AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed September 14, 2023 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-00857-CR JOSEPH DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-82260-2021 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Garcia A jury convicted appellant of murder and assessed punishment at life in prison. In a single issue, a ppellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Concluding appellant’s argument is without merit, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Background On March 12, 2021, a ppellant called 911 and told di spatchers he had shot his wife. He claimed that one of the firearms he had taken on an ear lier fishing trip had accidentally fired and hit his wife.–2– Appellant’s wife, Kimberly Enriquez, wa s found in the master bathroom of the couple’s home with a shotgun blast to he r chest. The shot destroyed her liver and damaged her duodenum, pancreas, adrenal glands, kidne ys, and lungs. Some of the shotgun pellets also went through portions of her heart. She died at the scene. Appellant was charged with murder. A jury found him guilty and assessed punishment at life in prison. Judgment wa s entered accordingly. Appellant now appeals from that judgment. II. Analysis Appellant’s sole issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues the evidence was legally insufficient for a reasonable fact finder to determ ine he had the specific intent to cause death or serious bodily injury when he shot his wife in the chest with a shotgun. We disagree. When we review the sufficiency of th e evidence to support a conviction, we uphold the conviction if any rational trier of fact coul d have found all essential elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Edward v. State , 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). In conducting our review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id . The jury is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and it may choose to believe all, some, or none of the evidence presented. Id. Moreover, the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if the inferences necessary to establis h guilt are reasonable based on the cumulative–3– force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id . at 655–56. When there are differing rationa l interpretations of the evidence, we differ to the interpretation most favorable to the verdict. Laster v. State , 275 S.W.3d 512, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Circumstantia l evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing an actor’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); O’Reilly v. State , 501 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2016, no pet.). We measure the sufficiency of the evid ence against the hypothetically correct jury charge, defined by the statutory el ements as modified by the charging instrument. Edward , 635 S.W.3d at 656. As relevant here, the St ate was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (i) appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of his wife, and (ii) in tended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of his wife.
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. § 19.02(b); see also Staves v. State , No. 01-22-00268- CR, 2022 WL 16640808, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houst on [1st Dist.] Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not desi gnated for publication). Appellant’s challenge focuse s on the requisite mental state. The intent of a defendant may be infe rred by his acts, words, and conduc t, as well as the method he used to commit the crime and the nature of the wounds inf licted on the victim. Hart
v. State , 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Nisbett v. State , 552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Proof of mental state will almost always depend upon–4– circumstantial evidence, Duntsch v. State , 568 S.W.3d 193, 216 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. ref’d) and is a fact question to be determined by the jury from all the circumstances. Walter v. State , 581 S.W.3d 957, 972 (Tex . App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref'd). Here, the jury could have reasona bly inferred from the overwhelming circumstantial evidence that appellant ha d the requisite intent to kill his wife. Appellant gave inconsistent statements and improbable explanations and admitted that he pulled the trigger on a firearm, a deadly weapon, at close range. All these circumstances support inferences concerning appellant’s intent. When officers arrived at the scene, a ppellant said multiple times that there was no magazine in the shotgun when it fi red. But when crime scene investigators checked the gun, there was s till a live round in the chambe r. Testimony established this indicated that a magazi ne was loaded into the wea pon at the time it was fired, because otherwise the chambe r would have been empty. Appellant told the officers that he and hi s wife had just been talking and were not arguing. Kimberly was in the bathroom , and he was in the bedroom. According to appellant, he was standing at the foot of the bed putting his guns away when the shotgun discharged and hit his wife. Ap pellant acknowledged th at he must have pulled the trigger. The weapon was found on the floor, poi nted at a window, away from the bathroom where Kimberly’s body was foun d. A firearm and toolmark examiner–5– testified that the weapon was an AR-15 style, 12 gauge se mi-automatic shotgun. It had a drop safety to prevent accidental fi ring without the trigger being pulled. The trigger had a 9.5-pound pull, which means th at significant pressure on the trigger is required to make the weapon fire. Appellant’s story changed seven months after the shooting when he wrote to his son from jail. Appellant wrote: Anthony, I was hoping I would neve r have to tell anyone what happened that night and they would ju st let me take a ll the blame, but the extra round in the ch amber changes everythi ng. You and B deserve to know. Dad. Y’all know there was nothing your mom could say or do to ever have me hurt her. Noth ing. Something did happen. 2013 came back around. No, I was not doing a nything. She finally put two and two together. I can’t go into detail. Several months later, in a telep hone call from jail, appellant said: That night, I know you remember 2013. And so that night, your mom found out that those nine months I ha d an affair and stuff. And she got really upset, and she started you know, yelling and hollering like she did back in 2014 when she found out about, you know, the nine months and stuff. And so when she was ye lling at me and stuff, and you know me, I went to the living room and th e kitchen and started throwing shit: bourbon and stuff. And, you know, that’s when I hear d the round chambering. And I got mad and I ran back there, and she was holding the gun, and I just grabbed it out of her hand and that’s when it went off, when I was going to throw it on the bed, when I was going back to the bed, that’s when it went off. I’m sorry [unintelligible]. All of this happened because of my infidelity. This later version of events claiming th at Kimberly loaded the shotgun while they were fighting, and it went off when he tried to take it from her is inconsistent with the version of events he first gave the police. The jury could reasonably infer–6– that appellant changed his story after he realized that the evidence did not support what he initially told the police. Inconsis tent statements are circumstantial evidence from which a jury may infer a defendant’s guilt. Nisbett , 552 S.W.3d at 267;
Guevara v. State , 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Improbable explanations can also support an inference of guilt. Nisbett , 552 S.W.3d at 267. The shotgun had a trigger pu ll requiring substantial pressure to fire the gun. This does not support appellant’s claim that the weapon accidentally discharged, but rather, suggests th e weapon was fired intentionally. See Turner v

. State , 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Aldridge v. State , No. 05-07- 00777-CR, 2008 WL 3272146, at *2 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) . Moreover, although appellant told the police there was no magazine in the gun when he fired, the live round officers found still in the chamber indicated otherwis e. And although appellant claimed he accidentally shot his wife when taking th e gun away from her, th e forensic evidence demonstrated that the shot was from nine to twelve feet away. The police found several guns at the scene, including Kimberly’s loaded pistol on the dresser. But instead of grabbing th e more easily managed, loaded pistol, appellant claims his angry wife loaded a s hotgun with a difficult trigger pull and then retreated to the bathroom. Had this occurred, appellant would then have had to enter the bathroom to take the shotgun away, a nd “accidentally” fire it directly into her chest while walking away to put the gun on the bed. The jury could reasonably have–7– concluded this was improba ble and found the explanation probative of wrongful conduct and circumstances of guilt. See Lozano v. State , 359 S.W.3d 790, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d). The specific intent to cause death can al so be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, such as the firearm used here. Cavazos v. State , 382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brown v. State , 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also T EX

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. § 1.07(17)(A) (defining a firearm as a deadly weapon). Texas law generally presumes that a cr iminal defendant intended the natural consequences of his acts. See Ruffin v. State , 270 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Appellant acknowledged that he must have pulled the trigger. Given that appellant was only nine to tw elve feet away from his wife at the time he shot her, the jury could infer that a ppellant intended to kill her. See Ervin v. State , 333 S.W.3d 187, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (concluding that when person discharges firearm at close range a nd death results, law presumes intent to kill). Finally, a jury may infer a culpable mental state from the extent of the victim’s injuries. Nisbett , 552 S.W.3d at 267; Patrick v. State , 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The shot here struck Kimber ly in the center of her chest, with no pellets striking any of her extremities or objects around her. The jury could reasonably infer that the shot was intended to be fatal.–8– “Because one’s acts are generally relia ble circumstantial evidence of one’s intent, the jury could reasonably infer th at [appellant] intended to do exactly what he did.” Laster , 275 S.W.3d at 524. Accordingly, in view of the abundant circumstantial evidence against appellant, cons idered in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is su fficient to support ap pellant’s conviction. Appellant’s sole issue is resolved agains t him, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

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. P. 47.2(b) 220857F.U05 /Dennise Garcia/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE–9– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT JOSEPH DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, Appellant

No. 05-22-00857-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-82260- 2021. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Justices Goldstein and Miskel participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered September 14, 2023