Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60920

Summary Calendar

BERNARDO ALFONSO MENDEZ-SANTACRUZ,

Petitioner

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A27 601 052

Before DeMOSS, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Bernardo Alfonso Mendez-Santacruz (Mendez), a native and citizen of

Colombia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his motion to reopen

removal proceedings after he was ordered deported in absentia. He argues that

the BIA should have found reasonable cause for his failure to appear at his

initial hearing and also asserts that the BIA erred in failing to exercise its

discretion to reopen the proceedings to consider adjustment of status.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 11, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 07-60920

2

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under the “highly

deferential abuse of discretion standard,” regardless of the basis of the alien’s

request for relief. Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, we must affirm the BIA’s decision as long as it is not capricious,

“utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is

arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational approach.” Singh v.

Gonzales, 436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotations

omitted). 

The governing statute in place at the time of Mendez’s 1987 deportation

hearing allowed in absentia hearings if the alien was given a reasonable

opportunity to be present but failed or refused to attend the proceedings without

reasonable cause. I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982) (repealed 1990); see

also Williams-Igwonobe v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 453, 455 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2006).

Under the former § 1252(b), an alien denied relief in an in absentia hearing may

still move for reopening, but is required to demonstrate reasonable cause for his

failure to appear at the original hearing. Williams-Igwonobe, 437 F.3d at 455-56

& n.1 (citing Matter of Haim, 19 I.&N. Dec. 641, 642 (BIA 1988)). Mendez

asserts that he established reasonable cause for his absence from his original

deportation hearing by demonstrating that he was not given proper notice.

Properly notifying an alien’s counsel of the time, date, and location of a

hearing can constitute adequate and effective notice to the alien. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 292.5(a); see also Men Keng Chang v. Jiungi, 669 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1982);

Matter of Barocio, 19 I.&N. Dec. 255, 259 (BIA 1985). Mendez has wholly failed

to show that Lionel Perez did not serve as his counsel of record or that Perez did

not receive the notice sent. Beyond the bare allegations that he did not attend

the hearing because he did not receive notification from Perez, he has made no

attempt to comply with the requirements of In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637

(BIA 1988), or otherwise demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. See In

re N-K- & V-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 879, 880-81 (BIA 1997) (if an applicant meets the

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requirements set forth in Lozada, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can

form the basis of a successful motion to reopen). The general application of the

Lozada requirements is not an abuse of discretion. Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d

487, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding that

Mendez had not shown reasonable cause for his absence from his initial

immigration hearing.

Mendez also asserts that his motion was timely because a motion to reopen

based upon lack of proper notice can be filed at any time. See INA

§ 240a)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(5)(C)(ii). He is correct to the extent that his

motion to reopen sought to rescind his in absentia deportation order; however,

to the extent that Mendez sought to reopen in order to apply for new relief, the

motion was not timely filed. In re M-S-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 349 (BIA 1998); 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b); see also In re Cruz-Garcia, 22 I.&N. Dec. 1155, 1160

(BIA 1999) (concluding that respondent’s motion to reopen to consider

adjustment of status was untimely because the motion had not been filed by

September 30, 1996). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying

the motion to reopen to the extent that Mendez sought an adjustment of status.

Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.

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