United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-50809

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Danielle Elyce Randolph, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:21-CR-68-1

Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Danielle Elyce Randolph pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by 

a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). On appeal, she 

challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a special 

condition of supervised release allowing searches of her person and property. 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 16, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Because the search condition at issue was set out in the presentence 

report (PSR) and referenced at sentencing, but Randolph did not object, we 

review for plain error. See United States v. Dean, 940 F.3d 888, 890-91 (5th 

Cir. 2019). To show plain error, Randolph must show (1) an error (2) that is 

clear or obvious and (3) that affected her substantial rights. See Puckett 

v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If she makes such a showing, this 

court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

Randolph first argues that the district court procedurally erred by 

failing to explain why it imposed this condition. A district court abuses its 

discretion by not explaining how a special condition is reasonably related to 

the relevant statutory factors. See United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 

(5th Cir. 2014). If a district court fails to set forth its reasons for imposing a 

special condition, “a court of appeals may nevertheless affirm . . . where the 

district court’s reasoning can be inferred after an examination of the record.”

United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). 

Because neither the district court nor the PSR provided reasons, we 

must determine if we can infer the district court’s reasoning. See Caravayo, 

809 F.3d at 275. The PSR indicated that Randolph has an extensive criminal 

record, including two convictions for theft, five convictions for drug 

possession, one conviction for aiding and abetting possession with intent to 

distribute crack cocaine, and one conviction for assault. In addition, at the 

time she committed the instant offense, Randolph was on supervised release. 

Thus, we infer that the district court found that the search condition would 

be a “mechanism for enforcing other conditions prohibiting [Randolph’s] 

possession of drugs or firearms by facilitating the detection of evidence of 

other supervised release violations.” Dean, 940 F.3d at 891. In addition, in 

light of her criminal history and her previous violations of the terms of her 

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supervised release, Randolph has not shown an effect on her substantial 

rights because she has not shown that an explanation would have changed the 

sentence imposed. See id. 

Randolph also argues this search condition is substantively 

unreasonable because the need for it was not supported by the evidence, it is 

overbroad, and it is a greater-than-necessary deprivation of her right to be 

free from unreasonable searches. A district court may impose any condition 

of supervision that it deems appropriate as long as the condition is reasonably 

related to at least one of the relevant statutory factors. See United States 

v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 153 (5th Cir. 2009); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1); 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)-(D). The condition also “must be narrowly 

tailored such that it does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is 

reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes set forth in . . . § 3553(a).” United 

States v. Scott, 821 F.3d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted); see § 3583(d)(2). 

Again, because Randolph has an extensive criminal record, and she 

previously violated the terms of her supervised release, we conclude that the 

need for this search condition is supported by the record and it is not 

overbroad. See Dean, 940 F.3d at 891. We also have previously concluded 

that this condition is narrowly tailored because it contains limitations on a

probation officer’s authority to conduct searches. See id. at 892. In light of 

Randolph’s criminal history, the “possibility of intermittent searches is not 

too much of a burden on [her] already reduced liberty interest.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

For the reasons discussed above, Randolph has not shown that the 

district court plainly erred by imposing this search condition. Therefore, the 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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