2019
This report is available online at www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications.

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DIA-02-1706-085
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IV

PREFACE

In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to 

produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The purpose was to provide 

America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a comprehensive and accurate view 

of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 250,000 copies, and 

it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around 

the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. 

policymakers and the public for the first time.

In the spirit of Soviet Military Power, DIA began in 2017 to produce a series of unclassified Defense 

Intelligence overviews of major foreign military challenges we face. This volume provides details on 

China’s defense and military goals, strategy, plans, and intentions; the organization, structure, and 

capability of its military supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base. 

This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, our leaders, the national 

security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century.
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY V

The Defense Intelligence Agency—indeed the broader U.S. Intelligence Community—is continually asked, "What 

do we need to know about China?" What is China’s vision of the world and its role in it? What are Beijing’s strategic 

intentions and what are the implications for Washington? How are the PLA’s roles and missions changing as it 

becomes a more capable military force? 

Since Mao Zedong’s Communist Revolution in October 1949 brought the Chinese Communist Party to power, China 

has struggled to identify and align itself with its desired place in the world. Early factional struggles for control of party 

leadership, decades of negotiations to define territorial boundaries, and continued claims to territories not yet recovered 

have at times seemed at odds with the self-described nature of the Chinese as peace-loving and oriented only toward 

their own defense. Chinese leaders historically have been willing to use military force against threats to their regime, 

whether foreign or domestic, at times preemptively. Lack of significant involvement in military operations during the 

last several decades has led to a sense of insecurity within the PLA as it seeks to modernize into a great power military. 

Still, the United States has at times found itself in direct conflict with China or Chinese forces. China supported two 

major conflicts in Asia after the Second World War, introducing Chinese volunteer forces in Korea and providing 

direct Chinese air and air defense support to Hanoi in Vietnam. In addition, China fought border skirmishes with 

the Soviet Union, India, and a unified Vietnam. In all three cases, military action was an integral part of Chinese 

diplomatic negotiations. Since then, China has concluded negotiations for most of its land borders (India and 

Bhutan being the outliers) but remains in contention with Japan, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 

and Vietnam over maritime borders, which may in part explain motivation for the PLA Navy’s impressive growth 

and the new emphasis on maritime law enforcement capabilities.

China’s double-digit economic growth has slowed recently, but it served to fund several successive defense 

modernization Five-Year Plans. As international concern over Beijing's human rights policies stymied the PLA’s 

search for ever more sophisticated technologies, China shifted funds and efforts to acquiring technology by any 

means available. Domestic laws forced foreign partners of Chinese-based joint ventures to release their technology 

in exchange for entry into China’s lucrative market, and China has used other means to secure needed technology 

and expertise. The result of this multifaceted approach to technology acquisition is a PLA on the verge of fielding 

some of the most modern weapon systems in the world. In some areas, it already leads the world.

Chinese leaders characterize China’s long-term military modernization program as essential to achieving great 

power status. Indeed, China is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air, maritime, space and 

information domains which will enable China to impose its will in the region. As it continues to grow in strength and 

confidence, our nation’s leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which at 

times may be antithetical to U.S. interests. With a deeper understanding of the military might behind Chinese economic 

and diplomatic efforts, we can provide our own national political, economic, and military leaders the widest range of 

options for choosing when to counter, when to encourage, and when to join with China in actions around the world.

This report offers insights into the modernization of Chinese military power as it reforms from a defensive, inflexible 

ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security responsibilities to a joint, highly agile, expeditionary, 

and power-projecting arm of Chinese foreign policy that engages in military diplomacy and operations across the globe.

The 2015 Chinese white paper China’s Military Strategy, issued by China’s State Council Information Office, 

states: “It is a Chinese Dream to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream is to 

make the country strong....Without a strong military, a country can neither be safe nor strong.”

Robert P. Ashley, Jr.

Lieutenant General, U.S. A rmy 

Director

Defense Intelligence Agency
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CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

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VII

CONTENTS

Introduction/Historical Overview1

1978–Present: China’s Military Rise2

National Military Overview7

Threat Perceptions7

National Security Strategy.  

The PLA’s Role in National Security.  

Military Leadership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Stability Issues.  

External Defense Relations.  

Defense Budget.  

Military Doctrine and Strategy 2

Perceptions of Modern Conflict.  

National Military Command and Control . 

Core Elements of Command and Control Reform                25

Modernizing Joint Command and Control

                   27

Regional and Global Operations.  

Core Chinese Military Capabilities 3

Power Projection and Expeditionary Operations.  

Nuclear Forces and Weapons.  

Biological and Chemical Warfare.  

Space/Counterspace.  

Satellites                                     41

Counterspace

                                   43

Human Spaceflight and Space-Exploration Probes

               43

Space Launch

 .
VIII

Cyberspace  

Denial and Deception.  

Logistics and Defense-Industrial Modernization.  

Logistics .

Defense-Industrial Base 48

Underground Facilities.  

Missions Other Than War  .

Outlook: Developing a Robust Force. 

APPENDIX A: PLA Army. 

APPENDIX B: PLA Navy . 

APPENDIX C: PLA Air Force. 

APPENDIX D: PLA Rocket Force. 

APPENDIX E: PLA Strategic Support Force. 

APPENDIX F: Chinese Intelligence Services. 

APPENDIX G: Military Resources, 

Infrastructure, and Logistics .  

APPENDIX H: Defense Industry.  .

APPENDIX I: Arms Sales.  .

APPENDIX J: Glossary of Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
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CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

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1

Introduction/Historical Overview

hina’s history dates back nearly five 

millennia. Historians credit the armies 

of numerous dynasties throughout 

those many centuries with unifying the early 

warring states, building the Great Wall, sending the fleets of early Ming Dynasty maritime 

explorer Zheng He to far-off foreign lands, and 

defending against foreign incursions. However, 

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has existed 

for less than a century. Initially referred to as 

the “Red Army” under Mao Zedong, the PLA is 

not a national institution but rather the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP). Established in 1927, the army spent 

much of its first two decades engaged in fighting the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek 

C

PLA honor guard.

Image Source: DIMOC

With more than 5,000 years of civilized history, the Chinese nation created a 

brilliant Chinese civilization, made outstanding contributions to mankind, and 

became a great nation of the world.

—Chinese President Xi Jinping1
2

during the intermittent Chinese Civil War as 

well as fighting against the Japanese during 

World War II (which China refers to as the 

War of Resistance Against Japan).

Mao’s Red Army declared victory over the 

Nationalists in October 1949, even as combat 

continued. That same year, the PLA expanded 

to include the PLA Navy and the PLA Air 

Force. The PLA remained technologically 

inferior to Western militaries during its early 

decades, but China’s leaders readily employed 

PLA forces against the United States in Korea 

and Vietnam. Beijing’s willingness to rely on 

the PLA as a tool of foreign policy strengthened 

the PLA’s position in China. Even as Mao led 

China through the upheaval of the Great Leap 

Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the PLA 

endured. Although the PLA emerged from the 

Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s as one 

of the stronger pillars of CCP power, its combat power was not commensurate with that of 

other large states’ armed forces.

1978–Present: China’s 

Military Rise

After Deng Xiaoping’s assumption of power in 

1978, the path to today’s PLA was set when 

national defense was included as the fourth of 

China’s four “modernizations” (the others being 

industry, science and technology, and agriculture). National defense was accorded the lowest priority, which carried implications for military funding and development. The failure to 

achieve comprehensive modernization during 

Mao’s rule was brought home during the 1979 

conflict between China and Vietnam, when the 

PLA’s performance exposed grave weaknesses 

in operational planning, tactics, command 

and control (C2), logistics, and weaponry. The 

persistent exchanges of fire with Vietnamese 

forces during the 1980s highlighted the need 

for changes even as large numbers of PLA 

ground troops from around the country were 

rotated to the border to gain combat experience. Meanwhile, the PLA began to study 

contemporary foreign, particularly Western, 

military operations more closely, such as the 

Falklands War (1982) and the bombing of 

Libya (1986), for insights on how to modernize 

China’s combat forces.

In 1989, PLA units intervened with lethal 

force on behalf of the CCP to suppress political 

demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, which 

considerably damaged the PLA’s domestic and 

international image. World events in 1991 further shook CCP leaders’ confidence in the PLA. 

The U.S. military’s performance in the Persian Gulf War provided the PLA stark lessons 

regarding the lethal effectiveness of information-enabled weapons and forces, particularly 

mobility and precision-strike capabilities, that 

had become the standard for effectively waging 

war in the modern era. As a result, in the early 

1990s Beijing altered its military doctrine, 

concluding that the most likely conflict that 

China would face would be a “local war under 

high-technology conditions” (later amended to 

“conditions of informatization,” referring to 

warfare in the digital age). This differed markedly from the Mao-era mindset that the PLA 
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 3

would need to be prepared to fight a war more 

akin to World War II. The PLA’s strategy also 

changed, moving away from the Maoist para-

digm of luring an enemy into China to fight a 

“people’s war” with regular troops, irregular 

(guerrilla) forces, and the general populace. 

Instead, the PLA began to emphasize a more 

offensive version of the PLA’s historical strate-

gic concept of “active defense”: take advantage 

of longer range, precision-guided munitions 

(primarily ballistic and cruise missiles) to keep 

a potential enemy as far as possible from the 

economically fast-developing Chinese coastal 

areas by fighting a “noncontact,” short, sharp 

conflict like the Persian Gulf War.

China’s changing strategic threat percep-

tions also shaped military doctrine and the 

direction of PLA development. Although the 

Soviet Union had loomed large as a potential 

military opponent, the threat of a Soviet inva-

sion diminished during the 1980s, shifting the 

focus away from preparing for a World War II–

style conflict. Furthermore, the U.S. 7th Fleet 

aircraft carrier intervention during the 1996 

China-Taiwan “missile crisis” and the acciden-

tal NATO strike against China’s Embassy in 

Serbia in 1999 led Beijing to focus on building 

capabilities to counter U.S. forces in addition 

to capabilities to dissuade Taiwan from any 

political activity Beijing deemed unacceptable.

Entering the 21st century, China’s leaders rec-

ognized the confluence of several factors that 

led them to expand the scope and quicken the 

pace of PLA development: China’s growing 

global economic and political interests, rapid 

technology-driven changes in modern warfare, 

and perceptions of increased strategic-level 

external threats, including to China’s mari-

time interests. At this time, Chinese leaders 

perceived a “period of strategic opportunity” 

wherein the country presumably would not 

be involved in a major military conflict before 

2020, allowing time for economic and military 

development. As a result, throughout the late 

1990s and early 2000s, China’s leaders initi-

ated several practical steps to modernize the 

PLA as a warfighting instrument.

To accelerate the PLA’s modernization and 

address capability shortfalls, Beijing increased 

the PLA’s budget by an average of 10 percent 

per year from 2000 to 2016. Beijing also estab-

lished a PLA General Armaments Depart-

ment in 1998 to rationalize equipment mod-

ernization and acquisition processes, and 

instituted several broad scientific and tech-

nical programs to improve the defense-in-

dustrial base and decrease the PLA’s depen-

dence on foreign weapon acquisitions. The 

PLA also revamped its training programs, 

with all services attempting to prepare more 

realistically for conflict by emphasizing mis-

sion-focused exercises, multiservice opera-

tions, mobility, better C2 and staff work, and 

enhanced logistic support, as well as achiev-

ing battlefield advantage by applying “infor-

matized” warfare (regional conflicts defined 

by real-time, data-networked C2) methods. 

[For more on “informatized” warfighting, please 

see Military Doctrine and Strategy, page 23].
4

Beijing also implemented personnel changes 

to professionalize the PLA. While Beijing was 

focused on economic development in the late 

1970s, the PLA had been allowed to operate 

nonmilitary businesses to offset limited investment and resources. This led to widespread corruption and drew attention away from training 

for actual military operations. In 1998, Chinese leaders ordered the PLA to stop operating nonmilitary businesses and focus solely 

on professional military tasks. As a result, the 

PLA divested from a number of business ventures but still remains to some extent involved 

in business schemes. The PLA developed a 

noncommissioned officer corps and began programs to recruit more technically competent 

university graduates to operate its modern 

weapons. PLA political officers assigned to all 

levels of the military acquired broader personnel management responsibilities in addition to 

their focus on keeping the PLA ideologically 

pure and loyal to the CCP.

In 2004, then-President Hu Jintao outlined 

for the PLA the “Historic Missions of the 

Armed Forces in the New Period of the New 

Century,” more commonly referred to as the 

“New Historic Missions of the PLA,” to augment the PLA’s role as a diplomatic and military instrument and as a guardian of China’s 

global interests. These new missions included 

ensuring China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security; preserving the 

“period of strategic opportunity” for China’s 

development; safeguarding China’s expanding 

national interests; and helping ensure world 

peace. Hu’s endowment of the PLA with these 

missions, at a time when economic interests 

had become substantial drivers of Beijing’s 

foreign policy, signified a critical inflection 

point in the PLA’s assumption of a global role 

and transition away from a force bound only 

to defending China’s immediate territorial and 

sovereignty interests.

Subsequent PLA activities, such as counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 

2009, international training and exercises, 

noncombatant evacuations in Libya and 

Yemen, and expanded peacekeeping operations in Africa under UN auspices, have all 

been part of China’s increasingly ambitious 

vision for expanding PLA activities to support 

its growing global clout. China’s establishment 

of its first overseas military base in Djibouti 

in 2017—overturning Beijing’s insistence from 

its first defense white paper issued in 1998 

that China “does not station troops or set up 

military bases in any foreign country”—is only 

the latest development in this progression.

The PLA’s evolution since President Xi Jinping’s 

transition to power in 2012 has built on the Hu 

era but also marked a shift, with Xi concurrently 

taking the helm of the party, military, and state, 

enabling him to shape the direction of the PLA 

earlier during his tenure. Xi has focused on 

strengthening the PLA as a force, underscoring the themes of party rule over the military, 

improving military capabilities, and enhancing the military’s professionalism.2

 Xi has also 

expanded the scope and ambition of PLA modernization, clearly affirming the PLA’s overseas 

role and providing the institutional framework 

to enable substantial military growth beyond the 

PLA’s traditional security threats.
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5

In late 2015, President Xi Jinping unveiled 

the most substantial PLA reforms in at least 

30 years. The reforms were designed in part 

to make the PLA a leaner, more lethal force 

capable of conducting the types of joint operations that it believes it must master to compete with the U.S. military. Initial reforms 

established joint theater commands and a 

new Joint Staff Department while reorganizing the 4 general departments that previously 

ran the PLA into 15 Central Military Commission (CMC) departments and offices. These 

efforts aimed to clarify command authorities, 

integrate China’s military services for joint 

operations, and facilitate Beijing’s transition 

from peace to war.

The structural reforms also established a separate Army headquarters, elevated China’s 

missile force to a full service by establishing 

the PLA Rocket Force, unified China’s space 

and cyber capabilities under the Strategic Support Force, and created a Joint Logistics Support Force to direct precision support to PLA 

operations.3,4,5 The decision to place the Army, 

which has traditionally played a dominant 

role in PLA leadership, on equal footing with 

the PLA’s other services underscores a postreform emphasis on jointness. Overall reforms, 

which the CMC aims to complete by 2020, are 

expected to touch all levels of the PLA, including cutting approximately 300,000 personnel 

and refining military doctrine and policies. 

Image Source: Shutterstock

PLA troops preparing for parade commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA

– September 2017.
6

[For a more detailed breakdown of PLA services 

and activities, please see Appendixes A–I.]

In October 2017, China’s leaders used the 

opportunity of its once-in-5-years Party Congress to reduce the size of the CMC, shifting 

toward a more joint command structure and 

aligning the military’s highest body to its postreform C2. Reducing the size of the CMC will 

help Beijing streamline strategic decisionmaking, bolster political oversight of the military, 

and build a more integrated and professional 

force. The move also highlights Xi’s focus on 

eliminating corruption, improving party loyalty, and incentivizing operational experience. The CMC now represents a capable and 

diverse generation of officers with operational 

experience, which as a whole has the most joint 

representation in the PLA’s history.

In his work report to the 19th Party Congress 

in October 2017, Xi Jinping called on the PLA 

to “prepare for military struggle in all strategic 

directions,” and said the military was integral 

to achieving China’s national rejuvenation. In 

his speech, Xi set three developmental benchmarks for the PLA, including becoming a mechanized force with increased informatized and 

strategic capabilities by 2020, a fully modernized force by 2035, and a worldwide first-class 

military by midcentury.6

 The latter two goals 

build on the call in China’s 2013 defense white 

paper, also issued under Xi, for China’s armed 

forces to achieve a status “commensurate 

with China’s international standing.” Viewed 

in sum, Xi’s vision for the PLA constitutes a 

logical outgrowth of CCP instructions to the 

PLA since 2004 to protect China’s expanding 

“development interests” at home and abroad.

The extent to which the PLA can progress in 

its transformation into a world-class military 

depends on the favorable resolution of several 

key issues, some of which are longstanding 

institutional barriers. The PLA’s traditional 

identity as a party army with a military culture 

that is hierarchical and where decisionmaking is top-down and centralized in some ways 

is incongruous with efforts to professionalize 

the PLA and imbue it with a culture that values individual decisionmaking and embraces 

mission delegation. The PLA also will need 

to refine newly established C2 structures to 

enable the execution of dynamic, fast-paced 

joint military operations and effectively integrate new technologies and processes. Perhaps 

one of the most difficult challenges of the ongoing reforms is that they represent the institutionalization of a cultural shift within the PLA 

away from its traditional ground-force-centric, 

inward-facing model to one that lays the foundation for coequal, professional services capable 

of joint operations across the globe.
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 7

National Military Overview

Threat Perceptions

The party’s perception that China is facing 

unprecedented security risks is a driving fac-

tor in China’s approach to national security.

7

In May 2015, China’s State Council Informa-

tion Office published a white paper titled Chi-

na’s Military Strategy, which outlined how Bei-

jing views the global security environment, 

China’s role in that environment, and how 

the PLA supports that role. The document 

presented a vision for the PLA’s services and 

emerging security domains that would trans-

form the PLA from its legacy posture to one 

focused more on long-range mobility. Within 

the context of Beijing’s “period of strategic 

opportunity,” Beijing calculates in China’s 

Military Strategy that world war is unlikely 

in the immediate future, but China should be 

prepared for the possibility of local war.

Authoritative Chinese publications typically 

avoid explicitly listing direct threats, but these 

threats can be gleaned from several documents 

that point to Beijing’s security concerns.

8

 Bei-

jing’s primary threat perceptions include sov-

ereignty and domestic security issues that 

it believes could undermine the overriding 

strategic objective to perpetuate communist 

rule. These include longstanding concerns 

regarding Taiwan independence, Uighur and 

Tibetan separatism, and perceived challenges 

to China’s control of disputed areas in the 

East and South China Seas. Authoritative 

documents also highlight the Korean Penin-

sula as an area of instability and uncertainty, 

and express concern regarding unsettled ter-

The People’s Liberation Army at a Glance

Services: Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force.

Personnel: Approximately 2 million in regular forces.

Recruit base: Conscription, some volunteer.

Equipment profile: Primarily domestic systems heavily influenced by technology derived 

from other countries; modern weaponry in each service; some advanced weaponry.

Core strength: Long-range precision strike, information warfare, nuclear retaliatory capability.

Developing strengths: Maritime power projection, special operations.

Key vulnerabilities: Logistics, rigid command structure, joint warfare.
8

China’s Territorial Claims

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 9

ritorial disputes along China’s border with 

India, which periodically result in tense stand-

offs like the one that occurred in the sum-

mer of 2017 in the disputed Doklam region.

9

Finally, while it calls for a peer-to-peer coop-

erative relationship with the United States, 

China also believes that U.S. military presence 

and U.S.-led security architecture in Asia seeks 

to constrain China’s rise and interfere with 

China’s sovereignty, particularly in a Taiwan 

conflict scenario and in the East and South 

China Seas. Since at least the 1990’s, Beijing 

has repeatedly communicated its preference to 

move away from the U.S.-led regional security 

system and has pursued its own regional secu-

rity initiatives in support of what it views as 

a natural transition to regional predominance.

China’s Military Strategy reflects Beijing’s 

drive to establish a coherent, unified approach 

to managing national security in a world where 

Beijing perceives that China’s expanding inter-

ests have made it more vulnerable at home and 

abroad. The following excerpt from the doc-

ument illustrates Beijing’s perception of this 

security environment:

In today’s world, the global trends toward multipolarity and economic globalization are 

intensifying, and an information society is rapidly coming into being. Countries are increas-

ingly bound together in a community of shared destiny. Peace, development, cooperation, 

and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times.

Profound changes are taking place in the international situation, as manifested in the his-

toric changes in the balance of power, global governance structure, Asia-Pacific geostrategic 

landscape, and international competition in the economic, scientific and technological, and 

military fields. The forces for world peace are on the rise; so are the factors against war. In 

the foreseeable future, a world war is unlikely, and the international situation is expected 

to remain generally peaceful. There are, however, new threats from hegemonism, power 

politics, and neointerventionism. International competition for the redistribution of power, 

rights, and interests is tending to intensify. Terrorist activities are growing increasingly 

worrisome. Hotspot issues, such as ethnic, religious, border, and territorial disputes, are 

complex and volatile. Small-scale wars, conflicts, and crises are recurrent in some regions. 

Therefore, the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015
10

China’s Military Strategy is directed primarily at an internal audience. Thus, it is replete 

with party jargon, but it does contain the broad 

underpinnings of China’s military decisionmaking calculus. For example, Beijing sees 

both threats and opportunities emerging from 

the evolution of the international community 

beyond the U.S.-led unipolar framework toward 

a more integrated global environment shaped 

by major-power dynamics. Furthermore, China 

sees itself as an emerging major power that will 

be able to gain influence as long as it can maintain a stable periphery. As it emerges, Beijing 

will use its growing power to shape the regional 

environment in the face of interconnected 

threats while trying to avoid conflict over core 

interests: sovereignty, development, and unification. More specifically, China believes it must 

plan to address the many threats to regional 

stability because they are individually complex 

and at the same time contain a potential for 

external actors, most importantly the United 

States, to become involved. Nevertheless, China 

must also look to safeguard its international 

interests as they multiply and incur additional 

threats. Finally, as new threats emerge and as 

other militaries adjust their acquisition, strategies, and structure, China knows the PLA must 

be prepared to fight in new realms and adapt to 

the modern, high-tech battlefield. 

With a generally favorable external environment, China will remain in an important period 

of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved. China’s comprehensive national strength, core competitiveness and risk-resistance capacity are 

notably increasing, and China enjoys growing international standing and influence. Domestically, the Chinese people’s standard of living has remarkably improved, and Chinese society remains stable. China, as a large developing country, still faces multiple and complex 

security threats, as well as increasing external impediments and challenges. Subsistence and 

development security concerns, as well as traditional and nontraditional security threats, 

are interwoven. Therefore, China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, 

territorial integrity and development interests.

As the world economic and strategic center of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to the 

Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. carries on its ‘rebalancing’ strategy and enhances its military 

presence and its military alliances in this region. Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the 

postwar mechanism, overhauling its military and security policies. Such development has 

caused grave concerns among other countries in the region. On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors 

take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands 
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11

that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South 

China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and recon-

naissance against China. It is thus a longstanding task for China to safeguard its maritime 

rights and interests. Certain disputes over land territory are still smoldering. The Korean 

Peninsula and Northeast Asia are shrouded in instability and uncertainty. Regional ter-

rorism, separatism, and extremism are rampant. All these have a negative impact on the 

security and stability along China’s periphery.

