J-A07002-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SHAYMOND CAMPBELL,

Appellant No. 126 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 24, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0016091-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 9, 2015

Appellant, Shaymond Campbell, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of two and a half (21⁄2) to five (5) years’ incarceration, followed by 

five (5) years’ probation, imposed after he was convicted of person not to 

possess a firearm, terroristic threats, criminal mischief, and disorderly 

conduct. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

convictions. We affirm. 

The facts which led to Appellant’s convictions are set forth by the trial 

court in the following portion of its Rule 1925(a) opinion:

[Appellant’s] charges stem from an incident at the home of his 

former girlfriend, Alexis Kaduck, in the early morning hours 

between November 5 and November 6, 2012. Appellant had 

been staying in the home, at 342 Plum Street in Carnegie, with 

Alexis, her mother, Carrie Kaduck, and Alexis’ 16 year old 

brother. On the night at issue, [Appellant] and Alexis had been 

arguing in [Alexis’] room about a text that [Alexis] had received 

from another man. Alexis’ mother, Ms. Kaduck, entered the 
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room and told the couple to stop arguing because her son was 

sleeping. At that time, [Appellant] was holding Alexis[’] iPhone. 

[Appellant] threw the phone against the wall, leaving a hole in 

the wall and breaking the phone in half.

After this occurred, Ms. Kaduck demanded that [Appellant] 

leave her home. [Appellant] grabbed a bag and headed down 

the stairs to the first floor and, ultimately, out the front door. 

Alexis followed [Appellant] outside. Ms. Kaduck stood on the 

front porch with Alexis as Alexis asked [Appellant] to return her 

phone. [Appellant] threw the phone onto the ground and 

smashed it with his foot. Ms. Kaduck grabbed her daughter’s 

arm and told her to get in the house. She closed the front door 

as soon as both she and her daughter were in the home. 

Seconds later, Ms. Kaduck heard four (4) or five (5) loud noises, 

which she identified as gun shots. Upon hearing the shots, she 

directed her daughter, Alexis, and her son, who had woken up, 

to immediately go upstairs to her bedroom. 

Ms. Kaduck called 911 as her children ran up the stairs. 

While she was on the phone with a 911 operator and heading 

upstairs, she heard another loud noise and went down the stairs 

to see what was occurring. She saw [Appellant] trying to break 

down the back door to enter the house, and she ran back up the 

stairs and went into her bedroom with her children. [Appellant] 

broke through the back door, and, as [Appellant] ascended the 

stairs, Ms. Kaduck opened the door slightly to show him that she 

was on the phone with 911. He looked at her and said, “Okay, 

snitch, I have something for you.” [Appellant] then went down 

the stairs and out the front door. Moments later, Ms. Kaduck 

and Alexis heard a loud crash, which occurred when [Appellant] 

threw a flower pot through the back windshield of Ms. Kaduck’s 

car. 

A neighbor had also heard two (2) sets of noise[s] from 

the Kaduck’s house. The first noises that she heard she initially 

thought were firecrackers. However, after learning that Ms. 

Kaduck’s vehicle was struck by bullets, she acknowledged that 

the sounds were consistent with a gun being discharged. The 

second set of noises that she heard consisted of a bang followed 

by what sounded like someone hitting a door. The witness, 

Jenaya Mebane, went downstairs and looked out her window to 

identify the noise. At that point, she saw [Appellant] run down 

the front porch steps and throw something into Ms. Kaduck’s 

vehicle.
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Ms. Kaduck and Alexis came outside of the home after the 

police arrived and saw that Ms. Kaduck’s car had been shot 

seven (7) to nine (9) times. The bullets struck the engine, the 

dashboard and the seats, as well as smashed all of the windows. 

The vehicle was a total loss. They also saw that a flower pot had 

been thrown through the rear window of the vehicle. 

Additionally, the back doors to the Kaduck residence were 

broken down.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 7/22/14, at 2-4 (citations to the record omitted). 

Based on the aforementioned evidence presented at a non-jury trial on 

October 24, 2013, Appellant was found guilty of person not to possess a 

firearm, terroristic threats, criminal mischief, and disorderly conduct and was 

sentenced by the court to four (4) to eight (8) years’ incarceration, to be 

followed by four (4) years’ probation. Appellant was further ordered to pay 

$7,188 in restitution. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to modify 

sentence, which the court granted, in part, on December 19, 2013, reducing 

his sentence to two and a half (21⁄2) to five (5) years’ incarceration, to be 

followed by five (5) years’ probation. 

Following the modification of his sentence, Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal, as well as a timely concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant presents the 

following sole issue for our review: “Are the guilty verdicts for the crimes of 

[p]ossession of a [f]irearm and [t]erroristic [t]hreats supported by sufficient

evidence?” Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

The standard we apply in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence is well-established:
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As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims 

requires that we evaluate the record “in the light most favorable 

to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). 

“Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when 

it establishes each material element of the crime charged and 

the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Commonwealth v. Brewer, 876 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). Nevertheless, “the Commonwealth need not 

establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.” Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 

2000) (“[T]he facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with the 

defendant’s innocence”). Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt 

is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. See

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 

2001).

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. See Brewer, 876 A.2d at 1032. 

Accordingly, “[t]he fact that the evidence establishing a 

defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not 

preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the 

presumption of innocence.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1038-39 (Pa. Super. 2002)). 

Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the 

fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates 

the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a 

reasonable doubt, the appellant’s conviction will be upheld. See 

Brewer, 876 A.2d at 1032. 

Commonwealth v. Pettyjohn, 64 A.3d 1072, 1074-75 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Pedota, 64 A.3d 634, 635-636 (Pa. Super. 

2013)).

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

conviction of person not to possess a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). 
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“In order to obtain a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, the 

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

possessed a firearm and that he was convicted of an enumerated offense 

that prohibits him from possessing, using, controlling, or transferring a 

firearm.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. Super. 

2009). Appellant does not dispute that he was convicted of an enumerated 

offense that prohibits him from possessing a firearm. Appellant’s Brief, at 

13. Instead, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm. Id. Appellant 

references the events that took place after the police arrived at the scene, 

as well as during his apprehension. Appellant’s Brief, 16-20. The relevant 

facts are summarized by the trial court as follows:

Carnegie police officers arrived within minutes of the 911 

call and noted the damage done to the back door. 

Approximately seven (7) minutes after the first officers were 

dispatched to the scene, Scott Township Sergeant Stephen Fury 

apprehended [Appellant] at the corner of Ridge Avenue and Hays 

Street, several blocks away from the Kaducks’ home on Plum 

Avenue. [Appellant] was arrested and patted down, but no gun 

was recovered from him. Officer Timothy Clark of the Carnegie 

Police Department transported [Appellant] to the Allegheny 

County Jail and testified credibly that [Appellant], without 

questioning or prompting, asked the officer “Did you find the 

gun?”[] 

A K-9 officer was brought in to search the area. Although 

the canine did find a portion of Ms. Kaduck’s cell phone in an 

area behind the home, the dog did not locate [Appellant’s] 

weapon. However, the officer handler for the K-9 explained that 

the dog does not track down physical items unless instructed to 

do so. In the back yard, the dog was instructed to find an 

object. However, when the dog was taken to the front of the 
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home, it was commanded to track [Appellant’s] human scent, 

which led him to follow [Appellant’s] path. Several months later, 

the Allegheny County Medical Examiner’s Office found that shell 

casings recovered from the scene on Plum Avenue matched a 

9mm Glock pistol that was involved in a matter not relating to 

[Appellant]. 

TCO, at 4-5. (citations to the record omitted).

Specifically, Appellant avers that the evidence fails to provide any link

whatsoever between himself and the firearm that shot Ms. Kaduck’s car. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 19. The essence of Appellant’s argument is that no 

witnesses saw him with a firearm or saw him shoot a firearm on the night in 

question, nor was he found in possession of a firearm. Appellant, therefore, 

suggests that his conviction is based on pure speculation. Id. at 11. 

In support of his sufficiency claim, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. 

Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004 (Pa. Super. 2001), where the defendants raised 

an insufficiency claim regarding their possession of firearms convictions, 

based on the fact that the victim never saw a firearm and no firearm was 

recovered by the police. Appellant’s Brief, at 27-29. However, similar to the 

case at bar, the court in Galindes found the defendants’ insufficiency claims 

without merit. Galindes, 786 A.2d at 1011. 

In Galindes, the victim heard banging coming from the rear of his 

home and observed the defendants kicking in the back door. The victim 

yelled “freeze” and “[i]mmediately thereafter he heard a gunshot and saw a 

flash.” Id. at 1008. The court concluded “[a]lthough [the victim] did not 

see the gun, possession of the firearm undoubtedly manifested itself in the 
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process of the crime from both the gunshot sounds and accompanying 

flashes.” Id. at 1011. 

Appellant attempts to distinguish the case at bar, noting that in 

Galindes, “[e]ven though the gun was not seen by the victim, there was no 

question that the defendant was in the same location as both the shot that 

the victim heard and the accompanying flash from the weapon. There was a 

visible effect on the victim. That did not occur in the case at bar.” 

Appellant’s Brief, at 28-29 (emphasis omitted). We disagree with 

Appellants’ distinguishment. The timeline of events in the instant case, 

combined with the sound of gunshots and bullet holes found in Ms. Kaduck’s 

car, support the inference of Appellant’s possession of a firearm. Appellant’s 

statement, “[d]id you find the gun?” to Officer Clark while being transported 

to the jail further suggests that Appellant had knowledge of the firearm used 

at the scene of the incident. 

Moreover, the Commonwealth presented evidence which established 

that Appellant had constructive possession of a firearm. “Constructive 

possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that possession of the 

contraband was more likely than not . . . [C]onstructive possession may be 

established by the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. 

Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 779 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2001)). In reviewing the 

totality of the circumstances in the case at bar, the trial court stated that it:
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did not... have any doubt that [Appellant] was in possession of a 

gun that night and that he fired it at and into Ms. Kaduck’s car. 

The only person on the street in the area of the Kaduck’s vehicle 

within seconds of Ms. Kaduck and Alexis returning inside the 

home was [Appellant]. There was no evidence presented of 

another person or vehicle passing by the home in the mere 

seconds between Ms. Kaduck closing the door and the sound of 

gunshots. [Appellant] was angry at both Kaducks, and was 

standing right next to the vehicle immediately before it was 

destroyed by gunfire. This is not a situation where the court 

speculated or guessed at what occurred. It is simply the 

application of strong and compelling circumstantial evidence 

which compels the guilty verdict. 

TCO, at 8-9. 

Based on our review of the facts in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude there was sufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Appellant was in possession 

of a firearm. Therefore, we uphold Appellant’s conviction of person not to 

possess a firearm. 

Next, we address Appellant’s sufficiency claim regarding his conviction 

of terroristic threats under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1), which provides, “[a] 

person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates, 

either directly or indirectly, a threat to . . . commit any crime of violence 

with intent to terrorize another.” Accordingly, in order to sustain a 

terroristic threat conviction, the Commonwealth must prove that Appellant 

“threaten[ed] to commit a crime of violence and that he communicate[d] the 

threat with the intent to terrorize or with reckless disregard for the risk of 

causing terror.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d 123, 128 (Pa. Super. 
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1995) (citing Commonwealth v. Campbell, 625 A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. 

1993); Commonwealth v. Cancilla, 649 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. 1994)).

Neither the ability to carry out the threat, nor a belief by the 

person threatened that the threat will be carried out, is an 

element of the offense. Rather, the harm sought to be 

prevented by the statute is the psychological distress that 

follows from an invasion of another’s sense of personal security. 

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 730 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Herein, the basis of the terroristic threats conviction is Appellant’s 

statement, “Okay, snitch, I have something for you.” TCO, at 3. Appellant 

avers that the words “I have something for you,” do not reference a crime of 

violence. Appellant’s Brief, at 31. However, “[e]ven a single verbal threat 

might be made... as to support the inference that the actor intended to 

terrorize....” Campbell, 625 A.2d at 522 (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Ashford, 407 A.2d 1328, 1329 (Pa. Super. 1979)). “[I]t is unnecessary for 

[the defendant] to specifically articulate the crime of violence which he or 

she intends to commit where the type of crime may be inferred from the 

nature of the statement and the context and circumstances surrounding the 

utterance of the statement.” Campbell, 624 A.2d at 522 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 582 A.2d 1352 (Pa. Super. 1990)). 

Examining the context in which Appellant’s words were spoken, Ms. 

Kaduck would reasonably have believed that Appellant was threatening her 

with a violent act. She had just heard what she believed to be gunshots. 

Moments later, Appellant broke into her house by kicking down the back 
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door and was coming up the stairs towards her. It would be reasonable for 

Ms. Kaduck to assume that her safety was being threatened in these 

circumstances. Additionally, the Commonwealth submits that the use of the 

word “snitch” by Appellant constitutes an explicit threat of retaliation against 

her. We agree.

Appellant further avers that his action of throwing a flower pot through 

the rear window of Ms. Kaduck’s car following his statement to Ms. Kaduck 

does not constitute a crime of violence. Id. Here, Appellant mistakenly 

relies on his actions following the threat, rather than the words that were 

spoken and the psychological distress caused to Ms. Kaduck in the moment. 

Appellant’s actions following the verbal threat do not alter the perceived 

threat to Ms. Kaduck’s personal safety at the time the words were spoken. 

In the alternative, Appellant avers that the statement he uttered to 

Ms. Kaduck was made during a “heated exchange” and that the offense of 

terroristic threats is not intended to criminalize mere “spur of the moment” 

utterances made during a “heated exchange”. Appellant’s Brief, at 33-34. 

(citations omitted). While Appellant was admittedly angry,1“being angry 

does not render a person incapable of forming the intent to terrorize. 

Rather, ... this Court must consider the totality of circumstances to 

____________________________________________

1

“[Appellant] was extremely angry and emotionally compromised by the 

text message that he found from another man to his girlfriend. He ‘flew off 

the handle’....” Appellant’s Brief, at 34.
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determine whether the threat was a result of a heated verbal exchange or 

confrontation.” In re J.H., 797 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Based on the circumstances surrounding the incident in question, we 

conclude that Appellant’s words were not merely made during a heated 

exchange. Ms. Kaduck had retreated back into her house and closed the 

door. Appellant escalated the incident on his own when he then proceeded 

to break down the back door of Ms. Kaduck’s house and climbed the stairs 

towards the bedroom where Ms. Kaduck was hiding with her two children. 

Ms. Kaduck did not say anything to Appellant. Rather, she merely opened 

the bedroom door so that Appellant could hear that she was on the phone 

with 911. Appellant’s statement appears to have been made deliberately 

with the intent to threaten retaliation against Ms. Kaduck. We, therefore, 

conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction of 

terroristic threats.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/9/2015
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served, to be followed by four (4) years of probation. Further, the Defendant was 

ordered to pay $7, 188 in restitution. Following argument on, and consideration of, the 

Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence, this court granted the Defendant's motion on 

December 19, 2013, reducing his period of incarceration to two and a half (2 1/2) to five 

charges following a non-jury trial. Immediately following the guilty verdict, this court 

sentenced the Defendant to four (4) to eight (8) years incarceration, with credit for timeThreats (18 Pa. C.S.A.' §2706), Criminal Mischief (18 Pa. C.S.A. §3304), and Disorderly 

Conduct (18 Pa. C.S.A. §5503). On October 24, 2013, this court found him guilty of all 

charged with. Person not to Possess a Firearm (18 Pa. C.S.A. §6105), Terroristic 

modification of the Defendant's sentence on December 19, 2013. The Defendant was 

This is a direct appeal following a non-jury trial on October 24, 2013 and the 

OPINION 

Defendant. 

SHAYMOND CAMPBELL, 

CC: 2012-16091 

vs. 

COMMONWEAL TH OF CRIMINAL DIVISION 

PENNSYLVANIA,· 

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

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2 

phone in half. (T.A. 10/24/13, pp. 13, 29). · 

from another man. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 12, 13). Alexis' mother, Ms. Kaduck, entered the 

room and told the couple to stop arguing because her son was sleeping. (T.R. 

10/24/13, pp. 28·29). At that time, the Defendant was holding Alexis's iPhone. The 

Defendant threw the phone against the wall, leaving a hole in the wall and breaking the 

Alexis' 16 year old brother. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 11, 28). On the night at issue, the 

Defendant and Alexis had been arguing in her room about a text that she had received 

home, at 342 Plum Street in Carnegie, with Alexis, her mother, Carrie Kaduck, and 

.· I 

November 6, 2012. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 11). The Defendant had been staying in the 

girlfriend, Alexis Kaduck, in the early morning hours between November 5 and 

· The Defendant's charges stem from an incident at the home of his former 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 

i ., 

After this occurred, Ms. Kaduck demanded that the Defendant leave her home. 

The Defendant grabbed a bag and headed down the stairs to the first floor and, 

ultimately, out the front door. (T.A. 10/24/13, pp. _13, 29). Alexis followed the Defendant 

outside. Ms. Kaduck stood on the front porch with Alexis as Alexis asked the Defendant 

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

him of Person not to Possess a Firearm and Terroristic Threats and that this court's 

probation. Restitution was again ordered to be paid in the amount of $7, 188. 

(5) years incarceration, with credit for time-served, to be followed by five (5) years 

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• i! 

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windshield of Ms. Kaduck's car. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 17, 32). 

phone with a 911 operator and heading upstairs, she heard another loud noise and 

went down the stairs to see what was occurring. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 31 ). She saw the 

Defendant trying to break down the back door to enter the house, and she ran back up 

the stairs and went into her bedroom with her children. (T.A. 10/24/13, p. 31). The 

Defendant broke through the back door, and, as the D_efendant ascended the stairs, Ms. 

Kaduck opened the door slightly to show him that she was on the phone with 911. (T.R. 

10/24/13, p. 31). He looked at her and said, "Okay, snitch, I have something for you." 

(T.A. 10/24/13, pp. 25, 31). The Defendant then went down the stairs and out the front 

door. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 17, 32). Moments later, Ms. Kaduck and Alexis heard a loud 

crash, which occurred when the Defendant threw a flower pot through the back 

bedroom. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 31). 

daughter, Alexis, and her son, who had woken . up, to immediately go upstairs to her 

as soon as both she and her daughter were in the home. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 14, 30). 

Seconds later, Ms. Kaduck heard four (4) or five (5) loud noises; which she identified as 

gun shots. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 31, 34-35). Upon hearing the shots, she directed her 

Ms. Kaduck called 911 as her children ran up the stairs. While she was on the 

grabbed her daughter's arm and told her to get in the house. She closed the front door 

to return her phone. (T.A. 10/24/13, pp. 14, 29). The Defendant threw the phone onto 

the ground and smashed it with his foot. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 14, 29). Ms. Kaduck 

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Stephen Fury apprehended the Defendant at the corner of Ridge Avenue and Hays 

Street, several blocks away from the Kaducks' home on Plum Avenue. (T.A. 10/24/13, 

minutes after the first officers were dispatched to the scene, Scott Township Sergeant 

damage done to the back door. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 65, 67). Approximately seven (7) 

Carnegie police officers arrived within minutes of the 911 call and noted the 

(T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 19, 33). Additionally, the back doors to the Kaduck residence were 

broken down. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 34). 

also saw that a flower pot had been thrown through the rear window of the vehicle. 

saw that Ms. Kaduck's car had been shot seven (7) to nine (9) times .. (T. A. 10/24/13, 

pp. 18, 32·33). The bullets struck the engine, the dashboard and the seats, as well as 

smashed all of the windows. The vehicle was a total loss. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 33). They 

Ms. Kaduck and Alexis came outside of the home after the police arrived and 

noise. (T.A. 10/24/13, p. 60). At that point, she saw the Defendant run down the front 

porch steps and throw something into Ms. Kaduck's vehicle. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 60). 

A neighbor had also heard two (2) sets of noise from the Kaduck's house. The 

first noises that she heard she initially thought were firecrackers. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 59). 

However, after learning that Ms. Kaduck's vehicle was struck by bullets, she 

acknowledged that the sounds were consistent with a gun being discharged. (T.R. 

10/24/13, pp. 62·63). The second set of noises that she heard consisted of a bang 

followed by what sounded like someone hitting a door. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 60). The · 

witness, Janaya Mebane, went downstairs and looked out her window to identify the 

§#-#ii§;;& t ! 

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On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to find him 

guilty of both Person Not to Possess and Terroristic Threats and that this court's verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence. For the following reasons set forth below, this 

court's verdict was supported by evidence which proved the Defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt for both offenses. 

A K-9 officer was brought in to search the area. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 69}. Although 

the canine did find a portion of Ms. Kaduck's cell phone in an area behind the home, the 

dog did not locate the Defendant's weapon. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 117, 119-120). 

However, the officer handler for the K-9 explained that the dog does not track down 

physical items unless instructed to do so. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 125). In the back yard, the 

dog was instructed to find an object. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 127). However, when the dog 

was taken to the front of the home, it was commanded to track the Defendant's human 

scent, which led him to follow the Defendant's path. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 127). Several 

months later, the Allegheny County Medical Examiner's Office found that shell casings 

recovered from the scene on Plum Avenue matched a 9mm Glock pistol that was 

involved in a matter not relating to the Defendant. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 39-46). 

pp. 88, 90, 100-102, 114). The Defendant was arrested and patted down, but no gun 

was recovered from him. (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 102). Officer Timothy Clark of the Carnegie 

Police Department transported the Defendant to the Allegheny County Jail and testified 

credibly that the Defendant, without questioning or prompting, asked the officer "Did you 

find the gun?" (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 80-81 }. 

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fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, n~ 

Com. v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 506 (Pa. Super. 2005). Any question of doubt is for the 

court's verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. 

determine credibility and to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Com. v. Lyons, 

833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003). An appellate court may only reverse the lower 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses. When evidence conflicts, · it is the sole province of the fact finder to 

137, 142 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

cannot be based upon mere speculation and conjecture. Com. v. Graham, 81 A.3d 

(Pa. Super. 2013). However, it is well recognized, however, that a criminal conviction 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Com. v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 658 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

Jones, 954 A.2d 1194 (Pa. Super. 2008). An appellate court may not re-welqh the 

evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. The Commonwealth 

sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Com. v. 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is 

The standard of review regarding claims of insufficiency of the evidence is well· 

settled. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 

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that the vehicle had been riddled with bullets (T.R. 10/24/13, p. 70). Additionally, there 

Kaduck's car had been shot at least six (6) times, and the evidence was uncontroverted 

sound of gunshots. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 59, 62-63). Responding officers found that Ms. 

sounds that she thought sounded like firecrackers, but which were consistent with the 

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Both Ms. Kaduck ano Alexis testified that, within seconds of going into the house, 

while the Defendant was outside the home, they heard four (4) or five (5) loud noises, 

consistent with gunshots. (T.R. 10/24/13, pp. 14-15, 31, 34-35). Additionally, the 

Kaduck's neighbor, Jenaya Mebane, testified that she also heard four (4} or five (5) 

circumstantial evidence for this court to have found that he possessed a gun that night. 

and that he was not found with a gun in his possession, there was sufficient 

the Defendant is correct that no witnesses saw him with a gun or saw him shoot a gun, 

or manufacture ... a firearm in this Commonwealth. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). While 

as follows: a person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection 

(b), within or without this Commonwealth ... shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer 

presented. The crime of Persons Not to Possess Firearms is defined in pertinent part 

was not proven by sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence 

The Defendant asserts that his conviction as a Person not to Possess a Firearm 

Person Not to Possess 

A.2d 703 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. Com. v. Perez, 931 

".'. 

" 

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immediately before it was destroyed by gunfire. This is not a situation where the court 

speculated or guessed at what occurred. It is simply the application of strong and 

seconds between Ms. Kaduck closing the door and the sound of gunshots. The 

Defendant was angry at both Kaducks, and was standing right next to the vehicle 

evidence presented of another person or vehicle passing by the home in the mere 

·I Kaduck and Alexis returning inside the home was the Defendant. There was no 

This court did. not, and does not, have any doubt that the Defendant was in 

possession of a gun that night and that he fired it at and into Ms. Kaduck's car. The 

only person on the street in the area of the Kaduck's vehicle within seconds of Ms. 

750 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

from a set of facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than not, and it 

may be established by the totality of the circumstances. Com. v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 

recovered at or near the crime scene. Constructive possession is an inference arising 

constructive possession of a weapon, as a gun was never found on the Defendant or 

guilty on this count, the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Baker, supra, at 658. Here, the Commonwealthsouqht to prove that the Defendant had 

Although this court relied on circumstantial evidence when it found the Defendant 

pp. 15, 30). 

was credible testimony from both Carrie Kaduck and Alexis Kaduck that, at the time of 

this incident, the street was otherwise quiet, with no one else outside. (LR. 10/24/13, 

i 

' I 

t 

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sense of personal security. Id. 

ability to carry out the threat, nor a belief by the person threatened that the threat will be 

carried out, is an element of the offense. Id. Rather, the harm sought to be prevented 

by the statute is the psychological distress that follows from an invasion of another's 

of causing terror. Com. v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 730 (Pa. Super. 2003). Neither the 

communicated with the intent to terrorize another or with reckless disregard for the risk 

defendant made a threat to commit a crime of violence, and 2) the threat was 

threat to commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another. 18 Pa. C.S. A 

§2706. To meet its burden of proof, the Commonwealth must prove that 1) the 

crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a 

Kaduck was not serious enough to constitute a terroristic threat. A person commits the 

The Defendant asserts that the statement made by the Defendant to Ms. Carrie 

Terroristic Threats 

Possess charge. 

from the evidence, this court correctly found the Defendant guilty of the Person Not to 

' 

certainly would have preferred that there be physical evidence in the form of a positive 

gunshot residue test, or the recovery of the weapon near the scene of the crime or the 

location of the Defendant's apprehension, this court based its verdict on the evidence as 

presented. Based on all of that evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

compelling circumstantial evidence which compels the guilty verdict. While this court 

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This court's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence to sustain convictions 

on both the charges of Person Not to Possess and Terroristic Threats. Additionally, the 

great weight of the evidence, including inferences to be drawn from that evidence, 

support this court's conviction of the Defendant on these charges. This court's verdict 

and sentencing should be upheld. 

Ms. Carrje Kaduck testified that the Defendant told her, "Okay, snitch, I have 

something for you," when he became aware that she was on the phone with 911. (T.R. 

10/24/13, pp. 17, 31). The Defendant made this statement to Ms. Kaduck after throwing 

a phone at her wall hard enough to put a hole in the wall, after smashing her daughter's 

cell phone with his foot, after firing shots Into her car and after forcibly breaking into her 

home, damaging her back door in the process. To suggest that the Defendant's 

statement was anything less than a threat, when coupled with his violent conduct that 

preceded the statement, is disingenuous and ignores the totality of the circumstances 

and the context in which the threat was made. Although the Defendant now maintains 

that his subsequent action of throwing a flower pot was not of a serious or threatening 

nature, this court viewed his statement as a clear threat of violence intended to terrorize 

Ms. Kaduck and her family. This court found the testimony regarding the threat made 

and the fear that it caused to be credible, and its conviction on this charge should be 

upheld. 

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Date 

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