alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A) AUDITED
STATEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH (B) ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-KSB FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       3,338,458
<SECURITIES>                                    29,289
<RECEIVABLES>                                  315,016
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,800
<INVENTORY>                                    189,815
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,892,112
<PP&E>                                         461,135
<DEPRECIATION>                                 264,713
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,251,878
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          172,305
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  3,321,153
<COMMON>                                            98
<OTHER-SE>                                     371,671
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,251,878
<SALES>                                        967,408
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               967,408
<CGS>                                          809,437
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  809,437
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,182,856
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             146,331
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,144,363)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,144,363)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,144,363)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.30)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.30)
        

</TABLE>
#### C. M. ALEXANDER v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPT. OF HIGHWAYS, O. D. Creel, Con-Plex, Division of USI, Inc., John Doe, James Doe and XYZ Insurance Co.

No. 60432.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 28, 1977.

In re: Con-Plex, Division of U.S. Industries, Inc. and O. D. Creel applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Tangipahoa, 347 So.2d 1249.

Writ denied.
# STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

4. All references to September 1,2008 with respect to the submission ofFuture Compliance Reports are hereby replaced with September 1,2009. 3. Any references to May 31, 2007 and May 31, 2008 withrespect to calculation and retirementofnon-ozone season DERCs shall now include May 31, 2009 and May 31, 2010. 2. Any references to October 1st with respectto the date by which the Respondents shall estimate and acquire Discrete Emission Reduction Credits (DERCS) and/or allowances for the non-ozone season shall now include October 1,2009. Trading Agreement and Order 8120A Modification No.2 ) ) ) ) )

1. All references to May I, 2009 with respect to the authorization to use emissions reduction credit trading and/oremission reduction credits and NOx allowances to comply with the emissions limits ofSubsections 22a-174-22(d)(I) through 22a-174- 22(d)(2)(A) ofthe Regulations ofConnecticut State Agencies ("Regulations") are hereby replaced with May I, 20IO.

5. No later than May 1,2010, with respectto the emission units identified in Trading Agreement and Order 8120A and/or its subsequent modifications, the Respondent shall comply with the requirements ofSections 22a-174-22(d)(I) and 22a-174-22(d)(2)(A) of the Regulations. Whereas, the Commissioner ofEnvironmental Protection ("Commissioner") and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation ("Respondent") having agreed to the terms and conditions set forth in Trading Agreement and Order 8120A and all previous modification thereto, do now, by mutual agreement, further modify said modified Trading Agreement and Orderas follows: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation In the matter of The State ofConnecticut and

6. All other terms and conditions ofTrading Agreement and Order 8120A, as modified, shall remain in effect.

( Printed on Recycled Paper) 79 Elm Street • Hartford. CT 06106 - 5127 http://www.ct.gov/dep All Equal OpportuniTy EmployerTitle: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation 2 Trading Agreement and Order 8120A ModificationNo.2 The Respondent hereby consents to the entry ofthis modification to the Trading Agreement and Order without further notice. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Signature:**_~~~~~~~~~==:::~** 

# __ Name: ----,-f\II-'-'.i",-,et",-----,-M.....:.=ll u=(I{J--'-.r-=------

_ 

## \j 

# ice

# t1e~ -

# O?Rd~) Date:

__ 

### 1-(-'.'_20---,-(

# 'Z_IJ_Il-,~,----- _
Issued as a modification ofaTrading Agreement and Order. 

# .k
Gar 0 Director Engineering and EnforcementDivision Bureau ofAir Management

.- J
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4093 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4093

  To secure the voting rights of former felons who have been released 
                          from incarceration.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 18, 1994

 Mr. Conyers introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To secure the voting rights of former felons who have been released 
                          from incarceration.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Voting Rights of Former Offenders 
Act''.

SEC. 2. RIGHTS OF CITIZENS.

    The right of a citizen of the United States, who otherwise is 
qualified, to vote in any election for Federal office shall not be 
denied or abridged because he has committed a criminal offense unless 
such citizen is imprisoned in a correctional institution or facility at 
the time of such election.

SEC. 3. STATE REQUIREMENTS.

    Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the States from 
establishing requirements for the holding of State or local elective 
office; nor from enacting any State law which affords the right to vote 
in any election for Federal office on terms less restrictive than those 
established by this Act.

SEC. 4. FINES.

    Whoever shall intentionally deny or attempt to deny any person any 
right secured by this Act shall be fined not more than $500, or 
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

    For purposes of this Act--
            (1) the term ``correctional institution or facility'' means 
        any prison, penitentiary, jail, or other institution or 
        facility for the confinement of individuals convicted of 
        criminal offenses, except that such term does not include any 
        residential community treatment center (or similar public or 
        private facility);
            (2) the term ``election'' means (A) a general, special, 
        primary, or runoff election, (B) a convention or caucus of a 
        political party held to nominate a candidate, (C) a primary 
        election held for the selection of delegates to a national 
        nominating convention of a political party, or (D) a primary 
        election held for the expression of a preference for the 
        nomination of persons for election to the office of President; 
        and
            (3) the term ``Federal office'' means the office of 
        President or Vice President of the United States, or of Senator 
        or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, 
        the Congress of the United States.

                                 <all>
```
Filed 2/11/20



## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMES DAVID BECK and GERALD DEAN CRUZ,

Defendants and Appellants.

S029843

Alameda County Superior Court

110467

- A and 110467

- B

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND

DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING

THE COURT:

The opinion in this matter filed on December 2, 2019, and

appearing at 8 Cal.5th 584, is modified as follows:

In the paragraph spanning pages 644 and 645, in the sentence

beginning “We conclude there is no reasonable pr obability,” the phrase

“there is no reasonable probability Beck and Cruz were prejudiced by

any error” is replaced by the phrase “the instructional error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” As modified, the sentence now

reads:

We conclude the instructional error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

This modification does not change the judgment.

T he petition for rehearing is denied

.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 509 

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of National Forest System 

land to the city of Fruit Heights, Utah. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 7, 2013 

Mr. HATCH introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of National 

Forest System land to the city of Fruit Heights, Utah. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fruit Heights Land 

5 Conveyance Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 

8 (1) CITY.—The term ‘‘City’’ means the city of 

9 Fruit Heights, Utah. 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 509 IS

1 (2) MAP.—The term ‘‘map’’ means the map en2 titled ‘‘Proposed Fruit Heights City Conveyance’’ 

3 and dated September 13, 2012. 

4 (3) NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND.—The 

5 term ‘‘National Forest System land’’ means the ap6 proximately 100 acres of National Forest System 

7 land, as depicted on the map. 

8 (4) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

9 the Secretary of Agriculture. 

10 SEC. 3. CONVEYANCE OF CERTAIN LAND TO THE CITY OF 

11 FRUIT HEIGHTS, UTAH. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall convey to the 

13 City, without consideration, all right, title, and interest of 

14 the United States in and to the National Forest System 

15 land. 

16 (b) SURVEY.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—If determined by the Sec18 retary to be necessary, the exact acreage and legal 

19 description of the National Forest System land shall 

20 be determined by a survey approved by the Sec21 retary. 

22 (2) COSTS.—The City shall pay the reasonable 

23 survey and other administrative costs associated 

24 with a survey conducted under paragraph (1). 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 509 IS

1 (c) EASEMENT.—As a condition of the conveyance 

2 under subsection (a), the Secretary shall reserve an ease3 ment to the National Forest System land for the Bonne4 ville Shoreline Trail. 

5 (d) USE OF NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND.—As 

6 a condition of the conveyance under subsection (a), the 

7 City shall use the National Forest System land only for 

8 public purposes. 

9 (e) REVERSIONARY INTEREST.—In the quitclaim 

10 deed to the City for the National Forest System land, the 

11 Secretary shall provide that the National Forest System 

12 land shall revert to the Secretary, at the election of the 

13 Secretary, if the National Forest System land is used for 

14 other than a public purpose. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Charles JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-89-9.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 25, 1991.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing June 27, 1991.

Thomas E. Salisbury, Norman, for appellant.

Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen., Sandra D. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge:

CHARLES JACKSON, appellant, was tried by jury for the crime of Murder in the First Degree, in violation of 21 O.S.1981, § 701.7, in Case No. CRF-86-4021 in the District Court of Tulsa County. Appellant was represented by counsel. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and set punishment at life imprisonment. The trial court sentenced appellant accordingly. From this Judgment and Sentence, appellant appeals.

*701Insomuch as we find that this case must be REVERSED, we find a recitation of the facts to be unnecessary. Prior to trial, appellant filed a Motion to Produce Numerous Documents, including fingerprint reports. On October 15, 1987, appellant filed a Notice of Alibi. Thereafter, on October 21, 1987, counsel filed an Amended Notice of Alibi. Appellant asserts that on November 2, 1987, the morning of trial, the State provided trial counsel with the results of the fingerprint comparison. The State responds that defense counsel signed for and received a copy of the report on October 27, 1987, five days before trial. Nevertheless, based on those results, which linked appellant to a getaway car, defense counsel moved to withdraw the earlier notice and amended notice of alibi, which was granted by the trial court. Appellant’s defense at trial was that of self-defense.

Prior to cross-examination of the appellant, the State had the amended Notice of Alibi marked as a State’s exhibit. Over a strenuous objection by defense counsel, the trial court allowed the exhibit into evidence for impeachment purposes. Thereafter, the prosecutor proceeded to cross-examine appellant concerning the withdrawn notice of alibi defense. This was clearly error. In *Sterling v. State,*514 P.2d 401, 403 (Okl.Cr.1973), this Court specifically held that use of Notice of Alibi to impeach a defense witness was improper. Furthermore, by way of comparison, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure make it very clear that evidence of a withdrawn intention to rely upon an alibi defense or of statements made in connection therewith is inadmissible against the person who gave the notice in any civil or criminal proceeding. *See*Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.1(f).

We find that the inadmissible evidence concerning his withdrawn alibi was highly prejudicial. The evidence clearly affected his credibility as a witness. Furthermore, after a review of the record, we do not find the evidence of appellant’s guilt to be such that it would render this error harmless. *See*20 O.S.1981, § 3001.1. Insofar as appellant received the minimum sentence for the crime charged, we are left with no choice but to REVERSE and REMAND this case for a new trial.

LANE, P.J., and BRETT and PARKS, JJ., concur.

LUMPKIN, V.P.J., concurs in result.
#### Todd Kennedy, Appellant, v Waterville Central School District et al., Respondents.

Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court improperly granted defendant Oneida County Board of Cooperative Educational Services’ ("BOCES”) motion for summary judgment because, on the basis of the proof before the court, there are issues of fact with respect to whether BOCES breached its duty to plaintiff and, if it did, whether that breach was a proximate cause of his injury *(see, Merkley v PalmyraMacedon Cent. School Dist.,*130 AD2d 937; *Alferoff v Casagrande,*122 AD2d 183).

Plaintiff was injured while using a radial arm saw. At the time, plaintiff was involved in an occupational education program whereby he was receiving academic credit toward the completion of his conservation class at BOCES. Thus, he was in the custody and control of BOCES *(see,*Education Law *1020§ 1950 [4] [h] [3]; 8 NYCRR part 141), and BOCES had a duty to exercise toward him the same degree of care that a reasonably prudent parent would exercise under the same circumstances *(see, Lawes v Board of Educ.,*16 NY2d 302, 305; *Merkley v Palmyra-Macedon Cent. School Dist., supra,*at 938). In addition, BOCES expressly agreed by contract to oversee plaintiffs occupational education program. Despite having knowledge that plaintiff worked carelessly and lacked safety consciousness, BOCES agreed to allow plaintiff to work in a lumberyard, without first investigating whether plaintiff would be placed in a dangerous situation. Hence, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that BOCES was not negligent or that its negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.

However, Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint against defendant Waterville Central School District ("Water-ville”). At the time of his injury, plaintiff had passed from the custody and control of Waterville to the custody and control of BOCES *(see,*Education Law § 1950 [4] [h] [3]). There is no evidence on the record that Waterville was aware of the nature of plaintiffs employment, and there is no allegation that Waterville was negligent in allowing plaintiff to participate in the BOCES curriculum. In addition, Waterville undertook no special obligations with respect to plaintiffs occupational education opportunity. Thus, as a matter of law, Water-ville is not liable to plaintiff for his injuries *(see generally, Pratt v Robinson,*39 NY2d 554). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Shaheen, J.—Summary Judgment.) Present—Denman, J. P., Green, Balio, Lowery and Davis, JJ. *[See,*147 Misc 2d 66.]
#### LUDLUM ENTERPRISES, INC., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Ramada Inn of Fort Lauderdale, and Haskell M. Liberman, Appellants, v. DEEM INVESTMENT CORP., a Florida corporation, et al., Appellees.

No. 71-1043.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 29, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1972.

J. B. Booher, of Booher & McGrotty, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

Michael K. Davis, of Watson, Hubert & Davis, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

We have reviewed the briefs and record on appeal and heard oral argument. On the basis thereof, we are of the opinion that no reversible error has been demonstrated. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed. See Arison Shipping Company v. Klosters Rederi A/S, Fla.App.1971, 259 So.2d 784; Edenfield v. Crisp, Fla.App.1966, 186 So.2d 545, arid Insurance Management, Inc. v. McLeod, Fla.App.1966, 194 So.2d 16.

Affirmed.

*389MAGER, J., and WHITE, JOSEPH S., Associate Judge, concur.

WALDEN, J., dissents, with opinion.

WALDEN, Judge

(dissenting):

The appointment of a receiver in this case represented an abuse of discretion and was in nowise legally justified by the facts and circumstances of this case. Among other insufficiencies, there was no showing of fraud, mismanagement, insolvency, danger or peril to the property, or that the appellee would ultimately prevail. Further, there were other more reasonable avenues of assurance and protection available to the court.

I would reverse.
`Exhibit 31.2

                            Section 302 Certification
                            of Robert A. Comey (CFO)`

---

`CERTIFICATION


     I, Robert A. Comey, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of MACC Private Equities
Inc.;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a  material  fact or  omit to sate a  material  fact  necessary  to make  the
statements made, in light of the circumstances  under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

     3. Based on my knowledge,  the financial  statements,  and other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
condition,  results of  operations  and cash flows of the  registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;

     4. The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

          a) Designed such disclosure  controls and  procedures,  or caused such
     disclosure controls or procedures to be designed under our supervision,  to
     ensure that material information relating to the registrant,  including its
     consolidated  subsidiaries,  is made  known to us by  others  within  those
     entities,  particularly  during the  period in which  this  report is being
     prepared;

          b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
     and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
     controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
     based on such evaluation; and

          c) Presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
     the disclosure  controls and  procedures  based on our evaluation as of the
     Evaluation Date;

     6. The registrant's other certifying  officers and I have disclosed,  based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial  reporting,  to
the  registrant's  auditors  and the audit  committee of  registrant's  board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a) all  significant  deficiencies  in the design or  operation  of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the  registrant's  ability to record,  process,  summarize and report  financial
information; and

     b) any fraud,  whether or not material,  that involves  management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls.`

---

`Date: December 29, 2005


        /s/ Robert A. Comey
      ---------------------------
      Robert A. Comey
      Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer`
# Four **th Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas** 

February 20, 2020

No. 04

- 19

- 00844

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C.

From the 229th Judicial District Court, Duval County, Texas Trial Court No. DC

- 18

- 53 The Honorable Selina Nava Mireles, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal of an order terminating the appellant’s parental rights, which must be disposed of by this Court within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed. T EX

. R. J UD

. A DMIN

. 6.2. Appellant has filed a motion for extension of time to file his brief. Appellant’s motion is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief is due on February 28, 2020.

Given the time constraints governing the disposition of this appeal, further requests for extensions of time will be disfavored.

_________________________________ Liz a A. Rodriguez , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
court o n this 20th day of February, 2020

.

___________________________________ Michael A . Cruz
, Clerk of Court