NUMBER 13-21-00281-CV

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

LA JOYA INDEPENDENT

SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant,

 v. 

RUTH VILLARREAL INSURANCE

AGENCY, LLC, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 398th District Court 

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Benavides, Silva, and Peña1

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

1 The Honorable Leticia Hinojosa, former Justice of this Court, did not participate in this decision 

because her term of office expired on December 31, 2022. In accordance with the appellate rules, she was 

replaced on panel by Justice Lionel Aron Peña Jr. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.1(a). 
2

Appellant La Joya Independent School District (La Joya) appeals the trial court’s 

denial of its plea to the jurisdiction seeking to dismiss appellee Ruth Villarreal Insurance 

Agency, LLC’s (Agency) breach of contract claim. By two issues, La Joya argues the trial 

court erred by denying its plea because the Agency did not establish a waiver of its 

governmental immunity, and thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Agency’s 

claims. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The history between these two parties spans several years. Because the question 

before us now invokes a prior case between the parties, we provide a brief review of that 

case. See La Joya Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Villarreal, No. 13-13-00325-CV, 2014 WL 3050484 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 3, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Then and 

now, the Agency provided insurance services to La Joya. In the prior suit, the Agency and 

Ruth Villarreal, individually, alleged that certain school board members placed an item on 

the board’s agenda to switch from the Agency to another insurance provider that politically 

supported those board members. See id. at *2. After La Joya canceled the contract, the 

Agency and Villarreal filed suit against La Joya and the board members for breach of 

contract. Id. La Joya filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that it enjoyed immunity from 

the Agency’s suit. Id. The trial court denied La Joya’s plea, and this Court affirmed the 

trial court’s ruling. Id.

La Joya and the Agency then entered into a settlement agreement, whereby the 

parties would release their claims against each other. Further, La Joya agreed to pay to

the Agency $300,000 for “past actual damages” and $1.5 million to the Agency and 
3

Villarreal’s attorneys for attorneys’ fees.2 The settlement agreement specifies that

[t]he parties further agree that as part of the consideration for La Joya’s 

release, it has agreed to hire [the Agency] to be its exclusive [i]nsurance 

[a]gent, and to enter into a contract for such services . . . . It is 

acknowledged by the parties that [the Agency] has chosen to forgo the 

remaining $3,300,000.00 [Villarreal] claims as actual damages against [La 

Joya] only in order for the opportunity to enter into the exclusive 

agent/consultant of record contract to be paid for services to be performed 

in the future.

As contemplated, the parties entered into an exclusive insurance agent and 

professional services agreement, which was set to expire on February 30, 2024. As 

relevant here, the insurance agreement contained a liquidated damages clause:

[i]n consideration of the services, agreements, and settlement of prior 

litigation between the parties, in the event that [La Joya] terminates this 

agreement prior to its expiration on December 15, 2024, for any reason, [La 

Joya] shall pay liquidated damages to [the Agency] in the amount of 

$68,375.00 per month, for each month remaining on the original term of this 

agreement at the time of termination. 

The contract also required the parties to reevaluate the commission rate every two 

years to keep it within industry standards. Dr. Alda Benavides, La Joya’s school board 

superintendent, signed the settlement agreement on January 30, 2017, and its counsel 

signed the settlement agreement on February 6, 2017. Oscar “Coach” Salinas, La Joya’s 

school board president, signed the insurance agreement on January 30, 2017. Villarreal 

signed both agreements on January 31, 2017, and her counsel signed the settlement 

agreement on February 1, 2017. Both agreements contained a merger clause. 

On October 31, 2019, La Joya sent a letter to the Agency and Villarreal through its 

2 In the first suit, Ruth Villarreal, individually, was a plaintiff with the Agency. Portions of the record 

and accompanying documents may refer to either Villarreal individually or the Agency.
4

counsel, notifying the Agency that it was exercising its authority to renegotiate the 

commission rate. According to La Joya, it hired an independent insurance consultant who 

determined that La Joya was “extremely overpaying for the services being provided.”

