J

### -A08016-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE 

### SUPERIOR COURT 

### I.O.P. 

### 65.37 MARC MATRANGA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

### Appellant

v.

U-HAUL COMPANY OF : No. 1067 EDA 2017 PENNSYLVANIA Appeal 

### from the Order Entered February 15, 2017 In the Court 

### of Common Pleas 

### of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): March

### Term, 2015, No. 04019
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: 

### FILED JUNE 

### 22, 

### 2018 Marc Matranga appeals 

### from the 

### trial court's order granting summary 

### judgment in 

### favorofAppellee, U-Haul Company 

### of Pennsylvania (U

### -Haul), and dismissing Matranga's 

### complaint with prejudice. 

### After careful review, we 

### affirm. On March 31, 2015, Matranga 

### instituted the underlying negligence action against U-Haul 

### after he was 

### injured in a July 2013 

### forklift accident. At the 

### timeofthe accident, Matranga was 

### working as a 

### welder helper atthe Falls Manufacturing Company (Facility) in Fairless Hills, one of U-Haul's production facilities. The Facility 

### manufactures parts 

### for U-Haul 

### trailers. Matranga was employed by McGrath Technical 

### Staffing, 

### Inc., a 

### staffing agency. McGrath would hire

### workersand assign

### them to

### various

### temporary positions to 

### perform work at 

### the Facility 

### with its 

### client, U-Haul. In 2013, McGrath executed a

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.J

### -A08016-18
Staffing Services 

### Contract (Contract) with U-Haul 

### that included a 

### waiver provision wherein Matranga waived his 

### rightto pursue a claim 

### against U-Haul 

### for any 

### workplace injuries. The 

### Contract also specified 

### that "All 

### workers assigned to U-Haul areemployees of [McGrath] and 

### that such 

### workers are not employees 

### of U

### -Haul." 2013 

### Staffing Services 

### Contract, 

### 4/9/13, at ¶ 2. On the date of the accident, Matranga's

### job was to load parts onto a 

### cart, push 

### them to a welding 

### station, and then unload the parts. At the 

### time of the accident, Matranga was holding an 

### electrical line 

### out of the way of a 

### forklift being operated by U-Haul 

### employee, Jose Molina. Molina crashed the 

### forklift into a 

### stack of steel 

### frames, which then fell over onto Matranga. Matranga suffered serious and 

### permanent injuries from the accident, including: a

### tear of his 

### labrum; pelvic 

### injury; disc 

### protrusion; lumbar sprain and 

### strain; and back and hip pain. As a 

### result ofthe injuries, Matranga alleged he had suffered a 

### significant loss of wages and income, suffered 

### permanent impairment, and will continue to incur medical expenses related to his 

### treatment. On 

### September 6, 2016, U-Haul filed a 

### motion 

### for summary

### judgment claiming 

### that it was not liable 

### for Matranga's 

### injuries based on the defenses of 

### statutory employer, co

### -employee, borrowed 

### servant and 

### contractual waiver/release. Matranga filed a response tothe 

### motion, claiming

### that hewas 

### specifically designated as a McGrath employee under the 

### parties' contract, he
was 

### functionally an employee of McGrath because the staffing service exercised 

### control over him and his 

### work, and 

### that any 

### contractual waiver was

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### -A08016-18

ineffective. On February 15, 2017, the 

### trial court entered its 

### order granting
U-Haul's motion and dismissing Matranga's 

### complaint with prejudice. This 

### timely appeal

### follows.' On appeal, Matranga presents the 

### following issues 

### for
our consideration:
1. 

### Whether U-Haul should be denied 

### status as the 

### statutory employer of Marc Matranga, where U-Haul is unable to establish the 

### factors 

### for 

### statutory employment status under the 

### McDonald[v. Levinson 

### Steel Co., 153 A. 424 (Pa. 

### 1930)] test, and where both the 

### contract between U-Haul and Mr. Matranga's employer, McGrath, and 

### the evidence of record 

### clearly 

### demonstrate 

### that McGrath, not U-Haul, was Mr. Matranga's 

### employer and both had the 

### right of control and, in 

### fact, exercised such 

### control, over Mr. Matranga and his work? 2. 

### Whether U-Haul should be denied 

### immunity on the basis 

### of the alleged co

### -employee status of Marc Matranga and Jose Molina, where the evidence of record 

### clearly demonstrates 

### that Mr. Matranga was an employee of, and 

### controlled and supervised by, McGrath, and Mr. Molina was an 

### employee of, and 

### controlled and supervised by, U-Haul, each 

### performing 

### different work functions under separate control? 3. 

### Whether U-Haul's 

### contention 

### that Marc Matranga is a borrowed 

### servant must fail, where the 

### contract between U

### -Haul and McGrath 

### expressly provides 

### that Mr. Matranga was an employee of McGrath, and 

### where the

### contract and evidence of record 

### clearly 

### demonstrate 

### that McGrath had the 

### right of control and, in 

### fact, exercised such 

### control, over Mr. Matranga and his work? 4. 

### Whether U-Haul's 

### contention 

### that Marc Matranga 

### contractually waived and released all claims

### against U-Haul 

### must fail,wherethe document relied upon by U-Haul was not the same 

### document which Mr. Matranga was given and signed, U-Haul was not the 

### party purportedly released in the document, Mr. Matranga's signature to 

### thiscontract ofadhesion was procured under duress,


### ' Matranga filed a 

### motion 

### for reconsideration on February 24, 2017, which the 

### trial court denied as 

### moot, on March 22, 2017, once he filed his

### timely notice ofappeal on March 13, 2017. 

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### -A08016-18

and U-Haul failed to plead 

### waiver of release as an 

### affirmative defense in its answer to the complaint? Appellant's Brief at 6-7. Our standard of review in cases of 

### summary

### judgment is well 

### settled. This 

### courtwill only reverse the

### trial court's 

### entry of

### summary

### judgmentwhere 

### there was an abuse of 

### discretion or an 

### error of law. 

### Merriweather v. 

### Philadelphia Newspapers, 

### Inc., 684 A.2d 137, 140 (Pa. Super. 1996). 

### Summary 

### judgment is 

### proper when the pleadings, 

### depositions, answers to 

### interrogatories, admissions on file, and 

### affidavits demonstrate 

### that there exists no genuine issue of 

### material fact and the moving 

### party is 

### entitled to 

### judgment as a 

### matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. In 

### determining whether to 

### grant summary

### judgment a 

### trial court must resolve all doubts against the moving 

### party and examine the record in a 

### light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

### Id. Summary

### judgment may only be granted in cases where it is clear and free 

### from doubt 

### that the moving 

### party is 

### entitled to 

### judgment
as a 

### matterof law. 

### Id. Matranga 

### first claims 

### that U-Haul was not his 

### statutory employer because it did not prove the 

### elements of such a 

### theory and because 

### the parties' contract and the evidenceof record 

### clearly demonstrate 

### that McGrath
was Matranga's 

### employer, having both the 

### right of 

### control and 

### actually exercising such 

### control over his 

### work. Pennsylvania's 

### Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) provides the exclusive remedy 

### for employees seeking to recover 

### from their employers 

### for work-related injuries. See 77 P.S. § 481. UndertheAct, 

### the

### term 

### "employer"

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### -A08016-18

also refers to those who 

### qualify as a 

### statutory employer. 

### Id. at § 52. A 

### statutory employer is defined 

### under the Act as: An 

### employer who 

### permits the 

### entry upon the premises occupied by him or under his 

### control of a 

### laborer or an 

### assistant hired by an employe or 

### contractor, for the performance upon such premises 

### of a 

### part ofthe employer's regular business 

### entrusted to such employe or 

### contractor, shall be liable to such 

### laborer or 

### assistant in 

### the same 

### manner and to the same 

### extent as to his own employe. 

### Id. "A

### statutoryemployer is a 

### masterwho is not a 

### contractual or 

### [a] commonlaw one, but is made one by the 

### [Workers' Compensation] 

### Act." 

### Shamis v. 

### Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 969 (Pa. Super. 

### 2013), citing 

### McDonald v. 

### Levinson 

### Steel Co., 153 A. 

### 424, 425 (Pa. 

### 1930). In 

### McDonald, our Supreme Court established the 

### test for determining whether a 

### party qualifies as a 

### statutory employer under the Act.2 According to 

### McDonald, a 

### party must establish 

### the following elements to 

### qualify as a 

### statutory employer: (1) an 

### employerwho is under 

### contract with an 

### owner or one in the position of an 

### owner; (2) 

### the premises is occupied by or under the control of such 

### employer; (3) a 

### subcontract made by such 

### employer; (4) part of the 

### employer's regular business 

### entrusted to such 

### subcontractor; and 

### (5)
an employee ofsuch 

### subcontractor. 

### Kelly v. 

### ThackrayCrane 

### Rental,

### Inc., 874A.2d 649, 655 (Pa. Super. 

### 2005). 

### Instantly, the 

### trial court found 

### that U-Haul was Matranga's 

### statutory employer, where it concluded 

### that: U-Haul had a 

### contract with McGrath,

2 77 P.S. § 203, as amended 77 P.S. § 52 

### (Employers' 

### liabilityto employe of employe or 

### contractor permitted to 

### enter upon premises).

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### -A08016-18
Matranga's 

### employer; the Facility was occupied by U

### -Haul; 

### there was a 

### subcontract made by U-Haul; part of U-Haul's regular business was 

### entrusted to McGrath; and Matranga was an employee of McGrath. 

### See 

### Affidavit of Michael P. Wiley, CEO of McGrath Technical 

### Staffing, 

### Inc., 

### 7/27/16, at ¶ 2 

### (averring 

### that in 2013 McGrath 

### contracted with U-Haul to provide its 

### workers 

### for assignment at U-Haul's Fairless Hills 

### facility on as-needed basis and 

### for duration to be 

### determined solely by U

### -Haul). John 

### Kathrins, a "lead 

### man" in the welding 

### department at the Facility, stated in his 

### deposition 

### that his 

### day-to-day duties consisted of: 

### setting the workers up on

### jobs, teaching 

### them the

### jobs, making sure the

### job at hand was being done 

### correctly, making sure the 

### workers have all 

### their parts, making
sure the parts are 

### correct, and making sure any needed 

### fixtures are at 

### the stations. Deposition of John Kathrins, 

### 5/20/16, at 11. Kathrins also stated 

### that U-Haul would have made the decisions regarding 

### what assignments Matranga, as a 

### laborer, would have 

### throughout his 

### shift, 

### id. at 34, and 

### that McGrath was not

### "involved inanyofthe 

### day-to-daycontrol overthe

### temporary workers in 

### [the] welding 

### department." 

### Id. at 

### 35-36. Finally, Matranga stated in his 

### affidavit 

### that his U-Haul 

### supervisor would 

### meet with the welders daily, discuss 

### what they were going to make in a given day, 

### what trail they were making, and how 

### many pieces had to be 

### completed. 

### See Affidavit of Marc Matranga, 

### 4/20/16, at 

### 149-152. McGrath was not responsible

### for training any ofthe welders. 

### Id. at 197.


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### -A08016-18

Undersuch 

### circumstances, weagree

### with the

### trial court

### that U-Haul was Matranga's 

### statutory employer. See 

### Kelly, supra at 657 

### (employer effectively occupies premises 

### for purposes of section 52 of the Act when its 

### supervisor is 

### present at site on 

### daily basis and when its employees are 

### regularly present on premises at same 

### time as 

### subcontractor's employees); 

### see

### also Wilkinson v. 

### K

### -Mart, 603 A.2d 659 (Pa. Super. 1992) 

### (plaintiff, a 

### truck driver, qualified as K

### -Mart's

### statutory employee where: 

### plaintiff's direct employer had 

### contractwith K

### -Mart to 

### supply it

### truck drivers; K

### -Mart reserved 

### rightto dispatch vehicle given to 

### plaintiff to 

### drive and to 

### direct 

### plaintiff in day

### to-day operations of 

### vehicle; and K

### -Mart not 

### only controlled the 

### work to be done, but also 

### controlled manner of

### performance byselecting the routes to be used).3 Matranga 

### next asserts 

### that becausethe Contract specified 

### that McGrath
was his 

### employer and 

### that he was not an employee of U-Haul, he 

### cannot be considered to be U-Haul's

### statutory employee and is not precluded in bringing

a negligence action against U-Haul.4 We disagree.

3 Having 

### determined 

### that U-Haul was Matranga's 

### statutory employer, Matranga is also barred 

### from pursuing a 

### tort action 

### against his co

### -employee, U-Haul 

### workerJose Molina. 

### See 77 P.S. § 72 (person not liable to anyone at common law on account of 

### disability for any act or omission occurring while he or she in same 

### employ as person disabled except

### for intentionalwrong).

4 Because we have concluded 

### that U-Haul was Matranga's 

### statutoryemployer, there is no need to 

### further review the 

### merits of his 

### remaining claims 

### that involve the 

### alternative legal bases the 

### court relied on in 

### granting summary 

### judgment in U-Haul's favor. However, to stave 

### off any

### further appeals in the 

### matter, we have decided to review the issues.

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In 

### Pastore v. 

### Anjo Consr. Co., 578 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. 

### 1990), our Courtexplained 

### that we are not 

### controlled by the names

### that parties use in a 

### contract to describe 

### their relationship. Rather, courts 

### must lookto the 

### entire body ofthe 

### contract and its purpose to 

### determine the legal effect. 

### Id. at 25 

### (quoting 

### Capozzoli v. 

### Stone & 

### WebsterEngineering Corp., 42 A.2d 524, 525 (Pa. 

### 1945)). Here,the evidenceclearly showed 

### thatthere was a 

### statutory employer-employee relationship between U-Haul and Matranga; the language ofthe 

### parties' Contractdoes not change 

### that legal conclusion. The

### court also 

### determined 

### that Matranga was a borrowed 

### servantwhere
U-Haul 

### controlled the 

### work he 

### performed. The 

### test for determining the 

### identity of the 

### "true" master when a 

### servant has been loaned to 

### another focuses on the 

### right of 

### control: The crucial

### test in 

### determining whether a

### servantfurnished byone person to 

### another becomes the employe of the person to whom he is loaned is 

### whetherhepasses 

### underthe

### latter's

### right

### ofcontrol with 

### regard

### notonlytothe 

### work to bedone 

### butalso tothe

### manner 

### ofperforming it. A 

### servant is 

### the employe of the person who has the 

### right of controlling the manner of his 

### performance of the 

### work, irrespective of

### whether he 

### actually exercises

### that control or not. 

### Wilkinson v. 

### K 

### -Mart, 603 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. Super. 1992) 

### (citations omitted) (emphasis added and in 

### original). Specifically, the evidence showed 

### that: U-Haul chose the 

### departments to which Matranga was assigned; Matranga reported to 

### floor supervisors, who were U-Haul employees, 

### with work concerns,when he ran 

### outof

### workorwhen 

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### -A08016-18

he 

### left his

### workstation; and U-Haul employees assigned Matranga 

### with tasks, 

### trained Matranga how to 

### perform them, and reviewed Matranga's 

### work. Matranga stated 

### that the plant manager would have a 

### daily meeting every morning 

### with the welding 

### department workers to discuss 

### what they were making, which 

### trailer parts 

### they were 

### making, and how 

### many pieces had to be 

### completed. The manager wouldthen follow up during the day and give the welders the specific details as to 

### what was 

### actually being made or expected. When Matranga 

### first started working in the welding 

### department, U-Haul employeeJose Molina would 

### direct him in his

### duties, with the general guidance of U-Haul welding 

### supervisor, John Cathy. 

### See 

### Affidavit of Marc Matranga, 

### 4/20/16, at 

### 170-73; 189. McGrath was not responsible

### for training any ofthe welders. 

### Id. at 197. Undersuch 

### circumstances, we agree

### withthe

### trial court's conclusion

### that Matranga was a borrowed 

### servant of U-Haul. Finally, the 

### trial courtfound 

### that Matranga had 

### contractuallywaived his claims 

### against U-Haul based upon a provision in the 

### parties' Contract, which 

### provided: 

### Limitation of Liability.
12. 

### Limitationof Liability.To

### the

### extentpermitted by

### law,you, on

### yourown behalfand on behalfofanyoneclaiming by or

### through you,

### waiveanyand 

### all 

### rightyou have,

### or may have,

### toclaim orassert a

### claim,

### suit,actionordemand 

### ofany 

### kind,nature or 

### description, including 

### without limitation, claims, 

### suits, actions or demands

### for personal 

### injury or death 

### whether arising in 

## tort, contract or 

### otherwise, against Client or Client's 

### customers, agents, 

### officers, directors, or employees, 

### resulting from or arising 

### directly or 

### indirectly out of your employment 

### with McGrath Systems. You 

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### -A08016-18 

### recognize and 

### agree 

### that McGrath 

### Systems 

### provides 

### workers'compensationcoverage

### forsuch

### thingsas

### on-thejob injuries or occupational diseases 

### incurred 

### while on 

### assignment 

### for McGrath 

### Systems, and 

### you agree 

### to look solely to McGrath 

### Systems 

## and/or its insurer

### for damages 

## and/or expenses 

### for such 

### injury, illness or 

### other claims incurred 

### while on 

### assignment. You agree to 

### notify McGrath Systems if you believe

### thatthere are any unsafeconditions at the Client

### worksite or 

### facility. In the event of a 

### workplace 

### injurythat does not 

### permit you to 

### return to full 

### duty, McGrath Systems will make modified 

### duty positions available 

### that meet any Physician's 

### restrictions, which may or may not be at 

### your normal place of 

### employment. Parties' 

### Contract, 

### 4/9/13, at ¶ 12 (emphasis added). Matranga claims 

### that he did not 

### contractually waive and release all claims 

### against U-Haul based upon the above

### -quoted language 

### from the 

### parties' contract. Specifically, he asserts 

### thatthe contract was not the same one 

### that he was given and signed, 

### that U-Haul was not the 

### party released in the document, 

### that his 

### signature on the 

### contract was procured under duress, and 

### that U-Haul failed to plead 

### waiver of release as an 

### affirmative defense in its answer to the 

### complaint. We disagree. First, we note 

### that U-Haul did raise 

### the defense of 

### waiver generally in its new 

### matter. See U-Haul Answer & New Matter, 

### 6/16/15, at ¶ 58 

### ("Plaintiff's claims may be barred by

. . 

### waiver."). Under such 

### circumstances, we decline to find 

### that U-Haul has waived 

### this defense. 

### See Pa.R.C.P. 126 

### (favoring liberal 

### construction of rules to resolve issues in "a

### just, speedy, and inexpensive 

### manner"). Next, Matranga claims 

### that he was 

### "never afforded the 

### opportunity to 

### 'contemplate'the purported Agreement and release as he was never provided

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### -A08016-18

with a copy ofthe

### Agreement

. . . 

### [and] was given 

### only a 

### signature page 

### that
U-Haul 

### purports belongs to the 

### Agreement and was never presented

### with the 

### entire 

### document." Appellant's Brief, 

### at 50-51. 

### Instantly, Matranga 

### admitted he signed the Contract. While he stated 

### that he

### felt rushed and may not have reviewed the 

### entire document before signing it, this does not 

### render the agreement unenforceable. See 

### Toro v. 

### Fitness

# Intl LLC., 150 A.3d 968 (Pa. Super 2016) 

### (failureto read 

### agreement before signing it does not 

### render agreement 

### either invalid or 

### unenforceable). To be 

### valid, an 

### exculpatory clause, such as the 

### instant waiver clause, 

### must meetthree conditions: (1) it 

### must not 

### contravene public 

### policy; (2) the 

### contract must be between persons relating 

### entirelyto

### their own 

### private affairs; and (3) each 

### party must be a free bargaining agentto the 

### agreement so 

### thatthe

### contract is not oneofadhesion. 

### Chepkevich v. 

### Hidden ValleyResort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1189 (Pa. 

### 2010). Here, Matranga has not elicited any evidence showing 

### that the 

### Chepkevich conditions were not 

### present in the 

### instant case. Matranga averred 

### that he had the 

### opportunity to ask questions about the Contract and, in 

### fact, did askquestions 

### prior to signing it. Moreover, it was Matranga's 

### duty to read the 

### contract before signing 

### it; it is well

### -established 

### that the failure to read some or all 

### of a 

### contract does not 

### justify nullifying the agreement. 

### Standard Venetian 

### Blind Co. v.

### American Emp. 

### Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563 (Pa. 

### 1983); 

### accord Seaton v. 

### East 

### Windsor Speedway, 

### Inc., 582 A.2d 1380 (Pa. Super. 1990) (where 

### plaintiff claimed he did not know and was not told he was signing a release, Court found 

### plaintiff signed release

### voluntarily,

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### -A08016-18

where he was not compelled to sign it, and 

### there was no evidence offraud or issue of

### trust between parties to 

### contract). Matranga has not proven 

### fraud, issues of 

### mistrust among 

### the parties, or 

### that he was forced to sign the Contract. Under such 

### circumstances, we fail to find 

### that the Contract was unenforceable as it relates to Matranga. Tothe 

### extent

### that Matranga claims

### thatthe Facility, not U-Haul, was 

### the party released in 

### thedocument, we disagree. The 

### Contract clearlystates

### that it was made

### "by and between Falls Manufacturing 

### Incorporated, 

### (hereinafter "U

### -Haul") and McGrath Solutions 

### (hereinafter "Staffing 

### Agency[.]") 2013 

### Staffing Services 

### Contract, 

### 4/9/13, at 1 (emphasis added). The 

### remainder of the 

### document references U-Haul as 

### the contracting 

### party; the Facility is a division of U-Haul. 

### See U-Haul Answer & New Matter, 

### 6/16/15, at ¶ 3 (U- Haul 

### "operates, manages, 

### controls and 

### maintains the [Fairless Hills] 

### premises."); 

### see 

### also Affidavit of Michael P. Wiley of McGrath Technical 

### Staffing 

### Inc., 

### 7/27/16, at ¶ 2 (McGrath 

### contracted with U-Haul to provide workers 

### for assignment at U-Haul's production 

### facility in Fairless Hills, PA); 

### Affidavit of William B. Hawthorne, President of Falls Mfg. Co., 

### 5/23/16, at ¶ 1 

### (averring 

### that Falls Manufacturing Company is a 

### division of U-Haul Co. 

### of Pennsylvania). Orderaffirmed. Judge Panella

### joins this Memorandum. Judge 

### Strassburger files a Dissenting Memorandum.

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### -A08016-18

Judgment Entered.

J seph D. 

### Seletyn, Prothonotary

Date: 

### 6/22/18

- 13 -