NORTH KOREA

A GROWING REGIONAL and GLOBAL THREAT

MILITARY POWER
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IV

PREFACE

In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency 

to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The purpose was to 

provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a comprehensive and 

accurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 

250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages 

and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of 

Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public for the first time. DIA also produced 

similar documents describing North Korean military strength in 1991 and 1995.

In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of major foreign 

military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on North Korea’s defense 

and military goals, strategy, plans and intentions; the organization, structure, and capabilities of its 

military to supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base. This product 

and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, leaders and troops, the national 

security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century.
NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER A Growing Regional and Global Threat

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North Korea is one of the most militarized countries in the world and remains a critical security challenge 

for the United States, our Northeast Asian allies, and the international community. The Kim regime has 

seen itself as free to take destabilizing actions to advance its political goals, including attacks on South 

Korea, development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, proliferation of weapons, and cyberattacks 

against civilian infrastructure worldwide. Compounding this challenge, the closed nature of the regime 

makes gathering facts about North Korea's military extremely diffi cult.

Just over twenty years ago, North Korea appeared to be on the brink of national collapse. Economic 

assistance from former patrons in the Soviet Union disappeared; society was confronted with the death in 

1994 of regime founder Kim Il Sung—revered as a deity by his people—and a 3-year famine killed almost 

a million people. Many experts in academia and the Intelligence Community predicted that North Korea 

would never see the 21st century. Yet today, North Korea not only endures under a third-generation Kim 

family leader, it has become a growing menace to the United States and our allies in the region.

Kim Jong Un has pressed his nation down the path to develop nuclear weapons and combine them with 

ballistic missiles that can reach South Korea, Japan, and the United States. He has implemented a 

rapid, ambitious missile development and fl ight-testing program to refi ne these capabilities and improve 

their reliability. His vision of a North Korea that can directly hold the United States at risk, and thereby 

deter Washington and compel it into policy decisions benefi cial to Pyongyang, is clear and is plainly 

articulated as a goal in authoritative North Korean rhetoric.

Equally dangerous, North Korea continues to maintain one of the world’s largest conventional militaries 

that directly threatens South Korea. The North can launch a high-intensity, short-duration attack on the 

South with thousands of artillery and rocket systems. This option could cause thousands of casualties 

and massive disruption to a regional economic hub. Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on improving military 

training and investment in new weapon systems highlights the overriding priority the regime puts on 

its military capabilities.

In 2018, at the historic fi rst summit between Kim Jong Un and the President of the United States, North 

Korea pledged to work with the United States to accomplish what it described as “the denuclearization 

of the Korean Peninsula”, and committed to other measures to reduce tensions and achieve “a lasting 

and stable peace regime.” In the following years, North Korea tested multiple new missiles that threaten 

South Korea and U.S. forces stationed there, displayed a new potentially more capable ICBM and new 

weapons for its conventional force. Additionally, there continues to be activity at North Korea’s nuclear 

sites. These actions indicate that North Korea will continue to be a challenge for the United States in 

the coming years. This report, is a baseline examination of North Korea and its core military capabilities, 

and is intended to help us better understand the current threat Pyongyang poses to the United States 

and its allies.

From North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un's Remarks at the 8th Workers’ Party

Congress, Released 9 January 2021

“Building the national nuclear force was a strategic and predominant goal. The status of our state 

as a nuclear weapons state...enabled it to bolster its powerful and reliable strategic deterrent for 

coping with any threat by providing a perfect nuclear shield. New, cutting edge weapons systems 

were [also] developed one after another ... making our state’s superiority in military technology 

irreversible and putting its war deterrent and capability of fi ghting war on the highest level.”1

Scott D Berrier

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

Director

Defense Intelligence Agency
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CONTENTS

Introduction and Historical Overview 1

Origins and Combat History of the Korean People's Army (KPA), 1948–1953.

The Post–Korean War KPA, 1953–1991  

Shift to Asymmetric Capabilities, 1991–Present. 

National Military Overview 7

Threat Perceptions 

National Security Strategy  

Political Stability . 

External Relations  

Defense Budget . 

Military Doctrine and Strategy. 

Perceptions of Modern Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Military and Security Leadership.  

National Military Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Nuclear Command and Control.  

Core North Korean Military Capabilities .

Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles . 

Program History and Pathway to Weapon Development.  

Ballistic Missile Force.  

Biological and Chemical Weapons  .

Offensive Conventional Systems . 

National Defense  .

Underground Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Air Defense.  

Coastal Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Electronic Warfare.  
VIII

Space/Counterspace . 

Cyberspace  .

Computer Network Attack and Intimidation.  

Cyber-Enabled Propaganda.  

Intelligence Collection.  

Currency Generation.  

Denial and Deception . 

Logistics and Sustainment . 

Human Capital . 

Outlook: Targeted Investments in Select Military

Capabilities 38

Appendix A: Strategic Force .

Appendix B: Ground Forces 42

Appendix C: Air and Air Defense Forces 45

Appendix D: Navy .

Appendix E: Special Operations Forces 52

Appendix F: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces .

Appendix G: Intelligence Services 57

Appendix H: Defense Industry and the Energy Sector  .

Appendix I: Arms Sales 67

Acronyms 71
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Satellite view of the Korean Peninsula at night, 2020. Visible light emissions from North Korea continue to be extremely sparse, reflecting limited 

availability of electricity to most of the country outside the capital, Pyongyang, and the leadership’s fundamental decision to invest a large portion 

of North Korea’s resources into building military power.

Image Source: NASA
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Introduction/Historical Overview

he evolution of the Korean People’s 

Army (KPA) from a regional military 

to an aspiring nuclear force with intercontinental strike capabilities is the result of 

decades of commitment to two consistent missions given to the military by the Kim family 

regime: preserve the North Korean state’s 

independent existence against any external 

power, and provide the means for North Korea 

to dominate the Korean Peninsula. Over the 

course of its existence, the KPA has seen both 

the decline of some core strengths and the evolution of new capabilities, but it has retained 

these central roles. Although expanded in 

scope, the new capabilities North Korea’s 

military is developing are consistent with its 

founding objectives. They are intended to hold 

the United States at bay while preserving the 

capacity to inflict sufficient damage on the 

South, such that both countries have no choice 

but to respect the North’s sovereignty and 

treat it as an equal.2

North Korea’s military poses two direct, overlapping challenges to the United States and its 

allies: a conventional force consisting mostly 

of artillery and infantry that can attack South 

Korea with little advance warning, and a ballisT

Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first leader. Kim founded the Korean People's Army in 1948 with support and 

equipment from the Soviet Union.

Image Source: AFP
2

tic missile arsenal, intended to be armed with 

nuclear weapons, that is capable of reaching 

bases and cities in South Korea and Japan, and 

the U.S. homeland.3

 Although the conventional 

threat to the South has evolved slowly over 

several decades, the rapid pace of development 

and testing in the nuclear and missile programs 

between 2012 and 2017 has brought this second possibility closer to reality faster than most 

international observers had anticipated. These 

capabilities create growing risk of a military 

flashpoint in Northeast Asia that could quickly 

escalate off the Korean Peninsula, possibly 

across the Pacific Ocean to U.S. soil.

Origins and Combat History 

of the KPA, 1948–1953

The KPA was founded in 1948 as an infantry-centric force established to provide Kim Il Sung—the 

Soviet-backed North Korean leader who rose to 

power after the peninsula was divided in 1945—a 

means to defend his new regime, provide a platform to indoctrinate his people, and allow him to 

achieve dominance over the entire Korean Peninsula. Most of the KPA’s original equipment, support infrastructure, and training was provided 

by the Soviet Union. Kim founded the KPA on a 

mix of Soviet strategic and Chinese tactical influences, deriving doctrine and military thought 

from Marxism-Leninism and interpreting it for a 

Korean audience.4

In 1950, Kim launched a general invasion of 

South Korea with the intention of reunifying 

the peninsula under Pyongyang’s rule. The 

KPA drove South Korean and U.S. forces to 

the southern tip of the peninsula in a matter of 

weeks. Operating under a United Nations Command (UNC) established by Security Council 

Resolution 84, forces and support personnel 

from over a dozen countries reversed the KPA’s 

advance and drove it back to the Yalu River, 

which divides North Korea from China. Chinese forces then intervened on North Korea’s 

behalf, leading to an eventual stalemate at 

the 38th parallel—today’s Demilitarized Zone 

(DMZ). The Korean War remains the only sustained conflict in which the KPA participated 

as a major belligerent. North Korea suffered 

an estimated 1.5 million soldiers and civilians killed in the war and endured devastating damage from aerial bombing and ground 

assault.5

 These losses deeply influenced North 

Korean strategic thinking and military and 

defense planning, resonating into the present 

day. Although hostilities were suspended with 

an Armistice Agreement in 1953, no peace 

treaty was signed, and the peninsula technically remains in a state of war.

U.S. aerial bombing over Wonsan Harbor during 

the Korean War. North Korea suffered massive 

industrial damage in combat with United Nations 

Command forces from 1950 to 1953.

Image Source: Shutterstock
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The Post–Korean War KPA, 

1953–1991

Rebuilding after the Korean War, North Korea 

had shifted its military strategy by the 1960s to 

a Maoist-style war of attrition, hoping to undermine the government in Seoul through covert 

infiltration, assassinations, and attempts to 

foster Communist insurgencies.6,7 During this 

period, Kim embarked on a program to modernize the KPA and posture it to defend in depth 

against any foreign aggressor. In December 

1962, Kim Il Sung espoused the Four Military 

Guidelines: arm the entire population, fortify 

the entire country, train the entire army as a 

"Cadre Force" (meaning all soldiers capable 

of establishing and training military units), 

and modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics 

under the principle of self-reliance in national 

defense.8,9 Early North Korean interest in 

nuclear technology, which dates to the 1950s, 

reached a practical stage during this period; a 

Soviet-supplied research reactor went online 

in 1967, and a domestically-designed reactor 

began operating in 1986.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the North Korean 

regime accelerated and redirected KPA modernization initiatives toward reestablishing 

offensive conventional warfare capabilities. 

In an August 1976 Korean Workers' Party 

journal, an article entitled "Scientific Features of Modern War and Factors of Victory" 

kicked off a rare internal debate on military 

doctrine by stressing the importance of economic development and the impact of new 

weapons on military strategy. The author 

argued that the quality of arms and the level 

of military technology define the characteristics of war. The primacy of conventional 

warfare again became doctrine. This article 

laid down several concepts that continued to 

influence North Korean operational doctrine 

through the 1990s and into the 21st century; 

particularly influential was an emphasis on 

operational and tactical mobility, deep-strike 

capabilities, and use of the subterranean 

domain throughout the depth of the battlefield.10 Although these tenets remain central 

to North Korean military doctrine, the ability of the state to sustain forcewide modernization began to decline in the late 1980s.

Kim Jong Il, right, became leader in 1994 after the 

death of Kim Il Sung, left. The younger Kim set 

North Korea on course to further its nuclear and 

missile programs.

Image Source: AFP
4

Shift to Asymmetric 

Capabilities, 1991–Present

With the loss of direct Soviet and Chinese military-to-military support in the early 1990s, 

the beginning of a major economic decline, 

and the famine in the late 1990s, accompanied by advances in U.S. and South Korean 

military capabilities, North Korea became 

less and less likely to prevail in a conventional war on the peninsula. Under new 

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the KPA 

emphasized asymmetric capabilities, such 

as special operations forces, chemical and 

biological weapons, and long-range artillery 

postured against the predominantly civilian 

population in Seoul, and renewed its emphasis on developing a nuclear strike capability. 

Also during this period, Kim publicized the 

Songun ideology—“Military First” politics —a 

public reaffirmation of the KPA’s centrality to 

the regime. Under this philosophy, the military became one of the dominant institutions 

in North Korean society.11

By the 1990s, North Korea was making strides 

in ballistic missile development. In 1993 the 

North flight-tested a new, Scud-derived medium-range ballistic missile, the No Dong, and 

in 1998 North Korea attempted to launch a 

satellite using a prototype multistage rocket 

that could support the development of longer-range ballistic missiles.12,13 North Korea 

continued to operate a nuclear reactor at 

Yongbyon during this period, fueling concerns 

that Pyongyang could extract plutonium for 

use in nuclear weapons.14 These developments 

spurred international efforts to constrain the 

growth of the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs, first through a bilateral Agreed Framework between North Korea 

and the United States and later through a 

multilateral Six-Party Talks process also 

involving South Korea, Japan, China, and 

Russia. For a time, Kim Jong Il cooperated 

with some of these initiatives, temporarily 

suspending missile testing and nuclear activities and submitting to some degree of international monitoring in exchange for economic 

incentives and security assurances.15

“Military First” Politics

North Korea’s “Military First,” or Songun, philosophy established the military as the most 

important North Korean institution and a means to solve social, economic, and political 

problems.16,17 Although some North Korean accounts date its origins to the 1930s, when Kim 

Il Sung led an anti-Japanese guerrilla movement, Songun was not formally introduced until 

after Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994. Kim Jong Il established the ideology in part because the 

military served as a better power base for him than the Korean Workers' Party did.18 Military First has resulted in a larger role for the KPA in social and economic projects, including large-scale infrastructure development and agriculture.19 Although the ideology persists, 

Kim Jong Un has reinvigorated the status of the Korean Workers' Party during his rule.
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By the mid-2000s, Kim Jong Il had decided 

to put the North on a path to a nuclear 

breakout. His primary motivations were 

apprehension about U.S. military intentions after the 9/11 attacks and major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, a continually worsening military imbalance on the 

peninsula, and failure to obtain anticipated 

energy assistance and other economic concessions from international negotiations. In 

2006, he resumed ballistic missile testing, 

renewed satellite launch attempts using 

larger multistage rockets, and carried out 

North Korea’s first nuclear test.20 Additional ballistic missile flight tests and a 

second nuclear test followed in 2009.21 Since 

then, despite intense international pressure and daunting technological challenges, 

North Korea has unambiguously linked its 

national security strategy, interests, and 

identity to becoming a nuclear power with 

intercontinental reach. These concepts are 

now enshrined in North Korea's law, doctrine, and constitution.22

Kim Jong Un has rapidly accelerated development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles since 

assuming power in 2011.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
6

Kim Jong Il died in 2011. His youngest son, 

Kim Jong Un, succeeded to leadership at age 

27 and accelerated the pace of development of 

both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. 

By mid-2017, the new leader had overseen four 

underground nuclear tests (for a total of six 

since 2006) with higher yields than previous 

tests and had debuted and flight-tested more 

than half a dozen new ballistic missiles of varying ranges, including a submarine-launched 

ballistic missile, two types of mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and the first tested 

North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.23,24,25

Kim Jong Un has also focused his attention 

on the KPA’s conventional capabilities. From 

2011-2017 Kim kept up a steady pace of public engagements with military units to emphasize the KPA’s centrality to the North Korean 

regime, and has directed improvements in the 

realism and complexity of military training. To 

that end, Kim presided over high-profile artillery 

firepower exercises, Air Force pilot competitions, 

and special forces raid training on mock-ups of 

the South Korean presidential residence.26, 27

In April 2018, Kim began prioritizing diplomatic engagement likely in an effort to 

encourage sanctions relief. At the same time, 

North Korea introduced new weapons systems in a September 2018 military parade 

featuring conventional forces.

During the first half of 2019, Kim gradually 

resumed efforts to highlight military capabilities, likely signaling his frustration over the 

lack of progress on diplomatic initiatives. He has 

resumed publicizing military visits and weapons 

launches, and in October 2020 and January 2021 

military parades displayed multiple new missiles, including a larger ICBM.

Since Kim Jong Un took power, North Korea 

has introduced a few new conventional systems and equipment sets across all its military 

services, including new tanks, artillery rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles, most of 

which have been displayed in military parades 

linked to important North Korean holidays 

and observances.28 The extent to which some 

new equipment has been integrated into the 

force is unclear, but these observations suggest 

a continuing KPA emphasis on modernizing 

strike weaponry, improving surveillance and 

reconnaissance capabilities, and broadening 

the regime’s options for raids or other special 

forces operations in South Korea.

The North Korean military, once considered a 

threat that would be confined to the 20th century, has never abandoned its ambition of dominating the peninsula and, if possible, reunifying 

it under Pyongyang’s rule. The KPA currently 

lacks the operational capability to forcibly 

reunify the Korean Peninsula, as attempted in 

1950, but Kim’s forces are developing capabilities that will provide a wider range of asymmetric options to menace and deter his regional 

adversaries, quickly escalate any conflict off the 

peninsula, and severely complicate the environment for military operations in the region.

North Korean soldiers stand atop armored vehicles 

during September 2018 military parade.

Image Source: AFP
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The Korean People’s Army at a Glance

Services: Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, Strategic Force (ballistic missiles)

Personnel: Over 1.3 million (plus approximately 7 million paramilitary, reservists and bodyguard command personnel)

Recruit base: Universal conscription

Equipment profile: Primarily Soviet-era systems; some newer systems in each service

Core strength: Massed artillery threat to South Korea, Special Operations, underground 

facilities, defensive fortifications

Developing strengths: Strategic ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons

Key vulnerabilities: Logistics for sustained combat operations

National Military Overview

North Korean military event in Pyongyang. The North remains one of the world’s most militarized societies.

Image Source: AFP
8

Threat Perceptions

North Korea's perception that the outside world 

is inherently hostile drives the North's security 

strategy and pursuit of specific military developments. This perception is informed by a history 

of invasion and subjugation by stronger powers 

stretching back centuries and, in the 20th century, by the 1910–45 Japanese occupation and 

the externally enforced division of the Korean 

Peninsula at the end of World War II.29 The Kim 

family dynasty has exploited this history to craft 

a totalitarian political culture that is defined by 

resistance to outside powers and that invests 

the Kim family with unique, unquestionable 

authority to protect the Korean people from 

external threats. To respond to this existential 

threat, North Korea’s leaders believe they must 

develop the military capabilities to hold external aggressors at bay and preserve the North’s 

sovereignty and independence. These essential 

themes have been constant across all three Kim 

dynasty leaders, with the North’s capabilities 

evolving over time to meet different manifestations of the perceived threat.

The North views the United States as its primary 

and immediate external security threat. This perception is strongly rooted in the U.S. role during 

the Korean War, the U.S. military presence on the 

peninsula since the armistice, and the leading role 

Washington has played in attempting to modify 

Pyongyang’s behavior and constrain its nuclear 

ambitions. South Korea and Japan are treated 

as extensions of U.S. aggression. The North also 

perceives a strong and longer-term ideological 

threat from South Korea because Seoul’s different 

economic and political systems represent an alternative—and, to Pyongyang, unacceptable—way 

of life for the historically unified Korean people. 

Advances in South Korean and Japanese military 

capabilities over the last two decades have also 

clarified a major and growing gap between the 

North's military power and that of its neighbors.

China and Russia have historically been allies, 

partners, and patrons of the North Korean 

state, but, despite broader diplomatic outreach since 2018, Pyongyang tends to show 

little trust in either country. The North fears 

absorption or preemption by a much more powerful China and probably wants to preserve its 

political independence from Beijing even at the 

risk of alienating Chinese leadership. Pyongyang probably sees Russia as a relatively less 

important partner in the region.

The Kim regime is driven by fears of threats to 

its power from internal sources as well. Kim Il 

Sung endured a period of factionalism before 

consolidating absolute rule over the North in 

the late 1950s; this experience taught him to 

place a priority on eradicating all political, economic, and social influences that might threaten 

his ideological control of the population. Over 

decades, this manifested as a series of overlapping internal security measures and societal 

controls designed to ensure absolute loyalty to 

the leader. Political control over the military 

was particularly critical, and it remains a major 

priority for the Kim Jong Un regime.30

One of the greatest perceived threats to North 

Korea’s ideological control and internal stability is the growing influence of what the regime 

sees as politically corrosive outside information, 

including through foreign media exposure and 
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the importing of entertainment programming 

that depicts daily life in South Korea.31 This 

trend has grown as the regime’s capability to provide basic goods and services to the population 

in the provinces outside Pyongyang has steeply 

declined, driving an increase in market activity 

that has coincided with broader availability of 

cell phones. Since the 2000s, North Korea has 

attempted various military and security efforts 

to monitor and deal with unsanctioned activity 

but has been forced to accept a degree of risk 

posed by the influx of outside media.32

National Security Strategy

North Korea’s national security strategy has 

two main objectives: ensure the Kim regime’s 

long-term security, which the leadership defines 

as North Korea remaining a sovereign, independent country ruled by the Kim family, and 

retaining the capability to exercise dominant 

influence over the Korean Peninsula. Since the 

mid-2000s, the North’s strategy to achieve these 

goals has been to prioritize the development of 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver 

nuclear weapons to increasingly distant ranges 

while maintaining a conventional military capable of inflicting enormous damage on South 

Korea. Kim Jong Un expanded the nuclear and 

missile programs in an effort to develop a survivable nuclear weapon delivery capability that 

the regime could use, in theory, to respond to any 

external attack. Pyongyang’s goal is to maintain 

a credible nuclear capability, which it believes 

will deter any external attack. It also seeks to 

use its nuclear and conventional military capabilities to compel South Korea and the United 

States into policy decisions that are beneficial to 

North Korea. As part of his strategy, Kim Jong 

Un has publicly emphasized the ability of North 

Korean nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to strike 

the United States and regional U.S. allies in an 

attempt to intimidate international audiences.

Kim Jong Un takes personal interest in developing 

KPA capabilities and is often portrayed in state media 

directing exercises and observing training.

Image Source: AFP/KCNA VIA KNS

From North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un's Remarks at 5th Party Plenary 

Session, Released 1 January 2020 

“This is a great victory... strategic weapon systems planned by the party are coming into our 

grasp one by one... Such leaps in cutting-edge national defense science make our military and 

technological advantage irreversible, accelerate the increase of our national strengths to the maximum, heighten our ability to control surrounding political situations, and give our enemies an 

immense and overwhelming strike of anxiety and fear.”33
10

The North also has traditionally used periodic, 

limited-scope military actions to pressure South 

Korea and to underscore the fragility of the armistice, which it seeks to replace with a peace treaty 

on its terms. During the 1960s and 1970s, these 

actions took the form of aggressive skirmishes 

along the DMZ and overt attempts to assassinate South Korean leaders, including the South 

Korean president, with special forces raids and 

terrorist tactics.34 In recent years the North has 

confined aggression against the South to targeted 

engagements in the disputed Northwest Islands 

area. Confrontations between patrol craft and 

other incidents along the Northern Limit Line 

have claimed more than 50 South Korean lives 

since 1999.35 In 2010, North Korea attacked and 

sank a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors, and bombarded a South Korean 

Marine Corps installation on Yeonpyeong Island, 

resulting in 2 military and 2 civilian deaths.36,37

No comparable attack on the South has yet 

occurred under Kim Jong Un’s rule, but North 

Korea’s willingness to strike South Korea with 

lethal force endures. In August 2015 a landmine detonated in the DMZ and wounded two 

South Korean soldiers, kicking off a monthlong 

Targeting U.S. Forces

Historically, North Korea used military action against both South Korean and U.S. targets 

after the 1953 Armistice Agreement halted the Korean War. Pyongyang targeted U.S. forces 

in several high-profile incidents, including the seizure of the USS Pueblo in international 

waters in 1968 and the shootdown of a U.S. reconnaissance plane in international airspace 

in 1969. Pyongyang has largely avoided the deliberate targeting of U.S. personnel since the 

late 1970s and has concentrated its limited-objective attacks on South Korean personnel, 

except in a 1994 incident when a U.S. Army helicopter was shot down, killing one crewmember, after it accidentally strayed into North Korean airspace.

South Korean corvette Cheonan, which was sunk 

by a North Korean torpedo in March 2010, pictured 

here on a salvage barge.

Image Source: AFP
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confrontation with the South that ultimately led 

to artillery fire along the border. Escalation to a 

wider conflict was possible although averted in 

this instance.38

Political Stability

Kim Jong Un views political stability as essential 

to safeguarding his rule, a perception inherited 

from his father and grandfather. No North Korean 

leader has tolerated the emergence of a competing 

political system or a lack of loyalty among regime 

elites. To maintain stability and control, the state 

retains a pervasive internal security apparatus 

consisting of multiple agencies and departments 

with overlapping areas of responsibility and 

broad powers to monitor all North Korean citizens 

for criminal and subversive behavior. North Koreans are also encouraged to report on one another 

at the local level through a “neighborhood watch” 

system called inminban. Citizens found to have 

transgressed can be interned in a massive system 

of state-run prison camps, where they are subjected to abusive conditions.39

Kim has used purges and executions to eliminate 

perceived threats to his authority and compel loyalty from subordinates. His perception of a threat 

may be driven in part by sensitivity to questions 

about whether the young Kim was capable of 

taking full leadership of North Korea after his 

father’s death, and it also seems intended to 

invoke memories of Kim Il Sung, whose image 

and methods Kim Jong Un has sought to emulate. Most prominently, Kim publicly removed 

his uncle, Chang Song-taek, from the position of 

vice chairman of the National Defense Commission in December 2013 and had him executed for 

alleged crimes against the state.40 In the military, 

Kim has repeatedly reshuffled personnel in key 

defense positions and demoted senior officers in 

rank. The result is a system that appears largely 

stable from the outside, with elites motivated by 

fear and co-opted with privilege to preserve the 

Kim regime.41

Despite renewed emphasis on ideological indoctrination and strengthened border controls, 

North Koreans continue to defect abroad. Most 

escape into China and, if they are able to elude 

authorities and find work, eventually make their 

way to South Korea by way of Southeast Asia.42

In 2020, 229 North Korean defectors arrived in 

South Korea, a notable drop from 1,047 in 2019, 

which is probably because North Korea closed its 

borders to prevent COVID-19 transmission. The 

defection rate has declined from a high of 2,914 

people in 2009, probably owing to strengthened 

security along the North Korea-China border.43

A small number of higher-profile North Koreans 

defect—notably, in 2016, including the deputy 

chief of mission to the embassy in London—but 

In 2010, North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong Island 

along the northwestern maritime border with South 

Korea, the first kinetic strike on South Korean–occupied territory in decades.

Image Source: AFP
12

this trend does not yet seem to have broadened to 

the point where Kim considers it a major threat.44

External Relations

North Korea’s external relationships do not appear 

to significantly contribute to its defense establishment or boost military readiness. International 

sanctions against North Korea contribute to potential partners’ lack of interest in expanding ties.

In the first years of his rule, Kim Jong Un made 

few efforts to engage foreign counterparts. However, starting in 2018 he began an international 

outreach effort, travelling abroad for the first 

time as leader of North Korea to meet the leaders of China, South Korea, the United States, 

and Russia. He likely believes these efforts are 

necessary to obtain sanctions relief.

Pyongyang’s only formal defense agreement is 

with China: the 1961 Sino–North Korean Treaty of 

Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. 

This agreement obliges each signatory to render 

military assistance in defense of the other if one is 

attacked,45 but direct military-to-military engagement between Pyongyang and Beijing has been 

suspended for years. Diplomatic relations between 

both countries worsened after North Korea’s 

nuclear and missile tests accelerated. In 2017, 

China instituted new import restrictions intended 

to affect the North Korean economy and continued to call for North Korea to cease its nuclear 

and ballistic missile test activities. Kim Jong Un 

visited China and met with President Xi Jinping 

in March, May, and June of 2018, and in January 

2019, indicating a desire to nurture relations. Xi 

made his first visit to North Korea in June 2019.46

Russia, which provided substantial military 

assistance and equipment to North Korea during 

the Soviet era, has largely curtailed its defense 

relationship with North Korea. Since UNSC 

sanctions in August 2017, however, some economic and diplomatic engagement with Russia 

has taken place. In October 2017, a state-owned 

Russian company began to provide a second internet connection to North Korea, reducing Pyongyang’s dependence on China.47 Kim Jong Un met 

with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the 

first time in April 2019 as part of Kim’s effort to 

diversify diplomatic and economic ties and further reduce economic dependence on China. The 

two discussed diplomatic and commercial opportunities, although no official agreements were 

announced.48 Thus far, these overtures have 

led to minimal improvements in relations given 

North Korea’s perception of Russia’s pressure to 

denuclearize and failure to provide significant 

economic and military concessions.

North Korea views Japan and South Korea as 

adversaries but maintains lines of communication with both countries. North Korea met 

with a Japanese delegation in 2016 to discuss 

Kim Jong Un meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping 

in Beijing on 8 January 2019.

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS
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an ongoing dispute over the disposition of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea during 

the late 1970s and early 1980s. The North and 

South held two summits in 2018, and have intermittently held high-level talks at Panmunjom 

in the DMZ to tamp down tensions in inter-Korean relations. In September 2018, the Koreas 

signed the Comprehensive Military Agreement, 

which calls on both sides to take measures to 

prevent accidental military clashes. After an 

initial push to carry out the agreement, progress stalled and in June 2020 North Korea 

demolished a liaison offi ce and threatened to 

reverse military actions taken thus far.49,50,51

Defense Budget

Although the regime does not publish exact economic fi gures, estimates are based on trends 

in observed economic activity. As such, North 

Korea’s economy shrank by about 4 percent 

in 2018 because of UNSC sanctions. In 2019, 

North Korea’s economy grew slightly, but likely 

contracted in 2020 because of trade disruptions 

due to the COVID-19 pandemic.52 Coal, other 

minerals, and clothing account for almost 70 

percent of Pyongyang’s nonmilitary foreign 

trade, according to the International Trade Centre, but are currently banned as North Korean 

exports by UNSC sanctions imposed in 2017.53

Defense spending is a regime priority. Spending 

estimates range from $7 billion to $11 billion; 

20–30 percent of North Korea’s GDP is allocated 

to the military.54 This level of commitment makes 

North Korea the highest spending nation in the 

world for defense as a percentage of GDP. Pyongyang has probably increased defense spending 

during the past decade and likely will continue 

devoting a large portion of its GDP to national 

defense through at least 2021.55 A detailed 

breakdown of North Korean military spending 

by categories such as personnel, procurement, 

or operations and maintenance is unavailable. 

Pyongyang has mustered suffi cient funds, most 

likely by shifting priorities, to fi nance foreign 

procurement and domestic development and production for testing missile systems and nuclear 

weapons. Nonmonetary resources, including raw 

materials and electrical power, are also prioritized for use in military projects.56

National Defense Burden Comparison, 2020 Global Baseline 1707-13888

<1% <1-1.9% 2-9.9% 10-19.9% 20-30%

NORTH

KOREA

Percentage of GDP Spent on Defense # Number of Countries

63 61 62

2 1
14

Military Doctrine and Strategy

Perceptions of Modern Conflict

North Korea understands that the character of 

war has changed since its last sustained combat experience in 1953 and sees its military as 

largely unprepared to engage in modern warfare. Pyongyang probably assesses its force as 

a whole cannot prevail in combat against the 

United States, given U.S. forces’ overwhelming advantages in power projection, strategic 

air superiority, and precision-guided standoff strike capability. This perception has been 

informed by North Korea’s monitoring of U.S. 

operations in the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 

Kosovo air campaign, campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and U.S.-led air operations in 

Libya in 2011 and Syria since 2014. The North 

also is a keen observer of South Korean military 

capabilities and probably judges it is at a qualitative disadvantage against its neighbor.57,58,59

North Korean defense planning, therefore, has 

adapted to deter direct U.S. military intervention by signaling that the cost of such intervention would be unacceptably high to the United 

States even if North Korea ultimately lost the 

engagement. In the last few years, this effort 

to shape adversary deterrence calculations has 

centered on developing and publicizing a survivable nuclear-armed ballistic missile force. 

Should deterrence fail, North Korea would 

seek to maximize its defensive advantages—

including inhospitable terrain, widespread 

use of underground facilities, and a population 

conditioned from birth to resist foreign invaders—to raise the cost of taking and holding 

North Korean territory.

Some investments in specific North Korean 

military capabilities are intended to improve 

the odds of North Korean success in a modern conflict. However, these efforts are generally isolated to a few areas and would not, in 

Pyongyang’s estimation, confer overwhelming 

advantage on the KPA in a modern conflict 

against the United States and South Korea.

Military and Security Leadership

Kim Jong Un is the supreme commander of 

the KPA, in addition to his position as head of 

all governmental, political, and security institutions in the country. He holds the rank of 

marshal in the KPA and was appointed a fourstar general before his succession, although 

he is not known to have any actual military 

experience. In North Korea’s unitary leadership structure, Kim is the ultimate authority 

for all defense and national security decisions, 

including operational planning and execution, procurement and acquisition, and strategy and doctrine. As the first secretary of the 

Korean Workers' Party, he establishes policy 

and guidance for North Korea’s military and 

implements party policy through key national-level organizations.60,61 As the party's Central Military Commission chairman and the 

State Affairs Commission chairman, Kim controls all military and defense-related policy, 

with broad authority to consolidate political, 

military, and state powers during both wartime and peacetime.62
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Kim Jong Un at a military parade, April 2017. Kim has directed improvements to each KPA service’s capabilities.

Image Source: AFP/KCNA VIA KNS

Kim Jong Un's Leadership Priorities

Born in 1983, Kim Jong Un was the youngest of Kim Jong Il’s three sons. Kim Jong Il formally 

introduced Kim Jong Un as his successor in 2009, bypassing his older sons, Kim Jong Nam and 

Kim Jong Chol. Little is known about Kim’s life before his succession to leadership in 2011.

Kim’s priorities as leader of North Korea have been to solidify the state's nuclear capability and 

make rapid strides toward achieving a ballistic missile arsenal capable of threatening the United 

States while attempting to modernize the economy – a “dual line” policy called Byungjin in the 

North. Although economic development is a priority, Kim is willing to endure financial losses in 

order to advance other goals; North Korean nuclear and missile tests continue to result in UN 

sanctions, and, in 2016, a rocket launch prompted South Korea to close the Kaesong Industrial 

Complex, which provided the regime about $100 million a year through cash remittances.

In relations with the United States, Kim initially responded to Washington’s demands that he 

abandon his nuclear aspirations by accelerating the program’s development and by issuing specific threats to attack the United States. In 2018, Kim demonstrated a willingness to participate 

in talks on denuclearization. However, since 2019 he has demonstrated his intent to continue bolstering North Korea’s military deterrent by developing and testing new missiles and developing 

new military equipment for the conventional force.
16

Through the General Political Bureau, North 

Korea maintains a separate political command 

and control apparatus to ensure military loyalty to the Kim regime and implementation of 

party guidance. The bureau leads all political 

and ideological training, monitors morale and 

personal lives, guides servicemen’s political 

lives, and disseminates propaganda for the 

military in order to maintain military loyalty 

to the regime. The director of the General Political Bureau usually serves as a key adviser to 

Kim Jong Un. Vice Marshall Kwon Yong-chin 

was appointed head of the General Political 

Bureau in January 2021.63,64,65

Operational control of North Korea’s armed 

forces resides in the General Staff Department, 

which reports directly to Kim Jong Un.66 The 

department as a whole aggregates and operationally commands all military service headquarters, functional and combat commands, 

and military communications, and it evaluates 

the overall training and readiness of the North 

Korean military. Vice Marshal Pak Chong-chon 

was appointed as the General Staff Department 

head in September 2019, and is one of Kim’s 

principal military advisers.67

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is 

responsible for administrative control of the 

military and external relations with foreign 

militaries. MND manages the manpower and 

resource needs of North Korea’s conventional 

armed forces and special operations forces. 

In the past MND-controlled companies were 

involved in earning foreign currency through 

exports and domestic distribution, though this 

activity has probably been reduced by international sanctions.68 As of July 2021, Colonel General Kim Chong-kwan has been removed from 

his position as MND chief and his replacement 

was not announced. The MND minister is positioned primarily to manage defense acquisitions, resourcing and fi nancing allocations for 

all North Korean armed forces.69

General Staff Department Chief Vice Marshal Pak 

Chong-chon with Kim Jong Un.

Image Source: Rodong Sinmun

Vice Marshall Kwon Yong-chin, General Political Bureau .

Image Source: Uriminjokkkiri
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National Military Command 

and Control

As the KPA supreme commander and central 

decisionmaker in North Korea, Kim Jong Un 

is the linchpin of KPA command and control. 

Kim exercises command and control over all 

corps-level military organizations, including ground, air, naval, and ballistic missile 

forces.70 The General Staff Department maintains overall control of all North Korean military forces and is charged with turning the 

supreme commander’s directives into operational military orders.71

North Korean Military Command and Control 1707-13888

Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un operates as the absolute decisionmaker of North Korea’s armed 

forces. The Supreme Command would disseminate any order from Kim to North Korea’s armed 

forces, including its ballistic missile corps, the Strategic Force. As the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman and the State Affairs Commission (SAC) chairman, Kim 

controls all military and defense-related policy.

Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un

Korean Workers’ Party

Central Military Commission

Ministry of National Defense

Supreme Command

General Staff Department

State Affairs Commission

Ground Forces Air Force Navy Strategic Force

Wartime Procedure

Peacetime Consultation
18

During wartime, Kim Jong Un would exercise 

overall control of preparations, mobilization, and 

operations. The Supreme Command functions as 

both the highest ranking advisory board to Kim 

on all state and military affairs and as the organization charged with converting the supreme commander’s strategies into actual wartime directives. The Supreme Command would comprise 

senior officers from the General Staff Department, Ministry of National Defense, and other 

key national-level organizations.72

Nuclear Command and Control

Kim Jong Un has established through public 

policy statements and legislation that he is the 

sole release authority for North Korean nuclear 

weapons use against any adversary. In 2013, 

North Korea revised its national constitution 

and passed a law on nuclear use, which stated 

that nuclear weapons could not be used without an express order from the supreme commander.73 Kim has personally authorized North 

Korea's nuclear tests, most recently in September 2017. North Korean state-sponsored media 

published the order with his signature after 

the test occurred.74 Other North Korean public 

media releases have emphasized Kim’s singular 

role in authorizing missile force alerts and the 

signing of a “firepower strike plan,” ostensibly 

for nuclear attack on the United States.75

Kim Jong Un exercises personal command and control over North Korea’s nuclear, ballistic missile, and conventional military forces. In this 2013 image released by North Korean state media, a map of notional missile strikes 

on the United States is the backdrop to Kim signing a “firepower strike plan.”

Image Source: AFP
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Core North Korean Military Capabilities

Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles

orth Korea has aspired to become a 

nuclear weapons power for decades. 

Although the nuclear program’s foundation dates to the 1950s, Pyongyang started 

making its most significant progress toward 

developing a nuclear weapons capability after 

withdrawing from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2002, citing increasing alarm over U.S. military activities abroad 

and dissatisfaction with the pace at which international economic aid, promised in past nuclear 

negotiations, was arriving. The North began 

testing nuclear devices underground in 2006. 

North Korea discloses very few details about its 

nuclear weapons inventory and force structure.

Program History and Pathway to 

Weapon Development

North Korean nuclear research began in the 

late 1950s through cooperation agreements 

with the Soviet Union. The North’s first 

research reactor began operating in 1967, 

and Pyongyang later built a nuclear reactor 

at Yongbyon with an electrical power rating 

of 5 megawatts electrical (MWe). This reactor 

began operating in 1986 and was capable of 

producing about 6 kilograms of plutonium per 

year. Later that year, high-explosives testing 

and a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium 

from the reactor’s spent fuel were detected. 

Construction of additional reactors—a 50-MWe 

reactor at Yongbyon and a 200-MWe reactor at 

Taechon—provided additional indications of a 

larger-scale nuclear program.76

North Korea joined the Nonproliferation 

Treaty in 1985, but inspections only started 

7 years later under the treaty's safeguards 

regime, inviting questions about the North’s 

N

Reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex. 

North Korea has acknowledged both plutonium 

reprocessing and uranium enrichment activities at 

this installation. Activities at Yongbyon sites continue.

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons
20

North Korean Nuclear and Rocket Launch Facilities 1707-13887

North Korea’s launch installations have supported 

ground test and launches of multi-stage rockets, 

nominally for putting satellites in orbit. These activities provided a test bed for long-range ballistic 

missile technology, and support the development

of ICBMs now in the North Korean inventory. Recent 

activities at the Pyongsan Uranium Concentration 

Plant have also been reported.77
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plutonium production. In 1994, North Korea 

pledged to freeze and eventually dismantle its 

plutonium programs under the Agreed Framework with the United States. At that time, a 

number of sources estimated that Pyongyang 

had separated enough plutonium for one or two 

nuclear weapons. North Korea allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency to place seals 

on spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor and to 

undertake remote monitoring and onsite inspections at its nuclear facilities.78

In 2002, negotiators from the United States confronted North Korea with evidence of a clandestine uranium enrichment program, a claim that 

North Korean officials publicly denied. Disagreement over the North’s establishment of a uranium 

enrichment program led to the breakdown of the 

Agreed Framework. The United States reached 

agreement with members of the Korean Economic 

Development Organization and stopped shipment 

of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, whose response 

was removing the international monitors and 

seals at the Yongbyon facility and restarting its 

plutonium production infrastructure.79

North Korea has demonstrated the capability 

to produce kilogram quantities of plutonium for 

nuclear weapons and has claimed to possess the 

ability to produce enriched uranium for nuclear 

weapons. The North disclosed a uranium enrichment plant to an unofficial U.S. delegation in 

late 2010 and claimed it was intended to produce 

enriched uranium to fuel a light-water reactor.80

The North began underground nuclear testing in 

2006 and used early tests to both validate device 

designs and to send a political signal that it was 

advancing its nuclear capability. By September 

2017 North Korea had conducted six nuclear 

tests: one each in 2006, 2009, and 2013; two in 

2016; and one in September 2017, according to 

seismic detections and public claims by North 

Korean media.81,82 Successive tests have demonstrated generally higher explosive yields, according to seismic data.83 The September 2017 test 

generated a much larger seismic signature than 

had previous events, and North Korea claimed 

this was a test of a “hydrogen bomb” intended 

for use on an intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM).84 North Korea has exclusively used the 

underground nuclear test facility in the vicinity 

of Punggye for its nuclear tests. In May 2018, 

North Korea disabled some parts of the Punggye 

test site, announcing that it no longer needed 

to conduct nuclear tests. However, Pyongyang 

retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons minimizing the impact of this development.

Kim Jong Un examines a mock nuclear warhead displayed in front of a ballistic missile.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
22

Ballistic Missile Force

North Korea established a Strategic Force (previously known as the Strategic Rocket Forces) 

in 2012 and has described this organization 

as a nuclear-armed ballistic missile force. The 

Strategic Force includes units operating shortrange (SRBM), medium-range (MRBM), intermediate-range (IRBM) ballistic missiles, and 

ICBMs, each of which North Korea has stated 

represents a nuclear-capable system class. In 

2016, the North claimed a Scud class SRBM 

launch had tested nuclear weapon components 

in a mock attack against a South Korean port.85

Pyongyang has occasionally hinted at the 

possibility of other nuclear-capable units, for 

instance, by marching infantry troops carrying 

backpacks emblazoned with the nuclear symbol in a 2013 military parade.86

The North’s ballistic missile force is structured 

around multiple regional and intercontinental 

target sets. The Strategic Force operates Scud 

class missiles that can range South Korea, some 

extended-range variants of the Scud that can 

reach Japan, and the No Dong MRBM, which 

can reach Japan. This force also is responsible for 

the Hwasong-12 IRBM, which was designed to 

range Guam; and the Hwasong-14 ICBM, capable of reaching the continental United States. 87

North Korea revealed its first road mobile 

ICBM in a 2012 military parade. In 2015, it 

began flight-testing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Pukguksong-1. Subsequently, the North conducted an initial flight 

of a new solid-propellant MRBM, the Pukguksong-2 and a new IRBM, the Hwasong-12, which 

appears to be a replacement for the Musudan 

IRBM. North Korea conducted multiple flight 

tests of the Hwasong-12, including flight tests 

in August and September 2017 over northern 

Japan, ultimately reaching a range of approximately 3,700 kilometers, its longest-range direct 

trajectory ballistic missile flight tests to date.88,89

North Korea conducted an inaugural launch 

of its ICBM class system, the Hwasong-14 on 

4 July 2017 and again on 28 July 2017. It then 

launched a second type of ICBM, the larger 

Hwasong-15 on 28 November 2017.90

Hwasong-14 ICBM on a road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher prior to launch, July 2017.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

Hwasong-15 ICBM on its mobile launcher, November 2017.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
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North Korea conducted this second Hwasong-14 ICBM 

flight test on 28 July 2017.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

A TD-2/Unha-3 space launch vehicle preparing for 

launch, April 2012. Satellite launches contribute valuable data to the ballistic missile program.

Image Source: AFP

During an April 2017 parade, North Korea 

showcased a modified ICBM launcher with 

a launch canister, as well as a new mobileerector-launcher with a launch canister. 

Road-mobile launch canisters are typically 

associated with solid-propellant missiles. 

Actual missiles for the launch canisters were 

not displayed. The North also paraded a 

new Scud variant with a modified warhead, 

probably a maneuverable reentry vehicle.91

North Korea’s February 2018 military parade 

included one new short-range ballistic missile, which was arrayed in pairs on four-axle 

trucks. North Korea began testing a version 

of this solid-propellant missile in May 2019.92 

Between 2019-2021, North Korea launched a 

total of four new types of SRBMs.

North Korea also possesses space launch vehicles (SLV) which could reach the continental 

United States if configured as ICBMs. 93 These 

systems use ballistic missile technology, and 
24

Ballistic Missile Inventory96 1707-13888

Systems Number of 

Launchers Propellant Deployment Mode

Maximum 

Range (km)

SCUD B/C (SRBM) Fewer than 100 Liquid Road-Mobile 300–500

SCUD ER (SRBM) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile 1,000

Unnamed SRBM variants 

(Launched 2019) Undetermined Solid Road-Mobile 380–600+

No Dong (MRBM) Fewer than 100 Liquid Road-Mobile 1,200+

Hwasong-10 

(Musudan IRBM) Fewer than 50 Liquid Road-Mobile 3,000+

Hwasong-12 (IRBM) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile 4,500

Pukguksong-1 (SLBM) At least 1 

submarine Solid Submarine 1,000+

Pukguksong-3 (SLBM) Undetermined Solid Submarine 1,000+

Pukguksong-4 (SLBM) Undetermined Solid Submarine Unknown

Pukguksong-5 (SLBM) Undetermined Solid Submarine Unknown

Pukguksong-2 (MRBM) Undetermined Solid Road-Mobile 1,000

Hwasong-14 (ICBM) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile 10,000+

Hwasong-15 (ICBM) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile 12,000+

Unnamed ICBM 

(Paraded 2015) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile Intercontinental

Unnamed Larger ICBM 

(Paraded In 2020) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile Intercontinental

- Hwasong and Pukguksong designators are based on published North Korean names.

- All ranges are approximate.

space launches provide North Korea with valuable data applicable to the development of longrange, multi-stage ballistic missiles.94 North 

Korea’s Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2), called Unha-3 in 

the North, has been under development since at 

least the early 2000s. Its first flight test attempt, 

in 2006, failed; subsequent launches in 2009 and 

April 2012 also failed. In December 2012 and 

February 2016, the North successfully launched 

an object into low Earth orbit with the TD-2.95

The 4 July 2017 Hwasong-14 launch was North 

Korea’s first ICBM flight test. The Hwasong-14 

was launched almost straight up to an unusu-
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ally high altitude of approximately 2,800 kilometers above the Earth before impacting into 

the Sea of Japan.97 On 28 July, North Korea 

tested the Hwasong-14 to an even higher loft 

than achieved on 4 July. The lofted-launch 

technique enables the North to model how 

far the missile could travel without overfl ying 

another country and without a full-range fl ight 

test. In its tested confi guration the Hwasong-14 

ICBM is capable of reaching North America if 

fl own on a direct trajectory based on the vertical distance traveled by the missiles during 

the July 2017 fl ight tests.98 North Korea fl ight 

tested another new ICBM – identifi ed as the 

Hwasong-15 - in a lofted trajectory at an apogee of 4,475 kilometers on 28 November 2017. 

These ICBM fl ight tests mark signifi cant milestones in North Korea’s ballistic missile development process—the fi rst fl ight tests of missiles which can reach the United States.99,100

North Korea's ICBM Flight-test Trajectories, 2017 1707-13887

By testing ICBMs to 

extremely high altitudes, 

North Korea can assess 

how they would perform 

at long distances while 

keeping impact areas 

within the region.
26

Nuclear Deterrence Strategy and Use Doctrine

The steady development of road-mobile ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs highlights Pyongyang’s 

intention to build a survivable, reliable nuclear delivery capability.101 This developing capability has been accompanied by high-level statements, the fi rst of which was issued in 2013, 

in which North Korea stated it would use nuclear weapons to respond to an invasion and 

may use them to prevent an attack. Together, these developments suggest the potential 

for nuclear weapons to be used at any stage of confl ict when the North believes itself in 

regime-ending danger.102,103,104 The point at which North Korean leadership would perceive 

this threat is unclear, as are specifi c regime plans for nuclear use.

North Korea Missile Launches and Nuclear Tests105

1707-13888

Accounts for full flight tests only. Does not include partial tests of missile subsystems, such as static engine firings or 

cold-launch ejection tests, tests of air defense systems, close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range rockets, 

or artillery firings. Updated as of September 2021.

MRBM

(1,000–3,000 km)

SLBM

(1,000–3,000 km)

ICBM

(5,500+ km)

SRBM

(300–1,000 km)

Space Launch

Cruise Missile

Nuclear Test Unknown Missile

IRBM

(3,000–5,500 km)

0

1984

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1998

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

5

10

15

Number of Events

20

25

2019

2020

2021

KIM Il SUNG KIM JONG IL KIM JONG UN

1984-1994 1994-2011 2011-present
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Ranges 1707-13887
28

Biological and 

Chemical Weapons

North Korea has a longstanding biological 

warfare (BW) capability; additionally its biotechnology infrastructure could be redirected 

to support a BW program.106 The North is a 

signatory to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) but has yet to declare 

any relevant developments and has failed to 

provide a BWC confidence-building measure 

declaration since 1990.107,108,109 Pyongyang may 

consider the use of biological weapons during 

wartime or as a clandestine attack option.

North Korea has a chemical warfare (CW) program that could comprise up to several thousand metric tons of chemical warfare agents, 

and the capability to produce nerve, blister, 

blood, and choking agents.110 North Korea is 

not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. North Korea probably could employ 

CW agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles, along with unconventional, 

targeted methods. For example, North Korea 

was responsible for the assassination of Kim 

Jong Un’s half-brother in Malaysia using the 

nerve agent VX.111 An Indonesian woman and 

a Vietnamese woman were tried for the murder; four North Koreans were charged but 

fled the country before arrest.

Offensive 

Conventional Systems

North Korea’s conventional military consists of 

the ground, air, naval, and special operations 

forces. Each is limited to operations on or around 

the Korean Peninsula and poses a direct threat 

to South Korea and to U.S. forces based in South 

Korea. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy can 

operate at long distances off-peninsula or project 

power outside the region. North Korea’s conventional strike capability is concentrated primarily 

in massed fire from KPA artillery forces, Special 

Operations Forces (SOF), and, less effective, 

fixed-wing attack by fighters and bombers.

KPA Ground Forces operate thousands of longrange artillery and rocket systems along the 

entire length of the DMZ. These weapons include 

close-range mortars, guns, and multiple rocket 

launcher systems (MRLs) trained on South 

Korean military forces deployed north of Seoul, 

and longer-range self-propelled guns, rockets, 

and CRBMs that can reach Seoul and some points 

Long-range artillery guns in mass firing position for 

training exercise.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
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North Korean Artillery and Rocket Threat to South Korea 1707-13887
30

south of the capital. Collectively, this capability 

holds South Korean citizens and a large number 

of U.S. and South Korean military installations 

at risk.112 The North could use this capability to 

inflict severe damage and heavy casualties on the 

South with little warning.

North Korean SOF are designed for rapid offensive operations, infiltration, and limited attack 

against vulnerable targets in South Korea. 

Operating in specialized units, SOF personnel are among the most highly trained, wellequipped, best-fed, and highly motivated forces 

in the KPA. Recently, North Korea has emphasized SOF unit training with particular focus on 

improving their capability to raid key government installations in the South.

The North Korean Air Force can fly strike missions against targets in South Korea with fighters and bombers; its most capable platforms are 

the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter and the MiG-23 

Flogger fighter, although these would have considerable difficulty overcoming South Korea’s 

more modern air forces and air defenses. Several North Korean unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAVs) have been sighted over South Korea 

since 2014; models that crashed and were examined by the South Korean government had been 

configured for surveillance and reconnaissance, 

but the North could arm future UAVs.113

National Defense

Defending the North Korean homeland against 

external attack is a foundational KPA mission, 

constituting a major share of effort for KPA 

ground, air and air defense, and naval units. 

The criticality of homeland defense as a KPA 

mission was demonstrated during the Korean 

War. Although North Korea enjoys considerable geographic advantages for defense—

including mountainous terrain, coastal mudflats, and long seasons of poor weather—aerial 

bombardment by the United States and other 

nations in the UN Command force devastated 

all of North Korea’s major cities and urban 

areas during the Korean War. The North 

responded by constructing dense fortifications 

and multilayered air and coastal defense systems, embracing new electronic warfare technologies as they became available in order to 

foil U.S. precision-guided weapon systems, and 

burying most of its key military command and 

control nodes and critical equipment in deep, 

hardened underground facilities (UGFs).

Underground Facilities

North Korea’s UGF program is the largest and 

most fortified in the world, estimated to consist 

of thousands of UGFs and bunkers designed 

to withstand U.S. bunker-buster bombs.114,115

The UGF program’s primary function is to 

protect and conceal regime leaders, weapons 

of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, warfighting stores, and elements of military forces 

and defense industries. In 1963, Kim Il Sung 

publicly announced, “The entire nation must 

be made into a fortress. We must dig into the 

ground to protect ourselves.”116 The size and 

sophistication of these facilities range from 

small tunnels, only large enough to accom-
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modate personnel or a few vehicles, to large, 

complex UGFs for command and control, missiles, and other strategic assets. North Korea 

maintains a road network under Pyongyang to 

protect and conceal Kim Jong Un and senior 

leaders during a crisis, which improves conditions for sustainment of the regime and may 

embolden Kim to take more belligerent action 

if he perceives he is safe from counterattack.117

North Korea has adapted the use of deception 

in its defenses after observing U.S. conflicts in 

the Vietnam War, Kosovo, and both Iraq Wars. 

North Korea could use UGFs and mountainous 

topography to fortify its military installations 

and for concealment and defense during a conflict, probably hoping to strain U.S. resources 

and raise the cost of combat operations on 

the peninsula. North Korea will continue to 

improve and construct hardened bunkers and 

underground facilities to protect its forces.118

Air Defense

North Korea maintains a dense network of integrated air defense systems (IADS), providing 

overlapping, redundant coverage of Pyongyang, 

the DMZ, both coasts, and its strategic infrastructure. North Korean air defenses comprise 

primarily fixed, but transportable strategic surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, some mobile tactical SAM systems, antiaircraft artillery (AAA) 

positions, and man-portable air defense systems 

(MANPADS). North Korea’s IADS make good 

use of camouflage, concealment, and deception 

procedures and underground facilities to protect against attack. North Korea occasionally 

conducts field deployment training of air and 

air defense assets to improve wartime survivability. North Korean fighter aircraft are also 

capable of basic air defense operations.

North Korean airspace is divided into four air 

divisions, and each air division headquarters is 

responsible for the defense of its assigned region.119

Although Air Force Headquarters remains the 

final authority on engaging hostile forces, during 

wartime the various air defense divisions probably 

will operate autonomously within their assigned 

regions. North Korea has a large number of aging 

early warning and intercept radars that provide 

basic detection of large aircraft at long distances 

to support the defense of its airspace.

Entryway to a South Korean tunnel dug to interdict a secret North Korean infiltration tunnel under 

the DMZ. In addition to constructing sophisticated 

underground facilities for military use, North Korea 

may have built more than twenty infiltration tunnels 

for surreptitious KPA entry into South Korea, four of 

which were discovered between 1974 and 1990.

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons
32

Coastal Defense

North Korean coastal defense is maintained by 

the North Korean Navy, which operates radars, 

defense artillery and missile sites, and command 

and control nodes complemented by smaller 

patrol craft, mines, and attack, coastal, and 

midget-type submarines; and Air Force-operated aircraft. Defense radars and underground 

facilities on both coasts support coastal defense 

artillery and coastal defense cruise missile sites.

The Navy is divided into East and West Coast 

Fleets, each operating a variety of patrol craft, 

torpedo boats, and guided-missile patrol vessels 

that carry a variety of antiship cruise missiles, 

torpedoes, and guns. North Korean Navy patrol 

craft mostly operate in immediate coastal waters.

The North Koreans have a credible minelaying capability. Numerous small surface ships 

are capable of delivering mines to impede military and civilian shipping. Mines would be 

used to defend against amphibious assaults, 

provide seaward flank protection for land 

forces, and defend strategic ports. Defensive 

mines would be monitored by coastal observation teams and radar, and they would be 

supported by well-emplaced artillery and missile batteries, making approaching and mine 

clearing operations extremely hazardous.

Electronic Warfare

North Korea views electronic warfare as an 

essential tool in countering the threat posed by 

advanced Western weapon systems and precision-guided munitions, and critical to denying 

and disrupting enemy command and control, 

targeting, and intelligence gathering efforts. 

North Korea has operated GPS jammers near 

the DMZ, at times interfering with navigation 

systems onboard commercial aircraft flying in 

the area.120

Space/Counterspace

North Korea can be expected to try to deny an 

adversary use of space during a conflict; ample 

evidence is available to Pyongyang in open 

sources describing the general U.S. reliance on 

space-based assets to support joint operations 

and intelligence collection. The North’s nonkinetic counterspace capabilities include GPS and 

satellite communication jamming, which have 

been tested on multiple occasions in the past 

decade. Possession of ballistic missiles and space 

launch vehicles that can reach orbit theoretically 

suggests the North could attempt to disrupt 

orbiting satellites in a conflict.

North Korea’s space program is administered by a 

state-run civilian agency, the National Aerospace 

Development Administration.121 The North maintains a space launch complex on the west coast, 

the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, and associated space tracking facilities in Pyongyang, both 

of which supported satellite launch cycles in 2012 

and 2016. An older space launch site on the east 

coast has not been used for a launch since 2009. 

Although North Korea has placed two satellites in 

orbit and has articulated further space ambitions, 

its program also enables it to test technology used 

in ballistic missiles.122
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Cyberspace

North Korea views its offensive cyberspace capabilities, including computer network attack, 

as a cost-effective and deniable tool that it can 

employ with little risk of reprisal. Pyongyang’s 

cyberspace capabilities support military operations and national security goals by providing the 

Kim regime a way to influence and intimidate its 

adversaries and collect information on them. In 

light of the numerous sanctions targeting North 

Korea, cyberspace capabilities also provide the 

regime with a means to generate currency that 

circumvents international controls.123

Computer Network Attack 

and Intimidation

North Korea was linked to a 2014 cyber-intrusion into Sony Pictures Entertainment networks undertaken by a group called Hidden 

Cobra, previously referred to as Lazarus Group 

and Guardians of the Peace.124 The attack followed North Korean demands that Sony cancel 

the release of a film depicting the assassination 

of Kim Jong Un and resulted in data deletion 

and shutdown of employee network access.125 

The FBI stated that there was sufficient evidence to attribute the attack to North Korea.

In December 2017, the U.S. Government linked 

North Korea to the May 2017 WannaCry computer worm attack, which affected over 250,000 

computers in over 150 countries. This attack 

disrupted critical computer systems across 

the world, including Great Britain’s National 

Health Service.126

Cyber-Enabled Propaganda

North Korea has also used its cyberspace 

resources for political purposes and to spread 

propaganda on South Korean networks. South 

Korea has reported that the North hacked various websites to post pro-North opinions.127

Select North Korean Cyberspace Units 1707-13888

Institution/Unit Mission and Activities

Central Party Investigative Group Technical education and training

Unification Bureau Operations 

Department

Cyber-psychological warfare, organizational 

espionage

204th Unit (Unification Bureau 

Operations Department)

Psychological operations, incitement of disorder in 

South Korea

Number 91 Office Offensive cyberspace operations
34

Intelligence Collection

North Korea has used the Internet since the 

1990s to stay abreast of international developments, but with its growing cyberspace capabilities Pyongyang is now gaining access to secured 

information. In late 2016, South Korea’s Cyber 

Command was reportedly hacked by North 

Korean cyberactors. The intranet server of the 

Cyber Command was contaminated with malware. The South also found that some military 

documents, including confidential information, 

had been hacked, according to a South Korean 

Ministry of National Defense official. In a subsequent cyberspace operation in 2017, the North 

allegedly exfiltrated classified war plans, according to a South Korean legislator.128,129 In addition, North Korea is reportedly actively engaged 

in cyberspace infiltration into the United States 

and European countries for the purpose of exfiltrating technical data important to solving technological problems with miniaturizing nuclear 

weapons and perfecting its ballistic missiles.130

Currency Generation

North Korea is broadly suspected of using 

cyberspace means to steal money from financial institutions worldwide. North Korean 

hackers use overseas infrastructure to achieve 

their goals for the regime while also masking their attribution. The North's cyberactors 

also operate from overseas locations to generate currency illegally while maintaining legal 

means of revenue generation on the surface.131

The 2016 theft of $80 million from the Bank 

of Bangladesh has been attributed to North 

Korea. Several international cybersecurity 

firms have conducted research and documented similar North Korean cybercrime 

operations resulting in thefts from more than 

100 global banks using a combination of malware tools and harvested user credentials, 

including in the Philippines, Vietnam, and 

Poland and others.132

In addition to cyber-enabled theft, North 

Korean hackers engage in global fraud, blackmail, online gambling, and other cyberactivities to create profits. These activities together 

are estimated to generate an annual revenue 

of $860 million, some portion of which probably supports military activities. Given the 

increased sanctions against North Korea as a 

result of nuclear and missile activities, Pyongyang will continue turning to cybercrime as a 

means to generate currency to fund its weapon 

programs while sidestepping international 

efforts to freeze the regime’s funding.133

Denial and Deception

Denial and deception (D&D) is fundamental 

to North Korean military operations. The KPA 

makes extensive use of D&D methods and 

materials to conceal its readiness and enhance 

survivability of its forces. North Korea probably 

understands the United States' and its allies’ 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

capabilities and is able to take measures to 

counter collection activities, including scheduling activities to occur at night or under 

cloud cover, using mountainous topography 

for terrain masking, and hiding equipment in 
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UGFs. The KPA also uses camouflage netting 

and paints, equipment decoys, false signals 

emitters, and smoke and obscurants.134,135,136

North Korea dedicates a substantial portion of 

its D&D resources to concealing activities associated with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, conducting many activities in UGFs.137

Logistics and Sustainment

Although doctrinal planning requires the 

KPA to maintain 6 months of supply in all 

resource categories to sustain defensive combat operations, North Korea may have sufficient supplies for only 2 to 3 months.138,139 

Subsistence supplies could last up to 3 

months, and ammunition could last slightly 

longer.140 Inadequate availability of fuel and 

transportation assets, poor maintenance of 

ground lines of communication, and insufficient training all constrain North Korea’s 

ability to sustain large-scale conventional 

offensive operations.141,142,143,144

North Korea’s transportation infrastructure 

is in poor condition; it has damaged roads, 

resource availability constraints, and difficult 

terrain.145,146 Many roads are unpaved gravel 

or dirt surfaces and lack consistent mainteThe Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge provides North Korea an important transportation link to China.

Image Source: Shutterstock
36

nance.147 Although these features are a defensive advantage in case of invasion, they also 

hamper KPA mobility in the offense. North 

Korea has fortified key maneuver corridors 

along the coasts, the DMZ, areas surrounding 

Pyongyang, and roads adjacent to the North 

Korea–China border.148,149,150,151 These roads 

provide access and mobility to some of North 

Korea’s supplies that are stockpiled in UGFs 

bordering the DMZ.152,153 Railroads also provide 

critical links between major cities within the 

country and connect to Chinese and Russian 

rail lines despite having similar inconsistent 

maintenance.154 The military is likely to use the 

railway network to reposition forces and supplies to sustain operations.155,156

Human Capital

Over 1.3 million people out of North Korea's 

population of approximately 25 million serve 

in the KPA, making North Korea's military the 

fourth largest in the world. As many as 20 perJunior KPA soldier at attention during a military event in Pyongyang. The KPA is a platform for ideological 

indoctrination and internal social control in addition to its offensive and defensive missions.

Image Source: Shutterstock
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cent of North Korean males between the ages 

of 16 and 54 are in the military at a given time 

and possibly up to 30 percent of males between 

the ages of 18 and 27, not counting the reserves 

or paramilitary units. The active-duty forces 

account for at least 6 percent of the population 

and at least 12 percent of the male population. 

With universal conscription and long-term 

service, the KPA serves as a key socialization 

mechanism for the state and a pathway to 

Korean Workers' Party membership.157

The bulk strength of the KPA is made up of 

conscripts serving a 10-year enlistment period. 

North Korea drafts women, although shorter 

enlistments are available to females and to 

personnel in specialty fields. Most KPA personnel spend their entire conscription period 

with the same unit in the same location, often 

using and training on the same equipment for 

a full decade. Conscripts who are selected for 

university-level education are eligible to serve 

their enlistment after graduation and may 

serve a shorter time in the military.

Historically, KPA servicemembers were 

afforded better rations than the general population, but this trend has declined precipitously 

since the mid-1990s, and most KPA conscripts 

now are subject to the same deprivation as the 

general population outside Pyongyang.158 Former KPA servicemembers who have defected 

to the South describe malnutrition and harsh 

service conditions. Because of North Korea’s 

chronic food insecurity, military personnel 

are periodically diverted away from standard 

duties to plant or harvest crops.159

Over the next few decades, the effects of the 

1994-97 famine will continue to affect the population that constitutes the majority of the 

KPA reserve manpower pool. North Korean 

children born in the 1990s suffered malnutrition, which resulted in declining physical 

development, stunted growth, and mental 

underdevelopment.160 This trend suggests that 

some number of KPA conscripts in the reserves 

will function at lower levels of effectiveness 

due to mental and physical impairments.161,162

The COVID-19 pandemic probably is having 

a disruptive impact on the North Korean population. North Korea has reported suspected 

COVID-19 cases, but has not officially reported 

any confirmed cases.163 Nonetheless, COVID-19 

has exacerbated North Korea’s already weak 

economy and despite continued denials of any 

domestic cases, Pyongyang has implemented 

border closures, quarantines, lockdowns, and 

steep reductions in trade to prevent the spread 

of the virus. North Korea’s military has probably experienced some degradation in unit 

proficiency, but can conduct most functions if 

ordered. How COVID-19 will ultimately affect 

North Korean civilians, military personnel, or 

leadership is unclear.
38

Outlook: Targeted Investments in 

Select Military Capabilities

im Jong Un has set North Korea’s military on a path to expand its capabilities 

across multiple domains in the coming 

years. Kim has placed a priority on the 

development and demonstration of weapons that 

provide North Korea the means to strike distant 

adversaries—including the United States—with 

nuclear weapons, improve the KPA’s capability 

to strike key targets in South Korea at increasing distances from the DMZ, and further fortify 

North Korea against external attack or invasion.

These operational goals reflect an overarching 

security strategy focused on deterrence and coercion; Kim appears to judge that he can prevent 

the United States from taking action against 

North Korea if he demonstrates a viable nuclear 

weapon deliverable on a reliable long-range ballistic missile. Moreover, Kim will continue to 

bolster his conventional military’s offensive and 

defensive capabilities to raise the cost of a conflict 

if deterrence should fail and to expand his options 

to threaten South Korea and locally based U.S. 

forces. Even absent WMD capabilities, these conventional capabilities continue to pose a constant 

threat to South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in 

the region.

Breaking from the fast pace of missile and 

nuclear testing in 2016-2017, North Korea 

pursued diplomatic outreach in 2018 and 

early 2019, and declared its support for the 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

It has not conducted any nuclear tests since 

2017, and has reversibly dismantled portions of its WMD infrastructure. However, 

we continue to observe activity, at Yongbyon 

and elsewhere, inconsistent with full denuclearization. North Korea began flight testing new SRBMs and an SLBM in mid-2019. 

In an October 2020 military parade, North 

Korea revealed a new larger ICBM, probably 

designed to deliver multiple warheads. North 

Korea retains its WMD capabilities, and it is 

unlikely to give up all of its WMD stockpiles, 

delivery systems, and production capabilities. 

North Korean leaders view nuclear arms as 

critical to regime survival.

Unless it agrees to, and follows through with, 

full denuclearization, including the scrapping of 

delivery systems, North Korea will likely grow 

and advance all of the following military sectors:

Land Based Ballistic Missiles. In 2018, 

North Korea stated that it would abide by a missile launch moratorium during dialogue with the 

United States; however, it conducted multiple 

launches of new solid-propellant SRBM variants 

beginning in May 2019. Even if additional flight 

tests of longer range systems do not occur in the 

near term, Pyongyang will probably focus on 

training and improving its missile forces which 

are increasingly central to North Korea’s deterrence strategy. North Korea also will work to 

improve its newer solid-propellant ballistic missiles - solid fueled missiles can be made ready for 

launch more quickly than liquid fueled missiles. 

K
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It is possible we could see a test of a long range 

missile over the next year.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles.

North Korea’s debut of an SLBM in 2015 opened 

a new potential area of operations for the North 

Korean Navy. It tested another new SLBM, the 

Pukguksong-3, in October 2019 and paraded 

a new Pukguksong-4 in 2020 and a Pukguksong-5 in 2021. This capability is likely to grow 

slowly because constructing and deploying new 

submarines requires a lengthy, resource-intensive manufacturing process.

Nuclear Weapons. Integrating a nuclear 

weapon with a ballistic missile and enabling 

that nuclear-armed missile to function reliably 

as a system is North Korea’s ultimate operational goal. Further underground nuclear tests 

to validate weapon capabilities are possible if 

North Korea reconstitutes its nuclear test site 

or establishes a new one.

Long-Range Artillery. North Korea’s development of longer range and precision-guided MRLs 

will continue, and these systems will be deployed 

with the Ground Forces to multiply the artillery 

threat to Seoul and points south of Seoul.

Special Operations Forces. The North’s 

efforts to train SOF for operations in South 

Korea will continue and will be used for propaganda purposes as well as practical unit training. The North may seek to build proficiencies 

in infiltration techniques and raids against 

South Korean government facilities.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. North Korea has 

demonstrated a capacity to field multiple classes 

of UAVs and fly them into South Korean airspace 

undetected, although several of these UAVs have 

malfunctioned and crashed. The North probably 

sees future intelligence gathering roles for its 

UAVs and may look into arming UAVs to supplement the Air Force’s ground-attack capabilities.

Cyberspace Capabilities. North Korea will 

continue to target U.S. and allied networks in the 

government, military, and private sectors. Pyongyang will focus hacking efforts on targets that 

offer opportunities to steal useful information and 

deny or disrupt our use of computer networks. 

Cyber-enabled theft and currency-generating 

activities also will continue, and the North’s hacking techniques may become more sophisticated.

Limited Resources Hamper Development 

in Other Sectors. North Korea lacks the capacity to invest significant resources in new, more 

capable systems across the entire force. Elements of North Korean military power that do 

not receive this level of leadership attention, 

such as the Air Force or the surface Navy, will 

remain capable of executing their core missions, 

but their readiness and capability will probably 

remain static or erode over time. Critical deficiencies and shortfalls in North Korea’s transportation infrastructure and military supply base are 

likely to persist, limiting the KPA’s mobility on 

the offensive and preventing it from sustaining a 

major advance into South Korea.

Sanctions placed on North Korea have probably limited the amount of resources it has to 

implement military modernization on its own. 

North Korea will continue to use diplomatic 

engagement, counterpressure against the sanctions regime, and direct sanctions evasion to try 

to mitigate some of the effects of the sanctions. 

North Korea may calculate that China and Russia will eventually distance themselves from the 

U.S. policy of strict sanctions enforcement as 

each seeks to increase its leverage in the region.
40

APPENDIX A: Strategic Force

North Korea’s Strategic Force operates the 

regime’s ballistic missiles. The service’s mission is nuclear and conventional ballistic missile strike against targets inside and outside 

the region. Kim Jong Un has prioritized the 

development of new Strategic Force-operated 

missile systems and has directed more launches 

of older missiles, suggesting this service could 

become one of North Korea’s more capable military arms if training and development are sustained and pursued consistently forcewide.

The Strategic Force is a service-level entity on 

par with the North Korean Air and Air Defense 

Command or Navy; it is probably subordinated 

directly to the General Staff Department and 

is only one step removed from Kim's personal 

command. The Strategic Force enjoys a high 

public profile and is credited with numerous 

key advances in North Korean ballistic missile capabilities. Kim has, according to North 

Korean state media, issued orders to the Strategic Force on multiple occasions directing it 

Kim Jong Un inspects a Hwasong-12 IRBM prior to flight-testing. Tests to improve the reliability of ballistic missiles 

have been increased and publicized under Kim Jong Un.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
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to increase its alert status and prepare for 

missile strike operations against U.S. bases 

in the Western Pacific and against the United 

States directly.164

North Korea’s ballistic missile units control 

a wide selection of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, 

and ICBMs.165 It is unclear what operational 

role, if any, the Strategic Force has with 

respect to North Korea’s developmental submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). North 

Korean state media has shown testing of a ballistic missile with a precision-control guidance 

system and has alluded to a possible antiship 

role for North Korea's ballistic missile units.166

The strength of the Strategic Force is estimated 

at 10,000 personnel. The service controls over 

200 road-mobile ballistic missile launchers.167 In 

a missile deployment or strike scenario, mobile 

launchers permit North Korea to mobilize systems out of garrisons and conceal them while 

launch preparations are under way. Since 2014, 

the Strategic Force has undertaken multiple 

mobilization and launch exercises apparently 

designed to train on these tactics, techniques, 

and procedures, and North Korean media has 

described some missile launch events as testing 

nuclear components.168 Kim has personally overseen land- and sea-based ballistic missile testing 

and publicized the achievements through photos 

and video, reflecting his personal interest in this 

service’s development.

North Korea’s ballistic missile force is one of 

the most rapidly modernizing elements of the 

national military. Several new ballistic missile 

systems and associated equipment were publicly 

debuted in 2017 through flight testing and a military parade; those systems that are deployed 

operationally will almost certainly be operated 

by the Strategic Force. Also in 2017, tracked 

ballistic missile launchers were observed for 

the first time.169 In 2018, North Korea paraded 

a never before seen SRBM that appears similar 

to the Russian solid-propellant Iskander missile system. It tested this and three other new 

types of SRBMs multiple times since 2019.170,171 

The Strategic Force also continues to operate 

several missiles that date to the 1980s–1990s, 

including Scud class SRBMs and the No Dong 

MRBMs. Continued flight tests on these systems from 2015-2017—as well as North Korean 

press statements highlighting the role they 

play in current nuclear attack plans—suggest 

that North Korea remains interested in improving the performance of these older missiles and 

validating the proficiency of their launch crews.

Scud class SRBM on new tracked launcher, paraded in 

Pyongyang in April 2017.

Image Source: 2017 DIBMAC Report
42

APPENDIX B: Ground Forces

KPA Ground Forces—armor, infantry, and 

artillery—remain the core of North Korea’s military power and the primary means by which 

Pyongyang threatens Seoul. The KPA ground 

units comprise 10 regular corps, 2 mechanized 

corps, 1 armored division, 4 mechanized divisions, and 1 artillery division plus numerous 

combat, combat support, and combat service 

support brigades and regiments. The Ground 

Forces number about 1,000,000 active-duty 

soldiers, and another 150,000 are assigned to 

reserve units.172,173,174,175,176 With a large artillery 

and infantry force forward-deployed, the KPA 

Ground Force can mount an attack on South 

Korean and U.S. forces with little or no warning. Although the KPA may meet initial success, 

its maneuver and sustainment problems, stemming from resource shortages, probably would 

limit its ability to maintain the momentum of 

an attack, unless it receives outside support.

Ground Forces are subordinate to the General Staff Department. The force is infantry 

heavy and is supported by significant artillery 

and armored/mechanized forces. The forward 

corps and the armored, mechanized, and artillery units operate the most modern ground 

equipment in the KPA inventory. The rear 

corps are a mix of regular and reserve forces 

with older equipment. The KPA is oriented to 

a conflict along the DMZ, with over 70 percent 

of the force deployed south of Pyongyang.177

In addition to the regular and reserve forces, 

the KPA has an extensive paramilitary organization that assists in providing rear-area 

security and manpower to replace combat 

losses. These forces are organized into the 

Worker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG) and Red 

Youth Guard (RYG).178 These organizations 

are present at all levels of government (province, county, ward) and are under the control 

of the Korean Workers' Party in peacetime 

but revert to military control during crisis or 

war. The WPRG and RYG have about 6 million personnel (approximately 25 percent of 

the North Korean population).179

The KPA artillery and armored force mainly 

comprises North Korean–produced copies of 

Soviet-era equipment. It is largely based on old 

technology but is reliable and easy to maintain. 

The artillery force includes a large number of 

conventional towed and self-propelled systems 

and long-range 170-mm guns and 240-mm multiple rocket launchers.180

New 300-mm MRL CRBM in live fire exercise, 2016.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
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Major Ground Units181,182

1707-13887
44

KPA Ground Forces modernization is slow and 

incremental, but Kim has dedicated some new 

systems to ground units. North Korea debuted 

a new main battle tank in a military parade 

in 2010, and the KPA has conducted multiple 

tests of the new 300-mm MRL CRBM since 

2014. The 300-mm MRL CRBM is an advanced 

MRL system configured to fire up to eight 300-

mm guided, rocket-propelled munitions per 

launcher. Presumably it will be deployed with 

artillery units. The system will extend the 

range of KPA firepower well south of Seoul 

and could be sufficiently accurate for precision targeting against key South Korean and 

U.S. military installations on the peninsula.183

Additionally, in September 2018 North Korea 

paraded a new self-propelled artillery system 

and a new six-wheeled, eight canister tactical 

guided missile system, most likely an antitank guided or surface-to-air missile. North 

Korea probably tested this new tactical guided 

missile system in April 2019.184,185 [For more 

details on modernization, see Appendix H.

North Korean strategy, doctrine, and tactics 

for ground operations have remained fairly 

consistent since the 1950s. In the event of a 

massed attack against South Korea, the North 

would use heavy concentrations of infantry 

and armor supported by artillery to break 

through and attempt to destroy forces defending along the DMZ, and advance rapidly down 

the entire peninsula. These operations would 

be coordinated closely with the opening of a 

second front comprising special operations 

forces (SOF) units conducting raids and disruptive attacks in the South Korean rear area.

The KPA Ground Forces are capable of defending against and deterring a land invasion 

from the South. The KPA would initially focus 

on infantry and light infantry operations supported by large volumes of artillery fire support, but would default to guerrilla-style operations targeting rear areas and logistics if 

invading forces progressed beyond the DMZ. 

KPA doctrine puts great emphasis on fighting under arduous conditions, at night, in the 

mountains, and during inclement weather. 

KPA tactics are heavily influenced by Kim Il 

Sung's anti-Japanese guerrilla activity, which 

emphasized the value of small-unit fighting. 

The modern KPA emphasizes small and large 

units attacking an objective simultaneously, 

such as SOF or light infantry attacking the 

objective from the rear or flank while heavy 

infantry supported with artillery assaults 

from the front and flanks.186
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APPENDIX C: Air and Air Defense Forces

The North Korean Air Force is primarily responsible for defending North Korea’s airspace and 

territorial integrity. Its other missions include 

tactical air support to KPA Ground Forces, insertion of SOF, transportation and logistics support, wartime strikes against targets in South 

Korea, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is capable of defending 

North Korean airspace, with aircraft and groundbased systems but would struggle to penetrate 

South Korean air defenses in an attack role.

North Korean air and air defense forces are organized into four air divisions (each responsible for 

a sector of the country) that control surface-toair missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), 

and air surveillance assets. The forces also control transport units and two airborne sniper brigades as well as various support elements. The 

air divisions control combat and transport aircraft and helicopters that operate from a large 

number of airfields.

The air and air defense forces have about 110,000 

personnel and control over 900 combat aircraft, 

over 300 transport aircraft, and 300 helicopters. 

The more modern aircraft are concentrated in 

and around Pyongyang, and the SAMs and AAA 

provide perimeter security for the country and the 

capital in particular. The capital has one of the 

most dense concentrations of AAA in the world.187

The Air Force’s most capable combat aircraft 

are its few MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters procured 

from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, its 

MiG-23 Flogger interceptors, its Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, and its Il-28 Beagle 

bombers. The majority of its aircraft are much 

older and less capable; the Air Force is one of 

the only air forces in the world that still operates MiG-21s, MiG-19s, MiG-17s, and MiG-15s. 

The Air Force also maintains a large fleet of 

An-2 Colt aircraft, first produced in the 1940s, 

which are single-engine 10-passenger biplanes 

probably tasked with inserting SOF into South 

Korea but are also capable of supporting simple 

air-to-ground strike missions. The Air Force is 

rounded out with other Soviet-era transport aircraft, including helicopters that would be used 

for troop transport and limited ground attack.188

The most common North Korean groundbased air defense artillery threat to aircraft (helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft) 

and unmanned aerial systems is very likely 

manually directed AAA and man-portable 

air defense systems (MANPADS). Manually 

directed systems will have limited ability 

to engage smaller targets, such as UAVs, in 

addition to poor ability to engage all targets 

at night and in inclement weather.

Russian MiG-29C. The North Korean model of this 

1980s-era fighter is the newest aircraft in the North 

Korean Air Force inventory.

Image Source: AFP
46

Major Air Units189

1707-13887

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

0 50 100 Kilometers

Fighter base

Transport base 

Helicopter base

Other airfield

All locations are notional

AIR ORDER OF BATTLE (approx.)

Personnel strength

Combat aircraft

Helicopters

Transport aircraft

110,000

900

300

300

Manpo

Uiju

Sungam-ni

Kuktong

Orang (HQ)

Iwon

Hwangsuwon

Changjin-up

Toksan

Sondok

Kowon

Wonsan

Kuum-ni

Hyon-ni

Sonchon

Kaechon

Pukchang

Pakchon

Kangdong

Koksan

Nuchon-ni Taetan

Hwangju (HQ)

Kanchon

Kwail

Onchon

Mirim

Panghyon

Taechon (HQ)

Kwaksan

Sunchon

Pyongyang

Chunghwa (HQ)

Military Demarca tion Line and

Demilitarize d Zone

Nort hern Limit Line

Pyongyang

NORTH KOREA

SOUTH KOREA

RUSSIA

CHINA
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KPA ground-based AAA probably will rely 

heavily on medium-caliber (30-mm to 57-mm) 

AAA guns. Medium-caliber AAA guns maximize firepower (a combination of rate of fire 

and kinetic energy) by offering some of the 

highest rates of fire while being large enough 

to have sufficient terminal ballistics and 

lethality characteristics. The KPA also fields 

numerous 14.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns 

and domestically produced MANPADS (SA-7, 

SA-14, and SA-16). North Korea operates a 

variety of SAMs, mostly Soviet-era systems, 

including the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-13.190

Flight time for North Korean pilots reportedly is 

severely restricted to as few as 15–25 hours per 

year. Flight hours this low probably stem from 

fuel shortages and may reflect concern over the 

upkeep and maintenance of the North’s aging 

aircraft.191 Under these conditions, North Korean 

pilots most likely focus their training on simple 

pilot proficiency and the maintenance of basic 

aeronautical skills. The pilots of more advanced 

fighter aircraft probably fly more frequently, 

maintaining a higher degree of proficiency and 

at times participating in aerobatic competitions 

and demonstrations during public air shows. In 

September 2016, North Korea hosted its first 

advertised International Friendship Air Festival, at Kalma Airfield in Wonsan, where a variety of pilot drills were held and aircraft were displayed for the public.192

North Korea has probably modernized select 

older air defense systems in addition to introducing some newer systems. During a 2010 

military parade, North Korea first displayed a 

new mobile SAM launcher and accompanying 

radar that externally resembled the Russian 

S-300 and Chinese HQ-9; this system was most 

recently tested in 2017.193 The North is also 

developing or procuring a variety of UAVs, some 

of which have been used for reconnaissance 

missions over South Korea and which could 

be equipped with rudimentary armaments.194

North Korea is probably pursuing larger UAVs 

for a variety of military missions.

North Korean reconnaissance drone, recovered after 

crashing in South Korea. Several UAV models have 

been sighted in South Korean airspace.

Image Source: AFP/SOUTH KOREAN DEFENCE MINISTRY

The SA-5 surface-to-air missile is North Korea's 

longest-range SAM.

Image Source: Shutterstock
48

APPENDIX D: Navy

The North Korean Navy is the smallest of the 

KPA’s three conventional force services, with 

about 60,000 personnel. The Navy’s primary 

mission is to defend North Korea’s coastline 

and territorial waters from attack and to protect the approaches to North Korea’s main ports. 

The Navy is also responsible for SOF insertion, 

coastal surveillance, and the protection and control of fisheries operations. In wartime, the Navy 

will focus on antisurface warfare, mine warfare, 

and interdicting sea lines of communication to 

hinder the United States and UNC’s ability to 

flow forces into the theater.195 North Korea’s 

Navy would be constrained to a largely defensive 

role in a conflict, and it would face significant 

challenges attempting to operate against South 

Korea or the United States.

North Korean Navy Romeo-class diesel-electric attack submarine, 2014. Kim Jong Un is aboard for an inspection.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
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Major Naval Units196

1707-13887
50

North Korea’s Navy is primarily a coastal 

force. It maintains one of the world’s largest 

submarine forces and operates a large fleet 

of air-cushioned hovercraft and conventional 

landing craft to support amphibious operations 

and SOF insertion. The force is divided into 

East and West Coast Fleets, with each operating a variety of patrol craft, guided-missile 

patrol boats, submarines, and landing craft.197

North Korea has about 70 diesel-electric 

attack, coastal, and midget class submarines 

in service divided between both coasts. Many 

of the North’s submarines are of older design 

and have limited endurance; however, they 

are sufficiently capable of using torpedoes 

and mines to threaten merchant ships and 

U.S. and allied navies operating near the 

Korean Peninsula. Determined to expand its 

undersea and deterrent capabilities, North 

Korea launched a new ballistic missile submarine with a single launch tube in 2015 and 

began flight-testing SLBMs the same year. 

North Korea is expected to continue SLBM 

development and expand its naval deterrent 

unless it proceeds with denuclearization. 

Finally, North Korea is likely to introduce 

other new submarines into its force.198,199,200,201

The Navy’s surface ship order of battle comprises mostly small patrol craft that carry 

a variety of antiship cruise missiles, torpedoes, and naval guns. The Navy also operates a large fleet of air-cushioned hovercraft 

and conventional landing craft to support 

amphibious operations and SOF insertion.202 

The Navy uses a variety of torpedoes, including straight-running and wake-homing 

torpedoes, that can be launched from submarines and some surface ships. An international investigation concluded that North 

Korea used a wake-homing torpedo known as 

CHT-02D to sink the South Korean corvette 

Cheonan in March 2010.203,204

Pukguksong-1 SLBM launch, April 2016 (left). North Korea’s SLBM progressed rapidly from ejection tests to 

short-range flight test, later followed by a launch of Pukguksong-3 in 2019 (right).

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP and AFP PHOTOS/KCNA
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North Korea has a history of mine warfare 

being instrumental to its coastal defense strategy. During the Korean War, North Korea’s 

naval forces were able to mine Wonsan Harbor and, as a result, successfully prevented 

a U.S. amphibious landing from cutting off 

retreating North Korean ground forces. Therefore, mines probably remain a key element of 

North Korea’s maritime defense strategy.205 

The Navy may also attempt offensive mining 

of South Korean ports.

The most dramatic new development in the 

North Korean naval force was the debut of 

a ballistic missile–capable submarine and 

its associated SLBM, the Pukguksong-1 

(translated as Polaris-1). According to North 

Korean press statements, the SLBM will be 

cold-launched and solid-fueled, will carry 

a nuclear warhead, and is intended to be 

launched from ballistic missile submarines. 

North Korea conducted multiple flight tests 

of the developmental SLBM in 2016 and 

displayed it in a military parade in 2017.206

North Korea tested a second SLBM, called 

Pukguksong-3, in October 2019. A ballistic 

missile strike role would be wholly new for 

the Navy, which may not yet have a final 

plan for how to incorporate this new mission into existing doctrine and plans. North 

Korea’s Navy also tested antiship cruise missiles in 2017.207

North Korean Navy patrol boat on guard in waters 

off the Mt. Kumgang international tourist zone, 2011.

Image Source: AFP
52

APPENDIX E: Special Operations Forces

North Korea's special operations forces (SOF) 

are designed to infiltrate South Korea and attack 

targets in the rear area, and to defend against 

foreign attacks on North Korea. SOF members 

operate in specialized units, including reconnaissance, airborne and seaborne insertion, and 

commando squads.208 Core SOF doctrine emphasizes speed of movement and surprise attack to 

accomplish the mission. SOF personnel may be 

airlifted by helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft 

(and possibly Civil Air Administration transports), moved by surface ships or submarines, or 

travel on foot over land or via suspected crossDMZ tunnels to attack high-value targets, such 

as command and control nodes, airbases, and 

ports. North Korean SOF are highly trained and 

well-equipped in comparison to other units, and, 

if successfully infiltrated into the South, would 

be capable of disruptive attacks in the rear area.

SOF personnel are present at all echelons of 

the KPA (from brigade and division to corps) 

as well as the strategic-level 11th Corps, which 

controls a number of SOF brigades for strategic 

missions, including creating a “second front” in 

the rear area that disrupts and distracts from 

the main fight along the frontlines. SOF light 

infantry, sniper, and reconnaissance elements 

and air and naval SOF elements are present in 

many infantry divisions and the forward corps.

The various SOF units comprise over 200,000 

personnel organized into brigades of 3,000–

5,000 members and separate regiments and 

battalions of varying strength (these personnel 

are accounted for in KPA manpower figures). 

North Korean SOF units are provided with the 

best available equipment, including weapons, 

explosives, incendiaries, chemical and biological 

agents, parachutes, aircraft, and communications equipment. Compared with the equipment 

of other worldwide SOF units, North Korea's 

equipment is rudimentary, and North Korean 

SOF probably lacks such sophisticated items 

as burst communications equipment, advanced 

signal-processing equipment, and specialized 

explosives. State media photos from two training exercises revealed purported North Korean 

SOF using newly identified equipment, including helical magazines, improved ballistic helmets, night-vision devices, and body armor, but 

fielding of this equipment to operational units 

cannot be verified.209

KPA special operations forces parade in Pyongyang, 2017. New optical equipment and firearms 

are displayed.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
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Strategic SOF units support national objectives with reconnaissance and raid missions. 

Specifically, these units develop targeting 

information, report South Korean civilian 

and military actions, and conduct poststrike 

assessments. Typical missions would involve 

the location and sabotage or destruction of 

national-level artillery; airfields; storage 

facilities; air defense locations; and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) assets in South Korean rear 

areas. In addition, strategic units also may 

kidnap or assassinate key South Korean or 

U.S. personnel.

Infiltration of enemy territory—possibly 

before a war begins—is a key KPA SOF 

mission. SOF can be infiltrated by air using 

the An-2, which can support this operation 

by paradrop or by landing on a highway to 

debark personnel. Maritime infiltration can 

be accomplished by cushioned hovercraft, 

which could deliver over 7,000 SOF personnel to each of South Korea's coastlines, and 

by submarines, including Romeo class diesel-electric submarines and specially outfitted 

Sango class submarines, which are designed 

solely for coastal infiltration.210,211

Operational SOF units support corps objectives with light infantry and reconnaissance 

missions. In wartime light infantry units will 

target critical terrain and command-and-control assets, delay South Korean, U.S., and UNC 

reserve forces, and attack division (and higher) 

command posts. In addition, these units ascertain enemy intentions, develop targeting information for ballistic missiles and long-range 

artillery, conduct poststrike assessments, and 

determine locations of South Korean, U.S., and 

UNC reserve forces. Tactical SOF units support 

maneuver division and brigade objectives with 

light infantry operations. Light infantry units 

attack brigade and division command posts, 

capture key terrain to assist in maneuvering divisions and brigades, and destroy South 

Korean, U.S., and UNC reserve forces. The 

organic reconnaissance company of the maneuSouth Korean naval personnel recover a damaged 

North Korean semisubmersible craft in the sea south 

of Jinhae, South Korea, 1999. North Korean SOF 

utilize such vessels to infiltrate agents into the South.

Image Source: AFP
54

ver unit performs tactical reconnaissance. The 

reconnaissance company and light infantry 

battalion develop targets for destruction. These 

targets include air defense sites, force concentrations, artillery positions, and C3I assets.

Doctrinally, North Korean SOF units train in 

unconventional warfare following the tenets 

laid out by Kim Il Sung in various training 

and doctrine manuals. Defensively, the North 

Korean SOF serves as North Korea's primary 

counter-SOF force, guarding key sites against 

possible targeting by enemy SOF during wartime. Because of the importance that the regime 

places on North Korea's SOF capability, SOF 

members often receive more frequent training 

of a much higher quality than regular KPA 

infantry receive.212

Air-cushioned landing craft used for SOF infiltration, shown in training exercises publicized by North Korean 

state media.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
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APPENDIX F: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces

The KPA has an extensive reserve structure 

built around numerous Reserve Military Training Units (RMTUs). These units primarily comprise infantry divisions and brigades and artillery brigades and regiments. The RMTUs' role 

is to maintain North Koreans' basic soldier skills 

and proficiencies should citizens need to augment the active-duty forces during a crisis. The 

majority of the RMTUs are in the rear corps, but 

some are also in the forward corps. In a conflict 

scenario, RMTUs and other paramilitary groups 

are trained to function as insurgents and defend 

their homeland against external attackers.

North Korea also has an extensive paramilitary structure that includes the Worker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG) and Red Youth Guard 

(RYG) under party/civilian control in peacetime 

and organized into regiments and battalions. 

These paramilitary units are usually mobilized 

Soldiers in the Worker Peasant Red Guard paramilitary train for concealment and defense operations, 2013.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
56

for domestic projects, such as road building and 

agricultural support. The corps-sized Bodyguard Command (with multiple brigade units) 

provides regime protection forces outside the 

KPA's control. Finally, engineering and logistic 

units provide numerous services often associated with the private and government sectors 

in other nations but that are under party and 

government control in North Korea, including 

agricultural support and road maintenance.213

The RMTU elements comprise up to 600,000 

personnel, but few are on active duty at any 

one time. The WPRG and RYG comprise up to 

5 million personnel and 1 million personnel, 

respectively. They comprise about 25 percent 

of the entire population but are seldom mobilized in any significant number. The Bodyguard 

Command and other militarized elements add 

an additional 300,000 personnel to the overall strength of the paramilitary force and are 

actively engaged in their roles at all times.

RMTUs are routinely activated in small numbers during the KPA's summer and winter 

training activities. RMTUs augment local 

active-duty forces in force security, counter-SOF operations, movement of logistics, etc. 

The RMTUs’ training during either training 

cycle generally reflects KPA training in basic 

soldier skills and small-unit combat skills.

North Korean reserve military personnel are 

issued uniforms for wartime use and for training with active units and are equipped with 

individual weapons, including handgrenades 

and rocket-propelled grenades. Reserve soldiers 

are most likely to be armed with older variants 

of Kalashnikov-model (Type 58/68) rifles. Most 

reserve units have wartime reserve caches of 

weapons, food, and supplies near their wartime 

areas of operation.

The WPRG is organized into elements that 

vary in size and serve locally in each village, 

town, factory, and enterprise. The WPRG and 

the RYG conduct combat and political training 

as preparation for an all-people resistance war 

to defend their provinces, counties, and hometowns as required to defend the North as part 

of an impregnable fortress. Physically qualified nonexempt North Koreans are assigned 

to a reserve military unit upon release from 

KPA active duty. Male reservists serve with an 

assigned unit until they are 60 years old.
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APPENDIX G: Intelligence Services

North Korea has four primary intelligence and 

counterintelligence services: the Reconnaissance 

General Bureau, the Ministry of State Security, 

the United Front Department of the Korean 

Workers’ Party, and the Cultural Exchange 

Bureau, which was formerly known as the 225th 

Department. North Korean intelligence and 

security services collect political, military, economic, and technical information through open 

sources, human intelligence, cyberspace capabilities, and signals intelligence capabilities. 

North Korea’s primary intelligence collection 

targets are South Korea, the United States, and 

Japan.214 The North’s intelligence services have 

also conducted operations against these countries, including the abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.

Reconnaissance General Bureau

The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) 

is North Korea’s premier military intelligence 

service, responsible for collection, analysis, and 

clandestine operations.215, 216 The RGB was established in 2009 during a reorganization of North 

Korea’s intelligence services, which transferred 

three intelligence agencies from the Korean 

Workers' Party and consolidated them under the 

National Defense Commission (disestablished 

and replaced by the State Affairs Commission 

in 2016).217 Administratively, the RGB is subordinate to the KPA General Staff Department.218

The RGB consists of six bureaus with compartmented functions, including operations, reconNorth Korean Intelligence Services 1707-13888

State Affairs Commission

Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un

Korean Workers’ Party

United Front 

Department

Cultural 

Exchange 

Bureau

Ministry of People’s 

Armed Forces

General Staff Department

Reconnaissance General Bureau

Ministry of State Security

Operations Reconnaissance Technology 

and Cyber

Overseas 

Intelligence

Inter-Korean 

Talks

Service 

Support
58

naissance, technology and cyberspace functions, 

overseas intelligence, inter-Korean talks, and 

service support.219 The RGB and its predecessor organizations have been tied to a number of 

foreign kidnappings, assassinations, state-sponsored terror attacks, cyberoperations, and infiltration operations.220 The RGB also oversees 

businesses in foreign countries, which are used 

as fronts for espionage, currency generation, 

cyberoperations, weapon sales, goods procurement, and other illicit activities.221, 222

RGB personnel are highly trained, attending an 

intelligence academy where operatives receive 

instruction in firearms and explosives, martial 

arts, underwater diving, and other activities before 

becoming operational.223 The RGB also recruits 

and co-opts foreign nationals to gather intelligence 

and execute operations in foreign countries.

Ministry of State Security

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is North 

Korea’s primary counterintelligence organization, tasked with operating North Korean prison 

camps, investigating cases of domestic espionage, 

repatriating defectors, and conducting overseas 

counterespionage activities in North Korea’s 

foreign missions.224 The MSS is an autonomous 

agency of the North Korean government, reporting directly to Kim Jong Un.225 Jong Kyong-thaek 

was appointed the Minister of State Security as 

of October 2017.226

The MSS executes its counterintelligence mission abroad as well as domestically and has been 

implicated in widespread human rights violations.227, 228 The MSS investigates political crimes 

and manages North Korea’s political prison 

camps, where prisoners are subject to extrajudicial punishments, brutal treatment, poor conditions, and summary executions.229 The MSS also 

enforces censorship laws related to foreign media 

and monitors the populace and foreign citizens in 

North Korea through technical surveillance, communications monitoring, recruited citizens, and 

random inspections.230 The MSS deploys agents 

globally—often under diplomatic cover in embassies and UN posts—to monitor North Korean 

personnel working overseas and to repatriate 

North Koreans. The MSS has increased its presence abroad because of North Korean defections 

in recent years.231

United Front Department

The United Front Department (UFD) is North 

Korea’s primary civilian intelligence agency, 

propaganda office, and policymaking entity for 

inter-Korean relations and dialogue.232 The UFD 

is directly subordinate to the Korean Workers' 

Party.233 The UFD overtly attempts to establish 

pro-North Korean groups in South Korea, such as 

the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council.234

Cultural Exchange Bureau

The Cultural Exchange Bureau (CEB) is responsible for running agents in South Korea to 

establish underground political parties focused 

on fomenting unrest, revolution, or pro-DPRK 

views. The CEB also conducts clandestine influence operations.235, 236
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North Korean Intelligence Services’ Covert and Clandestine Operations 1707-13888

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

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2012

2011

2010

2009

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1968

May - WannaCry ransomware attacks.

Feb - Murder of Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, in Malaysia.

Conducted cyber espionage against United States and other foreign government entities.

Nov - Hack of world banking system; $81 million stolen from Bangladeshi bank reserves through SWIFT.

3 Nov - Hack of Sony Pictures; destroyed 70 percent of firm’s computers, compromised employee PII and internal emails, resulted in 

 delay of movie release.

20 Apr - DarkSeoul cyberattack executed by North Korea; malware rendered tens of thousands of computers in South Korea’s financial 

 and media sectors inoperable.

Sep - Attempted assassination of defector Park Sang-hak by North Korean agent.

Jun - Denial-of-service attacks against U.S. and South Korean government telecommunications services led by RGB’s Lab 110 unit.

Attempted assassination of North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop.

North Korea hacking of South Korean and U.S. Defense Department networks.

Jun - North Korean midget submarine captured by South Korea on probable spy mission; all four 

 North Korean agents onboard committed suicide after killing five sailors from the sub’s crew.

Feb - Defector from extended Kim family, Lee Han-yong, assassinated outside his apartment building in Bundang, South Korea.

Sep - North Korean submarine on espionage mission infiltrated South Korean territory; 24 North Koreans killed, 13 South 

 Koreans killed, 1 North Korean missing, 1 North Korean captured.

Assassination of South Korean diplomat Choi Duk-keun in Vladivostok, Russia, by poison.

29 Nov - Bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 between Baghdad and Seoul by two North Korean agents; all 115 people onboard killed.

9 Oct - Attempted assassination of South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan in mausoleum bombing in Rangoon; 21 killed including 

 18 South Koreans.

Jan &

June - Kidnapping of South Korean actress Choi Eun-hee and producer Shin Sang-ok from Hong Kong.

15 Aug - Second assassination attempt on South Korean President Park Chung-hee in South Korea. Park’s wife, Yuk Young-soo, was 

 inadvertently killed in the attack.

11 Dec - North Korean agent hijacks domestic Korean Airlines Flight YS-11; holds passengers and crew hostage; 39 passengers 

later released, 11 kept in North Korea.

21 Jan - Failed raid on South Korea’s Blue House in an attempt to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee; South Korean 

and U.S. military personnel killed in the incident.
60

APPENDIX H: Defense Industry and the Energy Sector

North Korea places a high priority on its 

defense-industrial base because it produces 

the military hardware that Pyongyang views 

as essential to maintaining national security.237 North Korean government support for 

the defense industry comes at the expense 

of the country's civilian economy; while portions of the nonmilitary industrial base have 

become outdated and fallen into disrepair, key 

defense industries have continued to operate and modernize.238 North Korean defense 

factories produce a diverse array of military 

hardware, including small arms, a full range 

of munitions, light armored vehicles, tanks, 

naval ships and submarines, and advanced 

missile systems.239 Production priorities have 

shifted over the decades from a focus on large 

quantities of ground forces equipment in the 

1960s–1990s to the development of more 

capable missile systems.240

Although North Korea continues to pursue 

the ideal of self-reliance in weapon system 

development and production, it still requires 

materials and technology purchased on the 

open market abroad to improve domestic production capabilities and weapon system effectiveness. Pyongyang is attempting to upgrade 

select elements of its large arsenal of mostly 

outdated weapons and will continue to focus 

its limited production resources on force modernization, emphasizing strategic deterrence 

and defensive and asymmetric attack capabilities to counter the technological superiority of 

South Korean and U.S. forces.241 North Korea 

will produce limited amounts of improved 

equipment in the naval, aviation, and ground 

arms sectors, based on regime prioritization 

and resource availability.

Ballistic Missile Sector

In support of the growing regime-directed 

requirements to develop a nuclear-armed 

ballistic missile force capable of threatening 

the United States and the region, Pyongyang developed multiple longer-range liquid-propellant systems.242,243 North Korea is 

also testing new solid-propellant systems, an 

MRBM, an SLBM, and multiple SRBMs.244,245 

In addition, the country probably has several 

hundred SRBMs and MRBMs in its inventory, based on 1950s legacy Scud liquid-propellant technology.246

ICBMs

In July 2017, North Korea conducted its first 

two launches of an ICBM class system, testing the liquid-propellant Hwasong-14, which 

is capable of reaching the United States.247,248 

A follow-on flight-test of another new ICBM, 

Hwasong-15, occurred in November 2017. 

North Korea has displayed two other developmental liquid-propellant ICBMs that have 

yet to be flight-tested. In April 2012 and July 

2013, North Korea paraded six three-stage 

Hwasong-13 ICBMs on eight-axle transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). In October 2015, 

Pyongyang paraded four previously unseen 
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two-stage liquid-propellant ICBMs on the 

same eight-axle TELs used in 2012 and 2013; 

North Korea has not announced a name for 

this system.249,250,251,252,253 Then, in October 

2020, North Korea paraded 4 new larger 

ICBMs on 11-axle TELs; these missiles have 

not yet been tested.

SLBMs

North Korea has developed and produced its 

first SLBM system and a submarine launch 

platform, the single-launch-tube Gorae ballistic missile submarine and the Pukguksong-1 

missile, which was originally a liquid-propellant–fueled system but was replaced with a 

solid-fueled missile system. Solid fuel has a 

number of benefits, including being more stable and easier to handle, store, and transport. 

The medium-range Pukguksong-1 has been 

ejection-tested numerous times from both a 

land-based ejection stand and a seagoing ejection test barge. These tests culminated in an 

August 2016 launch in which the missile flew 

about 500 kilometers. North Korea reached 

this milestone after only 3 years of ejection 

tests and flight tests, which demonstrates a 

fast-paced missile development program.254,255

North Korea tested a second medium-range 

SLBM, Pukguksong-3 in 2019. Since then 

North Korea paraded 2 new SLBMs, the Pukguksong-4 in October 2020 and the Pukguksong-5 in January 2021. Pyongyang has not 

tested these new missiles or indicated which 

submarine will employ them. Improvements 

and expansion at Sinpo Shipyard indicate that 

North Korea may produce a larger submarine 

with the capability to carry and fire more than 

one missile at a time.256, 257

IRBMs

North Korea has two developmental liquid-propellant IRBM systems, the Musudan and the Hwasong-12. The Musudan 

was first displayed in a 2010 parade but 

was not flight-tested until 2016; seven of 

the eight tests ended in failure because missiles exploded on takeoff or early in flight.258 

The Hwasong-12 was first displayed in an 

April 2017 military parade and flight-tested 

New untested SLBM, October 2020.

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA

North Korea featured a new ICBM in its October 2020 

military parade.

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA
62

in mid-May 2017.259 The Hwasong-12 has a 

demonstrated range of over 3,700 kilometers, sufficient to reach Guam.260,261

SRBMs and MRBMs

North Korea’s SRBMs are the foundation of 

Pyongyang’s ballistic missile program. SRBMs 

are a proven capability that provides Pyongyang 

a reliable platform for testing and developing 

longer-range systems while holding at risk the 

United States and its allies on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan. North Korea probably has 

hundreds of Scud-based SRBMs and Scud-derived No Dong MRBMs that were developed 

and initially deployed during the mid-1980s to 

early 1990s. North Korea continues to develop 

new SRBM systems, including a liquid propellant SRBM on a new tracked TEL paraded 

in April 2017 and a SRBM similar to the Russian solid-propellant Iskander missile system 

paraded in 2018. North Korea tested a version 

of this missile and two other new SRBMs multiple times since May 2019.262,263,264,265 In October 

2020, North Korea paraded 52 solid propellant 

SRBMs on 6 different wheeled and tracked TEL 

chassis. North Korea introduced yet another 

SRBM at its January 2021 parade. It conducted 

the first test of this missile in March 2021. 

Additionally, in September 2021 North Korea 

tested a new rail-based launcher for an SRBM .

Pyongyang is developing a solid-propellant 

MRBM known as the Pukguksong-2, a landbased version of the developmental Pukguksong-1 SLBM. This is the largest known 

solid-propellant system produced by North 

Korea. The Pukguksong-2 was flight-tested in 

February and May of 2017 and is carried on a 

tracked TEL.266

Other Missile Developments

In its October 2020 military parade, Pyongyang 

displayed a new missile system mounting four 

previously unseen canisters on towed two-axle 

trailer launchers pulled by a three-axle cabover-engine truck. This system is likely a cruise 

missile, possibly a land-attack variant of North 

Korea’s anti-ship cruise missile. In September 

2021, North Korea tested LACMs from a 5 canHwasong-12 IRBM.

Image Source: AFP

North Korea launching a new type of SRBM; July 2019.

Image Source: Rodong Sinmun
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Kim Jong Un tours submarine construction hall; July 2019.

Image Source: Rodong Sinmun

ister TEL that had carried probable SRBMs in 

the October and January parades.

In an April 2017 military parade, Pyongyang 

displayed two previously unseen containerized ballistic missile systems, although 

actual airframes were not observed. The first 

system consisted of a capped launch tube 

mounted on an eight-axle TEL. The second 

system also had a capped launch tube, though 

slightly shorter than the first, mounted on a 

four-axle trailer pulled by a three-axle cabover-engine truck.267

Naval Sector

North Korea’s naval industry can produce 

vessels to support a coastal force which today 

comprises primarily aging patrol craft (that 

carry a variety of antiship cruise missiles, 

torpedoes, and guns) and a few large corvette-sized vessels. In addition, Pyongyang 

has built a large fleet of air-cushioned hovercraft and conventional landing craft to support amphibious operations and SOF insertion. Construction of surface ships during 

the past 5 years has concentrated on a small 

number of modern, higher speed designs 

for patrol boats and corvettes with minimal 
64

surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile 

capability. Naval shipyards are on both the 

east and west coasts, but because of insufficient resources they usually produce infrequently. The naval industry is able to maintain a portion of the North Korean Navy fleet 

with regular repair and maintenance capabilities, but many vessels remain pierside or in 

nonoperational condition.268 Submarine production efforts are focused at the Sinpo Shipyard on the east coast.

Aviation and Air Defense Sector

North Korea’s aviation industry is capable 

of assembling light, single-engine airplanes, 

such as the Cessna 172, and small-to-medium 

UAVs. In the 1980s and 1990s, the industry 

was able to assemble fixed-wing aircraft and 

helicopters from partially completed kits supplied by Russia, China, and other countries, 

but that capability has since waned. North 

Korea is unable to produce modern jet fighters 

and engines, instead relying on cannibalization and the purchase of spare parts from overseas markets to maintain its dated forces.269

North Korea has recently been flying small-tomedium–sized photoreconnaissance UAVs with 

autonomous GPS-waypoint navigation capabilities over the DMZ into South Korean territory. 

These UAVs are based on commercial Chinese 

designs; some systems are produced in China 

and purchased on the open market, and others 

are produced in North Korea using imported 

components. North Korea has built larger 

UAVs, including target drones and training 

simulators and probably attack drones. Most of 

these larger systems are based on older models procured from Russia and China, with the 

exception of a jet-powered UAV based on the 

U.S. MQM-107D Streaker system that probably 

was acquired from Middle Eastern sources.270

Ground Arms Sector

The majority of North Korean ground forces 

are equipped with 1950s–1970s Russian and 

Chinese light and medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, and towed and self-propelled 

artillery, or North Korean–developed versions 

of this legacy equipment. Since at least 2010, 

North Korea has produced only limited quantities of improved ground forces equipment, 

including an upgraded main battle tank, and 

the 300-mm MRL CRBM. In development since 

at least 2013, this CRBM system is equipped 

with two rocket pods carrying a total of eight 

guided rounds; the pods are mounted on a 

three-axle Chinese-origin truck chassis.271, 272

Long-range self-propelled artillery piece, one of thousands of such guns capable of striking Seoul.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP
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In August 2010, North Korean news media 

aired video footage of the regime’s new main 

battle tank. The tank has features similar 

to the Russian T-72, which would provide 

improved performance over Pyongyang’s Chonma-ho family of tanks that is based on the Russian T-62. The tank probably is in service with 

only one armored unit in the Army.273

In a September 2018 military parade, Pyongyang displayed a new tracked, self-propelled 

artillery gun and a tactical guided missile system, most likely an anti-tank guided or surface-to-air missile, mounted on a six-wheeled 

armored chassis. It is unknown if either of these 

systems is currently deployed with the KPA.274

In October 2020, North Korea paraded several 

new systems that showcased North Korea’s 

continued defense industrial activity to diversify and modernize its military force, in spite 

of strict sanctions. These included a new tank 

design that had flat armor panels around the 

turret and seven road-wheels; previous tanks 

only had six. It also paraded never-before-seen 

light armored vehicles with gun turrets and 

anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. These new 

systems are not yet fielded.

The Energy Sector

North Korea’s oil and gas sector remains in a 

state of disrepair because of sanctions and years 

of neglect. The country has no oil and natural gas 

production and relies on crude oil imports from 

China to meet demand.275 Pyongyang officially 

imports a small amount of refined petroleum 

products from China and Russia.276 Although 

North Korea reportedly has some oil and gas 

reserves offshore as well as on land, the country 

does not have the technical expertise to explore 

or develop these resources.277,278 China exports 

about 10,000 barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil by 

pipeline to North Korea’s only operating refinery, in Paengma Ri (29,000-b/d capacity).

North Korea’s other refinery, in Sonbong 

(45,000-b/d capacity), was constructed to process Russian and Middle Eastern crude oil 

imports. It has been shut down since the late 

1990s because of the breakdown in the Six-Party 

Talks on nuclear disarmament and because of 

payment issues.279

North Korea gives priority to the military over 

the civilian population when it comes to providing access to refined petroleum products. Since 

2018, the United States and its allies observed 

North Korean maritime vessels using illicit 

at-sea, ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum from 

third-country tankers to acquire additional 

refined petroleum as a way to mitigate the 

New main battle tank, paraded in 2020.

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA
66

effects of UNSC sanctions.280 These ship-to-ship 

transfers stabilized North Korea’s fuel supplies 

and prices, though acute shortages still affect 

civilian industry and military operations.281

North Korea’s electric power sector cannot 

meet the country’s demand for electricity due 

to decades of overuse, poor maintenance, and 

equipment shortages. Since the early 1990s, 

North Korea has experienced frequent blackouts and has the third-lowest electric power 

consumption per capita among East Asian and 

Pacific countries.282,283 In his 2019 New Year 

Address Kim Jong Un identified increasing 

electricity generation as one of the most important goals for improving the North Korean economy.284 North Korea is exploring ways to use 

wind and solar energy for electricity generation 

to reduce its reliance on oil imports and vulnerability to international sanctions. North Korea 

and China jointly operate four hydroelectric 

power plants on the Yalu River that accounted 

for 16 to 17 percent of North Korea’s total electricity production in 2013.285
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APPENDIX I: Arms Sales

North Korea has exported conventional arms 

and ballistic missiles for several decades. 

Despite the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718,286

1874,287 2087,288 2094,289 2270,290 2321,291 and 

2356,292 which prohibit North Korea from selling weapons and providing related technical 

training, Pyongyang continues to market, sell, 

and deliver weapons-related goods and services. Weapon sales are an important source 

of foreign currency for North Korea’s weapons 

programs, and thus, Pyongyang is unlikely 

to cease export activity despite UN Security 

Council sanctions,293 increased international 

efforts to interdict North Korea's weapons-related exports, and the implementation of Executive Order 13382, under which designated 

WMD proliferators’ access to the United States 

and global financial systems is targeted.

Global concern about North Korea’s proliferation activities continues to mount, leading 

some countries, such as Namibia, to halt new 

purchases from Pyongyang and leading other 

nations to take action to prevent arms-related 

deliveries.294,295 Although some of its weapons 

transfer attempts have been interdicted by the 

international community, North Korea very 

likely will continue to attempt arms shipments 

via new and increasingly complex routes.

North Korea uses a worldwide network to 

facilitate arms sales activities and has had a 

core, but now dwindling, group of customers 

that include Iran, Syria, and Uganda. Other 

customers, such as Sudan, have recently 

agreed to end arms cooperation with Pyongyang.296,297 North Korea has transferred ballistic missile–related equipment, components, 

materials, and technical assistance to countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 

Conventional weapons sales have included 

ammunition, small arms, radars, and SAMs 

as well as related repairs, technical support 

services, and military equipment production 

facilities.298,299 In late 2009, North Korea was 

implicated in the attempted sale of rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons to 

Iran or possibly to Hizballah when Thailand 

interdicted and seized a cargo plane laden 

with arms.300 In 2013, a North Korean ship, 

the Chong Chon Gang, was held by Panamanian authorities as it attempted to transit the Panama Canal laden with 240 tons 

of military equipment, including a MiG-21 

fighter aircraft, concealed under a licit cargo 

shipment of sugar. North Korea claimed that 

it was repairing the equipment for Cuba.301

In addition to Iran and Syria, past clients for 

North Korea’s ballistic missiles and associated 

technology have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 

Pakistan, and Yemen.302 Burma has begun distancing itself from North Korea, but concerns 

remain regarding lingering arms trade ties 

between the two countries.303

North Korea uses various methods to circumvent UNSCRs,304 including falsifying end-user 

certificates,305 mislabeling crates,306 sending 

cargo through multiple front companies and 

intermediaries,307 and using air cargo for deliveries of high-value and sensitive arms exports.308

North Korea has demonstrated a willingness 

to proliferate nuclear technology.309 Using the 

proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear 

scientist A.Q. Khan,310 in early 2001, North 

Korea provided Muamar Qadafi’s Libya with 
68

North Korea’s Conventional Weapons and Missile-Related 

Customers, 2002-2020 1707-13887

North Korea is a viable alternative for those countries that cannot obtain military equipment from other 

suppliers because of sanctions or severe budgetary constraints. North Korean military sales to Iraq predate 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

uranium hexafluoride311 – the form of uranium 

used in the uranium enrichment process to 

produce fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear 

weapons. This material was removed in 2004 

by the United States and United Kingdom 

under the terms of an agreement to eliminate 

Libya’s nuclear weapons program.312,313 North 

Korea also provided Syria with nuclear reactor 

technology until 2007.314, 315
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AAA Anti-aircraft artillery

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

BW Biological weapons

CMC Central Military Commission

CRBM Close-range ballistic missile

CW Chemical weapons

C3I Command, control, communications, 

and intelligence

D&D Denial and deception

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GPS Global Positioning System

ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile

IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile

KPA Korean People’s Army

MANPADS Man-portable air defense system

MND Ministry of National Defense

MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile

MRLS Multiple rocket launcher system

MSS Ministry of State Security

MWe Megawatts electrical

RGB Reconnaissance General Bureau

RMTU Reserve Military Training Unit

RYG Red Youth Guard

SAC State Affairs Commission

SAM Surface-to-air missile

SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLV Space launch vehicle

SOF Special Operations Forces

SRBM Short-range ballistic missile

 TEL Transporter-erector-launcher

UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle

UGF Underground facility

UN United Nations

UNSCR United Nations Security Council 

Resolution

WPRG Worker Peasant Red Guard

ACRONYMS
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