Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Commitment of Tunget, 2018 IL App (1st) 162555

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re COMMITMENT OF STEVEN TUNGET (The People of the 

State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Steven Tunget, RespondentAppellant).

District & No. First District, Fifth Division

Docket No. 1-16-2555

Filed

Modified upon denial

of rehearing

June 29, 2018

August 24, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 04-CR-80005; the 

Hon. Dennis J. Porter, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Law Offices of Chicago-Kent College of Law, of Chicago (Daniel T. 

Coyne, Matthew M. Daniels, Michael R. Johnson, and Kate E. Levine, 

of counsel), for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, 

Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Joshua M. Schneider, 

Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.
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Panel JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Hall concurred in the judgment 

and opinion. 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Respondent, Steven Tunget, was adjudicated a sexually violent person (SVP) as defined by 

the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)) 

and subsequently institutionalized in a secure setting. The trial court later conditionally 

released respondent; however, the conditional release was revoked on the State’s petition. On 

appeal, respondent contends that the trial court erred in revoking his conditional release and 

recommitting him to institutional care. Respondent additionally claims that the trial court 

abused its discretion in allowing expert testimony that relied upon a nonstatutory standard. 

Based on the following, we affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 Respondent, who is 61 years old, was diagnosed with paraphilia, not otherwise specified; 

voyeurism; exhibitionism; and antisocial personality disorder. He was detained under the Act 

in 2004 after a finding that it was substantially probable that he would engage in acts of sexual 

violence. Thereafter, while institutionalized in a secure setting, respondent participated in the 

Illinois Department of Human Services’ (DHS) sex offender treatment program.

¶ 4 On October 6, 2010, respondent filed a petition for conditional release. At the hearing on 

respondent’s petition, Dr. Kimberly Weitl, a DHS evaluator, and Dr. Lesley Kane, an examiner 

appointed by the court, recommended respondent’s conditional release. The trial court granted 

respondent’s petition. DHS then prepared a conditional release plan requiring respondent to 

agree to abide by the 52 listed conditions of release. On August 20, 2012, the trial court 

approved the conditional release plan, which respondent agreed to by signing and initialing the 

plan next to each condition. In relevant part, the conditional release plan required that 

respondent (1) refrain from having any contact with other sex offenders outside the treatment 

setting without prior approval (Condition 16), (2) refrain from having any contact with a minor 

child without prior approval (Condition 17), (3) “provide a daily log of activities and monthly 

written reports as directed by the DHS case management team” (Condition 27), (4) comply 

with all conditions imposed by the conditional release agent and DHS case management team 

to restrict high-risk situations and access to potential victims (Condition 28), and (5) refrain 

from having anyone in his apartment without prior approval (Condition 50). 

¶ 5 Respondent remained on conditional release until the State filed a petition to revoke that 

status. The petition was filed on July 15, 2015, and respondent was detained in a secure facility 

pending a hearing. On August 24, 2015, the State filed an amended petition to revoke 

respondent’s conditional release, alleging he violated six conditions of his conditional release 

plan, namely, Conditions 11 (become self supporting and gainfully employed), 16, 17, 27, 28, 

and 50. The State’s petition additionally alleged respondent’s conditional release should be 

revoked to protect the safety of others. More specifically, the State alleged respondent 
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(1) engaged in inappropriate conversations with women in the community and misinterpreted 

the women’s intentions as sexual advancements, (2) failed to make sufficient progress in 

treatment, (3) frequently and intently watched his neighbors, and (4) consistently failed to be 

honest with his case management team. Prior to the hearing, respondent moved to strike the 

allegation that he violated Condition 11 where the State failed to present a sufficient claim to 

support revocation of his conditional release on that basis. The trial court granted respondent’s 

motion. 

¶ 6 The State presented three witnesses at the revocation hearing: Stephen Glazier, 

respondent’s conditional release agent; Rhonda Meacham, respondent’s conditional release 

treatment provider; and Dr. Weitl, who had been conducting periodic reexaminations of 

respondent for eight years. Prior to the hearing, respondent attempted to bar Dr. Weitl’s 

testimony, arguing she had no relevant admissible opinion because her opinion differed from 

the statutory standard for conditional release and she inappropriately destroyed the notes she 

took during her consultation with Meacham and interview with respondent. Respondent’s 

motion to bar Dr. Weitl from testifying was denied. 

¶ 7 At the hearing, Glazier testified that, as respondent’s conditional release agent, he 

monitored and supervised respondent while on conditional release through home contact visits 

and surveillance. Glazier used a written log to memorialize his contacts with respondent and 

wrote violation reports when respondent violated a condition of his release. Glazier stated that 

respondent was assigned an apartment by DHS and was limited to home confinement, like all 

SVPs, when first released. 

