UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1357

ALDMYR SYSTEMS, INC.; ZEGATO SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

STEPHEN A. FRIEDMAN, Esq.; JOSEPH, GREENWALD & LAAKE, PA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District Judge. 

(8:15-cv-00864-PJM)

Submitted: January 31, 2017 Decided: February 9, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James P. Chandler, CHANDLER LAW FIRM, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellants. Shirlie Lake, Daniel R. Hodges, ECCLESTON & WOLF, 

P.C., Hanover, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Aldmyr Systems, Inc., and Zegato Solutions, Inc. 

(collectively “Appellants”), appeal the district court’s dismissal 

of their complaint and the court’s determination that sanctions

were warranted against Appellants, their counsel, and Donald 

Bailey, Sr. (“Mr. Bailey”), Appellants’ Chief Executive Officer. 

Appellants filed suit against Stephen Friedman and Joseph, 

Greenwald & Laake, P.A. (collectively “Appellees”), alleging 

copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets for 

actions taken by Appellees during the state divorce proceedings 

between Mr. Bailey and Appellees’ client, Geraldine Bailey (“Ms. 

Bailey”). We affirm.

Appellants first argue that the district court erred in 

granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss because Appellants alleged 

sufficient facts to establish their claims. Because Appellants do 

not challenge on appeal the district court’s dispositive 

determination that the domestic relations exception to federal 

jurisdiction1 barred their claims, we conclude that Appellants have 

waived review of that issue. See Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 

F.3d 241, 249 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is a well settled rule that 

 1 The domestic relations exception “divests the federal courts 

of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees,”

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992), and to rule on 

any issues that are inextricably intertwined with those matters.

Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 860-61 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1994).
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contentions not raised in the argument section of the opening brief

are abandoned.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Consequently, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of

Appellants’ complaint.

Next, Appellants argue that the district court erred in 

imposing sanctions. Appellants contend that Appellees failed to 

comply with the safe-harbor provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2),

by not identifying the conduct that warranted sanctions. However, 

our review of the record on appeal leads us to conclude that 

Appellees complied with the rule. See Brickwood Contractors, 

Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc) (discussing Rule 11(c)(2)).

Appellants also assert the district court erred in concluding 

that they filed their lawsuit for an improper purpose—

specifically, to harass Ms. Bailey and her counsel and to gain 

leverage in Mr. Bailey’s state court divorce proceeding. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).2 “We review a district court’s imposition of 

Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion.” In re Bees, 562 F.3d 

284, 287 (4th Cir. 2009). “A district court . . . necessarily 

 2 “Rule 11 defines the term improper purpose to include 

factors such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 

increase in the costs of litigation.” In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 

505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n 

order to determine ‘improper purpose,’ a district court must judge 

the conduct of counsel under an objective standard of 

reasonableness rather than assessing subjective intent.” Id.
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abuse[s] its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous 

view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 

evidence.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 

(1990); see Andrews v. Am.’s Living Ctrs., LLC, 827 F.3d 306, 312 

(4th Cir. 2016) (defining clear error); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 

at 520 (reviewing finding of improper purpose for clear error). 

We have carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record on 

appeal and conclude that the district court did not clearly err in 

finding Appellants filed their action for an improper purpose. 

Finally, Appellants challenge the application of sanctions 

to Mr. Bailey as a violation of his due process rights. The 

district court held Mr. Bailey liable for sanctions, jointly and 

severally with Appellants and Appellants’ counsel, concluding that 

Mr. Bailey represented the true party in interest in this suit and 

acted as Appellants’ alter ego and that piercing the corporate 

veil was appropriate. Notably, Appellants do not challenge on 

appeal the district court’s piercing of the corporate veil and, 

therefore, have waived review of that determination. See

Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 249. Appellants’ failure is fatal 

to their due process claim. See Newport News Holdings Corp. v. 

Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 433 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(holding that Due Process Clause is not violated when court 

“exercise[s] personal jurisdiction over an individual [who] would 

not ordinarily be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court 
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when the individual is an alter ego of a corporation that would be 

subject to personal jurisdiction in that court”) (ellipses and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED