T h e H on or abl e Ja mes S. G wi n of t h e U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct C ou r t f or t h e N or t h er n D i s t r i ct of O h i o, s i t t i n g by 1/ d esi gnat i o n. -1 - UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - : EMMETTE MCCORMI CK, J R., : CASE NO. 1:07-CV-570 : Plaintiff, : : vs. : OPI NI ON & ORDER – AMENDED : [R esolving Doc. No. 72
. ] THE DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA, et al ., : : De fe nd ants
. : :

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - J AMES S. GW I

N, UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE: 1/ In this long-r

unni n g d i s p ute, Plaintiff Emmette McCormick, Jr. say s the District and individual defenda

nts Wanda Patten and Devon Br own terminated his employ ment with the District of Col umb ia ’s De pa

rtment of Cor re c tio ns in v iol atio n o f D istri c t of Col umb ia

law a nd his F if th Amendment rig hts. Defe ndants now see k summary judge ment. They say that McCormick had no
co n s t i tu t i o n al l y -p ro t ec t edi n t er es t , th atex i s t i n g s t atu t es p ro v i d e a d equ at e p ro ce s s fo r ch al l en gi n g a wrong ful termination, that his termination was ne ither re taliatory nor wrong ful, and that qua lifi ed immunit y protec ts the individual defe ndants. Plaintiff McCormick opposes the motion beca use, he say s, g enuine disputes of material fa ct nec essitate a jur y trial. Be cause the Court finds that District statutes aff

orded Mc Cormick adequate pro c e s s , th a t t h e in d iv id u a l d e f e ndants are entitled to qualified i m munity and that he ha s not shown that his discharg e wa s retaliator y , the Court GRANTS Def endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt as to Counts I , I I , I I I , I V, and V. B eca use the Court lac ksCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

-2 - jurisdic ti o n

o v e r Pl a in ti f f ’ s wrong ful dischar g e cla im, the Court DI SMI SSES Count VIunder F e de ra l Rule of Civil P roce dure 12( b)(1)
. I. F acts In Marc h 2006, the District of Columb i a Department of Corre ctions fired Plaintiff, Supervisory

Correc tional Office r Emmette McCormick. [Doc. 73 at 7.] McCormick say s that the events lea ding to his termination beg an with t wo incidents in Marc h 2005, one involving a leak by the Of fi c e of Inte rn a l A ff

a ir s and the oth e r inv olv ing a c ra c k c oc a ine se izur e . H e sa y s th at a s a

re su lt of the se e v e n t s In t e r

n a l A f f a i r s r e t a l i at e d a

n d s o u g h t t o h av e h i m f

i r e d
. H e s ay s th at w h i le the ir ini tia l atte mpt s f

a ile d, Inte rn a l A ff

a ir s lat e r suc c e e de d ba se d on his i nv olv e me nt i n a thi rd e ve nt i n J anuar y 2006, where I n t er n al Affa irs found that McCormick struc k a handc uffe d inmate. Michae l To bia s. A. Le ak I nc ide nt Mc Cor mic k s ay s the c ha in of e ve nts that led to h is t e rm inatio n b e g an in Marc h 2 00 5, wh ile he wa s servingas Ac ting Capta in -i n -C h ar g e of the Special Mana g ement Unit. [Doc. 73 at 7.] Around this time then-Ac ting W arde n of the Centra l Detention Fa cility , L arr y L ee Corbe tt, rece ived officia l notice that statements take n by then-Interna l A ffa irs Investig ator Def endant Wanda Patten in another c ase ha d been imprope rl y re l ea s ed. [ Doc. 73 at 10] The statements, g iven by two
corr ectional of

fice rs, identified the two c orre ctional offic ers a s witnesses to an inmate’ s assault of a third cor

rec t i o n al o ff

i ce r and contained their home a ddresse s. [Doc. 73 10 .] In a n atte mpt to minimi ze the damag e ca used by this potentially -dang erous disclosure , Corbett order ed P laintiff McCormick to sear ch inmates’ c ells for c opies of the I nterna l Affa irs statements. [Doc. 73 at 10-11.] McCormick found unr edac ted copies of the statements in the cell of one inmate and prepa red a re portCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

-3 - implicating Interna l Affa irs and De fenda nt Patten in the leak. [Doc. 73 at 7, 11.] H e tr ans mitte d h is repor t to I nterna l Affa irs amongothers. [Doc. 73 at 11.] B. C r ac k Co c ain e Inc ide nt McCormick say s that Interna l Affa irs, disgr untled by his a ccusations, sought his termination in response. [Doc. 73 at 7.] L ater in March, 2005, Mc Cormick say s he over saw the se izure of cr ack
coca ine from a

n inmate’s ce ll. [ Doc. 73 at 11.] He arr i v ed af t er t h e seizure, examined the seized substance, tested it, and determined t hat i t was crac k coca ine. [Doc. 73 at 11-12.] He then dire cted the offic er who had conduc ted the seizure to pre pare a written repor t of t he incident. [ Doc. 73 at 12.] The off icer ’s initial report said that the of fice r had se ized the cra ck with the aid of a drug- s n i ffing dog . [Doc. 73 at 12.] S ubsequently , howeve r, anothe r off icer informed Mc Cormick that the dog only assisted the officers a fter the cra ck had a lrea dy been se ized. [ Doc. 73 at 1 2
. ] M c C o r m i c k s ays he notified his superior s of this discrepa ncy an d o rdered the r eport c orre cted. [Doc. 73 at 12.] Shortly there afte r, he sa

y s Interna l Affa irs, under the direc tion of Defe ndant Patten , co n ducted a n investigation into the chang ing of the re port. [Doc. 73 at 12.] On J une 9, 2005, Def endant Patten produce d a re port of her

finding s. [Doc. 73 at 12.]. On Au gu s t 1, 2005, the then-I nterna l Affa irs Chi ef tra nsmitt ed the r eport to the De puty Mayor with a re commendation to fire McCormick for some unexplained interfe renc e with the investig ation of the a rre st circ umstances. [ Doc. 73 at 12.] The De puty

