alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Victor A. Humphrey, as Administrator of Sean A. Humphrey, Deceased, Respondent, v Jewish Hospital and Medical Center of Brooklyn, Defendant, and Isadore R. Gold, Appellant.

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death, the defendant Isadore Roy Gold appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pizzuto, J.), dated October 5, 1989, which denied his motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

We find that material issues of fact exist, *inter alia,*as to whether the defendant Isadore Roy Gold used appropriate care in the prenatal treatment of the plaintiff’s wife and delivery of the infant. To grant summary judgment it must clearly appear that no material and triable issues of fact are presented *(see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324; *Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center,*64 NY2d 851, 853; *Canosa v Abadir,*165 AD2d 823).

The defendant claims that since the plaintiff’s expert was a general surgeon he was unqualified to render an opinion in the specialty of obstetrics or gynecology. The defendant’s claim is without merit. A physician need not be a specialist in a particular field in order to be considered a medical expert *(see, Fuller v Preis,*35 NY2d 425; *Joswick v Lenox Hill Hosp.,*161 AD2d 352; *Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn.,*53 AD2d 169; Fisch, New York Evidence § 428, at 277; Richardson, *495Evidence § 368 [Prince 10th ed]). Mangano, P. J., Lawrence, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOISES VELASQUEZ-MEDINA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 17-70553 

Agency No. A088-892-353 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 21, 2019**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Moises Velasquez-Medina, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to 

reopen. We have jurisdiction under U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of 

discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and review de novo questions of law. 

Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-70553 

petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely VelasquezMedina’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel and new 

eligibility for asylum and related relief, where he filed the motion more than three 

years after his final administrative order of removal, he did not show due diligence 

for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, and he did not show that the motion was 

subject to any exceptions to the deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3) (subject 

to exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date 

of the final administrative decision); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from 

timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as the 

petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

We reject Velasquez-Medina’s contention that the BIA failed to address his 

request for reopening based on new eligibility for asylum and related relief. The

BIA addressed the timeliness of his motion and did not need to address changed 

country conditions because this exception was not raised in his brief to the BIA.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3); Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 

2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the 

results they reach).

Because these determinations are dispositive, we do not reach Velasquez-
3 17-70553 

Medina’s remaining contentions regarding compliance with the procedural 

requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and whether 

he was prejudiced by prior counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance. See Simeonov, 

371 F.3d at 538.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Report of AXIM International, Inc., a Nevada Corporation, (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the Quarter ended June 30, 2015, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned certify the following pursuant to Section 18, U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/ Dr. George Anastassov


Dr. George Anastassov


Chief Executive Officer


Chief Financial Officer


Principal Accounting Officer





August 19, 2015
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<CASH>                                           5,421
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</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

BRIAN D. BAUR,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 66 EAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 18th day of July, 2018

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-7438
JOEL WATKINS FULP, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus MECKLENBURG COUNTY JAIL, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District Judge. (CA-05-362-2) Submitted: October 20, 2005 Decided: October 31, 2005 Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Joel Watkins Fulp, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Joel Watkins Fulp appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action for failure to comply with its order to file a supplemental complaint to cure the defects in the original complaint. Because Fulp may cure the defect in his complaint by filing a supplemental complaint in accordance with the district court’s order, the dismissal is not appealable. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 , 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We further deny Fulp’s motion to amend caption. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### River House Realty Co., Inc. Plaintiff, v Lico Contracting, Inc., et al., Defendants. (Action No. 1.) Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company, as Subrogee of Advertising to Women Inc., Appellant, v Ella Cisneros, Respondent, et al., Defendants. (And Two Third-Party Actions.) (Action No. 3.) *427River House Realty Co., Inc., Plaintiff, v Lico Contracting, Inc., et al., Defendants. (Action No. 1.) John J. Farber et al., Plaintiffs, and John L. Ernest et al., Appellants, v River House Realty Co., Inc., et al., Defendants, and Oswald Cisneros et al., Respondents. (And Two Third-Party Actions.) (Action No. 4.) (And Ten Other Actions.)

(Appeal No. 42220.)

(Appeal No. 42221.)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Burton Sherman, J.), entered on or about October 23, 1989, which denied a motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of John L. Ernst and Lois Geraci Ernst, plaintiffs-appellants in Action No. 4 and against defendant-respondent Ella Cisneros, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Order of the same court entered on November 22, 1989, which, *inter alia,*denied a motion by defendant River House and a cross-motion by plaintiff-appellant Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company as subrogee of Advertising to Women Inc., pursuant to CPLR 3212 (e), for partial summary judgment against defendant-respondent Ella Cisneros, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

These actions arise from a fire in a co-operative apartment building. The IAS court properly decided issues of fact as to the cause of fire. Allegations by Mrs. Cisneros, in whose apartment the fire began, that contractors employed by her to perform renovating caused the fire, did not warrant summary judgment. These allegations are, at most, informal judicial admissions, which are not conclusive (Richardson, Evidence § 217 [Prince 10th ed]), as are the allegations in a related federal action, brought against the contractor *(Pitt v Brough,*132 AD2d 836, 837). The allegations in the third-party complaint, which consist mostly of allegations of legal conclusion, are permissible inconsistent pleadings of a cause of action or defense (CPLR 3014).

Respondent’s application to strike the brief filed by River House Realty Co., Inc. and Brown Harris Stevens is denied. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Carro, Kupferman, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
EX-10.3



 EXHIBIT 10.3 
  

			
	 




  
	  	 Suite 1200, 888 Dunsmuir Street

Vancouver, BC V6C 3K4
 Tel:
(604) 629-2991
  
  


  
 December 11,
2015 
 Laurie Sadler 
 ################ 

################# 
 ####### 

Dear Mr. Sadler, 
  

	Re:	Agreement to Continue Employment 

 As you know, Lynden Energy Corp. (“Lynden”) may
undertake a plan of arrangement which, if completed, will result in a change of control of Lynden (the “Arrangement”). In order to complete the Arrangement if it proceeds, Lynden will need you to continue as its chief financial
officer. To entice you to continue in such position until the date on which the Arrangement is effected (the “Effective Date”) and to provide reasonable assistance in the transition to new management of Lynden for a period of 90
days following the Effective Date, Lynden proposes to pay to your company, Timeout Holdings Inc., the sum of CDN$25,000 (the “Final Payment”) plus GST. The Final Payment will be in addition to your current remuneration. Lynden
agrees to pay the Final Payment to you by the business day immediately preceding the Effective Date provided that you: 
  

	 	1.	continue as Lynden’s chief financial officer until the Effective Date on the current terms of remuneration (unless altered by mutual written agreement of you and Lynden); and 


 

	 	2.	execute and deliver on the Effective Date to Lynden a release substantially in the form contemplated under the agreement concerning the Arrangement. 


Please indicate your acceptance of the above by signing where indicated below. We look forward to continuing to work with you and we appreciate your ongoing
assistance. 
 Yours truly, 
  

			
	Lynden Energy Corp.
		
	Per:	 	 /s/ Colin Watt

	 Colin Watt, CEO and President


 The undersigned accepts the above. 
  

	
	 /s/ Laurie Sadler

	Signature
250 La. 255

#### Eli ALLEN v. SUPERIOR INSURANCE COMPANY OF DALLAS et al.

No. 48535.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 20, 1967.

In re: Eli Allen applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 192 So.2d 820.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we find no error of law in the judgment complained of.
UNIVERSAL BUSINESS PAYMENT SOLUTIONS ACQUISITION CORPORATION




May 9, 2011




UBPS Services, LLC


Radnor Financial Center


150 North Radnor-Chester Road, Suite F-200


Radnor, Pennsylvania 19087


ATTN: Bipin Shah, Member




Gentlemen and Ladies:




This letter will confirm our agreement that, commencing on the effective date (the “Effective Date”) of the registration statement for the initial public offering (the “IPO”) of the securities of Universal Business Payment Solutions Acquisition Corporation (the “Company”) and continuing until the consummation by the Company of a “Business Combination” (as described in the Company’s registration statement in connection with the IPO), or the Company’s liquidation, UBPS Services, LLC shall make available to the Company certain administrative, technology and secretarial services, as well as the use of certain limited office space, including a conference room in Radnor, Pennsylvania, as may be required by the Company from time to time, situated at 150 North Radnor-Chester Road, Suite F-200, Radnor, Pennsylvania 19087 (or any successor location).  In exchange therefor, the Company shall pay UBPS Services, LLC the sum of $7,500 per month on the Effective Date and continuing monthly thereafter.




This letter agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding of the parties hereto in respect of its subject matter and supersedes all prior understandings, agreements or representations by or among the parties hereto, written or oral, to the extent they relate in any way to the subject matter hereof or the transactions contemplated hereby.




This letter agreement may not be amended, modified or waived as to any particular provisions, except by a written instrument executed by all parties hereto.




No party hereto may assign either this letter agreement or any of its rights, interests or obligations hereunder without the prior written approval of the other party.  Any purported assignment in violation of this paragraph shall be void and ineffectual and shall not operate to transfer or assign any interest or title to the purported assignee.




This letter agreement, the entire relationship of the parties hereto, and any litigation between the parties (whether grounded in contract, tort, statute, law or equity) shall be governed by, construed in accordance with, and interpreted pursuant to the laws of the State of New York.










Very truly yours,UNIVERSAL BUSINESS PAYMENT SOLUTIONS

ACQUISITION CORPORATIONBy:
/s/ Bipin C. ShahName:
Bipin C. ShahTitle:
Chief Executive Officer





AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED BY:UBPS SERVICES, LLCBy:
/s/ Bipin C. ShahName:
Bipin C. ShahTitle:
Chief Executive Officer





[Signature Page to Administrative Services Agreement]
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Quarterly Report of American Midstream Partners, LP (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Brian F.
Bierbach, President and Chief Executive Officer of American Midstream GP, LLC, the general partner of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: November 13, 2012



/s/ Brian F. BierbachBrian F. BierbachPresident and Chief Executive Officer ofAmerican Midstream GP, LLC,
the general partner of American Midstream Partners, LP


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being
filed as part of the Report or as a separate document. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         40,498
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  92,018
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               283,683
<PP&E>                                         40,669
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2,589
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 813,511
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          246,074
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    17,248
<COMMON>                                       21,533
<OTHER-SE>                                     174,313
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   813,511
<SALES>                                        140,355
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               140,355
<CGS>                                          126,703
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  126,703
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               125,199
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,608
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (113,155)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (113,155)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.10)
        


</TABLE>
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-85,653-05

EX PARTE JOHNNY CALVIN SCOTT, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. C-396-W011386-1359184-D IN THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM TARRANT COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of capital murder

and sentenced to life imprisonment. Applicant's conviction was affirmed by the Second Court of

Appeals in an unpublished opinion on June 4, 2015. Scott v. State, No. 02-14-00183-CR (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2015) (not designated for publication).

In the instant application, Applicant contends that he is actually innocent based on newly

discovered evidence, CODIS Hit Report linking DNA evidence found on the victim's body to

another person. In his second ground for relief, Applicant contends that a detective lied to him
2

during his interrogation when he told Applicant that no one else's DNA was found under the victim's

fingernails and that the State allowed perjured testimony by the detective when he testified to that

effect. The trial court determined that the CODIS report had been rescinded and concluded that

Applicant had presented no newly discovered evidence that constitutes affirmative evidence of his

innocence.

We agree. After a review of the record, we find that Applicant's actual innocence claim is

without merit. Therefore, we deny relief. Applicant’s second ground is barred from review under

Article 11.07, Section 4 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, that claim is

dismissed. 

Filed: April 21, 2021

Do not publish
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.47


                               [TCI LETTERHEAD]


                              December 26, 1996


Mr. Larry E. Romrell
Tele-Communications, Inc.
5619 DTC Parkway
Englewood, CO 80111

Dear Larry:

         This letter sets forth the agreement of Tele-Communications, Inc.
("TCI") to purchase from you or Colorado National Bank, as your assignee
pursuant to your $850,000 Credit Line and $1,800,000 Term Note, insofar as such
purchase is permitted under TCI's loan agreements (as of today's date, no TCI
loan agreement would prohibit this purchase), any and all of the 103 shares of
the WestMarc Series C Cumulative Compounding Redeemable Preferred Stock owned
by you at the date of purchase.  TCI agrees to purchase each such share from
you or Colorado National Bank (free and clear of any liens or other
encumbrances) upon ten business days' notice from you at the Liquidation Price
of $32,250 per share plus any accrued, but unpaid, dividends on such shares
through the date of purchase.  This agreement expires on January 1, 2002.

                                      Sincerely yours,



                                      /s/ John C. Malone
                                      John C. Malone

SMB/sww