h i s i n ab i l i ty to pa y an d pe ti ti one r’ s a bi l i ty to do s o. See Puls , 268 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 889, 645 N.E.2d a

t 530. Responden

t has not met thi s burden . Thus, we fi nd that the trial

court ’s award of a

tt orney f ees constitutes

an abuse of d i scre tion . I n c o ming t o t his c o nc lus io n, we r eje ct r es po nd en t ’s r elia nc e u po n t he fac t t ha t t he o r igin17

of thi s action arose f

rom petiti oner’s f

ai lure to pay ch

il d support. Speci fi

cally , respondent argues that p etitioner’s fai

lure to p ay ch

il d suppor t co nstitutes misconduct and cites Hale for t he propo si tion that the trial

court did n

ot abuse i ts discretion because

mi sconduct of the parties ca n b e c on si dere d w h en deter m i n i n g w h eth er to award a

ttorn ey f ee s. W h i l e p eti ti on er ’s f ai l ur e to su pp o r t he rch ildr en r efle ct s p o o r ly up o n he rpe r so na l ch ar ac t er , we do no t be lieve t ha t t his que st ionable jud gment is equ ivalent t o t he misco nduc t discu ssed in Hale . Hale in volv ed a spouse’s f raudulen t acquisi tion of m arital propert y. See Hale , 278 Ill . App. 3d at 57, 662 N.E .2d at 183. H ere, re spon

den t does n ot all ege th at peti tion er en gage d i n a ny f raudu l en t conduct. Thus, we f

in d Hale distin guish able on its facts. Fo r t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e r ever se t hat po rt ion o f the t rial co ur t ’s o rd er re quir ing petitioner t o pay respondent child suppor t arr earages in the am ount of $59,299 .42. We also re ver se t hat po rt ion o f the t rial co ur t ’s o rd er re quir ing pet itio ner t o p ay res po ndent ’s co unse l the su m of $1 ,75 5 i n f ee s a n d c ost s. The m

atte r i s rem an de d f or f ur th er pr oce ed i n gscon siste n t wi th t his op inion. O’B RIEN, P.J . and W

RIGH T, J., con

cur.