PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM L. GLADNEY, a/k/a "L", 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 21-1159

_________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado

(D.C. No. 1:05-CR-00141-MSK-8)

_________________________________

David G. Maxted, Maxted Law LLC, Denver, Colorado, appearing for the Appellant. 

Marissa R. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney (Cole Finegan, United States 

Attorney, with her on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney for the District of 

Colorado, Denver, Colorado, appearing for the Appellee.

_________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BRISCOE, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.

_________________________________

Defendant William Gladney was convicted in 2007 of three criminal counts: 

violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1963(a); conspiracy to distribute more than 50 

grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A); and 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

August 15, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and (2). Gladney was sentenced to concurrent 

life sentences on the RICO and drug conspiracy convictions, followed by a ten-year 

consecutive sentence on the firearms conviction.

In 2020, Gladney filed a motion to reduce his sentence in light of changes that 

Congress implemented to the sentencing scheme for offenses involving cocaine base. 

Gladney also sought funds to hire an investigator to gather evidence to support his 

motion for reduction of sentence. The district court denied without prejudice 

Gladney’s request for funds. It then denied Gladney’s motion for reduction of 

sentence. 

Gladney now appeals from these two rulings. For the reasons that follow, we 

dismiss Gladney’s appeal for lack of standing. 

I

A

This court previously described Gladney’s crimes in detail in its decision 

affirming Gladney’s convictions and sentences. See United States v. Hutchinson, 573 

F.3d 1011 (10th Cir. 2009). Gladney’s crimes all occurred at the Alpine Rose Motel 

in Denver. The motel “was a hub of drug activity for years,” but “the business really 

ratcheted up in 2004 when Lee Arthur Thompson and Alvin Hutchinson moved in.” 

Id. at 1016. Thompson was a crack supplier and Hutchinson was “a prolific dealer” 

at the motel. Id. “Together” the two men “acted as authority figures, directing the 

drug trade at the Alpine Rose.” Id. 

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The residents of the Alpine Rose, all of whom were selected by Thompson and 

Hutchinson, “performed a variety of roles” in the drug trade. Id. Some of the 

residents were dealers “who received drugs from . . . Thompson and . . . Hutchinson 

and resold them to street-level customers.” Id. Other residents served as “enforcers” 

who “ensured that motel residents abided . . . Thompson’s and . . . Hutchinson’s 

directions.” Id. at 1017. 

Gladney was one of the dealers who lived at the Alpine Rose. “On 

October 23, 2004,” an individual named “Marlo Johnson sought to purchase drugs 

from . . . Gladney.” Id. at 1018. Although “Gladney was not in his room,” one of 

Gladney’s lookouts “gave . . . Johnson drugs.” Id. “Johnson later returned to the 

room, complaining that he had been shorted.” Id. “Apparently upset by the 

challenge to his (and his lookout’s) honor, . . . Gladney responded by shooting and 

killing . . . Johnson.” Id. “Gladney later told” his lookout “that he did so to set an 

example for other ‘punks.’” Id. 

“[A]t the height of the motel’s crack dealing operation in . . . 2004,” 

approximately “100 customers visited each day” to purchase crack. Id. at 1016. The 

district court in this case conservatively estimated that the operation distributed 

between 8.4 and 25.2 kilograms of crack.

B

Gladney, Thompson, and Hutchinson, as well as five other individuals 

involved in the drug trafficking operation, were eventually arrested and charged in 

federal court in connection with their activities at the Alpine Rose. Gladney, 

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Thompson and another individual were tried together. At the conclusion of the trial, 

the jury convicted Gladney of three counts: violating the Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1963(a) 

(Count 1 of the second superseding indictment); conspiracy to distribute more than 

50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) 

(Count 3 of the second superseding indictment); and using, carrying, or possessing a 

firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) 

and (2) (Count 21 of the second superseding indictment). 

Gladney was sentenced on June 7, 2007. During the sentencing hearing, the 

district court detailed its Guidelines calculations. The district court began by noting 

that “[t]he guidelines calculations for Count 1 [(the RICO conviction)] 

encompass[ed] the drug amounts attributed to Count 3 [(the conspiracy to distribute 

and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base conviction)],” and that, 

consequently, “pursuant to Section 3D1.2 of the guidelines, Count 1 and Count 3 

[we]re grouped for guideline calculations.” ROA at 64. The district court in turn 

noted that Gladney “was found guilty of seven separate racketeering acts” in 

connection with Count 1. Id. One of those acts “was the murder of . . . Johnson”; the 

remaining six acts all related to Gladney’s involvement in distributing crack cocaine. 

