(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO 

No. 12–315. Argued December 9, 2013—Decided January 27, 2014 

Respondent Hoeper was a pilot for petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines 

Corp. When Air Wisconsin stopped flying from Hoeper’s home base

on aircraft that he was certified to fly, he needed to become certified 

on a different type of aircraft to keep his job. After Hoeper failed in

his first three attempts to gain certification, Air Wisconsin agreed to

give him a fourth and final chance. But he performed poorly during a 

required training session in a simulator. Hoeper responded angrily

to this failure—raising his voice, tossing his headset, using profanity,

and accusing the instructor of “railroading the situation.”

The instructor called an Air Wisconsin manager, who booked

Hoeper on a flight from the test location to Hoeper’s home in Denver. 

Several hours later, the manager discussed Hoeper’s behavior with 

other airline officials. The officials discussed Hoeper’s outburst, his 

impending termination, the history of assaults by disgruntled airline

employees, and the chance that—because Hoeper was a Federal

Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), permitted “to carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation,” 49 U. S. C. §44921(f)(1)—he

might be armed. At the end of the meeting, an airline executive 

made the decision to notify the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the situation. The manager who had received the initial

report from Hoeper’s instructor made the call to the TSA. During

that call, according to the jury, he made two statements: first, that

Hoeper “was an FFDO who may be armed” and that the airline was

“concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his

firearm”; and second, that an “[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program 

was terminated today.” In response, the TSA removed Hoeper from 

his plane, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his 

gun. Hoeper eventually boarded a later flight to Denver, and Air

Wisconsin fired him the next day. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

2 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Syllabus 

Hoeper sued for defamation in Colorado state court. Air Wisconsin 

moved for summary judgment and later for a directed verdict, relying

on the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which

grants airlines and their employees immunity against civil liability

for reporting suspicious behavior, 49 U. S. C. §44941(a), except where 

such disclosure is “made with actual knowledge that the disclosure

was false, inaccurate, or misleading” or “made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure,” §44941(b). The trial 

court denied the motions and submitted the ATSA immunity question to the jury. The jury found for Hoeper on the defamation claim.

The State Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the trial court erred 

in submitting the immunity question to the jury but that the error 

was harmless. Laboring under the assumption that even true statements do not qualify for ATSA immunity if they are made recklessly,

the court held that Air Wisconsin was not entitled to immunity because its statements to the TSA were made with reckless disregard of

their truth or falsity. 

Held: 

1. ATSA immunity may not be denied to materially true statements. Pp. 7–11.

(a) The ATSA immunity exception is patterned after the actual

malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 

which requires material falsity. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker 

Magazine, Inc., 501 U. S. 496, 517. Because the material falsity requirement was settled when the ATSA was enacted, Congress presumably meant to incorporate it into the ATSA’s immunity exception 

and did not mean to deny ATSA immunity to true statements made

recklessly. This presumption is not rebutted by other indicia of statutory meaning. Section 44941(b)(1) requires falsity, and §44941(b)(2) 

simply extends the immunity exception from knowing falsehoods to

reckless ones. Denying immunity for substantially true reports, on

the theory that the person making the report had not yet gathered 

enough information to be certain of its truth, would defeat the purpose of ATSA immunity: to ensure that air carriers and their employees do not hesitate to provide the TSA with needed information. 

Pp. 7–10.

(b) Hoeper’s arguments that the State Supreme Court’s judgment 

should be affirmed notwithstanding its misapprehension of ATSA’s

immunity standard are unpersuasive. Hoeper claims that Air Wisconsin did not argue the truth of its statements in asserting immunity, but Air Wisconsin contended in the state court that ATSA’s immunity exception incorporates the New York Times actual malice 

standard, which requires material falsity. And the State Supreme

Court did not perform the requisite analysis of material falsity in 
 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Syllabus 

finding the record sufficient to support the defamation verdict. A 

court’s deferential review of jury findings cannot substitute for its 

own analysis of the record; the jury was instructed only to determine 

falsity, not materiality; and applying the material falsity standard to

a defamation claim is quite different from applying it to ATSA immunity. Pp. 10–11. 

2. Under the correct material falsity analysis, Air Wisconsin is entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Pp. 12–18.

(a) In the defamation context, a materially false statement is one

that “ ‘would have a different effect on the mind of the reader [or listener] from that which the . . . truth would have produced.’ ” Masson, 

501 U. S., at 517. This standard suffices in the ATSA context as well, 

so long as the hypothetical reader or listener is a security officer. For 

purposes of ATSA immunity, a falsehood cannot be material absent a

substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining a response to the supposed threat.

Pp. 12–13. 

(b) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hoeper,

the Court concludes as a matter of law that any falsehoods in Air

Wisconsin’s statement to the TSA were not material. First, the Court 

rejects Hoeper’s argument that Air Wisconsin should have qualified

its statement that Hoeper “was an FFDO who may be armed” by noting that it had no reason to think he actually was armed. To the extent that Air Wisconsin’s statement could have been confusing, any

such confusion is immaterial, as a reasonable TSA officer—having

been told that Hoeper was an FFDO who was upset about losing his

job—would have wanted to investigate whether he was armed. To 

demand more precise wording would vitiate the purpose of ATSA 

immunity: to encourage air carriers and their employees, often in

fast-moving situations and with little time to fine-tune their diction,

to provide the TSA immediately with information about potential

threats. Second, Air Wisconsin’s statement that Hoeper “was terminated today” was not materially false. While Hoeper had not actually

been fired at the time of the statement, everyone involved knew that 

his firing was imminent. No reasonable TSA officer would care 

whether an angry, potentially armed airline employee had just been

fired or merely knew he was about to meet that fate. Finally, although the details of Hoeper’s behavior during the simulator session

may be disputed, it would have been correct even under Hoeper’s version of the facts for Air Wisconsin to report that Hoeper “blew up”

during the test. From a reasonable security officer’s perspective, 

there is no material difference between a statement that Hoeper had

“blown up” in a professional setting and a statement that he was unstable. Air Wisconsin’s related statement that it was “concerned 
 

