UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4108

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES HARRY BARKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, 

District Judge. (2:14-cr-00056-1)

Submitted: July 23, 2015 Decided: July 27, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David O. Schles, THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID SCHLES, Charleston, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Candace Haley Bunn, Assistant United

States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

James Harry Barker appeals his conviction and 30-month 

sentence imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to 

distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). On 

appeal, Barker’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the court

plainly erred in finding Barker competent to plead, and whether

the court imposed a procedurally or substantively unreasonable 

sentence. Barker was notified of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government has 

declined to file a response. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

Because Barker did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea in 

the district court, we review the plea hearing for plain error. 

United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Under this standard, Barker bears the burden to demonstrate that 

(1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error 

affected his substantial rights, and (4) we should exercise our 

discretion to note the error. Henderson v. United States, 133 S.

Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013).

It is axiomatic that, “[b]efore a court may accept a guilty 

plea, it must ensure that the defendant is competent to enter the 

plea.” United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 564 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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A defendant is competent to plead if he “has sufficient present 

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 

rational understanding” and also “has a rational as well as factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him.” United States v. 

Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “When a response in a plea colloquy raises 

questions about the defendant’s state of mind, the court must 

broaden its inquiry to satisfy itself that the plea is being made 

knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 

376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). To 

succeed on his competency challenge, Barker must demonstrate that 

the district court “ignored facts raising a bona fide doubt 

regarding his competency,” such that the district court abused its 

discretion in accepting the plea. See Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 291 

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the court questioned Barker thoroughly regarding 

factors relevant to his competence, including his age; educational 

history; current use of medicines, drugs, and alcohol; and history 

of mental health or substance abuse treatment. Although the plea 

colloquy revealed that Barker was illiterate and taking 

prescription medicines, Barker’s and his counsel’s responses 

during the colloquy provided no basis to question Barker’s ability 

to understand the proceedings. We therefore find no error, plain 

or otherwise, in the district court’s competency determination. 
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Turning to Barker’s sentencing challenge, we review a 

sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 

(2007). We first “ensur[e] that the district court committed no 

significant procedural error,” including improper calculation of 

the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, and inadequate explanation of the 

sentence imposed. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). If we find no 

procedural error, we examine the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence under “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not 

greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. See

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume that a within-Guidelines sentence 

is substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 

295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). Barker

bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by showing that the 

sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors.” Id.

We discern no error in the court’s sentence. The court 

properly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range, considered 

the parties’ arguments and Barker’s request for a variance, and 

provided a reasoned explanation for the sentence it imposed, 

grounded in the § 3553(a) factors. Further, Barker fails to rebut 
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the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his withinGuidelines sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in 

this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm Barker’s conviction and sentence. This court 

requires that counsel inform Barker, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. 

If Barker requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in 

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Barker.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED