Opinion filed April 3, 2014



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

___ __ __ _ ____ 

### No. 11

- 1 3

- 00 3 0 1

- C V

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### IN THE INTEREST OF L. J.P

. , A CHILD

On Appeal from the 3 1 8 th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. FM 55,417

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
The trial court entered an order that terminat ed the parental rights of both the
mother and the father of L. J.P

. The moth er , Appellant, has filed a notice of appeal. 1 In her single issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the finding that termination is in the best interest of L.J.P. We
affirm.
T ermination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.001 ( West Supp. 201 3 ). To determine on appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case , we review

1 The father did not appeal.2 all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether
a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding

was true. In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on the entir e record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25

– 26 (Tex. 2002). To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(1)(A )

– ( T) and that termination is in the best interest of the child.
F AM

. § 161.001. In this case, the trial court found that A ppellant committed two of
the acts listed in Section 161 .001(1). The trial court found that A ppellant had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the physical or emotional well

- being of the child and
that A ppellan t had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well

being. See id. § 161.001(1) (D), (E). Appellant does not challenge the finding s made pursuant to Section 161.001(1). Either o f t he se unchallenged finding s wa s sufficient to support termination as long as termination was shown to be in the
child ’s best interest. See id. § 161.001. The trial court also found that termination
was in the child ’ s best interest. See id. § 161.001(2). The question before us is whether the best interest finding is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be prov ed. In re C.J.O. , 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. denied). But courts may use the non

- exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W.2d 367, 371

– 72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child,3 (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist
these individ uals to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate
that the exist ing parent

- child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating
that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.J.O. , 325 S.W.3d at 266. The Department of Family and Protective Services originally became
involved with L. J.P. i n August 2011, when drug tests taken upon her birth were positive for amphetamine and methadone

. Appe llant admitted that she had used heroin about one week prior to L.J.P.’s birth

. T he Department determined that the parents’ home was inappropriate and dangerous. The parents failed to perform the family

- based safety services and , after the Department ini tiated an emergency removal, absconded with L.J.P. After six months of attempting to locate L.J.P., the Department dismissed the case. About one year after the parents absconded with L.J.P., the parents and L.J.P. were discovered in a van in a parking lo t. Officer Reymundo Tobar was directed to the van when he responded to a report of a female staggering with a baby in the parking lot. Officer Tobar observed L.J.P.’s parents, unclothed, in the driver’s seat of the van, having sex. L.J.P., who was approximately eighteen months old, was standing next to her parents while they were engaging in
intercourse

. It was cold and rainy, and L.J.P. was wearing only a diaper. A syringe that had no top on it and, thus, had an exposed needle was located on the floor of the van “right where the child was standing.” This syringe contained a4 black substance that was later determined to be heroin. The van contained a total of thirty

- six syringes; two small bags of bath salts; “old, old food”; and dirty clothes. Two more small bags were discovered on the father when he was searched at the jail. The father told officers these bags contained speed, bath salts,
and he roin. Officer Tobar testified that both of L.J.P.’s parents were fidgety and sweaty and appeared to be under the influ ence of some type of substance. Appellant was incarcerated at the time of the final termination hearing , but she participated in the hear ing via telephone

. The record shows that Appellant had been convicted of interference with child custody, possession of a controlled substance (twice), and endangering a child. Appellant testified that her projected parole date is November 20, 2014. App ellant refuted Officer Tobar’s allegations regarding the incident in the parking lot . She testified that she was not having
intercourse in the van ; that she was not under the influence of narcotics; that there were no syringes on the floor of the van near L.J.P. ; and that, to her knowledge, there were no drugs in the van. Prior to L.J.P.’s birth, Appellant had had a son, and her rights to that child
had been terminated. Shortly after the parents’ arrest in this case, the Department placed L.J.P. in the sa me home as her brother. L.J.P.’s foster parents had adopted
L.J.P.’s brother and were also interest ed in adopting L.J.P. L.J.P., who was two years old at the time of trial, was doing well in her placement. Two Department employees testified that they be lieved it would be in the best interest of L.J.P. for the parents’ rights to be terminated. The child’s guardian ad litem also
recommended termination and stated that it would be in L.J.P.’s best interest to terminate the parental rights of both Appellant and the father and to permit adoption by the current foster parents. The record shows that Appellant had engaged in a course of conduct that endangered L.J.P.
, that Appellant had not demonstrated an ability to meet L.J.P.’s5 needs, that L.J.P. was doing well in her current placement, that the current placement was stable, and that the circumstances in this case were “pretty severe.”
W e cannot hold that the trial court’s best interest finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence; t h e trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief
or conviction that it would be in L. J.P

. ’s best interest for A ppellant’s parental rights to be terminated

. T he evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the best interest finding

. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
We affirm t he trial court’s order o f terminat ion

.

JOHN M. BAILEY
JUSTICE

April 3 , 201 4 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson , J. , and Bailey, J.