NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2020 IL App (3d) 180189-U 

Order filed August 4, 2020 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

 

ILLINOIS,

 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 

 v.

 

ROBERT D. WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

Kankakee County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-18-0189 

Circuit No. 16-CF-439 

The Honorable 

Kathy S. Bradshaw-Elliott, 

Judge, presiding. 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices O’Brien and Wright concurred in the judgment 

 Justice Wright also specially concurred. 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: In an appeal in a criminal case, the appellate court found that: (1) defendant was 

not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery with a firearm

because the State failed to negate defendant’s claim of self-defense; and (2) 

defendant’s conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, which was 

based, in part, upon defendant’s failure to have an Illinois firearm owner’s 

identification card at the time of the offense, could not stand because defendant 

had a valid gun permit from Indiana, his state of residence, when the offense 
2 

occurred. The appellate court, therefore, reversed defendant’s convictions for 

aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. 

¶ 2 After a bench trial, defendant, Robert D. Williams, was found guilty of aggravated 

battery with a firearm (ABWF) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2016)) and aggravated 

unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(C) (West 2016)) and was 

sentenced to consecutive terms in prison of eight years for ABWF and one year for AUUW. 

Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that: (1) he was not proven guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of ABWF because the State failed to negate defendant’s claim of self-defense; 

and (2) his conviction for AUUW, which was based, in part, upon defendant’s failure to have an 

Illinois firearm owner’s identification (FOID) card at the time of the offense, cannot stand 

because defendant had a valid gun permit from Indiana, his state of residence, when the offense 

occurred. We agree with defendant’s arguments. We, therefore, reverse defendant’s convictions 

for ABWF and AUUW. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On September 24, 2016, shortly before 6 a.m., defendant shot Jermain Mason several 

times in Victoria Kennedy’s apartment in Manteno, Illinois. Mason was severely injured in the 

shooting but recovered. Defendant was later charged with attempted murder, ABWF, and 

AUUW as a result of the shooting. Defendant claimed that he had shot Mason in self-defense.

¶ 5 Defendant’s case proceeded to a bench trial in November and December 2017. The 

evidence presented at the trial established the following facts, most of which were uncontested. 

At the time of the shooting, Victoria Kennedy and Jermain Mason were in a relationship and

lived together in Kennedy’s apartment. Mason and Kennedy had been living together for a short 

period, had a rocky relationship, and argued verbally almost every day. 
3 

¶ 6 Kennedy’s apartment was a very small efficiency or one-bedroom apartment that was 

located, along with some other apartments, in the upstairs of a building above some businesses. 

Mason and Kennedy parked their cars in a parking area behind the building. An external 

stairway in the back of the building led up to a balcony, and, on the balcony, there was a door to 

Kennedy’s apartment. Because the apartment was very small, the balcony door opened directly 

into Kennedy’s kitchen. The kitchen had appliances on one side and cabinets on the other and 

had a narrow walkway between them that was about four or five feet wide. The walkway led to 

the entrance area of a small bedroom on the right side. The distance from the balcony door to the 

entrance area of the bedroom was approximately 8 to 15 feet. The bedroom did not have a door, 

and a curtain or sheet had been hung in the entrance area to separate the bedroom from the 

kitchen. 

¶ 7 On the night before the shooting, Kennedy and Mason got into an argument. Mason left 

the apartment to spend the night at his mother’s house in Kankakee. Kennedy contacted 

defendant, who she had recently met on a dating website. The two had been communicating for 

a few weeks to a month and had sent nude photographs to each other. Defendant thought that 

Kennedy was single. At about 1 a.m., Kennedy invited defendant to her apartment. 

¶ 8 Defendant had never met Kennedy in-person and had never been to Kennedy’s 

apartment. He arrived at the apartment at about 4:30 a.m. He parked his vehicle in the back of 

the building next to Kennedy’s car, as Kennedy had directed, and went upstairs to Kennedy’s 

apartment. All of the lights inside the apartment were off, and the apartment was very dark 

inside. Kennedy led defendant to the bedroom, and, shortly thereafter, they started having sex. 

As they were doing so, they were interrupted by a loud knock at the back door. It was Mason. 

Mason had stopped at the apartment on his way to work that morning to try to patch things up 
4 

with Kennedy and was angry because he saw a strange vehicle parked next to Kennedy’s car and 

thought that Kennedy had another man in the apartment. 

¶ 9 Defendant and Kennedy jumped out of bed. Kennedy told defendant that the person 

knocking at the door was probably her ex-boyfriend and assured defendant that Mason did not 

have a key. Kennedy threw some clothes on, rushed to the front door, and told Mason that she 

had company. Kennedy did not turn any of the lights on, and the apartment was still very dark. 

Defendant, who was still naked with a condom on, scrambled to find his clothes or the light 

switch, to no avail. Unbeknownst to Kennedy, Mason had a key to the apartment. He 

immediately opened the balcony door and went into the kitchen where he was met by Kennedy. 

Defendant grabbed a semiautomatic pistol that he had brought with him into the apartment 

concealed upon his person. 

¶ 10 Mason yelled at Kennedy and possibly used some profanity. He pushed Kennedy out of 

the way and headed toward the bedroom. As Mason got near or possibly into the bedroom, he 

was slightly backlit by a small amount of light coming from the balcony area, and defendant 

could see that Mason was a big guy and that he had something dark in his hand. Defendant fired 

several shots at Mason. The first shot hit Mason in the stomach. Mason backed away from the 

bedroom entrance but remained in the pathway of the kitchen and continued to face defendant. 

Defendant moved forward, trying to make his way to the only exit he knew about (the balcony 

door), and continued to fire the gun at Mason. Kennedy was screaming. The shots hit Mason in 

the chest, arm, and hip. After being hit in the hip, Mason fell down onto his back on or near the 

balcony. A final shot hit Mason in the leg after he was down. Although defendant had more 

bullets left in the clip of his gun, he stopped firing, grabbed some of his clothes, and fled the 
5 

apartment. He was still naked at the time. As defendant was leaving, he told Mason that he was 

sorry. 

¶ 11 Defendant left the area and drove to Chicago where some of his family lived. On the 

way, he stopped in Indiana and threw the gun off a bridge. At the time of the shooting, 

defendant was an Indiana resident and held a valid gun permit, a concealed carry permit, from 

Indiana. Defendant did not have an Illinois gun permit or an Illinois FOID card. The gun 

defendant had brought to Kennedy’s apartment was a 9-millimeter Glock pistol. The pistol was 

a semiautomatic, which meant that the trigger had to be pressed for every shot that was fired. 

When defendant arrived at the apartment, he had 16 bullets in the clip of the gun and one bullet 

in the chamber of the gun. Defendant owned the gun legally and had never fired that gun or any 

other gun prior to the date in question. Approximately 9 shots were fired during the incident. 

Five of those shots hit Mason. The entire incident happened very fast. After the shooting 

occurred, a police officer who processed the scene recovered four spent shell casings from the 

bedroom floor of the apartment and five spent shell casings from the kitchen floor. According to 

that police officer, however, the location of the casings did not necessarily indicate from where 

in the apartment the shots had been fired.

¶ 12 At the time of the shooting, Mason was approximately 27 years old, 6 foot 4 inches tall, 

and weighed 287 pounds. Defendant was approximately 28 years old, 5 foot 11 inches tall, and 

weighed 195 or 200 pounds. The item that Mason had in his hand just prior to being shot was a 

gray flip cellphone that Mason used for work. After the shooting occurred, the police officer 

who processed the scene recovered that cellphone from the kitchen floor of the apartment where 

it had apparently been dropped by Mason after he was shot. Mason was unarmed at the time of 

the shooting and did not have a gun or any other weapon on his person that day. 
6 

¶ 13 As indicated above, the only real issue at defendant’s bench trial was whether defendant 

had acted in self-defense. As to that issue, all three of the individuals (Mason, Kennedy, and 

defendant) involved in the incident at Kennedy’s apartment agreed that Kennedy’s apartment 

was very small, that no lights were on in the apartment at the time of the shooting, and that the 

inside of the apartment was very dark that morning. Mason, Kennedy, and defendant also all 

agreed that Mason did not make any verbal threats to defendant or even say anything to 

defendant before Mason was shot. Mason was, however, angry and yelling and had pushed 

Kennedy out of the way, although defendant did not see Mason do so. 

¶ 14 With regard to how close Mason had gotten to defendant before the first shot was fired

and certain other pertinent matters, Mason testified that he had just gotten to the entrance of the 

bedroom (but not inside the bedroom) and had started to move the curtain aside when he saw the 

“flame” from defendant’s gun and felt something hit him in the stomach. Kennedy also testified 

that Mason had only gotten to the entrance of the bedroom. 

¶ 15 Defendant, on the other hand, testified that after Mason was “banging” on the rear

balcony door “aggressively” and defendant and Kennedy had jumped out of bed, Kennedy 

stated, “Oh, s***, he’s going to kill me.” Defendant asked Kennedy who was at the door, and 

Kennedy told him it was her “ex.” Defendant asked Kennedy if Mason had a key, and Kennedy 

said, “Hold on.” Defendant yelled to Kennedy to turn the light on, but Kennedy ran out of the 

bedroom and toward the rear balcony door. Defendant was still in the bedroom and was still 

naked with a condom on and could not see. He scrambled around trying to find a light switch 

and his clothing. Scared and unable to find a light, defendant reached under the front of the bed 

and grabbed his gun. Defendant was afraid that he was going to get hurt and that he was not 

“going to make it out.” As Kennedy confronted Mason in the kitchen, defendant peeked out of 
7 

the bedroom and could see from the small amount of backlight that was coming from the balcony 

area that Mason was a big guy. According to defendant, Mason ran into the bedroom a few steps 

and was within “[b]reathing space” of defendant before defendant fired the first shot. As Mason 

was running into the bedroom, defendant saw a dark object in Mason’s right hand and saw that 

Mason was reaching out toward defendant with his left hand. As he did so, Mason said, 

“[m]otherfucker.” Defendant was scared for his life and thought that Mason had a weapon. 

Defendant reacted and started to fire.

¶ 16 As for what happened after the first shot was fired, Mason testified that he started

backing up and said to defendant, “Hold on bro. What you—what you want?” Mason testified 

further that he tried to run out of the apartment through the door to the balcony, although he 

continued to face defendant the entire time. According to Mason, the final shot hit him when he 

was already down and lying on his back on the balcony. As defendant fired the shots, defendant 

said to Kennedy, “You set me up.” Mason testified further that when Kennedy confronted the 

defendant immediately after or during the shooting, defendant pointed the gun at or toward 

Kennedy and told her to move or that he would shoot her too. 

¶ 17 Kennedy testified that after defendant started shooting, Mason ran toward the rear 

balcony door. Defendant moved into the kitchen and continued to fire. Kennedy was in the 

kitchen at the time and some of the shots went past her. Kennedy told defendant to stop and 

asked defendant what the “f***” he was doing. Defendant accused Kennedy of setting him up 

and told Kennedy to move out of the way or that he would shoot her. Kennedy got out of the 

way, and defendant left the apartment through the rear balcony door. 

¶ 18 Defendant testified that he was not trying to kill or hurt Mason when he fired the gun 

repeatedly but, rather, was scared and was just trying to get out of the apartment unharmed. 
8 

Pulling the trigger was more of a reflexive action. Defendant did not recall how many times he 

had fired his weapon and said that he fired the weapon because he was afraid for his life. When 

asked why he was afraid, defendant stated that he had never been to the apartment before, he did 

not know where he was at, and it was dark. Upon being asked further, defendant stated that he 

had no doubt in his mind that Mason was going to harm him. According to defendant, his gun 

had an easy trigger pull and would shoot as fast as the person using the gun could pull the 

trigger. As defendant was firing the gun, he was afraid and shaken and just wanted to get out of 

the apartment. He did not realize that he had even hit Mason with any of the shots. During his 

testimony, defendant stated that he did not recall if Mason was heading toward the rear balcony 

door, only that Mason was backing up a little into the kitchen. After Mason went down, 

defendant stopped firing. Defendant started to run out of the apartment but then realized that he 

did not have his keys or phone or anything. Defendant turned to go back to the bedroom to grab 

his belongings, and Kennedy stood in the way. Defendant told Kennedy to move and that he 

needed to get his stuff. Kennedy did so. Defendant grabbed as much of his belongings as he 

could and then ran out of the apartment to his vehicle. He was still naked and still wearing a 

condom. Defendant denied during his testimony that he had pointed the gun at or threatened 

Kennedy and also denied that he had accused Kennedy of setting him up, although defendant 

acknowledged that Kennedy had sent him a text message after the incident in which she stated 

that she had not set him up. After defendant left the apartment, he received multiple phone calls 

and one or more text messages from Kennedy, but he did not answer Kennedy’s calls or respond 

to Kennedy’s messages. 

¶ 19 After all the evidence had been presented, the trial court took the case under advisement. 

The trial court later found defendant guilty of ABWF and AUUW but found defendant not guilty 
9 

of attempted first degree murder. In announcing its ruling, the trial court stated, in pertinent part, 

as follows: 

“I am—I am gonna take this case in two parts. As to the bedroom, I am 

finding the Defendant not guilty on attempt first degree murder. It was a very 

dark apartment, he could not see. From what he could hear and what he could 

see, he’s much smaller than Jermian [sic] Mason, he thought his life was in 

danger and I believe that is reasonable when he was in that bedroom. So I am 

finding him not guilty on attempt first degree murder. However, on Count 2[,] I 

am finding you guilty because—this is your own testimony—when you get out of 

the bedroom the Defendant—Jermian [sic] Mason is facing you, you know that’s 

the outer door that he’s going to. You also testified that—how you knew that 

Jermain Mason was bigger than you was because there was a light emanating 

from under the door. 

So as Jermian [sic] Mason came closer and closer to that balcony door 

there was some light. And that’s according to Mr. Williams [the defendant] 

himself. I believe that was unreasonable and without justification. On aggravated 

battery of a firearm [sic] the State has to show that he knowingly and intentionally 

caused injury to another person and that’s by means of discharging a firearm and 

looking at justification and self-defense. At that point I don’t believe it was 

reasonable. As a matter of fact, at that point Jermian [sic] Mason was actually 

trying to get out of the door and I believe there was some light from the outside. 

And that’s per the Defendant himself.
10 

So I am finding the aggravated battery with a firearm was without legal 

justification. So I’m finding you guilty of Count 2 and Count 3 and not guilty of 

Count 1.” 

¶ 20 Following the trial court’s decision, defendant filed a posttrial motion for a finding of not 

guilty or, alternatively, for a new trial. In the motion, defendant argued, among other things, 

that: (1) he had not been proven guilty of ABWF beyond a reasonable doubt because the State 

failed to negate defendant’s claim of self-defense; and (2) the State’s failure to recognize 

defendant’s Indiana gun permit (that defendant had a gun permit from Indiana at the time of the 

AUUW offense) violated defendant’s constitutional rights. After a hearing, the trial court denied 

defendant’s posttrial motion. In so doing, the trial court noted as to defendant’s AUUW 

conviction that although it could consider defendant’s Indiana gun permit as mitigation in 

sentencing, it knew of no case law or statute that would allow defendant to carry a gun into 

Illinois. A sentencing hearing was subsequently held, and defendant was sentenced to 

consecutive terms in prison of eight years for ABWF and one year for AUUW. Defendant 

appealed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 A. ABWF

¶ 23 As his first point of contention on appeal, defendant argues that he was not proven guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of ABWF and that his conviction of that charge should be overturned. 

More specifically, defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to negate 

his claim of self-defense. Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously reached the 

opposite conclusion because the trial court: (1) incorrectly decided to treat the shots fired by

defendant as taking place in two parts—the shots fired in the bedroom (which the trial court 
11 

determined were legally justified by self-defense and found defendant not guilty of attempted 

murder) and the shots fired in the kitchen (which the trial court determined were not legally 

justified by self-defense and found defendant guilty of ABWF)—even though all of the shots 

were fired by defendant in rapid succession without any lapse, delay, or change in circumstances; 

(2) incorrectly placed a burden on defendant, that the law does not require, to exercise infallible 

judgment during a brief period of time when defendant was under great stress and excitement;

(3) failed to consider how defendant perceived the danger and whether defendant’s perception 

was objectively reasonable; and (4) based its decision, in part, upon its incorrect recollection of 

defendant’s testimony in that the trial court incorrectly thought that defendant indicated he knew 

the victim was trying to leave the apartment and that there was additional light in the kitchen 

area. For all of the reasons stated, defendant asks that we reverse his ABWF conviction outright. 

¶ 24 The State argues that defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of ABWF 

and that defendant’s conviction should be upheld. According to the State, defendant’s assertions 

to the contrary are without merit because: (1) although defendant relies upon the trial court’s 

alleged determination that the State failed to negate defendant’s claim of self-defense as to the 

attempted murder charge, the trial court made no such determination and may have found 

defendant not guilty of the attempted murder charge based upon a perceived lack of proof as to 

the intent element of that offense; (2) defendant improperly attempts to challenge the trial court’s 

finding of guilty on the ABWF charge by claiming that the finding of guilty is inconsistent with 

the finding of not guilty on the attempted murder charge, a legal argument (inconsistent verdicts) 

that is no longer allowed under Illinois law; (3) the trial court’s determination that defendant did 

not act in self-defense with regard to the ABWF charge was not improbable or unsatisfactory, as 

is required for a reversal of defendant’s conviction under the Collins standard (People v. Collins, 
12 

106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)), since there was no evidence in this case that Mason (the victim) 

threatened unlawful force or took aggressive action against defendant and since defendant’s 

beliefs regarding self-defense were not objectively reasonable; and (4) despite defendant’s 

assertion to the contrary, it is clear from the record that the trial court considered defendant’s 

perception of the danger and the factual circumstances of this case and found that defendant’s 

conduct was not objectively reasonable. For all of the reasons set forth, the State asks that we 

affirm defendant’s conviction of ABWF.

¶ 25 In reply to the State’s contentions, defendant asserts that: (1) any reasonable reading of 

the record and the applicable law shows that the trial court found that the State had failed to 

negate defendant’s claim of self-defense as to the attempted murder charge; (2) although the 

State claims that the evidence does not establish that the shots were fired without any lapse in 

time, it was uncontested that the shooting happened quickly and none of the three main witnesses 

who testified about the incident testified that any lapse of time occurred; (3) where defendant 

was initially justified in firing the gun, it was incumbent upon the State to prove that a sufficient 

time interval passed between the initial four shots and the subsequent five shots, which would 

have allowed defendant, acting as a reasonable person, to realize that no further shooting was 

necessary; (4) defendant is not arguing inconsistent verdicts, as the State suggests but, rather, is 

arguing that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) the State’s claim that there 

was no evidence that Mason had threatened unlawful force against defendant or was the 

aggressor ignores the case law on self-defense where Illinois courts have found that it is not 

necessary that the danger be real or that the victim be armed with a weapon, only that the facts 

and circumstances of the case induced a reasonable belief in the defendant that the threatened 

danger existed; (6) the trial court’s determination that it was unreasonable for defendant to 
13 

continue fearing for his life (after the first four shots had been fired in the bedroom) and that 

defendant should have realized that Mason was no longer an actual threat disregarded the fact 

that defendant could not escape at that point from the danger Mason posed since Mason was still 

in front of defendant and blocking defendant’s only exit; and (7) this is not a case where the 

force used by the defendant continued well-beyond the point at which the apparent danger ceased 

to exist such that defendant’s claim of self-defense would no longer be reasonable. For those 

reasons and for the reasons initially asserted, defendant again asks this court to reverse his 

conviction of ABWF outright. 

¶ 26 Pursuant to the Collins standard, a reviewing court faced with a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution 

and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280 (2009). In 

applying the Collins standard, the reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the 

record in favor of the prosecution. People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 326 (2005). The reviewing 

court will not retry the defendant. People v. Austin M., 2012 IL 111194, ¶ 107. Determinations 

of witness credibility, the weight to be given testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from the evidence are responsibilities of the trier of fact, not the reviewing court. People 

v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 43 (1989). Thus, the Collins standard of review fully recognizes that 

it is the trier of fact's responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 232 

Ill. 2d at 281. That same standard of review is applied by the reviewing court regardless of 

whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, or whether defendant received a bench or a jury 

trial, and circumstantial evidence meeting that standard is sufficient to sustain a criminal 
14 

conviction. Id.; People v. Kotlarz, 193 Ill. 2d 272, 298 (2000). In applying the Collins standard, 

a reviewing court will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable, 

unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it leaves a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Austin 

M., 2012 IL 111194, ¶ 107. 

¶ 27 As indicated above, there is no dispute in this case that defendant shot Mason (the victim) 

multiple times and that Mason was injured. The only dispute as to the ABWF conviction is 

whether the State sufficiently negated defendant’s claim of self-defense. Section 7-1 of the 

Criminal Code of 2012 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person is justified in the use of force 

against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary 

to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force." 720 ILCS 

5/7-1(a) (West 2016). Self-defense is an affirmative defense—once it has been raised by the 

defendant, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

did not act in self-defense, in addition to proving the elements of the offense charged. 720 ILCS 

5/7-14 (West 2016); People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 224 (2004). To establish a claim of selfdefense, the defendant must present some evidence as to each of the following six elements: (1) 

that unlawful force was threatened against him; (2) that he was not the aggressor; (3) that the 

danger of harm to him was imminent; (4) that the use of force was necessary; (5) that he actually 

and subjectively believed a danger existed that required the use of the amount of force applied; 

and (6) that his beliefs in that regard were objectively reasonable. See 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 

2016); Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225; People v. Montes, 263 Ill. App. 3d 680, 690 (1994). If the State 

negates any one of those elements, the defendant's claim of self-defense must be rejected. Lee, 

213 Ill. 2d at 225. 
15 

¶ 28 The use of deadly force in self-defense is only justified when a person reasonably 

believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself 

or to another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2016). 

The determination of that issue is dependent upon the circumstance involved (see People v. 

Woods, 81 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1980)) and the key question is whether the defendant's belief that it 

was necessary to use deadly force was reasonable under those circumstances (see Montes, 263 

Ill. App. 3d at 690). A person who is thrust into a life-endangering situation is not required to 

use infallible judgment in deciding whether and how to act to defend himself. See People v. 

White, 87 Ill. App. 3d 321, 323 (1980). Such a requirement would be unreasonable to impose 

upon a decision that must be made very quickly by a person who is fearful and under great stress. 

Id. 

¶ 29 In the present case, after having reviewed the record, we find that the evidence was 

insufficient to negate defendant’s claim of self-defense as necessary to prove defendant guilty of 

ABWF. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented at defendant’s 

bench trial showed that defendant fired nine shots in rapid succession at Mason as defendant 

tried to make his way to the rear balcony door and escape from the apartment. Defendant was 

naked at the time in a dark, narrow, and unfamiliar apartment and facing the real and imminent 

threat of an angry boyfriend, who was much larger in size than defendant, was carrying a dark 

object in his hand that defendant thought was a weapon, was closing in on defendant’s position, 

and who had just caught defendant having sex with his girlfriend. Although the trial court drew 

a distinction between the shots fired in the bedroom and those fired in the kitchen, that 

distinction was unwarranted in this case as the evidence showed that all of the shots were fired in 

rapid succession over a very short period of time and no evidence was presented to suggest that 
16 

there was any lapse, delay, or significant change in circumstances between the shots fired in the 

bedroom and the shots fired in the kitchen. See People v. Bailey, 27 Ill. App. 3d 128, 133-36 

