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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

MARC MATRANGA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant 

v. 

U -HAUL COMPANY OF : No. 1067 EDA 2017 

PENNSYLVANIA 

Appeal from the Order Entered February 15, 2017 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): March Term, 2015, No. 04019 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2018 

Marc Matranga appeals from the trial court's order granting summary 

judgment in favor of Appellee, U -Haul Company of Pennsylvania (U -Haul), and 

dismissing Matranga's complaint with prejudice. After careful review, we 

affirm. 

On March 31, 2015, Matranga instituted the underlying negligence 

action against U -Haul after he was injured in a July 2013 forklift accident. At 

the time of the accident, Matranga was working as a welder helper at the Falls 

Manufacturing Company (Facility) in Fairless Hills, one of U -Haul's production 

facilities. The Facility manufactures parts for U -Haul trailers. Matranga was 

employed by McGrath Technical Staffing, Inc., a staffing agency. McGrath 

would hire workers and assign them to various temporary positions to perform 

work at the Facility with its client, U -Haul. In 2013, McGrath executed a 

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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Staffing Services Contract (Contract) with U -Haul that included a waiver 

provision wherein Matranga waived his right to pursue a claim against U -Haul 

for any workplace injuries. The Contract also specified that "All workers 

assigned to U -Haul are employees of [McGrath] and that such workers are not 

employees of U -Haul." 2013 Staffing Services Contract, 4/9/13, at ¶ 2. On 

the date of the accident, Matranga's job was to load parts onto a cart, push 

them to a welding station, and then unload the parts. 

At the time of the accident, Matranga was holding an electrical line out 

of the way of a forklift being operated by U -Haul employee, Jose Molina. 

Molina crashed the forklift into a stack of steel frames, which then fell over 

onto Matranga. Matranga suffered serious and permanent injuries from the 

accident, including: a tear of his labrum; pelvic injury; disc protrusion; lumbar 

sprain and strain; and back and hip pain. As a result of the injuries, Matranga 

alleged he had suffered a significant loss of wages and income, suffered 

permanent impairment, and will continue to incur medical expenses related to 

his treatment. 

On September 6, 2016, U -Haul filed a motion for summary judgment 

claiming that it was not liable for Matranga's injuries based on the defenses 

of statutory employer, co -employee, borrowed servant and contractual 

waiver/release. Matranga filed a response to the motion, claiming that he was 

specifically designated as a McGrath employee under the parties' contract, he 

was functionally an employee of McGrath because the staffing service 

exercised control over him and his work, and that any contractual waiver was 

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ineffective. On February 15, 2017, the trial court entered its order granting 

U -Haul's motion and dismissing Matranga's complaint with prejudice. This 

timely appeal follows.' On appeal, Matranga presents the following issues for 

our consideration: 

1. Whether U -Haul should be denied status as the statutory 

employer of Marc Matranga, where U -Haul is unable to establish 

the factors for statutory employment status under the 

McDonald[v. Levinson Steel Co., 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930)] test, 

and where both the contract between U -Haul and Mr. Matranga's 

employer, McGrath, and the evidence of record clearly 

demonstrate that McGrath, not U -Haul, was Mr. Matranga's 

employer and both had the right of control and, in fact, exercised 

such control, over Mr. Matranga and his work? 

2. Whether U -Haul should be denied immunity on the basis of the 

alleged co -employee status of Marc Matranga and Jose Molina, 

where the evidence of record clearly demonstrates that Mr. 

Matranga was an employee of, and controlled and supervised by, 

McGrath, and Mr. Molina was an employee of, and controlled and 

supervised by, U -Haul, each performing different work functions 

under separate control? 

3. Whether U -Haul's contention that Marc Matranga is a borrowed 

servant must fail, where the contract between U -Haul and 

McGrath expressly provides that Mr. Matranga was an employee 

of McGrath, and where the contract and evidence of record clearly 

demonstrate that McGrath had the right of control and, in fact, 

exercised such control, over Mr. Matranga and his work? 

4. Whether U -Haul's contention that Marc Matranga contractually 

waived and released all claims against U -Haul must fail, where the 

document relied upon by U -Haul was not the same document 

which Mr. Matranga was given and signed, U -Haul was not the 

party purportedly released in the document, Mr. Matranga's 

signature to this contract of adhesion was procured under duress, 

' Matranga filed a motion for reconsideration on February 24, 2017, which the 

trial court denied as moot, on March 22, 2017, once he filed his timely notice 

of appeal on March 13, 2017. 

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and U -Haul failed to plead waiver of release as an affirmative 

defense in its answer to the complaint? 

Appellant's Brief at 6-7. 

Our standard of review in cases of summary judgment is well settled. 

This court will only reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment where 

there was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Merriweather v. 

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 684 A.2d 137, 140 (Pa. Super. 1996). 

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits demonstrate that there 

exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. In determining whether to 

grant summary judgment a trial court must resolve all doubts against the 

moving party and examine the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment may only be granted in cases where 

it is clear and free from doubt that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Id. 

Matranga first claims that U -Haul was not his statutory employer 

because it did not prove the elements of such a theory and because the 

parties' contract and the evidence of record clearly demonstrate that McGrath 

was Matranga's employer, having both the right of control and actually 

exercising such control over his work. 

Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) provides the 

exclusive remedy for employees seeking to recover from their employers for 

work -related injuries. See 77 P.S. § 481. Under the Act, the term "employer" 

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also refers to those who qualify as a statutory employer. Id. at § 52. A 

statutory employer is defined under the Act as: 

An employer who permits the entry upon the premises occupied 

by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by 

an employe or contractor, for the performance upon such 

premises of a part of the employer's regular business entrusted to 

such employe or contractor, shall be liable to such laborer or 

assistant in the same manner and to the same extent as to his 

own employe. 

Id. "A statutory employer is a master who is not a contractual or [a] commonlaw one, but is made one by the [Workers' Compensation] Act." Shamis v. 

Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 969 (Pa. Super. 2013), citing McDonald v. Levinson 

Steel Co., 153 A. 424, 425 (Pa. 1930). 

In McDonald, our Supreme Court established the test for determining 

whether a party qualifies as a statutory employer under the Act.2 According 

to McDonald, a party must establish the following elements to qualify as a 

statutory employer: (1) an employer who is under contract with an owner or 

one in the position of an owner; (2) the premises is occupied by or under the 

control of such employer; (3) a subcontract made by such employer; (4) part 

of the employer's regular business entrusted to such subcontractor; and (5) 

an employee of such subcontractor. Kelly v. Thackray Crane Rental, Inc., 

874 A.2d 649, 655 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Instantly, the trial court found that U -Haul was Matranga's statutory 

employer, where it concluded that: U -Haul had a contract with McGrath, 

2 77 P.S. § 203, as amended 77 P.S. § 52 (Employers' liability to employe of 

employe or contractor permitted to enter upon premises). 

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Matranga's employer; the Facility was occupied by U -Haul; there was a 

subcontract made by U -Haul; part of U -Haul's regular business was entrusted 

to McGrath; and Matranga was an employee of McGrath. See Affidavit of 

Michael P. Wiley, CEO of McGrath Technical Staffing, Inc., 7/27/16, at ¶ 2 

(averring that in 2013 McGrath contracted with U -Haul to provide its workers 

for assignment at U -Haul's Fairless Hills facility on as -needed basis and for 

duration to be determined solely by U -Haul). 

John Kathrins, a "lead man" in the welding department at the Facility, 

stated in his deposition that his day-to-day duties consisted of: setting the 

workers up on jobs, teaching them the jobs, making sure the job at hand was 

being done correctly, making sure the workers have all their parts, making 

sure the parts are correct, and making sure any needed fixtures are at the 

stations. Deposition of John Kathrins, 5/20/16, at 11. Kathrins also stated 

that U -Haul would have made the decisions regarding what assignments 

Matranga, as a laborer, would have throughout his shift, id. at 34, and that 

McGrath was not "involved in any of the day-to-day control over the temporary 

workers in [the] welding department." Id. at 35-36. Finally, Matranga stated 

in his affidavit that his U -Haul supervisor would meet with the welders daily, 

discuss what they were going to make in a given day, what trail they were 

making, and how many pieces had to be completed. See Affidavit of Marc 

Matranga, 4/20/16, at 149-152. McGrath was not responsible for training any 

of the welders. Id. at 197. 

