IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2023 WY 111

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

November 16, 2023

NICOLE WARD f/k/a NICOLE BELDEN 

and ANDY WARD,

Appellants

(Respondents),

v.

BRETT BELDEN and ISABEL BELDEN,

Appellees

(Petitioners).

S-23-0007

Appeal from the District Court of Washakie County

The Honorable Bobbi Dean Overfield, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Christopher M. Brennan, Woodhouse Roden Ames & Brennan, LLC, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:

Thomas P. Keegan, Keegan & Krisjansons, P.C., Cody, Wyoming.

Guardian ad Litem:

Amanda K. Roberts, Lonabaugh and Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Before FOX, C.J., KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and KASTE, D.J.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
1

KASTE, District Judge.

[¶1] Grandparents, Brett and Isabel Belden, were granted visitation with the children of 

their deceased son in 2019 after their relationship with the children’s mother, Nicole Ward, 

deteriorated. Following the adoption of the children in 2022 by their stepfather, Andy 

Ward, the Wards informed the Beldens that the Wards would no longer comply with the

visitation order. The Beldens moved to enforce the existing visitation order, and the Wards 

responded by filing a petition to modify the visitation order. The district court held the 

Wards in contempt for failing to comply with the original visitation order and then, after a

bench trial, issued an order modifying the Beldens’ visitation to better accommodate the 

parties’ current needs and obligations. The Wards appealed from the order modifying 

visitation and we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] The Wards raise three issues, which we rephrase here. 

I. Does Mr. Ward have a due process right to relitigate the initial grandparent 

visitation order after the adoption because he was not a party to the original 

proceedings?

II. Must a district court reapply the parental presumption when it considers a 

petition to revoke or amend a grandparent visitation order under Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 20-7-101(d)?

III. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it amended the grandparent 

visitation order?

FACTS

[¶3] On December 7, 2016, Grant Belden passed away in an airplane crash, leaving 

behind his wife, Nicole Ward, formerly Nicole Belden, and two young children, CWB and 

DB born in 2012 and 2015 respectively. Prior to Grant’s untimely death, the family lived 

on a ranch in Thermopolis, Wyoming owned by Grant’s parents, Brett and Isabel Belden. 

Ms. Ward and the children continued to live on the Belden’s ranch until a verbal altercation 

between Ms. Ward and Mr. Belden, concerning ownership of a gun built by Grant, caused 

her to move with the children to Worland, Wyoming in the spring of 2019. Prior to this 

altercation, both CWB and DB had a close relationship with their grandparents.

[¶4] Following the altercation, Ms. Ward began restricting contact between the children 

and Mr. Belden. Soon after, Ms. Ward moved to Parkman, Wyoming to live with her then 

fiancé, Andy Ward. Ms. Ward then cut all ties with her former friends and the children’s 

entire paternal family in Thermopolis and prevented the Beldens from visiting the children. 
2

In response, the Beldens filed an action to establish grandparent visitation rights in May 

2019.

[¶5] In March 2020, Ms. Ward, the Beldens, and the guardian ad litem agreed to a 

stipulated order which established grandparent visitation with the children. The foundation 

of the stipulated order was the parties’ agreement that “It is in the best interests of the minor 

children that they have reasonable visitation with their paternal grandparents.” The 

stipulated order included monthly weekend-long visits in Thermopolis, visits in Sheridan, 

and weekly phone calls between the children and grandparents. The parties were required 

to meet at a half-way point to exchange the children, so they were each responsible for half 

the transportation costs. The order also prohibited the parties from disparaging each other 

to ensure the children maintained healthy relationships with both parties. The parties 

followed this schedule faithfully for the next year and a half. 

[¶6] In August 2021, Ms. Ward married Mr. Ward and soon afterward the Wards began 

limiting visitation with the Beldens. Starting in November of 2021, the Wards gave

numerous seemingly legitimate reasons for withholding visitation, including COVID-19 

exposure and poor weather conditions. However, some of these excuses appear to have 

been contrived. For example, when the Beldens’ were denied visitation because the 

children were allegedly quarantined for COVID-19, Ms. Ward took the children to the 

store, brought them on field trips with other children, and took them to the park to spend 

time with their maternal relatives. While the Beldens were willing to reschedule the missed 

visits, Ms. Ward never rescheduled the visits.

[¶7] On January 10, 2022, Mr. Ward adopted CWB and DB. That same day he sent a 

letter to the Beldens stating, “On behalf of myself and Nicole Ward, we will no longer 

comply to the order of grandparent visitation[.]” Mr. Ward then offered the Beldens three 

days of visitation each year sometime in the summer months in Sheridan and phone visits 

with the children but only if the children wished to speak to their grandparents. He then 

threatened, “You can accept this offering and cooperate with us or get nothing and no 

visits.” Afterward, Ms. Ward openly refused to follow the order, and the Beldens did not 

have any visits with the children until April 2022.

[¶8] In response, the Beldens filed a motion for order to show cause why Ms. Ward

should not be held in contempt for violating the stipulated visitation order. Ms. Ward

responded by filing a motion to modify the grandparent visitation order. After an 

evidentiary hearing, the district court held Ms. Ward in contempt, required her to resume 

visits required by the stipulated visitation order, and required her to make up the missed 

visits over the next two summers. The district court then joined Mr. Ward as a necessary 

party and set the motion to modify the stipulated grandparent visitation order for a bench 

trial.
3

[¶9] At the bench trial, the Beldens testified that they had several visits with the children

following the contempt order and believed that the Wards were actively undermining the 

children’s formerly healthy relationship with their grandparents. The Beldens reported 

that, since the contempt order was entered, the children began calling home multiple times 

every day during visitation. The Beldens believed the calls were encouraged by the Wards, 

and that the children’s behavior would change negatively after each phone call. The 

Beldens testified that the children had stopped calling them by their pet names, “Gippy” 

and “Gimmy,” and now referred to them by their first names or as “the Beldens.” The 

district court received a video showing Mr. Ward telling the children, “We won’t quit 

trying until we are successful” and “Marines never give up.” Mr. Ward testified that these 

statements referred to his goal of terminating visitation with the Beldens.

[¶10] For their part, the Wards testified about how their circumstances had changed since 

the original stipulated visitation order had been entered. Ms. Ward testified that most of 

their time was occupied by their duties at a restaurant they had purchased in Sheridan and 

with homeschooling CWB and DB. The Wards testified that the children’s homeschooling 

required them to attend extra events to socialize with other homeschooled children, and 

that these events generally conflicted with the Beldens’ visitation schedule. The Wards 

argued that the Beldens should be responsible for all the transportation for visitation to

minimize interference with the Wards’ work schedules. The Wards also complained about 

the children missing social activities for the visits that took place after the contempt order. 

The Beldens contended that they would have rescheduled their visits to times that were 

more convenient for the children, but they had not been informed of these activities.

[¶11] The district court also conducted an in-camera interview with the oldest child, 

CWB. He explained that his parents had told him that the Beldens had been cruel towards 

his deceased father, and that the Beldens were mean. These comments and stories 

apparently had only been shared with him in the months leading up to trial. The district 

court determined that the child had either been coached by the Wards, or that the Wards 

had done nothing to hide their animosity for the Beldens from the children.

[¶12] In a thorough decision letter, the district court determined that the stipulated 

visitation order survived the children’s adoption by Mr. Ward and that the Beldens were 

not required to overcome the parental presumption a second time in the modification 

proceedings. The district court then determined that the Wards had not established good 

cause to revoke the stipulated visitation order but found good cause existed to amend the 

order to provide for less frequent visits and less travel on the part of the parents. 

Accordingly, the district court entered an order modifying the original order that reduced

the number of required visits and phone calls and shifted all responsibility for 

transportation to the Beldens. The Wards appealed from this order.
4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶13] Following a bench trial in a grandparent visitation action, we review the district 

court’s factual findings for clear error. Bowman v. Study, 2022 WY 139, ¶ 9, 519 P.3d 985, 

988 (Wyo. 2022).

While the factual findings of a judge are presumptively correct, 

the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible 

evidence in the record. Due regard is given to the opportunity 

of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and 

our review does not entail reweighing disputed evidence. ... A 

finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence 

to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed. We assume that the evidence of the prevailing 

party below is true and give that party every reasonable 

inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.

Id. (citations and quotations omitted). We review the district court’s conclusions of law de 

novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. The grandparent visitation order survived Mr. Ward’s adoption of the children.

[¶14] We most recently discussed the legal principles related to grandparent visitation 

proceedings in Bowman. Id. ¶¶ 10–15, 519 P.3d at 988–990. There we explained that 

“Any analysis of state-mandated grandparent visitation must start with the recognition that 

‘parents have a fundamental due process right to raise their children as they see fit and 

make decisions regarding their associations without interference from the government.’”

Id. ¶ 10, 519 P.3d at 988 (quoting Ailport v. Ailport, 2022 WY 43, ¶ 8, 507 P.3d 427, 433 

(Wyo. 2022)). While Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101(a) “confers grandparents a broad right 

to bring an action against parents to establish visitation with their grandchildren[,]” that 

right is limited by the parents’ fundamental due process right.1

1 Subsection (a) provides in relevant part:

A grandparent may bring an original action against any person having custody of the 

grandparent’s minor grandchild to establish reasonable visitation rights to the child. If the 

court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would be in the best interest of the child and that 

the rights of the child’s parents are not substantially impaired, the court shall grant 

reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent.
5

[¶15] To balance these competing rights, we have interpreted § 20-7-101(a) to require 

grandparents seeking visitation to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parents 

are unfit or their visitation decision is harmful to the children. Bowman, at ¶ 13, 519 P.3d 

at 989. This threshold requirement ensures the parents’ decision is given the “special 

weight” necessary to satisfy due process required by the United States Supreme Court in 

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061–62, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). 

Id. “Only after the grandparents have shown the parents are unfit or their visitation decision 

is harmful to the children will the presumption in favor of parental decision-making be 

overcome to allow the court to consider what visitation would serve the children’s best 

interests.” Id.

[¶16] Once the parental presumption has been overcome and grandparent visitation has 

been established, section 20-7-101(d) governs the process for modifying an existing 

visitation order. That subsection provides “In any action or proceeding in which visitation 

rights have been granted to a grandparent under this section, the court may for good cause 

upon petition of the person having custody or who is the guardian of the child, revoke or 

amend the visitation rights granted to the grandparent.” In addition, we have held that 

adoption can terminate a grandparent visitation order in certain circumstances. 

Specifically, in Hede v. Gilstrap, we held that the grandparent visitation rights of the 

paternal grandparents terminated upon the adoption of the grandchildren by their maternal 

grandparents. 2005 WY 24, ¶ 40, 107 P.3d 158, 175 (Wyo. 2005).

[¶17] In Hede, we explained that “adoption terminates the legal relationships between the 

biological family and the adopted child.” Id. at ¶¶ 24–25, 107 P.3d at 168–169 (citing 

Matter of Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 970–71 (Wyo. 1990) and In re Estate of 

Kirkpatrick, 2003 WY 125, ¶¶ 12-17, 77 P.3d 404, 407–409 (Wyo. 2003)); see also Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 1-22-114(a) (providing that after adoption “the former parent, guardian or 

putative father of the child shall have no right to the control or custody of the child. The 

adopting persons shall have all of the rights and obligations respecting the child as if they 

were natural parents.”). At that time, we noted “the adoption statutes unambiguously do 

not provide for biological grandparent intervention in adoption proceedings, nor for 

biological grandparent contesting of adoptions, nor for visitation after adoption.” Id. at 

¶ 26, 107 P.3d at 169.

The very fact that neither the adoption statutes nor the 

grandparent visitation statute specified that grandparent 

visitation orders survive adoption of the grandchild, coupled 

with the fact that the adoption statutes were not amended so as 

to provide for notice to grandparents or to provide that 

grandparents be made parties to an adoption, indicates the 

legislature’s intent that grandparent visitation rights terminate 

upon adoption, just as the rights of any other biological family 

member.
6

Id. at ¶ 36, 107 P.3d at 174–175.

[¶18] However, we also explained that “There is one section of the grandparent visitation 

statute that does directly reflect legislative intent as to the effect of adoption on grandparent 

visitation.” Id. at ¶ 29, 107 P.3d at 170. At the time, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101(c) 

provided that “No action to establish visitation rights may be brought by a grandparent 

under subsection (a) of this section if the minor grandchild has been adopted and neither 

adopting parent is a natural parent of the child.” This provision created a limited exception 

for stepparent adoptions to the general rule that grandparent visitation cannot be ordered 

after adoption. Hede ¶ 29, 107 P.3d. at 170. Although the precise question was not before 

us, we strongly intimated that grandparent visitation rights survive a stepparent adoption. 

