Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Dan J. May

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Jeffry G. Price

Peru, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Janel Manriquez,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Derek Lee Manriquez,

Appellee-Plaintiff

January 20, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

52A04-1503-DR-118

Appeal from the Miami Superior 

Court II

The Honorable George A. 

Hopkins, Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

52D02-1309-DR-270

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Janel Manriquez (Mother) appeals the trial court’s final decree of dissolution of 

her marriage to Derek Lee Manriquez (Father). Although she sets out five 

issues for review, her arguments boil down to two issues. First, did the trial 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 2 of 9

court err in failing to divide Father’s 2013 tax refund between the parties? 

Second, did the trial court abuse its discretion in the determination of parenting 

time?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father were married on December 30, 2008. They have two 

children together, J.M. and B.M., born July 2008 and October 2011

respectively. The parties separated in August 2013 and Mother filed for divorce

on September 10, 2013, a little more than a year after the family returned from 

living in Texas.

[4] Since July 2012, Father has worked night shifts at the Indiana Department of 

Correction. He works from about 6:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. on seven nights 

over a two-week period. The first week he works on Monday, Tuesday, 

Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. He then works Wednesday and Thursday the 

next week. In light of Father’s non-traditional work schedule and Mother’s 

unemployment, the parties shared custody of the children after their separation. 

They agreed that Mother would care for the children in her home on the days 

Father worked, and Father would care for them on the remaining days in his 

parents’ home, where he was temporarily living to save money. This 

arrangement resulted in the parties having an equal amount of parenting time 

during a two-week period.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 3 of 9

[5] Following a provisional hearing on February 10, 2014, the trial court granted 

legal custody of the children to Father and continued the parties’ arrangement

regarding shared physical custody. This was despite Mother’s request for 

custody of the children with Father having parenting time on alternating 

weekends. The court found that while the shared arrangement was “unwieldy” 

it was “satisfactory and justifie[d] a deviation from the Specific Parenting Time 

Provisions (Section II) of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines”. Appellant’s 

Appendix at 20. Additionally, the court ordered Father to pay $27 per week in 

child support.

[6] The final hearing was held on November 13 and December 8, 2014. Both 

parties sought legal and physical custody of the children. J.M. was in first 

grade at the time of the final hearing. Mother testified that if she obtained 

custody of the children, J.M.’s school would change because she lived in a 

different county. 

[7] With respect to custody, Mother testified that the existing arrangement was not

in the best interest of the children. She noted several disagreements between 

her and Father that had made the children upset. She indicated that this had 

been the atmosphere and relationship between the parties since the provisional 

order. Further, Mother’s proposed child support worksheet was calculated 

based on Father exercising parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting 

Time Guidelines (the IPTG).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 4 of 9

[8] The record indicates that Mother became employed full time during the 

provisional period. Since March 2014, she has worked Monday through Friday 

from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Father’s testimony indicated that the parties 

modified the shared-custody arrangement once Mother began working. In 

vague terms, Father testified that after she became employed, Mother would 

care for the children while he was working “whenever she was home”. 

Transcript at 117. Father indicated that if he had custody of the children, he 

would propose that the “sharing of [the] kids...stay like that”. Id. 

[9] On December 15, 2014, the trial court issued its final decree of dissolution in 

which the court divided the parties’ marital estate and determined child custody 

and support. Relevant to this appeal, the court split a $1015 tax refund between 

the parties, awarded physical and legal custody of the children to Father, 

ordered Mother to pay child support of $59 per week, and indicated that the 

IPTG applied.

[10] Mother filed a motion to correct error on January 7, 2015, arguing among other 

things that the court failed to include Father’s 2013 tax refund in the marital 

estate. Shortly thereafter, she filed an amended motion, in which she added a 

claim that the trial court erred “by failing to incorporate into its ruling the 

agreement of the parties to continue the shared custody arrangement whereby 

both parties testified and agreed that the Mother should have the children while 

the Father worked his night shift and vice versa.” Appellant’s Appendix at 24. 

Father filed a response to the amended motion to correct error, but Mother did 

not include this document in her appendix.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 5 of 9

[11] The trial court did not rule upon the motion to correct error or set it for hearing 

within forty-five days. Accordingly, the motion was deemed denied on or 

about February 21, 2015. Mother timely appealed.

Discussion & Decision

1. Division of Marital Property

[12] Mother initially contends that the trial court erred by failing to divide Father’s 

2013 tax refund. She directs us to the provisional hearing and order referencing 

the parties’ 2013 tax returns. Specifically, at the provisional hearing, Father 

testified that he had filed his 2013 tax return and expected a refund of 

“approximately 42 hundred.” Supplemental Transcript at 39. Accordingly, the 

trial court provisionally ordered:

11. The father has filed tax returns for tax year 2013. Upon 

receipt of any refund(s) the father shall deliver the refund(s) to his 

attorney who shall hold the same in trust until further order of 

the court.

In the event the mother receives any tax refund(s) for tax year 

2013, she shall deliver the refund(s) to her attorney who shall 

hold the same in trust until further order of the court.

Appellant’s Appendix at 20.1

 

1 The provisional order terminated once the final decree was entered. Ind. Code § 31-15-4-14.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 6 of 9

[13] Mother fails to acknowledge that no evidence was presented at the final hearing 

regarding Father’s 2013 tax return. Indeed, her own exhibit listing assets and 

debts of the marriage generally indicated “Tax Refund” with a value of $1,015. 

Volume of Exhibits at Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. Her testimony did not further 

enlighten the trial court regarding Father’s 2013 tax return. She testified that 

the parties had already divided a tax refund from 2012 in the amount of $2500. 

She then acknowledged that her attorney “ha[d] the 2013...tax refund of a 

thousand fifteen in [his] trust account”. Transcript at 20. No mention was 

made of a separate tax refund in the amount of $4200.

[14] In its order, the trial court provided: “The parties received a tax refund in the 

amount of $1,015.00. Each party shall receive one half of the refund except the 

amount for mother shall be offset by the amount she owes the father for the 

unpaid medical bills ($236.40).” Appellant’s Appendix at 16. This was clearly 

supported by the evidence presented at the final hearing. Further, even if we 

were to assume that Father’s 2013 tax refund was erroneously excluded from 

the marital estate, Mother invited that error. “The doctrine of invited error is 

grounded in estoppel and precludes a party from taking advantage of an error 

that he or she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his or 

her own neglect or misconduct.” Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 541 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. See also Galloway v. Galloway, 855 N.E.2d 302, 306 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (the burden of producing evidence as to the value of 

marital property rests squarely on the shoulders of the parties and their 

attorneys). Having failed to introduce evidence of the value or existence of a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 7 of 9

separate tax refund, Mother is estopped from challenging the trial court’s 

distribution. See Galloway, 855 N.E.2d at 306.

2. Parenting Time

[15] Mother does not challenge the trial court’s award of legal and physical custody 

of the children to Father. She contends only that the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to order parenting time beyond the minimum set out in the 

IPTG. Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court should have continued 

the parties’ arrangement in which she would have the children overnights when 

Father worked his night shifts.

[16] Decisions about parenting time require courts to give “foremost consideration” 

to the best interest of the children. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 

(Ind. 2013). We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Id. 

“Judgments in custody matters typically turn on the facts and will be set aside 

only when they are clearly erroneous.” Id. We will not substitute our judgment 

if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court’s judgment. Id. 

See also Gomez v. Gomez, 887 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“on appeal 

it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it 

must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is 

a basis for reversal”).

[17] The evidence reveals that upon their separation Mother and Father 

implemented a unique arrangement to provide care for the children while 

Father worked his night shifts. This arrangement resulted in the parties 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 8 of 9

effectively having the children an equal amount of time over a two-week period. 

By the time of the provisional hearing, Mother was no longer in favor of this 

arrangement and sought primary custody with Father having parenting time 

pursuant to the IPTG. The trial court, however, chose to provisionally adopt 

the parties’ original arrangement, which the court found “unwieldy” but 

“satisfactory”. Appellant’s Appendix at 20.

[18] Once Mother began working in March 2014, the parties apparently modified 

the arrangement. Although not specifically defined at trial, it can be reasonably 

inferred that the modified arrangement resulted in some reduction in Mother’s 

time with the children due to her work schedule. Mother testified at the final 

hearing that the custody arrangement was not working in the best interest of the 

children, and she testified regarding disagreements between she and Father that 

had negatively affected the children. As a result, Mother asked the trial court 

for custody of the children and submitted a child support worksheet indicating 

that Father should be credited with ninety-eight overnights per year, which 

equates to parenting time pursuant to the IPTG. 

[19] In its final order, the trial court summarily granted custody to Father and 

ordered that the parties apply the IPTG. Mother argues on appeal that the trial 

court abused its discretion because it “ignored [Mother] and [Father’s] agreed 

joint parenting plan” without explanation. 2 Appellant’s Brief at 12. On the 

 

2 To the extent Mother asserts that the trial court erred by not entering written findings regarding the best 

interest of the children, we observe that neither party requested that the court enter specific findings. See
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A04-1503-DR-118 | January 20, 2016 Page 9 of 9

contrary, the record firmly establishes that at the provisional hearing and the 

final hearing, Mother was opposed to the shared parenting plan originally 

implemented by the parties. She expressly testified at the final hearing that the 

plan was no longer in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, no agreed 

parenting plan existed between the parties at the time of the final hearing.3 

Under the circumstances, we do not find that the trial court abused its 

discretion by applying the IPTG rather than continuing the provisional

arrangement. 

[20] Judgment affirmed.

Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

 

Hegerfeld v. Hegerfeld, 555 N.E.2d 853, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“[n]either [party] requested specific findings; 

therefore, it was unnecessary for the trial court to make specific findings that the custody award was in the 

children’s best interest”).

3 The IPTG certainly encourage parenting plans created by the parties. Section II(A) provides that if such an 

agreement is reached, “the parenting plan shall be reduced to writing, signed by both parties, and filed for 

approval by the court in order to be enforceable.”