NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

LUIS MICHAEL MOLINA, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-50276

D.C. No. 3:12-cr-04922-BEN-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 6, 2016**

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Luis Molina appeals his conviction for attempting to 

bring an alien into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) 

and (iii). We affirm. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 8 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Border Patrol stopped Molina as he was attempting to enter the United 

States. Officers searched his car and found a recently-built, non-factory 

compartment. Inside the compartment, officers discovered Maria Villasensor, 

who was attempting to enter the United States illegally. At trial, Molina argued 

that he was unaware of Villasensor’s presence in his car. The jury convicted 

Molina of attempting to bring an alien into the United States for the purpose of 

commercial advantage or private financial gain, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), and 

attempting to bring an alien into the United States without presentation to an 

appropriate immigration officer at a designated port of entry, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). Molina timely appealed. 

The district court did not err in admitting Villasensor’s testimony that she 

was going to pay a smuggling fee to be brought into the United States. Federal 

Rule of Evidence 602 explains that “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if 

evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal 

knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of 

the witness’s own testimony.” Villasensor’s testimony that she was going to pay a 

fee to be smuggled into the United States was admissible under Rule 602 because 

her earlier testimony that she had worked with another individual on the details of 
3 

being smuggled into the United States established sufficient personal knowledge.

1

The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion in allowing statements 

by the prosecutor in closing that Villasensor could have been seriously harmed if 

Molina drove recklessly because of the jagged edges of the compartment near her 

face, and that Villasensor could have died if Molina was driving for too long.

“Prosecutors can argue reasonable inferences based on the record, and have

considerable leeway to strike hard blows based on the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence.” United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The challenged statements were reasonable 

inferences drawn from a record that established, among other things: the 

compartment had jagged metal edges near Villasensor’s face; her head was right 

above the muffler, which could reach 600 degrees; Villasensor was having 

difficulty breathing; and she could not get herself out of the compartment without 

assistance. Nor did the district court err in permitting the prosecutor to argue that 

Molina knew of the danger to Villasenor, because the prosecutor’s statements were 

 

1 Because we find that the district court did not err in admitting Villasensor’s 

testimony as to facts of which she had personal knowledge under Rule 602, we 

need not consider Molina’s alternative argument that Villasensor’s testimony 

constituted improper lay opinion testimony under Rule 701. 
4 

couched in explicitly inferential terms and reasonably drawn from the record.

We review Molina’s additional challenges to the prosecutor’s arguments for 

plain error because Molina did not object to the statements at trial. See United 

States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010). The district court did not plainly err 

by allowing the prosecutor to argue during closing that nobody would be paid if 

Villasensor did not reach the United States alive. Villasensor’s statements about 

payment in the future tense combined with the lack of evidence that any money 

had yet changed hands made this a fair inference. Nor did the district court 

plainly err in allowing the prosecutor to argue that a person would need keys to 

open the compartment in Molina’s car. This statement was supported by the 

record (as well as common sense) given that the compartment had to be opened 

from within the car.

 

AFFIRMED.