* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 24 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BILLY W. CASEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-5224 (D.C. No. 94-C-658-J) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before EBEL, HENRY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Billy W. Casey appeals the district court’ s decision affirming the Secretary’s determination that claimant was not dis abled on or before December 31, 1987, the last date on which he enjoye d insured status under the Social Security Act. See Potter v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 905 F.2d 1346, 1347 (10th Cir. 1990). We review the Secreta ry’s decision to determine whether her factual findings are supported by subst antial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Castellano v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). We may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment” for that of the Secret ary. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). We affirm. Background Claimant worked until May 17, 1984, and applied fordisability and supplemental security income benefits in 1985, clai ming disability due to high blood pressure, a back injury, a bowel problem, and a mental impairment. After1 A somatoform disorder exists when there are “[p]hys ical symptoms for

which there are no demonstrable organic findings orknown physiological mechanisms.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.07. The disorder causes a claimant to exaggerate his physical problems in his mind beyond what the medical data indicate. See Easter v. Bowen , 867 F.2d 1128, 1129 (8th Cir. 1989). Such a disorder may itself be disabling. Id. at 1130. -3- an administrative hearing in 1986, the Secretary de nied benefits. The district court twice reversed and remanded this case for sup plemental administrative hearings. After the last administrative hearing, held on Octo ber 5, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined at step f ive, see Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining the five-step sequential process), that claimant had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to engage in the full range of light work and that claimant’s RFC wa s not significantly affected by his mental impairment. See R. Vol II-B, at 567-68. The ALJ reviewed and thoroughly discussed claimant’ s voluminous physical and mental history. The ALJ evaluated cla imant’s mental impairment and determined that claimant had psychogenic, or so matoform, pain disorder. 1 The ALJ concluded, however, that claimant’s mental impairment was not so severe as to preclude the performance of all substa ntial gainful activity at the light work level. See id. at 567-68. The ALJ completed a Psychiatric Review Technique (PRT) form as part of his decision, findi ng that claimant did have-4-

somatoform disorder. On the PRT, the ALJ evaluatedthe effect of claimant’s mental impairment on his RFC. The ALJ determined t hat claimant’s mental impairment had only “slight” effect on his activiti es of daily living; “moderate” effect on his ability to maintain social functionin g; “never” resulted in deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner; and “once or twice” resul ted in an episode of deterioration or decompensation in a work or work-l ike setting. See id. at 571. Because the ALJ determined that claimant’s mental i mpairment did not affect his ability to perform light work, the ALJ applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, ap p. 2, in determining claimant’s disability status. Applying the grids, the ALJ det ermined that claimant was not disabled until April 26, 1992, when he became fifty -five years old. The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s determination. Claimantappealed to the district court, and the case was referred to a magistrate ju dge, who affirmed the Secretary’s determination. Discussion “When there is evidence of a mental impairment thatallegedly prevents a claimant from working, the Secretary must follow th e procedure for evaluating mental impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.152 0a and the Listing of Impairments and document the procedure accordingly. ” Cruse v. United States-5-

Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 49 F.3d 614, 617 (10th Cir. 1995). Documentation is made by completing a PRT form, whi ch the ALJ must attach to his written decision. “[T]he record must contain s ubstantial competent evidence to support the conclusions recorded on the PRT form [, and] if the ALJ prepares the form himself, he must ‘discuss in his opinion the evidence he considered in reaching the conclusions expressed on the form.’” I d. at 617-18 (quoting Washington v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir. 1994)). Claimant contends that the ALJ’s finding that his m ental impairment does not affect his ability to work is not supported by substantial evidence. He also argues that because the ALJ erred in finding that c laimant’s mental impairment does not affect his ability to work, the ALJ should not have applied the grids to find him not disabled before April 26, 1992. Claim ant does not challenge the ALJ’s determination that he retained the RFC to per form light work. Specifically, claimant contends the ALJ erred by ba sing his conclusion that claimant’s mental impairment did not significantly impair his ability to work on the ALJ’s conclusion that claimant’s mental impairm ent did not meet or equal a Listing of Impairments for mental impairments. We are not persuaded the ALJ failed in this respect. The ALJ did find that clai mant did not have a mental impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equivalent to one listed in the Listing of Impairments, see R. Vol. II-B, at 556-57, 568, but-6-

there is nothing in the ALJ’s decision to suggest that finding was the basis of the ALJ’s determination that claimant’s mental impairme nt did not effect his ability to perform light work. The ALJ thoroughly discusse d claimant’s mental impairment, and all of the medical testimony and nu merous mental evaluations of claimant. Given the ALJ’s discussion of claimant’s mental impairment, the ALJ’s written decision clearly indicates he considered al l of the evidence concerning claimant’s impairment when he assessed the severityof claimant’s functional limitations. Claimant also contends that the ALJ misinterpreted a “Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental)” form, completed by Dr. Passmore, a psychiatrist who examined claimant in 1985 and 1988, in violation of Cruse , 49 F.3d at 618. Claimant contends the ALJ’s misi nterpretation of this form led him to improperly support his find ing as to the severity of claimant’s mental impairment on Dr. Passmore’s eval uation. We disagree. In
Cruse , we held that use of the term “fair” (or “poor”) o n the type of mental assessment form used by Dr. Passmore is evidence of disability. See id. The ALJ did note Dr. Passmore’s “fair” rating as part of hi s overall discussion of the medical record, but it is clear that the ALJ did no t misinterpret or misapply Dr. Passmore’s evaluation, and that the ALJ’s determination was based on a consideration of the record as a whole.-7-

We further conclude that substantial evidence suppo rts the ALJ's determination that claimant’s mental impairment did not significantly compromise his ability to perform light work. Although claima nt suffers from a mental impairment, the evidence does not indicate that cla imant’s impairment prevents him from working. See Coleman v. Chater , 58 F.3d 577, 580 (10th Cir. 1995). Because claimant’s ability to perform light work is not significantly compromised by his mental impairment, the ALJ appro priately relied on the grids.
See Evans v. Chater , 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995) (the ALJ may us e the grids if, despite a nonexertional impairment, the c laimant can perform a substantial majority of the work in the designated RFC category). The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge