alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Joan Harriman, Appellant, v Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company et al., Respondents.

In an *586action to recover the proceeds of a policy of insurance, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McCarthy, J.), dated April 21, 1989, as denied her motion for leave to amend her complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff moved to increase the ad damnum clause of her complaint to an amount beyond the liability limits of her homeowner’s insurance policy for losses which are clearly not covered under that policy. She contends that, as a result of the defendant’s bad faith in refusing to settle her claim for the loss of the use of her home, she has sustained a plethora of consequential damages. These include, among other things, the loss of her business, costs of refinancing her home and of defending against foreclosure actions, legal fees which were not incurred in the instant action, lost income, and miscellaneous costs for such things as postage and photocopying.

Generally, an insurer’s liability is limited to the face amount of the policy, plus appropriate interest (see, *Samovar of Russia Jewelry Antique Corp. v Generali, Gen. Ins. Co.,*102 AD2d 279, 281). Under certain circumstances, liability in excess of the face amount of the policy may be imposed on a liability insurance carrier for breach of its implied duty to act in good faith in its performance of the contract *(see, Gordon v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,*30 NY2d 427, *cert denied*410 US 931). However, the plaintiffs claims here are speculative, remote, and could not have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of this insurance contract *(see, DiBlasi v Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,*147 AD2d 93, 103). In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to increase the ad damnum clause of her complaint *(see, Dolan v Garden City Union Free School Dist.,*113 AD2d 781, 785).

We have examined the plaintiffs remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J. P., Eiber, Balletta and Ritter, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ANTONIO GONZALEZ, Jr., 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50016 

D.C. No. 3:16-cr-01835-CAB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 13, 2018**

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Antonio Gonzalez, Jr., appeals his bench-trial conviction for importation of 

heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Gonzalez contends that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 16 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-50016 

prove the elements of a duress defense. We review mixed questions of law and 

fact de novo. See United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 

2012).

The district court did not err in concluding that Gonzalez had failed to 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted under duress. See 

United States v. Solorzano-Rivera, 368 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004). The court 

was entitled to question Gonzalez’s credibility. See United States v. Archdale, 229 

F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the record supports the court’s 

conclusion that the threat alleged by Gonzalez was insufficient to support his 

duress defense. See 9th Cir. Crim. Jury Instr. 6.5 (2010) (to establish duress, 

defendant must prove that threat was “present, immediate, or impending”); United 

States v. Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d 931, 948 (9th Cir. 2012) (a threat is 

“immediate” only if it is specific; “vague and undetailed threats will not suffice”).

AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 705 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 705

    To amend title 36, United States Code, to ensure that memorials 
commemorating the service of the United States Armed Forces may contain 
               religious symbols, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 11, 2013

  Mr. Burr (for himself, Mr. Johanns, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Isakson, and Mr. 
   Boozman) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend title 36, United States Code, to ensure that memorials 
commemorating the service of the United States Armed Forces may contain 
               religious symbols, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``War Memorial Protection Act of 
2013''.

SEC. 2. INCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AS PART OF MILITARY MEMORIALS.

    (a) Authority.--Chapter 21 of title 36, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 2115. Inclusion of religious symbols as part of military 
              memorials
    ``(a) Inclusion of Religious Symbols Authorized.--To recognize the 
religious background of members of the United States Armed Forces, 
religious symbols may be included as part of--
            ``(1) a military memorial that is established or acquired 
        by the United States Government; or
            ``(2) a military memorial that is not established by the 
        United States Government, but for which the American Battle 
        Monuments Commission cooperated in the establishment of the 
        memorial.
    ``(b) Military Memorial Defined.--In this section, the term 
`military memorial' means a memorial or monument commemorating the 
service of the United States Armed Forces. The term includes works of 
architecture and art described in section 2105(b) of this title.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following:

``2115. Inclusion of religious symbols as part of military 
                            memorials.''.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10946

Summary Calendar

__________________

COREY DESHUN WILLIS,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, TEXAS DEPARTMENT

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

 Respondent-Appellee.

---------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:95-CV-077-Y

----------------------

December 11, 1996

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Corey Deshun Willis, a Texas prisoner (# 643988), appeals

the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. He argues that his guilty plea to a

robbery-by-threats charge was involuntary and that the

prosecution breached his plea agreement, that his attorney was
No. 95-10946

-2-

ineffective for causing him to plead guilty by telling him that

he would receive an early parole date, and that counsel was

ineffective in other respects. Willis has failed to show that

his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. See

James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1996). His primary

ineffective-assistance claim is meritless because he has not

shown that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial in the

absence of allegedly erroneous advice concerning his parole

eligibility. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 

Willis’ remaining ineffective assistance claims are waived by

entry of a valid guilty plea. Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677,

682 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906 (1984). Willis

is not entitled to appointed counsel on appeal; his motion for

appointed counsel is DENIED. See Self v. Blackburn, 751 F.2d

789, 793 & n.19 (5th Cir. 1985). Willis’ motion to strike a

clerk’s office order granting the respondent’s unopposed motion

to expand the record on appeal by filing a transcript of Willis’

plea proceeding is also DENIED.

AFFIRMED.

MOTIONS DENIED.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1

                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-18063, 333-47481, 333-32551, 333-47545,
333-84593 and 333-77835), Form S-3 (File Nos. 333-46557 and 333-44003) and
Form S-4 (File No. 333-89491) of Summit Design, Inc. and subsidiaries of our
report dated January 28, 2000 relating to the consolidated financial
statements, which appears in the Annual Report to Shareholders, which is
incorporated in this Annual Report on Form 10-K. We also consent to the
incorporation by reference of our report dated January 28, 2000 relating to
the financial statement schedule, which appears in this Form 10-K.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP

Portland, Oregon
March 1, 2000
February 24, 2016 

Mr. Gregory S. Winton 

The Aviation Law Firm 

Counsel to Leading Edge Associates Inc. 

1997 Annapolis Exchange Parkway 

Annapolis, MD 21401 

Dear Mr. Winton: 

This letter is to inform you that we are rescinding the December 11, 2015 Grant of Exemption 

No. 11530A. 

On December 11, 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued Exemption No. 

11530A to Leading Edge Associates, Inc. That exemption from §§ 61.23(a) and (c), 

61.101(e)(4) and (5), 61.113(a), 61.315(a), 91.7(a), 91.119(c), 91.121, 91.151(a)(1), 

91.405(a), 91.407(a)(1), 91.409(a)(1) and (2), and 91.417(a) and (b) of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations (14 CFR), added the Leading Edge Precision Vision 30 aircraft to their 

existing exemption. After reviewing this grant of amendment, the FAA is rescinding 

Exemption No. 11530A. 

On July 1, 2015, Leading Edge Associates, Inc. submitted a petition to amend Exemption No. 

11530A to add the Leading Edge Precision Vision 30 aircraft and the application of larvacides 

and adulticides for mosquito control to their existing exemption, originally issued May 11, 

2015 for aerial data collection with the Leading Edge Precision Vision 10 aircraft. On January 

6, 2016, the FAA received a letter from Rep. Mark Meadows inquiring about the omission of 

the request to add the application of larvacides and adulticides for mosquito control to their 

exemption. Upon review of the grant of amendment, the FAA determined that the amendment 

indeed did not address the petitioner’s request to add the application of larvacides and 

adulticides for mosquito control. Additionally, the FAA determined that the amendment was 

issued in error, and will need to take appropriate action to rescind the amendment issued on 

December 11, 2015. 

In accordance with the statutory criteria provided in Section 333 of Public Law 112−95 in 

reference to 49 U.S.C. § 44704, and in consideration of the size, weight, speed, and limited 

operating area associated with the aircraft and its operation, the Secretary of Transportation 

must determine that this aircraft meets the conditions of Section 333. This determination has 

not been made for the Leading Edge Precision Vision 30 aircraft. Consistent with prior 

practice, when notified of these types of errors, the FAA will act to rectify the situation. 
 2

The FAA is evaluating the amendment request dated July 1, 2015 for additional aircraft and 

operations is hereby under at this time. When the FAA completes its review, we will proceed 

accordingly and no further action will be required by the petitioner. The FAA will contact the 

petitioner if additional information is needed to process the request. 

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that Exemption No. 11530A was granted in error. 

Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113 and 44701, 

delegated to me by the Administrator, Exemption No. 11530A is rescinded effective 

immediately. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

John S. Duncan 

Director, Flight Standards Service
*

* Information has been Redacted in accordance with the two principled exceptions of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act 

(FATAA) of 2016; including the health and security of implementing partners, as well as national interest of the United States.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6354
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus PERSONNE ELRICO MCGHEE, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CA-96-136-5, CR-93-46) Submitted: October 23, 1997 Decided: November 14, 1997 Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Personne Elrico McGhee, Appellant Pro Se. Paul Thomas Camilletti, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district co urt's order accepting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and declining to reduce Appellant's sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (1994). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. McGhee , Nos. CR-93-46; CA-96-136-5 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 22, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Albert F. SETLIFF.

No. 54197.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 19, 1973.

In re: Albert F. Setliff applying for Writs of Certiorari, Review, Prohibition, Mandamus and for Stay Order.

Writ denied. Relator has an adequate remedy in the event of conviction.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM DECEMBER 31,
1995 ANNUAL REPORT ON 10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                         182,901
<SECURITIES>                                    72,806
<RECEIVABLES>                                  641,364
<ALLOWANCES>                                    79,536
<INVENTORY>                                    173,568
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,248,037
<PP&E>                                       2,078,439
<DEPRECIATION>                                 903,608
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,817,159
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,035,190
<BONDS>                                        247,934
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    576,379
<COMMON>                                       105,698
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,124,159
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,817,159
<SALES>                                      3,448,287
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,448,287
<CGS>                                        1,843,475
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,843,475
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               634,077
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                25,184
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              29,467
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (455,013)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (116,030)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (338,983)
<DISCONTINUED>                               1,578,458
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                      (12,724)
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,226,751
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    10.02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    10.02
        

</TABLE>
# Iris Oifigiúil C 222I/2021

| | ISSN 1977-107X |
| --- | --- |
| Iris Oifigiúil
  an Aontais Eorpaigh | C 222I |
| | |
| An t-eagrán Gaeilge | Faisnéis agus Fógraí | 6411 Meitheamh 2021 |

ISSN 1977-107X

Iris Oifigiúil

an Aontais Eorpaigh

C 222I

An t-eagrán Gaeilge

Faisnéis agus Fógraí

6411 Meitheamh 2021

---

| Clár | Leathanach |
| --- | --- |
| | II   Faisnéis |
| | FAISNÉIS Ó INSTITIÚIDÍ, Ó CHOMHLACHTAÍ, Ó OIFIGÍ, AGUS Ó GHNÍOMHAIREACHTAÍ AN AONTAIS EORPAIGH |
| | An Chomhairle |
| 2021/C 222 I/01 | Ráiteas ón gCoimisiún | 1 |

Clár

Leathanach

II   Faisnéis

FAISNÉIS Ó INSTITIÚIDÍ, Ó CHOMHLACHTAÍ, Ó OIFIGÍ, AGUS Ó GHNÍOMHAIREACHTAÍ AN AONTAIS EORPAIGH

An Chomhairle

2021/C 222 I/01

Ráiteas ón gCoimisiún

1

---

| GA | |
| --- | --- |

GA

---

II Faisnéis

FAISNÉIS Ó INSTITIÚIDÍ, Ó CHOMHLACHTAÍ, Ó OIFIGÍ, AGUS Ó GHNÍOMHAIREACHTAÍ AN AONTAIS EORPAIGH

An Chomhairle

| 11.6.2021 | GA | Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh | CI 222/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.6.2021

GA

Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh

CI 222/1

---

Ráiteas ón gCoimisiún

(2021/C 222 I/01)

Aithníonn an Coimisiún a thábhachtaí atá clár comhchoiteann fothaithe acmhainneachta agus oiliúna le haghaidh ceadúnaithe agus forfheidhmithe, chun go mbeidh córas rialaithe onnmhairiúcháin an Aontais éifeachtach. Glacann an Coimisiún mar chúram air féin, i gcomhairle leis an nGrúpa Comhordúcháin Dé-Úsáide, féachaint ar na himpleachtaí acmhainní daonna agus airgeadais a d‘fhéadfadh a bheith ag gabháil le clár den chineál sin, d’fhonn roghanna a shainaithint maidir le ceapadh, módúlachtaí agus imscaradh cláir fothaithe acmhainneachta agus oiliúna.

---
#### In the Matter of the Claims of Rosemary A. Oswald et al., Appellants. Thomas F. Hartnett, as Commissioner of *939Labor, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed December 6, 1989, which ruled that claimants were disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because their employment was terminated due to misconduct.

Upon claimants’ continued refusals to perform additional duties because of a decrease in the amount of work in their department, the employer terminated their employment. Claimants contended that they were not trained for the new duties and their normal job would suffer, both of which they claimed would cause them stress. Contrary to claimants’ contentions, the record establishes that the new job responsibilities would only take up 2 to 3 hours each week, would not extend their work day and the skill level needed to perform the new duties was equivalent to their normal duties. In addition, claimants failed to offer any evidence of stress. Under the circumstances and given that this was a reasonable request in light of the employer’s financial condition at the time, we find substantial evidence to support the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s decision that claimant’s refusal to take on these duties constituted misconduct *(see, Matter of Centineo [Levine],*53 AD2d 759; *Matter of Utley [Levine],*51 AD2d 823).

Decision affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Mikoll, Levine, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       4,646,475
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                     113,243,666
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            13,483,258
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 25,178,732
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      25,029,329
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        25,351,334
<LOANS>                                     77,806,536
<ALLOWANCE>                                  1,140,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             148,103,564
<DEPOSITS>                                 130,665,208
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,242,200
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       600,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  15,596,156
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             148,103,564
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              6,989,025
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            2,610,758
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               455,539
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            10,055,322
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           4,400,932
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           4,400,932
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        5,654,390
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  125,245
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              4,296,960
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,357,853
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,489,129
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,489,129
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.48
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.48
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.65
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                   596,877
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                100,079
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             1,138,747
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  166,722
<RECOVERIES>                                    42,730
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            1,140,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         1,140,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>