NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CLIFFORD L. NOLL,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2024-1174

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:23-cv-00294-TMD, Judge Thompson M. Dietz.

______________________ 

Decided: July 24, 2024

______________________ 

CLIFFORD L. NOLL, Coeur d’Alene, ID, pro se.

 SAMUEL PATRICK JONES, Tax Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by MICHAEL J. HAUNGS, DAVID A.

HUBBERT. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, LINN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Case: 24-1174 Document: 17 Page: 1 Filed: 07/24/2024
2 NOLL v. US

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Clifford L. Noll appeals the United States 

Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of his complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. Because Mr. Noll has not alleged any claim that falls within the limited jurisdiction of 

the trial court, we affirm.

I 

On February 27, 2023, Mr. Noll, proceeding pro se, 

filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims. S.A.1 9–

14. In his complaint, he alleged a number of claims against 

the government for actions taken by the Internal Revenue 

Service (IRS) to satisfy Mr. Noll’s tax liability. Mr. Noll alleges that in 1988, the IRS unlawfully filed a federal tax 

lien against his property in the amount of $125,916.80 and

that the IRS later sold that property to recover the amount 

owed. He also alleges that the IRS improperly seized 

$3,000 from his bank account in 2000. As explained by the 

trial court, “Mr. Noll asserts that these actions by the IRS 

amount to, among other claims, trespass and violation of 

his constitutional rights because he denies the legitimacy 

of the underlying tax liability and, by extension, the attempts to satisfy the tax liability.” Noll v. United States, 

No. 1:23-cv-00294-TMD (Fed. Cl. July 24, 2023), ECF No. 

10 at 2; S.A. 3. Mr. Noll’s complaint sought $35,664,300 in 

damages “to be paid in United States of America minted 

gold coins.” S.A. 10.

On April 17, 2023, the government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), asserting that, even if 

Mr. Noll’s complaint is liberally construed, none of the 

1 Citations to “S.A.” refer to the Supplemental Appendix submitted with the government’s response brief. 

See ECF No. 10.

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NOLL v. US 3

alleged claims could properly confer jurisdiction. In considering the motion to dismiss, the trial court first noted that, 

although claims by pro se plaintiffs “are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” 

S.A. 3 (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)), Mr. Noll was “not excused or exempt from meeting the Court’s jurisdictional 

requirements,” S.A. 3 (citing Henke v. United States, 60 

F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 

The trial court found that “Mr. Noll’s complaint, when 

construed liberally, alleges claims for due process violations, a Fifth Amendment taking, tort, illegal collections 

activities, and a claim for refund,” but even generously construed, “his complaint fails to properly invoke this Court’s 

jurisdiction, and, therefore, his complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” S.A. 4. The 

court first noted that it did not have jurisdiction to consider

Mr. Noll’s Fourth Amendment claim or Fifth Amendment 

due process claim, because neither were money-mandating 

claims as required by the Tucker Act. Next, the court rejected any attempt by Mr. Noll to establish jurisdiction by 

citing an Idaho state statute, because the Court of Federal 

Claims “does not have jurisdiction over claims arising out 

of state statutes or regulations.” S.A. 4 (citing Murray v. 

United States, 817 F.2d 1580, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 

With respect to Mr. Noll’s Fifth Amendment takings claim, 

the trial court found that dismissal was appropriate because Mr. Noll did not “concede the validity of the government action which is the basis of the claim,” which is 

required to maintain such a claim under the Tucker Act. 

S.A. 5 (citing Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 

796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). For Mr. Noll’s allegations of trespass and fraud, the trial court explained that such claims 

“sound in tort, or allege criminal conduct,” S.A. 5 (quoting 

Cycenas v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 485, 498 (2015)), and 

accordingly, cannot be heard in the Court of Federal 

Claims, S.A. 5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). Next, the 

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4 NOLL v. US

court noted that although “Mr. Noll’s complaint can reasonably be construed to allege a wrongful levy against his 

property and unauthorized collection actions by IRS agents 

to satisfy his tax liability,” such claims are limited to the 

exclusive jurisdiction of “a district court of the United 

States.” S.A. 5 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 7426(a)(1), 7433(a)). Finally, the trial court found that Mr. Noll had not met the 

jurisdictional prerequisites for it to consider a tax refund 

claim—namely, Mr. Noll had not provided any evidence or 

allegations that he either made a payment of taxes, or that 

he filed a tax refund claim with the IRS. Accordingly, the 

trial court granted the government’s motion and dismissed 

the case without prejudice. 

Mr. Noll timely appealed the dismissal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Waltner v. 

United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), gives it jurisdiction over “claims for money damages against the 

United States” founded upon “‘any Act of Congress’” in 

cases not sounding in tort. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 

1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). To come within the court’s 

Tucker Act jurisdiction, however, “a plaintiff must identify 

a separate source of substantive law that creates the right 

to money damages”—in other words, a source that is 

“money-mandating.” Id.

We see no error in the trial court’s conclusion that it 

lacked jurisdiction over any claim in Mr. Noll’s complaint. 

As an initial matter, we agree with the trial court’s liberal 

interpretation of the claims raised in the complaint, and

Mr. Noll does not contest the court’s characterization on 

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NOLL v. US 5

appeal. With respect to Mr. Noll’s allegations of either a 

Fourth Amendment violation or Fifth Amendment due process violation, this court has held that such clauses are not 

money-mandating. See Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 

1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The law is well settled that 

the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments do not mandate the payment of money and 

thus do not provide a cause of action under the Tucker 

Act.”); In re United States, 463 F.3d 1328, 1335 n.5 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006) (“We agree that because the Due Process Clause 

is not money-mandating, it may not provide the basis for 

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.”); Brown v. United 

States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because monetary damages are not available for a Fourth Amendment 

violation, the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over a such a violation.” (citing United States v. 

Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983))). Further, to the extent 

that Mr. Noll attempts to save these claims by citing Idaho 

state law, see, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 9; Reply Br. 7, he cannot 

prevail. See Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 

1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Claims founded on state law 

are also outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of the 

Court of Federal Claims.”).

We also agree with the trial court that Mr. Noll’s complaint fails to the extent that it can be read as seeking monetary relief under the Internal Revenue Code for unlawful 

tax collection actions. As explained by the trial court, the 

provisions within the Internal Revenue Code that provide 

avenues for taxpayers to bring these types of claims, for example, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7426 and 7433, grant exclusive jurisdiction over such claims to “a district court of the United 

States.” 26 U.S.C. §§ 7426(a)(1), 7433(a). “The Court of 

Federal Claims is not a district court of the United States,” 

and therefore, is not the proper venue for these claims. See

Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 

2002). 

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6 NOLL v. US

The trial court was also correct to hold that it did not 

have jurisdiction over Mr. Noll’s allegations of trespass and 

fraud. The Tucker Act and our case law interpreting the 

Act are clear that the Court of Federal Claims does not 

have jurisdiction over tort claims, including trespass and 

fraud. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); Souders, 497 F.3d at 1307

(“It is immediately clear that the tort claims are clearly 

outside the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal 

Claims and thus cannot be transferred there.”). To the extent that Mr. Noll raises allegations based on criminal statutes—such as a claim for “extortion,” see S.A. 13—these 

claims also fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379

(Fed. Cir. 1994). 

Mr. Noll has also not satisfied the jurisdictional requirements to bring a claim for a tax refund. In order for

the trial court to have jurisdiction over a tax refund claim, 

“the taxpayer must make full payment of the tax liability, 

bring a timely claim for refund with the IRS, and file a 

timely complaint after the refund claim is denied or 

deemed denied.” Walby v. United States, 957 F.3d 1295, 

1298 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing I.R.C. §§ 7422(a), 6532(a); 

Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); 

see also Dixon v. United States, 67 F.4th 1156, 1161 (Fed. 

Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608–

10 (1990)). As the trial court pointed out, Mr. Noll has done 

none of this, and in fact, continues to assert that he is not 

subject to federal income tax. See S.A 5–6; Appellant’s Br. 

2–5.

Finally, we agree with the trial court that dismissal of 

Mr. Noll’s takings claim was appropriate. Although the 

Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a 

money-mandating source under the Tucker Act, see Jan’s 

Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008), to maintain a takings claim, a claimant must 

also make a “nonfrivolous allegation” that he is within the 

class of plaintiffs entitled to recover under that clause, id., 

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NOLL v. US 7

and he “must concede the validity of the Government action 

which is the basis of the . . . claim,” Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at

802–03. Again, there is nothing in the record to support a 

finding that Mr. Noll has conceded the validity of the government’s sale of his property.2

III

We have considered Mr. Noll’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated above, 

we affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

2 The trial court characterized the dismissal of 

Mr. Noll’s takings claim as a dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. S.A. 4–5. We note that this court has, 

at times, considered similar dismissals to be jurisdictional, 

see Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1331

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at 802), and at 

other times, to be dismissals for failure to state a claim, see 

Tindall v. United States, No. 2024-1143, 2024 WL 960452, 

at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024) (nonprecedential) (also citing 

Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at 802–03). Regardless how the issue 

is framed, we find that dismissal was appropriate. See 

Brown v. United States, 22 F.4th 1008, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 

2022) (holding that, in the context of a tax refund statute, 

the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was harmless error because the claim could properly 

be dismissed for failure to state a claim).

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