State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: July 23, 2015 106085 

________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK,

Respondent,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MICHAEL A. NICHOLAS,

Appellant.

________________________________

Calendar Date: May 28, 2015

Before: Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Rose and Lynch, JJ.

__________

Cheryl Coleman, Albany, for appellant.

J. Anthony Jordan, District Attorney, Fort Edward (Devin J.

Anderson of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Lynch, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Washington

County (McKeighan, J.), rendered September 6, 2013, upon a

verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal sale of

controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession

of a controlled substance in the third degree.

Following his alleged sale of crack cocaine to a

confidential informant (hereinafter CI) on October 9, 2012,

defendant was charged with criminal sale of a controlled

substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a

controlled substance in the third degree. Defendant was

thereafter convicted as charged and sentenced, as a second felony

offender, to concurrent prison terms of 12 years, plus three

years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
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We disagree with defendant's contentions that his

convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and

were against the weight of the evidence. Defendant primarily

maintains that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he was the person who possessed and sold the crack

cocaine. He also challenges the CI's credibility.

Scott Gillis, a police detective, testified at trial that

defendant became the target of a narcotics investigation

following his presence at a September 27, 2012 controlled buy

between the CI and another individual at an apartment in the

Village of Hudson Falls, Washington County. Thereafter, on

October 9, 2012, the CI arranged to purchase crack cocaine from

defendant at the same location. After a search of the CI

confirmed the absence of contraband, he was provided with $100 of

prerecorded buy money, equipped with an audio recording and

transmitting device and dropped off by Gillis a few blocks from

the residence. Gillis observed the CI walk to the apartment

building, although he did not see him enter the residence. 

According to the CI, defendant and two other men were inside the

apartment at the time of the sale. After a coded discussion with

defendant about prices of narcotics, the CI gave him the buy

money in exchange for a bag of crack cocaine. Gillis was able to

contemporaneously listen to the conversation in the residence via

the audio device, but he did not witness the transaction, nor was

it apparent from the recording that a drug sale had even

occurred. The CI then reconvened with Gillis, turned over the

bag of crack cocaine and submitted to another search, which

revealed no contraband. A lab analysis of the substance in the

bag confirmed that it was, in fact, cocaine. Notably, the buy

money was never recovered by law enforcement. 

A verdict is legally insufficient "where, viewing the

record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is

no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which

a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved

beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349

[2007] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). As to

defendant's challenge to the weight of the evidence, given that

an acquittal would not have been an unreasonable outcome, we must

weigh "the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and
-3- 106085 

the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn

from the testimony while viewing the evidence in a neutral light

and giving deference to the jury's credibility determinations"

(People v Gibson, 121 AD3d 1416, 1418 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d

1119 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see

People v Johnson, 91 AD3d 1194, 1196 [2012], lv denied 18 NY3d

995 [2012]). Here, the only direct evidence of defendant's

presence in the apartment at the time of the sale was the

testimony of the CI, who not only implicated defendant in the

transaction, but also identified his voice at trial during a

playback of the audio recording.1 Accordingly, the entire case

hinged on the CI's credibility. Although the CI gave testimony

that was inconsistent with his grand jury testimony, received

compensation for executing the crack cocaine purchase, worked

with law enforcement on other controlled buys for approximately

five years and had an extensive criminal history, such

information was presented to the jury, which clearly credited the

CI's testimony (see People v Richards, 124 AD3d 1146, 1147

[2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 992 [2015]; People v Wingo, 103 AD3d

1036, 1037 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1021 [2013]; People v

Tisdale, 103 AD3d 987, 988 [2013], lvs denied 21 NY3d 1004, 1010

[2013]). Thus, we cannot say that the evidence was legally

insufficient or that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence (see People v Wingo, 103 AD3d at 1036-1037; People v

Jones, 101 AD3d 1241, 1241-1242 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 944

[2013]; People v Heaney, 75 AD3d 836, 836 [2010], lv denied 15

NY3d 852 [2010]; People v Miles, 61 AD3d 1118, 1119-1120 [2009],

lv denied 12 NY3d 918 [2009]).

However, we find merit in the claim that defendant was

deprived of a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of

erroneously admitting evidence of prior uncharged crimes and the

improper vouching by a witness for the People. "Evidence of

similar uncharged crimes has probative value, but as a general

rule it is excluded for policy reasons because it may induce the

jury to base a finding of guilt on collateral matters or to

convict a defendant because of his [or her] past" (People v

1 Gillis testified that the CI's voice was the only voice

that he could recognize from the audio recording.
-4- 106085 

Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241 [1987]; accord People v Buskey, 45 AD3d

1170, 1172 [2007]; see People v Arafet, 13 NY3d 460, 465 [2009]). 

However, such evidence "may be admitted where [it] fall[s] within

the recognized Molineux exceptions – motive, intent, absence of

mistake, common plan or scheme and identity – or where such proof

is inextricably interwoven with the charged crimes, provide[s]

necessary background or complete[s] a witness's narrative"

(People v Rivera, 124 AD3d 1070, 1073 [2015] [internal quotation

marks and citation omitted]; see People v Morris, 21 NY3d 588,

594 [2013]). "To be inextricably interwoven . . . the evidence

must be explanatory of the acts done or words used in the

otherwise admissible part of the evidence" (People v Crandall, 67

NY2d 111, 116 [1986]; see People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350, 361

[1981]). In other words, "it must be 'evidence relating directly

to the crime charged' such that 'the value of the evidence

clearly outweighs any possible prejudice'" (People v Crandall, 67

NY2d at 116-117, quoting People v Vails, 43 NY2d 364, 368-369

[1977]). Before admitting evidence of prior uncharged crimes,

the trial court must determine that its probative value outweighs

its prejudicial effect (see People v Till, 87 NY2d 835, 836

[1995]; People v Elmy, 117 AD3d 1183, 1187 [2014]). In short,

"under . . . Molineux jurisprudence, we begin with the premise

that uncharged crimes are inadmissible and, from there, carve out

exceptions" (People v Resek, 3 NY3d 385, 390 [2004]). 

In their Molineux proffer, the People sought to introduce

evidence of a September 24, 2012 meeting at the apartment among

defendant, the CI and others, during which defendant allegedly

possessed a handgun and handled numerous bags of crack cocaine. 

They also included in their application the September 27, 2012

controlled buy at which defendant was present. County Court

permitted evidence as to both events, but prohibited evidence as

to the handgun and crack cocaine from the September 24, 2012

event on the ground that such testimony would be too prejudicial. 

The court specifically pointed out that the September 27, 2012

event was not a sale involving defendant. Although the court did

not elaborate, this decision reflects the requisite balancing of

the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial

effect (see People v Meseck, 52 AD3d 948, 950 [2008], lv denied

11 NY3d 739 [2008]).
-5- 106085 

At trial, however, the CI testified that defendant was not

only present during the September 27, 2012 controlled purchase of

crack cocaine, but that he had also participated in the

transaction by providing the actual drugs. County Court denied

defendant's prompt motion for a mistrial, but otherwise sustained

his objection and struck this portion of the CI's testimony,

without further limiting instructions to the jury. In our view,

this revelation was highly prejudicial, as it related to a recent

uncharged crime that was nearly identical to the sale for which

defendant was on trial (see People v Wallace, 31 AD3d 1041, 1043-

1045 [2006]; People v Foster, 295 AD2d 110, 113 [2002], lv denied

98 NY2d 710 [2002]). Shortly thereafter, the CI recounted that,

upon entering the apartment on October 9, 2012, he had observed

defendant sitting at a table "with large amounts of heroin and

crack cocaine in front of him." Although no reference to

"heroin" was included in the People's Molineux proffer, or

otherwise previously disclosed, the court overruled defendant's

objection, permitting further testimony from the CI about the

presence of heroin. Because defendant was not charged with

possession or sale of heroin, it cannot be said that this

evidence was directly related to or in any way necessary to

explain his alleged possession and sale of crack cocaine such

that it was inextricably interwoven into the CI's narrative (see

People v Crandall, 67 NY2d at 116-117; People v Ventimiglia, 52

NY2d at 361; compare People v Buchanan, 95 AD3d 1433, 1435-1436

[2012], lvs denied 22 NY3d 1039, 1043 [2013]; People v Torres, 19

AD3d 732, 734 [2005], lv dismissed 5 NY3d 810 [2005]). 

Significantly, the court did not attempt to cure the prejudice

arising from the CI's improper testimony by issuing an

instruction either at the time of defendant's objection or during

the jury charge (compare People v Tinkler, 105 AD3d 1140, 1143

[2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1020 [2013]; People v Reid, 97 AD3d

1037, 1038 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1104 [2012]; People v

Leonard, 83 AD3d 1113, 1117 [2011], affd 19 NY3d 323 [2012];

People v Delaney, 42 AD3d 820, 822 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 922

[2007]).2 Compounding the problem, County Court had earlier

2 Notwithstanding defendant's failure to make such a

request, County Court should have provided appropriate limiting

instructions to the jury (see People v Resek, 3 NY3d at 389;
-6- 106085 

denied defendant's application to redact that part of the audio

recording of the October 9, 2012 event, which referenced the

pricing and packaging of "dog food," a code name for heroin. By

its ruling, the court was apparently under the erroneous

impression that an undercover audio recording of the transaction

in issue could not be redacted. Coming at the beginning of the

recording, this commentary should have, and easily could have,

been redacted.3

Further prejudice resulted from the People's redirect

examination of Gillis, who stated that the CI was "very reliable

and very trustworthy." After County Court overruled defendant's

objection, and characterized the testimony as "opinion," Gillis

elaborated that the CI had "never given [him a] reason to not

believe anything that [the CI] is telling [him]." Allowing

Gillis to vouch for the CI's credibility was clearly improper

(see People v Guay, 18 NY3d 16, 24 [2011]; People v McClary, 85

AD3d 1622, 1623-1624 [2011]; People v Fredrick, 53 AD3d 1088,

1088-1089 [2008]; see also People v Slaughter, 189 AD2d 157, 160

[1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 1080 [1993]). The effect was

compounded by the People's summation, wherein the prosecutor

surmised that law enforcement had used the CI for several years

because of his reliability (see People v Oathout, 21 NY3d 127,

131 [2013]; People v Casanova, 119 AD3d 976, 978-979 [2014]). 

While we recognize that County Court sustained defendant's

People v Mitchell, 112 AD3d 1071, 1074 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d

1140 [2014]).

3 The audio recording contained a conversation between

defendant and the CI regarding the sale of "dog food," i.e.,

heroin. Defendant moved to redact those portions of the

recording referring to dog food on the basis that the jury would

incorrectly infer that the coded language concerned the crack

cocaine sale with which defendant was charged. County Court

denied defendant's request and the People played the recording in

full for the jury, neglecting to explain the term at issue. 

Defendant was then pressed to bring out the meaning of dog food

during his cross-examination of the CI in order to ameliorate any

confusion resulting from leaving the term undefined.
-7- 106085 

objection, no curative instruction was issued, and we remain

concerned that the prosecutor's remark amplified the effect of

Gillis' improper vouching (see People v Wallace, 31 AD3d at

1044). 

In view of the fact that defendant was one of three people

who could have sold the crack cocaine to the CI during a

transaction that was neither verbalized nor witnessed by anyone

but the CI, we cannot say that the proof of defendant's guilt is

overwhelming (see id. at 1043-1045), such that the errors at

trial may be deemed harmless (see People v Brown, 114 AD3d 1017,

1019-1020 [2014]; People v Parham, 74 AD3d 1237, 1238 [2010], lv

denied 15 NY3d 923 [2010]; see generally People v Gillyard, 13

NY3d 351, 357 [2009]). Rather, it is our view that the

cumulative effect of these errors deprived defendant of a fair

trial (see People v Wlasiuk, 32 AD3d 674, 675 [2006], lv

dismissed 7 NY3d 871 [2006]). Accordingly, we must reverse

defendant's judgment of conviction and remit for a new trial. In

light of this disposition, defendant's remaining contentions have

been rendered academic.

Garry, J.P., and Rose, J., concur.

Egan Jr., J. (concurring).

I agree that the cumulative errors identified by the

majority warrant reversal of defendant's conviction and the

remittal of this matter for a new trial. Where the majority and

I part company, however, is with respect to the evidence relative

to defendant's alleged possession of heroin. To my analysis,

this uncharged criminal activity falls squarely within one or

more of the recognized Molineux exceptions. Here, the

confidential informant (hereinafter CI) testified that, upon

entering the apartment on the day in question, he observed

defendant "sitting at the table with large amounts of heroin and

crack cocaine in front of him." Such testimony, in my view, was

part and parcel of the CI's attempt to set the scene and provide

context for the October 9, 2012 transaction, thereby providing

necessary background information and/or completing the CI's

narrative (see People v Rivera, 124 AD3d 1070, 1073 [2015]). 
-8- 106085 

Hence, step one of the Molineux test was satisfied.

Although I agree that, under the particular facts of this

case, the probative value of such evidence was outweighed by its

prejudicial effect, thereby warranting the exclusion thereof, I

write separately to make clear that not every casual, off-thecuff reference to an uncharged crime constitutes reversible

error. For example, it would be neither unusual nor surprising

if, during the course of a controlled buy, a CI or an undercover

officer observed additional evidence of criminal activity beyond

that with which a particular defendant ultimately was charged. 

Although any testimony relative to such uncharged criminal

activity indeed should be part of the People's Molineux

application and must satisfy that two-part test in order to be

admitted into evidence at trial, not every fleeting or isolated

reference to uncharged criminal activity constitutes a Molineux

violation, nor does the mere mention of an uncharged crime

necessarily afford a basis upon which to reverse an otherwise

valid conviction. And, to the extent that the majority's

decision suggests otherwise, I disagree.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and

matter remitted to the County Court of Washington County for a

new trial.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court