1 

### NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: LETI C I A MIRANDA

- GARCIA , Debtor

. BAP No. AZ

- 2 2

- 1 0 53

- L B F

Bk. No. 2 : 20

- b k

- 08707

- EPB

MEMOR AN DUM ∗ GREG BEST , Ap pell ant , v. LETICIA MIRAND A

- GAR CIA ; LOTHAR GOERNITZ, Chapter 7 Trustee , Appell ee s

. Appeal from the United States Bankruptc y Court for the District of Arizona Eddward P. Ballinger, Jr. , Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Pres iding

Before: LAFFER T Y, BRAND , and FARIS, Ban kruptcy Judges.

I N T R ODUCT ION
Creditor Greg Best appeals the bankruptc y court ’ s order den ying his request to extend retroactivel y the deadline for filing a § 523 (c) 1 complaint

∗ Th is d is p o s it i on is n o t appropri at e f or publica t ion

. Alt h ou g h it may be cited fo r wha t ever pe r su a si v e val ue i t ma y ha ve, se e Fe d . R

. A p p

. P. 32. 1, it has n o p recedential

v al ue, see 9t h C i r. BA P R u l e 8024

- 1.

1 Unl es s s p ec i fied o t her w ise, a ll c ha p te r a nd secti on re f e rences are to t he B a nkr up tc y C ode, 1 1 U.S .C. §§ 10 1

– 1 53 2

. “ Rule ” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proc edure, and “ Ci vil Rul e ” refe renc es ar e to the Federa l Rules of Civil Pr ocedu re. “ LBR ” referen ces are to the Lo cal Bank rup tcy Rules for the Dist rict of Arizona. 

# FILED

OCT 17 2022
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT2 and related relief

. Best argued that relief was warranted beca use , although
he was aware of the deadline, h e re lied on the chapter 7 trustee ’ s stateme nt
at the § 341(a) meeting that he wou ld be seeking dismiss al of the case for
Debtor Leti cia Miranda

- Garcia ’ s failure to appea r

. But the t rustee did not
move to di smiss the case because Debtor informed him that her failure to appear was due to CO VID. A con ti nued § 341(a) meeting wa s then
scheduled without notice to creditors . The deadline for filing nondischargeabil i ty complaints passed , and the case essentially proceeded
in due course. Upon lea r ning that Debtor had received a discharge , Best filed a
moti on t o reope n and vacate t he discharge, which the bankruptcy court granted. He then filed an untimely adversary proceeding seeking to except his debt from discharge. Next, he filed motions : (1) for relief from stay and

to abst a in from det ermining Best ’ s claim , (2) to extend the d ea dline for objections to disch arge, and (3) to dismiss Debtor ’ s bankruptcy cas e

. Debtor moved to reinstate the discharge. The bankruptcy court denied
Be st ’ s motions and granted Debtor ’ s.
T he primary que stion under lying the mot ions was w h ether , under
the fac ts before it, the bankruptcy court had the a uthority to extend the
deadline for Best to file a nondischar geability complaint. The bankruptcy
court found that alth ough mistakes were made b y others, in t he end it w as
Best ’ s respo nsibil i t y to tr ack the bankru ptcy court d ocket to en sure that he
filed a timely complaint , and neither t he Code nor the Rules , as interpreted3 by the Ninth Circuit, permitte d the bankruptcy court to ex tend the
deadline in th e ci r cumstances

. W e A FFIRM

. FAC TS
Deb t o r filed a chapter 7 ba nkruptcy case in July 2020. Lothar
Goern itz was appointed chapter 7 tr ust ee ( “ Tr ustee ” ). Debtor listed Best on
her S chedule F as a nonpriority unsecured creditor holding two
unl iquidated claim s , and she included Best on her m a s ter ma il ing lis t. Best
holds a state court judgment in ex cess of $1 million ag ainst Debtor and
others a nd, a s of the petition date, wa s litigating fraud and related claims against Debtor in a separate lawsuit.
The day af ter Debtor filed he r petition, t h e bankr up tcy c le rk issued

not ice of the date of the First Meetin g of Creditors (“First 341 Meeting ”)

an d the Octob er 30, 2020 deadline for the filing of objections to discharge and dischargeability complaints

. A few days be fore the First 34 1 Meeting , the b ankrup t cy c lerk dismissed th e case for Debtor’s failure to pay the filing fee. Apparently un aware of the dismiss a l, Best and his state cou rt
counsel appear ed for the First 341 Meeting

. A few days later, T rustee filed a Re port of No Distribu tion , wh ich

c o ntaine d form lang uage st a t ing : I, LOTH AR GOERNITZ, having been appointed trustee of the estate of the ab ove
- named debtor(s), report tha t th is case was dismissed or c onverted. I have nei ther received any property nor paid an y monies on account of this esta t e. I h ereby certi fy4 that the chapter 7 estate of the above

- named debtor(s) has been fully administered t hrough the date of conversion o r di smissal. I request that I be discharged from a ny further duties as trustee.

. . . Nearly a mo nth later, Debtor file d a mot i on to re in state the case , which th e bankr uptcy c ourt granted. The bankruptcy clerk issued a new
notic e of § 341 (a) meeting (“Second 341 Meeting ”) and of the ne w deadline
for objections to di scharge and nondischargeabilit y complaints , December 18, 2 020 ( “ B ar D ate ” )

. I t is undisput ed that Best had not ice of these dates.
Best and his state cou rt counsel appeared at the Second 341 Meeting , but
Debtor did not. Trustee stated on the record he would be moving to
dismiss the case due to Debtor’s failure t o appear.
T rustee n ev er f iled a motion t o dism iss because, shortly after the
Second 341 Meet ing , he rec eived a “frantic phone call ” from Debtor in
which she informed him that she had been unable to attend the meeting
because sh e was dealing with COVID

. H e ne ve rthe l e s s fil ed a no ther Report
of No Distribution containing the same language as the first , i ncluding the

ver biage that the case had been d ismissed or converted

. A week later, he
filed a w ithdrawal of that rep ort, which sta t ed , “Trustee’s Repor t in a dis mi ssed cas e was file d in error.”
T wo weeks later, without notice to interested parties, Trustee
conducted Debtor’s § 341 m eet ing (“Third 341 Meet ing”). Best did not
appear , presumably becaus e he lac ked notice

.5 About a m onth later, Trustee filed a standard R ep ort o f No
Distri bution , which i n dicated that there were no funds for distribution and that the case had been fully administered. Eventually, the bankruptcy clerk
closed th e case a nd discha rged Trustee of his duties. Thi s was followed by the filing of a N ot ice that Case Wa s Clos ed Without Entry of the Discharge
due to Debtor’s failure to file h er Financial Management Cour se Certificate , notice of wh ich was provided to Best.
T hree m onths later, Debtor filed her F inancial Management Cours e Certificate and a m otion to re open, which the bankr uptcy c ourt granted. Her discharge was entered that same day , and t he case was clos ed s hortly
thereaf ter

. After receiving notice of the dis charge , Best hired counsel and filed a
motion to r eopen and vacate the discharg e

. A lthough it does not ap pear that Debtor filed a n ything in response to that motion , she appear ed at the initial hearing on the matter t o ex press her opp osition , clai ming she had proof that Best had b een notified of the Third 341 M eeting.
T he bankruptcy c ou rt set the matte r for an evident iary hearing , at
which Trustee and Debtor testified. Trustee conceded th at his of fice had mistakenly failed to p rovi de notice of the Third 3 41 Meeting , and Debtor had no evidence to the contrary . The bankruptcy court t h u s gr an ted the
motion to va cate the d isc harge

. In Sept ember 202 1, approximately nine months after the Bar Date , Best filed a complaint seeking a declaration of nondischargeability with6 respect to his claim under §§ 5 23 (a)(2) and (a)(6). He then f il ed a motio n in
the bank ruptcy case seeking r elief from stay to liquidate h is p e nding claims

a gainst Debtor in s tate court and asking the bankruptcy cour t to abstain
from hearin g those claims. He also filed a mo ti on to extend t he deadline for filing obje c ti ons to dis ch arge, argui ng that the bankruptc y court ha d authority under § 105( a ) to set a new de adline to prevent an abuse of
process. Debtor filed a motion under Civil Rule 60 , applicable via Ru le 9024,

to reconsider th e vacat ur o f the discharge or der

. In respons e, Best moved to
dismi ss the bankr uptcy case on the ground s that Debtor had failed to appear for her first two meeting s of creditors , to provide documents to
Trustee , and to provide notice of the Thi rd 341 M eeting as required by the
L ocal Bankruptcy R ules for the District of A r izo na

. Afte r a hearing , the bankruptcy court denied Best ’ s motions and granted Debtor ’ s. Best time ly appealed. J U RIS D ICTI ON
The bankruptcy cou rt had jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § § 1334 and
157 (b)(2) ( A ) and (G)

. We have juri sdictio n und er 28 U.S.C. § 158.
I SSUE S
Did the bankru pt cy court abuse its discretio n in denyin g Best ’ s
motion to exten d the deadl ine f or filing a n on di schargeabi li t y complai nt? Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in granting Debt or ’ s
motion to reinstate the discharge ?7 D id the ba nkruptcy court a buse i ts discretion in denying Best ’ s motion to dismiss Debtor ’ s case?
Did the b ankruptcy court abuse its discretion in denying Bes t ’ s
motion for relief from stay and abstention ?
S TA N D ARD S O F R EVIE W
The bankr uptc y cou rt ’ s interpretation of the Code and Rules is

re view ed de novo. Kir Temecula, L.P. v. LPM Corp. (In re LPM Corp.) , 269 B.R. 217, 220 ( 9th Cir. BAP 2001), aff ’ d , 300 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2002)

. De

nov o review means tha t we r eview the matter anew , a s if th e b ankrup tcy

cou rt had no t pr evio u sly deci ded i t. Fran cis v. Wallace (In re Franci s) , 5 05
B.R. 9 14, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 201 4). The bankruptcy court ’ s rulings o n a motion for relief from s tay , a
motion to extend the deadline t o file a nondischargeability co mpl aint, and
a motion to dism iss a chapter 7 ca se are all reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Serv. , Inc. ( In re Veal ) , 450 B.R. 897, 915 ( 9 th Cir. BAP 2011) (re lief from stay); W illms v. Sanderson , 723 F.3d 1094,
11 03 (9th Cir. 2013) (m otio n to exte nd) ; Mendez v . S alve n ( In re Mendez ) , 36 7 B.R. 109, 113 ( 9 t h Cir. BAP 2007) (motion to dismiss). An order granting
reconsideration is also review e d for abu se of discre tion. See First Ave. W. Bldg., LLC v. James (In re On eC ast Media, Inc.) , 439 F.3 d 55 8, 56 1 (9th Cir.
2 006 ) (o rder d enying reconsideration )

. To determine whethe r the bankruptcy court abused its discretion, we
conduct a two

- step inquiry: (1) we review de no vo wheth er the bankruptc y8 cour t “identified the corre ct legal rule to apply to t he r eli ef requested” ; and ( 2) i f it did, we co nsider whether the bankruptcy cour t ’ s application of the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferenc es that may be drawn fro m the facts in the record. Un it ed States v. Hinkson , 585
F.3 d 1 24 7, 1262 (9t h Cir

. 20 09 ) (en ban c).
DISC USS I O N Although the bankruptcy court had severa l motions before it, the threshold question affecting a ll those motions was whe ther , under the
circumstan c es, it had the authority t o e xtend retroactively t he d eadline t o file a no nd is chargeabili t y c omp laint. B ased on Ninth Circuit authority plac ing an affirmativ e duty on creditors to protect their claims , the bankruptcy court concluded that Best had not met his burden to show

un ique or extraordin a ry circumst ances justif yi n g a n ext ens ion unde r Rules 4007(c) or 4004(b ) , e ven though Trustee ’ s actions had created confusion.
This determination supported or mooted the relief requested in the other
motions. As discussed below, the bankruptcy court correct ly interpre ted the applic able law.
A. The ba nkrupt cy court di d not abuse its discre tion in denying Best ’ s motion to extend the Bar Date

. Rule 400 7 ( c ) provides , a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c) shall be filed no later than 60 da ys after the f irst date set for th e meeting of cred i tors under § 341(a). The court shall give all creditors no l e ss than 30 days ’ notice of the time so fixed in9 the manner provided in Rule 2002. On motion of a party in interest, after hearing on notice, th e court may fo r cause e xtend the t ime fixed under t h is subdivision. The m otion sha ll be filed before the time ha s expired. Rule 900 6(b)(3) provides that a “co urt may enla rge the time for taking
action under Rul e

. . . 4007(c)

. . . only to the ex tent and under the

con ditions s tated in [ t h at rule] .”
B est acknowledge s that he had notice of the B ar D ate

. He
nevertheless r elied on Trustee ’ s representation at t he Se cond 341 Meeting
that he intended to dism iss the case for Debtor ’ s failure to appear

. Dismissal would have el imi nated the B ar D at e , and if the cas e were reinstated, new de adlines would have been set

. Because this did not occur, and because he was not given n oti ce of the Third 341 Meeting, h e a rgues
t he bankruptcy court erred in not granti ng an exten sion of the Ba r Date

. But a s the bankruptcy co urt acknowledged , the time l imit s set forth in the Bankrupt cy Rules are strictly construed

. Fur ther, “ [a] creditor wit h actual knowledge of a bankruptcy case h as an affirmative duty to take
action t o protect i ts claim e ven where it receives no notice of the ba r date. ” Wilzig v. Lopez ( In re Lopez ) , 192 B.R. 539, 543 ( 9th Cir. BAP 1996) (citations omitted). See also Lompa v . Price ( In re Price ) , 871 F.2d 97, 99 ( 9th Cir. 1989) (even though debtor fail ed to list creditor on ba nkruptcy schedules , and
creditor rece iv ed no notice of bar dates, creditor was not e ntitled to
extensio n of bar date when his state court counsel had n o tice of the bankruptcy filing in time to ascertain the bar date )

.10 A b ankruptc y court has no discretion to exten d retro acti vely the
deadline set in Rule 4007 ( c )

. Anwar v. Johnson , 720 F.3d 1183 , 1186 ( 9 th Cir. 2013)

. In Anwar , t he creditor ’ s counsel attempted to file no ndischargea bility complaint s on t he last day for doing so but, due to techn ica l problem s with his computer, he m issed the midnight deadline by mere minut es

. Id. at
1185

- 86. The Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court ’ s d i smissal of the complaints as untimely : “ Consiste n t with the plain lang uage of FRBP
4007 ( c ) a nd 9006(b)(3 ), we ha ve repeatedly held that the sixty

- day time limit for filing nondisch argeability complaints under 11 U.S. C. § 523(c) is
strict and, without qualificatio n , cannot be extended unless a motion is
made before the 60

- day limit expires. ” Id. at 1 187 (cita tions an d quo t ation
mark s omitted )

. Of c ourse, Anw a r is factu ally distinguis hable because in that instance
ther e was no confusion about the bar date

. But , as noted abov e, even where

a creditor lacks notice of the bar date, th at does not automatically entitle
that creditor to a r etroactive extension of the bar da te. Such an extension may be warranted only whe n the court was respons ible for misleading the
creditor. In th at ci rcumstance , the Ninth Circuit has held that the
ba nk ruptcy court has the equitable pow er und er § 105(a) to c orrect its
mistake. Anwiler v. Patchett ( In re Anwiler ) , 958 F.2d 925, 9 2 9 (9th Cir. 1992),
as amended o n denial of reh ’ g (A pr. 8, 1992)

. 2

2 The Anwar cou rt cited Anwiler but explicitly stated that it was not deciding whether “ external forces that prevented any filings

— such as emergency situat ions, the11 In Anwiler , t he debtor filed his chapter 7 case in the Ce nt ral District of
Californi a. The cl erk of t hat court sent out t he required notice of § 341 (a)

mee ting and ba r dates for f il ing comp lain ts to determin e dischargeability
of debts and to object to discharge . Thereafter, the case was transferred t o the Southern District of Califor nia . The clerk of th at court sent out a ne w notice with later deadline s. Cre ditors filed a nondischargeability complaint
after the earlier de adline but before the latter . Neverth eless, the bankruptcy
court dismissed the co mplaint as unt i mely because it was not filed wit hin
60 d ays of the date set for the first § 3 41 (a ) meeting . T his Pa nel rev ersed,
and the Ninth Circ uit affirmed the Panel. The Circuit hel d that, although
the time limit s under Rules 4004 and 4007 are to be strict ly constr ued, t he bankruptcy court had equi ta ble po wer under § 105(a) t o correct its own
mistake : Allowi ng a c ourt to correct its mistakes is not inconsistent with the purpose of Bankruptcy Rules 4004 and 4007. U nder the prior bankruptcy rules a party requ esting an exten sion of time after the time to fil e had passed could ple ad excusable neglect. When the ne w rule s elimi nated excusable neglect as a remedy, the parties were put on notice that they must be diligent in pursuing their claims. The intent behind the rules is no t circumvented by allowing a n unti me ly complaint to stan d when a party relied on a court docume nt sent before the deadline had expired. It would be very harsh indeed to deny equitable relief in cas es where the delay in filing is not due to

loss of the court ’ s own electronic filing cap acity, or the court ’ s affirmative misleading of a party

— would war rant [ any equitable ] exception ” to the strict application of the f iling deadl ine

