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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KYLE A.*

(SC 20721)

McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Alexander,

Dannehy and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree, criminal mischief

in the first degree, and threatening in the second degree, among other

crimes, the defendant appealed. The defendant had contacted his

brother, A, and told A that he was coming to A’s residence despite

A’s contrary wishes. The defendant thereafter unlawfully entered A’s

residence. A fled the residence and sought aid from certain neighbors.

Subsequently, the defendant damaged certain property within the residence and, while outside, repeatedly struck A’s car with a baseball bat.

At trial, defense counsel neither requested an instruction on the burglary

charge nor objected to the proposed instruction that the court had

distributed to the state and defense for review. The jury returned a

guilty verdict on all of the charges pertaining to the incident, including

burglary. The Appellate Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions, and

the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court.

Held:

The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not

committed plain error when it gave a jury instruction on first degree

burglary that did not identify the crime or crimes the defendant allegedly

was intending to commit when he unlawfully entered or remained in A’s

residence, this court having concluded that such an omission was not

an obvious and indisputable error so egregious that it affected the fairness

and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings:

When instructing a jury on the elements of burglary in the first degree

pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 53a-101 (a) (1)), a trial court should

name and define the elements of the crime or crimes for which there is

evidence to support a finding of the defendant’s intent to commit in

connection with the unlawful entry or remaining, and, although it is the

better practice for trial courts to name the crime or crimes and define

such elements in its instructions, this court has never clearly held that

such an instruction is mandatory.

Although the trial court in the present case did not name the relevant

crimes and describe the elements thereof in its instruction on first degree

burglary, the court’s instruction accurately recited the elements of the

burglary charge and offered guidance on how to interpret them, making

it clear that the intent to commit a crime within the building is a distinct

element, which lessened the chance that the jury would have improperly

found that the defendant’s unlawful entry itself was the crime he intended

to commit.

Moreover, defense counsel did not object to the part of the charge

describing the elements of burglary in the first degree or propose an

instruction that would have included the language of the intended

offense.

Furthermore, the trial court’s statement of the applicable statute did not

mislead the jury as to what evidence it could consider, and, although the

court’s instruction included an incomplete explanation of the elements

of burglary in the first degree, this court concluded that it would be a

significant departure from its precedent to hold that the trial court’s

oversight in this regard was the kind of truly extraordinary situation

contemplated by the plain error doctrine.

In addition, even if there had been a patent error in the court’s instruction,

reversal on plain error grounds would not be warranted because the

omission did not result in a manifest injustice, the evidence having

established that the defendant violently forced his way into A’s residence

and caused extensive damage therein, the court having properly

instructed the jury on the elements of first degree criminal mischief, and
the jury having necessarily concluded that the defendant had intended

to damage the tangible property of another by finding the defendant

guilty of criminal mischief.

Notwithstanding the defendant’s argument that his criminal mischief

conviction may have been based solely on the damage he caused to A’s

car outside of A’s residence, this court saw no reason why the jury would

have focused exclusively on the damage to the car and ignored the

significant destruction the defendant caused inside A’s residence, and

the fact that the prosecutor, during closing argument, directed the jury’s

attention to the criminal mischief charge and other possible intended

crimes made it less likely that the jury based its verdict on noncriminal conduct.

Argued October 25, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the

defendant with the crimes of burglary in the first degree,

criminal mischief in the first degree, and threatening

in the second degree, substitute information, in the

second case, charging the defendant with the crime

of criminal violation of a protective order, substitute

information, in the third case, charging the defendant

with the crime of tampering with a witness, and substitute information, in the fourth case, charging the defendant with the crime of attempt to commit criminal

violation of a protective order, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford and

tried to the jury before McShane, J.; verdicts and judgments of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to

the Appellate Court, Elgo, Suarez and Sullivan, Js.,

which affirmed the trial court’s judgments, and the

defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to

this court. Affirmed.

