[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 18

- 13920

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 9:17

- cv - 81254

- DMM

PBT REAL ESTATE, LLC , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,

versus TOWN OF PALM BEACH, et al

. , Defendant s - Appell ee s
.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ ( February 22, 2021 ) Before MARTIN , TJOFLAT , and TRAXLER , * Circuit Judges

. TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge :

* The Honorable William B. Traxler, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 1 of 242 Florida law authorizes a municipality to relocate the electrical, telephone , and cable television utilities within a city by placing them underground and levying a special assessment on real property benefited by the relocation. 1 In July 2017, the Town of Palm Beach (the “Town”) decided to underground the utilities servicing some of its neighborhoods and to finance the project by levying special assessments on the properties serviced

. The condominiums in Palm Beach Towers (“PB Towers”) were included

. PBT Real Estate, LLC (“PBT”) , owns one of those condominiums. After the Palm Beach Town Council resolved to implement the project, PBT , on behalf of itself and the owners of the other condominiums , s ought an injunction in state
court barring the Town from levying a special a ssessment against their properties

. PBT initially argued that the assessments would be invalid because the utilities

1 Florida law provides that (1) Any municipality of this state may, by its governing authority:

. . . . (d) Pay for the relocation of utilities, including the pla ce ment underground of electrical, telephone, and cable television services, pursuant to voluntary agreement with the utility.

. . . (k) Provide for the payment of all or any part of the costs of any such improvements by levying and collecting special assessments on the abutting, adjoining, contiguous, or other specially benefitted property.

. . . (2) Special assessments may be levied only for the purposes enumerated in this sectio n and shall be levied only on benefited real property at a rate of assessment based on the special benefit accruing to such property from such improvements when the improvements funded by the special assessment provide a benefit which is different in type or degree from benefits provided to the community as a whole. Fla. Stat. § 170.01. USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 2 of 243 servicing their properties had already been undergrounded through a privately funded project

. 2 But b efore the state court could rule on their application for injunctive relief, PBT amended i t s complaint to allege that requiring it and the other condominium owners to pay the special assessments would violate their Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantiv e due process and equal protection of the law s and would violate Florida state law

. Following this amendment, the Town removed the case to the U nited S tates District Court for the Southern District of Florida

. The case is before us on appeal following the District Court ’s re ject ion of the owners’ claims. The District C ourt granted both the Town ’s motion for summary judgment on the owners’ substantive due pro cess and equal protection claims and the Town’s motion to dismiss the owners’ state law claim s
. We affirm the District C ourt’s judgment on all claims except for one state law claim

. I. As early as 2006, the Town began developing a plan for undergrounding its utilities

— a process that involves burying the existing overhead electrical,

2 The Florida Supreme Court has declared that “[t]here are two requirements for the imposition of a valid special assessment. First, the property assessed must derive a sp ecial benefit from the service provided. Second, the assessment must be fairly and reasonably apportioned among the properties that receive the special benefit. ” City of Boca Raton v. State , 595 So. 2d 25, 29 (Fla. 1992) (citations omitted).

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 3 of 244 telephone, and cable wires

. The T own decided to undertake the undergrounding
process on a gradual basis, “by neighborhood or area,” and fund it by levying
spec ial assessment s on property owners within the area

. Over the next several years, the Town retaine d two financial services firms to assist with finding a basis for imposing non

- ad valorem special assessments on properties within the Town to fund utility undergrounding projects

. Willdan Financial Services prepared a report in 2009, and Raftelis Financial Consultants provided an updated report in 2017. In their respective reports, Willdan and Raftelis provided that the apportionment of the special assessment would be determined b y assigning a number of “Equivalent Benefit Units” (“EBUs”) to each property based on the anticipated value the prop erty would receive from underground ed utilities

. The EBU calculation t ook into account three types of benefits: increased reliability of services, increased safety due to the removal of poles and overhead lines, and increased aesthetic value from removing lines and poles from sight. 3 H igher EBU value s assigned to a property would correspond with higher special assessment s
. B etween 2009 and 2017, the Town undergrounded the utilities in some limited areas and levied s pecial assessments on the property owners in th ose areas

3 The reports allocated to all parcels a minimum number of baseline EBUs for each category, regardless of whether there were overhead lines on or adjacent to the property, in recognition of the town

- wide benefits that undergrounded utilities would bring.

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 4 of 245 pursuant to the methodology detailed in the Willdan Report. The utilities servicing
P alm Beach Towers were among those undergrounded during this period , but the project was financed privately and was not subject to a special assessment payable to the Town

. On June 13, 2017, the Town Council passed an Initial Assessment Resolution authorizing the Town to create an “Underground Utility Assessment
Area” ( the “ Project ”) and specially assess property owners to fund the cost of the Project

. The Town Council determined that the Project “ w[ould] provide a special benefit to all [properties] located within the Underground Utility Assessment Area” in the form of enhanced safety, reliability, and aesthetics. The resolution adopted the methodology of the Raftelis R eport to calculate the amount of
ant icipated benefit for each property and the corresponding amount of special assessment for each property owner. The r esolution exclude d from the town

- wide assessment those properties with already

- undergrounded utilities , which were previously subject to a special assessment. Commensurate with its adoption of the Initial Assessment Resolution, the
Town Council published a notice that informed the public and the owners of all properties within the assessment area of the proposed special assessment s
. The

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 5 of 246 notice announced that on July 12, 2017, the Town Council would conduct a public hearing with respect to the imposition of the proposed special assessments. 4 A PBT representat ive appeared at the July 12 hearing and contested PBT’s proposed assessment obligation

. The representative had two “specific objections

. . . to the special assessment .” First, PB Towers had “already undergrounded its utilities.” Second, the “property [would] not benefit from the
Town

- wide underground project in an amount that exceed [ed] the amount of the special assessment that [PBT] w [ould] be required to pay

. ” 5 A t th e conclusion of the hearing , the Town Council passed a Final Assessment Resolution (the “Resolution”) , which officially imposed the special assessment as described in the Initial Assessment Resolution

.

4 Fla. Stat. § 170.07, “Publication of preliminary assessment role,” provides, in pertinent part: Upon the completion of said preliminary assessment roll, the governing authority of the municipality shall by resolution fix a time and place at which the owners of the property to be assessed or any other persons interested therein may appear before said governing authority and be heard as to the propriety and advisability of making such improvements, as to the cost thereof, as to the manner of payment therefor, and as to the amount thereof to be assessed against each property so improved. Thirty days ’ notice in writing of such time and place shall be given to such property owners. Fla. Stat. § 170.08, “Final consideration of special assessments; equalizing board to hear complaints and adjust assessments; rebate of difference in cost and assessment,” provides that, prior to any “final decision on whether to levy [a] special assessment[],” the “governing authority of the municipality shall meet and hear testimony from affected property owners as to the propriety and advisability of making the improvements and funding them with special assessments on property.”
5 PBT’s representative said that he would be paying far more for the PBT “500

- square foot unit” than two othe r properties, “Testa’s restaurant” and the “old Texaco gas station,” whose square footage exceeded that of the PBT condominium “by over 1,000 percent.”

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 6 of 247 II. On August 1 , 2017, PBT , proceeding on behalf of itself and the owners of the other condominium s in PB Towers , f iled a Complaint in the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida alleging that their special assessments were invalid under Florida state law on two grounds : (1) T he Project “ d [id] not provide a ‘special benefit’ to the [PB Towers] properties” and (2) the Towers special
assessments were based on “appraisal practices that differ [ed] from the appraisal practices generally applied by the Town to comparable properties w ith underground utilities.” The Complaint sought an order permanently enjoining the Town and Palm Beach County’s property appraiser and tax collector from enforcing the special assessments ( the “Assessment s ”)

. Instead of proceeding in this manner, o n Sep tember 22 , 2017, PBT moved the Circuit Court for leave to amend the C omplaint and substitute the proposed Amended Complaint attached to its motion. 6 On November 1, 2017, the Circuit Court granted the motion , and the Amended Complaint became operative

. The Amended Complaint contained two counts , both seeking an order permanently enjoining the Town from enforcing PBT’s special assessments and

6 The record is silent as to the Town’s response to the Complaint, i.e. , whether it moved t o dismiss t he Complaint or simply filed an answer.

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 7 of 248 awarding it attorney’s fees

. 7 In Count I, PBT claimed that the Assessment violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment s
. 8 In Count II, PBT alleged that the Assessment s violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by not “imposing [the] same [ special assessment] on other properties similarly situated

. ”
Th e Amended Complaint ’s assertion of federal constitutional claims rendered the case remova b l e to federal district court. The Town promptly removed the case 9 and shortly thereafter moved the District Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief

. 10 The Court granted the Town’s motion.

7 Counts I and II based PBT’s entitlement of relief on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
8 Count I was entitled “Taking Under United States Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Flor ida Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Count I appeared to assert five distinct claims: (1) that the Town exceeded the police powers delegated to it (pr esumably by Fla. Stat. §§ 170.01(1)(d), (1)(k), and (2), which together give municipalities the power to finance the relocation of utilities by special assessment); (2) that the Town deprived PBT of “its rights, privileges, and immunities” and “due process of law” in violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) that the Town Council’s imposition of the Assessments violated Article VII, §§ 1(a) and 9(a) of the Florida Constitution; (4) that the Town Council’s imposition of the Assessments violated Fla. Stat. § 166.021(3)(b); and (5) that the Assessments imposed a lien on PBT’s property and thus constituted a taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment via its Due Process Clause. As indicated infra, the District Court dismissed the Takings Clause claim. In its Second Amended Complaint, PBT realleged the “taking” as a violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) ; 144 6. To the extent Count I of the Amended Complaint presented state law claims, see supra n. 8 , the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain them under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 10 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 8 of 249 The District Court interpreted Count I as alleging only a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim and dismissed it because “the Takings Clause does not apply to [a] mere obligation to pay an assessment.” 11 The Court then dismissed Count II because it s allegation that “ there are similarly situated properties that were treated differently” was a mere conclusion . Specifically, Count II failed to allege that the properties were “ similarly situated ‘in light of all the factors that would be relevant to an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmake r
. ’ ” The Court dismissed Count I with prejudice and Count II without prejudice , with leave to amend.
PBT responded with a Second Amended Complaint containing three
counts

. 12 In Count I, PBT transformed the Takings Clause claim asserted in Count I of the Amended Complaint in to a claim under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment : t he Assessments were “ not rationally related to serve a legitim ate government interest ” and were imposed by the Town Council “arbitrarily” under “capricious a d hoc [ ‘ unwritten ’ ] rules.” In Count II, PBT re alleged its Equal Protection Clause claim , stating that “other similarly situated properties” which “will not have their utility lines undergrounded by [the Project],” were being “intentionally treated differ ently , ” in that they did not

11 This quoted language was taken from our decision in Swisher Intern ational , Inc. v. Schafer , 550 F.3d 1046, 1049 (11th Cir. 2008).
12 Like its predecessor complaint, the Second Amended Complaint sought relief from the alleged federal constitutional violatio ns under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It also sought attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 9 of 2410 receive a special assessment. In Count III, PBT alleged that the Assessments constituted an “unconstitutional tax ” under the “Florida Constitution and Florida law ” because the Project did not “confer ” a special benefit on the PB Towers properties

. 13 To the extent “any special benefit, ” might have been conferred, “ it d [id] not exceed the Special Assessment the Town [Council] has imposed on PBT’s properties.”
Th e Town moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint , contendi ng that none of the three counts stated a claim for relief. The District Court agreed and granted the motion. The Count I substantive due process claim was deficient because, despite the allegation that th e Assessments were the product of ad hoc

“ unwritten rules,” Count I “never describe [d] these ‘unwritten rules’ or specifie [d] who ‘engaged’ in them.” 14 Nor d id it state whether the rules were created legislatively or administratively. The Court dismissed PBT’s Count II claim under the Equal Prot ection Clause for the reason it dismissed Count II of the F irst Amended Complaint : t he facts alleged were insufficient to show that the other

13 We assume that the reference to the Florida Constitution and law was to Article VII, §§ 1(a) and 9(a) of the Florida Constitution and Fla. Stat. § 166.021(3)(b) since t hose provisions, although not explicitly referenced in Count III, appeared in the allegations made antecedent to Count I and were incorporated into Count III by reference.
14 Count I was silent as to whether the Town Council’s imposition of the Assessments was an executive decision or a legislative act. The District Court explained that in order for PBT to plausibly state a claim that substantive due process protects its state

- created property rights, it would have to show that the imposition of the Assessm ents constituted a “legislative act.”

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 10 of 2411 “ similarly situated properties were actually similarly situated in light of “all the factors that would be relevant to an objectively reasonable government decisionmaker.” And Count III was insufficient because it alleged “a violation of Florida law generally,” without i dentifying the provisions of the Florida Constitution or the law allegedly violated. The order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint gave PBT leave to file a third amended complaint , in which PBT again raised three claims for relief.
Count I , based once again on the substantive component of the Due Process Clause , alleged that Assessments, imposed by the Town Council legislatively, were “arbitrary and capricious without any rational basis,” in that the Project “d[id] not improve the safety, reliability, or aesthetics of PBT’s property.” Count II , based (as before) on the Equal Protection Clause, allege d that the Assessment s de n ied
PBT equal protection of the law because the Resolution exempted similarly situated property owners (the “Comparators”) from paying a special assessment. 15
Count III re plicated Count III of the Second Amended Complaint in asserting that the Assessments amounted to an “unconstitutional tax” under the “Florida Constitution and Florida law” because the Project conferred no special benefit on the PB Towers properties. Count III additionally asserted that if the Project

15 PBT sought relief on the claims in Counts I and II under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 11 of 2412 conferred a special benefi t , the amount of the Assessments exceeded the special benefit and, to that extent , the Assessments constituted a “ taking [of] property without due process of law under Florida law

. ” 16 The Town responded to the Third Amended Complaint by moving the District Court fo r summary judgment on Counts I and II and for dismissal of Count
III for failure to state a claim for relief

. 17 Th e District Court granted both motions. Addressing Count I, the Court treated PBT’s substantive due process claim as a challenge to the Resolution itself rather than its application to PBT

. Having done
so, the C ourt concluded that the claim could not withstand summary judgment because PBT presented no evidence that the Resolution was not “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Turning to Count II, the C ourt found PB T ’s equal protection claim insufficient for the reason s it stated in denying the claim earlier : PBT failed to “come forward with any evidence to show that [it] is similarly situated to the Comparators in light of all the factors that would be relevant to an objectively reasonable governmental decisionma ker.” And t he C ourt dismissed Count III for the reason it dismissed Count III of the Second Amended

16 The reference to “due process of law under Florida law” was the only allegation added to Co unt III of the Second Amended Complaint. 17 The Town’s motion for summary judgment was based on evidence obtained during discovery.

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 12 of 2413 Complaint: PBT failed to “allege the [Florida] Constitutional or statutory provision giving rise to this cause of action.” 18
PBT moved the District Court “ for reconsideration

. ” 19 The C ourt denied the motion, and PBT lodged this appeal . It argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on Counts I and II , erred in dismissing Count III , and abused its discretion in denying reconsideration

. I I I. We consider first the summary judgment granted on Counts I and II. We review the judgment de novo , viewing all facts in the light most favorable to PBT and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor

. See McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc. , 768 F.3d 1135, 1141 (11th Cir. 2014). The Town was entitled to the s ummary judgment on C ounts I and II if there was “ no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [ it was ] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A. We consider first the District Court’s disposition of Count I ’s substantive due process claim. In its complaint, PBT alleged that “[b]ecause the utility lines at

18 The District Court looked only to the allegations of Count III in making this statement. It did not consider Count III ’s incorporation by reference of the citation antecedent to Count I of the allegation that the Assessments violated Article VII, §§ 1(a) and 9(b) of the Florida Constitution and Fla. Stat. § 166.021(3). See supra n. 8

. 19 The motion was filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 13 of 2414 PBT’s Property are already undergrounded, the Town

- Wide Underground Project does not improve the safety, reliability, or aesthetics at PBT’s Property.” Therefore, in its view, the Assessments failed to “confer[] any special benefit to PBT’s Property” and were “arbitrary and capricious without any rational basis.”
PBT assert ed that the “Town’s en acting and imposing the Special Assessment is a legislative act.” On appeal, PBT again argues that the Assessments violated its “substantive due process” rights because the Project “did not confer direct, special benefits logically related to” its propert y; therefore, the Assessments were “arbitrary and irrational as applied to [PBT’s property]

. ” Appellant’s Br. at 28

. Ordinarily, the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “protects those rights that are ‘fundamental,’ t hat is, right s that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” McKinney v. Pate , 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut , 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937)). Garden

- variety property rights do not meet this standard and thus , as a general proposition, their deprivation does not in and of itself concern the concept of ordered liberty. See DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. C ty

. of DeKalb , 106 F.3d 956, 959 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ommon law rights are not equivalent to fundamental rights, which are created only by the Constitution

. ”)

. There is at least one exception to this rule . That is “ [w] here a person ’ s state

created rights are infringed by a ‘ legislative act, ’ the substantive component of the

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 14 of 2415 Due Process Clause generally protects that person from arbitrary and irrational governmental action

. ” Kentner v. City of Sanibel , 750 F.3d 1274, 1279

– 80 (11th Cir. 2014)

. We review this category of substantive due process challenges to legislative acts that do not implicate fundamental rights under the rational basis standard. Id. at 1280. “ In order to survive this minimal scrutiny, the challenged provi sion need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. ” Schwarz v. Kogan , 132 F.3d 1387, 1390

– 91 (11th Cir. 1998). However, th e legislative exception does not include as - applied challenges, which “ are always executive because the executive is responsible for applying, or enforcing, the law .” Hillcrest Prop., LLP v. Pasco County , 915 F.3d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 2019)

. We are mindful that “non

- legislative deprivations of state

- created rights

. . . cannot support a substantive due process claim, not even if the plaintiff alleges that the government acted arbitrar[ily] and irrationally.” Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook , 345 F.3 d 1258 , 1263 (11th Cir. 2003 ) (per curiam).
I n its complaint and before this Court, we understand PBT to invoke the legislative exception for substantive due process claims . We therefore view Count I solely as a challenge to the Resolution itself. 20 To prevail on that challenge , PBT

20 To the extent Count I challenges the Resolution as applied to PBT, that is a challenge to executive action, because “as

- applied violations are always executive.” Hillcrest Prop. , 915 F.3d at 1301. And “ non - legislative deprivations of state

- created rights

. . . cannot support a substantive due process claim

. ” Greenbriar Village , 345 F.3d at 1263

. Thus, any challenge to the Resolution as applied to PBT fails as a matter of law.

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 15 of 2416 was required to demonstrate that the Resolution , on its face, was arbitrary and irrational and not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See
Kentner , 750 F.3d at 1279

– 80; Schwarz , 132 F.3d at 1391. Count I asserts that the Resolution is “arbitrary and capricious without any rational basis” because “the utility lines at PBT’s Property are already undergrounded, ” and thus “ the Town

Wide Underground Project does not improve the safety, reliabilit y, or aesthetics at PBT’s Property .” Again on appeal , PBT asserts that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town because “there remain genuine issues of fact regarding whether there are direct, special benefits conferred o n the Property relating to reliability, safety, or aesthetics.” The fundamental flaw in th e se contentions, however, is that they take issue with the Resolution as applied to PBT and its property. As the District Court correctly observed, the question “is not whether the Town was correct in finding that [PBT] receives some measure of benefit from the project.” Instead, since Count I onl y challenge s the Resolution, the que stion is whether the Resolution itself is “rationally related to a legitimate government purpos e. ” Schwarz , 132 F.3d at 1391. For that question, we apply “minimal scrutiny,” and our minimal scrutiny makes clear that PBT failed to point to evidence suffic ient to demonstrate that the Town lacked a rational basis for imposing special assessments to finance the project

. Id. PBT has also failed to produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 16 of 2417 that the Town’s determination that all of the properties located within the Underground Utility Assessment Area benefited from the Project

— in the form of enhanced safety, reliability, and aesthetics

— was arbitrary and capricious

. See
Kentner , 750 F.3d at 1279

– 80. Count I alleges that the Resolution itself violates substantive due process . It is therefore not enough for PBT to claim factual disputes exist about whether the Town had a rational basis in imposing the Assessment on its property. Rather, PBT was required to come forward with evidence showing the Town lacked a rational basis in enacting the Resolution as a whole . Because it did not, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in the Town’s favor.
B

. We turn now to PBT’s argument in support of Count II , that the imposition of the Assessment s was foreclosed by the Equal Protection Clause because the Resolution expressly excluded the Comparators from its special assessment

. PBT contends that the Comparato rs are similarly situated because , like the owners of t he
PB Towers properties , their utilit y lines had been undergrounded prior to the commencement of the Project

. PBT characterizes its equal protection claim, which is based solely on the Resolution’s differential treatment of the Comparators, as a “class of one” claim. When presenting a class of one equal protection claim, a plaintiff alleges that it is

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 17 of 2418 the only entity being treated differently from al l other similarly situated entities , even though it does not belong to a suspect classification

. Vill. o f Willowbrook v. Olech , 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074

– 75 (2000) (per curiam)

. In order to prevail, a plaintiff must show that it “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala. , 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Olech , 528 U.S. at 564, 120 S. Ct. at 1074)

. In this Circuit, we apply the “ similarly situated ” requirement “with rigor.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin , 496 F.3d 1189, 1207 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he [entities] being compared ‘must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects .’” Irvin , 496 F.3d at 1204 (emphasis in original) (quoting Campbell , 434 F.3d at 1314). Put another way , “[d]ifferent treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate the equal protection clause.” Campbell , 434 F.3d at 1314 (quoting E&T Realty v. Strickland , 830 F.2d 1107, 1109 (11th Cir. 1987)). A plaintiff must ultimately show that it and any comparators are “similarly situated ‘in light of all the factors that would be relevant to an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker.’” Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc. , 541 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Griffin Indus. , 496 F.3d at 1207). PBT cannot show that the Comparators are similarly situated in all relevant respects. As proof that they are , PBT points to the fact that , like the utility lines

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 18 of 2419 servicing the PB Towers properties, the Comparators ’ utility lines were undergrounded prior to the adoption of the Project

. The Town respon ds that the Comparators are not similarly situated because their utility lines were undergrounded pursuant to separate projects that were funded by special

assessment s , not private funding

. The Town Council t herefore found that it was “fair and reasonable to exclude these parcels” from the Resolution’s special
assessment in order to avoid imposing duplicative special assessment obligations

on the Comparators’ properties

. The PB Towers properties , on the other hand, were assessed because the Town Council found that all properties within the assessment area would receive a “baseline s pecial assessment.”
G iven the relevant differences between the Comparators and the PB
Towers

— i.e. , the Comparators’ owners’ obligation to pay a separate undergrounding special assessment to the Town and the lack of such a special
assessment in connecti on with the undergrounding of the PB Towers properties

— all that PBT has shown is that the Town Council treated dissimilar prope rties differently

. Such treatment does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause

. Campbell , 434 F.3d at 1314. And even if they were similar, PBT fails to identify any evidence that an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker would consider the similarity it proffers

. See Douglas Asphalt , 541 F.3d at 1275.

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 19 of 2420 I V

. PBT further argues that the District Court erred in dismissing Count III of the Third Amended Complaint for failing to i dentify the provisions of the Florida Constitution or other releva nt laws that the imposition of the Assessments supposedly violated. We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

. Randall v. Scott , 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). In doing so, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. T o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

e ntitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In addition, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 ( 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “ Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. ” Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). While Iqbal and Twombly “ concern the factual allegations a complaint must contain to survive a motion to dismiss ,” Rule 8 does

“ not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asse rted .” Johnson v. City of Shelby , 574 U.S. 10, 11, 12, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 , 347 (2014) (per curiam).

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 20 of 2421 Count III alleged two distinct state law claims. The first claim asserted that the Assessments constituted an “unconstitutional tax ” under the “Florida Constitution and Florida law” because the Project conferred no special benefit on the PB Towers properties. The District Court dismissed this claim for failure to identify the provisions of the Florida Constitution or law the Town Cou ncil purportedly violated. We think the District Court was mistaken on this point. Count III incorporates the “General Allegations” section of the complaint

. The General Allegations, in turn, include citations to Article VII, Sections 6 and 9(b) of the Florida Constitution, as well as Florida Statutes §§ 170.01, 170.08 , all of which deal with taxation and special assessments under Florida law . Beyond that, Count III references the Raftelis Report, citing two Florida state cases. One of those
cases, Cit y of Boca Raton , outlines the “two requirements for the imposition of a valid special assessment under Florida law.” 595 So. 2d at 29. The other case, Whisnant v. Stringfellow , 50 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1951), considered whether a tax was a special assessment under the Florida Constitution. Id. at 885

– 86. Although Count III’s passing references to these authorities may be an “imperfect statement of the legal theory,” the cited authorities do provide a legal theory, and thus Rule 8 does not require dismissal. See Johnson , 574 U.S. at 11, 135 S. Ct. at 346. The second claim alleged that if the Project conferred a special benefit on the PB Towers properties, the amount of the Assessments exceeded the special

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 21 of 2422 benefit and to that extent the Assessments constituted a “taking [of] property without due process of law under Florida law.” Count III cites no provision of the Florida C onstitution or law that treats an uncompensated gov ernmental taking , which is what PBT presumably alleges , as a “taking of property without due process of law.” And we are aware of none. The Florida Constitution does have a takings clause. Art icle X, § 6(a) states that “ [n] o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.” See also St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Koontz , 77 So. 3d 1220 , 1226 (Fla. 2011), rev’d on other grounds , 570 U.S. 595, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) . The Florida Supreme Court “ has interpreted the takings clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions coextensively.” Id. If we consider PBT’s takings claim as hav ing been brought under Article X, § 6(a), it fails for the same reason the District Court gave when dismissing the federal takings claim alleged in Count I of the Amended Complain t: “ [T] he Takings Clause does not apply to [a] mere obligation to pay an assessment.” In fine, the District Court was correct to dismiss the state law takings claims asserted in Count III , but erred in dismissing the state law claim alleging an unconstitutional tax

. However, t his latter claim was properly before the District
Court only based on supplemental jurisdiction. Because the federal claims were

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 22 of 2423 properly dismissed, the District Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over” this state law claim on remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). That way, the Florida courts can interpret their own constitution and statutes.
V

. Finally, PBT argues that the District Court should have granted its motion for reconsideration. PBT claims that new evidence discovered after the District
Court disposed of the case raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding its federal constitutional claims

. PBT filed its motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e ). We review the District Court’s denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion. Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006)

. “The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59 ] motion are newly

- discovered evide nce or manifest errors of law or fact.” In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)

. “[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument [s] or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, F la., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)

. In the summary judgment context, the movant must show that the new evidence was unavailable at the time that summary judgment was granted. Mays v. U.S. Postal
Service , 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)

.

USCA11 Case: 18-13920 Date Filed: 02/22/2021 Page: 23 of 2424 Putting aside the question of whether the new evidence was available when the District Court granted the Town summary judgment, the evidence PBT present ed provide d no basis for the c ourt to reconsider its ruling. The evidence consists of testimony purportedly indicating either (1) that the PB Towers properties may not have received a specific benefit from the Project or (2) that the Comparators received one
. This evidence was largely duplicative of th e evidence already available when the District C ourt ruled. As such, it would not have changed the outcome. We accordingly find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s refusal to reconsider.
V I

. For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s disposition of the claims set forth in the Third Amended Complaint and of PBT’s motion for reconsideration

are AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

.

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