[Cite as State v. Stewart, 2023-Ohio-1493.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 22AP-352

(C.P.C. No. 21CR-2438)

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Tangela V. Stewart, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on May 4, 2023

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and George M.

Schumann, for appellant. Argued: George M. Schumann.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Andrew T. 

Kielczewski, for appellee. Argued: Andrew T. Kielczewski.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.

{¶ 1} In the midst of a serious global pandemic, personal care aides like defendantappellant, Tangela V. Stewart, accepted significant risks by continuing to assist their 

patients with activities of daily living, errands, and household chores. It would have been 

reasonable for providers to limit risks of exposing their patients and themselves to the novel 

coronavirus disease (COVID-19) by performing many traditionally in-home services 

outside of their patients’ homes. These risks were particularly rampant in 2020 because

there was no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for COVID-19 at that time.

{¶ 2} It is during this timeframe the plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, claims Ms. 

Stewart committed Medicaid fraud and theft. More precisely, the state accused Ms. Stewart 
No. 22AP-352 2

of seeking and obtaining Medicaid funds for personal care assistance services she did not, 

in fact, provide to her patient, A.S., in May/June 2020. Although A.S. repeatedly denied 

the veracity of these allegations, a Franklin County jury nonetheless found Ms. Stewart 

guilty of both first-degree misdemeanor offenses on April 21, 2022.

{¶ 3} Ms. Stewart now appeals from the May 20, 2022 judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, arguing her two convictions are against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Because we find she cannot satisfy the exacting requirements to 

prevail under this difficult standard of review, we must overrule her assignment of error 

and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 4} On June 15, 2021, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Ms. Stewart with 

one count of Medicaid fraud, in violation of R.C. 2913.40(B), and one count of theft by 

deception, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3). Both offenses are misdemeanors of the first 

degree if the value of the funds obtained in violation of either statute is less than $1,000.

R.C. 2913.40(E); R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). The indictment, however, accused Ms. Stewart of 

unlawfully obtaining between $1,000.00 and $7,499.99 in Medicaid funds for personal 

care assistance services she did not actually render to her patient, A.S., in 2020. Based on 

this amount, both offenses were charged as fifth-degree felonies in accordance with their 

controlling statutory provisions. See R.C. 2913.40(E); R.C. 2913.02(B)(2).

{¶ 5} Following a four-day jury trial, the jury found Ms. Stewart guilty of both 

offenses on April 21, 2022. The jury also found the aggregate value of the property or 

services involved in both offenses was less than $1,000. (Tr. Vol. IV at 43-44.) Based on 

those findings, both offenses were classified as misdemeanors of the first degree. See R.C. 

2913.40(E); R.C. 2913.02(B)(2).

{¶ 6} After the verdict was rendered, the trial court ordered Ms. Stewart to undergo 

a pre-sentence investigation and revoked her bond. (Tr. Vol. IV at 45.) She was thus 

incarcerated in the local jail for 29 days while she awaited her sentencing hearing. (See Tr. 

Vol. IV at 45; Tr. Vol. V at 2.)

{¶ 7} At Ms. Stewart’s May 19, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court found the 

theft and Medicaid fraud offenses merged into a single conviction for purposes of 
No. 22AP-352 3

sentencing, and the state elected to proceed on the Medicaid fraud count. (Tr. Vol. V at 2; 

May 20, 2022 Jgmt. Entry.) The trial court sentenced Ms. Stewart to a two-year period of 

community control for that offense. (Tr. Vol. V at 5; Jgmt. Entry.) Among other community 

control sanctions it imposed, the trial court ordered Ms. Stewart to pay $9001in restitution 

to the Ohio Department of Medicaid and imposed a 180-day local jail sentence, suspending 

151 days and crediting the 29 days Ms. Stewart spent in the local jail prior to sentencing.

(Jgmt. Entry.)

{¶ 8} Ms. Stewart timely appealed and asserts the following assignment of error for 

our review:

THE VERDICTS OF GUILT AS TO MEDICAID FRAUD AND 

THEFT ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE.

II. FACTUAL OVERVIEW

{¶ 9} In 2020, Ms. Stewart was authorized by the Ohio Department of Medicaid 

(“Department”) to render and receive payment for personal care assistance services she 

provided to Medicaid recipients in their homes. (Tr. Vol. III at 22, 77.) Providers like Ms. 

Stewart play a vital role in our society because, with their assistance, people with activitylimiting conditions (due to age, medical conditions, or while recovering from an injury) can

continue living in their own homes. Personal care assistance services include assisting 

patients with their daily care (e.g., dressing, bathing, household chores, meal preparation), 

as well as errands and transportation (e.g., groceries, prescriptions, doctor’s 

appointments). (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 10-11.)

{¶ 10} To be compensated for personal care services provided to Medicaid recipients 

in Ohio, all providers must be certified and have an active provider agreement with the 

1 The jury only found the aggregate value of the property involved was less than $1,000 for both offenses. 

(See Apr. 21, 2022 Verdict Forms.) At the sentencing hearing, the trial court suggested $900 as the 

restitution amount. (Tr. Vol. IV at 2-3.) Although the record does not indicate the trial court’s basis for 

that amount, the parties nonetheless agreed to it. (See id.) Of note, R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) provides, in relevant 

part, that restitution “shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct 

and proximate result of the commission of the offense.” Since Ms. Stewart attributes no error to the 

restitution amount imposed on appeal, however, we must assume all requirements of R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) 

regarding the imposition and calculation of restitution are satisfied here.
No. 22AP-352 4

Department. (Tr. Vol. III at 11-16.) These agreements identify a provider’s rights and 

responsibilities under federal and Ohio laws. (Tr. Vol. III at 12-13.)

