### NOTICE: SLIP OPINION (not the court’s final written decision) The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the written opinionsthat areoriginally filed by the court. Aslip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions can be changed by subsequentcourtorders. For example,a court may issue an order makingsubstantive changesto a slip opinionor publishing for precedential purposesa previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally,nonsubstantive edits (forstyle, grammar,citation,format, punctuation, etc.)are madebefore the opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court decisions:the Washington Reports 2dand the Washington Appellate Reports. An opinion in theofficial reports replacesthe slip opinion as the official opinion of the court. The slip opinion that begins on the next pageis for a published opinion, and it has since been revised forpublication in the printed official reports. The official textof thecourt’sopinion is foundin the advance sheets and the bound volumes of theofficial reports. Also, an electronic version(intended to mirror the language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of charge, at this website:https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports

. For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential (unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports,see https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.

# FILE
IN CLERKS OFFICE IUPREME CC'.Ji"\T, STAn! OFWASHINOlON DA'i':I 

## MAY 072015

# 'hla.~

# ¥.(!,9. CHIEFJU$ lCE 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OFWASHINGTON, ) ) Respondent, ) No. 90281-0 ) v. ) En Bane ) WILLIAM MICHAEL REIS, ) 

## MAY 072015 ) Filed Petitioner. ) )

WIGGINS, J.-William Reis was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance after a search of his home produced evidence of a marijuana grow operation. Reis moved to suppress the results ofthe search on the ground that the search warrant was invalid, arguing that the 2011 amendments to the Washington State Medical UseofCannabisAct (MUCA), chapter69.51ARCW, decriminalizedthe possession of cannabis for medical use. The trial court denied Reis's motion to suppress, and the Court ofAppeals granted discretionary review and affirmed. The 2011 amendments to RCW 69.51A.040 provide in relevant part that the "medical use ofcannabis in accordance with the terms andconditions ofthis chapter does not constitute a crime

...." (Emphasis added.) One of these "terms and conditions" is that a medical user must be registered with a registry established byState 

### v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 section 901 of the 2011 MUCA amendments. RCW 69.51A.040(2), (3). But the governorvetoed section 901, and no registry currently exists. It is thus impossible to register "in accordance with the terms and conditions of this chapter

..." after the governor's veto. We hold that the plain language of MUCA, supported by the context in which the language appears, the overall statutory scheme, and the legislative intent as captured by the governor's veto message, does not support the conclusion that the medical use ofmarijuana is notacrime. Therefore, we affirmthe CourtofAppeals and remand fortrial. FACTS Detective Thomas Calabrese received an anonymous tip in 2012 from an individual living in the Shorewood area of Burien, informing him that a man named "William" was actively growing marijuana in a house in that neighborhood. The informant, who feared retaliation by Reis, declined to provide any additional information. Calabrese later drove through Shorewood and was able to observe six marijuana plantsgrowing on the back porchofahome. Hethen observed an individual tending those plants. He noted the address and left. Detective Calabrese then asked and was granted permission to use a neighbor'syard to observethe porch. From this vantage point, Calabresewas ableto observethe plants on the porch. He also heard adistinct humming sound coming from the northwestside ofthetarget homeand observed black plastic covering the daylight basementwindow. Calabrese also noticed condensation on this window.

2State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 Leaving his vantage point, Calabrese drove past the target house and noted the license plate numberon thevehicle parked in frontofthe house.Adirectorysearch of the plate indicated that the vehicle belonged to William Reis. Calabrese began checking that name and discoveredthat Reis had been arrested in 2005 fordomestic violence. During that arrest, officers discovered a large marijuana grow operation in the basement, as well as a rifle and $18,000 cash hidden in the attic. Additional searches of Reis's financial records in 2005 connected him to a large marijuanagrow operation in California. Detective Calabrese also learned that Reis had been arrested in 2011 for possession of 1.3 grams ofmarijuana. Calabrese obtained Reis's 2005 booking photo and found that it matched the individual he observed tending the marijuana plants on the porch. Hethen returned to Shorewood to interview neighbors in an effort to determine whether Reis was selling
or distributing marijuana. However, none of Reis's neighbors would talk to him. They each asserted thattheywere afraid ofReis and thatthey did notwant Reis to retaliate againstthem. Oneofthe neighborseven informed Calabresethatthey had purchased
afirearm specificallyto protectthemselvesfrom Reis. Detective Calabrese put all ofthis information in an affidavit of probable cause to support a search warrant of Reis's home. Judge Eide granted a search warrant, finding probable cause to believe that Reis was violating Washington's Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. 1A search of Reis's home pursuant

