NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

AS TO A.V., E.V., Z.V., and A.V.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0068

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD21835

The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Peoria

By Edward D. Johnson

Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 10-19-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.V., et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Marshal Brent Van Moorlehem (Father) appeals the juvenile

court’s termination of his parent-child relationship with four children: ASV, 

born August 2016; EDV, born March 2018; ZMV, born May 2019; and AGV, 

born September 2020. We affirm because reasonable evidence supports the 

court’s determination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) that Father is unable to 

discharge parental responsibilities because of a history of chronic abuse of 

dangerous drugs and controlled substances, and there are reasonable 

grounds to believe this condition will continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period, and its ruling that termination is in the children’s best 

interests under A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On October 13, 2020, DCS filed a dependency petition 

alleging Father and Mother had histories of methamphetamine use and 

were unable to parent the children. DCS petitioned for an in-home 

dependency and placed the children with their maternal grandmother. 

¶3 DCS had been involved with the family four years earlier and

temporarily removed one child from Father’s care because of substance 

abuse. After Father participated in rehabilitative services, the juvenile 

court, which had found the child dependent, dismissed that dependency

case. 

¶4 Throughout the instant dependency proceedings, Father 

continued to use dangerous drugs. Father tested positive for controlled 

substances in November 2020. Despite agreeing to do so, he did not

participate in urinalysis testing or engage with substance abuse treatment

offered by DCS. DCS nonetheless allowed Father additional time, until 

mid-December 2020, to participate in family reunification services. Father 

was “resistant to engaging in services” and declined to participate. The 

juvenile court found the children dependent as to Father in absentia on 

February 26, 2021, and allowed his counsel to withdraw. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.V., et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 In May 2021, DCS informed the court that Father was 

incarcerated and faced federal criminal charges. Father eventually pled 

guilty to drug trafficking offenses he committed in 2019 and 2020. After 

serving several months for those offenses, Father was released on probation 

at the beginning of November 2021. 

¶6 No one appeared for Father at dependency proceedings in 

May, July, and August 2021, and he remained out of contact with DCS after 

his release. 

¶7 While in prison, Father completed rehabilitative programs, 

including substance abuse and parenting programs. Unfortunately, he 

relapsed after release and tested positive for methamphetamine in January

and February 2022. DCS moved to remove the children from the custody 

of maternal grandmother, who also tested positive for methamphetamine

and supplied Father with methamphetamine. DCS referred Father for 

substance abuse treatment and a home visit, and made multiple attempts 

to engage Father. The referral for services was unsuccessful and closed out 

a few weeks later. DCS placed the children with two different foster 

families. 

¶8 On March 30, 2022, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental 

rights based on his substance abuse and because the children had remained

out of Father’s care for fifteen months. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(c). The 

court appointed counsel for Father, ending a period of over a year during 

which Father lacked counsel. After multiple continuances, the court held a 

termination hearing in late January and early February 2023.

¶9 At the hearing, Father testified to his history of using 

methamphetamine with repeated relapses starting from age 12 and 

persisting through his mid-30’s. Though Father’s urine samples did not test 

positive for methamphetamine after March 2022, his August 2022 hair 

follicle sample did. Father maintained he had kept sober since mid-March 

2022 when he started participating in services. He explained why he did 

not attend some testing appointments and his belief that the court could use 

the probation department testing records. Father also testified about 

participating in a counseling program two hours per week for nine weeks. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.V., et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶10 The court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate 

the parent-child relationship under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), that DCS had made 

reasonable efforts to provide services to reunify the family, and that 

termination was in the children’s best interests. 

¶11 Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-

120.21(A), and -2101(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Reasonable Evidence and Inferences Support the Juvenile Court’s 

Ruling that Termination Was Warranted Under § 8-533(B)(3).

¶12 Father’s appeal challenges particular findings of fact, and also 

the juvenile court’s conclusion that sufficient facts supported the juvenile 

court’s conclusion that a statutory ground for termination applied. As to 

the findings of fact, he argues he was sober for “months” before the 

termination adjudication hearing, since March 2022, and “had nearly a year 

of established sobriety through urinalysis testing.” From that, Father

maintains that the juvenile court thus lacked “reasonable grounds to 

believe” Father’s chronic substance abuse “will continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period” under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). 

¶13 This court accepts the juvenile court’s factual findings “if 

reasonable evidence and inferences support them.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 533 P.3d 202, 212 ¶ 46 (2023) (citing Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579-80 ¶ 10 (2021)). We defer to these findings because 

“the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess 

witness credibility.” Id. We review whether sufficient evidence supports 

the presence of a statutory ground for termination for clear error. Brionna 

J., 533 P.3d at 209-10 ¶ 31. Finally, we will affirm a termination order unless 

the court abuses its discretion. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 

470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). 

¶14 Terminating parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) requires:

(1) clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination; and 

(2) a preponderance of the evidence showing that termination of the 

relationship is in the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

245 Ariz. 146, 149-50 ¶ 8 (2018); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 22 

(2005).
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.V., et al.

Decision of the Court

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As relevant here under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), the court may terminate a 

parent-child relationship if it finds clear and convincing evidence that “the 

parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a 

history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or 

alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will 

continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” 

A. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s 

Conclusions Concerning Father’s Sobriety.

¶15 The juvenile court found that despite DCS’ reasonable 

reunification efforts to “repeatedly refer[] [Father] . . . for urinalysis testing 

and substance abuse treatment,” and “[m]ultiple attempts . . . to engage 

[Father] in the services, including a home visit and multiple phone calls,”

he did not participate and had not demonstrated his sobriety for a 

prolonged period by competent evidence. See Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453 ¶ 12 (App. 2005) (requiring court finding about 

DCS’s reasonable efforts to reunify).

¶16 The juvenile court considered Father’s evidence, testimony, 

and credibility, and found it lacked “sufficient credible evidence to 

corroborate or conclude that [Father] has refrained from using 

methamphetamines since March 2022.” See Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 579-80 ¶ 

10 (explaining juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and 

judge credibility). In so finding, the court discussed Father’s partial 

participation in testing between April 2022 and the termination hearing in 

January and February 2023. The court explained that Father missed nearly 

one-third of his tests during that time and noted Father’s submission of 

diluted samples and refusal to follow testing procedures. 

¶17 Further, the juvenile court considered Father’s reasons for his 

no-shows and found lacking in credibility:

that he was unable to [participate in substance abuse] test[s] 

for various reasons, including that he should not have been 

required to test so frequently because he was testing through 

probation, that he was on probation at work and unable to 

test, and that he frequently worked out of town.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.V., et al.

Decision of the Court

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The court found these reasons were “inadequate” “excuses” for Father’s 

failure to fully participate and noted that “[i]n addition to the missed 

urinalysis tests,” Father’s “August 29, 2022 hair follicle test was positive for 

methamphetamines and amphetamines.” 

¶18 While Father argued that follicle testing is imprecise and

merely reflected his illegal drug use in March 2022, the juvenile court also 

heard his testimony about this when rendering its decision. Father’s 

explanation for the positive follicle test does not suggest, much less 

demonstrate, an abuse of discretion or that the court’s order lacks a 

reasonable evidentiary basis. To the contrary, the juvenile court’s thorough 

parsing of the record demonstrates its order is founded on a reasonable 

evidentiary basis.

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding Present

the Evidence Required For Termination By A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(3).

¶19 Even if we were to accept as true Father’s claim of months of 

sobriety, that premise would not foreclose the juvenile court’s considered

finding of “reasonable grounds to believe that [Father’s chronic substance 

abuse] will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period,” under A.R.S. § 

8-533(B)(3). Because “[c]hronic substance abuse is long-lasting but not 

necessarily constant substance abuse,” we have previously upheld the 

termination of parental rights under § 8-533(B)(3) despite a parent’s periods 

of sobriety. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287 ¶ 17 (App. 

2016) (quoting Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377 ¶ 16

(App. 2010)). In Raymond F., upon which the juvenile court relied, we 

explained that “temporary abstinence . . . does not outweigh [a parent’s] 

significant history of abuse or [a] consistent inability to abstain” throughout 

the case. 224 Ariz. at 379 ¶ 29. These precedents and their logic apply with 

equal force here.

¶20 In considering whether there are reasonable grounds to 

believe a parent’s inability to discharge parental responsibilities will 

continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, the court can consider:

evidence of prior substance abuse, including the length and frequency of 

the substance abuse, the types of substances abused, the behaviors 

associated with the substance abuse, a parent’s prior efforts to maintain 

sobriety, and prior relapses. Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. at 287 ¶ 20.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.V., et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶21 Here, the court properly considered Father’s decades-long 

addiction to methamphetamine, that his use started as a preteen, and that 

he “has been battling his addiction for many years.” The court considered 

Father’s recent plea to two drug offenses and that Father has struggled with 

sobriety when out of custody. It further considered Father’s ongoing 

failures to complete or engage in treatment as evidence that substance 

abuse will persist indeterminately and that Father’s failure to abstain 

despite a pending termination is, under these circumstances, evidence that 

he has not overcome his substance dependence. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. 

at 379 ¶ 29 (failing to remedy substance abuse when confronted with 

imminent loss of child is evidence a parent has substance dependence). 

II. Reasonable Evidence and Inferences Support the Juvenile Court’s 

Finding that Termination Would Serve the Children’s Best 

Interests Under § 8-533(B). 

¶22 Though Father argues termination is not in the children’s best 

interests and contends the court erred by determining otherwise, he does 

not direct us to any asserted error and essentially asks this court to reweigh 

the evidence, which we cannot do. See Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 579-80 ¶ 10

(explaining juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and 

judge credibility and appellate courts do not resolve conflicting evidence or 

reweigh evidence). 

¶23 Our review of the record reveals two reasons that support the 

superior court’s best-interests findings. First, Father had not demonstrated

any prolonged period of sobriety and could not provide a stable and secure 

home that was safe from illegal substances. Second, the children are 

adoptable and in positive placements willing to adopt them. See Jesus M. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282 ¶¶ 12, 14 (App. 2002) (establishing 

bests interests by preponderance of the evidence requires “either showing 

an affirmative benefit to the child by removal or a detriment to the child by 

continuing in the relationship.”).

¶24 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order terminating Father’s 

parental rights to the children. See Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 474 ¶ 14 (stating 

we accept findings supported by reasonable evidence and will affirm unless 

the court abuses its discretion); accord Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 579-80 ¶ 10; Alma 

S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.V., et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶25 Finally, DCS asks us to reverse the juvenile court’s finding it

had not made diligent efforts toward reunification, given that Father “did 

not have the benefit of court-appointed counsel for [fourteen] months.” 

However, Father does not raise this issue in challenging the juvenile court’s 

termination order, making its resolution unnecessary to our decision in this 

appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the reasons stated, we affirm.