{¶ 11} Ms. Stewart was under such agreement as a certified “non-agency personal 

care aide”2 Medicaid provider. (Tr. Vol. III at 14-22; Trial Ex. 1, 1a.) At all relevant times, 

Ms. Stewart’s payment for such services was thus subject to the terms set forth in her 

provider agreement with the Department. (See Tr. Vol. III at 18-22; Trial Ex. 1A.)

A. Claim Reimbursement Process and Monitoring 

{¶ 12} The Department contracts with managed care companies to supervise, 

monitor, and process claims related to services provided by personal care aides like Ms. 

Stewart. (Tr. Vol. III at 22-24.) In 2020, Ms. Stewart contracted as a Medicaid provider 

with the managed care company, United HealthCare Community Plan. (See Tr. Vol. III at 

23, 55-56. See generally Trial Ex. 3.)

{¶ 13} Under the controlling provider agreement, personal care aides like Ms. 

Stewart are only reimbursed for medically necessary services. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 16-

20, 27-28.) And they can only bill for services they actually provide to a patient. (See, e.g., 

Tr. Vol. III at 17, 20-22, 27-28.) Although many personal care assistance services are 

generally provided by an aide in a patient’s home, some of these services must (or can) be 

provided elsewhere. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 10-11, 27-29.) Further, the provider agreement 

does not require aides to provide personal care services at a particular time or at the same 

time for each patient visit. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 27-28; See Trial Ex. 1 and 1A.) The case 

manager schedules the services to be provided, and a patient’s service plan may specify 

when services must be provided. (Tr. Vol. III at 28-29.) Of note, A.S.’s services plan from

the relevant timeframe was not presented as evidence and her case manager did not testify 

at trial.

{¶ 14} To receive payment (or reimbursement) for services provided to Medicaid 

recipients, an aide submits a claim (i.e., bills) to their managed care company. (Tr. Vol. III 

at 22-24.) Properly submitted claims include, among other things, the provider’s unique 

2 At trial, the terms “personal care aide,” “personal care assistance aide,” “personal aide,” “home health 

aide,” “health aide,” and “nursing aide” were used interchangeably and without distinction. (See, e.g., Tr.

Vol. III at 10, 18, 45, 78, 189.)
No. 22AP-352 5

identifying number,

3 the service date, the patient’s name, the procedure (service) code, and 

the number of units billed by the provider. (See Tr. Vol. III at 24-25.) One “unit” equates 

to a 15-minute increment of service time. (Tr. Vol. III at 61.) Although aides must keep a 

daily log of services provided to each patient (“timesheets”), nothing in the record suggests 

they are required to submit these timesheets to their managed care company in order to 

obtain reimbursement. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 22-24, 56-65.)

{¶ 15} The Department uses multiple tools to verify reimbursement claims

submitted by personal care aides like Ms. Stewart. One is the electronic visit verification 

(“EVV”) system. (Tr. Vol. III at 30-32, 40-43.) For each patient visit, a personal care aide 

must “call-in” and “call-out” to the EVV system at the start and end of services, thus 

verifying the duration of the visit (Tr. Vol. III at 31-32.) The EVV system records the GPS 

coordinates of the location where call-ins and call-outs are made and flags in the “EVV log” 

when calls are made more than 1,000 feet from a patient’s home. (Tr. Vol. III at 32-39.)

{¶ 16} Medicaid also typically requires patients to verify the time and type of 

services provided during each visit by digital or voice signature in a mobile verification visit 

application on the provider’s cell phone. (Tr. Vol. III at 32, 40-41.) But, that requirement 

was waived in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Tr. Vol. III at 45.) And although 

personal care aides were still required to use the EVV system in 2020 (Tr. Vol. III at 45), 

reimbursement claims were not denied on account of EVV system flags (i.e., the provider 

calling in or out to the system from a location more than 1,000 feet from a patient’s home).

(See Tr. Vol. III at 39-40.)

{¶ 17} After a managed care company approves a claim, it pays the provider with 

Medicaid funds. (Tr. Vol. III at 23-24.)

B. Ms. Stewart’s Claim Submissions and Payments in 2020

{¶ 18} This case involves Ms. Stewart’s billing and receipt of Medicaid funds for 

services she allegedly did not provide to Medicaid recipient, A.S., between May 21, 2020 

3 As explained at trial by Heather Hire, medical administrator at the Department: “Each Medicaid provider 

has a unique identifier [number] so that they can bill the department. If they’re billing through a managed 

care company, those claims come into the system using that number.” (Tr. Vol. III at 24.)
No. 22AP-352 6

and July 2, 2020 (the “Service Period”).

4 The state became involved in this matter when 

the Department submitted a referral to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Ohio 

Attorney General’s Office and requested an investigation into these allegations. (Tr. Vol. 

III at 76-77.) The lead investigator, Special Agent Steven Braidich, ultimately concluded 

that she was. As a result, Ms. Stewart was indicted with Medicaid fraud and theft. 

{¶ 19} Before describing the basis for the state’s allegations against Ms. Stewart,

however, it is helpful to lay out some relevant history.

{¶ 20} In 2020, A.S. was in her late 60s and lived alone in a duplex. (Tr. Vol. III at

155-56. See Trial Ex. A.) Due to her medical conditions—13 pins in her right foot, spinal 

stenosis, spondylosis, high blood pressure, and fibromyalgia—A.S. was a Medicaid 

recipient. (Tr. Vol. III at 159-61.) She had a limited ability to take care of herself, perform 

household chores, and run errands because of the pain and weakness she endured from 

these medical conditions. (Tr. Vol. III at 160-61, 187.) A.S. was “basically homebound,” 

rarely had houseguests, and did not have a car. (Tr. Vol. III at 159-61.) Accordingly, prior 

to and in 2020, A.S. was authorized to receive 19 hours of personal care services per week 

from a Medicaid provider. (Tr. Vol. III at 162, 165.) At all relevant times, Ms. Stewart 

provided those services to A.S. (Tr. Vol. III at 162, 174, 190.)

{¶ 21} Of particular significance, the Service Period dates fall within a timeframe 

when the world was in the midst of a serious global pandemic caused by COVID-19. And 

vaccines to protect against COVID-19 were not available in Ohio until December 2020.5

These circumstances unequivocally impacted the ability of personal care aides like Ms. 

Stewart to perform in-home services for their patients. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 45, 121-22, 

195-97, 203-04, 208.) Continuing to provide these services meant Ms. Stewart risked 

becoming infected and infecting her patients, many of whom are immunocompromised and 

elderly. At the same time, patients like A.S. continued to require assistance with activities 

of daily living, household chores, and errands.

4 The service dates at issue in this case are May 20, 2020 through June 23, 2020. (See Trial Ex. 5, 7.) Ms. 

Stewart received payment (i.e., Medicaid funds) for these service dates between May 30, 2020 and July 2, 

2020. (See id.) “Service Period” generally pertains to the former, but also encompasses the latter as it 

relates to the dates on which Ms. Stewart received payment for the relevant service dates.

5 COVID-19 Update: Vaccinations Begin in Ohio, Office of the Governor, STATE OF OHIO (Dec. 14, 2020), 

https://governor.ohio.gov/media/news-and-media/covid19-update-12142020. (accessed May 2, 2023).
No. 22AP-352 7

{¶ 22} To limit the exposure risks inherent in providing personal care services in 

close contact, providers like Ms. Stewart looked for alternative ways to safely provide the 

personal care services traditionally performed in patients’ homes.

6 This often meant 

preparing meals or doing laundry outside of the patient’s home. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 

10-11, 124-28, 170-71, 184-85, 194-99.) Indeed, Ms. Stewart testified she was directed by 

her managed care agency to maintain social distancing when providing services to her 

patients in 2020. (See Tr. Vol. III at 203-04.) Further, the limited availability of items in 

stores, in addition to modified store hours, required personal care aides like Ms. Stewart to 

devote longer (or different) periods of time to performing errands for their patients. (See 

Tr. Vol. III at 196-201, 208.) And, of note, A.S. contracted COVID-19 during the Service 

Period. (Tr. Vol. III at 191, 196-97, 200-03.) These circumstances frame our analysis in 

this case.

{¶ 23} Evidence and testimony at trial established three general uncontested facts 

central to our evaluation of Ms. Stewart’s manifest weight challenge.

{¶ 24} First, Ms. Stewart billed her managed care company for either 12 units or 8 

units of “personal care service, per 15 minutes” provided to A.S. daily between May 20, 

2020 and June 23, 2020. (Tr. Vol. III at 66-72; Trial Ex. 3, 5, 7.) This equates to either 3 

hours (12 units) or 2 hours (8 units) of personal care services per day, and 92 hours in total 

for the entire Service Period. (Trial Ex. 3, 5.) Of note, Ms. Stewart did not bill for more 

than the approved 19 hours of service per week during the Service Period. (Tr. Vol. III at 

66-72; Trial Ex. 3, 7.) 

{¶ 25} Second, between May 30, 2020 and July 2, 2020, Ms. Stewart received 

$1,362.10 in Medicaid funds for the 92 hours of personal care aide services she claimed (in 

her Medicaid reimbursement submissions) she provided to A.S. during the Service Period. 

(Trial Ex. 3, 7.) Of that amount, the state claimed $1,314.53 in Medicaid funds were paid

to Ms. Stewart for services that were not actually rendered to A.S. (Trial Ex. 7; Tr. Vol. III 

6 Indeed, recognizing these risks, Governor DeWine issued additional executive orders that closed facilities 

providing older adult daycare services and senior centers (effective Mar. 23, 2020) and generally relaxed or 

amended administrative rules pertaining to, among other things, healthcare providers’ ability to render aid. 

See, e.g., Laura A. Bischoff & Kristen Spicker, Coronavirus Timeline: A Look at the Orders Changing Life 

in Ohio, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (May 13, 2020), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/timelinecoronavirus-prompts-orders-changing-everyday-life-ohio/gpnVSADPxZxMltlDVyqKEP/. (accessed 

May 2, 2023)
No. 22AP-352 8

at 111-13, 138-39.) The state did not carry its burden on that full amount, however, because 

the jury found the unlawfully obtained amount involved in both offenses was less than 

$1,000. (Apr. 21, 2022 Verdicts 1(B) and 2(B); Tr. Vol. IV at 43-44.)

{¶ 26} Finally, the continuously recording surveillance camera trained on A.S.’s 

residence during the Service Period showed Ms. Stewart at A.S.’s home for less than 15 

minutes each day. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 93-94, 111-12, 125-27; Trial Ex. 4, 5. See also Tr. 

Vol. II at 157-62.) More precisely, Special Agent Braidich’s unrefuted testimony established 

that the surveillance camera captured Ms. Stewart at A.S.’s home for approximately 3.75 

hours, in total, during the entire Service Period. (Tr. Vol. III at 84-93; Trial Ex. 5. But see

Tr. Vol. III at 118-19, 125-27, 130-31, 138-40.) The surveillance camera also generally 

showed Ms. Stewart’s vehicle at A.S.’s home in the mornings. (See Trial Ex. 4, 5.) 

{¶ 27} The state’s case rested primarily on these three pieces of evidence and the 

predicate assumption that personal care services were only provided at A.S.’s residence. 

Under this framework, the state’s argument on appeal is simple: because the surveillance 

footage showed Ms. Stewart at A.S.’s home approximately 3.75 hours, in total, between 

May 20, 2020 and June 23, 2020, “the jury properly concluded that [Ms. Stewart] was not 

providing the proper amount of services for which she billed” and was paid, i.e., 92 hours. 

(See Appellee’s Brief at 13.) 

{¶ 28} But, providing personal care services exclusively in a patient’s home is not the 

standard for reimbursement, and this was particularly true during the Service Period given 

the ongoing global pandemic. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 45, 121-22, 196-97.) Indeed, Ms. 

Stewart testified at trial that most of the hours she billed during the Service Period were for 

out-of-home services she provided to A.S. (meal prep, grocery shopping, laundry, supplies, 

etc.). (Tr. Vol. III at 192-204.) A.S.’s trial testimony also corroborated Ms. Stewart running 

errands for her during the Service Period. (Tr. Vol. III at 136-37, 170-71.) And, the 

surveillance camera footage was generally consistent with (or at least generally did not 

refute) Ms. Stewart’s account of running errands and performing tasks outside of the home 

for A.S., and then coming to A.S.’s home to drop off prepared food, laundry, groceries, 

prescriptions, or the like. (See Tr. Vol. III at 192-201; Trial Ex. 5.)

{¶ 29} Ms. Stewart’s car was observed on the surveillance footage at A.S.’s home all

but three days during the Service Period. (See Tr. Vol. III at 87-93, 105-07, 127-31; Trial 
No. 22AP-352 9

Ex. 5.) The surveillance camera also captured Ms. Stewart’s vehicle briefly sitting outside of 

A.S.’s home and then departing without anyone having entered or exited the vehicle on 

three other days. (See Ex. 5; Tr. Vol. III at 88-89, 178-80.) Special Agent Braidich conceded 

he had no information about conversations between Ms. Stewart and A.S. (either on the 

phone or the day before) concerning errands or tasks A.S. needed assistance with on any

particular day. (See Tr. Vol. III at 122-31.) Nor could Special Agent Braidich refute the 

possibility that, even on the days when Ms. Stewart’s vehicle was not observed at A.S.’s

home or sat idle in A.S.’s driveway, Ms. Stewart was performing personal care services that 

she and A.S. had discussed over the phone or the day before. (See Tr. Vol. III at 122-31.)

To be sure, Ms. Stewart and A.S. both testified about having service-related phone 

conversations during the Service Period—undoubtedly, a necessary means to accommodate 

social distancing guidelines in effect at that time. (See Tr. Vol. III at 170-71, 184, 201-04.)

{¶ 30} Special Agent Braidich’s uncertainty about these matters stemmed from the 

fact that the surveillance camera was pointed at A.S.’s front door—which A.S. never used. 

(Tr. Vol. III at 85-87, 158.) A.S. testified that she and her guests almost always entered and 

exited her home through the back door. (Tr. Vol. III at 158-59.) But, the backyard, back 

door, and side door of A.S.’s home were not visible due to the surveillance camera’s angle. 

(Tr. Vol. II at 168; Tr. Vol. III at 84-86, 120. See Tr. Vol. III at 157-59; Trial Ex. A, B.) And

no surveillance was conducted on the back entrance to A.S.’s home during the relevant 

timeframe. (Tr. Vol. III at 120. See Trial Ex. 5.)

{¶ 31} This is significant because Ms. Stewart typically parked in A.S.’s backyard 

near the back door. (See Tr. Vol. III at 120-31; Trial Ex. 5.) When this happened, the

surveillance camera did not capture whether Ms. Stewart exited the car, A.S. came out to 

the car, or if any items were carried into or out of A.S.’s home. (See Tr. Vol. III at 120-31; 

Trial Ex. 5.) No surveillance was contemporaneously conducted on what Ms. Stewart was 

doing when she was not at A.S.’s home. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 120-21, 126-31. See also Tr. 

Vol. II at 168.) As a result, the state did not present evidence unequivocally showing that

Ms. Stewart was not, for instance, running errands or at her own home preparing food for 

A.S. during any billed service timeframe. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 120-31.) Thus, at trial, 

Special Agent Braidich acknowledged it was possible Ms. Stewart dropped off groceries, did 

laundry, prepared meals, or delivered prescriptions for A.S. when her vehicle was observed 
No. 22AP-352 10

at A.S.’s home on most of the days during the Service Period. (See Tr. Vol. III at 123-27; 

Trial Ex. 5.) But, because of its positioning, the surveillance camera had no ability to 

capture this.

C. Ms. Stewart’s Timesheets

{¶ 32} Sometime after the surveillance period ended, Special Agent Braidich served 

Ms. Stewart with a subpoena requesting she provide him with all documentation and

timesheets she maintained for her Medicaid patients. (Tr. Vol. III at 94-95.) On April 28, 

2021, Ms. Stewart produced those documents. (Tr. Vol. III at 95-96.) Special Agent 

Braidich noted that timesheets are “a common occurrence in the world of home health care” 

and that Ms. Stewart used what appeared to be a “standard timesheet” typical of the ones 

he usually reviews during his investigations. (Tr. Vol. III at 96-97.) 

{¶ 33} Along with the date, time-in, time-out, patient name, and service provider, 

the timesheets included boxes to “check” the services performed during each shift. (Tr. Vol. 

III at 97; Trial Ex. 6, C.) Ms. Stewart’s timesheets for the Service Period were admitted into 

evidence and discussed extensively at trial. (Trial Ex. 6, C.) She testified that she completed 

these timesheets daily (Tr. Vol. III at 203), and Ms. Stewart and A.S. both attested to their

accuracy (see Tr. Vol. III at 138, 162-70, 174-76, 181-82, 191-93, 202-05).

{¶ 34} A.S. testified that Ms. Stewart provided 19 hours of personal care services to 

her each week during the Service Period. (Tr. Vol. III at 162-66.) After speaking with her 

case manager, Heather Garrett—who did not testify at trial—A.S. believed she and Ms. 

Stewart could coordinate when the 19 hours of services were provided. (Tr. Vol. III at 165-

66, 175.) Unrefuted evidence and testimony thus established Ms. Stewart was permitted to 

provide personal care services to A.S. at varying times during the Service Period for up to 

19 hours each week. (See Tr. Vol. III at 165-66.)

{¶ 35} Ms. Stewart’s timesheets indicated she performed the following personal care 

services during the Service Period: changing bedding, making the bed, kitchen cleaning, 

bathroom cleaning, and vacuuming/dusting. (Trial Ex. 6, C. See also Tr. Vol. III at 103-

04.) Nearly all of these services could only be performed in A.S.’s home. (Tr. Vol. III at 103-

04; Trial Ex. 6.) Ms. Stewart testified she completed the exclusively in-home services within 

minutes during the Service Period. (Tr. Vol. III at 194.) That testimony was generally 
No. 22AP-352 11

consistent with the surveillance camera footage showing Ms. Stewart at A.S.’s home for less 

than 15 minutes per day. (See Trial Ex. 4, 5.)

{¶ 36} Ms. Stewart also described providing personal care services to A.S. at times 

other than those listed on her timesheets. (Tr. Vol. III at 195-96, 208-09. See also Tr. Vol. 

III at 174-76.) But the surveillance camera only twice captured Ms. Stewart’s vehicle 

coming and going from A.S.’s home multiple times in a single day during the Service Period. 

(See Trial Ex. 4, 5. See also Tr. Vol. III at 128-33, 195-96. Compare with Tr. Vol. III at 99.) 

Relatedly, Special Agent Braidich described Ms. Stewart’s timesheet hours as exactly 

matching the EVV “clock-in” and “clock-out” data. (Tr. Vol. III at 98. Compare Trial Ex. 6, 

with Trial Ex. 2.) In other words, the EVV system data also did not show Ms. Stewart calling 

in or out at times other than those listed on her timesheets. (See Trial Ex. 2.)

{¶ 37} From these circumstances, three points jump out. First, Ms. Stewart billed 

92 service hours (2 or 3 hours each day) during the Service Period. (Trial Ex. 7; Tr. Vol. III 

at 191.) Second, the surveillance footage showed Ms. Stewart at A.S.’s home approximately 

3.75 hours during the entire Service Period. (See Tr. Vol. III at 97-99, 103-07; Trial Ex. 4, 

5.) Third, unrefuted evidence established that on at least 6 days during the Service Period,

Ms. Stewart did not go into A.S.’s home, meaning she did not perform any of the exclusively 

“in-home” services checked off on her timesheets for those corresponding days. (Compare

Trial Ex. 6 with Trial Ex. 5.) These points add up to the conclusion that approximately 

88.25 service hours were unaccounted for in Ms. Stewart’s timesheets and the surveillance 

footage of A.S.’s home during the Service Period.

{¶ 38} To account for these hours, Ms. Stewart testified about the errands and 

services she performed for A.S. outside of A.S.’s home. (See Tr. Vol. III at 194-205.) A.S. 

generally corroborated that Ms. Stewart sometimes performed out-of-home services for 

her. (See Tr. Vol. III at 170-71, 184-85.) But, Ms. Stewart never checked the

“Groceries/Errands” boxes on any of her timesheets from the Service Period. (Tr. Vol. III 

at 104, 140, 203-05; Trial Ex. 6, C.)

{¶ 39} Ms. Stewart also testified about returning to A.S.’s home in the afternoons or 

evenings to perform additional services (e.g., taking trash can to the curb) or to drop off 

items she picked up for A.S. while running errands. (Tr. Vol. III at 194-96.) The surveillance 
No. 22AP-352 12

footage from the Service Period did not, however, corroborate those claims. (See Tr. Vol. 

III at 99, 128-31; Trial Ex. 4, 5)

{¶ 40} Ms. Stewart explained that her timesheets from the Service Period did not 

reflect all of the services she provided to A.S. because some of the services she performed

outside of A.S.’s home were not listed on the timesheets. (See Tr. Vol. III at 194-201; Trial 

Ex. 6, C.) We note the timesheet forms generally delineate tasks that could only be 

performed in a patient’s home. (See Trial Ex. 6, C.) They do not expressly itemize tasks 

like meal prep, laundry, travel time, or other personal care assistance services that could 

be (but, unlike errands and appointments, were not necessarily required to be) performed 

outside of a patient’s home. (Compare Trial Ex. 6 with Tr. Vol. III at 197-99.) The 

timesheets do list “Groceries/Errands” as a personal care service task. (Trial Ex. 6, C.) But,

the box pertaining to this task was not checked for any service date on Ms. Stewart’s 

timesheets from the Service Period. (See Trial Ex. 6, C.)

{¶ 41} Significantly, Ms. Stewart did not—and was not required to—submit her 

timesheets to United HealthCare Community Plan in order to obtain reimbursement for 

services she provided. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 22-25, 58- 65.) Ms. Stewart’s timesheets 

were not provided to anyone (other than for A.S. to sign and return to Ms. Stewart) until 

April 2021, when she produced them for Special Agent Braidich in response to his 

subpoena. (See Tr. Vol. III at 94-96, 162-69.)

{¶ 42} We do recognize that, under the controlling provider agreement, Ms. Stewart 

was obligated to maintain, for at least six years, “all records necessary and in such form so 

as to fully disclose the extent of services provided and significant business transactions.” 

(Trial Ex. 1A at 5. See Tr. Vol. III at 205-06.) We emphasize, however, a Medicaid provider’s 

failure to accurately document the services performed each day on timesheets does not, in 

and of itself, prove personal care assistance services were not provided to a patient. (See, 

e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 143.) On that point, it is significant to note that A.S. told the special 

agents and testified at trial that Ms. Stewart performed services for her during all of the 

billed service hours. (See Tr. Vol. III at 134-38, 162-73, 176, 182, 184-85.) A.S. never 

claimed Ms. Stewart failed to meet her needs. As a result, the state’s case rested primarily 

on inferences about several pieces of inconsistent and irreconcilable evidence and 

testimony presented at trial.
No. 22AP-352 13

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶ 43} In her first and sole assignment of error, Ms. Stewart argues her convictions 

are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We must disagree.

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 44} A manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence presented 

and questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. See, e.g., State v. Richey, 

10th Dist. No. 17AP-260, 2018-Ohio-3498, ¶ 50, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 

328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 11-13 and State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-87 (1997).

“Although evidence may be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the issue of manifest weight 

requires a different type of analysis.” State v. Walker, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-679, 2003-

Ohio-986, ¶ 43. “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of 

credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’ ”

(Emphasis omitted.) Thompkins at 387, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th

Ed.1990). See also Mid Am. Constr., LLC v. Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-846, 2019-

Ohio-3863, ¶ 21.

{¶ 45} A judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence if it is 

“supported by some competent, credible evidence[.]” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 

54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280 (1978). In making this determination, we must examine the entire 

record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the witnesses’ credibility 

and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its 

way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered. See, e.g., Sparre v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 12AP381, 2013-Ohio-4153, ¶ 10, citing Eastley at ¶ 20, citing Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. 

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). See also State v. Martin, ___ Ohio St.3d 

___, 2022-Ohio-4175,¶ 26.

{¶ 46} Accordingly, when considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence, a court of appeals sits as a “thirteenth juror” 

and may disagree “with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins

at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). See also Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175 at

¶ 26. At the same time, we must remain mindful that the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence are matters primarily for the trier of fact to assess. See, e.g., State v. 
No. 22AP-352 14

DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus; Morris v. Ohio Dept. of 

Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-131, 2021-Ohio-3803, ¶ 64, quoting Watson v. Ohio 

Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-606, 2012-Ohio-1017, ¶ 31, citing Seasons Coal 

Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). See also State v. Brightwell, 10th Dist. 

No. 18AP-243, 2019-Ohio-1009, ¶ 33.

{¶ 47} This is a difficult burden for an appellant to overcome because the resolution 

of factual issues resides with the trier of fact, DeHass at paragraph one of the syllabus, and 

the trier of fact has the authority to “believe or disbelieve any witness or accept part of what 

a witness says and reject the rest.” State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964). Accordingly,

“judgments ‘supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential 

elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.’ ” Morris at ¶ 64, quoting Meccon, Inc. v. Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. No. 12AP899, 2013-Ohio-2563, ¶ 15, citing Watson at ¶ 31, citing C.E. Morris at syllabus. See also 

State v. Moore, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-464, 2021-Ohio-1379, ¶ 67, citing State v. Salinas, 10th 

Dist. No. 09AP-1201, 2010-Ohio-4738, ¶ 32, citing Thompkins at 387.

{¶ 48} Further, to reverse a jury verdict as being against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel 

reviewing the case is required pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio 

Constitution. Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 2-4, 

citing Thompkins at paragraph four of the syllabus.

B. Applicable Law

{¶ 49} Our analysis of Ms. Stewart’s manifest weight challenge is limited to the 

Medicaid fraud offense. This is because the trial court merged the theft and Medicaid fraud 

offenses at sentencing.7 See State v. McKinney, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-23, 2008-Ohio-6522,

¶ 44. See also State v. Kpoto, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-492, 2020-Ohio-3866, ¶ 13, 16-21.

{¶ 50} The Medicaid fraud statute prohibits a person from “knowingly mak[ing] or 

caus[ing] to be made a false or misleading statement or representation for use in obtaining 

7 If we found Ms. Stewart’s Medicaid fraud conviction to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

however, we would also evaluate the evidence underlying the theft offense. Such additional analysis is not 

necessary in this case.
No. 22AP-352 15

reimbursement from the medicaid program.” R.C. 2913.40(B).

{¶ 51} We have recognized that “[t]he gravamen of the offense is the making of a 

false or misleading statement or representation for use in obtaining Medicaid 

reimbursement with knowledge that the statement is false or misleading.” State v. 

Vogelsong, 82 Ohio App.3d 354, 361 (10th Dist.1992). And, to obtain a Medicaid fraud

conviction, the state must prove it was “improper” for the service provider to bill for such 

services. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 99 Ohio App.3d 604, 608 (10th Dist.1994). Billing for 

services not provided is improper. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 17, 20-21; Trial Ex. 1A at 4.)

{¶ 52} Furthermore, the provider must have knowingly engaged in this conduct. See

Vogelsong at 361. A person acts “knowingly, regardless of [her] purpose,” when she is aware 

that her conduct “will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” 

R.C. 2901.22(B). “When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an 

offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high 

probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to 

avoid learning the fact.” Id.

C. Evaluation of Ms. Stewart’s Manifest Weight Challenge

{¶ 53} The state accused Ms. Stewart of unlawfully obtaining money from the 

Department by requesting and obtaining payment for personal care assistance services she 

did not actually render to A.S. In direct contravention to the state’s allegations, however, 

A.S. maintained in her interview with special agents and trial testimony that Ms. Stewart 

provided all of the 92 billed service hours during the Service Period. (See Tr. Vol. III at 134-

38, 165-66.) The state’s case thus rested primarily on inferences that could be made about 

inconsistent evidence and testimony presented at trial.

{¶ 54} On appeal, Ms. Stewart concedes there is some inconsistency between the 

type of services Ms. Stewart (and, to some extent, A.S.) testified were provided and the type 

of services Ms. Stewart recorded on her timesheets. (Appellant’s Brief at 22.) Ms. Stewart 

argues on appeal that “inconsistent or inaccurate timesheets as to the type of services that 

were provided is not the gravamen for the offense of Medicaid fraud.” (Appellant’s Brief at 

22.) We generally agree. But, we are not the jury. And, in this case, the jury found the state 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Stewart knew she requested reimbursement for 

more hours than she actually worked. It also found Ms. Stewart made these false or 
No. 22AP-352 16

misleading representations in the reimbursement claims (billing) she submitted to United 

HealthCare Community Plan with the purpose to obtain Medicaid reimbursement for some 

amount less than $1,000, knowing she was not lawfully entitled to that amount. (See

Apr. 21, 2022 Verdict Forms.) Our role is to decide whether those findings are supported 

by competent, credible evidence.

{¶ 55} Ms. Stewart did not, and was not required to, submit her timesheets to obtain 

reimbursement for the services she provided. And we acknowledge Ms. Stewart presented 

evidence at trial that, if believed, may have accounted for all of the billed hours of service 

during the Service Period—that being 3.75 in-home service hours and 88.25 out-of-home 

service hours. Further, the state generally agrees a Medicaid provider can properly bill for 

personal care services rendered outside of a patient’s home, and we believe this to be

particularly true in the midst of a global pandemic. 

{¶ 56} To be sure, the Ohio Administrative Code contemplates—and certainly does 

not prohibit—a personal care aide from providing personal care services outside of a 

patient’s home. It states that “personal care activities” provided by a personal care aide can 

include:

1. Assisting the individual with managing the home, 

handling personal affairs, and providing assistance 

with self-administration of medications, as defined in 

rule 173-39-01 of the Administrative Code.

2. Assisting the individual with [activities of daily living 

(ADL), as defined in Ohio Adm.Code 5160-3-05(B)(2)] 

and [instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), as 

defined in Ohio Adm.Code 5160-3-05(B)(17)].

3. Homemaker activities listed in rule 173-39-02.8 of the 

Administrative Code when those activities are specified 

in the individual's service plan and are incidental to the 

activities in paragraphs (A)(1) and (A)(2) of this rule or 

are essential to the health and welfare of the individual 

rather than the individual's family.

4. Providing respite services to the individual's caregiver.
No. 22AP-352 17

5. Providing an errand outside of the presence of the 

individual that is needed by the individual to maintain 

the individual's health and safety (e.g., picking up a 

prescription or groceries for the individual).

Ohio Adm.Code 173-39-02.11(A). See also Ohio Adm.Code 173-39-01(B). 

{¶ 57} We therefore conclude that, at all relevant times and particularly during the 

pandemic, Ms. Stewart was permitted to bill for services she performed for A.S. outside of 

A.S.’s home. For these reasons, we do not find the GPS location data from the EVV system—

which generally showed Ms. Stewart “calling in” at her own home and “calling out” at A.S.’s 

home—to be relevant, competent, or credible evidence of improper billing under the facts 

and circumstances of this case. (See Tr. Vol. III at 79-83; Trial Ex. 9A, 9B.)

{¶ 58} We also note that “meal preparation,” “personal laundry,” and “shopping” are 

all expressly enumerated as “instrumental activit[ies] of daily living” that a personal care 

aide can provide to a patient and seek reimbursement for under the Ohio Administrative 

Code. See Ohio Adm.Code 5160-3-05(B)(17); Ohio Adm.Code 173-39-02.11(A)(2); Ohio 

Adm.Code 173-39-01(B). And Ms. Stewart presented evidence that she provided these 

types out-of-home services to A.S. during the Service Period, and, more broadly, that she 

performed all hours of service for which she billed and was paid. (See Tr. Vol. III at 169-

76, 191-205.) However, there was also evidence to the contrary presented through the 

timesheets, the testimony of A.S. and Ms. Stewart about these timesheets, the surveillance 

camera footage, and Special Agent Braidich’s testimony about his investigation.

{¶ 59} Ms. Stewart testified she completed all timesheets daily—i.e., 

contemporaneously with when the services were provided. (Tr. Vol. III at 191, 203-04.) 

And Ms. Stewart and A.S. both testified these timesheets were accurate. (See Tr. Vol. III at 

138, 162-70, 174-76, 181-82, 191-93, 202-05.) All timesheets were signed by Ms. Stewart 

and A.S. (Tr. Vol. III at 137, 162-70, 191-93; Trial Ex. 6, C.) A.S. said she reviewed all of Ms. 

Stewart’s completed timesheets for accuracy at the end of each service week before she 

signed them. (Tr. Vol. III at 162-70. See also id. at 191.) We note her signature is on all 

timesheets from the Service Period, which, taken with her testimony about signing them, 

meant A.S. verified their accuracy shortly after services were provided. (See Trial Ex. 6, C.)

{¶ 60} Indeed, A.S. testified at trial that the timesheets accurately depicted the 
No. 22AP-352 18

duration and type of services Ms. Stewart provided to her during the Service Period.

(Compare Tr. Vol. III at 174, 182, 203, with Tr. Vol. III at 195.) But, nearly all of the services 

Ms. Stewart checked on those timesheets were services that could only be performed in 

A.S.’s home. (See Trial Ex. 6, C.) And the surveillance camera footage only supported 

approximately 3.75 “in-home” service hours during the Service Period. (Trial Ex. 5.)

{¶ 61} To reconcile billing 2-3 service hours each day with the surveillance camera 

footage showing Ms. Stewart at A.S.’s home 0-15 minutes per day, Ms. Stewart claimed

most of the billed service hours pertained to errands and tasks she performed for A.S. 

outside of A.S.’s home during the Service Period. (See Tr. Vol. III at 194-205.) And A.S. 

generally recalled Ms. Stewart occasionally performing some services outside of A.S.’s 

home. (See Tr. Vol. III at 170-71, 184-85.) But Ms. Stewart did not check boxes on any of 

her timesheets for most of the out-of-home services she testified to providing during the 

Service Period.

8 (See Trial Ex. 6, C.)

{¶ 62} Ms. Stewart never checked the “Groceries/Errands” boxes on any of the 

timesheets from the Service Period. (Tr. Vol. III at 104-05, 140, 203-05; Trial Ex. 6, C.) 

The reason, she explained, was because “[i]f [she] couldn’t find something [at the store] 

that day, there wasn’t no [sic] sense in checking it off.” (Tr. Vol. III at 203.) In the same 

sentence, she also claimed it “was just an honest mistake” that occurred because she was

“really tired,” “burned out in 2020,” and “all over the place trying to make sure [A.S.] had 

what she needed and what she wanted.” (Tr. Vol. III at 203.) However, both A.S. and Ms. 

Stewart undermined this testimony because they repeatedly testified the timesheets were 

accurate. (Tr. Vol. III at 163, 174-76, 182, 191-92, 202-05.) We acknowledge Ms. Stewart 

subsequently modified her testimony when she claimed her timesheets omitted most of the 

out-of-home errands and services she provided to A.S. during the Service Period. (Tr. Vol. 

III at 202-05.) Yet, that testimony was undermined by testimony from the defense’s own 

witness, A.S., who affirmed the accuracy of the timesheets in their entirety—including the 

depiction of the type of services Ms. Stewart performed each day during the Service Period.

8 We acknowledge the “Change Bedding” task on the timesheets could pertain to laundry services performed 

outside of A.S.’s home. (See Trial Ex. 6, C.) And, Ms. Stewart testified about going to a commercial 

laundromat to clean some of A.S.’s soiled bedding. (Tr. Vol. III at 196-98.) But, the “Change Bedding” 

service was checked off on the timesheets for just five service dates during the entire Service Period. (See

Trial Ex. 6, C.)
No. 22AP-352 19

(Tr. Vol. III at 182.) In other words, A.S. did not testify the timesheets failed to reflect the 

out-of-home services Ms. Stewart provided to her during the Service Period.

{¶ 63} Ultimately, this case comes down to the irreconcilable differences between 

the testimony of Ms. Stewart and A.S. and the tangible evidence presented at trial. We 

reiterate the foundational principle that in a criminal prosecution, the state must prove 

every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant is not required 

to disprove any essential element of the offense. State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94

(1986). With that foundational principle in mind, we are thus leery to say Ms. Stewart’s 

failure to check the “Groceries/Errands” box (or to create a new box) on timesheets she is 

not required to submit for reimbursement, alone, is competent, credible evidence of 

Medicaid fraud or theft. While Ms. Stewart may have been required to create and maintain 

accurate, contemporaneous timesheets to retain her status as a certified Medicaid provider, 

her failure to do so does not necessarily mean she committed a criminal offense. We 

certainly caution against resting a Medicaid fraud or theft conviction on merely inaccurate 

timesheets or a provider’s inability to affirmatively show, years later, that all billed services 

were actually rendered. We also have limited confidence in the ability of a patient—who 

did not claim her Medicaid provider failed to render any services—to competently testify 

that her provider’s timesheets from years earlier accurately describe the duration and type 

of services provided on particular days.

{¶ 64} Under different facts and circumstances than those presented here, this type 

of evidence, alone, might not suffice as competent, credible evidence of Medicaid fraud. 

But, since the source of these inconsistencies is largely derived from the testimony of 

defense witnesses—Ms. Stewart and A.S.—we decline to find these concerns bear on our 

analysis of the manifest weight challenge raised in this case.

{¶ 65} Furthermore, to convict Ms. Stewart of first-degree misdemeanor Medicaid 

fraud, the jury only had to find the state proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. 

Stewart knowingly made false or misleading representations about the services she 

provided in order to obtain Medicaid reimbursement in any amount less than $1,000. 

See R.C. 2913.40(B), (E). To satisfy its burden, the state only needed to prove Ms. Stewart

did not do some of the work she was paid for during the Service Period–not all.

{¶ 66} With this in mind, we find the unrefuted evidence regarding six particular 
No. 22AP-352 20

days of the Service Period fatal to Ms. Stewart’s manifest weight challenge. That evidence 

proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Stewart did not go to A.S.’s home at all on at 

least three days (May 29, June 4, and June 15) and drove to, but did not enter, A.S.’s home 

on at least three others (May 23, May 30, and June 14). (See Trial Ex. 5.) Yet, Ms. Stewart 

indicated in her timesheets for these six services dates she performed services that could 

only be completed in A.S.’s home. (See Trial Ex. 6, C.) On the three days Ms. Stewart only 

drove to A.S.’s home, the surveillance footage showed no one entering or exiting her vehicle. 

(See Trial Ex. 5.) So, the state also proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least on these 

six days, Ms. Stewart did not take A.S. anywhere, drop anything off for A.S. (e.g., groceries),

or receive anything from A.S. (e.g., dirty laundry). (See Trial Ex. 5.)

{¶ 67} Ms. Stewart represented that she worked 15 service hours on these six days, 

and, as a result, she was paid accordingly. (See Trial Ex. 7.) Based on the evidence, however, 

those services hours could only be derived from out-of-home services provided. On her 

timesheets for all of these six days, Ms. Stewart did not check the boxes for out-of-home 

services. (Trial Ex. 5.) Nonetheless, A.S. testified the services Ms. Stewart indicated on her 

timesheets were accurate portrayals of the services she actually received on all days during 

the Service Period, including these six. (Tr. Vol. III at 163-64, 174-76, 182.) For these 

reasons, we find it was certainly within the province of the jury to infer services were not 

provided (at least on some or all of these six service dates) based on this evidence, the trial 

testimony, and the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses who testified at trial.

{¶ 68} It is true that the trial witnesses and evidence showed uncertainty concerning 

whether and for what duration Ms. Stewart performed personal care services for A.S.

outside of A.S.’s home during the Service Period. Nonetheless, based on the foregoing, and 

given the exacting standard of review to which our analysis of Ms. Stewart’s manifest weight 

challenge must be confined, we find there is substantial competent and credible evidence 

to support Ms. Stewart’s Medicaid fraud conviction. Accordingly, we find the jury’s verdict 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and overrule Ms. Stewart’s sole 

assignment of error.
No. 22AP-352 21

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶ 69} Having overruled Ms. Stewart’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

JAMISON and BOGGS, JJ., concur.