This report is available online at www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications

For media and public inquiries about this report, contact DIA-PAO@dodiis.mil

For more information about the Defense Intelligence Agency, visit DIA's website at www.dia.mil

Cover image, Russian tanks, model T90A. Source: Shutterstock.

DIA-11-1704-161
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
IV

PREFACE

For more than 50 years, DIA officers have met the full range of security challenges facing our 

great nation. Our intelligence professionals operate across the globe, and our work supports 

customers from the forward-deployed warfighter to the national policymaker. DIA is united in 

a common vision—to be the indispensable source of defense intelligence expertise—and for the 

past five decades we have done just that.

As part of this vision, DIA has a long history of producing comprehensive and authoritative 

defense intelligence overviews. In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 

asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet 

Union’s military strength. The purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security 

community, and the public a complete and accurate view of the threat. The result: the first 

edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 250,000 copies, and it soon became an 

annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world. 

In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. 

policymakers and the public for the first time.

Today, we are faced with a complexity of intelligence challenges from multiple threats that we 

cannot afford to misunderstand. In the spirit of Soviet Military Power, DIA is proud to produce 

an unclassified defense intelligence overview of the military capabilities associated with 

the challenges we face—beginning with Russia. This product is intended to foster a dialogue 

between U.S. leaders, the national security community, partner nations, and the public about 

the challenges we face in the 21st century.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY V

The international order established after the Second World War and developed throughout the 

Cold War largely ensured widespread peace and stability even as it saw new conflicts—large and 

small—take place in different regions of the world. This post-war era, underwritten primarily by 

the strength of the United States, also gave rise to the greatest period of prosperity in history, 

witnessing countries rebuild from war and emerge from colonialism to become vibrant and valuable 

members of the international community. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United 

States emerged as a world leader militarily, economically and diplomatically. Today, however, the 

United States faces an increasingly complex array of challenges to our national security.

The resurgence of Russia on the world stage—seizing the Crimean Peninsula, destabilizing eastern 

Ukraine, intervening on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and shaping the information 

environment to suit its interests—poses a major challenge to the United States. Moscow will continue 

to aggressively pursue its foreign policy and security objectives by employing the full spectrum of the 

state’s capabilities. Its powerful military, coupled with the actual or perceived threat of intervention, 

allows its whole-of-government efforts to resonate widely.

Russia continues to modernize its extensive nuclear forces and is developing long range precision-guided 

conventional weapons systems. It is manipulating the global information environment, employing tools 

of indirect action against countries on its periphery and using its military for power projection and 

expeditionary force deployments far outside its borders. Its ultimate deterrent is a robust nuclear force 

capable of conducting a massed nuclear strike on targets in the United States within minutes.

Within the next decade, an even more confident and capable Russia could emerge. The United States needs 

to anticipate, rather than react, to Russian actions and pursue a greater awareness of Russian goals and 

capabilities to prevent potential conflicts. Our policymakers and commanders must have a complete 

understanding of Russia’s military capabilities, especially as U.S. and Russian forces may increasingly 

encounter each other around the globe. DIA will continue to provide our leaders decision-space, ensuring 

they have the time and information necessary to protect our nation. The wrong decisions—or the right 

ones made too late—could have dire consequences.

This report examines a resurgent Russia’s military power to foster a deeper understanding of its core 

capabilities, goals, and aspirations in the 21st Century.

Vincent R. Stewart

Lieutenant General, USMC 

Director 

Defense Intelligence Agency

Vladimir Putin’s address to the Russian Federal Assembly following the referendum 

on annexation of Crimea, 18 March, 2014:

“The USA prefers to follow the rule of the strongest and not by the international law. They are 

convinced that they have been chosen and they are exceptional, that they are allowed to shape 

the destiny of the world, that it is only them that can be right. They act as they please. Here and 

there they use force against sovereign states, set up coalitions in accordance with the principle: 

who is not with us is against us.”
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VII

Introduction/Historical Overview9

1991–Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military9

Russian National Military Overview . 

Russia’s Threat Perceptions  1

National Security Strategy  . 

Stability Issues   

External Defense Relations  . 

Defense Budget   

Military Doctrine and Strategy   

Russian Perceptions of Modern Conflict   

Military and Security Leadership   

Main Operations Directorate                            25

National Military Command and Control   

Russian Nuclear Command and Control                      26

Command and Control of Joint Forces                       27

Core Russian Military Capabilities.  

Nuclear Forces and Weapons.  

Biological and Chemical Weapons  3

Anti-Access/Area Denial  3

Information Operations                               32

Strategic Air Operations  .

Integrated Air Defense System  .

Modern Precision Strike Capabilities                         33

CONTENTS
VIII

Precision Strike.  

Space/Counterspace.  

Cyber  .

Propaganda Helps Shape The Information Environment 38

Cyber-Enabled Psychological Operations 39

Information Defense 40

Media Laws—A Hedge Against Instability 41

Indirect Action . 

Electronic Warfare.  

Power Projection  .

Underground Facilities.  

Denial and Deception.  

Outlook: A Modernizing Force.  

Appendix A: Russian Strategic Rocket Forces.  

Appendix B: Russian Ground Forces.  

Appendix C: Russian Aerospace Forces  .

Appendix D: Russian Navy.  

Appendix E: Russian Special Operations Forces.  

Appendix F: Russian Intelligence Services.  

Appendix G: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs.  

Appendix H: Arms Sales.  
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9

Introduction/Historical Overview

1991-Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military

ollowing the collapse of the USSR in 

1991, the Russian Federation inherited several formidable tasks and challenges from its Soviet predecessor. For the newly-formed Russian Ministry of Defense, the most 

immediate challenge was to relocate military 

equipment and personnel from the newly independent states of the former USSR and countries of the disbanded Warsaw Pact into a new 

Russian state.1 The assets of the Soviet Union’s 

nuclear arsenal were of particular importance. 

Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 

the four states with nuclear weapons in their 

territory, eventually reached an agreement 

to dismantle all tactical and strategic nuclear 

weapons in the non-Russian republics or return 

them to Russia.2 The issue of conventional military forces was much more problematic. Forces 

returning from Eastern Europe had to be reintegrated into the new Russian military, while 

F

Kremlin Guards in 2017. Military power has always been regarded as of critical importance by Russian and 

Soviet leaders, but after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was left with a dramatically weakened military.

Image Source: Shutterstock
10

those in the newly independent states were 

viewed as the basis for building national militaries for new sovereign countries.3

Returning military forces from Eastern 

Europe were often shipped piecemeal back 

to unprepared bases in the Russian Federation.4

 Other units located in the territory of 

the former Soviet Union were absorbed by the 

newly independent states. In certain cases, 

units such as the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine 

or the 14th Army in Moldova actively resisted 

the attempts by the Soviet successor states to 

absorb these forces. Some of these stranded 

units became embroiled in ethnic conflicts in 

Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan.5 Most significantly for the new Russian military, interior military districts, which under the Soviet 

Union contained low-readiness mobilization 

forces such as the Moscow and North Caucasus Military Districts, now became “front-line” 

districts bordering foreign states.6 The Russian Federation emerged from the collapse of 

the Soviet Union with a much smaller military 

and an entirely new set of security challenges.7

Russia’s new military faced dramatic budgetary, readiness, and personnel shortfalls, as 

well as uncertainty of its role as Moscow struggled to determine its place in the post-Cold War 

world.8, 9 Russia cut military spending drastically during the decade of post-Soviet economic 

turbulence. Fielding of new weapons systems 

slowed to a trickle and eventually halted; the 

huge former Soviet arms industry struggled, 

focusing on gaining hard currency by selling its 

most modern weapons to foreign buyers.10 At 

the same time, Russian military units lacked 

funding and fuel to train and exercise, and pay 

was often months in arrears. The readiness of 

the force was minimal, and the popular image 

of the Russian military of the 1990s remains 

ships rusting at pier side, pilots unable to fly, 

and Russian officers moonlighting with second 

jobs to make ends meet.11

Moscow also had difficulty manning its military. Press reports on military life that began 

to appear during the glasnost (openness) era of 

the late 1980s highlighted the harshness of the 

conscript’s lot, and in particular the brutal and 

sometimes deadly dedovschina hazing of new 

draftees. Draft evasion became endemic, with 

many young Russian men using any and all legal 

or illegal measures to avoid military service.12, 13 

Troops gathered around a fire for warmth during the 

Chechen conflict; the difficulties Moscow’s weakened 

military faced during its operations against the separatist republic underscored its deterioration during 

the 1990s.

Image Source: Shutterstock
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11

Russian generals voiced complaints about the 

poor quality of the conscripts they actually 

received, as they were often unhealthy, poorly 

educated, and sometimes arrived with crimi-

nal records.14 The military’s most painful trial, 

however, was caused by insurgency within the 

borders of the Russian Federation. From 1994 

to 1995, undermanned and poorly trained 

Russian forces struggled to take and secure 

the breakaway Chechen Republic in the North 

Caucasus.15 The military’s problems and lim-

itations were widely publicized by the Russian 

and international press, further undermin-

ing its reputation and reinforcing the desire of 

young Russians to avoid service. 

Throughout the post-Soviet era, there was 

a recognized need to reform and modernize 

the military.16 Not only did the Russian mili

-

tary suffer from the readiness and manpower 

shortfalls outlined above, but Moscow’s forces 

retained their cumbersome Soviet-era organi-

zation, designed for the mobilization of mas-

sive numbers of reservists to conduct deep 

mechanized theater operations in the context 

of a major war.17 The 1990s and first decade of 

the 21st century saw a series of military reform 

efforts announced, discussed, and only abort-

ively implemented. Russia’s first Minister of 

Defense, General Pavel Grachev, (1992–1996) 

posited the creation of a fully manned and 

equipped small “mobile force” component that 

could rapidly move to a conflict area and hold 

the line until additional forces mobilized;18, 19, 20 

Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev (1997–2001) 

created a new strategic nuclear deterrence 

force based on his previous service, the Strate-

gic Rocket Forces;21, 22 and Minister of Defense 

Sergey Ivanov (2001–2007) and Chief of the 

General Staff Yuriy Baluyevsky (2004–2008) 

pushed for the establishment of new regional 

theater commands and filling the military’s 

ranks with professional “contract” person-

nel.23, 24 By the late 2000s, these reform plans 

remained largely unimplemented, unsuccess-

ful, or abandoned. 

One arguable exception to this series of mil-

itary reform failures was the effort during 

the late 1990s to create “permanently ready 

forces,” a subset of the Russian force struc-

ture made up of units with better manning 

and equipment levels.25, 26 These units were 

created and used during the second Chechen 

conflict (1999–2004) and enabled Moscow to 

intervene more rapidly and with more capa-

ble forces than during the first Chechen War 

(1994–1995).27

Russian SS-25 ICBM launcher; given the weakened 

state of its conventional forces in the years after the 

collapse of the USSR, Moscow prioritized the mainte-

nance of its nuclear capabilities.

Image Source: Shutterstock
12

Despite modest improvements and a measure 

of success in the second Chechen conflict, the 

Russian military still entered the first decade 

of the 21st century with a Soviet-era mobilization force structure almost completely equipped 

with dated Soviet-era equipment. Shortfalls in 

modern command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment and capabilities were particularly notable. Russian military limitations were fully on display during 

the August 2008 “five-day war” with Georgia.28 

Russian forces prevailed and defeated their relatively weak Georgian opponents, but after-action analysis by the Russian military highlighted many failings. Air and artillery strikes 

missed their targets, an army commander had 

to resort to a cell phone to contact a higher 

headquarters,29 and several aircraft were lost 

to Georgian air defenses. While internationally 

Transition to the New Look Program

Moscow’s limitations in modernizing its military had led to heavy dependence on its aging 

nuclear forces to defend the state. But while the presence of a robust nuclear deterrent 

dissuaded potential aggressors from directly attacking the Russian Federation, it was 

not flexible enough for Moscow to use in small, local conflicts such as Georgia or as a 

tool of power projection. The New Look program was a comprehensive and massive effort, 

aimed to change the Russian military from a Cold War-style mobilization force to a more 

ready, modern, and professional military able to respond to 21st century conflicts.30 Partially-manned Soviet-style divisions were reorganized into what were planned to be fully-manned brigades; officer ranks were trimmed from 350,000 billets to initially 150,000, 

although later the number rose to 220,000; the contract manning effort was reshaped and 

reinvigorated, with a goal of 425,000 professional enlisted personnel in the force by 2017;31

the six extant military districts were reshaped initially into four joint strategic commands, 

which controlled all military assets in their areas in peace and war; and lastly, a massive 

state armaments program was initiated, allocating 1.1 trillion rubles over 10 years, aiming 

at fielding a Russian military with 70% new or modernized equipment by 2020.32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37

Minister of Defense Shoygu at the 2014 Victory Day 

Parade; since 2012, Shoygu has presided over the 

continued modernization of the Russian military as 

well as its operations in Ukraine and Syria.

Image Source: Shutterstock
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13

many were impressed by the ability of the 

Russian military, so derelict in the 1990s, to 

accomplish its mission, Moscow was spurred 

by what it viewed as critical shortfalls in Geor-

gia to rapidly push forward a whole new set 

of reforms—known as the “New Look”—which 

had been under discussion before the conflict.38

The New Look was controversial and painful 

for many in or associated with the Russian 

military establishment.39, 40, 41 Even military 

education and medical support organiza-

tions became targets for major reductions. In 

late 2012, the unpopular Minister of Defense 

associated with the reform effort, Anatoliy 

Serdyukov, left office and the former head of 

the Emergency Situations Ministry, Sergey 

Shoygu, took over.42 Shoygu proved adept at 

easing some of the most unpopular aspects 

of the New Look while largely retaining and 

refining the essence of the reform program.43

The years of Shoygu’s tenure have seen the 

New Look military engaged in a series of active 

operations. In early 2014, Russian naval infan-

try, special forces, and airborne troops rapidly 

seized control of the Crimean Peninsula.44

While they faced almost no opposition, the 

operation gave the world its first look at a mil-

itary that appeared surprisingly disciplined 

and well-equipped for those whose image of 

Russian forces was formed during the years 

of decay in the 1990s. Although their presence 

was denied by Moscow, Russian special forces 

and troops operated to mobilize, lead, equip, 

and support separatist militias in the Donbas 

region of eastern Ukraine from spring 2014 to 

the present. Ukrainian forces have stressed 

the capabilities of the Russian-enabled sepa-

ratist units, especially with respect to C4ISR, 

artillery firepower, and air defense.45, 46 In Sep

-

tember 2015, Moscow launched its first expedi-

tionary operation since the Soviet era, deploy-

ing fixed-wing and helicopter aviation assets to 

Syria. Combined with other military support 

to the Asad regime such as intelligence infor-

mation, advisors, ammunition, and artillery, 

Russian action arrested the decline in the Syrian 

regime’s military position.47

The Russian military today is on the rise—not 

as the same Soviet force that faced the West 

in the Cold War, dependent on large units 

with heavy equipment, but as a smaller, more 

mobile, balanced force rapidly becoming capa-

ble of conducting the full range of modern war-

fare. It is a military that can intervene in coun-

tries along Russia’s periphery or as far away as 

the Middle East. The new Russian military is 

a tool that can be used to underpin Moscow’s 

stated ambitions of being a leading force in a 

multipolar world. 
14

Russia National Military Overview

Russia’s Threat Perceptions

Russia has established five Joint Strategic Commands (Obyedinennoye Strategicheskoye Komandovaniye – 

OSK) to deal with perceived threats from the west, south, east, and Arctic.48

Russian Joint Strategic Commands 1612-11168

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

ince returning to power in 2012, Russian President Putin has sought to 

reassert Russia as a great power on 

the global stage and to restructure an international order that the Kremlin believes is tilted 

too heavily in favor of the United States at 

Russia’s expense.49 Moscow seeks to promote a 

multi-polar world predicated on the principles 

of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, the 
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

15

primacy of the United Nations, and a careful 

balance of power preventing one state or group 

of states from dominating the international 

order.50 To support these great power ambi-

tions, Moscow has sought to build a robust 

military able to project power, add credibility 

to Russian diplomacy, and ensure that Rus-

sian interests can no longer be summarily dis-

missed without consequence.51

Russia’s assertive promotion of its national 

interests, punctuated by its military actions in 

Ukraine and Syria, demonstrates a more con-

fident and somewhat less risk averse Kremlin, 

but it also has revived international concerns 

about the re-emergence of a more militaristic 

Russia. Russian military forces played a key 

role in the seizure of Crimea and fomenting an 

artificial separatist revolt in eastern Ukraine, 

blunting Kyiv’s aspirations to join NATO, at 

least for the foreseeable future.52 Addition-

ally, Russia’s military intervention in Syria 

has changed the entire dynamic of the conflict, 

bolstering the Asad regime and ensuring that 

no resolution to the conflict is possible with-

out Moscow’s agreement. Nevertheless, these 

actions also belie a deeply entrenched sense of 

insecurity regarding a United States that Mos-

cow believes is intent on undermining Russia 

at home and abroad.53

Moscow undoubtedly views the United States 

and its NATO partners as the principle threat 

to Russian security, its geo-political ambitions, 

and most importantly, the Kremlin’s contin-

ued hold on power. This perception of vul-

nerability vis-à-vis the United States is most 

clearly evident in the latest Russian National 

Security Strategy published in December 2015. 

The document identifies the United States and 

its NATO allies as Russia’s main threat, and 

accuses the West of pursuing a deliberate pol-

icy of containment against Russia to sustain 

its domination of the post-Cold War interna-

tional order and deprive Moscow of its rightful 

place on the world stage.54, 55 It explicitly states, 

“the Russian Federation's implementation of 

an independent foreign and domestic policy 

is giving rise to opposition from the United 

States and its allies, who are seeking to retain 

their dominance in world affairs.” The security 

strategy also cites the buildup of NATO mili-

tary capabilities closer to the Russian border, 

the deployment of U.S. missile defense capabil-

ities in Europe, and the ongoing U.S. pursuit 

of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon sys-

tems as a serious threat to Russian security.56

Russia also has a deep and abiding distrust of 

U.S. efforts to promote democracy around the 

world and what it perceives as a U.S. campaign 

to impose a single set of global values. Moscow 

worries that U.S. attempts to dictate a set of 

acceptable international norms threatens the 

foundations of Kremlin power by giving license 

for foreign meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. 

The December 2015 National Security Strategy 

warns of the importance of preserving tradi-

tional Russian spiritual and cultural values 

against foreign Western ideas and influences 

aimed at undermining Russia from within.57

The Kremlin is convinced the United States 

is laying the groundwork for regime change in 

Russia, a conviction further reinforced by the 

events in Ukraine. Moscow views the United 

States as the critical driver behind the crisis in 
16

Ukraine and the Arab Spring and believes that 

the overthrow of former Ukrainian President 

Yanukovych is the latest move in a long-established pattern of U.S.-orchestrated regime 

change efforts, including the Kosovo campaign, 

Iraq, Libya, and the 2003–05 “color revolutions” 

in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.58

Russian threat perceptions are not limited to the 

United States, and Moscow views the danger 

posed by Islamic militants and terrorists with 

grave concern.59 The Kremlin is particularly sensitive to the growth and spread of these ideologies 

and their potential to further radicalize Russian 

Muslims in the turbulent North Caucasus and 

other Muslim areas of central Russia. Russian 

military operations in Syria are also intended to 

eliminate jihadist elements operating there that 

originated in the territory of the former Soviet 

Union, to prevent them from returning home and 

posing a threat to Russia. At the same time, Moscow remains anxious about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and the potential for Afghanbased Islamic extremists to spill over into the

Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union 

and ultimately into Russia.60

Russian threat perceptions with regard to China 

are more divided and nuanced. Russian officials 

regularly praise the cooperative nature of the 

bilateral relationship, and Putin himself 

has declared that the current Russian-Chinese 

relationship is the best it has been in decades. In 

fact, the Russian National Security Strategy lists 

developing a strategic partnership with China as 

one of Russia’s most important goals.61 Moscow 

and Beijing share a common interest in weakening U.S. global influence and are actively cooperating in that regard.62, 63 Military cooperation 

between the two countries is slowly expanding, 

as are economic ties.64 Nevertheless, some Russians are keenly aware of the growing power disparity between Russia and an ascendant China 

and worry that Moscow is at risk of becoming Beijing’s junior partner.65 Others continue to harbor 

suspicions that China over the longer term will 

once again become a military threat to Russia.66, 67

National Security Strategy

Russia’s current National Security Strategy was 

signed by President Vladimir Putin on 31 December 2015 as an update to the previous National 

Security Strategy published in 2009. The National 

Security Strategy is the Kremlin’s foundational 

planning document and is intended for domestic and external audiences.68 It codifies Moscow’s 

strategic interests and national priorities for at 

least the next 6 years. The national priorities 

were consistent with those identified in previous 

strategies; however, the tone of this update was 

harsher than the 2009 strategy, reflecting Moscow’s view of worsening relations with the West.

The 2015 strategy identifies Russian national 

interests as strengthening the country’s defense, 

ensuring political and social stability, raising the 

living standard, preserving and developing culture, improving the economy, and strengthening 

Russia’s status as a leading world power. These 

national interests are to be achieved through concentration on eight strategic national priorities:

• National defense

• State and public security
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17

• Economic growth • Science, technology, and education • Healthcare • Culture • Ecology of living systems and rational 

use of natural resources

• Strategic stability and equal strategic 

partnership

In the 2015 document, the sections on national 

defense, internal stability, economy, and culture 

were significantly expanded.69 Moscow identified 

new threats to state and public security posed by 

foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

“color revolutions,” and the use of social media to 

foment unrest and undermine political and social 

stability,70 reflecting Russian officials’ allegations 

that Western powers seek to provoke regime 

change in Russia.71 The culture priority contains 

some of the strategy’s most significant revisions, 

emphasizing the need to preserve and strengthen 

“traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,” 

and indicating that Moscow views culture, lan-

guage, and history as a tool for influence.

Unlike the 2009 version, the new National Secu-

rity Strategy directly accuses the United States 

and NATO of pursuing actions that cause insta-

bility and threaten Russian national security.72

The importance of a strong military for a lead-

ing world power is acknowledged; the strategy 

states that “the role of force as a factor in inter-

national relations is not declining.” The new 

strategy reiterated key concepts outlined in Rus-

sia’s 2014 military doctrine on the importance of 

deterrence and conflict prevention, nuclear and 

nonnuclear deterrence, and the need to improve 

Russia’s mobilization process.73 The National 

Security Strategy reflects a Russia more confi-

dent of its ability to defend its sovereignty, resist 

Western pressure, and contribute to the resolu-

tion of conflicts abroad (or insecurity).

Stability Issues

The Kremlin views internal political stability as 

a critical component of national strength and pro-

jecting power abroad, as evidenced by the empha-

sis placed on it in the National Security Strategy. 

Since returning to the presidency in 2012, Russian 

President Putin has worked to consolidate power. 

His efforts to further centralize control have been 

challenged by a slowing economy, lower energy 

prices, and growing public discontent with a sys-

tem that lacks any genuine pluralism.74 Putin has 

tried to deflect from these concerns by promising 

to restore Russia to great power status, on par 

with the United States, to mobilize public support 

and secure his legitimacy.75, 76

The Kremlin has taken steps to neutralize polit-

ical opposition by expanding laws to impose 

harsh sentences that discourage public pro-

tests and encourage self-censorship.77 It has 

also restructured its internal security forces to 

ensure a more loyal and responsive apparatus. 

Russia maintains security forces that are not 

subordinate to the military to conduct a range of 

internal security and policing functions. None-

theless, the Kremlin will likely face continu-

ing challenges to its rule from democracy and 

anti-corruption activists, labor unrest, as well 

the ever present threat of terrorism emanating 

from Russia’s restive North Caucasus region. 
18

Insurgency in the South

Russia’s enduring insurgency in its restive North Caucasus region continues at a consistent 

but low level. Stemming directly from its two conflicts in Chechnya in 1994–96 and then reigniting in 1999, Moscow largely declared an end to major operations by 2009, although it still 

retains a sizeable military and security force structure and counterterrorism regime in the 

region.84 Still a volatile region, a general level of order is maintained via a mix of local and 

federal-level Russian forces, including Chechen forces loyal to Moscow headed by Chechen 

President Ramzan Kadyrov.85

Once the center of insurgent activity, levels of instability in Chechnya gradually have plateaued 

over the years, while those in its neighboring Muslim provinces such as Dagestan and Ingushetia have experienced sporadic upswings in activity over time. Although large groups of insurgents are now primarily a thing of the past, smaller bands still exist with affiliations to various 

nationalist and extremist groups such as ISIS-Caucasus and the Imarat Kavkaz. These groups 

and their members conduct small-scale operations and bombings against Russian forces—primarily from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) police or the National Guard. Although daily 

attacks have largely abated since late 2013, pervasive socio-economic issues, corruption, and 

heavy-handedness (real or perceived) by Russian authorities will continue drive feelings of disenfranchisement amongst the populace, providing a steady source for radicalization in the region. 

Ministries with Internal Security Missions 1612-11145

Ministry/Agency Mission

Personnel 

(Number of Troops)

National Guard Regime and internal security, 

federal law enforcement (200,000)78

Ministry of Internal Affairs 

(MVD)

Civil policing and local law 

enforcement 904,80079

Federal Security Services 

(FSB) Border Troops Border security: ground and maritime (170,000)*80

Ministry of Justice (UIN) Civil judicial system, prison guarding 32,000*81

Ministry of Emergency 

Situations (EMERCOM)

Civil defense, disaster response, 

humanitarian relief, firefighting 289,000 (7,500)82

Federal Protection Service 

(FSO)

Presidential, VIP, and regime 

protection 20,00083

*Estimate 
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19

External Defense Relations

The Commonwealth of Independent States 

(CIS) was a regional coordination body cre-

ated among a number of the former Soviet 

states in the wake of the dissolution of the 

former Soviet Union. Nine states remain 

members, with Ukraine and Turkmenistan 

retaining associate member status. Russia’s 

most important defense and security rela-

tionships are with its allies in the CIS Collec-

tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—

Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Tajikistan. Based on the 1992 Tashkent 

Collective Security Agreement, the CSTO was 

established in 2002 as part of a larger Rus-

sian effort in the post-Soviet environment 

to create a more structured military organi-

zation capable of implementing the security 

guarantees stipulated in the agreement. Since 

then, the CSTO has developed a bureaucratic 

staff under the organization’s secretary gen-

eral and a rapid reaction force to respond to 

various contingencies that might impact the 

security of the member states. The CSTO con-

ducts yearly joint military exercises address-

ing various scenarios such as peacekeeping 

or counterterrorism operations.86 Russia also 

maintains an airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, 

under the auspices of the CSTO.

Nonetheless, Russian efforts to build the 

CSTO into a more structured and capable 

organization on par with NATO largely have 

floundered. Some of the non-Russian member 

states worry that Moscow is using the orga-

nization to undermine their sovereignty and 

independence and are cautious of deepening 

military cooperation with Russia, as evidenced 

by Uzbekistan’s withdrawal in 2007. Differ-

ing threat perceptions, an absence of trust 

amongst the members, and funding shortfalls 

have further plagued the organization.87, 88, 89, 90

Russia also is building cooperative defense 

relationships with other various countries 

throughout the Middle East, Latin America, 

Africa, and Asia, but its engagement is far less 

robust than in the former Soviet Union. Mos-

cow appears to no longer be interested in fund-

ing Soviet-style patronage relationships, and 

Russian policy remains largely transactional 

aimed at expanding arms sales and other Rus-

sian economic interests, which has contributed 

to the limited nature of these ties.91, 92 Never-

theless, the Kremlin continues to view its mil-

itary outreach to these countries as important 

to enhancing its global stature and strengthen-

ing its regional influence.

Defense Budget

Russian government spending on national 

defense has generally grown over the last 

decade and in 2016 reached a post-Soviet 

record. This increase in defense spending 

was enabled by both a general increase in 

the size of Russia’s GDP and a political deci-

sion to increase the defense burden—the 

share of national wealth devoted to defense.

In 2015, Russian defense spending reached a 

then-record $52 billion (in 2017 dollars) and 

the defense burden was nearly 4% of GDP. 
20

The 2016 budget, which was initially to 

decrease defense spending, was amended 

late in the year to increase defense spending to $61 billion, a 4.5% defense burden 

on GDP.93, 94, 95 By contrast, in 2006 defense 

spending was $27 billion, and the defense 

burden was 2.4%.96, 97

Moscow’s ambitious rearmament program has 

driven the increase in defense spending. The 

Strategic Armament Program (SAP) called 

for spending 19.4 trillion rubles (equivalent 

to $285 billion) to rearm Ministry of Defense 

forces from 2011 through 2020. Each year the 

SAP is implemented through the State Defense 

Order (SDO), Moscow’s purchase of new weaponry, investment in weapons-related research 

and design, and expenditure on modernization 

and repair of existing weaponry.101 Funding for 

the 10 year program was heavily back-loaded 

such that just 31% was to be spent in the first 

5 years (2011–2015) and nearly 70% was to be 

spent from 2016 to 2020.102 In order for Moscow to meet its original target for SAP spending and maintain its operational spending at 

current levels, defense spending from 2016 

through 2020 will have to increase substantially over 2011–2015 levels.

Russian defense spending, however, is poised 

to decrease in 2017.103 The 2017 budget calls 

for 2.8 trillion rubles to be spent on national 

defense, equivalent to $42 billion.104 This constitutes a 30% real cut in defense spending 

Russia's Official Defense Spending 2006-2017 (billions of 2017 dollars)98, 99, 100

1612-11108

27.026 29.024 30.754 34.412 32.375 33.345 37.862 40.762 43.416 51.519 60.825 42.278

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Real defense expenditures US$ # % of GDP (nominal NCU based expenditures)

2.4

2.3

2.4

2.9

2.6 2.5

2.8

3.0

3.1

3.8

4.5

3.1
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

21

from 2016 levels, and if it is not amended to 

increase funds mid-year, it would be the lowest 

budget for national defense since 2013.105, 106, 107

According to Russian press and Ministry of 

Finance announcements, from 2017 through 

2019 Russian defense spending will be essen-

tially frozen in nominal terms—and therefore 

declining in real terms.108, 109

Russian government revenues are highly 

dependent on oil prices, and Moscow’s deci-

sion to base its budget for 2017–2019 on 

low projected oil prices in 2017–2019 is 

largely responsible for the glum outlook 

for government revenue and low projected 

GDP growth rates.110 According to the Inter-

national Monetary Fund and a number 

of prominent economists, Russia faces a 

growth ceiling; absent structural reforms, 

Russian GDP growth would probably reach 

only 1 to 2 percent per year, even were oil 

prices to increase significantly.111, 112
22

ince at least 1991, the Russian perception of the nature of modern conflict has evolved. Russia views wars as 

often undeclared, fought for relatively limited political objectives, and occurring across 

all domains, including outer space and the 

information space.113 Russian leaders have 

noted the tendency for crises to arise quickly 

and develop impetuously, and to potentially 

escalate from local wars into global ones.114, 115 

In addition, Moscow judges that modern conflicts are characterized by a destructive and 

rapid “initial period of war”—a subject on 

which Russian military leaders and theorists 

have written extensively since the 1920s—

which is becoming more decisive than ever 

before. In modern cyber-enabled information and battlefield spaces, this destructive 

non-kinetic initial period can be reduced to 

milliseconds, and kinetically to hours.116

Moscow fears that the speed, accuracy, and 

quantity of non-nuclear strategic precision-guided weapons can achieve strategic 

effects on par with nuclear weapons,117 one 

of the primary reasons that since at least 1993 

(and most recently codified in the 2014 Military Doctrine) Russia has reserved the right to 

a nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack that 

threatens the existence of the state.118, 119, 120 In 

addition to rejecting no-first-use, Moscow has 

discussed using nuclear weapons to de-escalate 

a conflict.121, 122 While most military theorists 

and leaders believe great-power conflict is 

unlikely, they nevertheless express concern 

about the usability of the information space to 

achieve state goals.123 Russia has tied this decisive and shortened initial period to the idea that 

only more proactive or even preemptive action 

is required to counter it.124, 125, 126 Russian developments in precision-guided munitions indicate 

a desire for “deep strike” capability to preempt 

attacks from an adversary.

