J-S46036-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STANLEY JONES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 342 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009096-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2020

Stanley Jones (“Jones”) appeals from the Order dismissing his first 

Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On February 2, 2013, while on patrol near the Somerset Subway Station 

in Philadelphia, a Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 

(“SEPTA”) police officer observed Jones urinating on the outside wall of a 

building. The officer approached Jones and instructed him to place his hands 

against the wall. The officer searched Jones, and felt what he believed to be 

a handgun in Jones’s front waistband. Before the officer could retrieve the 

object, Jones fled from the officer.

The SEPTA officer chased Jones on foot, while a second SEPTA officer 

followed in a police vehicle. During the chase, the pursuing SEPTA officer 

observed Jones throw a silver object under a parked gray pickup truck. The 
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two SEPTA officers eventually caught Jones and placed him under arrest. The 

officers then searched underneath the gray pickup truck, and discovered a 

silver Smith & Wesson firearm.

Jones was subsequently charged with, inter alia, persons not to possess 

firearms.

1

 On October 9, 2013, Jones filed an Omnibus Pre-trial Motion, 

requesting, in relevant part, suppression of the firearm. Following a hearing, 

the trial court denied the Motion with regard to suppression of the firearm.

Following a jury trial, Jones was found guilty of possession of a firearm 

prohibited. This Court affirmed Jones’s judgment of sentence, and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Jones’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 

See Commonwealth v. Jones, 181 A.3d 1255 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 187 A.3d 205 (Pa. 2018).

Jones filed a timely PCRA Petition, pro se. The PCRA court appointed 

Jones counsel, who filed an Amended PCRA Petition. The PCRA court issued

a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of its intention to dismiss the Petition without a 

hearing, and subsequently dismissed Jones’s Petition. Jones, pro se, filed a 

timely Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise 

Statement of matters complained of on appeal. Jones’s counsel then filed an 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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amended Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement.2

On appeal, Jones raises the following claims for our review:

1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA [P]etition 

when evidence was presented that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to adequately challenge the jurisdictional authority of the 

[SEPTA] police, as well as the subsequent detention and arrest of 

[Jones][?]

2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA [P]etition 

when evidence was presented that [Jones]’s constitutional rights 

were violated by the prosecutor’s improper reference[,] during 

closing statements[,] to facts that were not introduced into 

evidence[?]

3. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA [P]etition 

when evidence was presented that [Jones]’s constitutional rights 

were violated by the extra-territorial actions of the [SEPTA] 

police[?]

4. Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary 

hearing[?]

Brief for Appellant at 8.

“The standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is 

whether that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free 

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Weimer, 167 A.3d 78, 81 (Pa. Super. 

____________________________________________

2

In its Opinion, the PCRA court indicates that it treated Jones’s pro se Concise 

Statement as a legal nullity, because Jones was still represented by counsel 

at the time of its filing. The PCRA court further stated that although the 

Concise Statement filed by Jones’s counsel was untimely, it was able to 

address the claims raised therein. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 

428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that “[i]f there has been an untimely 

filing, this Court may decide the appeal on the merits if the trial court had 

adequate opportunity to prepare an opinion addressing the issues being raised 

on appeal.”). We therefore will address the issues raised by Jones. 
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2017). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no 

support for the findings in the certified record.” Id. (citation omitted). 

In his first claim,3 Jones argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to “adequately” challenge the SEPTA officers’ jurisdiction to stop and 

frisk Jones. Id. at 14-16. Jones concedes that his trial counsel made this 

argument in his Omnibus Pre-trial Motion, but asserts that his trial counsel 

failed to present a “competent and compelling legal argument.” Id. at 15. 

According to Jones, trial counsel did not present any relevant legal precedent 

in support of his argument to the court. Id.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA, 

a petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

counsel’s ineffectiveness “so undermined the truth-determining process that 

no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Specifically, a petitioner must establish that “the 

underlying claim has arguable merit; second, that counsel had no reasonable 

basis for his action or inaction; and third, that [the a]ppellant was prejudiced.” 

Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2014). “A 

PCRA petitioner must address each of these prongs on appeal.” 

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3 Jones’s Argument section labels and addresses his claims in a different 

numerical order than his Statement of Questions Involved. Specifically, claims 

1 and 3 are flipped. We will refer to Jones’s claims as they are referenced in 

his Statement of Questions Involved.
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Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018). Counsel is 

presumed to be effective and the burden is on the appellant to prove 

otherwise. Commonwealth v. Hannible, 30 A.3d 426, 439 (Pa. 2011). A 

failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection 

of the claim. Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010).

Here, Jones raised the instant underlying claim on direct appeal to this 

Court. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 181 A.3d 1255 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(unpublished memorandum at *1) (wherein this court quoted Jones’s first 

claim on appeal as “[d]id not the trial court err in denying [Jones’s] Motion to 

Suppress physical evidence where the [SEPTA] police were outside of their 

jurisdiction when they stopped [Jones]....”). This Court concluded that the 

SEPTA officers 

had jurisdiction over area surrounding Somerset Station...; 

[SEPTA] officers were responsible for patrolling Somerset Station 

and [a] two block radius around [the] Station to enforce qualityof-life-crimes; around 3:45 p.m. on February 2, 2013, two 

[SEPTA] officers observed [Jones] urinate in public within [a] two 

block radius of Somerset Station; based on [Jones’s] location, 

[SEPTA] officers had jurisdiction to stop [Jones], and legal 

authority to arrest Appellant for summary offense of public 

urination and to perform search-incident-to-arrest of [Jones’s]

person....

Id. at *2; see also Commonwealth v. Bloom, 979 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (setting forth the jurisdiction of SEPTA officers). Accordingly,

since this Court has already determined that Jones’s underlying claim lacks 

arguable merit, his ineffectiveness claim thus fails. Charleston, supra.
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In his second claim, Jones argues that his constitutional right to due 

process was violated when the prosecutor made statements in his closing 

argument that were not supported by the evidence produced at trial. See

Brief for Appellant at 13. Jones contends that, at trial, he questioned why 

there was no DNA evidence linking him to the firearm that he was charged 

with possessing. Id. According to Jones, the prosecutor attempted to rebut 

this claim by stating in his closing argument that the City of Philadelphia lacked 

financial resources to perform DNA testing on every case. Id. Jones claims 

that there was no evidence produced at trial to support the prosecutor’s 

assertion. Id.

Here, Jones makes bald assertions that the prosecutor’s statements 

violated his constitutional right to due process, without citing to any relevant 

legal authority or developing any meaningful argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a) (providing that an appellant’s argument shall include “such discussion 

and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”) “[W]here an appellate 

brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant 

authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable 

of review, that claim is waived.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 

924 (Pa. 2009). It is not the role of this Court to “formulate [an a]ppellant’s 
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arguments for him.” Id. at 925. Because Jones failed to properly develop 

this claim for our review, it is waived.4

In his third claim, Jones argues that the SEPTA police officers violated 

his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, when they stopped him without jurisdiction. Id.

This claim is identical to the claim underlying Jones’s ineffectiveness of 

counsel allegation set forth in his first claim. As we discussed infra, Jones 

raised this claim on direct appeal, and this Court concluded that the SEPTA 

officers had jurisdiction over the area in which Jones was stopped. See

Commonwealth v. Jones, 181 A.3d 1255 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished 

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4 Even if Jones had developed this claim for our review, similarly to Jones’s 

first claim, he raised this claim on direct appeal with this Court, and we found 

that it lacked merit. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 181 A.3d 1255 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum at *1) (stating Jones’s fourth issue 

on appeal as “[d]id not the trial court err in allowing the Commonwealth’s 

attorney to argue in closing to the jury that the firearm in this case was not 

tested for fingerprints or DNA because of municipal funding issues ... where 

that argument had no basis in evidence....”); id. at *2 (stating, in relevant 

part, that “Commonwealth’s remark was a fair response to defense counsel’s 

closing argument, which questioned why police did not process firearm for 

fingerprint and DNA evidence; additionally, Commonwealth’s comment did not 

prejudice Appellant; further, court properly took judicial notice of funding 

issues in Philadelphia, which is matter of common knowledge in 

Philadelphia....”); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (stating that in order to 

be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the Petitioner must plead and prove 

“[t]hat the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.”). 

Accordingly, this claim is not cognizable under the PCRA. See

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 96 (Pa. 2012) (stating that previously 

litigated claims are not cognizable under the PCRA).
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memorandum at *2). Accordingly, this claim lacks merit, and is not cognizable 

under the PCRA. See Spotz, supra.

In his fourth claim, Jones argues that the PCRA court erred by failing to 

grant him an evidentiary hearing. Brief for Appellant at 16. Jones claims that 

he “raised significant instances of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness,” and the 

“PCRA court offered no analysis to indicate that every conceivable legitimate 

benefit was given to each claim” that he raised. Id.

[A] PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a PCRA petition 

without a hearing if the court is satisfied that there are no genuine 

issues concerning any material fact; that the defendant is not 

entitled to post-conviction collateral relief; and that no legitimate 

purpose would be served by further proceedings.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 161 A.3d 960, 964 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations 

omitted). “[A]s to ineffectiveness claims in particular, if the record reflects 

that the underlying issue is of no arguable merit or no prejudice resulted, no 

evidentiary hearing is required.” Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 

A.3d 708, 726-27 (Pa. 2014).

Because the record reflects that Jones’s arguments lack arguable merit, 

we conclude that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 

Jones’s Petition without a hearing. See Brown, supra.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/29/20