Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Chris Palmer Frazier

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Richard C. Webster

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

William P. Guffey,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 13, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

70A01-1409-CR-410

Appeal from the Rush Circuit Court.

The Honorable David E. Northam, 

Judge.

Cause No. 70C01-1311-FB-757

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 2 of 15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, William P. Guffey (Guffey), appeals his sentence 

following his conviction for aggravated battery, a Class B felony, Ind. Code § 

35-42-2-1.5 (2013); battery resulting in bodily injury to a law enforcement 

officer, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(A) (2013); and disorderly 

conduct, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a) (2013).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Guffey raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion; and

(2) Whether Guffey’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and his character.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On the early morning of November 10, 2013, emergency personnel were

dispatched to 7139 W. North Street in Arlington, Rush County, Indiana, on a 

report of a possible overdose. Rushville Police Deputy Douglas Keith (Deputy 

Keith) arrived as the medics were preparing to load Guffey, who was 

unresponsive, into the ambulance. Deputy Keith spoke with Guffey’s wife, 

Deborah Guffey (Deborah), who stated that Guffey had consumed a large 

quantity of Adderall pills and alcohol. She also warned that when Guffey woke 

up, he would likely be combative.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 3 of 15

[5] Deputy Keith accompanied the ambulance to Rush Memorial Hospital, and 

Guffey began regaining consciousness en route. As Deborah predicted, Guffey

was uncooperative and aggressive. Upon arrival at the emergency room at 

approximately 4:00 a.m., Guffey threatened and verbally abused the medical 

providers, and he grabbed the hand of a nurse and twisted it as he yelled at her 

not to touch him again. Deputy Keith warned Guffey that if he continued to 

harass and harm the hospital staff, he would be arrested. Guffey was hooked 

up to an IV, and he drifted in and out of sleep for most of the morning. When 

he woke up, he was belligerent. He tried to pull his IV out, and he was loud, 

obnoxious, and profane. Guffey’s continuous yelling disrupted the entire 

emergency department, so police officers were summoned two different times to 

help get Guffey under control. The officers warned Guffey that if they had to 

come back a third time, he would be arrested for disorderly conduct.

[6] In order to counteract the effects of the Adderall, a nurse administered multiple 

doses of Ativan. Whereas Adderall is a stimulant, Ativan is a downer that will 

reduce the heart rate and blood pressure and will help decrease the 

impulsiveness and agitation brought on by Adderall. As the day progressed,

Guffey began to sober up, and with the help of the Ativan, he generally became 

more cooperative. However, he continued to have periodic outbursts, which 

were countered with additional doses of Ativan.

[7] Guffey made it clear that he wanted to leave the hospital, but his doctor was

concerned that lethal doses of Adderall could still be in his system. In addition, 

there was a concern that Guffey might be suicidal and could harm himself if 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 4 of 15

released. The doctor thus gave Guffey the option of either remaining in the 

hospital voluntarily for twenty-four hours for observation or to be committed to 

a seventy-two hour lockdown at a psychiatric facility. Guffey agreed that he 

would stay at the hospital, so at approximately 2:00 p.m., he was moved from 

the emergency room to a private room where his vitals could be constantly 

monitored. However, just two hours later, Guffey decided that he was going to 

leave. He unhooked himself from the monitors and headed toward the exit.

[8] After discovering that Guffey had disappeared from his room, a nurse found 

him in the parking lot and tried to convince him to return to his room because 

he had not yet been discharged. When Guffey indicated that he was going 

home, the nurse asked him to let her remove his IV first. Instead, Guffey 

shouted obscenities and ripped the IV out of his arm and threw it on the 

ground. By this time, Sergeant Brent Campbell (Sergeant Campbell) had 

responded to the hospital’s third call for help with Guffey.

[9] Sergeant Campbell was discussing the situation with the nurses and Deborah 

when Police Chief Craig Tucker (Chief Tucker) arrived. Chief Tucker—who 

had responded to the hospital’s prior calls for Guffey—asked Guffey to quiet 

down, but Guffey just screamed that he wanted to leave and to smoke a 

cigarette. Deborah explained to Sergeant Campbell that if Guffey could just 

smoke a cigarette, he would readmit himself. Rush Memorial Hospital is a 

smoke-free campus, so in order to diffuse the situation, Sergeant Campbell 

suggested that Guffey could walk to a nearby restaurant’s parking lot to smoke. 

Deborah conveyed the information to Guffey, and as Guffey crossed the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 5 of 15

parking lot, he shouted “[s]omething to the effect of corn fed mother f***ing 

pussies” among other profanities. (Tr. p. 234).

[10] Based on the fact that Guffey continued to be excessively loud and disruptive, 

Chief Tucker approached Guffey and informed him that he was under arrest 

and asked him to put his hands behind his back. Chief Tucker took out his 

handcuffs and reached for one of Guffey’s arms, but Guffey “pulled away and 

then turned his body into a bladed position which . . . would be like a fighting 

position.” (Tr. p. 235). Guffey then shoved him in the chest, so Chief Tucker 

grabbed Guffey’s shoulders and used a leg sweep maneuver to subdue him, but 

Guffey pulled Chief Tucker down with him. As the men fell to the ground, 

Chief Tucker’s elbow shattered on impact. The “excruciating” pain prevented 

Chief Tucker from moving his arm, and Guffey was able to roll over on top of 

him and secure Chief Tucker in a headlock. (Tr. p. 273). While maintaining 

the chokehold, Guffey gouged Chief Tucker’s eyes and scratched his face.

[11] Sergeant Campbell rushed to assist Chief Tucker, but he was unable to pull 

Guffey off of him. As Sergeant Campbell searched for a taser in Chief Tucker’s 

belt, a nearby paramedic and EMT student came to Chief Tucker’s aid, 

grabbing onto Guffey’s arms to break the chokehold enough for Chief Tucker to 

slip his head out. Sergeant Campbell attempted to secure Guffey in handcuffs 

but noticed that blood was running down Chief Tucker’s face. Realizing that 

Guffey was still jamming his fingers into Chief Tucker’s eye sockets and 

appeared to be biting his face, Sergeant Campbell—with the help of a nurse

bystander—grabbed Guffey by the hair and pinned his head down to the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 6 of 15

pavement while they handcuffed Guffey. All the while, Guffey continued to 

scream profanities and fight—kicking Sergeant Campbell repeatedly in the back

until he was placed in leg shackles. As the officers were arranging for Guffey’s 

transport to jail, Guffey asked Chief Tucker, “[H]ow’s your eye now bitch, 

how’s that you pussy[?]” (Tr. p. 277). Chief Tucker required reconstructive 

surgery to repair his elbow; however, he no longer has full range of motion and 

continues to experience pain. Chief Tucker was also treated for a scratched 

cornea and the abrasions on his face.

[12] On November 12, 2013, the State filed an Information, charging Guffey with 

Count I, aggravated battery, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5 (2013); Count 

II, battery resulting in bodily injury to a law enforcement officer, a Class D 

felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(A) (2013); Count III, battery resulting in bodily 

injury to a law enforcement officer, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(A) 

(2013); Count IV, disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-45-1-

3(a) (2013); and Count V, resisting law enforcement, a Class D felony, I.C. § 

35-44.1-3-1(a),(b)(1)(B) (2013).

[13] On August 4, 2014, the State filed a motion to dismiss Count III, battery 

resulting in bodily injury to a law enforcement officer as a Class D felony, 

which the trial court granted on August 11, 2014. On August 12-14, 2014, a 

jury trial was held. At the close of the evidence, the jury found Guffey guilty as 

charged, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on the same. On 

August 29, 2014, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court 

vacated Count V, resisting law enforcement as a Class D felony, based on 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 7 of 15

double jeopardy concerns. The trial court imposed a term of fifteen years on 

Count I; eighteen months on Count II; and 180 days on Count IV. The trial 

court further ordered that the sentences should all be served concurrently, for an 

aggregate sentence of fifteen years, with ten years executed in the Indiana 

Department of Correction (DOC) and five years suspended to probation.

[14] Guffey now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Sentencing Discretion

[15] Guffey claims that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion. Sentencing 

decisions are matters left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. 

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490, clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). On 

appeal, we review a trial court’s sentencing order only for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. It is an abuse of discretion if the trial court’s “decision is ‘clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or 

the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” Id.

(quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). Our supreme court has 

determined that in matters of sentencing, a trial court may abuse its discretion 

by failing to enter a sentencing statement, entering a finding of aggravating and 

mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record, omitting reasons that are 

clearly supported by the record and are advanced for consideration, or by 

including reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. If we find 

that the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing 

“‘if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 8 of 15

same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the 

record.’” Sandleben v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491), trans. denied.

[16] In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial court identified Guffey’s 

criminal record as a slight aggravator and the fact that the victim was a law 

enforcement officer engaged in his official duties (only for the aggravated 

battery charge) as a strong aggravating circumstance. The court considered the 

fact that Guffey led a law-abiding life for intermittent periods of time; that 

incarceration would be a hardship for his family; and Guffey’s expression of 

remorse as slight mitigators. The trial court “note[d] that for the most part [the

aggravating and mitigating factors] balance each other out and offset each 

other.” (Tr. p. 414). However, with respect to Count I, Class B felony 

aggravated battery, the trial court found that because Guffey’s victim was a law 

enforcement officer, the aggravating circumstances “substantially outweigh” the 

mitigators. (Tr. p. 415). Accordingly, the trial court imposed an enhanced 

sentence of fifteen years on Count I, of which five years was suspended to 

probation. See I.C. § 35-50-2-5 (2013) (requiring a fixed term of between six and 

twenty years for a Class B felony, with the advisory term being ten years). On 

Counts II and IV, respectively, the trial court imposed the advisory sentence for 

a Class D felony of eighteen months and the maximum sentence for a Class B 

misdemeanor of 180 days. See I.C. §§ 35-50-2-7(a); -3-3 (2013).

[17] Guffey now claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

consider his mental illness as a mitigating circumstance “despite evidence in the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 9 of 15

record supporting such a finding.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). We first note that 

Guffey did not cite his mental illness as a mitigating factor at the sentencing 

hearing. It is well established that a trial court is not required to “comb through 

[the presentence investigation report] and present mitigating arguments on 

behalf of the defendant when the defendant fails to act.” Bryant v. State, 984 

N.E.2d 240, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Thus, Guffey’s failure to 

proffer his mental health as “a mitigating circumstance to the trial court waives 

consideration of the circumstance on appeal.” Id.

[18] Waiver notwithstanding, in order to establish that the trial court abused its 

discretion, Guffey must demonstrate “that the mitigating evidence is both 

significant and clearly supported by the record.” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 

873, 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). However, the trial court is under no obligation 

“to accept a defendant’s claim as to what constitutes a mitigating 

circumstance.” Id. Nor is the trial court required to justify “why it did not find 

a factor to be significantly mitigating.” Sandleben, 22 N.E.3d at 796. Our 

supreme court has identified “four factors that bear on the weight to be given to 

mental illness at sentencing”:

(1) the extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her behavior 

due to the disorder or impairment;

(2) overall limitations on functioning;

(3) the duration of the mental illness; and

(4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the 

commission of the crime.

Bryant, 984 N.E.2d at 252 (quoting Weeks v. State, 697 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind. 

1998)). Guffey asserts that the evidence establishes that he “suffered from an 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 10 of 15

‘inability to control his . . . behavior due to [his] disorder or impairment’”—i.e., 

that he had overdosed on Adderall and was on suicide watch for twenty-four 

hours. (Appellant’s Br. p. 12).

[19] Even though Guffey did not raise his mental health as a mitigating factor for 

the trial court’s consideration, during the sentencing hearing, he made a general 

request for the trial court to order a mental health evaluation and for the DOC 

to “follow through with that” as part of his sentence. (Tr. p. 376). As a result, 

the trial court’s sentencing order provided:

[Guffey] raised the issue of his mental health due to the events leading 

up to the incident in question. The evidence of the action of the 

medical providers was consistent with the protocol for a temporary 

[seventy-two] hour commitment that is used on a regular basis for 

short term drug induced issues. The [c]ourt does not find the issues 

supported by the evidence related to mental health or substance abuse 

issues constitutes a mitigating factor.

(Appellant’s App. p. 17). In addition, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court 

stated that it had considered

the fact that [Guffey] was . . . suffering from an overdose of [A]dderall 

and had exhibited suicidal ideations sufficient to cause medical 

professionals . . . to decide his condition required at least twenty-four 

hours of observation. . . . [T]he factors that the [c]ourt is supposed to 

consider in this . . . is the extent of these, of [Guffey’s] inability to 

control his behavior. . . . I believe there was ample evidence to 

establish that or at least to argue . . . that through [the] time release . . . 

characteristics of the drug, he was affected more and sometimes less 

during the course of his time at the hospital. . . . [W]hether or not that 

was . . . during the period of . . . the confrontation . . . I don’t . . . 

believe was conclusively shown. . . . [T]he overall limitation of 

[Guffey’s] functioning again . . . went up and down . . . . [E]specially 

in cases when the . . . mental issues are drug induced. . . . I would not 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 11 of 15

. . . feel that . . . this would be considered a mental . . . issue . . . of long 

duration, and I suppose I would add if, if in fact he did have mental 

health issues above the alcohol induced ones . . . over a long, long 

period of time, . . . again he seems to have been able to control it . . . 

enough that he only had two prior misdemeanor . . . convictions. 

Again I just did not . . . consider the, . . . well I considered it but . . . I 

did not find that . . . there was adequate proof to establish that there 

were mental health issues to be considered a mitigating circumstance.

(Tr. pp. 410-11).

[20] It is clear that the trial court considered and specifically rejected Guffey’s 

mental health as a mitigating factor. As such, Guffey is essentially requesting 

our court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. As stated above, the 

trial court was not obligated to accept Guffey’s argument as to what constitutes 

a mitigating factor. Weedman, 21 N.E.3d at 893. Therefore, we find that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Guffey’s mental health 

was not a mitigating factor.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[21] Next, Guffey claims that his sentence is inappropriate. Notwithstanding the 

fact that the trial court acted within its sentencing discretion, our court “may 

revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial 

court’s decision, [we] find[] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 

7(B). Although Appellate Rule 7(B) “leaves much to the discretion of appellate 

courts,” we are ever mindful of “the long-recognized principle that ‘sentencing 

is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should 

receive considerable deference.’” Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552, 555 (Ind. 2014) 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 12 of 15

(quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). Thus, the 

purpose of appellate sentence review “should be to attempt to leaven the 

outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged 

with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived 

‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. Whether we will 

find a sentence to be inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the 

defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad 

other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. Ultimately, we 

focus on “the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be served.” Id.

[22] With respect to the nature of the offense, the record reveals that Guffey 

consumed large quantities of Adderall pills—for which he did not have a 

prescription—and alcohol. While being treated for the overdose at the hospital, 

Guffey was belligerent and disrupted the entire emergency department to the 

point that the police had to be called for assistance on three different occasions. 

After Guffey ripped out his IV and left the hospital, Chief Tucker and Sergeant 

Campbell attempted to diffuse the situation by allowing Guffey to go smoke, 

but Guffey continued to shout obscenities and interrupted the officers’ 

investigation. Upon learning that he was being arrested, Guffey became 

violent. He shoved Chief Tucker in the chest, and when Chief Tucker 

attempted to subdue him, Guffey grabbed onto him and pulled him down to the 

ground, causing Chief Tucker’s elbow to shatter. Thereafter, Guffey viciously 

attacked Chief Tucker, who was defenseless due to his level of pain. Guffey 

gouged Chief Tucker’s eye sockets and scratched and bit his face. Guffey also 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 13 of 15

put Chief Tucker in a chokehold, and as he strangled him, the EMT student 

overhead Guffey tell him to “just die.” (Tr. p. 222).

[23] When Guffey was eventually handcuffed, he bragged about the number of 

people it took to restrain him and about the injuries that he inflicted upon Chief 

Tucker. Chief Tucker’s medical bills exceeded $32,000, and he required 

intensive therapy to rehabilitate his elbow. Despite the therapy, Chief Tucker 

will never regain full mobility in his elbow. He will experience pain for the rest 

of his life, which is expected to increase in severity as he ages, and, most likely, 

Chief Tucker will require additional surgery in the future.

[24] Guffey now asserts that he “did not enter into that situation deliberately 

attempting to attack the Chief and hurt him badly.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 13). 

We are not persuaded by Guffey’s contention that this was “an instantaneous 

reaction to being touched and restrained in a moment when his entire 

physiological system was highly aroused as a result of an amphetamine 

overdose.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 14). Based on Deborah’s warning to Deputy 

Keith that Guffey would probably be combative when he woke up, it is evident 

that Guffey is a hostile individual—perhaps more so when intoxicated. 

Although Guffey’s emergency room physician, Dr. Russell Daugherty (Dr. 

Daugherty), testified that impulsiveness may be an effect of the Adderall, Dr. 

Daugherty also stated that “Guffey “presented more as . . . drunk than . . . the 

effects of being [on] Adderall.” (Tr. p. 151). Moreover, Guffey’s vitals actually

indicated that he had been coming down off the effects of the Adderall during

the twelve hours that he was hospitalized, and Dr. Daugherty testified that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 14 of 15

Guffey was able to understand and retain what he was being told. Even though 

Adderall might contribute to impulsive behavior, Dr. Daugherty explained that 

it did not cause Guffey to be unaware of his conduct. If Guffey’s belligerent 

behavior was solely the result of the Adderall overdose, Dr. Daugherty stated 

that he would have expected to see Guffey acting irrationally while his family 

was visiting shortly before the altercation, but he did not.

[25] As to the character of the offender, we recognize that Guffey has a relatively 

mild criminal record. In 1993, he was convicted of battery resulting in bodily 

injury as a Class A misdemeanor, and then in 2010, he was charged with a 

Class D felony for intimidation but ultimately pled guilty a Class B 

misdemeanor for disorderly conduct. Although his record consists only of two 

misdemeanor convictions, it is significant that the offenses are similar to those 

in the instant case because it demonstrates that Guffey did not learn from the 

consequences of his prior mistakes. Furthermore, even though there have been 

significant gaps of time between Guffey’s convictions, based on the fact that he 

acquired and consumed Adderall—a controlled substance—without a 

prescription, Guffey was not necessarily leading a law-abiding life during that 

time.

[26] We further find that Guffey’s conduct subsequent to the altercation is indicative 

of a poor character. Guffey callously asked Chief Tucker, “[H]ow’s your eye 

now bitch, how’s that you pussy[?]” and boasted about the fact that it took 

multiple people to restrain him. (Tr. p. 277). As Chief Tucker testified during 

the sentencing, “an individual who viciously attacks a police officer exhibits a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 15 of 15

direct intent to attack peace and tranquility and his actions degrade the order 

valued by our greater society.” (Tr. p. 393). Accordingly, we find that Guffey’s 

sentence is appropriate based on the nature of the offense and his character. 

CONCLUSION

[27] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its 

discretion in declining to find Guffey’s mental health to be a mitigating 

circumstance. We further conclude that Guffey’s sentence is not inappropriate 

in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[28] Affirmed.

[29] Bailey, J. and Barnes, J. concur