2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-24-2015

Isaac Fullman v. Thomas Kistler

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Recommended Citation

"Isaac Fullman v. Thomas Kistler" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 653.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4758

___________

ISAAC K. FULLMAN,

 Appellant

v.

THOMAS KING KISTLER; MATTHEW SHUPENKO; JEFFREY HEFFRICH; 

JEFFREY T. HITE; CAPT. JOHN PERRYMAN; LT. M. GORDON; JEANNA 

ANANEA; KARLA MCCOOL; BRYAN CRAMER

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-01740)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 27, 2015

Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: June 24, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Isaac Fullman appeals pro se from the District Court’s December 3, 2014 order 

dismissing, with prejudice, his civil rights complaint filed in Civil Action No. 4:14-cv01740.1

 For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

I.

In 2010, the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Pennsylvania, convicted 

Fullman of, inter alia, driving under the influence (“DUI”) and driving while his license 

was suspended or revoked. Fullman was sentenced to a prison term of ten days to two 

years for the DUI offense, with a concurrent 90-day prison term for driving while his 

license was suspended/revoked. Fullman’s efforts to attack that judgment on direct 

appeal and state court post-conviction review were unsuccessful.

Beginning in September 2012, Fullman filed a host of pro se civil complaints in 

the District Court. A little background about these other complaints is helpful to 

understanding the origin of the case at issue here. Each complaint concerned the traffic 

stop that led to his DUI arrest, his criminal proceedings, and/or events that arose while he 

was in prison serving his sentence. In that last category, Fullman alleged (as he did in his 

complaint here), that (1) he did not receive credit for the one day that he had spent in the

custody of the Philadelphia Police Department, (2) he was not paid for the prison job that 

 

1 On that same day, the District Court dismissed a complaint filed by Fullman in another 

case (Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-01739). We address his appeal from that judgment in a 

separate opinion. See C.A. No. 14-4757.
3

he held in April and May 2012, and (3) a pair of his socks were lost and not replaced by 

the prison. Going forward, we will refer to these allegations as Claims 1, 2, and 3. 

In March 2013, the District Court dismissed all but one of Fullman’s cases (Civil 

Action No. 4:12-cv-01879) so that he could file one, all-inclusive complaint. In doing so, 

the District Court indicated that Fullman could not obtain injunctive relief with respect to 

Claim 1 because he was no longer in custody. Furthermore, the court concluded that 

Claims 2 and 3 failed to state a viable claim because his pleadings indicated that he had 

been afforded meaningful post-deprivation administrative remedies. 

Shortly thereafter, Fullman filed his amended complaint in No. 4:12-cv-01879. 

The United States Magistrate Judge who was assigned to the case observed that 

this amended complaint is actually less complete than the 

initial flawed pleadings filed by [Fullman]. For example, the 

amended complaint contains no single case caption, and no 

clear or comprehensive recital of the defendants Fullman 

wishes to sue. Instead, the amended complaint appears to 

simply summarize the nine prior complaints, each of which 

was found to be flawed in a number of respects by the court.

(Mag. J. Report & Recommendation issued in Civ. Action No. 4:12-cv-01879 on May 16, 

2013, at 2-3.) After reiterating some of the flaws found in Fullman’s earlier complaints 

(but not the aforementioned flaws concerning Claims 1 through 3), the Magistrate Judge 

“recommended that the defective claims and improper parties named in the [amended] 

complaint be dismissed with prejudice.” (Id. at 14.) The Magistrate Judge further 

recommended that “[s]ince Fullman’s amended complaint otherwise defies 

comprehension or description, it is recommended that any remaining claims be 
4

dismissed, but without prejudice to one final effort by Fullman to file a proper amended 

complaint.” (Id. at 14-15.)

In June 2013, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation 

in part and rejected it in part. The court agreed that dismissal was appropriate, but 

disagreed that further leave to amend should be granted. The court explained that the 

amended complaint would be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety “because Fullman 

has already been granted one opportunity to amend his complaint to state a claim, but, 

nevertheless, still failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and because 

he failed to comply with this Court’s [instructions in its March 2013 order for filing an 

amended complaint] . . . pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).” (Dist. Ct. Order issued in 

Civ. Action No. 4:12-cv-01879 on June 12, 2013, at 2.)2 The court’s order itself, 

meanwhile, simply stated that “[t]he action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 41(b).” (Id. at 3.)

Fullman did not appeal from the District Court’s June 2013 order. Instead, in 

September 2014, he filed the complaint at issue here, reiterating Claims 1 through 3. The 

Magistrate Judge recommended that this new complaint be dismissed with prejudice, 

concluding that it was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. On December 3, 

2014, the District Court adopted that recommendation. Fullman now appeals from that 

latest order.

II.

 

2 Rule 41(b) provides for the involuntary dismissal of an action where the plaintiff “fails 

to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
5

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 

plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Fullman’s complaint. See Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis supported by 

the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, “prevents 

parties from relitigating an issue that has already been actually litigated.” Peloro v. 

United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir. 2007). This doctrine applies when “‘(1) the 

issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that 

issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and 

(4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.’” Id. at 175 (quoting 

Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 

1995)). There might be some question whether all of these elements are satisfied here.3 

We need not resolve that question, however, because (1) the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel is not jurisdictional, see Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 

615 F.3d 159, 170 (3d Cir. 2010), and (2) Claims 1 through 3 otherwise fail.

 

3 As indicated above, neither the District Court nor the Magistrate Judge specifically 

discussed Claims 1 through 3 when reviewing Fullman’s omnibus amended complaint. 

Additionally, the court’s June 2013 dismissal of that pleading with prejudice was driven, 

at least in part, by Fullman’s failure to comply with the court’s earlier order. 

Accordingly, there may be a colorable argument that any determination as to Claims 1 

through 3 was not “essential” to that dismissal. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. 

Pub. Util. Comm’n, 288 F.3d 519, 527 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[I]n determining whether the 

issue was essential to the judgment, we must look to whether the issue was critical to the 

judgment or merely dicta.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
6

Recall that Claim 1 alleges that Fullman’s sentence was not credited for the one 

day that he spent in the Philadelphia Police Department’s custody. To the extent that he 

wishes to obtain an injunction directing the award of that credit, the proper vehicle for 

seeking that relief would have been a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See

Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 2001). However, the time to file such a 

petition has passed, as he is no longer in custody. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 

490-91 (1989) (per curiam). To the extent that he seeks money damages, Claim 1 is 

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 

173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that, in Heck, “the Supreme Court held that where 

success in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity of 

conviction or duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination 

of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or 

sentence”); see also id. at 177-78 (rejecting argument that Heck’s favorable termination 

rule does not apply when the § 1983 plaintiff is no longer in custody).

Claims 2 and 3 allege that Fullman was deprived of certain property (i.e., a pair of 

socks and payment for his prison job). “‘[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of 

property’ by prison officials does not violate the Due Process Clause ‘if a meaningful 

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.’” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 210 

(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). Fullman has 

indicated that post-deprivation administrative remedies were afforded to him, but he has 

not alleged facts demonstrating that those remedies were not meaningful. Accordingly, 

Claims 2 and 3 fail to state a viable due process claim. See id. Furthermore, given that 
7

the District Court previously notified Fullman of the flaw in these claims and he failed to 

remedy it, there was no need for the court to grant him further leave to amend these 

claims. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(explaining that leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile). 

In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s December 3, 2014 order. 

Fullman’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.