Mayor dec lined, howeve r, to follow the re commendation. [Doc. 73 at 12.] C. Tobi as Inc ide nt Whil e some details rema in contested re g ardingthe eve nts imm ediately prec edingPlaintiff’s termination, the par

ties do not dispute the ge nera l chain of e vents. On January 13, 2006 a cor

rec tions office r mistakenly

rele ased a

substantial number of inmates f rom their ce lls. [ Doc. 73 at 13; Doc.Case No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

-4 - 72 at 5.] Nume rous corr ectional office rs, including Plaintiff McCormick responde d to order inmate s back into their cells. [Doc. 73 at 13; Doc. 72 at 5. ] Mc Cor mic k a lle g e s th at w hil e he wo rk e d to control the situation, an inmate on a highe r floor thre w wate r on him. [Doc. 73 at 13; Doc. 72 at 5.] Uncontra dicted witness stateme nts then s ay t h at McCormick orde red the inmate he be lieved responsible, Micha el Tobias, to an a rea of the prison known as the “Sally Port.” [Doc. 73 at 16; Doc. 72 a t 6. ] Som e guard -wi tn ess es gave st ate men ts tes ti fi ed t hatMcC orm icksl app ed h andcu ff e d in ma te Tobias while in the “Sally Port.” Other guard- witn es s es s ai dthey did not see, or we re not in a position t o see, Mc Cormick strike Tobias. [Doc. 73 at 16–19; Doc. 72 at 6
. ] D. Term ination As McCormick would have i t , t h i s woul d have be en the e nd of this sag a but for two int e rv e nin ge ve nts , a

n inve sti g ation of th e To bia s in c ide nt a nd his re ne we d e ff

or ts t o im pli c ate int er n al affairs in the leak incident. Fir st, a woman re prese nting he rself to be a fa mily member of Mi chae l T ob ia s e ma ile d a City Cou nc il m e mbe r a lle g ingthat Pla int if f M c Cor mic k p hy sic a lly mistreated Tobia s. [Doc. 73 at 1-2; Doc
. 72 at 6.] That email eventua lly prompted an inve stigation of the Patten incide nt by Interna l Affa irs and overseen by Def endant Patten. [Doc. 73 at 1-2; Doc
. 72 at6
. ] D ur i n gth e i n v e s t i g at i o n , D e f e n d an t In t e r n a l A f f a i r s In v e s t i g at o r

P at t e nt o o k

s t at e me nts from numer ous witnesses, b u t did not conduct an a dversa rial hea ring . On Marc h 9, 2006, the investigation culminated in a thirteen- pag e re port, which c oncluded that “ L t. M cC o rm ick struck inmate Michae l Tobias acr oss the right side of his fac e with an ope n hand at lea st once while he was handcuf fed in the sa lly

port of the Southwest (3) housing unit on January 13, 2006.” [Doc. 73-10
. ] McCormick vehe mently

contests this conclusion. [Doc. 73 at 26–29.] Second, McCormick sa

y s th a t on Febr uary 13, 2006, while the investig ation was takingplace ,Case No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

-5 - he wr ote to Def

endant Corr ections Dire ctor B rown, th en re cently -appointed a s Direc tor of the Depa rt ment of Corre ctions, ag ain alleg ing that Defe ndant Interna l Affa irs Investig ator Patten wa s
re s p o n s ible for the le aked statements found in the inmate’ s cell in Marc h 2005. [Doc. 73 at 31.] McCormick say s that after Def endant B rown rece ived t his transmission, Defenda nt Patten relayed the alleg ations of t h e Tobias incident to Def endant B rown. [Doc. 73 at 31 .] A t th at po int , McCo rm i ck s ay s, Correc tions Director B rown orde red Interna l Affa irs to investigate the Tobias incident and place d McCormick on administrative leav e. [ Do c. 73 at 31.] McCormick’s briefing g ive s n o d ate s f

or the se a lle g e d e ve nts
. Mc Cor mic k s ay s th at on

the bas is of

Inte rn a l A ff

a ir s’ re po rt

of the To bia s in c ide nt, Def endant Corrections Director Brown ordere d McCormick fired for cause. [Doc. 73 at 20-21; 31.] Mc Cor mic k s ay s th at hi s te rm inatio n c ou ple d w iththe Inte rn a l A ffai rs repor t in fr ing e his
c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d li be rt

y int e re sts , v iol ate DC wh ist le blo we r p ro te c tio ns , a nd con st itute common-law wrong ful dischar g e. His constitutional claims proce ed on two theor ies. Counts one
and tw o a lle g e tha

t the Di str ic t, and

ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants , r e sp e c tiv e ly , d e pr ive d M c Cor mic k o f h is constitutionally protec ted liberty interest in pursuing a car eer in corre ctions. [Doc. 3 .] C ounts three and four alleg e that his termination coupled w ith the thr eat of disclosure of information about the
c ir c ums tanc e s und e rl ying his te rm inatio n de pr ive d h im o f a c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d li be rt

y int e re st in his professional re putation. [ Doc. 3 .] Mc Cor mic k a lso say s th at hi s te rm inatio n v iol ate d th e D. C. Wh is tl e b lo w e r

