In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-22-00004-CR 

________________________

JOHNNY MOLINA, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the 140th District Court 

Lubbock County, Texas 

Trial Court No. DC-2021-CR-0497, Honorable Douglas H. Freitag, Presiding 

 

January 5, 2023 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

Whether called the “shotgun” approach or “throwing everything in plus the kitchen 

sink,” such strategies seldom assist. They confuse and invite comparison to Gertrude’s 

comment: “[t]he lady doth protest too much, methinks.”1 Clarity and conciseness better 

serve. That said, we turn to the nine issues and sixty-four pages of writing presented by 

1 Hamlet, William Shakespeare.
2

Johnny Molina in effort to reverse his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of children. 

We affirm. 

Issue Five

Our work begins with issue five entitled: “THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY 

INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT CONVICTION AND/OR TO ASSESS PUNISHMENT OF 

A LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT PAROLE.” We start there because sustaining the 

complaint provides him the greatest relief available. See Mixon v. State, 481 S.W.3d 318, 

322 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. ref’d) (requiring the consideration of issues regarding 

the sufficiency of evidence first). But, upon considering the argument, we overrule it.

The applicable standard of review is that discussed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012), and Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

While applying it, we consider all the evidence favorable to the verdict, even if found 

inadmissible when addressing later issues. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999). 

Again, the State indicted appellant for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The 

crime occurs when “during a period that is 30 or more days in duration” a 17-year-old or 

older person “commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts 

of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims” and the victim is “younger 

than 14 years of age . . . .” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b)(1), (b)(2)(A). A review of 

the evidence at bar illustrates that appellant sexually molested the two daughters of his 

girlfriend. The acts included touching their vaginal areas and attempting to engage in 

anal intercourse. He did so more than twice during a period spanning more than thirty
3

days. And, at the time, the girls were under fourteen years of age. So, the record contains 

evidence on which reasonable jurors could find appellant guilty, beyond reasonable 

doubt, of committing continuous sexual abuse of a child. 

In structuring his argument, though, appellant did not discuss the evidence 

inculpating him. Nor did he attempt to explain why it did not prove his guilt. Rather, he 

alluded to such matters as 1) the nature of the prosecutor’s closing argument, 2) the 

alleged bias of witnesses, 3) the admission of supposed hearsay, 4) an amendment to 

the indictment about which he failed to object, 5) the utterance of personal opinion as to 

his guilt by one or more witnesses, 6) reference to appellant as “a monster” being a 

“racially charged” statement, 7) how “[p]ersons of color, like Appellant, often obtain[ing]

higher sentences,” 8) the lack of specific jury findings which specify the underlying “acts 

of sexual abuse” committed by him, and 9) the collective effect of the foregoing upon his 

conviction. Even if those topics were components of or subject to consideration under 

the controlling standard of review, they were inadequately briefed. That is, he 

accompanied none of them with both substantive analysis and citation to authority, as 

required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (stating that the 

brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made with 

appropriate citation to authority and the record). Thus, they were waived to the extent 

they served as the foundation for his argument about the alleged insufficiency of the 

evidence. Smith v. Dixon, No. 07-20-00197-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 5592, at *6 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo July 14, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 

(finding the issue waived because the appellant provided neither substantive argument

nor citation to legal authority and the record). 
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Issue One

Appellant’s explanation of his first issue leaves us scratching our collective heads 

while attempting to understand his complaint. He seems to question whether the jury 

found that he committed two or more acts of sexual abuse within a period of thirty days 

or more. He suggests that it did not because 1) the State argued that jurors need not 

consider guilt of lesser included offenses until after considering guilt on the greater 

offense and 2) opining that “the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child was not a 

count in either the grand jury indictment or in the amended indictment . . . ”. According to 

appellant, the combining of these circumstances somehow led the jurors to believe they 

need not consider the lesser included offenses when deciding if appellant committed the 

greater offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. As understood, we overrule the 

issue for the following reasons.

First, we read indictments as a whole. Brooks v. State, 382 S.W.3d 601, 605-06

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet ref’d). So read, the amended indictment at bar clearly 

describes the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Through it, the State charged 

him with committing “two or more” itemized sexual offenses against two females who 

were younger than fourteen during a period “from on or about the 23rd day of October, 

2014 through the 9th day of February, 2018.” These encompass the very elements of the 

crime, as described in section 21.02 of the Texas Penal Code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §

21.01(b) (stating that a person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child 

if “during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more 

acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed 

against one or more victims” and the victims are “younger than 14 years of age . . .”). 
5

Second, we presume the jury follows the trial court’s instructions and charge, 

absent evidence otherwise. Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2003); Hareter v. State, 435 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 30, 2014, no 

pet.). Here, the trial court instructed the jurors, via its charge, that they “are bound to

receive the law from the Court.”2 (Emphasis added). So too were they informed, via the 

same document, of 1) the elements of continuous sexual abuse of a child as described in 

the statute and 2) the need to “first . . . determine whether the defendant is guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt of the charged offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child or 

children.” An application paragraph followed wherein the trial court itemized multiple 

instances of sexual abuse allegedly committed by appellant. The court coupled that with 

the statement about the jurors needing to find he committed two or more of them over a 

thirty-day or more period to be guilty of the crime. Appellant cites us to no evidence 

illustrating that the jurors failed to heed those instructions. So, we presume that the jury 

did as charged when finding appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse.

Issue Two

Appellant next argues that his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated. This 

purportedly occurred because the jurors did not expressly find he committed the same 

two or more underlying instances of abuse. We previously addressed the identical issue 

in Pfeifer v. State, No. 07-14-00277-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 7825, at *11-12 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo July 21, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) and 

Kennedy v. State, 385 S.W.3d 729, 731-32 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. ref’d) and 

2 We emphasize “the Court” since appellant seems to suggest that the jury followed the law as 

explained by the prosecutor. The trial court having admonished the jurors that it provides them the law, we 

again presume they heeded the directive; at least, appellant did not direct us to evidence indicating they 

did not.
6

rejected it. Jurors need not agree on which underlying individual acts the defendant 

committed. Kennedy, 385 S.W.3d at 732. 

To the extent that appellant also asserts that the jury charge “regarding a finding 

of continuous sexual abuse did not mention the charge of continuous sexual abuse,” we 

invite him to re-read the document. It expressly mentions the crime, its elements, and 

applies those elements to the circumstances at bar. So too did it instruct the jurors that 

they “will first be required to determine whether the defendant is guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of the charged offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child or 

children.” We overrule appellant’s second issue.

Issue Three

In appellant’s third issue, he argues the trial court erred in permitting the State to 

amend its indictment to include an offense not considered by the grand jury. Through the 

amendment, the State added another instance of assault to the litany of acts submitted 

as the manner and means by which he committed continuous sexual abuse. Adding that 

“offense” “invaded the province of the grand jury and violated Article 1, § 10 of the Texas 

Constitution,” according to appellant. We overrule the issue.

Appellant did not object to the amendment. By failing to object, he waived his 

complaint. Ramirez v. State, 105 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). And, 

assuming arguendo that the addition in question resulted in the inclusion of an additional 

offense as opposed to the addition of another instance describing the manner and means 

of committing the one offense, it did not fall outside the trial court’s jurisdiction. Contrary 

to appellant’s suggestion otherwise, the return of an indictment is the act vesting the trial 
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court with jurisdiction over the prosecution. Id. at 629. A grand jury returned the 

indictment at bar, thereby vesting the trial court with jurisdiction to try the cause. 

Issue Six

By his sixth issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the 

statements made by him to a detective during his interview with police. The statements 

were purportedly made while appellant was in custody and without being afforded his 

Miranda admonishments. We overrule the issue for the simple reason that appellant 

failed to preserve it at trial. Not only did he withhold objection when a recording of the 

interview was admitted into evidence but he also uttered “[n]o objection, your Honor.” See 

King v. State, No. 11-21-00039-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 6800, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—

Eastland Sept. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that 

appellant waived his article 38.22 since it was not raised at trial); Brantley v. State, No. 

07-13-00219-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1730, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 23, 

2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that appellant waived 

his Miranda complaint on appeal because he failed to raise it at trial).

Issue Seven

Next, appellant argues that the admission of hearsay evidence violated his Sixth 

Amendment constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. The purported hearsay 

came from three witnesses, namely Rachel Martinez, Patti Salazar, and John Wuerflein. 

Yet, this constitutional basis for excluding the testimony was not mentioned below. Nor 

do general hearsay objections fill the void we encountered. Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 

526, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that appellant’s general hearsay objection failed 
8

to preserve is complaint founded on the Confrontation Clause). Thus, we overrule the 

issue as waived.

Issue Eight

Appellant’s next issue involves the admission of outcry testimony. Allegedly, the 

witnesses in question were not the first adults to whom the child victims revealed 

instances of appellant’s abuse. Thus, admission of their testimony about what the victims

told them fell outside the hearsay exception created by article 38.072 of the Texas Code 

of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072. Yet, the two victims 

also testified at trial and, while doing so, described instances of sexual abuse inflicted 

upon them by appellant. Furthermore, their testimony about those instances was

admitted without objection. So, we have of record other evidence like that imparted by 

the alleged outcry witnesses. The presence of that substantially similar, yet unobjected 

to, evidence rendered harmless any supposed error regarding compliance with article

38.072. Mitchell v. State, No. 07-18-00169-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1800, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo March 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating 

that the improper admission of evidence is harmless if the same or similar evidence is 

admitted without objection at some other point during trial). We overrule the issue.

Issue Nine

Next, appellant claims his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated. This 

was purportedly so because he was subjected to multiple punishments for the same 

offense. We overrule the issue. 

Assuming arguendo that appellant’s contention about including lesser included

offenses in the jury charge exposes the accused to double jeopardy, we note that he was 
9

convicted of only one crime. That crime was the greater and more serious offense of 

continuous sexual abuse of a child. That being so, he suffered no harm. This is so 

because the remedy to a double jeopardy violation based on subjection to multiple 

punishments for the same crime is to affirm the conviction for the most serious offense 

and vacate the other conviction. Duran v. State, 492 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2016); Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 372-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). So, he received 

the relief to which he would have been entitled had a violation occurred.

Issue Four

We consider appellant’s fourth issue last, given its tenor. Through it, he globally 

asserts that the “many, multiple errors” in this case contributed to a wrongful verdict and 

sentence. Having overruled each of appellant’s other issues for the lack of error, waiver, 

inadequate briefing, and the lack of harm (assuming error occurred), we overrule this 

issue as well.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

Do not publish.