COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

TIMOTHY M. JONES 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0606-96-1 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 APRIL 15, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 

N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 

 Damian T. Horne (Horne, West & McMurtrie, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Timothy M. Jones was convicted of possession of cocaine. On 

appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress the evidence. Specifically, he argues that 

the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity was afoot when they stopped his car. 

 On the afternoon of July 14, 1995, Gloucester County Deputy 

Sheriff Hicks and Investigator Jones were on patrol in a white, 

unmarked Ford Bronco. A compact car driven by Jones approached 

them from behind at a high speed. As Jones' car came alongside 

the Bronco, the passenger in the front seat of the car motioned 

to two others in the rear. They all looked at the two officers 

and one man gestured as though he were shooting a gun. Jones' 

car then took position immediately behind and to the right of the 

officers' Bronco, and remained there. Although the officers 
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accelerated to seventy miles per hour and slowed to fifty miles 

per hour, Jones maintained a constant position, refusing to pass 

and staying behind and to the right of the Bronco. At a 

stoplight, Jones maintained this position rather than stopping 

alongside the Bronco. The vehicles proceeded in this fashion for 

twenty-five minutes. Hicks concluded that Jones sought to ensure 

that his car "was always at an advantage to [Hicks'] vehicle." 

 Three weeks earlier, a confidential informant had told the 

Gloucester County Sheriff's Department of a "contract" to murder 

Hicks and Jones in retaliation for a prior arrest. Hicks stated 

that several informants had confirmed the existence of the 

contract and had reported that money had been paid for this 

purpose. Hicks also testified that Jones "looked very familiar 

to one of the ones that [they] arrested [in the incident that 

gave rise to the contract on him and Jones.]" 

 Hicks and Jones decided to "follow-up" on the reported 

contract and to identify the persons in the vehicle. Upon 

entering York County, they obtained assistance from York County 

officers, who stopped Jones' vehicle. Investigator Donnelly 

obtained consent to search Jones for drugs and weapons and 

discovered a pipe containing crack cocaine. Jones was then 

arrested for possession of cocaine. 

 Jones has the burden of demonstrating that the trial court's 

ruling on the motion to suppress constituted reversible error. 

Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 
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(1980). Generally on appeal, determinations of reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause are examined de novo. However, we 

review the trial court's findings of historical fact only for 

clear error, and grant due weight to inferences derived from 

those facts by the trial judge and police officers. James v. 

Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 740, 743, 473 S.E.2d 90, 91 (1996) 

(citing Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996)). 

 Jones contends that the police officers lacked a reasonable 

suspicion, supported by objective facts, warranting the 

investigatory stop of his vehicle. He cites Bethea v. 

Commonwealth, 245 Va. 416, 429 S.E.2d 211 (1993), for the 

proposition that gestures and erratic driving patterns are not, 

by themselves, sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. His reliance on Bethea is misplaced. 

 In Bethea, police officers in an unmarked police vehicle 

observed Bethea, a passenger in a passing car, making faces at 

them, which "startled" and "scared" one officer. Id. at 417, 429 

S.E.2d at 212. The officers then stopped the vehicle for a 

traffic infraction. They ordered Bethea out of the vehicle and 

frisked him. Id. at 417-18, 429 S.E.2d at 212. The question 

before the Supreme Court concerned the constitutional validity of 

the police officer's demand that a passenger (Bethea) step out of 

the vehicle. Based partly upon Bethea's actions prior to the 

stop, the Supreme Court found that the totality of the 

circumstances, including the safety of the officer, supported the 
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requirement that Bethea exit the vehicle. Id. at 420, 429 S.E.2d 

at 213. See Bethea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 474, 478, 419 

S.E.2d 249, 251-52 (1992), aff'd, 245 Va. 416, 429 S.E.2d 211 

(1993) (discussing state's "legitimate and weighty" interest in 

the protection of police officers). Because the officers had 

stopped the vehicle lawfully due to a traffic infraction, the 

Supreme Court did not consider whether Bethea's actions alone 

would have provided a reasonable and articulable suspicion 

supporting the stop of the vehicle. 

 "A police officer may stop the driver or occupants of an 

automobile for investigatory purposes if the officer has 'a 

reasonable articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts, 

that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'" Freeman 

v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 660-61, 460 S.E.2d 261, 262 

(1995) (quoting Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 

405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991)). See Mejia v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. 

App. 749, 753, 441 S.E.2d 41, 43 (1994). "To determine whether 

an officer has articulated a reasonable basis to suspect criminal 

activity, a court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances, including the officer's knowledge, training, and 

experience." Freeman, 20 Va. App. at 661, 460 S.E.2d at 262 

(citing Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 

125, 128 (1989)). See also Jackson v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 

347, 353-54, 470 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1996); Logan v. Commonwealth, 

19 Va. App. 437, 441, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994). 
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 Viewing the totality of the circumstances in this case, we 

conclude that the officers had a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The unprovoked 

harassment and intimidation directed by Jones and his passengers 

at the police officers created a traffic hazard and a potentially 

dangerous situation. Jones' erratic driving, coupled with the 

gestures of the passengers and the threats reported to the 

officers, gave rise to a particularized and reasonable suspicion 

of criminal conduct and authorized an investigatory stop to 

identify Jones and his passengers and to question them regarding 

their conduct. See Quigley v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 28, 33, 

414 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1992); Peguese v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 

368, 370, 437 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1993). Accordingly, the trial 

court correctly refused to suppress the evidence obtained during 

the investigatory stop. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.