alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002

(subsections (a) and
(b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers
of SHC Advance Services Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s
knowledge, that:



The Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q
for the quarter ended January 31, 2012 (the “Form 10-Q”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Dated: May 3, 2012 | By: | /s/ David Selengut                  
|------------------ | --- | ------------------------------------
|                   |     | David Selengut, President           
|                   |     |                                     
|Dated: May 3, 2012 | By: | /s/ Barry I. Grossman               
|                   |     | Barry I. Grossman, CFO and Treasurer



The foregoing certification is being furnished
solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title
18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document.



A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to SHC Advance Services Inc. and will be retained by SHC Advance Services Inc. and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                          56,344
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                60,648
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  60,648
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           54,237
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,590    
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,821    
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    60,648
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                44,694
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (44,694)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (44,694)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1
 
 Certification of Principal Executive Officer
 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of China Renewable Construction Materials Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Chi Wu, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 /s/ Chi WuChi Wu
Principal Executive Officer

May 23, 2011
# G ^w«^u:t ^ Lcs>\^u^e^i r poT ^ ^ST ' ifjC - /;?6 ^ IRO N COUNT Y BOAR D CHAIRMA N 30 0 Taconit

e Stree t • Suit e 12 1 • Hurley , W

I 54534 _ (715)561-322 6

1 5 No v 201 0 Mr . Denni s DeVan y Essentia l Ai r

Servic e Divisio n X5 3 DO T Offic e o f

Aviatio n Analysis , Roo m640 1 40 0 SeventhStreet , S W Washington , D C 2059 0 X I e n C O m 3 m

'•Co

Dea r Mr . DeVany ; After discussin g th e proposal s that wer e presente dt o th e Gogebic-Iro nCounty Airport Board , a t thei r regular meetin g hel do nNo v 8 , 2010 , th e Iro nCounty Boar do f Supervisor s unanimousl y approve dsupportin g th e decisio nt o recommen dFrontie r Airline s a s th e requeste dcarrie r t o provid e airlin e servic e int o th e Ironwoo dairport . You r consideratio n o f

thi s recommendatio nwoul db e greatl y appreciated . Sincerely , 

# 2 > • Denni s DeRoss o Administrativ e Coordinato r Boar dChairma n
The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District 1

of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-2043

___________

Larry Gene Critel, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Lyle J. Koenig; David L. Piester; *

Richard G. Kopf; Pasco M. Bowman; * [UNPUBLISHED]

Diana E. Murphy; George G. Fagg, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: May 22, 1998

 Filed: June 2, 1998

___________

Before McMILLIAN, BEAM, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Larry Gene Critel appeals the district court’s order granting defendants’

1

separate motions to dismiss his complaint. After carefully reviewing the record, we

conclude the district court did not commit error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47A(a). 
-2-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Barbara JORDAN, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF AURORA and its Head Librarian in official capacity, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, and GAB Business Services, Inc., Defendant and Cross-Appellee.

No. 92CA1632.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. C.

Dec. 17, 1992.

Andrew T. Brake, P.C., Andrew T. Brake, Lee T. Judd, Brian L. Lewis, Denver, for plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant.

Hemphill *&*Ballew, Charles W. Hemphill, Littleton, for defendant-appellant and cross-appellee.

Halaby, McCrea & Cross, Theodore S. Halaby, John T. Scherling, Denver, for defendant and cross-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The City of Aurora has filed a motion seeking a stay without bond from the trial court judgment. We grant the motion.

Barbara Jordan initiated this proceeding for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against the City, which is self-insured for workers’ compensation purposes. The trial court ruled in favor of Jordan and, upon the City’s request for a stay pending appeal, granted the stay, but required the City to post a bond. The trial court reasoned that the City was not acting in a governmental capacity and, thus, was not entitled to the benefit of C.A.R. 8(c).

The City contends that the Governmental Immunity Act, § 24-10-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A), together with C.A.R. 8(c), specifically exempt the City as a governmental entity from having to post a bond. Jordan argues that C.A.R. 8(c) exempts only those governmental entities which are acting in their official capacity for the benefit of the public. We perceive *1336no need to look beyond the language of C.A.R. 8(c) to resolve this issue.

> C.A.R. 8(c) provides, in pertinent part: The state, the county commissioners of the various counties, cities, towns, and school districts and all charitable, educational, and reformatory institutions under the patronage or control of the state and *all public officials when suing or defending in their official capacities for the benefit of the public*shall not be required to furnish bond. (Emphasis added)

The phrase “in their official capacities for the benefit of the public” qualifies only “officials,” the only natural persons covered by the Rule. To apply the phrase to all the legal entities preceding “officials” would result in absurdity. *Cf Harding v. Industrial Commission,*183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (Colo.1973).

Jordan’s reliance on *Buchhalter v. Solomon,*78 Colo. 227, 241 P. 718 (1925) is misplaced. There, under the predecessor to C.A.R. 8(c), the court held that a private charity was not under the patronage or control of the state and, therefore, was not entitled to the exemption from posting a bond. There is no inconsistency between that case and the result here. The phrase “under the patronage or control of the state” qualifies only the noun “institutions” referred to, just as the phrase “in their official capacities for the benefit of the public” qualifies only the noun “officials.”

The motion for stay without bond is granted.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

 Docket Number: FAA-2013-0425

 Directorate Identifier: 2012NM224AD

747-53A2427, R6 --- 7/14/11

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
#### Ernest Agust DeCLEIR and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Ethel Mae CLARK, Appellee.

No. 71-617.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 30, 1972.

Charles A. Tabscott, of Gurney, Gurney & Handley, Orlando, for appellants.

Harry K. Anderson, of Hoffman, Hen-dry & Parker, Orlando, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

On the basis of our review of the briefs, record on appeal and oral argument we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability.

The driver of a vehicle which strikes the rear of another vehicle is presumed to be negligent and a plaintiff would be entitled to recover in absence of an explanation by the defendant. Guile v. Boggs, Fla.1965, 174 So.2d 26; Frazier v. Ross, Fla.App.1969, 225 So.2d 451. Whether the defendant driver’s explanation is sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence is, in our view, under the facts and circumstances of this case a matter within the exclusive domain of the jury. Stark v. Vasquez, Fla.1964, 168 So.2d 140. As this Court stated in Frazier v. Ross, supra,225 So.2d at 453:

> “ . . . Although the explanation is none too strong, we cannot hold that it was insufficient as a matter of law and required the trial court to take the issue of the defendant’s negligence away from the jury. . . . ”

We have reviewed the defendants’ remaining points concerning the excessiveness of the verdict and the admission of drug bills into evidence and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order directing a verdict on the issue of liability is set aside and the cause is remanded to *692the trial court with directions to grant defendants’ motion for new trial upon the issue of liability.

Reversed, in part; affirmed, in part.

REED, C. J., and WALDEN and MAGER, JJ., concur.
## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07 - 19 - 00100 - CV IN RE MICHAEL PIPKEN , RELATOR ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

### April 15 , 2019 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. Relator Michael Pipken , a Texas prison inmate appearing pro se , filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the clerk of this court. Pipken did not , however, accompany his petition with the required filing fee or proof of indigence and the materials required by Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. By letter of March 21, 2019, we direc ted Pipken to pay the filing fee or file an affidavit of indigence, and if indigent, to comply with Chapter 14 by filing an affidavit describing his previous filings and a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement . See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O DE A NN . § § 14.002 (a) ; 14.004 (West 2017). The letter further notified Pipken that the proceeding would be subject to dismissal without further2

notice should he fail to comply by April 1 . T EX . R. A PP . P. 42.3(c). To date, Pipken has neither paid the filing fee nor submitted the materials necessary to proceed under Chapter 14. Accordingly, Pipken’s petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed for failure to comply with a requirement of the appellate rules and an order of this court . T EX . R. A PP . P. 42.3(c). Per Curiam
In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 16-031V

(Not to be published)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

*

LUCY DIPIAZZA, *

*

Petitioner, * 

* Filed: April 14, 2017

v. *

* Decision on Attorneys’

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND * Fees and Costs

HUMAN SERVICES *

*

Respondent. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

DECISION (ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS)

HASTINGS, Special Master

In this case under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,1I issued a 

Decision on December 1, 2016. On March 27, 2017, Petitioner filed an application for 

attorneys’ fees and costs in this matter. Petitioner requests a total award of $18,076.36, 

representing $13,825.70.00 for attorneys’ fees, and $4,250.66 for attorneys’ costs. In accordance 

with General Order #9, Petitioner also submitted a statement indicating that Petitioner incurred 

no reimbursable costs in pursuit of this claim.

On April 13, 2017, Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner’s Application for 

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, which stated that “Respondent is satisfied the statutory requirements 

for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” (ECF No. 33, p. 2.) However, 

Respondent provided no specific comments concerning the amounts requested, and simply 

“recommends that the special master exercise his discretion [to] determine a reasonable award.” 

(Id., p. 3.) 

 

1 The applicable statutory provisions defining the program are found at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 et seq. (2012). 
I find that this Petition was filed and pursued in good faith and with a reasonable basis. 

Thus, an award for fees and costs is appropriate at this time, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(b) 

and (e)(1). Further, the proposed amounts seem reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, I 

hereby award the following attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(b) and 

(e)(1):

• a lump sum of $18,076.36, in the form of a check payable jointly to Petitioner 

and Petitioner’s counsel, Diana L. Stadelnikas, on account of services performed 

by counsel’s law firm.

In the absence of a timely-filed motion for review filed pursuant to Appendix B of the 

Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the clerk of the court shall enter judgment in 

accordance herewith.2

IT IS SO ORDERED

 /s/ George L. Hastings, Jr.

 George L. Hastings, Jr.

 Special Master

 

2 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice renouncing the 

right to seek review.
Exhibit 14.01

Intrado Inc. "Sarbanes Oxley Financial Code of Ethics"

Purpose and Intent:

The Intrado "Sarbanes Oxley Financial Code of Ethics" is designed to document the company's values of professional
and ethical conduct in the practice of financial management. Intrado's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Vice President of Finance and Controller ("Senior Financial Officers") hold an
important and elevated role in corporate governance in that they are uniquely capable and empowered to ensure that the interests of all relevant corporate constituencies are appropriately balanced,
protected and preserved.

The Code:

This code is but one part of Intrado's overall commitment, not just to financial management, but to the highest standards for personal and professional values and
performance in all areas of its business as those important principles are established in Intrado's internal written policies which apply to all of its employees and are acknowledged by each of them
in writing. This code: (1) establishes principles to which the Senior Financial Officers are expected to adhere and advocate; and (2) provides rules regarding individual and peer
responsibilities to other employees, the public and other corporate constituencies. The Senior Financial Officers are expected to abide by this code as well as any other applicable Intrado policies
relating to the areas covered by this code. Any violations of this code may result in disciplinary action. The Senior Financial Officers must:



Possible
violations or other concerns may be submitted anonymously. Intrado will in all cases handle inquiries discretely and will make every effort to maintain, within the limits
allowed by law, the confidentiality of anyone requesting guidance or reporting questionable behavior and/or a compliance concern.

It
is Intrado's intention that this document be its written code of ethics for Senior Financial Officers under Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Item 406 of
Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation S-K.

---

QuickLinks
Wdesk | exhibit-10.1-2014-02-18






Exhibit 10.1


MDU Resources Group, Inc.
2014 Annual Incentive Award Opportunity Chart


	
						
	Name
	Position
	2014 
Base  
Salary 
($)
	Threshold 
($)
	Target 
($)
	Maximum 
($)

	David L. Goodin
	President and Chief Executive Officer of MDU Resources Group, Inc.
	685,000
	319,655
	1,027,500
	2,124,767

	Terry D. Hildestad (1)
	Former President and Chief Executive Officer of MDU Resources Group, Inc.
	–
	–
	–
	–

	Doran N. Schwartz
	Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of MDU Resources Group, Inc.
	360,000
	55,998
	180,000
	372,222

	J. Kent Wells
	Vice Chairman of MDU Resources Group, Inc. and President and Chief Executive Officer of Exploration and Production segment
	600,000
	187,500
	750,000
	1,500,000

	Steven L. Bietz (2)
	President and Chief Executive Officer of Pipeline and Energy Services segment
	380,000
	61,750
	247,000
	494,000

	William E. Schneider (3)
	Former Executive Vice President – Bakken Development of MDU Resources Group, Inc.
	—
	—
	—
	—

	Jeffrey S. Thiede
	President and Chief Executive Officer of Construction Services segment
	400,000
	199,750
	340,000
	807,500

	Paul K. Sandness
	General Counsel and Secretary of MDU Resources Group, Inc.
	356,000
	66,451
	213,600
	441,703




(1)  Mr. Hildestad received no award due to his retirement on January 3, 2013.


(2)  Mr. Bietz also has five performance goals relating to the pipeline and energy services segment’s safety results, and each goal that is not met will reduce his annual incentive award payment by 1%.


(3)  Mr. Schneider received no award due to his retirement on June 18, 2013.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tanya McBride, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Giaccio, J.), rendered May 1, 1989, convicting her of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the People were improperly permitted to offer on rebuttal the testimony of a witness who impeached the defendant’s testimony on an issue that was allegedly collateral *(see, People v Pavao,*59 NY2d 282, 288-289; *People v Mills,*146 AD2d 810; *People v Orse,*91 AD2d 1003). However, the defendant failed to object to that witness’s testimony on those grounds until after closing arguments were made, and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]). Also unpreserved for our review is the defendant’s contention that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during the course of her summation *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]). Under the circumstances of this case, we decline to review these issues in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Brown and Eiber, JJ., concur.
#### Donald STUBBINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 67-325.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Feb. 27, 1968.

Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, and Edward J. Winter, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On this appeal by the defendant below from a conviction for robbery, following trial by the court, reversal is sought on the contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment. We have examined and considered the record and the briefs, and conclude that the trial court’s finding of guilt had adequate evi-dentiary support, and that no reversible error has been shown.

Affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Michael P. Miranda, Appellant, v Patricia B. Adduci, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, et al., Respondents.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent Commissioner of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles dated March 31, 1989, which sustained the finding of an Administrative Law Judge that the petitioner had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 (a), and imposed a fine of $35 and a surcharge of $10.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

The determination that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 (a) is supported by substantial evidence and must be confirmed *(see, Matter of McKenzie v Fisher,*39 NY2d 103; *Matter of Kahn v State of N. Y. Dept. of Motor Vehicles,*134 AD2d 594). The petitioner’s challenge to the administrative determination rests largely upon an issue of credibility which was primarily for the fact-finder to resolve *(see, Matter of Silherfarb v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs.,*60 NY2d 979; *Matter of Collins v Codd,*38 NY2d 269). The testimony of the police officer that he observed the petitioner making an unsafe lane change on his motorcycle was not incredible as a matter of law and was sufficient to sustain the Commissioner’s determination *(see, Matter of Ballen v Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,*147 AD2d 560; *Matter of Martin v Adduci,*138 AD2d 599).

We have reviewed the petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Brown, J. P., Kooper, Harwood and Miller, JJ., concur.