### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 512 -CV

In re Jose Ur rutia G om ez

OR IG IN A L PR OC E E D IN G FR OM HA YS C OU N T Y

O P I N I O N
J ose Urr utia Gom ez petitions for writ of manda mus to compel the district court to enter a nunc pro tunc or de r m od if y ing his jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n to re fl e c t ba c k- tim e c re dit
. For the re asons explained here in, we will conditionally g rant re lief. On J une 5, 2001, Gomez pled g uilty to sex ual assault of a ch i l d . The wr itten plea ag ree ment was memoria liz ed in a f orm titled “Plea B arg ain Ag ree ment” that contained blanks for
numerous potential terms. Only some of the blanks wer e completed with ty ped or h an dwritten
no ta tio ns :
O f f e n s e : S E X U A L A S S A U LT O F A C H ILD Deg ree : SECOND Ple a to E nh anc e me nt P ara g ra

ph s: State to Wa ive Enha

nc e me nt P ara g ra

ph s: State to D ism iss : Con fi ne me nt: [hand

wr itt e n:] 1 2 y e ars TD CJ ___

__ __ _ H ay s Co un ty

Jail

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ St a te Jail G Affir

mative finding deadly

wea pon used G Credit ag ree d for ______ da y s serve d2

Com mun ity Supervision: _____________ y ear s TDCJ probate d for ______ y ear s

_____________ State J ail probate d for _______ y ear s _____________ Hay s County J ail probate d for _____ G _____________ day s jail as condition of community supervision G __ __ __ _ Wo rk Re le a se G Def

err ed Adjudication probated for ______ y ear s G Fine $ _________ G Court Costs due at time of se ntencing G Restituti on $ _________ G Reimburse Ha

y s County

for c ourt appointed attorney G Ad

ult c omm un ity su pe rv isi on fe e of $ 4 0. 00 , p ay a

ble mon thl y Spe c ia l T e rm s: G Psy cholog ical/Drug/Alcohol Abuse Eva luation & Counseling

____________________________________________________ G I ntensive Supervision Prog ram G Com mun ity

Se rv ic e Re sti tut ion : __

__ __ __ _ H OU RS [handwritten “x”] G O th e r : [ h an dw r itte n :] “ n o c o n ta c t w it h [tw o n a me s ]” Thus, of the numer ous blanks in the “Plea B arg ain Ag ree ment” for m , o n l y the following contained notations: (1) the offense (sex ual assault of a child); (2) de g ree (sec ond); (3) the term of confine ment (12 y ear s in TDCJ ); and (4) a “spe ci al term” that Gomez have no conta ct with two i n d i v i d u al s . Ad d i t i o n al l y , t h e f

o rm s p ec i fi eda $ 4 0
. 0 0 adu l tco m m u n i t y s u p er v i s i o nfe e, al t h o u gh
no ne of the bo xes r e la tin g to that fe e or c omm un ity su pe rv isi on we re c he c ke d. Of sig nif ic anc e to this procee ding, the box beside “ Credit ag ree d for ______ day s serve d” was left bl ank, as was the space for indicating the “ day s serve d” for which cr edit had bee n “ag ree d.” At the bo tto m of

the pa g e wa s th e fo llo wi ngstate me nt:
“THE U NDERSI GNED c ertify

that they h av e READ AL LTERMS of the above a g re e me nt, a nd

the a g re e me nt c on ta ins AL L the t erms of the pl ea ag ree ment to which they have a g ree d:3

(Emphasis in orig inal). I mmediately below this c ertification we re the sig nature s of the prose cutor, Go me z, and

Go me z’s c ouns e l. Gomez’s judgme nt of conviction, as the State observe s, “mirror s the s igne d ple a a g r e e m e n t
. ” T h e j u d g m e n ts t a t e s “ P L E A B A R G A I N T E R M S : T W E L V E ( 1 2 ) Y EA RS I NCARCERATI ON,” a

nd “PUNI SHMENT AND PL ACE OF CON FI NEMENT: TWEL VE (12) YEARS CONFI

NEMENT I

N THE I

NSTI TUTI ONAL

DI VI SI ON OF T HE TEXA S DEPARTMENT OF CRI MI NAL J USTI CE AND A F I

NE OF NONE. ” A b l ank in t he judg ment form appe ars be side “TI ME CREDI TED AGA I NST SENTENCE.” The parties a g ree that the jud g me nt d id n ot a

wa rd any ba c k- tim e c re dit
. I n M arc h 2 00 8, Go me z fi le d a mot ion fo r j ud g me nt nunc pro tunc in the district court
re qu e sti ngtha

t hi s judgmen t of

c on vic tio n a

wa rd ingno ba c k- tim e c re dit be c or re c te d to re fl e c t a total of 160 day s cre dit. I n support, Gomez submitted a cer tification from the Hay s County Sheriff’ s Offic e re flec ting that he had be en inca rce rate d following his arre st on Dece mber 23, 2000, a nd for
an additional 159 day s betwee n Marc h 19 and Aug ust 24, 2001. Gomez’s sentenc ing, J une 5, 2001,
oc c ur re d o n th e 78 th d ay

of the 15 9- da

y pe ri od in w hic h h e wa s c on fi ne d in the Ha y s Co un ty

Jail
. I n an or d e r d a te d Ju ly 1 8 , 2 0 0 8 , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d e n ie d r e li e f , a d d in g th a t it “ f

u rth er f inds that the re cord a ccur ately ref lects t h e sentenc e of the Court, including ba ck time.” Gome z subsequently soug ht ma

ndamus with this Court to c ompel the district court to ente r the nunc pro tunc judgme nt he re quested.

Ar tic le 42 .0 3, se c tio n 2( a ) of the c od e of c ri min a l pr oc e dure mand a te s th a t “ [i]n a ll criminal ca ses the judg e of the court in which the def endant wa s convicted sha ll give the defe ndantI n fact, th e hi gh cou rt ha s e mph a size d th a t nunc pro tunc is the on ly means by

which a 1 defe ndant ca

n obtain relief

from the omission of back- time cre dit from a judg ment, at least until the defe ndant is co n fi ned beyond his corre ct maxim um discharg e date
. See E x parte De eringer , 210 S.W .3d 616, 617-18 & n.7 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006) (explaining that suc h a complaint would be c og niza ble in a ha be a s app lic a tio n only if the a pp lic ant al le g e s tha t he is b e ingill e g a lly c on fi ne d p a st his max imum dis char g e date beca use the trial c ourt failed to grant him the cor re ct am o unt of pre- sentenc e cr edit). 4 c re dit on his se nte nc e fo r t

he tim e the de fe nd ant h a s sp e nt ( 1) in ja il in sa id c a us e . . . f ro m th e tim e of arr e st a nd con fine me nt u

nti l hi s se nte nc e by

the tr ia l c ourt .” Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 42.03, § 2(a) (1) ( West S upp. 2008). C o n s equently , “[t] he trial c ourt is require d to gr ant the [defendant] pre- sentenc e jail time when se ntence is pronounced.” Se e Ex pa rteY ba rra , 149 S.W .3d 147, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Ref lecting the mandator

y , minist eria l nature of

this duty , the cour

t of cr iminal appea ls has i nstructed lower courts that “[i] n the eve nt the [t rial] court fails to awa rd such
c re dit a t th e tim e the se nte nc e is impo se d, the tr ia l court ha s the a uth or ity to co rr e c t the jud g me nt t o
r e f l e c tt h e a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e c r e d i tb y nunc pro tunc order and should do so.” Id. ; see also Collins

v . S tat e , 240 S.W .3d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“An inc orre ct ca lculatio n o f t h e amount of bac k-time awa

rded to a defe ndant, or the omission o f an y statutory back- time in the judgment
c an b e a dju ste d b y

a mo ti on for jud g me nt nunc pro tunc ”). Th e c ourt ha s si mil arl y

he ld t hat a 1 defe ndant may

seek ma ndamus cha lleng ing a

trial court’ s denial of or ref usal to rule on a motion for
a nunc pro tunc order

to add bac k-time. Se e Y

ba rra , 149 S.W .3d at 149. Th e State do e s n ot d isp ute Go me z’s pr oo f t hat he s e rv e d a

tot a l of 79 da y s in Hay s County

J ail betwee n his arr est and sente ncing . Instead, it argues that “[b]ecause this is a plea b ar g a i nc a s e , i t i s c o n t r o l l e d b y Col lin s v . S

tat e .” In Colli ns , the def

endant e ntere d a plea

ag ree ment
re g a rd in g dr

u g p o s s e s s i o n c h ar g e s i n w h i c h h e e xp l i c i t l y a g r e e d t o f i v e y e ar s ’ c o n f

i n e m e n twi th5

34 day s of pre -sentenc e bac k-time. The trial c ourt ac cepte d the plea a nd enter ed judg ment trac king those terms. Afte r the trial c o u rt ’s p l en ary power had expired, Collins obt ained a nunc pro tunc
or de r f ro m th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nti ng him an ad dit ion a l 271 day s of ba c k- tim e that he ha d a c c ru e d w hil e in custody

prior to sentenc ing. The S tate appealed, and t he cour t of appe als reve rsed. Collins then appea led to the cour

t of criminal appe als, which a ffirme d the cou rt o f ap p eals. See Collins , 240 S.W .3d at 926-28.

The court of c riminal appea ls emphasized the g ener al principles that a nunc pro tunc
or de r i s a pp ro pr ia te fo r f

ixingc le ri c a l e rr or s in

the re c or d a s to the jud g me nt t he tr ia l c ourt

a c tua lly
re nd e re d, no t e rr or s th a t w e re the re su lt of ju di cia l r e a so nin g , a nd that it c ann ot b e us e d to “cha ng e a c ourt’s re cords to ref lect what [t he trial court] be lieves should ha ve bee n done.” Id. at 928 (c i t i n g Ex parte Poe , 751 S.W .2d 873, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) and Ex parte Dopps , 723 S.W 2d 66 9, 67 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ))
. I t obse rv e d th a t, c on se qu e ntl y , “ be fo re a jud g me nt nunc pro tunc may be enter ed, there must be proof that the proposed judgme nt w as ac tually rende red or

pronounce d at an e arlier

time.” Id. (c i t i n g W

ils on v . S tat e , 677 S.W .2d 518, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). Fr om the re cord in Colli ns , the cour t of criminal appe als concl u d ed , “[ i ] t i s clea r . . . that there was no
c le ri c a l e rr or

that th is j ud g me nt nunc pro tunc was c orre ct i n g. T h e judge e x erc ised judicial
rea soning w hen he c hose to ac cept the r ecommendation of the State and all ow the ter ms of the plea barg ain to c ontrol, and he enter ed judg ment in acc ordanc e with these te rms.” Id. “The ref ore,” the c ourt re a so ne d, “ a

jud g me nt nunc pro tunc is not the proper reme dy for the failure t o aw ard additional back- time in this circ umstance.” Id.6 The c ourt of cr iminal appeals distinguishe d the Y ba rra line of ca ses re g arding back- time on the basis that “in this case, the re is a c ontrolling plea barg ain.” Id. at 929. I t noted that in Ex parte Olivare

s , 202 S.W .3d 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), it ha d rec og nized that a defe ndant
c ou ld a ff ir ma tiv e ly wa ive his ri g ht t o p re -s e nte nc e ba c k- tim e c re dit by e nte ri ngint o a

ple a ba rg a in “if the f acts on re cord suppor

t that a wa iver oc curr ed.” Colli ns , 240 S.W .3d at 929. The Colli ns court re asoned: The que stion before this court now is no t wh et her A ppellee a ffirmatively

waived his ri g hts to t

he ba c k- tim e c re dit , nor

is t he re e ve n a

n a sse rt ion

that th e ple a

ba rg a in wa s n ot e nte re d in to k

no wi ng ly and vo lunt ari ly
. An

a pp e a l f ro m a jud g me nt nunc pro tunc would not be the corr ect proce dure for deciding such an issu e. However, the a bil ity of a de fe nd ant t o e nte r int o a ple a ba rg a in a nd wa ive his ri g ht t o b a c k- tim e is i mpo rt ant b e c a

us e it d e mon str a te s th a t App e lle e did no t ha ve a c le ar a uto ma tic leg al r ig h t to th e p r e - s e n te n c e c r e d it
. A s e xp la in e d a b o v e , th e a c t o f a c c e pting the rec ommendation of the State in a ple a bar g ain re quired the judge to exercise judicial dis c re tio n, and

wh e n g ra

nti ngthe jud g me nt n u n c p r o tunc , the judg e employ ed judicial rea soning when determining whether he was bound by the t erms of the plea ba rg ain . Thi s w a s n ot s imp ly a mis c a lc ulatio n in

the numbe r o f d ay s o f b a c k- tim e to be aw ar d e d , o r a mi s ta k e in th e tr an s c r ip ti o n o f th e ju d g me n t in to th e court rec ords. Eac h judge had to make spe cific de termination s as t o wh at Appellee was entitled, and ther efor e, no ministerial ac t was implicated.
Id. On the oth e r ha

nd , the c ourt of c ri min a l a pp e a ls e mph a size d so me lim itatio ns on the se c on c e pts
. I t o b s e r v e d , “ [i ]f a p p e ll an t h a d

n e g o ti a te d

to r e c e iv e th is [aw ar d

o f a d d it io n a l b a c k

- ti me c r e d it ], then entry o f

th e f in a l c a lc u lati o no f

b a c k

- ti me c o u ld

h a v e b e e na c c o mp li s h e d b y ju d g me nt nunc pro tunc .” Id. F ur

the r, the c ourt str e sse d, “ if the a mou nt o f p re -s e nte nc e ja il- tim e wa s n ot a
ne g oti a te d ter

m of a ple a ba

rg a in, the statut e wo uld a

pp ly and the de fe nd a

nt wo uld be e nti tle d to a ll statutory back- time.” I t was “[b] y acc epting the pl ea barg ain wit h 34 day s of credit, Appellee waived his statutory

rig ht to the time served.” Id.7 Her e, the State ur g es that “[a]s i n Colli ns , our judg ment perf ectly matches the ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt” be c a

us e ne ith e r i nc lud e d a

sp e c if ic re fe re nc e to b a c k- tim e c re dit
. The State c hara cter izes the plea ag ree ment as wa i v i n g Go mez’s back- time, arguing that

“ [w]he n Re la tor

a c c e pte d th e ple a , th e re wa s n o me nti on of the po ssi bil ity of a dd iti on a l ba c k- tim e
c re dit . I f R e la tor

ha d ne g oti a te d to re c e ive his ba c k- tim e , th e n e ntr y of the fi na l c a lc ulatio n c ou ld have be e n a c c omp lis he d b y a jud g me nt nunc pro tunc . Relator sig ned the ve ry pag e that re flec ted no back time.” Gomez responds that while Colli ns “ ha s in je c te d s ome c on fu sio n in to nunc pro tunc prac tice,” it is limit ed to ca ses wher e “the rec ord af firmatively

refl ec ts a waive r of time cr edits, a defe ndant is entitled to all the time spent in jail between a rre st and sentenc ing.” He points out that the Colli ns court a cknowledg ed that “if the amount of pre -sentenc e jail-time wa s not a neg otiated term of a plea ba rg ain, the statute would a pply and the de fenda

nt w ould be entitled to all statutory back- time.” Id. Whe re , a s h e re , th e ple a a g re e me nt is s imp ly

sil e nt a s to the a mou

nt o f b a c k- tim e
cre di t , Go m ez urg es, he “ cannot be said to have w aived statutory back time a

nd the ‘judicial
rea soning’ involved in a cce pting the plea ba rg ain does not pre clude c orre ction of the judg ment by nunc pro tunc order .” See id. We a g r e e w it h G o me z. Unlike the situation in Colli ns , which involved a plea ag ree ment specify i n g an amount of bac k-time cre dit, Gomez’s plea ag ree ment did not address, one way or the other, whe ther Go me z wa s to re c e ive ba c k- tim e or ho w muc h. Al tho ug h th e pa rt ie s sp e c if

ie d c e rt a in o the r t e rm s elicited in the Plea B arg ain Agre ement form, the parties lef t blank the spac es conc erningback- time,
and “ c e rt if [ie d] th a t . . . th e a g re e me nt c on ta ins AL L the terms of the plea a g ree ment to which they8

have a g ree d.” Thus, by

its ex press ter

ms, Gomez’s written plea a g ree ment did not address whe ther he wa s t o re ceive back- time or how much. Contrar y to the State’s ar g uments, the rationale of Colli ns , as the c ourt of cr iminal appeals made clea r, does not extend to case s, like this one, where “the amount of pre-s en t en ce j ail -time was not a ne g otiated term of a plea ba rg ain.” Id. I n such ins tanc e s, the c ourt

e mph a size d, “ the statut e wo uld a pp ly and the de fe nd ant w ou ld b e e nti tle d to a ll statutory back- time.” Id. Acc ording ly , we c onditionally g rant Gome z’s petition for writ of mandamus a nd dir e c t th e dis tr ic t court to va c a te its or de r de nyingGo me z’s mot ion fo r j ud g me nt nunc pro tunc and to en te r a j ud g me nt nunc pro tunc awa rd ing Go me z c re dit fo r the a mou nt o f t ime he se rv e d p ri or

to sentenc ing. T he wr it will i ssue only if the di strict court fails to take appropriate action in ac corda nce with this opi nion.

_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and Pember

ton Filed: September

16, 2008