alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Publicatieblad C 222I/2021

| | ISSN 1977-0995 |
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| Publicatieblad
  van de Europese Unie | C 222I |
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| Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal | Mededelingen en bekendmakingen | 64e jaargang11 juni 2021 |

ISSN 1977-0995

Publicatieblad

van de Europese Unie

C 222I

Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal

Mededelingen en bekendmakingen

64e jaargang11 juni 2021

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| Inhoud | Bladzijde |
| --- | --- |
| | II   Mededelingen |
| | MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Raad |
| 2021/C 222 I/01 | Verklaring van de Commissie | 1 |

Inhoud

Bladzijde

II   Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Raad

2021/C 222 I/01

Verklaring van de Commissie

1

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| NL | |
| --- | --- |

NL

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II Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Raad

| 11.6.2021 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | CI 222/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.6.2021

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

CI 222/1

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Verklaring van de Commissie

(2021/C 222 I/01)

De Commissie onderkent dat een gemeenschappelijk programma voor capaciteitsopbouw en opleiding op het gebied van vergunningverlening en de handhaving daarvan, van belang is voor een doeltreffend EU-uitvoercontrolesysteem. De Commissie beijvert zich, in overleg met de coördinatiegroep tweeërlei gebruik, om te onderzoeken welke gevolgen een dergelijk programma kan hebben voor de personele en financiële middelen, teneinde de opties voor de opzet, de modaliteiten en de uitrol van een programma voor capaciteitsopbouw en opleiding in kaart te brengen.

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#### Frank J. Cipolla et al., Appellants, v S.M. Flickinger Company, Inc., Respondent. (And a Third-Party Action.)

(Appeal No. 1.)

Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following Memorandum: Plaintiff, an employee of third-party defendant, Fleishmann Service Corp., commenced this action against defendant, which had hired Fleishmann to remove and replace a hydraulic lift in its garage, which required the removal of a concrete floor. Plaintiff, who was engaged in loading concrete and dirt from the garage and hauling it away in a truck owned by Fleishmann, fell to the floor while he was stepping down from the truck’s damaged metal running board, about *I-V2*feet from the floor. He commenced this action against defendant, asserting in his second cause of action, as amplified by his bill of particulars, that defendant violated Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 by permitting the truck’s hazardous condition to exist, thereby failing to provide a safe place to work. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint, which also included a negligence cause of action and a derivative cause of action by his wife, and *1065plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. The court granted defendant’s motion.

We find that the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s second cause of action insofar as it asserted a violation of Labor Law § 241 (6), and that cause of action, as well as the derivative cause of action, must be reinstated to that extent. Defendant’s assertion that the truck was not part of the work site is erroneous because it is undisputed that the truck was necessary to the performance of the job *(see, Kemp v Lakelands Precast,*84 AD2d 630, *mod on other grounds*55 NY2d 1032; *see, eg., Cox v LaBarge Bros. Co.,*154 AD2d 947, *lv dismissed*75 NY2d 808; *cf., Sprague v Louis Picciano, Inc.,*100 AD2d 247, 249-250, *lv denied*62 NY2d 605). This statute serves the strong public policy of encouraging owners to hire safety-conscious and financially responsible contractors *(see, Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp.,*44 NY2d 290, 301, *rearg denied*45 NY2d 776). Having established that the running board was defective, plaintiff raised an issue of fact whether defendant breached its nondelegable duty to provide adequate protection to plaintiff *(see, Nagel v Metzger,*103 AD2d 1; *DaBolt v Bethlehem Steel Corp.,*92 AD2d 70, *lv dismissed*60 NY2d 554).

We further find, however, that the court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s second cause of action insofar as it asserted a claim pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1). Plaintiff’s fall from the running board of the truck, which was *l-Vi*feet from the floor, is not the kind of fall from an elevated work site intended to be covered by that section *(see generally, Staples v Town of Amherst,*146 AD2d 292; *see, eg., Klien v General Foods Corp.,*148 AD2d 968; *cf., Cartella v Strong Museum,*135 AD2d 1089). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Rath, Jr., J.—Summary Judgment.) Present—Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 11, 2009

0831 

# Order

September 11, 2009

138804

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 138804 COA: 290099 Wayne CC: 08-001672-FC RICHARD MERLO, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the March 18, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
**EXHIBIT 13.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT**

**TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Embotelladora Andina S.A. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Andrés Wainer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/   ANDRÉS WAINER    |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Andrés   Wainer        |   |
| Chief   Financial Officer   |   |
| Embotelladora   Andina S.A. |   |
| Dated:   April 30, 2012     |   |

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

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Exhibit 12.1
CERTIFICATION
     I, Miguel Rincon, Chief Executive Officer of Corporación Durango, S.A. deC.V. (the “Company”), certify that:
1. I have reviewed the Company’s annual report on Form 20-F for the year endedDecember 31, 2003, as amended by the Form 20-F/A to which this statement isfiled as an exhibit (the “Report”); 2. Based on my knowledge, the Report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatement made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by theReport; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in the Report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial conditions, results of operations and cash flows ofthe Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Report; 4. The Company’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company andhave:
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theCompany, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared; (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Company’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in the Report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, asof the end of the period covered by the Report based on suchevaluation; and (c) Disclosed in the Report any change in the Company’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the periodcovered by the Report that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the Company’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and
5. The Company’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe Company’s auditors and the audit committee of the Company’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company’s abilityto record, process, summarize and report financial information; and (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the Company’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.
Date: July 22, 2004      /s/ Miguel RincónBy: Miguel RincónTitle: Chief Executive Officer
258 La. 971

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ephrim GRIFFIN v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 51457.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 16, 1971.

In re: Ephrim Griffin applying for writs of habeas corpus and remedial writs.

Application denied. Boykin v. Alabama is not retroactive. The showing is otherwise insufficient to warrant the exercise of our original or supervisory jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Ardoin v. Henderson, 255 La. 1029, 233 So.2d 923.
#### North River Insurance Company, Appellant, v ECA Warehouse Corporation, Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Fingerhood, J.), entered on or about December 8, 1991, which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment declaring that it is not required to defend *226or indemnify defendant in an action pending in Supreme Court, Nassau County entitled *Enterprise Metal Corp. v ECA Warehouse Corp.,*unanimously modified, on the law, to grant summary judgment to defendant declaring that plaintiff has a duty to defend and to dismiss as premature that portion of the complaint seeking a declaration of plaintiff’s duty to indemnify, and otherwise affirmed, with costs.

At issue in this action for a declaratory judgment is plaintiff insurer’s duty pursuant to a warehouseman’s liability insurance policy to defend defendant insured in a Nassau County action for breach of a contract of bailment and conversion. It is well established that an insurer’s duty to defend arises where the allegations of the complaint against the insured fall within the scope of the risks undertaken by the insurer. *(International Paper Co. v Continental Cas. Co.,*35 NY2d 322, 325.) Only if the complaint, on its face, excludes every possible basis on which an insurer might be held to be obligated to indemnify the insured can the insurer be relieved of the obligation to defend. *(Servidone Constr. Corp. v Security Ins. Co.,*64 NY2d 419, 423-424.) As there is no question that the claims pleaded in the complaint in the underlying action herein are, on their face, covered under the policy at issue, plaintiff’s duty to defend arose, as a matter of law. It is irrelevant on the issue of the obligation to defend that questions of fact may exist as to whether the loss will ultimately be found to fall within a clause of the policy excluding certain types of loss, such as "mysterious disappearances,” from coverage.

In light of the foregoing, and notwithstanding its failure to cross-move for such relief (CPLR 3212 [b]), summary judgment should be granted to defendant by way of a declaratory judgment in its favor *(see, Arrow Louver & Damper Corp. v Newsday, Inc.,*86 AD2d 513) declaring plaintiff’s duty to defend it in the underlying action.

Since resolution of the second issue upon which plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, i.e., whether it is required to indemnify defendant, depends upon resolution of the underlying action, that portion of the complaint which seeks such relief must be dismissed as premature. *(Prashker v United States Guar. Co.,*1 NY2d 584.) Concur—Carro, J. P., Ellerin, Kupferman, Smith and Rubin, JJ.
#### Cary Brofsky, Respondent, v City of New York et al., Defendants, and Da’Jarm Construction Company, Inc., et al., Appellants.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Da’Jarm Construction Company, Inc., and B. G. National Plumbing & Heating Corp. separately appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lerner, J.), dated October 6, 1989, which denied their respective motions to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

The appellants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs common-law negligence action was barred by the so-called "fireman’s rule” *(see, Santangelo v State of New York,*71 NY2d 393). The plaintiff, a New York City police officer, was allegedly injured when he stepped into a pothole on a public street. We find that the appellants’ motions were properly denied as the traffic condition which necessitated the officer’s services at that location was sufficiently separate and apart from the alleged negligent acts which caused his injuries *(see, Murphy v Creative Foods Corp.,*170 AD2d 441; *Janeczko v Duhl,*166 AD2d 257; *Starkey v Trancamp Contr. Corp.,*152 AD2d 358; *Burnside v City of New York,*144 Misc 2d 183). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7521

BRIAN PARKS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

DONALD F. AMES, Superintendent,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at 

Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, Chief District Judge. (2:20-cv-00691)

Submitted: March 28, 2022 Decided: March 31, 2022

Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian Parks, Appellant Pro Se. Lindsay Sara See, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Brian Parks seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner 

satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 

137 S. Ct. 759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, 

the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive ruling is debatable, and that the 

petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 

565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Parks has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny Parks’ 

motion to appoint counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2


​


Certification of Principal Financial Officer


Pursuant to


Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)





In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2018 (the “Report”) of GSV Capital Corp. (the “Registrant”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Allison Green, the Principal Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:





|    |                                                                                                                                  
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

​


|    |                                                                                                                                                        
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

/s/ Allison Green​Name: Allison GreenDate: November 8, 2018
Exhibit32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Reportof Shearson Mid-West Futures Fund (the"Partnership") on Form 10-K for the yearending December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the "Report"),I, Daniel R. McAuliffe, Jr., Chief Financial Officer and Director ofCitigroup Managed Futures LLC, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Partnership.

/s/ Daniel R. McAuliffe,Jr.

|  |
|--|
|  |  |
|  |

Daniel R. McAuliffe,Jr. Citigroup Managed Futures LLC Chief Financial Officer andDirector

March 29,2006

|  |
|--|
|  |  |
|  |

Date

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Exhibit 32.1 - SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION



EXHIBIT 32.1

Section 1350 Certifications



I am the Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer
of General Cleaning and Maintenance, a Nevada corporation (the “Company”). I am delivering this certificate in connection
with the Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter year ended December 31, 2011 and filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“Form 10-Q’).



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of General Cleaning and Maintenance (the “Company”)
certifies to his knowledge that:

|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                             
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(1) | The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2011 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                             
|(2) | The information contained in that Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditions and results of operations of the Company.                                                   







|                                                               
|---------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/   Rocio Corral                                             
|Rocio Corral                                                   
|Principal Executive Officer
        Principal Financial Officer
|Date:  February 17, 2012
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 19-0524V

UNPUBLISHED

DAYNA CLARK,

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Chief Special Master Corcoran 

Filed: August 3, 2020

Special Processing Unit (SPU);

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine 

Administration (SIRVA)

Gerald S. Sack, Law Offices of Gerald S. Sack, LLC, West Hartford, CT, for petitioner.

Althea Walker Davis, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

On April 10, 2019, Dayna Clark filed a petition for compensation under the National 

Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.

2 (the “Vaccine 

Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a left Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Injury 

(SIRVA) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccination administered on October 10, 2017. 

Second Amended Petition at Preamble (ECF 27). The case was assigned to the Special 

Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On August 3, 2020, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at

1. Specifically, it is Respondent’s position that Petitioner has satisfied the criteria set forth 

in the Vaccine Injury Table and Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation: “petitioner had 

 1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required 

to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act 

of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government 

Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance 

with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, 

the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that 

the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease 

of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa 

(2012).
2

no history of pain, inflammation, or dysfunction in her left shoulder; her pain and reduced 

range of motion occurred within 48 hours of receipt of an intramuscular vaccination; her 

symptoms were limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine was administered; and no 

other condition or abnormality was identified to explain her symptoms.” ECF 33 at 5-6. 

In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that 

Petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master