[Cite as Nolan v. Wetzel, 2022-Ohio-4382.]

COURT OF APPEALS

MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KATHRYN L. NOLAN, ET AL

Plaintiffs-Appellants

-vsMAYOR R.D. WETZEL, ET AL

Defendants-Appellees

JUDGES:

: Hon. Earle E. Wise, P.J.

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.

: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

:

:

: Case No. 22AP0001

:

:

: OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Morgan County Court 

of Common Pleas, Case No. 20CV0189

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 8, 2022

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiffs-Appellants For Defendants-Appellees

ANN VOSBURG Pro Se PAUL-MICHAEL LAFAYETTE

KATHRYN L. NOLAN CARA M. WRIGHT

7640 Marion Street 65 East State Street, Ste. 2550

Chesterhill, OH 43728 Columbus, OH 43215
[Cite as Nolan v. Wetzel, 2022-Ohio-4382.]

Gwin, J.,

{¶1} Appellants Kathryn Nolan and Ann Vosburg appeal the December 23, 2021 

judgment entry of the Morgan County Court of Common Pleas granting appellees’ motion 

for summary judgment.

Facts & Procedural History

{¶2} Appellant Kathryn Nolan resides in the Village of Chesterhill in a home 

owned by a friend, appellant Ann Vosburg. In 2007, a magistrate at the mayor’s court 

found Nolan in violation of Village Ordinance 06-7-2 (nuisance code) concerning upkeep 

of the property, and ordered her to pay $725.00 in fines and costs. When Nolan failed to 

pay the fines and court costs, the magistrate found Nolan in contempt of court and 

sentenced her to ten days in jail, but gave her thirty days to pay the fine and purge her 

contempt. The magistrate also instructed Councilman Kenneth Peters to give Nolan a list 

of the violations that needed to be corrected. Nolan met with Councilman Peters and 

received the list of violations needing correction. Nolan failed to pay the fine or complete 

the tasks within thirty days. Several weeks later, Nolan began paying the fine in $10.00 

increments. The magistrate issued a bench warrant. Nolan was arrested and spent 

several days in jail. 

{¶3} On December 4, 2020, appellants filed a complaint against appellees the 

Village of Chesterhill (“Village”), R.C. Wetzel (mayor), John Wells (Chesterhill Village 

attorney), Gordon Armstrong (Village Administrator), and Jerica Simmons (Village Fiscal 

Officer). The complaint alleges appellees have denied appellants records they requested 

“over and over” under the Sunshine Laws. In the complaint, appellants state, “plaintiffs 

request the records be at once delivered to them from defendants.” 
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 3

{¶4} Appellees filed an answer on January 25, 2021. Appellees filed a motion 

for summary judgment on November 2, 2021. Appellants filed a memorandum in 

opposition on November 30, 2021. 

{¶5} Appellees filed a reply brief on December 10, 2021. Attached to their reply 

brief is the affidavit of Jerica Simmons, the Village Clerk and Fiscal Officer since 2017. 

Simmons avers she is the designated records custodian for the Village. She further states 

that on September 24, 2020, she compiled all of the records responsive to a request from 

Nolan and gave the records to Nolan. 

{¶6} The trial court issued a judgment entry on December 23, 2021, granting 

appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The court construed appellants’ complaint as 

a mandamus action seeking the production of records. The trial court found the complaint 

is deficient on its face for failing to allege a clear legal right to the requested records or a 

clear legal duty on the part of appellees to produce the records. 

{¶7} Appellants appeal the December 23, 2021 judgment entry of the Morgan 

County Court of Common Pleas and assign the following as error:

{¶8} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DEMANDING THE 

DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES COMPLETE THEIR DELIVERY OF RECORDS 

REQUESTED.

{¶9} “II. THE COURT SEEMED TO DENY VALUES INVOLVED AND COSTS 

OF MATERIALS AS WELL AS THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING AGE-MATCHING TILES.

{¶10} “III. THE COURT ERRED IN CLAIMING THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS 

HAVE NOT PROVED A LEGAL RIGHT TO THE RECORDS STILL TO COME.
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 4

{¶11} “IV. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE FISCAL 

OFFICER JERICA SIMMONS TO GO WHEN PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS BOTH 

HEARD THE COMMENTS SHE DENIES HAVING MADE.” 

Public Records & Summary Judgment Standards

{¶12} Ohio’s Public Records Act requires a public office to make copies of public 

records available to any person on request and within a reasonable period of time. R.C. 

149.43(B)(1); State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 161 Ohio St.3d 130, 2020-Ohio-3686, 

161 N.E.3d 575. The Ohio Supreme Court construes the Public Records Act as “liberally 

in favor of broad access” to public records. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton 

Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996). 

{¶13} Under R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b), a mandamus action is the remedy for a person 

denied access to a public record. “To prevail on a claim for mandamus relief in a publicrecords case, a party must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief and a 

corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the respondents to provide that relief.” State 

ex rel. Penland v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, 158 Ohio St.3d 15, 2019-

Ohio-4130, 139 N.E.3d 862, citing State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. 

Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553. 

{¶14} Civil Rule 56 states, in pertinent part:

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in 

the action, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or 
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 5

stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary 

judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or 

stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds 

can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party 

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being 

entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the 

party’s favor. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 

rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 

to the amount of damages. 

{¶15} A trial court should not enter summary judgment if it appears a material fact 

is genuinely disputed, nor if, construing the allegations most favorably towards the nonmoving party, reasonable minds could draw different conclusions from the undisputed 

facts. Hounshell v. Am. States Ins. Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 424 N.E.2d 311 (1981). The 

court may not resolve any ambiguities in the evidence presented. Inland Refuse Transfer 

Co. v. Browning-Ferris Inds. Of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 474 N.E.2d 271 (1984). A 

fact is material if it affects the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. 

Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 135 Ohio App.3d 301, 733 N.E.2d 1186 (6th Dist. 

1999). 

{¶16} When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment, an 

appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding 

Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). This means we review the matter 

de novo. Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 2000-Ohio-186, 738 N.E.2d 1243.
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 6

I. & III.

{¶17} In their first and third assignments of error, appellants contend the trial court 

committed error in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment because they are 

entitled to the records. 

{¶18} “It is the responsibility of the person who wishes to inspect and/or copy 

records to identify with reasonable clarity the records at issue.” State ex rel. Morgan v. 

New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208. 

{¶19} In their complaint, appellants do not identify what records they seek. 

However, in their opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment, they state they 

are seeking the following records: photographs cropped and enlarged from the mayor’s 

court, including the judge’s notes on the back of each photograph; prison records from 

Nolan’s ten-day incarceration; the “contract” the village had with dustman Dustin Parsons; 

the letter asked for by Parsons defending him and his right to come on the property written 

by a lawyer and paid for by the Village; anything written by Village Administrator 

Armstrong who told Parsons he could take anything “not nailed down”; and any written 

orders to Simmons ordering her to “give Kathryn Nolan * * * nothing.” 

{¶20} With regards to the request for photographs with judge’s notes on the back, 

the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that a judge’s personal, handwritten notes made during 

the course of trial are not public records. State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft, 67 Ohio St.3d 439, 

1993-Ohio-32, 619 N.E.2d 688; State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 163 Ohio St.3d 217, 2020-

Ohio-5585, 169 N.E.3d 625. The notes are “simply personal papers kept for the judge’s 

own convenience and not official records.” Id. Further, Simmons states in her affidavit 

that there were no photographs in the mayor’s court file. Appellees have “no duty to
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 7

create or provide access to nonexistent records.” State ex rel. Lanham v. Smith, 112 

Ohio St.3d 527, 2007-Ohio-609, 861 N.E.2d 530. Appellants provide no Civil Rule 56 

evidence to rebut Simmons’ averment. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error in 

granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment on this claim. 

{¶21} As to appellants’ request for a “letter asked for by Dustin Parsons defending 

him and his right to come on the property written by a lawyer paid for the Village,” 

Simmons avers in her affidavit that no such record exists. Appellants provide no Rule 56 

evidence to dispute this assertion. Appellees have “no duty to create or provide access 

to nonexistent records.” Id. Further, Ohio courts have consistently recognized that 

“[r]ecords of communications between attorneys and their state-government clients 

pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice are excepted from disclosure under R.C. 

149.43(A)(1) since the release of these records is prohibited by state law” – i.e., they are 

protected by this state’s attorney-client privilege. State ex rel. Thomas v. Ohio State 

Univ., 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 643 N.E.2d 126 (1994); State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. 

Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-1508, 824 N.E.2d 990; State ex rel. Hicks v. 

Fraley, 166 Ohio St.3d 141, 2021-Ohio-2724, 184 N.E.2d 13. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not commit error in granting appellees’ summary judgment on this claim. 

{¶22} As to appellants’ request for “prison records from Nolan’s ten-day 

incarceration,” Simmons avers in her affidavit that the Village is not in possession of any 

records with regards to Nolan’s incarceration. Appellants failed to produce any 

evidentiary quality materials to rebut this assertion. Appellees have “no duty to create or 

provide access to nonexistent records.” State ex rel. Lanham v. Smith, 112 Ohio St.3d 

527, 2007-Ohio-609, 861 N.E.2d 530. 
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 8

{¶23} Further, the mayor’s court proceeding and subsequent incarceration of 

Nolan were the subject of a case filed by Nolan in federal district court. Appellees 

attached to their motion for summary judgment several judgment entries from the district 

court in the Southern District of Ohio. Nolan filed a lawsuit against Mayor Wetzel, the 

Village, the Chesterhill Council members, Magistrate John Wells, the Morgan County 

Sheriff, and two police officers, in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. 

Nolan filed the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged her constitutional rights 

were violated by the defendants in connection with her false arrest and imprisonment. 

Nolan v. Jenkins, S.D. Ohio No. 2:09-CV-942, 2011 WL 13130847 (Dec. 9, 2011). 

{¶24} During the course of the litigation, Nolan filed a motion to compel, seeking 

the “whole and complete file” of her case in mayor’s court and “all documents related to 

her incarceration.” The district court denied her motions to compel, accepting the 

defendants “repeated representations that all responsive documents in their possession 

have been produced. The Court can compel nothing more.” The district court also 

entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on Nolan’s § 1983 claim. Nolan v. 

Jenkins, S.D. Ohio No. 2:09-cv-942, 2012 WL 12887884 (March 26, 2012). Nolan 

appealed the district court’s dismissal of her 11 U.S.C. § 1983 claim to the Sixth Circuit 

Court of Appeals, but did not appeal the court’s finding on the motions to compel. The 

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. Nolan v. 

Jenkins, 6th Cir. No. 12-3435, 2013 WL 69262 (Jan. 8, 2013). 

{¶25} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “a claim litigated to finality in the United 

States District Court cannot be relitigated in a state court when the state claim involves 
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 9

the identical subject matter previously litigated in federal court, and there is * * * no issue 

of party or privity.” Rogers v. City of Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986). 

{¶26} Res judicata can be divided into two different subparts: claim preclusion 

and issue preclusion. Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). 

Claim preclusion holds that a valid, final judgment on the merits bars all subsequent 

actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the 

subject matter of the previous action. Id. Issue preclusion precludes relitigation of “any 

issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.” 

Fort Frye Teachers Assn. v. State Emp. Rels. Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 692 N.E.2d 140 

(1998). An issue “that was actually and directly at issue in a previous action, that was 

passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into 

question in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privities, whether the 

cause of action in the two actions be identical or different.” Id. In applying the doctrine 

of issue preclusion, the causes of action do not have to be identical, so long as the issue 

has been actually and directly litigated. Id. 

{¶27} We find the doctrine of issue preclusion applies in this case. The issue of 

whether appellees produced the mayor’s court file and any records they had with respect 

to Nolan’s incarceration was actually and directly litigated by the district court, a court of 

competent jurisdiction, in a previous action. This action (the subsequent action) is 

between the same parties or their privities. 

{¶28} Further, Simmons avers in her affidavit that she personally provided 

appellants with a complete copy of the mayor’s file, including the ledger sheets of 

payments made by Nolan on the fines levied, and copies of the Village Ordinance 
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 10

regarding the maintenance requirements for properties in the village, in September of 

2020. Appellees attached a copy of these documents to their motion for summary 

judgment. “A respondent meets its burden of proving that a public records claim is moot 

by providing an affidavit that the requested public records in her possession have been 

provided.” State ex rel. Conley v. Park, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014CA00169, 2016-Ohio5199. Appellants did not provide any Civil Rule 56 evidence to dispute Simmons’ 

averment. Since the records have been provided, the claim is moot. Accordingly, the 

trial court did not commit error in granting summary judgment to appellees on this claim. 

{¶29} As to the “contract” between the Village and Parsons, Simmons avers in her 

affidavit that she provided appellants with a copy of the resolution passed by Village 

Council retaining Parsons and a copy of the Village meeting minutes approving payment 

of Parsons’ legal fees related to appellants’ prior lawsuit against the Village and Parsons. 

“A respondent meets its burden of proving that a public records claim is moot by providing 

an affidavit that the requested public records in her possession have been provided.” 

State ex rel. Conley v. Park, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014CA00169, 2016-Ohio-5199. 

Appellants did not provide any Civil Rule 56 evidence to dispute Simmons’ averment. 

Since the records have been provided, the claim is moot. Accordingly, the trial court did 

not commit error in granting summary judgment to appellees on this claim. 

{¶30} Finally, with regards to anything written from Armstrong to Parsons, and any 

written orders to Simmons ordering her to “give Kathryn Nolan * * * nothing,” Simmons 

stated in her affidavit that the Village is not in possession of anything written by Armstrong 

telling Parsons he could take anything “not nailed down” or any written orders from 

anyone telling Simmons to “give Kathryn Nolan nothing.” Appellants provide no Rule 56 
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 11

evidence to dispute these averments. Appellees have “no duty to create or provide 

access to nonexistent records.” State ex rel. Lanham v. Smith, 112 Ohio St.3d 527, 2007-

Ohio-609, 861 N.E.2d 530. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error in granting 

appellees’ summary judgment on these claims. 

{¶31} Based on the foregoing, appellants’ first and third assignments of error are 

overruled. 

II.

{¶32} In appellants’ second assignment of error, they state, “the court seemed to 

deny values involved and costs of materials as well as the difficulty of finding agematching tiles.” Appellants make no argument in this section, other than to state that “we 

have been stripped of our materials obtained to redo and repair our home by the 

Defendants/Appellees at the behest principally of the Mayor, R.D. Wetzel.” 

{¶33} Appellants failed to raise this issue in the trial court in either their complaint 

or their response to the motion for summary judgment. Their complaint only includes a 

cause of action pursuant to the “Sunshine Act,” and asks the court to order the delivery 

of the records from the defendants. There was nothing in the complaint or response to 

the motion for summary judgment regarding the “stripping” of materials, the costs of 

materials, or age-matching tiles. “Failure to raise an issue before the trial court operates 

as a waiver of a party’s right to assert such for the first time on appeal.” Freeman v. 

Freeman, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 22CAF020013, 2022-Ohio-3222; In re Adoption of 

C.A.H., 5th Dist. Knox No. 19 CA 000037, 2020-Ohio-1260, citing Hadley v. Figley, 5th 

Dist. Ashland No. 15-COA-001, 2015-Ohio-4600. Appellants have not argued plain error. 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). 
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 12

{¶34} Appellants’ second assignment of error is overruled. 

IV.

{¶35} In their fourth assignment of error, appellants state the trial court “erred in 

allowing the affidavit of Simmons to go” because Simmons’ assertion that she never said 

she had been told “we don’t have to give you anything” is untrue. 

{¶36} However, appellants’ argument is unsupported by evidentiary quality 

materials as required by Civil Rule 56. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cogar, 5th Dist. Ashland 

No. 12-COA-022, 2013-Ohio-311. Rule 56(C) states that “no evidence or stipulation may 

be considered except as stated in this rule.” 

{¶37} In their reply brief, appellants state they did not have a chance to respond 

to Simmons’ affidavit because the affidavit was presented for the first time in appellees’ 

reply brief to their motion for summary judgment. However, appellants did not attempt to 

strike the affidavit, nor did they seek leave to file a sur-reply. This Court has previously 

held that when an appellant does not attempt to strike or seek leave to file a sur-reply, 

appellant waives any error. Carrico v. Bower Home Inspection, LLC, 5th Dist. Knox No. 

16CA21, 2017-Ohio-4057; Edwards v. Perry Twp. Board of Trustees, 5th Dist. Stark No. 

2015CA00107, 2016-Ohio-5125; Campagna-McGuffin v. Diva Gymnastics Academy, 

Inc., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2022 CA 00057, 2022-Ohio-3885. Accordingly, we find appellants 

waived any error by failing to move to strike the affidavit or seeking leave to file a surreply. 

{¶38} Appellants fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶39} Based on the foregoing, appellants’ assignments of error are overruled. 
Morgan County, Case No. 22AP0001 13

{¶40} The December 23, 2021 judgment entry of the Morgan County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, J.,

Wise, Earle, P.J., and

Baldwin, J., concur