NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-3447

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JAMES TALLEY, Firefighter,

Appellant

v.

JEROME B. SIMANDLE, District Judge

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-03984)

District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 5, 2015

Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 26, 2015)

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OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute 

binding precedent.
2

Appellant James Talley appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) federal civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

We will dismiss this appeal as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

Appellee Jerome B. Simandle is a United States District Judge for the District of 

New Jersey. In March 2004, Talley filed suit in the District of New Jersey alleging 

Fourth Amendment violations, wrongful termination, and various other state-law 

violations by the City of Atlantic City, for which Talley was employed as a firefighter 

until discharged after testing positive for cocaine. See Talley v. City of Atl. City, No. 04-

cv-1146 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2005). In January 2005, Judge Simandle dismissed Talley’s 

suit, holding, inter alia, that Talley had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted and was time-barred from bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the court 

declined to exercise jurisdiction over Talley’s remaining state-law claims, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c). Judge Simandle subsequently denied numerous post-judgment motions by 

Talley. Talley filed multiple unsuccessful appeals.1 

On July 9, 2013, Talley brought this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 

Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against the United States 

Department of Justice and Judge Simandle in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

Talley alleged that Judge Simandle improperly dismissed his 2004 suit in violation of 

Talley’s due process rights. Talley requested monetary damages and re-adjudication of 

 

1 See Talley v. City of Atl. City, C.A. No. 05-3780 (order filed Nov. 22, 2005); Talley v. City of 

Atl. City, C.A. No. 07-4074 (order filed Sept. 11, 2008); Talley v. City of Atl. City, C.A. No 10-

3428 (order filed Jan. 13, 2011).
3

his 2004 case against Atlantic City. On July 16, 2013, the District Court granted Talley’s 

motion to proceed IFP but dismissed his complaint with prejudice pursuant to 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) as barred by judicial and sovereign immunity. Talley timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 

District Court’s dismissal of Talley’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In screening IFP complaints, a district 

court must dismiss an action if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune to such a claim. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii). We will dismiss an appeal as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) 

if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

325 (1989).

Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, a judge is immune from suit for monetary 

damages arising from his judicial acts. Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 

(3d Cir. 2000). The only exceptions are for nonjudicial actions or those “taken in the 

complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S 9, 12 (1991). In 

deciding the viability of Talley’s claims, Simandle engaged in a quintessentially judicial 

act, and Talley has alleged no facts to support an inference that Simandle acted in the 

clear absence of his jurisdiction. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 

2006). 
4

We note that Talley’s allegations do not actually involve the Department of Justice 

in any meaningful way. Moreover, he may not maintain a Bivens action against a federal 

agency. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 486 (1994). 

As for his request for equitable relief, Talley’s 2004 suit against Atlantic City was 

dismissed, among other reasons, as time-barred and for failure to state a claim, making 

the dismissal a final judgment on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Plaut v. 

Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995). The doctrine of res judicata therefore 

prevents a court from re-adjudicating those claims. See EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 

F.2d 489, 493 (3d Cir. 1990). We observe that Talley offers no grounds to support an 

inference that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate those 2004 claims. 

See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480–84 (1981). 

Under the circumstances of this case, the District Court certainly did not abuse its 

discretion in denying leave to amend on the grounds of futility. See Grayson v. Mayview 

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 

In conclusion, because Talley’s appeal lacks any arguable legal basis, we will 

dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).