### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON April 2000 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LAWR ENCE DAVIS SHERRILL Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County No. 98CR-1256 C. Creed McGinley, Judge

No. W1999-01488-CCA-R3-CD - Decided July 27, 2000

This appeal results from the defendant's conviction by a Carroll County jury for introducing contraband

into a penal institution. He was sentenced to six years incarceration and fined $2,500. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a new trial basedon the lack

of evidence to corroborate the testimony of his accomplice required for a conviction. After careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial cour t. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
A LAN E. G LENN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID H. W ELLES and D AVID G. H AYES , JJ., joined.
Steven L. West, McKenzie, Tennessee (on appeal) and John E. Williams, Huntingdon, Tennessee (at trial) for the

appellant, Lawr

ence Davis Sherr

ill.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Rep orter; Tara B. Hi nkle, Assistant Atto

rney General; Robert “Gus” Radford, District Attorney General; and Eleanor Cahill, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
On September 21, 1998 , a Carroll County ju ry returned a gu

ilty verdict a

ga inst the defendan

t, Lawrence Sherrill, for introducing contraband into apenal institution where prisoners were housed. On October 29, 1998, the trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in prison and assessed a fine of $2,500. On November 25, 1998, the defendant filed a motion for new trial on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction and, on May 7, 1999, the defendant filed a supplement to motion t

o dismiss alleging tha

t Tennessee law d

oes n ot allo w a conviction based solelyon the testimony of an accomplice. After consideri ng the evidence a

nd arguments of co

unsel, the trial court denied the defendant's motion on May 10, 1999. The defendant appe

als on a single issue: Whether th

e trial court err

ed in denying his

motion for

a new trial or directed verdict when the only incriminating evidence was the uncorroborated testimony of a co-defendant. After a car eful review of the re

cord, we affir

m the judgment of the

trial court.1 Scott te stifi ed that s he had already pled guilt y to intr oducing a drug or c ausing a drug to b e introdu ced into the coun ty jail. -2- FACTS
On Thursday, March 12, 1998, co-defendant Casey Rena e Scott 1 was living at her grandmother's house in

Huntingdon, Tennessee, when she received several collect phone calls from the defendant. Scott

had dated the def

endant, who was ho

used at the jail, fo

r about a year a

nd a half prior to that time. She testified that the defendant told her to put some marijuana in a book and bring it to the jail. Since the defendant's visiting day was not until the next Sunday, he arranged to have the marijuana brough

t in by Tracey Pea

rson, a fellow inma

te. The defenda

nt t old Scott to get the drugs from his brother, Kenny, and put it in the binding of the book. She was to glue the ends of the binding together. At trial, Scott iden tified the Bible in

which she placed the marijuana. She stated that her name appeared on tha

t Bible but testified

that she scratch

ed it out and put Pea

rson's name on it in two places. Afte

r preparing the B ible, Scott was told b y the defendant to

give it to Trenell Johnson to bring to Pearson at the jail. Johnson was to pick the book up from Scott at her residence. Johnson arrived at Scott's residence around 6:30 or 7:00 p.m., at which time Scott handed her a sack containing the Bible, two enve lopes, and a blac

k pair of sweat pa

nts. Scott did not see

th e i tems again until she was arrested.
On cross -e xamination, Scott te stified that she re

ceived a senten

ce of three yea

rs at thirty percent as part of her plea agreement. She admitted that she did not tell the police the whole story on March 12, 1998, when she gav e a false stateme

nt that Pearson, ra

ther than the def

endant, told

her that Johnson was coming over to get the Bible. At trial, she stated that she talked to Pearson on the phone, but it was the defendant who told her that Johnson was coming over. She also admitted that she lied when she told police that there was nothing in the Bible when she gave it to Johnson. On the Wedne s day before the trial, Scott decided to tell the truth. She admitted that she had never implicated the defendant until that Wednesday, when the prosecutor came to the jail to see her. She stated that the State hadnot threatened he r or made promise

s to her in exchange for her testimony. Scott had not talked

to Johnson recent

ly but did see her ou

tside the courtro

om. On redirect, the wi

tness testified that the defendant had written her letters telling her not to testify. She agreed that the l etters said, "But wh

