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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

DEBRA A. MANTEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED July 21, 2015

v No. 319673 Saginaw Circuit Court Family Division DONALD E. MANTEY, LC No. 08-003051-DO

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: B ORRELLO , P.J., and R ONAYNE K RAUSE and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Plaintiff, Debra A. Mantey, appeals as of right the amended ju dgment of divorce regarding the dissolution of her marriage with defendant, Donal d E. Mantey. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is the second appeal in this case and involves the dissol ution of the parties’ marriage. They married in 1976 and plaintiff filed for divorce in 2008. 1 At the time of the marriage, plaintiff had a high school diploma and defendant had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering. Defendant operated two farming busines s during the marriage, namely, Mantey Brothers and Ed Mantey & Sons. His taxable income in 20 09 was $203,437. Plaintiff, on the other hand, worked only part-time during the marriage an d never earned more than $12,000 a year. At the time plaintiff filed for divorce, she w as 54 years old and defendant was 59 years old.

In the previous appeal, plainti ff asserted error in the trial court’s property distribution and denial of spousal support. A panel of this Court concluded tha t several of the trial court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous or insufficient for app ellate review. Mantey v Mantey
, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 15, 2013 (Docket No. 309042), pp 4-5. The panel instructed that a remand was necess ary to resolve issues regarding

1 The parties’ children were no l onger minors at the time plaint iff filed for divorce.-2- the value Mantey Hills property and the related legal questions of whether plaintiff’s interest was in the Mantey Hills partnership or in the partnership’s property. Id. at 4-5. It also ordered the trial court to make specific findings regarding the spousal sup port factors, and for the trial court to determine the issue of a ny spousal support arrearage. Id. at 7.

On remand, the trial court made additional findings, and ultim ately denied plaintiff’s request for spousal support. Howev er, the trial court failed t o value certain assets as it was directed to do on remand. P laintiff again appeals.

II. SPOUSAL SUPPORT

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we apply the followin g standards of review:

It is within the trial court’ s discretion to award spousal sup port, and we review a spousal support award fo r an abuse of discretion. We also review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision whether to impute income to a party. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision f alls outside the range of reasonable and principl ed outcomes. The object in awa rding spousal support is to balance the income s and needs of the parties so t hat neither will be impoverished; spousal support is to be based on what is just an d reasonable under the circumstances of the case. We review for clear error the t rial court’s factual findings regarding spousal suppor t. A finding is clearly erron eous if, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. If the trial court’s findings are not clearl y erroneous, we must determine whether the dispositional ruling was fair and equitab le under the circumstances of the case. We must affirm the trial court’s di spositional ruling unless we are convinced that it was inequitable. [ Loutts v Loutts , 298 Mich App 21, 25-26; 826 NW2d 152 (2012) (quotat ion marks and citation om itted).]

Moreover, “[w]hether a trial co urt followed an appellate court’ s ruling on remand is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Schumacher v Dep’t of Natural Resources

, 275 Mich App 121, 127; 737 NW2d 782 (2007).

B. ANALYSIS

The objective in awarding spousal support is to balance the inc ome and needs of the parties, so that neither will be impoverished. Loutts , 298 Mich App at 26 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court should award spousal suppor t based on what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Berger v Berger , 277 Mich App 700, 726; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). Among the factors th e trial court should cons ider are:

(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the len gth of the marriage, (3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the sou rce and amount of property awarded to the parties, (5) the parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony, (7) the present situation of the parties, (8) t he needs of the parties,-3- (9) the parties’ health, (10) the prior standard of living of t he parties and whether either is responsible for the s upport of others, (11) contribut ions of the parties to the joint estate, (12) a party’s fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of cohabitation on a party’s financia l status, and (14) general pr inciples of equity [ Id. at 726-727.]

“The trial court should make specific factual findings regardi ng the factors that are relevant to the particular case.” Myland v Myland , 290 Mich App 691, 695; 804 NW2d 124 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff first challenges the trial court’s finding regarding the length of the marriage. She concedes that calling it a “long term marriage” is not clea rly erroneous, but contends that this finding was not definite enough. MCR 2.517(A)(2) provides that “[b]rief definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on the contested matters are sufficient, without overelaboration of detail or par ticularization of facts.” In t his case, the parties married in 1976 and plaintiff filed for divorce in 2008. On remand, the trial court found that the parties had a “long term marriage.” This finding satisfies the requirements of MCR 2.517(A)(2) and is not clearly erroneous.

Next, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s finding that defe ndant had “some ability” to pay spousal support. Plaintiff contends that the trial court s everely understated plaintiff’s needs and defendant’s ability to pay. Again, while the trial court’s finding may not have been the most specific, it was sufficient. Defendant had the ability to pay, which the court found. In the 2010 tax year, plaintiff’s wages were $13,357, whereas defendant rep orted a taxable income of $203,437 in 2009. Mantey , unpub op at 1. Although the trial court used the modifier “s ome” when characterizing defendant’s ability to pay, that merely ind icates an unspecified amount, not necessarily a minimization. 2 The court’s finding is definit e enough within the meaning of MCR 2.517(A)(2) and not clearly erroneous. The court also addresse d the parties’ needs, finding that “[t]he division of the marital e state will provide for the need s of both parties.”

Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s finding that “[t]h e fact that Plaintiff will receive $618,990.00 as her share of the marital estate (The original $5 36,490.00 plus $82,500.00 from the Court’s redetermination of her share of the value of the re al estate), in addition to health insurance for 3 years, gives the Plaintiff ample resources.” 3 Plaintiff contends that the trial court ignored the fact that she had no housing, limited health insura nce with a high deductible and copay, no income-producing assets, no retirement accounts, no via ble employment prospects, and that she had to spend part of her award on attorney fees.

2 “Some” is defined as “being an undetermined or unspecified one ;” “unspecified but considerable in number, amount, degree etc.;” “an unspecified n umber, amount, etc., as distinguished from the rest or in addition;” “to some degree or extent.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2005).

3 Plaintiff asserts that the tri al court used the wrong numbers; however, that issue is moot because the mathematical error was corrected in the judgment of divorce.-4- However, it is not clear that the court ignored these factors. The court’s findings do not indicate the extent of the considerations examined in reaching its finding. Even assuming that the court did not consider all of these factors, the award of o ver a half a million dollars in liquid assets and three years of healthinsurance certainly constitute s “ample” resources. The court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.

Plaintiff, however, also takes issue with the trial court’s fi nding regarding the parties’ contributions to the joint estate. The court found that the “v ast majority of the marital estate was the result of the Defendant’s efforts or inheritance” and “contributions.” We again find no clear error. During the marriage, def endant operated two farming bus inesses: Mantey Brothers and Ed Mantey & Sons. Mantey , unpub op at 1. The parties’ health insurance was provided th rough Ed Mantey & Sons and the parties had a health savings account in c onjunction with their insurance plan. Id . Defendant’s base salary in 2009 was $60,000 and he had a tax able income of $203,437. Id . He also owned farm parcels that were leased to Ed Mantey & S ons. Id. at 2. Defendant received a 1989 gift of 240 acres that he and his sib lings deeded to the Mantey Hills partnership in 1996. Id . As for plaintiff, she testified that she mostly worked part- time and in the 2010 tax year, her wages were $13,357. Mantey , unpub op at 1.

Thus, defendant earned the major ity of the parties’ marital inc ome and accumulated significant assets by virtue of gifts from his family. Althoug h plaintiff contends that the trial court failed to recognize her c ontributions to the marital esta te, we disagree. First, the trial court merely found that the vast majority of the contributions came from defendant. This finding implied that plaintiff at least contributed somewhat to the mar ital estate. Plaintiff obliquely references the fact that she took the primary role in raising t he children and caring for the home. See Hanaway v Hanaway , 208 Mich App 278, 294; 527 NW2d 792 (1995). Yet, plaintiff highlights no evidence to support that assertion. “ ‘Facts sta ted must be supported by specific page references to the transcript, the pleadings, or other docu ment or paper filed with the trial court.’ MCR 7.212(C)(7). We will not search the record for fac tual support for plaintiffs’ claims.” Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys , 263 Mich App 364, 388; 689 NW2d 145 (2004).

Moreover, very little evidence was submitted regarding plaintif f’s precise role in contributing to the marital estate or in raising the children, most likely because custody was not at issue. Although plaintiff testified that she did not work w hen the children were younger, she provided no details reg arding the parties’ roles and responsibi lities in childcare or household services. In fact, rather than a stay-at-home mother, plaintif f asserted that she worked almost the entire time throughout the marriage, although it was primarily part-time and her financial contributions were relatively minor. Defendant testified that plaintiff “helped” to raise the children and that they both performed household activities such as cooking. 4 In light of plaintiff’s failure to highlight any evidence to the contrary, we find no clear error in the trial court’s finding.

4 To the extent that plaintiff may have introduced evidence to t he contrary, she has not identified it on appeal. Derderian , 263 Mich App at 388.-5- Plaintiff, however, concludes th at in light of the spousal supp ort factors, the trial court’s ultimate decision to deny spousal support was an abuse of discr etion. We review a trial court’s spousal support award for an abuse of discretion. Loutts , 298 Mich App at 25. Even if we find no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings, we still “must determine whether the dispositional ruling was fair a nd equitable under the circumsta nces of the case.” Id. at 26.

Here, both parties received substantial assets, with plaintiff receiving over $600,000 in liquid assets and defendant recei ving the marital home, two bus inesses, farm parcels, and his interest in the Mantey Hills partnership. On appeal, defendant contends that in light of the significant debt he accrued in order to pay for plaintiff’s cas h award, the trial court’s decision to deny spousal support was correct. Plaintiff rejoins that defen dant received the income-producing assets, whereas she receive d only a fixed amount. See Hanaway , 208 Mich App at 296 (in evaluating the equity of awardi ng spousal support, the trial co urt should be mindf ul that “where both parties are awarded substan tial assets, the court . . . sh ould focus on the income-earning potential of the assets ” rather than myopically focus on “ the value of the assets them selves.”).

However, an impediment to our resolution of this issue is that the trial court failed to value all of the property, in direct violation of our previous opinion. In the first appeal, a panel of this Court directed as follows:

Donald Mantey argued that he successfully conveyed the interes t, and that because the Mantey Hills partnership held the property with rig hts of survivorship, Debra Mantey only had a remote interest in the pr operty. In contrast, Debra Mantey argued that because Donald Mantey’s atte mpt to convey his interest in the property to the Mantey Hills partnership in 1996 did not have her signature, the conveyance was invalid under the Michigan st atute of frauds because she had an interest in the property. She also argued th at, in the alternative, the Mantey Hills partnership itself had value.

If the trial court’s finding was meant to reject Debra Mantey’ s argument that the conveyance was void beca use her dower interest in the property was speculative and contingent, then the trial court erred. Though a dower interest is a contingent interest that vests on the death of the husband, the law also protects the interest before it vests. “[T]he statue of frauds requires bot h the seller and his wife with a dower interest to sign a purchase agreement in orde r to create a valid contract for the sale of land.” Without further analysis, we a re not definitely and firmly convinced that Debra Mantey’s dower interest in the prop erty was too speculative and contingent to pot entially void the transfer und er the statute of frauds.

If the trial court’s finding was meant to accept Donald Mantey ’s argument that Debra Mantey’s eventual int erest in the partnership itself was speculative and contingent, we again conclude that the trial court erred. We re iterate that the trial court found that although some of the parties’ property was gif ted, it was all marital property. The partnership agreement also provides that partnership interests themselves are val ued at $160,000, which mathematical ly breaks down to a value of $40,000 for each partner. Thus, if Donald Mantey’ s transfer of-6- property was valid, it appears th at Debra Mantey has some inter est in the partnership itself. The trial court should have determined a va lue for this disputed property. Thus, we conclude that the trial court made a mistake

. We reiterate that the trial court must make findings of fact “ essential to a proper resolution of the legal questions” so that this Court ca n determine if the judgment was legally correct and equitable. We conclude that this portion of the trial court’s order requires cla rification so that we can engag e in meaningful appellate review. [ Mantey , unpub at 4-5 (citations omitted).]

We expressly commanded the trial court to “make a finding of fa ct on the value of the Mantey Hills partnership, and resolve the related legal questions abou t whether Debra Mantey’s interest is in the Mantey Hills partnershi p itself or the partnership’s property.” Id . at 6.

Rather than adhere to our ruli ng, the trial court declined to value Mantey Hills and merely found that the value of the Mantey Hills property did not matter because the property was gifted and plaintiff only made a de minimus contribution to the maintenance of the property during the marriage. Because the trial court failed to comply with this C ourt’s opinion, we again must remand. As the trial court failed to value the Mantey Hills pa rtnership or resolve the related legal question of whether plaintiff’s interest is in the partne rship or property, the precise nature and amount of assets awarded to the parties remains unclear. W ithout the trial court’s complete and final findings, we are unable to determine whether the deni al of spousal support was inequitable. 5

Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court ignored this Court ’s directive to make findings of fact and a determination on the mer its of the arrearage issue. We previously directed as follows:

Debra Mantey argues that the trial court erred when it failed to address whether Donald Mantey was in arrears on his spousal support. Th e record supports Debra Mantey’s assertions that (1) Donald Mantey was w ithholding $918 from spousal support for hea lth insurance costs and (2) th e trial court already considered this amount may [sic] when it awarded tempor ary spousal support. The record also supports Donald Mantey’s assertion tha t the trial court’s order may have required him to pay for Debra Mantey’s health in surance twice. On remand, the trial court shall making [sic] findings of fact and a determination on the merits of this issue. [ Mantey , unpub op at 7.]

5 Defendant claims that in the prior appeal, this Court mistaken ly interpreted the trial court to have ruled that all property was marital property. However, de fendant fails to engage in any analysis regarding law of the case. “Insufficiently briefed is sues are deemed abandoned on appeal.” Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Builders & Constr Managers, LLC , 282 Mich App 410, 413; 766 NW2d 874 (2009). Further, on rema nd, the trial court never specifically found that, contrary t o this Court’s statements, M antey Hills was separate property.-7- Because the trial court did not e ven address this issue, we agr ee with plaintiff that the court again inexplicably failed to follow the remand order. Thus, we again remand for the trial court to address this issue. 6

To be clear, the trial court must resolve the spousal support arrearage issue. It also must “make a finding of fact on the value of the M antey Hills partne rship, and resolve the related legal questions about whether Debra Mantey’s interest is in the Mante y Hills partnership itself or the partnership’s property[,]” Mantey , unpub at 6, and consider what effect this may have on equitable considerations.

III. REMAND TO DIFFERENT JUDGE

Plaintiff also requests that we remand this case to a differen t trial court judge. “We may remand to a different judge if the original judge would have di fficulty in putting aside previously expressed views or findings, if reassignment is advisable to pr eserve the appearance of justice, and if reassignment will not ent ail excessive waste or duplicat ion.” Bayati v Bayati , 264 Mich App 595, 602-603; 691 NW2d 812 (2004).

However, “[w]e have carefully reviewed the record and have foun d no evidence that the trial court harbors a bias against [plaintiff] or that it would be unable to put aside previously expressed views or findings.” Kaeb v Kaeb , __Mich App__; __NW2d__ (Docket No. 319574, issued March 12, 2015); slip op at 9. Plaintiff highlights the trial court’s statement on remand that the parties were to submit further briefing and the court would “doctor up” the rest. While perhaps a poor choice of words, we detect no bias in this state ment. The trial court was merely communicating that it would make findings regarding any issues left unanswered. Nor is the fact that the trial court may have inc orrectly interpreted or unders tood our remand order a sufficient basis for remanding to a different judge in this case. The fac t that a judge came to a wrong legal conclusion is not a sufficient basis to assign the case to a di fferent judge. Bayati , 264 Mich App at 603. Further, at this point in the proceedings, remanding t o a different judge would require a significant expenditure of res ources and entail excessive waste

. Id. at 602-604. 7

IV. CONCLUSION

We again reverse the trial court’s judgment. On remand, the t rial court must: (1) determine if there is and the amount of a spousal support arrea rage; and (2) make a finding regarding the value of the Mantey Hills partnership , and resolve the relate d legal questions about whether Debra Mantey’s interest is in the Mantey Hills partners hip itself or the partnership’s

6 Defendant claims that because the trial court referenced that this issue was “preserved” in the amended judgment of divorce, it somehow is not properly before us. However, we clearly instructed the trial court to d ecide this issue, not cast it as ide.

7 Nor do we find it necessary under MCR 7.216 to invade the tria l court’s role and make findings of fact.-8- property. After determining thes e issues, the trial court may reexamine equitable considerations to determine whether a spousal support award is justified.

We have reviewed all further issues and find them to be without merit. We reverse and remand. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello /s/ Michael J. Riordan