No. 06-16-0008-CR

Trial Court No. 14F1096-102 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE SIXTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AT TEXARKANA, TEXAS

Joshua Jacobs, Appellant 

v.

The State of Texas, State 

Appealed from the 102nd Judicial District Court 

Bowie County, Texas 

BRIEF FOR THE STATE 

The State Does Not Request Oral Argument 

Respectfully submitted: 

Jerry D. Rochelle 

Criminal District Attorney 

Bowie County, Texas 

601 Main Street 

Texarkana, Texas 75501 

By: Lauren N. Sutton 

Assistant District Attorney 

601 Main Street 

Texarkana, Texas 75501 

Texas Bar No. 24079421 

Lauren.sutton@txkusa.org 

Attorneys for the State

ACCEPTED

06-16-00008-CR

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

9/8/2016 4:56:23 PM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 9/9/2016 10:02:00 AM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
i

In The Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Supreme Judicial District

At Texarkana, Texas

Joshua Jacobs, §

Appellant §

§ No. 06-16-00008-CR

v. § 

§

The State of Texas, § BRIEF FOR THE STATE

State §

§

Identity of the Parties

The following is a complete list of all the parties to the trial court’s judgment 

as required by the provisions of Rule 38.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure:

1. Defendant and Appellant:

Joshua Jacobs

2. Attorneys for Appellant at trial:

Will Williams

Bowie County Public Defender’s Office

424 W. Broad Street

Texarkana, Texas 75501

3. Attorney for appellant on appeal:

Troy Hornsby

1725 Galleria Oaks Drive

Texarkana, TX 75503
ii

4. Attorney for the State of Texas at trial:

Kelley Crisp

Lauren Richards

Assistant District Attorneys

601 Main Street

Texarkana, Texas 75501

5. Attorney for the State of Texas on Appeal:

Lauren Richards

Assistant District Attorney

601 Main Street

Texarkana, Texas 75501

Lauren.sutton@txkusa.org

6. Presiding Judge at trial:

Honorable Bobby Lockhart

District Court Judge

102nd Judicial District

Bowie County, Texas

Bi-State Justice Building

100 North State Line Avenue

Texarkana, Texas 75501
iii

Table of Contents

Identity of the Parties and Counsel .........................................................................i-ii

Table of Contents..................................................................................................... iii

Index of Authorities.............................................................................................. iv-v

Statement of the Case.................................................................................................1

Reply to Points of Error.............................................................................................2

Summary of the Argument..................................................................................... 3-4

Argument.............................................................................................................. 5-24

Reply to Points of Error Number One............................................. 5-11

The Appellant’s prior conviction was properly used to enhance 

his punishment. 

Reply to Point of Error Number Two ............................................. 5-11

The trial court did not err is limiting Appellant’s trial counsel’s 

voir dire on prior extraneous offenses. 

Reply to Point of Error Number Three ........................................... 5-11

Appellant’s prior out-of-state conviction is admissible pursuant 

to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37.

Prayer for Relief.......................................................................................................25

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................26

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................27
iv

Index of Authorities

Cases

Anderson v. State, 394 S.W.3d 531, 536. (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)......................8,12

Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)........................................14

Barnett v. State, 344 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref'd)...............14

Brooks v. State, 357 S.W.3d 777 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd)6,8

Cuevas v. State, 742 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)......................................14

Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).......................................16

Ex Parte White, 211 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)......................................10

Goodwin v. State, 91 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).............18

Hanson v. State, 269 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.)................14

Hill v. State, 426 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, pet. ref'd)....................13

Kuhn v. State, 45 S.W.3d 207 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd).....................6

Lincicome v. State, 3 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.)................18

Love v. State, 861 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)..........................................18

McCarter v. State, 837 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)..................................13

McDaniel v. State, 3 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d).........18

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990 (op. on reh’g).......18

Phelps v. State, 999 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, pet. ref’d) ..............18

Prudholm v. State, 333 S.W.3d 590 (Tex.Crim.App.2011).....................6,8,10,11,12
v

Reichle v. State, 06-14-00073-CR, 2015 WL 392846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 

30, 2015, pet. ref'd) .............................................................................................15,16

Robinson v. State, 35 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d).........18

Sherman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.)..............18

Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d.) .............18

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Garcia, 327 S.W. 3d 898 (2010)...................9

Thompson v. State, 267 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref'd)............13

Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).................................18

Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ......................................18

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

Texas Code Crim. Proc. art. 38..37 § 2(b)...............................................................19

Texas Penal Code

Tex. Penal Code § 22.011 ........................................................................................11

Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(c)(2).................................................................................16

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure

Tex. R. App. Proc. 44.2(b).......................................................................................16

Louisiana Revised Statutes

Louisiana Revised Statutes Sec. 14.80 ......................................................................9

Louisiana Revised Statutes Sec. 14.81.2(B)(1) .......................................................12
1

Statement of the Case

Appellant, Joshua Jacobs, was found of guilty by the jury of Aggravated 

Sexual Assault of a Child. After pleading “true” to the enhancement that he was 

previously convicted of a Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile, Appellant was 

automatically sentenced to Life in the Texas Department of Criminal JusticeInstitutional Division by the Judge. Jacobs then perfected appeal to this Honorable 

Court. He now appeals the verdict of the trial court on a three points of error. 
2

Reply to Points of Error

REPLY TO POINTS OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

The Appellant’s prior conviction was properly used to enhance his 

punishment. 

REPLY TO POINT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO:

The trial court did not err is limiting Appellant’s trial counsel’s voir 

dire on prior extraneous offenses. 

REPLY TO POINT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE:

Appellant’s prior out-of-state conviction is admissible pursuant to 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37.
3

Summary of the Argument

REPLY TO POINTS OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

The Appellant’s prior conviction was properly used to enhance his 

punishment. 

Appellant argues the trial court incorrectly found his prior conviction from 

Louisiana for Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile is substantially similar to the 

Texas offense of Sexual Assault of a Child. He argues the Louisiana conviction 

should don’t have been used to enhance his punishment pursuant to Texas Penal 

Code § 12.41(c)(2). 

However, the elements of the prior Louisiana offense and Texas offense 

each display a high degree of likeness. Additionally, the elements of each are 

substantially similar with respect to the individual or public interests protected and 

the impact of the elements on the seriousness of the offense. Therefore, the 

offenses are substantially similar and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

making such a determination.
4

REPLY TO POINT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO:

The trial court did not err is limiting Appellant’s trial counsel’s voir 

dire on prior extraneous offenses. 

In his second point of error, the Appellant argues the trial court erred when it 

was restricted in voir dire from referring to his prior Louisiana conviction for 

felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile as a “sexual offense.” However, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion because the limitation on the defense voir dire 

was reasonable. 

REPLY TO POINT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE:

Appellant’s prior out-of-state conviction is admissible pursuant to 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37.

In his third point of error, Appellant argues that because his prior conviction 

for Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile is a Louisiana conviction, it is not 

admissible under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.37. However, nothing 

in article 38.37 prohibits the use of a prior conviction or extraneous offense 

because the act occurred in another state. 
5

Argument

Reply to Points of Error One

The Appellant’s prior conviction was properly used to enhance his 

punishment. 

Appellant argues the trial court incorrectly found his prior conviction from 

Louisiana for Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile is substantially similar to the 

Texas offense of Sexual Assault of a Child. He argues the Louisiana conviction 

should don’t have been used to enhance his punishment pursuant to Texas Penal 

Code § 12.41(c)(2). 

However, the elements of the prior Louisiana offense and Texas offense 

each display a high degree of likeness. Additionally, the elements of each are 

substantially similar with respect to the individual or public interests protected and 

the impact of the elements on the seriousness of the offense. Therefore, the 

offenses are substantially similar and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

making such a determination.

Argument and Authorities

A. Standard of Review

Appellant claims that his prior Louisiana offense is not substantially similar 

to the offenses listed Penal Code section 12.42(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) and, 

therefore, could not be used to trigger a mandatory life sentence. 
6

The reviewing court must review the trial court's interpretation of the 

Louisiana and Texas statutes on a de novo basis.

1

.

B. Application of Law to Facts

Section 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code provides enhanced penalties for 

repeat sex offenders.2 Section 12.42(c)(2) effectively creates a “two-strikes policy” 

for repeat sex offenders in Texas, embodying the legislature's intent to treat repeat 

sex offenders more harshly than other repeat offenders.3 Section 12.42(c)(2)

mandates a life sentence for a defendant convicted of a sexual offense listed in 

subsection (c)(2)(A) that he committed after previously having been convicted of 

any of the enumerated sexual offenses in subsection (c)(2)(B) or “under the laws of 

another state containing elements that are substantially similar to the elements of 

an [enumerated] offense.”4

In the present case, the Appellant is a registered sex offender and has been 

so designated in this jurisdiction since on or about May 10, 2013. (C.R. p. 260, 

Exhibit A, Sex Offender Registration Form.) On his sex offender registration form, 

it is noted that the defendant’s out of state conviction was for Carnal Knowledge of 

Juvenile and that the registering Texas offense is listed as 1199002, the DPS code 

 

1

See Kuhn v. State, 45 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd)

2 Prudholm v. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Brooks v. State, 357 S.W.3d 

777, 785 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd).

3 Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 592; Brooks, 357 S.W.3d at 785–86.

4 Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 592; Brooks,357 S.W.3d at 786; see also Tex. Penal Code § 

12.42(c)(2).
7

for Sexual Assault of a Child. (C.R. p. 260; 262 Exhibit B, Texas Department of 

Public Safety’s List of Sexual Offense Codes). The DPS determinations under 

Article 62.003, Code of Criminal Procedure of offenses under the laws of the State 

of Louisiana clearly state that Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile is 

substantially similar to the Texas Offense of Sexual Assault of a Child. (C.R. p. 

264-275, Exhibit C, DPS Determinations List for State of Louisiana). 

In this case, Appellant acknowledged through his sexual offender 

registration, that his out of state conviction for Felony Carnal Knowledge of a 

Juvenile is substantially similar to Sexual Assault of a Child, a Texas offense. For 

over two years, the defendant was in compliance with his registration requirements 

and has not contested the finding of substantial similarity. It is only now, after the 

defendant has reoffended and committed a second sexual assault of a child offense,

and subsequently been sentenced to life in prison, that he argues that the offenses 

are not similar.

Appellant does not attack the jury's findings that he was guilty of aggravated 

sexual assault of a child. Instead, he argues the trial court erred by determining that

the Louisiana offense of sexual battery qualifies as a substantially similar sexual 

offense in Texas for purposes of section 12.42.

Before using a prior conviction from another state for this purpose, the trial 

court first must take judicial notice of the relevant out-of-state sexual offense and 
8

make a finding that the elements of that offense are substantially similar to the 

elements of a Texas sexual offense enumerated in section 12.42(c)(2)(B).5

In determining whether an out-of-state sexual offense contains “substantially 

similar” elements, courts use a two-pronged approach.6 First, they must determine 

whether the elements of each offense “display a high degree of likeness.”7

Generally, but not always, the analysis focuses on the elements of the offense.

8

Next, it must be determined whether the elements are substantially similar with 

respect to the individual or public interests protected and the impact of the 

elements on the seriousness of the offense.9 The second prong is a two-step 

analysis.

10 The Court must determine whether there is a similar danger to society 

that the statute seeks to prevent, and then whether the class, degree, and 

punishment range of the two offenses are similar.11

In the present case, the Appellant’s trial counsel filed “Defendant’s Brief 

and Objection to a Finding of Substantial Similarity of an Alleged Conviction from 

Louisiana Pursuant to 12.42(c)(2)(B)(v).” (C.R. p. 186). The trial court held a 

hearing on the issue and took judicial notice of the Appellant’s Louisiana sexual 

offense and made a finding that the elements of that offense are substantially 

 

5 Brooks, 357 S.W.3d at 786.

6

See Prudholm v. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 593–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

7

Id. at 594.

8 Anderson v. State, 394 S.W.3d 531, 536. (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

9

Id.

10Id.

11Id.
9

similar to the elements of a Texas sexual offense enumerated in section 

12.42(c)(2)(B). (R.R. Vol. 12, p. 61-66;74-77). In making this determination the 

trial court took into account the language was almost identical to the Louisiana 

statute and when compared the elements displayed a high degree of likeness, and 

that the statutes were substantially similar with respect to the individual or public 

interests protected and the impact of the elements on the seriousness of the 

offenses. (R.R. Vol. 12, p. 76-78). Thus, the trial court determined all prongs of the 

substantial similarity analysis weighed in favor of a finding that the two offense are 

substantially similar.

It is significant in the substantial similarity test to determine if the person 

guilty of the [out of state] law would also be guilty under the Texas law.12 Here, 

the defendant plead guilty to Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile. Under the 

laws of the State of Louisiana, Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile is 

committed when:

(1) A person who is seventeen years of age or older has sexual intercourse, 

with consent, with a person who is thirteen years of age or older but less 

than seventeen years of age, when the victim is not the spouse of the 

offender and when the difference between the age of the victim and the 

age of the offender is four years or greater.13 

 

12 See Texas Department of Public Safety v. Garcia, 327 S.W.3d 898 (2010). 

13 Louisiana Revised Statutes Sec. 14.80.
10

Under the laws of the State of Texas, if an individual has sexual relations 

with a juvenile under the age of 17 years, that person would be guilty of Sexual 

Assault of a Child. There is no requirement that the two statutes be identical.14 A 

statute from another jurisdiction may be considered to be substantially similar even 

if a defendant would not be subject to conviction under the Texas statute. The 

critical question appears to be whether the compared offenses protect the same 

individual or public interests. In Ex Parte White, the Court of Criminal Appeals 

held that a Delaware statute and a Texas statute were substantially similar despite 

multiple differences.15

An evaluation of the Prudholm factors establish that the Appellant’s 

Louisiana conviction is substantially similar to the Texas statute.

a. Degree of Likeness

Both statutes criminalize the same type of conduct using similar approaches. 

While the Texas statute prohibits a wider range of conduct with respect to child 

victims than the Louisiana statute, it also prohibits oral, vaginal, or anal intercourse 

with children 13 years old but under 17 years old. Like the Texas statute, the 

Louisiana statute prohibits oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse with a child victim 

13 years or older but under 17 years of age. The statutes further limit the age of the 

 

14 Prudholm v. State, 227 S.W. 3d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

15 Ex Parte White, 211 S.W. 3d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
11

victim—17 for both Texas and Louisiana.16 One difference in the two is that the 

Louisiana statutes requires a consent element with respect to child-victims, while 

in the Texas statute, consent of a child-victim is an impossibility. This difference is 

not dispositive, and after fully analyzing the elements of each statute, this Court 

can conclude the minor differences between the two statutes do not manifest an 

intent to punish different prohibited conduct. As a result, the statutes meet the first 

prong of Prudholm.

b. Individual or Public Interests Protected

The interest protected by the Louisiana Felony Carnal Knowledge of a 

Juvenile statute is clear. The statute aims to safeguard children from improper 

sexual contact. Likewise, the Texas Sexual Assault of a Child statute protects the 

same public interest. Both statutes serve the same public interest by criminalizing 

the same type of contact.

c. Impact of the Elements on the Seriousness of the Offense

The Texas offense of sexual assault of a child is a second-degree felony, 

punishable by two to twenty years' imprisonment and a fine not to exceed 

$10,000.

17 The Louisiana statute punishment range is not less than five years nor 

 

16 See Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 594(explaining that a one-year age difference in different states 

statutory definitions of “child” is a good example of elements that are substantially similar, but 

not identical).

17 Tex. Penal Code § 22.011.
12

more than 10 years and a fine not to exceed $5,000.18 In Prudholm, the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the California offense of sexual battery 

did not satisfy this requirement with respect to the Texas offenses of sexual assault 

or aggravated kidnapping.19 The California offense was a misdemeanor with a 

sentence of up to six months in prison, while Texas sexual assault is a seconddegree felony with a sentence of up to twenty years' in prison. In this case, the two 

charges have much more similar punishment ranges. Therefore, this factor weighs 

against a finding that the statutes are “substantially similar.”

No single factor in the analysis is dispositive, so this Court must weigh all 

factors before making a determination.20 The elements of the two statutes–the 

Louisiana offense of Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile and the Texas offense 

of Sexual Assault of a Child–are “substantially similar.” Both statutes seek to 

criminalize specific sexual acts against children. While the penalties for such 

conduct are less severe in Louisiana than in Texas, the “degree of likeness” and 

similar “interests protected” outweigh the sentencing variation. Therefore, the trial 

court was correct in finding that the two offenses were substantially similar.

For these reasons, Appellant’s point of error number one should be 

overruled.

 

18 Louisiana Revised Statutes Sec. 14:81.2(B)(1)

19 See Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 599–600.

20 Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 537.
13

Reply to Point of Error Two

The trial court did not err is limiting Appellant’s trial counsel’s voir 

dire on prior extraneous offenses. 

In his second point of error, the Appellant argues the trial court erred when it 

was restricted in voir dire from referring to his prior Louisiana conviction for 

felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile as a “sexual offense.” However, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion because the limitation on the defense voir dire 

was reasonable. 

Argument and Authorities

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s decision to limit voir dire is reviewed under an abuse of 

discretion.21 The trial court abuses its discretion when it limits a proper question 

concerning a proper area of inquiry.22 Instead, to establish that the trial court 

abused its discretion, the complaining party must show that (1) he did not attempt 

to prolong voir dire, and (2) the questions he sought to ask were not improper voir 

dire questions.23

 

21 Hill v. State, 426 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, pet. ref'd)

22 Thompson v. State, 267 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref'd)

(quoting Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).

23 See McCarter v. State, 837 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (applying two-prong test 

when defendant was in process of asking questions to entire panel, not individual members).
14

B. Application of Law to Facts

Texas courts allow parties to voir dire a jury panel about the law applicable 

to the enhancement of punishment but the explanation must be hypothetical and 

should not inform the jury of any specific allegation in the enhancement paragraph 

of the indictment.24 The use of hypotheticals during voir dire is meant to avoid 

“commit[ting] the [prospective] jurors to particular circumstances.”25

Prior to voir dire, the Appellant’s trial counsel submitted questions to the 

court which it intended to ask the jury panel. (R.R. Vol. 13, p. 4). The proffered 

questions sought to inform the jury that if evidence of a prior sexual offense is 

introduced, the jury must still find all elements of the instant offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. After a review of the questions, and hearing arguments from the 

defense and the state, the court determined that the defense would be allowed to 

ask the questions, but would be prevented to referring to prior offenses as sexual 

offenses. (R.R. Vol. 13, p. 13). 

It is of special note that the court agreed with the State that it had recently 

been extremely difficult seating juries and that voir dire had gotten very confusing 

and upsetting for jury panels. (R.R. Vol. 13, p. 12). The Defendant’s questions 

 

24 Hanson v. State, 269 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (citing Jack v. 

State, 867 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1993, no pet.)); see Barnett v. State, 344 

S.W.3d 6, 20 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref'd) (informing jury panel of specific 

allegations of enhancement is improper).

25 Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see Cuevas v. State, 742 S.W.2d 

331, 336 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
15

sought to commit panel members that they would not be influence by the facts of 

the extraneous offense, when article 38.37 specifically allows the jury to be so 

influence. (R.R. Vol. 13, p. 12). The trial court, in efforts to avoid confusion and 

poisoning the panel imposed the reasonable restriction that the defense counsel be 

allowed to refer to other felony offenses, but not specifically refer to them as 

sexual offense. (R.R. Vol. 13, p. 13). 

This Court addresses a similar situation in Reichle v. State, and found the 

trial court’s restriction was reasonable.26 In the present case, while discussing the 

matter prior to voir dire, the trial court also relied on the guidance from this Court 

in Reichle. (R.R. Vol. 13, p. 5). Appellant seeks to distinguish Reichle from the 

present case by pointing out the defense in Reichle was precluded from discussing 

specific facts of the prior offenses. The State argues that the effect on the panel 

would be virtually the same, even though Jacob’s counsel was not going to address 

specific facts of the prior offenses, the mention of an unrelated sexual offense 

would create the same problematic issues. 

By seeking to inform the jury of the fact the defendant had previously been 

convicted of a sexual offense, Jacobs trial counsel was seeking a commitment from 

the panel that they would not be influenced by the facts of the extraneous offenses, 

 

26 Reichle v. State, 06-14-00073-CR, 2015 WL 392846, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 30, 

2015, pet. ref'd)
16

even though Article 38.37 specifically allows the jury to be so influenced.27 In this 

circumstance, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s limitation of the 

presentation of the specific offense during voir dire. 

C. Harm Analysis

Should this court determine that trial court abused its discretion and did not 

allow the defense to ask appropriate questions, it must next be determined if the 

Appellant suffered harm. Generally, the denial of appropriate questioning 

during voir dire constitutes non-constitutional error which is subject to 

a harm analysis.

28

During the defense voir dire, he informed the panel, 

“In a trial of this nature, if there’s evidence that a defendant has committed a 

separate unrelated offense described by Chapter 22 of the Penal Code of 

assaultive offenses, that can be admitted at the trial for aggravated assault of 

a trial, and the jury is allowed to use that for any reason, any relevant reason 

and permissible reason, for the character of the defendant, did he acct on that 

character. So there’s different reasons you can use it, but before you can use 

that information, the State has to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt 

that that occurred, too, okay? Does that make sense? So if anything like that 

comes in, the Judge gives you an instruction that says, you can’t even 

consider this unless you believe it beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s a hard 

thing to do, to hear something and then not consider it if you don’t think 

they proved it beyond a reasonable doubt. Does anybody think they’d have a 

hard problem not considering something if the State didn’t prove it beyond a 

reasonable doubt?” (R.R. Vol. 13, p. 88). 

 

27Reichle v. State, 06-14-00073-CR, 2015 WL 392846, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 30, 

2015, pet. ref'd)(Stating Article 38.37 would allow the jury to consider the extraneous offenses 

“for any bearing the evidence ha [d] on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant 

and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.”)

28 See Tex. R. App. Proc. 44.2(b); Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
17

The defense continued to reiterate to the jury that they must hold the State to 

it’s burden on the unrelated offense before they could use it as evidence of the 

instant offense. (R.R. Vol. 13, p. 90). 

Appellant was allowed to thoroughly question the panel on this topic. (R.R. 

Vol. 13, p. 88-91). It cannot be said that the Appellant was harmed by the trial 

court’s limitation on their voir dire. For the above-mentioned reasons, Appellant’s 

second point of error should be overruled.

Reply to Point of Error Three

Appellant’s prior out-of-state conviction is admissible pursuant to 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37.

In his third point of error, Appellant argues that because his prior conviction 

for Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile is a Louisiana conviction, it is not 

admissible under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.37. However, nothing 

in article 38.37 prohibits the use of a prior conviction or extraneous offense 

because the act occurred in another state. 
18

Argument and Authorities

A. Standard of Review

A trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether to admit or 

exclude evidence.

29 When considering whether a trial court’s decision to admit or 

exclude evidence is error, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court 

abused that discretion.30 This inquiry depends on the facts of each case.31 An abuse 

of discretion occurs only when the trial court acts arbitrarily or unreasonably 

without reference to any guiding rules or principles.32 Even if the reviewing court 

might have reached a different result, the court must uphold the trial court’s 

decision to admit or exclude evidence if it was within the “zone of reasonable 

disagreement.”33

B. Application of Law to Facts

Appellant claims that because Article 38.37 does not expressly allow for the 

admission of out of state offenses or convictions, such should not be admitted into 

evidence pursuant to Article 38.37.

 

29 Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990 (op. on reh’g); McDaniel v. 

State, 3 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d). 

30 Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Robinson v. State, 35 

S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d). 

31 Love v. State, 861 S.W.2d 899, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Sherman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 841, 

847 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.).

32 Lincicome v. State, 3 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.); Phelps v. State, 

999 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, pet. ref’d); see Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 372. 

33 Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Montgomery, 810 

S.W.2d at 391); Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542; Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 505-506 (Tex. 

App—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d.); Goodwin v. State, 91 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tex. App—Fort 

Worth 2002, no pet.). 
19

The Appellant’s trial counsel filed a ‘Defendant’s Motion to Exclude 

Evidence Offered by the State Pursuant to Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 38.37’ 

(C.R. p. 178). The basis of the motion was that Article 38.37 only applies to 

Appellant’s offenses committed within the State of Texas. The trial court 

addressed the motion, and overruled the Appellant’s objection to the evidence on 

that basis. (R.R. Vol. 12, p. 26). The reasoning for the court’s ruling was that based 

on the court’s interpretation of the case law, the extraneous offense does not have 

to be a Texas offense to be introduced under Article 38.37. (R.R. Vol. 12, p. 26).

Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in 

allowing the evidence of Appellant’s prior out-of-state conviction pursuant to 

Article 38.37. However, there is no requirement that the separate offense be an 

offense committed within the state of Texas.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.37 allows for the admission of 

evidence that a defendant previously committed another offense in the same 

category as the primary offense for which he is on trial. The statue provides:

(b) Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, 

and subject to Section 2–a, evidence that the defendant has 

committed a separate offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2)

may be admitted in the trial of an alleged offense described by 

Subsection (a)(1) or (2) for any bearing the evidence has on relevant 

matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed 

in conformity with the character of the defendant.34

 

34 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, § 2(b) (emphasis added).
20

The purpose of Article 38.37 is to allow evidence that the defendant acted in 

conformity with his character to sexually assault children. In subsection (b) it 

clearly states that the separate offense must only be described by Subsection (a)(1) 

or (2). The statute does not require that the suspect have been charged with an 

offense described in Subsection (a)(1) or (2). It also does not require that the 

suspect have been convicted of an offense described in Subsection (a)(1) or (2). 

The requirement is that there be evidence the defendant committed an offense, and 

that offense must be described in Subsection (a)(1) or (2). If the legislature had 

intended to restrict article 38.37 to only conduct occurring in Texas, the statute 

would read, ‘..evidence that the defenand has committed a separate offense listed 

in Substection (a)(1) or (2).’ Instead, it only requires that the separate offense be 

described by the acts listed in Subsection (a)(1) or (2). It has in dispute that the 

separate offense committed by the Appellant in Louisiana, if the conduct occurred 

in Texas, would be described as Sexual Assault of a Child, which is listed in 

Subsection (a)(1).

To preclude the introduction of such evidence based on a geographic

restriction would reach an absurd result. The fact that the defendant committed 

other sexual offenses against children but they occurred in another state should not 

exempt such conduct from being introduced at his trial for a subsequent sexual 

offense against a child. Had the Appellant committed the same conduct for which 
21

he was found guilty in Louisiana, he would be guilty under the Texas Penal Code 

of Sexual Assault of a Child.

Appellant cites no binding precedent for his contention that an out-of-state 

conviction should not be admissible under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

article 38.37, but admits this is an issue of first impression. His contention is based 

solely on an interpretation of the statute which would produce absurd results.

For the above-mentioned reasons, Appellant’s third point of error should be 

overruled.
22

Prayer for Relief

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, there being legal and 

competent evidence sufficient to justify the conviction and punishment assessed in 

this case and no reversible error appearing in the record of the trial of the case, the 

State of Texas respectfully prays that this Honorable Court affirm the judgment 

and sentence of the trial court below.

Respectfully Submitted:

Jerry D. Rochelle

Criminal District Attorney

Bowie County, Texas

601 Main Street

Texarkana, Texas 75501

Phone: (903) 735-4800

Fax: (903) 735-4819

_/s/ Lauren N. Sutton___________

By: Lauren N. Sutton

Assistant District Attorney

601 Main Street

Texarkana, Texas 75501

Phone: (903) 735-4800

Fax: (903) 735-4819

Lauren.sutton@txkusa.org

Attorneys for the State
23

Certificate of Compliance

I, Lauren N. Richards, certify that, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, Appellee’s Brief contains 4,054 words, exclusive of the 

caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of 

contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented, 

statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of 

service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix.

/s/ Lauren N. Richards 

Lauren N. Richards
24

Certificate of Service

I, Lauren N. Richards, certify that I have served a true and correct copy of 

the foregoing Brief for the State upon Mr. Troy Hornsby, Attorney for Appellant, 

on this the 8

rd day of September 2016.

__/s/ Lauren N. Richards_________

Lauren N. Richards