[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-12942

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-00403-AT-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CLAYTON ARMSTRONG HILL, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(November 19, 2018)

Before JILL PRYOR, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Clayton Hill appeals his 8-month custodial sentence imposed upon 

revocation of his supervised release. Hill previously served a 61-month term of 

imprisonment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by 

obtaining the payment of fraudulent tax refunds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286, 

and identity fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(7), 2. At his revocation 

hearing, Hill conceded that he violated the terms of his supervised release by 

traveling outside the district without his probation officer’s permission. Hill 

admits he did not tell his probation officer and did not report to him for three 

months. 

On appeal, Hill argues that the his 8-month sentence, at the low end of the 

advisory guidelines range of 8 to 14 months, is substantively unreasonable given 

that his reason for leaving the district was to regain custody of his nine-year-old 

daughter. Hill contends the district court did not adequately take into account the 

circumstances of his supervised release violation, the nature of his offense, and his 

character.

In response, the government stresses, among other things, that this is Hill’s 

second violation. The first time, Hill’s supervised release was revoked for 

fraudulent conduct, and he received a 6-month sentence, below the advisory 

guidelines range. After his release, Hill reported to his probation officer only one 

time before traveling out of the district without permission and absconding for 

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several months. Because Hill continued to fail to report, a warrant was issued for 

his arrest. As to this second violation, the government asked for a 14-month 

sentence.

We review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release for 

reasonableness under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. 

Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006). 

“Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court may, upon finding by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has violated a condition of 

supervised release, revoke the term of supervised release and impose a term of 

imprisonment after considering certain factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 

Id. at 1107. The relevant § 3553(a) factors that a district court must consider 

before imposing a sentence upon revocation are: (1) the nature and circumstances 

of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for 

deterrence; (3) the need to protect the public from the defendant’s further crimes; 

(4) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 

training or medical care; (5) the relevant guidelines range; (6) pertinent policy 

statements of the Sentencing Commission; (7) the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentencing disparities; and (8) the need to provide restitution to victims. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7)). The 

district court does not need to explicitly mention that it considered the § 3553(a) 

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factors, as long as the record shows that it did consider the factors. See United 

States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007). 

The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden to show that the 

sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United 

States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). The weight given to any 

specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. 

United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). A district court abuses

its discretion when it: (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant 

weight; (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight; or 

(3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors 

unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en 

banc). 

If a district court revokes a term of supervision, it may require the defendant 

to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release that is statutorily 

authorized for the offense that resulted in the supervised release term. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3). Here, where the underlying offense was a Class C felony, the district 

court could have imposed a prison term of up to two years. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 286, 1028(b), 3559(a)(3). Further, the parties do not dispute that, with a Grade 

C supervised release violation and criminal history of VI, Hill’s recommended 

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imprisonment range under advisory Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines was 8 

to 14 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).

Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the guidelines 

range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United 

States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, a sentence imposed 

well below the statutory maximum is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. 

See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).

Hill’s 8-month sentence, imposed at the bottom of his advisory guideline 

range, was not substantively unreasonable. Hill failed to demonstrate that the 

district court either ignored the § 3553(a) factors or committed a clear error of 

judgment in weighing the relevant § 3553(a) factors. See Irey, 612 F.3d 1189. 

The record establishes that the district court sufficiently addressed the § 3553(a) 

factors and adequately explained that, in light of the seriousness of Hill’s 

underlying offense, his prior revocation of supervised release, and his tendency to 

make poor decisions while subject to conditions of supervision, Hill’s supervised 

release violation warranted an 8-month custodial sentence. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 

1189; Dorman, 488 F.3d at 944; Sweeting, 437 F.3d at 1107.

Moreover, it was entirely within the district court’s discretion to place 

particular emphasis on Hill’s inability to comply with the conditions of his 

supervised release and find that Hill’s mitigating evidence was insufficient to 

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warrant reinstating his supervised release. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743. 

Additionally, Hill’s 8-month sentence represented the lowest end of the applicable 

guideline range and also was well below the two-year statutory maximum penalty, 

suggesting substantive reasonableness. See Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746; Gonzalez, 550 

F.3d at 1324. Therefore, Hill’s argument that his 8-month sentence was 

substantively unreasonable lacks merit. 

Accordingly, we affirm Hill’s 8-month custodial sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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