Id. at 64–65. The district court stated that the six drug-related racketeering acts 

“[we]re grouped for calculations pursuant to [U.S.S.G. §] 3D1.2(d), and [that] the 

appropriate guideline [wa]s Section 2D1.1.” Id. at 65. Section 2D1.1, the district 

court noted, “states that if a victim was killed under circumstances that would 

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constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. Section 1111, had such killing taken place within 

the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States[,] that Section 2A1.1 or 

Section 2A1.2 would be applied as appropriate.” Id. “Accordingly,” the district 

court noted, “all racketeering acts [we]re grouped for guideline calculations as to 

Count 1.” Id. The district court then noted that “Count 3 [wa]s grouped with Count 

1, and the guideline used for Count 1 [wa]s Section 2A1.1, first degree murder.” Id. 

“The base offense level . . . for this [Count 1] and Count 3,” the district court noted, 

was “43.” Id. 

The district court applied three enhancements to the base offense level: (1) a 

four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) because “there were more 

than five participants involved in such conspiracy”; (2) a two-level enhancement 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 because Gladney “utilized a 17-year-old minor to sell 

cocaine base”; and (3) a two-level enhancement “for obstruction of justice” due to 

Gladney “concealing his identity while at the Alpine Rose Motel” and “directing 

[another individual] to dispose of . . . the revolver used in the murder of . . . 

Johnson.” Id. at 66. Although “these adjustments” raised the total offense level to 

51, the district court noted that “Application Note 2 to Sentencing Guideline Chapter 

5, Part A, states in rare cases a total offense level may exceed 43 and if it does so the 

offense level is to be treated as an offense level of 43.” Id. at 66–67. 

The district court then noted that Gladney had “no prior felony conviction[s]” 

and thus his “criminal history category [wa]s I.” Id. at 67. “With a total offense 

level of 43 and a criminal history category of I,” the district court noted, “the 

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guidelines provide[d] for life imprisonment on Count 1 and Count 3 concurrently.” 

Id. at 67. The district court also noted that a statutory mandatory minimum sentence 

of ten years applied to the firearms conviction and was “to be served consecutively to 

the sentence[s] on Counts 1 and 3.” Id. at 67–68. Ultimately, the district court 

sentenced Gladney to concurrent life sentences on the RICO and conspiracy 

convictions,

1 and a consecutive ten-year sentence on the firearms conviction.2

C

In 2010, approximately three years after Gladney was sentenced, Congress 

enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Fair Sentencing Act), 124 Stat. 2372. The 

Fair Sentencing Act “increased the drug amounts triggering mandatory minimums for 

crack trafficking offenses from 5 grams to 28 grams in respect to the 5-year minimum 

[statutory sentence under § 841(b)(1)(B)] and from 50 grams to 280 grams in respect 

to the 10-year minimum [statutory sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A)] (while leaving 

powder at 500 grams and 5,000 grams respectively).” Dorsey v. United States, 567 

1 The statutory maximum sentence for both of these convictions was life 

imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (criminal penalties for RICO conviction); 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (criminal penalties for drug conspiracies involving certain 

quantities of drugs).

2 After the completion of his federal trial, Gladney was convicted in Colorado 

state district court of first-degree murder and sentenced to a term of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. People v. Gladney, 250 P.3d 762, 

765 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Gladney’s 

conviction in May 2010, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for 

certiorari in October 2010. 

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U.S. 260, 269 (2012). These statutory changes, however, were not made retroactive 

by Congress.

“The Sentencing Commission then altered the drug quantity table used to 

calculate Guidelines ranges.” Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1861 (2021) 

(citing U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)). “The Commission decreased the recommended 

sentence for crack offenders to track the statutory change Congress made.” Id. “It 

then made the change retroactive, giving previous offenders an opportunity for 

resentencing.” Id. “Courts were still constrained, however, by the statutory 

minimums in place before 2010.” Id. “Many offenders thus remained sentenced to 

terms above what the Guidelines recommended.” Id.

“Congress addressed this issue in 2018 by enacting the First Step Act” of 2018 

(First Step Act), 132 Stat. 5222. Id. at 1861–62. Section 404 of the First Step Act 

authorized district courts to impose reduced sentences for defendants convicted of a 

“covered offense,” which the Act defined as “a violation of a Federal criminal 

statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . , that was committed before August 3, 2010.” First Step 

Act of 2018, Publ. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). “An offender 

is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act only if he previously 

received ‘a sentence for a covered offense.’” Terry, 141 S. Ct. at 1862 (citing 

§ 404(b) of First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5222).

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D

On January 3, 2020, Gladney filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence 

pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act. ROA at 76. Gladney asserted that if he had 

been sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act, he “would face a maximum sentence 

of 40 years under [§] 841(b)(1)(A), and a minimum of 20 years under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1962(c), and 1963(a), and not a life sentence under either, because even though the 

First Step Act did not modify the Rico [sic] conspiracy charged under § 1962, or 

1963, it did modify [his] count three [i.e., his drug conspiracy conviction] by 

effecting the statutory minimum and maximum penalties for 10 to life, to 5 to 40 

years.” Id. at 77. Gladney argued that his RICO conviction was “related to the 

underlying drug conspiracy,” and that the drug conspiracy conviction “now 

provide[d] [a] basis for a reduction . . . because [he] was charged for a 50 grams or 

more cocaine base conspiracy, and [that] [wa]s the underlying predicated [sic] 

offense for the Rico [sic] conspiracy.” Id. 

Counsel was appointed to represent Gladney. Gladney’s appointed counsel 

requested $1,700 in funding to pay for an investigator to gather records and interview 

witnesses in support of his motion for reduction of sentence. The district court 

“denie[d] the request . . . without prejudice,” noting that “the question of whether . . . 

Gladney [wa]s entitled to a resentencing under the First Step Act” was “a purely legal 

issue for which no additional investigation [wa]s necessary.” Aplt. Mot. to 

Supplement Record at 11. The district court further noted that if it determined that 

Gladney was “entitled to resentencing,” it “w[ould] then entertain a request for 

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investigative services to address the 18 [U.S.C. §] 3553 factors that b[ore] on the new 

sentence to be imposed.” Id.

On April 15, 2021, the district court issued an opinion and order denying 

Gladney’s motion to reduce sentence.3

 ROA at 160. As an initial matter, the district 

court concluded that Gladney was “eligible for consideration under the [First Step] 

Act” because he “was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), a statute that 

constitutes a ‘covered offense’ under the First Step Act.” Id. at 167. The district 

court in turn concluded, however, that Gladney “face[d] an obstacle in resentencing 

on” that drug conspiracy conviction. Id. at 168. The district court explained:

For practical purposes, Count Three is the only count of conviction that 

is a “covered offense” under the First Step Act’s language, and thus, the 

only Count upon which the Court can modify their sentences. But 

[Gladney] w[as] also convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on 

Count One, RICO conspiracy. Even if the sentence on Count Three was 

reduced in accordance with the First Step Act, such reduction would be 

only of a technical or symbolic nature because the life sentence[] would 

continue to control the length of [his] incarceration. Recognition of this 

reality suggests that the Court should decline to resentence on [the] 

Count Three conviction[] unless or until a collateral attack on [his] 

conviction[] or sentence[] on Count One is successful, or perhaps 

conclude that it lacks jurisdiction to consider [Gladney’s] motion[] 

entirely.

Id. at 168–69. The district court therefore “exercise[d] its discretion to decline to 

consider the application of the First Step Act to” Gladney’s conviction because his 

RICO conspiracy sentence “w[ould] continue to control the length of [his] continued 

3 The district court’s opinion and order also addressed similar motions filed by

three of Gladney’s codefendants.

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incarceration,” and thus “consideration of the merits of [his] First Step Act motion[] 

would serve only a technical, not practical, purpose.” Id. at 172.

The district court also noted that “[e]ven if [it] were to reach the merits of . . . 

Gladney’s motion[], it would nevertheless deny [his] request for First Step Act 

relief.” Id. at 173. The district court noted in support that, in contrast to his 

codefendants, Gladney “was accused and convicted of Racketeering Act One, namely 

the murder of Marlo Johnson, and Racketeering Act Two, participating in the drug 

conspiracy.” Id. at 180. The district court in turn noted that, in accordance with 

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), it grouped all of Gladney’s racketeering acts together for 

purposes of its Guideline calculations. As a result of this grouping, the district court 

noted, “the Guideline that controlled . . . Gladney’s sentencing for purposes of Count 

Three was the appropriate Guideline applicable to Count One, which the Court 

determined to be that applicable to First Degree Murder, [U.S.S.G.] § 2A1.1.” Id. 

“Because . . . Gladney’s Guideline calculation was not driven by the Drug Quantity 

Table in § 2D1.1(c),” the district court noted, “changes in that table as a result of the 

First Step Act d[id] not alter the calculus for . . . Gladney.” Id. at 181. “Gladney’s 

Guideline calculation,” the district court explained, “would be exactly the same today 

as it was in 2007, and thus, the First Step Act offers [him] no actual relief.” Id. And, 

the district court noted, “even if [it] were to de-couple Count Three from Count One 

and calculate . . . Gladney’s sentence on Count Three independently, the result would 

be the same.” Id. The district court explained that if it “were to find the drug 

quantity attributable to Count Three [wa]s between 8.4 and 25.2 kilograms of crack—

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a finding that would tend to understate the quantities supported in the record—that 

finding would yield a base Offense Level of 36 under § 2D1.1(c)(2).” Id. (emphasis 

in original). Further, “Gladney [wa]s subject to 8 levels of enhancement . . . , 

yielding an adjusted Offense Level of 42.” Id. “At Offense Level 42 with a Criminal 

History category of I, . . . Gladney would be subject to a Guideline range of 360 

months to life.” Id. at 181–82. The district court stated that, in light of “the scale 

and brazenness of the operation, as well as . . . Gladney’s culpability for the murder 

of . . . Johnson,” it “would sentence . . . Gladney at the high end of that range and 

impose a life sentence in any event.” Id. at 182. Thus, the district court concluded 

that “although . . . Gladney [wa]s eligible for First Step Act relief,” it “exercise[d] its 

discretion to deny that relief.” Id. at 185.

Gladney filed a timely notice of appeal. He has since filed a motion to 

supplement the record on appeal to include the records pertaining to his request for 

funding for an investigator.

II

A

Gladney argues on appeal that the district court erred in finding him ineligible 

for a reduction of sentence under the First Step Act. According to Gladney, “[a] 

plain reading of the [First Step Act] shows Section 404 does not limit eligibility to 

defendants who were only convicted and sentenced on covered offenses alone.” 

Aplt. Br. at 10. In other words, he argues the plain text of Section 404 of the First 

Step Act compels the conclusion that a defendant is eligible for a reduction if 

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convicted of a covered offense, even if also convicted of non-covered offenses. Id. at 

12. Gladney in turn argues that “the plain language” of the First Step Act “authorizes 

a reduction for covered as well as non-covered offenses.” Id. at 10. And in his case, 

Gladney argues, “[r]educing the sentence on one count unbundles the sentencing

package, allowing the court to reduce [his] sentence as to both Counts 1 and 3.” Id.

As we shall proceed to explain, Gladney’s arguments are largely foreclosed by 

this court’s decision in United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2020). 

Moreover, as we shall also explain, the decision in Mannie requires us to conclude 

that Gladney lacks standing and that, in turn, the district court lacked constitutional 

jurisdiction over Gladney’s motion to reduce his sentence.

Sentence modification and the First Step Act

Although a district court generally “has no authority to modify [a] sentence” 

once it is imposed, “Congress has provided the court with the authority to modify 

previously imposed sentences in three, very limited circumstances.” Mannie, 971 

F.3d at 1148. “One such exception permits a court to modify a previously imposed 

sentence when a modification is ‘expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B)). 

“While this exception authorizes [a] court to implement modifications, it does not 

itself provide standards for those modification[s].” Id. “Thus,” a “court must look 

elsewhere to find another statute containing said standards.” Id.

“In this case, those statutes are the Fair Sentencing Act . . . and the First Step 

Act.” Id. As previously noted, “the Fair Sentencing Act was passed to remedy the 

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100:1 crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity.” United States v. Brown, 974 

F.3d 1137, 1142 (10th Cir. 2020). And “[t]he First Step Act made the Fair 

Sentencing Act’s changes to crack cocaine penalties retroactive.” United States v. 

Broadway, 1 F.4th 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2021).

Section 404 of the First Step Act provides as follows:

(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE.—In this section, the term 

“covered offense” means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the 

statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372), that was 

committed before August 3, 2010.

(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED.—A court that imposed 

a sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, the 

Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or 

the court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372) were in 

effect at the time the covered offense was committed.

(c) LIMITATIONS.—No court shall entertain a motion made under this 

section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or 

previously reduced in accordance with the amendments made by 

sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–

220; 124 Stat. 2372) or if a previous motion made under this section to 

reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act, denied 

after a complete review of the motion on the merits. Nothing in this 

section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence 

pursuant to this section.

Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). 

When a defendant moves to modify his or her sentence under § 3582(c) in 

accordance with the First Step Act, the district court must first determine if the defendant 

is eligible for relief under the First Step Act. See United States v. Crooks, 997 F.3d 1273, 

1278 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding that eligibility for relief under the First Step Act turns on 

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“defendant’s federal offense of conviction, not his [or her] underlying conduct”); United 

States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 666 (2d Cir. 2020). Eligibility for relief hinges, in 

pertinent part, on whether the defendant was convicted of a “covered offense,” as that 

phrase is defined in the First Step Act. Crooks, 997 F.3d at 1278. If the district court

determines that the defendant is eligible for relief under the First Step Act, it must in turn 

evaluate whether the defendant is entitled to relief. Generally speaking, that requires the 

district court to “correctly calculate the defendant’s revised Guidelines range prior to 

exercising its discretion to grant or deny relief.” United States v. Burris, 29 F.4th 1232, 

1235 (10th Cir. 2022). 

“We review a district court’s disposition of a First Step Act motion for abuse 

of discretion.” Id. at 1234. “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an 

incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (quotation 

marks omitted). “We review matters of statutory interpretation, as well as the scope 

of a district court’s authority to reduce a sentence, de novo.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted).

The district court correctly concluded that Gladney was eligible for 

relief under the First Step Act

It is undisputed that Gladney’s conviction of Count 3, for conspiracy to 

distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 

841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), constitutes a “covered offense” under the First Step Act. 

That is because the acts that gave rise to the conviction occurred prior to August 3, 

2010 (the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act), and Congress lowered the 

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statutory penalties for that offense in the Fair Sentencing Act. See Mannie, 971 F.3d 

at 1152 (“to be initially eligible for relief” under the First Step Act, “an offender 

must have been convicted of and sentenced for (1) a violation of a federal criminal 

statute, (2) the penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the 2010 [Fair 

Sentencing Act], and (3) that was committed prior to August 3, 2010”).4

Gladney argues in his appeal that the district court erroneously concluded that 

the First Step Act affords relief only to defendants who were convicted of one or 

more “covered offenses,” and not to a defendant, like Gladney, who was convicted of 

both a “covered offense” and one or more non-covered offenses. But that is a 

mischaracterization of the district court’s holding. The district court plainly did not 

hold that Gladney’s conviction of a non-covered offense precluded him, as a matter 

of law, from obtaining relief under the First Step Act. Indeed, the district court 

expressly concluded that Gladney “was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A), a statute that constitutes a ‘covered offense’ under the First Step Act, 

and thus . . . [wa]s eligible for consideration under the Act.” ROA at 167. Thus, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in considering Gladney’s general eligibility 

for relief under the First Step Act.

4 Gladney argued in the district court that his RICO conviction also qualified 

as a “covered offense” under the First Step Act, but the district court rejected that 

argument and Gladney has abandoned it on appeal. Consequently, for purposes of 

this appeal, we shall assume, without deciding, that Gladney’s RICO offense is not a 

“covered” offense under the First Step Act.

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The district court correctly concluded that Gladney was not entitled to 

relief under the First Step Act

In determining whether Gladney was entitled to relief under the First Step Act, 

the district court concluded that even if it reduced Gladney’s sentence for the 

“covered” drug conspiracy conviction, “such reduction would be only of a technical 

or symbolic nature because the life sentence[]” for the RICO conviction “would 

continue to control the length of [Gladney’s] incarceration.” Id. at 169. For that 

reason, the district court stated that it would “exercise its discretion to decline to 

consider the application of the First Step Act to” Gladney’s conviction because 

“consideration of the merits of [his] First Step Act motion[] would serve only a 

technical, not practical, purpose.” Id. at 172. 

In his appeal, Gladney takes issue with the district court’s conclusions, arguing 

that “[n]othing in” the First Step Act “restricts or excludes from th[e] [sentence] 

reduction” authorized by the Act “other offenses of conviction,” including his RICO 

conviction. Aplt. Br. at 16. In other words, Gladney argues, “Congress did not 

exclude from a reduction those convicted of RICO conspiracy or other non-covered 

offenses, so long as the individual was convicted of a ‘covered offense’ and is 

otherwise eligible.” Id. at 20. Gladney further argues that “[t]he United States has 

also conceded in multiple cases that district courts may grant reductions impacting 

the entire sentencing package, and should be held to that position here.” Id. at 16.

Lastly, Gladney argues that the “sentencing package doctrine” supports the 

conclusion that the sentences for all of his offenses of conviction may be reduced. In 

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sum, Gladney argues, “[t]his Court should conclude that the plain text of Section 404 

[of the First Step Act] makes [him] eligible for a reduction in his sentencing 

package.” Id. at 22. 

In Mannie, this court effectively rejected these same arguments. One of the 

two defendants in Mannie, Michael Maytubby, was convicted in 2006 of eight 

criminal counts, including one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He was originally sentenced to 235 months 

on the conspiracy count, as well as 235-month sentences on two other counts. In 

total, Maytubby was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 295 months. In 

2007, Maytubby’s three original 235-month sentences were reduced to 188 months 

due to an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. In 2014, those same three 

sentences were further reduced to 151 months due to another amendment to the 

Sentencing Guidelines.

In 2019, Maytubby moved for a further reduction pursuant to the First Step 

Act. Although the district court concluded that Maytubby was eligible to seek relief 

under the First Step Act due to his conviction of a covered offense, the district court 

determined that the First Step Act did not change Maytubby’s advisory guideline 

range of 151 months to 188 months, and that the First Step Act’s only impact was a 

reduction in the statutory minimum sentence for the conspiracy conviction (from ten 

years to five years). The district court determined that Maytubby’s sentence 

remained appropriate and declined to reduce the sentence further.

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Maytubby appealed and argued “that the district court erred by (1) treating the 

lack of change in his advisory guideline range as dispositive, (2) failing to provide 

Maytubby a hearing, and (3) declining to further reduce his sentence.” 971 F.3d at 

1151. Maytubby also, after oral argument and in response to an order issued by the 

panel, filed a supplemental brief arguing that Congress, in the First Step Act, vested 

district courts with jurisdiction to impose a reduced sentence for a covered offense 

and counts over which the covered offense, through the guidelines computation and 

application, determined the sentence. In other words, as Gladney does here, 

Maytubby essentially argued that the First Step Act effectively authorized, and the 

sentencing package doctrine all but required, a district court to reduce the sentence 

for a non-covered offense if that sentence was the result of the district court 

originally grouping covered and non-covered offenses for purposes of Guidelines 

calculations. 

Although the court in Mannie did not directly address these arguments, it 

effectively rejected them. Specifically, the court began by noting that Mannie’s 

“sentence for his 2018 FSA [First Step Act] covered offense [wa]s 151 months,” and 

“r[an] concurrently with two of [his] other convictions for offenses not covered by 

the 2018 FSA.” 971 F.3d at 1153 (emphasis added). The court later made a similar 

statement: “Maytubby’s sentence for his 2018 FSA ‘covered’ crack cocaine offense 

runs concurrently with his two sentences for drug offenses not covered by the 2018 

FSA.” Id. (emphasis added). Lastly, the court stated: 

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Where, as here, an offender has been sentenced concurrently, the court 

can only redress the ongoing incarceration to the extent that some 

portion of the incarceration is solely dependent on the sentence of the 

crack cocaine offense that might be reduced under the 2018 FSA. 

Id. (emphasis added).

In light of the arguments that Maytubby made in his supplemental appellate 

brief, we conclude that these statements by the court must be read as holding that the 

First Step Act prohibits a district court from reducing the sentence on a non-covered 

offense, even if, as was true in Maytubby’s case, the covered and non-covered 

offenses were grouped together under the Sentencing Guidelines and the covered 

offense effectively controlled the sentence for the non-covered offense.5

Guided by this court’s precedent, we therefore conclude that Gladney’s 

arguments regarding the ability of a district court to reduce the sentence on a

non-covered offense are foreclosed by Mannie.

6

 

5

 We note that this holding in Mannie created a circuit split because, 

approximately a month before Mannie was issued, the Seventh Circuit held that 

Section 404(b) of the First Step Act “does not bar a court from reducing [the sentence 

for] a non-covered offense” in cases where the non-covered offense “was grouped 

with [the] covered offenses for sentencing, and the resulting aggregate sentence 

included . . . sentences for both the [non-covered] and covered offenses.” United 

States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2020).

6 In Mannie, this court emphasized that a concurrent sentence on a 

non-covered offense does not always mean a defendant lacks constitutional standing 

under the First Step Act. See 971 F.3d at 1153 n.9. For example, “a sentencing court 

may have jurisdiction to reduce an offender’s sentence for [non-covered] offenses 

under [18 U.S.C.] § 3582(c)(2),” a sentence modification statute that is separate from 

the First Step Act. Id. In that instance, a court would have separate statutory bases 

to reduce each sentence—(1) the First Step Act to reduce the covered offense 

(Cont’d)

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Gladney lacks constitutional standing

We in turn conclude that Gladney lacks constitutional standing. Federal 

courts, being courts of limited jurisdiction, must always be sure of their own subject

matter jurisdiction, including that the party seeking relief has standing. Navajo 

Nation v. Dalley, 896 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2018). Standing, as an essential 

part of Article III’s “case and controversy” requirement, is a fundamental limitation 

on the federal courts’ constitutionally granted jurisdiction. See Mannie, 971 F.3d at 

1152. A district court may “modify a defendant’s sentence only in specified 

instances where Congress has expressly granted the court jurisdiction to do so.” Id. 

at 1151 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Therefore, a defendant who moves 

a federal district court to modify his sentence must demonstrate that the district court 

possesses both statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over his motion.

Here, Gladney’s eligibility for relief under the First Step Act, due to his 

conviction of a covered offense, provided the district court with statutory jurisdiction 

over his motion. See Mannie, 971 F.3d at 1152. But, as we have explained, this 

court’s decision in Mannie precluded the district court from reducing the sentences 

on Gladney’s non-covered offenses. As a result, any reduction the district court 

could have made to the sentence on Gladney’s covered offense “would not actually 

sentence, and (2) § 3582(c)(2) to reduce a non-covered offense sentence, and the 

defendant would thus have standing. See id.

But in Mannie, we concluded that § 3582(c)(2) did not authorize any further 

reduction of Maytubby’s sentences for the non-covered offenses. See id. at 1153–54. 

And here, Gladney does not rely on § 3582(c)(2) as a basis to reduce his sentence on 

the RICO conviction. See Oral Arg. at 12:15–13:35.

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reduce the length of [Gladney’s] incarceration.” Id. at 1154. Again, guided by this 

court’s precedent, we conclude the district court therefore “cannot redress 

[Gladney’s] injury” and, in turn, Gladney’s motion for reduction of sentence under 

the First Step Act “does not present a live controversy.”7,8

 Id. 

III

We DENY Gladney’s motion to supplement the record on appeal and 

DISMISS Gladney’s appeal for lack of standing.

7 We note that there is some tension between Mannie’s standing and 

constitutional jurisdiction analysis and this court’s prior decisions on those issues. In 

particular, Mannie concluded that Maytubby lacked standing, and that the district 

court in turn lacked constitutional jurisdiction over his motion, only after considering 

and rejecting on the merits Maytubby’s arguments that the First Step Act authorized 

the district court to reduce the sentences on his non-covered offenses. In pre-Mannie

cases, however, we have held that a court must assume for standing purposes that the 

plaintiff’s claims are correct on the merits. E.g., WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, 759 

F.3d 1196, 1207 (10th Cir. 2014). 

8 For this reason, we deny as moot Gladney’s argument that “the district court 

abused its discretion” by denying Criminal Justice Act (CJA) “funds for an 

investigator to obtain mitigation and other evidence.” Aplt. Br. at 26.

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