PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BIRHAN TEWABE, 

Petitioner,

v.  No. 04-1327

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General,

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

(A79-497-029)

Argued: November 29, 2005

Decided: April 26, 2006

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review granted; vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and

Judge Motz joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Firooz T. Namei, MCKINNEY & NAMEI CO., L.P.A.,

Cincinnati, Ohio, for Petitioner. Shelley Rene Goad, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON

BRIEF: Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,

Linda S. Wendtland, Assistant Director, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Office of Immigration Litigation,

Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge: 

An immigration judge (IJ) denied the application of Birhan

Tewabe, an Ethiopian citizen, for asylum and other relief, and the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed in a split decision. The

IJ denied the application after finding that Tewabe’s testimony was

implausible. Because the IJ did not provide specific and cogent reasons for discrediting Tewabe’s testimony, we grant her petition for

review, vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand for further proceedings. 

I.

In July 2001 Tewabe submitted an application for asylum and withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(1), 1231(b)(3), and for

relief under the Convention Against Torture, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).

At her March 2002 hearing she offered the following evidence,

mainly through her testimony and an affidavit. Tewabe is an Ethiopian citizen. Both of her parents are ethnic Tigrayans (Tigray is an

Ethiopian province bordering Eritrea). Tewabe’s father was born in

Asmara, which is now part of Eritrea. In 1998 Tewabe began working

as a flight attendant for Ethiopian Airlines, which is run by the Ethiopian government. 

In mid-1998 one of Tewabe’s cousins was deported from Ethiopia

to Eritrea when authorities discovered that his father was born in what

is now Eritrea. At the time, there was armed conflict on the EthiopiaEritrea border, and the Ethiopian government regularly detained and

deported Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin without due process. Tewabe’s father and her cousin’s father went to the office of the

Immigration Security and Refugee Affairs (ISRA) to complain about

the cousin’s deportation. When they arrived, the two men were asked

to show their identification, and ISRA officials learned that both were

born in Eritrea. They were detained and immediately deported. 

2 TEWABE v. GONZALES
When Tewabe’s father failed to return home, her mother went to

ISRA to inquire but was turned away. Tewabe’s mother contacted relatives in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is a faction of the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF). She learned that her husband (Tewabe’s

father) had been deported. Shortly thereafter, Tewabe was suspended

from her job at Ethiopian Airlines because her personnel file reflected

that her father was born in Eritrea. After two months she was permitted to return to work because her mother and relatives in the TPLF

convinced airline management that she was in fact Tigrayan. Tewabe’s sister Hirut fled to Israel after experiencing similar problems at

her place of employment, the Ethiopian Ministry of Health, where

officials assumed she was ethnic Eritrean. Tewabe’s brother Daniel

moved to London because he had been detained on several occasions

by local officials who believed he was Eritrean. 

In 1999 Tewabe learned that her cousin, who had been deported to

Eritrea, had died in an Eritrean military training camp. Shortly thereafter, while attending a work meeting at Ethiopian Airlines, Tewabe

criticized the deportations, stressing that innocent people were being

thrown out of the country. The next day, Ethiopian Airlines again suspended Tewabe based on the assumption that she was Eritrean. After

three weeks she was able to return to her job, again with the help of

her mother’s relatives. 

In March 2001 twelve members of the TPLF, including one of

Tewabe’s relatives, were ousted from the TPLF central committee

and from their government positions. According to Tewabe, relatives

of the dissidents became targets of government persecution. Tewabe

and her family supported the dissidents’ rights to express themselves

and to have access to the media. According to Tewabe, a TPLF audit

commission found the actions of the prime minister’s faction undemocratic and illegal. The prime minister ignored the commission’s

report and began eliminating his opponents in order to secure his

power. Tewabe and her family spoke out against the government

when a dissident leader, Seye Abraha, was imprisoned. Several TPLF

members were purged and hundreds of Tigrayans were abducted,

while others, fearing for their lives, left the country. 

