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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF EAST GRAND RAPIDS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED April 11, 2017

v No. 329259

Kent Circuit Court TREVOR ALLEN VANDERHART, LC No. 14-010058-AR

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M URPHY , P.J., and S AWYER and S WARTZLE , JJ.

M URPHY

, P.J. ( concurring ).

I agree with the lead opinion that we should affirm the circui t court’s ruling reversing the

district court’s decision to set a side defendant’s jury-trial c onviction of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, MCL 257.625(1)(b). I respectfully disagree, however, with the analysis of the lead opinion. I cannot conclude that a single dim taillight eq uates to “an unsafe condition as to endanger a person” for purposes of MCL 257.683(1). Instead, I would hold that the circuit court employed the correct analysi s. Accordingly, I concur.

“A police officer on reasonable grounds shown may stop a motor vehicle and inspect the motor vehicle, and if a defect in equipment is found, the offic er may issue the driver a citation for a violation of a provision of sections 683 to 711.” MCL 25 7.683(2). Section 686 concerns rear lamps, i.e., taillights, a nd provides in pertinent part:

(1) A motor vehicle . . . shall be equipped with at least 1 rea r lamp mounted on the rear, which, when lighted as required by this ac t, shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of 500 feet to the rear.

(2) Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be constructed and placed so as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration pl ate and render it clearly legible from a distance of 50 feet to the rear. A tail lamp or tail lamps

, together with any separate lamp for illuminating the rear regis tration plate, shall be wired so as to be lighted whenever the head lamps o r auxiliary driving lamps are lighted. [MCL 257.686 (emphasis added).]-2- In People v Williams , 236 Mich App 610; 601 NW2d 138 (1999), the police stopped a motor vehicle that had an inoperative passenger-side taillight; the taillight on the driver’s side of the car worked properly. This Court construed MCL 257.686(1) a nd (2) and held as follows:

The plain language o f subsection 686(1) st ates that all motor vehicles must be “equipped with” at least one “rear lamp.” There is no disput e that defendant's automobile satisfied this requirement, because it was equipped with two tail lamps. The language of the sec ond sentence of subsection 686(2) is less clear. Arguably, it could be read to provide either (1) that a tail la mp must be wired so as to be lighted as specified in order to comply with the Vehic le Code—the implication being that an automobile with a tail lamp not wired so as to be lighted as specified would be in violation of the Vehicle Code—or (2) t hat an automobile must be equipped with at least one tail lamp wired so as to be lighted as specified in order to be in complian ce with the Vehicle Code.

We think the first reading comes closer to producing an harmon ious whole. If the Legislature intende d the second sentence of subse ction 686(2) to mean only that an automobile must have one operative tail lamp in order to be in compliance with the Vehicle Code, the words “or tail lamps” wou ld be rendered nugatory. On the other hand, under the first reading of subsect ion 686(2), the words “a tail lamp” would refer to those motor vehicles “equipp ed with” only one tail lamp, while the words “tail lamps” would refer to those mo tor vehicles “equipped with” multiple tail lamps. Accordingly, the first rea ding is preferable. Moreover, we believe that the first reading best ac complishes the purpose of the Vehicle Code, which is to promote traffic safety . Under the second reading of subsection 686(2), an automobile equipped with multi ple tail lamps— and therefore presumably intended to function with multiple tai l lamps—would be in compliance with the Vehicle Code even if one of its tail lam ps was inoperative. Conversely, under th e first reading of subsection 686(2), all tail lamps intended for use on an automobile would have to be operat ive in order for the automobile to be in compliance with the Vehicle Code. We as sume that when multiple tail lamps are included in an automobile's design, the y are intended, in part, to function togethe r to enhance safety.

For the reasons stated, we conclude that a motor vehicle equip ped with multiple tail lamps is in violation of subsection 686(2) of the Vehicle Code if one or more of its tail lamps is inoperative. Therefore, we hold th at the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the Vehicle Code p rovided no basis for the traffic stop. [ Williams , 236 Mich App at 613-615 (citations omitted).]

In this case, defendant’s vehic le was equipped with the standa rd two taillights, and while the passenger-side ta illight was operating or functioning, it w as not doing so fully, as the taillight was significantly dimmer than t he other taillight. MCL 257.686 (2), as interpreted by the panel in

Williams , required defendant’s vehicle’s two taillights to be “lighted, ” given that the head lamps were lit when defendant was pulled over by the officer. It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature, in using the word “lighted” in that context, inten ded for taillights to be properly or fully lit when a car’s headlights ar e turned on. A sound argument ca n be made that a defective or-3- malfunctioning taillight violates MCL 257.686(2), even though s ome light may still emanate from the taillight. Williams does not preclude that construction; rather, it tends to lend s upport for such an interpretation, given the Court’s aim to accomplish the purpose of the Vehicle Code, which is to promote traffic safety. Williams , 236 Mich App at 614.

Nevertheless, assuming, without ultimately deciding, that MCL 2 57.686(2) cannot serve as a legal basis for the officer to have stopped defendant’s ve hicle for the dim or malfunctioning taillight, the officer’s belief to the contrary constituted a r easonable mistake of law. See People v

Dunbar , 499 Mich 60, 71 n 9; 879 NW2d 229 (2016) (“[A] police officer ’s reasonable suspicion supporting a traffic stop may rest on a ‘reasonable mistake of law.’ ”) (Quoting Heien v North

Carolina , 574 US __; 135 S Ct 530, 536; 190 L Ed 2d 475 [2014].) There certainly is sufficient ambiguity in MCL 257.686(2) to s upport this conclusion. My ana lysis is generally consistent with that employed by the circuit court. 1

In sum, I respectfully concur.

/s/ William B. Murphy

1 The lead opinion definitively determines that for taillights t o be "lighted" for purposes of MCL 257.686(2), they must emit a light visible from 500 feet away, as alluded to in MCL 257.686(1). I cannot state that th is interpretation is wrong, but one could reasonably argue that the lead opinion conflates subsections (1) and (2) of MCL 257.6 86, effectively requiring both taillights on a motor vehicle to emit a red light that can plai nly be seen from a distance of 500 feet, even though the Legislature, for whatever reason, plainly and specifically insisted that just one taillight emit a light from that distance. The bottom line is that MCL 257.686(2) can be construed in multiple ways that are reasonable, rendering it am biguous and susceptible to a reasonable mistake of law by an officer.