COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

SHARON ANN LANE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0331-99-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 APRIL 4, 2000 

ROBERT LEE LANE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Kathleen H. MacKay, Judge 

Brian R. Frank for appellant. 

Frances Fite (Suzanne G. Scheer; Fite & 

O'Brien, Ltd., on brief), for appellee. 

Sharon Lane ("wife") appeals the trial court's ruling that 

the spousal support awarded in the parties' final decree of 

divorce could be modified pursuant to Code § 20-109(A). Robert 

Lane ("husband") cross-appeals, contending the trial court erred 

by finding that the parties' circumstances did not warrant 

either reduction or termination of spousal support and in 

denying his motion to do so on that ground. For the reasons 

that follow, we hold that the trial court erred in finding the 

parties' spousal support agreement subject to modification, but 

we affirm its decision denying husband's petition to modify his 

support obligation. 
- 2 - 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties were divorced by decree of the Circuit Court of 

Fairfax County in 1988. There was no equitable distribution 

hearing. Instead, counsel for the parties, but not the parties 

themselves, signed a final decree of divorce which incorporated 

by reference some of the terms to which the parties had agreed 

in their settlement agreement. The final decree stated, inter 

alia, that husband's spousal support obligation would remain in 

effect until the death of either of the parties or until wife's 

remarriage. The final decree provided further that wife would 

receive thirty percent of husband's retirement pay, but it made 

no provision for the distribution of any other property. It 

contained no express waivers. The final decree was entered on 

December 13, 1988. 

The parties entered into a subsequent agreement 

memorialized in a consent decree on March 14, 1989, which 

increased the level of spousal support from $300 per month to 

$500 per month. On September 3, 1997, husband petitioned to 

have his support obligation terminated on grounds of material 

change in circumstances. The trial court concluded that 

husband's spousal support obligation was subject to modification 

under Code § 20-109(A), but determined that no reduction or 

termination of support was justified by the changes in 

circumstances proven by husband. Although the court found that 
- 3 - 

the circumstances of both parties had changed since the final 

decree was entered, it concluded that husband's financial status 

remained "much better" than the financial status of the wife. 

The court therefore denied husband's petition for termination or 

modification of support. 

Wife noted her objection to the court's ruling that the 

spousal support was subject to the provisions of Code 

§ 20-109(A) allowing modification of the award and that Code 

§ 20-109(B) did not apply. Husband noted objections to the 

court's ruling as well, contending the court erroneously applied 

the standards of Code § 20-107.1 in denying his petition for 

modification of his support obligation. Wife noted her appeal 

to this Court, and husband cross-appealed. 

ANALYSIS

As written in 1988, Code § 20-109(B)1 read, in pertinent 

part: 

[I]f a stipulation or contract signed by the 

party to whom such relief might otherwise be 

awarded is filed before entry of a final 

decree, no decree or order directing the 

payment of support and maintenance for the 

spouse, suit money, or counsel fee or 

establishing or imposing any other condition 

 1

 The trial court appears to have relied on the current 

language of Code § 20-109, although in 1988 the statute was not 

subdivided into parts (A) and (B). However, the governing 

language from the 1988 statute is identical to that of the 

statute in its present form. The parties have adopted the trial 

court's references to those subparts, and we follow suit herein 

for ease of reference. 
- 4 - 

or consideration, monetary or nonmonetary, 

shall be entered except in accordance with 

that stipulation or contract. If such a 

stipulation or contract is filed after entry 

of a final decree and if any party so moves, 

the court shall modify its decree to conform 

to such stipulation or contract. 

The Virginia Supreme Court has defined stipulation to mean "an 

agreement between counsel respecting business before a court." 

Burke v. Gale, 193 Va. 130, 137, 67 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1951). In 

order to constitute a stipulation, an agreement between the 

parties incorporated into their final decree need only have been 

signed by their counsel. See id. Such stipulations or 

agreements cannot be modified. See id. ("If the stipulation was 

agreed to there can be no objection to it."); Code § 20-109(B). 

Cf. Kunz v. Jarnigan, 756 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988) 

(stipulation constituting a complete settlement of the parties' 

marital rights held not modifiable). However, Code § 20-109(B) 

is clear in its requirement that an agreement between the 

parties, whether by stipulation or by contract, be signed by the 

"party to whom such relief might . . . be awarded," in order for 

the terms of the agreement to become non-modifiable. 

The final decree was signed by neither party. Thus, 

according to the plain language of Code § 20-109(B), no 

agreement or stipulation was established by the final decree. 

However, the parties' subsequent consent decree meets the 

requirements of Code § 20-109(B) and constitutes a stipulation 
- 5 - 

as contemplated by the statute. It is a "contract or 

agreement," Orlandi v. Orlandi, 23 Va. App. 21, 26, 473 S.E.2d 

716, 719 (1996), signed by wife, the party seeking relief under 

it.2 See Durrett v. Durrett, 204 Va. 59, 63, 129 S.E.2d 50, 53 

(1963) ("'A consent decree is a contract or agreement between 

the parties to the suit, entered of record in the cause with the 

consent of the court, and is binding unless secured by fraud or 

mistake.'" (quoting Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 

692, 720, 130 S.E. 902, 911 (1925))). As the parties' consent 

decree was filed after the entry of the properly signed final 

decree by agreement of the parties, it becomes the governing 

agreement between the parties, see Parrillo v. Parrillo, 1 

Va. App. 226, 230-31, 336 S.E.2d 23, 25-26 (1985), and pursuant 

to Code § 20-109(B) its provisions regarding support cannot be 

modified. We, accordingly, find the trial court erred in ruling 

to the contrary and reverse its decision that the spousal 

support award was subject to modification. 

 2

 The statute's reference to the "party to whom such relief 

might otherwise be awarded" signifies the payee party, who, but 

for the existence of the property settlement agreement, would be 

entitled to claim spousal support under Code § 20-107.1. 

Contrary to husband's assertions, it is irrelevant that husband 

did not sign the consent decree, because only wife may be deemed 

the "party to whom such relief might otherwise be awarded" 

within the meaning of Code § 20-109(B). See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 

218 Va. 599, 602-03, 238 S.E.2d 817, 818-19 (1977) (payee 

ex-spouse was "party to whom relief might otherwise be awarded" 

under Code § 20-109, and was entitled to seek enforcement of 

consent decree modifying support award included in earlier final 

decree of divorce). 
- 6 - 

Because the agreement incorporated into the consent decree 

is not subject to modification under Code § 20-109(B), we reject 

husband's claim that the trial court erred by not reducing or 

eliminating his support obligation. Given the non-modifiable 

status of the spousal support obligation, the trial court's 

denial of his petition to modify his support obligation was not 

erroneous. "'We do not hesitate . . . where the correct 

conclusion has been reached but the wrong reason given, to 

sustain the result and assign the right ground.'" Beverly 

Health and Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Metcalf, 24 Va. App. 584, 596, 

484 S.E.2d 156, 162 (1997) (quoting Robbins v. Grimes, 211 Va. 

97, 100, 175 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1970)). Accordingly, we affirm 

the trial court's decision to deny husband's requested support 

modification. 

 Reversed in part and

 affirmed in part.
- 7 - 

Benton, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part. 

 In determining whether spousal support ordered in a final 

decree of divorce is modifiable, see Code § 20-109(A), the trial 

judge must distinguish between (1) court ordered support decreed 

pursuant to Code § 20-107.1 and (2) support derived from "a 

stipulation or contract signed by the party to whom [support] 

might otherwise be awarded" and decreed pursuant to Code 

§ 20-109(C). I agree with the majority opinion that the final 

decree was not signed by either party; therefore, Code 

§ 20-109(C) did not limit the trial judge's authority to modify 

the support ordered by the final decree. The final decree 

awarded custody of the parties' child to the wife and contained 

the following provision regarding spousal support: 

ORDERED that [the husband], shall pay [the 

wife], the sum of $300.00 per month as 

spousal support beginning December 1, 1988, 

and on the first day of each succeeding 

month until death of either party or 

remarriage of Complainant; for any period 

when custody of [the child] shall be changed 

to [the husband], spousal support shall be 

increased to $500.00 per month in lieu of 

child support. 

 I disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the 

"Consent Order," which the trial judge entered three months 

after the final decree, was "a stipulation or contract signed by 

the party to whom such relief might otherwise be awarded." Code 

§ 20-109(C). The first paragraph of the Consent Order states 

that "THIS CAUSE came on to be heard upon the joint motion of 
- 8 - 

the parties to voluntarily transfer custody of the parties' 

minor child . . . from the [wife] to the [husband] and upon 

argument of counsel." 

 Adjudicating this motion, the Consent Order specifies the 

judge's findings and ruling on spousal support as follows: 

 AND IT APPEARING TO THE COURT that on the 

13th day of December, 1988, this court 

entered a Decree of Divorce a vinculo

matrimonii, which contained certain 

provisions concerning custody of [the 

child], rights of visitation, and payments 

of support; that subsequent to that date, 

the parties have agreed to voluntarily 

transfer custody of said child from the 

[wife] to the [husband], and to maintain the 

same visitation rights for the new 

non-custodial parent and to clarify the 

issue of support; for other good cause 

shown, the motion ought to be granted, it is 

hereby 

 * * * * * * * 

 ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the 

[husband] shall pay the [wife] the sum of 

$500.00 per month as spousal support 

beginning on the first day of the month 

immediately following the date of the 

execution of this agreement, and on the 

first day of each succeeding month until the 

death of either party or remarriage of the 

complainant. . . . 

 Although, when the Consent Order was presented to the 

judge, the wife was acting as her own counsel and signed the 

Consent Order in that capacity "pro se," her signature did not 

render the Consent Order a "stipulation or contract" for 

purposes of Code § 20-109(C). Her signature on the Consent 
- 9 - 

Order merely indicated that it was an agreed adjudication of the 

issues before the court. In the absence of extraordinary 

language in a court's order or decree acknowledging the filing 

of "such a stipulation or contract" and the parties' intent to 

have a "pro se" signature on that decree or order operate to 

invoke the limitations of Code § 20-109(C), the mere entry of a 

court order or decree which is signed by a party acting "pro se" 

does not satisfy the requirements of Code § 20-109(C). 

 The statute states that "[i]f such a stipulation or 

contract is filed after entry of a final decree and if any party 

so moves, the court shall modify its decree to conform to such 

stipulation or contract." Code § 20-109(C) (emphasis added). 

Thus, I believe the statute contemplates a particular document 

signed by the parties, which has been filed with the court, and 

a court order, which has been entered to conform with that 

document. If the court order itself is to be considered as the 

"stipulation or contract," I believe the court order must 

clearly specify that it is so and reference the limitations of 

Code § 20-109(C). To require any less would engender confusion 

as to whether the court order or decree is entered pursuant to 

Code § 20-109(A) and (B) or pursuant to Code § 20-109(C). 

 The record in this case clearly established that, with 

respect to spousal support, the Consent Order did no more than 

enforce one of the original provisions of the final decree, 
- 10 - 

which stated that "for any period when custody of [the child] 

shall be changed to [the husband], spousal support shall be 

increased to $500.00 per month in lieu of child support." When 

the parties agreed to transfer the legal custody of the child 

from the wife to the husband per the Consent Order, they also 

sought to "clarify" that the condition in the final decree, 

which rendered the husband's increased payment to be "in lieu of 

child support," was in effect. 

 For these reasons, I would affirm the trial judge's ruling 

that spousal support was modifiable pursuant to Code 

§ 20-109(A). I would also affirm the trial judge's refusal to 

modify the spousal support. The trial judge found that the wife 

lives a "frugal" lifestyle, continues to repay a loan incurred 

during the marriage, and that the "surplus in her budget . . . 

should [allow her] . . . to repay her contribution to the . . . 

retirement system as well as repay the loan." Significantly, 

the trial judge ruled "[i]t would be appropriate to review at a 

future time [the wife's] needs using the findings made during 

this hearing as a benchmark." 

 The determination of the amount of support that is 

warranted is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. 

See Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 21, 27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211 

(1986). In determining the needs of the wife, the trial judge 
- 11 - 

thoroughly analyzed the financial evidence in the record. I 

find no abuse of discretion. 

 For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment.