alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUGO ERNESTO HURTADO, Petitioner,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 12-71916 Agency No. A027-534-004

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted July 6, 2015 ** San Francisco, California Before: GRABER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and FRIEDMAN, *** District Judge. 

# FILED

JUL 14 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Paul L. Friedman, Di strict Judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.Page 2 of 3 1. Substantial evidence supports the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of Hugo Hurtado’s application for asylum. The BIA properly found that the government’s evidence rebutted, on an individualized basis, the specific grounds for Hurtado’s fear of future persecution on account of imputed political opinion. See Popova v. INS , 273 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir. 2001). The government submitted two country reports on El Salvador establishing that (1) the civil war ended in 1993, (2) the military has been restructured, and (3) the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front is now the majority political party. That evidence supports the BIA’s determ ination that fundamentally changed conditions rebutted the presumption of future persecution. See Singh v. Holder , 753 F.3d 826, 832–33 (9th Cir. 2014); Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft , 336 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Hurtado did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution from other sources—namely, criminal gangs. The BIA reasonably concluded that Hurtado’s testimony established only the “mere prevalence of violence” and not that he would be a particular target. 2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hurtado humanitarian asylum. See Belayneh v. INS , 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000). The BIA found that Hurtado is statutorily eligible for such relief due to the severity of his 1985Page 3 of 3 mistreatment, and took into account the severity of his past persecution. The BIA also considered relevant factors in Hurtado’s favor, including his significant family ties and his employment during his 25 years in the United States. See Gulla v. Gonzales , 498 F.3d 911, 916, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2007); Kazlauskas v. INS , 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1995). The BIA nonetheless concluded that Hurtado’s record of criminal convictions, stemming from his abuse of alcohol, and his lack of rehabilitation outweigh these favorable fact ors. That determination was not an abuse of discretion. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Spectrum Strategic L.P. and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                      97,808,328
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,083,540<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             109,444,028<F2>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               109,444,028<F3>
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            39,555,618<F4>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            11,426,548
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             28,129,070
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         28,129,070
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                28,129,070
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Receivables include subscription receivable of $1,743,958 and interest
receivable of $339,582.
<F2>In addition to cash and receivables, total assets include net
unrealized gain on open contracts of $9,563,813 and net option
premiums of $(11,653).
<F3>Liabilities include redemptions payable of $847,860, accrued
brokerage fees of $590,001 and accrued management fees of
$313,646.
<F4>Total revenue includes realized trading revenue of $32,274,037, net
change in unrealized of $4,264,478 and interest income of $3,017,103.
</FN>


</TABLE>
#### Mary A. West, Respondent, v Village of Mamaroneck, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Village of Mamaroneck appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, *828Westchester County (Wood, J.), entered November 17, 1989, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as it is asserted against the defendant Village of Mamaroneck, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.

In this negligence action, the plaintiff alleged that she sustained injuries when she tripped over a vine on a public sidewalk in the Village of Mamaroneck. The Village moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to plead and prove that prior written notice was received by the Village or that the Village engaged in some affirmative tortious conduct so as to exempt the plaintiff from the requirement that she establish prior notice *(see,*Village Law § 6-628). In support of its summary judgment motion the Village submitted the affidavit of its Town Clerk which indicated that it had no record of any written notice with respect to the claimed defect.

In order to defeat the motion, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to come forward with proof sufficient to create an issue of fact necessitating a trial. The plaintiffs conclusory allegation that the Village created the condition, made in the affirmation of its attorney who had no personal knowledge of the facts, was insufficient to defeat the Village’s motion. Accordingly, the Village’s motion is granted *(see, Goldston v Town of Babylon,*145 AD2d 534; *Englehardt v Town of Hempstead,*141 AD2d 601; *Zigman v Town of Hempstead,*120 AD2d 520; *Abbatecola v Town of Islip,*97 AD2d 780). Mangano, P. J., Brown, Sullivan, Harwood and Miller, JJ., concur.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Civil Rights Commission

# AGENCY:

United States Commission on Civil Rights.

# ACTION:

Notice of Commission public business meeting.

# DATES:

Friday, September 14, 2018, 10:00 a.m. EST.

# ADDRESSES:

Place: National Place Building, 1331 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 11th Floor, Suite 1150, Washington, DC 20245 (Entrance on F Street NW).

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Brian Walch, phone: (202) 376-8371; TTY: (202) 376-8116; email:                         *publicaffairs@usccr.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    This business meeting is open to the public. There will also be a call-in line for individuals who desire to listen to the presentations: 800-682-0995; Conference ID 4872955. The event will also live-stream at                     *https://www.youtube.com/​user/​USCCR/​videos.*                     (Please note that streaming information is subject to change.) Persons with disabilities who need accommodation should contact Pamela Dunston at (202) 376-8105 or at                     *signlanguage@usccr.gov*                     at least seven (7) business days before the scheduled date of the meeting.                

## Meeting Agenda

I. Approval of Agenda

II. Business Meeting

A. Presentation by Indiana Advisory Committee Chair on the Committee's recently released report, Voting Rights in Indiana

B. Presentation by Texas Advisory Committee Chair on the Committee's recently released report, Voting Rights in Texas

C. Presentation by Alabama Advisory Committee Chair on the Committee's recently released report, Access to Voting in Alabama

D. Discussion and Vote on Fiscal Year 2019 Program Planning

E. Discussion and Vote on Fiscal Year 2020 Program Planning for Statutory Enforcement Report

F. Management and Operations
    - Staff Director's Report

III. Adjourn Meeting

Dated: September 4, 2018.

David Mussatt,

Supervisory Chief, Regional Programs Unit.

[FR Doc. 2018-19455 Filed 9-4-18; 4:15 pm]

 BILLING CODE 6335-01-P
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 95-60751

Conference Calendar

 

DONNIE MCDONALD,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

RAYMOND ROBERTS, Superintendent,

Mississippi State Penitentiary;

STEVE W. PUCKETT; 

MICHAEL C. MOORE, Attorney General of

the State of Mississippi,

Respondents-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:95-CV-208-D-D

- - - - - - - - - -

August 20, 1996

Before KING, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The district court dismissed Donnie McDonald’s, #63622,

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 without prejudice for failure to

exhaust state habeas remedies. At no time has McDonald asserted

that he presented the issue of the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress to the Mississippi state courts. Exhaustion 
No. 95-60751

- 2 -

of all claims in state court prior to requesting federal

collateral relief is a fundamental prerequisite to federal habeas

relief under § 2254. Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451, 453 (5th

Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 715 (1996). 

AFFIRMED.
V

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4011

For the relief of Anil K. Sharma.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 10, 1994

Mr. ROSE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on the Judiciary

A BILL

For the relief of Anil K. Sharma.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. FOREIGN RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT WAIVER

4 FOR ANIL K. SHARMA.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Anil K. Sharma is deemed, for

6 purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, to be

7 eligible to apply for any benefit under such Act for which

8 he qualifies without need to obtain a waiver of the two9 year residence requirement of section 212(e) of such Act.

10 (b) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

11 FEES.—Subsection (a) shall apply only if Anil K. Sharma

12 applies for a visa or for a change or adjustment of status
2

•HR 4011 IH

1 and pays the appropriate fees within 2 years after the date

2 of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 4 (Friday, January 6, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 745]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-33857]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[DOD-2010-OS-0043; RIN 0790-AI62]

32 CFR Part 222

DoD Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Program; Correction

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On December 27, 2011 (76 FR 80744-80747), Department of 
Defense published a final rule titled DoD Mandatory Declassification 
Review (MDR) Program, which assigns responsibilities and provides 
procedures for members of the public to request a declassification 
review of information classified under the provisions of Executive 
Order 13526, or predecessor orders. This rule corrects a paragraph 
identification error in the regulations.

DATES: This correction is effective January 26, 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patricia Toppings, (571) 372-0485.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 27, 2011, Department of Defense 
published a final rule titled DoD Mandatory Declassification Review 
(MDR) Program. Subsequent to the publication of that final rule, 
Department of Defense discovered that paragraph Sec.  222.5(f) in the 
third column of page 80746 should have read Sec.  222.5(j).

Correction

    In the final rule (FR Doc. 2011-33104) published on December 27, 
2011 (76 FR 80744-80747), make the following correction:

Sec.  222.5  [Corrected]

    On page 80746, in Sec.  222.5, in the third column, in the first 
line of the third paragraph, ``(f) MDR Appeals.'' should read ``(j) MDR 
Appeals.''.

    Dated: December 30, 2011.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2011-33857 Filed 1-5-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
```
EXHIBIT 32.1  SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION  In connection with the quarterly report of First Titan Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q /A Amendment No. 1 for the period ended March 31, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Robert Federowicz, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  December 6, 2012By:/s/ Robert FederowiczRobert FederowiczPresident, Principal Executive Officer,
Principal Financial and Accounting officer  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00232-CR

ERIC MILLER APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Eric Miller entered an open plea of guilty to evading arrest or 

detention with a vehicle, and the trial court sentenced him to five years’ 

confinement. Miller’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to 

withdraw and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel avers that in his 

professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the 

requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 

U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). This court informed Miller that he may file a 

pro se brief, but he did not do so. The State did not submit a brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See 

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State,

904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may 

we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–

83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with 

counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in 

the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 

S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 

684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: April 11, 2013
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Nelson Cortez, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Corriero, J.), rendered June 21, 1988, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by virtue of an experiment conducted by a member of the jury during the course of its deliberations. After the conclusion of the trial, the prosecutor and trial counsel met with the jurors and discussed the verdict. It was disclosed that one of the jurors, in determining whether the defendant could have folded a knife while being pursued by the complainant and his brother, had folded a paper towel or a piece of cardboard to simulate a knife. Based on the standards set forth in *People v Brown*(48 NY2d 388) and *People v Legister*(75 NY2d 832), we conclude that the juror’s actions did not deny the defendant a fair trial. The complainant testified that the defendant placed a knife to his throat, snatched his chain, and ran away. One of the complainant’s companions, who had pursued the defendant, testified that he cut his finger on the defendant’s knife while restraining the defendant. The police officer who effected the arrest testified that she ordered the defendant to drop the knife. Therefore, the issue of whether the defendant possessed or folded a knife during the pursuit was neither "a critical point at issue in the trial” nor prejudicial to the defendant *(see, People v Legister, supra,*at 833). Further, we note that under these circumstances, the juror was merely using common everyday experience to clarify a non-critical point in the case *(see, People v Legister, supra).*

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Sullivan, J. P., Fiber, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.
# Death of Senator John Sidney McCain III

As a mark of respect for the memory and longstanding service of Senator John Sidney McCain III, I hereby order, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the flag of the United States shall be flown at half-staff at the White House and upon all public buildings and grounds, at all military posts and naval stations, and on all naval vessels of the Federal Government in the District of Columbia and throughout the United States and its Territories and possessions until sunset, on the day of interment. I also direct that the flag shall be flown at half-staff for the same period at all United States embassies, legations, consular offices, and other facilities abroad, including all military facilities and naval vessels and stations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-seventh day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand eighteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-third.

[FR Doc. 2018-19025

Billing code 3295-F8-P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-1321

JTH TAX, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Liberty Tax Service, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

JONATHAN FEIN, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. F. Bradford Stillman, 

Magistrate Judge. (2:08-cv-00021-FBS) 

Submitted: November 4, 2009 Decided: November 18, 2009 

Before KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Declan C. Leonard, Jeffrey L. Rhodes, Stephanie D. Wilson, ALBO 

& OBLON, L.L.P., Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. 

Christopher D. Davis, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

 Jonathan Fein appeals the magistrate judge’s* order 

entering judgment in JTH Tax, Incorporated’s favor on its claim 

for breach of a franchise agreement, as well as its request for 

a permanent injunction against Fein. We have reviewed the 

record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the 

magistrate judge’s judgment. See JTH Tax, Inc. v. Fein, No. 

2:08-cv-00021-FBS (E.D. Va. entered Jan. 27, 2009; amended by 

order entered Feb. 23, 2009). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

 *

 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the 

magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2006).
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with this Report on Form 10-Q for the three and six months ended March 31, 2013, or the Report, of PennantPark
Floating Rate Capital Ltd., or the Registrant, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Arthur H. Penn, Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  
|------------------
|/s/ Arthur H. Penn
|Arthur H. Penn    
|May 9, 2013