UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4739

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DANNY LEE LANGLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:11-cr-00243-FL-1)

Submitted: May 13, 2013 Decided: May 21, 2013

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research 

and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Danny Lee Langley pled guilty, pursuant to a written 

plea agreement, to bribery and aiding and abetting, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 666 and 2 (2006). The district court sentenced 

Langley to eighty-four months’ imprisonment. Langley appeals. 

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. 

Langley was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental 

brief but has not done so. The Government has moved to dismiss 

the appeal based on the appellate waiver provision in Langley’s 

plea agreement. We dismiss in part and affirm in part. 

We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. 

United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Where the government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and did 

not breach its obligations under the plea agreement, we will 

enforce the waiver if the record establishes that (1) the 

defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive his right 

to appeal, and (2) the issues raised on appeal fall within the 

scope of the waiver. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 

168-69 (4th Cir. 2005). In determining whether a defendant’s 

appeal waiver was both knowing and intelligent, we must examine 

the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s 
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experience, conduct, educational background, and familiarity 

with the agreement’s terms. United States v. General, 278 F.3d 

389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002). “An appeal waiver ‘is not knowingly 

or voluntarily made if the district court fails to specifically 

question the defendant concerning the waiver provision of the 

plea agreement during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record 

indicates that the defendant did not otherwise understand the 

full significance of the waiver.’” United States v. Johnson, 

410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 

Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992)).

We conclude that Langley’s waiver was valid and 

enforceable as to issues within its scope. Under the plea 

agreement, Langley specifically waived his right to appeal a 

sentence within or below the Guidelines range established by the 

district court* at sentencing. Because Langley, in fact, 

received such a sentence, we grant the motion to dismiss insofar 

as the appeal addresses the propriety of Langley’s sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no non-waivable, potentially 

meritorious issues that fall outside the scope of the plea 

agreement. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to 

 * Langley consented to arraignment by magistrate judge. See

28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006).
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dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal of Langley’s sentence. 

We also deny the motion to dismiss in part and affirm the 

district court’s judgment as to all remaining issues. This 

court requires that counsel inform Langley, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Langley requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Langley. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED IN PART;

AFFIRMED IN PART