1Calabrese's affidavitdid notallege aviolation offederal law, and the record does notsuggest the he was pursuing a violation of federal law. Therefore, the sole question on appeal is whether Detective Calabrese had probable cause of a violation of state law. See United States v. $186,416.00 in U.S. Currency, 590 F.3d 942, 948 (9th. Cir. 2009) (requiring state 3State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 to the search warrant revealed plants, scales, ledgers, sales receipts, and tools indicative of a marijuana grow operation. The search also revealed 37 plants and 210.72 ounces ofcannabis.2 The State charged Reis with violating chapter 69.50 RCW, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Reis moved to suppress the evidence found in his home, asserting thatthe search warrantwas notsupported by probablecause. Thetrial court denied Reis's motion to suppress. The trial court granted Reis's motion for expedited discretionary review in the Court ofAppeals and certified this issue for immediate review under RAP 2.3(b)(4)3 before Reis's scheduled trial date. The Court ofAppeals, Division One, granted discretionary review and held in a published opinion that the authorized use of medical marijuana under RCW 69.51A.040 does not preclude an officerfrom searching; compliant use underthe statute is an affirmative defense that does not negate probable cause required for asearchwarrant. 

### State v. Reis, 180Wn. App. 438, 322 P.3d 1238 (2014). We granted review and now affirm.

law enforcement officers to indicate pursuits ofviolations offederal law in their affidavits, or to seek asearch warrantfrom afederal magistrate, to support afinding ofprobable cause for the violation ofafederal crime). 2 The "terms and conditions" of RCW 69.51A.040(1)(a)(i) that render the medical use of marijuana legal require thataqualifying patient ordesignated provider possess no morethan 15 marijuana plants and no more than 24 ounces of useable cannabis. 3 RAP 2.4(b)(4) provides for discretionary review when "[t]he superior court has certified

... thatthe order involves a controlling question oflawas to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that immediate review ofthe order may materially advance the ultimate termination ofthe litigation." 4State v. Reis (William Michael), 

### No. 90281-0 ANALYSIS This case asks usto determinewhether RCW69.51A.040, as enactedfollowing Governor Gregoire's 2011 veto, decriminalizes the medical use of marijuana.4 

### In answeringthis question, we applywell established principlesofstatutory interpretation to chapter 69.51A RCW. These principles lead to the conclusion that the medical use of marijuana is not lawful because compliance with RCW 69.51A.040 is currently impossible. Further, we reject Reis's arguments regarding the effect ofthe governor's veto; riothing aboutthe veto process changes our analysis ofthe enacted statute. I. Standard of Review We review questions ofstatutory interpretation de novo. Ass'n ofWash. Spirits 

### & Wine Distrib. 

## v. Wash. State LiquorControl

### Bd., 182Wn.2d 342, 350, 340 P.3d 849 (2015). The court discerns legislative intent from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text ofthe provision in question, the context ofthe statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole. /d. 

### (citing Dep't ofEcology

## v. Campbell 

### & Gwinn, 

### LLC, 146Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).

II. Overview ofWashington's Medical Marijuana Laws Marijuana is generally a schedule I unlawful controlled substance, the possession or cultivation of which is prohibited.5 

### RCW 69.50.204(c)(22); RCW

4 

### Reis concedes the search was valid ifwe conclude that chapter69.51A RCW provides only an affirmative defense. This opinion does notdiscuss the proprietyofthe search because we hold that the statute provides qualifying patients and designated providers with only an affirmative defense. 5 

### Initiative Measure 502, approved in November 2012, legalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana. The initiative was not in effect when this search warrant issued, and 5State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 69.50.401(1). It has maintainedthis classification bytheWashington State Legislature since 1971. RCW 69.50.204(c)(22). Since 1971, the possession, manufacture, and distribution of marijuana has been generally prohibited. See RCW 69.50.401-.455. However, in 1998, the legislature enacted the MUCA, chapter 69.51A RCW, creating
an exception forthe medicinal use ofmarijuana. This exception created an affirmative defense for qualifying patients and designated caregivers who could establish that they complied with the requirements of that chapter. Former RCW 69.51A.040(1) (1998). In 2011, the legislature amended MUCA by adopting Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill (E2SSB) 5073. The stated purpose ofthese amendments, as asserted in section 101 (vetoed), was to ensure that (a) Qualifying patients and designated providers complying with theterms ofthis act and registering with the departmentofhealth will no longer be subject to arrest or prosecution, other criminal sanctions, or civil consequences based solely on their medical use ofcannabis; (b) Qualifying patients will have access to an adequate, safe, consistent, and secure source ofmedical quality cannabis; and (c) Health care professionals may authorize the medical use of cannabis in the mannerprovided bythis actwithoutfearofstate criminal or civil sanctions. E2SSB 5073, 

### § 101 (as passed by the legislature) (vetoed); 

### see LAWS OF 2011, ch. 181, 

### § 101. In orderto achievethese goals, the legislaturecreated atwo-tiered system of medical exceptions to the general prohibitions on possessing or cultivating marijuana. E2SSB 5073 

### §§ 401, 402, 406 (codified as RCW69.51A.040, .043(1), (2)).

the parties agreethatthe initiative has no bearing on this case. Wedo notconsideroranalyze the initiative in this opinion. 6State 

### v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 Section 901 of the bill directed the state Department of Health and the state Department of Agriculture to "adopt rules for the creation, implementation, maintenance, and timely upgrading ofa secure and confidential registration system." E2SSB 5073, 

### § 901(1). Any established registry was required to allow (a) A peace officer to verify at any time whether a health care professional has registered a person as either a qualifying patient or a designated provider; and (b) A peace officer to verify at any time whether a person, location, or business is licensed

.... E2SSB 5073, 

### § 901 (as passed by the legislature) (vetoed); 

### see LAWS OF 2011, ch. 181, 

### § 901. Registration ofqualifying patients and designated providerswas optional. Registration would place the burden on law enforcement officials to establish thatthe terms and conditions of the medical marijuana exceptions were not being satisfied. E2SSB 5073, 

### §901 (4) (vetoed); 

### see RCW69.51A.040. Once established, the registry would provide registered users heightened protection from arrest, prosecution, criminal sanctions, and civil consequences based solely on their medical use of marijuana. E2SSB 5073, 

### § 102(2)(a) (codified as RCW 69.51A.005(2)). Otherwise compliant but nonregistered, users were entitled to raise an affirmative defense. E2SSB 5073, 

### § 402 (codified as RCW 69.51A.043). In April 2011, the United StatesAttorneys forthe Eastern and Western Districts ofWashington wrote an advisory letterto Governor Gregoire regarding Laws of2011, chapter 181. This letter explained the Department ofJustice's position on the bill: "The Washington legislative proposals will create a licensing scheme that permits large-scale marijuana cultivation and distribution. This would authorize conduct contrary to .federal law and thus, would undermine the federal government's efforts to regulate the possession, manufacturing, and trafficking of controlled substances

.... In addition, state employees who conducted activities mandated by the Washington 7State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 legislative proposals would not be immune from liability under the CSA [Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. ch. 13]. Potential actions the Department could consider include injunctive actions to prevent cultivation and distribution of marijuana and other associated violations of the CSA; civil fines; criminal prosecution; and the forfeiture of any property used to facilitate aviolation ofthe CSA." Cannabis Action Coal. 

## v. City ofKent, 180 Wn. App. 455, 464, 322 P.3d 1246 (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted), reviewgranted, 182 Wn.2d 1022, 336 P.3d 1165 (2014). Following receipt of this letter, the governor vetoed 36 sections that would have established and monitored a state licensed medical marijuana registry, including the legislature's statement of intent in section 101. See LAWS OF 2011, ch. 181, at 1376 (governor's veto message). No registry currently exists. However, the governor did not veto sections 401, 402, or 406, reasoning that the latter sections
were still meaningful becausethey "establish affirmative defenses" and "govern those who have not registered." 

### /d. Sections 402 and 406 (codified as RCW 69.51A.043(1) and (2), respectively) establish affirmative defenses for patients who have not registered. Section 401 (codified as RCW 69.51A.040) identifiesthe requirements for qualifying patients to receive heightened protections, beyond the ability to establish
an affirmative defense.As enacted, RCW 69.51A.040 provides heightened protection forqualifying patients and designated providerswho, among otherthings, registerwith the Department of Health.

Ill. Statutory Interpretation RCW 69.51A.040, as passed, does not decriminalize the medical use of marijuana. Instead, the plain language ofthe statute establishes a limited exception to the general prohibition against marijuana that existed at the time that the search warrant in this case issued. This interpretation is supported by the context in which 

### 8State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 the statute appears, the statute's placement within the statutory scheme, and the governor'sveto message accompanying E2SSB 5073. See LAWS OF2011, ch. 181, at 1374-76. The legislature may have intended to create heightened protections for qualifying patients who registered. However, because registration is currently impossible, the statute provides qualifying patients with only an affirmative defense untilthe legislature is ableto establish a registry. Therefore, we reject Reis's argument and affirm the Court ofAppeals. A. Plain language ofthe statute We begin with the plain language ofthe statute. As enacted, RCW 69.51A.040 reads in relevant part: The medical use ofcannabis in accordance with the terms and conditions of this chapter does not constitute a crime and a qualifying patient or designated provider in compliance with the terms and conditions of this chapter may not be arrested, prosecuted, or subject to other criminal sanctions orcivil consequences ... if:
(2) The qualifying patient or designated provider presents his or her proofofregistration with the departmentofhealth, to any peace officerwho questionsthe patient or provider

... ; (3) The qualifying patient or designated provider keeps a copy of his or her proof of registration with the registry established in section 901 of this act and the qualifying patient or designated provider's contact information posted prominently next to any cannabis plants, cannabis products, or useable cannabis located at his or her residence;
(6) The investigating peace officer has notobserved evidence of any ofthe circumstances identified in section 901(4) ofthis act. The language of this statute is clear and unambiguous: the medical use of cannabis is not a crime ifeach ofthe terms and conditions is complied with by either 9State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 qualifying patients ordesignated providers. Theterms and conditions are provided for in RCW 69.51A.040, and the terms "qualifying patient" and "designated provider" are defined. See RCW 69.51A.010. Because the terms are defined within the statute, we need not look outside the statute to determine their meaning. State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 271, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) ('"Words are giventhe meaning provided bythe statute or, in the absence ofspecificdefinition, theirordinary meaning."' (quoting State


### v. Standifer, 110 Wn.2d 90, 92, 750 P.2d 258 (1988))). It follows that one who does notsatisfythe terms and conditions, orwho is not aqualifying patient or a designated provider, is not entitled to the enumerated protections in this statute. B. Chapter69.51A RCWcreates an affirmative defense to the general prohibition on marijuana The context of the statute supports our plain language interpretation. We interpret laws dealing with the same or similar issues by considering them together. Bainbridge IslandPolice Guildv. CityofPuyallup, 172Wn.2d 398, 423, 259 P.3d 190 (2011). This is particularly relevant when analyzing exceptions-we do not analyze individual subsections in isolation from the other sections ofthe statute when doing
so would underminethe overall statutory purpose. In re Pers. Restraintof Adams, 178 Wn.2d 417, 424, 309 P.3d 451 (2013). The Controlled Substances Act makes it a crime to possess, manufacture, or distribute marijuana in Washington. See RCW 69.50.401-.455. The medical use of marijuana is an exception to this general prohibition, RCW 69.51A.020. The protections available through this exception vary based on a qualifying patient's or designated provider's adherencetotheterms and conditionsgoverningthe exception. RCW 69.51A.040. In this context, the amended MUCA clearly establishes a tiered 10State 

### v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 system of protections for compliant, qualifying users of medical marijuana: RCW 69.51A.040 and a series of affirmative defenses for qualifying patients failing the requirements of RCW 69.51A.040. RCW 69.51A.043, .045, .047. RCW 69.51A.040 decriminalizes cannabis used for medical purposes in accordance with the statutory scheme. This statute affords the highest level of protections for qualifying patients and designated providers who use cannabis "in accordance with the terms and conditions ofthis chapter." RCW 69.51A.040. There
are six required "termsand conditions" containedwithin RCW69.51A.040. Subsection (1) places limits on the quantity of cannabis that a qualifying patient or designated provider may possess. Subsections (2) and (3) require registration with the Department of Health-now impossible in light of the governor's veto-and require that the patient keep their registration within their home and present it to inquiring investigating officers. Subsections (4), (5), and (6) requirethatthe investigating officer not possess evidence that the qualifying patient or designated provider is converting marijuana fortheirown use or benefit, orotherwiseviolating distribution requirements
or registration requirements. If a qualifying patient or designated provider complies with all of these requirements, including registration, the use of marijuana "does not constitute a crime." 

### /d. RCW 69.51A.043 provides an affirmative defense for the medical use of cannabis. The legislature madethe distinction between section .040 and section .043 rest on whether the user was registered in the state registry. RCW 69.51A.040 (expressly requiring registration and display of registration); RCW 69.51A.043(2) ("A qualifying patient or designated provider who is not registered with the registry

... 11State 

### v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 may assert an affirmative defense to charges of violations of state law relating to cannabis through proof at trial, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she otherwise meets the requirements of RCW 69.51A.040."). Reis argues that this language is ambiguous because "RCW 69.51A.040 decriminalizes the same activity which RCW 69.51A.043 affords an affirmative defense." But nothing in the text ofthe statute enacted following the governor's veto supports this interpretation. Even though there is no registry, we cannot simply read that requirement out ofthe statute. See G-P Gypsum Corp. 

## v. Dep'tofRevenue, 169 Wn.2d 304, 309, 237 P.3d 256 (2010) ('"[s]tatutes must be interpreted and construed
so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous"' (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State

## v. J.P, 149Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003))). By its language, RCW 69.51A.040 decriminalizes activities for individuals who have, amongst other things, registered with the Department of Health, while RCW 69.51A.043 provides an affirmative defense for those who have not registered. An affirmative defense admits the defendant committed a criminal act but pleads an excusefordoing so. State

## v. Votava, 149Wn.2d 178, 187-88,66 P.3d 1050 (2003). Reis's reading would render RCW 69.51A.043 superfluous-there is no need for an affirmative defense to provide an excuse for conduct that is not unlawful. See State v. Kurtz, 178Wn.2d466, 478, 309 P.3d 472 (2013) (explainingthatan affirmative defense is necessary only when one's conduct falls outside the specific conduct protected under RCW 69.51A.040). Thus, Reis's argument turns the plain language ofthe statute on its head: the affirmative defense provisions are essential protections
12State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 for qualifying patients and designated providers because no one can enjoy the heightened protections of RCW 69.51A.040 in the absence ofa registry. 

### C. Legislative Intent For the reasons discussed above we hold that chapter 69.51A RCW provides medical marijuana patients with only an affirmative defense. Reis responds to these plain language arguments by asserting that RCW 69.51A.040 plainly reads, "[T]he medical use ofcannabis

...does notconstitute acrime," citing to ouropinion in 

### Kurtz, 178 Wn.2d at 478. He also argues that the codified legislative intent of RCW 69.51A.005 plainly articulates the purpose of the amendment and that our reading should give effectto this purpose. 

### Kurtz addressed whether the 2011 amendments to MUCA abrogated the
common law medical necessity defense. The court, in holding that the amendments did not abrogate the common law medical necessity defense, stated that "the legislature amended theAct making qualifying marijuana use a legal use, not simply
an affirmativedefense."

### /d. at476 (emphasisadded). Laterin that paragraph,the court repeated that "[t]he 2011 amendment**leg~lizing** qualifying marijuana use strongly suggests that the Act was not intended to abrogate or supplant the common law [medical] necessity defense."

### /d. (emphasis added). Ratherthan interpretthe statute, these statements mirror the language in RCW 69.51A040 that "the medical use of cannabis in accordance with the terms and conditions of this chapter does not constitute a crime." (Emphasis added.) Because registration is a requirement for qualifying marijuana use under RCW 69.51A.040, 

### Kurtz does not support Reis's argument.


### 13State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 Reis also argues thatthe legislature intended to decriminalizethe medical use ofmarijuana by giving patients heightened protectionsfrom searches and arrest. This may be true; however, the legislative intent codified as RCW 69.51A.0056 does not trump the plain language ofthe statute to create an ambiguity. Declarations of intent
are not controlling; instead, they serve "only as an important guide in determining the intended effect ofthe operative sections." Kilian 

### v. Atkinson, 147 Wn.2d 16, 23, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). This is true even when the codified intent speaks directly to the enacted statute. Here, the governor's veto struck 36 ofthe 58 original sections; the legislature's statement of intent speaks to a statute thatwas neverenacted. Though the legislature's initial intent in passing this statute was never realized, Governor Gregoire articulated her intentforthe surviving portions ofthe amendments in her veto message. See LAWS OF 2011, ch. 181, at 1374-76 (governor's veto message). Our"'fundamental objective in construing astatute isto ascertain and carry outthe legislature's intent,"' Lake v. WoodcreekHomeowner'sAss'n, 169Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010) (quoting ArborwoodIdaho, LLC v. CityofKennewick, 151

6 RCW 69.51A.005(2) reads as follows: Therefore, the legislature intends that: (a) Qualifying patients with terminal or debilitating medical conditions who, in thejudgmentoftheir health care professionals, may benefitfrom the medical use ofcannabis, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, or subjectto other criminal sanctions or civil consequences under state law based solely on their medical use ofcannabis, notwithstanding any other provision of law; (b) Personswho actas designated providersto such patients shall also not be arrested, prosecuted, or subject to other criminal sanctions or civil consequences under state law, notwithstanding any other provision of law, based solely on their assisting with the medical use ofcannabis

.... 14State 

### v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 Wn.2d 359, 367, 89 P.3d 217 (2004)), and "[i]n approving or disapproving legislation, the Governor acts in a legislative capacity and as part of the legislative branch of government." Hallin v. Trent, 94Wn.2d 671, 677, 619 P.2d 357 (1980) (quoting Shelton Hotel Co. 

### v. Bates, 4 Wn.2d 498, 506, 104 P.2d 478 (1940) ("When referring to what the legislature intended, we must not forget that the governor ... [is] acting in a legislative capacity, and we cannottherefore considerthe intent ofthe house and the senate apartfrom the intent ofthe governor.")). Here, the governor'sveto message is the only statementoflegislative intentspeaking to the removal ofthe registryfrom the bill as enacted. The veto message conveys the governor's recognition thatthe bill will not provide heightened arrest and seizure protection and that qualifying patients and designated providers will instead be able to assert an affirmative defense. LAWS OF 2011, ch. 181, at 1374-76 (governor's veto message). GovernorGregoire explained that she decidedto vetothe registry because she
was "open to legislationthat establishes asecure and confidential registration system to provide arrest and seizure protections under state lawto qualifying patients

...." 

### /d. at 1376. This strongly suggests that the governor recognized that this bill would not provide those protections. She then announced that she would veto sections 901 and 902, stating that "[w]ithout a registry, these sections are not meaningful." 

### /d. However, the governordeclined to veto sections 402 and 406; these sections provide
an affirmative defense for qualifying patients and designated providers who are not registered. 

### /d. The governor explicitly recognized that these sections remain meaningful without a registry "[b]ecause these sections govern those who have not registered." 

### /d. Thus, the legislative intent does not support Reis's argument. 

### 15State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 Applying each of these well-established principles of statutory interpretation leads to the conclusion that RCW 69.51A.040 does not decriminalizethe medical use ofcannabis. It is currently impossibleto complywith each ofthe requirements in RCW 69.51A.040 because a registry does notcurrently exist. Followingthe governor'sveto, chapter 69.51A RCW does not provide for the heightened search and arrest protections thatthe legislature may have intended. See RCW 69.51A.005(2); E2SSB 5073, 

### § 101 (vetoed). Instead, qualifying patients and designated providers are provided with an affirmative defense and RCW 69.51A.040 establishes the elements for raising that defense. The possibility remains that the legislature may yet amend the statute to create a registry; this does not suggest that the current statute has multiple reasonable interpretations. It also does not suggest that the legislature intended to decriminalize marijuana withoutthe benefits ofa registry. D. We maynotmodifytheplain andunambiguous statutorylanguage Despite Reis's arguments, we do not havethe authority to rewritethe statuteto provide the enhanced protections that the legislature may have intended had it anticipatedthe governor'sveto. The court is not permittedto "speculate as towhatthe legislature intended, had it foreseen the veto." Shelton Hotel Co. 

### v. Bates, 4 Wn.2d 498, 509, 104 P.2d 478 (1940). Instead, we are leftwith the statute '"to be considered
nowjust as it would have been if the vetoed provisions had never been written into the bill at any stage of the proceedings."' /d. at 506 (quoting State ex ref. Stiner

## v. Yelle, 174Wash. 402, 408, 25 P.2d 91 (1933)). Indeed, this situation is analogous to
a legislative omission, a situation in which we have long recognized that
we do not have the power to read into a statute that which we may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an intentional or an inadvertent 16State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 omission

.... [l]twould be a clearjudicial usurpation oflegislative power for us to correctthat legislative oversight. State v. Martin, 94 Wn.2d 1, 8, 614 P.2d 164 (1980) (citations omitted). It is not this court's job to remove words from statutes or to create judicial fixes, even ifwe think the legislature would approve. Statutes that frustrate the purpose of others, though perhaps unintentionally, are "purely a legislative problem." State ex ref. Hagan 

## v. Chinook Hotel, Inc., 65 Wn.2d 573, 578, 399 P.2d 8 (1965). Until the legislature amends the statute or creates a registry, the MUCA provides qualifying patients with only an affirmative defense. IV. The Veto Does Not Undermine OurAnalysis ofthe Enacted Statute This statutory analysis has interpreted the relative statutes as ifthe legislature had written the statutes as they were enacted following the governor's veto. Nothing aboutthe governor's veto changes the way we interpretthese statutes. The governor's veto power, broadly construed since the territorial days, has evolved over time. See generally Wash. State Legislature 

## v. Lowry, 131 Wn.2d 309, 315-16, 931 P.2d 885 (1997). Initially, the governor's veto extended to full bills, sections of bills, and items in bills. WASH. CONST. 1889, art. Ill, 

### § 12. This powerwas limited by the 62nd amendment in 1974. Lowry, 131 Wn.2d at 316. Today, the Washington Constitution confers on the governor general veto authority over legislation and a different "!.ine item" veto power over "appropriation items": If any bill presented to the governor contain several sections or appropriation items, he may object to one or more sections or appropriation items

... Provided, That he may notobjectto lessthan an entire section, except that if the section contain one or more appropriation items he may object to any such appropriation item or items.

17State 

### v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 WASH. CONST. art. Ill,§ 12 (amend. 62). Thus, underthe generalveto powerexercised in this case, the governor may veto a whole bill or a section of a bill but cannot veto individual items or lines in bills. 

### /d. Governor Gregoire lawfully vetoed 36 ofthe 58 sections ofchapter 181. LAWS OF 2011, ch. 181, at 1376 (governor's veto message). She vetoed section 901 which would have established and monitored a state licensed medical marijuana registry, but did notveto references to section 901, in the amended MUCA. As a result ofthe governor's choice not to veto references to the registry, these references remain in the bill, codified as chapter 69.51A RCW. Therefore, we must analyze the effect that Governor Gregoire's veto has on the remaining references to the vetoed sections. Specifically, we must address the references to a state registry. The governor's veto completely removes the vetoed material from the legislation. Hallin, 94 Wn.2d at 677. The act is "'to be considered nowjust as it would have been ifthe vetoed provisions had never been written into the bill at any stage of the proceedings."' Shelton HotelCo., 4Wn.2d at 506 (quoting State exref. Stiner, 174 Wash. at408). Reis relies on these cases, as well as Washington Federation ofState Employees v. State, 101 Wn.2d 536, 545, 682 P.2d 869 (1984), to arguethatwe must disregard notonlythevetoed provisionsthemselves butalso all remaining references to the vetoed sections. But this case differs from Hallin, Shelton Hotel Co., and Washington Federation in one major way: in those cases the disregarded language
was actually vetoed; in this case, the references to the registry were never vetoed from RCW 69.51A.040. Since the references to section 901 were not vetoed from

18State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 RCW 69.51A.040, we cannot disregard them. Accordingly, we reject Reis's argument thatthe medicinal use ofcannabis is no longera crime. Contrary to Reis's assertions, Washington Federation does not require this court to strike references to vetoed legislation. Washington Federation concerned a challenge to Governor Spellman's veto of Substitute House Bill 1226, 47th Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 53, at 511 (Wash. 1982). 101 Wn.2d at 538. Theveto explicitly removed section 30 and all references to that section. /d. The petitioner in Washington Federation arguedthatthe removal ofthe related itemswasa line itemveto inviolation of article Ill, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution. 

### !d. In rejecting that argument, this court held: The veto of Governor Spellman was of an entire section and was valid. The deleted references to section 30 were incidentally vetoed purely as a ministerial act. If not deleted, the Code Reviser, pursuant to RCW 1.08.015(2)(m), would have taken out such "manifestly obsolete" references. /d. at544. Thus, Washington Federation permittedthe incidentalveto bythe executive branch of individual line items, despite the general prohibitions of Washington Constitution article Ill, section 12 (amend. 62). 

### /d. It does notaddresswhetheracourt must evaluate and disregard individual items of legislation that reference a vetoed section when those items survived the governor's veto. We decline to read these requirements out ofthe statute when theywere not actually vetoed by the governor. Governor Gregoire's veto message carefully and deliberately distinguishes between references that "are not meaningful" and those that "remain meaningful" following herveto ofthe registry. But even ifwe believed thatthe governoroverlooked these particular references, we do not have the power to edit the language of the
19State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0 enacted statute. In exercising the veto power, the governor is acting in a legislative capacity. 

### Shelton Hotel Co., 4 Wn.2d at 506. This court does not have the authority to read language out of a statute, even when we believe that the statute contains
errors or inadvertent omissions. 

### Cf. Martin, 94 Wn.2d at 8 (court does not have the powerto "read into a statute that which we may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an intentional or an inadvertent omission"). The governor'sveto did not eliminate the statutory language requiring registration in RCW 69.51A.040, and we cannot eliminate that language ourselves. We instead must limit our interpretation to the enacted statute; we therefore regard "the excised material

... as though it had never been written by the legislature." 

### Hallin, 94 Wn.2d at 678.

V. Lawfulness ofthe Search Warrant We hold that the search was valid because the plain language ofthe statute and the legislative intent as expressed in the governor's veto message lead to the conclusion thata useror possessorofcannabis may raise only an affirmative defense under MUCA. Reis concedes that the possibility of proving the affirmative defense does not undermine probable cause for a search warrant. 

### State

## v. Fry, 168Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010). CONCLUSION We affirm the Court ofAppeals and remand fortrial consistentwith this opinion.

20State v. Reis (William Michael), No. 90281-0



### (/

WE CONCUR.

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