NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-1987

___________

LATEEFAH C. BROWN,

 Appellant

v.

DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES (DYFS); 

HONORABLE DARRELL M. FINEMAN J.S.C.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-01598)

District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 24, 2014

Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 27, 2014)

___________

OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Lateefah Brown appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey dismissing her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 

For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
2

I.

Prior to this lawsuit, Brown was a party to New Jersey state court litigation 

initiated by New Jersey’s Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”). There, 

Brown was found to have abused and/or neglected her minor child, L.J.B., and the child’s 

father was awarded legal and physical custody. After the New Jersey Supreme Court 

denied review in that case, Brown commenced this lawsuit, submitting a pro se complaint 

and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The complaint, which was brought 

against DYFS and a New Jersey Superior Court judge who had presided over an aspect of 

the state court litigation, reiterated the arguments of trial court error that Brown had made 

in her state court appeal. Brown sought reversal of the state court’s rulings and 

compensatory damages.

The District Court granted Brown’s IFP motion and screened the complaint

pursuant to § 1915(e). The court concluded that Brown’s claims were barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrine of issue preclusion, and that amendment of her 

complaint would be futile. As a result, the court dismissed the complaint without leave to 

amend. This appeal followed.1

 

1 The District Court received Brown’s notice of appeal three days after the expiration of 

the 30-day appeal period. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Thereafter, she timely moved 

the court to extend the appeal period pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

4(a)(5). The court, finding that Brown had established good cause for an extension, 

granted the motion and directed the Clerk to file the notice of appeal nunc pro tunc. We 

find no error in that ruling. See Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 322 

(3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that we generally review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 
3

II.

“It is standard practice that an appellant must state all issues raised on appeal in 

the opening brief.” United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011); see

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a); see also Al-Ra’id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting 

that pro se litigants are not exempted from this requirement). “[A]n appellant’s failure to 

identify or argue an issue in [her] opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on 

appeal.” United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, Brown’s brief 

does not even mention the District Court’s judgment, let alone articulate an argument for 

why that judgment should be disturbed. Instead, the brief’s five substantive pages 

complain about various aspects of her state court litigation and allege facts relating to that 

litigation. Because Brown has waived any challenge to the District Court’s judgment —

the complaints in her brief about her state court case do not justify relief here — we will 

not disturb that judgment. 

We note, however, that even if Brown had preserved a challenge to the District 

Court’s judgment, we still would not disturb that judgment. The complaint essentially 

asked the District Court to exercise appellate review over the state court’s adverse rulings 

and reverse them. The District Court correctly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine barred it from doing so, and that amendment of Brown’s complaint would be 

 

4(a)(5) motion for abuse of discretion). Accordingly, Brown’s appeal is timely, and we 

have jurisdiction over it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

futile. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) 

(explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers 

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments.”).2 Although Brown seeks to supplement the record — ostensibly with the 

state court records that she has submitted in her appendix and/or the DVD that she has 

lodged as an exhibit3 — those materials would not change the outcome of this case. 

In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Brown’s 

motion to supplement the record is denied.4 

 

2 We need not consider whether the doctrine of issue preclusion applies here.

3 Brown has referred to that exhibit as both a “DVD” and a “CD.”

4 Brown also asks us to add L.J.B. as a plaintiff in this case and appoint him counsel. But 

Brown lacks any authority to make these requests on the child’s behalf — as noted above, 

L.J.B.’s father has legal custody of the child. In any event, Brown has failed to 

demonstrate that the requested relief is warranted. Accordingly, these requests are 

denied. Finally, to the extent that Brown seeks an investigation into whether L.J.B. was 

abused after he was removed from her custody, that request falls outside the scope of this 

appeal and is not considered here.