NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.J.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0076 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD531170

The Honorable Robert Ian Brooks, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 8-29-2023
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.J.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in 

which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Frank J. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order granting 

permanent guardianship of his child, P.J., to the child’s paternal 

grandmother (“Grandmother”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s order. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 2 (2016).

Father and Sarafina H. (“Mother”) are the biological parents of P.J. and 

were never married.1 The parents had a history of domestic violence.

¶3 In 2015, the Department petitioned to find P.J. dependent as 

to both Father and Mother for abuse or neglect. Because Mother engaged in 

services, the juvenile court dismissed the dependency. The court granted 

Mother sole legal decision-making authority with Father having supervised 

visitation. In 2017, the Department again petitioned to find P.J. dependent 

as to both parents for neglect. The Department alleged that P.J. had been 

residing with Grandmother for an extended period. The court dismissed 

the dependency the following year because the parents agreed that

Grandmother would be P.J.’s caretaker.

¶4 In 2021, P.J.’s school notified the Department that he had 

“marks and bruises” on his face and arms. During a forensic interview, P.J. 

said that Father had hit him with a “charger cord” because he was mad.

Doctors confirmed that P.J.’s injuries were consistent with his statement.

P.J. also revealed that Father had told him not to tell his teachers or police 

and to say “his brother did it” although no other child lived in the 

household. Father was arrested and charged with child abuse. He admitted 

hitting P.J. because the child had placed food under the couch. Father

1 Mother did not contest the guardianship and is not a party to this 

appeal.
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.J.

Decision of the Court

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agreed to complete a parenting skills program, and after completion, the 

court dismissed the case.

¶5 Because the Department still had concerns about Father’s 

drug and alcohol abuse and his history of domestic violence and mental 

health issues, it again petitioned to find P.J. dependent as to Father because 

of abuse. The court found P.J. dependent as to Father and set the case plan 

for reunification. During the dependency proceeding, P.J. continued living

with Grandmother.

¶6 The Department offered Father services, including parenting 

skills, substance abuse assessment and treatment, behavioral health 

assessment and treatment, visitation, and parent aide classes. Father 

sporadically participated in drug testing. He tested positive for cocaine

multiple times between November 2021 and May 2022. He also tested 

positive for EtG (alcohol) and THC (cannabinoids), with EtG levels 

indicating that “he would be impaired and unable to safely parent” P.J.

Also, Father declined substance-abuse treatment, claiming that he did not 

have time. Eventually in April 2022, he participated in a substance-abuse 

treatment intake but engaged in the treatment inconsistently. Father first 

had to complete substance-abuse treatment before he could undergo anger 

management and domestic violence treatment. But he failed to complete 

substance-abuse treatment and did not show a sufficient period of sobriety. 

In addition, Father was unable to participate consistently in visits because 

his work schedule interfered with his appointments. Because Father was 

not close to remedying his substance abuse, domestic violence, and 

parenting issues, the Department moved to change the case plan to 

permanent guardianship. The court changed the case plan to permanent 

guardianship and ordered the Department to move to appoint a guardian.

¶7 The Department moved to appoint Grandmother as P.J.’s 

permanent guardian. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

The Department’s child safety specialist testified that the Department was 

still concerned about Father’s substance abuse. She also testified that 

Grandmother and P.J. had a strong bond and that he was doing well in her 

care. She added that Grandmother allowed Father visitation and contact 

with P.J. Father testified to using cocaine several times but was working on 

quitting. He also testified that his cocaine use would not affect his ability to 

parent P.J.

¶8 The court granted the motion and found that the Department 

made reasonable efforts to reunite the parents and P.J. but that “further 

efforts would be unproductive.” The court found that reunification was not 
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.J.

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in P.J.’s best interests because the parents could not properly care for him.

The court found that Father’s “inappropriate discipline and inability to 

meet the child’s basic needs was due to his use of substances.” The court 

also found that Father struggled with “understanding the significance of 

his actions and the safety threat physical abuse poses for [P.J.]” The court 

also found that Father did not remedy the circumstances that led to P.J.’s 

removal because he continued using substances, including cocaine, even 

after the court had changed the case plan to guardianship. The court found

that this demonstrated that he would “continue to use for a prolonged and 

indeterminate period.” As a result, it found that reunification efforts would 

be futile because Father “minimally participated” in substance abuse 

testing and treatment. The court concluded that granting the guardianship

was in P.J.’s best interests because P.J. and Grandmother were bonded and 

P.J. would not linger in care while Father “continue[d] intermittent 

engagement in services.” Granting the guardianship, the court added, 

would provide the parents more time to remedy these concerns while 

Grandmother continued to foster the parents’ relationship with P.J. Father 

timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Father argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that 

further efforts to reunite him with P.J. would be unproductive. As the 

moving party, the Department has the burden to prove the statutory 

grounds to establish a permanent guardianship by clear and convincing 

evidence. A.R.S. § 8–872(H). Because the juvenile court was in the “best 

position to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe 

the parties, and make appropriate factual findings,” In re Pima Cnty. 

Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546 (App. 1987), we will affirm 

the juvenile court’s order granting permanent guardianship unless the 

factual findings are clearly erroneous, see Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555 (App. 1997). The findings are clearly erroneous if no 

reasonable fact finder could have found that the evidence satisfied the 

applicable burden of proof. A.R.S. § 8–872(H); Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 555.

¶10 The court may establish a permanent guardianship if in the 

child’s best interests and (1) the child was adjudicated dependent; (2) the 

child has been in the custody of the prospective permanent guardian for at 

least nine months; (3) the Department has made reasonable efforts to 

reunite the parent and child and further efforts would be unproductive; and 

(4) severance and adoption would not be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. 

§ 8–871(A). In examining whether the court properly determined that 

furtherreunification efforts would be unproductive, we review whether the 
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.J.

Decision of the Court

5

court properly determined that the Department made reasonable efforts to 

reunify Father and P.J. A.R.S. § 8–872(H). The Department need not provide 

parents “every conceivable service” but should offer them time and 

opportunity to participate in services to improve their ability to care for 

their child. Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192 ¶ 37 

(App. 1999). The court’s primary consideration must be the child’s 

“physical, mental, and emotional needs and safety.” A.R.S. § 8–871(D).

¶11 The juvenile court did not err. The record shows that the 

Department made reasonable efforts to reunify Father and P.J. and that 

further efforts would be unproductive. The Department provided Father 

with substance-abuse treatment, testing, and supervised visitation for over 

one year. Yet he did not participate in the services consistently. He 

participated only in a few drug tests, which were positive for cocaine and 

alcohol. He failed to demonstrate a period of sobriety, even after the case 

plan changed to permanent guardianship, although he knew that it was 

required to regain custody of P.J. Further, failing to participate in and 

complete substance-abuse treatment prevented him from treatment for 

domestic violence and anger management. Thus, because Father did not 

demonstrate consistent sobriety or participation in services, further 

reunification efforts would have been unproductive. See Mary Ellen C., 193

Ariz. at 187 ¶ 1, 192 ¶ 34 (holding that the Department is not required to 

undertake futile measures but ones with a “reasonable prospect of 

success”).

¶12 Father does not contest the court’s best interests finding, and 

thus concedes it. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 

¶ 13 (2000). Nevertheless, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding 

that the permanent guardianship is in P.J.’s best interests. P.J. has lived with 

Grandmother for many years. He has bonded with Grandmother and is 

doing well in her care. The record supports that a guardianship would 

provide for P.J.’s physical, mental, and emotional needs and safety.

¶13 Father argues that his use of alcohol and cocaine does not 

present a danger to P.J. The record, however, shows that historically, 

Father’s substance abuse had led him to physically abuse P.J. His levels of 

intoxication when he tested positive for alcohol indicated that he was 

impaired and would be unable to safely care for P.J. His inability to 

understand that substance abuse posed a danger to P.J. is apparent from the 

record. 

¶14 Father argues that the court was inconsistent in finding that 

he would benefit from additional time to make behavioral changes while 
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further reunification efforts would be futile. The findings are not 

inconsistent, however. The court found that Father’s continued substance 

abuse during the dependency showed that he would be using “for a 

prolonged and indeterminate period.” It also found that the permanent 

guardianship would provide P.J. with permanency “while Father 

continue[d] his intermittent engagement with services.” Prolonging the 

dependency proceedings pending further reunification efforts would be 

futile because Father did not timely remedy his substance abuse to safely 

parent P.J. Granting the guardianship would allow P.J. permanency and 

provide Father more time to remedy the Department’s concerns. Further, 

Father’s parental rights have not been terminated. See A.R.S. § 8–872(I). A 

guardianship can be revoked upon a change of circumstances. See A.R.S. 

§ 8–873(A).

¶15 Father argues last that the juvenile court did not make 

“sufficiently specific findings,” which violated his due process rights.

Further, he contends that the court “deviated from its own stated intent” in 

signing the Department’s form of judgment granting the guardianship 

instead of making its own findings of fact in a separate minute entry as it 

had ordered. A party may move the court to alter or amend a final order 

for sufficient findings of fact but must do so within 12 days after entry of 

the final order. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 317(a). Father did not do so and has thus

waived this argument on appeal. See Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 249 

Ariz. 289, 296 ¶ 17 (App. 2020) (“When a court fails to comply with a rule 

that mandates findings, a party who does not raise the issue in an 

authorized post-judgment motion may waive it on appeal.”).

¶16 Even so, the court made sufficient factual findings in its final 

order. The court found that P.J. lived with Grandmother for at least nine 

months as a dependent child. The court found that Father had physically 

abused P.J. and admitted to abusing cocaine and alcohol. The court found 

that the Department offered Father services, in which he “minimally 

participated.” Further, the court found that Father continued to abuse 

substances, including cocaine, even after the court changed the case plan to 

guardianship. It even found the guardianship was in P.J.’s best interests 

because P.J. and Grandmother were bonded, and P.J. would not linger in 

care while Father “continue[d] intermittent engagement in services.” These 

findings were therefore sufficient. See Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

230 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 24 (App. 2012) (noting that the “primary purpose for 

requiring a court to making express findings of fact and conclusions of law 

is to allow the appellate court to determine exactly which issues were 

decided and whether the lower court correctly applied the law”). 
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.J.

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¶17 Further, nothing prevented the juvenile court from adopting 

the Department’s proposed findings and conclusions. See A.R.S. §§ 8–871, 

–872; Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 346. A court “may adopt proposed findings that the 

parties submit” as long as “those findings are consistent with the ones that 

it reaches independently after properly considering the facts.” Elliott v. 

Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 134 (App. 1990). The record demonstrates that the 

court independently made its own factual findings. At the end of the 

evidentiary hearing, the court explained that it would “make sure to read 

every page of every exhibit” before making a decision. The court issued the 

order about one month later. Even if the court did not set forth its own 

separate minute entry, the court clearly considered the exhibits before it in 

rendering its decision. We may infer that the court made “whatever 

additional findings are necessary to sustain its judgment” if those findings 

“are reasonably supported by the evidence and do not conflict with any of 

the court’s express findings.” Francine C., 249 Ariz. at 297 ¶ 19. Because 

reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s order, the court did not 

err.

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.