2021 IL App (4th) 190863-U 

NO. 4-19-0863 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

JAMES TAYLOR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

VICTOR CALLOWAY, Warden, Danville Correctional 

Center, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Vermilion County 

No. 13MR241 

Honorable 

Mark S. Goodwin, 

Judge Presiding. 

 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Harris and Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding plaintiff’s constitutional claims are 

(1) procedurally forfeited by his failure to include them in his pro se petition for 

writ of habeas corpus and (2) improper grounds for habeas corpus relief.

¶ 2 Plaintiff, James Taylor, appeals from the trial court’s November 2019 order 

dismissing his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Habeas Corpus Act (Act)

(735 ILCS 5/10-101 et seq. (West 2012)).

¶ 3 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court denied him his constitutional right to due 

process when it dismissed his petition for habeas corpus and subsequent motion to amend 

without “fully apprising the parties on plaintiff’s motion, or the issue therein, or allowing 

plaintiff the opportunity to be heard.” Plaintiff further argues the court’s November 2019 order 

rests on “doubtful, improbable and unsatisfactory evidence.” We affirm.

FILED

January 27, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 

is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances 

allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 This court previously set forth all the relevant facts in this case. See Taylor v. 

Brannon, 2015 IL App (4th) 140665-U; see also Taylor v. Calloway, 2019 IL App (4th) 

180612-U. We recite below only those facts relevant to resolve the issues involved in this appeal.

¶ 6 In November 2013, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint for relief under the Act (735 

ILCS 5/10-101 et seq. (West 2012)). Plaintiff, who was sentenced to indeterminate prison 

sentences of 100 to 200 years for murder and 6 to 20 years for kidnapping in October 1976, 

alleged, in part, he was entitled to immediate release from prison because he was denied equal 

protection under the laws when the General Assembly granted prisoners with lesser sentences the 

option to receive a determinate sentence but denied him the same right and, had he been given a 

determinate sentence, he would have already completed his sentence. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 

38, ¶ 1003-3-2.1(b) (“No release date under this Section shall be set for any person sentenced to 

an indeterminate sentence under the law in effect prior to the effective date of this Amendatory 

Act of 1977 in which the minimum term of such sentence is 20 years or more.”).

¶ 7 In September 2019, the State filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint, arguing, in 

part, plaintiff failed to identify any postconviction event which warranted his immediate release 

from custody. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the State argued section 3-3-2.1 of the Unified 

Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-3-2.1 (West 2012)) “did not invalidate 

[plaintiff’s] indeterminate sentence because the legislature expressly chose to preserve it.” The 

State further argued plaintiff’s ineligibility for a determinate sentence did not violate his due 

process or equal protection rights as “[p]laintiff is not a member of a suspect class.”

¶ 8 On October 7, 2019, plaintiff filed a response to the State’s answer, arguing the 

claims in his petition for habeas corpus “were predicated upon civil proceedings rather than 
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criminal proceedings, therefore plaintiff [did] not need to rely on a post-conviction event for 

viability on his civil claims.” Plaintiff further asserted the “Prisoner Review Board Statute 

3-2.1(b) was unconstitutionally amended” and deprived him of “the possibility of being 

sentenced under the Class X determinate sentence law for murder ***.” The following day, 

plaintiff filed a motion requesting the trial court grant him leave to amend his petition to include 

an as-applied challenge concerning “the alleged unconstitutional undertaking by the Illinois 

Legislator [sic] in regards to the *** enactment of Prisoner Review Statute 730 ILCS 

5/[3]-3-2.1(b).” 

¶ 9 On November 7, 2019, the trial court held a hearing by telephone. The record 

contains no transcript of the hearing. A docket entry from that day provides the court dismissed 

plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, “[a]fter consideration of the written pleadings by 

the Court, including Plaintiff’s additional theory of recovery included in his Motion for Leave to 

Amend.” The trial court subsequently entered a written order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 10 In January 2020, plaintiff filed a “Bystander’s Report in Lieu of Transcript’s.” 

Plaintiff asserted he appeared for a telephone hearing on November 7, 2019, and alleged the trial 

court dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus before “afford[ing] plaintiff *** any 

opportunity to respond, or speak on his own behalf in defense of his rights.” 

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff argues he was denied his constitutional right to due process 

when the trial court dismissed his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion to amend 

without “fully apprising the parties on plaintiff’s motion, or the issue therein, or allowing 

plaintiff the opportunity to be heard.” Plaintiff further argues the court’s November 2019 order 
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rests on “doubtful, improbable and unsatisfactory evidence.” These arguments were absent

below. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims are forfeited, and we need not address the merits of his 

appeal. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536, 662 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (1996) (“It is 

well settled that issues not raised in the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised for 

the first time on appeal.”).

¶ 14 Notwithstanding plaintiff’s forfeiture, plaintiff’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus does not fall within the recognized categories for which such relief may be 

granted. The Act sets forth seven grounds upon which a prisoner may attain habeas relief. 735 

ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2012). Our supreme court summarized these seven grounds, noting habeas

relief is available in only two situations: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the prisoner 

and (2) an occurrence after the conviction entitles the prisoner to release. People v. Gosier, 205 

Ill. 2d 198, 205, 792 N.E.2d 1266, 1270 (2001); see also Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 

Ill. 2d 428, 430, 704 N.E.2d 350, 351 (1998) (“It is well established that a writ of habeas corpus

is available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment 

of a court which lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the person of the petitioner, or where 

there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner’s conviction which entitled him to 

release.”). A petition seeking habeas relief may not be used to permit review of proceedings 

which do not fall within these categories, “even though the alleged error involves a denial of 

constitutional rights.” Barney, 184 Ill. 2d at 430; see also People v. Purnell, 356 Ill. App. 3d 524, 

528, 825 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (2005). We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a petition for

writ of habeas corpus. Hennings v. Chandler, 229 Ill. 2d 18, 24, 890 N.E.2d 920, 923 (2008). 

¶ 15 Here, plaintiff failed to meet either standard for habeas corpus relief. Plaintiff 

makes no argument as to how the trial court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction. 
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Nor does he demonstrate any postcommitment occurrence entitling him to immediate release.

Rather, plaintiff baldly asserts the trial court erroneously dismissed his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus because “[t]he original trial (sentencing) court did not have the subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear, or determine plaintiff’s request for Habeas Corpus relief,” and “plaintiff’s 

claims were predicated upon civil proceedings rather than criminal proceedings, therefore 

plaintiff did not need to rely on [a] Post-Conviction event for viability on his civil claims.” 

¶ 16 Even if we were to address plaintiff’s allegation section 3-3-2.1(b) of the Unified 

Code (730 ILCS 5/3-3-2.1 (West 2012)), enacted after he was sentenced, unconstitutionally 

denies him his right of equal protection by denying him the option of seeking a determinate 

sentence as given to other prisoners with lesser sentences, plaintiff fails to demonstrate he is 

entitled to relief. Section 3-3-2.1(b) provides, “No release date under this Section shall be set for 

any person sentenced to an indeterminate sentence under the law in effect prior to the effective 

date of this amendatory Act of 1977 in which the minimum term of such sentence is 20 years or 

more.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-2.1(b) (West 2012). As discussed above, plaintiff was sentenced to an 

indeterminate sentence of 100 to 200 years, and plaintiff readily concedes “[he] is a member of 

an unprotected class that was classified under Prisoner Review Board Statute 3-2.1(b).” 

Accordingly, section 3-3-2.1(b) expressly prohibited the Prisoner Review Board from setting a 

fixed release date for plaintiff. See People ex rel. Stringer v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 163 

Ill. App. 3d 1100, 1102, 517 N.E.2d 283, 284 (1987). As plaintiff was not eligible to receive a 

fixed release date under section 3-3-2.1(b), he remained sentenced to an indeterminate term of 

100 to 200 years. See Heirens v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 162 Ill. App. 3d 762, 767, 516 

N.E.2d 613, 616 (1987) (“[T]he legislature did not intend to give prisoners who had received 

more serious indeterminate sentences the choice between the parole system and a fixed release 
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date.”). Because we may affirm the trial court’s decision to deny a habeas corpus petition on any 

basis supported by the record, we hold the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s pro se

petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 61, 896 N.E.2d 327, 

333 (2008). 

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 19 Affirmed.