DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation

CHALLENGES TO

SECURITY IN SPACE

Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion

2022
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Cover image, Cislunar space domain viewed from beyond the far side of the Moon:

Shutterstock, Unsplash

II
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

SCOPE NOTE

Challenges to Security in Space was first published in early 2019 to address the main threats to the array of 

U.S. space capabilities, and examine space and counterspace strategies and systems pursued primarily by 

China and Russia and, to a lesser extent, by North Korea and Iran. This second edition builds on that work and 

provides an updated, unclassified overview of the threats to U.S. space capabilities, particularly from China

and Russia, as those threats continue to expand.

Between 2019 and 2021 the combined operational space fleets of China and Russia have grown by 

approximately 70 percent. This recent and continuing expansion follows a period of growth (2015–

2018) where China and Russia had increased their combined satellite fleets by more than 200 percent. 

The drive to modernize and increase capabilities for both countries is reflected in nearly all major space 

categories—satellite communications (SATCOM), remote sensing, navigation-related, and science and 

technology demonstration.

Since early 2019, competitor space operations have also increased in pace and scope worldwide, China’s 

and Russia’s counterspace developments continue to mature, global space services proliferate, and orbital 

congestion has increased. As a result, DIA has published this new edition to: 

• Expand its examination of competitor space situational awareness (SSA), and command and

control (C2) capabilities;

• Detail the profiles of organizations operating space and counterspace systems based on new information;

• Deepen our characterization of new space and counterspace systems deployed and in development;

• Focus on China's and Russia's interests in exploring the Moon and Mars;

• Provide a new section on the use of space beyond Earth orbit and its implications;

• Widen our treatment on the threats posed to all nations’ space operations from space debris.

Growth of All Chinese and Russian Satellites In-Orbit, 2019–2021

CHINESE SATELLITES RUSSIAN SATELLITES

2019 2020 2021 2019 2020 2021

SATCOM Remote Sensing Navigation-related Science, Technology Development, or Other

0

100

200

300

400

500

0

100

200

300

400

500

End of year totals are represented for 2019 through 2021. China’s and Russia’s combined, in-orbit satellite fleets 

will continue to grow. Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1 January 2022, Satellite Database.

2110-30293

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY III
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Space Reliance In An Era Of Competition And Expansion

Capabilities. Space-based capabilities impact many day-to-day aspects of the American way of life. These 

capabilities enable functions that affect our homes, transportation, electric power grids, banking systems, 

and our global communications. Satellites provide access to a broad range of information and enable many 

services in real time, from watching breaking news to monitoring our deployed armed forces around the 

world day or night. These and other benefits enabled by space systems are the result of more than 60 years 

of dedicated work by government agencies—military and civilian—supported by many commercial space 

providers. Space systems also enable the United States and our allies to project combat power to areas of 

conflict and instability and allow our armed forces to collect vital intelligence on foreign threats, to navigate 

and maneuver rapidly, and to communicate with each other anywhere around the globe to ensure our 

security and quick response to international military and humanitarian crises.

Competition. Space competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union began in 

earnest with Moscow’s launch of the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik-1, in 1957. China’s emergence 

as a space power in the late 20th and early 21st century and Russia’s post-Soviet resurgence have 

expanded the militarization of space as both countries integrate space and counterspace capabilities 

into their national and warfighting strategies to challenge the United States. Adversaries have observed 

more than 30 years of U.S. military operations supported by space systems and are now seeking ways to 

expand their own capabilities and deny the U.S. a space-enabled advantage.1

China and Russia, in particular, are developing various means to exploit the perceived U.S. reliance on 

space-based systems and challenge the U.S. position in the space domain.2 Beijing and Moscow seek 

to position themselves as leading space powers, intent on creating new global space norms. Through 

the use of space and counterspace capabilities, they aspire to undercut U.S. global leadership. Iran and 

North Korea will continue to develop and operate electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to deny or degrade 

space-based communications and navigation.3 

Proliferation. Space capabilities are increasing across a growing list of nations, including: missile warning, 

geolocation and tracking of friendly and adversary activities, target identification, and navigation services 

for their citizens and armed forces. Expanding constellations of remote-sensing satellites are reducing all 

countries' ability to conceal sensitive tests, evaluation activities, and military exercises and operations.4, 5

Space commercialization is also growing as companies augment or replace government-provided launch, 

communications, SSA, remote-sensing—also referred to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR)— and human spaceflight services. These firms are opening access to space technologies, services, 

and products to government and nongovernment entities that can pay for their capabilities.6,7,8 The 

growth of viable commercial space enterprises best represents how the use of space has expanded in 

scope, scale, and importance across the globe.

Counterspace. Space is being increasingly militarized. Some nations have developed, tested, and 

deployed various satellites and some counterspace weapons. China and Russia are developing new 

space systems to improve their military effectiveness and reduce any reliance on U.S. space systems such 

IV
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

as the Global Positioning System (GPS). Beijing and Moscow have also created separate space forces. As 

China’s and Russia’s space and counterspace capabilities increase, both nations are integrating space 

scenarios into their military exercises. They continue to develop, test, and proliferate sophisticated 

antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to hold U.S. and allied space assets at risk. At the same time, China and 

Russia are pursuing nonweaponization of space agreements in the United Nations.9 Russia regularly 

expresses concern about space weapons and is pursuing legal, binding space arms control agreements 

to curb what it sees as U.S. strength in outer space.10,11 The expansion of Chinese and Russian space and 

counterspace weapons combined with the general rise of other foreign space capabilities is driving many 

nations to formalize their space policies to better position themselves to secure the space domain and 

facilitate their own space services.12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25

Collisions. The probability of collisions of massive derelict objects in low Earth orbit (LEO) is growing 

and almost certainly will continue through at least 2030 because of rising numbers of space launches—

especially those with multiple payloads—and continuing fragmentation from collisions, battery 

explosions, and further ASAT testing events.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY V
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

CONTENTS

Scope Note III

Executive Summary IV

Space Capabilities 2

Denying Space 4

China 8

Russia 20

Emerging Challenges 30

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3

North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Key Space Issues through 2030 and Beyond .

Growth of Reusable Space Technology:

Commercial Opportunities and Military Advantage.  

Human Spaceflight and Cislunar Operations.  

Challenge to Space Operations: Debris and Orbital Collisions.  

Outlook 40

Appendix: Space and Counterspace Concepts . 

Glossary of Acronyms 48

Sources/Endnotes 49

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VII
Active Foreign Satellites

Countries/Multinational Owned Space Assets

SATCOM ISR and

Earth Observation Navigation-related Science, Technology Development, or Other

China Russia Other Foreign States

874

87

61

563 118 334

269

192

17

125

32

726

262

28

49

41

Countries/Consortiums

51 50 5 44

Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1 January 2022, Satellite Database

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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Space-based remote-sensing, communication, 

and navigation systems are used for various commercial, civilian, and military applications. Many 

nations, including China and Russia, have recognized the benefits of investing in and using space 

technologies. Those space capabilities include:

• Space-based remote-sensing or ISR satellites 

gather data of security concern and support intelligence and military activities, such as tracking and 

monitoring military forces and observing related 

events and locations. Space-based remote-sensing 

also supports civilian activities, such as crop and 

weather monitoring, as well as disaster response 

sites and operations.26

• Satellite communications is used for beyond-lineof-sight communications, including voice and television services. Communications satellites also enable 

Internet and other communications to reach remote 

areas without direct connectivity. Military SATCOM 

improves C2, allowing for greater mobility over 

greater distances by eliminating the need for groundbased infrastructure.27

• Positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services 

transmit timing signals for various applications, 

including air, land, sea, and space navigation; asset 

tracking; and precision weapons guidance. PNT also 

supports civilian transportation; precision farming; 

autonomous vehicle guidance; time synchronization for electrical power grids and banking transactions; communications across wireless Internet and 

emergency medical, fire, and police services; as well 

as navigation services for rail, road, air, and ocean 

cargo operations.28

• Space launch vehicles (SLVs) place objects in Earth 

orbit or put them on trajectories to explore the farthest reaches of space. For decades, this capability 

was restricted to a few spacefaring nations. The number of organizations able to launch satellites is small 

and placing satellites in orbit has usually been the 

largest expense in space operations. However, during 

the past 10–12 years, other nations have been developing SLVs, and increasing numbers of commercial 

entities worldwide have steadily fielded new capabilities. As a result, the average price, and thus barrier, to 

entry into space, has declined.29

As more nations and more services depend on spacebased capabilities—especially in critical social and 

economic sectors, such as medical, disaster response, 

weather forecasting, and financial transactions

the loss or degradation of those capabilities will 

increasingly disrupt daily life.30 Space asset disruption 

will probably lead to degradation of critical military and 

intelligence capabilities. Such disruptions can deny 

access to space for scientific purposes and negatively 

impact technological innovation.31,32,33

[See the Appendix on Space and Counterspace Concepts 

for additional details.]

SPACE

CAPABILITIES

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 2
Counterspace Threat Continuum

Space

Situational

Awareness

Electronic

Warfare

Denial &

Deception

Directed Energy

Weapons

Orbital

Threats

Ground Site

Attacks

Cyber

Attacks

Kinetic Energy 

Weapons

Nuclear

Detonation

NONREVERSIBLE

REVERSIBLE

The counterspace continuum represents the range of threats to space-based services, arranged from 

reversible to nonreversible effects. Reversible effects from denial and deception and EW are nondestructive and temporary, and the system is able to resume normal operations after the incident. Directed energy 

weapons (DEW), cyberspace threats, and orbital threats can cause temporary or permanent effects. 

Permanent effects from kinetic energy attacks on space systems, physical attacks against space-related 

ground infrastructure, and nuclear detonation in space would result in degradation or physical destruction 

of a space capability.

2008-26370

3
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Competitor nations have capabilities to deny others 

the use of space assets. Space is a critical enabler 

for U.S. and allied military forces during operations, 

exercises, and logistics around the world providing for near-instantaneous communications, situational awareness, and precision navigation for our 

forces. Military and civilian space services are not 

easily separated. Actions taken by any nation to 

interfere with space services used by the military 

probably would deny civilian space services as well, 

either accidentally or with purpose. Although many 

counterspace weapons are intended to degrade 

space services temporarily, others can damage or 

destroy satellites permanently.

• Physical or cyberattacks against ground sites and 

infrastructure supporting space operations can 

threaten satellite services.

• Space situational awareness sensors predict when 

satellites pass overhead. This allows for tracking, 

warning, and, if necessary, targeting of spacebased systems.

• Adversaries can jam global navigation and communications satellites used for C2 of naval, ground, and air 

forces as well as manned and unmanned vehicles.

• Adversary DEWs that target ISR satellites almost 

certainly are able to temporarily or permanently 

blind imagery satellites and other strategic sensors, 

thereby denying the ability to monitor, track, and target forces.

• Adversary ASAT missiles can be used to attack satellites in LEO and would produce massive amounts of 

debris that can remain in orbit for decades or even 

centuries. China tested an ASAT missile against its 

own defunct weather satellite in 2007, which created a debris cloud that poses a threat to satellites 

in nearby orbits today.34 Russia used an ASAT missile 

as recently as 15 November 2021 to destroy one of 

its derelict satellites in orbit.35

• Other space-based weapons can deliver temporary 

or permanent effects on other satellites.

Countries with nuclear weapons can launch a warhead on a long-range booster, such as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or SLV, and probably 

conduct a high-altitude nuclear detonation, which 

would create widespread electromagnetic disruptions in space and on Earth leading to potential damage or destruction of satellites.36

D E NYING

S P ACE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 4
Orbit Types and Uses37,38

Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO)

Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)

Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)

Low Earth Orbit (LEO)

Orbit Altitude* Uses

Low Earth Orbit Up to 2,000 kilometers

- Communications

- ISR

- Human Spaceflight †

Medium Earth Orbit Approx. 2,000 to 20,000 kilometers

- Communications

- Positioning, Navigation,

and Timing

Highly Elliptical Orbit

LEO altitudes at perigee

(nearest to Earth)

Approx. 40,000 kilometers at

apogee (farthest from Earth)

- Communications

- ISR

- Missile Warning

Geosynchronous

Earth Orbit Approx. 36,000 kilometers

- Communications

- ISR

- Missile Warning

* The advantages of higher orbits for communications and ISR are near-persistent coverage of most of the Earth in view of the satellite, 

with the exception of Earth’s polar regions where it is limited. LEO satellites cover all parts of the world, including the poles, but for 

shorter periods based on the speed of the satellite.

† With the exception of nine U.S. Apollo missions to the Moon, all human spaceflight has been completed in LEO.

2008-26357

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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Long March-5 (LM-5) carrying China's Tianwen-1 mission to Mars, launching from Wenchang Space Launch Center.

Image Source: Noel CELIS/AFP

7
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

China has devoted considerable economic and 

technological resources to growing all aspects of its 

space program, improving military space applications, developing human spaceflight, and conducting lunar and Martian exploration missions.41 During 

the past 10 years, China has doubled its launches 

per year and the number of satellites in orbit.42,43

China has placed three space stations in orbit, two 

of which have since deorbited, and the third of which 

launched in 2021.44,45,46,47,48 Furthermore, China has 

launched a robotic lander and rover to the far side 

of the Moon;49 a lander and sample return mission 

to the Moon;50,51,52,53 and an orbiter, lander, and rover 

in one mission to Mars.54,55,56 China has also launched 

multiple ASAT missiles that are able to destroy satellites and developed mobile jammers to deny SATCOM and GPS.57,58,59,60,61,62,63

Beijing’s goal is to become a broad-based, fully 

capable space power.64 Its rapidly growing space 

program—second only to the United States in the 

number of operational satellites—is a source of 

national pride and part of Chairman Xi Jinping’s 

“China Dream” to establish a powerful and prosperous China. The space program, managed by the 

People's Liberation Army (PLA), supports both civilian and military interests, including strengthening 

its science and technology sector, growing international relationships, and modernizing the military. 

China seeks to rapidly achieve these goals through 

advances in the research and development of space 

systems and space-related technology.65,66,67,68,69

China will continue to launch a range of satellites 

that substantially enhance its ISR capabilities; field 

advanced communications satellites able to transmit large amounts of data; increase PNT capabilities; and deploy new weather and oceanographic 

satellites.70 China has also developed and probably 

will continue to develop weapons for use against 

satellites in orbit to degrade and deny adversary

space capabilities.71,72,73

Exploring the vast universe, developing space 

programs, and becoming an aerospace power 

have always been the dream we have been

striving for.

—Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese

Communist Party, 24 April 2016,

Remarks on the first China Space Day39

The Beijing Aerospace Control Center (BACC) during the 

2 August 2020 launch of the Tianwen-1 mission to Mars.

Image Source: Xinhua via AFP

Space has already become a new domain of 

modern military struggle; it is a critical factor for 

deciding military transformation; and it has an 

extremely important influence on the evolution 

of future form-states, modes, and rules of war. 

Therefore, following with interest the military 

struggle circumstance of space and strengthening 

the study of the space military struggle problem is 

a very important topic we are currently facing.

—China’s Science of Military Strategy, 2020 

National Defense University 40

CHINA

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 8
Space Strategy and Doctrine

China officially advocates for the peaceful use of space 

and is pursuing agreements in the United Nations on 

the nonweaponization of space.78 China also continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities 

and has enacted military reforms to better integrate 

cyberspace, space, and EW into joint military operations. China’s space strategy is expected to evolve 

over time, keeping pace with the application of new 

space technology. These changes probably will be 

reflected in published national space strategy documents, through space policy actions, and in programs

enacted by political and military leadership.

The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to 

deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as 

a critical component to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”79,80,81,82 China’s first public mention of 

space and counterspace capabilities came as early 

as 1971, largely from academics reviewing foreign 

publications on ASAT technologies. However, Chinese science and technology efforts on space began 

to accelerate in the 1980s, most likely as a result of 

the U.S. space-focused Strategic Defense Initiative 

to defend against the former Soviet Union’s nuclear 

weapons.83 Subsequently, after observing the U.S. 

military’s performance during the 1991 Gulf War 

through actions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the 

second Iraq War, the PLA embarked on an effort 

to modernize weapon systems, across all domains 

including space, and update its doctrine to focus 

on using and countering adversary information-enabled warfare.84

China’s perceptions of the importance of space-enabled operations to the United States and its allies 

has shaped integral components of PLA military 

planning and campaigns. In addition, space is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for 

deployed Chinese forces, and the PLA probably sees 

counterspace operations as a means to deter and 

counter a U.S. intervention during a regional military conflict.85,86 China has claimed that “destroying 

or capturing satellites and other sensors” would 

make it difficult for the U.S. and allied militaries to 

use precision-guided weapons.87 Moreover, Chinese defense academics suggest that reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and early warning satellites could be among the targets of attacks 

designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”88

Military Strategic Guidelines

In 2015, Beijing’s official release of China’s Military Strategy directed the PLA to research and give priority to 

strategies to win “informatized local wars” and emphasized “maritime military struggle.”74 Chinese military 

strategy documents also emphasize the growing importance of offensive air, long-distance mobility, and 

space and cyberspace operations. China expects its future wars to be fought mostly outside its borders and 

in the maritime domain. China promulgated its military strategy and the supporting documents through its 

most recent update to its military strategic guidelines, the top-level directives that Beijing uses to define concepts, assess threats, and set priorities for planning, force posture, and modernization.75

The PLA uses “informatized warfare” to describe the process of acquiring, transmitting, processing, and 

using information to conduct joint military operations across the land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace 

domains and the electromagnetic spectrum during a conflict. PLA writings guide much of China’s military modernization today and highlight the benefit of near-real-time shared awareness of the battlefield 

in enabling quick, unified efforts to seize tactical opportunities. In November 2020, China’s Central Military Commission issued a trial update to PLA joint doctrine to codify warfighting reforms and will almost 

certainly improve its ability to conduct joint operations.76 Space-based systems will play an increasingly 

important role in support of these goals.77

9
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Space and Counterspace

Organizations

China’s space program comprises organizations in 

the military, political, defense-industrial, and commercial sectors. The PLA historically has managed 

China’s space program and continues to invest in 

improving China’s capabilities in space-based ISR, 

SATCOM, satellite navigation, human spaceflight, and 

robotic space exploration.89 Although state-owned 

enterprises are China’s primary civilian and military 

space contractors, China is placing greater emphasis 

on decentralizing and diversifying its space industry 

to increase competition.90

In 2015, China established the Strategic Support 

Force (SSF) to integrate cyberspace, space, and EW 

capabilities into joint military operations as part of 

its military reforms.91,92,93 The SSF forms the core 

of China’s information warfare force, supports 

the entire PLA, and reports directly to the Central 

Military Commission.

The SSF, led by PLA General Ju Qiansheng,94 is 

divided into two major departments: the Space 

Systems Department (SSD), very likely consolidating 

the majority of the PLA’s space functions, and the 

Network Systems Department (NSD), very likely 

in charge of cyberspace operations and EW.95,96

The SSD focuses primarily on satellite launches 

and operations to support ISR, navigation, and 

communication requirements.97 The SSD’s China 

Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC) operates all 

four launch sites, in addition to Yuanwang space 

support ships, two major satellite control centers—

Xian Satellite Control Center (XSCC) and the BACC—

and the PLA telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) 

system for all Chinese satellites.98,99 The EW functions 

of the PLA before 2015 were probably transferred to 

the NSD when it was stood up in 2015 as well.100,101

The State Council’s State Administration for Science, 

Technology, and Industry for National Defense 

(SASTIND) is the primary civilian organization 

that coordinates and manages China’s space 

activities, including allocating space research and 

development funds.102 It also maintains a working 

relationship with the PLA organization that oversees 

China’s military acquisitions. SASTIND guides 

and establishes policies for state-owned entities 

conducting China’s space activities.103

The China National Space Administration (CNSA), 

subordinate to SASTIND, serves as the public face of 

China’s civilian space efforts.104 China is increasingly 

using CNSA efforts to bolster relationships with 

countries around the world, providing opportunities 

to cooperate on space issues.105,106,107 As of 2019, 

China had more than a hundred cooperative spacerelated agreements with more than three dozen 

countries and four international organizations.108,109

Many space technologies can serve a civilian and military purpose and China emphasizes “military-civil 

fusion”—a phrase used, in part, to refer to the use of 

dual-use technologies, policies, and organizations for 

military benefit.110 The SSF works with civilian organizations like universities and research organizations 

to incorporate civilian support to military efforts since 

there is an already high demand for aerospace talent 

and competition for finite human resources.111 China’s commercial space sector features partially stateowned enterprises such as Zhuhai Orbita, Expace, 

Galactic Energy, and OK-Space for remote sensing, 

launch, and communication services.112,113,114,115

Acquisition of Foreign

Space and Counterspace

Technologies

The PLA continues to rely on overt and covert acquisition of foreign space and counterspace technologies to build Chinese knowledge and advance 

technological modernization as a supplement to its 

domestic research. China uses traditional technical 

espionage and cyberespionage techniques as well 

as its open-source collection network, technology 

transfer organizations, and exploitation of overseas 

scholars. Acquisition of foreign technology is used 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 10
to circumvent the costs of research and facilitate 

“leapfrog” development by exploiting the creativity 

of other nations.116

ISR Satellite Capabilities

China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational 

awareness. Used for military and civilian remote 

sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical and 

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery as well as 

electronic and signals intelligence data.117 China also 

exports its satellite technology globally, including its 

domestically developed remote-sensing satellites.

As of January 2022, China’s ISR satellite fleet contained 

more than 250 systems—a quantity second only to 

the United States, and nearly doubling China's in-orbit 

systems since 2018.118,119 The PLA owns and operates 

about half of the world’s ISR systems, most of which 

could support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of 

U.S. and allied forces worldwide, especially throughout the Indo-Pacific region. These satellites also allow 

the PLA to monitor potential regional flashpoints, 

including the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Indian Ocean, 

and the South China Sea.120,121,122

Recent improvements to China’s space-based ISR 

capabilities emphasize the development, procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with 

digital camera technology as well as space-based 

radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage. These 

improvements should increase China’s monitoring 

capabilities—including observation of U.S. aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air 

wings, making them more susceptible to long-range 

strikes. Space capabilities probably will enhance 

potential PLA military operations farther from the Chinese coast.123,124,125,126 These capabilities are being augmented with electronic reconnaissance satellites that 

monitor radar and radio transmissions.127

Satellite Communications

China owns and operates more than 60 communications satellites, at least 4 of which are dedicated 

to military use.128 China produces its military-dedicated satellites domestically. Its civilian communications satellites incorporate off-the-shelf commercially manufactured components.129 China is 

fielding advanced communications satellites capable of transmitting large amounts of data.130 Existing 

and future data relay satellites and other beyondline-of-sight communications systems could convey critical targeting data to Chinese military

operation centers.131,132,133

In addition, China is making progress on its ambitious plans to propel itself to the forefront of the 

global SATCOM industry.134,135,136 China is continuing 

to test next-generation capabilities like its Quantum Experimentation at Space Scale (QUESS) spacebased quantum-enabled communications satellite, 

which could supply the means to field highly secure 

communications systems.137,138 In June 2020, a team 

of Chinese scientists claimed to achieve quantum 

supremacy, reporting successful satellite-based distributions of entangled photon pairs at a distance 

of more than 1,200 kilometers and that the photon 

pairs’ integrity remained intact after traveling such 

distances. Testing satellite-based quantum entanA 10 December 2016 satellite-to-Earth link from Ali, 

Tibetan Autonomous Region to China's Micius Quantum Teleportation Satellite Experiment.

Image Source: Xinhua via AFP

11
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

glement represents a major milestone in building a 

practical, global, ultrasecure quantum network, but 

the widespread deployment and adoption of this 

technology still faces hurdles.139,140

China also intends to provide SATCOM support 

to users worldwide and plans to develop at least 

seven new SATCOM constellations in LEO. However, as these constellations are still in the early 

stages of development their effectiveness remains 

uncertain.141,142,143,144,145

PNT Capabilities

China’s satellite navigation system, known as BeiDou, is an independently constructed, developed, 

and exclusively China-operated PNT service. China’s priorities for BeiDou are to support national 

security and economic and social development 

by adopting Chinese PNT into precise agriculture, 

monitoring of vehicles and ships, and aiding with 

civilian-focused services across more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe.146,147 BeiDou provides all-time, all-weather, and high-accuracy PNT 

services to users domestically, in the Asia-Pacific 

region, as well as globally and consists of 49 operational satellites.148,149,150,151,152,153,154 Initially deployed 

to facilitate regional PNT services, BeiDou achieved 

worldwide initial operating capability in 2018.155,156

In June 2020, China successfully launched the 

final satellite in the BeiDou satellite constellation,

completing its global navigation system.157 China’s military uses BeiDou’s high-accuracy PNT services to enable force movements and precisionguided munitions delivery.161,162

BeiDou has a worldwide positional accuracy standard of 10 meters; accuracy in the Asia-Pacific region 

is within 5 meters.163 In addition to providing PNT, 

the BeiDou constellation offers unique capabilities, 

including text messaging and user tracking through 

its Regional Short Message Communication service to 

enable mass communications among BeiDou users. 

The system also provides additional military C2 capabilities for the PLA.164,165,166

China intends to use its BeiDou constellation to offer 

additional services and incentives to countries taking 

part in its Belt and Road Initiative emphasizing building strong economic ties to other countries to align 

partner nations with China’s interests.167,168 As of May 

2021, China is predicting Beidou products and services will be worth $156 billion by 2025, and potentially export BeiDou products to more than 100 million 

users in 120 countries.169

Human Spaceflight

and Space Exploration

Following uncrewed missions that began in 1999, 

China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight when it successfully orbited 

the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft in 2003.170,171,172

In 2011, China then launched its first space station, 

Tiangong-1, and in 2016, it launched its second 

space station, Tiangong-2.173,174,175 In 2020, China 

conducted its first orbital test of the New-Generation Manned Spaceship, which is expected to 

replace the Shenzhou series of crewed spacecraft.176 

On 29 April 2021, China launched the first element, 

Tianhe, of its new Tiangong space station.177 Beijing 

launched the first supply vessel, Tianzhou, and has 

launched two Chinese crews since then.178,179

China has also taken on a greater role in deep space 

exploration and space science and has made notable accomplishments during the past several years. 

China has demonstrated its interest in working with 

Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA) to con

China's Zhurong rover and Tianwen lander on Utopia 

Planitia, Mars, 11 June 2021.158,159,160

Image Source: Xinhua via AFP

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 12
China: Space Exploration Missions

Mission Description Launch Date

Yinghou-1 Mars orbiter launched aboard Russian Phobos-Grunt spacecraft. Mission failed to exit LEO.180 2011

XPNAV-1

The world’s first X-ray navigation satellite test—uses distant 

X-ray pulsars to navigate and determine its location in the solar 

system within 5 kilometers.181

2016

SISASAIL-1 Solar sail technology test for future deep-space missions.182 2019

Chang'e-4

First-ever landing on lunar far side; mission included a rover 

and lander and the lunar relay satellite, which was launched in 

May 2018.183,184,185,186

2019

Tianwen-1 Martian orbiter, lander, and rover.187,188,189,190 2020

Chang'e-5 Robotic mission landed on the Moon, collected samples, and 

returned them to Earth.191,192,193,194 2020

Tiangong Modular space station designed to host Chinese and foreign 

payloads and astronauts.195,196,197,198,199,200 2021–2022

Chang'e-6 Robotic mission to land, collect samples from the Moon’s 

south pole, and return to Earth.201 2023

Chang'e-7

Orbiter, relay satellite, lander, rover, and flyby craft. The lander 

and rover will have ground-penetrating radar, surface magnetometer, and a spectrometer for lunar exploration.2022024

Chang'e-8 Test and verification mission for future lunar expeditions.203 TBD

Lunar Robotic 

Mission Robotic research station on the Moon.204,205 2025

Human Lunar 

Program

Human lunar exploration program to put astronauts on the 

Moon.206,207,208 Mid-2030s

Lunar 

Research and 

Development 

Base

Establish a research base on the Moon, primarily supported 

by robotic technology and capable of supporting human 

visits.209,210

By 2050

13
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Chinese Space Launch Vehicles

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

Meters

Medium-Lift

2–20 metric tons

Heavy-Lift

20–50

metric tons

Super Heavy-Lift

>50 

metric tons

Light-Lift

<2 metric tons

*Developmental

Depicted payload capacity is approximate and varies depending on planned orbit Kuaizhou (KZ)-1 Hyperbola-1 Kaituo (KT)-2 Long March (LM)-6 LM-11LM-2C/-2D LM-4B/-4CLM-8LM-2F

LM-3A

LM-3C

LM-3B

LM-7/-7A

LM-5/-5B

LM-9*

The launch vehicles depicted are representative of China’s launch capabilities. Additional light-, medium-, and 

heavy-lift vehicles are in development. China uses its light-lift vehicles to place small payloads into LEO and its 

medium-lift—specifically the LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4—to place larger satellites into LEO and MEO and smaller satellites in GEO. The LM-5 heavy-lift SLV supports launching crewed space station components to LEO and heavy 

payloads to GEO. The developmental super heavy-lift LM-9 primarily will support missions to the Moon and Mars.

2008-26363

duct deep-space exploration.211,212 China is the third 

country to place a robotic rover on the Moon and 

was the first to land a rover on the lunar far side in 

2019, which is communicating through the Queqiao 

relay satellite that China launched the year before 

to a stable orbit around an Earth-Moon Lagrange 

point [See Cislunar Chart, page 35].213,214 

Space Launch Capabilities

China is improving its space launch capabilities to 

ensure it has an independent, reliable means to 

access space and to compete in the international 

space launch market. China continues to improve 

manufacturing efficiencies and launch capabilities 

overall, supporting continued human spaceflight 

and deep-space exploration missions—including to 

the Moon and Mars.215 New modular SLVs that allow 

China to tailor an SLV to the specific configuration 

required for each customer are beginning to go 

into operation, leading to increased launch vehicle 

reliability and overall cost savings for launch 

campaigns.216 China is also in the early stages of 

developing a super heavy-lift SLV similar to the U.S. 

Saturn V or the newer U.S. Space Launch System 

to support proposed crewed lunar and Mars 

exploration missions.217

In addition to land-based launches, in 2020 China 

demonstrated the ability to launch a Long March-11 

(LM-11) from a sea-based platform. This capability, 

if staged correctly, would allow China to launch 

nearer to the equator than its land-based launch 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 14
sites, increase the rocket’s carrying capacity, and 

potentially lower launch costs.218

China has developed quick-response SLVs to 

increase its attractiveness as a commercial small 

satellite launch provider and to rapidly reconstitute LEO space capabilities, which could support Chinese military operations during a conflict 

or civilian response to disasters. Compared with 

medium- and heavy-lift SLVs, these quick-response SLVs are able to expedite launch campaigns because they are transportable via road 

or rail and can be stored launch-ready with solid 

fuel for longer periods than liquid-fueled SLVs. 

Because their size is limited, quick-response SLVs 

such as the Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1), LM-6, and LM-11 

are only able to launch relatively small payloads 

of up to approximately 2 metric tons into LEO. 

Chinese Space Launch, SSA, Satellite Control Centers, Command and Control,

and Data Reception Stations219,220

All locations are approximate. Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. 

Depiction of claims on this map is without prejudice to U.S. non-recognition of any such claims.

0 500 1,000 Kilometers

Data Reception Station

Deep Space Tracking Network

Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR)

Satellite Control Center

Space Launch Site

Telemetry, Tracking, and Control (TT&C)

East China

Sea

N.

KOR.

MONGOLIA

CHINA

KYR.

BHU.

INDIA

NEPAL

BURMA VIET.

JAPAN

BANGL.

S.

KOR. PAK.

KAZAKHSTAN

RUSSIA

LAOS

THAI.

Aksai

Chin

Beijing

Beijing

Taiyuan

Xian

Wenchang

Xichang

Jiuquan

Haiyang

Port

Kunming

Zhejiang

Changchun

Nanning

Weinan

Jiamusi

Sanya

Kashgar

Shandong

Zhanyi

Kashgar

Qingdao

Korla

Miyun

Lingshui

China has four fixed launch sites. The newest, Wenchang on Hainan Island, has a launch latitude closer to the Equator, 

which provides a more efficient path to launch satellites into GEO. In 2020, China launched a LM-11 from a barge based 

in Haiyang Port. China's main satellite control center is in Xian, and its primary control center for human space flight 

and lunar missions is in Beijing. The PLA operates four large phased array radars (LPAR) most likely used for missile 

warning and SSA. Additionally, there are at least six ground stations used for satellite C2—including one in Neuquén, 

Argentina, and five for receiving remote sensing data from satellites—including one located in Kiruna, Sweden.

2108-29551

15
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

In June 2020, China announced its intention to

upgrade the payload capacity of the LM-11 in the 

new LM-11A, designed for land or sea launches,

beginning in 2022.221,222,223,224

The expansion of nonstate-owned Chinese launch 

vehicle and satellite operation companies in China’s 

domestic market since 2015 suggests that China is 

successfully advancing military-civil fusion efforts. 

Military-civil fusion blurs the lines between these 

entities and obfuscates the end users of acquired 

foreign technology and expertise.225

Space Situational Awareness

China has a robust network of space surveillance 

sensors capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This network includes a variety of telescopes, radars, 

and other sensors that allow China to support its

missions including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, ballistic missile early warning 

Chinese International SSA Efforts Collaboration and 

Overseas Tracking, Telemetry, and Control Sites

China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a multilateral organization with rotating leadership whose members include China, 

Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey with Egypt, 

Indonesia, and Mexico as associate members.226 APSCO oversees a space surveillance project known as the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object 

Observation System (APOSOS). As part of the project, China provided to Iran, 

Pakistan, and Peru 15-cm telescopes that are able to track objects in LEO and 

GEO. All tasking information and subsequent observation data collected is 

funneled through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National Astronomical 

Observatory of China. APOSOS has near full coverage of LEO and GEO. The 

organization is planning to improve optical system capabilities, coverage, and 

redundancy as well as data sharing networks.227,228,229

China has established locations worldwide to aid in TT&C of space missions 

both around the Earth as well as in cislunar and deep space. There are ground 

stations in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ethiopia, France, Greenland, Kenya, Kiribati, Namibia, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain, and 

Sweden. There are also four sites in Antarctica that can provide similar support as well as a BeiDou reference station: Great Wall, Kunlun, Taishan, and

Zhongshan Stations.230

Image Source: Xinhua via AFP

The four Chinese Yuanwang space tracking ships—

based in Jiangyin, near Shanghai, and usually supporting space launch operations from positions in the 

Pacific and Indian Oceans—are part of China’s SSA 

network. In early 2020, China’s Yuanwang-7 conducted operations in the Atlantic Ocean, a first for 

Yuanwang space support vessels.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 16
(BMEW), spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris monitoring.231,232

Electronic Warfare 

Capabilities

The PLA considers EW capabilities to be critical 

assets for modern warfare, and its doctrine 

emphasizes using EW to suppress or deceive enemy 

equipment.233 The PLA routinely incorporates in its 

exercises jamming and antijamming techniques 

that probably are intended to deny multiple types 

of space-based communications, radar systems, 

and GPS navigation support to military movement 

and precision-guided munitions employment.234

China probably is developing jammers dedicated 

to targeting SAR, including aboard military 

reconnaissance platforms. Interfering with SAR 

satellites very likely protects terrestrial assets by 

denying imagery and targeting in any potential 

conflict involving the United States or its allies.235,236

In addition, China probably is developing jammers 

to target SATCOM over a range of frequency 

bands, including military-protected extremely high 

frequency communications.237,238

Cyberthreats

The PLA emphasizes offensive cyberspace 

capabilities as a major component of integrated 

warfare and could use its cyberwarfare capabilities 

to support military operations against spacebased assets.239,240 For example, the PLA could 

employ its cyberattack elements to establish 

information dominance in the early stages of 

a conflict to constrain an adversary’s actions 

or slow its mobilization and deployment by 

targeting network-based command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); logistics; 

and commercial activities.

The PLA also conducts cyberespionage against 

foreign space entities, consistent with broader 

state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage, 

to increase its level of technologies and expertise 

available to support military research, development, and acquisition. The PLA unit responsible 

for conducting signals intelligence has supported 

cyberespionage against U.S. and European satellite 

and aerospace industries since at least 2007.241,242

Directed Energy Weapons

During the past two decades, Chinese defense 

research has proposed the development of several 

reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs 

for reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and 

even potentially destroying satellite components. 

China has multiple ground-based laser weapons 

of varying power levels to disrupt, degrade, or

damage satellites that include a current limited 

capability to employ laser systems against satellite 

sensors.243 By the mid- to late-2020s, China may field 

higher power systems that extend the threat to the 

structures of nonoptical satellites.244,245,246,247,248

ASAT Missile Threats

In 2007, China destroyed one of its defunct 

weather satellites more than 800 kilometers 

above the Earth with an ASAT missile. The effect 

of this destructive test generated more than 

3,000 pieces of trackable space debris, of which 

more than 2,700 remain in orbit and most will 

continue orbiting the Earth for decades.249,250

The PLA’s operational ground-based ASAT missile system is intended to target LEO satellites.

China’s military units have continued training with 

ASAT missiles.251,252

China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT 

weapons that are able to destroy satellites up to 

GEO. In 2013, China launched an object into space 

on a ballistic trajectory with a peak orbital radius 

above 30,000 kilometers, near GEO altitudes. No 

new satellites were released from the object, and 

the launch profile was inconsistent with traditional 

17
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

SLVs, ballistic missiles, or sounding rocket launches 

for scientific research, suggesting a basic capability 

could exist to use ASAT technology against satellites 

at great distances and not just LEO.253,254

Orbital Threats

China is developing other sophisticated space-based 

capabilities, such as satellite inspection and repair. At 

least some of these capabilities could also function 

as a weapon. China has launched multiple satellites 

to conduct scientific experiments on space maintenance technologies and is conducting research 

on space debris cleanup; the most recent launch 

was the Shijian-21 launched into GEO in October 

2021.255,256,257 In January 2022, Shijian-21 moved a 

derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a high graveyard orbit above GEO.258 The Shijian-17 is a Chinese 

satellite with a robotic arm. Space-based robotic arm 

technology could be used in a future system for grappling other satellites.259

Since at least 2006, the government-affiliated academic community in China began investigating 

aerospace engineering aspects associated with 

space-based kinetic weapons—generally a class of 

weapon used to attack ground, sea, or air targets 

from orbit. Space-based kinetic weapons research 

included methods of reentry, separation of payload, delivery vehicles, and transfer orbits for targeting purposes.260,261,262,263,264,265 China conducted 

the first fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with 

a hypersonic glide vehicle from China on 27 July 

2021. This demonstrated the greatest distance 

flown (~40,000 kilometers) and longest flight time 

(~100+ minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapons system to date.266

The 15 September 2020 LM-11 launch from the

Yellow Sea carrying nine satellites including the Jilin-1 

Gaofen 03-1.

Image Source: Xinhua via AFP

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 18
Image Source: Sputnik via AFP

Russian Space Agency ROSCOSMOS launch of a Soyuz-2.1b from Vostochnyy Cosmodrome. Vostochnyy is 

Russia's newest space launch facility, located in the Russian Far East. It is partially operational with construction still ongoing and once complete, this location will reduce Russia's reliance on the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan to access orbits which are unreachable from its more northerly main space launch 

center, Plesetsk.

19
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Russia views its space program as a longstanding 

example of its leadership on the international 

stage. Russia is a pioneer of space dating back to 

the former Soviet Union launching the first satellite, 

Sputnik-1, in 1957 and placing the first person into 

Earth orbit, Yuri Gagarin, in 1961. The International 

In the new, 21st century, Russia must maintain its status as a leading nuclear and space power because 

the space industry is directly linked with defence [sp] and I would like to remind you of this. Today, we will 

discuss issues related to long-term priorities of space exploration and will analyse [sp] what we must do to 

strengthen our positions in this truly strategic area.

—Russian President Vladimir Putin, 12 April 2021269

Slowly but surely, we are heading toward [militarization of space]. Roscosmos has no illusions 

about this. Everyone is working on it.

—Dimtry Rogozin, Chief,

Russian State Corporation Roscosmos270

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

General Colonel Aleksandr Golovko, the first and current Commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces, is seen here 

at the launch of a Global Navigation Satellite System-M (GLONASS M) satellite in November 2018.267,268

RUSSIA

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 20
Space Station’s (ISS) reliance on Russian launch 

vehicles to carry astronauts to and from the station 

from 2011 to 2020 reinforced the perception of 

Moscow as a global leader in space, which garnered 

Russia a measure of prestige and economic support 

for its space program.271

Russia’s space program is robust but more narrowly 

focused than China’s. Additionaly, Moscow’s budget is 

more limited than Beijing’s because of competing priorities within Russia’s broader military modernization 

efforts.272 In the years following the end of the Cold 

War, a combination of economic constraints and technological setbacks caused a decay of Russian space 

capabilities, including space-based remote sensing 

and satellite navigation.273 Nonetheless, during the 

past two decades, Moscow has continued to pursue 

space services in support of terrestrial applications 

while developing a suite of counterspace weapon 

capabilities, including EW to deny, degrade, and disrupt communications and PNT and DEWs to deny the 

use of space-based imagery.274,275 Russia is developing 

a mobile missile that is able to destroy satellites and 

crewed space vehicles.276,277,278,279

Space Strategy and Doctrine

Russia openly supports space arms control agreements to prevent weaponization of space, even as 

Russian military doctrine and authoritative writings 

clearly articulate that Russia views space as a warfighting domain and that achieving supremacy in 

space will be a decisive factor in winning future conflicts.280,281,282,283,284 Russian military thinkers believe 

the importance of space will continue to expand 

because of the growing role of precision weapons 

and satellite-supported information networks in all 

types of conflict.285,286 Moscow regularly expresses 

concern about space weapons and is pursuing legal, 

binding space arms control agreements to curb what 

it sees as U.S. strength in outer space.287,288,289 At the 

same time, Russia is developing an arsenal of counterspace capabilities to attack U.S. and allied assets. 

290,291,292,293,294,295,296,297,298,299,300,301,302,303,304,305,306

As Russia continues to modernize its military, it will 

increasingly integrate space services into its armed 

forces. Russia has a strong foundation of technical 

knowledge and expertise fostered by more than 60 

years of experience in space. However, Moscow sees 

overreliance on space as a potential vulnerability and 

is determined to avoid becoming excessively dependent on space to conduct its national defense mission.307,308,309,310 Russia has developed terrestrial redundancies to complement or replace space services that 

may be denied in a wartime environment.311

Russia views space as a critical enabler of U.S. precision-strike and military force projection capabilities. 

Russia believes that U.S. missile defense systems 

paired with U.S. space-enabled, conventional precision-strike capabilities undermine strategic stability.312,313 At the same time, Russia perceives the U.S. 

dependence on space as its Achilles’ heel, which 

can be exploited to achieve Russian conflict objectives.314 Russia is therefore pursuing counterspace 

systems to neutralize or deny U.S. space-based services, both military and commercial, as a means of 

offsetting a perceived U.S. military advantage.315,316

The Nedelin-class missile range instrumentation ship 

(AGM) Marshal Krylov, subordinate to Russia’s Pacific 

Fleet. AGM Marshal Krylov supports space and missile 

instrumentation tracking and range support missions.

Image Source: U.S. National Archives

21
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Russian counterspace doctrine involves employing 

ground-, air-, cyber-, and space-based systems to target an adversary’s satellites with attacks ranging from 

temporary jamming or sensor blinding to destruction of enemy spacecraft and supporting infrastructure.317,318,319,320 Moscow believes that developing and 

fielding counterspace capabilities will deter aggression from adversaries reliant on space.321 If deterrence fails, Russia believes its counterspace forces 

will offer its military leaders the ability to control 

escalation of a conflict through selective targeting of 

adversary space systems.322,323

Space and Counterspace

Organizations

In 2015, Russia created the Aerospace Forces 

by merging the former Air Force and Aerospace 

Defense Troops. This new force includes the Space 

Forces, Russia’s military element that conducts 

space launches and operates the BMEW, the satellite control network, and the space surveillance 

network.324,325,326 Russia’s defense minister stated 

that the change was “prompted by a shift in the 

center of gravity toward the aerospace sphere” 

and as a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike 

doctrine.327,328 To accomplish space and counterspace operational tasks, Russia’s Space Forces 

were organized into the 15th Special Purpose Aerospace Army, which consists of the 820th Main Missile Attack Warning Center, the 821st Main Space 

Reconnaissance Center, and the 153rd Titov Main 

Test and Space Systems Control Center.329,330,331,332,333 

The Space Forces also operate the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, where they launch military satellites, 

and the Mozhayskiy Military Space Academy, where 

they train officers and enlisted personnel in strategic and operational military operations theory and 

aerospace engineering specialties.334,335,336

The reorganization of Russia’s civilian space program 

was designed to improve upon inefficiencies across 

the sector and readjust from the loss of control 

over former Soviet space production enterprises in 

Ukraine. Today the Russian space industry is almost 

exclusively state owned.337 The state-owned corporation Roscosmos is the executive body responsible for overall management of the space industry 

and for carrying out Russia’s civilian space program. 

The space industry primarily comprises 75 design 

bureaus, enterprises, and companies that carry out 

research, engineering development, and production 

of Russia’s space technologies, satellites, and SLVs 

for both civilian and military purposes.338,339

During the past few years, Russia has faced several 

obstacles to its space program. Corruption has been 

prevalent and has stalled developments,340 budget 

cuts and sanctions have delayed projects,341,342,343 

and negligible private space investment has stymied 

growth and innovation.344

Acquisition of Foreign

Space and Counterspace

Technologies

Moscow directs a whole-of-government approach to 

select and acquire foreign space and counterspace 

technologies in support of Russia’s economic and 

military goals. Following the imposition of sanctions 

by the United States, western Europe, Australia, and 

Japan in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of the 

Crimean Peninsula, Moscow has exploited multiple 

collection paths to mitigate U.S. and European Union 

(EU) restrictions on Russia’s access to space technology, information, and expertise, but sanctions 

are still affecting space systems production.345,346

Russia relies on acquisition of Western components 

because of the decline of its domestic microelectronics industry and because of its inability to realize its 

import substitution program goals.347,348,349,350,351,352,353

ISR Satellite Capabilities

Russia designs and employs some of the world’s most 

capable individual ISR satellites, despite funding shortfalls and technological setbacks limiting the number 

of such systems in orbit. The fleet contains more than 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 22
30 satellites providing electro-optical imagery, a new 

radar observation platform, missile warning, and electronic and signals intelligence.354,355,356 At least half of 

these systems are owned and operated by the Russian Defense Ministry. Space-based sensors provide 

Russia strategic warning of ballistic missile launches, 

support targeting of Russian antiship cruise missiles,357 and support electro-optical imagery requirements for Russian military operations in Syria.358,359

Setbacks have hindered Russia’s ability to launch and 

maintain its military-dedicated ISR satellites, leading to 

increased use of its civilian and commercial satellites 

to fulfill military tasks.360

Satellite Communications

Russia owns and operates a diverse constellation 

of commercial and military communications satellites capable of providing mobile and fixed SATCOM services from various orbital altitudes. In 

spite of lagging behind other competitors, and the 

instituting of Western sanctions in 2014, Russia 

continues to replace aging communications satellites with modern and more capable satellites 

to preserve and expand its SATCOM capabilities, 

including through partnerships with European 

satellite manufacturers.361,362 The satellites are 

able to support worldwide military and paramilitary deployments, enabling Moscow to maintain 

C2 over its military units to support its national 

objectives.363,364,365,366,367,368

PNT Capabilities

GLONASS provides Russia worldwide satellite navigation services and supports Russia’s economic 

development and national security interests.369 Following the GLONASS constellation’s deterioration in 

the late 1990s, Russia committed to reconstituting 

GLONASS during the 2000s.370 Full operating capability was regained in 2011; Russia now launches satellites as needed to maintain the constellation while 

developing next-generation GLONASS satellites.371 

Russia’s military also uses GLONASS to enable military system deployments, force movement, and precision-guided munitions delivery.372,373,374

Human Spaceflight and

Space Exploration Efforts

Russia’s human spaceflight program started in the 

late 1950s and had its first major milestone with the 

launch of Yuri Gagarin aboard the Vostok-1 spacecraft in 1961.375 Since that historic launch, the former 

Soviet Union and then Russia has launched the Salyut, 

Almaz, and Mir Space Stations, multiple elements of 

the ISS, and several Mars exploration missions; however, only two Mars missions were successful—the 

last in 1971.376 Although Russia has talked about withdrawing from the ISS as late as April 2021, it is committed to the effort through at least 2025.377

Russia’s Luch relay satellites allow Moscow to communicate between the ISS and Earth without reliance on National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) and U.S. SATCOM systems.378 Since 

the manned launch of SpaceX’s Crew Dragon to the 

ISS in May 2020, Russia has offered to sell Soyuz 

seats to other international partners, such as the 

United Arab Emirates, to make up revenue from 

losing U.S. astronaut transportation requirements 

to the ISS.379,380

Like other spacefaring nations, Russia has ambitious plans for lunar exploration and settlement 

Russia's Luch 5A relay satellite in the Space Pavilion at 

the Cosmonautics and Aviation Center at the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy.

Image Source: Sputnik via AFP

23
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Russia: Space Exploration Missions381,382,383

Mission Description Launch Date

Nauka Russian ISS science module.384,385 July 2021386

Luna-25 Joint lunar lander project with ESA.387 2022388

Prichal Russian ISS docking module.389 2021

ExoMars Joint Mars lander with ESA.390,391 TBD

Luna-Grunt Lunar lander and sample return.392 2024

Luna-27

First mission to explore the lunar south pole, where 

frozen water lies under the surface and where Russia 

intends to build a base.393

2025394

Luna-26 Lunar orbital mapping mission.395 2024

Luna-28 Lunar sample return mission.396 2027–2028

Luna-29 Lunar rover mission.397 2028

Expedition-M Phobos sample return mission.398 2026–2035

International 

Lunar Research 

Station

Establish a research base on the Moon, primarily supported by robotic technology and capable of supporting 

human visits.399

2025–2035

during the next 40 years.401 Russia has discussed 

partnering with China, the EU, and the United States 

to achieve its lunar aspirations.402 China and Russia 

signed a memorandum of understanding in March 

2021 to work together on the International Lunar 

Research Station (ILRS).403,404

Space Launch Capabilities

Russia is updating and improving its space launch 

capabilities to enhance reliability, alleviate environmental concerns, increase manufacturing efficiencies, and support future human spaceflight and 

Russian Aerospace Forces monitor GLONASS satellites at the Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control 

Center in Krasnoznamensk outside Moscow.400

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 24
Russian Space Launch Vehicles

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Meters

Angara-1.2

Soyuz-2.1A

Soyuz-2.1B

Soyuz-2.1V

Soyuz-5

Angara-A5

Proton-M

Energia-5

Medium-Lift

2–20 metric tons

Heavy-Lift

20–50 metric tons

Super Heavy-Lift

>50 metric tons 

 tons

 2–20 tons

0–50 tons

y Lift >50 tons

Russia has focused on maintaining its own military and civil strategies, using heavier rockets into LEO. Russia’s 

heavy-lift vehicles are mostly used for launching into GEO or HEO. The developmental Energia SLV, designed to 

boost the Russian space shuttle into orbit, was discontinued in the 1980s. However, it was revived in 2016 to support proposed lunar missions and renamed "Yensei."

2008-26366

Russian Space Agency ROSCOMOS launches Progress MS-14 on Soyuz-2.1a from Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan.

Image Source: Sputnik via AFP

25
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Russian Space Launch, SSA, Satellite Control Centers, and Command and

Control Stations405,406,407,408,409,410,411,412,413,414,415,416,417,418,419,420,421,422,423,424,425,426,427,428,429,430,431,432,433

Russia owns two of its launch sites and leases one from Kazakhstan. The European Space Agency has contracted Russia to conduct launches from Kourou, French Guiana. Inactive spaceports include Kapustin Yar and 

Svobodny Spaceports. Russia’s space control sites are spread across Russia to enable effective satellite C2. 

GLONASS TT&C stations are similarly spread across Russia to ensure timely control of the navigation constellation. Moscow has spread nine radars at eight locations of various types across its landmass to enable a dual-role 

BMEW and SSA mission.

2108-29556

deep-space exploration missions.434,435

Russia’s updates to its medium- and heavy-lift 

launch fleets include modular SLVs, which allow 

Russia to tailor SLVs to the specific configuration 

required for each customer. Unlike China, Russia has not focused on new light-lift SLV designs, 

instead usually choosing to launch small satellites in multipayload launches on larger rockets. 

Russia is also in the early stages of developing a 

super heavy-lift SLV similar to the U.S. Saturn V or 

the newer U.S. Space Launch System to support 

proposed crewed lunar and Mars exploration missions.436 In 2019, Moscow retired the Soyuz-FG and 

Rokot, and it has since focused on newer SLVs with 

similar capabilities.437,438

Russia’s commercial launch industry acquired the 

launch systems of a previously Russia-Ukraine-U.S. 

consortium called Sea Launch. This capability features a mobile floating platform for space launches;

however, this effort is plagued by financial hardshi

and is on hold.439

A ban on U.S. purchases of Russian rocket engines is 

currently set to take effect in 2022, but Russian enterprises probably began to see negative consequences

beginning in 2020, as the U.S. demand for these 

engines decreased. In 2018, 17 of the 19 total engines 

on order were destined for the United States. Roscosmos has offered to cut prices by 30 percent.440

Space Situational Awareness

Russia’s space surveillance network, managed by 

the 821st Main Space Reconnaissance Center, is 

composed of a variety of telescopes, radars, and 

other sensors, and is capable of searching for, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. 

This network allows Russia to support its various 

missions including intelligence collection, counterDEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 26
space targeting, spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris monitoring. Some 

of these sensors also perform a BMEW function as 

their primary mission.444

Electronic Warfare Capabilities

The Russian military views EW as an essential tool 

for gaining and maintaining information superiority over its adversaries, allowing Russia to seize the 

operational initiative by disrupting adversary C4ISR 

capabilities. Russia has fielded a wide range of 

ground-based EW systems to counter GPS, tactical 

communications, SATCOM, and radars.446 Mobile 

jammers target radar and communications satellites. Russia has developed and fielded a full spectrum of EW capabilities with mobility, automation, 

and performance improvements able to counter 

Western space-enabled C4ISR and weapons guidance systems.447,448,449

In February 2020, Russian military officials confirmed that Russia is actively employing EW capabilities in Syria to counter GPS-enabled capabilities 

such as drones.450,451,452

Cyberthreats

Since at least 2010, the Russian military has placed 

a priority on the development of forces and capabilities, including cyberspace operations, for what it 

Russian International SSA Collaboration

Russia leads the nongovernmental organization International Scientific 

Optical Network (ISON), which is the largest foreign network of groundbased optical space surveillance sensors. ISON was established in 2001, 

and participants include international academic and scientific organizations 

and government entities such as Roscosmos. Russia’s Keldysh Institute of 

Applied Mathematics coordinates sensor tasking and combines information 

from nearly 100 ground-based optical sensors of varying sizes at 40 observatories across 16 countries—Australia, Bolivia, China, Georgia, Germany, 

Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia (seven locations) Spain, 

Switzerland, Ukraine (4 locations), the United States, and Uzbekistan.441,442,443

Russia has invested heavily in developing sophisticated 

EW capabilities, including this Krashuka-4 jammer.

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

Deployed SATCOM jammer in the field.445

Image Source: NASA Spaceflight Online Forum

27
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

a The name Burevestnik is also associated with a Russian developmental nuclear-powered cruise missile. [Source: National Air and Space 

Intelligence Center; 2020; 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Report; p.36.]

Russian Peresvet laser weapon probably is 

intended for use against satellites (July 2018).

Image Source: SPUTNIK/AFP

terms “information confrontation”—a holistic concept for ensuring information superiority. The weaponization of information is a critical aspect of this 

strategy and is employed in times of peace, crisis, 

and war. Russia considers the information sphere, 

especially space-enabled information collection and 

transmission, to be strategically decisive and has 

taken steps to modernize its military’s information 

attack and defense organizations and capabilities.453

Directed Energy Weapons

Directed energy weapons pose a direct threat to 

space operations. Russia has several ground-based 

lasers, for example, that can blind satellite sensors.454

By July 2018, Russia began delivering the Peresvet 

laser weapon system to its Aerospace Forces. Russian 

leaders indicate that Peresvet has an ASAT mission. In 

public statements, Russian President Vladimir Putin 

called it a “new type of strategic weapon,” and the 

Russian Defense Ministry asserted that it is capable 

of “fighting satellites in orbit.”455,456,457,458 In December 

2019, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated 

that this laser weapon has been deployed to five strategic missile divisions.459,460,461 Additional press reporting indicates that the ground-mobile Peresvet laser 

system is designed to blind enemy optical tracking systems, including those on satellites, with its laser.462,463

The system is meant to mask the movement of strategic missile systems, according to Moscow Interfax.464

Russia probably will field lasers that are more capable 

of damaging satellites in the mid-to-late 2020s.465 By 

2030, Russia may also field higher power systems that 

extend the threat to the structures of all satellites, not 

just electro-optical ISR.466

ASAT Missile Threats

Russia is also developing ASAT missile systems. These 

missiles can destroy U.S. and allied space systems in 

LEO, threatening ISR and communications satellites. 

Russia is developing and testing a mobile missile 

defense complex referred to as Nudol, which Russian 

sources describe as capable of destroying ballistic 

missiles and low-orbiting satellites.467,468,469,470,471,472

Although Russia publicly describes Nudol as a ballistic missile defense system, it has an inherent counterspace capability. Deputy Prime Minister, then Deputy 

Defense Minister, Yuri Borisov remarked in 2018 that 

Nudol is a “counterspace attack complex” for the Russian military.473 This weapon system—most recentlytested in November 2021—created over 1,500 pieces 

of trackable space debris and tens of thousands of 

pieces of lethal but nontrackable debris. This debris 

endangers spacecraft of all nations in LEO, including 

astronauts and cosmonauts on the ISS and China's 

Tiangong space station. With this test, Russia demonstrated the capability of the missile to destroy satellites in LEO.474,475

MiG-31BM taking off from Zhukovskiy with potential 

Burevestnik ASAT missile.

Image Source: The Space Review (Alex Snow)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 28
Russia is reportedly developing an air launched ASAT 

weapon called Burevestnika, targeting spacecraft in 

LEO. This system is based on the Soviet-era system 

called “Contact” that was designed for launching an 

ASAT missile from a MiG-31 fighter aircraft.476,477 In 

September 2018, a MiG-31 was photographed in flight 

at the Zhukovskiy aircraft test site near Moscow carrying a large missile that could be related to air-launched 

ASAT weapon testing.478 An Aerospace Forces squadron commander remarked that Russia would deploy 

an ASAT weapon on a MiG-31 ballistic missile “capable 

of destroying targets in near-space.”479

Orbital Threats

In 2020, Russia tested a space-based ASAT weapon 

and continues to research and develop sophisticated orbital capabilities that could serve dual-use 

purposes. For example, inspection and servicing 

satellites can closely approach satellites to inspect 

and repair malfunctions; this same technology

could also be used to conduct an attack on other 

countries’ satellites, resulting in temporary or

permanent damage.480

In 2017, Russia deployed what it described as 

an “inspector satellite capable of diagnosing the 

technical condition of a Russian satellite from the 

closest possible distance,” possibly as part of its 

Nivelir program. However, the satellite’s behavior has been inconsistent with on-orbit inspection or SSA activities.481,482,483 In November 2019, 

Russia deployed two satellites, Cosmos 2542 

and 2543.484,485 After the launch, one of the satellites appeared to begin following a U.S. national 

security satellite, approaching close enough to 

create potentially dangerous operating conditions.486,487,488 In July 2020, Russia ejected an 

object into orbit from Cosmos 2543 near another 

Russian satellite in a test of a space-based ASAT 

weapon.489,490 Additionally, Cosmos 2504 and Cosmos 2536 are prototype Russian ASAT weapons 

that could kinetically kill satellites in LEO.491

According to Russian press reporting, Roscosmos 

is creating a satellite intended for GEO operations, 

which will have orbital servicing capabilities. The 

same report also recognizes the ASAT capabilities 

of servicing satellites in all orbits.492

29
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Iran

Iran’s pursuit of a national space program supports both its civilian and military goals, including

boosting national pride, economic development, and 

military modernization.494,495,496 Tehran states it has 

developed sophisticated capabilities, including SLVs 

as well as communications and remote-sensing satellites;497 however, its SLVs are only able to launch 

small satellites into LEO and have proven unreliable.

The Iranian Space Agency (ISA) and Iranian Space 

Research Center (ISRC)—subordinate to the Ministry 

of Information and Communications Technology—

along with the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces 

Logistics (MODAFL) oversee part of the country’s satellite development programs.498,499 ISA and ISRC work 

with Iranian universities, private industry, and foreign 

partners to develop satellites to test communications 

and remote-sensing technologies.500,501,502 However, 

Iran’s limited space launch capacity has led to a significant backlog of built-but-unlaunched satellites.503

To ensure access to space-based ISR, Iran’s Project 

505 is probably an attempt to buy an ISR system 

from Russia that started in August 2015; however, 

this system is not yet in orbit.504,505 A Russian aerospace company, NPK Barl, and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Electromechanics would 

provide the ground system and the satellite respectively which would be operated by the Iranian staterun trade company, Bonyan Danesh Shargh.506,507

MODAFL and the IRGC-ASF oversee Iran’s SLV development programs. MODAFL’s first launch attempt, 

the two-stage Safir SLV in 2008,508 was followed by 

four successful launches, numerous failures, and 

retirement in 2020.509,510

In 2016, MODAFL tested the larger liquid-fueled Simorgh SLV, and as of March 2020, 

MODAFL planned to use the Simorgh’s technologies to develop other larger more capaOn 22 April 2020, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps-Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) successfully 

launched the Ghased SLV, placing the Noor-1 satellite 

into LEO.493

Image Source: IRNA

CHALLENGES

EMERGING

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 30
ble SLVs, including the Sarir and Soroush.511

Iran conducted launches of the IRGC-ASF–developed hybrid liquid- and solid-fueled Ghased SLV 

in 2020 and 2022.512 The IRGC-ASF subsequently 

announced its intent to continue SLV development, 

including a future SLV with GEO launch capability.513,514,515,516,517,518,519 Iran has also revealed plans 

for a larger four-stage Ghaem SLV, which could 

serve as a test bed for developing ICBM technologies. Because of inherent overlapping technology 

between ICBMs and SLVs, some Western analysts 

are concerned that Iran’s development of booster 

technology for larger, more capable SLVs will 

improve Iran’s ICBM potential.520,521,522,523 On 12 June 

2021, Iran launched an unknown SLV and was preparing a second SLV for launch in late-June.524

Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and 

counterspace capabilities and will attempt to deny 

an adversary use of space during a conflict.525 Tehran 

has publicly acknowledged it has developed capabilities to jam space-based communications and GPS 

signals.526,527,528 Iran may also contribute to the proliferation of such jamming equipment. Since 2010, 

state-owned Iran Electronics Industries has marketed 

several GPS jammers on its website.529 Advancements in SLV technology could also be applied to 

developing a basic ground-based ASAT missile, if Iran 

chooses to do so in the future.530,531,532,533

Iran has improved its domestic space domain 

awareness capabilities, establishing its first 

space-monitoring center in 2013.534 In 2005, Iran 

joined China-led APSCO to access SSA from other 

countries and hopes to expand its cooperation 

with the organization.535,536,537,538

North Korea

North Korea’s space program is administered by a 

state-run civilian agency, the National Aerospace 

Development Administration.539 North Korea’s 

space launch complex on the west coast, Sohae 

Satellite Launching Station, and associated space 

tracking facilities in Pyongyang supported satellite 

launch cycles in 2012 and 2016. In January 2021, 

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un announced that 

Pyongyang—in an attempt to secure its own spacebased reconnaissance capability—had completed 

its design of a satellite and will launch it in the near 

future. Kim Jong Un emphasized that North Korea 

is undertaking, “full scale work,” toward space capabilities, suggesting development of new or modified SLVs or a satellite intended for operational 

use.541,542 An older space launch site on the east 

coast, Tonghae, has not been used for a launch 

since 2009.543,544 North Korea has demonstrated 

Launch of Unha-3 SLV.540

Image Source: KCTV

31
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

nonkinetic counterspace capabilities, including GPS 

and SATCOM jamming, and probably intends to 

deny space-based navigation and communications 

during a conflict.545,546,547

In 2020, North Korean actors conducted numerous cyberoperations against our foreign partners’ defense industries and attempted to compromise various U.S. Government networks.548

Multiple North Korean hacker groups have 

targeted the aerospace industries potentially 

including space technologies.549,550,551 This activity, if left unchecked, could enable North Korea’s 

weapons and space system development and

procurement programs.552,553,554,555,556

North Korea’s ballistic missiles and SLVs, such 

as the Unha-3 SLV, in theory could be used to 

target satellites in a conflict.557 North Korea has 

placed two satellites in orbit and has articulated further space ambitions. Its space program 

has also enabled testing of technology used 

in ballistic missiles under the guise of peaceful use of space.558,559,560 These systems provided 

North Korea with valuable data applicable to 

the development of long-range and multistage

ballistic missiles.561

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 32
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

KEY SPACE ISSUES

THROUGH 2030 AND BEYOND

Growth of Reusable 

Space Technology: 

Commercial

Opportunities and 

Military Advantage

Access to space has traditionally required the use 

of expendable spacecraft: single-use launch vehicles, satellites, and capsules that are designed to 

maximize performance and then be discarded. 

Reliance on expendable vehicles has made access 

to space expensive and exclusive. Reusable technologies, while even more difficult and expensive 

to develop and build, stand to greatly reduce the 

cost of spaceflight by recovering, refurbishing, 

and reusing rocket stages, fairings, and capsules. 

Foreign nations increasingly seek to repeat U.S. 

successes in reusable technologies by developing 

their own reusable SLVs (R-SLVs) and spacecraft.

The state-owned enterprise, China Academy of 

Launch Vehicle Technology, modified the LM-8—

launched for the first time on 22 December 2020—

into an R-SLV.562 The Chinese company, i-Space, 

plans to launch the country’s first commercially 

developed R-SLV, called Hyperbola-2, in late-2021, 

but a Hyperbola-1 failure probably delayed that 

launch.563,564 China is also developing two partially 

reusable capsules: the New-Generation Manned 

Spaceship intended to replace the Shenzhou capsule, and the New-Generation Reusable Recoverable Satellite as an inexpensive platform for 

microgravity experiments and rapid space equipment testing.565,566

In 2019, the chief designer for NPO Energomash, one 

of Russia’s rocket propulsion companies, said that 

the company is moving forward with a proposal to 

create an R-SLV.567 NPO Energomash has also stated 

that it hopes to modify its successful RD-180 engine 

to be reusable as many as 10 times.568 Another Russian space corporation, Myasishchev, is designing an 

R-SLV first-stage that will return to its launch center 

after second stage separation.569

Space planes are another form of reusable technology. Space planes also feature enhanced maneuverability, making them uniquely suitable for certain 

missions as compared with traditional satellites. 

