Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-MI-2062 | February 27, 2017 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jon L. Orlosky

Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Phillip E. Stephenson

Michael T. Hotz

Spitzer Herriman Stephenson

Holderead Conner & Persinger, 

LLP

Marion, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

M Doed, LLC,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Wyeth S. Barrington, Pamela L. 

Barrington, City of Marion, Ed 

Blinn, Jr., Blinn Auto Sales, 

Credit Bureau Collection 

Services FDBA, Credit Bureau 

Collection Services FDBA, and 

Grant County Auditor, Roger 

Bainbridge,

Appellees-Respondents,

February 27, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

27A02-1609-MI-2062

Appeal from the Grant Superior 

Court

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

27D01-1509-MI-184
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-MI-2062 | February 27, 2017 Page 2 of 6

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] M Doed, LLC (“Doed”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its Motion to Declare 

Tax Sale Void Ab Initio. Doed presents a single dispositive issue for our review, 

namely, whether the trial court erred when it denied the motion. We do not 

reach the merits of Doed’s appeal, however, because it did not timely file its 

motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] On September 18, 2014, Grant County held its “annual tax sale,” and Doed 

purchased real estate located at 1015 West 50th Street in Marion. Appellee’s 

Br. at 4. The parcel included a house that, according to the “property card”1

issued by Grant County, had a “Finished Area” of 2161 square feet with three 

bedrooms, two bathrooms, and a fireplace. Petitioner’s Ex. 1. Prior to 

purchasing the property, Tom Terry, a member of Doed, “looked at the 

property sheet” and “did a drive by” to assess the house. Tr. at 10-11. Terry 

was not permitted to enter the house until after the tax deed was issued.

[3] On September 24, 2015, Doed filed a verified petition for an order directing the 

Auditor of Grant County to issue a tax deed. And on October 30, the trial 

 

1

 Doed uses the term “property card” to describe the document containing information the county used in 

assessing the property for real estate tax purposes.
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court granted that petition. On January 19, 2016, Doed filed a Motion to 

Allow for a Belated Redemption, which the trial court denied after a hearing.2

[4] Six months later, on July 14, 2016, Doed filed its motion to declare the tax sale 

void ab initio. In that motion, Doed alleged that the tax sale was “based on a 

tax assessment including improvement which the property was not subject to 

pay” and “is void ab initio.” Appellant’s App. at 7. At a hearing on that 

motion, Doed presented evidence that, contrary to the information contained 

on the property card, the house: was “two[-]thirds” unfinished; had only two 

bedrooms instead of three; had only one bathroom instead of two; and had no 

fireplace. Tr. at 13. Doed argued that these discrepancies between the property 

card and the condition of the house rendered the assessment for tax purposes 

incorrect. Thus, Doed asserted that it was entitled to have the tax sale declared 

void ab initio. The trial court denied Doed’s motion. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Doed contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to set aside 

the tax sale as void ab initio. An appeal from the issuance of a tax deed can be 

filed through either an independent action or a motion pursuant to Trial Rule 

60(B). BP Amoco Corp. v. Szymanski, 808 N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), 

 

2

 In that motion, Doed sought to set aside the tax sale because, it alleged, Grant County had not timely 

provided Doed with notice of “building violations.” Corrected Appellee’s App. at 2. Neither in that motion 

nor in the ensuing hearing did Doed mention that the condition of the house was not consistent with the 

information contained in the property card.
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trans. denied. Doed did not bring its motion under Trial Rule 60(B), but brought 

it as an independent action. Where a party who had the burden of proof at trial 

appeals, he appeals from a negative judgment and will prevail only if he 

establishes that the judgment is contrary to law. Helmuth v. Distance Learning 

Sys., Ind., Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). A judgment is 

contrary to law when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence lead to only one conclusion but the 

trial court reached a different conclusion. Id. Where, as here, the trial court 

entered a general judgment, the judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained 

upon any legal theory consistent with the evidence. Id. In making this 

determination, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of 

witnesses. Id. Rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the 

judgment together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.

[6] In this appeal, Doed maintains that 

[t]ax sale purchasers must be able to rely upon the official records 

of the county in which a tax sale is held when conducting due 

diligence research prior to a tax sale. If the information supplied 

by the county is significantly inaccurate, the tax sale purchaser 

should not be bound by the purchase. . . . In addition, when the 

inaccuracies contained in the official records affect the manner in 

which a property is assessed, it opens the door for a tax sale to be 

set aside under Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-16[,] as the 

property was not subject to the taxes for which it was sold.

Appellant’s Br. at 6. In sum, Doed contends that it is entitled to have the tax 

sale set aside both under “the doctrine of estoppel,” id., and under Indiana 
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Code Section 6-1.1-25-16(1) (2016), which provides that a person may move to 

set aside a tax sale if the “real property described in the deed was not subject to 

the taxes for which it was sold.”

[7] We do not reach the merits of this appeal because Doed did not timely file its

motion to set aside the tax sale. In Gupta v. Jay County Auditor, 910 N.E.2d 796 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009), Gupta, a tax sale purchaser, moved to set aside the tax 

sale because, he alleged, “the real property described in the deed was not subject 

to the taxes for which it was sold.” Id. at 801. In particular, Gupta alleged that 

the assessment was inaccurate because “[t]he building [wa]s sitting on many 

parcels [and a] portion of [the building was] owned by [a] different owner.” Id. 

at 798. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of that motion, holding as follows:

This court has held that both available remedies [to appeal the 

issuance of a tax deed], either a Trial Rule 60(B) motion or an 

independent action, are subject to the same sixty-day statutory 

time limit pursuant to Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-4.6(h). Edwards[ v. 

Neace], 898 N.E.2d [343,] 347-348 (relying upon BP Amoco Corp., 

808 N.E.2d at 690). Because Gupta’s motion was in effect, at 

least in part, a challenge under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-16 and such 

a motion is subject to the sixty-day time limit of Ind. Code § 6-

1.1-25-4.6, we conclude that the sixty-day time limit applies to 

Gupta’s motion. . . . Gupta did not file his motion to set aside 

and declare the tax sale void in the trial court until more than 

two years and eight months after the trial court entered an order 

directing the County Auditor to issue a tax deed relating to 

Gupta’s parcel. We conclude that the trial court properly denied 

Gupta’s motion to set aside the tax sale deed because the motion 

was not timely filed.

Id.
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[8] Here, in its motion to set aside the tax sale, Doed expressly relied on Indiana 

Code Section 6-1.1-25-16 and, therefore, under Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-

4.6(h), Doed was required to move the trial court to set the tax sale aside within 

sixty days of the trial court’s October 30, 2015, order to issue the tax deed. 

Doed did not file its motion until July 14, 2016, more than eight months after 

the trial court’s order. Thus, we hold that Doed’s motion to set aside the tax 

sale was untimely,

3 and the trial court did not err when it denied the motion.

[9] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.

 

3

 Citing Bank One Trust No. 386 v. Zem, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 873, 879 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, Doed 

maintains that, because the tax sale is “void ab initio, it ‘can be challenged at any time.’” Appellant’s App. at 

7. But Doed’s reliance on Zem is misplaced. In Zem, this court affirmed the trial court’s order declaring the 

tax sale void ab initio because the property was tax-exempt, and there were no taxes owing on the property. 

809 N.E.2d at 879. Here, Doed did not dispute that there were delinquent taxes but, rather, argued in 

essence only that the amount of taxes owing was incorrect given the allegedly inaccurate assessment. This 

court’s opinion in Gupta is dispositive.