### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-11-00605- CV

Texas P arks and Wildl if e De partm ent, Appellant

v. F ernando Flor es, Appellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F B LANCO CO UNTY, 424 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. CV-07 144, H ONO RAB LE DANIEL H . M ILLS, J UDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A p p e ll e e F e r

n a n d o F lo r e s b r o u g h t s u i t a g a i n s t t h e T e x a s P a

r k s a n d W i l d l i f e D e p a r t m e n t ( “ T PW D ” ) f

o r r e ta li a to r y d is c h a r g e , a ll e g in g th a

t h e w a s te r

mi n a te d f o r f il in g a w o r k e r s ’ c o mp e n s a

ti o n

c la im

. S e e T e x. L a b

. Co d e A n

n . § § 4 5 1

. 0 0 1

- . 0 0 3 ( We s t 2 0 0 6 )

. T PW D f il e d a p le a to th e ju

r is d ic ti o n , which the trial court denied. I n this interlocutory appea l, TPW D arg ues that the trial court err ed in deny ing its plea to the jurisdiction beca use Flore s did not establish a waiver of sovere ign immunit y . S e e T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Co d e A n n . § 5 1

. 0 1 4 ( a ) ( 8 ) ( We s t 2 0 0 5 ) ( p e r mi tt in g a p p e a l o f in

te r lo c u to r y order that g rants or denies plea to the j urisdiction by g overnme ntal unit). We aff irm the denial of the plea to the jur isdiction.

BACK GR OUND

Flore s was previously employ ed by TPW D as a park rang er at Bla nco State Park. I n 2009 and 2010, Flore s alleg edly sustained work-r elated injuries. Acc ording to his orig inal petition,Flore s rec eived a letter from his supervisor advising him that if he d i d n o t re t u rn t o work without

restric tions by October 15, 2010, his employ ment would be terminated. On October 14, 2010, Flore s submitt ed a worke rs’ compensation status repor t to TPW D. The report, which was co m pleted by Flore s’s doctor, indicated that Flore s was only clea red to return to work with restric tions. By letter dated Oc tober 15, 2010, Flores was notified that his employ ment was ter

minated for his fa ilure to
return w ithout restrictions.

On M ay 5, 2011, Flore s filed suit ag ainst TPW D under chapte r 451 of the Texa s L abor Code, als o k n o wn as the Anti-Retaliation L aw, which provides that a person may not be discharg ed for filing a worke rs’ compensa tio n cl ai m i n go od faith. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. §§ 451.001-.003

. TPW D answered and subsequently filed a plea to the j urisdiction asser ting that the court lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction over Fl o re s ’s claim beca use there is no waiver of

sovere ign immun ity for claims broug ht ag ainst state ag encie s under the Anti-Retaliation L aw. I n response , Flore s arg

ued that the State Applications Act opera tes as a waiver of sovere ign immunit y for his anti-r etaliation claim. See id. § 501.002(a) (10), (b) (West 2006). F ollowing a hear ing, the trial court de nied TPWD’s plea to the jurisdiction. This interlocutory appea l followed. I n its sole issue on appeal, TPW D contends that the trial court err ed in deny ing its plea beca use the leg islature has not clea rly and unambig uously waived sovere ign immunit y from suit under the Anti-Retaliation L aw, as require d by section 311.034 of the Code Construction Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (West Supp. 2011).

STANDARD OF REVIEW A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challeng es the trial court’s authority
to deter mine the subject matter of a specific cause of action. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 23 4 S. W. 3 d 5 4 7 , 5 5 3

- 5 4 ( T e x. 2 0 0 0 )

. So v e r e ig n im mu n it y f r o m s u it d e p r iv e s a c o u

r t o f s u b je c t- ma tt e r ju r is d ic ti o n a

n d th e r e f o r e is p r o p e r ly a s s e r

te d in a p le a to th e ju

r is d ic ti o n . S

ta te v . Lu e c k

, 2 9 0 S. W. 3 d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009). Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that

we r eview de novo. W

estbrook v. P enley , 231 S.W .3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007).

DISCUSSIO N The Sta t e an d its ag encie s are g ener ally immune from suit, absent an express waiver of sovere ign immunit y . Texas Dep’ t of Parks & W ildlif e v. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004)

. Texas c ourts defe r to the leg islature to w aive sovere ign immunit y from suit, be cause this allows the l eg is l at u re t o p rotec t its policy making function. Texas N atural Res. C

onservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002). Thus, a waiver of sovere ign immunit y must be expressed in clea

r and unambig uous statutory lang uag e. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman , 342 S.W .3d 54, 58 (Tex. 2011); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034.
State Applications Act and the Anti-Ret aliation L aw

The State Applications Act require s s t at e age n cies, such as TPW D, to provide

w o r k e r s ’ c o mp e n s a

ti o n b e n e f it s to th e ir e mp lo y e e s . S

e e T e x. L a b

. Co d e A nn . § 5 0 1

. 0 2 1 ( We s t 2 0 0 6 )

. The State Applications Act also incorpor ates many provisions of the Workers’ Compensa tion Act and makes them applicable to sta te ag encie s, such as TPW D. See id . § 501.002(a) (providing that “[t] he following provisions of Subtit les A and B apply to and are i n cl u d ed i n t h is chapte r except to the extent that they

are inconsistent with this chapte r”)

. I n addition, the S tate Applications Act makes the A nti-Retaliation L aw a pplicable to state a g encie s. Id

.

3I n Kerrville State Hosp i t al v. Fernandez, the Texas Supreme Court addre ssed the

very same issue now befor e this c ourt—whethe r the State Applications Act waives state ag encie s’

s o v e r e ig n im mu n it y f o r c la im s b r o u g h t u

n d e r th e A n

ti

- Re ta li a ti o n L a w . 2 8 S. W. 3 d 1 , 4 ( T e x. 2 0 0 0 )

. 1 The supreme court examined the 1989 version of the State Applications Act and deter mined that it provided a clea

r and unambig uous waiver of state ag encie s’ sovere ign immunit y for anti-re taliation claims. Id . at 18-19.

I n rea ching its conclusion, the supreme court focuse d its analy sis on section 15(b) of the 1989 version of the State Applications Act. The first sentenc e of section 15(b) incorporated the Anti-Retaliation L aw into the State Application Act. Act of Dec

. 13, 1989, 71st L eg . 2d C.S., ch. 1, § 15, 1989 Tex. Gen. L aws 1, 111-12 (cur rent version at Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 501.002(a) ). The

s u p r e me c o u

r t a c k n o w le d g e d th a

t th is in c o r

p o r a ti o n , s ta n d in g a lo n e , f

a il e d to s u f

f ic ie n tl y d e mo n s tr a

te the leg islature’s intent to waive immunit y . See Fernandez , 28 S.W .3d at 14 (citing Duhart v. State , 610 S.W .2d 740, 742-43 (Tex. 1980)). Howeve r, the second sentenc e of section 15(b) provided that the “individual ag ency shall be considere d the employ er” for purposes of the Anti-Retaliation L aw. Ac t o f De c. 13, 1989, 71st L eg . 2d C.S., ch. 1, § 15, 1989 Tex. Gen. L aws 1, 111-12. The court

ex p l ai ned that, by including this second sentenc e, the leg islature went far bey ond mere ly incorpora ting the Anti-Retaliation L aw into the State Applications Act. See Fernandez , 28 S.W .3d
at 15. I nstead, in this second sentenc e, the leg islature specific ally chose to desig nate the ag ency as

Prior to Fernandez , the supreme cour t h ad deter mined that the Anti-Retaliation L aw 1 itself did not contain a clea r and unambig uous waiver of immunit y . See City of LaPorte v. Barfield , 898 S.W .2d 288, 298-99 (Tex. 1995). I n this case , there is no dispute that the Anti-Retaliation L aw itself does not opera te as a waiver a s o v er ei gn i m m unity

. See Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman , 342 S.W .3d 54, 5 7 ( T e x. 2 0 11) (noting that Anti-Retaliation L aw has never been amende d). 4“ th e e mp lo y e r ” f o r p u r p o s e s o f th e A n

ti

- Re ta li a ti o n L a w . I d

. T h e c o u

r t r e a s o n e d th a

t th is d e s ig

n a ti o n would make no se nse if the a g ency could not be sued unde r the Anti-Reta liation L aw, r hetorica lly asking , “Why woul d th e leg islature desig nate an individual state ag ency as the employ er for purposes

o f a la w c r e a ti n g a c a u s e o f a c ti o n if th e a g e n c y c a nn o t b e s u e d f

o r th a t c a u s e o f a c ti o n ?” I

d

. a t 1 5

- 1 6

. Ba sed on these observa tions, the supreme court conclude d that section 15(b) would serve no purpose if the leg islature did not intend to waive state ag encie s’ sovere ign immunit y for anti-re taliation claims. Id . at 9, 18-19.

I n this case, TPW D does not di spute that the supre me cour t in Fernandez

held that the leg islature clea

rl y and unambig uously waived sovere ign immunit y for claims ag ainst state ag encie s under the Anti-Retaliation L aw. I nstead, TPW D contends that the supreme court’s holding in Fernandez should be re- examined in light of the leg islature’s 2001 enac tment of section 311.034 of the Code Construction Act and subsequent leg islative amendments to the State Appli cations Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034; Tex. L ab. Code Ann. §§ 501.001-051 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).

Section 311.034 of the Code Construction Act

We first examine whether the leg islature’s subsequent enac tment of section 311.034 of the Code Construction Act overr ules the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Fernandez

. Section 311.034 was a dded to the Code Construction Act in 2001 and in r eleva nt part provides:

I n order to prese rve the L eg islature’s interest in manag ing state fiscal matters throug h the appropr iations pr ocess, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovere ign immunit y unless the waive r is eff

ecte d by clea r and una mbiguous lang uag e.

5Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034. Howeve r, even befor e 2001, Texas courts had require d a clea r and unambig uous expression of waiver of sovere ign imm u n i t y . See, e.g. , City of LaPorte v. Barfi eld , 898 S.W .2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1995); Duhart v. State , 610 S.W .2d 740, 742 (T ex . 1 9 8 0 ); Texas W orkers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Texas Builders Ins. Co. , 994 S.W .2d 902, 9 0 6 (T ex . App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied)

. I n Fernandez , the supreme court applied this common-law standard, explaining that the purpose of the clea r-a nd-unambig uous require ment was “to g uara ntee that courts adher e to leg islative intent.” 28 S.W .3d at 3.

T P WD contends that, unlike the common-law standard applied in Fernandez , section 311.034 now makes clea r that waiver is eff

ecte d only by clea

r and unambig uous language

. Acc ording to TPW D, the court in Fernandez instead deter mined that the leg islature expressed a clea r and unambig uous intent to waive sovere ign immunit y , which is no longer rele vant under section 311.034.

We disag ree that enac tment of section 311.034 was intended to modify the common-law st an dard for waiver of sovere ign immunit y . As the Texas Supreme Court rec ently

re co gn i z ed in Travis Central Appraisal District v. Norman , section 311.304 mere ly codified thi s pre- exis ting, clea

r-a nd-unambig uous standard. 342 S.W .3d at 58. Moreove r, both befor e and afte r the enac tment of section 311.034, the clea r-a nd-unambig uous standard fo r wa i v er of sovere ign immunit y has foc used on leg islative intent. I n Norman , the cour t expl ained that the cur

rent c lear

and-una mbiguous require ment should not be applied “mec hanica lly to de fea t the law’s purpose or the leg islatu re’s intent.” Id. at 58 (citing Barfield , 898 SW .2d at 288). Rather, leg islative intent “re mains the polestar of

statutory construction.” See id

.

6Thus, even though Fernande z wa s decide d befor e the enac tment of section 311.034, the court in Fernandez applied the same standard for wa i v er of sovere ign immunit y p r e s e n te d in s e c ti o n 3 1 1

. 0 3 4 o f th e Co d e Co n s tr u c ti o n A c t. S

e e 2 8

. S. W. 3 d a

t 3

. We c a nn o t c o n c lu d e that Fernandez was overturne d by the l egi s lature’ s subsequent codifica tion of the clea r-andunambig uous standard. Changes to the State Appli cations Act

We next consider whether , as a result of subsequent leg i s l ative amendments, the State Applications Act no longer ref lects a c lear

and unambig uous waiver of sover eig n immunit y . TPW D asser

ts that the specific l an gu age of the State Applications Act relied on by the court in Fernandez , section 15(b) , has substantively chang ed since that decision. TPWD contends that, as

a result of these c hang es, the State Applica tions Ac t is now “too internally inconsistent” to c lear ly and unambig uously waive sovere ign immunit y . S ee Norman , 342 S.W .3d at 58 (holding that 2 Polit ical Subdivis ions L aw no longe r opera tes as waiver of sovere ign immunit y ). I nstead, acc ording
to TPW D, the lang uag e is now near ly identical to lang uag e that the supreme court in City of LaPorte

T PW D a s s e r

ts th a t, u n d e r th e T e xa s Su

p r e me Co u

r t’ s r e a s o n in g in Tr

a v is Ce n tr a l A p p r a is a l 2 District v. Norman , the leg islative chang es to the S t at e Ap p lications Act rende r it “too internally inconsistent” to satisfy the clear-a nd-unambig uous standard for waiver of immunit y . 342 S.W .3d at 58-59. How ever , the leg islature has “ continually tinkered with” the Polit ical Subdivisions L aw at issue in Norman , having amende d it more than four times since the supreme court orig inally deter mined that it ex presse d an intent t o waive immuni ty

. Id

. at 57. Most notably , the leg islature added a n express “no-wa iver” provision, which the supreme court conclude d rende rs t he Political Subdivis ion L aw “too internally inconsistent.” See also Tex. L abor Code Ann. § 504.053(e) (West 2006) (“N othing in the [P olitical Subdivis ion L aw] waives sovere ign immunit y o r cr ea t es a new cause of action”)

. The State Applications Act does not inc lude a “ no-wa iver” provision. I n short, Norman is not controlling in this case. 7v. Barfield conclude d fails to adequa tely express a waiver of sovere ign immunit y . See 898 S.W .2d at 295. I n Barf

i el d , the Texas Supreme Court held that the 1981 and 1989 versions of the Polit ical Subdivis ions L aw opera ted as a clea r waiver of sovere ign immunit y for anti-re taliation claims broug ht ag ainst political su b d i v i s ions. See id

. at 297-299. Howeve r, in rea ching this conclusion, the court first analy zed whether a cross-r efe renc e provision in the 198 1 Polit ical Subdivis ions L aw expressed a clea r intent to waive immunit y . See id

. at 2 9 5

. That provision provided that when the various statut es ad o p t ed by the Polit ical Subdivis ions L aw used the words “‘a ssociation,’ ‘subscribe r,’ or ‘employ er,’ or their equivalents” that those words wer e to be construed to mean “political subdivision.” Act of May 31, 1981, 67th L eg ., R.S., ch. 352, § 3, 1981 Tex. Gen. L aws 937, 938 (cur rent version at Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 501.002(b)- (c) ). The supreme court conclude d that the Polit ical Subdivis ion s L aw’s incorporation of the Anti-Retaliation L aw

ac co m panied by this ty

pe of cross-r efe renc e provision was an insufficient expression of th e leg islature’s intent to waive immunit y . See B a r f i el d , 898 S.W .2d at 295. TPW D now asser ts, in

essenc e, that the rele vant provisions in the curr ent version of the State Applications Act more closely rese mbl e the cross-r efe renc e provision reje cted as a waiver of sovere ign immunit y in Barfield , as opposed to section 15(b), the provision of the 1989 State Applications Act relied on by the cour t in Fernande z. As previously di s cu s sed, the supreme court in Fernandez focuse d its analy sis on section 15(b) of the 1989 ve rsion of the State Applica tion Act. Section 15(b) state d:

8[The Anti-Retaliation L aw] is adopted except to the extent it is inconsistent with this

article

. For t h e purpose of [t he Anti-Retaliation L aw], the individual state ag ency shall be consider ed the e mploy er.

Act of Dec

. 13, 1989, 71st L eg . 2d C.S., ch. 1, § 15, 1989 Tex. Gen. L aws 1, 111-12. As a result of leg islative chang es, section 15(b) of t h e 1 9 89 version of the State Applications Act has been repla ced by s ec t i o n 501.002(a) and section 501.002(b). These portions of the State Applications Act cur rently provide: (a) The followi n g p ro visions of [ the Tex as W orker ’s C ompensation Act] and [ the Anti-Retaliation L aw] apply to and are included in this chapte r except to the extent that they are inconsistent with this chapte r:

. . . (10) [the Anti-Retaliation L aw] (b) For the purposes of [S tate Applications Act] and [t he Anti-Retaliation L aw], the individual state ag ency

shall be consider ed the e mploy er.

Tex. L ab. Code Ann. §501.002(a) (b) (West 2006). Upon compar ing these statutory provisions, we conclude that section 501.002(a) and (b) of the curr ent State Applications Act, including its desig nation of the individual state agen cy as t h e “employ er” for purposes of the Anti-Retaliation L aw, are virtually identical to section 15(b). I n addition, we disag ree that the section 501.002(b) in the curr ent version of th e S t ate Applications Act is substantially simil ar to the cross-r efe renc e provision at issue in Barfield

.

L ike the v er s ion of the Polit ical Subdivis ions L aw at issue in Barfield , section 501.002(a) of the curr ent version of the State Applications Act incorporates many worke rs

9compensa tion statutes normally applicable only to private employ ers, including the Anti-Retaliation

L aw . See Tex. L abor Code Ann. § 501.002(a) (adopting all, or portions of, chapte rs 4 0 1 -4 0 6 , 408-417, and 451). Howeve r, unlike the cross-r efe renc e provision at issue in Barfield , section 501.002(b) does not simply provide inst ructions for “subst ituting one word for another in a series of statutes” See Fernandez , 28 S.W .3d at 8. I nstead, just like section 15(b) of the 1989 version of the State Applications Act, section 501.002(b) provides instructions for how to trea t state ag encie s under only one of the statutes incorpora ted—the Anti-Retaliation L aw. See id. (re jecting arg ument that section 15(b) of State Applications Act was cross-r efe renc e provision “virtually id en tical” to

cross-r efe renc e provision of Polit ical Subdivis ions L aw, rea soning that it provided “instructions for how to trea t state ag encie s under a specifie d statute”). As the supreme court rea soned in Fernandez , the leg islature would have no rea son to make this ty pe of specific desig nation unless it intended to waive immunit y for anti-re taliation claims. See 28 S.W .3d at 9. Acc ording ly , we cannot conclude that State Applications Act has substantively chang ed since the supreme court’s decision in Fernandez

or that the State Applica tions Act has bee n rende red “ too internally inconsistent.” Whether the curr ent version of the State Application s Ac t ref lects a clea

r and unambig uous waiver of sovere ign immunit y has not y et been decide d by the Texas Supreme Court. Ho we v er , sever al of our sister courts of appea ls have rec ently addre ssed the issue and held that neither the subsequent enac tment of section 311.034 of the Co d e C o n struction Act nor any amendment to the State Applications Act chang es t h e co urt’s holding in Fernandez

. See Texas Dep’ t of Aging & Disabilit

y Servs. v. Beltran , 350 S.W .3d 410, 414-15 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, pet. filed); Texas Office of the Comp troller of Pub. Acc ounts v. Saito , No. 05-10-00297- CV,
102012 Tex. App. L EXI S 5333, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas J uly 5, 2012, n o p et

. h

. ) (m em. op);

Office of the Attor n ey Ge n . v. Di az , No. 13-10-00479- CV, 2011 Tex. App. L EXI S 8349, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 20, 2011, pet. fil ed) (mem. op.). Having co nsidered these same

a r g u me n ts , w e a ls o d e te r

mi n e th a t F e r n a n d e z r e ma in s g o o d la

w w h ic h b in d s th is Co u

r t. S e e B e lt r a n , 3 350 S.W .3d at 416 (“U nder the doctrine of stare decisis, it is not our function to abrog ate or modify established prec edent.

. . . That function lies solely with the Texas Supreme Court.”); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster , 144 S.W .3d 554, 565 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, n o pet.) (“A s an i n termedia te court, we are not fre e to mold Texas law as we see fit but must instead follow t h e prec edents of the Texas Supreme Court unless and until the high court overr ules them or the Texas L eg islature superse des them by statute.”). Acc ording ly , we conclude that the State Applications Act clea rly and unambig uously expresses the leg islature’s intent to wa i v e s o v ere ign immunit y for claims broug ht ag ainst state ag encie s under the Anti-Retaliation L aw. We o v er ru l e t he TPW D’s sole issue on appe al.

CONCLUSION

We affir m the trial court’ s order

deny ing T PW D’s plea

to the jurisdiction.

TPW D also asser

ts that section 501.002(d) of the State Applications Act indicates that the 3 leg islature did not intend to waive sovere ign immunit y . This section provides that neither the State Applications Act n o r t h e Workers’ Compensation Act “author izes a cause of action or damag es ag ainst the s t at e, a s t ate ag ency , or an employ ee of the state bey ond the actions and damag es authorized by [t he Texas Torts Claim Act.].” See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 501.002(d) (West 2006); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.023-.024 (West 2011). Howeve r, this provision was expressly considere d by the Texas Supreme Court in Kerrville State Hospital v. Fernandez , and the court held that it serve d to incorporate the tort claim act’ s damag e caps. See 28 S.W .3d 1, 9-10 (Tex. 2000); see also Barfield , 898 S.W .2d at 299 (conc luding that identical provision in Political Subdivis ions L aw serve d to impose limit s on damag es rec overa b le u n der Anti-Retaliation L aw)

. We will not second g uess the Te x as Supreme Court’ s rea soning in re aching this conclusion. 11__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Henson, a nd Goodwin Affir med Filed: Aug ust 10, 2012

12