J-S78045-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JERROLD SISCO

 Appellant No. 987 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 28, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000402-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD,*J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MAY 26, 2017

Appellant, Jerrold Sisco, appeals from the order entered in the 

Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas denying, after an evidentiary 

hearing, his first Post Conviction Relief Act1(“PCRA”) petition. This case 

returns to us after we remanded to have counsel comply with all of the 

requirements of Turner/Finley,

2

including filing a petition to withdraw with 

this Court. Appellant’s counsel has substantially complied. We grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the order below.

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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On December 19, 2012, Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse3(“IDSI”) with a two year old child. 

On March 20, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to ten to thirty years’ 

incarceration; however, the court did not find Appellant to be a sexually 

violent predator. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a direct 

appeal to this Court. On July 12, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se motion for 

discovery and to produce transcripts. 

The PCRA court summarized the procedural posture of this case as 

follows:

When [Appellant] filed a document specifically 

requesting PCRA relief on December 16, 2015, the [c]ourt

treated it as an amendment to the unanswered Motion for 

Discovery and to Produce Transcripts he had filed on July 

12, 2013, which was well within the PCRA’s statute of 

limitations. PCRA counsel filed an additional amendment 

on March 10, 2016, and the [c]ourt convened a hearing on 

May 31, 2016, to entertain [Appellant’s] ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims.

PCRA Ct. Op., 6/28/16, at 1. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on 

June 28, 2016. This timely appeal followed. 

Appellant’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw representation pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We directed counsel to 

comply with the Turner/Finley requirements and denied the petition to 

withdraw without prejudice. Commonwealth v. Sisco, 987 WDA 2016 

(unpublished memorandum at 3) (Pa. Super. Oct. 28, 2016). Counsel filed a 

 

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b).
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Turner/Finley brief and a petition to withdraw. Appellant did not file a pro 

se response.4

Appellant’s counsel identifies the following issues on appeal:

1. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to file requested 

post-sentence motions and a direct appeal from the 

judgment of sentence?

2. Was [Appellant] coerced into pleading guilty by threat of 

abandonment by his trial counsel?

3. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to discuss with 

[Appellant] the “Simeon statement” and the “Hill letter”?

Turner/Finley Brief at 4.

Prior to addressing the issues raised in the Turner/Finley brief, we 

examine the following in evaluating counsel’s petition to withdraw:

[I]ndependent review of the record by competent counsel 

is required before withdrawal is permitted. Such 

independent review requires proof of:

1) A “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel detailing the nature 

and extent of his review;

2) The “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel listing each issue 

the petitioner wished to have reviewed;

3) The PCRA counsel’s “explanation”, in the “no-merit” 

letter, of why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent review 

of the record; and

5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the petition 

was meritless.

 

4 We note the Commonwealth did not file a brief.
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Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817–18 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citations and alterations omitted).

Further, the Widgins Court explained:

The Supreme Court [in Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 

A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009),] did not expressly overrule the 

additional requirement imposed by [Commonwealth v. 

Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006),] decision, i.e., 

that PCRA counsel seeking to withdraw contemporaneously 

forward to the petitioner a copy of the application to 

withdraw that includes (i) a copy of both the “no-merit” 

letter, and (ii) a statement advising the PCRA petitioner 

that, in the event the trial court grants the application of 

counsel to withdraw, the petitioner has the right to 

proceed pro se, or with the assistance of privately retained 

counsel.

Id. at 818 (citations omitted). Instantly, we have reviewed counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and conclude it substantially5complies with the 

requirements set forth by the Widgins Court. See id. Accordingly, “[w]e 

now turn to an independent review of [Appellant’s] PCRA Petition to 

ascertain whether his claim entitles him to relief.” Id. at 819.

First, Appellant contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file 

requested post-sentence motions and a direct appeal. He avers that on the 

day he was sentenced he asked counsel “what more is there to do, what 

motions” and “what more can we do.” Turner/Finley Brief at 14.

 

5 Counsel’s petition failed to advise Appellant explicitly about the nature and 

extent of his review. See Widgins, 29 A.3d at 817-18. However, counsel’s 

Turner/Finley brief contained a statement of the matters reviewed and his 

discussion of Appellant’s issues evidences a review of the record. See id.
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“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of

review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are

supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v. AbuJamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). “Furthermore, 

we note that we are bound by the PCRA court’s credibility determinations 

where there is record support for those determinations.” Commonwealth 

v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 694 (Pa. 2004) (citation omitted).

With respect to claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness, 

[C]ounsel is presumed to have provided effective

representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and

proves that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit;

(2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her conduct;

and (3) Appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s action or

omission. To demonstrate prejudice, an appellant must

prove that a reasonable probability of acquittal existed but

for the action or omission of trial counsel. A claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel will fail if the petitioner

does not meet any of the three prongs. Further, a PCRA

petitioner must exhibit a concerted effort to develop his

ineffectiveness claim and may not rely on boilerplate

allegations of ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(punctuation and citations omitted). 

In determining whether counsel’s action was reasonable, the court

does not consider “whether there were other more logical courses of action”

counsel could have pursued, but simply examines whether counsel’s decision

had any reasonable basis. Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586,

594 (Pa. 2007). Conversely, to merit relief, counsel’s action, given all the
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other available alternatives, must be “so unreasonable that no competent

lawyer would have chosen it.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 431 A.2d 233,

234 (Pa. 1981) (citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court has held that counsel’s unexplained 

failure to file a requested direct appeal constitutes 

ineffective assistance per se, such that the petitioner is 

entitled to reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro 

tunc without establishing prejudice. Commonwealth v. 

Lantzy, [ ] 736 A.2d 564, 572 ([Pa.] 1999). However, 

before a court will find ineffectiveness of counsel for failing 

to file a direct appeal, the petitioner must prove that he 

requested a direct appeal and the counsel disregarded the 

request. Commonwealth v. Bath, 907 A.2d 619 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). Here, [the a]ppellant has not alleged on 

appeal that he requested guilty plea/sentencing counsel to 

file a direct appeal and counsel failed to do so. Rather, 

[the a]ppellant contends that guilty plea/sentencing 

counsel was ineffective in failing to consult with [him] as to 

whether he desired to file a direct appeal . . . . 

With regard to counsel’s duty to consult, this Court has

held as follows:

[Case law] impose[s] a duty on counsel to 

adequately consult with the defendant as to the 

advantages and disadvantages of an appeal where 

there is reason to think that a defendant would want 

to appeal. The failure to consult may excuse the 

defendant from the obligation to request an appeal . 

. . such that counsel could still be found to be 

ineffective in not filing an appeal even where 

appellant did not request the appeal.

 [ ]

[C]ounsel has a constitutional duty to consult with a 

defendant about an appeal where counsel has reason 

to believe either (1) that a rational defendant would 

want to appeal (for example, because there are 

nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this 
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particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to 

counsel that he was interested in appealing.

Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1244–45 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(some citations omitted).

The PCRA court opined as follows:

Having agreed to the plea deal reflected in his written plea 

colloquy, [Appellant] knew going into the courtroom on 

March 20, 2013 that he would be receiving a sentence of 

10-30 years in prison. As he indicated on the date he 

entered his guilty plea, moreover, he understood that ten 

years was the mandatory minimum and that his negotiated 

maximum was ten years less than the statutory maximum. 

He also knew, of course, that he could anticipate a 

multiplied sentence if the Commonwealth added the other 

twenty-one counts and proved him guilty at trial. While 

[Appellant] may not have been eager to spend the next 

ten years of his life in prison, therefore, the [c]ourt does 

not believe that he inquired, even vaguely, about his 

appeal options. 

* * *

He knew on the date he was sentenced that the [c]ourt 

would be imposing the agreed-upon 10-30 years, that it 

was the best deal the Commonwealth would offer, and that 

rejecting it would engender a trial and all the risks he had 

consciously chosen to avoid by taking the plea deal. It 

thus defies reason to believe that [Appellant] suddenly 

wanted to upset the balance by taking an immediate 

appeal, and [counsel] cannot be deemed ineffective for not 

taking a groundless appeal his client never even 

requested.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 2-4.6 We agree no relief is due.

 

6 We note that at sentencing, the following exchange took place between 

Appellant and the court:
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At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Appellant testified, inter alia, as 

follows:

[Appellant’s PCRA Counsel]: . . . You also have an 

allegation that you asked [trial counsel] to file post 

sentence motions after you were sentenced?

A: Yeah. I asked him what more is there to do, what 

motions.

Q: When did you ask him that?

A: Right after my sentencing.

Q: Same day?

A: Yes.

Q: What was his response, if any, did he give you?

A: He just said, “Good luck.”

Q: Was this just a verbal request?

 

The Court: . . . You’ve been sentenced. Do you have any 

questions?

[Appellant]: No, Your Honor.

The Court: From today’s date, you have 10 days to file 

post-sentence motions. That would allow me to take a 

second look at your case. If I were to deny those motions, 

you have 30 days to appeal that denial to Superior Court, 

or you can take a separate avenue and file a direct appeal 

to Superior Court 30 days from today’s date. Do you 

understand your post-sentence and appeal rights?

[Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor.

N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 3/20/13, at 7.
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A: Yes.

Q: Was there anything in writing that you gave to him?

A: No. It was all verbal. That day, after sentencing, I 

asked him if there was anything else we can do. 

Something. Like a recommendation. Well, sentence 

reconsideration or something. He said, “Good luck.”

Q: You also have an allegation that you requested [trial 

counsel] to file a direct appeal. Can you tell us about that?

A: That is after sentencing when I was asking him what 

more can we do.

Q: Okay. It was just a general question?

A: Yeah.

Q: Not, hey, [counsel], file this, file that, file an appeal?

A: I don’t know the law. All I was asking is what more can 

we do.

Q: And that conversation, did it take place in the 

courtroom?

A: Outside of the courtroom, right after I got sentenced.

Q: In the courthouse?

A: Yeah.

N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 5/31/16, at 25-26.

Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing as follows:

[Appellant’s PCRA counsel]: Now, [Appellant] also made 

[sic] allegation here that he asked you to file postsentence motions and/or a direct appeal?

A: He did not. He knew exactly what was coming. He 

didn’t come into court and didn’t know─oh, my God, I’m 
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shocked. He knew what the plea was and the sentence, 

and he knew about the plea bargain. So, no, it wasn’t─

Q: And he indicated on the witness stand, [Appellant], that 

on March 20, 2013, the date of the sentencing, that either 

just outside of the courtroom, but inside of the courthouse 

somewhere, he asked about this, and you said something 

to the effect, well, if you’re thinking about filing motions or 

an appeal, good luck with that?

A: No. Usually, if I’m hearing someone sentenced, I say 

good luck. But, no. Again, he knew what he was getting, 

so I don’t know why he was so shocked. He agreed to 

that.

Q: But it’s your testimony that [Appellant] never asked 

you directly or indirectly to file post-sentence motions?

A: No

Q: He never asked you directly or indirectly to file an 

appeal?

A: No.

Q: Did he ever ask you, “What is there that you can do 

more for me,” after he was sentenced?

A: No.

Id. at 37-38. 

[The Commonwealth]: It’s your testimony that [Appellant] 

never advised you that he wanted you to file a postsentence motion or an appeal from his judgment of 

sentence?

A: No, he never did.

Id. at 44.

In the case sub judice, Appellant has not proven that he requested a 

direct appeal and that counsel ignored the request; therefore, counsel was 
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not per se ineffective. See Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1244. Furthermore, the 

record does not support a finding that there are nonfrivolous grounds for 

appeal. Consequently, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective in not 

consulting with Appellant regarding the filing of an appeal even if Appellant 

did not request an appeal. See id. at 1244-45; Perry, 959 A.2d at 936. 

The PCRA court found counsel’s testimony to be credible. See Santiago, 

855 A.2d at 694. We find the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the 

record and free of legal error. See Abu—Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1267.

Next, Appellant contends counsel coerced him into taking the guilty 

plea rather than go to trial. Appellant avers that when he told counsel he 

was contemplating going to trial, counsel indicated that if he did not have 

the money to pay for the trial fee, counsel would withdraw. Appellant felt 

abandoned. 

In Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365 (Pa. Super. 2006), this 

court opined: 

“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel 

during a plea process as well as during trial.” 

[Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. 

Super. 2002).] “A defendant is permitted to withdraw his 

guilty plea under the PCRA if ineffective assistance of 

counsel caused the defendant to enter an involuntary plea 

of guilty.” Commonwealth v. Kersteter, 877 A.2d 466, 

468 (Pa. Super. 2005).

We conduct our review of such a claim in accordance 

with the three-pronged ineffectiveness test under 

section 9543(a)(2)(ii) of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9543(a)(2)(ii). See [Commonwealth v.] Lynch[, 

820 A.2d 728, 732 (Pa. Super. 2003)]. “The 
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voluntariness of the plea depends on whether 

counsel’s advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 

733 (quoting [Hickman, 799 A.2d at 141].

* * *

Kersteter, 877 A.2d at 46[8]–69. Moreover, trial counsel 

is presumed to be effective. Commonwealth v. Carter, [ 

] 656 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. 1995).

Id. at 369. 

“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty 

plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the 

defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. 

Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). “[T]he 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial.” Rathfon, 899 A.2d at 370 (citation omitted). 

In the instant case, the PCRA court found no merit to this claim and 

opined:

By the date of the preliminary hearing, [Appellant] was 

being represented by Richard H. Milgrub, Esq. (“Milgrub”), 

whom Evelyn McConnell retained on her grandson’s behalf.

. . . [Appellant’s] victim was S.S., who was the daughter 

of his paramour, Amber Hill (“Hill”).

Based on [Appellant’s] recorded statement admitting to 

sexual contact with S.S., and Hill’s statement that she had 

witnessed him having sexual contact with her on five or six 

occasions, the Commonwealth filed seven additional counts 

of IDSI, along with seven counts each of Corruption of 

Minors and Indecent Assault with the magisterial district 

judge. During negotiations, however, the district attorney 
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offered to withdraw them if [Appellant] would plead to the 

original charge and accept a sentence of 10-30 years in 

prison. He also outlined some of the sentences the [c]ourt 

had previously imposed on similarly situated defendants 

who lost at trial. [Appellant] was not present at the time, 

but Milgrub advised him of both the offer and the likely 

sentencing outcome if he was found guilty by a jury.

Milgrub also apprised [Appellant] of the evidence the 

Commonwealth would use at trial, including his own 

confession and Hill’s partial corroboration thereof . . . .

 

[Appellant] had discussed the additional charges with his 

attorney shortly before the date of his plea and was well 

aware on December 19, 2012 that pleading guilty to one 

sex crime meant that he would not be found guilty of 

twenty-two.

 * * *

Having agreed to the plea deal reflected in his written 

plea colloquy, [Appellant] knew going into the courtroom 

on March 20, 2013 that he would be receiving a sentence 

of 10-30 years in prison. As he indicated on the date he 

entered his guilty plea, moreover, he understood that ten 

years was the mandatory minimum[7]and that his 

 

7 We note that Appellant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1), which has been held unconstitutional 

by Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651, 663 (Pa. 2016); see also 

Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Although Appellant did 

not raise the issue of the legality of his sentence, we can raise it sua sponte. 

See Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 118 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on April 19, 2013. A 

judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct review or at the 

expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), (3). “[A] 

constitutional right newly recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 

States is made retroactive to cases on collateral review only if that court 

specifically holds it to be retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 317, 320-21 (Pa. Super. 

2011). However, “neither our Supreme Court, nor the united States 

Supreme Court has held that Alleyne is to be applied retroactively to cases 

in which the judgment of sentence had become final.” Commonwealth v. 
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negotiated maximum was ten years less than the statutory 

maximum. He also knew, of course, that he could 

anticipate a multiplied sentence if the Commonwealth 

added the other twenty-one counts and proved him guilty 

at trial. 

 

PCRA Ct. Op. at 1-3, 5. The PCRA court concluded that there was no merit 

to Appellant’s “claim that Milgrub coerced him to plead guilty by making him 

feel abandoned, particularly when his answer to the district attorney’s 

inquiry about why he failed to indicate as much to the [c]ourt was that he 

relied on his attorney’s advice.” Id. at 5. We agree there is no merit to this 

claim.

At the PCRA hearing, Appellant testified, inter alia, as follows:

[Counsel for Appellant]: Now, when you pled guilty in front 

of Judge Foradora on December 19, 2012, we have the 

transcripts, why did you not bring something up then to 

Judge Foradora like: Hey, the only reason I’m pleading 

guilty is because my attorney told me if I don’t, he’s 

dropping it?

A: Because I was leaning on Milgrub for everything when it 

came to this case. 

N.T. PCRA Hr’g at 14.

Our review of the record reveals that Appellant was aware of the 

sentence he would receive upon pleading guilty to one count of IDSI. 

 

Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014). Moreover, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has explicitly held that Alleyne does not apply retroactively 

on collateral review. Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 

(Pa. 2016). Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief based upon a 

challenge to the legality of the sentence. 

 
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Appellant denied being innocent of the charges. N.T. Guilty Plea Hr’g, 

12/19/12, at 5. Appellant did not seek to withdraw his plea prior to 

sentencing. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g at 4. Appellant did not establish that 

plea counsel misrepresented the nature of the plea agreement prior to 

sentencing. See Rathfon, 899 A.2d at 369. Appellant has not 

demonstrated that he was prejudiced. See id. Furthermore, a review of the 

record does not evince the entry of an involuntary or unknowing plea. See 

Moser, 921 A.2d at 531. Moreover, we find no support for the averment 

that he would have proceeded to trial were it not for counsel’s threat of 

abandonment. Cf. Rathfon, 899 A.2d at 369-70. Thus, no relief is due on 

this claim.

Lastly, Appellant claims counsel was ineffective for failing to

adequately discuss with him the statement given by Ms. Carolyn A. Simeon 

to the police on August 6, 2012, as well as the Amber Hill letter. The 

statement and the letter indicate that the victim’s father, Mr. Joey Simeon, 

coached the victim to tell authorities that Appellant had sexually abused her.

At the PCRA hearing, Appellant testified, inter alia, as follows:

[Counsel for Appellant]: I’m going to show you what I’ve 

marked Exhibit A for identification. It purports to be a 

letter. Can you identify that?

A: Yeah. This is Amber Hill’s handwriting.

Q: Are you familiar with her handwriting?

A: Yes, I am.
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Q: And do you recall when she wrote that letter?

A: Yeah. I was in Elk County Prison for a failure to appear 

at court for a Domestic Relations case for child support.

Q: Okay. Would it have been well before the plea and 

sentence in this case─

A: Oh, yeah, well before that.

Q: ─when you received the letter?

A. Well before.

Q: Okay.

A: Before I was even charged.

Q: Okay. Now, this letter, Exhibit A, did that letter ever 

get into the hands of your attorney?

A: Yes. My grandmother [, Evelyn E. McConnell, ] sent it 

to him, I believe, at the prelim.

 * * *

Q: And, basically, why do you feel that letter is important?

A: Well, not only does it state that the father of the child 

tells the child what to say and or do to make an impression 

upon CYS as to supposed guilt or accusation, but it also 

pretty much says my innocence.

 * * *

Q: Okay. I’m going to show you what I’ve marked as 

Exhibit B for identification. Do you know that that is?

A: Well, from the looks of it, it is a statement given by 

Carolyn A. Simeon. And it is referring to Joe Simeon─or 

Joey Simeon─telling the child what to say, what to do, and 

that I’m innocent.

Q: Now, who is the author of that statement?
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A: Carolyn A. Simeon.

Q: Who is she?

A: Apparently, Joe’s aunt.

 * * *

Q: I’m going to ask before the district attorney asks you 

some of these questions. Were you aware that you gave 

certain statements to the police which could be construed 

as incriminating statements?

A: Yes, I’m aware.

 * * *

Q: And basically, those statements would show that your 

erect penis had contact with the child victim’s mouth; is 

that correct?

A: Yeah. That statement is correct, yeah.

 * * *

[The Commonwealth]: . . . I’m looking at the police report, 

which I’m now presuming that you’ve seen. And it says 

that Amber Hill, your girlfriend and the mother of [the 

victim] at that time, stated that she had seen you having 

sexual contact with [the victim] at least five or six times.

A: And I say that never happen [sic].

Q: That’s pretty damaging though, isn’t it?

A: Yeah. Sounds damaging, yes.

N.T. PCRA Hr’g at 6-9, 14-16. At the PCRA hearing, Appellant testified that 

he was only charged with one count of IDSI. Id. at 11. The Commonwealth 

stated: 
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Your honor, I would ask the [c]ourt to take judicial notice 

of the Magisterial District Judge 54-3-02, Judge Inzana, at 

Docket No. 58 of 2012. And I would point out there was 

one count of IDSI filed at that docket . . . .

I would also ask the [c]ourt to take judicial notice at the 

same magisterial court, Docket No. 163 of 2012, which 

shows charges being filed August 15, 2012, the day before 

that preliminary hearing, against [Appellant], in which 

seven counts of [IDSI] were filed, seven counts of 

Corruption of Minors, and seven counts of Indecent Assault 

Against a Person Less than 13 Years of Age, graded as a 

felony three. The IDSI’s were F1’s and the Corruptions 

were M1.

Id. at 38-39. Milgrub replied in the affirmative when the Commonwealth 

asked the following question: “Do you recall discussions that you had with 

me in which I agreed that if [Appellant] would enter his plea to one count of 

IDSI . . . we would forgo the prosecution of these other counts that we 

believed that we could prove?” Id. at 40. The Commonwealth noted that 

the 21 counts were withdrawn on September 26, 2012. Id.

Milgrub testified at the hearing regarding a letter he had written to 

Appellant’s grandmother. Id. at 41.

[The Commonwealth]: . . . [I]n this letter, . . . you refer to 

the fact that you had a conversation with [Appellant] on 

the phone prior to the date of this letter, December 13, 

2012?

A: Yes.

Q: And then you recite some things that you had told him, 

and that he was now aware of. The first being the 

sentence that was being offered. This was December 

13th, and I think the record would show the date of the 

plea was December 15th─
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[Appellant’s counsel]: December 19th, 2012.

[The Commonwealth]: December 19th. And you talked 

about what had been offered and what he was looking at. 

You say in the letter, “I explained to [Appellant] that he 

made a full confession. I also explained to him that his exgirlfriend, Amber, also corroborates some of his 

confessions.”

* * *

Q: So you had discussions with him about the strength of 

the Commonwealth’s case?

A: Yes.

 * * *

. . . I explained if he went to trial and all these other 

charges were filed, his life, effectively, would be over, 

based on the other county sentences that other people 

received in Jefferson County. . . .

Q: And he accepted that?

A: Yes. He entered the guilty plea and proceeded with 

sentencing.

Id. at 41-43.

Instantly, the PCRA court opined that Appellant 

knew for a fact at the time he pled that he was 

exponentially reducing his sentencing exposure, and the 

[c]ourt does not believe he would have risked spending the 

rest of his life in prison on the chance that a jury would 

have believed Simeon and and Hill over the victim, his own 

confession, and Hill’s partial corroboration of that 

confession. 

PCRA Ct. Op. at 4.
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We find the court’s credibility determinations are supported by the 

record; thus, we are bound by them. See Santiago, 855 A.2d at 694. 

Appellant has not demonstrated that but for counsel’s errors he would not 

have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial. See Rathfon, 899 A.2d 

at 369-70. Appellant has not shown that he entered an involuntary or 

unknowing plea. See Moser, 921 A.2d at 531.

Following our review of the record, we discern no error by the PCRA 

court. See Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1267. Consequently, we grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the order below. See id.; 

Widgins, 29 A.3d at 817-18. 

Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2017