The Taiwan issue bears on China’s reunification and long-term development, and reunifi-

cation is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation. In recent years, cross–

Taiwan Strait relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but 

the root cause of instability has not yet been removed, and the ‘Taiwan independence’ sep-

aratist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of 

cross-strait relations. Further, China faces a formidable task to maintain political security 

and social stability. Separatist forces for ‘East Turkistan independence’ and ‘Tibet indepen-

dence’ have inflicted serious damage, particularly with escalating violent terrorist activities 

by East Turkistan independence forces. Besides, anti-China forces have never given up their 

attempt to instigate a ‘color revolution’ in this country. Consequently, China faces more chal-

lenges in terms of national security and social stability. With the growth of China’s national 

interests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, ter-

rorism, piracy, serious natural disasters, and epidemics, and the security of overseas inter-

ests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well 

as institutions, personnel, and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.

The world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range, 

precise, smart, stealthy, and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly 

sophisticated. Outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights in strate-

gic competition among all parties. The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informa-

tization. World major powers are actively adjusting their national security strategies and 

defense policies and speeding up their military transformation and force restructuring. The 

aforementioned revolutionary changes in military technologies and the form of war have not 

only had a significant impact on the international political and military landscapes but also 

posed new and severe challenges to China’s military security.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015
12

National Security Strategy

Making progress while maintaining stability.

—Xi Jinping in his address to the 19th Party Congress10

China’s leaders see China as a country that is 

“moving closer to center stage” to achieve the 

“great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”11

This ambition permeates China’s national 

security strategy and the PLA’s role in supporting the party. Since the early 1980s, when 

China initiated its Reform and Opening policy, China’s economy has grown rapidly. The 

CCP remained focused primarily on economic 

growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in 

the early 2000s it identified the initial decades 

of the 21st century as a “period of strategic 

opportunity” in the international environment 

that would allow China to focus on building 

“comprehensive national power.” The CCP’s 

contemporary strategic objectives are to:

• Perpetuate CCP rule.

• Maintain domestic stability.

• Sustain economic growth 

and development.

• Defend national sovereignty and 

territorial integrity.

• Secure China’s status as a great power.

China has taken deliberate steps to modernize the CCP, its military, the government, and 

other institutions in an attempt to improve 

coherence. Before 2015, departments across 

the government formulated separate security 

strategies, but in early 2015, China’s leaders 

adopted China’s first publicly released national 

security strategy outline, a framework to guide 

China’s approach to addressing both domestic and international security threats, and 

called for international engagement to address 

shared security problems.12

The strategy outlines Beijing’s aim to ensure 

security, promote modernization, as well as 

preserve China’s socialist system. In addition 

to the strategic objectives above, the document emphasized the necessity of contributing to world peace and development and 

called for attention to promoting “rule of law” 

in support of national security.13 This led the 

National People’s Congress to pass a package 

of laws in 2015 and 2016 intended to address 

national security concerns, including harsher 

punishments for crimes involving terrorism 

and extremism, cybersecurity measures, and 

increased restrictions for foreign nongovernmental organizations.14,15

Although China’s national security strategy outline contained both inward- and outward-looking elements, Beijing’s view of China’s role in 

the international community was further elaborated in an article on Xi Jinping’s thoughts 

on diplomacy published in mid-2017 by one of 
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China’s top diplomats, Yang Jiechi. Yang paints 

a picture of Chinese diplomacy that focuses on 

China’s ambition for national rejuvenation 

and becoming a world power. Yang describes a 

confident China that is ready to “shoulder its 

responsibility as a major country” and build a 

global network of partnerships, but one that is 

resolved and uncompromising as it upholds its 

sovereignty and security interests.16

The PLA’s Role in 

National Security

China’s Military Strategy built on a series of 

biennial defense reviews that Beijing published 

beginning in 1998 to mitigate international con-

cern about the lack of transparency of its mil-

itary modernization. What differentiated the 

document from its predecessors was that it, for 

the first time, publicly clarified the PLA’s role 

in protecting China’s evolving national security 

interests and shed light on policies, such as the 

PLA’s commitment to nuclear deterrence. The 

report affirmed many of China’s longstanding 

defense policies but also signaled a shift toward 

emerging security domains, such as cyber and 

space, and also emphasized the need to focus on 

global maritime operations.

The report outlined eight “strategic tasks,” 

or types of missions the PLA must be ready 

to execute:17 • Safeguard the sovereignty of 

China’s territory.

• Safeguard national unification.

• Safeguard China’s interests in new 

domains, such as space and cyberspace.

• Safeguard China’s overseas interests. • Maintain strategic deterrence. • Participate in international 

security cooperation.

• Maintain China’s political security 

and social stability.

• Conduct emergency rescue, disaster relief, 

and “rights and interest protection” missions.

Beijing almost certainly views these missions 

as necessary national security tasks for China 

to claim great-power status. In 2017, Beijing 

emphasized several of these tasks in its “White 

Paper on China’s Policies on Asia Pacific Secu-

rity Cooperation,” stressing the need for a PLA 

that is able to conduct expeditionary operations 

and other activities to defend and secure grow-

ing Chinese national interests overseas from 

“destabilizing and uncertain factors.”18 The 

PLA coordinates with China’s law enforcement, 

Foreign Ministry, and other security entities as 

needed on military-related activities, particu-

larly operations beyond China’s borders.

Military Leadership

China’s military leaders are influential in 

defense and foreign policy. As the CCP’s armed 

wing, the PLA is organizationally part of the 

party apparatus. Career military officers for 

the most part are party members, and units at 

the company level and above have political offi-
14

cers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda, and counterintelligence. These political officers also are responsible for ensuring 

that party orders are carried out throughout 

the PLA. CCP committees, led by the political 

officers and military commanders, make major 

decisions in units at all levels.19

The CMC, the PLA’s highest decisionmaking 

body, is technically both a party organ subordinate to the CCP Central Committee and a 

governmental office appointed by the National 

People’s Congress, but it is staffed almost 

exclusively by military officers. The CMC 

chairman is a civilian who usually serves concurrently as the CCP general secretary and 

China’s president. During the past decade, the 

CMC’s membership has included two military 

vice chairmen who serve concurrently on the 

politburo; the minister of national defense, 

who serves as the face of the military for foreign engagement; the service commanders; 

and the directors of the four general headquarters departments. This framework occasionally shifts; it was revised during the 19th 

Party Congress in October 2017, at which 

Xi Jinping, CCP General Secretary, President and Central Military Commission Chairman.

Image Source: Shutterstock
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People’s Liberation Army’s Organizational Structure 

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

point the service chiefs were removed from 

the body, leaving the chairman, vice chair-

men, minister of national defense, Joint Staff 

Department chief, Political Work Department 

director, and Discipline Inspection Commis-

sion secretary.20,21 These changes align the 

military’s top body to its postreform structure 

and underscore key themes of jointness, party 

loyalty, and anticorruption. 

22,23
16

Political Work in the PLA

The PLA has been a politicized “party army” since its inception and exists to guarantee the 

CCP regime’s survival above all else, serving the state as a secondary role, in contrast to 

most Western militaries, which are considered apolitical, professional forces that first and 

foremost serve the state.

Maintaining this party-military identity even as the PLA embarks on major structural 

reforms is the top priority for China’s leadership. PLA reforms include establishment of the 

Political Work Department, which appears to have assumed many responsibilities of the 

former General Political Department. The PLA’s political work system is the primary means 

through which the CCP “controls the gun” in accordance with Mao Zedong’s famous dictum 

that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Most PLA officers are party members, 

and in recent decades, PLA officers typically have constituted about 20 percent of the CCP’s 

Central Committee. Moreover, since 1997 the two uniformed vice chairmen of the CMC have 

served concurrently on the CCP Politburo.

• The tiers of political work in the PLA are interlocking, reinforcing systems that allow the 

CCP to penetrate the military from top to bottom. These tiers comprise the political commissar system, the party committee system, and the party discipline inspection system.

• Political commissars are responsible for personnel, education, security, discipline, and 

morale. The Political Work Department, the director of which serves on the CMC, manages 

the PLA’s political commissars and is the locus for day-to-day political work in the military.

• The party committee system is replicated in some fashion at each level of command. 

Party committees fall under the supervision of the CMC Political Work Department and 

are intended to ensure loyalty at all levels. They propagate the party positions, policies, 

and directives throughout the force.

• Party discipline inspection bodies monitor the performance of party members in the military and ensure “upright” behavior. The PLA Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) was elevated to the CMC level during recent restructuring from its previous 

position as a subordinate office within the former General Political Department.24 These 

changes culminated with the CDIC head’s appointment as a member of the CMC during 

the 19th Party Congress. The CDIC has played a key role within the military in recent 

years, overseeing investigations to weed out graft and uproot politically powerful networks 

in the ranks as part of China’s ongoing anticorruption campaign. In November 2015, Xi 

also announced the creation of a new PLA Politics and Law Commission, mirroring a similar party organization that oversees legal and judicial issues in the state bureaucracy.25
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China’s leaders for decades have prioritized 

domestic stability and the continued rule of 

the CCP. Since the 1990s, however, China has 

confronted chronic social protest spurred by an 

often unresponsive and corrupt political and 

legal system, and a range of economic, social, 

and environmental problems. Under President 

Xi Jinping, Beijing has responded to these chal-

lenges with a mixture of increased repression 

and CCP-led efforts to address some of these 

underlying problems. Xi is using the CCP to 

assert control over all facets of the Chinese state, 

restricting the space for independent activity 

across social, political, and economic spheres. 

Stability Issues

We must do more to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development 

interests, and staunchly oppose all attempts to split China or undermine its eth-

nic unity and social harmony and stability.

–Xi Jinping, speech at the 19th Party Congress

People’s Armed Police in formation during antiterrorism drill for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Image Source: AFP
18

This push includes a sweeping anticorruption 

campaign, a faithfully propagandistic media, a 

tightly constrained civil society, and an all-encompassing concept of national security.26

In ethnic minority regions such as Tibet and 

Xinjiang, the CCP has promulgated repressive regulations against alleged extremism by 

tightening limits on peaceful religious expression and ethnic identity. Beginning in April 

2017, Xinjiang authorities detained hundreds 

of thousands, possibly millions, of Muslims 

in the region ostensibly for antiextremism 

reeducation. As part of the Xinjiang campaign, 

security officials greatly expanded their use of 

high-tech and big-data surveillance systems, 

which they are expected to extend countrywide 

in an effort to curb social unrest.27

China’s armed forces support the CCP’s 

domestic ambitions without question. In 2015, 

top military guidance reaffirmed this role as 

one of the force’s main strategic tasks: “maintain China’s political security and social stability.”28 China’s military and paramilitary 

leaders are actively developing doctrine and 

forces to backstop local police, respond to riots 

and natural disasters, and stop terrorism.

The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is at the forefront of this mission. The PAP is a paramilitary force of more than 500,000 troops that for 

decades has focused on domestic security and 

economic development tasks under the shared 

command of the CMC and State Council. In

2018, Beijing moved the PAP entirely under 

CMC control and out of civilian channels, 

and announced additional reforms intended 

to modernize its force structure, streamline 

its command system, and increase its operational effectiveness.29 Changes to the PAP 

also reflect a shift toward a more operational 

mindset, trading legacy site-security missions 

for rapid-deployment counterterrorism and 

maritime patrols.30

In recent years, Beijing’s longstanding suspicion that so-called “hostile foreign influences” 

constitute a significant threat to internal stability and CCP rule has led it to step up efforts 

to pursue political security-related goals overseas. In 2015, China passed a counterterrorism law that included a provision authorizing 

PLA, PAP, police, and intelligence operations 

abroad—evidence that party leaders are considering this possibility.31
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The PLA engages with foreign militaries to 

demonstrate its growing capabilities; improve 

its tactics, techniques, and procedures; enhance 

China’s image and influence abroad, and fur-

ther China’s diplomatic objectives. Bilateral 

and multilateral exercises provide political 

benefits to China and opportunities for the PLA 

to improve capabilities in areas such as coun-

terterrorism, mobility operations, and logis-

tics. Senior-level visits and exchanges provide 

China with opportunities to increase military 

officers’ international exposure, communicate 

China’s positions to foreign audiences, under-

stand alternative worldviews, and advance for-

eign relations through interpersonal contacts 

and military assistance programs.

China advances its day-to-day overseas mili-

tary diplomacy using PLA officers assigned as 

military attachés in at least 110 countries.32

China’s military attachés serve as military 

advisers to the ambassador, support Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objec-

tives, and perform a variety of duties tied to 

PLA military and security cooperation, includ-

ing counterpart exchanges with host nation and 

third-country personnel. Expanded PLA travel 

abroad enables PLA officers to observe and 

study foreign military command structures, 

unit formations, and operational training.33

As China’s regional and international inter-

ests have grown, the PLA has substantially 

expanded its international engagement, 

especially in the areas of peacekeeping oper-

ations (PKOs), counterpiracy, humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief (HADR), coun-

terterrorism, and multinational combined 

exercises. For example, many Latin Ameri-

can and Caribbean countries send officers to 

In the spirit of neighborhood diplomacy of friendship, sincerity, reciprocity, and inclusive-

ness, China’s armed forces will further develop relations with their counterparts in neigh-

boring countries. Also, they will work to raise the level of military relations with European 

counterparts [and] continue the traditional friendly military ties with their African, Latin 

American, and Southern Pacific counterparts. China’s armed forces will work to further 

defense and security cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and continue to 

participate in multilateral dialogues and cooperation mechanisms, such as the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus, ASEAN Regional 

Forum, Shangri-La Dialogue, Jakarta International Defence Dialogue, and Western Pacific 

Naval Symposium. The Chinese military will continue to host multilateral events like the 

Xiangshan Forum, striving to establish a new framework for security and cooperation con-

ducive to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015

External Defense Relations
20

the strategic-level College of Defense Studies 

at China’s National Defense University; some 

of these countries also send officers to other 

PLA schools. In addition to furthering PLA 

modernization, these engagements probably 

will remain focused on building China’s political ties, explaining China’s rise, and building 

China’s international influence, particularly in 

Asia, Africa, and Latin America.34

Defense Budget

China’s approach to funding security requirements has been deliberate and substantial. 

China’s military spending increased by an average of 10 percent (inflation adjusted) per year 

from 2000 to 2016 and has gradually slowed to 

5- to 7-percent growth during the past 2 years. 

The official defense budget has remained at 1.2 

to 1.4 percent of gross domestic product for the 

past decade, allowing for steady, sustainable 

expenditure growth and qualitative improvements throughout the PLA.

Estimating actual military expenses is difficult 

because of China’s poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition to a market 

economy. The formal defense budget process 

does not include funding for foreign weapons 

procurement, some research and development 

(R&D), and certain personnel benefits. Other 

government ministries distribute defense funds 

in addition to extrabudgetary funds that supplement personnel living subsidies, equipment 

maintenance, and other budgetary items.35,36

PLA soldiers conduct individual movement training.

Image Source: DIMOC
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However, using 2018 prices and exchange 

rates as an example, China’s total military-re-

lated spending for 2018 probably exceeded 

$200 billion, a threefold increase since 2002. 

Such spending has been on the rise since the 

1990s, when China formally began to empha-

size defense-related programs throughout the 

course of several “Five-Year Plans.”

Although the total dollar value of China’s 

defense budget remains significantly below 

that of the United States, China has benefited 

from “latecomer advantage.” In other words, 

China has not had to invest in costly R&D of 

new technologies to the same degree as the 

United States. Rather, China has routinely 

adopted the best and most effective platforms 

found in foreign militaries through direct pur-

chase, retrofits, or theft of intellectual prop-

erty. By doing so, China has been able to focus 

on expediting its military modernization at a 

small fraction of the original cost.

China's Official Defense Spending 2007-2018 (billions of 2018 dollars)

77.8 85.2

92.9 97.2 101.6 109.5 114.9

131.5 138.6 149.2 156.9 170.4

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Real defense expenditures 

(Billions 2018 USD, Adjusted for Inflation)

# % of GDP

1.3 1.3

1.4

1.3

1.2 1.2 1.2

1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
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Military Doctrine and Strategy

hina’s military goal is to build a strong, 

combat-effective force capable of winning regional conflicts and employing 

integrated, real-time C2 networks.37 The doctrine that supports this strategy is evolving 

with ongoing PLA reforms. For instance, in 

2017 the PLA began to implement revised military training regulations that focused on realistic training for modern warfare and preparations for joint combat operations.38

China characterizes its military strategy as 

one of “active defense,” a concept it describes 

as strategically defensive but operationally 

offensive. The strategy is rooted in the concept that once Beijing has determined that an 

adversary has damaged or intends to damage 

China’s interests at the strategic level, Beijing 

will be justified in responding “defensively” 

at the operational or tactical level, even if 

the adversary has not yet conducted offensive 

military operations. Beijing interprets active 

defense to include mandates for deescalating a 

conflict and seizing the initiative during a conflict, and has enshrined the concept in China’s 

National Security Law (2015) and in the PLA’s 

C

Jiangkai II class frigate Hengshui conducting gunnery exercise.

Image Source: DIMOC
24

major strategy documents.39 President Xi’s 

speech during the 90th anniversary parade of 

the PLA further highlighted that China would 

never conduct “invasion and expansion” but 

would never permit “any piece of Chinese territory” to separate from China.40

China’s approach to its dispute with Japan 

over the Senkaku Islands partially illustrates 

this concept: China has employed both military and law enforcement assets proactively 

to challenge Japan’s administration of the 

islands since Beijing determined that Japan’s 

purchase of the islands from a private owner 

in 2012 constituted a serious infringement on 

China’s sovereignty claims. Although the PLA 

has not yet carried out kinetic strikes on Japanese forces around the islands, China’s active 

defense concept could potentially justify such 

attacks if Beijing perceived Japan to have further escalated the dispute.

Perceptions of 

Modern Conflict

The PLA often uses the term “informatization” to 

describe the transformation process of becoming 

a modern military that can operate in the digital age. The concept figures prominently in PLA 

writings and is roughly analogous to the U.S. military’s concept of net-centric capability: a force’s 

ability to use advanced information technology 

and communications systems to gain operational 

advantage over an adversary. The PLA uses 

the term “informatized warfare” to describe the 

process of acquiring, transmitting, processing, 

and using information to conduct joint military 

operations across the domains of land, sea, air, 

space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum during a conflict. PLA writings highlight 

the benefit of near-real-time shared awareness 

of the battlefield in enabling quick, unified effort 

to seize tactical opportunities.41

In 2015, China’s leaders adjusted guidance on 

the type of war the PLA should be prepared 

to fight by directing the PLA to be capable of 

fighting and winning “informatized local wars,” 

with an emphasis on “maritime military struggle.” Chinese military strategy documents also 

emphasize the growing importance of offensive 

air operations, long-distance mobility operations, and space and cyber operations. In other 

words, China expects that its future wars mostly 

will be fought outside its borders and will involve 

conflict in the maritime domain. China promulgated this through its most recent update to 

its “military strategic guidelines,” the top-level 

directives that China’s leaders use to define concepts, assess threats, and set priorities for planning, force posture, and modernization.42

The PLA considers information the critical 

enabler for these maritime-focused digital-age 

operations, and as a result, China invests 

heavily in the development and proliferation of 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

equipment, force structure, and a universal 

network that processes information across 

all of its operational domains. These domains 

include C2, comprehensive support, multidimensional protection, joint firepower strike, 

and battlefield maneuver.
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National Military 

Command and Control

A key driver of ongoing military reforms is 

Beijing’s desire to increase the PLA’s ability to 

carry out joint operations on a modern, high-tech 

battlefield.43 Prior to reforms, no permanent joint 

C2 mechanism existed. In fact, service head-

quarters had operational authority over their 

own forces during peacetime, and the former 

Army-centric military regions were responsible 

for conducting joint operations during wartime, 

although this was never attempted. This con-

struct was impractical because it would have 

forced the PLA to transition from a service-ori-

ented peacetime construct to a war-ready joint 

construct on a moment’s notice. Senior leaders 

recognized this flaw, and President Xi remarked 

in 2013 that “establishing a joint C2 system 

should be given primary importance, and estab-

lishing a CMC and theater command joint C2 

system should not be delayed.”44

Consequently, core elements of national- and 

regional-level military reforms since 2015 have 

focused on refining the PLA’s C2 structure, 

producing a joint operational command system 

with decisionmaking emanating from the CMC 

to theater commands and down to operational 

units.45,46 The reform plan aimed to establish two 

clear lines of authority under the CMC, giving 

the services authority over force management 

issues while empowering theater headquarters 

to command operations—a distinction that had 

been ambiguous.47 One aspect of the new struc

-

ture that is different from previous Chinese 

military C2 is the permanence of operational 

C2, which eliminates the need to create ad hoc 

wartime commands. This system theoretically 

gives China the ability to quickly transition to 

a war footing. Speaking on behalf of the PLA, 

a Ministry of National Defense spokesman said 

reforms sought to improve “leadership admin-

istration and command of joint operations” so 

that the PLA would have a force structure able 

to fight and win modern conflicts.

Core Elements of Command

and Control Reform

Theater Commands. The PLA transitioned 

from seven military regions to five “theaters of 

operations,” or joint commands.48 This struc-

ture is aligned toward Beijing’s perceived 

“strategic directions,” geographic areas of stra-

tegic importance along China’s periphery in 

which the PLA must be prepared to operate.

Joint Operations Command Centers. The 

cornerstone of the military’s new joint C2 sys-

tem is the PLA’s national- and theater-level 

joint operations command centers (JOCCs), 

staffed by personnel drawn from all services. 

The national-level joint operations command 

center, also known as the CMC JOCC, coordi-

nates the efforts of the five theater commands 

to achieve the PLA’s strategic objectives. The 

theater-level JOCCs are responsible for all 

tasks in their area of responsibility, including 

carrying out around-the-clock watch functions, 

maintaining situational awareness, managing 

joint exercises, and providing a communica-

tions hub linking theater commanders with 

service component commanders and forces.49
26

Joint Staff Department. During PLA 

reforms, the CMC dissolved the former General Staff Department, establishing a number of CMC-subordinate departments from 

the former organization. According to the 

Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Staff 

Department (JSD) is responsible for combat 

planning, C2 support, and formulating strategy and requirements.50 The formation of the 

CMC JSD is likely to result in more streamlined and efficient operational planning 

because other former General Staff DepartAccording to China's Ministry of National Defense, the Theater of Operations construct will enhance 

combat effectiveness.

Theaters of Operation

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
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ment functions, such as mobilization, train-

ing, and administration, have been assumed 

by separate departments. The JSD is pur-

ported to have greater representation from 

across the PLA’s services, potentially enhanc-

ing joint operational planning and execution.51

Modernizing Joint 

Command and Control

China continues to place a high priority on 

modernizing the PLA’s command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, sur-

veillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) sys-

tem as a response to trends in modern war-

fare that emphasize the importance of rapid 

decisionmaking and information sharing and 

processing. The PLA is seeking to improve its 

technological capabilities and organizational 

structure to command complex joint operations 

in near and distant battlefields with increas-

ingly sophisticated weapons.52

Supporting the reforms with technological 

improvements to C4ISR systems is essential 

to improving the speed and effectiveness of 

decisionmaking while providing secure, reli-

able communications to fixed and mobile com-

mand posts. The PLA is fielding advanced 

automated command systems, such as its 

Integrated Command Platform, with units at 

lower echelons across the force. The adoption 

of the Integrated Command Platform enables 

multiservice communications necessary for 

joint operations.

