The HONORABLE JOHN R. TUNHEIM, United States District Judge 1

for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

 The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge 2

for the Western District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 96-1855

No. 96-2203

___________

Robert Dodson, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Woodmen of the World Life *

Insurance Society, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: December 13, 1996

 Filed: March 20, 1997

___________

Before WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM, District 1

Judge.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society (Woodmen) appeals from

the district court's orders awarding Robert Dodson disability benefits and 2

attorney fees. We affirm.
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I.

Dodson was employed by Woodmen as a field representative for more

than eighteen years. Under his contract with Woodmen, Dodson was enrolled

in a group disability insurance policy (the group policy). In the summer

of 1990, Dodson began suffering from various physical ailments, anxiety,

and depression, and his work level progressively declined. By letter dated

August 24, 1990, Dodson's manager stated that although he "sympathize[d]

with [Dodson's] health problems," Dodson would be terminated if his

production did not "drastically improve[] immediately." Although Dodson's

activity increased slightly the following week, he did not work at all the

first three weeks in September. Dodson was terminated on September 20,

1990, and his coverage under the group policy ended on this date as well.

On February 15, 1993, Dodson filed a claim for disability under the

group policy. Because the group policy provided that claims must be made

within one year after the onset of disability, Woodmen denied Dodson’s

claim as untimely. 

Dodson then filed this ERISA action, alleging that the group policy’s

summary plan description (SPD) was insufficient because it failed to

disclose the time limit for filing and that the time limit was therefore

not enforceable against him. The district court agreed, found that Dodson

was disabled before the termination of the group policy, and awarded Dodson

benefits and attorney fees.

II.

Woodmen contends that the district court erred in finding that Dodson

was disabled before the termination of the policy on
 Woodmen asserts that Dodson's alleged disability was related 3

to his fear that he might be terminated, apparently implying that

this fact would take his disability out of the scope of coverage.

Under our reading of the policy, however, all that is required is

a showing that Dodson was disabled prior to the termination of the

policy, September 20, 1990, and that the source of stress causing

Dodson's disability is irrelevant.

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September 20, 1990. We review the district court's factual determination

of Dodson's disability status for clear error. See Cooper Tire & Rubber

Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365, 369 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 300 (1995). 

As relevant, the group policy defines "disabled" as "not able to do

substantially all the basic duties of the participant's regular work" and

"not doing any work for wage or profit." Woodmen argues that Dodson's

allegedly disabling symptoms did not occur until after Dodson was

terminated. Relying on the testimony of Dodson's treating physician, Dr.

Kendall, and on Dodson's weekly activity reports, the district court

concluded that Dodson was unable to substantially perform the basic duties

of his work and thus was disabled prior to his termination on September 20,

1990. 

Dr. Kendall treated Dodson regularly between October of 1989 and

September of 1990. He testified that physical ailments caused Dodson to

miss work in the summer of 1990, which in turn caused Dodson to experience

stress and anxiety and to fear he would be terminated. Dr. Kendall opined

that these job-related factors, in addition to family problems, caused

Dodson acute depression or anxiety that rendered him mentally disabled and

completely unable to work as of September 7, 1990, thirteen days before his

termination and before coverage under the group policy ended. 

3

The district court found that Dodson's weekly work activity reports,

which showed declining activity in July and August of 1990
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and virtually no activity the first three weeks of September, corroborated

Dr. Kendall's testimony that Dodson was disabled before the termination of

the policy. Woodmen asserts that this finding is erroneous and that the

presence of some activity in July and August of 1990 shows that Dodson

maintained his ability to perform work and was therefore not disabled. We

agree with the district court, however, that Dodson's diminishing work

activity level corroborates Dr. Kendall's testimony that Dodson was unable

to perform substantially all the basic duties of his job before the

termination of coverage on September 20, 1990. 

Woodmen contends that the district court erred in discounting

testimony of Woodmen's medical director that Dodson was not disabled when

he was terminated. We have held that opinions of a reviewing physician in

an ERISA case are entitled to less deference than those of a treating

physician. See Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 901 (8th Cir. 1996).

Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the testimony

of the medical director was entitled to less deference because he was an

employee of Woodmen, had never personally examined Dodson, and had not

actively practiced medicine since 1961. Based on Dr. Kendall's testimony

and the documentary evidence, we cannot say that the district court's

conclusion that Dodson was disabled before the termination of the policy

is clearly erroneous.

III.

Woodmen contends that the group policy's time limit for filing bars

Dodson's claim for benefits. The omission from the SPD of information

regarding the time limit for filing violated ERISA, for ERISA requires that

SPDs contain information regarding "circumstances which may result in

disqualification, ineligibility,
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or denial or loss of benefits" and "the procedures to be followed in

presenting claims for benefits under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b).

Woodmen concedes that the SPD did not contain information regarding the

time limit for filing claims, but contends that because Dodson did not rely

on the omitted information the time limit should not be waived as applied

to him. 

A showing of reliance or prejudice must be shown to entitle a

claimant to relief based on a faulty SPD. See Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins.

Co., 972 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1992); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus.,

Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1520 (8th Cir. 1988). The facts in this case show

that Dodson was prejudiced by the omission of the time limit for filing

from the SPD. He was disabled in September of 1990 and had one year under

the policy to file for benefits. He became aware of the group policy in

June of 1991 and thus had three months -- until September of 1991 -- in

which he could have timely filed had he known of the time limit. The SPD

was the only document describing the group policy that Dodson had ever

received. Dodson testified that he read the SPD in June of 1991 but could

not "get anything out of" it and that "there was . . . no evidence of any

deadlines or claims to be filed or anything like that." Had the SPD

informed Dodson that the period for claiming benefits would expire in

September of 1991, he would have had the opportunity to timely file or

otherwise preserve his benefits. Cf. Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d

1574, 1579 n.2 (11th Cir. 1992) (evidence that beneficiary received and

read summary and failed to take timely action based on belief there was no

time limit would support beneficiary's claim for relief based on faulty

summary). 
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We reject Woodmen's contention that the time limit applied to bar

Dodson's claim because Dodson is an "expert" and should have known of the

allegedly standard year-long filing period. ERISA requires that SPDs be

"underst[andable] by the average Plan participant, and . . . sufficiently

accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and

beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan." 29 U.S.C.

§ 1022(a)(1). There is no provision excluding insurance salesmen from the

purview of ERISA protection. Moreover, Dodson sold life insurance, not

disability insurance, and we will not assume that he possessed special

familiarity with standard characteristics of disability policies. Absent

evidence showing that Dodson actually knew of the time limit in the group

policy, he should not be barred from coverage in the circumstances of this

case.

IV.

Finally, Woodmen argues that the district court erred in awarding

Dodson attorney fees, a decision we review for an abuse of discretion. See

Maune v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 83 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir.

1996). In determining whether to award attorney fees, a court should

consider the opposing party's culpability or bad faith, its ability to pay,

the deterrent effect an award would have on others, whether the party

requesting attorney fees sought to benefit all participants and

beneficiaries or to resolve a significant ERISA legal question, and the

relative merits of the parties' positions. See Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749

F.2d 494, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Maune, 83 F.3d at 963. The

district court carefully weighed these factors and found that they

supported an award of fees. We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling.
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The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.