Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1092 | November 19, 2018 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Stacy Y. Hart

Carlisle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Stacy Yuron Hart,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 19, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1092

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Circuit Court

The Honorable David D. Kiely,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

82C01-1407-F3-923

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1092 | November 19, 2018 Page 2 of 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Petitioner, Stacey Yuron Hart (Hart), appeals the trial court’s denial 

of his motion to correct erroneous sentence. 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Hart presents us with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the 

trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to correct erroneous 

sentence. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] The facts as they were found by this court on direct appeal are as follows:

From July 15-19, 2014, C.D., a fourteen-year-old runaway, lived 

with Hart at various locations in Evansville. During this time, 

Hart gave someone methamphetamine in exchange for the use of 

a motel room and sold methamphetamine from his car and at 

multiple residences. On July 19, police picked up C.D. C.D. 

tested positive for methamphetamine, Xanax, marijuana, and 

synthetic marijuana. Evansville Police Detective Tony Mayhew 

interviewed C.D. regarding her prior whereabouts.

Based on what C.D. told him, Detective Mayhew obtained a 

search warrant for Hart’s vehicle. On July 24, police stopped 

Hart’s vehicle based on Detective Mayhew’s warrant. The 

officer found a digital scale, a cigarette case containing baggie 

corners and tweezers, a glass pipe with residue, and small baggies 

with what he believed were drugs. Testing of the substances in 

the baggies revealed 7.16 grams of methamphetamine, two 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1092 | November 19, 2018 Page 3 of 5

tablets of methadone, three tablets of hydrocodone, and five 

tablets of Tramadol.

The State charged Hart with Level 3 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, Level 6 possession of a narcotic drug, Class 

A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Level 6 felony 

possession of a legend drug. It alleged Hart was an habitual 

offender. A jury found Hart guilty of all charges except Level 6 

felony possession of a legend drug, on which the trial court 

directed a verdict. The jury concluded Hart was an habitual 

offender based on his prior convictions of Class D felony failure 

to return to lawful detention in 2002 and Class C felony 

possession of a controlled substance in 2005.

Hart v. State, 2015 WL 6954942, slip op. at 2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2015), 

trans. denied.

[5] On October 23, 2014, the trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence on the 

Level 3 felony dealing methamphetamine conviction, enhanced by twenty years 

for the habitual offender adjudication, and concurrent, maximum sentences on 

the other two convictions resulting in an aggregate thirty-five-year sentence. 

Hart appealed. On direct appeal, he claimed that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to argue that he was not properly adjudicated a habitual offender. We 

rejected the claim and concluded that the State’s evidence of Hart’s prior felony 

convictions in 2002 and 2005 established that he was a habitual offender. 

[6] On March 8, 2018, Hart filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, asserting 

that the State relied on an ineligible prior conviction to support the habitual 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1092 | November 19, 2018 Page 4 of 5

offender adjudication because it was more than ten years old. On April 12, 

2018, the trial court denied Hart’s motion.

[7] Hart now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[8] Hart contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

correct his erroneous sentence. Specifically, he maintains that his adjudication 

as a habitual offender is invalid because it is not based on qualifying prior 

convictions. A trial court’s denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Hobbs v. State, 71 N.E.3d 46, 48 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. We will find an abuse of discretion if the trial 

court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before it. Id. 

[9] With respect to a sentencing error, “it is in the best interests of all concerned 

that it be immediately discovered and corrected.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 

783, 786 (Ind. 2004). A motion to correct sentence under Indiana Code section 

35-38-1-15 is appropriate only for “sentencing errors that are clear from the face 

of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Id. 

A sentencing error that requires examination of matters beyond the face of the 

sentencing judgment is better suited for resolution on direct appeal and postconviction relief. Id. Accordingly, [c]laims that require consideration of the 

proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a 

motion to correct sentence.” Id. A sentence is defective on its face “if it 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1092 | November 19, 2018 Page 5 of 5

violates express statutory authority at the time the sentence is pronounced, as 

when the sentence falls outside the statutory parameters for the particular 

offense or is based on an erroneous interpretation of a penalty provision.” 

Woodcox v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[10] Hart’s allegation that one of the underlying convictions used to support his 

habitual offender adjudication was more than ten years old at the time of 

sentencing and was therefore ineligible is not a claim that can be litigated by 

way of a motion to correct error. The evaluation of Hart’s allegation requires 

us to look beyond the face of the judgment and examine the underlying 

convictions on which the habitual offender adjudication was based. It is only 

by examining the evidence of the prior convictions themselves that we could 

reach a decision on Hart’s claim. Therefore, as Hart’s contention requires this 

court to look beyond the judgment, it may not be adjudicated through a motion 

to correct erroneous sentence. See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786. We affirm the 

trial court.

CONCLUSION

[11] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Hart’s motion to correct erroneous sentence.

[12] Affirmed.

[13] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur