By order of the Bankruptcy Appella te Panel, the precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8024-1(b). See also 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8014-1(c).
File Name: 17b0003n.06 

### BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

I N RE : M ARY A. G ORDON , Debtor

.

__________________________________________ T. L ARRY E DMONDSON , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v

. V IRGIL G ORDON , II, Defendant

- Appellant. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 16-8014

Appeal from the United St ates Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. Bankruptcy Case No. 12-09605—M arian F. Harrison, Judge. Decided and Filed: May 18, 2017
Before: DELK, HUMPHREY, and OPPERMAN , Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Phillip G. Young, Jr., THOMPSON BU RTON PLLC, Frankli n, Tennessee, for Appellee. Virgil Gordon, Atlanta, Georgia, pro se.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ DANIEL S. OPPERMAN, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. In this case, Virgil Gordon, II, as pro se Defendant and Appellant , appeals the bankruptcy court’s April 19, 2016 order finding him in civil contempt of court, dire cting him to turnover certa in funds from the sale 

### >No. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 2

of property, and awarding sanctions for the Chap ter 7 Trustee’s attorney’s fees. While we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s Contempt Order in part, we REVERSE th e award of sanctions and remand this matter to the bankruptcy court to allow Appellant an opportunity to be heard regarding the reasonableness of the amount of sanctions.

ISSUES ON APPEAL Appellant Virgil Gordon raises the following issues on appeal, as quot ed directly from his “Pro Se Appellant’s Brief”: 1
I. Virgil Gordon, never received legal notice of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Granting Plaintiff’s Expedited Motion for Summary Judgment in Adversary Case 3:13-ap-90351. II. Given that there is no proof in the record that Virgil Go rdon, ever received adequate legal notice of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Gr anting Plaintiff’s Expedited Motion for Summary Judgmen t in Adversary Case 3:13-ap-90351 Virgil Gordon, should never have been subject to civil contempt proceedings. III. Given that Virgil Gordon, should never have been subject to civil contempt proceedings, he should not be subject to any contempt judgment or any sanctions including all attorney fees. IV. Whether Virgil Gordon, should be responsible for the approximately $75,000.00 that Mary A Gordon has admitted to spending. V. When Virgil Gordon was made aware of civil contempt order all monies held in escrow for Mary A Gordon capital gain s taxes were immediately forwarded to trustee. VI. Whether any attorney’s fees ch arged to Virgil Gordon, are excessive. Attorney’s have billed the Mary A Go rdon estate and collected more than $105,000 all while leaving Mary A Gor don an 81 year old elderly woman destitute without an income to support herself. VII. Throughout the entirety of the case Virgil Gordon believes bias may be a factor in how the court ha s ruled on several issues.
VIII. Virgil Gordon is financially supporting his mother, Mary A Gordon along with two children on a sala ry less than $50,000 a judgment in favor of the trustee would hinder his ability to provide for his family.

1 The substantive portion of Appellant’s Brief consists ex clusively of these eight “s pecific issues” I. through VIII.No. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 3

For brevity, each issue will be referred to by Roman numeral throughout this Opinion.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The United States District Court for th e Middle District of Tennessee has authorized appeals to the Panel, and no party has timely elect ed to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6), (c)(1).
A finding of contempt made by the bankruptcy c ourt is reviewed for abuse of discretion as a finding within the sound di scretion of the trial court. Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund of Local Union #58 v. Gary’s Elec. Serv. Co. , 340 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Peppers v. Barry , 873 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir. 1989)).
A bankruptcy court’s decision to sanction is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Badovick v. Greenspan (In re Greenspan) , 464 B.R. 61, 2011 WL 310703, at *1 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2011) (table) (citing B-Line, LLC v. Wingert er (In re Wingerter) , 594 F.3d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 2010). See also See Mayor and City Counsel of Ba ltimore v. W. Va. (In re Eagle Picher Indus., Inc.) , 285 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 2002) (equitable determinations subject to an abuse of discretion standard).

“An abuse of discretion is defined as a ‘definite and firm conviction th at the [trial court] committed a clear error of judgment.’” Id. at 529 (internal citation omitted). The particular factual findings of the bankruptcy cour t are reviewed for “clear error.” Behlke v. Eisen (In re Behlke) , 358 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2004). Findings of contempt and sanctions premised “upon
an erroneous view of the law or an erroneous a ssessment of the evidence are necessarily an abuse
of discretion.” In re Royal Manor Mgmt. , 525 B.R. 338, 346 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2015) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp. , 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990)).

FACTS On October 19, 2012, Mary A. Gordon filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy case and T. Larry Edmondson (“Appellee” or “Trustee”) was appointed to serve as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Debtor’s estate. On September 13, 2013, the Appellee filed an adversary proceeding againstNo. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 4

Virgil Gordon, II, as Trustee for The Mary A lice Gordon 2012 Irrevocable Accounts Trust and Retirement Plan, to avoid the tran sfer of two parcels of real pr operty in San Diego, California. Virgil Gordon, II, is the son of Mary A. Gordon. The Trust ee alleged in this adversary proceeding that the properties were transferred in to the Trust within two months of the petition date for no value. On May 15, 2015, the Tr ustee filed an expedited motion for summary judgment and brief in the adversary proceeding to avoid the transfers of property from the Debtor to the Trust, and place all contents of the Trust into the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
The Court held a hearing on the Ex pedited Motion for Summary Judgment on May 26, 2015. At the hearing, counsel for th e Trustee was present, as was the Debtor and her counsel. Also present was Appellant Virgil Gordon, II, representing himself. At the conclusion of that hearing, the bankruptcy court granted the Trustee’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and on May 28, 2015, the Court issued an Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Summary Judgment Order”). The Court’s Order stated as follows:
1) The Motion is GRANTED. 2) All transfers of property from the Debtor to the Trust are hereby avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548. 3) All property held by the Trust, incl uding but not limited to real property known as 1290-1294 Keeler Court, San Diego, Cali fornia, hereby reverts back to the Debtor and is property of the bankruptcy estate. 4) The Trustee has authority to take a ll necessary steps and execute any and all documents needed to control, manage, re nt and/or liquidate property previously held by the Trust. 5) The Debtor, Virgil Gordon II, and a ny other party exercising control over the Trust are hereby ordered to immediately tu rn over all property held by the Trust to the Trustee. 6) The Court retains jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the terms of this Order.
On June 12, 2015, the Appellee sold one of the parcels of real property. The proceeds from that sale were placed in the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. A ppellant Virgil Gordon II, acting on behalf of the Trust, sold the other propert y, known as the Auto Zone property, without the knowledge or approval of the Trustee on or around December 2, 2015, for an approximate sale price of $1,815,000.00, which the Trustee alleges re sulted in an approxi mate $900,000 profit to the Trust, Virgil Gordon II, and/or Mary Gordon from the transfer. Because this property wasNo. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 5

part of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the Trustee sought a nd obtained an Order from the bankruptcy court against the Debtor, Virgil Gor don, and the Trust for immediate turnover of all funds associated with the sale of this propert y pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550. The bankruptcy
court entered this orde r for turnover on March 25, 2016 (“Tur nover Order”). The Trustee sought and obtained, also on March 25, 2016, an order to show cause as to why Virgil Gordon should not be held in civil contempt of court for the sale of this property, as well as his failure to appear at the previous hearing on the motion for turnover (“Contempt Show Cause Order”).
A hearing was held on the Contempt S how Cause Order on April 11, 2016. Virgil Gordon appeared for that hearing. Counsel for the Trustee and counsel for the United States Trustee also appeared at this h earing. Virgil Gordon testified as to the sale of the subject real property, and Trustee’s counsel further questio ned Mr. Gordon about the hearing underlying the Summary Judgment Order. Due to Mr. Gordon’s inability to completely remember his presence and what happened at the May 26, 2015, hear ing on the summary judgment motion, the bankruptcy court directed the relevant portion of the audio recording from the May 26, 2015 hearing be played into the record. The ba nkruptcy court’s ruling resulting in the Summary Judgment Order was confirmed as was Mr. Gordon’s presence at that hearing to hear the ruling. As a result, the bankruptcy court ruled at the April 11, 2016 hearing as follows:
The Court finds, based on the previous testimony of Mr. Gordon, that he knew of the Court’s order requiring the property to be turned over, requiring the Auto Zone property to be turned over to the tr ustee, and therefore not sold by him or Mrs. Gordon, and that it appears, based on his taking the Fifth Amendment and not answering these questions, that $173,614.39 was not – was either taken at the time of the sale or give n by Ms. Gordon to Mr. Gordon or something of that nature. In any event, it appears that $173,614.39 wa s paid to or for the benefit of Mr. Gordon and that the Court finds him in contempt of court. We’ll award attorneys’ fees for failure to turn that over, and we’ll require him to turn that money over . . . . [by] April the 26 th to turn over the money. If not, we’ll send out a marshal – we’ll turn it over to the marshal for – to pick him up.
(Tr., Apr. 11, 2016 hearing, pp. 21-23). 2

2 Although the transcript of the April 11, 2016, hear ing was not formally designated by Appellee for the record on appeal, this transcript was docketed at ECF No. 310 in the bankrupt cy case of Mary A. Gordon, Case No.No. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 6

On April 19, 2016, the bankruptcy court ente red an order finding Virgil Gordon in contempt of court, directing turnover of funds in the amount of $173,614.39 from the sale of the subject property, and awarding sa nctions for the Trustee’s attorn ey’s fees in the amount of $26,602.50 (“Contempt Order”). Specifically, in the Contempt Order, the bankruptcy court
found:

IT IS HEREBY FOUND: A. Pursuant to Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7052, the Court hereby incorporates and adopts the findings and conclusions stated orally at the h earing on April 11, 2016. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014. B. Proceeds in the amount of $173,614.39 were taken by Virgil Gordon, II, or were paid to or for the benefit of Virgil Gordon, II. C. Virgil Gordon, II, was present at the May 26, 2015 hearing for Summary Judgment in the associated Adversary Proceeding, 3:13-ap-90351.
On appeal, Appellant Virgil Gordon’s first ar gument is that he did not receive “adequate legal notice” of the Summary J udgment Order. Next, Appellant argues the bankruptcy court erred in finding him in civil contempt and aw arding sanctions because of this alleged notice issue, and further because he ha d or has complied to the extent possible with turn over of all “monies held in escrow” for the Debtor. Appella nt asserts that attorn ey’s fees charged as
sanctions are excessive and that he does not ha ve the financial ability to comply with the Contempt Order. Appellant also vaguely asserts bi as as “a factor in how the Court has ruled on
several issues.”

DISCUSSION

The Panel determines that the first four issues Appellant raises in his Brief, I through IV, are dependent upon the underlying Su mmary Judgment Order. All four issues concern whether Appellant received adequa te notice of either the May 28, 20 15 Summary Judgment Order, or the two orders entered on March 25, 2016–the Turnov er Order and Contempt Show Cause Order.

3:12-bk-09605, and was attached to Appellee’s Brief on Ap peal as an exhibit. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8009(a)(4), this transcript is consider ed part of the record on ap peal without separate formal designation.No. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 7

First, if Appellant is at tempting to include the May 28, 2015 Summary Judgment Order as an issue on appeal, he is untimely. Federa l Rule of Bankruptcy Pr ocedure 8002(a) provides that a notice of appeal shall be filed with the cler k “within 14 days of the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from.” Congress has specifically adopted this time
limitation. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) (An appeal from the bankruptcy court to the bankruptcy appellate panel “shall be taken in the same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from district courts and in th e time provided by Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy Rules.”). This appeal was filed on May 3, 2016, almost a year after the Summary Judgment Order.
Second, to the extent Appellant raises a l ack of notice of the Summary Judgment Order for the first time on appeal, such is without merit. “It is well-settled th at this court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on app eal unless our failure to consider the issue will result in a plain miscarriage of justice.” Bailey v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Educ ., 106 F.3d 135, 143 (6th Cir. 1997). Appellant has not presented an argument that the Panel’s failure to consider this issue will result in a miscarriage of justice. As Appellee points out, A ppellant has not preserved this issue on appeal because it was not raised in any of the pleadings or at hearings before the bankruptcy court subsequent to the Summary Judgme nt Order, all of which ultimately resulted in the Contempt Order. Even if timeliness was not in issue, Appellant was served with the summary judgment motion per Appellee’s proof of service on May 15, 2015, and Appellant clearly had knowledge of the Court’s ruling underlying th e Summary Judgment Order because he was present at the Ma y 26, 2015 hearing.
As to what may be considered the remaini ng four issues on appeal, V through VIII, the Panel will address each separately.
Issue V–Appellant states that when he becam e aware of the Contempt Order, “all monies held in escrow for Mary A Gordon capital gain s taxes were immediately forwarded to the trustee.” This statement speaks to whether or not Appellant has complied in whole or in part with the Contempt Order, not whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion and committed clear error in entering the Contempt Order. T hus, the Panel finds no abuse of discretion on this issue raised by Appellant.No. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 8

Issue VI–Appellant challenges whether the attorney’s fees charged and ultimately awarded as sanctions in the Contempt Or der are excessive. The total of $26,602.50 for attorney’s fees were awarded by the bankruptcy court as sancti ons in the Contempt Order. Appellant argues these fees are excessive because attorneys in this case have already collected $105,000, and further pointing to his inability to now support himself and his mother, who is unable to support herself.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9020 states, “Rule 9014 governs a motion for an order of contempt made by the United States trust ee or a party in interest.” The power further
arises from 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a pa rty in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
The party seeking a contempt order “mus t establish three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the alleged contemnor ha d knowledge of the order which he is said to have violated; (2) the alleged cont emnor did in fact viol ate the order; and (3 ) the order violated must have been specific and definite.” Hunter v. Magack (In re Magack) , 247 B.R. 406, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (citing Glover v. Johnson , 138 F.3d 229, 244 (6 th Cir. 1998)); In re Temple , 228 B.R. 896, 897 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998)). Courts have emphasized that “[w]illfulness is not an element of civil contempt and intent to disobey the order is irrelevant.”
In re Walker , 257 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (citing Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Crowley, 74 F.3d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1996)).
The bankruptcy court awarded $26,602.50 in atto rney fees as sanctions finding this amount “established by the accompanying affidavit of Justin T. Campbell, counsel for the Chapter 7 Trustee.” The bankruptcy court awarde d these sanctions in the Contempt Order, in addition to requiring the $173,614.39 in es tate funds to be paid bac k, after finding that Appellant was present at the May 26, 2015 hearing on the summary judgment motion and that Appellant did indeed violate the ruling a nd directive given to Appellant by the bankruptcy court at thatNo. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 9

hearing, as later incorporated in the Summary Judgment Order. The bankruptcy court entered the Contempt Order after the Contempt Show Cause Order setting the April 11, 2016, hearing was duly served upon Appellant at two separate addresses by first class mail on March 27, 2016. Doc. No. 234, BK Case No. 3: 12-bk–09605. Thus, the Panel finds no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court’s finding that Appe llant was declared to be in ci vil contempt of its orders.

Next the Panel turns to the issue of sanctions , first noting that the bankruptcy court is accorded “wide discretion” in determining the amount of sanctions to impose. Runfola & Assocs., Inc. v. Spectrum Reporting II, Inc. , 88 F.3d 368, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1996). However,
“such discretion is not unfettered.” Nicole Energy Mktg., Inc. v. McClatchey (In re Nicole Energy Servs.), Inc. , 356 B.R. 786, 2007 WL 328608, at *3 (B .A.P. 6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2007) (table decision) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2133 (1991))

. Before addressing the amount, the Panel is not satisfied that th e Appellant received sufficient notice of the possibility sanctions could be im posed upon him at the April 11, 2016, hearing, as well as an opportunity to respond. The Marc h 25, 2016 Contempt Show Cause Order was duly served upon Appellant and direct ed his appearance, but did not warn of the possibility of monetary sanctions even if he did, in fact, appear for the April 11, 2016 hearing. The Contempt
Show Cause Order did state that if he failed to “comply,” with the directive of the order, i.e., appear for the show cause hearing, such could re sult in “sanctions for ci vil contempt and further action as the Court deems necessary and appropri ate to ensure compliance with its Orders.” Absent from this order is any mention of th e possible imposition of monetary sanctions if Appellant did appear for the show cause hear ing on April 11, 2016. Thus, the bankruptcy court
abused its discretion in awardi ng sanctions without proper notice pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9020 and 9014.

In addition to the lack of notice, the Pa nel finds that Appellant was not given an opportunity to respond to the amount of sanctions reques ted in the Affidavit of counsel for the Trustee. The imposition of sanctions does not nece ssarily require a separate hearing as to the amount of sanctions, “so long as the Appellants were provided a procedure for opposing the
reasonableness and calculation of the sanctio n based upon attorney fees incurred.” Nicole Energy Servs. , 2007 WL 328608, at *4. The Affidavit was not introduced as evidence at theNo. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 10

hearing so that Appellant could ex amine counsel as to the fees or otherwise raise i ssues as to the fees sought in the Affidavit. Rather, the Affi davit was submitted to the court by counsel for Appellee after the hearin g without Appellant having had the oppor tunity to contes t those fees in any manner. Nor was Appellant given an opportunity to contest the fees sought in the Affidavit
after the Affidavit was submitted to the court. As an alternativ e to introduction of the Affidavit at the hearing, the court could have establishe d a procedure through whic h Appellant could have raised any objection he had to the fees sought af ter the Affidavit was submitted to the court, such as allowing Appellant to file an objection setting forth any is sues he had with the fees sought. As the BAP stated in Nicole Energy:
Due process also requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court imposes sanctions. It is unclear , however, whether due process requires both a hearing to consider whether to im pose sanctions and a se parate hearing to consider the amount of the sanction. Th e Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has not directly addressed this issue. Jurisdicti ons that have addressed this issue have found that due process is satisfied when the trial court holds “a hearing on the motion for sanctions, at which both sides ar e [permitted] to present arguments as to the propriety and type of sanctions to be awarded.” Such courts have also found that a separate hearing to determin e the amount and scope of the sanction awarded is not necessary. The bankruptcy court afforded the Appellants the fundamental requirements of due process. The Appellants agree that they had notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court imposed sanctions. A second hearing to determine the amount of the sanction to be imposed was not necessary so long as the Appellants were provided a proced ure for opposing the reasonableness and calculation of the sanc tion based upon attorney fees incurred. The Appellants were provided this opportunity and, in fact, submitted an opposing affidavit in response to the Trus tee’s affidavit, both of which were considered by the bankruptcy court. It is significant that the opposing affidavit by Appellants’ counsel only challenged the total amount as being unreasonable but failed to specify any particular time entry or hourly rate that was inappropriate or unreasonable.
Nicole Energy Servs., 2007 WL 328608, at *4. In this cas e, the bankruptcy court did not provide Appellant with notice and opportunity to contest the amount of the fees sought. While those fees may have been previously approved by the court through Appe llee’s fee applications, Appellant still at a minimum had the right to dispute whet her all of those fees were appropriately awarded as sanctions for his contem ptuous conduct. In other words, were all of those fees incurred as a result of Appellant’s conduct for which he was found in contempt?No. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 11

Appellant had the right to examin e any such issues and was not pr ovided with that right due to the Affidavit having been submitted to the cour t after the hearing and without the court’s otherwise establishing a procedure for those fees to be contested.
Furthermore, The Affidavit submitted by the Trustee’s counsel, which was attached to the Contempt Order, did not itemize the 34.3 hours of time spent by attorney Phillip G. Young, Jr. and the 68.7 hours of time spent by attorney Jus tin T. Campbell. Rather, the Affidavit simply multiplied the total hours by the applicable hourly rates to total the $26,602.50 ultimately
awarded as sanctions. On rema nd, Appellee should be required to itemize the time entries in affidavit form, so as to give Appellant the opportunity to respond. This will allow the bankruptcy court on remand to make the required findings of reasonableness.
Issue VII–Appellant broadly and vaguely assert s “bias” as a possible “factor in how the
court has ruled on several issues .” Appellant has not argued, nor can the Panel find bias was raised before the bankruptcy court, and as such, it will not now be considered for the first time on appeal.
Issue VIII–Appellant argues that he is unable to comply with the Contempt Order due to his financial situation, which includes supporting his mother, Ma ry Gordon, as well as his two children on a salary of less than $50,000. Agai n, this issue does not address whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in entering the Contempt Order. Appellee is entitled to attorney fees as compensation as long as the A ppellant is provided notice of the reasonableness
of such fees. Reasonableness is limited in these circumstances to the normal applicable standards for bankruptcy courts re viewing fee applications and whether these fees were related to the contemptuous conduct. Cf. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Crowley , 74 F.3d 716, 722 (6th Cir. 1996); Nicole Energy , 2007 WL 328608, at *4. See also United States v. United Mine Workers of Am. , 330 U.S. 258, 303-04, 67 S. Ct . 677, 701 (1947) (civil contempt is coercive, but also compensates for losses sustained).

CONCLUSION Appellant Virgil Gordon did not timely a ppeal the Summary Judgment Order, when he had notice of the underlying motion, was present at the hearing, and had notice of the SummaryNo. 16-8014 In re Gordon Page 12

Judgment Order. Further, Appellant has not shown that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in entering the Contempt Order. The bankruptcy c ourt’s Contempt Order is affirmed on all but the portion of the Contempt Order that awarded attorney fees as sanctions. As to sanctions, the Panel finds that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in not according Appellant proper notice and allowing him the oppor tunity to respond, and remands this matter to the bankruptcy court for the limited purposes of providing appellant notice and an opportunity to respond as to whether the sanctions awarded were reasonable and related to Appellant’s contempt.