[Cite as Hogg v. Grace Community Church, 2022-Ohio-3516.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

FAYETTE COUNTY

ALICE J. HOGG, et al.,

Appellees,

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GRACE COMMUNITY CHURCH, et al.,

Appellants.

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CASE NO. CA2021-11-025

O P I N I O N

10/3/2022

CIVIL APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case No. CVH20210092

Auman, Mahan & Furry, and Richard L. Carr, Jr. and David M. Rickert, for appellee, Alice 

J. Hogg.

Howard Law Office, and R. Jason Howard, for appellee, The Estate of Charles L. 

Schroeder.

Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, and Matthew J. Bakota, for appellant.

PIPER, J.

{¶1} Appellant, G.A. Repple & Company ("Repple"), appeals from the trial court's 

order compelling discovery and ordering it to obtain counsel for the purpose of responding 

to discovery requests. Repple's timely notice of appeal is primarily aimed at two specific 

points regarding the discovery order. 
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Procedural Background

{¶2} Charles Schroeder maintained investment accounts with Repple. On March 

27, 2019, and April 24, 2019, Charles purportedly signed documents designating Grace 

Community Church as the beneficiary of his investment accounts. Charles passed away 

on January 13, 2021. Plaintiffs-appellees, Alice Hogg, Steven Schroeder, Kenneth 

Schroeder, Faye Diltz, Doris White, Lenore Branson, and Jody Schroeder are Charles' 

heirs. 

{¶3} On March 29, 2021, the heirs filed a complaint in the Fayette County Court of 

Common Pleas against Grace Community Church, Repple, Charles' estate, and others 

alleging that the change of beneficiary forms purportedly signed by Charles were forgeries, 

the result of undue influence, or were invalid based upon Charles' incompetence. The 

complaint sought declaratory judgment that the assets from Charles' investment accounts 

are assets of his estate and further sought an injunction prohibiting Repple from transferring 

any other funds from Charles' accounts during the pendency of this action. 

{¶4} The record shows that Repple was served with the summon and complaint 

on April 1, 2021. Repple states that it deliberately did not answer the complaint or otherwise 

appear in the matter. On June 18, 2021, the heirs moved for default judgment against 

Repple. On June 23, 2021, the trial court granted default judgment against Repple:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be rendered against 

G.A. Repple & Co. in this matter. Specifically, such Defendant 

shall be bound by any determination of this Court on Plaintiffs'

claims for relief against Repple, but shall not be heard as part 

of the Court's determination of the merits of such claims. 

{¶5} Thereafter, the trial court issued an injunction in which it detailed the manner 

in which Repple would hold and administer accounts held in the name of Charles or his 

estate. 

{¶6} On July 23, 2021, the heirs served Repple with interrogatories and requests 
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for production. Repple did not respond. After some delay, Repple retained counsel to 

communicate with counsel for the heirs. Unable to resolve the matter, the heirs filed a 

motion to compel Repple to respond to its discovery requests, which the trial court granted. 

The trial court then ordered:

Defendant, G.A. Repple & Company, shall obtain counsel to 

represent it for the purpose of responding to discovery requests 

in this action, and shall fully respond to Plaintiffs' Joint First Set 

of Interrogatories and Joint First Requests for the Production of 

Documents which, on July 31, 2021, were served upon 

Defendant G.A. Repple & Company. Defendant, G.A. Repple & 

Company, shall fully respond to such requests on or before 

December 6, 2021. 

{¶7} Repple then appeared in the instant action for the first time to appeal the trial 

court's order compelling it to respond to the heirs' discovery requests. Repple also filed a 

motion for reconsideration and a motion for stay pending appeal. Repple also moved to 

deposit the account funds with the court as security for its appeal. Those motions do not 

appear to have been addressed below. We now consider Repple's appeal from the trial 

court's order compelling it to respond to the heirs' discovery requests and retain counsel. 

{¶8} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶9} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY, 

DATED OCTOBER 29, 2021 (THE "ORDER"), WHEN IT ORDERED APPELLANT G.A. 

REPPLE & COMPANY ("REPPLE") TO OBTAIN LEGAL COUNSEL, APPEAR IN THE 

TRIAL COURT ACTION, AND RESPOND TO CIVIL RULE 33 AND 34 WRITTEN 

DISCOVERY REQUESTS (THE "DISCOVERY REQUESTS") WHEN REPPLE HAD 

NEVER BEFORE APPEARED IN THE ACTION AND HAD NO INTENTION OF EVER 

DOING SO. 

{¶10} Assignment of Error No. 2:

{¶11} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER WHEN IT ORDERED REPPLE 
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TO OBTAIN LEGAL COUNSEL, APPEAR IN THE TRIAL COURT ACTION, AND 

RESPOND TO THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS, WHEN A DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

ALREADY HAD BEEN ENTERED AGAINST REPPLE.

Repple's Arguments

{¶12} This appeal does not involve the substantive merits of appellees' complaint or 

the allegations of fraud, forgery, or undue influence. In this appeal, one party, Repple, 

claims not to be a party and therefore argues that it is not required to comply with the trial 

court's discovery order. Repple's argument, however, is misconceived. 

{¶13} There is no dispute that Repple was named in the complaint and served with 

a summons. However, Repple claims that it made a deliberate choice not to participate in 

this litigation and therefore accepted default judgment. Repple argues, under its 

interpretation of the law, that it is not a party to this litigation because it did not answer or 

appear. Repple offers limited authority to support its proposition. Repple relies on Sections

298 and 310 under Judgments in Volume 63 of Ohio Jurisprudence for the proposition that 

it had a "rational choice" to allow default judgment in this case. Repple's argument extends 

that proposition to claim that it does not need to comply with discovery orders. Repple also 

references this court's February 7, 2022 entry in which we granted a motion for 

reconsideration of our prior decision dismissing the appeal. Therein, this court stated:

An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy is a final 

appealable order. R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). * * * The additional 

requirements necessary to make a provisional remedy a final 

appealable order are satisfied in this case, as the order in effect 

determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy, 

and the appealing party will not be afforded a meaningful or 

effective remedy on appeal following final judgment. Appellant 

is being ordered to appear and participate in discovery in a case 

where it was never a party. 

{¶14} It appears that the final sentence written above was incorrect and based upon 

representations made in requesting that this court reconsider its order of dismissal. 
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Nevertheless, Repple claims that this statement is law of the case and therefore is 

dispositive to its claim that it is not a party to the litigation. 

Repple is a Party

{¶15} As noted above, Repple's position that it is not a party is simply misconceived. 

First, law of the case does not apply to this court's February 7, 2022 entry because it was 

an interlocutory order that did not constitute a finding on the merits. Frazier v. Rodgers 

Builders, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91987, 2010-Ohio-3058, ¶ 64; Denuit v. Ohio State Bd. of 

Pharmacy, 4th Dist. Jackson Nos. 11CA11 and 11CA12, 2013-Ohio-2484, ¶ 19; Dunkle v. 

Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26612, 2013-Ohio-5555, ¶ 34. 

Furthermore, since law-of-the-case doctrine is a rule of practice rather than a binding rule 

of substantive law, it is not applied so as to achieve unjust results. Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 3 (1984); Hodge v. Callinan, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2018-07-073, 2019-Ohio1836, ¶ 18. 

{¶16} In this case, Repple claims that it is "not a party" because it did not appear in 

this matter with counsel and instead was found to be in default. In other words, Repple 

claims that it can avoid being named a party, and avoid discovery requests, through its 

unilateral actions alone. This argument is without merit as it fails to appreciate the plain 

language in Civ.R. 55(A), which refers to a party or parties in default. In relevant part, Civ.R. 

55(A) states:

When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 

sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 

these rules, the party entitled to a judgment by default shall 

apply in writing or orally to the court therefore * * *. If the party 

against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in 

the action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his 

representative) shall be served with written notice of the 

application for judgment at least seven days prior to the hearing 

on such application. If, in order to enable the court to enter 

judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an 

account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish 
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the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an 

investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such 

hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and 

proper and shall when applicable accord a right of trial by jury 

to the parties.

Civ. R. 55(A) (Emphasis added). As stated therein, there is no requirement that an 

individual or entity appear or defend itself in a lawsuit to become a party. Instead, the 

individual or entity "party" may be found in default if it fails to plead or otherwise defend 

itself. Civ. R. 55 then provides that a party that has appeared must be served with notice 

that the opposing party is seeking default judgment. Although it cites Civ. R. 55 in its brief, 

Repple does not recognize or explain the apparent contradiction that Civ.R. 55 presents to 

Repple's argument. 

{¶17} The "not a party" argument raised by Repple also fails for additional reasons. 

As the Supreme Court has stated "one becomes a party officially * * * upon service of a 

summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party 

served must appear and defend." Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 

U.S. 344, 350, 119 S.Ct. 1322 (1999). Similarly, in Ohio "[s]ervice of the summons and 

complaint is the procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject 

matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served." During v. Quoico, 

10th Dist. No. 11AP-735, 2012-Ohio-2990, ¶ 25. Here, the record reflects that Repple was 

named in the complaint and was served with the summons on April 1, 2021. Contrary to its 

arguments otherwise, Repple is a party in the instant action. 

Discovery

{¶18} Since Repple is a party, we must now consider whether it, as a defaulting 

party, is subject to discovery beyond that listed in Civ.R. 69 in aid of judgment or execution. 

Repple argues that it was improper for the trial court to order it to respond to discovery once 

default judgment had been entered against it. Repple cites several cases in support of its 
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argument, including Wick v. Lorain Manor, Inc., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 19CA011486, 2021-

Ohio-635; Winkle v. Southdown, Inc., 2d Dist. Greene Case No. 92-CA-107, 1993 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 4295, (Sep. 3, 1993); and Damsel v. Shapiro, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP107, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4052 (Sep. 13, 2001). However, those cases are inapplicable 

as they involve situations where the claims of the party seeking discovery have been 

dismissed or fully resolved and there no longer being need for discovery. They do not 

address, and have no bearing on, the circumstances in the case at bar where discovery is 

being sought from a party who had a default judgment granted against it, but where there 

is ongoing litigation between other parties involved in the dispute. Repple's citations do not 

involve a party with a default judgment who may possess information that could lead to 

admissible evidence in the remaining claims.

{¶19} In the case sub judice, the trial court issued a limited decision granting default 

judgment against Repple while the action and claims continue below. The trial court's 

decision expressly contemplated that additional proceedings would continue on the heirs' 

claims, including issues involving Repple. The trial court determined that the default 

judgment against Repple established that it will be bound by any subsequent determination 

and that Repple "shall remain a party for purposes of enforcement of this Preliminary 

Injunction and other possible issues as they arise." The trial court's findings and 

conclusions in this regard are appropriate and consistent with Civ.R. 26, which states 

"[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 

party's claim or defense * * *." The use of interrogatories and requests for production of 

documents, which Repple has not responded to, are permissible methods of obtaining such 

discovery. Civ. R. 33; Civ. R. 34. Although Repple has a default judgment against it, Repple 

is not exempt from discovery the trial court deems appropriate. 

{¶20} Throughout this appeal, Repple has stated various reasons for why it chose 
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to exercise what it characterizes as "the right to decide not to appear in/defend." It claims 

that the complaint suggested that the litigants were likely to be involved in "protracted 

litigation." Repple claims to have wanted to "stay far away from" this action because of the 

nature of allegations, including forgery and legal incompetence. Repple then concluded:

In the face of allegations like that, and with millions of dollars at 

stake, Repple also saw that Plaintiffs, the Estate, and the 

Church seemed to be cooperating with each other in some 

manner. More and more, their filings became "joint" filings, and 

they seemed to have their collective sights set on Repple, for 

reasons unbeknownst to Repple. None of this appeared to be 

anything in which Repple would want to become involved. 

{¶21} Meanwhile, the heirs claim that Repple is likely to have discoverable 

information. Yet, Repple has repeatedly failed to provide any discovery. Despite Repple's

arguments to the contrary, it is a party to this action. It was named a party in the complaint; 

it was served with the summons; and Repple is now subject to the limited decision granting 

default judgment against it. Therefore, the trial court did not err by issuing an order 

compelling Repple to respond to the heirs' discovery requests and retain counsel. Under 

Ohio law, a defendant that is a corporate entity may only appear through a licensed 

attorney. Vilardo v. Sheets, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2005-09-091, 2006-Ohio-3473, ¶ 

13, citing Union Savings Assn. v. Home Owners Aid, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 2d 60, 62 (1970). 

Repple's two assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶22} Judgment affirmed. 

M. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.