FILED

June 11, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

HOSSEIN AGHILI, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, )

) Davidson Circuit

) No. 95D-1401

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9605-CV-00214

HAMIDEH SABA SAADATNEJADI, )

)

Defendant/Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE MURIEL ROBINSON, JUDGE

For the Plaintiff/Appellee: For the Defendant/Appellant:

D. Scott Parsley Peggy D. Mathes

BARRETT, JOHNSTON & PARSLEY Nashville, Tennessee

Nashville, Tennessee

REVERSED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
1

Islamic custom entitles the prospective wife to a sadaq when the prospective husband

proposes marriage. The sadaq is a postponed dowry that protects the woman in the event of a

divorce. Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 

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O P I N I O N

This appeal involves the validity of an Islamic marriage. Shortly after the

marriage, the husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking

a divorce or, in the alternative, an annulment. After the wife counterclaimed for

a divorce, the husband moved for a summary judgment on his annulment claim.

The trial court granted the summary judgment, finding that the undisputed

evidence demonstrated that the officiant was not qualified to perform the marriage

under Islamic law and that the officiant had failed to file the marriage license

within the legally prescribed time. The wife takes issue on this appeal with the

trial court’s conclusion that the marriage was void ab initio. We have determined

that the trial court erred and, therefore, reverse the summary judgment.

I.

Hossein Aghili and Hamideh Saba Saadatnejadi are Americans of Iranian

descent. Mr. Aghili is forty-one and works as an engineer for the Tennessee

Department of Transportation. Ms. Saadatnejadi is twenty-six years old. Mr.

Aghili and Ms. Saadatnejadi met in Tennessee when Ms. Saadatnejadi was a

student. They were engaged in the Islamic Republic of Iran on October 12, 1994.

After returning to Tennessee, Mr. Aghili negotiated a marriage contract or

sadaq with Ms. Saadatnejadi’s father in accordance with Islamic custom.1 In this

contract, Mr. Aghili agreed that Ms. Saadatnejadi’s dowry would be 1,400 Iranian

gold coins and that he would pay Ms. Saadatnejadi 10,000 Iranian gold coins if

he violated any provision of the contract. Because Islamic law permits a man to

have four wives, Mr. Aghili also agreed that he would not marry anyone else if the

parties ever returned to live in Iran.
2An Islamic blessing is a formalized ceremony intended to hold out a couple as being

married.

3An imam is an Islamic religious leader, equivalent to a priest or rabbi. See In re

Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 871-72 (Ct. App. 1988). 

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Mr. Aghili and Ms. Saadatnejadi obtained a marriage license in Rutherford

County on December 9, 1994. Mr. Aghili requested Ghalam Hossein Azam

Tarahian to perform an Islamic blessing2

 for the couple. On December 17, 1994,

Mr. Tarahian blessed the couple in the presence of four witnesses at the home of

Ms. Saadatnejadi’s parents in Rutherford County. Following the ceremony, Mr.

Aghili, Ms. Saadatnejadi, and Mr. Tarahian signed a marriage certificate that was

filed with the mosque in Nashville. Mr. Tarahian did not, however, receive or

sign the Tennessee marriage license. Mr. Aghili apparently kept this document

because it was one of the documents required to be filed with the Interest Section

of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to make an official record of the marriage

in Iran.

Mr. Aghili and Ms. Saadatnejadi could not begin living together as husband

and wife following the blessing because Islamic custom required them to first

have a formal wedding reception. Their formal wedding reception took place on

December 30, 1994 and was attended by one hundred guests. Following the

reception, Mr. Aghili and Ms. Saadatnejadi honeymooned in Gatlinburg.

Problems arose as soon as the parties returned to Nashville. Mr. Aghili informed

Ms. Saadatnejadi that he would not record their marriage license unless she would

agree to sign another premarital agreement and to relinquish her dowry and earlier

marriage contracts. He also asserted that their marriage was invalid because Mr.

Tarahian did not have the authority to perform the December 17, 1994, Islamic

blessing.

The parties separated on January 29, 1995. On the advice of an employee

of the Rutherford County Clerk, Ms. Saadatnejadi and Mr. Tarahian later

completed and filed another marriage license form. Mr. Tarahian signed the form

as the officiant but did not date his signature or indicate on the form that he was

an imam.3 Apparently someone in the clerk’s office added the date and the

designation before filing the license with the Tennessee Department of Health.

Mr. Aghili did not sign this marriage license.
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Mr. Aghili filed suit on May 4, 1995, seeking a divorce or an annulment,

and Ms. Saadatnejadi counterclaimed for divorce. Mr. Aghili voluntarily

dismissed his complaint and responded to Ms. Saadatnejadi’s counterclaim by

asserting that she was attempting to obtain a divorce through fraud and

misrepresentation. Later, Mr. Aghili moved for a summary judgment asserting

that the marriage was invalid because Mr. Tarahian was not qualified to solemnize

marriages and because the marriage license had not been returned to the

Rutherford County Clerk within three days following the December 17, 1994

ceremony. The trial court apparently agreed with Mr. Aghili on both grounds and,

on January 23, 1996, entered an order finding that the parties’ marriage was void

ab initio and, therefore, that Ms. Saadatnejadi’s complaint for divorce should be

dismissed as moot.

II.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment. Accordingly, our task is to

review the record to determine whether the requirements for granting a summary

judgment have been met. Payne v. Breuer, 891 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tenn. 1994);

Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991). As

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 makes clear, a summary judgment is appropriate only when

there exists no material factual dispute concerning the claim or defense asserted

in the motion, Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993), and when the

moving party is entitled to a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Anderson

v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tenn. 1993).

Decisions to grant a summary judgment do not enjoy a presumption of

correctness on appeal. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). A

reviewing court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 613 (Tenn.

1994), and must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.

Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tenn. 1994). A summary judgment

should be affirmed only if the undisputed facts and conclusions reasonably drawn

from the facts support the conclusion that the moving party is entitled to judgment
4The final order refers to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-101 (1996), rather than Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-3-301. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-101 defines the prohibited degrees of relationship

between parties which is not at issue in this case. Thus, it seems clear that the reference to Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-3-101 is a typographical error and that the trial court intended to base its

decision on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301.

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as a matter of law. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995); Carvell

v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d at 26.

III.

The summary judgment in this case rests on two grounds. First, the trial

court determined that the parties’ marriage was void ab initio because Mr.

Tarahian was not authorized to solemnize marriages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 36-3-301 (1996).4

 Second, the trial court concluded that the marriage was void

because the marriage license was not filed within three days following the

ceremony as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-303 (1996). We have

determined that Mr. Aghili was not entitled to a summary judgment on either

ground. 

A.

THE SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE

Mr. Aghili asserts that Mr. Tarahian is not qualified to solemnize marriages

under Tennessee law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301(a) provides, in part, that “[a]ll

regular ministers of the gospel of every denomination, and Jewish rabbis, more

than eighteen (18) years of age, having the care of souls . . . may solemnize the

rite of matrimony.” Since the courts look to the tenets of the particular religion

to determine whether a particular person is a regular minister having care of souls,

Mr. Aghili has the burden of proving that Mr. Tarahian cannot administer Islamic

blessings under Islamic law.

Mr. Tarahian testified in his deposition that he was qualified to perform

Islamic blessings and that he had performed a number of these blessings. Mr.

Aghili submitted two affidavits to contradict Mr. Tarahian’s claims. In the first

affidavit, Mr. Aghili himself asserts that an Islamic “blessing is not recognized in

the State of Tennessee as a legal marriage.” This is, of course, a legal conclusion
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that Mr. Aghili is not qualified to make. Thus, Mr. Aghili’s opinion did not meet

the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.05 and should not have been considered.

In the second affidavit, Mr. Aghili’s attorney simply attaches two letters

purporting to demonstrate that Mr. Tarahian was not recognized as an imam in

Nashville’s Persian community. This affidavit likewise does not satisfy the

requirements in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.05. The letters are inadmissible hearsay and

contain opinions that are not relevant to Mr. Tarahian’s qualifications to

solemnize marriages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301. 

In response to these affidavits, Ms. Saadatnejadi filed the affidavit of a

professor of religion at Boston University who is an expert in Islamic Studies.

The professor explained: 

In contrast to Western religious teaching and practice

(particularly in Christianity, both Catholic and

Protestant, but also to some extent Judaism) Islam from

its inception to the present has consistently rejected the

distinction between clergy and laity. Islamic law

stipulates quite precisely that anyone with the requisite

knowledge of Islamic law is competent to perform

religious ceremonies, including marriage. One is not

required to have an official position in a religious

institution such as a mosque (masjid) in order to be

qualified to perform such ceremonies.

I understand that Mr. Tarahian who performed

the marriage ceremony in question is not the official

imam of the local mosque, though he does from time to

time carry out the duties ordinarily performed by an

imam. From the vantage point of Islamic jurisprudence,

the question of his right to bear the title imam is

irrelevant. His competence before Islamic law to

perform Muslim ceremonies is determined solely by his

knowledge of that legal corpus. It is quite clear that Mr.

Tarahian does possess such knowledge and that he is

recognized by members of the Muslim community as

possession [sic] the competence to perform religious

(and civil) ceremonies.

Viewing the competent proof in the light most favorable to Ms. Saadatnejadi, it

is undisputed that Mr. Tarahian possessed the authority to administer Islamic

blessings. At the most, the record contains a material factual dispute on this issue.

In either case, the trial court erred when it granted a summary judgment to Mr.

Aghili on this ground.
5The statutes governing marriage licenses do not require either the bride’s or the groom’s

signature on the marriage license.

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B.

THE FILING OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE

Mr. Aghili also asserts that the marriage is void because the marriage

license was not filed within three days after the December 17, 1994 ceremony.

This fact is undisputed because all parties agree that the second marriage license

was not filed in the Rutherford County Clerk’s office until February 8, 1995.

Thus, in order for Mr. Aghili to prevail on this ground, he must demonstrate that

the late filing of a marriage license invalidates a marriage as a matter of law. This

he cannot do.

The failure of an officiant to return the marriage license to the issuing clerk

within three days after the ceremony does not invalidate the marriage. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-3-306 (1996). Thus, if Mr. Tarahian could solemnize marriages

under Tennessee law, his failure to return the completed marriage license within

the time required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-303 does not undermine the validity

of the marriage. 

The purpose of the filing requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-303 is to

assure the preservation of a reliable, accurate record of a marriage. The filing of

the second marriage license on February 8, 1995 satisfies this requirement as long

as it contains the information required by law. The license filed on February 8,

1995 appears to be appropriate on its face. It is signed by the officiant as required

by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-103(c)(1) (1996),5 and it contains the information

required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-104(a) (1996). Despite Mr. Aghili’s

assertions that the February 8, 1995 license was invalid, the record contains no

competent evidence that the license was inadequate or that it was rejected by

either the clerk or the Department of Health.

IV.
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Tennessee protects the institution of marriage by presuming that regularly

solemnized marriages are valid. Cole v. Parton, 172 Tenn. 8, 11-12, 108 S.W.2d

884, 885 (1937). Thus, persons challenging a marriage must provide cogent and

convincing evidence that the marriage is invalid. Huey Bros. Lumber Co. v.

Anderson, 519 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1975); Moody v. T.H. Hays & Sons, Inc.,

189 Tenn. 666, 675, 227 S.W.2d 20, 24 (1950). Mr. Aghili has not carried his

burden and, therefore, was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law that his

marriage to Ms. Saadatnejadi was void ab initio.

We reverse the final judgment and remand this case to the trial court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also tax the costs of this

appeal to Hossein Aghili for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

________________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE 

________________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE