Filed 8/7/24 P. v. Thompson CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

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8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY THOMPSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B331835

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. PA023193)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Hilleri G. Merritt, Judge. Affirmed.

Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Analee J. Brodie, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________________
2

Anthony Thompson, who is serving a long prison term, 

appeals from an order partially denying his petition for 

resentencing pursuant to the recently amended Penal Code 

sections 1172.75 and 1385.1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. Current Felony Conviction

1. Residential Burglary

On November 12, 1994, Thompson, age 28, entered a 

dwelling inhabited by Janet Doering, age 60, with the intention 

of stealing from her. He ransacked several areas of her home 

while she was in her bed, stole $54 from her purse, and fled after 

she called 911. Doering was distraught by the burglary and 

suffered a fatal heart attack while talking to responding officers. 

Thompson was arrested nearby with Doering’s money in 

his possession, but the district attorney’s office at first declined to 

file charges pending further investigation involving fingerprint 

and shoe print analysis. 

In the meantime, Thompson robbed another home in March 

of 1995, and in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BA114822 

was convicted of residential robbery and sentenced to a base term 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

of four years in prison plus a consecutive enhancement of five 

years. 

2. Charges

In 1996, the District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles 

charged Thompson in a twice-amended information with the 

murder of Doering and residential burglary. 

a. One-Year Enhancement Allegations

The district attorney alleged that Thompson suffered felony 

convictions in 1988 and 1990 within the meaning of subdivision 

(b) of section 667.5, which at the time provided a one-year 

sentence enhancement for someone who failed to remain free of a 

conviction or prison custody for “any felony” for a period of five 

years prior to the conviction of the current offense. 

b. Five-Year Enhancement Allegations

The district attorney further alleged that Thompson’s 1990 

conviction and a conviction in 1993 were for serious or violent 

felonies within the meaning of subdivision (a)(1) of section 667, 

which provides a five-year sentence enhancement for each such 

conviction. 

c. Strike Allegations

Finally, the district attorney alleged that Thompson’s 1990 

and 1993 convictions constituted strikes for purposes of the 

“Three Strikes” law. 

3. Verdict and Sentencing

A jury deadlocked on the murder charge, which the People 

thereafter dismissed, but found Thompson guilty of residential 

burglary and found the prior convictions allegations true. 

The court sentenced Thompson to 25 years to life under the 

Three Strikes law plus five years each for the 1990 and 1993 

serious felony convictions. The court added one concurrent year 
4

each for the 1988 and 1990 prison priors but stayed the 

enhancement as to the 1990 prior because it was duplicative of 

the five-year enhancement already imposed for the 1990 

conviction. (§ 664.)

Thompson’s sentence totaled 35 years to life (including a 

concurrent one-year enhancement pursuant to subdivision (b) of 

section 667.5), consecutive to the four-year base term in Case No. 

BA114822. 

B. Resentencing

In 2020, the Legislature changed the scope of the one-year 

enhancement prescribed by subdivision (b) of section 667.5, 

narrowing its applicability from a current conviction for “any 

felony” to a conviction for a “sexually violent offense.” (People v. 

Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 669.) In 2022, the 

Legislature declared that any enhancement under subdivision (b) 

of section 667.5 imposed before 2020 for a non-sexually violent 

offense was invalid, and prescribed a resentencing procedure 

pursuant to which an inmate serving a now-invalid sentence 

could obtain complete resentencing. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a), added 

by Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) The Legislature also gave trial 

courts discretion to strike five-year enhancements for prior 

serious felony convictions. (Ibid.)

In 2022 and 2023, Thompson filed three petitions for 

resentencing, seeking dismissal of the one-year and five-year 

enhancements and vacation of the findings that his 1990 and 

1993 convictions constituted strikes. The People filed no formal 

opposition, but at the hearing opposed vacating the five-year 

enhancements and strike findings. 

Further facts came out at the June 15, 2023 resentencing 

hearing. By the time Thompson was sentenced in 1996, he had 
5

committed three offenses as a juvenile (two in 1981 and another 

in 1983), and seven crimes as an adult: a drug offense in 1986, 

burglary in 1987, battery with serious bodily injury in 1990, 

burglary in 1993, tampering with a vehicle in 1994, and first 

degree robbery and first degree burglary in 1995. In the 1995 

residential robbery case, which occurred a few months after the 

burglary of Ms. Doering’s home, Thompson entered the residence 

of a 71-year-old woman at 9:30 p.m., ransacked her bedroom, 

then woke her up with a hand over her mouth, threatened to kill 

her if she moved, and demanded to know where her purse was. 

The victim fought back, resulting in injuries to both parties. 

Thompson took about $2,000 in jewelry. 

Thompson’s counsel presented evidence that although early 

into his incarceration he was written up for minor infractions, he 

had a clean record over the past nine years in prison and he had 

completed his GED and programs in anger management, 

domestic violence prevention, victims awareness, life skills, 

addictive behavior, addiction recovery, and peer health. Counsel 

argued that Thompson had had no positive influences as a child 

and young man, and although 28 years old when he committed 

the instant burglary, was developmentally immature. Counsel 

presented several letters indicating Thompson had a support 

system outside prison, and argued he was able and eager to 

demonstrate he was not the same person who committed serious 

crimes almost thirty years prior. 

The resentencing court applauded Thompson for his efforts 

and discussed relevant changes in sentencing law since his 

conviction. It observed, “Now many things have changed the way 

we look at things (since the original Romero motion in 1996), 

aggravating factors, mitigating factors . . . .” The court stated it 

“need[ed] to look at Mr. Thompson as a whole person, not just 
6

numbers on a page,” and noted there were “a lot of mitigating 

factors since that 19[9]6 Romero motion. [Section] 1385 has 

changed significantly since then and I think that the court has to 

look at what he has done since then.” Ultimately, the court 

concluded that Thompson’s efforts and changes in the law

merited dismissal of the sentence enhancements but not the two 

strike findings.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the one- and five-year 

sentence enhancements but declined to vacate the strike findings. 

The resulting sentence was 25 years to life, of which Thompson 

had already served 28 years. 

DISCUSSION

Thompson contends the resentencing court abused its 

discretion in declining to vacate the strike findings either in the 

furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385 or as a matter of 

recent legislative mandate. (Neither Thompson nor Respondent 

contests the court’s dismissal of the one- and five-year sentence 

enhancements.)

I. Vacating Strike Findings in the Furtherance of 

Justice

A. Legal Principles

As noted, in 2020 and 2022 the Legislature changed the 

law regarding sentencing enhancements, invalidating the oneyear section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement except for 

sexually violent offenses and giving trial courts discretion to 

strike the five-year enhancements for prior serious felony 

convictions. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Under the new regime, a 

prisoner whose judgment of conviction was final could obtain 
7

retroactive resentencing because of the recent changes to the 

sentencing law. (Ibid.) 

Such resentencing is not limited merely to vacating nowinvalid enhancements. Instead, at resentencing “[t]he court shall 

apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any 

other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial 

discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to 

promote uniformity of sentencing. [¶] . . . The court may 

consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the 

disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant 

while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time 

served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced 

the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects 

that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so 

that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of 

justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2) & (3).) 

In other words, an inmate who is entitled to retroactive 

resentencing because of recent changes to the sentencing law is 

entitled to a complete reexamination of his or her sentence.

Such a reexamination may include application of section 

1385.

Under section 1385, subdivision (a) the trial court “may, . . . 

in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” This 

authority includes the power to “strike or vacate an allegation or 

finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has 

previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony . . . .” 

(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.) 

The “furtherance of justice” requires consideration of both 

the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of 

society represented by the prosecution. (People v. Orin (1975) 13 
8

Cal.3d 937, 945.) Thus, in deciding whether to vacate a strike 

finding in the furtherance of justice, a trial court must consider 

the nature and circumstances of the present felonies as well as 

the prior serious felony convictions. (People v. Williams, supra,

17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) The court must further consider the 

particulars of the defendant’s background, character, and 

prospects. (Ibid.) From this consideration, the court must decide 

whether the defendant “may be deemed” to be outside the “spirit,

in whole or in part,’’ of the Three Strikes law. (Ibid.) 

“[T]he spirit of the law is informed, guided, and limited by 

its letter, lest an unanchored spirit escape its legislative 

receptacle and take[s] on an unenacted shape. [¶] [T]he Three 

Strikes law expressly declares that its purpose is ‘to ensure 

longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who 

commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious 

and/or violent felony offenses.’ ” (People v. Strong (2001) 87 

Cal.App.4th 328, 337.) 

In other words, the spirit of the Three Strikes law is to 

punish recidivism. Thus, only “extraordinary circumstances” 

may demonstrate that the life sentence imposed on a repeat 

criminal falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (People 

v. Anderson (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 780, 786.) “At the very least, 

the reason for [vacating a strike finding] must be ‘that which 

would motivate a reasonable judge.’ ” (People v. Orin, supra, 13 

Cal.3d at p. 945.)

B. Standard of Review

We review for abuse of discretion an order declining to 

vacate a strike finding in furtherance of justice pursuant to 

section 1385. (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 162.) 

“This standard is deferential. [Citations.] But it is not empty.” 
9

(Ibid.) The question is whether the ruling “ ‘falls outside the 

bounds of reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant 

facts.” (Ibid.) An appellant must demonstrate on appeal that the 

sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. (People v. 

Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375, 378.) The Three Strikes law 

“creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to 

these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Ibid.) 

C. Application

Here, Thompson committed three offenses as a juvenile and 

seven crimes as an adult, culminating in two residential 

burglaries, the former of which resulted in the distraught 60-

year-old female victim suffering a fatal heart attack and the 

latter of which escalated to a robbery when Thompson held down 

the 71-year-old female victim and threatened to kill her.

Thompson committed no new crimes since 1996, but he has 

been incarcerated since that time, which significantly attenuates 

any mitigating value of the remoteness of his priors. (People v. 

Vasquez (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390.) These circumstances 

alone support the resentencing court’s conclusion that Thompson 

falls within the spirit of the Three Strikes laws, which is to limit 

the court’s discretion in sentencing repeat offenders. Little in the 

record suggests Thompson is not the sort of repeat offender

encompassed within that spirit.

Thompson relies heavily on his success in prison: He has 

obtained his GED and completed several classes, and he has 

friends outside prison and plans for the future. The resentencing 

court acknowledged these efforts, even applauding Thompson’s 

progress. Thompson also emphasizes his relative youth when 

committing the instant felony and the lack of positive influences 

in his life. He argues that he is has gained insight into the 
10

crimes of his youth and is “much less likely—or able—at his age 

(57) to run the risks of even unintentionally harming others that 

he indulged as a young man.” 

But these circumstances fail to show that the resentencing 

court’s decision was irrational or arbitrary. On the contrary, the 

court duly considered the nature and circumstances of the 

present felony as well as Thompson’s prior serious felony 

convictions, and further considered the particulars of his 

background, character, and prospects before concluding 

Thompson falls within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The 

court took special note that Thompson had chosen elderly victims 

for his crimes, and although he was now approaching an age 

where he may have a greater appreciation for the vulnerability of 

such victims, the court did not believe it appropriate to strike 

either of his priors. 

This is exactly the procedure the California Supreme Court 

has prescribed. (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) 

The court weighed the proper aspects of Thompson’s record, 

exercised its discretion to strike the five year enhancements for 

prior felonies, but exercised that same informed discretion in 

deciding not to strike either of the strike priors. Nothing 

indicates the court disregarded or undervalued any of the 

mitigating factors Thompson presented, and no principle or 

authority compelled it to draw any particular conclusion. The 

court’s conclusion after duly weighing the circumstances of 

Thompson’s felonies against the particulars of his background, 

character and prospects was thus an appropriate exercise of 

discretion.

Thompson argues that underlying felony sentencing is 

evolving to place more emphasis on rehabilitation than on 
11

lengthy incarceration, and from these sentencing trends he 

contends it is clear that the definition of “the furtherance of 

justice” is changing, as are the relevant factors regarding what it 

means to be outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. 

This argument, made without citation to case authority, 

provides no basis for finding an abuse of discretion in this case.

At the resentencing hearing it was clear the trial court was 

aware of what it considered relevant changes in sentencing law 

since Thompson’s conviction.

In any case, as Thompson concedes, in determining 

whether a particular defendant may be deemed outside the spirit 

of the Three Strikes law, the court must still consider the nature 

and circumstances of the present felony as well as the prior 

serious felony convictions. It was thus proper for the trial court 

to consider the “extremely aggravated” circumstances of 

Thompson’s prior felony convictions, which included residential 

burglaries where one elderly victim died, and another was 

attacked. 

