No. 85-198 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-VSJERRY ELWIN TIBBITTS, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

John Keith, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Kimberly Kradolfer, Asst. Atty. General, Helena 

Patrick L. Paul, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Jan. 8, 1987 

Decided: March 10, 1987 

Filed: MAR 1 0 1987 

8 25k.4 *,- 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Appellant Jerry Tibbits was found guilty of deliberate 

homicide by bench trial in the District Court of the Eighth 

Judicial District, Cascade County. Mr. Tibbitts was then 

sentenced by the District Court to serve 100 years in the 

Montana State Prison. We affirm. 

The issues are: 

1. Did the District Court err when it found that Mr. 

Tibbitts acted knowingly in causing the death of the 

decedent? 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when 

sentencing Mr. Tibbitts? 

In July 1984, Mr. Tibbitts and several other men worked 

for three or four hours at a supply store and then purchased 

some beer and drank it behind a Great Falls grocery store. 

The decedent joined their group and got in a discussion with 

Mr. Tibbitts over some beer and cigarettes. An argument 

ensued and Mr. Tibbitts picked up a bottle and hit the decedent twice with the bottle. Mr. Tibbitts then kicked the 

decedent and attempted to light his hair while he was 

stretched out on the ground. Two eye witnesses testified to 

this assault. 

Three Great Falls police officers and an ambulance crew 

all arrived at the scene within seconds of each other and Mr. 

Tibbitts was read the Miranda warning. At least four law 

enforcement officers heard Mr. Tibbitts confess to the killing at the scene and at the hospital where he was taken for a 

blood-alcohol sample. One of the officers also testified 

that Mr. Tibbitts specifically stated that he knew what had 

happened and that he had hit the victim with a beer bottle. 

Mr. Tibbitts testified during the bench trial that the 

decedent began grabbing beer and cigarettes from him and that 
he became "enraged" and began hitting and kicking the decedent. Mr. Tibbitts testified that he had been previously 

diagnosed as schizophrenic and that he had previously committed himself to mental institutions. Mr. Tibbitts also testified that he did not act in self defense. 

The doctor who performed the autopsy testified that the 

decedent had bruises and lacerations, a broken nose, and a 

fractured sternum from a blow to the chest which almost 

separated the decedent's breast bone into two pieces. The 

doctor stated that the cause of death was a laceration to the 

left atrium which caused bleeding into the pericardium sac 

surrounding the heart. This laceration was caused by a blunt 

force blow to the chest, such as the one which fractured the 

decedent's sternum. 

A staff psychiatrist at Warm Springs State Hospital who 

examined Mr. Tibbitts testified that the defendant suffered 

from paranoid schizophrenia but that he did understand what 

was happening around him and was capable of assisting in his 

defense. The psychiatrist also testified that Mr. Tibbitts 

could become psychotic at times but that in his opinion the 

defendant's state of mind did fit within the "knowingly" 

definition of § 45-2-101 (33), MCA. 

The District Court concluded as a matter of law: 

2. That the State did prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt and to a moral certainty that the defendant 

committed the crime of Deliberate Homicide, a 

Felony, under MCA section 45-5-201, by knowingly 

causing the injuries which caused the death of Kent 

Blackburn. 

3. That the evidence of the defendant's mental 

disease or defect showed that he did have the 

particular state of mind, that being knowledge 

under MCA section 45-2-101(33), when the crime 

occurred. 

4. That the defendant's mental condition, while not 

rising to a defense of the crime charged and 
proved, can be considered at sentencing under MCA 

section 46-14-311 and section 46-14-312. 

As a result of the initial sentencing order, a question was 

raised regarding the defendant's ability to appreciate the 

criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the 

requirements of the law at the time of the offense. This 

Court remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to determine for purposes of sentencing the mental 

status of Mr. Tibbitts under S 46-14-311 and -312, MCA. The 

lower court then entered an order clarifying the sentencing 

order which stated: 

The Court now clarifies the Sentencing Order by 

stating that, pursuant to Section 46-14-311 MCA, 

the defendant, at the time of the commission of the 

offense of which he was convicted (Deliberate 

Homicide, a felony), was suffering from a mental 

disease or defect, namely paranoid schizophrenia, 

but that said mental disease or defect did not 

render him unable to appreciate the criminality of 

his conduct or render him unable to conform his 

conduct to the requirements of law. 

The District Court sentenced Mr. Tibbitts to 100 years in the 

Montana State Prison. 

I 

Did the District Court err when it found that Mr. 

Tibbitts acted knowingly in causing the death of the 

decedent? 

The standard of review is that set forth in Jackson v. 

Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 

L.Ed.2d 560, 573: 

[W] hether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Emphasis in original.) 
This standard was adopted by Montana in State v. Rodriguez 

(Mont. 1981), 628 P.2d 280, 283, 38 St.Rep. 578F, 5781. 

Using this standard, we consider Mr. Tibbitts' specific 

contentions. 

First, Mr. Tibbitts maintains that the evidence does not 

support the District Court's determination that he acted 

knowingly in causing the death of the decedent. The deliberate homicide statute, 5 45-5-102, MCA, provides that Mr. 

Tibbitts must have acted knowingly or purposely to be convicted of deliberate homicide. The District Court found that 

Mr. Tibbitts had acted knowingly when he caused the death of 

the decedent. The "knowingly" definition found at 

5 45-2-101 (33) provides: 

[A] person acts knowingly with respect to conduct 

or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of his conduct or 

that the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct described by a statute defining an offense when he is 

aware that it is highly probable that such result 

will be caused by his conduct. When knowledge of 

the existence of a particular fact is an element of 

an offense, such knowl-edge is established if a 

person is aware of a high probability of its existence. Equivalent terms such as "knowing" or "with 

knowledge" have the same meaning. 

Mr. Tibbitts argues that he was unable to form the 

requisite criminal state of mind because he suffered from the 

mental disease of paranoid schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state at the time of the offense. Finally, Mr. 

Tibbitts maintains that the District Court's sentencing order 

was deficient. This last argument was specifically addressed 

by this Court when we remanded with instructions to the 

District Court to clarify its sentencing order. The District 

Court then wrote a clarification order. As a result, we find 

no basis for this argument. 
The District Court concluded that Mr. Tibbitts met the 

knowingly requirement of 5 45-2-101(33), MCA, that he was 

able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, and that 

his mental disease or defect did not negate this ability to 

appreciate the criminality of his conduct. The psychiatrist 

from Warm Springs State Hospital testified Mr. Tibbitts 

understood what was happening around him, was capable of 

assisting in his defense, and that in his opinion Mr. 

Tibbitts knew that it was highly probable that he would 

become involved in violent actions if he drank. Finally, the 

psychiatrist testified that in his opinion Mr. Tibbitts' 

state of mind did fit within the "knowingly" definition of 

5 45-2-101(33), MCA, when he committed the homicide. In 

addition, several law enforcement officers who were at the 

scene of the homicide right after it occurred testified that 

Mr. Tibbitts confessed to the crime. One officer specifically testified Mr. Tibbitts stated he knew what he had done. 

The District Court had all the evidence and testimony before 

it when making the determination that Mr. Tibbitts acted 

knowingly when he caused the decedent's death. Using the 

Jackson test, we find that "any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of [deliberate homicide] 

beyond a reasonable doubt." We therefore affirm the District 

Court on this issue. 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when sentencing Mr. Tibbitts? 

Mr. Tibbitts argues that the District Court abused its 

discretion when imposing his sentence by failing to properly 

consider the mental disease or defect at the time of the 

offense. Relying on 5 46-14-312(2), MCA, and State v. Korell 

(Mont. 1984), 690 P.2d 992, 41 St.Rep. 2141, the defendant 

maintains that he should be placed in Warm Springs State 
Hospital due to his mental defect. Although the District 

Court found that Mr. Tibbitts was suffering from a mental 

disease or defect at the time of the commission of the offense, it also found that the mental disease or defect "did 

not render him unable to appreciate the criminality of his 

conduct or render him unable to conform his conduct to the 

requirements of the law." As this Court stated in State v. 

Doney (Mont. 1981), 636 P.2d 1377, 1385, 38 St.Rep. 1707, 

Before such commitment (to Warm Springs) will be 

ordered, defendant must prove to the satisfaction 

of the sentencing court that "at the time of the 

commission of the offense of which he was convicted 

he was suffering from a mental disease or defect 

which rendered him unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 

the requirements of law. l1 Sections 46-14-311 and 

46-14-312, MCA. The sentencing judge is not limited to a consideration of evidence presented at the 

trial. A determination of the existence of mental 

disease or defect under these sections rests within 

the discretion of the sentencing judge. 

A defendant can be sentenced to imprisonment if the 

sentencing judge finds that the defendant was able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct 

to the requirements of the law. See Korell, 690 P.2d at 996. 

Mr. Tibbitts argues that the District Court failed to consider his psychotic mental state at the time of the commission 

of the offense and thus his prison sentence should be vacated 

with instructions for him to be placed at Warm Springs. 

We affirm the District Court's conclusion that Mr. 

Tibbitts was able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at 

the time of the commission of the offense in accordance with 

Doney and Korell. A police officer testified that Mr. 

Tibbitts seemed to understand what was going on around him 
following the incident. Mr. Tibbitts also testified in a 

calm and understanding manner of the events leading up to the 

attack and the examining psychiatrist testified that he 

believed Mr. Tibbitts fit within the "knowingly" definition 

of 45-2-101(33), MCA, when he committed the homicide. 

Accordingly the requirements of 55 46-14-311 and -312, MCA, 

have been met. 

We affirm the District Court. 

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