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Filed 12/2/15 P. v. Blunt CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SEDDIE BLUNT,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A142432

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 51400191)

On January 13, 2014, the Contra Costa District Attorney filed an information 

charging Seddie Blunt (Blunt or appellant) with felony possession of a firearm by a 

violent offender (Pen. Code, § 29900, subd. (a)(1)) (Count 1), felony possession of a 

firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (Count 2), and felony possession of 

ammunition by a prohibited person (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)) (Count 3), all based 

on his involvement in a December 2013 shooting incident outside of his home.

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The 

information additionally alleged that Blunt had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. 

(b)-(i), 1170.12) and a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On May 16, 2014, a jury found 

Blunt guilty of all three substantive charges. 

At sentencing on June 20, 2014, the trial court found the enhancement allegations 

true; denied Blunt’s motion to strike the prior strike conviction; stayed the sentence for 

Count 2 under section 654; sentenced Blunt to two concurrent terms of two years and 

eight months in prison for Count 1 and Count 3; and added an additional year for the 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
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prison prior, for a total sentence of three years and eight months. Blunt argues on appeal 

that the trial court committed error under In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 (Yurko),

requiring reversal of the finding as to his prior strike. He also maintains that sentencing 

him for both possession of a firearm by a violent offender (Count 1) and possession of 

ammunition by a prohibited person (Count 3) was erroneous under section 654. We 

agree that Blunt’s concurrent sentence for Count 3 must be stayed pursuant to section 

654, but otherwise affirm the judgment. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2013, at approximately 10:20 a.m., Richmond Police Officer 

Canelo responded to a Shot Spotter alert near Blunt’s residence.2 When Officer Canelo 

arrived on the scene, Officer Vegas was already present and speaking to a witness, Ms. 

Woods. According to Woods, a man had fired a shot from the driveway of Blunt’s 

residence. Based on this information, the two officers walked to the nearby residence and 

observed Blunt standing near the open trunk of a silver Ford Taurus. Officer Vegas 

asked Blunt not to close the trunk, but Blunt closed it anyway.

Officer Canelo then asked Blunt to walk towards the officers, which he did. 

Officer Canelo told Blunt he was being detained and searched him for weapons. Officer 

Vegas asked Blunt why he had closed the trunk and if there was something in it. Blunt 

replied: “Yeah, my gun is in the trunk.” Blunt further admitted that the Ford was his car, 

and the officers retrieved the car keys from Blunt’s pants pocket. When the officers 

opened the trunk, they recovered a 410-gauge single-barrel shotgun with a loaded shell 

and six loose shotgun shells. The shotgun appeared to be engraved with Blunt’s 

initials—SLB. 

After the officers arrested Blunt and he waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. 

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, Blunt explained that he had argued with Woods because he 

wanted to leave in his car and Woods was blocking his driveway with a cart. When Blunt 

asked Woods to move, she was reportedly belligerent and called him names. Claiming he

 

2

The City of Richmond uses the Shot Spotter system to triangulate areas where loud 

noises occur or shots are fired. 
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felt threatened, Blunt returned to his apartment, where he viewed Woods flagging people 

down and pointing at his apartment and car. At some point, according to Blunt, Woods 

produced a knife. Again feeling threatened, Blunt retrieved his shotgun and fired one 

shot into the air from his window. He claimed he was hoping to scare Woods and 

discourage her from returning. 

Blunt next unloaded the expended shell from his shotgun and placed another live 

round in it. When he saw Woods return, he left his apartment, walked to his car with the 

shotgun, and placed the shotgun in the trunk. The officers arrived while the trunk was 

still open. According to Blunt, he knew what he did was wrong, but he felt threatened 

by Woods and believed that firing the gun was the only way to resolve the situation. As a 

result of this incident, Blunt was charged as described above, and a jury trial was 

scheduled.

Commission of a prior qualifying crime was an element of each of the three 

substantive offenses with which Blunt was charged in this case: possession of a firearm 

by a violent offender; possession of a firearm by a felon; and possession of ammunition 

by a prohibited person. Prior to commencement of the jury trial, defense counsel agreed 

to stipulate to the existence of a prior conviction as an element of the various offenses, 

stating: “So I am thinking about the 1994 felony 211, Mr. Blunt and I would be willing 

to stipulate to that.” At the close of the People’s case, the trial court announced (and 

both parties confirmed) the stipulation to the jury as follows: “The two parties, the 

People and the defendant, have stipulated that prior to the time that the People allege a 

gun was found in the defendant’s possession, he had been convicted of the felony of 

robbery; and they have stipulated that under the Penal Code, that felony is designated as a 

violent felony.” According to the record, the parties did not discuss the separate prior 

strike allegation during the trial, no advisements were given to Blunt pursuant to Boykin 

v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin) and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 (Tahl), and 

Blunt did not expressly waive any of his trial rights with respect to the prior strike. 

After the jury returned guilty verdicts for all three offenses, sentencing occurred

before the trial court on June 20, 2014. Indicating that “we’re on for trial on the priors,” 
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the trial court went on to state: “Because we have a stipulation to the robbery, it appears 

to me the only matter that the People need to prove that’s relevant to the sentencing in 

any significant fashion is [the domestic violence conviction supporting the prison prior].” 

Nevertheless, the People thereafter submitted a certified copy of Blunt’s RAP sheet and 

prison packets from the Department of Corrections with respect to both the robbery and 

the domestic violence convictions, and these documents were received into evidence 

without objection for, as the court characterized it, “support of the determination of prior 

convictions.” After both parties declined to argue, the court found as follows: “The 

Court finds that the defendant was convicted in 1994 in the Alameda County Superior 

Court of a robbery, Penal Code Section 211, served a state prison term for that. That he 

was convicted, again in 2012, for a . . . 245(a), domestic violence crime and received a 

two-year state prison sentence for that crime. [¶] The Court finds also that the various 

crimes enumerated in the probation report by the probation officer are established by the 

evidence as the record of the defendant. That will be the Court’s finding on the priors.” 

Thereafter, as stated above, the court imposed a total sentence of three years and 

eight months on Blunt, including one year for the prison prior and concurrent sentences 

of two years and eight months with respect to Count 1 and Count 3. The sentences for 

Count 1 and Count 3 were doubled due to Blunt’s prior strike conviction. Blunt’s timely 

notice of appeal brought the matter before this court. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Yurko Error

“When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to 

ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 

170 (Cross).) As a part of this obligation, “the court must inform the defendant of three 

constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to 

trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of 

each.” (Ibid.; see Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 243-244; Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at 

pp. 130-133.) The California Supreme Court in Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857, concluded 

that these Boykin-Tahl “requirements of advisement and waiver apply when a defendant 
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admits the truth of a prior conviction allegation that subjects him to increased 

punishment.” (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 170 [discussing Yurko].) Specifically, the 

Yurko Court held that “ ‘Boykin and Tahl require, before a court accepts an accused’s 

admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions, express and specific admonitions 

as to the constitutional rights waived by an admission. The accused must be told that an 

admission of the truth of an allegation of prior convictions waives, as to the finding that 

he has indeed suffered such convictions, the same constitutional rights waived as to a 

finding of guilt in case of a guilty plea.’ ” (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 170, quoting 

Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 863.)

In fact, the Yurko Court, in dealing with admissions related to previous 

convictions, actually went beyond the Boykin-Tahl requirements. Under such 

circumstances, the Court concluded, “a defendant must also be advised of ‘the full penal 

effect of a finding of the truth of an allegation of prior convictions.’ ” (Cross, supra, 61 

Cal.4th at p. 170, quoting Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 865.) Specifically, Yurko holds 

“ ‘as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure’ that an accused, before admitting a 

prior conviction allegation, must be advised of the precise increase in the prison term that 

might be imposed, the effect on parole eligibility, and the possibility of being adjudged a 

habitual criminal.” (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171, quoting Yurko, supra, 10 

Cal.3d at p. 864.)

The California Supreme Court has subsequently clarified that Boykin, Tahl, and 

Yurko “do not apply to a stipulation of ‘evidentiary facts, even facts crucial to a 

conviction,’ if the stipulation does not encompass ‘all of the evidentiary facts necessary 

to imposition of the additional penalty.’ ” (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171.) Thus, for 

example, in People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413 (Newman), our high court held that 

Boykin and Tahl did not apply to the defendant’s stipulation to his status as a felon during 

trial because “no penal consequences flowed directly from the stipulation, and the 

prosecutor still was required to prove the remaining elements of the [felon in possession 

of a firearm] offense.” (Newman, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 421-422, disapproved on 

another ground in Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 178-179.) Similarly, in this case, when 
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Blunt stipulated to his prior robbery conviction during the jury trial on the substantive 

charges, Boykin and Tahl were not implicated because no penal consequences flowed 

directly from the stipulation. Rather, the stipulation merely relieved the People of 

proving one element of each of the charged offenses. (Cf. Newman, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 

p. 422.) Thus, it was not error to fail to advise Blunt of his Boykin-Tahl rights at that 

stage in the proceedings.

However, when the trial court, at the June 2014 sentencing hearing, adopted 

Blunt’s previous stipulation for purposes of proving his prior strike conviction without 

giving the necessary advisements, it appears that Yurko error occurred. Indeed, the trial 

court expressly stated that there was “a stipulation to the robbery” and went on to explain

that, for sentencing purposes, the People need only prove Blunt’s other prior conviction 

for domestic violence. Obviously, as the trial court recognized, Blunt’s stipulation 

admitted the truth of every fact necessary for imposition of additional punishment based 

on the prior strike conviction. It was tantamount to a plea of guilty insofar as the 

enhancement allegation was concerned. Thus, Yurko advisements were warranted. (Cf.

People v. Adams (1993) 6 Cal.4th 570, 580-583.) Indeed, the People concede as much. 

The question before us, then, becomes whether, under the particular circumstances 

of this case, the Yurko error identified by Blunt requires reversal of the trial court’s prior 

strike finding. Our high court has concluded that Yurko errors are not reversible per se. 

Rather, “the test for reversal is whether ‘the record affirmatively shows that [the guilty 

plea] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Cross, 

supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171, quoting People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175.) The 

Supreme Court has also employed a harmless error analysis when determining the 

consequences of Yurko error. Specifically, in People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915

(Guzman), overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 

1069, fn. 13, the defendant admitted that he had suffered two prior rape convictions. 

Although he was largely advised of his trial rights with respect to the admission, the trial 

court told the defendant that he had the right to “a hearing” on the prior convictions rather 

than the right to a jury trial. (Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 968.) Under these facts, the 
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Guzman court concluded: “On this record there is no reasonable probability that, if the 

term ‘jury trial’ instead of ‘hearing’ had been used, defendant (i) would have denied the 

priors and (ii) they would not have been found true. There is no dispute that defendant 

had suffered the priors and served prison terms therefor. We therefore conclude the error 

was harmless.” (Ibid.) 

In the present case, however, we need not avail ourselves of either of these 

analytical constructs in concluding that reversal of the trial court’s finding with respect to 

Blunt’s prior strike conviction is unnecessary. This is true because—although the trial 

court informed the People that no further proof of the prior strike was required given 

Blunt’s stipulation to the 1994 robbery—the People chose to reject the stipulation and 

prove the strike anyway. Specifically, the People introduced into evidence without 

objection both the prison packet from the Department of Corrections with respect to the 

1994 robbery and Blunt’s RAP sheet which confirmed the robbery conviction. The court 

found the evidence admissible “in support of the determination of prior convictions” and, 

after both sides declined to argue the matter, found that “the defendant was convicted in 

1994 in the Alameda County Superior Court of a robbery, Penal Code Section 211, [and] 

served a state prison term for that.” The prior conviction records admitted into evidence 

in this case, including the records with respect to the 1994 robbery, “were official 

government documents clearly describing the alleged convictions. As such, the fact of 

the convictions was presumptively established.” ( See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

19, 29-30, citing Evid. Code, § 664.) Since the People chose not to rely on Blunt’s prior 

stipulation when proving the prior strike conviction and instead admitted uncontested 

evidence which overwhelmingly established the existence of that conviction, the 

stipulation became irrelevant for purposes of sentencing and therefore Yurko advisements 

were simply not required.

B. Multiple Punishments Under Section 654

Blunt also contends that he was improperly sentenced for both Count 1 

(possession of a firearm by a violent offender) and Count 3 (possession of ammunition by 

a prohibited person) in violation of section 654, which prohibits multiple punishments for 
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the same offense. Section 654 provides in relevant part: “An act or omission that is 

punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the 

provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case 

shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” Section 654 

prohibits multiple punishment for the same offense even when, as here, the trial court 

imposes concurrent sentences. (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353 (Jones).) 

Moreover, although Blunt did not raise this issue in the trial court, “ ‘[e]rrors in the 

applicability of section 654 are corrected on appeal regardless of whether the point was 

raised by objection in the trial court or assigned as error on appeal.’ ” (People v. Hester

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.)

Recently, the Supreme Court in Jones confirmed that the “ ‘simultaneous 

possession of different items of contraband’ ”—like the firearm and the ammunition in 

this case—constitute separate acts for purposes of section 654. (Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th 

at p. 358.) However, “ ‘[s]ection 654 applies not only where there was but one act in the 

ordinary sense, but also where there was a course of conduct which violated more than 

one statute but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction. [Citation.] Whether a 

course of conduct is indivisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor. 

[Citation.] If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be 

punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” (People v. Dowdell

(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1414 (Dowdell).) Thus, section 654 would be implicated 

in this case if Blunt possessed both the firearm and the ammunition as part of an 

indivisible course of conduct based on a single objective.

“ ‘Whether the facts and circumstances reveal a single intent and objective within 

the meaning of Penal Code section 654 is generally a factual matter.’ ” (Dowdell, supra, 

227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414.) We therefore apply on appeal “the substantial evidence 

standard of review to the trial court’s implied finding that a defendant harbored a separate 

intent and objective for each offense.” (Ibid.) In contrast, “ ‘the dimension and meaning 

of section 654 is a legal question,’ ” and thus subject to our de novo consideration. 
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(Dowdell, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414; see People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock 

Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.)

Under similar, although not identical, circumstances, the Second District in People

v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132 (Lopez) concluded that section 654 barred 

punishment for both unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of 

ammunition. (Id. at p. 138.) In that case, all of the ammunition at issue was loaded into 

the prohibited weapon. (Ibid.) Noting that the defendant’s “obvious intent was to 

possess a loaded firearm,” the Lopez court opined: “While there may be instances when 

multiple punishment is lawful for possession of a firearm and ammunition, the instant 

case is not one of them. Where, as here, all of the ammunition is loaded into the firearm, 

an ‘indivisible course of conduct’ is present and section 654 precludes multiple 

punishment.” (Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, the Lopez court emphasized that, when 

undertaking an analysis of the applicability of section 654, “the appellate courts should 

not ‘parse[] the objectives too finely.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 

944, 953.) 

Here, Blunt argues that the reasoning in Lopez bars punishment for both 

possession offenses because there are no facts in the record indicating that he possessed 

the shotgun shells found in the trunk next to the firearm at issue with a “separate intent 

and objective.” Rather, he claims, he possessed both the shotgun and the extra shells as 

part of the same course of conduct and with the sole intent to possess a loaded shotgun to 

ward off a threatening trespasser. The People, in contrast, argue that Lopez is 

distinguishable because the ammunition in this case was not loaded into the gun, the 

record is silent as to when the shells were placed in the trunk, and Blunt could have 

intended to give the shells away or use them to reload an empty shotgun for a separate

criminal purpose. 

We find Blunt’s position to be the more persuasive. The six shotgun shells at 

issue were found loose in the trunk next to the single-shot shotgun. Of course, because 

the shotgun only permitted a single round to be loaded at any given time, the shells could 

not all be physically contained within the gun. However, they were all of the type which 
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could be used to reload the gun, they were unexpended, and, as previously stated, they 

were found in close proximity to the shotgun. Thus, this is not a case where different 

types of ammunition were found; where the ammunition was kept separately from the 

firearm; or where large amounts of stockpiled ammunition were recovered, all facts 

which might tend to support a finding of a separate criminal objective. Rather, the most 

reasonable inference from the evidence presented is that Blunt possessed both the 

shotgun and the extra shells with the single intent to possess a loaded shotgun (reloading 

as necessary) to respond to the perceived threat presented by Woods. In contrast, there is 

no substantial evidence supporting the People’s version of events. Under such 

circumstances, section 654 bars punishment for both possession offenses.

III. DISPOSITION

The 32-month concurrent sentence for Count 3, unlawful possession of 

ammunition, is stayed pursuant to section 654. The superior court is ordered to prepare 

an amended abstract of judgment to reflect this modification and send it to the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

REARDON, J.

We concur:

_________________________

RUVOLO, P. J.

_________________________

STREETER, J.
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People v. Blunt A142432