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21-3076-cr

United States v. Frith

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 2nd day of October, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:

BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

Circuit Judges,

JED S. RAKOFF,

District Judge.*

_____________________________________

United States of America,

Appellee,

v. 21-3076-cr

Simeon Frith,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: AMEER BENNO, Benno & Associates, P.C., New 

York, NY.

FOR APPELLEE: JESSICA FEINSTEIN (David Abramowicz, on the 

brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for 

Damian Williams, United States Attorney for 

*

 Judge Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by 

designation.
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the Southern District of New York, New York, 

NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Cote, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Simeon Frith appeals from the district court’s judgment, entered on 

December 14, 2021, revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to four years’ 

imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer 

only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Frith’s underlying conviction related to his participation in the kidnapping, robbery, and 

resulting murder of an individual. On August 7, 2020, in connection with such conduct, the district 

court sentenced Frith to eighty-four months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ 

supervised release.

On December 23, 2020, following his release from prison, Frith began his term of 

supervised release. Approximately six months later, the United States Probation Department 

submitted a report to the district court alleging multiple violations by Frith of his conditions of 

supervised release, including: Simple Assault in violation of Pennsylvania Crimes Code § 

2701(A)(1) (Specification 1); Strangulation in violation of Pennsylvania Crimes Code § 

2718(A)(1) (Specification 2); Leaving the Judicial District without Permission of the Court or 

Probation Officer (Specification 3); and Use of a Controlled Substance, to wit, Marijuana 
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(Specification 4). The alleged conduct in Specifications 1–3 related to Frith’s travel from New 

York to Pennsylvania, where, on April 28, 2021, he allegedly assaulted his then-girlfriend (the 

“Victim”), grabbing her by the throat, picking her up off the ground, and causing her to gasp for 

air. At his appearance on this initial violation report, on August 19, 2021, the district court did not 

detain Frith, but directed that he was not to have any further contact with the Victim. On 

September 29, 2021, the government filed a letter asking the district court to detain Frith because, 

on September 20, 2021, he had allegedly travelled to the Victim’s residence and raped her. On 

September 30, 2021, the district court conducted a detention hearing and detained Frith pending 

his hearing date on the charged violations of supervised release. On October 18, 2021, the 

Probation Department filed an Amended Violation Report that added Specification 5, which 

alleged that Frith had raped the Victim in violation of Pennsylvania Crimes Code § 3121.

On November 2, 2021, Frith pled guilty to Specifications 3 and 4. Following a revocation 

hearing, the district court found Frith guilty regarding the remaining specifications. On December 

14, 2021, the district court sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment, followed by a three-year 

term of supervised release, for the violations. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Frith challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his 

sentence, which we review under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. 

Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

This same standard applies to sentences that have been imposed following the revocation of 

supervised release. United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2018). As set forth below, 
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we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, procedurally or substantively, in 

imposing its sentence.

I. Procedural Reasonableness

With respect to Frith’s challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, he argues 

that the district court erred because it: (1) “either did not consider the Sentencing Guidelines at all,

or failed to take the correct range into account”; and (2) sentenced Frith “based on speculation,” 

as it relied on an unsupported factual finding. Appellant’s Br. 20–21. We find both arguments 

unpersuasive. 

“A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to calculate (or 

improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as 

mandatory, fails to consider the [Section] 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Smith, 949 

F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here, a 

defendant failed to raise any procedural objections during the sentencing hearing, we review for

plain error.1 United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). 

First, we find unpersuasive Frith’s contention that the district court failed to consider the 

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range for his supervised release violations. Chapter Seven of the 

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 Under the plain error standard, “an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at 

trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather 

than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected [the defendant’s] substantial rights, which in the 

ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Marcus, 560 

U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Guidelines sets forth policy statements with advisory sentencing ranges of imprisonment for 

various supervised release violations. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4; Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 128 (“In 

formulating sentencing ranges for violations of probation and supervised release, the Sentencing 

Commission specifically limited itself to policy statements rather than formal guidelines.”). Even 

prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), these policy 

statements, including the accompany sentencing ranges, were advisory. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 

128. Here, the record reflects that the various sentencing submissions that the district court 

reviewed, including the Amended Violation Report, correctly stated that the advisory range was 

thirty-to-thirty-seven months’ imprisonment and there is no indication in the record that the district 

court failed to consider that advisory range. See App’x at 492–93 (district court referencing the 

content of the Amended Violation Report).

Frith argues that “during the sentencing proceeding, Judge Cote stated that ‘the range in 

which she was focused’ was ‘between three years’ imprisonment and five years’ imprisonment,’” 

and “[i]t therefore appears that the district court either did not consider the Sentencing Guidelines 

at all, or failed to take the correct range into account.” Appellant’s Br. at 20 (alteration adopted) 

(quoting App’x at 495). We disagree. The district court’s statement must be considered in its full 

context. In particular, at the beginning of the sentencing proceeding, the district court first 

summarized Frith’s serious breaches of the supervised release conditions and then explained:

So I am trying to figure out where, between three years’ imprisonment and five 

years’ imprisonment, I should be choosing the right sentence here. That’s where 

my head is at. I haven’t made any decision, so feel free, defense counsel, to argue 

no imprisonment, but when I came on the bench, that was the range in which I was 

focused, having read everybody’s submissions. And I think, having talked with 
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probation, they’re at the lower end of the range I was focusing on, but they will 

speak for themselves. 

App’x at 495 (emphasis added). Thus, from that context, it is abundantly clear that the district 

court, in using the term “the range,” was not referencing its understanding of the advisory 

Guidelines range, but rather was noting its own range of the potential sentence after its review of 

the written submissions, and was providing the parties and the Probation Department that 

information as a frame of reference before they each stated their position at the sentencing.

Moreover, although the district court did not explicitly mention the advisory range during 

the sentencing, we have repeatedly held that, in the absence of record evidence suggesting 

otherwise, we presume “that a sentencing judge has faithfully discharged her duty to consider the 

statutory factors.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 

grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). Therefore, “we will not assume, simply 

from the fact that the district court did not [explicitly] reference the [applicable] sentencing range

. . . that it failed to satisfy its . . . obligation.” Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 129. In short, it is not 

“clear or obvious” from the record that the district court failed to consider the correct Guidelines 

range. Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, 

Frith’s procedural challenge with respect to the district court’s consideration of the Guidelines fails 

under plain error review. 

We are also unpersuaded by Frith’s argument that the district relied on an unsupported 

factual finding in arriving at his sentence—namely, “that [he] ‘did not explain honestly to 

Probation what he was doing and where he was living.’” Appellant’s Br. at 21 (alteration adopted) 

(quoting App’x at 494). There was ample evidence in the record to support that finding. With 
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regard to “what he was doing,” Probation Officer Rivera testified that, in July 2021, Frith told her 

that he had gone to Hazleton, Pennsylvania, “to his mother’s house to get his birth certificate” and 

denied any police contact. App’x at 231–32. However, at the revocation hearing, Officer Rivera

testified that she later learned from the Hazelwood Police Department that Frith was there to see 

the Victim and had “barged into her residence.” Id. at 232. Officer Rivera also testified that she 

learned from the Victim that Frith had visited the Victim in Hazleton a few months prior to this 

incident, in April 2021, when he assaulted and strangled her. Id. at 232–34; see also id. at 113–21

(Victim testifying at Frith’s revocation hearing about Frith’s April visit to her residence).

Moreover, regarding “where he was living,” Frith reported to Officer Rivera that he was living in 

the Bronx, with his aunt and her husband. Id. at 474. However, the Victim testified at Frith’s 

revocation hearing that he had a residence in New Jersey, where she visited him. Id. at 137–38. 

In addition, Frith himself stated at his sentencing that he would sometimes stay at a friend’s house 

in the Bronx. Id. at 508. Therefore, we discern no error in the district court’s factual finding 

regarding his lack of truthfulness with the Probation Department.

II. Substantive Reasonableness

Frith also argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing a substantively 

unreasonable sentence. Specifically, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by 

“imposing a sentence on the revocation of supervised release that exceeded the highest range of 

the federal Sentencing Guideline applicable to [] Frith’s circumstances—[thirty] to [thirty-seven]

months—while failing to enunciate any rationale for the steep departure.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. 

We disagree. 
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This Court will hold that a sentence is substantively unreasonable only when it is “so 

‘shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law’ that allowing 

[it] to stand would ‘damage the administration of justice.’” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 

265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009)). As a 

result, “we will set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases 

where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” 

Rigas, 583 F.3d at 122 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

First, Frith asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it improperly enhanced 

the sentence because of the rape specification and that the enhancement “served to ‘sanction [him] 

for the particular conduct triggering the revocation as if that conduct were being sentenced as new 

federal criminal conduct,’ despite the fact that the Sentencing Commission rejected that approach 

in formulating its Guidelines.” Reply Br. at 7 (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, intro. cmt.3(b)). As 

an initial matter, the district court expressly stated that “[its] sentence . . . would be the same 

whether [it] had acquitted [Frith] of the strangulation and rape or not.” App’x at 512. In any 

event, “we have repeatedly recognized that while the primary purpose of a revocation hearing is 

to ‘sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust,’ a district court may take into account, ‘to 

a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the 

violator.’” United States v. Degroate, 940 F.3d 167, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States 

v. Sindima, 488 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2007), in turn quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A. intro. cmt. 3(b)). 

Here, there is no indication that the district court’s sentence reflected an effort to punish 

him for the underlying criminal conduct that formed the basis for the violations, including the 
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rape. Indeed, the district court emphasized that, even independent of the strangulation and the 

rape, Frith “was violent to the victim, [] disobeyed direct orders, [] did not cooperate with the 

probation department in the way that [the district court] expected and in the way that is required.” 

App’x 512; see also id. at 494 (noting that Frith “showed himself unworthy of trust, incapable of 

following orders during these months he’s been on supervised release”). Moreover, the district 

court explained that its two main concerns in arriving at the “right sentence” were: (1) making “it 

clear to [Frith] that he has to grow up here, take responsibility for his behavior, his decisions, his 

life, and choose a different path”; and (2) “the safety of the community.” App’x at 495. Those 

articulated concerns demonstrate that the district court was not focused on punishment for the 

underlying criminal conduct, but rather on deterring Frith’s criminal conduct and protecting the 

community, which are 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that the district court may consider in the 

context of a sentencing on a supervised release violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (referencing 

Section 3553(a)(2)(B) and (C)).

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion due to any 

improper overreliance on Frith’s rape specification for sentencing purposes.2

Frith further contends that the district court’s sentence is substantively unreasonable 

because it failed to properly consider his mitigating factors, including his personal “history and

2

 With regard to the rape specification, Frith also suggests that the district court may have improperly 

considered, in its sentencing decision, testimony from the victim at the violation hearing (as to which there 

was no objection) relating to two other alleged non-consensual sexual encounters that Frith had with the 

victim. Those other encounters were not mentioned at the sentencing and Frith points to nothing in the 

record to suggest that the district court considered them in any way in arriving at its sentence. Accordingly, 

any suggestion that the district court improperly considered that testimony at sentencing is entirely 

speculative and does not provide a basis for remand.
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characteristics” or “the nature and circumstances of the offense” as required under 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(1). That contention is contradicted by the record. For example, at sentencing, the district 

court acknowledged several of the mitigating factors proffered by Frith including his “complex 

relationship” with the victim, App’x at 494, and the fact that there was “no evidence that [Frith]

reengaged with gang life or drug distribution in any way,” id. at 512. Moreover, the district court 

stated that, among other documents, it had reviewed the sentencing submission from defense

counsel, a letter from Frith and a letter from Frith’s mother, all of which also outline mitigating 

factors relevant to Frith’s circumstances. In essence, Frith simply disagrees with the district 

court’s assessment of the weight to be given to the applicable Section 3553(a) factors, but “the 

weight to be afforded any § 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the 

sentencing judge and is beyond our review, as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is 

reasonable.” Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 131 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, 

in light of the record and the reasons for the sentence provided by the district court, we conclude 

that the sentence is not “shockingly high,” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123, even in the context of the 

mitigating factors asserted by Frith. Accordingly, we conclude that the sentence was 

substantively reasonable.

* * *

We have considered Frith’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court