. Anwar , 720 F.3d at 1188 n.6

.12 t he fault of eit her party. While it is true that t he Creditors could hav e made a motion to extend time if they were co nfused about the proper date for filing the complaint, Anwiler could have also asked the court for clarification. As between two innocent p arties “[ i]f on e party must bear a loss, it shoul d be the Debtor becaus e he had notice of the erroneous date a nd had greater incentive to examine and correct the notice. It does not serve the Debtor well in equit y to object to the complaint after the Claim ants have reaso nably relied on and complied with th e erroneous notice.” In re Anwiler , 958 F.2d at 929 ( quoti ng B row n v. Sibley (In re Sibley) , 71 B.R. 147, 1 49 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) )

. Because the confusion res ulted from two

courts setting two different de adlines , the Circuit agreed with the BAP that
i t would be an abuse o f discretion to dismiss the compla int on the gr ound that it was untimely filed. Id. Similarly, i n In re Lopez , 192 B.R. 53 9 , th e bankrup tcy clerk issued
confusin g notices regarding the § 341 (a) mee ting and bar dates for filing

no ndis chargeabil i t y complain t s. The firs t n otice set a d ate for the § 341 (a ) meeting but did no t include a bar date; the second set a new dat e for the § 341 (a) meeting and included a bar dat e that was more than 60 days aft er
t he date scheduled for the firs t § 34 1 (a) meeting. A credit o r filed a
nond ischargeability complaint on the later bar date, and the bankruptcy court granted the deb to r ’ s motion to dis miss. The Panel reversed, holding
that altho ugh creditors g enerally hav e an affirmative duty to ascertain bar
d ates, the ambiguous no t ices created c onfusion that warranted granting an
extension:13 Because a creditor ’ s actual knowledge of a bankruptcy
case c reates an affirmative duty to ascertain the bar dates, arguably the imp lica tion of the September notice o f the existence of an earlie r date set for the meeting of creditors should have elicited an attempt by the creditor to determine the earlier date. Howe ver, under the circumstances attendant here, a confusin g problem was pr esen ted. An investigation of the d ocket would have shown that n o earlier orde r had been entered. While this information could have led the creditor to the assumption that the September notice announced the “first date set,” this conclusion is not readily a ppar ent. Since the notice facially purpo rts not to set the fir s t date and ref ers to a prior effective order, this assumption could reasonably not have come to mind. In this instance, th e erroneous notice placed the creditor in a worse posit ion than no noti ce a t all. Id. at 544. On appeal, Best attempts to equate Tru s tee ’ s acti ons to those of the bankruptcy court, arguing that he was misled by Trustee ’ s statement that
he would move to dism iss th e case and Trustee ’ s (and Debtor ’ s ) failure to comply with the lo ca l rules by giving notice of th e Thir d 341 Meeting

. He poin ts out that Trustee and his counsel are officers of the court

. Alt ernatively, he argues that th e errors in this case were so egregious that
there must be a remedy for them, and he urges the Pa nel to view the m as

“ unique ” circu mstances t hat warrant an ext ension of the Bar Date. In light
of the Ninth Circuit ’ s pronounce m ents regarding the narrow circumstances
in which a retroactive extension may be g ranted, however, we will not expand Anwiler ’ s h oldi ng to apply to Trus tee ’ s error s in thi s case

.14 Best emphas izes the failure to notice the rescheduled Third 341
Me eting. H e correctly points out that the Local Bankruptcy Rules for the
District of A rizona requ ire the re

- noticing of a continue d § 341 (a) meet ing.
See LBR 2003

- 1 and 2084

- 7

. 3 T he p arties agree that th is requirement was not

met. Bu t, as noted by the bank ru ptcy court, when a § 341 (a) meeting is
continued in a case that is not dismiss ed, th e continua nce does no t impact
the de adline f or filing a non di schargeability complaint. Se e In re A nwiler , 958 F.2d at 927 ( “ A bsent a motion to extend, the [bar] d ate, once set, does not change

. ” (c itations om itted) )

. Best erroneously conflat es the requirement to notice the continued § 341 (a) meeting with a req uire ment to

re
- notice the deadline for fil ing no ndischargeabil ity co mplaints

. Best also assigns error to the bankrup tcy court ’ s conclusion that a creditor who has knowledge of a bankruptcy has a n affirmative duty to

3 LBR 2003

- 1(a) pr ovi des: Any requ est to continue the meeti ng of creditors, to c onsolid ate the meetings of creditors, or to change the location of the meeting of creditors shall be directed to the Un ited States Trustee in chapter 9 or 11 c ases or to the case trustee in chap ter 7, 12 or 13 cases. If the trustee gra nts the continuance, the req uesting party must immediately file a notice of the new date, time, and location, and serve that notice on al l c reditors and parties in interest on the master mailing list, and file a cer tificat e of
serv ice.
LBR 2084

- 7 provides: For good cause, the trustee may reschedule or continue the meeting of creditors. If rescheduled, the trustee mus t request that the Clerk pr ovide notice of the res cheduled m eeting using the applicable ECF filing eve nt so t hat servi ce can be effected by the Clerk or Bankruptcy Noticin g Center. If continued, the trustee will note the continued hearing date on the docke t

.15 protect his c laim

. See I n re Lopez , 192 B.R

. at 543

. But as the ban kruptcy

court pointed out, the dock et never indicated that the case had been
dismissed. An d Trustee withdrew his report in a dismissed case on November 2, 2020, over a month before the Bar Date. Finally, as also pointed out by th e ba nkruptcy court, any con fusi on could h ave been
resolved wit h a phone call to Trustee. While we are sympathetic to Best ’ s situation, the bankruptcy court did not misinterpret applicable Ninth Circuit authority in denying the motion to e xtend the Bar Date

. B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse i ts discretion in gran ting Debtor ’ s motion to reinstate the discharge. Altho ugh the bankruptcy co urt did not explicitly state its rationale for granting D ebtor ’ s motion to reinstate the discharge , the record support s
it s ruling. The denial o f Best ’ s motion to extend the Bar Da te eliminated the only applicable excep tion to the requ irement to grant a discharge, see Rule
4004 ( c ) (1) ( E ) , 4 and Debtor had met the other requirements to receive a
dis charge . Ther e was thus no re as on to deny the motion

. Best do es not
argue o therwise.

4 That rule provides : In a chapter 7 case, on expiration of the times fixed for objecting to discharge an d for filing a motion to dismiss t he case under Rule 10 17(e), the court shall forthwith grant the discharge, except that the court shall not grant the discharge if:

. . . (E) a motion to extend the time for filing a complaint objecting to the discharge is pending [.]16 C. T he bankruptcy court did not abus e its discretion in den ying Best ’ s mo tion to dismiss. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss without any analysis, which Best argues was error. Best c ontend s that cause existed to
dism iss the case based on Debtor ’ s failures to appear at two § 341 (a) meetings and to pro vide required documents. He also argues that
dismissal w ould have been an appropriate alterna tive to extending the Bar
Date and wo uld hav e reme died the wrong he suffered d ue to t he mistakes
made in t his case. But dismissal under both §§ 707(a) and (b) is discretionary, and, g iven the bankruptcy court ’s denial of Best ’s moti on to

exte nd and its reinstatement of the discharge, denial of the m otion to dismiss was approp riate

. In an y event, dismissal wo uld not have afforded a ny relief to Best
because dismissal would not have a utomatically revoked the discharge.
Paveli ch v. McCormick, Barst ow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP ( In re
Pavelich ) , 229 B.R . 777, 780 ( 9th Cir. BAP 1999) , as am ended (Feb. 22, 1999)

. See also Rosado v. Corred era Pablos ( In re Rosado ) , No. P R 11

- 08 1, 2012 WL
2564375 , at 5 ( 1st Cir. BAP June 29, 2012) ( reversing bankruptc y court ’s grant of motion to dismiss chapter 7 ca se th at had been fully administ ered
and d ischa rged because creditor s lacked c onstitutional standing , and the
matter was moot b ecause no relief could be afforded to the moving
creditors , citing cases) ; In re Rodriguez , 255 B. R. 118, 12 1 (Bankr. S. D .N.Y.17 2000 ) (dismissal after discharge co nfe rs all the benefits but none of the burdens of bankruptcy on the debtor)

. D

. Best ’ s m otion for r elief from s tay was rendered moot by the granting of Debtor ’ s motio n to reinstate the discharge. Although the autom atic stay was in effect when Best filed h is motion
for relief from stay , the reinstate ment of Debtor ’ s discharge terminated th e stay. § 362( c )(2) (C). The request for relief from stay was thus rende red

moot , as the bankruptcy court could not have granted an y effective r elief

. Best does not argue otherwise.
C O N C L US ION
F o r these reasons, the b ank ru ptcy c ourt did not abus e its discretion in denying Best ’ s motion s to extend the B ar D ate, motion to dism iss, and motion for relief from stay, nor did it abuse its discretion in reinstat ing
Debtor ’ s discharge

. W e th ere f ore AF F IRM.