T he o ri gi nal co nt ract was between E q ui t ab l e Lif e A ss urance So ci et y of t he U ni t ed Stat es, t he fo rme r owner o f t he 1 S o u thla n d m a ll. S o u thla n d M a ll, L L C p u rc h a se d the m a ll a n d b e c a m e the su c c e sso r in inte re st to the c o n tra c t with V al o r. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 12, 200 4 S es sio n SOUTH LAND MALL, LLC v . VALOR SECURIT Y SERVICE S, INC.

An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. 004295-02 G eorgeH. Brow n, Jr., Judge

____________________________ No. W2003-03066-C OA-R3-C V - F iled April 4, 2005

_____________________________ This is a breac h of contract case. The service contrac t betwee n the plaintiff shopping mall and the de fe nd a nt s e c urity

c omp a ny pr ov ide d th a t th e se c urity c omp a ny wo uld“ de fe nd , in de mni fy , a ndho ld harmless” the mall for claims broug ht ag ainst the mall that relate d to or resulted f rom the services of the sec urity

company . An automobile ac cident on the mall parking lot resulted in the death of a child. The child’s mother sued the s hopping mall and the sec urity company for wr ong ful death. The complaint alleg ed that the driver of the car was under the observation of a security company ag ent wh o “ wa s o r s ho uldha ve be e n inc on ta c t w ith the drive r” wh e n th e a c c ide nt o c c ur re d. Th e se c urity

c omp a ny re fu se d to de fe nd the ma ll, ma int a ini ng that th e la ws uit didno t r e su lt f

ro m th e se rv ic e s it provided. The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt to the security company , holding that the

security company had no duty

to defe nd the suit. W e re verse , finding that the lang uag e in the complaint was suff

icient to trig g er the duty

to defe nd.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s R e ve r se d and Rem anded

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S. and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

J ohn H. Dotson and Andre a N. Ma lkin, Memphis, Tennessee , for the Plaintiff/Appe llant, Southl and Ma ll, LL C.
Charles O. McPherson and Alicia Y. Cox , Memphis, T ennesse e, for the Def endant/Appe llee, Va lor Security Service s, I nc.
OP IN ION Plaintiff/Appellant Southland Mall, L L C (“S o u t h l an d ”) i s a s h o p p i n g ce n t erl o ca t ed i n S h elby County , Tenne ssee. Southland contra cted with Va lor Security Service s, I nc. (“V alor” ) to provide on-site mall security

and publi c safety service s. The pertinent section of the contrac t provided that 1 Va lor wo uldA t t h e ti m e the c o m p la int w a s fil e d , W ise m a n d id no t kn o w the id e n tit y o f S o u thla n d ’s se c u rity ag e n t. 2 T he co m p l ai nt was i ni t i al l y am end ed on A ugust 1, 20 0 2

. T he am end ed co m p l ai nt ref erenced t he p o rt i o n of t he 3 C o n tinu ing S e rv ic e s a g re e m e n t t h a t p ro v id e d fo r a tto rn e y’s f e e s to a p re v a ili n g p a rty in a b re a c h o f co n tra c t d isp u te

. T he am end ed co m p l ai nt t hen reque st ed at t o rney ’ s fees as sociat ed wi t h bri ngi ng t hi s cause of act i o n. 2 de fe nd , in de mnif

y a ndho ld h arm le ss [So uth la nd ] . . . fr om anda g a ins t a ny a nda ll

c la ims , d e ma nd s, los se s, da ma g e s, inj urie s, lia bil iti e s, e xpense s, jud g me nts , li e ns , encumbr ance s, order s and awards ( all of which a re c ollectively

ref err ed to as “claims”), tog ether

with attorney s’ fe es and l i t i gat ion expenses, on acc ount of: (1) inj ury to o r d e a th of , an y

pe rs on

. . . o r ( 7) failu reby [Va lor ] to p e rf

orm it s obligations he reunde r, but a ll of the fore g oing shall apply only to the extent that the fore g oing r elate to or

result from the Services pe rformed or to be pe rformed . . .

un de r o r i n c on ne c tio n w iththi s A g re e me nt.
On Aug ust 18, 2000, a vehicle parke d in the Southland pa rking lot backed into a sma ll child, Diamond Kierra Wiseman, and killed he r. The c hild’s mother, Sharonda Wiseman (“ Wis eman” )

su e d th e drive r o f the ve hic le , So uth la nd , a nd“ John or JaneDo e Se c urity

Ag e nts of

Sou thl a ndMa ll, LL C” alleg ing wrong ful death. Wi seman a sserted that the acc ident occur red w ithin the observation 2 of Sou thl a ndse c urity

pe rs on ne l. Wi se ma n a lle g e d th a t “ [a]t a ll t ime s pe rt ine nt t o th is c omp la int , de fe nd a nt, Sou thl a nd Ma ll, LL C, its ag e nt an d/o r emplo y e e , wa s or sho uld ha ve be e n in c on ta c t w ith the def endant driver or dir ecting her w hen the f atal ac cident occ urre d.”

On J uly 30, 2 0 0 2 , af

t er W iseman’s wr ong ful death lawsuit was filed, Southland filed a Complaint for Dec laratory J udg ment ag ainst Valor. The de clar atory judgme nt action aske d the trial court to dec lare that Valor w as obl igated t o defe nd and indemnify Southland in W iseman’s wr ong ful death law suit. On Aug ust 29, 2002, Valor filed an answ er to Southland’s complaint for decla ratory judgme nt, deny ing any

duty to defe nd or indemnify

Southland in the wrong ful death action.

On J une 20, 2003, Southland filed a Sec ond Amended Compl aint. This amende d complaint 3

a d d e d a c l a i mf o r b r e a c h o f

c o n tr a c ta n d w i th d r e w t h e r e q u e s tf o r a d e c l ar a t o r y

j u d g m e n t

. In addition, Southland soug ht monetary damag es ag ainst Valor, including the leg al fe es and e x penses incurre d in defe nding Wi seman’s wrong ful death suit and in l itigating the bre ach of contra ct ac tion.

I n response , Valor filed a counter claim ag ainst Southl and, see king r ecove ry of leg al fee s and

e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d inde fe nd ing Sou thl a nd ’s br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im. B oth pa rt ie s the n f

ile d c ro ssmotions for summary

judgme nt. The cr oss-motions were he ard on N ovember 21, 2003. During the he ari ng , th e fo llo wi ng c oll oq uy oc c ur re d b e tw e e n th e tria l ju dg e a ndSou thl a nd ’s c ou ns e l:

Ms. Malkin: I

ag ree , y o u r h o n o r, b u t I wo u l d submit t hat that state me nt i n th e c omp la int trig g e re d th e c la im a g a ins t Southland Mall. W hen that clai m was filed, Sou thl and Ma ll i n tu rna sk e d V a lor fo r the du ty

to defe nd, which wa s declined. Court: What did S outhland do? Ms. Ma lki n: Sou thl a ndMa ll p ur su e d th a t la ws uit

.3

Court: What did they do? Ms. Malkin: Hired an attorney

. The case we n t i n to litigation and

was e ventually

dismiss ed. Court: It was dismissed? Ms. Ma lki n: Cor

re c t. Court: So somebody conclude d that the cause of action was wi tho ut m e ri t? Ms. Ma lki n: I

a m no t. Cou rt : I s th a t a

fair state me nt? Ms. Malkin: Fair statement. I ’m not privy to the ex act se ttlement

a ndwh a te ve r b ut i t w a s d ism iss e d. I wo ulda g re e to that. Court: Anything e lse? Ms. Malkin: The issue with re s p ec t t o t o d ay is Sout hland Mall’s desire to have the c osts associated with that litigation reimburse d and attorne y ’s fee s. Thank y ou, y our Honor. Court: I ’m g oing to de ny y our motion.

The trial c ourt then denie d Southland’s motion for summary judgme nt and g rante d Valor’ s motion for summary judgme nt. Southland now appea ls. On appea l, Southland alleg es t hat Wis eman’ s wrong ful death complaint trig g ere d Valor’ s duty to defe nd under the contrac t betwee n Southland and Valor, and that the t rial court err ed when it g rante d summary judgme nt to Valor base d on the merits of the w rong ful death lawsuit.

A motion for summary judgme nt should be g rante d when the movant demonstrates that there

are no g enuine issues of materia l f act and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.04. Summary judgme nt is onlyappropriate whe n the fa cts and the le g al conclusions dra wn from the f acts re asonably

permit only

one conc lusion. C

a r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995) . Since only questions of law a

re involved, the re is no pre sumption of

corr ectne ss reg arding a trial court’s gr ant of summ ary judgme nt. Bain v . W

e lls
, 936 S.W .2d 618, 62 2 (T e nn

. 19 97 ). Th e re fo re , ou r re vie w of the tria l c ou rt ’s g rant of su mma ry jud g me nt i s de novo on the re cord be fore this Court. Wa rre n v . Es tat e of Kir k , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997)

. On appe al, Southland first asserts that Va lor had a d u t y t o defe nd Southland based on the lang uag e of the s ervic e contr act. It is undisput ed that Southland contra cted with Va lor to “[p] rovide on-site mall security

/public safety

service s.” The contra ct further provided that Valor “ shall perf orm these rv ic e s a s d e sc ri be d a nda t th e tim e s sp e c if ie d b e low , a ndin a c c or da nce wi th Adde nd um A attached h ere to.” Addendum A, de signated as the “ Continui ng Service s Ag ree ment,” stated that “[a]ll exhibi ts, sc hedules and addenda attache d here to or ref

err ed to her ein ar e her eby incorporated by ref ere nce.” Ex hibit A to the Continui ng Service s Ag ree ment set forth training r equire ments for

se c urity pe rs on ne l. E xhibi t A sp e c if ie d th a t tr a ini ng sh ou ld i nc lud e “ tr a ff ic c on tr ol, c ro wdc on tr ol,

c ri me sc e ne pr e se rv a tio n, e va c uatio n p la n, [an d ] em e rg e nc y pr oc e du re s. ” Sou thl a nda lle g e s th a t th is portion of the exhibit t o the adde ndum to the se rvice contra ct shows that Valor ha d a duty to perform4

traff ic control a nd public safe ty duties. As a re sult, S outhland contends, Va lor had a duty to defe nd Southland in a lawsuit arising from those duties.
On this basis, Sout hland asserts, the lang uag e o f W i s em an’s wrong ful death complaint trig g ere d Valor’ s duty

to defe nd. First, Southland notes that the complaint listed “John or J ane D oe
security ag ents of S o u t h l an d Mall” as de fendants. The complaint also alleg ed that the “ minor plaint if f d e c e de nt w a s o n th e pa

rking lot of Sou thl a nd , wit hi n ob se rv a tio n o f s e c urity pe rs on ne l” wh e n the a c c ide nt oc c ur

re d a nd that “ de fe nd a nt Sou thl a nd , its a g e nt a nd /or e mpl oy e e , wa s o r s ho uld have be en in contac t with the defe ndant driver or direc ting he r whe n the fatal ac ci d ent occurre d.” I n a dd iti on , the c omp la int state d that “ [p]la int if fs re ly up on thedo c trine s respondeat superior and/or ag ency . . . for a ll matters relating to the law suit.”

Va lor as se rt s th a t it s r e fu sa l to de fe ndSou thl a ndin the wr on g fu l de a th l a ws uit wa s n ot a br e a c h o f i ts s e rv ic e a g re e me nt w ithSou th lan d wh e n it re fu se d to de fe ndSou thl a nd . V a lor fi rs t notes that traf

fic c ontrol was not one of its enumerate d d u t i es under the Continui ng Service s Ag re e me nt, a ndarg ue s th a t, a s a re su lt, it d id n ot h a ve a du ty to de fe nd

. Va lor c on c e de s tha t E xhibi t A to the Addendum to the Agr eeme nt, which mandated t raining in traff ic control, was incorporated into the ag ree ment. Howeve r, Va l o r co n t en ds that Ex hibit A does not set forth the job duties or responsibilities of Valor se curity g uards; it mere ly

lists t raf fic c ontrol as one of

the ar eas in whic h

s ec u ri t y gu ar d s wo u l d re ce i v e t ra i n i n g.

Va lor a sse rt s th a t th is C ourt mus t lo ok to the un de rl y ing wr on g fu l de a th c omp la int to
asce rtain if the c omplaint asserted a “claim o f t h e k i nd contemplated by the contra ct lang uag e.” Pe nny v . Ka rp , No. 200000528A, 2002 WL 31187760, *2 (Mass. Super. July9, 2002). Va lor arg ues that they had no duty

to defe nd beca

use, eve n if this Court found t hat Valor was obli g ated to provide traff ic control service s, Valor did not have a duty to be in c ontact with and dire ct the drive r of e ach

car in the parking lot. Thus, the ac cident did not result from a serviceperf

ormed or to be perf

ormed by Valor and did not trigg er the duty to defe nd.

Whil e ther e appe ars to be no T ennessee ca s e law directly on point, Tennessee case s d i s c u s s i n g t h e d u t y t o d e f e n d i n t h e i n s u r a n c e c o n t e x tar e i n s tru c t i v e

. In Dempst er Brothers, In c.
v. United States Fid. & Gu ar. Co. , 388 S.W .2d 153, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), this Court outlined the g ener al principle r elevant to the duty to defe nd:

Whe rethe co mp lai nt doe s n ot s tate fa c ts s uf fi c ie nt t o c le arl y

bring thec a se wi thi n
or wi tho ut the c ov e ra g e , the g e ne ra l ruleis that th e ins ur e r i s o bli g a te d to de fe ndif t h e r e i s , p o t e n t i a l l y, a

c a s e u n d e r

t h e c o m p l a i n tw i t h i n t h e c o v e r a g e o f t h e p o l i c y. Stated differ ently , in case of doubt as t o whether or not the alleg ations of the

c omp lai nt again st the ins ur e d s tate a c aus e of a c tio n w ith in the c ov e ra g e of the ir lia bil ity po lic y su ff ic ie nt to c omp e l the ins ur e r to de fe nd the a c tio n, su c h do ub t w ill be re solved in the insured’s f avor.

Id . at 156. Thus, in the insuranc e conte x t, the duty to defe nd is trigg ere d when the lang uag e of thec omp la int

state s a c aus e of a c tio n th a t may b e c o v e r e d u n d e r t h e p o l i c y.5

O t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a v e c o n s i d e r e d t h e d u t y t o d e f e n do u t s i d e t h e c o n t e x to f i n s u r a n c e

. In Pe nny v . Ka rp , No. 200000528A, 2002 WL 31187760 (Mass. S uper. J uly 9, 2002) the plaintiff sue d a shopping mall and the mall’s sec urity company , Spectag uard, f or injuries resulting from a f all on the mall’s sidewa lk. Id . at *3. The pla intiff alleg ed that the fa ll resulted from de fec tive condition in a brick wa lkway

at the mall. Id. at *1. The ma ll had contra cted with Specta g uard to “ police the premises a nd report all unusual or hazardous conditions note d at the premises to the client.” Id . The

se rv ic e a g re e me nt b e tw e e n th e ma ll andSpe c ta g ua rdpr ov ide d th a t “S pect ag ua rdsh a ll p ro te c t, de fe nd

. . . h oldha

rm le ss andind e mni fy

c lie nt

. . . a g a ins t a ll c la ims , a c tio ns , la ws uit s, lia bil iti e s . . . which ac tually

or alleg edly

arise out of

the ac ts or omissions of Specta guard or its employ ees under this ag ree ment.” Id. at *2.

After the plainti ff

fi l ed s u i taga i n s tt h e m al l an d S p ec t agu ar d , t h e m al l s o u gh ti n d em n i fi cation and def ense f rom Spectag uard, w hich Spectag uard de clined. Id

. at *2. As a r esult, the mall filed suit ag ainst Spectag uard. The S uperior Court of Massac husetts ordere d Spectag uard to de fend the mall in the trip and fall lawsuit, holding “that the undisputed fac ts are rea sonably susceptible of an interpre tation that it st ates a claim envisioned by

the contra ct betwe en the pa rties.” Id . at *5.

Under both Dempst er

and Pe nny , the duty

to defe nd was trig g ere d by the lang uag e of the underlying c omplaint, without reg ard to the merits of the underly ing suit. In this case, while V alor’s du tie s u nd e r the se rv ic e a g re e me nt a refa r f ro m c le ar, it is c e rt a inl y

arg ua blethat th e y

inc lud e tr a ff

ic safe ty . Moreove r, the wr ong ful death complaint clea rly alleg ed that Southland’s ag ent, Valor , was neg lige nt, asserting that Valor, Southland’s a g ent, “wa s

. . . in c ontact with the defe ndant driver or direc ting he r whe n the fatal acc ident occur red.”

Valor a rg ues that the mall sec urity g uards c annot be he ld to have a duty to direct e very

car in the ma ll p arking lot , a ndwe a g re e . It is c le ar, ho we ve r, that th e wr on g fu l de a th c omp la int in this

case alleg ed that the mall sec uri t y gu ar d ’s neg lige nce c ontributed to the ac cident. Without addre ssing the me rits of t he alleg ation, this langua g e in the complaint wa s enoug h to trigg er V alor’s contra ctual duty

to defe nd. As a re s u lt, we must rever se the g rant of V alor’s summary judgme nt motion and the denial of Southland’s summary judgme nt motion.

The de cision of the trial c ourt is reve rsed and the cause remanded f or further proc eeding s not inconsistent with this Opinion. Costs of the a ppeal are char g ed to Valor Security Service s, I nc., for

w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

__________________________________

HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE