[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-12579

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cv-01248-LSC

CHRISTOPHER WOOD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(March 12, 2018)

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Christopher Wood appeals the district court’s order affirming the decision of 

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny his application for 

supplemental security income. He makes four arguments on appeal: (1) that the 

Administrative Law Judge erred by failing to afford the proper weight to the 

opinions of his examining psychologist, Dr. David Wilson; (2) that the ALJ failed 

to consider all of his severe impairments and therefore erred in determining he had 

the residual functional capacity to perform light work; (3) that the ALJ engaged in 

improper “sit and squirm” jurisprudence; and (4) that the case should be remanded 

for consideration under a newly issued Social Security Ruling, SSR 16-3p. After 

careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.1

I

We review de novo the legal principles applied by the ALJ, but “we are 

limited to assessing whether the ALJ’s resulting decision is supported by 

substantial evidence.” Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1266–67 

(11th Cir. 2015). “Under the substantial evidence standard, [we] will affirm the 

ALJ’s decision if there exists ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. at 1267 (quoting Winschel v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)). We will not decide 

facts anew, make credibility determinations, or re-weigh the evidence. See 

 1 Because we write for the parties, we set out only what is necessary to explain our decision.

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Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. “Even if the evidence preponderates against the 

Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by 

substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 

(11th Cir. 2004). This standard is “the same as that of the district court,” so “we 

neither defer to nor consider any errors in the district court’s opinion.” Henry, 802 

F.3d at 1267 (citation and quotation omitted). 

A

Mr. Wood argues that the ALJ erred by failing to afford the proper weight to 

the opinions of his examining psychologist, Dr. Wilson. We disagree. Our review 

of the record shows that the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and that 

substantial evidence supports her conclusion that Dr. Wilson’s opinion was due 

minimal weight.

An ALJ considers many factors when weighing medical opinion evidence, 

including the examining or treating relationship, the extent to which an opinion is 

supported, and whether the medical opinion is consistent with the record as a 

whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). “Generally, the more consistent a medical 

opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to that 

medical opinion.” Id. See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (quoting same). 

Here, the ALJ explained that each of Dr. Wilson’s evaluations—from May 

of 2011 and June of 2013 respectively—were “not consistent with the objective 

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medical evidence as a whole or the other opinions of record.” The ALJ then 

explained the inconsistencies in detail. 

Notably, although Dr. Wilson opined that Mr. Wood had marked limitations 

in sustained concentration and adaptation, Mr. Wood reported that he watches 

television and plays video games all day without any reported problems. Further, 

Dr. Jack Bentley, another examining doctor, noted that Mr. Wood had no problems 

with attention or concentration while he administered the WAIS-III test.

The ALJ also noted that this opinion was inconsistent by Dr. Wilson’s own 

report from 2013, where he noted that Mr. Wood’s thought processes were intact, 

that he spoke clearly and at a normal rate, and that he was cooperative and 

respectful. These inconsistencies are appropriate bases for the ALJ to give 

minimal weight to Dr. Wilson’s opinion. See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 

1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (substantial evidence supported ALJ’s decision to discredit 

examining physician because evidence that claimant was able to work contradicted 

opinion of total disability).

B

Mr. Wood also argues that the ALJ failed to consider all of his severe 

impairments and therefore erred in determining he had the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work. Whether or not a claimant has a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments is considered at step two of the fiveCase: 17-12579 Date Filed: 03/12/2018 Page: 4 of 9 
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step sequential evaluation process set forth in the Social Security Regulations. See 

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) &

416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v)). An impairment is severe if it “significantly limits the 

claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Crayton v. 

Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997). 

At step two of the analysis, the ALJ determined that Mr. Wood exhibited 

several severe impairments. Mr. Wood contends that the ALJ should have also 

found “bipolar disorder, severe depression with extreme mood swings, general 

anxiety disorder, and suicidal ideation.” We are not persuaded that the ALJ erred. 

Step two is a “filter” which eliminates groundless claims. See Jamison v. Bowen, 

814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987). To meet his burden at this step, Mr. Wood 

only had to show “at least one” severe impairment. See id. He met his burden and 

the ALJ appropriately proceeded to the next step of the sequential analysis. 

Therefore, any error in not finding additional severe impairments did not harm Mr. 

Wood.

Moreover, the record also reflects that the ALJ properly considered all of 

Mr. Wood’s impairments and symptoms when assessing his RFC and specified 

certain restrictions that would accommodate him. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 

F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (requiring the ALJ to “determine the claimant’s 

RFC using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case”). Substantial 

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evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion at step four of the analysis that Mr. Wood 

has the RFC to perform light work. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 

(11th Cir. 1997) (“We will not disturb the Commissioner’s decision if, in light of 

the record as a whole, it appears to be supported by substantial evidence.”). The 

ALJ noted that, with certain restrictions on climbing and changing postures, Mr. 

Wood was physically capable of performing light work. To reach this conclusion, 

the ALJ explained that Mr. Wood’s leg pain is related to neuropathy, but he had 

only been treated once and that he does not take any pain or neuropathy 

medication. The record also shows that Mr. Wood reported that he would go on 

walks for about two hours, do laundry and other chores when asked, socialize with 

friends, and used to play basketball.

Regarding Mr. Wood’s mental capacity to perform light work, there is 

evidence that his antisocial behavior, ADHD, and anxiety could be managed if he 

took prescribed medication, monitored his blood sugar, and maintained a suitable 

diet for a diabetic. Likewise, evidence that Mr. Wood could go to the movies, 

watch television, and play video games indicates that he could maintain 

concentration on tasks for up to two hours. The record as a whole therefore 

supports the ALJ’s determination that, with additional restrictions to account for 

his mental health impairments and pain symptoms, Mr. Wood could perform light 

work. See Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439.

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C

Mr. Wood next argues that the ALJ engaged in improper “sit and squirm” 

jurisprudence. “Sit and squirm” jurisprudence occurs when “an ALJ who is not a 

medical expert [ ] subjectively arrive[s] at an index of traits which he expects the 

claimant to manifest at the hearing” and denies the claim if the claimant does not 

exhibit them. See Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir. 1984) 

(quotation omitted). That did not happen here. To the contrary, the ALJ 

appropriately noted that Mr. Wood’s ability “to sit during the entire hearing, which 

lasted just shy of an hour,” contradicted his testimony that his pain caused

problems with prolonged standing and sitting. The ALJ noted this observation, 

along with medical evidence and Mr. Wood’s testimony about his daily activities, 

when explaining why she partially discredited his subjective pain complaints. 

Unlike “sit and squirm” jurisprudence, the ALJ here did not ignore medical 

evidence and impose her own subjective standards; rather, she appropriately 

considered his demeanor at the hearing as one of many factors which called Mr. 

Wood’s credibility into question. See Norris v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1154, 1158 

(11th Cir. 1985) (noting the prohibition on “sit and squirm” jurisprudence does not 

“prohibit an ALJ from considering the claimant’s appearance and demeanor during 

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the hearing” but rather requires that the ALJ “not impose his observations in lieu of 

a consideration of the medical evidence presented”). The ALJ did not err in 

partially rejecting Mr. Wood’s subjective testimony. See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 

F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding “that the ALJ made a reasonable 

decision to reject [claimant’s] subjective testimony, articulating, in detail, the 

contrary evidence as his reasons for doing so”). 

II

Finally, Mr. Wood argues that SSR 16-3p is retroactive and requests that we 

remand his case to the ALJ for consideration of his symptoms in light of the newly 

issued rule. Following Mr. Wood’s briefing on appeal, we issued an opinion 

addressing this exact issue in Hargress v. Social Security Administration, — F.3d 

—, 2018 WL 1061567 (11th Cir. Feb 27, 2018). In Hargress, we held that “SSR 

16-3p applies only prospectively and does not provide a basis for remand.” Id. at 

*5. Therefore, SSR 16-3p is not retroactive and Mr. Wood’s argument for remand 

is foreclosed by our precedent.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision in this case

correctly applied the law and was supported by substantial evidence. The district 

court likewise correctly determined that SSR 16-3p did not require remand. We

therefore affirm.

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AFFIRMED.

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