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OLPARTMENTOF 

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:.-. CT'r^OATlOM^.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION •— f i r - ' ^ f f^ 

•"-''^' -" FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ;. . ^^..^^ZJ ;/ C 

1 O I. oq OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

' '• "" WASHINGTON, D.C. /Lrnl 2 0 2010 

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In the Matter of Brendan Airways, LLC 5 f r:' V "* s < ^-^ -- "-^ ^-' 

FAA Docket No. CP09EA0007 

DMS No. FAA-FAA-2009-0032 

Chief Administrative Law Judge Yoder 

COMPLAINANT'S FIRST RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S FIRST SET OF 

INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. AND 

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 

The Complainant reserves the right to supplement the following responses: 

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORIES 

Interrogatory #1 

Allegation 4 of section II of the Complaint contends that the spoiler servo actuators were 

placed in the maintenance mode during maintenance. On what date and during what 

maintenance operation were the spoiler servo actuators placed in the maintenance mode? 

Response to Interrogatory #1 

The Complainant does not know the exact date of the maintenance at this time, however, 

it is clear that the spoiler servo actuators were placed in the maintenance mode prior to 

the flight. The Complainant does not know during what maintenance operation the 

spoiler servo actuators were placed in the maintenance mode, however, it appears that the 

maintenance was performed by AAR. Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. §121.363 Brendan Airways 

is responsible for this maintenance. 

Interrogatory #2 

Please identify all of the facts that you contend support Allegation 4 of section II of the 

Complaint. 

Response to Interrogatory #2 

Prior to the flight there were several indications in the cockpit suggesting that left and 

right wing roll spoilers 3 and 5 were not operational, during the flight these roll spoilers 

did not fimction, and after the flight it was determined through visual inspection that the 

spoiler servo actuators were placed in the maintenance mode. 

Interrogatory #3 

Allegation 7 of section II of the Complaint contends that USA3000 performed 

maintenance on the aircraft's left wing roll spoilers three and five. Please identify the 

maintenance performed on each of those left wing roll spoilers three and five (limited to 

only the maintenance that is referenced by the Complaint), and state the date or dates on 

which this maintenance was performed. 

\, 
Response to Interrogatory #3 

See the Response to Interrogatory #1. 

Interrogatory #4 

Please identify all of the facts that you contend support Allegation 12 of section II of the 

Complaint. 

Response to Interrogatory #4 

The pilots witnessed the ECAM indicate this prior to takeoff, the EC AM was not 

malfiinctioning during the flight, if the ECAM is ftmctioning properly it will indicate that 

wing roll spoilers are not operational when they are in the maintenance mode, the spoiler 

servo actuators for the wing roll spoilers in question were in the maintenance mode 

during the flight. 

Interrogatory #5 

Please identify all of the facts that you contend support Allegation 13 of section II of the 

Complaint. 

Response to Interrogatory #5 

See the Response to Interrogatory #4. 

Interrogatory #6 

Please identify all of the facts that you contend support Allegation 19 of section II of the 

Complaint. 

Response to Interrogatory #6 

Left and right wing roll spoilers No. 3 and No. 5 were not operable during the flight and 

pursuant to the aircraft's MEL there is no circumstance in which the aircraft can be 

dispatched for flight when these spoilers are inoperable, and when the spoilers are left in 

the maintenance mode aerodynamic forces cause unwanted movement of the spoilers. 

Also the first landing attempt was aborted and the aircraft was damaged due to the 

inoperable wing roll spoilers. 

Interrogatory #7 

Please identify all of the facts that you contend support Allegation 20 of section II of the 

Complaint. 

Response to Interrogatory #7 

See the above and the Complaint. 

Interrogatory #8 

Is it the Administrator's contention that the flight was an operation that falls within the 

scope of Part 121? 

Response to Interrogatory #8 
Objection. Vague. 

Interrogatory #9 

If it is the Administrator's contention that the flight was an operation that falls within the 

scope of Part 121, then please identify all facts that support this contention and specify 

how that operation falls within the scope of Part 121. 

Response to Interrogatory #9 

Objection. Vague. 

Interrogatory #10 

Is it the Administrator's contention that the aircraft's left wing roll spoilers three and five 

were placed in the maintenance mode during maintenance performed by USA 3000. 

Response to Interrogatory #10 

Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. §121.363 it is the Administrator's contention that Brendan Airways 

is responsible for all maintenance performed on the aircraft. The Administrator does not 

know what individuals placed the aircraft's left wing roll spoilers three and five in the 

maintenance mode prior to the flight, however, it is the Administrator's contention that 

Brendan Airways is responsible for this maintenance. 

Interrogatory #11 

If it is the Administrator's contention that the aircraft's left wing roll spoilers three and 

five were placed in the maintenance mode during maintenance performed by USA3000, 

then please identify all facts that support this contention and specify which maintenance 

was being performed when these spoilers were placed in the maintenance mode. 

Response to Interrogatory #11 

See the Response to Interrogatories No. 1, 2, and 10. 

Interrogatory #12 

If it is the Administrator's contention that the aircraft's left wing roll spoilers three and 

five were placed in the maintenance mode during maintenance performed by USA3000, 

then please identify all facts that support the contention that the maintenance identified in 

INTERROGATORY # 11 was performed by USA3000. 

Response to Interrogatory #12 

See the Response to Interrogatories No. 1, 2, and 10. 

Interrogatory #13 

If it is the Administrator's contention that any other maintenance operation was 

improperly performed on the aircraft-aside from the aircraft's left wing roll spoilers three 

and five being placed in (and/or left in) the maintenance mode-then please identify this 

other maintenance. 

Response to Interrogatory #13 
The Complainant's only contentions about improper maintenance are found in the 

Complaint. 

Interrogatory #14 

The Respondent has asserted to the Administrator that the Respondent was not aware of 

the spoiler issue until the aircraft was in the air. Assuming only for the purpose of this 

interrogatory that the Respondent's assertion is correct, (a) does the FAA contend that the 

Respondent should have done anything differently upon discovery of the inoperable 

spoilers, and if so (b) what should he have done differently and (c) what is the objective 

standard upon which this contention of the Administrator is based. 

Response to Interrogatory #14 

Objection. This Interrogatory seeks information that would not lead to the admission of 

relevant or discoverable evidence. 

Interrogatory #15 

Please provide the identity and telephone number (business or personal) of each person 

the FAA intends to call as a witness in this matter. Please also provide a summary of the 

substance of the expected testimony of each person identified in response to this 

interrogatory. 

Response to Interrogatory #15 

The identity of any witnesses is a matter of trial strategy that has not yet been decided. 

The Complainant reserves the right to amend this answer as trial witnesses are identified. 

Interrogatory #16 

Please provide the identity and telephone number (business or personal) of each person 

the FAA believes has information or knowledge relevant to this matter. 

Response to Interrogatory #16 

Objection. Overbroad. Unduly burdensome. Further this Interrogatory requests 

information that would not lead to the discovery of relevant or admissible evidence. 

Notwithstanding the objection all witnesses who testified in the case of Administrator v. 

Surratt and Walker would have knowledge relevant to this matter. The telephone number 

of Aviation Safety Inspectors Laurence Johnson, Constantine Karamargin, Ernie 

Scardecchio, and Philip Stauffer is 610-595-1500. 

Interrogatory #17 

Please identify and provide the telephone number for each expert witness the FAA may 

call to testify in this proceeding. For each expert witness identified, please state the 

subject matter upon which each is expected to testify, summarize the substance of such 

expected testimony (including, without limitation, identification of all facts, treatises, 

reports and records that form the basis for such opinion). 

Response to Interrogatory #17 
The identity of any expert witnesses is a matter of trial strategy that has not yet been 

decided. The Respondent reserves the right to amend this answer as expert witnesses are 

identified. 

Interrogatory #18 

Please identify and documents and exhibits the FAA intends to introduce into evidence in 

the proceeding. 

Response to Interrogatory #18 

See the documents listed below: 

1. Section A of the EIR 

2. Section B of the EIR 

3. Section C of the EIR 

4. N265AV Aircraft logbook for the flight 

5. MAF Authorization Form 

6. USA 3000 GMM on MAF Flights 

7. ECAM Fault/Failure Classification-Airbus FCOM Vol 1 

8. ECAM Warning/Caution Classification-Airbus FCOM Vol 1 

9. Flight Warning Computer Flight Phase Description-Airbus FCOM VOl 1 

10. PFR for A/C N265AV dated 5/17/08 

11. Record of Telephone Call-David Beal 

12. Record of Interview-Tom Welsh 

13. Record of Interview-Eric Wormser 

14. Record of Interview-John Teufort 

15. Photos of N265AV's left wing during the flight 

16. Record of Interview-Joe Miller 

17. Frank Walker safety report 

18. Tony Surratt safety report 

19. Photos of wingtip damage 

20. N265AV aircraft logbook page 

21. Joe Miller 5/17/08 email 

22. Airbus AMM task 27-60-00 Spoiler Maintenance Practices 

23. William Hoffman 5:20:08 9:54 AM email 

24. William Hoffman 5:20:08 9:31 AM email 

25. Photo MVC 176F—ECAM display with all spoilers in (o) position 

26. Photo MVC 179F—ECAM display with left wing spoilers 3 & 5 in (m) position 

27. Airbus FCOM System Description of Flight Controls 

28. Flight Controls Controls and Indicators from USA 3000 FCOM 1.27.40 P 13 

29. Brendan Airways Normal Checklist 

30. SOP for Taxi from A320 FCOM 3.03.10 P. 2 

31. Flight Controls Controls and Indicators fi-om USA 3000 FCOM 1.27.40 P 9 

32. DFDR data-roll command from Captain's position 

33. DFDR data-roll command from First Officer's position 

34. DFDR data-Spoiler (2L, 2R, 3L, 3R, 4L) positions during Captain's flight control 

check roll input 
35. DFDR data-Spoiler (4R, 5L, 5R) positions during Captain's flight control check 

roll input 

36. DFDR data-Spoiler (2L, 2R, 3L, 3R, 4L) positions during First Officer's flight 

control check roll input 

37. DFDR data-Spoiler (4R, 5L, 5R) positions during First Officer's flight control 

check roll input 

38. DFDR data—left wing "down" roll command from First Officer's position. 

39. DFDR data-Spoiler (2L, 2R, 3L, 3R, 4L) positions during left wing "down" roll 

command from First Officer's position. 

40. DFDR data-Spoiler (4R, 5L, 5R) positions during left wing "down" roll command 

from First Officer's position. 

41. DFDR Summary Graph 8 showing spoiler positions for entire flight 

42. USA 3000 Airiines MEL Page 2-27-10 

43. USA 3000 Airlines MEL Page 2-27-11 

44. USA 3000 Airiines MEL Page 2-27-12 

45. USA 3000 Airiines MEL Page 2-27-13 

46. USA 3000 Airiines MEL Page 2-27-14 

47. USA 3000 Airiines MEL Page 2-27-15 

48. Maintenance Control Shift Turnover Log for 5/17/05 Pages 23-35 

49. May 30, 2008 LOI to Brendan Airways 

50. June 11, 2008 response to LOI 

51. Event Summary Timeline 

52. USA 3000 Airiines MEL TASK 27-64-01 Page 3-27-11 

53. USA 3000 Airiines MEL TASK 27-64-01 Pages 4-27-25 to 4-27-29 

54. Airbus A3 20 Aircraft Maintenance Manual 27-00-00 Pages 1-8 

55. June 16,2008 Joseph Guhin letter to Laurence Johnson 

56. June 13, 2008 Joe Miller letter to Joseph Guhin 

57. Document titled GWY 7265-17 May 2008 signed by Joseph Miller 

58. May 22, 2008 letter from Thomas Martin to Jack Eastman 

59. June 2, 2008 letter from Thomas Martin to William Hoffman 

60. June 4, 2008 letter from Thomas Martin to William Hoffman 

61. August 12, 2008 letter from Thomas Martin to William Hoffman 

62. June 3, 2008 letter from AAR services to Luis Carmona 

63. May 30,2008 letter from AAR services to Luis Carmona 

64. Chain of emails from Phil Stauffer 6/16/2008 to Tim Dulin; from Tim Dulin to 

Eric Blancaneaux; from Christine Escala to Tim Dulin; and Tim Dulin to Phils 

Stauffer. 

65. Document dated May 29, 2008 sent from Delloris McGoldrich to Chas Neil (This 

document is more or less a cover page of the DFDR data for the flight which is 

available on a CD in the possession of the Complainant. This DFDR data consists 

of thousands of pages of data and will not be turned over at this time as most of 

the data is not relevant to this case and upon information and belief the 

Respondent already possesses this data). 

66. N265AV Graph 1 

67. N265AV Graph 8 
Interrogatory #19 

Is it the Adminisfrator's contention that Respondent was aware, before take-off and 

during the flight, that the spoilers were not ftmctioning properly? If the answer to this 

question is "yes," then please identify each natural person who was "aware" and identify 

any facts or evidence that supports the Administrator's claim that the individual was 

"aware". 

Response to Interrogatory #19 

Both of the pilots who operated the aircraft during the flight either were aware that the 

aircraft's ECAM indicated that left and right wing roll spoilers 3 and 5 were not 

operational. Furthermore, if the pilots actually performed a flight control check they 

would have been aware that the spoilers were not ftmctioning properly prior to takeoff. 

The facts are that the pilots admit they saw the ECAM indications, the ECAM system 

was functioning properly, if the ECAM system is ftmctioning properly the ECAM will 

show that these spoilers are not operational if they are put in the maintenance mode, the 

flight control check requires the pilots to test the spoilers, and if the spoiler servo 

actuators for the spoilers are in the maintenance mode then the spoilers will not fimction 

during the flight control check. 
RESPONSE TO PRODUCTION REQUESTS 

Production Request #1 

A copy of selected documents has been previously provided by the Administrator to the 

Respondent. Please provide each document that has been collected and/or retained as a 

part of the FAA's investigation into the flight, but has not yet been released to 

Respondent. 

Response to Production Request #1 

To avoid confiasion the Administrator is producing all of the documents referenced in 

Response to Interrogatory No. 18. 

Production Request #2 

Please provide each document or record indicating the meaning or meanings of the amber 

LAF DEGRADED message on the aircraft's ECAM. If all responsive documents were 

included in the EIR, then a reference to the specific pages that are responsive would be 

sufficient to meet this request for production. 

Response to Production Request #2 

See the attached. 

Production Request #3 

Please provide each document or record suggesting that the aircraft's ECAM indicated 

that any wing spoilers were not operational during the flight, but prior to take-off. If all 

responsive documents were included in the EIR, then a reference to the specific pages 

that are responsive would be sufficient to meet this request for production. 

Response to Production Request #3 

See the attached. 

Production Request #4 

Please provide each document or record suggesting that the respondent was aware that 

the aircraft's ECAM indicated that any wing spoilers were not operational during the 

flight, but prior to take-off. If all responsive documents were included in the EIR, then a 

reference to the specific pages that are responsive would be sufficient to meet this request 

for production. 

Response to Production Request #4 

See the attached. 

Production Request #5 

Please provide each document or record suggesting that the aircraft's ECAM indicated 

that any wing spoilers were not operational during the flight, but after take-off. If all 

responsive documents were included in the EIR, then a reference to the specific pages 

that are responsive would be sufficient to meet this request for production. 
Response to Production Request #5 

See the attached. 

Production Request #6 

Please provide each document or record suggesting that the respondent was aware that 

the aircraft's ECAM indicated that any wing spoilers were not operational dviring the 

flight, but after takeoff. If all responsive documents were included in the EIR, then a 

reference to the specific pages that are responsive would be sufficient to meet this request 

for production. 

Response to Production Request #6 

See the attached. 

Production Request #7 

To the extent that such documents have not already been provided, please provide each 

document or record that supports any allegation made by the FAA in the Complaint in 

this case. 

Response to Production Request #7 

See the attached. 

Production Request #8 

Please provide all notes taken by any FAA inspector with respect to this case. If all 

responsive documents were included in the EIR, then a reference to the specific pages 

that are responsive would be sufficient to meet this request for production. 

Response to Production Request #8 

Objection. Vague. Further this Interrogatory requests information that will not lead to 

the discovery of relevant or admissible evidence and includes information that is 

protected by attorney client privilege. Notwithstanding the objection see the attached. 

Production Request #9 

Please provide all FAA policies that provide guidance on maintenance acceptance flights. 

Response to Production Request #9 

Objection. This Interrogatory requests information that will not lead to the discovery of 

relevant or admissible evidence. Notwithstanding the objection FAA policies are readily 

available to the public online. 

Production Request #10 

Please provide each document (that was not previously provided) that responds to any 

interrogatory propounded to the FAA from the Respondent. 

Response to Production Request #10 
Objection. Overbroad, vague, and unduly burdensome. Notwithstanding the objection 

see the attached docimients. 

Production Request #11 

Please provide the entirety of each EIR and all other investigative records associated with 

the investigation of AAR in relation to the incidents described in the Complaint. For 

your reference (but not to be construed as a limitation) one relevant FAA investigation 

file number may be 2008SO190220. 

Response to Production Request #11 

Objection. This Interrogatory requests information that will not lead to the discovery of 

relevant or admissible evidence. Besides the EIR number you cite above the only other 

known EIRs are the ones for pilots Surratt and Walker the releasable portions of which 

you have previously been provided. Concerning the EIR you cite the case was closed 

with no action and is scheduled for expungement. If and when a copy of this EIR can be 

obtained it will be provided in a subsequent response to discovery. 

Production Request #12 

Please provide each other EIR associated with the investigation of any other party in 

relation to the incident described in the Complaint. 

Response to Production Request #12 

The releasable portions of the Surratt and Walker EIRs have previously been provided to 

you. 

10 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 

Admission Request #1 

The Administrator admits that the Respondent did not know that the aircraft's spoilers 

were in maintenance mode until after the flight. 

Response to Admission Request #1 

Deny 

Admission Request #2 

The Administrator admits that the Respondent did not know that there was a problem 

with the spoilers until after the aircraft had left the ground for the flight. 

Response to Admission Request #2 

Deny 

Admission Request #3 

The Administrator admits the Captain Surratt, a pilot on the flight, did not know that 

there was a problem with the spoilers until after the aircraft had left the grotmd for the 

flight. 

Response to Admission Request #3 

Deny 

Admission Request #4 

The Administrator admits that Captain Walker, a pilot on the flight, did not know that 

there was a problem with the spoilers until after the aircraft had left the ground for the 

flight. 

Response to Admission Request #4 

Deny 

Admission Request #5 

The Adminisfrator admits that the USA3000 Pilots' Quick Reference Handbook provides 

a procedure for landing with inoperative spoilers. 

Response to Admission Request #5 

Admit 

Admission Request #6 

The Administrator admits that the US A3 000 A3 20 flight manual provides a procedure for 

landing with inoperative spoilers. 

Response to Admission Request #6 

Admit 

11 
Admission Request #7 

The Administrator admits that on the first landing attempt during the flight, the 

Respondent followed the procedure for landing with inoperative spoilers that was found 

in the flight manual and the Quick Reference Handbook. 

Response to Admission Request #7 

The Complainant has no knowledge as to whether the Respondent followed the procedure 

for landing with inoperative spoilers. 

Admission Request #8 

The Administrator admits that on May 19, 2008, the USA3000 filed a voluntary 

disclosure report concerning the incident described in the Complaint. 

Response to Admission Request #8 

Admit 

Admission Request #9 

The Administrator admits that on June 2, 2008, the Administrator sent a letter accepting 

the voluntary disclosure report filed by US A3 000 concerning the incident described in 

the Complaint. 

Response to Admission Request #9 

Admit, but note that on August 12, 2008 the Complainant sent another letter rescinding 

the acceptance of the voluntary disclosure. 

Admission Request 10 

The Administrator admits that the document attached as appendix A is a true and correct 

copy of a letter sent to the FAA by AAR on or about May 30, 2008. 

Response to Admission Request #10 

Admit 

Admission Request #11 

The Administrator admits that the docimient attached as appendix A addresses the 

maintenance incidents described in the allegations of the Complaint. 

Response to Admission Request #11 

The document attached as appendix A speaks for itself. 

Admission Request #12 

The Administrator admits that the document attached as appendix B is a true and correct 

copy of a letter sent by the FAA to USA 3000 on or about May 22, 2008. 

Response to Admission Request #12 

Admit 

12 
Admission Request #13 

The Administrator admits that the document attached as appendix C is a true and correct 

copy of a letter sent by the FAA to USA 3000 on or about May 30, 2008. 

Response to Admission Request #13 

Admit 

Admission Request #14 

The Adminisfrator admits that the document attached as appendix D is a true and correct 

copy of a letter sent by the FAA to USA 3000 on or about June 2,2008. 

Response to Admission Request #14 

Admit 

Respectfiilly submitted, 

Alfred R. Johnson, Jr. 

Regional Coimsel 

By: /X& / />-— Date: /r/M / /9/A. ^ 

M. Cohen 

Attorney 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1 Aviation Plaza 

Jamaica, NY 11434 

Telephone: 718 553-3270 

Facsimile: (718)995-5699 

13 
^ ±OK J ~ L 

ENFORCEMENT INVBSTIGATIVB RBP^.^C 

(Read Order 2150.3 for instructions) 

Report Number 

2008EA170038 

Related .....imber 

2008EA170039 

ALLEGED VIOLATOR IDENTIFICATION 

1. Name 

DBA Name 

Designator U30A 

BRENDAN AIRWAYS LLC 

USA 3000 AIRLINES 

2. Address (Include zip code) 

MULLEN, JOHN J PRESIDENT 

335 BISHOP HOLLOW ROAD 

SUITE 100 

NEWTOWN SQUARE PA 19073 

TELEPHONE NUMBER 

5. 

7. 

8. 

FAA Cert. # 1 

U30A762J 1 

(610) 

6 . FAA 

SCHED 

Aviation Employer 

AIRCRAFT 

MAKE AIRBUS 

323-1234 1 3 

Certieicata 

AIR CARRIER 

ENGINE, PROPELLER, 

1 9. MODEL A3202ia 

. DATE OF 

Type 1 

121 &/0| 

BIRTH / / 1 4. 

SMALL BUSINESS CONCERN 

COMPONENT OR APPLIANCE INVOLVED 

1 

1 

10. IDENT. NUMBER 

ACFT SN 427 

2fi5AV 

SEX 

11. Ovmer Name 

12. Address (Include zip code) 

ALLEGED VIOLATION 

I 13. Date Occurred | 14. Time | IS. Date Known to FAA | 16. Region of Discov 

I 2008/05/17 I 11:00 j 2008/05/17 j SO 

I 17. Location Sec Cat 

Airport ID 

• o 

d ^ ^ a;/.)A^ 

.Uj-i. 
SECTION B 

Statement of Case and Factors Affecting Sanctions: 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airlines) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 1 oflO 

I. STATEMENT OF CASE 

Summary; 

On May 17,2008, Brendan Airways LLC, dba USA 3000 Airlines, (al4CFR Part 121 

Air Carrier, Certificate Number U30A762A, performed a test flight (Maintenance 

Acceptance Flight-MAF) of aircraft N265AV departing from Miami International 

Airport, (MIA) Miami, Florida. This flight followed the release of the aircraft from a 

lengthy maintenance check (40 -t- days) by their Substantial Maintenance Provider (AAR 

Aircraft Services Inc. - Certificated Repair Station No. XE4R645M). N265 AV took off 

and flew a **test flight profile" for over 3 hours with 4 primary flight control roll spoilers 

inoperative. During landing the aircraft's left wing tip contacted the runway damaging 

the wingtip fence. 

Details of Case; 

The only flight flown by N265AV on May 17,2008, was from KML\ to KMIA and is 

listed on Aircraft Logbook page number 066670. The purpose of the test flight, 

identified as flight 115765, was recorded in the logbook as a "Lease Return and Hangar 

Check MAF" (Maintenance Acceptance Flight). (lOPl- N265AV Aircraft Logbook 

for fliglit on May 17,2008) 

The Brendan Airways MAF Authorization Form (M-35), referenced in the aircraft 

logbook entry for this flight, stated the purpose of the flight as "Acceptance flight test for 

redeliver to lessor and post maintenance visit." (TOP 2- MAF Authorization Form for 

test flight on 05/17/2008) 

The certificate holder's GMM (General Maintenance Manual) states the "USA 3000 

Engineering Representative will advise the Captain of the specific reason for the 

Maintenance Acceptance Flight. The repairs, replacements, adjustments or questionable 

conditions that warrant the Maintenance Acceptance Flight will be covered, with 

particular emphasis on conditions involving flight controls." (IOP3 -USA 3000 General 

Maintenance Manual on MAF flights) 

All Airbus A320 aircraft are equipped with an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor 

(ECAM), which monitors equipment status and alerts the flight crew to equipment 

failures on the aircraft. Equipment failures are classified by 3 classes. Class 1 messages 

are the most urgent and significant of the message classes. Class 1 failures always alert 

the crew with: 

• an aural warning, 

• a Master Warning or Master Caution Light 

• a display of the fault message in amber text on the flight deck ECAM Cathode 

Ray Tube. 
( 1 

SECTION B 

Statement of Case and Factors Affecting Sanctions: 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airiines) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 2 of 10 

The ECAM message referenced in this EIR ("F/CTL SPLR FAULT') is a Class 1 

message. (10P4 —ECAM Fault/Failure Classiflcation- Airbus FCOM Vol 1) 

ECAM Class 1 messages are further categorized and displayed in "Levels". An ECAM 

Class 1, Level 2 is a Caution Alert and corresponds to an abnormal condition which 

requires immediate crew awareness. It is always accompanied by 

• a Single Chime, 

• an illumination ofthe Master Caution light, 

• a display ofthe fault in amber text 

• an automatic call-up of the STATUS synoptic page relevant to the Caution Alert. 

