*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 28, 2005*

Decided September 28, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1710

LEONARD I. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 04 C 3136

Amy J. St. Eve, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Leonard Taylor appeals from an order of the district court upholding the

calculation by the Commissioner of Social Security of his monthly retirement

insurance benefit. Because the Commissioner’s decision is based on substantial

evidence, we affirm. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1710 Page 2

The Social Security Administration approved Taylor’s application for

retirement insurance benefits, but he requested recalculation of the monthly

amount on the belief that it is based on an understated record of his lifetime

earnings. When the agency stood by its calculation, Taylor sought review before an

Administrative Law Judge. As relevant here, Taylor testified before the ALJ that

the agency’s record of his prior earnings omits wages received in 1981 from

Children’s Home and Aid Society of Illinois (“Children’s Home”). Taylor produced a

letter from Children’s Home verifying his employment from February 18 through

October 12, 1981, but he presented no evidence that during this period he earned

more from Children’s Home than the $5,717 already credited to the agency’s record

of his earnings. Taylor conceded that without additional earnings his monthly

benefit was correctly calculated, and having been presented with no such evidence,

the ALJ upheld the agency’s benefit determination.

Taylor then sought review by the Appeals Council and submitted two

additional letters from Children’s Home verifying that his salary was $708 per

month during his employment, but still not showing total earnings greater than

$5,717. The Appeals Council denied review, explaining that the letters supported

the ALJ’s decision because earnings of $708 per month from February 18 through

October 12, 1981, corresponds to the $5,717 in 1981 wages from Children’s Home

already credited to his earnings record.

Taylor next turned to the district court and sought judicial review under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). In response to the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment,

Taylor again submitted new evidence, including copies of two Forms W-2, one

undated from Children’s Home showing $5,717 in earnings and one from Garden

Specialties, Inc., showing $6,464 in earnings in 1978. The district court noted that

Taylor’s submissions were not a part of the administrative record but, regardless,

only served to bolster the Commissioner’s decision because both match information

included already by the agency in his earnings record.

Like the district court we review the final decision of the Commissioner,

White v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1992), and where, as here, the

Appeals Council has declined to review the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s decision is the

final decision of the Commissioner, Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir.

2005). We defer to the ALJ’s findings if supported by substantial evidence. Boiles

v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation

omitted). In this case the ALJ considered, among other things, Taylor’s failure to

present evidence contradicting the agency’s record of his earnings and his

concession that without any additional income in his earnings record the

Commissioner’s calculation of his retirement benefit was correct. Substantial
No. 05-1710 Page 3

evidence therefore supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Taylor’s retirement benefit is

correctly calculated.

Taylor, though, appears to argue that we should order a remand so the

Commissioner may consider documents submitted to the district court as well as

allegations in his appellate brief about other earnings that he says are not included

in the agency’s record. But remand for consideration of additional evidence is

appropriate only upon a showing that there exists “new evidence which is material

and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the

record in a prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290,

1296 (7th Cir. 1997). The information in the Forms W-2 that Taylor provided to the

district court is already included in the agency’s record of his earnings; the forms

support rather than undermine the Commissioner’s decision. See Jens v. Barnhart,

347 F.3d 209, 214 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to direct remand for ALJ to evaluate

written documentation of claimant’s job description since ALJ had already

considered claimant’s testimony regarding duties of that position). And to the

extent that Taylor asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the agency incorrectly

credited wages from employers other than those mentioned to the ALJ or district

court, the information concerns past employment and cannot be characterized as

“new.” See Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining

information in existence or available to claimant at time of administrative

proceeding is not new). Therefore, Taylor is not entitled to remand under § 405(g).

AFFIRMED.