oever wants to te

stify against

me, good luck" and "Your brother would spread this around that you're a snitch to everybody," which scared her.
On recross, Scott admitted that she forgot when asked on cr o ss-examination that the prosecutor

came to see her on

the Thursday before

trial and that she gave the prosecutor two letters the defendant had written her. Scott had received them the week before the trial and recognized the defendant's handwriting. Another letter had come the day of the trial, which she did not read. She testified that she was scared, because the letters sounded like the defendant did not want her to

testify against him and wanted her to lie. Thewitness denied that the defendant threa tened her in the le

tters, butthen stated on further redirect that she was threatened. The letters were introduced into evidence.-3-

Trenell Johnson was called by the State as a witness. She testified that she knew the defendant in school but had not dated him. Johnson was dating Tracey Pearson in March of 1998 when the alleged incident occurred. At that time, Pearson was housed in the county jail, and Johnson plannedto vis it himon his regular Thursday visiting day, March 12. While she was still at her cousin’s house, the defendant called her and wanted h er t o pick up some things f rom Casey Scott to bring to the jail. He told her to give the items to Pearson. According to the witness, she w ent to Casey Scott’s house and received some items in a bag. She denied knowing what was in the bag, which she took to the

jail. There was a sign outside th e jail waiting are

a that instructed v

isitors to have a name on every person’s belongings, so she put the name [Tracey Pearson] on the bag. Marijuana was found in the Bible, and Johnson denied knowing that it was there.
On cross-examination, Johnson stat ed that she was not charged in the incident. She then stated that she did not talk to the defendant at her cousin’s house and that he did not tell her to go get anything. She testif

ied that it was Pearson who told her to get the items from Scott, and she did notknow if the defendant was ever going to see those items. According to Johnson, Pearson had been with her the week before the trial but had since left. On redirect, Johnson admitted that she told the prosecutor that the defendant called her cousi

n’s house but state

d that she did not ac

tuallytalk to him.
The State’s next witne ss was Tamm

y Annette H offman, who was a jailer with the Car

roll County Sheriff’s Department on March 12, 1998. She stated t hat it is a routine procedure for the jailers to examine packages that are brought in for inmates. Hoffman received a package for Tracey Pearson that containeda pair of jogging pants and a Bible. When Hoffman opened the Bible, she noticed some green plant-like material in the binding of the book and notified the “chief upstairs.” The chief cut open the binding of the Bible and, upon discovery of the marijuana, took custody of the book. On cross-examination, the witness examined the Bible and stated that the marijuana was still in the binder of the Bible. Anthony Moon, Chief Deputy for the Carroll County Sheriff’s Department, also testified for the State. Deputy Moon w as at the jail

on March 12, 1998. He was called by jailer Tammy Hoffman to come upstairs, because something was found in an incoming pack age. When he ar

rived upstairs, Hoffman showed Deputy Moon a Bible that had marijuana in the binding. He identified the Bible at trial. After taking custody of the book, Deputy Moon took it downstairs and locked it in the drug locker. The book

was eventually sent to the lab. As a result of Deputy Moon’s investigation, the defendant and Casey Scott were charged.
On cros s-examination, De puty Moon testified

that he did not belie

ve the stateme

nt that Case y Scott gave him that night. He stated that his office had made several unsuccessful

attempts to serve a subpoena on Tracey Pearson but was able to serve his girlfriend, Trenell Johnson. Betty Kathryn Sherriff, special agent for e nsic scientist and regional crime laboratory supervisor

for the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, described the procedur e used to identify2 Sherriff was the fi

rst wit ness to t estif y at tri al, but i t makes more sens e chronologic ally for us to pl ace her testimony at the en d of our recitation of th e facts. -4- suspecteddrugs in substance s submitted to

the lab. 2 In testing a suspecte d marijuana substa

nce, Ms. Sherriff stated that she fir

st weighs the substan

ce and then perf

orms a microscopic

examination and a modified Deuquenois Levine test. If both t ests are positive, she concludes tha

t the substance is marijuana. Ms. Sherriff testified that she ran the routine tests on the substance found in the Bible. The substance weighed 1.8 grams, and her tests identified the plant material as marijuana.
On cross-examinat

ion, Ms. Sherriff s

tated that she was

familiar with

the term “joint” as one hand-rolled

marijuana cigarette. According to Ms. Sherriff, an average marijuana cigarette weighs less than 1 gram, so 1.8 grams was enough marijuana to roll a

t least two cigare

ttes. She stated that she had no knowledge of the defendant’s involvement with the marijuana apart from the fact that

his name was on the request for

examination form she received. Neither Trenell Johnson’s nor Tracey Pearson’s name appeared on the form. Ms. Sherriff testified that the microscopic examination she uses to identify marijua

na would not be positive if marijuana residue was merely rubbed on a coat, but she was not sure if the modified Deuquenois Levine test would be positive. In that case, she explainedthat she would take a piece of the coat and inject a sample of it into a mass-spectrometer to identify tetrahydrozoline (THC) present in marijuana. She did not do that procedure in this case. Ms. Sherriff denied that a 50 gallon barrel of water would test positive for THC if two drops of the substance were dropped into it.
The State rested its

case. The defe

nse did not offer a

ny proof, and the c

asewent to the jury. The defendant was subsequently found guilty of introduction of drugs into a penal institution, and the jury set a fine of $2,500.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
Th e fin dings of fact by the trial court are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against those find ings. State v. Burns , 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . This court will not reweigh or reevaluate the factual evidence, and the trial court’s assessment of

the credibility of witnesses, along with the weight and value to be given to their testimony, will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. Question s involving the tr ial court’s application of law to the facts of a case are reviewed de novo by this court, as are mixed questions of law and fact. Id. ; Ruff v. State , 978 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tenn. 1998) ; Harries v. State , 958 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Corroborating Evidence
The defendant argues that his motion for a new trial or acquittal should have been granted, because he cannot

be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of his alleged accomplice, Casey Renae Scott. He argues that her testimony was the only incriminating testimony presented at trial-5-

linking him to the drugs. Trenell Johnson’s testimony, the defendant contends, was essentially that al l arrangem ents to transport contraband to the jail were made between her and Tracey Pearson, which didnot corroborate the accomplice’s story. Upon careful review of the record, we affirm the defendant’s conviction. In Tennessee, it is well established that a defendant cannot be convicted of a felony on the uncorroborated

testimony of an accomplice. State v. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994) ; Sherrill v. State , 321 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tenn. 1959); Stat e v. Allen , 10 S.W.3d 286, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm
. app
. denied(Tenn. 1999); State v. Anderson , 985 S.W.2d 9, 15 (T enn. Crim

. App. 19 97), perm
. app
. denied(Tenn. 1998). Whether an accomplice’s testimony has bee n sufficiently

corroborated to allow a guilty verdict is a question for the jury. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d at 803. However, our courts have given us guidance in determining whether sufficient corroborating evidence is pres

ent: [T]heremust be some fact testified to, entirely independent of the accomplice’s testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference, notonly that a crime has been committed, but also that the defendant is implicated in it; and this independent cor roborative testim

ony must also include some fact establishing the defendan t’s i dentity. This corroborative evidence may be direct or entirely circumstantial, and it need not be adequate, in and of itself, to support a

conviction; it

is sufficientto meet the requirements of the rule if it fairly and legitimately

tends to connect th

e defendant wit

h the c ommission of the crime charged. It is not ne c essary that the corroboration extend to every part of the accomplice’s evidence. The corroboration need notbe conclusive, but it is sufficient i f this evidence, of itself, tends to connect the de fend ant with the commission of the offense, although the evidence is

slight and entitled, whe

n standing alone, to but little consideration.
Id. (citations omitted).
We conclude that sufficient corroborating evidence was presented at trial to support the accomplice’s testimony. The Bible owned by the accomplice, Casey Scott, was introduced at trial and appeared just as she testified that she prepared it according to the defendant’s instructions by putting mariju ana in the bi nding. Scott’s name was apparently scratched out and replaced in two places with that of Tracey Pearson. Th is supports Scott’s testimony that, since the defendant’s visiting day was not until Sunday, he had to get the marijuana into the jail through another prisoner whose visiting day wa s that Thursd ay. In her testimony, Trenell Johnson, who was not an accomplice, stated that Pearson’s visiting day was Thursdays.
Scott’s testimony that the defendant arranged to have Trenell Johnson pick up the Bible for transfer to Tracey Pearson was also corroborated by Johnson’s testimony. Johnson testified that she received a call from the defendant, whether directly or indirectly through Pearson, on that Thursday-6-

telling her to go to Scott’s house to pi ck up a package

to bring to the jail. J

ohnson did

so and was caught by the jailers when she attempted to give th e Bible to Pearson.

Testimony from the

jailers, in conjunction with he

r own admissions,

placed Johnson at the jail on Thursday, March 12, 1998, and verified that the marijuana was to be passed to Pears on in the binding of th e Bible. This supports the accomplice’ s version of how she was instructed by

the defendant to g

et the drugs to him on his non-visiting day. Although the cord between the defendant and the drugs was thin in pla ces, it was sufficient to connect the defendant to the crime.
The defendant

attempted to discredit the testimony of Trenell Johnson at trial, and the record shows that her testimony was contradictory a t times. However, the issue of the credibility of a witness’s testimony was presented to the jury at trial and is an issue exclusively entrusted to the jury as the trier of fact. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d at 804. In addition, whether an accomplice’s testimony has been sufficiently corrobor ated i s also a matter entrusted to the jury. Id. The jury resolve d these issues in favor of the State, and we see nothing in the record that compels us to disturb this finding. Motion for a New Trial or Acquittal
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss or for a new trial. The motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant for violating Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-16-201(a)(1):

(a) It is unlawful for any person to: (1) Knowingly and with unlawful intent take, send or otherwise cause to be taken into any penal institution wher e prisoners are qu

artered or unde

r custodia

l supervision any weap o ns, ammunition, expl osives, intoxicants,legend drugs, or any controlled substances found in chapter 17, part 4 of this title.
When a motion for acquittal is presented to the trial court, the c

ourt is only concerned w

ith the legal sufficiency of the evidence, rather than the weight of the evidence p resent ed. State v. Blanton , 926 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm
. app
. denied (Tenn. 1996). In determining sufficiency, the trial court must consider the parties’ evidence, disregard the defendant’s evidence that conflicts with that of the State, and afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences. Id. at 957-58. If the evidence is

legally sufficie

nt to support a conviction, then the mo tion for acquittal is denied. Our standard is the same on appeal. State v. Anderson , 880 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1994).
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(f) allows the trial court to grant a new trial if the judge, acting as the “Thirteenth Juror,” disagreeswith the jury verdict. The trial court must weigh-7-

the evidence and grant a new trial if the evidence presented preponderates against the verdi

ct. Blanton , 926 S.W.2d at 958

. When the trial court ove rrules a motion for

a new trial,

we can presume that the judge approved the jury’s verdict. Id. Upon approval of the verdict, the defendant’s presumption of innocence is stripped away, and all conflicts in testimony of witnesses are resolved in favor of the State. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d at 804. The question on appeal again becomes one of the legal su fficiency of the

evidence to

sustain the verdict, which pr

ohibits us from rew

eighin g the evi dence. Blanton , 926 S.W.2d at 958. In reviewing the record, we m ust also keep in mind that the State is entitled to th

e strongest legitim

ate view of the evidence and

all reasonable i

nferences to

be drawn from it. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d at 803; Blanton , 926 S.W.2d at 958. If the evidence viewed in this light was sufficient for any rational juror to have found

the essential elements of the convicting offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then we must affirm the tri

al court’s verdi

ct. Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3(e); Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d at 803.
Because the accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated and can be credited, the evidence presented

at trial was suffi

cient to support the

jury’s guilty

verdict on every element of the above-cited

offense. When the evidence, including the accomplice’s testimony, is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that it was sufficient for a rational jury to have found the defendant guilty o

f the crime

charged beyond

a reasonable

doubt. The presen

ce of marijuana

in the Bible supplied by Sco tt and carried to

the jail by Johnson is

undisputed. The evidencesupports the jury’s decision that

the defendant wa

s the person who kn

owingly caused the drug to be brought into the jail. We see no reason to disturb the verdict in this case.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the evidence in the record before us wa s sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s te

stimony, and, there

fore, we affir

m the judgment of the

trial court.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE