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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

CITY OF EAST GRAND RAPIDS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 11, 2017 

v No. 329259 

Kent Circuit Court 

TREVOR ALLEN VANDERHART, LC No. 14-010058-AR 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and SAWYER and SWARTZLE, JJ. 

MURPHY, P.J. (concurring). 

 I agree with the lead opinion that we should affirm the circuit court’s ruling reversing the 

district court’s decision to set aside defendant’s jury-trial conviction of operating a motor vehicle 

while intoxicated, MCL 257.625(1)(b). I respectfully disagree, however, with the analysis of the 

lead opinion. I cannot conclude that a single dim taillight equates to “an unsafe condition as to 

endanger a person” for purposes of MCL 257.683(1). Instead, I would hold that the circuit court 

employed the correct analysis. Accordingly, I concur. 

 “A police officer on reasonable grounds shown may stop a motor vehicle and inspect the 

motor vehicle, and if a defect in equipment is found, the officer may issue the driver a citation 

for a violation of a provision of sections 683 to 711.” MCL 257.683(2). Section 686 concerns 

rear lamps, i.e., taillights, and provides in pertinent part: 

(1) A motor vehicle . . . shall be equipped with at least 1 rear lamp 

mounted on the rear, which, when lighted as required by this act, shall emit a red 

light plainly visible from a distance of 500 feet to the rear. 

(2) Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be constructed and placed 

so as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and render it 

clearly legible from a distance of 50 feet to the rear. A tail lamp or tail lamps, 

together with any separate lamp for illuminating the rear registration plate, shall 

be wired so as to be lighted whenever the head lamps or auxiliary driving lamps 

are lighted. [MCL 257.686 (emphasis added).] 
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 In People v Williams, 236 Mich App 610; 601 NW2d 138 (1999), the police stopped a 

motor vehicle that had an inoperative passenger-side taillight; the taillight on the driver’s side of 

the car worked properly. This Court construed MCL 257.686(1) and (2) and held as follows: 

 The plain language of subsection 686(1) states that all motor vehicles must 

be “equipped with” at least one “rear lamp.” There is no dispute that defendant's 

automobile satisfied this requirement, because it was equipped with two tail 

lamps. The language of the second sentence of subsection 686(2) is less clear. 

Arguably, it could be read to provide either (1) that a tail lamp must be wired so 

as to be lighted as specified in order to comply with the Vehicle Code—the 

implication being that an automobile with a tail lamp not wired so as to be lighted 

as specified would be in violation of the Vehicle Code—or (2) that an automobile 

must be equipped with at least one tail lamp wired so as to be lighted as specified 

in order to be in compliance with the Vehicle Code. 

 We think the first reading comes closer to producing an harmonious 

whole. If the Legislature intended the second sentence of subsection 686(2) to 

mean only that an automobile must have one operative tail lamp in order to be in 

compliance with the Vehicle Code, the words “or tail lamps” would be rendered 

nugatory. On the other hand, under the first reading of subsection 686(2), the 

words “a tail lamp” would refer to those motor vehicles “equipped with” only one 

tail lamp, while the words “tail lamps” would refer to those motor vehicles 

“equipped with” multiple tail lamps. Accordingly, the first reading is 

preferable. Moreover, we believe that the first reading best accomplishes the 

purpose of the Vehicle Code, which is to promote traffic safety. Under the second 

reading of subsection 686(2), an automobile equipped with multiple tail lamps—

and therefore presumably intended to function with multiple tail lamps—would be 

in compliance with the Vehicle Code even if one of its tail lamps was 

inoperative. Conversely, under the first reading of subsection 686(2), all tail 

lamps intended for use on an automobile would have to be operative in order for 

the automobile to be in compliance with the Vehicle Code. We assume that when 

multiple tail lamps are included in an automobile's design, they are intended, in 

part, to function together to enhance safety. 

 For the reasons stated, we conclude that a motor vehicle equipped with 

multiple tail lamps is in violation of subsection 686(2) of the Vehicle Code if one 

or more of its tail lamps is inoperative. Therefore, we hold that the trial court 

erred as a matter of law in determining that the Vehicle Code provided no basis 

for the traffic stop. [Williams, 236 Mich App at 613-615 (citations omitted).] 

 In this case, defendant’s vehicle was equipped with the standard two taillights, and while 

the passenger-side taillight was operating or functioning, it was not doing so fully, as the taillight 

was significantly dimmer than the other taillight. MCL 257.686(2), as interpreted by the panel in 

Williams, required defendant’s vehicle’s two taillights to be “lighted,” given that the head lamps 

were lit when defendant was pulled over by the officer. It is reasonable to conclude that the 

Legislature, in using the word “lighted” in that context, intended for taillights to be properly or 

fully lit when a car’s headlights are turned on. A sound argument can be made that a defective or 
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malfunctioning taillight violates MCL 257.686(2), even though some light may still emanate 

from the taillight. Williams does not preclude that construction; rather, it tends to lend support 

for such an interpretation, given the Court’s aim to accomplish the purpose of the Vehicle Code, 

which is to promote traffic safety. Williams, 236 Mich App at 614. 

Nevertheless, assuming, without ultimately deciding, that MCL 257.686(2) cannot serve 

as a legal basis for the officer to have stopped defendant’s vehicle for the dim or malfunctioning 

taillight, the officer’s belief to the contrary constituted a reasonable mistake of law. See People v 

Dunbar, 499 Mich 60, 71 n 9; 879 NW2d 229 (2016) (“[A] police officer’s reasonable suspicion 

supporting a traffic stop may rest on a ‘reasonable mistake of law.’ ”) (Quoting Heien v North 

Carolina, 574 US __; 135 S Ct 530, 536; 190 L Ed 2d 475 [2014].) There certainly is sufficient 

ambiguity in MCL 257.686(2) to support this conclusion. My analysis is generally consistent 

with that employed by the circuit court.1

 In sum, I respectfully concur. 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

 

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 The lead opinion definitively determines that for taillights to be "lighted" for purposes of MCL 

257.686(2), they must emit a light visible from 500 feet away, as alluded to in MCL 

257.686(1). I cannot state that this interpretation is wrong, but one could reasonably argue that 

the lead opinion conflates subsections (1) and (2) of MCL 257.686, effectively requiring both 

taillights on a motor vehicle to emit a red light that can plainly be seen from a distance of 500 

feet, even though the Legislature, for whatever reason, plainly and specifically insisted that just 

one taillight emit a light from that distance. The bottom line is that MCL 257.686(2) can be 

construed in multiple ways that are reasonable, rendering it ambiguous and susceptible to a 

reasonable mistake of law by an officer.