Filed 4/12/22 In re W.C. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re W.C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B310620

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

W.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. YJ40166)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. J. Christopher Smith, Judge. Remanded for 

resentencing.

Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. 

Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
2

W.C. was declared a ward of the juvenile court under 

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 602 for driving or taking a 

vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). On 

appeal he contends the juvenile court failed to make the required 

declaration of whether the current offense was a felony or a 

misdemeanor, nor was the requisite declaration made with 

respect to W.C.’s aggregated prior offenses. W.C. also seeks a 

recalculation of his maximum term due to a change in juvenile 

sentencing law. The People agree, as do we, that resentencing is 

required in light of the change in the law, and we therefore 

vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The instant appeal comes after a third wardship petition 

was filed with respect to W.C. within an 18-month period. The 

first petition was filed in July 2019; W.C. was alleged to have 

driven or taken a vehicle without consent. W.C. admitted the 

offense, and in February 2020, he was placed home on probation

subject to various conditions.

Three months later, in May 2020, the People filed a second 

wardship petition alleging that W.C. had committed three counts 

of grand theft of an automobile. (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1).)

The petition was amended to allege a count of driving and/or 

taking a vehicle without consent. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) 

W.C. admitted the added count on May 28, 2020, and the juvenile 

court dismissed the other three counts of the petition. On June 3, 

2020, the court terminated the home on probation commitment

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

and ordered W.C. suitably placed, with a maximum term of 

confinement of 3 years 8 months.

On November 5, 2020, the People filed the instant petition 

under section 602, alleging as a felony that W.C. had driven 

and/or taken a vehicle without consent. (Veh. Code, § 10851, 

subd. (a).) After a contested hearing in February 2021, the court 

found the allegations of the petition true and stated, “The minor’s 

a person described by section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions 

Code, and the offense is deemed to be a felony.” The court 

ordered W.C. to camp community placement for five to seven 

months and set the maximum term of confinement at four years 

two months. W.C. appeals.

DISCUSSION

It is unclear how the juvenile court arrived at a maximum 

term of confinement of four years two months when making its 

February 2021 orders. W.C. asserts the sentence was 

“presumably” the high term of three years for the current offense, 

plus some time for aggregated counts from previous petitions, 

and the People agree it “appears” this is the case. We agree this 

is the most likely explanation of the declared maximum term of 

confinement.

On September 30, 2020, Senate Bill No. 823 (2019–2020 

Reg. Sess.) was signed into law. Effective July 1, 2021, Senate 

Bill No. 823 added section 730, subdivision (a)(2), which provides, 

“A court shall not commit a juvenile to any juvenile facility for a 

period that exceeds the middle term of imprisonment that could 

be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense.” (Stats. 

2020, ch. 337, §27.)
4

As of July 1, 2021, W.C.’s judgment was not final. In In re 

Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–746, the California Supreme 

Court held that, absent evidence to the contrary, the Legislature 

intended amendments to statutes that reduce punishment for a 

particular crime to apply to all whose judgments are not yet final 

on the amendments’ operative date. (People v. Superior Court

(Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307–308; People v. Brown (2012) 

54 Cal.4th 314, 323.) As Senate Bill No. 823 decreased the 

possible maximum term of confinement, we agree with W.C. and 

the People that W.C. is entitled to the benefit of this change in 

the law.

Although the parties agree that W.C. is entitled to a 

recalculation of his maximum term of confinement using the 

middle term of two years for the offense, W.C. requests that this 

court reduce his maximum term of confinement to two years for 

the principal offense, while the People request the matter be 

remanded for a full resentencing. We conclude the matter should 

be remanded for resentencing. (People v. Navarro (2007) 

40 Cal.4th 668, 681 [when one part of a criminal sentence is 

found to be invalid, the appellate court should remand the matter 

for a full resentencing so the court may exercise its full 

sentencing discretion anew].)

Our conclusion that resentencing is required on this basis 

makes it unnecessary for us to address W.C.’s arguments that 

resentencing is necessary because the juvenile court failed to 

properly exercise its discretion to determine whether the current 

and previous offenses were felonies or misdemeanors. W.C. may 

raise these issues in the juvenile court as appropriate at 

resentencing.
5

DISPOSITION

The sentence is vacated and the matter remanded for 

resentencing consistent with this opinion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

HARUTUNIAN, J.

 Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.