ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Newsom-Bogan v. Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc., 2011 IL App

(1st) 092860

Appellate Court

Caption

MATTIE NEWSOM-BOGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.WENDY’SOLD

FASHIONED HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, INC., DefendantAppellee.

 District & No. First District, Sixth Division

Docket No. 1–09–2860

Filed June 24, 2011

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of the

opinion of the court but

has been prepared by the

Reporter of Decisions for

the convenience of the

reader.)

In an action for the injuries plaintiff suffered when she fell in

defendant’s fast-food restaurant, the trial court erred in entering

summary judgment for defendant where genuine issues of material fact

existed as to whether the grease plaintiff felt on the floor where she fell

was the proximate cause of her fall, whether the store manager failed to

discover the grease during the walk-through required by defendant’s

training manual for the restaurant, or whether the manager failed to

conduct the required walk-through.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 07–L–9119; the

Hon. Elizabeth M. Budzinski, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Jeffrey S. Deutschman, of Deutschman & Associates, P.C., of Chicago,

for appellant.

Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, of Chicago (Joshua G. Vincent, Kimberly

A. Jansen, and Robert J. Gibbons, of counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE R. GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Cahill dissented in the judgment, with opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 This case involves a slip and fall at a restaurant that resulted in an operated knee and the

grant of a summary judgment in favor of the restaurant.

¶ 2 Plaintiff Mattie Newsom-Bogan appeals from the granting of summary judgment to

defendant, Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc., in her negligence action

to recover monetary damages from her fall. On appeal, plaintiff contends that genuine issues

of material fact exist regarding the cause of her fall and constructive notice to defendant. We

reverse and remand.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On August 29, 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking monetary damages for injuries

incurred as a result of slipping and falling on the tile floor near a trash receptacle at

defendant’s restaurant at 3951 West 183rd Street in Hazel Crest, Illinois. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant owed her a duty to use ordinary and reasonable care with respect to the restaurant

premises. Defendant allegedly breached that duty by allowing the floor near the trash

receptacle to become and remain in a dangerous condition when it knew or should have

known of the dangerous condition and by failing to warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition.

¶ 5 In her discovery deposition, plaintiff, age 54, testified that at approximately 4:30 p.m. on

November 28, 2006, she entered Wendy’s restaurant. She observed only three or four other

tables of customers. The weather conditions were dry and cold, and there had been no rain

or snow that day. Plaintiff was wearing slip-on flat shoes with rubber soles. After she

purchased her food, plaintiff sat down to eat and was in a position to observe the area around

the trash receptacle where she eventually fell. After she finished her food, she stepped from

the carpeting to the tile floor and her right foot slipped and caused her to fall sideways,

landing on her left hip and right knee. The contents of her tray “went flying” and landed on

the floor. Plaintiff attempted to get up from the floor, but was unable to do so because her
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hands were greasy and she was unable to brace herself. She described the grease as being

“[t]he color of the floor” and did not recall any specific smell of the grease. When asked how

much grease was on the floor, she answered: “What I felt was with my hands. That’s all I

could feel. My hands were slippery. I tried to push up, and my hands were greasy after

touching the floor.” Plaintiff did not check to see if the greasy substance on the floor was on

her clothes. When asked about the cause of her fall, plaintiff testified:

“Q. At the time right after your fall, were you able to determine what caused your

fall?

A. All I could recall is that I tried to push myself, tried to brace myself up, and

my hands were greasy. I could not brace myself to get up off the floor.

Q. So was it your conclusion that you had slipped on the grease?

A. That’s what I would assume it was. I mean, I could not–I couldn’t balance

myself to get up off the floor.”

¶ 6 Eventually, two customers helped plaintiff into a chair and a male Wendy’s employee

came out to clean “the shake and tray and stuff” from where plaintiff fell. Tina Archer, an

assistant manager at Wendy’s, spoke with plaintiff. Plaintiff told Archer that she had fallen

and showed Archer where the fall occurred. Plaintiff required medical assistance after

experiencing pain in her leg and back, and Archer called for an ambulance. Plaintiff was

taken by ambulance to a hospital and eventually required surgery on her injured right knee.

¶ 7 Archer testified in her discovery deposition that on November 28, 2006, sometime after

4 p.m., she was notified by an employee that a customer had fallen. When plaintiff showed

Archer where she fell, Archer did not observe anything on the floor. Archer filled out an

incident report. Archer testified that plaintiff told her that she did not know how or why she

fell, she “just fell.” Archer testified that Wendy’s training manual provides that every 15

minutes the most senior manager working must walk through the restaurant to make sure

everything is up to par. If the manager is unable to complete a walk-through, the task is to

be delegated to another employee. If a customer notifies an employee of a food or drink spill,

the area is to be mopped up immediately. If an employee notices food or any debris on the

floor, it is to be picked up immediately.

¶ 8 On May 22, 2009, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment attaching portions of

plaintiff’s discovery deposition, arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiff to warn or make the

area safe because it had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of any substance on the

floor, and further argued that plaintiff had an obligation to show that the greasy substance

caused her to fall and failed to satisfy that obligation when she stated that she did not know

what caused her to fall.

¶ 9 In her response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff attached an

affidavit in which she stated that she was sitting at the table, eating her food for at least 20

minutes. During those 20 minutes, plaintiff could observe the area where she fell and did not

observe any employees do a walk-through or a customer spill anything. A portion of Archer’s

discovery deposition was also attached.

¶ 10 The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment “for the reasons set

forth in open court.” However, no transcript of the hearing or oral ruling was included in the
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record on appeal.

¶ 11 On appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion

because she presented evidence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was a

greasy substance on the floor that caused her to fall and evidence that defendant had

constructive notice of the substance on the floor.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28,

35 (2001). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact, but to determine

if one exists. Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 153 Ill. 2d 26, 31 (1992). In considering a

motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all the “ ‘pleadings, depositions,

admissions, exhibits, and affidavits on file in the case’ ” in favor of the nonmoving party.

Richardson v. Bond Drug Co. of Illinois, 387 Ill. App. 3d 881, 884 (2009) (quoting Purtill

v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986)). If the plaintiff cannot establish each element of his or

her cause of action, summary judgment for defendant is proper. Wallace v. Alexian Brothers

Medical Center, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1085 (2009). Summary judgment is a drastic means

of ending litigation and should be granted only when the right of the moving party is free

from doubt. Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 271 (1992). We

review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Morris, 197 Ill. 2d at 35.

¶ 14 To recover on a negligence claim on a “fall down” case, the plaintiff must establish the

existence of a duty owed by the defendant, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately

resulting from that breach. Pavlik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 323 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1063

(2001) (citing Miller v. National Ass’n of Realtors, 271 Ill. App. 3d 653, 656 (1994)). If the

plaintiff cannot establish any element of her cause of action, summary judgment for the

defendant is proper. Pavlik, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1063 (citing Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351,

358 (1989)).

¶ 15 A business owner breaches its duty to an invitee who slips on a foreign substance if: (1)

the substance was placed there by the negligence of the proprietor; (2) its servant knew of

its presence; or (3) the substance was there a sufficient length of time so that, in the exercise

of ordinary care, its presences should have been discovered, i.e., the proprietor had

constructive notice of the substance. Pavlik, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1063 (quoting Hayes v.

Bailey, 80 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1030 (1980)); see also Olinger v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea

Co., 21 Ill. 2d 469 (1961).

¶ 16 A defendant owes a business invitee on his premises a duty to “exercis[e] ordinary care

in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Donoho v. O’Connell’s, Inc.,

13 Ill. 2d 113, 118 (1958); Thompson v. Economy Super Marts, Inc., 221 Ill. App. 3d 263,

265 (1991). Where a business invitee is injured by slipping and falling on the premises and

there is no way of showing how the substance became located on the floor, liability may be

imposed if the defendant or its employees had constructive notice of its presence. Thompson,

221 Ill. App. 3d at 265. Constructive notice exists if the substance was there for a long

enough time period that the exercise of ordinary care would have made it known. Thompson,
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221 Ill. App. 3d at 265. Liability cannot be based on guess, speculation, or conjecture as to

the cause of the injury. Bermudez v. Martinez Trucking, 343 Ill. App. 3d 25, 30 (2003).

Proximate cause can only be established if it is reasonably certain the defendant’s acts caused

the plaintiff’s injury. Bermudez, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 25 (quoting Salinas v. Werton, 161 Ill.

App. 3d 510, 514 (1987)).

¶ 17 First, plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

substance on the floor caused her injury. In support of her argument, plaintiff cites to

Wiegman v. Hitch-Inn Post of Libertyville, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 789 (1999), Bellerive v.

Hilton Hotels Corp., 245 Ill. App. 3d 933 (1993), and Canzoneri v. Village of Franklin Park,

161 Ill. App. 3d 33 (1987).

¶ 18 In Wiegman, the plaintiff fell at the bottom of the staircase near the pool area of the

defendant’s hotel. Wiegman, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 792. This court affirmed the trial court’s

denial of the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and motion notwithstanding the

judgment. Wiegman, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 798. This court found that although the plaintiff did

not know what caused her fall, the fact that the plaintiff had fallen directly in the water on

the floor, noticed her dress was wet and had two witnesses testifying that there was water all

around her was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude the water caused her fall. Wiegman, 308

Ill. App. 3d at 798.

¶ 19 As in Wiegman, plaintiff did not know what caused her fall, but noticed a greasy

substance on her hands that was so slippery, she was unable to get up without help. Although

there were no witnesses who observed the grease on the floor, plaintiff’s testimony on her

discovery deposition is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to the cause of the fall.

Defendant’s written manual is sufficient to create a duty to inspect every 15 minutes, and

when plaintiff testified that she observed no one inspecting the area for 20 minutes, that

testimony is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to constructive notice.

¶ 20 In Bellerive, the plaintiff fell while walking down the stairs of the defendant’s hotel.

Bellerive, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 934. The plaintiff testified that she felt her foot was not level

when she stepped from the third to the second step and that she noticed the steps were old

and appeared “worn,” not level, and the area was not well lit. Bellerive, 245 Ill. App. 3d at

934. This court found that although the plaintiff was not sure which step caused her fall, the

testimony was sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to whether the worn steps were

the cause of her fall. Bellerive, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 937.

¶ 21 The appellate court stated in Bellerive that “[t]he court may draw reasonable inferences

from the undisputed facts, but where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences

from undisputed facts, the issue should be decided by a trier of fact and the motion denied.”

Bellerive, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 935-36 (citing Loyola Academy, 146 Ill. 2d at 271-72). “While

the court may draw inferences from undisputed facts, the court should not grant a motion for

summary judgment unless those facts are susceptible of only a single inference, and, if the

facts permit more than one conclusion or inference, including one unfavorable to the moving

party, a summary judgment should be denied.” Bellerive, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 936 (citing

Gardner v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 242, 252 (1991),

and Beverly Bank v. Alsip Bank, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1017 (1982)). While a plaintiff need
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not prove her case during summary judgment, she must present some evidentiary facts to

support the elements of her cause of action. Bellerive, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 936 (citing

Gardner, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 250).

¶ 22 As in Bellerive, when plaintiff noticed the greasy substance on her hands that was so

slippery she was unable to get up without help, and assumed she slipped and fell on the

grease, that was enough to create a triable issue of fact as to constructive notice.

¶ 23 In Canzoneri, the plaintiff was walking on a public sidewalk when she stepped on a piece

of broken sidewalk and fell to the ground. Canzoneri, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 35. In reversing the

grant of summary judgment for defendant, this court found that the plaintiff knew what

caused her fall, as evidenced by her deposition in which she repeatedly stated that the broken

sidewalk was the cause, and she denied slipping, tripping or stepping in a hole. Canzoneri,

161 Ill. App. 3d at 39.

¶ 24 As in Canzoneri, plaintiff concluded from the grease on her hands that she slipped on the

grease and that the grease was the cause of her fall.

¶ 25 Although all of these cases are distinguishable and different from the facts in the present

case, plaintiff’s testimony is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to constructive notice

and the cause of the fall that would preclude summary judgment.

¶ 26 CONCLUSION

¶ 27 In sum, there are two issues of material fact precluding summary judgment: (1) whether

the grease that plaintiff felt on the floor was also the proximate cause of her fall; and (2)

whether the Wendy’s manager failed either to discover the spilled grease during the required

walk-through or whether the manager failed to conduct the required walk-through. See 735

ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2008). Both of these issues are “genuine” since they determine the

elements of proximate cause and constructive notice. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2008).

Thus, summary judgment in this case is not appropriate and reversal of the trial court is

warranted.

¶ 28 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 29 JUSTICE CAHILL, dissenting:

¶ 30 This is, in my judgment, a “notice” case, and plaintiff’s deposition fails to establish that

Wendy’s had constructive notice of a spill on the restaurant floor. Before she submitted her

affidavit, plaintiff testified at her deposition that she did not “have any information from any

source as to how long this greasy substance was on the ground.”

¶ 31 Defense counsel subsequently asked, “Did you ever with your own eyes see anything, any

substance?” Plaintiff answered “No.”

¶ 32 From this deposition testimony, I believe plaintiff has failed to establish constructive

notice. I would affirm summary judgment for defendant.