Filed 10/24/22 P. v. Miles CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DEBRA LYNN MILES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B310095

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SA082880

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Kathryn A. Solorzano, Judge. Reversed.

Rudolph J. Alejo, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Michael J. 

Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
2

Debra Lynn Miles filed a petition for resentencing under 

former Penal Code section 1170.95, now renumbered as section 

1172.6. The trial court denied the petition, holding that the 

jury’s 2014 special circumstance finding precluded Miles from 

seeking relief under section 1172.6 until she first sought relief 

through a writ for habeas corpus. After the trial court’s ruling, 

the Supreme Court decided in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 

698 (Strong), that a pre-Banks and Clark special circumstance 

finding does not make a petitioner ineligible for relief under 

section 1172.6 as a matter of law, nor must the petitioner seek 

habeas relief first. We therefore remand to the trial court for 

further proceedings. Undesignated statutory references are to 

the Penal Code. 

I

A jury convicted Miles of first degree murder under a 

felony-murder theory in November 2014. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The 

jury also convicted her of burglary, robbery, and conspiracy to 

commit robbery. (§§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A), 459, 667.5, subd. 

(c), 182, subd. (a)(2).) The jury found true special circumstances 

that the murder occurred in the course of a robbery and a felony 

and that Miles was the actual killer, aided and abetted the 

murder with the intent to kill, or aided and abetted the felony 

that led to the death while acting as a major participant with 

reckless indifference to human life. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The 

judge sentenced Miles to life without parole.

Miles appealed the judgment. We affirmed. (People v. 

Miles (May 10, 2017, B269703) [nonpub. opn.].) In December 

2018, Miles filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

superior court. She argued her counsel was ineffective because 

he did not argue she did not show reckless indifference to human 
3

life as a matter of law. In March 2019, the trial court summarily 

denied her petition.

In June 2019, Miles filed a petition for resentencing under 

section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel for Miles. After 

several hearings, the trial court issued an order to show cause, 

but before the court held the evidentiary hearing, the Second 

District issued People v. Allison (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 449,

People v. Galvan (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1134, and People v. Nunez

(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 78. The trial court ruled that Allison, 

Galvan, and Nunez were the governing law and therefore denied 

Miles’ petition. The court held the special circumstance finding 

precluded relief unless Miles first sought relief through a writ of 

habeas corpus.

Miles appealed. 

After the parties’ briefing in this court, the Supreme Court 

issued People v. Strong. 

II

Strong mandates remand. 

A

In Strong, the Supreme Court considered whether a true 

finding of a special circumstance made before the Court’s 

decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and 

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) rendered a 

petitioner ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of 

law. Strong held it did not. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703.) 

Moreover, a petitioner would not be ineligible as a matter of law 

even if the evidence at trial would have been sufficient to support 

the findings under Banks and Clark. (Strong, at p. 710.) 

The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 

Reg. Sess.) to reform certain aspects of the state’s homicide law, 
4

including limiting the scope of the felony-murder rule. (Strong, 

supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707–708.) Under the new law, a person 

can only be convicted of felony murder if she was the actual 

killer, an aider and abettor to the murder who acted with intent 

to kill, or a major participant in the underlying felony who acted 

with reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, 

§ 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a process 

through which convicted persons can seek resentencing if they 

could no longer be convicted under the reformed homicide law. 

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie 

showing she is eligible for relief under section 1172.6, the court 

must hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d).) At 

this hearing, either party may present new evidence and the 

prosecution bears the burden of proving the petitioner could still 

be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

Before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, the Supreme 

Court issued two cases offering guidance on the meaning and 

application of the “major participant” and “reckless disregard” 

language. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 705–707.) Courts of 

Appeal split regarding whether pre-Banks and Clark special 

circumstance findings preclude a petitioner from being eligible as 

a matter of law for relief under section 1172.6. (Id. at pp. 709–

710.) The Supreme Court granted review in Strong to resolve the 

split. (Id. at p. 710.) 

The Court held that Banks and Clark represented a 

“significant change” in the interpretation and application of the 

“major participant” and “reckless disregard” requirements. 

(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 717.) This change occurred before 

the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437. (Id. at p. 710.) 

Thus, the “major participant” and “reckless indifference” 
5

language used in the Act incorporated that change. (Ibid.) 

Therefore, a pre-Banks and Clark special circumstance finding 

does not mean a petitioner could not make a prima facie case 

under section 1172.6 because such a finding is insufficient to 

show the petitioner would still be convicted under the current 

understanding of those requirements. (Id. at pp. 717–718.) 

The Supreme Court further held that a judicial posttrial 

review of the evidence offered at trial to determine its sufficiency 

under Banks and Clark would not comport with the strictures of 

section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 719–720.) The 

guidance in these cases might have significantly changed what 

evidence a defendant would present or counsel’s trial strategy. 

(Ibid.) A retrospective review cannot account for these 

differences and could not provide a finding beyond a reasonable 

doubt under the current legal framework. (Ibid.) For similar 

reasons, pre-Banks and Clark findings do not have preclusive 

effect in later proceedings in the case. (Id. at pp. 717–718.) 

Banks and Clark represent the type of change in law that 

warrants reconsideration. (Ibid.) 

The Court also found that although a person could seek 

habeas relief for a pre-Banks and Clark special circumstance 

finding, doing so was not a prerequisite to seeking relief under 

section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 713.)

B

The jury made a special circumstance finding that Miles 

was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference in 

2014, i.e., before Banks or Clark. The trial court denied Miles’s

petition based on the jury’s finding, holding the law required 

Miles to seek habeas relief before filing her section 1172.6 

petition. Strong has clarified that Miles need not do so and that 
6

the jury’s finding does not preclude Miles from making a prima 

facie showing. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) We remand 

for the trial court to hold further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

DISPOSITION

We reverse the order denying Miles’s section 1172.6 

petition and remand for the trial court to hold further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

GRIMES, Acting P. J. 

HARUTUNIAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.