alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit






Exhibit 10.14


SUMMARY OF OUTSIDE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION


Effective July 1, 2015, compensation paid to non-employee directors of the Company is as follows:


Cash Compensation


		
	•
	An annual cash retainer of $70,000, paid quarterly in advance.


Annual retainers of $20,000 for the Lead Director; $22,500 for the Audit Committee Chair, $20,000 for the HR Committee Chair; and $15,000 for the Governance Committee Chair, each paid quarterly in advance.
		
	•
	Annual Committee member retainers of $7,500 for Audit Committee members, $5,000 for HR Committee members; and $5,000 for Governance Committee members, each paid quarterly in advance.


		
	•
	A fee of $1,000 for each Executive Committee meeting attended in person or by telephone.




Outside directors may elect to defer their cash compensation under the DENTSPLY International Inc. Directors' Deferred Compensation Plan (as amended).


Equity Compensation


		
	•
	An annual grant of options to purchase a number of shares of common stock equal in value to $75,000, calculated using the Black-Scholes valuation method. The stock options vest in full one year from the date of grant and have an exercise price equal to the closing price of the Company's common stock on the date of grant. Stock options are exercisable for ten years from the grant date, subject to earlier expiration in the event of termination or retirement.


		
	•
	An annual grant of restricted stock units (RSUs), the number of which is determined by dividing $75,000 by the closing price of the Company's common stock on the date of grant. The RSUs vest one year from the date of grant and are payable to outside directors in shares of common stock upon vesting unless the director elects to defer settlement of the RSUs to a future date. Outside directors are entitled to receive dividend equivalents on the RSUs in the event the Company pays a regular cash dividend on its common stock.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-40529

(Summary Calendar)

 

SERGIO MORAIDA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

J. LAMBRIGHT, Correctional Officer, Gurney Unit;

T. GREENWOOD, CPT, Gurney Unit; UNIDENTIFIED

SMITH, Major, Gurney Unit; BRENDA CHANEY,

Asst. Warden, Gurney Unit; MICHAEL WILSON,

Warden, Gurney Unit; JANIE M. COCKRELL, Warden,

Regional Director, TDCJ-ID, WAYNE SCOTT DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; JAMES A. COLLINS,

DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

 Defendants-Appellees.

__________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:95-CV-581

__________________________________________

August 5, 1997

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is

not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR R. 47.5.4.

2

PER CURIAM:*

Sergio Moraida, # 674366, appeals the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (now (e)(2)(B)(I)) dismissal

of his due process claim and the judgment for the defendant on his excessive force claim after a

bench trial. Moraida makes generalized attacks on the factual findings of the magistrate judge. 

He contends that he accidently touched Lambright’s elbow and that he was not belligerent or

aggressive. He alleges perjury and conflicting statements and testimony by the defendants’

witnesses. Moraida offers no reason to question the magistrate judge’s factual findings. They are

not clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed on appeal. Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 843 (5th

Cir. 1993).

Moraida argues that he did not pose a reasonably perceived threat to warrant being

assaulted by Officer Lambright and that there was no need for force. “[W]henever prison officials

stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,

the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 6-7 (1992). The magistrate judge’s conclusions on the core inquiry are correct.

Moraida challenges the magistrate judge’s dismissal of his due process claim against

Greenwood and the supervisory officials. Moraida did not state a due process claim because his

punishment was 15 days solitary confinement and classification as medium custody for 90 days. 

He did not have a liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995).

Moraida argues that he should have been appointed counsel in the district court because

he is Spanish-speaking and cannot speak fluent English. Moraida does not point out any errors in
3

the magistrate judge’s statement of the facts which allegedly resulted from his inability to

communicate the facts of his claim. The magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in denying

appointment of counsel. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982).

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 23


                          CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP

We consent to the  incorporation  by  reference in the  Registration  Statements
(Form S-8 Nos.  33-82968 and 33-98896)  pertaining to the 1994 Stock Plan and in
the Registration  Statement (Form S-4 No.  33-95854) of Movie Gallery,  Inc. and
the related  Prospectus of our report dated  February 12, 1997,  with respect to
the consolidated  financial  statements of Movie Gallery,  Inc.  included in the
Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the fiscal year ended January 5, 1997.



                                                   /s/Ernst & Young LLP



Birmingham, Alabama
April 3, 1997
EX-10.12



 Exhibit 10.12 

SECOND AMENDMENT TO LEASE 

THIS SECOND AMENDMENT TO LEASE (“Second Amendment”) is made and entered into as of this 1st day of January 2016 by and
between BOULDER ROAD LLC, a Colorado limited liability company (“Landlord”), and GAIAM AMERICAS, INC., a Colorado corporation (“Tenant”). 

WITNESSETH 

WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant are parties to that certain Lease Agreement dated January 1, 2015, and as amended September 3,
2015, (collectively hereinafter referred to as the “Lease”), for certain property more particularly describe therein (the “Premises”) located at 833 West South Boulder Road, Louisville, CO. 

WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant agree the Effective Date of this First Amendment is the
1st day of January 2016. 
 WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant desire to amend the
Lease as hereinafter set forth. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing Recitals the mutual covenants herein contained,
and good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties herby agree as follows: 
  

	 	1.	Defined Terms. Except as herein modified or amended, the provisions, conditions and terms of the Lease shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect and are hereby ratified and confirmed by the parties
hereto. Any capitalized term used in this Second Amendment and not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Lease. 

  

	 	2.	Reduction of Premises. Landlord and Tenant hereby agree to remove from the Tenant Premises the area illustrated and attached hereto as Exhibit A. 


 

	 	3.	Reduction of Rentable Square Feet. Landlord and Tenant hereby agree to reduce Tenant’s Premises by 596 square feet. 

  

	 	4.	Revised Square Feet and Pro Rata Share. Upon the Effective Date of this Second Amendment, Tenant Premises will be a total of 40,964 square feet. Tenant Pro Rata share, as defined in Section 4(c) of the Lease
will be 27.26%, the numerator of which is 40,964 square feet and the denominator of which is 150,262 square feet. 

  

	 	5.	Miscellaneous. With the exception of those terms and conditions specifically modified and amended herein, the Lease shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with all its terms and conditions. In the
event of any conflict between the terms and conditions of this Second Amendment and the terms and conditions of the Lease, the terms and conditions of this Second Amendment shall control. 


[SIGNATURE PAGE TO FOLLOW] 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Landlord and Tenant, acting herein by duly authorized individuals,
have caused these presents to be executed, effective as of the Effective Date set forth herein. 
  

			
	 LANDLORD:
  

BOULDER ROAD, LLC
 a Colorado limited liability
company

		
	By:	 	/s/ Paul Tarell, Jr.
	Name:	 	Paul Tarell
	Title:	 	Chief Financial Officer
		
	Date:	 	February 1, 2016
	
	 TENANT:
  

GAIAM AMERICAS, INC
 a Colorado
corporation

		
	By:	 	/s/ Lynn Powers
	Name:	 	Lynn Powers
	Title:	 	Chief Executive Officer
		
	Date:	 	February 1, 2016
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack,

 Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 

November 22, 2019

Order 

Clerk

November 22, 2019

159513

OMEGA REHAB SERVICES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

ADVANCED SURGERY CENTER, LLC,

Intervening Plaintiff

SC: 159513

v COA: 342067

Oakland CC: 16-014980-NF

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE COMPANY

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties 

agreeing to the dismissal of this application for leave to appeal is considered, and the 

application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs.
----

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects the financial condition and results of the Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| August 14, 2014 | By:    | /s/ Timothy Keogh                     |   |
|-----------------|--------|--------------------------------------------|--------|
|            |   | Timothy Keogh,                             |   |
|            |   | Principal Executive Officer                |   |
|            |   |                                       |   |
|            |   |                                       |   |
| August 14, 2014 | By:    | /s/ Benjamin Barton                        |   |
|            |   | Benjamin Barton,                           |   |
|            |   | Principal Financial and Accounting Officer |   |

----
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1631

___________ Alan Cobb, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Appeal from the United States Chrysler Corporation; International * District Court for the Union, United Automobile, Aerospace * Eastern District of Missouri. & Agricultural Implement Workers of * America, Local 110; International * [UNPUBLISHED] Union, United Automobile, Aerospace * & Agricultural Implement Workers of * America, Region 5, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 28, 1998 Filed: May 1, 1998

___________ Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.The Honorable Edward L. Filippine, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1 district of Missouri. -2- Alan Cobb appeals from the district court & s entryof summary judgment in favor 1 of Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler); International Union--United Automobile , Aerospac e and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Region 5; an d In ternational Union--United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implemen t Work ers of America, Local 110 (collectively with Region 5, UAW), in this actio n alleging that UAW breache d its duty of fair representation and that Chrysler breached the collective bargaining agreement. We affirm. After Chrysler discharged Cobb for an u nauthorized, unexcused absence, UAW filed a grievance on behalf of Cobb, which it later withdrew. Cobb did not attempt to appeal the grievance withdrawal until after the thirty-day ti me period in which to do so, as provid ed by the UAW & s Constitution. We thus agree with the district court that Cobb failed to timely exhaust his internal union remedies. See Clayton v. Automobile Workers , 451 U.S. 679, 687-89, 694-96 (1989) (general ly, prior to commencing action alleging union breached duty of fair representation and employer breached collective bargaining agreement in federal court, employee must exhaust int ernal union remedies).
We furthe r conclude that Cobb & s additional arguments on appeal are withou t merit. The judgment is affirmed.-3-

A true copy. Attest: CLE RK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
.
#### Dolores Theresa DOHM, Appellant, v. Francis D. O’CONNOR, Judge of the Municipal Court in and for the City of Wilton Manors, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.

No. 38491.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 4, 1970.

A. Joseph Forzano, Hollywood, for appellant.

William G. Miller, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed under the authority of Smith v. Davis (Fla.1970) 231 So.2d 517, and De Jong v. Pallotto, 239 So.2d 252, decided by this court September 16, 1970, without prejudice to whatever rights, if any, the appellant may have under chapter 70-372 1 Laws of Florida, enacted by the Legislature 1970.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, DREW, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, C. J. (dissenting):

1

. Chapter 70-372 is: “An Act relating to criminal trial procedure; amending chapter 932, Florida Statutes, by adding sections 932.61 through 932.66, to provide that a person charged with a violation of a county or municipal ordinance for which no jury trial is provided, when said violation is also a violation of state law, may cause the transfer of said case to the appropriate court in which a trial by jury is provided; establishing the method and procedure for such transfer; providing for the transfer of surety bonds ; providing suggested forms for such transfer; providing an effective date.”

ERVIN, C. J.

(dissenting):

It appears to me that under our state constitution and laws a right to demand a trial by jury is fundamental and must be granted if imprisonment may be imposed upon conviction of the defendant, regardless of whether the prosecution arises under a state statute or a municipal ordinance and regardless of whether the trial is held in a state or county court or in a municipal court. An interesting article on the subject, prepared by Honorable Osee R. Fagan, Attorney at Law, Gainesville, Florida, entitled “Jury Trials in Municipal Court, Circa 1970,” appears in the October 1970 issue of The Florida Bar Journal, p. 442, et seq.
#### Roderick F. ELLIOTT and Lorenzo D. Purvis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF WELD COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and Sheriff Ed Jordan, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89CA0547.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. VI.

July 5, 1990.

Roderick F. Elliott, pro se.

Lorenzo D. Purvis, pro se.

Thomas O. David, County Atty., and Bruce T. Barker, Asst. County Atty., Greeley, for defendants-appellees.

Opinion by

Judge SILVERSTEIN *.

Plaintiffs, Roderick F. Elliott and Lorenzo D. Purvis, appeal the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants, the Board of Weld County Commissioners and Sheriff Ed Jordan. We affirm.

On May 9,1988, the Board of Weld County Commissioners passed a resolution which prohibited smoking in all of the county’s buildings. Plaintiffs, who were at one time incarcerated at the Weld County jail, instituted this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. On defendants’ motion, the trial court entered summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint.

On appeal, plaintiffs claim they have a liberty and property right to smoke tobacco products by virtue of § 25-14-102, C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11A), which, according to plaintiffs, requires that public facilities include an area for people who wish to smoke. Plaintiffs therefore argue that enforcement of the county resolution violates the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection. The argument is without merit.

*72Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, nothing in § 25-14-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11 A) requires that public buildings include an area for people who smoke. Moreover, § 25-14-105 expressly authorizes counties to regulate smoking in public places. We therefore conclude that the statute does not give rise to a constitutional right to smoke in a jail or prison. *See Hewitt v. Helms,*459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).

Plaintiffs next contend that enforcement of the resolution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment affords protection only against those conditions of confinement that involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, that result in the deprivation of basic human needs, or that are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. *Rhodes v. Chapman,*452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).

Applying this principle to the instant case, we conclude that the enforcement within the Weld County jail of the resolution regulating smoking does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. *Accord Doughty v. Board of County Commissioners,*731 F.Supp. 423 (D.Colo.1989).

Plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

STERNBERG, C.J., and NEY, J., concur.

*

 Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of the *Colo. Const.,*art. VI, Sec. 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10B).
ITRI EX-10.6 12.31.13






Exhibit 10.6
      
INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS    
      
MariLyn R. Blair    
Robert M. Burks, Jr.
Michel C. Cadieux    
Barbara J. Doyle
Deloris R. Duquette    
Kirby A. Dyess      
Jon E. Eliassen    
Charles H. Gaylord    
Thomas S. Glanville    
Steven M. Helmbrecht    
John W. Holleran    
Phillip Le Bris    
Chuck McAtee    
Philip C. Mezey    
Sharelynn F. Moore
Sharon L. Nelson    
Simon Pontin
Carl W. Porter    
Gary E. Pruitt    
Michael V. Pulli
Marcel Regnier    
Jared P. Serff    
Russell E. Vanos    
Shannon M. Votava
Robert W. Whitney    
Graham M. Wilson    
Lynda L. Ziegler
<PAGE>
                                                                       Exhibit 8


                              LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES

I.       EMPAQUES DE CARTON TITAN, S.A. DE C.V.
         --------------------------------------

         A.       Envases y Empaques de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.

                  1.       Industrias Centauro, S.A. de C.V.

         B.       Cartonpak, S.A. de C.V.

         C.       Cajas y Corrugados de Chihuahua, S.A. de C.V.

         D.       Central de Envases y Empaques, S.A. de C.V.

         E.       Papelera Heda, S.A. de C.V.

         F.       Ectsa International, Inc.

II.      DURANGO INTERNATIONAL, INC.
         ---------------------------

         A.       Durango McKinley Paper Company

III.     COMPANIA PAPELERA DE ATENQUIQUE, S.A. DE C.V.
         ---------------------------------------------

         A.       Forestal de Jalisco, S.A. de C.V.

IV.      PONDEROSA INDUSTRIAL DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V.
         --------------------------------------------

V.       PORTEADORES DE DURANGO, S.A. DE C.V.
         ------------------------------------

VI.      ADMINISTRACION CORPORATIVA DE DURANGO, S.A. DE C.V.
         ---------------------------------------------------

VII.     GRUPO PIPSAMEX, S.A. DE C.V.
         ----------------------------

         A.       Fabricas de Papel Tuxtepec, S.A. de C.V.

         B.       Fabrica Mexicana de Papel, S.A. de C.V.

         C.       Productora Nacional de Papel, S.A. de C.V.

         D.       Fibras de Durango, S.A. de C.V.

         E.       Papeles Forma-Todo, S.A. de C.V.

<PAGE>

VIII.    DURANGO PAPER COMPANY
         ---------------------

         A.       Durango Georgia Paper Company

         B.       Durango-Georgia Converting Corporation

                  1.       Durango-Georgia Converting, LLC

         C.       St. Marys Railroad, LLC

                                       -2-
NO. SCWC-11-0000595

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

CHEYNE DE LA GARZA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF HAWAI # I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CR NO. 08-0421(4); S.P.P. No. 10-1-0021(4))

ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By : Reck tenwal d, C.J ., Nak ayama, Ac oba , M cKe nna , a nd Pol lac k, JJ. )

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Cheyne De La Garza’s application for writ of certiorari, filed on September 10, 2012, is hereby accepted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that no oral argument will be heard in this case. Any party may, within ten (10) days and pursuant to Rule 34(c) of the Hawai # i Rules of Appellate Procedure, move for retention of oral argument.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, October 19, 2012. Cheyne De La Garza, /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald petitioner pro se /s/ Paula A. Nakayama John D. Kim and Artemio C. Baxa, /s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr. for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-11-0000595 19-OCT-2012 10:10 AM
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT DANIEL STEVE DIXON,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt, v. S. LAR OSA, C o rre c tiona l Offic e r; e t a l., De fe nda nts-Appe lle e s. No. 15-15812 D.C . No. 2:10-c v-01441-TLNKJN M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia Troy L. Nunle y , Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d July 26, 2016 ** B e fore : SC HR O EDER , C ANB Y, a n d C ALLAHAN, C irc uit Judge s. C a lifornia sta te prisone r Danie l Ste ve Dixon a ppe a ls pro se from

the distric t c ourt’ s sum

m ary judgm e nt in his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 a c tion a rising out of a

n a lle ge dly re ta lia t ory c e ll se arc h. W e hav e jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e re vie wde novo, Toguc hi v . C hung , 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th C ir. 2004), a nd 

# FIL ED AUG 04 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).we a ffirm .

The distric t c ourt prope rly grante d sum

m a ry judgm e nt on Dixon’ s re ta lia tion c la im a ga inst de fe nda

nt LaR osa

be c a u se Dixon fa ile d to ra ise a ge n uine disputeof m ate ria l fa c t a s to whe the r La R osa wa s a ware of a ny prote c te d a c tivity

whe n he se arc he d Dixon’ s c e ll. Se eRhode s v . Robinson , 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th C ir. 2005) (se tting forth e le m e nts of a re ta lia t ion c la im in the prison c onte xt). To the e xte nt tha

t Dixon intende d to c ha lle nge the dism issa l of his re ta lia tion c la im a ga inst de fe nda

nt Ke e na n, we do not c onside r this issue be c a use it wa s not spe c ific a lly

and distinc tly

ra ise d a nd a rgue d in theope ning brie f . Se ePadge tt v . W right , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th C ir. 2009). AFFIRM E D.

1 5 - 1 5 8 1 2 2