NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOHN VICTOR GLASSCOCK, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0528 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2018-140001-001

The Honorable Monica S. Garfinkel, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Linley Wilson

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Lawrence S. Matthew

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 7-22-2021
STATE v. GLASSCOCK

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 This appeal is presented to us pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969). Defense counsel 

has searched the record on appeal and advised us there are no meritorious 

grounds for reversal. John Glasscock was given the opportunity to file a 

supplemental brief but did not do so. Our obligation is to review the entire 

record for reversible error, State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999), 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

conviction and resolving all reasonable inferences against Glasscock, State 

v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). 

¶2 In August 2018, Glasscock was driving a vehicle with a 

temporary, paper license plate taped to the back window. Glasscock had 

bought the vehicle a few weeks before. Officer Jason Kline, on his routine 

patrol, observed Glasscock’s vehicle and was unable to read the temporary 

paper plate. He initiated a traffic stop. 

¶3 After being pulled over, Glasscock told Officer Kline that his 

driver’s license was suspended. The officer asked if there were any 

weapons in the vehicle, and both Glasscock and his passenger answered 

“no.” Officer Kline arrested Glasscock for driving with a suspended license.

He then began preparing to impound Glasscock’s vehicle. At some point,

police back-up arrived, and the officers began to inventory the contents of 

the vehicle. Officer Juan Gonzales noticed the “back end of a metal piece” 

in the driver’s door panel, partially obscured by miscellaneous papers. 

After removing the papers, Officer Gonzales discovered the item was an 

approximately 11-inch knife. 

¶4 Officer Kline transported Glasscock back to the Glendale city 

jail for processing. After reading him his Miranda rights, Officer Kline 

interviewed Glasscock. During the interview, Officer Kline told Glasscock 

“You know you’re not supposed to possess certain weapons then, right?” 

Glasscock responded, “All I had was a knife.” Glasscock then explained 

that he did not remember that the knife was in the car when he told Officer 
STATE v. GLASSCOCK

Decision of the Court

3

Kline that there were no weapons in the vehicle. Officer Kline asked, “So 

that’s your knife?” Glasscock responded, “Yes sir.”

¶5 The State charged Glasscock with possession of a deadly 

weapon while a prohibited possessor—a “misconduct involving weapons” 

charge and a class 4 felony. A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), (M). In an amendment 

to the information, the state alleged five historical, non-dangerous felony 

convictions. At trial, the State called Sergeant Jeff Daukas, who testified as 

a knife expert. He opined that the knife recovered from the vehicle was a 

type of survival knife designed for lethal use. Glasscock testified that he 

purchased the vehicle from the previous owner, and that Glasscock’s

girlfriend found the knife in the driver’s side door. He testified that he 

asked his girlfriend to throw the knife out, assumed that she had done so, 

and did not know the knife was still in the door until he watched police 

remove it from the car. He claimed to have never physically handled the 

knife. He also explained that he told Officer Kline the knife was his because 

he did not want the police to think it belonged to the passenger. 

¶6 Glasscock did not appear for the last day of trial. The court 

implicitly found Glasscock’s absence to be without good cause and 

proceeded in absentia. After closing arguments, the jury convicted 

Glasscock on the weapons misconduct charge. Glasscock was apprehended 

shortly after, and sentencing was scheduled.

1 Before sentencing, the court 

found that Glasscock had five prior felony convictions. The court sentenced 

Glasscock as a category 3, repetitive-offender, giving him a mitigated 

prison term of 8 years with 271 days of presentence incarceration credit. 

Glasscock timely appealed. 

¶7 After a thorough review of the record, we find no reversible 

error. Clark, 196 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 50. The record reflects Glasscock was present 

and represented by counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings against 

1 Under A.R.S. § 13-4033(C), a defendant may waive his right to an 

appeal if his absence causes sentencing to occur more than 90 days after 

conviction. In this case, sentencing occurred about nine months after the 

verdict. Arguably, this delay was partially Glasscock’s fault because he 

failed to appear for the final day of trial, although sentencing was also 

continued several times due to COVID-19. However, for § 13-4033(C) to bar 

an appeal, the superior court must make a finding at sentencing that the 

defendant “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to 

appeal.” State v. Nunn, 250 Ariz. 366, 369, ¶ 9 (App. 2020). Because the 

superior court made no such finding at sentencing, § 13-4033(C) does not 

bar Glasscock’s appeal. 
STATE v. GLASSCOCK

Decision of the Court

4

him, except for the final day of trial. However, the court implicitly found 

that Glasscock’s absence was without cause, holding trial in absentia. Thus, 

Glasscock waived his right to be present. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1. The evidence 

presented at trial supports the conviction, and the sentence imposed by the 

court falls within the range permitted by law. As far as the record reveals, 

these proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure and Glasscock’s constitutional and statutory rights.

Therefore, we affirm Glasscock’s conviction and sentence.

¶8 Unless defense counsel finds an issue that may be 

appropriately submitted to the Arizona Supreme Court, his obligations are 

fulfilled once he informs Glasscock of the outcome of this appeal and his

future options. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Glasscock has 

30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro 

per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.