alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1364

Filed October 25, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF A.B.,

Minor Child,

H.W., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Barbara H. Liesveld, 

District Associate Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights pursuant to Iowa 

Code chapter 232 (2017). AFFIRMED. 

Deborah M. Skelton, Walford, for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Kimberly A. Opatz of Linn County Advocate, Cedar Rapids, guardian ad 

litem for minor child.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
2

MCDONALD, Judge.

Henry appeals the termination of his parental rights in A.B. pursuant to 

Iowa Code section 232.116 (2017). He argues there was insufficient evidence to 

terminate his rights under section 232.116(1)(e) and (f). He also contends 

termination was not in the best interests of A.B. based on his bond with the child. 

We review de novo proceedings terminating parental rights. See In re 

A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). The legal framework for termination 

appeals is well established and does not need to be repeated here. See id.; In re 

M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219–20 (Iowa 2016) (stating review is de novo and 

setting forth the applicable “three-step inquiry”). “When the juvenile court 

terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the 

juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 

815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).

There is clear and convincing evidence to terminate Henry’s parental 

rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e). To terminate pursuant to 

this provision, the State was required to prove, as relevant here, “the parents 

have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the 

previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume 

care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so.” Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(1)(e). The child at issue is one of Henry’s seventeen or eighteen

children from different mothers. The child at issue is nine years of age, but 

Henry was unsure of her age at the termination hearing. This is unsurprising; 

Henry has seen her but a handful of times in her life. They have no shared 

history or bond. Since the initiation of this proceeding, Henry has done nothing 
3

to build a relationship with A.B. or have A.B. placed in his care. He did not attend 

visitations. Even at the termination hearing, Henry testified he just wants to be 

able to visit A.B. and have her know her half-siblings rather than assume care of 

the child. Termination of Henry’s parental rights is in the best interest of the 

child. The child wishes to remain in her current placement with her grandmother. 

There is no basis for this court to preserve the parent-child relationship pursuant 

to section 232.116(3). 

For these reasons, we affirm the termination of Henry’s parental rights in 

A.B. 

AFFIRMED.
#### AVOCA, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Herbert SINGLETON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 9110.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Dec. 26, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1973.

Johnnie A. Jones, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

K. J. Gilly, Milling, Saal, Benson, Woodward & Hillyer, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before SARTAIN, BLANCHE ’and EVERETT,- JJ.

EVERETT, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in 271 So.2d 630, the decision of the District Court is affirmed.
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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony M. Ruffule, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law § 170.25) based upon his possession *1054of a forged prescription for a narcotic syrup which he attempted to have filled at a pharmacy. At trial, defense counsel sought to have an expert witness testify about the effects of drug withdrawal on defendant’s ability to form the requisite intent to commit the crime charged, claiming that such evidence was admissible under Penal Law § 15.25, which deals with the effect of intoxication upon liability. The court properly declined to receive such testimony.

While intent is an essential element of the crime charged, expert testimony regarding defendant’s alleged inability to form the requisite intent was not necessary in this case because defendant, by his own testimony, established that he was fully aware of what he was doing on the day in question, and that it was his intent to defraud the pharmacist and obtain a narcotic syrup with a forged prescription *(see, People v Morrison,*58 AD2d 699). In addition, three police officers who participated in defendant’s arrest testified that defendant appeared to be normal and responded appropriately to their questions. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to receive the expert’s testimony *(see, People v Cronin,*60 NY2d 430, 433; *People v Miller,*116 AD2d 595).

Although we find that certain comments by the prosecutor on summation were improper *(e.g.,*his reference to jurors as defendant’s "next victims”; *see, People v Calderon,*88 AD2d 604), they were not so egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial, particularly since the trial court, on more than one occasion, gave cautionary instructions *(see, People v Cheek,*168 AD2d 946). (Appeal from Judgment of Oneida County Court, McLaughlin, J.—Criminal Possession Forged Instrument, 2nd Degree.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Green, Balio and Lowery, JJ.
#### Lawrence A. York, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

Judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: The Court of Claims properly dismissed claimant’s cause of action for malicious prosecution. Claimant failed to establish that the criminal proceeding was terminated in his favor. The evidence supports the court’s finding that the criminal charges against claimant were dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain *(see, Zebrowski v Bobinski,*278 NY 332). The evidence also supports the court’s findings that claimant was arrested based upon probable cause and that the criminal proceeding was not instituted with actual malice. There is no merit to claimant’s other contentions. (Appeal from Judgment of Court of Claims, NeMoyer, J.—Malicious Prosecution.) Present—Denman, J. P., Green, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Board of Directors Meeting 

Thursday, December 10, 2020, ~2:30PM 

This event is closed to the public 

Information summaries for the below listed projects can be found on dfc.gov 

Meeting Agenda 

I. CHAIRMAN OPENS MEETING 

II. ADMINISTRTIVE APPROVALS 

a. Minutes – September 9, 2020 DFC Board of Directors Meeting 

b. Board of Directors Public Engagement Policy 

c. Dividend to Treasury 

III. PROJECT APPROVALS 

a. Pearl Petroleum (Iraq) 

 Structured Finance 

b. Africa Data Centres Holding Limited (Africa) 

 Structured Finance 

c. Banco de la Producción (Produbanco) (Ecuador) 

Structured Finance 

d. Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (Europe Regional) 

 Investment Fund 

e. Vodacom (Ethiopia)

 Structured Finance 

IV. REPORTS 

V. MEETING ADJORNED 

Location: Meeting will be held via videoconference
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROGELIO CALDERON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

PHUC LAM, Prison Doctor; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 20

- 15731

D.C. No. 4:18

- cv

- 04384

- KAW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Kandis A. Westmore, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **

Submitted August 17, 2021 * * *

Before: SILVERMAN, CHRISTEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner R ogelio Calderon appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth C ircuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).

** * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 24 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 20

- 15731

§ 1291

. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung , 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.

2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants

because Calderon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

defendants were deliberately indifferent to Calderon’s heart issues

. See id . at

1060

- 61 (9th Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard requiring a

defendant be aware of and disregard an excessive risk to an inmate’s health).

Calderon has waived any challenge to the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on Calderon’s allegations against defendant Lam for falsifying or

omitting information from Calderon’s medical records, as well as the district

court’s grant of defendants’ motion to file a supplemental motion for summary

judgment, because he did not raise them in his opening brief. See Indep. Towe rs of

Wash. v. Washington , 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e review only issues

which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)); Acosta

– Huerta v. Estelle , 7 F.3d 139, 144

(9t h Cir. 1993) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening

brief are waived).

AFFIRMED.
#### Ida Nudelman, Appellant, v New York City Transit Authority, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Durante, J.), dated August 28, 1989, which failed to grant unconditionally her motion to strike the defendant’s answer for its failure to comply with a prior order of the same court dated March 16, 1989, directing the defendant’s employee to appear at an examination before trial.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The drastic sanction of unconditionally striking an answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery should not be invoked unless the resisting party’s default is clearly shown to be deliberate and contumacious. The plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing willfulness in the failure of the defendant’s employee to appear at a court-ordered examination before trial. The witness showed up three times to be deposed. The initial deposition was adjourned on the consent of both parties. The reasons for the later adjournments cannot be resolved on this record. Moreover, there are further disputed facts and discrepancies in the record which preclude finding that the failure of the defendant’s employee to appear was willful or contumacious *504
      *(see, Mulvey v Service Sys. Corp.,*146 AD2d 682), and preclude granting the plaintiffs motion unconditionally *(see, Dowlitt v City of New York,*113 AD2d 722). Nor has the plaintiff shown that the delay, which inconvenienced both parties, changed her circumstances in any detrimental manner. Given the circumstances of the defendant’s default and the lack of prejudice to the plaintiff as a result of the delay, the court acted properly in giving the defendant one additional opportunity to produce its employee *(see, Read v Dickson,*150 AD2d 543, 544-545; *Mulvey v Service Sys. Corp., supra).*Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>


                                                                Exhibit 99.1



                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                           AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Applied Digital Solutions,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31,
2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Scott R. Silverman, Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
of the Company.




/s/ Scott R. Silverman
----------------------
Scott R. Silverman
Chief Executive Officer
March 31, 2003
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ron Russo, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert Haft, J.), rendered January 13, 1989, convicting defendant, after jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of three to six years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s conviction arises out of his arrest for the street sale of valium to an undercover officer in exchange for prerecorded money. After the transaction was completed the undercover officer radioed detailed descriptions of the two suspects involved in the sale, including defendant. Defendant and his accomplice were located standing together a short distance from the location of the sale, and both of them possessed a portion of the "buy” money. After the arrest, the undercover officer made a drive-by confirmatory identification.

We reject defendant’s claim that proof of the validity of the arrest required testimony by the undercover officer. It was unnecessary to call the undercover officer to testify, as the *296testimony of the arresting officer established that defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause. *(People v Petralia,*62 NY2d 47, *cert denied*469 US 852.) The undercover officer’s radio report, which described each man’s race and build and noteworthy features of his clothing, was sufficiently accurate and detailed to conclude conclusively that defendant and his companion were the persons whom the undercover had described. *(Cf., People v Carrasquillo,*54 NY2d 248.) Further, the viewing by the undercover officer following defendant’s arrest "occurred at a place and time sufficiently connected and contemporaneous to the arrest itself as to constitute the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure” *(People v Wharton,*74 NY2d 921, 922-923), and was not subject to the same standards of suggestiveness which would apply to an identification by a civilian witness.

Defendant also challenges his adjudication as a second felony offender, arguing that the court improperly denied his request for an adjournment to obtain the plea minutes of the prior case. However, the court’s ruling that the plea minutes would not have helped defendant establish that he was not the person who was the subject of the disputed conviction was well founded. Counsel’s representation that she had reviewed the file in preparation for trial serves to establish that defendant was not deprived of a reasonable opportunity to prepare his claim that he was not the person named in the earlier indictment.

The sentence imposed was not an abuse of discretion. Concur—Rosenberger, J. R, Kupferman, Kassal and Rubin, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.1

Exhibit 32.1Certification of Chief Executive Officer pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Exchange Act and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the annual report on Form 10-KSB of Advant-e Corporation (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the report), the undersigned, Jason K. Wadzinski, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:

(1) The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.



|                      |  |     |  |                        
|--------------------- |  | --- |  | -----------------------
|Dated: March 31, 2008 |  | By: |  | /s/ Jason K. Wadzinski 
|                      |  |     |  | Jason K. Wadzinski     
|                      |  |     |  | Chief Executive Officer
EX-10.84



 Exhibit 10.84 
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
 ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC. 

2013 INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN 
 WHEREAS, Encore Capital Group, Inc. (the “Company”) currently maintains The Encore Capital Group, Inc. 2013 Incentive Compensation Plan (the “Plan”); and 

WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) approved the amendment of the Plan, effective February 20,
2014, to prohibit the practice of issuing stock options at an exercise price below fair market value on the date of the grant. 

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue and in exercise of the power reserved to the Board by Section 10.2 of the Plan, the Plan is hereby
amended, effective February 20, 2014, as follows: 
  

	 	1.	Definitions. 


Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Plan. 

 

	 	2.	Amendment. 


Section 9 of the Plan shall be amended by adding a new Section 9.4 to read as follows: 

 

	 	“9.4	Restrictions. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Plan to the contrary, no stock option granted under the Plan shall have an exercise price that is less than the
Fair Market Value of a Share of the Common Stock on the date of grant of such stock option.” 

  

	 	3.	Miscellaneous. 

  

	 	(a)	This amendment has been duly authorized and executed by the Company. 

  

	 	(b)	This amendment shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, without reference to Delaware’s choice of law statutes or decisions.


  

	 	(c)	Except as specifically amended hereby, the Plan shall remain in full force and effect. In the event the terms of the Plan conflict with this amendment, the terms of
this amendment shall control. 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this amendment to be executed
effective as of February 20, 2014. 
  

			
	 ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

		
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Steve Gonabe

		 	 Steve Gonabe

		 	 Senior Vice President,

		 	 Human Resources
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Steven Mann, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: We reject defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly precluded him from impeaching a witness by cross-examining her about her allegedly immoral conduct. The questions were properly precluded because they were not designed to impeach her credibility, but to bring out the home background in which the victim was being raised. The questions were thus irrelevant.

We also reject defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly allowed testimony about a prior uncharged crime. The challenged testimony was too vague to be assigned the meaning given to it by defendant. Defendant was tried without a jury, and we may presume that the trial court properly *1011"considered only the competent evidence in reaching [its] determination” *(People v Bishop,*111 AD2d 398, *lv denied*67 NY2d 649; *see, People v Moreno,*70 NY2d 403, 406; *People v Brown,*24 NY2d 168, 172). In any event, defendant has failed to preserve that issue for our review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Balls,*69 NY2d 641, 642; *People v Cooper,*147 AD2d 926, *lv denied*74 NY2d 738).

We have examined defendant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Erie County Court, Rogowski, J.—Sexual Abuse, 1st Degree.) Present—Denman, J. P., Green, Balio, Lowery and Davis, JJ.
Exhibit
32.1



CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO

18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the
undersigned hereby certifies that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2013 of ROI Land
Investments Ltd. (the “Company”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date:
    November 18th, 2013                                                  
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                               
|/s/
    Patrick Bragoli                                                        
|Patrick
        Bragoli, Director
        (Principal
        Executive Officer)