NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel, DES

DANIELLE SHKAY SMITH, Petitioners/Appellees,

v.

SHANE STEVENS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0590 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2021-052815 

The Honorable Michelle Carson, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum

Counsel for Department of Economic Security

Shane Stevens-El, Phoenix

Respondent/Appellant

FILED 7-20-2023
STATE/SMITH v. STEVENS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

G A S S, Chief Judge:

¶1 Shane Stevens-El (father) appeals the superior court’s denial 

of his motion to vacate a judgment imposing child support obligations. We 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother alleged father was the parent of her child born in 

December 2020. In October 2021, the Arizona Department of Economic 

Security (ADES) petitioned to establish father’s paternity through genetic 

testing and sought an order for child support on behalf of mother. ADES 

did so under the Title IV-D program. In response, father filed affidavits

stating he is a “fit parent” and was “elect[ing], by right, to not participate in 

the Title IV-D program.”

¶3 In May 2022, the superior court held a hearing to establish

child support and decided it would take no action on father’s affidavits. 

Though father attended the hearing, he did not participate and said he 

“d[id] not consent to these proceedings.” Father also did not complete the 

paternity test and refused to recognize the authority of the Title IV-D 

program. ADES moved to proceed by default and the superior court

granted the motion.

¶4 After the superior court proceeded by default, it ordered

father pay $6,022 in child-support arrears and $410 per month in 

prospective child support. Father then filed a motion titled “Motion to 

Vacate Void Judgment” demanding the superior court vacate its order. He

argued he has a constitutional right to decline to participate in Title IV-D 

services, he had not contracted to pay child support, and the superior 

court’s order was void because the court commissioner lacked authority. 

The superior court denied his motion. Father then timely appealed the 

superior court’s denial.
STATE/SMITH v. STEVENS

Decision of the Court

3

JURISDICTION

¶5 The state argues this court lacks jurisdiction over father’s 

appeal because father moved to vacate a “void judgment,” rather than filing 

a motion to set aside default judgment. But the judgment against father was 

not a default judgment.

¶6 A court may issue a default judgment when “a party against 

whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or 

otherwise defend.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(a)(1). Here, ADES petitioned and 

father timely responded by filing affidavits addressing the petition. The 

superior court did not enter a “default judgment.” Instead, it proceeded “by 

default” because of father’s nonparticipation and then entered a judgment.

Because father timely challenged the superior court’s final ruling, his 

motion was proper.

¶7 This court has jurisdiction over father’s appeal under article 

VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1 and 

-2101.A.1.

ANALYSIS

¶8 Father argues the superior court erred in denying his motion 

to vacate void judgment because: (1) the Title IV-D child support program 

violates his due process rights; (2) he need not pay child support because 

he did not contract to do so; and (3) the superior court’s order is void 

because the court commissioner lacked authority to preside over this

matter.

¶9 This court reviews the superior court’s conclusions of law 

about child support de novo. Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 419, 422 ¶ 7 (App. 2017). 

This court reviews factual findings for an abuse of discretion and reverses 

only when clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, 406 ¶ 6 

(App. 2011). A finding is clearly erroneous only if, after considering the 

evidence, this court has a “definite and firm conviction” the superior court 

erred. State v. Burr, 126 Ariz. 338, 339 (1980). This court does not “reweigh 

the evidence but defer[s] to the [superior] court’s determinations of witness 

credibility and the weight given to conflicting evidence.” Lehn v. AlThanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284 ¶ 20 (App. 2019).

¶10 Father provided no transcripts from the Title IV-D 

evidentiary hearing. If a party does not provide a transcript, this court 

presumes the testimony and other evidence discussed in the missing 

transcript supports the superior court’s factual findings and conclusions of 
STATE/SMITH v. STEVENS

Decision of the Court

4

law. State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30 ¶ 16 (App. 2003).

We apply that presumption here. See id.

I. The superior court did not violate father’s due process rights by 

ordering child support under Title IV-D.

¶11 Father argues the superior court deprived him of due process 

because he has the “right as a fit parent to decline Title IV-D services.” 

Father also argues the judgment infringed his constitutional right to make 

decisions about his child’s “care, custody, and control.”

¶12 This court reviews de novo “constitutional issues, including

an alleged violation of due process.” Wassef v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental

Exam’rsex rel. Hugunin, 242 Ariz. 90, 93 ¶ 11 (App. 2017). Due process errors

merit reversal only if they prejudice a party. Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462,

470 ¶ 26 (App. 2014).

¶13 The superior court did not violate father’s due process rights

under Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act. Title IV-D grants 

conditional funds to states to secure financial support for children from 

noncustodial parents. 42 U.S.C. § 651; A.R.S. § 25-509.A. Under Title IV-D, 

a state may provide certain services including establishing paternity and 

child support obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 654; A.R.S. §§ 25-509, -816.

¶14 Whether a custodial parent receives assistance from ADES’s

Title IV-D program to collect child support does not concern the child’s

care, custody, and control. See, e.g., Doll v. Barnell, 693 N.W.2d 455, 461

(Minn. App. 2005) (ruling state’s Title IV-D child-support program did not

violate parents’ right to control their child’s upbringing because child

support does not involve a fundamental parental right). An action securing

child support, thus, does not involve any fundamental parental rights.

II. Father has a legal duty, not a contractual duty, to support his child.

¶15 Father argues ADES has no cause of action because there

was no valid contract requiring him to provide child support.

¶16 Under Arizona law, “every person has the duty to provide

all reasonable support for that person’s . . . minor, unemancipated

children.” A.R.S. § 25-501.A. This duty “is not founded upon contract,

expressed or implied, but on the . . . legal duty of a [parent] to support

[their] minor children.” Indus. Comm’n v. Oden, 68 Ariz. 234, 238 (1949). In

fact, “[a] parent may not form a valid and enforceable contract which
STATE/SMITH v. STEVENS

Decision of the Court

5

releases the parent from all obligation to support his or her minor children.”

Smith v. Saxon, 186 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1996).

¶17 Father relies on the federal nature of Title IV-D to argue

mother has no right to child support. True, generally a parent has no

individual federal right to compel ADES to collect child support. Blessings v.

Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343–44 (1997); see also Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d

1558, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Title IV-D does not create any enforceable

right.”). But father’s argument misses the point. This case arises under state

law—not federal law. See A.R.S. § 25-505.A (permitting ADES to issue

income withholding orders). And state law compels father to support his

child. See A.R.S. § 25-501.A; Indus. Comm’n, 68 Ariz. at 238. Moreover,

ADES—not mother—seeks to enforce the obligation here. And while

mother has no individual right to compel ADES to pursue father for

payment of child support under Title IV-D, the State of Arizona may elect

to do so in its discretion. See A.R.S. § 25-509.B (authorizing state to initiate

or intervene in an action involving child support).

¶18 Father also argues the superior court erred in ordering him

to pay child support because it relied solely on mother’s testimony to

support its paternity finding. Not so. Under A.R.S. § 25-813(2), the superior 

court must enter an order of paternity if a party violates an order for genetic 

or blood testing. “An order of genetic testing issued by [ADES] has the same

force and effect as a superior court order.” A.R.S. § 25-816.A. And if the 

superior court decides paternity in the affirmative, it must order child 

support. A.R.S. § 25-809.A, .D.

¶19 Here, ADES ordered father to submit a genetic test to

establish paternity. But father never completed a genetic or blood test.

Because father violated the order for genetic testing, the superior court

lawfully determined father is the child’s legal parent. See A.R.S. § 25-809.A, 

.D; A.R.S. § 25-813(2).

III. The superior court commissioner’s order establishing child

support is valid and controlling.

¶20 Father argues the court commissioner “did not act as a court 

commissioner . . . in this proceeding, but as a hired contractor”; “[t]he ‘child

support proceeding’ was not a judicial process and the ‘paternity judgment’

and ‘support order’ . . . [were] not court order[s]”; and the judgment and

order were issued coram non judice—outside the presence of a judge. At

bottom, father argues the superior court commissioner’s order is void

because she lacked authority to preside over this matter.
STATE/SMITH v. STEVENS

Decision of the Court

6

¶21 Court commissioners have statutory authority to preside

over child-support cases and enter child-support orders. A.R.S. § 12-298.C.

When court commissioners act within the authority granted by statute, their

orders have the same force and effect as those entered by superior court

judges. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 96(a)(6); see also Green v. Thompson, 17 Ariz. App.

587, 590 (1972) (“The commissioner’s jurisdiction is narrower than that of a

regular superior court judge, but within the confines of that authority, he

acts as a superior court judge.”). Because the court commissioner’s order

establishing child support was within her authority, the order has the same

effect as if entered by a superior court judge.

¶22 The superior court commissioner’s order establishing child

support, thus, is valid and controlling.

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.