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Under such circumstances, we agree with the trial court that U -Haul was 

Matranga's statutory employer. See Kelly, supra at 657 (employer 

effectively occupies premises for purposes of section 52 of the Act when its 

supervisor is present at site on daily basis and when its employees are 

regularly present on premises at same time as subcontractor's employees); 

see also Wilkinson v. K -Mart, 603 A.2d 659 (Pa. Super. 1992) (plaintiff, a 

truck driver, qualified as K -Mart's statutory employee where: plaintiff's direct 

employer had contract with K -Mart to supply it truck drivers; K -Mart reserved 

right to dispatch vehicle given to plaintiff to drive and to direct plaintiff in dayto-day operations of vehicle; and K -Mart not only controlled the work to be 

done, but also controlled manner of performance by selecting the routes to be 

used).3 

Matranga next asserts that because the Contract specified that McGrath 

was his employer and that he was not an employee of U -Haul, he cannot be 

considered to be U -Haul's statutory employee and is not precluded in bringing 

a negligence action against U-Haul.4 We disagree. 

3 Having determined that U -Haul was Matranga's statutory employer, 

Matranga is also barred from pursuing a tort action against his co -employee, 

U -Haul worker Jose Molina. See 77 P.S. § 72 (person not liable to anyone at 

common law on account of disability for any act or omission occurring while 

he or she in same employ as person disabled except for intentional wrong). 

4 Because we have concluded that U -Haul was Matranga's statutory employer, 

there is no need to further review the merits of his remaining claims that 

involve the alternative legal bases the court relied on in granting summary 

judgment in U -Haul's favor. However, to stave off any further appeals in the 

matter, we have decided to review the issues. 

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In Pastore v. Anjo Consr. Co., 578 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. 1990), our 

Court explained that we are not controlled by the names that parties use in a 

contract to describe their relationship. Rather, courts must look to the entire 

body of the contract and its purpose to determine the legal effect. Id. at 25 

(quoting Capozzoli v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 42 A.2d 524, 

525 (Pa. 1945)). Here, the evidence clearly showed that there was a statutory 

employer -employee relationship between U -Haul and Matranga; the language 

of the parties' Contract does not change that legal conclusion. 

The court also determined that Matranga was a borrowed servant where 

U -Haul controlled the work he performed. The test for determining the 

identity of the "true" master when a servant has been loaned to another 

focuses on the right of control: 

The crucial test in determining whether a servant furnished by one 

person to another becomes the employe of the person to whom 

he is loaned is whether he passes under the latter's right of control 

with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner 

of performing it. 

A servant is the employe of the person who has the right of 

controlling the manner of his performance of the work, 

irrespective of whether he actually exercises that control or not. 

Wilkinson v. K -Mart, 603 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added and in original). 

Specifically, the evidence showed that: U -Haul chose the departments 

to which Matranga was assigned; Matranga reported to floor supervisors, who 

were U -Haul employees, with work concerns, when he ran out of work or when 

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he left his workstation; and U -Haul employees assigned Matranga with tasks, 

trained Matranga how to perform them, and reviewed Matranga's work. 

Matranga stated that the plant manager would have a daily meeting every 

morning with the welding department workers to discuss what they were 

making, which trailer parts they were making, and how many pieces had to 

be completed. The manager would then follow up during the day and give the 

welders the specific details as to what was actually being made or expected. 

When Matranga first started working in the welding department, U -Haul 

employee Jose Molina would direct him in his duties, with the general guidance 

of U -Haul welding supervisor, John Cathy. See Affidavit of Marc Matranga, 

4/20/16, at 170-73; 189. McGrath was not responsible for training any of the 

welders. Id. at 197. Under such circumstances, we agree with the trial court's 

conclusion that Matranga was a borrowed servant of U -Haul. 

Finally, the trial court found that Matranga had contractually waived his 

claims against U -Haul based upon a provision in the parties' Contract, which 

provided: 

Limitation of Liability. 

12. Limitation of Liability. To the extent permitted by law, you, 

on your own behalf and on behalf of anyone claiming by or through 

you, waive any and all right you have, or may have, to claim 

or assert a claim, suit, action or demand of any kind, nature 

or description, including without limitation, claims, suits, 

actions or demands for personal injury or death whether 

arising in tort, contract or otherwise, against Client or 

Client's customers, agents, officers, directors, or 

employees, resulting from or arising directly or indirectly 

out of your employment with McGrath Systems. You 

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recognize and agree that McGrath Systems provides workers' compensation coverage for such things as on-thejob injuries or occupational diseases incurred while on 

assignment for McGrath Systems, and you agree to look 

solely to McGrath Systems and/or its insurer for damages and/or expenses for such injury, illness or other claims 

incurred while on assignment. You agree to notify McGrath 

Systems if you believe that there are any unsafe conditions at the 

Client worksite or facility. In the event of a workplace injury that 

does not permit you to return to full duty, McGrath Systems will 

make modified duty positions available that meet any Physician's 

restrictions, which may or may not be at your normal place of 

employment. 

Parties' Contract, 4/9/13, at ¶ 12 (emphasis added). 

Matranga claims that he did not contractually waive and release all 

claims against U -Haul based upon the above -quoted language from the 

parties' contract. Specifically, he asserts that the contract was not the same 

one that he was given and signed, that U -Haul was not the party released in 

the document, that his signature on the contract was procured under duress, 

and that U -Haul failed to plead waiver of release as an affirmative defense in 

its answer to the complaint. We disagree. 

First, we note that U -Haul did raise the defense of waiver generally in 

its new matter. See U -Haul Answer & New Matter, 6/16/15, at ¶ 58 

("Plaintiff's claims may be barred by . . waiver."). Under such 

circumstances, we decline to find that U -Haul has waived this defense. See 

Pa.R.C.P. 126 (favoring liberal construction of rules to resolve issues in "a just, 

speedy, and inexpensive manner"). 

Next, Matranga claims that he was "never afforded the opportunity to 

'contemplate' the purported Agreement and release as he was never provided 

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with a copy of the Agreement . . . [and] was given only a signature page that 

U -Haul purports belongs to the Agreement and was never presented with the 

entire document." Appellant's Brief, at 50-51. Instantly, Matranga admitted 

he signed the Contract. While he stated that he felt rushed and may not have 

reviewed the entire document before signing it, this does not render the 

agreement unenforceable. See Toro v. Fitness Intl LLC., 150 A.3d 968 

(Pa. Super 2016) (failure to read agreement before signing it does not render 

agreement either invalid or unenforceable). To be valid, an exculpatory 

clause, such as the instant waiver clause, must meet three conditions: (1) it 

must not contravene public policy; (2) the contract must be between persons 

relating entirely to their own private affairs; and (3) each party must be a free 

bargaining agent to the agreement so that the contract is not one of adhesion. 

Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1189 (Pa. 2010). 

Here, Matranga has not elicited any evidence showing that the 

Chepkevich conditions were not present in the instant case. Matranga 

averred that he had the opportunity to ask questions about the Contract and, 

in fact, did ask questions prior to signing it. Moreover, it was Matranga's duty 

to read the contract before signing it; it is well -established that the failure to 

read some or all of a contract does not justify nullifying the agreement. 

Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Emp. Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563 

(Pa. 1983); accord Seaton v. East Windsor Speedway, Inc., 582 A.2d 

1380 (Pa. Super. 1990) (where plaintiff claimed he did not know and was not 

told he was signing a release, Court found plaintiff signed release voluntarily, 

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where he was not compelled to sign it, and there was no evidence of fraud or 

issue of trust between parties to contract). Matranga has not proven fraud, 

issues of mistrust among the parties, or that he was forced to sign the 

Contract. Under such circumstances, we fail to find that the Contract was 

unenforceable as it relates to Matranga. 

To the extent that Matranga claims that the Facility, not U -Haul, was the 

party released in the document, we disagree. The Contract clearly states that 

it was made "by and between Falls Manufacturing Incorporated, (hereinafter 

"U -Haul") and McGrath Solutions (hereinafter "Staffing Agency[.]") 2013 

Staffing Services Contract, 4/9/13, at 1 (emphasis added). The remainder of 

the document references U -Haul as the contracting party; the Facility is a 

division of U -Haul. See U -Haul Answer & New Matter, 6/16/15, at ¶ 3 (U - Haul "operates, manages, controls and maintains the [Fairless Hills] 

premises."); see also Affidavit of Michael P. Wiley of McGrath Technical 

Staffing Inc., 7/27/16, at ¶ 2 (McGrath contracted with U -Haul to provide 

workers for assignment at U -Haul's production facility in Fairless Hills, PA); 

Affidavit of William B. Hawthorne, President of Falls Mfg. Co., 5/23/16, at ¶ 1 

(averring that Falls Manufacturing Company is a division of U -Haul Co. of 

Pennsylvania). 

Order affirmed. 

Judge Panella joins this Memorandum. 

Judge Strassburger files a Dissenting Memorandum. 

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Judgment Entered. 

J seph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/22/18 

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