Julia K. Conlin, assigned counsel, with whom was

Emily Graner Sexton, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was Margaret E. Kelley, state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DANNEHY, J. The defendant, Kyle A., was convicted,

following a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) (burglary), as well as certain other offenses, after unlawfully

entering a residence and destroying certain property

therein. We granted certification to appeal from the

judgment of the Appellate Court affirming, inter alia,

the trial court’s judgment of conviction of burglary.1

In

the present appeal, the defendant contends that the

Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial

court had not committed plain error when it failed to

give a jury instruction identifying the crime that he

allegedly intended to commit when he unlawfully

entered or remained in the residence. We conclude that,

although the trial court’s instruction did not conform

to the language that this court has repeatedly endorsed,

the trial court did not commit plain error. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. At the time of the incident that led to his arrest

and conviction, the defendant had been living in Maryland but had made plans to move back to Connecticut.

He intended to stay at a residence in West Haven that

was owned by the defendant’s mother, J, but was in

the sole possession and control of the defendant’s

brother, A, who lived there with his daughter, who was

eight years old at the time of the incident.2

The morning after he had been expected to arrive at

the residence, the defendant called A and made statements that led A to believe that he was intoxicated. A

advised the defendant that he would not be allowed

into the home if he had been drinking because A’s

daughter was there. The defendant agreed to wait until

he was no longer intoxicated before coming to the

house. In two subsequent conversations that day, A

reiterated that the defendant could not come to the

home if he was intoxicated. During their third and final

conversation, the defendant told A that he was coming

to the house ‘‘whether [A] [liked] it or not . . . .’’

When the defendant arrived at the residence that

afternoon, only A and his girlfriend, T, were present.3

The defendant, who did not have a key, began yelling

and banging on the front door. When no one let him

in, he broke a back door window and entered the home.

A and T fled the house and sought aid from their neighbors. They then observed the defendant, who had

emerged from the house and was in the driveway,

repeatedly striking A’s car with a baseball bat.

By the time the police arrived shortly thereafter, the

defendant had gone back into the home and began

‘‘destroying things . . . .’’ When the defendant eventually came out of the house and the police were taking

him into custody, he yelled at A that he was ‘‘going to
kill [A] when [he got] out of this,’’ a threat that he

repeated later that day at the police station. Upon

investigating the interior of the home, the police discovered shards of wood that they identified as fractured

pieces of the baseball bat, as well as a television, a

ceramic tabletop, and kitchen chairs that had been

smashed.

The defendant was charged with burglary, criminal

mischief in the first degree (criminal mischief), and

threatening in the second degree (threatening) for his

actions during the confrontation. Following his arrest,

a criminal protective order was issued. The defendant

was subsequently charged with criminal violation of a

protective order, tampering with a witness, and attempt

to commit criminal violation of a protective order. At

trial, defense counsel neither requested an instruction

on the burglary charge nor objected to the proposed

instruction that the court had distributed to the parties

for review. The trial court instructed the jury on that

charge in relevant part: ‘‘[A] person is guilty of burglary

in the first degree when he unlawfully enters or remains

in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein

and he is armed with a dangerous instrument.

* * *

‘‘The second element is that the defendant unlawfully

entered or remained in the building with the intent to

commit a crime in that building. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result when his conscious objective is to cause such result. Even if the defendant never

actually committed a crime in the building, if the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that there

was such an intention, this is sufficient to prove the

defendant unlawfully entered or remained in the building with the intent to commit a crime therein. Furthermore, the necessary intent to commit a crime must be

an intent to commit either a felony or misdemeanor

in addition to the unlawful entering or remaining in

the building.’’

The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict on all

six charges pertaining to the incident at A’s residence

and the defendant’s subsequent behavior. The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Court from the

judgments of conviction. In that appeal, the defendant

claimed, among other things, that, when instructing the

jury on the second element of the crime of burglary—

that the defendant unlawfully entered or remained in

the building with the intent to commit a crime

therein—the trial court committed plain error when it

failed to identify (1) the crime the defendant allegedly

intended to commit, and (2) the elements of that crime.