But the trial court did not stop there. It also considered 

other factors such as Thompson’s good conduct while in prison 

and evidence of his rehabilitation. Indeed, much of the hearing 

was taken up with the trial court’s colloquy with counsel about 

such factors. 

After considering all of these factors, the trial court 

exercised its discretion to strike the two five-year priors but not 

the prior strikes. To the extent Thompson invokes “changing and 

evolving” sentencing trends as a basis for us to reweigh the
12

evidence relevant to sentencing and reach a different conclusion, 

we decline to do so.

The resentencing court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Thompson’s petition to vacate the strike findings.

II. Senate Bill 81

Thompson argues that under recent amendments to section 

1385, the resentencing court was required to vacate at least one 

strike finding. We disagree.

Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81), 

amended section 1385 “to guide sentencing courts in deciding 

whether to dismiss an enhancement. [Citation] Under new 

section 1385(c), a court ‘shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in 

the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that 

enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.’ 

(§ 1385(c)(1).) In deciding whether to strike the enhancement, 

‘the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence . . . 

that any of [nine enumerated] mitigating circumstances . . . are 

present.’ [Fn.] (§ 1385(c)(2).) ‘Proof of the presence of one or 

more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing 

the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the 

enhancement would endanger public safety.’ (Ibid.) Alongside 

two of the enumerated circumstances, the Legislature included 

additional, mandatory language: when multiple enhancements 

are alleged, ‘all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall 

be dismissed’ (§ 1385(c)(2)(B)), and when an enhancement could 

result in a sentence of over 20 years, ‘the enhancement shall be 

dismissed’ (§ 1385(c)(2)(C)).” (People v. McDowell (2024) 99 

Cal.App.5th 1147, 1152-1153.)

Whether Senate Bill 81 applies to Thompson’s sentence is a 

question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. 
13

(People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694.) “ ‘[I]n construing a 

statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so 

as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In 

determining that intent, we first examine the words of the 

respective statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of 

the statute, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant 

what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” ’ ” 

(People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151.) “If, however, the 

terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts may 

resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be 

achieved and the legislative history.” (Ibid.)

As noted above, section 1385, subdivision (c) now provides: 

“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an 

enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if 

dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative 

statute.” (Italics added.) Subdivision (c) of section 1385 thus 

expressly applies to the dismissal only of an “enhancement.”

(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) 

Our appellate courts have routinely rejected the argument 

that the Three Strikes law constitutes an enhancement under 

section 1385, subdivision (c), concluding it is well established that 

the law is instead “an alternative sentencing scheme for the 

current offense.” (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 

243; see also People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, rev. 

granted May 29, 2024 (S283924) [Senate Bill 81 does not apply to 

prior strike convictions]; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 

67 [same]; People v. McDowell (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1155; 

People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 335.)

Thompson argues these cases were incorrectly decided, the 

meaning of the word “enhancement” is ambiguous, the legislative 
14

history of Senate Bill 81 indicates it was meant to apply to both 

enhancements and alternative sentencing schemes, and the rule 

of lenity requires that we adopt a definition of the statute that 

favors him. 

We disagree. “ ‘Ordinarily words used in a statute are 

presumed to be used in accordance with their established legal or 

technical meaning.’ [Citation.] The term ‘enhancement’ has a 

well-established technical meaning in California law. [Citation.] 

‘A sentence enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment 

added to the base term.” ’ [Citations.] It is equally well 

established that the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement; it 

is an alternative sentencing scheme for the current offense. 

[Citations.] We presume the Legislature was aware of, and 

acquiesced in, both this established judicial definition of 

enhancement and the distinction between an enhancement and 

an alternative sentencing scheme such as the Three Strikes law.” 

(People v. Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 243-244.)

Because the term “enhancement” has a well-established 

technical meaning which we presume the Legislature accepted, 

the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. We therefore 

follow its plain meaning, and may not consult legislative history 

or the rule of lenity to give the term a different meaning. (People 

v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 151 [“ ‘courts will not 

“interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does 

not exist” ’ ”].) Accordingly, the resentencing court did not err in 

declining to vacate Thompson’s strike findings pursuant to 

subdivision (c) of section 1385.
15

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

KELLEY, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

*

Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.