J-S41031-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: I.H.W.C., A MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: B.Z., MOTHER 

 No. 581 EDA 2014 

Appeal from the Decree December 27, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0074 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2014 

Appellant, B.Z. (Mother), appeals from the December 27, 2013 decree 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor son, I.H.W.C.1

 

After careful review, we affirm.2

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this case may be 

summarized as follows. I.H.W.C. was born in August 2012, and was placed 

in the custody of the Northampton County Division of Children, Youth and 

____________________________________________ 

1 On January 16, 2014, the orphans’ court entered a decree involuntarily 

terminating the parental rights of I.H.W.C.’s natural father, J.C. (Father). 

See Final Decree, 1/16/14, at 1-2. Father is not a party to this appeal. 

2

 The Guardian Ad Litem also filed a brief in this matter, wherein it agrees

with CYF that, “[t]he [orphans’] court did not abuse its discretion in 

terminating the parental rights of [M]other[,]” and “that termination of 

parental rights is in the best interests of I.H.W.C.” Guardian Ad Litem Brief 

at 5, 9. 
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Families (CYF) three days after birth due to Mother exhibiting severe mental 

health issues and being involuntarily committed for mental health treatment. 

N.T., 12/17/13, at 23; see also Order for Emergency Protective Custody, 

8/10/12, at ¶ 7. On September 28, 2012, the orphans’ court adjudicated 

I.H.W.C. dependent. See Order of Adjudication, 9/28/12. Thereafter, the 

orphans’ court established a permanency goal of reunification and outlined a 

series of family service plan (FSP) objectives for Mother. Specifically, 

Mother was ordered to cooperate with mental health services; to participate 

in and successfully complete psychological evaluations and follow through 

with all recommendations; to cooperate with parenting education and life 

skills training; and to maintain a stable residence for at least six months. 

Permanency Plan/Court Directive and Interim Order, 9/28/12. Additionally, 

Mother was granted supervised visitation of I.H.W.C. See id.; N.T., 

12/17/13, at 23. 

On October 31, 2012, Mother’s visitation rights were suspended when 

Mother became extremely volatile with several Sheriff’s deputies during one 

of her supervised visits with I.H.W.C. N.T., 12/17/13, at 23-24. The 

orphans’ court directed Mother to obtain a psychological and psychiatric 

evaluation, and precluded contact with I.H.W.C. until deemed stable by a 

mental health professional. See Final Decree, 12/27/13, at ¶ 4. The record 

reflects that Mother failed to complete a psychological or psychiatric 

examination, and she has never provided verification of mental health 
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treatment. Id. at ¶ 6; see also N.T., 12/17/13, at 24-25. Furthermore, 

Mother has not maintained a stable residence. N.T., 12/17/13, at 24. In 

addition, although represented by counsel in I.H.W.C.’s dependency matter, 

Mother failed to attend the adjudication and permanency review hearings. 

Id. 

On October 18, 2013, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to I.H.W.C. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b). On December 17, 2013, the orphans’ court held a 

termination hearing, which Mother did not attend. Mother, who was 

represented by counsel during said hearing, did not present any evidence. 

CYF made an offer of proof during the hearing, and introduced the juvenile 

court record in part, to which Mother’s counsel did not object. See N.T., 

12/17/13, at 23-26. CYF did not present testimonial evidence. Thereafter, 

on December 27, 2013, the orphans’ court entered a decree involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to I.H.W.C. pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), (5), and (b).3

 This timely appeal followed on January 27, 

2014.4

____________________________________________ 

3

The record reflects that the Final Decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to I.H.W.C. was signed by the orphans’ court on December 

20, 2013, but filed on December 27, 2013. Thereafter, on December 30, 

2013, the orphan’s court filed an order indicating notice of the entry of said 

decree on the record. See Orphans’ Court Order, 12/30/13.

4

 Mother and the orphans’ court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review. 

A. Should Mother’s rights be terminated when she 

failed to appear for proceedings because she 

feared [] Father and when [CYF] stopped her 

visits very early in the proceeding? 

Mother’s Brief at 4.

Preliminarily, we note that in its February 19, 2014 Rule 1925(a) 

opinion, the orphans’ court concludes that Mother’s issues on appeal are 

waived because they “have never been contested of record.” Orphans’ Court 

Opinion, 2/19/14, at 1. Upon review, we decline to find waiver in this 

instance, as Mother was represented by counsel, Robert Glazer, Esquire 

(Attorney Glazer), during the termination proceedings, and Attorney Glazer 

stated on the record that Mother contests the termination of her parental 

rights to I.H.W.C.. See N.T., 12/17/13, at 26-27. Accordingly, we now turn 

to the merits of Mother’s claim.

We begin by noting our well-settled standard and scope of review. 

When reviewing a decree entered by the [trial] 

court [regarding a petition to terminate parental 

rights], this Court must determine whether the 

record is free from legal error and if the [trial] 

court’s factual findings are supported by the 

evidence. Because the [trial] court sits as the factfinder, it determines the credibility of witnesses, and 

on review, we will not reverse its credibility 

determinations absent an abuse of that discretion. 