¶ 8 Glazier testified that he completed a violation report on September 4, 2013, as a result of 

respondent violating Condition 17 of his release plan. More specifically, Condition 17 

prohibited respondent from having any contact with a minor without prior approval, yet 

respondent sent a homemade birthday card to the daughter of his former girlfriend, Takika 

Winston. Prior to respondent’s conditional release, he was explicitly told that he could not 

have any contact with Takika’s daughter. Takika’s daughter was believed to be 16 years old 

when respondent sent her the birthday card. Respondent told Glazier that he placed the card in 

the mailbox as he exited his apartment to meet Glazier. Respondent acknowledged that he was 

“not supposed” to mail the card.

¶ 9 Glazier additionally testified that, on October 20, 2014, he completed another violation 

report, resulting from three condition violations. The first was for a violation of Condition 16, 

i.e., unauthorized contact outside of the treatment setting with a sex offender. Glazier 

explained that, while conducting an unannounced home visit, he was standing outside 

respondent’s apartment when he heard respondent’s voice engaged in a conversation. Glazier 

knocked on the apartment door, but respondent failed to answer. Glazier proceeded to call 

respondent two times without success. Glazier continued knocking on the apartment door until 

respondent eventually opened the door. After looking through respondent’s apartment and 

failing to find any occupants, Glazier inquired whether respondent had been on the phone. 

Respondent said no. Respondent acknowledged that he had been speaking through the window 

to another SVP named Troy K. in the adjacent building. Respondent initially reported that he 

spoke to Troy K. a few times; however, after further questioning, respondent admitted that he 

had been speaking to Troy K. twice a day for a few months. According to respondent, he and 

Troy K. engaged in “general conversation.” They did not plan anything illegal or commit any 

sex offenses. Glazier testified that respondent previously requested authorization through the 
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program to speak to Troy K., but was denied approval to do so. Respondent acknowledged he 

was not supposed to speak to Troy K. outside the treatment setting, yet he did anyway. Glazier 

stated that he was responsible for transporting respondent and Troy K. to treatment because 

they were on restricted movement or home confinement. Glazier drove them together to 

treatment, as well as to the grocery store and laundromat. 

¶ 10 Glazier testified that the second violation included in the October 20, 2014, report was for 

respondent’s violation of Condition 27 because he failed to include his communications with 

Troy K. in his daily log of activity. Glazier described the daily event log as a log kept by the 

individual on conditional release providing the details of his or her daily activities, including 

finances, communications (in person and by telephone), reading habits, and television 

programs watched. The daily logs were collected and reviewed on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. 

Glazier explained that the purpose of the daily logs was transparency by the SVP with the 

conditional release team. According to Glazier, respondent only logged two dates, October 10, 

2014, and October 15, 2014, for having communicated with Troy K. 

¶ 11 According to Glazier, the third conditional release violation included in the October 20, 

2014, violation report was for Condition 28, which required respondent to comply with all 

special conditions imposed by the conditional release agent and DHS management team to 

restrict him from high-risk situations and access to potential victims. Respondent violated the 

condition by communicating with Troy K., despite Glazier’s prior instruction to not have 

outside contact with the fellow SVP. As a result of the conditional release violations, 

respondent’s windows were covered on the side of the apartment adjacent to Troy K.’s 

building. Thereafter, in January 2015, respondent was relocated to another apartment. 

¶ 12 Glazier further testified that, on April 25, 2015, he wrote a letter of admonishment resulting 

from a phone message he received from respondent. In the message, respondent informed 

Glazier that he was in his kitchen with the door open to get fresh air, which had been approved, 

when a neighbor knocked on his door. The female neighbor asked if she could walk through 

respondent’s apartment to get to her front door because she was locked out. In the letter of 

admonishment, Glazier cited Condition 50 because respondent did not have prior authorization 

to have anyone in his apartment. Glazier added that respondent called him several times after 

leaving the initial voicemail. Respondent did not attempt to touch the neighbor. Glazier 

explained that respondent received a letter of admonishment and not a violation because he 

immediately reported the interaction. 

¶ 13 Meacham testified that she was a licensed clinical social worker and sex offender treatment 

provider and evaluator. Meacham provided respondent’s individual and group therapy while 

he was on conditional release. Meacham was deemed an expert in sex offender treatment. 

¶ 14 Meacham testified that respondent admitted violating a condition of his release in 

September 2013 by contacting Takika’s minor daughter. Respondent reported that he sent the 

minor Christmas and birthday cards, as well as a letter. According to Meacham, she had “many 

conversations” (between 5 and 10) in which respondent was told that he could not contact 

Takika’s daughter.

¶ 15 Meacham also discussed events that occurred in June, July, and August 2014. The first 

interaction involved a woman who allegedly invited respondent to be her roommate. The 

second interaction involved a woman that respondent had contact with in connection with his 

medical transportation services. Respondent reported to Meacham that he rode in the front seat 

of the vehicle while being transported. The female driver purchased ice cream for respondent 
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and put her hand on respondent’s leg while they shared conversations about their families. 

Respondent also shared information regarding his participation in the program with the driver. 

According to Meacham, respondent withheld reporting the incident for a “period of time” and 

did not include the interactions in his daily logs. Meacham testified that the boundaries 

between respondent and the female driver were inappropriate. Later, respondent further 

informed Meacham that, during another transport with the same female driver, she disclosed 

that she was a victim of sexual abuse. Respondent then shared his own history of victimization 

with the driver. After that interaction, respondent requested that he only receive male medical 

transport drivers. Despite his request, the next time he needed to be transported, the same 

female driver arrived. Respondent told Meacham that the pair continued having personal 

conversations during the transport. The third interaction involved a woman at Target. 

Respondent told Meacham that he would become excited when he knew that he was going to 

Target, hoping he would “run into” the woman. Meacham testified that respondent’s behaviors 

were concerning because he lacked the ability to establish boundaries regardless of the 

consequences. Meacham added that she was concerned with respondent’s decision to withhold 

information from his care providers. 

¶ 16 Meacham further testified that respondent engaged in concerning behavior in September 

2014. At that time, respondent reported his observations of other individuals in his apartment 

complex to the building management. Respondent “seemed to have a great deal of information 

about some of the tenants in the building.” This was concerning in light of respondent’s 

voyeurism and exhibitionism diagnoses, as well as in terms of respondent’s own safety 

because he was witnessing alleged criminal behavior within the building. In fact, in October 

2014, respondent reported witnessing a drug transaction through his window. He called the 

police and “watched everything unfold.” 

¶ 17 Meacham added that, also in October 2014, she learned respondent had been 

communicating with another client in the conditional release program who was housed in the 

adjacent building. The pair had been communicating once or twice per day for a “couple of 

months” through the window. Meacham testified that the communications were violations of 

respondent’s conditional release. According to Meacham, the pair had general conversations 

about their day and what they watched on television; however, they had a couple of “fairly 

negative conversations about their conditional release agents.” 

¶ 18 Respondent additionally reported to Meacham that, in October 2014, he had an interaction 

with a nurse at a doctor’s appointment. Respondent believed the nurse “gave him a lingering 

handshake.” According to Meacham, respondent interpreted the handshake as an “attraction.” 

He responded by telling the nurse she was attractive. 

¶ 19 Meacham further testified that, in December 2014, respondent reported that he walked 

through his apartment naked after showering and passed two pictures of former girlfriends 

while doing so. When he walked by the pictures, respondent asked “what they were looking 

at.” Respondent stated that he masturbated to fantasies of the interactions. Meacham testified 

that respondent did not include the sexual activity in his sexuality logs, which she required 

respondent to keep. Meacham clarified that the sexuality logs were not a separate condition in 

his conditional release plan but, rather, were part of the condition that required him to fully 

participate in treatment. 

¶ 20 Also, in December 2014, respondent had an interaction after undergoing hernia surgery. 

When he woke from the surgery, he discovered his genital area had been shaved and reported 
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wondering “whether or not the nurse who shaved him had liked what she saw.” Respondent 

additionally reported that, when asked by a hospital nurse if she could view his surgical 

stitches, he fantasized that she was asking to see his penis. Respondent also lifted his clothes to 

reveal his stitches to group members and the conditional release agents. Meacham testified that 

respondent asked if she wanted to see respondent’s stitches. Meacham believed respondent’s 

behaviors served to reinforce his interest in exhibitionism. 

¶ 21 Meacham opined that respondent was in his “offending cycle,” meaning “a progressive 

build up in thought and behavior and emotion typically that if not intervened on it could result 

in reoffense.” Meacham did not believe respondent was aware he was in his offending cycle. 

Meacham discontinued her work with respondent in May 2015 due to other responsibilities. As 

a result, respondent was transitioned to a different therapist. His group therapy sessions no 

longer consisted of only SVPs, but also included individuals on probation and parole. 

Meacham described respondent’s progress in the program as “variable.” Meacham explained 

that, initially when he was released, there was a period of stability and progress; however, 

around June 2014, respondent started to decline. Meacham observed no progress from that 

time until May 2015. Meacham also described a shift in respondent’s willingness to share 

information close in time to when a given event occurred. 

¶ 22 On cross-examination, Meacham described respondent as “a verbally active participant” in 

group therapy. Meacham testified that she was unaware of the content of the cards respondent 

sent to Takika’s minor daughter. Meacham stated there was no evidence he sent unauthorized 

mail to a minor after that incident. Meacham additionally testified that there was no indication 

respondent touched or made inappropriate comments to the female medical transport driver, 

nor was there any evidence respondent attacked, touched, flashed, or made sexual comments to 

the female Target employee. Meacham stated there was no indication that respondent became 

sexually aroused by watching his neighbors. 

¶ 23 Dr. Weitl testified next. Dr. Weitl was qualified as an expert in clinical psychology in the 

evaluation and risk analysis of sex offenders. Dr. Weitl testified that she reevaluated 

respondent on an annual basis as required by the Act. In her initial evaluation in 2008, Dr. 

Weitl learned respondent’s sexually violent history. The first incident of record was in 1977 

wherein respondent committed a sexual offense against a 15-year-old girl that was babysitting 

respondent’s brother. Respondent was 20 years old at the time. In 1981, respondent was 

convicted of public indecency after he was found peeping over a bathroom stall at a 

10-year-old girl and an 11-year-old girl while he had his pants down. In 1982, respondent was 

convicted of attempted rape by force involving a 14- or 15-year-old girl. In 1984, respondent 

was convicted of aggravated battery wherein he broke into a woman’s home, dragged her to 

the bathroom, forced her to undress, banged her head on the floor or sink, commanded her to 

get into the bathtub, and then he fled. In 1986, respondent was found to be a sexually 

dangerous person after 14 charges were filed against him, including placing obscene phone 

calls, exposing himself to minors, exposing himself outside of a store, and masturbating in a 

parking lot. Dr. Weitl testified that respondent was discharged from the sexually dangerous 

persons program in 2003. However, approximately three months later, respondent was 

convicted of criminal sexual abuse in relation to groping an 11-year-old girl’s buttocks while 

in a grocery store. Respondent attempted to pay off the child’s father to not report the incident 

and attempted to flee. While in prison following his conviction, respondent exposed himself to 

female correctional officers. 
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¶ 24 Dr. Weitl testified that she recommended respondent for conditional release in August 

2012. According to Dr. Weitl, respondent “appeared from [her] treatment notes and from [her] 

interview with him to have gained benefit from treatment. He had a long pattern of treatment 

before that. He was in the final phases of treatment at the facility. So [she] recommended him 

for release.”

¶ 25 Dr. Weitl stated, however, that she wrote a report in June 2015 upon which the State based 

its underlying petition to revoke respondent’s conditional release. Prior to writing the report, 

Dr. Weitl conducted her annual reevaluation, which consisted of reviewing the records from 

the case management team, the therapist’s notes, completed assessments, polygraphs, and 

penile plethysmograph examinations, which measure sexual arousal, and conducting 

interviews with Meacham and respondent. Dr. Weitl testified that, as a result of her 

reevaluation, she recommended that respondent required “more supervision and more intense 

therapy than could be provided in the community and that he be returned to the facility.” 

Specifically, in her June 2015 report, Dr. Weitl opined that respondent’s “progress in treatment 

[wa]s insufficient for him to continue to be safely managed and treated in the community on 

Conditional Release and he should be returned to the DHS [facility] for secure care and intense 

sex offender specific treatment.” Dr. Weitl explained at trial that respondent was “engaging in 

high risk behaviors, in his cycle and not recognizing it, and ready to reoffend. [Respondent] 

was not being honest. There were some serious concerns about what exactly he was doing. 

There had been some polygraph failures and then he would tell a little bit. So there were some 

serious indicators that [respondent] was not safe out there.” Dr. Weitl added that respondent 

was not following the conditions of his release and disclosed only limited details of his 

violations after failing multiple polygraph tests. Moreover, after returning to the secure 

facility, respondent still did not admit the extent of his conditional release violations. Dr. Weitl 

opined that respondent continued to be an SVP and “that he’s substantially probable to commit 

another act of sexual violence if not confined to a secure facility.”

¶ 26 Dr. Weitl continued by stating that, since having completed the June 2015 report, she had 

reviewed respondent’s DHS reports through February 2016. Based on what she had learned, 

Dr. Weitl did not change her opinion from that rendered in the June 2015 report. Dr. Weitl 

elaborated that, in that time period, respondent had not addressed his sexual deviance and 

provided “extremely vague” disclosures in his group therapy. Dr. Weitl acknowledged that 

respondent had not had any “tickets for sexual misconduct” since he had been back in the 

secured setting. Dr. Weitl additionally acknowledged a therapist’s monthly progress note from 

October 13, 2015, which provided that respondent had “processed the violations and warnings 

that ultimately led to his return from conditional release.” Dr. Weitl, however, dismissed the 

therapist’s note as “a summary” that had been “over-generaliz[ed].” Dr. Weitl also 

acknowledged that respondent passed his most recent polygraph exam administered in July 

2015. 

¶ 27 At the close of the hearing, respondent moved for a directed finding. The motion was 

granted as to the allegation related to sending a card to Takika’s minor daughter. The 

remainder of the motion was denied. Respondent then moved to strike Dr. Weitl’s testimony, 

arguing the State failed to disclose her opinion in its Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213 (eff. Jan. 

1, 2007) interrogatory response. The trial court denied respondent’s motion without providing 

a basis for its ruling. 
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¶ 28 On April 11, 2016, the trial court found respondent had violated conditions of his release 

and, therefore, his conditional release should be revoked. In so finding, the court stated: 

“The statute requires that at this hearing that the defendant’s conditional release 

may be revoked, *** it’s discretionary. After hearing that any rule or *** condition of 

release has been violated, or that the safety of others requires a conditional release be 

revoked. *** 

 So [I] think the statute requires some *** imminent danger to somebody ***. At 

least that’s the way I’m going to take this. I don’t think the State has shown that, some 

imminent danger to a specific person. 

 On the other side, that is that any rule or condition of release has been violated, *** 

I don’t see there being any issue, there have been several which have been violated. 

With regard to the woman in the apartment building, I *** cannot see revoking 

anyone’s conditional release on that set of facts, particularly where he calls the case 

agent while she’s in the apartment. I mean there’s got to be some consideration for a 

little human decency here, I suppose. 

 Looking out the window, same thing. I mean what else has he got to do, watch 

television, I suppose. There’s no evidence that he was indulging in his voyeurism out 

the window, at least I’ll give him the benefit of the doubt on that.

With the polygraph, same thing. Sitting here now, I can’t conceive—I suppose if 

you gave me some time I can conceive of some situation where I would revoke it on the 

basis of a response to a polygraph, I suppose, but this isn’t it, that’s for sure, 

so—especially if he’s a liar about how he was feeling about the polygraph, he’s a pretty 

good one ***. *** 

Now, [d]efense has said that, you know, everything’s in treatment, which quite 

frankly seems a wee bit of a stretch to me. *** 

*** I don’t think it’s true for the defendant about being in treatment while he’s 

riding in a cab or sitting in the doctor’s office waiting to go in or talking out his window 

with someone else who is sexually violent. 

 Again, your argument about how he didn’t act [out] about any of these, I think the 

State is correct, the whole purpose of this is to prevent him from acting out. It would be 

pitifully redundant to say he’s got to be acting out before you can do it because then 

you might as well just prosecute him for the new crime and be done with it. 

 So there we have it. Of the violations—I think there is evidence both borne by his 

statements and the fact that he admitted these things, albeit somewhat reluctantly, 

according to the testimony his contact log including the deficiencies in the 

masturbation and talking to the *** other person who was adjudicated sexually violent 

through his window for an extended period of time, these things are violations, and the 

State has shown that by clear and convincing evidence. 

 Now, the question then becomes are these actions sufficient to revoke the 

defendant’s conditional release? Every witness who testified, the case agent, his 

treatment provider, as well as Dr. Weitl has expressed concern that [respondent] is in 

his cycle for re-offending at various times and not recognizing it. And this is—they 

have all expressed a concern for it, and I do not feel that this Court is in a position to 

ignore the testimony regarding this concern for the reason that I alluded to further. It’s 
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not that he’s done something, it’s the fact that they are concerned that he is going to do 

something because he doesn’t recognize he’s in this cycle.

 I must confess when I first heard the testimony regarding him masturbating 

improperly, I was a little bewildered, but having had it explained to me, I can see where 

that type of masturbation would be—they would be concerned about it, because there is 

an element of exhibitionism with it, particularly if he’s pretending like the two picked 

females, their pictures are watching him, and that is one of his diagnoses, that is one of 

his problems, and I can see where they would be concerned about that. 

 So in view of the fact that all the witnesses expressed this concern, I feel it is 

necessary that [respondent’s] conditional release be revoked and that he be remanded 

to the Treatment Detention Facility. 

That’s not to say, [respondent], I don’t want to leave you with the belief there is no 

hope. The fact that I think you probably made some progress or at least potentially 

made some progress since you were back, and I would not be surprised to find that they 

were recommending you for conditional release at some time in the future, and that’s 

not to say that I would not be disposed to grant it based upon appropriate testimony.” 

¶ 29 Thereafter, respondent filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s April 11, 2016, order. 

After hearing arguments by the parties, the trial court denied respondent’s motion. This appeal 

followed. 

¶ 30 ANALYSIS 

¶ 31 The Act defines an SVP as a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 

and who is dangerous because he “suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially 

probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.” 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 

2004). The State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is 

an SVP; “once the State does so, the respondent is committed to the custody of DHS for 

control, care, and treatment ‘until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent 

person,’ which could hypothetically only end upon death.” In re Commitment of Rendon, 2014 

IL App (1st) 123090, ¶ 21 (quoting 725 ILCS 207/35, 40(a) (West 2010)). After an individual 

is found to be an SVP and is institutionalized in a secure setting to receive treatment for his or 

her mental disorders, he or she is “reexamined” on a yearly basis to determine whether he or 

she qualifies for conditional release. 725 ILCS 207/50, 55 (West 2004). More specifically, the 

relevant statute provides that the respondent is reevaluated “for the purpose of determining 

whether the person has made sufficient progress to be conditionally released or discharged.” 

Id. § 55(a). In 2012, the statute was amended to state that a respondent is reevaluated “for the 

purpose of determining whether: (1) the person has made sufficient progress in treatment to be 

conditionally released and (2) whether the person’s condition has so changed since the most 

recent periodic reexamination *** that he or she is no longer a sexually violent person.” Pub. 

Act 97-1075 (eff. Aug. 24, 2012). 

¶ 32 If an individual is granted conditional release, the SVP remains within the custody and 

control of the DHS and is subject to the conditions set by the court and the DHS. 725 ILCS 

207/40(b)(4), (b)(5) (West 2012). These conditions require a respondent to attend and fully 

participate in assessment, treatment, and behavior monitoring, including, but not limited to, 

medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment specific to sex offending to the extent 

appropriate and based on DHS recommendations. Id. § 40(b)(5)(F); Rendon, 2014 IL App 
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(1st) 123090, ¶ 25. Moreover, while on conditional release, a respondent must comply with 

“all other special conditions that the [DHS] may impose,” restricting him or her from 

“high-risk situations” and limiting “access or potential victims.” 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(5)(BB) 

(West 2012). 

¶ 33 If there is an allegation by the DHS “that a released person has violated any condition or 

rule, or that the safety of others requires that conditional release be revoked, he or she may be 

taken into custody under the rules of the [DHS].” Id. § 40(b)(4). In the proceedings following 

the filing of a petition to revoke a respondent’s conditional release, the State must prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that revocation of conditional release is required. Id.

¶ 34 As an initial matter, the parties dispute the applicable standard of review. Respondent 

contends a trial court’s ruling on a petition to revoke conditional release should not be 

disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent cites Rendon, 

2014 IL App (1st) 123090, ¶ 32, for support. In contrast, the State contends there is a two-part 

standard of review. The State agrees with respondent insomuch as the trial court’s factual 

findings regarding whether the respondent violated the conditions of his release is a decision 

that should not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, 

the State argues the trial court’s finding as to whether, given the violation, the respondent’s 

conditional release should be revoked requires an exercise of the court’s discretion and should 

not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. The State cites Rendon and section 

40(b)(4) of the Act as support. 

¶ 35 We agree with the State that our review of whether the trial court erred in finding 

respondent violated the conditions of his release and whether his conditional release should be 

revoked as a result requires a two-step analysis. The trial court’s factual finding that the State 

presented clear and convincing evidence to establish respondent violated the conditions of his 

release will not be disturbed unless the finding was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Id. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite 

conclusion is clearly evident or the trial court’s conclusion is “unreasonable, arbitrary, and not 

based upon the evidence presented.” In re Commitment of Trulock, 2012 IL App (3d) 110550, 

¶ 43. However, once a basis for revocation of conditional release has been established, whether 

to commit a person to a secure facility or to continue conditional release is a matter within the 

discretion of the trial court. The Act provides “[i]f the court determines *** that any rule or 

condition of release has been violated, *** it may revoke the order for conditional release and 

order that the released person be placed in an appropriate institution.” (Emphasis added.) 725 

ILCS 207/40(b)(4) (West 2012). The permissive language employed by the statute refers to a 

discretionary power, which the court may exercise or not as it chooses. People v. Ousley, 235 

Ill. 2d 299, 313 (2009) (citing People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, 51 (2005)). A trial court’s 

decision following an exercise of its discretion will not be overturned absent an abuse of that 

discretion. In re Detention of Ehrlich, 2012 IL App (1st) 102300, ¶ 75 (“[w]e review the circuit 

court’s decision to commit a person to a secure facility or to conditional release for an abuse of 

discretion”); In re Detention of Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d 585, 608-09 (2007) (applying an 

abuse of discretion analysis to assess a trial court’s decision to commit the respondent to a 

secure facility). An abuse of discretion will be found only if the trial court’s decision was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or no reasonable person would adopt the same view. In re Detention of 

Ehrlich, 2012 IL App (1st) 102300, ¶ 75. 
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¶ 36 Respondent contends that the trial court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence where the conditions the court deemed had been violated were not current, where the 

court’s finding that respondent was in his “cycle” was not supported by the record, and where 

the record demonstrated he had shown signs of improvement at the time of the hearing. With 

regard to the condition violations, respondent argues that his contact with Troy K., the other 

SVP, occurred nine months before the State filed its original petition seeking to revoke his 

conditional release. As a result, the condition violation was not current. In addition, respondent 

argues that his conversations with Troy K. were of no concern where they lacked objectionable 

substance. Respondent further argues that his masturbating fantasies in connection with the 

photographs of his former girlfriends and his failure to memorialize the incidents in his 

sexuality log did not provide a basis for revocation of his conditional release. According to 

respondent, the masturbating incidents were not current violations where they took place seven 

months before the filing of the State’s original petition to revoke his conditional release. 

Moreover, respondent argues that his conditional release plan did not contain a condition 

requiring him to participate in sexuality logs. 

¶ 37 We find the trial court’s determination that there was clear and convincing evidence 

respondent violated the conditions of his release was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Respondent does not dispute that he spoke to Troy K. in violation of Condition 16 of 

his conditional release plan. Respondent merely disputes the magnitude of the violation in light 

of the time that passed, since the violation was committed and the lack of dangerous content in 

the conversations. The Act, however, does not contain a time element establishing how long a 

violation remains eligible to support revocation of conditional release. See 725 ILCS 

207/40(b)(4) (West 2012). Moreover, respondent’s conditional release plan did not provide an 

exception for conversing with fellow SVPs if the content of the conversations was 

“innocuous.” Instead, Condition 16 merely stated that respondent could not have contact with 

any SVP outside of a therapeutic setting without prior consent. There is no dispute that 

respondent spoke to Troy K. twice per day for “a couple of months” outside the therapeutic 

setting, namely, through the windows of their adjacent apartment buildings. Additionally, the 

record is clear that respondent did not have authorization to converse with Troy K. in that 

setting. In fact, Glazier testified that he expressly denied respondent’s request to speak to other 

SVPs. Furthermore, the evidence was clear that respondent failed to log his conversations with 

Troy K. in his daily log in violation of Condition 27 of his release. According to Glazier, 

respondent merely logged two of the conversations at issue. 

¶ 38 The State also established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated 

Condition 28 of his release by failing to log the masturbating episodes he engaged in while 

viewing pictures of his former girlfriends. The State acknowledges that respondent’s 

conditional release plan did not include an express condition requiring him to maintain a 

sexuality log. Meacham, however, testified that the sexuality log was a condition she required 

as his therapist. As a result, respondent’s failure to submit the masturbation episodes in his 

sexuality log was a violation of Condition 28, which required respondent to comply with all 

conditions imposed by his conditional release agent and DHS case management team to 

restrict high-risk situations and access to potential victims. 

¶ 39 Where the State provided clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated his 

conditional release plan, the State was not also required to prove that “the safety of others” 

required revocation of his conditional release. Contrary to respondent’s argument, the trial 
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court determined that respondent violated the conditions of his release and then exercised its 

discretion in considering whether the condition violations required that his conditional release 

be revoked. The language of the statute is clear that “[i]f the [DHS] alleges that a released 

person has violated any condition or rule, or that the safety of others requires that conditional 

release be revoked, he *** may be taken into custody under the rules of the [DHS].” (Emphasis 

added.) 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(4) (West 2012). Accordingly, a respondent’s conditional release 

may be revoked either if (1) there is a violation of a condition or (2) the safety of others 

requires revocation. Because we have found the trial court did not commit manifest error in 

determining respondent violated his conditional release plan, we need not undergo an 

assessment of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish respondent was a danger to the 

safety of others. 

¶ 40 We next turn to the second part of the analysis, namely, whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in finding that respondent’s conditional release should be revoked. As stated, the 

Act provides that “[i]f the court determines after hearing that any rule or condition of release 

has been violated, *** it may revoke the order for conditional release and order that the 

released person be placed in an appropriate institution until the person is discharged from the 

commitment under *** this Act or until again placed on conditional release under *** this 

Act.” Id. The Act is silent on the factors to consider in recommitting an individual following 

the revocation of his or her conditional release and we have not found any cases on point. See 

725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2012). However, in considering whether an individual shall be 

committed to an institutionalized setting or granted conditional release, the relevant factors 

provided by the Act are “the nature and circumstances of the behavior that was the basis of the 

allegation in the petition ***, the person’s mental history and present mental condition, and 

what arrangements are available to ensure the person has access to and will participate in 

necessary treatment.” Id. §§ 40(b)(2), 60(d). Without additional, explicit guidance from the 

Act, we find these factors to be relevant in assessing whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. 

¶ 41 It is clear from the record that the trial court considered all of the evidence and that its 

determination was well supported. Glazier and Meacham discussed the pattern of respondent’s 

behavior constituting violations of his conditional release. Critically, Glazier, Meacham, and 

Dr. Weitl expressed concern over respondent’s consistent failure to report his offending 

behaviors in his logs, on his polygraphs, and in his individual and group therapy sessions. The 

record demonstrated that, generally, respondent reluctantly and vaguely reported the behaviors 

only after he failed polygraph tests. In assessing the circumstances of the behaviors underlying 

the State’s allegations, the trial court did consider that a number of the behaviors did not 

support findings of condition violations. The trial court additionally considered evidence 

demonstrating that respondent had made some progress since his readmission into the DHS 

facility. The court, however, relied on the expert opinions of Meacham and Dr. Weitl in 

providing that respondent was in a cycle of reoffense without recognizing his repeated 

engagement in high-risk behaviors.1 We reject respondent’s request for this court to reweigh 

the evidence. See In re Commitment of Jackson, 2017 IL App (3d) 170031, ¶ 29. In light of 

 

1We acknowledge that the trial court was mistaken in stating, in its findings, that Glazier also 

testified regarding respondent’s reoffense cycle. The trial court’s mistake does not invalidate or call 

into question the testimony of Meacham and Dr. Weitl. 
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respondent’s consistent lack of transparency and express refusal to participate in the conditions 

of his release, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking respondent’s 

conditional release and recommitting him to the institutionalized setting. 

¶ 42 Respondent next contends that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Weitl’s expert 

testimony. More specifically, respondent argues it was an abuse of the court’s discretion to 

allow Dr. Weitl to testify to an opinion based on a nonstatutory standard. Respondent 

additionally argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Weitl to testify, 

despite her failure to maintain her notes from interviews with Meacham and respondent. 

Respondent finally argues the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Weitl’s opinion testimony 

where it was not previously disclosed in conjunction with the Rule 213 written interrogatory. 

¶ 43 The admissibility of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Thompson v. Gordon, 221 Ill. 2d 414, 428 (2006). “A person will be allowed to testify as an 

expert if his experience and qualifications afford him knowledge that is not common to 

laypersons, and where his testimony will aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusions.” Id. 

¶ 44 Respondent challenges the admission of Dr. Weitl’s testimony as an expert where she 

testified to a “made up” standard used to determine that respondent’s conditional release 

should be revoked. Respondent specifically takes issue with Dr. Weitl’s opinion, as written in 

her June 2015 report, that respondent’s “progress in treatment [wa]s insufficient for him to 

continue to be safely managed and treated in the community on conditional release.”

¶ 45 We find there was no abuse of discretion in admitting Dr. Weitl’s expert opinion. There is 

no dispute that Dr. Weitl had the experience and qualifications providing her knowledge 

uncommon to laypeople. Additionally, there is no dispute that her knowledge and 

qualifications aided the trial court in reaching its conclusion. Moreover, the record was clear 

that Dr. Weitl was familiar with respondent’s case after having performed eight annual 

reevaluations of his SVP status. The dispute is whether Dr. Weitl’s opinion was relevant 

because she used nonstatutory language in rendering that opinion. Respondent does not cite 

any cases, and we are unaware of any, that require an expert to constrain his or her opinion to 

precise statutory language. Additionally, contrary to respondent’s argument, there is nothing in 

the record to suggest that Dr. Weitl created a new standard for determining whether revocation 

was required. Instead, Dr. Weitl’s June 2015 report and her testimony at the revocation hearing 

consistently complied with the statutory requirement for the revocation of conditional release. 

More specifically, Dr. Weitl, both in her report and at the hearing, repeatedly discussed 

respondent’s condition violations, which formed the basis of his conditional release 

revocation. See 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(4) (West 2012). In addition to those findings, Dr. Weitl 

expressed her opinion that respondent’s “progress in treatment [wa]s insufficient for him to 

continue to be safely managed and treated in the community on conditional release.” 

Considering the challenged opinion in light of the testimony directly establishing the statutory 

requirement for revocation, we find respondent failed to establish the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting Dr. Weitl’s expert opinion.

¶ 46 We additionally find respondent cannot demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in 

allowing Dr. Weitl to testify regarding her interviews of Meacham and respondent where she 

failed to maintain her notes from those interviews. Dr. Weitl addressed her process following 

reexamination, such that she destroyed the notes from her interviews once she drafted her 

written reexamination report. Dr. Weitl clarified that all of the information from her notes was 

included in the report. Respondent fails to argue what, if any, relevant information may have 
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been contained in the doctor’s notes in addition to that which appeared in her report. To the 

extent respondent wished to, and did, challenge Dr. Weitl on the interviews and the veracity of 

her report, the expert was available for cross-examination. The supreme court adopted Federal 

Rule of Evidence 705 in Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981). In January 2011, the Illinois 

Rules of Evidence became effective, including Illinois Rule of Evidence 705, which is nearly 

identical to the federal version. See Ill. R. Evid. 705 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The rule provides, 

“ ‘[t]he expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor 

without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise.’ ” 

Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 705). The supreme court explained, “[u]nder 

Rule 705 the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-examination to elicit the 

facts underlying the expert opinion.” Id. We, therefore, find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing Dr. Weitl to testify about the challenged interviews. 

¶ 47 We finally conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the State did 

not violate Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213.When asked by the State whether the safety of 

others required the revocation of respondent’s conditional release, Dr. Weitl responded in the 

affirmative. Respondent argues Dr. Weitl’s response was a violation of Rule 213 because the 

State did not disclose that testimony. 

¶ 48 When using an independent expert witness, Rule 213(f)(2) requires the party to identify the 

subjects on which the witness will testify and the opinions the party expects to elicit. Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 213(f)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2007). “An answer is sufficient if it gives reasonable notice of the 

testimony, taking into account the limitations on the party’s knowledge of the facts known by 

and opinions held by the witness.” Id.

¶ 49 The State’s Rule 213 interrogatory provided that Dr. Weitl’s “reports have previously been 

disclosed to respondent containing her opinions and the bases for her opinions. ***. She will 

be testifying in the areas of forensic psychology as well as the evaluation and treatment of sex 

offenders. Dr. Weitl may offer an opinion that she believes respondent’s conditional release 

should be revoked.” As stated, Dr. Weitl’s June 2015 report provided that respondent’s 

“progress in treatment [wa]s insufficient for him to continue to be safely managed and treated 

in the community on conditional release.” Moreover, in both its initial and amended revocation 

petitions, the State alleged, “in accordance with the opinion of Dr. Weitl, the safety of others in 

the community requires that Respondent’s conditional release be revoked.” We conclude the 

State sufficiently disclosed Dr. Weitl’s testimony, such that respondent was given reasonable 

notice of the testimony. We, therefore, find there was no abuse of discretion. 

¶ 50 CONCLUSION 

¶ 51 We affirm the judgment of the trial court in revoking respondent’s conditional release.

¶ 52 Affirmed.