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2018 PA Super 247

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

IN THE INTEREST OF E.O., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.O., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2641 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000127-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.O., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.O., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2643 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000228-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT*, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 05, 2018

A.O. (Father) appeals from the orders, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, finding him in contempt1for violating a visitation 

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1 When reviewing a contempt conviction, much deference is given to the 

discretion of the trial judge. Accordingly, we are confined to a determination 

of whether the facts support the trial court’s decision. Commonwealth v. 

Pruitt, 764 A.2d 569, 574 (Pa. Super. 2000).
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order in an underlying dependency proceeding and ordering him to serve 

seven days of incarceration. After careful review, we vacate and remand for 

further proceedings.

At a January 20172 shelter care hearing, legal custody of Father’s minor 

children, E.O. and B.O. (Children), was transferred to the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (DHS); Children were placed in a foster home. 

In February 2017, Children were adjudicated dependent; the trial court 

ordered Father have weekly, supervised, line-of-hearing visits with Children, 

at Children’s discretion, at the Community Umbrella Agency (Agency).

3

 At an 

August 3, 2017 permanency review hearing, the trial court found Father in 

contempt for violating the visitation order after Children told their assigned 

social worker that Father calls them on the telephone ten times a day and was 

meeting with them after court appearances.4 At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the court ordered Father to immediately serve seven days of incarceration for 

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2

In October 2016, DHS received a report alleging that Children’s sibling was 

being emotionally abused by Mother. See Dependency Petition, 2/2/17. 

There were also reports of a history of verbal and physical domestic abuse 

between Mother and Father and that Father verbally abused Children’s older 

sibling.

3 The permanency order also stated that visitation could be modified by 

agreement of the parties, parents were to confirm their visits 24 hours in 

advance, and, if parents failed to confirm visits within that time frame, they 

were not to occur. Permanency Review Order, 2/7/17, at 2. Finally, the order 

referred both Mother and Father for counseling and evaluations. Id.

4 See N.T. Permanency Hearing, 8/3/17, at 11-15.
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contempt.

5

 The court ordered both parents to continue with supervised visits 

at the Agency, at the sole discretion of Children. On August 10, 2017, the 

court held a hearing, stating that the “case was brought back today only to 

release Father from incarceration at CFCF. Father was held in contempt in 

violation of court order at the last hearing on 8/3/2017.”

Father filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s contempt order 

and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors raised on 

appeal.6 He raises the following issues for our consideration:

(1) Whether the trial court erred by finding Father in criminal 

contempt, rather than civil contempt.

(2) Whether the trial court erred by sentencing Father for direct 

criminal contempt rather than indirect criminal contempt.

(3) Whether the trial court erred by failing to provide Father 

with all necessary [c]onstitutional protections and 

safeguards required for criminal defendants.

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5 Specifically, the permanency order states:

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS Parents had unauthorized contact 

with Child.

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Father to be held in contempt, on State Road for 7 days due to 

violating court order.

Permanency Review Order, 8/3/17, at 1.

6

In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Father states that he did not have 

“inappropriate contact with any of [his] children,” that he did not violate the 

visitation order by calling Children, that he did not call Children ten times per 

day as alleged, and that “[t]he court may have mistaken [him] for [Mother].” 

See Father’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 8/14/17.
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(4) Whether the trial court erred by failing to establish Father’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(5) Whether the trial court erred by failing to sentence Father 

in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure.

Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

Contempt of court may be classified as civil or criminal in nature. 

The distinction between the two categories lies in the purpose 

behind the court’s finding of contempt. If the dominant purpose 

of the court is to prospectively coerce the contemnor into 

compliance with the court’s directive, the adjudication is one of 

civil contempt. However, if the court’s dominant purpose is to 

punish the contemnor for disobedience of the court’s order, 

the adjudication is one of criminal contempt.

In the Interest of C.W., 960 A.2d 458, 466 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis 

added), citing Pruitt, supra at 573.

Criminal contempt may be classified as either direct or indirect. “A direct 

criminal contempt consists of misconduct of a person in the presence of the 

court, or disobedience to or neglect of the lawful process of the court, or 

misbehavior so near thereto as to interfere with the immediate business of 

the court.” Fenstamaker v. Fenstamaker, 487 A.2d 11, 14 (Pa. Super. 

1985) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 762 

(Pa. 1980). “A charge of indirect criminal contempt consists of a claim that a 

violation of an order or decree of court occurred outside the presence of the 

court.” Commonwealth v. Ashton, 824 A.2d 1198, 1203 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citation omitted). Criminal contempt is a crime punishable by imprisonment 

or fine; sentences of imprisonment for contempt must be imposed according 

to the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701. Commonwealth v. 
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Falkenhan, 452 A.2d 750, 757 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, in cases where one is accused of criminal contempt, whether direct 

or indirect, the accused is entitled to certain procedural safeguards.

To establish a claim of indirect criminal contempt, the evidence must be 

sufficient to establish the following four elements: 

(1) the order in question must be definite, clear, specific and leave 

no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom it was 

addressed of the conduct prohibited; (2) the contemnor must 

have had notice of the specific order or decree; (3) the act 

constituting the violation must have been volitional; and (4) the 

contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent. 

Ashton, 824 A.2d at 1203 (citation omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court has emphasized that the order underlying a finding of indirect criminal 

contempt must limit the alleged contemnor’s conduct in a clear and definite 

manner. Id. Moreover, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 4133, except as otherwise 

provided by statute, “the punishment of commitment for contempt provided 

in section 4132 . . . shall extend only to contempts committed in open court. 

All other contempts shall be punishable by fine only.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 4133 

(emphasis added).

Here, the trial court’s order constituted a finding of criminal7 contempt 

where the visitation order set forth specific conditions surrounding Father’s 

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7 The characteristic that distinguishes civil from criminal contempt is the ability 

of the contemnor to purge himself of contempt by complying with the court’s 

directive. If he is given an opportunity to purge himself before imposition of 

punishment, the contempt order is civil in nature. Sinaiko v. Sinaiko, 664 
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visitation rights with Children, he allegedly violated these conditions by calling 

Children on the phone daily and meeting with them after court proceedings, 

and the court specifically stated that “it expect[s] that [its] court order will be 

abided by.” N.T. Permanency Hearing, 8/3/17, at 22 (“that’s defiance of my 

court order”); see Commonwealth v. Griffiths, 15 A.3d 73, 77 (Pa. Super 

2010) (“If the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of 

the court and to protect the interest of the general public, it is a proceeding 

for criminal contempt.”) (citation omitted); see also Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 

A.2d 1053 (Pa 1979) (if contempt consists solely of past act, only allowable 

judicial response is punitive, and any contempt adjudication must be criminal). 

While Father’s conduct may have amounted to criminal contempt where the 

trial court clearly sought to vindicate its authority and to punish Father for his 

alleged misconduct, Father’s contemptuous conduct did not occur in open 

court, nor did his misbehavior occur “so near thereto as to interfere with the

immediate business of the court.” Fenstamaker, supra. Thus, his conduct 

is classified as indirect criminal contempt. Compare Commonwealth v. 

Baker, 766 A.2d 328 (Pa. 2001) (charge of indirect criminal contempt consists 

of claim that violation of court order or decree occurred outside presence of 

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A.2d 1005, 1009 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted). If the purpose of the 

order is to punish despite an opportunity to purge, the order is criminal in 

nature. Id. Here, the court clearly imposed criminal, not civil contempt upon 

Father by immediately incarcerating him for violating a visitation order and 

not giving him an opportunity to purge.
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court) with Knaus v. Knaus, 127 A.2d 669, 671 (Pa. 1956) (direct contempt 

occurs either in presence of court or “so near thereto to interfere with its 

immediate business.”). 

Where one is accused of indirect criminal contempt, he shall enjoy the 

right to be notified of the accusation and time to prepare a defense. See 

Cipolla, 398 A.2d at 1056; see also In re Martorano, 346 A.2d 22 (Pa. 

1975) (accused in criminal contempt proceeding entitled to essential 

procedural safeguards attendant to criminal proceedings generally). 

Moreover, an individual may only be found guilty if the order underlying the 

finding of indirect criminal contempt limited his conduct “in a clear and definite 

manner.” Ashton, supra. Here, the visitation order permitted Father to have 

weekly, supervised, line-of-hearing visits with Children at the Agency, at 

Children’s discretion, and also permitted modification of visitation by 

agreement of the parties. 

Father instantly denied calling Children ten times a day8 and also 

claimed he never had unauthorized meetings with Children after court 

proceedings. N.T. Permanency Review Hearing, 8/3/17, at 23-25. Although 

the trial judge deemed Father not credible and found him to be manipulative, 

it did not provide Father with any of the required procedural safeguards 

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8 Notably, the permanency order does not mention whether Father was 

permitted to contact Children via telephone or whether he was restricted from 

communicating with them other than during supervised visitation.
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attached to indirect criminal contempt matters. Moreover, pursuant to section 

4133, the trial court was only permitted to fine Father, not incarcerate him. 

See Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759 (Pa.1980) (restricting 

incarceration to direct contempts).9 Because the trial court clearly failed to 

understand the nature of the proceedings, imposed an unauthorized sentence 

of imprisonment and, concomitantly, failed to accord Father the procedural 

safeguards he was due, we must vacate. Pruitt, supra. 

Order vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Platt joins this Opinion. 

Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 

case.

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9

In Commonwealth v. McMullen 961 A.2d 842 (Pa. 2008), the Supreme 

Court held 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4136 (statute for indirect criminal contempt 

proceedings involving restraining order or injunction) unconstitutional, 

recognizing that the right to a jury trial is procedural, that the Pennsylvania 

Constitution only provides for a jury trial when a criminal defendant faces a 

term of imprisonment exceeding six months, and that courts have authority 

to punish individuals in violation of their orders. The McMullen Court, 

however, specifically limited its holding to subsection 4136, stating “[w]e 

recognize there is other statutory law concerning contempt in Title 42, see 42 

Pa.C.S. §[§] 4132-39; however, only § 4136 is at issue in this case.” Id. at 

856 n.6. We realize that section 4133 proscribes a court’s power to imprison 

an individual found guilty of indirect criminal contempt. However, since the 

constitutionality of section 4133 is not before us today, unless and until the 

Supreme Court holds otherwise, that subsection is still valid.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/5/18