Later, on the morning of June 22, 2001, Tewabe and several of her

family members attended a "kebele" meeting. A kebele is a neighborTEWABE v. GONZALES 3
hood association that appears to be a rough equivalent of local government in Ethiopia. At the June 22 kebele meeting, Tewabe spoke

out against the undemocratic and oppressive actions of the prime minister and his supporters. Tewabe believed that she had an obligation

to speak out, and a Tigrayan co-worker, Haptu, had encouraged her

to speak out at this particular meeting. After Tewabe had spoken at

length, an EPRDF official yelled at her and told her to sit down.

Tewabe’s brother stood up and defended her, and people at the meeting began shouting at each other. Although Tewabe had spoken at

earlier kebele meetings, she had never spoken with such fervor, nor

had she witnessed such a hostile reaction. Tewabe became very

frightened and talked to her family about leaving the meeting.

Tewabe decided to leave with three of her sisters, although her

mother, who believed nothing would happen, decided to remain at the

meeting. Another sister, Almaz, stayed with her mother, and Tewabe’s brother, Beemnet, also stayed so that the two women would not

be alone. 

Tewabe and her three sisters went directly to the house of Tewabe’s friend and fellow flight attendant, Nardos Fisseha. Fisseha was

scheduled to work that night on a flight leaving for the United States.

Tewabe asked Fisseha to switch flights with Tewabe so that Tewabe

could leave the country and "observe the situation from afar," J.A.

438, and Fisseha agreed. (It was "very, very common" for flight attendants on Ethiopian Airlines to switch flights. J.A. 76.) Tewabe left on

Fisseha’s flight and arrived in the United States the next day, June 23,

2001. At the time, Tewabe had a "good job" in Ethiopia that she liked,

and she was engaged to be married. J.A. 74. As a flight attendant,

Tewabe had been to the United States many times before, including

about four times in 2000 and about four times in the first half of 2001.

She had always returned as scheduled and had never before applied

for asylum. 

When Tewabe arrived in the United States, she went to the hotel

where the crew was staying and called home. She spoke to a maid

who reported that Tewabe’s mother, sister (Almaz), and brother

(Beemnet), all of whom had remained at the kebele meeting, had been

imprisoned. Tewabe then spoke to Almaz’s husband, who confirmed

the maid’s account. Next, Tewabe called her friend Fisseha. Fisseha

handed the phone to one of Tewabe’s other sisters, who reported that

4 TEWABE v. GONZALES
the police had been to Fisseha’s house looking for Tewabe and her

sisters. Fisseha was hiding Tewabe’s three unincarcerated sisters from

the police, and the police became angry when they could not find

them. The following day Tewabe called Fisseha again and learned her

sisters were no longer with Fisseha. At this point Tewabe became so

frightened that she decided to remain in the United States and apply

for asylum. Two weeks later, Tewabe learned that her three sisters

had fled to Nairobi, Kenya. Tewabe submitted her application for asylum and other relief on July 27, 2001, slightly over a month after she

had arrived in the United States. 

Aside from her own testimony, Tewabe had limited evidence available to present at her hearing. All of Tewabe’s immediate family

members who had remained in Ethiopia, including her mother, were

in prison. The nine of her eleven siblings who were not in prison were

scattered in various countries around the world. (At least one of her

siblings has obtained refugee status.) Tewabe asked her brother-inlaw, Almaz’s husband, and Fisseha to write letters in support of her

asylum application, but neither of them did so. Fisseha refused to provide any evidence in support of the application because she had

become frightened and did not want to be involved with Tewabe any

longer. Tewabe was able to present two other witnesses at the hearing. Her sister from Canada, Ghidey, testified that she had heard from

Almaz’s husband about the arrests of her family members in Ethiopia.

Ghidey also testified that Tewabe told her that she decided to remain

in the United States when she learned of the arrests. In addition, Mulu

Werede, Tewabe’s acquaintance and former co-worker at Ethiopian

Airlines, testified on her behalf. He corroborated Tewabe’s testimony

about her speaking out against deportations at a work meeting in

1999, and he said that when Tewabe arrived in the United States she

told him that she had left Ethiopia because "she made a speech

against the government in the [kebele] meeting." J.A. 102. 

Tewabe submitted a number of exhibits, including news articles

stating that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s TPLF was still the principal faction in the EPDRF ruling coalition; her Ethiopian Airlines crew

member certificate; an Ethiopian Airlines termination of contract

dated June 29, 1999; a letter dated July 27, 2001, from the Eritrean

Relief and Refugee Commission indicating that her father had been

deported to Eritrea from Ethiopia on or about June 20, 1998; a letter

TEWABE v. GONZALES 5
dated September 25, 2001, from Tewabe’s sisters in Kenya acknowledging their flight to Nairobi and their mother’s imprisonment; a letter dated February 26, 2002, from Tewabe’s father stating that he had

been deported in June 1998; an Israeli document showing that a sibling had been granted refugee status; a letter dated February 13, 2002,

from Tewabe’s sister Beirut (in Kenya) stating that the family was a

target of Prime Minister Zenawi’s TPLF faction because they

opposed him and that their mother, brother, and sister were imprisoned because they were accused of supporting the dissidents; and a

document issued by the Ethiopian police, dated August 12, 2001,

summoning Tewabe for questioning on August 15, 2001. 

Immediately after Tewabe’s hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision

denying her application for asylum and other relief. The IJ based his

decision on his determination that her story was not plausible.

According to the IJ,

[T]he particular accounting of the applicant to stand up at a

[kebele] meeting while there is great dissention in her country having just gone through a war, knowing of the problems

that her family had, particularly her father, to bring attention

to herself knowing others who had brought attention to

themselves had been placed in jeopardy, to place her family

at potential risk and then to abruptly leave the meeting,

change a flight, and arrive in the United States to monitor

a situation, and the very next day, or that same day, deciding

to stay and apply for asylum, is not, in the opinion of this

Court, plausible. If the accounting of the applicant is not

plausible, the Court must conclude that she does not meet

her burden of proof, and that is the conclusion of the Court.

J.A. 24. The IJ mentioned in the first part of his oral decision that

Tewabe’s case could have benefitted from more corroborating evidence. In the end, however, the IJ denied relief on the ground that her

testimony was "not plausible." J.A. 24. Tewabe appealed to the BIA,

which issued a split decision affirming the IJ. Tewabe then petitioned

this court for review, arguing that the BIA’s decision must be vacated

because the IJ did not provide specific, cogent reasons for his adverse

credibility determination. 

6 TEWABE v. GONZALES
II.

To be eligible for asylum as a refugee, Tewabe must prove that she

is "unable or unwilling" to return to her home country because of

"persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). "The testimony of the [asylum]

applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof

without corroboration." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). Here, the IJ found that

Tewabe "d[id] not meet her burden of proof" because her "account[ ]

. . . is not plausible," J.A. 24, that is, not credible. The BIA affirmed.

We uphold the agency’s decision "unless [it is] manifestly contrary

to law." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(C). And agency findings of fact "are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary." Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992). "We also defer to credibility findings that are supported by substantial evidence." Camara v.

Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). This deference is broad

but not absolute: an IJ "who rejects a witness’s positive testimony

because in his or her judgment it lacks credibility should offer a specific, cogent reason for his [or her] disbelief." Id. (quoting Figeroa v.

INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989)). Examples of specific and

cogent reasons include "inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony; [in particular,] where

these circumstances exist in view of the background evidence on

country conditions, it is appropriate for an Immigration Judge to make

an adverse credibility determination on such a basis." In re S-M-J-,

21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 729, 1997 WL 80984 (BIA 1997) (en banc). "If

the IJ’s [adverse credibility] conclusion is not based on a specific,

cogent reason, but, instead is based on speculation, conjecture, or an

otherwise unsupported personal opinion," it cannot be upheld "because . . . it will not have been supported by substantial evidence."

Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 250 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

In Camara we rejected an IJ’s adverse credibility finding to the

extent it was based on the IJ’s speculative determination that the petitioner’s testimony was implausible. 378 F.3d at 369. The petitioner

(Camara) sought asylum and other relief on the ground that she had

been raped, tortured, and imprisoned because she openly opposed the

TEWABE v. GONZALES 7
government of her home country, Guinea. Id. at 363-64. At her hearing Camara testified that she had escaped from prison in Guinea and

that government officials were seeking to rearrest her. She decided

that she needed to flee Guinea after members of the military broke

into a friend’s house looking for her. Before Camara left Guinea, she

went to a courthouse where a relative worked to enlist the relative’s

assistance in obtaining documentation of government actions against

her; Camara sought this information to support an eventual asylum

application. Id. at 365. The IJ found Camara’s story implausible and

discredited her testimony. The IJ stated, "It simply makes no sense

. . . that someone who had just escaped from prison would then present themselves to a dictatorial Government legal institution." Id. at

368. We determined that "the IJ’s disbelief of Camara’s explanation

for obtaining her criminal papers was based only on speculation; there

is nothing implausible about the idea that Camara would approach a

relative for help in her troubles, even if it meant entering a courthouse

as an anonymous visitor." Id. at 369. We therefore held that the IJ’s

speculative assessment could not support her adverse credibility finding. Several other courts of appeals have similarly rejected an IJ’s

adverse credibility determination that is not grounded on specific,

cogent reasons. See, e.g., Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 131-32 (2d

Cir. 2005); Shire v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1288, 1295-99 (9th Cir. 2004);

Dia, 353 F.3d at 250-60. 

The IJ here attached the bare label "implausible" to Tewabe’s testimony without providing specific and cogent reasons for doing so.

This unexplained characterization is unsustainable because Tewabe’s

testimony is not inherently implausible. There are, as we will explain,

valid reasons that would support a finding that she is credible. In this

circumstance, because the IJ failed to provide specific, cogent reasons

for his adverse credibility determination, we cannot uphold it. 

First, the IJ found Tewabe’s account of the June 22, 2001, kebele

meeting to be implausible. This implausibility characterization applies

to Tewabe’s account of why she spoke out against the government at

the meeting. The IJ questioned why she would speak in light of the

political climate in Ethiopia, the persecution of some of her family

members (including her father), and the potential risk to her. These

factors might indicate that it was unwise for Tewabe to speak out, but

they do not support a finding that her explanation for deciding to

8 TEWABE v. GONZALES
speak out was implausible. Indeed, Tewabe offered several plausible

reasons for her decision to speak out. Haptu, a co-worker at the airline

and a Tigrayan, had urged Tewabe to attend the meeting and to participate in the discussion. He told Tewabe that she "should not be afraid

to speak out at the meeting[ ]" because it was necessary to "educate

the people and tell them about what’s going on." J.A. 53. In addition,

it made sense for Tewabe to speak in that particular forum (a kebele

meeting) because the purpose of the meeting was to "find out the

thinking of the people." J.A. 55. Tewabe also explained that she did

not think of the risks at the moment she decided to speak. Rather, she

believed she had an obligation to say something because "from day

to day the freedom to speak was being deteriorated." J.A. 58. Furthermore, to the extent the IJ labeled as implausible Tewabe’s claim that

she spoke out in spite of the risks, there is contrary evidence to suggest that at least some criticism of the government was tolerated. The

U.S. State Department’s February 2001 country report on Ethiopia

stated that "several groups critical of the [Ethiopian] Government

[have] held press conferences and public meetings without retribution," although "on occasion the Government [has] restricted [the constitutional] right [to discuss publicly any topic by opposing] the

activities and operations of groups critical of the Government." J.A.

121. Moreover, Tewabe had spoken out in the past and had been

encouraged to attend the June 22 kebele meeting and voice her opinion. 

Second, the IJ found implausible Tewabe’s sudden decision to

depart to the United States following the morning kebele meeting.

The IJ also found it implausible that Tewabe could make the departure arrangements so quickly. Again, the IJ did not offer specific and

cogent reasons for these findings. Tewabe, on the other hand, offered

specific and plausible reasons for her sudden decision and her ability

to leave quickly. She became very frightened at the kebele meeting

after the meeting turned hostile and an official yelled at her and told

her to sit down. She went to the house of her friend and fellow flight

attendant, Fisseha, and asked her to switch flights that night. It is not

hard to believe that flight attendants sometimes switch flights and are

prepared to travel on short notice. In any case, it was very common

for Ethiopian Airline attendants to switch flights, and Fisseha agreed

to do so. 

TEWABE v. GONZALES 9
Third, the IJ concluded that Tewabe’s decision to apply for asylum

so soon (within a couple of days) after arriving in the United States

was not plausible. The IJ offered no basis for this conclusion and thus

did not debunk Tewabe’s straightforward account of the timing of her

decision. Tewabe’s testimony was that, upon her arrival in the United

States, she made several phone calls home. During these conversations, she learned that her mother, brother, and sister had been

arrested, that her sisters fled to Kenya, and that the Ethiopian police

were looking for her. It was not until she had these conversations,

which occurred soon after Tewabe’s arrival in the United States, that

she decided to apply for asylum. 

In suggesting reasons why Tewabe’s testimony explaining her

actions could be deemed plausible, we do not purport to find that she

was a credible witness. Rather, we simply demonstrate why it was

necessary for the IJ to support any adverse credibility determination

with specific, cogent reasons. Because the IJ did not provide these

reasons, we cannot conclude that his credibility findings are supported

by substantial evidence. See Dia, 353 F.3d at 260. The case must

therefore be remanded for further proceedings. 

While we have outlined key portions of Tewabe’s testimony and

searched through the IJ’s decision in vain for a specific and cogent

reason for his adverse credibility determination, we do not mean to

imply that an IJ must provide extensive reasons for each and every

item of testimony that is rejected. We make this point because our

deferential standard of review does not allow us to micromanage IJ

decisionmaking. See Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272,

278 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[Agency] determinations concerning asylum eligibility . . . are conclusive if supported by reasonable, substantial, and

probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.") (internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, the requirement that an IJ provide a specific and cogent reason for an adverse

credibility finding leaves ample room for the IJ "to exercise common

sense in rejecting [an applicant’s] testimony even if the IJ cannot

point to . . . contrary evidence in the record to refute it." Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005). The IJ erred in this case

simply because he gave no cogent explanation based on common

10 TEWABE v. GONZALES
sense, the record, or any other relevant factor for disbelieving

Tewabe.*

In sum, further proceedings are necessary for the agency (beginning with the IJ) to determine whether Tewabe can meet her burden

of proving all of the elements of her claim for asylum or other

requested relief. These proceedings must be conducted without any

consideration of the IJ’s prior adverse credibility determination.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order

affirming the IJ’s decision, and remand the case to the BIA for further

proceedings. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED;

VACATED AND REMANDED

*When the IJ decided Tewabe’s case in 2002, he did not have the benefit of section 101(a)(3)(B)(iii) in the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.

109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 303, which provides guidance to IJs for making

credibility determinations in asylum cases. The section, codified at 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), states: 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant

factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the

demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness,

the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account,

the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and

oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath,

and considering the circumstances under which the statements

were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record

(including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,

without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor. There is no presumption of credibility, however, if

no adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of credibility

on appeal. 

We are not called upon here to consider the effect of this new provision

because it does not apply to asylum applications like Tewabe’s filed

prior to May 11, 2005. See REAL ID Act § 101(h)(2). 

TEWABE v. GONZALES 11