Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Senaca Lapsley

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Senaca Lapsley,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 27, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PC-2063

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Frances C. Gull, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D04-1602-PC-16

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 2 of 11

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Petitioner, Senaca Lapsley (Lapsley), appeals the post-conviction 

court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Lapsley presents three issues on appeal, which we restate as the following:

(1) Whether he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel;

(2) Whether his due process rights were violated when he received an 

enhanced sentence on the aggravated battery conviction to which his 

habitual offender enhancement was also attached; and 

(3) Whether he was deprived of a fair post-conviction proceeding. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] The facts of the underling offenses, as found by this court, are as follows:

At around 12:00 a.m. on December 25, 2013, Lapsley asked his 

girlfriend, Tequila James, if she would drop him off to see his 

brother at Stein Tavern. James saw that Lapsley had a pistol “on 

the side of his jacket and the pants pocket.” James dropped 

Lapsley off at Stein Tavern and drove away.

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on December 25, 2013, Lapsley, who 

had dreadlocks, his brother Lorenzo, and another man entered 

Sports and Spirits, a tavern in Fort Wayne, Indiana. There were 

around fifty people at the bar. Randy Daniels was working as a 

doorman at the bar, and Anna Roque and Zachary Huddleston, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 3 of 11

both of whom worked as bartenders but were not working at the 

time, were socializing with Daniels. At some point, Lorenzo 

punched a man in the face, and Daniels rushed over to break up 

the fight. Daniels attempted to defuse the situation and, with the 

help of Huddleston, directed Lapsley, Lorenzo, and the third 

man toward the door. Daniels, with Huddleston’s assistance, 

forced the three men to exit the bar through the front door, and 

Daniels locked the door.

Within seconds after he exited the building, Lapsley pulled a gun 

out of his clothing, pointed it directly through the front window 

of the bar, and fired the gun multiple times. Roque was struck in 

the hand, and Huddleston was struck in the neck and abdomen. 

A bullet entered Huddleston’s neck below his chin and exited out 

of his jaw, shattering it. A second bullet entered Huddleston’s 

abdomen, traveled through his bladder, and struck the femoral 

artery in his left leg. Huddleston tried to scream but could not 

because of the blood in his throat. Roque helped Huddleston roll 

over so that he could cough so that he would not choke on his 

own blood. A part of one of Roque’s fingers later had to be 

amputated as a result of her injuries. Huddleston later 

underwent approximately ten operations during three hospital 

stays totaling about two months.

In the morning following the shooting, Lapsley told James that 

Lorenzo had “knocked out somebody” at Sports and Spirits. 

Later that night, Lapsley and James were watching the news, and 

there was a report about the shooting at Sports and Spirits. 

When the report showed a picture of the window of Sports and 

Spirits with bullet holes in it, Lapsley yelled: “Damn, that look 

like my holes I put through the windows.” 

Lapsley v. State, No. 02A05-1408-CR-399 (Ind. Ct. App. March 20, 2015). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 4 of 11

[5] On December 27, 2013, the State filed an Information, charging Lapsley with 

two Counts of Class B felony aggravated battery and three Counts of Class C 

felony criminal recklessness. The State also alleged that Lapsley was an 

habitual offender. Lapsley was appointed a public defender to represent him in 

the proceedings. On July 9, 2014, a jury found Lapsley guilty as charged, and it 

found that he was an habitual offender. On August 7, 2014, the trial court 

sentenced Lapsley to twenty-year terms for each of the Class B felony 

aggravated batteries and to eight years for one of the Counts of Class C felony 

criminal recklessness, all to be served consecutively. The trial court enhanced 

Lapsley’s sentence for the first Count of aggravated battery by thirty years for 

being an habitual offender, for an aggregate sentence of seventy-eight years. 

Lapsley pursued a direct appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 

sustaining his convictions and the inappropriateness of his sentence. On March 

20, 2015, this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. Id. 

[6] On February 8, 2016, Lapsley filed his PCR. On May 19, 2017, the Public 

Defender of Indiana filed an appearance but subsequently withdrew from the 

case on August 17, 2017. Lapsley proceeded pro se with his PCR, which he 

amended on October 2, 2017. Among his twenty-six contentions of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and 

prosecutorial misconduct, Lapsley alleged the following: 

J. Trial counsel [] failed to object or correct the [S]tate’s 

misrepresentation of crucial evidence used against me. Noted as 

a 404(b) violation under Indiana Rules of Evidence. And a lesser 

include[d] offense should’ve been given to the jurors. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 5 of 11

K. Trial counsel [] [was] ineffective [be]cause he failed to argue 

defective indictment or information, lack of probable cause and 

failure to properly inform me of the charges against me. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 5). 

[7] On October 25, 2017, the trial court granted the State’s motion to require 

Lapsley to submit his case by affidavit. On November 6, 2017, Lapsley filed an

affidavit in support of his PCR. Lapsley’s affidavit contained general 

allegations of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel as well as the 

averment that “Petitioner was denied fundamental due process failure [sic] to 

inform defendant of prohibited conduct.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 79). On 

July 31, 2018, the post-conviction court denied Lapsley’s PCR. Regarding 

Lapsley’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the post-conviction 

court concluded that Lapsley had failed to demonstrate any inadequacy in his

trial counsel’s performance because he did not identify any lesser-included 

offenses he had been entitled to, nor had he specified how the Information had 

been defective or failed to inform him of the charges against him.

[8] Lapsley now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[9] PCR proceedings are civil proceedings in which a petitioner may present 

limited collateral challenges to a criminal conviction and sentence. Wilkes v. 

State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013). In a PCR proceeding, the petitioner 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 6 of 11

bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Id. When a petitioner appeals from the denial of his PCR, he stands in the 

position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Hollowell v. State, 19 

N.E.3d 263, 269 (Ind. 2014). To prevail on appeal from the denial of a PCR, 

the petitioner must show that the evidence “as a whole leads unerringly and 

unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the [PCR] court.” Id. In 

addition, where a PCR court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in 

accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6), we do not defer to its legal 

conclusions, but we will reverse its findings and judgment only upon a showing 

of clear error, meaning error which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made. Id. 

II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[10] Lapsley contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 

the Information because it did not allege that he committed the aggravated 

batteries by means of a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm. He also argues that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction for Class D 

felony battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery. However, in 

his amended PCR and affidavit in support, Lapsley made general allegations 

that his trial counsel should have challenged the Information and requested a 

lesser-included instruction without raising the more specific arguments that he 

now raises on appeal. It is well-settled that issues not raised in a PCR petition 

may not be raised for the first time on appeal from the denial of that petition. 

Pavan v. State, 64 N.E.3d 231, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Accordingly, we find 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 7 of 11

that these arguments were waived because they were not raised in the postconviction court proceedings.

[11] However, even if they had been argued below, Lapsley would not be entitled to 

relief. We evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the two-part 

test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on 

such a claim, a petitioner must show that 1) his counsel’s performance was 

deficient based on prevailing professional norms; and 2) that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240 (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). In order to demonstrate sufficient prejudice, the 

petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Id. at 1241 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A reasonable 

probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 

A petitioner’s failure to satisfy either the ‘performance’ or the ‘prejudice’ prong 

of a Strickland analysis will cause an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to 

fail. Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. 2006). 

[12] We begin by noting that Lapsley did not include copies of the charging 

Informations he challenges in his Appendix. However, the chronological case 

summary for the underlying criminal case included in the Appendix indicates 

that the State charged Lapsley with two Counts of aggravated battery under 

Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.5(2) (1997), which, at the time he committed 

the offenses, provided, in relevant part, that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 8 of 11

[a] person who knowingly or intentionally inflicts injury on a 

person that creates a substantial risk of death or causes:

* * * 

(2) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily 

member or organ[]

* * *

commits aggravated battery, a Class B felony.

Thus, the statute did not require that the State allege or prove that the offense 

was committed by means of a deadly weapon as Lapsley contends here on 

appeal. Because there was no deficiency in the charging information, Lapsley 

did not show that his counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to 

challenge it, or that he was prejudiced thereby. See Grafe v. State, 686 N.E.2d 

890, 896 (Ind. 1997) (“The failure to pose a meritless objection or present a 

meritless argument cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because it 

does not result in prejudice to the defendant.”). Because Lapsley’s argument 

regarding his counsel’s failure to request an instruction on the lesser-included 

offense of Class D felony battery hinges on his contention that the State’s 

charging information was deficient, that claim fails as well. For the same 

reasons, the post-conviction court’s conclusion that Lapsley had failed to 

demonstrate inadequate performance on the part of his trial counsel was not 

clearly erroneous. See Hollowell, 19 N.E.3d at 269.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 9 of 11

[13] In this section of his brief, Lapsley also argues that the trial court violated his 

due process rights by failing to instruct the jury that they must find that the 

aggravated batteries were accomplished by means of a deadly weapon. This is 

a freestanding claim of trial court error that was available to Lapsley on direct 

appeal but was not raised. Thus, Lapsley was procedurally barred from 

bringing that claim on post-conviction relief. See Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 

591, 597 (Ind. 2001) (holding that issues that were known and available on 

direct appeal, but not raised, are waived). In addition, as we have already 

determined, it is a meritless claim because the State was not required to prove 

the element of use of a deadly weapon in order to prove the offense. Lapsley’s 

related argument that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise the issue is also unavailing because, in addition to being based on a

meritless argument, Lapsley proceeded pro se in his post-conviction proceedings. 

A pro se litigant may not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against 

himself. Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 1987). 

III. Aggravated Battery Sentence

[14] Lapsley next argues that the trial court deprived him of his fundamental right to 

due process when it enhanced his sentence on Count I for Class B felony 

aggravated battery based on the same offenses that made the showing that he is 

an habitual offender. As noted above, this is a freestanding claim of trial court 

error that may not be raised in a PCR. Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597. In 

addition, Lapsley has not cited to the trial court’s sentencing statement or 

written sentencing order, and so even if the claim were properly before us, he 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 10 of 11

has failed to meet his burden on appeal to demonstrate that the trial court’s 

sentencing was improper. See Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240. Lastly, even if the 

trial court had sentenced him as Lapsley argues, he has not demonstrated any 

error on the part of the trial court. Under the sentencing scheme in effect at the 

time he committed the offenses, a trial court was not precluded from enhancing 

a base felony with the same criminal record that supported the finding that the 

defendant was an habitual offender. Pedraza v. State, 887 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. 

2008). 

IV. Fair Post-Conviction Proceeding

[15] Lapsley’s final claim is that he was deprived of a fair post-conviction 

proceeding because the Public Defender of Indiana withdrew from his case and 

because he was provided a form at the prison library to file his affidavit in 

support of his PCR that he contends was inadequate in some unspecified 

manner. There is no constitutional right to counsel for post-conviction 

proceedings under either the federal or state constitutions. Hill v. State, 960 

N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. 2012). After the Public Defender withdrew from his 

case, Lapsley had the right to proceed pro se with his PCR, which he did. Pro se

litigants such as Lapsley are “held to the same standards as a trained attorney 

and [are] afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being selfrepresented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). As a pro se

litigant, it was incumbent on Lapsley to prepare and file his affidavit and no one 

else. We conclude that Lapsley was not deprived of a fair proceeding as he 

pursued his PCR pro se. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2063 | June 27, 2019 Page 11 of 11

CONCLUSION

[16] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Lapsley received effective assistance 

of trial counsel, his freestanding claim of trial court error at sentencing is both 

procedurally barred and without merit, and that he received a fair postconviction proceeding.

[17] Affirmed. 

[18] Bailey, J. and Pyle, J. concur