In other words, [i]n cases involving [the] 

termination of parental rights, our scope of review is 

broad. All of the evidence, as well as the trial court’s 

factual and legal determinations, are to be 

considered. However, our standard of review is 
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limited to determining whether the order of the trial 

court is supported by competent evidence, and 

whether the trial court gave adequate consideration 

to the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the 

child. We have always been deferential to the trial 

court as the fact finder, as the determiner of the 

credibility of witnesses, and as the sole and final 

arbiter of all conflicts in the evidence. 

In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted). 

“[W]here the hearing court’s findings are supported by competent evidence 

of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could 

support an opposite result.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citations omitted). Moreover, “we may uphold a termination decision if any

proper basis exists for the result reached.” In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 606 

(Pa. Super. 2012). 

The Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, controls termination of 

parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511; In re L.M., 923 A.2d 

505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). Specifically, Section 2511 requires the trial 

court to engage in a bifurcated process before terminating parental rights. 

Id.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 
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needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 323 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). Moreover, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a) in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In 

re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 

863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 

Instantly, we proceed to address the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights to I.H.W.C. under Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as 

follows. 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination. 

(a) General rule. ろ The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a petition

filed on any of the following grounds: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a 

period of at least six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties. 

...

(b) Other considerations. ろ The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 
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With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). 

Upon careful review of the record, we conclude that Mother’s conduct 

warranted termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). As discussed, this 

Court has long recognized that parental rights may be terminated pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties. In 

re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 859 A.2d 

767 (Pa. 2004). We have described “parental duties,” as set forth in Section 

2511(a)(1), as follows. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the 

needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, 

guidance, and support. These needs, physical and 

emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this 

[C]ourt has held that the parental obligation is a 

positive duty[,] which requires affirmative 

performance. 

...

[T]his affirmative parental duty ... requires 

continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort 

to maintain communication and association with the 

child. 

In re E.M., 908 A.2d 297, 304-306 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). 
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Herein, the record reflects that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to I.H.W.C. or failed to perform her parental 

duties for a period in excess of six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the termination petition. Specifically, Mother failed to comply with both 

her FSP objectives and the orphans’ court’s October 31, 2012 order that 

would have reinstated her supervised visits with I.H.W.C. At the time of the 

filing of the termination petition, Mother had not seen I.H.W.C. for 

approximately one year. N.T., 12/17/13, at 25. The record further reflects 

that Mother has not maintained a stable residence during the entirety of 

I.H.W.C.’s lifetime. Id. at 24. Additionally, Mother failed to personally 

appear for any of the termination proceedings, nor “avail herself of courtordered treatment...[.]” Id. at 23; Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/19/14, at 2. 

Mother now contends that she failed to attend any of the termination 

proceedings because she “feared [] Father based on their past history[,]” 

and “should not be seen as intentionally failing to be involved” because she 

was barred from visitation with I.H.W.C. by the orphans’ court. Mother’s 

Brief at 9. Mother, however, fails to direct this Court to any evidence 

demonstrating her alleged fear of Father, and her contention is belied by the 

record. At the December 17, 2013 termination hearing, Attorney Glazer 

informed the orphans’ court that Mother’s absence was due to an unspecified 

medical issue. N.T., 12/17/13, at 2. Furthermore, the record reflects that 

the suspension of Mother’s visitation rights with I.H.W.C. is a result of her 
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own conduct, and she has failed to take action to remedy the situation that 

led to said suspension. As noted, the orphans’ court only suspended 

Mother’s visitation rights following her volatile behavior during one of her 

supervised visits with I.H.W.C.. Id. at 23-24. Thereafter, the orphans’ 

court directed Mother to obtain a psychological or psychiatric evaluation, but 

Mother failed to comply or participate in mental health treatment of any 

kind. Id. at 24-25.; see also Final Decree, 12/27/13, at ¶¶ 4-6. 

Accordingly, we conclude the record supports the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to I.H.W.C. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). 

We now turn to whether the termination of Mother’s parental rights to 

I.H.W.C. is warranted pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must 

engage in an analysis of the best interests of the 

child by taking into primary consideration the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs of the 

child. The trial court must consider intangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability. To this end, 

this [C]ourt has indicated that the trial court must 

also discern the nature and status of the parent-child 

bond, paying close attention to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing the bond. 

In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 997 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). 

“[I]n assessing the parental bond, the orphans’ court is permitted to 

rely upon the observations and evaluations of social workers.” In re K.M., 

53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). “However, in cases where there is no 

evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that 
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no bond exists.” J.M., supra at 324 (citation omitted). Therefore, “the 

extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances 

of the particular case.” Id.

Instantly, CYF counsel, Valerie Cammarene, Esquire (Attorney 

Cammarene) stated during the termination hearing that I.H.W.C. has been 

in the same foster home since his placement shortly after his birth, and is 

“meeting all the developmental milestones and is well-cared for in this 

home.” N.T., 12/17/13, at 23, 25. With respect to the nature and status of 

the bond between Mother and I.H.W.C., there is no evidence that such a 

bond exists. As discussed, I.H.W.C. was removed from Mother’s care at the 

time of birth in August 2012, and he has not seen Mother since October 

2012, when he was approximately two-months old. Id. at 23. As such, it is 

reasonable to infer that no bond exists between I.H.W.C. and Mother. See 

J.M., supra. Accordingly, we agree with the orphans’ court that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of I.H.W.C., pursuant to Section 

2511(b). 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the December 27, 2013 decree 

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to I.H.W.C. pursuant to 

Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b). 

Decree affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/26/2014