alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 175 (Monday, September 10, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 45627]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-19508]


=======================================================================
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Notice to All Interested Parties of Intent To Terminate 
Receivership

    Notice is hereby given that the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC or Receiver) as Receiver for the institution listed 
below intends to terminate its receivership for said institution.

                                   Notice of Intent To Terminate Receivership
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Date of
              Fund                    Receivership name             City              State       appointment of
                                                                                                     Receiver
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10436...........................  Inter Savings Bank, FSB   Maple Grove........  MN                    4/27/2012
                                   d/b/a InterBank, FSB.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The liquidation of the assets for the receivership has been 
completed. To the extent permitted by available funds and in accordance 
with law, the Receiver will be making a final dividend payment to 
proven creditors.
    Based upon the foregoing, the Receiver has determined that the 
continued existence of the receivership will serve no useful purpose. 
Consequently, notice is given that the receivership shall be 
terminated, to be effective no sooner than thirty days after the date 
of this notice. If any person wishes to comment concerning the 
termination of the receivership, such comment must be made in writing, 
identify the receivership to which the comment pertains, and sent 
within thirty days of the date of this notice to: Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Division of Resolutions and Receiverships, 
Attention: Receivership Oversight Department 34.6, 1601 Bryan Street, 
Dallas, TX 75201.
    No comments concerning the termination of this receivership will be 
considered which are not sent within this time frame.

    Dated at Washington, DC, on September 5, 2018.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-19508 Filed 9-7-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
<page>
			       EXHIBIT 32.01


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of Morgan Stanley Spectrum
Strategic L.P. (the "Partnership") on Form 10-K for the period
ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jeffrey A.
Rothman, President, Demeter Management Corporation, the general
partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

	(1)		The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

	(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Partnership.








By:	/s/Jeffrey A. Rothman

Name:	   Jeffrey A. Rothman
Title:	   President

Date:	   March 15, 2004
##### 



Exhibit 12.2
 Certification of the Principal Financial Officer
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)
(Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of the Company;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The Companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))
for the Company and have:
 (a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on
such evaluation; and(c)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the Companys internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by this report that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys
internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The Companys other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Companys auditors and the
audit committee of the Companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 (a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and(b)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/  Mayela Rincón de VelascoMayela Rincón de VelascoVice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *687Guy Flanders, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Fertig, J.), rendered January 4, 1989, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We reject the defendant’s contention that the People failed to disprove his agency defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Having considered the pertinent factors *(see, People v Torres,*150 AD2d 816; *People v Gonzales,*66 AD2d 828), and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A review of the record supports the conclusion that the defendant was not acting as a mere extension or agent of the buyer *(see, People v Lam Lek Chong,*45 NY2d 64, 75, *cert denied*439 US 935). The evidence adduced at trial established that the defendant had an ongoing relationship with the supplier, who was his only source for the drugs sold. Additionally, the defendant exhibited salesmanlike behavior by assuring the undercover officers that the supplier would "make good” for any dissatisfaction with the weight or quality of the drugs, and by offering the officers a discount price if they bought before a certain date. We also take note of the commercial quantities of the drugs involved in these transactions *(see, People v Lam Lek Chong, supra,*at 76). Additionally, we find that the People adduced legally sufficient evidence as to the weight of the cocaine to satisfy the minimum statutory requirement on the charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree.

Finally, we decline to disturb the sentence *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Sullivan, J. P., Fiber, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.
# C_2015323EN.01000501.xml

| 1.10.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.10.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/5

---

Notice to economic operators — New round of requests for the suspension of the autonomous Common Customs Tariff duties on certain industrial and agricultural products

(2015/C 323/06)

Economic operators are informed that the Commission has received requests in accordance with the administrative arrangements foreseen in the Commission Communication concerning autonomous tariff suspensions and quotas (2011/C 363/02) (1) for the July round of 2016.

1

The list of the products for which a duty suspension is requested is now available on the Commission’s thematic (Europa) website on the customs union (2).

2

Economic operators are also informed that the deadline for objections against new requests to reach the Commission, via the national administrations, is 11 December 2015 which is the date of the second scheduled meeting of the Economic Tariff Questions Group.

Interested operators are advised to consult the list regularly in order to be informed on the status of the requests.

More information on the autonomous tariff suspension procedure can be found on the Europa website:

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/tariff_aspects/suspensions/index_en.htm

---

(1)  OJ C 363, 13.12.2011, p. 6.

1

(2)  http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/susp/susp_home.jsp?Lang=en

2

---
Exhibit 10.42

 



 

Date

 

Dear Name,

 

I would like to take this opportunity to thank and recognize you for your performance contributions, determination, flexibility and teamwork, which have made a positive impact within the Spirit team.

 

Effective x Date, your Executive Compensation will be adjusted as noted below:

 

	
Current Base Salary:
    	
 
    	
$xx
    	
 
    
	
New Base Salary:
    	
 
    	
$xx
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Current Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP):
    	
 
    	
xx%
    	
 
    
	
New Short-Term Incentive Plan   (STIP):
    	
 
    	
xx%
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Current Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP):
    	
 
    	
xx%
    	
 
    
	
New Long-Term Incentive Plan   (LTIP):
    	
 
    	
xx%
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Current Total Direct Compensation (TDC):
    	
 
    	
$xx
    	
 
    
	
Your new Total Direct   Compensation (TDC):
    	
 
    	
$xx
    	
 
    


 

Once again, thank you and congratulations. I look forward to strong performance and achieving our goals in 201X and beyond.

 

Sincerely,

 

Manager
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7496

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

SCOTTIE JENKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 03-7497

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

SCOTTIE JENKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District

Judge. (CR-99-769; CA-03-131-7-13AK)

Submitted: February 12, 2004 Decided: February 20, 2004

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
- 2 -

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Scottie Jenkins, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth Jean Howard, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 3 -

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Scottie Jenkins seeks to

appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of

the magistrate judge and denying relief on his motion filed under

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000), and the district court’s order denying his

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration. The order is

appealable only if a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).

A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and

that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are

also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently

reviewed the record and conclude that Jenkins has not made the

requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeals. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
NO. 12-23-00105-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN RE:

DAVID A. KELLY, 

RELATOR

§

§

§

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

David A. Kelly, acting pro se, filed this original proceeding to challenge Respondent’s 

failure to rule on his motion to withdraw plea of guilty.1

 On May 18, 2023, Respondent signed an 

order denying Relator’s motion. Because Respondent ruled on Relator’s motion, Relator received 

the relief requested and this complaint is now moot. See In re Bonilla, 424 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (there is nothing to mandamus when relief sought has become 

moot); see also In re Hays, No. 12-19-00413-CR, 2019 WL 7987970, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 

19, 2019, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing as 

moot mandamus proceeding challenging failure to rule on motion for judgment nunc pro tunc

because respondent ruled on motion); In re Andrews, No. 12-19-00015-CR, 2019 WL 210815, at 

*1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 16, 2019, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (mandamus proceeding challenging failure to rule on motion to compel dismissed as 

moot where respondent ruled on motion). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for writ of 

mandamus as moot.

2

Opinion delivered May 31, 2023.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

1 Respondent is the Honorable Eddie Northcutt, Judge of the 8th District Court in Rains County, Texas. The 

State of Texas is the Real Party in Interest.

2 Relator’s mandamus petition failed to comply with certain appellate rules. This Court granted Relator an 

extension to June 22, 2023, to correct the defects. In the interim, however, Respondent ruled on Relator’s motion to 

withdraw guilty plea.
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

MAY 31, 2023

NO. 12-23-00105-CR

DAVID A. KELLY,

Relator

V.

HON. EDDIE NORTHCUTT,

Respondent

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

ON THIS DAY came to be heard the petition for writ of mandamus filed by 

David A. Kelly; who is the relator in appellate cause number 12-23-00105-CR and the defendant

in trial court cause number 6370, pending on the docket of the 8th Judicial District Court of 

Rains County, Texas. Said petition for writ of mandamus having been filed herein on April 25, 

2023, and the same having been duly considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that the 

writ should not issue, it is therefore CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the said 

petition for writ of mandamus be, and the same is, hereby dismissed as moot.

By per curiam opinion.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
#### David L. BELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska and Harbor Adjustment Service, Appellees.

No. S-5138.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

July 23, 1993.

Debra Fitzgerald and Chancy Croft, Chancy Croft Law Office, Anchorage, for appellant.

Frank S. Koziol, Anchorage, for appel-lees.

Before MOORE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, BURKE, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ.

*OPINION*

BURKE, Justice.

For the reasons stated in *Bailey v. Litwin Corp.,*780 P.2d 1007, 1011-12 (Alaska 1989), the superior court’s decision is AFFIRMED.

RABINOWITZ, J., with whom COMPTON, J., joins, dissenting.

RABINOWITZ, Justice,

with whom COMPTON, Justice, joins, dissenting.

In *Wise Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell,*718 P.2d 971 (Alaska 1986) we noted:

> [T]he objective of awarding attorney’s fees in compensation cases is to ensure that competent counsel are available to represent injured workers. This objective would not be furthered by a system in which claimants’ counsel could receive *1335nothing more than an hourly fee when they win while receiving nothing at all when they lose.

*Id.*at 975 (citation omitted).

In the instant case the Board noted appellant’s counsel’s request for an award of enhanced attorney’s fees “based on the *alleged*contingent nature of this case” (emphasis supplied) but then failed to explain why it denied the request.1 Given the Board’s apparent misapprehension as to the contingent nature of attorney’s fees in this type of litigation, and the objective of ensuring the injured worker’s access to competent counsel, I would remand the matter to the Board for the purpose of requiring an explanation of its rejection of appellant’s request for enhanced attorney’s fees.

1

. In *Wise Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell,*718 P.2d at 975, we recognized that payment of attorney’s fees is contingent upon a claimant’s success since "[a] contingency arrangement is ordinarily necessary because most injured claimants lack the financial resources to pay an attorney an hourly fee.”
----

----

I Comunicações

Comissão

----

Taxas de câmbio do euro (1)

17 de Março de 2005

(2005/C 66/01)

1 euro= 

----

(1)

Fonte: Taxas de câmbio de referência publicadas pelo Banco Central Europeu.

----

----

Autorização de auxílios concedidos pelos Estados no âmbito das disposições dos artigos 87.o e 88.o do Tratado CE

(A respeito dos quais a Comissão não levanta objecções)

(2005/C 66/02)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

Data da decisão: 

Estado-Membro: Alemanha

N.o do auxílio: N 376/2004

Denominação: Contribuição financeira 2004-2013

Objectivo: Navegação marítima — Reforço da qualificação do pessoal marítimo

Base jurídica: Richtlinie zur Förderung der deutschen Seeschiffahrt vom 23 April 2004

Orçamento: 4 milhões de € por ano

Montante do auxílio: 4 milhões de €

Duração: 2004-2013

Outras informações: O texto da decisão na(s) língua(s) que faz(em) fé, expurgado(s) dos respectivos dados confidenciais, está disponível no site:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/state_aids

----

----

Infracção n.o 2003/4497 — Queixa múltipla

(2005/C 66/03)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

Na sequência da decisão tomada sobre a infracção n.o 2003/4497 (queixa múltipla) na reunião A1/2004 sobre as infracções, a Comissão enviou à Itália um parecer fundamentado referente à aplicação incorrecta da Directiva 96/62/CE, relativa à avaliação e gestão da qualidade do ar ambiente, e da Directiva 99/30/CE, relativa a valores-limite para o dióxido de enxofre, dióxido de azoto e óxidos de azoto, partículas em suspensão e chumbo no ar ambiente. Em especial, a Comissão considerou que, ao não avaliar correctamente as concentrações ambientais de partículas PM10 em Civitavecchia (Roma) e, consequentemente, ao não ter divulgado regularmente ao público as informações sobre as referidas concentrações, a Itália não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força das Directivas 96/62/CE e 99/30/CE.

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Clainto Carr, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously reversed on the law and indictment dismissed. Memorandum: The prosecution failed to present legally sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction as an accessory to attempted robbery. The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621), fails to demonstrate that defendant assisted codefendant Howard Peoples in the assault and attempted robbery of complainant or that he shared Peoples’ intent to attempt the robbery *(see, People v Letizia,*122 AD2d 555, *lv denied*68 NY2d 814). Defendant’s presence as a guest in complainant’s apartment at the time of Peoples’ conduct does not constitute a sufficient basis for the imposition of accessorial liability *(see, People v Perniciaro,*58 NY2d 751; *People v Burke,*126 AD2d 938). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Marshall, J.—Attempted Robbery, 2nd Degree.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Balio, Lawton and Davis, JJ.