[Cite as State v. Henderson, 2015-Ohio-4408.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-14-1272 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201402338 

v. 

Samuel R. Henderson DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: October 23, 2015 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 James J. Popil, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

PIETRYKOWSKI, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Samuel R. Henderson, appeals the December 10, 2014 

judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas which, following a jury trial 

convicting him of aggravated burglary and abduction, sentenced him to a three-year 

prison term. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm. 
2.

{¶ 2} On August 22, 2014, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated 

burglary, R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), a first degree felony and one count of abduction, R.C. 

2905.02(A)(1), (C), a third degree felony. The charges stemmed from an incident on 

August 10, 2014, involving appellant and his ex-girlfriend. 

{¶ 3} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on November 18, 2014. Two police 

officers testified that on August 10, 2014, at approximately 10:00 p.m., they responded to 

a 911 call of appellant attempting to break into the victim’s home in Toledo, Lucas 

County, Ohio. Upon arrival, they observed the victim down on the sidewalk. She was 

visibly upset, shaking and crying. The victim indicated that appellant was the 

perpetrator. The officers testified that they called the fire department to come and assess 

her injuries; she was transported to the hospital. 

{¶ 4} The officers observed that the front door of the home, including the lock and 

the frame, was damaged. The deadbolt lock was in the locked position with the door 

open. There were also boot prints on the door. The officers took photographs of the 

scene; the injuries to the victim’s face were documented at the hospital. The photographs 

were admitted into evidence. Two 911 telephone calls, one made by the victim and 

another made by an individual staying at the home, describing appellant as the perpetrator 

were authenticated, played for the jury, and admitted into evidence. 

{¶ 5} A Toledo police detective testified that he arrived on the scene after the 

victim had been transported to the hospital. He interviewed two witnesses, D.H. and 

N.R. and went to the hospital and interviewed the victim. 
3.

{¶ 6} D.H. testified that he was an ex-boyfriend of the victim and that he and his 

girlfriend, N.R., had been temporarily living at the victim’s home. He had a child with 

the victim. D.H. testified that the incident in question began with appellant trying to 

“kick the door off the hinges.” Once appellant kicked the door in, D.H. stated that he 

came into the home “in a rage” and approached and hit D.H. D.H. stated that appellant 

and the victim were on the front porch and he saw appellant punch her in the face. D.H. 

next saw appellant holding the victim in a “headlock.” D.H. stated that appellant was 

attempting to drag the victim to his vehicle. D.H. explained that he did not continuously 

monitor the scene because he was attending to his frightened four year old and the 

victim’s other child. D.H. admitted that he had a criminal history and had been convicted 

of theft on multiple occasions. 

{¶ 7} N.R. similarly testified that she observed appellant kick the door in and 

begin hitting the victim. She stated that appellant attempted to drag the victim to his car; 

he left when he heard the police sirens. N.R. testified that she observed the victim with a 

black eye and a split lip. Because N.R. stated that she was out on bond during her direct 

testimony, during cross-examination she was questioned about the charge and indicated 

that witness D.H was her co-defendant. 

{¶ 8} Following the trial and deliberations, the jury found appellant guilty of 

aggravated burglary and abduction. Appellant was sentenced on December 10, 2014, and 

this appeal followed. Appellant raises three assignments of error for our review: 
4.

 I. The convictions against appellant were not supported by the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

 II. The convictions against appellant were not supported by the 

sufficiency of the evidence. 

 III. The trial court committed reversible error at appellant’s 

sentencing by failing to advise appellant of provisions contained in the 

sentencing judgment entry. 

{¶ 9} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error will be jointly addressed. 

The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that “the legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence 

and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). At its core, sufficiency of 

the evidence is a determination of adequacy and a court must consider whether the 

evidence was sufficient to support the conviction as a matter of law. Id. The proper 

analysis is “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 576, 660 

N.E.2d 724 (1996), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 10} In contrast, a manifest weight challenge questions whether the state has met 

its burden of persuasion. Thompkins at 387. In making this determination, the court of 

appeals sits as a “thirteenth juror” and, after: 
5.

“reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created 

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should 

be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction.” Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio 

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶ 11} Appellant’s argument is not that he did not strike the victim; rather, 

appellant contends that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence that he forcibly 

entered the victim’s home “with purpose to commit any criminal offense” as required for 

an aggravated burglary conviction. Further, appellant contends that the abduction 

element of removing an individual from the place they were located by force or threat 

was not established. 

{¶ 12} In the present case, when viewing the evidence in the prosecution’s favor, 

we find that the purpose to commit a criminal offense was sufficiently established. D.H. 

testified that he observed appellant kick the door in “in a rage” and strike him and the 

victim. N.R. testified that appellant kicked the door in and he and the victim started 

arguing. He then began hitting her. 

{¶ 13} Appellant disputes that the evidence demonstrated that his purpose in 

entering the home was to assault the victim. Both witnesses testified that appellant 
6.

entered the apartment in a rage. However, the state was not required to prove that he 

intended to strike the victim and D.H. prior to trespassing. The Supreme Court of Ohio 

has specifically held that “a defendant may form the purpose to commit a criminal 

offense at any point during the course of a trespass.” State v. Fontes, 87 Ohio St.3d 527, 

530, 721 N.E.2d 1037 (2000). Accord State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 33. Accordingly, we find that appellant’s aggravated burglary 

conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. 

{¶ 14} We further conclude that the evidence does not support the contention that 

the jury lost its way or that a manifest injustice occurred. Thus, appellant’s aggravated 

burglary conviction was not against the weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 15} Appellant next argues that as to the abduction charge, the state failed to 

present sufficient evidence that appellant forcibly removed the victim from her home. 

R.C. 2905.02. As this court has noted, the statute does not specify a specific distance and 

may be satisfied by a distance of only a few feet. State v. Witcher, 6th Dist. Lucas No. 

L-06-1039, 2007-Ohio-3960, ¶ 21-23. 

{¶ 16} The testimony presented at trial established that appellant burst into the 

home and began hitting the victim. They both ended up outside. D.H. and N.R. testified 

that they saw the victim in a headlock being dragged down the sidewalk towards 

appellant’s vehicle. Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant’s abduction 

conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. 
7.

{¶ 17} We further find that the abduction conviction was not against the weight 

manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are 

not well-taken. 

{¶ 18} In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred 

in imposing postrelease control, failing to notify him of the consequence of a felony 

conviction in relation to firearms possession/ownership, and in imposing financial 

sanctions. 

{¶ 19} Regarding postrelease control, appellant contends that, at sentencing, 

appellant was first informed that he would be subject to five years of mandatory 

postrelease control for the aggravated burglary charge and three years for the abduction 

charge. Appellant contends that he was then informed that it would be three years. The 

sentencing judgment entry reflects the court’s first pronouncement. 

{¶ 20} At the December 9, 2014 sentencing hearing the court stated: 

 The sentence as to count one [aggravated burglary] * * * [h]e’ll be 

ordered to serve a period of five years mandatory post-release control. As 

to count two, abduction, * * * [h]e’ll be sentenced to a mandatory three 

years post-release control on the abduction charge since the violence was 

there. 

 You’re notified that when you are released from the penitentiary, 

Mr. Henderson, you’ll be required to serve a period of three years 

mandatory post-release control. 
8.

{¶ 21} The court, appellant and his counsel then executed a form properly 

advising him of the imposition and terms of postrelease control. Based on the language 

the court used at sentencing, the executed sentencing notification, and the judgment 

entry, we conclude that the court simply misspoke with its reference to a three-year 

mandatory term and notice of postrelease control was proper. See State v. Wright, 6th 

Dist. Sandusky No. S-09-023, 2010-Ohio-2620, ¶ 29. 

{¶ 22} Appellant next argues that he was not informed at sentencing of his 

inability to own or possess a firearm as a result of his felony conviction. The sentencing 

judgment entry does reflect the notification. 

{¶ 23} Reviewing Ohio statutory and case law, we find no requirement that the 

court inform a convicted felon of his inability to possess firearms. R.C. 2943.033, 

relating to misdemeanor domestic violence convictions, requires that a court inform a 

defendant that under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) it may be unlawful for the individual to possess 

a firearm. However, this section further provides that “[t]he plea may not be vacated 

based on a failure to inform * * *.” Thus, we find that this argument lacks merit. 

{¶ 24} Lastly, appellant contends that the court failed to advise him at sentencing 

of the financial sanctions imposed by the court as a result of the convictions. Appellant 

admits that the court found that he had or would have the ability to pay the costs and that 

the written notification form that appellant signed contained a description of the financial 

sanctions. Further, costs were imposed in the judgment entry. 
9.

{¶ 25} Appellant’s argument does not contend that he does not have the ability to 

pay the financial sanctions; rather, it appears that he is arguing that he was not informed 

of the specific amounts. We note than an itemized list of costs is generated by the clerk 

of courts. State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 19. 

Even if the itemized bill had been prepared, it is generally not put into a judgment entry. 

Id. 

{¶ 26} Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant’s sentence was not contrary 

to law. Appellant’s third assignment of error is not well-taken. 

{¶ 27} On consideration whereof, we find that appellant was not prejudiced or 

prevented from having a fair trial and the judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, appellant is ordered to pay the costs 

of this appeal. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

 
10. 

 State v. Henderson 

 C.A. No. L-14-1272 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Arlene Singer, J. 

_______________________________ 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.