Filed 11/22/22 P. v. Dumbrava CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SEBASTIAN BOGDAN DUMBRAVA,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G060115

 (Super. Ct. No. 20HF0081)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Scott A. 

Steiner, Judge. Affirmed.

William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Heather 

M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *
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Appellant Sebastian Bogdan Dumbrava, after being detained at a mental 

health treatment facility, received notice he was prohibited from owning, possessing, 

controlling, receiving, or purchasing any firearm for a period of five years, absent court 

authorization. Firearm components and ammunition were subsequently found in his 

bedroom and he was convicted of two crimes: an attempt to possess a firearm and 

possession of ammunition. He was sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms totaling 

three years and eight months.

Dumbrava contends his judgment should be reversed because there was 

insufficient evidence about his detention, as required by the possession statutes he was 

convicted of violating, as well as insufficient evidence he attempted to possess a firearm. 

He also contends Penal Code section 654’s prohibition of multiple punishments for the 

same act should be applied to stay his eight-month sentence for possession of 

ammunition by a prohibited person. We affirm the judgment.

FACTS

In 2019, law enforcement officers interviewed Dumbrava as a result of 

threatening comments he posted on social media and thereafter transported Dumbrava to 

UCI Medical Center (UCI). After he entered the hospital, an employee came out and

requested the officers write an application for Dumbrava to be evaluated for a 72-hour

hold as authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150.1

Dumbrava was placed on an involuntary hold, and then transferred to 

Canyon Ridge Hospital (Canyon Ridge), and involuntarily admitted to the hospital on the 

basis of being a danger to others. He was assessed and stayed at this facility until he was 

released two days later, when he was given a written advisement explaining he could not

legally possess a firearm absent court authorization.

1

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
3

In 2020, after being alerted to Dumbrava’s Twitter account which contained 

threats against the University of Irvine and campus police, law enforcement officers 

executed a search warrant on Dumbrava’s bedroom. Inside a storage container, they 

found a locked duffel bag containing firearm components, a jig kit, tools necessary to 

build a civilian version of an assault rifle, 37 magazines for holding ammunition, and 

1,199 rounds of ammunition. The search also yielded two nonfunctioning firearm 

receivers, a shipping label for one of them, and a box containing instructions on how to 

assemble a rifle.

Dumbrava was initially charged in an information on 25 felony counts: 

receipt of a large capacity magazine (Pen. Code, § 32310, subd. (a) [counts 1 through 

22]); attempting to possess a firearm as a prohibited person (Pen. Code, § 8103, subd. 

(f)(1) & (i) [count 23]); and prohibited ownership of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, 

subd. (a)(1) [count 24]). The trial court granted the defense’s motion to dismiss counts 1 

through 22.

A court trial was conducted on counts 23 and 24. The prosecution

presented witnesses from Canyon Ridge, as well as a firearms expert who had executed 

the search warrant. The expert testified that Dumbrava had obtained all the necessary 

parts to build an assault rifle and that Dumbrava could assemble them into a functioning 

rifle in two to four hours.

The trial court convicted Dumbrava on both counts, and sentenced him to 

serve consecutive prison terms of three years on count 23 and eight months on count 24.

DISCUSSION

Dumbrava raises two claims on appeal. He contends there was insufficient 

evidence to convict him of either offense. Alternatively, he argues his eight-month 

sentence on count 24 for prohibited possession of ammunition should be stayed under 

Penal Code section 654. 
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I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Standard of Review

“In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role is 

a limited one,” where we “‘“must presume in support of the judgment the existence of 

every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.].)”’” (People 

v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739.) We “‘review the whole record in the light 

most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—

that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable 

trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Story 

(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [“the 

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt”].) 

Relevant Law

Section 8103 provides in relevant part that “[a] person who has been (i) 

taken into custody as provided in Section 5150 because that person is a danger to himself

. . . or to others, (ii) assessed within the meaning of Section 5151, and (iii) admitted to a 

designated facility within the meaning of Sections 5151 and 5152 because that person is a 

danger to himself . . . or others, shall not own, possess, control, receive, or purchase, or

attempt to own, possess, control, receive, or purchase, any firearm for a period of five 

years after the person is released from the facility.” (Id., subd. (f)(1)(A), italics added.) 

Section 5150 provides in relevant part as follows: “When a person, as a 

result of a mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself . . . , a [person 

authorized by the section] may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the 

person into custody for a period of up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis 

intervention, or placement for evaluation and treatment in a facility designated by the 
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county for evaluation and treatment and approved by the State Department of Health 

Care Services. At a minimum, assessment, as defined in Section 5150.4, and evaluation, 

as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 5008, shall be conducted and provided on an 

ongoing basis.” (Id., subd. (a), italics added.) 

Section 5150.4 states in its entirety that: “‘Assessment’ for the purposes of 

this article[, i.e., containing sections 5150 through 5155], means the determination of 

whether a person shall be evaluated and treated pursuant to Section 5150.” Section 5151 

states in relevant part as follows: “If the facility designated by the county for evaluation 

and treatment admits the person, it may detain the person for evaluation and treatment for 

a period not to exceed 72 hours. . . . [¶] Prior to admitting a person to the facility for 

treatment and evaluation pursuant to Section 5150, the professional person in charge of 

the facility or a designee shall assess the individual to determine the appropriateness of 

the involuntary detention.” (Id., subds. (a) & (b).) 

Penal Code section 30305 provides in relevant part that “[n]o person 

prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm under . . . 8103 of the Welfare and 

Institutions Code, shall own, possess, or have under custody or control, any ammunition 

or reloaded ammunition.” (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1).)

Application

The elements of section 8103 are supported by substantial evidence. The 

evidence at trial showed Dumbrava directly acted with the intent to own, possess, control, 

receive, or purchase a firearm within five years of being released from the second 

medical center. He was “taken into custody as provided in Section 5150 because” he was 

determined to be a danger to others; at a minimum, he was “assessed within the meaning 

of Section 5151” at Canyon Ridge; and he was “admitted to a designated facility within 

the meaning of Sections 5151 and 5152 because” he was determined to be a danger to 

others. (§ 8103, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).) Substantial evidence also supports a finding that 
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Dumbrava attempted to possess a firearm and possessed ammunition as proscribed by the 

statutes he was convicted of violating: section 8103 and Penal Code section 30305. 

Dumbrava asserts two theories to argue the trial evidence was insufficient 

for his convictions. First, he argues that for both convictions there was insufficient 

evidence he was “assessed within the meaning of Section 5151,” as required by section 

8103, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(ii). The argument rests on the premise that the first facility 

where Dumbrava was detained—the hospital—was the only location where an 

assessment could have been conducted. This premise is contradicted by the statutory 

scheme of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq.) (the Act), the legislation that 

contains section 5150 and governs its framework. 

The purpose of an assessment “within the meaning of section 5151” is “to 

determine the appropriateness of [an] involuntary detention” authorized by the Act. 

(§ 5151, subdivision (b).) The legislation provides that assessments for a detention be 

“conducted and provided on an ongoing basis,” as circumstances require. (§ 5151, subd. 

(a)). The Act contemplates that an individual may be treated at more than one facility

within the authorized 72-hour detention, which is what happened in this case. (See 

§ 5150, subd. (i)(1) [required information for detained person includes the proposition 

that the person “may request to be evaluated or treated at a facility of [his or her] 

choice”]; see § 5008, subd. (n) [defining meaning of “‘facility designated by the county 

for evaluation and treatment’”].)

Dumbrava’s detention at Canyon Ridge was subject to section 5151’s 

assessment requirement. (§ 5151, subd. (b) [“Prior to admitting a person to the facility 

for treatment and evaluation pursuant to Section 5150, the professional person in charge 

of the facility or a designee shall assess the individual to determine the appropriateness of 

the involuntary detention”].) The trial evidence included direct testimony by a nurse who 

worked at the facility, who testified that Dumbrava was assessed at the beginning of his 

detention there. Accordingly, although no direct evidence was presented at trial on 
7

whether Dumbrava was assessed at UCI, his assessment at this first facility is of no 

moment because there was substantial evidence that an assessment required by section 

8103, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(ii), occurred at the second facility, namely Canyon Ridge.

Second, Dumbrava contends his conviction for violating section 8103

should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence he attempted to possess a 

firearm. Generally, “[a]n attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific 

intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.”

(Pen. Code, § 21a; see People v. Moses (2020) 10 Cal.5th 893, 906.) Dumbrava’s claim 

of insufficient evidence focuses on the second element—whether there was a direct but 

ineffectual act that went beyond mere preparation. Here, the argument is made that 

Dumbrava’s conviction should be reversed because the evidence shows only acts of 

preparation. We disagree. 

Our Supreme Court has explained: “‘[b]etween preparation for the attempt 

and the attempt itself, there is a wide difference. The preparation consists in devising or 

arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense; the 

attempt is the direct movement toward the commission after the preparations are made.’ 

[Citation.] ‘“[I]t is sufficient if it is the first or some subsequent act directed towards that 

end after the preparations are made.’” [Citation.] (People v. Superior Court (Decker) 

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 8.)

“Although a definitive test has proved elusive, we have long recognized 

that ‘[w]henever the design of a person to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts in 

furtherance of the design will constitute an attempt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Superior 

Court (Decker), supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 8.) This is known as the “slight-acts rule.” (Id. at 

p. 10.) In Decker, our Supreme Court stated: “The purpose of requiring an overt act is 

that until such act occurs, one is uncertain whether the intended design will be carried 

out. When, by reason of the defendant’s conduct, the situation is ‘without any 
8

equivocality,’ and it appears the design will be carried out if not interrupted, the 

defendant’s conduct satisfies the test for an overt act. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 13-14.)

Here, Dumbrava’s intent was clear—to possess a functioning assault-style 

rifle and he had taken several steps in furtherance of his plan. His actions went beyond 

mere preparation as he had obtained all of the firearm’s components, procured 

information on how to assemble the firearm, gathered the tools he needed for the 

assembly, acquired 37 magazines to load ammunition into the firearm, and amassed 

1,199 rounds of ammunition. Considering all of these actions together, we have no 

problem concluding there was sufficient evidence Dumbrava’s actions went beyond mere 

preparation and are sufficient to constitute an attempt. 

In People v. Nguyen (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1311, we concluded the 

defendant, who had acquired the parts for an assault firearm, was properly convicted of 

the attempted possession of an assault weapon because he had gone beyond mere 

preparation by bending the flat receiver so the firearm could be assembled. (Id. at 

p. 1323.) Here, we find substantial evidence Dumbrava went beyond mere preparation 

by gathering the tools he needed to assemble the firearm and by obtaining substantial 

numbers of magazine and rounds of ammunition; this conduct satisfies the overt act 

requirement. It is for this reason we find Nguyen is consistent with our analysis here.

Dumbrava contends the evidence was insufficient because he had not 

drilled the receiver and the firearm remained unassembled. He asserts that even if he had 

started to put the rifle together, he had two to four hours of work to complete before he 

had a functioning rifle. This argument misapprehends the difference between the 

completed crime of possession of a firearm and an attempt to possess a firearm. Within 

two to four hours of starting the assembly, Dumbrava would have had an operable 

firearm and be guilty of possession of a firearm, not attempted possession of a firearm. 

Given the record, Dumbrava’s position on the sufficiency of the trial 

evidence ignores the plain statutory language of section 8103, which shows the 
9

Legislature elected to specify that either an attempted possession or successful possession 

of a firearm would equally violate the law. We decline to nullify the statutory phrase 

“attempt to” explicitly included in the conduct proscribed by section 8103. 

We find poignant the Supreme Court’s discussion of the law of attempts: 

“‘“One of the purposes of the criminal law is to protect society from those who intend to 

injure it. When it is established that the defendant intended to commit a specific crime 

and that in carrying out this intention he committed an act that caused harm or sufficient 

danger of harm, it is immaterial that for some collateral reason he could not complete the 

intended crime.” [Citation.] Accordingly, the requisite overt act “need not be the last 

proximate or ultimate step towards commission of the substantive crime . . . . [¶] 

Applying criminal culpability to acts directly moving toward commission of crime . . . is 

an obvious safeguard to society because it makes it unnecessary for police to wait before 

intervening until the actor has done the substantive evil sought to be prevented. It allows 

such criminal conduct to be stopped or intercepted when it becomes clear what the actor’s 

intention is and when the acts done show that the perpetrator is actually putting his plan 

into action.” [Citations.]’” (People v. Moses, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 899.) 

Here, Dumbrava’s intent was clear and he had started putting his plan into 

action by acquiring the parts he needed to have a functioning assault-style rifle, obtaining 

the tools to complete the assembly, and gathering the magazines and ammunition to use 

once the assembly was complete. It was unnecessary for police to wait until he had 

completed the assembly before intervening. 

II. Sentencing

Dumbrava contends we should apply Penal Code section 654 to stay 

execution of his consecutive eight-month sentence for possession of ammunition on

Count 24. The statute provides in relevant part that: “An act or omission that is 

punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either 
10

of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than 

one provision.” (Id., subd. (a).)

Given that Dumbrava’s conduct underlying counts 23 and 24 did not occur 

through a single physical act, we consider whether Dumbrava’s “course of criminal 

conduct is divisible”—whether it reflected a single intent and objective for the purpose of 

Penal Code section 654 analysis. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) 

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied findings that 

Dumbrava had maintained separate intents and objectives when he committed the acts 

underlying his convictions for counts 23 and 24. (People v. Jones (2002) 

103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143 [“Whether [Penal Code] section 654 applies in a given case 

is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its 

determination”].) Dumbrava attempted to possess a firearm and did possess over 1,100

rounds of ammunition, which were not loaded into a firearm. Presuming all facts the 

court could reasonably have deduced, the record supports a finding that Dumbrava may 

have been planning multiple attacks on multiple targets. Dumbrava relies on cases that

hold where a firearm is found loaded with ammunition, the possession of both cannot 

justify the imposition of two punishments. (See, e.g., People v. Lopez (2004) 

119 Cal.App.4th 132, 137-138.) Those cases are inapplicable here because the 

ammunition Dumbrava possessed was not loaded into a firearm.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

MARKS, J.*

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

DELANEY, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.