NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF 

PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., C.R., and K.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0205

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015JD202200092

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff

By Chad Joshua Winger

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Child Safety

FILED 06-13-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in which 

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Michael R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Amanda R. (“Mother”)1 have three children in 

common, born in 2011, 2013, and 2016, respectively. 

¶3 In June 2022, the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) 

took temporary custody of the children and petitioned for dependency due 

to the parents’ neglect, ongoing substance abuse, and history of domestic 

violence. One month later, the juvenile court adjudicated the children 

dependent and affirmed their placement in DCS custody. 

¶4 During the dependency, DCS offered the parents 

reunification services, including case management, child and family team 

meetings, individual counseling, parenting classes, parenting time, 

substance abuse treatment, drug testing, team decision-making meetings, 

and transportation. 

¶5 Father minimally engaged in these services. Early in the 

dependency, DCS referred him to the Arizona Families F.I.R.S.T. (“AFF”) 

program for substance abuse treatment. Though he completed an intake in 

July 2022, he did not participate further in the program.

¶6 DCS also referred Father to Physician Services, Inc. (“PSI”) for 

drug testing. Father tested twice in July 2022. His first test was positive for 

amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. His second test was positive 

for amphetamine and methamphetamine. He did not test again for over a 

year. 

1 Mother also appealed the juvenile court’s termination order. However, 

after she failed to file an opening brief, we dismissed her appeal. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al.

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¶7 In August 2022, Father enrolled with Mohave Mental Health 

Clinic, Inc. (“MMHC”) for substance abuse services. At MMHC, he 

participated sporadically in drug counseling and group meetings for about 

six months. In February 2023, he told a therapist he had a lengthy history 

of abusing methamphetamine, that he had suffered two heart attacks 

because of his drug use, and that his longest period of sobriety in the past

twenty-five years was approximately seven days. Father was admitted into 

a high-intensity residential treatment program. But after just five days, he 

left the program. Ultimately, the only service Father completed through 

MMHC was a parenting class, which he finished in April 2023. 

¶8 In May 2023, the juvenile court changed the case plan from 

family reunification to severance and adoption. Two weeks later, DCS 

moved to terminate Father’s parental rights, alleging two statutory grounds

as a basis: (1) the children’s out-of-home placement for nine months and (2) 

Father’s substance abuse. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), (3).

¶9 That same month, both parents moved to the Phoenix area 

and enrolled in an out-patient substance abuse treatment program offered 

by Frontline Empire, LLC (“Frontline”). Father began to attend group 

therapy at Frontline in June. In July, he started individual counseling and 

completed a psychiatric evaluation.

¶10 In August 2023, the juvenile court held a termination

adjudication hearing. Though the court commended the parents for 

engaging in substance abuse services “for approximately three months”

before trial, it also noted the parents “had multiple opportunities during 

the case to show sobriety and stability,” but had not yet done so. The court 

found that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide the parents 

with appropriate reunification services and that “neither Mother nor Father 

ha[d] completed any portion of their case plan with respect to addressing 

their significant substance abuse history.” The court terminated both 

parents’ rights to their children. 

¶11 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Before terminating parents’ rights to their children, a court 

must find at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and 

convincing evidence, Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, 

¶ 12 (2000), and that termination is in the children’s best interests by a 
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preponderance of the evidence, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 

(2005). We will “affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court abuses 

its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported by reasonable 

evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474, ¶ 14 (2022);

Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). We do not 

reweigh the evidence, but instead “look only to determine if there is 

evidence to sustain the court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Best-Interests

Finding.

¶13 Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that 

statutory grounds existed to terminate his parental rights under A.R.S. 

§§ 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(a). See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 

576, 577, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (finding that by failing to challenge a ground for 

termination, the parent “abandoned and waived any contention that the 

court erred in granting severance on that basis”). Instead, Father only 

challenges the juvenile court’s finding that termination of his parental 

rights was in the children’s best interests. 

¶14 In determining the children’s best interests, the court must 

consider the totality of circumstances at the time of the termination 

adjudication hearing, including the children’s adoptability and the parents’

rehabilitation. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018).

The court must also consider whether the children will benefit from the 

termination or be harmed if the relationship continued. Demetrius L. v. 

Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016). 

A. The Juvenile Court’s Benefit Finding

¶15 Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by

finding the children would benefit from termination of his parental rights 

merely because they were “adoptable” and in “potential adoptive 

placement[s].” Relying on Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, Father asserts that 

adoptability alone is insufficient to establish a benefit from termination and 

the court must also determine that a child’s adoption is likely. 244 Ariz. 365, 

370–71, ¶ 22 (App. 2018). 

¶16 The juvenile court may find a child would benefit from 

termination if there is an adoption plan or if the child is adoptable. Alma S., 

245 Ariz. at 150–51, ¶ 13. The court may also find that a child will benefit 

from “the stability an adoption would provide[.]” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action 

No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). Thus, when a prospective 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al.

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adoptive placement is meeting the child’s needs and the child’s adoption is 

both legally possible and likely, the court may find that termination of the 

parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, 

¶ 12.