Id. at ¶¶ 29–30, 107 P.3d at 170. In particular, we found “no compelling distinction 

between grandparent visitation rights that were ordered pre-adoption and those sought after 

adoption. The relationship between the child and the grandparent is exactly the same in 

either case and the potential interference with the adoptive family also is exactly the same.” 

Id. at ¶ 30, 107 P.3d at 170. Conversely, we concluded that the existence of the exception 

for stepparent adoptions did not mean that grandparent visitation rights survived adoptions 

by someone other than a stepparent. Id.

[¶19] The legislature responded to our decision in Hede in 2007 by amending both the 

adoption and the grandparent visitation statutes. 2007 Session Laws Ch. 127. First, the 

legislature required that every petition for adoption must contain “An affidavit stating the 

name or names of persons awarded visitation rights to the child under W.S. 20-7-101 or 

20-7-102 or an affidavit stating that no visitation rights under W.S. 20-7-101 or 20-7-102 

have been awarded in regard to the child.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(c)(v). Second the 

legislature required:

Prior to the hearing a copy of the petition to adopt a child and 

an order to show cause shall be served on any persons awarded 

visitation rights to the child under W.S. 20-7-101 or 20-7-102. 

The consent of persons awarded visitation rights to the 

adoption is not required. However, the court may exercise its 

discretion to allow those persons an opportunity to be heard if 

the court finds it to be in the best interest and welfare of the 

child.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-107(c). Finally, the legislature extended the limited exception for 

stepparent adoptions in § 20-7-101(c) to situations where “neither adopting parent is related 

by blood to the child.” Thus, grandparents, like those in Hede, are now permitted to seek 

visitation with their grandchildren after an adoption by a stepparent or a family member.

[¶20] When the legislature granted these new rights, it could have established a general 

rule that all grandparent visitation rights survive every adoption or that none do. But it 
7

chose not to adopt either of those general rules. In our view, this confirms the legislature’s 

intent to adhere to the dichotomy that we identified in Hede. Absent a general rule of 

survival, adoptions by those who are not stepparents or family members continue to 

terminate existing grandparent visitation rights. Conversely, absent a general rule 

terminating grandparent visitation after any adoption, existing grandparent visitation rights 

survive adoptions by stepparents and family members.2

[¶21] To be clear, we now state explicitly what we strongly intimated in Hede that 

grandparent visitation rights survive adoptions that fall within the expanded but still limited 

exception of § 20-7-101(c). We continue to see “no compelling distinction between 

grandparent visitation rights that were ordered pre-adoption and those sought after 

adoption.” Hede, ¶ 30, 107 P.3d at 170.

II. Precluding Mr. Ward from relitigating the original order does not violate due 

process.

[¶22] Mr. Ward was not a party to the stipulated visitation order entered before he married 

Ms. Ward and adopted the children. Accordingly, he claims that his due process rights 

were violated when the Beldens were not required to overcome the parental presumption a 

second time in this case by showing that he is an unfit parent or that his visitation decision 

will be harmful to the children. However, because the stipulated visitation order survived 

the stepparent adoption by Mr. Ward, his due process claim necessarily requires that we 

consider whether he is precluded from relitigating the claims or issues in that earlier 

proceeding. We find that Mr. Ward is precluded from relitigating whether the parental 

presumption has been overcome. We further conclude that such preclusion comports with 

due process.

[¶23] “The doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue 

preclusion) incorporate a universal legal principle of common-law jurisprudence to the 

effect that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court 

of competent jurisdiction ... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same 

parties or their privies.” Wyoming Dep’t of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007 WY 112, 

¶ 17, 162 P.3d 515, 522 (Wyo. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). Collateral estoppel 

does not apply here because the original visitation order was a consent judgment. See, e.g.,

Markstein v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 WY 122, ¶25, 77 P.3d 389, 397 (Wyo. 2003) 

(explaining that consent judgments ordinarily will not support collateral estoppel unless 

2 We note that other legislatures have drawn the same line and authorize survival of grandparent visitation 

rights after adoption by a stepparent or family member. See, e.g., Pier v. Bolles, 596 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Neb. 

1999); State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674, 679 (W. Va. 2001); Kanvick v. Reilley, 760 P.2d 

743 (Mont. 1988); Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1975); Hedrick v. Hedrick, 368 S.E.2d 14 (N.C. 

App. 1988); In re Marriage of Aragon, 764 P.2d 419 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); In re Groleau, 585 N.E.2d 726 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Howell v. Rogers, 551 So.2d 904 (Miss. 1989); and Rigler v. Treen, 660 A.2d 111 

(Pa. Super. 1995).
8

the agreement clearly expresses the intention of the parties to by bound in further 

proceedings). However, a consent judgment will ordinarily support res judicata or claim 

preclusion. Id. “Res judicata may be applied where four factors are found to exist: (1) 

identity in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to 

the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both 

the subject matter and the issues between them.” 3

 Exxon Mobil Corp., ¶ 18, 162 P.3d at 

522.

[¶24] We find that each of the four factors exist here. First, there is identity in parties 

because we conclude the Wards are privies.

Privity signifies that the relationship between two persons is 

such that a judgment involving one of them is conclusive upon 

the other, although the other was not a party to the suit.

However, privity is not established from the mere fact that 

persons may happen to be interested in the same question or in 

proving or disproving the same state of facts. Examples of 

legal relationships that bind a nonparty to an earlier judgment 

are preceding and succeeding owners of property, bailors and 

bailees, assignors and assignees and nonparties who are 

adequately represented by someone with the same interests 

who was a party.

Casiano v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dep’t of Transp., 2019 WY 16, ¶ 15, 434 P.3d 116, 121 

(Wyo. 2019) (cleaned up). Determining privity generally requires a careful examination 

of the circumstances of each case as it arises.

[¶25] Here we believe that Mr. Ward is in privity with Ms. Ward with regard to the initial 

threshold application of the parental presumption. We reach this conclusion not because 

they are spouses, as there are many circumstances where spouses are not in privity with 

each other. See, e.g., Worman v. Carver, 2002 WY 59, ¶¶ 29, 34, 44 P.3d 82, 89–90 (Wyo. 

2002) (finding wife to be in privity and not in privity with husband on different claims). 

Rather, we find these particular spouses in privity because they share the same interests in 

the initial application of the parental presumption. They also share the same interests in 

the best interests of the children and the same interests in exercising their now shared 

parental authority over the children. We see no good reason why the earlier judgment 

should not be conclusive as against Mr. Ward, and this is particularly true where he had 

3 Of course, the prior proceeding must also have been terminated with a final or appealable order. Womack 

v. Swan, 2018 WY 27, ¶ 17, 413 P.3d 127, 135 (Wyo. 2018). Here the prior proceedings resulted in a 

stipulated order which satisfies this requirement. See Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 2007 WY 10, 

¶ 23, 150 P.3d 653, 662 (Wyo. 2007) (explaining that consent decrees are the equivalent of litigated 

judgments for purposes of res judicata).
9

specific notice, both by statute and in fact, of the stipulated visitation order before he 

adopted the children.

[¶26] We also find that Mr. Ward was adequately represented in the prior proceedings by 

Ms. Ward. In those proceedings, she had an identical incentive to protect her parental right 

to make decisions for her children. She also had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

establishment of grandparent visitation and that opportunity was unaffected by her choice 

to voluntarily settle the case prior to trial. See, e.g., Hamaker v. Seales, 227 So.2d 32, 

38– 39 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (explaining that father exercised his parental rights by 

voluntarily agreeing to grandparent visitation). Ms. Ward chose to exercise her 

fundamental right to make decisions for her children by voluntarily agreeing to the 

Beldens’ request for visitation and we do not believe Mr. Ward should be permitted to 

second guess her choice and upset that voluntary settlement. See, e.g., Haderlie v. 

Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 711 (Wyo. 1993) (noting Wyoming has long recognized a 

strong public policy in favor of settlement of litigation).

[¶27] This conclusion also comports with the statutes governing adoption. When a parent 

adopts a child, he takes that child as he finds them. The adopting parents “shall have all of 

the rights and obligations respecting the child as if they were natural parents.” Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 1-22-114(a). The grandparent visitation order was a preexisting obligation and Mr. 

Ward adopted the children subject to that obligation. At the moment of adoption his right 

to contest the order was limited to filing a petition to revoke or amend the order under 

§ 20-7-101(d) just like the children’s natural parent.

[¶28] The remaining elements are easily met. The subject matter and the specific issue in 

the original proceedings are identical to the subject matter and issue Mr. Ward would like 

to litigate here. Whether the Beldens have overcome the parental presumption by showing 

parental unfitness or that the parent’s visitation decision will be harmful to the children and 

what visitation would serve the children’s best interests are the identical issues that were 

before the court in the initial proceedings. In fact, Mr. Ward explicitly asserts that he is 

seeking to require the Beldens to prove again the elements of the claim in which they 

previously prevailed to reestablish their entitlement to visitation. Finally, both of the 

Wards are acting in this litigation in their now shared capacity as parents. Because all four 

elements are present here, res judicata bars Mr. Ward from relitigating the initial threshold 

application of the parental presumption.

[¶29] Mr. Ward’s due process rights are not violated by this result. Generally, application 

of the preclusive doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are consistent with due 

process. In fact, we routinely apply res judicata to modifications of child custody and 

visitation orders.4 However, we have warned that “[E]xtreme applications of the doctrine 

4 See Willis v. Davis, 2013 WY 44, ¶6, 299 P.3d 88, 91 (Wyo. 2013) (“If a material change in circumstances 

cannot be shown, the doctrine of res judicata applies to the original [custody or visitation] order.”); Kappen 
10

of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is ‘fundamental in character.’” 

Himes v. Petro Eng’g & Const., 2003 WY 5, 61 P.3d 393, 400 n.4 (Wyo. 2003). We see 

nothing extreme about holding this married parent to the choices of his spouse as it relates 

to the care and custody of their children. Moreover, “[t]he touchstones of due process are 

notice and the opportunity to be heard.” ELA v. AAB, 2016 WY 98, ¶ 21, 382 P.3d 45, 50 

(Wyo. 2016). Ms. Ward had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the prior proceedings, 

Mr. Ward had notice of the prior order before he adopted the children, and he had an 

opportunity to be heard on his petition to modify. We see no reason why Mr. Ward would 

be entitled to more process here.

III. The parental presumption is not applicable in actions to revoke or amend.

[¶30] The Wards next contend that the district court erred when it failed to apply the 

parental presumption to their motion to modify the stipulated visitation order. In essence, 

they contend that they have a right to the parental presumption anytime visitation is either 

established or modified. We disagree.

[¶31] We begin by noting that § 20-7-101(d) governs modifications and it sets forth a 

different standard than subsection (a) which governs the establishment of visitation orders.

In particular, subsection (a), consistent with Troxel, requires the grandparents to show

“that the rights of the child’s parents are not substantially impaired” by granting visitation. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101(a). By contrast, subsection (d) requires the parents to show 

that “good cause” exists to modify the prior order. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101(d). The 

burden of proof is both explicitly different and vested in different parties. It would be 

inconsistent with the plain language of the statute to impose the additional requirement of 

overcoming the parental presumption again before requiring the parents to meet their 

burden of proof under subsection (d). In fact, subsection (d) would make little sense if a 

parent seeking modification could simply file a petition and then prevail without ever 

meeting their statutorily assigned burden.

[¶32] We next note that both Troxel and our own decision in Ailport interpreting § 20-7-

101 in light of Troxel involved the establishment of grandparent visitation. 530 U.S. at 61, 

120 S. Ct. at 2057; Ailport, ¶ 4, 507 P.3d at 431-432. Neither of these decisions considered 

modification proceedings and, therefore, shed no light on the issue. Other courts that have 

considered the issue have reached different conclusions.

v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶¶12–14, 341 P.3d 377, 381-382 (Wyo. 2015) (“The doctrine of res judicata has 

been ‘functionally incorporated as a threshold inquiry under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c).”) (cleaned up); 

Taulo-Millar v. Hognason, 2022 WY 8, ¶18, 501 P.3d 1274, 1280 (Wyo. 2022) (“Res judicata prohibits a 

district court from modifying a previous custody or visitation order absent a material change in 

circumstances.”) (quotations omitted).
11

[¶33] A few courts have reapplied the parental presumption in actions to modify or 

terminate grandparent visitation rights. See, e.g., Snyder v. Spaulding, 235 P.3d 578, 584

(Mont. 2010); In re A.M., 251 P.3d 1119, 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010); Barrett v. Ayres, 

972 A.2d 905, 914 (Md. App. 2009). This approach treats the parental presumption as a 

perpetual shield standing between the parents and the state which must be overcome before 

the state may take any action that would restrict the rights of a parent to be the primary 

decision-maker. As the Supreme Court of Montana explained, “[T]he constitutional rights 

discussed in Troxel ... do not simply evaporate because a contact order has been issued. 

The parent still retains her fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, 

custody, and control of her children.” Snyder, 235 P.3d at 584. “[A] fit parent’s estimation 

of her child’s best interests is entitled to deference, and the judge may not disregard or 

reject a fit parent’s views on continued visitation simply because he disagrees with them 

or thinks himself more enlightened than the parent.” Id.

[¶34] A larger group of courts have reached the opposite conclusion.5

 Many of these 

courts have concluded that reapplication of the parental preference in subsequent 

proceedings would render the initial order illusory. See, e.g., Slawinski, 150 A.3d at 414

(“once a parent enters into a consent order governing grandparent visitation, the parent may 

not unilaterally withdraw or require the grandparent to establish a right to visitation as if 

there had been no order at all.”); Albert, 613 S.E.2d at 869–70 (“To allow a natural parent 

to unilaterally rescind a judicially sanctioned consent decree establishing the custodial 

rights of the parties involved would render all such custody decrees void and 

unenforceable.”). More importantly, while these courts have recognized the interests of 

the parents, they have placed greater weight on the superior interests of the children in 

stability. “Declining to apply the presumption of superior parental rights in a modification 

proceeding not only gives deference to a court’s order, but it also promotes the important 

policy goal of stability for the child.” Lovlace, 418 S.W.3d at 31 (citations and quotations 

omitted).

5 See, e.g., Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 31 (Tenn. 2013) (“Once grandparents have obtained courtordered visitation, however, the presumption of superior parental rights does not apply in proceedings to 

modify or terminate grandparent visitation.”); Rennels v. Rennels, 257 P.3d 396, 401, n.5 (Nev. 2011) 

(“When a nonparent obtains visitation through a court order or judicial approval, they have successfully 

overcome the parental presumption and are in the same position as a parent seeking to modify or terminate 

visitation.”); Ingram v. Knippers, 72 P.3d 17, 22 (Okla. 2003) (“While a fit parent contesting grandparental 

visitation is entitled to a presumption that the parent will act in the best interest of the child, ... a court will 

not modify a valid visitation order without the moving party first showing a substantial change of 

circumstances.” (internal citation omitted)); Slawinski v. Nicholas, 150 A.3d 409, 414 (N.J. App. Div. 2016) 

(“[M]odification of a consent order governing grandparent visitation must be considered according to the 

same ... changed circumstances framework applicable to other custody and visitation orders.”); Albert v. 

Ramirez, 613 S.E.2d 865, 870 (Va. App. 2005) (“Requiring the party seeking a modification of a valid 

custody or visitation decree to prove a material change of circumstances justifying the modification is not 

inconsistent with or anathema to a parent’s constitutional rights as enunciated in Troxel.”); Deem v. Lobato, 

96 P.3d 1186, 1191 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (“Troxel does not shift the burden away from a parent who seeks 

to modify an existing order granting grandparent visitation.”).
12

[¶35] We choose to follow the majority of courts that have considered the issue and hold 

that the parental presumption does not apply when a court considers a petition to revoke or 

amend a grandparent visitation order under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101(d). Wyoming 

places the best interests of the child above all other matters in custody and visitation 

disputes. For example, we have held that “the best interests of the children are of overriding 

importance, and that they take precedence over the fundamental rights of parents.” Arnott 

v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, ¶ 31, 293 P.3d 440, 454 (Wyo. 2012). In this regard, we have 

recognized that “stability in a child’s environment is of utmost importance to the child’s 

well-being [and] changes in custody are not favored and should not be granted except in 

clear cases.” Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶ 12, 341 P.3d 377, 382 (Wyo. 2015) 

(cleaned up). We decline to allow dissatisfied parents to relitigate the very foundation of 

visitation orders that have been determined to be in the child’s best interests.

[¶36] Instead, we believe that requiring the parents to establish that “good cause” exists 

to revoke or amend a petition appropriately balances the interests of all parties. Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 20-7-101(d). Neither the legislature nor this Court has defined what constitutes 

good cause under § 20-7-101(d). Good cause can mean different things in different 

circumstances. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 2022 WY 31, ¶ 14, 505 P.3d 591, 596 (Wyo. 

2022) (defining good cause under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(f)(v) as requiring a driver 

to demonstrate that he would no longer present a threat to public safety if he were permitted 

to drive without an interlock device). Here the district court looked to the familiar “material 

change of circumstances” and “best interests” standard set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-

2-204(c) to consider whether the Wards had established good cause to revoke or amend the 

order. We think this approach is sound.

[¶37] Other courts have required similar showings and concluded that imposing this 

burden on the parents did not impair their fundamental rights. For example, the court in 

Lovlace, held “that when a grandparent or a parent initiates a proceeding to modify or 

terminate court-ordered grandparent visitation, the burdens of proof and the standards to 

be applied are the same as those typically applied in parent-vs-parent visitation 

modification cases.” 418 S.W.3d at 30. That court went on to explain that “Our holding 

should not be viewed as retreating from prior decisions recognizing the fundamental right 

of parents to the care and custody of their children.” Id. We agree and hold that when a 

parent seeks to amend or revoke a grandparent visitation order they demonstrate good cause 

under § 20-7-101(d) by showing “a material change of circumstances since the entry of the 

order in question and that the modification would be in the best interests of the children[.]” 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c).

[¶38] Accordingly, the district court properly rejected the Ward’s request to reapply the 

parental preference and properly applied the good cause standard set forth in § 20-7-101(d)

in these modification proceedings.
13

IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the visitation order.

[¶39] The Wards next assert the district court abused its discretion in modifying the 

visitation order because it failed to address the concerns they raised at trial. Again, we 

disagree.

We review a district court’s decision on a petition to modify 

child custody for an abuse of discretion. We will not disturb 

the decision absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of 

discretion. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 

among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it 

means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right 

under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 

capriciously.

Evans v. Sharpe, 2023 WY 55, ¶ 25, 530 P.3d 298, 307 (Wyo. 2023) (cleaned up).

[¶40] The district court agreed with the Wards that there had been a material change in 

circumstances and, therefore, the court was free to reassess the best interests of the children.

In its decision letter, the district court recounted in detail the Ward’s assertions that their 

work at the restaurant, the children’s homeschooling, together with their extra events and 

social activities, made visitation inconvenient. The district court also noted the Ward’s 

concerns that the travel times and length of visits were too long and their argument that

Beldens should bear all the costs of transportation for visitation. Finally, the district court

took due notice of the burden the original visitation order placed on the Wards and the 

difficulty they had complying with its terms. Then the district court modified the visitation 

order to accommodate all of these concerns by reducing the number of required visits and 

phone calls, and shifting all responsibility for transportation to the Beldens. In fact, the 

once generous visitation schedule was cut roughly in half. The modified order takes into 

account the busy schedules of the Wards, the needs and sensitivities of CWB and DB, and 

the interests of the Beldens in maintaining a relationship with the children of their deceased 

son.

[¶41] It seems the Wards’ real complaint is that the district court did not adopt the more 

restrictive visitation schedule that they had proposed. But a litigant’s mere dissatisfaction 

with an order does not establish an abuse of discretion. The district court addressed all the 

Ward’s complaints about visitation and did so in an extremely thoughtful manner 

calculated to reduce the persistent animosity that the Wards have shown towards the 

Beldens.
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CONCLUSION

[¶42] The stipulated grandparent visitation order survived Mr. Ward’s adoption of CWB 

and DB and Mr. Ward was not free to relitigate the claims addressed in that order. 

Precluding him from relitigating those claims does not violate his due process rights. 

Instead, he and his wife had a right to petition to amend or revoke that order under § 20-7-

101(d), although they were not entitled to the parental presumption in those proceedings. 

In those proceedings, the Wards were required to demonstrate that good cause existed to 

revoke or modify the original order, and while they demonstrated that there had been a 

material change in circumstances, they failed to show that the order should be revoked. 

The modified order fairly addressed the concerns the Wards raised at trial and the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give the Wards the visitation schedule they 

preferred.

[¶43] Affirmed.