alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Carl Gifaldi et al., Appellants, v Dumont Co., Inc., Doing Business as Dumont Chemical Company, et al., Defendants, Jefferson Chemical Company et al., Respondents, and Interstate Tire Company, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

Judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: The court properly dismissed the action against the moving defendants, the suppliers of the component chemicals incorporated into the allegedly defective polyurethane foam insulation in plaintiffs’ building. The negligence and products liability claims fail to state a cause of action because the amended complaint does not allege that the component chemicals were unreasonably dangerous at the time they left the hands of the defendants. The allegations of defectiveness are directed exclusively to the polyurethane foam insulation. Absent specific allegations that the components were defective or that the manufacturers knew that their products would be combined to form a dangerous or defective product, the defectiveness of the finished product cannot be imputed to the manufacturers of the components.

Additionally, plaintiffs’ negligence and products liability claims fail to state a cause of action because plaintiffs did not identify which entities manufactured the chemicals incorporated into the foam insulation installed in plaintiffs’ building. *1026Generally, identification of the exact defendant whose product allegedly damaged the plaintiff is an essential element of a products liability action *(Hymowitz v Lilly & Co.,*73 NY2d 487, 504). The rule is the same with respect to negligence claims *(see generally,*79 NY Jur 2d, Negligence, § 10, at 319). Plaintiffs’ inability to identify the proper defendants is not rectified by their attempt to plead theories of alternative liability or concerted action *(see, Hymowitz v Lilly & Co., supra,*at 505-509).

The court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ statutory claim. Defendants’ alleged violation of the reporting requirement of 15 USC § 2064 (b) does not give rise to a private right of action *(see, Kloepfer v Honda Motor Co.,*898 F2d 1452, 1457; *Drake v Honeywell, Inc.,*797 F2d 603, 604-607).

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to renew. Although plaintiffs presented some new facts in support of that motion, there was no showing that those facts were unknown and undiscoverable at the time of the prior motion. Moreover, to the extent that the court’s order denied plaintiffs’ motion to reargue all issues in the case, that order is not appealable.

Finally, we note that an order denying a motion to resettle a substantive portion of a previous order is not appealable *(see, Tidball v Tidball,*108 AD2d 957, 958). Thus, that appeal must be dismissed. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Mintz, J.—Dismiss Complaint.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Denman, Green and Pine, JJ.
#### Everett LAWSON, Appellant, v. A. P. HENNESSY & SONS, INC., Appellee.

No. 69-399.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 29, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 11, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Edward Mooney, Respondent.

Order unanimously reversed on the law, motion denied, indictment reinstated and matter remitted to Monroe County Court, for further proceedings on the indictment. Memorandum: The proof before the Grand Jury was sufficient to establish a prima facie case against defendant of forgery in the second degree by signing a false name to a fingerprint card *(see, People v Moore,*171 AD2d 1051; *People v Hennessy,*133 AD2d 174; *People v Kirk,*115 AD2d 758, *affd*68 NY2d 722; *People v Bigus,*115 AD2d 751, *affd*68 NY2d 723). The evidence was sufficient to raise the inference that the name defendant signed was not defendant’s real name but was fictitious. (Appeal from Order of Monroe County Court, Maloy, J.—Forgery, 2nd Degree.) Present—Den-man, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
```

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 173 (Thursday, September 6, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 45208]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-19357]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Rural Business-Cooperative Service

Rural Housing Service

Rural Utilities Service

Rural Development Cooperative Agreement Program; Correction.

AGENCY: Rural Business-Cooperative Service, Rural Housing Service, and 
Rural Utilities Service, USDA.

ACTION: Notice; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document corrects one item in the initial notice that 
published in the Federal Register on August 17, 2018, entitled ``Rural 
Development Cooperative Agreement Program.'' This correction revises 
the maximum available points for one scoring criteria.

DATES: Effective September 6, 2018.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christine Sorensen, Regional 
Coordinator, [email protected], (202) 568-9832.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In FR Doc. 2018-17765 appearing on page 
41046 in the Federal Register of August 16, 2018, make the following 
correction:

Correction

    On page 41052 in the second column, third paragraph, section d. 
reads ``The applicant will demonstrate how their proposal will utilize 
partnerships outside of RD . . . (10 points),'' replace with ``The 
applicant will demonstrate how their proposal will utilize partnerships 
outside of RD . . . (5 points).''

    Dated: August 30, 2018.
Joby Young,
Chief of Staff, USDA Rural Development.
[FR Doc. 2018-19357 Filed 9-5-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 3410-XY-P
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**IN THE INTEREST OF: P.N.**

**PETITION OF: P.N. :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 839 MAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 1st day of June, 2016, the Petition for Allowa nce of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**

**Justice Wecht did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.**
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
Pursuant to



Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.
Section 1350)



In connection with this Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2015 (the "Report") of Garrison Capital Inc. (the "Registrant"), as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Brian Chase, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best
of my knowledge, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





/s/ Brian Chase

Brian Chase

Chief Financial Officer

August 4, 2015
#### In the Matter of John Papandon, an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District, Petitioner.

Second Department,

November 18, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Frank A. Finnerty, Jr. (Chris G. McDonough*of counsel), for petitioner.

*Weil, Gotshal & Manges (Harris J. Yale*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

On December 12, 1990, the respondent was found guilty, *110after trial, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, of conspiracy to commit an offense or to defraud the United States in violation of 18 USC § 371, and aiding and assisting in the preparation of fraudulent Federal excise tax returns (two counts), in violation of 26 USC § 7206 (2) , which is a Federal felony.

We have previously held that 26 USC § 7206 (2) is essentially similar to New York Penal Law § 175.35, offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, a class E felony *(Matter of Hack,*142 AD2d 287).

Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4), the respondent ceased to be an attorney and counselor-at-law upon his conviction of a felony.

Accordingly, the petitioner’s motion is granted. The respondent is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law, effective immediately.

Mangano, P. J., Thompson, Bracken, Kunzeman and Sullivan, JJ., concur.

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, effective immediately, the respondent John Papandon, is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent shall promptly comply with this court’s rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended and resigned attorneys (22 NYCRR 691.10); and it is further,

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, effective immediately, the respondent John Papandon is commanded to desist and refrain (1) from practicing law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk or employee of another, (2) from appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission or other public authority, (3) from giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) from holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law.
Exhibit 4.2

Translation for information purpose only

CAISSE DES DEPOTS ET CONSIGNATIONS

Savings
Management Financial ManagementI.F. Director
Réf. DFFE/JO/CLC/IG-2003-198
Catherine LE CORRE

Paris,
October 23, 2003

By
letter dated October 17, 2003, you have requested the approval ofCaisse des Dépôts et
Consignationsto waive its rights to invoke certain Events of Default or Potential Events of Default against Euro Disney S.C.A. or Euro Disneyland S.N.C. (the "Waiver").

I
am pleased to confirm the approval ofCaisse des Dépôts et Consignationsof this waiver and the terms and
conditions of this waiver.

This
waiver is strictly limited to the Events of Default or Potential Events of Default expressly referred to in the Waiver and shall not extend and shall not be construed as extending
to a waiver of any otherCaisse des Dépôts et Consignationsright not included in the Waiver.

Yours
faithfully,

Jacques OllivierSavings Management Director

---

QuickLinks
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-3324SI

_____________ Marcia Sharon Neal, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern v. * District of Iowa. * Walgreen Drug Stores, also known as * [UNPUBLISHED] Walgreen Company, * * Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: May 21, 1997

Filed: May 30, 1997

_____________ Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM. Marcia Sharon Neal appeals the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in Neal's action to recover for injuries sustained in a purse-snatching incident in front of a Walgreen' s store. We review a grant of summary judgment under a wellestablished sta

ndard. Because this is a diversity action, we review de novo questions of state law. Having considered the record and the parties' briefs, we are satisfied the distric t court correctly applied the controlling law and the record supports the district court's ruling. Because a comprehensive opinion in this diversity case would lack-2-

preceden tial value, we affirm on the basis of the magistrate judge's ruling withou t further discussion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection
with the quarterly report of American Petroleum Tankers Parent LLC. (APT) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert
K. Kurz, the Chief Executive Officer of APT, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(i) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of APT.



|                   |  |                        
|------------------ |  | -----------------------
|Date: May 16, 2011
|                   |  | /s/ Robert K.
Kurz     
|                   |  | Robert K. Kurz         
|                   |  | Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



In connection with the Quarterly Report of SMTP, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Semyon Dukach, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to my knowledge:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.



|                    |                            
|------------------- | ---------------------------
|Date :  May 9, 2011 | /s/ Semyon Dukach          
|                    | Semyon Dukach              
|                    | Principal Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Derek J. Molloy, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him of attempted burglary in the third degree, defendant’s sole contention is that the circumstantial evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction because it failed to exclude to a moral certainty the innocent explanation proffered by defendant at trial. We disagree. Defendant’s account *1023is conclusively refuted by certain facts established by the People’s witnesses, for example, the sounds described by the victim as consistent with someone trying to jimmy the doors and windows; the fact that the broken glass had been removed from the window and stacked on the ground; and the fact that defendant fled directly past the patrol car. Moreover, defendant’s trial testimony is severely undercut by his inconsistent prior statements to the officers and to his parole officer. The evidence fairly, reasonably and naturally gives rise to an inference of guilt, is consistent with that inference, and excludes to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis of innocence *(see, People v Ford,*66 NY2d 428, 441-442; *People v Benzinger,*36 NY2d 29, 32; *People v Cleague,*22 NY2d 363). (Appeal from Judgment of Genesee County Court, Graney, J. —Attempted Burglary, 3rd Degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Denman, Green and Pine, JJ.
```

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 79 (Thursday, April 24, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 22807]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-09410]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE: 10:00 a.m., Friday, May 2, 2014.

PLACE: 1155 21st St. NW., Washington, DC, 9th Floor Commission 
Conference Room.

STATUS: Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Surveillance, Enforcement Matters, and 
Examinations. In the event that the times, dates, or locations of this 
or any future meetings change, an announcement of the change, along 
with the new time and place of the meeting will be posted on the 
Commission's Web site at http://www.cftc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christopher J. Kirkpatrick, 202-418-
5516.

 Natise Allen,
Executive Assistant.
[FR Doc. 2014-09410 Filed 4-22-14; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
```
May 11, 2016

U.S. Department of Transportation

Docket Management System

1200 New Jersey Ave.SE

Washington, DC 20590

Re: Amendment to Exemption 1 1836 issued pursuant to Section 333 of the FAA

Reform Act and Part 

### 11 of the Federal Aviation Regulations in R egulatory Docket

No. FAA-2015-1099

Dear Sir or Madam;

Thomas Hall seeks to amend the original 333 exemption #11836 as follows:



### 1. Update the current 333 exemption to reflect the current issuance which includes removal of

Closed Set Restrictions

2. Give authorization for all approved UAS/UAV Aircraft

There has been no change in the c onditions and reasons relative to public interest and safety that

were the basis for granting the original exemption.



### 1) Permit closed-set filming for the motion picture and television industry

Thomas Hall was issued an Exemption numbered 1 1836 (hereinafter the Exemption) without the

purpose of conducting scripted, closed-set filming for the motion picture and television industry.

Thomas Hall hereby requests an amendment to the Exemption to allow operations for the purpose of

conducting scripted,closed-set filming for the motion picture and television industry and additional type

of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) that fully co mplies with the conditions of the Exemption.



### 2) Additional aircraft

Thomas Hall wishes to operate at will all aircraft currently listed as approved. All operations of the

additional UAS will be in full compliance with the terms of the Exemption of 1 1386.

Please contact the undersigned should you have any question concerning this request for an

amendment to the Exemption.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas Hall,
#### The COLORADO BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Petitioner, v. W.M. RAEMER, D.D.S., Respondent.

No. 90SC289.

Supreme Court of Colorado.

Nov. 16, 1990.

ORDER OF COURT

Upon consideration of the Suggestion of Death, the Response, and the Reply, and being sufficiently advised in the premises,

IT IS ORDERED that this cause is DISMISSED as MOOT.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of John P. Harmon, Appellant. Thomas F. Hartnett, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 12, 1990, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause.

The evidence before the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board supports its conclusion that although claimant may have had good cause to refuse to work evening hours, he did not have sufficient reason to refuse to work at another location of the employer’s business. The second location would have enabled claimant to continue to work in the daytime. The record also establishes that the employer’s refusal to reimburse claimant for his travel time was not unreasonable. Although claimant contended that at the time of his being hired, the employer agreed that he would work exclusively at only one location, the employer disputed that assertion. Questions of credibility are left solely to the Board and it was free to accept the employer’s testimony and reject claimant’s testimony *(see, Matter of Nunes [Roberts], 98*AD2d 934). Accordingly, the decision that claimant left his employment without good cause is supported by substantial evidence and must be upheld *(see, Matter of Baker [Hartnett]*147 AD2d 790, *appeal dismissed*74 NY2d 714).

Decision affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 685 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 685

 To address the concept of ``Too Big To Fail'' with respect to certain 
                          financial entities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 9, 2013

  Mr. Sanders introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
    referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To address the concept of ``Too Big To Fail'' with respect to certain 
                          financial entities.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Exist 
Act''.

SEC. 2. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE TOO BIG TO FAIL.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than 90 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall submit to Congress a list of all commercial banks, investment 
banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies that the Secretary believes 
are too big to fail, which shall include, but is not limited to, any 
United States bank holding companies that have been identified as 
systemically important banks by the Financial Stability Board (in this 
Act referred to as the ``Too Big to Fail List'').

SEC. 3. BREAKING-UP TOO BIG TO FAIL INSTITUTIONS.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning 1 year after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
break up entities included on the Too Big To Fail List, so that their 
failure would no longer cause a catastrophic effect on the United 
States or global economy without a taxpayer bailout.

SEC. 4. DEFINITION.

    For purposes of this Act, the term ``Too Big to Fail'' means any 
entity that has grown so large that its failure would have a 
catastrophic effect on the stability of either the financial system or 
the United States economy without substantial Government assistance.
                                 <all>
```
#### Kathleen M. Kolb, Respondent, v Charles Strogh, Appellant.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries arising from alleged dental malpractice, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cannavo, J.), entered September 26, 1989, which denied his motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

We find that the plaintiff satisfied her burden of producing evidentiary proof in admissible form establishing the existence of a material question of fact as to the defendant’s negligence in treating her *(see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320). Because this issue requires a trial of the action, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Mangano, P. J., Brown, Sullivan, Harwood and Miller, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of David Samuels, a Suspended Attorney.

Motion granted and respondent, David Samuels, is reinstated as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York, effective April 9, 1991. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Ellerin, Wallach, Kupferman and Smith, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended
June 30, 2011 (the Report) of Solar Senior Capital Ltd. (the Registrant), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, MICHAEL S. GROSS, the Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant,
hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|      |  |                        
|----- |  | -----------------------
|      |  | /S/    MICHAEL S.
GROSS
|Name: |  | Michael S. Gross       
|Date: |  | August 2, 2011