* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10603

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

HOWARD EARL TAYLOR, also known as “T T”

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:06-CR-71-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Howard Earl Taylor appeals the sentence imposed following his jury

conviction of one count of distribution of cocaine base (crack cocaine) and two

counts of distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced Taylor to the statutory maximum of 240

months of imprisonment on each conviction count and ordered the sentences to

run consecutively,for a total of 720 months of imprisonment. Taylor argues that

the district court erred by adopting the drug quantity set forth in the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 23, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10603

2

presentence report (PSR) and by adopting the PSR’s determination that he was

an organizer or leader of criminal activity. He also argues that his sentence of

three consecutive terms of 20 years of imprisonment, or a total of 720 months of

imprisonment, is an unreasonable sentence.

Regarding drug quantity, Taylor argues, as he did in the district court,

that the drug quantity set forth in the PSR was based upon unreliable

information. This argument fails because Taylor did not offer evidence that

rebutted the facts set forth in the PSR or “otherwise demonstrate[d] that the

information in the PSR is unreliable.” United States v. Cabrera, 288 F.3d 163,

173-74 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, Taylor examined

the lead government agent, whose testimony indicates that the drug quantity

determination was based upon credible sources and information that was

corroborated by other facets of the investigation. Her sworn testimony bears

sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered by the district court during

sentencing. See United States v. Thomas, 12 F. 3d 1350, 1372 (5th Cir. 1994).

Taylor has thus failed to demonstrate that the information set forth in the PSR

regarding drug quantity is materially untrue, inaccurate, or unreliable. United

States v. Ramirez, 367 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Parker, 133

F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court did not clearly err in relying

upon the information in the PSR regarding drug quantity. See United States v.

Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 403 (5th Cir. 1997).

Regarding the district court’s determination that Taylor was an organizer

or leader of criminal activity, Taylor argues, as he did in the district court, that

the four point increase to his offense level based on organization or leadership

of a criminal activity is not justified by reliable information. He contends that

he was not close enough to the top of the supply chain to be deemed a leader or

an organizer under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) (2006). Unrefuted facts in the PSR

establish that Taylor operated multiple narcotics distribution houses, directed

the drug trafficking of four other individuals, purchased large quantities of
No. 07-10603

1 At the sentencing hearing, Taylor’s attorney objected to drug quantities used in the

sentencing calculations, the calculations themselves, the facts taken into account for the twolevel adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and a lack of proof of Miranda warnings, but

he did not object to the sentence as unreasonable. 

2 Taylor’s attorney only requested in a closing statement that the judge “take into

account . . . other factors recommended by 3553 of the United States Code.” 

3

powder cocaine, and manufactured and distributed crack cocaine directly or

through others. Thus, the district court’s conclusion that Taylor was an

organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants

or was otherwise extensive is plausible in light of the record, and the district

court did not clearly err when it increased Taylor’s offense level by four levels

pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). See United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 446 (5th

Cir. 2001); § 3B1.1, comment (n.4).

Finally, Taylor argues in general terms that his sentence is unreasonable

because it is based upon unreliable information set forth in the PSR, recent

amendments to the Guidelines indicate that the guidelines version that formed

the basis for his sentence contained disproportionately harsh penalties for

offenses involving crack cocaine, and his sentence is contrary to goals set forth

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As we have discussed, we are not persuaded that the

PSR contains unreliable information. Moreover, in the district court, Taylor did

not object to the reasonableness of his sentence,1 nor did he argue that his

sentence failed to consider factors set forth in § 3553(a).2 He also did not object

that the 2006 version of the Guidelines that formed the basis for his sentence

contained disproportionate penalties for offenses involving crack cocaine. This

court’s review is therefore for plain error. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d

389, 391 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, (Jan 22, 2008) (No. 07-8978);

UnitedStates v. Hernandez-Martinez, 485F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2007). Taylor’s

broad assertions regarding this issue fail to demonstrate that there was error,

that was plain, and that affected his substantial rights. See Peltier, 505 F.3d at

392.
No. 07-10603

4

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.