New technologies which are being introduced 

into the PLA enable sharing of information—

intelligence, battlefield information, logis-

tic information, and weather reports—on 

robust, redundant communication networks to 

improve commanders’ situational awareness. 

In particular, the transmission of intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data in 

near-real time to commanders in the field could 

facilitate the commanders’ decisionmaking pro-

cesses and make operations more efficient.53

As these technical improvements are brought 

on line, they greatly enhance the PLA’s flexi-

bility and responsiveness. Informatized opera-

tions no longer require in-person meetings for 

command decisionmaking or labor-intensive 

processes for execution. Commanders can issue 

In the implementation of the military stra-

tegic guideline in the new situation, China’s 

armed forces must closely center around 

the CPC’s [Communist Party's] goal of 

building a strong military, respond to the 

state’s core security needs, aim at build-

ing an informatized military and winning 

informatized wars, deepen the reform of 

national defense and the armed forces in 

an all-round way, build a modern system of 

military forces with Chinese characteristics, 

and constantly enhance their capabilities 

for addressing various security threats and 

accomplishing diversified military tasks.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015
28

orders to multiple units at the same time while 

on the move, and units can rapidly adjust their 

actions through the use of digital databases 

and command automation tools.

The nature of these reform and modernization 

efforts in part resembles a Western-style joint 

C2 structure in which operational commanders develop force packages from units that are 

trained and equipped by the services. The creation of a permanent joint C2 structure that 

places more emphasis on naval and aerospace 

forces, along with a dedicated Strategic Support Force responsible for electronic warfare 

and operations in the space and cyberspace 

domains, reflects an emerging PLA capacity to 

more effectively execute joint operations.54

Regional and 

Global Operations

Even as PLA capabilities have improved and 

units have begun to operate farther from the 

Chinese mainland, Beijing has continued to 

emphasize what it perceives as a “period of strategic opportunity” during which it can pursue 

development without a major military conflict. 

In line with this perception, Beijing has implemented an approach to external engagement 

that seeks to enhance China’s reach and power 

through activities calculated to fall below the 

threshold of alarming the international community about China’s rise or provoking the 

United States, its allies and partners, or others 

in the Asia-Pacific region into military conflict 

or an anti-China coalition. This is particularly 

evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and 

maritime sovereignty claims in the South and 

East China Seas. In the South China Sea, China 

primarily uses maritime law enforcement ships, 

with its Navy ships in protective positions, to 

pressure other claimants and limit access to 

Chinese-occupied features. China’s expansion 

of disputed features and construction in the 

Spratly Islands using large-scale land reclamation demonstrates China’s capacity—and a shift 

in willingness to exercise that capacity short of 

military conflict—to strengthen China’s control 

over disputed areas, enhance China’s presence, 

and challenge other claimants.55

PLA Navy sailors manning an Integrated Command 

Platform command post.

Image Source: DIMOC
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China’s maritime emphasis and concern 

with protecting its overseas interests have 

increasingly drawn the PLA beyond China’s borders and immediate periphery. The 

evolving focus of the PLA Navy (PLAN)—

from “offshore waters defense” to a mix of 

offshore waters defense and “open-seas protection”—reflects China’s desire for a wider 

operational reach. Since 2009, the PLA has 

incrementally expanded its global operations beyond the previously limited port 

calls and UN PKO missions. The PLAN 

has expanded the scope and frequency of 

extended-range naval deployments, military 

exercises, and engagements.

The establishment in Djibouti of the PLA’s first 

overseas military base with a deployed company 

of Marines and equipment, and probable follow-on bases at other locations, signals a turning point in the expansion of PLA operations 

in the Indian Ocean region and beyond.56,57,58,59

These bases, and other improvements to the 

PLA’s ability to project power during the next 

decade, will increase China’s ability to deter by 

military force and sustain operations abroad.

Luhai class destroyer Shenzhen.

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hereas the PLA of Mao’s era was 

ground-force-centric and lacked 

most modern capabilities such as 

mechanized troop transportation, investments 

in modernization have expanded China’s military capabilities across all warfare domains. 

Today’s PLA is still far from being able to 

deploy large numbers of conventional forces 

globally, but China has developed nuclear, 

space, cyberspace, and other capabilities 

that can reach potential adversaries across 

the globe.

Core Chinese Military Capabilities

PLAN helicopter operating near the Jiangkai II class Hengshui.

Image Source: DIMOC

W
32

The First and Second Island Chains

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Power Projection and 

Expeditionary Operations

Beijing’s longstanding interest to eventu-

ally compel Taiwan’s reunification with the 

mainland and deter any attempt by Taiwan 

to declare independence has served as the 

primary driver for China’s military modern-

ization. Beijing’s anticipation that foreign 

forces would intervene in a Taiwan scenario 

led the PLA to develop a range of systems to 

deter and deny foreign regional force projec-

tion. The implementation of Hu’s New His-

toric Missions in 2004 led to the incremental 

expansion of the military’s modernization pri-

orities to develop a PLA capable of operating 

in new domains and at increasing distances 

from the mainland. During this modernization 

process, PLA ground, air, naval, and missile 

forces have become increasingly able to proj-

ect power during peacetime and in the event 

of regional conflicts. Beijing almost certainly 

will use this growing ability to project power to 

bolster international perceptions of its role as 

a regional power and global stakeholder.

Although Beijing states that its intent is to 

serve as a stabilizing force regionally, in prac-

tice the PLA’s actions frequently result in 

increased tensions. Since 2012, Beijing has 

routinely challenged Tokyo’s Senkaku Island 

claims in the East China Sea. China’s Coast 

Guard frequently conducts incursions into the 

contiguous zone surrounding the islands to 

further China’s claims, while its Navy oper-

ates around the claims to enforce administra-

tion. The PLA has expanded and militarized 

China’s outposts in the South China Sea, and 

China’s Coast Guard, backed by the PLAN, 

commonly harasses Philippine and Vietnamese 

ships in the region.

Examples of incremental improvements to 

PLA power projection in the region are readily 

found in annual military exercises and opera-

tions.60 For instance, in 2015 the PLA Air Force 

(PLAAF) carried out four exercise training mis-

sions past the first island chain through the 

Bashi Channel, the northernmost passage of 

the Luzon Strait, and through the Miyako Strait 

closer to Japan. The Miyako Strait flights were 

1,500 kilometers from Guam, within range of 

the PLAAF’s CJ-20 air-launched land-attack 

cruise missile (LACM).61 Also in 2015, the 

PLAAF began flying the H-6K medium-range 

bomber, the PLAAF’s first aircraft capable of 

conducting strikes on Guam (with air-launched 

LACMs like the CJ-20), past the first island 

chain into the western Pacific.

China is also developing new capabilities that 

will enhance Beijing’s ability to project power. 

In September 2016, then-PLAAF Commander 

Gen Ma Xiaotian confirmed for the first 

time that the PLAAF was developing a new 

long-range bomber that would undoubtedly 

exceed the range and capabilities of the H-6K. 

Although the H-6K recently began flying with 

LACMs, this Chinese-built airframe is the 

10th design variant of the Soviet Tu-16, which 

began flying in 1952.62 In 2016, China and 

Ukraine agreed to restart production of the 

world’s largest transport aircraft, the An-225, 
34

which is capable of carrying a world-record 

payload of nearly 254 tons. China expects the 

first An-225 to be delivered and operational by 

2019.63 If used by the military, this capability 

would facilitate the PLA’s global reach.

In addition to land-based aircraft, China 

is currently building its first domestically 

designed and produced aircraft carrier.64 The 

primary purpose of this first domestic aircraft 

carrier will be to serve a regional defense mission. Beijing probably also will use the carrier 

to project power throughout the South China 

Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean.65 The 

carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018 

and is expected to enter into service by 2019.66

[For more information on China’s aircraft carrier program, please see Appendix B.]

Other areas that reflect China’s growing military presence abroad include China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.67 Separately, China routinely employs its modern 

hospital ship, Peace Ark, to support HADR 

missions worldwide. In 2015, the PLA conducted its first permissive noncombatant 

evacuation operation, to extricate Chinese 

and other civilians from Yemen supported by 

Yemeni security forces.

China’s efforts to enhance its presence abroad, 

such as establishing its first foreign military 

base in Djibouti and boosting economic connectivity by reinvigorating the New Silk Road 

Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime 

Road under the “Belt and Road Initiative” 

(BRI), could enable the PLA to project power 

at even greater distances from the Chinese 

mainland.68,69,70 In 2017, China’s leaders said 

that the BRI, which at first included economic 

initiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, and 

Europe, now encompasses all regions of the 

world, including the Arctic and Latin America, 

demonstrating the scope of Beijing’s ambition.

Growing PLA mission areas and enhanced 

presence abroad may lead to an increase in 

demand for the PLA to protect China’s overseas interests and provide support to Chinese 

personnel. China’s increased presence also 

introduces the possibility that the PLA could 

play a more prominent role in delivering global 

public goods in the future.

PLAN Anwei class hospital ship Heping Fangzhou 

(Peace Ark).

Image Source: DIMOC
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China’s Southern Theater Forces

China’s Southern Theater forces are arrayed to support multiple contingencies.

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
36

Separately, China’s modern naval platforms 

include advanced missile and technological capabilities that will strengthen the force’s core warfighting competencies and enable credible combat operations beyond the reaches of land-based 

defenses. The expansion of naval operations 

beyond China’s immediate vicinity will provide 

China with a diverse set of capabilities for striking targets across the Pacific and Indian Ocean 

regions, in addition to improving defensive capabilities such as exercising control of SLOCs. 

Improving bluewater capabilities will extend 

China’s maritime security buffer to protect China’s near- and far-seas interests more effectively.

China’s current aircraft carrier and planned 

follow-on carriers will extend air defense 

umbrellas beyond the range of coastal systems and help enable task group operations 

in far seas. Sea-based land attack probably is 

an emerging requirement for the PLAN. Chinese military experts argue that to pursue a 

defensive strategy in far seas, the PLAN must 

improve its ability to control land from the sea 

through development of a long-range LACM.71

The PLA’s land-based missile and air forces 

enable other military assets to focus on conducting offensive missions, such as blockades 

and sovereignty enforcement, as well as defensive operations farther from China’s shores. 

China also focuses on enhancing the PLA’s ISR 

capabilities, which will enable improved targeting and timely responses to perceived threats.

Nuclear Forces and Weapons

China invests considerable resources to maintain a limited, survivable nuclear force that 

can guarantee a damaging retaliatory strike.72

73 As part of this, China has long maintained 

a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would 

use nuclear forces only in response to a 

nuclear strike against China.74,75,76 There is 

some ambiguity, however, over the conditions 

under which China’s NFU policy would apply. 

Some PLA officers have written publicly of the 

need to spell out conditions under which China 

might need to use nuclear weapons first; for 

example, if an enemy’s conventional attack 

threatened the survival of China’s nuclear 

force or of the regime itself.77 Nevertheless, 

there has been no indication that national 

leaders are willing to attach such nuances and 

caveats to China’s NFU doctrine.

The nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered 

to a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China unconditionally will not use or threaten to use 

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapons-free zones and 

will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. 
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China is developing a new generation of mobile 

missiles, with warheads consisting of multi-

ple independently targetable reentry vehicles 

(MIRVs) and penetration aids, intended to 

ensure the viability of its strategic deterrent 

in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, 

to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, preci-

sion strike, and missile defense capabilities.78

China is enhancing peacetime readiness levels 

for these nuclear forces to ensure responsive-

ness. China maintains nuclear-capable deliv-

ery systems in its Rocket Force and Navy. As 

of 2017, the Air Force had been reassigned a 

nuclear mission, probably with a developmen-

tal strategic bomber.79,80,81,82,83 The bomber’s 

deployment would provide China with its first 

credible nuclear triad of delivery systems dis-

persed across land, sea, and air—a posture 

considered since the Cold War to improve sur-

vivability and strategic deterrence.

PLA writings express the value of a “launch 

on warning” nuclear posture, an approach to 

deterrence that uses heightened readiness, 

improved surveillance, and streamlined deci-

sionmaking processes to enable a more rapid 

response to enemy attack. These writings 

highlight the posture’s consistency with Chi-

na’s NFU policy. China is working to develop 

a space-based early warning capability that 

could support this posture in the future.84

The PLA is developing a range of technologies 

to counter U.S. and other countries’ ballistic 

missile defense systems, including maneu-

verable reentry vehicles (MARVs), MIRVs, 

decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and 

hypersonic glide vehicles.85,86,87 In addition, 

the PLA is likely to continue deploying more 

sophisticated C2 systems and refining C2 pro-

cesses as growing numbers of mobile intercon-

tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and future 

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine 

(SSBN) deterrence patrols require the PLA 

to safeguard the integrity of nuclear release 

authority for a larger, more dispersed force.

China maintains a stockpile of nuclear war-

heads and continues research on and develop-

ment and production of new nuclear weapons.88

The PLA probably has multiple nuclear war-

head designs that are decades old and require 

routine observation, maintenance, or refur-

bishment to maintain effectiveness.89 China’s 

nuclear weapon design and production orga-

nization—the China Academy of Engineering 

Physics—is the key organization in developing 

and maintaining China’s nuclear force.90 It 

employs tens of thousands of personnel, and its 

scientists are capable of conducting all aspects 

of nuclear weapon design research, including 

nuclear physics, materials science, electronics, 

explosives, and computer modeling.91,92

China will optimize its nuclear force structure; improve strategic early warning, command 

and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection; and deter 

other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.

—Excerpts from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015
38

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

China Nuclear Weapon-Related Facilities

China's nuclear weapons program has been supported by a number of facilities that include production, 

processing, research and development, and testing.
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

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China has the required industrial capacity to 

enrich uranium and produce plutonium for mil-

itary needs. The China National Nuclear Cor-

poration operates several uranium enrichment 

facilities organized under three plants.93 China 

probably intends the bulk of its enrichment 

capacity to support its burgeoning nuclear 

power industry but could devote some enrich-

ment capacity to support military needs.94 Chi-

na’s plutonium production reactors probably 

ceased operation in the 1980s.95 However, Chi-

na’s reprocessing facilities can extract pluto-

nium from spent reactor fuel.96

Biological and 

Chemical Warfare

China has consistently claimed that it has 

never researched, produced, or possessed bio-

logical weapons and would never do so.97 Bei-

jing says China has researched only defensive 

biological technology necessary for China’s 

defense.98 China acceded to the Biological Weap

-

ons Convention (BWC) in 1984.99 It declared 

the Academy of Military Science’s Institute of 

Microbiology and Epidemiology in Beijing as a 

biodefense research facility.100 China regularly 

and voluntarily submits to confidence-building 

measures under the BWC.101 Although China 

is not a member of the Australia Group, Chi-

na’s export control regulations have been in 

line with Australia Group guidelines and con-

trol lists since 2002.102, 103 China’s biotechnology 

infrastructure is sufficient to produce some bio-

logical agents or toxins on a large scale.104,105,106

The Australia Group (AG) is an informal 

forum of countries which, through the 

harmonisation of export controls, seeks to 

ensure that exports do not contribute to 

the development of chemical or biological 

weapons. Coordination of national export 

control measures assists Australia Group 

participants to fulfil their obligations 

under the Chemical Weapons Convention 

and the Biological and Toxin Weapons 

Convention to the fullest extent possible.

—Excerpt from the Australia Group’s website

China has declared that it once operated a 

small chemical weapons program for offensive 

purposes; however, Beijing has consistently 

maintained that the program was dismantled 

and all agents and munitions were used before 

China ratified the Chemical Weapons Conven-

tion (CWC) in 1997.107 Beijing also has declared 

two historical chemical warfare production 

facilities that may have produced mustard gas, 

phosgene, and lewisite.108,109 In 1998, Beijing 

published chemical export control regulations 

consistent with Organization for the Prohibi-

tion of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) standards. 

It also has consistently updated its chemical 

control list to reflect changes made to the Aus-

tralia Group chemical control list. China contin-

ues to reaffirm its compliance with the CWC as 

well as its support for the activities conducted 

by the OPCW.110,111,112 Since acceding to the 

CWC, China has declared hundreds of dualuse facilities and has hosted hundreds of facility inspections and OPCW-led seminars.113,114
40

China’s chemical infrastructure is sufficient to 

research, develop, and produce some chemical 

agents on a large scale.115

China probably has the technical expertise 

to weaponize chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, and China’s robust armaments industry and numerous conventional 

weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, 

and artillery, probably could be adapted to 

deliver CBW agents.116 China has the technical expertise, military units, and equipment 

necessary to detect CBW agents and to defend 

against a CBW attack.117

Entities and individuals in China continue to 

supply countries of concern with technologies, 

components, and raw materials applicable to 

weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Such material and technology transfers 

could assist countries in developing their own 

production capabilities.118

Space/Counterspace

Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition. Countries concerned are developing their space forces and instruments, and the first signs of weaponization of outer space have appeared. China has all along advocated the peaceful use of 

outer space, opposed the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and taken an active 

part in international space cooperation. China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer 

space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets 

to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015

The PLA historically has managed China’s 

space program and continues to invest in 

improving China’s capabilities in space-based 

ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.119 China 

uses its on-orbit and ground-based assets to 

support national civil, economic, political, and 

military goals and objectives. Strategists in the 

PLA regard the ability to use space-based systems and deny them to adversaries as central 

to enabling modern informatized warfare. As a 

result, the PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance 

against the militarization of space. Space operations probably will form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a key 

role in enabling actions to counter third-party 

intervention during military conflicts.

China continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent 

an adversary’s use of space-based assets during 

crisis or conflict. In addition to the research 

and possible development of satellite jammers 

and directed-energy weapons, China has prob-
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

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ably made progress on kinetic energy weap-

ons, including the anti-satellite missile system 

tested in July 2014.120 China is employing more 

sophisticated satellite operations and probably 

is testing on-orbit dual-use technologies that 

could be applied to counterspace missions.

The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), 

established in December 2015, has an import-

ant role in the management of China’s aero-

space warfare capabilities.121 Consolidating 

the PLA’s space, cyber, and electronic warfare 

capabilities into the SSF enables cross-domain 

synergy in “strategic frontiers.” The SSF may 

also be responsible for research, development, 

testing, and fielding of certain “new concept” 

weapons, such as directed energy and kinetic 

energy weapons. The SSF’s space function is 

primarily focused on satellite launch and oper-

ation to support PLA reconnaissance, nav-

igation, and communication requirements. 

[For more on the SSF, please see Appendix E.]

Space and counterspace capabilities—like mis-

sile forces, advanced air and seapower, and cyber 

capabilities—are critical for China to fight and 

win modern military engagements. To support 

various requirements, China has built a vast 

ground and maritime infrastructure enabling 

spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) man-

ufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.

Satellites

China employs a robust space-based ISR capa-

bility designed to enhance its worldwide situ-

ational awareness. Used for civil and military 

remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial and 

maritime surveillance, and military intelligence 

collection, China’s ISR satellites are capable of 

providing electro-optical (EO) and synthetic 

aperture radar imagery, as well as electronic 

intelligence and signals intelligence data.122

China pursues parallel programs for military 

and commercial communications satellites 

(COMSATs), and owns and operates about 

30 COMSATs used for civil, commercial, and 

military satellite communications. The PLA 

operates a small number of dedicated military 

COMSATs.123 China’s civil COMSATs incorpo

-

rate turnkey off-the-shelf commercially manu-

factured components, and China produces its 

military-dedicated satellites domestically.124

China continues to launch new COMSATs to 

replace its aging satellites and increase its 

overall satellite communications bandwidth, 

capacity, availability, and reliability.

China uses its domestically produced Dong-

fanghong-4 (DFH-4) satellite bus—the struc-

ture that contains the components of the sat-

ellite—for its military COMSATs.125 Even 

though early satellites suffered mission-ending 

or mission-degrading failures, the DFH-4 has 

become a reliable satellite bus. The PLA and 

government continue to vigorously support the 

program and have signed numerous contracts 

with domestic and international customers 

for future DFH-4 COMSATs. The DFH-4 bus 

has also allowed China to position itself as 

a competitor in the international COMSAT 

market, orchestrating many contracts with 

foreign countries to supply on-orbit satellites, 

ground-control systems, and training.
42

In 2008, China launched the first Tianlian 

data-relay satellite of its China Tracking 

and Data Relay Satellite constellation. As 

of December 2017, China had four Tianlian 

data-relay satellites on orbit, allowing China 

to relay commands and data to and from its 

satellites even when those satellites were not 

over Chinese territory.

In 2000, China launched its first Beidou satellites to test the development of a regional satellite navigation system. By 2012, China had 

established a regional satellite navigation constellation consisting of 10 Beidou satellites and 

had initiated testing of a global constellation 

similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System 

(GPS).126 As Beidou satellites continue to be 

placed in orbit, by 2020 China will complete its 

global constellation of 27 Beidou satellites while 

maintaining a separate regional constellation 

providing redundant coverage over Asia.127

China owns and operates 10 domestically 

produced Fengyun and Yunhai meteorological satellites.128 The China Meteorological 

Administration supports civilian and military customers with the delivery of meteorological data and detailed weather forecasts. 

The newer satellites house almost a dozen 

all-weather sensors concerning atmospheric 

conditions as well as maritime terrain data 

for military and civilian customers. China’s 

Space operations control station.

Image Source: AFP
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membership in the World Meteorological 

Organization grants it free access to global 

meteorological data from the international 

organization’s 191 members.129

Counterspace

The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies 

to improve China’s counterspace capabilities. 

China is developing antisatellite capabilities, 

including research and possible development 

of directed-energy weapons and satellite jam-

mers, and probably has made progress on the 

antisatellite missile system that it tested in 

July 2014. China is employing more sophisti-

cated satellite operations and probably is test-

ing dual-use technologies that could be applied 

to counterspace missions.130

China has not publicly acknowledged the exis-

tence of any new programs since it confirmed 

it used an antisatellite missile to destroy 

a weather satellite in 2007. PLA writings 

emphasize the necessity of “destroying, dam-

aging, and interfering with the enemy’s recon-

naissance...and communications satellites,” 

suggesting that such systems, as well as nav-

igation and early warning satellites, could be 

among the targets of attacks designed to “blind 

and deafen the enemy.”131,132

Human Spaceflight and 

Space-Exploration Probes

China became the third country to achieve 

independent human spaceflight in 2003, when 

it successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 

spacecraft, followed by space laboratory Tian-

gong-1 and -2 launches in 2011 and 2016, 

respectively. China intends to assemble and 

operate a permanently inhabited, modular 

space station capable of hosting foreign pay-

loads and astronauts by 2022.133

Long March-3B SLV in midlaunch.

Image Source: AFP
44

China operates four space launch sites: Jiuquan, Taiyuan, Xichang, and Wenchang.

