# Journal officiel C 298/26 j

| | ISSN 1977-0936 |
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| Journal officiel
  de l'Union européenne | C 298 |
| | |
| Édition de langue française | Communications et informations | 64e année26 juillet 2021 |

ISSN 1977-0936

Journal officiel

de l'Union européenne

C 298

Édition de langue française

Communications et informations

64e année26 juillet 2021

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| Sommaire | page |
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| | IV   Informations |
| | INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE |
| | Conseil |
| 2021/C 298/01 | Rapport annuel sur l’état d’avancement des travaux concernant la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de l’Union européenne contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (2020) | 1 |

Sommaire

page

IV   Informations

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

Conseil

2021/C 298/01

Rapport annuel sur l’état d’avancement des travaux concernant la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de l’Union européenne contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (2020)

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IV Informations

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

Conseil

| 26.7.2021 | FR EN EN | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 298/1 |
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26.7.2021

FR EN EN

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 298/1

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Rapport annuel sur l’état d’avancement des travaux concernant la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de l’Union européenne contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (2020)

(2021/C 298/01)

INTRODUCTION

| 1. | Le présent rapport sur l’état d’avancement des travaux concernant la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de l’Union européenne contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (ADM), adoptée par le Conseil européen en décembre 2003 (doc. 15708/03), porte sur les activités menées en 2020. Il ne se veut pas exhaustif et est centré sur les principaux développements intervenus. Toutes les activités ont été entreprises dans le contexte plus large de la politique de sécurité de l’UE et de la stratégie de l’UE sur l’union de la sécurité pour la période 2020-2025. |
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1.

| 2. | L’année 2020 a été une année sans précédent, la pandémie de COVID-19 ayant eu une forte incidence sur les travaux multilatéraux, principalement en raison des restrictions en matière de déplacements. Si un certain nombre de réunions multilatérales, tout particulièrement la 10e conférence d’examen du traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP), ont été reportées, de nombreuses autres réunions ont pu être organisées en ligne. De cette manière, les discussions multilatérales ont pu se poursuivre, malgré les limites des interactions par vidéoconférence. Étant donné que la plupart des travaux de l’UE sur les ADM sont menés dans des enceintes multilatérales, cela a créé de nouveaux défis. |
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2.

| 3. | Sur la base de la stratégie globale pour la politique étrangère et de sécurité de l’Union européenne (doc. 10715/16), de la stratégie de l’Union européenne contre la prolifération des ADM et des nouveaux axes d’action (doc. 17172/08), les principes directeurs de l’UE demeurent les suivants:






  a) | un multilatéralisme effectif, y compris la préservation du rôle central et la promotion de l’universalité de l’architecture mondiale de non-prolifération et de désarmement, par l’action diplomatique et par l’intermédiaire de l’assistance financière que l’UE apporte à des pays tiers et à des organisations internationales; |
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3.

a)

un multilatéralisme effectif, y compris la préservation du rôle central et la promotion de l’universalité de l’architecture mondiale de non-prolifération et de désarmement, par l’action diplomatique et par l’intermédiaire de l’assistance financière que l’UE apporte à des pays tiers et à des organisations internationales;

| b) | une coopération étroite avec les pays en vue d’un renforcement du régime international de non-prolifération; |
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b)

une coopération étroite avec les pays en vue d’un renforcement du régime international de non-prolifération;

| c) | les questions de non-prolifération sont abordées lors des réunions consacrées au dialogue politique et en matière de non-prolifération et de désarmement mené par l’UE au niveau bilatéral, ainsi qu’à l’occasion de contacts plus informels; |
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c)

les questions de non-prolifération sont abordées lors des réunions consacrées au dialogue politique et en matière de non-prolifération et de désarmement mené par l’UE au niveau bilatéral, ainsi qu’à l’occasion de contacts plus informels;

| d) | l’utilisation efficace et complémentaire de tous les instruments et de toutes les ressources financières disponibles — le budget de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, l’instrument contribuant à la stabilité et à la paix et d’autres instruments — afin de soutenir les objectifs de l’UE en matière de politique étrangère. |
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d)

l’utilisation efficace et complémentaire de tous les instruments et de toutes les ressources financières disponibles — le budget de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, l’instrument contribuant à la stabilité et à la paix et d’autres instruments — afin de soutenir les objectifs de l’UE en matière de politique étrangère.

| 4. | Le Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE), en particulier l’envoyé spécial pour le désarmement et la non-prolifération (un nouvel envoyé spécial a repris son poste le 1er septembre 2020), a représenté l’UE à plusieurs grandes réunions internationales qui se sont tenues en 2020:






  — | la réunion du groupe des directeurs chargés de la non-prolifération du G7 (2-4 mars, 16 septembre et 4 décembre), |
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4.

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la réunion du groupe des directeurs chargés de la non-prolifération du G7 (2-4 mars, 16 septembre et 4 décembre),

| — | la conférence intitulée «Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control» (6 novembre), |
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la conférence intitulée «Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control» (6 novembre),

| — | la conférence de l’OTAN sur les ADM (10 novembre), |
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la conférence de l’OTAN sur les ADM (10 novembre),

| — | de nombreux événements organisés par des groupes de réflexion sur la préparation de la conférence d’examen du TNP ainsi que des événements d’information organisés en vertu de décisions du Conseil, tels que le soutien à la conférence d’examen du TNP, le code de conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques (HCOC) et la convention sur l’interdiction des armes biologiques et à toxines (CABT). |
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de nombreux événements organisés par des groupes de réflexion sur la préparation de la conférence d’examen du TNP ainsi que des événements d’information organisés en vertu de décisions du Conseil, tels que le soutien à la conférence d’examen du TNP, le code de conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques (HCOC) et la convention sur l’interdiction des armes biologiques et à toxines (CABT).

L’envoyé spécial s’est surtout attaché à:

| a) | promouvoir la préservation et le renforcement du traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) en tant qu’instrument multilatéral fondamental pour la consolidation de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité dans le monde; |
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a)

promouvoir la préservation et le renforcement du traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) en tant qu’instrument multilatéral fondamental pour la consolidation de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité dans le monde;

| b) | promouvoir une adhésion universelle au traité d’interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE) et son entrée en vigueur, et renforcer la visibilité de l’engagement de l’UE à cet égard; |
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b)

promouvoir une adhésion universelle au traité d’interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE) et son entrée en vigueur, et renforcer la visibilité de l’engagement de l’UE à cet égard;

| c) | faire respecter la norme internationale interdisant les armes chimiques, notamment en empêchant toute impunité en cas d’utilisation de celles-ci; |
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c)

faire respecter la norme internationale interdisant les armes chimiques, notamment en empêchant toute impunité en cas d’utilisation de celles-ci;

| d) | promouvoir le code de conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques, qui constitue une mesure de confiance et de transparence. |
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d)

promouvoir le code de conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques, qui constitue une mesure de confiance et de transparence.

| 5. | Le groupe «Non-prolifération» (CONOP) du Conseil de l’UE a tenu neuf réunions en 2020, y compris une au niveau des directeurs, dont sept ont eu lieu par vidéoconférence informelle en raison de la pandémie, afin de discuter des positions et des activités futures de l’UE. Les délégations de l’UE à Vienne, Genève et New York ont élaboré et coordonné des dizaines de déclarations de l’UE destinées aux instances multilatérales, et elles ont activement contribué à la définition des politiques dans le cadre de réunions de coordination tenues périodiquement au niveau de l’UE et à travers leur participation aux réunions du groupe. |
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5.

QUESTIONS NUCLÉAIRES

| 6. | L’UE reste pleinement résolue à promouvoir l’universalisation et la mise en œuvre totale, complète et effective du traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP), l’entrée en vigueur et l’universalisation du traité sur l’interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE) ainsi que le lancement et la conclusion rapide de négociations, lors de la Conférence du désarmement, sur un traité interdisant la production de matières fissiles pour la fabrication d’armes et autres dispositifs explosifs nucléaires. La création au Moyen-Orient d’une zone exempte d’armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs reste aussi une priorité pour l’UE. Les contributions de l’UE à l’UNIDIR au titre de la décision (PESC) 2019/938 du Conseil (1) à l’appui des mesures de confiance conduisant à la création d’une telle zone se sont poursuivies en 2020. |
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6.

Le traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires et l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique

| 7. | Le cycle d’examen du TNP devait être achevé en avril/mai 2020 lors de la dixième conférence d’examen du TNP. En raison de la situation sanitaire mondiale et des restrictions en matière de déplacements qui s’en sont suivies, les États parties sont convenus, en mars 2020, de reporter la conférence d’examen à janvier 2021. Plus tard dans l’année, la conférence d’examen a été reportée une nouvelle fois, à titre provisoire, à août 2021. L’UE a apporté sa contribution à tous les débats pertinents organisés de manière virtuelle ainsi qu’en présentiel, notamment au débat général tenu lors de la 75e session de la Première Commission sur le désarmement et la sécurité internationale de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies. |
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7.

| 8. | La mise en œuvre de la décision (PESC) 2019/615 du Conseil (2) s’est poursuivie en 2020 avec deux activités menées par le Bureau des affaires de désarmement des Nations unies (UNODA): le séminaire thématique sur le pilier I (désarmement nucléaire), qui s’est tenu à Genève (les 29 et 30 janvier), et le séminaire thématique sur le pilier II (non-prolifération nucléaire), qui s’est tenu à New York (les 2 et 3 mars). L’objectif premier de la décision du Conseil est de faire en sorte que la conférence d’examen du TNP soit un succès et qu’un ensemble réaliste et applicable d’actions et de recommandations de nature à permettre un consensus puisse être établi. Les deux réunions régionales restantes, visant à couvrir l’ensemble des trois piliers du TNP, sous l’angle des priorités et des préoccupations régionales, n’ont pas pu être organisées. La décision (PESC) 2019/615 sur le soutien de l’Union aux activités préparatoires à la conférence d’examen a été prorogée en juin 2020, jusqu’au 16 avril 2021, sans nécessiter de moyens financiers supplémentaires, en vertu de la décision (PESC) 2020/906 du Conseil (3). |
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8.

| 9. | L’UE a continué de soutenir les principales responsabilités de l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique (AIEA) en ce qui concerne la non-prolifération, la sûreté nucléaire, la sécurité nucléaire, les applications de l’énergie nucléaire et la coopération technique dans le domaine de l’énergie nucléaire, y compris par un soutien financier approprié. L’UE et Euratom ont participé activement à toutes les réunions des organes directeurs de l’AIEA, la coordination au niveau de l’UE ayant lieu à Vienne. Deux résolutions parrainées par l’UE sur les garanties nucléaires et la sécurité nucléaire ont été adoptées par consensus lors de la 64e réunion de la conférence générale de l’AIEA, tenue en septembre 2020. |
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9.

| 10. | Avec la décision (PESC) 2020/1656 du Conseil du 6 novembre 2020 (4), prévoyant une enveloppe de 11,6 millions d’euros, l’UE continue de contribuer à la mise en œuvre des activités de l’AIEA en matière de sécurité nucléaire. Le financement de l’UE soutient les activités de l’AIEA visant:






  — | l’universalisation des instruments internationaux de non-prolifération et de sécurité nucléaire, y compris l’amendement à la convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires, |
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10.

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l’universalisation des instruments internationaux de non-prolifération et de sécurité nucléaire, y compris l’amendement à la convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires,

| — | la gestion de l’information, l’accent étant mis sur l’évaluation des besoins, des priorités et des menaces en matière de sécurité nucléaire; la sécurité nucléaire des matières et des installations associées, l’accent étant mis sur l’amélioration de la protection physique et de la comptabilité et du contrôle des matières nucléaires pour l’ensemble du cycle du combustible, ainsi qu’un document de réflexion sur l’application de mesures de protection physique à l’ère de la COVID-19, |
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la gestion de l’information, l’accent étant mis sur l’évaluation des besoins, des priorités et des menaces en matière de sécurité nucléaire; la sécurité nucléaire des matières et des installations associées, l’accent étant mis sur l’amélioration de la protection physique et de la comptabilité et du contrôle des matières nucléaires pour l’ensemble du cycle du combustible, ainsi qu’un document de réflexion sur l’application de mesures de protection physique à l’ère de la COVID-19,

| — | la sécurité nucléaire des matières échappant au contrôle réglementaire, l’accent étant mis sur l’infrastructure de réaction institutionnelle, et |
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la sécurité nucléaire des matières échappant au contrôle réglementaire, l’accent étant mis sur l’infrastructure de réaction institutionnelle, et

| — | le développement de programmes et la coopération internationale, l’accent étant mis sur le développement de programmes d’éducation et de formation ainsi que sur le renforcement des capacités et l’éducation en matière de sécurité nucléaire, sous l’angle de l’égalité de genre. |
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le développement de programmes et la coopération internationale, l’accent étant mis sur le développement de programmes d’éducation et de formation ainsi que sur le renforcement des capacités et l’éducation en matière de sécurité nucléaire, sous l’angle de l’égalité de genre.

| 11. | L’AIEA a également continué de mettre en œuvre avec succès la décision (PESC) 2016/2001 du Conseil du 15 novembre 2016 relative à la contribution de l’UE à la mise en place et à la gestion sécurisée d’une banque d’uranium faiblement enrichi (UFE) sous le contrôle de l’AIEA dans le cadre de la stratégie de l’Union européenne contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (5). |
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11.

| 12. | Le JRC et l’AIEA ont continué à mettre en œuvre des «arrangements pratiques de coopération concernant les applications en matière de science nucléaire» signés en marge de la 5e réunion des hauts fonctionnaires UE-AIEA (15 février 2017), visant à développer des activités conjointes et à éviter la duplication d’efforts. L’une des activités prévues par ces arrangements consiste à contrôler la radioactivité dans l’environnement, en la mesurant, dans toute l’Europe et dans un certain nombre d’autres lieux dans le monde, sous la forme de taux d’exposition moyenne et maximale aux rayons gamma pendant les dernières 24 heures. Ces mesures proviennent de quelque 5 500 sites de contrôle exploités par les autorités nationales compétentes dans 39 pays, qui communiquent les dernières valeurs radiologiques en date à la plate-forme d’échange de données radiologiques de l’Union européenne. La notification d’un accident radiologique ou d’une urgence radiologique intervient via des réseaux de notification rapide comme ECURIE ou EMERCON, gérés respectivement par la Commission européenne et l’AIEA, après consultation des autorités nationales compétentes. |
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12.

| 13. | Le plan d’action global commun constitue un élément essentiel de l’architecture mondiale de non-prolifération nucléaire et une réussite de la diplomatie multilatérale. La pleine mise en œuvre de l’accord est essentielle pour la sécurité européenne. L’UE a déploré à plusieurs reprises que l’Iran revoie à la baisse ses engagements en matière nucléaire au titre du plan d’action global commun, dont la mise en œuvre a débuté en juillet 2019 et s’est poursuivie tout au long de l’année 2020. Le haut représentant de l’Union, en tant que coordinateur de la commission conjointe du plan d’action global commun, reste pleinement déterminé à collaborer avec la communauté internationale afin de maintenir en place le plan d’action global commun et d’en assurer la mise en œuvre intégrale. Nous nous sommes réjouis de la perspective d’un retour des États-Unis au plan d’action global commun et du retour de l’Iran à sa mise en œuvre intégrale, et nous soutenons les efforts diplomatiques intenses en cours et les contacts du haut représentant de l’Union avec tous les partenaires concernés. |
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13.

| 14. | Dans le même temps, l’UE continue aussi de contribuer à la mise en œuvre du plan d’action global commun en coordonnant les activités de la commission conjointe et celles des groupes d’experts créés en vertu du plan d’action global commun. L’UE continue par ailleurs de soutenir la mission à long terme de l’AIEA consistant à vérifier et contrôler si l’Iran respecte ses engagements dans le domaine du nucléaire. Malgré les restrictions liées à la pandémie de COVID, l’UE continue de coopérer avec l’Iran dans le domaine du nucléaire civil en vertu de l’annexe III du plan d’action global commun dans le domaine de la sûreté nucléaire. La filière d’approvisionnement établie par le plan d’action global commun, dans le cadre de laquelle sont examinés les transferts d’articles nucléaires ou à double usage à l’Iran, reste pleinement opérationnelle. En 2020, le groupe «Marchés publics» s’est réuni sept fois et la tendance négative des propositions observée en 2019 s’est inversée. L’Iran reste le plus important bénéficiaire de l’action de l’UE dans le domaine de la sûreté nucléaire. La coopération nucléaire civile entre l’UE et l’Iran consiste notamment à soutenir la modernisation du réacteur de recherche d’Arak (Khondab), le régulateur iranien dans le domaine de la sûreté nucléaire (INRA), les activités de vérification et de surveillance de l’AIEA en Iran, les tests de résistance de la centrale nucléaire de Bushehr et la fourniture d’équipements au centre iranien de sûreté nucléaire de l’INRA. |
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14.

| 15. | Les accords de garanties généralisées et les protocoles additionnels constituent la norme actuelle en matière de vérification, et l’UE continue de plaider en faveur d’une adhésion universelle à ces accords et protocoles. L’étroite coopération mise en place entre Euratom et l’AIEA permet des garanties effectives et efficaces. L’UE soutient activement le système de garanties de l’AIEA par l’intermédiaire du programme de soutien aux garanties de la Commission européenne, de l’instrument relatif à la coopération en matière de sûreté nucléaire et des programmes de soutien d’États membres. Le programme de soutien aux garanties de la Commission européenne a renforcé les capacités de l’AIEA en matière de garanties nucléaires, dont les capacités de vérification de la mise en œuvre du plan d’action global commun, au moyen d’une formation destinée aux inspecteurs de l’AIEA chargés du contrôle des garanties et axée sur l’accès complémentaire et la mise en œuvre de la procédure combinée d’analyse de la concentration et de l’enrichissement en uranium (COMPUCEA) pour la vérification de l’enrichissement de l’UF6, y compris les différents matériaux de référence. Le programme de soutien aux garanties de la Commission européenne soutient le réseau de laboratoires d’analyse de l’AIEA dans le cadre de ses mandats de vérification du plan d’action global commun à travers des services d’analyse, des méthodes normalisées et des outils de contrôle de la qualité. En particulier, l’analyse des particules ainsi que la production et la certification de particules de référence aident le réseau de laboratoires d’analyse de l’AIEA à élaborer de nouvelles méthodes et de nouveaux protocoles de mesure pour l’analyse d’échantillons de l’environnement prélevés par frottis dans le cadre du protocole additionnel. |
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15.

| 16. | La Commission européenne continue d’administrer et de soutenir activement la European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), qui poursuit également son action de sensibilisation au niveau international grâce à ses protocoles d’accord avec la Commission africaine de l’énergie nucléaire et le réseau Asie-Pacifique pour les garanties, en étroite collaboration avec l’Institut de gestion des matières nucléaires. Les groupes de travail de l’ESARDA élaborent, testent et valident des approches innovantes en matière de garanties et de non-prolifération, au bénéfice direct de la direction de la DG ENER chargée des garanties nucléaires et du département des garanties de l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique. Malgré les restrictions liées à la pandémie de COVID, des formations techniques à distance sur l’enrichissement de l’uranium, les vérifications de la composition isotopique du plutonium et la cartographie laser pour la vérification du confinement (LMCV) ont été organisées à l’intention des inspecteurs d’Euratom. Avant la pandémie, une formation sur le comptage des neutrons a également eu lieu. Le cours bien établi de l’ESARDA sur les garanties nucléaires et la non-prolifération a toutefois été annulé en 2020 et des scénarios détaillés ont été élaborés pour l’édition 2021 du cours (12-16 avril 2021). Les résultats de la recherche et du développement et les initiatives en matière d’éducation et de formation renforcent les capacités européennes et internationales en matière de garanties nucléaires et de contrôle stratégique des échanges. Les retombées des travaux menés dans ce cadre ont été mises à profit pour contribuer aux initiatives en matière de sécurité nucléaire et de désarmement nucléaire. Le JRC de la Commission européenne a acquis de l’expérience en matière de formation technique à distance pour les inspecteurs des garanties, qui a été partagée avec l’AIEA dans le cadre de réunions trilatérales (AIEA, Euratom et JRC). L’habituelle réunion de mai de l’ESARDA à Luxembourg a été reportée à novembre 2020 et organisée conjointement par l’IRSN dans une configuration virtuelle avec 270 participants. L’ESARDA prépare actuellement la toute première réunion annuelle conjointe avec l’Institut de gestion des matières nucléaires, prévue en tant qu’événement virtuel pour la fin du mois d’août 2021. |
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16.

| 17. | La Commission européenne a financé un vaste projet d’éducation et de formation dans le domaine des garanties nucléaires avec le Réseau européen pour l’enseignement des sciences nucléaires (ENEN). Dans le cadre du contrat conclu à cet effet, l’ENEN collabore avec le Politecnico di Milano (POLIMI), le JRC, l’ESARDA et l’AIEA pour mettre en place le tout premier programme universitaire de troisième cycle sur les garanties nucléaires pour l’année universitaire 2021/2022. Une campagne de recrutement spécifique à l’intention d’étudiants de pays tiers est en cours et jusqu’à 35 conférenciers spécialisés ont été identifiés pour dispenser le cours. |
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17.

| 18. | Le Conseil, sur proposition du Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE), a décidé en 2020 de contribuer à l’universalisation d’éléments du système de garanties de l’AIEA, en accordant une attention particulière au protocole modifié relatif aux petites quantités de matières (PPQM) et au protocole additionnel (PA), par une série de démarches à effectuer dans des États tiers (6). La mise en œuvre de ces démarches a débuté en décembre 2020. |
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18.

| 19. | L’UE et ses États membres attachent la plus haute importance à la mise en œuvre et à l’amélioration constante de la sûreté nucléaire partout dans le monde. L’UE a donné force de loi aux objectifs de la déclaration de Vienne sur la sûreté nucléaire à travers sa directive modifiée sur la sûreté nucléaire, qui est entrée en vigueur en 2017. Un élément essentiel de la directive modifiée est l’instauration d’un objectif de sûreté nucléaire s’imposant à tous les opérateurs pour prévenir les accidents et éviter les rejets radioactifs de grande ampleur. La directive modifiée a en outre ajouté l’examen thématique par les pairs dans la législation Euratom. Un premier examen de ce type a été mené à bien. Tous les États membres de l’UE ont transposé les nouvelles exigences dans leur droit national. |
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19.

| 20. | Désireuse de faciliter les utilisations pacifiques de l’énergie nucléaire, l’UE a alloué, pour la période 2014-2020, un montant de 325 millions d’euros afin de promouvoir la sûreté nucléaire, la protection contre les rayonnements et l’application de garanties efficaces et effectives dans les pays tiers. En coopération avec l’AIEA et d’autres partenaires, la Commission européenne soutient la mise en œuvre du plan directeur stratégique pour la remédiation environnementale en Asie centrale, dont le financement doit se faire par un compte spécifiquement consacré à la remédiation et géré par la BERD. En tant que principal donateur, l’UE continue de s’adresser aux pays bénéficiaires (Kirghizstan, Tadjikistan et Ouzbékistan) afin de stimuler leur engagement et de lancer des projets concrets d’assainissement et de remédiation. |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | L’UE et ses États membres continuent de soutenir vigoureusement le programme de coopération technique de l’AIEA, notamment en apportant des contributions substantielles au Fonds de coopération technique et à l’initiative en faveur d’une utilisation pacifique de l’énergie nucléaire. L’UE et ses États membres se classent parmi les principaux contributeurs au programme de coopération technique, qui est un outil important pour permettre une utilisation sûre, sécurisée et pacifique de la technologie nucléaire et atteindre les objectifs du programme de développement durable à l’horizon 2030. |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | L’UE et l’AIEA se réunissent généralement chaque année au niveau des hauts fonctionnaires afin de passer en revue et de planifier leur coopération au sens large. Si la réunion annuelle de 2020 n’a pas pu être organisée en raison de la pandémie, des contacts étroits entre l’UE et l’AIEA ont néanmoins été maintenus par d’autres canaux. |
| --- | --- |

22.

Traité d’interdiction complète des essais nucléaires

| 23. | L’entrée en vigueur et l’universalisation du TICE sont des objectifs importants de la stratégie de l’UE contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive. Tous les États membres de l’UE ont démontré leur attachement au traité en le ratifiant et en appliquant ses obligations essentielles. Le TICE constitue une mesure forte d’instauration de la confiance et de renforcement de la sécurité. En 2020, l’UE a mené des activités diplomatiques en faveur du TICE, adaptées aux possibilités limitées dues à la pandémie. Promouvoir l’entrée en vigueur du TICE compte au nombre des actions énoncées dans le programme du Secrétaire général des Nations unies intitulé «Assurer notre avenir commun — Un programme de désarmement», que l’UE a décidé de soutenir. L’UE a appelé maintes fois à la ratification du traité dans les déclarations qu’elle a faites dans les enceintes concernées ainsi que dans le cadre de ses contacts bilatéraux avec les pays concernés figurant ou non à l’annexe II. En outre, le 6 octobre 2020, l’envoyé spécial pour la non-prolifération et le désarmement a participé en tant qu’intervenant au webinaire sur le TICE et la 10e conférence d’examen du TNP, organisé par l’OTICE. |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | L’UE promeut systématiquement les avantages et les contributions que le traité apporte à la paix, à la sécurité, au désarmement et à la non-prolifération, y compris dans ses applications civiles. Le soutien financier de l’UE en faveur de la commission préparatoire de l’Organisation du traité d’interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (OTICE) a été renouvelé en 2020, pour une nouvelle période de trois ans, par la décision (PESC) 2020/901 du Conseil (7) concernant le soutien de l’Union aux activités de la commission préparatoire de l’OTICE afin de renforcer ses capacités en matière de surveillance et de vérification. L’UE et ses États membres ont aussi contribué au maintien et au renforcement du régime de vérification du TICE en fournissant une aide technique, en renforçant les capacités et en facilitant la participation d’experts aux réunions de l’OTICE, en particulier pour les pays en développement. L’UE a participé activement aux sessions de la commission préparatoire de l’OTICE et de ses groupes de travail A et B, la coordination au niveau de l’UE ayant lieu au sein du groupe CONOP et à Vienne. |
| --- | --- |

24.

Initiatives liées à la sécurité nucléaire

| 25. | L’UE a soutenu la convocation et les résultats de la conférence internationale sur la sécurité nucléaire (ICONS 2020), tenue en février 2020. Dans leur déclaration ministérielle, les participants à la conférence réitèrent leur engagement à soutenir et renforcer l’efficacité et l’exhaustivité de la sécurité nucléaire de toutes les matières nucléaires et autres matières radioactives et des installations nucléaires, et reconnaissent le rôle essentiel que l’AIEA joue en favorisant et en coordonnant la coopération internationale dans le domaine de la sécurité nucléaire. |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | L’UE a continué de promouvoir la convention internationale pour la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire (CTN) et l’amendement à la convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires (CPPMN) en tant qu’éléments fondamentaux de l’architecture mondiale en matière de sécurité nucléaire et de lutte contre le terrorisme. L’Office des Nations unies contre la drogue et le crime (ONUDC) et le Bureau des Nations unies pour la lutte contre le terrorisme ont continué à mettre en œuvre la décision (PESC) 2018/1939 du Conseil concernant le soutien de l’Union à l’universalisation et à la mise en œuvre effective de la CTN (8). Cette décision a pour objectifs d’accroître le nombre d’adhérents à la CTN, de mieux faire connaître la CTN aux responsables politiques et décideurs nationaux, ainsi que de renforcer les capacités; il s’agit d’aider à améliorer les législations nationales et de renforcer les capacités des parties prenantes nationales, y compris le personnel de la justice pénale, en ce qui concerne les enquêtes, les poursuites et le jugement des affaires de terrorisme nucléaire. Un certain nombre d’événements prévus pour 2020 ont été reportés ou, à défaut, organisés avec succès dans un format virtuel, compte tenu de la pandémie. |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | L’UE a continué de soutenir l’Initiative internationale de lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire (GICNT) et de l’aider dans l’accomplissement de sa mission consistant à renforcer, au niveau mondial, les capacités permettant de prévenir et détecter le terrorisme nucléaire et d’y faire face. |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | L’UE et ses États membres participent activement aux travaux de la GICNT dans tous les domaines: la détection nucléaire, la criminalistique nucléaire, ainsi que la réaction et l’atténuation. |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Le centre européen de formation en sécurité nucléaire (CEFSN), qui forme à la détection des actes illicites impliquant des matières nucléaires et autres matières radioactives et aux moyens d’y répondre, est entièrement opérationnel depuis 2013, au service des États membres de l’Union européenne et de pays partenaires, dont plusieurs membres de la GICNT. Le centre est géré par le Centre commun de recherche (JRC) de la Commission européenne sur ses sites de Karlsruhe (Allemagne) et d’Ispra (Italie), en étroite coopération avec d’autres initiatives internationales promues par l’AIEA et plusieurs pays partenaires de la GICNT. Le centre est aussi utilisé pour des exercices pratiques liés essentiellement à la lutte contre le trafic de matières nucléaires. Le CEFSN s’efforce de répondre aux besoins de formation des États membres de l’UE et des partenaires de l’UE, notamment en dispensant des formations coordonnées, qui sont destinées aux délégués des États membres et portent sur les pratiques douanières et les mesures prises pour faire respecter la législation, qu’elles soient déjà mises en œuvre ou prévues pour la période 2019-2021 (en collaboration directe avec la DG Migration et affaires intérieures et la DG Fiscalité et union douanière de la Commission européenne). Le CEFSN renforce l’infrastructure utilisée pour dispenser les formations, développe des outils d’apprentissage virtuel et fournit une évaluation des performances des équipements à la demande des États membres de l’UE. La pandémie a limité les formations en présentiel. Une approche hybride a été mise au point à l’aide de moyens modernes, en mettant l’accent sur des exercices de terrain avec utilisation à distance d’instruments et utilisation réelle de matières nucléaires et radioactives afin de soutenir les efforts de lutte contre les menaces CBRN et le terrorisme nucléaire. |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | La Commission européenne et les États membres de l’UE ont poursuivi leurs activités de criminalistique nucléaire concernant la caractérisation des matières nucléaires interceptées, en utilisant des capacités avancées de criminalistique nucléaire sur le site du JRC à Karlsruhe (Allemagne). |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Le JRC et l’ESARDA ont apporté une contribution substantielle au livre sur la non-prolifération nucléaire et la vérification du contrôle des armements — concepts de systèmes innovants, publié en 2020. |
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31.

| 32. | La Commission européenne a continué de renforcer la capacité des États membres de l’UE à tester et à évaluer les performances des équipements utilisés pour détecter le trafic de matières nucléaires et radioactives dans le cadre de son programme ITRAP+10 phase II, qui conduira à une harmonisation et à une normalisation accrues et contribuera de manière substantielle aux normes internationales. À cet effet, la Commission a également organisé, en marge de la conférence internationale sur la sécurité nucléaire (ICONS) 2020, une manifestation qui a connu un franc succès. |
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32.

| 33. | La Commission européenne continue de jouer un rôle majeur au sein du groupe de travail sur la surveillance des frontières pour la sécurité nucléaire. Elle a présidé à la fois ce groupe de travail et ses deux sous-groupes sur les technologies de détection et le renforcement des capacités. |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | La Commission européenne a poursuivi ses activités de recherche sur le développement d’une nouvelle technique d’analyse non destructive, à savoir la spectrométrie des gamma retardés pour la vérification des signatures des matières nucléaires, en collaboration avec l’AIEA. Une action commune (JRC et AIEA) dans le cadre du programme de soutien à l’AIEA a été présentée. |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | En 2020, la DG TAXUD, soutenue par le JRC et le CEFSN, a lancé un programme interactif d’apprentissage en ligne pour aider les agents des douanes à acquérir des connaissances sur le contrôle des matières radioactives et nucléaires aux frontières. Le module de base met en exergue le rôle important que jouent les agents des douanes dans la détection des matières nucléaires et radioactives, en les sensibilisant aux risques et aux menaces, et contient une introduction de base aux matières, équipements et processus pertinents. Le module avancé examine plus en détail les mêmes sujets. Les deux cours comprennent des scénarios réalistes, impliquant des ports maritimes, des aéroports, des chemins de fer et des frontières terrestres, dans lesquels les participants peuvent tester leur prise de décision. La collaboration entre la DG TAXUD et le JRC a permis de renforcer les synergies entre les administrations douanières des États membres. Les formations dispensées au CEFSN serviront de base aux experts nationaux pour échanger les bonnes pratiques en matière de sécurité nucléaire pour la protection des frontières, contribuant ainsi à l’élaboration de procédures harmonisées. Ces efforts s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’une action visant à lutter de manière collaborative contre le trafic nucléaire et à faciliter les échanges par les points de contrôle douaniers. Au final, l’objectif est d’empêcher des individus d’avoir accès à des matières dangereuses en promouvant une culture commune de la sécurité nucléaire. |
| --- | --- |

35.

Initiatives liées à la vérification nucléaire

| 36. | L’UE et ses États membres ont soutenu la création du groupe d’experts gouvernementaux sur la vérification du désarmement nucléaire lors de la session de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies tenue en 2016, se sont félicités des discussions menées au sein du GEE et ont approuvé la recommandation de poursuivre les travaux, en tenant compte du rapport du groupe d’experts gouvernementaux. L’UE soutient pleinement la résolution 74/50 de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies et la création d’un nouveau groupe d’experts gouvernementaux, qui doit se réunir en 2021 et 2022 pour continuer à examiner le rôle de la vérification dans la promotion du désarmement nucléaire. L’UE soutient les activités menées dans le cadre de partenariats plus larges et d’arrangements de vérification coopérative et a participé aux travaux du partenariat international pour la vérification du désarmement nucléaire (PIVDN) depuis l’instauration de ce dernier, en 2015. L’UE fait aussi campagne en faveur de l’action liée à la vérification du désarmement nucléaire qui figure dans le programme du Secrétaire général des Nations unies intitulé «Assurer notre avenir commun — Un programme de désarmement». |
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36.

Questions régionales

| 37. | L’UE et ses États membres ont continué de demander avec insistance à la RPDC de prendre des mesures concrètes en vue de l’abandon de ses programmes d’ADM et de missiles balistiques de manière complète, vérifiable et irréversible. Ce message a été relayé dans toutes les déclarations faites par l’UE en la matière. L’UE a vu la République populaire démocratique de Corée (RPDC) lancer des missiles balistiques en mars et avril 2020, en violation des obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de multiples résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies; ces lancements de missiles représentent une menace grave pour la paix et la sécurité régionales et internationales et sapent les efforts internationaux déployés en vue d’instaurer une paix et une sécurité durables dans la péninsule coréenne. La présentation de missiles apparemment nouveaux en octobre et les affirmations de la RPDC selon lesquelles elle ne se considère plus tenue de maintenir un moratoire sur les essais d’armes nucléaires et de missiles balistiques intercontinentaux ont pesé encore davantage sur les conditions nécessaires à la reprise du dialogue. L’UE a invité la RPDC à mettre immédiatement un terme à tous ses lancements, à engager des négociations constructives, à prendre des mesures concrètes et crédibles en vue de renforcer la confiance et à abandonner tous ses programmes d’armement nucléaire et de missiles balistiques de manière complète, vérifiable et irréversible. L’UE a continué de demander avec insistance à la RPDC de se conformer intégralement à l’ensemble des résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies ainsi qu’à ses autres obligations et engagements internationaux, de signer et ratifier sans tarder le TICE et de revenir au respect des obligations qui lui incombent en vertu du TNP en matière de garanties. L’UE a rapidement transposé toutes les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité dans sa législation et elle a également adopté des sanctions autonomes rigoureuses, qui complètent et renforcent celles adoptées par les Nations unies. L’UE a poursuivi ses efforts pour encourager d’autres pays à mettre pleinement en œuvre les sanctions à l’encontre de la RPDC. Dans une déclaration faite le 16 juin, le porte-parole du SEAE a déploré les actions de la RPDC qui avaient suscité des tensions et a demandé instamment la reprise d’un processus diplomatique soutenu visant à instaurer la confiance ainsi qu’une paix et une sécurité durables dans la péninsule coréenne, sans armes nucléaires, le plus tôt possible. |
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37.

Conférence du désarmement (CD)/Traité interdisant la production de matières fissiles pour la fabrication d’armes et autres dispositifs explosifs nucléaires

| 38. | L’UE reste unie et confirme son engagement en faveur d’une maîtrise des armements nucléaires et d’un désarmement nucléaire vérifiables et fondés sur les traités et souligne la nécessité de renouveler les efforts multilatéraux et de réactiver les enceintes de négociation multilatérales, en particulier la conférence du désarmement. Le lancement immédiat de négociations sur un traité interdisant la production de matières fissiles pour la fabrication d’armes nucléaires et autres dispositifs explosifs nucléaires (TIPMF) est une priorité de longue date de l’UE dans le cadre de la conférence du désarmement. L’UE soutient le lancement de telles négociations conformément au document CD/1299 et au mandat qui y figure. L’UE demande à tous les États membres de la CD d’entamer sans tarder des négociations sur le TIPMF et de commencer à travailler sur les autres questions inscrites à l’ordre du jour. Par la décision (UE) 2017/2284 du Conseil du 11 décembre 2017 (9), l’UE a apporté un soutien financier au Bureau des affaires de désarmement des Nations unies afin de faciliter la participation des pays d’Afrique, d’Asie, d’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes aux consultations et autres activités en rapport avec le TIPMF. Elle encourage également tous les pays possédant des armes nucléaires qui ne l’ont pas encore fait à déclarer et à soutenir un moratoire immédiat sur la production de matières fissiles pour la fabrication d’armes nucléaires et autres dispositifs explosifs nucléaires. L’État membre de l’UE qui est doté d’armes nucléaires a déclaré des moratoires en ce domaine, et il a démantelé les installations correspondantes. |
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38.

ARMES CHIMIQUES

| 39. | L’UE a continué de soutenir l’Organisation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC), politiquement, diplomatiquement et financièrement, afin de parvenir à une mise en œuvre complète et effective de la convention sur les armes chimiques (CAC) et à une adhésion universelle à cette convention. |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Dans ce contexte, la mise en œuvre de la décision (PESC) 2019/538 du Conseil du 1er avril 2019 (10) s’est poursuivie. Cette décision prévoit que l’UE appuie les principales activités de l’OIAC (telles que la mise en œuvre au niveau national, la coopération internationale, l’universalisation, le programme pour l’Afrique) pendant la période 2019-2022. Elle prévoit aussi une contribution importante à la mise à niveau du laboratoire de l’OIAC pour en faire un Centre pour la chimie et la technologie et à la mise en œuvre de la décision C-SS-4/DEC.3 intitulée «Contrer la menace que constitue l’emploi d’armes chimiques», prise lors de la session extraordinaire de la Conférence des États parties à la CAC, le 27 juin 2018. |
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40.

| 41. | L’UE a résolument soutenu le travail accompli par la mission d’établissement des faits, l’équipe d’évaluation des déclarations et l’équipe d’enquête et d’identification de l’OIAC pour enquêter sur les informations faisant état de l’utilisation d’armes chimiques en Syrie et chercher à remédier aux lacunes et incohérences constatées dans la déclaration initiale faite par ce pays, ainsi que pour enquêter sur les auteurs d’attaques chimiques en Syrie et identifier ceux-ci. C’est dans ce contexte que s’est poursuivie la mise en œuvre de la décision (PESC) 2017/2303 du Conseil (11), modifiée par la décision (PESC) 2019/2112 du Conseil à l’appui de la poursuite de la mise en œuvre de la résolution 2118 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et de la décision EC-M-33/DEC.1 du Conseil exécutif de l’OIAC sur la destruction des armes chimiques syriennes, notamment grâce à la fourniture d’images satellite à l’appui des opérations de l’OIAC en Syrie. |
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41.

| 42. | Conformément aux conclusions du Conseil européen du 28 juin 2018, qui indiquaient que l’UE s’engageait à apporter son soutien à la mise en œuvre de la décision C-SS-4/DEC.3 prise lors de la session extraordinaire de la conférence des États parties à la convention sur les armes chimiques tenue le 27 juin 2018, en vue de mettre en place un mécanisme d’établissement des responsabilités en réponse à l’utilisation répétée de ces armes depuis 2012 et dans la perspective de faire adopter les projets de programme et de budget de l’OIAC pour 2021, l’UE a mené une démarche auprès d’un grand nombre d’États parties à la CAC, leur demandant de participer et d’apporter leur soutien au bon déroulement de la première partie de la 25e conférence des États parties, qui s’est tenue du 30 novembre au 1er décembre 2020. |
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42.

| 43. | En 2020 s’est poursuivie la mise en œuvre de la décision (PESC) 2017/1252 du Conseil du 11 juillet 2017 à l’appui du renforcement de la sûreté et de la sécurité chimiques en Ukraine dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de la résolution 1540 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies relative à la non-prolifération des armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs (12). Par cette décision, l’UE a soutenu le renforcement des capacités nationales en Ukraine et notamment la création d’un centre de référence national ukrainien chargé d’identifier les substances chimiques contrôlées et toxiques. |
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43.

ARMES BIOLOGIQUES

| 44. | L’UE et ses États membres sont d’ardents partisans de la convention sur les armes biologiques ou à toxines (BTWC) et participent résolument aux efforts internationaux visant à améliorer la biosûreté et la biosécurité dans le monde entier. Par l’intermédiaire d’actions communes et de décisions du Conseil, l’UE a fourni depuis 2006 près de 10 millions d’euros au soutien direct de la BTWC. En outre, l’UE a fourni 6 millions d’euros supplémentaires pour soutenir le renforcement de la biosécurité et de la biosûreté en Ukraine et dans un certain nombre de pays d’Amérique latine, ainsi qu’à l’appui du mécanisme permettant au secrétaire général de l’ONU d’enquêter sur les allégations d’emploi d’armes chimiques et biologiques. |
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44.

| 45. | En juillet 2020, l’UE a mené une campagne d’information sur l’universalisation auprès de treize pays qui ne sont pas encore parties à la BTWC, les encourageant à adhérer à celle-ci avant la neuvième conférence d’examen. |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | En 2020, la mise en œuvre de la décision (PESC) 2019/97 du Conseil (13) en faveur de la BWTC s’est poursuivie, tout en étant considérablement entravée par la pandémie de COVID-19. Cette décision prévoit un budget de 3 millions d’euros destiné au Bureau des affaires de désarmement des Nations unies (UNODA) pour la période 2019-2022. Cela permet à l’unité d’appui à l’application de la BTWC de faciliter six nouveaux projets en faveur de l’universalisation; de renforcer les capacités de mise en œuvre au niveau national, y compris trois exercices d’examen par les pairs; de favoriser la biosûreté dans les pays du Sud; d’élaborer des outils propices à la communication, à l’éducation et à la coopération; ainsi que d’accroître la préparation en vue de faire face à des attaques biologiques. Le 14 octobre 2020, le programme national de préparation pour le Nigeria ainsi qu’une formation en ligne sur la préparation et la présentation de mesures de confiance ont été lancés à l’occasion d’une réunion virtuelle. |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | En 2020, la mise en œuvre de la décision (PESC) 2019/1296 adoptée par le Conseil le 31 juillet 2019 à l’appui du renforcement de la sûreté et de la sécurité biologiques en Ukraine dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de la résolution 1540 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies relative à la non-prolifération des armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs (14) a été retardée. Par cette décision, qui est mise en œuvre par l’OSCE et prévoit un soutien de 1,9 millions d’euros sur trois ans, l’UE soutient le renforcement de la sûreté et la sécurité biologiques en Ukraine, notamment en améliorant la base législative et réglementaire de ce pays et ses systèmes de santé humaine et animale, ainsi qu’en sensibilisant les chercheurs en sciences de la vie. |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | En 2020, la mise en œuvre de la décision (PESC) 2019/2108 adoptée par le Conseil le 9 décembre 2019 à l’appui du renforcement de la sûreté et de la sécurité biologiques en Amérique latine dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de la résolution 1540 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies relative à la non-prolifération des armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs (15) s’est poursuivie, tout en étant considérablement entravée par la pandémie de COVID-19. La décision est mise en œuvre par l’Organisation des États américains et prévoit un soutien d’un montant de 2,7 millions d’euros sur trois ans. |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Le 2 juin 2020, le Conseil a adopté la décision (PESC) 2020/732 du 2 juin 2020 en faveur du mécanisme permettant au secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations unies d’enquêter sur les allégations d’emploi d’armes chimiques et biologiques ou à toxines (16), qui est mise en œuvre par le Bureau des affaires de désarmement des Nations unies et prévoit un montant de 1,4 million d’euros sur trois ans. |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | En raison de la pandémie de COVID-19, toutes les réunions de la BTWC de 2020 ont été reportées à 2021, tandis que la neuvième conférence d’examen a été reportée à 2022. Entre-temps, en octobre et novembre 2020, l’unité d’appui à l’application de la BTWC a organisé une série de séminaires informels en ligne sur les sujets couverts par les cinq réunions d’experts. |
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50.

| 51. | En octobre 2020, l’UE a mené une campagne d’information à New York et à Genève pour encourager les États membres des Nations unies à ne pas soutenir, lors de la 75e session de l’AGNU, un projet de résolution sur le mécanisme du Secrétaire général de l’ONU qui ne correspondait pas à la conception de ce mécanisme qu’elle soutient fermement, à savoir un instrument international indépendant pour enquêter sur les allégations d’emploi d’armes chimiques et biologiques. |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Le 12 octobre 2020, l’UE a prorogé pour une période de douze mois, par la décision (PESC) 2020/1466 du Conseil (17), son régime de mesures restrictives visant à lutter contre l’utilisation et la prolifération des armes chimiques. Le 14 octobre 2020, le Conseil a adopté la décision (PESC) 2020/1482 (18) par laquelle six personnes et une entité ont été ajoutées à la liste des personnes physiques et morales, des entités et des organismes visés par des mesures restrictives. |
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52.

MISSILES BALISTIQUES

Code de conduite de La Haye

| 53. | Le Code de conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques (HCoC) est le résultat des efforts accomplis par la communauté internationale pour réglementer le domaine des missiles balistiques pouvant servir de vecteurs à des armes de destruction massive. Le HCoC est le seul instrument multilatéral visant à renforcer la transparence et la confiance en ce qui concerne la prolifération des missiles balistiques. En souscrivant au HCoC, ses membres s’engagent volontairement à émettre des notifications préalables aux lancements et vols d’essai de missiles balistiques et de lanceurs spatiaux. Les pays signataires s’engagent également à faire une déclaration annuelle présentant leur politique en matière de missiles balistiques et de lanceurs spatiaux. |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | L’UE le soutient résolument depuis sa création, et tous ses États membres y ont souscrit. Depuis la signature et l’entrée en vigueur du HCoC, en novembre 2002 à La Haye (Pays-Bas), le nombre de signataires de cet instrument politiquement contraignant est passé de 93 à 143. Cette évolution s’explique également par l’action diplomatique menée par l’UE auprès d’un certain nombre d’États non signataires en faveur de l’universalisation du code. |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | L’UE promeut systématiquement l’universalité, la mise en œuvre intégrale et le renforcement du fonctionnement du HCoC. Au cours des dix dernières années, le Conseil de l’UE a adopté, dans le cadre de la PESC, une série de décisions/d’actions communes qui ont permis à l’UE de continuer à soutenir le HCoC et la non-prolifération des missiles en général. À travers ces décisions du Conseil, l’UE finance des activités de sensibilisation, y compris des manifestations parallèles, des travaux de recherche, des réunions d’experts et des séminaires d’information régionaux du HCoC. Ces activités sont menées par la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), établie à Paris, et la présidence tournante du HCoC y est généralement associée. |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Par la décision (PESC) 2017/2370 du Conseil du 18 décembre 2017 (19), l’UE continue à encourager l’adhésion au Code et, in fine, à promouvoir son universalité; à soutenir la mise en œuvre intégrale du Code; à favoriser le dialogue entre les États signataires et non signataires en vue de contribuer à établir la confiance et la transparence; à encourager la retenue et à instaurer davantage de stabilité et de sécurité pour tous; à renforcer la visibilité du Code et à sensibiliser le public aux risques et menaces que fait peser la prolifération des missiles balistiques; et à examiner, en particulier dans le cadre d’études universitaires, les possibilités de renforcement du Code et de promotion de la coopération entre celui-ci et d’autres instruments multilatéraux pertinents. |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | En raison de la pandémie de COVID-19, il a été nécessaire de suspendre temporairement les activités présentielles. Un certain nombre d’actions d’information ont néanmoins eu lieu en format virtuel:






  i) | le 3 juin 2020, avec l’UNIDIR, sur les fusées, les missiles et l’espace: les enseignements tirés du Code de conduite de La Haye et au-delà; |
| --- | --- | --- |

57.

i)

le 3 juin 2020, avec l’UNIDIR, sur les fusées, les missiles et l’espace: les enseignements tirés du Code de conduite de La Haye et au-delà;

| ii) | le 29 octobre 2020, une manifestation en marge de la Première Commission de l’AGNU; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

le 29 octobre 2020, une manifestation en marge de la Première Commission de l’AGNU;

| iii) | le 10 décembre 2020, une mission d’experts au Viêt Nam; et |
| --- | --- |

iii)

le 10 décembre 2020, une mission d’experts au Viêt Nam; et

| iv) | un séminaire régional avec la Chine, le Népal et la Corée du Sud. |
| --- | --- |

iv)

un séminaire régional avec la Chine, le Népal et la Corée du Sud.

En outre, un certain nombre de documents et de notes thématiques succinctes ont été publiés.

RÉSOLUTION 1540 DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ DES NATIONS UNIES ET ATTÉNUATION DU RISQUE CBRN

| 58. | La résolution 1540 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies demeure un pilier central de l’architecture internationale pour la non-prolifération. Il s’agit du premier instrument international portant, d’une manière intégrée et globale, sur les armes de destruction massive, leurs vecteurs et leurs éléments connexes. Elle établit des obligations contraignantes pour tous les pays. L’objectif de celles-ci est d’empêcher et de dissuader les acteurs non étatiques de se procurer de telles armes, leurs vecteurs et les éléments connexes. Adoptée en vertu du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations unies, la résolution impose à tous les pays d’adopter les dispositions législatives nécessaires pour interdire aux acteurs non étatiques de se procurer des armes nucléaires, chimiques ou biologiques et de mettre en place des dispositifs internes appropriés de contrôle pour les éléments connexes, destinés à en empêcher le trafic. Le processus d’examen complet de la résolution 1540 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, effectué en 2016, a réaffirmé le caractère central, l’importance et la valeur de celle-ci, ainsi qu’il ressort de la résolution 2325 (2016). |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Afin d’aider à mettre en œuvre les résultats de l’examen complet de 2016 et de soutenir la mise en œuvre intégrale de la RCSNU 1540, le Conseil a adopté, le 11 mai 2017, la décision (PESC) 2017/809 (20) à l’appui de la mise en œuvre de la résolution 1540 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies relative à la non-prolifération des armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs. Cette décision du Conseil couvre une période de quarante-huit mois et est mise en œuvre par le Bureau des affaires de désarmement des Nations unies (UNODA) à New York, qui a sous-traité une partie de ces activités à l’OSCE, à Vienne. Le financement de l’UE aide les pays bénéficiaires à définir l’assistance technique spécifique dont ils ont besoin, à mieux faire connaître les programmes d’assistance technique pertinents et à renforcer la coopération avec les organisations internationales et régionales afin de soutenir les efforts déployés pour renforcer les capacités nationales. |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Le Centre commun de recherche (JRC) de la Commission européenne a officiellement transmis au président du comité 1540 un exemplaire du Strategic Trade Atlas (atlas des échanges de biens stratégiques), élaboré conjointement par le JRC et le laboratoire national d’Argonne du ministère américain de l’énergie. Cet ouvrage vise à faciliter une meilleure compréhension des flux commerciaux mondiaux de biens stratégiques, c’est-à-dire les biens présentant un intérêt stratégique militaire, y compris les biens à double usage. L’atlas est publié en deux volumes, et propose des aperçus par pays (21) et par produit (22) des échanges stratégiques. Il est utilisé, entre autres, par l’Organisation mondiale des douanes. À ce titre, il a été estimé qu’il présentait un intérêt pour le groupe d’experts du comité 1540. |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | L’initiative relative aux centres d’excellence CBRN de l’UE, lancée en 2010, est un programme de renforcement des capacités à l’échelle mondiale visant à atténuer les risques, qu’ils soient d’origine intentionnelle, accidentelle ou naturelle, liés à des substances ou agents chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucléaires et les risques pesant sur les installations ou les sites connexes. L’initiative réunit actuellement soixante-deux pays partenaires, regroupés autour de huit secrétariats régionaux, situés dans les régions suivantes: la façade atlantique africaine, l’Asie centrale, l’Afrique orientale et centrale, les pays du Conseil de coopération du Golfe, le Moyen-Orient, l’Afrique du Nord et le Sahel, l’Asie du Sud-Est, et l’Europe l’Est et du Sud-Est. |
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61.

| 62. | L’initiative a été financée au titre de l’instrument contribuant à la stabilité et à la paix, qui a expiré en 2020 et doit être remplacé par l’instrument de voisinage, de coopération au développement et de coopération internationale (IVCDCI) 2021-2027. Elle a permis de progresser dans l’atténuation des risques liés aux substances CBRN, en améliorant les capacités et la coopération aux échelons national et régional et en promouvant une culture de la sécurité et de la coopération, selon un rapport de la Cour des comptes européenne de 2018 (rapport spécial no 14/2018). Les pays participants sont soutenus dans leurs efforts visant à établir, de manière volontaire et suivant une approche régionale axée sur la demande, des structures de coordination et de gouvernance au niveau national et régional. Ces plateformes élaborent ou renforcent les politiques CBRN nationales et renforcent les capacités, sur la base de besoins spécifiques, d’évaluations des risques et de plans d’action nationaux. Elles reçoivent le soutien de plusieurs projets de coopération régionale financés au titre de l’initiative et ouverts à d’autres instruments de financement. Depuis 2010, 85 projets régionaux ont bénéficié d’un financement. Le budget de l’initiative pour la période de 10 ans qui s’est ouverte en 2010 s’élève à quelque 250 millions d’euros. |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Le réseau des centres d’excellence est désormais bien développé. Durant la pandémie de COVID-19, il a fait la preuve de sa solidité et de sa durabilité lorsque plusieurs secrétariats régionaux ont lancé une série de séminaires en ligne pour échanger leur expertise et partager leurs expériences et leurs bonnes pratiques en matière de gestion des épidémies. Un soutien ad hoc fourni à plusieurs pays les a aidés à mettre en place des procédures appropriées pour détecter les premiers cas de contamination. L’assistance proposée à long terme, en particulier à l’Afrique, continuera de renforcer les capacités de détection précoce et de surveillance des agents pathogènes hautement dangereux dans le cadre d’une approche fondée sur le concept «Une seule santé». Des plans d’action régionaux dans le domaine CBRN ainsi que la coopération interrégionale en la matière sont en cours de déploiement dans plusieurs régions. En outre, l’initiative est suffisamment avancée pour soutenir de nouvelles activités traitant de questions de gouvernance en matière de sécurité relatives à la cybercriminalité, au terrorisme, aux infrastructures critiques, aux médicaments falsifiés, aux menaces hybrides et aux explosifs, ainsi que pour continuer à renforcer la coopération en matière de criminalistique nucléaire, de contrôle aux frontières et de contrôle des exportations de biens à double usage. En 2020, dans le cadre du réseau des centres d’excellence CBRN de l’UE, le JCR de l’UE, en collaboration avec le ministère américain de l’énergie et l’Institut de recherche nucléaire de Kiev, a mis en place des activités d’éducation et de formation dans le domaine de la sécurité nucléaire à l’intention de participants venus de Géorgie, d’Ukraine, d’Azerbaïdjan et de République de Moldavie, le but étant de renforcer la sécurité nucléaire dans la région de la mer Noire, et apporté un soutien à la mise en œuvre de trois projets en matière de sécurité nucléaire dans ces mêmes pays. Des exercices théoriques et des exercices sur le terrain ont été organisés sur la base de scénarios de trafic de matières nucléaires en Ukraine et en République de Moldavie. Des formations pour jeunes professionnels de la sécurité nucléaire ont été proposées à l’institut de recherche nucléaire de Kiev et à l’institut de physique et de technologie de Kharkiv. En outre, un système régional d’information sur la criminalistique nucléaire a été mis en place. En vue de pérenniser les capacités de criminalistique nucléaire dans la région de la mer Noire, trois projets de suivi, gérés par le centre ukrainien de science et de technologie (STCU), ont été lancés début 2021 au bénéfice de la Géorgie, de l’Ukraine, de l’Azerbaïdjan et de la République de Moldavie. En outre, un projet de renforcement des capacités de criminalistique nucléaire en Géorgie et en Arménie a été élaboré; il sera géré par le centre international pour la science et la technologie (ISTC) et débutera également en 2021. |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | En ce qui concerne les volets intérieurs de l’atténuation des menaces CBRN, la mise en œuvre du plan d’action visant à améliorer la préparation aux risques en matière de sécurité chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire, présenté par la Commission en octobre 2017 dans le cadre plus large d’un train de mesures en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, a fait l’objet d’un examen vers la fin de 2019, et sur la base de ce dernier, le document est toujours considéré comme le cadre stratégique valable dans le domaine CBRN. Le programme de lutte antiterroriste pour l’UE 2020 a renforcé certains aspects en matière CBRN, notamment en rapport avec la menace que représentent les agents chimiques et la biosécurité. En ce qui concerne la première, la Commission examine actuellement la possibilité de restreindre l’accès à certaines substances chimiques susceptibles d’être utilisées à des fins malveillantes. Les travaux sur la détection CBRN — y compris les essais d’équipements qui ont été entrepris par certains États membres et coordonnés par la Commission — ont progressé comme prévu. Toutefois, certaines des activités CBRN entamées en 2019 ont dû être suspendues en 2020; tel est notamment le cas de la campagne de formation des services répressifs de l’UE sur les menaces radiologiques, qui était mise en œuvre au centre de formation EUSECTRA de Karlsruhe, en Allemagne. |
| --- | --- |

64.

| 65. | La mise en œuvre du plan d’action est étayée par des projets cofinancés par le Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure — coopération policière. Parmi les initiatives retenues, deux étaient particulièrement pertinentes pour la stratégie en matière CBRN. L’une d’elles (Mall-CBRN) porte sur la protection et la préparation CBRN dans les grands centres commerciaux, tandis qu’une autre (Safe Stadium) applique une approche similaire aux grandes enceintes sportives, en particulier aux stades de football. L’un des points forts des deux initiatives est la présence dans les consortiums de certains bénéficiaires finaux, par exemple le club de football Real Madrid. |
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65.

| 66. | Le plan d’action CBRN de l’UE a reçu un soutien scientifique et technique de la part d’un ensemble de projets de recherche financés par le programme «Pour une société sûre» au titre du septième programme-cadre. La recherche porte sur l’ensemble du cycle de gestion de crise, de la prévention au relèvement. Les activités menées pour cerner les besoins en matière de normalisation pourraient déboucher sur des normes européennes. Le programme Horizon 2020 aura pour effet de renforcer le travail de recherche en cours dans le domaine CBRN en définissant des thèmes ciblés. |
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66.

GROUPES DE RÉFLEXION

| 67. | Sur la base de la décision 2010/430/PESC du Conseil du 26 juillet 2010 (23), la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de l’UE contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive a été activement soutenue par le consortium de l’UE chargé de la non-prolifération et du désarmement, qui a commencé ses activités en janvier 2011. Le 26 février 2018, le Conseil a adopté la décision (PESC) 2018/299 (24), qui prolonge le soutien de l’UE aux activités du consortium pour la période 2018-2021, en s’appuyant sur les résultats obtenus jusqu’à présent et en ajoutant de nouveaux projets. |
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67.

| 68. | Les activités du consortium ont permis d’accroître la visibilité de l’UE auprès des pays tiers et de la société civile et ont contribué de manière substantielle à la définition de la politique menée par l’UE dans les domaines de la non-prolifération et du désarmement. Le consortium offre aux praticiens une plateforme permettant d’établir des contacts informels et encourage le dialogue entre les différentes parties prenantes. Dans le cadre de ses activités, il a contribué à mieux faire connaître les défis posés par les armes de destruction massive et les armes conventionnelles, et a examiné des solutions permettant de relever ces défis. Il s’appuie sur un vaste réseau de 99 groupes de réflexion et de centres de recherche à travers l’Europe, dont des membres issus de tous les États membres de l’UE ainsi que de pays partenaires tels que la Suisse, la Turquie et l’Ukraine. 9 instituts ont rejoint le réseau en 2020. |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Tous les événements organisés par le consortium ont permis d’assurer la diversité des participants et des intervenants du point de vue du genre, de l’âge, de l’expertise et de la représentation géographique. En raison des circonstances créées par la pandémie de COVID-19, ces événements se sont déroulés, en 2020, dans l’espace virtuel. Plus précisément, en 2020, le consortium a organisé les activités suivantes pour mettre en œuvre la décision (PESC) 2018/299:






  — | un cours sur la non-prolifération nucléaire destiné aux étudiants diplômés et de troisième cycle en informatique et en ingénierie, intitulé «The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: History, Threats and Solutions» (19-21 février 2020), |
| --- | --- | --- |

69.

—

un cours sur la non-prolifération nucléaire destiné aux étudiants diplômés et de troisième cycle en informatique et en ingénierie, intitulé «The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: History, Threats and Solutions» (19-21 février 2020),

| — | un séminaire ad hoc intitulé «Strengthening Non-proliferation and Disarmament Education in Europe» (partie I) (23 et 24 juin 2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

un séminaire ad hoc intitulé «Strengthening Non-proliferation and Disarmament Education in Europe» (partie I) (23 et 24 juin 2020),

| — | la 9e réunion consultative de l’UE, à laquelle ont participé des fonctionnaires de l’UE et des experts européens (10 et 11 septembre 2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

la 9e réunion consultative de l’UE, à laquelle ont participé des fonctionnaires de l’UE et des experts européens (10 et 11 septembre 2020),

| — | la 4e réunion annuelle du réseau européen de groupes de réflexion indépendants sur la non-prolifération et le désarmement (9 novembre 2020), |
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—

la 4e réunion annuelle du réseau européen de groupes de réflexion indépendants sur la non-prolifération et le désarmement (9 novembre 2020),

| — | la 9e conférence de l’UE sur la non-prolifération et le désarmement (12 et 13 novembre 2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

la 9e conférence de l’UE sur la non-prolifération et le désarmement (12 et 13 novembre 2020),

| — | un atelier «Next Generation» (25 novembre 2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

un atelier «Next Generation» (25 novembre 2020),

| — | un séminaire ad hoc intitulé «Addressing illicit SALW and ammunition in conflict affected areas: The role for peace support operations» (14 et 15 décembre 2020). |
| --- | --- |

—

un séminaire ad hoc intitulé «Addressing illicit SALW and ammunition in conflict affected areas: The role for peace support operations» (14 et 15 décembre 2020).

| 70. | En 2020, le consortium a publié une lettre d’information mensuelle ainsi que six documents de l’UE sur la non-prolifération et le désarmement (25). Les activités de formation, de 2018 à 2021, consistent à assurer des cours d’apprentissage en ligne sur la non-prolifération et le désarmement et les politiques de l’UE, ainsi qu’à soutenir, entre 2018 et 2021, la mise sur pied de 36 stages sur les questions de non-prolifération et de désarmement, dans les organisations membres du réseau. |
| --- | --- |

70.

CONTRÔLE DES EXPORTATIONS

| 71. | En 2020, le groupe COARM («Exportations d’armes conventionnelles») du Conseil a entamé les travaux sur la mise en œuvre des résultats attendus dans les conclusions du Conseil sur le réexamen de la position commune 2008/944/PESC (26) relative au contrôle des exportations d’armes (27). À la suite de l’accord intervenu au sein du groupe COARM, le Service européen pour l’action extérieure a lancé en octobre une base de données conviviale en ligne sur son site web, qui permet au public de consulter et d’analyser les données relatives aux exportations d’armes des États membres. Cette base de données a été largement saluée comme une amélioration significative de la transparence en matière d’exportation d’armes. Elle contient des informations sur la valeur, la destination et le type de licences d’exportation d’armements, ainsi que sur les exportations effectives depuis les États membres; sa mise à jour se fera sur une base annuelle. En outre, le groupe COARM a élaboré une décision du Conseil sur les certificats d’utilisateur final pour les exportations d’armes légères et de petit calibre et de leurs munitions. Cette décision a été adoptée en janvier 2021 et contribue à la poursuite de la convergence des politiques des États membres en matière d’exportation d’armements. Le groupe COARM a poursuivi ses actions de sensibilisation et de dialogue régulier avec diverses parties prenantes, y compris des organisations de la société civile, le CICR et des représentants de l’industrie européenne de la défense. |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | L’UE a également poursuivi ses activités de communication visant à aider les pays tiers à mettre en place un système de contrôle des exportations d’armes et à promouvoir l’universalisation du TCA. En vertu de la décision (PESC) 2018/101 du Conseil du 22 janvier 2018 (28), et de la décision (PESC) 2020/1464 du Conseil du 12 octobre 2020 relative à la promotion d’un contrôle efficace des exportations d’armes (29) qui lui a fait suite, mises en œuvre par l’Office fédéral allemand de l’économie et du contrôle des exportations (BAFA), un certain nombre d’ateliers et d’activités d’assistance spécifiques ont eu lieu, pour la plupart en format virtuel en raison de la pandémie. En outre, d’autres actions de communication au niveau régional, des programmes d’aide nationaux sur mesure et des ateliers d’assistance ad hoc ont été menés dans le cadre de la décision (PESC) 2017/915 du Conseil (30) et mis en œuvre par le BAFA et Expertise France. Ces actions visent à soutenir la mise en œuvre effective et l’universalisation du traité sur le commerce des armes. |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Dans le cadre du dialogue politique, des réunions consacrées aux questions relatives au contrôle des exportations d’armes ont eu lieu avec la Norvège et les États-Unis en 2020. Elles ont permis des échanges fructueux sur des questions d’intérêt mutuel, telles que les politiques d’exportation vers certaines destinations, le respect des dispositions en vigueur et la question du contrôle ainsi que le processus du traité sur le commerce des armes. |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | En 2020, l’UE a continué à actualiser régulièrement ses règlements afin de tenir compte de l’évolution des régimes multilatéraux de contrôle des exportations. Ainsi, le 7 octobre 2020, la Commission européenne a adopté un règlement délégué (UE) 2020/1749 (31) portant mise à jour de la liste de contrôle de l’UE des biens à double usage, conformément aux décisions prises dans le cadre des régimes multilatéraux de contrôle des exportations en 2019, et a introduit de nouveaux contrôles, par exemple en ce qui concerne les logiciels de surveillance pour les services répressifs et les outils d’informatique légale. La mise à jour de 2020 de la liste de contrôle de l’UE a également introduit des contrôles sur 24 produits chimiques supplémentaires, notamment des précurseurs d’agents neurotoxiques du groupe «Novitchok», conformément à l’accord conclu lors de la réunion intersessions du groupe d’Australie en février 2020, et afin d’empêcher le commerce de précurseurs d’armes chimiques. |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Le groupe de coordination «double usage» a continué de soutenir la mise en œuvre cohérente et effective des contrôles des exportations dans l’UE. De nouvelles fonctionnalités du «système électronique des biens à double usage» ont été mises en service en 2020 afin d’adapter le système aux modifications réglementaires telles que, par exemple, la mise à jour de la liste de contrôle de 2019 et les consultations électroniques sécurisées entre les autorités compétentes. Compte tenu du Brexit, une nouvelle fonctionnalité a été introduite pour faciliter l’échange d’informations avec l’autorité compétente du Royaume-Uni dans le cadre du protocole sur l’Irlande du Nord. L’UE a également progressé dans ses travaux sur la mise en place d’une «plateforme électronique de délivrance de licences» devant être utilisée par les États membres sur une base volontaire, et a entamé des travaux en vue de l’intégration des systèmes électroniques d’octroi de licences de biens à double usage avec les systèmes informatiques douaniers dans le cadre de l’initiative relative au guichet unique. Le rapport annuel de contrôle des exportations (32) a été publié afin d’assurer la transparence des contrôles des exportations et des activités d’octroi de licences, et un forum sur le contrôle des exportations organisé le 11 décembre 2020 a réuni des parties prenantes des États membres, de l’industrie et de la société civile (33). |
| --- | --- |

75.

| 76. | Le réexamen de la politique de l’UE en matière de contrôle des exportations a remarquablement progressé. Le Conseil et le Parlement européen se sont mis d’accord sur la modernisation des contrôles des exportations de l’UE. Les modifications substantielles qui ont été apportées pour améliorer l’efficience et l’efficacité des contrôles comprennent la mise à jour des définitions et des paramètres de contrôle, l’harmonisation, la simplification et le passage au numérique des licences, ainsi qu’un renforcement du partage d’informations et de la coopération avec des pays tiers. Le nouveau règlement rendra le système actuel de contrôle des exportations de l’UE plus effectif en introduisant une nouvelle dimension de «sécurité humaine» afin que l’UE puisse relever les défis posés par les technologies à double usage émergentes, en particulier les technologies de cybersurveillance, qui présentent un risque pour la sécurité nationale et internationale, y compris en matière de protection des droits de l’homme. Le nouveau règlement sera formellement adopté et entrera en vigueur en 2021. Les activités des régimes multilatéraux de contrôle des exportations ont été fortement affectées par la pandémie; les réunions plénières ont dû être annulées, même si les réunions virtuelles ont permis aux groupes de travail de poursuivre les travaux dans une certaine mesure. Cela étant, l’UE a participé à la réunion intersessions du groupe d’Australie à Bratislava (du 5 au 7 février 2020). |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | La mise en œuvre du programme de contrôle des exportations EU P2P visant à renforcer l’efficacité des systèmes de contrôle des exportations de biens à double usage et des éléments, équipements et technologies connexes s’est poursuivie dans six régions. En 2020, le programme a porté sur 41 pays, dont certains (14 pays) participent aux initiatives ciblées sur le contrôle des exportations menées avec le Centre des sciences et des technologies de l’Ukraine et avec le Centre international des sciences et des technologies du Kazakhstan. Un certain nombre d’ateliers régionaux, de manifestations d’assistance nationale et de séminaires de soutien ad hoc ont eu lieu, la plupart de façon virtuelle, en raison de la pandémie. |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | La coordination approfondie s’est poursuivie entre le programme de contrôle des exportations EU P2P et le programme du département d’État des États-Unis pour le contrôle des exportations et la sécurité des frontières. Des séminaires conjoints UE/États-Unis ont été organisés pour procéder à des échanges d’informations sur les méthodes d’évaluation de la menace, définir des indicateurs communs d’impact et coordonner l’assistance sur le terrain. La 6e université d’été du programme UE P2P consacrée aux contrôles stratégiques du commerce, à l’intention des pays partenaires du programme de contrôle des exportations de biens à double usage, a été organisée en ligne par le FPI et le JRC du 17 au 21 août 2020. Le portail P2P de l’UE, transféré vers l’environnement web officiel de l’Union européenne (https://europa.eu/cbrn-risk-mitigation/eu-p2p_en), a encore été amélioré en 2020. Il continuera de servir de plateforme pour tous les programmes d’information de l’UE relatifs au contrôle des exportations des biens militaires et à double usage, en vue d’adapter l’échange d’informations aux besoins des pays partenaires de l’UE. Le programme est financé par l’Instrument contribuant à la stabilité et à la paix. |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | En 2020, le Centre commun de recherche de la Commission (JRC) a encore développé le manuel sur le contrôle des exportations de produits chimiques, en publiant la base de données sur son portail. Une deuxième révision du manuel sera publiée au printemps 2021. Référence: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/world-trade-controls-export-control-handbook-chemicals |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | En janvier 2021, le Centre commun de recherche de la Commission a publié la nouvelle plateforme TIM en ligne concernant les biens à double usage, qui permet de cartographier plus de 70 millions de résumés de recherche (Scopus), de brevets (Patstat) et de projets financés par l’UE (base de données CORDIS) présentant un intérêt pour le double usage. Référence: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/science-update/tim-dual-use-tool-track-possible-dual-use-relevance-research-and-innovation-results |
| --- | --- |

80.

| 81. | Le régime de contrôle de la technologie des missiles (RCTM) est un regroupement informel et volontaire de pays qui partagent les objectifs de non-prolifération des vecteurs non pilotés d’armes de destruction massive et qui s’efforcent de coordonner les efforts de prévention à cet égard par le biais des régimes nationaux de licences d’exportation. Les gouvernements participants se sont engagés à respecter des directives communes en matière relatives aux politiques d’exportation (les directives du RCTM) qui s’appliquent à la liste commune intégrale d’articles soumis à contrôle (la liste des équipements, logiciels et technologies du RCTM). Les partenaires du RCTM échangent régulièrement des informations sur des questions nationales ayant trait aux licences d’exportation. Les directives et les listes de contrôle du RCTM constituent un ensemble de bonnes pratiques internationales de référence pour le contrôle des exportations de biens et technologies liés aux missiles. |
| --- | --- |

81.

| 82. | Une question d’importance fondamentale pour l’UE, dans le contexte du RCTM, reste le blocage de l’adhésion au régime de neuf États membres, à savoir la Croatie, Chypre, l’Estonie, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, Malte, la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et la Slovénie. |
| --- | --- |

82.

| 83. | En outre, la continuité et la prévisibilité de la présidence des régimes de contrôle des exportations tels que le RCTM sont essentielles au bon fonctionnement et à la crédibilité de ces régimes. Les États membres de l’UE qui sont membres du RCTM ont présenté, en vue de son examen par la réunion plénière, un document informel sur des questions relatives à la présidence, qui étudie les possibilités d’encourager et de soutenir une présidence durable du régime. L’UE poursuivra ses discussions avec les membres sur les différentes possibilités. Dans le contexte du régime, l’UE a toujours été favorable à l’adoption de déclarations publiques fermes du RCTM visant à faire état des préoccupations qu’inspirent à la communauté internationale les lancements de missiles balistiques et les progrès importants en matière de technologie des missiles réalisés par l’Iran et la RPDC. |
| --- | --- |

83.

ESPACE

| 84. | L’UE et ses États membres ont continué de promouvoir la préservation d’un environnement spatial sûr, sécurisé et durable et l’utilisation pacifique de l’espace extra-atmosphérique, sur une base équitable et mutuellement acceptable. Nous avons continué d’insister sur l’importance que revêtent des mesures de transparence et de confiance ainsi que sur la nécessité de promouvoir, dans le cadre des Nations unies, les principes de comportement responsable dans l’espace extra-atmosphérique. À cet égard, l’UE a fait des déclarations liées à l’espace lors de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies. |
| --- | --- |

84.

| 85. | L’UE et ses États membres sont restés fermement attachés à la prévention d’une course aux armements dans l’espace extra-atmosphérique, ce qui est essentiel pour renforcer la sécurité et la stabilité internationales et pour préserver l’utilisation à long terme de l’environnement spatial à des fins pacifiques. Nous avons continué à faire part de l’inquiétude que nous inspire la mise au point de toutes les armes et capacités antisatellites, y compris terrestres, et nous soulignons qu’il importe de prêter attention à ces développements rapidement et dans le cadre des efforts internationaux visant à empêcher une course aux armements dans l’espace extra-atmosphérique. |
| --- | --- |

85.

| 86. | L’UE et ses États membres ont réaffirmé leur satisfaction quant à l’adoption du préambule et des 21 lignes directrices aux fins de la viabilité à long terme des activités spatiales, qui ont été adoptées par le Comité des utilisations pacifiques de l’espace extra-atmosphérique, et approuvées par une résolution de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies en 2019 (34). Les lignes directrices constituent un complément important aux mesures de transparence et de confiance relatives aux activités spatiales (35). |
| --- | --- |

86.

| 87. | L’UE et ses États membres se sont félicités de l’adoption d’une nouvelle résolution sur la réduction des menaces grâce à un comportement responsable (36), qui constitue une mesure opportune pour réduire les menaces et les risques liés à l’espace extra-atmosphérique et promouvoir un comportement responsable dans l’espace extra-atmosphérique, notamment dans le cadre des Nations unies. Ils ont encouragé tous les pays à nouer un dialogue constructif en vue de parvenir à une compréhension commune de ce qu’est un comportement responsable dans l’espace extra-atmosphérique, ce à quoi l’UE contribuera également conjointement. |
| --- | --- |

87.

CLAUSES RELATIVES À LA NON-PROLIFÉRATION DES ADM

| 88. | Conformément à sa politique de lutte contre la prolifération des ADM et aux conclusions du Conseil de 2003, l’UE a continué d’œuvrer à l’intégration des engagements en matière de non-prolifération des ADM dans les accords avec les pays partenaires. En 2020, des négociations ont également eu lieu à cet effet avec le Royaume-Uni, dans le cadre de la préparation du Brexit et des futures relations entre l’UE et le Royaume-Uni. Conformément à la décision conjointe de l’UE et de Cuba relative à l’application provisoire de certaines parties du nouvel accord entre les deux parties, le premier dialogue UE-Cuba sur la non-prolifération des ADM a eu lieu à Bruxelles en mars 2019, sur la base de la clause relative aux ADM figurant dans le nouvel accord, et un deuxième dialogue s’est tenu en ligne en septembre 2020. |
| --- | --- |

88.

AUTRES ENCEINTES MULTILATÉRALES

G7

| 89. | L’UE a continué de participer activement aux réunions du groupe des directeurs chargés de la non-prolifération dans le cadre du G7. En 2020, l’UE a pris part aux réunions tenues sous la présidence des États-Unis, qui portaient sur des questions d’actualité dans le domaine de la non-prolifération et du désarmement et qui visaient à accomplir de nouveaux progrès en ce qui concerne la coordination du travail mené au sein du groupe des directeurs chargés de la non-prolifération dans le cadre du G7 et du Partenariat mondial du G7 contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et des matières connexes, en particulier en établissant un lien plus étroit entre les priorités stratégiques et les activités prévues par les projets. |
| --- | --- |

89.

| 90. | L’UE demeure attachée au Partenariat mondial contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et des matières connexes, grâce notamment à l’assistance technique (évaluation de la menace, plans d’action nationaux) qu’elle fournit partout dans le monde dans le cadre de l’initiative relative aux centres d’excellence de l’UE pour l’atténuation des risques CBRN. L’initiative contribuera également à la mise en œuvre du projet pilote mené par le Partenariat mondial, une initiative phare en vue d’atténuer la menace biologique en Afrique, avec le nouveau projet LABPLUS AFRICA. |
| --- | --- |

90.

---

(1)  JO L 149 du 7.6.2019, p. 63.

(2)  JO L 105 du 16.4.2019, p. 25.

(3)  JO L 207 du 30.6.2020, p. 36.

(4)  JO L 372 I du 9.11.2020, p. 4.

(5)  JO L 308 du 16.11.2016, p. 22.

(6)  Barbade, Belize, Bhoutan, État plurinational de Bolivie, Brunei Darussalam, Cap-Vert, Dominique, Fidji, Grenade, Guyane, Kiribati, Kirghizstan, République démocratique populaire lao, Mongolie, Myanmar/Birmanie, Namibie, Nauru, Népal, Sainte-Lucie, Saint-Vincent-et-les-Grenadines, Samoa, Arabie saoudite, Sierra Leone, Îles Salomon, Soudan, Suriname, Trinité-et-Tobago, Tuvalu, Yémen et Zambie.

(7)  JO L 207 du 30.6.2020, p. 15.

(8)  JO L 314 du 11.12.2018, p. 41.

(9)  JO L 328 du 12.12.2017, p. 32.

(10)  JO L 93 du 2.4.2019, p. 3.

(11)  JO L 318 du 10.12.2019, p. 159.

(12)  JO L 179 du 12.7.2017, p. 8.

(13)  JO L 19 du 22.1.2019, p. 11.

(14)  JO L 204 du 2.8.2019, p. 29.

(15)  JO L 318 du 10.12.2019, p. 123.

(16)  JO L 172 I du 3.6.2020, p. 5.

(17)  JO L 335 du 13.10.2020, p. 16.

(18)  JO L 341 du 15.10.2020, p. 9.

(19)  JO L 337 du 19.12.2017, p. 28.

(20)  JO L 121 du 12.5.2017, p. 39.

(21)  Versino, C., Heine, P. et Carrera, J., Strategic Trade Atlas. Country-Based Views, EUR 29194 EN, Office des publications de l’Union européenne, Luxembourg, 2018, ISBN 978-92-79-84030-2, doi:10.2760/440433, JRC111470.

(22)  Versino, C., Heine, P. et Carrera, J., Strategic Trade Atlas. Commodity-Based Views, EUR 29195 EN, Office des publications de l’Union européenne, Luxembourg, 2018, ISBN 978-92-79-84031-9, doi:10.2760/277525, JRC111471.

(23)  JO L 202 du 4.8.2010, p. 5.

(24)  JO L 56 du 28.2.2018, p. 46.

(25)  Disponible à l’adresse suivante: https://www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/online-publishing/non-proliferation-papers/

(26)  JO L 335 du 13.12.2008, p. 99.

(27)  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/40660/st12195-en19.pdf

(28)  JO L 17 du 23.1.2018, p. 40.

(29)  JO L 335 du 13.10.2020, p. 3.