Developing a space plane requires overcoming the 

obstacles of hypersonic flight, a rarified atmospheric 

environment, and extreme external heating. China 

has developed hypersonic glide vehicles for ballistic missile warhead delivery probably enabling further achievements in space application.570 China 

is developing the Shenlong and Tengyun space 

planes. In 2020, China launched into orbit its firstever prototype of a space plane, which stayed in 

orbit for 2 days before returning to Earth. Beijing stated its space plane was testing reusable 

spacecraft technologies as part of advancing the 

peaceful use of space.571,572 The Shenlong program previously conducted a drop test as early as 

2011, and Tengyun has only completed a model 

wind tunnel test.573,574 Russia announced multiple 

space plane projects during the past two decades, 

but it has made no serious progress following the

one and only flight of Buran, a copy of the U.S. Space 

Shuttle, in 1988.575,576,577,578

Reusable spaceflight technology will also enable the 

commercial space tourism industry, both for suborbital and orbital flight. The cost savings provided by 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 34
Cislunar Chart

DRO

LLO

NRHO

Y X

L Halo

L

Moon

L

DRO - Distant Retrograde Orbit

LLO - Low Lunar Orbit

NHRO - Near-Rectilinear Halo Orbit

L - Lagrange Point 1

L - Lagrange Point 2

To Earth

Most satellites operate in orbits near Earth to provide services for users on the ground. Satellite orbits are 

selected to best serve their application, for example, satellites that are required to remain over a single region 

on Earth are placed in GEO. Satellites will be placed in various cislunar orbits in the near future. In addition 

to direct orbits around the Moon, there are other points in the Earth-Moon system that are useful for satellite operations. Lagrange points are stable positions in space between two celestial bodies. Gravitational 

pull equals the centripetal force required for a smaller object to orbit there, and subsequently reduces fuel 

requirements to remain in these positions. L1 and L2—between the Moon and Earth and the far side of the 

Moon respectively—are depicted here. There are three other Lagrange points associated with the Earth-Moon 

system, L3-L5.579

2008-26359

reusable technology will be key for lowering ticket 

prices and widening the market. British, Japanese, 

and Russian firms are among those developing 

tourist spacecraft.580,581

Human Spaceflight and 

Cislunar Operations

Human spaceflight and space operations of most 

types to and beyond the moon will very likely 

increase in the future. Threats to U.S. and allied 

military space capabilities will persist as humanity 

expands its reach into space. Nations are motivated 

to pursue new scientific missions, compete for military advantage, expand communications and data 

processing, and obtain greater national and international prestige. Economic competition to exploit 

the potentially large amount of natural resources on 

the Moon, Mars, or even asteroids, while a nascent 

endeavor today, will become a driver for more 

space-capable states or consortiums in the future. 

35
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

A China National Space Agency graphic depicting the Proposed Chinese-Russian International Lunar Research 

Station. The individual elements are 1 lunar surface tracking & command station; 2 survey module; 3 mobile 

survey module; 4 leaping module; 5 lunar orbit module; 6 test platform; 7 Russia’s Luna-27; 8 relay module;

9 assembly robot; and reconnaissance robot.

 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

10

Image Source: China National Space Administration (CNSA)

New Competition for Space Beyond Earth's Orbit

Deep-space operations beyond Earth orbit, sometimes called xGEO,587 are focused on scientific missions and exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies. Spacecraft in xGEO are much harder to 

track and characterize, and could threaten U.S. or allied high-value satellites.588 Adversaries could also 

place operational or reserve satellites in deep space so they are much harder to monitor for later use 

in lower orbits.589

Space exploration initiatives are also opportunities 

for many nations to cooperate and benefit from 

scientific discoveries and technological innovation. 

This trend will expand and feed the presence of 

nations beyond Earth orbit on a level greater than 

that already demonstrated by the operation of 

interplanetary probes to date.

During the past two decades, foreign competitors 

have looked to lunar missions as major demonstrations of technological sophistication and national 

strength. Other nations have been involved in 

human spaceflight—more than 40 nations have 

orbited astronauts with Russian or U.S. human 

spaceflight missions.582,583 Many nations have contributed to the scientific knowledge of Earth with 

deep-space probes and missions to the Moon and 

Mars.584,585,586

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 36
Challenge to Space 

Operations: Debris 

and Orbital Collisions

The probability of collision between massive derelict objects in LEO is rising and almost certainly will 

continue to rise until at least 2030 as a result of fragmentation events such as collisions or battery explosions, ASAT testing, and a rapidly increasing number of space launches worldwide.590,591,592,593,594,595 

The collision risk is to all civilian, commercial, and 

government satellites of all nations. This adds to the 

difficulty of ensuring safe space operations and the 

overall stability of the space environment.

Debris in Orbit. Collisions between and explosions 

of massive derelict objects almost certainly will continue to add to the amount of space debris in orbit. 

As of January 2022, more than 25,000 objects of at 

least 10 centimeters in size were tracked and cataloged in Earth’s orbit to include active satellites.596,597

The primary risk to spacecraft in orbit is from uncataloged lethal nontrackable debris (LNT), which are 

objects between 5 millimeters and 10 centimeters 

in size. An estimated 600,000 to 900,000 pieces of 

uncataloged LNT are in LEO.598

Prior to 2007, most debris came from explosions 

of upper stages of SLVs. Today, nearly one-half 

of all cataloged debris are fragments from three 

major events: China’s destruction of its own defunct 

weather satellite in 2007, the accidental collision 

between a U.S. communications satellite and a dead 

Russian satellite in 2009, and the 2021 Russian Nudol 

ASAT test.599,600

Threats of Massive Object Collision. Of the cataloged 

objects, there are nearly 1,300 massive—greater than 

the size and weight of an automobile—derelict objects 

in LEO that pose a unique threat to LEO space operations. These objects approach each other within 5 

kilometers daily, some passing well within 1 kilometer 

monthly, at 10–15 kilometers per second.601

Computer rendering of tracked objects greater than 10 centimeters in Earth’s orbit. Red, yellow, and 

green objects are representations of active satellites in the GEO orbital belt and in MEO. [Note: The 

objects are not drawn to scale; the objects are approximately 10,000 times greater than actual size.]

37
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Massive Derelict Cluster Collision Probabilities

Cluster* In-Cluster 

PC** (Per Year)

In-Cluster 

PC Increase 

by 2030

No. of 

Likely 

Catalogued 

Fragments

LNT Likely 

Produced Comments

C615 ~1/280 5–7% ~5,500 ~80,000

Short-lived debris 

(years to decades). 

Near many satellites.

C775 ~1/715 2–3% ~4,500 ~70,000

Moderate-lived debris 

(decades).

Near many satellites.

C850 ~1/800 8–15% ~15,000 ~225,000 Long-lived debris 

(many decades).

Fewer satellites than 

C775 or C615. C975 ~1/120 16–26% ~3,500 ~55,000

C1,500 ~1/5,000 ~1% ~6,000 ~75,000

Very long-lived debris 

(many centuries).

Not near many satellites

* Cluster number represents orbital radius to the center of the cluster in kilometers, for example C850 is centered at 850

kilometers in altitude

** PC is probability of collision

A collision between these objects almost certainly 

would create 3,500–15,000 cataloged fragments 

and 55,000–225,000 LNT fragments, whereas a typical satellite breakup generally creates about 250 

pieces of cataloged debris.602 The annual probability 

of collision for massive derelict objects clustered at 

1,500 kilometers is 1 in 5,000 and for separate cluster objects at 850 kilometers in altitude is 1 in 800. 

Although the debris contribution for a collision at 850 

kilometers would nearly double the LEO catalog population (i.e., generate ~15,000 trackable fragments), 

the debris from a collision at 1,500 kilometers would 

remain in orbit potentially for thousands of years.

Threats Posed by Debris. Space debris can cause 

damage and destruction to satellites and crewed 

spacecraft, as well as increase costs if satellite manufacturers add additional shielding to withstand small 

fragment impacts and fuel to allow for more frequent 

avoidance maneuvers. The cost of any maneuvers 

increases fuel usage, adds to operational complexity and expense, and shortens spacecraft lifetimes 

which may require more space launches to maintain the same level of capability. Between 1998 and 

2022, the ISS, in LEO, maneuvered at least 30 times to 

avoid potential collisions with orbital debris.603 With 

an expected increase in large constellations of satellites and space debris, there is higher potential for 

satellite collisions, particularly in LEO.604

Orbital Lifetime of Debris. The time that debris 

remains in orbit depends largely on its size and altitude— the smaller objects are and the higher they 

orbit, the longer they remain in space. Fragments 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 38
from explosions and collisions will tend to be smaller 

and exist in lower orbits, and therefore, will have 

shorter orbital lifetimes than abandoned payloads 

and rocket bodies. Atmospheric drag acts as a natural cleaner by causing most debris at lower altitudes 

to reenter Earth’s atmosphere and burn up. Some 

intact objects at 500 kilometers can remain in orbit 

for about 10 years. As the altitude gets closer to 

1,500 kilometers, derelicts and debris can remain for 

more than 10,000 years.605

Orbital collisions tend to occur at high relative 

velocities (i.e., greater than 25,000 miles per hour 

in LEO and disperse fragments into many different 

orbital altitudes). A collision of two objects at 975 

kilometers—the most likely of the collision probabilities at about 1 in 120 chance per year—would 

leave many fragments in orbit for more than a 

thousand years.606

Postmission Disposal (PMD). In 1993, the United 

States set debris guidelines for space operators, 

which were adopted by many nations and the 

UN-affiliated Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee. In LEO, all objects were to be 

placed in orbits allowing for their eventual decay 

within 25 years of the end of mission. The usual 

PMD maneuver placed objects at or below 650 

kilometers.607 However, even if international and 

national guidelines were made legally binding, 

mitigation thresholds were made more stringent, 

or if compliance were even close to 100 percent; 

there would still be a formidable debris problem 

from the remnants of the first 63 years of space 

operations.608,609 While U.S. compliance is higher, 

current worldwide compliance with this guideline 

is well under 50 percent. The increase in the number of objects in orbit has implications for policymakers worldwide and is encouraging the development of space debris remediation technology.

39
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

The advantages space provides will drive some 

nations to improve their ability to access and operate in space. Additionally, some nations will pursue 

new and improved counterspace capabilities to target the perceived U.S. and allied reliance on spacebased assets.

Space services will continue to proliferate worldwide as technological and cost barriers fall and 

international partnerships for space support 

increase. State, non-state, and commercial actors 

will increasingly gain access to data and services 

emanating from space.610,611 The number of space 

launch companies and satellite service providers 

will expand at least through 2025. And with more 

groups—commercial, academic, and even private—

now able to reach orbit, the growth of satellites and 

debris in space is expected to increase. This growth 

of orbital objects will drive a need for more satellite 

tracking—commercial and government—to help 

distinguish threats from nonthreats, and to predict 

and prevent collisions which will prove to be an 

even greater task.612,613

China and Russia value superiority in space. As a 

result, they will seek ways to strengthen their space 

and counterspace programs, and determine ways to 

better integrate them into their respective militaries. 

Both nations are also seeking to broaden their space 

exploration initiatives—together and individually—

outside Earth’s orbit with plans to explore the Moon 

and Mars during the next 30 years. Lunar exploration by China and Russia aims to expand their scientific knowledge and prestige. If successful, it will likely 

lead to attempts by China and Russia to exploit the 

Moon's natural resources.

Iran and North Korea will focus on increasing their 

capabilities in the civil and military domains to 

counter space-based services such as communications and navigation.614 Both will maintain their ability to conduct EW against adversaries and theoretically could use their missile and SLV advancements 

to target orbiting satellites.

The combination of increasing counterspace capabilities—especially those of China and Russia—a general growth in numbers of space objects, and the 

proliferation of requirements for space-enabled services will make space an increasingly competitive and 

crowded environment for the foreseeable future.

As the number of spacefaring nations grows and 

space and counterspace capabilities become more 

integrated into military operations, the U.S space 

posture will be increasingly challenged and on orbit 

assets will face new risks.

Deep space operations will pose potential challenges 

to space assets due to the inherent difficulty in tracking and monitoring spacecraft at distances beyond 

GEO.615,616 Moreover, the growing incorporation of 

dual-use technology will continue as the development and testing of government and commercial 

satellite servicing spacecraft increases—some with 

potential counterspace capabilities.617

OUTLOOK

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 40
APPENDIX:

Space and Counterspace Concepts

Satellite C2 Architecture

Satellite C2 architecture uses TT&C to communicate 

with and control satellites. The control center uses 

an uplink to deliver commands to a spacecraft. The 

spacecraft sends data via a downlink to a ground 

station with the necessary antennas, transmitters, 

and receivers to receive the data. Some satellite 

constellations use relay satellites, which enable 

communication between satellites outside the 

reception area of a ground station.618 Any component 

of the architecture is vulnerable to attack, ranging 

from physical vulnerabilities of a ground site to 

EW disrupting the connection between the space 

segment and the operator.

Remote Sensing

Remote sensing—generally called ISR—satellites collect images, electronic emissions, and other data of 

the Earth’s land, sea, and atmosphere. Civilian and 

commercial applications are used for activities such 

as environmental monitoring, urban planning, and 

disaster response.

High demand for this data and falling costs for capable technology have spurred the rapid growth and 

proliferation of these satellites. A decade ago, foreign 

ISR satellites numbered nearly 100, and by January 

2022, that number reached more than 550. ISR satellites support a variety of military activities by providing signals intelligence, enabling battle damage 

assessments, and assisting military operations.619,620 

They have reduced the ability of all countries to perform sensitive military activities undetected.

Some countries’ militaries use space-based ISR. For 

example, militaries use space-based sensors to augment terrestrial platforms as part of their missile 

attack warning networks and can enable defensive 

or offensive operations in response. Space-based 

sensors usually provide the first indication of a missile launch, and ground-based radars provide follow-on information and confirm the attack.

Satellite Communications

Global communications networks rely on communications satellites for worldwide voice communications, television broadcasts, broadband Internet, 

mobile services, and data transfer for civilian, military, and commercial users worldwide. SATCOM 

systems are rapidly deployable, expandable, and 

increasingly affordable as the demand for services 

continues to rise globally.621

Today, most communications satellites operate in 

GEO more than 36,000 kilometers above the Earth. 

This distance provides wider coverage of the globe 

with fewer satellites; however, it is more expensive 

to place satellites in orbit at this distance. To reduce 

cost and gain new markets, SATCOM service providers have proposed future constellations with 

tens of thousands of satellites in low and medium 

altitude LEO.622 Better technology promises greater 

affordability, efficiency, and flexibility for civilian 

government, and military users worldwide.

Satellite Positioning,

Navigation, and Timing

Satellite navigation constellations provide PNT data 

that enable civilian, commercial, and military users 

to determine their precise location and local time.623

Satellite navigation services—with applications in 

navigation, munitions guidance, communications, 

agriculture, banking, and power supply—are critical 

41
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

to military and civilian users worldwide.624 Advances 

in satellite navigation technology offer foreign countries improved military situational awareness and 

accuracy in precision-guided munitions.625

The 1991 Gulf War and subsequent U.S. military 

operations illustrated the value of the U.S. GPS satellite navigation system for troop movement, force 

tracking, and precision munition delivery.626 This 

prompted other countries to develop their own satellite navigation systems. Today, satellite navigation 

constellations of China, Russia, the European Union 

and the United States offer global coverage, and 

Japan and India operate regional systems.627,628,629 The 

rise of foreign satellite navigation services reduces 

dependence on GPS and provides worldwide users 

multiple satellite navigation options.630,631,632

Space Launch Capabilities

Space launch is the ability to deliver payloads into 

space. SLVs place satellites in orbit to deploy, sustain, 

augment, or reconstitute constellations in support of 

military, civilian, or commercial customers.633

Many countries developed space launch capabilities to compete in the international market or to

advance national security strategies that require 

domestic access to space. Many commercial entities 

are attempting to enter the launch industry with the 

assistance of a state with established launch capabilities. Some commercial entities are independently 

developing space launch means.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 42
Space Situational Awareness

SPACE-BASED

RADIO

FREQUENCY

OPTICS

RADAR

LASER

2008-26371

Space situational awareness (SSA) is the detection 

and characterization of a space object, including its 

location, and the ability to track it, identify it, and predict its future location.634 Terrestrial and space-based 

sensors search the sky for foreign satellites and 

record their orbits, allowing for the prediction of their 

orbits and determination of the object’s function and 

operational status. This continuous process is the 

first in a sequence of steps that potential adversaries 

will use to target satellites, attack space assets with 

counterspace weapons, and assess the effectiveness 

of those attacks. Countries without advanced space 

tracking sensors can attain basic SSA by purchasing 

commercially available data.

Cyberthreats to Space Systems635

With sophisticated knowledge of satellite C2 and 

data distribution networks, actors can use offensive 

cyberspace capabilities to enable a range of reversible to nonreversible effects against space systems, associated ground infrastructure, users, and 

the links connecting them. Satellite command and 

data distribution networks expose space systems, 

ground infrastructure, users, and the links connecting these segments to cyber threats.

43
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Electronic Warfare636

TARGET COMSAT

UPLINK JAMMING

TRANSMITTER

JAMMER

RECEIVER

TRANSMITTER

EARTH STATION/

DOWNLINK SITE

TARGET COMSAT

DOWNLINK JAMMING

JAMMING SIGNAL

INTENDED COMMS SIGNAL

JAMMING COMBINED WITH THE 

INTENDED COMMS SIGNAL

MOBILE

JAMMER

DOWNLINK

JAMMER

2008-26372

Foreign competitors are able to conduct electronic 

attacks to disrupt, deny, deceive, or degrade space 

services. Electronic warfare includes using jamming 

and spoofing techniques to control the electromagnetic spectrum. Jamming prevents users from 

receiving intended signals and can be accomplished 

by two primary methods: uplink jamming and downlink jamming. Uplink jamming is directed toward the 

satellite and impairs services for all users in the satellite reception area. Downlink jamming has a localized 

effect because it is directed at ground users, such 

as a ground forces unit using satellite navigation 

to determine their location. Spoofing deceives the 

receiver by introducing a fake signal with erroneous 

information. EW can be challenging to attribute and 

distinguish from unintentional interference.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 44
DIRECTED ENERGY 

WEAPONS

HIGH-POWER

MICROWAVES

2011-27066

Directed energy weapons are designed to produce 

reversible or nonreversible effects against space 

systems to disrupt, damage, or destroy enemy 

equipment and facilities.637 Directed energy weapons systems include lasers, high-power microwave 

weapons, and other types of radiofrequency weapons. Reversible effects include temporarily blinding 

optical sensors to deny imagery of targeted military 

forces. Nonreversible effects include permanently 

damaging or destroying sensors or other satellite 

components, which causes the operators to lose 

data and time and face the burdens of replacement 

or reliance on lesser assets.

Directed-Energy Weapons

45
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Ground-Based ASAT Missiles

GROUND-BASED 

KINETIC ENERGY THREATS

2011-27066

Antisatellite missiles are designed to destroy satellites without placing the weapon system or any 

of its components into orbit. These systems typically consist of a fixed- or mobile-launch system, 

a missile, and a kinetic kill vehicle. These weapons could also be launched from aircraft or ships 

at sea. Once released, the kinetic kill vehicle uses 

an onboard seeker to intercept the target satellite. 

Ground-based ASAT missile attacks are more easily attributed than other counterspace weapons 

because launches are detectable, and their effects 

can create orbital debris.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 46
LASERS

HIGH-POWER

CHEMICAL MICROWAVES

SPRAYERS

RADIOFREQUENCY

JAMMERS

KINETIC KILL

VEHICLES

ROBOTIC

MECHANISMS

2008-26374

Orbital or space-based weapons are satellites that 

can attack other spacecraft, delivering temporary 

or permanent damage. These systems can include 

radiofrequency jammers, kinetic kill vehicles, lasers, 

robotic mechanisms, chemical sprayers, and highpower microwaves. Some of these systems—such as 

robotic technology for satellite servicing and repair 

or space debris removal—have peaceful uses but 

can also be used in ASAT operations.

Space-based Weapons

47
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Glossary of Acronyms

AGM missile range instrumentation ship ISS International Space Station

APOSOS Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space

Object Observation System KZ Kuaizhou

APSCO Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization LEO low Earth orbit

ASAT antisatellite LM Long March

BACC Beijing Aerospace Control Center LNT lethal nontrackable debris

BMEW ballistic missile early warning MEO medium Earth orbit

C2 command and control MODAFL Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces 

Logistics

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance NASA National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration

CLTC China Launch and Tracking Control

(PLA SSF SSD) NSD PLA SSF Network Systems Department

CNSA China National Space Administration PLA People’s Liberation Army

DEW directed energy weapon PMD post-mission disposal

ESA European Space Agency PNT positioning, navigation, and timing

EW electronic warfare, also referred to as 

“electromagnetic warfare” QUESS Quantum Experimentation at Space Scale

GEO geosynchronous Earth orbit SAR synthetic aperture radar

GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System SASTIND

State Administration for Science, 

Technology, and Industry for National 

Defense

GPS Global Positioning System SATCOM satellite communications

HEO highly elliptical orbit SLV space launch vehicle

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile SSA space situational awareness

ILRS International Lunar Research Station SSD PLA SSF Space Systems Department

IRGC-ASF Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps –

Aerospace Force SSF PLA Strategic Support Force

ISA Iranian Space Agency TT&C telemetry, tracking, and control

ISON International Scientific Optical

Network xGEO deep space orbits beyond 35,000 kilometers, but in the Earth-Moon system

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance XSCC Xian Satellite Control Center

ISRC Iranian Space Research Center

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 48
1 Greenemeier, Larry; 8 February 2016; “GPS and the World’s First 

‘Space War’”; Scientific American; https://www.scientificamerican.

com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-first-space-war/. Accessed 2 

August 2021.

2 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 13.

3 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 13.

4 Chin, Carrey A.; June 2011; A Study on the Commercialization of 

Space-based Remote Sensing in the Twenty-First Century and Its 

Implications to United States National Security; Naval Postgraduate 

School; http://faculty.nps.edu/thuynh/Theses/11Jun_Chin.pdf. 

Accessed 2 August 2021.

5 Army Space & Missile Defense Command; 2003; “Space – An 

Enabler”; Army Space Journal; https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/

u2/a525767.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

6 Sellers, Jerry Jon; 2015; Understanding Space: An Introduction to 

Astronautics, 4th Edition, pp. 59-60, 657-659; CEI: United States.

7 Weinbaum, C., Berner, S., and McClintock, B.; PE273; 2017; 

“SIGINT for Anyone: The Growing Availability of Signals Intelligence 

in the Public Domain”; RAND Corporation; https://www.rand.

org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE273/RAND_

PE273.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

8 Satellite Industry Association; June 2020; SIA: State of the 

Satellite Industry Report; https://brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/SIA_SSIR_2020.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

9 United Nations Conference on Disarmament; 10 October 1967; 

“Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 

Celestial Bodies”; http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space. 

Accessed 2 August 2021.

10 United Nations Conference on Disarmament; CD/1839; 29 

February 2008; “Letter Dated 12 February 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent 

Representative of China to the Conference On Disarmament 

Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting 

the Russian and Chinese Texts of the Draft ‘Treaty on Prevention of 

the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use 

of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)’ Introduced by the 

Russian Federation and China”; https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol-

=en/CD/1839. Accessed 2 August 2021.

11 United Nations Conference on Disarmament; CD/1985; 12 June 

2014; “Letter dated 10 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of 

China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Acting 

Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the updated 

Russian and Chinese texts of the draft ‘Treaty on Prevention of 

the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or 

Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)’ introduced by 

the Russian Federation and China”; https://undocs.org/CD/1985. 

Accessed 2 August 2021.

12 UK Ministry of Defense; 11 November 2015; National Security 

Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 19; 

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_

SD_Review_web_only.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

13 UK Ministry of Defense; 28 March 2018; National Security 

and Capability Review, p. 19; https://assets.publishing.service.

gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/

file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

14 UK Ministry of Defense; 17 June 2020; Toward a Defence Space 

Strategy; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/

uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/712376/MOD_Pocket_Tri-Fold_-_Defence_Space_Strategy_Headlines.pdf. Accessed 2 

August 2021.

15 Lye, Harry; 2 April 2020; “Will the UK get a Space Command?” 

Airforce Technology; https://www.airforce-technology.com/features/

will-the-uk-get-a-space-command/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

16 Chuter, Andrew; 15 January 2020; “Former Fighter Pilot Picked 

to Lead British Military’s Space Command”; Defense News; https://

www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/01/15/former-fighterpilot-picked-to-lead-british-militarys-space-command. Accessed 2 

August 2021.

17 EuroNews; 13 July 2019; “France’s Macron announces creation 

of French Space Force”; https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/13/

france-s-macron-announces-creation-of-french-space-force. Accessed 2 August 2021.

18 Blenkin, Max; 3 February 2020; “Germany signs up for multinational Combined Space Operations Initiative”; Space Connect; 

https://www.spaceconnectonline.com.au/operations/4116-germanysigns-up-for-multinational-combined-space-operations-initiative. 

Accessed 2 August 2021.

19 Miles, Cody, Maj.; 11 February 2020; “German delegation visits 

Vandenberg, discusses future of space operations”; Combined 

Force Space Component Command Public Affairs; https://www.

spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2081290/german-delegation-visits-vandenberg-discusses-future-space-cooperation/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

20 Jungholt, Thorsten; 21 August 2019; “Armament in Space – Still 

Without Weapons”; Die Welt; https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus198779675/Bundeswehr-So-laeuft-die-Aufruestung-imWeltraum.html. Accessed 2 August 2021.

SOURCES/ENDNOTES

49
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

21 AP News; 21 September 2020; “German military opens new 

space operations center”; https://apnews.com/article/national-security-germany-europe-archive-russia-94aaa4939c5c736e268f388700b49c6b. Accessed 2 August 2021.

22 Johnston, Eric; 2 June 2020; “Japan’s New Space Squadron 

Takes a Giant Leap Forward”; The Japan Times; https://www.

japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/02/national/japan-space-forceself-defense-forces/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

23 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense; 11-1290000-

000446-11; 31 December 2018; 2018 Defense White Paper, p. 

19; https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201907110548253080.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

24 DOD News; 5 September 2014; “DoD Agrees to Share Space 

Data with South Korea”; https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/

Article/Article/603194/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

25 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense; 11-1290000-

000446-11; 31 December 2018; 2018 Defense White Paper, p. 

74; https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201907110548253080.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

26 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. II-4 

– II-5.

27 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. II-4 

- II-5.

28 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. II-3 

- II-4.

29 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. II-8, 

II-17 – II-18.

30 The Chicago Tribune; 21 May 1998; “Satellite Outage Felt By 

Millions”; https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1998-05-

21-9805210138-story.html. Accessed 28 July 2021.

31 Brinson, Linda C.; March 2011; “What breakthroughs in 

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32 International Space Exploration Coordination Group; Benefits Stemming from Space Exploration; September 2013; 

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August 2021.

33 NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory; 20 Inventions We Wouldn’t 

Have Without Space Travel; https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/infographics/

infographic.view.php?id=11358. Accessed 28 July 2021.

34 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. I-13.

35 U.S. Space Command Public Affairs; 15 November 2021; 

“Russian direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test creates significant, 

long-lasting space debris”; https://www.spacecom.mil/news/

article-display/article/2842957/russia-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile-creates-significant-long-last/#.yzrxfviqul4. Accessed 16 

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36 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization; 5 November 2020; “9 July 1962: ‘Starfish Prime’, Outer Space”; https://

www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/9-july-1962starfish-primeouter-space. Accessed 5 August 2020.

37 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. I-11 

– I-12.

38 Riebeek, Holli; 4 September 2009; “Catalog of Earth Satellite 

Orbits”; NASA; https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog. Accessed 5 August 2020.

39 The State Council of the People’s Republic Of China; 28 

December 2016; Full text of white paper on China’s space 

activities in 2016; http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm. Accessed 2 

August 2021.

40 Xiao Tianliang, Lt. Gen., ed.; September 2020; The Science of Military Strategy (2020 Edition), p. 142; PLA National Defense University.

41 Gebhardt, Chris; 22 July 2020; “China seeks ‘Heavenly 

Questions’ with ambitious Tianwen-1 mission to Mars”; NASA 

Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/07/china-ambitious-tianwen1-mars/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

42 Bryce Space and Technology; 31 October 2020; 2020 Year in 

Review; https://www.brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/

Bryce_2020_Year_In_Review.png. Accessed 2 August 2021.

43 Bryce Space and Technology; 31 December 2019; “China’s Orbital 

Launch Activity”; https://brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/

China_Orbital_Launch_Activity_2020.pdf. Accessed 21 March 2022.

44 Krebs, Gunther; 14 September 2020; “Tiangong-1 (TG-1)”; 

Gunther’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc-sdat/tg-1.

htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

45 Howell, Elizabeth; 26 March 2018; “Tiangong-1: China’s First 

Space Station”; Space.com; https://www.space.com/27320-tiangong-1.html. Accessed 2 August 2021.

46 Krebs, Gunther; 14 September 2020; “Tiangong-2 (TG-2)”; 

Gunther’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc-sdat/tg-2.

htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

47 Nowakowski, Tomasz; 22 May 2016; “China reveals design for 

planned Tiangong 3 space station”; Space Flight Insider; https://

www.spaceflightinsider.com/missions/human-spaceflight/chinareveals-design-planned-tiangong-3-space-station/. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

48 Graham, William and Gebhardt, Chris; 28 June 2021; “China 

launches Tianhe module, start of ambitious two-year station construction effort”; NASA Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.

com/2021/04/china-station-construction-begins/. Accessed 30 

June 2021.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 50
49 Chang, Kenneth; 7 December 2018; “China’s Chang’e-4 

Launches on Mission to the Moon’s Far Side”; The New York 

Times; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/science/chinamoon-change-4.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

50 Amos, Jonathan; 16 December 2020; “China’s Chang’e-5 Moon 

mission probe touches down”; BBC; https://www.bbc.com/news/

science-environment-55148998. Accessed 3 August 2021.

51 Burghardt, Thomas; 23 November 2020; “China launches 

world’s first lunar sample return mission since 1976”; NASA Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/11/change5-samplereturn-launch/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

52 Gebhardt, Chris; 1 December 2020; “China lands on Moon after 

causing deep confusion by stopping broadcast”; NASA Spaceflight; 

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/12/china-preparing-to-landsample-return-mission-on-the-moon/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

53 AP News; 17 December 2020; “Chinese capsule returns to 

Earth carrying moon rocks”; https://apnews.com/article/technology-china-moon-da510a5fd9a97505296ddbdb5749c393. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

54 Gebhardt, Chris; 22 July 2020; “China seeks ‘Heavenly 

Questions’ with ambitious Tianwen-1 mission to Mars”; NASA 

Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/07/china-ambitious-tianwen1-mars/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

55 Gebhardt, Chris; 10 February 2021; “China, with Tianwen-1, begins tenure at Mars with successful orbital arrival”; NASA Spaceflight; 

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/02/china-ready-to-begin-marstenure-with-tianwen-1-orbit-insertion/. Accessed 12 February 2021.

56 Hanneke, Weitering; 14 May 2021; “China’s 1st Mars rover 

‘Zhurong’ lands on the Red Planet”; Space.com; https://www.

space.com/china-mars-rover-landing-success-tianwen-1-zhurong. 

Accessed 14 May 2021.

57 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. I-13.

58 18 Space Control Squadron; “Box Score”; Space-Track.org; 

https://www.space-track.org/#boxscore. Accessed 19 March 2022.

59 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 11 May 2017; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 9.

60 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 13.

61 Office of the Secretary of Defense; April 2015; Annual Report 

to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China 2015, p. 14; https://dod.defense.gov/

Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.

pdf. Accessed 27 July 2021.

62 Newman, Scott and Kuhn, Anthony; 10 April 2018; “Beijing 

Reportedly Installs Communications Jamming Equipment in South 

China Sea”; National Public Radio; https://www.npr.org/sections/

parallels/2018/03/02/589876233/the-u-s-positions-warships-intense-asia-pacific-waters. Accessed 2 August 2021.

63 Martini, Paul; 21 September 2016; “Cybersecurity is threatening 

America’s military supremacy”; Crunch Network (Reposted on Resilient 

Navigation and Timing Foundation blog); https://rntfnd.org/2016/09/26/

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64 The State Council of the People’s Republic Of China; 28 December 2016; Full text of white paper on China’s space activities in 

2016; http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/

content_281475527159496.htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

65 The State Council of the People’s Republic Of China; 28 January 

2022; Full Text: China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective; 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/20220128/eb9fb038ebfe4a3d93887b9f120ef74a/c.html. Accessed 28 January 2022.

66 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2020, pp. 63-65; https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINAMILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. Accessed 3 August 2021.

67 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; 8 

September 2017; China’s Position on a Code of Conduct in Space, 

p. 2; https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_China’s%20Position%20on%20a%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20

in%20Space.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

68 Kulaki, Gregory and Lewis, Jeffery G.; January 2009; A Place 

for One’s Mat: China’s Space Program, 1956-2003, p. 15; 

Carnegie Corporation; https://media.carnegie.org/filer_public/34/26/34264093-10f5-4f7c-a02c-6611514f5ee7/ccny_grantee_2009_china.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

69 Goswami, Namrata; 15 October 2018; “Waking Up to China’s 

Space Dream”; The Diplomat; https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/

waking-up-to-chinas-space-dream/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

70 Stokes, M., Alvarado, G., Weinstein, E., Easton, I.; 30 March 

2020; “China’s Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities”, p. 28; Project 2049 Institute prepared for The U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission; https://www.uscc.

gov/sites/default/ files/2020-05/China_Space_and_Counterspace_

Activities.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

71 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. I-13.

72 18 Space Control Squadron; “Box Score”; Space-Track.org; 

https://www.space-track.org/#boxscore. Accessed 19 March 2022.

73 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 11 May 2017; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 9.

74 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic 

of China; 26 May 2015; China’s Military Strategy (2015), pp. 6, 

11, 16-17; http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

75 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of 

China; 26 May 2015; China’s Military Strategy (2015), p. 3; http://

www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm. 

Accessed 2 August 2021.

51
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

76 Defense Intelligence Agency; 26 April 2021; Statement of the 

Record Worldwide Threat Assessment, pp. 8-9.

77 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2020, p. 82; https://media.defense.

gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. Accessed 2 August 2021.

78 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 13.

79 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; 2017; “The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space 

Operations”, p. ix, 7; RAND Corporation; https://www.rand.org/

content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2000/RR2058/

RAND_RR2058.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.

80 MacDonald, B.W., Blair, D., Cheng, D., Mueller, K., and Sampson, V.; 2016; Crisis Stability in Space: China and Other Challenges; Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 

Foreign Policy Institute.

81 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 13.

82 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

Report to Congress; Military and Security Developments Involving 

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83 Kulacki, Greg; 1 July 2009; “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in 

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85 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; 2 March 2015; “China Dream, Space 

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86 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

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87 Chang Long; 28 October 2003; “Grasp the Trend of New Military 

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88 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

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89 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

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90 Xinhua; 15 November 2013; “China to tackle monopolies, 

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91 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

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92 Costello, John; 8 February 2016; “The Strategic Support Force: 

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93 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; 2017; “The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space 

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94 Xinhua; 6 July 2021; “Xi promotes four military officers to rank of general”; http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-07/06/c_1310044470.htm. Accessed 23 July 2021.

95 Ni, Adam and Gill, Bates; 29 May 2019; “The People’s Liberation 

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96 Chopra, Anil; 8 March 2021; “People’s Liberation Army Strategic 

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97 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; 2017; “The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space 

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98 Wood, P., Stone, A., and Lee, T.A.; 1 March 2021; “China’s 

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22; China Aerospace Studies Institute; https://airuniversity.af.edu/

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99 Ni, Adam and Gill, Bates; 29 May 2019; “The People’s Liberation 

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100 Ni, Adam and Gill, Bates; 29 May 2019; “The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force: Update 2019”; The Jamestown 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 52
Foundation: China Brief, Vol. 19, Iss. 10, pp. 16-17; https://https://

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101 Chopra, Anil; 8 March 2021; “People’s Liberation Army Strategic 

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102 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China; 6 October 

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103 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

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104 Jones, Andrew; 25 May 2018; “China appoints new space 

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105 The State Council of the People’s Republic Of China; 28 

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106 UNOOSA; 28 May 2018; “Handbook: China Space Station 

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107 Luxembourg Ministry of Economy; 17 January 2018; The 

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108 Wood, P., Stone, A., and Lee, T.A.; 1 March 2021; “China’s 

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62; China Aerospace Studies Institute; https://airuniversity.af.edu/

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109 Prague Security Studies Institute; 31 March 2019; State Actor 

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Russian Economic and Financial Footprints, p. 11.

110 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

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111 Herbert, Natalie; February 2021; “Achieving the PLA’s Strategic 

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112 OK-Space; 5 May 2017; “OKW and CASC 1st Academy carry 

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113 China Spaceflight Blog; 16 September 2017; “Orbita”.

114 Barbosa, Rui; 8 November 2020; “Introducing China’s new 

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115 Expace Technology Co Ltd. “KZ Promotional Flier”.

116 Hannas, W.C., Mulvenon, J.C., Puglisi, A.B.; 2013; Chinese 

Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization, pp. 19, 22-23, 33-34, 78, 176, 189, 204-205, 216.

117 Harvey, Brian; 2013; China in Space: The Great Leap Forward, pp. 

105-119, 184-214; Springer Science + Business Media: New York.

118 18 Space Control Squadron; “Catalog”; Space-Track.org; 

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119 Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); 1 January 2022; 

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120 Keluo Liaofu; 8 October 2015; “Jilin-1 Satellite Liftoff into Space: 

US Aircraft Carrier has Nowhere to Hide”; Dingsheng Military Forum.

121 Sina (China Youth Network Reprint); 4 October 2015; “China’s 

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by global surveillance at the end of the year”.

122 Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); 1 January 2022; 

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123 Stokes, M., Alvarado, G., Weinstein, E., Easton, I.; 30 March 

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124 Pan Changpeng, Gu Wenjin, and Chen Jie, 2006; “An Analysis on the Capabilities of Military Satellites to Support an ASBM 

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125 Gao Fei, Hu Xujie, Gao Lungyun, and Liu Xiangmin; 19 March 

2008; “An Analysis on the Influence of Military Satellite Information 

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126 Stokes, M., Alvarado, G., Weinstein, E., Easton, I.; 30 March 

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53
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

127 Stokes, M., Alvarado, G., Weinstein, E., Easton, I.; 30 March 

2020; “China’s Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities”, p. 28; Project 2049 Institute prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; https://www.uscc.gov/

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128 Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); 1 January 2022; 

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space-weapons/satellite-database. Accessed 19 March 2022.

129 Stokes, Mark A. and Cheng, Dean; 26 April 2012; “China’s 

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130 Stokes, M., Alvarado, G., Weinstein, E., Easton, I.; 30 March 

2020; “China’s Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities”, p. 28; Project 2049 Institute prepared for the U.S.-China 

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gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/China_Space_and_Counterspace_

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131 Xinhua; 25 April 2008; “China Blasts Off First Data Relay Satellite”.

132 Chen Lihu, Wang Shilian, and Zhang Eryang; 1 June 2007; 

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133 Wu Ting-yong, Wu Shi-qi, and Ling Xiang, December 2005; 

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134 The State Council of the People’s Republic Of China; 28 

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135 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 16 May 2018; Annual Report 

to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

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136 Chan, Minnie; 6 November 2016; “Chinese Aerospace Giant 

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137 Conover, Emily; 13 December 2017; “A quantum communications satellite proved its potential in 2017”; Science News; 

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138 Krebs, Gunther; 14 September 2020; “QSS (QUESS, Mozi)”; 

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139 Makichuk, Dave; 17 June 2020; “China claims quantum 

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140 Stokes, M., Alvarado, G., Weinstein, E., Easton, I.; 30 March 

2020; “China’s Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities”, pp. 64-65; Project 2049 Institute prepared for the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission; https://www.uscc.

gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/China_Space_and_Counterspace_

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141 Curcio, Blaine; 4 December 2020; “Constellation Watch: China’s Incubating Answer to Starlink”; Satellite Markets; http://satellitemarkets.com/constellation-watch-china-incubating-answer-starlink. Accessed 2 August 2021.

142 Economic Times of India; 16 July 2018; “China to build 300 

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143 China National Administration of GNSS and Applications; 10 

November 2017; “China’s Rainbow Project Will Launch 156 Small 

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144 Ok-Space; 29 January 2018; “National Constellation – We have 

been helping”.

145 Jones, Andrew; 21 April 2021; “China is developing plans for a 

13,000-satellite megaconstellation”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

146 Jones, Andrew; 28 February 2020; “China to complete its 

answer to GPS with Beidou navigation satellite launches in March, 

May”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/china-to-complete-itsanswer-to-gps-with-beidou-navigation-satellite-launches-in-marchmay/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

147 Wencheng, Gao; 23 June 2020; “Commentary: China’s BeiDou 

system primed for serving whole world; Xinhua.

148 Yuanxi Yang, Weiguang Gao, Shuren Guo, Yue Mao, Yufei 

Yang; 11 December 2018; “Introduction to BeiDou-3 navigation 

satellite system”; Navigation.

149 Betz, J. Mingquan Lu, Morton, Y.T. J., Yuanxi Yang; 3 January 

2019; “Introduction to the special issue on the BeiDou navigation 

system”; Navigation.

150 Mingquan Lu, Wenyi Li, Zheng Yao, Xiaowei Cui; 16 December 

2018; “Overview of BDS III new signals”; Navigation.

151 Barbosa, Rui; 22 June 2020; “China Launches final Beidou-3 

with Long march 3B Return to Flight”; NASA Spaceflight; https://

www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/06/china-complete-beidou-constellation-long-march-3b/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

152 International GNSS Service; 11 August 2020; “BeiDou”; http://

mgex.igs.org/IGS_MGEX_Status_BDS.php. Accessed 2 August 2021.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 54
153 Beidou Navigation Systems; 19 March 2020; “China Successfully 

Launched the 54th BDS Satellite”; http://en.beidou.gov.cn/WHATSNEWS/202004/t20200401_20279.html. Accessed 2 August 2021.

154 Jones, Andrew; 28 February 2020; “China to complete its 

answer to GPS with Beidou navigation satellite launches in March, 

May”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/china-to-complete-itsanswer-to-gps-with-beidou-navigation-satellite-launches-in-marchmay/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

155 China Satellite Navigation Office; 5 March 2018; “Development 

of BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) – A System Update 

Report (2017-2018)”; Munich Satellite Navigation Summit 2018 

Proceedings.

156 Xinhua; 27 December 2018; “China’s BeiDou navigation 

system starts global service”; http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/27/c_137702496.htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

157 Howell, Elizabeth; 23 June 2020; “China launches final Beidou 

satellite to complete GPS-like navigation system”; Space.com; 

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158 Gebhardt, Chris; 10 February 2021; “China, with Tianwen-1, 

begins tenure at Mars with successful orbital arrival”; NASA Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/02/china-ready-tobegin-mars-tenure-with-tianwen-1-orbit-insertion/. Accessed 20 

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159 Hanneke, Weitering; 14 May 2021; “China’s 1st Mars rover 

‘Zhurong’ lands on the Red Planet”; Space.com; https://www.

space.com/china-mars-rover-landing-success-tianwen-1-zhurong. 

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160 Woo, Ryan and Sun Yilei; 22 May 2021; “China says Martian 

rover takes first drive on surface of Red Planet”; Reuters; https://

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161 China Central Television; 28 August 2020; “China PLA 74th 

Group Army’s Amphibious Brigade Holds Joint Land-Sea-Air Island 

Landing Drill”.

162 Liu Jiasheng, Sun Datong, and Peng Fubing; 1 February 2019; 

“Building Strategic Projection Carrying Tools Based on National Security Requirements”; Journal of Military Transportation University.

163 BeiDou Navigation Systems; December 2019; “Development of 

the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (Version 4.0)”.

164 Cang Wei and Song Wenwei; 26 May 2014; “Beidou to help 

safeguard fisherman on the high seas”; Xinhua.

165 Xinhua; 17 May 2012; “Beidou Navigation System Installed on 

More Chinese Fishing Boats”.

166 BeiDou Navigation Systems; December 2019; “Development of 

the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (Version 4.0)”.

167 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China; 16 June 

2016; “Full Text: China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System”.

168 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2020, p. 64; https://media.defense.

gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-MILITARYPOWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. Accessed 3 August 2021.

169 Lianping Gao and Ryan Woo; 26 May 2021; “China’s Beidou 

navigation system to serve $156 billion home market by 2025”; Reuters (Yahoo Finance reprint); https://finance.yahoo.com/news/chinas-beidou-navigation-system-serve-053827138.html. Accessed 

20 July 2021.

170 Krebs, Gunther; 23 May 2020; “Shenzhou Flight History”; 

Gunter’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sat/shenzhou_hist.htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

171 Krebs, Gunther; 14 September 2020; “Shenzhou 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 

6, 7 (SZ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)”; Gunther’s Space Page; https://space.

skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/sz-1.htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

172 Krebs, Gunther; 14 September 2020; “Shenzhou 8, 9, 10, 11, 

12 (SZ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)”; Gunther’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/sz-8.htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

173 Krebs, Gunther; 14 September 2020; “Tiangong-1 (TG-1)”; 

Gunther’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc-sdat/tg-1.

htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

174 Howell, Elizabeth; 26 March 2018; “Tiangong-1: China’s First 

Space Station”; Space.com; https://www.space.com/27320-tiangong-1.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

175 Krebs, Gunther; 14 September 2020; “Tiangong-2 (TG-2)”; 

Gunther’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc-sdat/tg-2.

htm. Accessed 2 August 2021.

176 China Daily; 8 May 2020; “Spacecraft re-entry Model Test 

Successful”.

177 Graham, William and Gebhardt, Chris; 28 June 2021; “China 

launches Tianhe module, start of ambitious two-year station construction effort”; NASA Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.

com/2021/04/china-station-construction-begins/. Accessed 20 

July 2021.

178 Graham, William; 29 May 2021; “China launches Tianzhou 

2, first cargo mission to new space station”; NASA Spaceflight; 

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/05/tianzhou-2-launch/. 

Accessed 20 July 2021.

179 Xinhua; 16 October 2021; “China Embarks on Longest Ever 

Crewed Mission for Space Station Construction”.

180 Jones, Morris; 17 November 2011; “Yinghuo Was Worth It”; 

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Worth_It_999.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

181 Krebs, Gunther; 11 December 2020; “XPNAV 1 (Maichong Xing 

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Accessed 31 January 2022.

182 Xiang Bo; 30 December 2019; “China’s First Solar Sail Verifies 

Key Technologies in Orbit;” Xinhua; http://www.xinhuanet.com/

english/2019-12/30/c_138667092.htm. Accessed 3 August 2021.

183 David, Leonard; 14 December 2013; “China Lands On The 

Moon: Historic Robotic Lunar Landing Includes 1st Chinese Rov55
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

er”; Space.com; https://www.space.com/23968-china-moon-rover-historic-lunar-landing.html#:~:text=China%20has%20landed%20its%20first%20robotic%20lander%20on,to%20make%20

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184 Wong, Catherine; 3 January 2019; “China’s Chang’e 4 lunar 

probe sends first photo of far side of the moon after historic soft 

landing”; South China Morning Post; https://www.scmp.com/

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185 Chang, Kenneth; 7 December 2018; “China’s Chang’e-4 

Launches on Mission to the Moon’s Far Side”; The New York 

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186 Clark, Stephen; 7 December 2018; “China launches historic 

mission to land on far side of the moon”; Spaceflight Now; https://

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187 Wu Nan; 24 June 2014; “Next stop - Mars: China aims to 

send rover to Red Planet within six years”; South China Morning 

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188 China National Space Administration; 24 April 2020; “China’s 

first Mars mission named Tianwen 1”; http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/

english/n6465652/n6465653/c6809448/content.html. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

189 Jones, Andrew; 23 July 2020; “Tianwen-1 launches for Mars, 

marking dawn of Chinese interplanetary exploration”; Space News; 

https://spacenews.com/tianwen-1-launches-for-mars-marking-dawn-of-chinese-interplanetary-exploration/. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

190 Huang, Kristin and Chik, Holly; 24 July 2020; “China’s Mars 

Probe Blasts off on Mission Fraught with Risks: Tianwen-1 has Embarked on Ambitious Project to Chart the Red Planet, but it Faces 

Many Obstacles”; South China Morning Post; https://www.scmp.

com/news/china/science/article/3094343/china-launches-first-mission-mars. Accessed 3 August 2021.

191 Amos, Jonathan; 16 December 2020; “China’s Chang’e-5 

Mission Returns Moon Samples”; BBC; https://bbc.com/news/science-environment-55323176. Accessed 3 August 2021.

192 Burghardt, Thomas; 23 November 2020; “China launches 

world’s first lunar sample return mission since 1976”; NASA Space

flight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/11/change5-samplereturn-launch/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

193 Gebhardt, Chris; 1 December 2020; “China lands on Moon after 

causing deep confusion by stopping broadcast”; NASA Spaceflight; 

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194 AP News; 17 December 2020; “Chinese capsule returns to 

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197 Sputnik News; 8 August 2018; “China to launch space station 

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199 Jones, Andrew; 11 September 2019. “China’s Space Station 

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208 Xinhua; 25 April 2018; “China Outlines Roadmap for 

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209 Xinhua; 25 April 2018; “China Outlines Roadmap for 

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212 Xinhua; 25 April 2018; “China Outlines Roadmap for 

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217 Jones, Andrew; 5 July 2018; “China reveals details for superheavy-lift Long March 9 and reusable Long March 8 rockets”;

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218 China Daily; 1 August 2019; “New Port Will Host Sea Based 

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224 Xinhua; 5 June 2020; “China Plans to Develop New Solid Fueled Carrier Rocket”; http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/05/c_139116817.htm. Accessed 3 August 2021.

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227 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) and 

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230 Wood, P., Stone, A., and Lee, T.A.; 1 March 2021; “China’s 

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231 Griesbach, Jacob and Vallado, David; 4 August 2011; “Simulating Space Surveillance Networks”, pp. 8-9; Proceedings from the 

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232 National Military Standard of the People’s Republic of China; 

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233 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; 

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57
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234 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

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235 Wang, X. and Zheng, K.; 1 May 2015; “Deception Jamming 

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236 Hou, W., Ji, Z., Lu, C., and Leng, K.; March 2017; “Research 

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237 Lin, J., Feng, T., Chen, B., and Jiang, C.; March 2010; “Study 

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238 Wang, H.; “Analysis on Anti-jamming Measures of Mobile User 

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239 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

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240 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

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241 CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team; May 2014; CrowdStrike 

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242 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 16 May 2018; Annual Report 

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243 Office of Director of National Intelligence; 11 December 2020; 

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244 Li Ying, Zhou Bingyu; 1 April 2002; “Ground High Power Laser 

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245 Gao Guiqing, Xiang Jin, Li Yongxiang, Zhou Yong; February 

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246 Wang Shiyong, Fu Youyu, Guo Jin; January 2002; “Evaluation 

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247 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

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248 PLA Strategic Strike Force in 21st Century; September 2009; 

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249 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

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250 18 Space Control Squadron; “Box Score”; Space-Track.org; 

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251 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 11 May 2017; 

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252 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

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253 Office of the Secretary of Defense; April 2015; Annual Report 

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254 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 1 September 2020; Annual 

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255 Jones, Andrew; 29 October 2021; “China launches classified 

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256 Jiayu Liu, Qiang Huang, Tao Yang, Xuechao Chen, and 

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257 Gong, Zizheng; October 2018; “Mission Planning and Simulation System Study on Active Debris Removal with Space-based 

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258 Jones, Andrew; 27 January 2022; “China’s Shijian-21 Towed 

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259 Office of Director of National Intelligence; 11 December 2020; 

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260 Qin Hui, Zhao Jian-Kang; November 2006; “Conceptual Research on Space to Ground Release Technologies for Spacecrafts”; 

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261 Yuan Guoxiong, Bai Tao, and Ren Zhang; 1 September 2005; 

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262 Kang Xingwu, Chen Gang, Qiao Yang, and Chen Shilu; 

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 58
263 Hu Zhengdong, Ding Hongbo, Cao Yuan, Guo Caifa, Cai Hong; 

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264 Duan Junhong, Gao Xiaoguang; July 2009; “Simulation Research on Attacking Process of a Space-based Weapon to Fixed 

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265 Zhang Wei, Wu Hua, Wang Zhengjun, and Fang Juan; 1 January 2017; “Research on Attack Mode of Space-to-ground Kinetic 

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266 179614-21.

267 Russian Ministry of Defense; 4 November 2018; “Aerospace Forces successfully launch Soyuz-2 vehicle from Plesetsk Cosmodrome”.

268 Bodner, Matthew; 3 August 2015; “Russian Military Merges Air 

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269 Official website of the Russian Federation president; 12 April 

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270 Interfax; 30 August 2019; “Future militarization of space unavoidable – Roscosmos head”.

271 Izvestia; 27 June 2020; “Roscomos Named Crew Dragon’s 

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272 Bodner, Matthew; 4 October 2017; “60 years after Sputnik, Russia is lost in space”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/60-yearsafter-sputnik-russia-is-lost-in-space/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

273 Siddiqi, Asif; 21 March 2017; “Russia’s Space Program Is Struggling Mightily”; Slate; https://slate.com/technology/2017/03/russiasspace-program-is-in-trouble.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

274 Defense Intelligence Agency; 28 June 2017; Russia Military 

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275 Interfax-AVN; 5 December 2018; “Peresvet combat laser can 

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276 Milkavkaz.net; 23 December 2015; “Russia: Aerospace Forces 

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277 Izvestiya; 4 June 2019; “Expert Spots the Russian VKS’s New 

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278 Interfax; 4 June 2019 “New missile of Russian missile defense 

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279 Ramm, Alexei; 19 April 2019; “Targeting Stars: What is Known 

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280 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

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281 Bozhov, Oleg; 9 August 2016; “How They Will Wage War in the 

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282 Official website of Russian Federation President; 26 December 

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283 Chekinov, S.G. Col. (Res) and Bogdanov, S.A. Lt. Gen. (Ret); 

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284 Chekinov, S.G. Col. (Res) and Bogdanov, S.A. Lt. Gen. (Ret); 1 

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285 Official website of Russian Federation President; 26 December 

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286 Bozhov, Oleg; 9 August 2016; “How They Will Wage War in the 

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287 Zhongguo Taikong Wang; 17 October 2017; “China Plans To 

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288 Luzin, Pavel; 25 October 2017; “Space Power: What is Russia’s 

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289 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; 6 July 

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290 Milkavkaz.net; 23 December 2015; “Russia: Aerospace Forces 

Order of Battle”.

291 Izvestiya; 4 June 2019; “Expert Spots the Russian VKS’s New 

Missile Interceptor”.

292 Interfax; 4 June 2019; “New missile of Russian missile defense 

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293 Ramm, Alexei; 19 April 2019; “Targeting Stars: What is Known 

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294 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 11 May 2017; 

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295 Vyatkin, Yaroslav; 16 April 2015; “Russian Potential for Combating, Acquiring Prompt Global Strike Capability Examined”; 

Argumenty Nedeli.

296 Ramm, Alexei; 19 April 2019; “Targeting Stars: What is Known 

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297 Claus, Malcom; 9 November 2018; “New Russian missile likely 

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298 O’Connor, Tom; 12 March 2018; “Russia’s Military has Laser 

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299 Interfax; 19 July 2018; “Space Forces Get Combat Laser System”.

300 Nebehay, Stephanie; 14 August 2018; “U.S. Warns on Russia’s 

59
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

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301 Interfax-AVN; 5 December 2018; “Peresvet combat laser can 

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302 Poblete, Yleem D.S.; 14 August 2018; “United States Remarks 

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303 Interfax; 26 October 2017; “Russia Tests Military Satellite Capable of Approaching other Spacecraft – Newspaper”.

304 Hendrickx, Bart; 27 September 2018; “Russia Develops Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite Capability”; Jane’s Intelligence Review.

305 Hennigan, W.J.; 10 February 2020; “Exclusive: Strange 

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306 Interfax; 6 December 2019; “Russian military experts stage 

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307 Krivoruchek, Aleksey; 5 August 2013; “Skorpion System to 

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308 Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona; 14 July 2009; “Impact of 

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309 Official website of Russian Federation President; 26 December 

2014; “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by 

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310 Chekinov, S.G. Col. (Res) and Bogdanov, S.A. Lt. Gen. (Ret); 

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311 Moscow Izvestiya; 14 August 2013; “Russia Building GroundBased Backup For Glonass”.

312 Rossiyskaya Gazeta; 15 October 2017; “Missile Defense 

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313 Bogdanov, Konstantin; 15 June 2018; “The Clowns Are Demolishing the Circus: US Missile Defense and the International Security 

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314 Sputnik News; 30 January 2016; “This is the Achilles’ Heel of 

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315 Bozhov, Oleg; 9 August 2016; “How They Will Wage War in the 

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316 Tuchkov, Vladimir; 28 October 2018; “Star Wars: Will Russia 

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317 Tuchkov, Vladimir; 28 October 2018; “Star Wars: Will Russia 

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318 Selivanov, V.V. and Ilyin, Y.D. Col.; 31 December 2017; “Choosing Priorities in Developing Kinetic Energy Weapons for Military 

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319 Izvestiya; 14 December 2017; “Space Is a Battlefield: 

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320 Gazeta; 27 August 2016; “Russian Missile Defense Advances, 

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321 Selivanov, V.V. and Ilyin, Y.D. Col.; 31 December 2017; “Choosing Priorities in Developing Kinetic Energy Weapons for Military 

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322 Chekinov, S.G. Col. (Res) and Bogdanov, S.A. Lt. Gen. (Ret); 31 

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323 Selivanov, V.V. and Ilyin, Y.D. Col.; 31 December 2017 “Choosing Priorities in Developing Kinetic Energy Weapons for Military 

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324 Bodner, Matthew; 3 August 2015; “Russian Military Merges Air 

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325 Voyennoye Obozreniye; 25 March 2011; “Russia’s Space 

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326 Durnovo, Aleksey; 9 December 2014; “Aerospace Defense 

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327 Golts, Alexander; 10 August 2015; “Russia’s Aerospace Forces 

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328 Bodner, Matthew; 3 August 2015; “Russian Military Merges Air 

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329 Wincewicz-Bosy, Marta and Gonciarz, Artur; 16 December 

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330 Russian Ministry of Defense; 31 July 2019; Space Forces; 

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331 RIA Novosti; 2010; “Russian Space Force”; https//sputniknews.

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332 Russian Ministry of Defense; 31 July 2019; Space Forces; 

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333 A. Kopik; 28 February 2003; “Russian Space Forces”; Novosti 

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334 Mozhayskiy Military Space Academy Website; 19 February 2019; 

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335 Russian Ministry of Defense; 31 July 2019; Space Forces; 

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336 A. Kopik; 28 February 2003; “Russian Space Forces”; Novosti 

Kosmonavtiki; web.archive.org/web/20090201000712/http://novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/content/numbers/243/30.shtml. Accessed 27 

July 2021.

337 Bodner, Matthew; 23 January 2015; “Putin Approves Roscosmos Merger with Conglomerate”; Space News; http://www.spacenews.com/putin-approves-roscosmos-merger-with-conglomerate/. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

338 Interfax; 16 November 2015; “State Space Corporation to 

Hire 500 Staff”.

339 State Corporation Roscosmos Website; “State Corporation 

Organizations”; http://www.roscosmos.ru/24028/. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

340 Interfax; 28 November 2019; “Illegal enrichment schemes 

existed in Roscosmos enterprise for decades – Head of State 

Corporation’s Internal Audit Service”.

341 Luzin, Pavel; 22 June 2021; “Roscosmos Suffers From Russia’s 

Confrontation With the US”; Jamestown.org; https://jamestown.org/

program/roscosmos-suffers-from-russias-confrontation-with-the-us/. 

Accessed 17 December 2021.

342 Interfax; 1 July 2015; “Russian Deputy PM Admits Sanctions 

Affect Defence Industry”.

343 Cheberko, Ivan; 26 September 2016; “Glonass’ Satellites Will 

Be Built from Russian Components by 2020”; Izvestiya.

344 Svarovskaya, Anastasiya; 3 April 2018; “Russian state-run and 

private space industry: problems and cooperation”; Space Watch.

345 Cheberko, Ivan; 27 September 2020; “Cosmic Scale of Import 

Substitution: What’s Going on with GLONASS”; Vedomosti.

346 Interfax; 16 June 2021; “U.S. sanctions on microelectronics 

supplies affect dozens of Russian satellites – Rogozin”.

347 Sputnik News; 30 May 2018; “Russian State Space Giant Roscosmos May Curb Space Program Due to Lack of Funds”; https://

sputniknews.com/science/201805301064927907-roscosmosfunds-change-state-program/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

348 Smirnov, Leonid; 5 January 2021; “United States Finds Russia’s 

Weak Spot”; Saint Petersburg Rosbalt.

349 Cheberko, Ivan; 27 September 2020; “Cosmic Scale of Import 

Substitution: What’s Going On With GLONASS”; Vedomosti.

350 Fedorov, Yevgeniy; 19 February 2020; “The ‘Era’ Military 

Technopolis: The Attempt to Make Up for What Has Been Lost in 

Microelectronics”; Voyennoye Obozreniye.

351 Dokuchayev, Dmitriy; 08 July 2019; “Russian Growth Model 

Doomed to Failure: Economist Yakov Mirkin’s Assessment of Half 

Year Results”; MK Online.

352 Borisov, Yuriy Ivanovich; 15 October 2018; “Yuriy Borisov: 

The Director Corps Should not Have the Incentive That All of 

Their Debts Will Be Written Off. The Deputy Prime Minister 

Talked About the Solutions to the Problem of the OPK’s Debt 

Load, About the Situation in Aircraft Manufacturing, and About 

the Plans to Bring the Electronic Sector Out of the Protracted 

Crisis”; Svobodnaya Pressa.

353 Polunin, Andrey; 15 October 2018; “Zhirinovskiy’s Frightener: 

Instead of the S-700 Russia Threatens the West With Fakes. Why 

We Will Not Be Seeing Even a Modernized Version of the S-500 in 

the Foreseeable Future”; Svobodnaya Pressa.

354 Interfax-AVN; 27 May 2019; “Roscosmos to spend over 3 bln 

rubles within 3 years on operating remote sensing satellites”.

355 Ramm, Alexei and Kretsul, Roman; 8 May 2019; “All Liana 

Space Reconnaissance System Satellites Will Be Placed Into Orbit 

by 1 January”; Izvestiya.

356 Kotlyar, Mikhail; 6 July 2020; “Unified Space System Communications, Surveillance Satellites To Be Deployed by 2024”; 

RBK Online.

357 Tuchkov, Vladimir; 10 March 2020; “Domestic Space Reconnaissance is on Top of the Game Again”; Izvestiya.

358 Izvestiya; 22 September 2017; “Military Expert Anton Lavrov 

Documents Need for Optical Reconnaissance Satellite Array”.

359 TASS; 17 November 2015; “Russia involves 10 reconnaissance 

satellites in Syria operation – General Staff”; http://tass.com/science/837273. Accessed 3 August 2021.

360 Kommersant; 28 July 2016; “Defense Ministry Orders New 

Space-Based Electro-Optical Reconnaissance System”.

361 Interfax; 29 April 2014; “Ban on U.S. high-tech exports won’t 

hurt Russian companies – Siluanov”.

362 Interfax; 29 April 2014; “U.S. Sanctions against Russia will hit 

ESA – Rogozin”.

363 Zak, Anatoly; 22 February 2019; “The Meridian military communications satellite”; Russian Space Web; http://www.russianspaceweb.com/meridian.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

364 Gonets Satellite Company; 2018; “‘Gonets Satellite Company’ 

Public Corporation”.

365 Zak, Anatoly; 15 June 2019; “Yamal Satellite Series”; Russian 

Space Web; http://www.russianspaceweb.com/yamal.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

366 State Corporation Roscomos; 5 June 2020; “Russia – Reshetnev Company: Express AMU7 Satellite was Assembled”.

367 Zak, Anatoly; 23 April 2020; “Russian communications satellites”; Russian Space Web; http://www.russianspaceweb.com/

spacecraft_comsats.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

61
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

368 Defense Intelligence Agency; 28 June 2017; Russia Military 

Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, 

pp. 35-37; https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Russia%20Military%20Power%20

Report%202017.pdf?ver=2017-06-28-144235-937. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

369 Aronov, Dmitry Dr. and Zheltonogov, Egor; 5 October 2018; 

“GLONASS Status Update”; Geyser Telecom.

370 ISS Reshetnev; 12 October 2018; “Glonass-K Project”; https://

www.iss-reshetnev.ru/projects. Accessed 3 August 2021.

371 Revnivykh, Ivan; 12 October 2016; “GLONASS Programme 

Update”; International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite 

Systems (ICG): Annual Meeting 2016; http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/

icg/2016/icg11/01.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

372 Serov, Sergei; 31 August 2020; “Eliminating Targets: Air Bombs 

are Quickly Becoming Smarter”; Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

373 Surovtsev, Oleg; 20 November 2020; “Secrets of Mastery of ‘Gods 

of War’: Interview with Colonel Sergey Ivantey, chief of the Eastern 

Military District Missile Troops and Artillery”; Suvorovskiy Natisk.

374 Strazh Baltiki; 20 November 2020; “Khrizantemas in Battle Order”.

375 NASA; “Yuri Gagarin: First Man in Space”; https://www.nasa.

gov/mission_pages/shuttle/sts1/gagarin_anniversary.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

376 Zak, Anatoly; 30 July 2020; “Robotic Missions to Mars”;

Russian Space Web; http://www.russianspaceweb.com/spacecraft_planetary_mars.html. Accessed 2 August 2021.

377 Pavlushchenko, Katya; 30 April 2021; “Roscosmos discusses 

ISS withdrawal strategy and new space station for mid-2020s”; 

NASA Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/04/roscosmos-future-for-mid-2020s/. Accessed 2 May 2021.

378 Interfax; 1 July 2020; “Russia working on own communications 

channel with ISS”.

379 Interfax; 2 July 2020; “Russian Segment of ISS to be Provided 

with Independent Channel of Communication with Earth – Roscosmos CEO Rogozin”.

380 Izvestiya; 31 May 2020; “Roscosmos Representative Spoke 

About the Plans to Test New Rockets in 2020”.

381 Grush, Loren; 12 October 2020; “Head of Russian 

space program calls for more international cooperation in 

NASA’s Moon plans”; The Verge; https://www.theverge.

com/2020/10/12/21512712/nasa-roscosmos-russia-dmitry-rogozin-artemis-moon-interntational-cooperation. Accessed 17 

December 2020.

382 Interfax; 22 August 2019; “Russia’s lunar program to be revealed by end of this fall – Rogozin”.

383 Interfax; 14 September 2019; “Russia’s lunar program to be 

completed in 2040 – Roscomos”.

384 Atkinson, Ian; 19 August 2020; “Russia’s Nauka ISS module 

arrives at Baikonur for final launch preparations”; NASA Spaceflight; 

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/08/nauka-arrives-baikonurfinal-preps/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

385 Cox, Thomas; 27 June 2020; “The ‘Science’ Module Will Be 

Launched To The ISS In The Second Quarter Of 2021”; List23.

com; https://list23.com/2397-the-quot-science-quot-module-willbe-launched-to-the-iss-in-the-second-quarter-of-2021/. Accessed 

19 April 2021.

386 Pultarova, Tereza; 21 July 2021; “Russia launches huge Nauka 

science module to space station after years of delays”; Space.com; 

https://www.space.com/russia-launches-nauka-space-station-research-module. Accessed 21 July 2021.

387 Whittington, Mark; 6 September 2020; “Russia makes bid to 

become a space power with Luna-25 mission to the moon”; The 

Hill; https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/russia-makes-bidto-become-a-space-power-with-luna-25-mission-to-the-moon/

ar-BB18L8O9. Accessed 3 August 2021.

388 Roskosmos; 6 November 2021; “Development of an Instrument 

for Geological Exploration of the Moon From Orbit”.

389 Harding, Pete; 26 November 2021; “Russian assembly complete: Roscosmos attaches new docking node to station”; NASA 

Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/prichallaunch/#more-82189. Accessed 26 November 2021.

390 Zak, Anatoly; 1 September 2019; “ExoMars-2020 (formerly 

ExoMars-2018)”; Russian Space Web; http://russianspaceweb.

com/exomars2018.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

391 Amos, Jonathan; 12 March 2020; “ExoMars Rosalind Franklin: Rover mission delayed until 2022”; BBC News; https://www.

bbc.com/news/science-environment-51844030. Accessed 2 

August 2021.

392 Zak, Anatoly; 23 July 2019; “Luna-Grunt sample return mission 

(Luna-28)”; Russian Space Web; http://russianspaceweb.com/

luna_grunt.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

393 Globalsecurity.org; February 2019; “Russian Lunar Landing 

Programs and Plans”; https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/

russia/lunar.htm. Accessed 3 August 2021.

394 Roskosmos; 6 November 2021; “Development of an Instrument 

for Geological Exploration of the Moon From Orbit”.

395 Roskosmos; 6 November 2021; “Development of an Instrument 

for Geological Exploration of the Moon From Orbit”.

396 Roskosmos; 6 November 2021; “Development of an Instrument 

for Geological Exploration of the Moon From Orbit”.

397 Globalsecurity.org; February 2019; “Russian Lunar Landing 

Programs and Plans”; https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/

russia/lunar.htm. Accessed 3 August 2021.

398 Interfax; 18 January 2019; “Russian scientists plan to send 

research satellite to Mars, Phobos after 2026”.

399 Jones, Andrew; 26 April 2021; “China, Russia open moon 

base project to international partners, early details emerge”; 

Space News; https://spacenews.com/china-rus sia-open-moonDEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 62
base-project-tointernational-partners-early-details-emerge/. 

Accessed 2 May 2021.

400 Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation; 4 October 2017; 

“Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control Centre marks 60th 

anniversary”.

401 WAM; 24 September 2019; “Mohamed bun Zayed learns about 

final preparations for First Emirati Astronaut’s Expedition to ISS”.

402 Grush, Loren; 12 October 2020; “Head of Russian 

space program calls for more international cooperation in 

NASA’s Moon plans”; The Verge; https://www.theverge.

com/2020/10/12/21512712/nasa-roscosmos-russia-dmitry-rogozin-artemis-moon-interntational-cooperation. Accessed 17 

December 2021.

403 Jones, Andrew; 26 April 2021; “China, Russia open moon 

base project to international partners, early details emerge”; 

Space News; https://spacenews.com/china-russia-open-moonbase-project-to-international-partners-early-details-emerge/. 

Accessed 2 May 2021.

404 Jones, Andrew; 9 March 2021; “China, Russia enter MOU 

on international lunar research station”; Space News; https://

spacenews.com/china-russia-enter-mou-on-international-lunar-research-station/. Accessed 20 March 2021.

405 Roberts, Thomas G.; 13 March 2019; “Spaceports of the 

World”, pp. 43, 45; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Aerospace Security Project; https://www.researchgate.net/profile/

Thomas_Roberts24/publication/332211453_Spaceports_of_the_

World/links/5ca6590a4585157bd322dc39/Spaceports-of-theWorld.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

406 Bratsky, Jan; 8 May 2021; “Russian complex ‘Okno-M’ detected increased space Activity”; Zvezda TV; https://tvzvezda.ru/

news/202158931-66F05.html. Accessed 27 July 2021.

407 Russian Ministry of Defense—Aerospace Defense Forces; 

“Optical-electronic complex ‘Okno’”; http://www.structure.mil.

ru/structure/forces/cosmic/weapons/more.htm?id=10342893@

morfmilitarymodel. Accessed 27 July 2021.

408 Federation of American Scientists; 30 December 2008; Sourcebook on the Okno (Fpn 52168), Krona (Fpn 20096) and Krona-N 

(Fpn 20776) Space Surveillance Sites; https://fas.org/spp/military/

program/track/okno.pdf. Accessed 27 July 2021.

409 IMINT & Analysis; June 2008; “Soviet & Russian Space Surveillance Facilities”; http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveillance.html. Accessed 27 July 2021.

410 Podvig, Pavel; 21 June 2011; “Daryal-U radar in Mishelevka 

demolished”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/06/daryal-u_radar_in_mishelevka_d.shtml. 

Accessed 27 July 2021.

411 Holm, Michael; 2011; “46th independent Radio-Technical Unit”; 

Soviet Armed Forces 1945–1991; http://www.ww2.dk/new/pvo/

radar/46ortu.htm. Accessed 27 July 2021.

412 SityShooter; 2011; “Radar ‘Dniester’ – ‘Dnepr-M’”; https://

www.webcitation.org/6cc28t10i?url=http://www.panoramio.com/

photo/58798723. Accessed 27 July 2021.

413 Podvig, Pavel; 23 December 2009; “Radar in Lekhtusi accepted for service”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/12/radar_in_lekhtusi_accepted_for.shtml. 

Accessed 27 July 2021.

414 Podvig, Pavel; 23 December 2009; “Radar in Lekhtusi accepted for service”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/12/radar_in_lekhtusi_accepted_for.shtml. 

Accessed 27 July 2021.

415 Podvig, Pavel; 14 February 2009; “Two radars at Armavir”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/02/

two_radars_at_armavir.shtml. Accessed 27 July 2021.

416 RIA Novosti; 15 December 2011; “Russia’s Baltic radar to be fully operational by 2014”; http://en.rian.ru/

news/20111215/170284350.html. Accessed 27 July 2021.

417 Podvig, Pavel; 21 June 2011; “Daryal-U radar in Mishelevka 

demolished”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/06/daryal-u_radar_in_mishelevka_d.shtml. 

Accessed 27 July 2021.

418 Lenta; 12 December 2011; “Upgrading early warning radars in the Northwest District will begin in 2015”; http://lenta.ru/

news/2011/12/12/modernize/. Accessed 27 July 2021.

419 TASS; 2 June 2013; “Construction of a missile warning 

radar system began in Altay”; http://www.tasstelecom.ru/news/

one/20215. Accessed 2 August 2021.

420 TASS; 2 December 2012’ “Three advanced early warning 

radars enter service in Russia”; http://tass.com/defense/981965.

Accessed 2 August 2021.

421 Interfax; 14 January 2013; “RTI General Director Boyev on New 

Missile Attack Warning System Radars”.

422 RIA Novosti; 9 February 2012; “St. Petersburg Radar to be Put on Alert in Feb”; http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_

news/20120209/171237484.html. Accessed 27 July 2021.

423 Izvestiya; 11 August 2011; “Russia restores the ‘missile umbrella’”; 

http://vz.ru/news/2011/8/11/513987.html. Accessed 27 July 2021.

424 Air and Space Defense; 1 July 2012; “Warning abdout Attack on 

our Territory”.

425 Arms Trade; 16 June 2015;“TSAMTO/ Of the news / Vladimir 

Putin appeared at the ceremony of the discovery of international 

military technical forum ‘the army-2015’”; http://www.armstrade.

org/includes/periodics/news/2015/0616/165029697/detail.shtml. 

Accessed 27 July 2021.

426 Russian Military News; 29 September 2016; “Interfax-agency 

of the Servicemen of Novostei”; http://www.militarynews.ru/story.

asp?rid=1&nid=361288. Accessed 27 July 2021. 

427 Podvig, Pavel; 22 March 2012; “New Voronezh-M radar in 

Mishelevka entered trials”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://

russianforces.org/blog/2012/03/new_voronezh-m_radar_in_mishel.

shtml. Accessed 27 July 2021.

63
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

428 Russian Ministry of Defense; 27 December 2014; “Archived 

copy”; http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12004148@egnews. Accessed 27 July 2021.

429 Podvig, Pavel; 2 June 2014; “Voronezh-DM radar in Yeniseysk”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://russianforces.org/

blog/2014/06/voronezh-dm_radar_in_yeniseysk.shtml. Accessed 

27 July 2021.

430 Podvig, Pavel; 17 September 2014; “Location of the Barnaul 

early-warning radar”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/09/location_of_the_barnaul_early-.shtml. 

Accessed 27 July 2021.

431 Podvig, Pavel; 19 September 2014; “Voronezh-M early-warning 

radar in Orsk located”; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; http://

russianforces.org/blog/2014/09/voronezh-m_early-warning_radar.

shtml. Accessed 27 July 2021.

432 Revnivykh, Sergey; 16 September 2008; “GLONASS Status 

and Progress”; ROSCOMOS; http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/

cgsicmeetings/48/reports/international subcommittee/%5b24%5d 

glonass cgsic 16.09.2008.pdf. Accessed 27 July 2021.

433 European Space Agency; 18 September 2014; “GLONASS 

Ground Segment”; https://gssc.esa.int/navipedia//index.php/

GLONASS_Ground_Segment. Accessed 27 July 2021.

434 GlobalSecurity.org; “Russian Space Launch Vehicles”; https://

www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/launch.htm. Accessed 

3 August 2021.

435 RIA-Novosti; 2012; “Russian Plans to Explore Solar System”.

436 Energia Corporation; 29 June 2019; “2018 Energia 

Annual Report”.

437 Gebhardt, Chris; 8 April 2020; “Russia conducts first Soyuz 

2.1a human launch; MS-16 crew arrives at Station”; NASA Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/04/soyuz-2-1a-human-launch-ms-16/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

438 Graham, William; 26 December 2019; “Rokot conducts 

final launch – carries three Gonets-M satellites to orbit”; NASA 

Spaceflight; https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2019/12/rokot-finallaunch-three-gonets-m-satellites/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

439 Foust, Jeff; 24 April 2020; “Sea Launch ‘frozen’ after ships moved 

to Russia”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/sea-launch-frozenafter-ships-moved-to-russia/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

440 Bodner, Matthew; 10 July 2018; “Energomash raises alarm 

over U.S. ban on Russian rocket engines”; Space News; https://

spacenews.com/energomash-raises-alarm-over-u-s-ban-on-russian-rocket-engines/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

441 Agapov, Vladimir; 27 March 2018; “Second Fragmentation of 

Titan 3C Transtage SSN#2692,” p. 5; IAA Space Debris Committee 

Meeting; https://iaaspace.org/wp-content/uploads/iaa/Scientific%20Activity/debrisminutes031816.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

442 Mokhatkin, A., Molotov, I., Voropaev, V., Borovin, S. Andrievsky, 

N., Dorokhov, N., and Agletdinov, V.; 21 April 2017; “Performance 

Analysis of the Large Space Debris Tracking Telescope in the North 

Caucasus After the Second First Light”; Proceedings of the 7th 

European Conference on Space Debris, Darmstadt, Germany; 

https://conference.sdo.esoc.esa.int/proceedings/sdc7/paper/299/

SDC7-paper299.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

443 Schmaltz, S., Molotov, I, Voropaev, V., Krugly, Y., Kouprianov, V., Elenin, L., Graziani, F., Erofeev, D., Kudak, V, and Wolf, 

A.; 24 January 2019; “ISON’S Sub-Network of Small Aperture 

Telescopes for Observations of NEOS, Space Debris and Meteors”; First Near Earth Objects and Debris Detection Conference, 

Darmstadt, Germany; https://conference.sdo.esoc.esa.int/

proceedings/neosst/paper/NEOSST1-paper442.pdf. Accessed 

27 July 2021.

444 NASA Spaceflight Forum; 15 November 2020; “Russian space-related electronic warfare projects”; https://

forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=52194.msg2154087#msg2154087. Accessed 5 December 2021.

445 Griesbach, Jacob and Vallado, David; 4 August 2011; “Simulating Space Surveillance Networks,” p. 9; Analytical Graphics, Inc.; 

Proceedings from the American Astronautical Society (AAS) Conference; https://www.agi.com/getmedia/8e3d8763-08c9-465da500-cba8b1300050/Simulating-Space-Surveillance-Networks.

pdf?ext=.pdf. Accessed 26 July 2021.

446 Defense Intelligence Agency; 28 June 2017; Russia Military 

Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, p. 

42; https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20

Power%20Publications/Russia%20Military%20Power%20Report%202017.pdf?ver=2017-06-28-144235-937. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

447 Military News; 1 May 2015; “Radioelectronic Warfare Assets 

have been Developed that can Hide Topol Launch Positions 

from Space Surveillance”; http://militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=374975. Accessed 3 August 2021.

448 UAWire; 28 October 2018; “Russia tests satellite jammer system”; https://uawire.org/russia-tests-mobile-anti-satellite-system. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

449 Ramm, Alexey; 27 April 2018; “New Systems Will be Able to 

Effectively Solve Problems Without Human Intervention: Interview 

with Col. Yuri Gubskov”; Izvestiya.

450 Varfolomeeva, Anna; 1 May 2018; “Signaling strength: Russia’s 

real Syria success is electronic warfare against the US”; Defense 

Post; https://www.thedefensepost.com/2018/05/01/russia-syria-electronic-warfare/. Accessed 4 August 2021.

451 Stupples, David; 9 October 2015; “Syria is Becoming a Test 

Bed for High-Tech Weapons of Electronic Warfare”; Gizmodo; 

https://gizmodo.com/syria-is-becoming-a-test-bed-for-high-techweapons-of-e-1735595580. Accessed 20 July 2021.

452 Defense World; 3 February 2020; “Russian Electronic Warfare 

System Brings Down Hostile Drones in Syria”; https://www.defenseworld.net/news/26265/Russian_Electronic_Warfare_System_

Brings_Down_Hostile_Drones_in_Syria. Accessed 3 August 2021.

453 Defense Intelligence Agency; 28 June 2017; Russia Military 

Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 64
pp. 37-41; https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/

Military%20Power%20Publications/Russia%20Military%20

Power%20Report%202017.pdf?ver=2017-06-28-144235-937. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

454 Office of Director of National Intelligence; 11 December 2020; 

“Support to U.S. Space Command Messaging”.

455 O’Connor, Tom; 12 March 2018; “Russia’s Military has Laser 

Weapons that Can Take out Enemies in Less than a Second”; 

Newsweek; http://www.newsweek.com/russia-military-laser-weapons-take-out-enemies-less-second-841091. Accessed 

3 August 2021.

456 Interfax; 19 July 2018; “Space Forces Get Combat 

Laser System”.

457 Nebehay, Stephanie; 14 August 2018; “U.S. Warns on Russia’s 

new space weapons”; Reuters; https://www.reuters.com/article/usrussia-usa-space-idUSKBN1KZ0T1. Accessed 3 August 2021.

458 Interfax-AVN; 5 December 2018; “Peresvet combat laser can 

fight satellites – Russian Defense Ministry”.

459 Interfax; 18 December 2019; “Peresvet combat lasers protecting road-mobile strategic missile complexes - General Staff chief”.

460 Interfax; 24 December 2019; “Peresvet combat lasers deployed 

in 5 divisions of Russian Strategic Missile Forces – Shoigu”.

461 Azanov, Roman; 24 December 2019; “‘Armament Is Not a 

Chess Game.’ What Equipment the Russian Army Received in 

2019: TASS on Principal Deliveries of Military Equipment and Arms 

to the Country’s Armed Forces Arms and Branches According to 

the Year’s Results”; TASS.

462 Zvezda Television; 29 December 2019; “Russia to deploy 

airborne Peresvet laser”.

463 Gundarova, Lyudmila; 27 May 2021; “Star/Junk Wars: How to 

Blind the Enemy and Not Blind Yourself”; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye; https://nvo.ng.ru. Accessed 20 July 2021.

464 Interfax; 30 December 2019; “Peresvet combat laser to be 

mounted on aircraft”.

465 Office of Director of National Intelligence; 11 December 2020; 

“Support to U.S. Space Command Messaging”.

466 Yezhenedelnik Zvezda; 29 September 2020; “Russian Military 

Industrial Complex: Debt, Red Tape Impact the Execution of the 

State Defense Order”.

467 Milkavkaz.net; 23 December 2015; “Russia: Aerospace Forces 

Order of Battle”.

468 Izvestiya; 28 May 2019; “An Expert Has Spotted the Russian 

VKS’s New Missile Interceptor”.

469 Interfax; 4 June 2019; “New missile of Russian missile defense 

system successfully test-launched at Kazakh firing range – Russian 

Defense Ministry”.

470 Ramm, Alexei; 19 April 2019; “Targeting Stars: What is Known 

about the New ASAT Weapon? Project NUDOL”; Izvestiya.

471 Dickinson, James H., Gen.; 21 April 2021; United States 

Space Command Presentation to the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives: Fiscal Year 2022 Priorities and Posture of the United 

States Space Command, p. 6; https://docs.house.gov/meetings/

AS/AS29/20210421/112467/HHRG-117-AS29-Wstate-DickinsonJ-20210421.pdf. Accessed 31 January 2022.

472 Vyatkin, Yaroslav; 16 April 2015; “Russian Potential for Combating, Acquiring Prompt Global Strike Capability Examined”; 

Argumenty Nedeli.

473 Gazeta; 28 July 2018; “In Russia new strategic weapons are 

being created”.

474 U.S. Space Command Public Affairs; 15 November 2021; 

“Russian direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test creates significant, 

long-lasting space debris”; https://www.spacecom.mil/news/

article-display/article/2842957/russia-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile-creates-significant-long-last/#.yzrxfviqul4. Accessed 16 

November 2021.

475 Khodarenok, Mikhail; 19 June 2020; “Russia: Defense 

Industry Source Provides Delivery Schedule for S-500 Prometey, Nudol Systems”; Gazeta; https://www.gazeta.ru/

army/2020/06/19/13123189.shtml. Accessed 3 August 2021.

476 Ramm, Alexei; 19 April 2019; “Targeting Stars: What is Known 

about the New ASAT Weapon? Project NUDOL”; Izvestiya.

477 Claus, Malcom; 9 November 2018; “New Russian missile likely 

to be part of anti-satellite system”; Jane’s Intelligence Review.

478 Mizokami, Kyle; 1 October 2018; “Russia’s MiG-31 Spotted 

with Possible Anti-Satellite Missile”; Popular Mechanics; https://

www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a23549729/russias-mig-31-spotted-with-possible-anti-satellite-missile/. Accessed 

3 August 2021.

479 Ramm, Alexei; 19 April 2019; “Targeting Stars: What is Known 

about the New ASAT Weapon? Project NUDOL”; Izvestiya.

480 Mizokami, Kyle; 16 August 2018; “Is Russia’s Mysterious New 

Satellite a Space Weapon?” Popular Mechanics; https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a22739471/is-russias-mysterious-new-satellite-a-space-weapon/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

481 Poblete, Yleem D.S.; 14 August 2018; “United States Remarks 

at the Conference on Disarmament as Delivered by Assistant 

Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance”; 

U.S. State Department; https://eneva.usmission.gov/2018/08/14/

remarks-by-assistant-secretary-yleem-d-s-poblete-at-the-conference-on-disarmament/. Accessed 30 July 2021.

482 Interfax; 26 October 2017; “Russia Tests Military Satellite Capable of Approaching other Spacecraft – Newspaper”.

483 Hendrickx, Bart; 27 September 2018; “Russia Develops Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite Capability”; Jane’s Intelligence Review.

484 TASS; 6 December 2019; “The Ministry of Defense Conducted an Experiment in Space to Separate a Small Satellite from 

Another Device”.

65
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

485 Zak, Anatoly; 26 November 2019; “Soyuz-2-1v launches a 

secret satellite”; Russian Space Web; http://russianspaceweb.com/

napryazhenie.html. Accessed 5 August 2020.

486 Hennigan, W.J.; 10 February 2020; “Exclusive: Strange Russian 

Spacecraft Shadowing U.S. Spy Satellite, General Says”; Time;

https://time.com/5779315/russian-spacecraft-spy-satellite-spaceforce/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

487 Interfax; 6 December 2019; “Russian military experts stage 

experiment in separating satellite from universal space platform”.

488 Agence France Presse; 14 August 2018; “Geneva – US 

dismisses ‘hypocritical’ draft space weapons treaty”; https://www.

shephardmedia.com/news/digital-battlespace/us-dismisses-hypocritical-draft-space-weapons-trea/. Accessed 5 August 2020.

489 U.S. Space Command Public Affairs; 23 July 2020; “Russia 

conducts space-based anti-satellite weapons test”; https://www.

spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2285098/russiaconducts-space-based-anti-satellite-weapons-test/. Accessed 5 

August 2020.

490 Hennigan, W.J.; 23 July 2020; “America Really Does Have a 

Space Force. We Went Inside to See What It Does”; Time; https://

time.com/5869987/spaceforce/. Accessed 5 August 2020.

491 Office of Director of National Intelligence; 11 December 2020; 

“Support to U.S. Space Command Messaging”.

492 Interfax; 17 September 2019; “Russia developing new 

inspector-satellite”.

493 NASA Spaceflight; 22 April 2020; “Topic:Qased –Noor 

– Shahrud – April 22, 2020, 03:59 UTC”; https://forum.

nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=50687.0. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

494 Office of the Supreme Leader; 16 October 2006; “20-Year 

Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1384-1404”.

495 Tehran Times; 9 April 2019; “Space Tech-Domestic Industry 

Should be Connected – Minister”.

496 E’remad ; 16 February 2020; “Ali Rabiei: I negate news on 

Rouhani’s Resignation Until Mordad 1400”.

497 Fars News Agency; 21 October 2018; “Official: Iran Among 9 

Top Satellite Manufacturers”.

498 Tarikhi, Parviz; 2 June 2008; “Iran’s Ambition in Space”; 

Position Magazine.

499 Iran Space Research Center; 18 June 2019; “IRSC About Us”. 

Accessed 5 August 2020.

500 Mehr News Agency; 17 August 2019; “SRI to Deliver Homegrown Pars-1 Satellite in Dec”.

501 Tehran Times 14 November 2018; “Iran to Involve Private Sector in Space Projects”.

502 Iran National Space Administration; 29 March 2019; Iran Space 

Agency; http://www.insa.isti.ir. Accessed 5 August 2020.

503 Tabnak; 13 January 2019; “Glance at Long Row of Iranian 

Satellites Ready for Launch – Plus Details”.

504 Warrick, Joby; 11 June 2021; “Russia is preparing to supply

Iran with an advanced satellite system that will boost Tehran’s ability 

to surveil military targets, officials say”; Washington Post; https://

www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/iran-russia-satellite/2021/06/10/d28978f0-c9ab-11eb-81b1-34796c7393af_story.

html. Accessed 20 July 2021.

505 Hendrickx, Bart; 21 June 2021; “Scrutinizing the Russian-Iranian satellite deal”; The Space Review; https://www.thespacereview.

com/article/4199/1. Accessed 20 July 2021.

506 TASS; 25 August 2015; “Russia to create satellite for remote 

sensing of the Earth for Iran”; https://tass.ru/kosmos/2210115. 

Accessed 20 July 2021.

507 VNIIEM; 25 August 2015; http://www.vniiem.ru/ru/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=718:2015-08-26-04-

14-18&catid=36:2008-03-09-13-50-48&itemid=50. Accessed 20 

July 2021.

508 Krebs, Gunther; 12 March 2020; “Safir”; Gunter’s Space 

Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/safir.htm. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

509 Tabnak; 13 January 2019; “Glance at Long Row of Iranian 

Satellites Ready for Launch – Plus Details”.

510 Mashregh News; 23 March 2020; “What is Iran Pursuing 

in Space?”.

511 Mashregh News; 28 March 2020; “Get Familiar with Iranian 

Satellite Launch Vehicles”.

512 Graham, William; 8 March 2022; “Iran Carries Out Military 

Launch with Qased Rocket and Noor-2 Satellite”; NASA Spaceflight; https://www.NASASpaceflight.com/2022/03/iran-military-qased-noor-2/. Accessed 19 March 2022.

513 Xinhua; 22 April 2020; “Iran ‘successfully’ puts 1st 

military satellite in orbit”; http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/22/c_138999480.htm. Accessed 3 August 2021.

514 Krebs, Gunter; 12 March 2020; “Simorgh (Safir-2)”; Gunter’s 

Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/simorgh.htm. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

515 Clark, Stephen; 22 April 2020; “Iran Places Military Satellite in 

Orbit”; Spaceflight Now; https://spaceflightnow.com/2020/04/22/

iran-places-military-satellite-in-orbit/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

516 Kalbasi, Khorso; 4 February 2020; “Islamic Republic Working 

on Two Small Satellite Launch Vehicles”; Financial Tribune; https://financialtribune.com/articles/sci-tech/102021/islamic-republic-working-on-two-satellite-launch-vehicles. Accessed 24 July 2021.

517 Todd, David; 22 April 2020; “Iran launches new Qased rocket 

type with Noor military sat aboard”; Seradata Ltd (Space Equipment Research & Analysis); https://www.seradata.com/iranlaunches-new-qased-rocket-type-with-noor-military-sat-aboard/. 

Accessed 24 July 2021.

518 Grush, Loren; 22 April 2020; “Iran claims it has successfully 

launched a military satellite”; The Verge; https://www.theverge.

com/2020/4/22/21230847/iran-military-satellite-rocket-launch-isDEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 66
lamic-revolutionary-guard-corps. Accessed 3 August 2021.

519 Todd, David; 22 April 2020; “Iran launches new Qased rocket 

type with Noor military sat aboard”; Seradata Ltd; https://www.

seradata.com/iran-launches-new-qased-rocket-type-with-noor-military-sat-aboard/. Accessed 24 July 2021.

520 Iran Military Forum; 15 February 2020; “Qaem solid propellant 

space launcher”; https://iran-military.com/index.php?threads/qaem-solid-propellant-space-launcher.1537/. Accessed 24 July 2021.

521 Harrison, Todd, et al; 20 March 2020; “Space Threat Assessment 2020”, p. 30; Center for Strategic and International Studies; 

https://aerospace.csis.org/sta2020. Accessed 22 March 2020.

522 Jane’s Intelligence Review; 14 April 2011; “Republic space – 

Iran’s satellite programme accelerates”.

523 World Politics Review; 29 September 2016; “Don’t Count Iran’s 

Nascent Space Capabilities Out”; www.worldpoliticsreview.com/

trend-lines/20067/don-t-count-iran-s-nascent-space-capabilitiesout. Accessed 3 August 2021.

524 Cohen, Zachary and Liebermann, Oren; 22 June 2021; 

“Pentagon tracked failed Iranian satellite launch and new images reveal Tehran is set to try again”; CNN; https://www.cnn.

com/2021/06/22/politics/iran-failed-satellite-launch/index.html. 

Accessed 20 July 2021.

525 Fars News; 13 November 2018; “DM: Iran to Give Crushing 

Response to Enemies Space Threats”.

526 Sadequi, Susan; 16 July 2018; “Iran: Official Says Satellite 

Jamming Signals, Radio Frequency Radiation Levels not Health 

Concern”; IRNA.

527 Fars News Agency; 26 September 2018; “Iran Unveils New 

Achievements in Drone Industry”.

528 Harrison, Todd, et al; 20 March 2020; “Space Threat Assessment 2020”, pp. 32-33; Center for Strategic and International Studies; https://aerospace.csis.org/sta2020. Accessed 22 March 2020.

529 Iran Electronics Industries; 12 January 2011; “Products”.

530 Fars News Agency; 21 October 2018; “Official: Iran Among 9 

Top Satellite Manufacturers”.

531 Harrison, Todd, et al; 20 March 2020; “Space Threat Assessment 2020”, p. 30; Center for Strategic and International Studies; 

https://aerospace.csis.org/sta2020. Accessed 22 March 2020.

532 Jane’s Intelligence Review; 14 April 2011; “Republic space – 

Iran’s satellite programme accelerates”.

533 World Politics Review; 29 September 2016; “Don’t Count Iran’s 

Nascent Space Capabilities Out”; www.worldpoliticsreview.com/

trend-lines/20067/don-t-count-iran-s-nascent-space-capabilitiesout. Accessed 3 August 2021.

534 Spacewatch Global; September 2019; “Iran and APSCO to 

create a space situational awareness network”; https://spacewatch.global/2016/09/iran-apsco-create-space-situational-awareness-network/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

535 Financial Tribune; 18 September 2017; “Iran Plans to Join 2 

APSCO Projects”; https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-sci-tech/72519/iran-plans-to-join-2-apsco-projects. Accessed 

3 August 2021.

536 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization; “Signing of APSCO Convention”; http://www.apsco.int/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

537 Tehran Times; 23 June 2018; “Iranian Space Agency Seeks 

Further Co-op With APSCO”.

538 Iran National Space Administration; 29 March 2019; “Imam 

Ja’far Sadeq Space Monitoring Center.

539 Kooser, Amanda; 2 April 2014. “North Korea Names Space 

Agency ‘NADA,’ Mimics NASA Logo”; CNET.com; https://www.

cnet.com/news/north-korea-names-space-agency-nada-mimicsnasa-logo/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

540 Krebs, Gunther; Accessed 8 Dec 20; “Unha-3”; Gunter’s Space 

Page; space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau_unha.htm. Accessed 3 August 

2021.

541 Agence France Presse (Yahoo News Reprint); 2 February 

2016; “N. Korea confirms Imminent Satellite Launch”; https://news.

yahoo.com/n-korea-issues-shipping-warning-satellite-launchimo-152605329.html. Accessed 3 August 2021. 

542 Zwirko, Colin; 11 October 2021; “North Korea boasts of 

‘full-scale’ work towards space capabilities“; North Korea News; 

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October 2021.

543 Dominguez, Gabriel; “Increased Activity spotted at North Korea’s Sohae rocket launch site: 38 North”; Jane’s Defense Weekly; 

10 October 2016.

544 Bermudez, Joseph and Cha, Victor; 17 December 2019; 

“December 2019 Update: Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground”; 

Beyond Parallel; https://beyondparallel.csis.org/december-2019-update-tonghae-satellite-launching-ground/. Accessed 

3 August 2021.

545 Waterman, Shaun; 23 August 2012; “North Korean Jamming 

of GPS shows system’s weakness”; The Washington Times;

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/23/northkorean-jamming-gps-shows-systems-weakness/. Accessed 5 

August 2020.

546 Williams, Martyn; 17 November 2012; “Report: DPRK Jams 

South Korean Satellite Comms”; North Korea Tech; https://www.

northkoreatech.org/2012/11/17/report-dprk-jams-south-korean-satellite-comms/. Accessed 6 August 2020.

547 Shim, Elizabeth; 31 March 2016; “North Korea Jamming 

GPS Signals in South; Can Affect Planes, Cellphones”; United 

Press International; http://www.upi.com/Top_News/WorldNews/2016/03/31/North-Korea-jamming-GPS-signals-in-Southcan-affect-planes-cellphones/2551459443059/. Accessed 5 

August 2020.

548 Paganini, Pierluigi; 19 November 2020; “Nation-state Ac67
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

tors From Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea Target Canada”; 

Security Affairs Blog; https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/111182/

cyber-warfare-2/canada-nation-state-actors.html. Accessed 17 

December 2021.

549 HHS Cybersecurity Program; 25 March 2021; North Korean 

Cyber Activity; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

550 Ciampanu, Catalin; 30 July 2020; “US defense and aerospace 

sectors targeted in new wave of North Korean attacks”; Zero Day 

Net; https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-defense-and-aerospacesectors-targeted-in-new-wave-of-north-korean-attacks/. Accessed 

27 July 2021.

551 Min Chao Choy and Weisensee, Nils; 19 June 2020; North Korean hackers targeted aerospace, defense companies via Linkedin: 

experts; NK News; https://www.nknews.org/2020/06/north-korean-hackers-targeted-aerospace-defense-companies-via-linkedin-experts/. Accessed 27 July 2021.

552 Alyac EST Security; 17 November 2020; “APT Hackers Use 

Biden Era North Korea Denuclearization Documents for Attack”.

553 Paganini, Pierluigi; 19 November 2020; “Nation-state actors 

from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea target Canada”; Security Affairs; https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/author/paganinip. 

Accessed 27 July 2021.

554 Canada Centre for Cyber Security; November 2020; “Canada 

Centre for Cyber Security warns of risks related to state-sponsored 

programs from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea”; https://www.

canada.ca/en/communications-security/news/2020/11/canadian-centre-for-cyber-security-releases-the-canadian-national-cyber-threat-assessment-2020.html. Accessed 27 July 2021.

555 U.S. Justice Department; 17 February 2021; “Three North 

Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to 

Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe”; 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and. 

Accessed 27 July 2021.

556 Center for Strategic and International Studies; 8 July 2021; 

“Significant Cyber Incidents”; https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents. Accessed 

27 July 2021.

557 Harrison, Todd, et al; 20 March 2020; “Space Threat Assessment 2020”, p. 38; Center for Strategic and International Studies; 

https://aerospace.csis.org/sta2020. Accessed 22 March 2020.

558 Office of the Secretary of Defense; 5 January 2016; Report to 

Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015, pp. 4, 10, 13, 19; https://

www.hsdl.org/?view&did=790165. Accessed 3 August 2021.

559 Harrison, Todd, et al; 20 March 2020; “Space Threat Assessment 2020”, pp. 35-36; Center for Strategic and International Studies; https://aerospace.csis.org/sta2020. Accessed 22 March 2020.

560 Lotto Persio, Sophia; 30 October 2017; “Star Wars: North Korea Unveils Five-Year-Plan to Conquer Space”; Newsweek; https://

www.newsweek.com/star-wars-north-koreas-unveils-5-year-planconquer-space-695896. Accessed 3 August 2021.

561 Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee/National Air and Space Intelligence Center; 11 January 2021; Ballistic 

and Cruise Missile Threat 2020, pp. 2, 27; https://www.nasic.

af.mil/Portals/19/images/Fact%20Sheet%20Images/2017%20

Ballistic%20and%20Cruise%20Missile%20Threat_Final_small.

pdf?ver=2017-07-21-083234-343. Accessed 3 August 2021.

562 Jones, Andrew; 22 December 2020; “China launches first Long 

March 8 from Wenchang spaceport”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/china-launches-first-long-march-8-from-wenchangspaceport/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

563 Global Times (China); 29 May 2020; “China’s liquid rocket 

engine completes key restart function test”.

564 Jones, Andrew; 4 August 2021; “Mystery Surrounds Chinese 

Private Rocket Launch Attempt”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/mystery-surrounds-chinese-private-launch-attempt/. 

Accessed 19 March 2022.

565 Quan Xiaoshu, Yu Fei, and Li Guoli; 08 May 2020; “China 

Focus: Return Capsule of China’s Experimental Manned Spaceship 

Comes Back Successfully”; Xinhua.

566 China Daily; 15 July 2019; “China Daily: New Recoverable Satellite to Lift Off in 2020”; http://www.chinadaily.com.

cn/a/201907/16/WS5d2cb0a7a3105895c2e7d8e3.html. Accessed 3 August 2021.

567 Levochkin, Petr; 12 April 2019; “Russia: Energomash Chief 

Designer: We are Ready to Supply Reusable Engines for Russian 

Rockets”; Interfax-AVN.

568 TASS; 26 August 2019; “Russia Orders Engine for Krylo Reusable Rocket Programme”.

569 Defense Intelligence Agency; 26 April 2021; Statement of the 

Record Worldwide Threat Assessment, p. 7.

570 Xinhua; 6 September 2020; “China’s Reusable Experimental 

Spacecraft Back to Landing Site”.

571 Xinhua; 4 September 2020; “China Launches Reusable Experimental Spacecraft”.

572 Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems; 9 March 2011; “Satellite 

Launch Vehicle Programmes: China: Air-launched Satellite Vehicle”.

573 China Hangtian; 21 October 2019; “China: CASC Completes Wind 

Tunnel Free Separation Test for Two-Stage-to-Orbit Space Plane”.

574 Interfax-AVN; 22 January 2009; “RSC Energia Considers Creating Tourist Space Plane”.

575 Moscow Vesti; 23 April 2010; “Russia’s Space Plane Said Much 

Cheaper Than US Shuttle”.

576 RIA-Novosti; 7 June 2005; “Russia: Space Official Says Buran 

Space Shuttle Could be Revived”.

577 Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey; 27 December 2007; 

“Russia not to Revive Buran Spacecraft Programme”.

578 Karpukhin, Sergei; 29 May 2019; “Russian Space Tourism 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 68
Firm to Send Dummy for First Flight in Returnable Capsule”; TASS; 

https://tass.com/science/1060575. Accessed 3 August 2021.

579 Space Facts; 6 January 2021; Astronauts and cosmonauts 

(sorted by first Mission); http://wwwspacefacts.de/english/e_first. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

580 Japan Economic Newswire; 1 September 2018; “Japanese 

Startup aims for Commercial Space Travel in 2023”.

581 NASA; 27 March 2018; “What is a Lagrange Point?”; NASA 

Solar System Exploration; https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/resources/754/what –is-a-lagrange-point/. Accessed 22 July 2021.

582 Kakaes, Konstantin; 30 January 2017; “International Collaborations in Space Always Reflect Politics on Earth: A Brief History of 

the Countries that Send People to Space, and Why”; Slate; https://

www.slate.com/technology/2017/03/a_brief_history_of_the_countries_that_send_people_to_space_and_why.html. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

583 European Space Agency; Mission Navigator; https://www.esa.

int/ESA/Our_Missions. Accessed 22 March 2021.

584 Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA); JAXA: 

Missions; https://global.jaxa.jp/projects/index.html. Accessed 22 

March 2021.

585 Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO); List of Scientific and 

Exploration Spacecraft; http://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft\list-of-scientific-and-exploration-spacecraft. Accessed 22 March 2021.

586 Trevithick, Joseph; 5 June 2020; “Air Force Is Looking Beyond 

Traditional Orbits To Get An Upper Hand In Space”; The War 

Zone; https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33888/air-force-islooking-beyond-traditional-orbits-to-get-an-upper-hand-in-space. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

587 Secure World Foundation; January 2017; The United 

States, China, and Space Security: Issues for the Trump Administration; https://swfound.org/media/205709/jw_uschinaspacesec_17012017.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

588 Secure World Foundation; January 2017; The United 

States, China, and Space Security: Issues for the Trump Administration; https://swfound.org/media/205709/jw_uschinaspacesec_17012017.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

589 18 Space Control Squadron; Space-Track.org; “Catalog”; 

https://www.space-track.org/#catalog. Accessed 19 March 2022.

590 NASA; 2001; U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices; https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/usg_od_

standard_practices.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

591 Federal Communications Commission; November 2019; U.S. 

Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices; https://

orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/usg_orbital_debris_mitigation_standard_practices_november_2019.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

592 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC); 

IADC-02-01; September 2007; IADC Space Debris Mitigation 

Guidelines; https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/iadc_mitigation_guidelines_rev_1_sep07.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

593 National Aeronautics and Space Administration; IG-21-011; 

27 January 2021; NASA’s Efforts to Mitigate the Risks Posed by 

Orbital Debris. https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/ig-21-011.pdf. Accessed 

3 August 2021.

594 European Space Operations Centre (ESOC); GEN-DB-LOG00288-OPS-SD, Version 4.0; 27 May 2021; ESA’s Annual Space 

Environment Report, pp. 68-71; https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf. Accessed 

3 August 2021.

595 18 Space Control Squadron; Space-Track.org; “Box Score”; 

https://www.space-track.org/. Accessed 19 March 2022.

596 Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); 1 January 2022; 

“Satellite Database”; https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/

space-weapons/satellite-database. Accessed 19 March 2022.

597 McKnight, D., Macdonald, J., Arora, R., Pelton, J., Jenniges, 

J., and Martinez, P.; S2468-8967(20)30006-9; May 2019; “The 

Global Risk Continuum (GRC)”; The Journal of Space Safety Engineering, JSSE 104, International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) Space Safety Conference, Los 

Angeles, CA, May 2019.

598 McKnight, D., Macdonald, J., Arora, R., Pelton, J., Jenniges, 

J., and Martinez, P.; S2468-8967(20)30006-9; May 2019; “The 

Global Risk Continuum (GRC)”; The Journal of Space Safety Engineering, JSSE 104, International Association for the Advancement 

of Space Safety (IAASS) Space Safety Conference, Los Angeles, 

CA, May 2019.

599 18 Space Control Squadron; Space-Track.org; “Box Score”; 

https://www.space-track.org/. Accessed 19 March 2022.

600 McKnight, D., Matney, M., Walbert, K., Behrend, S. Casey, P., 

and Speaks, S.; 25 September 2017; “Preliminary Analysis of Two 

Years of the Massive Collision Monitoring Activity”; International 

Astronautical Congress.

601 Rossia, A., Petita, A., and McKnight, D.; 8 June 2020; “Shortterm space safety analysis of LEO constellations and clusters”; 

Acta Astronautica 175.

602 Dr. Liou, J.-C.; 9 February 2018; “U.S. Space Debris Environment, Operations, and Research Updates”; UN Office on Outer 

Space Activities; http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/

stsc/2018/tech-14E.pdf. Accessed 5 August 2020.

603 McFall-Johnsen, Morgan; 4 December 2021; “Russia pushes the International Space Station away from '90s US rocket 

debris — the 2nd space-junk scare this week”; Business Insider; https://www.businessinsider.com/international-space-station-swerves-to-avoid-rocket-debris-2021-12. Accessed 19 March 

2022.

604 McKnight, D. and Kawashima, R.; IAA SG4.23; April 2019; “A 

Handbook for Post-Mission Disposal of Satellites Less Than 100 

kg”; International Academy of Astronautics (IAA).

605 McKnight, D. and Kawashima, R.; IAA SG4.23; April 2019; “A 

Handbook for Post-Mission Disposal of Satellites Less Than 100 

kg”; International Academy of Astronautics (IAA).

69
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

606 Federal Communications Commission; November 2019; 

U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices; 

https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/usg_orbital_debris_mitigation_standard_practices_november_2019.pdf. Accessed 3 

August 2021.

607 European Space Operations Centre (ESOC); GEN-DB-LOG00288-OPS-SD, Version 4.0; 27 May 2021; ESA’s Annual Space 

Environment Report, pp. 68-71; https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf. Accessed 

3 August 2021.

608 Manis, A., Matney, M., Anz-Meador, P., Gates, D., Kennedy, T., 

Seago, J., Vavrin, A. and Y.-L. Xu; April 2020; “The New NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model 3.1”; NASA Orbital Debris Quarterly 

News, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 2.

609 Aerospace Corporation; September 2020; Commercial MultiINT Cheat Sheet.

610 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 13.

611 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 13.

612 Beyer, Bill and Nelson, Nicholas; 28 June 2018; “Space Congestion Threatens to ‘Darken Skies’”; National Defense Magazine; 

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/6/28/

viewpoint-space-congestion-threatens-to-darken-skies. Accessed 

4 August 2020.

613 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018; 

Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community, p. 13.

614 Secure World Foundation; January 2017; The United 

States, China, and Space Security: Issues for the Trump Administration; https://swfound.org/media/205709/jw_uschinaspacesec_17012017.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

615 Secure World Foundation; January 2017; The United 

States, China, and Space Security: Issues for the Trump Administration; https://swfound.org/media/205709/jw_uschinaspacesec_17012017.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

616 Matytsin, Valery; 27 January 2017; “Russian specialists proposed creation of satellites to service spacecraft”; TASS; https://

tass.ru/kosmos/3976581. Accessed 20 July 2021.

617 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to 

Astronautics, 4th Edition, pp. 614-617, 623-624; CEI: United 

States; 2015.

618 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to 

Astronautics, 4th Edition, pp. 61-62; CEI: United States; 2015.

619 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. II-4.

620 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to 

Astronautics, 4th Edition, pp. 6, 59-60; CEI: United States; 2015.

621 Xinhua; 20 July 2018; “China developing in-orbit satellite transport vehicle”.

622 Jones, Andrew; 21 April 2021; “China is developing plans for a 

13,000-satellite megaconstellation”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communi- cations-megaconstellation/. Accessed 2 August 2021.

623 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. x.

624 GPS.GOV; 5 November 2019; “Timing”; http://www.gps.gov/

applications/timing/. Accessed 3 August 2021.

625 Hoehn, John R. and Ryder, Samuel D.; R45996; 26 June 2020; 

“Precision Guided Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress”; Congressional Research Service.

626 Gray, Brandon J., Major, USAF; August 2017; “The Post 

GPS-Only Era: Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) in 21st 

Century Warfare”; Air Command and Staff College; https://apps.

dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ad1054619.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2021.

627 Quasi-Zenith Satellite System; 2021; “Overview of the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System”; https://qzss.go.jp/en/overview/services/ 

sv01_what.html. Accessed 20 July 2021.

628 Indian Space Research Organization; 2021; “Indian Regional 

Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS): NavIC”; https://www.isro.gov.

in/irnss-programme. Accessed 3 August 2021.

629 European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency; 17 

February 2021; “Galileo is the European global satellite-based 

navigation system”; https://www.gsa.europa.eu/european-gnss/

galileo/galileo-european-global-satellite-based-navigation-system. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

630 Xinhua; 26 May 2021; “China’s Beidou-related industry estimated to top 1t yuan by 2025”; http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-05/26/c_139971521.htm. Accessed 20 July 2021.

631 Interfax; 4 May 2021; “Twenty-two GLONASS satellites currently in operation”.

632 Foust, Jeff; 8 April 2021; “OneWeb continues to study offering 

navigation services”; Space News; https://spacenews.com/oneweb-continues-to-study-offering-navigation-services/. Accessed 17 

December 2021.

633 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. II-8.

634 Erwin, Sandra; 14 November 2019; “Air Force: SSA is no more; 

it’s ‘Space Domain Awareness’”; Space News; https://spacenews.

com/air-force-ssa-is-no-more-its-space-domain-awareness/. 

Accessed 3 August 2021.

635 Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14: 

Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. I-3, 

II-16.

636 Joint Chiefs of Staff; November 2021; DoD Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms, p. 71.

637 Joint Chiefs of Staff: November 2021; DoD Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms, p. 64.

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