¶17 In this case, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings

that the children will benefit from the termination of the parent-child 

relationship. The DCS case manager testified the children are adoptable, 

that they are in adoptive placements, and that one of the placements is 

willing to adopt all three children. The case manager further testified that, 

even if the children could not all be adopted by the same placement, the 

placements are committed to maintaining the children’s relationships with 

each other after the adoptions. This testimony supports the court’s finding 

that the children were adoptable and in adoptive placements. From this 

testimony the court could reasonably infer that the proposed adoption, or 

adoptions, were legally possible and likely to occur if the parent-child 

relationships were terminated. See id. at 3, ¶ 9.

¶18 Relying on Titus S., Father contends a child’s adoptability is 

irrelevant unless the court finds a “return to [the] parent is unlikely.” 244 

Ariz. at 370–71, ¶ 22. He argues the court could not have found that a return 

to the parent was “unlikely” because DCS never attempted to preserve the 

family unit and the court did not consider his recent sobriety. 

¶19 His argument fails for several reasons. First, Titus S. does not 

support his contention that the juvenile court must consider whether a 

“return to parent is unlikely” before concluding a child will benefit from 

adoption. 244 Ariz. at 370–71, ¶ 22. Second, by failing to challenge grounds

for termination, he has conceded the court’s finding that DCS “made a 

diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services[.]” Moreover, 

Father fails to identify any additional reunification services he believes DCS 

should have offered him, but did not, to preserve the family. Third, the 

court did not ignore Father’s participation in substance abuse services at 

the time of the termination adjudication hearing. To the contrary, the court

commended the parents for engaging in treatment. But the court also 

considered other factors, including the children’s out-of-home placement 

for over a year and evidence that the parents “had multiple opportunities 

during the case to show sobriety and stability and yet [had] not done so[.]” 

¶20 On this record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion 

by finding the children would benefit from termination of the 

parent-child relationship. 
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B. The Juvenile Court’s Detriment Finding

¶21 Father next challenges the juvenile court’s finding the 

children would be harmed if the parent-child relationship continued. He 

argues the record showed the children are bonded to him and, therefore, 

the court erred by concluding that an ongoing parent-child relationship 

would harm the children.

¶22 The juvenile court, however, expressly considered Father’s 

bond, as well as the children’s desire to reunify with their parents.

Although a bonded relationship is a factor for the court to consider, it is not 

dispositive in addressing the children’s best interests. See Dominique M. v. 

Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98–99, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). Against this 

familial bond, the court considered other factors including the fact the

children had “suffered for years” due to Father’s “inability to provide a 

safe, stable home” and his neglect of their “medical, dental, emotional, and 

educational needs.” In weighing the evidence, the court concluded “the 

children deserve to have the opportunity to thrive in a safe, sober, and 

stable environment” and that if the court were to deny the termination, the 

children “will be at risk of future abuse or neglect.” 

¶23 Father asserts this finding was error because there is no real 

risk for further harm or neglect to the children because DCS, as their legal 

custodian, can protect them from harm while he establishes sobriety. But 

accepting his contention that the children should remain in DCS care until 

he can show he is sober would leave them in foster care for an indefinite 

period. Arizona law recognizes that long-term foster care can be harmful to 

children. See Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 476, ¶ 23 (explaining that “the 

legislature’s intent to avoid having children linger in foster care echoes 

throughout other grounds justifying termination in § 8-533(B),” including 

(B)(3) and (B)(8)). And “a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over 

a parent’s uncertain battle with drugs.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 

Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016). 

¶24 Additionally, by not challenging the court’s A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(3) finding, Father has conceded he was “unable to discharge [his] 

parental responsibilities because of . . . chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, 

and alcohol, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition 

will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” Accordingly, the 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the children would 

suffer a detriment if they maintained a parent-child relationship with 

Father. 
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C. The Children’s Right to Familial Integrity

¶25 Father also argues the juvenile court must consider the 

children’s fundamental liberty interest in an intact family as part of its 

best-interests analysis. He cites Kent K. for the position that “until a court 

finds grounds for termination, [the] parent and child ‘share a vital interest 

in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.’” 210 

Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35 (quoting Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982)). 

¶26 Father offers no legal authority to show he has standing to 

challenge the children’s fundamental liberty interests once his parental 

rights were terminated. See In re O.M., 254 Ariz. 543, 545, ¶ 9 (App. 2023) 

(“A parent lacks standing to challenge a child’s placement once parental 

rights are terminated.”). Regardless, the finding of a statutory ground to 

terminate parental rights is synonymous to a finding of parental unfitness. 

Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 9. Thus, in the best-interests stage of the analysis, 

“[t]he weight of the presumption that the child shares the parent’s interest 

in preserving the family relationship is greatly reduced by the potential 

harm to the child from maintaining a relationship with an unfit parent.” 

Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285, ¶ 31 (citations omitted). The court’s “foremost 

concern” then becomes “the child’s interest in stability and security.” Jessie

D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 583, ¶ 27 (2021) (quotations and 

citations omitted). Here, the juvenile court carefully considered the totality 

of the circumstances—including evidence of the children’s bond to their 

parents and their desire to return home—in determining that termination 

of parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶27 Read as a whole, Father’s arguments on appeal request that 

we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Because reasonable 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s best-interests finding, we affirm the 

court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.