Russia’s Military Doctrine, last updated in 

December 2014, contained several new elements not in the 2010 Doctrine, which reflect 

Moscow’s military focus and threat perceptions. First codified in the doctrine was 

the concept of non-nuclear deterrence, an 

idea that has been evolving since the Soviet 

period. The doctrine also underscored perceived threats to Russia’s domestic security 

and described the military’s requirement to 

inflict unacceptable damage on any adversary 

at any time. This requires the military to calculate or understand what level of damage 

would constitute unacceptable damage to an 

adversary.127, 128, 129 Mobilization readiness of 

the state was stressed, as were measures to 

unify state, societal, and individual efforts to 

protect Russia and increase the effectiveness 

of military-patriotic indoctrination of citizens 

and their preparation for military service.130

Military Doctrine And Strategy

Russian Perceptions of Modern Conflict
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23

The concepts of readiness, non-nuclear deter-

rence, and unacceptable damage are closely 

linked in Russian thinking; Russian military 

leaders judge that a highly ready non-nuclear 

force, able to inflict unacceptable damage on 

an aggressor—including against its economy—

at any moment, is its own deterrent.131, 132, 133, 134 

For Moscow, the word translated as “deter-

rence” ( ) is more closely linked 

to a concept of active restraint, or literally to 

hold back something moving with force.135 In 

the West, deterrence is often seen as an estab-

lished condition, whereas in Moscow it is an 

active, flexible process that continues through-

out the conflict spectrum.

The Russians define strategic deterrence as a 

package of coordinated political, diplomatic, 

economic, ideological, moral, spiritual, informa-

tional, scientific, technological, military, and 

other actions taken by a country to demonstrate 

the decisiveness of the political leadership to 

tap all instruments of state power consecutively 

or simultaneously—to stabilize the military, 

political, and strategic environment, to antic-

ipate aggression, and to deescalate military 

conflict.136, 137, 138, 139, 140 Some Russian theorists 

break deterrence down further into non-force-

ful and forceful means and even into deterrence 

by “type” (economic, military, nuclear, non-nu-

clear, etc.).141

Closely linked to strategic deterrence is the 

concept of strategic stability. At its basic level, 

Russia’s concept of deterrence, appropriately 

applied in its view, assures strategic stability. 

Strategic stability is the sum total of political, 

economic, military, and other measures (e.g., 

force) retained by states in a stable balance 

whereby neither side has the opportunity, inter-

est, or intent to carry out military aggression.142

Russia has observed modern conflicts and incor-

porated aspects of these observations into its 

deterrence and warfighting strategies. Russia 

seeks to shape the environment in peacetime 

to avoid or deter conflict and, if war does occur, 

will use its military force to establish a favor-

able outcome for Moscow.143, 144 Moscow’s warfighting strategy includes use of indirect action 

and asymmetric responses, including using 

technical and psychological operations to dis-

rupt technical systems, influence public opin-

ion, and “erode the opponent’s resolve.”145, 146, 147

The modernization of its nuclear and conven-

tional forces to include precision-guided strike 

weapons provide it a major military force to 

shape the outcome of war along the entire spec-

trum of modern conflict.

Military and Security

Leadership

Decisionmaking in Russia is highly centralized, 

and President Vladimir Putin dominates Russia’s 

decisionmaking, including for military and secu-

rity issues. His constitutional responsibilities 

include appointing the prime minister, chairman 

of the Central Bank, government ministers, and 

judges; he may announce State Duma elections 

or dissolve it. His annual address to the Federal 

Assembly sets guidelines for national internal 

and foreign policies, and he resolves internal 

governmental disputes. The Russian president 
24

governs foreign policy, signs international treaties, forms and heads the Security Council, and 

approves military doctrine.148 The Russian president serves as the Supreme Commander in 

Chief of the Russian military, and in times of 

emergency he may introduce martial law.149

The Russian Ministry of Defense is subordinate 

to President Putin as Supreme Commander in 

Chief and is charged with implementing presidential policy within the military, overseeing 

all readiness, manpower, and procurement 

issues.150, 151, 152 The defense minister has the 

legal authority to oversee and direct operations of the General Staff.153

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu was appointed 

Defense Minister on 6 November 2012, after 

18 years leading the Ministry of Emergency 

Situations.154 Shoygu’s introduction of frequent strategic-level, no-notice inspections 

in Russia’s military districts, unprecedented 

in number and scope for the post-Soviet Russian military, has been critical in assessing 

and increasing combat readiness in the armed 

forces, as well in as refining defense reforms.155

The General Staff’s primary mission is to 

ensure the military security of the Russian Federation (RF), that is, to protect the vital interests of the state and society from internal and 

external threats. The General Staff is responsible for monitoring and characterizing the threat 

environment and developing strategic and 

operational plans to equip, mobilize, employ, 

command, and control the armed forces.156, 157

According to a 2013 presidential edict describing General Staff missions and functions, its 

range of responsibilities was broadened to 

include coordination of all activity undertaken 

by federal executive organizations to ensure 

defense capability and security.158

The chief of the General Staff, Gen-Army Valeriy 

Gerasimov, serves as the military head of the 

Russian Armed Forces.159 Gerasimov previously 

served as deputy chief of the General Staff from 

December 2010 until May 2012, when he was 

appointed commander of the Central Military 

District.160 He became chief of the General Staff 

in November 2012. He is a respected armor 

officer with substantial combat experience and 

time in command in Russia’s restive North 

President Vladimir Putin Gen-Army Valeriy Gerasimov

Image Source: Open source

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25

Caucasus region.161, 162, 163 Since his appointment, 

Gerasimov has focused largely on dealing with 

military readiness, modifying defense reforms 

carried out by his predecessor, and preparing 

for security concerns.164, 165, 166, 167

Main Operations Directorate

The Main Operations Directorate (GOU) of the 

General Staff has operational control of the 

armed forces, organizes strategic and opera-

tional force planning; executes military exer-

cises and operational training, and engages 

with multilateral military-security organiza-

tions such as the CSTO, CIS, and Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization.168 The GOU shapes 

the Defense Plan of the Russian Federation, 

identifies sources of threats to Russia for strate-

gic planning, and works with the General Staff’s 

Military-Scientific Committee (VNK) to draft 

the State Armament Program.169, 170, 171, 172, 173

General Lieutenant (Gen-Lt, two stars) Sergey 

Rudskoy served as first deputy chief of the 

GOU for 9 years before becoming its chief in 

November 2015, Rudskoy has been the Gen-

eral Staff’s senior representative at interna-

tional forums, and he will likely leverage this 

experience to enhance coordination with other 

militaries operating in Syria.174, 175

National Military Command 

and Control

At the pinnacle of Russian military command 

and control is the Russian president, Vladi-

mir Putin, who serves as the Supreme Com-

mander in Chief of the armed forces. As such, 

he is the primary decisionmaker and is autho-

rized to assume direct command and control 

during times of crisis and martial law.176, 177 The 

minister of defense is appointed by the presi-

dent and is charged with implementing presi-

dential policy within the Ministry of Defense. 

This includes overseeing all hiring, equipping, 

training, care, and feeding of military person-

nel. With the implementation of Russia’s New 

Look military reforms, the minister of defense 

now has legal authority to oversee and direct 

operations of the General Staff.178 The chief of 

the General Staff is also appointed by the pres-

ident and serves as the military head of the 

armed forces.179 The General Staff’s primary 

mission is to ensure the military security of the 

Russian Federation and is responsible for mon-

itoring and characterizing the threat environ-

ment and developing strategic and operational 

plans to equip, mobilize, employ, command, and 

control the armed forces.180, 181 The service chiefs 

Gen-Lt Sergey Rudskoy

Image Source: Open source
26

have the responsibility of organizing, training, 

and equipping their forces to meet current and 

future national security challenges.182

The Russian military has established a redundant and survivable command and control 

(C2) system to control its forces that serves 

as a force-enabler. Russia’s C4ISR complex 

uses multiple capabilities ranging from technologically advanced systems to mechanically 

simple, legacy Soviet devices intended to centralize control of the military while providing 

intelligence support to speed up decisionmaking 

cycles and carry out joint operations.183, 184

Russia’s C2 system has six key characteristics:

• Centralized. The president of the Russian Federation is the commander in chief 

of the armed forces and is authorized to 

assume direct C2 over the military via 

the Ministry of Defense and General Staff 

during times of crisis and martial law.185

• Redundant. Multiple C2 systems are used 

at each echelon to disseminate commands 

and for the transmission of orders.186

• Geographically dispersed. Russia’s 

key C2 nodes and facilities are distributed 

throughout the country to increase survivability and limit single points of failure.187

• Secure. Moscow is upgrading C2 systems 

to take advantage of modern and secure 

digital communications networks.188

• Reliable. Russia routinely conducts snap 

and other training exercises to test the systems’ capabilities to pass information and 

increase decisionmaking efficiency.189

• Built for the worst case scenario. Russian C2 systems are designed to enable 

the dissemination of launch orders while 

under nuclear attack through several C2 

systems, including Perimetr, sometimes 

referred to as the “Dead Hand.”190

Russian Nuclear Command

and Control

Maintaining control of its nuclear arsenal is of 

critical importance to Moscow. During the Cold 

War, Russia developed a centralized nuclear 

C2 system capable of meeting its three primary 

requirements: reliability, speed, and security. 

President Putin with the nuclear briefcase.

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27

To accomplish these goals, strategic planners 

designed a complex system-of-systems that pro-

tects weapons from unauthorized or accidental 

use and centralizes command authority at the 

highest echelon, while guaranteeing the ability 

to quickly launch when necessary.191

Russian military doctrine underscores the cen-

tral role of the Russian president in authorizing 

the use of nuclear weapons. He uses the nuclear 

briefcase, which is carried by officers who 

always remain near the president. The General 

Staff monitors the status of the weapons of the 

nuclear triad and will send the direct command 

to the launch crews following the president’s 

decision to use nuclear weapons. The Russians 

send this command over multiple C2 systems, 

which creates a redundant dissemination pro-

cess to guarantee that they can launch their 

nuclear weapons. Moscow also maintains the 

Perimetr system, which is designed to ensure 

that a retaliatory launch can be ordered when 

Russia is under nuclear attack.192, 193, 194

Command and Control of 

Joint Forces 

Moscow Implemented a Joint Strategic Com-

mand (OSK) structure in 2010 to better 

facilitate joint military operations. Russia 

converted its six military districts into four 

OSKs.197, 198 In 2015, Russia created a fifth 

OSK, the OSK Northern Fleet, to improve its 

capability to project military power into the 

Arctic and to take advantage of the opening 

of the Russia’s Northern Sea Route.199

In contrast to pre-reform military districts 

that were primarily land force commands, 

the new OSKs are joint force elements that 

have control in times of peace and war over 

all general purpose forces stationed in—or 

deployed to—their territories. The phrase 

“military district” still exists and refers to 

specific geographic boundaries, but an OSK 

is the command element for that area. For 

example, the Eastern Military District covers 

President Putin and Defense Minister Shoygu at the 

NTsUO, November 2015.

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

National Defense Management Center (NTsUO), 

November 2015.195, 196

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright
28

the geographic territory from eastern Siberia 

to the Pacific Ocean, but it is commanded by 

OSK East.200, 201 These reforms resulted in a 

reduced command structure, both vertically 

and horizontally, which is more streamlined, 

efficient, and flexible.202, 203

Moscow’s National Defense Management 

Center (NTsUO), which came online in 2014, 

is a key component of the overall Russian C2 

system. The NTsUO works with subordinate 

regional and territorial defense management 

centers to coordinate ministry and department 

activities among lower echelons in accordance 

with national defense and security directives 

while liaising with municipal authorities.204
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29

ussia is one of the oldest nuclear 

powers, first detonating a nuclear 

device in 1949.205 As heir to the former 

Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, Russia has 

one of the world's two largest inventories of 

strategic weapons. While participating in strategic arms reduction treaties (START) with 

the United States, Russia is also committed 

to maintaining and modernizing its nuclear 

forces. Land-based intercontinental ballistic 

missiles are controlled by the Strategic Rocket 

Forces (SRF), and the sea-based and air strategic systems are managed by the Navy and 

Aerospace force, respectively. Moscow plans to 

spend about $28 billion by 2020 to upgrade the 

capacity of its strategic nuclear triad.206

• In the first leg of the triad the SRF operates 

three older ICBM systems for more than half 

of their land-based nuclear delivery vehicles. The oldest ICBMs in the arsenal are 

the silo-based liquid-fueled SS-18 (deployed 

in 1988–92) and SS-19 (deployed in 1979-

84). These missiles carry, respectively, 10 

and 6 multiple independently-targeted 

Dolgorukiy Class Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine. 

Core Russian Military Capabilities

Nuclear Forces and Weapons

Image Source: AFP
30

reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The solid-propellant, single-warhead SS-25 was deployed in 

1985–92 as a road-mobile ICBM. As these 

aging missiles reach the end of their operational lives, they will be withdrawn from 

service by 2019–2021 and replaced with 

newer, modern road-mobile and silo-based 

ICBMs by 2020. The SRF's missile inventories will be equally split between road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs.207

• The second element of the nuclear triad is 

a fleet of at least 10 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) under 

administrative control of the Naval High 

Command. The Russian strategic Navy 

is modernizing, mainly by building and 

deploying the DOLGORUKIY-class SSBN 

platform for the new SS-N-32 BULAVA

sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).208

• The third element of the nuclear triad is the 

Russian Aerospace Force's fleet of strategic 

bombers, which forms the core of the LongRange Aviation (LRA) Command. Like 

other components of the triad, the LRA is 

modernizing, to continue operating Tu-95 

BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK bombers 

beyond 2030. The last “new” BLACKJACK

was added to the fleet in 2005, and all existing Tu-160s will be upgraded to Tu-160M1 

or M2. Russia has announced that it will 

resume production of Tu-160M2 bombers 

and complete development of a new generation bomber (Russian designation: PAK-DA) 

within a decade, but timelines for both programs may slip if financial difficulties arise. 

The new bomber design is expected to have 

some stealth and short- or rough-runway 

capabilities, and employ both conventional 

and nuclear armament.209, 210

The main function of strategic forces is effective, reliable deterrence. Scenarios for the use of 

strategic nuclear forces fall into three main categories: preemptive strike (first strike), counterstrike (launch on warning, prior to impact 

in-country), and retaliatory strike (response to 

impacts in-country). Because the retaliation 

option imposes the most difficult situation on 

the strategic forces—which must respond even 

Russian Tu-160 heavy bomber and Il-78M tanker.

Image Source: AFP

Russian SS-27 Mod 2 road-mobile ICBM.

Image Source: AFP
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

31

after an enemy's strategic strike has impacted 

and disabled elements of the force—strategic 

forces, weapons, and battle management sys-

tems are designed and built to be hardened, 

stealthy, redundant, and reliable—and trained 

to function in a WMD-degraded environment.211

Russia continues to retain a sizable nuclear 

stockpile even after several decades of arms 

reduction treaties. Russia has a large nuclear 

weapons infrastructure and a production base 

capable of producing large numbers of new 

nuclear weapons annually.212, 213

The U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (New START), signed on 8 April 2010, 

sets for each country a limit of 1,550 warheads 

on strategic platforms, including one warhead 

attributed to each heavy bomber. There is also 

a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-de-

ployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy 

bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and a 

separate limit of 700 deployed strategic systems 

overall. The treaty will last 10 years, with cen-

tral limits to be met by 2018 with the option for a 

single extension of another 5 years. Colonel Gen-

eral Sergey Karakayev, commander of the SRF, 

has stated that an arsenal of 1,500 nuclear war-

heads would provide Russia a sufficient deter-

rent against attack.214 According to Russia’s New 

START Treaty data provided on 1 April 2017, 

Russia declared 1,765 warheads on 523 deployed 

ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.215

Russia currently has an active stockpile of 

approximately 2,000 non-strategic nuclear 

weapons. These include air-to-surface mis-

siles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity 

bombs, and depth charges for medium-range 

bombers, tactical bombers, and naval avia-

tion, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and 

anti-aircraft missiles, and torpedoes for sur-

face ships and submarines. There may also 

be warheads remaining for surface-to-air and 

other aerospace defense missile systems.216, 217

Russia’s nuclear forces modernization goals 

include: replace Soviet-legacy systems with 

modern nuclear weapons, maintain rough 

parity with the U.S. nuclear arsenal, improve 

the survivability and efficiency of its nuclear 

weapons, and maintain prestige on the inter-

national stage. Russia’s nuclear moderniza-

tion includes both strategic and non-strate-

gic nuclear weapons.218, 219

, 220, 221

Biological and

Chemical Weapons

In 1992, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin 

admitted having an offensive biological weap-

ons program and publicly committed to its ter-

mination. Subsequently, the Russian govern-

ment reversed itself and now claims neither 

the Soviet Union nor Russia has ever pursued 

an offensive biological weapons program.222

In 1997, Moscow declared the world’s larg-

est stockpile of chemical agents and muni-

tions—40,000 metric tons of agents—under the 

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The 

declared inventory consisted of a comprehensive 

array of traditional chemical warfare agents 

filled in munitions such as artillery, bombs, and 

missile warheads, as well as stored in bulk.223
32

As a state party to the CWC, Russia is obligated 

to destroy its chemical weapon stockpile.

As of January 2017, Russia had destroyed 

96.4% of its declared chemical weapons stockpile, according to press reporting.224 Russia 

intends to complete destruction of its remaining declared stockpile by 2020.225 Moscow has 

completed destruction activities and closed the 

facilities in Gornyy, Kambarka, Maradykovskiy, Leonidovka, Schchuch’ye, and Pochep and 

continues destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stockpile at a facility in Kizner.226

Russia used chemical incapacitants to resolve 

the Dubrovka Theater hostage situation in 

2002 and may consider using them in other 

counterterrorism actions.227

Anti-Access/Area Denial

Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) refers to preventing an adversary from operating in a particular region or area. Russia repeatedly cites 

in open source literature the need to repel or 

defend against a Western aerospace attack. 

Russia would seek to deter any Western use of 

aerospace power against Russia using its conventional, non-strategic nuclear, and, in extreme 

circumstances, its strategic nuclear forces. Russian military theorists have examined the likelihood of a great power war arising out of a local 

conflict, similar to the events leading up to World 

War I, and escalating to combat with U.S./NATO 

or another peer.228 Based on insight gleaned from 

studies of warfare since 1991, Russia would seek 

to limit the capability of an adversary to conduct 

aerospace strikes on its territory.229, 230

Russian strategy for A2/AD would focus on a 

combination of various elements that military 

planners and theoreticians have identified as 

critical to the development of a comprehensive approach to A2/AD.231, 232 These involve the 

incorporation of the following elements.

Information Operations

Information operations are seen as a critical 

capability to achieve decisive results in the initial period of conflict with a focus on control 

of the information spectrum in all dimensions 

of the modern battle space. Authors often cite 

the need in modern warfare to control information—sometimes termed “information blockade” or “information dominance”—and to seize 

the initiative early and deny an adversary 

use of the information space in a campaign so 

as to set the conditions needed for “decisive 

success.” Russia continues to emphasize electronic warfare and other information warfare 

capabilities, including denial and deception as 

part of its approach to all aspects of warfare 

including A2/AD.233

Strategic Air Operations

Russian military theorists continue to emphasize the key importance of strategic air operations in modern war. This concept originated 

in the 1920s, where Soviet planners viewed 

the initial period of war as the time that aviation would strike deep in enemy rear areas to 

destroy mobilization and concentration areas. 

At the same time, air forces would also prioritize the defense of the country against enemy 

air attack and conduct close air support of 
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

33

ground operations, achieving air supremacy in 

the first days of the war using all means.234 This 

concept was underscored in 1993, when Defense 

Minister Grachev indicated that “war will begin 

with an offensive aerospace operation on both 

sides.”235 Russian planners have indicated that 

in such a war there will be no front and no rear, 

with space emerging as an independent theater 

of military operations. Russian doctrine, down 

to the present day, continues to emphasize that 

strategic objectives can be achieved with mass 

aerospace strikes early in a conflict with victory 

achieved without the seizure and occupation of 

territory by forces.236

Russian planners have analyzed U.S. oper-

ations such as DESERT STORM, NOBLE 

ANVIL, and IRAQI FREEDOM for insight, 

observing military art at the strategic, oper-

ational, and tactical levels in campaigns that 

displayed U.S. aerospace capabilities and 

underscored the importance of developing 

comparable indigenous capabilities that can 

be employed defensively.237, 238 This empha-

sis on strategic air operations is reflected in 

long-term procurement goals of platforms and 

weapons focused on space, aerospace defense, 

and precision-guided munitions.239, 240

Integrated Air Defense System

Russian doctrine places a great deal of empha-

sis on aerospace defense as a key component 

in its overall A2/AD strategy.241, 242 Though still 

in development, Russia’s 21st century inte-

grated air defense system will be designed to 

integrate future and existing systems around 

a central command structure that is designed 

to promote the interaction of all air defense 

forces and weapons.243, 244 Capabilities opti-

mized against cruise missiles are key to this 

defense component, not just those optimized to 

target aircraft.

Modern Precision Strike Capabilities: 

Air and Sea Systems in Combination 

with Older Technologies 245, 246

Russia continues to develop a variety of seaand aerospace-based programs that offer a 

variety of offensive and defensive capabilities 

that could enable the implementation of its 

integrated A2/AD strategy.247, 248 These include 

the continued production and deployment of 

coastal defense cruise missiles, air/surface/

sub-surface-launched anti-ship cruise missiles 

(ASCMs),249 submarine-launched torpedoes, 

and naval mines, along with Russian fighter, 

bomber, and surface-to-air missile capability. 

Russian S-400 Surface-to-air missile systems – a key 

component of Moscow’s A2/AD strategy.

Image Source: AFP
34

These are intended provide Russia with the 

ability to limit access to its territory and 

extend its strategic depth by providing long 

range kinetic strike capability.

Precision Strike

Russian doctrine on Precision Strike is 

essentially a 21st century extension of the 

Russian doctrine of “deep battle” initially 

codified during the 1920s and 1930s by 

Chief of the General Staff Marshal Mikhail 

Tukhachevskiy and represents an attempt to 

incorporate new technology into traditional 

Russian strategic, operational, and tactical 

strategy. Deep battle was a strategic concept 

that focused on terminating, overwhelming, 

or dislocating enemy forces not only at the 

line of contact, but throughout the depth of 

the battlefield. Deep battle encompassed 

maneuvers by multiple Soviet Army frontsize formations simultaneously. It was not 

meant to deliver a victory in a single operation; instead, multiple operations, which 

might be conducted in parallel or successively, would induce a catastrophic failure 

in the enemy's defensive system. Initially, 

deep battle focused on improved ground and 

air forces and was influential in Soviet operations in World War II from 1943 onward. 

Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, writing in the 1970s to 1980s, 

updated the deep battle concept to develop 

a more aerospace-centric approach in an 

attempt to incorporate traditional Russian 

doctrine with precision technology.250

Ogarkov theorized throughout his tenure as 

chief of the Soviet General Staff that conventional precision-guided munitions were part 

of a revolution in military affairs. In an influential 1983 Krasnaya Zvezda article, Ogarkov took notice of the impact of new types of 

precision weapons and micro-circuitry on the 

development of conventional capabilities. For 

Ogarkov, the development of new conventional 

forms of non-nuclear weapons would enable 

the sorts of multi-front operations that were 

envisioned in the original deep battle concept. 

On a theoretical basis, Ogarkov forecast that 

precision strike could exercise a direct and 

decisive outcome of a future war.251, 252

Despite enthusiasm by the Soviet General 

Staff, very little progress was made in the 

development of precision-guided munitions 

except at the theoretical level for the remainder of the Soviet period. In 1991, DESERT 

STORM provided the Soviet military with proof 

of concept regarding the use of precision-guided 

munitions. Former Soviet officials and Russian 

authorities argued that the DESERT STORM 

campaign demonstrated the capability of precision-guided airstrikes in the land attack role to 

paralyze the rear area and an adversary’s economy. Targets could include vulnerable areas of 

the economy, command and control centers, 

and transportation centers. The introduction of 

precision-guided munitions changed the nature 

of modern war by reinforcing traditional concepts that emphasized decisive action during 

the initial stage of warfare and at the same 

time undermined the traditional Russian reliance on large ground force groupings to achieve 

tactical and strategic objectives.253
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

35

Russia was unable to achieve real progress in 

the development of precision strike until the 

first decade of the 21st century, when it was 

able to create a viable state armaments pro-

gram that allowed prioritization of certain key 

components of 21st-century warfare. Between 

2010 and 2015, Russia’s strategic forces, space 

and aerospace defense platforms, and preci-

sion-guided munitions254 such as ISKANDER, 

KALIBR, or KH-101 were defined as priori-

ties, and system development, production, 

and testing occurred. The effectiveness of pre-

cision-guided munitions are being tested in a 

variety of settings, including Command Staff 

exercises KAVKAZ-2012, VOSTOK-2014, and 

KAVKAZ-2016, as well as operationally against 

targets in Syria beginning in 2015.255, 256, 257

Space/Counterspace

The Russian General Staff postulates that 

modern warfare is increasingly reliant on infor-

mation, particularly from space, because of the 

expansion of the geographic scope of military 

action and the information needs of high-pre-

cision weapons.258 Russia has a significant 

constellation of satellites in orbit. According 

to Colonel Sergey Marchuk, chief of the Main 

Test Space Center, Russia has more than 130 

spacecraft, civilian and military, performing 

communications, navigation, geodetic survey 

support, meteorological, reconnaissance, and 

intelligence gathering missions.259

Russia’s space program is both formidable and 

in a state of rebuilding. Moscow seeks to main-

tain the health of its current constellations 

while deploying a next-generation architecture 

on par with Western space systems. Over the 

next several years, Russia will prioritize the 

modernization of its existing communications, 

navigation, and earth observation systems, 

while continuing to rebuild its electronic intelli-

gence and early warning system constellations.

Russia’s current systems provide an array of 

capability including high-resolution imagery, 

terrestrial and space weather, communica-

tions, navigation, missile warning, electronic 

intelligence, and scientific observations. With 

a long-standing heritage in space, Russia gains 

a sense of national pride from its space pro-

gram, which has included manned missions 

and leading the world in space launches. Cur-

rently ranked third in total number of satel-

lites in orbit behind the United States and 

China, the figure below displays a breakdown 

of Russia’s satellites in orbit.

Kh-101/102 air-launched cruise missiles on a Tu-95MS 

heavy bomber; Moscow first used its precision strike 

arsenal in combat during a series of 2015 strike opera-

tions by sea- and air-launched cruise missiles against 

targets in Syria.

Image Source: Shutterstock
36

Russia has concluded that gaining and maintaining supremacy in space has a decisive 

impact on the outcome of future conflicts.261

According to Russia’s 2010 military doctrine, 

militarization of outer space is a “main external military danger.”262 The 2014 update to 

Russia’s military doctrine calls out Western 

global strike capability by name.263 Russia, in 

military journals, has observed that Western 

operations have shifted to non-contact operations that rely on long-range, space-supported 

precision-guided munitions.264, 265, 266 Russia has 

been very vocal expressing its concerns about 

Western precision strike capabilities and missile defense plans. Deputy Prime Minister 

Dmitry Rogozin compared U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts in Eastern Europe to the 

Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983 and stated 

that such an effort justifies the development of 

Russian counterspace programs.

The Russian General Staff argues for pursuing 

in wartime such strategies as disrupting foreign 

military C2 or information support because they 

are so critical to the fast-paced, high-technology 

conflicts characteristic of modern warfare.267, 268

Russia believes that having the military capabilities to counter space operations will deter 

aggression by space-enabled adversaries and 

enable Russia to control escalation of conflict 

if deterrence fails.269 Military capabilities for 

space deterrence include strikes against satellites or ground-based infrastructure supporting 

space operations.270

On 1 August 2015, Russia created the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces by merging 

Russian satellites in orbit, 5 October 2016 260

1612-11112

Communication Navigation Science

and Tech

Earth

Observation

Relay

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80 70 5 20 33 12

Military Civil Commercial
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

37

the former Air Force and Aerospace Defense 

Troops. Defense Minister Shoygu stated the 

change was “prompted by a shift in the center 

of gravity... towards the aerospace sphere” and 

as a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike 

doctrine.271, 272 This merged force includes Rus-

sia’s space forces who have the mission of con-

ducting space launches and maintaining the 

ballistic missile early warning system, the 

satellite control network, and the space object 

surveillance and identification network.273, 274, 275

Russia also reorganized its space industry 

responsible for space research, design, and pro-

duction. Russia merged the government-owned 

United Rocket and Space Corporation (ORKK), 

which previously absorbed the majority of the 

space industry corporations in 2013, with the 

Federal Space Agency.276, 277 President Putin 

finalized the dissolution of the Federal Space 

Agency on 1 January 2016, naming the joint 

organization the Roscosmos State Corporation.

Cyber

Russia views the information sphere as a key 

domain for modern military conflict.278, 279 

Moscow perceives the information domain as 

strategically decisive and critically important 

to control its domestic populace and influence 

adversary states. Information warfare is a key 

Russia’s planned space launches through 2019 280

1612-11105

05

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

2017 2018 2019

Communications

33

Earth

Observation

16

Navigation

20

Science & Tech

40

ELINT 2EWS1Unknown 1
38

means of achieving its ambitions of becoming a 

dominant player on the world stage.281

Since at least 2010, the Russian military has 

prioritized the development of forces and means 

for what it terms “information confrontation,”282, 283 which is a holistic concept for ensuring information superiority, during peacetime 

and wartime.284 This concept includes control of 

the information content as well as the technical 

means for disseminating that content. Cyber 

operations are part of Russia’s attempts to control the information environment.

The weaponization of information is a key 

aspect of Russia’s strategy and is employed 

in time of peace, crisis, and war. In practice, 

information battles draw upon psychological warfare tactics and techniques from the 

Soviet Era for influencing Western societies.285

Moscow views information and psychological 

warfare as a measure to neutralize adversary 

actions in peace to prevent escalation to crisis 

or war.

Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov announced 

that “information operations troops” were 

involved for the first time in the Kavkaz-2016 

strategic command staff exercise in September 2016, demonstrating Russian military 

commitment to controlling the information 

domain.286, 287, 288

Propaganda Helps Shape The

Information Environment

Russian propaganda strives to influence, confuse, and demoralize its intended audience, 

often containing a mixture of true and false 

information to seem plausible and fit into the 

preexisting worldview of the intended audience. Russian propaganda targets a wide variety 

Information Confrontation

“Information confrontation,” or IPb (informatsionnoye protivoborstvo), is the Russian government’s term for conflict in the information sphere. IPb includes diplomatic, economic, military, political, cultural, social, and religious information arenas, and encompasses two measures for influence: informational-technical effect and informational-psychological effect.289, 290

• Informational-technical effect is roughly analogous to computer network operations, 

including computer-network defense, attack, and exploitation.

• Informational-psychological effect refers to attempts to change people’s behavior or 

beliefs in favor of Russian governmental objectives.

IPb is designed to shape perceptions and manipulate the behavior of target audiences. Information countermeasures are activities taken in advance of an event that could be either 

offensive (such as activities to discredit the key communicator) or defensive (such as measures to secure Internet websites) designed to prevent an attack.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

39

of audiences, including its own population, 

selected populations of other countries, domes-

tic and foreign political elites, and the West 

writ large.291, 292 The variety of techniques for 

disseminating Russian propaganda include 

pro-Kremlin “news” websites and TV and radio 

channels such as Russia Today and Sputnik 

News, bots and trolls on social media, search 

engine optimization, and paid journalists in 

Western and other foreign media.

Cyber-Enabled

Psychological Operations

One of the newest tools in Russia’s information 

toolkit is the use of cyber-enabled psychological 

operations that support its strategic and tacti-

cal information warfare objectives. These new 

techniques involve compromising networks for 

intelligence information that could be used to 

embarrass, discredit, or falsify information. 

Compromised material can then be leaked to 

the media at inopportune times. • Hacktivists. Russian intelligence services 

have been known to co-opt or masquerade 

as other hacktivist groups. These groups 

appeal to Russia due to the difficulty of 

attribution and the level of anonymity pro-

vided. It is widely accepted that Russia, via 

patriotic hackers, conducted a cyber attack 

on Estonia in 2007.293 Under the guise of 

hacktivism, a group called “CyberCaliph-

ate,” seemingly ISIS associated, conducted 

a hack against French station TV5 Monde 

in January 2015. The CyberCaliphate 

group was later linked to Russian military 

hackers. The same group hijacked the Twit-

ter feed of the U.S. Central Command.294 • CyberBerkut – A False Persona. Rus

-

sian hackers also use false personas. 

CyberBerkut is a front organization for 

Russian state-sponsored cyber activity, 

supporting Russia’s military operations 

and strategic objectives in Ukraine.295

CyberBerkut employs a range of both 

technical and propaganda attacks, 

consistent with the Russian concept 

of “information confrontation.” Since 

emerging in March 2014, CyberBerkut 

has been implicated in multiple incidents 

of cyber espionage and attack, includ-

ing distributed denial of service attacks 

against NATO, Ukraine, and German 

Major themes of Russian propaganda include:

The West’s liberal world order is bankrupt and should be replaced by a Eurasian neo-conserva-

tive post-liberal world order, which defends tradition, conservative values, and true liberty.296

The West demonizes Russia, which is only trying to defend its interests and sovereignty and 

act as an indispensable nation in world affairs.

The United States is determined to interfere with and overthrow sovereign governments 

around the world.297
40

government websites. More recently, it 

has focused on the online publication of 

hacked documents, ostensibly obtained 

from the Ukrainian government and 

political figures’ computers. CyberBerkut uses information gained through 

these hacks to discredit the Ukrainian 

government. The intent is to demoralize, embarrass, and create distrust of 

elected officials.298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303

• Trolls. Russia employs a troll army of paid 

online commentators who manipulate or 

try to change the narrative of a given story 

in Russia’s favor. Russia’s Troll Army, also 

known as the Internet Research Agency, is 

a state-funded organization that blogs and 

tweets on behalf of the Kremlin.304 Trolls 

typically post pro-Kremlin content and 

facilitate heated discussions in the comments sections of news articles. Their goal 

is to counter negative media and “Western 

influence.” While the goal of some trolls is 

to simply disrupt negative content, other 

trolls promote completely false content.305

• Bots. Another way Russia manipulates the 

information space is through the use of bots. 

Bots are automated pushers of content on 

social media. These bots vary in sophistication and can continuously push content or 

imitate real life patterns. Bots can drown 

out unwanted content or push a specific 

message. Bots have the ability to overwhelm 

the information space and discourage readers from looking for real content.306, 307

Information Defense

The Russian Federation Security Council’s 

2016 Information Security Doctrine mandates 

protecting Russian citizens from outside threats 

to the information sphere. The doctrine aims to 

secure Russian information freedom and protect information technologies from foreign influence, cyberattacks, intelligence collection, and 

terrorism. The doctrine emphasizes the need to 

develop a national system for government control of the Russian Internet, information warfare forces, and cyber weapons.308

Since at least 1999, Russia has attempted to 

gain consensus on international governance of 

the Internet and international norms and rules 

X&sU-! @#Tg^ e$4*!

Russia uses a Troll Army to disseminate and overwhelm blogs and twitter communications. 

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

CyberBerkut Arm Patch. 

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

41

guiding the behavior of states in the information 

space. A major component of the proposal pertains 

to a state’s ability to govern its information space 

as a means of maintaining state sovereignty and 

preventing an arms race in cyberspace. Although 

state sovereignty traditionally refers to domes-

tic enforcement law, Russia commonly uses this 

term to denounce other nations meddling in their 

internal affairs. Russia also proposed a code of 

conduct for cyberspace with specific dictums 

regarding non-state cyber-actors, such as crimi-

nal hackers involved in cyber activities.309, 310

Media Laws –

A Hedge Against Instability

In the past decade, Russia has implemented 

numerous laws curbing domestic media in broad-

cast, print, and cyber media, taking an abrupt 

turn from the post-Soviet glasnost policies of 

media “openness” and its own constitutional guar-

antees of freedom of speech.311 The use of social 

media to organize opposition street protests in 

2011 and 2012 prompted a reappraisal of official 

internet policy. Since then, the authorities have 

treated the Internet as a serious threat, pushing 

through laws increasing government controls 

over technology and content giving the state pow-

ers to block content, ban websites, monitor online 

activity, and limit media ownership.312 The ulti-

mate goal of this policy appears to be to create 

what some have called a "sovereign internet.”313

The Kremlin's strategy of reducing foreign influ-

ence on the media has not been confined to the 

internet. Numerous other pieces of legislation 

have been passed restricting the level of foreign 

ownership of the media, impeding the work of 

the foreign NGOs supporting independent media 

in Russia and forcing Russian media to account 

for any foreign funding they receive. A recent 

law has even banned foreign companies from 

conducting TV audience research in Russia.314

Indirect Action

Indirect action is a component of Russia’s stra-

tegic deterrence policy developed by Moscow in 

recent years. Its primary aim is to achieve Rus-

sia’s national objectives through a combina-

tion of military and non-military means while 

avoiding escalation into a full blown, direct, 

state-to-state conflict.315 Drawing on a combi-

nation of facets from Russia’s whole-of-govern-

ment or interdepartmental strategy and overt 

or covert military means, indirect action seeks 

to exploit weaknesses and fissures in target 

countries in order to fulfill Moscow’s desired 

national goals.316

The Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg.

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright
42

In Ukraine, indirect action manifested itself 

in non-military measures first, with less visible efforts taken to exert pressure on Kiev, like 

restricting food imports to Russia, but then 

broadening to wider actions involving financial, 

economic, and information warfare. Later, this 

was followed by unconventional military action 

involving Russian Spetsnaz and other non-attributable military units in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.317 This phase involved the actual 

seizure of facilities and infrastructure by these 

covered units, along with the use of local agents, 

sympathizers, and irregular forces in the vicinity to cause unrest and subversion, all of which 

are distinct hallmarks or evolutions of Soviet-era 

Spetsnaz wartime operations.318

Electronic Warfare

Based on authoritative military academic writings, the Russian military views electronic 

warfare as an essential tool for gaining and 

maintaining information superiority over its 

adversaries. Russia’s world-class electronic warfare forces support denial and deception operations and allow identification, interception, disruption, and, in combination with traditional 

fires, destruction of adversary command, control, 

communications, and intelligence capabilities.

In addition to technical disruption, effective use 

of electronic warfare can confuse adversary commanders and decisionmaking at any or all levels, 

demoralize opposing troops, and allow Russian 

forces to seize the operational initiative.319, 320, 321

Russia has fielded a wide range of ground-based 

electronic warfare systems to counter GPS, tactical communications, satellite communications, 

and radars.322 Further, military academics have 

suggested that electronic warfare fuse with cyber 

operations, allowing electronic warfare forces to 

corrupt and disable computers and networked 

systems as well as disrupt use of the electromagnetic spectrum.323, 324 Russia has aspirations 

to develop and field a full spectrum of electronic 

warfare capabilities to counter Western C4ISR 

and weapons guidance systems.

Power Projection

Moscow continues to prioritize modernizing its 

military forces, viewing military power as critical to achieving key strategic objectives and 

global influence. Russian acquisition plans for 

its ground, air, naval, and missile forces are 

designed to enable the ability to conduct out of 

area operations during peacetime and to contest 

Russian jammer on display at Kubinka in 2016; Moscow has invested heavily in developing sophisticated 

electronic warfare capabilities. 

Image Source: Shutterstock
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

43

U.S./NATO military superiority in the event of 

a regional conflict. The rebuilt Russian mili-

tary includes modernized, agile general pur-

pose forces, vital to limited out-of-area power 

projection. While the objectives of the Russian 

military do not suggest a return to the Cold War 

posture, Moscow intends to use its military to 

promote stability on its own terms and to assert 

its great power status.

Russia’s State Armaments Program will con-

tinue to emphasize priority programs related to 

the development of a viable 21st-century mili-

tary, prioritizing strategic forces, space, preci-

sion-guided munitions, and aerospace defense 

capabilities. Russia’s strategic triad along with 

the increasing capability of its conventional 

forces remains a critical deterrent in preventing 

an attack. Russian long-range aviation remains 

a priority for Russian leadership as a key part of 

its strategic deterrent capability, while also pro-

viding an advanced conventional option to rap-

idly project power well beyond Russian borders. 

Russia is also modernizing its naval forces, which 

conduct operations globally in order to “show the 

flag” and contribute to Moscow’s narrative of 

Russia’s re-emergence as a global power. Russia 

is also focused on enhancing its C4ISR capabil-

ities, which will enable improved targeting and 

timely responses to perceived threats. • Long-Range Aviation: Russia periodically 

deploys assets of its LRA bomber force to con-

duct limited out-of-area operations as a power 

projection tool. LRA operations have included 

activity in the Pacific, the Arctic, and even as 

far south in 2008 as Venezuela. The capabil-

ities of LRA aircraft allow for missions as far 

as 5,000–10,000 kilometers away.325

• Naval Forces: The Russian Navy will 

continue to conduct operations in parts of 

the world that are deemed important to 

national objectives. In recent times, these 

have included operations in the Mediterra-

nean,326 the Arctic,327 and periodic deploy-

ments to the western hemisphere328 and 

the Indian Ocean.329 Russia’s naval recapi-

talization program will focus on the devel-

opment of modern general purpose sub-

marines and surface combatants to enable 

continued out-of-area operations.330, 331

• Expeditionary Operations: Along with 

more conventional power projection mis-

sions, Russia has displayed a new capa-

bility to field an expeditionary force capa-

ble of intervening in a foreign conflict. In 

Syria, Russia used a mix of maritime and 

air assets to forward deploy its forces, 

and Russia will almost certainly be able 

to logistically support its current level 

of operations in Syria via a mix of those 

means for the foreseeable future.332

After politically supporting the Syrian regime 

throughout the Syrian civil war, Moscow began 

to deploy military forces to Syria in September 

2015, likely both to shore up the regime and 

assert Russia’s status as a military player and 

powerbroker in the Middle East.333 The majority 

of Russian air strikes and artillery operations 

have supported regime ground offensives and 

focused on opposition targets, with an increased 

focus against Islamic State forces at certain 

points in their campaign.334, 335, 336

Russia has also sought to use the Syrian interven-

tion as a showcase for its military modernization 

program and advanced conventional weapons 

systems, including employing systems from out-
44

side of Syrian territory to demonstrate its power 

projection capacity. Moscow has launched Kalibr 

land-attack cruise missiles from naval units in 

the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, 

demonstrated new capabilities with air-launched 

cruise missiles from its Tu-160M1 BLACKJACK

and Tu-95MS BEAR H heavy bombers, forward-staged long-range Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE 

bombers for strikes from Iranian territory, and 

deployed some of its most advanced air and air 

defense systems to Syria.337, 338, 339, 340 These operations are meant to demonstrate strategic capabilities and message the West about the manner 

in which the Russian military could operate in a 

major conventional conflict, while also providing 

combat experience for the personnel and allowing the systems to be field tested.341, 342

Underground Facilities

Russia inherited a vast underground facilities 

(UGFs) program from the Soviet Union, primarily 

designed to ensure the survival of the leadership 

and military command and control in wartime. 

This program involved the construction of underground bunkers, tunnels, secret subway lines, 

and other facilities beneath Moscow, other major 

Russian cities, and the sites of major military 

commands. Although the majority of these hardened facilities are near-surface bunkers, many 

critical sites are built deep underground and, in 

some cases, are hundreds of meters deep.343

Deep underground command posts both within 

and outside of Moscow are interconnected by a 

network of special deep subway lines that provide leadership a quick and secure means of 

evacuation. The leadership can move from their 

peacetime offices through concealed entryways 

to protective quarters beneath the city. A deep 

underground facility at the Kremlin and an enormous underground leadership bunker adjacent 

to Moscow State University are intended for the 

National Command Authority in wartime. They 

are estimated to be 200–300 meters deep and 

can accommodate an estimated 10,000 people.344

The leadership can remain beneath Moscow or 

travel along the special subway lines that connect these urban facilities to their preferred 

deep underground command posts outside the 

city, and possibly to the VIP terminal at Vnukovo Airfield, 27 kilometers southwest of the 

Kremlin. Two of the most important underground complexes for the National Command 

A Russian naval task force centered on its only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, conducted 

a 5-month deployment to the Mediterranean to 

support strike operations in Syria. 

Image Source: AFP
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

45

Authority and General Staff are located some 

60 kilometers south of the city.345

The support infrastructure for the UGFs in 

and around Moscow is substantial. A highly 

redundant communications system, consisting 

of both on-site and remote elements, allows the 

leadership to send orders and receive reports. 

Highly effective life support systems may per-

mit independent operations for many months 

following a nuclear attack.346

Russian military officials suggest the UGF pro-

gram has been retained. In October 2014, chief 

of the General Staff’s Main Operations Direc-

torate, General-Lieutenant Andrey Kartapolov, 

told a Rossiyskaya Gazeta correspondent that 

the new National Defense Management Cen-

ter in Moscow is safe from a nuclear strike. The 

National Defense Management Center became 

operational in December 2014 and is at the apex 

of the national command structure. General 

Kartapolov noted that protection against nuclear 

strike is always considered in building the most 

important facilities.347

Denial and Deception

The Russian military relies on extensive use of 

denial and deception (maskirovka) to obscure 

intentions and conceal military movement. The 

family of capabilities that composed traditional 

maskirovka includes camouflage, deception, 

denial, subversion, sabotage, espionage, propa-

ganda, and psychological operations.

Russian operational and tactical maskirovka is 

a form of operational combat support. It encom-

passes a set of interrelated organizational and 

technical measures and practical actions of staffs, 

troops, and facilities intended to deceive foreign 

intelligence. Maskirovka promotes surprise, 

maintenance of combat capability, and surviv-

ability. For example, maskirovka in rocket units 

and subunits is organized and carried out for the 

purpose of ensuring that the enemy experiences 

maximum difficulty in collecting intelligence 

data to reduce the effectiveness of strikes, but 

is also carried out to create the false appearance 

of a combined unit in support of deception at the 

operational level of war.348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353

Moscow employed maskirovka at the beginning 

of the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, when media 

reported on the presence of “little green men” 

in Crimea who strongly resembled Russian 

soldiers although they wore uniforms without 

insignia identifying their origins. President 

Putin insisted they were “self-defense groups” 

or “volunteers.” By the time Moscow admitted 

to the presence of Russian troops in Crimea, 

this deception had created enough confusion to 

forestall significant international intervention 

in the conflict, and the ground reality was irre-

versibly tipped in Russia’s favor.354, 355, 356, 357, 358

Moscow used troops without insignia – the “little 

green men” – to seize the Crimean Peninsula in early 

2014, claiming these forces were local militia. 

Image Source: Shutterstock
46

Outlook: A Modernizing Force 

he Russian military has built on the military doctrine, structure, and capabilities 

of the former Soviet Union, and although 

still dependent on many of the older Soviet platforms, the Russians have modernized their military strategy, doctrine, and tactics to include use 

of asymmetric weapons like cyber and indirect 

action such as was observed in Ukraine.

One of Russia’s biggest hurdles since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union has been 

its need to rely heavily on its nuclear forces to 

deter aggression, resulting in its stated willingness for first-use of nuclear weapons.359, 360 Russia 

has been building its conventional force capability along with modernizing its nuclear forces to 

create a more balanced military. Moscow has 

stressed development of conventional precision-strike weapons, a critical gap in its inventory, and recently has tested them in combat in 

Syria, providing it with an advanced non-nuclear 

capability to impact the battlefield.

In 2009, after almost two decades of deterioration and neglect of the Russian military, Moscow 

began developing a more modern military force 

capable of power projection outside Russia’s borders. The New Look reforms instituted structural and organizational reforms and the State 

Armaments Program emphasized development 

of modernized platforms and weapons’ systems. 

In 2013, readiness became an additional area 

of emphasis with institution of no-notice “snap” 

exercises and accompanying mobilization and 

deployments. Moscow’s long-term goal is building a military prepared to conduct the range of 

conflicts from local war through regional conflict 

to a strategic conflict that could result in massive 

nuclear exchange.

Recently, Russian forces have been involved in 

conflict in Ukraine and conducted an expeditionary deployment to Syria, providing experience in combat operations, and employing new 

tactics and advanced weapons systems. This 

more flexible and modern Russian force did 

not spring up overnight but is a result of years 

of concentrated effort to develop and field an 

improved military force.

Russia’s desire to be a leader in a multipolar 

world and recapture the “great power” status it had in Tsarist times and the latter days 

of the Soviet Union requires a force capable of 

deterring aggression, fighting the range of conflicts from local crises to nuclear war, projecting 

power and employing force if necessary to intervene in conflicts across the globe. Despite an 

economic slowdown that will affect the Russian 

military’s timeline for building all of its planned 

capabilities, Russia is rapidly fielding a modern 

force that can challenge adversaries and support 

its “great power” aspirations.

Russia’s commitment to building its military 

is demonstrated by its retention of the draft. 

All Russian males are required to register 

for the draft at 17 years of age and all men 

between the ages of 18 and 27 are obligated 

by law to perform one year of military service.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

47

The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) (Russian 

name: Raketniye Voyska Strategicheskovo Naz-

nacheniya [RVSN]), is one of the most potent mis-

sile forces in the world.361, 362 The SRF was estab-

lished as a separate military service in December 

1959 to operate the first nuclear-armed intercon-

tinental-range land-based ballistic missile (SS-6), 

as the third element of Russia's growing strate-

gic nuclear force deterrent triad.363, 364

The Russian SRF headquarters is in Moscow. 

The SRF's three missile armies—the 27th, 

31st, and 33rd—have a total of 12 subordinate 

missile divisions. Eight of the divisions operate 

road-mobile ICBMs, with the other four armed 

with silo-based missiles.365, 366 The Russian SRF 

have approximately 60,000 personnel.367

In 2016, the SRF had deployed 299 operational 

missiles, with half that number equipped with 

Appendix A: Russian Strategic Rocket Forces

Russia Strategic Rocket Forces 1612-11167

Locations of Strategic Rocket Forces missile divisions.368, 369, 370

Image Source: DIA. D3 Design
48

multiple independently-targetable reentry 

vehicles (MIRV) payloads. The SRF arsenal 

includes three older ICBM types—46 SS-18s 

and 30 SS-19s in silos, and 72 road-mobile 

SS-25s—and two newer ICBM types—60 silobased and 18 road-mobile SS-27 Mod 1s, and 

73 of the most modernized SS-27 Mod 2s.371, 372

The development of new ballistic missile systems 

is a high priority for Russia. The Russian military has outlined that the SRF should be completely re-armed with modern (post-Soviet) missile systems by 2022.373 Russia has stated that it 

will soon begin testing a developmental, heavy, 

liquid-propellant ICBM called the Sarmat to 

replace the aging SS-18. Russia’s goal is to begin 

Sarmat deployment in the 2018–2020 timeframe. 

Russia has announced a new missile called the 

Rubezh (Border) or RS-26, which is smaller than 

the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM and will be deployed in 

2017.374 According to the SRF commander, the 

RS-26 is envisioned as a mobile system and 

has been referred to by Russian Vice-Premier 

Rogozin as a “missile defense killer.”375 Russian 

industry officials also claim development of the 

Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is continuing. A 

decision on full development, production, and 

deployment will occur in the coming months.376

The currently deployed SS-18, which Russia 

plans to replace with the Sarmat, is a silobased, 10-MIRV heavy ICBM first deployed 

in 1988; it needs to be replaced by 2018–2020, 

when the SS-18s' 27- to 30-year service lives 

expire.377 The SS-19 is a silo-based, six-MIRV 

ICBM that entered service in 1980, which the 

SRF will replace with silo-based SS-27 Mod 2 

by 2019, as the SS-19s retire.378

The SS-25 solid-propellant, single-warhead, 

road-mobile ICBM was first deployed in 1985 and 

will retire by 2019–2021, to be replaced by regiments of new production SS-27 Mod 2s, and possibly the two-stage, road-mobile RS-26 Rubezh.379, 380

In addition, Russian leadership claims a 

new class of hypersonic glide vehicle is being 

developed to allow Russian strategic missiles 

to penetrate missile defense systems. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) are maneuverable vehicles that travel at hypersonic (typically greater than Mach 5) speed and spend 

most of their flight at much lower altitudes 

than a typical ballistic missile. The combination of high speed, maneuverability, and relatively low altitude makes them challenging 

targets for missile defense systems.381

Russia’s overall number of strategic systems 

is constrained by the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START), which entered 

into force on 5 February 2011. This treaty 

limits the United States and Russia to no 

more than 1,550 deployed warheads each 

(including warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, 

and counting each heavy bomber as one warhead) 7 years after entry into force.382

Russia retains about 1,200 nuclear warheads for 

ICBMs. Most of these missiles are maintained 

on alert, capable of being launched within minutes of receiving a launch order. Although the 

number of missiles in the Russian ICBM force 
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

49

will continue to decrease because of arms con-

trol agreements, aging missiles, and resource 

constraints, Russia intends to retain the largest 

ICBM force outside the United States.383

Despite Russia’s modernization efforts, the 

size of the SRF may drop below 300 deployed 

ICBMs by the early 2020s, but most of those 

missiles will be equipped with multiple war-

heads. The composition of the force is chang-

ing significantly to meet the deployed strategic 

warhead total limit of 1,550. Notably, prior 

to 2010, no SRF road-mobile ICBMs carried 

MIRVs; by the early 2020s, all will do so.384

Russian ICBM Systems385

1612-11143

System

Number

of Stages Warheads Propellant

Deployment

Mode Max Range km

SS-18

MOD 5 2 + PBV 10 LIQUID SILO 10,000+

SS-19

MOD 3 2 +PBV

6 LIQUID SILO 9,000+

SS-25 3 + PBV1 SOLID ROAD-MOBILE 11,000

SS-27

MOD 1 3 + PBV

1 SOLID SILO and 

ROAD-MOBILE 11,000

SS-27

MOD 2 3 + PBV Multiple SOLID SILO and ROAD-MOBILE 11,000
50

APPENDIX B: Russian Ground Forces

Russian Ground Forces

The Russian ground forces are composed of the 

Ground Troops, Airborne Troops (VDV), Naval 

Infantry, Coastal Troops, Coastal Missile Artillery Troops, and National Guard. The Russian 

Federation armed forces are geographically distributed across four military districts: Western, 

Southern, Central and Eastern. The Western 

Military District has three numbered combined-arms armies (CAAs), the Southern and 

Central Military Districts each have two, and 

the Eastern Military District has four.

The Ground Troops

The Ground Troops, or Sukhoputniye Voyska, 

are the land warfighting component of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The Ground Troops 

constitute the largest component of the Russian 

Federation armed forces. The Ground Troops 

are currently organized into approximately 40 

active and reserve maneuver brigades and eight 

maneuver divisions.386 There are about 350,000 

military personnel in the ground troops.387

According to Russia's Ministry of Defense, the 

roles of its Ground Troops include repelling 

enemy aggression and the protection of Russia's territorial integrity and Russian national 

interests.388 Its main peacetime missions include 

maintaining adequate combat readiness, participating in international peacekeeping operations, 

participating in disaster recovery efforts, and 

assisting in the maintenance of internal security, 

if needed. Examples of what Moscow designates 

peacekeeping operations include ongoing efforts 

in breakaway enclaves in Georgia and Moldova.389

In times of heightened tension, the Ground 

Troops will mobilize forces, operationally deploy 

to threatened areas, call up and train reservists, 

and prepare for defensive operations. Finally, 

in a time of war, Russia's Ground Troops are 

charged to suppress military conflicts if possible, 

repulse enemy aggression, conduct defensive 

and counter-offensive operations to defeat the 

aggressor, and defend critical infrastructure.390

Organizationally, the Ground Troops are composed of main combat components—motorized 

rifle, tank, missile and artillery, and air defense 

units. Support elements for these units include 

Russian armored fighting vehicles parade in Red 

Square; ground forces have historically played a dominant role in Russian military issues and leadership.

Image Source: AFP
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

51

reconnaissance, engineer, nuclear, biological 

and chemical defense, and signal troops. • Motorized Rifle Troops units are the 

most abundant formations in Russia's 

Ground Troops. Essentially mounted infan-

try, these are highly mobile forces tasked 

with holding territory, repulsing enemy 

attacks, breaking through enemy defenses, 

capturing important areas, and defeating 

the enemy.391

• Tank Troops are the main strike compo-

nent of the Ground Troops. They support 

Motorized Rifle Troop missions with direct 

fires during meeting engagements.392

• Missile Troops and Artillery are the 

main means of indirect fires for Russian 

combined arms operations. Missile Troops 

and Artillery forces are organized into mis-

sile, rocket-artillery, and combined artillery 

units.393 Missile units operate close/shortrange ballistic missiles. Rocket-artillery 

units operate multiple rocket launchers 

(MLRs), and combined artillery units oper-

ate composite towed or self-propelled artil-

lery and MLRs.

• Air Defense Troops provide air defense for 

the Ground Troops. These units are equipped 

with anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft artil-

lery, anti-aircraft gun-and-missile systems, 

and portable anti-aircraft missile systems.394

• Reconnaissance Troops perform a 

wide range of tasks in order to provide 

decision makers with information about 

enemy strength, disposition, terrain, and 

weather conditions.395

• Engineer Troops perform a variety of 

specialized tasks, including the construc-

tion of fortifications, installation of obsta-

cles (mine fields, etc.), the preparation of 

field deployment locations, the preparation 

and maintenance of deployment routes, 

the construction of bridges and ferry cross-

ings, and water purification.396

• Nuclear Biological Chemical Defense 

Troops are specialized forces tasked with 

mitigating the effects of nuclear, biological, 

or chemical contamination.397

• Signal Troops are specialized forces 

designed for the deployment and mainte-

nance of mobile redundant command, con-

trol, and communications systems.398

The New Look Reforms and 

the Ground Troops

The centerpiece of the 2008–2009 New Look 

reforms was the elimination of the divisional/

regimental structure and its replacement by the 

brigade. The Russian Ground Troops currently 

have about 40 combined arms brigades.399 In the 

winter of 2013, one motorized rifle brigade and 

one tank brigade were reformed as divisions, 

and in the spring of 2016, it was announced 

that four new divisions would be formed in the 

Western and Southern Military Districts and 

one in the Central Military District.400

The transition to the brigade structure was 

intended to optimize Russia's ground forces 

to fight in what the Russians call "local wars 

and armed conflicts," limited wars along Rus-

sia's periphery, which the Russian General 

Staff believes to be very likely under modern 

conditions. In November 2011, then-Chief of 

the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said: "The 

possibility of local armed conflicts virtually 
52

along the entire perimeter of the border has 

grown dramatically." 401 The Russian ground 

forces fielded brigades of this type that had been 

field tested in Afghanistan (1979–1989) and 

had proved to be quite effective in combat.402

Another development that had received great 

impetus in the Afghanistan war was the reinforced battalion, or battalion tactical group 

(BTG), a motorized rifle or tank battalion, 

strengthened by other assets, such as artillery, 

reconnaissance, and air defense resources. BTGs 

are similar to NATO battalion task forces and 

are ad-hoc organizations, individually created 

and optimized to fulfill a particular mission.403

The new Russian divisions are much smaller 

than their Soviet predecessors. While a Soviet 

motorized rifle division numbered around 

13,000 officers and soldiers, Russia's new 

motorized rifle divisions number around 9,000.

A proponent of the mixed division-brigade ground 

forces, then-acting chief of the ground forces, 

General Lieutenant Vladimir Popov, stated that 

Russia's combined arms brigades “in terms of 

structure are intended for fighting in local wars," 

but that they also "can be successfully employed 

in large-scale wars. They differ from divisions by 

lesser numbers of personnel and military equipment and are capable of executing missions with 

the very same high effectiveness as divisions, 

but in a smaller zone of responsibility."404 The 

re-introduction of some smaller divisions may be 

based more on their potential intimidation value 

than they are on their potential value in combat.

These positive developments have led some 

analysts to claim that Russia is developing 

entirely new military concepts. Modern Russian tactics show a strong continuity with past 

practices. Recent Russian activity in eastern 

Ukraine, for example, demonstrates a creative 

use of their traditional combined arms and 

reconnaissance-strike tactics combined with 

a more aggressive application of information 

warfare concepts that date back to the Soviet 

period. Russian ground forces troops have cooperated with non-traditional semi-military forces 

such as partisans and Cossacks for centuries.405

Regardless, the contemporary Russian ground 

forces pose a serious challenge to U.S. military 

planners, and they should be seen as neither a 

simple continuation of past Soviet practices, nor 

an entirely new force employing entirely new 

military concepts, but a highly nuanced and 

adaptive combination of both.406

The main combat power of the Ground Troops 

is centered in tank and motorized rifle divisions 

and separate tank and motorized rifle brigades 

that are normally subordinate to combined arms 

armies. Although Russia's military strategy is 

officially defensive, the Russian Ground Troops 

basic principle of land warfare is violent, sustained, and deep offensive action, just as it was 

during the Soviet era. Mechanized and armored 

formations supported by aviation and artillery 

are to seize the initiative at the outset of hostilities, penetrate the enemy's defenses, and drive 

deeply and decisively into the enemy's rear area.

Combined Arms Armies

The combined arms army is an operational 

and administrative organization that forms 

the basis of the Russian field army. A typical 

combined arms army includes two to four combined arms brigades, usually motorized rifle 
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

53

brigades and in a few cases a tank brigade, plus 

artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, chem-

ical defense, communications, intelligence and 

reconnaissance, and rear support units. By 

altering the mix of motorized rifle and tank 

formations and artillery and missile support, 

the army can operate in either offensive or 

defensive roles in different geographical areas 

and under various operational constraints.

The Tank Army

The Russian armed forces currently only have 

one tank army, the First Guards Tank Army 

(1st GTA). It, like the combined arms army, 

is both an operational and administrative 

unit. Currently, the 1st GTA includes a tank 

division, a motorized rifle division, and a tank 

brigade, plus artillery, missile, air defense, 

engineer, chemical defense, communications, 

intelligence and reconnaissance, and rear 

support units. The traditional role of a tank 

army is to exploit penetrations deep into the 

enemy's rear areas.

The Separate 

Combined-Arms Brigade

The primary combat formation of the Ground 

Troops is the separate combined-arms brigade, 

either motorized rifle (MR) or tank. There are 

three basic tables of organization and equip-

New Look Motorized Rifle Brigade Table of Organization 

and Equipment: Primary and Supporting Subunits407 1612-11131

Bde Cdr Headquarters

MR BN x3

510

43 MT-LBV

8 2S12

Tank BN

41 T-72

Officers

327

NCOs

1,005

Enlisted

3,061

Civilians

128

TOTAL

4,521

SP Arty BN x2

18 2S19

MRL BN

18 BM-21

Signal BN

223

19

227

CBT Engr BN

246

Recon BN Material Support BN

193 280

Repair BN

81

CBR Defense Company

102

Electronic Warfare Company

48

Commandant Company

60

Medical Company

130

16 2S6M1 6SA13

AT Arty BN AD MSL Arty BN

12 MT-12

24 9P162

AD MSL BN

12 SA-15B TLAR

9x SA-18 MANPADS
54

ment (TO&Es) for separate MR brigades and 

one for separate tank brigades. All Russian 

combined-arms brigades, however, regardless 

of specific primary combat vehicle, are organized in essentially the same manner.408

Tank and MR brigades differ in organization 

in that where the MR brigade has three MR 

battalions, one tank battalion, and an antitank (AT) battalion, the independent tank brigade reverses this basic structure with three 

tank battalions, one motorized tank battalion, 

and no AT battalion.409 The three MR TO&Es 

differ from one another in their primary combat vehicle, either wheeled armored personnel carrier (APC) or tracked infantry fighting 

vehicle (IFV).410 The organizational structure 

of a typical tracked APC-equipped independent MR brigade is shown in the accompanying illustration.411 In addition, the primary 

equipment of a separate motorized rifle brigade is shown in the table below.

Battalion Tactical Groups

BTGs are task-organized battalion-plus-sized tactical combat entities that are capable of performing independent combined-arms combat missions. They are similar in purpose, structure, and 

tactical use to U.S. Army battalion task forces. 

Most, if not all, New Look maneuver brigades 

Russian Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade Personnel 

and Primary Offensive Equipment412 1612-11142

Nomenclature Quantity

Personnel 4521

T-72B3 Main Battle Tank 41

BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle or 129

BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle or 129

MT-LBV Tracked Armored Personnel Carrier 129

BTR-82A Wheeled Armored Personnel Carrier 129

2S19 152-MM SP Howitzer 18

BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launcher 18
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

55

have one BTG, manned entirely or mostly with 

contract soldiers, that is used to perform the most 

difficult or complicated combat tasks assigned to 

the brigade. An order issued on 19 September 

2012 required all maneuver brigade commanders 

to create a contract-manned BTG within the bri-

gade if they had not already done so.413

The need to have effective BTGs is a primary 

driver of the New Look structural reforms. BTGs 

have their theoretical origins in the late Soviet 

period, where they were envisioned to fight 

against NATO on both a nuclear or non-nuclear 

battlefield in a nonlinear, large-scale environ-

ment. BTGs have been used in every local war 

or armed conflict in which Soviet and Russian 

forces have been involved since the Afghanistan 

War (1979–1989).414 The tactical use of BTGs 

in combat has impacted the tactical principles 

that govern their construction and use. BTGs 

currently serve—and will continue to serve—

as Russia's primary tactical fighting unit in all 

tactical circumstances, both in large-scale and 

small-scale conflicts, well into the future.

The Airborne Troops

Russia's Airborne Troops, or VDV (Vozdush-

no-Desantniye Voyska), is an independent arm 

of service within the Russian Federation armed 

forces. It is composed of four maneuver divi-

sions, four maneuver brigades, and a separate 

special purpose (Spetsnaz) reconnaissance bri-

gade.415 The VDV serves as Russia's high-mo-

bility initial invasion and rapid response 

force.416, 417 In its role as rapid response or initial 

assault forces, the VDV may be used to achieve 

specific objectives that shape the battlespace for 

follow-on ground forces. These may include: • Seizing key terrain (i.e., bridges, airports, 

and seaports)

• Establishing blocking positions and verti-

cal envelopment of a retreating enemy

• Disrupting enemy logistical supplies, com-

munications, and command centers

• Destroying high value targets418

Maneuver formations within the VDV are des-

ignated as either parachute or air assault, the 

primary difference being in whether they arrive 

at their objective via airdrop or overland means. 

In all cases, VDV personnel are trained to oper-

ate both ways. Major VDV formations are: • Two parachute divisions – the 98th 

Guards and 106th Guards

• Two air assault divisions – the 7th 

Guards Mountain and 76th Guards

• Four air assault brigades – the 11th, 31st, 

56th, and 83rd

• One special-purpose reconnaissance bri-

gade – the 45th Spetsnaz419

In line with its highly mobile function, the VDV 

is equipped with a large number of amphibious 

air droppable combat vehicles, the BMD-se-

ries IFVs and BTR-D series APCs. The VDV's 

increased mobility comes at the expense of 

armor and firepower; its primary combat vehi-

cles are generally lighter than their Ground 

Troops counterparts. In late 2016, however, the 

air assault divisions and brigades received up 

to a company (10 to 13) of T-72-series main bat-

tle tanks. The tank companies within these air 

assault units will very likely increase to tank 
56

Russian VDV Primary Combat Vehicles 1612-11144

System Function

Capacity 

(Crew/Dismounts)

BMD-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle 2/5

BMD-4M Infantry Fighting Vehicle 3/5

BTR-D Tracked APC 3/10

BTR-MDM Tracked APC 3/10

2S9 120-mm SP Combination Gun 3

2S25 125-mm Tracked SP Antitank Gun 3

battalions (30 to 42) by the end of 2018.420, 421 

The MBTs are not intended for air drops, but 

will accompany VDV ground maneuver formations to increase firepower and lethality.

Naval Infantry

Russian Naval Infantry is organized into 

units that are operationally subordinate to 

fleet commanders. Naval Infantry is focused 

on amphibious assaults, coastal defense, 

counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and ship security missions. The organization and equipment of Naval Infantry units are generally 

similar to that of motorized rifle units in the 

Ground Troops.422

The Naval Infantry consist of four independent brigades, one separate brigade, and 

three separate battalions.423

Coastal Troops

The Russian Coastal Troops consist of Coastal 

Missile Artillery Forces (CMAF) and Coastal 

Troops. CMAF consist of three independent 

brigades, two independent regiments, and one 

independent battalion.

The Coastal Troops are organized as ground 

forces but are subordinate to the Navy. The 

Coastal Troops consist mainly of motorized rifle brigades and artillery brigades.

Their primary mission is coastal and regional 

defense.424 The Navy Ground and Coastal 

Troop Headquarters, a command unit based 

in Moscow, heads the Coastal Troop force, but 

coastal missile units likely take operational 

orders from their respective fleets.425, 426, 427

Russia’s coastal missile and artillery forces 

provide anti-ship defenses for Russia’s coast-
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

57

line and littoral regions. Coastal missile 

defense in Russia is primarily centered on 

anti-ship missile systems. Most units are still 

dependent on two systems that entered production in the late 1970s to early 1980s—the 

STYX and SEPAL. Efforts are underway to 

rearm the coastal missile force with new, longer-range missile systems.428 These systems 

include the BAL and BASTION, and they are 

slowly being introduced to the force.429

BASTION Coastal Defense Missile Launcher. 

Image Source: AFP
58

APPENDIX C: Russian Aerospace Forces

The former Russian Federation Air Forces and 

Aerospace Defense Troops merged to create the 

Russian Federation Aerospace Forces (VKS) in 

August 2015. The merger places former space 

and aerospace defense assets vital to strategic 

aerospace operations under one organizational 

structure.430, 431 The Russian Aerospace Forces 

include four tactical air armies, which are aligned 

with the military districts. They also contain the 

Long-Range Aviation (LRA) and Military Transport Aviation (VTA), as well as the Space Troops, 

which are not subordinate to the military districts but to Aerospace Command in Moscow.432

Overall manpower for the Russian Aerospace 

Forces is listed at 148,000 including conscripts.

The 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army 

(AFADA) is subordinate to the Western Military

Russian Air Forces Air Bases433

1612-11135

Moscow maintains aviation units in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, represented on the map by the two 

fighter base symbols outside Russia’s borders.

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

59

District, the 14th Air Force and Air Defense 

Army to the Central Military District, the 11th 

Air Force and Air Defense Army to the Eastern 

Military District, and the 4th Air Force and Air 

Defense Army to the Southern Military District.

Long Range Aviation: The LRA is the 

bomber force of the Russian Aerospace Forces 

and operationally subordinate to the Supreme 

High Command of the Russian armed forces. 

The LRA is tasked with long-range bombard-

ment of strategic targets with conventional 

or nuclear weapons. Currently, TU-95MS 

aircraft are being modernized to include the 

Kh-101/102 missile system.434 The LRA has an 

inventory of 16 Tu-160, 60 Tu-95MS, and more 

than 50 Tu-22M3 bombers.435

Military Transport Aviation: The VTA is 

subordinate operationally to the Supreme High 

Command of the Russian armed forces and is 

the main provider of the air lift for Russian 

troops and equipment. The recent Ukraine 

and Syria conflicts have resulted in heavy 

Russian Air Forces Order-of-Battle436

1612-11136

Aircraft Type Total Number Most Capable

Bomber 141 Tu-160

Fighter 420 MiG-29

Fighter Ground Attack 345 Su-35S

Attack 215 Su-25SM

ELINT 32 Il-22M

Airborne Warning and Control 22 A-50

C26 Il-86VKP

Tanker 15 Il-78M

Heavy Transport 122 An-124

Training 198 Yak-130
60

use of the VTA forces, allowing pilots to gain 

significant flight hours. The primary aircraft 

operated by the VTA include the Il-76, An-124, 

An-22, An-26, An-72, and An-12. The various 

sizes of aircraft allow the VTA to support many 

different missions from VIP flights, to small 

cargo, to transporting tanks and aircraft. Additionally, these aircraft tend to have larger fuel 

tanks allowing for extended missions without 

refueling to increase efficiency.437

Space Troops:438 These forces within the 

Aerospace Forces have the mission of conducting space launches and maintaining the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite 

control network, and the space object surveillance and identification network.439, 440, 441
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

61

Russian Combat Aircraft – Fighters 442, 443, 444, 445, 446

1612-11138

Fighter Aircraft Entered Service Role

Operational

Su-35S 2014 Multi-Role Fighter

Su-30SM 2014 Multi-Role Fighter

Su-34 2012 Multi-Role Fighter-Bomber

MiG-31BM 2012 Fighter Interceptor

Su-27SM3 2011 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29K/KUB 2009 Multi-Role Naval Fighter

Yak-130 2009 Light Attack Fighter-Trainer

MiG-29N/SE 2009 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29SMT 2006 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29UBT 2006 Multi-Role Fighter

Su-27SM 2006 Fighter Interceptor

Su-30M2/MK2 2003 Multi-Role Fighter

Su-33 1994 Naval Multi-Role Fighter

Su-27P/S 1986 Fighter Interceptor

Su-27UB 1990 Fighter Interceptor

MiG-29 1983 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-31 1981 Fighter Interceptor

Developmental

MiG-29M/M2 2018 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-35S 2018 Multi-Role Fighter

PAK-FA 2020 5th Generation Multi-Role Fighter

LMFS Circa 2030 Light Weight Multi-Role Fighter

PAK-DP Circa 2030 Multi-Role Fighter Interceptor
62

Russian Bombers 447, 448, 449, 450, 451

1612-11107

Bomber Aircraft Entered Service Role

Tu-95MSM BEAR 2015 Modified Strategic/Tactical Bomber 

Tu-160M BLACKJACK 2014 Modified Strategic/Tactical Bomber

Tu-22M3M BACKFIRE 2014 Modified Regional Bomber 

Tu-160 1987 Legacy Strategic Bomber 

Tu-95MS 1983 Legacy Strategic Bomber 

Tu-22M3 1981 Legacy Regional Bomber

Developmental

Tu-160M2 2020 New Build Strategic/Tactical Bomber

PAK-DA 2025+ Future Strategic/Tactical Bomber

Integrated Air Defense System

Russia employs what is considered to be among 

the very best of modern military integrated air 

defense systems. Historically, Russia has been 

a leader in developing technologically advanced 

detection and engagement elements. During the 

1990s, Russia largely maintained its research 

and development programs for air defense equipment.452 During this period, Russia purchased 

very few of these systems for domestic use.453

However, the State Armaments Program of 2015, 

and the subsequent 2020 plan, significantly 

enhanced support for the purchase and employment of the newest and most capable air defense 

equipment including radar, surface to air mis-
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

63

siles, command and control, and electronic war-

fare equipment. Concurrent to the acquisition 

plan, Russia continues to support research and 

development efforts in the air defense realm.454

The military integrated air defense system kill 

chain provides the framework for the Russian 

design, deployment, and command hierarchy of 

deployed air defense assets. The kill chain con-

tains the seven elements that a fully functional 

Russian military integrated air defense system 

would employ in an air defense scenario.

To support the kill chain (outlined below), Russia 

employs redundant and overlapping systems.455

Russia employs its military integrated air defense 

system at home and abroad. The military inte-

Russian Military Integrated Air Defense System Kill Chain 1612-11110

Kill Chain Element Associated Equipment/Process

Indications and 

warning

Human intelligence, signals intelligence, open-source information, 

over-the-horizon radar

Detection

Air surveillance radar, airborne early warning and control radar, 

passive Detection system, ship-based radar, visual observation, 

secondary surveillance radar

Identification Secondary surveillance radar, visual identification, non-conformity 

with approved routes

Tracking Integration of detection data into data processing and command & 

control elements to maintain positional data on an airborne threat

Assignment

Command & control (variable echelon, based on threat condition 

and other factors) takes track data and assigns target tracks to 

weapons platforms

Engagement Surface to Air Missiles, Air to Air Missiles, Air Defense Artillery, 

Electronic Warfare

Assessment

Verification of engagement: air surveillance radar, airborne early 

warning and control radar, passive detection system, ship-based 

radar, visual observer, secondary surveillance radar in conjunction 

with command & control elements
64

grated air defense system also plays a significant 

role in Russia’s domestic defense and expeditionary operations.456 Russia’s initial deployments to 

Crimea and Syria included the Pantsir and S-300 

air defense systems. These systems allowed Russia to build an echelon-based air defense system 

in the Crimean Peninsula.457 At a later point 

in the Crimean and Syrian operations, Russia 

deployed long-range strategic surface to air missile systems in both countries.458

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

In 2008, Russia lagged behind the world in development of UAVs. However, the 2008 Georgia 

conflict accelerated efforts with initial requireRussian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles459, 460

1612-11113

UAV Entered Service Role

Operational

Pchela-1K 2009 Tactical UAV 

Zala 421-08

Grusha / Granat-1

2010 Tactical UAV 

Zastava 2013 Tactical UAV 

Orlan-10 2013 Tactical UAV 

Forpost 2013 Tactical & Strategic UAV 

Rubezh-20 / Granat-4 2013 Tactical UAV 

Takhion 2014 Tactical UAV 

Developmental

Orion/Inokhodets 2018 Tactical & Strategic UAV

Altius-M 2019 Strategic UAV

Gonshchik 2020+ Tactical & Strategic UAV

Okhotnik-B/U 2025+ Medium Weight UCAV
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

65

ments focused on tactical reconnaissance sys-

tems that currently dominate inventory. Russia 

has introduced a class of mini-UAVs for use by 

the military, but the most significant defense 

developments are occurring with larger, more 

capable systems for tactical and strategic use. 

Russia is also working on unmanned combat 

aerial vehicles (UCAVs).461

Russia’s fleet of aircraft is aging, but they are 

rapidly modernizing their air force as well as 

their air defense systems. When the Soviet 

Union collapsed in 1991, Russia’s air force 

entered a decline as industry and operational 

units languished. Since 2008, however, the Rus-

sian Air Force and Navy have invested unprec-

edented financial resources toward airpower to 

include the upgrade and/or new build of approx-

imately 700 combat fighter/bomber aircraft 

through 2020 to replace legacy systems.462, 463, 464

Newly modified aerodynamic systems in 

Syria demonstrate that Russian airpower 

has returned in limited numbers. Similar 

efforts with newly upgraded air combat sys-

tems have been used in the Crimea/Black Sea 

and Baltic regions with Russian expectations 

that provocative moves by the United States 

and/or NATO will be met with more capable 

Russian air power. Finally, a slowly improved 

strategic bomber force (i.e., Tu-95MS BEAR 

and Tu-160 BLACKJACK) is again using 

Cold War concepts to conduct international 

flights that impinge upon the sovereign bor-

ders of foreign nations.465
66

APPENDIX D: Russian Navy

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, 

as well as the economic stagnation that followed, 

led to a severe downsizing for the Navy. Naval 

construction ground to a halt, and the fleet fell 

into disrepair and obsolescence.466 Under Vladimir Putin, however, the Russian military’s 

capabilities have undergone significant improvement, and the Navy is no exception.

The Russian Navy has approximately 130,000 

personnel.467 The combined major forces of the 

current Russian Navy number about onesixth to one-quarter of what was the Soviet 

Navy in its heyday. That legacy force today 

has an average age exceeding 20–25 years. 

With the economic stabilization of the Russian Federation in the early 2000s, the past 

10 years have seen a steady increase in the 

maintenance, training, and deployment activity of the Navy and, more importantly, the 

activation of a broad submarine and ship construction program to recapitalize the fleet. 

The Navy’s missions remain focused on strategic deterrence and homeland defense. Periodic distant deployments support the Russian 

Federation’s global foreign policy interests.

The Navy operates nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile submarines, which are an essential 

arm of Russia’s nuclear triad and capable of 

delivering nuclear warheads from thousands 

of kilometers away. This strategic capability 

puts the Russian Navy in the top tier of foreign navies.468

Russian Navy Organization 1612-11111

Russian Navy

Northern Fleet 

Joint Strategic

Command (OSK)

Northern

Fleet Pacific Fleet Baltic Fleet Black SeaFleet

Caspian

Flotilla

Eastern 

Military 

District/(OSK)

Western

Military 

District/(OSK)

Southern

Military

District/(OSK)

Southern

Military

District/(OSK)
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

67

Structure

The headquarters of the Russian Navy is 

located in St. Petersburg. The Russian Fed-

eration Navy consists of four fleets (Baltic, 

Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific) and a flotilla 

in the Caspian Sea. The fleets receive admin-

istrative orders and guidance from the Navy 

Staff in St. Petersburg, whereas operational 

orders are issued from the various Joint Stra-

tegic Commands (OSKs).469 Each fleet and the 

Caspian Flotilla is operationally subordinate 

to one of these OSKs. 

Northern Fleet

The Northern Fleet is Russia’s most capable 

naval force. Based in Severomorsk, located in 

the Kola Gulf (the only ice-free direct access 

to the North Atlantic), its seven operational 

ballistic missile submarines provide the bulk 

of the firepower for the Navy’s arm of the stra-

tegic nuclear triad.470 Russia’s only operational 

aircraft carrier is also based in the Northern 

Fleet, along with the Navy’s only nuclear-pow-

ered heavy cruiser.471 Surface combatants and 

submarines deploy worldwide from the Kola 

Gulf, playing an active role in the ongoing 

Syria crisis, conducting counter-piracy patrols 

off the Horn of Africa, along with power projec-

tion in the North Atlantic and Caribbean. The 

Northern Fleet’s two primary missions are to 

provide strategic deterrence with its ballistic 

missile submarines and to defend the mari-

time approaches to northwest Russia.472

Pacific Fleet

The Pacific Fleet lags behind the Northern 

Fleet in terms of maintenance and overall capa-

bility; however, it is still able to conduct strate-

gic nuclear strikes against the U.S. mainland, 

and its surface units are active from the Pacific 

region to the Horn of Africa.473 The Pacific Fleet 

has its headquarters in Vladivostok, but its 

forces are split between two main locations with 

the majority of surface ships and diesel powered 

submarines in the Vladivostok region and the 

nuclear powered submarines, including the 

SSBNs, located in Petropavlovsk-Kamchats-

kiy.474, 475 The workhorses of the PACFLT are 

four UDALOY-class destroyers, which are regu-

larly deployed throughout the region.476

Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea Fleet for years has been a fleet in 

decline, forced to operate with a handful of Sovi-

et-era vessels. Beginning in 2014 after the occu-

GRIGOROVICH frigate. 

Image Source: AFP
68

pation of Crimea, new units began to enter the 

order of battle including modern coastal missiles 

and naval infantry.477 Then in 2015, new submarines and surface combatants began to arrive to 

bolster the fleet. Now armed with the KALIBR 

missile system, the Black Sea Fleet is a significant force in the region and over the next few 

years could have as many as six new attack submarines and six new surface ships, which can 

not only exert control on the Black Sea, but can 

operate in the Mediterranean to counter NATO 

forces and support operations in Syria.478

Baltic Fleet

The majority of Baltic Fleet vessels are located at 

Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad Oblast with a handful 

further north near St. Petersburg.479 Headquartered at Kaliningrad, the fleet’s mission focuses 

on specifically ensuring sea-lines of communication and trade are open between Kaliningrad and 

St. Petersburg, and in countering NATO forces in 

the region.480, 481 The Baltic Fleet has also been a 

key player in support of Russian interests in the 

Eastern Mediterranean Sea and Horn of Africa.482

With the arrival of two KALIBR-equipped vessels in 2016, the Baltic fleet presents a significant 

long-range precision conventional and theater 

nuclear strike threat to Western Europe.

Caspian Sea Flotilla

The Caspian Sea Flotilla is the dominant naval 

force on the Caspian Sea and was the first Russian surface force operationally equipped with 

the KALIBR missile system. Russia’s naval 

superiority ensures Moscow has leverage in 

regional economic disputes. The KALIBR land 

attack cruise missile gives Moscow a precision strike weapon that can range targets in 

Central Asia, the Middle East, and parts of 

Europe, as evidenced by strikes into Syria in 

October 2015.483 Most of the flotilla’s combat 

power (all of the KALIBR shooters) are based at 

Makhachkala, possibly to be closer to regional 

threats and also to avoid having to navigate 

the Volga River Delta to reach the sea, as is the 

case with ships based at Astrakhan.484, 485

Naval Aviation

Naval aviation assets are spread through 

four fleet air forces, each with composite regiments under their command. The main missions of naval aviation are to track and destroy 

enemy submarines and warships and also help 

achieve air superiority where the fleet is operating.486 Most naval aviation aircraft are landbased; the only aircraft carrier, ADMIRAL 

KUZNETSOV, can accommodate 22 strike aircraft and 17 attack helicopters.487

Submarine Forces

Russia’s sea-based strategic deterrent is deployed 

in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. There are six 

DELTA IV SSBNs, one DOLGORUKIY SSBN, 

and one remaining TYPHOON SSBN used as a 

test platform in the north. Three DELTA III and 

two DOLGORUKIY SSBNs are in the Pacific. All 

sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carried 

by these submarines—SS-N-18 (DELTA III), 

SS-N-23 (DELTA IV), and SS-N-32 (DOLGORUKIY)—can reach U.S. targets from their home-
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

69

base piers and, if required, could be launched 

with the submarines on the surface. 

These SSBNs are protected by nuclear-pow-

ered cruise missile and torpedo attack subma-

rines, which also engage enemy surface and 

submarine forces and pose a land attack cruise 

missile threat against an enemy homeland. In 

the Northern Fleet, these attack submarines 

include three OSCAR II and one SEVEROD-

VINSK SSGNs and three VICTOR III, six 

AKULA I/II, and four SIERRA SSNs. The 

SEVERODVINSK class is new, extremely quiet 

and is armed with a wide range of advanced 

cruise missiles to destroy enemy ships and tar-

gets ashore. The Pacific Fleet has five OSCAR 

II SSGNs and four AKULA I SSNs. It will even-

tually receive SEVERODVINSK SSGNs. A new 

fifth-generation general purpose nuclear-pow-

ered submarine is under development.

Non-nuclear diesel-electric submarines round out 

the Russian submarine forces. These units are 

assigned to all fleets for close-in area defense mis-

sions in adjacent seas. Older and newer versions 

of the KILO class comprise most of this force: six 

in the Northern Fleet, two in the Baltic, three new 

KALIBR-equipped units in the Black Sea, and 

eight older KILO class in the Pacific. The new-

est KILO version continues in construction with 

three more units destined for the Black Sea Fleet 

and eventually another six for the Pacific Fleet. 

A single PETERSBURG-class improved design 

experimental unit is in the Northern Fleet with 

two additional units to be completed. A future 

non-nuclear, KALINA design, likely having an 

air independent propulsion plant, is in develop-

ment with construction projected after 2020.

Surface Forces

The Russian Navy’s major combatant surface 

ships, frigates and larger, comprise some 32 

units assigned across all 4 fleets. • The Northern Fleet has Russia’s only air

-

craft carrier (KUZNETSOV), one nucle-

ar-powered KIROV-class cruiser, one con-

ventionally powered SLAVA-class cruiser, 

and four UDALOY-class destroyers. The 

first new GORSHKOV-class (KALIBR) 

guided missile frigate was recently commis-

sioned with more expected. This fleet also 

has 12 minor anti-ship and anti-subma-

rine combatant ships, as well as 4 ROPU-

CHA-class amphibious assault ships. 

• The Baltic Fleet has nine major ships—two 

older SOVREMENNYY-class destroyers 

and seven frigates: one KRIVAK-class, two 

NEUSTRASHIMYY-class, and four new 

STEREGUSHCHIY-class units. It recently 

received two SVIYAZHSK-class (KALIBR) 

guided missile patrol ships. These are sup-

plemented by 18 minor combatants and 4 

amphibious assault ships. 

• The Black Sea Fleet has one SLAVA-class 

cruiser, one 47-year-old KASHIN-class 

destroyer, two older KRIVAK-class frig-

ates, and the first of a planned six new 

GRIGOROVICH-class (KALIBR) frigates. 

More new construction units are expected 

for the Black Sea Fleet. The fleet is sup-

plemented by 15 minor combatants and 7 

amphibious assault ships. 

• The Caspian Flotilla has two GEPARD-class 

frigates (one with KALIBR) and recently 

received two new ASTRAKHAN-class patrol 

ships and three SVIYAZHSK-class (KALI-

BR-capable) guided missile patrol ships. 
70

• Finally, the Pacific Fleet has seven major 

ships: one SLAVA-class cruiser, four UDALOYclass and two SOVREMENNYY-class destroyers. These are supplemented by 24 minor 

anti-ship and anti-submarine combatants 

and 4 amphibious assault ships.

The Russian Navy has several weapons upgrade 

programs in progress. The new SS-N-32 

BULAVA submarine launched ballistic missile 

is being produced for the DOLGORUKIY-class 

SSBNs. The most consequential development 

is that Russia plans to deploy KALIBR capability on all new design construction nuclear and 

non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, frigates, and 

larger surface ships. KALIBR provides even 

modest platforms, such as corvettes, with significant offensive capability and, with the use of 

land attack missiles, all platforms have a significant ability to hold distant fixed ground targets 

at risk using conventional warheads. The proliferation of this capability within the new Russian 

Navy is profoundly changing its ability to deter, 

threaten, or destroy adversary targets. 

Although the Navy is mainly made up of Soviet-era surface ships and submarines, an extensive modernization program is underway, 

focusing first on the submarine force.488, 489, 490

Progress in submarine modernization is underway; however, the majority of the naval inventory still consists of aging units from the 1980s 

and 1990s. While more new classes of ships 

are planned, the Navy will have to maintain 

its older fleet for several years until these new 

vessels come online. Despite this, Russia is 

still capable of deploying its assets worldwide, 

best evidenced by continuous support to Russian operations in Syria since 2012 and recurring counter-piracy deployments to the Gulf of 

Aden since 2008.491, 492
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

71

APPENDIX E: Russian Special Operations Forces

Russia’s special operations forces are popu-

larly known by the abbreviation “Spetsnaz,” 

short for Spetsial’noye naznacheniye, a 

term meaning “special purpose.” Spetsnaz, 

although similar to special operations forces 

in Western countries, retains a slightly differ-

ent set of roles and missions than those com-

monly found elsewhere. The current incarna-

tion of Spetsnaz traces its origin back to naval 

and ground units created back in the mid1950s to establish a dedicated special purpose force to operate with the armed forces, 

although its wider lineage can be attributed 

to counterrevolutionary and partisan units 

formed during the Russian Revolution and 

World War II, respectively.493

These predecessor units became pivotal in 

defining the hallmark missions of the mod-

ern Spetsnaz force, from diversionary acts 

conducted by partisan units behind German 

lines in World War II to deep reconnaissance 

and intelligence collection, reflecting the postwar perception of a potential conflict with 

the West during the Cold War.494 These tra-

ditional missions—with slight modifications 

and variations—still manifest themselves in 

Spetsnaz doctrine and are associated with 

Moscow’s recent strategy of using indirect 

action, albeit with the wider aim of achieving 

goals while avoiding a large-scale conflict.

Within Russia, the term Spetsnaz is often 

misappropriated and misattributed. Moscow’s 

true Spetsnaz force is a relatively small, select 

group of mission-dedicated special purpose 

forces, primarily belonging to the military 

and its Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 

(e.g., the Defense Ministry’s ground and naval 

Spetsnaz units), and to a lesser extent, the 

security services of the National Guard, Fed-

eral Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelli-

gence Service (SVR), and Justice and Emer-

gency Situations Ministries.495 Estimated to 

number 20,000–30,000 personnel, Spetsnaz 

units in these organizations all retain distinct 

and separate missions from one another. The 

single largest contingent with which recent 

and visible exploits of Spetsnaz are attributed 

reside with the GRU.
72

APPENDIX F: Russian Intelligence Services

Russia has three primary intelligence services: the Federal Security Service (FSB), the 

Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the 

Main Intelligence Directorate of the General 

Staff (GRU). The FSB and SVR trace their 

lineage to the old Soviet Committee of State 

Security (KGB). Although the FSB and SVR 

are considered military services under Russian federal law, they are more akin to civilian intelligence agencies.496

The Federal Security Service 

The FSB has three primary missions: countering foreign intelligence services, combatting 

organized crime, and ensuring economic and 

financial security. It is also the Russian lead 

counterterrorism organization.497 President 

Vladimir Putin launched a major reorganization of the FSB during his first term, placing 

the organization under the president’s direct 

control. The FSB has continued to grow, integrating the Border Guard Service of Russia 

and the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI). 

The Foreign Intelligence Service 

The SVR is Russia’s main external intelligence 

agency; it focuses on civilian affairs, whereas 

the GRU focuses on military affairs. According 

to Russian law, the SVR is authorized to carry 

out the following missions:498

• Conduct intelligence.

• Implement active measures (disinformation, 

propaganda, etc.) to ensure Russia's security.

• Conduct military, strategic, economic, 

scientific, and technological espionage.

• Protect employees of Russian institutions 

overseas and their families.

• Provide personal security for Russian 

government officials and their families.

• Conduct joint operations with foreign 

security services.

• Conduct electronic surveillance in 

foreign countries.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

73

Responsibilities of Russian Intelligence Services499, 500, 501, 502

1612-11140

Political 

Intelligence

Economic

Intelligence

Military 

Intelligence

Measures of 

Support

CounterIntelligencePolitical

Security

Law

Enforcement

Soviet 

KGB

Main Intelligence 

Directorate 

(GRU)

Federal 

Security 

Service (FSB) 

Foreign 

Intelligence 

Service (SVR)

Federal 

Protection 

Service (FSO)

Interior 

Ministry 

(MVD)

National 

Guard 

(developing)

Main Role Subsidiary Role
74

The Main Intelligence Directorate 

of the General Staff

The GRU is the Ministry of Defense’s foreign intelligence organization that provides 

military intelligence for the General Staff,

Ministry of Defense, and senior government 

officials.505, 506, 507, 508 The GRU’s responsibilities 

include providing senior political and military leadership with all-source intelligence, 

including indications and warning of strategic threats and information to assist leadership in making decisions regarding Russia’s 

armaments program.509, 510 GRU operations 

abroad involve human intelligence (HUMINT) 

collection on potential enemies’ militaryindustrial capabilities, troop movements, and 

weapon systems.511, 512 The GRU manages military attachés, intelligence analysis, cryptanalysis, space-based assets, telecommunications 

intercept capabilities, and radio-electronic 

and telecommunications-based offensive capabilities.513, 514 It also oversees Spetsnaz units 

and special operations forces.515, 516, 517, 518 GRU 

operational combat and advisory roles have 

expanded dramatically in the past decade, 

involving military operations in Ukraine’s 

Crimea region, eastern Ukraine, and Syria.

519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526

GRU Headquarters Moscow.503, 504

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

75

APPENDIX G: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs

Russia’s huge defense industrial complex 

focuses predominantly on weapons production, 

though the goal is to move toward a combina-

tion of military and non-military products.527

President Vladimir Putin and Deputy Premier 

Dmitriy Rogozin, whose government portfolio 

covers the defense industry, have said that high 

levels of spending on the military and defense 

industrial complex will benefit the entire 

economy.528, 529 In April 2016, Putin announced 

Russia’s arms sales from the last year had been 

higher than planned, totaling $14.5 billion, 

with additional orders for $56 billion, the high-

est since 1992.530, 531 However, while Moscow’s 

pursuit of arms trade deals abroad may help 

partially offset challenging financial conditions 

and support continued military modernization 

goals, significant problems remain. 

Challenges, partly due to Western sanctions, 

have slowed production for some weapons and 

equipment. Russian industry’s dependence on 

weapons production, the depreciation of the 

ruble, and growing interest rates on industrial 

loans, which are used to finance facility modern-

ization and production expenses, have increased 

business costs for Russian defense firms.532 

Russian economists have warned that the 

resulting imbalance between civilian and mili-

tary spending could be problematic.533, 534, 535, 536

Russia’s 2011–2020 State Armaments Pro-

gram reflects President Putin’s ambitious 

mandate that 70% of Russia’s weapons inven-

tory consist of new or upgraded equipment by 

2020.537, 538 In pursuit of that goal, Putin person-

ally makes decisions about the defense indus-

try’s weapons modernization, production, and 

financing. Putin reestablished the Military 

Industrial Commission (VPK) in 2007 to bet-

ter manage state control of defense production 

and acquisition.539, 540

Since May 2013, Putin has chaired week-long 

working groups with the Defense Ministry and 

defense industry leadership twice a year to 

monitor program implementation and oversee 

adjustments.541, 542, 543 By 2014, Putin decreed 

himself Chairman of the VPK, probably to 

ensure that defense modernization efforts 

were fulfilled within economic constraints.544, 545

At the same time, Defense Minister Shoygu set 

up a half dozen new Defense Ministry scien-

tific and technical organizations, headed by 

military scientists, to place priority on defense 

orders that were cutting-edge, Russian-made, 

and technologically feasible.546, 547
76

The following are examples of weapons systems in active production, testing, or assimilation into military use, indicating current Russian leadership priorities for defense industry.

Ballistic Missile Sector

A key area of development detailed in Russia’s 

2011–2020 State Armament Program are the 

ballistic missile forces, which form the backbone of Moscow’s nuclear triad.548, 549 Russia has 

three competent bureaus that specialize in the 

design and development of ballistic missiles.550

Russia’s modernization efforts are driven by an 

aging missile inventory, the need to maintain 

a credible launch capability, and concern with 

the deployment of anti-missile defense systems 

by the United States.551 As of 2015, modernized 

systems only made up 56% of the missile force; 

they are scheduled to reach 100% by 2022.552

Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missiles (ICBM) 

Russia has several legacy ICBMs in its active 

inventory, including the SS-18, SS-19, and 

SS-25 that are being replaced by the SS-27, Sarmat, and SS-27 Mod 2; replacements should be 

completed by 2022.553, 554, 555

The SS-27 is a solid-propellant ICBM (silo and 

mobile variants), which uses a delivery vehicle made by the Minsk Heavy Wheeled Vehicle Factory in Belarus with launch equipment 

added by TsKb Titan in Volgograd. The SS-27 

missile was designed by several institutes: the 

Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology for 

the overall design, NPO Soyuz in Lubertsy for 

the three solid rocket motors, the All-Union 

Scientific Research Institute of Experimental 

Physics in Sarov for the nuclear warhead, and 

GPO Votkinskiy Mekhanicheskiy Zavod in 

Votkinsk for final assembly.556, 557, 558

The Sarmat heavy ICBM is still in testing with 

the State Missile Center Makeyev and is scheduled to complete development around 2018.559

The missile will be manufactured by the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant, while the 

NPO Energomash-designed motor will be produced by Proton-PM based in Perm.560

A new solid-propellant ICBM, the RS-26 

(Rubezh), was developed as a lighter version of 

the SS-27 and will only be deployed as a mobile 

variant sometime in 2017.561 The missile’s lower 

weight increases mobility and survivability, and 

the RS-26 will make use of various countermeasures to penetrate anti-missile defense systems.562

SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM.

Image Source: Shutterstock
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

77

In addition, Russian officials claim a new class 

of hypersonic vehicle is being developed to allow 

Russian strategic missiles to penetrate missile 

defense systems. Hypersonic glide vehicles are 

maneuverable vehicles that travel at hypersonic 

(typically greater than Mach 5) speed and spend 

most of their flight at much lower altitudes 

than a typical ballistic missile. Press reporting 

claimed a successful test of this system from an 

SS-19 booster occurred in April 2016.563

Submarine-Launched 

Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)

The SS-N-18 SLBM, first deployed in 1978, is a 

two-stage liquid-propellant system designed to 

be launched from a DELTA III submarine. The 

latest version, the SS-N-18 Mod 3, can carry 

up to three warheads to a maximum range of 

over 5,500 kilometers.564

The SS-N-23, initially deployed in 1989, is a 

three-stage, liquid-propellant missile designed 

by the State Missile Center Makeyev. It can 

carry four warheads to a range of over 8,000-

km and is launched from Delta IV subma-

rines.565 An upgrade of the SS-N-23, known as 

SINEVA, was completed in 2007 by the Kras-

noyarsk Machine Building Plant.566

The SS-N-32 BULAVA is a solid-propellant, 

sea-launched ballistic missile that underwent a 

19-year development cycle at the Moscow Insti-

tute of Thermal Technology.567 The BULAVA

can carry up to six independent nuclear war-

heads to a range of around 8,000 kilometers, is 

in service on the DOLGORUKIY-class subma-

rines, and is replacing older SLBMs in the Rus-

sian inventory.568, 569 

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)

The SS-21 TOCHKA is a mobile, single-stage, 

solid-propellant missile; it originally entered ser-

vice around 1976. The latest TOCHKA-U version 

entered service in 1990 and is the most capable 

system (maximum range of 120 kilometers, iner-

tial navigation with GLONASS updates, and 

radar or optical terminal guidance).570, 571 

SS-26 ISKANDER-M is a mobile, sin-

gle-stage, solid-propellant missile that is 

replacing the SS-21. The ISKANDER is 

equipped with an inertial/GLONASS guid-

ance system and either radar, electro-op-

tical, or infrared image matching termi-

nal guidance system, enabling it to strike 

moving targets.572

Russian ISKANDER-M missile system.

Image Source: AFP
78

Cruise Missile Sector 

Russia’s 2011–2020 State Armament Program 

also places a priority focus on the development 

and production of highly capable cruise missile 

systems.573 Russia has invested heavily in the 

development of air-, ground-, and sea-launched 

cruise missiles, and the development or refurbishment of associated launch platforms.574 In 

addition to developing domestic variants, Russia 

is focused on producing export variants of several cruise missile systems to remain competitive in the international arms market.575

Russia’s Tactical Missile Corporation 

Russia’s Federal Target Program for “Restructuring and Development of [the] Defense Industry (2002–2006)” and a Presidential decree in 

January 2002 prompted the establishment of the 

Tactical Missile Corporation (KRTV). The corporation, which has oversight of 30 weapon manufacturing enterprises, is Russia’s largest developer and producer of anti-ship, anti-radar, and 

multipurpose missiles for tactical airborne, ship 

borne, and coastal cruise missile systems.576, 577 

In 2014, the General Director of KRTV reported 

that the corporation received about $1 billion 

from the Federally Targeted Program for the 

Development of the Defense Industry (OPK) 

through 2020 to help modernize and re-equip 

production facilities.578, 579 To increase production capacity, Russia focused on improving 

production facilities in anticipation of the high 

production demands under the State Armament Program 2020.580

Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM)

Russia is in the process of refurbishing its 

long-range strategic bombers to carry the newest air-launched cruise missiles, the Kh-101 

(conventional) and the Kh-102 (nuclear-variant). These missiles were developed by the 

Raduga Science and Production Association 

[Machine-Building Design Bureau], a Tactical Missile Corporation subsidiary located in 

Dubna.581 The missiles are the follow-on system to the Kh-55, the main armament of Russia’s Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers.582, 583

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM)

The KALIBR-family of cruise missiles are 

some of Russia’s most capable systems. 

Designed by the Novator Design Bureau, a 

subsidiary of Almaz-Antey, the KALIBR-class 

missiles are the more capable domestic versions of the CLUB-family, which Russia has 

exported for several years.584 The KALIBR

class of missiles reportedly has an operational 

range up to 2,500 kilometers and has a lower 

flight profile than other Russian cruise missile systems.585, 586 The 3M-14 (SS-N-30A) is a 

long-range, land-attack cruise missile capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads.587 The 3M-54 (SS-N-27A) is an antiship missile, capable of being launched from 

submarine and surface ships.588

The ONIKS (SS-N-26) anti-ship cruise missile is another capable weapon system produced in Russia that also has a land-based 

variant, the BASTION mobile shore-based 

missile complex.589
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

79

Russia is also developing and testing the 

TSIRKON, its first hypersonic anti-ship cruise 

missile. This missile, which is expected to enter 

service in 2018, will have a 500 to 1,000-km 

range.590 Once operational, the nuclear-pow-

ered guided missile cruiser ADMIRAL NAKH-

IMOV will be one of the first naval vessels to 

carry these cruise missiles.591

Russia demonstrated some of its newest capa-

bilities in military technology in its Syria cam-

paign. Russia’s use of the KALIBR sea-launched 

cruise missile, including launches from a sub-

merged submarine, and of the Kh-101 airlaunched cruise missile for the first time in a 

combat situation demonstrated its advance-

ments in precision-guided munitions.592

Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)

Russia’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems 

remain among the best in the world, and Russia 

maintains a robust production capacity to sat-

isfy both domestic and export requirements. In 

recent years, Russia has also developed several 

highly-capable SAM systems and has invested 

in new infrastructure to support aggressive 

SAM production schedules.593 Many countries, 

including China, are interested in acquiring 

some of Russia’s longer-range systems.594

Almaz-Antey is Russia’s primary company 

responsible for development and production of air 

defense systems, including land-based and naval 

short, medium, and long-range air defense mis-

sile systems, ground surveillance radar stations, 

and automated control systems. Almaz-Antey 

formed in 2002 as a result of a merger between 

Antey Corporation and NPO Almaz.595, 596

Long-Range SAMs

Russia is adding new defense infrastructure 

to increase production of its newest long-range 

SAM system, the S-400; S-400 (SA-21) regi-

ments are operational throughout Russia.597, 598

The ANTEY-2500 is a long-range air defense 

system that reportedly can engage short-and 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise 

missiles, precision-guided weapons, strategic 

and tactical aircraft, as well as early warning 

and electronic warfare aircraft.599 

S-400 long-range SAM system.

Image Source: AFP

ANTEY-2500 long-range SAM system.

Image Source: AFP
80

Short-to-Medium Range 

Priority SAMs

The PANTSIR-S/S1 is a short-range air defense 

system developed by the KBP (Instrument Design 

Bureau) Tula. It is armed with 12 missiles and two 

30-mm anti-aircraft guns; for target acquisition and 

tracking it uses two radars and an electro-optical 

system. It was designed to defend ground installations and longer-range SAM systems against a 

variety of weapon systems, including fixed-wing 

aircraft and helicopters, precision guided missiles 

and cruise missiles, and unmanned air vehicles.600

It is usually deployed as a battery of 4–6 combat 

vehicles per site and each combat vehicle can 

engage up to four targets simultaneously. Russian 

air force plans to acquire 100–120 PANTSIR-S/S1 

combat vehicles by 2020.601 

Developmental Systems

The S-500 is a developmental system expected to 

have the capability to simultaneously engage 10 

targets at a maximum range of 600 kilometers; 

it is expected to be operational around 2020.602

The Vityaz is a short-to-medium-range SAM 

system; Russia hopes to produce up to 30 systems by 2020.603 The Vityaz system reportedly 

can carry two types of missiles, the 9M96E 

missiles or the 9M100.

Air Sector

In 2006, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) was created to consolidate aircraft design and production companies under 

one state controlled corporation. UAC controls 18 companies responsible for the design 

and production of most military and civilian 

aircraft.604, 605 UAC will have to deliver over 

1,000 new airplanes and helicopters to Russia’s military forces by 2020 to meet modernization goals established in the 2011–2020 

State Armament Program.606

Bombers

Russia plans to upgrade and operate its fleet 

of Tu-160/BLACKJACK, Tu-95MS BEAR H, 

and Tu-22M/BACKFIRE bombers beyond 

2030.607, 608 The upgrades are intended to keep 

older aircraft operational until the fifth-generation PAK-DA bomber reaches production. The 

PAK-DA will have new navigation systems and 

the capability to deploy Kh-101/Kh-102 airlaunched cruise missiles (ALCMs).609, 610, 611, 612, 613

Russia has restarted Tu-160M2/BLACKJACK

initial production to fill a critical gap in aircraft availability. Serial production of new 

Tu-160M2/BLACKJACK bombers is scheduled 

to begin no earlier than 2023 at the Kazan Aircraft Plant. The new bombers will have NK-32 

PAK-FA (T-50) fighter.

Image Source: AFP
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

81

engines, which will be produced at the Sama-

ra-based enterprise Kuznetsov, currently being 

modernized to start production by 2020.614

Fighters

Russian fighter production occurs at several 

plants, including the Sukhoi Aircraft-Man-

ufacturing Plants in Komsomolsk, Irkutsk and 

Novosibirsk, which produce the Su-30SM, 

Su-34, and Su-35; the MiG plants in Lukhovitsy 

and Nizhniy Novgorod produce the MiG-29.615

The fifth-generation fighter (PAK-FA) pro-

gram began in 2008 and is a high-priority item 

for the Russian air force. Six flying prototype 

aircraft were completed through 2016, with 

additional prototype aircraft in testing by the 

end of 2016. The Ministry of Defense plans to 

start serial production this year with the goal 

of producing 12 for the air force by 2020.616, 617

Helicopters

The state corporation Russian Helicopters 

operates five primary helicopter plants that 

produce the Ka 52 and Mi-28 attack variants, 

Mi-8/17, Mi-35, Mi-26, and ANSAT for the 

armed forces and for export.618, 619 Moscow’s pre-

vious reliance on helicopter engines produced 

in Ukraine has not adversely affected Russia’s 

ability to meet the needs of its military.620 

Transport Aircraft

The UAC is responsible for operating two large 

aircraft production plants at Kazan and Uly-

anovsk. Russia is producing its new transport, 

the Il-76MD-90A, which is a redesign of the 

Il-76/CANDID transport, and plans to produce 

39 Il-76MD-90A planes by 2020.621 The Ily-

ushin Design Bureau has begun development 

of the Il-78MD-90A refueler and the Il-112 

light military transport, based on Il-76 air-

frame design.622, 623

Naval Sector

In an effort to streamline the design and con-

struction of surface ships and submarines, 

President Putin established the United Ship-

building Corporation in 2007 to provide over-

sight of all major domestic military and civil-

ian shipbuilding. The corporation includes 

approximately 40 companies, including design 

bureaus and shipyards. Russia is currently 

upgrading and modernizing its naval fleet, con-

structing multi-role platforms with modular

designs.624 However, some new platforms 

have taken up to, or over, a decade to com-

plete construction and to enter into service as 

Russia’s shipbuilding industry is besieged by 

sanctions. Moscow is working to overcome the 

negative effects of international sanctions by 

becoming more self-reliant, indigenously pro-

ducing components formerly purchased from 

foreign suppliers.625

Russia currently has eight operational shipyards 

dedicated to surface ship and submarine con-

struction. While construction of patrol boats and 

corvettes has continued at a steady pace, major 

combatants and amphibious ships have encoun-

tered significant delays. For example, the Yantar 

Shipyard has faced difficulties meeting produc-

tion deadlines during construction of the GRIG-

OROVICH FFG and IVAN GREN LST.
82

Surface Combatants

Construction of the ADMIRAL GRIGOROVICH and GORSHKOV-class frigates, along 

with the STEREGUSHCHIY-class corvette, 

was to mark Russia’s return as a shipbuilding 

power and are intended to become the backbone of the fleet. A total of 17 of the ships (6 

GRIGOROVICH, 4 GORSHKOV, and 8 STEREGUSHCHIY) were ordered to be built. Final 

delivery of over half of these ships was disrupted due to the lack of gas turbine and diesel engines from Ukraine’s Zorya-Mashproyekt 

State Gas-Turbine Manufacturing Enterprise.626

Delivery of three GRIGOROVICH and two 

GORSHKOV frigates were eventually cancelled because domestically-produced gas-turbine engines would not be ready before 2020. 

The imported engines for the STEREGUSHCHIY corvettes have been replaced by domestic diesel engines produced by the Kolomna 

Engine Plant in Moscow, allowing for the production of corvettes and patrol boats to continue at a steady pace in spite of construction 

delays to the larger ships.627

The Russian Navy has one operational aircraft carrier in its inventory, the 26-yearold ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV, which is 

expected to enter a 2- to 3-year overhaul 

period beginning in 2018. This overhaul is 

not scheduled to consist of any major modernization or modifications and will keep 

the KUZNETSOV in the fleet until a new 

aircraft carrier becomes operational.628 The 

Murmansk Shipyard is planning to convert 

and enlarge its drydock to overhaul the 

KUZNETSOV and to provide maintenance/

repair service for large commercial ships. 

When complete, the result will be the country’s largest drydock (400 x 80 meters).629

Russia is planning to start the design of 

a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (the 

Shtorm) in 2020, with completion by 2030. 

Based on a model mock-up and initial information, the carrier will have a beam of 40 

meters and draft of 11 meters. Shtorm will 

be 330 meters in length, shorter than the 

U.S. Navy’s newest carrier but 10% longer and wider than the KUZNETSOV. The 

Shtorm will have RITM-200 nuclear reactors, a catapult, and two ski-jump ramps for 

launching aircraft and will be able to carry 

up to 90 aircraft and helicopters.630

Submarines

Historically the backbone of the Russian Navy, 

75% of the 61 operational submarines are over 

20 years old and are slowly being replaced. Russia will continue production of its fourth-generation DOLGORUKIY-class submarines 

through 2020. There are currently three in 

GORSHKOV-class Frigate.

Image Source: Shutterstock
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

83

service, with an additional eight scheduled to 

enter service in the coming years. Russia is also 

planning to construct a fifth-generation strate-

gic missile SSBN between 2031 and 2050.631, 632

The YASEN-class SSGN (Project 855, aka 

SEVERODVINSK) will replace aging VICTOR

III SSNs. The YASEN is produced at the 

Sevmash shipyard; the first of up to 10 hulls 

was delivered to the Navy in 2014, but the 

program has encountered delays. The flagship 

of the class (hull 1) required 16 years to com-

plete; hull 2 should soon be completed after 

7 years.633 Modernization and upgrade efforts 

are occurring on the OSCAR II SSGN and 

SIERRA II SSNs. The improved KILO SSK 

class (Project 636.3) is being produced with-

out significant delays. The initial order of 6 

was expanded to 12 in early 2016. The first 

three KILOS were delivered to the Black Sea 

Fleet in 2014–2015.634

Ground Arms

Since 2010, there have been significant improve-

ments in the condition of Russian ground arms, 

including the modernization and upgrade of 

the main battle tank (MBT) inventory. The 

active inventory includes the T-72, T-80U, and 

T-90 MBTs.635 The T-72 is one of Russia’s oldest 

active MBTs and has been upgraded to include 

substantial enhancements in explosive reactive 

armor, electronic components, and enhanced 

navigation systems.636 Russia’s newest in-service 

MBT, the T-90, features the new Sonsa-U sight-

ing systems and Shtora soft-kill active protection 

system.637 While Russia’s Ministry of Defense 

planned to phase out the T-80, the Omsk Trans-

port Machine Building Plant, one of Russia’s two 

MBT production and modernization facilities, is 

planning to upgrade the T-80U with Sosna-U, 

Relikt third-generation dynamic protection com-

plex, and advanced radio and C2 systems. 638

New Technology 

The Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) Corporation is Rus-

sia’s primary MBT production and moderniza-

tion center and is responsible for the production 

of Russia’s newest MBT (the Armata) to fulfill 

part of the 2020 and 2025 State Armament Pro-

gram.639, 640 The new-generation T-14 Armata 

MBT is being used as a common chassis for the 

Army’s heavy armored vehicles, including the 

T-15 Armata heavy infantry fighting vehicle 

(IFV) and the Koalitsiya-SV 2S35 self-propelled 

howitzer.641 This universal platform offers the 

Russian defense industry a more streamlined YASEN SSGN Hull 1.

Image Source: Shutterstock
84

means of armored vehicle production and will 

reduce maintenance and modernization costs in 

the future. 

Like the Armata, the Kurganets-25—slated 

to begin production in 2018—will provide a 

lighter, universal tracked platform for new 

IFVs and armored personnel carriers.642 The 

Bumerang wheeled armored personnel carrier has completed preliminary testing as of 

June 2016.643, 644 Russia will continue to field 

the BMP-3 (~700 units), BMP-2 (~1,800 units), 

and BMP-1 (~500 units) while new systems 

are designed and produced.645 The BMP-3 is 

Russia’s most modern IFV in service.646

Russian artillery modernization efforts include 

the Koalitsiya-SV 2S35 152-mm self-propelled 

howitzer, which is intended to be the future of 

Russian self-propelled artillery units and will 

ultimately phase out the 2S19 Msta-S.647 Several 

of Russia’s multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) 

have also been improved: the URAGAN 220mm 

MRL, the SMERCH 300mm MRL, and the new 

TORNADO-2 300 MRL, which is a modernized 

version of the SMERCH.

648 Russian MRLs are 

produced in large quantities for the Russian 

Army and export customers worldwide.649

T-14 Armata Tank.

Image Source: AFP
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

85

APPENDIX H: Arms Sales

Russia remains the second largest arms 

exporter worldwide, in terms of the annual 

value of both its export contracts and equip-

ment deliveries. Russia’s arms export strat-

egy included planning $13 billion in annual 

sales through 2016, and thereafter seeking 

growth until 2020.650 In 2016, Russian officials 

announced that Moscow exported $14.5 billion 

in military products in 2015.651

Russia is an exporter of nearly every category 

of conventional military equipment, from small 

arms to long-range air defense systems and 

submarines. Moscow sees great prospects in the 

global arms marketplace for many of its prod-

ucts. In the aircraft sector, Su-35, Su-30 and 

MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Yak-130 combat train-

ers, and a variety of Mil and Kamov helicopters 

are key products. In the air defense sector, S-400 

TRIUMF, ANTEY-2500, BUK-M2E, and TOR-

M2E surface-to-air missile systems, the PAN-

TSIR-S1 air defense missile/gun system, and 

IGLA-S MANPADS are top sellers. Frigates, 

submarines, and patrol boats are best-selling 

naval exports. Russia’s land warfare products 

are centered on T-90 tanks, BMP-3 infantry 

fighting vehicles, and Tigr armored cars.652

Marketing, contracting, and exporting Rus-

sian defense products is executed by state 

company Rosoboronexport (ROE). ROE typi-

cally accounts for approximately 85% of Rus-

sia’s total exports of weapons and military 

hardware. It ships Russian defense products 

to about 70 countries and cooperates with 

over 700 Russian defense industry companies. 

ROE is incorporated into Rostec (formerly 

known as Russian Technologies or Rostech-

nologii), the state corporation established in 

2007 to promote the development, production, 

and export of civilian and military high tech-

nology products.653 Although ROE manages 

the majority of Russian arms trade, over 15 

companies are authorized to export products 

abroad directly, most often spare parts and 

maintenance services, and these contracts 

account for about $2 billion annually.654

Russia’s largest export markets for arms are 

the Middle East/North Africa and the Asia-Pa-

cific regions. Russia also maintains sales in 

Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and some 

parts of Europe, although at a much lower 

level.655 Moscow is seeking to grow its market 

share in Southeast Asia and Latin America 

especially. Russia also is committed to expand-

ing high-level military technical cooperation 

with other member states of BRICS (Brazil, 

Russia, India, China, and South Africa).656, 657

Russia is taking steps to overcome challenges 

and remain competitive in the global arms mar-

ket. ROE increasingly has been offering com-

mercial credit for arms transactions, especially 

to countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 

that cannot afford to purchase expensive equip-

ment or upgrade their armed forces without 

financial assistance. Similarly, Russian officials 

have acknowledged that exchanging arms for 

access to customers’ natural resources may be 
86

necessary to stave off competition from other 

suppliers.658 President Putin has expressed 

Moscow’s willingness to improve financing 

options for contracts, expand offerings for joint 

production and local assembly of defense equipment in customers’ countries, and improve upon 

post-sale support and equipment servicing.659

Moscow casts itself as a reliable and predictable arms trade partner that does not make 

its commitments dependent on market preferences or political trends.660 Russia also is touting the effectiveness of its combat operations 

in Syria and using this to add cachet to its 

military products for export. Moscow believes 

that advertising many of its weapons systems 

as combat-proven will generate additional 

interest and orders from customers.661
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

89

1 Dick, Charles J. “A Bear Without Claws: The Russian Army 

in the 1990s.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 10,

no. 1, March 1997, pp. 1–2.

2 Miller, Steven E. “Moscow’s Military Power: Russia’s Search 

for Security in an Age of Transition.” The Russian Military: 

Power and Policy, edited by Steven E. Miller and Dmitri V. 

Trenin, MIT Press, 2004, pp. 2, 7.

3 Dick, p. 2.

4 Dick, pp. 1–2.

5 Allison, Roy, “Russia, Regional Conflict, and the Use of 

Military Power.” The Russian Military: Power and Policy, 

edited by Steven E. Miller and Dmitri V. Trenin, MIT Press, 

2004, pp. 132–133.

6 Dick, p. 2.

7 Miller, p. 1.

8 Arbatov, Alexei G, “Military Reform: From Crisis to Stagna

-

tion.” The Russian Military: Power and Policy, edited by Steven 

E. Miller and Dmitri V. Trenin, MIT Press, 2004, p. 100.

9 Dick, pages 3–4.

10 Shurygin, Vladislav. "The Russian Army: Chronicle of 

Collapse." Internet Agenstvo Federalnykh Rassledovaniy, 

6 Nov 2006, www.apn.ru/publications/print1253.htm. 

Accessed 7 Jan 2007.

11 Unattributed. “Army Officers Moonlighting to Avoid Star

-

vation.” Moscow Russian Television Network, 27 Oct 1996. 

Accessed 27 Oct 1996.

12 Golts, Aleksandr, “The Social and Political Condition of the 

Russian Military.” The Russian Military: Power and Policy, ed-

ited by Steven E. Miller and Dmitri V. Trenin, MIT Press, 2004, 

pp. 73–74.

13 Dick, p. 4.

14 Dick, pp. 4–5.

15 Barabanov, Mikhail, “Hard Lessons Learned: Russian Mili

-

tary Reform up to the Georgian Conflict.” Brothers Armed: Mil-

itary Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, edited by Colby Howard 

and Ruslan Pukhanov, East View Press, 2014, pp. 80–81.

16 Barabanov, “Hard Lessons,” p. 75.

17 Barbanov, “Hard Lessons,” p. 76.

18 Pallin, Carolina Vendil. Russian Military Reform: A failed exercise in defense decision making. Routledge, 2009, pp. 71–74.

19 Barabanov, Mikhail (ed), Russia’s New Army. Centre for 

Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow, Russia, 

2011, pp. 10–13.

20 Barabanov, “Hard Lessons,” pp. 79–80.

21 Pallin, pp. 94–96.

22 Pavlovskiy, Nikolay. “Good Bye, Soviet Army.”

Boss Magazine, 15 Feb 2010. Accessed 25 Feb 2010.

23 Barabanov, “New Army,” pp. 17–18.

24 Barabanov, “Hard Lessons,” p. 85.

25 Barabanov, “New Army,” pp. 13–14.

26 Barabanov, “Hard Lessons,” p. 82.

27 Barabanov, “New Army,” pp. 15–16.

28 Barabanov, “New Army,” pp. 19–20.

29 Tamantsev, Yaroslav. “Where the Military Shambles in Russia 

Is Leading.” Internet SEGODNYA.ru, 16 Dec 2008,

wwwsegodnia.ru/content/19109. Accessed 29 Dec 2008.

30 Shurygin, Vladislav. “Full text from the Press conference

with General Makarov.” Kommersant-Vlast, 13 Jul 2009,

www.kommersant.ru/vlast. Accessed 16 Jul 09.

31 Unattributed, “The Contract Fad.” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye Online, 22 Nov 2013, nvo.ng.ru/. Accessed 26 

Nov 2013.

32 Telmanov, Denis. “General Staff Submitted a Modernization 

Plan to the State Duma.” Moscow Gazeta Online, 13 Nov 

2008, http://gzt.ru/. Accessed 18 Nov 2008.

33 Barabanov, Mikhail. “Reform of the Combat Spirit.” Kom

-

mersant-Vlast, 20 Oct 2008, www.kommersant.ru/vlast.

aspx?issueid=41901. Accessed 21 Oct 2008.

34 Unattributed. “Chief of Russian General Staff Army Gen Ni

-

kolay Makarov meets with foreign military attaches.” Moscow 

Interfax, 21 Dec 2009, http://www.militarynews.ru/. Accessed 

22 Dec 2009.

REFERENCES
90

35 Unattributed. “The General Staff Has Laid Out a New 

Strategy.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 Dec 2009, www.Ng.ru/

nvo/2009-12-30_genshtab.html. Accessed 31 Dec 2009.

36 Barabanov, pp. 20–28.

37 Unattributed, “The Contract Fad.” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye Online, 22 Nov 2013, nvo.ng.ru/. Accessed 26 

Nov 2013.

38 Rastopshin, Mikhail. “Unprepared for the Noncontact 

Operations of the 21st Century.” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye, 15 Aug 2008, www.nvo.ng.ru/wars/2008-08-

15/8_ossetia.html. Accessed 29 Aug 2008.

39 Kotenok Yuriy. "The Army Needs to Be Protected from 

Dilettantes." Utro.ru, 21 Oct 2008, www.utro.ru/articles/2008/10/21/776199.shtml. Accessed 22 Oct 2008.

40 Khramchikhin, Aleksandr. "The Army is Cut Off at Its Knees: 

However, So Far There Are No Answers to the Questions: 

Why and to What End." Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye, 24 Oct 08. Accessed 3 Nov 2008.

41 Tamantsev, Yaroslav. “Where the Military Shambles in Russia 

Is Leading.” Internet SEGODNYA.ru, 16 Dec 2008, www.

segodnia.ru/content/19109. Accessed 29 Dec 2008.

42 Bratersky, Alexander and Earle, Jonathan. “Shoigu Inherits 

Armed Forces at Crossroads.” The Moscow Times, 9 Nov 

2012, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/

shoigu-inherits-armed-forces-at-crossroads/471212.html.

Accessed 9 Nov 2012.

43 Nikolskiy, Aleksey, and Kostenko, Natalya. "Shoygu's Army." 

Vedomosti Online, 8 Nov 2012, http://www.vedomosti.ru/. 

Accessed 15 Nov 2012.

44 Unattributed. “Analysis: Russian Military Manpower - 

Strengths, Weaknesses, Ukraine Standoff.” Caversham BBC 

Monitoring, 15 May 2014, Bbc/co/uk. Accessed 15 May 2014.

45 Unattributed. “Advanced Russian Weapons Deployed in 

Donbass.” Internet Kyiv Defense Express, 17 Feb 2015, http://

www.defense-ua.com. Accessed 17 Feb 2015.

46 Unattributed. “More Russian Troops, Hardware Spotted in 

Ukraine.” 5 Kanal TV in Ukrainian. Accessed 3 Oct 2014.

47 Sutyagin, Igor, “Detailing Russian Forces in Syria.” RUSI 

Defense Systems, 13 Nov 2015, https://rusi.org/publication/

rus-defense-systems/detailing-russian-forces-syria.

Accessed 25 Oct 2016.

48 “Northern Fleet.” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, http://structure.mil.ru/structure/okruga/north/news.htm.

49 Frolov, Vladimir, president of LEFF Group, a government relations and PR company. “Putin Seeks entente Cordiale with 

the West.” Opinion: The Moscow Times Online, 8 Mar 2016, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com. Accessed 8 Mar 2016.

50 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving 

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security 

Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation President, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

51 Trenin, Dmitri. “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded,” Foreign Affairs, May/Jun 2016, pp. 23–29.

52 Lukyanov, Fedor. “Putin’s Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place.” Foreign Affairs, May/Jun 2016, 

pp. 30–38.

53 Lukyanov, “Putin’s Foreign Policy,” pp. 30–38.

54 Lukyanov, “Putin’s Foreign Policy,” pp. 30–38.

55 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving 

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security 

Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation President, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

56 Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military,” pp. 23–30.

57 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National 

Security Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation President, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 

5 Jan 2016.

58 Lukyanov, “Putin’s Foreign Policy,” pp. 30–38.

59 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving 

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security 

Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation President, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

60 Unattributed. “Russian presidential representative to Afghanistan expressed his deep concerns regarding the expanding 

ISIL activities in Afghanistan.” TEHRAN (FNA), 24 Apr 2016, 

http://www.english.farsnews.com. Accessed 25 Apr 2016.

61 Government of the Russian Federation. “Deputy Secretary of 

the Russian Security Council Yevgeniy Lukyanov has issued a 

commentary on the most recent version of the National Security 

Strategy.” Official website of the Russian Federation Government, 

18 Jan 2016, http://government.ru. Accessed 18 Jan 2016.

62 Kashin, Vasiliy and Pyatachkova, Anastasiya. "On The Road 

to an Alliance? How Far Rapprochement Between Russia and 

China Could Go." Internet: Moscow Lenta.ru in Russian, 25 

Aug 2016, http://lenta.ru/. Accessed 30 Aug 2016.

63 Nechepurenko, Ivan. “Russia-China Alliance Could Launch 

New World Order.” The Moscow Times Online, 14 Jun 2014, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/. Accessed 16 Jun 2014.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

91

64 Kashin and Pyatachkova, "On The Road to an Alliance? How 

Far Rapprochement Between Russia and China Could Go."

65 Trenin, Dmitriy. "Russia's Foreign Policy in the Coming Five 

Years: Goals, Stimuli, Reference Points." Politkom.ru, 29 Apr 

2016, http://politikom.ru. Accessed 10 May 2016.

66 Cohen, Josh. “Putin's Fear of China Weakens Russia's 

Asia Pivot.” The Moscow Times, 17 Dec 2014, http://www.

themoscowtimes.com/. Accessed 24 Dec 2014.

67 Melnikova, Kseniya citing experts Gabuyev, Aleksandr and 

Bordachev, Timofey. "Restless Neighborhood.” Moscow 

Lenta.ru in Russian, 15 Jul 2015, http://www/lenta.ru/.

Accessed 19 Jul 2016.

68 Yegorov, Ivan. “Challenge Accepted; Nikolay Patrushev: 

National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Has 

Been Updated.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 22 Dec 2015, www.rg.

ru/2015/12/22/patrushev-site.html. Accessed 28 Dec 2015.

69 Official government document. “The Russian Federation 

National Security Strategy Through 2020.” Russian Federation 

Security Council Website, 12 May 2009, www.scrf.gov.ru. 

Accessed 15 May 2009.

70 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving 

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security 

Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation Presi-

dent, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

71 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving 

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security 

Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation Presi-

dent, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

72 Official government document. “The Russian Federation 

National Security Strategy Through 2020.” Russian Federation 

Security Council Website, 12 May 2009, www.scrf.gov.ru. 

Accessed 15 May 2009.

73 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving 

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security 

Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation Presi-

dent, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

74 Yaffa, Joshua. “ What the Russian Protests Mean for Putin,” 

27 March 2017, www.thenewyorker.com.

75 Yaffa, Joshua. “ What the Russian Protests Mean for Putin,” 

27 March 2017, www.thenewyorker.com.

76 Lipman, Maria. “How Putin Silences Dissent: Inside the Krem

-

lin’s Crackdown,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, pp. 38-47.

77 Lipman, Maria. “How Putin Silences Dissent: Inside the Krem

-

lin’s Crackdown,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, pp. 38-47.

78 Unattributed. “Russian National Guard to have central 

command point (Part 2).” Moscow Interfax, 9 Jul 2016, 

http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 10 Jul 2016.

79 Unattributed. “Maximal size of Russian Interior Ministry's 

staff cut to 904,800 - presidential order.” Moscow Interfax, 19 

Sep 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 20 Sep 2016.

80 Sokirko, Viktor. “Interview with Vladimir Pronichev.” Kom

-

somolskaya Pravda Online, 11 Oct 2011, http://www.kp.ru/. 

Accessed 15 Oct 2011.

81 Russia Federal Penitentiary Service. https://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Federal_Penitentiary_Service. Accessed 25 Oct 2016.

82 Unattributed. “Putin caps Emergencies Ministry headcount.” 

Moscow TASS, 30 Jul 2016, http://tass.ru. Accessed 31 Jul 2016.

83 Wilson, Kyle. “Australia: The puzzle of Putin’s insecurity: prae

-

torian guards, Stalinist blueprints.” The Strategist, 23 May 2016, 

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au. Accessed 24 May 2016.

84 Unattributed. “Chechnya Move Worries Russian Press.” 

BBC News Online, 17 Apr 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/. 

Accessed 17 Apr 2009.

85 Milashina, Yelena. "How Putin Has Liquidated Kadyrov's 

Army. Edict on the Formation of the National Guard Will Have 

Colossal Consequences for Chechnya." Novaya Gazeta 

Online, 10 Apr 2016, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/. Accessed 

26 Apr 2016.

86 Unattributed. “CSTO peacekeepers in exercise in Belarus to 

practice creation of corridors for refugees.” Moscow Interfax, 24 

Aug 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 25 Aug 2016.

87 Unattributed. “CSTO's draft strategy views NATO approach 

toward CSTO states' borders as threat to their security – Rus-

sian envoy Vasilyev (Part 2).” Moscow Interfax, 29 Jun 2016, 

http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 30 Jun 2016.

88 Unattributed. “Soldiers from the Collective Security Treaty 

Organisation (CSTO) have called on simulated NATO peace-

keeping forces to surrender as part of exercise ‘Cooperation 

2016.’" Moscow Zvezda TV, Ministry of Defense TV channel, 

19 Aug 2016.

89 Korostikov, Mikhail. "Tajik Mountains Can Barely Hold Out. 

Dushanbe Combating Terrorists and Drug Traffickers Using 

Chinese Jeeps and American Weapons." Kommersant Online, 

29 Apr 2016, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 29 Apr 2016.

90 Unattributed. "Hopeless Dead End. The Resolution of the 

Karabakh Conflict Requires a Minimum Trust, Which Is Com-

pletely Absent.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 Oct 2016, www.

Ng.ru/nvo/. Accessed 16 Oct 2016.
92

91 Karaganov, S.A. “A Strategy for Russia; Russian Foreign 

Policy: The End of The 2010s to the Beginning of the 2020s." 

Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, 6 Jun 2016, http://

www.svop.ru. Accessed 22 Jul 2016.

92 Karaganov, Sergey. "Russian Foreign Policy: New Stage? 

– Group of Established Experts Have Presented Their View of 

the Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta 

Online, 24 May 2016, http://rg.ru/. Accessed 29 May 2016.

93 Bocharova, Svetlana. “Siluanov Explained the Growth of the 

Classified Budget Expenditures.” RBC.ru, 17 Oct 2016. www.

rbc.ru. Accessed 20 Oct 2017.

94 Economist Intelligence Unit. Russia GDP, Exchange Rate, 

GDP deflator. eiu.com. Accessed Jun 2017.

95 Unattributed. “Putin signs 2016 Budget Amendments, 

Deficit Rises to 3 Trillion Rubles.” Interfax, 24 Nov 2016, http://

www.interfax.com/. Accessed 24 Nov 2016.

96 Economist Intelligence Unit. Russia GDP, Exchange Rate, 

GDP deflator. eiu.com. Accessed Jun 2017.

97 Russian Federation Ministry of Finance. “Annual information 

about execution of the federal budget (data from 1 January 

2006).” National defense line item, http://minfin.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/#. Accessed 28 Nov 2016.

98 Economist Intelligence Unit. Russia GDP, Exchange Rate, 

GDP deflator. eiu.com. Accessed Jun 2017.

99 Russian Federation Ministry of Finance. “Annual information 

about execution of the federal budget (data from 1 January 

2006).” National defense line item, http://minfin.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/#. Accessed 28 Nov 2016.

100 State Duma draft law 2428-7. “On introducing amendments in the Federal Law ‘On the Federal Budget in 2016,’” 

Appendix No. 3 of Explanatory Note, “Expenditures of the 

Federal Budget in 2016 in Framework of Sections and Subsections of Categories of Expenditures of the Federal Budget.” 

duma.gov.ru. Accessed 31 Oct 2016.

101 Cooper, Julian. “Russian State Armament Programme to 

2020: a quantitative assessment of implementation 2011–

2015.” SIPRI, Mar 2016, p. 20.

102 Cooper, p. 14.

103 Prokopenko, Aleksandra. “Расходы прорвали линию 

обороны.” Vedomosti Online, 9 Sep 2016.

104 Bocharova, “Siluanov Explained the Growth of the Classified Budget Expenditures.”

105 Economist Intelligence Unit. Russia GDP, Exchange Rate, 

GDP deflator. eiu.com. Accessed Jun 2017.

106 Russian Federation Ministry of Finance. “Annual information about execution of the federal budget (data from 1 

January 2006).” National defense line item, http://minfin.ru/ru/

statistics/fedbud/#. Accessed 28 Nov 2016.

107 State Duma draft law 2428-7, “On introducing amendments in the Federal Law ‘On the Federal Budget in 2016,’” 

Appendix No. 3 of Explanatory Note, “Expenditures of the 

Federal Budget in 2016 in Framework of Sections and Subsections of Categories of Expenditures of the Federal Budget.” 

duma.gov.ru. Accessed 31 Oct 2016.

108 Unattributed. “Russian Finance Ministry suggests 5% 

budget cuts in 2017.” ITAR-TASS News Agency, 7 Jul 2016. 

Accessed 7 Jul 2016.

109 Kuvshinova, Olga. “Доходы бюджета в 2019 году 

снизятся до 20-летнего минимума” [Budget Outlays in 2019 

Will Sink to 20-Year Low]. Vedomosti Online, 4 Sep 2016, 

www.vedomosti.ru. Accessed 13 Sep 2016.

110 Unattributed. “Potential exists for Bashneft sale, but timing 

of Rosneft privatization needs analysis.” Interfax, 22 Jun 2016, 

www.interfax.com. Accessed 23 Jun 2016.

111 “Interfax Russia & CIS Banking and Finance Weekly.” Interfax, 12 Aug 2016, www.interfax.com. Accessed 12 Aug 2016.

112 Prokopenko, Alexandra. “Experts Predict 'Lost Decade' 

for Russia's Stagnating Economy.” The Moscow Times, 

19 Aug 2016, themoscowtimes/articles/experts-proclaim-lost-decade-for-russias-stagnating-economy-55039. 

Accessed 19 Aug 2016.

113 Gerasimov, Valery. “Ценность Науки В Предвидении 

Новые Вызовы Требуют Переосмыслить Формы И 

Способы Ведения Боевых Действий” [The Value of Science 

is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking of the 

Forms and Methods of Conducting Combat Actions]. Military-Industrial Courier, 27 Feb 2013.

114 Unattributed. “Russian Chief of General Staff Makarov 

Addresses Academy of Military Sciences.” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 19 Feb 2012, http://nvo.ng.ru/. 

Accessed 19 Feb 2012.

115 Unattributed. “Numerous military conflicts may develop into full-fledged war – Makarov (Part 2).” Interfax-AVN 

Online in English, 7 Dec 2011, http://www.militarynews.ru. 

Accessed 7 Dec 2011.

116 Chekinov, Sergey.G. and Bogdanov, Sergey A. “Initial Periods of Wars and Their Impact on a Country's Preparations for 

a Future War.” Military Thought, 31 Dec 2012.

117 Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight.”
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

93

118 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

119 Unattributed. “К Вопросу o Ядерном Сдерживании” [On the 

Question of Nuclear Deterrence]. Military Thought, 1 Dec 2002.

120 Felgengauer, Pavel. “Rybkin’s Preventive Strike.” Moscow 

Segodnya, 14 Feb 1997.

121 Unattributed. “Russia Classifies Information on Pre-emptive 

Nuclear Strikes – Military.” Interfax-AVN Online, 5 Sep 2014, 

http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 5 Sep 2014.

122 Unattributed. “On Employing Nuclear Weapons to De-Es

-

calate Military Operations.” Military Thought, 1 May 1999.

123 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

124 Malashenko, E.I. “Creation and Employment of Strategic 

Reserves.” Military Thought, vol. 1, 2006.

125 Garayev, M.A. "Lessons and Conclusions Drawn from the 

Experience of the Great Patriotic War for Building Up and 

Training the Armed Forces.” Voyennaya Mysl, 5 May 2010.

126 Bogdanov, S.A. "Features of The Initial Period of Past and 

Future Wars." Voyennaya Mysl, 1 May 2003.

127 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

128 President of the Russian Federation. “2010 Military Doc

-

trine of the Russian Federation.” 5 Feb 2010, http://www.

kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Feb 2010.

129 Radchuk, V.A. “Determination of Levels of Unacceptable 

Damage to State Economic System: A Methodological Ap-

proach.” Military Thought, vol. 3, 2008.

130 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

131 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

132 Burenok, F.M. and Achasov, O.B. “Russia: Non-Nuclear 

Deterrence.” Military Thought, 1 Jan 2008.

133 Chekinov, S.G. and Bogdanov, S.A. “Strategic Deterrence 

and Russia's National Security Today.” Military Thought,

1 Jan 2012.

134 Radchuk, V.A. “Determination of Levels of Unacceptable 

Damage to State Economic System: A Methodological Ap-

proach.” Military Thought, vol. 3, 2008.

135 Ozhegov, S.I. and Shvedova, N.Yu. Encyclopedic Dictio

-

nary of the Russian Language. Russian Academy of Science 

Institute of the Russian Language, 1999, p. 707.

136 Unattributed. “К Вопросу o Ядерном Сдерживании” [On the 

Question of Nuclear Deterrence]. Military Thought, 11 Jan 2002.

137 Unattributed. “Strategic Deterrence and Russia's National 

Security Today.” Military Thought, 3 Aug 2012.

138 Unattributed. “Issues of Strategic Deterrence in Current 

Conditions.” Military Thought, 17 Feb 2010.

139 Barynkin, V.M. “Assessment of Effectiveness of Measures 

to Resolve Military Conflicts in the Early Stages of Their Devel-

opment.” Military Thought, 1 Mar 1996.

140 Tsgychko, V.N. “Balance of Forces’ Category in Potential 

Military Conflicts.” Military Thought, Mar 2002.

141 Unattributed. “К Вопросу o Ядерном Сдерживании” [On the 

Question of Nuclear Deterrence]. Military Thought, 11 Jan 2002.

142 Unattributed. “К Вопросу o Ядерном Сдерживании” [On the 

Question of Nuclear Deterrence]. Military Thought, 11 Jan 2002.

143 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

144 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving 

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security 

Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation Presi-

dent, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

145 Chekinov, S.G. and Bogdanov S.A. “Asymmetrical Ac

-

tions to Maintain Russia’s Military Security.” Military Thought, 

20 Jun 2013.

146 Bikkenin, R. “Questions of Theory: Information Conflict in 

The Military Sphere: Basic Elements and Concepts.” Informa-

tion Conflict in Military Sphere, 18 Sep 2003, pp. 38–40.

147 Giles, Keir. “Russia’s New Tools for Confronting the West.” 

Research Paper, Chatham House, Mar 2016, https://www. 

chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/

research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf. Accessed 

28 Mar 2016.
94

148 “Constitution of Russia, chapter 4. The President of the 

Russian Federation.” Wikisource, amended 30 Dec 2008, 

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Russia#CHAPTER_4._THE_PRESIDENT_OF_THE_RUSSIAN_FEDERATION. 

Accessed 14 Dec 2016.

149 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation 

President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Russian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.” 

Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007, 

www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.

150 Unattributed. “Defense Minister General of the Army Sergey 

Shoygu Conducted a Teleconference with Armed Forces Key 

Personnel.” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 8 

Apr 2013, www.mil.ru. Accessed 8 Apr 2013.

151 Unattributed. “Ministry of Defense Concludes First Contract 

for Delivery of Over 100 Armata Tanks.” Moscow RIA Novosti, 

6 Sep 2016, www.rian.ru. Accessed 7 Sep 2016.

152 Unattributed. “Russian Federation Ministry of Defense: 

Russia is Preparing a Response to USA Prompt Global 

Strike." ITAR-TASS, 2 Jun 2014, http://www.itar-tass.com/. 

Accessed 3 Jun 2014.

153 Unattributed. “Defense Minister General of the Army Sergey 

Shoygu Conducted a Teleconference with Armed Forces Key 

Personnel.” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 8 

Apr 2013, www.mil.ru. Accessed 8 Apr 2013.

154 Yershov, Yevgeniy. “Shoygu the All-Purpose and... the 

Only.” Moscow Polit.ru, 6 Nov 2012, http://polit.ru/.

Accessed 7 Nov 2012.

155 Unattributed. “General of the Army Sergey Shoygu, Russian Defense Minister, Has Summed Up the Outcome of Snap 

Inspections of the Combat Readiness of the Troops (Forces).” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 3 Aug 2015, 

http://www.mil.ru. Accessed 4 Aug 2015.

156 Miranovich, Gennadiy. “Defense of the Country: Scientific 

Approach.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 Jan 2014, http://

www.redstar.ru. Accessed 19 Feb 2014.

157 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine 

of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian 

Federation president, 31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. 

Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

158 President of the Russian Federation. “Statute on the 

Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff.” Official 

website of the Russian Federation president, 25 Jul 2012, 

http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 30 Jul 2013.

159 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation 

President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Russian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.” 

Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007, 

www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.

160 Unattributed. “GEN. Gerasimov Becomes Central Military 

District Commander.” Moscow Interfax, 11 May 2012, http://

www.interfax.com. Accessed 11 May 2012.

161 BBC Monitoring. “BBCM Profile: Russia's New Armed 

Forces Chief, Valeriy Gerasimov.” BBC Monitoring, 9 Nov 

2012, www.monitor.bbc.co.uk. Accessed 9 Nov 2012.

162 Unattributed. “Traditions will be Continued.” Moscow 

Krasnyy Voin, 3 Apr 2009. Accessed 4 Apr 2009.

163 Unattributed. “Gerasimov Will Bring Better Organization to 

General Staff – Experts.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 9 Nov 2012, 

http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 9 Nov 2012.

164 Unattributed. “The General Staff Planned a Complex of 

Measures for Strategic Deterrence for the Provision of Military 

Conflicts - Chief of the General Staff.” Moscow Interfax-AVN. 27 

Jan 2014. http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 5 Feb 2014.

165 Unattributed. “Russian General Staff Chief Outlines 'Problematic Issues' with NATO.” Moscow Rossiya 24 TV, 23 Jan 

2014, Vesti.ru. Accessed 23 Jan 2014.

166 Gerasimov, Valeriy. “First Main Test: Russia's Nuclear Arsenal Remains the Most Important National Security Guarantee.” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK), 3 Sep 2014, http://

vpk-news.ru/articles/21648. Accessed 5 Sep 2014.

167 Unattributed. “Russia Taking Measures to Prevent US, 

NATO military superiority.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 30 Jan 

2015,, http://www.interfax.ru/. Accessed 30 Jan 2015.

168 Unattributed. “Functions of the Main Operations Directorate 

of the General Staff.” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 30 May 2013, http://www.mil.ru. Accessed 31 May 2013.

169 Unattributed. “Chief of Main Operations Directorate Sergey 

Rudskoy Speech During Briefing on Terrorism.” Ministry of 

Defense of the Russian Federation, 2 Dec 2015, http://www.

mil.ru. Accessed 3 Dec 2015.

170 Tikhonov, Aleksandr. “Where the Threats to Peace Come 

from.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 May 2014, http://www.

redstar.ru. Accessed 2 Jun 2014.

171 Unattributed. “Out of 550 Proposals for RDT&E Costing 

120 Billion, Only 146 Costing About 20 Billion Were Included 

in Gosoboronzakaz-2011.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 4 Mar 2011, 

http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 4 Mar 2011.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

95

172 Unattributed. “Russian General Gives Data On Military 

Research.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 4 Mar 2011, http://www.

militarynews.ru. Accessed 6 Mar 2011.

173 Unattributed. “Russian Army Revises State Defense Order, 

Suspends Military Education Reform.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 14 

Nov 2012. http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 14 Nov 2012.

174 Unattributed. “Russia, Syria did not strike at areas agreed 

on in Geneva in past week – Rudskoi.” Interfax in English, 19 

Sep 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 19 Sep 2016.

175 Unattributed. “Russia, U.S. exchange info on ceasefire in 

Syria - Russian Defense Ministry.” Interfax in English, 27 Feb 

2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 27 Feb 2016.

176 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Biography of Russian Pres

-

ident Putin.” http://eng.mil.ru/en/management/leader.htm. 

Accessed 14 Oct 2016.

177 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation 

President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Rus-

sian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.” 

Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007, 

www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.

178 Petrov, Ivan. "Young and Stern: The Generals Will Be 

Discharged by a 42-Year-Old Veteran of the State Emergency 

Committee." RBK Daily, 6 Nov 2008.

179 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation 

President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Rus-

sian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.” 

Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007, 

www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.

180 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

181 Miranovich, Gennadiy. “Defense of the Country: Scientific 

Approach.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 Jan 2014, http://

www.redstar.ru. Accessed 19 Feb 2014.

182 tUnattributed. “Personnel Training System for Russian 

Ground Forces Will Be Improved – Commander-in-Chief.” 

Moscow Interfax-AVN, 3 Oct 2014, http://www.interfax.com/. 

Accessed 3 Oct 2014.

183 Yarynich, Valery E. “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Co

-

operation.” Conference paper, 2003. Source is former Russian 

General Staff officer and SRF member.

184 Bozhov, Oleg. "How They Will Wage War in the Future: 

Tanks Rumbled Across the Sky." MK Online, 13 Aug 2016, 

http://mk.ru/. Accessed 13 Aug 2016.

185 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation 

President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Rus-

sian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.” 

Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007, 

www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.

186 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”

187 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”

188 Litovkin, Dmitriy. "The Military Go on the Net." Izvestiya Online. 

18 Oct 2010. http://www.izvestia.ru/.Accessed 18 Oct 2010.

189 Yarynich, Valery E. “Russian Missile Programs, The MTCR 

and the Future of U.S. Russian Arms Control.” Conference 

paper. 21 Jul 1995.

190 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”

191 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”

192 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine 

of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation 

President V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation 

president, 31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 

Dec 2014.

193 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”

194 Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of 

the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Aftermath. 

Doubleday, 2009.

195 Russian Ministry of Defense. http://function.mil.ru/news_

page/country/more.htm?id=12066124@egNews&_print=true. 

Accessed 17 Nov 2015.

196 Russian Ministry of Defense. http://function.mil.ru/news_

page/country/more.htm?id=12066124@egNews&_print=true. 

Accessed 17 Nov 2015.

197 Unattributed. “President Signs Decree On Four Joint Strate

-

gic Commands in Russia.” ITAR-TASS in English, 15 Jul 2010.

198 Belousov, Yuriy and Tikhonov, Aleksandr. "From the Volga 

to the Yenisey." Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 10 Nov 2010, http://

www.redstar.ru. Accessed 10 Nov 2010.

199 Stepanov, Aleksandr. "Russia Expands Arctic Military Group

-

ing. Air Force and Air Defense Army to Be Part of Northern Fleet." 

MK Online, 3 Aug 2015, http://mk.ru/. Accessed 3 Aug 2015.

200 Belousov and Tikhonov, "From the Volga to the Yenisey."

201 Unattributed. “Organization of Russia's new operational-stra

-

tegic commands will be over in 2010.” Interfax-AVN, 12 Jun 

2010, http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 12 Jun 2010.

202 Belousov and Tikhonov, "From the Volga to the Yenisey."
96

203 Unattributed. “Organization of Russia's new operational-strategic commands will be over in 2010.” Interfax-AVN, 12 Jun 

2010, http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 12 Jun 2010.

204 Unattributed. “Russia opens regional defense control 

center in Yekaterinburg.” Interfax, 31 Mar 2014, http://www.

interfax.com/. Accessed 31 Mar 2014.

205 Dyachenko, A.A. Опаленные В Борьбе При Создании 

Ядерного Щита Родины: Научно-Публицистическая 

Монография. Chapter 4: Nuclear Test Site in The Arctic. 

Edited by V.N. Mikhaylov, Moscow, 2008, pp. 465–471.

206 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian 

Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

207 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian 

Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

208 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian 

Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

209 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian 

Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

210 Unattributed. “Upgraded Russian-made Tu-160M2 bomber 

to perform first flight in 2019.” TASS World Service, 2 Mar 2016.

211 Podvig, Pavel, et al. “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.” Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the 

Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, English language 

edition supported by the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT Press, 2001. pp. 50–51.

212 Rosatom Annual Report – 2014.

213 Unattributed. “Medvedkov: The Creation of Infrastructure 

for the Nuclear Deterrence Forces Is our Main Administration's 

Key Task.” Interfax, 3 Aug 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. 

Accessed 16 Aug 2016.

214 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian 

Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

215 U.S. Department of State. “Bureau of State, Bureau of 

Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START 

Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Forces, Fact 

Sheet, Washington, DC.” 1 April 2017, http://www.state.gov/t/

avc/newstart/269496.htm.

216 Sutyagin, Igor. “Royal United Services Institute Occasional Paper; Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s 

Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.” Nov 2012, p. 5.

217 Arbatov, Alexei. “Nuclear Threat Initiative. A Russian 

Perspective on the Challenge of U.S., NATO, and Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, 

www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Framework_Chpt8b.pdf%3F_%3D1322702907+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

218 Unattributed. “Report: Russian Military Modernization 176 

STC 15 E.” 11 Oct 2015.

219 Andreyev, Oleg. “RVSN Given Six Years to Rearm; Moscow 

Adjusts Plans to Enhance Combat Readiness of the Armed 

Forces.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 May 2016, http://www.

ng.ru/. Accessed 19 May 2016.

220 Unattributed. "Source Names Timeframe for Troops to Get 

New Sarmat Missile." Moscow Lenta.ru, 5 Sep 2016, http://

lenta.ru/. Accessed 15 Sep 2016.

221 Bodner, Matthew. “Kremlin Threatens Response to U.S. 

Nuclear Bomb Deployment in Germany.” Moscow Times 

Online in English, 23 Sep 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.

com. Accessed 24 Sep 2015.

222 Leitenberg, M and Zilinskas, R. The Soviet Biological 

Weapons Program: A History. Harvard University Press, 2012.

223 “Note by The Director General Overall Progress with Respect to the Destruction of the Remaining Chemical Weapons 

Stockpiles.” OPCW, EC-80/DG.22, 28 Sep 2015.

224 “Update on destruction of Russian chemical weapons 

released”, 12 January 2017, BBCMIR2017, 12 January 2017

225 “Report of the Visit by the Chairperson of the Executive 

Council and Representatives of the Executive Council to the 

Kizner Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility the Russian 

Federation, 25–29 Apr 2016.” OPCW, EC-82/1, 30 May 2016.

226 “Remarks by Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü Closing 

Ceremony of Maradykovsky Chemical Weapons Destruction 

Facility.” OPCW, 30 Oct 2016.

227 Riches, James. “Analysis of Clothing and Urine from Moscow Theatre Siege Casualties Reveals Carfentanil and Remifentanil Use.” Technical analysis from Porton Down, 2012.

228 Zaretsky, B.L. “Russia's Aerospace Security.” Moscow 

Military Thought, vol. 24, no. 3, 2015, pp. 24–30.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

97

229 Cherednikov, I.Yu., et al. “Protection of Critical Assets from 

Missile Attacks by Sabotage and Reconnaissance Groups.” 

Moscow Military Thought, vol. 24, no. 1, 2015, pp. 39–44.

230 Khmara, Yu, Lutovinov, V. “Military Security of the Russian 

Federation: How to Ensure It under Present Conditions.” Mos-

cow Military Thought, vol. 25, no. 1, 2016, pp. 26–40.

231 Belomytsev, A.V., et al. “How to Fight an Enemy Coming from 

Aerospace.” Moscow Military Thought, no. 5, 2014, pp. 41–43.

232 Falichev, Oleg. “We Cannot Allow Ourselves to Purchase 

Bad Armaments." Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 2 Mar 

2011, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 2 Mar 2011.

233 Cheltsov, B.F. “Approaches to the Creation of the National 

Aerospace Defense System in Light of Future Network-Centric 

Wars.” Moscow Military Thought, vol. 4, 2008, pp. 1–11.

234 “Questions of strategic and Operational Art in Sovi

-

et Military Labor (1917–1949)” [Вопросы стратегии и 

оперативного искусства в советских военных трудах 

(1917– 1949). М.: Воениздат]. Moscow Military Publishers, 

1965, p. 636.

235 Fitzgerald, Mary. “The New Revolution in Russian Military 

Affairs Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies.” 

Whitehall Paper Series, 1994, p. 3.

236 “Questions of strategic and Operational Art in Soviet 

Military Labor (1917–1949)” [Вопросы стратегии и 

оперативного искусства в советских военных трудах 

(1917–1949). М.: Воениздат]. Moscow Military Publishers, 

1965, p. 636.

237 Aleksandrov, A. Ye. “Prospects for the Introduction of Net

-

work-Centric Concepts.” Moscow Military Thought, vol. 23, 

no. 2, 2014, pp. 49–58.

238 Kalinkin, D.A., et al. “Strategic Deterrence against the U.S. 

Global ABM System and Prompt Global Strike Capabilities.” 

Moscow Military Thought, Vol. 24, no. 1, 2015, pp. 1–7.

239 Oya, Yelena. “Interview: Star Wars. How Russian Air 

Defenses Will Respond to the Latest Threats from the Skies. 

The Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Federation's 

Aerospace Forces Has Told Life.ru About New Armament in 

Service with the Russian Army.” Russkaya Sluzhba Novostey 

Online (RSN), 21 Aug 2016, http://www.rusnovosti.ru/.

Accessed 28 Aug 2016.

240 Falichev, Oleg. “We Cannot Allow Ourselves to Purchase 

Bad Armaments." Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 2 Mar 

2011, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 2 Mar 2011.

241 Solovyov, I.Ye and Tsurilov, Yu.N. “Executive Planning Princi

-

ples for the Development of the CIS Joint Air Defense System.” 

Moscow Military Thought, vol. 23, no. 3, 2014, pp. 132–140.

242 Akhmerov, D.Ye, et al. “Antiaircraft Defense Task Forces 

in Strategic Areas.” Moscow Military Thought, vol. 24, no. 4, 

2015, pp. 62-69.

243 Unattributed. “Advanced control systems to strengthen 

Russian air defense systems.” Interfax, 9 Oct 2015, http://

www.interfax.com/. Accessed 9 Oct 2015.

244 Zakharov, V.A., “Antiaircraft Forces in an Active Global 

Defense System.” Moscow Military Thought, no. 4, 2014.

245 Ilyin, Yu.D., et al. “Development Outlook for High-Precision 

Ammunition.” Moscow Military Thought, Vol. 23, no. 2, 2014, 

pp. 98–111.

246 Litvinenko, V.I. “Generalized Assessment of the Effective

-

ness of Conventional Arms and Weapons Based on New 

Physical Principles.” Moscow Military Thought, vol. 24, no. 4, 

2015, pp. 69–77.

247 Kiselyov, V.A. and Vorobyov, I.N. “Trends in the Tactics of 

Network-Centric Operations.” Moscow Military Thought, 

vol. 23, no. 2, 2014, pp. 33–41.

248 Korabelnikov, A.P. “Promising Trends in the Development 

of Aerospace Defense Forms and Methods in the Russian 

Federation.” Moscow Military Thought, vol. 24, no. 4, 2015, 

pp. 145–155.

249 Litvinenko, V.I. and Rusanov, I.P. “Basic Trends in Firepower 

Employment in Modern-Day Operations (Combat Actions).” 

Moscow Military Thought, vol. 23, no. 4, 2014, pp. 40–48.

250 Simpkin, Richard. Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal 

Tukhachevsky. Brassey's Defence, 1987.

251 Ogarkov, N.V. “A Reliable Bastion of Socialism and Peace.” 

Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 Feb 1983, p. 2.

252 Fitzgerald, Mary. “Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater 

Operation.” Center for Naval Analysis, CRM 86-238, Nov 1986.

253 Fitzgerald, Mary. “The Soviet Military and the New Air War 

in the Persian Gulf.” Airpower Journal, 1991.

254 Falichev, Oleg. “We Cannot Allow Ourselves to Purchase 

Bad Armaments." Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 2 Mar 

2011, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 2 Mar 2011.

255 Khayrullin, Shamil. “Salvos Thunder in the Caspian...” 

Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 17 Jan 2013, http://www.redstar.ru. 

Accessed 18 Jan 2013.

256 Mukhin, Vladimir. “Wars and Armies: Putin Saw the Maneu

-

vers through Shoygu's Eyes: They Verified the Effectiveness of 

the Nuclear and Precision-Guided Weapons Platforms at the 

Vostok-2014 Exercises.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 Sep 2014, 

http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 25 Sep 2014.
98

257 Unattributed. “Kalibr Missile Launches in Kavkaz-2016 

Exercise.” Moscow Zvezda TV, 9 Sep 2016, http://www.

tvzvezda.ru/tv. Accessed 9 Sep 2016.

258 Ganin A.V. and Korolyov I.I. and Pavlov, V.N. “Electronic 

Information Blockades by Combined-Arms EW Forces.” 

Moscow Military Thought, vol. 22, no. 3, 2013, pp. 17–25.

259 Koybletskiy, Oleg. “From Above We Can See Everything!” 

Moscow Oriyentir Online, 14 Sep 2016, http://orientir.milportal.ru/. 

Accessed 5 Oct 2016.

260 UCS Satellite Database. Union of Concerned Scientists. 

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/

satellite-database#.V_Uj1TZf0-4, 5 Oct 2016.

261 Morozov, Igor Vitalyevich. “Space and the Nature of 

Contemporary Military Operations: Gaining and Maintaining 

Supremacy in the Information and Space Spheres Has a Decisive Impact on the Course and Outcome of a Contemporary High-Tech Armed Confrontation.” Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona, 14 Jul 2009, http://www.vko.ru/. Accessed 

25 Aug 2009.

262 President of the Russian Federation. “2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." 5 Feb 2010, http://www.

kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Feb 2010.

263 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation 

President V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. 

Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

264 Raskin, Aleksandr, "Are Net 'Battles' Coming? We Continue the Discussion on the Nature and Look of Possible Wars of 

the Future." Armeyskiy Sbornik, monthly journal of the General 

Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, 30 Sep 2005. 

Accessed 15 Dec 2005.

265 Rog, Valentin. “Will We Respond to The Challenges of the 

Time?” Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 Apr 2005, ed. 4, pp. 10–13.

266 Khudoleyev, Victor. “Troops for the Battle in the Ether.” 

Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 Apr 2014, http://redstar.ru/index.php/

newspaper/item/15511-vojska-dlya-srazheni. Accessed 23 

Apr 2014.

267 Kupriyanov, G.P. “Principal Trends in The Evolution of Space 

Warfare.” Moscow Military Thought, vol. 14, no. 1, 2005.

268 Chekinov, S.G. and Bogdanov S.A. “Asymmetrical Actions to 

Maintain Russia’s Military Security.” Military Thought, 20 Jun 2013. 

Accessed 21 Jun 2013.

269 Bogdanov S.A. and Chekinov, S.G. “Strategic Deterrence 

and Russia's National Security Today.” Moscow Military 

Thought, no. 3, 2012, pp. 11–20.

270 Oleinikov, I.I., et al. “A Space Monitoring System as Part of 

Strategic Deterrence.” Moscow Military Thought, vol. 24, no. 3, 

2015, pp. 16–23.

271 Unattributed. “New branch of Armed Forces, Aerospace 

Forces, created in Russia – Shoygu.” Interfax, 3 Aug 2015. 

http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 3 Aug 2015.

272 Golts, Alexander. “Russia's Aerospace Forces Will Never 

Take Off.” The Moscow Times Online, 10 Aug 2015,

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/. Accessed 13 Aug 2015.

273 Bodner, Matthew. “Russian Military Merges Air Force and 

Space Command.” The Moscow Times Online, 3 Aug 2015, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/. Accessed 3 Aug 2015.

274 Unattributed. “Russia's Space Troops: Armaments and 

Facilities.” Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25 Mar 2011, http://topwar.ru/. 

Accessed 29 Mar 2011.

275 Durnovo, Aleksey. "Aerospace Defense Troops Space Command's Primary Mission Is to Ensure Russia's Security in Space." 

Ekho Moskvy Online, 9 Dec 2014, http://www.echo.msk.ru. 

Accessed 9 Dec 2014.

276 Unattributed. “Yury Vlasov Appointed Acting United Rocket 

and Space Corporation General Director.” Interfax, 2 Feb 2015, 

http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 2 Feb 2015.

277 Unattributed. “Yury Vlasov Appointed Acting United Rocket 

and Space Corporation General Director.” Interfax, 28 Dec 2015, 

http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 29 Dec 2015.

278 Unattributed. “The Army: We Are Awaiting Assistance 

from Military Science and the Defense Industrial Complex: 

We Will Not Manage to Create State-Of-The-Art Armed 

Forces Without this.” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 8 Feb 

2012, http://vpk-news.ru. Accessed 19 Feb 2012.

279 Chekinov, S.G. and Bogdanov S.A. “Asymmetrical Actions to 

Maintain Russia’s Military Security.” Military Thought, 20 Jun 2013. 

Accessed 21 Jun 2013.

280 “Plan of Russian Space Launches (part 2).” NASA Spaceflight Forum, 5 Oct 2016, http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/

index.php?topic=26990.880.

281 Chekinov, S. and Bogdanov, S. “The Nature and Content 

of a New Generation War.” Voennaya Mysl, no. 4, 2013.

282 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 5 Feb 2010, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 9 Feb 2014.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

99

283 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

284 Prudnikov, D. P. “State Information Policy in the Defense 

Area: An Initial Definition.” Military Thought 2008

285 Darczewska, Jolanta. “The Anatomy of Russian Information 

Warfare. The Crimea Operation, a Case Study.” OSW Point of 

View, no. 42, May 2014.

286 Solopov, Maksim. “Kavkaz with A Syrian Bias: The General 

Staff Has Summed Up the Results of the Kavkaz-2016 

Exercises.” Gazeta.ru, 13 Sep 2016, http://www.gazeta.ru/. 

Accessed 20 Sep 2016.

287 Russian Federation Security Council. "Information Security 

Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Draft)." Security Council of 

the Russian Federation, 23 Jun 2016, http://www.scrf.gov.ru. 

Accessed 20 Jun 2016.

288 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine 

of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation 

President V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation 

president, 31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 

Dec 2014.

289 Rozhkov, Roman. “Many Troubles, One Runet. Prospects 

for Russia’s ‘Digital Sovereignty.’” Kommersant Online, 6 Jan 

2015, http://kommersant.ru. Accessed 25 Dec 2016.

290 Unattributed. “Putin signs law on industrial policy.” Moscow 

Interfax, 31 Dec 2014, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 30 

Nov 2016.

291 Haines, John R. “Russia’s Use of Disinformation in the Ukraine 

Conflict.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 17 Feb 2015.

292 Darczewska. “The Anatomy of Russian Information War

-

fare. The Crimea Operation, a Case Study.”

293 Denning, Dorothy. “The Rise of Hacktivism.” Georgetown 

Journal of International Affairs, 8 Sep 2015, http://journal.george-

town.edu/the-rise-of-hacktivism/. Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

294 Leyden, John. “IT’S WAR: Hacktivists Throw in Their Lot 

with Spies and the Military.” The Channel Register, 20 Apr 2015, 

http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2015/04/20/Hactivists_and_

spies_feature_isis_anonymous. Accessed 30 Aug 2016.

295 Unattributed. “Russia’s Use of Disinformation in the 

Ukraine Conflict. Russian strategy analysis.” Eurasia Review, 

18 Feb 2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/18022015-rus-

sias-use-of-disinformation-in-the-ukraine-conflict-analysis/. 

Accessed 19 Mar 2015.

296 Darczewska. “The Anatomy of Russian Information War

-

fare. The Crimea Operation, a Case Study.”

297 Pomerantsev, Peter and Weiss, Michael. “The Menace of 

Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture, 

and Money.” The Interpreter, Institute of Modern Russia, 22 

Nov 2014, p. 5, http://www.interpretermag. com/wp-con-

tent/uploads/2014/ll/The_Menace_of_ Unreality_Final.pdf. 

Accessed 2 Aug 2015.

298 Haines, “Russia’s Use of Disinformation in the

Ukraine Conflict.”

299 Unattributed. “CyberBerkut – The New Russian Proxy?” 

SecuInsight, 12 Jun 2014, http://www.secuinsight.

fr/2014/06/12/is-cyberberkut-the-new-russian-proxy/. Ac-

cessed 18 Mar 2015.

300 Unattributed. “Pro-Russian Hackers Claim 1,100 Ukrainian 

Soldiers Killed in Past Two Weeks." RIA Novosti, 28 Jan 2015, 

http://ria.ru/. Accessed 28 Jan 2015.

301 Unattributed. “Ukrainian Presidential Election: Security Service Thwarts Cyber Plot to Rig Results.” Kyiv Post Online, 25 

May 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/. Accessed 25 May 2014.

302 Unattributed. “Ukrainian State Agency Refutes Reports 

of Hacker Attack on Central Elections Commission Web-

site.” UNN Online, 25 Oct 2014, http://www.unn.com.ua/. 

Accessed 25 Oct 2014.

303 Unattributed. “Alert: Ukrainian State Agency Confirms 

DDoS Attack on Central Elections Commission Website.” 

UNN Online, 25 Oct 2014, http://www.unn.com.ua/. Ac-

cessed 25 Oct 2014.

304 Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times, 2 Jun 2015, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.

html?_r=0. Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

305 Walker, Shaun. “Salutin’ Putin: Inside a Russian Troll 

House.” Guardian, 2 Apr 2015, http://www.guardian.co.uk. 

Accessed 2 Apr 2015.

306 Garfield, Leanna. “5 Countries that use bots to spread 

political propaganda.” Tech Insider, 16 Dec 2015, http://www.

techinsider.io/political-bots-by-governments-around-theworld-2015. Accessed 28 Sep 2016.

307 Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times, 2 Jun 2015, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.

html?_r=0. Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

308 Yegorov, Ivan. "Network Requires Protection. New Information 

Security Doctrine to Be Adopted This Year.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta 

Online, 18 Jul 2016, http://rg.ru/. Accessed 29 Sep 2016.
100

309 Baikova, Tatyana. "It Would Be Better for America to Ratify 

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." Izvestiya, 10 

Sep 2016.

310 Unattributed. “Central Asia Military.” Highlights: Central 

Asia Military Issues, 17 Aug 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. 

Accessed 4 Nov 2016.

311 Unattributed. “Russia’s Duma Adopts Revised Anti-Terror 

Bill.” RIA Novosti, 24 Jun 2016, http://ria.ru/. Accessed 24 

Jun 2016.

312 Afanasyeva, Anna. “With Share of Loyalty. Why State Is 

Taking Control Not Just of Media.” Kommersant Online, 30 

Dec 2016, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 4 Jan 2017.

313 Unattributed. “Communications Ministry Mulls Total Control 

over Russian Sector of the Web - Reports.” RT Online, 19 Aug 

2016, http://rt.com/. Accessed 19 Aug 2016.

314 Unattributed. “Putin Bans Foreigners from Russian TV 

Audience Research.” TASS, 4 Jul 2016, http://tass.ru/. Accessed 4 Jul 2016.

315 Rogozin, D.O. Ed. “War and Peace: Terms and Definition—

Voyna I Mir V Terminakh I Opredeleniyakh.” Military-Political 

Dictionary,, ProRog, 2011.

316 Rogozin, “War and Peace: Terms and Definitions—Voyna I 

Mir V Terminakh I Opredeleniyakh.”

317 Borkovskyy, Antin. "Andriy Illarionov on Prospects for 

Cease-Fire, Putin's 'Ukrainian Plan,' Likelihood of Use of 

Nuclear Weapons." Espreso TV Online, 26 May 2015, 

http://www.espreso.tv. Accessed 26 May 2015.

318 Suvorov, Viktor, “Chapter 8: The Agent Network.” 

Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces. W.W. 

Norton, 1988.

319 Kuznetsov, V.I., et al. “Electronic Warfare and Information Warfare: How They Compare.” Military Thought, vol. 1, 1 May 2013.

320 Dvornikov V.A., et al. “Tactics of Electronic Warfare Forces.” 

Military Thought, vol. 1, 2015.

321 Donskov, Col. Yu. Ye. and Nikitin, Lt. Col. O. G. “Special Information Operations in Armed Conflicts.” Military Thought; 30 

Sep 2005. The authors are leading Russian military scientists.

322 Melnikov, Igor. “Weapons of Assymetrical Response.” Rostov-na-Donu Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii, 11 Apr 2015.

323 Donskov “Special Information Operations in Armed Conflicts.”

324 Dvornikov, “Tactics of Electronic Warfare Forces.”

325 Durnovo, Aleksey. “Long Range Aviation -- Air Force's Main 

Strike Force.” Ekho Moskvy Online, 26 Feb 2016.

326 President of Russia. “Visit to the Armed Forces Central 

Command Centre, 6 Jun 2013.” Official Website of the Russian Federation President, 7 Jun 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. 

Accessed 7 Jun 2013.

327 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. “The Navy 

Begins the Implementation of the Long-Range Maritime Zone 

Support Vessel Renewal Program.” Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Information and Press Service Directorate, 21 

Jan 2013, http://www.mil.ru. Accessed 21 Jan 2013.

328 Unattributed. “Russia, Venezuela to Have Joint Naval Drill in 

Atlantic Ocean.” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 8 Sep 2008, 

www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 8 Sep 2008.

329 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is 

Escorting Another Convoy of Three Ships." Severnyy Flot, 

22 Mar 2013, http://pressa-sf.livejournal.com/. Accessed 

22 Mar 2013.

330 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is 

Escorting Another Convoy of Three Ships." Severnyy Flot, 

22 Mar 2013, http://pressa-sf.livejournal.com/. Accessed 

22 Mar 2013.

331 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is Escorting Another Convoy of Three Ships." Severnyy Flot, 22 Mar 

2013, http://pressa-sf.livejournal.com/. Accessed 22 Mar 2013.

332 Unattributed. “Syria Conflict: US Presses Russia on Military 

Buildup.” BBC, 16 Sep 2015.

333 Unattributed. “Russia starts ground operations in Syria.” 23 

Nov 2015, Al Bawaba Business.

334 Quinlivan, James T. “War on the Rocks—Artillery Returns to 

the Battlefield in the War Against ISIL.” 11 Jan 2016.

335 Unattributed. “RPT – Fight for Syria’s Aleppo Exposes 

Limits of Russian Air Power.” Reuters, 30 Aug 2016.

336 Unattributed. “Syria: Russia’s continuing war.” BBC, 27 

Apr 2016.

337 McInnis, J. Matthew. “What does Iran Really Want in Yemen?” AEI Ideas, 13 Apr 2015.

338 Unattributed. “Fight for Syria’s Aleppo Exposes Limits of 

Russian Air Power.” Channel Newsasia, 29 Aug 2016.

339 Unattributed. “Russian Cruise Missiles Target Syria.” Zaman 

al-Wasl, 19 Aug 2016. Accessed 19 Aug 2016.

340 Unattributed. “Syria: Russia’s continuing war.” BBC, 27 

Apr 2016.

341 Kozhanov, Nikolay. “What’s at stake for Russia in Syria?” 

BBC, Chatham House, 21 Sep 2015.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

101

342 Lavrov, Anton and Ramm, Aleksey. “Retribution without 

Refueling: Operation in Syria Reveals Weak Points in Aero-

space.” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 6 Apr 2016, http://

vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 13 Apr 2016.

343 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of 

Defense, Sep 1991, p. 41.

344 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of 

Defense, Sep 1991, p. 40.

345 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of 

Defense, Sep 1991, p. 40.

346 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of 

Defense, Sep 1991, p. 40.

347 Gavrilov, Yuriy. “The Order Will Come from the Center: 

National Defense Management Center, a Top-Secret Complex, 

Will Go On Alert Duty on 1 Dec.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 

27 Oct 2014, http://rg.ru/. Accessed 1 Nov 2014.

348 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Strategic Rocket 

Forces. Ministry of Defense, 1999, p. 521.

349 V.D. Zabolotin and N.E. Dimitriev. “Operational-Tactical Ma

-

skirovka.” Slovar’ voyennykh terminov” [Dictionary of Military 

Terms], 2000, p. 95. The Dictionary was the definitive General 

Staff Academy reference work on Russian military terminology 

at the time of publication.

350 Ministry of Defense. “Maskirovka.” Military Encyclopedia, 

vol. 5, p. 23.

351 V.D. Zabolotin and N.E. Dimitriev, “Surprise.” Slovar’ 

voyennykh terminov [Dictionary of Military Terms], 2000, p. 24.

352 Pynnoniemi, Katri and Racz, Andraz, Eds. Fog of Falsehood: 

Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine. The 

Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Report 45, 2016.

353 Robert, James Q. “Maskirovka 2.0 Hybrid Threat, Hybrid 

Response.” Joint Special Operations University – Center for 

Special Operations Study and Research, Dec 2015.

354 Pomerantsev and Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality.”

355 Chekinov, S., Bogdanov, S., “The Nature and Content

of a New Generation War,” Voennaya Mysl, no. 4, 2013.

356 Shevchenko, Vitaly. “Little green men or Russian invad

-

ers?” BBC News, 9 Mar 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-europe-26532154. Accessed on 9 Mar 2015.

357 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President 

V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 

31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

358 Darczewska, “The Anatomy of Russian Information War

-

fare. The Crimea Operation, a Case Study.”

359 Website of the Russian President. “Military Doctrine of the 

Russian Federation.” 31 Dec 2014.

360 Felgengauer, Pavel. “Rybkin’s Preventive Strike.” Moscow 

Segodnya, 14 Feb 1997.

361 “Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN).” Russian Military Anal

-

ysis, http://warfare.be/db/catid/239/linkid/2244/. Accessed 

5 Sep 2016.

362 “Russia Country Profiles.” http://www.nti.org/country-pro

-

files/russia/. Accessed 21 Sep 2016.

363 Podvig, Pavel, et al. “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.” Cen

-

ter for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the 

Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, English language 

edition supported by the Security Studies Program at the Massa-

chusetts Institute of Technology, MIT Press, 2001. pp. 4–5.

364 “Russian Strategic Missile Forces.” www.ausairpower.net/

APA-RVSN-Analysis.html. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

365 “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.” http://russianforces.

org/current/. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

366 “No plans to reduce the number of missile divisions.” http://

russianforces.org/blog/02/no_plans_to_reduce_the_number.

shtml. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

367 Unattributed. “No reductions planned in Russian Strategic 

Rocket Forces.” Interfax in English, 18 Feb 2016, http://www.

interfax.com/. Accessed 18 Feb 2016.

368 Unattributed. “Key Russian Strategic Missile Deployments.” 

Jane's CBRN Assessments, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 25 Apr 2016.

369 Multiple location name searches. www.google.com/maps. 

Accessed 28 Nov 2016. “Google Maps” is a free online map-

ping service.

370 “Comprehensive Control Inspections of Results of Winter 

Training Period Have Commenced in Strategic Missile Troops.” 

Moscow Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 

www.mil.ru. Accessed 9 Apr 2015.

371 “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.” http://russianforces.

org/current/. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

372 “Strategic Rocket Forces.” http://russianforces.org/mis

-

siles/. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

373 Andreyev, Oleg. “RVSN Given Six Years to Rearm; Mos

-

cow Adjusts Plans to Enhance Combat Readiness of the 

Armed Forces.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 May 2016, http://

www.ng.ru/. Accessed 19 May 2016.
102

374 Unattributed. “Rubezh Missile Will Enter Duty in a Year.” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 12 May 2016, http://rg.ru/. Accessed 12 May 2016.

375 Unattributed. “‘Missile defense killer’: Russia finalizes testing on prototype ICBM.” RT, 8 Jun 2013, www.rt.com/news/

missile-defense-killer-prototype-411/. Accessed 28 Mar 2017.

376 Litovkin, Viktor. “RS-26 Antimissile Defense 'Killer' Flies 

Where It Must.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 9 Oct 2013, 

http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 16 Oct 2013.

377 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian 

Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

378 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian 

Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

379 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian 

Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

380 “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016.” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080

/00963402.2016.1170359. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

381 Bozhyeva, Olga. "Sources: Russia Successfully Tested 

New Missile Superweapon: Developers Called Launch of 

Sarmat ICBM Warhead a 'Fantastic Success.'" MK Online,

21 Apr 2016. http://mk.ru/.

382 NEW START TREATY Text. 8 Apr 2010.

383 Andreyev, Oleg. “RVSN Given Six Years to Rearm; 

Moscow Adjusts Plans to Enhance Combat Readiness of 

the Armed Forces.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 May 2016, 

http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 19 May 2016.

384 “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016.” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080

/00963402.2016.1170359. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

385 Unattributed. “Key Russian Strategic Missile Deployments.” 

Jane's CBRN Assessments, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. 

Accessed 25 Apr 2016.

386 “Russian Army Order of Battle.” Globalsecurity.org, 27 Aug 

2016. Accessed 29 Aug 2016.

387 “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance,” 2017, 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271211, p. 211.

388 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website 

of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

389 Luca, Ana Maria. “Post-Soviet Russian Military Interventions.” Beirut NOW, 21 Oct 2015, www.nowlebanon.com. 

Accessed 22 Oct 2015.

390 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website 

of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

391 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website 

of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

392 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website 

of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

393 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website 

of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

394 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website 

of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

395 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website 

of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

396 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website 

of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

397 “Ground Troops.” Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, 

structure.mil.ru. Accessed 2 Sep 2016.

398 “Ground Troops.” Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, 

structure.mil.ru. Accessed 2 Sep 2016.

399 Barabanov, Mikhail, Ed. Novaia armiia Rossii [The New 

Military of Russia]. Moscow, Center for the analysis of strategy 

and technology, 2010.

400 First Tank Army and 2nd Taman Division resubordinated to 

20th Army. “Russia Is Closing the ‘Black Hole’ on the Border 

with Ukraine.” Vzglyad Online, 5 Jun 2015, http://vzglyad.ru/.

401 Bridge, Robert. "Border Alert: Nuke risk rising." Russia Today, 

17 Nov 2011, www.russiatoday.com. Accessed 19 Nov 2011.

402 Grau, Lester W. and Gress, Michael (translated and edited). 

The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. 

University of Kansas Press, 2002.

403 Vorob'ev I. and Kiselev V. "Taktika otriadno-gruppovogo 

boia" [The tactics of detachment-group combat]. Armeiskiy 

sbornik, [Army Digest], no. 9, Sep 2013, pp. 11–13. 
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

103

404 Popov, Vladimir. "Sukhoputnye voiska Rossii segodnia i 

zavtra" [The ground forces of Russia today and tomorrow]. 

Rossiiskoe voennoe obozrenie [Russian military review],

no. 3, Mar 2016, pp. 10–13.

405 Kiselev, V. “Gibridnaia voina kak novyi tip voiny budushche

-

go” [Hybrid warfare as a new type of future war]. Armeyskiy 

Sbornik [Army Digest], no. 12, Dec 2015); and Kiselev, V.A. and 

Vorob’ev, I.N. “Gibridnye operatsii kak noviy vid protivoborstva” 

[Hybrid warfare as a new type of confrontation]. Voennaia Mysl’ 

[Military Thought], no. 5, Apr 2015.

406 Giles, Keir. “Russia’s New Tools for Confronting the West.” 

Research Paper, Chatham House, Mar 2016, https://www.

chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ chathamhouse/publications/

research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf. Accessed 

28 Mar 2016.

407 Barabanov, Mikhail (ed). Russia’s New Army. Centre for 

Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2011, pp. 23–24.

408 Anisimov, Vladimir. “Five Primary Missions: The Arrival of 

Over 3,000 Models of Arms and Military Equipment in the 

Ground Troops Is Planned in the Near Future.” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer, 1 Jul 2009, www.vpk-news.ru. 

Accessed 21 Jul 2009.

409 Anatoliy-K (forum moderator pseudonym). “Al'ternativnaya 

OShS Otdel'noy tankoviy batal'yon tankovoy brigady" [Alter-

native TOEs for Separate tank battalions of tank brigades]. 

Voyniy Rubezh, 2 Jun 2009. Accessed 2 Jun 2009.

410 Anatoliy-K (forum moderator pseudonym). “Noviye Mo

-

totrelkoviye Brigady - 3 Chast” [New Motorized Rifle Brigades, 

Part 3]. Voyniy Rubezh, 26 July 2009. 26 July 2009.

411 Anatoliy-K (forum moderator pseudonym). “Noviye Mo

-

totrelkoviye Brigady - 3 Chast” [New Motorized Rifle Brigades, 

Part 3]. Voyniy Rubezh, 26 July 2009. 26 July 2009.

412 Anatoliy-K (forum moderator pseudonym). “Noviye Mo

-

totrelkoviye Brigady - 3 Chast” [New Motorized Rifle Brigades, 

Part 3]. Voyniy Rubezh, 26 July 2009. 26 July 2009.

413 Kirichenko, Ivan. “Unready Brigades: The Military Reform 

ala Serdyukov and Makarov Has Returned to Where It Be-

gan.” Svobodnaya Pressa, 20 Sep 2012, http://svpressa.ru/

society/article/58846/. Accessed 20 Sep 2012.

414 Mikhaylov, Viktor. “The Russian Military Brigade Contract.” 

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 22 May 2009,

http://nvo.ng.ru/. Accessed 28 May 2009.

415 Gavrilov, Yuriy. “Tests of the Latest ‘Rakushka’ BTR Will Be 

Conducted near Tula.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 7 Jan 2015, 

www.rg.ru. Accessed 7 Jan 2015.

416 Unattributed. “The VDV Will in the Coming Years Be

-

come Part of the Rapid-Response Force.” Argumenty i Fak-

ty, 4 Jun 2015, www.aif.ru/society/army/vdv_v_blizhayshie_

gody_voydut_v_sostav_voysk_bystrogo_reagirovaniya. 

Accessed 7 Jun 2015.

417 “The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area

Support.” U.S. Army, FM100-2-2, pp. 2-2–2-3.

418 “The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area

Support.” U.S. Army, FM100-2-2, pp. 2-2–2-3.

419 “VDV ORBAT.” globalsecurity.org, 2015.

420 Ptichin, Sergey. "Authority": "Air Assault Force Will Change 

to Tanks." Moscow Rossiskaya Gazeta online in Russian,

24 May 2016.

421 Unattributed. "All Airborne Assault Formations of the Air

-

borne Troops will Receive Tank Companies." Moscow Lenta.

ru in Russian, 1 Aug 2016.

422 “The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support; 

Amphibious Operations.” U.S. Army, FM100-2-2, p. 4 1.

423 2017 Jane's World Navies, https://janes-ihs-com.pen

-

tagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322754.

424 Official Press Release. “Motorized Riflemen and Naval 

Infantrymen of the Baltic Fleet Are Performing Life-Fire Drills as 

Part of Squads.” Moscow Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation, 11 Jul 2016, function.mil.ru/news page/country/

more?id12089569@egNews. Accessed 12 Jul 2016.

425 Khudoleyev, Victor. “Country Celebrated Missile Troops and 

Artillery Day on 19 Nov": "Heading for a Reconnaissance-Fire 

Delivery System.” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 21 Nov 2014, 

http://www.redstar.ru. Accessed 12 Dec 2014.

426 Unattributed. “PF coastal troops redeployed as part of sur

-

prise checks into combat readiness.” Interfax, 15 Sep 2014, 

http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 15 Sep 2014.

427 2017 Jane's World Navies, https://janes-ihs-com.pen

-

tagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322754.

428 Avdeyev, Yuriy. “Navy Coastal Troops' Acquisition of New 

Missile Systems Continues.” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 2 Nov 

2015, http://www.redstar.ru. Accessed 9 Nov 2015.

429 Unattributed. “Pacific Fleet Bal Coastal Missile System 

Battalion Starts Field Training in Primorye.” Ministry of Defense 

of the Russian Federation, 17 Feb 2016, http://www.mil.ru. 

Accessed 3 Mar 2016.

430 Bodner, Matthew. “Russian Military Merges Air Force and 

Space Command.” The Moscow Times, 3 Aug 2015.
104

431 Unattributed. “Russian Air Force/Aerospace Reorganization.” Fortuna’s Corner, 1 Jan 2015, http://fortunascorner.

com/2015/01/02/russian-air-force-reorganization/.

432 “Aerospace Forces.” Ministry of Defence of the Russian 

Federation, http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/type/vks.htm. 

Accessed 26 Oct 2016.

433 Air Forces Intelligence Database. 28 Sep 2016,

www.airforcesintel.com.

434 Tuchkov, Vladimir. “The Strategic Aircraft, of Which the 

U.S. Is Frightened, Increases Its Might: With What Can 

America Counter the Tu-160M2 Missile-Equipped Aircraft.” 

Svobodnaya Pressa, 10 Aug 2016, http://www.svpressa.ru/. 

Accessed 15 Aug 2016.

435 Tuchkov, Vladimir. “The Strategic Aircraft, of Which the 

U.S. Is Frightened, Increases Its Might: With What Can 

America Counter the Tu-160M2 Missile-Equipped Aircraft.” 

Svobodnaya Pressa, 10 Aug 2016, http://www.svpressa.ru/. 

Accessed 15 Aug 2016.

436 “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance.” 

2015, 115:1, 159-206.

437 Gordon, Yefim. Russian Air Power. Military Transport 

Aviation, 2009.

438 Unattributed. “New branch of Armed Forces, Aerospace 

Forces, created in Russia – Shoygu.” Interfax, 3 Aug 2015, 

http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 3 Aug 2015.

439 Bodner, Matthew. “Russian Military Merges Air Force and 

Space Command.” The Moscow Times Online. 3 Aug 2015. 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/. Accessed 3 Aug 2015.

440 Unattributed. “Russia's Space Troops: Armaments and 

Facilities.” Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25 Mar 2011, http://

topwar.ru/. Accessed 29 Mar 2011.

441 Durnovo, Aleksey. "Aerospace Defense Troops Space 

Command's Primary Mission Is to Ensure Russia's Security in 

Space." Ekho Moskvy Online, 9 Dec 2014, http://www.echo.

msk.ru. Accessed 9 Dec 2014.

442 “World Air Forces 2016.” FlightGlobal Insight, 2016.

443 “The Military Balance.” International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, 2014.

444 Newdick, Thomas. “Russia’s New Air Force is a Mystery.” 

War is Boring, 21 Feb 2014.

445 Butowski, Piotr. “Russian Airpower: Almanac 2015.” Air 

Force Magazine, 2015.

446 “Russian Air Force.” Combat Aircraft.

447 “World Air Forces 2016.” FlightGlobal Insight, 2016.

448 “The Military Balance.” International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, 2014.

449 “Russia’s New Air Force is a Mystery” Thomas Newdick, 

War is Boring, 21 Feb 2014.

450 Butowski, Piotr. “Russian Airpower: Almanac 2015.” Air 

Force Magazine, 2015.

451 “Russian Air Force.” Combat Aircraft.

452 Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce. Russia and the New 

States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval. Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 170.

453 Unattributed. “Aerospace Forces/Russian Federation Aerospace Forces.” Milkavkaz.net, 23 Dec 2015, www.milkavkaz.

net. Accessed 12 Oct 2016.

454 Unattributed. “Chief of Russian air defence enterprise outlines plans for new Systems.” Moscow Vesti TV, 11 Sep 2007, 

Vesti.ru. Accessed 15 Sep 2015.

455 Unattributed. “Aerospace Forces/Russian Federation Aerospace Forces.” Milkavkaz.net, 23 Dec 2015, www.milkavkaz.

net. Accessed 12 Oct 2016.

456 Unattributed. “Russia Transports Ultra-Modern OSA Air 

Defense Missile Systems to the Crimea: Russian Military 

Equipment is not Remaining in Place and it is Travelling 

Further to the Crimean Peninsula.” Kyiv UNIAN, 18 Mar 2014, 

http://www.unian.net/. Accessed 18 Mar 2014.

457 Unattributed. “Russian Defense Ministry explains S-300 

deployment in Syria citing need for protection of Russian 

military bases.” Interfax, 10 Oct 2016, Interfax.com. 

Accessed 10 Oct 2016.

458 Unattributed. “Russian Defense Ministry explains S-300 

deployment in Syria citing need for protection of Russian 

military bases.” Interfax, 10 Oct 2016, Interfax.com. Accessed 

10 Oct 2016.

459 “The Military Balance.” International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, 2014.

460 Butowski, Piotr. “Unmanned Russia.” Air International, Sep 

2013, pp. 60–63.

461 Butowski, Piotr. “Unmanned Russia.” Air International, Sep 

2013, pp. 60–63.

462 Oxenstrierna, Susane and Westerlund, Fredrik. “Arms procurement and the Russian Defense Industry: Challenges Up to 

2020.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2013.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

105

463 Bender, Jeremy. “Russia is Modernizing its increasingly ag

-

gressive air force.” Business Insider, 18 Mar 2015, www.busi-

nessinsider.com/russia-is-modernizing-its-air-force-2015-3.

464 Bender, Jeremy. “Russia is Modernizing its increasing

-

ly aggressive air force.” Business Insider, 18 Mar 2015, 

www.businessinsider.com/russia-is-modernizing-its-airforce-2015-3.

465 Vaev, Pavel K. “Russian Air Power Tool Brittle for 

Brinkmanship.” Ponars Eurasia, Policy Memo 398, Nov 2014.

466 Truffer, Patrick. “The Development of Russian Naval 

Capabilities After the Cold War.” CIMSEC, 24 Nov 2015, 

http://cimsec.org/development-russian-naval-capabili-

ties-cold-war/20147.

467 “Military balance 2015.” Annual periodical on World Military 

Forces. Routledge, 2015.

468 Polmar, Norman. Guide to the Soviet Navy. Naval Institute 

Press, 1985.

469 Pasyakin, Vladimir. “At the Highest Level of Coordination.” 

Sevastopol Flag Rodiny, 20 Dec 2014, www.sc.mil.ru/. Ac-

cessed 25 Jul 2016.

470 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian

-

ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.

471 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian

-

ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.

472 Flake, Lincoln Edson. “Russia’s Security Intentions in a 

melting Arctic.” Military and Strategic Affair Publication, vol. 6, 

no. 1, Mar 2014.

473 Zhunusov, Oleg. “Rosneft' Is Taking 'Zvezda' From OSK: A 

Consortium Will Help the Primorskiy Shipbuilders.” Kommer-

sant Online, 22 Aug 2013, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 

24 Aug 2013.

474 “Vladivostok.” Globalsecurity.org/Vladivostok. Accessed 18 

Aug 2016.

475 The split of forces can be observed on Google Earth. 

Accessed 17 Aug 2016.

476 “List of current ships of the Russian Navy.” russianships.

info, http://russianships.info/eng/today. Accessed 8 Jun 2016.

477 Zavolokin, Pavel. “The Crimea – Is Under Protection.” 

Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 6 Feb 2015, http://www.redstar.ru. 

Accessed 6 Feb 2015.

478 Unattributed. “Russia to end production of Varshavyanka 

Kilo-class submarines.” Moscow RIA Novosti, 4 Sep 2015, 

http://ria.ru/. Accessed 7 Sep 2015.

479 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian

-

ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.

480 Yurov, Dmitriy. “Service Reinforced by the Way of Life.” 

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 May 2006, http://www.redstar.

ru. Accessed 23 May 2006.

481 Russiannavy.com. Information on tasks, roles, and 

missions. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.

482 Unattributed. "Russian Navy to use up to ten civil vessels 

for military supplies to Syria.” Interfax, 15 Oct 2015, Interfax.

com. Accessed 15 Oct 2015.

483 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla ships carrying Kalibr-NK mis

-

siles depart for tactical drills.” Interfax, 25 Apr 2016, Interfax.

com. Accessed 25 Apr 2016.

484 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla force ends tactical exercis

-

es.” Interfax, 8 Jul 2016, Interfax.com. Accessed 8 Jul 2016.

 485 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla ships carrying Kalibr-NK 

missiles depart for tactical drills.” Interfax, 25 Apr 2016, Inter-

fax.com. Accessed 25 Apr 2016.

486 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Rus

-

sia and the CIS, Navy, Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 

10 Aug 2016, www.janes.com.

487 Wertheim, Eric. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets 

of the World, 16th Edition. Naval Institute Press, 2013, p. 573.

488 Litovkin, Dmitriy. "Deep Rising. Russia's Nuclear Sub

-

marine Fleet Is Being Rapidly Upgraded and Renewed.” 

Moscow Vzglyad, 28 Jul 2014, http://www.vz.ru/soci-

ety/2014/7/28/697642.html. Accessed 3 Aug 2014.

489 Unattributed. "Nuclear Submarine Severodvinsk Strikes 

Coastal Training Target from Barents Sea." RIA Novosti, 2 May 

2016, http://ria.ru/. Accessed 2 May 2016.

490 Khodarenok, Mikhail. “Strategic Ocean Operations No 

Longer Are Being Planned: Current Russian Navy Status.” 

Moscow Gazeta, 31 Jul 2016, http://www.gazeta.ru/. 

Accessed 6 Aug 2016.

491 Blechschmidt, Peter. “War Ships Against Pirates.” Munich 

Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 21 Nov 2008, Sueddeutsche.de. 

Accessed 21 Nov 2008.

492 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian

-

ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.

493 Suvorov, Viktor. “Chapter 3. A History of Spetsnaz.” 

Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of Soviet Special Forces. Translat-

ed from Russian by David Floyd. Norton & Company, 1988.
106

494 Suvorov, Viktor. “Chapter 3. A History of Spetsnaz.” 

Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of Soviet Special Forces. Translated from Russian by David Floyd. Norton & Company, 1988.

495 Galeotti, Mark. “The rising influence of Russian special forces.” Jane's Intelligence Review, 24 Nov 2014, https://janesihs-com.pentagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1729350.

496 Федеральный конституционный закон "О Правительстве 

Российской Федерации" [Federal Constitutional Law “Directorates of the Russian Federation”]. 17 Dec 1997.

497 Schneider, Eberhard. "The Russian Federal Security Service under President Putin.” Politics and the Ruling Group in 

Putin’s Russia, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008, pp. 42–62.

498 Littell, Jonathan. The Security Organs of the Russian Federation. A Brief History 1991–2004. Psan Publishing House, 2006.

499 Galeotti, Mark. “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence 

Services.” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2016, 

www.ecfr.eu.

500 “Tests Complete for New Staff Module for Russia Power 

Ministries.” RIA Novosti, 13 Jun 2016.

501 “In Russia the National Guard is Created.” Rossiiskoe 

Voennoe Obozrenie, Issue 4; 30 Apr 2016.

502 “National Guard Conducted RCB (NBC) Training of its Units 

in Volga NG Administrative District (MD).” Vremenniy Informatsionniy Tsentr, FSBNGRF, 27 Sept 2016.

503 “GRU.” Special Services, http://specialsluz.my1.ru/index/

gru/0-13.

504 Russian News Agency, http://ru-an.info/новости/

шпионские-тайны-гру/.

505 Safronov, Ivan. "Intelligence to Remain In-House. Who 

Could Replace Igor Sergun in the Post of Chief of the GRU?" 

Kommersant Online, 14 Jan 2016, http://kommersant.ru/. 

Accessed 14 Jan 2016.

506 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad, 

5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

507 Mikhaylov, Aleksey. "Control of the Main Strike. What 

Problems Can the New GRU Chief Resolve?" Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 10 Feb 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/. 

Accessed 12 Feb 2016.

508 Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services.”

509 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad, 

5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

510 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can 

the New GRU Chief Resolve?"

511 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad, 

5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

512 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can 

the New GRU Chief Resolve?"

513 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad. 

5 Nov 2009. www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

514 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can 

the New GRU Chief Resolve?"

515 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad. 

5 Nov 2009. www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

516 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can 

the New GRU Chief Resolve?"

517 Unattributed. “Russian MP Antoshkin, Recently Back from 

Syria, says Airstrikes Exceptionally Precise.” Interfax, 15 Oct 

2015, http://www.interfax.com/.

518 Gorbenko, Aleksandr. "The Russian Military Space Program 

of Tomorrow: What will This Be?" Odnako Online, 19 Jun 

2013, http://www.odnako.org/magazine/new.

519 Unattributed. “Russian Military Intelligence Chief Dies 

Unexpectedly.” Charter 97, 5 Jan 2016, http://www.charter97.

org/en/news/.

520 Galeotti, Mark. “The Unexpected Death of Russia’s Military 

Intelligence (GRU) Chief, Igor Sergun.” Moscow’s Shadows, 

4 Jan 2016, www.inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com. 

Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

521 Safronov, Ivan. "Intelligence to Remain In-House. Who 

Could Replace Igor Sergun in the Post of Chief of the GRU?" 

Kommersant Online, 14 Jan 2016, http://kommersant.ru/. 

Accessed 14 Jan 2016.

522 Unattributed. “Russian GRU Military Spy Chief Igor Sergun 

dies.” BBC Online, 5 Jan 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk. 

Accessed 5 Jan 2016.

523 Unattributed. “More evidence that captured Russians were 

military intelligence officers.” Prava Lyudyny v Ukrayini, 25 Nov 

2015, http://khpg.org.ua. Accessed 25 Nov 2015.

524 Pereborshchikov, Georgiy. "‘You could say we proved 

ourselves.’ War stories from Russians returned from fighting in 

eastern Ukraine." Meduza, 22 Feb 2016, https://meduza.io/

en. Accessed 22 Feb 2016.

525 Unattributed. “Russia Ramps Up Syria Military Involvement: 

Pro-Assad.” Beirut NOW, 27 Aug 2015, www.nowlebanon.

com. Accessed 27 Aug 2015.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

107

526 “On Zaslon in Syria.” Russian Centre for Analysis of 

Strategies and Technologies (CAST). LiveJournal, 19 Oct 

2015, Livejournal.ru. Accessed 25 Oct 2015.

527 Butrin, Dmitriy. "The Prime Minister's Eyes Opened to the 

Budget—The 'Open Government' Proposes to Buy Textbooks 

Rather Than Tanks." Kommersant Online, 10 Aug 2012, 

http://kommersant.ru/.

528 Hobson, Peter. “The Cost of Russia's War in Syria.” The 

Moscow Times Online, 21 Oct 2015, http://www.themoscow-

times.com/. Accessed 21 Oct 2015.

529 Smirnov, Roman. "Russia's Defense Industry Complex 

Ready to Fire Salvo at The Crisis." Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye Online, 4 Oct 2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/.

530 "Weapons of mass Acquisition." Оборона и 

безопасность, 1 Apr 2016.

531 “With a Key from the Sky—President.” Оборона и 

безопасность, 1 Apr 2016.

532 Zubarevich, Natalya. “Russian Economic Crisis Risks 

Stagnation, Degradation (Op-Ed).” Moscow Times Online in 

English, 25 Mar 2016, http://www.themoscowtimes.com. 

Accessed 31 Mar 2016.

533 Butrin, "The Prime Minister's Eyes Opened to the Budget"

534 Pismennaya, Yevgeniy, et al. "Medvedev's Concern That 

the Military Is Considered Too Expensive for the Country." 

Vedomosti Online, 22 Dec 2011, www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/

news/1448040/oshibka_medvedeva. Accessed 22 Dec 2011.

535 Unattributed. “Russia's anti-crisis commission to soon 

consider support for auto industry.” Interfax, 6 Feb 2015, 

www.interfax.com. Accessed 6 Feb 2015.

536 Ivankhnik, Aleksandr. "Resuscitation of Economic Council." 

Politkom, 22 Nov 2013, http://politcom.ru/.

537 Falichev, Oleg. "A Contingency Order.” Voyenno-Promysh

-

lennyy Kuryer, 26 Jan 2015, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 

26 Jan 2015.

538 Unattributed. "Russia is proud of you." Rossiya 24 

Television, 17 Mar 2016. Accessed 17 Mar 2016.

 539 Falichev, Oleg. "Soldiers to Order; Military Robots Being 

Rid of Outside Elements." Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer,

4 Jun 2015, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 4 Jun 2015.

540 Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Service and 

Information Directorate. "Specialists from the Russian De-

fense Ministry Main Directorate of Scientific Research Activity 

Are Taking Part in the Work of a Military Industry Conference 

on the Development of Robotics for the Security Agencies." 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2 Oct 2014, 

http://www.mil.ru. Accessed 2 Oct 2014.

541 President of Russia. "Meeting on armed forces develop

-

ment on 9 Nov 2015 in Sochi." Official Website of the Russian 

Federation President, 10 Nov 2015, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. 

Accessed 10 Nov 2015.

542 Unattributed. “Pace of fulfilling presidential instructions 

for military-industrial complex must be maintained - Putin.” 

Interfax, 12 May 2015, http://www.interfax.com. Accessed 

12 May 2015.

543 President of Russia. “Putin Chairs Meeting on Defence 

Procurement.” Official Website of the Russian Federation 

President, 15 May 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. Accessed

15 May 2014.

544 Safronov, Ivan. “Supreme decision-making commander.” 

Kommersant Online, 5 Sep 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/

doc/2559841. Accessed 5 Sep 2014.

545 Safronov, Ivan and Kozichev, Yevgeniy. "The Supreme 

Decider-in-Chief: Vladimir Putin will also Head the Military 

Industrial Commission." Kommersant Online, 6 Sep 2014, 

http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 6 Sep 2014.

546 Unattributed. "Russian Scientists Present Unique Projects 

to the Ministry of Defense." ITAR-TASS, 4 Dec 2012.

547 “Шойгу С Рогозиным Задумали Эксперимент.” Nezavisi

-

maia Gazeta, Issue 89, 29 Apr 2013. Accessed 29 Apr 2013.

548 “Russia will develop strike weapons to defeat US missile 

defences – Putin.” Rossiya 24 Television, 10 Nov 2015.

549 Gorenburg, Dmitry. “How is Economic Crisis Affecting 

Russian Military Modernization?” Russia Insider, 14 Apr 2016, 

http://russia-insider.com/en/how-economic-crisis-impacting-rus-

sian-military-modernization/ri13882. Accessed 26 Aug 2016.

550 Marakhonov, Vladimir. "So Who Among Us Favors Strong 

Russia? Conflict with Ukraine Has Cost Our Country Half 

Its Nuclear Potential.” Novaya Gazeta Online, 20 Jul 2015, 

www.novayagazeta.ru. Accessed 20 Jul 2015.

551 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien Invaders 

Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty Nedeli Online, 

4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed 27 Jul 2016.

552 Unattributed. “The Acceptance in the Inventory of the RS-26 

‘Yars-M’ Missile Complex Is Planned in 2017.” Vzglyad Online, 

12 May 2016, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 12 May 2016.

553 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the 

Hawaiian Islands: They Will Lay Out a New Route for the New 

Ballistic Missile." Izvestiya Online, 4 Jul 2016, www.izvestiya.ru. 

Accessed 4 Jul 2016.
108

554 Unattributed. “Russia Test Fires ICBM to Target in Kazakhstan.” Fars News Agency, 28 Dec 2013, http://www.english.

farsnews.com. Accessed 21 Sep 2016.

555 Summary of Reporting on Russian and FSU Nuclear Issues. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1 Dec 2014. Accessed 27 

Nov 2016.

556 Marakhonov, "So Who Among Us Favors Strong Russia? 

Conflict with Ukraine Has Cost Our Country Half Its

Nuclear Potential.”

557 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the 

Hawaiian Islands: They Will Lay Out a New Route for the New 

Ballistic Missile." Izvestiya Online, 4 Jul 2016, www.izvestiya.

ru. Accessed 4 Jul 2016.

558 Russian Space Web. Topol-M, online missile guide, 2 Nov 

2014, www.russianspaceweb.com/topolm.html. Accessed 10 

Sep 2016.

559 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the

Hawaiian Islands.”

560 Unattributed. “Testing of heavy strategic missile ‘Sarmat’ 

to start promptly.” Interfax, 10 Aug 2016, www.interfax.com. 

Accessed 11 Aug 2016.

561 Unattributed. “The Acceptance in the Inventory of the RS26 ‘Yars-M’ Missile Complex Is Planned in 2017.” Vzglyad Online, 12 May 2016, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 12 May 2016.

562 Unattributed. "Rubezh Missile Will Enter Duty in a Year." 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 12 May 2016, www.rg.ru. 

Accessed 12 May 2016.

563 Gertz, Bill. “Russia Tests Hypersonic Glide Vehicle on 

Missile.” The Washington Free Beacon, 22 Apr 2016, http://

freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-tests-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/.

564 NASIC; “Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat; 2013; http://www.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a582843.﻿pdf

565 NASIC; “Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat; 2013; http://www.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a582843.﻿pdf

566 Unattributed. “Offensive weapons, Ballistic missiles, 

Russian Federation, R-29RM Shetal/Sineva (RSM-54/3M27).” 

Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 18 Dec 2015.

567 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the 

Hawaiian Islands.”

568 Petrov, Vladimir. “Russia announces deployment plans for 

Bulava missile and Borey-class submarine.” Jane's Defence 

Weekly, 30 Sep 2008, www.janes.com.

569 Kristensen, Hans and Norris, Robert. “Russian nuclear 

forces, 2016.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 72, no. 3,

13 Sep 2016, pp. 125–134.

570 “OTR-21 Tochka.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

OTR-21_Tochka. Accessed 16 Sep 2016.

571 Unattributed. “SS-21 `Scarab' (OTR-21/9M79 Tochka).” Jane's 

Strategic Weapon Systems, 19 Jul 2005, www.janes.com.

572 Unattributed. “SS-26 'Stone' (9M720 Tender/Iskander-E).” 

Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 19 Jul 2005, www.janes.com.

573 Barabanov, Mikhail. "The Reason We Need a Combat 

Aircraft.” Odnako Online, 18 Aug 2011, http://odnakoj.ru/. 

Accessed 18 Aug 2011.

574 Unattributed. "RF Long-Range Aviation Will Test New 

Cruise Missiles in 2014." RIA Novosti Online, 28 Jan 2014, 

http://ria.ru/. Accessed 28 Jan 2014.

575 Khudoleyev, Konstantin, et al. “Serve Russia.” Zvezda TV, 

9 Feb 2014.

576 Unattributed. "Tactical Missiles Corporation to Showcase 

Modern Weapons.” Aviapanorama, 21 Aug 2013, Accessed 

21 Aug 2013.

577 Tactical Missile Corporation, http://eng.krtv.ru/about_eng. 

Accessed 18 Aug.

578 Unattributed. “V. Putin summarized series of Meetings, 

Dedicated to Fulfillment of the GOZ and Outfitting the [State 

Armaments Program] RF Armed Forces with Modern ViVT.” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 9 Dec 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/. 

Accessed 9 Dec 2013.

579 President of Russia. “Russian leader, Defence Plant Chiefs 

Discuss Production, Overhaul of Facilities.” Official website of 

the Russian Federation President, 29 Nov 2013, http://eng.

kremlin.ru/. Accessed 29 Nov 2013.

580 President of Russia. “Russian leader, Defence Plant Chiefs 

Discuss Production, Overhaul of Facilities.” Official website of 

the Russian Federation President, 29 Nov 2013, http://eng.

kremlin.ru/. Accessed 29 Nov 2013.

581 Yesin, Viktor. "Peace Vehicles—Part II: It Is Time to Eliminate 

the Gap Between Advanced Engineering Solutions and 

Defense-Industrial Complex Production Capabilities.” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 27 Feb 2015, http://vpknews.ru/. Accessed 27 Feb 2015.

582 Mardasov, Anton. “Voyevoda and Stilet Will Reach America 

Without Ukraine. How Far the Rupture with Kyiv Threatens the 

Effectiveness of Russian ICBMs and Cruise Missiles.” Moscow 

Svobodnaya Pressa, 24 Aug 15, http://svpressa.ru/war21/

article/130231/. Accessed 30 Aug 2015.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

109

583 “Cruise Missiles: Kh-101/102.” Missile Threat: A Project 

of the George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes, 

missilethreat.com. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.

584 Capaccio, Anthony. “Russia Deploys Advanced Cruise 

Missiles in Major Navy Reboot.” Bloomberg, 30 Dec 2015, 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-30/rus-

sia-deploying-advanced-cruise-missiles-in-major-navy-reboot. 

Accessed 18 Aug 2016.

585 Capaccio. “Russia Deploys Advanced Cruise Missiles in 

Major Navy Reboot.”

586 “U.S. Debates Cruise Missile Procurement.” Jane’s Intelli

-

gence Review, 7 Jul 2016.

587 Akulov, Andrei. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping 

Cruise Missile Game.” Strategic Culture Foundation, 24 May 

2016, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/24/

kalibr-russia-naval-system-upping-cruise-missile-game.html. 

Accessed 18 Aug 2016.

588 Akulov. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise 

Missile Game.”

589 “Jane’s P-800 Oniks/Yakhont (SS-N-26 Strobile).” Jane’s 

Defense Industry-Weapons: Naval.

590 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien Invad

-

ers Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty Nedeli 

Online, 4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed 27 Jul 2016.

591 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien 

Invaders Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty 

Nedeli Online, 4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed 

27 Jul 2016.

592 Unattributed. “Russian Defence Ministry Praises New Ka

-

libr Missile launches on Syria targets.” TASS Russian News 

Agency, 9 Dec 2015, http://tass.ru/ed/defense/842799. 

Accessed 20 May 2016.

593 Mukhin, Vladimir. “Russian Arctic Will Be Protected by the 

Triumf; Production of Aerospace Defense Assets Will Increase 

Tenfold in Near Future.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 Mar 2016, 

http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016.

594 Kozhin. “Negotiations on sale of S-400 surface-to-air 

missile systems to China and India ongoing, but priority their 

supply to Russian Armed Forces.” Moscow Interfax, 18 Apr 16, 

http://www.interfax.com. Accessed 18 Apr 2016.

595 “Concern PVO “Almaz-Antey”/Concern Aerospace 

Defense [PVO].” GlobalSecurity.org, 29 Mar 2016 http://

www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/concern-pvo.

htm. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.

596 “Aerospace and Defense: Company Overview of JointStock Company Concern Almaz-Antey.” Bloomberg, http://

www.bloomberg.com/Research/stocks/private/snapshot.

asp?privcapid=34169028. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.

597 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 

Aug 2016, www.janes.com.

598 Mukhin, Vladimir. “Russian Arctic Will Be Protected by the 

Triumf; Production of Aerospace Defense Assets Will Increase 

Tenfold in Near Future.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 Mar 2016, 

http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016.

599 “Antey-2500 Long-range Air Defense Missile System.” 

Military Today, http://www.military-today.com/missiles/an-

tey_2500.htm. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.

600 “Pantsyr S1 Close Range Air Defense System, Russia.” 

Army-Technology.com, www.army-technology.com. 

Accessed 22 Aug 2016.

601 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Rus

-

sia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 

2016, www.janes.com.

602 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – 

Russia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 

2016, www.janes.com.

603 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia 

and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 2016, 

www.janes.com.

604 “Aircraft industry of Russia: Military aircraft.” Wikipedia, 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_industry_of_Russia#Mili-

tary_aircraft. Accessed 2 Sep 2016.

605 “United Aircraft Corporation.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/United_Aircraft_Corporation. Accessed 2 Sep 2016.

606 Gorengurb, Dmity. “Russia’s State Armaments Program 

2020: Is the Third Time the Charm for Military modernization?” 

PONARS Eurasia policy memo, 12 Oct 2010.

607 “Modernized Strategic Bombers to Debut in Victory Day 

Parade Over Moscow.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 Apr 2016, 

janes.com. Accessed on 4 Aug 2016.

608 Harress, Christopher. “Russia Tupolev 22M3 Bombers Up

-

grade: Modernized Jets to be in Service by the End of 2015.” 

International Business Times, 17 Jul 2015, www.ibtimes.com.

609 “Modernized Strategic Bombers to Debut in Victory Day 

Parade Over Moscow.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 Apr 2016, 

janes.com. Accessed on 4 Aug 2016.

610 “Aircraft Upgrades/Tupolev Tu-160.” Janes, 15 Dec 2015, 

janes.com. Accessed 8 Aug 2016.
110

611 Unattributed. “Russian Air Forces to Take Delivery of More 

than 10 Upgraded Tu-95 Bombers in Two Years.” Russian Aviation, 30 Mar 2015, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 9 Aug 2016.

612 Unattributed. “Russia Plans to Complete Tu-22M3 Bomber 

Modernization Program by 2019.” Russian Aviation, 12 Jan 

2016, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 2 Aug 2016.

613 “Development of PAK-DA Bomber Moved from Preliminary 

Design State to Research and Development Work.” Russian Aviation, 2 Jul 2015, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 8 Aug 2016.

614 Jane’s Information Group, “Kuznetsov NK-321.” Jane’s 

Aero-Enginesm, Aero-engines - Turbofan, Russian Federation, 4 May 16.

615 Shapkin, Dmitriy. “They Have Pulled Out of the Dive: 

Combat Aircraft.” Kommersant Online, 21 Aug 2013,

http://kommersant.ru. Accessed 24 Aug 2013.

616 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “The Army: The T-50 Fighter Aircraft Is 

Ready for Series Production: The Delivery of the Aircraft to the 

Troops Will Begin in 2017.” Moscow Izvestiya Online, 15 Jun 

2016, http://www.izvestia.ru/. Accessed 15 Jun 2016.

617 Khodarenok, Mikhail. “Long Restrained, We Will Fly Quickly; 

Fifth-Generation Russian Fighter Will Be Serially Produced in 

2017.” Moscow Gazeta.ru, 1 Sep 2016. Accessed 13 Sep 2016.

618 Unattributed. “Nothing critical happens to Russian Helicopters holding as result of imposition of Western sanctions.” 

Moscow Interfax, 8 Sep 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. 

Accessed 8 Sept 2016.

619 Kramnick, Ilya. “Preserving the Heights: A Series of Advanced Helicopters Must Help Russia to Not Lose Its Place 

in the World Market.” Moscow Vzglyad Online, 10 Dec 2012, 

http://www.vz.ru/. Accessed 20 Dec 2012.

620 Unattributed. “Russian Helicopters business unaffected by 

extension of Ukrainian sanctions.” Moscow Interfax, 25 Oct 

2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 25 Oct 2016.

621 Fedorov, Konstantin. “Modernization of Russian Military-Transport Aviation: Russia's Military-Transport Aviation: 

Need for Radical Renewal.” Moscow Segodnya.Ru, 3 Jun 

2015, http://www.segodnia.ru/. Accessed 5 Jun 2015.

622 Fedorov, “Modernization of Russian Military-Transport Aviation.”

623 Zhuravlev, Nataliya. “A Hope for a Trillion: Plans Were 

Expressed on the Sale of the Latest Version of the Veteran 

Transport.” Moscow Vzglyad Online, 26 Dec 2012, http://

www.vz.ru/. Accessed 5 Jan 2013.

624 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s,

30 Jun 2016, pp. 27–28.

625 Unattributed. "Saylut Scientific Production Center Upgrades 

Test Stands for Ship Engines." RIA Novosti, 23 Aug 2016, 

www.ria.ru. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.

626 Ishchenko, Sergey. “Squadron Losing Way: Construction of 

17 Surface Combatants for Our Navy Under Threat of Disruption.” Moscow Svobodnaya Pressa, 19 Mar 2015, http://www.

svpressa.ru/. Accessed 26 Mar 2015.

627 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s,

30 Jun 2016, pp. 27–28.

628 “Kuznetsov Overhaul Designed to Maintain Carrier Capability While Russia Considers Future Carrier Options.” Jane’s 

Navy International, 30 Jun 2016.

629 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “A Unique Dock Will Be Built to Accommodate the Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.” Izvestiya Online, 7 Jun 16, http://www.izvestia.ru/. Accessed 12 Jun 2016.

630 Unattributed. “Shtorm aircraft carrier design to begin in 

2020.” Moscow Interfax, 30 Jun 16, http://www.interfax.com. 

Accessed 1 Jul 2016.

631 “Russia’s New Maritime Doctrine.” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 

14 Aug 2015, p. 4.

632 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30 

Jun 2016, p. 31.

633 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30 

Jun 2016, p. 30.

634 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30 

Jun 2016, p. 30.

635 de Larrinaga, Nick. “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground 

Forces Modernisation.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 Mar 2016.

636 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces 

Modernisation.”

637 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces 

Modernisation.”

638 Koryakin, Oleg. “T-80 Tank Is Being Modernized with 

Relikt and Sosna-U: Omsk Armorers Took on Modernization 

of T-80BV Tank.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 14 Jul 2016, 

http://rg.ru/. Accessed 15 Jul 2016.

639 Golts, Aleksandr. “Higher Arithmetic of the Russian Defense-Industrial Complex.” Moscow Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 

15 May 2015, www.ej.ru. Accessed 18 May 2015.

640 Frolov, Andrey. “An Obstacle for the Aircraft Carrier. The 

State Armaments Program to 2025 Fits Ill with Economic Realities.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 16 Mar 

2016, vpk-news.ru. Accessed 21 Mar 2016.
RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

111

641 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground

Forces Modernisation.”

642 Fedyushko, Dmitriy. “BMP-3's Second Youth. Vehicle 

Designed a Quarter of a Century Ago Has Become the Basis 

for the Newest Developments.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online, 23 Sep 2015, http://www.vpk-news.ru/arti-

cles/27164. Accessed 26 Oct 2015.

643 Frolov, Andrey. “An Obstacle for the Aircraft Carrier. The 

State Armaments Program to 2025 Fits Ill with Economic 

Realities.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 16 

Mar 2016, vpk-news.ru. Accessed 21 Mar 2016.

644 Official government statement. “Preliminary Testing of 

State-of-Art Boomerang Armored Personnel Carrier Will Be 

Completed in 2016.” Moscow TASS, 3 Jun 2016, tass.ru/. 

Accessed 6 Jun 2016.

645 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces 

Modernisation.”

646 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces 

Modernisation.”

647 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces 

Modernisation.”

648 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces 

Modernisation.”

649 “Ukraine mobility upgrades for Russian rocket launchers.” 

Jane’s International Defence Review, vol. 44, no. 3, Mar 2011, 

pp. 31–33.

650 “Rosoboronexport outlines 2020 strategy.” Jane's Defence, 

Industry Market Intelligence, 18 Nov 2013.

651 Safronov, Ivan and Dzhordzhevich, Aleksandr. “Demand 

Gives Rise to Armament -- Russian Military Exports Beat 

Records.” Moscow Kommersant Online, 23 Mar 2017, 

http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 29 Mar 2017.

652 Safronov, Ivan. “‘Our Goal is to Hold on to Russia’s Second 

Place in the Arms Delivery Sphere.’ Rosoboronexport General 

Director Anatoliy Isaykin Talks About 2013’s Results and 

the Prospects for 2014.” Kommersant Online, 27 Jan 2014, 

www.kommersant.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2014.

653 Unattributed. “Rosoboronexport's sales reach $6.5 bln 

in H1 (Part 2).” Interfax, 15 Aug 2013, www.interfax.com. 

Accessed 15 Aug 2013.

654 Unattributed. “Arms export costs account for $2 bln 

- $2.5 bln in Russia's arms exports – Military-Technical 

Cooperation Service.” Interfax, 16 Jun 2015, www.interfax.com. 

Accessed 16 Jun 2015.

655 Unattributed. “Russia broadens geography of military 

produce exports in 2014 – service.” Interfax, 26 May 2015, 

www.interfax.com. Accessed 27 Mar 2015.

656 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms 

Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website, 

27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.

657 Unattributed. “Patrushev seeks broader militarytechnological cooperation within BRICS (Part 2).” Interfax, 

26 May 2015, www.interfax.com. Accessed 26 May 2015.

658 Safronov, Ivan. “’Our Goal is to Hold on to Russia’s Sec

-

ond Place in the Arms Delivery Sphere.’ Rosoboronexport 

General Director Anatoliy Isaykin Talks About 2013’s Results 

and the Prospects for 2014.” Kommersant Online, 27 Jan 2014, 

www.kommersant.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2014.

659 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms 

Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website, 

27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.

660 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms 

Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website, 

27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.

661 Vlahovic, Branko. "Price Tag of Russian Weapons After 

Syria." Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 4 Apr 2016, www.novosti.rs. 

Accessed 4 Apr 2016.
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
WWW.D IA.M IL