NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-1709-18T2

 A-1710-18T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FRANK CAMPIONE and 

HOWARD KATZ,

Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________

Argued October 21, 2019 – Decided February 24, 2020

Before Judges Sabatino, Sumners and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 18-05-

0685.

Maura Kathryn Tully, Assistant Prosecutor argued the 

cause for appellant (Christopher J. Gramiccioni, 

Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura 

Kathryn Tully, of counsel and on the briefs).

Alton D. Kenney argued the cause for respondent Frank 

Campione (Starkey, Kelly, Kenneally, Cunningham & 

Turnbach, attorneys; Alton D. Kenney, on the brief).

Robert A. Honecker, Jr., argued the cause for 

respondent Howard Katz (Ansell, Grimm and Aaron, 

PC, attorneys; Robert A. Honecker, Jr., of counsel and 

on the brief).

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

February 24, 2020

APPELLATE DIVISION
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A-1709-18T2

Jodi Claire Krugman, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for amicus curiae the Attorney General of 

New Jersey in A-1709-18 (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Jodi Claire Krugman, on 

the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GEIGER, J.A.D.

On leave granted, plaintiff State of New Jersey appeals from a November 

16, 2018 order dismissing all counts of superseding Indictment No. 18-05-0685,

in its entirety, against defendants Frank Campione and Howard Katz. The order 

also denied defendants' motion to sever without prejudice and compelled the 

State to "provide the [d]efendants with the names and addresses of any and all 

expert witnesses contacted by the State to review the file for this matter." The 

State also appeals from a December 19, 2018 order: (1) denying its motion to 

reconsider and vacate the discovery aspects of the November 16, 2018 order;

and (2) ordering the State to "provide the [motion court] with a list of the names, 

addresses, and any oral or written opinions, and summaries thereof, of all expert 

witnesses contacted by the State in reference to this case for in camera review 

by Friday, December 21, 2018." We consolidate the appeals for purposes of 

issuing a single opinion. 

Following our review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part

the November 16, 2018 order, and reverse the December 19, 2018 order. 
3

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I.

Campione is a licensed physician assistant and the managing member of 

Acute Medical Housecalls, LLC (Acute). Katz is a licensed physician who 

began supervising Campione in 2011. 

In September 2012, Campione and Katz entered into a written contract 

whereby Campione would be responsible for the day-to-day operations of Acute, 

including "perform[ing] H&Ps and procedures for patients in the home setting," 

"scheduling of patients," "maintaining patient health records/charts," 

"performing all patient eligibility checks for treatment," "order[ing] and 

fund[ing] all prescription blanks," and "handl[ing] all calls during and after 

hours for patients." Katz agreed to "perform the duties of a supervising 

physician." His responsibilities included "review[ing] and sign[ing] all charts 

within seven (7) days of visit" and "maintain[ing] licensing for himself and 

compl[iance] with all rules and regulations as required by the New Jersey Board 

of Medical Examiners (Board)." Under this contractual arrangement, Campione 

would receive eighty percent of Acute's net profits and Katz would receive the 

remaining twenty percent. 

The Investigation 
4

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The Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office (Prosecutor's Office) 

investigated Campione and Katz as part of its efforts to stem the proliferation of 

prescribed opioids that were not medically necessary. According to the State, 

the investigation revealed the following alleged facts.

In October 2015, the Prosecutor's Office received information from a 

Middletown Police Department detective that K.M.1and an associate were 

arrested for possession and distribution of prescription medications that were 

controlled dangerous substances (CDS). K.M. told police he had purchased the 

prescription blank2 he used to obtain the CDS from an individual purporting to 

be a physician inside a McDonald's restaurant in Neptune Township. The 

prescription blank was recovered by police. It was issued by the office of Frank 

Campione, RPA-C, Acute Medical Housecalls, LLC, and listed Howard Katz, 

D.O., as Campione's supervising physician. 

Upon receiving this information, the Prosecutor's Office began 

investigating Campione's medical practices. A subpoena duces tecum was 

served on New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs requesting all information 

1

 We refer to Campione's patients by initials to protect their privacy. See R.

1:38-3(a).

2

 Our references to a "prescription blank" mean a completed and signed 

prescription form for a prescription legend drug, a drug that can only be procured 

by prescription. 
5

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relating to Campione from the New Jersey Prescription Monitoring Program 

(NJPMP) from January 1, 2015 through November 5, 2015. Documents

revealed that Campione had prescribed medication to 166 patients. K.M. had 

been prescribed fifteen separate prescriptions for Adderall, Oxycodone, and 

Xanax between January 1, 2015 and September 21, 2015.

An investigator in the Division of Consumer Affairs Enforcement Bureau 

advised the detective that Campione had a Physician's Assistant's license that

was valid through August 31, 2017. The investigator also informed the detective 

there appeared to be no affiliation between Campione's practice, Acute, and 

Katz's medical practice in Colts Neck.

A subpoena duces tecum served on Comcast revealed the identity of the 

subscriber for the phone number listed on Campione's prescription blank to be 

Campione's wife, and the address used for the account to be their residence in 

Brick Township. 

On December 2, 2015, as a result of information gathered during the 

investigation, detectives arrested and charged K.M. with fifteen counts of 

obtaining controlled dangerous substances by fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-13. During 

a post-arrest interview, K.M. told the detectives he was referred to "Dr. Frank" 

by a third-party who he met at a methadone clinic. K.M. described where he 

met Campione, once inside a McDonald's restaurant in Neptune, and later inside 
6

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Campione's vehicle. K.M. also described his interactions with Campione, 

including the examinations that took place, the prescriptions that he was 

provided, and how much he paid Campione each time. 

Detectives had K.M. call Campione and set up a controlled buy. 

Campione instructed K.M. to meet him at the Monmouth Mall the following day. 

The next day, investigators outfitted K.M. with a recording device and drove 

him to the Monmouth Mall parking lot to meet Campione. Detectives observed 

the meeting from a distance. When Campione arrived, detectives observed an 

unknown male, later identified as P.S., exit a vehicle and enter the front 

passenger seat of Campione's SUV.3 P.S. eventually exited the vehicle, 

whereupon Campione drove over to where K.M. was standing.

K.M. entered Campione's SUV and provided him with his previous 

prescription bottles. In return, Campione provided K.M. with completed 

prescription blanks to be filled at a pharmacy and K.M. paid Campione $175 in 

cash. As K.M. attempted to exit the vehicle, Campione told him not to "runaway 

yet" because Campione was "not just somebody who hands out scripts," and he 

needed to "do a few things." Although it is unclear from the audio recording 

3

 NJPMP records revealed that P.S. had received twenty-one prescriptions from 

Campione between January 2015 and December 2015. 
7

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what occurred during the examination, there was mention of a check of K.M.'s

breathing, blood pressure, and the amount of oxygen in his blood.4 The 

examination lasted less than two minutes. There was also some discussion about 

whether K.M. was taking his medications at the appropriate times. 

K.M. then exited the vehicle. After the completion of the controlled buy, 

K.M. turned over prescriptions for Xanax, Oxycodone, and Adderall that 

Campione had just issued. 

In December 2015, detectives served a subpoena duces tecum upon Katz 

for records relating to Acute. According to a detective's affidavit and grand jury 

testimony, Katz informed the detectives on December 14, 2015 that he was not 

involved in Acute's day-to-day practice. Katz explained that Campione's "role" 

was to meet with patients who were confined to their homes, or that were unable 

to travel to a doctor's office. Katz told the detectives that he does not review the 

prescription medications Campione prescribed for patients. Katz provided the 

detectives with an Excel spreadsheet list of "active" patients that he had received 

from Campione's wife on October 7, 2015. Detectives stated that K.M. was not 

on the list of active patients. Katz denied knowing who K.M. was, and likewise 

could not find him listed as a patient. From a later check of the NJPMP, it was 

4

 Although checking a patient's vital signs may have been appropriate, 

measuring vital signs alone appear inadequate to substantiate the medical 

necessity for CDS prescriptions. 
8

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learned that twenty-three patients who had received medications from Campione 

were not on the Excel patient list provided by Katz.

A subpoena duces tecum was also served on TD Bank for financial records 

pertaining to Campione and Acute from January 1, 2015 to December 20, 2015.

On February 2, 2016, P.S. was arrested and charged with two counts of 

obtaining CDS by fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-13. According to the detective's

affidavit, during his post-arrest interview, P.S. informed detectives about his 

December 3, 2015 meeting with Campione in his vehicle at the Monmouth Mall 

parking lot. After Campione checked P.S.'s "basic vital signs," Campione gave 

P.S. two prescriptions for opioids. P.S. paid Campione $125 and exited the 

vehicle. P.S. further informed detectives that he had been seeing Campione for 

a couple years and several of their interactions occurred in the same manner. 

P.S. also stated Campione was originally prescribing him Percocet for 

pain management. According to P.S., however, Campione received a letter from 

"the Board" that stated Percocet should not be used for chronic pain. As a result, 

Campione switched the medication from Percocet to Opana (oxymorphone), 

another opioid pain medication. When P.S. felt Opana was not working well 

enough, Campione also began prescribing him Hydromorphone. P.S. stated 

these two medications were what he had been prescribed by Campione "for quite 

a while." 
9

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The Prosecutor's Office applied for a warrant to search Campione's 

residence, business, and vehicle for evidence of the unlawful practice of 

medicine, unlawful distribution of CDS, conspiracy to obtain CDS by fraud, and 

related offenses. A judge granted the search warrants, finding probable cause 

based on an affidavit that detailed the results of the investigation. 

The search warrants were executed on February 18, 2016. On that same 

day, Campione was arrested and charged with second-degree distribution of 

prescription medication, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(4); third-degree unlawful practice 

of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20; and third-degree conspiracy to obtain a 

controlled dangerous substance by fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(l) and N.J.S.A. 

2C:35-13. 

Campione moved for a probable cause hearing. After a testimonial 

hearing, the motion court found that there was probable cause to charge 

Campione with the crimes contained in the warrant and denied his motion to 

dismiss the complaints. 

Campione subsequently moved to reopen the probable cause hearing 

pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(b). He also moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 

Rule 3:25-3, claiming there was an unreasonable delay in presenting the charges 

to a grand jury. On September 15, 2016, the court denied the motions. 
10 A-1709-18T2

Shortly thereafter, Campione filed a renewed motion to dismiss the 

complaint pursuant to Rule 3:25-3. The court denied the motion as moot after 

being informed that Campione intended to testify before the grand jury. 

The First Indictment 

On March 16, 2017, a Monmouth County Grand Jury returned Indictment 

No. 17-03-0313 charging Campione with a single count of third-degree unlawful 

practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20. Both Campione and Katz testified 

before the grand jury. Notably, Katz was not indicted by the grand jury.

Campione next moved to dismiss the indictment, contending he was being 

prosecuted for a "non-crime." On May 25, 2018, the motion court issued an 

order and forty-four-page written opinion denying the motion. The court found 

"the State presented sufficient evidence to the grand jury that [Campione] held 

himself out to some patients as a doctor of medicine, rather than as a physician 

assistant." The court noted the evidence included a voicemail message left by 

Campione for K.M., where he "can be heard saying, 'This is Dr. Frank.'" The 

court also noted the State presented evidence "that other patients believed 

[Campione] held himself out to be a medical doctor." The grand jury testimony 

of Detective Hunter Brockriede described statements by three other patients who 

told detectives that Campione identified himself as a medical doctor. The court 

determined the State presented "'some evidence' that [Campione] may have held 
11 A-1709-18T2

himself out to patients as a medical doctor, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-

20(c)."

The court further found the State presented "some evidence" to the grand 

jury that Campione violated N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(d) by engaging in an activity for 

which a license is necessary, when he prescribed CDS "without prior 

consultation with his supervising physician, in violation of N.J.S.A. 45:9-

27.19(a)(1)," for non-terminal patients. The court concluded that "[i]f 

[Campione] was prescribing [CDS] in violation of the statute, then he was 

engaging in activity that was outside the scope of his healthcare license." Thus, 

it determined the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation 

of N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.19. The court also found the State presented evidence that 

Campione prescribed CDS to patients during their first meeting without 

reviewing their medical records beforehand. 

The motion court also rejected Campione's argument that Brockreide 

misled the grand jury by testifying that, "many patient charts were unsigned." 

The court noted that N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.18 requires patient charts prepared by a 

physician's assistant to be countersigned by their supervising physician. 

Investigators seized medical charts that were not countersigned by Katz during 

the search of Campione's residence and vehicle. The court found the charts were 

not reviewed or countersigned by Katz electronically. 
12 A-1709-18T2

The court also rejected Campione's argument that the State did not present 

exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, claiming investigators did not seize 

inactive patient files from his residence. The court concluded Campione did not 

"demonstrate how the prosecutor's presentment of the inactive files would have 

directly negated [Campione's] guilt and that the files were clearly exculpatory." 

The court noted the State alleged there were eighty-six patients that Campione 

had not disclosed to Katz, based on a comparison of the files seized from Katz

to the list of patients obtained from the NJPMP and the list Katz provided to law 

enforcement. 

The court further rejected Campione's argument that the State made 

inaccurate statements about Physician Assistant Licensing Act (PALA), 

N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.10 to .28, to the grand jury. The court found the instructions 

given to the grand jury were not inaccurate, much less "blatantly wrong." The 

court likewise rejected Campione's argument that Brockriede did not answer a 

grand juror's question regarding the timing of countersigning by a supervising 

physician. 

The Second Indictment 

The State subsequently sought a superseding indictment against both 

Campione and Katz. Brockriede testified during the second grand jury 

proceeding. He presented the grand jury with the statements of eighteen 
13 A-1709-18T2

individuals who had obtained CDS prescriptions from Campione. The 

statements were used in support of the State's argument that Campione and Katz 

had used their involvement in Acute to provide CDS prescriptions, in exchange 

for cash, without medical justification. 

On May 24, 2018, the grand jury returned superseding Indictment No. 18-

05-0685. Both Campione and Katz were charged with third-degree conspiracy

to commit the crime of unlawful practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 

2C:2-6, and N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a), (c), (d) (count one); third-degree unlawful 

practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a) (count two); third-degree unlawful 

practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(c) (count three); and third-degree 

unlawful practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(d) (count four). 

Only Campione was charged, in the same indictment, with thirteen counts 

of third-degree distribution and/or dispensation of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(5) 

(counts five, seven, eight, ten, twelve, thirteen, sixteen, seventeen, twenty, 

twenty-two, twenty-four, twenty-seven, and twenty-nine); eleven counts of 

third-degree distribution and/or dispensation of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(13) 

(counts six, nine, eleven, fourteen, fifteen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty-one, 

twenty-three, twenty-five, and twenty-six); fourth-degree distribution of CDS, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(14) (count twenty-eight); fourth-degree possession of a 

prohibited weapon or device (hollow point bullets), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f) (count 
14 A-1709-18T2

thirty); and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited weapon or device (brass 

knuckles), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(e) (count thirty-one).5

The Dismissal Motion

On August 15, 2018, Katz and Campione separately moved to dismiss the 

superseding indictment. Following a hearing on October 29, 2018, a different 

judge issued a November 16, 2018 order and oral decision granting the motion,

dismissing the indictment in its entirety as to both defendants. The motion court 

engaged in the following analysis. 

As to the first count charging Campione and Katz with conspiracy to 

commit the unlawful practice of medicine, the court stated:

The State alleges the mere fact that the 

defendants had a written contractual agreement for 

Acute Medical House Calls LLC shows their intent to 

enter into a conspiracy. However, creating a limited 

liability company is not a criminal act. It's more 

reasonable to assume that the lack of a memorialized 

business organization infers intent to enter into a 

criminal conspiracy. Therefore the [c]ourt finds Katz 

and Campione formed Acute Medical House Calls to 

establish a legitimate legal business, not to engage in a 

conspiracy. In fact, it was Campione's company, Katz 

was a supervising physician and/or independent 

contractor. 

The State also alleges that this agreement 

combined with Campione prescribing CDS to patients 

without Katz' oversight could create an inference that 

5

 For ease of reference, we attach a table setting forth the charges, criminal code 

citation, and defendant charged for each of the thirty-one counts. 
15 A-1709-18T2

defendants intended to engage in a criminal conspiracy. 

However, there's evidence that Katz did supervise 

Campione in his role as a physician assistant in 

electronically reviewing patients' files every week or 

discussing the files with Campione on a regular basis. 

Det. Mazariegos testified that Katz met with Campione 

at least once a week to review patient files, indicating 

Katz was supervising Campione to some extent.

During the first Grand Jury proceeding the State 

called multiple witnesses who testified that they never 

saw Katz, and that Campione wrote the prescriptions on 

the first visit without having first reviewed their files. 

However, Melinda Campione, Campione's wife and 

office manager[,] submitted a sworn statement noting 

that she would ask patients medical history questions 

before Campione or Katz ever received the files. None 

of these witnesses could have accurately testified to the 

conversations that Katz and Campione had in reviewing 

patient files or as to whether or not Katz and Campione 

actually reviewed their files.

The State misled the Grand Jury, making it seem 

as though Katz never signed or approved any patient 

files, specifically referring to the "Katz file" found in 

Campione’s car. However, Campione and Katz rebut 

the argument for the more reasonable inference that the 

file was in the car to be transported to Katz for 

approval. Additionally[,] there's evidence that the 

number of patients actually receiving CDS from 

Campione was a small fraction of the patients he saw. 

If Katz and Campione wished to engage in a criminal 

conspiracy to profit from the illegal distribution of CDS 

the number of patients receiving CDS prescriptions 

would be much higher than the approximately five 

percent of patients submitted.

Moreover, it's undisputed that Campione 

administered physical exams to the patients, albeit 

cursory ones. Campione wrote the prescriptions for his 
16 A-1709-18T2

patients and it was up to the patients to go to a 

pharmacy to actually fill the prescription. The [c]ourt 

finds, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences, the indictment could not be sustained and 

there's no sufficient actual or circumstantial evidence 

to infer that Katz and Campione were engaged in a 

conspiracy and [c]ount [one] will be dismissed 

accordingly.

As to counts two, three, and four, charging Campione and Katz with the 

unlawful practice of medicine, the court stated:

Katz and Campione cannot be charged under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a), (c) or (d) because both 

defendants had the proper licensure from the State of 

New Jersey at the time of the indictment. There's no 

evidence to suggest that either defendant had suspended 

or revoked licenses at the time of the indictment or the 

alleged offenses. Although there's evidence that Katz 

and Campione may have exceeded the scope of their 

licenses to some extent, neither were charged under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(b) for exceeding the scope of 

practice permitted by Board order.

As to the alleged violation of PALA by treating patients in personal 

vehicles, rather than in a traditional medical care setting, the court found the 

State failed to read PALA in its entirety. The court noted N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a) 

permits a physician assistant to "practice in all medical care settings, including,

but not limited to, a physician's office, a health care facility, an institution, a 

veteran's home, or private home." The court further noted that two other judges 

had "previously stated that there was nothing criminal about Campione seeing 

patients in his vehicle." The court found "there's no law that prevents medical 
17 A-1709-18T2

professionals from seeing patients in a vehicle." The court stated patients are 

treated in ambulances every day, and "there's no law that distinguishes the use 

of a vehicle for medical purposes in emergent versus non emergent situations." 

Regarding the allegation that Campione unlawfully held himself out as a 

physician, the court stated:

The weight of the evidence shows Campione 

made it clear he was a physician assistant. His scrubs 

were embroidered with the physician assistant 

abbreviation, the literature he distributed noted he was 

a physician assistant, the prescription pads Campione 

used stated he was a physician assistant, and multiple 

patients testified they knew Campione was a physician 

assistant. Though a couple of patients may have 

referred to Campione as Dr. Campione, his failure to 

correct them is not enough to say that the held himself 

out to be a doctor.

Even though one voice mail from [K.M.'s] phone 

may have stated Campione once referred to himself as 

Dr. Campione, there's some dispute as to whether 

Campione actually referred to himself as doctor in the 

voice mail. The [c]ourt finds this isolated reference is 

not enough to support the conclusion that he held 

himself out to be a doctor.6

As to Katz's lack of direct supervision of Campione, the court stated: 

There is evidence that Katz may not have supervised 

Campione to the extent that he should have, and some

evidence shows that the appropriate forms may not 

have been filed with the [Board].

6

 The court reiterated this point in its analysis of the dismissal of counts five

through twenty-nine. 
18 A-1709-18T2

However[,] N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(b) specifically 

states that a "violation of any of the conditions of this 

section shall be deemed to have engaged in professional 

misconduct." . . . Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.17 

states that any supervising physician who allows a 

physician assistant to practice contrary to the 

provisions of N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.10 "shall be deemed to 

have engaged in professional misconduct and shall be 

subject to disciplinary action by the Board." . . . 

If Katz did indeed fail to properly supervise 

Campione, or if the appropriate notice of employment 

was not provided to the [Board] then this issue should 

be resolved according to that statute as a professional 

misconduct violation, not a criminal violation. 

The State also argues Campione violated 

N.J.A.C. 13:35-2B.12(c) by exceeding the legal 

restrictions for prescribing controlled dangerous 

substances. The State contends that Campione 

prescribed CDS without Katz issuing the initial 

prescription and without consulting Katz before issuing 

the prescription.

. . . . 

Katz and Campione could have discussed 

prescribing CDS to their patients via telephone, 

electronic communication or in person. Just because 

Campione is required to consult with Katz before 

prescribing CDS to a patient doesn't mean Katz is 

required to see every patient before Campione writes a 

CDS prescription. 

The [c]ourt finds these alleged violations to be 

regulatory in nature, not criminal. 

As to Katz's failure to file a "notice of employment" with the Board, the 

court concluded that "if the appropriate notice of employment was not provided 
19 A-1709-18T2

to the [Board] then this issue should be resolved according to [N.J.S.A. 45:9-

27.15(b)] as a professional misconduct violation, not a criminal violation." 

As to counts five through twenty-nine, charging Campione with various 

CDS offenses, the court concluded the indictment should be dismissed because 

of multiple instances where the State did not present evidence to the grand jury. 

The court described the following examples:

First, the State presented the case to grand jurors 

as if Katz and Campione were running an illegal CDS 

distribution business disguised as Acute Medical House 

Calls LLC when in fact the number of patients that were 

on CDS was a small fraction of the practice's overall 

patient account. 

If Katz and Campione were in business to 

illegally distribute CDS for profit, the number would 

most certainly be higher. In fact, Campione provided a 

number of services to patients, including administering 

influenza vaccinations, seeing elderly housebound

patients in their homes and providing healthcare access 

to those who may not have been able to see a doctor in 

a formal office setting for lack of insurance. 

[K.M. and P.S.], two of the patients referenced by 

Det. Mazariegos, were prescribed CDS after they had 

been sent for MRIs by Campione. Both patients had 

been diagnosed with conditions warranting the 

prescription of CDS. 

Additionally, as Katz noted in his brief, patients 

obtaining CDS would have to be screened through the 

prescription monitoring program at a pharmacy. To 

infer that Katz and Campione were running a for-profit 

drug distribution business is a gross 

mischaracterization of the facts. Indeed, review of the 
20 A-1709-18T2

prescription monitoring program would have shown if 

Campione was over-prescribing CDS to individuals.

. . . . 

Third, the State led the [g]rand [j]ury to believe 

that the prescriptions Campione was writing were 

illegal or invalid. Campione was a licensed physician 

assistant, he had the ability to prescribe medication to 

his patients in accordance with the law. Det. 

Mazariegos concluded that the prescriptions issued by 

Campione were legitimate, yet this evidence was not 

presented to the second Grand Jury. No evidence has 

been proffered to suggest that Campione was writing 

prescriptions in violation of New Jersey State law or 

that the prescriptions he wrote were invalid.

Fourth, the State misled the Grand Jury during 

the second presentation because the Assistant 

Prosecutor told the Grand Jury they were only 

considering the matter of State versus Frank Campione. 

The State never told the Grand Jury that Katz was a 

target. 

Katz was not invited to appear at the second 

Grand Jury presentation and he doesn't have to be, but 

nor was his testimony given under oath from the first 

Grand Jury presentation read to the new Grand Jury. 

Katz was only considered a target after a Grand Jury 

posed a question to the Assistant Prosecutor asking 

whether charges were being considered against him.

Fifth, the State misled the Grand Jury by overly 

emphasizing the fact that Campione saw some of his 

patients in a vehicle. By this point the State was wellaware there was nothing criminal about seeing patients 

inside a vehicle, yet the State still presented the case as 

though there were something criminal about the 

location of Campione's practice. As previously noted, 
21 A-1709-18T2

there's no statute or regulation that prohibits Campione 

from examining patients in a vehicle.

The State also misled the Grand Jury by showing 

the jurors a number of texts that had little to no 

probative value in the case. One text in particular 

stated, "[M.] in rehab, won't be home until next week." 

The jury was left to infer that rehab meant drug rehab, 

yet this patient was never admitted to any drug 

rehabilitation facility and was never prescribed any 

controlled dangerous substances by Katz or Campione. 

In fact, this patient was in a subacute rehabilitation 

facility after he was discharged from a hospital. This 

was a strategic move by the State to mislead the [g]rand 

[j]ury into thinking that Katz and Campione were in 

business to supply CDS to drug seeking patients.

Finally, the State consistently misstates 

Campione's patients were paying for prescriptions. 

Katz and Campione have consistently stated patients 

paid for their visits, the outpatient setting, and the 

examination. Katz and Campione did not provide 

patients with medication. Patients were required to 

take their prescriptions to a pharmacy to have them 

filled in order to obtain any medications. Multiple 

patients testified they paid a flat fee for their visit 

regardless of how many prescriptions if any they were 

given by Campione. There's no evidence to support the 

statement that Katz and Campione charged their 

patients for prescriptions.

As to count thirty, which charged Campione with unlawful possession of 

hollow point bullets, and count thirty-one, which charged Campione with 

unlawful possession of brass knuckles, the court stated: 

No evidence of the hollow point bullets or the 

brass knuckles was presented to the first Grand Jury. 

However, the evidence was presented to the second 
22 A-1709-18T2

Grand Jury after the rejection of the global settlement 

offer. The State was aware of the bullets and the brass 

knuckles during the first Grand Jury proceeding yet did 

not present this evidence. 

Based on our Supreme Court’s holding in State v. 

Gregory, 66 N.J. 510 (1975), the State was required to 

present evidence of the hollow point bullets and the 

brass knuckles at the first Grand Jury proceeding 

because the State was aware of Campione’s possession 

of those items at the time of the proceeding. 

Accordingly, [c]ounts [thirty] and [thirty-one] have to 

be dismissed.

Campione then orally moved to compel the State to provide the names and 

addresses of any additional experts the State had asked to review the file in this 

matter. Over the State's objection, the court granted the motion, and ordered the 

State to "provide the [d]efendants with the names and addresses of any and all 

expert witnesses contacted by the State to review the file for this matter." The 

court concluded it was reasonable to require the State to identify the experts it 

consulted with because if the State were to successfully appeal from the 

dismissal, the defense "would conceivably need to get their own expert. And 

they certainly don't want to contact somebody that [the State had] contacted." 

The Reconsideration and Discovery Issues

The State moved for reconsideration of the November 16, 2018 order 

regarding the additional expert discovery, contending the discovery issue was 

moot due to the dismissal of the indictment. Alternatively, it argued that even 
23 A-1709-18T2

if not moot, defendants were not entitled to such discovery. Following a hearing 

on December 17, 2018, the motion court orally ruled that the discovery issue 

was not moot because the State intended to appeal the dismissal of the 

indictment and the State was proceeding with civil forfeiture action against the 

property seized from Campione. The court further stated:

Rule 3:13-3(b) governs post-indictment 

discovery. The comments to the rule state the rule 

requires discovery to defendant respecting proposed 

expert witnesses in general in the same manner as is 

provided in the Civil practice.

The [c]ivil counterpart is Rule 4:10-2(d)(3). That 

rule states a party may discover[] facts known or 

opinions held by an expert other than the expert who is 

conducting an examination pursuant to Rule 4:19 who 

has been retained or specially employed by another 

party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial 

and it was not expected to be called as a witness for 

trial, only upon the showing of exceptional 

circumstances under which it is impractical for the 

party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on 

the same subject by other means. 

The court then engaged in a Brady7analysis, concluding since "the State 

received information for a potential expert witness exculpating defendants, the 

State had a duty under Brady to turn that information over to defendants as a 

matter of due process." The court found it necessary to undertake an in camera 

7

 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
24 A-1709-18T2

review of the names, addresses, reports, and opinions of the expert witnesses 

contacted by the State in order to determine whether a Brady violation occurred. 

In response to the State's argument, that discovery of its experts was moot 

due to the dismissal of the indictment, the court stated:

Here, the defendant Campione had his license 

indefinitely suspended by the Board . . . and has a case 

pending there. His license will not be reinstated until 

this criminal matter is resolved apparently.

As long as this case is possibly being appealed 

the issue [of the identity and findings of the consulting 

expert] is not moot. Moreover, as the State also has 

forfeiture proceedings going forward and they are 

simply not dismissing those, then it is not moot. 

Should the State not decide to appeal then the 

discovery issue would then be moot and the criminal 

indictment would remain dismissed. 

In response to defense counsel's request for additional discovery regarding 

potential experts, the court issued a December 19, 2018 order requiring the State 

to "provide the [c]ourt with a list of the names, addresses, and any oral or written 

opinions, and summaries thereof, of all expert witnesses contacted by the State 

in reference to this case for in camera review."

The Board's Civil Proceedings and the Consent Order 

In February 2016, the Board brought administrative proceedings against 

Campione "upon receipt of information that [Campione] was suspected of 

engaging in the indiscriminate prescribing of [CDS], including the prescribing 
25 A-1709-18T2

of CDS without legitimate medical purpose, in violation of N.J.A.C. 13:45H-7.4 

and that [Campione] may have been practicing contrary to the provisions of 

[PALA]." Campione consented to the temporary suspension of his physician 

assistant license. On March 31, 2016, the Board entered an interim consent 

order (interim order) suspending Campione's physician assistant license pending 

further order of the Board and his CDS registration pending further order of the 

Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs. The interim order directed that 

Campione "immediately cease and desist from prescribing or dispensing 

medications and from practicing as a physician assistant." The interim order 

further provided: "[Campione] understands that this Interim Consent Order is 

independent of, and not in lieu of, proceedings on behalf or by the DEA, and 

further agrees that resolution of any pending DEA matters will not resolve any 

matter which has, or could, be brought before the Board or the Director." The 

parties stipulated that entry of the order was "without admission of any 

wrongdoing by [Campione]." 

On March 27, 2019, Campione appeared before a Preliminary Evaluation 

Committee of the Board to discuss the pending investigation. Campione 

subsequently agreed to the entry of a September 24, 2019 consent order (consent 

order) that, in pertinent part: (1) suspended Campione's physician assistant 

license and CDS registration for a period of three years, retroactive to March 
26 A-1709-18T2

31, 2016; (2) required Campione to successfully complete Board-approved 

ethics, HIPAA, recordkeeping documentation, and CDS prescribing courses; (3) 

prohibited Campione from prescribing CDS until he successfully completed the 

CDS prescribing course; (4) limited Campione's practice "to meeting with and 

treating patients in a traditional medical setting such as a doctor's office, clinic, 

hospital or urgent care center" and prohibited "meeting with and treating patients 

and/or otherwise practicing outside of such a traditional, physical office 

location, including, but not limited to, mobile settings, in-home visits, nursing 

home facilities, assisted living facilities and private residences"; (5) required 

Campione to be supervised by a physician who had been pre-approved by the 

Board, and who must co-sign all of Campione's medical records and approve all 

prescriptions provided to patients; and (6) rendered Campione responsible for 

the costs and fees of the Board's investigation, totaling $48,837.94. The costs 

and fees are stayed unless and until Campione is found in violation of the terms 

of the consent order, at which time they shall become due and owing. 

Notably, the consent order further states:

10. The entry of this Order is without prejudice to 

further action, investigation, and prosecution by this 

Board, the Attorney General, the Drug Control Unit, the 

Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs, or any 

other law enforcement entities based upon 

[Campione's] conduct prior or subsequent to entry of 

this Order and not addressed by the terms of this Order.
27 A-1709-18T2

11. The Board reserves the right to vacate this Order 

and initiate further action against [Campione's] license 

and CDS Registration in the event the dismissed 

Superseding Indictment against [Campione] referenced 

above is reinstated at any time and a resolution of the 

criminal matter results in a conviction and/or admission 

of guilt to any of the charges contained therein.

The consent order concluded the Board's investigation of Campione, 

subject to reactivation in the event the superseding indictment was reinstated,

and the criminal proceedings resulted in a conviction or admission of guilt.

The State's Appeal 

The State appealed from both the November 16, 2018 and December 19, 

2018 court orders. We granted the State's application to stay the December 19, 

2018 order. These appeals are advanced by the County Prosecutor. We 

permitted the Attorney General to appear as an amicus, and he elected to have a 

Deputy Attorney General in the Division of Law do so. 

The State raises the following points on appeal:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING 

COUNTS 1 THROUGH 29 OF THE INDICTMENT 

AS THE STATE PRESENTED MORE THAN 

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY 

THAT DEFENDANTS COMMITTED SUCH 

CRIMINAL OFFENSES. 

A. Standard of Review. 
28 A-1709-18T2

B. The Lower Court Erred in Ruling That 

Defendants' Actions Could at Most Constitute 

Administrative Violations, Not Criminal 

Offenses. 

C. The Evidence of Defendants' Conduct in 

Violating the PALA as Presented to the Grand 

Jury Demonstrates a Prima Facie Case of 

Unlawful Practice of Medicine in Violation of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20a and 20d. The Lower Court 

Abused Its Discretion and Misapplied the Law in 

Dismissing Counts 2 and 4.

1. Defendants Violated the PALA by 

Campione Treating Patients in a NonMedical Care Setting.

2. Defendants Violated the PALA by 

Campione Treating Patients and 

Prescribing CDS Without Appropriate 

Supervision by Katz, and by Failing to File 

the Required Notice of Employment With 

the State.

D. The Evidence of Defendants' Conduct as 

Presented to the Grand Jury Demonstrates a 

Prima Facie Case of Unlawful Practice of 

Medicine in Violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20c, as 

Defendant Campione Unlawfully Held Himself 

Out as a Licensed Physician to Numerous 

Patients. The Lower Court Abused its Discretion 

in Dismissing Count 3.

E. The State Presented a Prima Facie Case of 

Conspiracy Between Campione and Katz. The 

Lower Court Abused Its Discretion is Dismissing 

Count 1.

F. The State Presented a Prima Facie Case of 

Numerous Instances of Unlawful CDS 
29 A-1709-18T2

Distribution and/or Dispensation by Campione. 

The Lower Court Abused Its Discretion and 

Misapplied the Law in Dismissing Counts 5 

through 29.

POINT II

UNDER STATE V. HOGAN, 144 N.J. 216 (1996), 

THE STATE HAS NO OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE 

NON-EXCLUPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE 

GRAND JURY, NOR WAS ITS PRESENTATION IN 

ANY WAY MISLEADING.

A. The Lower Court Improperly Expanded the 

Duties of the Prosecutor as Set Forth in State v. 

Hogan, 144 N.J. 216 (1996).

B. The State Did Not Mislead the Grand Jury.

POINT III

THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING 

COUNTS 30 AND 31. THE STATE HAD NO 

OBLIGATION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF 

DEFENDANT CAMPIONE'S POSSESSION OF 

PROHIBITED WEAPONS TO THE FIRST GRAND 

JURY.

POINT IV

THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

BY ORDERING POST-DISMISSAL DISCOVERY.

A. The Lower Court Abused Its Discretion in 

Ordering Post-Dismissal Discovery as a Case in 

Controversy No Longer Existed.
30 A-1709-18T2

B. The Law Does Not Entitle Defendants to the 

Discovery They Seek.

II.

"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the 

presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases" not applicable here. 

N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 8. "[T]he grand jury is asked to determine whether 'a basis 

exists for subjecting the accused to a trial.'" State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 227

(1996) (quoting Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Kohl, 59 N.J. 471, 487 (1971)). 

"Equally significant is its responsibility to 'protect[] the innocent from 

unfounded prosecution.'" Id. at 228 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Murphy, 110 N.J. 20, 29 (1988)). 

An indictment also "inform[s] the defendant of the offense charged 

against him, so that he may adequately prepare his defense." State v. Dorn, 233 

N.J. 81, 93 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. LeFurge, 101 N.J. 

404, 415 (1986)). Accordingly, an "indictment must allege all the essential facts 

of the crime." Ibid. (quoting LeFurge, 101 N.J. at 418). Therefore, "the State 

must present proof of every element of an offense to the grand jury and specify 

those elements in the indictment." Id. at 93-94 (quoting State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 

540, 633 (2004)).

"While acknowledging the significance of the grand jury's role in our 

criminal justice system, [our Supreme] Court has recognized the grand jury's 
31 A-1709-18T2

independence and has expressed a reluctance to intervene in the indictment 

process." Hogan, 144 N.J. at 228. To that end, our review of the dismissal of 

an indictment is guided by the following well-established principles:

An indictment is presumed valid and should only 

be dismissed if it is manifestly deficient or palpably 

defective. A motion to dismiss is addressed to the 

discretion of the trial court and that discretion should 

not be exercised except for the clearest and plainest 

ground.

At the grand jury stage, the State is not required 

to present enough evidence to sustain a conviction. As 

long as the State presents some evidence establishing 

each element of the crime to make out a prima facie 

case, a trial court should not dismiss an indictment. In 

a nutshell, a court examining a grand jury record should 

determine whether, viewing the evidence and the 

rational inferences drawn from that evidence in the 

light most favorable to the State, a grand jury could 

reasonably believe that a crime occurred and that the 

defendant committed it.

[State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380-81 (2016)

(citations omitted).]

"We generally review a trial court's decision to dismiss an indictment 

under the deferential abuse of discretion standard." State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 

513, 532 (2018) (citing Hogan, 144 N.J. at 229). When a decision to dismiss 

hinges on a purely legal question, however, our review is de novo and we need 

not defer to the motion court's interpretations. Ibid. (citing State v. S.B., 230 

N.J. 62, 67 (2017)). 
32 A-1709-18T2

III.

Guided by these principles, we review the dismissal of all thirty-one 

counts of the superseding indictment as to both defendants. 

Count One: Conspiracy to Commit the Unlawful Practice of Medicine

The State relied on the Acute contract in conjunction with Campione's 

prescribing CDS without Katz's oversight in support of its allegation that 

Campione and Katz conspired to engage in the unlawful practice of medicine. 

The State contends that such a violation of PALA provides the basis for criminal 

liability. We are unpersuaded by this argument. 

"[T]he agreement to commit a specific crime is at the heart of a conspiracy 

charge." State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 245 (2007). "It is the agreement that 

is pivotal." Id. at 246 (citation omitted). To sustain a charge of conspiracy the 

State must demonstrate an "overt act." N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(d). Here, the 

superseding indictment listed five overt acts that it alleged were contrary to 

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, and N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a), (c), (d) (relating to 

the unlawful practice of medicine). At its core, the State's listed overt acts 

indicate Campione and Katz conspired to violate PALA due to: (1) Katz's 

inadequate supervision of Campione; and (2) their failure to file the mandatory 

"notice of employment" required prior to 2016. 
33 A-1709-18T2

In order to be guilty of conspiracy, a person must, "with the purpose of 

promoting of facilitating its commission, agree with another person to "engage 

in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt to commit such crime." 

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a) (emphasis added). An "agreement to commit a specific 

crime is at the heart" of the conspiracy statute. State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 

245 (2007). A conspiracy requires an "actual agreement [with another] for the 

commission of the substantive crime." State v. Kamienski, 254 N.J. Super. 75, 

93 (App. Div. 1992). An agreement to violate civil statutes or regulations is not 

a crime. 

Contrary to the State's arguments, we conclude that a violation of PALA 

is not criminal. PALA explicitly states "[a]ny physician assistant who practices 

in violation of any of the conditions specified in subsection a. of this section 

shall be deemed to have engaged in professional misconduct." N.J.S.A. 45:9-

27.15(b). Such professional misconduct violations are resolved by the Board. 

N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(b); N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.17(b). The statutory provisions and 

related regulations authorize the Board to suspend or revoke a physician 

assistant license, but do not subject a physician assistant or a physician to 

criminal sanctions. Indeed, Campione ultimately received a three-year 

suspension of his physician assistant license. He is also responsible for costs 
34 A-1709-18T2

and fees if he violates the consent order. These are civil penalties, not criminal 

sanctions. 

As we recently explained in State v. Saad, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 

2019):

In addition, we do not accept the premise that the 

elements of a crime can be defined by an administrative 

regulation, which can be amended or repealed by [the 

Board] without involvement of the Legislature. 

Moreover, interpreting the statute to incorporate the 

regulation would introduce ambiguity as to which acts 

constitute criminal behavior, raising serious concerns 

regarding notice. 

[Slip op. at 12.]

Accordingly, an agreement to promote or facilitate a violation of PALA is not a 

criminal conspiracy.

While the State presented enough evidence to the grand jury showing 

Campione violated N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(c) by knowingly holding himself out as a 

person eligible to practice medicine, the record does not support the State's 

theory that Katz and Campione conspired to make patients believe Campione 

was a medical doctor. In addition, there is insufficient evidence that Campione 

violated N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a) or (d) to impute Campione's alleged unlawful 

practice of medicine to Katz. For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of 

count one with prejudice. 
35 A-1709-18T2

Counts Two, Three, and Four: Unlawful Practice of Medicine

PALA provides "[a] physician assistant may practice in all medical care 

settings, including, but not limited to, a physician's office, a health care facility, 

an institution, a veterans' home, or a private home." N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a). 

The State argues that a personal vehicle is not a "medical care setting" within 

the meaning of PALA. Conversely, Campione argues the statute does not 

expressly prohibit a physician assistant from visiting, treating and prescribing 

medications in locations determined by the physician assistant and his patients. 

Amicus Attorney General of New Jersey disagrees with both positions. 

Instead, the Attorney General notes "[f]rom the inception of the PALA, there 

were, and continue to be, significant limitations on where and how a physician 

assistant is permitted to practice." Although the Attorney General recognizes 

the language of the statute suggests a broad legislative intent for interpretation 

of "medical care settings," the examples provided by the Legislature reflect 

traditional medical care settings. Accordingly, the Attorney General suggests 

"it does not necessarily follow that a personal vehicle is an appropriate setting 

to provide medical care in all circumstances." 

The Attorney General goes on to state:

[F]actors that may be considered include [(1)] whether 

the physician assistant was practicing within his scope 

of practice and under appropriate supervision, [(2)] the 

nature of the patient's condition, and [(3)] whether the 
36 A-1709-18T2

setting would provide sufficient space and opportunity 

to examine the patient in an appropriate fashion. Also 

to be considered is [(4)] whether the setting will permit 

the ability to protect patient privacy for the examination 

and possible treatment, [(5)] whether patient records 

can be appropriately made and maintained, and [(6)] 

whether the physician assistant has the ability to consult 

with the supervising physician, if needed. Any 

emergent needs of the patient and proximity to 

emergency services would also be relevant.

[(Footnote omitted).]

The Attorney General concludes that "whether a location is an appropriate 

'medical care setting' is fact-sensitive." 

The motion court determined that Campione did not violate PALA by 

examining and prescribing medications for patients while in a vehicle rather than 

a medical care setting. It further determined that examining and treating patients 

in a vehicle is not a criminal act. The court noted that patients are routinely 

treated in ambulances, residences, and other non-medical settings. 

Counts two and four allege Campione and Katz engaged in the unlawful 

practice of medicine by failing to have Campione practice "under the direct 

supervision of a physician" and failing to provide the appropriate notice of 

Campione's employment with the Board, in violation of N.J.S.A. 45:9-
37 A-1709-18T2

27.15(a)(1) and (3).

8

 Campione and Katz were indicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-

20(a) and (d). Campione was also indicted for violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-

20(c). Both provisions state:

A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he 

knowingly does not possess a license or permit to 

practice medicine and surgery or podiatric medicine, or 

knowingly has had the license or permit suspended, 

revoked or otherwise limited by an order entered by the 

[Board], and he:

a. engages in that practice;

. . . . 

c. holds himself out to the public or any person as being 

eligible to engage in that practice;

d. engages in any activity for which such license or 

permit is a necessary prerequisite, including, but not 

limited to, the ordering of controlled dangerous 

substances or prescription legend drugs from a 

distributor or manufacturer[.]

The State acknowledges that at all relevant times Campione was a licensed 

physician assistant and Katz was a licensed physician. Neither was an imposter. 

At the time Campione wrote the prescriptions in question his license 

allowed him to do so, subject to proper authorization by a "supervising 

physician." N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.19(a)(1). He was registered to prescribe CDS. 

8

 N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a)(3) was subsequently deleted pursuant to P.L. 2015, c.

224. It was in effect when Campione and Katz are alleged to have committed 

the crimes presented in superseding Indictment No. 18-05-0685.
38 A-1709-18T2

His license and registration had not been suspended or revoked, nor had it been 

"limited by an order entered by the [Board]." N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20. Thus, 

Campione was licensed and registered to prescribe CDS. At no time was Katz's 

license suspended. 

The motion judge concluded that a physician assistant who violates PALA 

is subject to administrative penalties, not criminal sanctions. He further 

concluded that defendants did not violate N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a)(1) and (3). We 

agree. 

As previously noted, violation of PALA by a physician assistant is deemed 

professional misconduct. Similarly, "[a]ny physician who permits a physician 

assistant under the physician's supervision to practice contrary to the provisions 

of [N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.10 to .28] shall be deemed to have engaged in professional 

misconduct . . . and shall be subject to disciplinary action by the board." 

N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.17(b). Based upon PALA's plain language, we conclude the 

Legislature intended PALA violations by licensed practitioners to be resolved 

by the Board through civil penalties, not criminal prosecution.

9

 

9

 We view the violation of PALA by an unlicensed physician assistant 

differently because an unlicensed physician assistant is not permitted to 

prescribe medication. See N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a) and (d) (criminalizing such 

conduct). 
39 A-1709-18T2

In the circumstances presented here, Campione's alleged failure to 

practice "under the direct supervision of a physician" and the failure to provide 

notice of his employment to the Board involve professional misconduct, not 

criminal acts. Similarly, Katz's alleged failure to supervise Campione rendered 

him potentially liable for civil penalties, not criminal prosecution. Accordingly, 

the motion court properly dismissed counts two and four as to both defendants. 

The dismissal of counts two and four is with prejudice. 

Count three alleges Campione unlawfully engaged in the practice of 

medicine by repeatedly holding himself out as a physician, in violation of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(c). The motion judge acknowledged a question of fact 

existed as to whether Campione held himself out as a medical doctor. Here, the 

State presented "some evidence" to the grand jury that Campione presented himself 

as a physician to several patients by referring to himself as a medical doctor. The 

State presented the grand jury with at least "'some evidence' as to each element of a 

prima facie case." State v. Bennett, 194 N.J. Super. 231, 234 (1984) (quoting State 

v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 483 (Sup. Ct. 1943)). We reverse the dismissal of count 

three as to Campione. 

The State presented no evidence to the grand jury that Katz participated in 

Campione's alleged act of improperly holding himself out as a physician to patients. 

We therefore affirm the dismissal with prejudice of count three as to Katz. 
40 A-1709-18T2

Counts Five through Twenty-Nine: Distribution of CDS

Counts five through twenty-seven and twenty-nine charge Campione with 

third-degree distribution or dispensation of CDS; count twenty-eight charges him 

with fourth-degree distribution of CDS. He argued "[d]espite the absence of any 

clearly exculpatory evidence," and without providing a fact-specific analysis of each 

count, the motion judge dismissed each of the CDS distribution counts because of 

"multiple instances where the State did not present evidence to the Grand Jury," 

resulting in the grand jury receiving "a distorted version of the facts." 

The motion court based his ruling on the following aspects of the testimony 

presented by the State to the grand jury: (1) presenting the case as if Katz and 

Campione were running an illegal CDS distribution business when the number of 

patients prescribed CDS was only a small fraction of their patients; (2) repeatedly 

referring to Campione as a doctor to mislead the grand jury that he held himself out 

as a physician despite the weight of the evidence showing Campione made it clear 

he was a physician assistant; (3) leading the grand jury to believe that the CDS 

prescriptions were illegal or invalid despite Campione being a licensed physician 

assistant who was authorized to prescribe CDS; (4) overly emphasizing that 

Campione saw some of his patients in a vehicle; (5) showing the grand jury text 

messages that were misleading and had no probative value; and (6) consistently 

misstating that Campione's patients were paying for prescriptions rather than a flat 
41 A-1709-18T2

fee for visits and examinations in an outpatient setting, regardless of the quantity of 

prescriptions issued. The motion court found the State presented no evidence that 

Campione wrote illegal or invalid prescriptions. The court also found it significant 

that Campione "did not provide patients with medication." Instead, "[p]atients were 

required to take their prescriptions to a pharmacy to have them filled in order to 

obtain any medications."

The following principles inform our review of the dismissal of the 

distribution of CDS charges. 'The grand jury's role is not to weigh evidence 

presented by each party, but rather to investigate potential defendants and decide 

whether a criminal proceeding should be commenced." Hogan, 144 N.J. at 235. 

"Credibility determinations and resolution of factual disputes are reserved 

almost exclusively for the petit jury." Ibid.

"In seeking an indictment, the prosecutor's sole evidential obligation is to 

present a prima facie case that the accused has committed a crime." Id. at 236. 

"A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or 

innocence of the accused is adjudicated." Id. at 235 (quoting United States v. 

Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). Therefore, prosecutors are generally not 

required to "provide the grand jury with evidence on behalf of the accused." 

Ibid. However, the State may not "deceive the grand jury or present its evidence 

in a way that is tantamount to telling the grand jury a 'half-truth.'" Id. at 236. 
42 A-1709-18T2

Nevertheless, because grand jury proceedings are non-adversarial, "incomplete 

or imprecise legal interpretations [by the prosecutor] will not warrant dismissal 

of the indictment." State v. Laws, 262 N.J. Super. 551, 562 (App. Div. 1993) 

(citation omitted). Moreover, "the conduct of a prosecutor should not warrant 

dismissal unless it clearly invades the grand jury's decision-making function." 

Ibid. (citing State v. Schamberg, 146 N.J. Super. 559, 564 (App. Div. 1977)). 

Two factors should be considered in evaluating whether to dismiss counts 

of an indictment due to failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury: 

(1) does the evidence directly negate guilt; and (2) is it "clearly exculpatory." 

Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237. "[O]nly in the exceptional case will a prosecutor's 

failure to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury constitute grounds for 

challenging an indictment." Id. at 239. 

A licensed physician or physician assistant who is registered to prescribe 

CDS is not exempt from criminal prosecution for prescribing medically 

unnecessary CDS. State v. Vaccaro, 142 N.J. Super. 167, 172 (App. Div. 1976). 

As we explained in Vaccaro:

A physician's license and registration authorizes 

him to dispense controlled dangerous substances, but 

the statute makes it clear that he is immune from 

criminal liability when he dispenses the same "in good 

faith . . . in the course of his professional practice only."

If he engages in dispensing or selling such drugs 

beyond the necessities of the good faith practice of his

profession, he is no less a 'pusher' of drugs—a 
43 A-1709-18T2

criminal—than a layman unadorned by the trappings of 

a license or registration. See United States v. Moore, 

423 U.S. 77 (1975), for cases involving analogous 

federal statute.

. . . .

A physician who is honest and ethical, and 

dispenses the prohibited drugs in a good faith effort to 

treat and cure patients, has no fear of the criminal 

sanctions of the statute. However, his mere status as a 

licensed physician who has been properly registered as 

a dispenser of the prohibited drugs does not give him 

the blanket right to abuse his authority and profession 

by dispensing drugs without relation to his sworn 

professional obligations. See United States v. Moore; 

United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); Webb v. 

United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919); Commonwealth v. 

Miller, 282 N.E.2d 394 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1972); State v. 

Jacobs, 503 P.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1972). 

[Id. at 173-74.]

New Jersey physicians have been criminally prosecuted as well as 

administratively penalized for prescribing unnecessary CDS. Indeed, physicians 

are regularly investigated by the DEA and prosecuted in federal court for 

prescribing CDS that is not medically necessary.10 The fact they were licensed 

10

 According to one study, 257 criminal cases were initiated against physicians 

for drug trafficking, selling, illegally distributing, and racketeering, from 1998 

through 2006. Donald M. Goldenbaum, et al., Physicians Charged with Opioid 

Analgesic-Prescribing Offenses, 9 Am. Acad. of Pain Med. 737, 744 tbl. 4 

(2008). Of those physicians, "79.5% pled guilty or no contest to at least one of 

the criminal charges brought against them." Id. at 743. Of those physicians who 

pled not guilty, 90.6% were found guilty of at least one criminal charge. Ibid. 
44 A-1709-18T2

physicians did not prevent criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. 

Maynard, 278 Fed. Appx. 214, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[P]hysicians are subject to 

criminal liability 'when their activities fall outside the usual course of 

professional practice.'" (quoting Moore, 423 U.S. at 124 )); United States v. 

Tighe, 551 F.2d 18, 21 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting that "by placing a prescription for 

a controlled substance, issued outside of the usual course of medical practice, in 

the hands of an ultimate user a physician completes" a criminal act); United 

States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1946) (finding that "under the 

guise of 'treating' a patient a physician may not by issuing prescriptions make it 

possible for drugs to be peddled or for known addicts merely to satisfy their 

craving" (citing United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 287 (1922))). 

Accordingly, we reject Campione's argument that he cannot be guilty of 

distribution of CDS because he was a licensed physician assistant, who was 

registered to prescribe CDS to patients. This, however, does not end our inquiry.

Although Campione was permitted to prescribe CDS, he may only do so 

in good faith when the CDS is medically necessary and appropriate. Vaccaro, 

142 N.J. Super. at 173. CDS prescriptions issued to substance abusing patients

who do not have a legitimate medical need for such medication subjects the 

physician assistant to potential criminal prosecution and conviction. 

Determination of the medical necessity and appropriateness of the prescription 
45 A-1709-18T2

is a fact question to be considered by the grand and petit jurors. An indicted 

charge should not be dismissed if there is "some evidence" that the CDS 

prescription was not issued in good faith because it was medically unnecessary 

or inappropriate. 

In addition to his own testimony, Brockriede presented the statements of 

eighteen patients, K.M., P.S., P.J., M.M., A.L., N.H., B.H., J.M., S.Q., A.M., 

B.S., J.B., E.U., M.H., P.A., D.H., D.D., and C.M., to the grand jury. The State 

also presented text messages between Campione and his wife and other 

circumstantial evidence. Notably, the State did not present any expert witnesses 

or expert reports addressing the lack of medical necessity of the CDS 

prescriptions to the grand jury. To be sure, many of the patients' statements 

described underlying medical conditions causing them to suffer from chronic 

pain. In several instances, Campione prescribed medications that had been 

previously prescribed to them by former physicians. 

The bulk of the statements presented to the grand jury focused on the 

location of the examinations, payment for services in cash, the cursory nature of 

the examinations, the amount Campione charged, and whether the patient was 

housebound or otherwise prevented from traveling to a medical office. We do 

not view such facts as evidence that the prescriptions were not medically 

necessary and, therefore, constituted illegal distribution of CDS within the 
46 A-1709-18T2

meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5. Many of the patients were seen by Campione in 

their homes, nearby locations, or in his personal vehicle. House calls are an 

appropriate "medical care setting" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a). 

Similarly, examining patients and prescribing them medication at nearby 

locations would not provide a basis for criminal prosecution as opposed to

potential disciplinary action by the Board. And, as noted by amicus curiae 

Attorney General of New Jersey, "the statute does not expressly prohibit a 

personal vehicle from being a 'medical care setting.'" It depends on the 

circumstances.

Viewing the evidence presented to the grand jury as true and affording the 

State all reasonable inferences, we conclude there was "some evidence" that the 

CDS prescriptions issued by Campione to K.M., M.M., B.H. and A.M. were 

neither medically necessary nor issued in good faith. Consequently, the motion 

court erred by dismissing counts five, six, nine, thirteen, fourteen, seventeen, 

and eighteen. 

In so ruling, we are not commenting here on what evidence would be 

admissible at trial regarding the manner and locations of the examinations and 

treatment performed by Campione in his vehicle, at restaurants, or locations 

other than his office or the patient's residence. 
47 A-1709-18T2

On the other hand, our careful review of the grand jury testimony and 

exhibits leads us to conclude insufficient evidence was presented to the grand 

jury to make out a prima facie case as to counts seven, eight, ten, eleven, twelve, 

fifteen, sixteen, and nineteen through twenty-nine. Accordingly, the motion 

court properly dismissed those counts.11

By way of example, count seven charged Campione with distribution of 

CDS to P.S., yet during his statement to investigators, which was read to the 

grand jury, P.S. stated he provided Campione with his MRI report. He stated he 

had spinal stenosis and had difficulty walking. He saw Campione for pain 

management to address severe pain in his arms and legs. P.S. noted that 

Campione refused to prescribe him Percocet because it was inappropriate for 

chronic pain. He understood that Campione was a physician assistant, not a 

medical doctor. 

11

 In so ruling, we note that the motion judge did not state that the pre-trial 

dismissal was with prejudice. A pre-trial dismissal does not implicate double 

jeopardy concerns unless it is "based on a finding of fact relating to the merits 

of the prosecution," rather than that the evidence presented to the grand jury was 

insufficient to support an indictment. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court 

Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 2:3-1 (2020). We therefore consider the motion court's 

dismissal of counts five through twenty-nine to be without prejudice. Our 

affirmance of the dismissal of any of those counts is likewise without prejudice. 

The State may seek to re-indict Campione on the dismissed counts by presenting 

additional evidence to a grand jury, subject to the legal holdings we make here. 

We express no opinion as to likelihood of success of any such future attempt to

re-indict. 
48 A-1709-18T2

Count twenty-six charged Campione with distribution of CDS to P.A. 

During her statement to investigators, which was read to the grand jury, P.A. 

stated she had been injured in a serious motor vehicle accident and suffered a 

fractured leg, anoxia resulting in a lengthy coma, seizures, and a cognitive brain 

injury. This led to Campione treating her for bed sores. Campione saw P.A. at 

her residence, had blood work done, checked her vitals, inspected her bed sores, 

and referred her for physical therapy. In addition to pain medication and Xanax, 

Campione prescribed sleeping pills, diabetes medication, diuretics, and special 

shoes for her diabetes. He also ordered additional testing to be performed by 

nurses.

Count twenty-seven charged Campione with distribution of CDS to D.H.

During his statement to investigators, which was read to the grand jury, D.H. 

stated he was referred to Campione by a pain management physician. He 

described his medical condition as three herniated discs, a bulging disc, and 

sciatica. He was treated at his residence. Campione examined and urine tested 

him each month to make sure he was not selling his medication. In addition to 

pain medications, Campione prescribed Adderall for ADHD. He noted that his 

previous psychiatrist had also prescribed Adderall for that condition. When he 

sought an increase in Oxycodone dosage, Campione refused because he would 

not over prescribe. 
49 A-1709-18T2

IV.

Count thirty charges Campione with third-degree possession of hollow 

point bullets, a prohibited weapon. Count thirty-one charges Campione with 

fourth-degree possession of metal knuckles, a prohibited weapon. The motion 

judge dismissed both counts because the State did not present evidence of the 

hollow point bullets or metal knuckles to the first grand jury, even though it was 

aware of that evidence. Thus, Campione was not indicted by the first grand jury 

on those charges. The State presented evidence of the possession of those illegal 

weapons to the second grand jury, which true billed both counts. 

Following State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510 (1975), the motion judge applied 

Rule 3:15-1(b) to implement mandatory joinder. The Court has interpreted the 

Rule to encompass four factors a defendant must show to gain dismissal of an 

indictment on this basis: "(1) the multiple offenses are criminal; (2) the offenses 

are based on the same conduct or arose from the same episode; (3) the 

appropriate prosecuting officer knew of the offenses at the time the first trial

commenced; and (4) the offenses were within the jurisdiction and venue of a 

single court." State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 701 (1989) (emphasis added); 

R. 3:15-1(b). Further, the mandatory joinder rule is codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:1-

8(b), which provides in relevant part:

[A] defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for 

multiple criminal offenses based on the same conduct 
50 A-1709-18T2

or arising from the same episode, if such offenses are 

known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time 

of the commencement of the first trial and are within 

the jurisdiction and venue of a single court.

[(Emphasis added).]

The judge misapplied the mandatory joinder rule. Here, Campione was 

not subjected to separate trials. "No disposition on the merits ha[d] taken place."

State v. Phillips, 150 N.J. Super. 75, 77 (App. Div. 1977). Other than count one 

as to Campione, the charges presented to the second grand jury were different 

than those presented to the first grand jury. Moreover, the second indictment 

superseded the first. Here, presenting the superseding indictment to the grand 

jury did not implicate the double jeopardy clause or the mandatory joinder rule. 

"The mandatory joinder rule deals with offenses, not indictments." State v. 

Antieri, 180 N.J. Super. 267, 272 (Law Div. 1981), aff'd, 186 N.J. Super. 20 

(App. Div. 1982). The State may re-present charges to the grand jury multiple 

times until it secures an indictment. See State v. Shaw, 455 N.J. Super. 471, 

489 (App. Div. 2018) (holding the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss 

the indictment returned by a third grand jury where the State presented new and 

material evidence to the third panel). For these reasons, we reverse the dismissal 

of counts thirty and thirty-one. 

Campione also contends the State failed to recite the entire statute 

pertaining to metal knuckles when it presented count thirty-one to the grand 
51 A-1709-18T2

jury. He asserts that he had a "lawful purpose" for possessing the metal knuckles 

because he was a "weapons collector" and the State did not present this lawful 

defense to the grand jury. We find no merit in this argument. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

V.

We next address the post-dismissal discovery ordered by the motion court. 

The State argues the court abused its discretion by ordering post-dismissal 

discovery of the identity, opinions, and reports of the experts that it consulted. 

We agree. 

Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) requires the State to provide the following postindictment discovery:

[The] names and addresses of each person whom the 

prosecutor expects to call to trial as an expert witness, 

the expert's qualifications, the subject matter on which 

the expert is expected to testify, a copy of the report, if 

any, of such expert witness, or if no report is prepared, 

a statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert 

is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for 

each opinion.

As a result of the dismissal of the indictment in its entirety, the criminal 

action was no longer pending and no trial will occur unless the dismissal is 

overturned on appeal. Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) does not apply when all charges have 

been dismissed. Moreover, Campione can renew his application for discovery 

on remand as to any reinstated counts.
52 A-1709-18T2

Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) is "parallel" to the civil standard regarding expert 

testimony. State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 205 (1989); Pressler & Verniero, 

cmt. 3.2.9 on R. 3:13-3(b)(1). The motion court misapplied the civil standard 

for discovery of expert witnesses. 

It is the clear intention of [Rule 4:10-2(d)(1)] that 

it generally apply only to experts who will be testifying 

at trial, leaving parties free to consult with other experts 

whose opinion is not discoverable. See Graham v. 

Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361 (1991). A party's 

consultation with an expert whose identity and opinion 

is not disclosed to the adversary is privileged, 

precluding the adversary from himself producing that 

expert in the absence of exceptional circumstances 

within the meaning of [Rule 4:10-2(d)(3)]. 

[Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 5.2.1 on R. 4:10-2(d)(1).]

Further, in the civil context, "a consulting expert is prohibited from 

testifying for an adversary at trial absent the same 'exceptional circumstances' 

that would have allowed discovery of that expert's identity and opinion under 

Rule 4:10-2(d)(3)." Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 186 N.J. 286, 301 (2006) 

(citing Graham, 126 N.J. at 373). 

The fact that the State's civil forfeiture action was then still pending when 

the indictment was dismissed does not change the analysis.12 The owners of 

12

 During oral argument before this court, counsel advised that the civil 

forfeiture action is now settled. Consequently, the issue of discovery that might 

have been necessary in the forfeiture proceeding is now moot.
53 A-1709-18T2

property sought to be forfeited may seek discovery in the forfeiture action. See

State v. 1987 Chevrolet Camaro, 307 N.J. Super. 34, 43-46 (App. Div. 1998) 

(noting the right to discovery in forfeiture actions and applying discovery 

enforcement rules).

We likewise conclude that the pendency of license suspension 

proceedings brought against Campione by the Board, and his related temporary 

suspension, which will not be fully resolved until the criminal charges are 

resolved, does not provide a legal basis for ordering the State to provide postdismissal expert discovery. Campione may seek permitted discovery in the 

administrative proceeding if those proceedings are reactivated as a result of our 

decision reinstating certain counts of the indictment. N.J.A.C. 1:1-10.1 to -10.6. 

Recent precedent, such as In re Cayuse Corp. LLC, 445 N.J. Super. 80 

(App. Div. 2016), does not compel a contrary result. The facts in Cayuse, which 

involved a challenge to the denial of a retail firearms dealer's license application, 

are materially distinguishable. Cayuse faced potential adverse consequences on 

future license applications as a result of the application denial being challenged. 

Id. at 97. Here, the dismissal of the indictment terminated the criminal case. 

VI.

In sum, we affirm the dismissal with prejudice of counts one, two and 

four. We affirm the dismissal without prejudice of counts seven, eight, ten, 
54 A-1709-18T2

eleven, twelve, fifteen, sixteen, and nineteen through twenty-nine. We affirm 

the dismissal with prejudice of all charges against Katz. We reverse the 

dismissal of counts three (as to Campione), five, six, nine, thirteen, fourteen, 

seventeen, eighteen, thirty, and thirty-one and remand those counts for further 

proceedings. We also reverse the orders compelling post-dismissal discovery. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 

We do not retain jurisdiction.
55 A-1709-18T2

TABLE – INDICTMENT NO. 18-05-0685

Count: Contrary to 

N.J.S.A.:

Charging: Patient: Appellate 

Disposition:

One (1): 

third-degree 

conspiracy

2C:5-2, 2C:2-

6, and 2C:21-

20(a), (c), (d)

Campione & 

Katz

N/A Dismissed

Two (2): 

third-degree 

unlawful 

practice of 

medicine

2C:21-20(a) Campione & 

Katz

N/A Dismissed

Three (3): 

third-degree 

unlawful 

practice of 

medicine

2C:21-20(c) Campione & 

Katz

N/A Reinstated as 

to Campione/ 

dismissed as 

to Katz

Four (4): 

third-degree 

unlawful 

practice of 

medicine

2C:21-20(d) Campione & 

Katz

N/A Dismissed

Five (5): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione K.M. Reinstated

Six (6): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione K.M. Reinstated

Seven (7): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione P.S. Dismissed

Eight (8): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione P.J. Dismissed
56 A-1709-18T2

Nine (9): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione M.M. Reinstated

Ten (10): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione A.L. Dismissed

Eleven (11): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione A.L. Dismissed

Twelve (12): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione N.H. Dismissed

Thirteen (13): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione B.H. Reinstated

Fourteen 

(14): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione B.H. Reinstated

Fifteen (15): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione J.M. Dismissed

Sixteen (16): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione S.Q. Dismissed

Seventeen 

(17): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione A.M. Reinstated

Eighteen 

(18): third2C:35-5(b)(13)

Campione A.M. Reinstated
57 A-1709-18T2

degree 

distribution 

of CDS

Nineteen 

(19): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione B.S. Dismissed

Twenty (20): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione J.B. Dismissed

Twenty-One 

(21): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione J.B. Dismissed

Twenty-Two 

(22): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione E.U. Dismissed

TwentyThree (23): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione E.U. Dismissed

Twenty-Four 

(24): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione M.H. Dismissed

Twenty-Five 

(25): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione M.H. Dismissed

Twenty-Six 

(26): thirddegree 

2C:35-

5(b)(13)

Campione P.A. Dismissed
58 A-1709-18T2

distribution 

of CDS

TwentySeven (27): 

third-degree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione D.H. Dismissed

Twenty-Eight 

(28): fourthdegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-

5(b)(14)

Campione D.D. Dismissed

Twenty-Nine 

(29): thirddegree 

distribution 

of CDS

2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione C.M. Dismissed

Thirty (30): 

fourth-degree 

possession of 

a prohibited 

weapon 

(hollow point 

bullets)

2C:39-3(f) Campione N/A Reinstated

Thirty-One 

(31): fourthdegree 

possession of 

a prohibited 

weapon 

(metal

knuckles)

2C:39-3(e) Campione N/A Reinstated