alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 540 Engrossed Amendment House (EAH)]

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                     February 11, 2014.
    Resolved, That the bill from the Senate (S. 540) entitled ``An Act 
to designate the air route traffic control center located in Nashua, 
New Hampshire, as the `Patricia Clark Boston Air Route Traffic Control 
Center'.'', do pass with the following

                               AMENDMENT:

            Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Temporary Debt Limit Extension 
Act''.

SEC. 2. TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT.

    (a) In General.--Section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, 
shall not apply for the period beginning on the date of the enactment 
of this Act and ending on March 15, 2015.
    (b) Special Rule Relating to Obligations Issued During Extension 
Period.--Effective March 16, 2015, the limitation in effect under 
section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, shall be increased to 
the extent that--
            (1) the face amount of obligations issued under chapter 31 
        of such title and the face amount of obligations whose 
        principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States 
        Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary 
        of the Treasury) outstanding on March 16, 2015, exceeds
            (2) the face amount of such obligations outstanding on the 
        date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. RESTORING CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY OVER THE NATIONAL DEBT.

    (a) Extension Limited to Necessary Obligations.--An obligation 
shall not be taken into account under section 2(b)(1) unless the 
issuance of such obligation was necessary to fund a commitment incurred 
pursuant to law by the Federal Government that required payment before 
March 16, 2015.
    (b) Prohibition on Creation of Cash Reserve During Extension 
Period.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall not issue obligations 
during the period specified in section 2(a) for the purpose of 
increasing the cash balance above normal operating balances in 
anticipation of the expiration of such period.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
113th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                 S. 540

_______________________________________________________________________

                               AMENDMENT
```
LUIS M. HARRIS

,

Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 3819

_____________________________/

Opinion filed May 17, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County

. John C. Cooper

, Judge

.

Luis M. Harris, pro se , Appellant.

Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel; Robert J. Bobek and Sean W. Gellis, Assistant General Counsels, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS

, C.J., WINOKUR and M.K. THOMAS

, J J

. , CONCUR.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Emilio Gonzalez, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Peggy Bernheim, J.), rendered on July 22, 1987, convicting defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of robbery in the first degree and sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 5 to 10 years, unanimously affirmed.

We are unpersuaded that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh or severe. Taking into account, "among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction”, we perceive no abuse of discretion warranting a reduction in sentence. *(People v Farrar,*52 NY2d 302, 305.)

*341Further, defendant was sentenced in accordance with his plea bargain and within statutory guidelines. "Having received the benefit of his bargain, defendant should be bound by its terms.” *(People v Felman,*141 AD2d 889, 890, *lv denied*72 NY2d 918.) Concur—Milonas, J. P., Ross, Kassal, Smith and Rubin, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7404

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JAMES K. BURKS, JR., a/k/a Howard Theodore

Wright, a/k/a Marcus Williams, a/k/a Nathan

King, a/k/a Derrick Baxter, a/k/a Marcus

Allen, a/k/a Martin Wilson,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief District

Judge. (CR-93-460-A, CA-97-613-AM)

Submitted: January 15, 1998 Decided: January 28, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Lee Jenkins, Jr., Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.

Gordon Dean Kromberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his

28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) motion. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss on the reasoning of the district court. United

States v. Burks, Nos. CR-93-460-A; CA-97-613-AM (E.D. Va. Aug. 28,

1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 32



May 11, 2020



Via EDGAR



Securities and Exchange Commission

Judiciary Plaza

450 Fifth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20549



Re: Certification pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Ladies and Gentlemen:



In connection with the Quarterly Report
of VOC Energy Trust (the “Trust”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2020 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, not in its individual capacity
but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to its knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The above certification is furnished solely
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) and is not being filed as part of the Report or
as a separate disclosure document.



| | The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.
| | -----------------------------------------------
| | Trustee for VOC Energy Trust                   
| |                                                
| | By:                                            
| |                                                
| |
#### Nancy Jeffrey, Respondent, v Jacobus R. Jeffrey, Also Known as Jack Jeffrey, Appellant.

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant husband appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Modugno, J.H.O.), dated February 16, 1989, which, after a non-jury trial, dissolved the parties’ marriage and ordered that the former marital residence be sold and the proceeds be divided equally between the parties.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the complaint is dismissed.

The parties were married on June 21, 1958. In July 1976 the plaintiff wife moved out of the marital residence and in October 1986, over 10 years later, she commenced the instant action for a divorce, based upon the cruel and inhuman treatment of her by the defendant husband. At the trial, the plaintiff wife testified as to the defendant husband’s physical abuse of her. However, none of the alleged abuse had occurred after November 1976 and, thus, could not be a ground for a divorce based upon cruel and inhuman treatment *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 210). The wife moved at trial to amend her complaint to conform to the proof by adding a cause of action for "forced abandonment”, to wit, that she was forced to leave the marital home because of the husband’s abuse. The court granted the motion, and granted the plaintiff wife a divorce on the ground of abandonment. In so doing, it found that "[e]ven though Plaintiff left the marital residence, such action was instigated and caused solely by the cruel and inhuman treatment of [the plaintiff] over a period of years and by the fear for her life and danger of bodily harm”. We now reverse.

The Domestic Relations Law contains no provision allowing a party to obtain a divorce on the basis that the party was *720compelled to leave her spouse *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 170). Whether or not the plaintiff wife was justified in leaving the defendant husband would be a defense to a cause of action by the defendant husband for divorce based on abandonment *(see, Dornbusch v Dornbusch,*87 AD2d 883), but it does not constitute an independent cause of action. Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed, and the complaint dismissed. In view of this determination, we need not address the defendant husband’s remaining contentions. Brown, J. P., Sullivan, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.
<page>				       EXHIBIT 32.01


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of Morgan Stanley Spectrum
Technical L.P. (the "Partnership") on Form 10-K for the period
ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jeffrey A.
Rothman, President, Demeter Management Corporation, the general
partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Partnership.









By:	  /s/	Jeffrey A. Rothman

Name:		Jeffrey A. Rothman
Title:	President

Date:		March 15, 2004
[Cite as State v. Sharp, 2021-Ohio-273.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BUTLER COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Appellee, 

 - vs - 

STACY JULIAN SHARP, 

 Appellant. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

CASE NO. CA2020-08-089 

D E C I S I O N 

 2/1/2021 

 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CR2009-04-0679 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, John Heinkel, Government 

Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for appellee 

Michele Temmel, 6 S. Second Street, #305, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for appellant 

 Per Curiam.

{¶1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal filed by 

appellant, Stacy Julian Sharp, the transcript of the docket and journal entries, the transcript 

of proceedings and original papers from the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, and 

upon the brief filed by appellant's counsel. 
Butler CA2020-08-089 

{¶2} Appellant's counsel has filed a brief with this court pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), which (1) indicates that a careful review of 

the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any errors by the trial court 

prejudicial to the rights of appellant upon which an assignment of error may be predicated; 

(2) lists one potential error "that might arguably support the appeal," Anders, at 744, 87 

S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record independently to determine 

whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and without infringement of 

appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to withdraw as counsel for 

appellant on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that a copy of both 

the brief and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellant. 

{¶3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no response having 

been received, we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to 

appellant's rights in the proceedings in the trial court. The motion of counsel for appellant 

requesting to withdraw as counsel is granted, and this appeal is dismissed for the reason 

that it is wholly frivolous. 

PIPER, P.J., HENDRICKSON and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.
----

**Exhibit      32.1**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

|   | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                                                                                         |                                     |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
|        |                                                                                              | /s/ Jeffrey              I. Badgley |
|   | Jeffrey I. BadgleyPresident                  and Co-Chief Executive                  Officer |
Exhibit 32.1  SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION  In connection with the quarterly report of First Titan Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2015 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Sydney Jim, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1.The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  Date: August 17, 2015BY: /s/ Sydney JimSydney JimChief Executive Officer, President, Secretary, Treasurer, Principal Executive Officer, Principal Finance and Accounting Officer and Sole Director  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22

- 6417

CHARLES KENZELL CARTER , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. CORRECTIONAL OFFICER C. COLE; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER C. POWERS; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER M. RUTLEDGE; UNIT MANAGER JONATHAN CARICO; SERGEANT COLEMAN DOE; SGT. C. CAUDILL; LIEUTENANT BAILEY; NURSE DAVINSON, RN; WARDEN DAVID ZOOK; ASSISTANT WARDEN ANDERSON , Defendants

- Appellees

.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Vir ginia , at Roanoke

. Thomas T. Cullen , District Judge. ( 7:20

- cv - 00409

- TTC

- RSB )

Submitted : December 20, 2022 Decided: December 22, 2022

Before NIEMEYER and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges , and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Charles Kenzell Carter , Appellant Pro Se. Rosalie Fessier , Brittany Elizabeth Shipley , TIMBERLAKE SMITH , Staunton, V irginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-6417 Doc: 21 Filed: 12/22/2022 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM:
Cha rles Kenzell Carter, a Virginia prisoner, appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants on his Eighth Amendment claims . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court ’s
ord er
. Carter v. Corr. Officer Cole , No. 7:20

- cv - 00409

- TTC

- RSB (W.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2022). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisi onal process.
AFFIRMED USCA4 Appeal: 22-6417 Doc: 21 Filed: 12/22/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
APPLICATION 

UNDER THE 

SMALL 

COMMUNITY 

AIR 

SERVICE 

DEVELOPMENT 

PROGRAM

ABILENE 

REGIONAL 

AIRPORT

SUMMARY INFORMATION

A. Applicant Information: (Check all that apply)

X Not a Consortium Interstate Consortium Intrastate Consortium

Community now receives EAS subsidy

X

Community (or Consortium member) previously received a Small 

Community Grant; If previous recipient, 

Date of grant: 09/30/2006

Expiration date of grant: 09/30/2010

Federal funds requested: $465,100

Carrier(s) service obtained: N/A

Destination(s) served: N/A

B. Public/Private Partnerships: (List organization names)

Public Private

City of Abilene/Abilene Regional 

Airport

Development Corporation of Abilene

Texas Midwest Community 

Network

Abilene Reporter-News

Brownwood, TX Marketing Alliance

C. Project Proposal: 

(Check all that apply)

X Marketing X Start-Up Cost Offset

X Travel Bank Secure Additional Service

Surface Transportation X New Route

Launch New Carrier Subsidy

Study X Revenue Guarantee

Upgrade Aircraft First Service

Service Restoration Other (explain below): 

Regional Service __________

D. Existing Landing Aids at Local Airport:

X Full ILS Published Instrument Approach

Localizer Outer/Middle Marker

Other (specify):

E. Project Cost:

Line Description Subtotal Total 

amount

1 Federal amount requested $750,000

2 State cash financial contribution $0

Local cash financial contribution

3a Airport cash funds $10,000

3b Non-airport cash funds $92,500

3 Total local cash funds (3a+3b) $102,500

4 TOTAL CASH FUNDING (1+2+3) $852,500

In-Kind contribution

5a Airport In-Kind contribution** $15,800

5b Other In-Kind contribution** $893,000

5 TOTAL IN-KIND CONTRIBUTION (5a+5b) $908,800

6 TOTAL PROJECT COST (4+5) $1,761,300

F. In-Kind Contributions**

For funds in lines 5a (Airport In-Kind contribution) and 5b (Other In-Kind contribution), 

please describe the source(s) of fund(s) for each.

5a. Airport In-Kind: Airport use fees, program administration, and staffing

5b. Other In-Kind: Marketing match from local media and Airline Travel 

Bank®

G. Is this application subject to review by State under Executive Order 

12372 process?

a. This application was made available to the State under the Executive 

Order 12372. Process for review on (date) _____________.

b. Program is subject to E.O. 12372, but has not been selected for 

review.

c. Program is not covered by E.O. 12372.

H. Is the Applicant delinquent on any Federal debt? (if “yes”, provide 

explanation)

No

Yes (explain)

X

X
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Nathalie V. Mercier, Respondent.

Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law, motion denied, count one of the indictment reinstated and matter remitted to Cattaraugus County Court for further proceedings on the indictment. Memorandum: County Court erred in finding that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish the offense of grand larceny in the third degree. The Grand Jury may indict a person when the evidence before it establishes all the elements of the crime and also establishes reasonable cause to believe that the accused committed the crime to be charged (CPL 190.65 [1]; *People v Jennings,*69 NY2d 103, 115; *People v Moore,*171 AD2d 1051; *People v*
      *1051
      *Forde,*153 AD2d 466). On a motion to dismiss an indictment under CPL 210.20 (1) (b), the reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to the legal sufficiency of the evidence *(see, People v Jennings, supra,*at 115). The sufficiency of the People’s presentation is properly determined by inquiring whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant conviction by a petit jury *(see, People v Pelchat,*62 NY2d 97, 105). Moreover, even where the evidence introduced against the accused is circumstantial, the reviewing court should utilize the reasonable cause standard rather than the moral certainty standard, which may be appropriate upon a trial *(see, People v Jennings, supra,*at 115).

In this case, the evidence before the Grand Jury was that defendant, in January 1989, negotiated two checks on her deceased brother’s checking account, totaling $7350. Although the checks were dated prior to the brother’s death on December 31, 1988, the Grand Jury heard testimony that he had never made out such checks for defendant’s benefit. Defendant had possession of her brother’s checkbook from January to September 1989. Defendant also failed to turn over the can-celled checks, by which she received the money, to her attorney when she made her final accounting as administratrix of her brother’s estate. In addition, the evidence before the Grand Jury showed that defendant had withheld $800, which were proceeds of a van sale, from her brother’s estate. In light of these facts, we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to allow the Grand Jury to indict defendant for grand larceny in the third degree *(see,*Penal Law § 155.35). (Appeal from Order of Cattaraugus County Court, Kelly, J.—Dismiss Indictment.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Green, Balio and Lowery, JJ.