2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

No. 2-23-0035 

Order filed October 24, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of McHenry County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 20-CF-109 

) 

RAMIRO GONSALEZ-GARCIA, ) Honorable 

) Michael E. Coppedge, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s convictions of sex offenses against child victim could be raised as a 

bar to future prosecutions arising out of the same conduct and, thus, there was no 

double jeopardy violation, where the indictment alleged “separate and distinct acts” 

of abuse occurring during separate time frames, and the trial evidence further 

differentiated the acts both by the incentives defendant used to induce the victim to 

submit to the acts and by the type of penetration.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Ramiro Gonsalez-Garcia, was convicted of nine counts 

of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (PCSAC) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)). 

The trial court sentenced him to seven years in prison on each count, to be served consecutively. 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 2 - 

Defendant appeals from his convictions on six of those counts, arguing that the indictment, along 

with the trial evidence, was insufficient to protect him against double jeopardy. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In February 2020, defendant was indicted on nine counts of PCSAC. The victim was his 

girlfriend’s son, C.P., with whom he lived. Each count alleged that defendant committed the 

offense of PCSAC in that

“defendant, who was seventeen years of age or older, knowingly committed an act of 

contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the 

body of another for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the 

accused, or an act of sexual penetration, with C.P[.] (a male minor, born 2009), who was 

under thirteen years of age when the act was committed.”

Counts I and II each alleged that the act occurred “on or between August 1, 2014[,] through July 

31, 2015[.]” Counts III through V each alleged that the act occurred “on or between August 1, 

2016[,] and May 31, 2018[.]” Counts VI through VIII each alleged that the act occurred “on or 

between June 1, 2018[,] and May 31, 2019[.]” Count IX alleged that the act occurred “on or about 

January 25, 2020[.]” In addition, each count charged the act as a “separate and distinct act.” For 

instance, count I charged the act as “a first separate and distinct act,” count II charged the act as a 

“a second separate and distinct act,” count III charged the act as a “a third separate and distinct 

act,” and so on.

¶ 5 A bench trial took place in October 2022. At the outset, the State made an oral motion to 

amend the indictment. It asked to amend counts I through VII and count IX to allege “penis to 

anus contact” and to amend count VIII to allege “finger to anus” contact. Defense counsel 

objected. The trial court noted that the State was asking only to provide “greater specificity 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 3 - 

regarding what the identified act of sexual penetration was.” Nevertheless, the court stated that, 

“[i]f the defense is opposed to that specificity, then the defense’s objection is sustained.”

¶ 6 Thereafter, the following relevant evidence was presented.1

 Maria A. testified that she had 

two children: C.P., who was 13 years old and in 8th grade, and A.G., who was 8 years old and in 

3rd grade. Defendant was A.G.’s father but not C.P.’s father. At the time of trial, Maria lived

with her children in a duplex on Lake Street in McHenry County (Lake Street apartment). She 

moved to the Lake Street apartment with defendant, C.P., and A.G. sometime in 2015 or 2016. 

Before then, they lived in an apartment at Garden Quarters (Garden Quarters apartment). 

¶ 7 Maria testified that, when she lived at the Garden Quarters apartment and the Lake Street 

apartment, she worked at McDonald’s. Her hours were generally Tuesday through Saturday from 

7 a.m. to 3 p.m. or 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. She always worked the morning shift on Saturdays. Defendant 

would take care of A.G. and C.P. on Saturdays while she worked. Sometimes, C.P.’s father would 

take care of them. If neither was available, “a lady” would take care of the children. 

¶ 8 Maria testified that Saturday, January 25, 2020, was the final Saturday that defendant 

watched C.P. and A.G. On the following Friday, January 31, 2020, C.P. told her that he did not 

want to be left with defendant the next day. Maria asked C.P. if defendant had hit him. C.P. said 

no and started to cry. She then asked C.P. if defendant had “touched him.” C.P. said yes. When 

Maria asked where defendant touched him, C.P. pointed to “[h]is behind area.”

¶ 9 Maria testified that, in response to further questioning, C.P. told her that defendant would 

have C.P. kneel on the mattress in the bedroom that Maria and defendant occasionally shared. 

1

Prior to trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to introduce C.P.’s outof-court statements to his mother, an investigator, and a forensic interviewer.
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 4 - 

Sometimes defendant would put his hand over C.P.’s mouth and tell him not to yell so that the 

neighbors would not hear him. Then defendant “would send [C.P.] to the bathroom to go number 

two and told him that he couldn’t come out until he did it.” After C.P.’s disclosure, Maria called 

C.P.’s godmother. When C.P.’s godmother arrived, at about 2 a.m., Maria, C.P’s godmother, and 

C.P. confronted defendant with C.P.’s allegations. Defendant told them that “he didn’t do 

anything, and then he said he didn’t remember.”

¶ 10 The next day, Maria told defendant that she was going to call the police. Defendant asked 

her not to and said that he would turn himself in. Maria, defendant, and C.P. went to the police 

station together. After the police took their statements, she went with C.P. to the hospital, where 

C.P. was examined. About six hours later, they went to Woodstock, where C.P. was interviewed.

¶ 11 Maria testified that C.P. had a tablet when they lived at the Garden Quarters apartment. 

She stated: “It seems like it was white.” She also stated: “He had another black one, but I don’t 

remember.” She testified that she bought the black tablet used. When asked if C.P. had access to 

the black tablet at the Lake Street apartment, she replied: “No, the white one.” She had never seen 

defendant touch C.P. inappropriately.

¶ 12 C.P. testified that he was in eighth grade and lived at the Lake Street apartment with Maria, 

A.G., and his uncle. He saw his father every weekend. He has lived at the Lake Street apartment 

for eight years. Before that, he lived at the Garden Quarters apartment. He was in kindergarten 

and “[about] four” when he lived at the Garden Quarters apartment; A.G. was “a couple months 

old.” C.P. testified that the Lake Street apartment had two bedrooms. When they moved from the 

Garden Quarters apartment to the Lake Street apartment, defendant lived with them. At that time, 

C.P. shared a bedroom with A.G. and Maria; defendant had his own bedroom.
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 5 - 

¶ 13 C.P. testified that Maria worked at McDonald’s on Tuesdays through Saturdays from 6

a.m. to 4 p.m. Defendant watched C.P. and A.G. on Saturdays. The final Saturday defendant 

watched C.P. and A.G. was January 25, 2020. At the time, C.P. was ten years old and in fifth 

grade. That morning, defendant gave A.G. a tablet and told A.G. to go to the room that A.G., C.P., 

and Maria shared. Defendant told C.P. to go to defendant’s room. Defendant locked the door, 

told C.P. to get on the bed, and pulled down C.P.’s pants and underwear. Defendant then 

“proceeded to put his penis and finger in [C.P.’s] butt, not at the same time.” C.P. stated that it 

“felt painful.” C.P. testified that defendant would “put his penis in [C.P.’s] butt [and] go in and 

out repeatedly and sometimes his finger.” C.P. could not see what defendant was doing because 

defendant told him “to look away.” C.P. could hear a “spitting sound” and then “[i]t felt moist. 

Like sort of wet around.” C.P. could tell the difference between defendant’s penis and finger 

because defendant’s finger felt “sharper.” C.P. could feel defendant’s “fingernails”; “[t]hey were 

sharper than his penis,” as “[h]e didn’t really cut them that much.” After defendant was done, he

told C.P. to go to the bathroom. C.P. “wouldn’t go number two.” Defendant would have C.P. sit 

on the edge of the bathtub, defendant would turn on the faucet, and defendant would wipe C.P.’s 

butt. 

¶ 14 C.P. testified that the January 25, 2020, incident was not the only time “something like this 

had happened.” C.P. stated that it happened “[a] lot of times.” C.P. remembered that it had 

happened “[a]t least once in Garden Quarter[s], but a lot of times in Lake Street.” It happened 

“many other times,” and it was “not really” ever different.

¶ 15 C.P. testified regarding the incident at the Garden Quarters apartment. According to C.P., 

defendant brought home a “white and brownish” bunny. Defendant told him that if C.P. wanted 

to keep the bunny C.P. would “have to go to [defendant’s] room and pull [his] pants down and 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 6 - 

stuff and like, then *** let [defendant] put his finger and penis in [C.P.’s] butt.” Similar to what 

occurred later in the Lake Street apartment, defendant “put his penis into and finger into [C.P.’s] 

butt.” It lasted for a “[c]ouple minutes.” When this happened, Maria was at work and A.G., who

was only a couple of months old, was in the living room. C.P. remembered leaving the balcony 

doors open, seeing the bunny “jump out of the balcony,” and “being disappointed.” 

¶ 16 C.P. testified that, at the Lake Street apartment, defendant used a tablet to get C.P. to go 

into defendant’s bedroom. It was a “white tablet” with a “green case on it.” C.P. explained:

“[Defendant] would, like, take it away from me. Then, like, tell me if I wanted to use it, I 

had to let him put his finger and penis in my butt. And same thing with the black tablet 

that my dad bought me, like, fourth grade.”

C.P. testified that, like he did at the Garden Quarters apartment, defendant would take C.P. to 

defendant’s room, remove C.P.’s pants and underwear, tell C.P. to lie down, and then defendant 

would put his penis and finger inside C.P.’s butt. When asked how many times this occurred with 

the white tablet, C.P. responded “Oh, like a lot of times, like over 10, over 50. A lot of times.”

¶ 17 C.P. testified that defendant also used a “black tablet” to get C.P. to go into defendant’s 

bedroom. C.P. had the white tablet “first”; his dad bought him the black tablet when he was 

“around fourth grade.” Defendant used the black tablet in the same way that he used the white 

tablet. C.P. explained:

“[Defendant] would take it, tell me if I wanted it, I would have to go to [defendant’s] room 

and then put his penis and finger in my butt.”

C.P. stated that the incidents with the black tablet “didn’t differ” from the incidents with the white 

tablet or the bunny. When asked how many times defendant used the black tablet, C.P. responded, 

“[a] lot of times.” C.P. stated, “It was always his penis but, like, not always his finger.” C.P. did 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 7 - 

not know specifically how many times defendant used only his penis and how many times 

defendant used both his penis and finger.

¶ 18 C.P. testified that he never told anyone what defendant was doing because he was afraid of 

“[defendant] hurting us.” He explained that, when he was in kindergarten, around the same time 

that the sexual abuse began, defendant used to make C.P. “scratch the bottom of his feet” and “pop 

pimples” on his back. C.P. did not like doing that, so he told Maria. One day, defendant picked 

him up from kindergarten. Defendant and C.P. were sitting on the couch together, and defendant 

was on the phone. When defendant got off the phone, he began to hit C.P. and slap C.P.’s face. 

C.P. believed that it was because C.P. told Maria that defendant was making C.P. scratch 

defendant’s feet.

¶ 19 C.P. testified that, when he was in fifth grade, he told Maria what defendant had been doing 

to him. The next day was Saturday, and he did not want to be left alone with defendant because 

of the things that defendant would make him do. Maria called C.P.’s godmother. When his

godmother came over, they confronted defendant, who denied C.P.’s claims. The next day, they 

went to the police station, where C.P. spoke with an officer. C.P. next went to the hospital for an 

examination. After that, he spoke with an investigator.

¶ 20 Anna Krause testified that she was the operations manager and lead forensic interviewer 

with the Child Advocacy Center in McHenry County. She interviewed C.P. at about 11 p.m. on 

February 1, 2020. She identified People’s Exhibit No. 1 as the DVD recording of the interview, 

which was about 45 minutes long. The recording was admitted into evidence and played for the 

trial court.

¶ 21 C.P. made the following relevant statements in the video. C.P. told Krause that he was 10 

years old and in the fifth grade. C.P. went to the hospital because defendant had “basically—um—
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 8 - 

raped” him “a few times before” and that he “decided enough was enough so [he] told his mom

and went to the police station and reported [defendant].” C.P. told Krause that Maria left C.P. with 

defendant on weekends when she went to work at McDonald’s. C.P. explained that defendant 

would first give A.G. his tablet and tell him to go to his room. Then defendant would tell C.P. to 

go to defendant’s room and lay down on his stomach. Defendant would take off C.P.’s shorts and

underwear. C.P. “felt something going up [his] butt repeatedly over and over and it hurt.” When 

defendant was done, he told C.P. “to go to the bathroom and go number two and [he] couldn’t get 

up until [he] did number two.” Defendant told him not to flush.

¶ 22 C.P. told Krause that defendant put “his finger or his penis” up C.P.’s butt. Sometimes 

C.P. could feel “something hard, like, scratching [him]” at the “corner of [his] butt” on the “inside.” 

Sometimes C.P. heard defendant “spit” and then felt “liquid” up his butt. Defendant used “his 

hand” on C.P.’s “back” to push C.P. down on the mattress. Sometimes C.P. screamed because it 

hurt so bad, and defendant would cover his mouth and tell him to be quiet “or else the woman 

upstairs will hear.” 

¶ 23 C.P. told Krause that the last time this happened was “last week” and that it had not 

happened in a while. Defendant was “putting his hand in [C.P.’s] butt.” C.P. felt “multiple 

fingers.” C.P. could not remember how many times the abuse happened while he was in fifth 

grade.

¶ 24 C.P. reported that the abuse had started “like five years ago.” It was about a month after 

defendant “officially” moved in with C.P.’s family. C.P. remembered that, when he was in first 

grade, defendant brought a brown and white bunny home to the Garden Quarters apartment. C.P.’s 

mom was at work. C.P. wanted to pet the bunny, and defendant told him that he first “had to let 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 9 - 

[defendant] do that.” His mom did not know about the bunny. The bunny ran off and he never 

saw it again.

¶ 25 When C.P. was in fourth grade, defendant would not let him use his tablet until he did what 

defendant wanted him to do. When asked how many times this happened, C.P. stated that he did 

not know. C.P. said it was “multiple” times and “a lot.” It was “more than two” times. C.P.’s

first tablet was white with a green case. C.P. stopped using the white tablet, and his dad bought 

him a new tablet. Defendant used the new tablet in the same manner as he used the white tablet, 

telling C.P. he must let defendant do what he wanted to do before C.P. could use the tablet. 

Defendant used the new tablet more than two times. C.P. said that defendant never used any other 

reasons to get C.P. to let him do what he wanted to do. 

¶ 26 C.P. reported that the abuse happened in the bedroom at the Garden Quarters apartment 

and in defendant’s room at the Lake Street apartment. C.P. reported that defendant told him not 

to tell anyone what he did. Defendant never threatened him, but when C.P. was in kindergarten, 

defendant hit C.P. when C.P. reported to his mom that defendant was making him scratch his feet 

and that C.P. did not want to do it anymore. C.P. told Krause that he “hated” what defendant was 

doing to him and that he “finally got the courage” to tell his mom.

¶ 27 McHenry County sheriff’s deputy Jenifer Asplund testified that she met with C.P. and 

Maria at the police station on February 1, 2020. C.P. reported that he was ten years old and had 

lived at the Lake Street apartment for five years with defendant, Maria, and A.G. Before then,

they lived at the Garden Quarters apartment. C.P. told her that defendant had abused him at both 

locations. The last time defendant had abused him was on January 25, 2020, when Maria left for 

work. At that time, defendant gave A.G. a tablet and told him to go to his room. Defendant told 

C.P. to go into defendant’s room and to lie face down on the bed. Asplund testified: “[Defendant] 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 10 - 

removed [C.P.’s] pants bottom and his underwear leaving his shirt on and then placed his penis 

inside his anus going in and out several times slowly.” C.P. told her that when defendant was 

done, he told C.P. to “go into the bathroom, [C.P.] would have to go number two which is poo, 

and he couldn’t exit the bathroom until he was done, all instructed by [defendant].” C.P. told 

Asplund that this had happened other times with defendant in the same manner. After giving A.G. 

a tablet and telling him to go to his room, defendant would direct C.P. to defendant’s room. 

Defendant would “place his penis or other unknown—like fingers and other unknown objects into 

his penis [sic], and he is to go—after he’s done, meaning [defendant] is done, he is told to go to 

the bathroom and go number two before he can exit the room.” C.P. told her that “sometimes he 

would hear [defendant] spitting, and the penis would slide in easier in his anus and wouldn’t hurt 

as much as other times. Sometimes it would hurt more than others.” After speaking with Asplund, 

C.P. went to the hospital for an examination.

¶ 28 At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved for a directed finding as to either 

count I or II, arguing that C.P. testified to only one incident occurring at the Garden Quarters 

apartment. The trial court denied the motion, noting that C.P. testified that defendant placed both 

his penis and finger into C.P.’s anus and that those two acts could support a finding of two separate 

acts as charged in counts I and II. The court also noted that defendant had objected to the State’s 

attempt to amend the indictment to allege more specifically the type of penetration.

¶ 29 Defendant did not present evidence.

¶ 30 The trial court found defendant guilty of all counts of PCSAC. The court stated that the 

case turned on the credibility of C.P. The court considered C.P.’s statements during the interview,

when he was ten years old, and C.P.’s trial testimony, when he was 13 years old. The court noted 

that C.P.’s testimony was relatively consistent with his earlier statements and that any minor 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 11 - 

inconsistencies showed his credibility. The court also rejected defense counsel’s theory that Maria 

influenced C.P. to fabricate his claims against defendant to force defendant to remain in Illinois

and not go to Mexico with another woman.

¶ 31 The trial court noted that the differences among the various counts related only to when 

the acts were alleged to have occurred. The court noted that counts I and II related to acts alleged 

to have occurred between August 1, 2014, and July 31, 2015, when C.P. lived at the Garden 

Quarters apartment. The court found that C.P.’s testimony established one occurrence at the 

Garden Quarters apartment, which was tied to defendant’s use of a bunny. The court further found 

that, although the testimony established one occurrence, the occurrence was comprised of two 

acts—sexual penetration of C.P.’s anus with defendant’s penis and sexual penetration of C.P.’s 

anus with defendant’s finger—and thus supported findings of guilty on both counts I and II. 

¶ 32 The trial court next noted that count IX related to the events alleged to have occurred on 

January 25, 2020, the final Saturday that defendant was left alone with C.P. The court found that 

C.P.’s testimony was sufficient to prove that defendant placed his finger in C.P.’s anus on that 

date.

¶ 33 The trial court next addressed counts III through V, which charged acts alleged to have 

occurred between August 1, 2016, and May 31, 2018, and counts VI through VIII, which charged

acts alleged to have occurred between June 1, 2018, and May 31, 2019. The court noted that the 

acts charged in counts III through VIII all took place in the Lake Street apartment. The court 

further noted that the significance of the dates was “their orientation to a white laptop and a black 

laptop.” The court stated:

“Regarding the white tablet, the victim said it was used, quote, a lot of times, end 

quote. He said probably over ten times and maybe over fifty.
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 12 - 

The victim said the black tablet was used, quote, a lot of times, end quote.

The victim was clear that every occasion involved penis in anus penetration but not 

always finger in anus.

The question simply is, has the state proven or established beyond a reasonable 

doubt six incidents of abuse in the noted time frame? 

As previously noted, this could actually encompass only three incidents if each 

involved penis penetration and finger penetration.

Regardless of the factual dynamic, six separate events or three combined events, 

the state has proven these charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

On Counts Three through Eight inclusive, the defendant is therefore found guilty.”

¶ 34 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which raised no double jeopardy claims. The trial 

court denied the motion. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 

seven years in prison on each count, to be served consecutively. Defendant filed a motion for 

reconsideration of his sentence, which the court denied.

¶ 35 This timely appeal followed.

¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 37 Defendant appeals from his convictions on counts III through VIII of the indictment. He

contends that his right to be protected from double jeopardy was violated because the 

multiplicitous indictment, along with the trial evidence, failed to provide enough specificity to 

allow pleading the resulting convictions as a bar to future prosecutions arising out of the same 

conduct. 

¶ 38 A criminal defendant has a fundamental right, under both the United States Constitution 

(U.S. Const., amend. VI) and the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8), to be 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 13 - 

informed of the nature and cause of criminal accusations made against him. People v. Libricz, 

2022 IL 127757, ¶ 35. In Illinois, this right is delineated in section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/111-3 (West 2018)). See Libricz, 2022 IL 127757, ¶ 35. 

“ ‘Section 111-3(a) demands that the charging instrument be in writing, stating the 

name of the offense and the relevant statutory provision violated, setting forth the nature 

and elements of the offense and the date and county in which the offense occurred, and 

naming the accused if known or a reasonably certain description.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. 

Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (1994)). 

¶ 39 When the sufficiency of the charging instrument is attacked in a pretrial motion, the 

charging instrument must strictly comply with the requirements of section 111-3(a) of the Code. 

Libricz, 2022 IL 127757, ¶ 37. However, when an indictment is challenged for the first time on 

appeal, as in the present case, “ ‘the standard of review is more liberal.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. 

DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d 318, 322 (1996)). In such a case, “ ‘it is sufficient that the indictment 

apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with enough specificity to (1) allow 

preparation of his defense and (2) allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future 

prosecutions arising out of the same conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d at 322).

¶ 40 We note that defendant makes no argument that the indictment was not sufficiently specific 

to allow the preparation of his defense. (Nor does he argue that the evidence was insufficient to 

prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.) Instead, defendant argues that the indictment, along 

with the trial evidence, was insufficient to protect him from double jeopardy.

¶ 41 “The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, 

made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, provides that no person shall ‘be 

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’ ” People v. Bellmyer, 199 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 14 - 

Ill. 2d 529, 536-37 (2002) (quoting U.S. Cons., amend. V). The Illinois Constitution similarly 

precludes any person from being “twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” Ill. Const. 1970, 

Art. I, § 10. The double jeopardy clause bars three specific governmental actions: “(1) prosecution 

for the identical offense after an acquittal, (2) prosecution for the identical offense after a 

conviction, and (3) the imposition of more than one punishment for the same offense.” People v. 

Avendano, 2023 IL App (2d) 220176, ¶ 56. At issue here is whether the indictment, along with

the evidence, was sufficient to protect defendant against prosecution for the identical offense after 

conviction. 

¶ 42 First, although defendant does not dispute it, we note that there is no question that the 

indictment charged defendant with enough specificity to allow the preparation of his defense. 

Counts III through VIII of the indictment charged defendant with PCSAC. Each count specifically 

named the alleged offense, cited to the relevant statutory provision, indicated the county where the 

offense occurred, and stated defendant’s name. In addition, each count specifically provided, in 

the words of the statute, that defendant committed the offense of PCSAC in that

“defendant, who was seventeen years of age or older, knowingly committed an act of 

contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the 

body of another for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the 

accused, or an act of sexual penetration, with C.P[.] (a male minor, born 2009), who was 

under thirteen years of age when the act was committed.”

Further, as for the date of the offense, counts III through V each charged defendant with a “separate 

and distinct act” of sexual conduct with C.P. occurring between August 1, 2016, and May 31, 

2018. Counts VI through VIII each charged defendant with a “separate and distinct act” of sexual 

conduct with C.P. occurring between June 1, 2018, and May 31, 2019. We note that the State was 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 15 - 

not required to provide a precise date of the offense. See People v. Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d 22, 

27 (2005) (“As long as the crime occurred within the statute of limitations and prior to the return 

of the charging instrument, the State need only provide the defendant with the best information it 

has as to when the offenses occurred.”). In addition, had defendant believed that the indictment 

lacked sufficient specificity, he could have requested a bill of particulars. See DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 

2d at 324. Indeed, when the State attempted to amend the indictment to provide greater specificity, 

defendant objected. In any event, the indictment makes clear that defendant was charged with 

three separate acts of sexual conduct with C.P. occurring between August 1, 2016, and May 31, 

2018, and three separate acts of sexual conduct with C.P. occurring between June 1, 2018, and 

May 31, 2019.

¶ 43 There is no merit to defendant’s argument that the indictment is an impermissible 

multiplicitous indictment that exposes him to double jeopardy. An indictment is multiplicitous if 

it “charges a single offense as separate counts.” United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113, 1123 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Starks, 472 F.3d 466, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2006)). Such an 

indictment violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment because it exposes the 

defendant “to the threat of receiving multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. That is not 

the case here. As noted, counts III through VIII allege six “separate and distinct” acts supporting 

six “separate and distinct” violations of the same statute with the same victim. Defendant was not 

charged with multiple counts based on a single act.

¶ 44 Nevertheless, defendant contends that, although the indictment charged counts III through 

VIII as “separate and distinct” acts, there was no language in the indictment that meaningfully 

distinguished each count for purposes of double jeopardy. Defendant acknowledges that, in 

determining whether the indictment protects defendant from double jeopardy, we may consider 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 16 - 

the record. See Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 29 (“A prior prosecution can easily be proven by 

reference to the record, thereby protecting a defendant from being placed in double jeopardy.”). 

However, defendant argues that the record in fact supports his argument because C.P. testified that 

he submitted to the acts in exchange for the use of either a white or black tablet and that this 

occurred “over 50” times. According to defendant, there was nothing in the evidence that 

differentiated the 6 counts at issue from the rest of the alleged 50 or more acts. Thus, he asserts 

that the indictment, along with the evidence presented at trial, was insufficient to allow pleading a 

resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecutions arising out of the same conduct.

¶ 45 In support, defendant relies primarily on Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005). 

In Valentine, the defendant was charged with sexually abusing his eight-year-old stepdaughter 

between March 1, 1995, and January 16, 1996. Id. at 629. The indictment charged 20 counts of 

child rape and 20 counts of felonious sexual penetration. Id. at 628. Each count of child rape “was 

identically worded so that there was no differentiation among the charges[,]” as was each count of 

felonious sexual penetration. Id. Although the State provided the defendant with a bill of 

particulars, it “merely restated the allegations and identified the family home as the location of all 

forty offenses.” Id. at 629. At trial, the child victim did not testify to specific instances of abuse; 

instead, the victim testified that the defendant forced her to perform fellatio “on ‘about twenty’ 

occasions,” he digitally penetrated her vagina on about “on ‘about fifteen’ occasions,” and he 

anally penetrated her with his penis “on ‘about ten’ occasions.” Id. at 629. The jury found the 

defendant guilty of all 40 counts, and he was sentenced to 40 consecutive life sentences. Id. The 

Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the 20 child-rape convictions but only 15 of the 20 felonioussexual-penetration convictions. Id.
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 17 - 

¶ 46 The defendant then filed a federal habeas corpus petition claiming that the indictment 

violated his due process rights because it lacked specificity. Id. at 629-30. The Sixth Circuit held 

that the prosecution violated the defendant’s rights to adequate notice and protection from double 

jeopardy, justifying a grant of habeas relief on all counts but two. Id. at 637. The court reasoned 

that, in “view of the testimony and the indictment language, one of the child[-]rape and one of the 

penetration counts can be sustained but that the others must be set aside.” Id. at 628. The court 

determined that the 20 child-rape counts charged one crime and that the 20 penetration counts 

charged another crime. Id. at 629. The court stated that the defendant had notice that he was 

charged with these two separate crimes during the time period specified in the indictment, “[b]ut 

he had no way to otherwise identify what he was to defend against in the repetitive counts and no 

way to determine what charges of a similar nature could be brought against him in the future if he 

were re-indicted.” Id. at 628-29. The court held that, because the defendant was charged and 

convicted “for a generic pattern of abuse rather than for forty separate abusive incidents,” he was 

entitled to partial habeas relief. Id. at 634, 639. 

¶ 47 The court went on to note: 

“Importantly, the constitutional error in this case is traceable not to the generic 

language of the individual counts of the indictment but to the fact that there was no 

differentiation among the counts. The exigencies of child abuse cases necessitate 

considerable latitude in the construction of criminal charges. The prosecutors in this case, 

however, abused this wide latitude by piling on multiple identical counts. Numerous 

charges cannot be made out through estimation or inference. Instead, if prosecutors seek 

multiple charges against a defendant, they must link those multiple charges to multiple 

identifiable offenses. Due process requires this minimal step. Courts cannot uphold 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 18 - 

multiple convictions when they are unable to discern the evidence that supports each 

individual conviction.” Id. at 636-637. 

The court stated that, “[h]ad this case been tried in two counts, the convictions would clearly 

stand.” Id. at 637. The court also noted that differentiating between counts does not require 

“overly-burdensome precision” or “exacting specificity,” but can be accomplished by using 

different timeframes, types of offenses, or generic locations. Id. “[T]here must be some minimal 

differentiation between the counts at some point in the proceeding.” Id. at 638.

¶ 48 Recently, in Avendano, we considered the same argument defendant now makes. 

Avendano, 2023 IL App (2d) 220176, ¶¶ 55-61. The Avendano defendant also relied on Valentine. 

In Avendano, the defendant was charged with, inter alia, three counts of PCSAC. Id. ¶ 3. Each 

of the three counts alleged that, on or about January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2017,

“ ‘[the] defendant, a person seventeen years of age or over, knowingly committed an act of 

sexual contact with L.R., a child under the age of thirteen years when the act was 

committed, in that the defendant touched the sex organ of L.R. with his hand for the 

purpose of the sexual arousal of the defendant.’ ” Id.

L.R., who was 10 years old at the time of trial, testified that the defendant had been her 

kindergarten teacher and that he “would touch her with his hand under her clothes where she goes 

pee.” Id. ¶ 10. She testified that he was “ ‘always’ ” touching her “ ‘private part’ ” and that it 

happened “ ‘more than one time’ ”—indeed, “ ‘[e]very time [she] was in school.’ ” Id. A jury 

found the defendant guilty of each count of PCSAC. Id. ¶ 37.

¶ 49 On appeal, relying on Valentine, the defendant argued, inter alia, that two of his three 

convictions of PCSAC must be vacated “because the multiplicitous indictments deprived him of 

his due process right to be protected from double jeopardy.” Id. ¶¶ 55, 58. We disagreed. Id.
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 19 - 

¶ 60. First, we found that “the indictments were sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the 

offenses for which he was being charged.” Id. As in the present case, “each count cited the 

applicable statute that was violated, the nature of and the elements applicable to the charge, a 

specific time period within which the alleged offenses occurred, the county where the offenses 

occurred, the defendant’s name, and the victim’s identity.” Id. ¶ 57. 

¶ 50 Next, we rejected the defendant’s reliance on Valentine, finding the case distinguishable. 

We found that, unlike in Valentine, “[t]he evidence supported multiple counts of the same offense, 

as there was evidence that the offense occurred more than three times. The victim in the present 

case described the specific method of abuse/assault and testified that it happened almost every day 

she was in kindergarten.” Id. Thus, we concluded: “[T]here is no double jeopardy concern because 

the indictment and the trial record are sufficient to allow the defendant to plead his convictions as 

a bar to future prosecutions.” Id.

¶ 51 Moreover, we made clear that we found the Valentine dissent more persuasive than the 

majority. We stated:

“The dissenting justice explained that ‘prohibiting the use of multiple identical charges in 

a single indictment would severely hamper a state’s ability to prosecute crimes where a 

young child is both the victim and the sole witness.’ [Citation.] Indeed, 

‘[u]nder a rule restricting prosecutions to exceedingly narrow and precise charges, 

a sex-abuse charge would presumptively be limited to a single instance of abuse, 

despite clear evidence of multiple occasions, unless the child can remember the 

specific time and place details for each occurrence. Such an outcome is contrary to 

judicial precedent and is not constitutionally required.’ [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 61. 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 20 - 

We further noted that the dissent’s reasoning was consistent with Illinois precedent. See People 

v. Albarran, 2018 IL App (1st) 151508, ¶ 23 (indictment need include only enough specificity for 

the defendant to prepare a defense); see also People v. Foster, 2022 IL App (2d) 210556-U, ¶ 114 

(identical charges in an indictment not improper where there is evidence and argument to support 

a finding of multiple acts).

¶ 52 We continue to adhere to our decision in Avendano. As in Avendano, the indictment and 

the trial record are sufficient for defendant to assert a double jeopardy defense to bar a subsequent 

prosecution for the offenses alleged in counts III through VIII.

¶ 53 To be sure, C.P. testified that there were over 50 incidents of sexual conduct between 

defendant and C.P. However, unlike in Valentine, the State here did not “pil[e] on multiple 

identical counts” in the indictment. Valentine, 395 F.3d at 636. Instead, the State charged 

defendant with nine separate and distinct acts, occurring between August 2014 and January 2020, 

and distinguished them by the time periods within which they occurred. Relevant here, counts III 

through V alleged three separate and distinct acts occurring during one period, and counts VI 

through VIII allege three separate and distinct acts occurring during a second period. This is vastly 

different than the 40 charges at issue in Valentine. 

¶ 54 Moreover, unlike in Valentine, although the indictment did not provide factual 

differentiation among the three counts alleged in the two different periods, the evidence at trial 

did. C.P.’s testimony established two distinct time periods tied to defendant’s use of either a white 

tablet (counts III through V) or a black tablet (counts VI through VIII) as an incentive for C.P. to 

submit to sexual acts. C.P. testified that, prior to fourth grade, he had a white tablet. The evidence 

supports the conclusion that C.P. attended fourth grade during the 2018/2019 school year. Thus, 

counts III through V are tied to sexual acts committed by defendant at the Lake Street apartments, 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 21 - 

using the white tablet as an incentive, prior to C.P. entering fourth grade. C.P. testified that if C.P. 

wanted to use the tablet, he “had to let [defendant] put his finger and penis in [C.P.’s] butt.” C.P. 

testified that the sexual acts consisted of defendant “always” placing his penis in C.P.’s anus but 

“not always his finger.” C.P. testified that these occurrences happened over 50 times. Therefore, 

this testimony established, at a minimum, two occurrences of sexual conduct between defendant 

and C.P. during that period. One occurrence consisted of an act of defendant placing only his 

penis in C.P.’s anus. The second occurrence consisted of two acts—one act of defendant placing 

his penis in C.P.’s anus and another act of defendant placing his finger in C.P.’s anus. Thus, C.P.’s 

testimony established three separate and distinct acts during the period alleged in counts III 

through V.

¶ 55 Similarly, counts VI through VIII are tied to sexual acts committed by defendant at the 

Lake Street apartments using the black tablet as an incentive. C.P. testified that he obtained a 

black tablet when he was in fourth grade. C.P. testified that the same kind of incidents that had 

happened with the white tablet also happened with the black tablet. When asked if the incident 

with the black tablet happened just one time, C.P. stated that it happened “[a] lot of times.” Thus, 

as with the allegations tied to the white table, C.P.’s testimony related to the black tablet 

established that at least two separate occurrences—comprised of a total of three separate and 

distinct acts (penis in anus on one occasion, and both finger and penis in anus on a separate 

occasion)—took place between June 1, 2018, and May 31, 2019.

¶ 56 Given this testimony, there was “minimal differentiation between the counts at some point 

in the proceeding,” (id. at 638) and we are not “unable to discern the evidence that supports each 

individual conviction” (id. at 637). Defendant should not be shielded from conviction because 

C.P. testified that the occurrences happened more than 50 times. If the State were to charge 
2023 IL App (2d) 230035-U 

- 22 - 

defendant with additional offenses against C.P. in any hypothetical future prosecution based on 

the details of these already-adjudicated encounters, we are confident that he will be able to invoke 

the protection against double jeopardy. See People v. Dzierzanowski, 2023 IL App (2d) 210565-

U, ¶¶ 114, 117.

¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 58 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County. 

¶ 59 Affirmed.