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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA MCCORMICK,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED April 30, 2015

v No. 318920 Wayne Circuit Court HANOVER GROUP, INC., CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, TAMARA WEBER, and CAROLE F. YOUNGBLOOD, LC No. 10-003875-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: H OOD , P.J., and J ANSEN and G ADOLA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

In this breach-of-contract and insurance-fraud action, plainti ff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants Hanove r Group, Inc. (“Hanover”), Citizens Insurance Company of America (“Citizens”), and Tamara Weber (“Weber”) (collectively “defendants”), 1 and dismissing plaintiff’s case with prejudice. We affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

This action arises out of plaint iff’s lawsuit against Hanover, Citizens, Weber, and Youngblood, filed March 31, 2010, for insurance proceeds relate d to a fire that destroyed a home located at 8995 Henry Ruff Road, Livonia, Michigan. The instan t case is but a small part of extensive proceedings in the trial court, this Court, the Michi gan Supreme Court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, regarding litiga tion related, or tangential, to the

1 Another defendant, and former circuit judge, Carole F. Youngbl ood (“Youngblood”) was granted summary disposition in a prior order, which was affirme d by this Court in a prior appeal between the parties. See McCormick v Hanover Group, Inc , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2012 (Docket No. 302011), pp 8-10. Therefore, Youngblood is not a party t o the instant appeal.-2- 8995 Henry Ruff Road property. 2 In her complaint, plaintiff alleged two causes of action relevant to the instant appeal: (1) breach of contract against Hanover and Citizens; and (2) insurance fraud and conspiracy against Hanover, Citizens, and W eber.

On August 2, 2010, Citizens, Hanover, and Weber filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Defendants first argu ed that the statutes of limitations for plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, fraud, and consp iracy had expired before March 31, 2010, i.e., when plaintiff filed the complaint. Second, defend ants argued that plaintiff’s complaint violated a preliminaryinjunction entered by Youngblo od in 2006, “which prohibited [plaintiff] from filing suit without leave of Court,” and that plaintiff failed to obtain leave to bring this action.

The parties appeared for a hearing on defendants’ motion for s ummary disposition on August 20, 2010. The trial court ruled without hearing oral ar guments and denied the motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), finding insufficient evidence in the record for the court to decide whether the statute of limitations was tolled. However, the trial court dismissed the complaint because plaintiff violated the injunction, findin g that the injunction applied to any lawsuits relating to the property and that the present lawsuit was based on insurance on the property. The trial court held that it did not matter that Han over, Citizens, and Weber were not mentioned in the injunction and were not parties to the divorce action. The trial court concluded that plaintiff’s suit violate d the preliminary injunction and d ismissed the suit.

Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order dismissing her clai ms against defendants to this Court in 2012. This Court revers ed the trial court’s order dis missing plaintiff’s claims against Hanover, Citizens, and Weber, holding that “the trial court err ed in finding that the preliminary injunction applied to the insta nt lawsuit against Hanover, Citi zens, and Weber. Plaintiff’s lawsuit should not have been dismissed on this ground.” McCormick v Hanover Group, Inc

, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2012 (Docket No. 302011), p 7. Hanover, Citizens, and Weber also claimed on app eal that plaintiff’s claims against them were barred by the applicable statutes of limitati ons. Id . This Court held that the record was insufficient for the Court “to state with confidence whether some or all of plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, or whether any of the statutes of limitations were tolled by her filing of a lawsuit in federal c ourt. Accordingly, in light of the sparseness of the record before it and the presence of disputed facts, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of summary dispos ition to defendants on statute of limitations grounds.” Id . at 8. This case was then remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id . at 10.

On May 30, 2013, defendants filed a second motion for summary disposition, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5), (7), (8), and (10). Defendants argued that pl aintiff’s claims in the instant

2 See, e.g., McCormick v Braverman , 468 Mich 858; 657 NW2d 118 (2003); McCormick v Braverman , 451 F3d 382 (CA 6, 2006); McCormick v McCormick , 221 Mich App 672; 562 NW2d 504 (1997); McCormick v Hanover Group, Inc , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2012 (Docket No. 302011).-3- lawsuit were wholly different from the claims alleged by plaint iff in her 2004 and 2006 federal lawsuits related to the property, and therefore, the federal la wsuit did not toll the statute of limitations for plaintiff’s claims in this suit, and summary di sposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Additionally, defendants argued that plaintiff ha d no insurable interest in the property located at 8995 Henry Ruff Road, so she had no standin g to bring suit and summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(5). Finally, defenda nts argued that they had acted in accordance with prior, unappealed or affirmed court orders w hen they disbursed funds to persons other than plaintiff, and therefore, summary dispositio n was proper under both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).

On June 13, 2013, defendants filed a motion to strike plaintif f’s “final amended complaint and jury demand,” which plaintiff had filed on May 24 , 2013. Defendants argued that plaintiff did not obtain leave of court or written consent from defendants to file the amended complaint, and therefore, the trial court should strike the ame nded complaint pursuant to MCR 2.115(B). Plaintiff filed her response to defendants’ motion t o strike on June 25, 2013. Plaintiff argued that MCR 2.118(A)(1) allows a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course within 14 days after being served with a responsive pleading by an adverse party. Plaintiff further argued that because defendants had never filed an answe r to plaintiff’s original complaint, as required by court rule, plaintiff had the right t o amend the complaint because the 14-day period after the filing of a responsive pleading had notpassed. Further, plaintiff requested that the tr ial court enter a de fault judgment in her favor because of defendants’ delay.

When plaintiff raised the argument that defendants had never f iled an answer, the trial judge reviewed the lower court file, found that no answer or af firmative defenses were contained in the file, and believed that the answers were simply missing from the court file. The trial judge directed his clerk to call defense counsel to obtain a copy, bu t defense counsel told the clerk that no answer or affirmative defenses have ever been filed because of the unique procedural posture of the case, i.e., defendants’ i nitial motion for summary dispo sition/dismissal granted in favor of defendants, appeal, partial reversal on appeal, and finally, re mand to the trial court. Defendants then filed their answer on June 25, 2013, and advanced, in pert inent part, the affirmative defenses of statute of limitati ons, subject-matte r jurisdiction , lack of legal capa city to sue, and lack of insurable interest.

On June 26, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendant s’ answer and affirmative defenses, which were filed three years and 86 days after plaint iff filed her complaint. Plaintiff argued that defendants had willfully chosen to “ignore” her, an d conspired to conceal their wrongful acts from her, throughout the litigation, with their f ailure to file their answer to her complaint only the most recent act. Plaintiff further argued that defendants had waived their right to file an answer due to the ir inexcusable delay, and the doctrine of estoppel should apply.

The parties appeared for a hearing on defendants’ motion for s ummary disposition on June 28, 2013. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5) (lack of legal cap acity to sue due to plaintiff ’s lack of insurable interest in the property), (7) (statutes of lim itations), (8) (failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted because defendants’ actions followed valid court orders), and ( 10) (no genuine issue of material fact that judgment in defendants’ favor was proper because thei r actions were in conformance with valid court orders). The trial court also denied plaintif f’s request for a default judgment.-4- II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff’s federal lawsuits did not toll the applicable statutes of limitations. We disagr ee.

This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of summary disp osition. Ligon v Detroit

, 276 Mich App 120, 124; 739 NW2d 900 (2007). A party is entitle d to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) if the opposing party’s claim or claims a re barred under the applicable statute of limitations. In reviewing motions under MCR 2.116(C )(7), this Court will accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true unless con tradicted by the parties’ supporting affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evide nce. Odom v Wayne Co , 482 Mich 459, 466; 760 NW2d 217 (2008). “If t he pleadings demonstr ate that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if affidavits and other documen tary evidence show that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the running of the period of limitations, the trial court must render judgment without delay.” Adams v Adams (On Reconsideration) , 276 Mich App 704, 720; 742 NW2d 399 (2007).

The parties agree that plaintiff’s claims are governed by the six-year period of limitations prescribed in MCL 600.5807(8) and MCL 600.5813. The parties di sagree, however, when that limitations period began to run, and whether plaintiff’s federa l lawsuit tolled the applicable limitations period. MCL 600.5807 provi des, in pertinent part:

No person may bring or maintain any action to recover damages or sums due for breach of contract, or to enforce the specific performa nce of any contract unless, after the claim first accrued to himself or to someone through whom he claims, he commences the action within the periods of time pres cribed by this section.

* * *

(8) The period of limitations i s 6 years for all other actions to recover damages or sums due for breach of contract.

MCL 600.5813 provides that “[a]ll other personal actions shall be commenced within the period of 6 years after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different period is stated in the statutes.” Thus, plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and fraud are each subject to a six-year statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for plainti ff’s conspiracy claim, however, “takes on the limitations period of the underlying wrong that was the object of the conspiracy.” Terlecki v Stewart , 278 Mich App 644, 653; 754 NW2d 899 (2008). Here, plaintiff’ s conspiracy claim was related to her fraud cl aim and would also be subject to a six-year statute of limitations. MCL 600.5813; Terlecki , 278 Mich App at 653.

MCL 600.5827 specifies when a claim “accrues”:

Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of limitati ons runs from the time the claim accrues. The claim accrues at the time provided in sections [MCL 600.5829 to MCL 600.5838], and in cases not cover ed by these-5- sections the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.

It is undisputed that plaintiff’s claims are not covered by the statutory subsections MCL 600.5829 to MCL 600.5838. Therefore, her claim accrued, “at th e time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done.” MCL 600.5827; see also Boyle v Gen Motors Corp , 468 Mich 226, 231; 661 NW2d 557 (2003) (“[A] claim accrues when the wron g is done.”).

Plaintiff’s complaint contends that defendants breached the in surance contract they entered into with plaintiff by giving the insurance proceeds to a nonparty to the contract, committed insurance fraud by paying those proceeds to a nonparty, and conspired with the nonparty in furtherance of the fr aud. Thus, it is clear that p laintiff’s claims all flow directly from defendants’ disbursement of insurance funds to David Findling, the court-appointed receiver. Plaintiff first contends that the March 12, 2004 order that the trial court found to be the basis for the accrual date was entered in her parents’ divorce case, and therefore, that court never had jurisdiction over plaintiff and could not enter o rders to which she would be bound. However, the trial court properly found that the 8995 Henry Ruff Road property was included in the marital estate, and therefore, the divorce court had legitimate jurisdi ction over the property and its insurance proceeds. Additionally, though plaintiff contends th at she was not a party to the divorce action, this Court previous ly noted that other orders i n that case “list[ed] plaintiff as a third party defendant. Plaintiff provides no factual support f or her argument that she is erroneously listed as a party. A party may not merely announce its position and leave it to the Court to discover and rationalize the basis for its claims.” McCormick v Hanover Group, Inc

, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2012 (Docket No. 302011), p 6 n 7, citing Wilson v Taylor , 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998). Further, the September 10, 1999 order from Judge Lucas finding that the property belonged solely to the estate of plaintiff’s father provides:

This matter having come on to be heard on the Motions of Eric A. Braverman, Personal Representative of the Estate of Edward McCo rmick, Deceased, for the entry of the O rder Determining Title to Real Estate and Disposing of Plaintiff’s Claims r egarding Alimony and the Divis ion of the Medical Malpractice Suit, Motion for Attorneys Fees, and Motion for the Court to Adopt Certain Findings of Fact and all parties having been give n notice of this hearing and Linda McCormick and Mary McCorm ick having appeared in Court to respond to said motions and the Court being duly advised in the premises. [Emphasis added.]

Plaintiff has provided no support for her contention that she w as not a party to the divorce proceedings, and the documentary evidence before the trial cour t contradicts her contention.

Second, plaintiff contends that the March 12, 2004 order compe lling Citizens to disburse proceeds from the insurance policy to the appointed receiver wa s not the accrual date because that order only allows the receiver to take control of insuranc e proceeds “when and if issued.” However, plaintiff’s asserti on is unsupported by the order itse lf. The order expl icitly states:-6- IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Receiver’s motion is granted.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that David Findling, Court Appointed Receiver, is granted the authority to take control of the insurance proceeds for the property commonly known as 8995 Henry Ruff Roa d, Livonia, Michigan, with a legal description of:

Lot 10, Smiley-Ringwald Subdivision, as recorded in Liber 77, Page 35 of Plats, Wayne County Records (the “Property”).

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Citizens Insurance Company, which held the insurance policy in effect for the Property on D ecember 18, 2003, shall disburse the insurance proceeds to David Findling, Court Appointed Receiver.

Thus, despite plaintiff’s contention, the 2004 order to compel explicitly required defendants to pay the insurance proceeds to the court appointed receiver. Th ough plaintiff also claims that her accrual date did not arise until November 12, 2004, when Citize ns actually disbursed the funds, it does not matter that defendants c ontinued to contest this order for that time. Citizens was only given the authority, and explicit ly ordered, to disburse funds to the receiver be cause of the March 12, 2004 divorce court order. Because it was this very disburs ement that plaintiff relies upon for her claims of breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy, the tr ial court properly found that the accrual date of plaintiff’ s claims was March 12, 2004.

Next, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred when it foun d that the statute of limitations was not tolled regarding plain tiff’s claims against Citizens an d Weber. “[T]he statute of limitations is tolled during the time a prior suit is pending b etween the parties if the prior action is not adjudicated on the merits.” Roberts v City of Troy , 170 Mich App 567, 581; 429 NW2d 206 (1988). The statute of limitations is also tolled while pa rties litigate a claim in federal court, if the court dismisses the claim without prejudice. Id . This exception does not apply to different causes of action seeking different relief. See Lenz v Detroit , 376 Mich 156, 160; 135 NW2d 904 (1965) (holding that a plaintiff’ s cause of action seeking dama ges for unlawful discharge was not tolled by a prior suit in which the plaintiff sought mandamus t o compel his reinstatement).

Plaintiff filed two separate federal lawsuits that could possi bly have tolled the statute of limitations on plaintiff’s claims against one or more defendant s. On February 20, 2004, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Citizens and David Findling in the Unit ed States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. That complaint included three co unts: (1) “violation of civil rights, First Amendment petition for redress, seizure and deprivation o f non-party plaintiff’s property”; (2) “violation of civil rights, fourth amendment illegal searchand seizure and abuse of process”; and (3) “violation of civil rights, First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, deprivation of property, redress and due process of law, and violations of the doctrines [of] res judicata[,] estopple [sic] by judgment, decl aratory judgment.” While the 2 004 lawsuit did include plaintiff and Citizens as parties, it is clear that the causes of action in the two cases, i.e., breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy in the state court case, and nu merous allegations of constitutional rights violations in the federal court case, were completely di fferent causes of action seeking-7- different relief. Id . Thus, plaintiff’s 2004 federal complaint and corresponding l awsuit did not toll the statute of limitations.

On April 7, 2006, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Hanover, a lleging numerous violations of her constitutional rights, as well as “insurance fraud, embe zzlement, mail fraud, wire fraud, and financial institutional fraud.” McCormick v Hanover Ins Group, Inc , unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mi chigan, issued December 8, 2006 (Docket No. 06-11719). In the fe deral district court’s opinion dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit under FR Civ P 12(b)(6), and for lack of diversity jurisdiction , the court noted that plaintiff “asserts that she intentionally c hose to sue [Hanover] and not Citizens because [Hanover and Hanover Insurance Company] are the ones who violated federal la w.” Id . The federal district court further noted:

Defendants concede that Hanover Group owns Citizens. Defendan ts attach a copy of their corporate structure as evidence that eac h subsidiary is wholly owned and a separate entity apart from Hanover Group. T he corporate structure chart appears to illustrate that Hanover Group is the parent corporation of both Hanover and Citizens. It also appears to illustrate th at Citizens is a subsidiary of Hanover. [ Id . at n 2.]

Thus, it is clear that of the p arties in the instant lawsuit, o nly plaintiff and Hanover were parties to the 2006 federal court complaint. While this lawsuit allege d claims of fraud that arguably tolled the statutes of limitations for plaintiff’s claims, 3 “the statute of limitations is tolled during the time a prior suit is pending between the parties ,” Roberts , 170 Mich App at 581 (emphasis added), and Citizens and Weber were not parties to the 2006 fed eral lawsuit. Therefore, the trial court did not err wh en it granted Citizens’ and Weber’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5) because plaintiff’s claims accrued on March 12, 2004, the statute of limitations was not tolled by the 2004 or 2006 federal lawsuits , and plaintiff’s complaint, filed on March 31, 2010, was filed after the conclusion of the six-year statute of limitations applicable to all three of plaintiff’s claims.

III. DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in failing to enter a default judgment against defendants for their failure to file an answer to plain tiff’s complaint for over three years. We disagree.

This Court reviews a trial cour t’s decision whether to grant o r deny a default judgment for an abuse of discretion. Huntington Nat’l Bank v Ristich , 292 Mich App 376, 383; 808 NW2d 511 (2011). A trial court abuses i ts discretion when it reache s a decision that falls outside the range of principled outcomes. King v Oakland Co Prosecutor , 303 Mich App 222, 225; 842 NW2d 403 (2013). Further, and to the extent necessary for the resolution of this issue,

3 Neither party disputes the trial court’s conclusion that the 2 006 federal lawsuit tolled the statutes of limitations for plain tiff’s claims, as they pertain ed to Hanover.-8- “[i]nterpretation of a court rul e is a question of law that thi s Court reviews de novo.” Wilcoxon v Wayne Co Neighborhood Legal Servs , 252 Mich App 549, 553; 652 NW2d 851 (2002).

MCR 1.105 provides that the court rules “are to be construed t o secure the just, speedy, and economical determination of every action and to avoid the c onsequences of error that does not affect the substantial right s of the parties.” MCR 2.603(A )(1) provides:

If a party against whom a judgme nt for affirmative relief is s ought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules , and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the default of that party. [Emphasis added.]

Under MCR 2.108(A)(1), defendants were required to file an answ er or other responsive pleading within 21 days after being served with the summons and copy of the complaint.

Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed on March 31, 2010. P laintiff’s amended complaint was filed on June 29, 2010. Service of the complaint was not noted in the lower court record until July 20, 2010. On August 2, 2010, less than 21 da ys after service of the complaint, Hanover, Citizens, and Weber filed a motion for summary disposi tion, which ultimately led to dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. Defendants’ motion for summary disposition was a proper vehicle through which they could “otherwise defend” the lawsuit against them within the court rules, MCR 2.603(A)(1), as evidenced by the fact that it led to a complete dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against them. After this Court reversed the trial court order dismissing plaintiff’s claims against Hanover, Citizens, and Weber, and remanded the case to the trial court, the parties enthusiastically engaged in discovery efforts, including numero us interrogatories, requests to admit, depositions, and motions to compel. Despite defendants’ failure to file an answer and affirmative defenses with the trial court, at no point did defe ndants fail to “otherwise defend as provided by [the court] rules.” MCR 2.603(A)(1). Michigan pol icy favors the meritorious determination of issues, and ther efore disfavors the entry of d efault judgments in most cases. Helder v North Pointe Ins Co , 234 Mich App 500, 506; 595 NW2d 157 (1999), rev’d on other grounds 462 Mich 92 (2000). The merits of such a policy are ob vious in cases such as this, where the parties actively lit igated and conducted discovery inthe lawsuit, despite the fact that defendants inadvertently failed t o file an answer to plaintiff’ s complaint.

Additionally, the trial court correctly found that plaintiff s uffered no prejudice from defendants’ delay. Plaintiff asse rts that she was prejudiced b y defendants’ delay because she was unaware of some of the defens es raised after discovery was completed, including lack of insurable interest. However, pl aintiff claimed that she held l egal and rightful title to the property at issue numerous times before defendants’ filing of their affi rmative defenses. Plaintiff did not suffer any prejudice from defendants’ delay because she had ass erted her ownership of the 8995 Henry Ruff Road property throug hout the litigation. Therefore, the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for a default judgment was properly denied “to avoid the consequences of error that does not affect the s ubstantial rights of the partie s.” MCR 1.105.-9- IV. FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff also contends that the trial court relied on erroneo us facts in its determination regarding defendants’ motion for summary disposition. We disag ree.

A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Mericka v Dep’t of Community Health , 283 Mich App 29, 36; 770 NW2d 24 (2009).

Plaintiff first contends that the statute of limitations has e xpired against any affirmative defenses defendants may claim regarding plaintiff’s lack of ins urable interest. However, plaintiff has cited no law supporting the pr oposition that affirmative de fenses, such as lack of an insurable interest, are subject to statutes of limitations. Therefore, p laintiff has abandoned this issue on appeal. Etefia v Credit Technologies, Inc , 245 Mich App 466, 471; 628 NW2d 577 (2001) (“Insufficiently briefed issues are deemed abandoned on appeal. ”). Further, even addressing plaintiff’s unsupported contention on its merits, it is clear t hat statutes of limitations apply to legal actions, not affirmative defenses. See, e.g., MCL 600.58 07 (“No person may bring or maintain any action to recover damages or sums due for breach of contract, or to enforce the specific performance of any contract unless, after the claim fi rst accrued to himself or to someone through whom he claims, he commences the action within the periods of time prescribed by this sectio n.”) (emphasis added).

Second, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in relyi ng upon the September 10, 1999 order of Judge Lucas in the divorce action of plaintiff’s parents. Plaintiff contends that the 1999 order “contained error after error,” did not address a Mar ch 21, 1980 quitclaim deed transferring the property to plaintiff, and that plaintiff shou ld not be subject to the 1999 order because she was not a party to that case. Judge Lucas’s order stated that plaintiff had assisted her mother in preparing legal documents devoid of any merit, th is Court’s opinion in McCormick v McCormick , 221 Mich App at 672, permitted Judge Lucas to award the 8995 Henry Ruff Road property to the marital estate, and no other conveyance of the property prohibited the divorce court from awarding the property to the marital estate. The or der provided that the property was “the sole and separate property of the Estate of Edward McCormi ck,” plaintiff’s father, subject to a life estate reserved for Mary McCormick, plaintiff’s mother. Additionally, and despite plaintiff’s contentions, the very first paragraph of Judge Luca s’s order provided that plaintiff appeared before the court in her parents’ divorce case, and par ticipated in Judge Lucas’s determination. Again, plaintiff has provided no evidence contr adicting this order.

An insurance policy must be s upported by an insurable interest , and a policy th at is not so supported is void. Corwin v DaimlerChrysler Ins Co , 296 Mich App 242, 257, 258; 819 NW2d 68 (2012). “An ‘insurable interest’ need not be in the nature of ownership, but rather can be any kind of benefit from the thing so insured or any kind of loss t hat would be suffered by its damage or destruction.” Morrison v Secura Ins , 286 Mich App 569, 572-573; 781 NW2d 151 (2009). This requirement “arises out of the venerable public policy aga inst ‘wager policies’; which, as eloquently explained by Justice C OOLEY , are insurance policies in which the insured has no interest, and they are held to be void because such policies pr esent insureds with unacceptable temptation to commit wrongful acts to obtain payment.” Id . at 572. Here, the unrefuted 1999 order from the divorce action betw een plaintiff’s parents state s, unequivocally, that the property was solely owned by the estate of Edward McCormick. Plaintiff’ s insurance policy with-10- Citizens provided, under the head ing “Conditions,” that Citizen s would not be liable “to the ‘insured’ for more than the amount of the ‘insured’s’ interest at the time of loss.” Because plaintiff had no ownership inte rest in the subject property, th e trial court properly granted summary disposition to Citizens and Weber. On the basis of the entire record it is clear that no mistake has been made, and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiff had no insurable interest in the 8995 H enry Ruff Road property.

V. GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT

Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in gran ting summary disposition in defendants’ favor because there were outstanding genuine issues of material fact, i.e., whether defendants breached their contract with plaintiff, such that summary disposition was improper. Again, we disagree.

This Court reviews de novo the gr ant or denial of summary disp osition. Ligon , 276 Mich App at 124. A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C )(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 491 Mich 200, 206; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). In reviewing a grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissi ons, and other evidence submitt ed by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sallie v Fifth Third Bank , 297 Mich App 115, 117-118; 824 NW2d 238 (2012). Summary disposition is appropriate if there i s no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is ent itled to judgment as a matter o f law. MCR 2.116(C)(10); Latham v Barton Malow Co , 480 Mich 105, 111; 746 NW2d 868 (2008). A genuine issue of m aterial fact exists when, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds may differ. Debano-Griffin v Lake Co , 493 Mich 167, 175; 828 NW2d 634 (2013).

“A material fact is an ultimate fact issue upon which a jury’s verdict must be based.” Belmont v Forest Hills Pub Sch , 114 Mich App 692, 696; 319 NW2d 386 (1982); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed) (providing that a mater ial fact is “[a] fact that is significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand”). Plaintiff contends that the trial court never considered whether plaintiff’s homeowner’s insurance policy was breached, and this constituted a genuine issue of material fact, such that summary disposition was impro per.

The trial court granted summary disposition to defendants on n umerous grounds, including: (1) statute of limitations, i.e., MCR 2.116(C)(7); (2) lack of legal capacity to sue due to plaintiff’s lack of insurable interest, i.e., MCR 2.116(C)(5 ); (3) failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted because defendants’ disbursement of funds to the receiver were required by valid court orders, i.e., MCR 2.116(C)(8); and (4) no genuine issue of material fact that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law be cause defendants’ disbursement of funds to the receiver were required by valid court orders, i.e. , MCR 2.116(C)(10). Even if plaintiff was correct that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to defendants because there were outstanding issues of material fact, summarydisposition in defendants’ favor would still be proper on the oth er grounds the trial court reli ed upon, and therefore, reversal would not be proper. See Amerisure Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 262 Mich App 10, 21; 684 NW2d 391 (2004) (“[W]e will not reverse a trial court’s decisio n when it reaches the right result for the wrong reasons.”).-11- Additionally, plaintiff’s proffe red “genuine issue of material fact” is not material to the determination below. The trial court granted defendants’ motio n for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), i.e., the claim for which there must be no genuine issue of material fact, because defendants were “following court orders that were never reversed, overruled, stricken, or otherwise found to be invalid” when the y disbursed the insurance funds to the court appointed receiver. T he underlying issue of whether defendants breached their insurance contract with plaintiff was not materialbecause plaintiff’s claims could be dismissed before ever reaching that issue. The issue of breach of contra ct was not “an ultimate fact issue upon which a jury’s verdict must be based.” Belmont , 114 Mich App at 696. Therefore, there was no genuine issue of material fact and summary disposition i n defendants’ favor was proper.

Affirmed. Having prevailed on appeal, defendants may tax thei r costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood /s/ Kathleen Jansen /s/ Michael F. Gadola