alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cascade Springs Ltd. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   Date:   November 16, 2011   /s/ William Delahunte---------------------------------
William Delahunte, 
Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Chadwick Stricker, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Moskowitz, J.), rendered September 26, 1984, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification evidence.

*636Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The record of the *Wade*hearing in this case fails to sustain the defendant’s contention that the police engaged in an impermissibly suggestive precinct showup in order to obtain an identification of the defendant. Rather, the record demonstrates that an eyewitness to the crime viewed the defendant when the defendant and several other individuals entered the precinct to answer questions concerning the homicide. This encounter was inadvertent. Accordingly, inasmuch as no police-arranged identification procedure was employed, the hearing court properly denied the defendant’s application to suppress the identification testimony of the witness.

The defendant’s assertion that he had been placed under arrest illegally prior to the identification is likewise entirely unsupported by the record. The uncontradicted testimony of the arresting officer demonstrated that the defendant and his companions voluntarily and without objection consented to accompany the police to the station house to answer questions, and that the defendant was not placed in custody until after the witness identified him. The mere fact that the defendant may have felt obliged to cooperate with the police in order to maintain an appearance of innocence does not call for a different conclusion *(see, People v Prahl,*124 AD2d 607).

The People were properly permitted to present rebuttal testimony in response to the evidence adduced by the defense. Moreover, even if we were to find that the testimony was not technically of a rebuttal nature, we would nevertheless conclude that the trial court properly permitted its introduction into evidence in the exercise of its sound discretion *(see,*CPL 260.30 [7]; *People v Harris,*57 NY2d 335, 346, *cert denied*460 US 1047; *People v Medina,*130 AD2d 515; *People v O’Dell,*111 AD2d 937).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]). Bracken, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>


                                                                  EXHIBIT 23.2

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
TRIGEN ENERGY CORPORATION

WE CONSENT TO INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN THE REGISTRATION STATEMENTS NO.
333-4198 ON FORM S-3, NO. 33-92468 AND NO. 333-36151 ON FORM S-8, AND NO.
33-83736 ON FORM S-8 AND POST EFFECTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO FORM S-8 AND NO.
333-87277 ON FORM S-8 OF TRIGEN ENERGY CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES OF OUR
REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 3, 1998, RELATING TO THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF
OPERATIONS, STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER
31, 1997 OF TRIGEN ENERGY CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES, AND THE RELATED
SCHEDULES, AS OF AND FOR THE PERIODS DESCRIBED THEREIN, WHICH REPORT APPEARS
IN THE DECEMBER 31, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K OF TRIGEN ENERGY
CORPORATION.


                                  KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLLP


MARCH 28, 2000
STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13** 

**- 1371** 

KAZEEM ADESHINA ISHOLA, a/k/a John Alexander, a/k/a Robert Hutton, a/k/a Daniel Luroche, a/k/a Victor Sille, a/k/a Christopher J. Pitera, a/k/a James P. McNicolas

,

Petitioner

,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General
,

Respondent

.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

.

Submitted : July 17, 2013 Decided: July 25, 2013

Before KING, DUNCAN, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion

.

Kazeem Adeshina Ishola, Petitioner Pro Se. Stefanie A.
Svoren

- Jay, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Kazeem Adeshina Ishola, a native and citizen of

Nigeria, petitions for review of an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (Board) denying his motion to reopen as

untimely and numerically barred. We ha ve reviewed the

administrative record and Ishola’s contentions, and conclude

that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) , (c) (2013). We accordingly

deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by th e

Board. See In re: Ishola , (B.I.A. Mar. 14, 2013). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
----

----

III Πληροφορίες

Eυρωπαϊκός Οργανισμός Φαρμάκων

----

ΠΡΟΣΛΉΨΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΟΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΌ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΌ ΦΑΡΜΆΚΩΝ (ΛΟΝΔΊΝΟ)

(2005/C 76 A/01)

Ο Οργανισμός είναι επιφορτισμένος με το συντονισμό της αξιολόγησης και του ελέγχου των φαρμακευτικών προϊόντων για ανθρώπινη και κτηνιατρική χρήση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση [βλέπε κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 726/2004 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου (ΕΕ L 136 της 30.4.2004, σ. 1)]. Ο ΕΜΕΑ ιδρύθηκε τον Ιανουάριο του 1995 και έχει πολλές και στενές επαφές με την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, τα 25 κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ, τις χώρες μέλη του ΕΟΧ-EZEΣ και πολλές άλλες ομάδες του δημόσιου και του ιδιωτικού τομέα.

Περισσότερες πληροφορίες για τον ΕΜΕΑ και τις δραστηριότητές του παρέχονται άμεσα μέσω του Διαδικτύου· η διεύθυνσή μας στον Παγκόσμιο Ιστό είναι http://www.emea.eu.int.

Οι υποψήφιοι που θα επιλεγούν θα συμπεριληφθούν σε πίνακα επιτυχόντων και, ανάλογα με την κατάσταση από άποψη προϋπολογισμού, θα τους προσφερθεί πενταετής ανανεώσιμη σύμβαση σύμφωνα με τους όρους απασχόλησης που εφαρμόζονται στο λοιπό προσωπικό των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων (ΕΕ L 56 της 4.3. 1968) (1).

Ο τόπος διορισμού είναι το Λονδίνο.

Οι υποψήφιοι πρέπει να είναι υπήκοοι κράτους μέλους των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων, της Ισλανδίας, της Νορβηγίας ή του Λιχτενστάιν, υπό την προϋπόθεση ότι απολαύουν πλήρως των πολιτικών δικαιωμάτων τους.

Οι πλήρεις όροι, η περιγραφή των καθηκόντων και το απαραίτητο έντυπο αίτησης πρέπει να μεταφορτωθούν από την ιστοθέση του ΕΜΕΑ http://www.emea.eu.int/. Η αίτηση υποψηφιότητας πρέπει να είναι δεόντως υπογεγραμμένη, να φέρει ημερομηνία και να αποσταλεί, μαζί με όλα τα δικαιολογητικά, το αργότερο έως τις 11 Μαΐου 2005 (ως ημερομηνία αποστολής λαμβάνεται η ημερομηνία της σφραγίδας του ταχυδρομείου), στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:ΕΜΕΑ - Ηead of Personnel, 7 Westferry Circus, Canary Wharf, UK-London E14 4HB [τηλ.: (44-207) 418 84 00· Φαξ (44-207) 418 84 16].

Στο μέλλον, η Επίσημη Εφημερίδα δεν θα αποστέλλεται πλέον αυτομάτως σε κατάλογο παραληπτών. Εάν επιθυμείτε να λαμβάνετε κοινοποίηση των δημοσιεύσεων, παρακαλούμε να εγγραφείτε ηλεκτρονικά στη διεύθυνση http://www.emea.eu.int/«Online Mailing Service».

----

(1)  Το Συμβούλιο ενέκρινε τους νέους κανονισμούς υπηρεσιακής κατάστασης, οι οποίοι τέθηκαν σε ισχύ την 1η Μαΐου 2004. Οι νέοι αυτοί κανονισμοί περιλαμβάνουν ένα νέο σύστημα σταδιοδρομίας. Οι επιτυχόντες θα προσληφθούν με βάση τους νέους κανονισμούς υπηρεσιακής κατάστασης, σύμφωνα με τις προβλεπόμενες ρυθμίσεις, ιδίως το άρθρο 12 του μέρους 2 του παραρτήματος XIII (βλέπε ιστοθέση IntraComm: http://www.europa.eu.int).

----
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of CPI International Holding Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 29, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, O. Joe Caldarelli, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





|    |                                                                                                                      
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

|    |                                                                                                                                                     
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







/s/ O. JOE CALDARELLIO. Joe CaldarelliChief Executive OfficerAugust 8, 2012
Exhibit 23.1CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMWe consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos.33-75254, 33-75252, 33-92656, 333-01978, 333-34839, 333-34837, 333-81521, 333-81523, 333-64410,333-64412, 333-100294, 333-100295, 333-116550, 333-116551, 333-125839, 333-125840 and 333-129838)and the Registration Statements on Form S-4 (Nos. 333-77343, 333-43752 and 333-64656) of ourreport dated June 10, 2004, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule ofBlack Box Corporation for the year ended March 31, 2004 and included in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2006 filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission./s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLPPittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Pechanga Band of Luiseflo Mission IndiansP.O. Box 1477

Dear Chairman Macarro:

I am pleased to aimounce that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined that thePechanga Band of Luiseflo Mission Indians (Pechanga) is eligible for treatment as a state (TAS) with

respect to Clean Air Act (CAA) sections 105, 107(d), 126 and 505(a)(2). As described in the enclosed

memorandum, Pechanga’s TAS application demonstrates the Pechanga meets all ofthe requirements for

TAS eligibility under CAA sections 301(d)(2) and 3 02(r) and the Tribal Authority Rule at 40 CFR §

49.6, for purposes of CAA sections 105, 107(d), 126 and 505(a)(2).I would like to commend Pechanga’s effort in working collaboratively with EPA to produce the

application which resulted in final approval. We look forward to continuing our work together to protectand enhance the Pechanga air resources. We also would like to publicly acknowledge and celebrate thisaccomplishment at an upcoming EPA Region 9 Tribal Operations Committee meeting, and we will be in

touch with your staffto coordinate this.If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to give me a call, or have your staff contact Sara

Bartholomew ofthe Air Division at (415) 947-4100.

Sincerely,

cc: Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California

Mary Nichols, Chair, California Air Resources Board

Matt Rodriquez, Secretary, California EPA

Syndi Smallwood, Environmental Director, Pechanga Band

Barry R. Wallerstein, APCO, South Coast AQMDRobert Kard, APCO, San Diego APCD

Bjorn Fredrickson , Recreation and Lands Officer, Palomar Ranger District,

Cleveland National Forest

Printed on Recycled Paper
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2009-1222

(Interference No. 105,602)

JONES J. ROBERTSON and ROBERT M. CURRIE,

Appellants,

v.

JOS TIMMERMANS and JEAN C. RAYMOND,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office,

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.

ON MOTION

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellants' unopposed motion for an extension of time,

until June 24, 2009, to file their opening brief,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The motion is granted.

FOR THE COURT

APR 9 2009

/s/ Jan Horbalv

Date Jan Horbaly

Clerk FILED

us. COURT OF APPEALS F

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT OR

cc:	David Henry Voorhees, Esq.

Christian J. Garascia, Esq.

s8

APR 0 9 2009

CLERK
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk March 23, 2009

s0316 

# Order

March 23, 2009

137570 & (18)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 137570 COA: 285533 Oakland CC: 2002-186193-FH BRIAN LEE MEEK, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 5, 2008 order of the Court of Appeals is considered , and it is DENIED, because the defendant has
failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to re lief under MCR 6.508(D). The
motion to remand is DENIED.
Exhibit 32.1





OFFICER CERTIFICATION





PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the quarterly report of Advanced Environmental Recycling Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Joe G. Brooks, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:  March 31, 2011





/s/ Joe G. BrooksJoe G. BrooksChairman and Chief Executive Officer

(principal executive officer)
### State of the Air 2015



# F

York County 

# C

Cumberland County



# C

Knox County 

# C

Hancock County 

### Particle Pollution:

a ll Maine counties

receive a grade of 

# A

Ozone Pollution:

u nhealthy air in

s outhern and
coastal Maine
MP

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 19-0369

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

MALCOLM JOSEPH NEWROBE, SR., 

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 60-day extension of time, 

and good cause appearing therefor, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time to 

and including November 27, 2020, within which to prepare, serve, and file its 

response brief.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 21 2020

09/21/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0369
Fmm: 

To: 

RE: Clarification requested for PBR/PTIO SIP submittal 

Hopk!ns, Mike to: Kaushal Gupta 

Cc: Genevieve Damico, "Mansour, Mike" 

"Hopkins, Mike" <Mike.Hopkins@epa.state.oh.us> 

Kaushal Gupta/R5/USEPA/US@EPA, 

05/24/2012 08:54AM 

Cc: Genevieve Damfco/R5iUSEPAJUS@EPA, "Mansour, Mike" <Mike.Mansour@epa.state.oh.us> 

·.,.,..------· History: This message has been forwarded. 

Kaushal: 

Please see my responses below each of your questions. Let me know if you need more. 

Mike 

From: Kaushal Gupta [mailto:Gupta.Kaushal@epamail.epa.gov] 

Sent: Wednesday, May 23, 2012 5:57 PM 

To: Hopkins, Mike 

Cc: Genevieve Damico 

Subject: Clarification requested for PBR/PTIO SIP submittal 

Mike, 

A couple of issues came up during review of the Permits-by-Rule and Permits to Install and Operate SIP 

Revisions. These issues pertain to the permanent exemption for organic liquid storage tanks. Please 

provide clarification as requested below: 

1. As mentioned in Ohio EPA's Inter-Office Memorandum from Mike Mansour to you on January 26, 2012, 

the rules do not define "organic liquids" but they do define "organic compounds." Please confirm that the 

organic liquids used in the exempted organic liquid storage tanks will be chemically identical to the 

"organic compounds" already regulated under the SIP, and that these liquids will never be in other 

physical states (solid or gas). 

Yes, "organic liquids'' would be "organic compounds'' that are liquids at the temperatures and 

pressures experienced by these storage tanks. These materials would have to be liquids at these 

same storage temperatures and pressures in order to qualify for the exemption. 

2. The exemption applies to organic liquid storage tanks that used submerged fill. "Submerged fill" is not 

defined in the regulations. Please provide a definition of submerged fill. 

"Submerged Fill" is not defined in Chapter 31, but Chapter 31 references Chapter 21 and 

"submerged fill pipe" is defined in Chapter 21. If you look at OAC paragraph 3745-31-0l(A), it 

states that definitions of Chapter 21 apply in Chapter 31. "Submerged fill pipe'' is defined at 

OAC paragraph 3745-21-0l(C)(6) so, therefore, that definition applies in Chapter 31. 

"Submerged till" is just a short hand way of saying you must use a "submerged fill pipe''. 
Thank you. 

Kaushal Gupta 

USEPA Region 5 Air Permits Section 

(312) 886-6803
#### James Watkins, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Twiss Watkins, an Infant, Respondent, v Bank of Castile et al., Appellants.

Order unanimously af*1062firmed with costs. Memorandum: Defendants contend that plaintiff is barred by collateral estoppel from litigating his claim for lost wages. We disagree. Because plaintiff arbitrated only his no-fault claim for medical expenses, and not his claim for lost wages, there is no identity of issue to form a basis for issue preclusion *(see, Kaufman v Lilly & Co.,*65 NY2d 449, 455; *Kingston v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,*165 AD2d 970). Indeed, the issue of lost wages could not have been considered in the health service arbitration because, under the multitiered no-fault arbitration system, that arbitration forum is limited to medical payment claim disputes *(see,*11 NYCRR 65.16 [c] [3] [ii]; *see also, Matter of Berent [County of Erie],*86 AD2d 764). Additionally, plaintiff’s failure to reach the $50,000 threshold for basic economic loss does not bar him from suing defendants for lost wages to the extent that they exceed basic economic loss *(see generally, Fiveson v Kondenar,*110 AD2d 749; *McDonnell v Best Bus Co.,*97 AD2d 433). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Newman, J. —Summary Judgment.) Present—Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
#### The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Alva Allen HARRISON, Respondent.

No. 89SC147.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

May 2, 1990.

ORDER OF COURT

Upon consideration of the Record on Appeal, together with the Written arguments of counsel, and being sufficiently advised in the premises,

IT IS ORDERED that the Writ of Certio-rari is DENIED as having been improvidently granted.
<PAGE>   1


                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 33-91650), pertaining to the Employee Stock Incentive Plan and in the
Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-954) pertaining to 70,000 shares of
common stock of The Sirena Apparel Group, Inc. of our report dated August 21,
1997, with respect to the financial statements and schedule of The Sirena
Apparel Group, Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
June 30, 1997.




                                            ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Los Angeles, California
September 24, 1997
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Manuel Garcia, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Herbert Altman, J.), rendered December 21, 1987, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term of from seven to twenty-one years, and an order of said court, entered on or about July 7, 1988, denying defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, unanimously affirmed.

There is no merit to defendant’s claims that he was not accorded the opportunity to testify before the Grand Jury and that the testimony of Detective Torres before the Grand Jury was perjured. Having pled guilty, defendant’s conviction rests on the sufficiency of his plea and not the legal or constitutional sufficiency of any proceedings which might have led to his conviction after trial *(People v Di Raffaele,*55 NY2d 234). Defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of his plea and, in any event, we find that it was both knowingly and voluntarily entered. Moreover, we note defendant’s request to appear before the Grand Jury came on the eve of trial, one year after the indictment had been voted, and without the required notice to the District Attorney (CPL 190.50 [5] [a]) or a timely motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground now raised (CPL 190.50 [5] [c]). Defendant’s assertion that his plea was coerced by his trial counsel and the court is directly refuted by the record, especially defendant’s own statement that he authorized his attorney to enter a plea of guilty because he was "in fact” guilty.

*331The defendant received meaningful representation *(see, People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137). Faced with a case where there were several eyewitnesses to the crime, including defendant’s own brother who incriminated him, and the fact that the murder weapon was found behind the apartment building where defendant was arrested, trial counsel nonetheless competently and vigorously attempted to obtain suppression of lineup identifications, as well as of the gun recovered, and, eventually, was able to gain a favorable plea arrangement for the defendant. In any event, we find the specific examples of ineffectiveness asserted by defendant, *pro se,*to be frivolous. Nor is there any merit to defendant’s *pro se*challenge to the effectiveness of his appellate counsel on this appeal. *(People v Bachert,*69 NY2d 593.) Finally, we do not find the forty-seven year old defendant’s sentence to be excessive. As a prior felon, charged with murder in the second degree, and faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt, defendant could have received a minimum sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years. Moreover, insofar as defendant’s sentence is in accordance with a negotiated plea bargain, he is bound by its terms *(People v Felman,*141 AD2d 889, *lv denied*72 NY2d 918). Concur—Murphy, P. J., Milonas, Ellerin, Wallach and Kassal, JJ.