* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MONA WATSON CLARK, in her individual capactiy and as Executor of the Estate of Lewis M. Watson, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; et al., Defendants - Appellees. No. 11-17311D.C. No. 1:06-cv-00544-MEARLP
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Marvin E. Aspen, Senior District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 11, 2013 ** Honolulu, Hawaii Before: FARRIS, D.W. NELSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. Mona Clark submitted several FOIA requests to the IRS and the Tax Division of the Department of Justice seeking information related to the estate of 

# FILED
JUN 19 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 her great uncle. Clark filed suit in distri ct court to enforce her FOIA requests and alleged that the IRS disclosed tax informati on to an unauthorized third party. After granting partial summary judgment to both parties, the district court allowed a portion of the unauthorized disclosure clai m to proceed to trial, after which the court ruled against Clark. We have juri sdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. The searches ultimately conducted by the IRS and the Tax Division of the Department of Justice were “reasona bly calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Zemansky v. EPA , 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Clark’s arguments on appeal are numerous and without merit; it is not necessary to address each individually. Cl ark simply fails to recognize that “the issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate .” Id. (citation omitted). The district court correctly dismissed Clark’s claim that the IRS disclosed confidential information from the Watson es tate to an unauthorized individual in connection with its examination of the es tate’s 1981 tax return. To proceed with her claim pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7431, Clark had to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether: (1) there was a disclosure of return3 information; (2) the disclosure was unauthorized in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6103; and (3) the disclosure was made negligently or knowingly. See Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States , 580 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2009). The only evidence Clark offered was the testimony of her expert witn ess, which consisted of his “plausible” explanations for various notations made by the IRS. However, his conclusion that “the IRS disclosed confidential taxpa yer information [regarding the 1981 tax return] to an unauthorized third party” was not supported by any evidence; it was merely an allegation based on what po ssibly could have happened during the course of events that he described. The expert also undercut his allegation by stating that “[i]nformation that is contained in the . . . records [that Clark should access with new searches] will reveal wh ether confidential ta xpayer information was disclosed to an unauthorized third party.” Clark did not put forth evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.The district court properly dismissed the remainder of Clark’s unauthorizeddisclosure claim as time-barred. Section 7431(d) contains a statute of limitations that requires claims to be brought “within 2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff.” 26 U.S.C. § 7431(d). “[A]n action pursuant to section 7431(d) must be filed within two years of the date of discovery of the supposedly improper disclosure, not the date when the plai ntiff realizes that a disclosure was4 unauthorized.” Aloe Vera , 580 F.3d at 872. Clark received a phone call in 1990 from her attorney who told her that he received a tax refund check from an attorney affiliated with the former executor of th e Watson estate. Clark knew at that time that he was no longer the executor of the es tate. The information contained in the check constituted disclosures—for exampl e, the amount of the refund—and Clark was told that this information had b een received by someone who she knew was not authorized to receive it. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2), (8). Clark had notice of the violation in 1990. Her claim in 2006 was not timely, and the district court correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction. See Aloe Vera , 580 F.3d at 872. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Clark’s motion to recuse Judge Aspen. Clark’s first argument was that Judge Aspen’s assignment from out of circuit warranted his recusal. Clark raised this argument a year after the case had been reassigned to Judge As pen and after the case had gone to trial. Clark did not raise her objection with “reasonable promptness,” so we do not entertain it. Preston v. United States , 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991). Clark’s second argument was that Judge Aspen’s fina ncial interest in an entity called BSV required his recusal. The district court acted within its discretion when it found that Judge Aspen had “no fina ncial interest in the outcome of” Clark’s dispute with5 the IRS and rejected Clark’s argument on that basis. Herrington v. Sonoma Cnty. , 834 F.2d 1488, 1503 (9th Cir. 1987). AFFIRMED.