1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### SOL E , SE C RETARY, F L ORI D A DEPAR T ME NT OF EN

VIRONM E N TAL PR OTECTI O N, ET AL


### . v . WYNER ET AL


### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NTH CIRCUI T No. 06–5 31. Ar g u ed Apr il 17, 200 7—D e c i ded Ju n e4, 2007 Inpr iv ate ac ti on s u n d er42 U. S. C. §1983 , feder al distr i c tc o u r t s may

“allow the pre v ailing party .

. . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” §1 988(b). Plaint iff-res pondent Wyner notified the Florida Depa rt mentof Environmen t a lProt ection(DEP), in mid-January 2 0 0 3 , of her in t e nt ion t ocrea t eon Va lent in e’s Da y, wit h i nMa cArt hu r S t at e Bea ch Pa rk, a na n t i w a r a r t w ork cons is t i ng of nude individua l s asse mbledin t oa peac e s i g n . Respon din gonFebr u a ry6, D E P in

formed Wynert h a ther dis p la y would b ela wful only if t h e pa rt ici

pan t s c o mp lie d w i thFlor id a’s “B ath ing Suit Rule,” w h ich requires patr on s of st at e par k s to w e a r , at a min i mu m, a th on gan d, if female , ab i kini t o p. To s a fegua rd her dis p la y, a n d fut ure nud e expres s ive ac tiv i ties, ag ai n s t polic e in ter fer enc e , Wy neran d a c o pla i n t iff (c ollec

tively Wyner o rplaintiff) sued Flor ida officials in the Federal Distric t Courton Feb r ua ry 1 2

. Invo king t h e Firs t Amendment ’s prot ect i on of expres s ive co nduct , Wy ne rreq u es t e d immedia t einjunct ive relief ag ain s t in ter fer en c ew i thth e peac e sig ndisplayan d per m an en t in

j unct ive relief a g a i ns tint e rferencewit hf u t ure a c t ivit i es s i mila rly in

v o lv in g n u d ity. Anattac h m en t to th e c o mplain t set o u t a 19 95 set

tlemen t w i thD E P per m it tin gWy n e r to stag e a pl a yw i thn u d e performers at MacArthur Beach provid ed th e area was screened off to sh ield beac h g oer s w h odid n o t w i shto see th e play

. Alth ou ghdisc on cert ed b yt h e hur ried c h a r a c t e r of th e pro c eeding, t h e D i s t rictCourt gra n t e d Wyne r aprelimina r y inj unct ion o nFeb rua ry 1 3 , s u gges t ing th at ac u r tainorsc r eenc o uld sa tisfyth e in ter e sts of bo thth e St at e an d Wy n e r . Th e peac e sy mbol di spl a yth at took plac e th e n e x tday wa s s e tup ou t s ide aba rrier a ppa rent ly putup b yt h e S t at e. Once disassembled from the peace symbolfor m ation , p a r t ic ipan ts w e n t2 SO LE v. WYN ER Sy llabu s int ot h e wa t e r in t h e nude. Therea ft er, Wy ner pu rs ued her dema n d for aperma n entinj unct ion, not i ng t h a ts h e int e nded t oputon a n ot her Va lent ine’s Da y produ c t i on a tMa cArt hur Bea c h , a g a i n involv

ing nudit y. Af t e r dis c overy, b o t h side s mo v e d forsu mmar yju dg men t
. At a Jan u a r y21, 20 04 h e ar in g , Wyn e r ’ s cou n s el ac kn ow ledg ed th at the peace symbol display participan ts hadset up in front of the bar

rier. The cou r tdenied pla i nt iff’s motion for s u mma ry judgmenta n d granted defendants’ motion for su mmary final judgment. The delib

era t efa ilure of Wyner a n dher copa rt ici p a n t s t o s t a yb e hind t h e s creen a tt h e 2 0 0 3 Va lentine’s Da y dis p la y, t h e courtconcluded , demon s tr ated th at th e Ba th i n gSu it Ru le’s pr oh ibitionof n u d ityw a s essen t i a l to p r otec t th e v i sitin gpu blic

. Wh ile Wy n e ru l timate ly failed to pr ev ail onth e mer i t s , th e c o u r tadded, sh e did o btain a pr e limina r y inj unct ion, a n d t h erefore q u a lified a s apreva i ling pa rt y t o t h a text e nt
. Rea s oning t h att h e prelimin a r y inj unct ioncould notb e r e v i sited at th e sec o n dstag e of th e litig at i o nbec a u s e it h a d ex pir e d, th e c o ur t aw ar ded plain t iff c o u n s el fees c o v e r i n gth e fir s t ph ase of th e litigation. The Florida offic i als appe aled, challenging b o th the pre

limina r y inj unct ion a n d t h e couns el fees a w a r d. The Elevent hCir

cuit held first that defendan t s’ challe nges to the preliminary injunc

t i on were mo ot
. Theco ur tt h en affirmed the co unse lfees award, r e ason in gth at th e pr elim in ar yor derallow e d Wy n e rto pr esen t th e peac e sy mbol displ a yu n i mpeded byadv e rse sta t e ac tion

. Held: Prevailing party sta t us does not at te nd achievement of aprelim i

na ry inj u nct ion t h a tis reve rs ed, dis s o lved, or ot he rwis eundoneb y the final decision in the same case. Pp. 6–11.

(a) “The touchstone of the p r evailin g party inquiry” this Court has sta t ed, is “th e mater i a lal ter ationof th e le g a l r e lation sh i p of th e par t i es in a ma n n er whic hCongres s s o ughtt opromot e int h e fee s t at

ut e.” Texas State Teac he rsAss n . v. Ga rland In depe nde nt School Dist. , 489 U. S. 782, 792–793. At the pr eliminary injunction stage, th e c o u r tis c a lled u p onto a sses s th e pr ob abil i tyof th e plain t iff’s u l

t i mat es ucces s on t h e merit s . The foun d a t i on for t h ata s s e ss men t will be more o rless secure dependin g on the thoroughne ss of the ex

plor ationu n d er takenbyth e par t ies an d th e c o u r t
. In th is c a se, th e prelimina r y inj unct ion hea r ing wa s nece s s a rily has t y a n d ab b r evi

ated. There was no time for disc overy, nor fo r a d eq ua t ereview o f doc u m en ts or pr epar ationa n d pr esen tatio nof w i tn esses. Th e pr ov i

sional relief granted expired before appellate review coul d be gained, and the court’s threshold ruling wo ul d have no precl u sive effect in t h e cont inuin glit iga t i on, a s b o t ht h e Dis t rictCourta n d t h e Courtof Appea l s cons idered t h e prelimina r y inj unct ion mootonce t h e dis p la y took place. T h e provisional relief’ s t e nta t ive cha ra ct er, in view of t h e cont inua t i on of t h e lit igat ion t odefinit ively res o lve t h e cont rove rs y,3 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s would have m a de a fee request at th e initial stage premature. Of controlling im portance, the eventualruling on the merits for defen

da nt s , a f t e r bot hs i des considered t h e ca se fitfor fina l a d j u dica tion, s u pers eded the prelimina r y ruling

. Wyner ’ s t e mpora r y s ucces s r e sted ona p r emise—th e u n d er stan din gth at a c u r tai norsc r e en would a d eq ua tely s e rve Florida ’ s int e res ti nshielding th e public fro m nudit y—t h a tthe Dis t rictCourt , wit ht h e b e nefitof afuller reco rd, ul

t i mat e ly rej e c t ed. Wyner cont ends t h a t t h e preliminary inj unct ion wa s notunder mined b yt h e s u b s eq uentmerit s a d j u dication b e ca us e th e dec i sionto g r an t pr eli m in ar yr e lief w a s an“as a pplied” r u lin g based on the officials’ impe rmissibl e content-based ad ministration of t h e Ba t h ing SuitRule. But t h e Dis t rictCourta s s u med cont entneu trality for purposes of its p r eliminar y order. The fina l decision in Wyner’s ca s erej e ct ed t h e sa me cla i m s h e a dva nced in her prelimi

na ry inj unct io n mot i on: t h att h e s t a t e law b a nning nu dit yin pa rks wa s uncons t i tut i ona las a p plied t oexpres s ive, nonerot i c nudit y. At th e en d of the fr ay , Flor ida’s Bath in gSu it Ru le r e m a in ed in tac t
. Wyner had gained no enduring “cha ng[e] [in] the legal relationship ” betw eenh e r s elf an d th e st ateofficials she sued. See Texas Stat e T

e ac he rs As sn. , 489 U. S., at 792. Pp. 6–10

. (b) Wyner is not a prevailing pa rty, for her i n it ial victory was ephemera l. This Courtexpr es s e s no view on whet h e r , i nt h e ab s ence of afina l decis i on on t h e m e rit s of acla i m for perma n entinj unct ive relief, s ucces s in ga ining aprelimina r y inj unct ion ma y s o met i mes warrant an award of couns el fees. Itdecides only that a plaintiff who g a in s a pr elim in ar yin ju nc tiondoes n o t qu alifyforanaw ar d of c o u n sel fees under §1988(b) if the merits of the case are ultimately de

c i ded ag ain s t h e r . Pp. 10–11. 179 Fed. Appx . 566, r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

G IN SB U R G , J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 06–5 31 

### MICHA E L W. SOLE, SECR ETARY , FLORI DA DE PAR T MENT OF ENVIR O N M ENTAL P R OT ECTI O N,

ET AL 

### ., PET I TIONER S v. T. A. WYNER ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Ju n e4, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G

### delivered the opinion of th e Court. For priva t e actions brought under 42 U. S. C. §1983 and other specified measures designed to secure civil rights, Congress established an exception to the “Am e rican Rule” that “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect [counsel fees] from the loser.” Alyeska Pipelin e Servi ce Co. v. W ilder ness Socie t y , 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975). Th at exceptio n, codified in 42 U. S. C. §1988(b), authorizes federal district cou rts, in their discretion, to “allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as partof t h e costs.” This case p r esents a sole question: Does a plaintiff who gains a preliminary injunction after an abbreviated hearing, but is deni ed a perma n ent injunc

tion after a dispositive adjudicatio non the merits, qualify as a “prevailing party” within the compass of §1988(b)? Viewing th e two stag es of the litigation as discrete episodes, pl aintiffs below, responde nts here, m a intain that they prevailed at the preliminary injunction stage, and therefore qualify for a fee award for their counsels’efforts to obtain that interim relief. Defendants below, petition

-2 SO LE v. WYN ER Opinion of t h eCourt 

### ers here, regard the ca se as a uni t; they urge that a pre

liminary injunction holds no sway once fuller considera

tion yields rejection of the pro visional order’ s legal or factual und erpinnings. We agree with the latter position and hold that a final decision on t h e merits denying per

manent injunctive relief or dinarily determines who pre

vails in th e action for purposes of §1988(b). A plaintiff who achieves a transient victory at the threshold of a n action can gain no award under that fee-shif ting provisi o n if, at the end of the litigation, her initial success is undone and she leav es the courthouse emp t yhanded. I In mid-January 2003, plaintiff-respondent T. A. Wyne r notified the Florida Department of Environmental Protec

tion (DEP) of her intention to create on Valentine’s Day , February 1 4 , 2003, within John D. Ma cArthur Beach State Par k , an antiwar artwor k

. The work would consist of nude individuals ass e mbled into a peace sign . By letter dated February 6, DEP inform ed Wyner that her peace sign display would be lawful onlyif the participants com

plied with the “Bathing Suit Rule” set out in Florida Ad

ministrative Code §6 2D–2.014(7)(b) (2005). That rule required patrons, in al l areas of Florida’s state parks, to wear, at a minimum, a thong and, if female, a bikini top. 1 

### To safeguard the Valentine’s Day display, and future expressive activities of the sameorder, against police interference, Wyner filed suit in t h e United S t ates Dist ri c t Court for t h e Southern District of Florida on February 12, 2003. She invoked the First Am endment’s protection of expressive conduct, and named a s defendants the Secre

-

——————

1 Th e ru le r e ads: “Inev er yarea of a p a r kin c l u d in gbath in gar eas n o in div i du al sh a ll ex pose th e h u m an , male orfemale g e n i ta ls, pu bicar ea , th e en tir ebu t t oc ks orfemale br east belo wth e top of th e n i pple, w i th less th ana f u llyopaqu e c o v e r i n g .” Fla

. Admin

. Cod eAn n . §62D – 2.014( 7)(b) (20 05).3 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### tary of DEP and the Manager of MacArthu rBeach Park. 2 

### Her compl a int requested immediate injunctive relief against interference with the peace sign display, App. 1 8 , and perma n ent injunc tive relief against inter f erence wit h “future exp r essive activities that may include non-eroti c displays of nude human bodies,” id ., at 19. An exhib i t attached to the complaint set out a May 12, 1 995 Stipula

tion for Set t lement wit hDE P. Id ., at 22–23. That settle

ment had facilitated a Fe bruary 19, 1996 play Wyner coordinated at MacArthur Beac h, a production involving nude performers. A term of the s e ttlement provided that Wyner wou l d “arran g e for placement of a bolt of cloth in a semi-circle around the area where the play [would] be performed,” id ., at 23, so that beachgoers who did not wish to see the play would be shielded from the nude performers. The day aft e r the complaint was filed, on February 13 , 2003, the District Court heard Wyner’s emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. Although disconcerted by th e hurried character of the proceeding, see id ., a t37, 93, 95, the court granted th e preliminary injunc tion. “Th e choice,” th e court ex plained, “need not be either/or.” Wyner v. Struhs , 254 F. Supp. 2 d1297, 1303 (SD Fla

. 2003). Pointing to th e May 1995 settlement laying o u t “agreed-upo n manner restriction s,” the court determined that “[ p]laintiff[’s] desi red exp r ession and the interests of the state may both be satisfied si multaneous l y.” Ibid. I n this regard, the court h a d inquired of DEP’s co unsel at the preliminary injunction hearing: “Why wouldn’tthe curtain or screen solve the problem of s o mebody [who] doesn’ t want to see . . . nudity? Seem s li ke that wo uld solve [the]

——————

2 Wyne r wa s j o ined b ycopl a i nt iff GeorgeS i mon, who s e rved a s a videographer for expressive activi t i es Wy ner previous l yorga nized at Ma cArt hur B e a ch. S ee App. 1 3

. For conve n ience , we refer t ot h e copla i nt iffs collect ively a s Wyneror pla i nt iff.4 SO LE v. WYN ER Opinion of t h eCourt 

### problem, wouldn’t it?” App. 86. Counsel for DEP re sponded: “That’s anoption. I don’t think necessarily [defendants] would be opposed to that .

. . .” Ibid

. ;see id. , at 74 (testimony of Chief of Operations for Florida Park Service at the prelimi nary injunction hearing that th e Service’s counsel, on prior occas i ons, had advised: “[I ] f they go behind the scre en and they liv[e] up to the agree

ment then i t ’s oka y . If they don’t go behind the screen and they don’t live up to the agr eement then it’ s not ok ay.”). The peace symbol di splay tookplace at MacArthu r Beach the next day. A screen was put up, apparently by the State, as the District Court anticipated. See id ., at 108. See al so id. , at 94(District Judge’s statement at th e conclusion of the preliminary inju nction hearing: “I wan t to make itclear . . . that the [ p reliminary] injunction doesn’ t preclude the de partment, if it chooses, from using

. . . some sort of barrier . . . .”). But the displa y was set u p outside the barrier, and particip ants, once disassembled from the peace symbol formation, went into the water in the nude. See id ., at 108; Deposi tion of T. A. Wyner in Civ. Action No. 03–80103 (SD Fla., Nov. 14, 20 03), pp. 99– 100. Thereafter, Wyner pursued her demand for a permanent injunction. Her counsel represented that on February 1 4 , 2004, Wyner intended to put on another production at MacArthu r Beach, agai n involving nudity. See App. 107. After discov ery, both sides moved for summary jud g ment
. At the hearing on the motions, held January 21, 2004, the DistrictCo urt as ked Wyner’s co unsel about the sc reen put up around the prece d ing year’s peace symbol display. Counsel ac knowledged that the participants in that dis

play ignored the barrier and set up in front of the screen. Id ., at 108. A week later, having unsuccessfully urged the parties to resolve the case as “[th ey] did before in [the 1 995] settle

ment,” id ., at 143, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for5 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### summary judgment a n d gran ted defendants’ motion for summary final judgment. The deliberate fail ure of Wyner and her coparticipants to remain behind the screen at the 2003 Valentine’s Day display, the court concl u ded, demon

strated tha tthe Bathi n g Suit Rul e ’s prohibition of nudity was “no greater than is essentia l . . . to protec t the experi

ences of the visiting public.” Wy nerv. Stru hs , Case No. 03–80103–CIV (SD Fla., Jan. 28, 2004) (Summary Judg

ment Order), App. to Pet. for C e rt. 42a. While Wyner ultimately failed to prevail on the merits, the court added , she did obtain a preliminary inju nction proh ibiting police interference with the Valentine’s Day 2003 temporary art installation , id ., at 45 a, and therefore qual if ied as apre vailing party to that e x tent, see Wyner v. St r u hs , Case No. 03–80103–CIV (SD Fla., Aug. 16, 2004) (Om n ibus Orde r), App. to Brief in Opposition 5a– 13a. The preliminary injunction c o uld not be revisited atthe second stage of the litigation, the court noted, for it had “expire don its own terms.” Id. , at 4a. So reasoning, the court a w arded plain

tiff counsel fees covering the first p hase of the litigation. The Florida officials appealed, challenging both th e order gran ting a preli m inary inju nction and the award of counsel fees

. Wyner, h o wever, pursued no app e al from th e final order denying a permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuitheld first that defen

dants’ chall e nges to the prelimina r y injunction were moot because they addressed “a finite event that occurred an d ended on a specific, past date.” Wyner v. Stru hs , 179 Fed

. Appx. 566, 567, n. 1 (2006) (perc u riam)

. Th e court then affirmed th e counsel f ees award, reasoning that plaintiff had gained through the prelimin ary injunction “the pri

mary relief [she] sought,” i.e. , th e prelimina r y order al

lowed her t o present t h e peace sy mbol displa y unimpeded by adverse state action. Id. , at 569

. Wyner wou l d not have qualified for an a w ard of counsel fees, the court recogni z ed, had th e preliminary injunc tion6 SO LE v. WYN ER Opinion of t h eCourt 

### rested on amistak e of law. Id. , at 568, 569–570. But it was “new d e velopment s ,” the court said, id ., at 569, not any legal error, that a ccountedfor her failure “to achieve actual succ ess on the merits at the permanent injunction stage,” id. , at 569, n. 7

. Plaintiff and others participatin g in the displ a y, as Wyner’s counseladmitted, did not stay behind the barrier at the peace symbol display, id. , at 56 9; further, th e court noted, “a fairreading o f the recor d show[ed] th at [p]laintif [f] had no intention of remaining behind a [barrier] duri ng future n u de expressive works, ” ibid

. The l i k e lihood of success sh own at the preliminary injunction stage, the court explained, id. , at 5 69, n. 7, ha d been overta ken by the subsequen t“demonstrat[ion] that the less restrictive alte rnative,” i.e. , a cloth screen or oth e r barrier, “was not suff icient to protect the government ’s interest,” id. , at 569. But tha tdemonstration, the court concluded, did not bar an award of fees, beca use the “new facts” emerged only at the summary judgment stage. Ibid

. We granted certiorari, Struhs v. Wyner , 549 U. S. ___ (2007), and now reverse. II “The touch s tone of the prevailing party inq u iry,” this Court has stated, is “the material alteration of the legal relationshi p of the parties in a manner wh ich Congre ss sought to promote in t h e feestatute.” Texas Sta t e T e ach

ers A ssn. v. Garland Independen tSchool Dist. , 489 U. S. 782, 792–793 (1989). See He wittv. Helms , 4 82 U. S. 75 5, 760 (1987) (plaintiff must “receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail”); Maherv. Gag n e , 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980) (upholding fees where plaintiffs settled and obtained a consen t decree); cf. Buckhanno n Board & Care Hom e, Inc. v. W e stVirg inia Dep t. of He alth andHu man Reso urces , 532 U. S. 598, 6 05 (2001) (precedent “counsel[s] again s t holding that the term ‘prevailing party’ auth o rizes an award of a t torney’s fees7 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### withouta c o rresponding alteration in the legal relation

ship of the parties”). 3

### T h e petitioni n g state offi cials main

tain that plaintiff here does not satisfy that standard fo r, as a cons equence of the finalsu mmary judgment, “[t]he state law whose constitutionality [Wyner] attac k ed [ i.e ., the Bathin g Suit Rule,] remains valid and enforceable today.” Bri e f for Petitioners 3. T h e District Court left n o doubt on that score, the state officials emphas ize; ordering final judgment for defendants, the court expr essed, in the bottom line of its opin ion, its “hope” that plaintiff would continue to use the pa rk, “albeit not in the nude.” Su m mary Judgment Order, App. to Pe t. for Cert. 46a. Wyner, on the other hand, urges that despite the denial of a perma n ent injunction, she got precisely what she wanted wh en she commenced this litigation: permissionto create the nude peace symbol wi thout state interference. That fleetin g success, however, did not establi s h that she prevailed on the gravamen of her plea for injunctive relief, i.e ., her charge that th e state officials had denied her and other parti cipants in t h e peace symbol display “the righ t to engage in constitutionallyprotected expre ssive activi

ties.” App. 18. Prevail i ng party status, we hold, does n o t

——————

3 Buck han n on Board & Care Home, Inc. v. W e st V i rg in ia D e p t. of Health and H u man Resour c e s , 532 U. S. 5 98, 6 0 0 (2 001) , h e ld th atth e t e rm “ p reva iling pa rt y” in the fee-s hi fting provisions of the Fair Hous

ing Amendme nts Act of 1 9 8 8and the Ame ricans with Disab ilit ies Act o f 1990 doe s not “includ[e] a party that ha s f a iled to secure a judgment on t h e merit s or acou r t -orde red co ns ent decree, b u t h a s nonet h eless a chieved t h e d e s i red res u ltb e ca us e t h e la ws uitb r oughtab o utavolun

tar yc h a ng e i nth e defen d a n t’s c o n d uc t.” Th e dissen tin Buck han n o n would havedeemed such aplainti ff “prevailing,” not because of any temporary reli ef ga ined (in tha tca s e , a cons ents t a ypending lit iga t i on), bu t bec a u s e t h e law s u i t c a u s ed th e St at e to a m en d it s law s , ter m in at

in gth e c o n t rov e r s ybetw eenth e par t ie s, an d permanentlygivin g plaintiff the real-world outcome it sought. See id., at 622, 624–625 (opinion of G INS B URG , J

. ). Our decis i on t o da y is cons is t e ntwit ht h e v i ew s of bothth e major i tyan d th e dissen t e r s in Buck han n on .8 SO LE v. WYN ER Opinion of t h eCourt 

### attend achievement of a prelimi nary injun ction that is reversed, dissolved, o rotherwise undone by the final decision in the same case. 4 

### At the preliminary injunction stage, the court is called upon to as sess the pr obability of the plainti ff’s ultimate success on the merits. See, e.g ., As hcroftv. A m ericanCi vil Liber t ies U n ion , 542 U. S. 656, 666 (2004); Dora nv. Sal e m Inn, Inc. , 4 22 U. S. 922, 931 (197 5). The foundation for that assess ment will b e more or l e ss secure depending on the thoroughness of the exploration undertak e n by the parties and the court. In some cases, the proceedings prior to a grant of tem p orary relief are searching; in oth

ers, little time and resources are spent on the threshold contest. In this case, the preliminary injunction hearing wa s necessarily hasty and a bbreviated. Held one day after the complaint was filed and one day before the event, the timing afforded the state officer defendants little opportu

nity to oppose Wyner’s emerge ncy motion. Counsel for the state defendants appe ared only by telephone. App. 36. The emergency proceeding allowed no time for discovery, nor for ade quate review of docum e nts or pre p aration an d presentation of witnesses. See id ., at 38–39. The provi

sionalrelief immediately grant ed expired before appellat e review could be gained, and the court’s th reshold ruling would have no preclusive effect in the continuing litiga

tion. Boththe Dist rict Cour t a n d the Cou rt of Appea l s considered the prelimi nary injunction a m ootissue, not f i t for reexamination or review, once the displa y tookplace. See Summary Judgme n t Order, App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a; Omnibus Order, App. to Brief in Opposition 3a–4a; 17 9 Fed. Appx., at 567, n. 1; cf. Lewisv. Con t i n ental Ban k

——————

4 In res o lving Wyner’s cla i m for cou n s e l fees , we expres s no opinion on th e dimen s ion s of th e Fir s t Amen d men t ’s pr otec tionfor ar tw or ks th at involve nudity.9 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Corp. , 494 U. S. 472, 4 77–479 (1990). In short, the provi

sional relief gran ted te rminat ed only the parties’opening engagement. Its tent ative chara cter, in view of the co n tinuation of the litigation to defini tively resolve the con

troversy, would have made a fee request at the initial stage prem ature. Of controlling importa nce to our decision, the eventual ruling on the merits for defendants, after b o th sides con

sidered the case fit for final adjudication, superseded the preliminary ruling. Wyner’s temp orary succe ss rested on a premise the DistrictCourt ulti mately rejected. That court granted prelimin ary relief on the under standing th at a curtain or screen would adequately serve Florida’s inter

est in shiel d ing the public from nudity tha trecreational beach users did not wi sh to see. See supra , at 3–4; 254 F. Supp. 2 d , at 1303 (noting that the partie s had previ

ously agreed upon “a number of .

. . mannerrestrictions that are far less restrictive than th e total ban on nudity”). At the su mmary jud g ment stag e, with the benefit of a fuller recor d , the District Court recognized that its initia l assessmentwas incorrect. Participants in the peace sy m bol display were in fact unwilling to stay behi nd a screen that separated them from ot her park visitors

. See Sum

mary Judgment Order, App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. See al so App. 108 (acknowledgment by Wyner’s counsel that pa r ticipants i nthe February 14, 2 003 protest “in effec[t] ignored the screen”). In light of the demonst r ated inade

quacy of th e screen to contain th e nude display, the Dis

trict Cour tdetermined that enforcement of the Bathing Suit Rule was necessary to “pre serv[e] park aesthetics” and “p rotec tthe expe riences of the visiting pu blic.” Sum

mary Judgment Order, App. to Pe t. for Cert. 41a, 42a. Wyner contends that the preliminary injun cti on was not undermined by the subsequent a d judication on the meri ts because the decision to grant preliminary relief was an “as applied” rul i ng. In developing this argument, she asserts10 SO LE v. WYN ER Opinion of t h eCourt 

### that the officials engaged in impermissible content-based administrat i on of the Bathing SuitRule. But the District Court assu med, “for th e purposes of [its initial] order,” th e content neutrality of the state officials’ conduct. See 254 F. Supp. 2d, at 1302. See also 17 9 Fed. Appx., at 568, a n d n. 4 (reiterating that, “for the s a ke of the preliminar y injunction order,” the Distric tC o urt “assu med content neutrality”). That spe c ification is controlling. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65(d) (requiri ng every injunction to “set forth the reasons for its issuance” and “b e specific in terms”). S ee also Schmidtv. Less ar d , 414 U. S. 473, 4 76 (1974) (percuriam) (Rule 65(d) “was design ed to preve n t uncertaintyand confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders.”). The final decision in Wyner’s c a se rejected the same claim she a dvanced in her prelimi nary injunction motion : that the state law banning nudity in parks was unconsti

tutional as applied to expressi ve, nonerotic nudity. At the end of the fray, Florida’ s Bathing Suit Rule remain ed intact, and Wyner had gained no enduring “chang[e] [in] the legal re lationship” between he rself and the state off i

cials she sued. See Texas State T e ache rs A s s n . , 489 U. S., at 792. III Wyner is n o t a prevailing party, we conclude, for her initial victory was eph e meral. A plaintiff who “secur[es] a preliminary injunction, then loses on the merits as the case plays out and judgment is ent e red against [her],” has “[won] a battle but los[t] the war. ” Watson v. Count y of Riversid e , 3 00 F. 3d 10 92, 1096 (CA9 2002). We are pre

sented with, and therefore decide, no broader issue inthi s case. We express no view on whether, in the absenc e of a fin a l decision on the merits of a claim for permanent injunctiv e relief, success in gain ing a preliminary injunction may11 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### sometimes warran tan award of counsel fees. We decide only that aplaintiff who gains a preliminary injunctio n does not qualify for an award of counselfees under §1988(b) if the merits of the case are ultimately decided against her. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is r e versed, an d the case i s remanded for proceed

ings consistent with thi s opinion. It is so orde red.