The ECAM message referenced in this EIR ("F/CTL SPLR FAULT') is a Class 1 Level 

2 message. (IOP5 —ECAM Warning/Caution Classification - Airbus FCOM Vol 1) 

All Airbus A320 aircraft are equipped with a Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS) 

which recorded historical faults and warnings displayed to the crew. Each record 

identifies the time of fault and warning occurrence and the aircraft's phase of flight (as 

determined by the Flight Warning Computer). The CFDS system provides a printed 

Post Flight Report (PFR) at the completion of every flight. This report records a 

summary of faults, the UTC time of fault occurrence, and the flight phase during which 

faults were logged. For safety reasons, the Centralized Fault Display System is 

designed and programmed to hide (not display) some ECAM messages during the 3 

critical takeoff and landing phases of flight (identified as PH 3,4, 5, 7, 8). (IOP6 -

Flight Warning Computer Flight Phase Description- Airbus FCOM Vol 1) 

On 05/17/2008 at 1717 UTC, after the start ofthe first engine (identified as Flight Phase 

2 indicated by PH 2 on the PFR), N265AV's CFDS recorded the following ECAM 

Caution Message, "F/CTL SPLR FAULT' on the PFR (shown highlighted in green on 

lOP). This was the first of three identical fault warnings on the ground. This fault was 

confirmed and logged on the PFR by both ofthe aircraft's Electronic Flight Control 

System (EFCS) computers. Over the next 2 minutes, the PFR recorded multiple resets, 

from personnel on the flight deck, ofthe aircraft Spoiler Elevator Computers (SEC). 

These computers, among other functions, control the aircraft's primary flight control roll 

spoilers. The resets of these computers are logged as "F/CTL SEC 1, 2, or 3 FAULT' 

on the PFR. (IOP7 -Copy of PFR submitted by Brendan Airways for Flight U5765 

on 05/17/2008) 

The last fault recorded on the PFR while on the ground in Flight Phase 2 (PH2) was an 

ECAM Caution Message of "F/CTL SPLR FAULT' at 1720UTC. This occurred prior 

to take-off at 1725 UTC. The next F/CTL SPLR FAULT was recorded on the PFR at 

1732 UTC after additional resets ofthe Spoiler Elevator Computers from the flight deck. 

At this time, N265AV was in Flight Phase 6 (PH6), which starts at an altitude of 1500 
SECTION B 

Statement of Case and Factors Affecting Sanctions: 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airlines) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 3 of 10 

feet. (IOP7 -Copy of PFR submitted by Brendan Airways for Flight U5765 on 

05/17/2008) 

Maintenance personnel riding in the cabin during the flight state they saw roll spoilers 3 

& 5 "floating" (raised upwards) during the entire flight regime. (IOP8a through 

IOP8d—Witness statements from personnel onboard the flight.) 

Photographs supplied by Brendan Airways in response to FAA Letter of Investigation 

dated 05/30/2008 show left wing roll spoilers 3 & 5 deflected upward. (IOP9 — 

Photographs of N265AV's left wing during Flight U5765) 

During the approach for landing at MIA, N265 AV landed "hard" and '*rolled hard left" 

as described in statements by those on-board. All witness statements describe the 

aircraft bouncing upwards and rolling left wing down. The Director of Maintenance 

mentioned noticing that the "aircraft was not flaring... both main gears hit, came up and 

rolled left." He remembers hearing one ofthe flight crew state "we're losing it" and the 

other answer "I know". A go-around was initiated and the subsequent landing was 

accomplished successfully with a modified flap and increased speed configui'ation. 

Emergency vehicles were stationed along the runway during the landing. 

(lOPSa through (OP8d—Statements from crewmembcrs onboard the flight) 

(lOPlO—Statement from Brendan Airways Director of Maintenance Joe Miller) 

(lOPll—Safety report submitted to Brendan Airways by Captain Frank Walker) 

(IOP12—Safety report submitted to Brendan Airways by Captain Tony Surratt.) 

An inspection of N265AV was accomplished by Brendan Airways and AAR Aircraft 

Services maintenance personnel upon arrival at the ramp. It revealed that the left wingtip 

fence was damaged and the lower part ofthe wingtip fence and lower static wick were 

missing. (IOP13 —Photos of Wingtip Fence damage submitted by Brendan 

Airways) 

A statement entered in the aircraft logbook on 05/17/2008, after the flight, includes the 

comment "L/H wing tip damaged at landing." (IOP14—Copy of N265AV aircraft 

logbook page) 

An investigation accomplished immediate after N265AVs arrival at the ramp on May 17, 

2008, by representatives of AAR Aircraft Services Inc. and Brendan Airways revealed 

that the hydraulic confrols for roll spoilers 3 & 5 on the left wing were selected to the 

(M) manual "bypass" position. This was stated in an email from the Director of 

Maintenance to the FAA on-scene investigators in MIA on May 17, 2008. It is also 

confirmed by the USA 3000 line engineer who, along with the AAR representative, 
( I 

SECTION B 

Statement of Case and Factors Affecting Sanctions: 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airlines) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 4 of 10 

accomplished the inspection. The Maintenance Control Shift Log for 05/17/2008 also 

contains information on the spoila:s found in the (M) position. 

(lOP 15—Email statement by Joe Miller, DOM USA 3000 to FAA on-scene 

investigators in MIA) 

(lOP 8a - Record of Telephone Call - David Beale, CLE Line Enghieer 

(lOP 24—Maintenance Control Shift log for 05/1708 (page 30) 

The (M) manual position ofthe spoilers is a maintenance function only and allows 

technicians to move the roll spoiler as needed by hand during maintenance. The Airbus 

Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) does not permit any spoiler hydraulic control to 

be left in the (M) position for flight. A Caution Note in the AMM states that if the 

spoiler is left in the (M) position "aerodynamic forces will cause unwanted movement of 

the spoiler." 

(IOP16—Copy of Airbus Maintenance AMM task 27-60-00—Spoiler Maintenance 

Practices) 

On May 19,2008, the FAA requested that Brendan Airways replicate the spoiler servo 

control valve settings that were present on the MAF flight on May 17,2008. Brendan 

Airways provided photographs of N265AV flight deck ECAM displays taken when all 

roll spoilers are in the (O) "operational" position. Additionally, Brendan Airways 

provided photographs of N265AV flight deck ECAM displays taken when the left wing 

roll spoilers 3 & 5 were hydraulically bypassed by selection ofthe (M) '*manual" 

position. 

• Photograph No. 1 (lOP 17c) shows the ECAM display five green lines on both 

sides of ttie letters "SPD BRK" when all roll spoilers are operational and not 

deployed. 

• Photograph No. 2 (lOP 17d) shows the ECAM displays an amber line and 

nxmiber, corresponding with the faulted roll spoiler, when the left wing roll 

spoilers 3 & 5 are mechanically selected to the (M) position. This photo also 

shows the right wing roll spoilers 3 & 5 are also locked out hydraulically by the 

controlling Spoiler Elevator Computers exactly as it occurred during Flight 

U5765. The right wing spoiler lockout is a result ofthe flight control computer 

recognizing that the corresponding left wing spoilers are faulted, providing 

symmetrical flight control for both wings. 

o The "LAF DEGRADED" amber message is a function ofthe #5 spoiler 

servo being in left in the (M) position. This message does not show when 

the #5 spoiler servo is in the (O) position (see lOP 17c). 

(lOP17a through 17d—Email submission and photos by Brendan Airways on 

05/20/2008 to FAA Certificate Management Team) 

(IOP17e—Airbus description of LAF DEGRADED message) 
SECTION B 

Statement of Case and Factors Affecting Sanctions: 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airlines) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 5 of 10 

The Spoiler Fault recorded on N265AV's PFR at engine startup on 05/17/2008 for flight 

U5765 is a Class 1 Level 2 ECAM Alert. As previously documented in lOP 5, this 

would generate the illumination ofthe amber Master Caution light, a Single Chime and 

the display ofthe fault ("F/CTL SPLR FAULT') on the upper ECAM in amber text. It 

also will automatically display the ECANfl F/CTL System synoptic page on the low^ 

ECAM display. These multiple displays alert the crew to the "loss of one or more flight 

control roll spoilers." (IOP18- Flight Controls -Controls and Indicators—Airbus 

FCOM Vol. 1) 

The Normal Checklist used by Brendan Airways requires a Flight Control Check to be 

accomplished before takeoff by the flight crew by both the Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot 

Not Flying (PNF). The Brendan Airways Before Takeoff Checklist requires the crew to 

verify the correct operation of all the flight controls, including "the correct deflection 

and retraction of all spoilers." (Bold italics added for emphasis in this EIR) 

(IOP19—Brendan Airways Normal Checklist 7.01) 

(lOP 20—Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Taxi Checklist (FCOM 

3.03.10) submitted by Brendan Airways) 

Eight flight control roll spoilers are depicted as small lines on the ECAM Flight Control 

page. (Number 1 spoiler on both wings is a dedicated ground spoiler only.) The 

indications on the ECAM Flight Control page for roll spoilers (2, 3,4, and 5 on both 

wings) during a normal Flight Control Check would be all lines green with arrows 

pointing upwards on' the left side or right side as determined by the pilot's flight control 

side stick input. (IOP21— Flight Controls —Controls and Indicators—Airbus 

FCOMVoLl) 

The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) tabular data for command side stick and flight 

confrol positions during the flight control check accomplished several times show the 

left wing spoilers 3 & 5 did not deflect upwards when the left wing "down" command 

was present fix>m either the Captain's or First Officer's side stick. (The data highlighted 

in orange in this lOP indicates the failure to respond normally by left wing spoilers 3 & 5 

to roll commands from the cockpit). The left wing spoilers 2 & 4 always showed 

deflection when commanded. (The data highlighted in green in this lOP indicates the 

successful deflection of left wing spoilers 2 & 4 in response to cockpit roll commands). 

The Captain's flight confrol check was accomplidied at 1718 UTC and the First 

Officer's flight confrol check was accomplished at 1719 UTC. There is an additional 

First Officer "left wing down" command at 1720 UTC. There are no other roll inputs 

from the flight deck recorded by the DFDR data between engine start and lift-off at 1725 

UTC. 

In all of these of flight control tests, left wing roll spoilers 3 & 5 did not deflect 

according to DFDR data. This indicated no satisfactory flight control check prior to 

take-off (Bold italics added for emphasis.) 
( ( 

SECTION B 

Statement of Case and Factors Affecting Sanctions: 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airlines) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 6 of 10 

The summary graph (lOP 22j) shows the spoiler responses during the flight control 

checks before takeoff and during flight. On the ground left wing roll spoilers 3 & 5 did 

not deflect at all. In flight they "floated" responding to aerodynamic forces acting on 

them. (NOTE: Since Brendan Airways does not have a Fli^t Operations Quality 

Assurance (FOQA) program, the DFDR data is submissable per Order 2150.3b 

(IOP22—DFDR tabular data submitted by Brendan Afa^ays) 

The Airbus Fault/Failure classification states that for Class 1 failures "the failures must 

be repaired or entered in the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) before the aircraft can 

depart." It also contains a section named Dispatch Consequences. For Class 1 messages 

(the class in which this F/CL SPOILER FAULT is classified) the guidance is to refer to 

MEL for GO/NO GO decisions. (IOP4—ECAM Fault/Failure Classification- Airbus 

FCOM Vol 1) 

Brendan Airways MEL requires a maintenance procedure be accomplished before the 

aircraft can be dispatched with any spoiler fault. The MEL does not permit deferral for 

the combination of spoilers (3 & 5) indicated inoperative during the flight control check. 

(IOP23 —Brendan Airways MEL for inoperative spoilers) 

The Brendan Airways Maintenance Confrol Shift Turnover Log for May 17, 2008, has 

no record of a call from N265AV to report any problem with the spoilers or discuss 

MEL procedures prior to takeoff. On page 30 of this report, the log reports the 

unsatisfactory MAF flight and that the aircraft struck its left wing on the runway. On 

page 34 of this report, there is a note ofthe spoilers found in the (M) position upon 

examination. (IOP24—Brendan Airways Maintenance Control Shift Turnover Log) 

A Letter of Investigation (LOI) was sent on May 30, 2008, to Brendan Airways LLC 

informing them that the matter was under investigation by the FAA. (IOP25-Copy of 

LOI issued to Brendan Airways) 

A response to the LOI dated June 11, 2008, written by the Director of Safety and 

Regulatory Compliance was received from Brendan Airways, It included 26 

attachments as documentation. Some of those attachments have been included as Items 

of Proof in this EIR. (IOP26-Copy of Brendan Airways response to LOI) 

The time-line visually summarizes events relative to this EIR and combines data from 

both the PFR and DFDR. The time-line indicates multiple resets ofthe SECs and fault 

warnings relating to the spoilers indicated on the PFR in the first 3 minutes after engine 

start. The DFDR data shows the flight confrol checks were accomplished during these 

same 3 minutes. The aircraft was airborne 8 minutes after engine start. 

While the times are taken directly from the Post Flight Report (PFR) and Digital Flight 

Data Recorder (DFDR) data, the timeline is not to scale. It is solely meant to give a 
SECTION C 

Items of Proof 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airlhies) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 1 of 3 

Items of Proof 

Table of Contents 

lOP 1- N265AV Afrcraft Logbook for flight on May 17,2008 

IOP2- MAF Authorization Form -Form M-35 for test flight on 05/17/2008 

IQP3 -USA 3000 General Maintenance Manual on MAF flights 

IOP4 —ECAM Fault/Failure Classification- Airbus FCOM Vol 1 

IOP5 —ECAM Warning/Caution Classification - Airbus FCOM Vol 1 

IOP6 - Flight Warning Computer Flight Phase Description- Airbus FCOM Vol 1 

IOP7 -Copy of PFR submitted by Brendan Airways for Flight U5765 on 05/17/2008 

lOP 8—Statements from personnel onboard the flight 

lOP 8a - Record of Telephone Call - David Beale, CLE Line Engineer 

lOP 8b - Record of Interview - Tom Welsh, Quality Control Inspector 

lOP 8c - Record of Interview - Eric Wormser, Quality Confrol Inspector 

lOP 8d - Record of Interview - John Teufort, Stores Personnel 

IOP9 - Photos supplied by Brendan Airways of N265AV's left wing during Flight 

U5765 

lOP 10- Statement from Brendan Airways Director of Maintenance Joe Miller 

lOP 11—Safety report submitted to Brendan Airways by Captain Frank Walker 

lOP 12—Safety report submitted to Brendan Airways by Captain Tony Surratt 

lOP 13 —Photos of Wingtip Fence damage submitted by Brendan Airways 

lOP 14—Copy of N265AV aircraft logbook page 

lOP 15—Email statement by Joe Miller, DOM USA 3000 to FAA on-scene investigators 

inML\ 
SECTION C 

Items of Proof 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airlines) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 2 of 3 

lOP 16- Copy of Airbus Maintenance AMM task 27-60-00—Spoiler Maintenance 

Practices 

lOP 17 - Email submission and photos by Brendan Airways on 05/20/2008 to FAA 

Certificate Management Team & FCOM Description of Flight Confrols 

lOP 17a - Brendan Airways Director of Quality email verifying photos 

lOP 17b - Brendan Airways Director of Quality email labeling photos 

lOP 17c - Photo MVC 176F~ECAM display with all spoilers on N265AV in (O). 

operations position 

lOP 17d-Photo MVC 179F~ECAM display wifli left wing spoilers 3 & 5 on 

N265AV in (M) manual position 

lOP 17e - Airbus FCOM System Description of Flight Confrols 

lOP 18- Flight Controls -Confrols and Indicators—Airbus FCOM Vol. I 

lOP 19—Brendan Airways Normal Checklist 7.01 

lOP 20-Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Taxi Checklist (FCOM 3.03.10) 

submitted by Brendan Airways 

lOP 21— Flight Controls -Controls and Indicators—Airbus FCOM Vol. 1 

IOP22—DFDR tabular data submitted by Brendan Airways 

lOP 22a - DFDR data - roll command from Captain's position 

lOP 22b - DFDR data - roll command from First Officer's position 

lOP 22c - DFDR data - Spoiler (2L, 2R, 3L, 3R, 4L) positions during Captain's 

flight control check roll input 

lOP 22d - DFDR data - Spoiler (4R, 5L, 5R) positions during Captain's flight 

control check roll input 

lOP 22e - DFDR data - Spoiler (2L, 2R, 3L, 3R, 4L) positions during First 

Officer's flight control check roll input 

lOP 22f - DFDR data - Spoiler (4R, 5L, 5R) positions during First Officer's flight 

confrol check roll input 

lOP 22g - DFDR data - left wing "doAvn" roll command from First Officer's 

position 

lOP 22h - DFDR data - Spoiler (2L, 2R, 3L, 3R, 4L) positions during left wing 

"down" roll command from First Officer's position 

lOP 22i - DFDR data - Spoiler (4R, 5L, 5R) positions during left wing "down" 

roll command from First Officer's position 

lOP 22j - DFDR Summary Graph 8 showing spoiler positions for entire flight 
SECTION C 

Items of Proof 

Brendan Airways LLC (dba USA 3000 Airlines) 

EIR File: 2008EA170038 Page 3 of 3 

rOP23 - Brendan Airways MEL for inoperative spoilers 

rOP24 - Brendan Airways Maintenance Control Shift turnover Log pages 

lOP 25- Copy of LOI issued to Brendan Airways 

IOP26 - Copy of Brendan Airways response to LOI 

IOP27 -Time-line derived fix>m PFR and DFDR data 
Miy. 19. 2008 9:44AM 

r 

No. 0503 f. 1 

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PAGE 31/01 

vaol 

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P6im4l^(DBI01i01> 
USA 3000 AIRLINE^ GENERAL L .<NTENANCE MANUAL 

CHAPTER 4: FERRY FLIGHT POLICY Revision: Original 

SECTION 2: AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE ACCEPTANCE FLIGHT October 1. 2001 

c. Initiate a Maintenance Acceptance Flight Report, (Form M-35) completing all 

required blocks and fonA/ard it to the Line Engineering Manager. 

3. The USA 3000 Engineering or Quality Control Representative will advise the Captain of the specific reason for the Maintenance Acceptance Flight. The repairs, 

replacements, adjustments or questionable conditions that warrant the Maintenance Acceptance Flight will be covered, with particular emphasis on conditions 

involving flight controls. 

4. The USA 3000 Engineering or Quality Control Representative at the departing station will make an entry in the Aircraft Flight Log, in the corrective action column 

stating the reason and repairs, replacements, or adjustments accomplished. 

5. After completing the Maintenance Acceptance Flight, the Captain will sign in the 

discrepancy column of the Flight Log Page and include the statement "Maintenance Acceptance Flight Satisfactory" or "Maintenance Acceptance Flight Unsatisfactory". If the Maintenance Acceptance Flight Is unsatisfactory, the Captain will 

then enter all discrepancies in the Discrepancy Column. 

6. At stations, other than the USA 3000 Line Stations, authorization for the Maintenance Acceptance Flights will be transmitted via facsimile by Maintenance Control 

to a USA 3000 line engineering or quality control representative at the station 

where the respective aircraft is located. The facsimile authorizing the Maintenance Acceptance Flight will be placed In the aircraft logbook by the Captain prior 

to the aircraft departing on the Maintenance Acceptance Flight. When the aircraft 

returns from the Maintenance Acceptance Flight, the Captain will advise the line 

engineering or quality control representative of the result of the MAF. The line 

engineering or quality control representative will inform Maintenance Control of 

the results of the MAF. 

7. If the MAF was satisfactory with no discrepancies, a Maintenance Release will be 

entered in the Con-ective Action Block of the log page. An example of such an 

entry is: 

a. Maintenance Acceptance Flight Satisfactory - Aircraft Released for Service. 

8. This entry is then signed, to include certificate number, date, and station by the 

technician making the entry. The Airworthiness Release Block must be completed 

at this time. 

9. If the MAF was unsatisfactory, further troubleshooting and maintenance will be 

performed as required and the process repeated until the discrepancy is cleared 

and another MAF is performed and rated satisfactory. 

4-2- 2 
mUSA3000 

MAINTENANCE SYSTEM 

DESCRIPTION 

1.45.10 

SEQ 100 

P 3 

REV 32 

FAILURE/FAULT CLASSIFICATION 

The CentraHzed Fauk Display System (CFDS) identifiei the faulty system and puts any 

failures or faulls into one of three classes: 

Class 1: PalurBi ihdteated to the ffigfit crew by means of the ECAM, or other fliQht f 

deck eHStetr Theyi imnt be repaired or entered In the MB. {MInhnum f 

Equipment list) before the aiicraft can depart. / 

Class 2: Fmilts indteated to maintenance pereonnei by the CFDS, and which trigger a 

MAINT status entry on the maintenance part of the ECAM status page. The 

aircraft can operate with these faults, but they must be repaired within 10 

days. 

Class 3: Faults indicated to maintenance personnel by the CFDS, but which do not 

trigger a MAINT status. The operator may have these feuKs corrected at his 

convenience. 

FaihiMadl dasi M 

OpwfikMiit Gonso(]U6noM 

Indteatkntothaflighlcnw 

Dbpttcli BwuiKMwnco.': 

Indjcstiontotha 

mafntenancs team 

ami 

YES 

VESr 

AutenrtciHrdliplivtfti 

-* Wvnini or cmiwi.- • 

(namgi* on Enghw -^ 

VWaiiHI pj>pl^»;-, 

*-* Rap QFiMiottlon n Hit 

llgmdicto;''"~ 

Mm ttMEtx 

•Gor 

TWGOr 

Class 2 

NO 

YES 

JivBileble on the ECAM 

status page. 

1 

f 0 need to retar to M A 

•ccept for the mesaags 

t ATRBIFFT) 

For all the other dass 2 

ihnessage^ 'GO* without 

GonuiDons. 

for 10 days. 

YES 

Autonutfealy print out at Hw end or each flight: 

Fauk maasagei on the CFDS (Hist Right Report. 

Class 3 

NO 

NO 

M a not applicable 

YES 

Avaitoble on request 

through system report/Test 

U3K mS 0*21.1 I K 
afcfJS4 3000 

INDICATINQ/RECORDINQ SYSTEMS 

ECAM DESCRiPTIQN 

1.31.10 P 2 

SEQ 001 REV 35 

COLOR CODE 

The ECAM display uses a colar code that indicates the importanca of the failure or the 

indication. 

RED : The configuration or feilura requires icnmediate action. 

AMBER : The fflght crew should be aware of tha configuration or faBure, but need 

not tate immediai* action. 

GREEN : The item is operating normally. 

WHITE : These titles and remarics guide the fBght craw, as they execute various 

procedures. 

BLUE : These are actions to be canied out; or Bmitatkns. 

MAGENTA : These are particular messages that apply to particular pieces of 

equipmetit or situations (inhibition messages, for example). 

WARNINC/CAUTION CLASSIFICATION 

lEVB. SIGNinCATION AURAL VISUAL 

FAILURE MODE Laval3 

UNSI I 

Laval 1 

Rad wwnlnQ: Tha conAguratiaa or 

Mlun reqiiras immsdlate acdon: 

—Ahuafl In dangeroua configurstioiv or 

Imit nqM conditioni (eg: stsA 

o^jeadl ^ ^ 

— System faihn ahedng fR^A safety 

(eg: Eng nra, excess cab ar 

ConiJnuouB 

RepelMve Chbne 

(CRC) or spedflc 

sounder 

synthetic voibs 

Amber ceutteit T 

The fl^iM cn w ahodd be aware of the 

conliguretlon or faHun^ but does not 

need to lefce snv imnwdlaie actjoa 

I lowevBt dme and situatlan pamaUki)^ 

thoas cautions should M conaidaied 

wittnut delay to pravant any linthar 

ilagradrton of the affiartad syitem r 

- System Mu m wHhnit any dbaol 

coneaquanoe on the flight salMy (eg: 

HYP B SYS m PR> 

Stnito CHnn 

(scT 

- MASTER WARN 

light rad flashing or 

speciilc red Ight 

- Weming message 

(rad)an&WD 

- Autometie cal of 

the relevant sntem 

page on the SA) * 

Ambar caution: Requires crew NONE 

~ Failins leadhig to a loss of 

redundancy or system degradation 

J^:FCDCf[fault i ) 

!• MASr a CMJt 

Hjft amber steady 

-^.auuon meiaeg> 

(amMon^WD ' 

-AutamotiDcatar 

tha lalavant sratem 

page on the S ^ * . 

- Caution message 

(ambei) on E/WO 

generaly without 

pracedurai 

INFORMATION ADVISORY System paiamaten montoring NONE 

MEMO Infbnnation : Recals nomisl or 

automatle sslectian of Aaictions'which 

an temporarily used 

NONE 

- Automelio call of 

the relevant system 

page on the ^ The 

affected paianwier 

green. 

— Gnon, Amber, or 

Magenta 

on&WD 

except in some cases 

UK MSR 04»-Zt « 1311 
jITlffiifltfBllfflllfllfff 

mUSA3000 

INDICATINIVRECOROING SYSTEMS 

INDICATIONS ON E/WO 

1.31.15 

SEQ 001 

P 3 

REV 23 

fFU6HT PHASES 

SfNEBAL 

Thir FWC dMdM its fiunctkHis according to these ten fflght phi 

To improve itr operational efficacy, the computer inhibits some warnings and cautions for 

certain flight phases; It does so to avoid aiertihg tha piloti unnecessarily at times whiiti. 

they haws hi| ^ woridoads. such as during talceoff or landing. In tiiese two phases, the OU/ 

dlspby» xiagenti memos % TO*, INHIBITf (flT^phasQicS. t. and 5), and^ IDG INHIBIT , 

(fBght phases 7 and i). f " 

Note; TTrsss flight phases are difkrent from and independent of the ones that the FMGC 

uses. 

FtlSHT PHASE INHIBITIPN 

Two cases are possible (for instance):' 

0 ® FAILURE APPEARANCE 

DHIStn* 

2 I FUGHT PHASES INHIBmON 

Effect on E/WD: 

0 The failure occurs during phase 1. The B/\ND displays the warning immediately and 

continues to display it as long as the feilure is present, even in phase 2. 

0 The failure occurs during phase 2. The JE/\ND displays the warning only when the aircraft 

has entered phase 3, where it is not inhibited. Then the warning remains disptayed as 

long as the failure is present 

U3K UL 
USA 3000 PFR 05/19/2008 

A/C lOENT 

N265AV 

UTC 

1717 

171 a 

1718 

1719 

1719 

1719 

1719 

172a 

1727 

1728 

1732 

1732 

1732. 

1735 

1741 

1747 

1759 

1826 

1831 

1836 

1838 

1845 

1849 

1853 

1854 

1857 

PH ATA 

02 220000 

02 27000O; 

02 270000 

02 270000 

02 270000 

02 270000 

02 270000 

02 27000a 

06 520000 

06 216300 

06 270000 

06 270000 

OA 270000^ 

06 220000 

06 216300 

06 230000 

06 216300 

06 213100 

06 220000 

06 216100 

06 213100 

06 216300 

06 361200 

06 216300 

06 220000 

06 361100 

DATE 

05/17/2008 

GMT 

1702/0000 

FLTN 

U57265 

FROM/TO 

XXX/MIA 

PFR FILTER 

^ List of cockpit ECAM warnings displayed during flight 

WARNINO 

AUTO FLTAP OFF M F/CTL SPLR FAULT^ 

F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT ^ '^K- . . 

F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT 4 r ^^^fi(jj9 a 

F/CTL SPLR FAULT f Af \ 

F/CTLSEC1 FAULT fe- ^^^^^ ^ 

A£2f ^ 

1859 06 280000 

1900 06 220000 

F/CTLSEC2FAUL 

F/CTL SPLR FAULT^ 

DOOR R AFT EMER EXIT 

CONO TRIM AIR SYS FAUL 

F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT ^T 

F/CTL SEC 2 FAULT 4^ 

F/CTL SPLR FAUL-& 

AUTO FLTAP OFF (2) , 

CONO TRIM AIR SYS FAULT (2) 

COM ACARS FAULT 

COND TRIM AIR SYS FAULT 

CAB PR SAFETY VALVE 

OPEN 

AUTO FLTAm<R OFF 

AIR PACK 1+2 FAULT 

CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT 

COND TRIM AIR SYS FAULT 

AIR APU BLEED FAULT (2) 

COND TRIM AIR SYS FAULT (2) 

AUTO FLTA/THR OFF 

AIR ENG 2 BLEED ABNORM 

PR 

FUEL LTK PUMP 1+2 LO PR 

AUTO FLT A/THR OFF 

AIRMAN C AIRBUS 1W6-2007 Page I 
USA 300O PFR 05/19/2008 

1900 

1903 

1932 

1933 

1939 

1949 

1950 

1950 

1951 

1951 

19S2' 

1956 

2000 

2034 

2036 

2045 

UTC 

1717 

06 280000 

06 216300 

06 362000 

06 270000 

06 216300 

06 270000 

06 290000 

06 290000 

06 270000 

06 290000 

06 2700QO> 

06 320000 

06 216300 

08 220000 

06 216300 

08 270000 

PH ATA 

02 361134 

1717 02 361153 

171ft 02? 278451 

1718: 02_276451_ 

1728 06 216352 

1732 06 279434 

1732 06 276451 

FUEL R TK PUMP 1+2 LO PR 

CONO TRIM AIR SYS FAULT (2) 

AIR ENO 2 BLEED NOT CLSO 

MAINTENANCE STATUS F/CTL 

COND TRIM AIR SYS FAULT (3) 

F/CTL SPD BRK DISAGREE 

HYDGENG1PUMPL0PR 

HYD Y ENG 2 PUMP LO PR 

F/CTL SPLR FAULT 

HYD B SYS LO PR 

F/CTL SPLR FAULTf 

L/Q DOORS NOT CLOSED 

COND TRIM AIR SYS FAULT (4) 

AUTO FLT A/THR OFF 

CONO TRIM AIR SYS FAULT 

F/CTL SIDESTICK PRIORITY 

FAULT MESSAGE 

BMC2 OR SOLENOID 10HA2 

CKT 

OVPRESS-V5HA2 

L SF^LRS SERVO VLV SICEf 

OR OUTPUT FROM SEC1 7 

Log of faults recorded by CFDS 

SOURCE 

BMC 2 

BMC 2 

EFCSi; 

LSPLR6 SERVO VLV 32CEa EFC31 

OR OUTPUT FROM SECS^?^ 

TRIM AIR PRESS VALVE OR TEMPCTL 

PRESS SWITCH 

SEC1 ENGAGE INPUTS EFCS 1 

L SPLfii POS ERPOR 31CE5 

IDENT 

EFCS 2 / 

EFCS''2 

AIRMAN C AIRBL'S 1906-2007 Page 2 
Record of telephone call with USA 3000 Airlines employee. David Beal 

Position: Cleveland Line Engineer 

Date; May 30, 2008 

Location; Telephone 

FAA Inspectors Present: Inspector Karamargin & Inspector Stauffer 

Subject: N265AV. GWY Fit 7265 May 17. 2008 

1) Question? Describe in your own words just prior to the flight, take off and the wing strike? 

He stated they were performing a Maintenance Acceptance f^light (MAF), when he arrived 

at N26SAV he performed a walk around, started the APU, did not operated any flight 

controls , verified no ECAM warnings. Pilots did their checks and they taxied out and took 

iff. Spoiler's #3 & #5 on the left wing were floating during the entire flight. Russian pilot 

came out of the flight deck shortly after take off and checked both wings and stated spoilers 

#3 and #5 are up. Dave stated #3 & #5 spoilers were raised about 8 Inches during the 

entire flight. He also stated during the flight he performed checks on the lavatory system, 

galley ovens and other interior checks. He stated he was sitting in first class left side of 

aircraft and test flight was normal. The first landing there was no flair, it appeared we lost 

lift, right gear hit first, left wing down very far. Engines spooled up and we took back off. 

Flight deck door was closed the entire flight other than when the Russian pilot came out to 

check the wings. Second landing was much faster and was not normal to him. They taxied 

to the gate and noticed emergency vehicles all around them. He exited the aircraft and 

noticed the left wing tip was damaged. He needed a maintenance stand to inspect the 

wing, which was brought out by AAR mechanic Jefferson and they verified that the #3 & #5 

spoilers were in the maintenance "M* position. He stated tliat you could move the spoilers 

by hand. A hex head tool is used to move the spoilers to the bypass position. 

2) Question? Did anyone ask you about any ECAM Faults/Messages prior to take off, after 

engine start? "No" 

3) Question? Who was at the controls during the landing when the wing scrapped the 

ground? 'Bill was in the Captain Seat and Tony was in the First officer's seat. Joe Miller 

was in the 3*^ observer seat and the Russian pilot was in the 2"* observer seat'. 

4) Question? Who authorized you to be on this Maintenance Acceptance Flight (MAF)? "Joe 

Miller" 

5) Question? Did you observe any spoilers floating during the flight? "Yes left wing #3 & #5". 

6) Question? Did the Russian pilot sit in any pilot seat during this flight? "No". 

7) Question? Did the leasing company representative from ILC sit in any pilot seat during the 

flight? "ILC rep was not on the first flight but on the second flight, but did not sit in any pilot 

seat". 

8) Question? Any other damage noted? "No, NDT performed on wing tip fence bolts, bolts 

were not bent. Hand landing inspection performed but load 15 report showed no hard 

landing". 

Date: May 30, 2008 

Title: Aviation Safety Inspector, Airworthiness 

Signature: .;' - / ' 

:6> 
Interview 

Tom Welsh. May 30 2008 

Subject: N265AV, GWY Fit 7265 May 17, 2008 

1) Question? Describe in your own words just prior to die flight, take off and the wing strike? Take 

ofT was normal Was onboard to inspect lavatories and other interior items. Flight was 

approximately 3.S hours. He stated the left wing spoilers were raised during the entire flight, 

stated he was sitting in first class, right side, iiisle seat Right main rear hit then left wing down 

and from my seat you could see concrete out of the left aircraft windows. Cockpit door was closed 

during landing. Powered out of landing and took back ofT. He stated he thought he was going to 

crash. Second landing was fast After landing emergency vehicles were around them and he went 

with Dave and AAR mechanic to inspect left wing, they found the #3 & #S spoiler in the "M" 

position. 

2) Quesdon? Did anyone ask you about any ECAM Faults/Messages prior to take off, after engine 

start? "No" think door was closed. 

3) Question? Who was at the controls during the landing when the wing scrapped the ground? 

Captain seat had the younger guy in it First officer's seat had the older guy in it Russian pilot was 

in the 3"^ observer's seat and Joe Miller was in the 2"^ observer's seat 

4) Quesdon? Who authorized you to be on this Maintenance Acceptance Flight (MAP)? "Joe 

Miller" 

5) Question? Did you observe any spoilers floating during the flight? "Yes" left wing #3 A #S only. 

6) Quesdon? Did the Russian pilot sit in any pilot seat during this flight? "No" He noticed the 

spoiler floating. 

7) Question? Any Damage to aircraft after the landing? Only the left wing tip fence. 

8) Quesdon? Any thing you want to add? Only that he did not work on the spoilers and that the left 

wing had a flap rub strip replaced. 

y -/^ 

•j-T^- -i^''-''^ ,--^'-' ^ - /-/-'^^'•• > ^v l 

£> 
Interview with USA 3000 Airlines employee FAA Inspectors Present: 

Name: Eric Wormser: ^JErme Scardecchio PAL 

Position: Philadelphia Line Engineer !>-- " <^ /j / 

Ai&P Certificate #: 3038826 O^^m.*^. >>/-i*_^^ yX 

Employee Number: 3310 ' -^<=-*—^"^ ^^^'^^f-RV 

Date: 9 June 2008 

Location: USA 3000 Airline Philadelphia Maintenance Office 

Questions Regarding 17 May 2008, N265AV Incident at MIA 

1. Q) What date was the engine run after the inspection / engine change ? 

1. A) Couldn't remember. May 2008 

2. Q) Who was onboard during the post inspection run ? 

2. A) Believed Dave Beal was, but I wasn't working the day shift, I worked the night shift. 

3. Q) Who conducted the post inspection engine run ? 

3. A) Believed Dave Beal was, but I wasn't working the day shift, I worked the night shift. 

4. Q) What systems were functional checked during the post inspection engine run? 

4. A) Can't say for sure I wasn't onboard or working the day shift, I worked the night 

shift. 

5. Q) Can you describe in your own words what events/maintenance actions took place from 

the date of the post inspection engine run (after the run) up until of the test flight ? 

5. A) Paint detailing was going on. Emergency slides were being re-armed including the 

doors and hatches, engine and APU bleed air was being troubleshot. 

6. Q) Describe in your own words the events that transpired, prior to, during and. after the 

maintenance acceptance Fight of N265AV on 17 May 2008 at MIA airport ? 

6. A) Everyone showed in the AM. Aircrew was doing a preflight briefing. Joe Milled had 

briefed the maintenance crew the night before the test flight what to except and what 

was going to be checked. A maintenance weekly check was accomplished prior to the 

test flight, no issues were noted. It was a normal close the doors, push back and takeoff. 

I never entered the cockpit after boarding the aircraft. 

7. Q) Did anyone ask you about the ECAM Faults/ Message after engine start or prior to 

takeoff that day? 

7. A) No. 

8. Q) Who was at the controls during the fight and when the left wing scrapped the ground ? 

8. A) Unknown, the cockpit door was closed 

9. Q) After engine start or during the test flight did anyone exit the cockpit to the cabin ? 

9. A) Yes 

10. Q) If so, who? . 

10. A) The Russian pilot. J , Q y 
l0A.Q)When? 

1OA. A) About a third into the flight 

11. Q) What did he/they do 7 

11. A) Came out did some checks ofthe galley and water system. 

12, Q) During the test flight did anyone from the cockpit come into the cabin and look out 

the cabin windows at the spoilers ? 

12. A) Yes 

12A.Q)Ifso,who? 

12 A. A) The Russian pilot, only looked out the left side ofthe aircraft at the left wing 

spoilers. 

12B. Q)When? 

12B. A) About a third into the flight 

12C. Q) Did he/they make any statements or ask any questions ? 

I2C. A) No. 

13. Q) Who authorized you to be on the test flight that day, and what were your duties ? 

13. A) Joe Miller, my duty was an onboard observer. No duty task were assigned to me. 

14. Q) During flight did you notice any spoiler opening or floating ? 

14. A) Yes 

14A. Q)When? 

14A. A) About 30 minutes after takeoff. 

15. Q) Where was the Russian pilot sitting during the flight ? 

15. A) In the cockpit in one ofthe observers seat before the cockpit door closed after the door 

closed I couldn't say. 

16. Q) After landing what happen ? ^^ ^ 

16. A) First approach was normal until right before touch down, then the aircraft hit hard '^-* 

rolled left wing over, abruptly rolled right leveled off, engine's spooled the aircraft 

accelerated and the aircraft climbed. Second approach was uneventful, normal roll 

out, taxied off of the runway, MIA emergency team responded and followed us back 

to the ramp. Aircraft stopped short ofthe ramp due to construction, engines were shut 

down and the aircraft was towed to the AAR ramp. Didn't talk to any ofthe MIA 

emergency crew. 

17. Q) Did you notice any other damage to the aircraft, other than the left wing tip damage ? 

17. A) No 

18. Q) Is there anything else that you can remember that may help this investigation ? 

18. A) Shortly after the aircraft was parked a maintenance stand was requested a AAR & 

U30A mechanic's inspected the position of all the spoiler control values. # 3 & #5 left 

wing spoiler control values were found in the M (maintenance/bypass) mode/position. 

5L 
18A. Q) Had anyone from AAR asked you how to put the spoilers into the bypass position 

(M mode) ? 

18A.A)No. 

19. Q) Do you have a theory what may have caused or lead up to this event? 

19. A) Someone after the ops checks were completed on the spoilers' moved the spoiler 

control value into the M mode. AAR personnel accomplished un-dociunented maintenance. 

20. Q) You have any suggestions on how to prevent this type of incident in the future ? 

20. A) No, other than re-inspecting after any contract maintenance is completed. 
Record of Interview 

John Teufert. Mav 30 2008 

Subject: N265AV, GWY Fit 7265 May 17, 2008 

1) Question? Describe in your own words what happened? Take ofT was fine and he noticed the left 

wing spoilers were up in flight. Cockpit door was closed during flight He was onboard to perform 

operational checks of lights, lavatory, and galley equipment Landing was hard and aircraft rolled 

to the left. He state he was sitting in business class fist row, left window seat Pilot took badu^tT 

and second landing was faster, harder and rolled to the left as well. Fire trucks and police nV^ e 

aircraft 

2) Quesdon? Who was in the flight deck? First officer, Captain, Joe Miller and Russian pilot 

3) Question? Who authorized you to be on this Maintenance Acceptance Flight (MAP)? "Joe 

Miller" Joe asked if you have ever been on a flight and asked if want to come and help out, so h>. 

did. 

Date: //^^c j •' C', -i;^". / 

Title: ,n,it/','r^- .5^/^-^^^;^^^^^-'^ • 

Signature: 

y -V ^ ^ 

'/->, 

^/ 

Record of Interview 

Interview with USA 3000 Airlines employee Joe Miller 

Position: Director of Maintenance and Engineering 

Date: June 3, 2008 

Location: USA 3000 Headquarters 

FAA Inspectors Present: Inspector Karamargin & Inspector Stauffer 

Subject: N265AV. GWY Fit 7265 May 17. 2008 

1) Question? Describe in vour own words lust prior to the flight, take off and the 

wing strike. On landing we were going to land on 8R but tower asked the pilot if 

we could land on 8L due to an American MD80. Runway 8L was chosen. Aifcfaft/ 

was not flaring and I cpukT see tha pilot pulling back on the control stick. Both ( 

maiiiraridrhg gears hit; then came up» rolled left: He thought Tony stated; "We/ 

are losing it^ and then he heardt 'I knoW. Throttles were moved up and dual 

input warning sounded, aircraft accelerated. Tony said "['ve got the aircraft!" Not 

sure what was said to the tower but he heard someone state the number of souls 

on board (SOB) and fuel quantity. Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) was taken 

out and pilot found two spoilers INOP In abnomnal procedures - dual hydraulic 

failure. Since weight of aircraft was so light, we did the calculations and selected 

flaps 3, plus 25 knots. On second landing aircraft wanted to roll to the left and 

right wing came up. Spoilers not anned the second time. 8R was the selected 

runway used during the second landing. 

2) Question? When did the crew know about the #3 & #5 spoiler message? What 

were the indications? Several pre-flights completed. Both engines were sterted In 

Auto, then Brakes and steering checked. We tumed off the ramp on the taxiway, 

and called tower. Left Captain flying did flight control check and received LAF 

degraded message. Right non flying pilot did flight control check and also 

received LAF degraded message. Both messages were displayed on Mid Lower 

ECAM. "LAF Degraded Message" was the only message. He was not sure about 

#3 or #5 spoilers being displayed on flight control page: — 

3) Question? Who was at the controls during the landing when the wing scrapped 

the ground? Bill was in the Captain seat. First officer seat was occupied by Tony 

Sunratt. 

4) Question? Where any calls made or sent bv ACARS to Dispatch or Maintenance 

control? "Not that I recall" 

5) Question? Did vou or the crew trouble shoot the faults? Yes the crew performed 

SEC resets, #1 SEC & #3 SEC first, then #1 SEC and #2 SEC, for LAF message. 

6) Question? How was the decision made to proceed on with the ECAM fault? Who 

made that decision? "Do not recall", Flight crew stated to tower they were ready 

to go on Runway 8 after the flight control check. 

7) Question? Was the MEL. FCOM or QRH used prior to take off for the ECAM 

faults? "Do not recall what they did" 

JtbM ^ 
8) Question? How did the aircraft oerfonm on take off? No issues on take off. During 

the slow speed tests lots of rudder trim was used and auto pilot did not stay on. 

Stow speed tests were preformed 'A through the flight. Not sure the number of 

times the rudder trim check was perfomied. During the landing on Runway 8L, 

Bill stated the aircraft felt mushy. 

9) Question? How long was the flight? About 3.29 hours, two hours were planned. 

10) Question? Who detemnined that the first officer would flv in the left seat? He is a 

line Captain, had four stripes. 

11) Question? How many vears/experience have vou had working on/with A320 

Aircraft? Since 1988,20 years. 

12) Question? How many tesf flights/maintenance acceptance flights have vou been 

on? Approximately in excess of 100. Fifty with previous airiines, nine which were 

new deliveries. 

13) Question? Who authorized vou to be on this Maintenance Acceptance Flight 

(MAF)? Myself and Bill Hoffman, the Director of Quality. 

14) Question? Why was Part B on the M35 Forni not filled out completely? It was 

filled out, it states. "Acceptance Flight Test for Redelivery to Lessor and post 

maintenance visit". Mr. Miller stated he went over the Flight Test procedure with 

flight crew and dispatch, prior to the flight. 

15) Question? Any thing vou want to add? Flight deck door was opened during flight 

so Russian pilot could see the maintenance personnel perfomi their checks. The 

flight control check should have caught this spoiler fault This same condition 

happened once before and the (M) maintenance procedure in the MEL was 

revised. Cannot have both #3 and #5 spoilers INOP. Once aircraft Is under its 

own power it's the Flight Crew's call. Should have reviewed MEL and if no 

' restrictions then cbhtlnue on," if (M) procedureVesfrictTohs then aircraft would 

return to the gate. AAR did good work and quality during check, lack of 

consistency and flow of check was the only negative. 

Date: June 3, 2008 

Title: Aviation Safety Inspector, Airworthiness 

Signature: 

/ / 

> .^V * " / yt.. . 

/'/ 

m?" 

/ i t 
Frank Walker Jr. 

<fWalker9u8a3000alrilne«.co 

m> 

05/19/2008 01:09 PM 

To whofrinan@usa3000airlines.com 

CO 

bcc 

Subject Flight Safety Report 

Frank Walker, Jr. 

4680 

Aircraft Damage 

General Information 

Your Name 

Employee Numt}er 

Event Type 

Do you wish to send a 

CONFIDENTIAL report? 

Checking this box will remove your name and employee number from the 

final report sent to Corporate Safety. 

Do you wish to submit this report to the NASA ASRS? / 

Where would you like your NASA ASRS receipt to be sent? 

Street Address 

101 Hillcrest Dr. 

City 

Belmont 

Flight Information 

Flight Number 

Event Date Zulu 

Event Time Zulu 

Departure Station 

Arrival Station 

Diversion Station 

Aircraft 

State 

North Carolina 

7265 

May 17, 2008 

2045 

MIA 

MIA 

N2eSAV 

Zip 

28012 

Additional Information 

Captain's Emeiigency Authority 

Exercised? 

Emergency Declared? 

MedLInk Contacted? 

Your Crew Assignment: 

ATC Facility: 

Radio Frequency: 

Altitude (MSL): 

Adverse Weather Conditions 

Fog 

Ice 

Rain 

Snow 

• 

• 

First Officer 

Tower 

20 
Thunderstorm 

Turbulence 

WIndshear 

Phase of Flight: Landing 

Hours Since Awakening: 5 

lllnesi/lnjury Infdrmation 

Passenger Name 

Sex 

Seat# 

Passenger Addres^' 

Passenger City 

Passenger State 

Passenger Zip 

Passenger Telephone 

Nurse/Physician Attended 

Nurse/Physlclan Name 

Nurse/Physician Address 

Nurse/Physlclan City 

Nurse/Physlclan State 

Nurse/Physlclan Zip 

Nurse/Physlclan Telephone 

Physical Condition of Passenger 

First Alde/Meds Given 

Witness Name 

Witness Address 

Witness City. 

witness State 

vyitnessZIp 

Narrative 

Test flight was performed on 265 after maintenance was done in MIA.During the test we experienced trouble with two 

spoilers.We had several ECAM warinlngs of this condition but were crew awareness only.l was the flying pilot and noticed severs 

times during the flight the rudder trim was going out of range making the autopilot have troule holding the aircraft stable.At this 

point I disconnected the autopilot, retrlmed the aircraft and hand flew it the rest ofthe test with no adverse handling 

condltlons.Dur1ng approach I noticed the aircraft was sloppy .and sluggish on the controls.Durlng flare of about 20' the aircraft 

roiled hard left with firm touchdown and bounce.At this point we went to TOGA and go around.Unaware to us at the time the 

lower part of the left wing tip had- hit the ground and took off a small part of the tip along with a static wick.No adverse handling 

conditions were experience on the go around and on return we used flaps 3 with a higher speed(VREF-i-25) which appeared to 

make tha aircraft more controllable but it still tred to roll left In the flare.l do believe the extra airspeed and flaps 3 had a postlve 

effect on the outcome. 
Tony Surratt 

<t8urattOu8a300Gairllnes.co 

m> 

05/18/2008 01:04 AM 

To whofrrnan@usa3000air1ines.com 

cc 

bcc 

Subject Flight Safety Report 

Tony Surratt 

3281 

Aircraft Damage 

General Information 

Your Name 

Employee Number 

Event Type 

Do you wish to setKi a 

CONFIDENTIAL report? 

Checking this box will remove your name and employee number from the 

final report sent to Corporate Safety. 

Do you wish to submit this report to the NASA ASRS? 

Where would you like your IMASA ASRS receipt to be sent? 

Street Address 

10390 Washlngtonla Palm Way #4444 

City 

FL Myers 

Flight Information 

Flight Number 

Event Date Zulu 

Event Time Zulu 

Departure Station 

Anivat Station" 

Diversion Station 

Aircraft 

State 

Florida 

7265 

May 17,2008 

2045 

MIA 

MIA 

N265AV 

Zip 

33966 

Additional Information 

Captain's Emergency Authority 

Exercised? 

Emergency Declared? 

MedLInk Contacted? 

Your Crew Assignment: 

ATC Facility: 

Radio Frequency: 

Altitude (MSL): 

Adverse Weather Conditions 

Fog 

Ice 

Rain 

Snow 

• 

• 

Captain 

Tower 

20 feet 
Thunderstonn 

Turbulence 

WlfKlshear 

Phase of Flight: Landing 

i-lours Since Awakening: 8 

lllnets/lnjury Infonnatlon 

Passenger Name 

Sex 

Seat# 

Passenger Address 

Passenger City 

Passenger State 

Passenger Zip 

Passenger Telephone 

Nurse/Physlclan Attended 

Nurse/Physlclan Name 

Nurse/Physlclan Address 

Nurse/Physlclan City 

Nurse/Physician State 

Nurse/Physlclan Zip 

Nurse/Physlclan Telephtone 

Physical Condition of Passenger 

First Aida/Meds Given 

Witness Name 

Witness Address 

witness City 

Witness State 

WitnessZIp 

Narrative 

During a maintenance acceptance test flight we experienced trouble with 2 spoilers enroute. We had several ECAM warnings of 

the 2 spoilers being Inoperative but ECAM Indicated crew awareness only.Frank Walker was the flying pilot and we noticed 

several times during the test flight that the autopilot was excessively trimming right rudder. On approach into MIA Frank 

mentioned that the aircraft felt "sloppy' at full configuration. During the flare the aircraft suddenly dropped from about 20 feet 

bounced and rolled hard left. We Immediately went to TOGA and initiated a go-around. The subsequent landing was conducted 

at Flap 3 and VREF +25. Although the aircraft tried to roll left on landing the second time, I believe the extra energy kept It 

controllable. No damage to aircraft except for about a. foot of the left wingtip fence being ground off due to contact with the 

runway. 
w May. 19. 2008 S:'15AM 19.0503 ?. 3 

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Joe Mlller/USA3000/KCDATA To 'Ramses Perez" <rperez@avbome.com>, "Brian Loomer* 

05/17/2008 10:40 PM <bk)omer@avbomo.com> 

cc 'Bill Hofrman' <whoflman@usa3000.com>, 'Joseph Guhin" 

<Jguhin@usa3000.com>, "Jack Eastman" 

<Jeastman@usa3000airline8.com>, "Chas Nell* 

bcc 

Subject MSN 427 

History: ^ -f^is message has been replied to. 

Our initial review of the spoiler issue (with AAR personnel involved) found spoilers 3/5 on the left wing to 

be in 'Maintenance Mode'. 

Please conside this our official notification for request for investigation into this incident 

Joe Miller 
AIRBUS 

A/C Reg.: 

N265AV 

^ JOB CARD 

U3K - A320 

TITLE: 

27-60-00-866-002 - Extension-Retraction ofthe 

Spoilers for Maintenance 

MPD-TASK: 

AMM TASK: 

27-60-00-006-002 

27-60-00 PB 201 

CARD ZONE INTERVAL 

SKILL ACCESS 

** ON A/C ALL 

TASK 27-60-00-866-002 

Extension-Retraction of the Spoilers for Maintenance 

NOTE: The procedure is the same for all spoilers 

1. Reason for the Job 

Self Explanatory 

2. Job Set-UD Information 

A. Fixtures, Tools, Test and Support Equipment 

REFERENCE 

No specific 

No specific 

No specific 

No specific 

98027603002001 

98D27604000000 

98D27803000000 

QTY 

1 

1 

1 

DESIGNATION 

circuit breaker(s) safety clip(s) 

access platform 1.6 m (5 ft. 3 in.) 

access platform 3.5 m (11 ft. 6 In.) 

metal rod (tommy bar) dia. 4 mm (0.1574 in.) 

SPOILER MAINTENANCE KEY 

COLLAR-SAFETY, SPOILER 

LOCKING TOOL - FLAP/SLAT CONTROL LEVER 

B. RiaTerenced Irifbrrhatlon 

REFERENCE 

27-00-00-080-002 

27-50-00-866-008 

27-50-00-866-009 

27-64-00-710-001 

27-80-00-866-004 

DESIGNATION 

Removal of the Flap/Slat Control-Lever Locking Tool 

(98D27803000000) 

Extension of the Flaps on the Ground 

MECH INS? 

Retraction of the Flaps on the Ground 

Operational Test of the Spoiler Hydraulic Actuation 

Extending the Slats on the Ground 

** ON A/C 265-265 

(Ref. Fig. 201 A/27-60-00-991-003-A SHEET 201 A.1^ 

** ON A/C ALL 

3. Job Set-UD 

Subtask 27-60-00-860-050 

EFF : 265-265 Page 1 of 5 

AMM Rev Date : May 01/08 

PRINT DATE : Jul 22/08 
AIRBUS 

A/C Reg.: 

N285AV 

^ JOB CARD ^ 

U3K - A320 

TITLE: 

27-60-00-866-002 - Extension-Retraction of the 

Spoilers for Maintenance 

MPD-TASK: 

AMM TASK : 

27-60-00-866-002 

27-60-00 PB 201 

A. Aircraft Maintenance Configuration 

(1) Extend the slats and flaps (Ref. AMM TASK 27-50-00-868-008) (Ref. AMM TASK 27-80-00-866-004^ 

(2) Make sure that the LOCKING TOOL - FLAP/SLAT CONTROL LEVER (98D278030000001 is in 

position on the flap/slat control lever 

(3) Put the warning notice on the HYD section of the panel 40VU to tell persons not to pressurize the 

aircraft hydraulic systems. 

Subtask 27-60-00-010-051 

B. Get Access 

(1) Put the access platform in position at the access door 822. 

(2) Open the access door 822. 

(3) On the battery power center 105VU: 

- loosen the two screws and remove the protective cover. 

(4) Put the access platform In position: 

(a) at the zone 580 for the left spoilers. 

(b) at the zone 680 for the right spoilers. 

(5) Open these access doors: 

(a) 573BB for the left spoiler 1. 

(b) 575BB for the left spoiler 2. 

(c) 575DB for the left spoiler 3. 

(d) 575EB for the left spoiler 4. 

(e)-575GB for the left spoHerS. — 

(f) 673BB for the right spoiler 1. 

(g) 675BB for the right spoiler 2. 

(h) 675DB for the right spoiler 3. 

(!) 675EB for the right spoiler 4. 

(j) 675GB for the right spoiler 5. 

Subtask 27-60-00-865-053 

C. Open, safety and tag this(these) circuit breaker(8): 

PANEL 

49VU 

105VU 

121VU 

121VU 

DESIGNATION 

FLIGHT C0NTR0LS/SEC1/N0RM/SPLY 

FLT CTL/SEC1/STBY SPLY 

FLIGHT CONTROLS/SEC3/SPLY 

FLIGHT C0NTR0LS/SEC2/SPLY 

IDENT 

21CE1 

22CE 

21CE3 

21CE2 

LOCATION 

B08 

B01 

019 

018 

4. Procedure 

EFF : 265-265 Page 2 of 5 

AMM Rev Date : May 01/08 

PRINT DATE : Jul 22/08 
AIRBUS 

A/C Reg.: 

N265AV 

' JOB CARD ^ 

U3K-A320 

TITLE: 

27-60-00-866-002 - Extension-Retraction of the 

Spoilers for Maintenance 

MPD-TASK: 

AMM TASK: 

27-60-00-886-002 

27-60-00 PB 201 

** ON A/C 265-265 

Subtask 27-60-00-866^54-A 

A. Extension 

IRef. Flo. 201An-ASK 27-60-00-991-003-A SHEET 2Q1A.1) 

(1) Turn the hex-head control switch (2) of the opening vah^e of the servocontrol to the M position 

(Maintenance). 

(2) Move the spoiler to the extended position by hand. 

(3) Put the COLLAR-SAFETY. SPOILER (98D27604000000) (3) on the rod (1) of the servocontrol. 

(4) Install the two pins of the safety collar (3). 

Subtask 27-60-0O-866-O56-A 

B. Retraction 

(1) Make sure that the warning notice is in position on the panel 40VU to tell persons not to pressurize the 

hydraulic systems. 

(2) Make sure that the LOCKING TOOL - FLAP/SLAT CONTROL LEVER (980-^" 000} is in 

position on the flap/slat control lever. 

(3) Remove the two pins of the safety collar (3) 

(4) Remove the safety collar (3) of the servocontrol. 

(5) Move the spoiler to the retracted position with your hand. / 

CAUTION: MAKE SURE THAT THE STOP OF THE HEX. HEAD IS AGAINST THE LETTER 'O' ON 

THE HOUSING. 

AERODYNAMIC FORCES WILL CAUSE UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF THE SPOILER IF 

THE STOP OF THE HEX. HEAD IS AGAINST THE LETTER " M " . 

(6) Turn the hex-head control switch (2) of the opening valve of the TCyocontrol 

(Operation). \ 

(7) Make sure that you cannot move the spoiler manually. 

osition 

** ON A/C ALL 

5. Close-uo 

Subtask 27-60-00-860-051 

A. Put the aircraft back to its Initial configuration. 

(1) Make sure that the work area is clean and clear of tool(s} and other items. 

Subtask 27-60-00-710-051 

B. Do the operational test of the spoiler hydraulic actuation (Ref AMM TASK 27-64-00-710-001) 

Subtask 27-60-00-410-051 

EFF: 265-265 Page 3 of 5 

AMM Rev Date : May 01/08 

PRINT DATE : Jul 22/08 
AIRBUS 

A/C Reg.: 

N265AV 

JOB CARD 

U3K-A320 

TITLE: 

27-60-00-866-002 - Extension-Retraction ofthe 

Spoilers for Maintenance 

MPD-TASK: 

AMM TASK: 

27-60-00-866-002 

27-60-00 PB 201 

C. Close Access 

(1) Install the protective cover on the battery power center 105VU. 

(2) Tighten the two screws. 

(3) Close the access door 822 . 

(4) Close access door(s) In zone(s) 580, 680. 

(5) Remove the access platfonm(s). 

Subtask 27-60-00-865-054 

D. Remove the safety clip(s) and the tag(s) and close thls(these) circuit breaker(s): 

21CE1 21CE2 21CE3 22CE 

Subtask 27-60-00-866-055 

E. Retraction of the flaps 

(1) Remove the LOCKING TOOL - FLAP/SLAT CONTROL LEVER (98D27803000000) from the FLAPS 

panel 114VU (Ref. AMM TASK 27-00-00-080-002). 

(2) Retract the flaps (Ref AMM TASK 27-50-00-866-009^ 

EFF : 265-265 Page 4 of 5 

AMM Rev Date : May 01/08 

PRINT DATE : Jul 22/08 
AIRBUS 

A/C Reg.: 

N265AV 

' JOB CARD ' 

U3K - A320 

TITLE: 

27-60-00-866-002 • Extension-Retraction of the 

Spoilers for Maintenance 

MPD-TASK: 

AMM TASK: 

27-60-00-000-002 

27-60-00 PB 201 

575 ES ZS80 

Figure 27-60-00-991-OOS-A / SHEET 201A.1/1 - Spoilers Servocontrol 

*• ON A/C 265-265 

;FF : 265-265 Page 5 of 5 

AMM Rev Date : May 01/08 

PRINT DATE : Jul 22/08 
William Hofftnan To 

<whoflhianQusa3000.com> 

05/20/2008 09:54 AM 

bcc 

Subject N265AV #3 and #5 (LH)spoiler issue 

Gentlemen: 

Per FAA request of May 19, 2008, USA 3000 replicated the LH #3 and #S spoiler servo control valves in the 

maintenance mode, took a picture ofthe Iwr ECAM display, then placed them in the Operations mode and took a 

picture ofthe Iwr ECAM display. All accomplished on May 19, 2008 at AAR in Miami, in accordance with the 

AMM. Pictures were provided this am to your office via e-mail. 

William (Bill) Hof!nian 

Director of Quality Control 

USA 3000 Airlines 

Tel: 610-325-1286 

Fax: 610-325-1285 

> » 

/5* 
William Hofftnan 

<wha4ftnanQuaa3QOO.com> 

05/20/2008 09:31 AM 

To 

cc 

bcc 

History: 

Subject 265 ECAM Pictures 

' ^ This message has been fbnwarded. 

Picture 176F is normal screen 

Picture 179F is with spoiler 3/5 - L/H in maintenance position 

(See attached file: MVC-l76F.JPG)(See attached file: MVC-179F.JPG) 

William (Bill) Hoffman 

Director of Quality Control 

USA 3000 Airlines 

Tel: 610-325-1286 

^ 

Fax: 610-325-1285 MVC-176F.JPG MVC-179F.JPG 
I 

# 

\ . „ 

w ^ I 

/ 

• ' : > / 
^ 

(. 

j1t1ffi?1t1WflOTfltfl1fff 

m,lJSA3000 

\ 

FUGHT CONTROLS 

CONTROLS AND INDICATORS 

1.27.40 P 11 

SEQ 001 REV 23 

a \ LAF DEGRADED indication 

Tha indication comes on in amber when the LAF normal law is not availaUe when there 

is a failure of hydraulic accumulator, ELAC. SEC, ailerot^spoiler sen/c^ack, etc. 

ECAM WHEEL PAGE 

o 

WHEEL 

UP LOCK 7 

-195. 

V" UP LOCK 

280 ** 140 

alv-REL-aza 

PSX 

STEERINS 

L/6 tm. 

VSKID 

ALTNBNK 

AUToanc 

MED 

195. 

IP LOCK 

7 

140 t 140 

a3»«a.-«4a 

>2?5.psiJ55, 

-^i i $ 4 i i i i i $ 

T «rftrt* 

i.H.(BXa if. 

/T> SPOILERS/SPEED BRAKES INDICATION 

These indications are.tiiesQm^^ thosB-disptayetLonibe-FLTXTLpager 

U3K MM 04IT 

/ J 

•''•-: » 
FUGHT CONTROLS 

CONTROLS AND INDICATORS 

1.27.40 P 13 

SEQ 100 REV 41 

E/WO: FAILURE TniE 

cotMlthxn 

•mmms 

Cm AOR la fMAy or h u bam tBiectid by llw ELAC, 

and than Is • spaad or anaM-mK k disagne 

bBtww fiWSftJI n j FAUL w twoT wnwinlno ADH«. 

Lost of ground spoHar hnclion in 

SEC1+3or1-t-2or 2 + 3or»-f-24-3 . 

tfflflBKHSAftBg 

nnMon disagna balwaan surfacai and levar 

rnvm 

Spd bralca le¥ar tranaducan to SEC 1 and 3 failed SPD BRK SnU. OUT 

Spaad brafca out with at leaat one engbw not at idia 

mfflCBEinrai 

losa of tha alactrical conlnl of tha stabifaar (wHh or 

without janwilnQ of tha stabifcwt 

LjfllEieVPAl 

Lon of both sanojacks on ona elevator or actjvation of 

elavaar fluttar Bar protactto unite n in ELAC 

LittlAILMl 

Lwa of botfj aarvolacla on one alletoft 

Loea o» on> t i irww apoHiHt' • 

EUeiHTCBrAULT' ^ 

Faikn Failuiaa of pteh channel In ELAC 1. of pttai chanw 

Feikm of pttch channel in ELAC 2, or baa of one or 

boih 8LAC 2 niddar pedal tranadueara. 

GfHrSWiTTF+T 

GndaolrchannatfaltodlnSECSia 

aiVlBIVfl FAUIT 

L«ia,al oi»a aetvolack on one elevalot S« BRK i 13-t-^t FAULT _ 

Sed brilli tevar tmnaducefa to^ C 3II I failed. 

AIL sflWti ttULf 

Lost of one sarvojack on one aiieran or loas of one or 

botft BAG 1 rudAr pedal tranadueara. 

TcDTf 

LAF accurolalor b w presauta. 

aBESflCKPftlOfllTy 

Falkira In a sidestick priority togic dicuit 

Auuic: 

WARMNS 

SINGIE 

CHIME 

._NIL . 

MASTB); 

UOW,;; 

m h 

% t • • 

MASTER 

CAUnON 

SO 

PAGE 

CALLED 

NL 

F/CTL 

NIL 

F/CTL 

LOCAL 

WARNINO 

FAULT ItB 

onEAC 

pfaa 

NIL 

Nil .-^-l^ . 

NIL 

FLT 

PHASE 

INHIB 

3.4. 

5.7 

3,4,5 

1,2,3.4, 

5, 8. 9, 

10 

4.5 

XT 

3.4, 

5.7,8 

3,4.5 

3,4,5,7, 

3.4,5,8, 

7.8 

3,4,5,8, 

7,8,3 

U3K ma 04J7 
'•--' ( 

. -) 1 J { 

:OCKPIT PREP COMPLETE (BOTH) 

SEAR PINS & COVERS REMOVED 

SIGNS ON/AUTO 

\DIRS NAV 

- Ua QUANTITY LBS 

ro DATA SET 

3AR0 REF SET (BOTH) 

A/INDOW/DOORS CLOSED (BOTH) 

3EAC0N ON 

FHR LEVERS IDLE 

I'ARKING BRAKE '... AS RQRD 

\NTI ICE AS RQRD 

jiCAM STATUS CHECKED 

j'lTCH TRIM SET 

|UDDER TRIM ZERO , 

i l LIGHT CONTROLS CHECKED (BOTH) 

JLTINST CHECKED (BOTH) 

r 

RIERNG CONFIRMED 

J P SEHING CONF - (BOTH) 

t, VR. V2/FLX TEMP (BOTH) 

[C..„..,.,„..,.,,..,„,,,,^,^,.,,:^..^,.,,,,,,.,SET 

Z m MEMO TO NO BLUE 

• AUTO BRK MAX 

• SIGNS ON 

• CABING READY (<^) 

\ • SPLRSARM 

i • FLAPSTO 

I • TO CONFIG NORM 

llBlNCREW ADVISED 

G MODE SEL AS RQRD 

nKS AS RQRD 

•I 

N3GEAR ..; UP 

j \PS RETRACTED 

lOKS ON 

BRIEFING CONFIRMED 

ECAM STATUS CHECKED 

SEAT BELTS ON 

BARO SET (BOTH) 

MDA/DH SET (BOTH) 

ENG MODE SEL AS RQRD 

CABIN CREW ADVISED 

A/THR SPEED/OFF 

ECAM MEMO LOG NO BLUE j 

• LDG GEAR DN | 

• SIGNS ON ; 

• CABIN READY (<^ ) 

• SPLRSARM 

• FLAPS SET 

llJOREF. SET (BOTH) 

APU BLEED AS RQRD | 

ENGINES OFF I 

SEAT BELTS .:;:::...:...:.z.z:.;.;,.;...:.„:; OFF j 

EXT LT AS RQRD j 

FUEL PUMPS OFF i 

PARK BRK and CHOCKS AS RQRD i 

Consider HEAVY FiAIN | 

ADIRS OFF ; 

OXYGEN OFF ; 

APU BLEED OFF 

EMER EXIT LT OFF 

NO SMOKING OFF 

APU and BAT OFF 

Consider COLD WEATHER 

CVR Circuit Breaker PULL • 

(Reportable incident/accident) 
A320 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 

TAXI 

3.03.10 P2 

S EQ 001 REV 39 

BRAKES CHECK 

- Once the aircraft starts moving: 

• Check 1/76 brake efUdency of the nomial braldng system: The ainnft must slow down when 

presslr^ the brake pedals. 

CAUTION 

If tha aircraft has been pariced in wet conditions for a long period, the efficiency of the first 

brake application at IO\N speed will be reduced. 

• Also check that green pressure has taken over yellow pressure: The yellow pressure on the 

brake pressure triple indicator shouU remain at 0 when pres^ g the brake pedals. Although 

green hydraulic power supplies the braking system, each tinte pedals are qukkly pressed, a 

brief brake pressure indication may appear on the BRAKE PRESS indtoator. 

- If a 'spongy* pedal is fe/t during taxi, this indicates a degraded perfbmiance of the alternate 

braking system. 

- If an arc is displayed on the ECAM WHEEL page, above the bra^e temperature, sat the brake 

fans on (if installed). 

•HJSHtCOHBnfOIJneiJii^^ ^.u.....;.............. ..... CHECK \ 

i. At a cbnvenfenf stage, prfor to or during faxt and before mning i/» autobraice, the PF silentfy 

applies full longitudinal and lateral sidestick deflectton. • -* 

On the F/CTL page, the PNF checks full travel and the correct sense of all elevators and all 

ailerons, and the conect cteHedton and retraction ofaSspoSeraf 

The PNF calls oiA fuHup', full down', 'neutral', fullleff, full right", 'neutral', as each full travel/ 

neutral positton Is reached. 

The PF silently chedcs that the PNF calls are In accordance with the skiestick order. 

Note: In order to reach ftill travel, fuU sidestick must be held for a sufUdent period of time. 

2JTbe.PF presses ^aJ'EDAL DISC pu^buttononthenasawheeltillBr, and sileaffy applies full left . 

njddar, full right nidder, andneutraL The PNF calls out "fullteff, luU right', 'neutral', as each full 

travel/neutral pos/fran is reached. 

3. TTfflF PN^^f/ftes M lOngSudlnal and lateral s/desM deflecOort, aijd silently checks hill travel 

and the conact isehse' of all elevators and all ailemns, andthi cpnaGl de/Hsctfon and retracthni 

of aiJ ispoterai ian tfie ECAM RCTlf-' * 

Wofir T7id F/CTl page Is automaikaffy dl^layed for 20 seconds.! 

ALL 

/f-ffncAt^OyiA./ Z-Z, /7«;d V y 
AsmMmuaoMut 

mUSA3000 

FUGHT CONTROLS 

CONTROLS AND INDICATORS 

1.27.40 P 9 

SEQ 001 REV 33 

ECAM F/CTl PAGE 

©-

GBY 

L 

AIL 

B 6 

q •^ u L 'SPO BRKi— ±i,><^ 

»-PITCH TRIN G Y' 

-3.2 ' IP 

B 6 ' 

RUD 

GBY 

' -4^ 

w ^ i5-U Ji;c4 M--iKO<.: 

: SPOILBt DEFLECTED BV NQRE THAN 2,3*(eREEN> 

/7}.SnoifafaAnaad^bralcei Indlcadoiy* 

1 

• 1 

ii 

: SPOUBt RETRACTED (OtEElO 

: SPOILB) FAULT DEFLECTED OWER> 

: SPOILER FAULT RETRACTED OtfBER> 

•<i ) 

•<i ) 

/7> Hydraulic system presstira indication 

Normally gi^en. Changes to amber if pressure in the hydraulic system gets low. 

(s) ELAC/SEC indication 

Normally green. Changes to amber if there is a failure in tha ELAC or the SEC, or if ELAC 

or SEC pushbutton is off, or if both flight control data concentrators (FCDCs) fail. 

The sum)unding box is normally grey. It changes to amber if the ELAC or SEC indication 

does. 

UJK MM 0«1T 
511.9 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEDi 

0.0 

511.9 

0.0 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged i 

not engaged I 

Roll command on left side 

stick (CP posiUon) 

171824 UTC 

Samples 263-269 

Positive (+) roll input is left wing down 

Negative (-) roll input is right wing down 

not engaged i!" 

;^ r 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

•'22.76 

24.70 

1 24.70 

24.79 

24.79 

24.79 

. . ... . - 24.79-- -

21.62 

12.22 

5.63 

5.36 

5.27 

5.27 

A 

y 

, j » 
^ ...ar-^uuB 14:63:29 

Roll command on right side 

stick (FO position) 

171924 UTC 

Samples 326-333 

Positive (+) roll input is left wing down 

Negative (•) roll Input is right wing down 

COMPRESS&D 

171928 COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED! 

171932 COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED^ 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

171936 COMPRESSED 

511.9 

511.9 

0.0 

511.9 

COMPRESSED 

0.0 

0.0-

511.9 

0.0 

511.9 

511.9 

0.4 

6.4 

OA 

0.4' 

OA" 

0.4" 

7 

4 

0.4 

0.7_ 

0.7 

0.7 

6.7 

0.4 

0.4 

0.4 

o;4 

6.'4' 

0.4 

6.4" 

0 4' 

0.4 

6.4 

6.4 

6.4 

0.4 

0.4 

0.4 

0.4 

0.4 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged' 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

0.00 

6.00 

0.00 

6'00 

0.00 

o^od 

0.00 

~ 0 M 

0.00 

d.QQ 

0.00 

bod 

0.00 

o.6o 

6.0O 

o.oo 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

o.od 

0.00 

aob 

0.00 

o'od" 

0.00 

o!6d 

0.00 

6.00 

0.00 

6.6o 

6.00 

6.6d' 

o.od 

0.00 

oM" 

-o.oa666" 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

6 00 

0.00 

o.od 

d.oo 

6.00-

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

000 

0.00 

0.00 

0^00 

0.00 

6.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

6.00 

0.00 

d^dd 

0.00 

0.66"" 

d.do 

o.od" 

odd 

o.od 

d'dd 

d.oo 

o!dd 

0.00 

0.00 

oM 

0.00 

"-1.14" 

-7 73 

-8;26 

-13.80 

Tirdis" 

-20.13 

-20.21 

-20.21 

-20.21 

-20.21 

-19.60 

-14.16 

-^.19" 

2.99 

9.67 

14,15" 

-17,4a19.60 

19.78 

i9;78 

19,78 

19L78 

19.78 

19.34 

19.07 

19'07 

18.46 

17.49 

15.82 

10.02 

2.90 

-0.09 

-0^09 

-0.09 

-0.09 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

4.66 

4.66 

"4:75" • 

4.66 

4:66' 

4.66 

"""4.68 

4.66 

4.68 

4.68 

4^66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.68 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.68 

9^14 " 

17.75 

iglfla"" 

22.85 

24.70" 

24.70 

24.7d 

24.70 

24.70 

24.70 

24.70 

21.45 

13^36 

4 04 

-5.63 

"-14.59' 

-.18.11. 

-18.81 

-18.96 

-18.98 

-16.96 

-1907 

-19.07 

-19;d7 

-19.07 

-18.98 

-18.98 

-18.19 

-16.96 

-11.43 

-0.44 

4.39 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.68 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4!66 

1 r 
iVDelTi Document8\A320 

TjTTr 

JSA\N26SAV\268.i -tli 

171604 

171808 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

511.9 not command 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 

0.0 

not command 

not command 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 511.9 

not command 

not command 

171812 

171608 

171818 

171820 

171612 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED! 

COMPRESSEDi' 

COMPRESSED! 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEDi 

cbMPRESSE[> 

COMPRESSED! 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEbi 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED I 

"COMPRESiSebi 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEDI 

'COMlifiESSEb 

COMPRESSED; 

COMPREiSSED: 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED: 

COMPRESSED; 

COMPRESSED" 

COMPRESSED' 

COMPRESSED: 

COMPRESSED: 

COMPRESSED 

COMPJFtESiSEb; 

COMPRESSED! 

511.9 

0.0 

511.9 

d.o 

0.0 

511.9 

6}} 

51lJ 

not command 

not^ommand 

not command 

notoommartd 

0.00 

0.00 

0,00 

0.00 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

notcommariid 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

Spoiler positions in degrees 

for spoilers 2 L&R, 3 LAR, 4L 

during CP Roll command 

171824 UTC 

Samples 263-269 

-171824— 

COMPRESSED: 

^COMPRESSiEDr-

"COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

"COMPRESSED! 

COMPRESSED; 

COMPRESSEDi 

COMPRESSED! 

COMPRESSED: 

COMPRESSED; 

COMiPRESSED " 

COMPRIESSED: 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb 

COMPRESSEb 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

171828 

171616 

171832 

171836 

511.9 

d'd 

511.9 

d^d 

d.d". 

511.9 

0.0 

514:9-

511.9 

0.0 

511.9. 

. o.d 

0.0 

511.9 

6.0 

511.9" 

511;9 

O.d 

511.9 

0.0 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

riot command 

not command 

noitcomfnimd 

not command 

not command 

0.00 

0.66 

6.00 

O.od 

6.00 

•0.0(1 

0.00 

o.oo 

not cpmmand 

-jioH»mmarid"--— OiOO— 

not command 

not command 6.35 

riot command 

not command 34.64' 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not commarKd 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

0.00 

O.od 

6.66 

d,6d 

odd 

0.00 

0.0O— 

0.28 

a28 

6.26 

6.26 

"a26 

•6.35 ;•• 

0.26 

. 0.26 [-

0.00 

add 

odd 

o.od 

6.66 

odd 

aoo 

0.00-

" 1 

1 

--'•• -

i 

"-

... )... 

0.00 

0.00 

d.oo 

0.00 

d.oo 

d.od 

add 

d.dd 

d.do' 

0.00 

d^dd 

o:dd 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00- -

4 

22.68 

0.09 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

ado 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

o.od 

0.00 

29.36 

34,37 

8.79 

0.09 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.26 I 0.00 

0.00 

"d.3ar; |y " 0.00 

0 28 /* 

ass 

;34,IO,..J : 

0.35 

0.35 

0.35^ 

0.35 

6.35 

6.35 

0.35 

a35 

0.35 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

a6o 

o'do 

6.00 

6.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

o.oo 

0.00 

0.00 

6.od 

0.00 

nnn 
:J9-MnY-2008 11:41:36 

SampI* SpQUrPo»4-fl^ 

D:\DeH'»Documents\A320USA\N265AV\265.sdf { <llm 

Spoiler positions in degrees 

for spoilers 4R, S L&R 

during CP Roll command 

171824 UTC 

Samples 263-269 

A 
...«• •.wyo i 

Sample 

0:\Dell'8 Document8\A320USA\N268AV\265.sdf 

- ; ' M .r« ; J 

i:4-|:36 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED ' 

171908 COMPRESSED 

C'OMPRESSEb; 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb 

171636 COMPRESSED 

COMP'REiSSEb'" 

COMPRESSED' 

COMPRESSEb 

171912 COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb" 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb 

COMPRESSED' 

coMPwiissEb 

COMPRESSED; 

COMPRESSED 

171916 COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED: 

COMPRESSED" 

COMPRESSED 

17164d cbwS'RESSEb 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb" 

COMPRESSEb 

171920 COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

; COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMIPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb 

COMPRESSEb 

171924 COMPRESSED 

511.9 

0.0 

0.0 

511.9 

0.0 

511.9 

511.9 

did 

511.9 

d:d 

"do 

51l"9 

6.6 

511.9 

51V9 

0.0 

511.9 

0.0 

not command 

not command 

nolcomrrand 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

riot command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

riot command 

not command 

not command 

m t command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not oomrrtarKl 

not command 

not command 

COMPRESSEDI not command 

. - COMPRESSED- O.a notoommandCOMPRESSEb: ~ not command 

171644 COMPRESSED: 511.9 not command 

COMPRESSlbi ~ rotcommarid 

COMPRESSEb! 0.0 ! notoorhmand 

COMPRESSEb' not command 

171928 COMPRESSED; 511,9 not command 

COMPRESSED riot command 

COMPRESSEb 511.9 not command 

COMPRESSEb not command 

COMPRESSED 0.0 not command 

COMPRESSED; not command 

COMPRESSED 511.9 not command 

COMPRESSEb not command 

171932 COMPRESSED 0.0 not command 

COMPRESSED' not command 

COMPRESSED 0.6 not command 

COMPRESSED not command 

171648 COMPRESiSEO 511.9 not command 

COMPRESSED not oomrnand 

COMPRESSED 0,6 not command 

COMPRESSED not command 

COMPRESSED 511.9 not command 

COMPRESSED not command 

COMPRESSED 511.9 not command 

Spoiler positions in degrees 

for spoilers 2 L&R, 3 L&R, 4L 

during FO Roll comman d 

171924 UTC 

Samples 326-333 

0.00 

"o.od 

0^00 

odd 

odd 

d.dd 

o,do 

0,00-

0.00 

o.6d 

o.od 

0.00 

0.00 

0.09 

34.37 

171936 

34.10 

32^43 i 

"ass 

0.09 

0.00 

0.00 

odd 

odd 

"o.dd" 

o.oo 

OJOO"" 

0.00 

- 0,00 -

0.00 

; o.do 

L - . 

26.72 

34.89 

20.04 

0.09 

f 0.00 

i O.od 

0.00 

6.66" 

0.00 

0.00 

0.26 

6M 

6.26 

6.26 

"6.26 

0.26" 

0.26 

0.26--

0.26 

0.26 

6.2« 

0,26 

0.35 

0.26__ 

6.26 

0!26 

6.26 

6.28 

0.26 

0.26 

0.00 

6.00 

add 

6.00 

d.od 

odd 

aoo 

o.oo0.00 

0.00 

27.95 

34.80 

17!84 

0.09 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

"add" 

0.00 

0.00 

0,00' 

o.oo 

aoo 

0.00 

0,00 

aoo 

aoo 

0,00 

d.od 

odd 

add 

d.od 

d.dd 

d.dd 

d.oo 

6.00 

d.dd 

aoo 

- 0.00 

aoo 

0.00 

0.00 

0^00 

0.00 

7.38 

34.10 \i 

•33.49 "f" 

HiM >f 

"5:98 

0.00 

0.00 

\ 
-..Mw I i.Hi:j o 

>|ICf|lB 

O.OO 

0.00 

aoo 

0.00 

0.00 

o.od 

o.od 

d.oo 

0.00 

odd 

d.od 

odd 

add 

ddo 

d.od 

d.od 

d'dd 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

25.40 

34.89 

8.35 

D:\Der»Documents\A320USA\N2aSAV\288.sdf ( <tli 

23.55 

34.72 

2a39 

32dm 

33(ky 

33d 

331 

331 

332 

332 

333 _ 

m: 

334^ 

33<feV 

W*V'-. 

) » • 

ai8 

0.00 

o.oo 

odd 

0.66 

0,00 

0.00 

6.28 4 

ai8 1 

0.18 

0.18 

o^ia ' " " 

ai8 

a i 8 

0.00 

aoo 

d.oo 

" 6:66 

d.oo 

d.od 

0.00 1 

Spoiler positions in degrees 

for spoilsrs 4R, 5 L&R 

during FO Roll command 

171924 UTC 

Samples 326-333 

J } 

> ) 
2a-May-2008 14:53:29 D:\De«'s Document5\A320USA\N26SAV\26S.sdf ^ <tlm 

'.Yi 

•?3 

"Left wing "down" command 

from FO side stick 

172000 UTC 

Samples 362-366 

n Positive (+) roll Input is left wing down 

Negative (-) roll input is right wing down 

ymi 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

172000 COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED: 

511.9 

0.0 

511.9 

511.9 

'^1 

COMPRESSED 

IjOMPRESSibf:" 8^ 

:.--^'?\v 

172004- COMPRESSED; 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

0.0 

511.9 

0.0 

0.0 

511.9 

0.0 

u.u 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

6,0 

0.0 

OJO 

o.d 

6.0 

6.6 

6.6 

6.0 

0J3 

d.d 

o.d 

do 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

noter>gaoBd 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

not engaged 

0,00 

odd 

0.00 

add 

0.00 

odd" 

aoo 

odd" 

0.00 

d.dd" 

0.00 

odd 

d.oo 

d.oo 

0.00 

d.do 

0.00. 

0.00 

dido" 

aoo 

d;dd 

0.00 

d!dd 

0.00 

ddo 

0.00 

add 

0.00 

o.od 

0.00 

d.dd 

0.00 

d.od 

o.od 

aoo 

add" 

-o.oad.dd 

0.00 

add" 

0.00 

odd^ 

add 

d.dd 

0.00 

dxo" 

0.00 

o:6d 

0,00 

d.oo 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0,00 

0.00 

o.od 

0.00 

0.00 

aoo 

0.00 

d.dd 

0,00 

odd 

0,00 

'd.dd 

0.00 

ddd 

odo 

odd 

0,00 

o.od 

0.00 

d.oo 

0.00 

0,00 

d.dd" 

o.od 

d:6d"" 

0.00 

d.dd 

0.00 

o,dd 

0.00 

QJOO 

d.oo 

d.dd 

0.00 

.0.00 

aoo 

dido 

0.00 

aoo 

6.66 

-o.ool 

d.dd 

0.00 

odd 

0.00 

d.dd 

044 

"2.1 f 

10.28 

14.24 

16.79 

1907 

19,78 

19.78 

19.78 

19.78 

19.78 

19.78 

ia34 

18.28 

11.95 

3.78 

-0.09 

-0.09 

•0.09 

4.66 

4.66 

468 

4.66 

4.88 

4.66 

4.68 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.68 

4.66 

' 4M' 

4.68 

4.66 

4.66 

4;68 

4.66 

4,66 

4.66 

4,66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.68 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4.66 

4,66-

4.68 

4.68 

4.6(Si 

4.66 

4.6fr 

i3.34 

-3.78 

-9.76 

-13.54 

-16.70 

-18.54 

-18.90 

-19.d7 

-19.07 

-19.07 

-19.07 

-19,07 

-19.07 

-18.44 

-9.67 

-2,02 

4.39 

4.57 

4.57 

,'N 
29-May-2008 11:41:36 

Sampla;.;.. ,;,; ••.UT€t^;i'Sii 

D:\Deini Documenta\A320USA\N26SAV\265.sdf [ 

I I n I I—•—ii M I 

337*%^ 

33ftt4 

33&.%.; 

33««r 

340l(| 

iA 

n 331 

171940 

171652 

171944 

171948 

171656 

171952 

N 38«f^?-i 

38fl#"?: 

171958 

171700 

172000 

172004 

171704 

COMPRESSED 

"COMPRESSib"' 

COMPRESSED; 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEDI 

COMPRESSEb 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSEb 

COMPRESSED 

COMTOESSED 

COMPJRESSEb 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED" 

COMPRESSED 

CbMF»RESSED 

COMPRESSED 

COMPRESSED; 

COMPRESSED 

notcompirsd 

COMPRESSEb 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprad 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED; 

—not comprsd--

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMiPRESSEb" 

not comprsd ; 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSEb 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

COMPRESSED 

not comprsd 

not command 

0.0 

5lT.9~ 

6^0 

0.0 

51 lid " 

d.d 

51 i i 

511.9 

0.0 

511.9 

OJ) 

0.0 

511.9 

0.0 

511.9 

511.9 

O.d 

"siifg 

did 

ad 

511.9 

d.d 

sii.9 

5U.9 

o.d 

511.9 

o.o 

0.0 

511.9 

0.0 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

notcommaind 

notcommaiKi 

not command 

rK)t command 

riot command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

notoomiTMuid 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

iwt command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

notcomcTiand 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

notcoiranand 

not command 

not command 

not command . 

-not command— 

riot command 

not command 

not commarKi 

not command 

notcommaixi 

notcomnuind 

riot command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

notcommarKl 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not command 

not commartd 

not command 

0.00 

oM 

d.dd"" 

0.00 

6!dd 

odd 

0.26 

di28 

_ 

""">^^?i 

0.00 

dod" 

add" 

Spoiler positions in degrees 

for spoilers 2 L&R, 3 L&R, 4L 

during FO left wing "down" 

command 

172000 UTC 

Samples 362-366 

0.00 

0.00 

OOQ 

^.. • 

' d!db 

add 

odd 

d,'dd 

6,66 

0.00 

oioo 

6.00 

0.00 

0,00 

3.60 

32.78* 

34.37 

27.07 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

000 

d.dd 

d.dd 

o.od 

add 

odd 

0.00 

oioo 

0.66 

0.00 

0,00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.35 

0.35 

d,26 

a35 

"a2e 

0.26 

aaijs 

6.35 

0.26 

0.26 

0.35 

6.28 

0.26 

0,26 

a26 

0,28 

0,26 

0.00 

0.00 

6.00 

O.od 

o.dd 

dod 

6.6o 

6,6o 

o.od 

d.oo 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

0,00 

aoo 

d,dd 

odo 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

d.oo 

o.dd 

aoo 

0,09 

0.00 

0.00 

o.od 

0.00 

0.00 

aod 

0.00 

d.dd 

0.00 

add 

d.dd 

d.od 

d.do 

oioo 

d.oo 

aoo 

4.13 

34.19 

34.19 

15.82 
29-May-2008 11:41:36 D:\Dell'8 Document8\A320USA\N265AV\265.3df ( 

Sampl*:i<^>:; Sljofrf&s^ftg 

'34*>-i;v' 

34i#;' 

•35^ : 

35(^>,; 

35t^'? 

35fi^t' 

35*!^^ 

• - - T It 

•35*1^'" 

35«il;'. 

•35«^ | 

• ^ 

'35iiot' 

359iKi,^ 

38qi' 

360;« 

36<^;; 

36t' 

362, vvV; 

383 >^ 

«3 

; 164;. •"! 

I 64 •..'"' 

:; 55 

:; 55 

t «•: i. 

3 '^ H 

0,00 

ddd 

o,dd 

d.oo 

0.00 

0.09 

0.00 

0,00 

o.od 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

o.od 

odd' 

d.dd 

d.6d 

ddd 

6.60 

660 

odd 

ood 

o.do 

0,00 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

ai8 

(J26--

a2e 

aaa"" 

0.26 

0.28 

6.26 

0.26 

a i8 

ai8 

0.18 

a i 8 

0.18 

0.18 

0.26 

O.od 

0,09 

odd 

0.00 

6,26 

6,26 

6,28 

0.28 

6.26 

0,26 

018 

aia^ 

ai8 

0.18 

;'iA./ i.. -^'fn'li 

aoo 

add 

ddd" 

drdd" 

d;6d' 

odd" 

d!!dd 

dido 

d.oo 

0.00 

0,00 

0,00 

0.00 

o.dd 

0.00 

odd 

d.oo 

6.09" 

0.00 

"d,"dd~ 

odd 

6:dd 

oido 

0.00 

o.dd 

0.00 

0.00 

0.00 

aoo 

0,00 

Spoiler positions in degrees 

for spoilers 4R, 5 L&R 

during FO left wing "down'* 

command 

172000 UTC 

Samples 362-366 

;» v 
a 

in 

> 

3 

O 

CM 

a 

Q. 

> 

CO 

t .• Q 

i '• n 

• ) 

. ^ X li,l'llAj 

..'1 

-v 

I 

o d 

114 . J 

d 

J) 

• ^ 

r— 

• o 

r 

o 

r 

JO 

_ 3 

-J 

r 

::n 
USA 3000 AIRLINES 

CHAPTER 2: (MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST 

SECTION 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 

( 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST 

Revision: 12 

May 1, 2005 

SYSTEM & 

SEQUENCE 

NUMBERS 

27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 

64-01 SPOILER 

SURFACES 

(N265AVOnly) 

1. ITEM 

C 

C 

C 

2. NUMBER INSTALLED 

10 

10 

10 

3. NUMBER REQUIRED FOR DISPATCH 

8 

8 

8 

4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS 

(M) (O) One pair of symmetrical surfaces 

1or 3 may be inoperative In the retracted 

position provided 

a) SECs associated with operative 

spoilers operate normally, and 

b) AFM perfomnance penalties are 

applied. 

(M) (O) One pair of symmetrical surfaces 5 

may be inoperative in the retracted position 

provided SECs associated with operative 

spoilers normally. 

(M) (O) One pair of symmetrical surfaces 2 

or 4 may be Inoperative In the retracted 

position provided: 

a) SECs associated position with 

. operative spoilers operate 

nomiaily, and 

b) SFCS 2 flap channel operates 

normally, and • 

c) AFM performance penalties are 

applied. 

(Continued) 

2-27-10 
nov 

dl dUQB 12:iaPM LRU OFFICES OF JRSON DICK 2026288948 p.2 

USA 3000 Altt.lNES 

CHAprei 2: MWHIUM EoumieiiT LMT 

SECTK3N 27 RJQHT CONTROta 

MINMUM EQUIPMENT LIST 

RsvWon: 12 

l^tay 1,2005 

SYSTEM ft 

SEQUENCE 

NUMBERS 

aTFUQHTCONmOLS 

64-Ot SPOILER 

SURFACES 

(CCNTD) 

(N286AVOnly) 

l.rTEM 2. NUMBER iNSTALLED 

10 

10 

3. NUMBER REQUMED FOR {MSRATCH 

4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS 

(M) (O) IVfo pslr of aynvnalrlcal aurlnM 1 

ana^cmey oeviQpvnMiin oMiwraciM 

poiition provfclMfe 

•) seCtMsodaMwHhopwellve 

8|Milm Qpvsle nonraljh end 

b) SFCS2nipdwirMl 

noniwll]^ wwl 

c) AFM pwtannwM 

apptod. 

(M) (O) IWo pair of aymnwMcal turlteM S 

•nd 4 may b« inoperailve kfi ttw retractsd 

a) SECa^iioclalBd wWi opemMv 

•poiws opanrta noniiailyi and 

b) TR1andTR2opandanonnalK 

o) OCTIeConlnMtorliaviariflad 

doaad balofe each dapaftufiv 

d) 3FC82ffapchaniwl< 

nonnaNy, and 

a) AFM paftamanoe i 

1 

NOTE: lfipdlar4oraiainoparaliv«.LAF 

ia in daoradsd mode. Ratar to 27-

84-02. 

(Continuad) 

2-27-11 
,,wv cJL cuua 

la:18PM LRU OFFICES OF JflSON DICK 2026288948 p.3 

U8A 3000 AIRLINES 

CNAPTER 2: MmiMUM EQUVMBNT Litr 

SECTION 27 FUGHT CONTROLS 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT UST 

Revision: 19 

April 18,2007 

SYSTEM & 

SEQUENCE 

NUMBERS 

2rPL10HT CONTROLS 

8 4 ^ SPOMER 

SURFACES 

(CONTD) 

(N2BQAVLN264AV. 

N2e8AV4l271AV 

Only) 

l.rTEM 

C 

C 

C 

2. NUMB 

10 

10 

^« 

lER INSTALLED 

3.NUMe 

8 

8 

8 

lER REQUIRED FOR OiSPATCH 

4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS 

(M) (O) One peir or aymmaMcalnHfiKaa 1 

or 8 may be Inopanrtive In Iha ratradMl 

poaHtan prevMad! 

a) SECa aaaoclalad wWh oparaHw 

gpollafa ofttnie nannal)^ and 

b) AFMpadtannanoapanaMaaera 

aneilad. 

(M) (O) One pair or syiranalricil auitaoaa 8 

nwy oe inopamve n me mracna pomon 

prowfdad SECa aaaoclalad wNti oparaUva 

sponare oparate normaVyi 

(M) (0) One prtr of aynwialiltad aurfhcaa 2 

or 4 nay be inoparaUva fe) flie nAsdad 

poaiBon pravMas 

a) SECaaaaodatadwUioparatlva 

spoHari opanrta nofmall]^ and 

b) SFC82(lapchannalopanln 

iii'minly, and 

c) AFM pa« toinance pa»ialllaa ara 

MmiadL 

(Con«niiad} 

2-27-12 
USA 3000 AIRUNES 

CHAPTER 2: MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST 

SECTION 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT UST 

Revision: 19 

April 18. 2007 

SYSTEM & 

SEQUENCE 

NUMBERS 

27 FUGHT CONTROLS 

64-01 SPOILER 

SURFACES 

(CONTD) 

(N260AV.N264AV. 

N266AV-N271AV 

Only) 

64-02 LOAD ALLEVIATION 

FUNCTION (LAF) 

(N266AV) 

LITEM 

C 

C 

D 

2. NUMBER INSTALLED 

10 

10 

1 

3. NUMBER REQUIRED FOR DISPATCH 

6 

6 

0 

4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS 

(M) (0) Two pair of symmetrical surfaces 1 

and 2 may be Inoperative in the retracted 

position provided: 

a) SECs associated with operative 

spoilers operate nonnally, and 

b) SFCS 2 flap channel operates 

normally, and 

c) AFM performance penatties are 

applied. 

(M) (0) Two pair of symmetrical surfaces 3 

and 4 may be inoperative in the refracted 

position provided: 

a) SECs associated with operative 

spoilers operate normally, and 

b) TR 1 and TR 2 operate normally, 

c) DC Tie Contractor 1 is verified 

dosed before each departure. 

d) SFCS 2 flap channel operates 

nonmally, and 

e) AFM perfonnance penalties are 

applied. 

2-27-13 
USA 3000 AIRLINES 

CHAPTER 2: MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST 

SECTION 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST 

Revision: 13 

June 27.2005 

SYSTEM & 

SEQUENCE 

NUMBERS 

27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 

64-03 

84-04 

81-01 

84-01 

84-02 

LAF 

ACCUMULATORS 

(N266AVONLY) 

ECAM SPOILERS 

HYDRAULIC 

SYSTEM PRESSURE 

INDICATION ON 

FLIGHT CONTROL 

PAGE 

SLAT WING TIP 

BRAKES 

SOLENOIDS 

SLATS HYDRAULIC 

MOTORS 

SLAT PCU VALVE 

BLOCKS 

LITEM 

D 

C 

C 

C 

B 

2. NUMBER INSTALLED 

4 

3 

4 

2 

2 

3. NUMBER REQUIRED FOR DISPATCH 

0 

2 

2 

1 

1 

4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS 

One symbol (G, B, Y) may be inoperative 

provided associated hydraulic system 

pressure indication Is available on ECAM 

hydraulic page. 

(M) Solenoids associated with SFCC 2 may 

be inoperative provided SFCC 1 WTBs 

operate normally before each flight. 

(M) <0) SFCS 2 Slat PCU \^lve Block may 

be inoperative provided: 

a) Slats, Raps, and associated 

monitoring and protection systems 

operate nonnaily on SFCC1, 

b) Operation of SFCC 1 WTBs are 

confinmed by tests before each 

departure, 

c) Electrical supply to SFCC 2 slat 

channel is inhibited, and 

d) ELAC, SEC, ADIRS, LGCIU, FAC 

and RA systems operate nonrmlly. 

e) Takeoffin CONF l+F is prohibited. 

2-27-14 

I 

•i 

1 
ex cuuu 12:19PH LRU! OFFICES OF JRSON DICK 2026288948 p.6 

USA 3000 AIRLINES 

CHAPrm 2: MSiMUM ECMPMBir UST 

SECTION 27 RJOHT CONTROLS 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT UST 

Raivi8lon:8 

No\^«nlMr20,2003 

SYSTEM & 

SEQUENCE 

NUMBERS 

27 PUQHT CONTROLS 

924)1 SPEED BRAKE 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

1) Spaad brake 2 or 

3and4 

82-02 GROUND SPOILER 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

1) SpoHarS 

2) 9poam9im62 

or3and4 

8^0^ ACCELEROMETER 

SYSTEMS 

824)4 SIDBSnCK 

1RAN8DUCBR 

SYSTEMS 

924)0 SPOILEW SPEED 

BRAKE 

INDKATfONSON 

BCAM F/CTL AND 

WHEELPAQE 

LITEM 

C 

C 

2. NUMBER INSTALLED 

8 

2 

8 

10 

10 

3. NUMBER REQUIREO FOR DISPATCH 

0 

4 

4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS 

(O) May be moparaMve provldad AFM 

parfofnwnoa panaMaa aaaoclalad vMh al 

(O) May be moparaUve prowWad AFM 

partonnanoa panaMlaa aaaodaiad wtti two 

palm of ground ipolaw Iwpaiaiwe awi 

(O) May ba jnoparadva pravidad AFM 

(O) 1 and 2 or 8 aid 4 may be 

pravidaci AAI parflormanoa 

IneuipoiaiaU Me 274)4)1. 

OaMadi Rani 4. 

l4By be hoparrtve tor an aaaodatad 

(O) May be 

check of aff 

madebalixe 

provMadevlaual 

la 

2-27-15 
MAINTENANCE CONTROL 

SHIFT TURNOVER LOG 

A/C: 

STATION: 

CONTACT: 

FLIGHT NUMBER: 

CONTROLLER: 

LOG PAGE: 

DESCRIPTION: 

N266AV 

ORD 

MIKE M. 

RON 

ED SHINN 

68515 

START TIME: 

FINISH TIME 

OMI/NUMBER 

CATEGORY: 

DISPATCHER: 

ITEM NUM: 

DATE: 

7:23 

NEFOG000210 

D 

MIKE CONNELLY 

02 

5/17/2008 

REPOTTED ANCHOR CENTER AISLE THRESHOLD INSTALLED STRIP. 

CLEARED IN AIMS AND AURA. 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM Page 23 
MAINTENANCE CONTROL 

SHIFT TURNOVER LOG 

A/C: 

STATION: 

CONTACT: 

FLIGHT NUMBER: 

CONTROLLER: 

LOG PAGE: 

DESCRIPTION: 

N268AV 

BWI 

jSTEVE B. 

RON 

ED SHINN 

65999 

START TIME: 

FINISH TIME 

DMi/NUMBER 

CATEGORY: 

DISPATCHER: 

ITEM NUM: 

DATE: 

7:55 

MEL00003548 

MIKE CONNELLY 

03 

5/17/2008 

REMOVED AND REPLACED ELECTRONIC CTRL BOX lAW 49-61-34 

PB401.PERFORMED AHRS &ACYC UPDATE.THIS CLEARS MEL00003548. 

CLEARED IN AIMS AND AURA. 

# 

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A/C: 

STATION: 

CONTACT: 

FLIGHT NUMBER: 

CONTROLLER: 

LOG PAGE: 

DESCRIPTION: 

N270AV 

RSW 

CHRIS C. 

RON 

ED SHINN 

065322 

START TIME: 

FINISH TIME 

DMi/NUMBER 

CATEGORY: 

DISPATCHER: 

ITEM NUM: 

DATE: 

9:26 

NEF00000211 

D 

MIKE CONNELLY 

_ 

5/17/2008 

SEATS 25 B.C READING LIGHT INOP. - A/C RELEASED PER DMI/NEF #000000211. 

ENTERED IN AIMS AND AURA. 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41. PM 

I I 

I Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM Paga 25 
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STATION: 

CONTACT: 

FLIGHT NUMBER: 

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N270AV 

RSW 

|CHRIS C. 

RON 

ED SHINN 

065322 

START TIME: 

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CATEGORY: 

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ITEM NUM: 

DATE: 

9:46 

NEF000000212 

D 

MIKE CONNELLY 

02 

5/17/2008 

HEAD PHONES @ 25 A.C DONT WORK. - A/C RELEASED PER DMI/NEF #00000212. 

ENTERED IN AIMS AND AURA. 

Thursday. May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM 

I 

1 Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM Page 26 
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A/C: 

STATION: 

CONTACT: 

FLIGHT NUMBER: 

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GENERAL 

DAVID DRUM 

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10:30 

r 

5/17/2008 

AIMS HRS/ CYC REPORT PRINTED REVIEWED AND FILED. 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 P M Page 27 

i 
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N268AV 

CUN 

MARIO 

320 

DAVID DRUM 

066601 

START TIME: 

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DATE: 

|14:10 

MEL00003550 

MATT SHEAFFER 

01 

5/17/2008 

COCKPIT DOOR FAULT LIGHT ILLUMINATED. LOWER DOOR LATCH DOES NOT 

LOCK. -VERIFIED LOWER STRIKE FAILED IN UNLOCKED POSITION. RELEASED 

PER DMI#MEL00003550 lAW MEL 52-50-02-7. 

ENTERED IN AIMS AND AURA 

REQUESTED AOG RELOCATE 15 EA. SPLICE P/N NSA936830-20 AND 1EA. LWR 

STRIKE P/N AR4714-201, BWI HAS DMC-519 AND AND CONTACT P/N 

NSA93791OEA2O0O ON HAND. PARTS WILL BE DRIVEN ASAP TO BWI TONIGHT. 

Thursday. May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM 

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N267AV 

CUN 

ALEXANDRO 

410 

DAVID DRUM 

067012 

START TIME: 

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DISPATCHER: 

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DATE: 

14:35 

DM100002705 

01 

5/17/2008 

FRONT PAX 02 USED. REMAINING PRESS 1500PSI. -RELEASED PER 

DMi#DMI00002705. FWD PAX 0 2 BOTTLE USED. 1500 PSI REMAINS. 

ENTERED IN AIMS AND AURA 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM 

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N265AV 

MIA 

JOE MILLER 

HANGAR / FLT 7265 

DAVID DRUM 

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21:15 

5/17/2008 

JOE CALLED AND SAID THAT THE MAF WAS UNSATISFACTORY. ON APPROACH 

THEY HAD A PROBLEM AND STRUCK THE LEFT WING TIP ON THE RUNWAY. HE 

WILL CALL BACK WITH MORE INFO AS SOON AS ABLE. 

Thursday. May 29. 2008 1:40:41 PM 

^ 

I 

! 

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N271AV 

PIT 

GLENN VEAHMAN 

RON 

DAVID DRUM 

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21:15 

5/17/2008 

PIT LE GLENN CALLED AND REPORTED PILOT WRIGHT UP: CAPT SEAT RECLINE 

INOP. GLENN T/S AND FOUND IB RECLINE CABLE BROKEN HE REPORTS P/N 

NEEDED IS SB3-011-001-02. CALLED AOG AND FOUND THAT USAIR HAS MANY 

SPARES ON HAND IN PIT. REQUESTED AOG PURCHASE FROM USAIR PIT. 

NOTIFIED PIT GLEN TO PICK-UP CABLE FROM USAIR MAIN HANGAR STOCK ROOM 

AT 2200Z. SENT CMM FOR IPC AND R/R OVER PIT PRINTER AND NOTIFIED 

GLENN. REQUESTED HE NOTIFY MOC AS SOON AS AIRCRAFT IS FIXED. 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM 

13 

5i> 

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N269AV 

ORD 

TERRY D 

DAVID DRUM 

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21:00 

5/17/2008 

TERRY REPORTS THAT CREW 02 BOTTLE APPROACHING MINIMUM LIMITS FOR 4 

MAN CREW. HE WILL HAVE MIDNIGHT SHIFT TRY TO SERVICE BOTTLE AT UAL 

TONIGHT. PLACED REQ FOR BOTTLE SPECIFIC TO N268AV AND N269AV. AOG 

WILL FED EX TONIGHT EDD MONDAY (HAZMAT). AOG HAS VERIFIED THAT IF 

NEEDED UAL WILL LEND NEEDED P/N 5 EA. IN STOCK (ORD). SINCE N269AV IS IN 

ORD FOR ONLY ONE MORE WEEK HAD AOG PLACE REQ ON HOLD UNTIL WE SEE 

IF ORD LE CAN RESERVICE CURRENTLY INSTALLED BOTTLE.. MOC TO LET AOG 

KNOW OF OUTCOME. 

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INFO ONLY 

ILLIAS KIRITSIS 

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23:00 

BEN SCHROEDER 

5/17/2008 

SHIFT CHANGE AND PASSDOWN C/W TIMES AND CYCLES REVIEWED AND FILED. 

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MIA 

DAVE 

ILLIAS KIRITSIS 

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|0:00 

BEN SCHROEDER 

5/17/2008 

SPOKE WITH DAVE BEAL REGARDING 265 TEST FLIGHT, DAVE REPORTS THAT 

MIA IS PERFORMING A HARD LANDING INSPECTION AT THIS TIME, HE ASLO SAID 

THE SPOILER ACTUATORS WERE SET TO THE (M) POSITION NOT THE (O) 

POSITION. THUS CAUSING THE SPOILERS TO DEPLAY IN FLIGHT. THE PFR 

SHOWS 44 COCKPIT EFFECTS WITH 7 FAULTS, SEVERAL OF THE FAULTS WERE 

MOST LIKELY CAUSED BY THE INCORRECT SETTING ON THE SPOILER 

ACTUATORS. MORE INFO WILL FOLLOW AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. 

Thursday. May 29. 2008 1:40:41 PM 

« < ; 

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CLE 

JIM 

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ILLIAS KIRITSIS 

[067013 

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3:00 

3:05 

DM100002705 

BEN SCHROEDER 

03 

5/17/2008 

RPL PORT PAX 0 2 BOTTLE AT FWD POSITION. THIS CLEARS DMI#DMI00002705. 

CLEARED IN AIMS AND AURA. 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM 

a 

II 

Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:40:41 PM Page 35 

-1 
1: , 

\:,_ 

<d 

II a r^««rh^r,» PHIUVDELPHIAFSDO-17] 

U.S. Department 2 InO Plaza. Suite 110 

of Transportation Philadelphia, PA 19113 

FeckKOl Aviation ?**"* ®1°:^^.^^ 

AdmlnWrotlon ''«• aio-595-i5i9 

May 30. 2008 

Certified-Return Receipt 

Mr. Joseph Guhin 

USA 3000 Airlines 

335 Bishop Hollow Road, Suite 100 

Newtown Square, PA 19073 

Dear Mr. Guhin: 

File Number 2008EA170038 

On May 19, 2008, Brendan Alrv/ays, LLC, (dba USA 3000 Airlines) notified this office of a 

wingtip fence strike on the runway by an Airbus A-320-212, N265AV, operated by USA 3000 

Airiines, during an attempted landing at Miarni International Airport (MIA) on May 17, 2008. The 

flight was conducted as a maintenance/customer acceptance flight following heavy 

maintenance by AAR Aircraft Services, Inc. (XE4R645M) at MIA. 

A review of the maintenance logbook and other records revealed that Brenden Airways. LLC. 

may have operated an unairworthy aircraft during the flight referenced above. 

This letter is to inform you that this matter lis under investigation by the Federal Aviation 

Administration. We wish to offer you an opportunity to discuss the matter personally arid submit 

|| a written statementr If you^ desire to-dCTeitherrthrs'shauld'beaecompIlsfTedlwtlM^^ 

l | following receipt of this letter. Your statement should contain all pertinent facts and any 

| | mitigating circumstances, which you believe may have a bearing on this matter. If we do not 

hear from you within the specified tinie. our report will proceed without the benefit of your 

statement. 

Sincerely, 

LaurenceO. Johnsonti^ ^80080 . JOhllSOn 

II Principal Operations Inspector i 

'ii 

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Is 

i I 

8 
USA 3000 

•i J, 

I 

June 11,2008 

Laurence Johnson 

Principal Operations Inspector- USA3000 

Philadelphia FSDO-17 

2 Int'l Plaza, Suite 110 

Philidelphia, PA 19113 

Dear Mr. Johnson, 

RE: LOI File Number 2008EA170038 and VDRP Reference ID: 2649 

On May 30,2008, you sent USA3000 Airlines a Letter of Investigation (LOI) concerning 

the maintenance acceptance test flight of Brendan Airways L.L.C., dba USA3000 

Airlines aircraft N265AV, at MIA, on May 17,2008. On June 4,2008, you sent a letter 

to William Hoffman, USA3000 Airlines Director of Quality Control, accepting a VDRP 

with the condition the acceptance only related to the maintenance aspects ofthe test 

flight. 

This reply to the LOI refers only to the operation's aspects ofthe test fUght. 

-This^commentary is based on^the Pilet^Safety Repertsrtfae-reportthe Directorof 

Maintenance & Engineering gave to the FAA on May 19,2008, conversations with 

Joe Miller, Director of Maintenance & Engineering and Captain Snnratt on June 10 

2008, AIRBUS Industries and USA3000 Airlines manuals, and various date 

downloads. USA3000 Airlines b providing to you all of the information, data, and 

documentation witli tliis letter that it has to date. Any additional information that 

comes to light or is discovered wiU be forwarded to your ofBcc as soon as possible. 

On May 17,2008, USA3000 Airlines conducted a MIA-MIA, Part 91 maintenance 

acceptance test flight in preparation for returning MSN 427 to the lessor. International 

Lease Finance Corp. During the flight control check during the taxi checklist, the crew 

noted there was an ECAM caution of LAF DEGRADED. It was cleared by resetting the 

Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC) pushbuttons. According to both Captain Surratt and 

Joe Miller, this caution is not un-common, and quickly cleared. The aircraft had a clean 

upper ECAM page prior to the imeventiul takeoff. While airborne, during routine page 

call-ups, the ECAM panel displayed symmetrical, spoiler 3/5 UR amber indications. 

Diiring the flight a pilot from the next leasing airline, left the cockpit and returned noting 

335 Bishop Hollow Road, Suite 100 Newtown Square, PA 19073 

Phone: 610.325.1280 Fax 610.325.1285 
two spoilers on the left wing were floating. An USA3000 Airlines inspection's employee 

took some pictures of those spoilers (photos, attachment 1). During the flight, the pilots 

noted the rudder trim going out of limits. Captain Walker disei^aged the autopilot and 

manually trinuned the aircraft On approach. Captain Walker stated the aircraft felt 

"sloppy." In the flare, the aircraft dropped abruptly, bounced and rolled left The crew 

initiated a go-around and flew a second approach at Flaps 3 and VREF+25. On the 

second landing {^proach, on touchdown, the aircraft tried to roll left again but was 

controllable to a landing. 

After landing, it was discovered that a portion of left wingtip fence was ground off. 

Repair cost is about $33,000 (photos, attachment 2). 

The initial review ofthe aircraft after landing (with AAR Services personnel involved) 

found spoilers 3/5 on the left wing to be in 'Maintenance Mode*. Joe Miller, USA3000 

Airlines Director of Maintenance & Engineering, who was aboard the flight, formally 

requested an investigation by AAR Services at that time (Joe Miller email, attachment 3). 

On May 19,2008, Mr. Miller provided the MIA FAA a written statement (Joe Miller 

Memo, attachment 4). Mr. Miller directed the digital flight data recorder be removed and 

quarantined. The DFDR was sent to Honeywell for download and analysis. 

On May 18,2008, Tim Lyons, USA3000 Airlines Chief Pilot, spoke to both pilots. On 

May 19,2008, Joe Guhin, US A3000 Airlines Director of Safety and Regulatory 

Compliance, called both pilots and directed safety reports be submitted (Surratt Report, 

attachment 5, Walker Report, attachment 6). 

On May 19,2008, Joe Guhin called the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

Operations center and spoke to the investigator on duty, John Lovell. Mr. Guhin 

\ provided the essential information of who, vrbat, when, where and the estimated cost. 

I ^ ^ t^vellTeqtieslM phofiM ofTIiclJaSapr^WcE 

I (attachment 2). On May 20,2008, Mr Lovell, via email, was asked and concurred that 

^1 the NTSB had no further interest in the event and authorized release ofthe flight data 

II recorder (email, attachment 7). 

'-•_% 

I On May 19,2008, The FAA requested USA3000 Airlines set aircraft N265AV in the 

same configuration as it was prior to the test flight on May 17,2008, (spoilers 3/5 on the 

left wing in maintenance mode) and take a picture ofthe ECAM faidt panel. The photo 

was emailed to the FAA on May 20,2008 ^hoto and email, attachment 8). 

On May 22,2008, Joe Guhin asked the pilots again to submit detailed summaries. On 

May 23, Jack Eastman, the USASOOOAirUnes Director of Operations, was called by an 

attorney for the International Brotheihood of Teamsters, Local 747, that represents the 

pilots in the employ of USA3000 Airiines. Mr. Eastman was advised that the effort to 

obtain additional infomiation was being considered harassment by the Union. On June 

10,2008, Joe Guhin, USA3000 Airlines Director of Safety and Regulatory Compliance, 

spoke to Joe Miller, USA3000 Airlines Director of Maintenance and Engineering, who 

IS 

I I 6 
provided a detailed synopsis ofthe flight, and his rational on why the aircraft was safe to 

launch, torn his viewpoint in the jump seat On 10 June 2008, Joe Guhin spoke to 

Captain Surratt, who provided a separate and similar description and rational on preflight 

indications and for feeling the aircraft was safe to launch. 

Attachment 9 is the Aircraft Log sheet (Form M-3) for the flight 

Attachment 10 is the AIMS printouts for Pilots Surratt and Walker showing they were 

scheduled for the flight 

Attachment 11 is a photo of ECAM flight control display with normal indications. 

Attachment 12 is a training document page ofthe ECAM F/CTL display, with an 

explanation ofthe display 

Attachment 13 is an FCOM page with a legend ofthe color codes on the displays 

Attachment 14 is a print out of a portion ofthe Post Flight Report (PFR) ofthe test flight 

showing the time ofthe ECAM fault displays. Joe Miller, commented that the F/CTL 

SPLR faults will be momentary when the SEC pushbuttons are reset 

Attachment 14a are Airbus TSM Manual pages related to the LAF DEGRADED fault. 

Attachment 15 is the FCOM page for F/CTL SEC 1 (2) (3) Fault 

Attachment 16 is the FCOM page for F/CTL SPLR Fault 

Attachment 17 is the FCOM page for LAF ACCU Fault 

Attachment 18~are~trainiiig^ociimmt pagesTor spoilen and the ECAM F/CTL display. 

Page one has the statement that when one spoiler surface fails, the symmetric one on the 

other wing is inhibited. 

Attachment 19 are FCOM pages of warning and cautions for Aircraft N265AV. 

Attachment 20 is an FCOM page on "SPEED BRK" memo display logic. 

Attachment 21 are pages from the USA3000 Airlines Minimum Eqwpment List (MEL), 

Chg 22, concerning spoiler surface malfimctions. (Change 22 is provided. Change 23 is 

the current edition and does not include guidance on N265AV). 

Attachment 22 is the A320 Expanded TAXI Checklist from the FCOM. Page 2 describes 

the flight control check. 
Attachment 23 is subject flight DFDR tabular data for command stick and flight control 

positions during the flight control test (1718:18 to 1719:38 UTC). The DFDR data did 

not have readouts ofthe ECAM panel display indications. 

Attachment 24 is a flightaware.com, minute-by-minute, recap of position, speed and 

altitude ofthe maintenance test flight 

On May 30,2008, Larry Johnson informed Joe Guhin that Pilot Walker was in the left 

seat and why was PIC Surratt not in the left seat and flying? After conferring with Chief 

Pilot Tim Lyons, Joe replied via email that Pilot Walker was Captain qualified (email, 

attachment 25). 

Attachment 26 is a copy ofthe FAA approved USA3000 Airlines NORMAL 

CHECKLIST 

If you have any questions on this package, please contact me at (610) 325-1289 or at 

jguhin@usa3000.com 

^ 

Joseph M. Guhin 

Director of Safety & Regulatory Compliance 

USA3000 Airiines 

(610)325-1289 

iguhin@USA3000.com 

Attachments: 

1. Photos of left wing spoilers floating 

2. Photos of damaged wing fence 

3. Email from Joe Miller to AAR Services 

4. Joe Miller incident Memo to MIA FAA 

5. Safety Report Pilot Surratt 

6. Safety Report Pilot Walker 

7. Email from NTSB releasing DFDR 

8. Email & Photo of N265AV ECAM panel with spoiler faults 

9. Log page, N265AV, May 17,2008 

10. AIMS schedule page for Pilots Surratt and Walker 

11. Photo of ECAM flight control page with normal indications 

12. ECAM F/CTL display legend 

13. ECAM color code legend 

14. N265AVPFR,Mayl7,2008 

14a Airbus TSM Manual pages related to the LAF DEGRADED fault 
15. FCOM page for F/CTL SEC 1 (2) (3) Fault 

16. FCOM page for F/CTL SPLR Fault 

17. FCOM page for LAF ACCU Fault 

18. Training document pages for spoilers and the ECAM F/CTL display 

19. FCOM pages of warning and cautions for Aircraft N265AV 

20. FCOM page on "SPEED BRK" memo display logic 

21. USA3000Airlines MEL, Chg 22, spoiler surface malfunctions 

22. A320 TAXI Checklist from the FCOM 

23. DFDR tabular data for the flight control check 

24. flighta'ware.com, flight recap 

25. Email on Pilot Walker being m left seat 

26. USA3000 Airlines Normal Checklist - page 7.01 
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USA 3000 AIRLINES 

CHAPTER 3: MEL OPERATIONS PROCEDURES 

SECTION ATA 27: MEL TASK: 27-64-01 

( 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT UST 

Revision: 13 

June 27. 2005 

MEL TASK: 27-64-01 

A. SPOILER SURFACES 

1. Performance penalty with one pair of ground spoilers inoperative: 

a. Spoiler 5 inoperative: no performance penalty 

b. Spoiler 1,2,3 or 4 inoperative: 

1) Take-off must be performed with full thrust. 

2) Detenmine maximum take-off weight and associated speeds in normal 

conditions on dry runway by selecting the appropriate configuration on 

the OPS MEL screen, 

3) Landing performance - reference OPS. 

NOTE: THIS WEiGHT AND THESE SPEEDS MA Y BE RETAINED FOR TAKEOFF ON WET RUNWAY, PROVIDED REVERSE THRUST IS USED 

FOR DECELERATION. TAKE-OFF WITH ONE OR MORE SPOILERS 

INOPERATIVE AND REVERSER INOPERATIVE IS NOT RECOMMENDED ON WET RUNWAY. 

c. Perfonnance penalty with two pairs of ground spoilers inoperative: 

1) Take-off must be performed with full thrust. 

2) Determine max T/0 weight and associated speeds in normal conditions 

on dry mnway by selecting the appropriate configuration on the OPS 

MEL screen. 

NOTE: THIS WEIGHT AND THESE SPEEDS MA Y BE RETAINED FOR TAKEOFF ON WET RUNWAY, PROVIDED REVERSE THRUST IS USED 

FOR DECELERATION. TAKE-OFF WITH ONE OR MORE SPOILERS 

INOPERATIVE-AND-REVERSER-1N0PERATIVE1S~N0T'RECOMMENDED ON WET RUNWAY. 

3) Landing Perfonnance - reference OPS. 

3-27-11 
USA 3000 AIRUNES 

CHAPTER 4: MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES 

SECTION ATA 27: MEL TASK: 27-64-01 

{ 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT UST 

Revision: 8 

November 20, 2003 

MEL TASK: 27-64-01 

DEACTIVATION OF THE SPOILER SERVO CONTROL 

WARNING: PUT THE SAFETY DEVICES AND THE WARNING NOTICES IN 

POSITION BEFORE YOU START A TASK ON OR NEAR: 

• THE FUGHT CONTROLS 

- THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES 

- THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED DOORS 

- COMPONENTS THAT MOVE. 

WARNING: DO NOT DO THIS DEACTIVATION PROCEDURE IF THERE IS 

EXTERNAL LEAKAGE ON THE UNSERVICEABLE SERVOCONTROL 

WARNING: YOU MUST ALSO DO THE DEACTIVATION OF THE SERVOCONTROL, WHICH IS SYMMETRICAL TO THE UNSERVICEABLE SERVOCONTROL. 

WARNING: MAKE SURE THAT THE TRAVEL RANGES OF THE FLIGHT 

CONTROL SURFACES ARE CLEAR BEFORE YOU PRESSURIZE/DEPRESSURIZE A HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. 

A. JOB SET-UP 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CONFIGURATION 

1. Energize the aircraft electrical circuits (Ref. TASK 24-41 -00-861 -002). 

2. Extend the flaps (Ref TASK^^^ 

3. On the overhead panel 23VU: 

a. Release the FLT CTL/SEC 1 pushbutton switch (on this pushbutton switch, 

the OFF legend comes on). 

4. On the overhead panel 24VU: 

a. Release the FLT CTL/SEC 2 and FLT CTL/SEC 3 pushbutton switches (on 

these pushbutton switches, the OFF legends come on). 

5. On the panel 114VU. put the LOCKING TOOL -FLAP/SLAT CONTROL LEVER 

(98027803000000) in position on the flap and slat control lever. 

6. Put the PIN-SIDE STICK LOCKING (98D27903500000) in position on each 

side-stick controller. 

7. Install the Maintenance in Progress notice on the center pedestal. 

8. Oepressurize the hydraulic system related to the spoiler that you must deactivate. 

4-27-25 

UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED AND/OR DOWNLOADED. 

CHECK THE ACM FOLDER AND/OR TECH PUBS LIBRARY INVENTORY LIST FOR THE CURRENT/CONTROLLED DOCUMENT. 
( 

USA 3000 AIRUNES MINIMUM EQUIPMENT UST 

CHAPTER 4: MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES Revision: 8 

SECTION ATA 27: MEL TASK: 27-64-01 November 20. 2003 

9. For the spoiler 1 or 5. depressurize the Green hydraulic system (Ref. TASK 29-

23-00-864-001). 

10. For the spoiler 2 or 4. depressurize the Yellow hydraulic system (Ref. TASK 29-

24-00-864-001). 

11. For the spoiler 3, depressurize the Blue hydraulic system (Ref. TASK 29-10-00-

864-003). 

12. Put the access platfomn in position in: 

a. Zone 580 for the left spoilers. 

b. Zone 680 for the right spoilers. 

13. Open these access doors: 

a. 573BB for the left spoiler 1. 

b. 575BB for the left spoiler 2. 

c. 575DB for the left spoiler 3. 

d. 575EB for the left spoiler 4. 

e. 575GB for the left spoiler 5. 

f. 673BB for the right spoiler 1. 

g. 675BB for the right spoiler 2. 

h. 675DB for the right spoiler 3. 

1. 675EB for the right spoiler 4. 

j . 675GB for the right spoiler 5. 

14^ Beforeyou^de-activatoaservo-controK-make^surethat-ithaeno-extemalleaks: 

B. PROCEDURE 

1. Deactivation of the Spoiler Servo-control. (Ref. Fig. 401/TASK 27-64-00-991-

003) 

NOTE: WHEN YOU DEACTIVATE A SPOILER SERVO-CONTROL. YOU 

MUST ALSO DEACTIVATE THE SYMMETRICAL SERVO-CONTROL 

ON THE OTHER WING 

2. Install the SPOILER MAINTENANCE KEY (98D27603002001X1) on the servocontrol and turn it a quarter turn counterclockwise. 

NOTE: IF NECESSARY. USE A METAL ROD (TOMMY BAR) DIA.4MM 

(0.1574IN.) TO TURN THE SPOILER MAINTENANCE KEY. 

3. Disconnect the connector (3) from the receptacle (2) of the servo-control. 

4. Put blanking caps on the connector (3) and receptacle (2). 

5. Attach the electrical connector to a hydraulic line with a tie-wrap. 

4-27-26 

UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED AND.OR DOWNLOADED. 

CHECK THE ACM FOLDER AND.OR TECH PUBS LIBRARY INVENTORY LIST FOR THE CURRENT/CONTROLLED DOCUMENT 
USA 3000 AIRUNES 

CHAPTER 4: MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES 

SECTION ATA 27: MEL TASK: 27-64-01 

{ 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST 

Revision: 8 

November 20, 2003 

S7saa 57SEa 

S73BB I S790B S75QB ^5 2 

Be-actlvat-ion and Re-activation of the servocontrol 

Figure 401/TASK 27-64-00-991-003 

6. Make sure that the spoiler is in the fully retracted position. 

7. Turn the SPOILER MAINTENANCE KEY (98D27603002001) a quarter turn 

clockwise and remove it. 

4-27-27 

UNCONTRaLED COPY WHEN PRINTED AND/OR DOWNLOADED. 

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( I 

USA 3000 AIRUNES 

CHAPTER 4: MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES 

SECTION ATA 27: MEL TASK: 27-64-01 

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT UST 

Revision: 10 

May 17. 2004 

CAUTION: MAKE SURE THAT NO SPOILER MAINTENANCE KEY STAYS 

ENGAGED IN THE MAINTENANCE DEVICE HOUSING AERODYNAMIC FORCES WILL CAUSE UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF 

THE SPOILER IF THE MAINTENANCE KEY STAYS IN ITS HOUSING 

NOTE: IF NECESSARY, USE A METAL ROD (TOMMY BAR) DIA.4MM 

(0.1S74IN.) TO TURN THE SPOILER MAINTENANCE KEY. 

8. Apply moderate upward hand force to the lower surfece of the deactivated 

spoiler surface(s) and verify that the spoiler(s) WILL NOT move under force. 

9. On the overhead panel 23VU: ^X 

a. Push the FLT CTL/SEC 1 pushbutton switch (on this pushbutton switcnitne 

OFF legend goes off). \ 

10. On the overhead panel 24VU: 

a. Push the FLT CTL/SEC 2 and FLT CTL/SEC 3 pushbutton switches {<-

these pushbutton switches, the OFF legends go off). 

11. On the ECAM control panel on the center pedestal, push the F/CTL key. 

12. On the ECAM lower display unit, the F/CTL page comes into view. 

13. Pressurize the aircraft hydraulic systems (Ref. TASK 29-23-00-863-001) (Ref. 

TASK 29-24-00r863-001) (Ref. TASK 29-10-00-863-003). 

14. Do the operational test of the spoilers (Ref. TASK 27-64-00-710-001) 

NOTE: MAKE SURE THAT THE TWO SYMMETRICAL SPOILERS 

DEACTIVATED DO NOT OPERATE. 

YOU 

C: CLdSE-UP 

1. Put the aircraft back to its initial conflguration. 

2. On the panel 114VU, remove the LOCKING TOOL -FLAP/SLAT CONTROL 

LEVER (98D27803000000) fi'om the flap and slat control lever. 

3. Retract the flaps (Ref. TASK 27-50-00-866-009). 

4. Depressurize the aircraft hydraulic systems (Ref. TASK 29-23-00-864-001) (Ref. 

TASK 29-24-00-864-001) (Ref. TASK 29-10-00-864-003). 

5. Remove the PIN-SIDE STICK LOCKING (98D27903500000) and the Maintenance in Progress notice. 

6. Close access door(s) in zone(s) 580,680. 

7. Remove access platform(s). 

8. Make sure that the work area is clean and clear of tool(s) and other items. 

9. Remove the Maintenance in Progress notice from the center pedestal. 

4-27-28 

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CHECK THE ACM FOLDER AND/OR TECH PUBS LIBRARY INVENTORY LIST FOR THE CURRENT/CONTROLLFH nn/-i <• • -
C®^J«°0 A/RUNES 

n AiM ^ — 
^A320 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

FLIGHT CONTROLS - GENERAL - DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION 

R 

1. Pescription of Primary Flight Controls 

R 

R **0N A/C 265-265^ 

A. Glossary 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

1 ABBREVIATION | 

1 ADC 1 

1 ADIRS 

1 CFDIU 

1 DHU 

1 ECAH 

1 EFCC 

1 EFCS 

1 ELAC 

1 FAC 

1 FCDC 

1 FHGC 

1 IRS 

i LAF 

1 LVDT 

1 RV6T 

1 sec 

1 SFCC 

GLOSSARY 

SIGNIFICATION 

Air Data Computer 

Air Data/Inertlal Reference Systen 

Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit 

Data Management Unit 

Electronic Centralized Aircraft Honitoring 

Electronic Flight Control Computer 

Electrical Flight Control System 

Elevator Aileron Computer 

Flight Agmentation Computer 

Flight Control Data Concentrator 

Flight Management and Guidance Computer 

Inertial Reference System 

Load Alleviation Function 

Linear Variable Differential Transducer 

Rotary Variable Differential Transducer 

Spoiler Elevator Computer 

Slat Flap Control Computer 

EFF : ALL 

U3K 

270000 Page 1 

Aug 01/04 

Printed i n Franc* 
®A320 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

R B. General Principles 

R The control is achieved through conventional surfaces. 

R (Ref. Fig. 001) 

R The roll and pitch controls of the aircraft are electrical. They are 

R based on two different types of digital computers (ELAC and SEC), each of 

R them is able to control the aircraft in both axes. Honitoring and 

R redundancy within the flight control system, aircraft sensors, power and 

R hydraulic generation ensure a high degree of availability of the 

R electrical control. The basic yaw control is hydromechanical as well as 

R the alternate horizontal stabilizer control, thus providing the ability 

R to keep the aircraft in flight during a temporary complete loss of 

R electrical power. However, in normal conditions, some rudder control 

R functions (trim, travel limitation) are achieved by the FAC. 

R The normal pitch control law is basically the closed loop control of the 

R load factor, and includes flight envelope protections. The normal lateral 

R control law combines the roll rate control, turn coordination and Dutch 

R roll damping functions. The ailerons and the two external spoilers are 

R used for load alleviation purpose. 

R **0N A/C ALL 

R Post SB 27-1115 For A/C 265-265, 

R A. Glossar y 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

R 

1 ABBREVIATION 

1 ADC 

1 ADIRS 

1 CFDIU 

1 DMU 

i ECAH 

1 EFCC 

1 EFCS 

i ELAC 

1 FAC 

1 FCDC 

i FMGC 

1 IRS 

1 LVDT 

1 RVDT 

1 SEC 

1 SFCC 

GLOSSARY 

SIGNIFICATION 

Air Data Computer 

Air Data/Inertial Reference System 

Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit 

Data Management Unit 

Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring 

Electronic Flight Control Computer 

Electrical Flight Control System 

Elevator Aileron Computer 

Flight Agmentation Computer 

Flight Control Data Concentrator 

Flight Management and Guidance Computer 

Inertial Reference System 

Linear Variable Differential Transducer 

Rotary Variable Differential Transducer 

Spoiler Elevator Computer 

Slat Flap Control Computer 

EFF : ALL 

U3K 

27-0000 Page 2 

Aug 01/04 

Printad in France 
OA320 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

i ibiii 

r 

Flight Control Surfaces (A320) 

Figure 001 

EFF : 265-265, 

U3K 

27-00-00 Page 3 

Aug 01/04 

Printed in Franc* 
OA320 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

R B. General Principles 

R The control is achieved through conventional surfaces. 

R (Ref. Fig. 001A) 

R The roll and pitch controls of the aircraft are electrical. They are 

R based on two different types of digital computers (ELAC and SEC), each of 

R them being able to control the aircraft in both axes. Honitoring and 

R redundancy within the flight control system, aircraft sensors, power and 

R hydraulic generation ensure a high degree of availability of the 

R electrical control. The basic yaw control is hydromechanical as well as 

R the alternate horizontal stabilizer control, thus providing the ability 

R to keep the aircraft in flight during a temporary complete loas of 

R electrical power. However, in normal conditions, some rudder control 

R functions (trim, travel limitation) arc achieved by the FAC. 

R The normal pitch control law is basically the closed loop control of the 

R load factor, and includes flight envelope protections. The normal lateral 

R control Law combines the roll rate control, turn coordination and Dutch 

R roll damping functions. 

R 

**0N A/C 265-265, 

C. Ailerons 

The roll control of the aircraft is achieved by one wing tip aileron 

augmented by four spoilers on each wing. The ailerons are manually 

controlled from the side stick controllers or automatically in autopilot 

or load alleviation function. 

Each aileron can be powered by two servocontrols signalled by two 

Elevator and Aileron Computers (ELAC) and supplied from different 

hydraulic systems. In normal operation, the roll function of the ailerons 

is achieved through the ELAC 1 and the associated servocontrols in active 

mode, the ELAC 2 being in standby and its associated servocontrols in 

damping mods. Tha load alleviation function of the ailerons is performed 

by both ELACs and all the aileron servocontrols. In the event of a 

failure, the ailerons become automatically controlled by the ELAC 2 (roll 

and load alleviation) and the associated servocontrols switched to the 

active mode, the others being now damped. If a multiple failure condition 

causes the loss of the control of the two servocontrols of an aileron, 

the servocontrols automatically switch to the damping mode. This 

operating mode is also automatically engaged in the event of loss of 

pressure. 

Two independent side stick controllers are installed in the cockpit. They 

include the roll and pitch position transducers and feel mechanisms, and 

a solenoid-operated detent that locks the control lever in neutral 

position when the autopilot is engaged. 

EFF : ALL 

U3K 

27-00-00 P.». 

Aug 01/04 

Printed In France 
OA320 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

Fligh t Control Surfaces (A320) 

Figure 001A 

EFF : ALL 

U3JC 

2700-00 Page 5 

May 01/03 

Printed in France 
(SA320 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

**0N A/C ALL 

R Post SB 27-1115 For A/C 265-265, 

C. Ailerons 

The roll control of the aircraft is achieved by one wing tip aileron 

augmented by four spoilers on each wing. The ailerons are manually 

controlled from the side stick controllers or automatically in autopilot 

function. 

Each aileron can be powered by two servocontrols signalled by two 

Elevator and Aileron Computers (ELAC) and supplied from different 

hydraulic systems. In normal operation, the roll function of the ailerons 

is achieved through the ELAC 1 and the associated servocontrols in active 

node, the ELAC 2 being in standby and its associated servocontrols in 

damping mode. In the event of a failure, the ailerons become 

automatically controlled by the ELAC 2 (roll) and the associated 

servocontrols switched to the active mode, the others being now damped. 

If a multiple failure condition causes the loss of the control of the two 

servocontrols of an aileron, the servocontrols automatically switch to 

the damping mode. This operating mode is also automatically engaged in 

the event of loss of pressure. 

Two independent side stick controllers are installed in the cockpit. They 

include the roll and pitch position transducers and feel mechanisms, and 

a solenoid-operated detent that locks the control lever in neutral 

position when the autopilot is engaged. 

**0N A/C ALL 

D. Rudder 

The rudder mainly permits to achieve the yaw control. 

The rudder is actuated by three servo controls. 

The servo controls can be driven: 

- in manual mode: 

either mechanically from the pedals , 

or electrically from the side stick and/or the rudder pedals 

- in autopilot control mode: 

from the FMGECs. 

The rudder is powered by three servo controls mechanically signalled from 

the pedals through a single load path linkage fitted with a centering 

spring device that holds the servocontrol input in the neutral position 

if a disconnection occurs. 

Each set of pedals is fitted with a position transducer. 

Feel is provided by a spring rod, the zero force position of which is 

controlled by an electrical trim actuator. 

A solenoid-operated mechanism increases the feel force threshold when the 

autopilot is engaged. 

EFF : ALL 

U3K 

27-00-00 Page 6 

May 01/04 

Printed In France 
9A320 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

Two yaw-damper electrohydraulic servoactuators connected to a common 

output lever drive the linkage through a differential lever arrangement. 

One servoactuator is normally operating, the other being by-passed. A 

spring rod is provided to center the actuators when both of them are 

depressurized. 

The maximum control stroke is restricted by the Travel Limitation Unit as 

a function of the airspeed. 

The trim actuator, the yaw damper servoactuators and the travel 

limitation unit are normally controlled by the Flight Augmentation 

Computer (FAC) 1, the FAC 2 being in standby. 

In addition to their basic function, the trim actuator and the yaw damper 

servoactuators are used to introduce the autopilot signals. 

Rudder Immobilization or runaway in the event of a servocontrol valve 

jamming is prevented by a spring rod and pressure relief valve 

arrangement. 

E. Elevators (Ref. 27-30 and 27-90) 

The pitch control of the aircraft is achieved by two mechanically 

independent elevators controlled manually from the side stick controllers 

or automatically in autopilot function. 

Each elevator can be driven by two electrohydraulic servocontrols 

signalled by the ELACs or SEC 1 or 2, and supplied from different 

hydraulic systems. 

In normal operation the elevators are controlled by the ELAC 2 and the 

associated servocontrols in active mode, the other computers being in 

standby and the servocontrols in damping mode. In the event of a high 

load-factor demand that would cause one servocontrol to stall, the second 

servocontrol is operated. In the event of failure, the elevators are 

controled by ELAC1, then by SEC2 or SEC1. In the event of the loss of 

control of the two servocontrols of the elevator, the servocontrols are 

automatically switched to a centering mode and hold the surface in the 

neutral position (Electrical control loss), in the event of the loss of 

the two hydraulic systems supplying the servocontrols of one elevator, 

the damping mode becomes automatically engaged. 

The side stick controller operation for the pitch control is similar to 

the roll control as described in para. I.B. 

F. Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (Ref. 27-40 and 27-90) 

The pitch trim function is achieved by the Trimmable Horizontal 

Stabilizer (THS) either automatically in normal in-flight manual mode or 

autopilot function or manually from the handwheels in normal ground 

operation or in-flight failure condition. 

The THS is moved and held by a THS actuator that includes a double 

load-path ball screw powered by two differentially coupled hydraulic 

motors mechanically servocontrolled. The ball screw is fitted with a 

no-back brake, the motors ar* fitted with pressure-off brakes. The 

EFF : ALL 

U3K 

27-0000 Page 7 

May 01/03 

Printed In Franc* 
9A320 

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

control loops include a device that applies both pressure-off brakes in 

the event of either control valve jamming. 

The input shaft of the THS actuator is normally driven by an electrical 

motor servocontrolled by the ELAC 2, two other motors controlled 

respectively by ELAC 1 or SEC 1 and SEC 2. 

The input shaft of the THS actuator can also be manually driven by the 

pilots through a mechanical linkage normally moved by the handwheels. 

An overriding mechanism gives the priority to the mechanical control over 

the electrical control. 

R **0N A/C 265-265, 

G. Spoilers 

Five spoiler surfaces are provided on each wing to achieve the functions 

below : 

- roll spoiler (surfaces 2 to 5) 

- speedbrake (surfaces 2 to 4) 

- load alleviation (surfaces 4 and 5) 

- ground spoilers (all surfaces). 

These surfaces are manually controlled from the side stick controllers 

(roll spoilers), speedbrake control lever (speedbrake) or automatically 

in autopilot, ground spoiler or load alleviation function. 

Each surface is controlled by one servocontrol supplied from the Green, 

Yellow or Blue system and signalled from the SEC 1, 2 or 3. 

The combination of the different functions is achieved in the computers. 

In the event of an electrical failure, the associated surface is 

hydraulically held down. In the event of a hydraulic failure, the 

servocontrol is hydraulically locked in one direction to prevent the 

surface from raising. In both cases the control of tha symmetrical 

surface is automatically inhibited. 

**0N A/C ALL 

R Post SB 27-1115 For A/C 265-265, 

G. Spoilers 

Five spoiler surfaces are provided on each wing to achieve the functions 

below : 

- roll spoiler (surfaces 2 to 5) 

- speedbrake (surfaces 2 to 4) 

- ground spoilers (all surfaces). 

These surfaces are manually controlled from the side stick controllers 

(roll spoilers), speedbrake control lever (speedbrake) or automatically 

in autopilot and ground spoiler function. 

Each surface is controlled by one servocontrol supplied from the Green, 

Yellow or Blue system and signalled from the SEC 1, 2 or 3. 

EFF : ALL 

U3K 

27-0000 Page 8 

May 01/04 

Printed in Franc* 
USA 3000 

A I K L 1 N H S '''j^-^'/B-Or. 

June 16,2008 

Laurence Johnson 

Principal Operations Inspector- USA3000 

Philadelphia FSDO-17 

2 IntM Plaza 

Philadelphia, PA 19113 

Dear Mr. Johnson, 

RE: Request for clarification of information in the response to LOI file nunii>er 

2008EA170038, MIA-MIA Maintenance Acceptance Flight, 17 May, 2008 

USA3000 Airlines was asked to explain the numerous ECAM fault indications that were 

listed on Post Flight Report ofthe subject 17 May 2(X)8 flight, (attachment 14 ofthe 

response package) and why the crew felt they were launching with an airworthy aircraft. 

Following a Director's meeting with the COO, Joe Miller, USA3000 Airlines Director of 

Maintenance and Engineering, was tasked to provide a detailed explanation of how the 

ECAM faults were generated and >^y the crew felt they launched with an airworthy 

aircraft (Attachment 1). 

Also include are copies of LOI file number 2008EA170038 (attachment 2) and the 

clarification guidance letter to VDRP Reference ID: 2649 (attachment 3). 

If you have any questions on this package, please contact me at (610) 325-1289 or at 

jguhin@usa3(M)0.com. 

Joseph M. Guhin 

Director of Safety & Regulatory Compliance 

USA3000 Airlines 

(610)325-1289 

335 Bishop Hollow Road, Suice 100 Newtown Square, PA 19073 

Phone: 610.325.1280 Fax 610.325.1285 
A.TA ~SD0-t7 

HSCeiVED 

JUi, ) 7 2008 

Attachments: 

1: Letter From Joe Miller, June 13,2008 

2. LOI File Number 2008EA170038, May 30,2008 

3. Clarification letter to VDRP Reference ID: 2649. 4 June, 2008 

cc: A. Kinnear 

J. Miller 

J.Eastman 

W. Hoffman 

T. Lyons 

USA3000 

R L I N E S 
USA 3000 

B S * 

m \ 1 2008 

. H .. . N B S - ^^.IclPvtc' 

June 1.3, 2008 

Joseph Guhin 

Director of Regulator^' Compliance 

USA 3000 ."lirKncs 

Joe, 

SUBJECT: LOI FILE NUMBER 20O8EA170038 AND VDRP ID: 2649 

Iniriher to our conversation ot" this Uute and in i«i attempt to provide ndditional insight into ihe events 

surrounding the M:iintcn.-u>cc .\cccptaiicc Mif^t of N265.W o( 17 May 2008, picajtc find below a reiteration of 

my memory of the event. 

Pre/light checks were completed without incident. .\uto engine starts were completed without incident. Post 

start check* were completed without tncidcnL Taxi checks were completed without incident. During 

performance of the tlight control check, the l.»wcr E(1\M I'light Control system page appeared and l.MDKC;R.\0K1 ) advisorj" was displaj-cd. I recall no Upper HCAM w-.trnings. 

.\ftcr a brief discussion on the length of time the aircraft had been out of $cr\-icc and the normal 'gremlins' of 

not being powered for most of the past 45 days we proceeded to reset the SEC computers (during which time 

there were momentaty transitor)' faultsi, which are indicated by the l^Dst Might Report (PFR)). After react the 

I_\F DHGR.\DnD advisor,' mesisage disappeared .ind then after a few seconds reappeared. Tlte SlZC's were 

reset again (which again triggered momentary transitory faults on the I'FR) and the advisory disappeared and 

did not letuni. Thcoe resets show as time stamps 1718-1720 Flight Phase (PM) 02. 

During the climb to FUlO a scries of tests were to be performed iti accordance with the Airbus Single Aisle 

In-Service .\ircraft Flight Test profile. During these tests there is a section on Right control authority checks. 

During this process we noted the I.\F DEGR.ADED advisor}' message .ind spoiler's 3 and 5 left and right 

showing amber on the FT..T CTRI. system page and the SEC tcsct was performed again (time stamp I"32 PFI 

06). The T..\F DF.CR.\DF,D advisory and spoiler 3/5. T./R amlicr remained. 

The tligltt continued witli various related (I'/CTI^ SPLR FAULT at 1951/1952 when testing hydraulic pumps 

affeciivity and Power Transfer Unit operation) and unrelated faults being triggered due to testing and/or actual 

faidts. During the low spcx-d 'un-clcan' (flaps not fully retracted) tests the crew noted the slip indicator on the 

Primary Flight Display and an unusvial rudder trim. Ihe auto-pilot (.-NP) was selected OFF, rudder trim reset, 

and the AP was selected back ON. After some time had passed the crew .igatn noted the rudder trim, selected 

AP OFF :uid hand flew the tcmainder of ihe flight up to the approach. 

lite Quick Reference Handb(x>k w.ts referenced for the Umitarions of spoilers 3 and 5 (L/R) tnopcr.itive 

(whiclt were actually found in a dual hydraulic failure section) and we computed the landing distance penalty for 

this condirion. 

The final steps in the tlight test rct^uired a ir.\T III Dual approach, which we were sctring up tor on the MIA 

8R when the tower requested we change to \tt.\ Sih, which did not h.ivc an 11-S. We accepted the runway 

change, alrcad;- knowing the landing distance penalty, and proceeded to land on .\n.\ 81^ 

A^ck^f^-f i , i>a^^t i/x. 

335 Bishop Hollow Road, Suit e 100 Newtown Square , PA 19073 

Phone : 610.325.128 0 Fax 610.325.128 5 
June 16, 2008 

f>Ece;v6o 

.\fter the attempt to land on MI.A 8J. was unsuccessfiiJ, the crew called for GliAR UP and Fl APS .3. I'hete 

was a brief discussion at which point we determined the aircraft was fl)'ing well with FLAPS 3, we would 

proceed on the second approach in that configuration and our second attempt, which was to MLV 8R, was 

successftil. 

Upon deplaning we noted the damage to the left wing tip. 

Regards, 

j^MiUe r 

Director of Maintenance it Engineering 

USA 3000 Airlines 

cc: .K. Kinnear 

J. F.a8tman 

VKC Hoffman 

T. L)'ons 

^VS A 3000 
95/23/2008 18:18 3057153458 FAA SCXJTH FL PAGE 12/23 

GWY 7265 - 17 May 2008 

Maintenance Acceptance Flight - post End of Lease check 

Preflight done lAW USA 3000 Airlines Check List - no issues 

Engine karts performed with AUTO - nocmal - no issues 

Taxi checks (braJces and NWS) performed - no issues 

Taxi to position and hold 

Flight control check - LAF Degraded message, spoilers 3/5 L/R showed amber 

Acceptance flight performed - flight crew commented on rudder trim during 

flight 

In flight, duztng cabin checks vm noted spoilers 3/5 on the left wing not flush 

Approadi mode for SR > tower requested tiansto to 8L (due to traffic on 8R seen 

visually) on approach 

During flare aiicraft continued to setde 

Gear contacted the ground and became airborne again at which point the aiicraft 

rolled to the left - visually noted both crew meamben became engaged in flight 

cocztFol -noted autal tone of *l>ual &ipu(". Check Aiinun in the ri ^ seat took 

over flightt discusaion in the cockpit detennined a Flaps 3 landing would be 

acccMmplished canying extra speed. Second f^roach was made to 8R -

continued to landing on 8R. On touchdown li ^ wing seemed to iift*. Revorse 

thnist applied, no fhrther issues noted, taxied to hard stand and shut down 

engines. On exiting the alicxaftws noted the left wingt^ffencc damaged. 

Submitted by: "TfeC^kZ ^ 

Frederick (Joe) Jos/dh MiUer 

Director of MainteMuce St En^eering 

USA 3000 Airlines 

335 Bishop Hollow Koad 

Newtown Square, PA 19073 

Airman's Certificate: AAP 3064124 
o 

lie rw,«,h«-«» F«l«»IAvl«tloo AdmlittaMlon 

asDepomrwir FngMStandwdtonwrtometi? 

of TrarMportatkjn 2 InttnwtioMi Pita Suite 110 

Fedwal AvtaNon PhiM^)Ne,PAi9ii3 

AcftMnMrcMon F«C eiMswsia 

May 22,2008 

Certiflad-Rttum Receipt 

Jack Eastman 

Oirsctor of Operations 

USA 3000 Aiilines 

335 Bishop Hoitow Road 

Newtown Square, PA 19703 

Dear Mr. Eastman: 

On May 19,2008, Brendan Airways* LLC d/b/a/ USA 3000 Airlines, a Part 121 aircarrler 

operatf ng under Air Carrier Certificate No. U30A762J. self disclosed an apparent violation wfiils 

operatino N2eSAV, an Airtxjs A320-212. s/n 427. 

After reviewing the Voluntary Disck)sups Reportkig Program (VDRP) submissksn this office is 

unable to validate this VDRP due to the foitowing: 

• The VDRP lacks sufficient detail of the alleged vtolatkxi. 

• The VDRP does not adequately describe the circumstances sunx>undbig this incident 

If you have any hitVw questtons feel free to contact me at the afcwve listed number. 

Sincerely. 

Thomas R. Martin 

Manager 

Philadelphia Flight Standards District Office 
U.S. Department 

of Tronspcftatton 

Fedfo l Avjcrtten 

AdminMroticn -

Federal Aviation Adtninlstratlon 

Flight Standanla District omc* 17 

2 International Plaza Suite 110 

Philadeiptila, PA 19113 

Phone: 810-598-1500 axL 237 

Fax: 610-598-1519 

June 2, 200a 

Certifled-Retum Receipt 

William J. Hoffman 

Director of Quality Control 

USA 3000 Airlines 

335 Bishop Hollow Road 

Newtown Square, PA 19703 

Dear Mr. Hoffman: 

VDRP Reference ID number. 2649 

On May 19, 2008, Brendan Airways, LLC d/b/a/ USA 3000 Airiines, a Part 121 air carrier 

operating under Air Carrier Certificate No. U30A762J, self disclosed an apparent violation while 

operating N265AV, an Airbus A320-212, s/n 427. 

We have reviewed USA 3000 Airlines revised Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP) 

submission to this office and are now prepared to accept this VDRP, pending future 

investigation. 

if you have any further questions feel free to contact me at the above listed number. 

Thomas R. Martin 

Manager 

Philadelphia Flight Standards District Office 
o ,,- - 4c* -.« Federal Aviation AdminWratlon 

U.S. Oopaitrrwnt »e/;?C)0.17 Flli^ Standerda District Office 17 

of Ttaiaportcrtton ncCg/ vgQ 2 IrMmaUanal Plazs SUte 110 

Federal Avkillon PhiMeipMa.PAl9ll3 

ArfminMmHM Jll N J> in- - Phonr 810^98-1300 ext 237 

A(*nlnistlcMon ^/y/Y J / 2OO8 Fax: 610-598.1819 

June 4, 2008 

Certiflet^Ratum Rsceipt 

William J. Hoffman 

Director of Quality Control 

USA 3000 Airlines 

335 Bishop Holk)w Road 

Newtown Square, PA 19703 

Dear Mr. Hofhnan: 

VDRP Reference ID: #2649 

On May 19,2008, Brendan Airways, LLC (d/b/a/ USA 3000 Airlines), a Part 121 air carrier 

operating under Air Carrier Certificate #U30A762J. self disclosed art apparent violation while 

operating N26SAV, an Airbus A320-212, m8n# 427. We reviewed the USA 3000 Airlines 

revised Voluntary Disckjsure Reporting Program (VDRP) submtsston to this office and on June 

2.2008, we accepted this VDRP, pending further investigation. 

We vi/wM like to clarity tiie conditions of our acceptance of ttie revised sut»ni8sion. Our intent 

was and is to accept USA 3000'8 submission of ttie VDRP as it relates to the maintenance 

accomplished and "return to service' of an unairworthy aircraft by maintenance personnel. Our 

acceptance of this VDRP does not indicate any acceptance of a Voluntary Self-Disclosure as 

relates to ttra operation of an unairworthy aircraft by Brendan /Mrways LLC. 

if you have any further questions feel free to contact me at the above listed number. 

Sincerely, 

Thomas R. Martin 

Manager 

Philadelphia Flight Standards District Office 

/\ ffeick .s ^-^-^ J 
o 

U.3. Department 

of Tran»pQrtotkx> 

Federal Aviation 

AdmlnMroflen 

Fadsral Aviation AdrnMstratlon 

Fllghi Standanto Olslrlcl Office 17 

2 tntamelional Plaza Suite 110 

PhUadeiphla, PA 19113 

Phone: 610-595-1S00 ext 237 

Fax: 610-S9S-1S19 

August 12, 2008 

Certified-Return Receipt 

William J. Hoffman 

Director of Quality Control 

USA 3000 Airlines 

335 Bishop Hollow Road 

Newtown Square, PA 19703 

Dear Mr. Hoffman: 

VDRP Reference 10 number: 2649 

On May 19, 2008. Brendan Airways, LLC d/b/a/ USA 3000 Airlines, a Part 121 air canier 

operating under Air Can-ier Certificate No. U30A762J, self disclosed an apparent vtolation while 

operating N265AV. an Airbus A320-212, s/n 427. The PHL FSOO oonditionaily accepted this 

VDRP on June 2, 2008, pending further investigation. 

As a result of furtiier investigation, the PHL FSDO is withdrawing its acceptance of VDRP ID 

number 2649. This rejection is based on the criteria governing the acceptance of Voluntary 

Disclosures defined in FAA Order 2150.3B wNch states the voluntary disclosure may be 

accepted if: 

o "77ie regulated entity dbes ifot disclose the apparent violation to the FAA during. 

or in anticipation of, an FAA investigation or inspection or in association with an 

accitUmt or incident;" 

Since this self disclosure was ttie result of an incident, it does not meet the criteria for 

acceptance, if you have any furUier questions feel free to contact me at the above listed 

number. 

Sincerely. 

Thomas R. Martin 

Manager 

Philadelphia Flight Standards District Office 
OAAR 

Aircraft Services — Miami 

S300 NW 36» S/»«rt, BUg. SSO • Muiml. FL 33122 

P.O. Box 52-2602 - Maati, florida 33752 

Ph. 3iB-snno* 

FMC .va^Tisjas 

June 3,2008 

Mr. Luis Carmona 

Principal Maintenance Inspector 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Soutli Florida FSDO 19 

8600 SW 36* Street, Suite 200 

Miami, Florida 33166 

Subject: AAR Quality and Safety Program Alignment 

Dear Mr. Carmona; 

Encouraged by conversations you and I have had regarding certain quality and safety 

escapes occurring in our repair station, we solicited assistance from Headquarters to help 

us align our quality system with that ofthe Corporation. The objective is to develop a 

comprehensive program to idemiiy and address potential weaknesses in our quality 

system. This letter is to inform you of our plans. 

The program focuses primarily on educating our workforce to recognize risic and to 

empower them to fix the problems befbre an unwanted event occurs. To be successful, 

the first step vnll be to define the expectations; that is, get a thorough understanding of all 

applicable corporate policies. At the same time, we will strive to create and maintain an 

environment that encourages reponing **the good, the bad and the ugly" without fear of 

retribution and to provide eveiyone with the necessary tools to communicate these issues 

or concerns. And, should the unwanted occur, to be capable of thoroughly investigating 

the event to find the cure by determining its root cause and contributing factors. 

The enclosed table shows the training anticipated. Our plans are to start the training by 

the middle of this month and be ninety percent complete by the end of September, 2008. 

Another important i^art ofthe program consists of actions we have initiated to address 

identified weaknesses. Some of these are: 

• To relief the maintenance supervisors of unnecessary distractions and allow them 

more time to carry out their responsibilities as supervisors, we have filled the 

newly created position of Manager Planning - P2P reporting directiy to the VP 

Planning. The fust task for the new Manager will be to revisit the process 

outiined in Woric Instruction PL 01 Pack-to-Plane (P2P) for possible 

improvements. He and his (aheady existing) staff will be responsible to 

consistentiy and accurately pre-plan all maintenance visits. 
• The search continues for five additional QC Inspectors. The additional personnel 

will fiiicilitate having mspectors assigned to each project, as opposed to rotating 

tiiem based on operational needs and availability, lihis should create an 

cnvirormient more conducive to mentoring and educating in best practices, as well 

as providing better oversight. 

• Approval has been obtained to add one more QA Auditor to assist with in-process 

audits, thus establishing additional opportunities to detect and solve problems, and 

to measure progress. So far, an internal candidate with QA Auditor potential has 

been identified and we are currently assessing the individual's training needs. 

We also recognize the importance ofthe timely delivery of parts and materials necessary 

to complete the assigned mamtenance on schedule. Late parts introduce uncertainty and 

stress into the supervisors' already busy schedule and become a distraction from their 

regular job. We do not have a grip on this yet, but we are looking at ways to minimize 

the impact. 

In summary, with the endorsement and support of our F^DO, we are convinced the 

program will be successfitl. We welcome your energy and enthusiasm to help us 

continue improving to get to the next level. 

Sincerely, 

Alfixdo ConMbgra 

Vice President Quality and Safety 

cc: Brian Loomer 

Roy Shelton 

Sergio Lopez 

Rayner Hutchinson 

Greg Mantr a 
OAIR 

Aircraft Services — Miami 

FM»XE4R«4SM 

53O0NW3«^SttttK BUg. ISO-Mltmi, FL33122 

RO. ft» il-un . MiMii Flcn* 33TS2 

M.3CS-*7}-27M 

nix3a$-in>S3<f 

May 30,2008 

Mr. Luis Camiona 

Principal Maintenance Inspector 

Federal Aviation Administration 

South Florida FSDO 19 

8600 SW 36* Street. Suite 200 

Miami. Florida 33166 

Refererce: Your File No. 2008SO190220 

Dear Mr. Carmona: 

This letter is in response to your request for information received on May 20, 2008 

regarding the allegation of improper maintenance being perfimned by AAR Aitemft 

Sendees - A^ami (ASM) on USA3000 Airlines (U3K) Aiiaaft N26SAV, Airbus Model 

A320-212, Serial Number 427. The allegation is specifically related to non-compliance 

with 14 CFR 145.205(a). 

ASM has completed an in-depth investigation of the event and the circumstances 

sunousding it snd offen the following coitunents. 

Summary of the Aircraft Visit: 

ASM W<»fc Older. 28108 

Arrival Date: 04/07/2008 

Maintenance Release Date: 05/17/2008 

Afaw>rthine88 Release by U3K: 05/17/2008 

Work Scope: C Clieck, airwonhiness directives, modifications, paint, etc per agreement 

Badcgronnd! 

On May 17,2008 ASM released aircraft N265AV back to service after undergoing a 

heavy maintenance check. The airworthiness release was signed by a qualified U3K 

representative. A U3K fiight crew was dispatched to perform a customer acceptance 

tlight check. Several persoimel were on board the aircraft during tiw acceptance flight in 

addition to the U3K crew. They induded repiesentBtives from U3K, the leasing 

Qompaxty (ILFC) and its new customer Stata Transport Company Russia (Rossiya). 
The preflight was accomplished in accordance with U3K Check List and no issues were 

documented. Engine starts were performed with AUTO - Normal and no issues were 

reported. Taxi checks were conducted with brakes and nose wheel steering and no 

discrepancies were noted. During the flight control ciieck a cockph message was 

displayed indicating Lateral Degrade (SPD BRK LAF Degraded) and the indication was 

amber lights on spoilers ^3 and #5 Left. 

The crew initiated take-off roll and the acceptance flight was performed. Durmg in flight 

cabin checks it was noted diat the #3 and #S spoilers on the left wing were not flush with 

the wing and were seen '^floating". The acceptance flight continued for a total flight time 

recorded of 3.S hours. 

Description ofthe Event: 

The following information was also obtained during the post flight debriefing through 

testimony from individuals on board during the occurrence. 

On initial approach to Runway 8 Right at MIA the tower requested the crew to transfer to 

8 Left due to traffic on 8 Right. Durmg landing flare the aircraft continued to settle to the 

runway. When the landing gear contacted the ground, the aircraft bounced and became 

airtrame again at which tinw the aircraft roiled sharply to the left and the left wingtip 

fetKe contacted die runway. Both crew members became engaged with the flight 

controls. An aural tone sounded hidicating Dual Input The pilot in die right seat took 

command ofthe aircraft The crew completed their checklist and their discussion 

detennined that a Flaps 3 landing would be accomplished carrying extra speed. The 

second approach was made to Runway 8 Right. 

During the second landing; the aircraft right wing lifted once again and the aircraft tried 

to roll left shorUy after landing gear touchdown. Reverse thrust was applied and the 

landing was successftil. The crew taxied to a hard stand and shut down die engines. 

Immediate Corrective Action 

1. Ouided by post flight htfonnation received ftom U3 K personnel on board the 

fligiit, an inspection was conducted ofthe H2 and #5 spoiler actuators. The 

inspection rcnrealed that they were left in the maintenance mode. Spoilers #3 and 

HS were reset in the "O** mode. Remaining left and right wing spoilers # I through 

#5 were verified in the "O" mode and the spoiler system was operationally 

checked with satisftetory results. 

2. Accomplished a visual inspection ofthe left wuigtip fimce and fbund it damaged. 

The ibnce was removed sad replaced. 

3. A visual m^pection ofthe #] engine cowling and pylon resulted in no damage 

noted. 

4. A hard landhig inspection was initiated, but later rescinded as a result of computer 

recorded information to the contrary, showing tiiat a hard landing had not in fact 

occuned. 

5. A hidden damage inspection ofthe wingtip area was conducted with negative 

results. 
Investigation: 

• The switches on the spoiler actoators are two position snatches; one is labeled 

" 0 " for operation mode and the otiier is labeled "M" for maintenance mode. 

• After the event, ASM verified the correct operation ofthe cockpit indication 

(amber lights) when the spoiler servo swhchcs were placed in the maintenance 

position. 

• Neither U3K nor ASM have a preflight card or task to perform flight control 

checks prior to flight 

The investigation continued to determine what maintenance tasks were perforaied in the 

area ofthe spoilera while the aircraft was in for maintenance at ASM. The following 

information vna gathered ftom the maintenance records: 

• U3K - A320 MPD - Task Cari 27640002 tided 27-64-00-200-^l - Check ofthe 

Spoilers Servo Controls and Hinge Bearings for Excessive Play and Condition 

was issued. 

• During the above inspection it was noted that die )¥4 and #5 Right and tite #2, #3, 

and #4 Left Wing Spoiler bearings failed test 

• Non-I^utine cards were generated for each failed bearing identifled after the 

inspection. An operational chbck of the spoilers was performed after the 

excessive play was corrected on spoilen #2, #3 and #4 left, as VMII as #4 and US 

right Pertinent items, including the operational check, were completed on April 

29,2008. This reworic was determined to be not Rn by U3K. 

« During interviews with the technicians and inspectors involved with this 

inspection and repair, each one stated that tiwy tumed the servo control switch to 

the maintenance position to perform this task. 

• The Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) reference 27-64-45 PB 401 "Spoiler 

removal Removal/Installation" was referenced for the bearing refrfacemcnt 

Because Spoiler #SLeft was not disturbed during the above maintenance tadc, die 

investigation shifted to reviewing the entire work package fiom April 29,2008 through 

tho end ofthe maintenance cheek on May 17,2008. The focus was to determine if any 

additional malnteiuBice tasks were performed during this phase of die check in the area of 

the spoilers. 

Non-Routine card #1020 identified as "LT Wing Spoilers Need Paint Touch Up On Botii 

Sides" was considered a potential contributing ftctor at first. The corrective action states 

'Touch-up as required on LT Wing Spoilen Both Sides LVW A-320 SMR SI-23-11". 

We discovered that it is possible to mask and paint the underside of tiie spoilers with die 

flaps down and the spoilen in the retracted position. 

At the end, die paper work review determined that there were no specific maintenance 

tasks recorded or work cominuation steps fbund that indicated die spoiler servo control 

switohes were reposhioned. 
Conclusion: 

The maintenance completed with the operational check ofthe spoilers on April 29,2008 

was determined to be the last documented time ASM was in the area ofthe aircraft 

spoilera. This task was detennined to not be causal in tills event due to the i!^5 Left 

Spoiler not undergoing maintenance, yet found in the "M" mode. It does, however, raise 

a point that was contributory to the event: 

1. Airbus AMM 27-60-00 PB 201 "Spoiler Maintenance Practices" requires a 

special tool P/N 98D2760300200I for certain aircraft to set the spoiler actuatora 

in die "M" mode. The tool is a socket-like tool with a red stieamer attached and 

has a "lip" that allows retention in place while the maintenance mode is set. 

2. This tool, together with a modification to die mode device in the actuator, became 

the permanent flx firom Airbus to prevent this type of event after one that occurred 

in August, 1993. 

• Aircraft N26SAV has not been modified. The AMM does not require the use of 

this special tool on diis aircraft. ASM recommends diat all spoiler actoators be 

modified to accept tool P/N 98D27603002001. 

During the course of die visit, after April 29,2008 the servo switches for the #3 and #5 

spoilers were placed in the "Maintenance" mode. However, them is no record of such 

action and we were unable to determine who may have been involved. 

All scheduled maintenance tasks were completed and recorded per the air carrier's 

maintenance program. 

Preventive Action; 

1. l a tha absence of an air carrier task card, ASM wilt develop and implement the 

use of a preflight checklist to sui^iement tlie current aviintics cliecklist and 

tennination service check we cunentiyperfbrm on all departing aircraft. Target 

omtpletion is July 1,2008. 

2. ASM will publish a Maintenance Crew Briefing, Form CB 01 to cover this item 

In Quality Central and will review it with all crews to heighten awareness. 

Completion of diis action is anticipated before tiie anival ofthe next A320 

aircraft or by July 1,2008, whichever is first. 

3. Crew meetings will be conducted concerning proper documentation of work in 

progress, work mteiruptions and unscheduled activities, inchiding critical system 

deactivation. This sut^ect will be inchided in the next scheduled meeting in June, 

2008. 
In closing, AAR Aircraft Services - Miami is committed to continue improving our 

procedures, educate our personnel and introduce the checks and balances necessary to 

enhance safety in our indusny. In light ofthe facts revealed during dtis investigation and 

die circumstances surrounding the event, we respectfully request Uiat you close this 

matter through administrative action without penalty. 

If you should need additional information, please contact me at (305) 607-6245. 

Sincerely, 

/ \ i 

Aifiedo Consue^a 

Vice President Quality and Safety 

cc: Brian Loomer 

Michael Fischetti 

Claire Best 

Ramses Perez 

Don Vilim 

Rayner Hutchinson 

Greg Manghera 
TimOulin/ANhVFAA 

ANM-116, International 

Branch 

07/02/2008 12:08 PM 

To 

cc 

bcc 

Subject Fw: Alrtous Technical Question 

Phil, 

In response to your message this morning, here Is the Airbus answer to your questions. I apologize for 

not forwarding this to you sooner. I was planning to review their response before forwarding it to you, but 

have been too busy with other Issues. Please contact me if you have any further questions. 

Thanks, 

Tim Dulin 

FAA Program Manager 

International Branch, ANM-116 

phone 425-227-2141 

fax 425-227-1149 

e:maii tim.dultn@faa.gov 

Fotwarded by Tim Dulin/ANM/FAA on 07/02/2008 09:00 AM — 

'QGALA, Chrfatkw-

<Chf1ailne.EacalaQairbusxo 

m> 

06/23/2008 01:43 AM 

To Tim Dulln/ANM/FAA@FAA 

cc "BLANCANEAUX, Eric' <E(1c.Blancaneaux@airbus.com>, 

"REFERENCE M0801405r 

<IMCeAX400-c»FR+38a»ATLAS+3Bp=AIRBUS+3Bg»rBf8r 

sncs+3B«Fchrano4-3B@airt)us.com> 

Subiect AlrtHJs Technical Quesdon 

Good morning Tim 

Please find below our Design Office answer. 

During Che pre-fly chack, Che spoiler 2, 3, 4 & 5 are checked. 

When you perform on grotmd the ROLL part of Che flight control check, the 

spoiler in maintenance bypass position, and the opposite spoiler position are 

indicated in amber position and you have a spoiler fault warning (inhibited in 

phase 3 to 5}. 

Th» spoiler 1 is not checked during the pre-fly. 

If one of spoiler 1 is in maintenance bypass position, the indication in aunber 

position of the two spoilers l appears only after high speep taxi or after 

take off. 

The spoiler fault message associated is inhibited until the A/C is in cruise 

(phase 6). 

In general when a spoiler servo loop is lost, the pair is inhibited and the 

display becomes aunber unless position sensor is faulty the position remain 

indicated. 

In addition, please note that a reset of the corresponding SEC would clear the 

warning and make the display green again. 

But as soon as the spoiler will be extended again (due to aerodynamic upfloat) 
the warning may come back. 

Best regards. 

Christine Escala 

Single Aisle Aircraft Continued Airworthiness Engineer 

Product Integrity Division - BAS 

AIRB(7S Central Entity 

Phone: +33 (0) 5 61 93 34 76 

Fax: +33 (0) 5 61 93 44 51 

E-mail: chri8tine.escalaeairbus.com 

Original Message 

Prom: Tim.Dulinefaa.gov Cmailto:Tim.oulinefaa.gov] 

Sent: 16 June 2008 19:58 

To: BLAMCANBAtnC, Erie 

Cc: Philip.B.Staufferefaa.gov; Brenda.s.Hoitefaa.gov; 

michael. gaddeeasa. europa. eu 

Subject: Fw: Airbus Technical Question 

BonjoTir Eric, 

Would you please respond to the FAA inspector questions below regarding the 

type of indications that would be displayed if one of the spoilers is 

inadvertently left in the maintenance bypass position. 

Thank you and Best Regards, 

Tim Dulin 

FAA program Manager 

Internationa l Branch. ANM-116 

phone 425-227-2141 

fax 425-227-1149 

ermail tim.dulinefaa.go v 

Forwarded by Tim Dulin/ANM/FAA on 06/16/2008 10:50 AM 

Philip B 

Stauffer/ABA/FAA 

ABA-PHL-FSDO-17, To 

Philadelphia, PA Tim Dulin/ANM/FAAePAA 

cc 

Brenda 3 Holt/ANM/FAA«FAA, Thomas 

06/16/2008 08:15 Martin/ABA/FAA 

AM Subject 

Fw: Airbus Technical Question 
Qood morning Mr. Dulin, 

This morning I spoke with Brenda Holt and she referred me to you. I have a 

technical question regarding an Airbus A320-212 and hope you can help me 

with the answer. 

My question involves the cockpit indications on ECAM when spoilers on only 

one wing are Inadvertently left in the (M) maintenance bypass position. 

My questions are: 

With a spoiler left in the (M) bypass position, will it (cuid the 

corresponding spoiler on the opposite wing) always show amber when 

hydraulic pressure is applied to all 3 hydraulic systems? 

With a spoiler left in the (M) bypass position and hydraulic pressure 

available, will che ECAM F/CTL display ever display the spoiler in the 

retracted and green (not amber) mode? 

In this situation, will the SCAM Warning SPLR FA17LT display on ECAM? 

In this situation, will a reset of the applicable SEC clear the SPLR 

PAXTLT or will it remain displayed as long as the spoiler remains In the 

bypass position? 

Thanks for your assistance. Feel free to call if you have any further 

questions. 

Regards, 

Phil 

Phil Stauffer 

Federal Aviation Administration (ASI-AW) 

2 International Plaza--Suite 110 

Philadelphia, PA 19113-1504 

Phone: 610-595-1500 (ext-222) 

Fax: 610-595-1519 

This mail has originated outside your organization, either from an external 

partner or the Global Internet. 

Keep this in mind if you answer this message. 

The infonnatlon in this e-mail is confidential. The contents may not be 

disclosed or used by anyone other then the addressee. Access to this e-mail by 

anyone else is unauthorised. 

If you are not the intended recipient, please notify Airbus immediately and 

delete this e-mail. 

Airbus cannot accept any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of 

this e-mail as it has been sent over public networks. If you have any concerns 

over the content of this massage or its Accuracy or Integrity, please contact 

Airbus immediately. 

All outgoing e-mails from Airbus are checked using regularly updated virus 

scajoning software but you should take whatever measures you deem to be 

appropriate to ensure that this message and any attachments are virus free. 
Honeywell 

Commercial Electronic* Systems 

Ho«ey%vcll 

15001 NonhftW 36* Slroet, P. O. Box 97001 

Redmond. Washiflgton 98073-9701 

(423)88$-37ll 

(42S)88S-206tFAX 

May 29, 2008 

To: Chas Neil Telephone: 610-325-1291 

USA3000 

335 Bishop Hollow Rd. Suite 100 

Newtown Square, PA 

Customer Reference: RO05270812225 

Part Number: 980-4700-042 S/N: 09653 

Honeywell Reference: 5001758435 

A/C: N265AV 

Tabular listinqs: 

The Sample Parameter (printed on the first column from the left) can be used to correlate 

between the data. The sampling rate used is 1-second inten/als. 

OBSERVATIONS; READOUT FOR REPORTED INCIDENT 

The following Database: A320_D6A.sdb was used to perfoim Readout. 

Spoiler 3L & 5L seem to be operating in reverse. Readings averaged between 11+ and 14->-

during flight down to 0.7 during SpdBrfcCmd. Seen in graphs and texts 1 & 8. 

Spoiler 3R & 5R stay at zero for entire flight 2R & 4R tend to float intermittentiy, 

especially erratic during GearSelDn. 

Other spoiler reactions as follows and can be seen In graphs and texts 1 & 8. 

SpdBrkCmd at sample 6155 and 8204 

Spoilers 2L & 2R go to 20.00, 3L drops to 1 .xx, 4L & 4R go to 40.xx, 5L drops to 9.xx 

SpdBrt(Cmd at sample 8705 

Spoilers 2L & 2R go to 12.00, 3L drops to 8.xx, 4L & 4R go to 25.xx, 5L goes to 15.xx 

GearSeiOn at sample 9146 

Spoiler 2R & 4R become erratic, 3L climbs to 31.xx, 5L climbs to 2S.xx 

SpdBrkCmd at sample 9302 

Spoiler 2L 0.00, 2R 14.xx, 3L drops to 23.xx, 4L 0.00, 4R 12.xx, 5L 24.xx 

SpdBrkCmd at sample 11845 

Spoiler 2L & R go to 20.xx, 3L drops to 0.7,4L & R go to 40.xx, 5L drops to 8.xx 

GearSeiOn at sample 11914 

Spoiler 2L 0.00, 2R erratic, 3L 23.xx. 4L 0,00, 4R erratic, 5L 23.xx 

TOGA, only main gear touches down. Seen at sample 12034 in graph and spread TOGA. 

GearSelDn at sample 12522 

Spoiler 2L 0.00, 2R erratic, 3L IS.xx, 4L 0.00, 4R erratic, 5L 15.xx. 

At landing, during full spoiler command (no SpdBrkCmd), 3L drops to 7.xx, 5L drops to 15.xx 

HydLoPrs-Blu LO PRESS between samples 9432-9436 & 9458-9524. See graph and text 5. 

CabinPrsWam between samples 5042-5597. See graph and text 6. 

AilBlue-R NOT AVAILABLE. See graph and text 7. 
Honeywell 

Commercial Electronics Systems 

Honeywell 

15001 Northeast 36* Street. P. O. Box 97001 

Redmond, Washington 98073-9701 

(425)885-3711 

(425) 885-2061 FAX 

Synchronization words, which are recorded in each subframe along with the aircraft data, are 

used as reference to locate and organize the recorded infomiation during the transcription. 

During the transcription, the subframes identified as containing invalid synchronization words 

are flagged by setting a bit in Word 01 of the 128-word subframe. Several factors, such as 

signal distortion and Flight Recorder power interruptions, contribute to synchronization errors. 

Data affected by sync errors are identified in the Tabular Listings as RED in color. Since 

synchronization word is the only word checked for validity, the data contained in, or around 

an error flagged Subframe is not necessarily invalid. Therefore, all printed data should be 

examined for validity. 

Values in the Tabular Listings that are BLUE in color have exceeded the limits defined in the 

database. These limits are usually obtained from the signal details document, however, in the 

absence of defined limits, full-scale range is usually used. Therefore, true exceedances may 

not be always identified in this manner. 

We will retain a copy of all transcribed data, for a minimum of 90 days from the mailing date 

of this report. If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not 

hesitate to contact our office at any time. 

Delloris McGoldrick 

Data Retrieval Services 

HONEYWELL 

Tel#: (425)885-8316 

Fax #: (425) 885-8322 

delloris.mcQoldrick(5).honevwell.com 

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