According to the independent consultant, La Joya should have been paying one fourth to 

one third the existing commission rate. In its letter, La Joya notified the Agency that it was 

discontinuing the group benefit plans and stop-loss coverage as defined by the insurance 

agreement but would continue receiving voluntary plans under the agreement.

The Agency responded to La Joya that it was willing to renegotiate the current 

agreement. However, La Joya responded with concerns over the Agency’s use of the 

word “commissions” and the insurance agreement’s use of “service fees,” contending that

the contract authorized additional fees that are not commissions. The letter also 

requested Villarreal or the Agency produce their insurance counselor’s license, stating 

they had been unable to locate it on the Texas Department of Insurance website. La Joya 

noted that a person without a counselor’s license was not permitted to provide services 

“as defined by [§] 4052.001 of the Texas Insurance Code or charge a fee for such 

services.”3

La Joya sent an additional letter on December 12, 2019, proposing a renegotiated 

contract that discontinued group benefit plans and stop-loss coverage but maintained 

3 Section 4052.001 was repealed effective September 1, 2021. See Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., 

ch. 355 (H.B. 4030), § 7, sec. 22(6), 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 355 (repealed 2021). The former 

section defined a “life and health insurance counselor.” See id. All previously issued life and health 

insurance counselor’s licenses were converted to “a general lines agent with a life, accident, and health 

qualification.” TEX. DEP’T INS., Commissioner’s Bulletin # B-0019-21, (July 12, 2021),

https://www.tdi.texas.gov/bulletins/2021/B-0019-21.html (last visited January 17, 2023); see also TEX. INS.

CODE ANN. § 4054.051 (setting out various insurance services that require a “general life, accident, and 

health license”).
5

voluntary plans under the agreement. La Joya contended that Villarreal and the Agency 

lacked the necessary license, but even if they did have the necessary license, they were

not permitted to “receive compensation for the same service provided to the same client 

if the counselor receives compensation for the services as an agent under Chapter 4054

of the Texas Insurance Code.”4

Ultimately, on February 27, 2020, La Joya filed an original petition alleging that the 

Agency breached the insurance agreement and engaged in fraudulent inducement, 

common law fraud, and constructive fraud by representing to La Joya that the Agency 

had all required licenses when it did not. La Joya sought recission of the contract, actual 

and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. On August 31, 2021, La Joya filed its first 

amended petition which included a request for

a declaratory judgment that (1) the [i]nsurance [c]ontract is void and/or 

voidable because [the Agency] does not hold the requisite license to 

perform services under the [i]nsurance [c]ontract; (2) the [i]nsurance 

[c]ontract is void and/or voidable because it violates the Texas Insurance 

Code; and (3) [the Agency’s] services to [La Joya] created a conflict of 

interest.

On August 27, 2020, the Agency filed a counter petition, alleging La Joya breached 

the settlement agreement by canceling a separate prescription care contract which

4 La Joya cited § 4052.055, which was similarly repealed. See Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 355, 

§ 7, sec. 22(6), 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 355 (repealed 2021). Section 4052.055 prohibited a life and 

health insurance counselor from receiving compensation if they receive compensation as an agent under 

Chapter 4054. Chapter 4054 sets out the provisions applicable to a general life, accident, and health 

insurance agent. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 4054.001–.359. Prior to the repeal of Chapter 4052, Texas 

Department of Insurance issued separate licenses for insurance counselors and insurance agents. TEX.

DEP’T INS., Commissioner’s Bulletin # B-0041-07, (October 17, 2007),

https://www.tdi.texas.gov/bulletins/2007/cc41.html (last visited January 17, 2023). Insurance agents are 

typically affiliated with a limited number of insurance companies while insurance counselors were able to 

“act solely on behalf of the client in an advisory or counseling capacity when considering insurance 

products” rather than as an agent for the insurance companies. See id.
6

terminated certain fees the Agency was receiving as part of the contract. The Agency’s 

live pleading was its second amended counter petition filed on February 2, 2021, which 

alleged that La Joya breached the settlement agreement and interfered with the insurance 

agreement. The Agency further alleged that La Joya’s actions regarding the insurance

agreement were part of a political scheme of one of its board members, Salinas, in 

response to Villarreal’s husband running for La Joya school board.

The Agency’s petition alleged that Salinas was part of a slate of candidates who 

deemed themselves “TeamUn1ted,” which included four candidates. On November 6, 

2020, three of the TeamUn1ted candidates won their election, allowing Salinas to garner 

a majority of the votes on the school board. On December 14, 2020, La Joya sent a formal 

notice to the Agency, terminating it as the exclusive insurance agent. The Agency sought 

liquidated damages under the contract for each month remaining on the contract.

On November 23, 2020, prior to any amended petitions by the Agency, La Joya 

filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the Agency failed to allege any facts supporting 

its claim that La Joya breached any agreement. La Joya asserted that the Agency’s failure 

to do so required the trial court to dismiss the Agency’s claims because La Joya enjoyed 

sovereign immunity for which no waiver existed. After the Agency filed its first amended 

petition, it filed a response to La Joya’s plea with objections, asking the trial court to strike 

the plea as moot because the Agency had amended its petition to alleviate any 

deficiencies. On January 20, 2021, the trial court sustained the Agency’s objections and 

struck La Joya’s plea as moot.

On June 9, 2021, La Joya filed a second plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the 
7

Agency’s request for liquidated damages, which was calculated using the Agency’s lost 

profits, was a request for consequential damages for which there is no waiver of immunity. 

See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.153(b)(1); see also La Joya Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

Trevino, No. 13-17-00333-CV, 2019 WL 1487358, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Apr. 4, 2019, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.) (holding lost fees and commissions 

“constitute lost profits which are consequential damages excluded from recovery under

[§] 271.153”). On the same day, La Joya filed a motion requesting that the trial court rule 

on its original plea to the jurisdiction.

On August 31, 2021, the Agency filed its response to La Joya’s second plea to the 

jurisdiction. The Agency argued that La Joya’s plea should be denied because La Joya 

is not immune from suit or liability for breaching a settlement agreement. In support of this 

argument, the Agency asserted that the insurance agreement and settlement agreement 

were executed at the same time and reference each other, so they should be construed 

as one agreement. The Agency further argued that if the trial court determined immunity 

was not waived for a breach of settlement agreement, liquidated damages are not 

necessarily consequential damages, but are part of “the balance due and owed” by La 

Joya for which there is a waiver. See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.153(a)(1); see 

also McKinney & Moore, Inc. v. City of Longview, No. 14-08-00628-CV, 2009 WL

4577348, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 8, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) 

(holding that “by definition, if particular damages are specifically accounted for in the 

contract, they are direct, not consequential, in nature”). The Agency argued, “The 

liquidated damages that [the Agency] seeks to recover in the instant action are direct in 
8

nature because [the parties] . . . contemplated, at the time of contract formation, that the 

liquidated damages in question would be the result of the breach of the exclusive 

insurance agent agreement.” Lastly, the Agency argued that various fact questions 

precluded the trial court from sustaining La Joya’s plea.

After a hearing, the trial court denied La Joya’s plea to the jurisdiction. This appeal 

followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Local governmental entities ‘enjoy governmental immunity from suit, unless 

immunity is expressly waived.’” Lubbock Cnty. Water Control & Imp. Dist. v. Church & 

Akin, L.L.C., 442 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear 

Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex. 2010)). “Governmental immunity 

includes both immunity from liability, ‘which bars enforcement of a judgment against a 

governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which bars suit against the entity 

altogether.’” Id. If a local governmental entity enjoys governmental immunity, the trial court 

does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 

S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004). 

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea used “to defeat a cause of action without 

regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 

S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea challenges the trial court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction over a pleaded cause of action. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. “When a plea to 

the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts 

that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Id. We will 
9

liberally construe the pleadings and look to the pleader’s intent. Id. When the 

determinative facts are undisputed, we review the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the 

jurisdiction de novo. Id. The plaintiff carries the initial burden to plead facts affirmatively 

showing that the trial court has jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 

S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).

“However, if a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional 

facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve 

the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to do.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

at 227. If the evidence creates a fact question, the plea to the jurisdiction should not be 

granted, and the fact issue should be resolved by the trier of fact. Id. at 228. If, on the 

other hand, the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the 

jurisdictional issue, the trial court should rule on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of 

law. Id. This standard generally mirrors that of summary judgment. Id.; see generally TEX.

R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

Accordingly, when challenging the jurisdictional facts, the governmental unit 

carries the initial burden. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. “[A]fter the [governmental unit] 

asserts and supports with evidence that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 

we simply require the plaintiffs, when the facts underlying the merits and subject matter 

jurisdiction are intertwined, to show that there is a disputed material fact regarding the 

jurisdictional issue.” Id. “When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading 

requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the plea that 

implicates the merits of the case, we take as true all evidence favorable to the 
10

nonmovant.” Id. “We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the 

nonmovant’s favor.” Id.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Waiver of Immunity

It is up to the legislature to waive immunity for local governmental entities, and it 

must do so by “clear and unambiguous language.” Church & Akin, L.L.C., 442 S.W.3d at 

301 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN § 311.034). The legislature has created one such waiver 

for certain contract claims:

A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution 

to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this 

subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of 

adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and 

conditions of this subchapter.

TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.152. However, the legislature has also limited the 

types of damages a claimant may recover for breach of contract against a local 

governmental entity. Id. § 271.153; see Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 346 

(Tex. 2006) (holding a local governmental entity’s immunity is not waived unless damages 

sought are permitted by § 271.153).

Section 271.153 limits recovery of money damages under a breach of contract 

claim to “the balance due and owed by the local governmental entity under the contract,” 

“the amount owed for change orders,” and “reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees 

that are equitable and just[,] and interest as allowed by law.” TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 271.153(a)(1)–(4). The statute does not allow a claimant to recover “consequential 

damages” or “exemplary damages[.]” Id. § 271.153(b)(1), (2).

A “balance due and owed” under the contract “is simply the amount of damages 
11

for breach of contract payable and unpaid.” Zachry Constr. Corp. v. Port of Hous. Auth. 

of Harris Cty., 449 S.W.3d 98, 111 (Tex. 2014). Consequential damages, on the other 

hand, are “those damages which result naturally, but not necessarily, from the 

defendant’s wrongful acts.” Kan. City S. v. Port of Corpus Christi Auth. of Nueces Cnty., 

305 S.W.3d 296, 307 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, pet. denied) (cleaned 

up). Lost profits, commissions, or other fees constitute consequential damages. Tooke, 

197 S.W.3d at 346; see also Trevino, 2019 WL 1487358, at *5.

Further, when a governmental entity files suit asserting affirmative claims for 

monetary relief, it lacks immunity for claims from the adverse party as an offset that are 

“germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to those asserted by the 

governmental entity.” Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 377 (Tex. 

2006); see Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex. 2019). The waiver 

of immunity in such instances does not apply to damages in excess of an offset to the 

governmental unit’s damages. Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 377.

B. Merger Clauses

“A ‘merger clause’ is a contractual provision to the effect that the written terms of 

the contract may not be varied by prior agreements because all such agreements have 

been merged into the written document.” W. Loop Hosp., LLC v. Hous. Galleria Lodging 

Assocs., LLC, 649 S.W.3d 461, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied)

(quoting San Antonio Props., L.P. v. PSRA Invs., Inc., 255 S.W.3d 255, 260 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2008, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.)). However, “[w]here appropriate, 

‘a court may determine, as a matter of law,’ that multiple separate contracts, documents, 
12

and agreements ‘were part of a single, unified instrument.’” Rieder v. Woods, 603 S.W.3d 

86, 94 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 

831, 840 (Tex. 2000)). We must construe multiple documents together with caution, 

bearing in mind that tethering documents to each other is “simply a device for ascertaining 

and giving effect to the intention of the parties and cannot be applied arbitrarily and 

without regard to the realities of the situation.’” Id. at 94–95 (quoting Miles v. Martin, 321 

S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1959)).

C. Liquidated Damages

“The term ‘liquidated damages’ ordinarily refers to an acceptable measure of 

damages that parties stipulate in advance will be assessed in the event of a contract 

breach.” Flores v. Millennium Ints., Ltd., 185 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tex. 2005).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Breach of the Settlement Agreement

La Joya argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Agency’s breach of 

contract claim for the settlement agreement because the Agency failed to plead facts 

alleging a violation of the terms of the settlement agreement. La Joya further contends

that the Agency’s breach of contract claim for the insurance agreement cannot support a 

claim for breach of the settlement agreement because they are two distinct contracts. In 

response, the Agency argues the two contracts should be construed together because 

the settlement agreement required the insurance agreement to be signed, the two 

contracts were contemplated in tandem during the course of a single transaction, and 

both documents were executed at the same time by the same parties.
13

Although both the settlement agreement and insurance agreement contain merger 

clauses, the settlement agreement contemplates and requires the execution of the 

insurance agreement. See Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex. 1981) (looking to the 

intent of the parties to conclude that four separate documents were for the purpose of a 

singular transaction). Further, both agreements were executed by the same parties, at 

the same time, and both relate to a settlement regarding the purchase of insurance 

services by La Joya from the Agency. See Rieder, 603 S.W.3d at 94. Because the 

execution of the insurance agreement was “a necessary part of the same transaction” as 

the settlement agreement, we conclude that as a matter of law the two agreements “were 

part of a single, unified instrument.” See id.; Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist, 22 S.W.3d at

840 (concluding that a series of documents between two governmental entities 

constituted a single, unified contract).

Having concluded that both contracts constitute one agreement, we turn to La 

Joya’s first issue: the Agency failed to plead facts in support of its claim that La Joya 

breached the settlement agreement. However, the Agency’s second amended counter 

petition does just that by alleging a violation of the terms of the settlement agreement.

Specifically, the Agency alleges that La Joya breached the settlement agreement when it 

cancelled the insurance agreement because the insurance agreement was a necessary 

component of the settlement agreement. La Joya’s first issue is overruled.

B. Permissible Damages

By its second issue, La Joya argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the 

Agency’s breach of contract of the insurance agreement because the damages sought 
14

are not permitted by Texas Local Government Code § 271.153(b)(1). See TEX. LOCAL 

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.153(b)(1) (prohibiting consequential damages in breach of 

contract suits against a local governmental entity); Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 346 (concluding 

that lost profit damages are consequential damages prohibited by § 271.153(b)(1)). La 

Joya asserts that § 271.153(a)(1) limits the damages recoverable under a breach of 

contract claim to amounts owed for work performed under a contract. La Joya further 

argues that because the Agency seeks damages in excess of an amount that would offset 

its own claim, the waiver of jurisdiction pursuant to Reata does not apply. See Reata 

Constr. Corp., 197 S.W.3d at 377 (“Once it asserts affirmative claims for monetary 

recovery, [the governmental entity] must participate in the litigation process as an ordinary 

litigant, save for the limitation that [it] continues to have immunity from affirmative damage 

claims against it for monetary relief exceeding amounts necessary to offset [it]s claims.”).

We must first determine whether the waiver of immunity established by Reata 

applies to the Agency’s counterclaim. In Reata, the Texas Supreme Court created two 

possible categories for counterclaims to a governmental entity’s claim for affirmative 

relief:

The first category consisted of claims that would offset, in whole or in part, 

any recovery by the City and that were germane to, connected with, and 

properly defensive to the City’s claims. The second category consisted of 

(1) claims for amounts over and above the amount that would offset the 

City’s claim but were nevertheless germane to, connected with, and 

properly defensive to the City’s claims; and (2) claims that simply were not 

germane to, connected with, or properly defensive to the City’s claim. The 

City had immunity from suit as to both types of claims in the second 

category, but it did not have immunity from suit as to claims in the first 

category. 

City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 374–75 (Tex. 2011) (discussing Reata).
15

Accordingly, under Reata and its progeny, a waiver of immunity exists to the extent the 

Agency claims damages of an amount that would operate as an offset to La Joya’s own 

affirmative claims, but we must determine whether an independent waiver of immunity 

exists for any amount beyond an offset.5 See id.; See Reata Constr. Corp., 197 S.W.3d 

at 377. Thus, the question before us is whether liquidated damages constitute an “amount 

due and owed” under the contract or impermissible consequential damages under the 

statute. See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.153. 

When interpreting statutory language, we “presume that the Legislature chose its 

words carefully, recognizing that every word in a statute was included for some purpose 

and that every word excluded was omitted for a purpose.” In re J.R., 652 S.W.3d 508, 

513 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (citing Hogan v. Zoanni, 627 S.W.3d 

163, 175 (Tex. 2021)). Subsection (a)(1) permits a trial court to award “the balance due 

and owed by the local governmental entity under the contract . . . .” Id. § 271.153(a)(1). 

The balance due and owed “is simply the amount of damages for breach of contract 

payable and unpaid.” Zachry Constr. Corp., 449 S.W.3d at 111. 

La Joya takes the position that this should be read to limit amounts due to work or 

services the Agency has already performed prior to the breach. In support of its position, 

La Joya points to our decision in La Joya Independent School District v. Trevino, wherein 

we held Trevino could not seek lost profit damages from La Joya for breach of contract 

because lost profit damages constitute consequential damages. See Trevino, 2019 WL 

5 La Joya does not argue that the Agency’s counterclaims are not germane to, connected with, or 

properly defensive to its own affirmative claims.
16

1487358, at *5. However, Trevino did not involve a liquidated damages clause; rather, 

Trevino’s sole form of damages was expressly for lost profits. See id. at *1. Thus, we find 

Trevino to be inapposite.

Further, we find La Joya’s interpretation of “the balance due and owed . . . under 

the contract” including only compensation for work performed under the contract to be 

overly restrictive. In presuming the legislature carefully selected the language in 

§ 271.153(a)(1), we note that the legislature did not restrict the recovery for breach of 

contract to amounts owed for “worked performed under the contract.” See In re J.R., 652 

S.W.3d at 513. Instead, the legislature provided recovery for amounts “due and 

owed . . . under the contract,” which is more expansive. See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 271.153(a)(1). 

Liquidated damages are a predetermined calculation of damages owed by a 

breaching party for breaching the contract. See Flores, 185 S.W.3d at 431. Accordingly, 

we conclude that liquidated damages constitute an amount “due and owed by the local 

governmental entity under the contract.” See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 271.153(a)(1); McKinney & Moore, Inc., 2009 WL 4577348, at *5 (“[B]y definition, if 

particular damages are specifically accounted for in the contract, they are direct, not 

consequential, in nature.”). La Joya directs our attention to a declaration by Villarreal that 

the liquidated damages are equivalent to the Agency’s lost profits. However, the basis 

that the parties used to calculate and agree to liquidated damages does not change their 

nature.6 See, e.g., FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., L.P., 426 S.W.3d 59, 

6 La Joya does not argue on appeal that the liquidated damages constitute an impermissible 

penalty. See Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. 1991); see also Atrium Med. Ctr., LP v. Hous.
17

71 (Tex. 2014) (declining to label liquidated damages as a penalty “merely because the 

liquidated damages clause derives from a ‘penalty’ scheme” found in the administrative 

code). Accordingly, we conclude that the Agency’s claim for damages is permissible 

under § 271.153, thus waiving La Joya’s immunity. See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 271.153(a)(1).

Having determined that La Joya’s immunity has been waived pursuant to Reata 

and that the liquidated damages represent an amount due and owed under the contract, 

we conclude the trial court did not err by denying La Joya’s plea to the jurisdiction. See 

TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 271.152, 271.153(a)(1); Reata Constr. Corp., 197 

S.W.3d at 377.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.7

CLARISSA SILVA

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

23rd day of February, 2023.

Red C LLC, 595 S.W.3d 188, 196 (Tex. 2020) (“[T]o show that a liquidated damages provision is 

unreasonable because the actual damages incurred were much less than the amount contracted for, a 

defendant may be required to prove what the actual damages were.” (quoting Phillips, 820 S.W.2d at 788)).

7 On March 23, 2022, the Agency filed an unopposed motion to expedite our ruling, which we 

carried with the case. The motion is hereby denied as moot.