IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-10929

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

ERIC JAMAL GRAYS,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CR-178-1

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Eric Jamal Grays pleaded guilty to one count of possession, with intent 

to distribute, methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(c),

and was sentenced below the sentencing range for the advisory Sentencing 

Guidelines to, inter alia, 90-months’ imprisonment. He contests his sentence,

contending the district court erred by: including drug amounts found in his 

roommate’s bedroom as relevant conduct for the purpose of the Guideline

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 10, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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§ 2D1.1 drug-quantity calculation; and applying the Guideline § 3C1.1 

enhancement for obstruction of justice. 

Although, post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory only, the district 

court must avoid significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating 

the Guidelines sentencing range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48–51 

(2007). If no such procedural error exists, a properly preserved objection to an 

ultimate sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an abuseof-discretion standard. Id. at 51; United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 

750, 751–53 (5th Cir. 2009). 

In that respect, for issues preserved in district court, its application of 

the Guidelines is reviewed de novo; its factual findings, only for clear error. 

E.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). “A 

factual determination is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in [the] light of 

the record as a whole.” United States v. Zamora-Salazar, 860 F.3d 826, 836 

(5th Cir.) (internal quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 413 

(2017). 

On the other hand, for issues not preserved in district court, review is 

only for plain error. E.g., United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th 

Cir. 2012). Under that standard, Grays must show a forfeited plain (clear or 

obvious) error that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 

556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he does so, we have the discretion to correct the 

reversible plain error, but should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id.

First, in the light of the record and our case law, we are unpersuaded by

Grays’ contentions that the district court clearly erred in sentencing him based 

on the statements in the presentence investigation report (PSR) made by an 

unindicted coconspirator during the course of a police investigation, which

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were independently corroborated and had sufficient indicia of reliability. See

United States v. Ortega-Calderon, 814 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 2016); United 

States v. Fuentes, 775 F.3d 213, 220 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Zuniga, 

720 F.3d 587, 591–92 (5th Cir. 2013) (facts in a PSR based on coconspirator 

statements are not categorically unreliable, and can have sufficient indicia of 

reliability if they are corroborated by other details). Grays failed to present 

rebuttal evidence demonstrating the facts contained in the PSR were 

“materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable”; and, therefore, the court was 

entitled to rely on the coconspirator’s statements in calculating Grays’ drugquantity and applying the obstruction enhancement. United States v. Harris, 

702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 

Along that line, Grays’ conclusory constitutional arguments are 

unpersuasive. See United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 776 (5th Cir. 2007)

(citing United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is 

no Confrontation Clause right at sentencing . . .”.)); United States v. Young, 

981 F.2d 180, 187 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Hearsay is admissible for sentencing 

purposes, including corroborated out-of-court statements by unidentified 

[confidential informants], and thus its admission does not violate due process 

or the right to confrontation.”).

Second, the court’s relevant-conduct determination was plausible in the 

light of the record as a whole, including the physical evidence found during the 

search of the apartment and other reliable evidence that Grays distributed 

drugs supplied by his roommate. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); United States 

v. Ice, 471 F. App’x 293, 294 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Giron, 249 F. 

App’x 350, 351 (5th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the relevant-conduct 

determination and the resulting drug-quantity calculation were not clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 2001). In that 

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regard, the court did give reasons for its relevant-conduct determination, and 

Grays’ challenge—raised for the first time on appeal—to the sufficiency of the 

court’s explanation for that determination fails on plain-error review. See

United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 364–65 (5th Cir. 2009).

Third, the district court did not clearly err in imposing the obstruction 

enhancement based on Grays’ solicitation of help removing guns and drugs

from his bedroom following his arrest by state authorities on gun-and-drug 

charges. See United States v. Alexander, 602 F.3d 639, 641–42 (5th Cir. 2010).

AFFIRMED.

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