This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 6 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16
- 0606 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Christopher Davis Schultz, Appellant. Filed January 17, 2017 Affirmed Larkin , Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 27

- CR

- 14

- 32912
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jodi Proulx, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten , Presiding Judge; Peterson , Judge; and Larkin , Judge

.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N LARKIN , Judge Appellant challenges his conviction s of first

- degree controlled

- substance crime, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence against him. We affirm. FACTS In November 2014, police officers executed a search warrant at a house located in New Germany , Minnesota. The officers observed evidence of a recently dismantled marijuana

- grow operation including equipment, wiring, ventilation, temperature

- control systems, dried marijuana clippings, and paraphernalia. T he officers also found receipts

connec ting appellant Christopher Davis Schul t z to the operation.
T he house’s residential tenant , J.H. , was present when the search warrant was executed. Officers interviewed J.H. regarding the grow operation. J.H. admitted his involvement . He also suggested that Schultz financed the operation, visited the house weekly to check on the operation, and rece ived several pounds of marijuana every few months in exchange for financing the operation . J.H. described Schultz, his residence, and his vehicle to the officers. Law enforcement confirmed J.H.’s description of Schultz’s residence and vehicle.
Officer s began surveillance of Schultz’s property the same day that they executed the warrant at J.H.’s home . When Schultz left his residence that day, an officer stopped his vehicle and arrested him based on his suspected involvement in J.H.’s marijuana

- grow
op eration. The officer search ed Schultz incident to arrest and found a baggie of suspected3

cocaine

. Later, the police searched S c hultz’s car and found multiple bags of suspected cocaine weighing approximately 160 grams. R espondent State of Minnesota charg ed Schultz with two counts of first

- degree controlled

- substance crime based on the narcotics recovered from his person and vehicle. Schultz moved to suppress the narcotics , arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and concluded that there was probable cause to believe that Schultz “was committing a crime in the form of participating in a marijuana grow operation and receiving 3

- 5 pounds of marijuana.” The district court fu rther concluded that the subsequent search es of Schultz’s person and vehicle were valid. Schultz agreed to a stipulated

- facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3 , and
the district court found him guilty of two counts of first

- degree controlled

- s ubstance crime. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N
I. Schultz contends that his “convictions should be reversed because the district court erred when it found probable cause existed to arrest [him] and that the subsequent search of his person and vehicle was valid.” He argues that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and that the evidence against him should have been suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful
arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963) ( stating that if “evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of”4

illegal police conduct, the evidence may not be used against the subject of the illegal conduct (quotation omitted) ). The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution protect “against unreas onable searches and seizures.” “Under both the federal and state constitutions, subject only to a few specifically established and well

delineated exceptions, sea rches or seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable.” State v. Dickey , 827 N.W.2d 792, 798 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotations omitted). “A well

- established exception to the warrant r equirement permits police officers to arrest a felony suspect without an arrest warrant in a public place provided they have probable cause.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Probable cause exists when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the
totali ty of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.” S tate v. Onyelobi , 879 N.W.2d 334, 343 (Minn. 2016 ) (quotation omitted). A finding of probable cause requires “more than me re suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review a determination of probable cause for a warrantless arrest de novo. State v.
Horner , 617 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Minn. 2000)

. The district court’s probable

- cause determination was largely based on J.H.’s statements to the police regarding the grow operation. J.H. told the police that the operation had been in existence for “about a year and a half.” J.H. admitted that he had recently dumped his marijuana crop in a river.5

The police asked J.H. about Schultz: Q: Just a question, c an you tell us who is Christopher Schultz, too? A: Yeah I sold him a little bit, nothing to o sizeable. Personal amounts. Q: Like what’s personal amounts? A: Quarter, ha lf pound. The police pressed J.H. for details regarding Schultz’s involvement in the operation. They asked: Q: Ok , so when you give Chris [Schultz] how much for three

months? Just tell me a number. A: How much[?] Q: Three pounds, four pounds, five pou nds? A: Probably two or three. Q: Ok, so let’s say three. When you’re giving him three pounds every three months, that’s what I’m gonna call it, not five, what are you getting in return for it? Or what’s coming off your tab? A: That amount. Q: $3200? Per pound? A: Yeah. Although J.H. never expressly implicated Schultz in the grow operation , J.H

. ’s responses suggest ed that Schultz was involved:

Q: Ok seeing how you meet with [Schultz] every three months, give or take, how often do you stay in cont act with him? Is it daily? Is it weekly? A: It’s sporadic I mean. Q: Again, if you had to pick a number is it weekly, daily, monthly? A: Weekly. Q: Ok, how do you get in contact with [Schultz]? A: Just call him or text him. Q: Good. That’s a good answer. What number do you have for [Schultz]? Is it in your cell phone? A: Yeah.

. . . .6 Q: Ok. And who’s Michael? A: Michael? Q: Mike and [Schultz] together? Mike and [Schultz] come to pick up? A: No I don’t know any Mike. Q: It’s your writing man. Mike and [Schultz] will be here when (Inaudible) Might come Wednesday night. A: Oh oh, that’s ah a friend of Michael and

. . . I probably haven’t talked to him in a year and a half. Q: Is he a friend of yours or a friend of [Sch ultz ’s ] or both? A: Ah both Q: Is he part of [Schultz ’s ] op? A: No. Q: Ok, so now we got your relationship with [Schultz] , we got a way to contact [Schultz] , we know you meet him and deliver every three months. How often does he stop by and check up upon you? A: Um I mean I mean sporadically maybe twice a week, maybe one a week, maybe. Q: Just to check on you or the crop or both, right? A: Just to hang out and. Q: Check on the crop, true? A: No, just to hang out I mean we’re friends you kn ow? Q: Would it be safe to say that while you’re hanging out every time he comes, he takes a quick glimpse at the crop? A: (inaudible). At the hearing on Schultz’s motion to suppress, the state asked one of the officers who questioned J.H. about J.H.’s inaudible response. The officer testified that J.H. nodded affirmatively when the officer asked if Schultz checked on the crops when Schultz visited
J.H. The district court’s probable

- cause determination was also based on receipts found during the search of J.H.’s residence. One receipt was for a honey

- bee extractor

. The receipt contained Schultz’s name and home address. An officer testified that the ext ractor is “commonly used

— by people who produce marijuana to also extract THC from t he7

marijuana plants, and create

— a wax or hash type substance.” Another receipt was for 12
1000

- watt bulbs

. This receipt contained Schultz’s address and the name “Charlie S chultz.”
An o fficer testified that the bulbs were consistent with the kind used in a growing operation.
A third receipt was for building equipment from Menards

. The receipt contained Schultz’s cellphone number and the name “Chris Scholtz

. ” An officer t estified that the equipment purchased was consistent with a grow operation “and some of the modifications that [the officers] saw at the house.” The purchase dates on the receipts predated Schultz’s arrest by approximately one year to one

- and

- a - half years , which, according to J.H., was when the grow operation was in existence. When viewed objectively, J.H.’s statements suggesting that Schultz was involved in the grow operation and the receipts found at J.H.’s residence connecting Schultz to the operation w ould cause an ordinary and prudent person to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that Schultz was involved in the operation. Schultz argues that J.H.’s “tip was unreliable and failed to establish probable ca use for a warrantless arrest.” Where a probable

- cause determi nation is based on an informant’s tip, the informant’ s veracity and the basis of knowledge are considerations under the totality

- of

- the

- circumstances test. State v. Albrecht , 465 N.W.2d 107, 108 (Minn. App. 1991). “Recent personal o bservation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the
p referred basis for an informant’ s knowledge.” State v. Wiley , 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985). An informant’ s reliability may be established by sufficient police corroboration of the inform ation supplied, and corroboration of even minor deta ils can “lend [] credence” to the information where the police know the informant’s identity. State8

v. Holiday , 749 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008)

. Also, t he fact that an informant makes a statement a gainst his or her own interest “is of some minimal relevance in a totality

- o f

- the

- circumstances analysis.” State v. McCloskey , 453 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1990). S tatements against interest enhance reliability because “ ‘ [p]eople do not lightly
admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. ’ ” State v. Wiberg , 296 N.W.2d 388, 395 & n.7 (Minn. 1980) (quoting United
St ates v. Harri s , 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075 , 2082 (1971) ). Here, J.H.’s knowledge is based on his recent personal observation of incriminating conduct. He reported that Schultz came to his home weekly , inspect ed the grow operation , and received three pounds of marijuana from the operation every three months. J.H.’s suggestion that Schultz was involved in the grow operation was corroborated by the receipts connected to the operation and to Schultz. Lastly, J.H.’s admission s that his home housed a marijuana

- gro w operation for the last year and a half , and that he dumped the resulting marijuana crop in a river , are statement s against interest that enhance J.H.’s reliability

. In sum, the totality of the circumstances established J.H.’s reliability for the purpose of a probable

- cause determination. J.H.’s statements established probable cause to believe that Schultz had been involved in a recently dismantled marijuana

- grow operation with J.H., from which Schultz recei ved three pounds of marijuana every thre e months. Thus, there was probable cause to believe that Schultz had violated Minn. Stat. § 152.096, subd. 1 (2014), which provides that “ [a]ny person who conspires to commit any act prohibited by this chapter, except possession or distribution for no rem uneration of a small amount of9

marijuana as defined in section 152.01, subdivision 16 , is guilty of a felony .” See Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd

. 16 (2014) (defining small amount of marijuana as 42.5 grams or less ). Because Schultz’s arre st was lawful, the district court did not err by refusing to suppress evidence obtained as the result of his arrest.
II. Schultz also contends that his warrantless arrest “ was unconstitutional because there was no identified felony for which [he] was arrested. ” He argues that the “police never identified the requisite felony offense prior to [ his ] arrest.” He concludes that “[b]ecause there was no identified felony offense, police did not have probable cause to believe [Schultz] had committed a felon y and [his] warrantless arrest was unconstitutional.” It is not clear whether Schultz is arguing that before the police arrest a person with out a warrant in a public place, they must somehow pronounce or document the suspected felony offense , or that there was not probable cause to believe that Schultz had committed a felony

- level offense. 1 If the fo rmer, Schultz does not provide supporting l egal authority for the argument, and w e do not discern obvious prejudicial error. We therefore do not analyze the issue. See State v. Wembley , 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006) ( “An assignment of error in a brief based on mere assertion and not supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quotation

1 This case was submitted without oral argument.10

omitted) ) , aff’ d , 728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2007)

. If the latter, we reject the argument for the reasons in section I of this opinion. Affirmed .