See State v. Kyle A., 212 Conn. App. 239, 259–60, 274

A.3d 896 (2022).

The Appellate Court affirmed the defendant’s burglary conviction, reasoning that there was no plain error
because the alleged error did not involve a failure to

include mandatory statutory language or produce a

manifest injustice. Id., 260–63. Although the Appellate

Court noted that the trial court should have instructed

the jury in more detail on the second element, it ultimately concluded that the omission was ‘‘unlikely to

have guided the jury to an incorrect verdict . . . .’’ Id.,

262–63. In reaching that conclusion, the Appellate Court

pointed to the trial court’s direction regarding intent to

commit a felony or misdemeanor, the facts reflected in

the evidence, and the prosecutor’s suggestion during

closing argument that the facts evinced the defendant’s

intent to commit three different crimes: criminal mischief, based on his destructive behavior inside of the

home, threatening A, and assaulting A. Id., 262. This

certified appeal followed.

Before this court, the defendant renews his claim

that the trial court committed plain error by failing to

identify and explain to the jury the elements of the

crime he allegedly intended to commit while he was

inside of the house, thereby allowing the jury to craft

its own understanding of what constitutes a felony or

misdemeanor. He contends that, without more specific

guidance from the court, the jury could have decided

that any behavior it considered morally offensive—such

as his intention to confront his brother in his home—

was a crime and, therefore, improperly have found the

intent element to be satisfied on that basis. Noting that

only jury instructions carry the weight and authority of

the court, the defendant also rejects the contention that

his criminal mischief conviction, the evidence presented at trial, or the prosecutor’s references to possible

intended crimes in her closing argument could compensate for this omission. Although we share the Appellate

Court’s concerns regarding the trial court’s failure to

describe the intended crimes; State v. Kyle A., supra,

212 Conn. App. 262–63; we conclude that the defendant

has not met the exceptionally high bar for demonstrating plain error in this case.

‘‘It is well established that a defendant is entitled to

have the jury correctly and adequately instructed on

the pertinent principles of substantive law.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Singleton, 292 Conn.

734, 768, 974 A.2d 679 (2009). In the present case, to

establish that the defendant committed burglary, the

state was required to prove that he entered or remained

unlawfully in A’s residence with intent to commit a

crime therein and was armed with a dangerous instrument. See General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1).

This court has consistently observed that, when giving

a jury charge under § 53a-101 (a) (1), it is the ‘‘better

practice’’ for the trial court to instruct the jury ‘‘on the

statutory names and definitions of [the] specific crimes

for which there was sufficient evidence of an intent to

commit.’’ State v. Smith, 194 Conn. 213, 220, 479 A.2d
814 (1984); see also Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 9.2-1, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/

Criminal.pdf (last visited January 24, 2024).4 Such an

instruction informs the jury, the members of which

are rarely well versed in legal principles, exactly what

behavior is at issue and on what basis it should evaluate

it. It thereby mitigates the risk that the jury will confuse

conduct that is criminal with that which is merely unsavory. See, e.g., State v. Langdell, 187 Vt. 576, 581, 989

A.2d 556 (2009) (‘‘[w]ithout being aware of the elements

of the intended crime, a juror might mistakenly convict

a defendant on faulty assumptions about what is criminal and what is not’’).

Relying primarily on this authority, the defendant in

the present case contends that the trial court committed

plain error when it failed to instruct the jury on the

statutory names and elements of the crimes that he

allegedly intended to commit when he entered A’s residence. ‘‘[The plain error] doctrine, codified at Practice

Book § 60-5, is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that,

although unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our system of justice and

work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved

party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Blaine, 334 Conn. 298, 305, 221 A.3d 798 (2019). ‘‘It is

axiomatic that, [t]he plain error doctrine . . . is not

. . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility.

. . . Put another way, plain error review is reserved

for only the most egregious errors. When an error of

such magnitude exists, it necessitates reversal.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 813–14, 155 A.3d 209 (2017).

‘‘[I]t is not enough for the defendant simply to demonstrate that his position is correct. Rather, the party

seeking plain error review must demonstrate that the

claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.’’ State v. Coward, 292 Conn. 296, 307, 972 A.2d

691 (2009).5

‘‘An appellate court addressing a claim of plain error

first must determine if the error is indeed plain in the

sense that it is patent [or] readily discernable on the

face of a factually adequate record, [and] also . . .

obvious in the sense of not debatable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanchez, 308 Conn. 64,

77, 60 A.3d 271 (2013). ‘‘Although a complete record

and an obvious error are prerequisites for plain error

review, they are not, of themselves, sufficient for its

application. . . . [I]n addition to examining the patent

nature of the error, the reviewing court must examine

that error for the grievousness of its consequences in

order to determine whether reversal under the plain

error doctrine is appropriate.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. Thus, we employ a two-pronged test to

determine whether plain error has occurred: ‘‘the defen-
dant must establish that (1) there was ‘an obvious and

readily discernable error,’ and (2) that error ‘was so

harmful or prejudicial that it resulted in manifest injustice.’ ’’ State v. Blaine, supra, 334 Conn. 306. Our review

of the Appellate Court’s decision with respect to

whether to reverse a trial court’s judgment under the

plain error doctrine is plenary. Id., 305.

When instructing the jury on the elements of § 53a101 (a) (1), trial courts should name and define the

elements of the crimes for which there is evidence to

support a finding of an intent to commit, as the model

criminal jury instructions call for. The trial court in

the present case failed to do so. For several reasons,

however, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s omission was an obvious and indisputable error so egregious

that it ‘‘affects the fairness and integrity of and public

confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jamison, 320 Conn. 589,

596, 134 A.3d 560 (2016).

Beginning with the first prong of the standard, the

trial court’s instruction accurately recited the elements

of the burglary charge and offered guidance on how to

interpret them. The court further made clear that the

intent to commit a crime within the building is a distinct

element, thereby lessening the chance that the jury

would improperly find that the defendant’s unlawful

entry itself was the crime that he intended to commit.6

See, e.g., State v. Smith, supra, 194 Conn. 219 (noting

that ‘‘jury could not have been misled into using evidence of the defendant’s entry of and presence in the

shop building to find that the defendant intended to

commit a crime therein’’). We also observe that, although

defense counsel raised several objections during the

charging conference, he did not object to the part of

the charge describing the elements of burglary or propose an instruction that would have included the language of the intended offense.7

Additionally, although our courts have repeatedly

noted that it is the better practice for trial courts to

include the elements of the intended crime when

instructing the jury on the elements of § 53a-101 (a)

(1), to date, we have never clearly held that such an

instruction is mandatory. See, e.g., State v. Zayas, 195

Conn. 611, 618, 490 A.2d 68 (1985); State v. Smith, supra,

194 Conn. 220; State v. Patterson, 35 Conn. App. 405,

419, 646 A.2d 258, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 930, 649 A.2d

254 (1994). Moreover, although the model jury instruction reflects this language, as a general rule, we have

declined to require the use of those instructions by

trial courts and have emphasized their ‘‘discretionary’’

nature. State v. Reyes, 325 Conn. 815, 821–22 n.3, 160

A.3d 323 (2017). We therefore cannot conclude that

the trial court’s failure to identify the specific intended

crime and its elements when it instructed the jury on

the elements of § 53a-101 (a) was an indisputable, obvi-
ous error.

Finally, we emphasize that it has been especially rare

for a jury instruction to be so clearly improper that our

courts have deemed plain error review necessary to

correct it. See State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 58 n.18, 770

A.2d 908 (2001). This court has done so when the trial

court has affirmatively misstated the law; see State v.

Preyer, 198 Conn. 190, 198–200, 502 A.2d 858 (1985)

(concluding that trial court committed plain error when

it incorrectly instructed jury that cohabitation was not

defense to charge of sexual assault in first degree);

and when it has failed to comply with a statute that

mandates a particular instruction. See State v. Ruocco,

322 Conn. 796, 801–802, 144 A.3d 354 (2016) (concluding

that trial court committed plain error when it failed to

instruct jury, as required by statute, that it could not

draw unfavorable inferences from defendant’s failure

to testify). We do not suggest that there are no other

circumstances in which an instruction could constitute

plain error, but the reluctance with which we have

chosen that course underscores that plain error is

reserved for only the most egregious defects. In the

present case, the trial court’s statement of the governing

statute did not mislead the jury as to what evidence it

could consider, and the instruction included an accurate though incomplete explanation of the elements of

burglary. It would be a significant departure from this

court’s precedent to hold that the trial court’s oversight

is the kind of ‘‘truly extraordinary’’ situation contemplated by the plain error doctrine. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Jamison, supra, 320 Conn. 596.

Even if we were to conclude that there was a patent

error in the trial court’s instruction, such a conclusion

still would not warrant reversal on plain error grounds

because the court’s omission did not result in a manifest

injustice. See, e.g., State v. Blaine, supra, 334 Conn.

306 (defendant must prove both obviously and readily

discernable error and manifest injustice to prevail on

claim of plain error). In support of his claim to the contrary, the defendant argues that, unlike in State v. Zayas,

supra, 195 Conn. 618, reversal is required because the

facts of the present case are ‘‘capable of varying interpretations, some criminal but others noncriminal,

though perhaps morally offensive . . . .’’

In Zayas, the defendant was apprehended after dark

on the front porch of another person’s house, carrying

a screwdriver that matched two sets of pry marks on

the sill of a storm window that had been pushed upward.

Id., 613, 615. In its instruction to the jury, the trial

court did not specify that the defendant had intended

to commit larceny when he attempted to unlawfully

enter the house. Id., 616. The defendant argued that,

by failing to identify the intended crime suggested by

the evidence, the court had allowed the jury to find him

guilty on the basis of noncriminal conduct. Id. This
court, however, observed that ‘‘[c]ommon experience

tells us that an unlawful entry into a dwelling at night

is not without purpose,’’ noted that pry marks on a

windowsill ‘‘bespeak criminal purpose,’’ and stated that

to ‘‘any person of ordinary intelligence, the expected

by-product of a surreptitious unlawful entry into the

home of another is theft.’’8

Id., 617–18. Therefore, the

court concluded that there was no explanation for the

defendant’s behavior that would not satisfy the intent

element.9

Id., 618.

The defendant contends that, unlike the situation presented in Zayas, the evidence in the present case would

support a finding that he entered the house seeking

only to confront his brother, and the jury could have

improperly ascribed criminal intent to that conduct. To

accept this premise, however, would require this court

to ‘‘find plain error without regard to the evidence in

the case . . . .’’ State v. Sanchez, supra, 308 Conn. 84.

In the present case, the evidence established that

the defendant had violently forced his way into A’s

residence and caused extensive damage with a baseball

bat once inside. The court properly instructed the jury

on the elements of criminal mischief, and the jury found

the defendant guilty of that separate charge. By finding

the defendant guilty of criminal mischief, the jury necessarily concluded that he intended to cause damage to

the tangible property of another. See General Statutes

§ 53a-115 (a) (1). Although the defendant argues that

his criminal mischief conviction may have been based

solely on the damage he inflicted on his brother’s car

and, therefore, would not have been relevant to his

intent to commit a crime inside of the residence, we

see no reason why the jury would have focused exclusively on the damage to the car and ignored the significant destruction that the defendant wrought inside the

residence, which multiple witnesses testified exceeded

the $1500 in damages necessary to prove first degree

criminal mischief.10 The likelihood that the jury ignored

the substantial evidence of the defendant’s criminal

behavior within the home, only to determine that he

was guilty because they found that he had damaged A’s

car or found his plan to confront his brother distasteful,

is far too remote for this court to conclude that a manifest injustice occurred.

The defendant correctly observes that a trial court’s

failure to instruct the jury on an element of an alleged

crime is not cured by the presence of evidence sufficient

to secure a conviction on that charge. See State v.

Anderson, 212 Conn. 31, 37, 561 A.2d 897 (1989). This

principle, however, is inapposite to the present case

because the trial court did instruct the jury on each

element of burglary, just not with the degree of specificity that the defendant now argues was necessary. ‘‘An

omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to

be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn.

555, 563, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982). The evidence presented

at trial and the prosecutor’s references to criminal mischief and other possible intended crimes in her closing

argument do not have the same effect as an instruction

from the court, but the fact that the prosecutor directed

the jury toward considering these offenses makes it

all the less likely that the jury based its verdict on

noncriminal conduct and, consequently, that the trial

court’s omission resulted in a manifest injustice requiring reversal.

During oral argument before this court, the state

maintained that, in certain circumstances, it may be

difficult to discern the intended crime or crimes. That

may be so, but it is not the role of the jury to determine

or select a particular crime or crimes. That obligation

rests with the state. Here, the facts and circumstances

of the case and the state of our case law prevent us

from concluding that the trial court committed plain

error. In the future, however, the failure of our courts

to instruct the jury on the elements of a crime so identified by the state will constitute an obvious error that

will warrant reversal if it results in a manifest injustice.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as

amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,

Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person

protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective

order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through

whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.

1 We granted certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did

the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court’s instruction on

burglary in the first degree was not reversible error under the plain error

doctrine?’’ State v. Kyle A., 343 Conn. 930, 281 A.3d 1187 (2022).

2 We declined to grant certification on the issue of whether the state’s

evidence was insufficient to prove burglary, a claim that rested largely on

J’s testimony that she had given the defendant permission to stay at the

residence and the defendant’s contention that A could not abrogate J’s

permission for him to be there.

3 A had taken the precaution of bringing his daughter to a relative’s house.

4 The model instruction provides in relevant part: ‘‘In this case, the state

claims that the defendant intended to commit <insert crime>. <Refer to

the count in which this crime was charged or, if uncharged, give the

elements of the crime.>.’’ Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions, supra,

instruction 9.2-1.

5 This court has acknowledged that, by imposing such an exacting standard, it is ‘‘willing to take the appellate risk of sanctioning a legally flawed

trial court judgment’’ and that errors harmful enough to warrant reversal

upon plenary review may be allowed to stand under the plain error rubric.

Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 216, 682 A.2d 106 (1996).

6 The court instructed the jury that ‘‘the necessary intent to commit a

crime must be an intent to commit either a felony or a misdemeanor, in

addition to the unlawful entering or remaining in the building.’’ (Emphasis added.)

7 We appreciate that, as the defendant has sought relief under the plain

error doctrine, it is already apparent that he did not preserve this claim.

Our observation is not meant to highlight defense counsel’s failure to object

but, rather, to emphasize that the evidence in this case so overwhelmingly

supported the defendant’s criminal intent that the absence of the intended

offense from the court’s instruction did not suggest a clear and obvious error.

8 On appeal, reviewing courts may consider the evidence presented at

trial to assess whether an instruction was specific enough to provide the

jury with a clear understanding of the offense. See, e.g., State v. Zayas,
supra, 195 Conn. 617–18 (discussing adequacy of jury instruction in light of

facts of case).

9 We expressly noted that we did not approve of the trial court’s instruction, which omitted the intended offense; State v. Zayas, supra, 195 Conn.

617–18; furthermore, our holding in Zayas should not be interpreted to

mean that an instruction cannot be defective, as a matter of law, for failing

to define the intended offense. But see State v. Serrano, 91 Conn. App. 227,

245 n.13, 880 A.2d 183, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 908, 884 A.2d 1029 (2005).

10 Officer Eurico Dias of the West Haven Police Department conducted a

walkthrough of the home after the incident and estimated the damage to

be $3800. J testified that she received an insurance payout of approximately

$5000 for the damage.