2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-19-2002

Golden v. Govt of VI

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-1069

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Recommended Citation

"Golden v. Govt of VI" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 414.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/414
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 

 No. 02-1069 

 

 

 ANNE GOLDEN, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS 

 SIMILARLY SITUATED 

 

 v. 

 

 GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; 

 CHARLES TURNBULL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF 

 THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS; 

 LOUIS WILLIS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE 

 VIRGIN ISLANDS BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 

 

 Appe

 

 

 Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 

 Division of St. Thomas 

 (D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-00162) 

 District Judge: Honorable Thomas K. Moore 

 

 

 Argued May 13, 2002 

 Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges 

 (Opinion filed: July 19, 2002) 

 Julio A. Brady, Esquire (Argued) 

 3009 Orange Grove, Suite 9 

 Christiansted, St. Croix 

 USVI, 00820 

 Attorney for Appellee 

 Iver A. Stridiron 

 Attorney General 

 Elliott McIver Davis 

 Solicitor General 

 Joanne E. Bozzuto (Argued) 

 Special Assistant Attorney General 

 Office of Attorney General of Virg

 Department of Justice 

 48B-50C Kronprindsens Gade, 

 GERS Building, 2nd Floor 

 Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas 

 USVI, 00802 

 Richard M. Prendergast 

 Office of Attorney General of Virg

 6040 Castle Coakley 

 Christiansted, St. Croix 

 USVI, 00820 
 Attorneys for Appellants 

 

 

 OPINION 

 

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge 

 In this case, the District Court of the Virgin Islands erred by allowing the parties 

to stipulate as to Plaintiff’s standing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further 

factual findings on this jurisdictional prerequisite. 

 I. 

 The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 

107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (the "Act"), 

lowered the tax rate from fifteen to ten percent for the first $6,000, $10,000, and $12,000 

of taxable income for singles, heads of households, and married couples filing jointly, 

respectively. Signed into law on June 7, 2001, the Act made the new ten percent tax 

bracket retroactive to January 1, 2001. However, in lieu of receiving the benefit of the 

ten percent rate for tax year 2001, the Act authorized a five percent tax credit paid to 

most taxpayers through an advance refund check representing the difference between the 

fifteen and ten percent rates. 26 U.S.C. 6428(a). In an effort to stimulate the economy, 

the Act provided that taxpayers should receive these refunds "as rapidly as possible, and 

to the extent practicable, before October 1 of 2001." 26 U.S.C. 6428(e)(3). Because 

the Act provided for the payment of refunds prior to the filing of tax year 2001 returns, 

taxpayers received refunds based on information reported on their tax year 2000 returns. 

Finally, the Act provided that no refunds would occur after December 31, 2001. 26 

U.S.C. 6428(e)(4). If a taxpayer did not receive her full refund or received no refund 

at all before that date, she could claim a "rate reduction credit" on her tax year 2001 

returns. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-84, at 126-27 (2001) (describing the rate reduction 

credit and advance refund mechanisms). 

 48 U.S.C. 1397 made the Act’s provisions applicable to the Virgin Islands and 

its taxpayers. Soon after the Act’s passage, the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal 

Revenue (the "VIBIR") announced that, due to budgetary and administrative constraints, 

it could not process the refunds prior to the December 31st deadline. 

 On September 5, 2001, Leo D. Goubourn and Anne Golden, purportedly on 

behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated Virgin Islands taxpayers, filed a 

complaint in the District Court challenging the VIBIR’s decision. The complaint sought 

(1) an injunction compelling the VIBIR to issue the refunds in compliance with the Act, 

and (2) a declaration that the VIBIR’s decision was in violation of the Act and 1397. 

Six days later, Golden amended the complaint to specify herself as the sole named 

plaintiff. On October 10th, Golden filed her motion for a preliminary injunction, and 

the VIBIR responded with its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary 

judgment. The District Court held a consolidated hearing for both motions on November 

26, 2001. That same day, it issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it 

awarded Golden declaratory relief but granted the VIBIR’s motion for summary 

judgment as to the injunctive relief claim. A final order followed on November 30th, 

and the VIBIR filed a timely notice of appeal limited to the District Court’s grant of 

declaratory relief on December 27th. 

 II. 

 On appeal, we need only address the threshold jurisdictional issue of Golden’s 

standing. To qualify for an advance refund, and thereby show standing to challenge the 

VIBIR’s decision, Golden must establish that she filed a return for tax year 2000 and was 

otherwise fully eligible for an advance refund. Before the District Court both parties 

stipulated that Golden had filed these returns. Without further factual inquiry the 

District Court held that Golden had standing based on this stipulation alone. 

 This stipulation could not confer standing on Golden. Because "standing is an 

Article III requirement for jurisdiction, the parties do not have the power to confer such 

jurisdiction upon the Court by conceding the standing of certain plaintiffs." Barhold v. 

Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 234 (2d Cir. 1988); see Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain 
Properties, 98 F.3d 590, 593 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting "[t]he district court’s finding that 

defendants conceded plaintiffs had standing" because "parties cannot confer subject 

matter jurisdiction on the courts by agreement"). 

 Further, there is no record evidence from which we can independently evaluate 

Golden’s standing. We recognize that this absence of evidence would normally be fatal 

to her complaint. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (stating that 

"[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden" of proving standing); Joint 

Stock Society v. UDV North America, Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 2001). 

Nevertheless, we have recognized our right to remand, rather than dismiss, litigation 

where further development of the record will assist our review of a district court’s 

standing determination. New Jersey Coalition of Rooming and Boarding House Owners 

v. Mayor and Council of the City of Asbury Park, 152 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 1998) 

(remanding because "the district court made insufficient factual findings for us to review 

its standing determination."). We find the exercise of that power most appropriate here, 

particularly because the record illustrates that, but for the stipulation, Golden was willing 

to introduce testimony and evidence on this issue. 

 III. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for 

further development of the record on the issue of Golden’s standing. 

 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing Opinion. 

 By the Court, 

 /s/ Thomas L. Ambro 

 Circuit Judge