1

Filed 12/9/21 P. v. Singh CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAGHVENDRA SINGH,

Defendant and Appellant.

C092034

(Super. Ct. No. 19FE010982)

A jury found defendant Raghvendra Singh guilty of 14 counts of filing a false or 

forged instrument (counts 1-4, 6-13, 15-16—Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a)).

1 Each of these 

counts pertained to a separate proof of service among those filed in various legal 

proceedings. The jury also found defendant guilty of two counts of conspiracy to file a 

false or forged instrument (counts 17 and 18). These allegations pertained to grant deeds. 

The jury found true an allegation that defendant was convicted of more than one violation 

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

of section 115, subdivision (a), and the cumulative financial loss from all transactions 

exceeded $100,000. (§ 115, subd. (c)(2).)2

The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 12 years in prison. 

On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his Faretta3

motion to represent himself; (2) the evidence does not support his conviction for count 

12; and (3) the evidence does not support the jury’s finding of a cumulative financial loss 

in excess of $100,000. We agree the evidence does not support the cumulative loss 

finding and will remand for resentencing in light of this conclusion. In all other respects, 

we affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

We summarize only the facts and underlying litigation that are relevant to the 

issues we will address in this appeal. 

A. Elk Grove Property

1. Restraining Order and Default Judgment

In December 2016, bullets fired from a house on Demonte Way in Elk Grove

entered a neighbor’s home. A Neighborhood Watch was formed in response to this and 

other activities at the house. Nathan was the “Neighborhood Watch captain.” 

The residents of the house told Nathan that defendant was the owner. Defendant’s 

wife, Kiran Rawat, was the actual owner. Nathan tried talking to defendant about the 

problems. Defendant “ran [Nathan] around in circles.” Defendant eventually accused 

Nathan of causing a “zombie nuisance,” coming to his house with a gun, and killing 

someone at his property. Defendant said Nathan’s family would be in danger for a long 

2

 The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss count 14 under section 1118.1, 

and the jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 5. The court declared a mistrial as to 

count 5, and the prosecution thereafter dismissed the count. 

3

 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
3

time. As a result, Nathan sought a restraining order against defendant. On September 29, 

2017, the restraining order was granted. The same day, a complaint was filed by “Kiran 

Singh” against Nathan seeking $90 million in damages. On July 3, 2018, a proof of 

service (count 4) was filed in which “Susan Garcia” declared that she personally served 

Nathan with the summons and complaint. Nathan testified this did not happen. He only 

became aware of the lawsuit by searching his name on the court’s website. A lawyer had 

advised him not to take any action until he had been properly served. Also, on July 3, 

2018, “Kiran Singh” requested an entry of default and judgment.

4 The request was 

granted, and a $90 million default judgment was entered against Nathan. A criminal

investigator for the Sacramento County District Attorney’s office testified regarding his 

unsuccessful attempts to locate Susan Garcia. 

Nathan obtained free legal services based on the fact he is in the military. In mid2019, his attorney successfully set aside the default judgment. In the interim, Nathan’s

wife required hospitalization for migraines. Nathan’s “immune system attacked [the] 

nerves in [his] arm,” and he needed about a year to recover. Nathan testified that none of 

these medical conditions existed before the $90 million default judgment. 

2. Nuisance Abatement Lawsuit

The City Attorney for the City of Elk Grove testified that the City had received 

hundreds of complaints about the Demonte Way house before deciding to file a nuisance 

abatement lawsuit against defendant’s wife in August 2017. Defendant became part of 

the lawsuit when his wife filed a cross-complaint against him and the City. In addition to 

the December 2016 shooting, the City had received complaints about illegal drug use, 

garbage, substandard housing, “people living in closets,” “makeshift walls that were not 

4

 The request claimed “Susan Garcia” served Nathan by mail. Nathan testified that did 

not occur, either. This proof of service was the basis for count 5. As previously 

indicated, the jury hung on this count. 
4

up to code,” excessive traffic and noise, and domestic disturbances at the house. Count

13 relates to a proof of service attached to defendant’s “Second Reply” in support of a 

motion to compel discovery and for terminating sanctions. Count 15 relates to a proof of 

service attached to a reply to an ex parte motion seeking to meet and confer filed on 

behalf of defendant and his wife. Count 16 relates to a proof of service attached to a 

request for a stay of trial court proceedings filed on behalf of defendant and his wife. The 

City Attorney testified he was not actually served with these documents. He explained 

this made it difficult to keep up with the litigation, but fortunately the superior court 

docket was available online. 

On January 15, 2019, the date of Kiran Rawat’s deposition in this lawsuit, 

defendant told the City Attorney the case was moot because “the property had been 

transferred.” Count 17 relates to a purported grant deed dated January 17, 2019, 

transferring the Demonte Way property from Kiran Rawat to Rajkumari Sanger as the 

trustee of the Sanger2 Living Trust. The court permitted the proceedings to continue

despite the purported transfer. The City ultimately prevailed with a judgment against 

Rawat declaring the property a nuisance, awarding the City $25,000 in civil penalties, 

ordering the property to be cleaned up, and inviting the City to apply for a receiver. A 

receiver has since taken over the property. 

B. Sacramento County Property

A code enforcement supervisor for Sacramento County testified that he became 

familiar with defendant in working on a case regarding a house on Stockton Boulevard. 

The case had been referred to code enforcement from the Sheriff’s Department, who had 

received complaints that 14 or 15 people lived in the house. Code enforcement 

connected some of the older residents with services, “but the rest of the people were 

basically squatters.” Code enforcement told them to move and then repeatedly boarded 

up the property to no avail. In December 2013, the house was nearly burned to the 

ground and an occupant died. 
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The code enforcement supervisor testified that defendant owned the property and 

his wife was listed on the title. Defendant received the notices of code enforcement 

violations. He did not do any repairs. The County of Sacramento filed an action seeking 

the appointment of a receiver for the property. Defendant resisted receivership. 

Ultimately, the receiver demolished the house and fenced the vacant property. Count 9 

relates to a proof of service attached to defendant’s opposition to the receiver’s petition to 

be discharged. Count 10 relates to a proof of service attached to defendant’s notice of 

appeal. Count 12 relates to the proof of service attached to the opening brief in that 

appeal. Each of these proofs of service represented that the supervisor for code 

enforcement had been served. The supervisor testified he was not served with any of 

these documents and was only familiar with them from county counsel. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Faretta

1. Trial Court Proceedings

On Thursday, January 30, 2020, the date set for defendant’s trial, the trial court 

called the matter and asked for motions in limine and witness lists. Defendant announced 

he had talked to his attorney and wanted to represent himself. The court responded that 

defendant was, “a little late for that. We’re set here for trial. You are too late to 

represent yourself. [¶] Plus, I understand, have you been deemed a vexatious litigant 

formally by the Courts in Sacramento County?” Defendant acknowledged that he had 

been deemed a vexatious litigant, at which point the court asked why he wanted to 

represent himself. Defendant asserted that his case was the first to involve the 

criminalization of filing false documents with courts, and that he should be allowed 30 

minutes of oral argument in every hearing. Defense counsel informed the court that a 

section 995 motion had already been denied in which it was argued a proof of service 

could not be the basis for a section 115 violation. 
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Defendant responded that his attorney was not talking to him and only had “ten 

percent facts and . . . ten percent legal knowledge” about his case. Upon hearing this, the 

trial court indicated he would consider defendant’s motion to be a Marsden5 motion and 

immediately cleared the courtroom to conduct such a hearing. 

Defendant had retained this attorney on October 15, 2019. Defendant said he 

understood his attorney could be discharged at any time and that he told his attorney on 

December 24, 2019, that he would represent himself. Defendant argued his attorney was 

not visiting him enough, and had refused to file various motions he wanted to file. 

Defendant indicated he had at least eight motions he wanted to file. Defense counsel 

believed many of defendant’s proposed motions would only waste court time. He said

visits with defendant would “end almost in yelling matches, and yelling matches of me 

trying to get [him to] please focus on the case.” 

Defendant suggested he did not believe trial could go forward and did not know 

why his counsel had indicated he was ready: “[T]he exhibits are not ready. They’re not 

discussed. The witnesses are not discussed. It takes a lot of time to try for twenty-two 

felonies.” Defense counsel said defendant would not speak to him about the substance of 

the case. Nonetheless, defense counsel stated he was ready to proceed to trial. The trial 

court explained defense counsel was sufficiently knowledgeable of the case, and defense 

counsel believed defendant had a potential defense in that the prosecution had to meet its 

burden of proof. The court advised defendant to work with his attorney. 

After the trial court denied the Marsden motion, defendant asserted he should be 

able to represent himself so that he could “move on with [his] motions.” The court 

responded that the motion was untimely as they were “in jury trial” and defendant’s 

status as a vexatious litigant was “very restrictive in terms of allowing you to represent 

5

 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
7

yourself, but my reason to deny your request is [that it is] untimely.” The court added 

that defendant’s attorney was prepared to proceed. The court then denied the Faretta

motion. The parties discussed administrative matters before adjourning for the afternoon. 

The court indicated it was usually dark on Fridays. As such, jury selection was set for the 

following Monday, February 3. The jury was selected on February 3, and opening 

statements and the presentation of evidence began on February 4. 

2. Analysis

Defendant argues the court erred in denying his Faretta motion. 

“In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court made clear that a criminal defendant 

has a federal constitutional right to represent himself if he voluntarily and intelligently so 

chooses. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835-836.) A trial court must grant a 

defendant’s request for self-representation if the request is timely and unequivocal, and 

the defendant makes his request voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. [Citation.] If a 

self-representation motion is untimely, however, it is ‘within the sound discretion of the 

trial court to determine whether such a defendant may dismiss counsel and proceed pro 

se.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 499.) 

“[A] Faretta motion is timely if it is made ‘within a reasonable time prior to the 

commencement of trial.’ ” (People v. Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 499.) Our Supreme 

Court has “held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are 

untimely.” (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 722 (Lynch), abrogated on another 

ground in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637, 643.) In determining whether 

a defendant’s pretrial Faretta motion is timely, “a trial court may consider the totality of 

the circumstances,” including “the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, 

. . . whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witnesses and the 

reluctance or availability of crucial trial witnesses, the complexity of the case, any 

ongoing pretrial proceedings, and whether the defendant had earlier opportunities to 

assert his right of self-representation.” (Id. at p. 726.) 
8

Defendant argues his request was timely because the case had only been pending 

since June 2019, this counsel was retained in October 2019, the request was made prior to 

trial at his first court appearance following the denial of his section 995 motion, the trial 

would be short, the case was not complex, there was no indication any witnesses would 

be inconvenienced by the delay, and he did not seek a continuance. Our Supreme Court 

has not articulated a standard of review for determining the narrow question of whether a 

Faretta motion was timely. (People v. Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 501.) 

Regardless, based on our independent review of the record and after taking into 

consideration the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the trial court properly 

treated defendant’s Faretta motion as untimely. Defendant understood his retained 

counsel could be discharged at any time and yet made the Faretta motion one court day 

before the jury was selected. Defense counsel was prepared to proceed. While the trial 

was ultimately short, defendant argued the case involved novel legal issues and indicated 

he was not ready to proceed with the evidence and witnesses or without filing a 

significant number of motions. The totality of the circumstances showed the motion was 

made within that period of time in which the trial court may exercise its sound discretion 

in considering whether to grant or deny an untimely motion. (See People v. Ruiz (1983) 

142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791 [motion was made on Friday with trial set to begin on 

Thursday].) 

In exercising this discretion, “the trial court should consider, among other factors, 

‘the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity 

to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, 

and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of 

such a motion.’ [Citation.] When a court denies an untimely request, its ruling is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426.) 

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 

because he presented the court with “serious concerns” about his current counsel and did 
9

not request a continuance. We disagree. Immediately before making his Faretta motion, 

defendant made what the trial court deemed to be a Marsden motion. The trial court 

inquired about defense counsel’s representation of and relationship with defendant, to 

which defense counsel responded with great detail. We conclude the trial court 

thoroughly considered the quality of defense counsel’s representation, and that the reason 

for defendant’s request was his desire to file numerous motions that his attorney believed 

were frivolous. Defendant’s disagreement with his attorney over trial tactics is “an 

insufficient reason to grant an untimely Faretta request.” (See People v. Wilkins (1990) 

225 Cal.App.3d 299, 309, fn. 4.) Moreover, while defendant did not ask for a 

continuance, he indicated during the Marsden hearing that he did not believe trial could 

go forward, as he believed neither the exhibits nor the witnesses had been “discussed.” 

Further, he asserted he should be able to represent himself so that he could “move on 

with [his] motions.” Thus, while defendant did not explicitly request a continuance, his 

arguments indicated further delay would be required if he represented himself. (See 

People v. Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 427 [explaining that although defendant did 

not explicitly request a continuance and asserted that she could take over her defense 

immediately, the defense she planned to take on would by its nature involve delay].) A

continuance would have been necessary to allow defendant to “remedy the alleged 

shortcomings of counsel’s prepared defense.” (People v. Ruiz, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 791.) 

On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s 

Faretta motion.

B. Count 12

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for 

violating section 115, subdivision (a), in count 12. 

Section 115, subdivision (a), provides: “Every person who knowingly procures or 

offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public 
10

office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or 

recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.”

“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 

determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the 

evidence.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890.)

Count 12 is based on the proof of service attached to defendant’s opening brief for 

his appeal related to the Sacramento County receivership proceeding. The jury was 

presented with evidence that defendant filed an appeal in this case, and a copy of an 

electronically signed opening brief and proof of service that corresponded with this 

appeal. The code enforcement officer testified he was never served with this document 

but had seen it before and obtained this familiarity “[f]rom my [c]ounty counsel.” The 

proof of service listed the code enforcement officer and county counsel. 

Defendant argues, “[t]he evidence is insufficient to establish that the document 

was filed – an essential element of the offense – because it does not bear a “filed” stamp, 

and the testimony of [the code enforcement supervisor] only establishes that he was 

aware of the document, but not that it was filed.” We disagree. Whether the document is 

actually accepted for filing “is not relevant to the statutory proscription.” (People v. 

Garfield (1985) 40 Cal.3d 192, 195.) 

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant violated section 

115 by procuring or offering for filing a false proof of service in connection with his 

opening brief. The proof of service—like the attached opening brief—is electronically 

signed and contains the relevant case numbers. The proof of service states that, on 

August 19, 2019, “Ram Narayan” declared under penalty of perjury that he mailed the 
11

attached Appellants’ Opening Brief to various individuals including the code 

enforcement supervisor. The supervisor testified he was never served with the document, 

and he did not know if county counsel was served with the document, but “she monitors 

the courts.” There was substantial evidence a reasonable juror could rely upon to 

determine defendant procured or offered for filing the falsified proof of service. This is 

not speculation but a reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence presented. 

The lack of a “filed” or “received” stamp does not alter this conclusion. 

Defendant observes the jury was instructed that to return a verdict of guilty on 

count 12, the prosecution had to prove defendant caused the document to be filed. But 

defendant provides no authority for the proposition that we are limited to considering 

only the law as given in the jury instructions when determining whether the evidence is 

sufficient. Indeed, in his reply brief, he cites the contrary authority. In it, the United 

States Supreme Court wrote: “A reviewing court’s limited determination on sufficiency 

review . . . does not rest on how the jury was instructed.” (Musacchio v. U.S. (2016) 577 

U.S. 237, 243.) Rather, “a sufficiency challenge should be assessed against the elements 

of the charged crime, not against the erroneously heightened command in the jury 

instruction.” (Ibid.) Because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer the 

document was procured or offered for filing, and that is sufficient under the statute, we 

must reject defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to count 12.

C. Cumulative Financial Loss

As set forth above, the jury also found true the special allegation pursuant to 

section 115, subdivision (c)(2), that defendant committed more than one violation of 

section 115, subdivision (a), and the cumulative financial loss exceeded $100,000. 

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support this finding. 

Section 115, subdivision (c), provides: “Except in unusual cases where the 

interests of justice would best be served if probation is granted, probation shall not be 

granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, any of the 
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following persons: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Any person who is convicted of more than one 

violation of this section in a single proceeding, with intent to defraud another, and where 

the violations resulted in a cumulative financial loss exceeding one hundred thousand 

dollars ($100,000).”

As the People acknowledge, no published authority has interpreted the meaning of 

a loss in this context. Instead, we rely on authority interpreting former section 12022.6,

subdivision (a), which provided that “[w]hen any person takes, damages or destroys any 

property in the commission or attempted commission of a felony, with the intent to cause 

that taking, damage, or destruction, the court shall impose an additional term as follows.” 

(Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 5.) The statute then set forth additional terms “[i]f the loss 

exceeds” certain dollar thresholds. (Ibid.)

Our Supreme Court explained, in this context, that “the defrauded agency’s ‘loss’ 

should be calculated by subtracting the amount the government would have paid had no 

acts of fraud occurred from the amount the government actually paid. Any money that 

the government would have been obligated to pay had the fraud not occurred is not 

attributable to the fraud, and thus is not a ‘loss’ arising out of the criminal offense.” 

(People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 962.) 

The City Attorney for the City of Elk Grove testified that the City’s litigation 

expenses related to its nuisance action were $112,000. During closing argument, the 

prosecutor argued this testimony was sufficient to demonstrate a loss in excess of 

$100,000. Defendant argues this loss was not caused by the proofs of service. He further 

asserts Nathan’s testimony established only a de minimis loss related to docket searches, 

copy charges, and filing fees. The People argue the nuisance litigation was caused and 

protracted by defendant’s fraudulent conduct, and this was sufficient evidence to uphold 

the finding. We agree with defendant. The City Attorney testified he did not know the

amount of fees directly attributable to the falsified proofs of service, but “it would have 

required extra work to deal with the proof of service, to write the argument and brief as to 
13

why the proof of service is defective, and to go on the Court’s website to acquire the 

documents [¶] . . . [¶] as opposed to simply receiving the document and responding to 

the merits. [¶] So there was an extra cost, but we did not track the costs to what minute 

detail.” Additionally, the City Attorney’s testimony indicates the City decided to file the 

nuisance action in August 2017 in “an effort to clean up the property and bring it up to 

code and remove the problems with the property.” This was before any of the charged 

offenses occurred. While these offenses extended the litigation somewhat, the evidence 

does not suggest the City of Elk Grove’s expenses would have been less than $12,000 if 

defendant had merely never violated section 115, subdivision (a). We will reverse the 

jury’s finding of a cumulative financial loss in excess of $100,000 within the meaning of 

section 115, subdivision (c)(2). 

Defendant argues remand for resentencing is necessary so the trial court can 

exercise its discretion without the constraints imposed by section 115, subdivision (c). 

(See People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 [“Defendants are entitled to 

sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing 

court”].) The People do not address this point. We agree that remand is required.
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III. DISPOSITION

We reverse the jury’s finding of a cumulative financial loss in excess of $100,000 

within the meaning of section 115, subdivision (c)(2), and remand for resentencing. The 

judgment is otherwise affirmed.

/S/

 

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

 

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

/S/

 

ROBIE, J.