Space Launch Sites

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

China is the third country to have soft-landed 

a rover on the Moon, deploying the rover Yutu 

as part of the Chang’e-3 mission in 2013. 

China’s Lunar Exploration Program plans to 

launch the first mission to land a rover on the 

lunar far side in 2018 (Chang’e-4), followed 

by its first lunar sample-return mission in 

2019 (Chang’e-5).134,135,136

Space Launch

China has a robust fleet of launch vehicles to 

support its requirements. The Chang Zheng, or 

Long March, and Kuaizhou SLVs can launch 

Chinese spacecraft to any orbit.
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Space Launch Fleet

System Propellant Generation Outlook

LM-2, LM-3, LM-4 series Liquid Legacy Phase out by 2025

LM-5 series Liquid Next Heavy-lift for the proposed space 

station and other payloads

LM-6 Liquid Next Light-lift for low Earth and

sun-synchronous orbit

LM-7 Liquid Next Medium-lift for human spacefight and 

resupply to the future space station

LM-11 and Kuaizhou series Solid Next Lift for emergency response

Cyberspace

Authoritative PLA writings identify con-

trolling the “information domain”—sometimes 

referred to as “information dominance”—as a 

prerequisite for achieving victory in a modern 

war and as essential for countering outside 

intervention in a conflict.140 The PLA’s broader 

concept of the information domain and of infor-

mation operations encompasses the network, 

electromagnetic, psychological, and intelli-

gence domains, with the “network domain” 

and corresponding “network warfare” roughly 

analogous to the current U.S. concept of the 

cyber domain and cyberwarfare.141

The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) may 

be the first step in the development of a cyber-

force by combining cyber reconnaissance, 

cyberattack, and cyberdefense capabilities into 

one organization to reduce bureaucratic hur-

dles and centralize command and control of 

PLA cyber units. Official pronouncements offer 

limited details on the organization’s makeup 

or mission. President Xi simply said during the 

SSF founding ceremony on 31 December 2015 

that the SSF is a “new-type combat force to 

maintain national security and [is] an import-

ant growth point for the PLA’s combat capa-

bilities.”142 The SSF probably was formed to 

consolidate cyber elements of the former PLA 

General Staff Third (Technical Reconnais-

sance) and Fourth (Electronic Countermea-

sures and Radar) Departments and Informati-

zation Department.143,144 [For more information 

on the SSF, please see Appendix E.]

137,138,139
46

The PLA could use its cyberwarfare capabilities to support military operations in three key 

areas. First, cyber reconnaissance allows the 

PLA to collect technical and operational data for 

intelligence and potential operational planning 

for cyberattacks because the accesses and tactics, techniques, and procedures for cyber reconnaissance translate into those also necessary to 

conduct cyberattacks. Second, the PLA could 

employ its cyberattack capabilities to establish 

information dominance in the early stages of a 

conflict to constrain an adversary’s actions or 

slow mobilization and deployment by targeting 

network-based C2, C4ISR, logistics, and commercial activities. Third, cyberwarfare capabilities can serve as a force multiplier when coupled 

with conventional capabilities during a conflict.

PLA military writings detail the effectiveness 

of information operations and cyberwarfare 

in modern conflicts, and advocate targeting 

an adversary’s C2 and logistics networks to 

affect the adversary’s ability to operate during 

the early stages of conflict. One authoritative 

source identifies an adversary’s C2 system as 

“the heart of information collection, control, 

and application on the battlefield. It is also the 

nerve center of the entire battlefield.”145 China’s cyberwarfare could also focus on targeting 

links and nodes in an adversary’s mobility system and identifying operational vulnerabilities 

in the mobilization and deployment phase.

The PLA also plays a role in cyber theft. In May 

2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted 

five PLA officers on charges of hacking into the 

networks of U.S. companies for commercial 

gain. Beijing maintains that the Chinese government and military do not engage in cyberespionage and that the United States fabricated 

the charges.146,147

Denial and Deception

The PLA uses military deception to reduce the 

effectiveness of adversaries’ reconnaissance 

and to deceive adversaries about the PLA’s 

warfighting intentions, actions, or major targets.148 PLA tradition emphasizes deception 

Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new 

domain of national security. As international strategic competition in cyberspace 

has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite 

a few countries are developing their cyber 

military forces. Being one of the major 

victims of hacker attacks, China is confronted with grave security threats to its 

cyber infrastructure. As cyberspace weighs 

more in military security, China will expedite the development of a cyberforce, and 

enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defense, support 

for the country’s endeavors in cyberspace 

and participation in international cyber 

cooperation, so as to stem major cyber crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security and social stability.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015
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and psychological manipulation to create 

asymmetric advantages and enable surprise. 

The PLA has a longstanding doctrine for 

deception, and claims that it regularly prac-

tices deception during training. PLA sources 

describe military deception as a form of com-

bat support, on par with ISR, meteorological 

support, missile calculation, engineering, and 

logistic support.

Denial and deception activities include: 149 • Concealing and camouflaging. • Blending false or misleading military 

movements with actual deployments

and war preparations.

• Employing counterreconnaissance: 

understanding and evading, jamming, or 

destroying the whole spectrum of enemy 

reconnaissance activities against PLA 

units and facilities.

• Using deceptive maneuvers, psycholog-

ical ploys, and unorthodox schemes to 

deceive, confuse, or otherwise manipulate 

an adversary into a militarily disadvanta-

geous position.150

Skillfully employed, deception can paralyze 

an enemy force and achieve decisive results. 

Options range from no-warning strikes, vio-

lent multiaxis strikes, and envelopment to a 

less ambitious attempt to confuse the adver-

sary regarding the exact timing, nature, direc-

tion, or scope of a PLA operation.151,152

Logistics and DefenseIndustrial Modernization

[China’s armed forces will] develop new 

support means, augment war reserves, inte-

grate logistics information systems, improve 

rules and standards, and meticulously orga-

nize supply and support, so as to build a 

logistics system that can provide support 

for fighting and winning modern war, serve 

the modernization of the armed forces, and 

transform towards informatization.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015

The PLA’s increased focus on developing the 

capabilities required to conduct joint oper-

ations under “informatized” conditions that 

began in the 1990s has spurred efforts during 

the past two decades to develop the PLA’s 

capacity to supply and sustain its operations. 

Along these lines, the PLA has taken steps 

to modernize its defense-industrial base to 

ensure that the PLA is developing capabil-

ities to meet future mission requirements. 

Key areas of focus have included civil-military 

integration, support to joint combat opera-

tions, and high-tech weapons development.

Logistics

According to various military officials, the 

PLA’s logistics system historically has been 

plagued with inefficiencies that degrade com-

bat readiness and restrict its ability to sup-
48

port and sustain modern joint combat operations.153,154,155 Since the late 1990s, the PLA has 

invested in the modernization of its logistics 

system, force structure, and supporting infrastructure to enable a transition from a rigid 

command-directed and manpower-dependent 

system, rife with corruption. The overarching 

objective of these reforms is to build a precision logistic support system that is capable of 

comprehensive, timely, and accurate logistic 

support to PLA joint operations.156,157

This transformation is dependent on building 

high-efficiency transportation and warehouse 

infrastructure, fielding new combat support 

equipment, integrating comprehensive information systems, and developing a new breed of 

officer capable of leveraging these capabilities 

to support rapid mobilization and high-tempo 

combat operations.158,159 For China, logistics 

modernization also is heavily dependent on the 

PLA’s ability to leverage the full potential of 

China’s comprehensive national power to maximize combat capabilities, ensure peacetime 

efficiencies, and guarantee a constant state of 

combat readiness.160

The PLA has made great progress in logistics 

reform by improving logistics resources and 

procedures during the past two decades, and 

enhancing the PLA’s ability to mobilize rapidly and project support along internal lines 

of communication for large operations (mostly 

disaster responses and exercises).161,162,163,164

Since 2016, the PLA has implemented structural reforms to improve command and control, procedural reforms to improve civil-military integration, and oversight mechanisms 

to eliminate waste and inefficiencies that stem 

from longstanding corrupt practices within the 

logistics sector. The successful implementation 

of these measures remains to be seen, given 

the substantial cultural challenges of executing joint operations and reducing corruption.165

The extent to which the PLA will be able to 

sustain external military force projection operations effectively also remains in question 

because the PLA’s experience is still nascent. 

Efforts to support the PLA’s first overseas military base, in Djibouti, may provide insight into 

these capabilities. [Please see Appendix G for 

more information on PLA logistics.]

Defense-Industrial Base

China’s defense-industrial complex comprises 

both a military and a state sector governed 

by the CMC and State Council, respectively, 

under oversight of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.166 The CMC’s 

Equipment Development Department oversees weapons planning, research, development, and acquisition (RDA) in conjunction 

with the military service armament organizations for China’s Army, Navy, Air Force, 

Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, Armed 

Police, and Coast Guard.

The State Council’s State Administration for 

Science, Technology, and Industry for National 

Defense (SASTIND) is the key organ responsible for overseeing China’s state-owned 

defense-industrial corporations and enterprises.167,168 Twelve SASTIND-subordinate 
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defense-industrial enterprises conduct RDA 

and production in six distinct scientific, engi-

neering, and technological domains: • Aerospace/missile • Naval/maritime • Aviation • Ground systems/ordnance • Electronics • Nuclear

During a speech at an equipment-quality work 

conference in 2015, CMC Vice Chairman Gen-

eral Xu Qiliang stressed the need to build a 

strong defense-industrial base to support mil-

itary development. Xu emphasized themes of 

quality, innovation, technology, and improving 

combat readiness, but also said it would be 

necessary to strengthen laws, regulations, and 

accountability within the defense industry to 

increase quality standards.169

The PLA initiated defense-industrial reforms 

in 2016 that aimed to reduce bureaucracy, 

develop a more structured RDA and produc-

tion decisionmaking apparatus, streamline 

developmental timelines, promote innovation, 

and institutionalize civil-military integration. 

Within an industrial context, the latter entails 

establishing a formal relationship between 

China’s defense and civilian industrial bases 

to develop a technologically advanced, domes-

tically reliant, and internationally relevant 

defense-industrial complex.170 Key components 

of the initiative include the establishment of 

widely distributed “science cities,” industrial 

parks, and high-tech zones—most near China’s 

defense-industrial corporations and commer-

cial industrial centers, large cities, and pro-

vincial capitals harboring significant RDA and 

manufacturing capabilities to facilitate effi-

cient logistics and supply.171,172 These reforms 

are expected to be implemented by 2020.

A key emphasis of defense-industrial reforms 

is developing an innovative military indus-

trial complex capable of delivering cutting-edge 

technologies to meet future PLA requirements. 

China’s research and development apparatus 

is designed to both identify and maximize the 

utility of emerging and potentially disruptive 

science and technology for military use. Scien-

tific and technological disciplines with military 

applications targeted for development include 

hypersonics; nanotechnology; high-performance 

computing; quantum communications; space 

systems; autonomous systems; artificial intel-

ligence; robotics; high-performance turbofan 

engine design; new, more efficient and power-

ful forms of propulsion; advanced manufac-

turing processes (including additive manufac-

turing/3-D printing); and advanced aerospace 

quality materials, just to name a few.173
50

Underground Facilities

The use of underground facilities for warfighting 

protection and concealment enhances China’s 

military capacity, with particular emphasis on 

protecting C4I functions and missile assets. The 

PLA maintains a robust, technologically advanced 

underground facility (UGF) program. Given its 

NFU nuclear policy, China assumes it might have 

to absorb an initial nuclear strike while ensuring 

that leadership and strategic assets survive.

China determined in the mid-to-late 1980s that 

it needed to update and expand its military UGF 

program. This modernization effort took on a 

renewed urgency after China observed U.S. and 

coalition air operations during the 1991 Persian 

Gulf War and in the Balkans in 1999. The resultant emphasis on “winning high-tech battles” 

precipitated research into advanced tunneling 

and construction methods. These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build more 

survivable, deeply buried facilities, resulting in 

the widespread UGF construction effort we have 

detected throughout China for the past decade.

Missions Other Than War

The PLA views “nonwar” missions as a component of its readiness preparations, broader military modernization efforts, and military diplomacy. These operations also reflect the PLA’s 

increasing role beyond China’s borders.174 In 

practice, the military shares many of these missions with the People’s Armed Police, China’s 

largely domestically oriented paramilitary force.

China has broadened its participation in UN 

PKOs since 2008 to support foreign policy and 

military objectives by improving China’s international image, providing the PLA with operational experience, and opening avenues for 

intelligence collection. China provides civilian 

police, military observers, engineers, logistic 

support specialists, and medical personnel to 

missions. In 2016, China had more than 3,000 

peacekeepers deployed in support of 10 UN 

missions around the globe—the largest contingent of any permanent member nation of the 

UN Security Council—and separately committed to establish an additional 8,000-member peacekeeping standby force. China has 

trained about 500 foreign peacekeepers and 

has pledged to increase this number to 2,500 

in the near future. In August 2017, Beijing 

announced that China’s first helicopter unit to 

be deployed to a UN mission area had arrived 

in Sudan to support the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur.175 As of 2018, 

China has more than 2,500 troops, police, and 

military observers committed to UN missions.

Medical team onboard Peace Ark.

Image Source: DIMOC
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Beijing’s increased participation in UN PKO 

missions, particularly in terms of securing Chi-

na’s international image, has not come without 

costs. For instance, in 2016, after three Chinese 

peacekeepers were killed in action and six were 

wounded in two high-profile attacks in Mali 

and South Sudan, some international media 

reports accused Chinese peacekeepers of failing 

to interdict attacks on civilian foreign aid work-

ers. These reports implicitly questioned China’s 

ability to perform as a responsible global actor.

In 2017, China sustained its contributions to 

counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden 

through the deployment of its 28th naval escort 

task force to the region since 2008. During the 

same period, the PLAN continued to use sup-

port for counterpiracy to justify Chinese sub-

marine patrols to the Indian Ocean. In 2016, a 

nuclear-powered attack submarine conducted a 

port call in Karachi, Pakistan, during an official 

visit by the PLAN commander, marking Chi-

na’s first port call in South Asia by a nuclear 

submarine. In 2017, Chinese attack submarines 

conducted port calls in Seppangar, Malaysia, 

and Karachi, but Sri Lanka denied a port call 

request in Colombo.176 These submarine patrols 

demonstrate the PLAN’s emerging capability to 

protect China’s SLOCs and to increase China’s 

power projection into the Indian Ocean.

China continues to use humanitarian and disas-

ter relief and counterterrorism cooperation as 

low-threat avenues to advance military engage-

ment with many of its foreign partners. In March 

2016, Beijing also proposed the creation of a mar-

itime joint search and rescue hotline with the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, probably 

in part as a means of assuaging regional concerns 

over Chinese activities in the South China Sea.

Fulfilling international responsibilities and 

obligations. China’s armed forces will con-

tinue to participate in UN peacekeeping mis-

sions, strictly observe the mandates of the 

UN Security Council, maintain its commit-

ment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, 

promote development and reconstruction, 

and safeguard regional peace and security. 

China’s armed forces will continue to take an 

active part in international disaster rescue 

and humanitarian assistance, dispatch pro-

fessional rescue teams to disaster-stricken 

areas for relief and disaster reduction, pro-

vide relief materials and medical aid, and 

strengthen international exchanges in the 

fields of rescue and disaster reduction. 

Through the aforementioned operations, 

the armed forces can also enhance their own 

capabilities and expertise.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015

PLA soldiers working on a school in Thailand.

Image Source: DIMOC
52

hina’s military modernization efforts 

have followed the broader growth 

and development of China as a 

whole. The PLA has made efforts toward 

reducing corruption, professionalizing training and education, developing a science and 

technology base for research and development, and organizing the force for effective 

C2. With its economic and security interests 

reaching around the globe, Beijing perceives 

further modernization of the PLA as an imperative for continued stability and security of its 

growing interests.

During the past decade alone, from counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to an 

expanded military presence in the East and 

South China Seas, China has demonstrated a 

willingness to use the PLA as an instrument 

of national power in the execution of “historic 

missions” in the new century. Improvements 

in PLA equipment and capabilities that have 

focused on generating combat power across the 

PLA services present Beijing with additional 

response options as China faces increasing 

global security concerns. Expected advances 

in areas such as nuclear deterrence, power 

projection, cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic spectrum operations will continue to be 

critical components of the PLA’s developing 

capabilities. China also continues to develop 

capabilities for “nonwar” missions, such as 

HADR and counterpiracy.

In the coming years, the PLA is likely to grow 

even more technologically advanced, with 

equipment comparable to that of other modern militaries. The PLA will acquire advanced 

fighter aircraft, naval vessels, missile systems, 

and space and cyberspace assets as it organizes 

and trains to address 21st century threats farther from China’s shores.

Outlook: Developing a Robust Force

C
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The world today is undergoing unprecedented changes, and China is at a critical stage of 

reform and development. In their endeavor to realize the Chinese Dream of great national 

rejuvenation, the Chinese people aspire to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain 

peace, pursue development, and share prosperity.

China’s destiny is vitally interrelated with that of the world as a whole. A prosperous and 

stable world would provide China with opportunities, while China’s peaceful development 

also offers an opportunity for the whole world. China will unswervingly follow the path of 

peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense 

policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and 

will never seek hegemony or expansion. China’s armed forces will remain a staunch force in 

maintaining world peace.

Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China’s 

modernization drive and a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development. Subordi-

nate to and serving the national strategic goal, China’s military strategy is an overarching 

guidance for blueprinting and directing the building and employment of the country’s armed 

forces. At this new historical starting point, China’s armed forces will adapt themselves to 

new changes in the national security environment, firmly follow the goal of the Communist 

Party of China to build a strong military for the new situation, implement the military 

strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, accelerate the modernization of 

national defense and armed forces, resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and 

development interests, and provide a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic 

goal of the ‘two centenaries’ and for realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great reju-

venation of the Chinese nation.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015

Note: The “two centenaries” is a reference to the 2021 centenary of the 

CCP as well as the 2049 centenary of the People’s Republic of China.
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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APPENDIX A: PLA Army

The PLA Army (PLAA) is the world’s largest 

standing ground force, with approximately 

915,000 active-duty personnel in combat 

units.177 China’s military reforms since 2015 

have included creating a separate PLAA head-

quarters for the first time in the PLA’s his-

tory. In April 2017, the PLA announced the 

reduction of 5 of the PLAA’s 18 group armies 

(corps-sized units), and the restructuring to a 

corps-brigade-battalion force structure. This 

new design implemented more mobile, modu-

lar units and integrated maneuver elements 

into combined-arms brigades.178 The PLAA is 

also modernizing C4I systems to enhance its 

forces’ interoperability.

Roles and Missions

The PLAA’s role is to serve as the primary 

ground fighting force for the PLA. Accordingly, 

the PLAA’s mission falls into five areas with 

eight supporting capabilities.

Roles and Missions

PLAA Strategic Purpose 1 Respond to emergencies and military threats 2 Safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territory, China’s security interests in new 

domains, and overseas interests

3 Participate in security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace 4 Maintain China’s political security and social stability 5 Perform emergency rescue and disaster relief

Required Tactical and Operational Capabilities 1 Remote maneuver actions 5 Occupation and control actions 2 Information countermeasures 6 Regional guard actions 3 Firepower strike options 7 Special operations actions 4 Mobile assault actions 8 All-dimension defensive actions
56

Major Ground Units

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
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PLAA-produced publications consistently 

discuss “new-type operations,” which are 

operations that emphasize an effects-based 

application of combat power to neutralize 

key nodes, diminish the enemy’s capability to 

effectively fight (systems confrontation), and 

achieve operational objectives quickly. At the 

tactical level, PLAA battalion training most 

likely includes use of precise, long-range fire 

to maximize protection and surprise; disper-

sion of formations of weapon platforms while 

relying on advanced communications technol-

ogies; and increasingly lethal munitions to 

enable PLAA commanders to produce mass 

effects on an enemy.

Units

The development of the PLAA’s “new-type” 

operational forces reflects China’s desire to plan 

and construct a force that is multifaceted, with 

capabilities for operations ranging from high-in-

tensity conflict to security-stability operations. 

These forces stress the importance of ISR and 

leveraging information to enable future com-

bat; they can conduct three-dimensional opera-

tions (Army aviation, air mobility, and airborne 

forces) and can operate in a severely degraded 

communications environment.

Operations emphasize engaging the enemy from 

much longer distances, place greater importance 

on protection and survivability, and emphasize 

the employment of cyberoperations. Future 

PLAA units will be smaller, more modular, and 

less dependent on headquarters for resources. 

This new construct envisions generating com-

bat power and effectiveness across warfighting 

functions, from smaller, more flexible units.179 

The PLAA is the world’s largest army.

Image Source: AFP

In line with the strategic requirement of 

mobile operations and multidimensional 

offense and defense, the PLAA will con-

tinue to reorient from theater defense to 

transtheater mobility. In the process of 

building small, multifunctional and mod-

ular units, the PLAA will adapt itself 

to tasks in different regions, develop the 

capacity of its combat forces for different 

purposes, and construct a combat force 

structure for joint operations. The PLAA 

will elevate its capabilities for precise, 

multidimensional, transtheater, multi-

functional, and sustainable operations.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015
58

Armor and Infantry. The majority of the 

PLAA’s armored and infantry units are organized as combined-arms brigades, but the PLAA 

maintains a few maneuver units organized into 

divisions. The combined-arms brigades vary in 

size and composition, containing up to 5,000 

troops. Infantry units include motorized infantry (those equipped with trucks for transportation) as well as mechanized infantry units, 

which can be equipped with either wheeled 

or tracked armored infantry fighting vehicles. 

Equipment in PLAA infantry units varies and 

may include a mix of obsolete platforms from 

the 1960s up to some of the region’s most modernized and capable platforms. PLAA armored 

units similarly comprise a wide range of legacy 

tanks and modernized third-generation main 

battle tanks.182

Artillery. Artillery is the key component of 

the PLAA’s strike capability.183 Its primary 

function is supporting ground assault missions, and artillery accounts for more than 

one-third of the Army’s operational unit 

strength.184 The current family of modernized 

systems emphasizes long-range deployment, 

firepower operations, and mobile warfare—

the key attributes that the PLAA requires in 

its newest artillery systems.185

Air Defense. PLAA air defense units comprise 

active-duty forces and reserve forces. Activeduty units provide air defense for the mobile 

forces. These units are equipped with a mix of 

tactical antiaircraft missiles, antiaircraft artillery, antiaircraft gun and missile systems, and 

man-portable antiaircraft missile systems. An 

extensive reserve antiaircraft artillery force, 

comprising divisions and separate brigades, 

provides primarily area antiaircraft artillery 

protection for China’s urban areas and critical 

economic areas.186,187

Electronic Countermeasures. Electronic 

countermeasure (ECM) units are equipped 

with a range of modern ground-based electronic warfare systems capable of targeting 

large portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. 

PLAA ECM units use HF/VHF/UHF, radar, 

and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-borne 

jamming systems to support maneuver forces.

Special Operations Forces. Consistent 

with the PLAA’s recent emphasis on information- and intelligence-driven operations, 

the PLAA’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

have undergone substantial expansion. According to PLAA doctrine, SOF missions include 

“carrying out special reconnaissance, special 

sabotage, [and] harassment attacks; seizing 

and controlling key targets; guiding precision 

PLAA Units

The table below highlights PLAA units by

type and size.

Type and Echelon 

Army Groups 13

Combined-Arms Brigades 78

Artillery Brigades 15

Army Aviation/Air Assault Brigades 13

Mechanized Infantry Division 1

180,181
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attacks; conducting rescues behind enemy 

lines; and dealing with border armed con-

flicts and unexpected events.”188 PLAA SOF 

appears to focus primarily on special recon-

naissance and direct-action missions.189

Army Aviation. PLA Army Aviation comprises 

13 brigades. These units are subordinate to 

corps-level units in the five theater commands. 

The PLA considers PLA Army Aviation a “newtype” operational force and a priority for modernization. Since 2010, PLA Army Aviation has 

transformed from an auxiliary transport role to 

that of a main combat force and has increased 

its regiments to brigade echelon. Newly fielded 

and forthcoming helicopters combined with 

structural and operational changes under way 

in the PLAA indicate a pattern of development 

designed to mold a three-dimensional, newtype Army Aviation force with all-weather dayor-night capability.190

Logistics and Support. PLAA logistics and 

equipment support elements exist in active and 

reserve units. They provide field forces with all 

classes of supply and maintenance support as 

well as medical and technical support. These 

forces normally form support groups under 

logistics and equipment command posts.191

The PLAA also relies heavily on civil-military 

integration to supplement services provided 

by military logistics units. Official publications 

note the importance of integrating civilian and 

military production during mobilizations, and 

the PLAA regularly uses a combination of mil-

itary and civilian materiel (rations and fuel), 

equipment (civilian transport vehicles, vessels, 

and aircraft), and facilities (ports, docks, and 

hospitals) during large-scale training exercises.

Equipment 192,193

Main Battle Tanks. The PLAA armored corps 

comprises a mix of older, obsolete tanks and a 

variety of more modern tanks. The PLAA is mod-

ernizing its armored units by fielding third-gen-

eration tanks with updated armor packages, 

larger-caliber cannons, improved fire-control 

systems, and advanced electronics and commu-

nications. The most capable of these tanks are 

the Type 96A and Type 99 main battle tank.194

Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles 

(AIFVs) and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs).

The PLAA has a large variety of wheeled and 

tracked AIFVs and APCs. Highlighted below 

are two of the PLAA’s most modern AIFVs. • ZBD-04A. The ZBD-04A is one of China’s 

newest tracked AIFVs. It is well armed 

with a 100-mm gun, a coaxial 30-mm can-

A ZTZ99 (Type 99) main battle tank 

conducting training.

Image Source: AFP
60

non, and a 7.62-mm machinegun. It has a 

traditional layout, with the engine in the 

front right and the driver in the front left. 

The turret is in the middle, with the troop 

compartment in the rear. The ZBD-04A has 

a licensed copy of the Russian BMP 3 turret. 

It has a three-member crew and room for 

seven passengers. This IFV weighs about 

21 tons and has improved armor.

• ZBL-09. The ZBL-09, often referred to as 

a “wheeled light tank,” is the PLA’s newest 

wheeled armored vehicle. It has an 8x8 configuration, a 105-mm gun, a 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, a 12.7-mm machinegun on 

the right side of the turret, and six 76-mm 

grenade launchers on each side of the turret. 

The driver is in the front, the turret is in the 

middle, the power pack is in the rear, and 

passive armor is fitted to the hull and turret.

Artillery and Rockets. China continues to 

produce modern artillery systems aimed at 

advancing the mechanization of PLAA artillery while integrating information systems to 

increase lethality and precision. The primary 

systems are the PHL03 300-mm self-propelled 

(SP) multiple rocket launcher, the PLZ05 155-

mm SP gun/howitzer, and two tracked and two 

wheeled 122-mm artillery systems. These new 

systems are likely to replace almost all towed 

artillery. The exception to this modernization 

trend is PLAA coastal defense artillery, which 

will continue using towed Type 59-1 130-mm 

guns and Type 66 152-mm howitzers.

Air Defense. China has been fielding medium-range HQ-16 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 

with select air defense units in the PLAA as 

part of a comprehensive upgrade of its air 

defense capabilities. China manufactures its 

own variant of Russia’s SA-15 and is fielding 

the system with PLAA air defense units supporting tracked armored forces.

China also manufactures a domestically 

designed variant of the French Crotale tactical SAM system. This wheeled SAM is being 

fielded with PLAA air defense units supporting primarily wheeled fighting forces. 

China’s tactical SAMs have been replacing 

outdated large-caliber antiaircraft artillery in 

air defense units defending operational and 

large tactical-level units.

China is fielding a modern domestically produced SP antiaircraft gun system with select 

PLAA air defense units protecting larger 

maneuver units. The PGZ-07 will provide highly 

mobile coverage for headquarters areas, troop 

concentrations, and key logistic support areas.

PHL03 Multiple Rocket Launchers on parade 

in Beijing

Image Source: AFP
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China’s domestically designed and produced 

PGZ-04 integrated missile-gun antiaircraft 

system is an upgraded version of the PGZ-95, 

equipped with more effective short-range SAMs. 

The system is fielded with many PLAA armored 

and mechanized units for close-range air defense 

protection of combat maneuver elements.

Training

In 2015, PLA leaders directed changes to ground 

forces training.195 These changes included a call 

for increased emphasis on problem solving, inno-

vation, and realistic combat training, replacing 

previously scripted training methods. Leaders 

stressed the performance of key tasks—such as 

conducting joint training, training in nighttime 

combat, and training under adverse weather 

and geographical conditions—as essential to 

winning wars. The PLAA makes use of a num-

ber of training locations available for its ground 

forces and maintains at least one sizable train-

ing area in each of China’s military theaters. 

These training areas offer a variety of terrain, 

from coastal and flat areas to moderately hilly, 

to high plateau and mountainous terrains. The 

major training bases provide units with venues 

featuring large areas for field maneuvers, artil-

lery fires, and force-on-force confrontations.

Professionalization. Since at least 2012, 

PLAA units (“red forces”) rotating through com-

bined-arms training centers have trained against 

a permanently established “blue force,” also 

known as an opposition force.196 The construction 

of a blue force was undertaken to ensure that the 

PLAA would become more sophisticated in con-

ducting realistic training scenarios. Increasingly, 

PLAA training emphasizes the need to empower 

lower-level leaders to conduct target-based, oppor-

tunistic, initiative-driven combat. The PLAA has 

decreased the emphasis on “saving face,” shifting 

toward a culture of understanding that command-

ers and subordinates should be allowed—and 

expected—to make mistakes in training.

Recruitment and Professional Military 

Education. Military service probably will 

remain a less attractive career option if Chi-

na’s economy stays healthy. Although Chinese 

youth remain interested in the career field, 

interest is not widespread.197 The PLAA relies 

on a 2-year conscription period along with 

a mix of volunteers (the ratio of conscripts to 

volunteers is unclear). Recruitment challenges 

notwithstanding, the PLA continues to pursue 

efforts to “cultivate new-type military person-

nel” to retain talent and develop personnel who 

PGZ-O7 self-propelled antiaircraft system on 

parade in Beijing.

Image Source: AFP
62

can meet the data demands of modern warfare.198 The Army also has changed military 

recruitment schedules and age limits in an 

effort to better attract educated and talented 

people.199 Basic training, where students learn 

fundamental military skills and receive political indoctrination, continues to serve as the 

foundation for both conscripted and volunteer 

personnel entering the service. After completing the initial curriculum, trainees are sent to 

their respective units for additional on-the-job 

training. Some new soldiers will go on to different locations for technical training outside 

their assigned units.200

PLA cadets receive political instruction.

Image Source: DIMOC
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APPENDIX B: PLA Navy

The PLA Navy (PLAN) is Asia’s largest navy, 

with an inventory of more than 300 surface 

combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, 

patrol craft, and specialized units.201 The 

PLAN is rapidly replacing obsolescent, gen-

erally single-purpose ships in favor of larger, 

multirole combatants with advanced antiship, 

antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and sen-

sors. This modernization aligns with China’s 

growing emphasis on the maritime domain, 

with increasing demands on the PLAN to con-

duct operational tasks at increasing distances 

from the Chinese mainland using multimis-

sion, long-range, sustainable naval platforms 

with robust self-defense capabilities.202,203

In the 1980s, China’s threat perceptions and 

growing economic interests drove a major 

shift in the strategic orientation and utility 

of naval forces. In particular, Chinese naval 

strategists sought to expand the bounds of 

their maritime capabilities beyond coastal 

defense. By 1987, PLAN Commander Adm Liu 

Huaqing had established a strategy referred 

to as “offshore defense.”204

Although Liu characterized offshore areas as 

east of Taiwan and the northern part of the 

Pacific Ocean, stretching beyond the first island 

chain, offshore defense was often associated 

with operations in the Yellow Sea, East China 

Sea, and South China Sea—China’s “near seas.” 

Development of offshore defense paralleled the 

CMC’s adoption of a new military strategy 

that focused on local wars on China’s periph-

ery rather than a major confrontation with 

the Soviet Union, and it focused on achieving 

regional goals and deterring a modern adver-

sary from intervening in a regional conflict.

Former President Hu and President Xi have 

repeatedly emphasized the importance of mari-

time power. In 2004, former President Hu’s out-

line of the PLA’s New Historic Missions encom-

passed new expectations for the PLAN. In his 

report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Hu 

declared, “We should enhance our capacity for 

exploiting marine resources, resolutely safe-

guard China’s maritime rights and interests, 

and build China into a maritime power.” Hu’s 

public emphasis on maritime power and the 

need to “resolutely safeguard” China’s mar-

itime rights and interests reflect a growing 

consensus in China that maritime power is 

In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open-seas protection, the PLAN will gradually shift its focus 

from “offshore waters defense” to the com-

bination of “offshore waters defense” with 

“open-seas protection,” and build a com-

bined, multifunctional and efficient marine 

combat force structure. The PLAN will 

enhance its capabilities for strategic deter-

rence and counterattack, maritime maneu-

vers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive 

defense, and comprehensive support.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015
64

essential to advancing China’s interests. This 

trajectory was carried forward under Xi and is 

explicit in China’s 2015 military strategy:

In 2015, Beijing formally introduced a new 

naval strategy, known as Offshore Defense and 

Open Seas Protection. The new strategy contains the primary elements of offshore defense 

but extends China’s maritime sphere of operations beyond the first and second island chains 

and into the high seas in support of China’s 

growing international interests and maritime 

missions. China relies heavily on maritime 

trade, access to overseas energy resources, and 

overseas employment of Chinese citizens to 

propel its domestic economy, spurring Beijing’s 

concern for ensuring that the PLAN is capable 

of pursuing open-seas protection missions. The 

PLAN’s acquisition patterns demonstrate a 

growing emphasis on ships that are multimission capable and large enough to sustain these 

types of operations.

Roles and Missions

Given China’s heavy reliance on maritime 

commerce, Beijing now has a vested interest 

in ensuring the security of international trade. 

Beijing also faces growing pressure to contribute to international security missions. As an 

increasingly modern and flexible force, the 

PLAN is at the forefront of addressing a number of enduring Chinese security challenges, 

from reunification with Taiwan to asserting 

China’s maritime claims in the East and South 

China Seas. Today the PLAN’s primary operational, training, and planning focus remains in 

the near seas, where China faces sovereignty 

disputes over various islands, maritime features, territorial waters, and associated marThe traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and 

great importance has to be attached to 

managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It 

is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure 

commensurate with its national security 

and development interests, safeguard its 

national sovereignty and maritime rights 

and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs (sea lines of communication) 

and overseas interests, and participate in 

international maritime cooperation so as 

to provide strategic support for building 

itself into a maritime power.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015

PLAN Jiangkai II class guided-missile frigate Linyi.

Image Source: DVIDS
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itime rights. The growth of China’s diversified 

“nonwar” missions, including HADR, SLOC 

protection, and PKOs, has been a major driver 

of—and justification for—China’s expanded 

naval strategy and operations in the far seas. 

The following subsections highlight a few of 

these missions.

Countering Third-Party Intervention.

Since the mid-1990s, Chinese planners and 

strategists have understood that the PLAN’s 

development of capabilities to deter, delay, and 

if necessary degrade third-party forces’ inter-

vention in a time of conflict is essential. Nearly 

two decades later, China has closed many of the 

gaps in key warfare areas, such as air defense 

and long-range strike, that would support coun-

tering third-party forces in regional campaigns. 

China has built or acquired a wide array of 

advanced platforms, including submarines, 

major surface combatants, missile patrol craft, 

maritime strike aircraft, and land-based sys-

tems that employ new, sophisticated antiship 

cruise missiles and SAMs. China also has devel-

oped the world’s first roadmobile, antiship bal-

listic missile, a system specifically designed to 

attack enemy aircraft carriers. China’s leaders 

hope that possessing these military capabilities 

will deter proindependence moves by Taiwan 

or, should deterrence fail, will permit a range 

of tailored military options against Taiwan and 

potential third-party military intervention.

Protecting Maritime Sovereignty. A key role 

for the PLAN is protecting China’s maritime sov-

ereignty. In the East and South China Seas, Bei-

jing faces longstanding disputes with its neigh-

bors regarding maritime boundaries, economic 

rights, and sovereignty over various geographic 

features. During the past few years, maritime 

disputes between China and rival claimants, 

including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and 

Malaysia, have periodically intensified.

China’s Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime 

Militia are increasingly visible throughout the 

region, and Beijing has employed increasingly 

coercive tactics to advance its regional inter-

ests. As China’s naval capabilities have grown, 

Beijing has taken steps to consolidate its mar-

itime forces and improve its ability to respond 

flexibly to contingencies, while avoiding esca-

lation to military conflict and maintaining a 

veneer of advancing peaceful global interests. 

China’s land reclamation and outpost expan-

sion in the Paracel and Spratly Islands include 

port facilities from which it can surge PLAN, 

The aircraft carrier Liaoning sailing in a formation of 

PLAN ships.

Image Source: AFP
66

China Coast Guard (CCG), and People’s Armed 

Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships to 

better enforce maritime sovereignty claims, 

as well as airbases to support reconnaissance, 

fighter, and strike aircraft.

Under Chinese law, maritime sovereignty is a 

domestic law enforcement issue under the purview of the CCG. Beijing also prefers to use CCG 

ships for assertive actions in disputed waters 

to reduce the risk of escalation and to portray 

itself more benignly to an international audience. For situations that Beijing perceives carry 

a heightened risk of escalation, it often deploys 

PLAN combatants in close proximity for rapid 

intervention if necessary. China also relies on 

the PAFMM – a paramilitary force of fishing 

boats – for sovereignty enforcement actions.

Sea Lane Protection. China increasingly 

sees a need for the PLAN to help protect its 

economic investments and political interests 

around the world. The security of oil import 

routes from the Middle East and Africa that 

pass through the Indian Ocean is particularly 

vital to China. Large portions of China’s critical mineral imports and trade in manufactured products and components also use these 

routes. Since any disruption of China’s trade 

could undermine China’s economy, the PLAN 

is placing growing importance on developing 

long-range SLOC protection and general naval 

presence capabilities. For example, SLOC protection and naval presence missions are among 

the main drivers in China’s establishment of 

a naval logistics support base in Djibouti as 

well as Beijing’s pursuit of additional logistics-port-access agreements. In addition, the 

PLAN’s participation in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden demonstrates Beijing’s intention to protect important SLOCs.

Naval Diplomacy. Another growing PLAN 

mission is naval diplomacy. Since PLAN task 

groups began supporting counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, the returning 

units have often followed the deployment with 

port visits across the Indian Ocean and other 

regions. In 2017, the PLAN completed its longest goodwill deployment in October, visiting 

20 countries in 7 months, including several port 

calls in Europe. The PLAN also employs its hospital ship, Peace Ark, to support HADR missions 

worldwide. These visits advance the Navy’s 

international profile, provide opportunities for 

bilateral cooperation, and build the PLAN’s 

experience in areas farther from China’s coast.

PLAN sailor participating in visit, board, search, and 

seizure (VBSS) training.

Image Source: DIMOC
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Nontraditional Missions. In 2004, the PLAN 

was tasked with safeguarding China’s national 

development and playing an important role in 

ensuring world peace. This represented a substantial adjustment to China’s national defense 

strategy and broadened its definition of security 

to include new geographic and functional areas 

beyond the PLA’s traditional territorial security 

missions. Missions such as naval escort in the 

Gulf of Aden support China’s economic interests 

while enhancing China’s international image.

Units

The PLAN controls all of China’s naval and naval 

aviation forces as well as seven marine brigades 

and has deployed naval forces in three of China’s five geographically oriented theaters that 

conduct day-to-day operations. The deputy commander of each fleet commands its respective 

aviation force. The 2015 PLA-wide structural 

reforms formally separated operational control 

of the Navy from force-building aspects administered by PLAN headquarters, and additional 

changes to the PLAN’s structure, particularly at 

the fleet level and below, are expected in 2018.

PLAN Luyang II class destroyer Xian.

Image Source: DIMOC
68

Major Naval Units

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
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North Sea Fleet. Headquartered in Qingdao, 

the North Sea Fleet is responsible for the Bo 

Hai, Yellow Sea, and northern portion of the 

East China Sea. It falls under the PLA North-

ern Theater Command’s area of operations.

East Sea Fleet. Headquartered in Ningbo, 

the East Sea Fleet covers the majority of the 

East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. It falls 

under the PLA Eastern Theater Command’s 

area of operations.

South Sea Fleet. Headquartered in Zhanji-

ang, the South Sea Fleet is responsible for the 

South China Sea. It falls under the PLA South-

ern Theater Command’s area of operations.

Equipment: Building a Modern Navy

During the past 15 years, China’s naval mod-

ernization has produced a technologically 

advanced, flexible force structure. The PLAN 

has more than 300 surface combatants, sub-

marines, amphibious ships, and missile-armed 

patrol craft. Although the overall inventory 

has remained relatively constant, the PLAN is 

rapidly retiring older, single-mission warships 

in favor of larger, multimission ships equipped 

with advanced antiship, antiair, and antisub-

marine weapons and sensors and C2 facilities.

In the initial stages of its modernization, the 

PLAN successfully concentrated resources on 

improving its antisurface warfare (ASUW) 

capabilities, both in surface ship and subma-

rine development. Subsequent efforts have 

focused on improving antiair warfare capabil-

ities and providing modest improvements in 

antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

Every major PLAN surface combatant under 

construction is capable of embarking a heli-

copter to support over-the-horizon targeting, 

ASW, and search and rescue. Meanwhile, the 

PLAN’s submarine force remains largely con-

centrated on ASUW, with Jin class SSBNs 

poised to contribute to China’s nuclear deter-

rent once they begin strategic patrols in the 

near future. Naval aviation is expanding its 

mission set by incorporating modern multirole 

combat aircraft along with modern special mis-

sion aircraft, carrier aviation, and UAVs. As a 

whole, the PLAN is becoming a force able to 

execute a wide variety of missions near home 

and far away.

Surface Force. In the late 1990s to early 

2000s, the PLAN transitioned from a “green-

water” (coastal) force to one capable of oper-

ating offshore with increasing regularity. 

During this period, China imported several 

major combatants, weapon systems, and sen- Artist rendition of a PLAN Renhai class cruiser.

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons
70

sors from Russia while concurrently producing 

and developing its own designs and modernizing older ships to employ advanced weapons. 

By the second decade of the 2000s, the PLAN 

was using Chinese designs for surface ships 

primarily equipped with Chinese weapons 

and sensors (although some engineering components and subsystems remained imported 

or license-produced in country at the time). 

Furthermore, the era of past designs has 

given way to production of modern multimission destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as 

China’s technological advancement in naval 

design has begun to approach a level commensurate with, and in some cases exceeding, that 

of other modern navies. Once operational, the 

new Renhai class (Type 055) guided-missile 

cruiser, of which several are currently under 

construction, will be one of the most advanced 

and powerful ships in the world, boasting a 

large array of advanced-capability weapons 

and sensors developed domestically.205

Shipboard air defense and antisurface warfare capabilities are arguably the most notable 

areas of improvement on PLAN surface ships. 

China has retired several older destroyers and 

frigates that had at most a point air defense 

capability and a range of just several nautical miles. Newer ships entering the force are 

equipped with medium- to long-range area air 

defense missiles, including the Renhai, which 

has 112 vertical-launch cells for mixed munitions. The PLAN received a total of six Luyang 

II (Type 052C) class guided-missile destroyers 

with the HHQ-9 SAM (55-NM range) and YJ-62 

antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (150-NM 

range), and six Luyang III (Type 052D) class 

guided-missile destroyers are now operational, 

with several more under construction. The 

Luyang III carries an extended-range variant 

of the HHQ-9 SAM and YJ-18 ASCM (290-NM 

range). In addition, more than 25 Jiangkai II 

(Type 054A) class guided-missile frigates are 

now operational, with the vertically launched 

HHQ-16 (20- to 40-NM range), and more are 

under construction.206

These newer ships use modern combat management systems and air surveillance sensors, such as the Sea Eagle and Dragon Eye 

phased-array radars. These new units allow 

the PLAN surface force to operate outside 

shore-based air defense systems because one or 

two ships are equipped to provide air defense 

for the entire task group.

China’s amphibious ship force has slowly 

grown since a modernization program began 

in the early 2000s. Since 2005, China has built 

six large Yuzhao (Type 071) class amphibious 

transport docks, signaling China’s development of an expeditionary warfare and overthe-horizon amphibious assault capability 

as well as inherent HADR and counterpiracy 

capabilities. The Yuzhao can carry up to four of 

the new Yuyi air-cushion utility landing craft 

(similar to the U.S. landing craft air cushion, 

LCAC) as well as four or more helicopters, 

armored vehicles, and troops on long-distance 

deployments. Additional Yuzhao construction 

is expected in the near term, as is a follow-on 

amphibious assault ship (landing helicopter 

assault, LHA, which Chinese sources term the 
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“Type 075”) that not only is larger but incorpo-

rates a full flight deck for helicopters. Produc-

tion on the LHA is expected to begin soon, if it 

has not already begun.

An expanded set of missions farther into the 

western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, such 

as counterpiracy deployments, HADR mis-

sions, survey voyages, and goodwill port vis-

its, has increased demands on and broadened 

the experience of the PLAN’s fleet of ocean-

going replenishment and service vessels. The 

PLAN recently launched two new Fuyi class 

fast combat support ships, intended to sup-

port aircraft carrier battle groups, as well 

as the smaller Fuchi class replenishment 

oilers, which support surface action groups 

and long-distance deployments. These ships 

constantly rotate in support of China’s Gulf 

of Aden counterpiracy deployments and reg-

ularly accompany surface groups operating 

beyond the first island chain. At present, 

China has at least 10 fleet replenishment ships 

operational, with more under construction.

The PLA Navy: Naval SAM Ranges 0 30 60 90 120 150

HHQ-7

HHQ-16

HHQ-9

HHQ-9 

Extended Range

Approximate Range (Kilometers)

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

PLAN ships conducting replenishment at sea.

Image Source: DVIDS
72

In addition, China has added a variety of 

oceangoing auxiliary ships in recent years, 

including submarine rescue ships, hospital 

ships, salvage and rescue ships, survey ships, 

intelligence collection ships, and various large 

transport ships.

Submarine Force. China’s modernizing force 

includes several types of submarines. For its 

diesel-electric force alone, between 2000 and 

2005 China constructed Ming diesel attack submarines (SSs) and Song SSs and the first Yuan 

air-independent attack submarine (SSP), and 

purchased eight Kilo SSs from Russia. Although 

all of these classes remain in service, only the 

Yuan SSP is in production. Over time, reducing 

the number of classes in service helps streamline maintenance, training, and interoperability. The submarine force comprises 6 nuclear 

attack submarines, 4 nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile submarines, and 50 diesel attack submarines. By 2020 the submarine force probably 

will increase to about 70 submarines.

The Yuan SSP is China’s most modern conventionally powered submarine. Seventeen are 

in service, with possibly three more slated for 

production. The Yuan SSP’s combat capability is comparable to that of the Song; both can 

launch Chinese-built antiship cruise missiles, 

but the Yuan has the added benefit of an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system and may 

have incorporated quieting technology from 

the Russian-designed Kilo SS. The AIP system 

provides a submarine a source of power other 

than battery or diesel engines while still submerged, increasing its underwater endurance 

and reducing its vulnerability to detection.

The remainder of the conventional submarine 

force is a mix of Song, Ming, and Russian-built 

Kilo SSs. Of these, only the Ming and four 

of the older Kilos lack an ability to launch 

ASCMs. Eight of China’s 12 Kilos are equipped 

with the SS-N-27 ASCM, which provides a 

long-range ASUW capability out to about 120 

nautical miles. China’s newest domestic submarine-launched ASCM, the CH-SS-N-13, 

extends a similar capability to the Song, Yuan, 

and Shang classes.

China also continues to modernize its nuclear-powered attack submarine force, although 

these make up a small percentage of the total 

number of submarines. Two Shang nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have 

been launched, one each in 2002 and 2003. After 

nearly 10 years, China is continuing production with four additional hulls of an improved 

Shang variant. These six submarines will 

replace the aging Han SSN on a nearly one-forPLAN sailors conduct VBSS training.

Image Source: DVIDS
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one basis during the next several years. After 

the completion of the improved Shang SSN, 

the PLAN is expected to begin production on 

another modified variant of the Shang SSN 

class, the Type 093B.207 Thereafter, the PLAN 

probably will progress to the Type 095 nucle-

ar-powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN). 

This class of submarine may provide a gener-

ational improvement in many areas, such as 

quieting and weapons capacity.

The PLA Navy’s Jin class nuclear powered bal-

listic missile submarines, armed with the JL-2 

submarine launched ballistic missile, provide 

China its first viable sea-based nuclear deter-

rent and credible second-strike nuclear capa-

bility. The JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic 

missile (SLBM) has nearly three times the 

range of the Xia SSBN’s JL-1 SLBM, which was 

able to reach targets only in China’s immediate 

vicinity. The JL-2 SLBM underwent successful 

testing in 2012. The Jin/JL-2 weapon system 

will provide China with a capability to strike 

targets in the continental United States from 

some patrol areas. To maintain a continuous 

at-sea nuclear deterrent, the PLAN probably 

would require a minimum of five Jin SSBNs; 

four are in service.

Aviation. The role of PLAN aviation has 

evolved during the past decade. PLAN com-

batants can now reach farther from shore and 

are more capable of providing their own air 

defense. This has allowed the PLAN to con-

centrate on an expanded array of aerial mis-

sions, particularly maritime strike, as well as 

maritime patrol, ASW, airborne early warn-

ing (AEW), and logistics. China’s first aircraft 

carrier signaled a new age for PLAN aviation, 

which is now evolving from an almost exclu-

sively land-based force to one with a seabased component.

Fixed-Wing Aircraft. During the past two 

decades, the PLAN has replaced antiquated 

fixed-wing aircraft, such as the Q-5 Fantan 

and the H-5 Beagle, with an array of high-qual-

ity aircraft. The force is now equipped for a 

wide range of missions, including offshore air 

defense, maritime strike, maritime patrol/

ASW, and carrier-based operations. Just a 

decade ago, this air modernization relied very 

heavily on Russian imports. Following in the 

PLAAF’s footsteps, the PLAN is now benefit-

The JL-2/CSS-NX-14 SLBM in midlaunch.

Image Source: DIBMAC Report
74

ing from domestic combat aircraft production. 

Today, the PLAN is taking deliveries of modern, domestically produced fourth-generation 

fighter aircraft, such as the J-10A Vigorous 

Dragon and the domestically produced J-11B 

Flanker. Equipped with modern radars and 

glass cockpits and armed with PL-8 and PL-12 

air-to-air missiles, PLAN J-10As and J-11Bs 

are among the most modern aircraft in China’s 

inventory and are capable of extended fighter 

patrols beyond China’s coastal areas.

For maritime strike, the PLAN has relied on variants of the H-6 Badger bomber for decades. The 

H-6 is a licensed copy of the ex-Soviet Tu-16 Badger medium jet bomber, and maritime versions 

employ advanced ASCMs against surface targets. 

Despite the age of their design, the H-6s continue 

to receive electronics and payload upgrades, 

keeping the aircraft viable as a long-range strike 

platform. As many as 30 aircraft remain in service. Noted improvements for the upgraded Badger include the ability to carry a maximum of four 

ASCMs (instead of the two previously seen on 

earlier H-6D variants). The PLAN also has modified a few H-6s to serve as tankers, increasing the 

range of PLAN fighter aircraft.

With at least five regiments fielded across the 

three fleets, the JH-7 Flounder augments the 

H-6 as the workhorse of the PLAN’s airborne 

maritime strike force. The JH-7 is a domestically produced tandem-seat fighter-bomber 

developed as a replacement for obsolete Q-5 

Fantan light attack aircraft and H-5 Beagle 

bombers. Updated versions of the JH-7 feature 

a more capable radar and additional weapons 

capacity, enhancing its maritime strike capabilities. The JH-7 can carry up to four ASCMs 

and two PL-5 or PL-8 short-range air-to-air 

missiles, providing considerable payload for 

maritime strike missions, or the JH-7 can sacrifice two ASCMs for underwing fuel tanks, 

increasing the platform’s range.

In addition to combat aircraft, the PLAN is 

expanding its inventory of fixed-wing maritime 

patrol aircraft, AEW, and surveillance aircraft. 

China has achieved significant new capabilities 

by modifying several existing airframes. The 

Y-8, a Chinese license-produced version of the 

ex-Soviet An-12 Cub, forms the basic airframe 

for several PLAN special-mission variants. All 

of these aircraft play a key role in providing a 

clear picture of surface and air contacts in the 

maritime environment. As the PLAN pushes farther from the coast, long-range aircraft capable 

of extended onstation times to act as the fleet’s 

eyes and ears become increasingly important.

The PLAN has also developed a Y-9 ASW 

variant. The new aircraft is equipped with 

a magnetic anomaly detector boom, similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s P-3. This Y-9 

ASW variant is equipped with surface-search 

radar mounted under the nose as well as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage, probably for electronic surveillance. A small EO/

infrared turret is located just behind the nose 

wheel, and this variant is equipped with an 

internal weapons bay in front of the main 

landing gear. Recent pictures of the Y-9 ASW 

variant suggest at least some aircraft have 

entered operational service.
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In December 2017, the Aviation Industry Cor-

poration of China conducted the maiden flight 

of the AG-600 Kunlong, the world’s largest 

seaplane.208 The aircraft is still under develop

-

ment, but once operational, the AG-600 proba-

bly will be used for both civilian and military 

roles, such as search and rescue operations or 

defense needs in the South China Sea. Chinese 

advertising depicts the aircraft as having an 

endurance of 12 hours and the capacity to res-

cue 50 people during a single flight.209

Aircraft Carrier Program. In September 

2012, China commissioned the Liaoning, join-

ing the small group of countries that have an 

aircraft carrier. Beijing acquired the Soviet 

ship, formerly the Varyag, from Ukraine in 

2002.210,211 Since that time, the PLAN has fol-

lowed the long and difficult path of learning to 

operate fixed-wing aircraft from a carrier. The 

first launches and recoveries of J-15 fighter 

aircraft occurred in November 2012, with 

additional testing and training in early July 

2013. With the first landing complete, China 

became only the fifth country in the world to 

have conventional takeoff and landing fighters 

aboard an aircraft carrier. In 2017, the Lia-

oning concluded its second deployment to the 

South China Sea for training—its first with 

embarked J-15 fighters—and conducted its 

first port visit to Hong Kong.212,213,214

The Aircraft Carrier Liaoning

Length 304.5 meters (999.0 ft)

Beam 70 meters (229.7 ft)

Draft 10.5 meters (34.4 ft)

Flight deck length 304.5 meters (999.0 ft)

Flight deck width 70 meters (229.7 ft)

Flight deck angle 7 degrees

Aircraft launch 

mechanism Ski jump

Ski jump angle 14 degrees

Top speed 30 kn (55.6 km/h)

(34.5 mph)

Range

3,850 NM (7,130.2 km) 

(4,430.5 miles) at 29 kn 

(53.7 km/h) (33.4 mph)

8,500 NM (15,742.0 km) 

(9,781.6 miles) at 18 kn 

(33.3 km/h) (20.7 mph)

Crew 1,960

Machinery 8 boilers; 4 turbines; 

200,000 shp; 4 shafts

Aircraft

Up to 24 J-15 fighters

6 Z-8 helicopters and 4 

Ka-31 helicopters

Image Source: AFP
76

The Liaoning’s ski-jump configuration restricts 

aircraft takeoff weight, limiting maximum 

ordnance loads and overall combat power. The 

ski-jump design also means it cannot operate 

large, specialized support aircraft, such as an 

AEW aircraft.

China’s first carrier air regiment will comprise the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark. The 

J-15 is externally similar to the Russian Su-33 

Flanker D but has many of the domestic avionics and armament capabilities of the Chinese 

J-11B Flanker. The J-15 has folding wings, 

strengthened landing gear, a tailhook under a 

shortened tail stinger, two-piece slotted flaps, 

canards, and a retractable inflight-refueling 

probe on the left side of the nose.

China’s aircraft carrier program also includes 

efforts to develop domestic carriers. In 2017, 

China launched its first domestic aircraft carrier, which was a modified version of the Liaoning and is expected to enter into service by 

2019.215,216 Like the Liaoning, the ship lacks catapult capabilities and has a smaller flight deck 

than U.S. carriers.217 The PLAN is expected 

to begin construction in 2018 on its first catapult-capable carrier, which will enable additional fighter aircraft, fixed-wing early warning 

aircraft, and more rapid flight operations.218

Helicopters. The PLAN operates three main 

helicopter variants: the domestically produced 

Z-9 and Z-8/Z-18 and the Russian-built Helix. 

The primary helicopter operated by the PLAN 

is the Z-9C. In the early 1980s, China obtained 

a license from France’s Aerospatiale (now Airbus Helicopter) to produce the AS 365N Dauphin II helicopter and its engine. The AS 365s 

produced in China were labeled as the Z-9, 

with the naval variant designated Z-9C. The 

Z-9C is capable of operating from any helicopter-capable PLAN combatant. The Z-9C can be 

fitted with the KLC-1 search radar and dipping sonar and is usually observed with a single lightweight torpedo. A new roof-mounted 

EO turret, unguided rockets, and 12.7-mm 

machinegun pods have been seen on several 

Z-9Cs during counterpiracy deployments. An 

upgraded naval version, designated the Z-9D, 

has been observed carrying small ASCMs.

The Z-8 is also a Chinese-produced helicopter 

based on a French design. In the late 1970s, 

the PLAN took delivery of the SA 321 Super 

Frelon. A reverse-engineered version was designated the Z-8, which reached initial operational capability by 1989. Low-rate production 

continued through the 1990s and into the early 

2000s. The Z-8’s size provides a greater cargo 

Chinese Marines attend an international fleet review.

Image Source: AFP
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capacity compared with other PLAN helicop-

ters but limits its ability to deploy from most 

PLAN combatants.

A new PLAN helicopter labeled the Z-18 has 

operated with the Liaoning. The Z-18 comes 

in three variants: transport, antisubmarine 

(Z-18F), and AEW (Z-18J). As with the Z-8, the 

Z-18’s size limits its deployment options.

Variants of the Helix are the only imported 

helicopters operated by the PLAN. In 1999, 

the PLAN took delivery of an initial batch of 

eight Russian-built Helix helicopters. Five 

were Ka-28 Helix As, and three were Helix Ds. 

An additional 9 Helix As have been delivered, 

and all 18 Helix are operational. As with the 

Russian Ka-27s, the exported Ka-28s can per-

form several mission sets but are usually used 

for ASW, and the Ka-27PSs are optimized for 

SAR and logistic support missions. The Ka-28 

is fitted with search radar and dipping sonar 

and can employ sonobuoys, torpedoes, depth 

charges, or mines.

In 2010, China purchased nine Ka-31 AEW 

helicopters and its E-801 radar system. The 

Z-18J and Ka-31 provide the PLAN a service-

able sea-based AEW capability to help fill that 

critical gap until newer catapult-equipped air-

craft carriers capable of operating fixed-wing 

AEW aircraft enter service.

Training

During the past decade, the scope and frequency 

of naval training have gradually expanded, 

reflecting the growing capabilities of China’s 

navy. The PLAN conducts year-round multimis-

sion training, including robust antisurface and 

antiair warfare training.219 The PLAN now also 

participates in training exercises farther from 

China’s coasts, in areas such as the western 

Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

In 2015, China's Military Strategy called for 

the PLA to enhance realistic military train-

ing, particularly in complex electromagnetic 

environments, diverse terrains, and adverse 

weather conditions.220 The same year, the 

PLAN Headquarters Military Training 

Department directed the PLAN to enhance the 

complexity of training and exercises by: • Making training more realistic. • Strengthening command authority and 

relationships through realistic opposing 

force training.

• Deepening tactical innovation. • Improving training in the actual use of 

weapons in an electromagnetic environment.

PLAN Z-9 helicopter.

Image Source: DVIDS
78

• Continuing “far seas” training.

• Improving training methods by avoiding 

formalism and scripting in exercises.

• Improving joint campaign-level training.221

PLAN participation in missions such as the 

antipiracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden provide opportunities to train in real-world situations to refine operational capabilities. The 

Navy also makes use of shore-based simulators and vessel training centers to help maintain year-round readiness levels.222

Paramilitary Forces

China Coast Guard. The CCG is responsible for a wide range of missions, including the 

enforcement of China’s sovereignty claims, 

antismuggling, surveillance, protection of fisheries resources, and general law enforcement. 

Maritime law enforcement responsibilities 

before 2013 were scattered across a number 

of organizations but have since been consolidated to establish more effective command and 

control. CCG ships are subordinate to the People's Armed Police and take part in Bejing's 

whole-of-govenrment approach to maritime 

disputes. China primarily uses civilian maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime 

disputes, employing the PLAN in a protective 

capacity in case of escalation.223

The CCG has rapidly increased and modernized its forces, improving China’s ability to 

enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the 

CCG’s large patrol ship fleet (more than 1,000 

tons) has more than doubled in size from about 

60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far 

the largest coast guard force in the world and 

increasing its capacity to conduct extended offshore operations in a number of disputed areas 

simultaneously. Furthermore, the newer ships 

are substantially larger and more capable than 

the older ships, and the majority are equipped 

with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water 

cannons, and guns ranging from 30-mm to 

76-mm. Among these ships, a number are 

capable of long-distance, long-endurance outof-area operations. In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants 

(more than 500 tons), which can be used for 

limited offshore operations, and more than 

400 coastal patrol craft (as well as about 1,000 

inshore and riverine patrol boats). By the end 

of the decade, the CCG is expected to add up to 

30 patrol ships and patrol combatants before 

the construction program levels off.224

Haixun class cutter conducting port visit to 

Honolulu, Hawaii – September 2012.

Image Source: DVIDS
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People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia.

The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national 

militia, an armed reserve force of civilians 

available for mobilization to perform basic 

support duties. Militia units organize around 

towns, villages, urban subdistricts, and enter-

prises, and they vary widely from one loca-

tion to another. The composition and mission 

of each unit reflects local conditions and per-

sonnel skills. In the South China Sea, the 

PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activ-

ities to achieve China’s political goals without 

fighting, part of broader Chinese military doc-

trine that states that confrontational opera-

tions short of war can be an effective means of 

accomplishing political objectives.225

A large number of PAFMM vessels train with 

and support the PLA and CCG in tasks such 

as safeguarding maritime claims, protecting 

fisheries, and providing logistic support, search 

and rescue (SAR), and surveillance and recon-

naissance. The Chinese government subsidizes 

local and provincial commercial organiza-

tions to operate militia ships to perform “offi-

cial” missions on an ad hoc basis outside their 

regular commercial roles. The PAFMM has 

played a noteworthy role in a number of mili-

tary campaigns and coercive incidents over the 

years, including the harassment of Vietnam-

ese survey ships in 2011, a standoff with the 

Philippines at Scarborough Reef in 2012, and 

a standoff involving a Chinese oil rig in 2014. 

In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing boats 

from companies or individual fisherman, but it 

appears that China is building a state-owned 

fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the 

South China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to 

the South China Sea, ordered the construction 

of 84 large militia fishing boats with reinforced 

hulls and ammunition storage for Sansha City, 

and the militia took delivery by the end of 

2016.226

Amphibious Capabilities

The PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) is the 

PLAN’s land combat arm. Its primary mission 

is to conduct offensive and defensive amphibi-

ous assault in the South China Sea, including 

the Paracel Island and Spratly Island chains, 

and potentially the Senkaku Islands.227 The 

PLANMC is tasked with seizing and consol-

idating beachheads, destroying an opposing 

force at the beachhead and adjacent areas, 

organizing landing areas, and supporting 

landings by the PLAA. Other missions include 

conducting amphibious raids; seizing and 

occupying enemy naval bases, seaports, and 

islands; building beachhead protective zones; 

and covering the PLAA as it advances inland 

from the coast.228

The seas and oceans bear on the enduring 

peace, lasting stability, and sustainable 

development of China...The traditional 

mentality that land outweighs the sea 

must be abandoned.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015
80

Roles and Missions. The PLANMC’s mission 

appears to be evolving beyond amphibious 

operations and toward a more expeditionary 

mission beyond China’s borders. This is in line 

with the PLA’s evolving strategy as outlined in 

China’s Military Strategy

229,230 For the PLAN, 

the New Historic Missions mean an increased 

focus on “diversified missions” or noncombat 

missions. Many of the tasks assigned to the 

armed forces in the white paper are ideally 

suited to the PLANMC, including ensuring 

Chinese sovereignty claims, safeguarding China’s security and interests “in new domains,” 

safeguarding the security of China’s interests 

overseas, and performing such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and 

interest protection, and guard duty.231 The 

PLANMC already is designated a rapid-reaction force for the PLA and has deployed on 

numerous occasions in response to natural 

disasters in China, including floods and earthquakes.232 The PLANMC is the natural landbased force of choice for HADR efforts overseas. In 2017, the PLA also chose to deploy 

PLANMC troops to the PLA’s first overseas 

base, in Djibouti, reflecting the Marine Corps’ 

growing role in China’s military.

Elements of the PLANMC are consistently 

deployed as part of the PLAN’s counterpiracy 

task groups operating in the Gulf of Aden.233 The 

size of the embarked force is no larger than a 

platoon. These Marines may be regular infantry 

troops but more likely come from an amphibious reconnaissance group subordinate to the 

amphibious reconnaissance battalion. They are 

highly trained in the tactics, techniques, and 

procedures required for a counterpiracy mission, 

including VBSS, hostage rescue, and small-team 

assault. VBSS tactics include fast-roping or rappelling from PLAN helicopters.234

Units. The PLANMC is subordinate to the 

PLAN and consists of seven brigades.235 Marine 

brigades are located in each of the North, 

East, and South Sea Fleets’ areas of responsibility.236,237 Recent PLA reforms included 

the establishment of a PLANMC headquarters, probably to oversee the administrative 

man, train, and equip functions of the growing 

Marine Corps, and also included the appointment of the PLANMC’s first commander.238,239

Each brigade has a headquarters element, an 

armored regiment, at least two infantry battalions, a howitzer battalion, a missile battalion, a communications and guard battalion, 

an engineer and chemical defense battalion, 

a maintenance battalion, and an amphibious reconnaissance battalion (special operations).240 Estimates of the PLANMC’s troop 

strength differ widely and have been reported 

as high as 35,000, but the actual number is 

PLA marines conduct helicopter entry/exit training.

Image Source: DIMOC
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PLANMC units conduct an amphibious assault during a training exercise.

Image Source: AFP

PLANMC Capabilities and Equipment

ZBD-05 AIFV ZLT-05 AAG PLZ-07B SP Howitzer

Weight 26.5 tons 28 tons 24.5 tons

Crew 3 + 8 infantry 4 5

Speed (in water) ~20 kn ~20 kn UNK

Speed (on land) +40 mph +40 mph +40 mph

Main armament

30-mm cannon

(4-km max range) 105-mm gun 122-mm cannon(18-km max range)

Red Arrow antitank

guided missile (ATGM)(2x) Red Arrow ATGM
82

probably between 28,000 and 35,000, evenly 

divided among the 7 brigades.241,242,243 The 

PLAN provides the PLANMC with both maritime and air (helicopter) transport, a force 

enabler for PLANMC amphibious warfare 

operations.244 The PLANMC does not have 

an organic air assault element and probably 

would rely on PLAN ground-attack fixed-wing 

aircraft or PLAA helicopters in a close air support role. The PLANMC also has a limited 

logistics capability.

Equipment. The PLANMC is a fully amphibious force capable of conducting amphibious 

assault operations using combined-arms tactics and multiple avenues of approach. It is 

the most capable amphibious force of any 

South China Sea claimant. The PLANMC 

can simultaneously seize multiple islands in 

the Spratlys. It also is capable of rapidly reinforcing China’s outposts in the Paracels. The 

PLANMC still faces challenges and limitations 

in close air support/air assault and logistics 

sustainment for large-scale amphibious operations. The PLANMC is incapable of defeating 

near-peer or peer countries such as the United 

States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia in 

amphibious or ground warfare.

The PLANMC’s primary fighting vehicles are 

based on a single chassis and include the ZBD05 AIFV and the ZLT-05 amphibious assault 

gun.245,246 Noncombatant amphibious variants 

of the ZBD chassis include an armored recovery vehicle and an armored ambulance.247 Additional combat equipment includes man-portable air defense systems, antipersonnel mortars, 

antitank rocket launchers, and flamethrowers. 

The PLANMC is also equipped with amphibious combat engineering equipment for obstacle 

removal, beach improvement, and construction 

of defenses once ashore.248
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APPENDIX C: PLA Air Force

The PLAAF is the largest air force in the 

region and the third largest in the world, with 

more than 2,500 total aircraft (not including 

UAVs or trainers) and 1,700 combat aircraft 

(including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical 

bombers, and multimission tactical and attack 

aircraft). The PLAAF is closing the gap with 

Western air forces across a broad spectrum of 

capabilities, such as aircraft performance, C2, 

and electronic warfare.

In 2017, the PLAAF reorganized its force struc-

ture as part of broader PLA reforms. Changes 

included establishing at least six new airbases 

and restructuring the force’s previously subordi-

nate regiments into brigades under these newly 

established bases by disbanding fighter and 

fighter-bomber divisions. The PLAAF also relo-

cated or resubordinated some units to different 

theater commands and redesignated the 15th 

Airborne Corps as the PLA Airborne Corps. 249

Roles and Missions

The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehen-

sive strategic air force capable of long-range 

airpower projection:250

The above excerpt illustrates the expanding 

roles and missions of the PLAAF. Whereas in 

the mid-1990s, the PLAAF’s primary responsi-

bilities were to protect China’s airfields, urban 

centers, transportation systems, and military 

facilities, the PLAAF is enhancing its ability to 

conduct both offensive and defensive air opera-

tions farther from China’s borders.251

In line with the strategic requirement of 

building air-space capabilities and conduct-

ing offensive and defensive operations, the 

PLA Air Force (PLAAF) will endeavor to 

shift its focus from territorial air defense to 

both defense and offense and build an airspace defense force structure that can meet 

the requirements of informatized opera-

tions. The PLAAF will boost its capabilities 

for strategic early warning, air strike, air 

and missile defense, information counter-

measures, airborne operations, strategic 

projection, and comprehensive support.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015
84

Major Air Units

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
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Equipment

Bombers. China’s bomber force comprises 

variants of the H-6 Badger bomber, and the 

PLAAF has worked to maintain and enhance 

the operational effectiveness of these aircraft. 

The H-6K variant, which China is fielding in 

greater numbers, integrates standoff weapons 

and features more efficient turbofan engines in 

redesigned wing roots.252 This extended-range 

aircraft can carry six LACMs, providing the 

PLA a long-range, standoff, precision-strike 

capability that can reach Guam.

The PLAAF is developing new medium- and 

long-range stealth bombers to strike regional 

and global targets. Stealth technology contin-

ues to play a key role in the development of 

these new bombers, which probably will reach 

initial operational capability no sooner than 

2025. These new bombers will have additional 

capabilities, with full-spectrum upgrades com-

pared with current operational bomber fleets, 

and will employ many fifth-generation fighter 

technologies in their design.

Early Warning. Airborne early warning and 

control (AEW&C) aircraft, such as China’s 

KJ-2000 Mainring, KJ-200 Moth, and KJ-500, 

are force multipliers, amplifying the capa-

bilities to detect, track, and target threats. 

These aircraft extend the range of a coun-

try’s integrated air defense system network. 

In particular, these systems are better suited 

to detecting low-altitude targets at greater 

standoff distances.

PLAAF AEW&C aircraft also incorporate stateof-the-art radar technology, such as active 

electronically scanned array radars that offer 

instantaneous target updates, electronic beam 

steering, advanced/specialized radar modes, 

very large search volumes, and the ability to 

stare at a target or track thousands of targets 

simultaneously. These features combine to 

provide faster target acquisition time, more 

accurate target position data, and increased 

ability to detect low-observable targets.

Fighters. Although the PLAAF still operates 

a large number of older second- and third-gen-

eration fighters, it will probably become a 

majority fourth-generation force within the 

next several years. The PLAAF has fielded 

at least 600 fourth-generation fighters and is 

already developing fifth-generation fighters. 

[Note: what the U.S. and Western militaries 

refer to as fourth-generation fighters, China 

refers to as third-generation. This is because the 

PLA never had first-generation fighters—its first 

fighter aircraft were second-generation fighters 

acquired from Russia.]

PLAAF J-11BS multirole fighter aircraft.

Image Source: AFP
86

Fourth-generation fighter aircraft*—which include the Chinese J-10B/C, J-11B, and 

J-16—are generally characterized by the following:

• Electronically or mechanically scanned multimode radars, passive infrared search and 

track systems.

• “Glass” cockpits with multifunction displays (MFDs), improved heads-up display 

(HUD), and helmet-mounted sight (HMS).

• High-bandwidth communications and datalinks and identification, friend or foe (IFF).

• Advanced electronic warfare (EW) avionics, including digital jamming system, radar 

warning receiver, chaff/flare dispensers, and adaptive countermeasures.

• Engines with increased thrust and service life; advanced weapons, including longrange air-to-air missiles (AAMs), off-boresight short-range AAMs, LACMs, ASCMs, 

and precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

• Passive electronically scanned array or active electronically scanned array (AESA) 

radars. These radars provide long-range radar detection and electronically scanned 

radar beams that enable automatic target acquisition, tracking of multiple targets, and 

highly accurate targeting data for air-to-air and precision air-to-ground engagements.

• Digital radiofrequency memory (DRFM) jammers enabling instantaneous smart jamming responses by automatically selecting jamming waveforms to counter a specific 

radar threat—significantly improving fighter aircraft survivability.

Fifth-generation fighter aircraft*, including the developmental Chinese J-20 and 

FC-31/J-31, are commonly defined by the following state-of-the-art technologies:

• Stealthy aircraft designs with significantly reduced radar and infrared signatures.

• AESA radars.

• Long-range, multiband EO targeting systems.

• Sensor fusion.

• Advanced glass cockpits with large MFDs and HMSs.

• Advanced datalinks fusing data from air and ground networks.

• Internal carriage of off-boresight and long-range AAMs, LACMs, ASCMs, and PGMs.

• Sophisticated EW suites with advanced DRFM jammers and EO defensive systems.

• Super maneuverability and/or super cruise capability (ability to fly above Mach 1 without use of afterburner).

• Designed with network-centric warfare technology; will have potent air-to-air lethality 

and standoff attack capabilities in sensor-to-shooter operations.

*U.S.- defined fourth and fifth generation fighter aircraft in China.
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. During the 

past 2 years, the PLA has improved its UAV 

capabilities, unveiled new aircraft that com-

bine strike capability with aerial reconnais-

sance, and deployed select platforms to new 

areas, such as the South China Sea. Examples 

include China’s first turbine-powered armed 

reconnaissance UAV, the Yunying (Cloud 

Shadow), and the armed ISR UAV Gongji 1. 

China also has sold armed UAVs to customers 

such as Iraq. Marketing material for China’s 

armed UAVs cites speeds of 170 mph, endur-

ance of 20 hours, and payloads of two or more 

air-to-surface guided munitions.

Surface-to-Air Missiles. The PLAAF has 

one of the largest forces of advanced longrange SAM systems in the world, made up 

of a combination of Russian-sourced SA-20 

(S-300PMU1/2) battalions and domestically 

produced CSA-9 (HQ-9) battalions. In early 

2018, Russia began delivering to China the 

S-400/Triumf SAM system, which Beijing will 

use to improve its strategic air defense systems 

as a follow-on to the SA-20.253 The PLAAF may 

simultaneously develop its domestically pro-

duced CSA-X-19 (HQ-19) to provide the basis 

for a ballistic missile defense capability.

Transport. China’s aviation industry contin-

ues to test its Y-20 large transport aircraft for 

introduction into the PLA’s operational inven-

tory to supplement and eventually replace 

China’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, 

which includes a limited number of Rus-

sian-made Il-76 aircraft. The Y-20 conducted 

its maiden flight in early 2013 and reportedly 

uses the same Russian engines as the Il-76. 

The large transports are intended to support 

airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refuel-

ing, and strategic reconnaissance operations 

as well as HADR.

Effective use of information is critical to strength-

ening the PLAAF, and development and acqui-

sition of systems and platforms are trending in 

this direction. Information demand will necessi-

tate a tight synchronization of C4ISR with oper-

ations. By 2020, the PLAAF probably hopes to 

develop an ISR capability to effectively support 

traditional air missions, including ground sup-

port and air superiority, along with the PLA’s 

emerging military capabilities in space. From 

the PLAAF’s perspective, this essentially means 

seamlessly melding all of its air and space capa-

bilities, a significant challenge.

PLAAF KJ-2000 airborne early warning and control 

system aircraft.

Image Source: AFP
88

Aircraft Systems Characteristics

Chinese 

Manned 

Aircraft

U.S. 

Generation Mission/Role Status

AESA 

Radar

Long-Range 

A/A Missiles

Off-Boresight A/A 

Missiles

PrecisionGuided 

Munitions Speed

J-7 2nd Fighter Operational Mach 2 class

J-8 3rd Fighter Operational X Mach 2 class

Su-30 4th Multirole Fighter Operational X X X Mach 2 class

J-10A 4th Multirole Fighter Operational X Mach 1.8 class

J-11B 4th Multirole Fighter Operational X X Mach 2 class

J-10B 4th+ Multirole Fighter Operational X X X Mach 1.8 class

J-10C 4th+ Multirole Fighter X X X X Mach 1.8 class

J-16 4th+ Multirole Fighter X X X X Mach 2 class

Su-35S 4th+ Multirole Fighter Buying from 

Russia X X X Mach 2 class

J-20 5th Multirole Fighter Development X X X X Mach 2 class

FC-31/J-31 5th Multirole Fighter Development X X X X Mach 1.8 class

JH-7 N/A Fighter-Bomber Operational X Mach 1.7 class

H-6 N/A Bomber Operational X Subsonic

Tactical Bomber Next Gen Fighter-Bomber Development X X X

Strategic Bomber Next Gen Long-Range Bomber Development X X

KJ-2000 N/A AEW&C Operational X Subsonic

KJ-200 N/A AEW&C Operational X Subsonic

KJ-500 N/A AEW&C Operational X Subsonic

+ Indicates a generation of aircraft has been partially upgraded with next-generation capabilities.

PLAAF literature paints a detailed picture of tomorrow’s air wars battlespace. It will be 

an uncertain, hotly contested environment where decisions will be made with extreme 

alacrity, requiring highly specialized equipment. The entire battlespace will be information-driven, from command staff decisions and supporting C2 all the way to the very 

weapons the PLAAF desires.
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Airborne Corps. As part of ongoing military 

reforms, in 2017 the PLAAF reorganized its 

airborne units into a new corps—the PLA 

Airborne Corps—consisting of six airborne 

brigades, a special operations brigade, an avi-

ation brigade, and a support brigade. Previ-

ously, airborne forces fell under the PLAAF 

15th Airborne Corps and were organized 

into three airborne divisions, supported by 

a special operations group, with both fixedand rotary-wing assets.254 The PLA Airborne 

Corps’ main purpose is to carry out operations 

including parachute, aircraft landing, and 

mixed parachute and aircraft landing. Accord-

ing to PLAA doctrine, the main advantage of 

airborne operations is to “cut across ground 

defense lines and topographical obstacles to 

unfold attacks directly inside the enemy dis-

position.”255 These operations are designed to 

support main-force operational efforts, seize 

and hold key targets and areas in the enemy’s 

depth (such as airfields and bridges), block 

an enemy’s retreat, block reinforcement by 

enemy reserve forces, and conduct raids on 

key targets in the enemy’s depth.256

Training and Exercises

Numerous professional articles and speeches 

by high-ranking Chinese officers indicate the 

PLAAF does not believe that its past training 

practices prepared its pilots and other per-

sonnel for actual combat. Unrealistic training 

manifested itself in multiple ways that hin-

dered the PLA’s air combat capabilities. The 

PLA recognizes that a gap exists between the 

skills of its pilots and those in “the air forces of 

powerful nations.” To address training weak-

nesses, the former PLAAF commander said 

that when the PLAAF trains, it must “train for 

battle” instead of “doing things for show...[or] 

going through the motions.”

During the past few years, the PLAAF has 

revamped its training program and now seeks 

to replicate real-world combat environments 

as closely as possible. Through its four “namebrand exercises”—RED SWORD, GOLDEN 

HELMET, GOLDEN DART, and BLUE 

SHIELD—the PLAAF is making incremen-

tal improvements to its training regimen. The 

PLAAF continues to seek engagement with 

foreign air forces, such as by participating in 

the Russian-sponsored Aviadarts air-to-ground 

competition and the FALCON STRIKE exercise 

with the Royal Thai Air Force, to gain exposure 

to foreign operational concepts and tactics.

The effect of these training initiatives on oper-

ational capabilities remains to be seen; how-

ever, the PLAAF is beginning to codify funda-

mental changes to the training philosophy that 

are expected to improve the PLA’s air capa-

Two J-10 fighters refueling with an H-6U tanker.

Image Source: AFP
90

bilities during the coming years. A key factor 

in this development is the PLAAF’s use of 

advanced air combat maneuvering instrumentation (ACMI) systems, which enable the force 

to train with more realism and learn more 

from each event while meeting safety requirements. The ACMI system allows the PLAAF 

to monitor air combat training in real time 

and to adjudicate interactions such as aircraft 

maneuvering, weapons employment, jamming, 

and use of chaff and flares. Coupled with foreign engagements, the use of ACMI in training 

offers the PLAAF the opportunity to accelerate 

its progress in training.

The PLAAF has also made advances in joint 

training. Traditionally Army-only exercises 

now incorporate PLAAF participation, and 

large-scale joint exercises have given the 

PLA opportunities to test its forces’ progress 

toward being able to operate in a true joint 

environment. Although more recent exercises 

suggest improvement and increased sophistication, systemic shortfalls identified in several 

PLA training events—difficulty in coordination, obstacles to information sharing, limited 

realism, and a continued reliance on scripting—persist as problems for PLA and PLAAF 

leaders, hampering key functions, such as air 

defense, targeting, battle damage assessment, 

and air support to ground forces.

Two fighter jets during a military drill over the South China Sea.

Image Source: AFP
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APPENDIX D: PLA Rocket Force

As part of military reforms initiated in late 2015, 

the PLA Second Artillery Force was renamed 

the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and for the first 

time the force was elevated to a full service on 

equal footing with the PLA Army, Navy, and Air 

Force. PLARF weapons systems include dozens 

of ICBMs and hundreds of theater-range mis-

siles for precision strike against major adver-

sary military and civilian infrastructure.257

Roles and Missions

The PLARF operates China’s strategic landbased nuclear and conventional missiles and is 

a critical component of China’s deterrence strat-

egy and efforts to counter third-party interven-

tion in regional conflicts. The PLARF also is 

charged with developing and testing several 

new classes and variants of long-range missiles, 

forming additional missile units, upgrading 

older missile systems, and developing methods 

to counter ballistic missile defenses.

Principal Weapon Systems

The PLARF has about 1,200 short-range bal-

listic missiles (SRBMs), and China is increas-

ing the lethality of its conventional missile 

force by fielding the CSS-11/DF-16 ballistic 

missile, with a range of 800 to 1,000 kilome-

ters. The CSS-11/DF-16, coupled with the 

already deployed conventional land-attack 

and antiship variants of the CSS-5/DF-21 

medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), will 

improve China’s ability to strike not only Tai-

wan but other regional targets.

The Rocket Force is fielding conventional 

MRBMs to increase the range at which it can 

conduct precision strikes against land targets 

and naval ships (including aircraft carriers) 

operating from China’s shores out to the first 

island chain—the islands running from the 

Kurils, through Taiwan, to Borneo, roughly 

encompassing the Yellow Sea, East China 

Sea, and South China Sea. The CSS-5 Mod-5/

DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 kilome-

ters and has a maneuverable warhead. During 

the PLA’s 90th anniversary parade in 2017, 

China displayed a new MRBM designated 

the DF-16G, which China claims features 

high accuracy, short preparation time, and an 

improved maneuverable terminal stage that 

can better infiltrate missile defense systems.258

China unveiled the DF-26 intermediate-range 

ballistic missile (IRBM) during its September 

2015 military parade in Beijing. The DF-26 is 

capable of conducting precision strikes against 

ground targets and contributes to China’s 

counterintervention posture in the Asia-Pa-

cific region. During the parade, official public 

statements also referenced a nuclear version 

of the DF-26, which, if it has the same guid-

ance capabilities, would give China its first 

nuclear precision-strike capability against 

theater targets.
92

The PLARF also continues to enhance its 

nuclear deterrent, maintaining silo-based 

nuclear ICBMs and adding more survivable, 

mobile nuclear delivery systems. China currently has 75 to 100 ICBMs, including the silobased CSS-4 Mod 2/DF-5A and MIRV-equipped 

CSS-4 Mod 3/DF-5B; the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1/DF-31 and CSS-10 Mod 2/

DF-31A; and the shorter range CSS-3/DF-4. 

The CSS-10 Mod 2/DF-31A has a range of more 

than 11,200 kilometers and can reach most 

locations within the continental United States. 

China also is developing a new MIRV-capable 

road-mobile ICBM, the CSS-X-10/DF-41.

The CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile 

(GLCM) has a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers and offers flight profiles different from 

ballistic missiles, enhancing targeting options. 

Because of overlap in the kinds of targets 

China is likely to engage with either ballistic 

missiles or cruise missiles, GLCMs and airlaunched land-attack cruise missiles provide 

key operational and planning flexibility. These 

weapons are likely to reduce the burden on 

ballistic missile forces as well as create somewhat safer strike opportunities for Chinese 

aircrews, allowing them to engage from much 

greater distances and from more advantageous 

locations. This will complicate an adversary’s 

air and missile defense problem.

A CSS-5 Mod 5/DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) system on parade.

Image Source: AFP
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PLA Rocket Force Systems*

System Type Warheads Propellant Deployment 

Mode

Max

Range km

CSS-3/DF-4 ICBM Nuclear Liquid ROTL** 5,500+

CSS-4/DF-5 ICBM Nuclear Liquid Silo 12,000-13,000

CSS-7/DF-11 SRBM Conventional Solid Mobile 300-600

CSS-6/DF-15 SRBM Conventional Solid Mobile 600-850+

CSS-11/DF-16 SRBM Conventional Solid Mobile 800-1,000

CSS-5/DF-21 MRBM

Nuclear and

Conventional

Variants

Solid Mobile 1,500-1,750+

CSS-5 Mod-5/DF-21D ASBM Conventional Solid Mobile 1,500+

DF-26 IRBM

Nuclear and

Conventional

Variants

Solid Mobile 4,000

CSS-10/DF-31 ICBM Nuclear Solid Mobile 7,200-11,200

CJ-10 GLCM Conventional Solid Mobile 1500+

*This chart does not include systems in development.

** Rollout to Launch
94

China’s Conventional and Nuclear Strike Range

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design
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Training

PLARF participation in joint force training has 

increased during the past few years, and all PLA 

joint training events probably now include at 

least some level of PLARF involvement, such as 

PLARF field operations in support of the exer-

cise. This development indicates an increased 

emphasis on joint firepower operations.

The PLARF is moving away from a dependence 

on conscripted personnel and is developing a 

technically qualified enlisted force. In addition, 

the force is modifying its annual training cycle 

to incorporate more complicated training earlier 

in the year, enabling PLARF units to better pre-

pare to participate in PLA joint training in the 

fall. The force also reportedly has implemented a 

rating system for unit training as well as accred-

itation criteria for personnel at critical posts.

The PLARF now regularly conducts train-

ing under extreme weather and geographical 

conditions and in complex electromagnetic 

and nuclear, biological, and chemical envi-

ronments. The PLARF’s goal is to train under 

actual combat conditions, which include con-

tending with enemy special forces, satellite 

reconnaissance, electromagnetic jamming, 

and air attacks. To that end, the PLARF has 

worked to improve its training against a mod-

ern (informatized) “blue force” that portrays a 

superior adversary.

PLARF training includes annual live missile 

launches that allow the missile brigades to 

practice all required procedures. Much like the 

increase in complexity for other PLA training 

events, recent Rocket Force guidance has called 

for the participating missile units to increase 

the difficulty and intensity of live launches.
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APPENDIX E: PLA Strategic Support Force

In December 2015, Beijing established the 

Strategic Support Force (SSF) to provide the 

PLA with cyber, aerospace, and electronic war-

fare capabilities.259 The SSF forms the core of 

China’s information warfare force, supports 

the entire PLA, and reports directly to the 

CMC. The force’s formation appears to be the 

outcome of debate in the PLA since the 1980s 

regarding PLA needs in a potential conflict 

with peer nations. According to a Ministry of 

National Defense spokesman, “The SSF will 

integrate reconnaissance, early warning, com-

munications, command, control, [and] naviga-

tion ... and will provide strong support for joint 

operations for each military service branch.”260

A key aspect of the SSF is that the new body 

unites previously dispersed elements, pro-

viding more centralized command and con-

trol of China’s cyber, space, and electronic 

warfare capabilities. Before the 2015 struc-

tural reforms, for example, responsibility for 

space, cyber, and electronic warfare missions 

rested with offices across the former General 

Armaments Department and the General 

Staff Department (GSD), including the GSD 

Technical Department and GSD Electronic 

Countermeasures and Radar Department.

The SSF constitutes the first steps in the devel-

opment of a cyberforce by combining cyber 

reconnaissance, cyberattack, and cyberde-

fense capabilities into one organization to 

reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize 

command and control. The SSF also appears 

to be in line with PLA efforts to support and 

execute modern informatized warfare.

The PLA’s 90th anniversary parade in July 

2017 included the participation of an SSF 

electronic reconnaissance formation, which 

reportedly provides highly mobile, integrated, 

flexible, multidomain information warfare 

capabilities. The unit’s mission reportedly is 

seizing and maintaining battlefield informa-

tion control. This focus on the SSF and one 

of its premier units suggests that the PLA is 

increasing the priority and prominence of the 

SSF and its assigned missions to tackle the 

military’s deficiencies in controlling complex 

electromagnetic environments.261

Strategic Support Force Insignia

Image Source: Wikicommons
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APPENDIX F: Chinese Intelligence Services

In June 2017, China passed a National Intel-

ligence Law specifying that “state intelligence 

work” would fall under the “central national 

security leadership body,” and military intel-

ligence work would fall under the Central 

Military Commission.262 The central national 

security leadership body may refer to an intel-

ligence committee structure subordinate to 

China’s Central National Security Commis-

sion.263 The PLA’s national-level intelligence 

system is still undergoing changes as part of 

broader military reform efforts.

Civilian Intelligence. The Ministry of 

State Security (MSS) is China’s main civil-

ian intelligence and counterintelligence ser-

vice.264 MSS missions include protecting Chi

-

na’s national security, securing political and 

social stability, implementing the updated 

State Security Law and related laws and 

regulations, protecting state secrets, and 

conducting counterintelligence.265

Domestic Security. The Ministry of Public 

Security (MPS) is China’s principal domestic 

security agency and is responsible for over-

seeing the country’s domestic policing and 

public security activities. Although the MPS 

is not directly involved in domestic intelli-

gence gathering, it has domestic intelligence 

functions, including investigating corruption 

cases, countering threats to political and 

social stability, countering terrorism, and 

policing the Internet.266,267

Political Work. The General Political Depart-

ment Liaison Department, which probably was 

renamed the Political Work Department Liai-

son Bureau (PWD/LB) during recent reforms, is 

the PLA’s principal organization responsible for 

political warfare and for collecting and analyzing 

intelligence information regarding senior-level 

officers from the United States, Taiwan, Japan, 

and other defense establishments of interest.268

269 The PWD/LB functions as an interlocking 

directorate that operates at the nexus of politics, 

finance, military operations, and intelligence. 

The PWD/LB has few analogous counterparts in 

modern democratic societies. 270

Military Intelligence. The former PLA Sec-

ond Department (2PLA) was a subdepart-

ment of the GSD. Postreform, the 2PLA has 

been identified as the Intelligence Bureau of 

the Joint Staff Department under the Cen-

tral Military Commission.271 This bureau 

carries out the military’s overt reporting and 

clandestine human intelligence collection 

operations, provides indications and warning 

and other analysis to the CMC leadership, 

runs the defense attaché network, and man-

ages intelligence produced by dedicated PLA 

reconnaissance assets.272,273,274

Signals Intelligence. The former PLA Third 

Department (3PLA) was one of the GSD’s 

subdepartments but postreform has proba-

bly been renamed and subordinated under 

the SSF. This element controls a vast signals 

intelligence (SIGINT) and computer network 
100

operations infrastructure. The PLA’s SIGINT 

and cyber assets target foreign satellite, line of 

sight, and over-the-horizon communications, 

as well as computer networks.275,276

Electronic Intelligence. The former PLA 

Fourth Department (4PLA) was a subdepartment of the GSD, but postreform has 

probably been renamed and subordinated to 

the SSF. This element is primarily responsible for offensive electronic warfare, but it 

is generally believed to maintain electronic 

intelligence capabilities.277,278
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APPENDIX G: Military Resources, Infrastructure, and Logistics

The PLA’s centralized control supply sys-

tem uses a push-pull process for replenish-

ment. This means that supplies are pushed 

to the troops based on standard demand and 

use; individual units pull supplies when they 

require additional materiel. Shortfalls in logis-

tic support to PLA operations, even going back 

to China’s military conflict with Vietnam in the 

late 1970s, when troops were ill equipped and 

encountered replenishment problems, have 

prompted the PLA to modernize its logistic 

support to match the modern requirements of 

its forces.279 This incremental transformation 

began in 2002 but also has been a major focus 

of the PLA’s ongoing reform efforts.

The PLA has gradually integrated its military 

and civilian sectors by drawing on private (or 

civilian) companies to supplement its logistics 

resources. Before reforms, the PLA’s supply 

system was controlled at multiple levels. The 

former General Logistics Department (GLD) 

provided general purpose supplies, such as 

food, shelter, and fuel. Specific branches of 

each service maintained special materiel 

unique to the PLAN and PLAAF. Redundant 

service and joint supply processes created 

inefficiencies within the logistics system. Cor-

ruption, bribery, and misuse of funds further 

reduced the effectiveness of strategic logistic 

support. Reforms to the PLA logistics system 

combined with vigorous anticorruption mea-

sures are intended to both improve the effi-

ciency of logistic support and reduce waste 

within the system.280,281

As part of the 2015 reorganization, the CMC 

eliminated the GLD, replacing the organization 

with the Logistic Support Department (LSD). 

The new LSD’s strategic and administrative 

roles include establishing logistic policies and 

conducting inspections.282 The LSD also provides 

oversight for the general purpose supply chain, 

military facility construction, and equipment 

management. The head of the LSD does not have 

a seat on the CMC, unlike his predecessor in the 

GLD, probably in part to reduce corruption and 

streamline PLA command and control.

Separately, the PLA established the Joint 

Logistic Support Force (JLSF) in September 

2016, charged with planning and executing 

integrated joint logistic support for strategic 

campaign operations.283,284 The JLSF oversees 

theaterwide supply operations, while ser-

vice branches retain service-specific supply 

responsibilities.285 The force is headquartered 

at a joint logistic support base in Wuhan and 

PLAN Fusu class replenishment ship Qinghaihu.

Image Source: DVIDS
102

commands five subordinate support centers.286 The reorganization centralizes logistics operations under one chain of command 

to more efficiently support theater and strategic logistics operations.

Much like structural changes that separated 

operational control of the PLA from force-building efforts among the PLA’s services, the 

establishment of the LSD and JLSF separated 

logistics management from logistic support to 

combat operations and probably was intended 

to shorten resource replenishment timelines 

across the PLA. These logistic reforms require 

testing to determine whether they will be 

effective in helping China overcome some of its 

combat inefficiencies and successfully support 

regional and national military operations.

The PLA also has continued its efforts to 

improve civil-military integration as a core 

function of logistic support to military operations under the LSD and JLSF constructs. 

This entails leveraging civilian sector capabilities and technologies to support military 

logistics to improve efficiency and reduce costs. 

The PLA continues to increase its use of civilian-controlled assets in military operations 

and exercises, most notably civilian ground 

transportation and ships supporting joint 

exercises and civilian firms providing supplies 

to mitigate logistic shortfalls.287,288,289

Military Transportation

China has a robust transportation infrastructure and is enlarging its transportation network 

to keep up with the country’s economic growth 

and increasing military demand. Although 

most of China’s rail lines, roads, and seaports 

are sufficient to support military transportation and mobilization, the variability of infrastructure throughout the country is an ongoing 

challenge. For example, western China’s transportation network is more limited than that 

of eastern China.290,291,292 Beijing is addressing 

this problem by initiating infrastructure projects and targeted funding allocations. Future 

transportation network improvements will 

bolster the PLA’s ability to mobilize by moving higher numbers of units more expediently 

across greater spans of the country.

The PLA primarily relies on rail transport 

to move large numbers of ground troops and 

large amounts of equipment.293 The Chinese 

rail network comprises about 100,000 kilometers of rail, 10,000 kilometers of which is highspeed track supporting trains running at up to 

250 kilometers per hour.294 The PLA also relies 

on the road network to transport troops and 

military equipment. Traffic congestion, tolls, 

and bottlenecks limit the capacity of eastern 

[The PLA will focus on] developing uniform military and civilian standards for 

infrastructure, key technical areas, and 

major industries, exploring methods for 

training military personnel in industries, 

and outsourcing logistics support to civilian support systems.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, 

May 2015
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China’s expressways in major cities.295 Road 

conditions vary from good to poorly main-

tained in rural areas, restricting capacity and 

increasing travel times.296,297 China expects to 

build about 1.3 million kilometers of roads and 

26,000 kilometers of expressways by 2020.298

China also is improving its existing domestic 

airfields to handle heavier payloads, construct-

ing airfields on islands and outposts in the 

South China Sea, and restructuring airfields 

to support military and civilian use.299 As of 

June 2016, about one-third of China’s airports 

supported military and civilian use.300 The PLA 

exercises control of China’s airspace, filling a 

role similar to that which the Federal Aviation 

Administration plays in controlling airspace 

in the United States. Although the Civil Avia-

tion Administration of China administers Chi-

nese civil aviation, PLA authority takes pre-

cedence over the airspace. Consequently, the 

PLA regularly adjusts civil aviation schedules 

and flightpaths to avoid PLA activities, such as 

exercises and other operations.

In mid-2016, China allocated $600 billion as 

part of a 3-year plan (2016-2018) to continue 

improving its transportation network and, 

later the same year, passed the Defense Trans-

portation Law (DTL) authorizing the manage-

ment, development, and production of dual-use 

facilities and equipment to support national 

and regional PLA operations.301 The DTL also 

regulates the planning, construction, manage-

ment, and use of transportation resources for 

national defense.302 Governments above the 

county level are required to include national 

defense transportation development in their 

socioeconomic development plan and to give the 

military basic information about civil transpor-

tation tools.303 The DTL grants the PLA author

-

ity over civil transportation systems during 

wartime. Structuring the transportation infra-

structure and facilities as a dual-use system 

avoids the additional costs of building separate 

airports, railways, ports, and roads for the mil-

itary. The PLA’s efforts to obtain access to com-

mercial ports in Africa, the Middle East, and 

South Asia would align with its future over-

seas logistic needs and meet its evolving naval 

requirements. The PLAN is likely to use com-

mercial ports and civilian ships to support its 

international and domestic logistic operations, 

resupply, replenishment, and maintenance.

China’s territorial claims in the South China 

Sea are driving major logistic developments 

in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. China’s 

reclaimed territory in the South China Sea 

is equipped with harbors and berthing areas 

that are capable of accommodating large naval 

ships, increasing the PLAN’s ability to exercise 

control of critical SLOCs.304

China is expanding its access to foreign ports, 

such as in Gwadar, Pakistan, to pre-position 

the logistic framework necessary to support 

the PLA’s growing presence abroad, includ-

ing normalizing and sustaining deployments 

into and beyond the Indian Ocean. China’s 

announcement in 2015 of its intention to build 

military facilities in Djibouti cited aims “to help 

the Navy and Army further participate in UN 

peacekeeping operations, carry out escort mis-

sions in the waters near Somalia and the Gulf 

of Aden, and provide humanitarian assistance.”
104

Transportation is also at the heart of the Belt 

and Road Initiative (BRI), which consists of 

establishing roads, railways, and ports to 

connect to countries from Asia to Africa and 

Europe. Although the BRI is marketed as primarily an effort to increase trade and development, China’s improved domestic transportation infrastructure and access to transportation 

infrastructure abroad also would benefit the 

PLA by enhancing PLA access to transportation hubs and road systems.305,306,307

China’s Outposts in the Spratly Islands

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

China's claims in the Spratly Islands require constant resupply from the mainland.
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APPENDIX H: Defense Industry

Defense Industry Reform

China’s defense-industrial complex contin-

ues to adapt and reorganize in an effort to 

improve weapon system research, devel-

opment, and production to compensate for 

an estimated lag of one to two generations 

behind its main competitors in the global 

arms industry. Over the past 2 years, China 

has undertaken organizational and policy 

measures to reenergize the military’s work 

on defense research and innovation through 

cooperation with the market sector. • In 2016, the CMC established the Science 

and Technology Commission, a high-level 

defense research body, as an independent 

organization under the high command. It 

also emphasized the importance of “civ-

il-military integration,” a phrase used in 

part to refer to the leveraging of dual-use 

technologies, policies, and organizations 

for military benefit.

• In March 2016, President Xi underscored 

this message by emphasizing defense 

innovation during a visit with the PLA’s 

delegation to the National People’s Con-

gress. He urged “great attention to the 

development of strategic, cutting-edge 

technologies” for the military, among 

other subjects.

China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) 

includes the establishment of focus areas 

for research, development, and innovation. 

Several of these have defense implications: 

aerospace engines—including turbofan tech-

nology—and gas turbines; quantum communi-

cations and computing; innovative electronics 

and software; automation and robotics; special 

materials and applications; nanotechnology; 

neuroscience, neural research, and artificial 

intelligence; and deep-space exploration and 

on-orbit servicing and maintenance systems. 

Other areas where China is concentrating sig-

nificant R&D resources include nuclear fusion, 

hypersonic technology, and the deployment 

and “hardening” of an expanding constellation 

of multipurpose satellites. China’s drive to 

expand civil-military integration and interna-

tional economic activity supports these goals.

The National Natural Science Foundation of 

China (NSFC), the China Academy of Sciences, 

and the Ministry of Science and Technology 

fund and promote basic and applied research, 

scientific innovation, and high-technology inte-

gration throughout China’s scientific, engineer-

ing, and civil-military industrial complex. The 

China Academy of Sciences, working closely 

with the NSFC, is the highest academic institu-

tion for comprehensive R&D in the natural and 

applied sciences in China and reports directly to 

the State Council in an advisory capacity, with 

much of its work ultimately funding disciplines 

and contributing to products for military use.
106

Major Production-Sector Snapshots

Missile and Space. China’s missile programs, 

including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are comparable to those of other international top-tier producers. China’s production 

of a wide range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, 

and surface-to-air missiles for the PLA and for 

export has probably been enhanced by upgrades 

to primary assembly and solid rocket motor 

production facilities. China has also purchased 

Russia’s S-400 air defense system and received 

its first delivery in April 2018.308 China’s space 

launch vehicle industry is expanding to support 

commercial and rapid satellite launch services 

and the manned space program.

Naval/Shipbuilding. China is the top 

ship-producing nation in the world and has 

increased its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all types of naval projects, including 

submarines, surface combatants, naval aviation, sealift, and amphibious assets. China’s 

two largest state-owned shipbuilders—the 

China State Shipbuilding Corporation and 

China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation—

collaborate in shared ship designs and construction information to increase shipbuilding 

efficiency. China continues to invest in foreign 

suppliers for some propulsion units but is 

becoming increasingly self-sufficient.

Armaments. China’s production capacity 

continues to advance in almost every area 

of PLAA systems, including new versions 

of main battle tanks and new light tanks, 

armored personnel carriers, assault vehicles, air defense artillery systems, and artillery pieces.309 China is capable of producing 

ground weapon systems at or near worldclass standards; however, quality deficiencies 

persist with some export equipment.

Aviation. China’s aviation industry has 

advanced to produce a developmental large 

transport aircraft, modern fourth- to fifth-generation fighters incorporating low-observable 

technologies, modern reconnaissance and 

attack UAVs, and attack helicopters. China’s 

commercial aircraft industry has invested in 

high-precision and technologically advanced 

machine tooling and production processes, 

avionics, and other components applicable to 

the production of military aircraft; however, 

China’s aircraft industry remains reliant on 

foreign-sourced components for dependable, 

proven, high-performance aircraft engines. 

China’s infrastructure and experience related 

to the production of commercial and military 

aircraft are improving because of the country’s 

ongoing C919 commercial airliner and Y-20 

large transport programs.

China’s domestically produced WS-10 family of 

military turbofan engines, which power the J11-B, 

carrier-based J-15, and J-16 fighters.

Image Source: AFP
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APPENDIX I: Arms Sales

From 2012 to 2016, China’s arms sales totaled 

about $20 billion, placing China among the 

world’s top five global arms suppliers.310 China 

primarily conducts arms sales in conjunction 

with economic aid and development assistance 

to support its broader foreign policy goals, such 

as securing access to natural resources and 

export markets, promoting its political influ-

ence among host country elites, and building 

support in international forums. To a lesser 

extent, arms sales also reflect the profit-seeking 

activities of individual arms trading companies 

in China and efforts to offset China’s defense-re-

lated research and development costs.

From the perspective of China’s arms custom-

ers, most of which are developing countries, Chi-

nese arms are less expensive than those offered 

by other top international arms suppliers. They 

also are generally considered to be of lower qual-

ity and reliability, but many still have advanced 

capabilities. Chinese arms also come with fewer 

political strings attached compared with alter-

native sources, which is attractive to customers 

who may not have access to other sources of 

arms for political or economic reasons.

The bulk of China’s sales from 2012 to 2016 

were to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, 

primarily Pakistan. China’s arms sales and 

defense-industrial cooperation with Paki-

stan include selling LY-80 SAMs, naval 

ships, main battle tanks, air-to-air missiles, 

and fighter aircraft.311,312,313 In 2015, China 

signed an agreement with Pakistan for the 

sale of eight submarines. Under the terms 

of this multibillion-dollar contract, the first 

four will be built in China and the remaining 

four in Pakistan.314,315

China is a niche supplier of armed UAVs and 

has sold these systems to several countries in 

the Middle East, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 

Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. China 

faces little competition for sale of such systems 

because most countries that produce them 

are restricted from selling the technology as 

signatories of the Missile Technology Control 

Regime and or the Wassenaar Arrangement 

on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 

Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.316
108

China’s Conventional Weapons and Missile-Related Customers, 2002–2017

Other Customers

Algeria

Angola

Argentina

Belarus

Benin

Bolivia

Burundi

Cambodia

Cameroon

Chad

Congo, 

Democratic 

Republic of

Congo, Republic of

Cuba

Djibouti

Ecuador

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Ghana

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Kuwait

Laos

Lebanon

Libya

Malaysia

Mali

Mauritania

Morocco

Mozambique

Namibia

Nepal

Niger

Nigeria

North Korea

Peru

Qatar

Rwanda

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Seychelles

Somalia

South Africa

South Sudan

Sri Lanka

Syria

Tanzania

Timor-Leste

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Uganda

Uzbekistan

Vietnam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

Over 65 countries have been recipients of Chinese arms since 2002.

317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328
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APPENDIX J: Glossary of Acronyms

2PLA PLA Second Department

3PLA PLA Third Department

4PLA PLA Fourth Department

ACMI air combat maneuvering 

instrumentation

AEW airborne early warning

AEW&C airborne early warning 

and control

AG Australia Group

AIFV armored infantry 

fighting vehicle

AIP air-independent propulsion

APC armored personnel carrier

ASBM antiship ballistic missile

ASCM antiship cruise missile

ASEAN Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations

ASW antisubmarine warfare

ASUW antisurface warfare

BCW Biological Weapons Convention

BRI Belt and Road Initiative

CBW chemical and biological warfare

CCG China Coast Guard

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CDIC Central Discipline 

Inspection Commission

CMC Central Military Commission

COMSAT communications satellite

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

C2 command and control

C4ISR

command, control, communica-

tions, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance

DTL Defense Transportation Law

ECM electronic countermeasures

EDD Equipment Development 

Department

EO electro-optical

ESF East Sea Fleet

EW electronic warfare

FFG guided-missile frigate

GDP gross domestic product

GLCM ground-launched cruise missile

GLD General Logistics Department

GPS Global Positioning System

GSD General Staff Department

HADR humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief

HF high frequency

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IO information operations

IRBM intermediate-range 

ballistic missile

ISR intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance

JLSF Joint Logistics Support Force
110

JOCC Joint Operations 

Command Center

JSD Joint Staff Department

LACM land-attack cruise missile

LHA landing helicopter assault

LSD Logistics Support Department

MARV maneuverable reentry vehicle

MIRV multiple independently 

targetable reentry vehicle

MOOTW military operations 

other than war

MND Ministry of National Defense

MPS Ministry of Public Security

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile

MSS Ministry of State Security

NFU no first use

NSF North Sea Fleet

OPCW Organization for the Prohibition 

of Chemical Weapons

PAFMM People’s Armed Forces

Maritime Militia

PKO peacekeeping operations

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAA PLA Army

PLAAF PLA Air Force

PLAN PLA Navy

PLANMC PLA Navy Marine Corps

PLARF PLA Rocket Force

PWD/LB Political Work Department 

Liaison Bureau

R&D research and development

RDA research, development, 

and acquisition

RMA revolution in military affairs

SAM surface-to-air missile

SAR search and rescue

SASTIND

State Administration for Science, 

Technology, Development, and 

Industry for National Defense

SIGINT signals intelligence

SLBM submarine-launched 

ballistic missile

SLOC sea line of communication

SLV space launch vehicle

SOF special operations forces

SP self-propelled

SRBM short-range ballistic missile

SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile submarine

SSGN nuclear-powered 

guided-missile submarine

SSF Strategic Support Force

SSN nuclear-powered 

attack submarine

SSP air-independent attack 

submarine

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UGF underground facility

UHF ultrahigh frequency

UN United Nations

VBSS visit, board, search, and seizure

VHF very high frequency
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Know About the South China Sea Disputes; 26 Feb 2016; 

www.huffingtonpost.com.

301 China Daily: China Spends 500 Mln Yuan to Support Public Private Partnerships; 5 Oct 2016; http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2016-10/05/content_15506276.html china 

spends US$75 to support PPP.

302 China Military Online: China Passes New Law on National 

Defense Transport; 3 Sep 2016; http://english.chinamil.com.

cn/view/2016-09/03/content_7241207.htm.

303 China Military Online: China Passes New Law on National 

Defense Transport; 3 Sep 2016; http://english.chinamil.com.

cn/view/2016-09/03/content_7241207.htm.

304 Weifeng Zhou; China Growing Assertiveness In The South 

China Sea; 11 May 2015; http://www.realinstitutoelcano.

org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/asia-pacific/ari60-

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305 The Straits Times; Chinese Firms Pump $20B Into Silk 

Road Projects; 24 Jun 2016; http://www.straittimes.com/asia/

east-asia/chinese-firms-pump-20b-into-silk-road-projects.
CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

125

306 Center for Security Studies in Security Policy, One Belt, 

One Road: China’s Vision of Connectivity; Sep 2016; www.

css.ethz.ch/en/center.

307 Puppet Masters; China’s One Belt, One Road: The Dawn 

Of A New Eurasian Country; 4 Oct 2016; https://www.sott.

net/article/330133-Chinas-One-Belt-One-Road-The-dawn-ofa-New-Eurasian-Century.

308 “Russia Delivers First S-400 Missile Defense Regiment to 

China,” The Diplomat, April 3, 2018, URL: www.thediplomat.

com/2018/04/russia-delivers-1st-s-400-missile-defense-regi-

ment-to-china/; DOI 3 April 2018; Accessed 1 November 2018.

309 “China Confirms Deployment of New Light Tank,” The 

Diplomat, October 12, 2017, URL: https://thediplomat.

com/2017/06/china-confirms-deployment-of-new-light-tank/; 

Accessed 9 May 2018. 

310 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop

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ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, 2018.

311 “Pakistan Navy Fast Attack Craft (Missile Boat) Cere

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mony Held at Karachi Shipyard,” Times of Islamabad Online 

in English, December 29, 2016. URL: https://timesofislam-

abad.﻿com/29-Dec-2016/pakistan-navy-fast-attackcraft-missile-boat-ceremony-held-at-karchi-shipyard. 

312 Qian Feng, “Sub Sales No Cause for Worry in India” Bei

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jing Global Times Online, October 15, 2015. URL: http://www.

globaltimes.cn/content/947437.﻿shtml.

313 “Pakistan: PAF adds 16 more JF-17 Thunder jets,” Islam

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abad The News Online in English, February 16, 2017. URL: 

https://www.thenews.com.﻿pk/latest/186724-PAFadds-16-more-JF-17-Thunder-jets.

314 Qian Feng, “Sub Sales No Cause for Worry in India” Bei

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jing Global Times Online, October 15, 2015. URL: http://www.

globaltimes.cn/content/947437.﻿shtml.

315 “Pakistan: China to Supply Pakistan with Eight New At

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tack Submarines,” The Express Tribune, Pakistan, August 31, 

2016. URL: https://tribune.com.﻿pk/story/1173324/

china-supply-pakistan-eight-new-attack-submarines/.

316 “China: A Rising Drone Weapons Dealer to the 

World,” CNBC, March 05, 2016, URL: http://www.cnbc.

com/2016/03/03/china-a-rising-drone-weapons-dealer-tothe-world.html.

317 Government document, U.S. Department of State; World

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wide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2017; Table III; 

https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2017/index.htm; 

Accessed 26 JUN 2018.

318 Government document, U.S. Department of State; 

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ble III; https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2016/index.

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319 Government document, U.S. Department of State; World

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wide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2015; Table III; 

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320 Government document, U.S. Department of State; World

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wide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2014; Table III; 

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321 Government document, U.S. Department of State; World

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wide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2013; Table III; 

https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2013/index.htm; 

Accessed 26 JUN 2018.

322 Government document, U.S. Department of State; World

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wide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2012; Table III; 

https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2012/index.htm; 

Accessed 26 JUN 2018.

323 Government document, U.S. Department of State; World

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wide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2005; Table III; 

https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm; 

Accessed 26 JUN 2018.

324 News Article, Jane’s World Air Forces; 05 SEP 2017; Uz

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bekistan - Air Force; https://janes.intelink.ic.gov/docs/binder/

jwaf/jwaf48/jwafa302.htm, Accessed28 JUN 2018.

325 News Article, Jane’s World Armies; 25 OCT 2017; Turk

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jwar/jwar44/jwara254.htm, Accessed 28 JUN 2018.

326 News Article, Jane’s World Armies; 01 JUN 2018; Belarus 

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jwara113.htm, Accessed 28 JUN 2018.

327 News Article, Jane’s World Armies; 06 APR 2018; Senegal 

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jwara229.htm, Accessed 28 JUN 2018.

328 News Article, Jane’s World Air Forces; 04 DEC 2017; Ka

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