* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or coll ateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 5 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ALI MEHDIPOUR, Plaintiff-Appellant, and FRANK MEHDIPOUR; LADONNA MEHDIPOUR, Plaintiffs,

v. THE CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, a municipality and political sub-division of the State of Oklahoma, and PATRICK BURNE (sic) and WINFORDE “WIMPY” MARTIN, as public officers and as individuals, Defendants-Appellees. No. 98-6310 D.C. No. CIV-92-977-L D.C. No. CIV-95-312L (W.D. Okla.)



### ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, BALDOCKand HENRY , Circuit Judges.1 The brief is not clear as to the identity of the Appellant; it is signed only

by Ali Mehdipour. To the extent Ali Mehdipour is attempting to appeal on behalf of his co-plaintiffs, Frank Mehdipour and Ladonna M ehdipour, we simply note one pro se litigant, who is not an attorney, cannotrepresent other pro se parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“parties may plead and conduct t heir own cases personally or by counsel”); 10th Cir. R. 46.5 (“[a] party who is not represented by an attorney must sign any motion, brief or other paper ”). We therefore treat Ali Mehdipour as the sole appellant. -2- After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Ali Mehdipour, 1 proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of the motion to vacate a December 12, 1995, judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant t o 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. We have occasion to once again revisit segments of the tortured history of these proceedings. See, e.g. Mehdipour v. City of Okla. City, 161 F.3d 18 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished); Mehdipour v. City of Okla. City , 145 F.3d 1346 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished); Mehdipour v. City of Okla. City , 131 F.3d 152 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished). On June 5, 1992, the Meh dipours filed a civil rights action against the City of Oklahoma City and police officers Patrick Byrne and Winforde Martin. On March 31, 1994, the district c ourt dismissed the action without prejudice for failure to obtain timely serv ice, failure to respond, and2 Over the last year, we have addressed an appeal of the 1997 summary judgment, a Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b) motion to vacat e the 1992 original dismissal order, and another Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the 1997 judgment. -3- failure to comply with a direct court order. In ad dition, the court ordered the Mehdipours to pay defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees arising in any future attempts to prosecute the same claims in any other court. The Mehdipours did not appeal this order. Instead, on February 28, 1995, the Mehdipours fileda second suit based on the same set of facts underlying the 1992 suit. Th e court ordered them to post a bond in the amount of the costs and fees expended b y defendants in the 1992 case. The Mehdipours posted the bond for $6,485.10 . The court allowed defendants to execute on the bond, and the action p roceeded. The Mehdipours appealed the order allowing defendants to execute o n the bond. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order w as not final or otherwise immediately appealable. We noted in the order thatthe Mehdipours could appeal after final adjudication. In January 1997, the dis trict court granted summary judgment for defendants in the 1995 suit. The Mehdipours then initiated a number of attacks o n the outcome of their case and on the payment of fees. 2 On March 25, 1998, at the end of a string of unsuccessful attempts, the Mehdipours filed the ins tant Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the 1995 order to post bond. They contended under Rule 60(b)(4) that the-4-

1995 order was erroneous and therefore void. The d istrict court denied the motion, finding it was not filed within a reasonabl e time and the facts did not demonstrate the exceptional circumstances needed to vacate a judgment under either Rule 60(b)(4) or 60(b)(6). In reviewing the district court's determination that its judgment is not void under Rule 60(b)(4), we review de novo. See Wilmer v. Board of County
Comm’rs , 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995). The moving pa rty must show lack of jurisdiction or that the court acted in a mannerinconsistent with the due process of law. See 11 C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT ET AL ., F EDERAL P RACTICE &
P ROCEDURE § 2862 (2d ed.1995). Setting aside a judgment on voidness grounds is narrowly restricted. Even an erroneous judgmentdoes not amount to a void one under Rule 60(b)(4). See id. Mr. Mehdipour has not shown lack of jurisdiction or a violation of due process. We review the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)(6 ) only for an abuse of discretion. See Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc. , 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996). However, in determining whether a district court abused its discretion, we recognize that "‘[r]elief under Rule 60(b) is extra ordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.’" Id. (quoting Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co. , 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990)). Furthermo re, a motion for relief must be made in a “reasonable tim e.” See Fed. R. Civ. Pro.-5-

60(b). There was no abuse of discretion here since nothing in the record demonstrates the exceptional circumstances requiredto vacate a judgment. Furthermore, we agree with the district court that Mr. Mehdipour waited too long to file his motion under Rule 60(b)(6). The time l imitation began to run on June 27, 1996, when the bond was posted. Mr. Mehdipour filed the instant motion in March 1998, having sat for almost two years on his right to assert it. His time has long since passed. After careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge