C RISTINA TARANTOLA, M.D., (INCORRECTLY SET FORTH AS CHRISTINA TARANTOLA, M.D.) , Appellant,

v. WILLIAM B. HENGHOLD, M.D, P.A. , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D 16

- 3718

_____________________________/ Opinion filed March 7 , 2017. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. J. Scott Duncan , Judge

. Todd M. Ladouceur, Jessica L. Scholl, and Chris K. Ritchie of Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, P.L.C., Pensacola , for Appellant. Jeremy C. Branning, Daniel E. Harrell, and Andrew M. Spencer of Clark Partington, Pensacola , for Appellee.

JAY, J

. In this appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction pursuant to a

covenant not to co mpete , we affirm in all respects except as to appellant’s claim that the trial court misconstrued the covenant as prohibiting appellant from “practicing dermatological medicine including Mohs surgery. ” W e conclude that the injunction2 is overly broad insofar as it can be construed as prohibiting appe llant from practicing general dermatology unrelated to Mohs surgery. Appellant entered into an employment contract containing a covenant not to compete that restricted her from “[d]irectly or indirectly rendering medical services that include performing M ohs surgery in any capacity for Employee’s own account or for others.” After appellant left her empl oyment, her employer filed a complaint for injunctive relief and breach of contract alleging that appellant violate d the

coven ant not to compete. In its order granting a temporary injunction, the trial court interpreted “medical services” to “encompass all dermatological ser vices including Mohs surgery.” This appeal followed. In evaluating “employment agreements, as with all contracts, courts must apply t he ‘ most commonly understood meaning with regard to the subject matter and circumstances of the contract.’” DePuy Orth op a edics, Inc. v. Waxman , 95 So. 3d 928, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citation omitted)

. This requires construing the pertinent language “in a ccordance with the plain meaning of the words contained” in the agreement. Ferreira v. Home Depot/Sedgwick CMS , 12 So. 3d 866, 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Here, t he contractual term “medical services” is modified by the restrictive clause “that include perfo rming Mohs surgery.” Barnhart v. Thomas , 540 U.S. 20, 26, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003) ( “[A] limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately3 follows.” ). Based on this language , appel lant is clearly restricted f rom providing medical services that involve the provision of Mohs surgery

. T his restriction applies not only to performing Mohs surgery , but also to any pre - operative and post

operative medical services associated with this type of surgery . However, it would not prohibit appellant from practicing general dermatology provide d that her dermatology practice does not encompass services that directly or indirectly relate

to the provision of Mohs surgery.
As written, t he trial court’s temporary in junction generally restricts appellant from practicing “ dermatological medicine ” because the participial phrase “including Mohs surgery” is not one of limitation

. See Include , Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“The participle including typically indicates a partial list <the plaintiff asserted five tort claims, including slander and libel>. But some drafters use phrases
such as including without limitation and including but not limited to

— whic h mean the same thing.”). Accordingly, we reverse the temporary injunction in p art and remand with directions that the trial court narrow the injunction so that appellant is not prohibited from practicing general dermatology unrelated to Mohs surgery. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with directions.
OSTERHAUS and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.