St a tute, D.C. Code § 615.53 (a ) b ec au s e p ro t ec t edd i s cl o s ure s
— h i s re p o rt s o nth e leak incident–wer e a c ontributing fa ctor to his termination. [Doc. 3 .] F inally , McCormick say s that the District wrong fully

terminated him bec ause of these disclosure s. [Doc. 3
. ] De fe nd ants no w m ov e fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. F ir st, the y argue that Plai nti ff ha s n o li be rt yCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

-6 - interest in continued e mploy ment b ec au se he w as an at will employ ee a nd that his professional reputation was not defa

med. [Doc. 72 at 9– 32 .] Se c on d, the y sa y that pl a int iff di d no t e xha us t
a dmi nis tr ativ e re medi es un de r t he DC Com

pr e he ns ive Me ri t Pe rs onne l A c t. T hir d, De fe nd ants De von Br own and Wanda Patten sa y they are qualifiedly

immune. [ Doc. 72 at 3 2

– 3 4
. ] F o urth, Def endants say

that Plaintiff’s alleg ed whistleblowingactivities do not fall within the statute’s protec tions. [ Doc. 72 at 36 –3 9. ] F ina lly , D e fe nd ants say that Pla int if

f’ s w ro ng fu l di sc ha

rg e c la ims
are unsubstantiated. [ Doc. 72 at 38–39.] P laintiff counter s that materially disputed fac ts as to eac h iss ue wa rr ant a jur y tr ia l. II. Sum m ar y J udge m e nt Summary judgme nt is appropriate when “ there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c)
. A def endant movingfor summary judgme nt ha s the initial burden of showingthe abse nce of
a g e nu in e f

a c tu a l i s s u e w it

hr e s p e c t t o o n e o r

mo r e e s s e n ti a l e le me n ts o f th e p la inti f

f ' s c la im. See Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)
. The moving defe ndant meets his burde n by “informingthe district court of the basis for its motion, and i dentifying those portions of ‘the pleading s, depositions, answers to inter ro gat o ri es, and a dmissions on file, tog ether with the aff idavits, if any ,’ which [he] believes demonstrate t he absence of a ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct.” Id. at 323 , (qu o t i n g Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c) ). Howeve r, t he movi ngdefe ndant is under no “ express or implied” duty

to “support [his] m o tion with affidavits or other simil ar materials neg atingthe opponent' s claim.” Id
. Once the m oving defe ndant s atisfies his burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovingplaintiff to set forth spec ific fa cts showi n ga triable issue. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith RadioCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

Coun t s II a nd IV a l so ch ar g e con s t i t u t i on al v i ol at i on s a g ai n s t de f en dan t s Pat t en a n d B r own pu r s u an t t o 2/ 42 U
. S. C. § 1983 , b u t t h e C o u rt fi n d s tha t q u a lif ie d im m u n ity p ro te c ts th e se d e fen d a n ts, a n d s o d o e s n o t d isc u ss th e se c o u n ts h e re . See i nf

r a Pa r t I V. -7 - Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) . The nonmovingplaintiff may not defe at the summary

judgme nt motion mere ly by

showing some exist ence of doubt as to the mater ial fac ts. See id. at 586
. Nor c an the no nmo vin gpla int if

f rel y upon

the me re a lle g atio ns or

de nia ls o f h e r p le a din g s. Fe d.R.Civ.P
. 56(e)
. In decidinga motion for summary judgme nt, the Court views the fa ctual evide nce a nd draw s all rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the nonmovingplaintiff. Adicke s v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)
. To be sure , the Court need not c onclusively resolve a n alleg edly

disputed issue in favor of

the nonmoving plaintiff; rathe r, the plaintiff must prese nt “suffic ient evidenc e supporting the claimed f

actua l dispute ... to require a jury or judg e to re solve the par ties' differ ing ve rsions of the truth at trial.” First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co. , 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968) . U lti mate ly the Court must decide “whether the evidence presents sufficient disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one party must pre vail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)
. I I I . Co n s ti tu ti o n a l Cl a i ms Counts I and I I I c ha

rg e vio latio ns of

Pla int if f’ s c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d li be rt

y int e re sts
. 2/ Termination of a

public employ ee ma

y impair the employ ee’ s liberty interest in pursuinga chose n
car eer . See Bd

. o f R e ge nts v . R oth , 408 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1972)
. An employ ee can make out such
a c la im i n tw o w ay s: F ir st, he may pr ov e that th e g ov e rnme nt’ s c ha rg e s in c on jun c tio n w ith termination “mig ht seriously damag e his standing and associations in his communi ty .” Id. at 573 ; see also O'D on ne ll v . B arry , 148 F.3d 1126, 1139- 40 (D.C. Cir. 1998) . Se c on d, he may de mon str ateCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

-8 - that g overnme nt “imposed on him a stigma or other disability

that fore closed h is free dom to take advanta g e of othe r employ ment opportunities.” Id. ; seealso O’ Do nn e ll 148 F.3d at 1140 . In either
c a se , if the e mpl oye e c an s ho w a pr ote c te d inte re st, “ du e pr oc e ss woul d accord a n o pp or tun ity to ref ute the cha

rg e.” Id. A. Libe r tyInt e r e st 1. Damage to Standing and Association Go ve rnme nt d e pr ive s an e mpl oye e of a pr ote c te d lib e rt y int e re st whe re it “ sti g matiz[e s] hi s g ood name” in conjunction with “an a ccompa nying loss of g overnme nt employ ment.” Mosrie v. Ba rry , 718 F.2d 1151, 1160 ( D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting P a u l v . D a v is , 4 2 4 U. S
. 6 93, 706 (1976) )
. “[I ]nj ury t o reputation cannot occ ur in the abse nce of public disclosure of the alleg edly damag ing statements. Oran ge v . D ist . o f Co lum bia , 59 F.3d 1267, 1274 ( D.C. Cir. 1995) . A n inte rn a l r e po rt , neither w idely

circ ulated “nor

made available to the public,” does not c onstitut e stig matization. Id. The pa rties her e do not contest that Plaintiff lost his employ ment, and the Court assumes for t he sake of argument that the alleg ations that plaintiff struck a restra ined inmate could damag e his reputation. Stil l, t he Court fi nd s n o e vid e nc e that D e fe nd ants “ pu bli c [ly ] dis c los [ed ]” the se a lle g atio ns . Pla int if f a sse rt s th at th e e vid e nc e a dd uc e d s atis fi e s th e pu

bli c dis c los ur e e le me nt i n tw o w ay s. First, he sa

y s that the g overnme nt need not make public disclosures itself. Instead, it should suffice that he “is re quired to communicate t h at [si c] the fac t that he was te rminated for using e x cessive fo rc e on e ve ry g ov e rnme nt ap pli c atio n he is ev e r g oin g to fi le ” and that pri vate e mpl oye rs lik e wi se require disclosure of his re cord. [Doc. 73 at 40.] Second, P laintiff s ay s that Def endants “ themselves published the char g es ag ainst Mr. McCormick by filing their motion for summary judge ment on the public rec ord.” [Doc. 73 at 4 0 n . 8
. ]Case No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

In su p p o rt o f t h is inte rp re ta tio n o f “p u b licly d isc lo se d ,” P la intiff re lies o n a sing le q u o ta tio n fro m D e fen d a n t’s 3/ M em o ran d um i n S up p o rt o f S um m ary Ju d ge m en t , w hich cit es G ra y v . Un io n C n ty . In te rm e d ia te E d . D ist. , 5 2 0 F .2 d 8 0 3 , 806 ( 9t h Ci r . 1975)
. T h at c as e of f er s n o s u ppor t f

or s u ch a re adi n g ; i n s t ea d t h e N i n t h C i r cu i t h el d t h at t h e mag n i t u de of t he al l ega t i ons di d not r i s e t o cons t i t ut i onal l eve l
. T he cas e t hu s provi des l i t t l e pers uas i ve aut hor i t y . T he onl y ot her cas e of wh i ch t hi s cour t i s awa r e i n w hi ch a c our t he l d tha t a n o t e i n a per s onnel f i l e c ons t i t ut ed di s cl osu r e wa s o v e rtu rn e d o n o the r g ro u n d s. See J o n e s v . M c K e n zie , 628 F. Su pp. 1500 ( D
. D
. C. 1986) ; r ev ’ d on ot her gr ounds 833 F. 2d 335 ; vacat ed 490 U
. S. 1001
. -9 - Plaintiff errs. First, a r equire ment that information be tra nsmitt ed to prospec tive employ ers 3/ coupled with “[r]estricted disclosure of such materia l to other feder al age ncies, with cle ar limits on further distribution, is not stigmatizing and does not infring e upon constitutional liberty interests.” Doe v . Cheney , 8 8 5 F. 2 d 8 9 8 , 910 (D.C. Cir. 1989) . Every case of which the Court is aware has presumed that “p u b l i c disclosure ” re quires exactly that: The Gove rnment must make public a stigmatizing a lleg ation. See Orange , 59 F.3d at 1274 , Cheney , 885 F.2d at 910 (“N SA did not make pu bli c a c c us atio ns .” ); see also Quinn v. Shirley , 293 F.3d 315, 320 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (“ [C]harg e s mu st be made public . . . . [P ]u b l i c dis semination must have bee n voluntary .”) , W ojcik v. M

ass. State Lottery Comm’n , 300 F.3d 92, 103 (1st Cir. 2002) (Plaintiff “fa iled to adduce any evidenc e that the alleg edly stigmati z i n g s t at em en t s we re d i s s em i n at edb y go v ern m en tac t o rs i na f

o rm al s et t i n g. ”). The fac ts that Pl aintiff has a dduced f ail to satisfy t h i s burden. More over, e ven if the D istrict does transmit Plaintiff’s file t o other ag encie s, so long as it limit s distribution, such distribution does not infring e his liberty

interest. See Doe , 885 F.2d at 910
. Plaintiff’s second c laim, that Defe ndants “themselve s published the char g es aga i n s t Mr. McCormick by

filing the ir mot i on for summary judge ment on the public re cord,” fairs no be tter. [Doc. 73 at 4 0 n .8.] Deprivation of a c onstitut ionally protec ted liberty

interest occ urs wher e “stig ma[] . . . acc ompan[ies] loss of g overnme nt employ ment.” M

o s rie , 7 1 8 F. 2 d at 1160 . The alleg edly stigmatizing e vent in this case–the public filing of documents on August 10, 2010–did notCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

-1 0- acc ompany

the loss of employ

ment. The loss of employ ment, by Plaintiff’s own ac count, took place some four year s ear lier on Mar ch 31, 2006. [Doc. 73 at 1.] For the fore g oing r easons, Mc Cormick has not sh o wn that the Gover nment infring ed a protec ted liberty

interest by

publicly distributed stig matizi ng information about him in conjunc tion wi th h is t e rm inatio n. Stil l Mc Cor mic k’ s li be rt

y int e re st cl a im ca

n pro c e e d if

he c an s ho w that r e su lt Def endants’ a ctions virtually fore close fr om employ

ment in the field. 2. Foreclosure from Em

ployment Where g overnme nt imposes “a stig ma or other disability that fore close[s]
. . . fre edom to take advanta g e of othe r employ ment opportunities,” it deprives a person of

constitutionally

protec ted liberty
. Ro th , 408 U.S. at 573
. A pl aintiff may show that the gover nment’s ac tions have this effe ct in e ith e r of tw o wa

y s. F ir st, he c an sho w that the g ov e rnme nt’ s ac tio ns “ fo rm a lly or a uto matic a lly exclude” him “fr om other gove rnment employ ment opportunities.” Kar tse v a v . D e p’ t of Sta te , 37 F.3d 1524, 1528 ( D.C. Cir.1994) . Alternatively , a plaintiff c an show tha t governme nt “ac tion prec ludes her from pursuing her pr ofession.” Id. at 1529
. McCormick claims the latter. H e say s that “being dismiss ed for alleg edly hitting a restra ined inmate will ‘self- evidently ’ bar Mr. McCormick from fur ther e mploy

ment in that occupation.” [Doc. 73 at 37.] Responding, the Def endants a rgue that the re cord contains no such evidenc e. [Doc. 78 at 4.] W ith reg ard to this issue, the Court finds
su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to r a ise a

tr ia ble iss ue of

fa c t. At le a st thr e e c ri te ri a g ov e rn e mpl oya bil ity fo r d ue pr oc e ss p ur

po se s: t he natur e and

se ve ri ty of the a lleg ation, the ra

ng e of e mploy

ment from which a

plaintiff claims he is for ec l osed, and plaintiff’s actual pos t-termination employ ment. In O’

Do nn e ll , the D.C. Circuit found that a de moted po lic e of fi c ia l su ff e re d n o d epri vat io n of li be rt y wh e re the re a so ns fo r d e mot ion re late d to pu

bli cCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

-1 1- statements, and he soon found e mploy ment as a police chief

in a small town. See 148 F.3d at 1141
. B y c o n tr a s t, K

a rtseva conce rned a

Russian translator who wa s denied a secur ity clea ranc e for unknown re asons and claimed that as a result she could not find employ ment as a Russian tra

nslator. See 37 F.3d at 1529–30 . T he re , th e Cour t of App e a ls f ound that th e tr ans lator

state d a c la im
war rantingfurther

fac tual develo p ment. Id. No evidenc e shows Plaintiff has be en able to find further employ ment in corre ctions or a c ompara ble field. He state s he is employ ed as a driver. [Doc. 73-1 at 10.] And McCormick’s testimony , g iven his experience in corre ctions, provides suffic ient evidenc e to ra ise a triable issue as to whether his firing for strikinga handc uffe d inmate would make h im un e mp lo y a

b le in c o r r e c ti o n s. [Doc. 73-1 at 9. ] While thi s is a c los e c a se , th is e vid e nc e is
su ff ic ie nt t o r a ise a

tr ia ble iss ue of wh e the r he ha d a lib e rt y int e re st i n f

utu re e mpl oy me nt t hat c ou ld not be taken w ithout an opportunity to be hea

rd. S t i l l, Plainti ff must show that this deprivation
occur red with ou t du e pr oc ess . B. D ue P r oc e ss The Due Process Clause guara ntees that no person “shall
. . . be deprived of life, liberty , or proper ty , without due proce

ss of law .” U.S. Const. amend. V (empha sis added). I n case s involving
a lib e rt y int e re st i n pro fe ssi on a l emp loy me nt, the we ll- se ttl e d r e me dy “ mand ate d b y

the Du e Pr oc e ss Clause of the [Fifth] Amendment is an ‘ o p p o rt u n ity to refute the cha

rg e.’ ” Do e v . U

.S . D e p’ t of Justice , 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 ( D.C. Cir. 1985) (qu o t i n g Codd v. Velger , 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (qu o t i n g Ro th , 408 U.S. at 573 )). Where a plaintiff“c an demonstrate that [her employ er] harme d her pr of e ssi on a l st and ingwi tho ut p ro vid ingthe pr op e r p ro c e dura l pr ote c tions , h e r r e me dy is a ‘name -cle aring ’ hea

ring .” Id. The District say s it pr ovided two avenue s for McCormick to c lear his name. F irst, during theCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

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Pl a i n t i f

f r e l i e s on a a f

oo t n ot e f r om Ho l ma n v . Wi l l i a ms , w h ic h sa ys “[p ]la intiff ' s w ro n g ful ter m ina tio n c la im 4/ i s n ot pr e e mp t e d b y t h e CM PA be c a u s e t h e s t a t u t e of f e r s n o a dm i n i s t r a t i v e r e c ou r s e t o a t
- w i l l e mp l oy ees f or c l a i ms r el at ed t o t hei r t er mi nat i on. ” 436 F. Su pp. 2d 68, 76 ( D
. D
. C. 2006)
. Y et t hat f oo t not e was i n c ont ext of ex pl ai ni ng t hat t he C M P A did no t preem p t t hat plai nt i f f ’ s co m m o n l aw wro ngf ul dis cha rg e c la im . M cC o rmick’ s st rai ned , plai n- t ext r eadi ng goes t oo far. H i s c o nst i t ut i onal cl ai m i s not r el at ed t o cha l l eng i ng hi s t er mi nat i on, but i ns t ead t he f act s t hat fo re c lo se him fro m futu re e m p lo ym e n t. H e re , t h e C M P A p r o v id e s a d e q u a te re lief b e c a u se it p e rm its P la intiff to cha l l eng e t he al l ega t i ons ag ai ns t hi m and cl ear hi s na me. -1 2- Interna l Affa irs investigation into t he Tob ia s in c ident, Plaintiff ga ve a statement and pr ovided written statements. [Doc. 72 at 15–21.] Second, the District sa y s that Plainti ff should have pursued administrative re medies under the Comprehensive Merit P ersonne l Act (CMPA). D.C. Code §§ 1- 601, et seq . [Doc. 72 at 12-15.] I n response , McCormick say s that the Interna l Affa irs investigation provided insuffic ient proce ss beca use he ne ver sa

w the evide nce a g ainst him and had insufficie nt oppo rt u n i t y

to present his side of the case . [Doc. 73 at 41–42.] He furthe r say s that the administrative review procedure s under the CMPA do not apply to him. [ Doc. 73 at 5.] The Court doubts that McCormick’s ability to give statements to Interna l Affa irs Investig ator Patten re sulted in any proce dural due proce ss claim. Be cause the pos t-termination procedure s provide for a name clea ringhear ing, the Court finds that the Dis trict provided Plaintiff ade quate pr ocess irr espec tive of whether McCormick had a

chanc e to pre sent his positi on to I nterna l Affa irs Investig ator Patten . By its plain langua g e, the CMPA applies t o Plaintiff and gives him the basic safe g uard of a
name- clea

ringhear ing. Wit h exceptions not applicable here , the CMPA “a ppl[ ies] to all employ ees 4/ of t he Dist rict of Columbi a g overnme nt.” D.C. Code § 1-602.01 . Plaintiff evidently conce des that the CMPA applies to him because he has filed c laims under it—namely Count V, which invokes D.C. Code § 1-615.51 et seq . [Doc. 73 at 29–35.] And the CMP A provides f or a na me-c lear ing he a r in g : Ane mp lo y e e ma

y c h a ll e n g e “ ana dv e r s e a c ti o nf o r c a u s e th at r e s u lt s in

r emoval,” wher eupon “the Offic e shall re view the r ecor d and uphold , re v erse, or modify the dec ision of theCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

G w i n , J.

I n s u i t s al l eg i n g depr i v at i on of a l i ber t y i n t er es t t h r ou g h f or ec l os u r e f

r om a c ar ee r , t h e momen t of de pr i v at i on 5/ i s di f f i cu l t t o di s ce r n . I t cou l d occ u r ei t h er at M cCor mi ck ’ s t er mi n at i on or at t h e momen t h e u n s u cc es s f u l l y s o ught f urthe r em p l o ym en t
. T he i m p o rt i s this: A p o st
- t erm i na t i o n na m e-clea ring he aring co nsti t utes p re-d ep rivati o n p ro ce ss i n t he l at t er case, but d o es not i n the f o rme r. W hi l e t he p art i es di sput e whet her M cC o rmick s ho ul d have recei ved m o re p re- t erm i nat i o n p roce ss , t hi s C o urt need no t d eci d e t hi s q ue stio n . See D oe , 753 F. 2d a t 1114 (“ [T ]he adm i ni st rat i ve b urdens i nvo l ved i n a po st
- t erm i nat i o n Codd heari ng do not i n any way i nt erf ere wi t h t he D ep art m ent ' s em p l o y m ent d eci si o ns. ”). -1 3- ag ency .” D.C. Code § 1-606.03(a )
. S t i l l , th e C M P A p r o c e d

ur e s mu s tc o m p l y w i thth e s t an d ar d d e l i n e at e d

b y Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
. See Doe , 753 F.2d at 1113
. Ma the ws require s

consideration of three disti nct factors: first, the private intere st that will be affe cted by the of fi c ia l a c tio n; s e c on d, the ri sk of an e rr on e ou s d e pr ivatio n o f s uc h inte re st thr ou g h the pr oc e dure s us e d, and the pr ob a ble va lue , if

any , o f a dd iti on a l or

su bs tit ute proce dural saf

eguards; and finally , the Gover nment' s interest, includingthe func tion inv olv e d a

nd the fi sc a l and

a dmi nis tr ativ e bu rde ns that th e a dd iti on a l or su bs tit ute pr oc e dura l r e qu ir e me nt w ou ld e nta il. Ma tth e ws , 424 U.S. at 334
. Th e CMPApr oc e dure s satis fy the se re qu ir e me nts . A s to the fi rs t Ma tth e ws fac tor, McCormick’s interest is not a proper ty interest in his position, but a liberty interest re lated to future employ ment. Whil e the liber

ty interest is important, the immediate circ umstances of the termination of pre vious employ

ment are less important: In case s of “discha rg e amidst alleg ations of 5/ unprofe ssio n ali sm” the “r emedy is a ‘name -cle aringhear ing.” See Doe , 753 F.2d at 1102
. “[N]ame-clea

ring ” sug g ests that this Court need not determine the prec ise moment of depr ivation, bu t o n l y w h e th e r M c C o r m i c k r e c e i v e d a d e qu at e p r o c e s s b e f

o r e th e T o b i a s a l l e g at i o n s b e c a me ind e lib ly atta c he d to his re c or d. Th e CMPApr ov ide s Mc Cor mic k th e se pr oc e dure s. Under the CMPA, “ [t ]he Office [of Employ ee A ppeals] may

order oral a rgument, on its own motion or on moti on filed by any party within 15 day s, and provide such other pr ocedur es or r ules and re g ulations as it deems prac ticable or desirable in a ny appea l unde r this section.” D.C. Code §Case No. 1:07-CV- 570

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-1 4- 1-606.03(b) . Moreove r, “[a]ny employ ee or

ag ency may appea l the decision of the O ffice to the Sup erior Court of the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

fo r a re vie w o f t

he re c or d a

nd su c h Co ur

t ma y a ff ir m,
reve rse, r emove, or

modify such decision, or take a ny other a ppropriate action the Court may deem
nece ssary .” D. C
. C o d e § 1 -606.03 . Almost by definition, judicial review satisfies the sec ond Ma tth e w’ s fac tor. Since these pr ocedur es ar e ade quate unde r this se t of fac ts, the Court need not conside r the third Ma tth e ws fac tor, the g overnme nt’s interest and an alter native set of pr ocedur es. In sum, the CMPA satisfies the Due Proce ss require ments of a name- clea ring hear ing for a plaintiff depr ived of a constitutionally

protec ted liberty

interest in profe ssional employ ment in a chose n field. IV. Quali fi ed Im m uni ty Th e fo re g oin gana ly sis a lso su ff ic e s to sh owwhy

qu a lif ie d immun it y prote c ts D e fe nd ants Cor re c tio ns Di re c tor

B ro wn and Inte rn a l A ff a ir s Inv e sti g ator

Patte n. “ [G]ov e rnme nt o ff ic ia ls perf orming discretionar

y functions, g ener ally are shielded fr om liabilit y for c ivil damag es insofar

as their conduc t does not violate clea rly established statutory

or constit u tional rig hts of which a
rea sonable pe rson would have k n o wn .” Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) . In no particula r orde r, “a court must de cide whether the fac ts that a plaintiff has
. . . shown (see Rules 50, 56 ) m ake out a vi ol ation o f a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht” and “ wh e the r t

he ri g ht at is su e wa s ‘ c le arl y established” at the time of defe ndant' s alleg ed misconduct.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232, (2009) ; see id. at 236
. B e c a us e Mc Cor

mic k ha s no t sh own a vio latio n o f a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht, D e f e n d an t s B r o w nan d

P at t e nar e e n t i t l e d

t o q u a l i f i e d i m mun i ty. McCormick would have to sho w t h at De fenda nts Brown and Patten publicly disclosed inf or matio n d ama g ingto h is p ro fe ssi on al repu tat io n o r t hat th e y fo re c los e d h im f

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-1 5- corr ections without due proc ess. But McCormick prese nts no evidenc e that Defenda nts Brown or Patten disclosed the information in his personne l file. Instead, he say s that the finding s may forc e him to dis close the infor mation. [ Doc. 73 at 4 0
. ] L ikewise, the Court finds no e vidence that Def endants B rown or Patten de nied McCormick a name- clea

ring hear ing under the CMPA. [Doc. 73 at 42–44.] McCormick’s claim that “the Deputy Mayor denied his request for a post-ter mination meeting” d o es notimply that he wa s denied a

name- clea

ringhear ing unde r the CMPA nor that Def endants Patton and Br o wn were involved. [Doc. 73 at 22 .] A c c or din g ly , th e Court g ra nts Def endants summary

judge ment on Count I Iand IV.

V. Whi st le blo werCl aim In addition to constituti onal claims, Plaintiff also ra ises claims under the DC whistleblower statute, D.C. Code § 1-615.52 , and common law. Plaintiff sa y s the ac tual motive for his termination
was reta liation f

or his pr otected disclosures in c onnection with the leak inciden t
. [Doc. 73 at 31.] He sa y s that eac h time he re peate d the disclosure, D efe ndants place d him under investig ation and
so ug ht h is t e rm inatio n. Ind e e d a ft e r h is i nit ia l di sc los ur e , Inte rn a l A ff air s recomme nc e d h is termination in conne ct i o n wi th the cra ck coc aine incide nt. [ Doc. 73 at 31 .] Whi le thi s f ir st reta liation attempt failed, he sa y s that Interna l Affa irs succeed ed i n obtaining his ter mination following the Tobias incident. [Doc. 73 at 31.] Under the DC whistleblower statute, “ [a] superviso r s h al l not take, or thre aten to take , a p ro h i b i t e d p er s o n n el ac t i o no r o th erwi s e r et al i at e a gai n s tan em p l o y ee b ec au s e o f t h e e mp l o y ee 's protec ted disclosure or beca use of an employ ee' s ref

usal to c omply

with an illeg al orde r.” D.C. Code § 1-615.53(a )
. An employ ee so subjec ted “may bringa civil ac tion ag ainst the District.” D.C. Code § 1-615.54(a )(1) . In th e c ivi l su it,Case No. 1:07-CV- 570

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-1 6-

on c e it has bee n d e mon str ate d b y a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that an a c tiv ity proscr ibed by § 1-615.53 was a contributing fac tor in the alleg ed prohibited pe rsonnel action ag ainst an employ ee, the burden of proof sha ll be on the def endant to prove by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that the a lle ged action would have oc curr ed for le g it im ate , in d e p e n d e n t r e a s o n s e v e nif th e e mp lo y e e h a d

n o t e n g a g e d

in activities protec ted by

this section. D.C. Code § 1-615.54(b) . A“ c on tr ibutin gfa c tor ” is “ any fa c tor wh ic h, a lon e or

in c onne c tio n w ith other fac tors, tends to affe ct in any way the outcome of

the dec ision.” D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a )(2)
. The McD onnell Dou g l as Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) , f ra me wo rk g ov e rn s D .C. whistleblower c ases. J

oh ns on v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 935 A.2d 1113, 1118 (D.C. 2007) . At summary judge ment, a plaintiff must “c h al l en ge the motion for summary judgme nt with a proff

er of a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e that the ir “ pr ote c te d a c tiv ity”
. . . wa s a “ c on tr ibutin g fa c tor ” in h e r a dv e rs e employ ment actions. Id. Yet eve n if a plaintiff makes such a proff er, summar

y judgme nt for the defe ndant is nonetheless a ppropriate wher e plaintiff “ [can]not counter the [defenda nts’]ex planation that appellants would have bee n [di sciplined] any way , for a

n unrelated, leg iti m at e rea son.” Id. at 1120 . In b uil din g a pr ima fa c ie c a se , “th e fa c ts an d cir c ums tanc e s re lie d upo n must atta in t he dignit y of substantial evidenc e and must not be such as mere ly to c reate a suspicion.” Id. (fur ther c itation omi tte d) . A nd

“ an in fe re nc e of

re ta liatio n c ann ot r e st s ole ly on ‘t e mpo ra l pr ox imi ty ’ ( e ve n if it i s established) wher e the opportunity for reta liation c onflicts with the opponent' s expli cit evidenc e of an innoce nt expl anation of the event.” Id. The Court doubts but nonetheless assumes that McCormick has made a prima f acie case that his termination was in reta liation for protec ted disclosures. Yet he ha s not shown that his termination would not have oc curr ed “f or an unr elated, le g itimate rea son.” Id. at 1120 . The re cord shows that the Depa rtment of Corre ctions terminated Plaintiff bec ause I nterna l Affa irs fo u n d t h at he struck aCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

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-1 7- restra ined inmate. [Doc. 72 at 39.] On this poi nt, Plainti ff of fer s no evidenc e to the contra ry . [Doc. 73 at 35.] The Court acknow ledg es t hat P laintiff has shown a dispute of f act r eg ardingwhether

Plaintiff struck a r estraine d inmate. B ut whether P l ai n t i ff struck a r estraine d inmate is a wholly differ ent fa c tua l qu e sti on

fr om whe the r t

he De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio ns te rm inate d Pl a in ti ff becaus e its inv e sti g atio n f

ound that he ha d. Th e latte r q

ue sti on c on tr ols thi s c la im; the fo rm e r i s ir re le va nt. [A] party cannot stave off

a g rant of summar

y judgme nt merely

by filing a ny ty pe of aff idavit, sworn discover

y materia l, or any

document that m er ely

happens to touch upon the subject matter of the c ase. The evidenc e prof fer ed in opposition to a moti on for summary

judgme nt must b e, o n its own, clear ly responsive to the f

actua l r e qu i r e m e n t s f

o r p r o v i n gl i a

b i l i ty. Id. at 1122 . Her e, Plaintiff fa ils to m eet his burde n. Plaintiff points t o no fac tual materia l contesting the “ unrelated, leg itimate rea son” for his termination. Id. at 1120
. In fac t, he cites evidence showing the opposite: “McCormick was terminated for cause ‘base d on an Interna l A ff ai rs i nvestig ative finding .’ ” [Doc. 73 at 21.] Acc ording ly , the Court grants summary judge ment for the District on Pla int if f’ s w his tle blo we r c la im.

VI. Com m on Law Wrongfu l Discharge Planitiff also claims that his termination constitutes common law wrong ful dischar g e. The pa rt ie s’ br ie fi ngis s tr iki ng ly de vo id of le g a l ana ly sis on thi s p oint; the y

a pp are ntl y pr e sume that th is issue turns on the same que stions as Pl aintiff’s whistleblowe r cla im. These assumptions are misplaced. “ Under

the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Ac t (‘CMPA’) , D
. C. Code § 1-601.01 et se q. (2001) , suc h common law cla i m s ar e pre empted.” Le wis v . D ist . o f Co lum bia De

p’ t of Mo tor Vehicle s , 987 A.2d 1134, 1 1 3 7 (D .C. 2010) . The for ce of pree mption is particula

rly stronghere be c a us e “ [t]he Counc il s qu are ly a dd re sse d th e iss ue its e lf

, a rt ic ulatin gan e xpre ss p ub lic po lic y inCase No. 1:07-CV- 570

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-1 8- fa vo r o f g ov e rnme nt e mpl oye e wh ist le blo wi ng and c re atin g a sp e c if ic , s tatut or

y c a us e of a c tio n to enfor ce it.” Car te r v . Di

st. of C olu mb ia , 980 A.2d 1217, 1226 (D.C. 2009) . Acc ording ly , this Court must “def er to the leg islature' s prer og atives and to de cline to re cog nize a novel, competingcause of action for wrong ful dischar g e at c ommon law.” Id. The Court di smisses Pl aintiff’s wr ong ful discharg e cla im for lack of subject matter jur isdiction. See Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 1)
.

VII. Conclusion For the fore g oing r ea s o n s , th e C o urtGRAN T S th e D ef en d an t s ' m o t i o nfo r s u m m ary judgme nt as to Count s I t h ro u gh V and DI SMI SSES Count VIpursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b)( 1)
. I T I S SO ORDERED.

Date d: O c tob e r 2 2, 20 12 s/ Jame s S. Gwin J A M E S S
. G W IN UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE