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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In re Estate of LORETTA PELLEGRINI.

LORETTA TRAWINSKI, as the PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE of the Estate of LORETTA PELLEGRINI,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED June 15, 2017

v No. 332285
Macomb Probate Court DELPHINE SZPORKA, LC No. 2015-217232-CZP

Defendant-Appellant,
and

ATHENE ANNUITY AND LIFE COMPANY, formerly known as AMERICAN INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY INC,

Defendants.

Before: O’B RIEN , P.J., and H OEKSTRA and B OONSTRA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.
Delphine Szporka appeals as of right the probate court’s March 14, 2016 order granting summary disposition in favor of the Estate of Loretta Pellegrin i. We affirm.

The issue before this Court is whether the probate court erred in concluding that the decedent, Loretta Pellegrini, s ubstantially complied with the c hange-of-beneficiary provision in the contract at issue. “It is well settled in Michigan that substantial compliance with change-ofbeneficiary requirements is su fficient to effect a substitution .” Aetna Life Ins Co v Brooks , 96 Mich App 310, 315; 292 NW2d 532 (1980) . Stated differently,

where the contract of insurance outlines the manner or method b y which beneficiaries may be designated or changed, the steps or formal ities so stipulated must be at least substantially c omplied with, it being generall y conceded that in such a case a designation can be effective only by following th e policy provisions-2- and by conforming to the manner or mode specified in the contra ct. [ Dogariu v Dogariu , 306 Mich 392, 398; 11 NW2d 1 ( 1943) (internal citation and qu otation marks omitted).]

The contract at issue in this case, which is an annuity policy , provides, in relevant part, as follows with respect to beneficiaries:

The Beneficiary is the person or persons who will receive the D eath Benefit provided by this Contract. While the Annuitant is alive, the O wner may change a Beneficiary by a signed written request filed with the Company and may name one or more contingent Beneficiaries. No change will take effe ct unless the Company receives such signed written request. A change will ta ke effect as of the date the written request w as signed. Any change is subject to payment or other action taken by the Company b efore the change was receive d.

This Court reviews de novo a tr ial court’s interpretation and application of a contractual provision. Innovation Ventures v Liquid Mfg , 499 Mich 491, 507; 885 NW2d 861 (2016). “When interpreting a contract, ou r primary obligation is to giv e effect to the parties’ intention at the time they entered into the contract. To do so, we examine the language of the contract according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id . “Absent an ambiguity or internal inconsistency, contractual interpretation begins and ends with the actual words of a written agreement.” Id . That is, when the contractual language used by the parties i s unambiguous, this
Court must interpret and enforce th at language as written. Id

.
Applying those rules to the facts of this case, we ultimately agree with the probate court’s decision that the decedent, Pellegrini, substantially complied with the change-of-beneficiary provision in the contract at issu e. It appears undisputed that Pellegrini’s life-insurance agent mailed a signed request-for-service form to the insurance compa ny in an attempt to change the beneficiary of the policy. Lik ewise, it also appears undispute d that the insurance company received but did not process that request-for-service form beca use of two deficiencies. Consequently, the question before this Court is simple: Does t he mailed and received, but not processed, request-of-service form signed by Pellegrini constit ute substantial compliance with the change-of-beneficiary provi sion quoted above? We conclude that it does.

The change-of-beneficiary prov ision at issue in this case unam biguously provides, in pertinent part, the following with respect to change the benefi ciary or beneficiaries of the policy: “No change will take effect unless the Company receives such signed written request.” (Emphasis added.) When a contract term is not defined by the c ontract itself, this Court turns to the term’s dictionary definition to ascertain and apply its pla in and ordinary meaning. Hastings Mut Ins Co v Safety King, Inc , 286 Mich App 287, 294; 778 NW2d 275 (2009). The verb “receive” can be defined as “to come into possession of.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). Thus, an individual or entity “receives” something when that something “come[s] into possession of” that individual or entity. Applyi ng that definition to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the insurance company received the request-for-service form. It acknowledged as much when it responded to that form, thanking P ellegrini for sending it. While it is apparent that the insurance company did not “process” tha t form, the change-of-beneficiary provision quoted above unambiguou sly provides that a beneficiar y changes when the insurance-3- company “receives,” not when it “processes,” a request-for-serv ice form that includes such a request. Therefore, because it did, in fact, “receive” the req uest-for-service form, we conclude that Pellegrini substantially com plied with the change-of-benef iciary provision quoted above.

While we appreciate the fact that insurance company apparently never “processed” the change-of-beneficiary request m ade by Pellegrini before her dea th, we nevertheless remain of the view that her actions—mailing a signed and notarized request-fo r-service form that unequivocally expresses her intent to change the beneficiary of the contract at issue—constitute substantial compliance with the provision quoted above. The on ly alleged deficiencies with respect to the request-for-service form that she submitted rela ted to her failure to include a single page that included no information with respect to her request a nd her unnecessary but irrelevant inclusion of her estate as both the primary and secondary beneficiary. Stated simply, it is apparent that these deficiencies were trivial at best. Indeed, we find it noteworthy that the provision quoted above does not require a correctly completed re quest-for-service form. Rather

, it requires a “signed written re quest,” and the request-for-ser vice form sent on behalf of Ms. Pellegrini, while not completed correctly, is a “signed written request” that unequivocally reflects her desire to change the beneficiary. Michigan courts have consistently held that strict compliance with provisions like this is simply not required. S ee, e.g., Aetna Life Ins Co , 96 Mich App at 316 (holding that an insured’s written change-of-be neficiary request was sufficient despite the fact “that he used the wrong form” and the fact “th at the form was never received by the insurance company”); see also Harris v Metropolitan Life Ins Co , 330 Mich 24, 27-28; 46 NW2d 448 (1950) (holding that an i nsured’s written change-of-be neficiary request was sufficient despite the fact that it was not accompanied by a certificate a s required by the contractual provision at issue).

Affirmed. The estate, as the pr evailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra