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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

9th Circuit Court – Manchester Family Division

No. 2014-457

IN THE MATTER OF MARY E. SHEYS AND ERIC BLACKBURN

Argued: May 13, 2015

Opinion Issued: July 15, 2015

Bossie & Wilson, PLLC, of Manchester (Jon N. Strasburger on the brief 

and orally), for the petitioner.

Michael Bedard, of Concord, by brief and orally, for the respondent.

DALIANIS, C.J. The respondent, Eric Blackburn, appeals an order of the 

Circuit Court (Carbon, J.) granting the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner, 

Mary E. Sheys, on the ground that the court lacked exclusive, continuing 

jurisdiction over the parties’ post-divorce parenting matters. On appeal, the 

respondent argues that the trial court’s order is contrary to RSA 458-A:13, I 

(Supp. 2014), a provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), see RSA ch. 458-A (Supp. 2014). Because we 

agree with the respondent, we reverse and remand.

The record contains the following facts. The parties were married in 

August 2005 and were divorced by a New Hampshire court in 2009. When 

they divorced, both parties lived and worked in New Hampshire.
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The parties have two children, one born in 2006 and the other in 2007. 

The parenting plan entered with their divorce decree gave the parties joint 

decision-making responsibility for the children, who resided primarily with the 

petitioner. The respondent was awarded parenting time on two afternoons 

during the school week, every other weekend, and for two non-consecutive 

weeks during the summer.

In January 2013, the petitioner notified the respondent that she had to 

relocate from Manchester to Natick, Massachusetts, because she had been 

unemployed since November 2012 and had obtained a new job in Natick. The 

petitioner relocated with the children to Natick in February 2013.

After the petitioner moved to Natick, the respondent filed a motion in 

which he argued that he should be awarded primary residential responsibility 

for the children and that the petitioner should be found in contempt for having 

relocated in violation of the parties’ parenting plan. In April 2013, the trial 

court denied this relief, finding that although the petitioner did not provide the 

respondent with the 60-day notice required by the parties’ parenting plan, she 

provided him “at least 40-45 days” notice before relocating, which afforded him 

“ample time to . . . request . . . a hearing as provided by statute.” The court 

entered a new parenting plan, pursuant to which the parties again had joint 

decision-making responsibility for the children, who again were to reside 

primarily with the petitioner. The respondent was awarded parenting time on 

alternate weekends, any time he was in the Natick area, and at other times as 

agreed by the parties. He was also awarded parenting time for two nonconsecutive weeks each summer, five days during April vacation in even years, 

and five days during February vacation in odd years, unless the parties 

otherwise agreed.

In December 2013, the respondent requested that the court modify the 

parties’ parenting plan and find the petitioner in contempt. The respondent’s 

contempt motion was scheduled to be heard on February 19, 2014. On 

February 7, 2014, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the pending 

proceedings in New Hampshire because she and the children had been 

Massachusetts residents for one year and because she had a motion pending in

a Massachusetts court to modify the parties’ divorce decree and parenting plan. 

Following a hearing, the New Hampshire court granted the petitioner’s motion 

to dismiss, reasoning that it was “appropriate for the Court to decline 

continuing jurisdiction over this matter” because “[t]he [p]etitioner and the 

children no longer have a significant connection with the State of New 

Hampshire.” See RSA 458-A:13, I(a). The respondent unsuccessfully moved 

for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the respondent argues that the trial court erred when it 

concluded that the children lacked a significant connection with New 

Hampshire. To address this argument, we must interpret the UCCJEA. Our 
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review of the trial court’s statutory interpretation is de novo. See In the Matter 

of Yaman & Yaman, 167 N.H. 82, 86 (2014). When examining the language of 

a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. 

We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider 

what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did 

not see fit to include. Id. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we 

do not look beyond it for further indications of legislative intent. Id.

Under the UCCJEA, once a court of this state has issued an initial 

custody order or has modified an initial order, the court has exclusive, 

continuing jurisdiction over the matter until:

(a) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the 

child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a 

parent have a significant connection with this state and that 

substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning

the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; 

or 

(b) A court of this state or a court of another state determines 

that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a 

parent do not presently reside in this state.

RSA 458-A:13, I (emphasis added); see Yaman, 167 N.H. at 87-89 (providing an 

overview of the UCCJEA).

The UCCJEA does not define the phrase “significant connection.” 

However, the official comments to the UCCJEA explain that, pursuant to this 

provision, “even if the child has acquired a new home State, the original decree 

State retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, so long as the general 

requisites of the ‘substantial connection’ jurisdiction provisions of Section 201 

[of the UCCJEA] are met.” Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act 

§ 202, cmt. 1, 9 Part IA U.L.A. 674 (1999); see RSA 458-A:12, I(b) (providing 

that a court may exercise jurisdiction to issue an initial custody order if no 

other state is the child’s home state or the home state has declined 

jurisdiction, and the child and at least one parent has a significant connection 

to the state “other than mere physical presence” and substantial evidence 

concerning the child is available in the state). The comments further explain 

that “[i]f the relationship between the child and the person remaining in the 

State with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction becomes so attenuated that the 

court could no longer find significant connections and substantial evidence, 

jurisdiction would no longer exist.” Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction & 

Enforcement Act § 202, cmt. 1, 9 Part IA U.L.A. 674 (1999).

A majority of jurisdictions have concluded that a child has a “significant 

connection” with a state when one parent resides and “exercises at least some 
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parenting time” there. White v. Harrison-White, 760 N.W.2d 691, 697 (Mich. 

Ct. App. 2008); see Uttley v. Bobo, 242 S.W.3d 638, 640-41 (Ark. Ct. App.

2006) (children had sufficient contacts with Arkansas for court to retain 

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction when father lived in Arkansas and children 

visited him there); Fish v. Fish, 596 S.E.2d 654, 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) 

(holding that Georgia court had continuing jurisdiction when father lived in 

Georgia and children visited him there at least six times during the year); Ruth 

v. Ruth, 83 P.3d 1248, 1253-54 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that Kansas 

court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction when father continued to live in 

Kansas and children, who had relocated to Missouri, visited Kansas two 

weekends each month and eight weeks during the summer); In re Forlenza, 

140 S.W.3d 373, 377 (Tex. 2004) (concluding that “[b]ecause the record 

establishes that the children visited Texas on a number of occasions and 

maintained a close relationship with their mother and other relatives residing 

in Texas, . . . the children have a significant connection with Texas sufficient to 

support the trial court’s exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the modification 

proceedings”); Prickett v. Prickett, 167 P.3d 661, 663-64 (Wyo. 2007) (court 

retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to UCCJEA when father 

still lived in Wyoming and visited with children there).

We join the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue and 

hold that a child has a “significant connection” with New Hampshire when one 

parent still resides here and exercises more than de minimis parenting time 

here. In this case, the petitioner concedes that the respondent exercises his 

parenting time with the children in New Hampshire on alternating weekends, 

certain holidays, and for some extended periods in the summer and that he 

has relatives remaining in New Hampshire. Under these circumstances, we 

hold, as a matter of law, that the children have a significant connection with 

New Hampshire sufficient to support the trial court’s exclusive, continuing 

jurisdiction over these proceedings.

The petitioner urges us to affirm the trial court on the alternate ground 

that New Hampshire is an inconvenient forum pursuant to RSA 458-A:18. 

Although she agrees that the trial court “did not use the term ‘inconvenient 

forum’ in its order,” she contends that “given the testimony at the . . . hearing 

and the facts cited in the trial court’s order, it is clear that the trial court made 

that determination.”

The interpretation of a court order is a question of law, which we review 

de novo. Appeal of Langenfeld, 160 N.H. 85, 89 (2010). In construing a court 

order, we look to the plain meaning of the words used in the document. Id. 

We construe subsidiary clauses so as not to conflict with the primary purpose 

of the trial court’s decree. Id. As a general matter, a court decree or judgment 

is to be construed with reference to the issues it was meant to decide. Id.
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Here, considering the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the trial court’s 

order, the respondent’s motion to reconsider, the petitioner’s objection thereto, 

and the parties’ arguments at the motion hearing, it is evident that the only

issue the court was asked to decide was whether it retained exclusive, 

continuing jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to RSA 458-A:13. The court 

was not asked to decide, and did not decide, whether New Hampshire is an 

inconvenient forum under RSA 458-A:18. Accordingly, we decline the 

petitioner’s invitation to affirm the trial court’s decision on this alternate 

ground.

We likewise decline her invitation to determine, in the first instance, 

whether New Hampshire is an inconvenient forum pursuant to RSA 458-A:18. 

“When, as in this case, a discretionary decision is at issue and the trial court 

has not exercised that discretion, we may sustain the trial court’s ruling on a 

ground upon which it did not rely only if there is only one way the trial court 

could have ruled as a matter of law.” State v. Hayward, 166 N.H. 575, 583 

(2014) (quotation omitted). We are unable to conclude on the record before us 

that there was only one way that the trial court could have ruled had it been 

asked to decide whether New Hampshire is an inconvenient forum pursuant to 

RSA 458-A:18. Under those circumstances, we decline to affirm the trial

court’s decision on the ground that the court reached the right result for the 

wrong reason. See id. at 584.

Reversed and remanded.

HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.