### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 4, 200 4 S es sio n

DOT BU SH GOO T ET AL 

### . v. MET ROP OLITA N G OVE RN MEN T OF

NA SHV ILLE A ND DA VID SON CO UN TY Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 01C-3841 Thom as Brothers, Judge

No. M2003- 02013-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Novem ber 9, 2005

This appea l involves a dispute betwee n the surviving spouses of five disabled city employ ees and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Da vidson Countyover the amount of life insura nce be ne fi ts p a y ablea ft e r the e mpl oy e e s d ie d. Th e su rv ivi ng sp ou se s f ile d th re e se pa

rate la ws uit s a sse rt ing that th e c ity ha d bre a c he d the ir sp ou se s’ e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c ts a s w e ll a s it s f idu c iary du ty and had c ommitt ed fr aud by conce aling information and by knowing ly

providing false inf

ormation re g ard ing a

waive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t th a t w ou ld h a ve g re a tly inc re a se d th e ir

de a th b e ne fi ts. Th e se suits were c onsolidated in the C ircuit Court for Davidson County

. The trial c ourt g rante d a summary judgme nt dismi ssing a ll the surviving spouses’ intentional tort claims because they wer e barr ed by the Govern me n ta l T o rt Lia b il ity A c t. T h e r e main in g b r e a c h o f c o n tr a c t c laim s o f

th r e e o f the su rv ivi ng sp ou se s w e retrie d to a jury , a nd the tria l c ou rt

dir e c te d a

ve rd ic t f or thec ity a t th e c los e of t h e p laintiffs’ proof . There afte r, the trial c ourt g rante d a summary judgme nt dismi ssing the r e main in g c laim s o f

th e o th e r tw o s u r v iv in g s p o u s e s
. A ll th e s u r v iv in g s p o u s e s h a v e ap p e a le d

. We aff irm the summary

judgme nt orders dismissing the surviving spouses’ intentional tort claims and the bre ach of

contra ct claim of one surviving spouse. We reve rse the direc ted verdict with reg ard to t h re e o f t h e remaining surviving spouses’ bre ach of contra ct claims, as we ll as the summary jud g me nt d ism iss ing theoth e r s ur viv ing sp ou se ’s br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t And Reverse d in P art
W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined. P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J

. , n o tp ar t i ci p at i n g.
Dan R A lexander, Nashville, Tenne ssee, for the appellants, Dot Bush Goot, Norma Tay lor, Bobby Duke, Joe Reese, and Fay e Jackson.
Karl F. De an, Micha el B . Blig h, and John L

. Kenne dy , for the appellee , Metropolitan Government o f N a s h v i l l e a n d D a v i d s o n C o u n t y.M et r op ol i t an G ov’ t of N as hv i l l e & D avi dson C ount y , T enn es s ee C od e § 3. 20

. 01 0 [ her ei naf t er M et r o. Co de] 1 p ro v id e s c o v e re d e m p lo ye e s w ith lif e in su ra n c e b e n e fit s “d u rin g a ll tim e s tha t he [o r sh e ] is a n e ligib le e m p lo ye e
. . . .”

M e tro . C o d e § 3 .2 0 .0 3 0 (C ) sta te s tha t “[w ]a ive r o f p re m ium b e n e fit s fo r d isa b ili ty o c c u rr ing p rio r to a g e sixty 2

s hal l be i ncl uded [ i n t he “ l i fe cont r act ”]

. T he word ‘ di s abi l i t y ’ s hal l hav e t he def i ni t i on as i s cus t om ar y wi t h t he i ns ur er and n ot as ot her wi s e def i ned i n t he s y s t em. ” -2-

OP IN ION
I. M E T ROP OL I T AN G OVE RNM E NT ’ S G R O U P L I FE I N SUR A N C E B E N E FIT
The Metr opoli tan Government of Na shville and Davidson County , like most larg e public and private e mploy ers, pr ovides g roup insuranc e bene fits to its employ ees. Eve r since 196 5 , i t has provid ed l i fe i nsuranc e cove rag e to ac tive employ ees and former employ ees w ho are rec eiving disability or retirement benefits. The New York Life I nsuranc e C ompany issued the first g roup term 1 life insuranc e policy in 1965, and Aetna Life Insuranc e Company

repla ced N ew Yor

k Life Insuranc e Compa ny in 1 99 9. Th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt i s r e sp on sib le fo r pay ing the pr e miu ms fo r this po lic y , a ndtheins ur a nc e c omp a n i e s a r er e s p o n s i b l ef

o r d e te rm ini ng e lig ibi lit y

a ndpay ing thec la ims

. At a ll t ime s r e le vant to th is case , th e g ro up te rm lif e ins ur a nc e po lic y

pr ov ide d a c tiv e c ity employ ees w ith life insurance cover ag e equa l to twice their a nnual salary to a maxim um of

$50,000. Former e mploy ees r ece iving a disabilityor service pe nsion were entitled to $7,500 in covera g e. Howeve r, the policy

also containe d a wa iver of pr emium provision that entitled employ ees w ho be c a me dis able d be fo re the ir sixtie th birthd a y to ma int a in the ir lif e ins ur a nc e c ov e ra g e a t th e sa me level they had as a ctive employ ees w ithout continuing to pay the pre miums t h at h ad been paid by the Metropolitan Gove rnment while they wer e active e mploy ees. To be e ligible f or this benef

it, the 2 disabled former employ ee w as re quired to be “ disabled” a s defined in the insurance policy , and the employ ee se eking the waive r of prem i um benef it was requir ed to apply

to the insurancecompany for this bene fit within two y ear s after being found elig ible for a disabilitypension.
The life insurance be nefits pay able to the spouses of el i gi ble disabled e mploy ees diff ere d signific antly

depending on whether

the em ploy ee e stablished his or her right to the waiver of premium bene fit. The spouses of disabled employ ees who had not qualified f or the be nefit re ceive d $7,500 upon the death of their spouse. Howeve r, the spouses of disabled employ ees w ho qualified for the be nefit and w ho had ea rned $25,000 or more whe n they wer e ac tive employ ees r ece ived $50,000 upon the death of their spouse.
II. T HE C LAIM S OF THE S URVI VI NG S POUSES
The three lawsuits g iving rise to this appea l involve the s urviving spouses of five employ ees of the Metr opolitan Governme nt who became di sabled and took disabilit y retire ment betwee n 1985 and 1996. Roy

Bush, a budg et di rec tor, beg an drawing disability benef its in J anuary 1985 following his se c on d o pe n h e art

su rg e ry
. F oll ow ing his de a th in Ap ri l 14 , 19 92 , his wi do w, Do t B us h G oo t, rec eived life insurancebenef its in t he amount of $7,548.75. B lant Duke, a civil warr ant proc essor-3-

in the Davidson County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment, qualified f

or disability

benef its in Februa

ry 1985. When he died, his widow, B obbie J ane D uke, re ceive d $7,544.68. Gene J ackson, an employ ee of theDe pa rt me nt o f P ub lic Wor

ks , w a s a me mbe r of

theoldDa vid so n Co un ty pe ns ionplan b e c aus e he had de clined to bec ome a member of the Metropolitan Employ ee B enef it Sy stem. He qua lified for a disabilitypension in J anuary 1987 beca

use of heart problems. After he died on J une 18, 1998, his widow, Wanda Fay e Jackson, rec eived $7,543.88. Cly de Tay lor, a ser gea n t wi th the Metropolitan Police Depa rtment, qualified for a disability pension in 1992. Following his death on April 7, 2000, his widow, Norma H. Tay lor, rec eived $7,500. Finally , Marily n Reese, an employ ee at Gene ral Hospital, qualifie d for disability in Febr uary 1996 afte r injuring her ba ck. After she die d on April 9, 2001, her surviving husba nd, J oe Lloy d Reese, r ece ived $7,500.
The sur v i v i n g s p o u s es o f t h es e f i v e e m p l o y ee s l at erd i s co v er ed t h att h eywo u l d h av e r ec eived a muc h la rg e r de a th be ne fi t ha d the ir de c e a se d sp ou se qu a lif ie d fo r the waive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t wi thi n tw o y e ars a ft e r b e ing fo un d e lig ibl e fo r a dis abil ity pe ns ion . Two of

thesu rv ivi ng sp ou se s, Ms. Go ot a nd Ms. Jac ks on , a ttribu te the ir fo rm e r hu sb a nd s’ failu re to qu a lif y fo r the be ne fi t to the ir ig no ranc e of the be ne fi t be c aus e e mpl oy e e s of the Me tr op oli ta n Go ve rn me nt h a d n ot p ro vid e d th e ir husbands with timely

information about this benef it. Two other spouse s, Ms. Duke and Ms. Tay lor, assert that their forme r husbands did not quali fy for the w aiver

of pre mium benefit bec ause e mploy ees of the Metropolitan Gove rnment provided them with fa lse information re g arding their eligibility

. Ms. Duke asserts t hat her husband inq uir e d a

bo ut the waive r o f pr e miu m ben e fi t and wa s told that he wa s not el ig ibl e fo r the be ne fi t be c aus e he wa s in th e wr on g de pa rt me nt. Ms. Tay lor

a sse rt s th a t he r h us ba ndapp lie d f or thebe ne fi t afte r he ha d been disa

bled for oney ear

but that he was told that his application wa s too late. The remaining spouse, M r. Reese , conce des that his wife r ece ived two documents e x plaining thewaive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t w he n s he qu a lif ie d f or a dis abil ity re tir e me nt i n 1 99 6 an d that she did no t app ly fo r the be ne fi t w ith in t wo y e ars a ft e r s he be c a me e lig ibl e fo r d isa bil ity pay me nts

. He a lso conce des that her

J uly 1999 application for

the bene fit was turne d down b ec au s e i t was too l ate. Howeve r, he a sserts that the Metropolitan Gove rnment should have g iven his wife another c hance in 2000 to apply for the benef it afte r Aetna Life I nsuranc e C ompany sug g ested to the Metr opolitan Government that it offer a one- tim e gra ce pe riod to permit disabled employ ees w ho had not re qu e ste d th e waive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t to su bmi t th e ir app lic a tio ns
. On J uly 18, 2001, Mmes. Goot, Tay lor, and Duke filed a c omplaint in the Chancery Court fo r D a vid so n Co un ty

se e kin g to r e cov er th e death b e ne fi t th e y wo uldha ve re c e ive d h a d th e ir hu sb a nd s q ua lif

ie d f or thewaive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t. T he y a lle g e d th a t they

we rethi rd -p arty benef iciarie s of their husbands’ g roup life insu r an ce c ontrac ts and that the Metropolitan Gove rnment ha d b re a c he d it s c on tr a c tua l a ndfi du c iary du ti es to the ir hu sb a nd s “ by

c on c e a lin g a ndfaili ng to inf orm Plaint if

fs of c on tr a c t pr ov isi on s th a t in ur e to the ir be nefi t

. . . a ndby

int e nti on a lly

lying to the Plaintiffs to the detriment of the Plaintiffs and to the be nefit of the insuranc e companies . . . .”
Mr. Reec e, repr esente d by the same attorney who was re prese nting Mmes. Goot, Tay lor, and Duke, f iled his complaint in the Chancery Court for Da vidson Countyon J uly , 30, 2001 seeking the death be nefit he w ould have r ece ived had his wife qualified for the waive r of pr emium benef it. HeT h e at t o rney r epr es en t i n g M mes
. G oot , T ay l or , a n d D u k e h ad ov er l ook ed T en n
. Code An n
. § 29- 20- 307 3 (2 0 0 0 ) v e sting c irc u it c o u rts w ith e x c lus ive ju risd ic tio n o v e r c la im s fil e d un d e r th e G o v e rn m e n ta l T o rt L ia b ili ty A c t.

M mes. G oo t , T ay l or, an d D uk e f i l ed an am ended co mp l ai nt o n O ct ob er 8, 200 1 cont ai ni ng al l ega t i ons s i mi l ar 4
to tho se c o n ta ine d in M s. J a c k so n ’s co m p la int. M r. R e e se fi le d a sim ilar a m e n d e d c o m p la int o n J a n u a ry 1 4 , 2 0 0 2

.

T he M et r op ol i t an G over nment ne ver f i l ed an an s wer t o t he com pl ai nt f i l ed by M mes. G oo t , T ay l or, and D uk e, 5 b ut no o ne d i scovered t hi s o vers i ght unt i l t he se c o n d d ay o f t ri al on June 18 , 20 0 3

. T hi s revel at i o n pro m p t ed t he M et r opol i t an G ov er n men t t o f i l e an a n s we r t o M r
. Ree s e’ s c ompl ai n t on J u n e 30, 2003.

T enn
. R

. C i v. P

. 7. 02 ( 1) r equi r es t hat mo t i ons “ s t at e wi t h par t i cul ar i t y t he gr ounds t her efor.
. . . ” See Je nni ngs 6

v . S e w e ll-A llen P ig g ly W ig g ly , __ _ S.W

. 3 d

__ _ , __ _ , 20 0 5 W L 2 5 1 3 9 7 6 , at * 1 (T enn. 20 0 5 ). -4- too alleg ed that he was a third-party benef iciary of hi s wife’ s g roup l ife insurance c ontrac t and that the Metropolitan Gove rnment had br eac hed its contrac tual and fiduciary duties by failing to notify either his wife or him o f Ae t n a L i fe I nsuranc e Company ’s J uly 20, 2000 proposal for

the g rac e period. Like Mmes. Goot, Taylor, and Duke, Mr. Reese acc used the employ ees of the Metropolitan Government of “c oncea ling and failing to inform” and of “intentionally

ly ing.”
On Dec ember

7, 2001, the Chance ry Court f or Davidson Countytransfe rre d the complaint filed by Mmes. Goot, Tay lor, and Duke to the Circuit Court for Davidson County

. On Dec ember 3 21, 2001, Ms. J ackson, r epre sented b y the same attorney

who was r epre senting the other f our surviving spouse s, filed her complaint in the C ircuit Court for Da vidson County . She asserted that the Metropolitan Gove rnment had brea ched its fiduciary duties and its employ ment contra ct with her hu sb a ndby

“ c on c e a lin g a ndfaili ng to inf orm” he r o f the “ waive r o f p re miu m op tio n” that w ou ld have pr ovided her

with a larg er de ath bene fit and by “intentionally

ly ing” to her a nd her husband. 4 On May 3, 2002, all three complaints wer e consolidated in the C ircuit Court for Da vidson Countyfor “ pre- trial and discove ry purposes only .” At this point, the Me tropolitan Government had filed an answer to Ms. Jackson’s amende d complaint but had not y et filed answe rs to either Mr

. Reese’ s complaint or the complaint filed on behalf of Mmes. Goot, Tay lor, and Duke. On Octobe r 5 15, 2002, the Metropolitan Government filed identical motions for summary judgme nt in all three case s. Whi le none of

these motions comp l i ed with Tenn. R. Civ. P . 7.02(1), we g lean f rom the 6
rec ord that the motions asserte d that the survivin g s p o u s es ’ intentional tort claims based on the alleg ed misrepr esenta tions byemploy ees of the Metropolitan Gove rnment we re ba rre d by Tenn. Cod e An n. § 2 9- 20 -2 05 (6 ) ( 20 00 ). Th e su rv ivi ng sp ou se s r e sp on de d b y ins ist ing that th e ir

c la ims sounded in contra ct rathe r than in tort. On J anuary 15, 2003, following a hearing on Dec ember 13, 20 02 , th e tria l c ou rt

e nte re d a n o rd e r g ranti ng pa rt ia l su mma

ry jud g me nts in a ll thr e e c a se s b e c aus e “the

. . . [pl aintiffs’] tort claims arise out of a lleg ed misrepr esentations byemploy ees of the Def endant and are there fore barr ed by the Governmental Tort Liability Ac t

. ” Ho wever, the c ourt pe rm itt e d th e c a se s to c on tin ue be c aus e “ the fa c ts put fo rth by the

. . .[su rv ivi ng sp ou se s] arg ua bly state a c laim for bre ach of contra ct and will re quire a trial.”
On J une 17, 2003, the tria l court empa neled a j u ry to try the re maining br eac h of contra ct claims of Mmes. Goot, Tay lor, and D u k e. The Metr opolitan Governme nt moved for a direc ted verdic t on numerous g rounds at the close of the plaintiffs’ case -in-chie f. It was at this point that the parties and the court disc overe d that the Metropolitan Gove rnment had ne ver f iled an answ er. TheT he t r i al cour t i s r ef er r i ng he r e t o A et na’ s propo s al for t he one- t i me gr ace per i od per mi t t i ng di s abl ed 7

e m p lo ye e s w h o ha d no t q u a lif ie d fo r th e w a ive r o f p re m ium b e n e fit to a p p ly f o r th e b e n e fit

. A c t o f M a y 4 , 1 9 7 3 , ch . 3 4 5 , 1 9 7 3 T e n n . P u b . A c ts 1 2 4 3

. 8
-5- tria l c ou rt de c ide d to dir e c t a ve rd ic t fo r the Me tr op oli ta n Go ve rn me nt a ft e r c on c lud ing that Mm e s. Goot, Tay lor , an d Du k e had “f ailed to prove an esse ntial element of the ir claim.” Thecourt conclude d that the plaintiffs had “ failed to pr o v e t h e terms of the insuranc e contr act unde r which the y c la im the y

wo uldha ve be ne fi te d [sic ] h a d the y be e n inf orme d of its te rm s” a nd that w ith ou t th is proof the jury

would be unable to determ i n e whether their spouses “ would have qua lified for the waiver of premium benef

it” or “to determine Plaintiffs’ damag es.” Thetrial court e ntere d an orde r g ranting the direc ted ver dict on J uly 15, 2003. On Aug ust 29, 2003, the Metropolitan Government filed new motio n s f o r s u mm a r y ju d g ment seeking dismiss al of the rema ining claims of Mr. Reese and Ms. J ackson. F ollowing a hearing on October 10, 2003, the t rial court enter ed sepa rate order s on October

23, 2003 g ranting the motions and dismis sing a ll remaining claims. The c ourt conc luded that Ms. J ackson’ s brea ch of c ontrac t claim was “barr ed by

the applica

ble statute of limitations.” Wi th reg ard to Mr. Ree se’s re maining cla im , th e c o u rt d e te r mi n e d th a t h is d e c e a s e d w if e h a d b e e n p r o p e r ly n o ti f ie d o f th e wa iver of pr e miu m be ne fi t and that “th e July 20 , 2 00 0 le tte r f

ro m A e tna

US H e a lth c are didno t me rg e wi th 7 Mrs. Reese ’s contra ct of e mploy ment so as to require the Def endant to notify

her of its contents.”
The five surviving spouse s have a ppeale d. All five take issue with the summary judgme nt dismiss ing the ir i n t en t i onal tort claims. Mmes. Goot, Taylor, and Dukechalleng e the dire cted verdic t dismi ssing their

contra ct claims. F inally , Mr. Reese and Ms. J ackson take issue with the summary judgme nts dismi ssing their contra ct claims.

III . T HE S URVI VI NG S POUSES ’ I N TENTION A L T OR T C L A I MS
De sp ite the ir

ins ist e nc e in the tria l cou rt that th e ir c la ims so un de d inc on tr a c t r a the r tha n to rt , all five surviving spouses take issue with the trial court’s de cision to gr ant the summary judgme nt dismiss ing the ir intentional tort claims on the g round that they wer e barr ed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205( 6). They

assert that the trial court erre d beca use their c omplaints contain claims based on intentional torts other than misrepre sentat i o n an d that these c laims are pe rmitted under Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-20- 310(c) (Supp. 2004). We have concluded that the trial court properly dismiss ed the se int e nti on a l to rt

c la ims

. The doc trine of sove reig n immunit y , embedde d in Tenn. Const. ar t

. I , § 17, provides that suits for money

damag es may

not be broug ht ag ainst the State of Te nnessee or other g overnme ntal entities without their consent. Doy le v . Fro st , 49 S.W. 3d85 3, 85 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; Hawks v. City of W estmoreland , 960 S.W .2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1997) . When the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly enac ted the Governmental Tort LiabilityAct in 1973, it consented to suits for money damag es being filed 8 ag a in s t c o u n ti e s , mu n ic ip a li ti e s , a n d o th e r lo c a l g o v e r n me n t e n ti ti e s
. T h e G o v e r n me n tal Tort Liability Act mus t be construed s trictly beca use i t is in derog ation of the c ommon law. LimbaughA fter a ll, ne g lige n c e p ro v id e s a b a sis fo r l ia b ili ty ind e p e n d e n t o f inte n t. R EST ATEM ENT (S E C OND ) O F T O RTS 9 § 2 8 2 c m t. b (1 9 6 5 ); W

. P AGE K E E T ON E T AL

. P R OS S E R A ND K E E T ON O N T H E L A W O F T ORTS § 2 8 , a t 160- 61 ( 5t h e d. 1 9 8 4 ) [ herei naf

t er P R OS S E R A ND K EE TON O N THE L A W O F T O RTS ].

T h e cou r t ’ s di s cu s s i on of c on t i n u at i on of

i mmun i t y f

r om s u i t for i n t en t i on al t or t s wa s l i mi t ed t o T en n
. Code 10 Ann

. § 29- 20- 205( 2)

. T h e s t at u t e, h owe v er , l i s t s ot h er i n t en t i on al t or t s for wh i ch i mmun i t y i s pr es er v ed. T en n
. Code Ann

. § 29- 20- 205( 5) ( mal i ci ou s i n s t i t u t i on of j u di ci al or a dmi n i s t r at i v e pr oce edi n g s ) ; T en n
. Code An n
. § 29- 20- 205( 6) (in te n tio n a l m isre p re se n ta tio n ). P re su m a b ly, a lo c a l go v e rn m e n t wo u ld a lso b e im m u n e fro m s u it a risin g o u t o f an a ssa u lt
o r b a tter y c o m m itt e d b y a g o v e rn m e n t e m p lo ye e in the c o n te x t o f a rio t, u n la w ful a sse m b ly, o r c ivil d istur b a n c e
. See T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -2 0 -2 0 5 (7 ). -6- v . Co ffe e Me d. Ctr

. , 59 S.W .3d 73, 79 (Tenn. 2001) . Where immunityfrom suit has bee n waived, the g overnme nt entity is the proper defendant, not the government employ ee whose conduct cause d the inj ury
. Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 29 -2 0- 31 0( b) (S up p. 20 04 ); Sa lle e v . B ar re tt , 171 S.W .3d 822, 826 (Tenn. 2005)

. Te nn . Co de A nn . § 29 -20 -20 5 ex pres sl y rem ov es i mm un it y

fro m s ui t “f

or i nj uryproximate ly cause d by a neg lige nt a ct or omission of any employ ee w ithin the scope of his [or her] employ ment.” Howeve r, the statute c ontains exceptions to waiver. Whil e it had been be lieved for deca des that the Governmental Tort LiabilityAct did not authorize suits for damag es caused bya loca l gove rnment employ ee’ s intentional tort, the Ten n es s ee Supreme Court has now he ld that the Act does not 9 embody a blanke t prohibition against suit s seeking damag es for all intentional torts. Rather, the Court has limit ed the immunity to the intentional torts enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-205. Lim ba ug h v . Co

ffe e Me d. Ctr

. , 59 S.W .3d at 84. 10
Th e Go ve rn me nta l T ort Lia bil it y Ac t e xplic itl y

pr ov ide s th a t lo c a l g ov e rn me nts re ta in immunit y for injuries c aused by

their employ ees “ dece it,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-205(2) , and for injuries cause d by

“misrepr esentation by

an employ ee w hether

or not such is negl i g ent or int e nti on a l,” Te nn . Code An n. § 2 9- 20 -2 05 (6 ). Th e iss ue we mus t de c ideis w he the r the tort c la ims of the five surviving spouse s fall within the scope of these two provisio n s
. We are g uided in our analy s i s o f t h i s question by the customary

rules of statutory

construction, as w ell as our understanding of the state of the law whe n the Governmental Tort LiabilityAct wa s enac ted. Sallee
v . B ar re tt , 1 71 S.W. 3da t 82 6- 29 ; Lim ba ug h v . Co ffe e Me d. Ctr

. , 59 S.W .3d at 83.
Substantial overla

pping exi sts in modern tort law with re g ard to the c oncepts of de ceit and misrepre sentation. Misrepre sentation is the key stone in the architectureof the tort law of fraud and dece it. 9 S TU AR T M. S PEI S ER , T HE A MER I C AN LA W O F T O RT S § 3 2:1 1, a t 22 8 ( 19 92 ); se e als o Robinson v. Ome r , 952 S.W .2d 423, 426-27 (Te nn. 1997) (re cog nizi ng three separ ate torts base d on mis re pr e se ntatio n, inc lud ing fr audor de c e it) ; Holt v. Am. Progressive Life Ins. Co. , 731 S.W .2d 923, 927 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). F or the most part, the c ommon-law tort of d ec ei t is lim ited to case s wher e ther e wa s an intent to mislead. 2 F O WLER V. H ARPER , T HE LA W O F T O RT S § 7.1, at 381 (2d e d. 19 86 ); P R OS S ER AND KEETON ON THE LA W O F T O RT S § 107, at 740. The c oncept of misrepre sentation which c an be tr ace d to the c o mm o n
- law a c ti on of dec eit, R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F T O RT S Cha

pte r 22 Sc op e No te , a t 54 (1 97 7) ; First Nat’l Bank v. Brook s Farms , 821 S.W .2d 925, 927 (Tenn. 1991), is a broader conce pt than deceit. P R OS S ER AND K EETON ON THE LA W O F T OR TS § 105, at 727.M et ro. C o d e § 3.08

. 0 3 0 (A ). 11
-7- Ev e ry on e of thetort c la ims inc lud e d inthefi ve su rvi vi ng sp ou se s’ c omp la int s c on ta in alleg ations involving “c oncea ling and failing to inform,” “inten ti o n all y ly in g , ” an d “ f r a u d , f r a udulent conce alment, dec eit and fr audulent misrepr esentation by conce aling information . . . and by pro vi di ng fal se a ndinc or re c t in fo rm a tio n kno wnby the[d]e fe nd a nts to b e fa lse .” Ea c h o f the se c la ims e a sil y

fi ts w ith in th e scop e of

theGo ve rn me nta l T ort Lia bil ity Ac t’ s e xclu sio n o f c la ims based on “ dece it” and “misre prese ntation.” T h er ef ore, the trial court pr operly g rante d the Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt’ s mo tio n to dis mis s th e su rv ivi ng sp ou se s’ tort c la ims

. IV. M S . J ACKS ON ’ S B R EA C H O F C ON TRA C T C L A IM
Ms. J ackson takes issue with the trial court’s deci s i o n t o g rant the Me tropolitan Government’s summary

judgme nt mot ion based on the statute of limit ations. She insist s that the discovery rule should apply

to her bre ach of

contra ct claim. We ag ree
. A.
Ms. J ackson’ s brea ch of contra ct claim, like the claims of the other surviving spouse s, arises from the employ ment relationship betwee n the Metropolitan Gove rnment and he r dec ease d spouse. Her co m p l ai n t embodies essentially two theories. F irst, she asserts that the Metropolitan Go v e r n me n t b r e a c h e d it s s p e c if ic o b li g a ti o n to e xp lain th e b e n e f it s y s te m a n d in f

r in g ed upon her husband’s rig hts by

failing to inf

orm him of the exist enceof the waiver of pr emium benef it. Second, sh e a s s e rt s t h a t t h e M e tr o p o l i t a n G o v e r n m e n t ’ s f a i l u r e t o i n f

o r m h e r h u s b a n d o f t h i s b e n e f i t a lso v i o l at ed i t s o b l i gat i o n o f go o d fa i t h an d fa i r d ea l i n g.
Th e re latio ns hip of

e mpl oy e r ande mpl oy e e ari se s o ut o f c on tr a c t. Va rg o v . Li nc oln Br as s W orks, Inc

. , 115 S.W .3d 48 7 , 4 9 1 (T en n
. C t. App. 2003). It is based on the mutual assent of the parties, an d it

is th e p r o d u c t o f

a n a g r e e me n t o r

s e r ie s o f a g r e e me n ts b e tw e e n th e e mp lo y e r and employ ee r eg arding the s co pe and nature of the work to be pe rformed, the duration, terms, and conditions of employ ment, and the c ompensation for pe rforming the w ork. Hamby v . Gene sco, Inc

. , 627 S.W .2d 373, 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). An employ ment ag ree ment may be written, oral, or a combination of the two, and the terms of the a g ree ment may either be specific ally

barg ained f

or or ma y be su pp lie d b y

app lic ablele g a l r e qu ir e me nts

. 1. The M e tr opo lit an G ov e r nm e nt ’s Co nt r ac tu al O blig at ion s W it h Re ga r d To P r ov iding It s Em plo ye e s wit h Life Ins ur anc e Co ve r ag e Co nt ain ing

a Waiver of P rem ium P rovision
The Metr opolitan Governme nt is required to provide its em p l o y ees w ith a “prog ram of benef its . . . to provide for

specific kinds of needs upon de ath, upon hospitaliz ation and sickne ss and up on ret ir e me nt b e c aus e of dis abil ity or olda g e .” I nc lud e d a mon g the sebe ne fi ts a re“ be ne fi ts 11 pay able upon the death of the e mploy ee w hich ar e not inconsistent with gr oup life insuranc e plansM et ro. C o d e § 3.08

. 0 3 0 (B )( 1 ). 12

M et r o. Code § 3. 20. 010. 13

M et r o. Code § 3. 20. 010. 14

M et ro. C o d e § 3.20

. 0 3 0 (C ). 15

M et ro. C o d e § 3.08

. 0 4 0 (A )( 3 ). 16
-8- in ge nera l use by

businesses and industries in Da vidson County . . . .” Acc ording ly , employ ees w ho 12
are members o f t h e Metropolitan Employ ee B enef it Sy stem are entitled to be “c overe d for life insurancebenef

its during a ll times that he [ or she] is an eligible employ ee. .
. .” I n order to provide 13 thi s b e ne fi t, the Me tr op oli ta n E mpl oy e e B e ne fi t B oa rd is re qu ir e d to e nte r int o a g ro up c on tr a c t w ith a lif e ins ur a nc e c omp a ny

to “ un de rw ri te” th e re qu ir e d in su ranc e be ne fi ts. Th is c on tr a c t mu st 14 include a “ [w] aiver

of pre mium benefits for disability occur ring prior to ag e six ty . . . .” 15
The Metr opolitan Governme nt’s obligation to it s em p lo y e e s d o e s n o t e n d

w it hs im p ly ma king arr ang ement s t o p rovide g roup bene fits to its employ ees. B eca use of the c omplex ity

of g roup benef its, the Metropolitan Employ ee Be n efit Board must also take steps to make sure that the employ ees a

re a war e of and understand wh at t heir be nefits ar e. Ac cording ly , the Metropolitan Employ ee B enef

it Boar d must “[d] irec t the prepa ration of and approve a booklet explaining the me tr opol it an emp lo y e e be ne fi t sy ste m in fu ll d e ta il, a ndmake a va ila blein the pe ns ionof

fi c e to metropolitan employ ees f ull information conce rning a metr o p o l i t an employ ee’ s status and his [ or her] rig hts conce rning the sy stem. . . .” 16
2.

The M e tr opo lit an G ov e r nm e nt ’s Duty o f G oo d F aith and F air De ali ng Under Tenne ssee L aw, every contra ct carries with it an implied covenant of g ood faith and fair de aling

. W

allace v. Nat’l Bank

of Commerce , 9 38 S.W. 2d68 4, 686 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Elliott v. El lio tt , 149 S.W .3d 77, 84-85 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2004). As a re sult of this covenant, ea ch contr acting pa rty pr omi se s to pe rf

orm it s p art

of thec on tr a c t in g oo d f

a itha nd , in re turn, e xpe c ts the oth e r p arty to do the same. The purpose of the implied-in-law coven an t i s t wo -fold. F irst, it honors the contrac ting parties’ rea sonable e x pectations. Bayou Land Co. v. Talley , 9 24 P.2 d 1 36 , 1 54 (C olo . 1 99 6) ; Cox v. CSX Intermodal, I

nc. , 732 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. D ist. Ct. App. 1999); Ce na c v . M ur ry , 609 So. 2d12 57 , 1 27 2 ( Mis s. 19 92 ); Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borde n, Inc. , 690 A.2d 575, 586 (N.J . 1997). Second, it protec ts the rig hts of the parties to rece ive the bene fits of the ag ree ment they enter ed into. W infree v. Educ ators Credit Union , 900 S.W .2d 285, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); see a lso W agenseller v . Scottsdale Mem ’l Hosp. , 7 10 P.2d 10 25 , 10 40 (A ri z. 1 98 5) ; Gu z v . B e c hte l Na t’ l, Inc. , 8 P.3 d 1 08 9, 11 10 (C a l. 2 00 0) ; H a b e tzv. Condon , 618 A.2d 501, 505 (Conn. 1992). The imp lie d o bli g a tio n o f g oo d f a itha ndfair

de a lin g do e s n ot, ho we ve r, c re a te new con tr a c tua l rig htsSee , e . g. , Peps i Co, Inc. v . Cent r al Inv. Cor p. , 2 6 8 F . S u p p . 2 d 9 6 2 , 9 6 7 (S .D . O h io 2 0 0 1 ); D u n lap v . S ta te 17 Far m Fi r e & Cas

. Co. , 8 7 8 A .2 d 4 3 4 , 4 4 1 (D e l. 2 0 0 5 ); U no Res t aur ant s , Inc. v . Bos t on K en m o re R ea l ty Cor p. , 805 N .E .2 d 9 5 7 , 9 6 4 (M a ss. 2 0 0 4 ); O akw oo d V i l l ag e LLC v. A l ber t s on s , Inc. , 10 4 P

. 3 d 12 2 6 , 12 4 0 (U t ah 2 0 0 4 ).

Fi el ds v. Thom ps on Pr i nt i ng Co. , 3 6 3 F .3 d 2 5 9 , 2 7 1 (3 d C ir. 2 0 0 4 ); W i t t v. S t a t e, D ep ’t o f C o rr. , 75 P. 3d 18 1 0 3 0 , 1 0 3 4 (A la sk a 2 0 0 3 ); G r os s m an v . Col um bi ne M ed. G r oup , 1 2 P .3 d 2 6 9 , 2 7 1 (C o lo . C t. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ); G i l ber t v. El Pas o Co. , 57 5 A

. 2 d 11 3 1 , 11 4 3 (D el

. 19 9 0 ).

C r ews v. B uckm an Lab s
. Int ’ l , Inc. , 7 8 S .W .3 d 8 5 2 , 8 5 8 (T e n n . 2 0 0 2 ); B a in e s v . W ilso n C o u n ty , 86 S. W

. 3d 19 5 7 5 , 57 8 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 2 ). -9- or ob lig a tio ns , no r c a n it be us e d to c ir c umv e nt o r al te r the sp e c if ic te rm s o f the pa

rt ie s’ 17
a g re e me nt. 18 Despit e t h e see mingly

broad a pplication of the implied duty of g ood faith and f

air de aling to all contrac ts, this court is not of one mind re g arding its application to employ ment contra cts. The Eastern Section has held th at t h e d u t yof g ood faith and f air de aling is part of e very employ ment contra ct. Hooks v . Gibson , 8 4 2 S

. W

. 2 d 6 2 5 , 6 2 8 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 2 ) ; W i l l i a ms v. Mare mont Corp. , 776 S.W .2d 78, 80-81 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1988)

. Howeve r, the Western Sec tion has held that there is no implied duty of g ood faith and f air de aling in employ ee- at-will contra cts. Mc Ge e v . B e st , 10 6 S. W.3 d 4 8, 67 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; Randolph v. Dominion Bank , 826 S.W .2d 477, 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). The Middl e S ection has he ld that the employ ment ag ree ments include the implied duty of g ood faith and f

air de aling , Dunn v. Matrix Exhibits, Inc. , No. M2003-02725-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 2604048, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2005), but ha s al s o h el d that employ ers do not brea ch their implied duty of g ood faith and f

air d ea l i n g wh en they

fire an at-will employ ee. W hittaker v. Care-M

ore, Inc

. , 621 S.W .2d 395, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
We have de termined that the Western Section went too fa r whe n it completely

excised the implied dutyof g ood faith and fair de aling from at- will employ ment contra cts. The c ases be fore the Western Section involved at-will employ ees who believed that they had bee n fired unf

airly . They a sse rt e d that the ir te rm inatio n wa s a bre a c h of the e mpl oyme nt a g re e me nt b e c aus e it v iol a te d th e ir e mpl oy e r’ s impli e d d uty

of g oo d f a ith a nd fair de a lin g
. Th e Wes te rn Se c tio n re so lve d th e c la im i n thee mpl oy e r’ s f

a vo r b y ho ldi ng that e mpl oyme nt- a t- wi ll c on tr a c ts do no t c on ta in an impli e d d uty o f go o d fa i t h an d fa i r d ea l i n g. Employ ees- at- w il l ha ve no contr act right or expectation of continued, inde finite employ ment beca use they can beterminated at any

time for any

rea son. Howeve r, they

may have othe r contra ct 19 rig hts and expectations, such as the right and expectation to be paid the a g ree d-upon wa g e and the rig ht and expectation of ha ving w ork hours co n s i s t ent with applicable fede ral a nd state law. W illiams v. Maremont Corp. , 776 S.W .2d at 81. B eca use the implied obligation of g ood faith and fair de aling does not cre ate ne w rig hts or modify exis ting c ontrac t rig hts, it would have be en more appropriate for

th e W es t er n S ec tion to hold t hat the implied duty of g ood faith and f

air de aling c a nn ot m od if

y thee mpl oyme nt- a t- wi ll do c trine a nd , the re fo re , that a n e mpl oy e r do e s n ot b re a c h it s implied dutyof g ood faith and fair dealing when it discha rg es an at-will employ ee f or any rea son.For e x ampl e, t h i s c ou r t h el d t h at T en n
. Code Ann

. § 56- 7- 601( c) [ n ow codi f i ed at T en n
. Code An n
. § 56- 7- 20 23 05 ( a) ( 2)( H ) (200 0)] requi r ed an empl oy er t o not i f y i t s em pl oy ees o f

t hei r r i gh t t o conve r t t hei r gr oup l i fe i ns ur anc e c o v e ra g e to a n ind ivid u a l p o licy. E s t at e of Saf f l es v. R el i an ce U ni ver s al , Inc. , 7 0 1 S .W .2 d a t 8 2 3 -2 4

. -10- Ac c or din g ly , w e fi nd that the Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt’ s e mpl oyme nt a g re e me nt w ithits employ ees inc ludes an implied obligation of g ood faith and f air de al i n g o n the part of both the Metropolitan Government and its employ ees. This oblig ation require d both parties to ac t in good faith or “ to act in word and deed, in a responsib l e manner .” W illiams v. Maremont Corp. , 776 S

. W

. 2 d at8 1 (q u o t i n g H EN R Y R. G I B S ON , G I B S ON ’ S S U I TS I N C H ANC ER Y § 34, at 34 (Willi am H. I nman ed., 6th ed. 1982) ).
3. The M e tr opo lit an G ov e r nm e nt ’s P e r for m anc e of It s C ont r ac tu al O blig at ion s

Re ga r ding th e Wa ive rof P r e m iumBe ne fit When employ ers pr ocure g roup insuranc e poli cies to cover their employ ees, the y

are acting for the m selves and a s ag ents for the ir employ ees. Boseman v . Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. , 3 01 U. S. 19 6, 20 4- 05 , 5 7 S. Ct. 68 6, 69 0 ( 19 37 ); Hale v. A m. Home Assurance Co. , 224 Tenn. 650, 656, 461 S.W. 2d38 4, 38 6 ( 19 70 ); Bates v. J im Rule Chevrole t, Inc. , No. 16, 1990 WL 51295, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. Ap r. 26 , 199 0) (N o Te nn . R. App . P. 11 app lic a tio n f ile d) ; Nidif

fer v. Clinchfield R.R. Co. , 600 S.W .2d 242, 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). A ccor dingly , they have a duty to a ct in g ood faith and with due dilige nce in obtai n i n g i n s u ra nce f or their e mploy ees. Estate of Saffles v. Reliance Universal, Inc

. , 7 01 S.W. 2d82 1, 82 3- 24 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 5) ; Nidif fer v. Clinchfield R.R. Co. , 600 S.W .2d at 246. The surviving spouses are not ta king issue in this ca se with the manne r in which the Metropolitan Government obtained the g roup life insurance policies first from the Ne w York Life I nsuranc e Company

and later from Ae tna Life Insuranc e Company . Acc ording ly , for t h e p u rp ose of this appe al, we pr esume that the Metropolitan Government brea ched no oblig ation to its employ ees when it obtained the g roup life i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y.
Howeve r, an e mploy er’ s dut y t o i n fo rm its employ ees of their rig hts and bene fits under a g ro up ins ur a nc e po lic y

is i nd e pe nd e nt f

ro m it s o bli g a tio n to pr oc ur e thepo lic y . The so ur c e of thi s duty may be statutory o r co n t ra ctual or may even beimposed by

the common law. Burnette v. 20 Purolator Cour ier Corp. , No. 1284, 1990 W L 801, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. J an. 9, 1990), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 26, 1990). I n this case , Metro. C ode § 3.08.040(A)(3) r equire d the Metropolitan Govern me n t to e xp lain th e e mp lo y e e b e n e f it s y s te m “ in f

u ll d e tail ” a n d to ma

k e a v a il ab le in the retire ment office “full information” conce rning the employ ees’ “status and

. . . rig hts conce rning the sy ste m. . . .” Ac c or din g ly , th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt, a s p art of its e mpl oyme nt a g re e me nt w ith its employ ees, ha d an oblig ation to fully inform its employ ees of their rig hts and status w ith reg ard to the waive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t. The surviving spouses have prese nted evidenc e that ca l ls into question whether the Metropolitan Government has acte d rea sonably in discharg ing its contra ctual oblig ation to inform its employ ees of

the waiv er o f p re m ium benefit. Even thoug h the g roup life insurance policy has been in plac e since 1965, there is e vidence that prior to 1992, the Metropolitan Gove rnment eitherM m es. G o o t and Jackson, whose spo uses t o o k dis ab i l i t y ret i rem ent i n 19 8 5 and 19 8 7 r e sp ect i vel y , have 21
te stif ie d tha t t h e M e tro p o lit a n G o v e rn m e n t d id no t i n fo rm the m o r th e ir sp o u se s o f t h is b e n e fit

.
M m es. D uke and T ayl o r, who se s p o u ses t o o k dis ab i l i t y ret i rem ent i n 19 8 5 and 19 9 2 res p ect i vel y , have 22
te stif ie d tha t t h e ir sp o u se s inq u ire d into the ir e ligib ili ty fo r the w a ive r o f p re m ium b e n e fit w h e n the y re tire d b u t we re to ld tha t t h e y w e re no t elig ib le fo r th e b e n e fit

.

M e Ne ws i s a pu bl i ca t i on of t h e M et r opol i t an Empl oy ee B en ef i t B oar d. 23
-11- failed to inform disabled employ ees of the exist enceof this benef it or misinformed the e mploy ees 21 who aske d about it. Whil e ther e is some evidenc e that the Me tropo l i t an Go v er nment was 22 informing disabilityretire es of the e x istence of this benefit i n 1996, g ener al notice of this benefit was not give n until the publication of ME Ne ws in July 2001. This e vidence is suf ficient to c reate an 23 iss ue fo r the jury re g ard ing wh e ther the Me tr op oli tan Go ve rn me nt ha s br e a c he d its du ty to no tif y its em p l o y ee s o f t h ei r b en ef

i t s as we l l as i t s d u t y

o f go o d fa i t h an d fa i r d ea l i n g.
B.
The Metr opolitan Governme nt asserts that Ms. J ackson’ s brea ch of contra ct claim is tim ebarr ed bec ause she failed to file he r complaint withing six y ear s after the purporte d b re ac h of the contra ct in 1987 when it fa iled to i n fo rm h er s pouse of the e x istence of the waive r of pr emium benef it. Ms. J ackson c oncede s that the six -y ear s tatute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 109(a) (3) a

pplies. Howeve r, she insists that the di scovery rule should apply and that if it does, her c omp la int is t ime ly be c aus e sh e fi le d it wi thi ng six y e ars a ft e r dis c ov e ri ng that her hu sb a ndwo uld ha ve be e n e nti tle d to thewaive r of pr e miu m ben e fi t had the Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt e xpla ine d it to him wh e n h e to o k

d is ab il ity r e ti r e me n t i n 1 9 8 7

. T h e tria l c o u rt c o n c lu d e d th a t M s
. Ja c k s o n’s complaint was time-ba

rre d, and thus we must determine whether the discovery

rule may be invoked wi th r e g ardto M s. Jac ks on ’s br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im.
1.
T h e d i scovery

rule is a limited exception to the statute of limitations

. P e ro ’ s Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee , 90 S.W .3d 614, 621 (Tenn. 2002) (cha rac terizing the discovery rule as an “equitable exception” to the statute of limitations). I t tolls the running of the statute of limit ations until the plaintiff knows or, i n the ex erc ise of reasonable car e and dilig ence , should know that the plaintiff has a lega l cause of action ag ainst the defendant. Terry v. Niblack , 979 S.W .2d 583, 586 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 955 S.W .2d 49, 51 (Tenn. 1997)

. The rationale underly ing the discovery rule is that injured parties should not be placed in the anomalous situation of being require d to file suit before they know they

have be en injured. McCroske

y v. B ryant Air Conditi oning Co. , 5 24 S.W. 2d 48 7, 49 0 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) ; Teeters v. Currey , 518 S.W .2d 512, 515 (Tenn. 1974) . The rule alleviates the intolerable result of bar ring a ca use of action by holding that it “a ccr

ued” be fore the plaintiff discove red the inju ryor the wr ong
. Foster v . H ar ris , 633 S.W .2d 304, 305 (Tenn. 1982) . Howeve r, the rule ap p l ies only in case s wherethe plaintiff did not disc over and rea sonably could not ha ve been e x pecte d to discover the e x istence of a ri gh t of ac tion, Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 9 5 5 S. W. 2 d a t 5 1 , a n d it to ll s th e ru n n in g o f th e s tatu teofM cCr os ke y v. Br yantAi r Condi t i oni ng Co. , 524 S. W

. 2d a t 492. 24
Q ual i t y Aut o Par t s Co. v . Bl uf f Ci t y Bui ck Co. , 87 6 S.W

. 2 d 81 8 , 82 1

- 2 2 (T enn. 19 9 4 ). 25

P er o’s St eak & Spa gh et t i H ou s e v . Lee , 90 S. W

. 3d a t 624- 25. 26
-12- lim itatio ns on ly

a s lo ng a s the plaint if

f ha s no kn ow le dg e a t a ll that a wr on g ha s oc c ur re d a nd , a s a rea sonable pe rson, would not have been put on inquiry

. Po tts v . Ce lotex Cor p ., 796 S.W .2d 678, 680 (Tenn. 1990)

. T h e d i s co v er y

ru l e w as fi rs ti n v o k ed b y t h e T en n es s ee S u p re m e C o u rto v ert h i rt y y ea rs ago in a medica l malprac tice ca se. Teeters v. Currey , 5 18 S.W. 2da t 51 5. It ha s si nc e be e n a pp lie d to other tort ac tions, McCroske y v. B ryant Air Conditi oning Co. , 524 S.W .2d at 491, including le g al and denta l malprac tice claims. Carvell v. Bottoms , 9 0 0 S

. W

. 2d 23, 28 (Tenn. 1995) (leg al ma lpr a c tic e ); Fo ste r v . H ar ris , 633 S.W .2d at 305 (de ntal malprac tice). H oweve r, the Te nnessee Sup re me Cou rt

ha s d e c lin e d to app ly

thedis c ov e ry ru le in c a se s in vo lvi ng br e a c h o f w arr a nty c la ims g overne d by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (2001), defamation actions, and claims for conve rsion 24 25 of a ne g oti ableins trume nt a

bs e nt f ra ud ule nt c on c e a lme nt. 26
Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s y e t to a dd re ss w hethe r the dis c ov e ry ru le ma y app ly to br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la ims a nd , if so , th e c ir c ums ta nc e s w arr a nti ng its app lic a tio n. Ho we ver, this c ou rt app e ars to h a ve e nd or se d th e app lic ati on of th e dis c ov e ry ru le in a br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c a se i n v o l v ing a

lease of re al prope rty

. Mc Fa rli n v . Ci ty of M ur fre e sb oro , N o
. 8 6

- 1 2 4

- I I , 1 9 8 7 WL 17728, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. Ap p
. S ept. 30, 1987) (N o Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) . The property owner lease d his property

to a city for a landfill. The contract required the city to cover the top of thela nd fi ll w ithso il i n a c c or da nc e wi th a pp lic ablee nv ir on ment a l r e g ulatio ns . T he c ity abandone d the landfill, but the owner did not discover for

many y ear s that the city

had failed to cover the landfill with the amount of soi l require d by the environmental reg ulations. The property owner su e d th e c ity fo r b re a c h o f c on tr a c t w ith in o ne y e ar a ft e r d isc ov e ri ng thec on dit ionbu t mo rethan s ix y e ars a ft e r the c ity

ha d a ba nd on e d th e pr op e rty
. Th e tria l c ou rt dis mis se d th e pr op e rty

ow ne r’ s c la im beca use it was not filed within the six -y ear statute of limitation s in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3- 109(a) (1) ( 2000).
This court re verse d the orde r g ranting the city ’s m otion to dismiss

. We framed t he is sue as fo llo ws : “ wh e th e r

late dis c ov e ry

of a c on tr a c t vi olatio n r e su lti ng in i nju ry to p ro pe rty

ma y e ff e c tiv e ly delay the running of the s tatute.” Mc Fa rli n v . Cityof M ur fre e sb oro , 1987 WL

17728, at *3. I n the proce ss of overr

uling the motio n t o d i s m i ss, “despite the a ppare nt running of the statute of limit ations,” this court noted:

T h e r e s o l u t i o n o f

t h e i s s u e u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n i s n o t w i t h o u t d o u b t

. It is ins ist e d that no Te nn e sse e auth ority app lie s the dis c ov e ry ru le to actions for

brea ch of c ontrac t.

. . . It is arg uable that a party to a contra ct knows (or should know) his [ or her ] rights under the contra ct and s h o u l d be ale rt to discover any non-fe asanc e, misfea sance or malfea sance under the contra ct. Wh i l e t his would ordinarily be the case , in the prese nt situation the opportunity to obse rve and discoverT he d i sco v e ry ru le i s i nt end ed t o prevent t he i neq ui t y t hat a s t ri ct ap p l i cat i o n of t he st at ut e o f l i m i t at i o ns 27

w o u ld p ro d u c e
. P er o’s St eak & Spa gh et t i H ou s e v . Lee , 90 S. W

. 3d a t 621.

A l l s t at ut es of

l i m i ta tio n s a re in tend ed t o preserve fai rnes s and jus t i ce b y preventi ng undue de l ay i n f i l i ng 28 la w su its an d the re b y e n su re th a t e v id e n c e is p re se rv e d a n d fa c ts a re n o t o b sc u re d b y the p a ssa g e o f t im e
. P ot t s v. Cel ot ex Cor p. , 7 9 6 S .W .2 d a t 6 8 1 ; O w en v. S u m m ers , 97 S.W

. 3 d 11 4 , 12 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 1 ). Apr i l E nt er s
. , Inc

. v. KTTV , 1 9 5 C al. R p t r. 4 2 1 , 4 3 6 (C t

. A p p
. 1 9 8 3 ) (“In t he t yp i ca l co ntrac t fo r p urc ha se 29

o f w i d get s, for exa m p l e, the b uy er i s well aware t he co nt ract has b een b reached when t he d at e fo r del i very arr i ves and he ha s not rece i ved hi s wi dget s
. Si mi l ar l y , t he s el l er kn ows whe n pay ment i s due u nder t he cont r act

. I f t hat t i me pas s es w itho u t re c e ip t o f t h e a m o u n t d u e he is ea sily aw a re tha t t h e c o n tra c t ha s b e e n b re a c h e d .” ). -13- violations was less obvious, for the contrac t was a le ase in whic h the owner surre ndere d possession to the lessee f or t he term of the lea se. Mo re ov e r, theve ry

natur e of thele a se c on tr a c t w a s su c h a s to e na ble the lessee to conce al the bre ac h of contra ct. That is, the contr act require d t h e l es s ee to c over ( conce al) the r ubbish with a sufficient l ay ero f e ar t h

. On ce t h e r u b b i s hwa s co v er ed , t h e de p t h o f c o v er age would not be observa

ble unt il the passag e of time a nd the oper ation of the e lements caused the de ficienc y to be visible.
Mc Fa rli n v . Ci ty of M

ur fre e sb oro , 1987 WL

17728, at *4.
We now direc tly addre ss the application of the discovery rule to bre ach of

contra ct ac tions us ing thec ri te ri a fa sh ion e d by the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt to d e te rm inewh e the r the dis c ov e ry ru le may be invoked with re g ard to a particula r cause of a ction. Pero’s Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee , 90 S.W. 3d

a t 62 0; Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co. , 876 S.W. 2da t 82 0. We mus t f ir st c on sid e r the la ng ua g e of

thesp e c if

ic statut e of lim itatio ns app lic ableto the c la im andthe n w e mus t balanc e the policies supportin g t h e d i s covery rule ag ainst the policies supporting the strict 27
app lic a tio n o f the statut e of lim itatio ns
. 28
2. The six-y ear

statute of limitations i n Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-109(a )(3) applies to this case. That statute simply

provides that contr actua l cause s of ac tion not otherwise expressly provided for

“ sh a ll b e c omm e nc e d w ith in s ix(6 ) y e ars a ft e r the c aus e of a c tio n a c c ru e d.

. . .” Th is l a ng ua g e is quite simil ar to the other statutes of l imitations to which the Te nnessee Supreme Court has a pplied the discovery rule, and the statute contains no other lang uag e that would other wise be inc onsistent wi th the inv oc a tio n o f the dis c ov e ry ru le in p ro pe r c ir c ums ta nc e s. As a g ener al matter, the re w ill be li ttle need for the discovery rule in most breac h of contra ct case s. A buy er is immediately awa re of a breac h upon the delivery of nonconf orming g oods, and a seller knows of

the bre ach w hen payment is delinquent. Howeve r, it is not difficult to envision 29 circ umstances in which a party to a contra ct would not be aw are that the other pa rty has brea ched the contra ct. I n those circ umstances, just as in tort claims involving pe rsonal injuries, it would be unjust to hol d that a plaint i ff ’s cl ai m for br eac h of contra ct ac crue s befor e the plaintiff kne w or should have known that the contra ct had be en bre ache d.See , e . g . , H u n t o n v . G uar di an Li f e Ins
. Co. , 24 3 F. Sup p
. 2d 68 6 , 69 8

- 9 9 (S. D

. T ex. 20 0 1 ); Ci t y of 30 P h i l a d elp h i a v. O n e R ea d i n g C t r. A sso cs. , 1 4 3 F . S u p p . 2 d 5 0 8 , 5 2 6 (E .D . P a . 2 0 0 1 ); Baum an v . D ay , 892 P. 2d 817, 8 2 7 -2 8 (A la sk a 1 9 9 5 ); W al k v. Ri ng , 4 4 P .3 d 9 9 0 , 9 9 9 (A riz . 2 0 0 2 ); Apr i l Ent er s , Inc. v . KTTV , 195 Cal

. Rpt r
. a t 437; M arc uci l l i v. B oa r dw al k Bu i l der s , Inc. , N o
. C IV

. A

. 99 C

- 0 2

- 0 0 7 , 20 0 2 W L 10 3 8 8 1 8 , at * 4 (D el

. Sup er. M ay 1 6 , 20 0 2 ); D ove nm uehl e, Inc. v . Lawye r s Ti t l e Ins
. Cor p. , 4 7 8 S o . 2 d 4 2 3 , 4 2 4 -2 5 ( F la . D ist. C t. A p p . 1 9 8 5 ); S tra u se r v . W e stfield Ins
. Co. , 8 2 7 N .E .2 d 1 1 8 1 , 1 1 8 5 (In d . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ); P of f enbergerv. R i s s er , 4 3 1 A .2 d 6 7 7 , 6 8 0 (M d . 1 9 8 1 ); Snor t l and
v . S ta te , 6 1 5 N .W .2 d 5 7 4 , 5 7 7 (N .D . 2 0 0 0 ); M a h er v . T i etex C o rp ., 5 0 0 S .E .2 d 2 0 4 , 2 0 7 (S .C . C t. A p p . 1 9 9 8 ); G i bs on v . E lli s , 5 8 S .W .3 d 8 1 8 , 8 2 3 (T e x . A p p . 2 0 0 1 ); Ar chi t ec ht oni cs Cons t r . M gm t

. , Inc. v . Khor r am , 45 P. 3d 1142, 1147 (W ash. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 2 ).

T he i nherent l y undis co verab l e requir em ent i s m et when t he i njured p art y is unli kel y to d i scover t he wrong 31 du r i n g t h e l i mi t at i on s pe r i od de s pi t e du e di l i g en ce
. T o be i n h er en t l y u n di s co verab l e, the w r on g a n d i n j u r y mu s t be
u n k n o w n to the p la intiff b e c a u se o f the ir v e ry na tur e a n d n o t b e c a u se o f an y fau lt o f t h e p la intiff

. In re C o a st a l P l a i n s, Inc. , 17 9 F.3d 19 7 , 21 4

- 1 5 (5t h C i r. 19 9 9 ). -14- Ma ny c ou rt s n ow app ly

thedis c ov e ry ru le to br e a c h of co ntr a c t cla ims a nd ho ld that a c aus e of ac tion for bre ach of contra ct beg ins to run when a party either discove rs the bre ach or could have or should have disc overe d the bre ach th ro u gh t h e ex erc ise of re asonable judgme nt. 31 S AM UEL W I L L I S TON , A T RE AT I S E ON TH E LA W O F C O N T RA CT S § 79:14, at 304 (Richar d A. L ord ed., 4th e d. 2004) [hereina fter W I L L I S TON ON C ON TR AC TS ]. Th e se c ou rt s h a ve inv ok e d th e dis c ov e ry ru le in 30
case s where (1) the brea ch of c ontrac t was diffic ult for the plaintiff to dete ct, (2) the defe ndant was in a far superior position t o compre hend the br eac h and the r esulting damag e, or ( 3) the de fendant had re ason to believe that the plaintiff re mained ig norant that it had be en wr ong ed. El Pollo Loco, In c . v . H as him , 316 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003). Stated another way , the discovery

rule a pplies in case s wher e the brea ch of contra ct i s inhere ntly undiscoverva

ble. Ap ril

En te rs. , I nc . v . KTT

V , 31 19 5 Ca l. Rptr . at 43 7; J

.M . Kr up ar Con str . Co . v . R os e nb e rg , 95 S.W .3d 322, 329 (Tex. A pp. 2002).
Th e re are , how e ve r, a t lea st two c ir c ums ta nc e s in w hic h th e inv oc a tio n o f the dis c ov e ry ru le would be improper , even w hen t h e b re ach of contra ct is inherently

undiscovera

ble. Fir st, as the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Co urt ha s p oin te d o ut, thedis c ov e ry ru le c a nn ot b e inv ok e d w he n it is inconsistent wi t h t h e t erms of the applicable statute of limitations. I n these c ircumstance s, the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly has already weig hed the competing policies involving the a ccr ual of the cause of a ction and the tolling of the statute. S ec o n d , t h e dis covery rule c annot superc ede a c on tr a c tua lly

a g re e d up on lim itatio ns pe ri od a s a lon g a s the a g re e d up on pe ri od a ff or ds a re a so na ble time within which to fil e suit. See New W elton Homes v . Eck

man , 830 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ind. 2005); 3 E RI C M I LLS H OL MES , C OR B I N ON C O N T RA CT S § 9.9, at 278 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1996)

. I n th e se c ir c ums ta nc e s, thepa rt ie s th e mse lve s h a ve we ig he d th e c omp e tin g c on sid e ratio ns , an d th e ir barg ain should be enf

orce d as long as it is consistent with publi c policy

. 3.
Acc ording to Ms. J ackson, ne ither she nor he r husband we re a war e of the waiver of pre mium benef it in 1987 when her hu s b an d q ualified for

disabilityretire ment. Acc ording ly , the J acksons we re not awar e that the Me tropolitan Governme nt had bre ache d its contractua l obligation to inform Mr. J ackson of

the exist enceof this benef it. I t would be unre asonable and unrealistic to impute either to Mr. J ackson or

Ms. J ac k s o n i n d epende nt knowledg e of the details of the g roup life insura nceA fter a ll, the M e tro p o lit a n C o u n c il im p o se d o n the M e tro p o lit a n G o v e rn m e n t t h e o b liga tio n to no tif y 32 empl oy ee s of

t h ei r r i g h t s a n d be n ef

i t s bec au s e t h e Coun ci l appr ec i at ed t h e compl ex i t y of t h e ben ef

i t pl an s a n d u n der s t ood t hat m o st em p l o y ees would b e unab l e t o dis co ver t he i nfo rma t i o n on t hei r own. -15- policy that the M etropolitan Government had purchase d or of the pr ovision in t he Metropolitan Code re qu iring that a

waive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t beinc lud e d intheg ro up lif e ins ur a nc e c on tr a c t. 32
Th us , f or thepu rp os e s o f the dis c ov e ry ru le , it wo uld ha ve be e n d if

fi c ult fo r the Jac ks on s to be aw are of or discove r that the Metr opolitan Governme nt had bre ache d its co n t ra ct i n 1987 by failing to inform them of the e x istence of t h e wa i v er o f premium benefit. The Me tropolitan Government was in a far superior position whe n compar ed to the J acksons, and bec ause of its failure to notify them of the e x istence of this benef it, the M etropolitan Government had reason to believe that the J ackso n s wereunawa re of both the exis tence of the be nefit and the Metropolitan Government’s bre ach.
Ms. J ackson f

irs t l ea rn ed of the exi stence of the waiver of pr emium benef it in J uly 1998 when she applied for benef its following her husband’s death. She was told at that time that she was ine lig ibl e fo r this be ne fi t be c aus e Mr . Jackson h a d f a ile d to app ly

fo r andqu a lif

y fo r the be ne fi t wi thi n tw o y e ars fo llo wi ng his dis abil ity re tir e me nt i n 1 98 7. Ms. Jac ks on fi le d he r l a ws uit a g a ins t the Metropolitan Gove rnment in Dec ember 2001, within six y ear s follow i n g h er discovery of the exis tence of the be nefit and the Metropolitan Government’s brea ch of contra ct. We have de termined that Ms. J ackson may

invoke the discove ry rule a nd, there fore , that her c omplaint was timely filed. Acc ording ly , we r ever se the sum m ar y j u d gm ent dismissi ng her br eac h of contra ct claim on the g round that it was not timely filed.
V. M R . R EE SE ’ S B R EA C H O F C ON TRA C T C L A IM
Mr. Reese ’s claim stands on a f actua l footing f

ar diff ere n t from the claims of the other surviving spouse s because his wife is the only employ ee who rec eived timely notice of thewaiver of pre mium benefit. Ms. Reese took disability retire ment in Febr

uary 1996, and in A pril 1996 she rec eived two documents from the Metropolitan Government informing her of the waiver of pre mium be ne fi t a nd the ste ps to b e take n to qu a lif y fo r i t. D e sp ite thi s in fo rm a tio n, Ms. Re e se didno t app ly for the be nefit until J uly

1999. Her

application wa s rejec ted bec ause it had not been f iled within two y e ars a ft e r s he qu a lif

ie d f or dis abil ity re tir e me nt. Up to this point , the fa cts clea rly do not support a bre ach of con trac t claim beca

use the Me tr opol it an G ov ernm entful fi ll ed i ts ob li gati on un der M etr o. Co de § 3. 08 .0 40 (A)( 3) to p ro vid eMs. Re e se “ fu ll i nf

ormatio n” regardi ng he r rig hts a ndstatus . H ow e ve r, Mr . Re e se re lie s o n e ve nts occur ring afte r Jul y

1999 to suppo rt h i s b re ach of contra ct claim. On July20, 2000, Aetna Life I nsuranc e Company ’s manag er of t h e M et ro p o litan Governme nt’s acc ount wrote a letter to the Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt p ro po sin g a “ on e tim e e xce pti on ” fo r e mpl oy e e s c ur re ntl y on dis abil ity wh o h a d f

a ile d to qu a lif

y fo r the waive r of premium b e ne fi t w ith in t wo y e ars of takin g dis abil ity re tir e me nt. Th e Me tr op oli ta n Go ve rn me nt de c lin e d thi s of fe r, app are ntl y

be c aus e it w ou ld h a ve c os t-16-

ov e r $ 10 ,0 00 ,0 00 . T he Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt n e ver i nfo rm ed th e pe rs on s o n d isa bil ity retire ment of Ae tna’s off

er or of its decision to rejec t the offe r. Ms. Reese died in April 2001. I n his c omplaint f iled in July 2001, Mr. Reese asserts that the Metropolitan Government brea ched its c ontrac t by failing to inform Ms. Reese of Aetna’ s proposal to o ff e r e mpl oy e e ’s lik e his wi fe a n op po rtun ity to qu a lif y fo r the waive r of pr e miu m be ne fi t. T his claim fa ils on three g rounds. Fir st, the Metropolitan Government does not have either the statutory or contra ctual oblig ation to inform its employ ees of its neg otiations and discussions with i nsuranc e companies r eg ar d i n g chang es in g roup insuranc e bene fits. Second, while the Me tropolitan Go ve rn me nt h a s a n o bli g a tio n to a c t re a so na bly wh e n it is p ro c uring g ro up he a lthins ur a nc e be ne fi ts for its employ ees, it wa s not acting unrea sonably when it dec lined to incur an a dditional $10,000,000 expense in order

to offer employ ees a

“one time e x ceptio n ” to the re quirements to qualify for the waive r o f p r e mi u m b e n e f it

. T h ir d , th e M e tr o p o li tan G o v e r n me n t h a d n o o b li g a ti o n u n d e r Metro. Code § 3.08.040(A) (3) to inform disabled employ ees of the “one time exception” because it never became part of t he employ ee benef it plan. Acc ording ly , the t rial court properly determined that the Me tr op oli ta n Gov e rn me nt wa s ent itl e d to a dismi ssa l of Mr. Re e se ’s br e a c h of c on tr a c t c la im a s a matter of la w.
VI . T HE B R EA C H O F C ON TRA C T C LA IM S OF M M ES . G OOT , T AYL OR , AND D UKE
We now turn to the brea ch of c ontrac t claims of Mmes. Goot, Taylor, and Duke . The trial court g rante d a direc ted verdic t f or the Metropolitan Government at the close of their pr oof on the g round that they had failed to prove “ the terms of the life insuranc e contr act.” Mmes. Goot, Tay lor, a ndDu ke a sse rt that the tria l cou rt e rr e d be c aus e the te rm s of the waive r o f p re miu m pr ov isi on in the life insura nce c ontrac t were not in disput e. F or its part, the Metr opolitan Governme nt insist s that the trial court err ed by failing to dir ect a verdic t on the g round that Mmes. Goot, Taylor, and Duke wer e not third-party

benef iciarie s of their de ceas ed s p o u ses’ g roup insuranc e policies. We have deter mined t h att h e t ri al co u rtp ro p er l y d ec l i n ed t o d i re cta v er d i cto n t h e M et ro p o l i t an Go v er n m en t’s third- p arty

b e n e f ic ia r y c laim b u t th a t th e tria l c o u rt e rr e d b y d ir e c ti n g a

v e r d ic t b e c au s e o f

the surviving spouse s’ fa ilure to prove the terms of the w aiver of pre mium provision.
A. The Sur viv ing Spous e s a s In te nde d Thir d- P ar ty Be ne fic iar ie s o f The ir

Spou ses’ G roup Li fe Ins urance Benefits
The Te nnessee Supreme Court has a dopted the “intent to bene fit ” t es t as s et forth in the R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F C O N T RA CT S § 3 02 (1 98 1) . T he on ly thi rdpa rtie s w ho ma y

c la im a le g a lly e nf or c e ableint e re st in a con tr a c t ar e pe rs on s who thec on tr a c tin g pa rt ie s in te nd e d to be ne fi t. Th e c ou rt ’s te st f

or de te rm ini ng wh e the r a

thi rdpa rty is an in te nd e d b e ne fi c iary pr ov ide s: A third party is an intended third-party benef iciary of a contr act, and thu s is e nti tle d to e nf

or c e thec on tr a c t’ s te rm s, if (1) The pa

rties to the contra ct have not otherwise a g ree d;-17- (2 ) Recogni tion o f a

ri g ht t o p e rf

orma nc e in the be ne fi c iary is appropriate to ef

fec tuate the intention of the pa rties; and (3) The terms of the contra ct o r t he cir cumstance s surrounding perf ormanc e indicate that either: ( a ) the p e r f

o r man c e o f th e p r o mi s e w il l s a ti s f y an obligation or d i schar g e a duty owed by the promisee to the benef

iciary ; or (b) the promisee intends to g ive the bene ficiary the benef it of the promised performanc e. Owner-Ope rator I

ndep. Drivers Ass’n v. Concord EFS, Inc

. , 59 S.W .3d 63, 70 (Tenn. 2001). An intended bene ficiary ’s rights are measure d by the contra ct itself, United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Elam , 1 9 8 T e n n
. 1 9 4 , 2 1 3

- 1 4 , 2 7 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 9 3 , 7 0 2 ( 1 9 5 5 ) , t h u s c o u rt s m u s ta n a l y z e t h i r d- part y contra ct claims by construing the contract as a whole rathe r t han in a piec emea l fashion. Benton v. Vanderbilt Univ. , 137 S.W .3d 614, 619-20 (Te nn. 2004). The Metropolitan Government is obligated t o provide all elig ible employ ees w ith gr oup life insurancecover ag e that contains a waiver of premium benef it. A life insurancepolicy is a mix ture of contra ct and donative transfe r, and when the policy is pay able to someone other than the insured, it is a classic example of a third-pa rty benef iciary contra ct. Mi lbo ur

ne v . Co ns e c o S e rv s. , LLC , 181 F . Su pp . 2 d 4 66 , 4 68 (D . M d. 20 02 ); In re Es tate of D e W itt , 5 4 P. 3d84 9, 85 9 ( Col o. 2002 ); In re E s ta te o f E ngland , No. WI LL S FOLI O 114375, 2000 WL 128854, at *4 (De l. Ch. J an. 4, 2000); Chicago W

hite Metal Ca s t i n g , Inc. v . Treiber , 517 N.E.2d 7, 11 (Ill. Ct . App. 1987). Onc e the insured name s a bene ficiary , there is no question that the employ ee, the employ er, and the insuranc e company intend to benef

it the named bene ficiary
. When gr oup insurancepolicies areinvolved, the courts ge nera lly view the employ ee a s the intended third-pa

rty bene f ic ia r y of the c ontrac t for insuranc e betwe en the e mploy er and the insuranc e company
. Nidif

fer v. C linchfield R.R. Co. , 6 00 S.W. 2da t 24 6; se e als o R owo rth v . Minn e so ta M ut. Life Ins. Co. , 674 F .2 d 7 56 , 7 58 (8 th C ir . 1 98 2) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Me ssier , 173 F. Supp. 90, 91 (D. Pa. 1959). T hus, t h e em p l o y ees the mselves have leg ally enfor cea ble rig hts under the g roup insurancecontra cts. The c ourts have a lso extended the same rights to any benef iciary named by

the employ ee a s long as all the conditi ons of the policy have be en fulfilled. Ba ss v . J oh n H an c oc k Mu t. Life Ins. Co. , 5 18 P.2 d 1 14 7, 11 50 n. 4 ( Ca l. 1 97 4) ; Keane v . Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 91 A.2d 875, 883 (N.J. S uper. Ct. 1952); 13 W I L L I S TON ON C O N T RA CT S § 37:29, at 186.
One o f the principle r easons f or purc hasing life insuranc e is to confe r a be nefit on a third party following the death of the named insured. Acc ording ly , when the Me tropolitan Governme nt included life insurance among the g roup benef its a vailable to its employ ees, it knew and intended t h a tt h e s e d e a t h b e n e f

i t s w o u l d b e p a i d u p o n t h e e m p l o ye e ’ s d e a t h t o t h e e m p l o ye e ’ s b e n e f i c i ar y. It follows, theref

ore, that both the employ ee and t he Metropolitan Government knew and intended that upon the death of the employ ee, the surviving spouse or other nam ed bene ficiary would be entitled to rec eive the death benefits as long as all the re quirements for rec eiving these be nefits had been f ulfilled.-18-

I n light of the relationship betwee n the employ ees and their beneficiaries, we c onclude that su rv ivi ng sp ou se s o f e mpl oy e e s, a s inte nd e d be ne fi c iari e s of the g ro up lif e ins ur a nc e be ne fi t, c ou ld step into the shoes of their former spouse to pursue their claim that the Metropolitan Government brea ched the employ ment contra ct by failing to pr ovide “f ull information” re g arding the waive r of premium bene fit as re quired by Metro. Code § 3.08.040(A )(3) . There fore , the trial court did not err when it de cl i n ed t o gra n tt h e M et ro p o l i t an Go v er n m en t ’s m o t i o n fo r d i re ct ed v er d i ctp re d icated upon its claim that the surviving spouse s werenot intended third-party b en ef iciarie s of their former sp ou se s’ g ro up lif

e ins ur a nc e be ne fi t.
B. The Sur viv ing Spous e s’ Evi de nc e Suppo r ti ng Th e irBr e ac h of C ont r ac t C lai m The fina l issue involv es t h e t ri al court’s decision to direc t a ver dict for the Me tropolitan Government beca

u s e M mes. Goot, Taylor, and Duke did not introduce a c opy of the g roup life insurancecontra ct containing the waive r of premium benef it. Mmes. Goot, Tay lor, and Duke assert that the trial court erre d beca use the Metr opolitan Governme nt had neve r denie d the exist enceof the g roup life insurance c ontrac t co n t ai n i n g a waiver of pr emium provision or what the terms of the waiv er o f p re m ium provision were. We a g ree , in light of the state of the plea dings and the Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt’ s re pr e se ntatio ns re g ard ing the te rm s o f the waive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t during the pre trial proce eding s. Ba sed on the fa cts of this case , Mmes. Goot, Tay lor, and Duke wer e no t r e qu ir e d to intr od uc e a c op y of theg ro up lif

e ins ur a nc e c on tr a c t in or de r t o ma ke ou t a prima fa c ie br e a c h o f e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t c la im.
1.
All three surviv i n g s p o u s es alleg ed in their a mended c omplaint that the Metropolitan Government provided its employ ees w ith gr oup life i nsuranc e that contained a waiver of pr emium benef it for disabled e mploy ees. The y also alleg ed that their spouse s wereelig ible for this benef it and that their spouses would have qualified for it ha d they been told a bout it. I n addition, they

alleg ed that the Metropolitan Government brea ched its e mploy ment contra ct with their spouses by failing to i nf orm th e m of

thewaive r o f p re miu m be ne fi t in a tim e ly ma nn e r andthat a s a

re su lt o f this br e a c h o f c on tr a c t, the y

re c e ive d o nly

$7 ,5 00 in de a th be ne fi ts as op po se d to th e $5 0, 00 0 inde a th benef its they would have rec eived had their spous e applied for the waiver of premium benefit in a timely manner
. The Metr opolitan Governme nt never filed an answer to the amende d complaint or any of the earlier complain t s fi l ed byMmes. Goot, Tay lor, and Duke . Howeve r, in Octobe r 2002, it filed a motion for summary

judgme nt and statements of undisputed fac t r eg arding eac h surviving spouse ’s claim. It supported the motion and statements with the depositions of ea ch of the surviving spouse s an d w ith th e a f

f id a v it o f it s A s s is tan t D ir e c to r o f H u man Re s o u r c e s r e g ar d in g the g roup life insurancepolicy

and the waiver of pr emium provision. I n its statements of undisp u t ed fa ct s , the Metropolitan Government asserted:-19- The Metr opolitan Governme nt provides life insura nce co v er age fo r i t s em p l o y ee s an d fo rm erem p l o y ee s re ce i v i n g a disabilitypension or a se rvice pension.
Act ive e mpl oy e e s r e c e ivelif e ins ur a nc e c ov e ra g e e qu a l to twice their annual salary to a maxi mum of $50,000. Fo rm er em p l o y ee s re ce i v i n g a se rv i ce o r di s ab i l i t y p en s i o n re ce i v e c o v er age of a [sic] $7,500. Employ ees w ho become disabled b ef ore the ag e of 60 c an apply of [sic] a “waiver of pr emium” which, if a pproved, a llows them to maintain their life insuranc e cove rag e at the same leve l they had as an ac tive employ ee.
I n o r d e r to r e c e iv e ap p r o v a l f o r th e w a iv e r o f p r emium and maintain the hig her c overa g e, a d i s ab l ed former e mploy ee must be d is ab le d w ith inth e d e f

in it io n s e t f

o rthinth e in s u r a n c e p o li c y and make app lic a tio n to thelif e ins ur a nc e c omp a ny

wi thi n th e app r o p ri a te time frame

. The de termination of whe ther a former employ ee qualifies for the waive r of pr emium benef it rests s olely

with the life insuranc e c o m p a n y.
Th e su rv ivi ng sp ou se s r e sp on de d to theMe tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt’ s sta te me nts of un dis pu te d f

a c ts by stating that they

did not dis p u t e t h es e fa ct s . The c ase pr ocee ded to trial af ter the tria l court declined to f

ind that the Metropolitan Government was entitl ed to a judgment as a matter of l aw on thesu rv ivi ng sp ou se s’ br e a c h o f e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t c la ims

. At tria l, the la wy e r re pr e se nti ng theMe tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt c on c e de d th a t th e plaint if fs ’ spouses rec eived g roup life insurance c overa g e whe n they wer e city em p l o y ees and that this li fe ins ura nc e c ov e ra g e c on ta ine d a waive r o f p re miu m pr ov isi on . H ow e ve r, thela wy e r s pe c if ic a lly declined to stipulate that the e mploy ees did not r ece ive ade quate notice of the waiver of pr emium bene fi t o r that eac h of the surviving spouse’s dama g es amounted to a pproxi mately

$42,500. There afte r, ea ch of the surviving spouse s testified (1) r eg arding her understanding of how the waive r of pre mium provision worked; (2) that her spouse either did not rece ive timely

information re g arding the waive r of pr emium benef it or rec eived errone ous information re g arding their elig ibilit y for the benef it; (3) that her spouse would have a pplied for the w aiver

of pre mium benefit in a timely manner had he know n about i t; (4) that her spouse met all the requirements for the benefit; and (5) that as a re sult of her spouse’ s failure to submita timely application for

the waive r of pr emium benef it, she re c e ive d a de a th be ne fi t of $7 ,5 00 rathe r than the $5 0, 00 0 be ne fi t sh e wo uld hav e ot he rw iseW h i l e n on e of t h e s u r v i v i n g s po u s e s t e s t i f i e d a bo u t t h e i n c om e t h e i r s po u s e w a s e a r n i n g w h e n h e be c a me 33 d i sabled, t he ir te st i m o ny t hat t hey wo ul d have recei ved t he $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 de at h be nef i t pe rmit s an i nference t hat al l of t he
s u r v i v i n g s pou s es w er e ea r n i n g $25, 000 pe r y ea r or mor e wh en t h ey be ca me di s abl ed. -20- rec eived. On cr oss-examination, each of the surviving spouses testified t hat t hey had not re ad the 33 g roup life insurance c ontr ac t and that they had g ained their

understanding of the ope ration of the waiver of pre mium provision from employ ees of the Metropolitan B enef

it Boar d. The surviving spouses also pre sent ed the testimony of two former e mploy ees of the Me tr op oli ta n B e ne fi t B oa rdwh o d e sc ri be d th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt’ s h aph a zar d a pp ro a c h to informing disabled employ ees of the waiver of premium provision or how to qua lify for it. During its cross-examination of these employ ees, the Metropolitan Government introduced into evide nce on e pa g e of

thethi rt e e n- pa g e le tte r pur po rt e dly g ive n to all emplo y e e s w ho qu a lif ie d f or a dis abil ity retire ment. This letter conta ined the following statements r ega rding the waive r of pr emium provision:
Wit h the ef fec tive date of y our di sability pension, y our life insurance, under c overa g e provide d by The Metr opoli t an Government, will be re duced to $7, 50 0 u nle ss y ou aretot a lly dis able d. I f y ou aretot a lly dis able d an d ar e le ss tha n s ixty (6 0) y e ars of

a g e , th e n y ou ma y

app ly fo r a waive r of

pr e miu m a ndthea mou nt o f i ns ur a nc e that y ou ha d in e ff e c t a s a n e mpl oy e e wi ll co nti nu e in ef fe c t. Y ou arec on sid e re d to be tot ally disabled if y ou are completely preve nted by

injury or sickness fr om doing, f

or pay or prof it, any work for which y ou are fitted by educa tion, training, and experience . Th e am ount of y our insurancecover ag e will be $7,500 at a g e 65.
Sho uldy ou di e withi n th e fi rs t ( 1s t) y e ar o f b e ing on a dis abil ity pensio n , the amount of insura nce that was available to y ou as an e mpl oy e e is s til l in e ff

e c t if it c a n b e sh own th at y ou we retot a lly disabled. I f y ou are totally disabled, y ou may

continue to be c overe d for the amount that y ou rec eived a s an employ ee if y ou file proof

of y ou r dis abil ity wi thi n o ne (1 ) y e ar o f g oin g on dis abil ity . I f y ou wi sh to file such a claim, y ou should contac t the Be nefit B oard O fficeand we will assist y ou in proce ssing that a pplication. Thus, when the surviving spouses closed their case -in-chie f, the following proof wa s befor e the jury : (1) that the Me tropolitan Governme nt offer ed g roup life insurance containing a waiver of p re m i u mp r o v i s i o n t o i t s em p l o y ee s ; (2 ) t h atal l ci t y em p l o y ee s re ce i v ed l i fe i n s u ra n ce co v er age equal to twice their annua l salary up to $50,000; (3) that the life insurancebenef it for employ ees on dis abil ity re tir e me nt w a s $ 7 , 5 0 0 ; ( 4 ) th at e mplo y e e s w ho be c a me tot a lly dis able d b e fo rethe ir

sixtie th birthd a y we ree lig ibl e fo r the waive r o f p re miu m ben efi t and that if the y qu a lif ie d f or thebe ne fi t, the ir lif e ins ur a nc e c ov e ra g e wo uld c on tin ue a t the le ve l it wa s w he n th e y we rea c tiv e e mpl oy e e s; (5) that the spouse s of ea ch of the plaintiffs became disabled befor e their six tieth birthday and that the y we retot a lly

dis able d; ( 6) that th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt w a s r e qu ir e d to pr ov idea ll i tsT hi s d eci si o n ap p ears t o be prem i sed o n t he b est evi d ence rul e, T enn. R

. E vi d

. 10 0 2 , e v e n t ho ugh t he 34 M e tro p o lit a n G o v e rn m e n t d id no t m a k e a b e st e v id e n c e o b je c tio n d u rin g the su rv ivin g sp o u se s’ ca se -in-c h ie f.

T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 8

. 0 4 p rovides t hat averme nt s i n a pleading t o whi ch a res p o nsi ve p l ead i ng i s requir ed are 35 d eem ed ad m i t t ed when no t de ni ed i n t he res p o nsi ve p l ead i ng. H o wever, when no res p o n siv e p l ead i ng i s f i l ed , t he
o p p o si ng pa rt y m ust i nvo ke t he d ef aul t jud gm ent pro ced ures i n T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 55 rat her t han wai t unt i l t ri al and i nvo ke T e n n . R . C iv. P . 8 .0 4

. S m ith v . S m ith , 6 4 3 S .W .2 d 3 2 0 , 3 2 3 (T e n n . 1 9 8 2 ); Edw ar ds v . Edw ar ds , 501 S. W

. 2d 283, 290 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 7 3 ); s ee al s o St ory v. Lan i er , 1 6 6 S .W .3 d 1 6 7 , 1 8 2 -8 3 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ). -21- employ e e s w ith “ f

u ll in f o r mati o n ” o f th e ir r ig h ts a n d s tatu s r e g ar d in g th e ir b e n e f it s ; a n d ( 7) that neither the employ ee spouse s nor the plaintiffs we re pr ovided “f ull informatio n ” re garding the waive r o f p re miu m pr ov isi on wh e n th e y we reapp ro ve d f

or a dis abil ity re tir e me nt. Following the close of the s urviving spouses’ case-in- chief , the Metropolitan Gove rnment moved for a

direc ted ver dict on six g rounds. Two of these g rounds wer e (1) that the plaintiffs had failed to p ro v e t h e “elements” of the g roup life insurance c ontrac t and (2) that the plaintiffs had failed to pre sent medica l evidencedemonstrating that their spouses would havequalified for the waiver of pre mium benefit had they applied for

it in a timely

manner. The trial c ourt g rante d the Metropolitan Government a dire cted verdic t on both of these g rounds. Whil e the c ourt did not focus on the absence of medical evidence , it held t hat t he surviving s pouses had failed to prove w hat the qu a lif ic a tio ns fo r the waive r of pr e miu m be ne fi t we re a nd wh e the r the ir sp ou ses met the se require ments because t hey failed to introduce a copy of the g roup life insurance c ontrac t. The c ourt 34 stated that it believed that the j ury would be left to speculate reg arding the amount of the surviving spouses’ damag es unl ess t hey had a copy of t he group insurance contra ct containing the waiver of premium provision.
2. The pre paration and trial of t his case by both lawy ers lea ves much to be de sired. The chief sh ortc omi ng s a

retheMe tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt’ s f a ilu re to fi le a n a ns we r t o th e su rv ivi ng sp ou se s’ complaint and the f

ailure of the lawy er repr esenting the surviving spouses to bring this significa nt o v er s i gh tt o an y o n e ’ s a t t e n t i o n b ef o re t h e c l o s e o f t h e p l ai n t i ffs ’ c as e- i n -c h i ef

. T h e p l ea d i n gs 35
re qu ir e d by Te nn
. R. Civ

. P. 7 a nd 8 are no t ve sti g ia l app e nd a g e s to l iti g a tio n. Th e ir pu rp os e is t o provide notice of the pa rties’ c laims and defe nses. R OBER T B A N KS , J R
. & J UNE F. E NTMAN , T E NNES S EE C IV I L P ROCE DURE § 5-4(a ), at 5-41 ( 2004) (“ T ENNES S EE C I V I L P ROCE D U RE ”). The purpose of

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.04 is to ensure that the defe ndant’s answe r g ives the plaintiff notice of tho se a lle g a tio ns in the c omp la int that areun c on te sted and that w ill no t bea n is su e a t tria l. T ENNES S EE C I V I L P ROCE D U RE , § 5-4(f ), at 5-56. There is no question that the disputed fac tual and leg al issues in this case we re not broug ht into sharp focus be cause of t he Metropolitan Gove rnment’s failure to file an a nswer. The shortc omings in the surviving spouses’ cas e- in-chief cannot, in fairness, be attributed solely to the surviving spouse s themselves. They are t he re sult, in no sm all measure , of the Metropolitan Government’s fa ilure to file an answer and by the Metropolitan Gove rnment’s pre trial assertions reg arding the exist enceand terms of the g roup life ins u ra n ce co n trac t, particularly the waiver of premium provision. Had the Metropolitan Government denied the exis tence of the g roup-22-

life insuranc e contr act c ontaining the waiver of premium provision for disabled e mploy ees, w hich it did not, t he surviving spouses would, most likely , have pr esente d more de tailed evide n ce r eg arding the exist enceand terms of the contra ct. Had the Metropolitan Government denied that the surviving spouses’ under standing and interpr etation of the w aiver of premium provision, which it did not, the su rv ivi ng sp ou se s w ou ld, mos t li ke ly , have pres entedmor e de ta ile d e vid e nc e re g ard ing thete rm s of thewaive r o f p re miu m pro vis ion

. Ha d th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt d e nie d th a t th e ir sp ou se s’ ag e or the extent of their spouses’ disabilitywould not have be en suff icient to qualify

for the w aiver of pre mium benefit, which it did not, the pl aintiffs would, most likely , have pr esente d more de tailed e vid e nc e su pp ortin g c la im that th e ir sp ou se s q ua lif

ie d f or thebe ne fi t.
Howeve r, not o n l ydid the Metropolitan Government fail to take issue w ith the surviving spouses’ under standing of the waiver of pr emium provision, its portray al of the pr ovision throughout the proc eeding s leading up to the trial was essentially identical to the under standing of the surviving spouses. The Me tropolitan Governme nt’s posture throug hout the pretria l proce eding s would have led a r easona

ble per son to infer that the Metropolitan Government was conce ding the exis tence of the g roup life insurance contra ct containing the waiver of pre mium provision for disabled employ ees and the spe cific te rms of the waiver of pr emium provision.
A court’s ability

to addre ss its workload fairly and ef ficiently depends in lar g e mea sure on the consistency

and c l ar i ty

of the pa

rties’ c laims and defe nses. Monroe County Motor Co. v. Tennessee Odin Ins. Co. , 33 Te nn . A pp . 2 23 , 2 31 , 2 31 S.W. 2d38 6, 39 0 ( 19 50 ) ( ho ldi ng that th e ru le preve nting li t i gants from taking inconsistent positi ons is “nece ssary to the orderly

dispatch of lit ig a tio n” ). Th us , li tig a nts wi ll n ot b e pe rm itt e d to play fa st andloo se wi th the c ou rt s or wi th the ir adver saries by

taking inconsistent o r contra ry positions. Johnston v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. , 14 6 Te nn . 1 35 , 1 59 , 2 40 S.W. 42 9, 43 6 ( 19 22 ); W ebber v. W

ebber , 1 09 S.W. 3d35 7, 35 9 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 03 ); Cot

hron v . S c ott , 60 Tenn. App. 298, 304, 446 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (1969).
The Metr opolitan Governme nt’s claim that it was entitled to a dire cted ve rdict bec ause the surviving spouses did not introduce a copy of the g roup life insurance contra ct containing the waive r of pr e miu m pr ov isi on is i nc on sis te nt w ith its po sit ion du ri ng a ll the pr e tria l pro c e e din g s. Th is s uit involves an alleg ed bre ach of an employment contra ct, not a g roup l i fe i n suranc e contr act. The re was no dispute prior to the trial reg ar d i ng the exist enceor the terms of the g roup life insura nce contra ct. The only

possible disputes involved the a dequac y of the employ ees’ notice of the waiver of thepr e miu m pr ov isi on , w he ther theplaint if

fs ’ s po us e s me t th e a g e a nddis abil ity re qu ir e me nts of the provision, and, if the y did, the amount of the be nefit. Thus, just as the Metropolitan Government’s fa ilure to file an answer preve nted it f rom belate dly

asserting a

statute of limitations defe nse, its failure to de ny the exist enceof the g roup life insurance c ontrac t or t h e terms of the waiver of pre mium provision s hould have unde rmined its reque st for a direc ted verdict on the g round that the surviving spouses d i d not establish the exis tence of the waiver of pr emium benef it by int ro du c ing a

c op y of theg ro up lif

e ins ur a nc e c on tr a c t.
Th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt h a s a lw a y s bee n in the be st pos iti on to kno w the pr e c ise te rm s of the g roup life insurance c ontrac t and the waiver of pr emium provision. After a ll, it i s one of the pa rt ie s to theg ro up lif

e ins ur a nc e c on tr a c t, and the c on tr a c t has be e n in its poss e ssi on a nd un de r i ts control throug hout the litigation. Its own employ ees testified reg arding the re levant provisions ofW e h av e al r ea dy poi n t ed ou t t h at t h e s u r v i v i n g s pou s es ’ t es t i mon y t h at t h ey w ou l d h av e r ece i v ed $50, 000 36 i s p rem i sed o n t he reasonab l e i nference t hat each of t he spo uses were earni ng $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 or m o re each y ear whi l e t hey were ac t i ve em p l o yee s. -23- the contra ct, and their

testimonywas e nti re l y co n s i stent with the surviving spouse s’ testimony reg arding their under standing of t he contract. There was no materia l fac tual dispute reg arding the operative provisions of t h e gro up life insuranc e contr act or the waive r of pr emium provision. Acc ording ly , the M etropolitan Government was not entitled to a directed verdict on t he surviving sp ou se s’ br e a c h o f e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t c la im. During their ca se-in-c hief, the surviving spouses pr esente d proof ( 1) that ea ch spouse wa s le ss tha n sixty

y e ars of a g e wh e n h e be c a me dis able d, (2 ) that e a c h s po us e wa s d isa ble d e no ug h to qualify for the w aiver

of pre mium benefit, (3) that eac h spouse would have qualified for the waive r of pre mium benefit had they been inf ormed of the benef

it in a ti mely manner , and, therefor e, (4) that e a c h s po us e wo uldha ve re c e ive d the ma ximum $5 0, 00 0 be ne fi t rathe r tha n th e $7 ,5 00 the y a c tua lly re c e ive d h a d the Me tr op oli ta n Gov e rn me nt fu lf ill e d its obli g a tio n to pro vid e the ir sp ou se s w ith“ fu ll inf ormatio n” re g ard ing thewaive r of premium p ro vis ionin a tim e ly ma nn e r. No sp e c ulatio n is

36
ne e de d to arrivea t th e c on c lus ionthat th e su rv ivi ng sp ou se s ha d be e n da ma g e d by app ro xima te ly $4 2, 50 0 b y

virtueof theMe tr op oli ta n G ov e rnmen t’ s all e g e d b re a c h o f the e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t. This evi d en ce i s sufficie nt to withst and the dire cted ve rdict and to plac e the bur den on the Metropolitan Government to prove ( 1) that the surviving spouses’ under standing of the terms of the waiver of pre mium provision was incorre ct, (2) that the employ ee spouses wer e too old to qualify for the w aiver

of pre mium benefit, (3) that the employ ee spouse s werenot disabled enoug h to qualify for the w aiver

of pre mium benefit, or (4) that the employ ee spouses’ salarie s weretoo low to qualify the m f or thema ximum

$5 0, 00 0 b e ne fi t.
VI I.
I n summary , we a ffirm the dismissal of all surviving spouses’ intentional tort claims and Mr. Reese’ s brea ch of c ontrac t claim. We re v er se the summary judgme nt dismi ssing Ms. Jackson’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim, as we ll as the direc ted ver dict dismiss ing the brea ch of contra ct claims of M m es
. Go ot, Tay lor, and Duke . We remand the case s to the trial court for further proce edin gs consistent with this opi nion, and we tax the costs of this appea l to the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and D avidson County

.

______________________________ WILL I AM C. K OC H, JR., P. J., M. S.