FILED

U.S. Bank

ruptc y Appel lat e Panel of the Te nth Circ uit

January 18, 2017

Blain e F . Bates Clerk NOT FOR PUBLICATION *

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

IN RE HOPE MARIE CARLTON,

Debtor.

__________________________________

KEITH ROBERT LEVIN,

Plaintif

f - Appellee,

v.

HOPE MARIE CARLTON,

Def

endant - Appellant. BAP No. CO-15-044

Bankr. No. 12-29679
Adv. No. 15-01099 Chapter 7

OPINION

_________________________________
Appeal f rom the United States Bankruptcy Court
f or the District of

Colorado

_________________________________

Bef ore NUGENT

, SOMERS , and HALL , Bankruptcy Judges.

_________________________________

SOMERS , Bankruptcy

Judge.

_________________________________

D e b t o r H o p e C a r l t o n a p p e a l s t w o b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t o r d e r s : ( 1 ) t h e o r d e r

g r a n t i n g R o b e r t L e v i n ’ s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s C a r l t o n ’ s c o u n t e r c l a i m f o r L e v i n ’ s

a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n o f t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a y b y v i r t u e o f h i s m a k i n g a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s

This unpublished opinion m ay be cited f or its persuasive value, but is not prec edential, * except under the doctrines of law of the case , claim pre clusion, and issue pre clusion. 10th Cir. BA P L .R. 8018-6.i n a c c o r d w i t h a s c h e d u l e a p p r o v e d b y t h e s t a t e c o u r t

, w h i c h r e d u c e d p o s t p e t i t i o n

a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s t o c o l l e c t a s s e s s m e n t s o f a t t o r n e y f e e s a n d c o s t s a g a i n s t

C a r l t o n ; a n d ( 2 ) t h e g r a n t o f s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t t o L e v i n o n h i s a d v e r s a r y 1

c o m p l a i n t c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e d e b t C a r l t o n o w e s h i m f o r a t t o r n e y f

e e s a n d c o s t s

a w a r d e d i n c o n

j u n c t i o n w i t h a n a p p e a l f r o m a n o r d e r i n t h e d i v o r c e p r o c e e d i n g s i s

n o n d i s c h a r g e a b l e u n d e r 1 1 U

. S

. C

. § 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 5 )

. W e a f f i r m

. 2

I

. B a c k g r o u n d

.

A

. P r e b a n k r u p t c y S t a t e C o u r t P r o c e e d i n g s

.

T h i s c a s e b e g i n s w i t h t h e “ l o n g a n d v e r y t o r t u o u s d i v o r c e p r o c e e d i n g ” o f

H o p e C a r l t o n a n d R o b e r t L e v i n

. L e v i n a n d C a r l t o n w e r e m a r r i e d i n 1 9 9 1

. P r i o r 3

t o t h e m a r r i a g e , t h e y e n t e r e d i n t o a p r e n u p t i a l a g r e e m e n t ( “ t h e A g r e e m e n t ” )

,

w h i c h p r o v i d e d f

o r t h e d i v i s i o n o f a s s e t s i n t h e e v e n t o f a d i v o r c e

. T h e A g r e e m e n t

a l s o p r o v i d e d f

o r a t t o r n e y f

e e s a n d c o s t s t o b e a w a r d e d t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n

t h e e v e n t a d i s p u t e a r o s e r e g a r d i n g t h e t e r m s , c o n d i t i o n s , a n d o b l i g a t i o n s i m p o s e d

b y t h e A g r e e m e n t

. I n 2 0 0 5

, L e v i n f i l e d a d i v o r c e p e t i t i o n i n t h e S e v e n t h J u d i c i a l

D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n G r a n d C o u n t y , U t a h ( t h e “ D o m e s t i c C o u r t ” )

. C a r l t o n d i s p u t e d

The sum m ary

judgm ent order also granted Levin “relief f rom autom atic stay

to 1 pursue collection of

the Judgm ent pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.” Corrected Judgm ent at 7, in Appellant’s App. at 204. In her brief , Carlton does not allege error in this portion of the order.

All f uture ref erences to “Code,” “Section,” and “§” are to the Bankruptcy Code, 2 Title 11 of

the United States Code, unless otherwise indicated. All f uture ref erences to “Bankruptcy

Rule” or “Bankruptcy

Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, unless otherwise indicated. All f uture ref erences to “Civil Rule” or “Civil Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.

Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing 3 Counterclaim at 1, in Appellant’s App. at 178.

2t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e A g r e e m e n t a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a m o u n t o f a l i m o n y

.

O n N o v e m b e r 6

, 2 0 0 7

, t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t e n t e r e d i t s D e c r e e o f D i v o r c e

( t h e “ D o m e s t i c C o u r t O r d e r ” )

. I t h e l d t h a t t h e A g r e e m e n t w a s v a l i d a n d a w a r d e d 4

C a r l t o n $ 1 5

, 0 0 0 p e r m o n t h i n a l i m o n y u n t i l J a n u a r y 1

, 2 0 2 2

. I f p r i o r t o O c t o b e r 5

1

, 2 0 1 2

, C a r l t o n r e m a r r i e d o r c o h a b i t a t e d

, t h e n b e g i n n i n g O c t o b e r 1

, 2 0 1 2

,

a l i m o n y w o u l d b e r e d u c e d t o $ 7

, 5 0 0 p e r m o n t h u n t i l O c t o b e r 1

, 2 0 1 7

, a t w h i c h

t i m e i t w o u l d c e a s e

. T h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t O r d e r a l s o a w a r d e d L e v i n a t t o r n e y f e e s

a n d c o s t s o f $ 1 6 7

, 8 8 4

. 7 5

, w i t h i n t e r e s t a t 6

. 9 9 % p e r y e a r , a s t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y

6

i n t h e d i s p u t e r e g a r d i n g t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e A g r e e m e n t

. T h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t 7

O r d e r p r o v i d e d t h a t L e v i n w a s

o n l y e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r t h e s e f e e s f r o m [ C a r l t o n ] b y d e d u c t i n g $ 5

, 0 0 0

p e r m o n t h f

r o m h e r a l i m o n y p a y m e n t u n t i l t h e $ 1 6 7

, 8 8 4

. 7 5 t o g e t h e r

w i t h i n t e r e s t i s p a i d i n f u l l

. A n a m o r t i z a t i o n t a b l e r e f l e c t i n g t h e

p a y m e n t s c h e d u l e i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a s E x h i b i t B

. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g

t h i s d e d u c t i o n , t h e C o u r t c l a r i f i e s t h a t t h e a m o u n t o f a l i m o n y [ C a r l t o n ] i s t o b e p a i d i s $ 1 5

, 0 0 0 p e r m o n t h

, f r o m w h i c h a d e d u c t i o n

t o p a y t h i s j u d g m e n t i s t o b e m a d e

. 8

T h r e e m o n t h s l a t e r , b e g i n n i n g o n F e b r u a r y 1

, 2 0 0 8

, t h i s m o n t h l y d e d u c t i o n w a s

Exhibit A, Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Debtor’s Counterclaim 4 Order in Appellant’s App. at 56 (The schedule of pay m ents in the Appellant’s Appendix f ollowing the Decree of

Divorce appears not to be part of the original order, since it ref ers to subsequent events).

The Dom estic Court Order specif ied that alim ony

should be paid f

or f ourteen y ears 5 and three m onths beginning on October 1, 2007.

In the rest of

the text, awards of

attorney f ees and costs will be ref

erred to as 6 awards of attorney f ees.

Dom estic Court Order at 5, in Appellant’s App. at 60. 7

Id

. in Appellant’s App. at 60. (Exhibit B to the Dom estic Court Order is not in the 8 record on appeal).

3r e d u c e d t o $ 2

, 5 0 0 p e r m o n t h

. A t t a c h e d t o t h e o r d e r i s a l o a n a m o r t i z a t i o n 9

s c h e d u l e f

o r p a y m e n t o f t h e r e m a i n i n g a t t o r n e y f e e s a t 6 % i n s e v e n t y

- t h r e e

m o n t h l y p a y m e n t s o f $ 2

, 5 0 0

. 10

C a r l t o n a p p e a l e d t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t O r d e r t o t h e U t a h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s

.

T h a t c o u r t a f

f i r m e d t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n , h e l d t h a t L e v i n a s t h e

p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y w a s e n t i t l e d t o r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s o n a p p e a l

, a n d r e m a n d e d

t o t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a m o u n t

. O n A p r i l 1 9

, 2 0 1 1

, t h e 11

D o m e s t i c C o u r t a w a r d e d L e v i n $ 7 7

, 7 4 5

. 3 3 i n a d d i t i o n a l a t t o r n e y f e e s a s t h e

p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n t h e a p p e a l

. T h e j u d g m e n t p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e a w a r d “ s h a l l b e 12

c o l l e c t e d b y w i t h h o l d i n g a p o r t i o n o f e a c h a l i m o n y p a y m e n t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h

t h e a t t a c h e d s c h e d u l e , ” w h i c h p r o v i d e d f o r n e t m o n t h l y a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s o f 13

$ 1 0

, 0 0 0 t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r 1

, 2 0 1 2

, a n d o t h e r a d j u s t m e n t s t h e r e a f

t e r

. 14

I n O c t o b e r 2 0 0 9

, L e v i n f i l e d a m o t i o n t h a t a s k e d t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t t o f i n d

Exhibit 2, Plaintiff’s Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order 9 Dismissing Debtor’s Counterclaim at 3, in Appellant’s App. at 105.

Id . at 5-7, in Appellant’s App. at 107-109 (The Domestic Court Order states the 1 0 interest rate on the unpaid balance owed to Levin by Carlton will be 6.99%, but the loan

am ortization schedule rate is 6%).

Exhibit 3, Plaintiff’s Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order 1 1 Dismissing Debtor’s Counterclaim

, in Appellant’s App. at 110.

Exhibit 5, Plaintiff’s Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order 1 2 Dismissing Debtor’s Counterclaim at 2, in Appellant’s App. at 137.

Id

. in Appellant’s App. at 137. 1 3

Id . at 4, in Appellant’s App. at 139. 1 4

4t h a t C a r l t o n h a d c o h a b i t a t e d a n d h e r a l i m o n y s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e r e d u c e d

. 15

F o l l o w i n g a t r i a l

, t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t e n t e r e d i t s r u l i n g o n M a r c h 2 2

, 2 0 1 1

,

f i n d i n g t h a t C a r l t o n w a s i n f a c t c o h a b i t a t i n g a n d r e d u c i n g h e r a l i m o n y b e g i n n i n g

O c t o b e r 1

, 2 0 1 2 t o $ 7

, 5 0 0 p e r m o n t h

. B y a n o r d e r e n t e r e d o n O c t o b e r 1 2

, 2 0 1 1

, 16

t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t a w a r d e d L e v i n a t t o r n e y f e e s o f $ 1 2 5

, 0 0 0 “ t o b e p a i d b y

d e d u c t i o n f

r o m a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s a s s e t f o r t h i n E x h i b i t ‘ A ’ ” t o t h e o r d e r

. T h e 17

e x h i b i t p r o v i d e s f

o r n e t a l i m o n y o f $ 4

, 1 5 0 p e r m o n t h

, c o m m e n c i n g o n O c t o b e r 1

,

2 0 1 2

, w i t h t h e l a s t p a y m e n t s c h e d u l e d f o r S e p t e m b e r 1

, 2 0 1 7

. C a r l t o n t h e n 18

a p p e a l e d t h e 2 0 1 1 c o h a b i t a t i o n o r d e r a n d t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s o r d e r t o t h e U t a h C o u r t

o f A p p e a l s

.

B

. P r o c e e d i n g s a f

t e r b a n k r u p t c y f

i l i n g

.

I n S e p t e m b e r 2 0 1 2

, C a r l t o n f i l e d a C h a p t e r 1 3 b a n k r u p t c y , w h i c h s h e

s u b s e q u e n t l y c o n v e r t e d t o a C h a p t e r 1 1

, a n d t h e n c o n v e r t e d t o a C h a p t e r 7

.

C a r l t o n a l l e g e s t h a t o n t h e p e t i t i o n d a t e s h e o w e d L e v i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 8 5

, 0 0 0

. 19

I n J a n u a r y 2 0 1 4

, t h e U t a h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i s s u e d i t s o p i n i o n o n t h e a p p e a l

o f t h e 2 0 1 1 c o h a b i t a t i o n a n d a t t o r n e y f e e s o r d e r s , a f

f i r m i n g t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t

a n d r e m a n d i n g f

o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a t t o r n e y f e e s i n c u r r e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e

Exhibit 4, Plaintiff’s Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order 1 5 Dismissing Debtor’s Counterclaim at 2, in Appellant’s App. at 126.

Id

. in Appellant’s App. at 125. 1 6

Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Debtor’s Counterclaim at 3-4, in 1 7 Appellant’s App. at 147-148.

Id . at 7, in Appellant’s App. at 151. 1 8

Answer of Debtor, Hope Marie Carlton at 3, in Appellant’s App. at 31. 1 9

5s e c o n d a p p e a l

. T h e U t a h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s n o t e d t h a t i t s r u l i n g w a s s u b j e c t t o 20

a n y l i m i t a t i o n s r e l a t e d t o C a r l t o n ’ s b a n k r u p t c y a n d “ e x p r e s s [ e d ] n o o p i n i o n o n t h e

c a l c u l a t i o n o r r e c o v e r a b i l i t y o f a t t o r n e y f e e s i n s o f a r a s t h e s a m e m a y b e l i m i t e d o r

p r e c l u d e d b y [ C a r l t o n ’ s ] b a n k r u p t c y c a s e

. ” 21

A f t e r L e v i n o b t a i n e d r e l i e f f r o m s t a y , t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t o n r e m a n d

,

e n t e r e d i t s A m e n d e d O r d e r a n d J u d g m e n t R e : A t t o r n e

y ’ s F e e s o n F e b r u a r y 9

,

22

2 0 1 5 ( t h e “ F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 5 J u d g m e n t ” ) a w a r d i n g L e v i n $ 5 2

, 2 6 3

. 5 8 i n a t t o r n e y f e e s

i n c u r r e d i n c o n

j u n c t i o n t h e a p p e a l o f t h e 2 0 1 1 o r d e r s

. T h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t s t a t e d

t h a t :

T h i s j u d g m e n t c o n s t i t u t e s a d e b t o w e d b y [ C a r l t o n ] t o a f o r m e r

s p o u s e a n d w a s i n c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f a d i v o r c e a n d / o r i n

c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a d i v o r c e d e c r e e

. . . . 23

T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o m a k e s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , i t i s t h i s C o u r t ’ s o p i n i o n t h a t t h i s j u d g m e n t s h o u l d b e d e e m e d n o n

- d i s c h a r g e a b l e p u r s u a n t t o 1 1 U

. S

. C

. § 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 5 )

. . . ;

a n d

Exhibit 9, Plaintiff’s Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order 2 0 Dismissing Debtor’s Counterclaim at 9-10, in Appellant’s App. at 160-61.

Id. at 9, in Appellant’s App. at 160. In May 2013, Levin f

iled a m otion f

or relief 2 1
f rom the autom atic stay

only with respect to the appeal pending bef ore the Utah Court of Appeals. The bankruptcy court subsequently

entered an order f

or relief f rom the

autom atic stay

providing that “the request f or the relief

f rom the autom atic stay

is granted to perm it the Utah State Court of Appeals, to com

plete its determ ination of the issues raised in Appeal No. 2011-1023-CA.” Bankr. Dkt. Entry 91. In Novem

ber 2014, Levin f iled a second m otion f

or relief f rom stay to perm it the Dom estic Court to determ ine the attorney f ees arising out of

the appeal. Bankr. Dkt. Entry 165. The bankruptcy

court entered a second order granting the motion for relief f rom stay perm itting the Dom estic Court to address the outstanding attorney f ee issue lef

t unresolved in the Utah Court of Appeals’ opinion, but prohibiting Levin f rom pursuing collection against Carlton. Bankr. Dkt. Entry

174. Appellant did not include these m otions or orders in the Appendix and Appellee did not f

ile a Supplem ental Appendix.

February 2015 Judgm ent in Appellant’s App. at 162. 2 2

Id . at 2, in Appellant’s App. at 163. 2 3

6[ L e v i n ] i s s t a y e d f r o m e x e c u t i n g o r o t h e r w i s e c o l l e c t i n g o n t h i s j u d g m e n t u n t i l h e h a s r e c e i v e d r e l i e f t o d o s o f r o m t h e b a n k r u p t c y

c o u r t

. 24

I n M a r c h 2 0 1 5

, L e v i n f i l e d t h i s a d v e r s a r y p r o c e e d i n g ( t h e “ C o m p l a i n t ” )

, 25

s e e k i n g a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e d i s c h a r g e a b i l i t y o f t h e F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 5 J u d g m e n t

p u r s u a n t t o § 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 5 ) a n d ( a ) ( 1 5 )

, a n d r e q u e s t i n g r e l i e f f r o m t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a y

“ t o p e r m i t [ L e v i n ] t o r e t u r n t o t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t t o p u r s u e c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e

F e b r u a r y 9

, 2 0 1 5 J u d g m e n t

. ” C a r l t o n s u b s e q u e n t l y f i l e d a n a n s w e r , g e n e r a l l y 26 27

a d m i t t i n g a l l o f L e v i n ’ s f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t a t e c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s ,

b u t d e n y i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 5 J u d g m e n t a s

n o n d i s c h a r g e a b l e

.

C a r l t o n ’ s r e s p o n s e t o t h e C o m p l a i n t i n c l u d e d a n a n s w e r a n d a c o u n t e r c l a i m

a s s e r t i n g a c a u s e o f a c t i o n f o r v i o l a t i o n o f t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a y ( t h e

“ C o u n t e r c l a i m ” )

. I t s a l l e g a t i o n s a r e s t a t e d i n o n l y f i v e p a r a g r a p h s : ( 1 ) t h e 28

a c t i o n w a s f

o r v i o l a t i o n o f § 3 6 2 ; ( 2 ) D e b t o r f i l e d h e r p e t i t i o n o n S e p t e m b e r 2 1

,

2 0 1 2 ; ( 3 ) o n t h e p e t i t i o n d a t e , C a r l t o n w a s i n d e b t e d t o L e v i n i n t h e a p p r o x i m a t e

a m o u n t o f $ 8 5

, 0 0 0 ; ( 4 ) “ [ n ] o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f i l i n g o f t h e b a n k r u p t c y b y C a r l t o n ,

w i t h o u t t h e p e r m i s s i o n o f t h e B a n k r u p t c y C o u r t

, L e v i n c o n t i n u e d t o w i t h h o l d

Id . at 3, in Appellant’s App. at 164. 2 4

Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debts in Appellant’s App. at 10. 2 5

Id . at 5, in Appellant’s App. at 14. 2 6

Answer of Debtor, Hope Marie Carlton in Appellant’s App. at 29. 2 7

Id . at 3, in Appellant’s App. at 31. 2 8

7p a y m e n t s h e w a s o b l i g a t e d t o m a k e t o C a r l t o n t o r e d u c e t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s o w e d t o

h i m ; ” a n d ( 5 ) a s a r e s u l t

, C a r l t o n w a s d a m a g e d

. 29

L e v i n f i l e d h i s M

o t i o n t o D i s m i s s C o u n t e r c l a i m b a s e d o n t w o a r g u m e n t s :

( 1 ) d i s m i s s a l w a s r e q u i r e d u n d e r C i v i l R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) b e c a u s e t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t

l a c k e d s u b

j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r t h e “ d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s e x c e p t i o n ” t o

f e d e r a l c o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d u n d e r t h e R o o k e r

- F e l d m a n D o c t r i n e ; a n d

( 2 ) d i s m i s s a l w a s r e q u i r e d u n d e r C i v i l R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s n o

v i o l a t i o n o f t h e s t a y s i n c e L e v i n w a s s i m p l y c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e p a y m e n t s c h e d u l e

o r d e r e d b y t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t ( t h e “ M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s ” )

. C a r l t o n r e s p o n d e d b y 30

a r g u i n g t h a t C i v i l R u l e 8 ( a ) p r o v i d e s t h a t a c o m p l a i n t n e e d o n l y c o n t a i n a s h o r t

a n d p l a i n s t a t e m e n t o f t h e c l a i m ; m o t i o n s t o d i s m i s s a r e v i e w e d w i t h d i s f a v o r ; t h e

M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s i m p r o p e r l y a s s e r t e d a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e s a s a b a s i s f

o r

d i s m i s s a l ; a n d t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t L e v i n w i t h h e l d p a y m e n t o w e d b y h i m t o o f f s e t a

p r e p e t i t i o n d e b t o w e d b y C a r l t o n i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e s t a y w a s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e a

c a u s e o f a c t i o n

. T h e r e w a s n o d i s c u s s i o n o f s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n

. C a r l t o n 31

d i d n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s s h o u l d b e c o n v e r t e d t o a m o t i o n f o r

s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e m a t t e r s o u t s i d e t h e p l e a d i n g s s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d

.

Id. in Appellant’s App. at 31. The Court understands this allegation to address the 2 9 postpetition pay

m ents m ade by

Levin where the prepetition attorney f ee awards were deducted f

rom the alim ony

owed, in accord with the Domestic Court orders. The attorney f ees awarded postpetition by the February

2015 Judgm ent are the subject of the Com plaint, not the Counterclaim

.

Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim in Appellant’s App. at 41. 3 0

Counterclaim Plaintiff, Hope Marie Carlton’s Response to Counter-Defendant’s 3 1 Motion to Dismiss Counter Claim in Appellant’s App. at 47.

8T h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t s u b s e q u e n t l y c o n d u c t e d a t e l e p h o n i c h e a r i n g t o i s s u e

i t s o r a l r u l i n g o n t h e M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s ( t h e “ O r a l R u l i n g ” ) a n d d o c k e t e d t h e

m i n u t e s h e e t a s i t s o r d e r ( t h e “ D i s m i s s a l O r d e r ” )

. T h e m i n u t e s h e e t s t a t e s “ f o r 32

r e a s o n s s t a t e d o n t h e r e c o r d ” t h e C o u n t e r c l a i m w a s d i s m i s s e d a s a m a t t e r o f l a w

. 33

T h e r e c o r d o n a p p e a l d o e s n o t c o n t a i n a t r a n s c r i p t o f t h e O r a l R u l i n g

. W h e n

d e n y i n g C a r l t o n ’ s l a t e r

- f i l e d m o t i o n f

o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t

d e s c r i b e d i t s O r a l R u l i n g a s f o l l o w s :

T h e C o u r t f

o u n d t h a t t h e D e f

e n d a n t [ C a r l t o n ] ’ s c o u n t e r c l a i m s o u g h t

t o a l t e r t h e U t a h s t a t e c o u r t o r d e r s o f a l i m o n y a w a r d e d

. . . i n a

m a n n e r p r o h i b i t e d b y t h e R o o k e r

- F e l d m a n D o c t r i n e

. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e C o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e D e f e n d a n t ’ s c o u n t e r c l a i m u n d e r F e d

. R

. C i v

. P

. 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) f

o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a c l a i m u p o n w h i c h r e l i e f c o u l d b e

g r a n t e d

. I m p o r t a n t l y , t h e C o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f

f [ L e v i n ] w a s

n o t w i t h h o l d i n g a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s f r o m t h e D e f

e n d a n t i n a n i m p r o p e r

m a n n e r , b u t w a s s i m p l y o b e y i n g t h e U t a h s t a t e c o u r t ’ s o r d e r s i n

m a k i n g a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s t o t h e D e f e n d a n t

. 34

O n J u n e 2 4

, 2 0 1 5

, C a r l t o n m o v e d f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ( t h e “ R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

M o t i o n ” )

. C a r l t o n a r g u e d t h a t s h e w a s n o t a s k i n g t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t t o m o d i f y 35

t h e a l i m o n y a w a r d a n d t h a t t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t ’ s o r d e r s t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s b e

p a i d b y d e d u c t i o n s f

r o m a l i m o n y d i d n o t m o d i f y t h e a l i m o n y a w a r d

, b u t j u s t

p r o v i d e d f

o r a m e t h o d o f p a y m e n t s i m i l a r t o g a r n i s h m e n t

. S h e d i d n o t a d d r e s s

Dism issal Order, in Appellant’s App. at 51. 3 2

Id . at 1-2, in Appellant’s App. at 51-52. 3 3

Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing 3 4 Counterclaim at 2, in Appellant’s App. at 179 (internal citations omi tted).

Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Debtor’s Counterclaim in 3 5 Appellant’s App. at 53.

9L e v i n ’ s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s

. A s e x h i b i t s t o h e r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n M o t i o n ,

C a r l t o n s u b m i t t e d t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t O r d e r a n d a n a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s p r e a d s h e e t

,

w h i c h a p p e a r s t o b e a p r o p o s e d p a y m e n t s c h e d u l e a f t e r t h e c o h a b i t a t i o n r u l i n g

. 36

L e v i n f i l e d a n o b

j e c t i o n t o t h e R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n M o t i o n a g a i n a s s e r t i n g t h e 37

a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e C o u n t e r c l a i m s h o u l d b e d i s m i s s e d b e c a u s e t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t

l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n t o m o d i f y a d i v o r c e o r a l i m o n y d e c r e e

. A s e x h i b i t s t o h i s

r e s p o n s e , L e v i n s u b m i t t e d t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t o r d e r s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e a l l o w i n g

h i m t o r e d u c e h i s a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s a n d a p p l y t h e r e d u c t i o n s t o t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s

d e b t

.

O n S e p t e m b e r 2 1

, 2 0 1 5

, t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t d e n i e d t h e R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

M o t i o n ( t h e “ R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n O r d e r ” )

. I t c o n s t r u e d t h e m o t i o n a s a m o t i o n 38

u n d e r C i v i l R u l e 5 9 ( e )

, u n d e r w h i c h r e l i e f i s a p p r o p r i a t e w h e r e “ a c o u r t h a s

m i s a p p r e h e n d e d t h e f

a c t s , a p a r t y ’ s p o s i t i o n , o r c o n t r o l l i n g l a w

. ” W h i l e 39

r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e O r a l R u l i n g r e q u i r e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f f a c t s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e

b a r e b o n e s a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e C o u n t e r c l a i m a n d t h a t C a r l t o n w a s c o n t e n d i n g t h a t

t h e c o u r t h a d m i s a p p r e h e n d e d t h e f a c t s , t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t i t d i d n o t e r r i n

g r a n t i n g t h e M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s w i t h o u t c o n v e r t i n g i t i n t o a m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y

Id . at 9, in Appellant’s App. at 61. 3 6

Plaintiff’s Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing 3 7 Debtor’s Counterclaim in Appellant’s App. at 69.

Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing 3 8 Counterclaim in Appellant’s App. at 178.

Reconsideration Order at 3, in Appellant’s App. at 180. 3 9

10j u d g m e n t u n d e r C i v i l R u l e 1 2 ( d )

. A s t h e b a s i s f o r i t s r u l i n g , t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t

a c c e p t e d a s t r u e t h e f

a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e C o u n t e r c l a i m a n d t h e f a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e

C o m p l a i n t s e t t i n g f

o r t h t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e D o m e s t i c C o u r t o r d e r s , w h i c h C a r l t o n

h a d a d m i t t e d i n h e r a n s w e r

. B a s e d o n t h e s e f a c t s a l o n e , w h i c h t h e c o u r t f o u n d t o

b e s u f f i c i e n t

, t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t i t c o u l d n o t d r a w a r e a s o n a b l e

i n f e r e n c e t h a t L e v i n c o u l d b e l i a b l e f o r v i o l a t i o n o f t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a y b e c a u s e

t h o s e f a c t s s h o w e d t h a t L e v i n w a s “ s i m p l y f o l l o w i n g t h e o r d e r s o f t h e U t a h s t a t e

c o u r t b y p a y i n g t h e a m o u n t s p e c i f i e d i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e o r d e r s a n d j u d g m e n t s

. ” 40

T h e c o u r t f

u r t h e r s a i d

, “ A s p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d b y t h i s C o u r t

, b y s e e k i n g a n o r d e r

t h a t t h e a m o u n t o f t h e a l i m o n y p a y m e n t s m a d e b y t h e P l a i n t i f f

, a s d e t e r m i n e d b y

t h e U t a h s t a t e c o u r t

, v i o l a t e s t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a y , D e f e n d a n t s e e k s s u b s t a n t i v e

r e v i e w o f a s t a t e c o u r t j u d g m e n t

, a n d t h i s C o u r t h a s n o j u r i s d i c t i o n t o d o s o

. ” 41

O n J u l y 1

, 2 0 1 5

, w h i l e C a r l t o n ’ s R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n M o t i o n w a s p e n d i n g

b e f o r e t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t

, L e v i n f i l e d a m o t i o n f

o r j u d g m e n t o n t h e p l e a d i n g s ,

r e q u e s t i n g t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s a w a r d e d b y t h e U t a h D o m e s t i c C o u r t i n i t s

F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 5 J u d g m e n t b e e x c e p t e d f r o m d i s c h a r g e p u r s u a n t t o e i t h e r

§ 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 5 ) o r ( a ) ( 5 ) a n d t h a t h e b e g r a n t e d r e l i e f f r o m s t a y t o r e t u r n t o s t a t e

c o u r t t o e n f

o r c e t h e F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 5 J u d g m e n t

. C a r l t o n f i l e d a n o b

j e c t i o n 42 43

Id . at 6, in Appellant’s App. at 183. 4 0

Id

. 4 1

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Appellant’s App. at 62. 4 2

Debtor/Defendant’s Response to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in 4 3 (continued...)

11a r g u i n g t h a t a s a m a t t e r o f l a w , § 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 5 ) w a s n o t a p p l i c a b l e a n d L e v i n w a s n o t

e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t o n t h e p l e a d i n g s

.

O n S e p t e m b e r 2 4

, 2 0 1 5

, t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t r u l e d i n L e v i n ’ s f a v o r o n t h e

d i s c h a r g e a b i l i t y a n d s t a y i s s u e s b y i s s u i n g i t s O r d e r G r a n t i n g S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t

U n d e r 1 1 U

. S

. C

. § 5 2 3 (

a ) ( 1 5 ) ( t h e “ S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t O r d e r ” )

. T h e c o u r t 44

c o n c l u d e d t h a t “ t h e o n l y i n q u i r y u n d e r § 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 5 ) i s w h e t h e r t h e [ F e b r u a r y

2 0 1 5 ] J u d g m e n t w a s i n c u r r e d b y [ C a r l t o n ] ‘ i n t h e c o u r s e o f a d i v o r c e

. . . o r i n

c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t

, d i v o r c e d e c r e e o r o t h e r o r d e r o f a c o u r t o f

r e c o r d

. ’ ” C a r l t o n ’ s a r g u m e n t t h a t § 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 5 ) d i d n o t a p p l y b e c a u s e t h e

45

j u d g m e n t w a s b a s e d u p o n t h e p a r t i e s ’ p r e n u p t i a l a g r e e m e n t w a s r e j e c t e d

. T h e

b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t f

o u n d t h e F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 5 J u d g m e n t w a s e n t e r e d i n a n o n g o i n g

d i v o r c e a n d “ e m a n a t e d f r o m a s e r i e s o f c o u r t o r d e r s , a s o p p o s e d t o a s t a n d a l o n e

p r e n u p t i a l a g r e e m e n t

, ” a n d w a s t h e r e f o r e n o n d i s c h a r g e a b l e u n d e r § 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 5 )

. 46

T h e c o u r t a l s o g r a n t e d L e v i n “ r e l i e f f r o m a u t o m a t i c s t a y t o p u r s u e c o l l e c t i o n o f

t h e [ F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 5 ] J u d g m e n t

. ” A c o r r e c t e d o r d e r ( t h e “ C o r r e c t e d S u m m a r y 47

(...continued) 4 3 Appellant’s App. at 174.

Sum m ary Judgm ent Order in Appellant’s App. at 186. 4 4

Id. at 6, in Appellant’s App at 191 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)). 4 5

Id . at 7, in Appellant’s App. at 192. 4 6

Id

. 4 7

12J u d g m e n t O r d e r ” ) a n d a C o r r e c t e d J u d g m e n t w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r e d

. 48 49

C a r l t o n n o w a p p e a l s t h e D i s m i s s a l O r d e r , t h e R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n O r d e r , t h e

C o r r e c t e d S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t O r d e r , a n d t h e C o r r e c t e d J u d g m e n t

. 50

I I

. I s s u e s o n a p p e a l

.

A

. W h e t h e r t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g t h e M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s C o u n t e r c l a i m

.

B

. W h e t h e r t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f P l a i n t i f f L e v i n a n d f

i n d i n g t h e F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 5 J u d g m e n t

o w e d t o L e v i n b y C a r l t o n w a s n o n d i s c h a r g e a b l e u n d e r 1 1 U

. S

. C

. § 5 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 5 )

.

I I I

. S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w

.

W e r e v i e w a b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t ’ s d i s m i s s a l o f a c l a i m p u r s u a n t t o C i v i l R u l e

Corrected Sum m ary

Judgm ent Order in Appellant’s App. at 196. The Corrected 4 8
Sum m ary Judgm ent Order corrected ty pographical errors in the Summ ary Judgm ent Order.

Corrected Judgm ent in Appellant’s App. at 204. 4 9

Appellant subm itted copies of pages one and two of

Levin’s Proof

of Claim as 5 0 attachm ents to her Reply

Brief , ref erred to as “Exhibit Number 2.” Appellee then filed his Appellee’s Motion to Strike “Exhibit Number 2” Attached to Appellant’s Reply Brief (the “Motion to Strike”). BAP ECF No. 17. He argued that: (1) Exhibit Number 2 was neither included in Appellant’s Designation of the Record on Appeal nor Appellant’s Appendix; and (2) Exhibit Num ber 2 was an incomplete copy of the Proof of Claim , as Appellant om itted six attachm ents to the Claim f rom Exhibit Num

ber 2. Appellant did not f ile a response to the Motion to Strike. BAP Local Rule 8018-1(g) provides that “[ o]nly docum ents properly

bef ore the bankruptcy

court m ay

be included in the appendix and considered by

this Court.” 10th Cir. BAP L.R. 8018-1(g). The BAP Local Rules also provide that absent the f iling of a supplem ental or am ended appendix, “[ t]his Court need not rem edy

any f ailure by a party to designate an adequate record. When the party asserting an issue f

ails to provide a record suf f icient f or considering that issue, this Court

m ay decline to consider it.” 10th Cir. BAP L.R. 8009-3; see also Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc. , 972 F.2d 1545, 1549 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992) (appellate court declined to review evidence not bef ore the trial court when rulings at issue were made). Exhibit Num ber 2 was not subm itted to the bankruptcy court in the adversary

proceeding and was not ref erred to in the bankruptcy court’s Reconsideration Order. Furthermore, Exhibit Num ber 2 was not included in the Designation of Record. Accordingly , Exhibit Num ber 2 is HEREBY STRICKEN. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

131 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) d e n o v o a n d t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t ’ s r u l i n g o n a C i v i l R u l e 5 9 m otion f or 51

an abuse of

discretion. 5 2

W e review an order granting summ ary judgm ent de novo , apply ing “‘the sam e

legal standard as was used by the bankruptcy

court to determ ine whether either party is

entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.’” 5 3

IV. Discussion

A

. Did the bankruptcy court err in granting the Motion to Dism iss

Counterclaim

.

1. The positions of the parties.

On appeal, Carlton contends that the bankruptcy court erred in granting the Motion

to Dism iss and deny ing her Reconsideration Motion. The arguments presented in her

Appellant’s Brief

allege violations of

procedural rules. She asserts that the Civil Rules

are to be construed liberally , that Civil Rule 8(a) requires only that a com

plaint contain a

short and plain statem ent of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief , that

m otions to dism iss are disf avored, and that Levin’s Motion to Dism iss im properly

asserted a num

ber of af f irm ative def

enses. Carlton also argues that the bankruptcy court

erred when deny ing her Reconsideration Motion because, under Civil Rule 12(d), it

should have decided the Motion to Dism iss using sum m ary judgm ent standards and

Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). 5 1

LTF Real Estate Co. v. Expert S. Tulsa, LLC ( In re Expert S. Tulsa, LLC) , 522 5 2 B.R. 634, 643 (10th Cir. BAP 2014) (citing Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co. , 431 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005)).

Id . (quoting Rushton v. Bank of Utah ( In re C.W . Mining Co.) , 477 B.R. 176, 180 5 3 (10th Cir. BAP 2012)).

14procedures. In his Appellee’s Brief , Levin argues that the bankruptcy court was correct in

dism issing the Counterclaim because addressing Carlton’s allegations of violations of

the

autom atic stay

would have been tantamount to reliti gating the Dom estic Court’s various

alim ony orders, and the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to do so under the “domestic

relations exception” to f ederal court jurisdiction and under the Rooker-Feldman 5 4

Doctrine. Levin also supports the bankruptcy court’s denial of

the Reconsideration 5 5

Motion.

2. Carlton has not show n that the bankruptcy court comm itted reversible

error w hen dism issing the Counterclaim

.

As stated above, the Motion to Dism iss was granted by the Oral Ruling.

Bankruptcy

Rule 8009, titled “Record on Appeal; Sealed Documents,” in subsection

(a)(4), provides that the record on appeal must include, am ong other item s, “any opinion,

f indings of

f act, and conclusions of

law relating to the issues on appeal, including

transcripts of

all oral rulings.” But Carlton has f ailed to include a transcript of the Oral 5 6

Levin argues the “domestic relations exception” precluded the bankruptcy court 5 4 f rom exercising subject m atter jurisdiction over the Counterclaim. The bankruptcy court did not specif

ically address the dom estic relations exception. The “domestic relations exception . . . divests the f ederal courts [ including bankruptcy courts] of

power to issue divorce, alim ony , and child custody decrees,” Ankenbrandt v. Richards , 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992), or to f

ix pay m ents f or support, id . at n.6. Levin cites Ebel v. King ( In re Ebel) , 338 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005), as authority f or his position.

Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, f ederal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction 5 5 to hear appeals f

rom f inal judgm ents of

state courts or to adjudicate claims that are inextricably

intertwined with those judgm ents. In order f or Rooker-Feldman to apply

, (1) the party

m ust have lost in state cour t; (2) the party m ust com plain of injuries caused by the state-court judgm ent; (3) the party m ust invite a review and rejection of that judgm ent; (4) and the judgm ent m ust have been rendered bef ore the f ederal proceedings

com m enced. Flanders v. Lawrence ( In re Flanders) , 517 B.R. 245, 256 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014) (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections , 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005), but om itting internal quotation m arks)).

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(4). 5 6

15Ruling in the record on appeal. This Court’s local rule states, “This Court need not

rem edy any f ailure by a party to designate an adequate record. When the party asserting

an issue f ails to provide a record suf f icient f or considering that issue, this Court m ay

decline to consider it.” Since the transcript of the Oral Ruling is not provided, this 5 7

Court could in its discretion decline to consider whether the bankruptcy court erred when

granting the Motion to Dism iss.

However, because we f

ind the bankruptcy

court’s statem ent contained in its order

deny ing the Reconsideration Motion regarding its Oral Ruling to be a suf f icient substitute

f or a transcript, we elect to reach the merits. As stated above, the bankruptcy court

sum m arized its Oral Ruling as f ollows: “The Court f

ound that the Def

endant’s

counterclaim

sought to alter the Utah state court orders of alim ony awarded . . . in a

m anner prohibited by

the Rooker-Feldm an Doctrine. Consequently , the Court dism issed

the Def endant’s counterclaim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for f ailure to state a claim

upon which relief

could be granted.” Thus, this Court could reverse only if the 5 8

bankruptcy

court erred in f

inding that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars the

Counterclaim

.

But Carlton has never during the course of these proceedings contended that the

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply . The m atter was not addressed in her

10th Cir. BAP L.R. 8009-3; see also Lopez v. Long ( In re Long) , 255 BR 241, 245 5 7 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) (appellate court need not remedy counsel’s f

ailure to provide adequate record on appeal but may sum m arily

af f irm lower court); Tuloil, Inc. v. Shahid ( In re Shahid) , 254 B.R. 40, 43 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) (appellate court need not remedy counsel’s f

ailure to provide appendix suf f icient f or consideration of

issues on appeal).

Reconsideration Order at 2, in Appellant’s App. at 179. 5 8

16opposition to Levin’s Motion to Dism iss or in support of her Reconsideration Motion.

Further, as a basis f

or reversal, Carlton’s Appellant’s Brief relies solely

upon alleged

procedural errors. There is no discussion of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, and no

contention that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to rule that the of f set was a violation

of the stay even though it arose out of dom estic relations orders. 5 9

Because Carlton has not identif ied the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine as an issue on

appeal and has not brief

ed the question, this Court will not consider whether the

bankruptcy

court erred in apply ing the doctrine. In contrast to the rule that an appellate 6 0

court m ay af f irm on any basis shown by

the record, there is no rule of appellate procedure

that an appellate court may reverse based upon an issue not raised by the appellant.

Bankruptcy

Rule 8014(a) provides that an appellant’s brief m ust contain, am ong other

things, “a statem ent of

the issues presented” and “the argument, which m ust contain the

appellant’s contentions and the reasons f or them , with citations to the authorities and parts

of the record on which the appellant relies.” This bankruptcy rule is derived f

rom 6 1

Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 28(a), which has been construed to mean that an

appellate court should not reverse on the basis of an error not addressed in the appellant’s

In her Reply

Brief , Carlton does argue that the domesti c relations exception to 5 9
f ederal jurisdiction does not apply , but she does not m ention the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

See e.g., Wyoming v. Livingston , 443 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding 6 0 whether def

endant-appellee was f

ederal empl oy ee was waived by plaintif f -appellant because not addressed in appellant’s opening brief , even though issue was raised bef ore district court and at appellate oral argument); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa , 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1990) (issue not argued in appellate brief or at oral argument is waived).

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8014(a)(5), (a)(8). 6 1

17opening brief . The Tenth Circuit has said,

An appellant’s opening brief m ust identif

y “appellant’s contentions
and the reasons f

or them , with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Consistent with this requirement, we routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately

presented, in an appellant’s opening brief . Stated dif

f erently

, the om ission of

an issue in an opening brief generally f orf eits appellate
consideration of

that issue. 6 2

The f oregoing rule is related to the general principle that “a party m ay not lose in the

district court on one theory of the case, and then prevail on appeal on a dif f erent

theory .” In this case, bef ore the bankruptcy

court, Carlton did not m eaningf ully respond 6 3

to Levin’s position that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precluded consideration of

Carlton’s Counterclaim . She has waived any right to have the decision reversed even if

the bankruptcy

court erred when rely ing on the doctrine.

Rather than addressing the basis f or the bankruptcy

court’s Dism issal Order in her

Appellant’s Brief

, Carlton addresses irrelevant procedural matters. She asserts that the

Civil Rules are to be construed liberally , that Civil Rule 8(a) requires only that a

com plaint contain a short and plain statem ent of the claim showing the pleader is entitled

to relief , and that m otions to dism iss are disf avored. These assertions are generally true,

but Carlton f

ails to show how they

were violated. Carlton also argues that Levin’s

Motion to Dism iss asserted a num ber of af f irm ative def

enses and that af

f irm ative

def enses are not the proper basis f or a m otion to dism iss. Af f irm ative def

enses are

addressed in Civil Rule 8(c), which states that in responding to a pleading, a party m ust

Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations om itted). 6 2

Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust , 994 F.2d 716, 721 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Lone 6 3 Star Steel v. United Mine Workers , 851 F.2d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 1998)).

18af

f irm atively

state any avoidance or af

f irm ative def

ense, including eighteen listed

def enses. Carlton does not identif y any def enses which were stated as grounds to 6 4

dism iss the Counterclaim , and the bankruptcy court did not grant the Motion to Dism iss

based on any

af f irm ative def

ense. Carlton’s basic position, stated in her brief and

reiterated at oral argument, is that the Counterclaim should not have been dism issed

because the allegations in it are suf f icient to state a cause of

action. But this contention

provides no basis f

or reversal since it f

ails to address the reason f or the bankruptcy

court’s Dism issal Order.

3. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion w hen deny ing Carlton’s

m otion to reconsider the order dismis sing the Counterclaim on the ground that the

Motion to Dism iss should have been treated as a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent.

A bankruptcy

court’s ruling on a Civil Rule 59 m otion is reviewed f or an abuse of

discretion, and we f

ind no such abuse. On appeal, Carlton asserts that the bankruptcy

court erred when deny ing her Reconsideration Motion because, contrary to the

bankruptcy

court’s ruling, under Civil Rule 12(d), the Motion to Dism iss should have

been treated as a motion for summ ary judgm ent because the bankruptcy court considered

m atters outside the f

our corners of

the Com plaint. 6 5

Civil Rule 12(d) requires a court to treat a 12(b)(6) motion as a m otion f or

sum m ary judgm ent under certain circumstances. Specifically , C i v i l R u l e 1 2 ( d )

provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), m ade applicable to adversary proceedings by

Fed. R. Bankr. 6 4
P. 7008.

Appellant’s Brief

is am biguous about whether she asserts that summ ary judgm ent 6 5

treatm ent was required f

or the Motion to Dism iss or the Reconsideration Motion.

19[ i]f

, on a m otion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . , m atters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the m otion m

ust be treated as
one f or sum m ary

judgm ent . . . . [ P]arties m ust be given a reasonable opportunity

to present all [ pertinent] m aterial. 6 6

Under Civil Rule 12(d), a bankruptcy court com m its reversible error if it considers

supplem entary

m aterials without converting the m otion to dism iss into a m otion f or

sum m ary judgm ent and com

ply ing with the sum m ary

judgm ent rules. But even if a 6 7

bankruptcy

court considers and relies on matters outside the pleadings without giving the

parties a chance to present pertinent material, that action does “not necessarily m andate

reversal unless ‘the record discloses the existence of unresolved m aterial f

act issues,’ or

‘the parties represent that they would have subm itted specif ic controverted material

f actual issues to the trial court if they had been given the opportunity .’” 6 8

Carlton urges us to read Civil Rule 12(d) narrowly to m ean that in a situation 6 9

such as this, where an Answer and Counterclaim are filed as one responsive plea ding to a

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), m ade applicable to adversary proceedings by

Fed. R. Bankr. 6 6 P. 7012(b).

Miller v. Glanz , 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Ohio v. Peterson, 6 7 Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross , 585 F.2d 454, 457 (10th Cir. 1978)).

United States v. Rogers Cartage Co.

, 794 F.3d 854, 861 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting 6 8
W oods v. City of Chicago , 234 F.3d 979, 991 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also GFF Corp. v. Associated W

holesale Grocers, Inc. , 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (f ailure to convert Civil Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to one f or sum m ary

judgm ent where outside m aterials not excluded is reversible error unless outside materials were not outcom e determ inative).

W e exercise our discretion to address the Civil Rule 12(d) issue despite several 6 9 def iciencies in Carlton’s presentation to this Court. Carlton did not raise the issue bef ore the bankruptcy

court. W hen opposing the Motion to Dism iss, she did not argue that

m atters outside the pleadings should be considered or that the motion should be converted to one under Civil Rule 56. Also, she m ade no such contention when seeking reconsideration. The bankruptcy court sua sponte raised the Civil Rule 12(d) issue when deny ing the Reconsideration Motion. Further, our review of this issue, like the RookerFeldman issue, is ham

pered by the absence of

the transcript of

the Oral Ruling f

rom the record on appeal.

20Com

plaint, a bankruptcy

court m ay

only consider the allegations contained in the

Counterclaim

— not any

adm issions or denials in the Answer — in the context of a

12(b)(6) m otion. There does not appear to be any authority to support such a narrow

reading of

the rule, and Carlton does not cite any . The plain language of Civil Rule 7 0

12(d) lim its its application to situations where “m atters outside the pleadings are

presented.” The Answer and Counterclaim filed by Carlton f all squarely

within the 7 1

plain m eaning of

the word “pleadings.”

In this case, when objecting to dism issal, Carlton did not identif y any m aterial

controverted f

acts or suggest that Civil Rule 56 applied. She also did not ref erence Civil

Rule 12(d) in her Reconsideration Motion. Carlton was aware of and adm itted the f

acts

alleged in the Com

plaint, and those f

acts were suf

f icient f or the bankruptcy

court’s ruling.

There is no showing of

what would have been accomplished if the Motion to Dismiss had

been decided under the Civil Rule 12(d) procedures.

The Court theref

ore af f irm s the grant of

the Motion to Dism iss and the denial of

the Reconsideration Motion.

B. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in granting sum m ary judgm ent on Levin’s § 523(a)(15) Claim

.

A ruling on a sum m ary

judgm ent m otion is reviewed de novo , apply ing “the sam e

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has liberally

construed Civil Rule 12(d). See 7 0 GFF Corp. , 130 F.3d at 1384 (Notwithstanding the general rule that a Civil Rule 12(b)(6)

m otion m ust be converted to a mot ion f or sum m ary

judgm ent if

m atters outside the pleadings are considered, “if a plaintif f does not incorporate by

ref erence or attach a docum ent to its com

plaint, but the docum ent is ref erred to in the compl aint and is central to the plaintif

f ’s claim , a def

endant m ay

subm it an indisputably

authentic copy

to the court to be considered on a motion to di sm iss.”).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (em phasis added). 7 1

21legal standard as was used by the bankruptcy

court to determ ine whether either party is

entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Section 523(a)(15) provides that a debt “to a 7 2

spouse, f orm er spouse, or child of

the debtor and not of

the kind described in paragraph

(5) that is incurred by

the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection

with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of

record” is

nondischargeable under § 727. The bankruptcy court independently

exam ined the 7 3

nondischargeability

of the February

2015 Judgm ent under § 523(a)(5) and (a)(15),

ultim ately

concluding that it was nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(15).

Carlton argues that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the February

2015 Judgm ent was nondischargeable because § 523(a)(15) does not include a spec if ic

ref erence to prenuptial agreements. Her argum ent is not persuasive. This Court has

previously

held that exceptions to discharge under § 523(a)(15) are construed more

liberally than other provisions of

§ 523. The Ninth Circuit has also specif ically held, as 7 4

have other bankruptcy

courts, that attorney

f ee awards owed to a non-debtor spouse are

nondischargeable under § 523(a)(15). 7 5

The record indicates there is no dispute that the February 2015 Judgm ent is a debt

LTF Real Estate v. Expert S. Tulsa , 522 B.R. at 643 (quoting Rushton v. Bank of 7 2 Utah ( In re C.W . Mining Co.) , 477 B.R. 176, 180 (10th Cir. BAP 2012)).

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). 7 3

In re Taylor , 478 B.R. 419, 427 (10th Cir. BAP 2012), aff’d , 737 F.3d 670 (10th 7 4 Cir. 2013).

Lilly v. Smithson (

In re Lilly) , No. AZ-11-1185, 2012 WL 603771, at *3-4 (9th Cir. 7 5 BAP Jan. 31, 2012); Baker v. Baker (In re Baker) , No. 12-1302, 2013 W L 2606406, at *3-5 (Bankr. D.N.M. June 11, 2013); Mordas v. Schenkein (In re Schenkein) , No. 09- 01947, 2010 W L 3219464, at *4-6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2010).

22owed to a spouse or f orm er spouse and is not a “domesti c support obligation” under

§ 523(a)(5). Accordingly , the only issue on appeal is whether the judgment was incurred

by Carlton in the course of

a divorce or in connection with a divorce decree or other order

of a court of

record. 7 6

W e conclude that the bankruptcy court was correct in determining that the

February 2015 Judgm ent was incurred by Carlton in the course of

a divorce and in

connection with a divorce decree or other order of a court of

record. The Domestic Court

entered the February

2015 Judgm ent f

ollowing rem and f

rom the Utah Court of

Appeals’

af f irm ance of

an order entered in the course of alim ony reduction proceedings. Levin

incurred and paid attorney f ees directly

attributable to the divorce-related litigation

instigated by

Carlton, f

or which Carlton was responsible pursuant to the Agreement and

Utah law. Accordingly , the bankruptcy court did not err in determini ng that the February

2015 Judgm ent was nondischargable pursuant to § 523(a)(15), and entering its Corrected

Sum m ary Judgm ent Order.

V. Conclusion

Carlton has not shown that the bankruptcy court erred when it entered the

Dism issal Order granting the Motion to Dism iss, or that its Reconsideration Order

deny ing her Reconsideration Motion was an abuse of discretion. The bankruptcy court

correctly determ ined that Levin had established that no m aterial issues of f act existed and

that he was entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law on his § 523(a)(15)

nondischargeability

claim , so the bankruptcy court’s Corrected Summ ary Judgm ent Order

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). 7 6

23and its Corrected Judgm ent were not erroneous.

Based on the f

orgoing, we hold that the dism issal of the Counterclaim

and the

grant of sum m ary judgm ent in f

avor of Levin on the allegations of the Com plaint were

appropriate. We AFFIRM.

24