* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 97-30779

(Summary Calendar)

_________________

In The Matter Of: JOANN L ULMER 

Debtor,

DAN FRISARD,

Appellant,

versus

CYNTHIA LEE TRAINA,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Louisiana

(96-CV-3804-F)

February 16, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case arises out of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings

of JoAnn Ulmer, in which Dan Frisard (“Frisard”) is a creditor and
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Cynthia Traina (“Traina”), the bankruptcy trustee. Frisard is also

a defendant in related litigation brought by Traina in the

bankruptcy court, and a defendant in a Louisiana state court suit

in which Traina is an intervenor.

Frisard’s appeal arises from his Motion to Remove Trustee

filed in the bankruptcy court. Following an evidentiary hearing,

the bankruptcy court denied Frisard’s motion without prejudice and

stated that Frisard could refile his motion when it was warranted.

Frisard sought leave to appeal the bankruptcy court’s order in the

district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). The district court

refused to grant Frisard leave to appeal, holding that the

bankruptcy court’s decision was an interlocutory order and that

Frisard presented no evidence warranting leave to appeal. Id.

Frisard appeals the bankruptcy court’s denial of his Motion to

Remove Trustee and the district court’s holding that the bankruptcy

court’s order was interlocutory. Traina argues that this Court

lacks jurisdiction to hear Frisard’s appeal because it is from an

interlocutory order in the bankruptcy court. See In re Greene

County Hosp., 835 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that we do

not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders from

bankruptcy court). Frisard asserts two grounds for our

jurisdiction: he argues (1) that the bankruptcy court’s order is

not collateral, and that as a final order, it is appealable to this

Court; and (2) that a failure by this Court to review the
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bankruptcy court’s denial of his Motion to Remove violates his due

process rights. We disagree on both counts. 

With regards to his due process claim, Frisard puts forth no

case and makes no argument that he has a liberty or property

interest in our review of an interlocutory order from the

bankruptcy court. As for his first claim, the district court

correctly found that the bankruptcy court’s denial of Frisard’s

Motion to Remove Trustee was an interlocutory order. A final order

is “one which ends the litigation . . . and leaves nothing for the

court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States,

324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 633 (1945); see also In re Greene

County Hosp., 835 F.2d at 595 (“A final order must ‘conclusively

determine substantive rights.’”) (quoting In re Delta Services

Industries, 728 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1986). 

Frisard does not dispute that his motion was denied without

prejudice and that there continues to be substantive proceedings in

the bankruptcy court. In light of these facts, we agree with the

district court that the bankruptcy court’s order was interlocutory.

This disposes of Frisard’s claim; we have held that “[a] district

court may, in its discretion, take jurisdiction over interlocutory

appeals from the bankruptcy court, but we have no such discretion.

We have jurisdiction only over final orders.” See In re Greene

County Hosp., 835 F.2d at 591; cf. In re Aegis Specialty Marketing

Inc., 68 F.3d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1995) (“This court has stated
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‘that when a district court sitting as a court of appeals in

bankruptcy remands a case to the bankruptcy court for significant

further proceedings, the remand order is not ‘final’ and therefore

not appealable under § 158(d).”) (quoting In re Nichols, 21 F.3d

690, 692 (5th Cir. 1994).

This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Frisard’s appeal.

It is hereby DISMISSED.