(1975) (reversing a defendant’s aggravated battery convictions where the State failed to negate 

the defendant’s claim of self-defense and indicating in a situation where all of the shots were 

fired in rapid succession, that when a defendant was initially justified by self-defense in firing a 

gun, it was incumbent upon the State to prove that a sufficient time interval passed between the 

initial shots and subsequent shots that would have allowed the defendant, acting as a reasonable 

person, to realize that no further shooting was necessary); Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 

344 (1921) (reversing a defendant’s conviction for murder in the second degree and indicating 

that a person who shot another in self-defense did not necessarily lose his or her right to do so 

merely because the final shot was intentional and may have seemed unnecessary when 

considered in cold blood, such as if the assailant was down at the time of the final shot, if the 

final shot followed close upon the other shots while the heat of the conflict was on and the 

defendant believed that he was fighting for his life); People v. Motuzas, 352 Ill. 340, 347 (1933) 

(reversing a defendant’s conviction for murder and finding that the defendant had justifiably 

acted in self-defense and noting that for a valid self-defense claim, it was not necessary that the 

danger to the defendant was actually real, rather than just apparent, or that the victim was 

actually armed with a weapon, only that the defendant was confronted with such means or force 

as to cause the defendant to have a reasonable belief that he was in danger of losing his life or 

suffering great bodily harm); White, 87 Ill. App. 3d at 323 (reversing a defendant’s conviction 

for voluntary manslaughter where the State had failed to negate the defendant’s claim of selfdefense and recognizing that the law did not require a person, who had reasonable grounds to 

believe he was in apparent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily harm, to use 
17 

infallible judgment). Under the circumstances of this case, we must conclude, therefore, that the 

State failed to negate defendant’s claim of self-defense as to the ABWF charge. See 720 ILCS 

5/7-1(a) (West 2016); Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225-26; Montes, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 690; Bailey, 27 Ill. 

App. 3d at 133-36. We, therefore, reverse defendant’s conviction of ABWF. 

¶ 30 B. AUUW

¶ 31 As his second point of contention on appeal, defendant argues, and the State concedes, 

that the trial court erred in finding defendant guilty of AUUW where the charge was based, in 

part, upon defendant’s failure to have an Illinois FOID card at the time of the offense. The 

parties agree that such a conviction cannot stand under the circumstances of the present case 

where at the time of the offense, defendant was an Indiana resident and held a valid Indiana gun 

permit and was not required, therefore, to have an Illinois FOID card. See People v. Holmes, 

241 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (2011) (finding that the defendant in that case could not be convicted of the 

same AUUW offense as charged in the instant case where the defendant had a valid gun permit 

from Indiana, his state of residence, when the offense occurred). Accordingly, we reverse 

defendant’s AUUW conviction.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse defendant’s convictions of ABWF and AUUW.

¶ 34 Reversed. 

¶ 35 JUSTICE WRIGHT, specially concurring: 

¶ 36 I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse defendant’s convictions as unsupported by 

the evidence. However, I elect to write separately in order to draw attention to the systemic delay 

present in this record. 
18 

¶ 37 Initially, this court directed defendant’s court-appointed appellate counsel to submit 

defendant’s initial brief to this court on or before August 23, 2018. However, on eight occasions 

that initial deadline was extended at defense counsel’s request due to growing backlog in OSAD. 

This court received defendant’s opening brief on November 6, 2019, more than a year later than 

the original deadline. 

¶ 38 Here, defendant’s conviction has been set aside but defendant remained imprisoned, at 

considerable cost to the taxpayers, for at least 448 days before OSAD filed their brief in this appeal. 

Surely it is not unreasonable to significantly raise expectations for more timely work production 

by OSAD. More and more often, reviewing courts have noted OSAD’s delay with disapproval. 

See People v. Butts, 2018 IL App (1st) 150338-U, People v. Cisco, 2019 IL App (4th) 160515, and 

People v. Prokesh, 2020 IL App (3d) 170763-U. 

¶ 39 Once again, I rhetorically wonder whether this is an appeal where justice could have been 

less delayed despite the most favorable outcome available in a criminal appeal.