IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June Waters-Bey, :

: No. 777 C.D. 2016

Petitioner : Submitted: December 30, 2016

:

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: June 12, 2017

June Waters-Bey (Claimant) petitions pro se for review of the March 

24, 2016 order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that 

affirmed a referee’s decision vacating a revised financial determination, issued by 

the Department of Labor and Industry (Department) on December 30, 2015, and 

dismissing Claimant’s appeal. We reverse.

Claimant worked for the U.S. Department of Treasury, Internal 

Revenue Service (Employer) from February 10, 2015, through June 26, 2015, as a 

seasonal tax examiner. Claimant filed for unemployment compensation benefits 

effective July 5, 2015. In a Notice of Financial Determination dated July 14, 2015, 
2

the Department informed Claimant that she was not financially eligible for benefits 

pursuant to Section 401(a) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 The 

notice further stated that Claimant’s last day to appeal the determination was July 

29, 2015. Claimant appealed the determination and the Department received her 

appeal paperwork on July 30, 2015. A referee held a hearing on August 21, 2015, 

and dismissed the appeal as untimely by order dated August 24, 2015. Claimant 

appealed the referee’s decision to the Board and the Board, in an order dated 

October 16, 2015, dismissed the appeal as untimely.

Additionally, the Department sent Claimant a Notice of Revised 

Standing, dated October 30, 2015, informing her that her appeal from a Notice of 

Financial Determination dated October 9, 2015, was vacated while the local 

service center investigated her financial eligibility. Supp. Record Item No. 14.

On December 30, 2015, the Department issued a Revised Notice of

Financial Determination for Claimant’s application from July 5, 2015, again 

concluding that Claimant was not financially eligible for unemployment 

compensation benefits. Claimant timely appealed this determination.

A referee held a hearing on February 8, 2016, at which Claimant was 

the only participant. Claimant testified, summarizing the timing of her pay and her

history of employment with Employer. In her testimony, she asserted that she 

received her pay on an earlier date than Employer’s official pay date and, as a 

result, the Department misattributed her pay between quarters in her base year. 

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§801(a). At the time relevant for this appeal, Section 401(a)(2) of the Law provided that an 

employee must receive at least 49.5% of her total base year wages in one or more quarters, other 

than the highest quarter in the employee’s base year. The General Assembly has since amended 

Section 401(a)(2) to require only 37% of base year wages to be paid in one or more quarters, 

other than the highest quarter.
3

Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 12-13. Claimant testified that this miscalculation led 

to the determination that she was ineligible for benefits. Id. She further testified 

regarding her previous appeal, acknowledging that her appeal had been dismissed 

as untimely. N.T. at 11-12. Claimant also testified that she was confused by the 

Revised Financial Determination that she received and contacted the local service 

center. N.T. at 12. Claimant said that the local service center instructed her to 

appeal the Revised Financial Determination and requested documentation of her 

2015 financial earnings, which she attached to her appeal. Id.

By decision and order dated February 9, 2016, the referee vacated the 

December 30, 2015 Revised Financial Determination as a nullity and dismissed

Claimant’s appeal. The referee concluded that the July 14, 2015 financial 

determination was final because the Board dismissed Claimant’s appeal from that 

notice as untimely. The referee instructed the local service center to process a new 

application for benefits for Claimant, effective October 4, 2015, and issue a new 

financial determination based upon the evidence Claimant presented at the 

referee’s hearing.

Claimant timely appealed the referee’s February 9, 2016 dismissal of 

her appeal to the Board, arguing that she received two letters, dated October 30, 

2015, and December 10, 2015, vacating the standing determination while the local 

service center reviewed her case, which permitted her to appeal the Department’s 

financial determination upon receipt of the December 30, 2015 determination. On 

March 24, 2016, the Board affirmed the decision of the referee, adopting and 

incorporating the referee’s findings and conclusions. The Board concluded that its 

order from October 16, 2015, superseded any determinations subsequently issued
4

by the Department and, therefore, the Department lacked jurisdiction to issue a 

revised financial determination for Claimant’s application dated July 5, 2015.

On appeal to this Court,2 Claimant argues that the Board erred in 

dismissing her appeal as a nullity because the revised final determinations sent by 

the Department granted her new appeal rights. Relatedly, Claimant alleges that the 

subsequent financial determinations were sufficiently misleading so as to constitute

a breakdown of the administrative process.

3

However, the Board argues that the Department lacked jurisdiction to 

issue the revised financial determinations because the July 14, 2015 determination 

was final. The Board relies on Sections 501 and 509 of the Law to support its 

assertion that the original financial determination was final upon the close of the 

fifteen-day appeal period.

Section 501(d) and (e) of the Law states, in pertinent part:

(d) The department shall notify any employer or claimant 

who has been notified as required . . . of any revision 

made in the determination as contained in the original 

notice given to such employer or claimant.

(e) Unless the claimant or last employer or base-year 

employer of the claimant files an appeal with the board 

from the determination contained in any notice required 

 

2 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were 

violated, whether an error of law has been committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. Roberts v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 977 A.2d 12, 16 n. 2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

3 Although Claimant does not specifically list this question as a separate issue in the Pa. 

R.A.P. 2116 Statement of Questions Involved portion of her appellate brief, it is clear from her 

brief that this argument has been raised. This Court is generally inclined to read pro se materials 

liberally as long as we are able to conduct meaningful appellate review. See Robinson v. 

Schellenberg, 729 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
5

to be furnished . . . within fifteen calendar days after such 

notice was delivered to him personally, or was mailed to 

his last known post office address, and applies for a 

hearing, such determination of the department, with 

respect to the particular facts set forth in such notice, 

shall be final and compensation shall be paid or denied in 

accordance therewith.

43 P.S. §821(d), (e).

Section 509 of the Law states, in relevant part:

Any decision made by the department or any referee or 

the board shall not be subject to collateral attack as to any 

application claim or claims covered thereby or otherwise 

be disturbed, unless appealed from.

Subject to appeal proceedings and judicial review, any 

right, fact or matter in issue which was directly passed 

upon or necessarily involved in any decision of a referee 

or the board or the Court and which has become final 

shall be conclusive for all purposes of this act and shall 

not be subject to collateral attack as among all affected 

parties who had notice of such decision . . . .

43 P.S. §829. 

It is well settled that unappealed decisions by a referee or the Board 

become final and are binding for all applications and claims. See Deep v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 595 A.2d 229, 231 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1991); Chandler v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 580 A.2d 457 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1990); and Lentz v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 

402 A.2d 1127 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).

In Garza v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 669 A.2d 

445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), the Department issued a determination finding the 

claimant eligible for benefits. Seven days later and before any appeal was filed, 
6

the Department issued a revised determination finding the claimant ineligible for 

benefits due to willful misconduct. The claimant appealed and the Board affirmed.

On appeal to this Court, the claimant argued that the Department 

lacked jurisdiction to issue the revised determination because no appeal had been 

filed. We affirmed, holding that the Department has jurisdiction to revise a 

determination within the fifteen-day appeal period, before it becomes final, as long

as no appeal has been filed. We agreed with the Board that if an appeal is filed 

with the fifteen days, the determination cannot be subsequently revised even 

though it does not become final. Id. at 447.

In Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 991 A.2d 971, 974 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), we held 

that the Department may not issue a revised notice of determination after the 

appeal period has expired because the determination becomes final and the Board 

loses jurisdiction over the matter. See also Vereb v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, 676 A.2d 1290, 1292-93 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); First National 

Bank of Bath v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 619 A.2d 801, 803

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).

Nevertheless, in a factually similar case, Martyna v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 692 A.2d 594 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), we held that 

the Department had the authority to issue revised determinations after the appeal 

period has expired. The claimant in Martyna received an original Notice of 

Financial Determination, dated February 16, 1996, informing her that she was 

ineligible for benefits. She did not file a timely appeal. After the expiration of the 

fifteen-day appeal period, the Department sent her two revised notices, on March 

26, 1996, and April 1, 1996, reflecting upward revisions of her base year wage, but
7

also determining her to be financially ineligible for benefits. The claimant timely 

appealed from the final revised determination, but the Board concluded she did not 

show good cause for failing to timely appeal the February 16, 1996 determination. 

The claimant then appealed to this Court.

Before this Court, the Board argued that the original determination 

became final when the claimant failed to file a timely appeal and that the revised 

notices did not create new appeal rights. The Board asserted that the subsequent 

revisions were impermissible “collateral attacks” under Section 509 of the Law. 

Martyna, 692 A.2d 594-97.

In rejecting the Board’s assertion, we stated:

Martyna timely appealed the April 1, 1996 revised notice 

of determination. That notice was an adverse decision, 

based on changed factual circumstances revealed by the 

compensation authorities’ further investigation into 

Martyna’s claim, even though its outcome was the same 

disqualification as that rendered in the original February 

16, 1996 determination. Martyna is entitled to appeal 

this April 1, 1996 determination. We are led to this 

holding by a consideration of the consequences if the 

[Department] had, on redetermination, changed its 

finding on eligibility. If, for example, the [Department]

on further investigation found Martyna eligible after 

originally finding her ineligible, then certainly, in such 

circumstances, we could not allow Martyna’s employer 

to ignore the subsequent redetermination of eligibility 

and later challenge any consequent assessment as based 

on a nullity.

On the other hand, if the [Department] issued a revised 

notice finding Martyna ineligible more than thirty days 

after originally determining she had been eligible, she

would necessarily have to challenge the latter decision by 

appeal to the Board. Here, while there may be 

substantive legal arguments to make which are grounded 

in the fact that the [Department] had issued a previous, 
8

“final” unappealed determination, the latest of its 

determinations is an adverse adjudication of ineligibility.

There is no authority for the proposition that an appeal 

filed within fifteen days of its issuance is untimely. The 

Board found that Martyna filed an appeal from the last 

determination but seems to have ignored that finding in 

its reasoning.

At the very least, we can say that the issuance of two 

subsequent determinations of ineligibility was 

sufficiently misleading so as to constitute administrative 

breakdown. . . . [T]he very fact that the [Department]

sent two revised notices well after the original fifteen-day 

appeal period had expired leads to the conclusion that it 

believed it had the power to do so. If it was mistaken, 

Martyna should not bear the consequences of that 

administrative confusion.

Id. at 597. Emphasizing the unique nature of the case, we remanded the matter for 

a determination on the merits.

While the Board argues that the facts of this case are distinguishable 

from those in Martyna because the referee and Board issued decisions in this case, 

it is important to note that the decisions were not on the merits of the appeal, but 

only addressed the timeliness thereof. Claimant herein, as in Martyna, did not file 

an appeal within the fifteen day appeal period. Moreover, the timing of the 

Department’s subsequent determinations immediately surrounding the Board’s 

deliberations on Claimant’s appeal is sufficiently misleading so as to constitute a 

breakdown of the administrative process. We emphasize that this case, like 

Martyna, is unique and that our holding is limited. Nonetheless, we conclude that 

our decision in Martyna is controlling and that the Board had jurisdiction to 

consider Claimant’s appeal relating to the Department’s December 30, 2015 

Revised Financial Determination.
9

Accordingly, we reverse the Board’s March 24, 2016 order and 

remand for a decision on the merits of the issues that Claimant raised on appeal.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June Waters-Bey, :

: No. 777 C.D. 2016

Petitioner : 

:

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 12th day of June, 2017, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated March 24, 2016, is 

REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

Jurisdiction is RELINQUISHED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge