UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JOSE ALEMAR, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

RICK RAEMISCH, Colorado Department 

of Corrections Executive Director, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 18-1245 

(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-03183-LTB) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Jose Alemar, a pro se Colorado inmate, appeals the dismissal of his civil rights 

action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm the district court’s judgment. 

I 

 On December 29, 2017, Alemar sent the district court a letter seeking an 

unspecified injunction. The court initiated this action but directed Alemar to file a 

complaint, explaining it could not issue an injunction without a complaint. On 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 4, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

March 19, 2018, Alemar filed an amended complaint, alleging that on May 3, 2012, 

he was terminated from Colorado’s inmate sex offender treatment and monitoring 

program in violation of his due process rights. He alleged that he was told he could 

re-enter the program within 60 days, but instead he was placed on restricted 

privileges and transferred to another facility. He sought an injunction to stop the 

program and $75,000 in damages for every month he remained in prison. 

 On screening, a magistrate judge directed Alemar to show cause why the 

action should not be dismissed under the governing 2-year statute of limitations, 

noting the statute of limitations defense was obvious from the face of the complaint. 

Alemar responded that he was unaware of the statute of limitations, he was 

preoccupied with challenging his conviction, he had to research his case and file 

multiple grievances, his prison law library was inadequate, and he was repeatedly 

transitioned between different cells and units. The district court rejected this 

explanation, dismissed the suit as time-barred, and ruled that Alemar’s claim for 

damages was premature under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 

 Alemar appealed, but he does not contest the district court’s decision. Rather, 

he simply reargues the merits of his claims, without addressing the court’s holdings 

that his suit was untimely, tolling was unavailable, and his claim for damages was 

premature under Heck. 

II 

We review the district court’s dismissal de novo. Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 

1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). “The first task of an appellant is to explain to us why 
3 

the district court’s decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 

1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). Although we afford a pro se litigant’s materials a 

liberal construction, we cannot serve as his attorney by crafting arguments on his 

behalf. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 

(10th Cir. 2005). The failure to advance adequate legal arguments, with proper 

citations to the record and governing legal authorities, ordinarily waives appellate 

review, even for pro se litigants. See id. 

Alemar’s failure to present any proper legal argument waives our 

consideration of the district court’s conclusions. But even if we considered those 

conclusions, there was no error. The court recognized the statute of limitations for a 

§ 1983 action is set by state law, although federal law prescribes when the action 

accrued. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007). In Colorado, the statute 

of limitations for a § 1983 action is 2 years. Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 

1160 (10th Cir. 2010). A § 1983 action “accrues when the facts that would support a 

cause of action are or should be apparent.” Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 

(10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As the district court explained, Alemar alleged he was terminated from the 

inmate sex offender program on May 3, 2012, and he was not readmitted within 60 

days. His claim accrued at that time, when he knew or should have known of his 

alleged injuries. Yet he waited until December 2017 to initiate this action and did 

not file his amended complaint until March 2018, well beyond the 2-year statute of 

limitations. Under these circumstances, the suit was untimely. 
4 

Moreover, the district court correctly determined that equitable tolling did not 

save the action. The court noted that Colorado authorizes equitable tolling “when 

plaintiffs did not timely file their claims because of extraordinary circumstances or 

because defendants’ wrongful conduct prevented them from doing so,” Fogle v. 

Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

But the court recognized that none of Alemar’s explanations for his delayed filing 

suggested wrongful conduct by defendant or extraordinary circumstances. Cf. id. at 

1258-59 (holding allegations that defendants locked plaintiff “in his cell 23 hours a 

day for 5 days a week and 24 hours the other [2] days with no access to, inter alia, 

law library clerks or prison lawyers” might qualify as extraordinary circumstances to 

justify equitable tolling). Further, the court correctly observed that Colorado requires 

a litigant to diligently pursue his claims, see Braxton, 614 F.3d at 1161, though none 

of Alemar’s allegations demonstrated he did so. Thus, the district court properly 

concluded that tolling was unavailable and the suit was time-barred. 

To the extent Alemar sought injunctive relief, the district court recognized he 

sought “to halt the DOC sex offender treatment program because it is not designed to 

rehabilitate offenders.” R. at 108. Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), 

“[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not . . . bar a suit brought in federal court seeking 

to prospectively enjoin a state official from violating federal law.” Johns v. Stewart, 

57 F.3d 1544, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995). Although Alemar has never fully developed 

this issue, his pleadings in the district court suggest the claim is premised upon the 

notion that the program doesn’t comport with or effectuate state law, which is beyond 
5 

the scope of Young. See id. at 1553 (holding that, notwithstanding Young, “the 

Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought in federal court seeking to enjoin a state 

official from violating state law”). Alemar cites Young in his brief on appeal, see

Aplt. Br. at 17, but he merely reasserts his claim without explaining how it seeks 

prospective injunctive relief under Young. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 

1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that failure to adequately present argument in opening 

brief forfeits appellate consideration of the issue). Given these circumstances and 

Alemar’s limited allegations, the claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

Additionally, Alemar sought $75,000 for every month he remained in prison, 

but the district court correctly concluded his claim for damages was premature under 

Heck. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy 

for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks 

immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal 

terms of § 1983.” 512 U.S. at 481. As a consequence, 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court 

must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it 

would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been 

invalidated. 

Id. at 487. Under Heck, the accrual of a claim for damages is deferred until the 

conviction or sentence has been invalidated. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 392-93. 

 Applying Heck, the district court correctly recognized that Alemar’s damages

claim for his alleged wrongful incarceration necessarily implies that his conviction 
6 

and sentence are invalid. And because his conviction and sentence have not been set 

aside, the court properly determined the damages claim was premature. Accordingly, 

the court correctly dismissed the claim under Heck. 

III 

 The district court’s judgment is affirmed. Alemar’s “Motion to Drops Claims 

against C.D.O.C. ‘Providing: Consequences of termination from program[’]” [sic] is 

denied as moot, as is his pleading entitled, “Emergency-Amendment in form of 

Mandamus.” To the extent Alemar requests that we appoint counsel, his request is 

denied. See Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 397 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting court may 

only request counsel to take a case contingent on “the merits of the claims, the nature 

of the claims, [the litigant’s] ability to present the claims, and the complexity of 

issues”). Finally, Alemar’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees 

is granted. The relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), does not permit litigants to 

avoid payment of filing and docketing fees, only prepayment of those fees. Though 

we have disposed of this matter on the merits, Alemar remains obligated to pay all 

filing and docketing fees, and he must continue making partial payments until the 

entire fee is paid in full. 

Judge Hartz concurs in the result. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge