[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-14391

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00126-MEF-CSC

MARVA WATKINS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KID ONE TRANSPORT, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

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(February 28, 2013)

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Marva Watkins, proceeding pro se, appeals the summary judgment entered 

by the District Court in favor of favor of Kid One Transport System, Inc. (“Kid 

One”) on her claims of race and gender discrimination brought under Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). 

In her complaint, Watkins alleged that Kid One deprived her of vacation pay, paid 

her lower wages than other employees, and terminated her employment illegally on 

the basis of her race (black) and sex (female). Kid One, in moving for summary 

judgment, asserted that Watkins was terminated from her position as a driver 

because its insurance carrier cancelled her coverage; that she was not deprived of 

her vacation pay or paid lower wages based on her race; and that she had failed to 

exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her claim of gender discrimination. 

The District Court granted Kid One’s motion, concluding that Watkins failed to 

establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and failed to exhaust her 

administrative remedies as to her gender discrimination claim. Watkins appeals 

the court’s judgment. 

Watkins’s brief does not address the District Court’s order granting 

summary judgment—the order under review. Accordingly, her appeal is 

presumptively abandoned. Because she is proceeding pro se, however, we do 

consider whether summary judgment was appropriate.

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Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to 

discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 

respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of her race or gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To bring suit under 

Title VII, a plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a 

timely discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”). Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). Watkins’s EEOC filing failed to 

charge gender discrimination; in fact, it asserted no facts revealing such 

discrimination. The District Court therefore did not err in rejecting that claim. We 

consider, instead, the claim of race discrimination. 

Watkins attempted to prove her claim of race discrimination by 

circumstantial evidence, and thus invoked the burden-of-proof model established 

by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 

1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 

(11th Cir. 2003). Her first step was to show that she was: (1) a member of the 

protected class; (2) qualified for her current position; (3) subject to an adverse 

employment action; and (4) replaced by someone outside the protected group or 

treated less favorably than any similarly situated employee outside her protected 

group. Maynard, 342 F.3d at 1289. If she completed that step, Kid One had the 

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obligation of coming forth with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 

employment decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. at 

1824. If it did that, Watkins had to show that the reason was pretextual. Id. at 804, 

93 S.Ct. at 1825.

Kid One was entitled to summary judgment on Watkins’s claim of race 

discrimination,1 because the undisputed evidence does not support the inference 

that Kid One treated non-black employees more favorably than it treated Watkins, 

who is black. The record contains no evidence of any person, regardless of race, 

who was allowed to remain employed as a driver with Kid One after the insurer 

cancelled the driver’s coverage. Further, there is no evidence that non-black 

employees were paid higher wages or paid for unused vacation leave after being 

terminated from employment with Kid One. 

AFFIRMED.

 1

 Watkins satisfied the first and third McDonnell Douglas Corp. steps, but, according to the 

evidence, not the second or third. And she did not establish as pretext the company’s nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.

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