It is the p o licy o f t h is c o u rt to id e n tif y m ino r v ic tim s b y the ir initials. See St at e v. Sc hi m pf , 782 S. W

. 2d 186, 1 1 8 8 n.1 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 1 9 8 9 ). 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 20, 200 6
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JAC KIE GLE NN AL LEN Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Lin coln County No. S0400169 Robert C rigler, Judge

No. M2005- 02808-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Augu st 16, 2006

Th e Ap pe lla nt, Jac kie Gl e nn Al le n, app e a ls the se nte nc ing de c isi on of the Linc olnCou nty

Cir c uit Cou rt

. Al le n ple d g uil ty to the c ri me s of ra pe a nd inc e st a nd wa s su bs e qu e ntl y se ntenc ed to concur rent sente nces of

ten y ea rs an d s i x m onths for the ra pe and f ive y ear s for the inc est. After revie w of the r ecor d, we a ffirm the se ntence s as imposed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
A. Jac ks on De ari ng , I I I , A ssi stant P ub lic De fe nd e r, She lbyvil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe llant, Jac kie Glenn Allen.
Pau l G

. Su mm e r s , A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l a n d Re p o r ter ; Pr e s to n Sh ip p , A s s is tan t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; W. Mic ha e l Mc Cow n, Di stric t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; an d AnnL . F ile r, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

P roce dural Hi story
Th e fa c ts o f the c a se , a s r e c ite d at th e g uil ty ple a he ari ng , a

rea s f oll ow s: [O ]n o r ab o u t O c to b e r 3 0 , 2 0 0 4 , [th e A p p e ll a n t] , w h o is th e f a th e r o f [J. A

. ], 1
. . . wer e at their

residenc e her e in Lincoln County , Tenne ssee whe n the father, [the Appellant], entere d the bedr oom.-2- [J .A.], who is 15 y ear s old, was on her bed and was prepa ring to g o to sleep and wa s very sleepy

. At some point while he was on the bed talking to he r, he pulled her unde rwe ar to the side and had sexual intercour se with her a g ainst her will.
Th is w a s late r r e po rt e d to of fi c e rs at the Linc olnCou nty sh e ri ff ’s de pa

rt me nt.
Th e of fi c e rs didc oll e c t th e pa nti e s th a t [J.A. ] ha d o n th e nig ht that th is incident occ urre d.
A D NAte st was c on du c te d o f the se me n f ou ndon the pa nti e s. I t w a s a p o s it iv e matc h f

o r th e f a th e r , [th e A p p e ll a n t]

. [Th e Ap pe lla nt] a lso c a me to the sh e ri ff ’s de pa rt me nt a nd did c on fe ss to thi s c ri me . H e is the biologic al father of [J .A.].
On No ve mbe r 1 6, 20 04 , a

L inc olnCou nty

g r an d j u r y re turne d a

tw o- c ou nt i nd ic tme nt a g a ins t the Appellant c harg ing him with ra pe and inc est for the ab o v e ac t i o n s. On J une 7, 2005, the Appellant ente red an “open” g uiltyplea to both cha rg es. A sente ncing h ea ri ng was c onducted on Aug ust 2 and Aug ust 23, 2005, at which t he Appellant, his g randmother , and his g reat-aunt testified. The Appe llant’s g randmother and g reat-aunt ea ch testified reg arding the Appellant’s impoverished and abuse d childhood and that the Appe llant is now ex tremely remorse ful for his a ctions. Following t h e p re s en t at i o n o f e v i d en ce , t h e t ri al co u rt i m p o s ed co n cu rr en ts en t en ce s o f t en y ea rs an d s i x m o n t hs for the r ape c onviction and fiv e y ear s for the inc est conviction. The A ppellant subsequently filed a notice of

appea l challeng ing the sentenc es imposed.
Ana lys is
Whe n a n a c c us e d c ha lle ng e s th e le ng th, rang e , o r the ma nn e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e , th is court ha s a duty

to cond u ct a de novo revie w of the se ntence with a pre sumption t hat the de te rm inatio ns made by

the tr ia l c ou rt

arec or re c t. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ); State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). This pr esumption is "c onditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se n t en ci n g p ri nciples and a ll releva nt fac ts and cir cum st ances ." Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. When conducting a de novo re vie w o f a se nte nc e , th is court must consider: ( a) the evidenc e, if any , rec eived at the trial and the se ntencing hearing; ( b) the pre- sentenc e report; (c) the principles of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and cha

rac teristics of the c riminal con d u ct i n v o lved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhanc ement fa ctors; (f) any statement that the Appe llan t m ad e o n h i s own beha lf; and (g ) the potential or lac k of potential for reha bilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, - 103, -210 (2003) ; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 168. The party challeng ing a sentenc e bea

rs the burde n of establishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. T.C.A.§ 40-35- 401(d), Sentenc ing Commission Com ments.
I f our r eview ref

lects that the trial c ourt, following the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, imposed a lawf

ul sentence afte r having g iven due consideration and proper weig ht to the fac tors andA n a pp eal f r om a s ent enc e may be bas ed upon one or mo r e of t he fol l owi ng gr ounds : ( 1) T he s ent enc e wa s 2

n o t i m p o se d in a c c o rd a n c e w ith this c h a p te r; o r (2 ) th e e n h a n c e m e n t an d m iti g a ting fac to rs w e re no t we igh e d p ro p e rly, and t he sent ence i s excessi ve und er t he sent enci ng co nsi d erat i o ns set out i n § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 3

. T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 4 0 1 (b)(1), (2).

-3- principles set out under

the sentenc ing law, and made finding s of fa ct that ar e ade quately supported by t he re cord, the n we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pr efe rre d a diffe rent result. State v. Fletc her , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . Howeve r, whe re the trial c ou rt fails to c omp ly wi th the statut ory pr ov isi on s of se nte nc ing , app e llate re vie w i s de novo without a pre sumption of corre ctness.
I ni ti all y , we are c on str a ine d to no te that th e Ap pe llant’ s so le iss ue , a s r a ise d o n a pp e a l, “Whether the sentenc e of the Trial J udg e is proper ,” fails to present a c og nizable issue for sente ncing revie w. The Appe llant presents no a rg ument for the misapplication of any enhanc ement fa ctor, nor 2 does h e arg ue for

the application of any

mitigating fac tor. We are provided no c lue as to why the sentenc e is improper othe r than that we should “conduc t a revie w of the re cord and [ ] reduc e [the Appellant’s] sentence .” Additionally , the Appellant’ s b ri ef fails to comply

with the briefing require ments of our rule s of appe llate proc edure , thus, potentiallywaiving revie w of a ll sentencing issues. See Tenn. R. App. P . 27(a) (4),( 7). None theless, in order to avoid further

delay and protra cted litigation of this issue, we e lect re view of the Ap p el l an t ’s refer ence to reduc tion of his sentence , which we interpre t as ref erring to a n excessive sentenc e, and his passing ref ere nce to “ prison o v er cr o wd i n g” a n d p ro b at i o n , wh i ch we i n t erp re tas re fe rr i n g t o al t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g.
I. Excessive Sentence s The Appe llant was convic ted as a Rang e I , standard offe nder of rape , a Class B f

elony , which car ries a sentenc ing rang e of e ight to twelve y ear s. See T.C.A. § 40-35-112( a)( 2) (2003). He wa s also convicte d of ince st, a Class C felony , which ca rries a sentenc ing r ang e of thre e to six y ear s. See Id . at ( a )( 3) . T he pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e to b e imp os e d b y the tr ia l cou rt fo r a Cla ss B or C f e lon y is the minimum s entenc e within the applica ble ra ng e unless ther e ar e enh an c e me n t o r mi ti g ating f

actor s prese nt. T.C.A. § 40 -3 5 -2 1 0 (c ). I f the trial c ourt finds enha nceme nt fac tors but no miti g ating fac tors, the court may

set the sentenc e ab o v e t h e p resumpti ve minimum sentence. Id . at (d). Howeve r, if both enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors are prese nt, t h e co u rt must start at the minimum sentenc e, enhance as appropriate for enhanc ement fac tors, and then r educe the sentenc e as appr opriate f

or applica ble mitigating fac tors. Id . at (e ).
I n setting the Appellant’s se ntence s at ten y ear s and six months for rape and five y ear s for incest, the trial court applied four enhanc ement fac tors: ( 1) a previous history of criminal convic tions o r c r im in a l b e h a v io r in a d d it io n to th o s e n e c e s s ar y to e s ta b li s h th e ap p r o p r iate r a n g e ; (2) that the victim was particula

rly vulnera ble bec ause of

ag e; (3) that the offe n s e i n v o l v ed a victim and wa s committed to gr atify

the def endant’s d es ire for

pleasure or excitement; and (4) that the def endant-4-

abused a position of public or private trust. See T

. C

. A. § 40-35-114( 2), (5) , (8), ( 16) (2003)

. Additionally , the court applied the “c atch- all” mitigator based upon its f in d in g th at the Appe llant was remorse ful. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113( 13) (2003)

. Fo l l o wi n g de novo revie w, we find no err or in the court’s a pplication of enhanceme nt fac tor (2), a previous history

of criminal convictions. The re cord e stablishes that the Appellant ha s one prior c on vic tio n fo r mis de me a no r the ft

. Th e c ou rt , ho we ve r, no te d th a t th e c on vic tio n o c c ur re d in 1990 and g ave this fa ctor li ttle weig ht. Additionally , we do not find err or in the court’s application of fa ctor (16) , that the Appellant a bus ed a position of public or private trust. Clearly , the court applied this fac tor based upon the exis tence of a fathe r/daug hter relationship between the A ppellant and the victim. Testimony established that the r el ati onship betwee n the two was a close one , and this c ourt has pre viouslydetermined that the exist ence of such f ather /daug hter re lationship between a def endant a nd a victim justifies the application of this enha ncement fac tor when the pare nt uses his positi on of par ental authority to fac ilitate the commission of the crime. State v. Haye s , 899 S.W .2d 175, 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . Moreove r, we find no erro r in the trial court’s app lic a tio n of the “ c a tc h- a ll” mit ig a tor ba se d upo n the Ap pe llant’ s re mor se , whi c h is a pr op e r b a sis fo r m i t i gati on of a se ntence

. State v. Leggs , 9 5 5 S. W. 2 d 8 4 5 , 8 5 0 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 9 7), overruled on othe r grounds by State v. Hoope r , 29 S.W .3d 1 (Tenn. 2000). It is the trial court who hear s the evidenc e first hand and is in the best positi on to determine the exis tence and prope r we ight to be given to such f

actor s. State v. Boggs , 932 S.W .2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . Nothing in the rec ord pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’s finding s.
Howeve r, with reg ard to the a pplication of enhanceme nt f actor s (5) and (8), we f

ind error

. With re g ardto f

a c tor (5 ), that th e vic tim

wa s pa rt ic ula rl y vu lne ra

ble ba se d up on he r a g e , th e State bear s the burden of

establishing that a victim is particularly vulnerable due to ag e or phy sical or mental disability

. State v. W alton , 958 S.W .2d 724, 729 (Tenn. 1997)

. A victim’s “ag e alone may have little or no be aring on siz e, streng th or vitality . Thus, u n l es s t h e S t ate pr oduces e vidence of ph y sic a l or

me nta l li mit a ti on s at th e ti me of theof fe ns e , a lon g wi th p ro of

of thevic tim ’s a g e , it cannot be presumed that the victim was particula rly vulnera ble base d solely

on her a g e.” Po ole , 945 S.W. 2d93 , 9 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; see also State v. Hunter , 926 S.W .2d 744, 749 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (fourteen- y ear -old rape victim’s ag e alon en o t s u f f ic ie n t t o s u p p o r

t a p p lication of enhanceme nt fac tor (5 )) . T he Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s he ld that pa rt ic ula r vu lne ra bil ity ari se s o nly

wh e n th e vic tim is “ incapa ble of re sisting, summoning he lp, or testify ing a g ainst the perpe trator.” State v. Adams , 864 S.W .2d 31, 35 (Tenn. 1993). Vulnera bility is “ a fac tual issue to be resolved by the trier of fa ct on a case by case basis.” Id

. The rec ord ref lects that, at the time of the offe nses, the victim was two and one- half months short of her six teenth birthday . Howeve r, no ot h er ev i d en ce r eg arding any particula r vul n erabilitywas pre sented. The trial court, other than stating that this factor w as applicable , made no further finding s. Thus, it a ppear s that the trial court a pplied this factor ba sed solely on the victim’s ag e. Wit hout e vidence of particular vulner ability in the rec ord, we conclude that the trial court erre d in apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (5).
L ikewise, we find that the trial court’s application of f actor (8), that the of

fense was committed to gr atify

the def endant’ s desire for pleasure or excitement, was in er ror. Application of-5-

this enhance ment fac tor requir es t he S tate to prove obje ctive evide nce of the def endant’ s motivation to seek pleasure or ex citement throug h sexual assault. Sta te v . A rn e tt , 49 S.W .3d 250, 262 (Tenn. 2001). I t has bee n determined that fac tor (8) may be applied w here there is “evidenc e including , but not limi ted to, sexuallyexpli cit rema rks and overt sexual display s made by the defe ndant, such a s fo n d l i n g o r ki ssing a

victim or otherwise be having in a sexual manner, or rema rks or be havior demonstrating the def

end an t ’s enjoy ment of the shee r violence of the ra pe.” Id . T hu s, wh ile thi s fa c tor c a n a pp ly in a se xua l of

fe ns e , it mus t be sh ow n that the c ir c ums ta nc e s su rr ou nd ing the of fe ns e g o bey ond that which one would normally associate with sex ual ac ts. State v. Kissinger , 922 S.W .2d 482, 489 (Tenn. 1996) . No such e vidence was pre sented in this case. Ac cording ly , we c annot find that the re cord supports application of this fac tor.
D e s p it ethe trial court’ s improper a pplication of enhanceme nt fac tors (5) and (8) to the instant convi c ti o n s , w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e ap p li c a ti o n o f th e r e main in g f a c to r s ju s ti f

ie s th e s e n te n ces a s i m p o s e d , p ar t i c u l ar l y i n v i e w o f t h e g r e a t e r w e i g h t ap p l i c ab l e t o e n h a n c i n g f a c t o r ( 1 6 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we f ind no error

as to the leng th of the sentenc es imposed. This issue is without m erit.
II. Alter native Sentence
Under the 1989 Sentencing Act, sente nces w hich involve conf inement ar e to be ba sed on the following considerations contained in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-103(1): (A) c onfinement is nec essary to protect socie ty

by restraining a

defe ndant who has a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) conf inement is nece ssary

to avoid depre ciating the s eriousness of the offe nse or c on fi ne me nt i s pa

rt ic ula rl y su ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) mea sures less restric tive than conf inement have fre quently

or re cently

been applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant[.] State v. Grigsby , 9 57 S.W. 2d54 1, 54 5 (T e nn . Crim . A pp . 1 99 7) ; State v. Millsaps , 920 S.W .2d 267, 270 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Under the C riminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, trial judg es ar e encour ag ed to use al t ernatives to incarc eration. An espec ially mitigated or

standard of

fende r convicted of

a Class C, D, or E fe lony is p re s u med to be a f

avora ble candidate for

alternative sentenc ing options in the abse nce of evidenc e to the contr ary . T.C.A. § 40-35-102( 6).
At th is ju n c tu r e , w e w o u ld n o te th a t th e tria l c o u r t f o u n d th e A p p e ll a n t in e li g ible for a n a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e in v ie w o f the Ap pe llant’ s c on vic tio n f or ra pe , a de sig nate d v iol e nt o ff

e ns e under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 4 0 -3 5 -5 0 1(i)(2) (2003), whic h require s service s of one hundred perc ent, less any sentenc e cre dits e arne d, not to exceed fiftee n perc ent. As such, the trial court c oncluded that be cause there is “no rele ase e ligibility for a person c ommitt ing [ a violent offe nse]” the Appellant wa s ineligible f or probation or place ment in a community corr ect i onsW e no t e t hat t hi s sect i o n was am end ed ef fect i ve June 7, 2 0 0 5 , t he d ay o f t he A p p el l ant ’ s gui l t y plea heari ng. 3 P rior to t h a t am en d m en t , a d efen d an t wa s eli gib l e fo r p ro b ati o n if t he senten ce i m p o sed wa s eight y ea rs o r l ess. H owever , becau s e t he A pp el l ant was s ent enc ed af t er t he amendment was ef fect i ve, he was s ubj ect t o t he t en- y ear p ro v isio n
. See T .C .A . § 3 9 -1 1 -1 1 2 (2 0 0 3 ). -6- prog ram. This ruling is mispl ace d. A defe ndant’s rele ase elig ibilit y date (RED) be comes ope rative only afte r the defe ndant is pla ced in c onfinement for service of the sentenc e. The issue of whe ther confine ment is warr anted is a se parate question.
Be cause the Appellant was convicte d of ra pe, a Class B felony , he is not presumed to be a favor able c andidate f

or alternative sente ncing

. See T.C.A. § 40-35-102( 6). Moreove r, a defendant is eligible f

or probation onlyif the sentence rece ived i s ten y ear s or l ess, subject to ce rtain statutory exclu s i o n s not releva nt here . T.C.A. § 40-35-303( a) ( 2003 & Supp. 2005). Thus, based upon 3 Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35- 3 0 3(a) , the Appellant is statutorily ineligible f

or probation beca use his sentenc e is ten y ear s and six months. Additi onally , the Appellant is also inelig ible for commu n i t y corr ections consider ation beca use both of his convictions involved crimes ag ainst the person. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 6- 10 6( a )( 1) (2 00 3) . A lth ou g h th e Ap pe llant i s in e lig ibl e fo r c ommun ity c or re c tio ns un de r s e c tio n 1 06 (a ), du e to the natur e of his c on vic tio ns , he po te nti a lly re ma ins e lig ibl e for c ommunitycorr ections plac ement unde r the “ specia l needs” provision of section 106(c ).

“ Ho we ve r, ba se d u po n the la ng ua g e of the statut e , thi s c ou rt ha s lon g a nd c on sis te ntl y he ld that in order to qualify

under the s p ec i al nee ds provision, the defe ndant must be statutorily elig ible for probation.” State v. Cowan , 4 0 S

. W

. 3 d 8 5 (T en n
. C ri m
. Ap p
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Gr isby , 957 S.W .2d 541, 5 4 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), perm. to app. denie d (T e nn . Se pt. 15 , 1 99 7) ; State v. Boston , 9 38 S.W. 2d43 5, 43 8 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ); State v. Staten , 787 S.W .2d 934, 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)).
I n th is r e g ard , th e re c or d f a ils to e sta

bli sh the e xiste nc e of

a ny “ sp e c ia l ne e ds ” wh ic h c ou ld best be a ddresse d in the com m unity , rathe r than in a c orre ctional institut ion. Perhaps more importantly , howeve r, the re cord establishes that the Appellant is not entitled to probation due to the fac t that his sente nce is in excess of ten y ear s. Thus, we f ind no error

in the trial court’ s denial of an alternative sente nce.
CO NC LU SION
Ba sed upon the for egoing , the Appellant’ s sentence s for ra pe and inc est are aff

irmed as imposed.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE