United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 2015 Decided June 5, 2015

No. 13-5269

PRISON LEGAL NEWS,

APPELLANT

v.

CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR., DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF

PRISONS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-01812)

Ronald G. London argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Lisa B. Zycherman and Lance Weber.

Bruce D. Brown, Gregg P. Leslie, Bruce W. Sandford,

Laurie A. Babinski, Peter Scheer and Charles D. Tobin were on

the brief for amici curiaeThe Reporters Committee for Freedom

of the Press, et al. in support of appellant. 

Wyneva Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Alan Burch,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
2

Before: HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH. 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: The efforts of Prison

Legal News (“PLN”) to obtain documents from the Federal

Bureau of Prisons are chronicled in the four district court

opinions preceding this appeal. See Prison Legal News v.

Samuels, 954 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2013); Prison Legal News

v. Lappin, 780 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2011); Prison Legal

News v. Lappin, 603 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D.D.C. 2009); Prison

Legal News v. Lappin, 436 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2006). PLN

publishes a legal journal devoted to news and litigation

concerning detention facilities. In 2003, PLN filed a Freedom

of Information Act (“FOIA”) request with the Federal Bureau of

Prisons seeking all documents showing money the Bureau paid

in connection with lawsuits and claims brought against it

between January 1, 1996, and July 31, 2003. PLN also sought

a waiver of any fees associated with the request. Prison Legal

News v. Samuels, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 24; Prison Legal News v.

Lappin, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 18-19. 

The Bureau produced no records and denied the fee waiver. 

After PLN brought suit in 2005, the Bureau produced

approximately 11,000 pages of documents, of which 2,993

contained redactions. Prison Legal News v. Samuels, 954 F.

Supp. 2d at 24-25. The Bureau provided affidavits, declarations,

and Vaughn indices in support of the redactions. Id. at 24-25. 1

 A Vaughn index describes the documents withheld or redacted

1

and the FOIA exemptions invoked, and explains why each exemption

applies. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Keys v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
3

PLN challenged the basis for the redactions and the adequacy of

the Bureau’s search for responsive documents. The district

court ruled that the Bureau had conducted an adequate search,

but that the Bureau had not justified the redactions. See Prison

Legal News v. Lappin, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 41-45. 

After multiple cross-motions for summaryjudgment, 102 or

so documents remained at issue. Prison Legal News v. Samuels,

954 F. Supp. 2d at 25 & n.5. The Bureau provided an updated 2

Vaughn index (the Stroble Vaughn index), and the parties crossfiled for summary judgment once again. The updated Vaughn

index indicated that the Bureau applied both FOIA exemptions

6 and 7(C) to support the remaining redactions. 3 4

The district court granted the Bureau’s cross-motion for

summary judgment, holding that the Stroble Vaughn index

The parties state that 102 documents are still in dispute, but the 2

district court suggested that the number is lower. Prison Legal News

v. Samuels, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 25 n.5. In the parties’ Joint Appendix,

some of the “redacted documents in dispute” do not contain any

redactions. See, e.g., Exhibits 93 & 94 (Docs. 110-97 & 110-98),

Joint Appendix 1209-36. 

Exemption 6 permits the government to withhold “personnel 3

and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would

constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 620 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).

Exemption 7(C) permits the government to withhold “records 4

or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the

extent that the production of such law enforcement records or

information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C);

see Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
4

supported application of FOIA exemption 6. In reaching that

conclusion, the court first noted that the requested documents

include names and personal information and so “easily fall

under the purview of an individual’s ‘interest in avoiding

disclosure of personal matters.’” Id. at 29 (quoting Judicial

Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1125 (D.C. Cir.

2004)). The court proceeded to balance this interest against the

public interest in disclosure, finding that the Bureau’s

categorical explanation for the redactions supported application

of exemption 6. Id. at 29-31; see also Horowitz v. Peace Corps,

428 F.3d 271, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Wash. Post Co. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir.

1982). Because it determined that exemption 6 supported the

redactions, the court did not address the applicability of

exemption 7(C).

On appeal, PLN argues that neither exemption 6 nor

exemption 7(C) applies. The argument is that the Bureau’s use

of a categorical explanation for the redactions was improper

because of the varied nature of the documents and of the

individuals shielded from disclosure. PLN claims that the

district court did not adequately balance the privacy and public

interests at stake. Because we agree that more was required,

both of the Bureau and of the district court, we reverse the

district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for

further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I.

FOIA requires the government to disclose, upon request,

broad classes of documents identified in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). It

exempts from disclosure nine categories of documents described

in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The government is entitled to summary

judgment if no material facts are in dispute and if it

demonstrates that withheld or redacted documents are not
5

required to be disclosed under § 552(a) or are exempt from

disclosure under § 552(b). Billington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

233 F.3d 581, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Cause of Action

v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 753 F.3d 210, 212 (D.C.

Cir. 2014); Katz v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 68 F.3d

1438, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We review the district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo. See Nat’l Sec. Archive v.

CIA, 752 F.3d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 

A.

The Bureau redacted documents on the basis of exemption

6, which shields from disclosure “personnel and medical files

and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(6). “Similar files” include “detailed Government 5

records on an individual which can be identified as applying to

that individual.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

365 F.3d at 1124 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co.,

456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982)). Exemption 6 covers “not just files,

but also bits of personal information, such as names and

addresses, the release of which would ‘create[] a palpable threat

to privacy.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449

As we have written, the Vaughn index indicatesthat the Bureau 5

applied not only exemption 6, but also exemption 7(C), an exemption

that protects information that was collected for law enforcement

purposes and “could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C),

to support the redactions. “‘Exemption 7(C) is more protective of

privacy than Exemption 6’ and thus establishes a lower bar for

withholding material.” ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 6

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S.

487, 496 n.6 (1994)). Because the district court addressed only

exemption 6, our analysis is limited to that exemption. On remand,

the district court may examine the applicability of both exemptions.
6

F.3d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting

Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 830 F.2d 388, 391 (D.C. Cir.

1987)). 

The primary purpose of this exemption is “‘to protect

individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result

from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information.’”

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d at 1124

(quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 599). 

Exemption 6 “does not categorically exempt individuals’

identities.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449

F.3d at 153. “The scope of a privacy interest under Exemption

6 will always be dependent on the context in which it has been

asserted.” Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 97 F.3d

575, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

To apply exemption 6, a court must first “determine

whether‘disclosure would compromise a substantial, as opposed

to a de minimis, privacy interest.’” Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr.

for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,

554 F.3d 1046, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of

Retired Fed. Emps. v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir.

1989)). If a substantial privacy interest is at stake, then the court

must “balance” the individual’s right of privacy against the

public interest in disclosure. Horowitz, 428 F.3d at 278 (citing

Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372-73 (1976)). 

“The focus of the public interest analysis is the citizens’

right to know ‘what their government is up to.’” Id. (quoting

U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the

Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). Neither the identity of the

requesting party nor the purpose for which the party intends to

use a document is relevant to the public interest, but the

availability of the information through other sources is. Id.
7

The government bears the burden of showing that a

substantial invasion of privacy will occur if the documents are

released. See Ripskis v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 746

F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1984). It may do so by affidavits “‘if they

contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely

conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by

contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency

bad faith.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d

208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Consumer Fed. of Am. v.

Dep’t of Agric., 455 U.S. 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

B.

PLN does not contend that the documents still at issue are

outside the scope of exemption 6, but argues that the district

court erred in balancing the individual’s privacy interest against

the public interest in disclosure. The redacted information

6

consists of individuals’ names and other personal identifying

information that would reveal the identity of a person related to

a claim filed against the Bureau. Prison Legal News v. Samuels,

954 F. Supp. 2d at 28. Government employees have “at least a

minimal privacy interest in [their] employment history and job

performance evaluation.” Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91 (D.C.

Amicus curiae contendsthat the information at issue here “is not 6

the type that should be exempt under Exemption 6.” Brief of Amicus

Curiae The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al. at 7. 

The court will not entertain an argument made for the first time on

appeal by an amicus. Elliott v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 596 F.3d 842, 850

(D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Cook v. Food & Drug Admin., 733 F.3d 1,

5-6 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And, even if we were to consider this argument,

the redactions at issue here – covering individuals’ names and other

personal identifying information – fall within the scope of exemption

6, which extends to “bits of personal information, such as names and

addresses.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d at

152 (quoting Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 830 F.2d at 391). 
8

Cir. 1984). We have extended this protection to nongovernment employees whose names appear in government

records. See, e.g., Painting & Drywall Work Pres. Fund, Inc. v.

Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 936 F.2d 1300, 1303 (D.C. Cir.

1991).

To carry its burden, the Bureau’s Vaughn index must

“‘adequately describe each . . . [redaction] from a released

document,’ and ‘must state the exemption claimed for each . . .

[redaction] and explain why the exemption is relevant.’”

Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (quoting Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603

F.2d 945, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam)). The Bureau

submitted a declaration of Wilson J. Moorer, a paralegal

specialist at the FOIA section of the Bureau’s general counsel’s

office, which separates the documents at issue into categories

and specifies the exemptions applied to each category. See

Fourth Supplemental Decl. of Wilson J. Moorer, Joint Appendix

1478 (“Moorer Declaration”). This declaration supplements the

latest Vaughn index the Bureau produced on April 25, 2012. 

Joint Appendix 1349. The Moorer Declaration describes each

type of document and the information redacted. It then provides

a general rationale for protecting personal identifying

information: to prevent the public from knowing an individual

suffered some sort of injury or loss, or was subjected to

discrimination, because association with the filing of a claim can

be stigmatizing. It then states that the public interest in knowing

the identity of individuals involved in claims against the Bureau

is minimal. 

The primary types of claims against the Bureau are those

inmates filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and

those employees filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission or Merit Systems Protection Board. Prison Legal

News v. Samuels, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 28. Documents related to
9

the tort claims include Tort Claim Form SF-95 which is “utilized

to submit [ ] administrative claims” for “money damages for

personal injury or death and/or damage to or loss of property”

pursuant to the FTCA. Moorer Decl. ¶ 10. For discrimination

claims Department of JusticeComplaint of Discrimination Form

DOJ 201A is “used where an applicant for Federal Employment

or a Federal Employee believes he or she has been discriminated

against because of race, color, sex . . ., religion, national origin,

age, disability . . ., sexual orientation, parental status or reprisal

by a federal agency” and has presented the matter to the EEOC. 

Moorer Decl. ¶ 80. 

For each type of document, the Moorer Declaration asserts

a privacy interest because the filing of a claim discloses that the

individual who filed the claim either “suffered some sort of

injury, loss or death” or “has alleged that he or she suffered

some form of discrimination by the Bureau of Prisons.” Moorer

Decl. ¶¶ 11, 79, 102; Joint Appendix 1483, 1524, 1547. This

privacy interest is bolstered by “the fact that it is not unusual or

uncommon for an individual to be stigmatized by the filing of

claims, regardless of whether the stigma has merit.” Id. ¶ 11,

Joint Appendix 1483. As to the public interest in FTCA

claimants’ identities, the Declaration asserts that “[t]he

knowledge a particular person filed a claim disclosed no

information that would directly reveal the operations or

activities of the federal government,” and would “reveal only

allegations related to singular incidents, as opposed to legitimate

findings related to agency practice.” Id. Accordingly, the

“release of the names would make no contribution to the public

understanding of a government function.” Id. As to EEOC

complaints, the Declaration states “the disclosure of the specific

claimant that filed an EEOC complaint falls outside the ambit of

the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve” and so

the “release of the names would make no contribution to the
10

public understanding of a government function.” Moorer Decl.

¶ 79. 

The Bureau’s final Vaughn index was more detailed in

some respects than the Moorer Declaration and less so in others. 

The index provided a specific description of each document –

typically the type of document, the date of the document, the

number of pages, and its docket or exhibit number. The

“rationale for exemptions” included summary assertions like

“revealing the name of the Claimant who filed an EEOC

complaint and his or her address would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” and the “release of

the Complaint’s name and his or her address would make no

contribution to the public understanding of a government

function.” Stroble Vaughn Index at 1. Forsome documents, the

rationale for exemptions included the fact that the “claim

involved an allegation of sexual abuse,” e.g. Stroble Vaughn

Index at 6-7, that the claimant “filed a claim of discrimination,”

e.g. id. at 25, or that the claim was filed pursuant to the FTCA,

e.g. id. at 109. The redactions were not limited to those filing

tort or discrimination claims, but in some instances also

encompassed the alleged wrongdoers or witnesses on the basis

that “revealing the name of staff members merely alleged to

have engaged in discriminatory conduct or alleged to have

witnessed such, regardless if such charges were sustained, would

constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 

Stroble Vaughn Index at 5, 7-10. 

Both the final Vaughn index and the Moorer Declaration

lump the privacy interests of all claimants and any perpetrator

or witness whose information is redacted into categories based

on the type of document in which the individual’s information

appears. Both provide only cursory statements such as those

described above to justify the redactions. The district court
11

accepted this categorical methodology. Prison Legal News v.

Samuels, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 28-29. 

II.

A categorical approach to redactions or withholdings is

permissible under FOIA when “the FOIA litigation process

threatens to reveal ‘the very information the agency hopes to

protect.’” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 746 F.3d 1082, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

(“CREW”) (quoting ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 432 (D.C. Cir.

2013)). The government may justify its withholdings and

redactions “category-of-document by category-of-document, so

long as its definitions of relevant categories are sufficiently

distinct to allow a court to determine whether specific claimed

exemptions are properly applied.” Id. (quoting Gallant v.

NLRB, 25 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The range of

circumstances included in the category must “characteristically

support[] an inference that the statutory requirements for

exemption are satisfied.” Id. at 1088-89 (quoting Nation

Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 893 (D.C. Cir.

1995)). 

Here, it is difficult to see how the categories in the Moorer

Declaration support application of exemption 6. The categories,

centered as they are on specific types of filed documents,

include a wide range of claims covering various degrees of

privacy interests. As PLN points out, the privacy interest of tort

claimants will be different when they are claiming injury from

a slip and fall as compared to a sexual assault. The EEOC

claims also present a diverse picture and can hardly be

considered a category that “‘characteristically support[s] an

inference’ that the statutory requirements for exemption are

satisfied.” CREW, 746 F.3d at 1088-89 (alteration in original)

(quoting Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 893). 
12

There is another problem with the categorical approach here

– it fails to distinguish between redacting the identity of the

alleged victim and the identity of the alleged perpetrator. This

distinction is significant with respect to the employees’ interest

in keeping their information private. But the Bureau has made

no effort to distinguish between the privacy interests of

employees who are victims and those who are perpetrators. In

fact, it has offered little support for redacting information that

would identify perpetrators. The district court failed to give any

weight to the distinction between the accused and the accuser

when balancing private and public interests. 

In addition, the Bureau has not been consistent in shielding

the names of its employees accused of wrongdoing. While

redacting the names of those accused of discriminating in

Exhibits 1 (Doc. 110-5) and 2 (Doc. 110-6), it did not redact the

name of a Bureau employee who was the alleged perpetrator of

a sexual assault on an inmate in Exhibit 3 (Doc. 110-7). Joint

Appendix 274, 291, 302. The Bureau never explains its

inconsistency. Neitherthe Stroble Vaughn index nor the Moorer

Declaration provides insight into why the names of some alleged

perpetrators are redacted while others are revealed.

The category of claims and settlements under the FTCA is

equally diverse, if not more so, than the claims of employment

discrimination. Consider, for example, a Bureau employee’s

tort claim for personal injury resulting from being hit in the eye

by a screw thrown by another Bureau employee, Exhibit 53

(Doc. 110-57), Joint Appendix 869-76; an inmate’s claim that he

was kept in prison 154 days after his release date, Exhibit 102

(Doc. 110-106), Joint Appendix 1307-12; and the above

mentioned sexual assault of an inmate, Exhibit 3 (Doc. 110-7),

Joint Appendix 302-14. In each case, the claimant’s name was

redacted, but in the eye injury case, the name of the perpetrator

and an inmate witness were also redacted. Exhibit 53 (Doc.
13

110-57). Yet in the case of the sexual assault, the perpetrator’s

name was not redacted. In the scheme of things, one would

think that an employee’s eye injury resulting from the throwing

of a screw is vastly different from a sexual assault on an inmate

and that the privacy interests of the victims and perpetrators in

these two cases will be different. These examples are sufficient

to show that the privacy interests involved in a given type of

claim do not fall within a single category that “characteristically

support[s] an inference that the statutory requirements for

exemption are satisfied.” CREW, 746 F.3d at 1088-89

(alteration in original) (quoting Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at

893). 

7

The same can be said about the public interest in disclosure. 

PLN seeks documents regarding “specific events that occurred

within [Bureau] facilities that will provide insight to the public

about how its federal prisons are being managed and operated,

and how its tax dollars are being expended.” Prison Legal News

v. Lappin, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 26. Identifying employees who

repeatedly engage in tortious or discriminatory conduct will

“‘shed[] light on an agency’s performance of its statutory

duties.’” Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs.,

554 F.3d at 1051 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of

Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,

While the Bureau’s redactions are far from uniform between

7

documents, they are also inconsistent within a single Exhibit. When

a victim’s name appears both in a settlement document and in a public

court filing, the Bureau redacts the name from the former but not the

latter. See, e.g., Exhibit 54 (Doc. 110-58), Joint Appendix 878-87

(redacting name of deceased inmate in stipulation for settlement and

administrative claim but not in order for temporary guardianship for

the decedent’s child); Exhibit 95 (Doc. 110-99), Joint Appendix 1239-

45 (redacting name of claimant in FTCA claim form but not in a

settlement of civil action).
14

773 (1989)). This, in turn, will further the public interest in

ensuring that “disciplinary measures imposed are adequate, and

that those who are accountable are dealt with in an appropriate

manner.” Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d at 92. It may also help root out

the misuse of public funds, an interest typically favoring

disclosure. See, e.g., Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric.,

515 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Dobronski v. FCC, 17

F.3d 275, 278-80 (9th Cir. 1994).

The public interest in disclosure will vary based on the

individual’s role in a given claim – victim, perpetrator, witness,

medical professional diagnosing an inmate, and so forth – and

the nature of the claim itself. These differences in interest do

not warrant the categorical approach taken in the Moorer

Declaration and Stroble Vaughn Index. The specific form used

to lodge a claim reveals little about the public interest at stake,

and so use of the claim form categorically to justify redactions

does not reflect the balancing of interests that FOIA requires. 

The Bureau’s declarations and Vaughn indices fall short of 

“‘adequately describ[ing] each . . . [redaction] from a released

document’ and . . . ‘explain[ing] why the exemption is

relevant.’” Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d at 1080

(quoting Founding Church of Scientology, 603 F.2d at 949). 

We decline to engage in the required balancing in the first

instance and therefore will remand the case to the district court. 

On remand, the Bureau must fashion a coherent catalogue of the

documents still in dispute and the district court must balance the

privacy and public interests in light of the Bureau’s new

submissions.

We are not foreclosing use of a categorical approach. There

may be groups in which a categorical approach is appropriate.

Forinstance, perhaps the Bureau can formulate a single rationale

for shielding the names of medical professionals who treat
15

inmates, or for redacting the names of prisoners who testify in

FTCA claims because they fear retaliation byBureau employees

or other inmates. An agency may even be justified in shielding

from disclosure the names of all employees without providing

a justification on an individual-by-individual basis. Judicial

Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d at 153 (citing

Gallant, 26 F.3d at 173). But the redactions in this case vary

greatly, and the categories are not drawn based on the

individual’s privacy interest or the public interest in disclosure. 

The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

Bureau is reversed and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.