 

4 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Syllabus 

about [Hoeper’s] mental stability” is no more troubling. Many of the

officials who attended the meeting at airline headquarters might not 

have framed their concerns in terms of “mental stability,” but it

would be inconsistent with the ATSA’s text and purpose to expose Air

Wisconsin to liability because the manager who placed the call to the 

TSA could have chosen a slightly better phrase to articulate the airline’s concern. A statement that would otherwise qualify for ATSA 

immunity cannot lose that immunity because of some minor imprecision, so long as “the gist” of the statement is accurate, Masson, 501 

U. S., at 517. Pp. 13–18. 

Reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in 

which SCALIA, THOMAS, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I, II, and III– 

A. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, 

in which THOMAS and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–315 

AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION, 

PETITIONER v. WILLIAM L. HOEPER 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
 

[January 27, 2014]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In 2001, Congress created the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) to assess and manage threats against 

air travel. Aviation and Transportation Security Act

(ATSA), 49 U. S. C. §44901 et seq. To ensure that the 

TSA would be informed of potential threats, Congress gave

airlines and their employees immunity against civil liability for reporting suspicious behavior. §44941(a). But this 

immunity does not attach to “any disclosure made with

actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate,

or misleading” or “any disclosure made with reckless 

disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.”

§44941(b).

The question before us is whether ATSA immunity may 

be denied under §44941(b) without a determination that a 

disclosure was materially false. We hold that it may not. 

Because the state courts made no such determination, and 

because any falsehood in the disclosure here would not

have affected a reasonable security officer’s assessment of 

the supposed threat, we reverse the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court. 
 

 

 

 

2 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

I 

A 

William Hoeper joined Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation as a pilot in 1998. But by late 2004, Air Wisconsin 

had stopped operating flights from Denver, Hoeper’s home 

base, on any type of aircraft for which he was certified. To 

continue flying for Air Wisconsin out of Denver, Hoeper 

needed to gain certification on the British Aerospace 146 

(BAe-146), an aircraft he had not flown. 

Hoeper failed in his first three attempts to pass a proficiency test. After the third failure, as he later acknowledged at trial, his employment was “at [Air Wisconsin’s]

discretion.” App. 193. But he and Air Wisconsin entered 

into an agreement to afford him “one more opportunity to

pass [the] proficiency check.” Id., at 426. The agreement 

left little doubt that Hoeper would lose his job if he failed 

again.

In December 2004, Hoeper flew from Denver to Virginia

for simulator training as part of this final test. During the

training, Hoeper failed to cope with a challenging scenario 

created by the instructor, Mark Schuerman, and the simulator showed the engines “flam[ing] out” due to a loss of

fuel. App. 203. As Schuerman began to tell Hoeper that 

he “should know better,” ibid., Hoeper responded angrily. 

He later described what happened: 

“At this point, that’s it. I take my headset off and I

toss it up on the glare shield. . . . [Schuerman] and I 

exchanged words at the same elevated decibel level. 

Mine went something like this: This is a bunch of shit.

I’m sorry. You are railroading the situation and it’s

not realistic.” Id., at 203–204. 

When Hoeper announced that he wanted to call the legal 

department of the pilots’ union, Schuerman ended the 

session so that Hoeper could do so. Schuerman then reported Hoeper’s behavior to Patrick Doyle, the Wisconsin-
 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

based manager of the BAe-146 fleet. Doyle booked Hoeper

on a United Airlines flight back to Denver.

Several hours after Schuerman’s report, Doyle discussed 

the situation at Air Wisconsin’s headquarters with the 

airline’s Vice President of Operations, Kevin LaWare; its 

Managing Director of Flight Operations, Scott Orozco; and 

its Assistant Chief Pilot, Robert Frisch. LaWare later explained the accretion of his concerns about what Hoeper

might do next. He regarded Hoeper’s behavior in the 

simulator as “a fairly significant outburst,” of a sort that

he “hadn’t seen . . . before.” Id., at 276. And he knew “it 

was a given that . . . Hoeper’s employment was . . . going 

to be terminated” as a result of his failure to complete the 

simulator training. Id., at 278. 

Then, LaWare testified, Orozco mentioned that Hoeper 

was a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO). The FFDO 

program allows the Government to “deputize volunteer 

pilots of air carriers . . . to defend the flight decks of aircraft . . . against acts of criminal violence or air piracy.”

§44921(a). FFDOs are permitted “to carry a firearm while 

engaged in providing air transportation.” §44921(f)(1). 

Hoeper had become an FFDO earlier in 2004 and had been

issued a firearm. He was not allowed to carry the firearm

during his trip to the training facility, because he was not 

“engaged in providing air transportation,” ibid. But according to one official at the meeting, the Denver airport’s 

security procedures made it possible for crew members to

bypass screening, so that Hoeper could have carried his 

gun despite the rule. Indeed, Frisch later testified that he 

was “aware of one” incident in which an Air Wisconsin 

pilot had come to training with his FFDO weapon. App.

292. On the basis of this information, LaWare concluded, 

there was “no way . . . to confirm” whether “Hoeper had

his weapon with him, even though . . . by policy, [he was] 

not supposed to have it with him.” Id., at 279. 

Finally, LaWare testified, he and the other Air Wiscon-
 

 

4 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

sin officials discussed two prior episodes in which disgruntled airline employees had lashed out violently. Id., at 

280. In one incident, a FedEx flight engineer under investigation for misconduct “entered the cockpit” of a FedEx 

flight “and began attacking the crew with a hammer” 

before being subdued. United States v. Calloway, 116 

F. 3d 1129, 1131 (CA6 1997). In another, a recently fired

ticket agent brought a gun onto a Pacific Southwest Airlines flight and shot his former supervisor and the crew,

leading to a fatal crash. Malnic, Report Confirms That 

Gunman Caused 1987 Crash of PSA Jet, L. A. Times, 

Jan. 6, 1989, p. 29. 

In light of all this—Hoeper’s anger, his impending termination, the chance that he might be armed, and the 

history of assaults by disgruntled airline employees—

LaWare decided that the airline “need[ed] to make a call

to the TSA,” to let the authorities know “the status” of the 

situation. App. 282.

Doyle offered to make the call. According to the jury, he

made two statements to the TSA: first, that Hoeper “was

an FFDO who may be armed” and that the airline was 

“concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts

of his firearm”; and second, that an “[u]nstable pilot in

[the] FFDO program was terminated today.” App. to Pet.

for Cert. 111a. (The latter statement appears in the record as the subject line of an internal TSA e-mail, summarizing the call from Doyle. App. 414.)

The TSA responded to the call by ordering that Hoeper’s 

plane return to the gate. Officers boarded the plane, removed Hoeper, searched him, and questioned him about

the location of his gun. When Hoeper stated that the gun 

was at his home in Denver, a Denver-based federal agent 

went there to retrieve it. 

Later that day, Hoeper boarded a return flight to Denver. Air Wisconsin fired him the following day. 
 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

Hoeper sued Air Wisconsin in Colorado state court on 

several claims, including defamation.1 Air Wisconsin 

moved for summary judgment on the basis of ATSA immunity,2 but the trial court denied it, ruling that the jury

was entitled to find the facts pertinent to immunity. The 

case went to trial, and the court denied Air Wisconsin’s 

motion for a directed verdict on the same basis. It submitted the question of ATSA immunity to the jury, with the

instruction—following the language of §44941(b)—that 

immunity would not apply if Hoeper had proved that

Air Wisconsin “made the disclosure [to the TSA] with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or

misleading” or “with reckless disregard as to its truth or

falsity.” App. 582. The jury instructions did not state that

ATSA immunity protects materially true statements. 

The jury found for Hoeper on the defamation claim and 

awarded him $849,625 in compensatory damages and 

$391,875 in punitive damages. The court reduced the 

latter award to $350,000, for a total judgment of just

under $1.2 million, plus costs.

The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. 232 P. 3d 230 

(2009). It held “that the trial court properly submitted the 

ATSA immunity issue to the jury,” that “the record sup-

—————— 

1Air Wisconsin agrees that it bears responsibility for Doyle’s statements. 2012 WL 907764, *2, *16, n. 2 (Colo., Mar. 19, 2012). 2The ATSA immunity provision specifies that “[a]ny air carrier . . . or 

any employee of an air carrier . . . who makes a voluntary disclosure 

of any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or

regulation, relating to air piracy, a threat to aircraft or passenger 

safety, or terrorism, . . . to any employee or agent of the Department of 

Transportation, the Department of Justice, any Federal, State, or local

law enforcement officer, or any airport or airline security officer shall 

not be civilly liable to any person under any law or regulation of the

United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or

political subdivision of any State, for such disclosure.” 49 U. S. C. 

§44941(a). 
 

6 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

ports the jury’s rejection of immunity,” and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s defamation

verdict. Id., at 233. 

The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. 2012 WL 

907764 (Mar. 19, 2012). It began by holding, contrary to

the lower courts, “that immunity under the ATSA is a

question of law to be determined by the trial court before

trial.” Id., at *4. But it concluded that the trial court’s 

error in submitting immunity to the jury was “harmless 

because Air Wisconsin is not entitled to immunity.” Id., at 

*6. In a key footnote, the court stated: “In our determination of immunity under the ATSA, we need not, and therefore do not, decide whether the statements were true or 

false. Rather, we conclude that Air Wisconsin made the 

statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or 

falsity.” Id., at *16, n. 6. The court thus appears to 

have labored under the assumption that even true statements do not qualify for ATSA immunity if they are made 

recklessly.

Applying this standard, and giving “no weight to the

jury’s finding[s],” ibid., n. 5, the court held that “[a]lthough the events at the training may have warranted

a report to TSA,” Air Wisconsin’s statements “overstated

those events to such a degree that they were made with

reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.” Id., at *7. The 

court opined that Air Wisconsin “would likely be immune

under the ATSA if Doyle had reported that Hoeper was an 

Air Wisconsin employee, that he knew he would be terminated soon, that he had acted irrationally at the training 

three hours earlier and ‘blew up’ at test administrators,

and that he was an FFDO pilot.” Id., at *8. But because 

Doyle actually told TSA “(1) that he believed Hoeper to be 

mentally unstable; (2) that Hoeper had been terminated 

earlier that day; and (3) that Hoeper may have been

armed,” id., at *7, the court determined that his statements “went well beyond” the facts and did not qualify for 
 

 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

immunity, id., at *8. The court went on to conclude that 

the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s defamation verdict. 

Justice Eid, joined by two others, dissented in part. She 

agreed with the majority’s holding that immunity is an

issue for the court, not the jury. But she reasoned that Air 

Wisconsin was entitled to immunity “because [its] statements to the TSA were substantially true.” Id., at *11. 

We granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether ATSA immunity may be denied without a determination that the

air carrier’s disclosure was materially false.” 570 U. S. ___ 

(2013). 

II
 

A 

Congress patterned the exception to ATSA immunity

after the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. 

Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), and we have long held that 

actual malice requires material falsity. Because we presume that Congress meant to incorporate the settled

meaning of actual malice when it incorporated the language of that standard, we hold that a statement otherwise eligible for ATSA immunity may not be denied 

immunity unless the statement is materially false. 

In New York Times, we held that under the First 

Amendment, a public official cannot recover “for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he 

proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—

that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 

disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id., at 279– 

280. Congress borrowed this exact language in denying 

ATSA immunity to “(1) any disclosure made with actual

knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or

misleading; or (2) any disclosure made with reckless

disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.”

§44941(b). 
 

 

8 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

One could in principle construe the language of the

actual malice standard to cover true statements made 

recklessly. But we have long held, to the contrary, that

actual malice entails falsity. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U. S. 767, 775 (1986) (“[A]s one 

might expect given the language of the Court in New York 

Times, a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the

statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation” (citation omitted)); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 

U. S. 64, 74 (1964) (“We held in New York Times that a 

public official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he

establishes that the utterance was false”). 

Indeed, we have required more than mere falsity to

establish actual malice: The falsity must be “material.” 

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U. S. 496, 517 

(1991). As we explained in Masson, “[m]inor inaccuracies

do not amount to falsity so long as ‘the substance, the gist,

the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.’” Ibid. A 

“statement is not considered false unless it ‘would have a 

different effect on the mind of the reader from that which 

the pleaded truth would have produced.’” Ibid. (quoting

R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 138 (1980)). 

These holdings were settled when Congress enacted the

ATSA, and we therefore presume that Congress meant to 

adopt the material falsity requirement when it incorporated the actual malice standard into the ATSA immunity

exception. “[I]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction

that, when Congress employs a term of art, it presumably 

knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached

to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which

it is taken.” FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip 

op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). The actual 

malice standard does not cover materially true statements 

made recklessly, so we presume that Congress did not 

mean to deny ATSA immunity to such statements. 

Other indicia of statutory meaning could rebut this 
 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

presumption, but here, they do not. First, the ATSA’s 

text favors a falsity requirement. The first subsection of 

§44941(b) requires falsity, as a true disclosure cannot have 

been made “with actual knowledge” that it “was false.” 

The only question is whether the second subsection— 

which denies immunity to “any disclosure made with 

reckless disregard as to [its] truth or falsity”—similarly 

requires falsity. We conclude that it does. The second 

subsection simply extends the immunity exception from

knowing falsehoods to reckless ones, ensuring that an air 

carrier cannot avoid liability for a baseless report by sticking its head in the sand to avoid “actual knowledge” that 

its statements are false. “[T]he defense of truth . . . , even 

if not explicitly recognized, . . .is implicit in . . . a standard 

of recovery that rests on knowing or reckless disregard of 

the truth.” Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 

498–499 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).

A material falsity requirement also serves the purpose 

of ATSA immunity. The ATSA shifted from airlines to the 

TSA the responsibility “for assessing and investigating 

possible threats to airline security.” 2012 WL 907764, *14 

(Eid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In 

directing the TSA to “receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to transportation security,” 49 

U. S. C. §114(f)(1), Congress wanted to ensure that air 

carriers and their employees would not hesitate to provide 

the TSA with the information it needed. This is the purpose of the immunity provision, evident both from its

context and from the title of the statutory section that

contained it: “encouraging airline employees to report suspicious activities.” ATSA §125, 115 Stat. 631 (capitalization and boldface type omitted). It would defeat this 

purpose to deny immunity for substantially true reports, 

on the theory that the person making the report had not

yet gathered enough information to be certain of its truth. 

Such a rule would restore the pre-ATSA state of affairs, in 
 

 

10 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

which air carriers bore the responsibility to investigate

and verify potential threats. 

We therefore hold that ATSA immunity may not be

denied under §44941(b) to materially true statements.

This interpretation of the statute is clear enough that

Hoeper effectively concedes it. See Brief for Respondent

30 (acknowledging that if the Colorado Supreme Court 

actually said “‘an airline may be denied ATSA immunity 

. . . for reporting true information,’” then “the court was 

likely wrong”). Hoeper does point out in a footnote that 

given Congress’ desire to deny immunity to “‘bad actors,’” 

and “given that the vast majority of reckless statements 

will not turn out to be true[,] . . . Congress could have

quite reasonably chosen to deny the special privilege of 

ATSA immunity to all reckless speakers,” even those

whose statements turned out to be true. Id., at 30, n. 12. 

But although Congress could have made this choice, nothing about the statute’s text or purpose suggests that it 

actually did. Instead, Congress chose to model the exception to ATSA immunity after a standard we have long 

construed to require material falsity. 

B 

We are not persuaded by Hoeper’s arguments that

we should affirm the judgment of the Colorado Supreme

Court notwithstanding its misapprehension of the ATSA

immunity standard.

Hoeper first argues that Air Wisconsin forfeited the

claim that it is entitled to immunity because its statements were materially true. His premise is that Air

Wisconsin argued the truth of its statements only in challenging the evidentiary basis for the defamation verdict, not 

in asserting immunity. But Air Wisconsin’s brief before 

the Colorado Supreme Court argued that the exception to

ATSA immunity “appears to incorporate the New York 

Times actual malice standard,” which—as we have ex-
 

 

 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

plained—requires material falsity. Petitioner’s Opening 

Brief in No. 09SC1050, p. 24.

Hoeper next argues that the Colorado Supreme Court 

performed the requisite analysis of material falsity, albeit 

in the context of finding the record sufficient to support

the jury’s defamation verdict. For several reasons, however, 

this analysis does not suffice for us to affirm the denial 

of ATSA immunity. First, to the extent that the immunity

determination belongs to the court—as the Colorado Supreme Court held—a court’s deferential review of jury

findings cannot substitute for its own analysis of the

record. Second, the jury here did not find that any falsity

in Air Wisconsin’s statements was material, because the 

trial court instructed it only to determine whether “[o]ne

or more of th[e] statements was false,” App. 580, without 

addressing materiality. Third, applying the material

falsity standard to a defamation claim is quite different 

from applying it to ATSA immunity. In both contexts, 

a materially false statement is one that “‘would have a 

different effect on the mind of the reader [or listener] from 

that which the . . . truth would have produced.’” Masson, 

501 U. S., at 517. But the identity of the relevant reader

or listener varies according to the context. In determining

whether a falsehood is material to a defamation claim, we 

care whether it affects the subject’s reputation in the 

community. In the context of determining ATSA immunity, by contrast, we care whether a falsehood affects the

authorities’ perception of and response to a given threat.3 

—————— 

3These are very different inquiries. Suppose the TSA receives the 

following tip: “My adulterous husband is carrying a gun onto a flight.”

Whether the husband is adulterous will presumably have no effect on

the TSA’s assessment of any security risk that he poses. So if the word 

“adulterous” is false, the caller may still be entitled to ATSA immunity.

But any falsity as to that word obviously would affect the husband’s

reputation in the community, so it would be material in the context of a

defamation claim. 
 

12 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

III 

Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis of material falsity was erroneous. We turn next to explaining 

why, by applying the ATSA immunity standard to the

facts of this case.4 

A 

We begin by addressing how to determine the materiality of a false statement in the ATSA context. As we noted 

earlier, a materially false statement is generally one that

“‘would have a different effect on the mind of the reader 

[or listener] from that which the . . . truth would have

produced.’” Ibid. The parties quibble over whether ATSA 

immunity requires some special version of this standard,

but they more or less agree—as do we—that the usual 

standard suffices as long as the hypothetical reader or 

listener is a security officer.

A further question is what it means for a statement to

produce “‘a different effect on the mind of ’” a security

officer from that which the truth would have produced. In 

defamation law, the reputational harm caused by a false 

statement is its effect on a reader’s or listener’s mind. But 

contrary to the position of Hoeper’s counsel at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32–33, courts cannot decide whether 

a false statement produced “‘a different effect on the mind 

of ’” a hypothetical TSA officer without considering the

effect of that statement on TSA’s behavior. After all, the 

—————— 

4We “recognize the prudence . . . of allowing the lower courts ‘to undertake [a fact-intensive inquiry] in the first instance.’ ” Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 654 (2010). Here, however, we conclude that 

another prudential consideration—the need for clear guidance on a 

novel but important question of federal law—weighs in favor of our 

applying the ATSA immunity standard. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers 

Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 503 (1984) (“[T]his Court’s

role in marking out the limits of [a First Amendment] standard through 

the process of case-by-case adjudication is of special importance”). 
Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

whole reason the TSA considers threat reports is to determine and execute a response.

A plaintiff seeking to defeat ATSA immunity need not 

show “precisely what a particular official or federal agency

would have done in a counterfactual scenario.” Brief for 

United States as Amicus Curiae 27. Such a showing

would be “impossible . . . given the need to maintain secrecy regarding airline security operations.” Brief for Respondent 42. But any falsehood cannot be material, for 

purposes of ATSA immunity, absent a substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it 

important in determining a response to the supposed

threat. Cf. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 

U. S. 438, 449 (1976) (an omission in a proxy solicitation 

“is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 

reasonable shareholder would consider it important in 

deciding how to vote”). This standard “is an objective

one, involving the [hypothetical] significance of an omitted 

or misrepresented fact to a reasonable” security official,

rather than the actual significance of that fact to a particular security official. Id., at 445. 

B 

We apply the material falsity standard to the facts of

this case. In doing so, we neither embrace nor reject the 

Colorado Supreme Court’s unanimous holding “that immunity under the ATSA is a question of law to be determined by the trial court before trial.” 2012 WL 9097764, 

*4; see id., at *11 (Eid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with majority). Rather, we conclude 

that even if a jury were to find the historical facts in the 

manner most favorable to Hoeper, Air Wisconsin is entitled to ATSA immunity as a matter of law. 

We begin with Air Wisconsin’s statement that Hoeper

“was an FFDO who may be armed.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 

111a. Hoeper cannot dispute the literal truth of this 
 

14 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

statement: He was an FFDO, and because FFDOs possess

weapons, any FFDO “may be armed.” Hoeper argues only

that to avoid any misinterpretation, Air Wisconsin should 

have qualified the statement by adding that it had no

reason to think he was actually carrying his gun during

the trip to Virginia, especially because he was not allowed 

to do so under §44921(f)(1).5 We agree that Air Wisconsin’s statement could have been misinterpreted by some,

but we reject Hoeper’s argument for two reasons. First, 

any confusion of the nature that Hoeper suggests would 

have been immaterial: A reasonable TSA officer, having 

been told only that Hoeper was an FFDO and that he was

upset about losing his job, would have wanted to investigate whether Hoeper was carrying his gun. Second, to 

accept Hoeper’s demand for such precise wording would 

vitiate the purpose of ATSA immunity: to encourage air 

carriers and their employees, often in fast-moving situations and with little time to fine-tune their diction, to 

provide the TSA immediately with information about 

potential threats. Baggage handlers, flight attendants, 

gate agents, and other airline employees who report suspicious behavior to the TSA should not face financial ruin if, 

in the heat of a potential threat, they fail to choose their

words with exacting care.6 

—————— 

5See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42–43 (concession by Hoeper’s counsel that “it 

would have been true for [Air Wisconsin] to say, look, we’re calling to

let you know, because Mr. Hoeper’s an FFDO, we don’t have any reason 

to believe that he has gun with him, but we can’t tell for sure, so we 

just thought we would tell you, in case you have any questions and 

want to investigate further”).

While we take the jury’s findings at face value, we note that the

record suggests Air Wisconsin may well have added the qualifier that

Hoeper argues was necessary. An internal TSA e-mail summarizing

Doyle’s call concludes by stating: “[Redacted] does not believe [redacted]

is in possession of a firearm at this time.” App. 414. 6Hoeper also takes issue with Air Wisconsin’s statement that it was 

“concerned about . . . the whereabouts of his firearm,” App. to Pet. for 
 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

We next consider Air Wisconsin’s statement that Hoeper

“was terminated today.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a.

When Air Wisconsin made that statement, Hoeper had not 

yet been fired. But everyone knew the firing was almost 

certainly imminent. Hoeper acknowledged that his employment was “at [Air Wisconsin’s] discretion” after his 

third failed test, App. 193, and the agreement between 

him and Air Wisconsin stated that his “fourth . . . attempt” 

to pass the test would be his “final” one, id., at 426. No 

reasonable TSA officer would care whether an angry, potentially armed airline employee had just been fired or

merely knew he was about to meet that fate.

Finally, we consider Air Wisconsin’s statements that 

Hoeper was “[u]nstable” and that it was “concerned about

his mental stability.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. Although the details of Hoeper’s behavior during the simulator session may be disputed, Hoeper himself testified that

he had become visibly angry: He decided “that’s it,” he

removed his headset and “toss[ed] it,” and he accused the 

instructor—at an “elevated decibel level,” and with an 

expletive—of “railroading the situation.” App. 203–204. It 

would surely have been correct, then, for Air Wisconsin to

report that Hoeper “‘blew up’” during the test. 2012 WL 

907764, *8. The question is whether, from the perspective

of a reasonable security officer, there is any material 

difference between a statement that Hoeper had just “blown

up” in a professional setting and a statement that he

was “[u]nstable.” We think not. 

We are no more troubled by Air Wisconsin’s related 

statement that it was “concerned about [Hoeper’s] mental

stability.” Hoeper is correct that many of the Air Wisconsin officials who attended the meeting at headquarters 

—————— 

Cert. 111a. But his arguments concerning this statement are the same

as those concerning the statement that he “may [have] been armed,”
 

ibid., and we reject them for the same reasons. 
 

16 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

might not have framed their concerns in terms of “mental stability.” LaWare, for instance, testified that “[t]hose

weren’t the words that [he] would have anticipated” when

he directed Doyle to call the TSA. App. 272. But the 

officials who attended the meeting did harbor concerns 

about Hoeper’s mental state: They knew he had just 

“blown up,” and they worried about what he might do 

next. It would be inconsistent with the ATSA’s text and 

purpose to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because its

employee could have chosen a slightly better phrase than

“mental stability” to articulate its concern. Just as 

“[m]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity” in the 

defamation context, “so long as ‘the substance, the gist, 

the sting, of the libelous charge be justified,’” Masson, 501 

U. S., at 517, a statement that would otherwise qualify for 

ATSA immunity cannot lose that immunity because of 

some minor imprecision, so long as “the gist” of the statement is accurate. Doyle’s statements to the TSA accurately conveyed “the gist” of the situation; it is irrelevant

whether trained lawyers or judges might with the luxury

of time have chosen more precise words. 

Hoeper’s overarching factual theory appears to be that 

members of the BAe-146 team, including Doyle and Schuerman, harbored personal animosity toward him, which

caused them to manipulate the proficiency tests in order

to fail him. But even if Hoeper were correct about

all this (and we express no view on that question), we do 

not see why it would have made him any less a threat in 

the eyes of a reasonable security officer. As between two 

employees—one who thinks he is being fired because of his 

inadequate skills, another who thinks he is being fired 

because his employer hates him—the latter is presumably 

more, not less, likely to lash out in anger. 

The partial dissent argues that Doyle’s reference to

Hoeper’s “mental stability” was so egregious as to make

his report to the TSA the basis of a $1.2 million defama-
 

 

 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

tion judgment. We disagree. While lawyers and judges

may in some contexts apply the label “mentally unstable” 

to people suffering from serious mental illnesses, see post,

at 4 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),

that is hardly the only manner in which the label is used. 

A holding that Air Wisconsin lost its ATSA immunity by

virtue of Doyle’s failure to be aware of every connotation of 

the phrase “mental stability” would eviscerate the immunity provision. All of us from time to time use words that, 

on reflection, we might modify. If such slips of the tongue

could give rise to major financial liability, no airline would 

contact the TSA (or permit its employees to do so) without

running by its lawyers the text of its proposed disclosure—

exactly the kind of hesitation that Congress aimed to

avoid. 

The partial dissent further argues that Hoeper’s “display of anger” made him no more a threat than “millions

of perfectly harmless air travelers.” Post, at 4. But 

Hoeper did not just lose his temper; he lost it in circumstances that he knew would lead to his firing, which he

regarded as the culmination of a vendetta against him. 

And he was not just any passenger; he was an FFDO,

which meant that he could plausibly have been carrying a 

firearm. In short, Hoeper was not some traveling businessman who yelled at a barista in a fit of pique over a

badly brewed cup of coffee.

Finally, the partial dissent relies on an expert’s testimony “that Hoeper’s behavior did not warrant any report

to the TSA.” Post, at 4 (citing App. 356). But the expert

appears to have based that statement on an outdated 

understanding of reporting obligations that is flatly at

odds with the ATSA. Prior to the ATSA, “airlines were 

responsible for assessing and investigating possible

threats to airline security.” 2012 WL 907764, *14 (Eid, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). But the ATSA 

shifted that responsibility to the TSA, creating a policy 
 

 

18 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of the Court 

“known as ‘when in doubt, report.’ ” Ibid.; see supra, at 9. 

The expert who believed that Hoeper’s conduct did not 

warrant a report to the TSA also believed that airlines

have “an obligation . . . to filter out . . . the low noise from

. . . what’s significant” in reporting threats. App. 356. 

That understanding does not comport with the policy that 

Congress chose to enact.

The Colorado Supreme Court recognized that even if the

facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Hoeper, Air 

Wisconsin “would likely be immune” had it “reported that 

Hoeper . . . knew he would be terminated soon, that he

had acted irrationally at the training three hours earlier

and ‘blew up’ at test administrators, and that he was an

FFDO pilot.” 2012 WL 907764, *8. But the court erred in 

parsing so finely the distinctions between these hypothetical statements and the ones that Air Wisconsin actually 

made. The minor differences are, for the reasons we have 

explained, immaterial as a matter of law in determining

Air Wisconsin’s ATSA immunity. 

By incorporating the actual malice standard into 

§44941(b), Congress meant to give air carriers the

“‘breathing space’” to report potential threats to security

officials without fear of civil liability for a few inaptly 

chosen words. New York Times, 376 U. S., at 272. To hold 

Air Wisconsin liable for minor misstatements or loose 

wording would undermine that purpose and disregard the 

statutory text. 

* * * 

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is

therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–315 

AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION, 

PETITIONER v. WILLIAM L. HOEPER 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
 

[January 27, 2014]

 JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and 

JUSTICE KAGAN join, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part. 

I agree with the Court that under the Aviation and

Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U. S. C. §44901 

et seq., an airline may not be denied immunity for a report it made to the Transportation Security Administration

(TSA) absent a finding that the report was materially 

false. I also agree that, in this context, materiality means 

that the falsehood had a natural tendency to influence a 

reasonable TSA officer’s determination of an appropriate

response to the report; and that neither the jury nor the

courts below considered material falsity in this ATSAspecific way. I therefore join Parts I, II, and III–A of the

Court’s opinion. 

Having answered the question we granted certiorari to

decide, see 570 U. S. ___ (2013), I would stop there and 

remand the case for further proceedings. Instead, the 

Court proceeds to “apply the [ATSA] material falsity

standard to the facts of this case” in the first instance, 

ante, at 13, and concludes as a matter of law that Air 

Wisconsin’s report to the TSA about William Hoeper was

not materially false. In so holding, the Court in my view

reaches out to decide a factbound question better left to 

the lower courts, and then proceeds to give the wrong 
 

 

2 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

answer. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part III–B 

and the disposition.

We have held that under the First Amendment, a court’s 

role is to determine whether “[a] reasonable jury could 

find a material difference between” the defendant’s statement and the truth. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 

Inc., 501 U. S. 496, 522 (1991). That makes sense, since 

materiality is the sort of “‘mixed question of law and fact’” 

that “has typically been resolved by juries.” United States 

v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 512 (1995). The jury has a vital

role to play in the materiality inquiry, which entails “‘delicate assessments of the inferences a “reasonable decisionmaker” would draw from a given set of facts and the 

significance of those inferences to him’” and is therefore 

“‘peculiarly one for the trier of fact.’” Ibid. (quoting TSC 

Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438, 450 

(1976); brackets omitted). Such a question cannot be

withdrawn from the jury unless “the facts and the law will

reasonably support only one conclusion” on which “reasonable persons . . . could [not] differ.” McDermott Int’l, Inc. 

v. Wilander, 498 U. S. 337, 356 (1991). The same rule 

applies to a determination of immunity from suit: When a 

defendant raises qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court must “adop[t] . . . the plaintiff ’s version 

of the facts” unless “no reasonable jury could believe it.” 

Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 378–380 (2007). 

Therefore, if we are to apply the ATSA materiality 

standard to the complex record in this case in the first

instance, it is proper to view “the historical facts in the 

manner most favorable to Hoeper,” as the Court purports

to do. Ante, at 13. We must of course begin by taking as

given the findings that we know the jury already made,

including that Air Wisconsin told the TSA that the airline 

was “concerned about [Hoeper’s] mental stability” and that 

he was an “[u]nstable pilot,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a 

(special verdict form), and that those statements were 
Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

false, 2012 WL 907764, *10 (Colo., Mar. 19, 2012). Next, 

we must ask whether a reasonable jury could find the 

remaining historical facts to be such that those statements

were not only false, but materially false from the perspective of a reasonable TSA agent. If not, judgment for Air 

Wisconsin is proper; but if so, the ATSA materiality question should be tried to a (properly instructed) jury. (Unless, of course, a reasonable jury would be compelled to 

find facts that would render the statements materially 

false, in which case judgment for Hoeper would be proper; 

but that is assuredly not the case here.)

Applying that reasonable-jury standard, I do not see

how we can possibly hold as a matter of law that Air 

Wisconsin’s report was not materially false. The Court 

acknowledges Hoeper’s description of the confrontation

that spawned the airline’s threat report: After failing 

a flight simulator test, Hoeper “decided ‘that’s it,’ he 

removed his headset and ‘toss[ed] it,’ and he accused 

the instructor—at an ‘elevated decibel level,’ and with 

an expletive—of ‘railroading the situation.’” Ante, at 15 

(quoting App. 203–204). A jury could credit Hoeper’s 

account. It could also believe his “overarching factual

theory” that his anger was reasonable because the instructor had “manipulate[d]” the test to cause him to fail out of

“personal animosity,” ante, at 16—a theory that was not 

without supporting evidence, see, e.g., App. 259–260 (pilot 

testifying as expert witness that Hoeper’s testing was 

“absolutely unfair” and “biased”). Moreover, there was 

evidence from which a jury could conclude that no one who

interacted with Hoeper during or after the confrontation—

including the instructor—viewed him as either unstable or 

threatening. See, e.g., id., at 15–16 (instructor acknowledging that he “‘quickly realized it wasn’t a threatening 

situation’”); id., at 29–31 (instructor testifying he “‘never 

felt that [Hoeper] was going to go do something stupid,’” 

“‘didn’t believe that Mr. Hoeper posed a threat in any way 
 

 

 

 

4 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

to anybody else at all,’” “‘did not believe that Mr. Hoeper 

was engaging in irrational behavior,’” and “‘deem[ed] him 

perfectly safe to get on an airplane’ ”); id., at 462 (airline 

representative who gave Hoeper permission to fly home

testifying he “had no concern that [Hoeper] was a physical 

threat to anybody” and “didn’t believe he was mentally 

unstable”).

In short, a jury could find that Hoeper did nothing more

than engage in a brief, run-of-the-mill, and arguably 

justified display of anger that included raising his voice

and swearing, but that did not cause anyone, including the 

person on the receiving end of the outburst, to view him as 

either irrational or a potential source of violence. Viewing

the facts in that light, I cannot agree with the Court that

a reasonable TSA official would not “consider . . . important,” ante, at 13, the difference between an individual 

who engaged in this sort of heated but commonplace display of anger, on the one hand, and on the other, an

individual whose colleagues regard him as “mentally unstable.” It is the difference between a category that no doubt 

includes millions of perfectly harmless air travelers and 

one that, in ordinary parlance, connotes an alarming

degree of unpredictability and aggressiveness. Indeed, we 

have used that term in connection with individuals so 

“dangerously mentally ill” that they may be subject to civil

confinement. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 363 

(1997). The importance of that difference was highlighted

by the expert testimony in this case of a former TSA Federal Security Director, who stated—based on a version of 

the underlying facts the jury was entitled to accept—that

Hoeper’s behavior did not warrant any report to the TSA.

App. 356.* 

—————— 

*The Court dismisses the former Director’s testimony because he

testified that in making threat reports to the TSA, airline officials 

should use “common sense” to “filter out the garbage and report [only] 
 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

The association with dangerous mental illness is not, as

the Court suggests, merely one “connotation of the phrase

‘mental [in]stability’” among many, ante, at 17; it is the 

everyday understanding of that phrase. The Court says

that this is “hardly the only manner in which the label is 

used,” ibid., but it does not even attempt to describe another usage, let alone one that would be a materially 

accurate description of the facts of this case as a jury 

might find them. The Court also suggests that the circumstances of this case—particularly the fact that Hoeper

knew his firing was imminent, had reason to be angry 

with the airline, and was authorized to carry a firearm—

distinguish Hoeper’s confrontation with the instructor 

from an ordinary “fit of pique.” Ibid. But if so, it was all 

the more important for the airline to make an accurate 

report to the TSA, so that the agency could assess the 

possible danger and determine an appropriate response.

Falsely reporting to the TSA that a young Irishman is an

IRA terrorist is much more likely to produce a prompt

and erroneous response than reporting that a 70-year-old 

English grandmother is. The circumstances the Court 

identifies enhanced, rather than diminished, the likelihood that the false “mentally unstable” designation would 

have a material effect on the TSA’s response. 

In sum, it is simply implausible that, taking the facts of 

—————— 

really suspicious incidents,” App. 356, a view the Court deems “flatly at 

odds with the ATSA,” ante, at 17. The ATSA, however, simply requires 

airlines to report “threat[s] to civil aviation,” 49 U. S. C. §44905(a). The 

statute surely places a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of reporting, 

but it certainly does not preclude the exercise of reasonable judgment 

in deciding what rises to the level of a “threat” and what constitutes, as

the former Director put it, irrelevant “garbage.” And even if one 

disagrees with the former Director that no report should have been

made at all, the point is that a reasonable jury could have considered 

his testimony relevant to establishing that falsely expressing concerns 

about an individual’s “mental stability” in the circumstances of this 

case would have a material effect on the TSA’s decisionmaking process. 
 

 

6 AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORP. v. HOEPER 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

this case in the light most favorable to Hoeper, a reasonable jury would have to find that the report of mental instability would have no effect upon the course of action 

determined by the TSA. The Court’s holding to the contrary demonstrates the wisdom of preserving the jury’s

role in this inquiry, designed to inject a practical sense

that judges sometimes lack. I respectfully dissent from 

that holding.