(30)  JO L 139 du 30.5.2017, p. 38.

(31)  JO L 421 du 14.12.2020, p. 1.

(32)  https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/february/tradoc_159415.pdf

(33)  https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/december/tradoc_158495.pdf

(34)  https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/a/a7420_0_html/V1906077.pdf

(35)  https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gadocs/A_68_189E.pdf

(36)  https://undocs.org/fr/A/RES/75/36

---

ANNEXE I

Overview of EU Council Joint Actions and Council Decisions in the framework of the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

| | Title | Objective and implementing entity | Budget and duration |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/564 of 23 April 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/298 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction | Extension of the implementation period of a previously adopted Council Decision, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  Implementing agency: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) | Budget: EUR 0

  OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 27

  Estimated duration of the action: 7 months |
| 2. | Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons | The overall objective is to support the full operationalisation of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in view of growing apprehensions regarding the possibility of the use of biological weapons.
  More specifically, the following activities are supported:






  — | Support for training of experts on the roster of the SGM; |

Title

Objective and implementing entity

Budget and duration

1.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/564 of 23 April 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/298 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Extension of the implementation period of a previously adopted Council Decision, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Implementing agency: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

Budget: EUR 0

OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 27

Estimated duration of the action: 7 months

2.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons

The overall objective is to support the full operationalisation of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in view of growing apprehensions regarding the possibility of the use of biological weapons.

More specifically, the following activities are supported:

—

Support for training of experts on the roster of the SGM;

| — | Support for participation of laboratories in activities to develop a network capable of supporting an SGM investigation into an allegation of the use of biological weapons; |
| --- | --- |

—

Support for participation of laboratories in activities to develop a network capable of supporting an SGM investigation into an allegation of the use of biological weapons;

| — | Outreach activities to ensure nominations of experts and laboratories from the Global South; |
| --- | --- |

—

Outreach activities to ensure nominations of experts and laboratories from the Global South;

| — | Support for a Capstone (Field) Exercise; |
| --- | --- |

—

Support for a Capstone (Field) Exercise;

| — | Support for a regular coordination activities/workshops with relevant organisational partners; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Support for a regular coordination activities/workshops with relevant organisational partners; and

| — | Contributing to the implementation of the Secretary General’s Disarmament Agenda. |
| --- | --- |

—

Contributing to the implementation of the Secretary General’s Disarmament Agenda.

Implementing agency: the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1 418 042

OJ L 172 I, 3.6.2020, p. 5

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

3.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/755 of 8 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 on the Union support for the International Atomic Energy Agency activities in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Extension of the implementation period of a previously adopted Council Decision, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Implementing agency: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Budget: EUR 0

OJ L 179 I, 9.6.2020, p. 2

Estimated duration of the action: 6 months

4.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/796 of 16 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/1252 in support of the strengthening of chemical safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Extension of the implementation period of a previously adopted Council Decision, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Implementing agency: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 0

OJ L 193, 17.6.2020, p. 15

Estimated duration of the action: 6 months

5.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/795 of 16 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Extension of the implementation period of a previously adopted Council Decision, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Implementing agency: the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 0

OJ L 193, 17.6.2020, p. 14

Estimated duration of the action: 12 months

6.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Council Decision foresees a continuation of the monitoring activities of the CTBTO, as well as support for outreach to promote the entry into force and the universalisation of the Treaty.

Implementing agency: the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

Budget: EUR 6 288 892

OJ L 193, 30.6.2020, p. 14

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

7.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/906 of 29 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Extension of the implementation period of a previously adopted Council Decision, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Implementing agency: the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 0

OJ L 207, 30.6.2020, p. 36

Estimated duration of the action: 6 months

8.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1066 of 20 July 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Extension of the implementation period of a previously adopted Council Decision, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Implementing agency: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)

Budget: EUR 0

OJ L 234 I, 21.7.2020, p. 1

Estimated duration of the action: 12 months

9.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The overall objective of this Council Decision is to continue supporting the nuclear security activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). More specifically, the following projects in nuclear security will be supported:

| — | the universalization of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM); |
| --- | --- |

—

the universalization of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM);

| — | computer security and information technology services and enhancing nuclear security culture; |
| --- | --- |

—

computer security and information technology services and enhancing nuclear security culture;

| — | information management with a focus on assessing nuclear security needs, priorities and threats; |
| --- | --- |

—

information management with a focus on assessing nuclear security needs, priorities and threats;

| — | nuclear security of materials and associated facilities with a focus on enhancing physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control for the whole fuel cycle; |
| --- | --- |

—

nuclear security of materials and associated facilities with a focus on enhancing physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control for the whole fuel cycle;

| — | nuclear security of materials out of regulatory control; |
| --- | --- |

—

nuclear security of materials out of regulatory control;

| — | programme development and international cooperation with a focus on education and training programme development; and |
| --- | --- |

—

programme development and international cooperation with a focus on education and training programme development; and

| — | gender-focused capacity building and education in nuclear security. |
| --- | --- |

—

gender-focused capacity building and education in nuclear security.

Implementing agency: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Budget: EUR 11 582 300

OJ L 372 I, 9.11.2020, p. 4

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

10.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

This Council Decision serves as an operational policy tool for providing essential follow-up and momentum to the activities undertaken throughout 2016-2018 in the framework of Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP in support of the BTWC. It will support in particular the discussions in the BTWC Meetings of Experts in 2019 and 2020, as well as preparations for the Ninth Review Conference in 2021.

The following activities will be undertaken: (1) Universalisation; (2) Capacity development for national implementation; (3) Fostering biosecurity networks in the Global South; (4) BTWC inter-sessional programme and Ninth Review Conference in 2021; (5) Preparedness to prevent and respond to biological attacks; and, (6) Enabling tools for outreach.

Implementing agency: BTWC Implementation Support Unit via UNODA

Budget: EUR 3 029 856

OJ L 19, 22.1.2019, p. 11

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

11.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Council Decision foresees a contribution to the core activities of the Organisation, notably for verification, national implementation, universalisation and the Africa programme. It also contributes substantially to the project of transforming the OPCW laboratory into a Centre of Chemistry and Technology and to the implementation of the decision by the OPCW Conference of States Parties directing the OPCW Technical Secretariat to put into place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Implementing agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 11 601 256

OJ L 93, 2.4.2019, p. 3

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

12.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 of 15 April 2019 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The Council Decision supports the organisation of a series of consultations: three thematic seminars for all States Parties on nuclear disarmament (Geneva), nuclear non-proliferation (New York) and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Vienna), targeted at practitioners/diplomats, academia and civil society, as well as four regional meetings: Asia-Pacific, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East.

The regional meetings will cover all three of the NPT pillars viewed through the lens of regional priorities and concerns. All activities will seek to highlight the many benefits already provided by the NPT and the need to preserve those benefits.

Implementing agency: UNODA

Budget: EUR 1 299 883

OJ L 105, 16.4.2019, p. 25

Estimated duration of the action: 18 months

13.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East

Objectives:

| — | To produce a factual narrative of efforts to establish a ME WMDFZ between 1995 and 2015 to fill an important gap in the research literature and identify lessons for future efforts. |
| --- | --- |

—

To produce a factual narrative of efforts to establish a ME WMDFZ between 1995 and 2015 to fill an important gap in the research literature and identify lessons for future efforts.

| — | To identify key issues, opportunities, obstacles and ideas of contemporary relevance to consideration of a WMDFZ and efforts to enhance regional security cooperation. |
| --- | --- |

—

To identify key issues, opportunities, obstacles and ideas of contemporary relevance to consideration of a WMDFZ and efforts to enhance regional security cooperation.

| — | To engage and obtain perspectives and insights from a wide community of researchers, policymakers and academics in the region on these issues and, in so doing, expand the number and diversity of participants exploring the prospects for dialogue and progress. |
| --- | --- |

—

To engage and obtain perspectives and insights from a wide community of researchers, policymakers and academics in the region on these issues and, in so doing, expand the number and diversity of participants exploring the prospects for dialogue and progress.

| — | To facilitate dialogue among these experts with a view to fostering networks, communication and engagement that could in turn contribute to future efforts to advance regional security, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament progress in the region. |
| --- | --- |

—

To facilitate dialogue among these experts with a view to fostering networks, communication and engagement that could in turn contribute to future efforts to advance regional security, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament progress in the region.

Implementing agency: UNIDIR

Budget: EUR 2 856 278

OJ L 149, 7.6.2019, p. 63

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

14.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1092 of 26 June 2019 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2302 in support of the OPCW activities to assist clean-up operations at the former chemical weapons storage site in Libya in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1092 extended the duration of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2302 from 20 months to 32 months.

Implementing agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

OJ L 173, 27.6.2019, p. 47

15.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

The overall objective of this Decision is to support three OSCE projects aiming at strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with UNSC Resolution 1540(2004) and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

The following activities would be undertaken:

| a) | harmonisation of existing Ukrainian regulations on biosafety and biosecurity with international standards; |
| --- | --- |

a)

harmonisation of existing Ukrainian regulations on biosafety and biosecurity with international standards;

| b) | establishing of the veterinary surveillance system sustainability in Ukraine; and |
| --- | --- |

b)

establishing of the veterinary surveillance system sustainability in Ukraine; and

| c) | awareness raising, education and training for life scientists on biosafety and biosecurity. |
| --- | --- |

c)

awareness raising, education and training for life scientists on biosafety and biosecurity.

Implementing agency: OSCE

Budget: EUR 1 913 900

OJ L 204, 2.8.2019, p. 29

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

16.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

This Council Decision has the objective to improve biosafety and biosecurity in beneficiary countries in Latin America in line with UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004).

The following activities are to be undertaken:

| a) | Technical and legislative assistance to strengthen, in beneficiary countries, regulations on biosafety and biosecurity and ensure their harmonization with international standards, and to promote and enhance regional cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

a)

Technical and legislative assistance to strengthen, in beneficiary countries, regulations on biosafety and biosecurity and ensure their harmonization with international standards, and to promote and enhance regional cooperation;

| b) | awareness raising, education and training on biosafety and biosecurity. |
| --- | --- |

b)

awareness raising, education and training on biosafety and biosecurity.

Implementing agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 2 738 708

OJ L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 123

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

17.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2112 of 9 December 2019 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303 in support of the continued implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council decision EC/M-33/DEC.1 on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2112 extended the duration of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303 from 12 months to 48 months.

Implementing agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC)

OJ L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 159

18.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 of 17 December 2018 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda

The objective is to support gender-mainstreaming of small arms (SALW) control and countering firearms abuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the UN Programme of Action against illicit SALW (PoA), through:

| — | the development of a training manual and an implementation support programme; |
| --- | --- |

—

the development of a training manual and an implementation support programme;

| — | the development and implementation of train-the-trainer courses on gender; |
| --- | --- |

—

the development and implementation of train-the-trainer courses on gender;

| — | the training for national officials, including those in security forces, on operational gender & SALW control issues; |
| --- | --- |

—

the training for national officials, including those in security forces, on operational gender & SALW control issues;

| — | training for regional UN staff; |
| --- | --- |

—

training for regional UN staff;

| — | the engagement with civil society, in order to address gender-specific manifestations of gun violence in local communities, including funding of local actions; |
| --- | --- |

—

the engagement with civil society, in order to address gender-specific manifestations of gun violence in local communities, including funding of local actions;

| — | the creation of synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals and the WPS agenda through the integration of gender perspectives in SALW control; |
| --- | --- |

—

the creation of synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals and the WPS agenda through the integration of gender perspectives in SALW control;

| — | to implement the gender-related actions in the outcome document of the UN PoA Review Conference; |
| --- | --- |

—

to implement the gender-related actions in the outcome document of the UN PoA Review Conference;

| — | the promotion of research and analysis on SALW and gender; |
| --- | --- |

—

the promotion of research and analysis on SALW and gender;

| — | the development and maintenance of a dedicated website to enhance the visibility and to increase the impact of the project; |
| --- | --- |

—

the development and maintenance of a dedicated website to enhance the visibility and to increase the impact of the project;

| — | the promotion of advocacy and of outreach activities in support of the implementation of the project. |
| --- | --- |

—

the promotion of advocacy and of outreach activities in support of the implementation of the project.

Implementing agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 4 375 508

OJ L 322, 18.12.2018, p. 38

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

19.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 of 17 December 2018 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’

With this Council Decision, the EU wishes to show its support to countering illicit arms in order to prevent violence, organised crime and conflicts in the region. The Council Decision has the following specific objectives:

| — | Strengthen physical security and management systems for national military and other institutional stockpiles through improved site security measures and inventory control; |
| --- | --- |

—

Strengthen physical security and management systems for national military and other institutional stockpiles through improved site security measures and inventory control;

| — | Reinforce national capabilities for destruction of seized, excess or unsafe SALW and ammunition; |
| --- | --- |

—

Reinforce national capabilities for destruction of seized, excess or unsafe SALW and ammunition;

| — | Enhance national SALW marking and tracing capacity and foment regional cooperation on tracing confiscated weapons and ammunition; |
| --- | --- |

—

Enhance national SALW marking and tracing capacity and foment regional cooperation on tracing confiscated weapons and ammunition;

| — | Improve SALW transfer mechanisms through national legislation, border controls, and regional coordination; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Improve SALW transfer mechanisms through national legislation, border controls, and regional coordination; and

| — | Promote socially responsible behaviours in selected communities, targeting groups that are severely affected by armed violence, including the use of turn-in campaigns or other strategies designed to reduce local incidence of violent crimes. |
| --- | --- |

—

Promote socially responsible behaviours in selected communities, targeting groups that are severely affected by armed violence, including the use of turn-in campaigns or other strategies designed to reduce local incidence of violent crimes.

Implementing agency: Organization of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 3 000 000

OJ L 322, 18.12.2018, p. 27

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

20.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

With this Decision, the EU is supporting one of the key elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

The objectives of the support are to increase the number of adherents to ICSANT, to raise awareness among national policy- and decision-makers, as well as capacity-building: to help improve national legislation and to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including criminal justice officials to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of nuclear terrorism.

The Council Decision aims to build synergies with on-going EU projects in support for relevant international legal instruments, such as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

The Council Decision will promote the universalization and effective implementation of ICSANT through the development and maintenance of a password-protected website on all resources on ICSANT including examples of national legislation; the development of an e-learning module on ICSANT, to be translated into at least four UN official languages; the provision of relevant legislative assistance; capacity building of relevant stakeholders including criminal justice officials that could be involved in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving nuclear and other radioactive material covered by ICSANT; holding of global and regional workshops and country visits and by the collection and dissemination of good practices.

Implementing agency: United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

Budget: EUR 4 999 986

OJ L 314, 11.12.2018, p. 41

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

21.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1943 of 10 December 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303 in support of the continued implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The duration of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303, on the provision of satellite imagery in support of the OPCW, has been extended for 12 months. This to allow the OPCW to continue the implementation of the activities and to reach their planned objectives.

Implementing agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 0

OJ L 314, 11.12.2018, p. 58

22.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

With a view to fighting the illicit trade in firearms and SALW in the Western Balkans, support is provided for the implementation of the ‘Regional Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW/firearms and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024’.

This Council Decision also provides support for countering illicit arms trafficking in the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

Implementing agency: South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC)

Budget: EUR 4 002 588

OJ L 293, 20.11.2018, p. 11

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

23.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1789 of 19 November 2018 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States

The focus of the project is on capacity-building in Arab States for implementing the UN Programme of Actions against illicit small arms and light weapons.

Actions in the following areas are supported:

| — | international SALW transfer control (combating illicit arms flows); |
| --- | --- |

—

international SALW transfer control (combating illicit arms flows);

| — | identification and disruption of sources of illicit small arms (capacity-building for law-enforcement agencies); |
| --- | --- |

—

identification and disruption of sources of illicit small arms (capacity-building for law-enforcement agencies);

| — | other measures related to small-arms control, including stockpile management, control of related supplies and security; |
| --- | --- |

—

other measures related to small-arms control, including stockpile management, control of related supplies and security;

| — | disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); |
| --- | --- |

—

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR);

| — | provision of information relevant to illicit SALW and enhanced SALW control. |
| --- | --- |

—

provision of information relevant to illicit SALW and enhanced SALW control.

Implementing agency: League of Arab States (LAS)

Budget: EUR 2 858 550

OJ L 293, 20.11.2018, p. 24

Estimated duration of the action: 24 months

24.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/298 of 26 February 2018 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The EU assistance is supporting universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the long term sustainability of its verification regime through outreach and capacity building.

The Council Decision continues the support for:

| — | certified auxiliary seismic stations part of the CTBTO International Monitoring System; |
| --- | --- |

—

certified auxiliary seismic stations part of the CTBTO International Monitoring System;

| — | the development of noble gas sampling systems through study of materials for improved adsorption of xenon; |
| --- | --- |

—

the development of noble gas sampling systems through study of materials for improved adsorption of xenon;

| — | continuing the radio-xenon background measurement campaigns in different regions of the world; |
| --- | --- |

—

continuing the radio-xenon background measurement campaigns in different regions of the world;

| — | the Ensemble Prediction System to quantify uncertainties and confidence level in Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) simulations; |
| --- | --- |

—

the Ensemble Prediction System to quantify uncertainties and confidence level in Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) simulations;

| — | the scientific evaluation of the increase in resolution for ATM tools; |
| --- | --- |

—

the scientific evaluation of the increase in resolution for ATM tools;

| — | the development of new software; |
| --- | --- |

—

the development of new software;

| — | enhancing the on-site inspection noble gas processing and detection; |
| --- | --- |

—

enhancing the on-site inspection noble gas processing and detection;

| — | enhancing the automatic processing and integration capabilities in seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound National Data Centre-in-a-Box; |
| --- | --- |

—

enhancing the automatic processing and integration capabilities in seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound National Data Centre-in-a-Box;

| — | integrated outreach and capacity-building targeting State Signatories and Non-Signatories. |
| --- | --- |

—

integrated outreach and capacity-building targeting State Signatories and Non-Signatories.

Implementing agency: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

Budget: EUR 4 594 752

OJ L 56, 28.2.2018, p. 34

Estimated duration of the action: 24 months

25.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 of 26 February 2018 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Over the period 2018-2021, EU funding for the activities of the European Network of Independent Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Think Tanks will be continued.

The following objectives will be further pursued:

| (a) | to encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

to encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems;

| (b) | to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the Network on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the Network on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament;

| (c) | to constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

to constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community;

| (d) | to contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

to contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union;

| (e) | to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries.

Implementing agency: EU Non-Proliferation Consortium

Budget: EUR 4 507 005

OJ L 56, 28.2.2018, p. 46

Estimated duration of the action: 42 months

26.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/294 of 26 February 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/259 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The duration of Decision (CFSP) 2015/259 has been extended until December 2018, with a view to the full implementation of the activities.

Implementing agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 0

OJ L 55, 27.2.2018, p. 58

27.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/101 of 22 January 2018 on the promotion of effective arms export controls

This is a new phase of EU outreach activities in the field of arms export controls. 24 third countries in the EU close neighbourhood will receive technical assistance to improve their controls over arms transfer. In addition to promoting effective arms export controls, the objective of this Decision is to support regional cooperation, enhanced transparency and greater responsibility in line with the principles of the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the risk assessment criteria contained therein.

Implementing agency: German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (‘BAFA’)

Budget: EUR 1 304 107

OJ L 17, 23.1.2018, p. 40

Estimated duration of the action: 30 months

28.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation

The contribution aims to:

| a) | promote the subscription to the Code by an ever larger number of States and ultimately its universality; |
| --- | --- |

a)

promote the subscription to the Code by an ever larger number of States and ultimately its universality;

| b) | support the full implementation of the Code; |
| --- | --- |

b)

support the full implementation of the Code;

| c) | promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all; |
| --- | --- |

c)

promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all;

| d) | reinforce the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation; |
| --- | --- |

d)

reinforce the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation;

| e) | explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space. |
| --- | --- |

e)

explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space.

Implementing agency: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique

Budget: EUR 1 878 120

OJ L 337, 19.12.2017, p. 28

Estimated duration of the action: 40 months

29.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2302 of 12 December 2017 in support of the OPCW activities to assist clean-up operations at the former chemical weapons storage site in Libya

| a) | The contribution aims to support the OPCW in the complete destruction of Libya's chemical weapons stockpile subject to the verification measures provided for in the Chemical Weapons Convention. The specific objectives of the project are to: |
| --- | --- |

a)

The contribution aims to support the OPCW in the complete destruction of Libya's chemical weapons stockpile subject to the verification measures provided for in the Chemical Weapons Convention. The specific objectives of the project are to:

| b) | complete the full clean-up operations at the former chemical weapons storage site at Ruwagha (Al Jufra province), in an environmentally compliant manner, subject to the verification measures provided for in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); |
| --- | --- |

b)

complete the full clean-up operations at the former chemical weapons storage site at Ruwagha (Al Jufra province), in an environmentally compliant manner, subject to the verification measures provided for in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);

| c) | increase the capacity of the Libyan National Authority (LNA), as designated pursuant to Article VII(4) of the CWC, and those engaged in destruction, decontamination, and disposal of chemical materials in Libya, and |
| --- | --- |

c)

increase the capacity of the Libyan National Authority (LNA), as designated pursuant to Article VII(4) of the CWC, and those engaged in destruction, decontamination, and disposal of chemical materials in Libya, and

| d) | train those engaged in these efforts to collect, record, and transport soil samples in and around the Ruwagha tank farm in accordance with OPCW standards, with the use of live video feeds and sealed OPCW cameras, for compliance with the report of the Eighty-Third Session of the Executive Council. |
| --- | --- |

d)

train those engaged in these efforts to collect, record, and transport soil samples in and around the Ruwagha tank farm in accordance with OPCW standards, with the use of live video feeds and sealed OPCW cameras, for compliance with the report of the Eighty-Third Session of the Executive Council.

Implementing agency: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 3 035 591

OJ L 329, 13.12.2017, p. 49

Estimated duration of the action: 20 months

30.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303 of 12 December 2017 in support of the continued implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons

The project supported through this Decision is the provision of situation-awareness products related to the security of the OPCW fact-finding mission, including the status of the road network through the delivery to OPCW of SatCen satellite imagery products.

Implementing agency: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 1 003 717

OJ L 329, 13.12.2017, p. 55

Estimated duration of the action: 12 months

31.

Council Decision (EU) 2017/2284 of 11 December 2017 to provide support to States in the African, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and Caribbean regions to participate in the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group consultative process

The contribution provides support to States in the African, the Asia-Pacific and the Latin America and Caribbean regions to participate in the high-level FMCT expert preparatory group consultative process, in sub-regional workshops and expert meetings. It also aims to facilitate the transmission of knowledge between academia, civil society organisations and Member States relating to fissile materials and to establish a repository of relevant information and publications.

Implementing agency: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1 220 881

OJ L 328, 12.12.2017, p. 34

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

32.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1252 of 11 July 2017 in support of the strengthening of chemical safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Aiming to enhance peace and security in the neighbourhood of the Union by reducing the threat posed by the illicit trade of controlled and toxic chemicals in the OSCE region, in particular in Ukraine and to uphold effective multilateralism at regional level by supporting the action of the OSCE to enhance the capabilities of the competent authorities in Ukraine to prevent the illicit trade of controlled and toxic chemicals in line with obligations under UNSCR 1540, the contribution provides support for:

| a) | improving Ukraine's regulatory system on chemical safety and security; |
| --- | --- |

a)

improving Ukraine's regulatory system on chemical safety and security;

| b) | establishing a Ukrainian national reference centre to identify controlled and toxic chemicals; |
| --- | --- |

b)

establishing a Ukrainian national reference centre to identify controlled and toxic chemicals;

| c) | strengthening controls over cross-boundary movement of controlled and toxic chemicals. |
| --- | --- |

c)

strengthening controls over cross-boundary movement of controlled and toxic chemicals.

Implementing agency: the OSCE Secretariat and an OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine

Budget: EUR 1 431 157

OJ L 179, 12.7.2017, p. 8

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

33.

Council Decision 2017/1195/CFSP of 4 July 2017 amending Decision 2014/129/CFSP, promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (EU Consortium Second Extension)

Second Extension of the EU Consortium Council Decision

Implementing agency: EU Non-Proliferation Consortium

Budget: EUR 434 254

OJ L 172, 5.7.2017, p. 14

Estimated duration of the action: 6 months

34.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/915 of 29 May 2017 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

This is a second phase of EU outreach activities in support of the Arms Trade Treaty in order to:

| a) | support a number of States to strengthen their arms transfer control systems for effective implementation of the ATT; |
| --- | --- |

a)

support a number of States to strengthen their arms transfer control systems for effective implementation of the ATT;

| (b) | increase awareness and ownership of the ATT at national and regional levels by the relevant national and regional authorities and civil society stakeholders. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

increase awareness and ownership of the ATT at national and regional levels by the relevant national and regional authorities and civil society stakeholders.

Implementing agency: German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (‘BAFA’) and Expertise France (EF).

Budget: EUR 8 368 151

OJ L 139, 30.5.2017, p. 39

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

35.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

The support provided aims to help enhance the relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities, primarily through training, capacity-building and assistance facilitation in close coordination with other Union programmes and other actors involved in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004); to ensure synergies and complementarity; to contribute to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of both the 2009 comprehensive review on the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the outcome of the comprehensive review conducted during 2016, in particular in the areas of technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness; to support the development of voluntary UNSCR 1540 (2004) national implementation action plans upon States' request; to promote the engagement of relevant stakeholders from industry and civil society in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004).

Implementing agency: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 2 672 770

OJ L 121, 12.5.2017, p. 39

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

36.

Council Decision 2017/632/CFSP Amending Decision 2014/129/CFSP, promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (EU Consortium First Extension)

Extending the duration of Council Decision 2014/129/CFSP to enable the full implementation of the activities contained therein.

Implementing agency: EU Non-Proliferation Consortium

Budget: no-cost extension

OJ L 90, 4.4.2017, p. 10

Estimated duration of the action: 3 months

37.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 of 21 December 2016 on the Union support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) activities in the area of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The support provided for the nuclear security activities of the IAEA aims to:

| a) | ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of support provided through previous Joint Actions and Decisions; |
| --- | --- |

a)

ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of support provided through previous Joint Actions and Decisions;

| b) | strengthen countries indigenous nuclear security support infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

b)

strengthen countries indigenous nuclear security support infrastructure;

| c) | strengthen countries legislative and regulatory framework; |
| --- | --- |

c)

strengthen countries legislative and regulatory framework;

| d) | strengthen nuclear security systems and measures for nuclear and other radioactive materials; |
| --- | --- |

d)

strengthen nuclear security systems and measures for nuclear and other radioactive materials;

| e) | strengthen countries institutional infrastructure and capabilities to deal with nuclear and radioactive materials out of regulatory control; |
| --- | --- |

e)

strengthen countries institutional infrastructure and capabilities to deal with nuclear and radioactive materials out of regulatory control;

| f) | strengthen countries response and resilience to cybercrime and mitigate its impact on nuclear security; |
| --- | --- |

f)

strengthen countries response and resilience to cybercrime and mitigate its impact on nuclear security;

| g) | enhance education and training capacities in the field of nuclear security; |
| --- | --- |

g)

enhance education and training capacities in the field of nuclear security;

| h) | provide focused and continuing support for the implementation and universal adherence to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. |
| --- | --- |

h)

provide focused and continuing support for the implementation and universal adherence to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

Implementing agency: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Budget: EUR 9 361 204,23

OJ L 352, 23.12.2016, p. 74

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months

38.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2001 of 15 November 2016 on a Union contribution to the establishment and the secure management of a Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the framework of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The contribution provides support for the safe and secure operation and management of the IAEA LEU Bank by ensuring high levels of security and safety during transport and storage, in line with the IAEA safety standards and security guidance documents. It provides support for:

| a) | the safe and secure establishment of storage for the 90 tonnes of LEU; |
| --- | --- |

a)

the safe and secure establishment of storage for the 90 tonnes of LEU;

| b) | the secure transport of 90 tonnes of LEU; |
| --- | --- |

b)

the secure transport of 90 tonnes of LEU;

| c) | the long term storage of the 90 tonnes of LEU |
| --- | --- |

c)

the long term storage of the 90 tonnes of LEU

Implementing agency: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Budget: EUR 4 362 200

OJ L 308, 16.11.2016, p. 22

Estimated duration of the action: 60 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement

39.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/51 of 18 January 2016 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in the framework of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The contribution provides support for:

| a) | promoting universal adherence to the BTWC by encouraging States not party to better understand the benefits of joining the BTWC and getting more involved in BTWC meetings and other activities, |
| --- | --- |

a)

promoting universal adherence to the BTWC by encouraging States not party to better understand the benefits of joining the BTWC and getting more involved in BTWC meetings and other activities,

| b) | enhancing interaction with non-governmental stakeholders on science and technology and biosafety and biosecurity, |
| --- | --- |

b)

enhancing interaction with non-governmental stakeholders on science and technology and biosafety and biosecurity,

| c) | developing national capacities for BTWC implementation — in particular in developing countries, and on areas such as Articles VII and X — by improving the quality and quantity of declarations submitted under the Confidence-Building Measures system in order to enhance confidence in compliance with the BTWC, |
| --- | --- |

c)

developing national capacities for BTWC implementation — in particular in developing countries, and on areas such as Articles VII and X — by improving the quality and quantity of declarations submitted under the Confidence-Building Measures system in order to enhance confidence in compliance with the BTWC,

| d) | supporting the intersessional programme and the preparations for the Eighth Review Conference, |
| --- | --- |

d)

supporting the intersessional programme and the preparations for the Eighth Review Conference,

| e) | strengthening the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons (SGM), |
| --- | --- |

e)

strengthening the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons (SGM),

| f) | enabling tools for awareness-raising, education and engagement. |
| --- | --- |

f)

enabling tools for awareness-raising, education and engagement.

Implementing agency: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

Budget: EUR 2 340 000

OJ L 12, 19.1.2016, p. 50

Estimated duration of the action: 36 months from the conclusion of the financing agreement.

40.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2215 of 30 November 2015 in support of UNSCR 2235 (2015), establishing an OPCW-UN joint investigative mechanism to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic

The decision supported the OPCW and the JIM by contributing to costs associated with their activities under UNSCR 2235 (2015), with the following overall objective: identification to the greatest extent feasible of individuals, entities, groups or governments who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, where the OPCW FFM determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, as weapons.

Implementing agency: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Budget: EUR 2 290 463

OJ L 314, 1.12.2015, p. 51

Estimated duration of the action: 18 months from the conclusion of the financing agreement.

41.

Implementing agency: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

Budget: EUR 2 295 632

OJ L 314, 1.12.2015, p. 51

Estimated duration of the action: 18 months from the conclusion of the financing agreement.

42.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1838 of 12 October 2015 amending Decision 2013/391/CFSP in support of the practical implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Decision 2013/391/CFSP was amended as follows: (1) in Article 5, paragraph 2 was replaced by the following: ‘2.This Decision shall expire on 25 April 2016.’ (2) in the Annex, point 6 was replaced by the following: ‘6. DURATION This Decision will expire on 25 April 2016.’

Implementing agency: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

Budget: EUR 750 000

OJ L 266, 13.10.2015, p. 96

Duration of the action:

| 1) | CD 2013/391/CFSP (row 65): 24 months; |
| --- | --- |

1)

CD 2013/391/CFSP (row 65): 24 months;

| 2) | CD2015/1838/CFSP: extended it until 25 April 2016. |
| --- | --- |

2)

CD2015/1838/CFSP: extended it until 25 April 2016.

43.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1837 of 12 October 2015 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The sixth Council Decision supports the CTBT Organisation, without substituting actions/projects funded through the regular budget, a) in its technical pillars to enhance the technical and scientific capacity of the PTS and b) in its capacity to promote the universal adherence and entry-into-force of the Treaty and the verification regime through training and educational activities. The projects aim to:

| a) | sustain the operability of the CTBTO verification system; |
| --- | --- |

a)

sustain the operability of the CTBTO verification system;

| b) | expand the capabilities of the Multispectral/Infrared (MSIR) system, developed by the PTS under EU Council Decision V, by adding dedicated sensors to help inspection teams detect OSI-relevant features; |
| --- | --- |

b)

expand the capabilities of the Multispectral/Infrared (MSIR) system, developed by the PTS under EU Council Decision V, by adding dedicated sensors to help inspection teams detect OSI-relevant features;

| c) | promote universal adherence and the entry into force of the Treaty and the long term sustainability of its verification regime through outreach activities and capacity building. |
| --- | --- |

c)

promote universal adherence and the entry into force of the Treaty and the long term sustainability of its verification regime through outreach activities and capacity building.

Implementing agency: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

Budget: EUR 3 024 756

OJ L 266, 13.10.2015, p. 83

Duration of the action: 24 months from the conclusion of the financial agreement.

44.

Council Decision 2015/259/CFSP of 17 February 2015 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The EU Council Decision 2015/259/CFSP for the years 2015-17 has made available to the OPCW some EUR 2,5 mln to support:

| a) | universality, |
| --- | --- |

a)

universality,

| b) | national implementation, |
| --- | --- |

b)

national implementation,

| c) | international cooperation, |
| --- | --- |

c)

international cooperation,

| d) | the Africa Programme and |
| --- | --- |

d)

the Africa Programme and

| e) | implementation of lessons learned from the Syrian operation. |
| --- | --- |

e)

implementation of lessons learned from the Syrian operation.

Implementing agency: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Budget: EUR 2 528 069

OJ L 43, 18.2.2015, p. 14

Duration of the action: 36 months

45.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/203 of 9 February 2015 in support of the Union proposal for an international Code of Conduct for outer- space activities as a contribution to transparency and confidence building measures in outer-space activities

The objective was to promote the proposal for an international Code of Conduct on outer-space activities as a contribution to the creation of TCBMs in outer-space activities in line with UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/50, while building on the lessons-learned from Council Decision 2012/281/CFSP.

The projects supported by the EU aimed to:

| a) | enhance awareness, knowledge and understanding of the proposal for an international Code of Conduct and the process led by the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

a)

enhance awareness, knowledge and understanding of the proposal for an international Code of Conduct and the process led by the European Union.

| b) | continue to provide a framework for the multilateral process on the proposal for an international Code of Conduct for outer-space activities, that will enable the international community to continue to engage with a view to building the widest possible consensus for adoption of the Code of Conduct, through supporting multilateral meetings for negotiations on the draft Code, and for its formal adoption. |
| --- | --- |

b)

continue to provide a framework for the multilateral process on the proposal for an international Code of Conduct for outer-space activities, that will enable the international community to continue to engage with a view to building the widest possible consensus for adoption of the Code of Conduct, through supporting multilateral meetings for negotiations on the draft Code, and for its formal adoption.

Implementing agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 775 729

OJ L 33, 10.2.2015, p. 38

Duration of the action: 18 months

46.

Council Decision 2014/ 913/CFSP of 15 December 2014 in support of the HCoC and ballistic missile Non-Proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The objectives were to:

| 1. | Support the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation and the Missile Technology Control Regime, in particular with the aim to:






  a) | promote universality and the subscription to the Code by all States with ballistic missile capabilities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Support the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation and the Missile Technology Control Regime, in particular with the aim to:

a)

promote universality and the subscription to the Code by all States with ballistic missile capabilities;

| b) | support the implementation and reinforce the visibility of the Code; |
| --- | --- |

b)

support the implementation and reinforce the visibility of the Code;

| c) | promote adherence to the MTCR guidelines and its annex. |
| --- | --- |

c)

promote adherence to the MTCR guidelines and its annex.

| 2. | More generally, to support a range of activities to fight against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, aimed notably at raising awareness of this threat, stepping up efforts to increase the effectiveness of multilateral instruments, building up support to initiatives to address these specific challenges and helping interested countries to reinforce nationally their relevant export control regimes. |
| --- | --- |

2.

More generally, to support a range of activities to fight against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, aimed notably at raising awareness of this threat, stepping up efforts to increase the effectiveness of multilateral instruments, building up support to initiatives to address these specific challenges and helping interested countries to reinforce nationally their relevant export control regimes.

Implementing agency: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS).

Budget: EUR 990 000

OJ L 360, 17.12.2014, p. 44

Duration of the action: 30 months

47.

Council Decision 2014/129/CFSP of 10 March 2014 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The Council Decision continued the support to the Consortium of think-tanks. It built on the achievements and experiences since 2011. New tasks were added, among which:

| a) | annual international conference on non-proliferation and disarmament (3 in total; 250-300 targeted participants, international in scope, held in Brussels) |
| --- | --- |

a)

annual international conference on non-proliferation and disarmament (3 in total; 250-300 targeted participants, international in scope, held in Brussels)

| b) | annual consultative meeting on non-proliferation and disarmament (3 in total, 100 targeted participants, European in scope, held in Brussels) |
| --- | --- |

b)

annual consultative meeting on non-proliferation and disarmament (3 in total, 100 targeted participants, European in scope, held in Brussels)

| c) | internet platform and production of policy papers; |
| --- | --- |

c)

internet platform and production of policy papers;

| d) | ad hoc seminars; |
| --- | --- |

d)

ad hoc seminars;

| e) | help-desk facility for production within two weeks-time of up to twenty 5-10 pages policy papers on demand by EEAS; |
| --- | --- |

e)

help-desk facility for production within two weeks-time of up to twenty 5-10 pages policy papers on demand by EEAS;

| f) | education on non-proliferation and disarmament (European online curriculum for university use to be available 24 months after the starting of the contract). |
| --- | --- |

f)

education on non-proliferation and disarmament (European online curriculum for university use to be available 24 months after the starting of the contract).

Implementing agency: The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium of Think-Tanks.

Budget: EUR 3 600 000

OJ L 71, 12.3.2014, p. 3

Duration of the action: 36 months

48.

Council Decision 2013/726/CFSP of 9 December 2013 in support of the UNSCR 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council EC-M-33/Dec 1, in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The overall objective was to support the OPCW activities by contributing to costs associated with the inspection and verification of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, and costs associated with activities complementary to the core mandated tasks in support of UNSCR 2118 (2013) and the OPCW Executive Council Decision of 27 September 2013 on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and subsequent and related resolutions and decisions. The project under the Council Decision provided situation-awareness products: satellite imagery and related information products of the EU Satellite Centre, related to the security of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission, including the status of the road network.

Implementing agency: The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Budget: EUR 2 311 842

OJ L 329, 10.12.2013, p. 41

Duration of the action: 12 months. Extended until 30 September 2015.

Implemented.

49.

Council Decision 2013/668/CFSP of 18 November 2013 in support of World Health Organisation activities in the area of bio-safety and bio-security in the framework of the European Union Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The overall objective was to support the implementation of the BTWC focusing on the safety and security of microbial or other biological agents or toxins in laboratories and other facilities, including during transportation and to promote bio-risk reduction practices and awareness, including biosafety, biosecurity, bioethics and preparedness against intentional misuse of biological agents and toxins.

Implementing entity: The World Health Organisation (WTO).

Budget: EUR 1 727 000

OJ L 310, 20.11.2013, p. 13

Duration of the action: 24 months

50.

Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP of 21 October 2013 on the Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — IAEA VI

The overall aim was to support the IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification to:

| (a) | promote universal adherence to international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments, including IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

promote universal adherence to international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments, including IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols;

| (b) | protect proliferation-sensitive materials and equipment and the relevant technology by providing legislative and regulatory assistance in the area of nuclear security and safeguards; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

protect proliferation-sensitive materials and equipment and the relevant technology by providing legislative and regulatory assistance in the area of nuclear security and safeguards;

| (c) | strengthen the detection of, and response to, illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

strengthen the detection of, and response to, illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Implementing entity: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Budget: EUR 8 050 000

OJ L 281, 23.10.2013, p. 6

Duration of the action: 36 months

51.

Council Decision 2013/391/CFSP of 22 July 2013 in support of the practical implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

The support focused on:

| (a) | enhancing relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities primarily through capacity-building and assistance facilitation; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

enhancing relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities primarily through capacity-building and assistance facilitation;

| (b) | contributing to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of the 2009 Comprehensive Review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), in particular in the areas of technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

contributing to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of the 2009 Comprehensive Review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), in particular in the areas of technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness;

| (c) | initiating, developing and implementing national action plans upon states request. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

initiating, developing and implementing national action plans upon states request.

Implementing entity: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

Budget: EUR 750 000

OJ L 198, 23.7.2013, p. 40

Duration of the action: 24 months.

52.

Council Decision 2012/699/CFSP of 13 November 2012 on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — CTBTO V.

The Union supported four projects, the objectives of which were to:

| (a) | provide technical assistance and capacity building to State Signatories to enable them to fully participate in and contribute to the implementation of the CTBT verification system; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

provide technical assistance and capacity building to State Signatories to enable them to fully participate in and contribute to the implementation of the CTBT verification system;

| (b) | develop capacity for future generations of CTBT experts through the Capacity Development Initiative (CDI); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

develop capacity for future generations of CTBT experts through the Capacity Development Initiative (CDI);

| (c) | enhance the Atmospheric Transport Model (ATM); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

enhance the Atmospheric Transport Model (ATM);

| (d) | characterize and mitigate Radio Xenon noble gases; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

characterize and mitigate Radio Xenon noble gases;

| (e) | support the Integrated Field Exercise in 2014 (IFE14) through the development of an integrated multispectral array; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

support the Integrated Field Exercise in 2014 (IFE14) through the development of an integrated multispectral array;

| (f) | sustain certified IMS Auxiliary Seismic Stations. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

sustain certified IMS Auxiliary Seismic Stations.

Implementing entity: The Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO.

Budget: EUR 5 185 028

OJ L 314, 14.11.2012, p. 27

Duration of the action: 24 months. Extended to 3 December 2015.

Implemented

53.

Council Decision 2012/423/CFSP of 23 July 2012 on support of ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the Council Common Position 2003/805/CFSP

The objectives were to:

| (a) | support the activities of The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation, in particular with the aim to:






  — | promote the universality of the Code and the subscription to the Code by all States with ballistic missile capabilities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(a)

support the activities of The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation, in particular with the aim to:

—

promote the universality of the Code and the subscription to the Code by all States with ballistic missile capabilities;

| — | support the implementation of the Code; |
| --- | --- |

—

support the implementation of the Code;

| — | reinforce the visibility of the Code on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of its signature; |
| --- | --- |

—

reinforce the visibility of the Code on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of its signature;

| (b) | support a range of activities to fight against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, step up efforts to increase the effectiveness of multilateral instruments, build up support for initiatives addressing these specific challenges and help interested countries to reinforce nationally their relevant export control regimes. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

support a range of activities to fight against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, step up efforts to increase the effectiveness of multilateral instruments, build up support for initiatives addressing these specific challenges and help interested countries to reinforce nationally their relevant export control regimes.

Implementing entity: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS).

Budget: EUR 930 000

OJ L 196, 24.7.2012, p. 74

Duration of the action: 24 months. Extended to 28 March 2015.

Implemented

54.

Council Decision 2012/422/CFSP of 23 July 2012 in support of a process leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The objectives were to:

| (a) | support the work of the Facilitator for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

support the work of the Facilitator for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction;

| (b) | enhance the visibility of the Union as a global actor and in the region in the field of non-proliferation; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

enhance the visibility of the Union as a global actor and in the region in the field of non-proliferation;

| (c) | encourage regional political and security-related dialogue within civil societies and governments, and more particularly among experts, officials and academics; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

encourage regional political and security-related dialogue within civil societies and governments, and more particularly among experts, officials and academics;

| (d) | identify concrete confidence-building measures that could serve as practical steps towards the prospect of a Middle East zone free of WMD and their means of delivery; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

identify concrete confidence-building measures that could serve as practical steps towards the prospect of a Middle East zone free of WMD and their means of delivery;

| (e) | encourage discussion on the universalization and implementation of relevant international treaties and other instruments to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

encourage discussion on the universalization and implementation of relevant international treaties and other instruments to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems;

| (f) | discuss issues related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international and regional cooperation. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

discuss issues related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international and regional cooperation.

Implementing entity: EU Non-Proliferation Consortium.

Budget: EUR 352 000

OJ L 196, 24.7.2012, p. 67

Duration of the action: 18 months.

A contingency amount of EUR 20 000 was given to the Arab Institute for Security Studies in Amman, Jordan for organising a meeting on the subject of the WMDFZ in the M.E. (13-14 November 2013).

Implemented.

55.

Council Decision 2012/421/CFSP of 23 July 2012 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), in the framework of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The objectives were to:

| (a) | promote universal adherence to the BTWC, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

promote universal adherence to the BTWC,

| (b) | support the implementation of the BTWC and the submission of CBMs by the States Parties, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

support the implementation of the BTWC and the submission of CBMs by the States Parties,

| (c) | support the work of the 2012-2015 inter-sessional programme with a view to strengthening the implementation and effectiveness of the BTWC. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

support the work of the 2012-2015 inter-sessional programme with a view to strengthening the implementation and effectiveness of the BTWC.

Implementing entity: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

Budget: EUR 1 700 000

OJ L 196, 24.7.2012, p. 61

Duration of the action: 24 months. Extended to 31 January 2015.

Implemented

56.

Council Decision 2012/281/CFSP of 29 May 2012 in the framework of the European Security Strategy in support of the Union proposal for an international Code of Conduct on outer-space activities.

The objectives were:

| (a) | consultations with States, active or not yet active on space issues to discuss the proposal and to gather their views, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

consultations with States, active or not yet active on space issues to discuss the proposal and to gather their views,

| (b) | gathering expert support for the process of developing an international Code of Conduct for outer-space activities. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

gathering expert support for the process of developing an international Code of Conduct for outer-space activities.

Implementing entity: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Budget: EUR 1 490 000

OJ L 140, 30.5.2012, p. 68

Duration of the action: 18 months. Extended to 31 July 2014.

Implemented

57.

Council Decision 2012/166/CFSP of 23 March 2012 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — V.

The objectives were to:

| (a) | enhance the capacities of States Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the CWC, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

enhance the capacities of States Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the CWC,

| (b) | enhance the preparedness of States Parties to prevent and respond to attacks involving toxic chemicals, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

enhance the preparedness of States Parties to prevent and respond to attacks involving toxic chemicals,

| (c) | enhance international cooperation in the field of chemical activities, |
| --- | --- |

(c)

enhance international cooperation in the field of chemical activities,

| (d) | support the ability of the OPCW to adapt to developments in the field of science and technology, |
| --- | --- |

(d)

support the ability of the OPCW to adapt to developments in the field of science and technology,

| (e) | promote universality by encouraging States not Parties to join the CWC. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

promote universality by encouraging States not Parties to join the CWC.

Implementing entity: The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Budget: EUR 2 140 000

OJ L 87, 24.3.2012, p. 49

Duration of the action: 24 months. Extended to 31 December 2014

Implemented

58.

Council Decision 2010/799/CFSP of 13 December 2010 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The objectives were to:

| (a) | encourage regional political and security-related dialogue within civil societies and governments, and among experts, officials and academics, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

encourage regional political and security-related dialogue within civil societies and governments, and among experts, officials and academics,

| (b) | identify confidence-building measures that could serve as practical steps towards the prospect of a Middle East zone free of WMD and their means of delivery, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

identify confidence-building measures that could serve as practical steps towards the prospect of a Middle East zone free of WMD and their means of delivery,

| (c) | encourage discussion on the universalization and implementation of relevant international treaties and other instruments to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, |
| --- | --- |

(c)

encourage discussion on the universalization and implementation of relevant international treaties and other instruments to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems,

| (d) | discuss issues related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international and regional cooperation in this regard. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

discuss issues related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international and regional cooperation in this regard.

Implementing entity: EU Non-Proliferation Consortium.

Budget: EUR 347 700

OJ L 341, 23.12.2012, p. 27

Implemented.

59.

Council Decision 2010/585/CFSP of 27 September 2010 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — IAEA V.

The objectives were:

| (a) | strengthening national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

strengthening national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol,

| (b) | assisting States in strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

assisting States in strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials,

| (c) | strengthening States' capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

strengthening States' capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Implementing entity: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Budget: EUR 9 966 000

OJ L 302, 1.10.2010, p. 10

Duration of the action: 24 months. Extended to 31 December 2014.

Implemented

60.

Council Decision 2010/430/CFSP of 26 July 2010 establishing a European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The objective of this network of independent non-proliferation think tanks was to encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the WMD proliferation and their delivery systems within civil society, and among experts, researchers and academics. The support for the network focused on:

| (a) | organising a kick-off meeting and an annual conference with a view to submitting a report and/or recommendations to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), |
| --- | --- |

(a)

organising a kick-off meeting and an annual conference with a view to submitting a report and/or recommendations to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR),

| (b) | creating an internet platform to facilitate contacts and foster research dialogue among the network of non-proliferation think tanks. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

creating an internet platform to facilitate contacts and foster research dialogue among the network of non-proliferation think tanks.

Implementing entity: EU Non-Proliferation Consortium.

Budget: EUR 2 182 000

OJ L 202, 4.8.2010, p. 5

Duration of the action: 36 months. Extended to 30 June 2014.

Implemented

61.

Council Decision 2010/461/CFSP of 26 July 2010 on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — CTBTO IV.

The objectives were to:

| (a) | improve the operation and sustainability of the auxiliary seismic stations network of the CTBT’s International Monitoring System; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

improve the operation and sustainability of the auxiliary seismic stations network of the CTBT’s International Monitoring System;

| (b) | improve the CTBT verification system through strengthened cooperation with the scientific community; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

improve the CTBT verification system through strengthened cooperation with the scientific community;

| (c) | provide technical assistance to States Signatories in Africa and in the Latin American and Caribbean Region so as to enable them to fully participate in and contribute to the implementation of the CTBT verification system; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

provide technical assistance to States Signatories in Africa and in the Latin American and Caribbean Region so as to enable them to fully participate in and contribute to the implementation of the CTBT verification system;

| (d) | develop an OSI noble gas capable detection system. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

develop an OSI noble gas capable detection system.

Implementing entity: The Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO.

Budget: EUR 5 280 000

OJ L 219, 20.8.2010, p. 7

Duration of the action: 18 months. Extended to 16 May 2014.

Implemented

62.

Council Decision 2009/569/CFSP of 27 July 2009 on support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: OPCW IV.

The objective was to support universal adherence to the CWC, to promote ratification/accession to the CWC by States not Parties (signatory States as well as non-signatory States) and to support the full implementation of the CWC by the States Parties:

Implementing entity: The Organisation for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Budget: EUR 2 110 000

OJ L 197, 29.7.2009, p. 96

Duration of the action: 18 months.

Implemented

63.

Council Decision 2008/974/CFSP of 18 December 2008 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The EU supported three aspects of the Code:

| (a) | universality of the Code, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

universality of the Code,

| (b) | implementation of the Code, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

implementation of the Code,

| (c) | improved functioning of the Code. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

improved functioning of the Code.

Implementing entity: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS).

Budget: EUR 1 015 000

OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 91

Duration of the action: 24 months.

Implemented.

64.

Council Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP of 10 November 2008 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The overall objective was to:

| (a) | support universal adherence to the BTWC, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

support universal adherence to the BTWC,

| (b) | improve implementation of the BTWC, including the submission of confidence building measures declarations, and |
| --- | --- |

(b)

improve implementation of the BTWC, including the submission of confidence building measures declarations, and

| (c) | support the best use of the inter-sessional process 2007-2010 for the preparation of the 2011 Review Conference. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

support the best use of the inter-sessional process 2007-2010 for the preparation of the 2011 Review Conference.

Implementing entity: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) — Geneva.

Budget: EUR 1 400 000

OJ L 302, 13.11.2008, p. 29

Duration of the action: 24 months.

Implemented.

65.

Council Joint Action 2008/588/CFSP of 15 July 2008 on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — CTBTO III.

The EU supported the building of capacity of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO in the area of verification by:

| (a) | noble gas monitoring: radio-xenon measurements and data analysis, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

noble gas monitoring: radio-xenon measurements and data analysis,

| (b) | integrating States Signatories in Africa to fully participate in and contribute to the implementation of the CTBTO monitoring and verification system. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

integrating States Signatories in Africa to fully participate in and contribute to the implementation of the CTBTO monitoring and verification system.

Implementing entity: The CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Budget: EUR 2 316 000

OJ L 189, 17.7.2008, p. 28

Duration of the action: 18 months.

Implemented.

66.

Council Joint Action 2008/368/CFSP of 14 May 2008 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and in the framework of the implementation of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — UNSCR 1540.

The projects in support of the implementation of UNSCR 1540 were six workshops aiming at enhancing the capacity of export-control officials in six sub regions: Africa, Central America, Mercosur, the Middle East and Gulf Regions, Pacific Islands and South-East Asia — to implement UNSCR 1540 in practice. The workshops were tailored for border, customs and regulatory officials and contained the main elements of an export control process including applicable laws (including national and international legal aspects), regulatory controls (including licensing provisions, end-user verification and awareness-raising programmes) and enforcement (including commodity identification, risk-assessment and detection methods).

Implementing entity: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

Budget: EUR 475 000

OJ L 127, 15.5.2008, p. 78

Duration of the action: 24 months.

Implemented.

67.

Council Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP of 14 April 2008 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — IAEA IV.

The objectives were to:

| (a) | strengthen national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

strengthen national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol,

| (b) | assist States in strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

assist States in strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials,

| (c) | strengthen States' capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

strengthen States' capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Implementing entity: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Budget: EUR 7 703 000

OJ L 107, 17.4.2008, p. 62

Duration of the action: 24 months.

Implemented.

68.

Council Joint Action 2008/307/CFSP of 14 April 2008 in support of World Health Organisation activities in the area of laboratory bio-safety and bio-security — WHO I.

The overall objective was to support the implementation of the BTWC, in particular those aspects that relate to the safety and security of microbial or other biological agents and toxins in laboratories and other facilities, including during transportation as appropriate, to prevent unauthorised access to and removal of such agents and toxins. The contribution aimed to:

| (a) | promote bio-risk reduction management through regional and national outreach, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

promote bio-risk reduction management through regional and national outreach,

| (b) | strengthen the security and laboratory management practices against biological risks. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

strengthen the security and laboratory management practices against biological risks.

Implementing entity: The World Health Organisation (WTO).

Budget: EUR 2 105 000

OJ L 106, 16.4.2008, p. 17

Duration of the action: 24 months.

Implemented.

69.

Council Joint Action 2007/753/CFSP of 19 November 2007 in support of the IAEA monitoring and verification activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction — DPRK.

The objective was to contribute to the monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK, in accordance with the Initial Actions of 13 February 2007, as agreed in the framework of the six-party-talks.

Implementing entity: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA — Department of Safeguards)

Budget: EUR 1 780 000

OJ L 304, 22.11.2007, p. 38

Estimated duration of the action: 18 months. Suspension, Force majeure. Ended

70.

Council Joint Action 2007/468/CFSP of 28 June 2007 of 28 June 2007 on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction CTBTO II.

The objective was to support the early entry into force of the Treaty, and the establishing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification regime through:

| (a) | improvement of the knowledge of Provisional Technical Secretariat noble gas measurements; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

improvement of the knowledge of Provisional Technical Secretariat noble gas measurements;

| (b) | support for the Integrated Field Exercise 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

support for the Integrated Field Exercise 2008.

Implementing entity: The CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Budget: EUR 1 670 000

OJ L 176, 6.7.2007, p. 31

Duration of the action: 15 months.

Implemented.

71.

Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP of 19 March 2007 on support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — OPCW III.

The objective was to support universal adherence to the CWC, to promote ratification/accession to the CWC by States not Parties (signatory States as well as non-signatory States) and to support the full implementation of the CWC by the States Parties. The contribution also promoted international cooperation in the field of chemical activities, as accompanying measures to the implementation of the CWC and provided support for the creation of a collaborative framework among the chemical industry, OPCW and national authorities on the 10th anniversary of the OPCW.

Implementing entity: The Organisation for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Budget: EUR 1 700 000

OJ L 85, 27.3.2007, p. 10

Duration of the action: 18 months.

Implemented.

72.

Council Joint Action 2007/178/CFSP of 19 March 2007 in support of chemical weapons destruction in the Russian Federation in the framework of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — Russian Federation IV.

The objective was to assist the Russian Federation in destroying some of its chemical weapons as required by the CWC. This Joint Action supported the completion of the electricity supply infrastructure at Shchuch’ye chemical weapon destruction facility.

Implementing entity: The Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Budget: EUR 3 145 000

OJ L 81, 22.3.2007, p. 30

Duration of the action: 18 months. Implemented.

73.

Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP of 12 June 2006 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — IAEA III.

The objective was to strengthen nuclear security in selected countries focusing on:

| (a) | legislative and regulatory assistance; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

legislative and regulatory assistance;

| (b) | strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials;

| (c) | strengthening of countries capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

strengthening of countries capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking.

Implementing entity: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Budget: EUR 6 995 000

OJ L 165, 17.6.2006, p. 20

Duration of the action: 15 months.

Implemented.

74.

Council Joint Action 2006/419/CFSP of 12 June 2006 in support of the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The action aimed at addressing three aspects:

| (a) | awareness-raising of requirements and obligations under the Resolution, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

awareness-raising of requirements and obligations under the Resolution,

| (b) | strengthening national capacities in three target regions: Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia-Pacific, in drafting national reports on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and |
| --- | --- |

(b)

strengthening national capacities in three target regions: Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia-Pacific, in drafting national reports on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and

| (c) | sharing experience from the adoption of national measures required for the implementation of the Resolution. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

sharing experience from the adoption of national measures required for the implementation of the Resolution.

Implementing entity: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

Budget: EUR 195 000

OJ L 165, 17.6.2006, p. 30

Duration of the action: 22 months.

Implemented.

75.

Council Joint Action 2006/243/CFSP of 20 March 2006 on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in the area of training and capacity building for verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — CTBTO I.

The objective was to improve the capacity of CTBT Signatory States to fulfil their verification responsibilities and to enable them to fully benefit from participation in the treaty regime with the help of a computer-based training/self-study.

Implementing entity: The CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Budget: EUR 1 133 000

OJ L 88, 25.3.2006, p. 68

Duration of the action: 15 months. Implemented.

76.

Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27 February 2006 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in the framework of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The objective was to support universal adherence to the BTWC, promote accession to the BTWC by States not Party (signatory States as well as non-signatory States) and support the implementation of the BTWC by States Parties.

Implementing entity: The Graduate Institute of International Studies (GIIS), Geneva.

Budget: EUR 867 000

OJ L 65, 7.3.2006, p. 51

Duration of the action: 18 months. Implemented.

77.

Council Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — OPCW II.

The objective was to support universal adherence to the CWC and accession to the CWC by States not Party (signatory States as well as non-signatory States) and the implementation of the CWC by States Parties. The contribution also helped foster international cooperation.

Implementing entity: The Organisation for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Budget: EUR 1 697 000

OJ L 331, 17.12.2005, p. 34

Duration of the action: 12 months. Implemented.

78.

Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — IAEA II.

The objectives of the contribution were to:

| (a) | strengthen the physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

strengthen the physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities;

| (b) | strengthen the security of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

strengthen the security of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications;

| (c) | strengthen the countries capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

strengthen the countries capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking;

| (d) | provide legislative assistance for the implementation of obligations under IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

provide legislative assistance for the implementation of obligations under IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

Implementing entity: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Budget: EUR 3 914 000

OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 44

Duration of the action: 15 months.

Implemented.

79.

Council Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP of 22 November 2004 on support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — OPCW I.

The objective was to: support universal adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC); promote the accession to the CWC by States not Party (signatory States as well as non-signatory States); support the implementation of the CWC by the States Parties and promote international cooperation.

Implementing entity: The Organisation for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Budget: EUR 1 841 000

OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 63

Estimated duration of the action: 12 months.

Implemented.

80.

Council Joint Action 2004/796/CFSP of 22 November 2004 for the support of the physical protection of a nuclear site in the Russian Federation — Russian Federation III.

The objective was to reinforce the physical protection of nuclear sites in Russia to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear fissile material and of sabotage by improving the physical protection at the Bochvar Institute of the Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (formerly MINATOM).

Implementing entity: The Federal Republic of Germany.

Budget: EUR 7 730 000

OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 57

Duration of the action: 36 months. Implemented.

81.

Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear security programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — IAEA I.

The objective was to:

| (a) | strengthen the physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

strengthen the physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities;

| (b) | strengthen the security of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

strengthen the security of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications;

| (c) | strengthen the countries capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

strengthen the countries capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking;

Implementing entity: The International Atomic Energy Agency.

Budget: EUR 3 329 000

OJ L 182, 19.5.2004, p. 46

Duration of the action: 15 months.

Implemented.

82.

Council Joint Action 2003/472/CFSP of 24 June 2003 on the continuation of the European Union cooperation programme for non-proliferation and disarmament in the Russian Federation — Russian Federation II.

The Joint Action financed a unit of experts under the cooperation programme for non-proliferation and disarmament in the Russian Federation.

Implementing entity: The Russian Federation.

Budget: EUR 680 000

OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, p. 69

Expired on the date of expiry of the EU Common Strategy 1999/414/CFSP on Russia.

Implemented.

83.

Council Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP of 17 December 1999 establishing a European Union Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation — Russian Federation I.

The project contributed to:

| (a) | a chemical weapons pilot destruction plant situated in Gorny, Saratov region, Russia; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

a chemical weapons pilot destruction plant situated in Gorny, Saratov region, Russia;

| (b) | set studies and experimental studies on plutonium transport, storage and disposition. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

set studies and experimental studies on plutonium transport, storage and disposition.

Implementing entity: The Russian Federation.

Budget: EUR 8 900 000

OJ L 331, 23.12.1999, p. 11

Duration of the action: 48 months.

Implemented.

---

ANNEXE II

Overview of Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace IcSP — CBRN 1997-2018

‘Risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents’

Funding through ISCT-STCU

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Administrative operating budget, supplemental budgets and projects | Retraining former weapon scientists and engineers through support for:






  — | International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC, Moscow) and |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

Administrative operating budget, supplemental budgets and projects

Retraining former weapon scientists and engineers through support for:

—

International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC, Moscow) and

| — | Science and Technology Centre (STCU, Kiev) |
| --- | --- |

—

Science and Technology Centre (STCU, Kiev)

To redirect scientists/engineers' talents to civilian and peaceful activities through science and technological cooperation

ISTC and/or STCU

TACIS

235 million

1997-2006

IfS (AAP)

15 million

8 million

7,5  million

5,0  million

4,5  million

4,0  million

4,8  million

4,0  million

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

348-211

Enhancing regional CBRN detection capacity for the Border Guards in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova

To provide mobile chemical and RN detection equipment for the border guards

STCU

4,1  million

9.2014–9.2015

365-540

Provision of specialized CBRN equipment for first responders in the SEE CoE Region

EU CBRN CoE. CBRN equipment — SEE CoE Region

STCU

1,7  million

2016–6.2017 (tbc)

369-100

Strengthening the national legal framework and provision of specialized training on bio-safety and bio-security in Central Asia

EU CBRN CoE. Biosafety-biosecurity in Central Asia

ISTC

5 000 000

2016–2018

378591

Funding of the 2017 ISTC Administrative Operating Budget (AOB), Supplemental Budgets (SBs), and projects

Administrative support — ISTC

ISTC

1 500 000

31.12.2021

378227

Support to the Centre of Excellence of Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security — ISTC

EU CBRN CoE. Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security.

ISTC

3 500 000

7.11.2019

378590

Funding of the 2017 STCU Administrative Operating Budget (AOB), Supplemental Budgets (SBs), and projects

EU CBRN CoE — Administrative support

STCU

700 000

7.11.2021

378591

Funding of the 2017 ISTC Administrative Operating Budget (AOB), Supplemental Budgets (SBs), and projects

EU CBRN CoE — Administrative support

ISTC

1 500 000

31.12.2021

Year 2008 (excluding funding for ISTC/STCU)

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 145-156 | Combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in FSU countries (Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus) | To supply equipment for detection of NRM at border check points as it was identified in the previous phase of the activity financed by TACIS Nuclear Safety programme, contributing thus to reduce nuclear and radiation terrorism threat | JRC | 5 million | 11.7.2008–12.4.2013 |
| 145-130 | Assistance in export control of dual-use goods | To support the development of the legal framework and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls on dual-use items, including measures for regional cooperation with a view of contributing to the fight against the proliferation of WMD and related materials, equipment and technologies | BAFA (D) | ~ 5 million | 19.3.2008–31.12.2010 |
| 145-132 | Knowledge Management System on CBRN Trafficking | To improve capabilities of participating states, neighbouring countries of the EU in South-East Europe and possibly Caucasus, to combat the illicit trafficking and criminal use of CBRN materials (preparation phase to ‘EU CBRN Centres of Excellence’) | UNICRI | 1 million | 31.1.2008–1.8.2010 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

145-156

Combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in FSU countries (Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus)

To supply equipment for detection of NRM at border check points as it was identified in the previous phase of the activity financed by TACIS Nuclear Safety programme, contributing thus to reduce nuclear and radiation terrorism threat

JRC

5 million

11.7.2008–12.4.2013

145-130

Assistance in export control of dual-use goods

To support the development of the legal framework and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls on dual-use items, including measures for regional cooperation with a view of contributing to the fight against the proliferation of WMD and related materials, equipment and technologies

BAFA (D)

~ 5 million

19.3.2008–31.12.2010

145-132

Knowledge Management System on CBRN Trafficking

To improve capabilities of participating states, neighbouring countries of the EU in South-East Europe and possibly Caucasus, to combat the illicit trafficking and criminal use of CBRN materials (preparation phase to ‘EU CBRN Centres of Excellence’)

UNICRI

1 million

31.1.2008–1.8.2010

Year 2009 (excluding funding for ISTC/STCU)

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 200-523 | Knowledge management system on CBRN trafficking in North Africa and selected countries in the Middle East | To develop a durable co-operation legacy in the area of trafficking of CBRN materials (preparation phase to ‘EU CBRN Centres of Excellence’) | UNICRI | 1 million | 16.3.2009–15.7.2011 |
| 217-540 | Strengthening bio-safety and bio-security capabilities in Central Asian countries | To address shortcomings in the safety/security practices of key biological facilities in selected countries of Central Asia; to raise the skills of the personnel working at facilities (laboratories) handling dangerous biological agents or supervising those facilities, and to provide additional equipment, as needed, to ensure an adequate level of bio-safety and security | ISTC | 6,8  million | 21.9.2009–21.9.2014 |
| 219-636 | Combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in selected FSU and Mediterranean Basin countries and preparation of border management activities in the ASEAN region | To reduce the threat of nuclear and radiation terrorism. For this purpose the assistance will be provided to the partner countries in the improvement of the technical and organisational measures for detection of nuclear and radioactive materials (NRM) illicit trafficking | JRC | 6,7  million | 2.12.2009–1.12.2014 |
| 216-327 | Awareness raising of exporters export control of dual-use goods | To enhance the effectiveness of export control of dual use items in the Russian Federation, with a view to contribute to the fight against the proliferation of WMD (the specific objectives will be achieved through information exchange with EU exporters, support industry and researchers for awareness raising, organisation of seminars for exporters in the regions of the Russian Federation) | Russian independent non-profit organisation for professional advancement ‘Export Control Training Centre’ | 1 million | 1.9.2009–1.3.2011 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

200-523

Knowledge management system on CBRN trafficking in North Africa and selected countries in the Middle East

To develop a durable co-operation legacy in the area of trafficking of CBRN materials (preparation phase to ‘EU CBRN Centres of Excellence’)

UNICRI

1 million

16.3.2009–15.7.2011

217-540

Strengthening bio-safety and bio-security capabilities in Central Asian countries

To address shortcomings in the safety/security practices of key biological facilities in selected countries of Central Asia; to raise the skills of the personnel working at facilities (laboratories) handling dangerous biological agents or supervising those facilities, and to provide additional equipment, as needed, to ensure an adequate level of bio-safety and security

ISTC

6,8  million

21.9.2009–21.9.2014

219-636

Combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in selected FSU and Mediterranean Basin countries and preparation of border management activities in the ASEAN region

To reduce the threat of nuclear and radiation terrorism. For this purpose the assistance will be provided to the partner countries in the improvement of the technical and organisational measures for detection of nuclear and radioactive materials (NRM) illicit trafficking

JRC

6,7  million

2.12.2009–1.12.2014

216-327

Awareness raising of exporters export control of dual-use goods

To enhance the effectiveness of export control of dual use items in the Russian Federation, with a view to contribute to the fight against the proliferation of WMD (the specific objectives will be achieved through information exchange with EU exporters, support industry and researchers for awareness raising, organisation of seminars for exporters in the regions of the Russian Federation)

Russian independent non-profit organisation for professional advancement ‘Export Control Training Centre’

1 million

1.9.2009–1.3.2011

Year 2010 (excluding funding for ISTC/STCU)

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 239-471 (UNICRI main) –239-481 (JRC main) 253-483
  and 253-485 (pilot projects JRC and Univ. Milan) / 250-984 (UNICRI establishment of 2 Secretariats) | CBRN Centre of Excellence — First Phase | To set up a mechanism contributing to strengthen the long-term national and regional capabilities of responsible authorities and to develop a durable cooperation legacy in the fight against the CBRN threat | UNICRI / JRC main contracts / 2 pilot projects in South East Asia / first step (2 Secretariats in Caucasus and South East Asia) | 5 million | 5.2010–5.2012 |
| 235-364 | Border monitoring activities in the Republic of Georgia, Central Asia and Afghanistan | To enhance the detection of radioactive and nuclear materials at identified borders crossing and/or nodal points in the Republic of Georgia, at Southern borders of selected Central Asian countries with Afghanistan and at the airport of Kabul | JRC | 4 million | 4.5.2010–4.5.2013 |
| 238-194 | EpiSouth: a network for the control of health and security threats and other bio-security risks in the Mediterranean Region and South-East Europe | To increase through capacity building the bio security in the Mediterranean region and South-East Europe (10 EU + 17 non EU countries) | Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome (Italy) | 3 million | 15.10.2010–15.4.2013 |
| 247-264 (service)
  248-064 + 258-635 (supply) | Redirection of former Iraqi WMD scientists through capacity building for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including site and radioactive waste management | To assist Iraq with redirection of scientists and engineers possessing WMD-related skills and dual-use knowledge through their engagement in a comprehensive decommissioning, dismantling and decontamination of nuclear facilities | Università degli Studi dell'Insubria (service) –
  CANBERRA + NNL (supplies) | 2,5  million
  (1,5 mil. for service +1,5 mil. for supplies) | 8.2010–8.2013 |
| 253-484 | Knowledge Management System on CBRN risk mitigation — Evolving towards CoE ‘Mediterranean Basin’ | To integrate the existing Knowledge Management Systems, namely for South East Europe and for North Africa, and to prepare the evolution towards a Centre of Excellence in the Mediterranean Basin dealing with CBRN risk mitigation (preparation phase to ‘EU CBRN Centres of Excellence’) | UNICRI | 0,5  million | 25.11.2010–30.4.2012 |
| 254-942 | Bio-safety and bio-security improvement at the Ukrainian anti-plague station (UAPS) in Simferopol | To contribute to full implementation of the BTWC (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) in Ukraine, which includes the prevention of illicit access to pathogens by terrorists and other criminals | STCU | 4 million | 22.11.2010–21.8.2014 |
| 256-885 | Assistance in export control of dual-use goods | To continue the on-going activities in this field in the already covered countries, with possible extension to other regions/countries | BAFA (D) | 5 million | 21.12.2010–1.7.2013 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

239-471 (UNICRI main) –239-481 (JRC main) 253-483

and 253-485 (pilot projects JRC and Univ. Milan) / 250-984 (UNICRI establishment of 2 Secretariats)

CBRN Centre of Excellence — First Phase

To set up a mechanism contributing to strengthen the long-term national and regional capabilities of responsible authorities and to develop a durable cooperation legacy in the fight against the CBRN threat

UNICRI / JRC main contracts / 2 pilot projects in South East Asia / first step (2 Secretariats in Caucasus and South East Asia)

5 million

5.2010–5.2012

235-364

Border monitoring activities in the Republic of Georgia, Central Asia and Afghanistan

To enhance the detection of radioactive and nuclear materials at identified borders crossing and/or nodal points in the Republic of Georgia, at Southern borders of selected Central Asian countries with Afghanistan and at the airport of Kabul

JRC

4 million

4.5.2010–4.5.2013

238-194

EpiSouth: a network for the control of health and security threats and other bio-security risks in the Mediterranean Region and South-East Europe

To increase through capacity building the bio security in the Mediterranean region and South-East Europe (10 EU + 17 non EU countries)

Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome (Italy)

3 million

15.10.2010–15.4.2013

247-264 (service)

248-064 + 258-635 (supply)

Redirection of former Iraqi WMD scientists through capacity building for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including site and radioactive waste management

To assist Iraq with redirection of scientists and engineers possessing WMD-related skills and dual-use knowledge through their engagement in a comprehensive decommissioning, dismantling and decontamination of nuclear facilities

Università degli Studi dell'Insubria (service) –

CANBERRA + NNL (supplies)

2,5  million

(1,5 mil. for service +1,5 mil. for supplies)

8.2010–8.2013

253-484

Knowledge Management System on CBRN risk mitigation — Evolving towards CoE ‘Mediterranean Basin’

To integrate the existing Knowledge Management Systems, namely for South East Europe and for North Africa, and to prepare the evolution towards a Centre of Excellence in the Mediterranean Basin dealing with CBRN risk mitigation (preparation phase to ‘EU CBRN Centres of Excellence’)

UNICRI

0,5  million

25.11.2010–30.4.2012

254-942

Bio-safety and bio-security improvement at the Ukrainian anti-plague station (UAPS) in Simferopol

To contribute to full implementation of the BTWC (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) in Ukraine, which includes the prevention of illicit access to pathogens by terrorists and other criminals

STCU

4 million

22.11.2010–21.8.2014

256-885

Assistance in export control of dual-use goods

To continue the on-going activities in this field in the already covered countries, with possible extension to other regions/countries

BAFA (D)

5 million

21.12.2010–1.7.2013

Year 2011 (excluding funding for ISTC/STCU)

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount
  (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 263-555 (set-up)
  273-506
  (actions) | CBRN Centres of Excellence — Second phase | To set-up three to four new Centres in the Middle East and, possibly, Gulf region, Mediterranean Basin, Central Asia and Southern Africa, extend the projects in South East Asia and in Ukraine / South Caucasus and implement thematic projects in all project areas of priority 1 | UNICRI | 4,5  million
  16,3  million | 23.8.2011–28.2.2013 |
| 273-571 | Enhancing the capability of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Service (ECAS) — EU contribution to the new Nuclear Material Laboratory (NML) | To ensure that the IAEA has a strong independent analytical capability for safeguards in the decades to come by means of expansion and modernisation of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Services | IAEA | 5 million | 30.11.2011–30.11.2015 |
| 272-372 (service) and 272-424 (supplies) | Establishment of Mobile Laboratories for Pathogens up to Risk Group 4 in combination with CBRN Capacity Building in Sub-Saharan Africa | To implement two units of mobile labs to be used to perform diagnosis of up to group 4 infectious agents in sub-Saharan Africa and one ‘stand-by’unit based in the EU for training purposes and to be deployed in other countries outside the EU where these agents are endemic or outbreaks occur | Bernhard-Nocht-Institut für Tropenmedizin (service) — supply under evaluation | 3,5  million | 15.12.2011–14.12.2015 |
| I273-572 | Strengthening bio-safety and bio-security capabilities in South Caucasus and in Central Asian Countries | To raise the capabilities of State organisations in target countries responsible for bio-safety and bio-security in a way that will result in a substantial improvement of the countries’ bio-safety/security situations | UNICRI | 5 million | 1.1.2012–31.12.2015 |
| 278-349 | Multilateral Nuclear Assurances — EU contribution to the Low Enriched Uranium bank under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) | To purchase a quantity of Low Enriched Uranium | IAEA | 20 million | 30.11.2011–30.11.2013 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount

(EUR)

Execution period

263-555 (set-up)

273-506

(actions)

CBRN Centres of Excellence — Second phase

To set-up three to four new Centres in the Middle East and, possibly, Gulf region, Mediterranean Basin, Central Asia and Southern Africa, extend the projects in South East Asia and in Ukraine / South Caucasus and implement thematic projects in all project areas of priority 1

UNICRI

4,5  million

16,3  million

23.8.2011–28.2.2013

273-571

Enhancing the capability of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Service (ECAS) — EU contribution to the new Nuclear Material Laboratory (NML)

To ensure that the IAEA has a strong independent analytical capability for safeguards in the decades to come by means of expansion and modernisation of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Services

IAEA

5 million

30.11.2011–30.11.2015

272-372 (service) and 272-424 (supplies)

Establishment of Mobile Laboratories for Pathogens up to Risk Group 4 in combination with CBRN Capacity Building in Sub-Saharan Africa

To implement two units of mobile labs to be used to perform diagnosis of up to group 4 infectious agents in sub-Saharan Africa and one ‘stand-by’unit based in the EU for training purposes and to be deployed in other countries outside the EU where these agents are endemic or outbreaks occur

Bernhard-Nocht-Institut für Tropenmedizin (service) — supply under evaluation

3,5  million

15.12.2011–14.12.2015

I273-572

Strengthening bio-safety and bio-security capabilities in South Caucasus and in Central Asian Countries

To raise the capabilities of State organisations in target countries responsible for bio-safety and bio-security in a way that will result in a substantial improvement of the countries’ bio-safety/security situations

UNICRI

5 million

1.1.2012–31.12.2015

278-349

Multilateral Nuclear Assurances — EU contribution to the Low Enriched Uranium bank under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

To purchase a quantity of Low Enriched Uranium

IAEA

20 million

30.11.2011–30.11.2013

Year 2012 (excluding funding for ISTC/STCU)

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 285-261 | CBRN protection to Ukraine in the framework of the UEFA European Football Championship 2012 | To counteract nuclear and radiation terrorism threat (for these purposes the assistance should be provided to Ukraine in the improvement of the technical and organisational measures for detection of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials (NRM) illicit trafficking, including training and establishment of an expert network) | Sateilyturvakeskus | 343 000 | 3.2012–4.2013 |
| 292-244 | Supply for POL11 — Equipment Supply for CBRN protection support to Ukraine in the framework of the UEFA European Championship 2012 | To enhance the CBRN security at Poland — Ukraine border with the occasion of the football championship Euro2012 | Sateilyturvakeskus | 307 000 | 5.2012–1.2014 |
| 301-327 | Provision of specialised technical training to enhance the first responders' capabilities in case of CBRN incidents | To reinforce inter-agency coordination to respond to CBRN incidents (this includes defining standard operational procedures in response to such incidents, e.g. post-incident management and site restoration) | France Expertise Internationale | 699 274 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 301-675 | EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative | To provide support in the implementation of the project ‘EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence’ | JRC | 3,5  million | 10.2012–10.2014 |
| 301-740 | Building capacity to identify and respond to threats from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances | The European Commission is seeking external support to implement technical aspects related to the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation CoE. The overall objective of the project of which this contract will be a part is as follows: 1) Counter the threat arising from chemical, biological and radioactive or nuclear agents in particular when used in a criminal or terrorist context; 2) Improve the preparedness and response capabilities of states to unlawful or criminal acts involving CBRN agents. | Fundacion Internacional y para Iberoamerica de Administracion y Politicas Publicas | 499 100 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 301-756 | Contribution to the establishment and development of EU Centres of Excellence Governance — Phase II | The main aim of this assignment is to link actively technical expertise, management initiative, elements of diplomacy and of cultural sensitiveness to enhance the establishment and performance of the CoE initiative. By implementing modern and judicious governance approaches, it will in particular support capacity building and management with the right sense of ownership among actors and stakeholders at national, regional and overall levels, and correctly adapt the initiative to the challenges of CBRN risk mitigation. The initiative also aims at enhancing the visibility, acceptance and support among the EU stakeholders, both at EU and MS levels. | Association Groupe ESSEC | 1 399 988 | 12.2012–6.2014 |
| 302-214 | Regional Human Resource Development for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Management through a University Master's Programme carried out in Thailand | To cover the tuition fees and living expenses of 10 Thai and 10 international (limited to the Southeast Asia region) students expected to enrol and graduate from the Master's degree programme developed jointly with the US PNNL in Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Management at the Chulalongkorn University of Thailand | Enconet Consulting GMBH | 649 812 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 302-252 | Bio-risk Management | To share the bio-risk management program developed in Thailand with the participating countries in the project | France Expertise Internationale | 480 000 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 302-364 | Development of a methodology for RN materials detection, management and protection of the public | To develop and manage a system for the detection of RN material from sensors located in a variety of locations such as borders, critical infrastructure, ports, airports, etc.; to recommend equipment and standard procedures to respond to RN events | France Expertise Internationale | 599 830 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 302-427 | Prerequisite to strengthening CBRN national legal frameworks | To increase, through capacity building the health security in the Mediterranean Area and South-East Europe Black Sea Region by enhancing and strengthening the preparedness to common health threats and bio-security risks at national and regional levels by the creation of a Network of laboratories, by strengthening the already previously created by Episouth plus (the reinforcement of relations of trust in a region is an objective and an instrument in the scope of Project’s implementation) | France Expertise Internationale | 299 936 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 302-428 | Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on bio-safety/bio-security/bio-risk management | To develop and transfer knowledge concerning best practice on bio-safety, bio-security and bio-risk management in this region | Università degli Studi di Roma Torvergata | 434 010 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 304-799 | Assistance in export control of dual-use goods | To strengthen the export control systems of partner countries, with a strong link with the Regional Centres of Excellence activities, by aligning them to the standard of the international export control regimes and treaties and therefore meeting the requirements of the UNSCR 1540 (2004) | Bundesrepublik Deutschland | 3 650 000 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 305-778 | ‘EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence’ Coordination and CBRN Need Assessment Methodology | To support countries with improving national policies and ensuring international cooperation in the area of CBRN risk mitigation through the implementation of a Needs Assessment methodology for the Regional Secretariats and the partner countries | United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute | 2 million | 12.2012–6.2015 |
| 306-644 | Supply of radiation detection equipment for South East Asia — LOT 1 | To supply radiation detecting equipment to the various entities (border guards, custom services) from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines | Polimaster Instruments UAB | 497 500 | 12.2012–3.2014 |
| 306-670 | Supply of radiation detection equipment for South East Asia — LOT2 | To supply radiation detecting equipment to the various entities (border guards, custom services) from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines | Mirion Technologies MGPI SA | 241 540 | 12.2012–3.2014 |
| 306-675 | Supply of radiation detection equipment for South East Asia — LOT 3 | To supply radiation detecting equipment to the various entities (border guards, custom services) from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines | ENVINET AS | 988 205 | 12.2012–10.2015 |
| 307-293 | Establishment of a Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MediPIET) | To enhance health security in the Mediterranean region by supporting capacity building for prevention and control of natural or man-made threats to health posed by communicable diseases through the start-up of a long-term Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MediPIET) | European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control | 440 000 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 307-400 | Supply of radiation detection equipment for Democratic Republic of Congo- LOT1 | To supply radiation detecting equipment to the Custom and Excise Administration Directorate of the Democratic Republic of Congo | Polimaster Instruments UAB | 298 500 | 12.2012–3.2014 |
| 307-401 | Supply of radiation detection equipment for Democratic Republic of Congo- LOT2 | To supply radiation detecting equipment to the Custom and Excise Administration Directorate of the Democratic Republic of Congo | Mirion Technologies MGPI SA | 121 660 | 12.2012–3.2014 |
| 307-781 | Support for the border monitoring activities in the South East Asia and Democratic Republic of the Congo | To counteract nuclear and radiation terrorism threat (for this purposes, the assistance should be provided to the identified countries in the improvement of the technical and organisational measures for detection of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials (NRM) illicit trafficking, including training and establishment of an expert network) | JRC | 1 650 000 | 12.2012–12.2015 |
| 308-512 | Implementation of Projects CBRN — 3rd call: #77 #111 #114 | The overall objective is the enhancement of the RN security situation in the countries of concern (with a spin-off towards chemical detection under P77). Such concern needs to be addressed in a systematic manner and with interventions at quite a few different levels. Also the ‘action radius’of the interventions needs to be described (to assure the proper engagement of the key actors). | JRC | 2,3  million | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 310-879 | Network of universities and institutes for raising awareness on dual-use concerns of chemical materials | The European Commission is seeking external support to implement technical aspects related to the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation CoE. The overall objective of the project is to reinforce inter-interagency coordination to respond to CBRN incidents. This includes defining standard operational procedures in response to such incidents, e.g. post-incident management and site restoration. | Agenzia Nazionale per le Nuove Tecnologie, l'Energia e lo Sviluppo Economico Sostenibile — ENEA | 721 886 | 12.2012–12.2014 |
| 301-675 | EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative | To provide support for the implementation of the project ‘EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence’ | JRC | 3,5  million | 10.2012–10.2014 |
| 306-680 | Second contribution to enhance the capability of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Service (ECAS) — The New Nuclear Material Laboratory (NML) | To support IAEA in constructing and outfitting the chemistry and instrumentation laboratories of the new IAEA Safeguards Analytical Services NML for the analysis of nuclear material according to the latest standards assuring safety and measurement quality | IAEA | 5 million | 12.2012–12.2016 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

285-261

CBRN protection to Ukraine in the framework of the UEFA European Football Championship 2012

To counteract nuclear and radiation terrorism threat (for these purposes the assistance should be provided to Ukraine in the improvement of the technical and organisational measures for detection of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials (NRM) illicit trafficking, including training and establishment of an expert network)

Sateilyturvakeskus

343 000

3.2012–4.2013

292-244

Supply for POL11 — Equipment Supply for CBRN protection support to Ukraine in the framework of the UEFA European Championship 2012

To enhance the CBRN security at Poland — Ukraine border with the occasion of the football championship Euro2012

Sateilyturvakeskus

307 000

5.2012–1.2014

301-327

Provision of specialised technical training to enhance the first responders' capabilities in case of CBRN incidents

To reinforce inter-agency coordination to respond to CBRN incidents (this includes defining standard operational procedures in response to such incidents, e.g. post-incident management and site restoration)

France Expertise Internationale

699 274

12.2012–12.2014

301-675

EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative

To provide support in the implementation of the project ‘EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence’

JRC

3,5  million

10.2012–10.2014

301-740

Building capacity to identify and respond to threats from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances

The European Commission is seeking external support to implement technical aspects related to the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation CoE. The overall objective of the project of which this contract will be a part is as follows: 1) Counter the threat arising from chemical, biological and radioactive or nuclear agents in particular when used in a criminal or terrorist context; 2) Improve the preparedness and response capabilities of states to unlawful or criminal acts involving CBRN agents.

Fundacion Internacional y para Iberoamerica de Administracion y Politicas Publicas

499 100

12.2012–12.2014

301-756

Contribution to the establishment and development of EU Centres of Excellence Governance — Phase II

The main aim of this assignment is to link actively technical expertise, management initiative, elements of diplomacy and of cultural sensitiveness to enhance the establishment and performance of the CoE initiative. By implementing modern and judicious governance approaches, it will in particular support capacity building and management with the right sense of ownership among actors and stakeholders at national, regional and overall levels, and correctly adapt the initiative to the challenges of CBRN risk mitigation. The initiative also aims at enhancing the visibility, acceptance and support among the EU stakeholders, both at EU and MS levels.

Association Groupe ESSEC

1 399 988

12.2012–6.2014

302-214

Regional Human Resource Development for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Management through a University Master's Programme carried out in Thailand

To cover the tuition fees and living expenses of 10 Thai and 10 international (limited to the Southeast Asia region) students expected to enrol and graduate from the Master's degree programme developed jointly with the US PNNL in Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Management at the Chulalongkorn University of Thailand

Enconet Consulting GMBH

649 812

12.2012–12.2014

302-252

Bio-risk Management

To share the bio-risk management program developed in Thailand with the participating countries in the project

France Expertise Internationale

480 000

12.2012–12.2014

302-364

Development of a methodology for RN materials detection, management and protection of the public

To develop and manage a system for the detection of RN material from sensors located in a variety of locations such as borders, critical infrastructure, ports, airports, etc.; to recommend equipment and standard procedures to respond to RN events

France Expertise Internationale

599 830

12.2012–12.2014

302-427

Prerequisite to strengthening CBRN national legal frameworks

To increase, through capacity building the health security in the Mediterranean Area and South-East Europe Black Sea Region by enhancing and strengthening the preparedness to common health threats and bio-security risks at national and regional levels by the creation of a Network of laboratories, by strengthening the already previously created by Episouth plus (the reinforcement of relations of trust in a region is an objective and an instrument in the scope of Project’s implementation)

France Expertise Internationale

299 936

12.2012–12.2014

302-428

Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on bio-safety/bio-security/bio-risk management

To develop and transfer knowledge concerning best practice on bio-safety, bio-security and bio-risk management in this region

Università degli Studi di Roma Torvergata

434 010

12.2012–12.2014

304-799

Assistance in export control of dual-use goods

To strengthen the export control systems of partner countries, with a strong link with the Regional Centres of Excellence activities, by aligning them to the standard of the international export control regimes and treaties and therefore meeting the requirements of the UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Bundesrepublik Deutschland

3 650 000

12.2012–12.2014

305-778

‘EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence’ Coordination and CBRN Need Assessment Methodology

To support countries with improving national policies and ensuring international cooperation in the area of CBRN risk mitigation through the implementation of a Needs Assessment methodology for the Regional Secretariats and the partner countries

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

2 million

12.2012–6.2015

306-644

Supply of radiation detection equipment for South East Asia — LOT 1

To supply radiation detecting equipment to the various entities (border guards, custom services) from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines

Polimaster Instruments UAB

497 500

12.2012–3.2014

306-670

Supply of radiation detection equipment for South East Asia — LOT2

To supply radiation detecting equipment to the various entities (border guards, custom services) from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines

Mirion Technologies MGPI SA

241 540

12.2012–3.2014

306-675

Supply of radiation detection equipment for South East Asia — LOT 3

To supply radiation detecting equipment to the various entities (border guards, custom services) from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines

ENVINET AS

988 205

12.2012–10.2015

307-293

Establishment of a Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MediPIET)

To enhance health security in the Mediterranean region by supporting capacity building for prevention and control of natural or man-made threats to health posed by communicable diseases through the start-up of a long-term Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MediPIET)

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

440 000

12.2012–12.2014

307-400

Supply of radiation detection equipment for Democratic Republic of Congo- LOT1

To supply radiation detecting equipment to the Custom and Excise Administration Directorate of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Polimaster Instruments UAB

298 500

12.2012–3.2014

307-401

Supply of radiation detection equipment for Democratic Republic of Congo- LOT2

To supply radiation detecting equipment to the Custom and Excise Administration Directorate of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Mirion Technologies MGPI SA

121 660

12.2012–3.2014

307-781

Support for the border monitoring activities in the South East Asia and Democratic Republic of the Congo

To counteract nuclear and radiation terrorism threat (for this purposes, the assistance should be provided to the identified countries in the improvement of the technical and organisational measures for detection of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials (NRM) illicit trafficking, including training and establishment of an expert network)

JRC

1 650 000

12.2012–12.2015

308-512

Implementation of Projects CBRN — 3rd call: #77 #111 #114

The overall objective is the enhancement of the RN security situation in the countries of concern (with a spin-off towards chemical detection under P77). Such concern needs to be addressed in a systematic manner and with interventions at quite a few different levels. Also the ‘action radius’of the interventions needs to be described (to assure the proper engagement of the key actors).

JRC

2,3  million

12.2012–12.2014

310-879

Network of universities and institutes for raising awareness on dual-use concerns of chemical materials

The European Commission is seeking external support to implement technical aspects related to the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation CoE. The overall objective of the project is to reinforce inter-interagency coordination to respond to CBRN incidents. This includes defining standard operational procedures in response to such incidents, e.g. post-incident management and site restoration.

Agenzia Nazionale per le Nuove Tecnologie, l'Energia e lo Sviluppo Economico Sostenibile — ENEA

721 886

12.2012–12.2014

301-675

EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative

To provide support for the implementation of the project ‘EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence’

JRC

3,5  million

10.2012–10.2014

306-680

Second contribution to enhance the capability of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Service (ECAS) — The New Nuclear Material Laboratory (NML)

To support IAEA in constructing and outfitting the chemistry and instrumentation laboratories of the new IAEA Safeguards Analytical Services NML for the analysis of nuclear material according to the latest standards assuring safety and measurement quality

IAEA

5 million

12.2012–12.2016

Year 2013 (excluding funding for ISTC/STCU)

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 315-979 | Strengthening the National CBRN Legal Framework & Provision of specialized and technical training to enhance CBRN preparedness and response capabilities | The present procedure aims at awarding a Contract that will technically implement two projects (Component 1 and Component 2) funded by the EU Instrument for Stability (Priority 1) in the framework of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear — Centres of Excellence (CBRN-CoE) | France Expertise Internationale | 2 699 069 | 9.2013–9.2016 |
| 316-496 | Strengthening Capacities in CBRN Response and in Chemical and Medical Emergency | The CBRN emergency response needs to be identified and prioritised per country. Comprehensive technology solutions for detection, protection, decontamination, mitigation, containment and disposal should also be elaborated. CBRN incidents require full utilization of national resources to respond to and mitigate the consequences of such emergencies. The main responsibility in cases of CBRN emergencies falls upon first responders. It is therefore essential that countries build upon their national resources to mitigate and respond to the consequences of an emergency situation. Best-practices should thus be exchanged amongst these first responders at MIE regional level and CBRN risk mitigation knowledge developed. It should also result in increased awareness of stocks of hazardous chemical agents, their pre-cursors as this is one of the means of targeting illicit use and /or trafficking of WMD. | Wojskowy Instytut Higieny i Epidemiologii | 3 914 034 | 12.2013–12.2016 |
| 318-905 | Support to the European Commission — Exploratory missions in Middle East/East and south Mediterranean countries/South East of Europe in the safety and security CBRN fields | To provide support to the European Commission with finding out what kind of short-term measures should be developed taken into account different situations and circumstances regionally and/or nationally (this entails assessing countries' preparedness — risk assessment, crisis prevention and warning systems — and response mechanisms in the field of CBRN) | France Expertise Internationale | 299 999 | 6.2013–6.2015 |
| 321-215 | Strengthening Health Security at Ports, Airports and Ground crossings | To increase health security globally by providing technical guidance and tools, information and knowledge sharing, international collaboration and assisting countries in enhancing and strengthening capacities for prevention, detection, control and response to public health events related to activities at points of entry and international travel and transport, in a multi-sectoral approach, to minimize risks in association with natural or deliberate released hazards | World Health Organisation | 1,5  million | 7.2013–7.2015 |
| 323-494 | AAF- Waste management | EU CBRN CoE. To improve the management of biologic and chemical waste in the African Atlantic Façade region and Tunisia. This includes the review of regulations and technical training on detection and sampling | Fundacion Internacional y para Iberoamerica de Administracion y Politicas Publicas | 3 871 800 | 1.2014–6.2017 |
| 329-422 | Implementation of Projects CBRN — 3rd call. Complementary actions for project: #77 #111 #114 | EU CBRN CoE. The global overall scope of work is to pursue international efforts in counteracting the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. This project aims at supporting the development of an integrated regional nuclear safety and security systems. This will be achieved by assessing the adoption of laws and regulation in the field in order comply with international related standards for improving the security and safety of radioactive sources by encouraging the establishment of storage facilities and completion of inventories, disseminate best practices for the development of a national response plan in the participating countries. These activities are carried out under a well-coordinated approach with other donors in the region, in order not to duplicate existing efforts. | IAEA | 700 047 | 1.2014–12.2015 |
| 332-096 | Export control outreach for dual use items | This project aims to deepen support measures to improve dual use export control systems in third countries taking specific geopolitical challenges into account. The following beneficiary countries are eligible under this project: Jordan/ Neighbouring Countries and Kazakhstan/ Neighbouring Countries. Regional activities may include all beneficiary countries in the region. Where appropriate and in justified cases and following the demand of beneficiary countries also activities in other countries/ or regions will be carried out. | Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle | 2,5  million | 12.2013–12.2015 |
| 332-212 | Conferences associated to EU CBRN Centres of Excellence | To provide support for organising conferences and meetings in partner countries in order to enhance the inter-agency cooperation that will contribute to mitigating the risks and threats associated with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials and facilities | LDK Consultants, Engineers & Planners SA | 140 885,85 | 1.2014–1.2015 |
| 332-306 | Consolidation and Extension of the CBRN Regional Centre Secretariats | EU CBRN CoE. To strengthen regional capabilities in the area of CBRN risk mitigation. It is expected that the project will promote better cooperation and coordination of countries on CBRN risk mitigation at regional and international levels (the set-up of the Regional Secretariats is meant to provide the missing infrastructure at regional level to facilitate sharing of information and experience among partner countries) | United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute | 3,1  million | 5.2014–10.2015 |
| 332-312 | Strengthening Health Laboratories to minimize potential biological risks | To minimize potential biological risks through enhancement of laboratory biosafety, biosecurity, quality management and diagnostic capacity. Specific objective 1: Support the development of nationally-owned laboratory policies, strategies norms and regulations Specific objective 2: Engage institutional and individual capacity building efforts through implementation of appropriate tools, methodologies and training activities Specific objective 3: Enhance the ability of Member States to safely and rapidly detect and respond to natural or deliberate events of national and international concern according to the IHR through support to laboratory networks | World Health Organisation | 4 495 712 | 12.2013–12.2016 |
| 329-859 | Further development and consolidation of the Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (‘MediPIET’) | To contribute to the overall objective of enhancing health security in the Mediterranean region by supporting capacity building for prevention and control of natural or man-made health threats posed by communicable diseases through the further roll-out of the Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MediPIET) | Fundacion Internacional y para Iberoamerica de Administracion y Politicas Publicas | 6,4  million | 12.2013–12.2016 |
| 330-961 | MEDILABSECURE | To increase, through capacity building the health security in the Mediterranean Area and South-East Europe Black Sea Region by enhancing and strengthening the preparedness to common health threats and bio-security risks at national and regional levels by the creation of a Network of laboratories, by strengthening the already previously created by Episouth plus (the reinforcement of relations of trust in a region is an objective and an instrument in the scope of Project’s implementation) | Institut Pasteur
  Fondation | 3 626 410 | 12.2013–12.2017 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

315-979

Strengthening the National CBRN Legal Framework & Provision of specialized and technical training to enhance CBRN preparedness and response capabilities

The present procedure aims at awarding a Contract that will technically implement two projects (Component 1 and Component 2) funded by the EU Instrument for Stability (Priority 1) in the framework of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear — Centres of Excellence (CBRN-CoE)

France Expertise Internationale

2 699 069

9.2013–9.2016

316-496

Strengthening Capacities in CBRN Response and in Chemical and Medical Emergency

The CBRN emergency response needs to be identified and prioritised per country. Comprehensive technology solutions for detection, protection, decontamination, mitigation, containment and disposal should also be elaborated. CBRN incidents require full utilization of national resources to respond to and mitigate the consequences of such emergencies. The main responsibility in cases of CBRN emergencies falls upon first responders. It is therefore essential that countries build upon their national resources to mitigate and respond to the consequences of an emergency situation. Best-practices should thus be exchanged amongst these first responders at MIE regional level and CBRN risk mitigation knowledge developed. It should also result in increased awareness of stocks of hazardous chemical agents, their pre-cursors as this is one of the means of targeting illicit use and /or trafficking of WMD.

Wojskowy Instytut Higieny i Epidemiologii

3 914 034

12.2013–12.2016

318-905

Support to the European Commission — Exploratory missions in Middle East/East and south Mediterranean countries/South East of Europe in the safety and security CBRN fields

To provide support to the European Commission with finding out what kind of short-term measures should be developed taken into account different situations and circumstances regionally and/or nationally (this entails assessing countries' preparedness — risk assessment, crisis prevention and warning systems — and response mechanisms in the field of CBRN)

France Expertise Internationale

299 999

6.2013–6.2015

321-215

Strengthening Health Security at Ports, Airports and Ground crossings

To increase health security globally by providing technical guidance and tools, information and knowledge sharing, international collaboration and assisting countries in enhancing and strengthening capacities for prevention, detection, control and response to public health events related to activities at points of entry and international travel and transport, in a multi-sectoral approach, to minimize risks in association with natural or deliberate released hazards

World Health Organisation

1,5  million

7.2013–7.2015

323-494

AAF- Waste management

EU CBRN CoE. To improve the management of biologic and chemical waste in the African Atlantic Façade region and Tunisia. This includes the review of regulations and technical training on detection and sampling

Fundacion Internacional y para Iberoamerica de Administracion y Politicas Publicas

3 871 800

1.2014–6.2017

329-422

Implementation of Projects CBRN — 3rd call. Complementary actions for project: #77 #111 #114

EU CBRN CoE. The global overall scope of work is to pursue international efforts in counteracting the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. This project aims at supporting the development of an integrated regional nuclear safety and security systems. This will be achieved by assessing the adoption of laws and regulation in the field in order comply with international related standards for improving the security and safety of radioactive sources by encouraging the establishment of storage facilities and completion of inventories, disseminate best practices for the development of a national response plan in the participating countries. These activities are carried out under a well-coordinated approach with other donors in the region, in order not to duplicate existing efforts.

IAEA

700 047

1.2014–12.2015

332-096

Export control outreach for dual use items

This project aims to deepen support measures to improve dual use export control systems in third countries taking specific geopolitical challenges into account. The following beneficiary countries are eligible under this project: Jordan/ Neighbouring Countries and Kazakhstan/ Neighbouring Countries. Regional activities may include all beneficiary countries in the region. Where appropriate and in justified cases and following the demand of beneficiary countries also activities in other countries/ or regions will be carried out.

Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle

2,5  million

12.2013–12.2015

332-212

Conferences associated to EU CBRN Centres of Excellence

To provide support for organising conferences and meetings in partner countries in order to enhance the inter-agency cooperation that will contribute to mitigating the risks and threats associated with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials and facilities

LDK Consultants, Engineers & Planners SA

140 885,85

1.2014–1.2015

332-306

Consolidation and Extension of the CBRN Regional Centre Secretariats

EU CBRN CoE. To strengthen regional capabilities in the area of CBRN risk mitigation. It is expected that the project will promote better cooperation and coordination of countries on CBRN risk mitigation at regional and international levels (the set-up of the Regional Secretariats is meant to provide the missing infrastructure at regional level to facilitate sharing of information and experience among partner countries)

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

3,1  million

5.2014–10.2015

332-312

Strengthening Health Laboratories to minimize potential biological risks

To minimize potential biological risks through enhancement of laboratory biosafety, biosecurity, quality management and diagnostic capacity. Specific objective 1: Support the development of nationally-owned laboratory policies, strategies norms and regulations Specific objective 2: Engage institutional and individual capacity building efforts through implementation of appropriate tools, methodologies and training activities Specific objective 3: Enhance the ability of Member States to safely and rapidly detect and respond to natural or deliberate events of national and international concern according to the IHR through support to laboratory networks

World Health Organisation

4 495 712

12.2013–12.2016

329-859

Further development and consolidation of the Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (‘MediPIET’)

To contribute to the overall objective of enhancing health security in the Mediterranean region by supporting capacity building for prevention and control of natural or man-made health threats posed by communicable diseases through the further roll-out of the Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MediPIET)

Fundacion Internacional y para Iberoamerica de Administracion y Politicas Publicas

6,4  million

12.2013–12.2016

330-961

MEDILABSECURE

To increase, through capacity building the health security in the Mediterranean Area and South-East Europe Black Sea Region by enhancing and strengthening the preparedness to common health threats and bio-security risks at national and regional levels by the creation of a Network of laboratories, by strengthening the already previously created by Episouth plus (the reinforcement of relations of trust in a region is an objective and an instrument in the scope of Project’s implementation)

Institut Pasteur

Fondation

3 626 410

12.2013–12.2017

Year 2014 (excluding funding for ISTC/STCU)

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 337-084 | Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons of Mass destruction | To contribute to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Special Trust Fund that finances the activities for the complete destruction of Syrian Chemical material stockpiles | OPCW | 12 million | 2.2014–12.2015 |
| 343-652 | Contribution to the establishment and development of EU Centres of Excellence Governance — Phase III | To support to the governance of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence | ESSEC-IRENE-ENCO | 1,5  million | 9.2014–9.2016 |
| 346-176 | High risk chemical facilities and risk mitigation in the AAF Region | EU CBRN CoE. Enhancing sound chemical hazard management within the African Atlantic Façade Region in order to prevent the occurrence of high risks chemical accidents | France Expertise Internationale | 3 million | 1.2015–12.2017 |
| 346-488 | Chemical safety and security in the Central and Eastern African region | EU CBRN CoE. Enhancing sound chemical hazard management within the ECA region by strengthening the national ‘Chemical legal framework’in order to prevent the occurrence of accident inside and around all important chemical installations, as well as to enhance Chemical preparedness and response capabilities | Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) MBH | 2 978 000 | 1.2015–1.2018 |
| 347-013 | EUWAM-Lab (P43) | EU CBRN CoE. Establishment of a Mobile Laboratory for in situ interventions on VHF outbreak sites in combination with CBRN Capacity Building in Western Africa | France Expertise Internationale | 2 579 854,40 | 9.2014–9.2016 |
| 347-135 | EU outreach programme for dual use items | Contribute to the creation, consolidation or updating the effective export control systems for dual use items in partner countries by continuing to offer them a long-term perspective for cooperation | France Expertise Internationale | 2 249 250 | 9.2015–2.2017 |
| 347-634 | Strengthening CBRN first response capabilities and regional cooperation in South East Europe, Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine | EU CBRN CoE. Enhance response capabilities and promote inter-agency and regional cooperation in CBRN first response in the South East Europe, Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine | Centre d'Etude de l'Energie Nucléaire
  Fondation d'Utilité Publique | 2 953 550 | 1.2015–12.2017 |
| 350-752 | One Health Project in Pakistan | Support the development of a structured, integrated and sustainable collaboration between the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture in Pakistan for improved risk assessments and detection, prevention and control of the spread of emerging zoonotic diseases | World Health Organization | 927 608 | 1.2015–1.2017 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

337-084

Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons of Mass destruction

To contribute to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Special Trust Fund that finances the activities for the complete destruction of Syrian Chemical material stockpiles

OPCW

12 million

2.2014–12.2015

343-652

Contribution to the establishment and development of EU Centres of Excellence Governance — Phase III

To support to the governance of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence

ESSEC-IRENE-ENCO

1,5  million

9.2014–9.2016

346-176

High risk chemical facilities and risk mitigation in the AAF Region

EU CBRN CoE. Enhancing sound chemical hazard management within the African Atlantic Façade Region in order to prevent the occurrence of high risks chemical accidents

France Expertise Internationale

3 million

1.2015–12.2017

346-488

Chemical safety and security in the Central and Eastern African region

EU CBRN CoE. Enhancing sound chemical hazard management within the ECA region by strengthening the national ‘Chemical legal framework’in order to prevent the occurrence of accident inside and around all important chemical installations, as well as to enhance Chemical preparedness and response capabilities

Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) MBH

2 978 000

1.2015–1.2018

347-013

EUWAM-Lab (P43)

EU CBRN CoE. Establishment of a Mobile Laboratory for in situ interventions on VHF outbreak sites in combination with CBRN Capacity Building in Western Africa

France Expertise Internationale

2 579 854,40

9.2014–9.2016

347-135

EU outreach programme for dual use items

Contribute to the creation, consolidation or updating the effective export control systems for dual use items in partner countries by continuing to offer them a long-term perspective for cooperation

France Expertise Internationale

2 249 250

9.2015–2.2017

347-634

Strengthening CBRN first response capabilities and regional cooperation in South East Europe, Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine

EU CBRN CoE. Enhance response capabilities and promote inter-agency and regional cooperation in CBRN first response in the South East Europe, Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine

Centre d'Etude de l'Energie Nucléaire

Fondation d'Utilité Publique

2 953 550

1.2015–12.2017

350-752

One Health Project in Pakistan

Support the development of a structured, integrated and sustainable collaboration between the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture in Pakistan for improved risk assessments and detection, prevention and control of the spread of emerging zoonotic diseases

World Health Organization

927 608

1.2015–1.2017

Year 2015

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 355-376 | EU outreach programme for dual use items — South-East Asia | Support to export control outreach in South-East Asia. | France Expertise Internationale | 2 999 500 | 9.2015–2.2017 |
| 272-372 | Establishment of Mobile Laboratories for Pathogens up to Risk Group 4 in combination with CBRN Capacity Building in sub-Saharan Africa | EU CBRN CoE — Mobile labs in sub-Saharan Africa -Extension – | BERNHARD-NOCHT-INSTITUT FUR TROPENMEDIZIN | 500 000 | 6.2016 |
| 355-443 | Enhancement of CBRN capacities of South East Asia in addressing CBRN risk mitigation concerning CBRN first response, biosafety and biosecurity, awareness raising and legal framework | EU CBRN CoE Biosafety-biosecurity in South East Asia | FUNDACION INTERNACIONAL Y PARA IBEROAMERICA DE ADMINISTRACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS | 3 000 000,00 | 7.2015–7.2018 |
| 355-879 | Provision of specialized CBRN equipment for training first responders | EU CBRN CoE CBRN equipment for first responders in Gabon, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Uganda | PAUL BOYE TECHNOLOGIES SAS -FR | 2 712 516,87 | 9.2015–9.2017 |
| 357-652 | ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIATS | EU CBRN CoE On site technical assistance (Rabat, Tbilisi, Nairobi) | AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA -BE | 2 969 700,00 | 9.2015–9.2018 |
| 362-277 | REGIONAL MANAGEMENT OF OUTBREAKS IN THE CBRN CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE PARTNER COUNTRIES OF THE AFRICAN ATLANTIC FAÇADE REGION | EU CBRN CoE Management of outbreaks in the African Atlantic Façade (pandemics) | AGENCE FRANCAISE D EXPERTISE TECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE | 3 499 600,00 | 1.2016–12.2018 |
| 370291 | Feasibility study for the establishment of the Wildlife Forensics Training Academy in South Africa | Wildlife Forensics Training | NEDERLANDS FORENSISCH INSTITUUT | 182 000 | 28.12.2016 |
| 359484 | Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region | Support to GCC region | CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE
  FONDATION D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE | 285 000 | 14.9.2016 |
| 355376 | EU outreach programme for dual use items — South-East Asia | EU outreach programme for dual use items in South-East Asia | AGENCE FRANCAISE D'EXPERTISE TECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE | 2 999 500 | 28.2.2017 |
| 371715 | Capacity building for medical preparedness and response to CBRN incidents — CoE Project 54 | EU CBRN CoE CBRN. Capacity building for medical preparedness and response to CBRN incidents. Middle East (P54) | SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS
  COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANY | 2 999 965 | 17.7.2019 |
| 365817 | Annual meeting EU CBRN National Focal Points 2016 | | LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA | 182 949,5 | 11.10.2016 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

355-376

EU outreach programme for dual use items — South-East Asia

Support to export control outreach in South-East Asia.

France Expertise Internationale

2 999 500

9.2015–2.2017

272-372

Establishment of Mobile Laboratories for Pathogens up to Risk Group 4 in combination with CBRN Capacity Building in sub-Saharan Africa

EU CBRN CoE — Mobile labs in sub-Saharan Africa -Extension –

BERNHARD-NOCHT-INSTITUT FUR TROPENMEDIZIN

500 000

6.2016

355-443

Enhancement of CBRN capacities of South East Asia in addressing CBRN risk mitigation concerning CBRN first response, biosafety and biosecurity, awareness raising and legal framework

EU CBRN CoE Biosafety-biosecurity in South East Asia

FUNDACION INTERNACIONAL Y PARA IBEROAMERICA DE ADMINISTRACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS

3 000 000,00

7.2015–7.2018

355-879

Provision of specialized CBRN equipment for training first responders

EU CBRN CoE CBRN equipment for first responders in Gabon, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Uganda

PAUL BOYE TECHNOLOGIES SAS -FR

2 712 516,87

9.2015–9.2017

357-652

ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIATS

EU CBRN CoE On site technical assistance (Rabat, Tbilisi, Nairobi)

AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA -BE

2 969 700,00

9.2015–9.2018

362-277

REGIONAL MANAGEMENT OF OUTBREAKS IN THE CBRN CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE PARTNER COUNTRIES OF THE AFRICAN ATLANTIC FAÇADE REGION

EU CBRN CoE Management of outbreaks in the African Atlantic Façade (pandemics)

AGENCE FRANCAISE D EXPERTISE TECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE

3 499 600,00

1.2016–12.2018

370291

Feasibility study for the establishment of the Wildlife Forensics Training Academy in South Africa

Wildlife Forensics Training

NEDERLANDS FORENSISCH INSTITUUT

182 000

28.12.2016

359484

Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region

Support to GCC region

CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE

FONDATION D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE

285 000

14.9.2016

355376

EU outreach programme for dual use items — South-East Asia

EU outreach programme for dual use items in South-East Asia

AGENCE FRANCAISE D'EXPERTISE TECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE

2 999 500

28.2.2017

371715

Capacity building for medical preparedness and response to CBRN incidents — CoE Project 54

EU CBRN CoE CBRN. Capacity building for medical preparedness and response to CBRN incidents. Middle East (P54)

SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS

COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANY

2 999 965

17.7.2019

365817

Annual meeting EU CBRN National Focal Points 2016

LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA

182 949,5

11.10.2016

Year 2016

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 384-876 | Recommittement — Feasibility study for the establishment of the Wildlife Forensics Training Academy in South Africa (2015 / 370-291) | EU CBRN CoE | NEDERLANDS FORENSISCH INSTITUUT
  NET | 174 515,29 | 29.9.2017 |
| 38130 | SEACHEM — Sound management of chemicals and their associated wastes in Southeast Asia | EU CBRN CoE. Chemical Waste management | SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS | 2 999 815 | 29.8.2020 |
| 369616 | Support to the development, adoption and implementation of CBRN Needs Assessments, National and Regional CBRN Action Plans, their promotion and visibility | EU CBRN CoE. Promotion, adoption, implementation and visibility of CBRN Needs EU CBRN CoE. Assessments, National and Regional CBRN Action Plans | UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIMEAND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE | 2 000 000 | 31.8.2017 |
| 372955 | ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIATS in Algiers and Tashkent | EU CBRN CoE On site technical assistance (Algiers, Amman, Tashkent) | ENCONET CONSULTING GMBH | 2 130 250 | 10.11.2019 |
| 373918 | Strengthening cross-border capacity for control and detection of CBRN substances | EU CBRN CoE CBRN cross border security in the North of Africa and Sahel (P55) | AGENCE FRANCAISE D'EXPERTISE TECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE | 3 500 000 | 30.9.2019 |
| 374993 | P57 ‘Strengthening crime scene forensics capabilities in investigating CBRN incidents in the South East and Eastern Europe Centres of Excellence region’ | EU CBRN CoE. ‘Strengthening crime scene forensics capabilities’ | CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE
  FONDATION D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE | 1 399 670 | 14.1.2020 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

384-876

Recommittement — Feasibility study for the establishment of the Wildlife Forensics Training Academy in South Africa (2015 / 370-291)

EU CBRN CoE

NEDERLANDS FORENSISCH INSTITUUT

NET

174 515,29

29.9.2017

38130

SEACHEM — Sound management of chemicals and their associated wastes in Southeast Asia

EU CBRN CoE. Chemical Waste management

SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS

2 999 815

29.8.2020

369616

Support to the development, adoption and implementation of CBRN Needs Assessments, National and Regional CBRN Action Plans, their promotion and visibility

EU CBRN CoE. Promotion, adoption, implementation and visibility of CBRN Needs EU CBRN CoE. Assessments, National and Regional CBRN Action Plans

UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIMEAND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

2 000 000

31.8.2017

372955

ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIATS in Algiers and Tashkent

EU CBRN CoE On site technical assistance (Algiers, Amman, Tashkent)

ENCONET CONSULTING GMBH

2 130 250

10.11.2019

373918

Strengthening cross-border capacity for control and detection of CBRN substances

EU CBRN CoE CBRN cross border security in the North of Africa and Sahel (P55)

AGENCE FRANCAISE D'EXPERTISE TECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE

3 500 000

30.9.2019

374993

P57 ‘Strengthening crime scene forensics capabilities in investigating CBRN incidents in the South East and Eastern Europe Centres of Excellence region’

EU CBRN CoE. ‘Strengthening crime scene forensics capabilities’

CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE

FONDATION D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE

1 399 670

14.1.2020

Year 2017

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 376203 | Study on the sustainability of the EU CBRN CoE's capacity building activities | EU CBRN CoE. Educational component. | FONDAZIONE ALESSANDRO VOLTA PER LAPROMOZIONE DELL UNIVERSITA DELLA RICERCA SCIENTIFICA DELL ALTA FORMAZIONE E DELLA CULTURA | 298 900 | 31.3.2018 |
| 377918 | Support to the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative and its mechanisms. Towards the consolidation of the regional secretariats. | EU CBRN CoE. Regional Secretariats. | UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIMEAND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE | 3 000 000 | 14.1.2018 |
| 377943 | Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region | EU CBRN CoE. On site technical assistance (GCC region) | Senior expert | 425 000 | 2.2019 |
| 378686 | EU CBRN Centers of Excellence NFP meeting 2017 | EU CBRN CoE annual international meeting. | ITALTREND C&T SPA | 235 587 | 6.4.2017 |
| 378793 | Supporting the EC organizing European Summer School 2017 and Conference in Export Control | European Summer School 2017 and Conference in Export Control | LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA | 277 167 | 8.3.2018 |
| 378848 | Assistance on evaluation of Export Control Outreach P2P program | Evaluation of P2P programme | Individual expert | 20 000 | 17.2.2017 |
| 381687 | Worldwide technical support to the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence. | EU CBRN CoE. Portal, NAQs, NAPs, technical evaluations, communication. | EC DG JRC | 3 500 000 | 2018 |
| 381687 | Administrative arrangement. Worldwide institutional technical support to the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence. | EU CBRN CoE | CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE
  FONDATION D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE | 3 411 384 | 31.12.2017 |
| 384445 | Technical Assistance for the implementation of the EU Export Control programme in partner countries | EU outreach programme for dual use items | CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE
  FONDATION D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE | 297 750 | 6.4.2019 |
| 384614 | Project development and donor coordination for the establishment of Wildlife Forensics Training Academies in Africa | EU CBRN CoE. Forensics Training | NEDERLANDS FORENSISCH INSTITUUT
  NET | 350 000 | 24.9.2018 |
| 384772 | 2017 International Meeting of EU CBRN CoE National Focal Points, Brussels | EU CBRN CoE annual international meeting. | LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS | 233 799 | 16.2.2018 |
| 388844 | P2P Summer School 2018 and other meetings in the frame of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) | EU outreach programme for dual use items | LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS | 227 940 | 1.10.2018 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

376203

Study on the sustainability of the EU CBRN CoE's capacity building activities

EU CBRN CoE. Educational component.

FONDAZIONE ALESSANDRO VOLTA PER LAPROMOZIONE DELL UNIVERSITA DELLA RICERCA SCIENTIFICA DELL ALTA FORMAZIONE E DELLA CULTURA

298 900

31.3.2018

377918

Support to the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative and its mechanisms. Towards the consolidation of the regional secretariats.

EU CBRN CoE. Regional Secretariats.

UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIMEAND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

3 000 000

14.1.2018

377943

Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region

EU CBRN CoE. On site technical assistance (GCC region)

Senior expert

425 000

2.2019

378686

EU CBRN Centers of Excellence NFP meeting 2017

EU CBRN CoE annual international meeting.

ITALTREND C&T SPA

235 587

6.4.2017

378793

Supporting the EC organizing European Summer School 2017 and Conference in Export Control

European Summer School 2017 and Conference in Export Control

LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA

277 167

8.3.2018

378848

Assistance on evaluation of Export Control Outreach P2P program

Evaluation of P2P programme

Individual expert

20 000

17.2.2017

381687

Worldwide technical support to the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence.

EU CBRN CoE. Portal, NAQs, NAPs, technical evaluations, communication.

EC DG JRC

3 500 000

2018

381687

Administrative arrangement. Worldwide institutional technical support to the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence.

EU CBRN CoE

CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE

FONDATION D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE

3 411 384

31.12.2017

384445

Technical Assistance for the implementation of the EU Export Control programme in partner countries

EU outreach programme for dual use items

CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE

FONDATION D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE

297 750

6.4.2019

384614

Project development and donor coordination for the establishment of Wildlife Forensics Training Academies in Africa

EU CBRN CoE. Forensics Training

NEDERLANDS FORENSISCH INSTITUUT

NET

350 000

24.9.2018

384772

2017 International Meeting of EU CBRN CoE National Focal Points, Brussels

EU CBRN CoE annual international meeting.

LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS

233 799

16.2.2018

388844

P2P Summer School 2018 and other meetings in the frame of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

EU outreach programme for dual use items

LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS

227 940

1.10.2018

Year 2018

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 378224 | P57/58 — Additional equipment — Montenegro - | EU CBRN CoE | STCU | 350 000 | 2017–2019 |
| 384876 | Feasibility study for the establishment of the Wildlife Forensics Training Academy in South Africa | EU CBRN CoE | Nederlands Forensisch Instituut | 152 373 | 2017 |
| 386600 | New African Magazine — subscription contract | EU CBRN CoE | Stirling | 1 000 | 2017–2018 |
| 386666 | Stirling Assynt Report and GT Intell Serv — subscription contract | EU CBRN CoE | TRAC | 33 600 | 2017–2018 |
| 388380 | Assistance in reporting and communication on IcSP CBRN CoE activities | EU CBRN CoE | Individual expert | 20 000 | 2018 |
| 388397 | P65 CoE CA chemical waste management | EU CBRN CoE | MICR | 401 089 | 2017–2020 |
| 388844 | 2018 P2P Summer School in Export Control | EU CBRN CoE | LDK | 227 940 | 2017–2018 |
| 390045 | STCU operational grant | EU CBRN CoE | STCU | 1 000 000 | 2018–2022 |
| 390046 | ISTC operational grant | EU CBRN CoE | ISTC | 2 500 000 | 2018–2022 |
| 390079 | CBRN CoE Governance Team | EU CBRN CoE | ASSOCIATION GROUPE ESSEC | 1 680 520 | 2018–2019 |
| 390601 | P66 MEDISAFE | EU CBRN CoE | Expertise France | 3 998 250 | 2018–2021 |
| 391059 | Assistance on mapping EU security/CT activities | EU CBRN CoE | Individual expert | 20 000 | 2017 |
| 391935 | UNICRI | EU CBRN CoE | UNICRI | 2 707 453 | 2018–2019 |
| 393533 | Development of a pilot CBRN Centres of Excellence Research Competition | EU CBRN CoE | Fondazione Alessadnrio Volta | 149 850 | 2018 |
| 393792 | P62 OSA South East Asia | EU CBRN CoE | Business and Strategies Europe | 1 198 750 | 2018–2021 |
| 394360 | Support for Conferences and Events CBRN | EU CBRN CoE | Pomilio Blumm | 1 052 346 | 2018–2020 |
| 395369 | Assistance and support in implementation of IcSP | EU CBRN CoE | Individual expert | 20 000 | 2018 |
| 395899 | P68 Training and Tutoring | EU CBRN CoE | LDK | 268 700 | 2018–2020 |
| 402247 | P75 — Preventing biological risks increased by environmental and climate change in the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Sahel regions by strengthening institutional capacities in the context of One Health (MEDILABSECURE) | EU CBRN CoE | Institut Pasteur Fondation | 2 088 964 | 2018–2020 |
| 402649 | P76 — Preventing biological risks increased by environmental and climate change by strengthening Public Health Laboratories — (STRONGLABS) | EU CBRN CoE | WHO | 1 000 000 | 2018–2020 |
| 399140 | On-Site Technical Assistance To The Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear Centres Of Excellence Secretariat In Rabat | EU CBRN CoE | LA INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION SRL | 1 195 975 | 2018–2021 |
| 402810 | Funding of the 2019 ISTC Administrative Operating Budget | EU CBRN CoE | ISTC | 2 500 000 | 2018–2023 |
| 402811 | Funding of the 2019 STCU Administrative Operating Budget | EU CBRN CoE | STCU | 1 000 000 | 2018–2023 |
| 404680 | Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region | EU CBRN CoE | OSA | 590 000 | 2018–2020 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

378224

P57/58 — Additional equipment — Montenegro -

EU CBRN CoE

STCU

350 000

2017–2019

384876

Feasibility study for the establishment of the Wildlife Forensics Training Academy in South Africa

EU CBRN CoE

Nederlands Forensisch Instituut

152 373

2017

386600

New African Magazine — subscription contract

EU CBRN CoE

Stirling

1 000

2017–2018

386666

Stirling Assynt Report and GT Intell Serv — subscription contract

EU CBRN CoE

TRAC

33 600

2017–2018

388380

Assistance in reporting and communication on IcSP CBRN CoE activities

EU CBRN CoE

Individual expert

20 000

2018

388397

P65 CoE CA chemical waste management

EU CBRN CoE

MICR

401 089

2017–2020

388844

2018 P2P Summer School in Export Control

EU CBRN CoE

LDK

227 940

2017–2018

390045

STCU operational grant

EU CBRN CoE

STCU

1 000 000

2018–2022

390046

ISTC operational grant

EU CBRN CoE

ISTC

2 500 000

2018–2022

390079

CBRN CoE Governance Team

EU CBRN CoE

ASSOCIATION GROUPE ESSEC

1 680 520

2018–2019

390601

P66 MEDISAFE

EU CBRN CoE

Expertise France

3 998 250

2018–2021

391059

Assistance on mapping EU security/CT activities

EU CBRN CoE

Individual expert

20 000

2017

391935

UNICRI

EU CBRN CoE

UNICRI

2 707 453

2018–2019

393533

Development of a pilot CBRN Centres of Excellence Research Competition

EU CBRN CoE

Fondazione Alessadnrio Volta

149 850

2018

393792

P62 OSA South East Asia

EU CBRN CoE

Business and Strategies Europe

1 198 750

2018–2021

394360

Support for Conferences and Events CBRN

EU CBRN CoE

Pomilio Blumm

1 052 346

2018–2020

395369

Assistance and support in implementation of IcSP

EU CBRN CoE

Individual expert

20 000

2018

395899

P68 Training and Tutoring

EU CBRN CoE

LDK

268 700

2018–2020

402247

P75 — Preventing biological risks increased by environmental and climate change in the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Sahel regions by strengthening institutional capacities in the context of One Health (MEDILABSECURE)

EU CBRN CoE

Institut Pasteur Fondation

2 088 964

2018–2020

402649

P76 — Preventing biological risks increased by environmental and climate change by strengthening Public Health Laboratories — (STRONGLABS)

EU CBRN CoE

WHO

1 000 000

2018–2020

399140

On-Site Technical Assistance To The Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear Centres Of Excellence Secretariat In Rabat

EU CBRN CoE

LA INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION SRL

1 195 975

2018–2021

402810

Funding of the 2019 ISTC Administrative Operating Budget

EU CBRN CoE

ISTC

2 500 000

2018–2023

402811

Funding of the 2019 STCU Administrative Operating Budget

EU CBRN CoE

STCU

1 000 000

2018–2023

404680

Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region

EU CBRN CoE

OSA

590 000

2018–2020

Year 2019

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 408921 | Funding of the 2020 STCU Administrative Operating Budget (AOB and service contract | Administrative support — STCU | STCU | 680 000 | 31.12.2020 |
| 408920 | Funding of the 2020 ISTC Administrative Operating Budget (AOB and service contracts | Administrative support — ISTC | ISTC | 1 041 000 | 31.12.2020 |
| 412541 | Funding of the 2020 — 2021 ISTC activities and Supplemental Budgets (SBs), | Capacity building | ISTC | 779 000 | 31.12.2021 |
| 402901 | CoE Project 73 — CBRN Protection of critical infrastructure in Middle East CoE Region | EU CBRN COE | SCK-CEN | 2 399 200 | 2019–2022 |
| 403281 | Support to the assessment of priority countries and impact of the EU CBRN CoE Initiative | EU CBRN COE | SCK-CEN | 300 000 | 2019–2021 |
| 404680 | Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region | EU CBRN COE | Peter Clevestig | 599 400 | 2019–2022 |
| 404922 | Support to CBRN CoE regional secretariats
  UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIMEAND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE | EU CBRN COE | UNICRI | 3 950 000 | 2019–2020 |
| 407001 | ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIAT in NAIROBI | EU CBRN COE | ENCONET | 1 178 900 | 2019–2022 |
| 407176 | P70 — Provision of specialized equipment to manage transport accidents with dangerous goods for first responders | EU CBRN COE | Paul Boyé | 2 249 717 | 2019–2022 |
| 407688 | ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIAT in TBILISI | EU CBRN COE | AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA | 1 127 320 | 2019–2022 |
| 408380 | BIOSEC — Enhanced Biosecurity in South-East Asia P81 | EU CBRN COE | SCJS Europe | 3 499 850 | 2019–2022 |
| 408466 | P83 — Provision of specialized CBRN equipment for the training of personnel in charge of border control in Algeria | EU CBRN COE | EXCELOR HOLDING GROUP EOOD | 323 321 | 2019–2022 |
| 410027 | Preparation of a communication strategy on IcSP-funded projects managed by the CBRN Sector of the Security and Nuclear Safety Unit of DG DEVCO | EU CBRN COE | Rogie | 20 000 | 2020 |
| EXT
  372955 | ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIATS in Algiers and Tashkent | EU CBRN COE | ENCONET | 2 130 250 | 2019–2022 |
| EXT
  394360 | Support to the organisation of events related to the CBRN Centre of Excellence Initiative and Export Control programme | EU CBRN COE | Pomilio Blum | 969 799 | 2019–2022 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

408921

Funding of the 2020 STCU Administrative Operating Budget (AOB and service contract

Administrative support — STCU

STCU

680 000

31.12.2020

408920

Funding of the 2020 ISTC Administrative Operating Budget (AOB and service contracts

Administrative support — ISTC

ISTC

1 041 000

31.12.2020

412541

Funding of the 2020 — 2021 ISTC activities and Supplemental Budgets (SBs),

Capacity building

ISTC

779 000

31.12.2021

402901

CoE Project 73 — CBRN Protection of critical infrastructure in Middle East CoE Region

EU CBRN COE

SCK-CEN

2 399 200

2019–2022

403281

Support to the assessment of priority countries and impact of the EU CBRN CoE Initiative

EU CBRN COE

SCK-CEN

300 000

2019–2021

404680

Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region

EU CBRN COE

Peter Clevestig

599 400

2019–2022

404922

Support to CBRN CoE regional secretariats

UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIMEAND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

EU CBRN COE

UNICRI

3 950 000

2019–2020

407001

ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIAT in NAIROBI

EU CBRN COE

ENCONET

1 178 900

2019–2022

407176

P70 — Provision of specialized equipment to manage transport accidents with dangerous goods for first responders

EU CBRN COE

Paul Boyé

2 249 717

2019–2022

407688

ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIAT in TBILISI

EU CBRN COE

AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA

1 127 320

2019–2022

408380

BIOSEC — Enhanced Biosecurity in South-East Asia P81

EU CBRN COE

SCJS Europe

3 499 850

2019–2022

408466

P83 — Provision of specialized CBRN equipment for the training of personnel in charge of border control in Algeria

EU CBRN COE

EXCELOR HOLDING GROUP EOOD

323 321

2019–2022

410027

Preparation of a communication strategy on IcSP-funded projects managed by the CBRN Sector of the Security and Nuclear Safety Unit of DG DEVCO

EU CBRN COE

Rogie

20 000

2020

EXT

372955

ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE SECRETARIATS in Algiers and Tashkent

EU CBRN COE

ENCONET

2 130 250

2019–2022

EXT

394360

Support to the organisation of events related to the CBRN Centre of Excellence Initiative and Export Control programme

EU CBRN COE

Pomilio Blum

969 799

2019–2022

Year 2020

| Project identification | Title | Objective | Contractor | Amount (EUR) | Execution period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| IFS/2020/415-595 | P85 — Strengthening Laboratory Capacities in Africa Against CoVID-19 and epidemics: from set up in Senegal to scale up in Africa (LABPLUS AFRICA) | EU CBRN COE | INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER | 10 000 000,00 | 2020–2023 |
| EXT
  IFS/2018/393-792 | On-site Technical Support to CBRN Centre of Excellence (CoE) Regional Secretariat in Manila | EU CBRN COE | BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE | 23 407,00 | 2018–2024 |
| EXT
  IFS/2019/402-901 | CoE Project 73 — CBRN Protection of critical infrastructure in Middle East CoE Region | EU CBRN COE | CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE | 100 000,00 | 2019–2023 |
| IFS/2020/419-061 | P86 — Mise en place et opérationnalisation d’un Mastère Spécialisé NRBCE, mention Afrique (MANA) | EU CBRN COE | UNIVERSITE DE HAUTE ALSACE UHA | 1 498 200,00 | 2020–2023 |
| IFS/2020/419-151 | Worldwide institutional technical support to the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence for the period 2021-2020 | EU CBRN COE | JRC CCR JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE — CENTRE COMMUN DE RECHERCHE | 3 300 000,00 | 2020–2022 |
| IFS/2020/420-370 | Funding of the 2021 STCU Administrative Operating Budget (AOB) and service contracts | Administrative support | SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER IN UKRAINE | 680 000,00 | 2020–2021 |
| IFS/2020/420-371 | Funding of the 2021 ISTC Administrative Operating Budget (AOB) and service contracts | Administrative support | INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER | 1 107 000,00 | 2020–2021 |
| IFS/2020/420-489 | P87 — Central Asia — CBRN CoE Mass gathering 2021-2023 | EU CBRN COE | INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER | 3 500 000,00 | 2020–2024 |

Project identification

Title

Objective

Contractor

Amount (EUR)

Execution period

IFS/2020/415-595

P85 — Strengthening Laboratory Capacities in Africa Against CoVID-19 and epidemics: from set up in Senegal to scale up in Africa (LABPLUS AFRICA)

EU CBRN COE

INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER

10 000 000,00

2020–2023

EXT

IFS/2018/393-792

On-site Technical Support to CBRN Centre of Excellence (CoE) Regional Secretariat in Manila

EU CBRN COE

BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE

23 407,00

2018–2024

EXT

IFS/2019/402-901

CoE Project 73 — CBRN Protection of critical infrastructure in Middle East CoE Region

EU CBRN COE

CENTRE D'ETUDE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE

100 000,00

2019–2023

IFS/2020/419-061

P86 — Mise en place et opérationnalisation d’un Mastère Spécialisé NRBCE, mention Afrique (MANA)

EU CBRN COE

UNIVERSITE DE HAUTE ALSACE UHA

1 498 200,00

2020–2023

IFS/2020/419-151

Worldwide institutional technical support to the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence for the period 2021-2020

EU CBRN COE

JRC CCR JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE — CENTRE COMMUN DE RECHERCHE

3 300 000,00

2020–2022

IFS/2020/420-370

Funding of the 2021 STCU Administrative Operating Budget (AOB) and service contracts

Administrative support

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER IN UKRAINE

680 000,00

2020–2021

IFS/2020/420-371

Funding of the 2021 ISTC Administrative Operating Budget (AOB) and service contracts

Administrative support

INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER

1 107 000,00

2020–2021

IFS/2020/420-489

P87 — Central Asia — CBRN CoE Mass gathering 2021-2023

EU CBRN COE

INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER

3 500 000,00

2020–2024

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